1979-08-06 Warren Buffett.You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus

Refer To：《You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus》。

Pension-fund managers continue to make investment decisions with their eyes firmly fixed on the rearview mirror. This generals-fighting-the-last-war approach has proven costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.

养老基金经理依旧死盯着后视镜作出投资决策。像打仗的将军只会复刻上一场战争的策略，这种做法过去已付出高昂代价，这次很可能同样如此。

Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds. Yet pensions managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please ("whose bread I eat, his song I sing"), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.

目前股票的估值水平本应带来远高于债券的长期回报。但养老基金经理——往往要取悦于企业赞助方（“吃谁的饭，替谁唱歌”）——却正以前所未有的比例将资金大量投入债券。

Meanwhile, orders for stocks are being placed with an eyedropper. Parkinson--of Parkinson's law fame--might conclude that the enthusiasm of professionals for stocks varies proportionately with the recent pleasure derived from ownership. This always was the way John Q. Public was expected to behave. John Q. Expert seems similarly afflicted. Here's the record.

与此同时，买入股票的指令却像用滴管一样稀少。以帕金森定律闻名的帕金森或许会得出结论：专业人士对股票的热情与近期持股带来的愉悦感成正比。过去，我们预计普通大众会如此行事；如今，所谓专家也似乎患上同样的毛病。以下是记录。

In 1972, when the Dow earned \$67.11, or 11% on beginning book value of 607, it closed the year selling at 1,020, and pension managers couldn't buy stocks fast enough. Purchases of equities in 1972 were 105% of net funds available (i.e., bonds were sold), a record except for the 122% of the even more buoyant prior year. This two-year stampede increased the equity portion of total pension assets from 61% to 74%--an all-time record that coincided nicely with a record-high price for the Dow. The more investment managers paid for stocks, the better they felt about them.

1972年，道指赚取了67.11美元，相当于期初账面价值607的11%，年末收于1,020点，养老基金经理恨不得把股票买到手软。当年股票买入力度相当于可投净资金的105%（也就是说卖出了债券），仅略低于前一年更为亢奋时的122%。这两年的冲锋把养老基金资产中的股票比例从61%推高到74%，创下历史新高，与道指创纪录高点相得益彰。投资经理买股票花得越多，对股票感觉越好。

And then the market went into a tailspin in 1973-74. Although the Dow earned \$99.04 in 1974, or 14% on beginning book value of 690, it finished the year selling at 616. A bargain? Alas, such bargain prices produced panic rather than purchases; only 21% of net investable funds went into equities that year, a 25-year record low. The proportion of equities held by private noninsured pension plans fell to 54% of net assets, a full 20-point drop from the level deemed appropriate when the Dow was 400 points higher.

随后，市场在1973—1974年急转直下。尽管道指在1974年赚取了99.04美元，相当于期初账面价值690的14%，却以616点收官。便宜货？可惜如此廉价反而引发恐慌而非买入；当年流向股票的资金仅占可投净资金的21%，创下25年来新低。私人非保险养老计划持有的股票比例降至净资产的54%，较道指高出400点时被认为“合适”的水平足足下降了20个百分点。

By 1976, the courage of pension managers rose in tandem with the price level, and 56% of available funds was committed to stocks. The Dow that year averaged close to 1,000, a level then about 25% above book value.

到1976年，随着价格回升，养老基金经理的勇气也同步上升，可投资金中有56%投向股票。那一年道指平均接近1,000点，约相当于账面价值溢价25%。

In 1978, stocks were valued far more reasonably, with the Dow selling below book value most of the time. Yet a new low of 9% of net funds was invested in equities during the year. The first quarter of 1979 continued at very close to the same level.

