1990-03-19 Will the Real Warren Buffett Please Stand Up?

WARREN BUFFETT TALKS LIKE A CRACKER- BARREL BEN GRAHAM, BUT HE INVENTS SOPHISTICATED ARBITRAGE STRATEGIES THAT KEEP HIM WAY AHEAD OF THE SMARTEST FOLKS ON WALL STREET.

沃伦·巴菲特说话像坐在乡村杂货铺门口闲聊的本·格雷厄姆，但他发明的精妙套利策略却让他始终远远领先于华尔街最聪明的人。

BY TATIANA POUSSCHINE WITH CAROLYN TORCELLINI

撰文：塔蒂娅娜·普辛　合作：卡罗琳·托塞利尼

Warren Buffett quotes Benjamin Graham, who was quoting the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard: “Life must be lived forward but judged backwards.”

沃伦·巴菲特引用了本杰明·格雷厄姆的一句话，而格雷厄姆又在引用丹麦哲学家索伦·克尔凯郭尔：“人生必须向前而活，却要向后而评判。”

FORBES came to talk investments with the billionaire considered by many the ultimate investor of the later 20th century. Why is Berkshire Hathaway’s 59- year- old chairman quoting a dead investment thinker quoting a long- ago philosopher?

《福布斯》此次专访这位被许多人视作20世纪后期终极投资者的亿万富翁。为什么伯克希尔-哈撒韦59岁的董事长要引用已故投资大师又引用的那位古老哲学家的话？

Warren Buffett is making a fine point. It’s this: In retrospect it’s easy to see how he made 30% annual compound returns over many years; looking ahead it’s not clear how he’s going to keep beating the market; but because something is unclear doesn’t mean it can’t happen.

沃伦·巴菲特想强调的要点是：回头看，他多年取得年复合30%的收益似乎一目了然；但向前看，他如何继续跑赢大市并不清晰；然而事情不清晰并不代表它不会发生。

This is Buffett’s indirect answer to those who—like the author of a recent article in Barron’s—say that Berkshire Hathaway at a 65% premium to stated net asset value is a grossly overvalued stock. What investment company—and that’s what Berkshire Hathaway is—could be worth that kind of a premium? Even Buffett concedes he won’t be able to multiply money as fast in the future as he did in the past.

这是巴菲特对质疑者的间接回应——比如《巴伦周刊》近期文章作者——他们称伯克希尔-哈撒韦溢价其账面净资产65%实属严重高估。哪家投资公司（而伯克希尔正是投资公司）能值如此溢价？巴菲特自己也承认，未来赚钱的速度不可能像过去那样快。

But he isn’t conceding that he can’t continue beating the averages.

但他并未承认自己不能继续跑赢大盘。

No, the future isn’t visible as the past is, but that was true, too, in the decades when the Buffett legend was created. If everybody had seen what he had seen, he wouldn’t have made huge gains from his visions. From the evidence, he hasn’t lost the talent of seeing ahead.

没错，未来不像过去那样清晰可见，但在缔造巴菲特传奇的数十年里同样如此。若所有人都看见他所看见的，他就无法凭远见获取巨额收益。从现有证据看，他并未失去前瞻的天赋。

In the 1970s Buffett saw that media companies, especially big-city newspapers, were cheap relative to the earning power of their entrenched positions—their franchises—as well as logical innovations about to be introduced. That seems obvious now, but it wasn’t then. He made large investments in the Buffalo News, the Washington Post Co., Affiliated Publications. People who didn’t see what he saw gladly sold him shares at prices that now look ridiculously cheap.

20世纪70年代，巴菲特发现媒体公司，尤其是大城市报纸，相对于其稳固地位——即特许经营权——及即将出现的合理创新而言被严重低估。这在今天看来显而易见，但当时并非如此。他大举投资《水牛城新闻》《华盛顿邮报公司》和Affiliated Publications。那些未能洞悉其价值的人欣然以如今看起来荒谬低廉的价格把股票卖给他。

When the public caught on, Buffett had to find another vision. In the 1980s Buffett was among the first to appreciate the values in consumer brand names.

