1997-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
1. Buffett is losing his voice
巴菲特嗓音嘶哑
WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren Buffett, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, as you probably have gathered by now. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 早上好，我是沃伦·巴菲特，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事长，这一点你们可能已经知道了。（笑）
I had a real problem last night. I was losing my voice almost entirely. I don’t want you to think I lost it cheering for myself this morning here. I think I’ll do all right, but we’ve always got Charlie here to — he’s always done the talking. I just move my lips, you know. (Laughter)
昨晚我遇到了一个真正的问题，我的嗓音几乎完全嘶哑了。我不想让你们以为这是因为我今天早上为自己欢呼所致。我想我会没事的，不过我们还有查理，他一直负责说话，我只需要动动嘴唇就行了。（笑声）
So I’d like to tell you a little bit about how we’re going to conduct things. And then we’ll go through a script that was written by the speechwriter for Saddam Hussein. It has all the warmth and charm and participatory elements you’d expect.
所以我想先告诉你们一点我们今天的流程安排。然后我们会念一份由萨达姆·侯赛因的演讲稿撰稿人写的脚本，里面包含你们期待的所有温暖、魅力和参与元素。
And we’ll get through the business of the meeting as promptly as we can, which is usually about five or six minutes. And then Charlie and I will answer questions, your questions until noon, when we’ll have a break for about a half an hour.
我们会尽快完成会议的事务部分，通常大约需要五到六分钟。接下来，查理和我会回答你们的问题，直到中午，我们会休息大约半小时。
There’s food outside all the time. And then at 12:30 we’ll reconvene, and we’ll go till 3:30 or thereabouts. And I hope my voice lasts. We’ve got various non-Coca-Cola products here designed to keep it going.
外面随时都有食物供应。然后在12:30我们会重新开始，会议将持续到3:30左右。我希望我的嗓音能坚持住。我们准备了各种非可口可乐的产品来维持嗓音状态。
We’ll have a zone system where we have 12 microphones placed around, and — I believe it’s 12 — and we’ll just go around in order. And if you’ll go to the microphone nearest you, there will be someone there who will try to arrange the people — get to ask questions in the order in which they arrived. And we’ll make sure that everybody gets a chance to ask their questions before people go on to second questions.
我们会采用分区系统，周围放置了12个麦克风——我想是12个——然后按顺序进行提问。如果你走到离你最近的麦克风，会有人在那里按到场顺序安排大家提问。我们会确保每个人都有机会提问，然后才允许重复提问。
Particularly in the afternoon, we’ll make a special effort to answer the questions from people that have come from outside North America. We really got quite an attendance today. All 50 states — at least in terms of tickets — all 50 states are represented.
尤其是在下午，我们会特别努力回答来自北美以外地区人们的问题。今天真的是出席人数众多。全美50个州——至少从票务上看——都有代表出席。
We had — I had it here somewhere. Yeah, we had ticket requests, at least, and I met a number of people from South Africa, Australia, Brazil, England, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Saipan, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland.
我们——我这里有记录。是的，我们至少收到的购票请求中，还有不少来自南非、澳大利亚、巴西、英国、法国、德国、希腊、香港、爱尔兰、冰岛、以色列、塞班、新西兰、沙特阿拉伯、新加坡、瑞典、瑞士的观众。
So when people have come from that sort of distance, we want to make sure that they — obviously we want to make sure that they particularly get their questions answered.
所以当人们从这么远的地方赶来时，我们当然要确保特别优先回答他们的问题。
Interestingly enough, we have an increased percentage from last year who come from Nebraska this year. And you have to be a little careful in interpreting that, because some people say they’re from Nebraska and really aren’t, because for status reasons they, you know, like that. (Laughter and applause)
有趣的是，今年来自内布拉斯加州的参会者比例比去年有所增加。不过在解释这个数据时要稍微小心，因为有些人说他们来自内布拉斯加州，其实并不是。因为某些“地位”原因，你知道的，他们喜欢这么说。（笑声和掌声）
So make them produce their driver’s license if they tell you they came from Nebraska.
所以，如果有人说他们来自内布拉斯加州，就让他们出示驾照证明吧。
2. Formal business meeting begins
正式股东大会开始
WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s most of the preliminaries, so I’m going to get into this. We’ll get the meeting over with here promptly with your cooperation.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想大部分准备工作已经完成了，所以我们现在开始吧。在大家的配合下，我们将尽快完成会议的正式部分。
And I will go through this little script that’s been prepared for me, and it says, the meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company. I welcome you to this 1997 annual meeting of shareholders.
我将念一段为我准备的小稿子，上面写道：会议现在开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席。欢迎大家出席1997年度股东大会。
I will first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present in addition to myself. I’ve introduced you to Charlie already.
首先，我将介绍出席会议的伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事会成员，除了我以外，我已经向大家介绍过查理了。
And the other directors, I believe, are in the front row here. If they’d stand when I mention their names, you can withhold any applause until finished, and then it’s optional. (Laughter)
其他董事，我想，他们现在应该坐在前排。当我提到他们的名字时，请他们起立，你们可以等介绍完后再鼓掌，当然鼓不鼓掌是自愿的。（笑声）
Howard Buffett, Howie you want to stand up? Susan Buffett. Walter Scott. And Malcolm Chace III, “Kim” Chace. And that is our extensive directorate. (Applause)
霍华德·巴菲特，霍威，请站起来？苏珊·巴菲特。沃尔特·斯科特。还有马尔科姆·蔡斯三世，“金”蔡斯。这就是我们庞大的董事会。（掌声）
Give them a lot of applause because they don’t get much else for it. It’s a rather low-paying board. (Applause)
多给他们一些掌声吧，因为他们基本上没有其他的回报。这是一个薪酬很低的董事会。（掌声）
Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
今天还有我们的审计公司德勤（Deloitte and Touche）的合伙人出席。他们可以回答大家关于他们公司对伯克希尔账户审计的相关问题。
Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings.
福雷斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将记录会议的书面记录。
Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.
贝基·艾米克小姐被任命为本次会议的选举监督员。她将核实董事选举中投票的计数结果。
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc B. Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing 1,012,050 Class A Berkshire shares and 645,940 Class B Berkshire shares, to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards. That number of shares represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特二世和马克·B·汉堡。到上周五为止，共收到代理投票卡，代表1,012,050股A类伯克希尔股票和645,940股B类伯克希尔股票。这些代理持有人将按卡上指示进行投票。这些股票数量已达到法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。
We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that we will entertain questions that you might have.
我们将进行会议的事务部分，然后结束正式会议。之后，我们将回答大家可能有的问题。
First order of business will be reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders, and I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place the motion before the meeting.
会议的第一项议程是宣读上次股东大会的会议记录，我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders will be dispensed with.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议免去宣读上次股东大会会议记录的环节。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议吗？
VOICES: (Inaudible)
众人： （听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: We got a second. The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this motion by voice vote. Those in favor say “aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议了。动议已经提出并附议。有没有评论或问题？我们将以口头表决的方式进行投票。赞成的请说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye.
众人： 赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? Say, “I’m leaving.” (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 反对的请说“我要走了。”（笑声）
The motion is carried. Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
动议通过。秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股数量、具备投票权的股票数量以及本次会议代表股票数量的报告？
FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated, a proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 7, 1997, being the record date of this meeting, there were 1,205,078 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 815,015 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to 1/200th of a vote on motions considered at the meeting. Of that number, 1,012,050 Class A shares and 645,940 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.
福雷斯特·克鲁特： 是的。如会议通知中所述，会议通知和代理声明于1997年3月7日通过优先邮件发送给所有登记在册的股东，这是本次会议的记录日。根据记录，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的流通A类普通股为1,205,078股，每股拥有一次投票权；B类普通股为815,015股，每股拥有1/200的投票权。在上述数量中，截至上周五，代理投票卡代表了1,012,050股A类股票和645,940股B类股票出席了本次会议。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。如果有股东在场希望撤回之前提交的代理投票并亲自投票选举董事，可以这样做。
Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you.
此外，如果有在场股东未提交代理投票但希望获得选票以便亲自投票，也可以这样做。如果您有此需求，请向过道中的会议工作人员表明身份，他们会向您提供选票。
Will those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so that we may distribute them?
需要选票的人员请表明身份，以便我们分发选票。
3. Berkshire board elected
伯克希尔董事会选举
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, the one item of business for this meeting is to elect directors. I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好，本次会议的唯一事务是选举董事。我现在请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出关于董事选举的动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和沃尔特·斯科特二世当选为董事。
WARREN BUFFETT: It sounds good to me. Is there a second? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 听起来不错。有人附议吗？（笑声）
It has been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?
已经有人提议并附议沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和沃尔特·斯科特二世当选为董事。还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？
My kind of group.
真是我喜欢的团队。
The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting and present, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections. Think we had one or two to collect there.
提名已经准备好表决。如果有股东在场并投票，请现在在选票上标记董事选举的意见，并将选票交给选举监督员。我想我们还有一两张选票需要收集。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received?
请代理投票人也向选举监督员提交董事选举的选票，并根据收到的指示投票。
Miss Amick, when you are ready you may give your report.
艾米克小姐，请在准备好时进行报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Friday cast not less than 1,015,697 and 2,300 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
贝基·艾米克： 我的报告已准备好。截至上周五收到的代理投票卡中，每位被提名人分别获得不低于1,015,697票和2,300票。这一数字远远超过所有流通的A类和B类股票总票数的多数。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as those cast in person at this meeting, if any, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证，包括代理持有人在本次会议上根据提交的代理投票进行的额外投票，以及本次会议上亲自投票的票数（如有），将交给秘书保存并附于本次会议记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢你，艾米克小姐。
Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace III, and Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors. After adjournment of the business meeting I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the business of Berkshire but do not call for any action at this meeting.
沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和沃尔特·斯科特二世已当选为董事。在本次事务会议结束后，我将回答大家可能有的与伯克希尔业务相关的问题，但这些问题不需要在本次会议上采取任何行动。
Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting.
在我们结束会议之前，还有没有其他事务需要讨论？如果没有，我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move this meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议本次会议结束。
WARREN BUFFETT: Second?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议吗？
VOICES: (Inaudible)
众人： （听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say “aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特： 结束会议的动议已经提出并附议。我们将以口头表决方式进行投票。有讨论吗？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye.
众人： 赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed, say “no.” The meeting is adjourned. (Laughter and applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 反对的请说“不赞成。”会议结束。（笑声和掌声）
You’re a very good group. You know, in that movie they said something about $350,000 an hour, and I see you’re conserving your money here by moving this thing right along. (Laughter)
你们是一群很优秀的人。你们知道，在那部电影里提到每小时35万美元，而我发现你们通过快速推进会议节省了不少钱。（笑声）
4. Q&A session begins
问答环节开始
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re going to answer questions. And if you’ll just go to the nearest microphone, and let’s see where we start here. I’m just orienting myself to a map here. And we have area 1 is right here.
沃伦·巴菲特： 现在我们开始回答问题。如果你们可以到离自己最近的麦克风前提问，我们来看从哪里开始。我正在看地图，这里是第一区域。
I might describe this ahead of time. We have six areas on the main floor and we have six areas throughout the balcony. And they sort of work their way back one through six, and then seven starts over here, and then it works its way around to 12.
我提前说明一下。主楼层有六个区域，阳台上也有六个区域。它们从1号到6号依次排列，然后从这里开始是7号，再依次到12号。
And we look forward to having questions, the tougher the better. And if you always would just identify yourself and where you’re from, and that you’re a shareholder.
我们期待回答你们的问题，越难越好。如果可以的话，请先说明你的身份、来自哪里，以及你是股东。
5. McDonald’s isn’t as “inevitable” as Coca-Cola and Gillette
麦当劳并不像可口可乐和吉列那样“不可避免”
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir. My name is Tom Conrad (PH) and I’m from McLean, Virginia. And I’m a shareholder.
观众： 是的，先生。我叫汤姆·康拉德（音），来自弗吉尼亚州麦克莱恩。我是一名股东。
And I asked a question last year, Mr. Buffett, to you. I was struck with what you said, that it takes only three quality companies to be — to invest in to be set for a lifetime. And I asked you the question last year, “Should I wait until the market goes down, or should I get in now?”
去年我问过您一个问题，巴菲特先生。您说过，只需要投资三家优质公司，就可以为一生做好投资安排。这让我印象深刻。我去年问您，“我应该等到市场下跌再投资，还是现在就进入？”
And you advised to get in now, and the three companies that I chose were Coca-Cola, Gillette and Disney. And because of that advice I was able to afford the ticket to come back this year — (laughter) — to ask you a second question. (Buffett laughs)
您建议我现在进入，我选择了可口可乐、吉列和迪士尼三家公司。因为您的建议，我今年能负担得起门票，回来问您第二个问题了。（笑声）（巴菲特笑）
And my question is this. I’m thinking of —
我的问题是这样的。我正在考虑——
WARREN BUFFETT: You ought to quit while you’re ahead, but go ahead. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 你应该趁现在领先的时候见好就收，但继续吧。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m thinking of expanding to a fourth company. The fourth company that I’m thinking of is McDonald’s. And —
观众： 我正在考虑扩展到第四家公司。我想到的第四家公司是麦当劳。而且——
WARREN BUFFETT: I see.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我明白了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — I just wanted to ask you if you feel that McDonald’s has the same ability to dominate the way Coca-Cola and Gillette has.
观众： 我想问您，您是否认为麦当劳拥有像可口可乐和吉列那样的主导能力？
And secondly, do you feel that if the answer is yes, that I should wait until the price comes down a bit, or get in now? And that’s my question.
其次，如果答案是肯定的，您是否认为我应该等到价格稍微回落后再买入，还是现在就进入？这就是我的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you like it to the eighth of a point, or shall we round off? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 你是想要精确到1/8点，还是我们四舍五入？（笑声）
In the annual report, we talked about Coca-Cola and Gillette in terms of their base business being what I call “The Inevitables.” But that related, obviously, to the soft drink business in the case of Coca-Cola and the shaving products with Gillette. It doesn’t extend to necessarily everything they do. But fortunately in both those companies those are very important products.
在年报中，我们提到可口可乐和吉列的核心业务是我称之为“不可避免”的业务。但这显然仅指可口可乐的软饮料业务和吉列的剃须产品业务。这并不适用于他们所做的所有事情。但幸运的是，这两家公司都拥有非常重要的产品。
I would say that in the food business, you would never get the total certainty of dominance that you would get in products like Coca-Cola and Gillette. People move around in the food business, from where they eat, from — they may favor McDonald’s but they will go to different places at different times. And somebody starts shaving with a Gillette Sensor Plus is very unlikely to go elsewhere, in my view.
我会说，在食品行业，你永远不会像可口可乐和吉列这样的产品那样拥有完全的主导地位确定性。在食品行业，人们会变换吃饭的地方，他们可能喜欢麦当劳，但会在不同的时间去不同的地方。而一旦有人开始使用吉列的Sensor Plus剃须刀，在我看来，他们不太可能转用其他产品。
So they do not — you just — you never would get in the food business, in my judgment, quite the inevitability that you would get in the soft drink business with a Coca-Cola.
所以，在我的判断中，食品行业不会像软饮料行业的可口可乐那样具有“不可避免性”。
You’ll never get it again in the soft drink business. I mean, it took a hundred — I guess it’d be 1886, so it’d be about 111 years to get to the point where they are. And the infrastructure’s incredible, and — so I wouldn’t put it quite in the same class, in terms of inevitability.
软饮料行业也再不会出现这样的“不可避免性”。我的意思是，从1886年开始，大概花了111年的时间才达到他们现在的地位。他们的基础设施极为惊人——所以从“不可避免性”来看，我不会将麦当劳放在同一类别。
That doesn’t mean — it can be a better stock investment, depending on the price. But you’re not going to get the price from me, and knowing Charlie I doubt if you’ll get the price from him. But we’ll give him a chance. (Laughs)
但这并不意味着它不能成为更好的股票投资，这取决于价格。不过你不会从我这里得到价格，而我了解查理，我怀疑你也不会从他那里得到价格。但我们还是给他一个机会吧。（笑声）
(Laughter)
（笑声）
He’s breathing, folks. He’s breathing. (Laughter and applause)
他还活着，伙计们。他还在呼吸。（笑声和掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve got this down to a routine. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我们已经形成了固定模式。（笑声）
No, I have nothing to add, Warren.
不，沃伦，我没有补充的。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的。（笑声）
I didn’t have anything to say, either. I just took longer. (Laughter)
其实我也没什么要说的，只是花的时间长一点。（笑声）
6. You can pay too much even if a business is “wonderful”
即使是“优秀”的企业，你也可能付出过高的价格
WARREN BUFFETT: How about area 2?
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们来听听第二区域的问题？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Pete Banner (PH) and I’m from Boulder, Colorado, and I’m a shareholder.
观众： 巴菲特先生，我叫皮特·班纳（音），来自科罗拉多州博尔德，我是一名股东。
Recently [Federal Reserve Chairman] Mr. [Alan] Greenspan made his comments about exuberance. And it wasn’t long thereafter that you came out in the annual report and made your comments that you felt the market was fully valued or something of that nature.
最近，[美联储主席]艾伦·格林斯潘先生发表了关于市场过度乐观的评论。不久之后，您在年报中也提到，您认为市场估值过高或类似的观点。
Did you have, or have you had, any communication with Mr. Greenspan regarding the valuation of the stock market?
您是否与格林斯潘先生就股市估值问题有过交流？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, the answer to that is no. The last time I — well, I can’t remember precisely when the last time I saw Alan Greenspan was. It was a long time ago.
沃伦·巴菲特： 没有，答案是否定的。我上一次见到艾伦·格林斯潘是什么时候——嗯，我已经记不清了，那是很久以前的事了。
We had one conversation the day of the Salomon crisis, and he was formerly on the board of Cap Cities before he took his job with the Fed — Cap Cities/ABC — so I knew him then, but —
在索罗门危机发生的那一天，我们有过一次对话。在加入美联储之前，他曾是首都城市/美国广播公司（Cap Cities/ABC）的董事，所以我那时认识他，但——
You know, it’s very hard to understand what Alan says sometimes, so there’s not much sense talking to him, I mean — (Laughter)
你知道，有时候很难理解艾伦说的话，所以和他交谈意义不大，我的意思是——（笑声）
He’s very careful about what he says.
他对自己的言辞非常谨慎。
But I should — I’m glad you brought up the subject of the annual report. Because what I was doing in the annual report is I had talked about Coke and Gillette as being “The Inevitables,” and what wonderful businesses they were.
不过，我应该感谢你提到年报这个话题。因为我在年报中谈到了可口可乐和吉列，称它们是“不可避免的”（The Inevitables），并且是非常优秀的企业。
And I thought it appropriate, particularly — the report goes to a lot of people — that they would not take that as an unqualified buy recommendation about the companies, because they’re absolutely wonderful companies run by outstanding managers.
我认为有必要澄清，特别是——年报有很多读者——不要将这些内容误解为对这些公司的无条件买入建议。虽然这些公司确实非常优秀，由杰出的管理者经营。
But you can pay too much, at least in the short run, for businesses like that. So I thought it was only appropriate to point out that no matter how wonderful a business it is, that there always is a risk that you will pay a price where it will take a few years for the business to catch up with the stock. That the stock can get ahead of the business.
但即使是这样的企业，你也可能支付过高的价格，至少在短期内是如此。所以我认为指出这一点是很有必要的：无论企业多么优秀，总会存在一个风险，那就是你支付的价格过高，以至于需要几年时间企业才能赶上股票价格。股票可能会跑在企业的前面。
And I don’t know where that point is with those companies or any other companies, but I did say that I thought that the risks were fairly high that that situation existed with most securities in the market, including companies such as “The Inevitables.”
至于这些公司或其他任何公司的具体情况，我并不清楚。但我确实提到，我认为市场上大多数证券，包括这些“不可避免”的公司，都存在这种情况的风险相当高。
But it was designed to be sure that people did not take the remarks that I made about those companies, and just take that as an unqualified buy recommendation regardless of price.
我这样说是为了确保人们不会将我对这些公司的评论误解为不考虑价格的无条件买入建议。
We have no intention of selling those two stocks. We wouldn’t sell them if they were selling at prices considerably higher than they are now.
我们无意出售这两只股票。即使它们的价格比现在高很多，我们也不会卖。
But I didn’t want — particularly — relatively unsophisticated people to see those names there and then think, “This guy is touting these as a wonderful buy.” Generally speaking, I think if you’re sure enough about a business being wonderful, it’s more important to be certain about the business being a wonderful business than it is to be certain that the price is not 10 percent too high or 5 percent too high or something of the sort.
但我不希望——特别是相对不熟悉市场的人——看到这些名字后以为“这个人在推荐这些股票是绝佳的买入机会”。一般来说，如果你对一家企业是优秀的企业足够确定，那么确认这是一家优秀企业比确认价格没有高出10%或5%更重要。
And that’s a philosophy that I came slowly to. I originally was incredibly price conscious. We used to have prayer meetings before we would raise our bid an eighth, you know, around the office. (Laughter)
这是我逐渐形成的投资理念。我最初对价格极为敏感。过去，我们在办公室要把报价提高1/8之前甚至会召开祈祷会。（笑声）
But that was a mistake. And in some cases, a huge mistake. I mean, we’ve missed things because of that.
但这是一种错误。在某些情况下，这是一个巨大的错误。因为这种心态，我们错过了一些机会。
And so what I said in the report was not a market prediction in any sense. We never try to predict the stock market.
所以，我在报告中说的内容绝不是市场预测。我们从不尝试预测股市。
We do try to price securities. We try to price businesses, is what we try to do. And we find it hard to find wonderful, good, average, substandard businesses that look to us like they’re cheap now. But, you know, you don’t always get a chance to buy things cheap.
我们确实尝试对证券进行定价。我们尝试给企业定价。这就是我们所做的事情。我们发现，现在很难找到看起来便宜的优秀、良好、普通或低于标准的企业。不过，你知道的，你不可能总是有机会以低价买入东西。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我当然完全同意。（笑声）
The one thing we can confidently guarantee is that real inflation-adjusted returns from investing in a standard collection of stocks will be lower in the long-term future than they’ve been in the last 15 years or so. This has been an unprecedented period, and there will be some regression toward the mean in average returns from investing in the stock market.
我们可以自信地保证一件事，那就是未来长期内，通过投资于普通股票组合的实际（经通胀调整的）回报率将低于过去15年左右的水平。这是一个前所未有的时期，未来股票市场的平均回报率会向均值回归。
WARREN BUFFETT: American business has done extraordinarily well in the last decade-plus. And that’s a huge plus for securities, because they just represent pieces of those businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特： 在过去十多年里，美国企业表现异常出色。这对证券来说是一个巨大的利好，因为它们只是代表了这些企业的一部分。
Interest rates over the last 15 years have fallen. That’s a big plus for stocks. Anytime interest rates go down, the value of every financial asset goes up, in rational calculation.
过去15年里，利率下降了。这对股票是一个很大的利好。任何时候利率下降，从理性计算来看，所有金融资产的价值都会上升。
Both of those factors have combined in recent years to produce conditions that enhance the true value of American business. But those are pretty widely recognized now, and after a while — Ben Graham always used to say you can get in more trouble in investment with a good premise than with a bad premise, because the bad premise will shout out to you immediately as being fallacious, whereas with a good premise it’ll work for awhile.
最近几年，这两个因素结合在一起，创造了提升美国企业真实价值的条件。但这些条件现在已被广泛认知，随后——本·格雷厄姆常说，与其说坏的前提让投资更麻烦，不如说好的前提更麻烦。因为坏的前提会立即显现出其谬误，而好的前提则会有效一段时间。
You know, businesses are worth more money if interest rates fall and stocks rise. But then eventually the market action of the securities themselves creates its own rationale for a whole — for a large crop of buyers, and people forget about the reasons and the mathematical limitations that were implied in what they — in what got them excited in the first place. And after a while, rising prices themselves alone will keep people excited and cause more people to enter the game.
你知道，当利率下降、股票上涨时，企业的价值会变得更高。但最终，证券本身的市场行为会为大批买家创造一种全新的理由，人们逐渐忘记了最初让他们兴奋的原因和其中隐含的数学局限性。过了一段时间，仅仅是价格的上涨就足以让人们兴奋，并吸引更多人进入游戏。
And therefore the good premise, after a while, is forgotten except for the fact that it produced these rising prices. And the prices themselves take over.
因此，好的前提在一段时间后会被遗忘，除了它产生了这些上涨的价格这一事实。而价格本身则接管了一切。
He wrote about that and the connection with the 1920s when Edgar Lawrence Smith in 1924 wrote a fine book on why stocks were better than bonds. And that was sort of the Bible of the bull market of the ’20s, and it made sense, if you paid attention to a couple of the caveats which were in Edgar Lawrence Smith’s little book, which related to price.
他写过这个问题以及它与1920年代的关系。1924年，埃德加·劳伦斯·史密斯（Edgar Lawrence Smith）写了一本很好的书，讲述了为什么股票比债券更好。这本书在1920年代的牛市中被视为“圣经”。如果你注意到史密斯的小书中提到的几个关于价格的警告，那么它是有意义的。
But people tend to forget about the importance of the price they pay as the experience of a bull market just sort of dulls the senses generally.
但随着牛市的经历逐渐麻痹人们的感官，人们往往会忘记支付价格的重要性。
7. Berkshire discourages “street name” registrations of its stock
伯克希尔不鼓励股票以“街名”登记
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Lola Wells (PH) and I come from Florida.
观众： 巴菲特先生，我叫洛拉·韦尔斯（音），来自佛罗里达州。
I’m a very minimum stockholder. And I’m curious why stockholders whose stock is held in street name aren’t eligible to make recommendations for your donations.
我是一个小股东。我很好奇为什么以“街名”登记的股东不能为您公司的捐款提出建议。
WARREN BUFFETT: The distinction really isn’t whether their stock is held in street — well, that’s one distinction. The Class B shareholders, as was pointed out in the prospectus originally for the B shares, do not participate in the program. The A shares that are held by the beneficial owner do participate.
沃伦·巴菲特： 区别实际上并不完全在于股票是否以“街名”登记——当然，这是一个区别。正如最初在B类股招股说明书中指出的那样，B类股股东不参与该计划。持有A类股票的受益所有人可以参与该计划。
We obtained a tax ruling — 1981 or thereabouts — that made sure that the — there would be no taxation as a constructive dividend of the amount that shareholders could designate. There always was that possibility that the IRS would take a position that by allowing shareholders to designate a contribution to a charity, that we were giving them something which first would be taxed as a dividend, and then they would later give away.
我们在1981年左右获得了一项税务裁定，确保股东指定的捐赠金额不会被视为构成红利而被征税。始终存在一种可能性，即美国国税局（IRS）可能会认为，允许股东指定向慈善机构捐款，相当于我们先给了他们一些红利，这些红利先需要缴税，然后他们再捐出去。
So we have a tax ruling, and that tax ruling applies to shares held by beneficial owners, or by record holders themselves. And we followed that ruling subsequently.
所以我们有这样一项税务裁定，该裁定适用于由受益所有人或登记持有人直接持有的股票。我们后来一直遵循这一裁定。
I might say it would be sort of a nightmare too, frankly, if we got into street name holders. We’re at the point now where we probably have 30 or 35,000 street name holders of the A, and with the B it’s probably 60,000 or some number like that. And it would be quite a nightmare to do.
坦率地说，如果我们涉及到“街名”登记的持有人，那将是一场噩梦。目前，我们大概有3万到3.5万名以“街名”登记的A类股持有人，而B类股大概有6万名左右。这将是一项非常复杂的工作。
And anyone, you know, unless they have margin debt against their stock, they can put it in their own name and we encourage people to do it.
而且任何人，只要他们没有以股票作抵押的融资债务，就可以将股票登记在自己的名字下，我们鼓励大家这样做。
One reason we encourage people to do it is that they’ll get their shareholder communications more promptly, too. We find that it’s quite erratic — that the distribution of reports is quite erratic — when handled through brokerage houses to street name holders.
我们鼓励大家这样做的另一个原因是，他们可以更及时地收到股东通信。我们发现，通过券商分发给“街名”登记持有人的报告非常不稳定——分发过程存在很大问题。
So we really do encourage you to have your stock registered in your own name. You’ll get the communications promptly, and if you get the A shares you’ll be able to participate in the contributions program.
所以我们确实鼓励您将股票登记在自己的名字下。这样您可以及时收到相关通信文件，并且如果您持有A类股票，还可以参与捐款计划。
And don’t minimize your holdings, incidentally. Between the two of us we control the company, so I’m glad to have you here. (Laughter)
顺便说一句，不要轻视您的持股数量。我们两个人就可以控制公司，所以我很高兴您能来这里。（笑声）
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s no ideological bias against the small shareholder. It’s just not technically feasible to do it as a matter of administration.
查理·芒格： 我们并没有对小股东的任何意识形态偏见。只是从行政管理的角度来看，这在技术上不可行。
WARREN BUFFETT: I should point out that the entire shareholder-designated contributions program, really, all of the work in relation to this meeting, I mean, and Ak-Sar-Ben has been terrific. They’ve helped out enormously.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我应该指出，整个股东指定捐款计划，以及与本次会议相关的所有工作，我的意思是，阿克-萨尔-本（Ak-Sar-Ben）表现非常出色。他们提供了巨大的帮助。
But in terms of sending out 11,000-plus tickets to the meeting, the baseball tickets, the planning that goes into it and everything, it’s all done by the people at Berkshire, basically. They pitch in to do all kinds of work.
但是，就发送超过11,000张会议门票、棒球票、进行规划等等而言，这些工作基本上都是由伯克希尔的员工完成的。他们投身于各种工作。
So when you look at that 3,000-plus square foot office — we get help from an internal auditor who works — does not work — in the office.
所以，当你看到我们那3,000多平方英尺的办公室时——我们确实得到了内部审计师的帮助，不过他并不是在办公室工作的。
But very few people just do all of their regular jobs, and then they do this on top of it. And they never thought they were getting into this. (Applause)
但实际上只有少数人，他们在完成日常工作的基础上还要做这些工作。他们从没想过会涉足这些事情。（掌声）
Thank you.
谢谢大家。
We could have a department of 50 people, you know, assigned to something like this. But, the same way — you know, we get thousands and thousands of requests for annual reports, and they all come in, and we’ve got just a few people, and they handle it with courtesy and cheerfulness and I really tip my hat to them.
我们本可以设立一个50人的部门来处理这类事情。但是，正如我们收到成千上万的年报请求时一样，我们只有少数几个人，他们以礼貌和热情的态度处理这些请求。我真的向他们致敬。
8. Why Buffett hasn’t written a book
巴菲特为什么没有写书
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, let’s go to Zone Four please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 现在我们来听听第4区的问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Marshall Patton (PH) from Bandera, Texas.
观众： 早上好，我是马歇尔·帕顿（音），来自德克萨斯州班德拉。
And first I’d like to thank you very much for not only giving us a good investment vehicle, but giving us a good education along the way. And thanks a lot for the two-volume set of the letters to stockholders over the years. It’s required reading around our place.
首先，我非常感谢您不仅为我们提供了一个好的投资工具，还在此过程中给我们提供了良好的教育。同时感谢您多年致股东的信件合集，那两卷书是我们公司必读的材料。
And if you can contain your hostility, I’d like to thank Charlie Munger for — (Buffett laughs) — the copy of his speech to the University of Southern California Business School students back in 1994. It’s also required reading.
如果您能克制一下敌意，我还要感谢查理·芒格——（巴菲特笑了）——感谢他1994年在南加州大学商学院学生面前的演讲稿。这也是我们的必读材料。
And I want to ask you, when are you going to write your book?
我想问您，您什么时候会写一本书？
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, first of all I’d like to comment on Charlie’s talk here.
沃伦·巴菲特： （笑）首先，我想对查理的演讲发表点评论。
I think every investor in the world ought to read that talk before they invest. I think that’s a classic. And we have copies available for — we mailed it out a year or so ago to the shareholders at that time. But anybody’d like a copy of that talk I’d be glad to supply it.
我认为，世界上的每一位投资者在投资之前都应该读读那篇演讲。我认为那是一篇经典之作。我们之前在一两年前已经将其寄给了当时的股东。但如果任何人想要一份那篇演讲稿，我很乐意提供。
There doesn’t seem to be any need for me to write a book. Everybody else is doing it. (Laughter)
看来我没有必要写书了，别人都在写。（笑声）
We’ve got Janet Lowe here who just wrote the most recent one.
珍妮特·洛（Janet Lowe）就在这里，她刚刚写了最近的一本书。
You know, at one time or another I said everything I know and a good bit more. So I’ve never felt compelled to do it. I really feel that the annual reports are sort of a book on the installment system.
你知道，我在某些时候已经说出了我所知道的一切，甚至还多说了一些。所以我从未感到必须要写书。我真的觉得年度报告就像是一种分期连载的书。
Plus I think very few people write two books, and I have this kind of unwarranted optimism, I guess, that the best is always yet to come and there are a lot more interesting things that are going to happen, and I would hate to preclude commenting on those. So I think it’s going to be a few years. But I may get around to it at some point.
此外，我认为很少有人会写两本书。我有一种可能不合理的乐观情绪，我觉得最好的事情永远在未来，还有很多有趣的事情即将发生，我不想因为写书而错过对这些事情的评论。所以，这可能还需要几年时间。不过，我可能最终会考虑写书。
But I think maybe it’d be a bad sign if it happened, because it might be that I really thought that what I was writing about was more important than what was going to happen next.
但我觉得，如果我真的开始写书，可能是一个坏迹象，因为那可能意味着我真的认为写的内容比接下来会发生的事情更重要。
Charlie, are you going to write a book?
查理，你打算写一本书吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but your comment about why you are unable to write a book reminds me of the Middle Western fellow who left an unfinished manuscript. And he apologized for not finishing his book, which was entitled Famous Middle Western Sons Of Bitches. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 不打算写。但你关于为什么无法写书的评论让我想起了一位中西部的人，他留下了一份未完成的手稿。他为没有完成自己的书道歉，那本书的标题是《著名的中西部混蛋们》（笑声）。
And he said he was always meeting a new one — (laughter) — and therefore he could never finish the book. (Laughter and applause)
他说他总是在遇到新的混蛋——（笑声）——所以他永远无法完成那本书。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: As a courtesy, Charlie and I are leaving each other out of the book that we write. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 出于礼貌，查理和我会把彼此从我们要写的书中排除。（笑声）
Charlie was — Charlie grew up in Nebraska, and he’s authentic. He has the credentials to prove it. We worked in the same grocery store at different times many years ago.
查理——查理在内布拉斯加长大，他很真实。他有资格证明这一点。许多年前，我们在不同的时间段里在同一家杂货店工作过。
9. “Realistic” expectations
“现实”的预期
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请第5区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is J.P. from Singapore. I flew 24 hours to get here.
观众： 巴菲特先生，我叫J.P.，来自新加坡。我飞了24个小时来到这里。
Mr. Buffett, throughout your life you have repeatedly under promised and over delivered. For many recent years, for example, you’ve targeted Berkshire Hathaway’s long-term book value growth at 15 percent. Yet you have come through at about 24 percent. That is a big gap of 9 percent between your modesty and the outcome. Perhaps the biggest dose of modesty in corporate history.
