原文信息：

• 标题：1963 Semi-annual Letter to Partners
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：1963-07-10
• 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
• 中文翻译参考：RanRan
• 整理：孙萧萧

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.

810 KIEWIT PLAZA

OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

July 10, 1963

During the first half of 1963, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "Dow") advanced from 652.10 to 706.88. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of $10.66 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%.

1963 年上半年，道指从 652.10 上涨到 706.88，加上 10.66 美元的股息，道指的整体收益率是 10.0%。

Our incantation has been: (1) that short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning, particularly in reference to an investment operation such as ours that devotes a portion of resources to control situations, and; (2) That our results relative to the Dow and other common-stock-form media, will be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult time just matching such media in bubbling markets.

我们又要老生常谈了：(1) 三年以下的短期业绩毫无意义，我们有一部分投资是控股类，短期业绩对我们更没意义。(2) 与道指和公募基金相比，在市场下跌时，我们能跑在前面，在市场泡沫中，我们可能望尘莫及。

Nevertheless, our first-half performance, excluding any change in Dempster valuation (and its valuation did change --I'm saving this for dessert later in the letter) was plus 14%. This 14% is computed on total net assets (not non-Dempster assets) and is after expenses, but before monthly payments (to those who take them) to partners and allocation to the General Partner. Such allocations are academic on an interim basis, but if we were also plus 14% at yearend, the first 6% would be allocated to partners according to their capital, plus three- quarters of the balance of 8% (14% -6%), or an additional 6%, giving the limited partners a plus 12% performance.

尽管如此，不算登普斯特的估值变化（其实登普斯特的估值有变化，这个好消息我留到后面再说），我们上半年的业绩是上涨 14%。14% 是按照总净资产计算出来的（包括登普斯特的资产），其中扣除了经营费用，未扣除有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。短期的分成计算只是纸面上的，如果我们年末确实上涨了 14%，则先把 6% 按照各自的本金占比分配给合伙人，再把剩下的 8% 中的四分之三，即 6%，分配给合伙人，有限合伙人合计获得 12% 的收益率。

Despite the relatively pleasant results of the first half the admonitions stated two paragraphs earlier hold in full force. At plus 14% versus plus 10% for the Dow, this six months has been a less satisfactory period than the first half of 1962 when we were minus 7.5% versus minus 21.7% for the Dow. You should completely understand our thinking in this regard which has been emphasized in previous letters.

虽说我们上半年的相对业绩喜人，第二段中的提醒仍然完全有效。我们今年上半年的业绩不如 1962 年上半年。今年上半年，我们上涨 14%，道指上涨 10%；1962 年上半年，我们下跌 7.5%，道指下跌 21.7%。这个思维方式，我们在上一封信中重点讲过了，大家必须彻底明白。

During the first half we had an average net investment in "generals" (long positions in generals minus short positions in generals) of approximately $5,275,000. Our overall gain from this net investment in generals (for a description of our investment categories see the last annual letter) was about $1,100,000 for a percentage gain from this category of roughly 21%. This again illustrates the extent to which the allocation of our resources among various categories affects short-term results. In 1962 the generals were down for the year and only an outstanding performance by both of the other two categories, "work-outs" and "controls," gave us our unusually favorable results for that year.

上半年，我们“低估类”的净投资金额（低估类中做多仓位减去做空仓位）约为 5,275,000 美元。低估类净投资带来的整体收益是 1,100,000 美元，低估类收益率约为 21%（关于我们的三种投资类别，请参考去年的年度信）。这再次证明我们在各个类别中的配置会影响短期业绩。1962 年，低估类是亏损的，因为套利类和控制类表现出色，我们才能取得不俗的收益率。

Now this year, our work-outs have done poorer than the Dow and have been a drag on performance, as they are expected to be in rising markets. While it would be very nice to be 100% in generals in advancing markets and 100% in work-outs in declining markets, I make no attempt to guess the course of the stock market in such a manner. We consider all three of our categories to be good businesses on a long-term basis, although their short- term price behavior characteristics differ substantially in various types of markets. We consider attempting to gauge stock market fluctuations to be a very poor business on a long-term basis and are not going to be in it, either directly or indirectly through the process of trying to guess which of our categories is likely to do best in the near future.

