1975-10-14 Warren Buffett.PENSIONS
There are two aspects of the pension cost problem upon which management can have a significant impact: (1) maintaining rational control over pension plan promises to employees and (2) increasing investment returns on pension plan assets.
养老金成本问题有两个方面是管理层可以产生重大影响的：（1）对员工养老金计划承诺保持理性控制；（2）提高养老金资产的投资回报率。
The Irreversible Nature of Pension Promises
养老金承诺的不可逆性
To control promises rationally, it is necessary to understand the basic arithmetic and practical rules governing pension plans.
要理性控制养老金承诺，必须理解养老金计划的基本数学逻辑和实际运作规则。
The first thing to recognize, with every pension benefit decision, is that you almost certainly are playing for keeps and won't be able to reverse your decision subsequently if it produces subnormal profitability.
在做出任何养老金福利决定时，首先要认识到，你几乎肯定是在“终局下注”——一旦决定导致盈利低于预期，事后几乎无法反悔。
As a practical matter, it is next to impossible to decrease pension benefits in a large profitable company - or even a large marginal one.The plan may embody language unequivocally declaring the company's right to terminate at any time and providing that contributions shall be solely at the option of the company.But the law has eroded much of the significance such "out" clauses were presumed to have, and operating practicalities render any residual rights to terminate moot.
从实际操作来看，几乎不可能在一家大型盈利公司——甚至是一家大型边际盈利公司中削减养老金福利。养老金计划可能在文本中明确声明公司有随时终止的权利，且缴费完全由公司决定。但现实是，法律已经大幅削弱了这类“免责条款”的实际效力，而运营上的实际障碍也让公司即便保有部分终止权，也形同虚设。
So, rule number one regarding pension costs has to be to know what you are getting into before signing up. Look before you leap.There probably is more managerial ignorance on pension costs than any other cost item of remotely similar magnitude.And, as will become so expensively clear to citizens in future decades, there has been even greater electorate ignorance of governmental pension costs.Actuarial thinking simply is not intuitive to most minds.The lexicon is arcane, the numbers seem unreal, and making promises never quite triggers the visceral response evoked by writing a check.
因此，养老金成本的第一条规则是：签字前务必弄清楚自己正在承诺什么。三思而后行。在所有可比规模的成本项目中，养老金成本恐怕是管理者最缺乏认知的。而且未来几十年，公众将付出昂贵代价才会意识到：对政府养老金成本的无知更为严重。对大多数人来说，精算思维根本不直观。精算术语艰涩难懂，数字看上去脱离现实，而作出承诺远不会像“写支票”那样引发人的直觉反应。
In no other managerial area can such huge aggregate liabilities - which will be reflected in progressively increasing annual costs and cash requirements - be created so quickly and with so little immediate financial pain.Like pressroom labor practices, small errors will compound. Care and caution are in order.
在其他任何管理领域，都几乎不存在可以如此迅速制造出巨大总负债的情况——而这些负债将在未来多年持续以年度成本和现金需求的形式显现，却几乎没有即时的财务疼痛感。就像印刷厂的用工习惯那样，小错误会不断积累并放大，因此必须格外小心谨慎。
Deceptive Arithmetic of "Promise Now - Pay Later"
“先承诺，后付款”的欺骗性数学逻辑
If you promise to pay me $500 per month for life, you have just expended - actuarially but, nevertheless, in a totally tangible sense - about $65,000. If you are financially good for such a lifetime promise, you would be better off (if I have an average expectancy regarding longevity for one my age) handing me a check for $50,000. But it wouldn't feel the same.
如果你承诺每月给我支付500美元终身养老金，从精算角度看，你就已经支出约65,000美元——虽然这是个精算数值，但其现实意义非常具体明确。如果你确实有能力履行这样的终身承诺，那你还不如（假设我寿命符合同龄人平均水平）直接写一张50,000美元的支票给我。但心理上，这种做法并不会让你产生相同的感觉。
And, if you promise to pay me 1,000 hamburgers a month for life which, superficially, may sound equivalent to the previous proposition (assuming a present hamburger price of 500, you have created an obli¬gation which, in an inflationary world, becomes most difficult to evaluate. This creates a risk we talk of later as an "earthquake risk". One thing is certain. You won't find an insurance company willing to take the 1,000-hamburgers-a-month obligation off your hands for \$65,000 - or even \$130,000. While hamburgers equate to 50 now, the promise to pay hamburgers in the future does not equate to the promise to pay fifty-eent pieces in the future.
如果你答应终身每月给我 1,000 个汉堡，表面上看似与之前的提议（假设目前汉堡价格为 0.50 美元）等价，你实际上在通胀环境下创造了一项难以评估的义务。这就产生了我们后面将要讨论的“地震风险”。有一点是确定的：你不会找到任何保险公司愿意花 65,000 美元——甚至 130,000 美元——来替你承担这项每月 1,000 个汉堡的义务。虽然现在一个汉堡相当于 0.50 美元，但承诺将来支付汉堡，并不等同于承诺将来支付 50 美分硬币。
So, before plans are introduced or amended, the financial consequences (particularly in a world of significant inflation which I believe to be close to a certainty)\* should be clearly understood by you. Con¬sulting actuaries are very good at making calculations. They are frequently terrible at making the assumptions upon which the calcula-tions are based. In fact, they well may be peculiarly ill-equipped to make the most important assumptions if the world is one of economic discontinuities. They are trained to be conventional. Their self-interest in obtaining and retaining business would be ill-served if they were to become more than mildly unconventional. And being con¬ventional on the crucial assumptions basically means accepting histor¬ical experience adjusted by a moderate nudge from current events.
因此，在引入或修改任何计划之前，你必须清楚了解其财务后果（特别是在一个我认为极有可能出现显著通胀的世界里）。精算顾问在计算方面非常擅长，但在对计算所依据的假设做出判断时，往往表现得糟糕至极。事实上，如果经济环境出现断裂，他们在制定最重要假设方面很可能显得特别不具备能力。他们的训练使他们趋于保守，而他们为了获取并保留业务的私利，也不大可能做出过于非传统的假设。在关键假设方面保持保守，基本上意味着接受历史经验，并根据当前事件做适度调整。
这些人都没有定性分析的能力。
This works fine in forecasting such factors as mortality and morbidity, works reasonably well on items such as employee turnover, and can be a disaster in estimating the two most important elements of the pension cost equation, which are fund earnings and salary escalation.
这种做法在预测死亡率和发病率等因素时效果很好，在预测员工流动率等项目时也相当可行，但在估算养老金成本方程中最重要的两个因素——资产收益率和工资增长——时，却可能导致灾难性的结果。
Illustrated Elemental Actuarial Principles
说明基本的精算原则
To illustrate a few actuarial principles worth understanding, but without employing the technical jargon and the asterisks, let's use the example of your household. Assume that you, personally, make irrevocable promises to pay pensions of \$300 per month for life after they reach 65 to, say, four household employees. To make it easy, let's say that they each are 55 years of age at present. If you make that promise today, you have reduced your net worth today by about $70,000. (For simplicity's sake, I am ignoring some variables such as sex of employees - women live longer and therefore cost more -death before 65, etc. In calculating such factors the actuaries shine.)
为了说明一些值得理解的精算原则，但不使用专业术语和注释，我们以你家庭为例。假设你个人做出不可撤销的承诺，当家中四名雇员达到 65 岁后，终身每月支付他们 300 美元的养老金。为了简单起见，假设他们目前均为 55 岁。如果你今天做出该承诺，你的净资产将减少大约 70,000 美元。（为简化起见，我忽略了一些变量，例如雇员的性别——女性寿命更长因此成本更高——65 岁前死亡等。在计算这些因素时，精算师表现出色。）
My views regarding inflationary possibilities are more extreme than those of most respected observers. It is difficult to substantiate a dogmatic view, since conclusions rest more upon social and political judgments than upon economic training and analysis. You should recognize the subjective nature of the reasoning leading to my pessimistic conclusions regarding inflation over the longer term -- and not be reluctant to correct accordingly.