巴菲特先生，您一生中一再低调承诺，却总能超额实现。例如，近年来，您对伯克希尔·哈撒韦长期账面价值增长的目标是15%，但您实际达到了约24%。这中间有9个百分点的巨大差距，或许是企业史上最大的一次谦逊表现。
May I ask, why is there such a big gap between your modesty and the outcome? (Laughter)
请问，为什么您的谦逊与结果之间会有如此大的差距？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think it was modesty. I think it was —
沃伦·巴菲特： 我不认为那是谦逊。我认为是因为——
For one thing, we’ve had a terrific market that has reappraised all businesses in the last ten or 15 years. So when we really started worrying about future performance, the key factor was having larger amounts of capital. And there’s no question that the larger the amount of capital you work with, the more difficult the job is.
首先，我们遇到了一个极好的市场，在过去的十年或十五年里，市场重新评估了所有的企业。因此，当我们真正开始担忧未来表现时，关键因素是我们拥有了更多的资本。毫无疑问，资本量越大，任务就越难完成。
Now, we were fortunate that that ascension in capital happened to coincide with things that just lifted all the boats substantially. And so we’ve had better luck than I would have guessed we would have had ten years ago, or five years ago.
幸运的是，资本的增加恰逢其时，遇到了可以显著提升整体的利好因素。因此，我们的运气比我十年前或五年前预料的要好得多。
But it’s been aided by a huge tailwind. And absent that tailwind we would not have done as well. I think maybe we would have done relatively as well, but we would not have done as well in absolute terms.
不过，这一切都得益于强大的顺风效应。如果没有这种顺风，我们的表现不会如此出色。我认为相对来说我们可能仍表现不错，但绝对表现上会逊色一些。
And we won’t have that tailwind in the future, I can assure you of that. But we will have a larger amount of capital, which is the anchor that works on it.
未来我们不会再有这样的顺风效应，这一点我可以向你保证。但我们会有更大的资本量，这将成为我们工作的阻力。
So, if Charlie and I could make a deal to increase the intrinsic value of Berkshire at 15 percent a year over the next ten years, we would sign up now. And I don’t want you to even tempt us with lower numbers, because those numbers get astounding.
所以，如果查理和我能够达成协议，让伯克希尔未来十年的内在价值每年增长15%，我们现在就会签字。而且我不希望你用更低的数字来诱惑我们，因为那些数字最终会令人震惊。
If we paid no dividend at all over a ten-year period, you can figure out where a 15 percent rate would take us. And we hope to get there, but we think that is absolutely the tops.
如果我们在十年内不支付任何股息，你可以计算出15%的增长率会将我们带到什么水平。我们希望能达到这个目标，但我们认为这已经是绝对的上限了。
And I think it’s very likely for a period when the market starts underperforming businesses, that the rate could be very substantially lower than that.
而且我认为，当市场表现开始落后于企业表现时，这个增长率很可能会显著低于15%。
Charlie, do you want to expand on that?
查理，你想补充一下吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the questioner came from Singapore, which has perhaps the best economic record in the history of developing an economy. And therefore he referred to 15 percent per annum as modest. It’s not modest, it’s arrogant. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 这个提问者来自新加坡，新加坡可能在经济发展历史上创造了最好的经济记录。因此他把年增长15%称为“谦逊”。这不是谦逊，这是自大。（笑声）
Only somebody from Singapore would call it modest. (Laughter)
只有新加坡人会称其为“谦逊”。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Be careful, Charlie, or they’ll have a voice vote that we should move to Singapore, I mean —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，是的。查理，小心点，不然他们可能会用表决的方式要求我们搬到新加坡去，我是说——
This is the group that wants performance.
这是一个追求业绩的群体。
Large quantities of money are not going to compound at super rates — at super compound rates. Small sums probably aren’t either, but large sums aren’t.
大额资金不可能以超高的复合增长率增长——小额资金可能也不行，但大额资金绝对不行。
And if anybody that manages large sums of money that promises or implies that they can achieve really outstanding returns, you know, I’d stay away from them.
如果有管理大额资金的人承诺或暗示他们可以获得非常出色的回报，我建议远离他们。
The numbers just get too big. And you know, you’ve seen some of that with certain money management organizations in recent years. And you know, 15 percent on an intrinsic value which is substantially greater than our book value gets to be a very, very big number.
数字会变得太大。近年来，你可能已经在一些资金管理机构中看到了这一点。以远高于我们账面价值的内在价值计算，15%的增长率将是一个非常非常大的数字。
And we need huge ideas. We don’t need thousands of ideas. I mean, we might need them, but we could never come up with them. So what we look for is the very large idea.
我们需要巨大的创意，而不是成千上万的创意。我的意思是，我们可能需要成千上万的创意，但我们永远无法想出那么多。所以我们寻找的是那些非常重大的创意。
But we’re not finding them now. And we’ll keep looking, and every now and then we will find something.
但我们现在没有找到这样的创意。我们会继续寻找，偶尔也会找到一些东西。
But really, if you think we’re going to have any chance of doing better than 15 percent, and believe me, that is no number that I’d want to sign my name to, but you really shouldn’t — you’re going to be disappointed in Berkshire. And we don’t want to disappoint you, so that’s the reason we try to be realistic about expectations.
但说实话，如果你认为我们有机会做得比15%更好，相信我，我不愿意为这个数字签字，但你真的不应该——你会对伯克希尔感到失望。而我们不想让你失望，这就是为什么我们试图对预期保持现实的原因。
10. Pre-Buffett Berkshire shareholders
巴菲特接手之前的伯克希尔股东
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第六区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Darrell Patrick (PH) from Dayton, Ohio.
观众： 我叫达雷尔·帕特里克（音），来自俄亥俄州代顿。
How many shareholders do you have that have owned Berkshire longer than you and Charlie? And have you ever gotten together with them?
有多少股东持有伯克希尔的时间比您和查理还长？您是否曾与他们聚会？
WARREN BUFFETT: How many shareholders have had it longer than we have? Well, we started buying in 1962. And it was seven and — I think the first ticket was at 7 5/8ths or thereabouts.
沃伦·巴菲特： 有多少股东持有的时间比我们长？嗯，我们从1962年开始买入。当时股价是7又5/8，或者差不多是这个价格。
It was 2,000 shares. I’ve got the trading card on the wall, and I paid a dime commission. I can’t believe I was paying a dime commission in those days. We pay a nickel now, on much higher-priced stocks. (Laughter)
当时买了2,000股。我把交易记录卡挂在墙上，那时支付了每股10美分的佣金。我都不敢相信自己当时付了这么高的佣金。现在股价高得多，但我们只支付每股5美分的佣金。（笑声）
It’s a good thing I didn’t have a fistfight with a broker about whether to pay it or not. I might have not had those 2,000 shares.
还好我没有因为是否支付这笔佣金和经纪人打起来。不然我可能就没有那2,000股了。
We have as a director, Kim Chace, and his family’s holdings in Berkshire go back to, what? Kim, where are you down here? There we are. What year would you —?
我们有一位董事是金·蔡斯（Kim Chace），他家的伯克希尔持股可以追溯到哪一年？金，你在哪？在那里。是哪一年？
MALCOLM CHACE: The ’20s.
马尔科姆·蔡斯： 20年代。
WARREN BUFFETT: The ’20s, yeah. The Chace family has been in Berkshire since the ’20s.
沃伦·巴菲特： 20年代，是的。蔡斯家族从20年代起就一直持有伯克希尔的股票。
But I would say — we bought about 70 percent of the — Buffett Partnership, which was a partnership I ran in the ’60s — bought about 70 percent of the company. So that means they were 300,000 shares roughly that were not owned by us.
不过我想说——巴菲特合伙公司（我在60年代运营的一个合伙企业）购买了大约70%的伯克希尔股份。这意味着还有大约30万股不归我们所有。
Aside from the Chace family, I’m sure there are people that — I’m sure we’ve got, you know, 50 or 100 shareholders maybe from that earlier dates that are still around, and I’m glad they are.
除了蔡斯家族，我相信还有一些股东——可能有50到100位股东从更早的时期持有伯克希尔股票，他们仍然在，我对此感到高兴。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格： 没什么补充的。
11. Buffett’s jet: “Indefensible” to “Indispensable”
巴菲特的飞机：“无可辩解”到“不可或缺”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7, up in the balcony over here.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第七区，阳台那边。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Maurus Spence from Omaha, Nebraska.
观众： 我是莫里斯·斯宾塞，来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈。
In light of recent stock market volatility, could you give us your definition of stock market risk, and how does your definition differ from the standard definition?
鉴于最近股市的波动，您能否给我们讲一下您对股市风险的定义？以及您的定义与标准定义有何不同？
Finally, due to Charlie’s recent counter-revelation about jets, are you going to rename “The Indefensible?”
最后，鉴于查理最近关于飞机的“反向启示”，您是否打算给飞机“无可辩解”改名？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie would like to make an announcement on that second point. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理可能想就第二点发表声明。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Prompted by Al Ueltschi, we are changing the name of the company plane from “The Indefensible” to “The Indispensable.” (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格： 在阿尔·尤尔奇（Al Ueltschi）的建议下，我们将公司飞机的名字从“无可辩解”改为“不可或缺”。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it was Chateaubriand, who, incidentally, was a writer and philosopher in addition to being the father of a piece of meat — Chateaubriand wrote one time, I believe I’m correct on my attribution here, that events make more traitors than ideas.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这让我想起了夏多布里昂（Chateaubriand），顺便说一句，他是一位作家和哲学家，同时也是一种肉的命名来源——夏多布里昂曾写过一句话，我想我的引用是正确的：“事件制造的叛徒比思想制造的更多。”
And if you think about that in terms of Charlie’s remark, that the purchase of FlightSafety caused Charlie to have this counter-revelation. It’s an experience that is duplicated many times in life where people flip over very quickly to a new view based on their new circumstances.
如果你从查理的评论来看，这次“反向启示”是因为我们收购了FlightSafety。这种经历在生活中多次重复，当人们基于新环境迅速转变观点时都会发生。
Now, what was that first question again? (Laughter)
那么，第一个问题是什么来着？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I might add that I have a friend who’s a United Airlines pilot, and he has recently been promoted into the 747-400. Before he started carrying people like you around for hire, he had to train intensively for five weeks. One-hundred percent of his training was in a simulator. They’re that good. So —
查理·芒格： 我补充一点，我有一个朋友是联合航空的飞行员，他最近晋升为747-400的飞行员。在他开始载客之前，他必须进行五周的强化训练，其中100%的训练是在模拟器里完成的。模拟器就是这么先进。
WARREN BUFFETT: They better be that good. They cost us about 19 million.
沃伦·巴菲特： 它们最好这么先进，因为它们花了我们大约1900万美元。
I mean, but they’re fabulous. I mean, if you think about — I think it’s 85 percent of the problems that you can encounter in a plane, if you attempted to teach people by actually being in a plane, they wouldn’t be here anymore, so there’s —
我的意思是，它们确实很棒。想想看，飞机上可能遇到的问题有85%是在实际飞行中无法模拟的。如果尝试通过实际飞行来教人们处理这些问题，他们可能已经不在了，所以——
You want to develop the instincts and responses that can react to 85 percent of the problems, the only place to learn them is in a simulator, and probably the other 15 percent the best place is.
如果你想培养能够应对85%问题的直觉和反应，唯一能学习的地方就是模拟器，可能另外15%的问题模拟器也是最好的学习场所。
12. “Volatility is a huge plus to the real investor”
“波动性对真正的投资者是一个巨大的优势”
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, let’s go back to your first question. Give it to me again.
沃伦·巴菲特： 现在我们回到你的第一个问题。再说一遍吧。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The first part was, would you define — give us your definition of stock market risk and how it differs from the standard definition.
观众： 第一个部分是，您能否定义一下股市风险，并告诉我们您的定义与标准定义有何不同？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We don’t think in terms of — well, we think first in terms of business risk, you know.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们不会从传统意义上思考风险——我们首先考虑的是业务风险。
The key to [Benjamin] Graham’s approach to investing is not thinking of stocks as stocks or part of a stock market. Stocks are part of a business. People in this room own a piece of a business. If the business does well, they’re going to do all right as long as they don’t pay way too much to join into that business.
[本杰明]格雷厄姆的投资方法的关键在于，不要把股票看作股票或股市的一部分。股票是企业的一部分。在座的人拥有一部分企业。如果企业经营良好，只要他们没有以过高的价格进入这个企业，他们就会获得不错的回报。
So we look at — we’re thinking about business risk. Now, business risk can arise in various ways. It can arise from the capital structure when somebody sticks a ton of debt into some business, and so that if there’s a hiccup in the business that the lenders foreclose.
因此，我们关注的是业务风险。业务风险可能通过各种方式产生。当企业背负大量债务时，这种资本结构可能会带来风险，因为一旦企业出现问题，债权人可能会迫使企业破产。
It can come about just by the nature of the — certain businesses are just very risky. Back in — when there were more commercial aircraft manufacturers, Charlie and I would think of making a commercial airplane, a big airliner, sort of as a bet-your-company risk because you would shove hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars out into the pot before you really had customers.
风险还可能来自于业务本身的性质——某些行业本身就非常有风险。例如，在商用飞机制造商较多的时期，查理和我认为制造商用飞机、大型客机是“赌上公司”的风险，因为在你真正拥有客户之前，你需要投入数亿美元。
And then if you had a problem with the plane, you know, that company could go. There’s certain businesses that inherently — because of long lead times, because of heavy capital investment — that basically have a lot of risk.
如果飞机出了问题，公司可能就会倒闭。有些行业本质上——由于开发周期长、资本投资大——基本上会有很大的风险。
And commodity businesses have risk unless you’re the low-cost producer, because the low-cost producer can put you out of business.
而且商品型企业也有风险，除非你是最低成本的生产商，因为最低成本的生产商可以让你破产。
Our textile business was not the low-cost producer. And we had a fine management, and everybody worked hard. We had cooperative unions, all kinds of things. But we weren’t the low-cost producer, so it was a risky business. The guy who could sell it cheaper than we could made it risky for us.
我们的纺织业务不是最低成本的生产商。尽管我们有出色的管理层，每个人都非常努力，我们还有合作的工会和各种优势，但我们不是最低成本生产商，所以这是一项高风险业务。那些比我们卖得更便宜的人，让我们的业务变得危险。
So there’s a lot of ways businesses can be risky.
所以企业有很多种方式可能面临风险。
We tend to go into businesses that inherently are low-risk, and are capitalized in a way that that low risk of the business is transformed into a low risk to the enterprise.
我们倾向于选择那些本质上低风险的企业，并通过合理的资本结构将业务的低风险转化为整个企业的低风险。
The risk beyond that is that even though you buy — identify — such businesses, that you pay too much for them. That risk is usually a risk of time rather than loss of principal, unless you get into a really extravagant situation.
除此之外的风险是，即使你找到并购买了这样的企业，你也可能为它们支付过高的价格。这种风险通常是时间的风险，而不是本金损失的风险，除非你进入了一个非常夸张的情境。
But then the risk becomes the risk of you yourself. I mean, whether you can retain your belief in the real fundamentals of the business and not get too concerned about the stock market.
但随后，风险变成了你自身的风险。我的意思是，能否保持对企业真实基本面的信念，而不过于关注股市的表现。
The stock market is there to serve you, and not to instruct you. And that’s a key to owning a good business, and getting rid of the risk that would otherwise exist in the market.
股市的存在是为你服务的，而不是指引你。这是拥有一家好企业的关键，也是消除市场中原本存在的风险的关键。
You mentioned volatility. It doesn’t make any difference to us whether the volatility of the stock market, you know, is — averages a half a percent a day or a quarter percent a day or 5 percent a day. In fact, we’d make a lot more money if volatility was higher, because it would create more mistakes in the market.
你提到了波动性。对我们来说，股市的波动率是每天平均0.5%、0.25%还是5%，都没有区别。事实上，如果波动性更高，我们会赚更多的钱，因为这会在市场中创造更多的错误。
So volatility is a huge plus to the real investor.
因此，波动性对真正的投资者来说是一个巨大的优势。
Ben Graham used the example of “Mr. Market,” which is the — and we’ve used it. I’ve copied it in the report. I copy from all the good writers.
本·格雷厄姆用过“市场先生”（Mr. Market）的例子，我们也用过。我在年报中引用了这个例子。我会从所有优秀的作家那里借鉴内容。
And Ben said, “You know, just imagine that when you buy a stock, that you — in effect, you’ve bought into a business where you have this obliging partner who comes around every day and offers you a price at which you’ll either buy or sell. And the price is identical.”
本说过，“你可以想象，当你买入一只股票时，你实际上进入了一家企业，而你有一个体贴的合伙人每天都会为你提供一个买入或卖出的价格，而且这个价格是一样的。”
And no one ever gets that in a private business, where daily you get a buy-sell offer by a party. But in the stock market you get it. That’s a huge advantage. And it’s a bigger advantage if this partner of yours is a heavy-drinking manic depressive. (Laughter)
在私人企业中，从来没有人能每天收到另一方的买卖报价。但在股市中你可以得到这样的机会。这是一个巨大的优势。如果你的这个合伙人还是一个酗酒的躁郁症患者，那优势更大了。（笑声）
The crazier he is, the more money you’re going to make.
他越疯狂，你赚的钱就越多。
So you, as an investor, you love volatility. Not if you’re on margin, but if you’re an investor you aren’t on margin.
作为投资者，你应该喜欢波动性。当然，如果你是融资投资，那就另当别论；但作为一个真正的投资者，你不会依赖融资。
And if you’re an investor, you love the idea of wild swings because it means more things are going to get mispriced.
如果你是投资者，你会喜欢剧烈的波动，因为这意味着市场中更多东西会被错误定价。
Actually, volatility in recent years has dampened from what it used to be. It looks bigger because people think in terms of Dow points and so they see these big numbers about plus 50 or minus 50 or something. But volatility was much higher many years ago than it is now. And you had — the amplitude of the swings was really wild. And that gave you more opportunity.
实际上，近年来的波动性已经比过去小了。之所以看起来更大，是因为人们用道琼斯指数的点数来衡量，所以他们看到的是一些大数字，比如上涨50点或下跌50点。但许多年前的波动性远远高于现在。当时的波动幅度非常剧烈，这为你提供了更多的机会。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it got to be the occasion in corporate finance departments of universities where they developed the notion of risk-adjusted returns. And my best advice to all of you would be to totally ignore this development.
查理·芒格： 这倒是成为了大学公司金融系的一个课题，他们提出了“风险调整收益”的概念。而我对你们的最佳建议是完全无视这个概念。
Risk had a very good colloquial meaning, meaning a substantial chance that something would go horribly wrong. And the finance professors sort of got volatility mixed up with a lot of foolish mathematics.
“风险”原本在日常用语中有很好的含义，意思是某件事很可能会严重出错。但金融教授们把波动性和一些愚蠢的数学概念混为一谈。
To me, it’s less rational than what we do, and I don’t think we’re going to change. (Buffett laughs)
在我看来，这比我们所做的还不理性，我不认为我们会改变。（巴菲特笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Finance departments teach that volatility equals risk. Now, they want to measure risk, and they don’t know any other way. They don’t know how to do it, basically. And so they say that volatility measures risk.
沃伦·巴菲特： 金融系教授教导说波动性等于风险。他们想要衡量风险，但他们不知道其他方法。基本上，他们根本不知道该怎么做，所以他们说波动性就是风险。
And, you know, I’ve often used the example that the Washington Post stock when we first bought it had gone — in 1973 — had gone down almost 50 percent from a valuation of the whole company of close to, say, 180 or 175 million, down to maybe 80 million or 90 million.
你知道，我经常举华盛顿邮报股票的例子。当我们在1973年第一次买入时，这只股票的公司估值从接近1.8亿或1.75亿美元跌到了大约8000万或9000万美元，几乎下降了50%。
And because it happened very fast, the beta of the stock had actually increased and a professor would have told you that the stock — company — was more risky if you bought it for 80 million than if you bought it for 170 million. Which is something that I’ve thought about ever since they told me that 25 years ago, and I still haven’t figured it out. (Laughter)
由于这一切发生得很快，该股票的贝塔值实际上增加了。一位教授会告诉你，如果你以8000万美元买入该股票，公司比你以1.7亿美元买入时更具风险。这件事我从25年前听他们说起后就一直在想，但我至今仍没搞明白。（笑声）
13. University of Florida will teach Graham-style investing
佛罗里达大学将教授格雷厄姆风格的投资
WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, I should make an announcement on that, because I think that I’ve made a certain amount of fun of financial departments over the years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 顺便说一下，我应该就这个话题做个宣布，因为这些年来，我对金融系开了一些玩笑。
A fellow named Mason Hawkins who runs Southeastern Asset Management just gave a million dollar gift to the University of Florida, and the state of Florida is matching that with 750,000.
梅森·霍金斯（Mason Hawkins）先生，他运营着东南资产管理公司，刚刚向佛罗里达大学捐赠了100万美元，而佛罗里达州政府将匹配捐赠75万美元。
So this million-seven-fifty is going to be used to have several courses in what essentially is the Graham approach to investing, I think, starting very soon. So that there will be at least — and there are more than this — but there will be a finance department in this case specifically devoted to teaching the Graham approach.
因此，这175万美元将被用于开设几门课程，这些课程基本上是关于格雷厄姆投资方法的，我认为这些课程很快就会开设。至少会有一个金融系专门致力于教授格雷厄姆方法。当然，这只是其中之一，还有其他类似课程。
And I think they’re even going to pick up on my suggestion that I stuck in the annual report about having a course on how to value a business and what your attitude toward the stock market should be.
我认为，他们甚至会采纳我在年报中提到的建议，开设一门关于如何评估企业价值以及对待股市应有态度的课程。
So thanks to Mason, who’s done very well managing money, I should add.
因此，我要感谢梅森，他在管理资金方面表现出色，我必须补充这一点。
And there will be at least one university course that tackles what I think are the important questions in investing.
将会至少有一门大学课程解决我认为在投资中最重要的问题。
14. Compulsory reinvestment and “owner earnings”
强制性再投资与“所有者收益”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请第8区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name is Richard Sercer from Tucson, Arizona.
观众： 各位先生，我叫理查德·瑟瑟，来自亚利桑那州图森。
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s give him a hand. This is the gentleman that led to the FlightSafety purchase. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 让我们为他鼓掌。这位先生促成了对FlightSafety的收购。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question relates to owner earnings. What guidance can you give us as to the calculation of item (c), which is maintenance capital spending and working capital requirements?
观众： 我的问题与所有者收益有关。您能否就项目(c)的计算提供一些指导，即维护资本支出和营运资本需求？
WARREN BUFFETT: Item (c)? Richard, I was going to ask you a question. How about another company? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 项目(c)？理查德，我本来想问你一个问题。换一个公司如何？（笑声）
Richard and his wife Alma have attended, what, maybe eight or so meetings, and what he did is covered in the annual report. But if it had not been for Richard we would not have merged with FlightSafety. And for that we owe him a lot of thanks.
理查德和他的妻子阿尔玛可能已经参加了大约八次会议，他做的事情在年报中有所提及。如果不是理查德，我们就不会与FlightSafety合并。对此，我们非常感谢他。
Now, the item (c), I don’t remember item (c).
现在，项目(c)，我不记得项目(c)了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: He’s talking about maintenance expenditures and working capital —
查理·芒格： 他在说维护支出和营运资本——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I know.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我知道了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — and so forth. The compulsory reinvestment.
查理·芒格： ——等等。强制性再投资。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, oh, back on the — goes back some years on that description. Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，哦，这是回到多年前的那个描述。是的。
In the case of the businesses that we’re in, both wholly owned and major investee companies, we regard the reported earnings — with the exception of the — some major purchase accounting adjustment, which will usually be an amortization of intangibles item — we regard the reported earnings — actually the reported earnings plus — plus or minus, but usually plus — purchase accounting adjustments, to be a pretty good representation of the real earnings of the business.
对于我们所处的行业，无论是全资子公司还是主要投资公司，我们认为报告的收益——除了一些重大购置会计调整（通常是无形资产的摊销项目）外——实际上，报告的收益加上购置会计调整（通常是加上），是企业实际收益的一个很好的代表。
Now you can make the argument that when Coca-Cola’s spending a ton of money each year in marketing and advertising that they’re expensing, that really a portion of that’s creating an asset just as if they were building a factory, because it is creating more value for the company in the future, in addition to doing something for them in the present. And I wouldn’t argue with that.
现在，你可以这样争论：当可口可乐每年在市场营销和广告上投入大量资金，并将其作为费用列支时，实际上部分支出是在创造资产，就像他们在建造工厂一样，因为这些支出不仅为当下创造了价值，还为公司的未来创造了更多价值。而我对此没有异议。
软件公司创造除广告以外的另一个维度，用于软件开发的费用没有消失，如果一个企业能集合软件和广告是非常好的模式。
But of course, that was true in the past, too. And if you’d capitalized those expenditures in those earlier years, you’d be amortizing the cost of them at the present time.
当然，这在过去也是如此。如果你在早些年将这些支出资本化，那么现在你就会摊销这些支出的成本。
I think with a relatively low inflation situation, with the kind of businesses we own, I think that reported earnings plus amortization of any — well, it’s really amortization of intangibles. Other purchase accounting adjustments usually aren’t that important. I would say that they give a good representation to us of owner earnings.
我认为，在相对低通胀的情况下，对于我们所拥有的这类业务，报告的收益加上任何无形资产摊销（实际上主要是无形资产的摊销）可以很好地代表所有者收益。其他购置会计调整通常不太重要。
Can you think of any exceptions in our businesses particularly, Charlie?
查理，你能想到我们业务中特别的例外情况吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. We have — after some unpleasant early experience, we have tried to avoid places where there was a lot of compulsory reinvestment just in order to stand still.
查理·芒格： 没有。在经历了一些早期不愉快的经验后，我们尽量避免那些需要大量强制性再投资才能保持现状的领域。
But there are businesses out there that are still like that. It’s just that we don’t have any.
不过，确实还有一些企业是这样的，只是我们没有涉足这些企业。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that in the case of GEICO, for example, the earnings — the gain in intrinsic value — will be substantially greater than represented by the annual earnings.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我会说，以GEICO为例，其收益——内在价值的增长——远远大于年度收益所代表的数字。
Whether you want to call that extra amount owner earnings or not is another question. But as we build float from that business, as long as it’s represented by the same kind of policyholders that we’ve had in the past, there is an added element to the gain in intrinsic value that goes well beyond the reported earnings for the year.
至于你是否愿意将这部分额外的增长称为所有者收益，这是另一个问题。但随着我们从该业务中积累浮存金，只要这部分浮存金仍然由过去相同类型的保单持有人支持，这种内在价值的额外增长就远远超出了年度报告收益的范围。
But whether you want to really think of that as earnings, or whether you just want to think of that as an increment to intrinsic value, you know, I sort of leave to you.
至于你是否真的想把它视为收益，或者只是将其视为内在价值的增量，我会将这个问题留给你来决定。
But I would say that there’s no question that in our insurance business, where our float was $20 million or so when we went into it in 1967, and where it is now, that there have been earnings, in effect, through the buildup of the float that have been above and beyond the reported earnings that we’ve given to you.
但我会说，我们的保险业务中，从1967年进入时的2000万美元浮存金，到现在的水平，无疑已经通过浮存金的积累产生了收益，这些收益远远超出了我们报告的收益。
I think our look-through earnings are — they’re very rough. And we don’t try to — we don’t believe in carrying things out to four decimal places where, you know, we really don’t know what the first digit is very well.
我认为我们的“透视收益”是非常粗略的。我们并不试图——也不相信把事情精确到小数点后四位，尤其是在我们甚至对第一位数字都没有很大把握的情况下。
So, I don’t want — I never want you to think of them as too precise, but I think they give a good rough indication of the actual earnings that are taking place, attributable to our situation every year.
所以，我不希望——也不希望你们把它们看得过于精确，但我认为它们对每年与我们情况相关的实际收益提供了一个不错的粗略指引。
And I think the pace at which they move gives you a good idea as to the progress, or the lack of progress, that we’ve made.
我认为这些数字的变动速度可以很好地反映出我们的进展，或者说没有进展。
The only big adjustment I would make in those is in the super-cat insurance business, we’re going to have a really bad year occasionally. And you probably should take something off all of the good years, and you probably should not regard — when the bad year comes — you should not regard that as something to be projected into the future.
我唯一会做出的重大调整是，在超级灾难保险业务中，我们偶尔会遇到一个非常糟糕的年份。你可能需要从所有好的年份中扣除一些收益，而当糟糕的年份到来时，也不应该将其视为未来的常态。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No more.
查理·芒格： 没有补充。
WARREN BUFFETT: No more.
沃伦·巴菲特： 没有了。
15. Ratings after Walt Disney’s purchase of ABC
迪士尼收购ABC后的收视率
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 9, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请第九区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m Rick Fulton from Omaha. Really.
观众： 巴菲特先生，我是里克·富尔顿，来自奥马哈，真的。
Recently I was in Washington, D.C. on — with my wife on a business trip, and I wanted to tell Mrs. Graham, I know she’s here, what a pleasure it is to get up in the morning to a good newspaper like the Washington Post.
最近我和妻子出差去华盛顿，我想告诉格雷厄姆夫人，我知道她在这里，每天早晨能读到像《华盛顿邮报》这样优秀的报纸是多么令人愉快。
Also, I have a question about CapCities and now Disney.
另外，我有一个关于CapCities和现在迪士尼的问题。
And is Mr. Murphy keeping busy now that ABC’s owned by Disney? (Buffett laughs)
ABC现在被迪士尼收购了，墨菲先生还忙得过来吗？（巴菲特笑）
Also, every week you read in the paper the Nielsen ratings. And does it matter that ABC now, it seems that less people recently are watching? Does it matter to Disney’s bottom line? Thank you.
每周我们都会在报纸上看到尼尔森收视率的排名。最近似乎看ABC的人少了，这对迪士尼的利润有影响吗？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first question about Mr. Murphy is that if we could hire Mr. Murphy we would. I mean, there is no one in this world that is a better manager than Tom Murphy, or a better human being as far as that’s concerned, so —
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于墨菲先生的第一个问题，如果我们能雇用墨菲先生，我们会这么做。我的意思是，这个世界上没有比汤姆·墨菲更好的经理人了，就人品而言，他也是无与伦比的，所以——
He — I think he’s keeping pretty busy. He has been responsible for NYU Hospital. He wouldn’t say that, but he’s been the chairman of it for some years, and that’s a $800 million a year or thereabouts organization. Charlie runs a hospital, so he knows how busy it can keep you.
我想他还是很忙的。他一直负责纽约大学医院。他不会这么说，但他已经担任这个医院的主席好几年了，这是一家年收入约8亿美元的机构。查理也经营一家医院，所以他知道这能让你有多忙。
And he — but I would say this, that I would love to find a business that I could entice Murph to come back and run. Because they don’t get any better than he is.
但是我会说，我希望能找到一个业务，能吸引墨菲回来运营。因为没有人能比他做得更好。
And Charlie, you want to add anything on Murph, or?
查理，你想补充一下关于墨菲的内容吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d like to because you’re absolutely right. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 好的，因为你说得完全正确。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And what was the other part of the question?
沃伦·巴菲特： 刚才问题的另一部分是什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sir, does recent — the decline in ABC’s Nielsen ratings —
观众： 先生，最近ABC的尼尔森收视率下降——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — have anything to do with the bottom line?
观众： ——对利润有影响吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Are we talking (inaudible) —
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们是不是在说（听不清）——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — (inaudible) Forrest Gump last night? (Laughter)
观众： ——（听不清）昨晚的《阿甘正传》吗？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it makes a difference, sure. Ratings translate in many cases into — not — depends on daypart, depends on a whole bunch of things. But overall, you make more money if your ratings are good in news, if they’re good in early morning, if they’re good in daytime, if they’re good at late evening, whatever. I mean, ratings translate into money.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这确实有影响。收视率在许多情况下会转化为收益——具体情况取决于时段和其他很多因素。但总体来说，如果你的新闻、早间节目、白天节目或晚间节目收视率高，你就会赚更多的钱。也就是说，收视率会转化为收入。
They may not translate immediately, particularly if they have some big hit show you may have sold it out too cheap. But over time the prices you receive for your product relate to ratings.
当然，这种转化可能不会立刻发生，特别是如果你有一档热门节目，却以太低的价格售出。但从长远来看，你为产品获得的价格与收视率相关。
And over time, but over a longer period of time, the price that you pay for the product also relates to the ratings. But there’s a difference in the time cycle. So that it makes a difference to any network’s bottom line what their ratings level is.
同时，从更长的时间来看，你为节目支付的价格也与收视率相关。不过，这两者的时间周期不同。所以，收视率对任何电视网络的利润都有影响。
Disney is conscious of that, and they are very able operators, and I predict you’ll see in a couple of years. But you can’t see it immediately. The schedule fixes don’t work on a, you know, week-to-week basis because people have habits, and there’s a time lag involved in any change.
迪士尼对此非常清楚，他们是非常优秀的运营者。我预测，你将在几年后看到成果。但这种效果不会立刻显现。节目表的调整不会在每周之间立刻起作用，因为观众有自己的习惯，任何变化都会有时间延迟。
And you’ve seen — over the last 20 years — you’ve seen various networks on top or on the bottom from time to time. So it moves around. It moves around a fair amount.
在过去20年里，你会发现各大网络时而在顶峰，时而在低谷。所以，这种变化是动态的，变化幅度也相当大。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think the TV network business is intrinsically a pretty tough business.
查理·芒格： 是的，我认为电视网络业务本质上是一个相当困难的行业。
跟零售业有点类似，这些业务都共同的特征：在用户大脑关闭时运行，游戏可能有相同的问题。
And Disney did way better on ESPN than they might have forecast, and they probably did a little worse on the network. These things happen.
迪士尼在ESPN上的表现远超预期，而在电视网络上的表现可能略差一些。这种情况是正常的。
WARREN BUFFETT: That was, incidentally, the situation when CapCities bought ABC. In 1985, we made the deal, I think, and it closed — I think it closed the first day or two of ’86. I may be wrong on that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 顺便说一下，这也是CapCities收购ABC时的情况。我记得是在1985年达成的协议，并在1986年的前几天完成了交易。可能我的记忆不太准确。
But the network diminished — the ratings — diminished significantly, and particularly in daytime. We’d always thought daytime was almost a certainty to produce big earnings, and it had.
但当时电视网的收视率明显下降，尤其是白天时段。我们一直认为白天时段几乎肯定会带来可观的收入，而事实也是如此。
Primetime is what people pay the most attention to, but daytime slipped significantly after we bought it. It has no relationship to those movies — I mean, to a movie you saw earlier — when I started appearing on it. Don’t want anybody to make that connection, but it did happen to be at the same time.
黄金时段是人们最关注的，但在我们收购ABC后，白天时段的表现大幅下滑。当然，这与我开始出现在电视上的那些节目——我指的是电影——没有任何关系。我不想让任何人把这些联系起来，但这的确是同时发生的。
The kicker we got, again, was ESPN. ESPN was losing money when CapCities made the deal to buy ABC, and we never really regarded it as being that — having that big a potential.
但我们真正的“意外收获”是ESPN。当时CapCities收购ABC时，ESPN正在亏损，而我们从未真正认为它会有如此大的潜力。
And you know, it has been huge. It was enormously better for us than we ever anticipated.
事实证明，ESPN的表现非常出色。它的表现远远超出了我们的预期。
Leonard Goldenson, who ran ABC, told us it was going to be that good. But, of course, we were too smart to pay any attention to him. And I think Disney has been pleasantly surprised by how well ESPN has done, too. It’s a powerhouse.
当时管理ABC的伦纳德·戈尔登森（Leonard Goldenson）告诉我们，ESPN会表现得非常好。但当然了，我们“太聪明了”，没把他的话当回事。我认为迪士尼对ESPN的表现也感到惊喜。它是一股强大的力量。
16. Creation of Class B shares similar to a stock split
创建B类股票类似于股票拆分
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 10, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请第十区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bill Turan (PH). I’m from Des Moines, Iowa, and I’m a stockholder.
