1996-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1995 was $5.3 billion, or 45.0%. Per-share book value grew by a little less, 43.1%, because we paid stock for two acquisitions, increasing our shares outstanding by 1.3%. Over the last 31 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $14,426, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.
1995 年我们的净资产增加了 53 亿美元，增幅 45.0%。每股账面价值增长略低，为 43.1%，原因是我们用股票支付了两笔收购对价，使流通股数增加了 1.3%。在过去 31 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 14,426 美元，年复合增长率为 23.6%。
There's no reason to do handsprings over 1995's gains. This was a year in which any fool could make a bundle in the stock market. And we did. To paraphrase President Kennedy, a rising tide lifts all yachts.
没必要为 1995 年的增长而翻跟头庆祝。这一年里，股市上涨到“任何傻瓜都能赚一大笔”的程度，我们也确实赚到了。套用 President Kennedy 的话：水涨船高，所有游艇都被托起。
Putting aside the financial results, there was plenty of good news at Berkshire last year: We negotiated three acquisitions of exactly the type we desire. Two of these, Helzberg's Diamond Shops and R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, are included in our 1995 financial statements, while our largest transaction, the purchase of GEICO, closed immediately after the end of the year. (I'll tell you more about all three acquisitions later in the report.)
撇开财务结果不谈，伯克希尔去年也有不少好消息：我们谈成了三笔完全符合我们偏好的收购。其中两笔——Helzberg’s Diamond Shops 和 R.C. Willey Home Furnishings——已经计入 1995 年财务报表；而我们最大的一笔交易——收购 GEICO——在年底刚过不久就完成交割。（我将在报告后文更详细介绍这三笔收购。）
These new subsidiaries roughly double our revenues. Even so, the acquisitions neither materially increased our shares outstanding nor our debt. And, though these three operations employ over 11,000 people, our headquarters staff grew only from 11 to 12. (No sense going crazy.)
这些新子公司大致会让我们的营收规模翻一倍。即便如此，这些收购既没有显著增加我们的流通股数量，也没有显著增加我们的负债。而且，尽管这三项业务雇佣了 11,000 多名员工，我们总部员工只从 11 人增加到了 12 人。（没必要发疯。）
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to build a collection of companies - both wholly- and partly-owned - that have excellent economic characteristics and that are run by outstanding managers. Our favorite acquisition is the negotiated transaction that allows us to purchase 100% of such a business at a fair price. But we are almost as happy when the stock market offers us the chance to buy a modest percentage of an outstanding business at a pro-rata price well below what it would take to buy 100%. This double-barrelled approach - purchases of entire businesses through negotiation or purchases of part-interests through the stock market - gives us an important advantage over capital-allocators who stick to a single course. Woody Allen once explained why eclecticism works: "The real advantage of being bisexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night."
Charlie Munger（伯克希尔副董事长、也是我的合伙人）和我希望建立一个公司集合——既包括全资拥有，也包括部分持股——这些公司必须具备优秀的经济特性，并由杰出的管理者运营。我们最喜欢的收购方式，是通过谈判以合理价格买下这类企业 100% 的股权。但如果股市给了我们机会，让我们以远低于收购 100% 所需的价格，按比例买入一家杰出企业的一小部分股权，我们也几乎同样开心。这种“双管齐下”的方式——通过谈判买整家公司，或通过股市买入部分权益——让我们相较于只走单一路线的资本配置者拥有重要优势。Woody Allen 曾解释为何“兼容并包”有效：“做双性恋的真正优势，是能把周六晚上的约会机会翻倍。”
Over the years, we've been Woody-like in our thinking, attempting to increase our marketable investments in wonderful businesses, while simultaneously trying to buy similar businesses in their entirety. The following table illustrates our progress on both fronts. In the tabulation, we show the marketable securities owned per share of Berkshire at ten-year intervals. A second column lists our per-share operating earnings (before taxes and purchase-price adjustments but after interest and corporate overhead) from all other activities. In other words, the second column shows what we earned excluding the dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from investments. Purchase-price accounting adjustments are ignored for reasons we have explained at length in previous reports and which, as an act of mercy, we won't repeat. (We'll be glad to send masochists the earlier explanations, however.)
这些年里，我们的思路颇有点“Woody 式”：一方面努力增加我们在优秀企业中的可交易证券投资，另一方面也同时尝试把类似的企业整个买下来。下面的表格展示了我们在这两条战线上取得的进展。表中，我们以每 10 年为间隔列示伯克希尔每股所拥有的可交易证券规模；第二列列示我们来自其他所有经营活动的每股经营收益（税前并剔除购买价会计调整，但已扣除利息和公司总部费用）。换句话说，第二列展示的是：不包含我们从投资中实现的股息、利息和资本利得时，我们自身经营赚到的钱。购买价会计调整被忽略，原因我们在以前报告里已长篇解释过——出于“怜悯”，这次就不重复了。（当然，如果有人喜欢“受虐”，我们也很乐意把以前的解释寄给他。）
These results have not sprung from some master plan that we concocted in 1965. In a general way, we knew then what we hoped to accomplish but had no idea what specific opportunities might make it possible. Today we remain similarly unstructured: Over time, we expect to improve the figures in both columns but have no road map to tell us how that will come about.
这些结果并非源自我们在 1965 年“策划”的某个总体蓝图。大体上，我们当时知道希望达成什么，但完全不知道会有哪些具体机会使之成为可能。今天我们仍然同样“不设结构”：随着时间推移，我们预计两栏数据都会改善，但我们没有路线图告诉我们这将如何发生。
We proceed with two advantages: First, our operating managers are outstanding and, in most cases, have an unusually strong attachment to Berkshire. Second, Charlie and I have had considerable experience in allocating capital and try to go at that job rationally and objectively. The giant disadvantage we face is size: In the early years, we needed only good ideas, but now we need good big ideas. Unfortunately, the difficulty of finding these grows in direct proportion to our financial success, a problem that increasingly erodes our strengths.
我们有两个优势：第一，我们的经营管理者非常出色，而且在多数情况下，对 Berkshire 有一种异常强烈的归属感。第二，Charlie 和我在资本配置方面积累了相当经验，并努力以理性、客观的方式完成这项工作。我们面临的巨大劣势是规模：早年我们只需要好点子，但现在我们需要“又好又大”的点子。不幸的是，寻找这种点子的难度与我们的财务成功成正比增长，这个问题会越来越侵蚀我们的优势。
I will have more to say about Berkshire's prospects later in this report, when I discuss our proposed recapitalization.
关于 Berkshire 的前景，我会在本报告后文谈得更多——当我讨论我们拟议的 recapitalization（资本重组）时。
Acquisitions
并购活动
It may seem strange that we exult over a year in which we made three acquisitions, given that we have regularly used these pages to question the acquisition activities of most managers. Rest assured, Charlie and I haven't lost our skepticism: We believe most deals do damage to the shareholders of the acquiring company. Too often, the words from HMS Pinafore apply: "Things are seldom what they seem, skim milk masquerades as cream." Specifically, sellers and their representatives invariably present financial projections having more entertainment value than educational value. In the production of rosy scenarios, Wall Street can hold its own against Washington.
看起来或许有点奇怪：我们在一年内完成三笔收购却“欢欣鼓舞”，毕竟我们长期在这些页里质疑大多数管理层的收购行为。请放心，Charlie 和我并没有失去怀疑精神：我们认为大多数交易都会损害收购方公司的股东利益。很多时候，HMS Pinafore 里那句话很贴切：“事情往往不是它看上去的样子，脱脂奶伪装成奶油。”更具体地说，卖方及其代表几乎总会给出一些财务预测——娱乐价值远大于教育价值。在制造“美好前景”这件事上，Wall Street 的功力并不输给 Washington。
In any case, why potential buyers even look at projections prepared by sellers baffles me. Charlie and I never give them a glance, but instead keep in mind the story of the man with an ailing horse. Visiting the vet, he said: "Can you help me? Sometimes my horse walks just fine and sometimes he limps." The vet's reply was pointed: "No problem - when he's walking fine, sell him." In the world of mergers and acquisitions, that horse would be peddled as Secretariat.
不管怎么说，潜在买家居然还会去看卖方准备的预测，这件事一直让我困惑。Charlie 和我从来不瞄一眼；我们脑子里想的是那个“病马”的故事：一个人带着一匹病马去看兽医，说：“你能帮帮我吗？我的马有时候走得挺好，有时候一瘸一拐。”兽医的回答一针见血：“没问题——它走得挺好的时候，把它卖了。”在并购世界里，那匹马会被当成 Secretariat（传奇赛马“秘书处”）那样兜售。
At Berkshire, we have all the difficulties in perceiving the future that other acquisition-minded companies do. Like they also, we face the inherent problem that the seller of a business practically always knows far more about it than the buyer and also picks the time of sale - a time when the business is likely to be walking "just fine."
在 Berkshire，我们在判断未来方面的困难，并不比其他热衷收购的公司少。和他们一样，我们也面临一个根本性问题：卖方几乎总是比买方更了解这门生意，而且卖方还能挑选出售时点——通常就是生意“走得挺好”的时候。
Even so, we do have a few advantages, perhaps the greatest being that we don't have a strategic plan. Thus we feel no need to proceed in an ordained direction (a course leading almost invariably to silly purchase prices) but can instead simply decide what makes sense for our owners. In doing that, we always mentally compare any move we are contemplating with dozens of other opportunities open to us, including the purchase of small pieces of the best businesses in the world via the stock market. Our practice of making this comparison - acquisitions against passive investments - is a discipline that managers focused simply on expansion seldom use.
即便如此，我们确实也有一些优势，或许最大的优势是：我们没有战略规划。因此，我们不需要沿着某条“被钦定”的方向前进（而这种路线几乎必然导致愚蠢的收购价格），我们只需要决定：对我们的所有者而言，什么是合算的。为此，我们总会在脑中把任何正在考虑的动作，与我们面前数十种其他机会做比较——其中就包括通过股市买入世界上最优秀企业的一小部分股权。我们坚持做这种比较——把“收购”与“被动投资”对照——这是一种纪律；而那些只盯着扩张的管理者，很少采用这种纪律。
Talking to Time Magazine a few years back, Peter Drucker got to the heart of things: "I will tell you a secret: Dealmaking beats working. Dealmaking is exciting and fun, and working is grubby. Running anything is primarily an enormous amount of grubby detail work . . . dealmaking is romantic, sexy. That's why you have deals that make no sense."
几年前 Peter Drucker 在接受 Time Magazine 采访时说到了点子上：“我告诉你一个秘密：做交易胜过做实事。做交易刺激、有趣；做实事又脏又累。经营任何东西，主要就是海量的脏活累活细节……而做交易浪漫、性感。这就是为什么你会看到很多毫无道理的交易。”
In making acquisitions, we have a further advantage: As payment, we can offer sellers a stock backed by an extraordinary collection of outstanding businesses. An individual or a family wishing to dispose of a single fine business, but also wishing to defer personal taxes indefinitely, is apt to find Berkshire stock a particularly comfortable holding. I believe, in fact, that this calculus played an important part in the two acquisitions for which we paid shares in 1995.
在收购上，我们还有一个额外优势：我们可以用股票作为对价，而这只股票背后支撑着一组非同寻常的杰出企业。一个个人或家族如果想处置一门优质生意，同时又希望无限期递延个人税负，那么 Berkshire 股票往往会是一个非常“舒服”的持有标的。事实上，我相信这种权衡在 1995 年那两笔以发股支付的收购中起了重要作用。
Beyond that, sellers sometimes care about placing their companies in a corporate home that will both endure and provide pleasant, productive working conditions for their managers. Here again, Berkshire offers something special. Our managers operate with extraordinary autonomy. Additionally, our ownership structure enables sellers to know that when I say we are buying to keep, the promise means something. For our part, we like dealing with owners who care what happens to their companies and people. A buyer is likely to find fewer unpleasant surprises dealing with that type of seller than with one simply auctioning off his business.
除此之外，卖方有时也在意：把公司放进一个既能长期存在、又能为管理团队提供愉快且富有成效工作环境的“企业之家”。在这方面，Berkshire 也确实有独到之处。我们的经理人拥有极高程度的自主权。另外，我们的所有权结构使卖方能够确信：当我说“我们买下就是为了长期持有”时，这个承诺是有分量的。对我们而言，我们也喜欢与那些真正关心自己公司与员工未来的所有者打交道。相较于那种只是把生意拿出来拍卖的人，买家跟前一种卖家交易，往往更不容易碰到令人不快的意外。
In addition to the foregoing being an explanation of our acquisition style, it is, of course, a not-so-subtle sales pitch. If you own or represent a business earning $25 million or more before tax, and it fits the criteria listed on page 23, just give me a call. Our discussion will be confidential. And if you aren't interested now, file our proposition in the back of your mind: We are never going to lose our appetite for buying companies with good economics and excellent management.