我对通胀可能性的看法比大多数受人尊敬的观察者要极端得多。很难用确凿的证据来证明这一绝对观点，因为结论更多地基于社会和政治判断，而非经济学训练和分析。你应当认识到，我关于长期通胀悲观结论所依据的推理具有主观性——并且不要犹豫，根据需要对其进行修正。
Why are you immediately \$70,000 poorer? Well, if you set aside a \$70,000 fund now and invest it at 7% interest - and let all such interest remain in the fund to be compounded - the principal value of the fund will grow to about \$140,000 in ten years when your employees reach 65. And to buy them a lifetime annuity of \$3,600 per year will then cost about \$35,000 each, utilizing the entire accumulated capital of the fund. So if you make the promise and it is binding - legally or morally - figure you have spent today \$70,000, even though you don't have to pay out a dime of cash for ten years.
为什么你马上会损失 70,000 美元？因为如果你现在拨出一笔 70,000 美元的资金，并以 7% 的利率进行投资——并让所有这部分利息留在基金中进行复利——那么在十年后当你的员工到达 65 岁时，该基金的本金将增长到大约 140,000 美元。而那时为他们购买每年 3,600 美元的终身年金将需要约 35,000 美元每人，恰好动用基金累积的全部资本。因此，如果你做出了该承诺并且该承诺具有法律或道德约束力，就等于你今天花费了 70,000 美元，尽管在未来十年内你无需支出一分钱现金。
Now take it one step further and assume that your employees each are earning \$600 per month but, instead of promising them \$300 per month upon retirement, you promise them 50% of their salary at the time they retire. If their increases run 7.2% per year - and they probably will in the world I foresee - they will be earning \$1,200 per month by the time they reach 65. And it will now cost you \$70,000 each to purchase annuities for them to fulfill your promise. The actual cost, today, of modifying your promise from 50% of present pay to 50% of terminal pay was to exactly double the fund that needed to be set aside now from \$70,000 to \$140,000.
现在再进一步，假设你的每位员工目前每月收入为 600 美元，但你并不承诺他们退休后每月 300 美元，而是承诺给他们退休时当月薪资的 50%。如果他们的薪资年增幅是 7.2%——而在我预见的世界里，很可能会如此——那么当他们到达 65 岁时，月薪将达到 1,200 美元。此时，为兑现该承诺而为每位员工购买年金的费用将是 70,000 美元。也就是说，今天你若要将承诺从“退休时给 50% 现有薪资”改为“退休时给 50% 末期薪资”，所需预留的基金就要从 70,000 美元恰好增加到 140,000 美元。
Many pension plans use final average pay (usually the average of the last five years, or the highest consecutive five years in the last ten years employed) and some use career average pay. I am not arguing here which should be used, but am illustrating the dramatic difference in costs that can occur because of rather minor-appearing changes in wording.
许多养老计划采用末期平均薪资（通常指最后五年薪资的平均，或过去十年中薪资最高的连续五年平均），也有一些采用职业生涯平均薪资。我在此并不讨论哪种方式更合适，而是要说明，仅因措辞看似微小的变化，成本就可能出现显著差异。
Pension costs in a labor intensive business clearly can be of major size and an important variable in the cost picture, particularly in a world characterized by high rates of inflation. I emphasize the latter factor to the point of redundancy because most managements I know - and virtually all elected officials in the case of governmental plans - simply never fully grasp the magnitude of liabilities they are incurring by relatively painless current promises. In many cases in the public area the bill in large part will be handed to the next generation, to be paid by increased taxes or by accelerated use of the printing press. But in a corporation the bill will have to be paid out of current and future revenues - with interest - and frequently with what is, in effect, a cost-of-living escalator.
在劳动密集型企业中，养老金成本显然可能非常庞大，并且是成本构成中的重要变量，尤其是在一个通胀率很高的世界里。我反复强调后者这一因素，因为我认识的大多数管理层——以及几乎所有制定政府养老计划的民选官员——根本无法充分理解他们因相对无痛的当前承诺而承担的巨大负债。在公共领域的许多情况下，这笔账单在很大程度上将转嫁给下一代，由增加税收或加速印钞来偿付。但在企业中，这笔账单必须从当前和未来的收入中支付——带有利息——而且往往还附带一种实质上的生活成本调整机制。
The "Earthquake Risk"
“地震风险”
In Germany, in the great inflation of the early 1920s, the entire Daimler Benz (Mercedes) Automobile Company was selling in the mar-ket for the price of 300 motor cars. Almost all past investments were nearly worthless, and current salary levels were astronomical in relation to past history. Under such conditions, or conditions far short of such an extreme, the burden of any pension benefits owed by a business, which are based on current salary levels though related to much earlier service in employment, must be backed almost exclus-ively by the current value (earning power) of the business. Advance funding simply evaporates.
在德国，二十世纪二十年代初的大通货膨胀期间，整个戴姆勒·奔驰（梅赛德斯）汽车公司在市场上的售价相当于 300 辆汽车的价格。几乎所有既有投资都几乎一文不值，而当前的薪资水平相对于历史而言已高得离谱。在这种情况下，或即便远未达到如此极端水平，企业所负担的任何基于现行薪资水平但与更早期任职服务相关的养老金福利，都必须几乎完全由企业当前的价值（盈利能力）来支持。预先的资金筹措就会彻底蒸发。
For example, assume that salaries (and the cost of living) are moving upward at 25% per year and the pension fund is earning 10% per
year - a set of assumptions not ridiculously different from what exists in England at the moment. Under such conditions, funds put aside for retirement immediately begin to shrink in relation to prom-ised benefits. Every month fewer hamburgers can be purchased from the funds contributed to the pension plan - even after accumulating dividends and interest on the funds.
例如，假设薪资（以及生活成本）以每年 25% 的速度上涨，而养老金基金的收益率为每年 10%——这一假设与现今英国的状况也并非天差地别。在这种情况下，为退休预留的资金在与承诺的福利相比时会立即开始缩水。即便在基金累计了红利和利息之后，每个月从养老金计划中拿出的那笔资金也只能购买越来越少的汉堡。
Almost no one chooses to think about this sort of "earthquake risk" in dealing with pension plans, any more than people choose to spend much time thinking about nuclear war. It may be my earlier-mentioned bias, or my mathematical bent, but I believe some "unthinkable" inflation-related calculations should be made - and even considered before any company assumes open-ended pension obligations guaranteeing a large number of persons absolute protection against inflation by gearing benefits without limit to final pay or escalating benefits to persons already retired, based on changes in the cost of living.
几乎没有人在处理养老金计划时会去考虑这种“地震风险”，就像人们不会花很多时间去思考核战争一样。这或许是我先前提到的偏见，或是我对数学的倾向，但我认为应当进行一些“不可想象”的通胀相关计算——甚至在任何公司承担开放式养老金义务、以无限制地将福利与末期薪资挂钩或根据生活费变动对已退休人员的福利进行升级之前，都应该对此进行审慎考量。
最早发现地震震级频率服从幂律分布的是本诺·古登堡（Beno Gutenberg）和查尔斯·里克特（Charles F. Richter）。他们在 1944 年提出的 Gutenberg–Richter 定律（log N = a – b M）揭示了地震震级 M 与其发生次数 N 之间的幂律关系。
Thus, the really devastating possibility regarding private pension plans is sustained double-digit inflation. When salaries move ahead at a substantially higher rate than investment returns and benefits are tied to final salaries (or, even more expensively, cost-of-living increases after retirement as in recent rubber and aluminum eontracts), it is virtually impossible to pre-fund obligations. Like it or not, you become much like the Social Security Fund, absent the power to tax. Should that occur, future purchasers of the products of the company must be willing to do so at prices that reflect not only the wages of current workers, but the promises to past workers. Some businesses will have economic characteristics allowing them to pass along these costs, but others will have major troubles. On balance, I believe we are in relatively favorable businesses under such circumstances. I do not believe this problem can be solved by the investment process. I mention it for completeness, not because I have answers - and to urge caution in making pension benefit prom-ises subject to dramatic escalation through substantial attrition in the purchasing power of money.
