1992 Steve Jobs.MIT Distinguished Speaker Series
Speech Transcript 演讲稿
Ladies and gentlemen, we are extremely grateful for Steve to giving up his time to be with us this afternoon. Could you please give a warm welcome to our distinguished guest, Steve Jobs.
女士们，先生们，我们非常感谢史蒂夫今天下午抽出时间与我们在一起。请大家热烈欢迎我们的尊贵嘉宾，史蒂夫·乔布斯。
Thank you. Hi. I guess we get to spend an hour or so together today. And most of the time, I wanted to spend just talking about what you want to talk and answering some questions. But I thought if you wanted, I'd take about 10 minutes or 15 minutes upfront and tell you what we're doing at NeXT and why the world might need another computer company. Is that something you guys think about these things? OK.
谢谢。你好。我想我们今天可以一起度过一个小时左右的时间。在大部分时间里，我想和你们聊聊你们想聊的话题，并回答一些问题。但我想如果你们愿意，我可以先花大约 10 到 15 分钟的时间告诉你们我们在 NeXT 做什么，以及为什么世界可能需要另一家电脑公司。你们觉得这些事情值得思考吗？好的。
I thought I'd tell you about some of our mistakes. Maybe that would be more useful. We have a lot of scar tissue. There is a really interesting book that was written by a guy named Paul Strassmann. And Paul has one of the more interesting jobs in the planet. He's the Chief Information Officer— CIO of a very large organization called the Pentagon. And they really understand software there. I had a conversation with him not too long ago, and he said, the lesson from the Gulf War was that the best software will win the war.
我想告诉你一些我们的错误。也许这会更有用。我们有很多伤疤。有一本非常有趣的书是由一个叫保罗·斯特拉斯曼的人写的。保罗在这个星球上有着更有趣的工作之一。他是一个非常大型组织——五角大楼的首席信息官（CIO）。他们对软件的理解非常深刻。我不久前和他进行了一次对话，他说，海湾战争的教训是，最好的软件将赢得战争。
And so they're trying to do a lot of work in the software area. He wrote a book, though, before he got this job called The Business Value of Computers. It's rather thick, and it's not good bedtime reading. But you can plow through it, and there's some incredible stuff in it. And he asked two questions in particular. One was, he surveyed a bunch of companies from not very successful all the way up through really successful. And there's somebody taking notes here.
他们正在软件领域做很多工作。不过，在他得到这份工作之前，他写了一本书，名为《计算机的商业价值》。这本书相当厚，不适合睡前阅读。但你可以努力读完，里面有一些令人难以置信的内容。他特别问了两个问题。一个是，他对一群公司进行了调查，从不太成功到非常成功的公司都有。这里有人在做笔记。
He asked how much they spent on information technology as a percentage of revenues. And he got a very counter-intuitive answer, right? You'd think that either the really successful companies would either spend more or less than the not-successful companies, depending on your theory. But it was exactly the same. They all spent about 2% of revenues on information technology.
他问他们在信息技术上花费的比例占收入的多少。他得到了一个非常反直觉的答案，对吧？你可能会认为，成功的公司要么花费更多，要么花费更少，具体取决于你的理论。但结果却是完全一样。他们在信息技术上的花费都大约占收入的 2%。
And he found this curious, and so he asked another question. How did they spend their money? And he found out that the really successful ones— actually, let's start with the not-so-successful ones. As success increases and dollars increase, he found out that the not-so-successful ones spent the majority of their money on management productivity, and the more successful ones spent the majority of their money on operational productivity applications.
他觉得这很奇怪，于是又问了一个问题。他们是如何花钱的？他发现，真正成功的人——实际上，我们先从那些不太成功的人开始。随着成功和收入的增加，他发现那些不太成功的人把大部分钱花在管理生产力上，而那些更成功的人则把大部分钱花在运营生产力应用上。
Now, this was not very pleasant for me to read, because I spent the first 10 years of my life on management productivity, which was PCs. PCs and Macs never attacked operational productivity. They just attacked management productivity. Why is that? Because you can't go down to your local computer store and buy an app that will help you do stock trading, or will help you run a hospital, or will help you in whatever operational part of your business you want to automate. Unless you're a very, very small business, then you can run some accounting packages. But other than that, if you were a medium-sized or large business, these things never attacked operational productivity.
现在，这对我来说读起来并不是很愉快，因为我生命的前十年都在关注管理生产力，也就是个人电脑。个人电脑和苹果电脑从未专注过运营生产力。它们只是专注了管理生产力。为什么会这样？因为你不能去当地的电脑商店买一个可以帮助你进行股票交易的应用程序，或者帮助你管理医院，或者帮助你自动化你业务中任何运营部分的应用程序。除非你是一个非常非常小的企业，否则你可以使用一些会计软件。但除此之外，如果你是中型或大型企业，这些东西从未专注过运营生产力。
So we zoom out and we say, how have people attacked operational productivity with information technology? Well, in the '60s, they bought a mainframe, and they got some terminals and a bunch of COBOL programmers, and they wrote a few apps. And most of them were kind of back-room apps. And it sort of worked for the very few that could afford to do this.
所以我们放大视野，问一下，人们是如何利用信息技术提高运营生产力的？在 60 年代，他们购买了一台大型计算机，配备了一些终端和一群 COBOL 程序员，编写了一些应用程序。大多数应用程序都是后台应用。对于那些能够负担得起这样做的人来说，这种方式勉强奏效。
In the '70s, they got a mainframe and some terminals, and they did the same thing. And a few of them got a few mini computers and terminals and tried to do it a little cheaper. In the '80s, nothing changed. Mainframe and terminals, minis and terminals. Until maybe about two or three years ago. What happened two or three years ago was that the front office started to realize that they needed operational apps so bad that they couldn't depend on the MIS folks anymore.
在 70 年代，他们购置了一台大型计算机和一些终端，做了同样的事情。然后他们中的一些人又购置了一些小型计算机和终端，试图以更低的成本来实现。在 80 年代，情况没有变化。大型计算机和终端、小型计算机和终端。直到大约两三年前。两三年前发生的事情是，前台开始意识到他们迫切需要应用程序，以至于再也不能依赖 MIS 人员了。
They started taking life into their own hands and sometimes working with the MIS folks to start downsizing and getting some servers and running some industry-standard databases like Sybase or Oracle in the servers, and making a little local area network, and getting maybe some Sun Workstations, and spending about two years writing some mission-critical operational applications. Like trading apps for Wall Street, perfect example.
他们开始掌握自己的生活，有时与 MIS 团队合作，开始缩减规模，获取一些服务器，并在这些服务器上运行一些行业标准的数据库，如 Sybase 或 Oracle，建立一个小型局域网，可能还购买一些 Sun 工作站，花费大约两年的时间编写一些关键的应用程序。例如，华尔街的交易应用程序，就是一个完美的例子。
And it kind of worked. And the reason that they needed to do this was because more and more, they were discovering that things like new products required a custom operational application. An example, if you're in financial services and you come up with a new product, it's only three things. It's an idea, it's a sales force, and it's a custom app to bang on databases to make the product real, to do the mortgage swaps or whatever it is you want to do. Without the app, you don't have a product.
这有点奏效。他们之所以需要这样做，是因为他们越来越发现，新产品等事物需要定制的应用程序。举个例子，如果你在金融服务行业，推出一个新产品，只有三样东西。一个是想法，一个是销售团队，还有一个是定制应用程序，用于操作数据库，使产品变为现实，进行抵押贷款掉期或其他你想做的事情。没有这个应用程序，你就没有产品。
And so there has been an increasing buildup of demand from the front parts of corporations to create more and more and more of these operational applications. And I think it's going to get to the point where this becomes fairly clear that this is the next big revolution in desktop computing, is to attack the operational productivity. And as we start to re-engineer the way we do things, to automate a lot of this in custom applications.
因此，企业前端对创建越来越多的应用程序的需求不断增加。我认为这将变得相当明显，这将是桌面计算的下一个重大革命，即提升操作生产力。随着我们开始重新设计工作方式，以在定制应用程序中自动化许多流程。
Sounds a little strange now, to most people. Sounds like desktop publishing in 1985. Nobody knew what it was, everybody thought it was kind of a strange vertical thing over there. But my guess is it's pretty horizontal. And we're attacking vertical markets now that know they want this. And it's going extremely well. Sun is the only company that's really had any success at this, and we're knocking them out of the box. Because we came up with the software called NeXTSTEP which lets you build apps five to 10 times faster than anything anyone's ever seen.
现在对大多数人来说听起来有点奇怪。听起来像 1985 年的桌面出版。没有人知道这是什么，大家都觉得那边有点奇怪的垂直应用。但我猜这其实是相当水平的。我们现在正在攻克那些知道自己想要这个的垂直市场。而且进展非常顺利。Sun 是唯一一家在这方面真正取得成功的公司，而我们正在将他们击败。因为我们开发了名为 NeXTSTEP 的软件，它让你构建应用程序的速度比任何人见过的快五到十倍。
And after you build them, they're deployable and usable by mere mortals, because it's really easy to use, this computer. And you can interoperate your custom apps seamlessly with a bunch of off-the-shelf productivity apps. So we go to these companies that use Suns and take two years to write their apps—or are thinking about using Suns, and they can write their apps in about 90 days on a NeXT. Now, if you're on Wall Street and you can create a new product in 90 days versus your competitor in two years, that's eight new products you can field for their every one. And you can start to see the competitive advantage that can be created this way.
在你构建它们之后，它们可以被普通人部署和使用，因为这台计算机真的很容易使用。你可以将自定义应用程序与一堆现成的生产力应用程序无缝互操作。因此，我们去那些使用 Sun 公司的企业，花两年时间编写他们的应用程序——或者考虑使用 Sun 的企业，他们可以在 NeXT 上大约 90 天内编写他们的应用程序。现在，如果你在华尔街，你可以在 90 天内创建一个新产品，而你的竞争对手需要两年时间，那么你就可以在他们每一个产品的基础上推出八个新产品。你可以开始看到通过这种方式可以创造的竞争优势。
Now, we had no idea that we were any good at this when we started NeXT. A lot of times you don't know what your competitive advantage is when you launch a new product. Let me give you historical example. When we created—how many of you guys use Macs? Anybody? Good.
现在，当我们开始 NeXT 时，我们完全不知道自己是否擅长这个。很多时候，当你推出新产品时，你并不知道自己的竞争优势是什么。让我给你一个历史例子。当我们创建——你们有多少人使用 Mac？有人吗？很好。
How many of you have seen a NeXT? Oh, how many of you use a NeXT? Oh, that's not so bad. We'd like to change that ratio a little bit.
你们中有多少人见过 NeXT？哦，有多少人使用 NeXT？哦，这还不错。我们想稍微改变一下这个比例。
We're on the right track. When we did the Macintosh, we never anticipated desktop publishing when we created the Mac. Sounds funny, because that turned out to be the Mac's compelling advantage, right? The thing that it did not one and a half or two times better than everything else, but four or five times better than anything else, where you had to have one. We never anticipated it. We anticipated bitmap displays and laser printers, but we never thought about page maker, that whole industry really coming down to the desktop. Maybe we weren't smart enough.
我们走在正确的道路上。当我们开发 Macintosh 时，完全没有预料到桌面出版的出现。听起来很有趣，因为这恰好成了 Mac 的一个重要优势，对吧？它并不是比其他产品好一到两倍，而是好四到五倍，让人不得不拥有一个。我们从未预料到这一点。我们预见到了图形显示器和激光打印机，但从未想到页面制作软件，整个行业真的会降临到桌面上。也许我们当时不够聪明。
But we were smart enough to see it start to happen nine to 12 months later. And we changed our entire marketing and business strategy to focus on desktop publishing, and it became the Trojan horse that eventually got the Mac into corporate America, where it could show its owners all the other wonderful things it could do.
但我们足够聪明，能够在 9 到 12 个月后看到这一切开始发生。于是我们改变了整个营销和商业策略，专注于桌面出版，这成为了最终将 Mac 引入美国企业的特洛伊木马，让它向用户展示了其他所有美妙的功能。
Likewise, when we created NeXTSTEP, this revolutionary object-oriented software that we have, our target customer coming from the PC world, where shrinkwrapped apps were king, was Lotus and Adobe and WordPerfect and all the shrinkwrapped apps developers. And the purpose was to let them create their apps five to 10 times faster for these shrinkwrapped apps. And it worked. We have a ton of shrinkwrapped apps, now. Best of breed in almost every category.