当公众意识到这一点后，巴菲特需要新的远见。20世纪80年代，他率先认识到消费品品牌价值。

Go back far enough in Buffett’s 49-year investment career and you’ll find this disciple of Benjamin Graham buying Ben Graham stocks: stocks selling so cheap that you had to pay only for the working capital and you got the rest of the assets for nothing. But such stocks all but vanished after the 1960s, and Buffett adapted the Graham net-working-capital approach to a much more expensive stock market.

回溯巴菲特49年的投资生涯，你会发现这位格雷厄姆门徒曾购买“本·格雷厄姆股票”：价格低到只需支付营运资本就能把其余资产白拿的股票。但此类股票在60年代后几乎消失，巴菲特遂将格雷厄姆的净营运资本方法调整用于一个更加昂贵的股市。

He began buying stocks that were cheap, not on balance sheet analysis but on off-balance-sheet analysis. A brand name might be carried on the books at \$1 but worth billions. These brand names were often more valuable than tangible assets like cash and inventory and real estate. But, not appearing on balance sheets, they were rarely capitalized by prevailing security analysis techniques.

他开始购买那些按账外分析而非资产负债表分析显得便宜的股票。一个品牌在账面可能只记1美元，却价值数十亿美元。这些品牌往往比现金、存货和房地产等有形资产更有价值。但因未出现在资产负债表上，它们很少被当时主流的证券分析技术所估值。

Buffett bought General Foods, Beatrice and RJR Nabisco. On General Foods alone he more than doubled his money when he sold in 1985.

巴菲特买入了通用食品、比阿特丽斯和RJR纳贝斯克。仅通用食品一项，他在1985年出售时就把投资翻了一倍多。

During the takeover mania of the 1980s Buffett bought shares at everyday market prices. Then he waited for somebody else to do a takeover—as in General Foods—or just sat until the market recognized the value he saw—as in Capital Cities.

在80年代的并购狂潮中，巴菲特以日常市场价购入股票，随后等待他人发起收购——如通用食品案例——或耐心持有，直到市场认识到他所看见的价值——如Capital Cities。

But that, as Kierkegaard would say, is the judgment, the backwards part. Conditions have changed as the buyout wave eliminated many stocks selling at prices that ignored intangible values. Living his life forward, Buffett began feeling for different profit opportunities. In 1987 he dabbled in arbitrage. Here’s how:

正如克尔凯郭尔所言，这就是“评判”，即向后看的一面。随着收购浪潮的到来，许多忽视无形价值而低价交易的股票被市场吞没，环境已然改变。向前生活的巴菲特开始寻找新的盈利机会。1987 年，他涉足套利，操作如下：

“We look at the arbitrage deal, once something is announced. We look at what they’ve announced, what we think it will be worth, what we will have to pay, how long we’re going to be in. We try to calculate the probability it will go through. That’s the calculation, and the name \[of the companies involved] doesn’t make much difference.” Like a horse-player, he bets the jockeys and not the horses. Maybe not surprising in a man who, according to John Train writing in The Money Masters, sold horse-racing handicapping sheets under the name Stable Boy Selections in his native Omaha, Nebr. at the ripe age of 12.

“一旦有并购要约公布，我们就评估该套利交易：对方宣布的条件、我们认为的真实价值、我们的买入成本、持有时长，并尽量计算成交概率。就是这么个算法，涉及公司的名字并不重要。”像赛马赌客一样，他押的是骑师而非赛马。或许不足为奇——正如约翰·特伦在《投资大师》中写道，巴菲特 12 岁时就在故乡内布拉斯加州奥马哈以“马厩小子精选”之名出售赛马盘口指南。

How has he done as an arbitrage handicapper? Pretty darned well. To find out, FORBES collected the state insurance commissions’ filings on all 12 of Berkshire Hathaway’s insurance companies; it is the money from these companies that provides most of Berkshire Hathaway’s investment funds. What deals did Buffett play? Some picks came as no surprise: Philip Morris, RJR Nabisco and Kraft. Other names were more surprising: Interco, Federated, Southland and Marine Midland. Here are some deals FORBES looked at.