因此，私营养老金计划真正具有毁灭性影响的可能性在于持续的两位数通胀。当薪资增长率大幅超过投资回报率，而福利又与末期薪资挂钩（或更昂贵地与退休后生活费挂钩，如近期的橡胶和铝业合同所规定），那么几乎不可能提前筹集足够资金来履行义务。不管你愿不愿意，在这种情况下你会很像社会保障基金，但却不具备税收权力。如果真的出现这种情况，公司产品的未来购买者就必须愿意以不仅反映当前员工薪资，还反映对过去员工承诺的价格购买商品。有些企业具备将这些成本转嫁给客户的经济特性，但其他企业则会面临重大困境。总体而言，我认为，我们在这种环境下从事的业务相对有利。我并不认为投资过程能够解决此问题。我提到它仅是为了完整性，而不是因为我有答案——并提醒大家在做出可能因货币购买力大幅下降而急剧升级的养老金福利承诺时务必谨慎。
Now let's look at funding and investment behavior appropriate to an economic world at least reasonably similar to the past, recognizing that such a world is far from a certainty.
现在让我们来看看在一个至少与过去大致相似的经济环境中，适当的资金筹措和投资行为，当然也要认识到这样的环境并非必然发生。
The Investment Management Problem Inherent in All Pension Plans
所有养老金计划固有的投资管理问题
Once having committed to provide pensions, how do we pay? The law and prudent business practice mandate that we start putting aside funds on a fairly orderly and consistent basis from which we can ful¬fill our promises. In this manner we pay the employee currently while he is being productive for the company, and we simultaneously set up a savings account (collectively, not individually) which will accumulate at interest so as to purchase an annuity (not actually "purchased" in most plans, of course, just assured by the pension fund) for him at retirement which will discharge our promise to pay him throughout his non-productive years. Thus, our current cost and current cash requirements (if our estimates are accurate as to what we will earn on the savings account as well as other estimates regarding turnover, salary escalation, longevity, etc.) will reflect his total lifetime employment costs to us spread rather evenly over his productive years.
既然已经承诺提供养老金，那我们如何支付？法律和审慎的商业惯例都要求我们以相当有序且一致的方式开始拨备资金，以便我们能够兑现承诺。通过这种方式，我们在员工为公司创造价值期间向其支付报酬，同时我们还设立一个储蓄账户（集体的，而非个人的），该账户将积累利息，以便在其退休时为其购买年金（当然，在大多数计划中并非真正“购买”，而是由养老金基金予以保障），从而履行我们在其无生产力阶段向其支付的承诺。因此，我们的当前成本和当前现金需求（如果我们对储蓄账户的收益以及员工流动率、薪资增长、寿命等其他估计准确无误）将体现其整个职业生涯成本，并相对平均地分布在其创造价值的年份里。
(This advance funding treatment, matching full current costs against current production, contrasts with the Social Security Plan's pro¬gram which essentially taxes current producers to pay current non-producers. This simply means moving a portion of current national output of goods and services over from those who produced it to those who are non-producing, and to whom promises have been made. If such a system had been in effect for a very long time, the demographic profile remained fairly constant, the promises remained fairly constant, and there was no inflation, the net effect from such a pay-as-you-go approach would not substantially differ from an advance funding basis. However, these conditions do not exist which may make for various problems - including some that exacerbate inflation and thus have negative fall-out for the economics of private plans.)
（这种预先筹集资金的处理方式，将全部当前成本与当前生产相匹配，这与社会保障计划的模式形成对比。后者本质上是对当前生产者征税，以支付当前不生产者的费用。这仅仅意味着将部分当前国民生产的商品和服务从生产者转移给已做出承诺但不再生产的人。如果这种制度长时间运行下去，人口结构保持相对稳定，承诺保持相对不变，且不存在通货膨胀，那么这种现收现付模式与预先筹集资金的基础方式在净效应上并无实质差异。然而，这些条件并不具备，因此会带来各种问题——包括加剧通胀，从而对私人计划的经济性产生负面影响。）
Because a business corporation, unlike the Federal government, has to create a "savings account" -- an investment accumulating and investment management operation of some sort -- to properly fund its pension plan, it must make investment management decisions with respect to pension plan assets.
由于一家商业公司与联邦政府不同，必须设立一个“储蓄账户”——即某种形式的投资积累和投资管理运作——以适当为其养老金计划提供资金，因此必须就养老金计划资产做出投资管理决策。
The History of Corporate Pension Plan Management Act One - The Awakening
企业养老金计划管理的历史 第一幕——觉醒
A few decades ago pensions were a relatively new thing at most companies, so that the "savings accounts" were in their formative stages and therefore much smaller. Furthermore, promises were fractions of those presently made, so that the amount eventually required in the savings account to purchase the required annuity at retirement was correspondingly smaller.
数十年前，养老金对于大多数公司而言还是一件相对新颖的事物，因此“储蓄账户”正处于形成阶段，规模也相对较小。此外，当时的承诺金额仅为当前承诺金额的一小部分，因此，为了在退休时购买所需年金而在储蓄账户中最终需要的金额也相应较少。
Thus the amounts paid into pension funds ("savings accounts") were largely forgotten so far as managerial responsibility was concerned until the great awakening of the 1960s. At that time managements noticed:
因此，就管理责任而言，直到 1960 年代的“大觉醒”之前，向养老金基金（“储蓄账户”）缴纳的金额在很大程度上都被遗忘了。那时，管理层注意到：
(1) The funds had grown to the point where they sometimes were 25% to 50% of the net worth of the company - often making the assets employed in the savings account larger than those em-ployed in the company's largest division. Here are a few figures which I have handy from year-end 1972:
这些基金已增长到有时占公司净资产的 25% 到 50%，往往使得储蓄账户中使用的资产比公司最大业务部门所使用的资产还要多。以下是我手头上 1972 年年终的一些数字：
So, while U. S. Steel had a visible $3.6 billion in net operating assets which management probably spent 99% plus of their business hours thinking about, they had $2.2 billion in the "bank", whose economic results would impact future values for the shareholders, dollar for dollar, with the economic results of the steel assets. There literally were years when the savings account earned more than was earned out of all operating assets of the steel business. (In fairness to U. S. Steel, it should be mentioned that they were one of the pioneers in recognizing the importance of pension assets - and have done a better-than-average job through in-house management.)
因此，尽管美国钢铁公司名义上拥有 36 亿美元的净运营资产，其管理层可能将超过 99% 的工作时间都集中在这些资产上，但他们在“银行”里还有 22 亿美元，这部分资产的经济成果将与钢铁资产的经济效果逐美金对美金地影响未来的股东价值。事实上，有些年份里，储蓄账户的收益甚至超过了钢铁业务所有运营资产的收益。（公平地说，美国钢铁公司是最早认识到养老金资产重要性的大公司之一——并且通过内部管理在这方面做得比平均水平要好。）
(2) The returns actually realized on the "savings account" had an enormous impact on costs. A sustained 1% change in earning rate could easily swing the annual cost to the contributing company by 15%.
“储蓄账户”实际实现的收益对成本产生了巨大的影响。若收益率持续变动 1%，就足以使供款公司的年度成本轻松波动 15%。
(3) During a period when equities had produced fabulous returns, many of the plans had been invested largely in bonds - which not only bore low fixed rates of 3% to 5% in the earlier periods, but also had suffered significant shrinkages in market values as interest rates increased secularly. (If interest rates go up, bond prices must go down - and if the bonds are long-term and the rates rise sharply, prices go into a power dive.)
在股票曾带来惊人回报的时期，许多计划的大部分资金却主要投资于债券——这些债券不仅在早期阶段的固定利率很低，仅为 3% 至 5%，还随着利率长期上升而遭受了市值大幅缩水。（如果利率上升，债券价格必然下跌——尤其是当债券期限较长且利率急剧攀升时，价格会急速暴跌。）
(4) Many managements thus saw their largest division earning dismal rates of return with substantial market value shrinkage in the bond component, while all around them high returns were being realized from stocks with little apparent effort or talent. If a company had \$100 million invested in its engine division earning 12% by managerial zeal and ingenuity, why tolerate \$100 million in its pension fund "division" poking along at only 11% because of inattention - particularly when increasing the \$100 million to some larger figure would have the same impact in future earnings for owners as raising margins on engines. Intensive effort on production, research and sales might only produce an increase from 12% to 13% in the engine area, since decisions already had been so near to optimal, but it was easy to imagine 0 becoming 10% in the pension fund area if just average results were attained in equity investment. And, of course, who would settle for being just average?