上述内容当然是在解释我们的收购风格；同时，也是一段“不那么含蓄”的推销。如果你拥有或代表一家税前利润达到 2,500 万美元或以上的企业，并且它符合第 23 页列出的标准，给我打个电话即可。我们的讨论会保密。如果你现在没兴趣，也请把这个提议先放在脑海后面：我们永远不会失去对“经济性好、管理层优秀”的企业的收购胃口。
Concluding this little dissertation on acquisitions, I can't resist repeating a tale told me last year by a corporate executive. The business he grew up in was a fine one, with a long-time record of leadership in its industry. Its main product, however, was distressingly glamorless. So several decades ago, the company hired a management consultant who - naturally - advised diversification, the then-current fad. ("Focus" was not yet in style.) Before long, the company acquired a number of businesses, each after the consulting firm had gone through a long - and expensive - acquisition study. And the outcome? Said the executive sadly, "When we started, we were getting 100% of our earnings from the original business. After ten years, we were getting 150%."
在结束这段关于收购的小论文之前，我忍不住再重复一个去年一位企业高管讲给我的故事。他成长所在的企业本来就很好，在行业里长期处于领先地位。但它的主打产品“朴素得令人沮丧”，毫无光彩。于是几十年前，公司请来一位管理咨询顾问——当然——建议多元化，当时最时髦的做法。（那时候“聚焦”还没流行。）不久，公司收购了好几门业务，每一笔收购之前，咨询公司都做了一套漫长——而且昂贵——的收购研究。结果如何？那位高管沮丧地说：“一开始，我们 100% 的利润来自原来的主业。十年后，我们拿到了 150%。”
Helzberg's Diamond Shops
钻石连锁店
A few years back, management consultants popularized a technique called "management by walking around" (MBWA). At Berkshire, we've instituted ABWA (acquisitions by walking around).
几年前，管理咨询顾问把一种叫“management by walking around”（MBWA，走动式管理）的方法炒热了。在 Berkshire，我们则搞出了 ABWA（acquisitions by walking around，走动式收购）。
In May 1994, a week or so after the Annual Meeting, I was crossing the street at 58th and Fifth Avenue in New York, when a woman called out my name. I listened as she told me she'd been to, and had enjoyed, the Annual Meeting. A few seconds later, a man who'd heard the woman stop me did so as well. He turned out to be Barnett Helzberg, Jr., who owned four shares of Berkshire and had also been at our meeting.
1994 年 5 月，年度股东大会结束后一周左右，我在纽约第五大道与 58 街的路口过马路时，有位女士喊了我的名字。我听她说，她去参加了年度大会，而且很喜欢。几秒钟后，一个听到她叫住我的男士也把我拦下了。他就是 Barnett Helzberg, Jr.，持有 Berkshire 四股，也同样参加了我们的大会。
In our few minutes of conversation, Barnett said he had a business we might be interested in. When people say that, it usually turns out they have a lemonade stand - with potential, of course, to quickly grow into the next Microsoft. So I simply asked Barnett to send me particulars. That, I thought to myself. will be the end of that.
在我们短短几分钟的交谈里，Barnett 说他有一门生意我们可能会感兴趣。别人这么说时，通常意味着他们只有一个柠檬水摊——当然，潜力巨大，随时可以长成下一个 Microsoft。于是我只是让 Barnett 把具体资料寄给我。我当时心里想：这事就到此为止了。
Not long after, Barnett sent me the financial statements of Helzberg's Diamond Shops. The company had been started by his grandfather in 1915 from a single store in Kansas City and had developed by the time we met into a group with 134 stores in 23 states. Sales had grown from $10 million in 1974 to $53 million in 1984 and $282 million in 1994. We weren't talking lemonade stands.
没过多久，Barnett 给我寄来了 Helzberg’s Diamond Shops 的财务报表。这家公司由他祖父于 1915 年在 Kansas City 从一家单店创立。到我们见面时，它已经发展为覆盖 23 个州、134 家门店的连锁体系。销售额从 1974 年的 1,000 万美元增长到 1984 年的 5,300 万美元，再到 1994 年的 2.82 亿美元。我们谈的显然不是柠檬水摊。
对家族企业有偏好。
Barnett, then 60, loved the business but also wanted to feel free of it. In 1988, as a step in that direction, he had brought in Jeff Comment, formerly President of Wanamaker's, to help him run things. The hiring of Jeff turned out to be a homerun, but Barnett still found that he couldn't shake a feeling of ultimate responsibility. Additionally, he owned a valuable asset that was subject to the vagaries of a single, very competitive industry, and he thought it prudent to diversify his family's holdings.
Barnett 当时 60 岁，他热爱这门生意，但也希望能从中“抽身”。1988 年，为了朝这个方向迈一步，他请来了 Jeff Comment（曾任 Wanamaker’s 总裁）协助管理。聘用 Jeff 的结果堪称“全垒打”，但 Barnett 仍然发现自己摆脱不了那种“最终责任在我”的感觉。与此同时，他的财富高度绑定在一个单一、且竞争极其激烈的行业上，而这类资产价值又会随行业景气起伏而波动；因此他认为，把家族资产做些分散化是审慎之举。
Berkshire was made to order for him. It took us awhile to get together on price, but there was never any question in my mind that, first, Helzberg's was the kind of business that we wanted to own and, second, Jeff was our kind of manager. In fact, we would not have bought the business if Jeff had not been there to run it. Buying a retailer without good management is like buying the Eiffel Tower without an elevator.
对他而言，Berkshire 简直是量身定做。我们在价格上磨合了一阵子，但在我心里从来没有疑问：第一，Helzberg’s 属于我们想要拥有的那类生意；第二，Jeff 属于我们想要的那类经理人。事实上，如果不是 Jeff 在那里负责经营，我们根本不会买这家公司。收购一家零售企业却没有优秀管理层，就像买下 Eiffel Tower 却没有电梯一样荒唐。
珠宝店的假设可能跟see's candy有相似的地方，后者是谈恋爱，前者是结婚。
We completed the Helzberg purchase in 1995 by means of a tax-free exchange of stock, the only kind of transaction that interested Barnett. Though he was certainly under no obligation to do so, Barnett shared a meaningful part of his proceeds from the sale with a large number of his associates. When someone behaves that generously, you know you are going to be treated right as a buyer.
我们在 1995 年完成了对 Helzberg 的收购，方式是免税的股票置换——这也是 Barnett 唯一感兴趣的交易形式。尽管他完全没有义务这么做，Barnett 仍把出售所得中相当有意义的一部分分享给了许多同事与伙伴。一个人能如此慷慨行事，你就会知道：作为买家，你会被公平对待。
The average Helzberg's store has annual sales of about $2 million, far more than competitors operating similarly-sized stores achieve. This superior per-store productivity is the key to Helzberg's excellent profits. If the company continues its first-rate performance - and we believe it will - it could grow rather quickly to several times its present size.
Helzberg’s 门店的平均年销售额约 200 万美元，远高于那些经营相似规模门店的竞争对手。单店生产率的这种优势，是 Helzberg’s 优秀利润水平的关键。如果公司能继续保持一流表现——我们相信会的——它的规模就有可能相当快地增长到目前的数倍。
Helzberg's, it should be added, is an entirely different sort of operation from Borsheim's, our Omaha jewelry business, and the two companies will operate independently of each other. Borsheim's had an excellent year in 1995, with sales up 11.7%. Susan Jacques, its 36-year-old CEO, had an even better year, giving birth to her second son at the start of the Christmas season. Susan has proved to be a terrific leader in the two years since her promotion.
另外需要补充的是，Helzberg’s 与我们在 Omaha 的珠宝业务 Borsheim’s 完全是两种不同类型的运营，两家公司将彼此独立运作。Borsheim’s 在 1995 年也度过了非常出色的一年，销售额增长 11.7%。其 36 岁的 CEO Susan Jacques 的一年更是“喜上加喜”，她在圣诞季一开始就迎来了第二个儿子。Susan 在升任后的两年里，已证明自己是一位非常出色的领导者。
R.C. Willey Home Furnishings
威利家具店
It was Nebraska Furniture Mart's Irv Blumkin who did the walking around in the case of R.C. Willey, long the leading home furnishings business in Utah. Over the years, Irv had told me about the strengths of that company. And he had also told Bill Child, CEO of R.C. Willey, how pleased the Blumkin family had been with its Berkshire relationship. So in early 1995, Bill mentioned to Irv that for estate tax and diversification reasons, he and the other owners of R.C. Willey might be interested in selling.
在 R.C. Willey 这笔交易里，“走动式”反而是 Nebraska Furniture Mart 的 Irv Blumkin 完成的。多年来，Irv 一直向我介绍这家公司（长期以来都是 Utah 家居用品领域的龙头）的强项；他也不断向 R.C. Willey 的 CEO Bill Child 分享：Blumkin 家族与 Berkshire 建立关系之后有多满意。因此在 1995 年初，Bill 对 Irv 提到：出于遗产税与分散化的原因，他和 R.C. Willey 的其他所有者可能会考虑出售。
From that point forward, things could not have been simpler. Bill sent me some figures, and I wrote him a letter indicating my idea of value. We quickly agreed on a number, and found our personal chemistry to be perfect. By mid-year, the merger was completed.
从那一刻起，事情进展得再简单不过。Bill 寄给我一些数据，我回信说明我对价值的看法。我们很快就对一个数字达成一致，而且发现彼此的“个人化学反应”也完全契合。到年中，这笔合并就完成了。
R.C. Willey is an amazing story. Bill took over the business from his father-in-law in 1954 when sales were about $250,000. From this tiny base, Bill employed Mae West's philosophy: "It's not what you've got - it's what you do with what you've got." Aided by his brother, Sheldon, Bill has built the company to its 1995 sales volume of $257 million, and it now accounts for over 50% of the furniture business in Utah. Like Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey sells appliances, electronics, computers and carpets in addition to furniture. Both companies have about the same sales volume, but NFM gets all of its business from one complex in Omaha, whereas R.C. Willey will open its sixth major store in the next few months.
R.C. Willey 是个令人惊叹的故事。Bill 在 1954 年从他的岳父手里接过这门生意时，销售额大约只有 25 万美元。以这样一个微小的起点，Bill 运用了 Mae West 的哲学：“重要的不是你拥有什么——而是你如何运用你所拥有的。”在弟弟 Sheldon 的协助下，Bill 把公司打造到 1995 年 2.57 亿美元的销售规模，如今它占据了 Utah 超过 50% 的家具市场份额。和 Nebraska Furniture Mart 一样，R.C. Willey 除了家具，还销售家电、电子产品、电脑和地毯。两家公司销售规模大致相当，但 NFM 的全部业务来自 Omaha 的一个综合卖场；而 R.C. Willey 则将在未来几个月里开出第六家大型门店。
Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.
零售业是一门艰难的生意。在我的投资生涯里，我见过大量零售商曾在一段时间里实现惊人的增长、取得极高的股东权益回报率，但随后却突然“俯冲”，往往一路跌进破产。这种“流星式”现象在零售业远比在制造业或服务业常见。部分原因在于：零售商必须日复一日地保持聪明。竞争对手总是在复制你，然后再在你之上做得更狠。与此同时，消费者又被各种各样的方式招徕，去不断尝试一批又一批的新商家。在零售业里，“滑行”就等于失败。
基本上是国内几家零售商的现状。
In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business, there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him. For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to bankruptcy.
与这种“必须每天都聪明”的生意相反，还有一种我称之为“只需要聪明一次”的生意。比如，如果你足够聪明，在电视网刚起步的早期就买下一家 network TV station，那么即使你安排一个懒散、守旧的外甥去经营，这门生意仍可能几十年都表现不错。当然，如果你请来 Tom Murphy 经营，你会做得更好；但即便没有他，你也仍能舒服地保持盈利。而对零售商来说，雇那个外甥就等于拿到一张直达破产的快车票。
The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done so successfully for decades. Like the CEOs of our other operating units, they will operate autonomously: We want them to feel that the businesses they run are theirs. This means no second-guessing by Charlie and me. We avoid the attitude of the alumnus whose message to the football coach is "I'm 100% with you - win or tie." Our basic goal as an owner is to behave with our managers as we like our owners to behave with us.
我们今年买下的两家零售企业都很幸运：它们拥有极其出色的管理者，这些人热爱竞争，并且几十年来一直竞争得很成功。和我们其他经营单元的 CEO 一样，他们将自主经营：我们希望他们觉得自己经营的业务就是他们自己的。这意味着 Charlie 和我不会事后诸葛、不会“二次猜测”。我们避免那种校友对橄榄球教练说的态度：“我 100% 支持你——赢或者打平。”作为所有者，我们的基本目标是：我们希望如何被我们的所有者对待，就如何对待我们的经理人。
As we add more operations, I'm sometimes asked how many people I can handle reporting to me. My answer to that is simple: If I have one person reporting to me and he is a lemon, that's one too many, and if I have managers like those we now have, the number can be almost unlimited. We are lucky to have Bill and Sheldon associated with us, and we hope that we can acquire other businesses that bring with them managers of similar caliber.