到了1978年，股票估值要合理得多，道指大部分时间低于账面价值。但当年仅有9%的可投净资金流入股票，创出新低。1979年第一季度基本保持同样水平。

By these actions, pension managers, in record-setting manner, are voting for purchase of bonds--at interest rates of 9% to 10%--and against purchase of American equities at prices aggregating book value or less. But these same pension managers probably would concede that those American equities, in aggregate and over the longer term, would earn about 13% (the average in recent years) on book value. And, overwhelmingly, the managers of their corporate sponsors would agree.

通过这些操作，养老基金经理以创纪录的方式投票：在9%到10%的利率水平上买债券，而反对以接近甚至低于账面价值的价格买入美国股票。但这些同样的基金经理大多会承认，美国股票总体上、从长期来看能在账面价值上赚取大约13%的收益（这是近年平均水平）。他们的企业赞助方管理层也会压倒性地同意这一点。

Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of schizophrenia regarding equities. They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive. But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general. And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will eagerly bid 150% to 200% of book value for businesses typical of corporate America but, wearing his pension hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value. Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?

事实上，许多企业管理者在对待股票的问题上表现出某种精神分裂。他们认为自家股票便宜得吓人，但与此同时又批准养老金政策，普遍拒绝买入普通股。同一位老板，戴上并购帽时，愿意为美国典型企业支付账面价值150%到200%的价格；可戴上养老金帽时，却鄙视以账面价值买入类似公司。难道他的才能如此独特，以至于当他能亲自掌控企业时，支付“两美元买一美元”就合理，而如果必须让商业圆桌会议的同行来经营，就断言“一美元买一美元”是不明智的养老金投资？

A simple Pavlovian response may be the major cause of this puzzling behavior. During the last decade, stocks have produced pain--both for corporate sponsors and for the investment managers the sponsors hire. Neither group wishes to return to the scene of the accident. But the pain has not been produced because business has performed badly, but rather because stocks have underperformed business. Such underperformance cannot prevail indefinitely, any more than could the earlier overperformance of stocks versus business that lured pension money into equities at high prices.

这种令人困惑的行为，主要原因可能是简单的“巴甫洛夫式”反应。过去十年，股票带来了疼痛——无论是对企业赞助者还是他们雇佣的投资经理而言。两者都不愿回到事故现场。然而，这份疼痛并非因为企业经营不善，而是因为股票表现落后于企业本身。这种落后不可能无限期持续，就像股票曾经跑赢企业、把养老金资金吸引到高价股票上一样，那种超额表现也终将难以为继。

非常形象的描述，很多自以为是的“高手”只会装神秘，所吸引的都是白痴，如果你的观众是白痴，那么自己也是白痴。

Can better results be obtained over, say, 20 years from a group of 9 1/2% bonds of leading American companies maturing in 1999 than from a group of Dow-type equities purchased, in aggregate, at around book value and likely to earn, in aggregate, around 13% on that book value? The probabilities seem exceptionally low. The choice of equities would prove inferior only if either a major sustained decline in return on equity occurs or a ludicrously low valuation of earnings prevails at the end of the 20-year period. Should price/earnings ratios expand over the 20-year period—and that 13% return on equity be averaged—purchases made now at book value will result in better than a 13% annual return. How can bonds at only 9 1/2% be a better buy?

比如说，一个由领先美国公司发行、1999年到期、票息为9 1/2%的债券组合，在20年期间能否取得比一组以大致账面价值买入、且整体预计能在该账面价值上赚取约13%收益的道指型股票更好的结果？这种可能性似乎极低。只有在股本回报率出现大幅且持续下滑，或在20年期末出现对盈利的荒唐低估时，股票的选择才会表现得更差。如果在20年间市盈率有所扩大——且13%的股本回报率成为平均值——那么现在按账面价值进行的购买将带来超过13%的年回报率。利率只有9 1/2%的债券怎么会是更好的买卖？

Think for a moment of book value of the Dow as equivalent to par, or the principal value of a bond. And think of the 13% or so expectable average rate of earnings on that book value as a sort of fluctuating coupon on the bond—a portion of which is retained to add to principal amount just like the interest return on U.S. Savings Bonds. Currently our "Dow Bond" can be purchased at a significant discount (at about 840 vs. 940 "principal amount," or book value of the Dow. Figures are based on the old Dow, prior to the recent substitutions. The returns would be moderately higher and the book values somewhat lower if the new Dow had been used.). That Dow Bond purchased at a discount with an average coupon of 13%—even though the coupon will fluctuate with business conditions—seems to me to be a long-term investment far superior to a conventional 9 1/2% 20-year bond purchased at par.