因此，许多管理层看到，他们最大部门的回报率惨淡，而债券部分的市值也大幅缩水；与此同时，周围的股票却在几乎不需额外努力或专门才能的情况下实现了高额回报。如果一家公司的发动机部门通过管理的热忱和创造力投资 1 亿美元能赚取 12% 的收益，那么为什么要容忍养老金“部门”也投资 1 亿美元，却因疏于管理只挣取 11% 呢？尤其是当将这 1 亿美元增加到更大数额，对未来业主收益的影响与提高发动机利润率是一样的。因为决策已经接近最优，专注于生产、研发和销售可能只能将发动机部门的回报率从 12% 提高到 13%，但只要在股票投资方面达到平均水平，就很容易想象养老金领域的收益率从 0 跃升至 10%。当然，又有谁会满足于仅仅做到平均呢？
The History of Corporate Pension Plan Management Act Two - The Great Leap
企业养老金计划管理的历史 第一幕——飞跃
And so the hunt was on. Wall Street abhors a commercial vacuum. If the will to believe stirs within the customer, the merchandise will be supplied - without warranty. When franchise companies are wanted by investors, franchise companies will be found - and recommended by the underwriters. If there are none to be found, they will be created. Similarly, if above-average investment performance is sought, it will be promised in abundance - and at least the illusion will be produced.
于是，猎寻开始了。华尔街讨厌商业真空。如果客户内心产生了信念的意愿，商品便会源源而来——即便没有任何保证。当投资者需要特许经营公司时，特许经营公司就会被找到——并由承销商推荐。如果找不到，就会被创造出来。同样，如果追求超出平均水平的投资表现，就会被大量承诺——至少会营造出这种幻觉。
Initially those who know better will resist promising the impossible. As the clientele first begins to drain away, advisors will argue the unsoundness of the new trend and the strengths of the old methods. But when the trickle gives signs of turning into a flood, business Darwinism will prevail and most organizations will adapt. This is what happened in the money management field.
最初，那些更有见识的人会抵制承诺不可能实现的目标。当客户最初开始流失时，顾问们会争论新趋势的不合理性以及旧方法的优势。但当涓涓细流呈现转为洪流的迹象时，商业达尔文主义将占据优势，大多数组织会随之调整。这就是资金管理领域所发生的情况。
The banks had traditionally been the major money managers (leaving aside insured plans) and, by and large, their investing as well as their communication had been lackluster. They felt obliged to seek improvement, or at least the appearance of improvement, as corporate managers searched for yardsticks by which to make their decisions as to whom care of this newly discovered giant "division" should be granted. The corporate managers naturally looked for groups with impressive organizational charts, lots of young talent, hungry but appropriately conscious of responsibility, (heavy on MBAs from good schools), a capacity for speed in decision making and action - in short, organizations that looked something like they perceived themselves. And they looked for a record of recent performance.
传统上，银行一直是主要的资金管理者（撇开有保障的计划不谈），而在整体上，他们的投资以及沟通表现都乏善可陈。随着企业管理者在寻找衡量标准以决定应将这一新发现的庞大“业务部门”托付给谁，他们感到不得不寻求改进，或至少寻求改进的表象。企业管理者自然会寻找那些组织架构令人印象深刻、拥有大量充满活力又恰当意识到责任的年轻人才（尤其来自名校的大量工商管理硕士），具有快速决策和行动能力——简而言之，能够体现管理者自我形象的组织。他们也会关注其近期业绩记录。
Unfortunately, they found both.
不幸的是，他们同时找到了这两种情况。
A little thought, of course, would convince anyone that the composite area of professionally managed money can't perform above average. It simply is too large a portion of the entire investment universe. Estimates are that now about 70% of stock market trading is accounted for by professionally managed money. Any thought that 70% of the environment is going to substantially out-perform the total environment is analagous to the fellow sitting down with his friends at the poker table and announcing: "Well, fellows, if we all play carefully tonight, we all should be able to win a little."
当然，稍加思考就会让人相信：由专业人士管理的资金整体不可能跑赢平均水平。它占据了整个投资市场太大的份额。据估计，现在约有 70% 的股票市场交易由专业管理的资金完成。任何认为这 70% 的市场环境会大幅超越整个市场的想法，都类似于一个人在扑克牌桌上对朋友们说：“伙计们，如果我们今晚都打得谨慎一些，我们应该都能赢一点。”
So, clearly the almost universal expectations of above-average performance in pension fund management were doomed to disappointment. These disappointments were certain to be amplified by a corollary affliction that frequently accompanies pressure for investment performance - higher turnover rates. It is difficult to measure turnover costs with precision, but they certainly must run at least 2% on average when applied to the round trip of purchase and sale. If an investment manager, striving for not only acceptable quarterly performance but also for the appearance of behaving as other highly-thought-of managers are known to be behaving, moves aggressively to keep his portfolio in the "right" stocks, he easily can average turnover rates of 25% per year. When the performance rage peaked, drastically higher turnover figures were recorded with some managers.
因此，很明显，对养老金基金管理实现超平均业绩的几乎普遍期望注定会失望。而这些失望还必然会因与追求投资业绩压力紧密相关的并发症——更高的换手率——而被放大。虽然很难准确衡量换手成本，但当涉及买卖往返时，这些成本平均肯定至少要达到 2%。如果一位投资经理不仅追求可接受的季度业绩，还要营造出与其他备受推崇的经理人表现一致的形象，他就会积极调整投资组合以持有“正确”股票，这样他的年均换手率很容易达到 25%。当追求业绩的热潮达到顶峰时，有些经理人的换手率甚至更高。
An interesting example of this line of thinking (sub-species: wishful) occurs in the April, 1975, Conference Board "Trends in Pension Fund Administration" article which Marty sent me the other day. In a carefully written "Investment Guidelines" statement by a manufacturing company, it is announced: Ne believe it is reasonable to expect long-term results superior to the usual market indexes, and the S & P 500 in particular. Specifically, we look for performance better than this index in all types of market environments." And yes, Virginia, maybe every football team can have a winning season this year.
一个有趣的典型（可归类为“愿景型”）出现在 1975 年 4 月《会议委员会》（Conference Board）刊物的《养老金基金管理趋势》（Trends in Pension Fund Administration）一文中，此文是 Marty 前几天发给我的。某制造公司在一份精心撰写的“投资指南”声明中写道：我们认为，预计长期业绩优于通常的市场指数，尤其是 S&P 500，是合理的。具体而言，我们期望在各种市场环境中都能超越该指数的表现。”是的，Virginia，也许今年每支橄榄球队都能取得胜利赛季。
In any event, a 25% turnover rate among professionals as a group, with 2% costs attached to such turnover, reduces group performance by 1/2 of 1% per annum (\$12 billion per year on \$300 billion of assets). This means that, instead of chance dispersal of results causing half of all managers to fall above the unmanaged performance level (which has no transaction costs) and half to be below, the frictional drag of turnover costs causes well over half to perform worse than what "average" might be assumed to be.
无论如何，专业人士群体中 25% 的换手率，再加上与此换手率相关的 2% 成本，会使群体业绩每年下降 0.5%（相当于在 3,000 亿美元资产中每年损失 120 亿美元）。这意味着，与其说业绩的随机分布会导致一半的经理人跑赢无交易成本的基准水平，而另一半落后，不如说换手成本造成的摩擦阻力使得远超过一半的经理人表现不及通常所假设的“平均水平”。
For the reasons set forth above, almost all recent investment management performance by pension funds of large corporations has been fair to poor. Specifically, the Becker study (most comprehensive of all pension investment measuring services) reports the following:
基于上述原因，大型企业养老金基金的近来投资管理业绩几乎都只是中等或偏差。具体而言，Becker 研究（在所有养老金投资衡量服务中最为全面）报告了以下情况：
*Excludes bond segment of portfolios so that equity management only is measured against the equity yard stick.