随着我们增加更多业务，有时有人问我：有多少人向我汇报我还能应付？我的回答很简单：如果只有一个人向我汇报，而他是个“烂柠檬”，那都嫌多；如果我们的经理人像现在这样优秀，那么人数几乎可以无限。我们很幸运能与 Bill 和 Sheldon 共事，也希望未来能收购更多企业——并且这些企业能带来同等水准的经理人。
GEICO Corporation
Right after yearend, we completed the purchase of 100% of GEICO, the seventh largest auto insurer in the United States, with about 3.7 million cars insured. I've had a 45-year association with GEICO, and though the story has been told before, it's worth a short recap here.
在年末刚过不久，我们完成了对 GEICO 100% 股权的收购。GEICO 是美国第七大汽车保险公司，承保车辆约 370 万辆。我与 GEICO 的缘分已有 45 年。虽然这个故事以前讲过，但在这里做个简短回顾仍然值得。
I attended Columbia University's business school in 1950-51, not because I cared about the degree it offered, but because I wanted to study under Ben Graham, then teaching there. The time I spent in Ben's classes was a personal high, and quickly induced me to learn all I could about my hero. I turned first to Who's Who in America, finding there, among other things, that Ben was Chairman of Government Employees Insurance Company, to me an unknown company in an unfamiliar industry.
我在 1950-51 年就读 Columbia University 的商学院，并不是因为我在乎它能给我什么学位，而是因为我想跟随当时在那里任教的 Ben Graham 学习。在 Ben 的课堂里度过的时光，是我个人的高光时刻，并迅速促使我尽可能多地了解这位英雄。我首先翻了 Who’s Who in America，在里面发现——除其他信息之外——Ben 是 Government Employees Insurance Company 的董事长；对我来说，这是一家陌生行业里的陌生公司。
最原始的心理动机：想解决问题，对现实世界有基本的信任。
A librarian next referred me to Best's Fire and Casualty insurance manual, where I learned that GEICO was based in Washington, DC. So on a Saturday in January, 1951, I took the train to Washington and headed for GEICO's downtown headquarters. To my dismay, the building was closed, but I pounded on the door until a custodian appeared. I asked this puzzled fellow if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he said he'd seen one man working on the sixth floor.
随后，一位图书管理员建议我去查 Best’s Fire and Casualty insurance manual，于是我得知 GEICO 的总部在 Washington, DC。于是，在 1951 年 1 月的一个星期六，我坐火车到了华盛顿，直奔 GEICO 位于市中心的总部。令我沮丧的是，大楼关着门。但我不停敲门，直到一名管理员出现。我问这个一脸困惑的人，办公室里是否还有人可以聊聊；他告诉我，他见过有一个人在六楼工作。
And thus I met Lorimer Davidson, Assistant to the President, who was later to become CEO. Though my only credentials were that I was a student of Graham's, "Davy" graciously spent four hours or so showering me with both kindness and instruction. No one has ever received a better half-day course in how the insurance industry functions nor in the factors that enable one company to excel over others. As Davy made clear, GEICO's method of selling - direct marketing - gave it an enormous cost advantage over competitors that sold through agents, a form of distribution so ingrained in the business of these insurers that it was impossible for them to give it up. After my session with Davy, I was more excited about GEICO than I have ever been about a stock.
就这样，我见到了 Lorimer Davidson——当时的职位是总裁助理，后来成为 CEO。尽管我唯一的“资历”只是 Graham 的学生，“Davy” 仍非常慷慨地花了大约四个小时，给了我满满的善意与教导。没有人曾得到过比这更好的半天课程：既包括保险行业如何运作，也包括是什么因素能让一家公司显著优于同行。正如 Davy 讲得很清楚，GEICO 的销售方式——direct marketing（直销/直接营销）——让它相较于通过代理人销售的竞争对手拥有巨大的成本优势；而“通过代理分销”这种方式在这些保险公司的业务中根深蒂固，以至于他们不可能放弃。与 Davy 交流之后，我对 GEICO 的兴奋程度，超过了我对任何一只股票曾有过的兴奋。
When I finished at Columbia some months later and returned to Omaha to sell securities, I naturally focused almost exclusively on GEICO. My first sales call - on my Aunt Alice, who always supported me 100% - was successful. But I was then a skinny, unpolished 20-year-old who looked about 17, and my pitch usually failed. Undaunted, I wrote a short report late in 1951 about GEICO for "The Security I Like Best" column in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a leading financial publication of the time. More important, I bought stock for my own account.
几个月后我从 Columbia 毕业，回到 Omaha 做证券销售时，我自然几乎把全部精力都放在 GEICO 上。我的第一次推销对象——我的 Alice 姨妈（她总是 100% 支持我）——买账了。但那时我只是个又瘦、又不老练的 20 岁年轻人，看上去顶多 17 岁，我的推介通常都失败。尽管如此，我并不气馁：1951 年底，我为当时一份重要的金融刊物 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 的专栏 “The Security I Like Best” 写了一篇关于 GEICO 的短文。更重要的是，我也用自己的账户买入了 GEICO 的股票。
You may think this odd, but I have kept copies of every tax return I filed, starting with the return for 1944. Checking back, I find that I purchased GEICO shares on four occasions during 1951, the last purchase being made on September 26. This pattern of persistence suggests to me that my tendency toward self-intoxication was developed early. I probably came back on that September day from unsuccessfully trying to sell some prospect and decided - despite my already having more than 50% of my net worth in GEICO - to load up further. In any event, I accumulated 350 shares of GEICO during the year, at a cost of $10,282. At yearend, this holding was worth $13,125, more than 65% of my net worth.
你可能觉得这很奇怪，但我保留了自己报过的每一份纳税申报表，从 1944 年那份开始。我翻查后发现：1951 年我分四次买入 GEICO 股票，最后一次是在 9 月 26 日。这种“坚持不懈”的模式让我觉得：我那种容易对自己“陶醉”的倾向很早就形成了。很可能那天 9 月我又一次推销失败，回到家后——尽管当时 GEICO 已占我净资产的 50% 以上——仍决定继续加仓。不管怎样，我在那一年累计买入了 350 股 GEICO，总成本 10,282 美元。到年末，这笔持仓市值 13,125 美元，占我净资产的 65% 以上。
写短文的习惯也是一开始就有的，放在现在可以套上一个更成熟的框架，参考：《1951-12-06 Warren Buffett.The Security I Like Best》。
1、长期的经济前景，汽车保险是个必需品，没有保险不能上路；
2、必需品往往缺少差异化，需要依靠低成本的竞争优势，最好是结构性的低成本优势：直销；
3、管理在低成本的模式非常重要，这类商业模式不能经受糟糕的管理。
You can see why GEICO was my first business love. Furthermore, just to complete this stroll down memory lane, I should add that I earned most of the funds I used to buy GEICO shares by delivering The Washington Post, the chief product of a company that much later made it possible for Berkshire to turn $10 million into $500 million.
你现在能理解为什么 GEICO 会成为我第一次“商业上的初恋”。此外，为了把这段回忆补完整，我还得补一句：我买 GEICO 股票用的大部分资金，是靠送 The Washington Post 挣来的——这份报纸是那家公司（后来）最重要的产品；多年之后，正是这家公司让 Berkshire 有机会把 1,000 万美元变成 5 亿美元。
Alas, I sold my entire GEICO position in 1952 for $15,259, primarily to switch into Western Insurance Securities. This act of infidelity can partially be excused by the fact that Western was selling for slightly more than one times its current earnings, a p/e ratio that for some reason caught my eye. But in the next 20 years, the GEICO stock I sold grew in value to about $1.3 million, which taught me a lesson about the inadvisability of selling a stake in an identifiably-wonderful company.
唉，我在 1952 年把 GEICO 的持仓全部卖掉了，卖了 15,259 美元，主要是为了换到 Western Insurance Securities。这次“不忠”在某种程度上可以被原谅，因为 Western 的股价大约只相当于当期盈利的一倍多一点——不知为何，这个 p/e 比率当时特别吸引我的眼球。但在接下来的 20 年里，我卖掉的那些 GEICO 股票增值到了大约 130 万美元，这给了我一个教训：把一家“明明白白很优秀”的公司里的持股卖掉，往往并不明智。
In the early 1970's, after Davy retired, the executives running GEICO made some serious errors in estimating their claims costs, a mistake that led the company to underprice its policies - and that almost caused it to go bankrupt. The company was saved only because Jack Byrne came in as CEO in 1976 and took drastic remedial measures.
在 1970 年代早期，Davy 退休后，接手管理 GEICO 的高管在估算理赔成本时犯了严重错误，这导致公司对保单定价过低——几乎把自己推到破产边缘。公司之所以得救，只因为 Jack Byrne 在 1976 年出任 CEO，并采取了严厉的纠偏措施。
Because I believed both in Jack and in GEICO's fundamental competitive strength, Berkshire purchased a large interest in the company during the second half of 1976, and also made smaller purchases later. By yearend 1980, we had put $45.7 million into GEICO and owned 33.3% of its shares. During the next 15 years, we did not make further purchases. Our interest in the company, nonetheless, grew to about 50% because it was a big repurchaser of its own shares.
因为我既相信 Jack，也相信 GEICO 的根本竞争优势，Berkshire 在 1976 年下半年买入了该公司一个很大的股权，并在之后又有过几次小额增持。到 1980 年年底，我们在 GEICO 上累计投入了 4,570 万美元，持有其 33.3% 的股份。接下来的 15 年里，我们没有再继续买入。尽管如此，由于 GEICO 大规模回购自家股票，我们的持股比例仍然上升到约 50%。
Then, in 1995, we agreed to pay $2.3 billion for the half of the company we didn't own. That is a steep price. But it gives us full ownership of a growing enterprise whose business remains exceptional for precisely the same reasons that prevailed in 1951. In addition, GEICO has two extraordinary managers: Tony Nicely, who runs the insurance side of the operation, and Lou Simpson, who runs investments.
随后，在 1995 年，我们同意为我们尚未拥有的那一半公司支付 23 亿美元。这个价格很高。但它让我们完全拥有一家正在成长的企业，而这家企业之所以非同寻常，其原因与 1951 年时完全一致。此外，GEICO 还有两位非凡的经理人：Tony Nicely 负责保险业务运营，Lou Simpson 负责投资。
Tony, 52, has been with GEICO for 34 years. There's no one I would rather have managing GEICO's insurance operation. He has brains, energy, integrity and focus. If we're lucky, he'll stay another 34 years.
Tony 当时 52 岁，已在 GEICO 工作 34 年。在管理 GEICO 的保险运营方面，没有人比他更让我放心。他有头脑、有精力、有操守，也够专注。如果我们够幸运，他还能再干 34 年。
Lou runs investments just as ably. Between 1980 and 1995, the equities under Lou's management returned an average of 22.8% annually vs. 15.7% for the S&P. Lou takes the same conservative, concentrated approach to investments that we do at Berkshire, and it is an enormous plus for us to have him on board. One point that goes beyond Lou's GEICO work: His presence on the scene assures us that Berkshire would have an extraordinary professional immediately available to handle its investments if something were to happen to Charlie and me.
Lou 管理投资同样出色。1980 到 1995 年间，在 Lou 管理下的股票投资年均回报 22.8%，而同期 S&P 的回报是 15.7%。Lou 采取的投资方法与我们在 Berkshire 一样——保守、集中。能让他在团队里，对我们是巨大加分。还有一点超出 Lou 在 GEICO 的本职工作：他的存在让我们确信，如果 Charlie 和我发生什么意外，Berkshire 也能立刻有一位杰出的职业投资人接手投资事务。
GEICO, of course, must continue both to attract good policyholders and keep them happy. It must also reserve and price properly. But the ultimate key to the company's success is its rock-bottom operating costs, which virtually no competitor can match. In 1995, moreover, Tony and his management team pushed underwriting and loss adjustment expenses down further to 23.6% of premiums, nearly one percentage point below 1994's ratio. In business, I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable "moats." Thanks to Tony and his management team, GEICO's moat widened in 1995.
当然，GEICO 必须持续吸引优质保户并让他们满意；也必须在准备金计提与费率定价上做对。但公司成功的最终关键，在于它极低的运营成本——几乎没有竞争对手能匹敌。1995 年，Tony 与其管理团队又把承保费用与理赔调整费用压得更低：合计仅为保费的 23.6%，比 1994 年的比例低了接近一个百分点。在商业世界里，我寻找的是：有坚固护城河守护的经济城堡。感谢 Tony 及其管理团队，GEICO 的护城河在 1995 年进一步加宽。
Finally, let me bring you up to date on Davy. He's now 93 and remains my friend and teacher. He continues to pay close attention to GEICO and has always been there when the company's CEOs - Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder and Tony - have needed him. Our acquisition of 100% of GEICO caused Davy to incur a large tax. Characteristically, he still warmly supported the transaction.
最后，向你更新一下 Davy 的近况。他现在 93 岁，仍是我的朋友和老师。他一直密切关注 GEICO，在公司历任 CEO——Jack Byrne、Bill Snyder 和 Tony——需要他时，他也始终都在。我们收购 GEICO 的 100% 股权让 Davy 产生了一笔很大的税负；而一如既往，他仍热情支持这笔交易。
Davy has been one of my heroes for the 45 years I've known him, and he's never let me down. You should understand that Berkshire would not be where it is today if Davy had not been so generous with his time on a cold Saturday in 1951. I've often thanked him privately, but it is fitting that I use this report to thank him on behalf of Berkshire's shareholders.