那么，作为套利“盘口师”的战绩如何？相当惊人。为探究此事，《福布斯》调阅了伯克希尔旗下 12 家保险公司向各州保险监管机构递交的申报文件；这些保险公司资金是伯克希尔主要的投资来源。巴菲特做了哪些交易？菲利普·莫里斯、RJR 纳贝斯克、卡夫等并不出人意料；而 Interco、Federated、Southland、Marine Midland 等则颇令人惊讶。以下是《福布斯》关注的部分案例。

In 1987 he bet relatively small amounts. A \$2.7 million investment in Southland on Oct. 10 turned into \$3.3 million just ten days later—on an annualized basis that’s a 740% return. What fun.

1987 年，他下注金额相对较小。例如，他在 10 月 10 日买入 Southland 270 万美元，仅十天后即变成 330 万美元——按年化计算，收益率高达 740%。可谓痛快淋漓。

There were, of course, plenty of losers and break- evens in that crash year. Still, overall in 1987 Buffett’s arbitrage activities earned a 90% return versus the S\&P’s 5%.

当然，在那场股灾年份也有不少亏损和平盘，但 1987 年整体来看，巴菲特的套利操作取得了 90% 的收益，而标普指数仅上涨 5%。

Emboldened, Buffett increased the arbitrage stakes. In 1988 he bet on almost 20 different deals, putting in as much as \$120 million. Net net, Buffett’s trades equally weighted average annual return would have been 35%, compared with the S\&P 17.07% gain.

信心倍增的巴菲特加大了筹码。1988 年，他参与近 20 桩套利交易，投入高达 1.2 亿美元。若等权计算，巴菲特的年化平均收益率达 35%，而标普指数仅上涨 17.07%。

Most folks find a winning strategy and keep riding it for too long. Buffett’s sensitive antennae have saved him from that—so far. Buffett’s enthusiasm for arbitrage quickly cooled early last year when he lost 31% on his investments. This was even before the UAL debacle and the collapse in junk bonds marked the end of the wider stages of the takeover game. But Buffett was already playing a different arbitrage game.

大多数人找到一招制胜策略后往往骑虎难下，而巴菲特凭借敏锐嗅觉迄今避免了这种命运。去年年初，他在套利投资上亏损 31%，热情迅速降温——那还是 UAL 并购案崩盘、垃圾债市场瓦解、并购游戏大幕落下之前。但那时的巴菲特已在下另一盘套利棋。

The new game has kept his name in the news a lot in recent months, even though almost nobody really figured out what he was doing as he took stakes in huge companies like Coca-Cola, Salomon, Inc., Gillette, USAir, Champion International.

这场新游戏让他的名字近月频频见诸报端，尽管几乎没人真正看懂他为何买入可口可乐、所罗门、吉列、USAir、Champion International 等巨头股份。

What was he really doing?

他究竟在做什么？

The instrument Buffett uses for his new game is convertible preferred stock. To most people that’s a timid way of playing a situation. Buffett uses the instrument differently.

巴菲特这回使用的工具是可转换优先股。对多数人而言，这是一种保守的操作方式，而巴菲特却另辟蹊径。

Let’s look at his opening bid in the game in a deal Buffett did with John Gutfreund, chairman of Salomon Brothers, in September 1987. Salomon was then under threat of a takeover from Reylon’s Ronald Perelman. Gutfreund needed a friendly investor, and Buffett has a carefully cultivated image as friendly to the management of companies he invests in.