今年，套利类的收益不如道指，拖累了我们的业绩，这种情况在市场上涨时很正常。在市场上涨时，100% 持有低估类，在市场下跌时，100% 持有套利类，那当然好了，但是我不猜测市场走势来安排仓位。我们觉得，从长期来看，我们的三类投资都很赚钱，虽然在不一样的市场行情中，它们的短期价格表现迥然不同。我们认为，从长期来看，揣测市场波动赚不着钱，我们不猜涨跌，不直接猜，也不间接猜。猜测哪一类投资短期内表现最好，就属于间接猜。

Shown below are the usual statistics on a cumulative basis for the Dow and Buffett Partnership. Ltd. (including predecessor partnerships) as well as for the two largest open-end (mutual funds) and two largest closed-end investment companies following a diversified common-stock investment policy:

与往常一样，下表是道指、我们的合伙基金（包括先前的合伙人账户）、两家最大的开放式基金以及两家最大的分散投资股票的封闭式投资公司的复合收益率对比情况。

Footnotes :

备注：

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。 

(2) From 1963 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62. Estimated for first half 1963.

(2) 来源：1963 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62。1963 年上半年数据为估算值。 

(3) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

(3) 1957-61 年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。 

(4) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.

(4) 1957-61 年的数据以前一列合伙基金收益率为基础，按照当前合伙协议计算，扣除了普通合伙人分成。

The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality, etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market.

大基金费用高昂、地位尊崇，道指是无人管理的一揽子蓝筹股，但是我们从业绩对比中可以看出来，大基金始终跟不上指数。投资顾问、信托部门和大基金的方法、逻辑类似，业绩也差不多。我不是要批评这些机构。这些投资途径为数千万投资者提供了大量服务，包括高度分散、方便省心、避开劣质股等，但是它们的服务不包括（绝大部分基金也没承诺）以高于大盘的收益率让资金复利增长。

Our partnership's fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly cannot represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don't achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation.

归根到底，我们合伙投资是为了什么？就是为了与一般投资途径相比，我们能以更低的长期本金损失风险，实现更高的复利。我们保证不了一定能实现这个目标。我们能肯定的、能保证的是，在相当长的一段时间内，只要不是投机热潮无休无止，如果我们还实现不了这个目标，我们就清盘。

In our most recent annual letter, I described Harry Bottle as the “man of the year”. If this was an understatement.

在上一封年度信中，我称赞哈里·博特尔 (Harry Bottle) 是“年度之星”。哈里岂止是年度之星？

Last year Harry did an extraordinary job of converting unproductive assets into cash which we then, of course, began to invest in undervalued securities. Harry has continued this year to turn under-utilized assets into cash, but in addition, he has made the remaining needed assets productive. Thus we have had the following transformation in balance sheets during the last nineteen months:

去年，哈里出色地将效益低下的资产变现，我们随后就把这些现金投资，买了低估的股票。今年，哈里继续变卖效率低下的资产，留下来的资产效益也更好了。经过他 19 个月的努力，登普斯特的资产负债表发生了质变：

November 30, 1961 (000’s omitted)1

1961 年 11 月 30 日（单位：千美元）1

November 30, 1962 (000’s omitted)

1962 年 11 月 30 日（单位：千美元）

November 30, 1963 (000’s omitted) 

I have included above the conversion factors we have previously used in valuing Dempster for B.P.L. purposes to reflect estimated immediate sale values of non-earning assets.