同样，当我们创建 NeXTSTEP 这个革命性的面向对象软件时，我们的目标客户来自 PC 世界，在那里，盒装软件是王者，主要是 Lotus、Adobe 和 WordPerfect 以及所有盒装软件的开发者。我们的目的是让他们能够以五到十倍的速度创建这些盒装软件的应用程序。结果是成功的。现在我们有大量的盒装软件，几乎在每个类别中都是最优秀的。
But it wasn't until early in '91, early last year, a little over a year ago, that some really big companies came to us and said, you don't understand what you've got. The same software that allows Lotus to create their apps five to 10 times faster is letting us build our in-house mission-critical apps five to 10 times faster. And this is the biggest problem we've had.
但直到 91 年初，也就是去年初，一年多前，一些真正的大公司找到了我们，告诉我们，你们不明白自己拥有的是什么。让 Lotus 能够以五到十倍的速度创建应用程序的软件，也让我们能够以五到十倍的速度构建我们内部的关键任务应用程序。这是我们面临的最大问题。
This is a huge problem for every big company, and almost all medium-sized companies, and you have a solution in your hands, and you dummies don't even know it. And it took them about three months before we finally heard it. And then last summer, we changed our whole sales and marketing strategy around to focus on that. And it's taken off like a rocket.
这对每个大公司和几乎所有中型公司来说都是一个巨大的问题，而你们手中有解决方案，但你们这些傻瓜甚至都不知道。我们大约等了三个月才终于听到这个消息。然后去年夏天，我们彻底改变了整个销售和营销策略，专注于这个。结果它像火箭一样腾飞。
And we grew about 4x last year, and probably grow about 2x this year. And our customer list is now very, very strong and growing like crazy. We just got back from spending a few days in DC and in New York. And we're talking to customers we only dreamed of talking to a year ago. So that's what we do. And our arch enemy Sun, they want to kill us. Which is good. They should try to do that as soon as possible, because the sooner they do it, the cheaper it will be for them.
我们去年增长了大约 4 倍，今年可能增长约 2 倍。我们的客户名单现在非常强大，增长得非常快。我们刚从华盛顿和纽约度过几天回来。我们正在与一年前只敢梦想的客户交谈。这就是我们的工作。而我们的死敌Sun，他们想要消灭我们。这很好。他们应该尽快尝试这样做，因为他们越早这样做，对他们来说成本就越低。
I think it's gone past the point where it's possible. And the greatest thing is, hardware churns every 18 months. It's pretty impossible to get a sustainable competitive advantage from hardware. If you're lucky, you can make something one and a half or two times as good as your competitor, which probably isn't enough to be quite a competitive advantage. And it only lasts for six months.
我认为这已经超过了可能的界限。最重要的是，硬件每 18 个月就会更新一次。从硬件中获得可持续的竞争优势几乎是不可能的。如果你运气好，你可以做出比竞争对手好 1.5 倍或 2 倍的产品，但这可能不足以形成真正的竞争优势。而且这种优势只持续六个月。
But software seems to take a lot longer for people to catch up with. I watched Microsoft take eight or nine years to catch up with the Mac, and it's arguable whether they've even caught up. It takes a long time. And we think that the soonest we're going to have a true competitor is probably four to five years. So we've got that amount of time to grow ourselves a $1 to $2 billion company so that we can compete with them on scale.
但软件似乎需要更长的时间让人们赶上。我看到微软花了八到九年才赶上 Mac，甚至可以说他们是否真的赶上了还值得争论。这需要很长时间。我们认为，最早要有一个真正的竞争对手可能需要四到五年。因此，我们有这段时间来将自己发展成一个价值 10 亿到 20 亿美元的公司，以便能够在规模上与他们竞争。
See, today we can't compete with them on scale. We never have as many salespeople as they do, as Sun does. We don't have the ad budgets that they do. So we've got to have a better product. And I hope we always have a better product, and I think we can. But I'd also like to be able to at least give them a run for their money on scale. So we've got the next three to four years to run really fast, so that by the time they even get close to having a competitive product, we're at a large enough scale to where we can start to compete with them.
看，今天我们无法在规模上与他们竞争。我们从来没有像他们那样多的销售人员，也没有像Sun那样的广告预算。因此，我们必须拥有更好的产品。我希望我们始终拥有更好的产品，我相信我们可以做到。但我也希望至少能在规模上与他们一较高下。因此，我们在接下来的三到四年里必须快速发展，以便在他们接近拥有竞争产品时，我们的规模足够大，可以开始与他们竞争。
And that's what we're doing with our lives right now, spending a lot of time with customers, spending a lot of time making NeXTSTEP better, and that kind of thing. So that's the strategic basis of what we do. Does that make any sense to you? Have you run across the concept of sort of operational custom applications at all?
我们现在的生活就是这样，花很多时间与客户交流，花很多时间改进 NeXTSTEP，做这些事情。这就是我们工作的战略基础。你觉得这样有道理吗？你有没有遇到过某种操作性定制应用的概念？
I mean, most of you have come from companies where you've had work experience, right? And you've all done that? So do you have this problem in the companies you come from, of a lot of pressure to write these operational custom applications and hardly anything coming out of the spigot to satisfy this thirst? How many of you from Wall Street? Good.
我想，大多数人都来自有工作经验的公司，对吧？你们都经历过这个吗？那么你们来自的公司是否存在这样的问题：有很大的压力去编写这些操作定制应用程序，但几乎没有任何成果来满足这种需求？你们中有多少人来自华尔街？很好。
Good How many of you from manufacturing companies? Excellent. Where are the rest of you from?
很好，你们中有多少人来自制造公司？太好了。你们其余的人来自哪里？
Consulting. 咨询。
How many from consulting? Oh, that's bad.
咨询方面有多少？哦，那真糟糕。
A mind is too important to waste.
头脑太重要了，不能浪费。
You should do something. 你应该做点什么。
Why is that bad? A consultant can come into a company and use your system, and basically build their applications in predictably short amounts of time, and show them a working product.
为什么这不好？顾问可以进入公司，使用你的系统，基本上在可预测的短时间内构建他们的应用程序，并向他们展示一个可工作的产品。
The only consultants I've seen that I think are truly useful are the ones that help us sell our computers. No seriously, I don't think there's anything inherently evil in consulting.
我见过的唯一我认为真正有用的顾问是那些帮助我们销售电脑的顾问。说真的，我不认为咨询本身有什么邪恶之处。
I think that without owning something, over an extended period of time— like, a few years— where one has a chance to take responsibility for one's recommendations, where one has to see one's recommendations through all action stages and accumulate scar tissue for the mistakes and pick oneself up off the ground and dust oneself off, one learns a fraction of what one can.
我认为，如果没有拥有某样东西，经过一段较长的时间——比如几年——在这个过程中，人有机会对自己的建议负责，必须经历所有行动阶段并为错误积累伤痕，自己从地上爬起来并抖掉身上的灰尘，那么人所学到的只是其中的一小部分。
Coming in and making recommendations and not owning the results, not owning the implementation, I think is a fraction of the value, and a fraction of the opportunity to learn and get better. And so you do get a broad cut at companies, but it's very thin. It's like a picture of a— I'm a vegetarian, so I won't use steak. But it's like a picture of a banana.
进来提出建议却不承担结果，不参与实施，我认为这只是价值的一小部分，也是学习和提升机会的一小部分。因此，你确实可以对公司有一个广泛的了解，但这非常肤浅。就像一张——我是素食主义者，所以我不想用牛排。但这就像一张香蕉的照片。
You might get a very accurate picture, but it's only two dimensional. And without the experience of actually doing it, you never get three dimensional. So you might have a lot of pictures on your walls. You can show it off to your friends. You can say look, I've worked in bananas, I've worked in peaches, I've worked in grapes. But you never really taste it. And that's what I think.
你可能会得到一个非常准确的图像，但它只是二维的。如果没有实际操作的经验，你永远无法获得三维的感觉。所以你可能在墙上挂了很多图片。你可以向朋友炫耀。你可以说，看看，我在香蕉上工作过，我在桃子上工作过，我在葡萄上工作过。但你从未真正品尝过。这就是我的想法。
You're also a variable expense. And in hard times, you find yourself. You find yourself variable, right?
你也是一个可变的开支。在困难时期，你会发现自己。你发现自己是可变的，对吧？
If it's the software that's going to make or break your company, how come you're putting out on platform. Why don't you put it on Sun's? They have a much larger base.
如果软件将决定你公司的成败，为什么你要在这个平台上发布？为什么不放在 Sun 的上？他们的用户基础更大。
Right, very good question. I'm going to generalize your question. Why don't we just become a software company, right? That's a very good question. It's a subtle question. I'm going to try to go through some several things, and I'm sorry if I jump around. We got a lot of requests from customers last year that they would love to see NeXTSTEP on other platforms, and primarily, Intel-based platforms like the 486.
好的，非常好的问题。我将对你的问题进行概括。我们为什么不直接成为一家软件公司呢，对吧？这是一个非常好的问题。这是一个微妙的问题。我会尝试讨论几个方面，如果我跳来跳去请你见谅。去年我们收到了很多客户的请求，他们希望在其他平台上看到 NeXTSTEP，主要是基于 Intel 的平台，比如 486。
So we decided to do just that. And we have ported NeXTSTEP to the 486, and we're finishing it now. And it will ship in the September, October timeframe. And it's exactly the same stuff we run in our own computer. Same app, same user interface, same training, same development environment. And we're going to sell it for $9.95, and we're OEMing it to a bunch of companies whose names you'll recognize quite easily, and OEMing it to them at a much cheaper price.
所以我们决定这样做。我们已经将 NeXTSTEP 移植到 486 上，现在正在完成它。它将在九月或十月发货。它与我们自己电脑上运行的完全相同。相同的应用程序，相同的用户界面，相同的培训，相同的开发环境。我们将以 9.95 美元的价格出售，并以更便宜的价格将其 OEM 给一些你们很容易认出的公司。
And everybody's coming out of the woodwork to help us. We're getting help from Novell. We're getting help from all the developers. Intel's really helping us. And they really want us to succeed. Why is that? Right. They all want to make sure that there's a choice out there, and they're all really scared about Microsoft. And they see NeXTSTEP as the only thing on the horizon that can challenge Microsoft in system software for the next several years. So we're enjoying a lot of help, and boy we need it, so that's good.
大家都纷纷出面来帮助我们。我们得到了 Novell 的支持，所有开发者也在帮助我们。英特尔真的在帮助我们，他们非常希望我们成功。为什么呢？没错，他们都想确保市场上有选择，他们都对微软感到非常担忧。他们认为 NeXTSTEP 是未来几年内唯一能够在系统软件上挑战微软的东西。因此，我们得到了很多帮助，真是太好了，我们确实需要这些帮助。
Now, we've also had a lot of requests from companies to port NeXTSTEP to other platforms. And we're talking to some of those companies right now. Now, we've got a lot of requests from Sun customers the port NeXTSTEP to Sun. So a lot of them are saying, look, we may not want to buy them anymore, but we already bought 500, and we don't want to throw them in the bay. So can we put your software in them? Because Sun's falling behind in software. Now, Sun says they'd rather stick needles in their eyes than help us do this.
现在，我们也收到了很多公司请求将 NeXTSTEP 移植到其他平台的要求。我们正在与其中一些公司进行洽谈。现在，我们收到了很多来自 Sun 客户的请求，希望将 NeXTSTEP 移植到 Sun。因此，他们中的许多人表示，听着，我们可能不想再购买它们，但我们已经购买了 500 台，我们不想把它们扔进海湾。那么我们能否在它们上面安装你们的软件？因为 Sun 在软件方面落后了。现在，Sun 表示他们宁愿往自己眼睛里扎针，也不愿意帮助我们做到这一点。
That's a quote. And so we're evaluating right now, which will be worse for Sun, if we port it or if we don't port it? And since we're fairly customer-driven, we'll probably end up doing what the customers ask us to do, because we want to make them happy. Now, this leads one into the question, should we just be a software company?
这是一句引用。因此我们现在正在评估，如果我们移植它，还是不移植它，对 Sun 来说哪个更糟？由于我们相当以客户为导向，我们可能最终会做客户要求我们做的事情，因为我们想让他们满意。现在，这引出了一个问题，我们是否应该只做一家软件公司？
And we think the answer is no. We think we should be a software company and a hardware company. In making the decision to put NeXTSTEP on more than our own platforms, we clearly decided that we will sell less than 100% of the NeXTSTEP hardware. However, we think that the marketplace will grow, and we will sell more absolute hardware.
