Berkshire Hathaway’s longtime vice chairman, Charles Munger, passed away yesterday at age 99. This Forbes cover story from early 1996, reveals just how transformational he was for Warren Buffett.
伯克希尔·哈撒韦长期担任副董事长的查尔斯·芒格于昨日逝世，享年99岁。这篇发表于1996年初的《福布斯》封面故事揭示了他对沃伦·巴菲特的深刻变革影响。
By Matt Schifrin, Forbes Staff
作者：马特·希夫林，《福布斯》工作人员
Nearly 28 years ago, in the January 22, 1996 edition of Forbes Magazine, we published the first major profile on Warren Buffett’s consigliere, “The Not-So-Silent Partner.”
将近28年前，在1996年1月22日的《福布斯》杂志中，我们发表了首篇关于沃伦·巴菲特谋士的深度人物专访《并非沉默的合伙人》。
I urge you to read this excellent vintage Forbes cover story. You will learn that without Munger’s counsel, 93-year old Warren Buffett would have likely never become the GOAT among global investors, or amassed a net worth of $120 billion. In Buffett’s early days he was a strict Graham & Dodd value investor, buying cheap stocks at “give-away prices” and selling them when they were no longer cheap. Munger converted Buffett’s guiding investment philosophy into what we describe in our story as “one decision growth stocks” with the intention of buying and holding forever. This is exactly what Berkshire has done with stocks such as Coca-Cola and American Express, and private companies like See’s Candies and GEICO.
我强烈建议你阅读这篇出色的老《福布斯》封面报道。你将了解到，如果没有芒格的指点，93岁的沃伦·巴菲特或许永远无法成为全球投资界的“史上最佳”，也不可能积累1200亿美元的净资产。巴菲特早年严格奉行格雷厄姆—多德价值投资法，以“白菜价”买入便宜股票，再在它们不再便宜时卖出。芒格把巴菲特的投资理念转变为我们文中称之为“只需一次决策的成长股”，目的就是买入后永久持有。伯克希尔对可口可乐、美国运通等股票，以及喜诗糖果、GEICO 等私营公司的做法正是如此。
Using this strategy Berkshire became unshackled from the restrictions of deep discount Benjamin Graham value investing. While rigorous analysis was still employed, Berkshire began buying “fully valued” stocks that had nearly invincible franchises, like Apple, whose growing stream of earnings and dividends ultimately became compound interest machines.
凭借这一策略，伯克希尔摆脱了深度折价式本杰明·格雷厄姆价值投资的束缚。在依旧进行严谨分析的同时，伯克希尔开始买入那些几乎拥有无敌护城河的“完全估值”股票，例如苹果，其不断增长的盈利和分红最终化作复利机器。
The other major Berkshire strategy heavily influenced by Munger, and first detailed in this cover story, is the idea of playing the odds by using the “float” from the premiums of the insurance companies it owns, like GEICO and National Indemnity. By using these low cost “liabilities” in the same way investors use leverage, Berkshire has been able to greatly magnify its portfolio returns.
芒格深刻影响的伯克希尔另一项主要策略，并在这篇封面故事中首次详述，是利用所持保险公司（如 GEICO 和 National Indemnity）保费“浮存金”来押注胜率。通过将这些低成本“负债”当作投资杠杆使用，伯克希尔大幅放大了其投资组合的回报。
By Robert Lenzner and David S. Fondiller
作者：罗伯特·伦茨纳、戴维·S·方迪勒
The Not-So-Silent Partner
并非沉默的合伙人
Meet Charlie Munger, the Los Angeles lawyer who converted Warren Buffett from an old- fashioned Graham value investor to the ultimate buy-and-hold value strategist.
认识一下查理·芒格，这位洛杉矶律师把沃伦·巴菲特从老派的格雷厄姆价值投资者转变为终极“买入并持有”的价值策略家。
WARREN BUFFETT, probably the greatest investor in modern American history, did not do it alone. He never claimed he did, but so overwhelming has his public presence become that few people realize that for more than 30 years Buffett has had a not-so-silent partner who is as much the creator of the Berkshire Hathaway investment philosophy as is the master himself.
沃伦·巴菲特，或许是现代美国历史上最伟大的投资者，并非独自完成这一切。他从未这么宣称，但由于他在公众视野中的形象过于强大，鲜有人意识到，在过去三十多年里，巴菲特一直拥有一位并非沉默的合伙人，此人对伯克希尔·哈撒韦投资哲学的贡献不亚于巴菲特本人。
Charles Munger is a 72-year-old lawyer and investor, a curmudgeon who lives in Los Angeles, 1,300 miles and a two-hour time difference from Buffett’s headquarters in Omaha, Neb. Munger and Buffett complement each other beautifully. Munger comes on more arrogant and erudite, while Buffett comes on modest and folksy. But that's the surface in both cases. Underneath, these are two minds in almost uncanny sync.
查尔斯·芒格是一位72岁的律师兼投资人，这位倔老头常住洛杉矶，距巴菲特位于内布拉斯加州奥马哈的总部有1,300英里、时差两小时。芒格与巴菲特互补得天衣无缝。芒格外表更显傲气与博学，而巴菲特则显得谦逊亲切。但这都只是表面，实际上，两人思维方式几乎同步得令人惊叹。
“I probably haven’t talked to anyone on Wall Street one hundredth of the times I speak to Charlie,” says Buffett. Charlie Munger is the quintessential realist against whom Buffett tests his ideas. “Charlie has the best 30-second mind in the world. He goes from A to Z in one move. He sees the essence of everything before you even finish the sentence.” In 1978 Munger was named vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway and in 1983 chairman of Wesco Financial Corp., a finance company that’s 80% controlled by Berkshire. He is also a director of Salomon Inc.
“我跟华尔街任何人的交谈次数，都不到跟查理通话的百分之一，”巴菲特说。查理·芒格是巴菲特检验想法的典型现实主义者。“查理拥有世界上最出色的30秒思维，他一步就能从A跳到Z，在你话音未落之前就看到了事情的本质。”1978年，芒格被任命为伯克希尔·哈撒韦副董事长；1983年，他又出任伯克希尔持股80%的金融公司——韦斯科金融董事长。他同时还是所罗门公司的董事。
To understand Munger’s influence on Buffett you have to recall the gradual evolution of the latter’s investment philosophy. The Omaha phenomenon began as pure Ben Graham—buy cheap stocks at giveaway prices if possible and sell them when they are no longer cheap. You figure out when they are cheap by careful balance sheet analysis. Buffett still follows the Graham precepts of careful analysis, but it’s been years since Buffett has bought stocks that, by Graham’s standards, are cheap in terms of assets, earnings or cash flow. Nor does he, in classic Graham style, look to sell holdings when they catch up with the market.