*不包括投资组合中的债券部分，以便仅将股票管理与股票基准进行对比。
In the short term, it frequently is better to look smart than to be smart, particularly if your employment is to be decided by a rather brief interview. If the fans are going to decide your hiring status based on only a few swings, it is prudent to develop a batting style that will remind them of Joe DiMaggio or Ted Williams, even if long-range your percentage of solid hits with that style is small and you know you obtain better results batting cross-handed.
从短期来看，看起来聪明往往比真正聪明更为重要，尤其当你是否获得这份工作要通过一次很简单的面试来决定时。如果观众只会根据你几次挥棒来决定是否录用你，那么采用一种能让他们联想到乔·迪马吉奥或泰德·威廉姆斯的击球风格是明智的，即使从长远来看，通过这种风格你的实心安打率很低，并且你知道用反手击球能取得更好的效果。
Is There Hope? Can a Wise Corporation Assure Superior Investment Performance for its Pension Plan?
有希望吗？一个明智的企业能否为其养老金计划确保优异的投资表现？
If above-average performance is to be their yardstick, the vast majority of investment managers must fail. Will a few succeed - due either to chance or skill? Of course. For some intermediate period of years a few are bound to look better than average due to chance - just as would be the case if 1,000 "coin managers" engaged in a coin-flipping contest. There would be some "winners" over a 5 or 10-flip measurement cycle. (After five flips, you would expect to have 31 with uniformly "successful" records - who, with their oracular abilities confirmed in the crucible of the marketplace, would author pedantic essays on subjects such as pensions.)
如果要以超出平均水平的业绩作为衡量标准，那么绝大多数投资经理都会失败。会有少数人凭借运气或技巧取得成功吗？当然会。在某个中期时间段内，总会有少数人因为运气而看起来优于平均水平——就像在一场有 1,000 名“抛硬币经理人”参与的抛硬币比赛中，这种情况也是如此。在一次 5 次或 10 次抛硬币的测评周期中，肯定会出现一些“赢家”。（在抛掷五次之后，你可以预见将会有 31 位保持“全胜”记录的人——他们在市场的熔炉中验证了其预测能力，随后会撰写一些关于养老金等话题的学究式文章。）
In addition to the ones benefitting from short-term luck,I believe it possible that a few will succeed - in a modest way - because of skill. I do not believe they can be identified solely by a study of their past record. They may be operating with a coin that they know favors heads, and be calling heads each time, but their bare statistical record will not be distinguishable from the larger group who have been calling flips indiscriminately and have been lucky - so far.
除了那些因为短期运气而受益的人之外，我认为还有少数人可能凭借技巧——并非特别出色，但足以取得一定成功。我不认为仅凭研究他们的过往业绩就能识别出这些人。他们可能在使用一枚他们知道偏向正面的硬币，并每次都报正面，但他们的纯统计记录与那些随意抛硬币并侥幸获胜的更大群体之间并无差别——至少到目前为止是这样。
It may be possible, if you know a good deal about investments as well as human personality, to talk with a manager who has a decent record and find that he is using methods which really give an advantage over other investors, and which appear to be likely to provide continued superiority in the future. This requires a very wise and informed client - and even then is not free from pitfalls.
如果你对投资和人性有相当了解，也许可以与某位业绩尚可的经理人交流，发现他所使用的方法确实相对于其他投资者具有优势，并可能在未来持续保持领先。这需要一个非常聪慧且见多识广的委托人——即便如此，也并非没有陷阱。
For openers, there is one huge, obvious pitfall. I am virtually certain that above-average performance cannot be maintained with large sums of managed money. It is nice to think that \$20 billion managed under one roof will produce financial resources which can hire some of the world's most effective investment talent. After all, doesn't the big money at Las Vegas attract the most effective entertainers
to its stages? Surely \$50 million annually of fees on \$20 billion of managed assets will allow (a) an array of industry specialists covering minute-by-minute developments affecting companies within their purview; (b) top-flight economists to study the movement of the tides; and (c) nimble, decisive portfolio managers to translate this wealth of information into appropriate market action.
首先，有一个巨大的、显而易见的陷阱：我几乎可以确定，管理大量资金时无法维持超平均业绩。你可能会认为，将 200 亿美元集中在一个平台上管理，可以产生足够的财力来雇佣世界上最有效的投资人才。毕竟，拉斯维加斯的大钱难道不是吸引了最顶尖的表演者吗？每年从 200 亿美元的管理资产中收取 5,000 万美元的费用，似乎能够：（a）配备一批行业专家，实时跟踪其管辖范围内公司的一举一动；（b）聘请一流经济学家来研究市场潮流；（c）让敏锐果断的投资组合经理将这些丰富的信息转化为相应的市场操作。
It just doesn't work that way.
事实并非如此。
Down the street there is another \$20 billion getting the same input. Each such organization has its own group of bridge experts cooperating on identical hands - and they all have read the same book and consulted the same computers. Furthermore, you just don't move \$20 billion or any significant fraction around easily or inexpensively - particularly not when all eyes tend to be focused on the same current investment problems and opportunities. An increase in funds managed dramatically reduces the number of investment opportunities, since only companies of very large size can be of any real use in filling portfolios. More money means fewer choices - and the restriction of those choices to exactly the same bill of fare offered to others with ravenous financial appetites.
在街对面还有另外 200 亿美元享受相同的配备。每个这样的机构都有自己的一组牌技专家，他们在相同的“牌局”上进行配合——他们都读过同一本书，也查询同一套电脑系统。此外，你不可能轻而易举或廉价地调动 200 亿美元或任何可观规模的资金——尤其当所有人都将目光集中在相同的当前投资问题和机会上时。管理资金规模的扩大会极大地减少可选的投资机会，因为只有规模极大的公司才能真正满足投资组合的需求。资金越多，可供选择的标的就越少——而且这些选择会被限制在和那些拥有同样强烈资本胃口的机构所看到的完全相同的“菜单”上。
In short, the rational expectation of assuring above average pension fund management is very close to nil.
简而言之，理性预期要确保养老金基金管理实现超平均业绩几乎等于零。
Illustrations of Reality in Pension Fund Investment Management
养老金投资管理现实案例
I recently received some interesting figures from a pension fund involving about \$250 million of assets. The 9-1/2 year record through June 30, 1975 of the three major banks involved (managing \$20 - \$50 million per bank) follows, compared to "average" as defined in two ways, the S & P 500 and the D-J Industrials:
我最近收到了一家拥有约 2.5 亿美元资产的养老金基金提供的一些有趣数据。截止到 1975 年 6 月 30 日，这三家主要银行（每家管理 2,000 万至 5,000 万美元）的九年半业绩记录如下，并与通过两种方式定义的“平均”表现——即 S&P 500 指数和道琼斯工业平均指数进行比较：
Until recently, Chase had managed a comparable segment of the funds but was terminated because of poor performance - probably worse than the other banks shown above. Each percentage point plus or minus affected this fund by about \$2 to \$4 million over the time period measured.
直到最近，Chase 一直管理着该基金的一个类似部分，但由于业绩不佳而被终止——可能比上述其他银行更差。在所测算的时间段内，每上升或下降一个百分点，就会使该基金约减少或增加 200 万到 400 万美元。
A further interesting calculation was made. On June 30, of the portfolio held by Continental, 64% of the securities held, measured by market value, also were in the Morgan portfolio and 44% were duplicated in the First National City portfolio. Similar overlap was demonstrated in other ways.
又做了一个有趣的计算：截至 6 月 30 日，Continental 持有的投资组合中，以市值计有 64% 的证券也出现在 Morgan 的投资组合中，而 44% 的证券在 First National City 的投资组合中重复。其他方式也显示了类似的重叠情况。
I am familiar enough with the record of this fund to state that no unusual constraints have been placed on the managers, and no special factors have to be recognized to interpret the numbers.