我们认为答案是否定的。我们认为我们应该是一家软件公司和一家硬件公司。在决定将 NeXTSTEP 放在我们自己的平台之外时，我们明确一部分硬件由我们自己提供，我们认为市场会增长，我们将销售更多的硬件。
跟随本心，乔布斯不能容忍不可控的局面。
And secondly, the charter of our hardware division is to make the best NeXTSTEP hardware. Might not be the cheapest, might not be this, might not be that. But we think all in all, we can make the best stuff. And I would love at nothing better than if someday we only sold 20% or 25% of the NeXTSTEP hardware. But I still think that's a billion-dollar-plus hardware business. And I'll get into one other hardware-related reason in a minute.
其次，我们硬件部门的任务是制造最好的 NeXTSTEP 硬件。可能不是最便宜的，可能不是这个，可能不是那个。但我们认为，总的来说，我们可以制造出最好的产品。我希望有一天我们只销售 20% 或 25% 的 NeXTSTEP 硬件。但我仍然认为这是一项超过十亿美元的硬件业务。我稍后会再提到一个与硬件相关的原因。
There are some things I can't talk about here. In addition to that, if you look at how we sell our computers right now, we have a sales force in the US of about 130 professionals in the field out selling NeXT computers. They spend 90% of their time selling NeXTSTEP software, and then 10% of their time selling the hardware.
有些事情我不能在这里谈论。此外，如果你看看我们现在如何销售我们的计算机，我们在美国有大约 130 名专业销售人员在外面销售 NeXT 计算机。他们 90%的时间用于销售 NeXTSTEP 软件，10%的时间用于销售硬件。
In other words, if they can get the customer to buy into NeXTSTEP, then they're going to sell the hardware, because right now we have the only hardware it runs on. So they are out there selling NeXTSTEP right now. And this is what is required to launch a new innovative product. The current distribution channels for the computer industry over the last several years have lost their ability to create demand.
换句话说，如果他们能让客户接受 NeXTSTEP，那么他们就会销售硬件，因为现在我们拥有唯一可以运行它的硬件。因此，他们现在正在销售 NeXTSTEP。这是推出新创新产品所必需的。在过去几年中，计算机行业的当前分销渠道已经失去了创造需求的能力。
They can fulfill demand, but they can't create it. If a new product comes out, you're lucky if you can find somebody at the computer store that even knows how to demo it. So the more innovative the product is, the more revolutionary it is and not just an incremental improvement, the more you're stuck. Because the existing channel is only fulfilling demand. Matter of fact, it's getting so bad, that it's getting wiped out, because there are more efficient channels to fulfill demand, like the telephone and Federal Express. So we're seeing the channel become condensed on its way to I think just telebusiness.
他们可以满足需求，但无法创造需求。如果有新产品推出，如果你能在电脑商店找到一个甚至知道如何演示它的人，那你就算幸运了。因此，产品越创新，越具有革命性，而不仅仅是渐进式的改进，你就越陷入困境。因为现有的渠道只是满足需求。事实上，情况变得如此糟糕，以至于它正在被淘汰，因为有更高效的渠道来满足需求，比如电话和联邦快递。因此，我们看到渠道在向我认为只是远程商务的方向收缩。
So how does one bring innovation to the marketplace? We believe the only way we know how to do it right now is with the direct sales force, out there in front of customers showing them the products in the environment of their own problems, and discussing how those problems can be mated with these solutions.
那么，如何将创新带入市场呢？我们相信，目前我们唯一知道的有效方法就是通过直接销售团队，亲自到客户面前展示产品，让他们在自己面临的问题环境中看到这些产品，并讨论如何将这些问题与解决方案匹配。
A software-only company could never afford to field a direct sales force. With average selling prices of $500 a software package, you could never afford 130 professionals in the field. With an average selling price of $5,000, you can. And that's why I don't think we're going to see any more systems software companies succeed. I don't think it's possible to fund the efforts to educate the market about a revolutionary product with ASPs that low.
一家仅靠软件的公司永远无法负担直接销售团队。软件包的平均售价为 500 美元时，你根本无法负担 130 名专业人员在现场工作。而当平均售价为 5000 美元时，你就可以。因此，我认为我们不会再看到任何系统软件公司成功。我认为以如此低的平均售价来资助市场教育一款革命性产品的努力是不可能的。
很独特的视角，巴菲特买入房屋中介公司跟这个很类似，。
And if it's not a revolutionary product, I don't think the company can succeed. So our strategy has been that we've got to be a hardware company in order to make our software business succeed. And we think we can do really well at both of them. I know that's a long answer, but it's a complex problem too. Yes?
如果这不是一款革命性的产品，我认为公司无法成功。因此我们的战略是，我们必须成为一家硬件公司，以使我们的软件业务成功。我们认为我们在这两方面都能做得很好。我知道这是个很长的回答，但这也是一个复杂的问题。是吗？
Sure. If you ask us who our competitors are, we'll say really three things. One is Sun's Solaris software, the other is Microsoft, and the third is Taligent. Let's take them in that order. Sun for a while had a software value added, because they had the best Unix in the marketplace. But the market's moved way beyond that, and unfortunately, Sun hasn't. So their software's falling further and further behind, and while we take them very seriously, we don't think Solaris is going to be much competition. It doesn't have an object in it, and it's pretty much what they have today.
当然。如果你问我们谁是我们的竞争对手，我们会说其实有三个。一个是Sun公司的 Solaris 软件，另一个是微软，第三个是 Taligent。我们按这个顺序来讨论。Sun公司曾经有过软件增值，因为他们在市场上拥有最好的 Unix。但市场已经远远超越了这一点，不幸的是，Sun公司并没有跟上。因此，他们的软件越来越落后，尽管我们非常重视他们，但我们认为 Solaris 不会成为太大的竞争对手。它里面没有对象，基本上就是他们今天所拥有的。
Microsoft is doing NT, which is their sort of second attempt that a Unix wannabe. And that's great, and I think it will be better than the last one, which was OS/2. But fundamentally, it's just an operating system. It's better plumbing for Windows. That's a good way of thinking of it. Unfortunately, you're still stuck with Windows in all of its glory, including the worst development environment that's ever been invented. And so we don't think that this is really going to present a challenge to what we're going after, which are these mission-critical custom apps, because the development environment is horrendous, it's not object-oriented, and even with the better plumbing, we think it will be widely rejected for what we do.
微软正在开发 NT，这是他们第二次尝试成为 Unix 的替代品。这很好，我认为它会比上一个版本 OS/2 更好。但从根本上说，这只是一个操作系统。它为 Windows 提供了更好的底层支持。这是一个很好的理解方式。不幸的是，你仍然被困在 Windows 的所有辉煌之中，包括有史以来最糟糕的开发环境。因此，我们认为这并不会对我们所追求的任务关键型定制应用程序构成真正的挑战，因为开发环境非常糟糕，它不是面向对象的，即使有了更好的底层支持，我们认为它也会被广泛拒绝。
In terms of Taligent, Taligent represents the first true competitor that we could have. They're going to ship a product around 1995, if they execute to their plans. And I think if they do execute to their plans and work really hard, by about the mid '90s, they'll have roughly what we have today. And that's not meant as a joke. It still means we have to run very hard, because they will have a lot of resources at their disposal.
在 Taligent 方面，Taligent 代表了我们可能面临的第一个真正的竞争对手。如果他们按照计划执行，他们将在 1995 年左右推出一款产品。我认为如果他们确实按照计划执行并努力工作，到 90 年代中期，他们将拥有大致与我们今天相同的产品。这并不是开玩笑。这仍然意味着我们必须非常努力，因为他们将拥有大量的资源可供使用。
I think there's a lot of questions as to whether they will ever ship a product. I think they're a few years away from having something running, unquote. But we take them very seriously. Now, they've helped us enormously, because they've blessed object-oriented programming. And right now, we're the only folks that have it, and will be for the next three or four years. So if we can't compete with Taligent, it's probably because we've shot ourselves in the foot. You couldn't ask for something better. IBM and Apple saying, these guys are right on track, and come back in five years and we'll have it too. It's great. And so the ball's in our court. Yes, in the back.
我认为关于他们是否会推出产品有很多问题。我认为他们距离有可运行的产品还有几年。但我们非常认真对待他们。现在，他们对我们帮助巨大，因为他们推动了面向对象编程。而现在，我们是唯一拥有它的人，未来三到四年内也将是如此。所以如果我们无法与 Taligent 竞争，那可能是因为我们自毁前程。你无法要求更好的事情。IBM 和苹果说，这些家伙正走在正轨上，五年后我们也会有。这太棒了。因此，球在我们这边。是的，后面。
You describe NeXTSTEP as an environment and an operating system. And what I hear you talk about is a great way to develop an application. I don't develop applications. I use other operating systems. Do you see a fracture of the operating system market into a specialized niche that you're describing, and then the general market for those of us who don't develop apps? Or are you saying that you can then bridge from an environment that allows you to develop apps into an operating system that'll be like Windows or MS DOS on a lot of machines?
你将 NeXTSTEP 描述为一个环境和一个操作系统。我听到你谈论的是一个开发应用程序的好方法。我不开发应用程序。我使用其他操作系统。你是否认为你所描述的操作系统市场会分裂成一个专门的细分市场，以及一个针对我们这些不开发应用程序的人的一般市场？还是说你认为可以从一个允许你开发应用程序的环境过渡到一个像 Windows 或 MS DOS 那样的操作系统，在许多机器上使用？
Well, let's get our terminology straight. We look at NeXTSTEP as an operating environment. Much more than an operating system. Unix, which is our operating system, is 10% of NeXTSTEP. So in these modern operating environments, when you develop a custom app in NeXTSTEP, it doesn't run on the Mac or on Windows. It can't. You need all the objects that come with NeXTSTEP to make it work.
好吧，让我们理清术语。我们将 NeXTSTEP 视为一个操作环境。远不止是一个操作系统。Unix 是我们的操作系统，占 NeXTSTEP 的 10%。因此，在这些现代操作环境中，当你在 NeXTSTEP 中开发一个自定义应用时，它无法在 Mac 或 Windows 上运行。它不能。你需要 NeXTSTEP 附带的所有对象才能使其工作。
And let me go into a little detail there. How many of you are technical here? A lot, OK, great. Well, we've discovered something. You don't write code any faster in NeXTSTEP than you do in any other operating and development environment that we know of. However, to do a particular app on average, you write about 20% of the code that you do in any other development environment we know of. About 20% of the code than in Sun or in anything else.
让我详细说一下。这里有多少人是技术人员？很多，好，太好了。我们发现了一些事情。在 NeXTSTEP 中编写代码的速度并不比我们知道的其他操作和开发环境快。然而，开发一个特定的应用程序时，您编写的代码大约是我们知道的其他开发环境的 20%。在 Sun 或其他任何环境中，代码量大约是 20%。
So the code that's the fastest to write, the code that's the easiest to maintain, and the code that never breaks, is the code you don't write. So that's our strategy, write a lot less code. And the way we do this is we enable the developer to use a lot of objects that others have written. We ship six years worth of objects with NeXTSTEP.
所以，写起来最快的代码、最容易维护的代码，以及永远不会出错的代码，就是你不写的代码。因此，这就是我们的策略，写更少的代码。我们实现这一点的方法是让开发者使用许多其他人编写的对象。我们随 NeXTSTEP 一起提供六年的对象。
You can create your own objects for your own company, and then reuse them around your developers. And there's now independent third party companies not selling system software, not selling applications, but selling objects. There's not quite 10 of them, and it's starting. And I think it's going to be a very big thing.
您可以为自己的公司创建自己的对象，然后在您的开发人员之间重复使用它们。现在有一些独立的第三方公司，它们不销售系统软件，不销售应用程序，而是销售对象。这样的公司还不到 10 家，但它们正在起步。我认为这将会是一个非常大的趋势。
不是每个想法都能够走到最后。
So in order to deliver these apps that are created on the NeXTSTEP, you have to have NeXTSTEP so they can run on top and take advantage of this rich community of objects. And that's why we're porting NeXTSTEP to the 486. That's why you'll see NeXTSTEP running on several hardware platforms. And will there be a fracturing, if you will? Sure, to some extent. And I tend to look at it as a transition. Was there a fracturing when Mac came out? Yes. And there's been more of a transition, as people either move to Mac or in the case of Windows, adopt what's good about the Mac.