要理解芒格对巴菲特的影响，就必须回顾后者投资理念的逐步演变。这位奥马哈奇才最初完全遵循本·格雷厄姆的思路——尽可能以白菜价买入便宜股票，在它们不再便宜时卖出。通过仔细分析资产负债表来判断何时便宜。如今，巴菲特仍然遵循格雷厄姆关于审慎分析的教义，但他已经多年没有按格雷厄姆标准——即资产、收益或现金流层面便宜——买入股票了。也不再像经典格雷厄姆那样，在持股价格追上市场时就卖出。
Over the years, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, Buffett has moved closer to the concept of one-decision growth stocks—buy ’em and hold ’em forever, or at least until their fundamentals deteriorate.
多年来，尤其是上世纪80年代和90年代，巴菲特越来越接近“一次决策”成长股的理念——买入后永远持有，或至少持有至其基本面恶化。
Coca-Cola wasn't cheap by conventional standards when Berkshire Hathaway first bought it in 1988. On The Street it was regarded as an excellent but fully valued stock. Coca-Cola has since appreciated by close to 600%, or a compound annual rate of return of some 25%, but Berkshire has taken not a penny in profits and has sold not a single share.
伯克希尔·哈撒韦在1988年首次买入可口可乐时，按照传统标准这并不便宜。在华尔街，它被视为一家优秀但估值已满的公司。此后可口可乐股价已上涨近600%，复合年化收益率约25%，但伯克希尔分文未取、亦未卖出一股。
What distinguishes Buffett and Munger from the herd that went to its doom in 1974 with the Nifty 50 one-decision growth stocks is this: In true Ben Graham fashion Buffett and Munger do their homework. Berkshire Hathaway’s one-decision picks—Coca-Cola, Washington Post Co., Geico, Gillette, Wells Fargo, Buffalo News and Dexter Shoes—were chosen only after exhaustive analysis of balance sheets and of social and economic trends. Where most analysts saw only good but fully valued properties, Buffett saw franchises that were priceless, virtually immune from inflation and capable of continued growth—compound interest machines, in short. None of the flashes in the pan here like Avon Products or Xerox that passed as buy-and-hold-forever stocks 20 years back.
巴菲特和芒格之所以能与1974年持有“漂亮50”一决策成长股而遭灭顶之灾的大多数投资者区分开来，原因在于：他们以真正的本·格雷厄姆方式做足了功课。伯克希尔·哈撒韦的一决策股票——可口可乐、《华盛顿邮报》公司、GEICO、吉列、富国银行、《布法罗新闻》和Dexter鞋业——都是在对资产负债表以及社会和经济趋势进行详尽分析后才挑选出来的。当大多数分析师只看到优秀但估值已满的资产时，巴菲特却看到了无价、几乎不受通胀影响且能够持续增长的特许经营权——简而言之，就是复利机器。这里没有像雅芳或施乐那样昙花一现、20年前被视为“永远持有”股票的公司。
In that gradual synthesis of Graham and one-decision theory, Charlie Munger played the creative role. Buffett says: “Charlie shoved me in the direction of not just buying bargains, as Ben Graham had taught me. This was the real impact he had on me. It took a powerful force to move me on from Graham’s limiting views. It was the power of Charlie’s mind. He expanded my horizons.”
在格雷厄姆理论与一决策理念渐进融合的过程中，查理·芒格扮演了创造性的角色。巴菲特说：“查理把我从只买便宜货——正如本·格雷厄姆教我的——的路子上推了出来。这就是他对我真正的影响。要让我从格雷厄姆的局限性观念中走出来，需要一种强大的力量，这力量就是查理的头脑。他拓宽了我的视野。”
As if completing Buffett’s thought—though in a separate interview—Munger explains further: “We realized that some company that was selling at two or three times book value could still be a hell of a bargain because of momentums implicit in its position, sometimes combined with an unusual managerial skill plainly present in some individual or other, or some system or other.” Coca-Cola fits that pattern. So do See’s Candies and the Washington Post Co. Munger says: “We intend to hold Coca-Cola forever.” Forever? That’s a word not to be found in Ben Graham’s investment lexicon.
仿佛在补充巴菲特的想法——虽然是在另一场采访中——芒格进一步解释道：“我们认识到，一家公司即便市价是账面价值的两三倍，依然可能是极好的买卖，因为其地位中隐含的动能，有时再加上一些个体或某种制度所体现的非凡管理才能。”可口可乐正符合这一模式，喜诗糖果和《华盛顿邮报》公司也是。芒格说：“我们打算永远持有可口可乐。”永远？在本·格雷厄姆的投资词汇里，可找不到这个词。
Conventional wisdom says that no one ever went broke taking profits. Munger doesn’t think that way. “There are huge advantages for an individual to get into a position where you make a few great investments and just sit back. You’re paying less to brokers. You’re listening to less nonsense.” Best of all, Munger says, you don’t have to pay off the tax collector every year. “If it works, the governmental tax system gives you an extra one, two or three percentage points per annum with compound effects.” Munger is referring to what most investors know in theory but ignore in practice: that the so-called capital gains tax is no capital gains tax at all. It is a transaction tax. No transaction, no tax. Since profit-taking involves transactions it obliges you to take the IRS in as a partner. With profits not taken, there remains a theoretical tax liability, but the money is still working for you.
传统智慧认为，落袋为安的人从未破产。芒格却不这么想。“一个人若能做到只做几笔伟大的投资然后静坐其成，会有巨大的优势。你付给经纪人的费用更少，听到的废话也更少。”芒格说，最重要的是，你不用每年都向税务员交钱。“如果运作得当，政府的税收体制每年会通过复利效果额外给你一两个甚至三个百分点。”芒格指的是大多数投资者理论上知道却在实践中忽视的一点：所谓资本利得税根本不是资本利得税，而是一种交易税。没有交易，就没有税。因为获利了结需要交易，你就不得不把国税局拉进来做合伙人。而在不获利了结的情况下，只剩下理论上的纳税义务，资金仍在为你工作。
Besides, if you sell stock in a great company, where can you find a comparable investment? As the poet Omar Khay-yam put it: “Oft I wonder what the vintner buys half so precious as the stuff he sells.”