我对该基金的业绩记录十分熟悉，可以断言经理人并未受到任何非同寻常的限制，也无需考虑特殊因素来解读这些数字。
I believe that Morgan's above-average record here, compared to that of other large banks, is typical of its relative performance at other pension funds. I also feel the predictive value of that relative standing to be low.
我认为，与其他大型银行相比，摩根在此表现出超出平均水平的业绩，这在其他养老金基金中也是其相对表现的典型体现。但我也觉得，这种相对排名的预测价值很低。
Pensions & Investments magazine recently rated the 35 largest banks for which five-year performance records of commingled equity funds were available. Ten did as well as or better than the S & P, consistent with what might be expected according to probability theory if everyone were operating solely according to chance and there was a modest drag on performance caused by transaction costs. More importantly, I know of no set of statistics which would demonstrate any opposite view relating to managers handling large amounts of money.
《养老金与投资》杂志最近对 35 家拥有可查五年混合股票基金业绩记录的最大银行进行了评级。其中有 10 家的表现与标普指数持平或更好，这与概率理论的预期相符——如果人人纯靠运气操作，再加上交易成本对业绩造成小幅拖累，就会出现这种分布。更重要的是，我未见过任何数据能够证明大额资金管理人能取得相反的优异结果。
The evidence all seems to confirm that it is unwise to expect above-average investment results from a corporate pension plan, conventionally managed.
所有证据似乎都表明：在常规管理的企业养老金计划中寄望于取得高于平均水平的投资回报是不明智的。
Major Options in Pension Fund Management
养老金基金管理的主要选择
With respect to pension fund investments in securities, several paths can be followed, singly or in combination:
在养老金进行证券投资时，可以单独或组合地采取以下几条路径：
(1) One or more large conventional money managers may be retained, with the expectation that performance will be slightly poorer than "average" because of costs involved. If the manager is very large and conventional - any major bank will do - directors of the corporation should run no risk of imprudent behavior as fiduciaries under the new ERISA statute. Conventional behavior is safe - even when the potential litigants have the benefit of hindsight. If we should go this route, I see no reason to change from Morgan.
可以聘请一家或多家大型传统资产管理机构，并预期由于成本因素，其业绩将略低于“平均”水平。只要管理机构规模足够大、运营方式足够传统——任何一家大型银行都行——公司董事在新《雇员退休收入保障法》（ERISA）下就不会因受托人职责而面临轻率行为的风险。循规蹈矩是安全的——即便潜在的诉讼方事后诸葛亮。若走这条路，我看不出有任何理由换掉摩根。
(2) Management in security selection can be, in essence, abandoned by simply creating a portfolio which is equivalent to "average". This minimizes turnover and management costs, and probably accomplishes about the same result as (1) - perhaps with just a touch more potential liability for results, since a tacit admission has been made that no effort is being expended to "manage". Several funds have been established fairly recently to duplicate the averages, quite explicitly embodying the principle that no management is cheaper, and slightly better than average paid management after transaction costs.This policy could be implemented by participating in such funds, or on a do-it-yourself basis.
也可以本质上放弃选股管理，直接构建一个等同于“平均”的投资组合。这样可将换手率和管理费用降至最低，结果大致与方案 (1) 相同——只是因明确承认“不管理”，结果责任的潜在风险略高。近期已有若干基金专门复制市场平均，明确体现了“零管理更便宜，且扣除交易成本后略优于付费管理”的原则。此策略可以通过参与此类基金，或自行操作来实现。
段永平最近3年的业绩就是这个样子，参考：《2025-01-29 段永平.H&H International Investment, LLC》。
(3) A manager can be found handling smaller amounts whose record has been good for the right reasons.
可以寻找一位处理较小资金的管理者，其业绩良好且基于正确的原因。
Then hope that no one else finds him.
然后就希望无人发现他。
芒格用了李录以后就要求不能再接受其他人的资金。
Good records of any type usually have attracted massive money flows - whether the record was based on unusual skill, luck, or even, occasionally, semi-fraudulent activity which has "manufactured" the record. Even those records which I believe to have been based at least partially on skill have wilted when subjected to torrents of money.
任何类型的亮眼业绩都会吸引大量资金涌入——无论这些成绩源于非凡技艺、运气，甚至偶尔是“制造”出来的半欺诈行为。即便是我认为至少部分出自真本事的业绩，一旦遭遇资金洪流也往往会枯萎。
A further problem is that in no case were the superior records I have observed based upon institutional skills which could be maintained despite changes in the faces. Rather, the good results have been accomplished by a single individual or, at most, a few, working in fairly specialized areas in which the great bulk of investment money simply had no interest. It has been very difficult to out-think the pack on General Motors, IBM, Sears, etc. Rather, the unusual records - and there have been few that have been maintained - have been achieved by those who have worked relatively neglected fields in which competition was light.
更大的问题在于，我看到的优异记录无一建立在可替换人员仍能维系的制度化技巧之上。相反，它们往往出自一名、至多几名个人，在大多数资金毫无兴趣的专业化领域苦心经营。在通用汽车、IBM、希尔斯等热门股票上击败大多数人极其困难；反而，那些极少数得以延续的卓越业绩，来自于在竞争稀少、相对被忽视领域深耕的人。
Many pension funds, including the fund to which I referred earlier, have attempted to find superior but relatively unknown managers still working with small sums. This often involves dozens of interviews and usually comes down to the past record, particularly the recent past, plus an articulate practitioner who "looks" reasonable and respectable. In my opinion, based only on impressions, the overall record from this selection process has been poor and very likely worse than the mildly below-average record of the major money manager.
许多养老金，包括我前文提到的那只基金，都尝试寻找业绩优异但仍管理少量资金、相对不出名的经理。这通常要进行数十次面试，最终还是取决于其过往记录——尤其是最近的表现——再加上一位能言善辩、看上去“靠谱体面”的操盘人。仅凭我的印象判断，这一筛选流程的整体成果并不理想，极可能还不如大型资产管理机构略低于平均的业绩。
Your win-loss percentage in tennis will not be determined by the absolute level of ability that you possess. Rather, it will be determined by your ability to select inferior opponents. If you select with care it will be quite easy to attain a winning percentage higher than, say, Cliff Richey while he is playing on the tour. Application of this principle is the key element in bridge, poker, or investments. (Harder to apply in the latter, however - it is easier to identify a couple of palookas at the bridge table.)
你在网球比赛中的胜率并不取决于你所拥有的绝对能力水平，而取决于你选择实力较弱对手的能力。如果你谨慎选择对手，就很容易在巡回赛中取得比克利夫·里基（Cliff Richey）更高的胜率。这一原则在桥牌、扑克或投资中同样适用。（在投资领域更难应用，因为在桥牌桌上识别几位菜鸟要容易得多。）
The reason isn't too hard to see (particularly with a rear view mirror). Much of Wall Street is a succession of fashions. Obviously some individuals will have hit the most recent fashion, and their record will look correspondingly good - maybe sensationally good if they have a reckless streak and have played a particular trend very hard. But fashion-hitting never has been successfully maintained, to my knowledge. And the manager primarily selected for recent hot performance knows what he is expected to do. He is to perform - and quickly. So the new small manager's decisions frequently are characterized by high turnover, major mistakes, even more furious activity to catch up, etc. It has not happened every time, but my hunch is that the sum total performance of the relatively unknown go-go managers for pension funds has been worse than the lumbering, stiff-legged minuet performed by the major banks.