因此，为了交付在 NeXTSTEP 上创建的这些应用程序，您必须拥有 NeXTSTEP，以便它们能够在上面运行并利用这个丰富的对象社区。这就是我们将 NeXTSTEP 移植到 486 的原因。这就是您将看到 NeXTSTEP 在多个硬件平台上运行的原因。那么会不会有一种分裂呢？当然，在某种程度上会有。我倾向于将其视为一种过渡。当 Mac 发布时是否发生过分裂？是的。随着人们要么转向 Mac，要么在 Windows 的情况下采用 Mac 的优点，过渡的情况更多。
Same thing's going to happen here. We believe very strongly that the benefits from these object-oriented environments— not only just rapid development, but a much richer user environment. If you use a NeXT, it's a lot nicer than a Mac or a PC, even if you never developed an app. Other environments will absorb some of those breakthroughs, and more and more people will use NeXTSTEP. And things will tend to balance themselves out over time. But there will be a transition. And our goal is to make sure we're part of it. Yeah.
同样的事情将在这里发生。我们非常坚信，这些面向对象的环境带来的好处——不仅仅是快速开发，还有更丰富的用户环境。如果你使用 NeXT，它比 Mac 或 PC 要好得多，即使你从未开发过应用程序。其他环境将吸收一些这些突破，越来越多的人将使用 NeXTSTEP。事情会随着时间的推移趋于平衡。但会有一个过渡期。我们的目标是确保我们成为其中的一部分。是的。
You spoke earlier that your competitive advantage, you felt lied in the fact that these companies today were needing development on the operational basis, as opposed to the management. Many companies, though— or some, perhaps— outsource their development. How does this change you business strategy?
你之前提到你的竞争优势在于这些公司今天需要在运营基础上进行开发，而不是管理。不过，许多公司——或者说一些公司——将他们的开发外包。这如何改变你的商业策略？
Good question. If our business strategy says that we do a lot of things well, but the tip of our arrow, or our Trojan horse, which is getting us into these large and medium-sized accounts is our custom application development ability, then our growth is going to be paced among other things by the development community available to these companies to develop these apps.
好问题。如果我们的商业战略表明我们做了很多事情很好，但我们进入这些大中型客户的关键在于我们的定制应用开发能力，那么我们的增长将受到可供这些公司开发这些应用的开发社区的影响。
Now, even though we have shrunk the development time down to a fraction of what it was, still without developers out there, we're not going to win. Fortunately, most companies have really increased the staffs of good people in their IS departments dramatically in the last several years— last four or five years. There's now really bright people who know something about computer science in IS departments. And most of the industries we talk to, whether they're healthcare, financial services, even law enforcement, places like that have on-site developers in their IS teams.
现在，尽管我们已经将开发时间缩短到原来的很小一部分，但如果没有开发人员在外面，我们仍然无法获胜。幸运的是，过去几年，尤其是过去四五年，大多数公司在其信息系统部门显著增加了优秀员工的数量。现在，信息系统部门里有很多聪明的人，他们对计算机科学有所了解。我们接触的大多数行业，无论是医疗保健、金融服务，甚至执法等地方，都在其信息系统团队中拥有现场开发人员。
If not, they're starting to become a lot of vars, and people out there that we're using in LA or in New York where I just was, we probably have about 10 independent third party companies helping parts of Wall Street develop things. So I think that's not going to be a stumbling block. My personal opinion is the number of people in applications development is shrinking. It exploded in the '80s with PCs, but now that industry is consolidating. It's consolidating down to very few companies. And there's a lot of excess people out there, that I think are starting to get channeled into some of these other areas.
如果不是这样，他们开始变得有很多变量，而我们在洛杉矶或我刚去过的纽约使用的人，可能有大约 10 家独立的第三方公司在帮助华尔街开发一些东西。所以我认为这不会成为一个绊脚石。我的个人观点是，应用开发领域的人数正在减少。这个行业在 80 年代随着个人电脑的出现而爆炸性增长，但现在这个行业正在整合。它正在整合到非常少的公司中。而且外面有很多多余的人，我认为他们开始被引导到其他一些领域。
So far, it hasn't been a problem. But if you want to do that, please call us and tell us, because we always need more. So what are you guys all going to do when you get out of here? You going to go back to your companies? How many of you are going to go back? How many aren't going to go back? What are you going to do?
到目前为止，这还不是问题。但如果你想这样做，请给我们打电话告诉我们，因为我们总是需要更多。那么你们出来后打算怎么做？你们会回到自己的公司吗？有多少人会回去？有多少人不会回去？你们打算怎么做？
Well yeah, I think we always have jobs for really smart, technical people. You know, technically-based people. And you guys are getting a great business education here. Yeah, we'd love to talk to you about it. Yes, sir.
当然，我认为我们总是有职位适合非常聪明、技术型的人。你知道，技术背景的人。而你们在这里获得了很好的商业教育。是的，我们很乐意和你们谈谈这个。是的，先生。
Well, I don't want to step on any toes here.
好吧，我不想踩到任何人的脚。
Go ahead. 继续。
But where do you Apple would be had you not left it? And specifically, could it have come out with something as revolutionary in the tech industry?
但是，如果你没有离开苹果，你认为苹果会在哪里？具体来说，它是否能够推出在科技行业中如此革命性的产品？
Well, these are deep questions.
好吧，这些是深刻的问题。
I'll tell you, I've obviously thought about this a lot. And I don't want to get into it too much. But I will say that I think everybody lost. I think I lost. And I wanted to spend my life there. I think Apple lost. I think customers lost. And having said all that, so what? You go on. It's not as bad as a lot of things. Not as bad as losing your arm.
我告诉你，我显然对此想了很多。我不想过多深入。但我想说的是，我认为每个人都输了。我觉得我输了。我想在那儿度过我的一生。我认为苹果输了。我认为顾客也输了。说了这么多，那又怎么样呢？你继续生活。这并没有那么糟糕。比失去一只手臂要好得多。
So people go on, and companies go on. And I think Apple— I'm very happy every time Apple ships a Mac. It makes me very, very happy. I think the PowerBooks are decent products. I like them. But Apple has been struggling the last few years. They've been having a real struggle with who they want to be.
人们继续前行，公司也在继续。我很高兴每次苹果发布一款 Mac。我感到非常非常高兴。我认为 PowerBook 是不错的产品。我喜欢它们。但苹果在过去几年里一直在挣扎。他们在努力寻找自己想要成为什么样的公司。
And this is nothing new. We always had that. That was part of what kept Apple alive, I think. And there were two camps within Apple. Camp one wanted to be the next serious computer company, and camp two wanted to sort of be the Sony of computers. And that struggling I think was somewhat tearing Apple apart.
这并不是新鲜事。我们一直都有这个。我认为这也是让苹果生存下来的部分原因。苹果内部有两个阵营。第一个阵营想成为下一个严肃的计算机公司，而第二个阵营则想成为计算机界的索尼。我认为这种挣扎在某种程度上让苹果分裂。
And fortunately, the Sony guys have won. They've kind of decided to go be the Sony of computers. And so the PowerBooks are pretty good, but the Quadras suck wind right now, the high end stuff. And they're basically not putting a lot of resources onto the power users on desktops, and they've put most of their best people now on the portables and on consumer products that they're going to be coming out with.
幸运的是，索尼的人赢了。他们决定成为计算机领域的索尼。因此，PowerBook 还不错，但 Quadra 现在表现糟糕，尤其是高端产品。他们基本上没有在桌面上的专业用户身上投入很多资源，而是将大部分优秀人才放在便携式设备和即将推出的消费产品上。
And I think they'll do very well at that. Now, there's a problem in there, in that if you look at the consumer products that sell over a million a year, you can count them on a few hands. It turns out, there's not— I mean, consumer electronics products, not like toothbrushes. But electronics products. And so let's assume they have one of those or two of those. Let's say they have a product that sells two million a year at a $500 ASP to them.
我认为他们会做得很好。不过，这里面有个问题，如果你看看每年销售超过一百万的消费电子产品，你可以用几只手来数。结果是，消费电子产品并不多——我指的是电子产品，而不是像牙刷这样的产品。所以我们假设他们有一款或两款这样的产品。假设他们有一款每年销售两百万，平均售价为 500 美元的产品。
So it sells to the consumer at $795 or something like that. That's what, a billion dollars, right? two million a year, $500 apiece. It's a billion dollars. They still have to get the other $7 billion of revenue somewhere. So it's going to be an interesting transition as the ASPs get lower. The volumes have to get much, much higher, and you run into some scale issues when you look out at the consumer electronics industry.
所以它以大约 795 美元的价格出售给消费者。这是什么，10亿美元，对吧？每年两百万，五百美元一件。这是10亿美元。他们仍然需要在其他地方获得 70 亿美元的收入。因此，随着平均销售价格降低，这将是一个有趣的过渡。销量必须大幅增加，而当你观察消费电子行业时，会遇到一些规模问题。
Not that it's not possible. And I think it's going to be really interesting to watch. And we also see a lot of not quite that clarity of movement, but some movement in the Windows and PC world again towards taking what they have now and making it portable. But not giving the top third of the market more power.
这并不是说不可能。我认为这将会非常有趣。同时，我们也看到在Windows和PC领域，虽然不够清晰，但确实有一些动向，试图将现有技术变得更具可携性。但这些动向并没有赋予市场最顶层的1/3更多的能力。
You know, System 7 on the Mac was supposed to be the second coming. And it wasn't. It turned out to be an incremental improvement. OS/2 was supposed to take us into new dimensions, and it turned out to be a complete failure. And they're going to throw another $100 million after it just to make sure you all know about it.
你知道，Mac上的System 7曾被认为是第二次革命。但是它并没有。它只是一个渐进的改进。OS/2曾被认为能带我们进入新的维度，但结果却完全失败了。他们还要再投入一亿美金，只为确保大家都知道这件事。
And so there is a third of those desktops out there that the users and the people that want to deploy more sophisticated apps are— they're in the desert wanting something to drink. And I think there's a tremendous opportunity to give them some solutions.
因此，有三分之一的桌面用户和希望部署更复杂应用程序的人就像在沙漠中渴望饮水。我认为这是一个巨大的机会，可以为他们提供一些解决方案。
Now, that doesn't mean that Apple is not going to be successful. It just means they're going to go off in another direction. Who knows what would have happened had all this not happened. Yes, up in the corner?
现在，这并不意味着苹果不会成功。这只是意味着他们将朝另一个方向发展。谁知道如果这一切没有发生会发生什么呢？是的，在角落里？
You've talked a lot about making products. I wonder if you could talk about the management at NeXT, and if you see changing at all, as you hope, go from $120 million company to a $1 billion company.
你谈了很多关于产品的事情。我想知道你能否谈谈 NeXT 的管理，以及你是否看到任何变化，正如你所希望的，从一个 1.2 亿美元的公司发展到一个 10 亿美元的公司。
Sure. Yeah, we're— we've done a lot in the last year. The most significant things we did were, one, we hired this guy right here. Mike Slade is our VP of Marketing. He spent—you can stand up.
当然。是的，我们在过去一年里做了很多事情。我们做的最重要的事情之一就是，我们聘请了这个人。迈克·斯莱德是我们的市场副总裁。他花了——你可以站起来。
No. 不。
And he's cheap, too. 而且他也很便宜。
And Mike spent seven or eight years at Microsoft. And I originally met him, he was the Product Manager for Excel when it first came out, and ended up running big pieces of marketing for Microsoft. So Mike runs all the marketing at NeXT.
迈克在微软工作了七八年。我第一次见到他时，他是 Excel 刚推出时的产品经理，后来负责微软的大部分市场营销。所以迈克负责 NeXT 的所有市场营销。
And Mike came in to NeXT just about the time when we were finally hearing what these big companies were saying about mission critical custom apps. And so we've worked very closely together to redefine the marketing strategy of the company. And Mike is done just a superb job at that.
迈克在我们终于听到这些大公司对关键任务定制应用程序的看法时，正好来到 NeXT。因此，我们紧密合作，重新定义了公司的营销策略。迈克在这方面做得非常出色。
The second big thing we did was, about three months ago, a little over three months ago, we consolidated our hardware design engineering, our manufacturing, our worldwide distribution, and hardware service all into one chunk called the hardware division. So from cradle to grave, they have hardware responsibility. And we're in the process of forming the software division right now, so that we're all still under the same roof, but we have clarity about the fact that we've got to make two businesses successful.
我们做的第二件大事是，大约三个月前，稍微超过三个月前，我们将我们的硬件设计工程、制造、全球分销和硬件服务整合成一个称为硬件部门的整体。因此，从摇篮到坟墓，他们负责硬件。我们现在正在组建软件部门，以便我们仍然在同一屋檐下，但我们清楚地知道我们必须让两个业务成功。
The third thing that we did was— and we have a really great person running that, Rich Page, who is one of the founders of NeXT. And he's doing a great job running that. We hired a new CFO recently, Marcel Gani.