此外，如果你卖掉一家伟大公司的股票，又到哪里去找同等的投资呢？正如诗人奥玛·开亚姆所言：“我常常想，酿酒人能买到什么，能比他卖出的酒更珍贵？”
Buffett and Munger share a deep respect for the awesome, mysterious power of compound interest. Charlie Munger loves to quote his hero, Benjamin Franklin, on the subject. Wrote Franklin of compounding: “. . . ’tis the stone that will turn all your lead into gold. . . . Remember that money is of a prolific generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more."
巴菲特和芒格对复利那种惊人而神秘的力量怀有深深的敬意。查理·芒格喜欢就此引用他的偶像本杰明·富兰克林的话。富兰克林写道：“……它是能把所有铅变成黄金的石头……记住，金钱具有繁衍的本性。钱能生钱，其后代还能再生更多的钱。”
Munger is rarely without a compound rate of return table. He illustrates its magic by taking an investment of $1 and demonstrating that a return of 13.4% a year, after taxes, over 30 years, will make that $1 worth $43.50. To Munger it's much better to depend on compounding than on market timing.
芒格手边几乎总带着一张复利收益率对照表。他用 1 美元做示范：若税后年回报率为 13.4%，30 年后这 1 美元就会变成 43.50 美元。在芒格看来，依靠复利远胜于依靠择时。
What few people realize is that Buffett and Munger wring extra power from the compounding principle through use of leverage. Take that $1 compounded for 30 years at 13.4%. Suppose in the first year you borrow 50 cents at 8% and invest that, too. The net effect is to raise your rate of return from 13.4% to 18.8%. Repeat that process every year, and over the full 30 years your $1 will beget its way to $176.
鲜有人意识到，巴菲特和芒格通过使用杠杆让复利威力更上一层楼。同样是 1 美元、30 年、13.4% 的收益率，如果第一年再以 8% 的利率借入 0.5 美元一起投入，实际回报率可从 13.4% 提高到 18.8%。年年如此循环，30 年后这 1 美元最终能增值到 176 美元。
“Understanding both the power of compound return and the difficulty getting it is the heart and soul of understanding a lot of things,” says Munger in typically grandiose terms.
芒格一如既往地高屋建瓴地说：“既懂复利威力，又懂获取复利之难，这才是理解许多事物的核心与灵魂。”
Munger persuaded Buffett to buy 100% of See’s Candies for Berkshire in 1972 for $25 million, net of surplus cash. This was no Ben Graham stock. But it has turned out to be a compound interest machine. Last year See’s made about $50 million pretax, putting a value on the company of $500 million. That's a 13.3% compounded rate of return for 24 years. Add in pretax retained earnings over this period—which were reinvested—and you get a total pre-tax return of over 23% annually.
1972 年，在芒格的力劝下，伯克希尔以 2,500 万美元（扣除多余现金后）全资收购了喜诗糖果。这可不是一只“本·格雷厄姆式”股票，但事实证明它是一台复利机器。去年喜诗的税前利润约 5,000 万美元，隐含估值 5 亿美元——24 年里复合回报率 13.3%。若再把期间留存并再投资的税前利润算上，整体税前年回报率超过 23%。
At any time in these 24 years Berkshire Hathaway could have cashed in all or part of See’s through an initial public offering. Why didn’t it? Answers Munger: “The number of acquisitions making 23% pretax is very small in America.” Better to leave the money compounding in a relatively sure thing.
在这 24 年里的任何时点，伯克希尔都可以通过 IPO 套现全部或部分喜诗股份。为什么没这么做？芒格回答：“在美国，能做到税前 23% 回报的收购少之又少。”与其如此，不如让资金在一个相对确定的项目里继续复利增长。
In Roger Lowenstein’s insightful and highly readable biography, Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, Munger gets relatively few pages of his own. Yet Buffett would be the first to admit that without Charlie Munger he probably would not have become one of the richest men in the world.
罗杰·洛文斯坦见解深刻、可读性极高的传记《巴菲特传：一个美国资本家的成长》中，芒格仅占寥寥数页。但巴菲特自己最清楚：若没有查理·芒格，他大概成不了世界首富行列的一员。
Lowenstein doesn’t ignore Munger’s role but, perhaps because it is less dramatic than Buffett’s, he underplays it. Once a year Warren and Charlie sit side-by-side on the stage of an auditorium in Omaha on the day of the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting. They often meet in New York and California, and recently spent the weekend in Seattle with Buffett’s close pal, Microsoft’s Bill Gates. But for most of the year they are connected only by the telephone wires.
洛文斯坦并未忽视芒格的作用，只是相较于巴菲特的传奇，显得不那么戏剧化而被弱化。每年一次，沃伦与查理会在奥马哈的伯克希尔股东大会上并肩而坐。他们也常在纽约、加州碰面，最近还与巴菲特的挚友——微软的比尔·盖茨——一起在西雅图度周末。但大多数时间，他们仅靠电话线相连。
In the exchanges carried over those wires, Buffett is the stock picker while Munger is the doubter, the skeptic, the devil's advocate, against whom Buffett tests his ideas. The simple fact is that you can’t tell whether an idea is likely to work unless you consider all the possible negatives. Not that Munger is a sour puss. Their verbal exchanges are larded with jokes. For all their surface differences, these two men have similar minds. “Everybody engaged in complicated work needs colleagues,” explains Munger. “Just the discipline of having to put your thoughts in order with somebody else is a very useful thing.”
在那头电话线上，巴菲特负责挑选股票，芒格则是怀疑者、质疑者、反方辩手，是巴菲特检验想法的对象。道理很简单：只有充分考虑所有负面可能，才能判断一个点子是否可行。并非芒格爱唱反调，他们的对话里笑话连篇。尽管表面差异不小，两人思维方式却高度相似。芒格总结道：“凡从事复杂工作的人都需要同事。必须把自己的想法梳理给另一个人，这种纪律本身就大有裨益。”
“You know this cliché that opposites attract? Well, opposites don’t attract. Psychological experiments prove that it’s people who are alike that are attracted to each other. Our minds work in very much the same way.”
“你知道‘异性相吸’这句陈词滥调吧？其实，异性并不会相吸。心理学实验证明，彼此相似的人才会互相吸引。我们的思维方式十分相像。”
Where and how do their minds work together? “On the close calls,” Munger replies. Okay, it’s a good company. But is the price low enough? Is the management made up of people Munger and Buffett are comfortable with? If it is cheap enough to buy, is it cheap for the wrong reason or the right reason? As Munger puts it: “What's the flip side, what can go wrong that I haven’t seen?”