稍作思考，把道指的账面价值视为债券的面值或本金价值；把大约13%的预期平均账面收益率看作债券的一种浮动“票息”——其中一部分被保留下来，像美国储蓄债券的利息一样计入本金。目前我们的“道指债券”可以明显折价购入（约840点对比道指账面价值940点的“本金”，数字基于旧道指，即最近换股前的成分股；若用新道指，收益会略高而账面价值会略低）。这只折价买入、平均票息13%的道指债券——即便票息会随经济状况波动——在我看来远优于按面值买入的传统9 1/2%、20年期债券，适合作为长期投资。

Of course, there is no guarantee that future corporate earnings will average 13%. It may be that some pension managers shun stocks because they expect reported returns on equity to fall sharply in the next decade. However, I don't believe such a view is widespread.

当然，未来企业盈利平均达到13%并无保证。有些养老金经理或许回避股票，因为他们预期在下一个十年中报告的股本回报率会大幅下降。然而，我并不认为这种观点很普遍。

Instead, investment managers usually set forth two major objections to the thought that stocks should now be favored over bonds. Some say earnings currently are overstated, with real earnings after replacement-value depreciation far less than those reported. Thus, they say, real 13% earnings aren't available. But that argument ignores the evidence in such investment areas as life insurance, banking, fire-casualty insurance, finance companies, service businesses, etc.

相反，投资经理通常提出两大反对理由，认为现阶段不应偏好股票而应偏好债券。第一种观点认为当前盈利被高估，替换成本折旧后的实际盈利远低于报告值，因此所谓13%的实际盈利并不存在。但这种观点忽视了人寿保险、银行、财产意外保险、金融公司、服务业等投资领域的证据。

In those industries, replacement-value accounting would produce results virtually identical with those produced by conventional accounting. And yet, one can put together a very attractive package of large companies in those fields with an expectable return of 13% or better on book value and with a price which, in aggregate, approximates book value. Furthermore, I see no evidence that corporate managers turn their backs on 13% returns in their acquisition decisions because of replacement-value accounting considerations.

在这些行业中，替换成本会计得出的结果与传统会计几乎完全一致。然而，人们仍可在这些领域挑选出一揽子大型公司，其在账面价值上的预期回报为13%或更高，整体市价却大体接近账面价值。此外，我没有看到企业管理层在并购决策中因替换成本会计因素而放弃13%的回报。

有些行业更赚钱，主要指向金融和服务业。

A second argument is made that there are just too many question marks about the near future; wouldn't it be better to wait until things clear up a bit? You know the prose: "Maintain buying reserves until current uncertainties are resolved," etc. Before reaching for that crutch, face up to two unpleasant facts: The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.

第二种观点认为，近期前景存在太多问号；不如等形势明朗一些再行动。你知道那些套话：“保留购买能力，直至当前不确定性消除”等等。在依赖这根拐杖之前，先直面两件令人不快的事实：未来从来不清晰；在股市里，你会为愉快的一致预期付出极高的代价。不确定性实际上是长期价值买家的朋友。

If anyone can afford to have such a long-term perspective in making investment decisions, it should be pension-fund managers. While corporate managers frequently incur large obligations in order to acquire businesses at premium prices, most pension plans have very minor flow-of-funds problems. If they wish to invest for the long term—as they do in buying those 20- and 30-year bonds they now embrace—they certainly are in a position to do so. They can, and should, buy stocks with the attitude and expectations of an investor entering into a long-term partnership.