先看他在 1987 年 9 月与所罗门兄弟董事长约翰·古特弗伦德达成的首笔交易。当时所罗门正面临雷隆公司罗纳德·佩雷尔曼的收购威胁，古特弗伦德急需一位“友好投资者”，而巴菲特素以友善管理层的形象闻名。

Salomon sold Berkshire a new Salomon Brothers preferred stock issue, in the amount of \$700 million. Converted, the shares would have represented 12% of Salomon’s capitalization and thus an effective barrier to a hostile takeover. It also brought Buffett two influential seats on Salomon’s board.

所罗门向伯克希尔发行了 7 亿美元的新优先股。若转换，这部分股份将占所罗门总市值的 12%，有效阻挡敌意收购，同时为巴菲特带来两个举足轻重的董事会席位。

But note that Buffett didn’t commit to Salomon’s volatile common stock. The preferred issue yielded 9% and was convertible after three years into Salomon common stock at \$) 38( a premium of only \$ 2.7% to the market price at a time when a typical premium for convertible preferreds was 20% to 25%\$ . Berkshire Hathaway had a call on common at a relatively modest premium over market and way below Salomon’s old highs.

但请注意，巴菲特并未承诺买入所罗门那支波动剧烈的普通股。这批优先股票息为 9%，三年后可按 38 美元转换为所罗门普通股，溢价仅 2.7%，而当时可转优先股通常需付 20%–25% 的溢价。伯克希尔·哈撒韦因而可在市价上方相对温和、且远低于所罗门历史高位的价格认购普通股。

And there was another kicker in the form of a fat tax advantage for Buffett. We’ll get to this tax advantage later.

此外，这里面还有一条对巴菲特极为有利的丰厚税收优惠，稍后我们会谈到。

Starting in July 1989 Buffett negotiated three more such deals, all structured similarly to the Salomon one. In July Buffett bought \$) 600( million of special Gillette preferreds, yielding \$ 8 3⁄4% (against 2% on Gillette common today) and convertible at an 18% premium to the then market price of the common. Prospectively the deal put 11%\$ of Gillette’s stock in Buffett’s hands and offered protection against another hostile bid from the like of Coniston Partners.

自 1989 年 7 月起，巴菲特又谈成三宗同类交易，结构均与所罗门案相似。7 月，他以 6 亿美元购入吉列特种优先股，股息 8 ¾%，而吉列普通股当时仅 2%；该优先股可按当时普通股价溢价 18% 转换。若届时转换，这笔交易将使巴菲特持有吉列 11% 股份，并可防御 Coniston Partners 之类的再次敌意收购。

Last summer airline stocks were the takeover rage, and USAir, like Salomon Brothers, also wanted a white knight. Buffett in August bought \$) 358( million of USAir preferred bearing a \$ 9 1⁄4% quarterly dividend but with a convertible premium of 17%\$ and an option to redeem two years later.

去年夏天，航空股并购风潮正盛，USAir 与所罗门一样，也需要一位“白衣骑士”。8 月，巴菲特斥资 3.58 亿美元购入 USAir 优先股，季度股息 9 ¼%，转换溢价 17%，并附带公司两年后赎回的选项。

Buffett’s most recent such deal was signed in December. Champion International, one of the world’s largest paper producers, wanted an ally and invited Buffett in. Buffett put \$) 300( million into convertible preferred at a \$ 9 1⁄4% yield (Champion common now yields only 3.6% ), redeemable in 1999, granting Berkshire a 7.8%\$ vote, at a 30% conversion premium.

巴菲特最新的一笔此类交易于 12 月签署。全球最大造纸商之一 Champion International 寻求盟友并邀请巴菲特入股。巴菲特投入 3 亿美元购买可转优先股，收益率 9 ¼%（Champion 普通股当前股息仅 3.6%），1999 年可赎回，给予伯克希尔 7.8% 投票权，转换溢价 30%。

T he Coca-Cola investment raised eyebrows. What was a Ben Grahamite doing buying 7% of a company whose stock sold for five times book value? Accumulating 23.4 million shares over months at an average price of \$) 44( a share \$ 45 was the high for 1988), Buffett wasn’t spending () 1\$ billion on an unknown. He bought Coke at a multiple of 13 times estimated 1989 earnings when the overall market was trading at 11 times.