那他们在哪些问题上、如何协同思考？芒格回答：“在那些难以抉择的时刻。”不错，这是一家好公司。但价格够低吗？管理层是否让巴菲特和芒格放心？如果股价确实便宜，是因为正确的原因便宜，还是由于错误的原因？正如芒格所说：“反面是什么？有什么我没看到的潜在麻烦？”
Right now the two men are matching wits about Berkshire Hathaway’s 20 million shares, or 13% stake, in Capital Cities/ABC, worth $2.5 billion. By early this year, when shareholders vote on the takeover of Capital Cities by Walt Disney Co., Munger and Buffett will have to decide whether they want to become one of the two largest shareholders in what would be the biggest entertainment concern in the nation.
眼下，两人正在就伯克希尔持有的 2,000 万股（约 13%）Capital Cities/ABC 股份、价值 25 亿美元的问题进行博弈。今年年初，Capital Cities/ABC 股东将就沃尔特·迪士尼公司的收购方案投票。届时芒格和巴菲特必须决定，自己是否愿意成为这个全美最大娱乐集团的前两大股东之一。
Should they go for all Walt Disney stock in the deal? Or compromise by choosing half stock and half cash? Maybe with the Dow over 5000, they should cash in all their chips.
他们应当在交易中换取全部迪士尼股票吗？还是折中选择一半股票、一半现金？亦或在道指突破 5000 点的当下，干脆悉数兑现？
Don’t be surprised if Buffett and Munger go for a good-sized chunk of cash. "We have huge admiration for what Disney has achieved. But the stock is very high, and the market itself is near record levels,” Munger tells Forbes. Disney is selling at 22 times earnings and 5 times book value. It’s good but is it that good? Munger and Buffett are keeping the wires burning talking about it.
若巴菲特和芒格最终拿走一大笔现金，也不足为奇。芒格对《福布斯》说：“我们非常钦佩迪士尼取得的成就。但它的股价已非常昂贵，而整个市场也逼近历史高位。”迪士尼目前市盈率 22 倍、市净率 5 倍。优秀归优秀，可值不值得这么高？芒格和巴菲特正就此电话不断。
In a tie vote, Munger says, Buffett wins. After they have kicked around a subject, he is willing to let Buffett make the final decision. “A lot of dominant personalities, like me, can never play the subservient role even to Warren, who is more able and dedicated than I am,” Munger says.
芒格表示，如果意见相持不下，就听巴菲特的。在充分讨论后，他愿意让巴菲特作最终决定。“许多像我这样强势的人物，哪怕对沃伦——他比我更能干、更投入——也很难甘当副手，”芒格说。
That last sentence explains a lot about both men. Munger is immensely opinionated. Yet he is willing to play second fiddle. To subordinate strong views and a powerful personality requires a high degree of self-discipline and objectivity. Objectivity is the key word here. It means stripping decisions of emotions, of hopes and fears, of impatience and self-delusion and all purely subjective elements. Few people have this strength. Munger does. Giving in sometimes to Buffett requires, in Munger’s own words, “objectivity about where you rank in the scheme of things.”
这最后一句话揭示了两人的特点。芒格见解犀利，却甘当配角。要压下强烈观点与强大个性，需要高度的自律与客观。这里的关键词是“客观”——把情绪、期望与恐惧、急躁和自我欺骗等主观因素统统剥离。能做到这一点的人寥寥无几，而芒格做到了。正如他自己所言，偶尔让步于巴菲特，源于“对自己在大格局中所处位置的客观认识”。
Another word for objectivity is “cold-blooded.” Most of us mere humans get dizzy when a stock we hold goes up and up. Acrophobia sets in. We fear losing our paper profits. So we sell and sometimes we are sorry. At the other extreme, we like an investment but shy away because the consensus says we are wrong. Munger and Buffett strive to strip out emotion. Likewise, when things start to go wrong, most of us keep hoping they will soon get better. Munger and Buffett try not to hope but to coldly analyze the possibilities. This hard-nosed objectivity had a recent demonstration in the joint decision to redeem $140 million worth of preferred shares in troubled Salomon Inc. rather than convert them into common shares. Emotionally Buffett and Munger had a lot tied up in Salomon. Objectively, they could find better places to put the money. Salomon just had to go.
客观还有个同义词——“冷血”。普通投资者在手中股票节节攀升时往往头晕目眩，高处不胜寒，担心失去账面利润，于是匆匆卖出，事后懊悔；反过来，明明看好一只股票，却因大众意见相左而退缩。芒格和巴菲特力求剔除情绪。同样，当形势恶化时，大多数人仍抱着一线希望，期盼好转；芒格与巴菲特则尽量不寄望，而是冷静分析各种可能性。这种铁面客观最近又有实例：他们决定赎回所持问题公司所罗门（Salomon Inc.）价值 1.4 亿美元的优先股，而不是转换为普通股。感情上，巴菲特和芒格对所罗门倾注甚多；客观上，他们能找到更好的资金去处。所以，所罗门必须出局。
Munger backed up Buffett on one of the most cold-blooded decisions at Salomon: to refuse to pay all of the deferred and vested compensation former chairman John Gutfreund claimed he was owed. Contrast this with the rich payoffs recently given to ousted executives at Time Warner. In Munger’s view, Gutfreund let the company down and deserved no huge golden handshake.
芒格在所罗门公司支持巴菲特作出了一项极为“冷血”的决定：拒绝向前董事长约翰·古德弗伦德支付其声称应得的全部递延及既得薪酬。相比时代华纳近来向被解雇高管支付的大额遣散费，这一做法显得尤为严厉。在芒格看来，古德弗伦德辜负了公司，根本不配得到丰厚的“金色握手”。
Gutfreund is bitter toward Munger. For the sake of keeping the peace most executives would have paid Gutfreund off. But in Munger’s view that would not be an objective decision.
古德弗伦德对芒格颇为怨恨。若为息事宁人，多数高管大概会把钱给他。但在芒格眼里，那不是客观的决策。
More often than they disagree, Munger and Buffett see things exactly alike. It took them only about three hours to decide about accumulating a 4% position in the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. for Berkshire Hathaway in 1989. That position, for which Berkshire paid only $72 million, is today worth over half a billion dollars.