如果有人在做投资决策时有能力采取如此长期的视角，那就应该是养老金经理。当企业管理层常因收购溢价而承担巨额义务时，大多数养老金计划的资金流动问题却很小。如果他们愿意——正如他们现在热衷于买入20年、30年期债券那样——完全可以进行长期投资。他们能够，也理应，以进入长期合作伙伴关系的投资者心态和期望来购买股票。

Corporate managers who duck responsibility for pension management by making easy, conventional or faddish decisions are making an expensive mistake. Pension assets probably total about one-third of overall industrial net worth and, of course, bulk far larger in the case of many specific industrial corporations. Thus, poor management of those assets frequently equates to poor management of the largest single segment of the business. Soundly achieved higher returns will produce significantly greater earnings for the corporate sponsors and will also enhance the security and prospective payments available to pensioners.

通过做出轻率、常规或追逐时髦的决定而逃避养老金管理责任的企业管理者，正在犯下昂贵的错误。养老金资产大约占工业总体净值的三分之一；对于许多具体工业公司，这一比例甚至要大得多。因此，对这些资产管理不善往往意味着对企业最大单一业务板块管理不善。稳健取得的更高回报将为企业赞助方带来显著更高的收益，也将增强养老金领取者的安全性与未来支付能力。

Managers currently opting for lower equity ratios either have a highly negative opinion of future American business results or expect to be nimble enough to dance back into stocks at even lower levels. There may well be some period in the near future when financial markets are demoralized and much better buys are available in equities; that possibility exists at all times. But you can be sure that at such a time the future will seem neither predictable nor pleasant. Those now awaiting a "better time" for equity investing are highly likely to maintain that posture until well into the next bull market.

目前选择降低股票比例的经理人，要么对未来美国企业业绩持极度悲观态度，要么自信能在更低点机敏地回到股市。不久的将来金融市场或许会陷入低迷，股票出现更好的买入机会；这种可能性随时都存在。但可以肯定的是，在那样的时刻，未来既不可预测也不令人愉快。现在正等待“更好时机”进行股票投资的那些人，很可能一直保持这一姿态，直到下一轮牛市已进行相当深入。

持这种心态的人不可能深入理解某个企业，是心理上的缺陷导致的行为习惯。

Editor's Note: This editor's note accompanied the original publication of this article:

编者注：以下文字为本文最初发表时附带的编者按：

Warren Buffett is a down-to-earth man of 48 who prefers to operate out of his native Omaha rather than in the canyons of Wall Street, but the pros regard him as possibly the most successful living money manager, a direct descendant of the legendary Ben Graham under whom he studied. Buffett made a fortune for himself and his clients in the Fifties and Sixties but threw in the towel in 1969 because he could no longer find bargains. Then in late 1974, when the Dow Jones industrials were below 600 and the air was thick with doom, he told Forbes: "I feel like an oversexed man in a harem. This is the time to start investing." Within months, the greatest rally in history began, with the DJI running almost 450 points in a bit over a year. What does Buffett think now? In this article, he puts it bluntly: Now is the time to buy.

沃伦·巴菲特今年48岁，为人务实，更喜欢在家乡奥马哈办公，而不是在华尔街摩天大楼中穿梭。但专业人士认为他或许是当今最成功的资金管理者，是他恩师、本杰明·格雷厄姆这位传奇人物的嫡传。巴菲特在五六十年代为自己和客户赚得盆满钵满，却在1969年退出，因为他已找不到便宜货。1974年末，当道琼斯工业指数跌破600点、市场弥漫绝望氛围时，他告诉《福布斯》：“我感觉像一个性欲旺盛的男人身处后宫。现在是开始投资的时刻。” 数月内，历史上最伟大的反弹展开，道指一年多就上涨近450点。巴菲特如今怎么看？在本文中，他直言：现在就是买入的时候。

1979-08-06 Warren Buffett.You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus

1979-08-06 Warren Buffett.You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus

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