原因并不难理解（尤其是回过头来看的时候）。华尔街大多是一个接一个的潮流显现。显然，总有人正好踩中最新潮流，他们的业绩随之亮眼——如果再带点冒险冲动、大举押注某个趋势，甚至可能惊艳四座。但就我所知，踩中潮流的成功从未能持续。那些因近期火爆业绩而被选中的经理也清楚自己肩负的期望：必须继续表现——而且要快。因此，这些新晋小型经理的决策往往高换手、犯大错，随后更狂热地操作以追回损失，等等。并非每次都会如此，但我的直觉是，这些名不见经传、风风火火替养老金操盘的经理总体表现，还不如大银行那支笨拙迟缓的“方步舞”。
(4) A fixed income (bonds) investment strategy can be followed, which presently allows returns of about 9% per annum that can be locked in for some time. This option currently is becoming somewhat more popular, should be quite defensible under ERISA, and will look good or bad, depending upon what returns from equity holdings develop over the next decade or two. This essentially is the same decision that was made by default several decades ago by many companies, except the rates then were 4% instead of 9%. I do not recommend an attempt by us to go back and forth from bonds to stocks. This is a skill possessed by few, if any - and certainly not by a group. If we could master this particular form of alchemy, there would be little reason to do anything else.
可以采用一种固定收益（债券）投资策略，目前可锁定约 9% 的年回报并维持一段时间。该选项近年来日渐受到青睐，在 ERISA 规定下也颇具可辩护性；其最终好坏，则取决于未来十年或二十年权益投资的收益表现。这本质上与数十年前许多公司默认作出的决定相同，只是当年的利率是 4%，而不是 9%。我并不建议我们在债券与股票之间来回切换；这种“炼金术”鲜有人真正掌握，更别说靠集体操作。如果真有人能精通此道，也无需再做其他投资。
The comfort level produced by this option is likely to be high under any conditions except high rates of inflation -which will produce distress under all of the options discussed herein.
除非出现高通胀率，否则这一选项带来的心安程度可能在任何情况下都很高——而高通胀率会让本文讨论的所有选项都陷入困境。
(5) My final option - and the one to which I lean, although not at anything like a 45-degree angle - is mildly unconventional, thereby causing somewhat more legal risk for directors. It may differ from other common stock programs, more in attitude than in appearance, or even results. It involves treating portfolio management decisions much like business acquisition decisions by corporate managers.
The directors and officers of the company consider themselves to be quite capable of making business decisions, including decisions regarding the long-term attractiveness of specific business operations purchased at specific prices. We have made decisions to purchase several television businesses, a newspaper business, etc. And in other relationships we have made such judgments covering a much wider spectrum of business operations.
最后一个选项——也是我个人略偏向的做法，尽管并非倾斜四十五度那么明显——带有一点点非常规色彩，因此会让董事们承担稍多法律风险。与其他普通股票计划相比，它的不同更多体现在态度，而非表象甚至结果。其核心是把投资组合管理决策当作企业管理者做并购决策来对待。公司董事和高管自认为完全有能力做出商业决策，包括判断在特定价格买入某项业务的长期吸引力。我们已决定收购了数家电视台业务、一家报纸业务等；在其他场合，我们也就更广泛的业务类型做过类似判断。
Negotiated prices for such purchases of entire businesses often are dramatically higher than stock market valuations attributable to well-managed similar operations. Longer term, rewards to owners in both cases will flow from such investments proportional to the economic results of the business. By buying small pieces of businesses through the stock market rather than entire businesses through negotiation, several disadvantages occur: (a) the right to manage, or select managers, is forfeited; (b) the right to determine dividend policy or direct the areas of internal reinvestment is absent; (c) ability to borrow long-term against the business assets (versus against the stock position) is greatly reduced; and (d) the opportunity to sell the business on a full-value, private-owner basis is forfeited.
整家公司交易的谈判价格往往远高于股票市场对同类良好运营企业的估值。从长期来看，两种情况下所有者的回报都与企业的经济成果成正比。但通过股市买入企业的“碎片”而非谈判收购整个公司，会带来若干劣势：(a) 放弃管理或选择管理层的权利；(b) 无权决定分红政策或指定内部再投资领域；(c) 以企业资产做长期抵押融资的能力（相较以持股抵押）大幅削弱；以及 (d) 失去以全价值、私人所有者溢价出售整家企业的机会。
These are important negative factors but, if a group of investments are carefully chosen at a bargain price, it can minimize the impact of a single bad experience in, say, the management area, which cannot be corrected. And occasionally there is an offsetting advantage which can be of very substantial value - but for which nothing should be paid at the time of purchase. That relates to the periodic tendency of stock markets to experience excesses which cause businesses - when changing hands in small pieces through stock transactions - to sell at prices significantly above privately-determined negotiated values. At such times, holdings may be liquidated at better prices than if the whole business were owned - and, due to the impersonal nature of securities markets, no moral stigma need be attached to dealing with such unwitting buyers.
这些都是重要的不利因素，但如果能以极具吸引力的价格精挑细选一组投资，可将某一方面（例如管理层问题）无法纠正的单一糟糕经历的影响降至最低。并且偶尔也会出现一项可观的抵消性优势——而这种优势在购入时无需支付额外费用。那就是股市周期性产生的“过度”现象：企业在股市中以碎片方式易手时，价格往往显著高于私下谈判的估值。在此类时机，可以优于整家公司持有者的价位套现，而且由于证券市场的非人格化特征，与这些毫不知情的买家交易也无须背负道德压力。
I am leaving most of the legal discussion out of this memo - partly due to space considerations and partly because it is not my field. In general, the safest course is to behave as most others are behaving - and to trust in the expertise of large, well-regarded conventional organizations. I also believe it is defensible - although not as automatically defensible - to diversify among a group of well-financed entrenched businesses purchased at reasonable valuations of earnings and assets.
本备忘录中大部分法律讨论被省略——部分出于篇幅考虑，也部分因为这并非我的专业领域。通常而言，最安全的做法是随大流，并信赖那些大型、声誉良好的传统机构的专业能力。我同样认为，将资金分散配置到一组资金充裕、根基稳固、以合理的收益和资产估值购入的企业中是可以辩护的——尽管其辩护力度不如完全循规蹈矩来得自动。
Stock market prices may bounce wildly and irrationally but, if decisions regarding internal rates of return of the business are reasonably correct - and a small portion of the business is bought at a fraction of its private-owner value - a good return for the fund should be assured over the time span against which pension fund results should be measured.
股价可能会剧烈且非理性地波动，但如果关于企业内部收益率的决策基本正确，并且能以私人持有价值的一小部分价格购入企业的一小部分股份，那么在衡量养老金基金业绩的时间跨度内，就应能确保基金获得良好回报。
It might be asked what the difference is between this approach and simply picking stocks a la Morgan, Scudder, Stevens, etc. It is, in large part, a matter of attitude, whereby the results of the business become the standard against which measurements are made rather than quarterly stock prices. It embodies a long time span for judgment confirmation, just as does an investment by a corporation in a major new division, plant or product. It treats stock ownership as business ownership with the corresponding adjustment in mental set. And it demands an excess of value over price paid, not merely a favorable short-term earnings or stock market outlook. General stock market considerations simply don't enter into the purchase decision.
人们或许会问，这种做法与按摩根、斯卡德、史蒂文斯等方式简单挑选股票有何不同。主要区别在于心态：经营结果而非季度股价成为衡量标准。它需要较长时间来验证判断，就像公司投资大型新事业部、工厂或产品一样。它把持股视为企业所有权，并相应调整思维方式。它要求所付价格明显低于价值，而不仅仅是看好短期盈利或股市前景。一般性的股市因素根本不会影响买入决定。
Finally, it rests on a belief, which both seems logical and which has been borne out historically in securities markets, that intrinsic business value is the eventual prime determinant of stock prices. In the words of my former boss: "In the short run the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine."
最后，这一策略基于一个既合乎逻辑又被证券市场历史证明的信念：企业内在价值最终是决定股价的主要因素。用我前老板的话说：“短期看市场是投票机，长期看市场是称重机。”
Specifically, it probably is possible to invest the $12 million in our pension fund in a dozen businesses (maybe more; ERISA emphasizes diversification) with current intrinsic value (measured by private-owner valuations and transactions) attributable to our investment of, say, $20 million and current earnings of at least $1.5 million. The portion of such earnings paid out to us clearly is worth 100 cents on the dollar, and a reasonable batting average by the managements of companies in which we invest should result in the portion reinvested having similar value. If this is the case, such a "pension division" operation will produce better returns than bond investment at current rates.