在我认识 Davy 的 45 年里，他一直是我的英雄之一，而且从未让我失望。你应该明白：如果当年 1951 年那个寒冷的星期六，Davy 没有如此慷慨地给我时间，Berkshire 今天不会是现在的样子。我私下里已经感谢过他很多次，但我也觉得，在这份报告里代表 Berkshire 的股东向他致谢，是再合适不过的。
Insurance Operations
保险业务运营
In addition to acquiring GEICO, we enjoyed other favorable developments in insurance during 1995.
除了收购 GEICO 之外，1995 年我们在保险业务上还出现了其他一些有利进展。
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.
正如我们在以往报告中解释过的，在保险业务里真正关键的是两点：第一，我们创造了多少 “float”（浮存金）；第二，它对我们而言的成本是多少。Float 是我们持有但并不拥有的资金。在保险经营中，float 的形成来自两个原因：多数保单要求保费预先缴付；更重要的是，保险公司通常需要一段时间才能获悉损失并完成理赔的处理与结案。
Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float. An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.
通常，保险公司收取的保费并不足以覆盖它必须支付的赔款与费用。这就会留下一个“underwriting loss”（承保亏损）——而这份亏损就是 float 的成本。长期来看，若一家保险公司的 float 成本低于公司在其他渠道获取资金所需承担的成本，那么这门保险生意就是赚钱的；但若 float 成本高于市场资金利率，那么这门生意的价值就是负的。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last three, our cost of float has been negative, which means we have calculated our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
如下表所示，Berkshire 的保险业务一直是巨大的赢家。为制作这张表，我们这样计算 float——而我们在相对保费规模而言能创造出异常可观的 float：把赔款准备金、理赔费用准备金、因承接再保险而持有的资金、未到期保费准备金加总，再减去代理人余额、预付取得成本、预付税款，以及与承接再保险相关的递延费用。我们的 float 成本由承保亏损或承保利润决定。在我们取得承保利润的年份——比如最近三年——我们的 float 成本为负，这意味着我们在计算保险收益时，是把承保利润与 float 带来的投资收益相加。
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 20.7%. In more years than not, our cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to "free" money has boosted Berkshire's performance in a major way.
自 1967 年我们进入保险业务以来，我们的 float 以年复合 20.7% 的速度增长。并且在多数年份里，我们的资金成本不仅很低，甚至低于零。获得这种“免费”的资金渠道，显著提升了 Berkshire 的业绩。
Any company's level of profitability is determined by three items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost; and (3) its utilization of "leverage" - that is, the degree to which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity. Over the years, we have done well on Point 1, having produced high returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly - to a degree that is not generally well-understood - because our liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms. The same cannot be said by many other property and casualty insurers, who may generate plenty of float, but at a cost that exceeds what the funds are worth to them. In those circumstances, leverage becomes a disadvantage.
任何公司的盈利水平由三件事决定：(1) 资产能赚多少钱；(2) 负债要付出多少成本；(3) “leverage”（杠杆）的使用程度——也就是资产有多大比例是由负债而非股东权益来融资。多年来，我们在第一点上做得很好，资产回报率很高。但我们也在第二点上获得了巨大好处——而这一点通常并不为人充分理解——因为我们的负债成本非常低。负债成本低的一个重要原因，是我们以非常有利的条款获得了 float。许多其他的 property and casualty insurers（财产与意外险公司）并非如此：他们也许能产生很多 float，但成本却高到超过这些资金对他们的价值。在那种情况下，杠杆反而变成劣势。
国内很多国有企业有这方面的结构性优势，但必须结合具体的商业模式才能真正发挥作用。
Since our float has cost us virtually nothing over the years, it has in effect served as equity. Of course, it differs from true equity in that it doesn't belong to us. Nevertheless, let's assume that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of 1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during 1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net result - more shares, equal assets and lower earnings - would have materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand why float wonderfully benefits a business - if it is obtained at a low cost.
由于多年来我们的 float 几乎没有成本，它在效果上等同于股东权益。当然，它与真正的权益不同，因为它并不属于我们。但尽管如此，我们做一个假设：如果在 1994 年年底，我们不是拥有 34 亿美元的 float，而是用 34 亿美元的 equity（股东权益）来替代它。在这种情景下，我们在 1995 年期间所能拥有的资产总量并不会比实际更多。然而，我们的盈利会略低一些，因为去年 float 的成本是负的——也就是说，我们的 float 反而产生了利润。并且，想要获得那 34 亿美元的替代权益，我们就需要发行大量新的 Berkshire 股票。最终结果是——更多的股份、相同的资产、更低的盈利——这会显著降低我们股票的价值。所以你可以理解：float 对企业的好处巨大——前提是它的成本足够低。
Our acquisition of GEICO will immediately increase our float by nearly $3 billion, with additional growth almost certain. We also expect GEICO to operate at a decent underwriting profit in most years, a fact that will increase the probability that our total float will cost us nothing. Of course, we paid a very substantial price for the GEICO float, whereas virtually all of the gains in float depicted in the table were developed internally.
我们收购 GEICO 将会立刻让我们的 float 增加将近 30 亿美元，而且进一步增长几乎可以确定。我们也预期 GEICO 在多数年份能够实现体面的承保利润，这将提高我们的总 float “不花钱”的概率。当然，我们为 GEICO 的 float 付出了非常可观的价格；而表格中几乎所有 float 的增长，都是我们内部逐步培育出来的。
Our enthusiasm over 1995's insurance results must be tempered once again because we had our third straight year of good fortune in the super-cat business. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take many years to measure. We know that the results of years like the past three will be at least partially offset by some truly terrible year in the future. We just hope that "partially" turns out to be the proper adverb.
我们对 1995 年保险业绩的热情必须再次降温，因为在 super-cat（超级巨灾）业务上，我们已经连续第三年走运。在这项业务中，我们向保险公司与再保险公司出售保单，让它们免受“超大灾难”影响。由于真正的重大灾难发生频率很低，我们的 super-cat 业务在大多数年份都可能显示巨额利润，但偶尔也会记录一次巨额亏损。换句话说，这项业务的吸引力需要很多年才能被真正衡量。我们知道，像过去三年这样的结果，未来某一年“非常可怕”的结果至少会部分抵消。我们只希望“部分”这个副词，最后确实是恰当的。
There were plenty of catastrophes last year, but no super-cats of the insured variety. The Southeast had a close call when Opal, sporting winds of 150 miles per hour, hovered off Florida. However, the storm abated before hitting land, and so a second Andrew was dodged. For insurers, the Kobe earthquake was another close call: The economic damage was huge - perhaps even a record - but only a tiny portion of it was insured. The insurance industry won't always be that lucky.
去年灾难不少，但没有出现保险意义上的 super-cat。美国东南部与 Opal 擦肩而过——它在佛州外海盘旋，风速高达每小时 150 英里；但风暴在登陆前减弱，因此躲过了第二个 Andrew。对保险公司而言，Kobe 地震也是一次“险情”：经济损失巨大——或许甚至创纪录——但只有很小一部分得到了保险覆盖。保险业不可能永远这么走运。
Ajit Jain is the guiding genius of our super-cat business and writes important non-cat business as well. In insurance, the term "catastrophe" is applied to an event, such as a hurricane or earthquake, that causes a great many insured losses. The other deals Ajit enters into usually cover only a single large loss. A simplified description of three transactions from last year will illustrate both what I mean and Ajit's versatility. We insured: (1) The life of Mike Tyson for a sum that is large initially and that, fight-by-fight, gradually declines to zero over the next few years; (2) Lloyd's against more than 225 of its "names" dying during the year; and (3) The launch, and a year of orbit, of two Chinese satellites. Happily, both satellites are orbiting, the Lloyd's folk avoided abnormal mortality, and if Mike Tyson looked any healthier, no one would get in the ring with him.
Ajit Jain 是我们 super-cat 业务的“总设计师”，同时也承保了大量重要的非巨灾业务。在保险业，“catastrophe”（灾难）指的是像飓风或地震这样会造成大量已保险损失的事件。Ajit 做的其他交易通常只覆盖单一的一笔大损失。下面用去年三笔交易的简化描述，来说明我的意思以及 Ajit 的多面能力。我们承保了：(1) Mike Tyson 的生命：初始保额很大，随后在未来几年里按每场比赛逐步递减，直到归零；(2) 为 Lloyd’s 承保：如果一年内超过 225 位“names”（出资人/承保成员）死亡，则触发赔付；(3) 为两颗中国卫星的发射及其一年在轨运行提供保险。值得庆幸的是，两颗卫星都在轨运行，Lloyd’s 的那群人也没有出现异常死亡率；而 Mike Tyson 要是看起来再健康一点，恐怕没人敢上台跟他打。
Berkshire is sought out for many kinds of insurance, both super-cat and large single-risk, because: (1) our financial strength is unmatched, and insureds know we can and will pay our losses under the most adverse of circumstances; (2) we can supply a quote faster than anyone in the business; and (3) we will issue policies with limits larger than anyone else is prepared to write. Most of our competitors have extensive reinsurance treaties and lay off much of their business. While this helps them avoid shock losses, it also hurts their flexibility and reaction time. As you know, Berkshire moves quickly to seize investment and acquisition opportunities; in insurance we respond with the same exceptional speed. In another important point, large coverages don't frighten us but, on the contrary, intensify our interest. We have offered a policy under which we could have lost $1 billion; the largest coverage that a client accepted was $400 million.
Berkshire 之所以在 super-cat 与“大额单一风险”两类业务上都被频繁找上门，原因是：(1) 我们的财务实力无可匹敌，被保险人知道即便在最不利的情况下我们也能、也会赔付；(2) 我们能比业内任何人更快给出报价；(3) 我们愿意出具更高限额的保单，限额之大超过任何其他公司愿意承保的水平。我们的多数竞争对手都有大量再保险分保协议，会把很大一部分业务转出去。这样做能帮助他们避免“冲击性损失”，但也会削弱他们的灵活性与反应速度。你知道，Berkshire 在抓住投资与收购机会方面行动很快；在保险业务上，我们也以同样的速度回应。另外一个重要点是：大额保障并不会吓到我们；相反，它会更激发我们的兴趣。我们曾经报出过一份保单，潜在最大损失可达 10 亿美元；而客户实际接受的最大限额是 4 亿美元。
We will get hit from time to time with large losses. Charlie and I, however, are quite willing to accept relatively volatile results in exchange for better long-term earnings than we would otherwise have had. In other words, we prefer a lumpy 15% to a smooth 12%. Since most managers opt for smoothness, we are left with a competitive advantage that we try to maximize. We do, though, monitor our aggregate exposure in order to keep our "worst case" at a level that leaves us comfortable.
我们会不时遭遇大额损失。不过，Charlie 和我非常愿意用相对更“波动”的结果，去换取长期而言更高的盈利。换句话说，我们宁要“颠簸的 15%”，也不要“平滑的 12%”。由于多数经理人都偏好平滑，我们反而因此拥有一项竞争优势，并努力把它最大化。当然，我们也会监控总体风险敞口，确保我们的“最坏情形”仍处在让我们感觉舒适的水平。
Indeed, our worst case from a "once-in-a-century" super-cat is far less severe - relative to net worth - than that faced by many well-known primary companies writing great numbers of property policies. These insurers don't issue single huge-limit policies as we do, but their small policies, in aggregate, can create a risk of staggering size. The "big one" would blow right through the reinsurance covers of some of these insurers, exposing them to uncapped losses that could threaten their survival. In our case, losses would be large, but capped at levels we could easily handle.
事实上，从“百年一遇”的 super-cat 角度看，我们的最坏情形——相对于净资产——远比许多知名的一线承保公司更温和。这些保险公司不会像我们一样签发单张超大限额保单，但它们大量的小额保单累积起来，可能形成规模惊人的风险。“真正的大灾”可能直接击穿其中一些公司的再保险保护，使其暴露于无上限的损失，进而威胁生存。而在我们这里，损失会很大，但上限明确，而且处在我们轻松可承受的水平。
Prices are weakening in the super-cat field. That is understandable considering the influx of capital into the reinsurance business a few years ago and the natural desire of those holding the capital to employ it. No matter what others may do, we will not knowingly write business at inadequate rates. We unwittingly did this in the early 1970's and, after more than 20 years, regularly receive significant bills stemming from the mistakes of that era. My guess is that we will still be getting surprises from that business 20 years from now. A bad reinsurance contract is like hell: easy to enter and impossible to exit.
super-cat 领域的价格正在走弱。这并不奇怪：几年前再保险行业涌入大量资本，而持有这些资本的人自然希望把钱“用起来”。不管别人怎么做，我们都不会在明知费率不足的情况下承保。我们在 1970 年代早期曾“无意中”这么做过；20 多年过去了，我们仍不断收到源自当年错误的显著账单。我猜，即便再过 20 年，我们仍会被那批业务“惊到”。一份糟糕的再保险合同就像地狱：进去很容易，出来不可能。
I actively participated in those early reinsurance decisions, and Berkshire paid a heavy tuition for my education in the business. Unfortunately, reinsurance students can't attend school on scholarship. GEICO, incidentally, suffered a similar, disastrous experience in the early 1980's, when it plunged enthusiastically into the writing of reinsurance and large risks. GEICO's folly was brief, but it will be cleaning things up for at least another decade. The well-publicized problems at Lloyd's further illustrate the perils of reinsurance and also underscore how vital it is that the interests of the people who write insurance business be aligned - on the downside as well as the upside - with those of the people putting up the capital. When that kind of symmetry is missing, insurers almost invariably run into trouble, though its existence may remain hidden for some time.