观众： 我叫比尔·图兰（音），来自爱荷华州得梅因，我是股东。
It would appear that there’s going to be a capital gains tax cut. If it does materialize, would you consider a stock split? (Buffett laughs)
看起来资本利得税将会下调。如果真的实现，您会考虑股票拆分吗？（巴菲特笑）
Secondly, is there an extra copy of your annual report available on the premises?
其次，这里是否有多余的年报可供领取？
WARREN BUFFETT: My guess is we’ll get you an annual report. In fact, if someone could take it up to zone 10, we’ll be glad to get it to you.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我猜我们会为您找到一份年报。实际上，如果有人可以送到第十区，我们很乐意提供给您。
I don’t think — well, I’ll put it this way. If they cut the capital gains tax to zero, we’ll maybe — (Laughter)
我不认为——嗯，这样说吧。如果资本利得税降到零，我们可能会——（笑声）
I don’t think I’d get Charlie’s vote though, anyway. No, we will not be splitting Berkshire stock. (Applause)
不过，我想我不会得到查理的支持。不，我们不会拆分伯克希尔的股票。（掌声）
Incidentally, we do not consider splitting the stock a pro-shareholder move. If we did, we’d do it.
顺便说一句，我们并不认为拆分股票是一项对股东有利的举措。如果我们认为它有利，我们早就做了。
We think that net, to take the entire experience, it’s worked out well for shareholders, and we think we have a more investor-oriented — or investment-oriented — audience in this room today than we would have had if we’d split many times.
我们认为，从整体经验来看，这种方式对股东来说效果不错。我们认为，今天在场的观众比我们如果多次拆分股票时会吸引到的观众更具有投资者导向，或者说更关注投资。
It is a way of enticing certain types of investors, and perhaps discouraging others. And so it’s worked well.
这是吸引某些类型投资者、同时可能劝退其他类型投资者的一种方式。所以它运作得很好。
But I will say this, too. We got pushed into, in effect, issuing the Class B shares last year. Wasn’t our — wouldn’t have been something we would have done, except for the possible formation of the unit trust. And I would say that’s worked out very well from our standpoint.
但我也想说，我们实际上是被迫在去年发行了B类股票。这不是我们本来会做的事，除非是为了应对可能成立的信托基金。从我们的角度来看，这个决定效果很好。
So we’re happy that it happened, and we’re happy that the Class B shareholders have joined us. And we now have something that’s denominated, you know, at a much lower level.
所以我们很高兴这件事发生了，也很高兴B类股东加入了我们。现在我们有了一种更低价格单位的股票。
And there have been no bad effects whatsoever from having the Class B out there. So anybody owns the A stock and wants to split, you can split 30-for-1 this afternoon. I mean, how many other companies give you that chance?
发行B类股票并没有带来任何不良影响。所以，如果有A类股票的股东想拆分，你今天下午就可以按30比1进行拆分。我是说，还有多少公司会给你这样的机会？
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think what he’s trying to tell you is that you’ve had your stock split. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我认为他想告诉你的是，你的股票已经完成了拆分。（笑声）
17. We don’t know how to value Intel and Microsoft
我们不知道如何评估英特尔和微软
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 11, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请第十一区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, I would like to thank you again for issuing the Class B shares.
观众： 是的，巴菲特先生，我再次感谢您发行了B类股票。
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, I’m glad we did, and I hope you own them.
沃伦·巴菲特： （笑）我很高兴我们这么做了，我希望您拥有这些股票。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am a Class B shareholder.
观众： 我是一名B类股股东。
I need your comment on some analysis that we did. If someone uses your investment philosophy of building a highly concentrated portfolio of six to eight stocks, and adopts your buy-and-holding principle so that the max of compounding and no tax works for you, but however, with one major modification: invest in high-octane companies like Intel and Microsoft that are growing at 30 percent, instead of typical 15 percent growth company in your portfolio.
我们进行了一些分析。如果有人采用您的投资哲学，建立一个高度集中的投资组合，包含6到8只股票，并采用您的长期持有原则，这样可以最大化复利效应且免于缴税，但有一个主要修改：投资于像英特尔和微软这样的高增长公司，它们的增长率是30%，而不是您投资组合中典型的15%的增长公司。
My question is, will this investment philosophy translate into twice the shareholder return as you have historically provided to your shareholders?
我的问题是，这种投资哲学是否会转化为您历史上为股东提供回报的两倍？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it will certainly work out to twice the return if Intel and Microsoft do twice as well as Coke and Gillette. I mean, it’s a question of being able to identify businesses that you understand and feel very certain about.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。如果英特尔和微软的表现是可口可乐和吉列的两倍，那么回报肯定也会是两倍。这主要取决于是否能够识别出您理解并非常确信的业务。
And if you understand those businesses, and many people do, but Charlie and I don’t, you have the opportunity to evaluate them. And if you decide they’re fairly priced and they have marvelous prospects, you’re going to do very well.
如果您理解这些业务，很多人确实理解，但查理和我不理解，那么您就有机会去评估它们。如果您认为它们的价格合理且前景光明，那么您会表现得非常出色。
But there’s a whole group of companies, a very large group of companies, that Charlie and I just don’t know how to value. And that doesn’t bother us. I mean, you know, we don’t know what — we don’t know how to figure out what cocoa beans are going to do, or the Russian ruble, or I mean, there’s all kinds of financial instruments that we just don’t feel we have the knowledge to evaluate.
但是，有一大类公司，确实是很大的一类公司，查理和我不知道该如何评估。而这并不会困扰我们。我的意思是，比如我们不知道可可豆的价格走势，也不知道俄罗斯卢布会如何表现，还有各种各样的金融工具，我们觉得自己没有足够的知识去评估它们。
And really, you know, it might be a little too much to expect that somebody would understand every business in the world.
确实，期望有人能够理解全世界的每一个行业可能有点过分。
And we find some that are much harder for us to understand. And when I say understand, my idea of understanding a business is that you’ve got a pretty good idea where it’s going to be in ten years. And I just can’t get that conviction with a lot of businesses, whereas I can get it with relatively few. But I only need a few. As you’ve pointed out, you only need a few, six or eight or something like that.
我们发现有些行业对我们来说非常难以理解。而我所说的“理解”是指你对一个企业十年后的状况有一个相当清晰的预判。而对于很多企业，我无法得到这种信心，而对于少数企业，我可以。但我只需要少数几个企业。正如你提到的，你只需要少数几个，比如六到八个这样的企业。
It would be better for you — it certainly would have been better for you — if we had the insights about what we regard as the somewhat more complicated businesses you describe, because there was and may still be a chance to make a whole lot more money if those growth rates that you describe are maintained.
如果我们对你所描述的那些稍微复杂一些的企业有更多的洞察力，这对你来说会更好——肯定会更好。因为如果这些增长率能够保持，那么确实有机会赚到更多的钱，现在可能仍然有这样的机会。
But I don’t think they’re — I don’t think you’ll find better managers than Andy Grove at Intel and Bill Gates at Microsoft. And they certainly seem to have fantastic positions in the businesses they’re in.
但我不认为——我不认为你能找到比英特尔的安迪·格罗夫（Andy Grove）和微软的比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）更优秀的管理者。而且他们似乎确实在各自的领域中占据了极好的位置。
But I don’t know enough about those businesses to be as sure that those positions are fantastic as I am about being sure that Gillette and Coca-Cola’s businesses are fantastic.
但对于这些企业，我并没有足够的了解，无法像确信吉列和可口可乐的业务一样，确信它们的地位是如此的出色。
You may understand those businesses better than you understand Coke and Gillette because of your background or just the way your mind is wired. But I don’t, and therefore I have to stick with what I really think I can understand. And if there’s more money to be made elsewhere, I think the people that make it are entitled to it.
由于你的背景或思维方式，你可能比了解可口可乐和吉列更了解那些企业。但我不是，因此我必须坚持投资我真正认为可以理解的业务。如果其他地方可以赚更多的钱，我认为那些赚到钱的人是应得的。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you take a business like Intel, there are limitations under the laws of physics which eventually stop your putting more transistors on a single chip. And the 30 percent per annum, or something like that, you — I don’t think — those limitations are still a good distance away, but they’re not any infinite distance away.
查理·芒格： 以英特尔这样的公司为例，物理定律设定了一些限制，这些限制最终会阻止你在单个芯片上放置更多的晶体管。至于30%的年增长率之类的情况，我认为——这些限制还比较遥远，但并不是无限遥远的。
That means that Intel has to leverage its current leadership into new activities, just as IBM leveraged the Hollerith machine into the computer. Predicting whether somebody’s going to be able to do that in advance is just — it’s too tough for us.
这意味着英特尔必须将其当前的领先地位扩展到新的活动中，就像IBM将霍勒瑞斯打孔机（Hollerith machine）扩展到计算机领域一样。提前预测某人是否能够做到这一点——对我们来说，这太难了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Bob Noyce —
沃伦·巴菲特： 鲍勃·诺伊斯——
CHARLIE MUNGER: We could (inaudible) to you.
查理·芒格： 我们可以（听不清）。
WARREN BUFFETT: Bob Noyce, one of the two founders of — two primary founders — of Intel, grew up in Grinnell, Iowa. I think he’s the son of a minister in Grinnell, and went through Grinnell College and was chairman of the board of trustees of Grinnell when I went on the board of Grinnell back in the late ’60s.
沃伦·巴菲特： 鲍勃·诺伊斯是英特尔的两位主要创始人之一，他在艾奥瓦州的格林内尔长大。我记得他是格林内尔一位牧师的儿子，就读于格林内尔学院，并在我于60年代末加入格林内尔董事会时，担任学院董事会主席。
And when he left Fairchild to form Intel with Gordon Moore, Grinnell bought 10 percent of the private placement that funded — was the initial funding for Intel.
当他离开仙童公司（Fairchild）与戈登·摩尔（Gordon Moore）共同创立英特尔时，格林内尔购买了英特尔初始私募资金的10%。
And Bob was a terrific guy. He was very easy to talk to, just as Bill Gates is. I mean, these fellows explained the businesses to me, and they’re great teachers but I’m a lousy student. And they — I mean, they really do. They’re very good at explaining their businesses.
鲍勃是一个了不起的人。他非常平易近人，就像比尔·盖茨一样。我是说，这些人向我解释他们的业务，他们是很棒的老师，但我是个糟糕的学生。他们确实是非常擅长解释他们的业务。
Bob was a very down to earth Iowa boy who could tell you the risks and tell you the upside, and enormously likeable, a hundred percent honest, every way.
鲍勃是一个非常脚踏实地的艾奥瓦州男孩，他会告诉你风险和潜力。他非常讨人喜欢，完全诚实，方方面面都是如此。
So we did buy 10 percent of the original issue. The genius that ran the investment committee and managed to sell those a few years later, I won’t give you his name. (Laughter)
因此，我们确实购买了最初发行的10%。至于那个领导投资委员会并在几年后卖掉这些股份的天才，我就不说他的名字了。（笑声）
And there’s no prize for anybody that calculates the value of those shares now.
顺便说一下，现在谁要是计算这些股份的价值，是没有奖品的。
Incidentally, one of the things Bob was very keen on originally, in fact he was probably the keenest on it, was he had some watch that Intel was making. And it was a fabulous watch, according to Bob.
顺便说一下，鲍勃最初非常热衷的一件事，实际上他可能最为热衷的，是英特尔当时制作的一款手表。据鲍勃说，这是一款了不起的手表。
It just had one problem. We sent a guy out from Grinnell who was going out to the West Coast to where Intel was. And Bob gave him one of these watches. And when he got back to Grinnell he wrote up a report about this little investment we had, and he said, “These watches are marvelous.” He said, “Without touching anything, they managed to adapt to the time zones as they change as we went along.” In other words, they were running very fast, as it turned out. (Laughter)
不过它有一个问题。我们从格林内尔派了一个人到西海岸英特尔的所在地。鲍勃给了他一块这样的手表。当他回到格林内尔时，他写了一份关于我们这笔小投资的报告。他说：“这些手表太棒了。”他说：“不用动任何东西，它们就能自动适应我们经过的时区变化。”换句话说，事实证明，它们走得非常快。（笑声）
And they worked with that watch for about five or six years, and they fell on their face.
他们花了五到六年时间研究那款手表，结果以失败告终。
And as you know, you know, they had a total transformation in the mid-’80s when the product on which they relied also ran out of gas. So, it’s not —
大家知道，在80年代中期，他们依赖的产品也失去了动力，于是他们进行了彻底的转型。所以，这并不是——
And Andy Grove has written a terrific book, incidentally, Only the Paranoid Survive, which describes strategic inflection points. I recommend that every one of you read that book, because it is a terrific book.
顺便说一下，安迪·格罗夫写了一本非常棒的书——《只有偏执狂才能生存》，书中描述了战略拐点。我建议你们每个人都去读这本书，因为它确实很好。
But they had an Andy Grove there who made that transformation, along with some other people. But that doesn’t happen every time. Companies get left behind.
但他们有安迪·格罗夫和其他一些人一起完成了转型。不过，这种事情并不是每次都会发生。公司会被落下。
恰恰说明这是一项非常艰难的生意，微软有同样的经历。
We don’t want to be in businesses where companies — where we feel companies can be left behind. And that means that, you know — and Intel could have, and almost did, go off the tracks. IBM owned a big piece of Intel, as you know, and they sold it in the mid-’80s.
我们不希望进入那些我们认为可能会被落后的行业。这意味着，英特尔曾经——几乎确实——脱轨了。你们知道，IBM曾经拥有英特尔的大量股份，但他们在80年代中期卖掉了。
So, you know, here are a bunch of people that should know a lot about that business but they couldn’t see the future either.
所以，你看，这些人应该对那个行业非常了解，但他们也看不到未来。
I think it’s very tough to make money that way, but I think some people can make a lot of money understanding those kinds of businesses. I mean, there are people with the insights.
我认为靠那种方式赚钱非常困难，但我也认为有些人可以通过理解那类业务赚很多钱。我的意思是，有些人确实有这种洞察力。
Walter Scott, one of our directors, has done terrifically with a business that started, you know, just a gleam in the eye maybe ten or 12 years ago here in Omaha, and it turned into a huge business.
我们的董事之一沃尔特·斯科特，在一家业务上取得了巨大的成功。这家业务大约在十到十二年前从奥马哈萌芽，后来发展成了一个巨大的企业。
And you know, Walter explained that to me on the way down to football games, but bad student again, so — (Laughs)
沃尔特曾在我们去看橄榄球比赛的路上向我解释过这个业务，但我还是一个差学生，所以——（笑声）
Walter — if Walter could have connected, and you know, I’d cheer from the stands. But that doesn’t bother me at all. I mean, what would bother me is if I think I understand a business and I don’t. That would bother me.
如果沃尔特能理解，我会在看台上为他欢呼。但这对我来说根本没有困扰。真正会困扰我的是，如果我认为我理解一个业务，但实际上并没有，那才会困扰我。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, having flunked when we were young and strong at understanding some complex businesses, we’re not looking to master what we earlier failed at — (laughs) — in our latter years. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我们年轻力壮的时候，就已经在理解一些复杂业务上失败了，现在年纪大了，我们可不打算重新掌握那些我们之前没搞懂的东西。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 12? This may turn out like a revival meeting where we all confess our sins and come forward (inaudible). (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 第十二区？这可能会像一个忏悔大会，大家都来承认自己的过错并站出来（听不清）。（笑声）
18. Confident about Salomon but not rest of Wall St.
对所罗门公司有信心，但对华尔街其他部分没有
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. My name is Cary Blecker (PH) from Wellington, Florida.
观众： 早上好，各位先生。我叫凯里·布莱克（音），来自佛罗里达州威灵顿。
I know in 1987 when you purchased — or invested — in the Salomon Brothers convertible preferred stock, you had the eight-year time frame to convert it into common or take the cash out. I know in ’95 you took cash out, which was not a vote of confidence for Salomon Brothers. Any feelings on that in the future?
我知道1987年您购买或投资了所罗门兄弟的可转换优先股，您有八年的时间可以将其转换为普通股或取现。我知道在1995年您选择了取现，这并不是对所罗门兄弟的信任投票。对此，您对未来有何看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We — as the gentleman mentioned, we bought it in 1987, and starting in 1995 we have a — we have, every year for five years, we either have to take cash or convert to common, 20 percent of the original issue of 700 million.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。正如这位先生提到的，我们在1987年购买了该优先股。从1995年开始，我们在接下来的五年中，每年都必须在取现或转换为普通股之间进行选择，每次转换7亿美元原始发行金额的20%。
We don’t have to make those decisions ahead of time. So we, in 1995, we elected to take cash. In 1996 we elected to take stock.
我们不需要提前做出这些决定。因此，在1995年我们选择了取现，而在1996年我们选择了转换为股票。
And you know, we see no reason ever to swing at the ball while it’s still in the pitcher’s glove. We’d just as soon wait till it gets to the plate to make the decision. So the ball will get to the plate on October 31st of 1997, I believe, for the next 20 percent. And we’ll decide whether to swing at that point. But we don’t need to make that decision today.
我们认为，没有理由在球还在投手手套里时就挥棒。我们更愿意等到球到达本垒板时再做决定。因此，我相信1997年10月31日，我们将对下一批20%的股份做出决定。我们会在那时决定是否挥棒，而不是今天。
I would say that, you know, the odds are overwhelming that we’ll convert, but we’ll wait until that time to make the final decision.
我会说，转换的可能性非常大，但我们会等到那个时候再做最终决定。
We have terrific confidence in the people that run Salomon. They helped us through some incredibly dark days in the past, and showed the stuff of which they were made. And so we feel very good about that.
我们对管理所罗门公司的人非常有信心。他们在过去的一些极其黑暗的日子里帮助了我们，展现了他们的优秀品质。所以我们对此非常满意。
We don’t have the same degree of conviction about the profitability of the investment banking or brokerage business as a whole.
但对于整个投行或经纪业务的盈利能力，我们并没有同样的信心。
It’s not the sort of — you don’t develop that kind of conviction about that business versus a Coca-Cola or something. They’re different. They have different economic characteristics.
这并不是那种——你无法像对可口可乐等公司那样对这些业务建立同样的信心。它们是不同的，具有不同的经济特性。
So we will see how the businesses — the industry — evolves. But we feel very good about the management, and the odds are extremely high that we will convert. But we will swing at the ball when it gets to the plate.
所以我们会观察这些业务——以及整个行业——的发展。但我们对管理层非常满意，转换的可能性非常高。不过，我们会在球到达本垒板时挥棒。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No more.
查理·芒格： 没有补充。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的
19. Can’t exchange stocks without paying taxes
无法在不缴税的情况下交换股票
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see. We did 12. We’re back at 1 again.
沃伦·巴菲特： 让我们看看。我们已经到了第12区，现在又回到第一区了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ted Vokali (PH) from Corpus Christi, Texas. And I would like to ask a question to you.
观众： 我叫特德·沃卡利（音），来自德克萨斯州科珀斯克里斯蒂。我想问您一个问题。
Companies are purchased from time to time, and the purchasing company will give shares instead of cash, and their shareholder will receive new shares.
公司有时会被收购，收购公司会以股票代替现金进行支付，股东将收到新的股票。
Can an individual investor transfer non-Berkshire to Berkshire with or without going through a broker? And if not, how does Berkshire do this with another company? And if possible, I would like to also receive a copy of the annual report.
个人投资者是否可以将非伯克希尔股票转为伯克希尔股票，无论是否通过经纪人？如果不能，伯克希尔是如何与其他公司完成这种操作的？另外，如果可以的话，我也想要一份年报。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll get you a copy of the annual report.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们会为您提供一份年报。
The only way I know of — and maybe Charlie knows some other way — the only way you can switch your shares in one company for — into shares of another company is to have a tax-free merger. And the Internal Revenue Code has specifications about that.
我所知道的唯一方法——也许查理知道其他方法——可以将一家公司的股票转换为另一家公司的股票的唯一方式是进行免税并购。而《国内税收法典》对此有明确规定。
You can have a transaction, as we had with FlightSafety where a portion is — of the shareholders — can take cash, and a portion can take stock, and it’s still tax-free for the people who elect stock.
比如我们与FlightSafety的交易中，一部分股东可以选择现金，另一部分可以选择股票。而对于选择股票的人来说，这仍然是免税的。
You can’t have too many people take cash and have that happen. There are a lot of technical rules about what’s tax-free.
但不能有太多的人选择现金，否则就无法实现免税。关于免税有很多技术规则。
But there’s no way that you can own General Motors and transfer it into General Electric stock without a tax and a broker. Well, you don’t have to have a broker. If your neighbor happens to own it you could make a deal privately. But the easiest way usually is through a broker.
但是，你不可能在没有税或经纪人的情况下，将通用汽车的股票转为通用电气的股票。当然，你不一定需要经纪人。如果你的邻居正好拥有相关股票，你们可以私下达成交易。但通常最简单的方法是通过经纪人完成。
But there’s no way you can do it without tax, unless General Motors and General Electric decide to merge at some point.
不过，除非通用汽车和通用电气决定在某个时间点合并，否则无法免税完成这样的操作。
So the opportunities to switch from one security to another without tax are really limited to merger.
因此，在不缴税的情况下将一种证券换成另一种证券的机会实际上仅限于并购。
And in terms of brokerage costs, it just happens to be that it’s — that the most economical way of finding the person in the world that wants to both buy the stock you want to sell and sell you the stock you want to buy is through an intermediary — a broker. And the costs of that actually can be relatively low.
至于经纪费用，目前找到一个既想买你想卖的股票又愿意卖你想买的股票的人，最经济的方法就是通过中介——经纪人。而实际上，这种方式的成本可以相对较低。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there’s one way still permitted by the tax laws. You can still form a partnership. If you own General Electric and I own General Motors and we each feel too concentrated, well, you could form a partnership and each put in your stock. And in essence you would each thereafter be invested half and half with some diversification. I will predict that Wall Street will eventually get around to promoting such partnerships.
查理·芒格： 我认为按照现行税法还有一种方法。你可以成立一个合伙企业。如果你拥有通用电气的股票，而我拥有通用汽车的股票，并且我们都觉得自己的投资太过集中，那么我们可以成立一个合伙企业，把各自的股票投入其中。这样本质上，我们之后的投资都会各占一半，同时实现了一定程度的分散。我预测，华尔街最终会推广这种形式的合伙企业。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, they did through swap funds, you know, since 25 years ago. And then — that was where you put in your highly — your stock that had an enormous amount of unrealized appreciation in it, and a whole bunch of other people did, and then you owned a fund which itself had a lot of unrealized appreciation in it. And you had —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，他们曾通过互换基金做到这一点，大概25年前。这种方式是把你未实现大量增值的股票投入基金，同时其他人也把类似的股票投入其中，然后你拥有一个同样包含大量未实现增值的基金。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Plus a new layer of costs.
查理·芒格： 另外还增加了一层新的成本。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, plus a new layer of costs, always.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，总是会增加一层新的成本。
And you owned a piece of this larger fund, and you owned a piece of everything else — everything that the other people wanted to get rid of, and they owned a piece of what you wanted to get rid of, and superimposed with some costs.
然后你拥有了这个更大基金的一部分，基金中包含了其他人想要处理的所有东西，而他们也拥有了你想要处理的东西，再加上一些额外的成本。
But that vehicle was sort of stopped in its tracks, I think, in the mid-’70s by an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code.
但我记得，这种方式在70年代中期因为《国内税收法典》的修订而基本停止了。
But as Charlie said, you could replicate the effect of a swap fund by doing it with a partnership. It’d be kind of awkward, but it can be done.
但正如查理所说，你可以通过合伙企业来复制互换基金的效果。这可能有点麻烦，但确实是可以做到的。
20. Strong businesses, but no “master plan”
强劲业务，但没有“总体规划”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
沃伦·巴菲特： 请第二区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, I’m Marc Rabinov from Australia. I am a shareholder.
观众： 各位先生，我是来自澳大利亚的马克·拉比诺夫，我是股东。
I had a question really related to our own businesses, and how they’re going, and where you’re looking to be in ten years’ time.
我有一个问题是关于我们自己的业务，它们现在的状况如何，以及您希望十年后达到什么目标。
Perhaps I could start with the insurance float. It’s grown at 20 percent. Do you think that 20 percent growth rate will continue for the next ten years?
或许我可以从保险浮存金开始问起。它的增长率是20%。您认为这种增长率在未来十年会继续吗？
Do you think our stable businesses, which have been growing at, say, 5 or 7 percent will maintain that rate?
您认为我们的稳定业务，比如每年增长5%到7%的那些业务，会保持这个增长率吗？
And do you think FlightSafety, which from the SEC filings has been growing at about 5 percent, do you think that’ll continue at that rate?
还有，您认为根据SEC文件显示，FlightSafety大约以5%的速度增长，它会继续保持这个增长率吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re glad to have you from Australia. I think we’ve got about 15 people here from Australia, so it — got a good representation.
沃伦·巴菲特： 很高兴您来自澳大利亚。我想我们这里大约有15位来自澳大利亚的与会者，代表性很强。
I don’t think the insurance float can grow at 20 percent a year. That’s been helped by some acquisitions and things. I mean, it’s done way better, obviously, than we ever thought it would 30, almost 30 years ago when we made the deal with Jack Ringwalt.
我不认为保险浮存金可以每年增长20%。这一增长部分得益于一些收购等因素。显然，它的表现远超我们30年前与杰克·林瓦尔特达成协议时的预期。
I would say, though, that I think GEICO is going to do even better than we expected when we bought it. And we thought it was going to do awfully well then.
不过，我要说的是，我认为GEICO的表现会比我们收购时预期的还要好。我们当时已经认为它会表现非常出色。
In Tony Nicely, you know, we have an absolutely outstanding manager of that business. And he is focused on it. He knows it. I think he went to work there when he was 18. And he’s been there 35 years or thereabouts. They don’t come any better. And he is absolutely zeroed in on the things that he should be zeroed in on, and he’s — the implementation gets better all the time.
托尼·尼克利是我们这个业务的出色管理者。他非常专注，非常了解这一业务。我想他18岁时就在GEICO工作，现在已经在那里干了大约35年。他是无与伦比的。他完全专注于他应该专注的事情，而且他的执行力一直在提升。
I mentioned in the annual report that the unit growth of GEICO’s voluntary auto business — and we talk about voluntary because you get assigned risk-type things that lose you money, but the real business is the voluntary auto business — grew at 10 percent last year, which was the best growth rate in over two decades.
我在年报中提到，GEICO的自愿车险业务的单位增长——我们讨论的是自愿业务，因为被指派的风险业务会让你亏钱，而真正的业务是自愿车险业务——去年增长了10%，这是二十多年来的最好增长率。
First four months of this year, it’s growing at about 16 percent. And 16 percent unit growth translates into about 20 percent a year premium growth.
今年前四个月的增长率约为16%。16%的单位增长意味着年保费增长率大约为20%。
So GEICO at present would give you some encouragement for at least that segment of the insurance float growing at a rate that’s sort of comparable to the past.
因此，目前来看，至少保险浮存金中的这一部分——GEICO——的增长率可以让你感到一些鼓舞，其增长速度与过去相当。
Insurance is going to be a very big business for us. And the float will grow, in my view, at a good rate. But I wouldn’t want to predict that good a rate.
保险业务将成为我们的一项非常重要的业务。在我看来，浮存金会以一个不错的速度增长。但我不想预测会有如此高的增长率。
Most of our other businesses, very good businesses. They don’t have 20 percent a year growth possibilities in them. They throw off lots of cash, which we can use to buy other things, which may turn out to be a better strategy than even having a single high-growth business.
我们的大多数其他业务都是非常优秀的业务。但它们没有每年20%的增长可能性。它们能产生大量现金，而我们可以用这些现金购买其他东西，这可能比拥有单一的高增长业务更好的策略。
FlightSafety, about six weeks ago or thereabouts, announced a major hookup in a joint venture with Boeing, as you may have noticed. And they’re a terrific partner, and it’ll be a great partnership.
FlightSafety大约六周前宣布与波音成立一家合资公司，你们可能已经注意到了。他们是非常棒的合作伙伴，这将是一次很棒的合作。
That’s just for our — the training for our — for larger planes, primarily, I think, hundred-seat and up planes, although I think there may be a few Fokkers in there that are slightly smaller planes. But it’s basically the big commercial planes.
这主要是为更大型的飞机提供培训，我认为主要是100座及以上的飞机，尽管可能还有一些规模略小的福克飞机（Fokker）。但基本上是大型商用飞机。
And the combination of FlightSafety and Boeing worldwide in training over the coming decades, I think, will be a very powerful combination. So we’ve got some very good businesses.
在未来几十年里，FlightSafety和波音在全球范围内的培训合作，我认为将是一个非常强大的组合。所以我们拥有一些非常优秀的业务。
And I don’t see that movie that’s presented before — I sit out here like you and watch it. But I like the ending of it.
我不知道这部电影接下来会如何演绎——我像你们一样坐在这里观看。但我喜欢它的结局。
And the people we have out there, they’ve run businesses extremely well in the past. They get better results out of those businesses, frankly, than other people would, or that other people in the industry generally do. So I think they have good futures.
我们那些出色的管理者过去一直运营业务非常出色。坦率地说，他们从这些业务中获得的结果比其他人，或者比行业中的其他人通常能做的更好。所以我认为他们有很好的前景。
But they will throw off lots of cash in aggregate. And the tough job — we like to tell people it’s the tough job anyway — is that Charlie and I have to figure out where to put that cash to maintain higher — reasonable — growth rate.
但总体而言，这些业务会产生大量现金。而最难的任务——我们喜欢告诉别人这是最难的任务——是查理和我必须找到合适的地方去投资这些现金，以维持较高的——合理的——增长率。
保险是一个可以大量投入资本的行业。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible)
观众：（听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Could you — I’m not sure that’s — could you turn that on, please, so that —
沃伦·巴菲特： 请您——我不太确定——能否打开那个设备，这样——
MARK RAVENHILL: I’m sorry to pin you down, but —
马克·雷文希尔： 抱歉让您具体回答，但——
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s OK. You can pin me down.
沃伦·巴菲特： 没关系，您可以问得具体些。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — would you guess that FlightSafety, then, is more likely to be in that 10 to 15 percent ballpark?
观众： 您觉得FlightSafety的增长是否更可能在10%到15%这个范围内？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s hard to tell on numbers. I mean, certainly there’s going to be growth in pilot training around the world. But FlightSafety already has a significant portion of the corporate market, for example. So it would be hard to grow a lot faster in the corporate market, although I can hear Al grinding his teeth, you know, when I say that, because he plans to grow a lot faster than the market.
沃伦·巴菲特： 这个数字很难说。我是说，飞行员培训在全球范围内肯定会增长。但以FlightSafety为例，它已经占据了公司市场的很大一部分。所以在公司市场上，要实现远高于市场的增长会比较困难，尽管我说这话的时候，能感觉到阿尔（Al）咬牙切齿，因为他计划增长速度比市场快得多。
But the corporate market, we’ve got a significant percentage. Commercial market, there could be a lot of potential in. You know, it won’t come tomorrow or the next day. But, you know, ideally we would like to see people when they buy a 777 or 747 or something, buy a lifetime pilot training contract at that time.
但在公司市场，我们已经有了很大的份额。在商用市场，可能还有很大的潜力。这不会是明天或后天的事情。但理想情况下，我们希望看到人们在购买777或747等飞机时，同时购买终身飞行员培训合同。
So I wouldn’t want to stick a number on it, but I’ve got high hopes. And FlightSafety also announced recently a very major contract with the government through Raytheon. So it’s a company that’s got its sights set a lot higher than where it is now.
所以我不想给它贴上具体的数字，但我对它充满希望。FlightSafety最近还通过雷神公司与政府签订了一份非常重要的合同。这家公司目前的目标比它现在的水平高得多。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And insurance, 15 percent? (Inaudible)
观众： 那么保险呢，15%？（听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Will you — you want tenths of a percent or will you — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 您——您是想要精确到十分之一的百分比吗？（笑声）
We just don’t know. I mean, we didn’t know 25 — we didn’t — 30 years ago we didn’t know we would be in the insurance business.
我们真的不知道。我的意思是，25年前，或者更确切地说，30年前，我们并不知道我们会进入保险业务。
I mean, Berkshire, we have no master plan. And Charlie and I did not sit down in 1960 — early ’65 — and say, “We’re going to do this and that,” and all that.
我的意思是，伯克希尔没有总体规划。查理和我在1965年初并没有坐下来讨论说，“我们要做这个做那个”之类的计划。
We’re going to do — we’re going to try and do sensible things as we go along. The more money we have, the harder it is to find sensible things.
我们只是一路上尽量做一些合理的事情。我们有的钱越多，找到合理的事情就越难。
But that’s the criteria. Insurance is certainly a major area of opportunity for us. It’s been a major opportunity.
但这就是标准。保险显然是我们一个重要的机会领域，它一直是一个重要的机会。
We have — in certain fields we have a terrific advantage for the three reasons I laid out in the annual report. But I mean, we have capital strength, and a willingness to take on risk, and a speed of action, and a certainty of payment, that in aggregate no one matches.
在某些领域，我们具有年报中提到的三大优势。我是说，我们拥有资本实力、承担风险的意愿、行动的速度以及支付的确定性，这些加在一起是无人能及的。
Now, how much demand there is for that depends on circumstances in the business and how much supply there is at lower prices that we think don’t make sense is another question. But I think we’ll do OK in insurance over time.
至于这种需求有多大，取决于业务中的具体情况，以及以我们认为不合理的低价提供的供应量有多少，这是另一个问题。但我认为，从长远来看，我们在保险领域的表现会不错。
21. Most money managers have “gotten a lot for nothing”
大多数基金经理“从无所得到了很多”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I’m Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi.
观众： 巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是来自密西西比州杰克逊的蒂姆·梅德利。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad to have you back, Jim — Tim.
沃伦·巴菲特： 很高兴你回来了，吉姆——哦，蒂姆。
How many years have you come?
你来参加多少年了？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is my 11th.
观众： 这是我第11次来了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good.
沃伦·巴菲特： 很好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: They’ve been 11 great years. Thank you very much.
观众： 这11年都非常棒，非常感谢。
At this meeting four or five years ago, you commented that money managers in the aggregate have not done better than various market indices. And you attributed this, in part, to the frictional cost inherent in an actively-managed portfolio.
在四五年前的会议上，您评论说，总体而言，基金经理的表现并不优于各类市场指数。而您将部分原因归结于主动管理投资组合中固有的摩擦成本。
I wonder if today you would update your thoughts on this. And do you think that this underperformance compared to index funds will continue?
我想知道，今天您是否愿意对此发表更新的看法？您认为与指数基金相比，这种表现不佳的情况会持续下去吗？
And then a related question, if the two of you were giving advice to a classroom of equity mutual fund managers, are there two or three things in particular that you would want to suggest to them?
还有一个相关问题，如果你们两位要对一群股票型共同基金经理上课，您会特别建议他们注意哪两到三点？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I would say this. Money managers, in the last few years since I made that statement, have not disappointed me. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我会这样说。从我发表那个声明以来，过去几年的基金经理并没有让我失望。（笑声）
In aggregate, they have underperformed index funds. And it’s the nature of the game. They simply cannot overperform, in aggregate. There are too many of them managing too big a portion of the pool.