可口可乐这笔投资令人大跌眼镜：一位本·格雷厄姆信徒怎么会买下一家市净率达 5 倍、持股高达 7% 的公司？巴菲特在数月内累计购入 2,340 万股，平均价 44 美元（1988 年高点为 45 美元），砸下近 10 亿美元可不是在押注陌生标的。他以 1989 年预估盈利的 13 倍市盈率买进，而当时整体市场市盈率仅 11 倍。

Buffett, however, denies the purchase violates his precepts of value investing. He says Coke’s price didn’t reflect the all-but-guaranteed growth of international sales in a world that is increasingly uniform in its tastes. But he also felt shareholder value could be enhanced by more aggressive use of capital. Since he bought in, the firm has announced it would buy back up to 20 million shares, or 6% of the common — a Buffett hallmark. Since Buffett joined the board it has also announced an 18% increase in Coke’s dividend payout, a move that will make the stock look less rich.

不过巴菲特否认此举违背价值投资原则。他认为，股价未能反映全球口味日益趋同背景下国际销量几乎有保证的增长前景。同时，他也认为更加积极地运用资本可以提升股东价值。自他入股以来，公司已宣布将回购至多 2,000 万股，占普通股 6%，这正是巴菲特的招牌动作。巴菲特进入董事会后，公司还宣布将股息提高 18%，此举将使股价看起来不那么昂贵。

The market seems to have come to agree. After Coca-Cola sold its 49% interest in Columbia Pictures Entertainment to Sony last fall, Coke booked \$) 530( million in gains while adding \$ 1.1 billion in cash to its balance sheet. The stock rose to 81; Buffett already has a gain of () 600\$ million.

市场似乎已认可他的观点。去年秋天，可口可乐将持有的哥伦比亚影业 49% 股权售予索尼，账面入账 5.3 亿美元收益，并为资产负债表增添 11 亿美元现金。股价随之升至 81 美元；巴菲特已获利 6 亿美元。

And what about the other recent deals? Aren’t they just an indirect way of buying the stocks of Salomon Brothers, Champion, USAir and Gillette? Yes and no. “I wouldn’t have bought any of them on an equity basis,” Buffett tells FORBES. “This \[buying convertible preferred issues] is lending money, plus an equity kicker.” But you can look at what he is doing the other way around. Buffett was buying Gillette stock with a yield kicker. What, then, does he mean by saying he wouldn’t buy Gillette stock on an equity basis? Merely that the straight common stock is too risky. The convertible is much safer than the stock because it carries the option to put it back to the company as a fixed-income investment. It can be a stock or a bond—at Buffett’s option. If Gillette’s earnings fall apart, Buffett doesn’t convert the preferred into stock, and it retains value as a fixed-income investment.

那么最近的其他交易呢？它们难道不只是变相买入所罗门兄弟、Champion、USAir 和吉列股票的方式吗？答案是也对也不对。巴菲特告诉《福布斯》：“若单纯当股权投资，我一个都不会买。这（购买可转换优先股）本质上是放贷，再加上一点股权增值的甜头。”反过来看，巴菲特其实是在用收益附加条款买吉列股票。那他说不会买吉列普通股又是什么意思？仅仅因为单买普通股风险太大。可转优先股更安全，因为可选择将其作为固定收益投资回售给公司。它既可以是股票，也可以是债券——取决于巴菲特的选择。如果吉列盈利崩塌，巴菲特不会把优先股转为普通股，而它依然作为固定收益投资保持价值。

(This was one of the mistakes in the Barron’s article; it valued the convertibles only in terms of the underlying stocks rather than valuing them as an ideal mix of stock and bond.)