我们做的第三件事是——我们有一个非常出色的人在负责这个项目，Rich Page，他是 NeXT 的创始人之一。他在管理这个项目方面做得非常出色。我们最近聘请了一位新的首席财务官，Marcel Gani。
He's from Intel, spent 12 years at Intel doing some pretty interesting jobs. He ran all of finance for Europe. He ran all of internal audit for the Board. He ran all of manufacturing, planning, and scheduling for a while, and things like that. He's a pretty good guy, went to Cyprus for a year and a half, and then came to NeXT. And he's great.
他来自英特尔，在英特尔工作了 12 年，做了一些非常有趣的工作。他负责欧洲的所有财务工作。他负责董事会的所有内部审计工作。他还负责过一段时间的制造、计划和调度等工作。他是个不错的人，去了塞浦路斯一年半，然后来到 NeXT。他很棒。
And then recently, as a matter of fact, about last week, I hired a Chief Operating Officer, a guy named Peter van Cuylenburg. And Peter is someone I first met when we were looking for an Executive Vice President to the Sales and Marketing.
最近，实际上是上周，我聘请了一位首席运营官，一个名叫彼得·范库伦堡的家伙。彼得是我第一次见到的，当时我们在寻找一位销售和市场的执行副总裁。
And he turned me down for the job. And we subsequently decided not to hire that position. And I've been chasing him for the last year and a half almost. He's really good. He spent a lot of time at TI as [? run ?] Europe, and about three years ago, went to a company called Mercury Communications in England—they're the MCI of the UK—and turned that company around to about $2 billion, and then was promoted to run half of Cable & or half of Mercury's parent company, Cable & Wireless, and was running—they're about $6 billion.
他拒绝了这个职位。后来我们决定不再聘用这个职位。我已经追了他一年半了。他真的很优秀。他曾在TI工作，负责欧洲业务，大约三年前去了一个名叫Mercury Communications的公司——这是英国的MCI——并把那家公司扭转过来，达到了大约20亿美元的规模，然后被提拔到管理Cable & Wireless的一半业务，他们的公司大约有60亿美元。
And he went there when he thought that communications and computing were going to, kind of, come together, but never happened. And he figured out that his real love is in the computer business. He's very, very good, operationally, so that's just happened last week.
他去那里是因为他认为通信和计算会结合在一起，但这从未发生。他意识到自己真正热爱的领域是计算机行业。他在操作方面非常出色，这件事上周刚发生。
It seems like all the good people I really want to hire, it seems take me a year to hire them. Them And it's always been that way, even at Apple. Some of the best technical people, or whoever, it always seemed to take me, like, a year to pry them out of HP, or wherever, and took me over a year to hire—I think Mike has the award. You're about a year and a half.
似乎我真正想要雇佣的所有优秀人才，似乎都需要我花费一年的时间来雇佣他们。而且这种情况一直都是这样，即使在苹果公司也是如此。一些最优秀的技术人才，或者其他人，似乎总是需要我花费大约一年的时间才能把他们从惠普或其他地方挖出来，雇佣他们花费了我超过一年的时间——我认为迈克获得了这个奖项。你大约花了一年半的时间。
And they're all worth it. What happens is, I usually meet somebody that is really good—I think is very, very good. And you can't get them. And then you go try to find other people. And nobody measures up.
而他们都是值得的。发生的事情是，我通常会遇到一个非常优秀的人——我认为他非常非常优秀。可是你无法得到他们。然后你去尝试寻找其他人，但没有人能与之匹敌。
You know, when you meet somebody that good, just, you always compare them to this one person. And you know you're going to be settling for second best if you compromise. And I've always found it best not to compromise, and just keep chipping away.
你知道，当你遇到这么好的人时，你总是会把他们和某一个人比较。而你知道如果妥协的话，你就会满足于次优选择。我一直发现最好不要妥协，而是继续努力。
So I think we're doing quite a bit. It feels like we're running the company a lot better now than we ever have. We've definitely made our share of mistakes. Yeah?
所以我觉得我们做得相当不错。现在感觉我们比以往任何时候都更好地管理公司。我们确实犯过不少错误。是吗？
What technological advances do you see coming over the next five to 10 years? and how is NeXTSTEP structured to take advantage of those?
在未来五到十年内，您预见到哪些技术进步？NeXTSTEP 是如何结构化以利用这些进步的？
I'll give you a global answer. Then we can descend into some details. I believe that you can use the concept of technology windows opening, and then eventually closing. And what I mean by that is, enough technology, usually from fairly diverse places, comes together, and makes something that's a quantum leap forward possible.
我会给你一个总体的回答。然后我们可以深入一些细节。我相信你可以使用技术窗口开启然后最终关闭的概念。我的意思是，足够的技术，通常来自相当多样化的地方，汇聚在一起，使得某种飞跃成为可能。
And it doesn't come out of nowhere. If you poke around the labs, and you hang around the Media Lab here at MIT and other places, you can, kind of, get a feel for some of those things. And usually, they're not quite possible. But, all of a sudden, you start to sense things coming together, and the planets lining up, to where this is now possible, or barely possible. And a window opens up.
这并不是凭空而来的。如果你在实验室里四处探查，或者在麻省理工学院的媒体实验室和其他地方逗留，你可以大致感受到其中的一些东西。通常来说，这些东西并不是完全可行的。但突然间，你开始感觉到事情在逐渐成形，行星开始对齐，这一切变得可能，或者勉强可能。然后，一个窗口打开了。
And it usually takes around— my experience anyway, my life has been, it takes around five years to create a commercial product that takes advantage of that technical window opening up.
通常需要大约——根据我的经验，我的生活是，创造一个利用那个技术窗口开放的商业产品大约需要五年。
Sometimes you start before the window is quite open. And you can't get through it. And you push it up. And you push it up. Sometimes it just takes a lot of work, took that long with the Apple II, took that long with the Mac. You know, it took a Lisa along the way, $100 million. It takes a while. It's a expensive to push those windows open.
有时候你在窗口还没完全打开的时候就开始了。你无法通过它。你不断地推它。你不断地推它。有时候这确实需要很多努力，Apple II 花了那么长时间，Mac 也花了那么长时间。你知道，Lisa 也花了 1 亿美元。需要一段时间。推开这些窗口是很昂贵的。
And in our case, you know, our first product failed. We came out with this cube. And we sold 10,000 of them. Why? Because we weren't quite there yet. And we made some mistakes along the way. And we had to course correct.
在我们的案例中，你知道，我们的第一个产品失败了。我们推出了这个立方体。我们卖出了 10,000 个。为什么？因为我们还没有完全准备好。在这个过程中我们犯了一些错误。我们不得不进行调整。
You know, Macintosh was a course correction off the Lisa. So with Apple II and III, we did it in reverse. It takes around five years, or some number of years like that, to realize that window opening. And then it seems to take about another five years to really exploit it in the marketplace.
你知道，Macintosh 是对 Lisa 的一个修正。因此，在 Apple II 和 III 上，我们是反向操作。大约需要五年，或者类似的几年，才能意识到那个窗口的开启。然后似乎又需要大约五年才能在市场上真正利用它。
And let me give you some examples. from my life. Apple II lasted 15 years, 15 years. The hardware churned. But basically, it was the same for 15 years. DOS—you know, DOS, just passed 10 years. I don't think anyone would disagree that it's going to easily last another five, right—unfortunately.
让我给你一些例子，来自我的经历。苹果 II 持续了 15 年，15 年。硬件更换了。但基本上，它在 15 年里都是一样的。DOS——你知道，DOS，刚过了 10 年。我想没有人会不同意它很容易再持续五年，对吧——不幸的是。
And Mac, you know, Mac is eight years old, right? No question it's going to last another four or five years, right? These things are hard. They don't last because it's convenient, or even because it's economic. They last because they're really—this is hard stuff to do.
而 Mac，你知道，Mac 已经八岁了，对吧？毫无疑问，它还会再用四五年，对吧？这些东西很坚固。它们之所以耐用，不是因为方便，甚至也不是因为经济实惠。它们之所以耐用，是因为这真的是很难做到的。
And so when we are pushing that window open, I think with our current generation of products, we finally got the window open. After six years, it's open. We've got an extremely elegant implementation. And we've got five years of work to do to exploit it in the marketplace.
所以当我们推开那个窗口时，我认为凭借我们当前一代的产品，我们终于把窗口打开了。经过六年，它终于打开了。我们有一个极其优雅的实现。我们还有五年的工作要在市场上利用它。
You know, we'll peak in five years. Five years, we'll all sit around, and say, OK, it's time to get started on the next thing. It's time to get going on the next thing—maybe four years from now. But we've got a lot of work ahead of us just to move this thing out, and educate the market, and continue to refine it based on market feedback.
你知道，我们将在五年内达到巅峰。五年后，我们都会坐在一起，说，好吧，是时候开始下一个事情了。是时候开始下一个事情了——也许是四年后。但我们还有很多工作要做，才能推动这个项目，教育市场，并根据市场反馈继续完善它。
So everything I know about technology windows that are open, or just about open, is in NeXTSTEP, or we're working on it in the labs. And these things generally don't come along independently. They, kind of— clumps of them come together, has been my experience.
所以我所知道的关于技术的所有信息，关于开放或即将开放的窗口，都在 NeXTSTEP 中，或者我们正在实验室中进行研究。这些东西通常不会独立出现。根据我的经验，它们往往是成群结队地出现的。
So the things that aren't in there right now that I can talk about, there's some video stuff that's really interesting, that's going to be integrated in. There some security stuff that's really fascinating that's integrating in. But most of the core technologies in there—products are getting smaller and portable. Products are getting much, much faster. But these things are well known.
所以现在没有提到的一些事情，我可以谈谈，有一些非常有趣的视频内容将会被整合进来。有一些非常吸引人的安全技术也在整合中。但大多数核心技术已经在里面——产品变得更小、更便携。产品变得快得多。但这些事情都是众所周知的。
You know, the products that we can put on—that we can give to you in the next year or two are going to be running at speeds that I find hard to believe. And I've been doing this for a while. So I think the windows open.
你知道，我们可以在接下来一两年内提供给你的产品将以我难以置信的速度运行。我已经做这个有一段时间了。所以我认为机会来了。
And I think object-oriented technology is the biggest technical breakthrough I have seen since the early '80s, with the graphical user interfaces. And I think it's bigger, actually. It will prove to be bigger over time. Yes?
我认为面向对象技术是自 80 年代初以来我所见过的最大技术突破，尤其是图形用户界面。我认为它实际上更大。随着时间的推移，它将证明是更大的。是吗？
I have a question. If the value [INAUDIBLE] and things like operational applications, and NeXTSTEP is a tool to help you build those, where do you draw the line in capturing the most value between actually developing applications, something like Word or Excel, and becoming a tool builder to support those people who may capture a little bit more of the value? Where do you want to draw the line there?
我有一个问题。如果价值[听不清]和操作应用程序之类的东西，而 NeXTSTEP 是一个帮助你构建这些的工具，那么在实际开发应用程序（比如 Word 或 Excel）和成为一个工具构建者以支持那些可能捕获更多价值的人之间，你会在哪里划定捕获最大价值的界限？你想在哪里划定这个界限？
If you're a software company?
如果你是一家软件公司？
If you're a software company.
如果你是一家软件公司。
Well, Microsoft has made it easy.
好吧，微软让这变得简单。
Repeat the question. 重复这个问题。
Yeah, oh, sorry, the question is, if you're a software company, should you develop apps, or should you develop objects and tools? And see, the software industry, with Microsoft, and Lotus, and WordPerfect made it real easy. Unless you've got $20 million or $30 million burning a hole in your pocket so you can go out and hire a few hundred people to develop what it takes to develop one of these polished shrink-wrapped apps on Mac or on Windows, then you don't have much of a choice. There's not a real opportunity there to— assuming you had the best spreadsheet today, you could easily spend $50 million marketing it before you'd be breaking even selling it, because of just how expensive it is to market a product today.
是的，哦，抱歉，问题是，如果你是一家软件公司，你应该开发应用程序，还是应该开发对象和工具？看看，软件行业，像微软、Lotus 和 WordPerfect 让这变得非常简单。除非你有 2000 万或 3000 万美金在口袋里烧着，以便你可以出去雇几百个人来开发制作这些精致的包装应用程序所需的东西，否则你没有太多选择。如果假设你今天拥有最好的电子表格，你可能很容易在营销上花费 5000 万美元，才会在销售时达到收支平衡，因为今天营销一个产品是多么昂贵。
But that's only for existing spreadsheets. If you're trying to develop a next-level generation of it, a different type of product.