我当年对那些早期再保险决策有过积极参与，而 Berkshire 为我在这门生意里的“学习”付出了沉重学费。不幸的是，再保险学生是没法拿奖学金上学的。顺便一提，GEICO 在 1980 年代早期也经历过类似的灾难：它热情高涨地冲进再保险与大额风险承保。GEICO 的愚行持续时间不长，但它至少还要再用十年去收拾残局。Lloyd’s 那些广为报道的问题，也进一步说明了再保险的凶险，并凸显一个关键点：写保险业务的人，其利益必须在下行与上行两端都与出资人（资本提供者）的利益对齐。当这种对称性缺失时，保险公司几乎必然会出问题，只是问题可能在一段时间里被掩盖。
有些保险公司的做法跟按揭贷款的证券化相似，自留的部分很小，大头风险都转让出去，这也属于利益没有对齐，造成具体写保单的人存在注意力的偏差。
A small, apocryphal story about an insurance CEO who was visited by an analyst tells a lot about this industry. To the analyst's questions about his business, the CEO had nothing but gloomy answers: Rates were ridiculously low; the reserves on his balance sheet weren't adequate for ordinary claims, much less those likely to arise from asbestos and environmental problems; most of his reinsurers had long since gone broke, leaving him holding the sack. But then the CEO brightened: "Still, things could be a lot worse," he said. "It could be my money." At Berkshire, it's our money.
一个关于某位保险公司 CEO 的小故事（据说并不一定真实）很能说明这个行业。一天，一位分析师来拜访他。分析师问起生意情况，CEO 的回答全是阴郁：费率低得荒唐；资产负债表上的准备金连普通理赔都不够，更别提未来可能因石棉与环境问题引发的索赔；他的大多数再保险人早就破产了，结果包袱全落到他自己身上。但随后 CEO 忽然精神一振：“不过，情况还可能更糟，”他说，“它本可以是我的钱。”在 Berkshire，这是我们的钱。
Berkshire's other insurance operations, though relatively small, performed magnificently in 1995. National Indemnity's traditional business had a combined ratio of 84.2 and developed, as usual, a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had an average combined ratio of 85.6. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, grew at a good rate in 1995 and achieved a combined ratio of 81.4. Its three-year combined ratio is an amazing 82.4. Berkshire's California workers' compensation business, run by Brad Kinstler, faced fierce price-cutting in 1995 and lost a great many renewals when we refused to accept inadequate rates. Though this operation's volume dropped materially, it produced an excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, continues to do an extraordinary job. His premium volume was up 23% in 1995, and underwriting profit grew by 59%. Ajit, Don, Rod, Brad and John are all under 45, an embarrassing fact demolishing my theory that managers only hit their stride after they reach 70.
Berkshire 的其他保险业务规模虽相对较小，但在 1995 年表现极其出色。National Indemnity 的传统业务 combined ratio（综合成本率）为 84.2，并且像往常一样，在相对于保费规模而言创造了大量 float。过去三年里，由 Don Wurster 负责的这一板块平均 combined ratio 为 85.6。我们的 homestate 业务由 Rod Eldred 管理，1995 年以不错的速度增长，并实现了 81.4 的 combined ratio；其三年 combined ratio 低至惊人的 82.4。Berkshire 在 California 的 workers’ compensation（工伤险）业务由 Brad Kinstler 负责，1995 年面对激烈的降价竞争；当我们拒绝接受不足费率时，丢失了大量续保。尽管业务规模明显下降，该业务仍实现了优秀的承保利润。最后，Central States Indemnity 的 John Kizer 继续做着非同寻常的工作：1995 年保费规模增长 23%，承保利润增长 59%。Ajit、Don、Rod、Brad 和 John 都不到 45 岁——这件事很“尴尬”，因为它彻底击碎了我那个“经理人要到 70 岁才进入巅峰期”的理论。
To sum up, we entered 1995 with an exceptional insurance operation of moderate size. By adding GEICO, we entered 1996 with a business still better in quality, much improved in its growth prospects, and doubled in size. More than ever, insurance is our core strength.
总而言之，我们在 1995 年开始时，已经拥有一套规模适中、但质量极高的保险体系。加入 GEICO 之后，我们在 1996 年开始时拥有的保险业务质量更高、增长前景显著改善、规模也翻了一倍。比以往任何时候都更明显：保险是我们的核心强项。
Sources of Reported Earnings
报告收益的来源
The table below shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-premium charges are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表展示了 Berkshire 报告利润的主要来源。在这种呈现方式下，purchase-premium charges（收购溢价摊销/费用）不会被分配到具体对应的业务中，而是被汇总后单独列示。这样处理，可以让你看到：如果我们当初没有买下这些企业，它们各自“本来会如何被报告”的利润水平。我们认为，这种呈现方式对投资者与管理者更有用，因为 GAAP 要求把收购溢价逐一按业务计提/冲减。需要强调的是：表中展示的总利润当然与我们经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总利润完全一致。
A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 41-52, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 57-63, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
关于这些业务的大量信息都在第 41–52 页，其中也能看到我们按 GAAP 口径披露的分部收益。此外，在第 57–63 页，我们把 Berkshire 的财务数据按四个板块在非 GAAP 口径下重新编排——这种呈现方式更贴近 Charlie 和我理解公司的方式。我们的意图是：把财务信息以一种“如果角色互换，我们希望你提供给我们”的方式提供给你。
At Berkshire, we believe in Charlie's dictum - "Just tell me the bad news; the good news will take care of itself" - and that is the behavior we expect of our managers when they are reporting to us. Consequently, I also owe you - Berkshire's owners - a report on three operations that, though they continued to earn decent (or better) returns on invested capital, experienced a decline in earnings last year. Each encountered a different type of problem.
在 Berkshire，我们信奉 Charlie 的一句格言——“只告诉我坏消息；好消息会自己照顾好自己”——这也是我们希望经理人在向我们汇报时所遵循的行为准则。因此，我也欠你们——Berkshire 的所有者——一份关于三项业务的报告：它们虽然仍能赚取体面（或更好）的投入资本回报，但去年盈利出现了下滑。并且，这三项业务分别遇到了不同类型的问题。
Our shoe business operated in an industry that suffered depressed earnings throughout last year, and many of our competitors made only marginal profits or worse. That means we at least maintained, and in some instances widened, our competitive superiority. So I have no doubt that our shoe operations will climb back to top-grade earnings in the future. In other words, though the turn has not yet occurred, we believe you should view last year's figures as reflecting a cyclical problem, not a secular one.
我们的鞋业业务所处的行业在去年整体盈利低迷，许多竞争对手只获得微薄利润甚至亏损。这意味着我们至少保持了竞争优势，并且在某些情况下还扩大了优势。所以我毫不怀疑：我们的鞋业业务未来会回到顶级盈利水平。换句话说，尽管拐点尚未到来，我们认为你应该把去年的数字视为周期性问题的体现，而不是结构性（长期）问题。
The Buffalo News, though still doing very well in comparison to other newspapers, is another story. In this case, industry trends are not good. In the 1991 Annual Report, I explained that newspapers had lost a notch in their economic attractiveness from the days when they appeared to have a bullet-proof franchise. Today, the industry retains its excellent economics, but has lost still another notch. Over time, we expect the competitive strength of newspapers to gradually erode, though the industry should nevertheless remain a fine business for many years to come.
The Buffalo News 虽然相较其他报纸仍表现得很好，但它是另一回事。在这里，行业趋势并不乐观。在 1991 年年报中，我解释过：报纸业从曾经看似“防弹”的特许经营时代起，经济吸引力已经下降了一档。如今，这个行业仍然保有不错的经济特性，但又再下降了一档。随着时间推移，我们预计报纸的竞争强度会逐步被侵蚀；尽管如此，这个行业在未来很多年里仍会是一门好生意。
Berkshire's most difficult problem is World Book, which operates in an industry beset by increasingly tough competition from CD-ROM and on-line offerings. True, we are still profitable, a claim that perhaps no other print encyclopedia can make. But our sales and earnings trends have gone in the wrong direction. At the end of 1995, World Book made major changes in the way it distributes its product, stepped up its efforts with electronic products and sharply reduced its overhead costs. It will take time for us to evaluate the effects of these initiatives, but we are confident they will significantly improve our viability.
Berkshire 最棘手的问题是 World Book。它所处的行业正受到 CD-ROM 与在线产品日益激烈的竞争冲击。没错，我们仍然是盈利的——也许没有其他纸质百科全书还能这么说。但我们的销量与利润趋势却在走下坡路。1995 年年底，World Book 对其分销方式做出了重大调整，加大了对电子产品的投入，并大幅削减了管理费用。我们需要时间来评估这些举措的效果，但我们确信：它们会显著提升我们继续生存与竞争的能力。
All of our operations, including those whose earnings fell last year, benefit from exceptionally talented and dedicated managers. Were we to have the choice of any other executives now working in their industries, there is not one of our managers we would replace.
我们所有的业务——包括那些去年利润下滑的业务——都受益于一群极其有才华且高度投入的经理人。即便让我们在他们所在行业里、从所有现任高管中任意挑选，我们也找不到一个经理人会愿意替换掉我们现在的任何一位。
Many of our managers don't have to work for a living, but simply go out and perform every day for the same reason that wealthy golfers stay on the tour: They love both doing what they do and doing it well. To describe them as working may be a misnomer - they simply prefer spending much of their time on a productive activity at which they excel to spending it on leisure activities. Our job is to provide an environment that will keep them feeling this way, and so far we seem to have succeeded: Thinking back over the 1965-95 period, I can't recall that a single key manager has left Berkshire to join another employer.
我们的很多经理人其实不必为生计工作；他们每天出来表现，就像富有的高尔夫球手仍留在巡回赛上一样：他们热爱自己做的事，也热爱把它做得出色。把他们的状态称为“工作”也许并不准确——他们只是更愿意把大量时间花在自己擅长且富有成效的活动上，而不是花在纯粹的休闲上。我们的职责是提供一种环境，让他们能一直保持这种感觉。到目前为止，我们似乎做到了：回想 1965–95 这 30 年，我想不起有任何一位关键经理离开 Berkshire 去投奔别的雇主。
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $600 million are itemized.
下面我们列示我们的普通股投资。其中市值超过 6 亿美元的持仓会单独列出。
We continue in our Rip Van Winkle mode: Five of our six top positions at yearend 1994 were left untouched during 1995. The sixth was American Express, in which we increased our ownership to about 10%.
我们仍处在 Rip Van Winkle（睡了很多年的“睡汉”）模式：在 1994 年年底的六大持仓中，有五个在 1995 年完全未动。第六个是 American Express，我们把持股比例提高到约 10%。
In early 1996, two major events affected our holdings: First, our purchase of the GEICO stock we did not already own caused that company to be converted into a wholly-owned subsidiary. Second, we exchanged our Cap Cities shares for a combination of cash and Disney stock.
1996 年初，两件大事影响了我们的持仓：第一，我们买下了此前尚未持有的 GEICO 股票，使 GEICO 变成我们的全资子公司。第二，我们把 Cap Cities 的持股换成了现金与 Disney 股票的组合。
In the Disney merger, Cap Cities shareholders had a choice of actions. If they chose, they could exchange each of their Cap Cities shares for one share of Disney stock plus $65. Or they could ask for - though not necessarily get - all cash or all stock, with their ultimate allotment of each depending on the choices made by other shareholders and certain decisions made by Disney. For our 20 million shares, we sought stock, but do not know, as this report goes to press, how much we were allocated. We are certain, however, to receive something over 20 million Disney shares. We have also recently bought Disney stock in the market.
在 Disney 的这次合并中，Cap Cities 的股东可以自行选择处理方式。如果愿意，他们可以把每一股 Cap Cities 换成一股 Disney 股票外加 65 美元现金。或者，他们也可以提出——但未必能全部满足——“全现金”或“全股票”的要求；最终每个股东能拿到多少现金与多少股票，会取决于其他股东的选择以及 Disney 的一些决策。对于我们持有的 2,000 万股，我们选择要股票，但在本报告付印时，我们还不知道最终被分配到了多少。我们可以确定的是：我们会收到超过 2,000 万股 Disney 股票。我们近期也在市场上额外买入了 Disney 股票。
One more bit of history: I first became interested in Disney in 1966, when its market valuation was less than $90 million, even though the company had earned around $21 million pre-tax in 1965 and was sitting with more cash than debt. At Disneyland, the $17 million Pirates of the Caribbean ride would soon open. Imagine my excitement - a company selling at only five times rides!