（这正是《巴伦周刊》文章中的错误之一；它只按所对应的普通股估值可转债，而没有把它们视作兼具股债特性的理想组合。）

作者不知道自己在讲什么。

Buffett gets a special deal, but so does management. Management is happy to give him a good total yield, because it can be fairly sure he’s not going to kick them out and take over.

巴菲特得到了特别协议，但管理层同样受益。管理层乐意给他优厚总收益，因为基本可以确定他不会把他们赶下台并发动收购。

Put differently, how much does Warren Buffett charge for takeover protection? Let’s look closer at the Champion deal. In 1986 Champion sold to the public a convertible bond, due in 2011. The issue pays 4.5% and is convertible into Champion common at \$34.75 per share.

换言之，沃伦·巴菲特为“反收购保护”收取多少费用？让我们仔细看看 Champion 的交易。1986 年，Champion 面向公众发行一笔 2011 年到期的可转债，票面利率 4.5%，可按 34.75 美元/股转换为 Champion 普通股。

Compare this with the deal Buffett got. His Champion preferred pays 9 1⁄4% and Buffett can convert within two years at \$38 a share—a 30% premium to Champion’s current price. Buffett got a much better yield than the public.

将此与巴菲特拿到的协议比较：他的 Champion 优先股收益率为 9¼%，两年内可按 38 美元/股转换，较当时市价溢价 30%。巴菲特得到的收益率远高于公众投资者。

Greenmail? Not at all. It’s whitemail, and it pays nicely.

这算“绿色敲诈”吗？完全不是。这是“白色邮件”，回报丰厚。

et’s talk about some of the smart ways Buffett plays the tax laws. Last September Berkshire Hathaway marketed \$903 million worth of convertible bonds (through Salomon Brothers, of course). The Berkshire Hathaway paper is a zero-coupon convertible. It yields 5.5% and matures in 15 years. It is convertible over the next 3 years into Berkshire Hathaway common stock at \$9,815—a heavy premium to Berkshire Hathaway’s then price and an even heftier premium to its asset value.

再来谈谈巴菲特巧用税法的几种方式。去年九月，伯克希尔·哈撒韦发行了 9.03 亿美元的可转换债券（当然由所罗门兄弟承销）。这是一种零息可转债，收益率 5.5%，15 年后到期；未来 3 年内可按 9,815 美元转换为伯克希尔普通股，较当时股价溢价巨大，更远高于其净资产价值。

So, from the start, Berkshire’s shareholders are ahead. They borrow at 5.5% and lend at 9% or so; banks should have it so good. Berkshire demands a conversion premium on its inflated stock of 15% and then turns and invests the money in situations where the conversion premium averages about the same. Another thing: Buyers of Berkshire’s zeros don’t get cash, but Berkshire collects cash on its preferred dividends.

因此，从一开始伯克希尔股东就占了便宜：以 5.5% 的成本借入，再以约 9% 的收益率出借；银行都没这么好赚。伯克希尔对其高估值股票要求 15% 的转换溢价，然后把钱投向同样大约享有这一级别溢价的项目。还有一点：购买伯克希尔零息债的投资者拿不到现金利息，但伯克希尔却能收取其优先股的现金分红。

You can also look at the Berkshire money-raising as highly sophisticated arbitrage. Buffett was in effect selling in the futures market a richly priced security—Berkshire Hathaway—and using the proceeds to buy long, relatively undervalued securities such as Champion and USAir.

你也可以把伯克希尔的融资视为高度复杂的套利操作：巴菲特实际上在“期货市场”卖出高价的伯克希尔证券，再用所得资金长期买入 Champion、USAir 等相对低估的证券。

But we haven’t finished parsing Buffett’s complex arbitrage. We mentioned earlier that Buffett’s deals are even better than they look because there is a tax gimmick. What is it?