但这仅适用于现有的电子表格。如果你试图开发下一代产品，那就是另一种类型的产品。
Well, assume that you have a breakthrough spreadsheet. Again, on mainstream platforms, it will take $50 million to just rise above the noise level and market it. So what the brightest people I know of today are doing is they're writing objects. They're writing hunks of things that other developers are going to use to build apps. And they're going where everybody isn't. And that's, I think, going to be the next new thing. Yeah?
好吧，假设你有一个突破性的电子表格。再次强调，在主流平台上，仅仅为了超越噪音水平并进行市场推广，就需要 5000 万美元。因此，我所知道的最聪明的人正在做的是，他们在编写对象。他们在编写其他开发者将用来构建应用程序的模块。他们去的是大家都不去的地方。我认为这将是下一个新趋势。是吗？
You mentioned that a possible problem for Macs is the lack of developers and consultants out there who recommend it. Based on that view, what's the NeXT view of how to market itself to academic institutions?
你提到，Mac 的一个可能问题是缺乏推荐它的开发者和顾问。基于这种观点，NeXT 如何看待自己在学术机构中的市场营销？
I think your question is, what is our philosophy on marketing our products to higher education?
我认为你的问题是，我们在向高等教育市场营销我们的产品时的理念是什么？
Mhm. 嗯。
Well, we started off selling only to higher education, which arguably, was a mistake. And But we've done really well there. And our hearts are there. And we sold a lot of Macintoshes there too, when we were at Apple.
好吧，我们最开始只向高等教育销售，这可以说是一个错误。但我们在那里的表现非常好，我们的心也在那里。我们在苹果公司时也卖出了很多 Macintosh。
And I think it's a no-brainer. I think you take your products. You discount them as heavily as you can. You sell them into higher education. Higher education is a wonderful place to give you great feedback about how to make your products better, and what's wrong with them. And it's a great place to educate bright people that you can hire, and that your customers can hire when they graduate, so we do exactly that.
我认为这是显而易见的。你应该把你的产品尽可能大幅度地打折。你把它们销售给高等教育。高等教育是一个很好的地方，可以给你提供关于如何改进产品以及产品存在什么问题的反馈。而且这是一个培养优秀人才的好地方，这些人才在毕业后可以被你和你的客户雇用，所以我们正是这样做的。
We have— I think were sold on about 350 campuses in the United States. We are clearly the number one selling workstation across the US. And we're the number two selling computer of any type at campuses, like here MIT or Stanford, right behind the Macintosh.
我们在美国大约有 350 个校园销售。我认为我们显然是美国销量第一的工作站。在校园中，我们是所有类型计算机的第二大畅销产品，比如这里的麻省理工学院或斯坦福大学，仅次于 Macintosh。
We sell more computers at MIT than PCs through the institutional resale engines. So we do as much as we can. And I think it's been pretty effective. What do you think?
我们在麻省理工学院通过机构转售渠道销售的计算机比个人电脑还要多。因此我们尽可能多地做。 我认为这非常有效。你怎么看？
I mean, for example, [INAUDIBLE] is going away. Like, the support [INAUDIBLE] is going.
我的意思是，例如，[听不清]要离开了。就像，支持[听不清]也要走了。
Right. 对。
I mean, I'm talking about, not just selling computers. I'm talking about establishing a network of institutionalized system [INAUDIBLE].
我的意思是，我说的不仅仅是卖电脑。我是在谈论建立一个制度化系统的网络[听不清].
Well, what's happening is— see, the Project Athenas didn't succeed for a reason. They didn't succeed, because they had a lot of good ideas as a research project, but the people necessary to commercialize those things and make them into real products aren't necessarily the same people that are going to pioneer the ideas at a university like MIT.
好吧，发生的事情是——你看，阿尔忒弥斯计划没有成功是有原因的。它们没有成功，因为作为一个研究项目，它们有很多好的想法，但将这些想法商业化并将其转化为真正产品所需的人，不一定是那些在像麻省理工学院这样的大学中开创这些想法的人。
And so those projects never quite get baked. The recipes, kind of, developed. And you make a few samples. And it's pretty good, but the computer industry is pretty advanced. And so other people pick up those ideas, and make them into real products. And they, kind of, leave the research projects in the dust if the researchers drop research and start trying to commercialize stuff.
因此，这些项目从未真正成熟。配方有点发展了。你做了一些样品。效果还不错，但计算机行业相当先进。因此，其他人会采纳这些想法，并将其转化为真正的产品。如果研究人员放弃研究，开始尝试商业化，那么他们就会把研究项目抛在脑后。
And I can point to 100 examples of that in higher education. So it's probably good that Project Athena has a beginning, a middle, and an end, so that those people don't get stuck trying to do commercial software in an academic environment. It's, kind of, a mismatch.
我可以举出 100 个高等教育中的例子。因此，阿西娜计划有一个开始、中间和结束，可能是件好事，这样那些人就不会在学术环境中陷入开发商业软件的困境。这有点不匹配。
As far as we're concerned, what we're doing is, there's a lot of labs that are being put in in higher education. And we're winning almost every one of those. And we really go hard after the lab, so that people that can't afford the computers have public access.
就我们而言，我们正在做的是，许多实验室正在高等教育中建立。我们几乎赢得了每一个实验室。我们非常努力地争取这些实验室，以便那些负担不起电脑的人能够获得公共访问。
And most universities now have fairly elaborate campus-wide networks. It's no longer a new cutting-edge thing. And we plug right into those. So I think it's— life's moved beyond where it was a few years ago, where those kind of projects were really important. And the knowledge to do that exists fairly widespread. I think a few more and— yeah?
现在大多数大学都有相当复杂的校园网络。这不再是一个新兴的前沿事物。我们直接接入这些网络。所以我认为生活已经超越了几年前的状态，那时这类项目真的很重要。而且进行这些项目的知识相对普遍。我想再多几个——是的？
What's the most important thing that you personally learned at Apple, that you're doing at NeXT?
你在苹果学到的最重要的事情是什么，你现在在 NeXT 做的事情？
Good question. I'm not sure I learned this when I was at Apple, but I learned it based on the data when I was at Apple. And that is, I now take a longer-term view on people.
好问题。我不确定我在苹果时是否学过这个，但我是在苹果时根据数据学到的。也就是说，我现在对人们采取更长远的看法。
In other words, when I see something not being done right, my first reaction isn't to go fix it. It's to say, we're building a team here. And we're going to do great stuff for the next decade, not just the next year, and so what do I need to do to help so that the person that's screwing up learns versus how do I fix the problem?
换句话说，当我看到某件事情没有做好时，我的第一反应不是去修复它。而是说，我们在这里建立一个团队。我们将在未来十年内做出伟大的成就，而不仅仅是明年。那么我需要做些什么来帮助那个犯错的人学习，而不是我该如何解决这个问题？
And that's painful sometimes. And I still have that first instinct to go fix the problem. But that's taking a longer-term view and people is probably the biggest thing that's changed. And then and I don't know. That's maybe the part that's biological, but—
有时候这很痛苦。我仍然有第一反应去解决问题。但这需要更长远的视角，而人可能是变化最大的一点。然后，我不知道。这也许是生物上的部分，但——
Yes? 是吗？
To pull off on that question, I wanted to ask you about your management style, and specifically, how do you resolve conflict in your organization?
我想问你关于你的管理风格，特别是你是如何在组织中解决冲突的？
What's our management style? How do we resolve conflict? I've never believed in the theory that, if we're on the same management team, and a decision has to be made, and I decide in a way that you don't like, and I say, come on, buy into the decision. You know, buy into it. Like, we're all in the same team, you don't agree, but buy into it. Let's go make it happen.
我们的管理风格是什么？我们如何解决冲突？我从来不相信这样的理论：如果我们在同一个管理团队中，必须做出一个决定，而我做出的决定你不喜欢，我就会说，来吧，接受这个决定。你知道，接受它。就像我们都是同一个团队的一员，你不同意，但还是要接受。让我们去实现它。
Because what happens is, sooner or later, you're paying somebody to do what they think is right, but then you're trying to get them to do what they think isn't right. And sooner or later, it outs. And you end up having that conflict.
因为发生的事情是，迟早你在付钱给某人去做他们认为正确的事情，但你又试图让他们去做他们认为不正确的事情。迟早，这种矛盾会显露出来。最终你会面临这种冲突。
So I've always felt that the best way is to get everybody in a room, and talk it through until you agree. Now, that's not everybody in the company, but that's everybody that's really involved in that decision, that needs to execute it.
所以我一直觉得最好的办法是把所有人聚在一个房间里，讨论直到达成一致。现在，这并不是指公司里的每一个人，而是指那些真正参与这个决策、需要执行它的人。
And so that's how we try to run NeXT. The way we run NeXT is, we have a team at the top we call the Policy Team. There's eight people. Mike is on it. I'm on it. We have six other people on it.
所以这就是我们尝试管理 NeXT 的方式。我们管理 NeXT 的方式是，我们有一个我们称之为政策团队的顶层团队。这个团队有八个人。迈克在其中。我也在其中。我们还有其他六个人。
And the key— we have two things we try to do. One is, we try to differentiate between the really important decisions and the ones that we don't have to make. And the really important ones, we work on it until we all agree, because we're paying people to tell us what to do.
关键是——我们有两件事要做。第一，我们试图区分真正重要的决策和那些我们不必做的决策。对于真正重要的决策，我们会努力直到大家达成一致，因为我们在支付人们告诉我们该做什么。
In other words, I don't view that we pay people to do things. That's easy, to find people to do things. What's harder is to find people to tell you what should be done, right? That's what we look for. So we pay people a lot of money, and we expect them to tell us what to do.
换句话说，我不认为我们是付钱让人们做事情。这很简单，找人做事情很容易。更难的是找到能告诉你应该做什么的人，对吧？这就是我们所寻找的。因此，我们支付给人们很多钱，并期望他们告诉我们该做什么。
And so when that's your attitude, you shouldn't run off and do things if people don't all feel good about them. And the key to making that work is to realize there's not that many things that any one team really has to decide. And we might have 25 really important things we have to decide on a year, not a lot.
所以当你的态度是这样的时，如果人们对某些事情都没有良好的感觉，你就不应该急于去做这些事情。使这一切顺利进行的关键是意识到任何一个团队真正需要决定的事情并不多。我们可能每年有 25 个非常重要的事情需要决定，并不多。
So that's how we try to run it. Sometimes it works. And sometimes we're still working on it. I can't think of once— I can't— maybe there's once or twice, but I can't even recall a time when I've said, dammit, I'm the CEO. And we're doing it this way, you know? I can recall a time when I've said, we don't see eye-to-eye, and you're off the team.
所以这就是我们尝试运行它的方式。有时它有效，有时我们仍在努力。我想不起来有一次——我想不起来——也许有一两次，但我甚至无法回忆起我说过，见鬼，我是首席执行官。我们就是这样做的，你知道吗？我记得有一次我说过，我们意见不合，你被踢出团队。
You know? I've had to say that once or twice, over a prolonged period of time, when a person has not wanted to go in the same direction we've wanted to go in as a team. It's my job every once in a while to say, hey, you want to go this way? We want to go this way. It's not working. But when people are on the team, then we work it out. Yeah?
你知道吗？在一段较长的时间里，我不得不说过一两次，当一个人不想和我们团队朝着同一个方向前进时。我的工作就是偶尔说，嘿，你想往这边走吗？我们想往这边走。这行不通。但当人们在团队中时，我们就会解决这个问题。对吧？
You've, kind of, chosen this direction, this niche towards the premium product, versus you've discussed Macintosh going into portability, and a lot of these portability issues. Do you think portability is exclusive? Can you do that and still do some of the market-driven type stuff as well?
你选择了这个方向，这个针对高端产品的细分市场，而你也讨论了 Macintosh 在便携性方面的进展，以及许多便携性问题。你认为便携性是独占的吗？你能做到这一点，同时还做一些市场驱动的事情吗？
I want to come back to your premium product characterization, because our products actually cost close to half of what Sun's do. And the reason they do is, we have the most automated factory in the industry. And we have a great VLSI design group, which designs stuff in a lot less parts. Do you guys—manufacturing, do you care about that?
我想回到你们的高端产品特性，因为我们的产品实际上成本接近于Sun公司的产品的一半。原因在于，我们拥有行业内最自动化的工厂。我们还有一个出色的 VLSI 设计团队，能够用更少的部件设计产品。你们——制造方面，是否在意这一点？
Yeah. 是的。
Yes. 是。
Yes. 是。
Yeah. 是的。
We should talk about that in a minute. The industry is bifurcating right now. And what's happening is, is that the Macs and the PCs as you know them today are all going to be just like this— hold up your PowerBook.