再补一段历史：我第一次对 Disney 产生兴趣是在 1966 年。当时公司的市值不到 9,000 万美元，而它在 1965 年税前利润约 2,100 万美元，并且账上现金还多于债务。在 Disneyland，造价 1,700 万美元的 Pirates of the Caribbean（加勒比海盗）项目很快就要开放。你可以想象我有多兴奋——一家公司的估值只相当于“五倍的游乐设施”！
Duly impressed, Buffett Partnership Ltd. bought a significant amount of Disney stock at a split-adjusted price of 31› per share. That decision may appear brilliant, given that the stock now sells for $66. But your Chairman was up to the task of nullifying it: In 1967 I sold out at 48› per share.
在被深深打动之后，Buffett Partnership Ltd. 以拆股调整后每股 0.31 美元的价格买入了相当数量的 Disney 股票。鉴于这只股票现在卖到 66 美元，这个决定看起来像是天才之举。但你们的董事长也有本事把它抵消掉：1967 年我以每股 0.48 美元把它全部卖掉了。
Oh well - we're happy to be once again a large owner of a business with both unique assets and outstanding management.
算了——我们很高兴再次成为一家拥有独特资产与杰出管理层的企业的大股东。
媒体是个竞争人类注意力的地方，始终充满了竞争。
Convertible Preferred Stocks
可转换优先股
As many of you will remember, Berkshire made five private purchases of convertible preferred stocks during the 1987-91 period and the time seems right to discuss their status. Here are the particulars:
你们中的很多人会记得：在 1987–91 年间，Berkshire 私下买入了五笔可转换优先股。现在时机成熟，可以谈谈它们的现状。具体情况如下：
In each case we had the option of sticking with these preferreds as fixed-income securities or converting them into common stock. Initially, their value to us came primarily from their fixed-income characteristics. The option we had to convert was a kicker.
在每一笔交易中，我们都有选择：要么把这些优先股当作固定收益证券继续持有，要么把它们转换成普通股。一开始，它们对我们的价值主要来自固定收益属性；我们手里的转换权只是“额外甜头”（kicker）。
Our $300 million private purchase of American Express "Percs" - described in the 1991 Annual Report - is not included in the table because that security was a modified form of common stock whose fixed-income characteristics contributed only a minor portion of its initial value. Three years after we bought them, the Percs automatically were converted to common stock. In contrast, the five securities in the table were set to become common stocks only if we wished them to - a crucial difference.
我们以 3 亿美元私下买入的 American Express “Percs”（在 1991 年年报中有描述）不在这张表里，因为那种证券更像一种改造过的普通股，其固定收益特征对初始价值贡献很小。我们买入三年后，Percs 会自动转换为普通股。相比之下，表中这五项证券只有在我们自己愿意的情况下才会变成普通股——这个差异至关重要。
When we purchased our convertible securities, I told you that we expected to earn after-tax returns from them that "moderately" exceeded what we could earn from the medium-term fixed-income securities they replaced. We beat this expectation - but only because of the performance of a single issue. I also told you that these securities, as a group, would "not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects." Unfortunately, that prediction was fulfilled. Finally, I said that "under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends." That's one I would like to have back. Winston Churchill once said that "eating my words has never given me indigestion." My assertion, however, that it was almost impossible for us to lose money on our preferreds has caused me some well-deserved heartburn.
当初我们买入这些可转换证券时，我曾告诉你：我们预计它们的税后回报会“适度”高于它们所替代的中期固定收益证券。我们确实超过了这个预期——但只因为其中某一只证券表现极好。我也告诉过你：这些证券整体而言，“不会产生我们在找到经济前景极佳的企业时所能实现的那种回报。”不幸的是，这个预测兑现了。最后，我还说过：“几乎在任何情况下，我们都预计这些优先股会把本金加股息还给我们。”这句话我现在真想收回。Winston Churchill 曾说过：“吃回自己的话从没让我消化不良。”但我那句“我们几乎不可能在这些优先股上亏钱”的断言，却让我吃了些应得的胃痛。
Our best holding has been Gillette, which we told you from the start was a superior business. Ironically, though, this is also the purchase in which I made my biggest mistake - of a kind, however, never recognized on financial statements.
我们表现最好的持仓是 Gillette——从一开始我们就告诉过你，它是一门优越的生意。讽刺的是，这也是我犯下最大错误的一笔买入——不过这种错误在财务报表里永远不会被识别出来。
We paid $600 million in 1989 for Gillette preferred shares that were convertible into 48 million (split-adjusted) common shares. Taking an alternative route with the $600 million, I probably could have purchased 60 million shares of common from the company. The market on the common was then about $10.50, and given that this would have been a huge private placement carrying important restrictions, I probably could have bought the stock at a discount of at least 5%. I can't be sure about this, but it's likely that Gillette's management would have been just as happy to have Berkshire opt for common.
我们在 1989 年以 6 亿美元买入了 Gillette 的优先股，该优先股可转换为 4,800 万股（拆股调整后）的普通股。若把这 6 亿美元换一种方式使用，我很可能可以直接从公司买到 6,000 万股普通股。当时普通股市价约 10.50 美元；考虑到这会是一笔规模巨大的私下配售、且附带重要限制，我很可能至少能以 5% 的折扣买入。我无法完全确定，但很可能 Gillette 的管理层同样乐意让 Berkshire 直接选择普通股。
But I was far too clever to do that. Instead, for less than two years, we received some extra dividend income (the difference between the preferred's yield and that of the common), at which point the company - quite properly - called the issue, moving to do that as quickly as was possible. If I had negotiated for common rather than preferred, we would have been better off at yearend 1995 by $625 million, minus the "excess" dividends of about $70 million.
但我当时“聪明过头”了，没有这么做。相反，我们在不到两年的时间里拿到了一些额外的股息收入（优先股收益率与普通股收益率之间的差额），随后公司——完全合理地——赎回了这只证券，并且尽可能快地完成了赎回。如果当初我谈的是普通股而不是优先股，那么到 1995 年年底，我们本可以多赚 6.25 亿美元，扣掉那段时间的“额外”股息约 7,000 万美元。
In the case of Champion, the ability of the company to call our preferred at 115% of cost forced a move out of us last August that we would rather have delayed. In this instance, we converted our shares just prior to the pending call and offered them to the company at a modest discount.
在 Champion 这笔投资中，公司以成本的 115% 赎回我们优先股的条款，迫使我们在去年 8 月作出一次退出动作——而我们其实更愿意把时间往后拖延。在这次事件里，我们在赎回生效前把优先股转换为普通股，并以一个不大的折扣价把这些股票卖回给公司。
Charlie and I have never had a conviction about the paper industry - actually, I can't remember ever owning the common stock of a paper producer in my 54 years of investing - so our choice in August was whether to sell in the market or to the company. Champion's management had always been candid and honorable in dealing with us and wished to repurchase common shares, so we offered our stock to the company. Our Champion capital gain was moderate - about 19% after tax from a six-year investment - but the preferred delivered us a good after-tax dividend yield throughout our holding period. (That said, many press accounts have overstated the after-tax yields earned by property-casualty insurance companies on dividends paid to them. What the press has failed to take into account is a change in the tax law that took effect in 1987 and that significantly reduced the dividends received credit applicable to insurers. For details, see our 1986 Annual Report.)
Charlie 和我从来没有对造纸行业形成过什么强烈信念——事实上，在我 54 年投资生涯里，我都记不起自己什么时候持有过一家纸品生产商的普通股——因此我们 8 月的选择只是：把股票卖给市场，还是卖回给公司。Champion 的管理层一直坦诚正直地对待我们，而且也希望回购普通股，所以我们把股票卖给了公司。我们在 Champion 的资本利得中等——六年投资的税后回报约 19%——但这只优先股在我们持有期间一直提供了不错的税后股息收益率。（顺便说一句，媒体对财产与意外险公司在股息上的税后收益率常常夸大。媒体忽略了 1987 年生效的一项税法变化：它显著降低了适用于保险公司的 dividends received credit（股息抵扣/股息扣除优惠）。细节可参见我们 1986 年年报。）
愿意买入住宅相关的周期性行业，比如，砖块。
Our First Empire preferred will be called on March 31, 1996, the earliest date allowable. We are comfortable owning stock in well-run banks, and we will convert and keep our First Empire common shares. Bob Wilmers, CEO of the company, is an outstanding banker, and we love being associated with him.
我们的 First Empire 优先股将于 1996 年 3 月 31 日被赎回——这是允许的最早日期。我们对持有经营良好的银行股很放心，因此会转换并继续持有 First Empire 的普通股。公司 CEO Bob Wilmers 是一位出色的银行家，我们很高兴能与他建立这样的合作关系。
Our other two preferreds have been disappointing, though the Salomon preferred has modestly outperformed the fixed-income securities for which it was a substitute. However, the amount of management time Charlie and I have devoted to this holding has been vastly greater than its economic significance to Berkshire. Certainly I never dreamed I would take a new job at age 60 - Salomon interim chairman, that is - because of an earlier purchase of a fixed-income security.
我们另外两只优先股表现令人失望，尽管 Salomon 的优先股相对它所替代的固定收益证券，略微跑赢。但 Charlie 和我在这项持仓上投入的管理时间，远远超过它对 Berkshire 的经济意义。我当然从没想过：因为此前买了一只固定收益证券，我会在 60 岁时“换一份新工作”——也就是担任 Salomon 的临时董事长。
Soon after our purchase of the Salomon preferred in 1987, I wrote that I had "no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking." Even the most charitable commentator would conclude that I have since proved my point.
我们在 1987 年买入 Salomon 优先股后不久，我写过一句话：我对投行行业的方向或未来盈利能力“并没有特别洞见”。即便是最宽容的评论者，也会得出结论：此后发生的一切，恰恰证明了我这句话。
To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the 9% dividend is currently quite attractive.
到目前为止，我们把 Salomon 优先股转换为普通股的选择权并没有体现出价值。并且，自从我承诺买入这只优先股以来，道琼斯工业指数翻了一倍，经纪券商板块表现也差不多。这意味着：我当初因为看中了转换期权的价值而选择 Salomon，这个决定必须被评为“很差”。即便如此，在一些艰难条件下，这只优先股仍作为固定收益工具持续兑现承诺，而其 9% 的股息率目前相当有吸引力。
Unless the preferred is converted, its terms require redemption of 20% of the issue on October 31 of each year, 1995-99, and $140 million of our original $700 million was taken on schedule last year. (Some press reports labeled this a sale, but a senior security that matures is not "sold.") Though we did not elect to convert the preferred that matured last year, we have four more bites at the conversion apple, and I believe it quite likely that we will yet find value in our right to convert.
如果不转换，这只优先股的条款要求在 1995–99 年间每年 10 月 31 日赎回该发行量的 20%；去年按期赎回了我们最初 7 亿美元中的 1.4 亿美元。（有些媒体把这称为“出售”，但一项高级证券到期被赎回，并不是“卖出”。）尽管我们去年并未选择把到期的那部分优先股转换为普通股，但我们还有四次“转换的机会”，我认为我们最终仍很可能会在转换权上找到价值。
I discussed the USAir investment at length in last year's report. The company's results improved in 1995, but it still faces significant problems. On the plus side for us is the fact that our preferred is structurally well-designed: For example, though we have not been paid dividends since June 1994, the amounts owed us are compounding at 5% over the prime rate. On the minus side is the fact that we are dealing with a weak credit.
我在去年的报告中已长篇讨论过 USAir 投资。公司在 1995 年的经营结果有所改善，但仍面临显著问题。对我们有利的一面是：我们的优先股在结构设计上很不错。例如，尽管自 1994 年 6 月以来我们一直没有收到股息，但公司欠我们的股息金额会以“高于最优惠贷款利率（prime rate）5%”的利率复利滚存。不利的一面是：我们面对的是一个信用很弱的主体。
We feel much better about our USAir preferred than we did a year ago, but your guess is as good as mine as to its ultimate value. (Indeed, considering my record with this investment, it's fair to say that your guess may be better than mine.) At yearend we carried our preferred (in which there is no public market) at 60% of par, though USAir also has outstanding a junior preferred that is significantly inferior to ours in all respects except conversion price and that was then trading at 82% of par. As I write this, the junior issue has advanced to 97% of par. Let's hope the market is right.
我们对 USAir 优先股的感觉比一年前好得多，但它的最终价值究竟如何，你的猜测并不比我差。（事实上，考虑到我在这笔投资上的记录，公平地说：你的猜测可能还会比我更准。）到年末，我们把这只优先股（没有公开市场）按面值的 60% 入账；而 USAir 还发行了一只次级优先股，除转换价格外，在各方面都明显不如我们的那只，但当时的交易价格却是面值的 82%。在我写这段话时，那只次级优先股已经涨到面值的 97%。希望市场是对的。
Overall, our preferreds have performed well, but that is true only because of one huge winner, Gillette. Leaving aside Gillette, our preferreds as a group have delivered us after-tax returns no more than equal to those we could have earned from the medium-term fixed-income issues that they replaced.