多数时候，芒格与巴菲特的看法完全一致。1989 年，他们仅用大约三小时就决定让伯克希尔买入联邦住房贷款抵押公司（Freddie Mac）4% 的股份。当时的成本仅 7,200 万美元，如今这部分持股已价值逾 5 亿美元。
It was a no-brainer, says Munger. “Only savings and loans could own it. And nobody could own more than 4%. Here was the perfect inefficient market. You’ve got something that makes hundreds of millions of dollars. It was obvious.”
芒格称这“一点儿都不用动脑子”。“只有储蓄贷款机构能持有，而且谁都不能超过 4%。这是典型的低效市场。公司本身赚几亿美元，机会显而易见。”
For Buffett and Munger maybe. But not for everyone.
对巴菲特和芒格而言或许显而易见，但显然并非人人看得懂。
Buffett is by far the wealthier of the two. Buffett—who got there first—with his wife owns 43.8% of Berkshire Hathaway, worth $17 billion. Munger’s 1.6% is currently worth $610 million.
两人之中，巴菲特的财富遥遥领先。他与妻子合计持有伯克希尔 43.8% 的股份，市值 170 亿美元；芒格的 1.6% 目前价值 6.1 亿美元。
Where Buffett says he can’t remember ever selling a share of Berkshire stock, Munger has given away several hundred shares as charitable gifts. He has given heaps of money to Los Angeles’ Good Samaritan Hospital. He has contributed liberally to Planned Parenthood and the Stanford University Law School, and was the major donor of a new science center at the Harvard-Westlake School, a private day school in Los Angeles.
巴菲特说自己几乎从未卖过一股伯克希尔，而芒格已将数百股捐作慈善。他向洛杉矶仁慈医院捐了大笔资金，慷慨支持计划生育协会和斯坦福大学法学院，并为洛杉矶私立哈佛-韦斯特莱克学校捐建了新的科学中心。
It's not a question of relative greed: Buffett does not live an especially lavish life and plans on leaving almost everything to his wife, Susan, who in turn has promised to leave it to the best endowed foundation in the world. It’s as if the two men, on this point, have different time spans: Munger wants the satisfaction of seeing his money do good things now; Buffett sees his role as piling up more chips for his heirs to do good things with.
这并非谁更贪婪的问题：巴菲特的生活并不奢华，他打算把几乎全部财产留给妻子苏珊，而苏珊又承诺将来捐给全球规模最大的基金会。两人在此似乎只是时间尺度不同：芒格希望亲眼看到财富立即发挥善举；巴菲特则认为自己该继续“堆筹码”，供继承人日后行善。
Apparently Buffett figures that the longer he has to work his compound interest magic, the more money his heirs will have to do good with. While a lot of people criticize Buffett for not being more generous, Munger stoutly defends his friend: “It’s more useful for Warren to be piling it up than to be giving it away.” It was Munger, not Buffett, who initiated the designated contributions plan under which Berkshire shareholders get to donate $13 for each of their shares to their favorite charity.
显然，巴菲特相信复利魔法运转得越久，后人可以做善事的资金就越多。尽管不少人批评他不够慷慨，芒格却力挺好友：“让沃伦继续积累，比现在捐出去更有意义。”事实上，由股东按每股 13 美元向心仪慈善机构定向捐款的方案，是芒格而非巴菲特首先倡议的。
One thing on which Munger and Buffett do not exactly agree is politics. Munger who, with his second wife Nancy, has eight children, is a registered Republican. Buffett is a Democrat who has enjoyed rubbing elbows with the Clintons. “I'm more conservative but I’m not a typical Colonel Blimp,” says Munger.
芒格与巴菲特意见并非处处一致，其中之一便是政治立场。芒格（与第二任妻子南希共育有八个子女）是注册共和党人；巴菲特则是民主党人，并乐于与克林顿夫妇打交道。芒格说：“我更保守些，但绝非刻板的军官布林普那一类。”
While he has less passion than Buffett for civil rights, Munger does agree with Buffett on population control and abortion rights. During the 1960s Munger helped California women obtain abortions in Mexico by paying for their trips. Later, he was a driving force in helping persuade the California Supreme Court to make the first decision overturning, on constitutional grounds, a law prohibiting abortions. Recalls Buffett: “Charlie took over the case. He solicited the deans of leading medical and law schools to enter amicus briefs. Charlie did all the work on it night and day, even writing some of the briefs himself.”
虽然他对民权运动的热情不如巴菲特高，但在计划生育和堕胎权上两人观点一致。20 世纪 60 年代，芒格出资帮助加州女性赴墨西哥做流产手术；此后，他又主导说服加州最高法院，首次以违宪为由推翻禁止堕胎的法律。巴菲特回忆：“查理接手这个案子，邀请多所顶尖医学院和法学院院长提交支持性法庭意见。他日夜操劳，甚至亲自撰写部分陈述。”
There must be something in the air or the water in Omaha. Though the pair met only in the late 1950s, the house Munger grew up in is only 200 yards from Buffett’s current home. As a young man Munger also worked in Buffett’s grandfather’s grocery store. After attending the University of Michigan and the California Institute of Technology without getting a degree, Munger served as meteorological officer in the Air Force in World War II. He gained entrance to Harvard Law School without an undergraduate degree, and graduated in 1948. He was only 22 when he entered Harvard, but even by the standards of that arrogant institution Munger was noted as a brainy but somewhat pompous and conceited fellow. Unprepared for a lesson one day, he calmly told his professor, “Give me the facts and I'll give you the law.”
也许奥马哈的空气或水里有什么魔力。虽然两人直到 20 世纪 50 年代末才相识，但芒格自幼成长的房子离巴菲特现居所仅 200 码。年轻时，芒格还在巴菲特祖父的杂货店打过工。就读密歇根大学和加州理工期间，他均未取得学位；二战中，他在空军担任气象官。随后，未持本科学历的芒格直接被哈佛法学院录取并于 1948 年毕业。22 岁就进入哈佛的他，即便按那所傲慢学府的标准，也以聪明但略显自负闻名。有次课前毫无准备，他淡定地对教授说：“告诉我案情，我来告诉你法律。”
Unlike Buffett, Munger has never devoted full time to investing. After graduation he shunned his home town, plying for the richer prospects in Los Angeles where he joined Musick Peeler & Garrett, the law firm which represented wealthy local entrepreneurs including J. Paul Getty.