总体而言，他们的表现不及指数基金。这是游戏的本质。他们总体上根本无法超越指数基金，因为他们管理的资金池占比太大了。
And for the same reason that the crowd could not come out here to Ak-Sar-Ben in the past years and make money, in aggregate, because there was a bite being taken out of every dollar that was invested in the parimutuel machines, that people that invest their dollars elsewhere through money managers in aggregate cannot do as well as they could do by themselves creating their own index fund, or it would be easier to have — just to buy into an index fund.
同样的原因，过去几年人们到Ak-Sar-Ben（场地）去投资时，整体上无法盈利，因为每投入赌池的一美元都会被抽成。而通过基金经理投资的人，其整体表现也无法和他们自己创建的指数基金相比，或者更简单的，直接买入一个指数基金的表现相比。
It’s — you know, they say in this world you can’t get something for nothing. But the truth is money managers, in aggregate, have gotten something for nothing. I mean, they’ve gotten a lot for nothing. And — (applause)
人们常说，这个世界上没有白拿的东西。但实际上，总体而言，基金经理确实得到了白拿的东西。他们实际上拿了很多。（掌声）
And people — investors have paid — and the corollary is investors have paid something for nothing.
而投资者——也可以说是——投资者为“没有”付出了代价。
And that doesn’t mean that people are evil. It doesn’t mean that they’re charlatans or anything. It’s the nature, if you got a 6 or $7 trillion, or whatever it may be, equity market, and you have a very significant percentage of it managed by professionals, and they charge you significant fees to invest with them, and they have costs when they change around.
这并不意味着这些人是坏人，也不意味着他们是骗子。这是一个本质问题。如果有一个6万亿或7万亿美元的股票市场，无论具体是多少，其中有很大一部分由专业人士管理，他们收取可观的费用，而在调整投资组合时还会产生成本。
They cannot do as well as unmanaged money, in aggregate.
总体而言，他们的表现不如未管理的资金。
And it’s the only field in the world that I, you know, that I can think of — Charlie’ll think of some others — but where the amateur, as long as he recognizes he’s an amateur, will do better than the professional does for the people whose money he’s handling.
这是世界上我所能想到的唯一一个领域——查理可能还能想到其他的——在这个领域中，只要一个业余投资者意识到自己是业余的，他的表现可能会比那些管理别人资金的专业人士更好。
And therefore if I were in a — teaching this class or speaking to that class, I would probably tell them that for their own psychological well-being they should probably leave the room. (Laughter)
所以，如果我要对这类人讲课，我可能会告诉他们，为了自己的心理健康，他们最好离开这个房间。（笑声）
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I pretty well said what I had to say on this subject in that talk I gave at USC. And anybody that wants to read that, why, can read it.
查理·芒格： 关于这个话题，我在南加州大学的那次演讲中已经基本说过了。任何想了解的人，都可以去读一下。
I will say that one of the things I like about the annual meeting is I get to interface with a whole lot of people that have even lower annual investment management expenses than Berkshire Hathaway the company does. I mean, if you stop to think about it, we’ve got our costs almost to zero, and many of you have gotten it to zero.
我想说，我喜欢年会的一个原因是，我有机会与一群年投资管理费用甚至比伯克希尔·哈撒韦还低的人交流。想想看，我们的成本几乎降到了零，而你们中很多人已经完全降到了零。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — Charlie and I would be glad to take any money management organization in the world that manages — oh, just been handed a note that says, “Unfortunately, we don’t have extra annual reports on site. Those shareholders desiring one should call us or write.” So. And we’re also on the internet. You can run it off there, too.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们——刚刚收到一张纸条，上面写着：“很遗憾，我们现场没有多余的年报。想要年报的股东可以打电话或写信联系我们。”此外，我们也在互联网上发布了年报，您也可以在网上下载。
So I apologize for not having them on the — here. But they’re easy to get. Just dial 346-1400 and there’s an annual report line, and you’ll have one sent to you.
很抱歉现场没有提供年报。但获取它非常容易。拨打346-1400，有一个年报专线，会把年报寄给您。
We would be willing to take any money management organization in the world managing 10 billion or more, and in the case of brokerage houses who have their brokers in aggregate handling 10 billion or more, and we would be willing to bet that their aggregate investment experience over the next five years or ten years for the group that they advise will be less — will be poorer — than that achieved by a no-load, very low-cost index fund.
我们愿意对世界上任何管理100亿美元或更多的资产管理机构，以及经纪公司中经纪人总共管理100亿美元或更多的情况打赌。我们愿意赌他们在未来五年或十年内为其客户所创造的整体投资业绩将低于无负担、成本极低的指数基金所实现的业绩。
And we’d put up a lot of money to make that wager with anybody that would care to step forward.
如果有人愿意接受这个赌注，我们会拿出很多钱来赌。
Gambling may be illegal, but now you can do it through something called derivatives, you see? (Laughter)
赌博可能是非法的，但现在可以通过所谓的衍生品进行，对吧？（笑声）
We could create an instrument that would allow that, even though it might be against the laws of the state of Nebraska.
我们可以创建一种工具来实现这种赌注，即使这可能违反内布拉斯加州的法律。
Charlie, would you join me on that or —?
查理，你会和我一起赌吗？还是——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with you. I always say that the — exactly one-fifth have to be in the bottom 20 percent, and — (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 嗯，我当然同意你的观点。我总是说——正好五分之一的人必须在表现最差的20%中，（笑声）
There are certain fundamental forces at work here that —
这背后确实有一些基本的力量在起作用——
But it is a very peculiar profession where you have to be in a state of psychological denial to shave in the morning if you do the work. I don’t think that’s true for a handful —
但这是一个非常特殊的行业，如果你做这项工作，早上刮胡子时可能需要处于一种心理否认状态。我认为这不适用于少数人——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it isn’t.
沃伦·巴菲特： 确实不是。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — of investment managers. I think we know investment managers who add value. But it’s a comparatively rare and small percentage.
查理·芒格： ——在投资经理中。我认为我们确实知道一些能带来增值的投资经理。但这在整个行业中是相对稀有且占比很小的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There — we have identified, in the past even — I mean, on a prospective basis, not retrospective — managers who have added value. And there’s a couple of them in this room.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。过去，我们甚至能够在前瞻的基础上，而非回顾的基础上，识别出一些能带来增值的经理。而在这个房间里就有几位这样的经理。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, and there’s Lou Simpson of GEICO.
查理·芒格： 还有GEICO的卢·辛普森。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he’s the one I had in mind. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，他就是我想到的那个人。（笑声）
You can do it. You can’t do it with unlimited amounts of money, and a good record tends to attract money. Even a mediocre record presented by a good salesperson tends to attract money.
你是可以做到的，但不能用无限的资金来做。一份良好的业绩往往会吸引资金。甚至一份由优秀销售人员呈现的平庸业绩也往往能吸引资金。
But there are people working with smaller amounts of money that — (coughs) — where the probabilities are that they will do better than — excuse me. (Clears throat)
但确实有一些人操作较少资金时——（咳嗽）——他们可能的表现会优于——抱歉。（清嗓子）
Where the probabilities are that they will — (clears throat) — do better than average. But they’re very rare.
他们的表现有可能优于平均水平。但这是非常罕见的。
Incidentally, I apologize on this voice. I had to leave Gorat’s early last night, and there were a number of you I was hoping to see. But I just — it was gone entirely last night, and then I —
顺便说一下，很抱歉我的嗓音。昨晚我不得不提前离开了Gorat's，有很多人我原本希望见到。但我实在——昨晚完全失声了，然后——
I’d like to tell you I did it by Cherry Coke, but I’ve managed to nurse it back to where it’s working again in reasonable shape.
我真想告诉你们是喝了樱桃可乐造成的，但我设法让它恢复到现在这个还能正常工作的状态了。
22. USAir CEO Stephen Wolf has done “terrific” job
USAir（现称美国航空）首席执行官史蒂芬·沃尔夫表现“非常出色”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Martha Copeland (PH) from San Francisco.
观众： 我是来自旧金山的玛莎·科普兰。
My question involves the headwinds which face USAir. Are you considering redeploying assets? Or how will your management plan to improve this company?
我的问题是关于美国航空面临的逆风。您是否考虑重新部署资产？或者您们的管理层有什么计划来改进这家公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re just an investor in US — they call it now US Airways — but we’re just an investor. We’ve owned a preferred stock for almost eight years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们只是美国航空的一个投资者——现在它被称为美国航空——但我们只是投资者。我们已经持有它的优先股将近八年了。
The company had some very rough going. Charlie and I would not have thought its chances for survival were very good, even some years back.
这家公司经历了一些非常艰难的时期。甚至在几年前，查理和我都不认为它的生存机会会很大。
But it’s done quite well lately. Stephen Wolf has done a terrific job of running it.
但最近它表现得相当不错。史蒂芬·沃尔夫在管理这家公司方面做得非常出色。
So as of the middle of April, all of our dividends are — were caught up, current. We’ve received, I don’t know, 260 or ’70 million in dividends in the last eight years.
截至4月中旬，我们的所有股息都已恢复到正常状态。在过去的八年中，我们收到了大约2.6亿到2.7亿美元的股息。
But we have nothing to do with managing the company. Matter of fact, there are some people that might have noted that when Charlie and I left as directors, that was when the fortunes of the company turned abruptly upward. (Laughter)
但我们与管理这家公司毫无关系。事实上，有些人可能注意到，查理和我退出董事会时，这家公司的命运突然转好。（笑声）
But — and we feel very good about what Stephen Wolf has done. I mean, he — there’s no tougher job than running an airline. That is not a job I would wish on anyone. And he’s improved the operating performance dramatically, and the financial performance has improved. And better yet, the preferred dividends have been paid. So we thank him for that, but we have nothing to do with it.
不过，我们对史蒂芬·沃尔夫的表现感到非常满意。我的意思是，没有比管理一家航空公司更难的工作了。这不是我会希望任何人去做的工作。他显著改善了公司的运营表现，财务表现也得到了改善。更棒的是，优先股的股息已经支付了。所以我们对此表示感谢，但我们与此无关。
By the terms of our preferred, in just a little over two years, we are due to be paid back our principal amount. It was really a loan in equity form, with a kick — possible kicker on the upside because of the conversion privilege on the preferred.
根据我们的优先股条款，再过两年多一点，我们应该收回我们的本金。这实际上是一种以股权形式存在的贷款，同时还可能因为优先股的转换权而在上涨时获得额外收益。
We would have sold the conversion privilege for nothing a few years ago, but it actually is not so far away now. The stock’s in the low 30s, and our conversion is in the high 30s. So we actually have some chance of even having conversion value on that. It’s been a very pleasant surprise.
几年前我们可能会毫无价值地卖掉这个转换权，但现在情况并非如此。股票价格在30美元出头，而我们的转换价格在30美元后段。所以实际上，我们有一些机会从中获得转换价值。这是一个非常令人愉快的惊喜。
You know, I made a mistake in getting into it, but Mr. Wolf is — seems to be capable of nullifying my mistake.
您知道，我当初投资这家公司是个错误，但沃尔夫先生似乎有能力弥补我的错误。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Pass. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 跳过。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll give him this (inaudible). (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们会把这个——（听不清）——给他。（笑声）
23. Put all your money into Berkshire stock?
是否应该将所有资金都投入伯克希尔的股票？
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第五区，请提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Eric Butler (PH) from Menlo Park, California. A couple of questions, one serious, one not quite.
观众： 我是来自加利福尼亚州门洛帕克的埃里克·巴特勒。我有两个问题，一个是认真的，另一个不是那么严肃。
Considering Berkshire Hathaway is well run at low cost, and is diversified, why should anyone do anything but put all their money into Berkshire Hathaway instead of maintaining a diversified portfolio?
鉴于伯克希尔·哈撒韦运行良好、成本低且多元化，为什么有人还需要投资其他地方，而不是把所有的钱都投入伯克希尔·哈撒韦，而不是维持一个多元化的投资组合？
And in some of these hagiographic kind of biographies, it’s apparent that you have other investments yourself beyond Berkshire Hathaway.
还有，在一些赞誉性的传记中，很明显您个人在伯克希尔·哈撒韦之外还有其他投资。
The second question I had, is there any significance to the fact that the Omaha World-Herald does not include Berkshire Hathaway in its stock tables on any day? Is this a sign that they do not honor profits?
第二个问题是，《奥马哈世界先驱报》没有在任何一天的股市表格中列出伯克希尔·哈撒韦。这是否意味着他们不尊重利润？
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) No, they — actually, they have a separate little table called Midlands — I think it’s entitled Midlands Investment. But they pick out about 50 stocks that are of particular interest to people in this area, and they lift those from the regular table and put it in this separate table, which is usually on a second page right following the main stock table. So they give us our just due on that, but you do have to — you should look in a different table for that.
沃伦·巴菲特： （笑声）不，他们——实际上，他们有一个单独的小表格叫做“中西部投资”。但他们会从常规表格中挑选出约50只特别受当地人关注的股票，放入这个单独的表格中，这个表格通常在主股票表格后的第二页。所以他们是给了我们应得的位置，但您确实需要在不同的表格中查找。
Second question about putting all your money in, I’ve got 99 percent of my money in Berkshire. But it was bought at a different price. (Laughter)
至于第二个关于是否将所有资金投入的问题，我有99%的资金都在伯克希尔。但这是在不同的价格买入的。（笑声）
And Charlie’s was bought a little cheaper, too, I think. So you know, we like the idea of having it all in there, but we don’t recommend that people do that because it’s — you will get very low-cost management. What we hope — well we hope is that from this point forward, that that cost does not reflect its value.
而查理买入的价格也更便宜一些，我想。所以，我们喜欢将所有资金都放在这里的想法，但我们不建议大家这么做，因为您确实会获得非常低成本的管理。我们希望——我们希望从这一点开始，这些成本不会反映它的价值。
But the price at which you enter is very important. You do get a great group of businesses. You get a lot of great operating managers. You get very reasonable costs. But that is fairly widely recognized now compared to the past, and people pay more for it than they used to.
但您进入时的价格非常重要。您确实会获得一组很棒的业务，许多优秀的运营经理，以及非常合理的成本。但与过去相比，这一点现在已经被广泛认可，人们愿意支付比以前更多的价格。
I’m still very comfortable with it, and I think Charlie’s comfortable with it, too. But everyone has to make up their own mind about price.
我对它仍然感到非常放心，我想查理也感到放心。但每个人都需要自己决定是否合适的价格。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Eventually, if the success continues and we have more of this hagiography, the stock will get to such a high price that it’s no longer sensible at all to buy.
查理·芒格： 是的。最终，如果成功继续下去，并且我们得到更多这样的赞誉文章，那么股票价格可能会变得高得完全不值得买入。
We hope we dampen that process as we go along. And of course, there’s always the very substantial chance that we’ll just fail to meet expectations due to the vicissitudes of life.
我们希望能在过程中减缓这一现象。当然，生活中的起伏变化总会带来我们未达预期的可能性。
WARREN BUFFETT: Falling on our face is what we call it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们称之为摔了个大跟头。（笑声）
24. Won’t buy a tobacco company, but could buy tobacco stocks
不会购买烟草公司，但可能会购买烟草股票
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第六区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Michael Hooper. I’m from Grand Island, Nebraska. I applaud Berkshire for starting the Class B shares.
观众： 我是来自内布拉斯加州大岛的迈克尔·胡珀。我为伯克希尔推出B类股票表示赞赏。
My question deals with tobacco stocks, which have been beaten down lately. Does Berkshire own any tobacco stocks, and are some of these stocks attractive now that prices are down on some of them? And in particular, a company called UST. Thank you.
我的问题是关于最近表现不佳的烟草股票。伯克希尔是否持有任何烟草股票？现在有些烟草股票价格下跌，它们是否具有吸引力？尤其是关于一家叫UST的公司。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have owned — we won’t comment on what we own now — but we have owned tobacco stocks in the past. We’ve never owned a lot of them, although we may have made a mistake by not owning a lot of them. But we’ve owned tobacco stocks in the past, and I’ve had people write me about whether we should do it or not.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们曾经持有——我们现在不会评论我们目前是否持有——但我们过去确实持有过烟草股票。我们从未大量持有过，尽管我们可能因为没有大量持有而犯了错。但我们确实过去持有过烟草股票，我也曾收到一些人写信问我们是否应该这么做。
We own a newspaper in Buffalo. It carries tobacco advertising. We don’t — well, actually, Charlie’s a director of a sensational warehouse chain called Costco, which used to be called PriceCostco. You know, they sell cigarettes.
我们拥有一家位于布法罗的报纸公司，它刊登烟草广告。我们没有——实际上，查理是一个知名仓储连锁店Costco（以前叫PriceCostco）的董事。你知道，他们卖香烟。
So we are part of the distribution chain in — with a hundred percent-owned subsidiary in the Buffalo News. And so we have felt that if we felt they were attractive as an investment, we would invest in tobacco stocks.
所以我们通过全资子公司布法罗新闻成为了烟草分销链的一部分。因此，如果我们认为烟草股票作为投资具有吸引力，我们会投资它们。
We made a decision some years ago that we didn’t want to be in the manufacture of chewing tobacco. We were offered the chance to buy a company that has done sensationally well subsequently, and we sat in a hotel in Memphis in the lobby and talked about it, and finally decided we didn’t want to do it.
几年前，我们做出了不参与生产嚼烟的决定。当时我们有机会收购一家后来表现极为出色的公司。我们在孟菲斯的一家酒店大堂里讨论了这件事，最终决定不这样做。
Can I give you some —?
我可以给你一些——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: But it wasn’t because we thought it wouldn’t do well. We knew it was going to do well.
查理·芒格： 但这不是因为我们认为它表现不好。我们知道它会表现得很好。
WARREN BUFFETT: We knew it was going to do well.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们知道它会表现很好。
But now, why would we take the ads for those companies, or why would we own a supermarket, for example, that sells them, or a 7-Eleven, you know, or a convenience store that sells them or something of the sort, and not want to manufacture them? I really can’t give you the answer to that precisely.
但现在，为什么我们会接受这些公司的广告？或者说，为什么我们会拥有一个销售烟草的超市，比如7-Eleven便利店，而却不想制造烟草产品？这个问题我无法确切回答。
But I just know that one bothers me and the other doesn’t bother me. And I’m sure other people would draw the line in a different way.
但我只知道，有些事情让我感到困扰，而另一些却不会。我相信其他人会以不同的方式划定界限。
So the fact that we’ve not been significant holders of tobacco stocks has not been because they’ve been on a boycotted list with us. It just means that overall we were uncomfortable enough about their prospects over time that we did not feel like making a big commitment in them.
因此，我们没有成为烟草股票的重要持有者，并不是因为我们把它们列入了抵制清单。这只是意味着，总体而言，我们对它们的长期前景感到不够舒适，因此不愿意在它们上投入大量资金。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think each company, each individual, has to draw its own ethical and moral lines, and personally, I like the messy complexity of having to do that. It makes life interesting.
查理·芒格： 是的。我认为每个公司和个人都需要划定自己的伦理和道德界限。就我个人而言，我喜欢这种必须处理复杂问题的过程，这让生活变得有趣。
WARREN BUFFETT: I hadn’t heard that before. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我之前没听你这么说过。（笑声）
We’ll make him in charge of this decision.
我们可以让他来负责这个决定。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, no, no. But I don’t think we can justify our call, particularly. We just — we have to draw the line somewhere between what we’re willing to do and what we’re not, and we draw it by our own lights.
查理·芒格： 不，不。不过我不认为我们可以特别正当地解释我们的决定。我们必须在愿意做的事情和不愿意做的事情之间划定界限，而我们是根据自己的标准来划定的。
WARREN BUFFETT: We owned a lot of bonds at one time of RJR Nabisco, for example, some years back. And should we own the bonds and not own the stocks?
沃伦·巴菲特： 比如，几年前我们曾经持有大量的RJR Nabisco债券。那么，我们应该持有债券而不是股票吗？
Should we own, you know — should be willing to own the stock but not be willing to own the business? Those are tough calls.
我们是否应该愿意持有股票但不愿意拥有业务？这些都是很难的抉择。
Probably the biggest distributor of — the biggest seller — of cigarettes in the United States is probably Walmart, but — just because they’re the biggest seller of everything. They’re the biggest seller of Gillette products, and they’re huge.
可能美国最大的香烟分销商——最大的零售商——可能是沃尔玛，因为他们是几乎所有商品的最大卖家。他们是吉列产品的最大卖家，他们规模很大。
And you know, do I find that morally reprehensible? I don’t. If I owned — we owned all of Walmart, we’d be selling cigarettes at Walmart. But other people might call it differently, and I wouldn’t disagree with them.
那么，我认为这是道德上应该谴责的吗？我不这么认为。如果我——我们拥有整个沃尔玛，我们也会在沃尔玛卖香烟。但其他人可能会有不同的看法，我也不会反对他们的观点。
25. Buffett on anti-abortion protesters
巴菲特谈反堕胎抗议者
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第七区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, I’m John Tarsney (PH), a shareholder from Omaha, Nebraska.
观众： 各位好，我是来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈的股东约翰·塔斯尼。
People have already asked any sophisticated question that I might have, so I’m reduced to my simple ones.
人们已经问了我可能想到的所有深奥问题，所以我只能提出一些简单的问题了。
I first became a shareholder through FlightSafety, and at that time I wasn’t sure that I wanted to be bought out. However, I decided that any man who could agree with me on FlightSafety might be a good man to go along with.
我是通过FlightSafety首次成为股东的，当时我并不确定自己是否想被收购。然而，我决定任何能和我在FlightSafety上达成一致的人可能是个值得合作的人。
CHARLIE MUNGER: (Laughs) Well, that’s one way of doing it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： （笑声）嗯，这也是一种做法。（笑声）
Maybe you’d fit in well at headquarters. (Laughter)
或许你在总部会很合适。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a couple — well, I don’t use Gillette products, either, as those of you who are close to me can see. (Laughter)
观众： 我有几个问题——嗯，我也不用吉列的产品，那些靠近我的人可能已经看出来了。（笑声）
My questions, my simple ones then, are, a couple of years ago, or within the recent times, you had said you would not necessarily buy Berkshire Hathaway. And I’d like to know whether you still feel the same way.
我的问题很简单，几年前，或者最近某个时候，您说过您不一定会购买伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票。我想知道您现在是否仍然这样认为。
Secondly, since I came to you through FlightSafety I’m wondering if there’s any other positions I should be looking at in that same — (laughter) — same light.
第二，既然我是通过FlightSafety成为您的股东，我想知道是否还有其他类似的投资机会值得我关注——（笑声）——以类似的视角来看待。
And thirdly, there was a very distressing sign to me — sign that I saw when I drove in. And I don’t know what the meaning of it is, or if you do. And it said something about abortion. And I just don’t have a clue.
第三，当我开车进来时，我看到一个让我很困扰的标语。我不知道它是什么意思，或者您是否知道。上面写了关于堕胎的事情。我完全不明白。
If you do — now, you can use yes or no answers to these and save your voice. (Buffett laughs)
如果您知道——您可以用“是”或“否”回答以节省您的嗓音。（巴菲特笑声）
Or suit yourself and elaborate.
或者您可以自行决定，详细解答。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ll work backwards.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，我们从后往前回答。
I think the signs probably relate to the contributions to Planned Parenthood. (Applause)
我认为那些标语可能与对计划生育协会（Planned Parenthood）的捐款有关。（掌声）
Thank you.
谢谢。
We follow a policy, as you know, at Berkshire of corporate contributions being designated by shareholders. We have some made by our operating companies to their local communities, and the local managers do what they think appropriate within their communities and with their own businesses.
正如您所知，伯克希尔的政策是让股东指定公司捐款的用途。我们的运营公司也会向当地社区捐款，这些决定由当地管理者根据其社区和业务的需要来做出。
So Tony Nicely at GEICO — I have no idea what GEICO contributes to, but they make those decisions at GEICO.
所以，比如GEICO的托尼·尼斯利——我并不知道GEICO捐助了哪些机构，但这些决定是由GEICO自己做出的。
But in terms of the parent company, we let the shareholders designate the contributions. We have a number of shareholders who designate Planned Parenthood. We have other shareholders who designate organizations that are — would be opposed to the ideas of Planned Parenthood. We make no judgment about those. (Mild applause)
但对于母公司，我们让股东来指定捐款的用途。有一些股东会选择将捐款指定给计划生育协会（Planned Parenthood），也有其他股东会指定将捐款给那些反对计划生育协会理念的组织。对此，我们不作任何判断。（轻微掌声）
And in terms of — I designate the Buffett Foundation every year, and then the Buffett Foundation, in turn, gives money to other things, including Planned Parenthood.
至于我自己，每年我都会将捐款指定给巴菲特基金会（Buffett Foundation），然后巴菲特基金会会将资金分配给其他机构，包括计划生育协会。
And so, in the sense that those funds come indirectly from Berkshire, they come in direct proportion to ownership the same way as everybody else gets a chance to do with their shares.
因此，从某种意义上说，这些资金间接来源于伯克希尔，它们是按照股东持股比例分配的，与其他股东通过其股份指定用途的方式是一样的。
And we’ve had people write us about it. You know, I — there’s no way in the world we would — you know, in fact there’s some that would say that we should be boycotted because I do this.
我们也收到过一些人的来信，您知道，有人甚至会说，因为我这样做，伯克希尔应该被抵制。
And we would not dream of questioning, you know, the people that we buy our almonds from, or walnuts from, or chocolate from, as to what their beliefs were, you know, before we bought that, or whether we would hire somebody that they’d have to agree with our beliefs, so —
但我们从不会考虑在购买杏仁、核桃或巧克力时，去质疑这些供应商的信仰，或者在招聘员工时要求他们必须认同我们的信念，所以——
It seems to me perfectly appropriate for people to express their views on it, and they probably don’t like — clearly they don’t like — what I do on that. But it’s where my reasoning and, you know, my own judgment leads me.
在我看来，人们对此表达他们的观点是完全适当的，他们可能不喜欢——显然不喜欢——我在这件事上的做法。但这是我的理性和个人判断所引导的结果。
But they’re out there, the few people out there expressing their views on it, and they’re entitled to do that. And I don’t have any problem with that.
但外面确实有少数人在表达他们的观点，他们有权这样做。我对此没有任何问题。
I think when they start saying, you know, “We don’t want to hire you because you have a different view than we do,” or “We don’t want to buy your products,” I think that’s a little different position to take. I wouldn’t do that. But again, it’s their right to do that.
我认为，当他们开始说，“因为你的观点和我们不同，所以我们不想雇用你”或者“我们不想买你的产品”时，这就是一个截然不同的立场了。我不会那样做。但同样，那是他们的权利。
26. Berkshire stock is now “more appropriately valued”
伯克希尔股票现在“估值更合适”
WARREN BUFFETT: Going back to whether we would buy the stock, I would say this a year ago — well, it was about March 1st because that’s when I wrote the annual report in 1996 — the stock was 36,000 and I said it was not undervalued at that point.
沃伦·巴菲特： 回到我们是否会买入股票的问题，我想说，一年前——准确来说是1996年3月1日左右，因为那是我写年报的时候——伯克希尔的股价是36,000美元，我当时说它在那个价位并未低估。
And since we were more or less forced to have an offering by the unit trust, which I’m very glad in retrospect we did, but it was not our idea, we felt that it was only appropriate in connection with that offering to point out that we had said it was not undervalued, and since Charlie and I like to buy undervalued securities, that we would not buy it ourselves at that price or recommend that others do.
因为我们当时或多或少被迫通过信托基金进行了一次发售，尽管回头看我对此非常高兴，但这并不是我们的主意。我们觉得有必要在发售时指出我们认为股价并未低估。而且既然查理和我喜欢买入低估的证券，那么在那个价位我们不会自己买入，也不会建议其他人买入。
And in the ensuing year, the intrinsic value of Berkshire changed quite dramatically. And the price didn’t change. In other words, the stock, after years of overperforming the business somewhat, underperformed the business. Which, of course, it’s bound to do.
在接下来的一年里，伯克希尔的内在价值发生了显著变化，而股价却没有变化。换句话说，这只股票在多年来表现略好于业务本身之后，终于出现了低于业务表现的情况。这是迟早会发生的事情。
And we’re glad that they got back more in tandem. So we said this year that we regarded the stock as being much more appropriately valued than it was a year earlier, which is obvious.
我们很高兴看到股价与业务表现更加同步。所以我们今年表示，相较一年前，股票的估值要更合理了，这显而易见。
And I would say that the caution I made about securities generally would apply. I would not except Berkshire from that caution, but I would rather own or purchase Berkshire myself than I would most other securities. I can tell you that.
我想说，我对证券的总体警告同样适用于伯克希尔。我不会将伯克希尔排除在外，但相比大多数其他证券，我更愿意持有或买入伯克希尔股票。这一点我可以告诉你。
Charlie? (Applause)
查理？（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie gives to Planned Parenthood, too, so he has to — (laughs). They didn’t put his names on those signs, but I’ll take care of that. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理也为计划生育协会捐款，所以他不得不——（笑声）。那些标语上没有他的名字，但我会处理的。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m perfectly willing to have that limelight passed, as well as the opportunity to say more on the subject.
查理·芒格： 我完全愿意让这个聚光灯转移，同时也放弃在这个话题上说更多话的机会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Did I miss one question up there? I think there were three of them, and I addressed two of them.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我是不是漏回答了一个问题？我记得有三个问题，我只回答了两个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: About any other area I should be looking at.
观众： 关于我是否应该关注其他领域的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s the reason I skipped it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这就是我跳过它的原因。（笑声）
Yeah, we don’t direct people to any specific investments.
是的，我们不会指导人们投资具体的标的。
27. World Book encyclopedia vs Microsoft’s Encarta
《世界百科全书》与微软Encarta的对比
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第八区，请提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. This is Nancy Jacobs (PH) from Omaha, a shareholder for about four years now.
观众： 早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自奥马哈的南希·雅各布斯，成为股东大约四年了。
Before I leave today, I’m planning to purchase the World Book on CD-ROM for my ten-year-old daughter. And I’d like a few words from either one of you, or both of you, about why I’m making the right choice.
在今天离开之前，我计划为我十岁的女儿购买《世界百科全书》的CD-ROM版本。我想听听你们其中一位或两位对我为何做出正确选择的看法。
And second, does purchasing World Book over a competitor give her a somewhat improved chance of becoming a brilliant billionaire investor?
其次，选择《世界百科全书》而不是竞争对手的产品，是否会让她成为杰出的亿万富翁投资者的几率稍微提高一些？
WARREN BUFFETT: Practically guarantees it, but go ahead. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这几乎是肯定的，但你继续。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. I’m buying, then.
观众： 好的，那我买了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to — you love to talk about World Book.
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，你想谈谈吗？你很喜欢谈论《世界百科全书》。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think World Book is clearly the class of the field. They have every word in the English language graded for reading comprehensibility, and the articles are cleverly written so the difficulty of comprehension rises slightly as you go through it.
查理·芒格： 我认为《世界百科全书》显然是这个领域的佼佼者。他们对英语中的每个单词都按照阅读理解能力进行了分级，文章的写作非常巧妙，随着阅读的深入，理解的难度会稍微上升。
And it’s very user-friendly to young people. And since it’s something you want to encourage, making it user-friendly is wonderful. I also find that with whatever intellect I have, it’s more user-friendly to me. And so I think it’s a hell of a product, either for the young people or the old.
它对年轻人非常友好。而既然这是你想鼓励的事情，做到这一点是非常棒的。我还发现，无论我的智力如何，它对我来说也更加友好。所以，我认为这是一个无论对年轻人还是老年人都非常棒的产品。
And for a quick reference system, I don’t think there is anything better.
作为一个快速参考系统，我认为没有什么比这更好的了。
Personally, I like the reading version, being an old-fashioned fellow. And I can hardly imagine a world where the wise people don’t do a lot of reading.
就我个人而言，我喜欢阅读版本，因为我是个传统的人。我几乎无法想象一个智慧的人不大量阅读的世界。
Now, maybe we’re going to have wise people in the future who spend all their time in front of screens in the course of getting that wisdom. But I doubt it. That’s all. (Laughter)
或许未来的智慧人士会通过整天盯着屏幕来获取智慧，但我对此表示怀疑。这就是我的看法。（笑声）
I think you may have bought a wonderful product, but I would have the other one, too. (Laughter)
我认为你可能买了一件很棒的产品，但我也会买另一个版本。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The product you see there was the joint development, and was launched in January of this year in conjunction with IBM. IBM has been our partner in that product. I believe it’s being bundled into all the IBM PCs now being sold. So they’ve worked very well with us.
沃伦·巴菲特： 您看到的产品是与IBM共同开发的，并于今年1月推出。IBM是我们该产品的合作伙伴。我相信这款产品现在已捆绑到所有正在销售的IBM个人电脑中。他们与我们合作得非常好。
Frankly, there’s a book, even, that deals with this.
坦率地说，甚至有一本书专门讨论这一点。
Bill Gates did a very good job of developing a product that was bundled with millions and millions and millions of PCs. It’s called Encarta. It’s actually Funk and Wagnalls. He hates it when that comes out, but they changed the name to Encarta, which was smart of him. (Laughter)
比尔·盖茨非常成功地开发了一款捆绑了数百万台个人电脑的产品，叫做Encarta。其实它是由Funk和Wagnalls开发的。他很不喜欢人们提到这一点，但他们把名字改成了Encarta，这对他来说是个聪明的做法。（笑声）
And there are a few people in this room who were witness to a demonstration four or five years ago in Bermuda, where in connection with Encarta, they showed the moon and the earth.
在这个房间里，有几个人曾在四五年前的百慕大看到过与Encarta有关的演示，展示了月球和地球。
And the moon bumped into the earth in this. And I just, I don’t know why it sticks in my mind. I thought I would mention it today, that the — (Laughter)
演示中月球撞上了地球。我不知道为什么这件事一直印在我的脑海里。我今天想提一下这个——（笑声）
But his is doing very well. So apparently there are a number of people that don’t care about the fact the moon and the earth collide, but in the World Book the moon and the earth never bump into each other. (Laughter)
不过他的产品非常成功。显然，有不少人并不在意月球和地球碰撞的事实，但在《世界百科全书》中，月球和地球从未相撞过。（笑声）
He’s done extremely well with Encarta, incidentally. I mean, it was a masterpiece of moving into an area and pushing hard. And you know, I tip my hat to him, but now we’re going to —
顺便说一下，他在Encarta上的表现非常出色。这是一项进入一个领域并努力推动的杰作。对此，我向他致敬，但现在我们——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we copied him.
查理·芒格： 是的，我们模仿了他。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we copied him. Right. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们模仿了他。对。（笑声）
OK, Nancy, be sure to buy the print version, too, so Charlie will respect you. (Laughter)
好的，南希，记得也买一个印刷版，这样查理会尊重你的。（笑声）
28. Tax fairness, economic prosperity, and the “ovarian lottery”
税收公平、经济繁荣与“卵巢彩票”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 9.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第九区，请提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. My name is Patrick Byrne. I’m here today from Hanover, New Hampshire.
观众： 早上好，先生们。我是来自新罕布什尔州汉诺威的帕特里克·伯恩。
I’ve searched for a couple questions upon which I might get the two of you to disagree.
我找了几个可能让你们二位意见不一致的问题。
First, what level of taxation — and I direct these as much to Mr. Munger, therefore, as to you Mr. Buffett — first, what level of taxation on capital gains is most conducive to the long-term economic health of a society, and is that also the fair or just rate?
首先，资本利得税的何种税率最有利于社会的长期经济健康？这是否也是公平或公正的税率？
In other words, is the just rate of taxation on capital gains precisely that rate that creates the most economic stuff? Or is there some other goal a state might pursue?