总体而言，我们的优先股投资表现不错，但这句话之所以成立，只因为有一个超级大赢家——Gillette。抛开 Gillette 不谈，我们这批优先股整体带来的税后回报，充其量也只是与它们当初所替代的中期固定收益证券大致相当。
未来往往是剧烈变化的，5个标的押中1个，而其余4个因为留有安全边际，在剧烈变化中还过得去，这是可以期望的局面。
A Proposed Recapitalization
股权重组提案
At the Annual Meeting you will be asked to approve a recapitalization of Berkshire, creating two classes of stock. If the plan is adopted, our existing common stock will be designated as Class A Common Stock and a new Class B Common Stock will be authorized.
在年度股东大会上，你们将被要求批准 Berkshire 的一次资本重组（recapitalization），从而创建两类股票。如果该方案通过，我们现有的普通股将被指定为 Class A Common Stock，并将新增授权发行 Class B Common Stock。
Each share of the "B" will have the rights of 1/30th of an "A" share with these exceptions: First, a B share will have 1/200th of the vote of an A share (rather than 1/30th of the vote). Second, the B will not be eligible to participate in Berkshire's shareholder-designated charitable contributions program.
每一股 “B” 将享有相当于 “A” 股 1/30 的权利，但有两个例外：第一，B 股的表决权只有 A 股的 1/200（而不是按 1/30 比例）；第二，B 股不能参与 Berkshire 的“由股东指定的慈善捐赠计划”。
When the recapitalization is complete, each share of A will become convertible, at the holder's option and at any time, into 30 shares of B. This conversion privilege will not extend in the opposite direction. That is, holders of B shares will not be able to convert them into A shares.
重组完成后，每一股 A 将在持有人自愿且随时的选择下，可以转换为 30 股 B。这个转换权不允许反向进行：也就是说，B 股持有人不能把 B 转换回 A。
We expect to list the B shares on the New York Stock Exchange, where they will trade alongside the A stock. To create the shareholder base necessary for a listing - and to ensure a liquid market in the B stock - Berkshire expects to make a public offering for cash of at least $100 million of new B shares. The offering will be made only by means of a prospectus.
我们预计将把 B 股在 New York Stock Exchange（纽交所）挂牌交易，使其与 A 股并列交易。为了形成满足挂牌所需的股东基础，并确保 B 股有充足流动性，Berkshire 计划以现金方式公开发行至少 1 亿美元的新 B 股。此次发行只能通过招股说明书（prospectus）进行。
The market will ultimately determine the price of the B shares. Their price, though, should be in the neighborhood of 1/30th of the price of the A shares.
市场最终会决定 B 股的价格。不过，它的价格应大致在 A 股价格的 1/30 附近。
Class A shareholders who wish to give gifts may find it convenient to convert a share or two of their stock into Class B shares. Additionally, arbitrage-related conversions will occur if demand for the B is strong enough to push its price to slightly above 1/30th of the price of A.
希望进行赠与的 Class A 股东，可能会觉得把一两股 A 转换成 B 更方便。此外，如果市场对 B 的需求强到把其价格推至略高于 A 的 1/30，那么基于套利的转换也会出现。
However, because the Class A stock will entitle its holders to full voting rights and access to Berkshire's contributions program, these shares will be superior to the Class B shares and we would expect most shareholders to remain holders of the Class A - which is precisely what the Buffett and Munger families plan to do, except in those instances when we ourselves might convert a few shares to facilitate gifts. The prospect that most shareholders will stick to the A stock suggests that it will enjoy a somewhat more liquid market than the B.
不过，由于 Class A 股票赋予持有人完整表决权，并可参与 Berkshire 的捐赠计划，因此 A 股优于 B 股；我们预计多数股东会继续持有 A 股——Buffett 与 Munger 家族也正是如此计划的（除非我们自己也需要转换少量股份以便于赠与）。多数股东将坚持持有 A 股这一前景也意味着：A 股的流动性可能会比 B 股略好一些。
There are tradeoffs for Berkshire in this recapitalization. But they do not arise from the proceeds of the offering - we will find constructive uses for the money - nor in any degree from the price at which we will sell the B shares. As I write this - with Berkshire stock at $36,000 - Charlie and I do not believe it undervalued. Therefore, the offering we propose will not diminish the per-share intrinsic value of our existing stock. Let me also put our thoughts about valuation more baldly: Berkshire is selling at a price at which Charlie and I would not consider buying it.
这次资本重组对 Berkshire 来说确实有取舍。但这些取舍既不是来自发行募集资金——我们会把钱用在有建设性的地方——也完全不是来自我们出售 B 股的价格。写这段话时，Berkshire 股价是 36,000 美元，Charlie 和我并不认为它被低估。因此，我们拟议的发行不会降低现有股票每股的内在价值。我再更直白地说说我们对估值的看法：Berkshire 现在的价格，是 Charlie 和我不会考虑买入的价格。
What Berkshire will incur by way of the B stock are certain added costs, including those involving the mechanics of handling a larger number of shareholders. On the other hand, the stock should be a convenience for people wishing to make gifts. And those of you who have hoped for a split have gained a do-it-yourself method of bringing one about.
B 股会带来的代价，是一些新增成本，包括处理更多股东的各种机制性成本。另一方面，这种股票会给想要做赠与的人带来便利。而那些一直期待拆股的人，也获得了一种“自己动手”的方式把拆股效果做出来。
We are making this move, though, for other reasons - having to do with the appearance of expense-laden unit trusts purporting to be low-priced "clones" of Berkshire and sure to be aggressively marketed. The idea behind these vehicles is not new: In recent years, a number of people have told me about their wish to create an "all-Berkshire" investment fund to be sold at a low dollar price. But until recently, the promoters of these investments heard out my objections and backed off.
不过，我们做这件事的原因在别处——与一种“低价的 Berkshire 克隆”有关：一些费用沉重的 unit trusts（单位信托）正在出现，它们自称是 Berkshire 的低价“复制品”，并且必然会被积极营销。这些产品背后的想法并不新：近几年，有不少人跟我提过，希望创建一只“全 Berkshire”的投资基金，以较低的单份金额对外出售。但直到最近，这些推广者听完我的反对意见后都会打退堂鼓。
I did not discourage these people because I prefer large investors over small. Were it possible, Charlie and I would love to turn $1,000 into $3,000 for multitudes of people who would find that gain an important answer to their immediate problems.
我并没有阻止这些人，是因为我更偏好大资金而不是小资金。相反，如果可能，Charlie 和我很愿意把 1,000 美元变成 3,000 美元，帮助成千上万的人——对他们来说，这样的收益可能正好能解决眼前的难题。
In order to quickly triple small stakes, however, we would have to just as quickly turn our present market capitalization of $43 billion into $129 billion (roughly the market cap of General Electric, America's most highly valued company). We can't come close to doing that. The very best we hope for is - on average - to double Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value every five years, and we may well fall far short of that goal.
但要想让“小额资金迅速翻三倍”，我们也必须同样迅速地把 Berkshire 目前 430 亿美元的市值变成 1,290 亿美元（大致相当于 General Electric——美国当时市值最高的公司）。我们做不到接近这种速度。我们所能期望的最好结果，是——平均而言——每五年把 Berkshire 的每股内在价值翻一倍，而我们也很可能远达不到这个目标。
In the end, Charlie and I do not care whether our shareholders own Berkshire in large or small amounts. What we wish for are shareholders of any size who are knowledgeable about our operations, share our objectives and long-term perspective, and are aware of our limitations, most particularly those imposed by our large capital base.
归根结底，Charlie 和我并不在乎股东持有 Berkshire 的金额是大是小。我们真正希望的是：不论持股规模如何，股东都应当了解我们的业务、认同我们的目标与长期视角，并且清楚我们的限制——尤其是由我们庞大的资本规模所带来的限制。
The unit trusts that have recently surfaced fly in the face of these goals. They would be sold by brokers working for big commissions, would impose other burdensome costs on their shareholders, and would be marketed en masse to unsophisticated buyers, apt to be seduced by our past record and beguiled by the publicity Berkshire and I have received in recent years. The sure outcome: a multitude of investors destined to be disappointed.
这些最近冒出来的 unit trusts（单位信托）与我们的目标完全背道而驰。它们会由拿高额佣金的经纪人销售，会让持有人承担其他沉重费用，并且会被大规模推销给缺乏专业判断的买家——这些人很容易被我们过去的业绩所诱惑，也容易被近几年 Berkshire 和我受到的媒体关注所迷住。结局几乎注定：大批投资者终将失望。
Through our creation of the B stock - a low-denomination product far superior to Berkshire-only trusts - we hope to make the clones unmerchandisable.
通过创建 B 股——一种面额更低、而且远优于“全 Berkshire”单位信托的产品——我们希望让这些“克隆产品”变得卖不动。
But both present and prospective Berkshire shareholders should pay special attention to one point: Though the per-share intrinsic value of our stock has grown at an excellent rate during the past five years, its market price has grown still faster. The stock, in other words, has outperformed the business.
不过，现有与潜在股东都应特别注意一点：尽管过去五年里我们股票的每股内在价值增长得非常出色，但它的市场价格上涨得更快。换句话说，股票的表现已经跑赢了企业本身。
That kind of market overperformance cannot persist indefinitely, neither for Berkshire nor any other stock. Inevitably, there will be periods of underperformance as well. The price volatility that results, though endemic to public markets, is not to our liking. What we would prefer instead is to have the market price of Berkshire precisely track its intrinsic value. Were the stock to do that, every shareholder would benefit during his period of ownership in exact proportion to the progress Berkshire itself made in the period.
这种“股价跑赢企业”的市场超额表现不可能无限持续——对 Berkshire 如此，对任何股票都如此。必然会出现一段段相对跑输的时期。由此带来的价格波动虽然是公开市场的常态，却并不合我们的心意。我们更愿意看到：Berkshire 的股价能够精确跟随其内在价值。如果真能如此，每一位股东在其持有期间获得的收益，就会与 Berkshire 在该期间创造的进步严格成比例。
Obviously, the market behavior of Berkshire's stock will never conform to this ideal. But we will come closer to this goal than we would otherwise if our present and prospective shareholders are informed, business-oriented and not exposed to high-commission salesmanship when making their investment decisions. To that end, we are better off if we can blunt the merchandising efforts of the unit trusts - and that is the reason we are creating the B stock.
当然，Berkshire 的股价行为永远不可能完全符合这种理想。但如果我们的现有与潜在股东是“有信息、以业务为导向”的，并且在做投资决策时不被高佣金推销所影响，我们就能比其他情形更接近这一目标。为此，如果我们能削弱 unit trusts 的营销能力，我们就更有利——这就是我们创建 B 股的原因。
We look forward to answering your questions about the recapitalization at the Annual Meeting.
我们期待在年度股东大会上回答你们关于这次资本重组的提问。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
Berkshire isn't the only American corporation utilizing the new, exciting ABWA strategy. At about 1:15 p.m. on July 14, 1995, Michael Eisner, CEO of The Walt Disney Company, was walking up Wildflower Lane in Sun Valley. At the same time, I was leaving a lunch at Herbert Allen's home on that street to meet Tom Murphy, CEO of Cap Cities/ABC, for a golf game.
Berkshire 并不是唯一一家采用这种“新奇又刺激”的 ABWA（acquisitions by walking around，走动式收购）策略的美国公司。1995 年 7 月 14 日下午大约 1:15，The Walt Disney Company 的 CEO Michael Eisner 正沿着 Sun Valley 的 Wildflower Lane 往上走。与此同时，我正从同一条街上 Herbert Allen 家的一场午餐离开，准备去见 Cap Cities/ABC 的 CEO Tom Murphy（我们要去打高尔夫）。
That morning, speaking to a large group of executives and money managers assembled by Allen's investment bank, Michael had made a brilliant presentation about Disney, and upon seeing him, I offered my congratulations. We chatted briefly - and the subject of a possible combination of Disney and Cap Cities came up. This wasn't the first time a merger had been discussed, but progress had never before been made, in part because Disney wanted to buy with cash and Cap Cities desired stock.
那天上午，Michael 在 Allen 的投行组织的一大群高管与资金管理人面前，做了一场关于 Disney 的精彩演讲。见到他后，我向他表示祝贺。我们简短聊了几句——话题就转到了 Disney 与 Cap Cities 可能的合并。这并不是第一次谈到合并，但此前一直没有进展，其中一个原因是：Disney 想用现金买，而 Cap Cities 更想要股票。
Michael and I waited a few minutes for Murph to arrive, and in the short conversation that ensued, both Michael and Murph indicated they might bend on the stock/cash question. Within a few weeks, they both did, at which point a contract was put together in three very busy days.
Michael 和我等了几分钟 Murph 才到。随后那段短暂对话里，Michael 和 Murph 都表示：在“现金/股票”的问题上，他们也许都愿意作出让步。几周后，两人果然都让了步，于是合同在三个极其忙碌的日子里就完成了。
The Disney/Cap Cities deal makes so much sense that I'm sure it would have occurred without that chance encounter in Sun Valley. But when I ran into Michael that day on Wildflower Lane, he was heading for his plane, so without that accidental meeting the deal certainly wouldn't have happened in the time frame it did. I believe both Disney and Cap Cities will benefit from the fact that we all serendipitously met that day.