与巴菲特不同，芒格并未把全部时间都投入投资。毕业后，他没有回奥马哈，而是奔赴机会更丰厚的洛杉矶，加入律师事务所 Musick Peeler & Garrett，为包括 J. Paul Getty 在内的本地富商提供法律服务。
Later, Munger formed his own firm, Munger, Tolles & Olson, which still carries his name first. It is one of the leading California firms, representing Southern California Edison and Unocal, as well as Berkshire Hathaway. In 1965 he stepped down as an active partner of the firm, though he keeps his office there and still lectures the partners on the importance of choosing clients like friends, and not going for the last dollar.
随后，芒格自立门户，创办了以本人姓名打头的 Munger Tolles & Olson 律师事务所。如今它已是加州一流律所，客户包括南加州爱迪生、优尼科以及伯克希尔。1965 年芒格退出日常合伙人角色，但保留办公室，仍会提醒同事“选客户要像选朋友，不必榨取最后一美元”。
Munger began his investment career independent of Buffett. From 1962 until 1975 he managed Wheeler Munger & Co., an investment counseling firm, from a grungy office in the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange building. Munger’s investment record did not match Buffett’s in those years, but he earned a highly respectable compound return of 19.8% a year before fees and after expenses.
芒格最初的投资生涯与巴菲特并无交集。1962-1975 年，他在太平洋证券交易所大楼一间破旧办公室里经营投资顾问公司 Wheeler Munger & Co.。虽然那时的成绩不及巴菲特，但扣除费用后，他仍取得年复合收益率 19.8% 的亮眼成绩。
Munger did not become a large Berkshire Hathaway shareholder until the late 1970s when two of his holdings, Diversified Retailing and later Blue Chip Stamps, were merged into Berkshire. After that, Buffett and Munger got to know each other better—and Buffett moved into his most productive period.
直到 20 世纪 70 年代末，芒格旗下的两家公司——Diversified Retailing 以及后来的 Blue Chip Stamps——并入伯克希尔，他才真正成了伯克希尔的大股东。此后，巴菲特与芒格的交情日益深厚，而巴菲特也随之进入了投资生涯最高产的阶段。
The two live very different lives. Of late Buffett has begun to enjoy his popularity, while not neglecting his investing. Munger, as always, pursues a wide range of activities. “I’ve tried to imitate, in a poor way, the life of Benjamin Franklin. When he was 42, Franklin quit business to focus more on being a writer, statesman, philanthropist, inventor and scientist. That’s why I have diverted my interest away from business.”
两人的生活方式截然不同。近年巴菲特在继续投资之余，也开始享受名声带来的社交乐趣；芒格则一如既往地展开多元活动。“我一直在拙劣地模仿本杰明·富兰克林的生活。富兰克林 42 岁时退出生意，转而投身写作、治国、慈善、发明与科学。所以我也把部分兴趣从商业上移开。”
Remarkably, neither Munger nor Buffett has much regard for Wall Street, though it has made their fortunes. “On a net basis the whole investment management business together gives no value added to all stock portfolio owners combined,” Munger says. “That isn’t true of plumbing and it isn’t true of medicine. Warren agrees with me 100%. We shake our heads at the brains that have been going into money management. What a waste of talent.”
颇为惊人的是，尽管华尔街造就了他们的财富，芒格和巴菲特对它都不甚尊重。芒格说：“整体而言，投资管理行业对所有股票持有者净增值为零。管道工不是这样，医生也不是这样。沃伦百分之百同意我的看法。我们对那么多聪明人投身资管行业感到惋惜——实在是人才浪费。”
Munger likens the market to the race track, where it's notoriously hard to beat the odds because the track takes a 17% cut on each dollar bet. Add in commissions, management charges, underwriting profits, and the whole fee structure, and the financial community’s take, while less than that of a race track, can still be quite material.
芒格把股市比作赛马场：由于场方抽走每美元赌资中的 17%，想跑赢赔率极其困难。再加上佣金、管理费、承销利润等整套费用，金融业的抽成虽不及赛马场，却也相当可观。
“Beating the market averages, after paying substantial costs and fees, is an against-the-odds game; yet a few people can do it, particularly those who view it as a game full of craziness with an occasional mispriced something or other,” Munger says.
“在支付了大笔成本和费用之后，要战胜市场平均水平基本是逆天而行；但总有极少数人能做到，尤其是那些把股市当作充满疯狂且偶尔出现估值错误游戏的人。”芒格如是说。
He adds: “Personally, I think that if security trading in America were to go down by 80%, the civilization would work better. And if I were God, I’d change the tax rules so it would go down by 80%—in fact, by more than 80%.” Munger once proposed a 100% tax on gains taken in less than a year from securities trading.
他补充道：“我个人认为，如果美国证券交易量减少 80%，文明运作会更好。要是我当上上帝，我会修改税法，让它降 80%，甚至超过 80%。”芒格曾提议，对持有不到一年的证券收益征收 100% 税率。
Is there a contradiction between this disdain for professional investing and Buffett and Munger’s brilliant practice of the art? You can tell by his answer that Munger has given a great deal of thought to that question.
那么，对职业投资的轻蔑是否与两人卓越的投资实践相矛盾？从芒格的回答可见，他对此早有深思。
“I join John Maynard Keynes in characterizing investment management as a low calling,” he responds, “because most of it is just shitting around a perpetual universe of common stocks. The people doing it just cancel each other out. You will note that none of my children is in investment management. Warren and I are a little different in that we actually run businesses and allocate capital to them.”
“我和约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯一样，把投资管理称为‘低等行当’，因为大多数时间只是围着那永无止境的一篮子普通股胡来，参与者彼此对冲，净效用为零。你会注意到，我的子女没有一个从事投资管理。沃伦和我稍有不同，我们是真正经营企业并为它们分配资本。”
“Keynes atoned for his ‘sins’ by making money for his college and serving his nation. I do my outside activities to atone and Warren uses his investment success to be a great teacher. And we love to make money for the people who trusted us early on, when we were young and poor.”
“凯恩斯通过替自己的学院赚钱、为国家服务来‘赎罪’。我靠各种社会活动来赎罪，沃伦则把投资成功用来当一名优秀的老师。我们俩都乐于替那些在我们年轻贫穷时就信任我们的人赚钱。”
In Forbes’ view, the social conscience Munger expresses is part and parcel of his investment success, as is Buffett's. And so these complex, aging prodigies carefully tend their compound interest machine, a joint creation of two exceptional personalities. Others may try to duplicate Berkshire Hathaway but they won't be able to duplicate these two exceptional minds.