换句话说，资本利得税的公正税率是否就是能创造最多经济价值的税率？还是说国家可能会追求其他目标？
And as a not-so-subtly related question, I work in a New Hampshire factory that makes industrial torches.
接下来的问题与之相关：我在新罕布什尔的一家制造工业火炬的工厂工作。
WARREN BUFFETT: As CEO, I might add, Patrick. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 顺便说一句，帕特里克是首席执行官。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Say again?
观众： 再说一遍？
WARREN BUFFETT: As CEO of — that “working” made it sound like you were down there on the floor. I just wanted people to — (Laughter).
沃伦·巴菲特： 作为首席执行官——“工作”这个说法让人感觉你像是在车间里。我只是想让大家知道——（笑声）。
Patrick writes me letters from chairman to chairman, so I think we’ve got to get him back at it.
帕特里克经常以主席的身份给我写信，我觉得我们得让他继续努力。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Continuing. (Laughter)
观众： 接着说吧。（笑声）
Well, it’s a small company. I do work as CEO, but it’s not much of a hierarchy.
这是家小公司。我确实担任首席执行官，但我们没有多少等级制度。
We make torches used in heavy manufacturing, and the fortunes of our factory echo those of industrial America.
我们制造用于重工业的火炬，我们工厂的命运与美国工业的命运息息相关。
Do you agree with the conventional wisdom that maintains that the age of classical industrial America has passed, and that we will — that America cannot be competitive in the long term with low-wage countries?
你是否认同这样的传统观点，即美国经典工业时代已经过去，美国无法在长期内与低工资国家竞争？
So the first question is on taxation of capital gains, and then the second is on the future for industrial America.
所以，第一个问题是关于资本利得税，第二个是关于美国工业的未来。
WARREN BUFFETT: I have a sensational answer on the tip of my tongue, but I think I’ll let Charlie go first — (laughs) — while I refine it a bit.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我有一个极好的答案就在舌尖上，但我想先让查理回答——（笑声）——我再稍微润色一下。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there’s an easy answer to your capital gain issue. And one is what makes an economy work best in some abstract mathematical sense. And the other is the consideration that you allude to, which gets into issues of fairness.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为你的资本利得税问题有一个简单的答案。一方面是从某种抽象的数学意义上看，什么能让经济最有效地运转；另一方面是你提到的，涉及公平性的问题。
Aristotle felt that systems work better when they were generally perceived as fair. The civilization worked better if people saw the differences in rewards as having been fairly — reasonably fair, anyway.
亚里士多德认为，当系统被普遍认为是公平时，它们运行得更好。如果人们认为奖励的差异是公平的——至少是合理公平的——文明就能更好地运作。
And I think that if you had a civilization where if you work 90 hours a week driving a taxicab with no money, no medical insurance and so forth, and somebody else does nothing but own Berkshire Hathaway shares and sit on the country club porch and peel off a few every year to pay the bills, that would be regarded as so unfair that even if it had some theoretical economic efficiency it would be counterproductive for our particular civilization to have that kind of a tax code.
我认为，如果一个文明中，有人每周工作90个小时开出租车，没有钱，没有医疗保险，而另一个人什么也不做，只是拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票，每年坐在乡村俱乐部的门廊上卖几股支付账单，那会被认为是如此不公平，即使在理论上这种税收制度可能有一些经济效率，对我们的文明来说，这种制度也是适得其反的。
So I’m all for having some taxation of capital gains. Once you reach that conclusion, you get into the question of what should — what is the fair rate?
所以，我完全支持对资本利得征税。一旦你得出这个结论，下一个问题就是——什么才是公平的税率？
I think the fair rate might well be a little lower than it is now, but not much lower.
我认为，公平的税率可能比现在稍微低一点，但不会低太多。
WARREN BUFFETT: Sounds to me like he’s a seller — of Berkshire. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 听起来他像是在卖伯克希尔的股票。（笑声）
Patrick is a former heavyweight boxer, and just got his Ph.D. fairly recently from Stanford with a 700-page dissertation, which has in it some commentary that actually bears on this.
帕特里克曾是一名重量级拳击手，最近刚刚从斯坦福获得博士学位，他的700页论文中确实对这个问题有一些评论。
And I thank Patrick, actually, for introducing me to kind of a system of construct — mental construct — to attack questions like this.
事实上，我要感谢帕特里克，他向我介绍了一种解决此类问题的思维构架。
Patrick gave me the example one time — and I think this may go back to John Rawls at Harvard — but he said, just imagine that you were going to be born 24 hours from now.
帕特里克曾给我举过一个例子——我想这可能可以追溯到哈佛的约翰·罗尔斯——他说，想象一下，如果你将在24小时后出生。
And you’d been granted this extraordinary power. You were given the right to determine the rules — the economic rules — of the society that you were going to enter. And those rules were going to prevail for your lifetime, and your children’s lifetime, and your grandchildren’s lifetime.
假设你被赋予了这种非凡的权力，你可以决定即将进入的社会的规则——经济规则。这些规则将在你的有生之年、你子女的有生之年，以及你孙辈的有生之年持续发挥作用。
Now, you’ve got this ability in this 24-hour period to make this decision as to the structure, but there — as in most of these genie-type questions there’s one hooker.
现在，你有了这个机会，在24小时内决定社会的结构，但——就像大多数这种“灯神式问题”一样——有一个条件限制。
You don’t know whether you’re going to be born black or white. You don’t know whether you’re going to be born male or female. You don’t know whether you’re going to be born bright or retarded. You don’t know whether you’re going to be born infirm or able-bodied. You don’t know whether you’re going to be born in the United States or Afghanistan.
你不知道自己会是生来是白人还是黑人。你不知道自己会是男性还是女性。你不知道自己是聪明的还是迟钝的。你不知道自己会是体弱多病还是健全健康的。你也不知道自己会出生在美国还是阿富汗。
In other words, you’re going to participate in 24 hours in what I call the ovarian lottery. (Laughter)
换句话说，在这24小时内，你将参加我所谓的“卵巢彩票”。（笑声）
It’s the most important event in which you’ll ever participate. It’s going to determine way more than what school you go to, how hard you work, all kinds of things. You’re going to get one ball drawn out of a barrel that probably contains 5.7 billion balls now, and that’s you.
这是你生命中最重要的一次“抽奖”。它决定的远远超过你将上的学校、你工作的努力程度以及其他各种事情。你会从一个可能包含57亿个球的桶里抽出一个球，那就是你。
Now, what kind of a society are you going to construct with that in prospect?
那么，在这样的前提下，你会构建一个怎样的社会？
Well, I suspect you would focus on two issues that Patrick mentioned in his question. You would try to figure out a system that is going to produce an abundant amount of goods, and where that abundance is going to increase at a rapid rate during your lifetime, and your children and your grandchildren, so they can live better than you do, in aggregate, and their grandchildren can live better.
我猜想，你会关注帕特里克在问题中提到的两个问题。你会试图设计一个能够生产大量物品的系统，并且这种丰裕能在你的有生之年、你子女和孙辈的有生之年快速增长，从而使他们总体上比你生活得更好，他们的子孙也会生活得更好。
So you’d want some system that turned out what people wanted and needed, and you’d want something that turned them out in increasing quantities for as far as the eye can see.
因此，你会希望有一个系统，能够生产出人们需要和想要的东西，并且这些东西的产量能够在可预见的未来不断增加。
But you would also want a system that, while it did that, treated the people that did not win the ovarian lottery in a way that you would want to be treated if you were in their position. Because a lot of people don’t win the lottery.
但你也会希望这个系统在完成上述目标的同时，还能以你希望自己在不幸时被对待的方式，对待那些没有赢得“卵巢彩票”的人。因为很多人并没有中奖。
I mean, Charlie — when we were born the odds were over 30-to-1 against being born in the United States, you know? Just winning that portion of the lottery, enormous plus. We wouldn’t be worth a damn in Afghanistan.
我的意思是，查理——在我们出生时，出生在美国的概率超过了30比1，对吧？仅仅是这一部分的抽奖中奖，就已经是巨大的幸运了。我们在阿富汗可能毫无价值。
We’d be giving talks, nobody’d be listening. Terrible. (Laughter)
我们或许在那边发表演讲，却无人倾听。太惨了。（笑声）
That’s the worst of all worlds.
那是最糟糕的情况。
So we won it that way. We won it partially in the era in which we were born by being born male, you know —
所以我们就这样赢了。我们部分地赢在了我们出生的时代，因为我们是男性，你知道——
When I was growing up, you know, women had — they could be teachers or secretaries or nurses, and that was about it. And 50 percent of the talent in the country was excluded from, in very large part, virtually all occupations.
在我成长的年代，女性——她们可以当老师、秘书或护士，仅此而已。国家50%的天赋被大范围地排除在几乎所有职业之外。
We won it by being white. You know, no tribute to us, it just happened that way.
我们赢在了是白人。你知道，这不是我们值得骄傲的地方，只是恰好如此。
And we won it in another way by being wired in a certain way, which we had nothing to do with, that happens to enable us to be good at valuing businesses.
我们还赢在了另一点，就是我们大脑的某种“线路”，这和我们没有关系，却恰好让我们擅长评估企业价值。
And you know, is that the greatest talent in the world? No. It just happens to be something that pays off like crazy in this system. (Laughter)
你说，这算是世界上最伟大的才能吗？不是。这只是碰巧在这个系统里收益巨大而已。（笑声）
Now, when you get through with that, you still want to have a system where the people that are born — like Bill Gates or Andy Grove or something — get to turn those talents to work in a way that really maximizes those talents.
那么，考虑完这些，你还是希望有一个系统，让像比尔·盖茨或安迪·格罗夫这样的人能将他们的才能最大化地发挥出来。
I mean, it would be a crime to have Bill or Andy or people like that, or Tom Murphy, working in some pedestrian occupation just because you had this great egalitarian instinct.
我的意思是，如果让比尔或安迪这样的人，或者汤姆·墨菲那样的人，只因为你的平等主义直觉而从事一些平凡的工作，那将是犯罪。
The trick, it seems to me, is to have some balance that causes the people who have the talents that can produce goods that people want in a market society, to turn them out in great quantity, and to keep wanting to do it all their lives, and at the same time takes the people that lost the lottery and makes sure that just because they, you know, on that one moment in time they got the wrong ticket, don’t live a life that’s dramatically worse than the people that were luckier.
在我看来，诀窍是找到某种平衡，让那些有才能、能在市场环境中生产出人们想要的商品的人，能够大量地生产这些商品，并愿意终生投入其中；同时，确保那些在“彩票”中输掉的人，不因为某一瞬间抽错了签，而过上与幸运者相比大大逊色的生活。
And when I get all through with that long speech, I probably come out with the idea that the capital gains tax as it exists today is probably about right, so —
讲完这一大段话后，我可能得出的结论是，现行的资本利得税大概是合适的，所以——
I see very few people — and I’ve been around a lot of people with money and talent over time — they don’t always go together — but I’ve been around both classes — (laughs) — and the — I see very few of them that are turned off from using their talents by a 28 percent capital gains tax. It just doesn’t happen.
我很少看到有人——而且我接触过很多有钱和有才的人——这两者不总是共存——但我接触过这两类人——（笑声）——我很少看到有人因为28%的资本利得税就不愿意施展自己的才能。这种情况根本不存在。
I mean, they do what they like to do. And part of the reason they’re good at what they do is they like to do it. And I’ve just never seen it happen.
我的意思是，他们做自己喜欢做的事。他们之所以擅长某些事，部分原因是他们喜欢这些事。我真的从没见过因为税率而放弃才能的例子。
And I’ve seen a lot of people that pay taxes that are higher than 28 percent that are contributing more to society, by some judgment other than a pure market system.
而且我见过很多税率高于28%的人，他们根据某些超出纯粹市场系统的判断，为社会做出了更多贡献。
(BREAK IN TAPE)
（录音中断）
29. “American economy encourages adaptation”
“美国经济鼓励适应性”
WARREN BUFFETT: The other question about the low-cost industrial — you know, how does the industrial society evolve, I — you know, the world evolves in a way, in a market society, so people do what they’re best at. And this country’s done very well in recent years — something like, you know, software that — where a Microsoft has been leading or an Intel or something. I mean, we have done very well.
沃伦·巴菲特：关于低成本工业的另一个问题——工业社会如何演变呢？我想说，在市场社会中，世界以一种方式演变，让人们去做他们最擅长的事情。而这个国家近年来表现得非常好——比如说，像微软引领的软件行业，或者英特尔等公司。我认为，我们确实做得非常好。
Ten years ago the American public was sort of down on itself, or 15 years ago, in terms of what the economy could do.
十年前，或者十五年前，美国公众对经济的潜力有点失望。
But here we are with our unemployment rate — in Nebraska it’s under 3 percent.
但现在，我们的失业率非常低——在内布拉斯加州甚至低于3%。
And you know, you look at the countries of Europe that were supposedly going to beat us into the ground, or you look at Japan.
你再看看欧洲那些据说要把我们击垮的国家，或者看看日本。
I think the American economy encourages adaptation. I mean, Singapore may be better, but in terms of major large economies, I think the American economy does awfully well in encouraging adaptation to what people want, and delivering it to them in ever-increasing amounts. And you know, I view that as all to the good.
我认为，美国经济鼓励适应性。也许新加坡可能更好一些，但就大型经济体而言，我认为美国经济在鼓励适应人们需求，并以不断增加的数量满足这些需求方面表现得非常好。我认为，这完全是件好事。
So I don’t regard any industry as sacred. I regard innovation and freeing up the able people to — able, in terms of production of goods in a market economy — to spend 12 hours a day all the time — I don’t see Andy or Bill letting up at all, in terms of where Intel and Microsoft are now.
因此，我不认为任何行业是神圣不可侵犯的。我看重的是创新和解放有能力的人——在市场经济中能够生产商品的人——让他们可以每天投入12个小时。我并没有看到安迪或比尔在英特尔和微软目前的发展中有任何懈怠的迹象。
I don’t see Roberto Goizueta at Coca-Cola, or Michael Eisner at Disney, or any of those people.
我没有看到可口可乐的罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔，或者迪士尼的迈克尔·艾斯纳，或其他这些人有任何松懈。
They don’t work 40-hour weeks, they work 70 or 80-hour weeks. And I think that system works very well in this country, and I don’t worry particularly about the specific products that are turned out.
他们不是每周工作40小时，而是工作70到80小时。我认为，这种系统在美国非常有效，我并不特别担心具体生产出来的产品。
Charlie?
查理？
30. Munger critical of Harvard philosopher John Rawls
芒格批评哈佛哲学家约翰·罗尔斯
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would not like the conclusion that both Warren and I have reached, that issues of fairness are properly to be considered in the tax laws, to cause anyone here to believe that I have a great respect for Harvard University’s philosopher John Rawls.
查理·芒格：我不希望沃伦和我得出的结论——即公平问题应该在税法中得到适当考虑——让在座的任何人误以为我对哈佛大学哲学家约翰·罗尔斯有多大敬意。
He is perhaps the world’s best-known living philosopher. And personally, I think he’s had a pernicious influence on human thought.
他或许是当今世界上最著名的在世哲学家。但就我个人而言，我认为他对人类思想产生了有害的影响。
He doesn’t know enough science. He doesn’t know enough economics. He doesn’t know enough about how systems work to be really good at figuring out what’s fair in systems. And he studied too much philosophy and too little of everything else. (Laughter)
他不懂足够的科学，也不懂足够的经济学，更不了解系统如何运作，无法真正擅长研究系统中的公平问题。他学了太多的哲学，而其他方面却了解得太少。（笑声）
If anybody thinks we love John Rawls, well, you can count me out. (Laughter)
如果有人以为我们喜欢约翰·罗尔斯，那就别把我算在里面。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: No — I wasn’t endorsing his conclusions, I was endorsing his thought — his original construct.
沃伦·巴菲特：不——我并不是赞同他的结论，我是赞同他的思考——他的原始构想。
Charlie, how about the industries part of the question that Patrick asked?
查理，帕特里克问的关于行业的问题你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if Patrick isn’t the smartest person in the room, there can’t be many in his class.
查理·芒格：嗯，如果帕特里克不是房间里最聪明的人，那也不会有多少人能和他比肩。
You are getting questions from a very able man, and he’s deliberately made them very difficult. (Laughter)
你们正在回答一位非常聪明的人提出的问题，而且他故意把问题设置得很难。（笑声）
And that whole issue is too complex for me to usefully discuss here. There are also certain limitations on ability that enter the equation. (Laughter)
整个问题太复杂了，我无法在这里做出有益的讨论。再说，这其中还有一些能力上的限制因素需要考虑。（笑声）
31. Class A stock may be exchanged for Class B at any time
A类股票可以随时兑换为B类股票
WARREN BUFFETT: So we’ll go to zone 10. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我们来到第十区。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good day, gentlemen. My name is Bill Rodenberg (PH) from Dayton, Ohio. I’m a shareholder, and my daughter Sarah, who is 13, is also a shareholder. She chose not to join me in the limelight. I think the hot dogs had a higher appeal to her.
观众：早上好，先生们。我叫比尔·罗登伯格（音），来自俄亥俄州代顿。我是一名股东，我13岁的女儿莎拉也是一名股东。她选择不和我一起在公众面前露脸。我想热狗对她的吸引力更大一些。
WARREN BUFFETT: Not to mention —
沃伦·巴菲特：更不用说——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And I’d like to say that it’s very reassuring to know that Uncle Warren and Uncle Charlie are taking care of her college fund. And it’s easy to sleep at night.
观众：我想说，知道沃伦叔叔和查理叔叔在照顾她的大学基金，这让人感到非常放心，晚上睡觉也很安稳。
I have two questions, one related to a question my wife asked me, which I was unable to fake a good answer to, and a second one related to my daughter’s one share of Berkshire A.
我有两个问题，一个是我妻子问我的问题，我无法编出一个好答案；另一个是关于我女儿持有的一股伯克希尔A类股票的问题。
My wife asked me, in the annual report you stated that if anyone out there has a good company like FlightSafety, please let you know and you’d be glad to look it over and give an answer within five minutes or less.
我妻子问我，在年报中你提到，如果有人拥有像FlightSafety这样优秀的公司，请告诉你，你很乐意看看，并会在五分钟内或更短时间内给出答案。
And her question is, how can he do that? Where does he get the information to make that decision? And how does he know that that information is valid?
她的问题是：他是怎么做到的？他从哪里获得信息来做出这样的决定？他又如何知道这些信息是有效的？
My second question has to do with my daughter. She’s 13. In five years she’ll be off to college, perhaps UNL, perhaps not.
我的第二个问题与我女儿有关。她今年13岁，五年后她将去上大学，也许是内布拉斯加大学林肯分校，也许不是。
In any case, she’s going to face a significant capital gains when she sells that one share of stock.
无论如何，当她出售那一股股票时，她将面临一笔可观的资本利得税。
WARREN BUFFETT: I hope so. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我希望如此。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You mentioned earlier, and I believe this is correct, you said that you could trade one share of A for 30 shares of B this afternoon. And I thought, wait a minute, I thought there was a limited window on that. We happened to be out of the country at the time that exchange took effect, and we missed it.
观众：您刚才提到——我相信这是正确的——您说今天下午可以用一股A类股票换30股B类股票。我当时想，等等，我以为这是有时间限制的。那时候我们正好在国外，所以错过了。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, the exchange exists forever. You can —
沃伦·巴菲特：不，兑换权是永久存在的。你可以——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Forever?
观众：永久的？
WARREN BUFFETT: You can always exchange a share of A for 30 shares of B. You cannot do it in reverse. You cannot shift 30 shares of B into one share of A. But there was no window or timetable on that.
沃伦·巴菲特：你可以随时用一股A类股票换30股B类股票。但反过来不行，你不能用30股B类股票换一股A类股票。不过，这并没有时间窗口或时间表的限制。
The A stock is forever exchangeable for 30 shares of B. I don’t recommend that she does it, because it’s always an option, and in the meantime she gets the shareholder-designated contribution, and there’s always the chance that the A will sell slight — at a price slightly above 30 shares of B. It doesn’t do it very often and it won’t be very much if it does, but —
A类股票永远可以兑换成30股B类股票。我并不建议她这么做，因为这是一个长期的选择权。同时，她还可以获得股东指定的捐赠。而且，A类股票有可能会以稍高于30股B类股票的价格出售。这种情况不常发生，即使发生，溢价也不会很高，但是——
We didn’t want to create an incentive for people to exchange A for B, but we — they will always have the right to do so.
我们不希望通过这种安排让人们产生把A类股票兑换成B类股票的动机，但我们——他们将永远拥有这种权利。
32. Just takes 5 minutes to know if we’re interested in a company
只需 5 分钟即可知道我们是否对一家公司感兴趣
WARREN BUFFETT: The five minute test is a — you know — Charlie and I have — we’re familiar with virtually every company of a size that would interest us in the country. I mean, if you’ve been around for 40 or more years looking at businesses, it’s just like if you were looking at — you know, studying baseball players every day. You get to know all the players after a while. And that’s the way it works.
沃伦·巴菲特：五分钟测试是——你知道——查理和我——我们熟悉这个国家几乎每一家我们感兴趣的规模的公司。我的意思是，如果你花了 40 年或更长时间来观察企业，这就好比你——你知道，每天研究棒球运动员。过一段时间，你就会了解所有球员。事情就是这样运作的。
Then we have a bunch of filters we’ve developed in our minds over time. We don’t say they’re perfect filters. We don’t say that those filters don’t occasionally leave things out that should get through. But they’re very — they’re efficient.
然后，我们随着时间的推移，在我们脑海中开发了一系列过滤器。我们并不是说它们是完美的过滤器。我们并不是说这些过滤器偶尔不会遗漏一些应该通过的东西。但它们非常——它们非常高效。
And they work just as well as if we spent months and hired experts and did all kinds of things. So we really can tell you in five minutes whether we’re interesting in something, and —
而且它们的效果和我们花几个月时间聘请专家并做各种事情一样好。所以我们真的可以在五分钟内告诉你我们是否对某事感兴趣，而且——
We’d never owned shares in FlightSafety but we’d been familiar with the company for at least 20 years, wouldn’t you say, Charlie?
我们从未拥有过 FlightSafety 的股份，但我们熟悉这家公司至少有 20 年了，你说是吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure, I had a partner who bought a lot of it 20 years ago. Yeah.
查理·芒格：当然，我有一个合伙人在 20 年前买了很多。是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But that’s true of almost any business. And we know — we’ve got a fix on what we don’t understand, and then we don’t care to know any more about them, particularly, although we’ll pick up a little as we go along, maybe.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但几乎所有企业都是如此。我们知道——我们已经确定了我们不了解的东西，然后我们不想特别了解更多关于它们的信息，尽管我们可能会在此过程中学到一些东西。
And then the ones that are — we’re capable of understanding, we’ve probably gotten about as far as we’ll get already. So we do know in five minutes.
然后那些——我们有能力理解的，我们可能已经达到了我们已经达到的程度。所以我们确实在五分钟内就知道了。
Now, when we do something with FlightSafety, before the purchase and even for somewhat — a little after the purchase — I’d never been — I’d never set foot on a piece — they have 40 or so training centers around the world — I’d never set foot on one of them.
现在，当我们对 FlightSafety 采取行动时，在收购之前，甚至在收购之后的一段时间里——我从未——我从未踏足过一块——他们在世界各地拥有 40 个左右的培训中心——我从未踏足过其中任何一个。
I’d never been to their headquarters. We never looked at a lease. We never look at title of the properties. I mean, we don’t do all of those things.
我从未去过他们的总部。我们从未看过租约。我们从未查看过这些房产的所有权。我的意思是，我们不做所有这些事情。
And I will say this: to date, that’s never cost us a penny. What costs us money is when we misassess the fundamental economic characteristics of the business.
我要说的是：到目前为止，这从未让我们损失一分钱。让我们赔钱的是当我们错误评估了企业的基本经济特征时。
But that is something we would not learn by what people generally consider due diligence. We could have lawyers look over all kinds of things, but that isn’t what makes a deal a good deal or a bad deal. And we don’t kid ourselves by having lots of studies made and lots of reports made. They’re going to support whatever they think the guy that pays them, you know, wants anyway. So they don’t mean anything. They’re nonsense.
但这不是我们通过人们通常认为的尽职调查所能学到的东西。我们可以让律师查看各种各样的东西，但这并不是决定一笔交易是好是坏的因素。我们不会通过做大量的研究和大量的报告来欺骗自己。他们会支持他们认为付钱给他们的人想要的任何东西。所以它们没有任何意义。它们是无稽之谈。
But we do care about being right about the economic characteristics of the business, and that’s one thing we think we’ve got certain filters that tell us in certain cases that we know enough to assess. And then we make some mistakes.
但我们确实关心对企业的经济特征做出正确的判断，这是我们认为我们拥有某些过滤器的一件事，这些过滤器在某些情况下告诉我们，我们有足够的知识进行评估。然后我们会犯一些错误。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that, except that people underrate the importance of a few simple big ideas. And I think that to the extent Berkshire Hathaway is a didactic enterprise teaching the right systems of thought, I think that the chief lessons are that a few big ideas really work, as I think these filters of ours have worked pretty well. Because they’re so simple.
查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的，只是人们低估了一些简单的大想法的重要性。我认为，就伯克希尔哈撒韦公司是一个教导正确思维体系的说教企业而言，我认为主要的教训是，一些大的想法真的有效，因为我认为我们的这些过滤器运作得相当好。因为它们如此简单。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think most of the people in this room, if they just focused on what made a good business or didn’t make a good business and thought about it a little while, they could develop a set of filters that would let them, in five minutes, figure out pretty well what made sense or didn’t make sense.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为这个房间里的大多数人，如果他们只是专注于什么造就了一个好的企业或什么没有造就一个好的企业，并思考一会儿，他们就可以开发出一套过滤器，让他们在五分钟内，很好地弄清楚什么有意义或什么没有意义。
I mean, there may be some reason after five minutes we don’t get together on a deal of some sort, but —
我的意思是，五分钟后，我们可能有一些原因无法达成某种协议，但是——
Another thing you can usually tell — at least you can tell it in the extreme cases — you can tell whether you’ve got the kind of manager, very quickly, that you want to have. I mean, if you’ve got somebody that’s been batting .400 all their life, and fortunately age doesn’t change that picture, in terms of business performance, and they love what they do, it’s going to work.
你通常可以分辨的另一件事——至少你可以在极端情况下分辨出来——你可以很快分辨出你是否拥有你想要的那种经理。我的意思是，如果你有一个一生都在以 0.400的命中率击球的人，幸运的是，就业务绩效而言，年龄不会改变这种情况，并且他们热爱自己的工作，那么这将会奏效。
If the seller cares a lot about the money, you’re probably not going to make a very good deal. If their real interest is going in the — is what they’re going to do with the money, they may fall out of love or have less interest in their business subsequently.
如果卖家非常关心钱，你可能不会做成一笔非常好的交易。如果他们真正的兴趣在于——在于他们将如何处理这笔钱，他们可能会失去对他们业务的热爱或兴趣。
We love working with people who are just plain nuts about their businesses. And it works very well. And you can usually spot that.
我们喜欢与那些对自己的业务非常着迷的人一起工作。而且效果非常好。你通常可以发现这一点。
Now, having said that, we’ll have a few people figuring out how to fake that attitude, you know, when they try and sell us some piece of junk here, but — (Laughter)
现在，话虽如此，我们会让一些人想办法假装那种态度，你知道，当他们试图在这里卖给我们一些垃圾时，但是——（笑声）
Charlie says we can get conned by some guy with a green eyeshade, you know, and a low-rent office and all that. But we won’t get taken in by the guy with the suede shoes. (Laughter)
查理说我们可能会被一些戴着绿色遮阳板、你知道的，还有低租金办公室之类的人所欺骗。但我们不会被穿着绒面鞋的人所欺骗。（笑声）
33. Buffett describes a “normal” day
巴菲特描述“正常”的一天
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：11 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for having me here today. My name is Dorsey Brown from Baltimore, Maryland.
观众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢你们今天邀请我来这里。我叫多尔西·布朗，来自马里兰州巴尔的摩。
I have two quick questions for you. Could you please comment on any observations that either of you may have concerning executive compensation and option issuance, a topic that seems to be getting a lot more media attention? And are we going to — getting a little bit of excesses in that area?
我有两个简短的问题想问你们。你们能否就你们对高管薪酬和期权发放的任何观察发表评论？这个话题似乎越来越受到媒体的关注。我们是否会在这个领域出现一些过度行为？
And my second question to you, Mr. Buffett, could you just give us some idea of what a normal day, how you would like to spend a reasonable, normal day and — working on the investment side of the equation, or analysis, or reading, or just to give us some flavor of that? Thank you.
我的第二个问题是问您，巴菲特先生，您能否简单介绍一下您平常的一天，您希望如何度过一个合理的、平常的一天，以及——在投资方面的工作、分析或阅读，或者只是让我们了解一下这方面的情况？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I’ll answer the second question first. Very easy.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我先回答第二个问题。非常容易。
I just — I read a lot, and I talk on the telephone a fair amount. We have no meetings. We have no committees. We have no slide presentations. You know, we have nothing, I mean it — (Laughter)
我只是——我读了很多书，也经常打电话。我们没有会议。我们没有委员会。我们没有幻灯片演示。你知道，我们什么都没有，我的意思是——（笑声）
And so I read a lot. I read annual reports. I read business publications. I could do it in way less time, but I enjoy doing it so I make it last, I mean, you know, like some other activities in life. The - (laughter)
所以我读了很多书。我阅读年度报告。我阅读商业出版物。我本可以在更短的时间内完成这些，但我喜欢这样做，所以我让它持续更长时间，我的意思是，你知道，就像生活中的其他一些活动一样。这个-（笑声）
So it’s — there’s really — it’s the most boring job to anybody watching it, but I’m in love with it, you know. And so I like doing that.
所以这——真的——对任何观看它的人来说都是最无聊的工作，但我热爱它，你知道。所以我喜欢这样做。
And I don’t like talking about it a lot, I just like to kind of keep up with what’s going on. Like I say, by this point in life I could filter out so much of that I would — I just don’t need to do that much of it.
而且我不喜欢过多地谈论它，我只是想了解一下正在发生的事情。就像我说的，到了人生的这个阶段，我可以过滤掉很多东西，我——我只是不需要做那么多。
But I kind of enjoy just seeing what’s going on vicariously through doing a lot of reading. And I spend some time on the phone, and I’m on the computer a lot playing bridge, and I get to do what I like all the time.
但我有点喜欢通过大量阅读来间接了解正在发生的事情。我会花一些时间打电话，我经常在电脑上玩桥牌，而且我一直都在做我喜欢的事情。
We’ll let Charlie describe what he does, which is even more bizarre. (Laughter)
我们会让查理描述一下他做了什么，这甚至更奇怪。（笑声）
And then we’ll talk about compensation and options.
然后我们会谈谈薪酬和期权。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s a little more foolishness in my life than Warren’s, and — including being chairman of a large hospital. I’m not suggesting that hospitals are foolish, I’m just suggesting that it takes a certain quirk of mind to be willing to be the chairman of a hospital.
查理·芒格：嗯，我的生活中比沃伦有更多愚蠢的事情，而且——包括担任一家大型医院的主席。我并不是说医院很愚蠢，我只是说愿意担任医院主席需要某种奇怪的思维方式。
And so my life is even more — it’s less rational than Warren’s. Warren lives one of the most rational lives I’ve ever seen. And it’s almost unbelievable, and — (Laughter)
所以我的生活甚至更——它不如沃伦理性。沃伦过着我见过的最理性的生活之一。这几乎令人难以置信，而且——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s got me wondering why I’m here today. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他让我怀疑我今天为什么来这里。（笑声）
34. Abuse of stock options as executive compensation
滥用股票期权作为高管薪酬
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll talk about comp then, a little.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，那我们就来谈谈薪酬问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, comp, yeah.
查理·芒格：是的，薪酬，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: The — comps — there are three or four aspects to that.
沃伦·巴菲特：这个——薪酬——有三四个方面。
On the subject of options, I would say that most options are constructed poorly, from the standpoint of the owner, but they’re constructed very well from the standpoint of the person who receives them, which is not entirely unexplainable because the — it’s a very strange form of negotiation when the beneficiary is the one that also really does all the design and hires the experts to come in and tell him what is good for the company when the expert knows that the guy who signs the check would be quite interested also in hearing what’s good for him.
关于期权的问题，我想说的是，从所有者的角度来看，大多数期权的构建都很糟糕，但从获得期权的人的角度来看，它们的构建非常好，这并非完全无法解释，因为——当受益人也是真正做所有设计并聘请专家进来告诉他什么对公司有利的人时，这是一种非常奇怪的谈判形式，而专家知道签支票的人也会非常有兴趣听听什么对他有利。
There’s nothing wrong with options per se, at all. Frankly, in terms of Berkshire, it would have been perfectly appropriate if a properly designed option had been given to me or to Charlie.
期权本身没有任何问题。坦率地说，就伯克希尔而言，如果给予我和查理一个设计合理的期权，那将是完全合适的。
I mean, we have responsibility for the whole enterprise, and we believe that any kind of incentive for performance should be related to the area in which you have responsibility.
我的意思是，我们对整个企业负责，我们认为任何形式的绩效激励都应该与你负责的领域相关。
We feel that if you want a typist to type 100 words a minute, that you ought to pay for typing 100 words a minute, not what the earnings per share were last year.
我们认为，如果你想让打字员每分钟打 100 个字，那么你应该按每分钟打 100 个字付费，而不是按去年的每股收益付费。
这种区分在软件企业已经模糊了，基层的工程师可能做出整体性的贡献。
We feel if a salesman gets paid for how many of the product is sold, he should get paid for that and not for some production quotas met.
我们认为，如果销售人员的报酬取决于产品的销售数量，那么他应该为此获得报酬，而不是为了达到某些生产配额。
So we believe in tying incentive comp to performance for which you have responsibility. And there are certain areas of a business that don’t lend themselves to that staff performance and so on.
因此，我们认为应该将激励性薪酬与你负责的绩效挂钩。而且企业的某些领域不适合这种员工绩效等等。
But that would lead to the corollary, that the people that are responsible for the entire results of the business, it’s perfectly appropriate to compensate them by options that in some way reflect the performance of that entire business.
但这会引出一个推论，即对企业的整体业绩负责的人，通过某种方式反映整个企业业绩的期权来补偿他们是完全合适的。
The trouble is that stock prices reflect other things than the performance of the business.
问题是，股票价格反映的不仅仅是企业的业绩。
For one thing, over a period of time, they reflect simply the reinvestment of earnings. You know, I have pointed out in the past that if you gave me an option on your savings account — to manage your savings account — and you reinvested all the interest, I would take away a significant payment at the end of ten years simply because you left the interest in.
首先，在一段时间内，它们仅仅反映了收益的再投资。你知道，我过去曾指出，如果你给我一个期权来管理你的储蓄账户——管理你的储蓄账户——然后你将所有利息再投资，我将在十年后拿走一大笔钱，仅仅因为你把利息留在了里面。
With a company that pays no dividend like Berkshire, if you’re going to leave all your capital in every year, for me to get a fixed-price option for ten years would mean that I was getting a royalty on money that you left with me. And I made the choice to have you leave it with me. So that does not strike me as equitable.
对于像伯克希尔这样不支付股息的公司，如果你每年都将所有资本留在公司，而我获得了一个为期十年的固定价格期权，这意味着我从你留给我的钱中获得了特许权使用费。而我选择了让你把钱留给我。所以这在我看来并不公平。
So I think any option should have a step-up in price that reflects the fact that money is reinvested by the shareholders annually. That if somebody wants to pay out a hundred percent of the earnings every year, then I’d say that you can have a fixed-price option. If you give me the money every year, and you do more with the money that’s left with you than the original sum, that’s fine.