Disney/Cap Cities 这笔交易合理到让我确信：即便没有那次在 Sun Valley 的偶遇，它最终也会发生。但我在 Wildflower Lane 遇到 Michael 的那天，他正赶去坐飞机；因此如果没有那次“意外相遇”，这笔交易肯定不会在当时那样的时间节奏里推进。我相信，Disney 与 Cap Cities 都会受益于我们那天的“机缘巧合”。
It's appropriate that I say a few words here about Murph. To put it simply, he is as fine an executive as I have ever seen in my long exposure to business. Equally important, he possesses human qualities every bit the equal of his managerial qualities. He's an extraordinary friend, parent, husband and citizen. In those rare instances in which Murph's personal interests diverged from those of shareholders, he unfailingly favored the owners. When I say that I like to be associated with managers whom I would love to have as a sibling, in-law, or trustee of my will, Murph is the exemplar of what I mean.
我很适合在这里说几句关于 Murph 的话。简单说，他是我在长期商业经历中见过的最优秀的高管之一。更重要的是，他的人格品质与他的管理才能同样出众。他是一位非凡的朋友、父亲、丈夫与公民。在极少数情况下，当 Murph 的个人利益与股东利益发生分歧时，他从不例外地选择站在所有者一边。当我说：我喜欢与那些“我愿意让他做我的兄弟、姻亲，或我遗嘱的受托人”的经理人打交道时，Murph 就是我所指的典范。
If Murph should elect to run another business, don't bother to study its value - just buy the stock. And don't later be as dumb as I was two years ago when I sold one-third of our holdings in Cap Cities for $635 million (versus the $1.27 billion those shares would bring in the Disney merger).
如果 Murph 将来选择去经营另一家企业，你不用费劲研究它值不值——直接买它的股票就行。也别像我两年前那样愚蠢：我当时卖掉了我们持有的 Cap Cities 的三分之一，拿到 6.35 亿美元（而那部分股票在 Disney 合并中能换到 12.7 亿美元）。
About 96.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1995 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made were $11.6 million and 3,600 charities were recipients. A full description of the shareholder-designated contributions program appears on pages 54-55.
在符合资格的股份中，约有 96.3% 参加了 Berkshire 1995 年的“由股东指定的捐赠计划”。实际捐赠金额为 1,160 万美元，共有 3,600 家慈善机构成为受赠方。关于该计划的完整说明见第 54–55 页。
Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because they don't have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get their designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. That second problem pained me especially this year because two good friends with substantial holdings missed the deadline. We had to deny their requests to be included because we can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.
每年都会有少数股东错过这个计划，原因要么是他们没有在规定的记录日之前把股票登记在自己名下（而是登记在经纪商、银行或托管机构的代持名下），要么是他们没能在允许的 60 天期限内把指定表格寄回给我们。第二个问题今年尤其让我难过，因为我有两位持股不少的好朋友错过了截止日期。我们不得不拒绝把他们纳入计划，因为我们不能对某些股东破例、却对其他股东不破例。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1996, will be ineligible for the 1996 program. When you get the form, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.
若想参与未来的计划，你必须持有登记在“实际所有者本人”名下的 Class A 股票，而不是登记在经纪商、银行或托管机构的代持名下。凡是在 1996 年 8 月 31 日仍未如此登记的股份，都将没有资格参加 1996 年的计划。收到表格后请尽快寄回，避免它被搁置或遗忘。
When it comes to our Annual Meetings, Charlie and I are managerial oddballs: We thoroughly enjoy the event. So come join us on Monday, May 6. At Berkshire, we have no investor relations department and don't use financial analysts as a channel for disseminating information, earnings "guidance," or the like. Instead, we prefer direct manager-to-owner communication and believe that the Annual Meeting is the ideal place for this interchange of ideas. Talking to you there is efficient for us and also democratic in that all present simultaneously hear what we have to say.
谈到年度股东大会，Charlie 和我算是“管理界的怪人”：我们非常享受这个活动。所以请你在 5 月 6 日（星期一） 来加入我们。在 Berkshire，我们没有投资者关系部门，也不会通过金融分析师来传播信息、发布盈利“指引”等等。相反，我们更偏好经理人与所有者之间的直接沟通，并认为年度大会是这种思想交流最理想的场所。在那里和你们交流对我们来说既高效，也更“民主”——因为所有到场的人会在同一时间听到我们要说的话。
Last year, for the first time, we had the Annual Meeting at the Holiday Convention Centre and the logistics seemed to work. The ballroom there was filled with about 3,200 people, and we had a video feed into a second room holding another 800 people. Seating in the main room was a little tight, so this year we will probably configure it to hold 3,000. This year we will also have two rooms for the overflow.
去年我们第一次把年度大会放在 Holiday Convention Centre 举办，从执行层面看似乎运转良好。那里的宴会厅坐满了大约 3,200 人，我们还把视频传到第二个房间，容纳了另外 800 人。主会场的座位有些紧张，因此今年我们可能把主会场配置成可容纳 3,000 人。今年我们还会为溢出人群再准备两个房间。
All in all, we will be able to handle 5,000 shareholders. The meeting will start at 9:30 a.m., but be warned that last year the main ballroom was filled shortly after 8:00 a.m.
总的来说，我们可以接待 5,000 名股东。大会将于上午 9:30 开始，但提醒你：去年主会场在 8:00 刚过不久就坐满了。
Shareholders from 49 states attended our 1995 meeting - where were you, Vermont? - and a number of foreign countries, including Australia, Sweden and Germany, were represented. As always, the meeting attracted shareholders who were interested in Berkshire's business - as contrasted to shareholders who are primarily interested in themselves - and the questions were all good. Charlie and I ate lunch on stage and answered questions for about five hours.
1995 年的大会来了来自 49 个州的股东——Vermont 你去哪儿了？——还有不少外国股东，代表国家包括 Australia、Sweden 和 Germany。和往常一样，到场的股东对 Berkshire 的生意本身感兴趣——而不是主要对自己感兴趣——提问都很不错。Charlie 和我在台上吃了午饭，并回答问题约五个小时。
We feel that if owners come from all over the world, we should try to make sure they have an opportunity to ask their questions. Most shareholders leave about noon, but a thousand or so hardcore types usually stay to see whether we will drop. Charlie and I are in training to last at least five hours again this year.
我们认为：既然有来自世界各地的所有者赶来，我们就应尽量确保他们有机会提问。大多数股东大约中午就会离开，但通常会有一千来个“硬核型”股东留下来，看看我们会不会“掉线”。Charlie 和我正在训练自己，今年也要至少坚持五个小时。
We will have our usual array of Berkshire products at the meeting and this year will add a sales representative from GEICO. At the 1995 meeting, we sold 747 pounds of candy, 759 pairs of shoes, and over $17,500 of World Books and related publications. In a move that might have been dangerous had our stock been weak, we added knives last year from our Quikut subsidiary and sold 400 sets of these. (We draw the line at soft fruit, however.) All of these goods will again be available this year. We don't consider a cultural event complete unless a little business is mixed in.
我们会像往常一样在大会上展示一系列 Berkshire 的产品，今年还会新增一位来自 GEICO 的销售代表。1995 年大会上，我们卖出了 747 磅糖果、759 双鞋子，以及超过 17,500 美元的 World Book 及相关出版物。去年我们还做了一个“如果股价不强可能会有点危险”的举动：我们从 Quikut 子公司引入了刀具，卖出了 400 套。（不过我们不会卖软水果——这条线我们还是守住的。）今年这些商品都会继续供应。我们不认为一个文化活动是完整的，除非里面也掺一点生意。
Because we expect a large crowd for the meeting, we recommend that you promptly get both plane and hotel reservations. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel, or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at 7:30, 8:00 and 8:30 for the meeting and return after it ends.
因为预计到场人多，我们建议你尽快预订机票与酒店。喜欢住在市中心（距离会场约 6 英里）的股东，可以考虑 Radisson Redick Tower（小而精致，88 间房）或几条街外规模更大的 Red Lion Hotel。会场附近有 Holiday Inn（403 间）、Homewood Suites（118 间）和 Hampton Inn（136 间）。另一个推荐点是 Marriott：它在 Omaha 西区，距离 Borsheim’s 约 100 码，开车到会场约 10 分钟。Marriott 会有巴士在 7:30、8:00、8:30 发车前往会场，并在大会结束后返回。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting. As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later.
我们委托书材料的附件会说明你如何获得入场所需的卡片。会场有一块相当大的停车区；住在 Holiday Inn、Homewood Suites 和 Hampton Inn 的股东可以步行前往。和往常一样，大会结束后我们会安排巴士送大家去 Nebraska Furniture Mart 和 Borsheim’s，并在稍后把大家从那里送回酒店或机场。
NFM's main store, on its 64-acre site about two miles north of the Centre, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Rose Blumkin - "Mrs. B" - is now 102, but will be hard at work in Mrs. B's Warehouse. She was honored in November at the opening of The Rose, a classic downtown theater of the 20's that has been magnificently restored, but that would have been demolished had she not saved it. Ask her to tell you the story.
NFM 的主店位于一个 64 英亩的场地上，距离会场（Centre）以北约两英里。营业时间为：工作日 10:00–21:00，周六 10:00–18:00，周日 12:00–18:00。Rose Blumkin——“Mrs. B”——现在 102 岁了，但仍会在 Mrs. B’s Warehouse 里辛勤工作。去年 11 月，她在一座名为 The Rose 的经典市中心剧院重新开幕时受到了表彰。这座 20 年代风格的剧院被华丽修复，而如果不是她出手相救，它本会被拆除。你可以请她讲讲这段故事。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 5th. Additionally, we will have a special opening for shareholders on Saturday, the 4th, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. Last year, on Shareholders Day, we wrote 1,733 tickets in the six hours we were open - which is a sale every 13 seconds. Remember, though, that records are made to be broken.
Borsheim’s 平时周日关门，但将于 5 月 5 日 10:00–18:00 为股东及其来宾开放。此外，5 月 4 日（周六） 18:00–21:00 还会为股东特别加开。去年“股东日”我们在 6 小时内开出了 1,733 张小票——也就是每 13 秒就成交一笔。不过要记住：纪录就是用来打破的。
At Borsheim's, we will also have the world's largest faceted diamond on display. Two years in the cutting, this inconspicuous bauble is 545 carats in size. Please inspect this stone and let it guide you in determining what size gem is appropriate for the one you love.
在 Borsheim’s，我们还会展出世界上最大的切面钻石。这颗“不起眼的小饰物”历经两年切割，重达 545 克拉。请你仔细看看这颗宝石，并让它帮助你判断：给你所爱的人挑选多大尺寸的宝石才算合适。
On Saturday evening, May 4, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Louisville Redbirds. I expect to make the opening pitch - owning a quarter of the team assures me of one start per year - but our manager, Mike Jirschele, will probably make his usual mistake and yank me immediately after. About 1,700 shareholders attended last year's game. Unfortunately, we had a rain-out, which greatly disappointed the many scouts in the stands. But the smart ones will be back this year, and I plan to show them my best stuff.
5 月 4 日（周六）晚上，Rosenblatt Stadium 将举行一场棒球赛，对阵双方是 Omaha Royals 与 Louisville Redbirds。我预计会投出开球——毕竟我拥有球队四分之一的股份，保证我每年有一次先发机会——但我们的经理 Mike Jirschele 可能又会犯他一贯的错误：立刻把我换下场。去年约有 1,700 名股东到场。不幸的是，当时因为下雨比赛被取消，让看台上许多球探非常失望。但聪明的球探今年会回来，而我也计划给他们看看我的“最好球路”。
Our proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. We will also offer an information packet this year listing restaurants that will be open on Sunday night and describing various things that you can do in Omaha on the weekend.
我们的委托书声明（proxy statement）会包含如何获取比赛门票的信息。今年我们还会提供一份信息包，列出周日晚上营业的餐厅，并介绍你在 Omaha 周末可以做的各种活动。
For years, I've unsuccessfully tried to get my grade school classmate, "Pal" Gorat, to open his steakhouse for business on the Sunday evening preceding the meeting. But this year he's relented. Gorat's is a family-owned enterprise that has thrived for 52 years, and if you like steaks, you'll love this place. I've told Pal he will get a good crowd, so call Gorat's at 402-551-3733 for a reservation. You'll spot me there - I'll be the one eating the rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.
多年来，我一直没能说服我小学同学、“Pal” Gorat 在股东大会前一晚（周日晚上）开门营业。但今年他让步了。Gorat’s 是一家家族企业，兴旺经营已 52 年；如果你喜欢牛排，你会爱上这家店。我告诉 Pal 他会有一大波客人，所以请致电 402-551-3733 预订。你会在那里看到我——我就是那个点三分熟 T-bone（还要双份薯丝饼）的家伙。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 1, 1996
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