不过，我们对巴菲特复杂套利的剖析尚未结束。前面提到，这些交易之所以比表面看起来更划算，还因为存在税收妙招。是什么呢？

Michael Harkins, a New York money manager who follows Buffett’s maneuvers, calls Buffett “a masterful tax arbitrager.” What he means is that Buffett structures both his borrowing and his buying so as to exploit some of the madness in the Byzantine tax code Congress has inflicted on the nation. The tax code says interest is tax deductible but dividends are not. This provision in the tax code is largely responsible for the takeover madness that swept the country last year.

关注巴菲特动向的纽约基金经理迈克尔·哈金斯称巴菲特为“高超的税务套利者”。他的意思是，巴菲特在融资和买入时都精心设计，以利用美国国会赋予全国那套繁复税法中的种种荒诞之处。税法规定利息可抵税，而股息不可抵税。这一条款正是去年席卷全美并购狂潮的重要推手。

Buffett has exploited the tax code in his usual subtle, cautious way. He makes most of his investments not through Berkshire Hathaway itself but through Berkshire’s insurance companies. The insurance companies receive the dividends on the preferred issues. As corporations these insurance companies take advantage of a partial tax exemption for dividends they receive from other corporations. The rules are complicated, but Buffett figures that his effective tax rate on dividends received is only 13% . That means the after-tax yield on the 9% Salomon preferred is 8% , much better than the after-tax yield on a high-quality bond.

巴菲特一如既往地以细腻而谨慎的方式利用税法。他的大部分投资并非直接通过伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身，而是通过伯克希尔旗下的保险公司进行。这些保险公司收取优先股分红，作为公司实体，它们可享受来自其他公司分红的部分免税优惠。虽然规定复杂，但巴菲特计算后发现，他在分红上实际承担的税率仅为 13%。这意味着 9% 息票的所罗门优先股税后收益率达到 8%，远优于高评级债券的税后收益。

This explains Buffett’s fondness for insurance companies. He thinks insurance is a rotten business, and, other things being equal, he’d like never to write another policy. But where else can he get the juicy, uncommitted cash flows and the tax advantages?

这也解释了巴菲特对保险公司的偏爱。他认为保险业本身并不好做，若条件允许，他宁愿再也不签发新的保单。可问题在于，除了保险公司，他还能在哪儿获得如此丰厚且不受限制的现金流与税收优势呢？

It gets even better with the Berkshire convertible bonds. Interest cost on these is fully tax-deductible. The after-tax interest cost is, therefore, around 3.6% . Now he turns around and reinvests in things that yield at least 8% after tax. Any banker would kill for a spread like that.

伯克希尔发行的可转换债券让情况更上一层楼。其利息支出可完全抵税，税后实际利率仅约 3.6%。随后，他再把这笔钱重新投向税后至少 8% 收益的项目。如此息差，任何银行家都梦寐以求。

His aversion to paying unnecessary taxes explains Buffett’s refusal to let Berkshire pay a common dividend; doing so would expose his shareholders to the notorious double taxation of dividends that Congress allows in the name of “fairness.” Better he should reinvest the money and give the shareholders the benefit of untaxed appreciation in asset value.

巴菲特厌恶不必要纳税，也就能解释他为何拒绝让伯克希尔派发普通股股息；派息会让股东遭遇国会以“公平”之名所设的“双重征税”。他更愿意把资金再投资，让股东分享资产增值而非被征税的好处。

There are wonderful advantages to being Warren Buffett, with his white knight image, his reputation for the golden touch, but there is the large disadvantage that, once he has pioneered an investment strategy, the homesteaders are close on his heels. As his innovations are copied, the returns narrow. He is forced to find a new frontier.