所以我认为任何期权都应该有一个价格上涨，以反映股东每年将资金再投资的事实。如果有人想每年支付 100% 的收益，那么我会说你可以拥有一个固定价格的期权。如果你每年都把钱给我，而且你用留给你的钱比原来的钱做得更多，那就没问题了。
But if money is left with someone for ten years, there’s going to be some increase in value even if they spend every day golfing. And to give a piece of that away simply over — to have a royalty on the passage of time for them is a mistake.
但是，如果把钱留给某人十年，即使他们每天都打高尔夫球，也会有一些价值增长。仅仅因为时间的流逝而把其中的一部分赠予他们——让他们拥有时间流逝的特许权使用费，这是一个错误。
I think options ought to be granted, basically, at the fair value of the business at the time they’re granted. Sometimes that’s the market price, sometimes it isn’t the market price, but —
我认为期权基本上应该在授予期权时以企业的公允价值授予。有时那是市场价格，有时不是市场价格，但是——
Certainly the management of a company would not give an option on their business to some third party at a market price they felt was way too low, so I find it a little disingenuous when managements say that they’re — when they get a takeover bid, they say that the company’s really worth twice that much, but they’re perfectly willing to issue options to themselves at this price which they say is totally inadequate, when the owners get the option elsewhere.
当然，公司的管理层不会以他们认为过低的市场价格将其业务的期权授予第三方，所以我发现当管理层说他们——当他们收到收购要约时，他们说公司的实际价值是这个价格的两倍，但当所有者在其他地方获得期权时，他们完全愿意以他们认为完全不够的价格向自己发行期权，这有点不诚实。
But options, properly structured, for people with responsibility for the business, I think, makes — can make sense. And I think that if something happened to me and to Charlie, in terms of the manager of the business subsequently, if it was structured properly, I would not see anything wrong with an option arrangement.
但是，对于对企业负有责任的人来说，结构合理的期权，我认为，是——可以是有意义的。而且我认为，如果我和查理发生了什么事，就随后的企业经理而言，如果结构合理，我不会认为期权安排有任何问题。
We carry this philosophy down to our subsidiaries where they generally get incentive arrangements that relate to the operation of their business. But they don’t have incentive arrangements that relate to Berkshire overall, because if Chuck Huggins does a wonderful job at See’s Candy, as he has done, and I fall on my face, in terms of allocating capital, Berkshire stock will go no place despite what Chuck does.
我们将这一理念贯彻到我们的子公司，在那里他们通常会获得与他们业务运营相关的激励安排。但他们没有与伯克希尔整体相关的激励安排，因为如果查克·哈金斯像他所做的那样在 See's Candy 做得很好，而我在资本配置方面一败涂地，那么无论查克做什么，伯克希尔的股票都将无处可去。
And to penalize him, or to tie his rewards to something over which he has no control, I think, is kind of silly. So we tie it instead to the operations of the candy business.
我认为，惩罚他，或者将他的奖励与他无法控制的事情挂钩，是有点愚蠢的。因此，我们将它与糖果业务的运营联系起来。
In terms of overall level of compensation, the real sin is having a mediocre manager. I mean, that is what costs owners very significant amounts of money over time.
就整体薪酬水平而言，真正的罪恶是拥有一个平庸的经理。我的意思是，随着时间的推移，这会让所有者付出非常高昂的代价。
And if a mediocre manager is paid a relatively small sum, it’s still a great mistake. And if they’re paid huge sums, it’s a travesty. And that happens sometimes.
如果一个平庸的经理的薪酬相对较低，那仍然是一个很大的错误。如果他们得到巨额报酬，那就是一种讽刺。这种情况有时会发生。
It’s almost impossible to pay the outstanding manager a sum that’s disproportion to the value of that outstanding manager, when you get a large enterprise.
当你的企业规模很大时，你几乎不可能付给杰出经理一笔与其价值不成比例的薪酬。
Coca-Cola had a market value of $4 billion when Roberto Goizueta took over. It had stagnated during the previous decade under an earlier management, despite having the same product and those great Mean Joe Greene commercials you saw, that was — Mean Joe Greene was in the ’70s. The “Teach the World to Sing” commercial was in the ’70s. All these great commercials. But the company didn’t do much.
当罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔接手时，可口可乐的市值为 40 亿美元。尽管拥有相同的产品和你看到的那些伟大的 Mean Joe Greene 广告，但在之前的十年里，它在前任管理层的领导下停滞不前，那是——Mean Joe Greene 是在 70 年代。“教世界唱歌”广告是在 70 年代。所有这些伟大的广告。但公司并没有做太多。
Roberto — if we’d bought the entire Coca-Cola Company — I wish we had — in 1981 or ’2, whenever he came in, for 4 billion and we now had a business worth 150 billion, Roberto would have earned more money with us than he’s earned under the present arrangement.
罗伯托——如果我们当时以 40 亿美元收购了整个可口可乐公司——我希望我们当时收购了——在 1981 年或 1982 年，无论他是什么时候进来的，而我们现在拥有一家价值 1500 亿美元的企业，罗伯托在我们这里赚的钱会比他在目前的安排下赚的钱更多。
I mean, having the right person in place is just enormously important.
我的意思是，拥有合适的人选非常重要。
How much they should take is another question. That’s more a philosophical question.
他们应该拿多少是另一个问题。这更像是一个哲学问题。
Tom Murphy, best manager, you know, in the world, he just didn’t feel like taking a lot of money out of it, you know. And you know, I tip my hat to him, but I don’t think that necessarily makes it wrong for somebody else to take more money for doing the job. But I think it ought to be related to doing the job.
汤姆·墨菲，你知道的，世界上最好的经理，他只是不想从中拿走很多钱，你知道的。你知道，我向他致敬，但我认为这并不一定意味着其他人为了做这项工作而拿更多的钱是错误的。但我认为这应该与完成工作有关。
When I ran a partnership in the 1960s, I took a quarter of the profit over 6 percent a year. And I didn’t get paid any salary, but I could make a lot of money doing that. And that thought occurred to me as I ran the place from day to day, and I think it probably helped a little. (Laughter)
当我在 1960 年代经营一家合伙企业时，我拿走了每年超过 6% 利润的四分之一。而且我没有拿到任何薪水，但我可以通过这样做赚很多钱。当我日复一日地经营这个地方时，我想到了这一点，我认为这可能有一点帮助。（笑声）
So I don’t think it’s a terrible thing to have somebody get paid for making money for the shareholders.
所以我认为让某人因为为股东赚钱而获得报酬并不是一件可怕的事情。
But they ought to get paid for really making it, not simply because the shareholders reinvest money with them. They ought to make it based on the fair value of what they had when they took over, and they ought to make it really for just excellent performance.
但他们应该因为真正赚到钱而获得报酬，而不仅仅是因为股东将钱再投资给他们。他们应该根据他们接手时的公允价值来赚钱，而且他们应该真正地为出色的表现而赚钱。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we have remarked in previous Berkshire Hathaway meetings that we regard present mandated corporate accounting, with respect to stock options as weak, corrupt, and contemptible. And it is.
查理·芒格：嗯，我们在之前的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司会议上说过，我们认为目前强制性的公司会计处理股票期权的方式是软弱的、腐败的和可鄙的。的确如此。
WARREN BUFFETT: Otherwise, we’re undecided. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：除此之外，我们还没有决定。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: If something is so wonderful as a standard technique of compensation, why does it have to be masked under weak, corrupt, and contemptible accounting? I think it is no credit to our civilization that we’ve drifted into this particular modality.
查理·芒格：如果某件事作为一种标准的薪酬技术如此美妙，为什么它必须被掩盖在软弱、腐败和可鄙的会计处理之下？我认为我们陷入这种特殊的模式对我们的文明来说不是一件光彩的事情。
And you can get, if you overuse stock options, where the whole thing is sort of a chain letter. I mean, in Silicon Valley there’s one company that practically paid everybody in options, and as long as the chain letter galloped, it worked as far as the income account because nothing went through expense.
如果你过度使用股票期权，你会发现整个事情有点像连锁信。我的意思是，在硅谷有一家公司实际上是用期权支付给所有人的，只要连锁信迅速发展，就收入账户而言它是有效的，因为没有任何费用产生。
And then once everybody is issuing stock options, everybody else feels that he has to do it. And the practice spreads.
然后，一旦每个人都在发行股票期权，其他每个人都觉得他必须这样做。这种做法就会蔓延开来。
So I am not totally wild about the extreme prevalence of the stock option modality in American corporate life. Personally, I would vastly prefer different modalities, which would probably involve stock instead of stock options.
因此，我对美国企业生活中股票期权模式的极端普遍性并不完全狂热。就个人而言，我更喜欢不同的模式，这些模式可能会涉及股票而不是股票期权。
I’m all for sharing with the kind of people who are doing the important work pretty well down in the organization in a place like Costco or Coca-Cola or any other such company. But I don’t much like the present scheme that civilization has drifted into.
我完全赞成与在好市多、可口可乐或任何其他此类公司中做重要工作的那种人在组织中相当好地分享。但我不太喜欢文明已经陷入的当前方案。
With respect to the subject of do we have some wretched excesses in American corporate compensation, my answer would be yes. I don’t think the excess is necessarily the guy who got the most money. In many cases I agree with Warren, that the money has been deserved.
关于我们美国企业薪酬是否存在一些可恶的过度行为这一主题，我的回答是肯定的。我不认为过度行为一定是拿钱最多的人。在许多情况下，我同意沃伦的观点，即这笔钱是应得的。
But such is the envy effect that the practice spreads to everybody else. And then the taxi driver and everybody starts thinking the system is irrational, unfair, crazy.
但这就是嫉妒效应，这种做法会蔓延到其他所有人。然后出租车司机和其他每个人都开始认为这个系统是不合理的、不公平的、疯狂的。
And I think that’s what causes some people, as they rise in American corporations, to, at a certain point of power gaining and wealth gaining, they start exercising extreme restraint as a sort of moral duty. And that’s what Warren was saying about Tom Murphy.
我认为这就是导致一些人在美国企业中崛起时，在获得权力和财富的某个时刻，他们开始作为一种道德义务进行极度克制的原因。这就是沃伦所说的汤姆·墨菲。
And I would argue that the Tom Murphy attitude is the right attitude. And it goes way, way back in the history of civilization. The word “liturgy” comes from a Greek word which is just the same. I mean, if you were an important citizen of Athens, it was a lot like being an important person in Jewish culture.
我认为汤姆·墨菲的态度是正确的态度。它可以追溯到文明的历史。 “liturgy”一词来自一个希腊词，意思是一样的。我的意思是，如果你是雅典的重要公民，那就很像犹太文化中的重要人物。
I mean, you had duties to give back and to act as a certain example. And the civilization had social pressures that enforced those duties. And I would argue that the Berkshire Hathaway compensation system, considering what the people at the top already have, it would be better if we saw a little more of it.
我的意思是，你有责任回馈社会并树立榜样。文明有社会压力来执行这些职责。我认为，考虑到高层人士已经拥有的东西，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的薪酬体系，如果我们能看到更多这样的情况会更好。
WARREN BUFFETT: A few —
沃伦·巴菲特：一些——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think Warren and I do all right. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：我认为沃伦和我做得很好。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: A few years — I think an added problem is the sort of, in terms of the accounting, the sort of hypocrisy that it pushes people into, and then which becomes accepted and sort of a norm, particularly when leaders do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：几年前——我认为一个额外的问题是，就会计而言，它迫使人们陷入的那种虚伪，然后这种虚伪被接受并成为一种常态，特别是当领导者这样做的时候。
And you know, you had a situation a few years back when there’s no question that any manager would say that stock options are a form of compensation. They would say that compensation is a form of expense, and they would say that expense belongs in the income account. But they didn’t want to have stock options counted because they felt that it might restrict their use.
而且你知道，几年前，毫无疑问，任何经理都会说股票期权是一种薪酬形式。他们会说薪酬是一种费用形式，他们会说费用属于损益表。但他们不想将股票期权计算在内，因为他们觉得这可能会限制他们的使用。
So when the federal — the FASB, Financial Accounting Standards Board — came up with a proposal to actually have reality reflected en masse, corporate chieftains descended on Washington to pressure legislators to have Congress start enacting accounting standards, which as I mentioned, one time in Indiana in the 1890s, there was a legislator that introduced a bill to have the value of pi changed to an even 3 because he thought that 3.14159 was too tough for the schoolchildren and it would ease computational problems.
因此，当联邦——FASB，财务会计准则委员会——提出一项真正反映现实的提案时，企业首领们纷纷前往华盛顿向立法者施压，要求国会开始制定会计准则，正如我所提到的，在 19 世纪 90 年代的印第安纳州，有一位立法者提出了一项法案，将 π 的值更改为整数 3，因为他认为 3.14159 对学童来说太难了，这将简化计算问题。
Well, that sort of behavior by corporate chieftains when they are in there, you know, arguing that black is white, in order to feather their own nest and maybe create a little higher stock prices, I think that it means that they forfeit, to some degree, their right to be taken seriously when they claim they’re operating for the good of the Republic, and march on Washington in other regards.
嗯，当企业首领们在那里，你知道，为了中饱私囊，也许是为了创造更高的股价，而争论黑白颠倒时，这种行为，我认为这意味着他们在某种程度上放弃了在他们声称自己是为了共和国的利益而运作并在其他方面向华盛顿进军时被认真对待的权利。
And I just think that when the organization recognizes its hypocrisy and so on, I think there’s a degradation that can set in through an organization that — whose leaders are also leaders in hypocrisy.
我只是认为，当组织认识到自己的虚伪等等时，我认为一个组织可能会出现退化——其领导人也是虚伪的领导人。
Like I say, we have no strong feelings on this subject, but — (Laughter)
就像我说的，我们对这个问题没有强烈的感觉，但是——（笑声）
Charlie, do you have anything?
查理，你有什么要说的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s rather interesting, though. There’s an earlier example. Commodore Vanderbilt took no salary from his railroads. After all, he controlled the railroads. They paid all the dividends that he needed, and he got the fun of running the whole railroad, and he thought it was beneath Commodore Vanderbilt to take a salary.
查理·芒格：不过，这很有趣。还有一个更早的例子。范德比尔特准将没有从他的铁路公司拿过一分钱的薪水。毕竟，他控制着铁路。他们支付了他所需的所有股息，他得到了经营整个铁路的乐趣，他认为拿薪水有失范德比尔特准将的身份。
We’ve never quite reached the Vanderbilt standard, but — (Laughter)
我们从未完全达到范德比尔特的标准，但是——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t have any dividends, Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们没有任何股息，查理。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah. (Laughs)
查理·芒格：是的，是的。（笑）
Well, maybe that’s the reason. (Laughter)
嗯，也许这就是原因。（笑声）
35. When opportunity knocks …
机会来敲门时……
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If we’re live now — what we might do is maybe have just — I think maybe we only need four microphones for the afternoon session. So we’ll have two on each side, one toward the back, one toward the front. And we’ll just go around in four microphones. Are we OK on that?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，如果我们现在直播了——我们或许只需要——我想下午的环节只需要四个麦克风就够了。我们会在两边各放两个，一个在后面，一个在前面。我们就用这四个麦克风轮流提问，可以吗？
And we’ll start just one second. Everybody has a chance to get to their seats.
我们稍等一会儿开始，大家有时间找到座位。
Charlie has promised to stop tapping the Coke can during this — (laughter) — session.
查理答应了，这次会议期间不再敲可乐罐了（笑声）。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I only did that when somebody else was talking. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我只是在别人讲话的时候才敲的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2? OK.
沃伦·巴菲特：第2区？好的。
I used to have a friend that was a stock salesman many years ago. And when you’d have lunch with him, he would just keep going like this: (knocking sound).
我以前有个朋友，多年前他是个股票推销员。当你跟他共进午餐时，他总会这样敲敲打打：（敲击声）。
And finally, it would get to you. And you’d say, “What’s that?” And he’d say, “That’s opportunity.” (Laughter)
最终，你会忍不住问他：“这是什么？” 他会回答：“这是机会。”（笑声）
He was pretty good.
他真的挺厉害的。
36. How to buy a business
如何购买一家企业
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s — Kelly tells me we should start with number 2, zone 2. So we’re going to start with zone 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，Kelly告诉我我们应该从第2个问题，第2区开始。所以我们从第2区开始。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I’m Fred Cooker (PH) from Boulder, Colorado.
听众：是的，我是来自科罗拉多州博尔德的弗雷德·库克（音）。
And this is a question about intrinsic value. And it’s a question for both of you because you have written that, perhaps, you would come up with different answers.
我的问题是关于内在价值的。这是对两位的提问，因为你们写过，你们可能会得出不同的答案。
You write and speak a great deal about intrinsic value, and you indicate that you try to give shareholders the tools in the annual report so they can come to their own determination.
你们经常谈论内在价值，并表示会在年报中为股东提供工具，以便他们自行判断。
What I’d like you to do is expand upon that a little bit. First of all, what do you believe to be the important tools, either in the Berkshire annual report or other annual reports that you review, in determining intrinsic value?
我希望你们能详细说明这一点。首先，你们认为在伯克希尔的年报或其他年报中，用来判断内在价值的重要工具是什么？
Secondly, what rules or principles or standards do you use in applying those tools?
其次，在使用这些工具时，你们遵循的规则、原则或标准是什么？
And lastly, how does that process, that is the use of the tools, the application of the standards, relate to what you have previously described as the filters you use in determining your valuation of a company?
最后，这个过程——也就是工具的使用和标准的应用——如何与之前提到的用于公司估值的筛选器相联系？
WARREN BUFFETT: If we could see, you know, looking at any business, what its future cash inflows or outflows from the business to the owners — or from the owners — would be over the next, we’ll call it, a hundred years, or until the business is extinct, and then could discount that back at the appropriate interest rate, which I’ll get to in a second, that would give us a number for intrinsic value.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们能够预见到任何一家企业在未来，比如说100年内，或者直到企业消亡为止，其从业务产生的现金流入或流出归属于所有者（或来自所有者）的情况，然后以适当的利率对这些现金流进行折现——我稍后会谈到利率的问题——那么我们就能得出一个内在价值的数字。
In other words, it would be like looking at a bond that had a whole bunch of coupons on it that was due in a hundred years. And if you could see what those coupons are, you can figure the value of that bond compared to government bonds, if you want to stick an appropriate risk rate in.
换句话说，这就像看一只包含很多票息、期限为100年的债券。如果你能看到那些票息，你就可以根据合适的风险利率，计算出这只债券与政府债券相比的价值。
Or you can compare one government bond with 5 percent coupons to another government bond with 7 percent coupons. Each one of those bonds has a different value because they have different coupons printed on them.
或者你可以将一只票息为5%的政府债券与另一只票息为7%的政府债券进行比较。由于票息不同，这两只债券的价值也不同。
Businesses have coupons that are going to develop in the future, too. The only problem is they aren’t printed on the instrument. And it’s up to the investor to try to estimate what those coupons are going to be over time.
企业也有未来将会产生的“票息”。唯一的问题是，这些“票息”并没有被标注在投资工具上。投资者需要自己去估算这些“票息”在未来会是什么样子。
As we have said, in high-tech businesses or something like that, we don’t have the faintest idea what the coupons are going to be.
正如我们所说，对于高科技企业或类似的领域，我们完全无法预测这些“票息”会是什么样子。
When we get into businesses where we think we can understand them reasonably well, we are trying to print the coupons out. We are trying to figure out what businesses are going to be worth in ten or 20 years.
当我们进入那些我们认为能够合理理解的行业时，我们会尝试“打印出”这些“票息”。我们试图弄清这些企业在十年或二十年后会值多少钱。
When we bought See’s Candy in 1972, we had to come to the judgment as to whether we could figure out the competitive forces that would operate, the strengths and weaknesses of the company, and how that would look over a ten or 20 or 30-year period.
1972年我们购买See’s Candy时，我们必须判断是否能够看清将会影响其运作的竞争力量、公司的优劣势，以及这些因素在未来十年、二十年或三十年内会如何发展。
And if you attempt to assess intrinsic value, it all relates to cash flows.
如果你试图评估内在价值，一切都与现金流有关。
The only reason for putting cash into any kind of an investment now is because you expect to take cash out. Not by selling it to somebody else, because that’s just a game of who beats who, but, in a sense, by what the asset, itself, produces.
现在将现金投入任何一种投资的唯一理由，是你期望能取回现金。这并不是通过卖给其他人，因为那只是“谁比谁快”的游戏，而是通过资产本身的产出。
That’s true if you’re buying a farm. It’s true if you’re buying an apartment house. It’s true if you’re buying a business.
无论你是购买农场、公寓楼，还是企业，这一原则都成立。
And the filters you describe. There are a number of filters which say to us we don’t know what that business is going to be worth in ten or 20 years. And we can’t even make an educated guess.
至于你提到的筛选器。我们的确有一些筛选器，它们告诉我们：我们不知道某个企业在十年或二十年后会值多少钱。甚至连合理的猜测都无法做出。
Obviously, we don’t think we know to three decimal places, or two decimal places, or anything like that, precisely what’s going to be produced. But we have a high degree of confidence that we’re in the ballpark with certain kinds of businesses.
显然，我们并不认为自己能够精确到小数点后三位或两位预测企业的产出。但对于某些类型的企业，我们有很高的信心能够大致估算出它们的范围。
The filters are designed to make sure we’re in those kinds of businesses. We, basically, use long-term, risk-free government bond-type interest rates to think back in terms of what we should discount at.
这些筛选器的设计目的是确保我们投资于那类企业。基本上，我们使用长期无风险的政府债券利率作为折现率的参考。
And, you know, that’s what the game of investment is all about. Investment is putting out money to get more money back later on from the asset. And not by selling it to somebody else, but by what the asset, itself, will produce.
你知道，这就是投资的全部意义所在。投资就是投入资金，期望日后从资产中获得更多资金回报。这种回报不是通过转售给别人获得，而是通过资产本身的产出实现的。
If you’re an investor, you’re looking at what the asset — you’re looking at what the asset is going to do — in our case, businesses.
如果你是一个投资者，你关注的是资产会做什么——在我们的案例中，就是企业会做什么。
If you’re a speculator, you’re primarily focusing on what the price of the object is going to do independent of the business. And that’s not our game.
如果你是一个投机者，你关注的主要是标的价格会如何变化，而不管企业本身如何。而这不是我们的方式。
So we figure if we’re right about the business, we’re going to make a lot of money. And if we’re wrong about the business, we don’t have any hopes — we don’t expect to make money.
因此，我们认为，如果我们对企业的判断是正确的，我们会赚很多钱。如果我们的判断是错误的，我们也不会寄希望于赚钱。
And in looking at Berkshire, we try to tell you as much as possible as we can about our business, of the key factors. Those are the things that Charlie and I —
在观察伯克希尔时，我们尽可能告诉你们关于我们业务的关键因素。这些是查理和我——
With the things we put in our report about those businesses are the things that we look at ourselves.
我们在报告中写到的那些企业信息，也是我们自己会关注的信息。
So if Charlie had nothing to do with Berkshire but he looked at our report, he would probably, in my view, he would come to pretty much the same idea of intrinsic value that he would come to from being around it, you know, for X number of years. The information should be there.
所以，如果查理和伯克希尔毫无关系，但他读了我们的报告，我认为他得出的内在价值观点，应该和他多年参与公司运营后的看法相差无几。这些信息都在那儿。
We give you the information that, if the positions were reversed, we would want to get from you.
我们提供的信息，是我们希望角色互换后能从你们那里得到的。
And in companies like Coca-Cola or Gillette or Disney or those kind of businesses, you will see the information in the reports. You have to have some understanding of what they’re doing. But you have that in your everyday activities. You’ll get that kind of knowledge.
在像可口可乐、吉列或迪士尼这样的公司中，你会在报告中看到相关信息。你需要对它们的运营有一些了解。但这些知识在你的日常活动中就能获得。
You won’t get it, you know, in terms of some high-tech company. But you’ll get it with those kind of companies. And, then, you sit down and you try to print out the future.
你不会从某些高科技公司那里获得这样的信息。但你能从那些传统企业中获得这些信息。然后，你可以坐下来试着“打印出”它们的未来。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would argue that one filter that’s useful in investing is the simple idea of opportunity cost.
查理·芒格：我认为，投资中一个很有用的筛选器是机会成本这个简单概念。
If you have one opportunity that you already have available in large quantity, and you like it better than 98 percent of the other things you see, well, you can just screen out the other 98 percent because you already know something better.
如果你有一个可以大量利用的机会，并且你认为它比98%的其他机会更好，那么你就可以筛掉那98%的其他选择，因为你已经知道了更好的选项。
So the people who have a lot of opportunities tend to make better investments than people that don’t have a lot of opportunities. And people who have very good opportunities, and using a concept of opportunity cost, they can make better decisions about what to buy.
因此，有更多机会的人往往会做出比机会少的人更好的投资。而那些拥有极好机会的人，通过使用机会成本的概念，可以更好地决定买什么。
With this attitude, you get a concentrated portfolio, which we don’t mind. That practice of ours, which is so simple, is not widely copied. I do not know why. Now, it’s copied among the Berkshire shareholders. I mean, all of you people have learned it.
以这种态度，你会得到一个集中的投资组合，而我们并不介意。我们这种简单的做法并未被广泛模仿。我不知道为什么。不过，这种做法在伯克希尔股东中被效仿了。也就是说，你们所有人都学到了这一点。
But it’s not the standard in investment management, even at great universities and other intellectual institutions.
但它并不是投资管理中的标准做法，即使是在著名大学和其他智库中也不是。
Very interesting question. If we’re right, why are so many eminent places so wrong? (Laughter)
这是一个非常有趣的问题。如果我们是对的，为什么有那么多杰出的地方却是错的？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: There are several possible answers to that question. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这个问题有几个可能的答案。（笑声）
The attitude, though — I mean, if somebody shows us a business, you know, the first thing that goes through our head is would we rather own this business than more Coca-Cola? Would we rather own it than more Gillette?
不过，我们的态度是——如果有人向我们展示一家公司，我们首先会想，我们是否更愿意拥有这家公司，而不是更多的可口可乐股份？我们是否更愿意拥有它，而不是更多的吉列股份？
It’s crazy not to compare it to things that you’re very certain of. There’s very few businesses that we’ll find that we’re certain of the future about as companies such as that. And therefore, we will want companies where the certainty gets close to that. And, then, we’ll want to figure that we’re better off than just buying more of those.
不将它与那些我们非常确定的东西进行比较是很疯狂的。我们很少能找到像这些公司一样让我们对未来充满信心的企业。因此，我们希望寻找那些接近这种确定性的公司，然后确定投资它们是否比购买更多这些公司更划算。
If every management, before they bought a business in some unrelated deal that they might not have even heard of, you know, more than a short time before that’s being promoted to them, if they said, “Is this better than buying in our own stock, you know? Is this better than even buying, you know, buying Coca-Cola stock or something,” there’d be a lot fewer deals done.
如果每个管理层在购买一家与其业务无关的公司之前，先问自己：“这是否比回购我们的股票更好？这是否甚至比买入可口可乐股票更好？”那么，会完成的交易就会少很多。
But they don’t — they tend not to measure — we try to measure against what we regard as close to perfection as we can get.
但他们不会——他们往往不会衡量——而我们尝试用我们认为接近完美的标准来衡量。
Charlie, anything?
查理，你有什么补充的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I will say this, that the concept of intrinsic value used to be a lot easier, because there were all kinds of stocks that were selling for 50 percent or less of the amount at which you could’ve easily liquidated the whole corporation if you owned the whole corporation.
查理·芒格： 我想说的是，内在价值的概念过去要容易得多，因为有各种股票的价格只有整个公司清算价值的50%或更低。如果你拥有整家公司，你可以轻松地以这个价格清算。
Indeed, in the history of Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve bought things at 20 percent of then-liquidating value.
事实上，在伯克希尔哈撒韦的历史中，我们曾以当时清算价值的20%买入一些公司。
And in the old days, the Ben Graham followers could run their Geiger counters over corporate America. And they could spill out a few things. And you could easily see, if you were at all familiar with the market prices of whole corporations, that you were buying at a huge discount.
在过去，追随本·格雷厄姆的人可以用他们的“盖革计数器”扫描美国公司。他们可以找到一些机会。如果你对整个公司的市场价格稍有了解，你会发现自己正在以巨大的折扣购买。
Well, no matter how bad the management, if you’re buying at 50 percent of asset value or 30 percent or so on down, you have a lot going for you.
不管管理层多么糟糕，如果你以资产价值的50%或30%甚至更低的价格买入，你就有很大的优势。
And as the world has wised up and as stocks have behaved so well for people, good stocks, generally, have gone to higher and higher prices. That game gets much harder.
随着世界变得更聪明，股票的表现对投资者越来越好，好股票的价格普遍上涨。这个游戏变得更加困难。
Now, to find something at a discount from intrinsic value, those simple systems, ordinarily, don’t work. You’ve got to get into Warren’s kind of thinking. And that is a lot harder.
现在，要找到低于内在价值的投资标的，那些简单的系统通常不起作用了。你必须采用沃伦的那种思维方式。而这要困难得多。
I think you can predict the future in a few places best if you understand a few basic ideas that come from a good general education. And that’s what I was talking about in that talk I gave at the USC Business School.
我认为，如果你掌握了一些来自良好教育的基础知识，在某些领域你可以更好地预测未来。这就是我在南加州大学商学院演讲中提到的内容。
In other words, Coca-Cola’s a simple company if it’s stripped down and analyzed in terms of some elemental forces.
换句话说，可口可乐是一家简单的公司，如果你将其剖析成一些基本的驱动力。
WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie —
沃伦·巴菲特： 当查理——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not hard to understand Costco, either, you know —
查理·芒格： 你知道的，理解Costco也不难——
There are certain fundamental models out there that do not take — you don’t have the kind of ability that quantum mechanics requires. You just have to know a few simple things and really know them.
有一些基本的商业模式不需要你具备像量子力学那样的能力。你只需要知道几件简单的事情，并且真正理解它们。
WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie talks about “liquidating value,” he’s not talking about closing up the enterprise. But he’s talking about what somebody else would pay for that stream of cash, too, I mean —
沃伦·巴菲特： 当查理提到“清算价值”时，他不是在说关闭企业，而是在说其他人愿意为那笔现金流支付的价格——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
查理·芒格： 是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: You could’ve looked at a collection of television stations owned by Cap Cities, for example, in the early to mid — well, 1974. It would’ve been worth, we’ll say, four times what the company was selling for. Not because you’d close the stations, but just their stream of income was worth that to somebody else. It’s just that the marketplace was very distressed — depressed.
沃伦·巴菲特： 比如，在1974年左右，你可以看看Cap Cities拥有的一系列电视台。它们的价值可能是公司市值的四倍。并不是因为你会关闭这些电视台，而是因为它们的收入流对其他人来说值这个价。只是当时的市场非常低迷——萧条。
Although, like I say, on a negotiated basis, you could have gone and sold the properties for four times what the company was selling for. And you got wonderful management.
不过，正如我所说，通过谈判，你可以以公司市值的四倍价格出售这些资产。而且你还得到了出色的管理团队。
I mean, those things happen in markets. They will happen again. But part of investing and calculating intrinsic values is if you get the wrong answer when you get through — in other words, if it says don’t buy, you can’t buy just because somebody else thinks it’s going up or because your friends have made a lot of easy money lately or anything of the sort.
我的意思是，这种事情在市场中会发生，而且还会再次发生。但投资和计算内在价值的一部分是，如果你的结论是错误的——换句话说，如果结果是“不要买”，你不能因为别人认为它会上涨，或者你的朋友最近赚了很多轻松的钱，就去买入。
You just — you have to be able to walk away from anything that doesn’t work. And very few things work these days. You also have to walk away from anything you don’t understand which, in my case, is a big handicap.
你必须能够放弃任何无效的东西。而如今，很少有东西真正奏效。你还必须远离任何你不理解的东西，这对我来说是一个很大的障碍。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But you would agree, wouldn’t you, Warren, that it’s much harder now?
查理·芒格： 但你会同意吧，沃伦，现在确实更难了？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But I would also agree that almost anytime over the last 40 years that we’ve been up on a podium, we would’ve said it was much harder in the past, (laughs) too.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。但我也会同意，在过去40年里，我们几乎每次站在讲台上时都会说过去更难（笑声）。
But it is harder now. It’s way harder.
但现在确实更难了，难得多。
Part of it being harder now, too, is the amount of the capital we run. I mean, if we were running $100,000, our prospects for returns would be — and we really needed the money — our prospects for return would be considerably better than they are running Berkshire. It’s very simple. Our universe of possible ideas would expand by a huge factor.
现在更难的一部分原因是我们管理的资金量。我是说，如果我们只管理10万美元，而且我们真的需要这些钱，我们的回报前景会比现在管理伯克希尔时好得多。这很简单。我们的投资选择范围会大幅扩大。
We are looking at things today that, by their nature, a lot of people are looking at. And there were times in the past when we were looking at things that very few people were looking at.
如今，我们关注的是很多人都在关注的事物。而过去，有些时候我们关注的东西几乎没人关注。
But there were other times in the past when we were looking at things where the whole world was just looking at them kind of crazy. And that’s a decided help.
但也有一些过去的时期，全世界都在疯狂地关注某些事物。这对我们来说是一个明确的帮助。
37. Stocks look high, but not as high as they look
股票看起来很高，但没有想象中那么高
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bakul Patel (PH). I’m from upstate New York. I’ve got a few questions. And I need your permission to ask each question separately and wait for the answer.
听众： 我叫Bakul Patel（音译），来自纽约州北部。我有几个问题，需要得到您的允许逐个提问并等待回答。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll take a couple, but —
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们可以回答几个，但——
I got through college, you know, only answering three or four questions. So I don’t want to go through that again. (Laughter)
你知道，我上大学时也只回答了三四个问题，所以我不想再经历那样的情况了。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: They are unrelated questions.
听众： 它们是无关的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. OK. We’ll give you a couple, then we’ll let other people have a chance. How about two, OK?
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，好吧。我们可以答两个问题，然后让其他人有机会。这样可以吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fine. Mr. Market is valuing Dow Jones at about 7,000 and S&P at about 800.
听众： 好的。目前市场将道琼斯指数估值约为7,000，标准普尔指数估值约为800。
By your valuation model, at the current interest rate and current inflation rate and current growth rate, what is a fair valuation of both these companies?
按照您的估值模型，在当前的利率、通胀率和增长率下，这两个指数的合理估值是多少？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question but a tough question. But I would say that if you believed American — the American business, in aggregate, could earn the kind of returns on equity that they have been earning in the last — or has in the last couple of years — and then you postulate no change in interest rates, you can justify 7,000 on the Dow and 800 on the S&P.
沃伦·巴菲特： 这是个好问题，但也是个难问题。不过，我会说，如果你相信美国整体企业能够像过去几年那样继续获得相似的股本回报率，并假设利率没有变化，那么7,000点的道琼斯指数和800点的标普指数是合理的。
Now, you know, there’s a couple ifs I threw in there. And if interest rates go higher, the valuation goes down automatically.
当然，你知道，我在这里提到了一些假设。如果利率上升，估值会自动下降。
And more importantly, if the returns on equity of American industry — which are historic highs, and which sort of classical economics would tell you would be hard to maintain — if those returns go down, on average, that also would pull it down.