我们以前给登普斯特估值时，针对各个资产负债表项目使用了不同的折价率，不考虑资产的盈利能力，估算它的短期清算价值。

As can be seen, Harry has converted the assets at a much more favorable basis than was implied by my valuations. This largely reflects Harry's expertise and, perhaps, to a minor degree my own conservatism in valuation.

报表中列出了我们使用的折价率。如报表所示，哈里变现资产得到的价值比我的估值高得多。这说明我的估值比较保守，但主要得益于哈里的能力。

As can also be seen, Dempster earned a very satisfactory operating profit in the first half (as well as a substantial unrealized gain in securities) and there is little question that the operating business, as now conducted, has at least moderate earning power on the vastly reduced assets needed to conduct it. Because of a very important- seasonal factor and also the presence of a tax carry forward, however, the earning power is not nearly what might be inferred simply by a comparison of the 11/30/62 and 6/30/63 balance sheets. Partly because of this seasonality, but more importantly, because of possible developments in Dempster before 1963 yearend, we have left our Dempster holdings at the same $51.26 valuation used at yearend 1962 in our figures for B.P.L’s first half. However, I would be very surprised if it does not work out higher than this figure at yearend.

One sidelight for the fundamentalists in our group: B.P.L. owns 71.7% of Dempster acquired at a cost of $1,262,577.27. On June 30, 1963 Dempster had a small safe deposit box at the Omaha National Bank containing securities worth $2,028,415.25. Our 71.7% share of $2,028,415.25 amounts to $1,454,373.70. Thus, everything above ground (and part of it underground) is profit. My security analyst friends may find this a rather primitive method of accounting, but I must confess that I find a bit more substance in this fingers and toes method than in any prayerful reliance that someone will pay me 35 times next year's earnings.

我再给喜欢基本面分析的合伙人讲个好玩的：合伙基金拥有登普斯特 71.7% 的股份，成本是 1,262,577.27 美元。1963 年 6 月 30 日，登普斯特在奥马哈国民银行 (Omaha National Bank) 有个小保险箱，里面存着价值 2,028,415.25 美元的证券。我们拥有这 2,028,415.25 美元的 71.7%，即 1,454,373.70 美元。所以公司土地上面（还有一部分在地下）的所有东西都是我们赚的。我的证券分析师朋友们可能觉得我这个会计方法太原始了，说真的，我还是愿意用我这样数手指头和脚趾头的方法，不想痴痴地指望别人明年会给我开出个 35 倍市盈率的报价，还是我原始的方法更靠谱些。

We accept advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to convert the payment to a partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the intent at the time of payment.

我们接受合伙人以及潜在合伙人预先存入资金，并从资金存入之日起到年末支付 6% 的利息。合伙人没有责任在年末将存入的资金转为合伙基金权益，但是在预先存入基金时应当有意向在年末转为基金权益。

Similarly, we allow partners to withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to yearend and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until yearend when it is charged against their capital account. Again, it is not intended that partners use us like a bank, but that they use the withdrawal right for unanticipated need for funds.

我们同样允许合伙人在年末之前预先提取资金，最高取款金额为其合伙基金账户资金的 20%，并从资金提取之日起到年末收取 6% 的利息，利息扣除时间为年末。这不是要把合伙基金变成合伙人的银行，而是通过允许预先提取资金，满足合伙人的紧急资金需求。

The willingness to both borrow and lend at 6% may seem "un-Buffett-like.” We look at the withdrawal right as a means of giving some liquidity for unexpected needs and, as a practical matter, are reasonably sure it will be far more than covered by advance payments.

存贷款利率都是 6%，看起来不是我巴菲特的风格。实际上，我们允许预先取出资金，是为了方便急需用钱的合伙人周转，而且我们也相信，预先存入资金金额会远远超过预先提取金额。

Why then the willingness to pay 6% for advance payment money when we can borrow from commercial banks at substantially lower rates? For example, in the first half we obtained a substantial six-month bank loan at 4%. The answer is that we expect on a long-term basis to earn better than 6% (the general partner's allocation is zero unless we do although it is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure in any short period)3. Moreover, I can adopt a different attitude in the investment of money that can be expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on short-term borrowed money. The advance payments have the added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new money over the year, rather than having it hit us all at once in January. On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short-term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable. On June 30, 1963 we had advance withdrawals of $21,832.00 and advance payments of $562,437.11.