作为沃伦·巴菲特自然有其巨大优势：白衣骑士的形象、点铁成金的声誉；可伴随而来的大劣势是，一旦他开创某种投资策略，追随者便蜂拥而至。随着创新被复制，收益率趋于收窄，他被迫不断开辟新战场。

So it is with the white mail/convertible preferreds. According to a recent account in the Wall Street Journal, Lazard Freres has created a partnership and has already cut deals with Polaroid and Transco Energy Corp. Theodore Forstmann, the leveraged buyout chap, wanted to raise \$3 billion to \$4 billion from pension funds and insurers to do a haircut on the Buffett technique but has since had to lower his expectations.

白色邮件／可转优先股策略亦如此。《华尔街日报》近日报道，拉扎德已设立合伙基金，与宝丽来及 Transco Energy 达成协议。杠杆收购大佬西奥多·弗斯特曼原本想从养老基金与保险公司筹集 30 亿至 40 亿美元，仿效巴菲特的做法，但如今不得不降低预期。

What will Buffett do for an encore? Buffett won’t talk directly about his plans for the future—why make life easier for the imitators? Anyhow, he is the sort of man who never says a word more than absolutely necessary.

巴菲特接下来会如何出招？他从不直接谈论未来计划——没必要替模仿者铺路。况且，他本就是那种只说绝对必要之话的人。

Some clues to his future emerge, however, from what he says of what he sees directly ahead for the economy. Buffett expects many of the leveraged buyouts of the last few years to sink. With its ready access to cheap cash, Berkshire will be able to step in and do some leveraging on terms highly favorable to itself. Buffett already has a term for the next stage: UBOS, an unleveraged buyout.

不过，从他对经济前景的只言片语中，可窥见些许线索。巴菲特预计过去几年进行的许多杠杆收购将陷入困境。凭借轻松获取的低成本资金，伯克希尔可以趁机以极为有利的条件出手。他已为下一阶段取名：UBOS——无杠杆收购。

No way, he concedes, can he match the 20% annual returns he has delivered in the past. Berkshire now has about \$5 billion in equity or net asset value, too much to move around easily. But he is convinced 15% returns are doable. To do that Buffett must generate earnings of \$750 million this year. Five years ago \$200 million would have done the trick.

他承认，不可能再复现过去年化 20% 的回报。伯克希尔如今拥有约 50 亿美元净资产，体量过大，难以灵活腾挪。但他坚信 15% 的回报仍可实现。要做到这一点，今年收益必须达到 7.5 亿美元；而在五年前，仅需 2 亿美元即可达标。

It looks difficult. And it will be difficult. Getting back to Kierkegaard, the past always seems obvious, the future obscure. But Buffett has his certainties. He likes to say: “In the short run the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it’s a weighing machine.” So you keep cool, hold down the risks and go with what the scale tells you rather than what the trend of the moment says. Anyone who can do that, consistently, his stock is certainly worth a premium to the market.

这看起来困难，也的确会很难。回到克尔凯郭尔：过去总显得显而易见，未来却模糊不清。不过巴菲特自有定见。他常说：“短期看市场是投票机，长期看是称重机。”因此，你要保持冷静、控制风险，依赖“秤”的衡量而非当下的趋势。凡能始终如一做到这一点，其股票当然值得市场支付溢价。

MANAGERS THINKING ABOUT ACCOUNTING ISSUES SHOULD NEVER FORGET ONE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S FAVORITE RIDDLES: HOW MANY LEGS DOES A DOG HAVE, IF YOU CALL A TAIL A LEG? THE ANSWER: FOUR, BECAUSE CALLING A TAIL A LEG DOESN’T MAKE IT A LEG. —WARREN BUFFETT

“管理者在思考会计问题时切勿忘记亚伯拉罕·林肯最爱出的那个谜语：如果把尾巴称作腿，一条狗有几条腿？答案仍是四条，因为把尾巴叫作腿并不会让它变成腿。”——沃伦·巴菲特

1990-03-19 Will the Real Warren Buffett Please Stand Up?

1990-03-19 Will the Real Warren Buffett Please Stand Up?

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