我们应该稍后谈谈这个问题。现在行业正在分化。发生的事情是，您今天所知道的 Mac 和 PC 都将变得像这样——举起您的 PowerBook。
They're all going to be just like this, only lighter and smaller, before very long. And they're taking the technology we have today, not particularly changing it, and getting it off the desktop in portable forms. And they're giving up a few things for that, but nothing terribly profound.
它们都将像这样，只是更轻更小，不久之后就会出现。它们正在利用我们今天拥有的技术，并没有特别改变它，而是将其从桌面转移到便携式形式。为了实现这一点，它们放弃了一些东西，但没有什么特别深刻的。
However, we're getting all sorts of signals from certain parts of the markets that they want things that are the enemy of that, right? Well, what are they? Well, speed— speed is the enemy of portability, because speed takes power, right?
然而，我们从市场的某些部分收到了各种信号，他们想要的东西与此相悖，对吧？那么，它们是什么呢？速度——速度是可便携性的敌人，因为速度需要能量，对吧？
So the kind of speed that our customers want, it would run for 3 and 1/2 minutes on batteries. And that's useless. The second thing they want is, they want a lot more storage on their disk drives, and a lot more memory, again, the enemy of portability for power and size reasons.
所以我们的客户想要的那种速度，电池只能支持 3 分半钟的运行。这是没用的。第二，他们希望硬盘有更多的存储空间，以及更多的内存，这同样是由于功率和体积原因对便携性的敌人。
Another thing they want is really high-speed networking, right? The radio LANs on these things, at best, are going to go 19.2 kilobits per second. Our customers want 100 megabits per second and higher. You're not going to do that with a radio LAN anytime in the next five years.
他们还想要的是非常高速的网络，对吧？这些设备上的无线局域网，最多也只能达到 19.2 千比特每秒。我们的客户希望达到 100 兆比特每秒及更高。未来五年内，你无法通过无线局域网实现这一点。
Another thing our customers want is our mix has shifted to, like, 80% color. And they want true color to do photographs. There is no flat panel color display today that will do photographic-quality color. And they want big ones, because once you have multitasking, and you run a bunch things at once, you need a bigger window into this electronic world. When you're using your computer for two or three hours a day, you don't want to be looking through blinders this big. You want something bigger.
我们的客户还希望我们的产品组合转向大约 80%的色彩。他们希望真实的色彩能够用于照片。目前没有任何平面显示器能够提供摄影级的色彩。他们还希望显示器更大，因为一旦你进行多任务处理，同时运行多个程序，你就需要一个更大的窗口来观察这个电子世界。当你每天使用电脑两到三个小时时，你不想通过这么小的视窗来看东西。你希望有更大的显示器。
So these are all the enemy of that today. And we're working on smaller products, for sure, but it's really tough to get both. And we're optimizing for the power, because we see a giant hole there for running these mission-critical custom apps. And what people are doing needs more power, so that's what we're optimizing for.
所以这些都是今天的敌人。我们确实在开发更小的产品，但同时做到这两点真的很困难。我们正在优化性能，因为我们看到在运行这些关键任务的定制应用程序方面存在一个巨大的空白。而人们所做的事情需要更多的性能，所以我们正在为此进行优化。
Let's talk about manufacturing. How many of you have a manufacturing background? Oh, that's great. I love manufacturing. And what kinds of things? What kinds of companies? You have—
让我们谈谈制造业。你们中有多少人有制造背景？哦，那太好了。我喜欢制造业。你们做什么样的事情？什么样的公司？你们有——
Pharmaceuticals. 药品。
Pharmaceuticals? Any auto people here?
制药行业？这里有汽车行业的人吗？
Yeah. 是的。
Him. 他。
Auto? Electronics? Which 汽车？电子产品？哪个
TI.
TI, uh-huh. TI，嗯哼。
Motorola. 摩托罗拉。
Motorola? 摩托罗拉？
Is it true you're sending your manufacturing overseas, or just— I heard—
你们真的要把制造业转移到海外吗，还是只是——我听说——
Yeah, I heard that rumor, too. No, it couldn't be further from the truth. We love manufacturing at NeXT. And when I was at Apple, I had the good fortune to lead the effort to build a Mac factory. And we designed, and built, and operated that factory. And it was a real breakthrough. It was the best factory in the industry until we built the at NeXT. And we made a lot of—
是的，我也听到了那个传闻。不，这与事实相去甚远。我们在 NeXT 热爱制造。当我在苹果时，我有幸领导建立 Mac 工厂的工作。我们设计、建造并运营了那座工厂。这是一次真正的突破。那是行业中最好的工厂，直到我们在 NeXT 建造了新的工厂。我们做了很多——
We made a lot of mistakes, though. As an example, I remember walking through it. You know, one of the things you learn when you start building factories is that warehouses are really bad, right?
我们犯了很多错误。例如，我记得走过这个地方。你知道，当你开始建造工厂时，你会学到的一件事是仓库真的很糟糕，对吧？
Warehouses are bad, because you tend to put things in them. And inventory is really bad. Inventory is really bad, because if it's defective, you don't find out about it for a while. And you don't close the quality feedback loop with the vendor, and correct the problem, until they've made a zillion of them. What you want to do is find the problem the first one that comes in the door, and stop them from making more until you fix the problem.
仓库不好，因为你倾向于把东西放进去。而库存真的很糟糕。库存真的很糟糕，因为如果它有缺陷，你不会立刻发现。而且在供应商那里你无法关闭质量反馈循环，直到他们生产了无数个。你想要做的是在第一个问题出现时就找到它，并阻止他们继续生产，直到你解决了问题。
So warehouses also cost money, because you put all this stuff in them. And the stuff— you have to go borrow money from the bank, or use money that could be used in a more productive purpose, so warehouses are bad.
所以仓库也需要花钱，因为你把所有这些东西放在里面。而这些东西——你必须去向银行借钱，或者使用本可以用于更有生产力的目的的钱，所以仓库是坏的。
And you want to go to JIT. I'm sure you've studied this all, and studied examples. I was walking through the Mac factory one day, and the two biggest pieces of automation we put in were a giant small-part storage and retrieval system. It was the totes that ran around.
你想去 JIT。我相信你已经研究过这一切，并研究了例子。一天我在 Mac 工厂走动时，我们投入的两个最大的自动化设备是一个巨大的小件存储和检索系统。就是那些四处移动的托盘。
And the second one was this giant burn in system at the end. And a few tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment. And I realized, unfortunately too late, that both of them are warehouses. They're just high-tech warehouses.
第二个是最后的这个巨型烧录系统，还有几千万美元的设备。我意识到，遗憾的是为时已晚，它们都是仓库。它们只是高科技仓库。
And so when we looked at NeXT, we said no warehouses of any kind. We have a true JIT factory. Stuff comes in, and is delivered right to the point of use on the factory floor. There is no warehouse. Deliveries are made daily, sometimes more frequently than that. There is no outgoing warehouse. Everything is visible.
因此，当我们查看 NeXT 时，我们说不需要任何类型的仓库。我们有一个真正的即时生产工厂。物品进来后，直接送到工厂车间的使用点。没有仓库。交付是每日进行的，有时更频繁。没有出货仓库。一切都是可见的。
And the reason that we were able to do a lot of what we've done = because we looked at— well, I'll give you an example. When we were learning about manufacturing at Mac, we hired a Stanford Business School Professor at the time named Steven Wheelwright, who Harvard has since stolen away, I think.
我们能够做到很多事情的原因是因为我们考虑了——好吧，我给你举个例子。当我们在 Mac 学习制造时，我们聘请了一位当时的斯坦福商学院教授，名叫史蒂文·惠尔赖特，我想哈佛后来把他挖走了。
And he did a neat thing. He drew on the board a little chart, first time I met him. He said, you can view all companies from a manufacturing perspective this way. You can say there's five stages— one, two, three, four, five. They all have these things.
他做了一件很棒的事。第一次见到他时，他在黑板上画了一个小图表。他说，你可以从制造的角度来看待所有公司。你可以说有五个阶段——一、二、三、四、五。它们都有这些东西。
And stage one is companies that view manufacturing as a necessary evil. They wish they didn't have to do it, but damn it, they do. And all the way up through stage five, which is companies that view manufacturing as a competitive opportunity for competitive advantage, right? We can get better time to market, and get new products out faster. We get lower costs. We get higher quality.
第一阶段是那些将制造视为必要之恶的公司。他们希望自己不必这样做，但可恶的是，他们必须这样做。一直到第五阶段，那些将制造视为竞争优势机会的公司，对吧？我们可以更快地进入市场，更快地推出新产品。我们降低成本，提高质量。
And in general, you know, you can, sort of, put the American flag here, and put the Japanese flag here.
一般来说，你可以把美国国旗放在这里，把日本国旗放在这里。
And that's changing, however. That's changing. And it's changing, because people like you are going into manufacturing. Companies are starting to realize that we were great at this one time. And then we took it for granted. And people are starting to pay good salaries now, and get good people.
然而，这种情况正在改变。人们像你一样进入制造业。公司开始意识到我们曾经在这一领域表现出色。然后我们对此视而不见。现在，人们开始支付高薪，吸引优秀人才。
And so we want to be one of these. And we try very hard. By the way, just going back to software for a minute, I often apply this scale to computer companies, and how they look at software. See, I think most computer companies are stage one. They wish software had never been invented.
因此，我们希望成为其中之一。我们非常努力。顺便说一下，回到软件上，我经常将这个标准应用于计算机公司，以及他们如何看待软件。你看，我认为大多数计算机公司处于第一阶段。他们希望软件从未被发明。
I put Compaq in that category. And IBM is maybe stage two, and things like that. And I think there's only— you know, Suns maybe, sort of, in the middle, maybe here. I think there's only three companies here, and that's us, Apple, and Microsoft, in stage five. We start everything with the software and work back.
我把康柏放在那个类别里。IBM 可能是第二阶段，还有其他类似的公司。我认为这里只有三家公司，那就是我们、苹果和微软，处于第五阶段。我们从软件开始，然后向后发展。
But anyway going back to manufacturing, we started looking at the factory as a software problem. And the first people we hired in the factory were some software engineers. We convinced them to move from R&D into software, which was not easy.
但无论如何，回到制造业，我们开始将工厂视为一个软件问题。我们在工厂招聘的第一批人是一些软件工程师。我们说服他们从研发转到软件，这并不容易。
We had to give them bonuses. We had to cajole them. We had to promise them they could come back if they hated it. And they went over there. And we said, this is really just a software problem with interesting I/O devices called robots. That's all it is. And so we started building the software first.
我们不得不给他们奖金。我们不得不劝说他们。我们不得不承诺他们如果讨厌这里可以回来。他们就去了那里。我们说，这实际上只是一个软件问题，涉及一些有趣的输入输出设备，叫做机器人。就这样。于是我们开始先构建软件。
And our first robots that we got, we specced them out. And we bought them completely turnkey, with the robot arms on them, and all the electronics, and the software to control them. And we specced it out, but we didn't write it.
我们买的第一台机器人，是我们自己设计的。我们买的是全套设备，包括机械臂、所有电子设备和控制软件。我们制定了规格，但没有编写软件。
And they didn't— they worked OK. Some of them are still in use, but they weren't great. And being software folks, we weren't real happy. They weren't elegant. We couldn't do what we wanted with the robots. We couldn't tie-in a quality information system to them, and all this other stuff we wanted.
他们没有——它们工作得还可以。其中一些仍在使用，但并不出色。作为软件人员，我们并不太满意。它们不够优雅。我们无法用机器人实现我们想要的功能。我们无法将一个质量信息系统与它们连接起来，以及我们想要的其他所有东西。
So the second generation, we specced out the hardware, and had somebody build the hardware for us, but we wrote all the software on our own computers. We're object-oriented, so we started writing robot objects, quality objects, you know, all sorts of objects to control this factory.
所以第二代，我们指定了硬件，并让人给我们制造硬件，但我们在自己的电脑上编写了所有软件。我们是面向对象的，所以我们开始编写机器人对象、质量对象，你知道的，各种对象来控制这个工厂。
And we found in our computer was great for it. And so our whole factory now runs on this object-oriented factory and quality system. The last generation of— our latest generation of robots, which we've deployed this year, we actually built the hardware.
我们发现我们的计算机非常适合这个。因此，我们整个工厂现在都在这个面向对象的工厂和质量系统上运行。我们今年部署的最新一代机器人，实际上是我们自己制造的硬件。
I've been to Japan maybe— oh, a lot of times— maybe 30, 40 times. And I love to have factories over there. They always amaze me, because they built everything themselves. They weren't afraid of anything. They needed a robot. They tried to buy one. But if they couldn't, they'd actually engineer it and build it.