更重要的是，如果美国企业的股本回报率下降——当前股本回报率处于历史高位，而根据经典经济学，这种水平难以维持——那么，这也会拉低估值。
But if you’re willing to accept the current level of returns on equity as being typical of the future case for American business and you’re willing to assume present interest rates are lower, then, you can justify a valuation on the Dow and S&P.
但是，如果你愿意接受当前的股本回报率水平作为未来美国企业的典型表现，并假设当前的低利率能够持续下去，那么，道琼斯指数和标普指数的估值就是合理的。
And it’s interesting because I got all that commentary after I wrote that line in the report which was, as I said earlier, designed for a little something else. I’ll give you a little trivia quiz.
有趣的是，当我在报告中写下那段话后，我得到了这些评论。而这段话，正如我之前提到的，本来是为了其他目的而写的。我给你们出一个小测验。
What two years in this century has the Dow had the greatest overall gain? The two years in the 1900s are 1933, which most of you don’t think of as a banner year, and 1954. And in both of those years, the Dow was up over 50 percent, counting dividends.
本世纪中，道琼斯指数在哪两年里总体涨幅最大？20世纪的两年是1933年（大多数人不会认为这是一个标志性年份）和1954年。在这两年中，道琼斯指数的涨幅都超过了50%，包括股息在内。
In March of 1955, because of that, the fact that the Dow had gone up — bear in the mind that the high on the Dow was 381 in 1929 and it took 25 years before that was surpassed. And in 1954, the Dow went from, say, 280 up to 404, or something like that, just a little over 50 percent.
1955年3月，因为道琼斯指数的上涨——记住，道指的最高点是在1929年的381点，而它花了25年才超过这个点位。在1954年，道指从280点上涨到404点左右，涨幅略高于50%。
So what did they decide to do? They decided to have congressional hearings about it. And they did.
那么，他们决定做什么呢？他们决定就此举行国会听证会。确实举行了。
In March of 1955, they had hearings in the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Chairman Fulbright. And my boss, Ben Graham, was called down to testify. And it’s fascinating reading. Bernard Baruch was there, all kinds of people. I’ve got the hearings at home.
1955年3月，他们在参议院银行和货币委员会举行了听证会，主席是福布赖特。而我的老板本·格雷厄姆被传唤作证。这份听证会记录非常有趣。伯纳德·巴鲁克也在场，还有各种各样的人。我家里还保存着这份听证会记录。
And Ben’s opening comments about the market at that time were that the market looks high, it is high, but it’s not as high as it looks. Well — (Laughter)
本当时关于市场的开场评论是：“市场看起来很高，它确实很高，但并不像看上去那么高。”嗯——（笑声）
That’s about the present situation. I mean, it looks very high, just by comparing 7,000, certainly, to the 404 at the end of 1954 when Ben was testifying.
这和现在的情况差不多。我是说，它看起来确实很高，比如，把现在的7,000点与1954年底本作证时的404点相比就能看出这一点。
But there are — there have been huge changing in earnings and return on equity on American business in general. And, then, you had this big move in interest rates.
但是，美国企业的盈利和股本回报率总体上经历了巨大的变化。随后，利率也发生了大幅波动。
Now, those are underlying fundamentals that have had — powered a huge bull market. After a while, as I mentioned earlier, people get captivated simply by the notion of rising prices without going back to the underlying rationale. And that’s when you get very dangerous conditions in terms of possible bubbles.
这些基本面因素推动了一个巨大的牛市。但正如我之前提到的，过了一段时间，人们往往会被价格上涨的表象所吸引，而不再回顾其背后的基本逻辑。这就是可能出现泡沫并带来极其危险局面的时刻。
And it would — you know — I have no idea where markets will go. But if you had the kind of conditions that could cause real excesses, just like you had excesses in 1973 and ’4, going back to when you could buy things at 20 cents on the dollar, you had excesses in the other direction.
而且——你知道——我无法预测市场会走向何方。但如果出现了能够导致真正过度的条件，就像1973年和1974年的情况一样，那时你可以以一美元20美分的价格买到东西。而过度现象也可能出现在另一个方向。
You know, the country didn’t disappear or anything. It’s just people behave in extreme ways in markets. And over time, that’s very good for people that keep their heads.
你知道，国家并没有消失，也没有发生什么天大的事情。只是人们在市场中表现得极端。但从长远来看，这对那些保持冷静的人非常有利。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.
查理·芒格： 我没什么要补充的。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. You get one more. (LAUGH)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，你还有一个问题。（笑声）
38. When Berkshire is cheap, other things are usually cheaper
当伯克希尔便宜时，其他东西通常更便宜
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If Mr. Market goes in the depressed phase that Berkshire Hathaway has got an investment portion of its book value about 28,000 per Class A share, that would put that Berkshire Hathaway share much lower than what it is now. Would Berkshire Hathaway consider buying back its own share? Or has it done so in the past? Or is it out of the question?
听众： 如果市场进入低迷阶段，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资部分每A类股的账面价值为28,000美元，这将使伯克希尔的股价远低于现在的水平。伯克希尔是否会考虑回购自己的股票？或者是否在过去做过？还是根本不可能？
WARREN BUFFETT: If the market went in the tank, Berkshire stock would go in the tank, too. And so there shouldn’t be anybody in this room that owns the stock that would not find it palatable, if not become positively enthusiastic, about the stock going down 50 percent.
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果市场崩盘，伯克希尔的股票也会下跌。所以，这个房间里持有伯克希尔股票的人都应该觉得股价下跌50%不是难以接受的事情，甚至可能感到兴奋。
It would not bother Charlie. It wouldn’t bother me, because we would have very intelligent things, then, to do with whatever capital we came into. And we would be generating capital as we went along.
这不会困扰查理，也不会困扰我，因为那时我们会有非常明智的事情可以用手头的资金去做。而且我们在经营过程中会不断产生资本。
We wouldn’t have sold our Coke. We wouldn’t have sold our Gillette. We wouldn’t have sold our businesses. So most of our capital would’ve ridden that down. But at least, we would have intelligent things to do with the money.
我们不会卖掉我们的可口可乐股份，也不会卖掉我们的吉列股份，更不会卖掉我们的业务。所以，我们的大部分资本会经历这场下跌。但至少，我们会有明智的事情可以用这些资金去做。
One of the intelligent things, possibly, could be to buy in our own stock. But that would imply that our own stock was cheaper relative to value than anything else we could find among possible opportunities. And the chances are we could find things that were more attractive.
其中一个明智的选择可能是回购我们的股票。但这意味着我们的股票相对于其价值比我们能找到的其他投资机会更便宜。而实际情况是，我们可能会发现更有吸引力的东西。
Back in 1973 or ’4, when we were buying Washington Post at a fraction of what it was worth, Berkshire stock may have been cheap then. But it wasn’t as cheap as the Washington Post.
回到1973年或1974年，当我们以其价值的一小部分价格买入《华盛顿邮报》时，伯克希尔的股票可能当时很便宜。但它没有《华盛顿邮报》那么便宜。
In 1987 or — well, in 1988 and ’89, you know, Berkshire stock may or may not have been cheap. But it wasn’t as cheap as Coca-Cola.
在1987年，或者说1988年和1989年，伯克希尔的股票可能便宜，也可能不便宜。但它没有可口可乐那么便宜。
And it’s unlikely that among the thousands of the possible investments that Berkshire will be the most attractive at any time. But if it were, you know, obviously, we would buy in our own stock.
在数千种可能的投资中，伯克希尔的股票成为最具吸引力的选择的可能性很小。但如果它是最吸引人的，显然，我们会回购自己的股票。
But I think if the Dow went down 50 percent, we would have plenty of interesting things to do. And we would not be unhappy.
但我认为，如果道琼斯指数下跌50%，我们会有很多有趣的事情可以做。我们不会感到不高兴。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We don’t have any rule against it. Opportunity cost is the game around here.
查理·芒格： 是的，我们对此没有任何限制。机会成本是我们这里的游戏规则。
39. International earnings in the United States
美国的国际收益
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m David Day from Coppell, Texas. And I’m a Berkshire shareholder.
听众： 我是来自德克萨斯州Coppell的David Day，我是伯克希尔的股东。
Mr. Buffett, what is your opinion of investing in foreign company stocks?
巴菲特先生，您对投资外国公司股票的看法是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have a number, well, at least several major businesses, three or four at least, five, six, I mean, as I count along, that derive very significant percentages of their earnings from international operations.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们有一些主要业务，至少三四个，甚至五六个，它们相当大比例的收益来自国际业务。
Coca-Cola earns 80 percent or more from international operations. Gillette would earn two-thirds or more from international operations.
可口可乐的国际业务收入占比达到80%或更多。吉列的国际业务收入占比达到三分之二或更多。
So if you look to where earnings are coming from, we get a lot from international companies. They don’t have to be domiciled outside the United States.
所以如果你看收益的来源，我们从国际公司中获得了很多收益。这些公司不一定要注册在美国以外。
It’s a slight advantage to us to have them domiciled in this country. For example, their dividends are treated better. We get better treatment on the dividends if they are domestically based rather than based someplace else, just because of the way the U.S. tax laws work.
将这些公司注册在美国对我们有一些小优势。例如，它们的股息会受到更好的待遇。如果这些公司注册在国内而不是其他地方，我们在股息方面会有更好的税收待遇，这仅仅是因为美国税法的运作方式。
But if Coca-Cola were domiciled in Amsterdam, or Gillette were domiciled in London, they had the same basic businesses, we would be attracted to them to virtually the same degree we are as having them domiciled in Atlanta and Boston.
但如果可口可乐注册在阿姆斯特丹，或者吉列注册在伦敦，而它们拥有相同的基本业务，我们对它们的吸引力几乎与它们注册在亚特兰大和波士顿时一样大。
We look at businesses outside this country that are domiciled outside this country. Many don’t meet our size requirements. But that’s true here, too. We have to look at very big companies. But we have nothing against buying into companies that are domiciled — or even buying the entire business of a company — that’s domiciled outside the United States.
我们关注注册在美国以外的公司。许多公司不符合我们的规模要求，但这在美国也是如此。我们必须关注非常大的公司。不过，我们对购买注册在美国以外的公司的股票，甚至收购整个公司并没有什么异议。
We feel slightly less familiar with the tax laws and the corporate cultures, perhaps. But that would not be a huge factor in a great many countries. And, you know, we will keep looking. We need to look everywhere with the kind of money that we have available for investment.
或许我们对税法和企业文化稍微不那么熟悉。但在很多国家，这并不是一个很大的障碍。我们会继续寻找投资机会。我们需要在全球范围内寻找适合我们投资资金规模的机会。
这个想法后面几年就改变了，其实一开始就是谨慎的。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Again, we’ve had a wonderful way of playing the rapid development of economies outside the United States. And so far, we haven’t seen anything that attracted us as being better.
查理·芒格： 再说一次，我们已经找到了一种很棒的方法来参与美国以外经济体的快速发展。而到目前为止，我们还没有发现比这更吸引我们的东西。
And if you can sell Coca-Cola, you know, do you really want to get into steel in Malaysia or something? (Laughter)
如果你可以卖可口可乐，你真的想去投资马来西亚的钢铁行业之类的吗？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We sold a substantial number of Kirby units outside of the United States last year. And that business has grown very significantly in recent years. And I think it promises to grow.
沃伦·巴菲特： 去年，我们在美国以外销售了相当数量的Kirby产品。这项业务近年来增长非常显著。我认为它有很好的增长前景。
We’re always looking for opportunities. Some things travel very well. And some things don’t.
我们一直在寻找机会。有些东西很容易跨国发展，而有些则不然。
I mean, Gillette travels. Disney travels. McDonalds travels. Coke travels.
比如，吉列能跨国发展。迪士尼能跨国发展。麦当劳能跨国发展。可口可乐能跨国发展。
You know, See’s Candy doesn’t travel as well. It might if you spent 50 years working on it. But it’s not an easy thing to travel. Actually, candy bars, themselves, don’t travel very well.
而你看，See’s糖果的跨国发展就没有那么顺利。如果你花50年来努力推动，也许可以做到。但它并不容易跨国发展。实际上，糖果棒本身并不太适合跨国发展。
If you look at the top-selling candy bars in France or in England and Japan, you don’t find the similarity that you find in terms of the bestselling soft drinks or movies or fast food hamburgers or razor blades, and —
如果你看法国、英国和日本的畅销糖果棒，它们之间并没有像畅销饮料、电影、快餐汉堡或剃须刀片那样的相似性，另外——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Except Snickers. For some reason, Snickers. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 除了士力架。出于某种原因，士力架可以。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It travels very well. Don’t ask me why. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 它非常适合跨国发展。别问我为什么。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Charlie’s had a lot of experience as he goes around the world. (Laughter) You don’t want to eat where we eat. You may want to invest where we invest, but — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，查理在全球旅行中积累了很多经验。（笑声）你们可能不会想在我们吃饭的地方吃饭，但你们可能会想在我们投资的地方投资。（笑声）
40. Businesses with “natural limits” welcomed at Berkshire
伯克希尔欢迎具有“自然限制”的企业
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Section 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Richard Tomkins (PH) from Gallatin, Tennessee. And I have just two quick questions.
听众： 我是来自田纳西州加拉廷的Richard Tomkins（音）。我有两个简短的问题。
Could both of y’all discuss the Kansas Bankers business and its competitors? How big of a moat Kansas Bankers has in the industry and if they’re going to expand, you know, outside of the 22 or 20 states that they’re currently in. And that’s A.
你们能否谈谈Kansas Bankers这项业务及其竞争对手？Kansas Bankers在行业中的护城河有多宽？他们是否会扩展到目前覆盖的20到22个州以外？这是第一个问题。
And, then, secondly, just clue us in a little bit more on the five-year discount notes that you did that were tied to the Salomon stock. And was that a way to unload it? Or just kind of give us a little more than what we saw in the annual.
其次，能否更详细地解释一下你们发行的与所罗门股票挂钩的五年贴现票据？这是为了减持这些股票吗？还是可以补充一些年报中没有提到的细节？
WARREN BUFFETT: Sometimes in the insurance business, you have a choice between being a good business or a big business. And fortunately, Don Towle, who runs Kansas Banker Surety, has chosen for a good business.
沃伦·巴菲特： 在保险行业，有时你需要在成为一家好公司和一家大公司之间做出选择。幸运的是，运营Kansas Banker Surety的Don Towle选择了成为一家好公司。
It’s a specialized operation that sells, as its name implies, to bankers, and primarily policies that have fidelity coverage.
这是一项专注的业务，正如其名称所暗示的，它主要为银行家提供保险，尤其是涵盖忠诚保证的保单。
That is just not a big volume business in the whole United States. They do it exceptionally well. Don knows every, you know, he knows every account. He knows every claim. You know, he runs a fabulous operation. But it’s not an operation that can double or triple in size doing what it does and doing well. There just aren’t — there’s not the opportunity there.
在整个美国，这并不是一个大规模的业务。他们做得非常出色。Don了解每一个账户、每一个理赔。他的运营非常出色。但这并不是一个可以通过现有业务翻倍或三倍增长的公司。这样的机会并不存在。
On the other hand, I think it’s tough to compete against Don because he brings an element of knowledge and personal attention to the account and factors of that sort that a really large company would have trouble duplicating.
另一方面，我认为与Don竞争很困难，因为他对账户的了解和个人关注是大型公司难以复制的。
Charlie, you want to add anything on Kansas Bankers?
查理，你有什么想补充的吗，关于Kansas Bankers？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There’s a huge class of businesses in America which are very strong and will throw out large amounts of cash in relation to their size but which can’t rationally be expanded very much. And if you try and expand certain kinds of businesses, you’re throwing money down the rat hole.
查理·芒格： 是的，美国有一大类企业，它们非常强大，相对于其规模能产生大量现金，但无法合理地大幅扩展。如果你试图扩展某些类型的业务，你可能就是在把钱打水漂。
The beauty of the Berkshire Hathaway system is that such businesses are very welcome here because the cash comes into headquarters and is allocated there.
伯克希尔哈撒韦系统的优点在于，这类企业在这里非常受欢迎，因为这些现金会流入总部，然后由总部分配。
If there’s anything sensible to do at the subsidiary level, we always want it done. But there are businesses where — lots of businesses — where there isn’t much of a way of redeploying the cash.
如果在子公司层面有合理的事情可以做，我们总是希望它能被完成。但对于许多业务来说，几乎没有太多重新部署现金的方式。
WARREN BUFFETT: Part the reason they have a moat around them is that they’re of a size and have specialized skills that other organizations just can’t get into it. I’ll give you another example, and that’s somewhat the same field.
沃伦·巴菲特： 它们之所以有护城河，部分原因是它们的规模和专业技能让其他组织无法进入这个领域。我再给你一个例子，这与该领域有些相似。
There’s a company called Western Surety. It’s changed ownership a couple of times. Charlie and I went up to see them 15 years ago about buying it at Sioux Falls.
有一家叫Western Surety的公司，已经易主了几次。15年前，查理和我曾经去苏福尔斯看过这家公司，想要收购它。
They write notary bonds. And they write a whole bunch of things that have $50 premiums or $25 premiums. They have — it was a company doing not that many millions of premiums, but they had 30,000 agents. But each agent, you know, may have done $500 worth of business within a year or a thousand dollars.
他们经营公证担保业务，还有许多保费只有50美元或25美元的项目。这家公司保费总额不算太多，但他们有3万名代理。每个代理可能一年只能做500美元或1000美元的业务。
Well, Chubb can’t go after that business the same way. We certainly can’t at National Indemnity. They have a distribution system that works wonders. But you can’t pump two or three times the volume through that distribution system. And if you could pump it through, there would’ve been more competition.
Chubb公司无法以同样的方式进入这个业务领域。我们在National Indemnity也做不到。他们的分销系统非常有效，但你无法通过该系统增加两到三倍的业务量。而如果能做到，就会有更多的竞争。
So there are businesses that have certain natural limits that, you know, you want to be careful that you don’t talk yourself into thinking a business that has limits and find out that it really has way more potential.
因此，有些业务有某种自然限制。你需要小心，不要让自己误以为一个业务有其限制，而实际上它还有更大的潜力。
I mean, it would’ve been a shame if Mr. [Asa Griggs] Candler decided that Coca-Cola only appealed to people in Atlanta or something of the sort. So you have to be a little careful on that.
比如，如果阿萨·格里格斯·坎德勒先生认为可口可乐只吸引亚特兰大的消费者，那将是一个遗憾。所以你需要对此稍加谨慎。
But we — a fellow like Don will be very good at understanding, you know, where his competitive advantages can take him and where they don’t take him. He’s done a terrific job over the years doing it.
不过，像Don这样的人非常擅长理解他的竞争优势可以带他到哪里，以及不能带他到哪里。他多年来在这方面做得非常出色。
41. Debt deals vs. buying stock
债务交易与购买股票的比较
WARREN BUFFETT: There was a second question, was there?
沃伦·巴菲特： 还有第二个问题，是吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just the $500 million I think that y’all did, of the discount.
听众： 就是你们提到的5亿美元贴现的问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, the Salomon notes.
查理·芒格： 哦，是所罗门票据。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, the Salomon notes. Yeah. Well, that is simply an issue of Berkshire — by Berkshire — of 500 million, as you mention, of a very low-coupon note — low-interest rate note, too — that is convertible — or exchangeable — into Salomon stock anytime during the next five years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，是所罗门票据。是的，这其实是伯克希尔发行的一笔5亿美元的票据，如你提到的，是一种非常低票息的债券——利率也很低——可以在未来五年内随时转换或兑换为所罗门的股票。
And it’s a way of taking the capital out of that block of stock at a low-interest cost to use elsewhere, while retaining a limited portion of the upside in the Salomon stock.
这是一种以低利息成本从这部分股票中提取资本并将其用于其他地方的方法，同时保留对所罗门股票部分上涨的有限参与权。
And we just — we made that decision, whenever it was, six months ago or so, based on the thought that we might have some good opportunities at some point to use that money, and raising the money at a little over a one percent current cost, or a three percent cost to maturity — and we think the actual cost is likely to be close to the one percent — made sense for us.
我们大约六个月前做出了这个决定，基于我们认为未来可能会有一些不错的机会使用这笔资金。以略高于1%的当前成本或3%的到期成本筹集资金——而我们认为实际成本可能接近1%——对我们来说是合理的。
We have never owned — I mean, we have the convertible preferreds of Champion, of US Airways, and of Salomon. And those are three industries — I don’t think we’ve ever owned an airline stock, common stock. I don’t think we’ve ever owned a paper company common stock. And we’ve only had a very limited amount of investment in the investment banking businesses.
我们从未拥有——我是说，我们拥有Champion、美国航空和所罗门的可转换优先股。而这些是三个行业——我不认为我们曾经持有过航空公司的普通股。我也不认为我们曾经持有过造纸公司的普通股。而且我们在投资银行业务的投资也非常有限。
Those are industries that we don’t feel that we’ve got the same kind of long-term economic advantage that we have in something like a Coke or a Gillette. So those are not natural places for us to be common shareholders. And the issuance of that exchangeable debt reflected that view.
这些行业我们认为没有可口可乐或吉列那样的长期经济优势。因此，这些行业不是我们自然会成为普通股股东的领域。而发行这种可兑换债券反映了我们的这种看法。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I agree. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我同意。（笑声）
42. Lower tax rate probably won’t trigger Berkshire stock sales
较低的税率可能不会引发伯克希尔股票的大量抛售
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第二区。
CHRISTINE SHRAM: My name is Kristen Schramm (PH). I am from Springfield, Illinois.
克里斯汀·施拉姆： 我叫克里斯汀·施拉姆，来自伊利诺伊州斯普林菲尔德。
I am a proud shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway. In light of the upcoming capital gains tax reduction, do you envision any increased selling pressure, such as buying opportunities for Berkshire stock?
我是伯克希尔哈撒韦的自豪股东。考虑到即将到来的资本利得税下调，您是否认为会出现任何增加的抛售压力，比如伯克希尔股票的购买机会？
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a good question, Kristen. We’re proud to have you, too. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这是个好问题，克里斯汀。我们也很自豪能有你这样的股东。（掌声）
A very high percentage of Berkshire shares is owned by people with a very low tax basis. So that if I had to guess, I would say that probably 80 percent, at least, of the shares are owned by people whose cost is less than a hundred dollars a share on the A stock.
伯克希尔股票中有很大一部分是由成本基础非常低的人持有的。如果让我猜，我会说至少有80%的股票是由持股成本每股低于100美元的股东持有的。
And that, undoubtedly, contributes to some people’s reluctance to sell, particularly if they’re older, and —
这无疑会导致一些人不愿意出售，特别是那些年纪较大的股东。
But I think it would probably — it might make less difference than you think. I think most people, if there were a lower capital gains rate, I don’t think it would be a huge change in the propensity to sell the stock.
但我认为这可能——影响可能比你想象的要小。我认为即使资本利得税率降低，大多数人出售股票的倾向也不会发生很大的变化。
I would hope, even if there was a zero capital gains tax, that there really wouldn’t be any rush for the exits. It wouldn’t affect my attitude, particularly. But I think it’s perfectly reasonable to assume that as the tax rate goes down, there will be some greater tendency to sell by people with a low tax basis on their shares.
我希望，即使资本利得税率降为零，也不会出现蜂拥抛售的情况。这不会特别影响我的态度。不过，我认为假设税率降低后，持有低税基股票的人更倾向于抛售，这是完全合理的。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the laws of microeconomics and the laws of psychology are such that if you said, “The tax rate will, for one month, go down to zero,” you would have some very dramatic effects in the markets. It’s not going to happen, of course.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为微观经济学和心理学的规律表明，如果你说“税率将在一个月内降为零”，市场会出现非常戏剧性的反应。当然，这不会发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. But if you said the tax rate was going to zero for one month, and then going to a hundred percent subsequently, I think you’d get a certain amount of activity. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。但如果你说税率在一个月内降为零，之后升至100%，我想你会看到一些特殊的市场活动。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: But then you’d really —
查理·芒格： 但那样你就真的会——
So you could tinker with the tax laws in a way that would cause dramatic market effects. I don’t anticipate any such things happening.
因此，你可以通过修改税法引发剧烈的市场反应。但我不认为这样的事情会发生。
We had something similar back when they — what was it, ’86 — where the tax rate was 20 percent on long-term capital gains. And it was the last year you could liquidate a corporation and not pay gains taxes on appreciated assets that were disposed of in the liquidation. And we got a great flood of liquidations in that year.
我们在1986年经历过类似的情况，当时长期资本利得税率是20%。那是最后一年，你可以清算一家公司而不用为清算中处置的增值资产支付资本利得税。因此，那一年出现了大量的公司清算。
So it’s possible to do things to the tax laws that have big market effects. But it gets very unlikely that any such thing is going to happen this year.
因此，通过修改税法确实可以对市场产生重大影响。但今年发生这种事情的可能性非常低。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I agree with that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我同意。
43. We know our super-cat insurance risks, but many others don’t
我们了解我们的巨灾保险风险，但许多人并不了解
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区？
VOICE: (Inaudible)
声音： （听不清）
VOICE: What number is this? Is this three or four? What is it?
声音： 这是第几个？第三还是第四？
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a zone 2?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有第二区吗？
VOICE: Is this it?
声音： 是这里吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The microphone working?
沃伦·巴菲特： 麦克风能用吗？
Zone 3? Well, we’ll go to zone 3, then.
第三区？那我们就去第三区吧。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Charles Parcells (PH) from Grosse Pointe, Michigan. Very glad to be here. I’m a recent stockholder of Berkshire. I’m sorry to say that. (Laughter)
听众： 我是来自密歇根州Grosse Pointe的Charles Parcells（音）。非常高兴能来到这里。我最近才成为伯克希尔的股东，说起来有点惭愧。（笑声）
But it does not diminish my admiration for past performance or my confidence in future performance.
但这并不影响我对伯克希尔过往表现的钦佩，也不影响我对未来表现的信心。
I heard recently a remark by, I think, a very successful investor, whom I think worked with the Bass family in Texas for a while.
我最近听到了一位非常成功的投资者的评论，我想他曾在德克萨斯州与Bass家族共事过一段时间。
And one of his comments, if I understand it correctly, said something like this. “Hurricane Andrew destroyed the super-cat industry.” And that’s about all he said. And I know we’re into it. I’m interested in its importance to Berkshire and your comments on it, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.
他的其中一条评论，如果我理解没错的话，是这样的：“飓风安德鲁摧毁了巨灾保险行业。”他大概就是这么说的。我知道伯克希尔参与了这一行业。我想听听它对伯克希尔的重要性，以及巴菲特先生和芒格先生的评论。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I guess I would say I don’t fully understand why he would — or even partially understand — why he would say that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我想我不完全理解——甚至部分理解——为什么他会那么说。
I mean, we are in business in the super-cat business — and I should explain, super-cat business is very much like it sounds. I mean, we write insurance for other insurance companies, other reinsurance companies, to protect them, to pay them at a time when something really big comes along, a super catastrophe. And Hurricane Andrew was certainly a super catastrophe.
我是说，我们确实从事巨灾保险业务——我应该解释一下，巨灾保险业务和它的名字很相符。我们为其他保险公司或再保险公司提供保险，保护它们在遇到真正大的灾难时获得赔付，而飓风安德鲁绝对是一次巨灾。
But that’s the reason people do business with us, so —
但这正是他们选择与我们合作的原因，所以——
We pay off infrequently, but we pay off big. And we paid off about 120 million at Hurricane Andrew. But if Hurricane Andrew happened today — well, at least in one of the policies (inaudible) we have — we would certainly be paying off at least, what, 6, 700 million, something like that.
我们赔付的频率不高，但金额很大。在飓风安德鲁事件中，我们赔付了大约1.2亿美元。但如果今天再发生类似飓风安德鲁的灾难——至少按照我们目前的一份保单（听不清）——我们肯定会赔付至少6亿或7亿美元，差不多是这个数目。
And if it happens five years from now, we’ll pay off a lot more than that because we will, undoubtedly, be writing more business at that time.
如果类似的事件在五年后发生，我们的赔付金额会比现在多得多，因为到那时，我们无疑会承保更多的业务。
So it’s just part of the game. And there will be super-cats of various kinds. There will be, you know, huge quakes. There will be more hurricanes than huge quakes. And when that time comes, we will write a big check.
这只是游戏的一部分。未来还会有各种巨灾。会有大的地震，也会有比地震更多的飓风。当那一天到来时，我们会开出一张大额支票。
But that doesn’t — you know, prices may be firmer after such an event. They may not be. They didn’t firm as much as you might expect after Andrew happened. Andrew was a huge surprise to people.
但这并不意味着——你知道，灾后保费价格可能会上涨，也可能不会。在安德鲁飓风之后，保费并没有像人们预期的那样大幅上涨。安德鲁飓风对很多人来说是一个巨大的意外。
As a digression, you know, people in the insurance business thought that — they all had these models — and some of them were prepared by reinsurance brokers and some of them by various research institutes — as how much they would lose under certain kinds of circumstances.
插一句话，保险行业的人认为他们都有这些模型——有些是由再保险经纪人准备的，有些是由各种研究机构准备的——用来预测在某些情况下可能的损失金额。
And they couldn’t have been further off with an Andrew, or with the Northridge earthquake.
而这些模型对安德鲁飓风或北岭地震的预测都差得离谱。
Fortunately, we don’t rely on those. We — I don’t know what exactly we do rely on, but we don’t rely on those. (Laughter)
幸运的是，我们不依赖这些模型。我们——我不知道我们具体依赖什么，但我们不依赖这些。（笑声）
And the — Hurricane Andrew was, you know, that was just — that’s part of business with Berkshire.
安德鲁飓风是——你知道的，那只是伯克希尔业务的一部分。
And we will have another one. And we’ll have another one after that. So every three, or five, or seven years, or who knows what, we will lose significant money in the super-cat business. And we expect that over 20 or 25 years, we will make more money than we lose.
我们未来还会遇到类似的事件，然后再遇到一次。每隔三年、五年、七年，或者谁知道多久，我们会在巨灾保险业务上损失一大笔钱。但我们预期在20到25年间，我们赚的钱会多于损失的钱。
We bring some real advantages to that business, as I wrote about in the report. And it makes sense for us to be in it. It only makes sense for us to be in it when the premium prices are right. But when they are appropriate, we will — we’re more than willing to step up and take on a fair amount of risk.
正如我在报告中写的那样，我们在这项业务中确实有一些优势。参与这项业务对我们来说是合理的，但只有在保费价格合适的情况下才合理。当价格合适时，我们非常愿意承担相当大的风险。
As I wrote in the report, on the California Earthquake Authority, you know, we could, tomorrow, face a demand for roughly a billion dollars. And we are prepared to write a check that day to take care of that. And we will write it, if it happens. And there aren’t many people in the world that an insured can count on to do that.
正如我在报告中提到的，加州地震保险局可能会在明天向我们提出大约10亿美元的赔偿需求。我们已经准备好当天开出支票来解决这个问题。如果真的发生了，我们会支付。而世界上能让被保险人如此信赖的公司并不多。
The interesting thing is that the worst exposure, still, for super-cats, are not borne by us. But they’re borne implicitly by some very big direct writing companies that have lots of risk on Long Island or along the New Madrid Fault or other places.
有趣的是，巨灾保险中最大的风险暴露并不在我们这里，而是隐性地由一些大型直接承保公司承担。这些公司在长岛、新马德里断层或其他地区承担了大量风险。
And they have got, well, millions of policies, and maybe hundreds of thousands of exposed policies. And they don’t think of themselves as being in the super-cat business. Well, they really do, but they don’t think, you know, day by day about it. And they are very exposed.
这些公司有数百万份保单，可能有数十万份面临风险的保单。他们并不认为自己从事的是巨灾保险业务。事实上他们确实是，但他们不会每天都去想这件事。他们的风险暴露很大。
Our exposures are limited to a given dollar amount. That dollar amount may be large. But at least we know what it is. And we take risks — that we’re willing to take risks when we think we’re appropriately paid.
我们的风险暴露是限定在一定的金额范围内的。这个金额可能很大，但至少我们知道它是多少。当我们认为得到了合理的回报时，我们愿意承担风险。
There’s a mentality to bring to the super-cat business that’s somewhat akin to what you bring to the investment business. So we think we’re well equipped for it.
参与巨灾保险业务需要一种类似于投资业务的心态。所以我们认为自己在这方面具备良好的能力。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. A billion dollars would be, what, 2 1/2 percent, or less, of the liquid assets and securities around Berkshire. And so that’s irritating, but it — (laughter) — it’s not going to destroy the enterprise.
查理·芒格： 是的，10亿美元大概占伯克希尔流动资产和证券的2.5%或更少。所以这虽然令人恼火，但——（笑声）——它不会摧毁整个公司。
Whereas, if you have an unwitting super-cat exposure that you don’t even recognize you have, it could destroy your company. Twentieth Century, a very well-run direct writer of insurance, they all but went broke with the Northridge Earthquake.
然而，如果你有未意识到的巨灾保险风险暴露，可能会摧毁你的公司。20世纪保险公司是一家经营良好的直接保险公司，但在北岭地震中几乎破产。
WARREN BUFFETT: And they didn’t think it was possible, either.
沃伦·巴菲特： 而且他们也不认为这是可能的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And they had no idea they had a super-cat exposure in what they thought was a simple, little direct writing insurance operation.
查理·芒格： 他们完全不知道自己在看似简单的小型直接保险业务中暴露于巨灾保险风险之中。
No, I don’t think we’ve got the main super-cat risks at all at Berkshire.
不，我不认为伯克希尔面临主要的巨灾保险风险。
WARREN BUFFETT: GEICO lost something like 150 million in Andrew. And their initial estimate of the loss was, like, $35 million. And that’s after they thought they’d heard about most of it. You can really get fooled in this business.
沃伦·巴菲特： 在安德鲁飓风中，GEICO损失了大约1.5亿美元。他们最初的损失估计是3500万美元。而且这是在他们以为已经了解大部分情况之后得出的数字。在这个行业里，你真的可能被情况误导。
In fact, 20th Century, which lost a billion dollars at Northridge just at the end of 1996, I think, added $40 million, as I remember, to the reserves for the Northridge Quake, which I think was in January of ’94.
事实上，20世纪保险公司在北岭地震中损失了10亿美元，而我记得在1996年底，他们为1994年1月的北岭地震增加了4000万美元的储备。
Now, you think on an earthquake, you know, you’d kind of know when it was over. But — (laughter) — you can really — you can get fooled.
现在，你可能会认为地震结束后你大概知道损失是多少。但——（笑声）——事实证明你可能会被情况误导。
And down at Andrew, I mean, the costs of construction go up dramatically in an area that’s been wiped out. And then there were all kinds of things in the codes. I mean, I think they started requiring architects’ drawings on everything, you know, over $5,000 in the way of repairs, some number like that — don’t hold me to the number. And, of course, the architects had a field day.
在安德鲁飓风之后，受灾地区的建筑成本急剧上升。此外，各种规范要求纷纷出台。我记得他们开始要求任何超过5000美元的维修费用都必须有建筑师的图纸支持，大概是这个数字——别让我对这个数字负责。当然，建筑师们因此赚得盆满钵满。
And then it turned out that everybody had a homeowner’s policy in the Oakland fire, for example. They all had a $300,000 book collection in their library. And, you know, who knows after the place has burned down? (Laughter)
后来，在奥克兰火灾中，发现几乎每个房主的保险单都包括了图书馆藏书，他们的藏书价值都标注为30万美元。而你知道，在房子烧毁之后，谁能核实呢？（笑声）
It’s not — you get a lot of surprises in that field. And the surprises in insurance are never symmetrical. They’re all bad. (Laughs)
在这个领域，你会遇到很多意外。而保险领域的意外从来都不是对称的。它们全是坏消息。（笑声）
44. “You need a large margin of safety”
“你需要一个很大的安全边际”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is (inaudible). I’m from New Mexico. And I’m a shareholder. I have two questions.