在《福布斯》看来，芒格所彰显的社会良知正是他和巴菲特投资成功不可分割的一部分。于是，这两位日渐年迈却依旧睿智的天才小心翼翼地照料他们那部复利机器——这是二人性格与智慧共同孕育的产物。旁人也许能仿造出另一家“伯克希尔”，却复制不了这两颗独特的大脑。
THE OPM FACTOR
“他人钱”杠杆
By R.L. and D.S.F.
作者：R.L. 与 D.S.F.
YOU PROBABLY never thought of it this way, but buying Berkshire Hathaway stock is a way of buying on margin a portfolio of investments assembled by Warren Buffett and his longtime partner, Charles Munger. On margin?
你也许从没这样想过：购买伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票，其实相当于用“融资买入”的方式，持有巴菲特与芒格精心打造的一揽子资产组合。融资买入？
Yep, even if you pay all cash, with Berkshire Hathaway you get the leverage without the risk of margin calls. Best of all, the borrowed money costs Berkshire next to nothing, so all of the profit made from it accrues to shareholders. Thus Berkshire Hathaway shareholders have working for them all the advantages of leverage without all of the risks. Selling at a premium of 35% over asset value, the stock is grossly overpriced. But factor in the leverage, and the premium looks a lot less imposing. Says Buffett: "There is less of a premium in the stock than it appears."
没错——哪怕你是全现金买入，持有伯克希尔仍等于享受杠杆，却没有追加保证金的风险。更妙的是，这笔“借来的钱”几乎不用付利息，因此产生的全部收益都归股东所有。伯克希尔股东既得杠杆之利，又无杠杆之害。表面上公司股价比资产净值高出 35%，似乎“贵得离谱”；但把隐含杠杆算进去，这个溢价便没那么吓人。巴菲特说：“股票的实际溢价比看上去要小。”
Explains Munger: “Warren and I are chicken about buying stocks on margin. There's always a slight chance of catastrophe when you own securities pledged to others. The ideal is to borrow in a way no temporary thing can disturb you.”
芒格解释：“我和沃伦向来不敢用保证金买股票。把证券抵押给别人，总存在小概率灾难。理想的做法是：即便借钱，也要借得让任何短期风浪都动摇不了你。”
Which is precisely what Berkshire Hathaway does: It invests not only its shareholders' equity but also $13.4 billion—$11,700 per share—of essentially interest-free, borrowed money.
而伯克希尔正是这么做的：除股东权益外，它还能运用 134 亿美元——折合每股约 11,700 美元——几乎无成本的“借来之财”。
That’s why Buffett can say that the premium on Berkshire stock is less than it appears. By the published figures, this $32,050 stock has a per share book value of $23,780 [Ed note. Berkshire stock sells for $545,650 today]. Roughly speaking, for every $1,000 in Berkshire assets, shareholders get another $500 in OPM as its slave. Add in that Other People’s Money which works just as hard for shareholders as the assets—and much of the premium vanishes.
这就是为什么巴菲特说伯克希尔股票的溢价看起来比实际要高的原因。根据公开数据，这只32,050美元的股票每股账面价值为23,780美元【编者注：伯克希尔股票今日价格为545,650美元】。粗略地说，伯克希尔每1000美元的资产，就有另外500美元的“他人之钱”在为股东效力。把这些同样为股东辛勤工作的他人资金加进来，大部分溢价就消失了。
Some of the OPM derives from the Buffett-Munger buy-and-rarely-sell strategy: Thus hefty capital gains taxes are accrued but scant few are paid; by October 1995, Berkshire had a $5.1 billion deferred tax liability but paid only $155 million to the IRS.
部分他人资金来自巴菲特-芒格的“买入并极少卖出”策略：因此，巨额的资本利得税被计提，却很少真正缴纳；到1995年10月，伯克希尔计入了51亿美元的递延税款，但只向国税局支付了1.55亿美元。
Munger: “The object is to buy a non-dividend-paying stock that compounds for 30 years at 15% a year and pay only a single tax of 35% at the end of the period. After taxes this works out to a 13.4% annual rate of return.”
芒格说：“目标是买入一只不分红的股票，让它以每年15%的速度复利30年，只在期末一次性缴纳35%的税。税后年化收益率约为13.4%。”
Next comes the insurance company “float.” Float is a technical term referring to the provisions for unpaid claims and the premiums paid in advance by the insured, which are, of course, held and used by the insurance company pending the payment of claims.
接下来是保险公司的“浮存金”。浮存金是一个术语，指尚未赔付的准备金以及投保人预付的保费，在理赔之前，这些钱当然由保险公司持有并运用。
This is virtually free money tor the insurer, though sometimes it must be dipped into for paying out claims. The Berkshire Hathaway insurance company “float” is $3.8 billion, soon to be $6.8 billion, with the imminent absorption of auto insurer Geico.
对保险公司来说，这几乎是免费的资金，虽然有时要用于支付赔款。伯克希尔的保险浮存金为38亿美元，随着即将收购汽车保险公司Geico，很快将增至68亿美元。
Then there's Berkshire Hathaway’s debt of $1.5 billion, the only part of OPM that costs any money at all. Big deal: The interest rate is a paltry 6.5%.
此外，伯克希尔还有15亿美元的债务——这是全部他人资金中唯一需要付费的部分。可这又算得了什么：利率只有可怜的6.5%。
"We regard our float as a very significant asset,” says Buffett. “We probably have as large an amount of float compared to our premium volume as virtually any property and casualty company there is—and that's intentional.”
巴菲特说：“我们把浮存金视为一项非常重要的资产。就浮存金与保费规模的比率而言，我们大概与几乎所有财险公司一样位居前列——而这完全是有意为之。”
The Other People’s Money headquarters: Berkshire Hathaway acquired its insurance operation for $8.5 million in 1967. Now it has $19 billion in surplus. But the headquarters hasn't changed.
“他人之钱”的大本营：伯克希尔在1967年以850万美元收购了其保险业务，如今它拥有190亿美元的盈余，但总部依旧没变。
Had Berkshire had to borrow that money at prevailing interest rates, the cost would have been close to $800 million a year.
如果伯克希尔必须按当时的市场利率借入这笔资金，每年成本将接近8亿美元。
All insurance companies have float. Berkshire Hathaway’s is different.