我去过日本很多次——哦，大约 30、40 次。我喜欢在那里有工厂。它们总是让我惊叹，因为他们自己建造了一切。他们不怕任何事情。他们需要一个机器人。他们试图购买一个。但如果买不到，他们实际上会设计并制造一个。
And you'd think this was really expensive, but we found out it's pretty cheap. It's actually cheaper than buying them. And so we've actually now designed our— and specced out our own robots. We don't mill the metal or anything. We get that all made. We put them all together. And we do the software top-to-bottom.
你可能会认为这真的很贵，但我们发现其实很便宜。实际上，它比购买它们还便宜。因此，我们现在已经设计并规范了我们自己的机器人。我们不铣削金属或其他任何东西。我们把所有的部件都制作好，然后组装在一起。我们从头到尾做软件。
And we have now some extraordinarily advanced robots in the factory. And our computers are built, start to finish, on the key components, completely untouched by human hands. So we're pretty convinced we're the low-cost producer. We do it in Fremont, California, right under our nose. And we export them to Japan, and all sorts of other places.
我们现在在工厂里有一些极其先进的机器人。我们的电脑从头到尾都是基于关键组件制造的，完全没有人手接触。因此，我们非常确信我们是低成本生产者。我们在加利福尼亚州的弗里蒙特进行生产，就在我们眼皮底下。我们将它们出口到日本以及其他各种地方。
And Canon is our partner in Japan. And they do very, very thorough quality audits. And we're now at the point where we're directly shipped to stock with them. And they say we're a very high-quality supplier.
佳能是我们在日本的合作伙伴。他们进行非常彻底的质量审计。我们现在已经能够直接向他们发货并入库。他们说我们是一个非常高质量的供应商。
How do your lines tie in with your research— your development team? Because I had heard that they could actually change the line from their own computers [INAUDIBLE]
您的产品线如何与您的研究（您的开发团队）结合起来？因为我听说他们实际上可以从自己的计算机上更改线路[听不清]
Yeah, they can. Well, we don't give everybody permission to do that, but
是的，他们可以。好吧，我们并不是给每个人都允许这样做，但
—yes, they can. Here's how it works. One of the things we do is we actually— when we want to build an engineering prototype— see what happens in most— one of the key things that manufacturing can contribute to competitive advantage is time to market. Why is that?
-是的，他们可以。事情是这样的。我们要做的一件事就是，当我们想制造一个工程原型时，看看在大多数情况下会发生什么，制造业能够为竞争优势做出贡献的关键因素之一就是上市时间。为什么这么说呢？
Because the way most things work is you design your product here. And after you're done, you throw it over the wall. And you design your manufacturing process here, sorting out a bunch of things that maybe weren't done right here, fixing them, changing them, and then completing the process design.
因为大多数事物的运作方式是你在这里设计你的产品。完成后，你把它扔到墙那边。然后你在这里设计你的制造过程，解决一些可能在这里没有做好、修复它们、改变它们，然后完成过程设计。
What you want to do is do this, and ship it right here while your competitors are still here. And that's what we've been able to do in many cases. What we do is, we suck data out of our CAD systems in engineering. We zing them around over the local networks over a T1 to [INAUDIBLE] factory is about 15 minutes away.
你想要做的是这样做，并在你的竞争对手仍在这里的时候将其发货。这就是我们在许多情况下能够做到的。我们所做的是，从我们的工程 CAD 系统中提取数据。我们通过本地网络以 T1 的速度将它们传送到距离约 15 分钟的[INAUDIBLE]工厂。
And in our own computers, we compute all of the robot placement programs' fully-optimized path. We compute all the vision system programs. We check it against the bill of materials in the IS system. And we download it to the robots. And we're ready to build a board, lot size of one, in-between two production CPU boards on the line, full surface mount with all of our automation technology.
在我们的计算机中，我们将所有机器人放置程序的完全优化路径计算出来。我们计算所有视觉系统程序。我们会根据 IS 系统中的物料清单进行核对。然后我们将它下载到机器人。然后就可以在生产线上的两块生产 CPU 板之间构建一个单批次、全表面贴装的电路板，并使用我们所有的自动化技术。
Now, the key is that manufacturing did that so well for engineering, that we haven't built a prototype in engineering for two years. We haven't built a wire wrap, or any other kind of prototype in engineering for two years. Everything has been built in the factory.
现在，关键是制造业在工程方面做得如此出色，以至于我们在工程领域已经两年没有建造原型了。我们已经两年没有在工程中建造过线缆包封装或任何其他类型的原型。所有的东西都是在工厂里建造的。
Now, what does that mean? What that means is, manufacturing gets involved from day one. Because the— the engineering guys call up manufacturing go, hey, we want to build a prototype. We're going to need these special parts in that thing. Take a look at this. Tell us what you think. We'd like to do it tomorrow. Let us know if that's OK, blah, blah, blah. They get involved from day one.
现在，这是什么意思呢？这意味着，从第一天起，制造就参与进来了。因为工程师们打电话给制造部门，说，嘿，我们想要制造一个原型。我们需要这些特殊的零件。看看这个。告诉我们你的想法。我们希望明天就能做到。让我们知道这是否可以，等等。他们从第一天起就参与其中。
And what it also means is— so we get this parallelism. Secondly, a lot of times, when you build prototypes, it's not quite the same technology as you're going to use in production. And so all the accumulated knowledge you get from building your prototypes, you throw away when you change technology to go into production. And you start over in that accumulation process.
这也意味着——我们得到了这种平行性。其次，很多时候，当你构建原型时，所使用的技术与最终生产中将使用的技术并不完全相同。因此，从构建原型中获得的所有积累知识，在你更换技术以进入生产时都会被抛弃。你需要在这个积累过程中重新开始。
Because we don't change technology, we don't throw anything away. We don't waste time. And it's led to one of the healthiest relationships between an engineering and manufacturing group I've ever seen in my life.
因为我们不改变技术，所以我们不扔掉任何东西。我们不浪费时间。这导致了我一生中见过的工程和制造团队之间最健康的关系之一。
They're all working off the same databases. They're all working on the same processes. They're all working in a very disciplined process environment, to where, when any processes are change, they all get together and review the proposals, and all buy into it.
他们都在使用相同的数据库。他们都在进行相同的流程。他们都在一个非常有纪律的流程环境中工作，因此，当任何流程发生变化时，他们都会聚在一起审查提案，并达成共识。
And it's not that hard. The key to it all, though, was we didn't go out and hire a bunch manufacturing people. We went out and hired engineers. And we convinced them that we were going to be different. We were going to pay them exactly the same as— as a matter of fact, we paid them a little more at the beginning.
这并不难。关键在于，我们并没有出去雇佣一大堆制造人员。我们出去雇佣了工程师。我们说服他们，我们会有所不同。我们会支付给他们与——实际上，起初我们支付给他们的还多一点。
But we pay him exactly the same as R&D, no different. There's migration, both directions, not just from manufacturing into R&D, but both directions. And they're not second-class citizens. They have the same offices. They have the same test equipment. They have the same computers on their desks.
但我们支付给他的薪水与研发部门完全相同，没有区别。人员流动是双向的，不仅仅是从制造转向研发，而是双向的。他们不是二等公民。他们有相同的办公室。他们有相同的测试设备。他们的桌子上有相同的电脑。
And it took us a while to convince them that we were really serious. For about the first few years, we had more PhDs in manufacturing than we did design engineering, until design engineering stole a few of them away.
而我们花了一段时间才说服他们我们真的很认真。在最初的几年里，我们在制造方面的博士人数比设计工程还要多，直到设计工程挖走了他们中的一些。
So it's really paid off for us, and I think it's one of our real opportunities for competitive advantage. Yeah, I think one or two more, and we've got to run. And probably, you do too. Yes, up there, [INAUDIBLE]?
所以这对我们真的很有帮助，我认为这是我们获得竞争优势的真正机会之一。是的，我认为再来一两个，我们就能成功。而且你们可能也是。是的，上面， [听不清]？
So you have no warehouses, is that true? You are doing true JIT? [INAUDIBLE]
所以你没有仓库，这是真的吗？你是在做真正的准时生产吗？[听不清]
Yeah. 是的。
How are you getting your products or your raw materials?
你是如何获取你的产品或原材料的？
How are we getting our raw materials?
我们如何获取原材料？
Yeah. 是的。
You mean, like, what truck line brings them in? Or what do you mean?
你是说，哪个卡车公司把它们送来？还是你是什么意思？
Is it air? Is it truck? I mean, how are you getting everything in that quickly?
是空运吗？是卡车吗？我的意思是，你怎么能这么快把所有东西都弄到位？
See the key thing is, that's not our problem. That's our suppliers' problem. So we agree with our supplier when the stuff is going to arrive on our factory floor. And if they can— if they're together enough to ship it by truck, that's fine. If they have to ship it by air, that's too bad. If they want to have a warehouse next to ours, because they're not good enough, well, then they have to do that.
关键是，这不是我们的问题。这是我们供应商的问题。因此，我们与供应商达成一致，确定货物何时会到达我们的工厂。如果他们能够——如果他们足够协调以通过卡车运输，那很好。如果他们必须通过空运，那就太糟糕了。如果他们想在我们旁边有一个仓库，因为他们不够好，那他们就得这样做。
Now, we're not giant, so we can't go command people to do things. But what's happened is, is we have a fairly narrow supply base. We don't have three billion suppliers. And they see tremendous advantages in working with us.
现在，我们不是巨头，所以我们不能命令人们做事情。但发生的情况是，我们的供应基础相对较窄。我们没有三十亿个供应商。他们在与我们合作中看到了巨大的优势。
We're pushing our quality information systems back to them. As an example, Motorola is one of our key suppliers. Almost every key supplier has NeXT computers. And we send them statistical quality information, sometimes daily— daily— off our automated quality information systems on their parts.
我们将我们的质量信息系统推回给他们。举个例子，摩托罗拉是我们的一家关键供应商。几乎每个关键供应商都有 NeXT 计算机。我们每天——每天——通过我们的自动化质量信息系统向他们发送关于他们零件的统计质量信息。
And those kinds of things are extremely valuable to them. So while we're not Goliath, we're a very valuable David to work with. And so they really bend over backwards to work with us.
这些事情对他们来说非常重要。因此，虽然我们不是巨人，但我们是一个非常有价值的大卫可以合作。因此，他们真的非常努力地与我们合作。
And we try to push the problems where they belong. If it's our problems, we take full responsibility for them. We own our process. But they— it's their job to get us a zero defect material on-time, per agreements. And our philosophy is, our money doesn't break after we give it to them, so their parts shouldn't break after they give them to us.
我们试图把问题推到属于它们的地方。如果是我们自己的问题，我们就要承担全部责任。我们拥有自己的流程。但他们的工作是按时、按协议为我们提供零缺陷的材料。我们的理念是，我们的钱给他们后不会坏，所以他们的零件给我们后也不应该坏。
Yeah? 嗯？
Do you see any possibility of bringing NeXT over to [INAUDIBLE] portable Macs? And do you see the future of Macs [INAUDIBLE] dying out, or what [INAUDIBLE]?
你认为将 NeXT 引入 [INAUDIBLE] 便携式 Mac 的可能性有多大？你认为 Mac 的未来是 [INAUDIBLE] 消亡，还是 [INAUDIBLE]？
You know, I think Macs are going to continue to grow. It depends on what Apple does. I think certain segments of the Mac market are going to continue to grow. I think certain segments of the Mac market are not going to be targeted for future growth.
你知道，我认为 Mac 会继续增长。这取决于苹果的做法。我认为 Mac 市场的某些细分领域将继续增长。我认为 Mac 市场的某些细分领域不会成为未来增长的目标。
And I think Macs are good computers to do certain things. But to do the things that people I think are going to want to do in a few years, I don't think you can do them on a Mac. I don't think you can do them on DOS and Windows.
我认为 Mac 是做某些事情的好电脑。但对于我认为人们在几年后想要做的事情，我认为在 Mac 上做不了。我认为在 DOS 和 Windows 上也做不了。
And so I think there's a need for some new technology. Just like, you know, there a lot of things that you can do on DOS when the Mac came out, but there were some new things you just couldn't. And it would take a long time. And I think it's the same way with the Mac. Hey, we have to head off into the sunset back to California, but thanks for a chance to be with you all for some time.
所以我认为需要一些新技术。就像你知道的，当 Mac 问世时，DOS 上有很多事情可以做，但有些新东西你就是做不到。这需要很长时间。我认为 Mac 也是如此。嘿，我们得回加利福尼亚了，但感谢你们让我有机会和大家在一起一段时间。
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