具体而言，我们很可能将养老金的1200万美元投资于十来家（或更多；ERISA强调分散化）企业，对应的当前内在价值（按私人持有者的估值和交易衡量）大约为2000万美元，并带来至少150万美元的当前收益。分配给我们的盈利部分显然价值一美元顶一美元，而只要所投企业管理层的打击率合理，再投资的那部分也应当具有同样的价值。如果情况如此，这个“养老金事业部”将比当前利率水平下的债券投资取得更好回报。
The main long-term risk would be that future returns on capital obtained by our "division managers" would turn SOUP. In some individual case that undoubtedly would prove true. It might well be that there also would be a favorable surprise or two. That is true of any acquisition program. The one substantial advantage that this "division" would have would be attractive purchase prices - far below those available for purchasers of entire businesses. If purchases could not be made on such a "bargain" basis, we simply would wait until they could. A second advantage would be the flexibility provided by a public stock market, allowing portions of business operations to be acquired or divested much more easily than entire operating businesses.
长期的主要风险在于，我们这些“事业部经理”未来获得的资本回报可能会变得糟糕。在某些个别案例中这无疑会发生，也可能会出现一两个意外惊喜。任何收购计划都是如此。该“事业部”的一大优势在于购买价格极具吸引力——远低于收购整个企业所需的价格。如果无法以这种“便宜货”价格买入，我们就耐心等待。第二大优势是公开股票市场提供的灵活性，使得我们可以比收购整个运营企业更轻松地买入或退出部分业务。
It must be emphasized that measurement of this program would have to be based on the progress in our share of earnings and assets of the constituent companies - not short-term market movements. We would expect substantial increases in earnings, dividends and asset values over, say, a decade just as we expect with our operating divisions at Washington Post. We would, in mental approach, have created a new diversified division, currently capitalized at about $12 million, which is expected to earn a better-than-bond rate with which to eventually pay retired employees. In a sense, this is what was done in the profit-sharing fund when it accumulated Washington Post stock throughout earlier years - basically a wise decision because the business earned very well internally and thereby grew in value at a substantial rate. It was an attractive partially-owned business, acquired at an attractive price. Until market prices were introduced, which complicated things, the funds built up through this self-owning division were significantly larger than would have been achieved by buying bonds or the general run of common stocks.
必须强调，对该计划的评估必须基于我们在所持公司收益和资产中的份额进展，而非短期市场波动。我们预计在十年左右的时间里，收益、股息和资产价值都会显著增长，就像我们对《华盛顿邮报》各运营事业部所期望的那样。从思维方式上说，我们已创建了一个新的多元化事业部，目前资本约1200万美元，预计其收益率将超过债券利率，并最终为退休员工付款。从某种意义上说，这与利润分享基金早年持续买入《华盛顿邮报》股票的做法如出一辙——这是一项明智的决定，因为公司内部收益优秀，从而以相当快的速度提升了价值。这是一笔以有吸引力的价格收购的优质部分所有权企业。在引入市场价格以前，也就是复杂性增加以前，通过这一自有事业部积累的资金远超购买债券或普通股票本可获得的水平。
If it should be decided to implement such a policy, recommendations should be obtained from qualified analysts who clearly understand our rather unusual selection criteria. This could be handled on a quite infrequent basis.
若决定实施此类政策，应当从充分理解我们这一独特选股标准的合格分析师处获得建议，而且完全可以不必频繁操作。
As mentioned earlier, a policy also could be followed combining more than one option. Most combinations have been (1) and (3), or (1) and (4), but (It-) and (5) could well be more logical.
如前所述，政策也可以采取组合多种选项的方式。大多数组合是（1）和（3），或（1）和（4），但（4）和（5）的组合可能更合乎逻辑。
Pension Asset Management in the Scale of Business Priorities
养老金资产管理在企业优先事项中的地位
Of course, the desirability of even considering something non-conventional (not to be equated with more risk; the exclusive benefit provision of ERISA requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties "solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries") relates to the relative impact pension results can have on overall earnings.
当然，考虑采取一些非常规做法（并不等同于更高风险；ERISA 的“专属利益”条款要求受托人“唯以参与者和受益人的利益”为出发点履行其职责）的可取性，与养老金投资结果对整体盈利的相对影响有关。
One of my friends always reminds me: "If a thing's not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well." If our pension assets were $1 million and likely to grow only a few hundred thousand dollars a year, it would be ridiculous to think of any activity that might incur even unwarranted criticism, let alone litigation. On the other hand, if we had U. S. Steel's pension situation, we might want to make a truly top priority project out of pension asset management (as they have), even if we might slightly increase personal risks to directors by so doing.
我的一个朋友总提醒我：“如果一件事根本不值得做，就不值得把它做好。” 如果我们的养老金资产只有 100 万美元，而且每年只能增加几十万美元，那么做任何可能招致哪怕是毫无根据的批评、更不用说诉讼的事情，都是荒唐的。另一方面，如果我们拥有美国钢铁那样的养老金情况，我们也许会像他们一样，把养老金资产管理提升为真正的首要项目，即使这会略微提高董事的个人风险。
We fall in between although, if you look through to the glans to which we contribute but don't manage (Guild, mechanical, etc.) we are moving more in the direction of U. S. Steel. It is likely that within ten years we will have $40 million in our direct pension "division" and further substantial sums in other plans presently on an indirect basis. Earnings of businesses purchased through this "division" should run at least $5 million per year.
我们处于两者之间，不过，如果把我们出资但并不管理的基金（公会、机械工等）也考虑进去，我们正朝着美国钢铁的方向靠拢。很可能在十年内，我们的直接养老金“事业部”规模将达到 4000 万美元，其他目前采用间接方式的计划也将拥有可观资金。通过这一“事业部”所购企业的年度收益应至少达到 500 万美元。
In, prior years it was felt that by limiting contributions to union plans to so much per shift, or per hour, management was relieved of responsibility for any specific level of benefits, as well as pension fund administration. The shield of this "hands off" position is eroding and we should recognize that we may well have responsibility at some future date for benefits promised under these plans, which we originally thought involved only defined contributions. With this in prospect, we may wish to gain at least partial command over fund investments in this area.
过去几年，人们认为只要把对工会计划的供款限定为每班次或每小时多少金额，管理层就可以免除对任何具体福利水平以及养老金基金管理的责任。这种“袖手旁观”立场的保护伞正在瓦解，我们应当认识到，将来我们很可能要对这些计划所承诺的福利负责，而我们最初认为它们只是固定缴款计划。有鉴于此，我们也许希望在这一领域的基金投资上至少获得部分控制权。
Summing up:
总结：
(1) If the economic world turns out to be one of sustained double-digit inflation - probably still unlikely but not unthinkable - among the carnage will be private pension plans. The investment process can do little to modify that disaster. Hope lies mainly in the care with which past promises have been made, and the ownership of a business whose economic characteristics allow pass-through pricing which includes a large part of past labor costs, as well as full current costs.
如果经济世界最终出现持续的两位数通胀——这也许仍不太可能，但并非不可想象——私营养老金计划将会是这场浩劫中的受害者之一。投资过程对这种灾难几乎无能为力。希望主要寄托在过去承诺的谨慎程度，以及拥有一家可将相当大部分过去劳动力成本与全部现时成本通过定价转嫁出去的企业。
(2) In a more orderly world, the care with which promises have been worded remains important, but on a scale that diminishes as inflation moderates. Conventional approaches to money management should not be expected to produce above average results. But average will be perfectly acceptable at low inflation rates.
在一个更有序的世界里，对承诺措辞的谨慎仍然重要，但随着通胀放缓，其重要性会降低。传统的资金管理方法不应被寄望于取得高于平均的结果。但在低通胀率下，取得平均水平完全可以接受。
(3) A mildly non-conventional investment approach, emphasizing a business approach to security selection, gives some opportunity for long-term results slightly above average without corresponding in¬crease in investment risk.
一种略带非常规的投资方法，以商业化思维选择证券，有机会在不增加相应投资风险的情况下获得略高于平均水平的长期回报。
Warren E. Buffett
October 14, 1975
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