所有保险公司都有浮存金，但伯克希尔的浮存金与众不同。
What makes it different is that a portion of it is in so-called super cat policies. It all started back in early 1967, when Berkshire Hathaway paid $8.5 million for two small Omaha insurance companies. National Indemnity and National Fire & Marine. The two tiny underwriters had $17.3 million in so-called float—or double the companies’ acquisition cost.
使其与众不同的是，其中一部分资金投向了所谓的“超级巨灾”保险。故事始于1967年初，当时伯克希尔·哈撒韦以850万美元收购了位于奥马哈的两家小型保险公司——National Indemnity 和 National Fire & Marine。这两家小型承保商拥有1730万美元的浮存金，约为收购成本的两倍。
Around this small acquisition, Berkshire developed a big business in writing super catastrophe insurance—which is reinsurance on reinsurance. It works like this: An insurance company is heavily exposed, let’s say, to homes in southern California. What if an earthquake devastates the place? The insurance company lays off some of its risk to Berkshire Hathaway or another company, which agrees to pay part of its claims over a certain amount—reinsurance. Sometimes the reinsurer wants to lay on some of its risk. So it buys super cat insurance. Berkshire Hathaway sells it to them, too.
围绕这桩小收购，伯克希尔发展出规模庞大的超级巨灾保险业务——也就是再保险的再保险。运作方式如下：假设一家保险公司对加州南部的住房承担了巨大风险，如果地震毁灭了该地区怎么办？这家公司就把部分风险转移给伯克希尔·哈撒韦或其他公司，对方同意在超出某一金额后承担部分赔付——这就是再保险。有时候，再保险公司也希望分散自己的风险，于是它会购买超级巨灾保险，而伯克希尔同样向它们出售这类保单。
This is tricky business but immensely profitable. When Berkshire Hathaway writes a super eat policy, it takes the entire premium, say 15% of the face value, as a reserve for the first year. At the end of the year, if the horrendous earthquake or wind storm didn’t happen, “we’ve made the money,” says Munger. Berkshire Hathaway then books the full premium as income.
这是一门复杂却利润丰厚的生意。当伯克希尔签下一份超级巨灾保单时，会在第一年将全部保费（例如面值的15%）提取为准备金。到了年末，如果没有发生可怕的地震或飓风，“我们就赚到这笔钱了，”芒格说。随后伯克希尔将全部保费确认为收入。
You can view the whole thing as a sophisticated kind of gambling: A hurricane could sweep away much of southern Florida. Berkshire is, in effect, betting that it won’t happen, and sets the odds in its favor by charging a premium of 15% of the policy’s face value.
你可以把这一切看作一种高端赌博：一场飓风可能席卷佛罗里达南部的大部分地区。实际上，伯克希尔在押注这种灾难不会发生，并通过收取相当于保单面值15%的保费来让赔率向自己倾斜。
If the sky doesn’t fall that year, Berkshire wins the entire bet. If it loses? The odds of another major earthquake in the Los Angeles basin in any single year are 20-to-1, in Buffett's opinion. An earthquake causing $30 billion in damage would cost Berkshire up to $1 billion; spread over 20 years that’s $50 million a year. The Northridge quake, which cost insurers about $ 12 billion, cost Berkshire hardly anything.
如果当年没有天塌地陷的灾难，伯克希尔就赢得整场赌局。如果输了呢？在巴菲特看来，洛杉矶盆地在任何单一年份再遭遇一次大地震的概率是20比1。一次造成300亿美元损失的地震会让伯克希尔付出高达10亿美元；摊到20年里，每年约为5000万美元。而那场令保险业损失约120亿美元的诺斯里奇地震，对伯克希尔几乎没有影响。
Munger says that Berkshire’s worst-case annual loss from super cat insurance would be $600 million after taxes. This would wipe out a year’s premiums, but that’s all. The biggest single policy Berkshire has written is $400 million, for 20th Century Insurance, which lost its entire capital because of the destruction of homes during the Northridge earthquake. Usually, though, Berkshire Hathaway spreads the risk among oil platform explosions, wind storms, earthquakes and other disasters. With a diversified book it spreads its risk widely.
芒格表示，伯克希尔在超级巨灾保险上的最坏年度损失在税后将达到6亿美元。这将抹去一整年的保费收入，但也仅此而已。伯克希尔承保过的单笔最大保单为4亿美元，客户是20th Century Insurance；该公司因诺斯里奇地震导致住宅毁损而损失了全部资本。不过通常情况下，伯克希尔·哈撒韦会把风险分散在海上油井爆炸、风暴、地震及其他灾害之间。通过多元化的承保组合，它大幅分散了风险。
Berkshire has done so well because it has avoided the asbestos and environmental hazard policies that sank so many other insurers. Its largest underwriting loss ever was $120 million in 1991.
伯克希尔表现如此出色，是因为它避开了令众多保险公司沉没的石棉和环境风险保单。其史上最大的承保亏损发生在1991年，仅为1.2亿美元。
The bottom line: For the last three years, Berkshire has made underwriting profits. So, its cost of funds is less than zero, which means the return on the float is pure profit.
结果如何？过去三年里，伯克希尔实现了承保盈利。因此，其资金成本低于零，这意味着浮存金的投资收益全都转化为纯利润。
Investing the float, Buffett and Munger have been able to get a compound rate of return of 23%. Now you know why Forbes calls Berkshire a wonderful compound interest machine.
通过投资浮存金，巴菲特和芒格获得了23%的复合回报率。现在你就明白为什么《福布斯》称伯克希尔为“卓越的复利机器”了。
Meanwhile, the average float grows geometrically. It has more than doubled, from $1.6 billion in 1990 to $3.8 billion in 1995. Berkshire’s once tiny insurance operation has become the second-best capitalized insurance company in the U.S. It is an A++-rated company with $19 billion in policy-holders’ surplus—second only to State Farm, with $24 billion, more than double the size of Allstate or AIG.
与此同时，平均浮存金呈几何级数增长；它已从1990年的16亿美元增加到1995年的38亿美元，翻了一倍多。伯克希尔曾经不起眼的保险业务，现已成为美国资本实力排名第二的保险公司。它拥有A++评级和190亿美元的保户盈余，仅次于拥有240亿美元的州立农场，规模是Allstate或AIG的两倍多。
But don’t bother looking for limousines or antiques in National Indemnity’s office. It still operates with a tiny staff out of its nondescript Omaha headquarters.
但别指望在National Indemnity的办公室里看到豪华轿车或古董。它仍以精简的员工队伍在奥马哈那栋毫不起眼的总部办公。