我们能从商业银行获得利率更低的贷款，为什么还要为预先存入资金支付 6% 的利率？上半年我们从银行获得了一笔六个月期限的大额贷款，利率才 4%。原因有两点：第一，我们相信我们的长期收益率会高于 6%（短期内能否超过 6% 有很大偶然性，长期来看，达不到这个目标，普通合伙人一分钱分成都没有）。第二，提前存入的资金，在可以预见的短期内能成为我们的权益资本，我将这些资金用于投资，和使用短期银行贷款相比，可以有不一样的心态。提前存入资金对我们还有个好处，我们不必在 1 月份集中收到大量资金，而是可以在一年中分批收到追加投资。对合伙人来说，6% 的利率比任何短期低风险投资收益率都高，我们这是互惠互利。1963 年 6 月 30 日，我们的预先提取资金金额是 21,832.00 美元，预先存入资金金额是 562,437.11 美元。

There is some possibility that we may have fairly substantial realized gains this year. Of course, this may not materialize at all and actually does not have anything to do with our investment performance this year. I am an outspoken advocate of paying large amounts of income taxes -- at low rates. A tremendous number of fuzzy, confused investment decisions are rationalized through so-called "tax considerations.”

今年我们有可能有大笔已实现收益。这笔收益也可能根本不会实现，也和我们今年的投资业绩毫无关系。所得税交的越多越好，我绝对愿意多交所得税，只是要享受低税率。考虑所谓的税收因素，人们做了许多模棱两可、糊里糊涂的投资决策。

My net worth is the market value of holdings less the tax payable upon sale. The liability is just as real as the asset unless the value of the asset declines (ouch), the asset is given away (no comment), or I die with it. The latter course of action would appear to at least border on a Pyrrhic victory.

我的资产净值是持仓市值减去出售时的应付税款。资产是实实在在的，负债也是一分钱都少不了，除非资产价值下降（疼啊）、把资产捐赠出去（不评论），或者我把钱留到死。最后的这个方法怎么都有点惨胜的意味。

Investment decisions should be made on the basis of the most probable compounding of after-tax net worth with minimum risk. Any isolation of low-basis securities merely freezes a portion of net worth at a compounding factor identical with the assets isolated. While this may work out either well or badly in individual cases, it is a nullification of investment management. The group experience holding various low basis securities will undoubtedly approximate group experience on securities as a whole, namely compounding at the compounding rate of the Dow. We do not consider this the optimum in after-tax compounding rates.

我以前和大家说过，如果来自合伙基金的盈利可能占你应税总收入的很大一部分，在做今年的纳税估算时，可以使用去年的实际纳税金额，这样比较稳妥，不会受罚。不管怎样，63 年 1 月 1 日新加入的合伙人需要交的税很少，因为我们的合伙协议规定先将资本利得分配给拥有未实现增值的合伙人。

As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest to me by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the partnership agreement, commitment letter for 1964, estimate of the 1963 tax situation, etc.

和往年一样，我们将在 11 月 1 日左右（向合伙人以及有意在 11 月 1 日前后加入的准合伙人）寄出修订版合伙协议、1964 年承诺书以及 1963 年纳税估算数据等文件。

My closing plea for questions regarding anything not clear always draws a blank. Maybe no one reads this far. Anyway, the offer is still open.

在每封信最后，我都请各位合伙人提问，总是收不到回音，可能根本没人读到这。无论如何，我还是随时乐意回答大家的任何疑问。

Cordially,

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦 E. 巴菲特谨上