听众： 是的，我叫（听不清），来自新墨西哥州。我是伯克希尔的股东。我有两个问题。
First, in your ’91 letter, you wrote about investors eventually repeat their mistakes. So what do you do to keep you from making the same mistake twice?
第一个问题，在您1991年的信中，您写到投资者最终会重复他们的错误。那么，您如何避免自己两次犯同样的错误？
And the second question is, in your ’92 letter, you wrote that you tend to deal with a problem of future earning in two ways. The first way is the business you understand. And the second is the margin of safety. And you say they are equally important. But if you — (loud noise) — but if you cannot find the happy combination of faster growth at a low key, which one do you think is more important, faster growth or low key? That’s my two questions.
第二个问题，在您1992年的信中，您提到您倾向于通过两种方式处理未来收益问题。第一是理解的业务，第二是安全边际。您说它们同样重要。但是如果——（噪音）——如果您找不到高增长和低风险的完美结合，您认为更重要的是高增长还是低风险？这是我的两个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we were told by — (loud noise) — we were told by some higher authority which one was more important there for a second. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想我们刚刚听到了——（噪音）——某个更高的权威在告诉我们哪个更重要。（笑声）
Well, they’re bound together. Obviously, if you understood a business perfectly — the future of a business — you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety.
实际上，它们是紧密相连的。显然，如果你完全理解一家企业及其未来，你需要的安全边际就会很少。
So the more volatile the business is — or possibility is — but assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger the margin of safety.
因此，业务或前景越不确定——假设你仍然想投资——你需要的安全边际就越大。
I think in that first edition of [Benjamin] Graham — I doubt if I’m right — was it (inaudible) and said, you know, maybe it was worth somewhere between 30 or 110, or some number. He said, “Well, that sounds — how much good does that do you to know that it’s worth between 30 and 110?” Well, it does you some good if it’s selling below 30 or above 110.”
我记得在本杰明·格雷厄姆的第一版著作中——我不确定是否记得准确——他说，也许某个东西的价值在30到110之间。他说，“好吧，知道它的价值在30到110之间有什么用？”嗯，如果它的价格低于30或高于110，这就对你有帮助。
That’s — you need a large margin of safety.
这就是——你需要一个大的安全边际。
Well, if you’re driving a truck across a bridge that holds — it says it holds 10,000 pounds — and you’ve got a 9,800 pound vehicle, you know, if the bridge is about six inches above the crevice that it covers, you may feel OK.
比如，如果你开着一辆9800磅重的卡车通过一座标称承重为10,000磅的桥梁，如果桥下只有6英寸深的裂缝，你可能会觉得没问题。
But if it’s, you know, over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety, in terms of only driving a 4,000 pound truck, or something, across. So it depends on the nature of the underlying risk.
但如果它横跨大峡谷，你可能会希望有更大的安全边际，比如只开一辆4000磅的卡车过去。因此，这取决于潜在风险的性质。
We don’t get the margin of safety now that we got in a 1973-4 period, for example.
比如说，我们现在的安全边际不像1973-74年那样高了。
The biggest thing to do is understand the business. If you understand the business, and get into the kind of the businesses where surprises — by their nature — surprises are few. And we think we’re largely in that type of business.
最重要的是理解企业。如果你理解企业，并选择进入那些本质上意外较少的企业，我们认为我们基本上就在这种类型的业务中。
45. Learn from the mistakes of others
从别人的错误中学习
WARREN BUFFETT: The earlier part about — you know, I’ve said about learning from your mistakes, the best thing to do is learn from other guys’ mistakes, I mean, you know —
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于学习自己的错误，我之前说过，最好的方法是从别人的错误中学习，我是说，你知道——
It’s like, you know, [U.S. General George] Patton used to say, you know, “It’s an honor to die for your country. Make sure the other guy gets the honor,” you know and — (Laughter)
这就像美国将军乔治·巴顿说过的，“为国捐躯是一种荣耀，确保让对手享受这种荣耀。”（笑声）
So our approach is really to try and learn vicariously. But there’s a lot of mistakes that I’ve repeated, I can tell you that.
所以我们的做法是尽量通过间接经验学习。但我可以告诉你，我犯过很多重复的错误。
The biggest one, probably — or the biggest category over time — is being reluctant to pay up a little for a business I knew was really outstanding, or to continue to buy it at higher prices when I knew it was outstanding.
最大的错误，或者说长期以来最大的类型，是我不愿意为我知道非常出色的企业多付一点钱，或者在我知道它很出色时，不愿意在更高的价格继续买入。
So the cost of that has been many, many billions. And I’ll probably keep making that mistake.
因此，这样的错误已经让我损失了许多许多的数十亿美元。而且我可能还会继续犯这个错误。
There are — the mistakes are made when there are businesses you can understand and they’re attractive and you don’t do something about it.
错误发生在那些你能理解的业务，它们很有吸引力，而你却没有采取行动的时候。
I don’t worry at all about the mistakes that come about because when I met Bill Gates, I didn’t buy Microsoft or something. That’s not my game. But the mistakes are made when you — most of our mistakes have been mistakes of omission rather than commission.
我一点都不担心那些我没有参与的错误，比如我遇到比尔·盖茨时没有买微软的股票之类的。这不是我的游戏。但我们的错误大多是遗漏的错误，而不是行动的错误。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think most people get very few, what I call, no-brainer opportunities, where it’s just so damned obvious that this is going to work. And since they are very few and they may be separated by periods of years, I think people have to learn to have the courage and the intelligence to step up in a major way when those rare opportunities come by.
查理·芒格： 是的，我认为大多数人很少遇到我所谓的“毫无疑问”的机会，那种显而易见的会成功的机会。而且这些机会很少，可能几年才会出现一次。我认为人们必须学会拥有勇气和智慧，在这些难得的机会到来时，果断地大举行动。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You got to be willing to take a really big bite. And it’s crazy if you don’t. And it’s crazy if you dabble around at the edges, so you’re not prepared to take a big bite when the time comes.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，你必须愿意咬上一大口。如果你不这样做，那就太疯狂了。如果你只是在边缘徘徊，那么当机会来临时，你就没有准备好采取重大行动，这同样是疯狂的。
46. Treasury bonds are yardstick to compare investments
国债是衡量投资的标尺
WARREN BUFFETT: We, apparently, have lost mike 4. So we’re just going to use three mikes from now on. And if you’ll just make your way to those mikes, we’ll see how we do with them.
沃伦·巴菲特： 显然，我们的4号麦克风坏了。所以从现在开始，我们只用三个麦克风。如果大家能移动到这些麦克风，我们看看能否顺利进行。
How about zone 1?
第一区怎么样？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Pete Brown (PH) from Columbus, Ohio, a Class B shareholder.
听众： 巴菲特先生，我是来自俄亥俄州哥伦布的皮特·布朗（音），B类股股东。
I had a couple questions if I could. The first is, I don’t have a very good idea in my mind how our typical insurance operations work. I mean, in particular, how money leaves the insurance pool and enters the investment pool, and how our operations are different than the typical, run-of-the-mill insurance operation, you know, around the country.
我有两个问题。第一个是，我对我们的典型保险业务运作方式没有太清晰的概念。特别是，资金是如何从保险资金池流入投资资金池的？我们的业务与全国典型的普通保险业务有何不同？
Why are we able to generate so much more float than, you know, the XYZ Company, you know, somewhere else?
为什么我们能够比其他公司，比如XYZ公司，产生更多的浮存金？
And a second question is, it kind of goes back to an article you wrote for Fortune Magazine back in the late ’70s about the effect of inflation on equity values and that sort of thing. And in it, you asserted that stocks were — in businesses — were really like bonds. They just had their own par. And the par being the average 12 percent return on equity that companies have averaged.
第二个问题是，回到您70年代末为《财富》杂志撰写的一篇文章，讨论了通货膨胀对股票价值的影响之类的问题。在文章中，您断言股票——或者说企业——实际上就像债券，只不过它们有自己的面值，而面值就是公司平均12%的股本回报率。
You know, a company does better than that has assets that are worth way more than a hundred cents on a dollar. A company does less, you know, will be less, correspondingly.
您知道，一家公司的表现好于这个回报率，其资产价值就会远高于一美元面值。表现差的公司，其资产价值相应会低于一美元面值。
My question is, when you’re projecting cash flows of a company as a prospective investment, why would you use the interest rate, you know, of risk-free Treasury bills? Why wouldn’t you use the sort of opportunity cost to discount that maybe Charlie was referring to, maybe 12 percent return on equity of average corporations? Maybe, you know, your 15 percent goal may be Coca-Cola’s return on equity as a comparison.
我的问题是，当您预测一个公司作为潜在投资的现金流时，为什么您会使用无风险国债的利率？为什么不使用类似查理提到的机会成本，比如平均公司12%的股本回报率，或者用您15%的目标回报率，或者可口可乐的股本回报率作为比较？
I mean, doing that would dramatically change the value of the company that you’re, you know, evaluating, as I’m sure you know. Why would you use the risk-free rate is my question.
我的意思是，这样做会显著改变您评估的公司的价值。我想您肯定知道。我的问题是，为什么您会使用无风险利率？
WARREN BUFFETT: The risk-free rate is used merely to equate one item to another. In other words, we’re looking for whatever’s the most attractive. But in terms of present valuing anything, we’re going to use a number.
沃伦·巴菲特： 无风险利率只是用来将一个投资与另一个投资进行比较。换句话说，我们在寻找最具吸引力的投资。但在对任何事物进行现值估算时，我们需要使用一个数字。
And, obviously, we can always buy the government bonds. So that becomes the yardstick rate. It doesn’t mean we want to buy government bonds. It doesn’t mean we want to buy government bonds if the best thing we can find is only — has a present value that works out at a half percent a year better than the government bond.
显然，我们总是可以购买国债。所以国债收益率就成了标尺。这并不意味着我们想要购买国债。如果我们发现的最好的投资项目现值只比国债高出每年0.5%，我们也不会选择国债。
But it’s the appropriate yardstick, in our view, to simply use to compare across all kinds of investment opportunities, oil wells, farms, whatever it may be.
但在我们看来，这是一个合适的标尺，可以简单地用来比较各种投资机会，比如油井、农场，或其他任何东西。
Now, it gets into degree of certainty, too. But it’s the yardstick rate. It’s not because we want to buy government bonds. But it does serve to make that a constant throughout the valuation process.
当然，这也涉及到确定性的程度。但这只是标尺利率。并不是因为我们想购买国债。而是因为它可以在整个估值过程中提供一个一致的参考点。
47. Insurance and investing are equal, but distinct, businesses
保险和投资是平等但独立的业务
WARREN BUFFETT: In our insurance business, we really have a group of insurance businesses. And they have different characteristics.
沃伦·巴菲特： 在我们的保险业务中，我们实际上拥有一组不同的保险业务。它们各有不同的特点。
The consistent characteristic, actually, is that they’re all very, very good businesses. Some of them are a lot larger and have opportunities to get larger. And some of them are not so large and have limited opportunities, in terms of growth. But every insurance operation we have is a distinct asset to Berkshire.
实际上，它们的共同点是它们都是非常好的业务。其中一些业务规模较大，还有进一步扩大的机会。而另一些业务规模较小，增长机会有限。但我们拥有的每一项保险业务都是伯克希尔的一项独特资产。
We’ve got smaller — a worker’s comp operation. We’ve got a credit operation — credit card — operation. We’ve got a Homestate operation. We have all these different businesses, Kansas Bankers Surety, whatever.
我们有小型的工伤赔偿业务，有信用保险业务——信用卡保险业务。有Homestate业务，还有各种其他业务，比如Kansas Bankers Surety，等等。
They’re all good businesses. Some of them don’t develop a lot of float relative to premium volume.
它们都是很好的业务。其中一些业务的浮存金相对于保费收入的比例并不大。
The nature of Kansas Bankers Surety is that it won’t develop a lot of float. It just happens to be the kind of business they write.
Kansas Bankers Surety的性质决定了它不会产生大量的浮存金。这仅仅是因为它所从事的业务类型的特性。
The nature of comp is that it develops more float, because comp claims pay more slowly.
而工伤赔偿保险的性质是它会产生更多的浮存金，因为工伤赔偿的理赔支付较慢。
We — you really should think of each one, though, as having different characteristics.
我们——你确实应该将每种业务看作是具有不同特性的。
GEICO is entirely different than the super-cap business. They’re both good businesses.
GEICO与巨灾保险业务完全不同。但它们都是很好的业务。
In terms of how we invest the money when it comes in, we invest it when it comes in. I mean, we’ll get a large super-cap premium today. It’s invested.
至于我们如何投资进来的资金，当资金进来时，我们就会进行投资。比如，我们今天收到一笔巨灾保险的保费，它就会被立即投资。
Now, if we have a claim tomorrow, then, we disinvest and in a substantial way.
如果明天发生理赔，我们就会大规模地撤资。
If you take something like GEICO, the cash flow is always going to be positive, probably, on that, you know.
如果是像GEICO这样的业务，它的现金流几乎总是正的。
We won’t have another Hurricane Andrew, because we’ve backed out of the homeowner’s business to quite an extent.
我们不会再经历另一次类似安德鲁飓风的事件，因为我们已经在很大程度上退出了家庭保险业务。
So month by month, the money comes in at a GEICO. And the faster it grows, the more the money that comes in.
所以每个月，GEICO都会有资金流入。而它增长得越快，流入的资金就越多。
We have so much capital that we can, basically, put that money into whatever makes the most sense for Berkshire. So we have none of either the mental or psychological constraints, or regulatory constraints, that many insurance companies operate under.
我们拥有如此多的资本，基本上可以将这些资金投入到对伯克希尔最有意义的地方。因此，我们没有许多保险公司面临的心理、思想或监管方面的限制。
Many of them think they sort of should have this portion in this and this portion in that and so on.
许多公司认为，他们的投资需要按比例分配到不同的资产类别中。
Investments usually play second fiddle to the insurance business at most companies that are in the insurance business. We look at them as being of equal importance.
在大多数保险公司中，投资通常只是保险业务的附属部分。而我们将投资和保险视为同等重要。
And we run them as two distinct businesses. We do whatever makes the most sense on the investment side, whatever makes the most sense on the insurance side. We never do anything on the investment side that will impinge on our business on the insurance side.
我们将它们作为两个独立的业务来运营。我们在投资端和保险端各自做出最合理的决策。我们从不在投资端做出任何会影响保险端业务的事情。
But you really should look at each one of our businesses separately. GEICO has entirely different characteristics than the super-cat business. They both call themselves insurance. They both develop float.
但你确实应该分别看待我们的每一项业务。GEICO与巨灾保险业务有完全不同的特性。它们都称为保险业务，也都产生浮存金。
But in economic terms and in terms of competitive strengths and that sort of thing, they’re two very different businesses. And our smaller businesses are different businesses. Some of those may grow reasonably well. We’ll keep working on it.
但在经济层面和竞争优势等方面，它们是两个截然不同的业务。而我们的小型业务又是不同的业务类型。其中一些可能会有不错的增长。我们会继续努力发展它们。
Charlie?
查理？
48. Munger on choosing your spouse
芒格谈如何选择配偶
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. That — if you look at a corporate stock, it’s obvious you can buy any maturity of government bond you want. So one opportunity cost of buying the stock is to compare it with a bond.
查理·芒格： 是的，如果你看一只公司的股票，很明显，你可以选择任何期限的国债作为投资。因此，购买股票的一个机会成本是将其与国债进行比较。
But you may find that half the stocks in America, you’re so fearful about or know so little about or think so poorly of, that you’d rather have the government bond. So on an opportunity cost basis, they’re taken out of the filter.
但你可能会发现，美国有一半的股票要么让你感到害怕，要么你对它们了解甚少，或者你对它们评价很低，以至于你更愿意持有国债。因此，从机会成本的角度来看，它们会被排除在筛选范围之外。
Now, you start finding corporations where you like the stocks way better than government bonds. You got to compare them one against the other. And when you find one that you regard as the best opportunity, that you can understand as the best opportunity, now you’ve got one to buy.
然后，你会找到一些公司，其股票比国债更吸引你。你需要将这些股票彼此比较。当你找到一个被你认为是最好的机会，而且你能够理解它为什么是最好的机会时，你就可以买入它了。
It’s a very simple idea. It uses nothing but the most elementary ideas from economics or game theory. It’s child’s play as a mental process. Now, it’s hard to make the business appraisals. But the mental process is a cinch.
这是一个非常简单的想法。它只使用了最基础的经济学或博弈论的概念。作为一种思维过程，这就像孩子的游戏一样简单。当然，要进行业务评估并不容易，但思维过程本身很简单。
WARREN BUFFETT: If Charlie and I were forced — told we had a choice of buying stock A, B, C or D and all 2,500 or 3,000, or whatever it may be, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, or buying a ten-year government bond and we had to hold the stock for ten years or the bond for ten years, probably in at least 80 percent of the cases, we’d take the ten-year Government, you know.
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果查理和我被迫选择购买A、B、C或D股票，或者纽约证券交易所上市的2500或3000家公司中的任意一只股票，或者购买一只10年期国债，并且我们必须持有股票或国债10年，那么至少在80%的情况下，我们会选择10年期国债。
In many cases, because we didn’t understand the business well enough elsewhere. Or secondly, we may understand it and still prefer the 10 percent Government.
在许多情况下，这是因为我们对其他地方的业务了解不够。或者即使我们了解它，我们仍然更喜欢10%的国债。
So — but we would measure everything that way.
因此——但我们会以这种方式衡量一切。
And I don’t know, did you come up with 80 percent or where, Charlie?
我不确定，你是怎么得出80%的比例的，查理？
Desert island, ten years. Get to fondle a stock certificate or fondle a government bond. Which one are you going to choose? (Laughter)
荒岛上，10年。只能选择爱抚一张股票凭证或一张国债凭证。你会选择哪个？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think life is a whole series of opportunity costs. You know, you got to marry the best person who is convenient to find who will have you. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我认为生活就是一系列的机会成本。你知道的，你需要找到一个最适合你且愿意接受你的人结婚。（笑声）
Investment is much the same sort of a process. (Buffett laughs)
投资也是类似的过程。（巴菲特笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: I knew we’d get in trouble after lunch. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我就知道午餐后我们会惹上麻烦。（笑声）
49. Why don’t more companies copy Berkshire?
为什么更多公司不模仿伯克希尔？
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. Martin Wiegand, Bethesda, Maryland, stockholder. For myself, my family and other small business owners, I want to thank you for the annual reports. They help a lot in helping us make business decisions and life decisions.
听众： 你好，我是来自马里兰州贝塞斯达的Martin Wiegand，伯克希尔的股东。我代表我自己、我的家人以及其他小企业主，感谢你们的年报。它们对我们的商业决策和生活决策提供了很大帮助。
My question is, many people come here — (Applause)
我的问题是，许多人来到这里——（掌声）
Many people come here to listen to you and to copy and understand your investment philosophy. But why don’t more people, in your opinion, try to copy your investment vehicle, a corporation that pays no dividends?
许多人来到这里听你们的演讲，试图模仿并理解你们的投资理念。但在您看来，为什么没有更多的人试图模仿你们的投资工具，即一家不支付股息的公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t really think if the right — I think there are other things that are probably better to copy about Berkshire, but they don’t get copied either.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我并不认为——我认为伯克希尔还有其他更值得模仿的地方，但这些地方也没有被模仿。
It was always interesting to me how few people — everybody read [Benjamin] Graham’s — and they didn’t really disagree with him. They just didn’t like following him because it didn’t promise enough, in a sense. I mean, people really wanted something very quickly.
让我一直觉得有趣的是，很少有人真正模仿[本杰明]·格雷厄姆的理念。大家都读过他的书，也没有真正反对他的观点。但他们不喜欢追随他的理念，因为从某种意义上说，它不能快速带来回报。人们真正想要的是快速成功。
忙着求死。
In terms of not paying dividends, we don’t pay dividends because we think we can turn every dollar we retain into more than a dollar of market value. I mean, the only reason for us to keep your money is if it becomes worth more by us keeping it than it would be worth if we gave it to you.
至于不支付股息，我们不支付股息是因为我们认为我们可以将每一美元留存收益转化为超过一美元的市场价值。我的意思是，我们保留你的资金的唯一理由是，如果我们保留它，它的价值会比直接分给你更高。
And if we can create more than a dollar of market value for every dollar we keep, you’re better off, whether you want to take that dollar out by selling a little piece of your stock, or whether you continue to leave it in. That’s the test.
如果我们可以为每一美元留存收益创造超过一美元的市场价值，无论你是通过出售部分股票来兑现，还是继续持有，你都会更受益。这就是我们的衡量标准。
If we come to the conclusion that we can’t do that, and we could come to that conclusion sometime, then we should distribute it to you.
如果我们得出结论，认为我们无法做到这一点，而这种情况在某个时候可能发生，那么我们就应该将这些资金分配给你。
The interesting thing is, we’re in certain businesses, for example, See’s Candy being one — we don’t have a way to intelligently use all of the money that See’s generates within the See’s Candy Company.
有趣的是，我们参与了一些业务，例如See’s糖果。我们无法在See’s糖果公司内部明智地使用它产生的所有资金。
企业集团的价值所在。
So if See’s were a standalone company, it would pay very large dividends, not because it, you know, just had some dividend paying policy. It would be simply because we wouldn’t have a way of using, in this case, $30 million a year, intelligently in expanding that business.
如果See’s是一家独立公司，它会支付非常高的股息，这并不是因为它有某种股息支付政策，而是因为我们没有办法明智地将它每年产生的3000万美元用于扩展该业务。
The Buffalo News is the same way. We don’t have a way of using money within that specific business, intelligently, to use the money it generates.
《布法罗新闻》也是同样的情况。我们没有办法在这项具体业务中明智地使用它所产生的资金。
We hope that in the overall Berkshire Hathaway scheme of things that we can intelligently use the money that the companies, in aggregate, generate for us.
我们希望，在伯克希尔哈撒韦的整体体系中，我们可以明智地使用这些公司为我们整体产生的资金。
And we think, so far, we have. And we think the prospects are reasonably good that we can continue to do that.
我们认为，到目前为止，我们做到了。我们也认为，我们有合理的希望可以继续这样做。
But dividend policy should really be determined by that criteria, also bearing in mind the possibilities of repurchase of stock, too.
但股息政策确实应该由这一标准决定，同时也要考虑股票回购的可能性。
But they should be determined by whether a dollar left in the business is worth more to the shareholder than a dollar paid out.
但股息政策的决定因素应该是，留在企业中的每一美元是否对股东的价值高于支付出去的一美元。
Someplace like Coca-Cola, you know, if Coca-Cola paid no dividends and simply repurchased shares and developed the bottling system and done the things that they have, the shareholders probably would’ve been even better off. They’ve been sensationally well off as it is. But they probably would’ve been even better off than they have been with the dividend policy they have had.
比如像可口可乐这样的公司，如果可口可乐不支付股息，而是简单地回购股票、发展瓶装系统以及继续推进他们已经做的事情，股东们可能会更受益。虽然他们已经过得非常好了，但可能会比他们现有的股息政策带来的情况更好。
And that’s true for Gillette and Disney and the companies of that sort that have got these terrific opportunities to use capital within the business, or to repurchase shares of a company that simply can’t be replaced.
这对于吉列、迪士尼以及类似公司来说也是如此。这些公司在业务中有极好的机会使用资本，或者回购那些无法替代的公司股票。
If — that usually is the best use of capital. It’s probably better than dividends. And, you know, we have written some about that, Martin. But people usually keep doing what they’ve been doing. They’re hard to change.
通常来说，这才是资本的最佳用途。这可能比支付股息更好。你知道，我们在这方面写过一些东西，马丁。但人们通常会坚持他们一直在做的事情，很难改变。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s interesting that you take that simple standard, you should retain money if you can make it worth more than it is by retaining it. That is not the standard thing that’s taught in the corporate finance departments of our major universities.
查理·芒格： 很有趣的是，你采用了这个简单的标准：如果保留资金可以让它的价值更高，那么你就应该保留资金。而这并不是我们主要大学的公司金融系教授的标准内容。
Why do we have this simple idea and they have another one? Time after time, we find that so.
为什么我们有这样的简单想法，而他们却有另一种想法？我们一次又一次发现情况就是如此。
I’ve tried to understand why they think the way they do. And I have great difficulty with it. I’ve just concluded that they’re wrong, and — (Laughter)
我试图理解他们为什么会那样想。而我对此感到非常困难。我只能得出结论，他们是错的。（笑声）
But that isn’t enough. There has to be reason why so many smart people are that wrong. And — (laughter) — that’s a story for another day. But there are things gravely wrong with American education that I hope that Berkshire Hathaway is slowly helping to fix.
但这还不够。一定有理由解释为什么这么多聪明人会犯这么大的错误。而且——（笑声）——这是一个以后再说的话题。但美国教育中有一些严重的问题，我希望伯克希尔哈撒韦正在慢慢帮助解决这些问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Can you imagine if the — pick any one of you here. And let’s say the two of us were in a business together. You know, it was earning $100,000 a year. How would we decide whether to leave the 100,000 each year? And it’d be exactly what we’ve talked about here. If we thought the 100,000 would translate into a present value of more than 100,000 by some action, we’d leave it in. And if it didn’t, we’d take it out. And it doesn’t seem to register, generally.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你能想象吗？在座的任何一位，比如我们两个人共同经营一家公司，这家公司每年赚10万美元。我们如何决定是否将这10万美元留在公司？这就是我们刚刚谈论的内容。如果我们认为，通过某种行动，这10万美元的现值会超过10万美元，我们就会把它留在公司。如果不会，我们就会把它拿出来。通常，这种思维似乎并未被广泛接受。
And incidentally, in our own case, we’ll probably go too long before we come to the conclusion that we’re not really using it that effectively, because there’ll be a certain — denial — we’ll go through. And we’ll say, “Well, that was just temporary last year.”
顺便提一句，就我们自己而言，我们可能会花很长时间才得出一个结论，即我们实际上并没有有效地使用这些资金，因为我们会经历一种——否认——的阶段。我们会说，“哦，那只是去年暂时的情况。”
But that will — that is our approach. And we’ll do our best to apply it.
但这就是——这就是我们的方法。我们会尽最大努力去应用它。
50. Corporate profits can’t stay so high
企业利润不可能长期维持如此高位
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is John Shane (PH). I’m from Nashville, Tennessee.
听众： 巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我叫约翰·谢恩（音），来自田纳西州纳什维尔。
You touched on the subject of return on equity in response to a different question. I wonder whether you might be willing to elaborate along the following line.
您在回答另一个问题时提到了股本回报率的主题。我想知道您是否愿意沿着以下思路展开讨论。
Right now, the Standard & Poor’s 500, in aggregate, have a return on equity of about 22 percent. The average over the decades for corporate America has been more like 12 or 13 percent.
目前，标普500指数的整体股本回报率约为22%。而过去几十年来，美国企业的平均水平更接近12%或13%。
How did we get to this point of extraordinary profitability? And how likely do you think we are, over the next ten or 15 years, to revert back to the mean of the low teens?
我们是如何达到如此高的盈利水平的？在未来的10到15年里，您认为我们有多大可能回到平均的低两位数水平？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say is, I never thought it would happen. So I start out with the fact that if you’d listened to me, you’d have been dead wrong, in terms of what the return on equity in 1996 or 1995, 1997 would be.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我得说，我从没想过这会发生。所以，如果你听过我的预测，你会发现我完全错了，比如对1995年、1996年或1997年的股本回报率的预测。
It does not seem to me that 22 percent returns on equity are sustainable in a world where the long-term interest rate is 7 percent, and where the capability of saving large amounts in the economy, you know, are quite dramatic.
在一个长期利率为7%、经济中储蓄能力非常显著的世界里，22%的股本回报率在我看来是不可持续的。
You would just think that there would be some sort of leveling effect between 7 and the 22 you named, that as savings got directed within the economy and as the competitive forces operate that we’ve been taught will operate over time, would come into play.
你会认为，在7%和你提到的22%之间应该会出现某种平衡效应，随着储蓄在经济中的流向以及竞争力量的逐渐发挥作用，这种差距会缩小。
But, you know, I’ve been wrong on that subject. And that’s why I say these levels are not unjustified if those kinds of returns can be made.
但事实证明，我在这个问题上是错的。这也是为什么我说，如果这种回报率能够实现，那么这些水平并非不合理。
Because let’s just say that you had a 22 percent perpetual bond. And you had the ability — and let’s say that a quarter of that — a third of that coupon — would be paid out. So you got a bond with a 22 percent coupon and, say, 7 percent is paid out, being the dividend payout on the S&P, we’ll say. And the other 15 percent is reinvested in more 22 percent bonds with similar characteristics.
假设你有一只22%利息的永久债券，并且有能力让其中四分之一或三分之一的利息被支付出去。比如，这只债券支付22%的利息，其中7%作为标普的股息支付，其余15%再投资于类似的22%回报率债券。
Now, what’s that instrument worth on a present-value basis in a 7 percent world? It’s worth a lot of money.
现在，在一个7%的利率环境下，这种债券在现值基础上值多少钱？它值很多钱。
In fact, it’s worth so much money that it becomes a mathematical fallacy at some point, because when the compound rate becomes higher than the discount rate, you get into infinite numbers, which are — or you get into infinity.
实际上，它的价值可能大到某种程度成为数学上的谬误，因为当复合回报率高于贴现率时，你会得到无限的数字，也就是走向无穷大。
And that’s a number — that’s the concept we like to think about around Berkshire — (laughs) — we haven’t figured out how to attain it.
这是一个数字——这是我们在伯克希尔喜欢思考的概念——（笑声）——不过我们还没想出如何实现它。
There’s a book called The Petersburg Paradox — there’s an article called The Petersburg Paradox and the Growth Stock Fallacy. I think that’s the name of it, by a fellow named, I think, David Durand, written about 25 years ago. And it gets into this bit where the growth rate is higher than the discount rate. And it shouldn’t work for an extended period of time. But it’s sure fun while it’s going on.
有一本书叫《圣彼得堡悖论》，还有一篇文章叫《圣彼得堡悖论与成长股的谬误》。我记得是这么叫的，是一个叫大卫·杜兰的人大约25年前写的。它探讨了增长率高于贴现率的情况。这种情况不应该长期持续，但在发生时确实很有趣。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think a couple of things contributed to this phenomenon that we so carefully mispredicted.
查理·芒格： 是的，我认为有几个因素促成了这个我们小心预测却完全错误的现象。
Number one, it became very fashionable for corporations to buy in shares. And I think that we helped, in a very small way, bring on that enlightenment. And I think that was a plus, in terms of rational corporate decision making.
第一，回购股票变得非常流行。我认为，我们在一定程度上小小地推动了这一启蒙。我认为这对理性企业决策来说是一个积极因素。
The other thing that happened is that the anti-trust administration got way more lenient in allowing people to buy competitors.
另一个因素是，反垄断执法变得更加宽松，允许公司收购竞争对手。
And I think those two factors helped raise returns on capital in the United States.
我认为这两个因素提高了美国的资本回报率。
But that can’t — you wouldn’t think that can go on forever. And what 15 percent per annum compounded will do is grow way faster than the economy can grow, way faster than aggregate profits can grow, over a long pull. So, sooner or later, something has to happen. I don’t think we’ve reached a new order of things where the laws of mathematics are somehow repealed.
但这不可能——你不会认为这可以永远持续下去。15%的年复合增长率会远远快于经济的增长，远远快于整体利润的增长。如果拉长时间来看，迟早会发生一些事情。我不认为我们进入了一个新的秩序，数学规律 somehow 被废除了。
WARREN BUFFETT: If real output in this country grows at, say, 3 percent a year — or real GDP grows at 3 percent a year — and the capitalized value of industry in the country grows at 10 percent a year, at some point you get into mathematical absurdities, I mean, at the low inflation rates.
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果这个国家的实际产出增长率是每年3%——或者实际GDP增长率是每年3%——而工业的资本化价值增长率是每年10%，那么在某个时候，这种情况会进入数学上的荒谬境地，尤其是在低通胀率的情况下。
You know, you can’t have it — if we have an economy that’s seven or eight trillion now in GDP and seven or eight trillion in equity valuation, that may or may not make sense. But if you have one that’s 15 billion in GDP and 75 billion in equity valuation — 75 trillion in equity valuation — you know, you get to things that don’t — can’t make any sense.
你知道，现在我们的经济是7万亿或8万亿的GDP，7万亿或8万亿的股权估值，这可能合理，也可能不合理。但如果GDP是15万亿，而股权估值是75万亿——75万亿的股权估值——那你就会进入一个完全不合理的境地。
So if you get these differential rates of growth among items that have some relationship, however tenuous, or at least non-specific in the short run, it doesn’t work after a while. And, you know, nobody wants to think about that. They don’t want to think about their own death. But I mean, it doesn’t go away just because you don’t want to think about it.
如果在某些彼此相关的项目之间存在不同的增长率，不管这种关系多么微弱，或者至少在短期内没有明确的关系，时间一长，这种情况就不可持续了。而且，你知道，没有人愿意去想这件事。他们不想思考自己的死亡。但我想说，仅仅因为你不想去想，它并不会消失。
And we haven’t gotten to any point like that. But you can project out numbers. And they just won’t make any sense after a while.
我们目前还没到那种地步。但如果你把数字继续向外推算，一段时间后它们就会变得毫无意义。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Corporate profits can’t be 200 percent of GNP.
查理·芒格： 是的，企业利润不可能达到国民生产总值（GNP）的200%。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Indeed, they can’t be 50 percent of GNP. So these high rates of compounding just go automatically into absurdity.
查理·芒格： 实际上，它们甚至不可能达到GNP的50%。因此，这种高复合增长率最终会自动进入荒谬的境地。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They really can’t be 20 percent of GDP or some number like that. So if — and if you start saying you can’t have a multiple of more, you get differential rates. And they just simply — you leave the tracks after a while.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，企业利润实际上不可能达到GDP的20%或类似的数字。如果你开始承认利润不能持续高倍增长，就会发现差异化的增长率最终会让你脱离现实轨道。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And all you people should be aware of this because all the people who are professional sellers of investment advice and brokerage service, et cetera, et cetera, have an immense vested interest in believing that things that can’t be true are true. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 你们大家都应该意识到这一点，因为所有专业的投资建议和经纪服务的销售人员都拥有巨大的既得利益，他们相信那些不可能是真的事情是真实的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And not only that, they’ve been selected in a Darwinian process to have formidable sales skills and large energy. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 不仅如此，他们还通过达尔文式的选择过程，具备了惊人的销售技巧和充沛的精力。（笑声）
And this is dangerous to the rest of us. (Laughter)
这对我们其他人来说是危险的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, you’ve been selected to be the recipients of their advice. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，而你们被选中成为他们建议的接受者。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right.
查理·芒格： 没错。
Furthermore, they figure out who we are and come in about 6 o’clock in the evening. (Buffett laughs)
更糟的是，他们还会找到我们是谁，并在晚上六点左右来找我们。（巴菲特笑）
51. “It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts”
“重要的不是市场份额，而是心智份额”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1 again.
沃伦·巴菲特： 再次到第一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City.
听众： 我是来自纽约市的迈克·阿塞尔（音）。
Could you explain a little more about what you call the “mind of the consumer” and the “nature of the product” and explain how you actually apply these concepts to find the companies with the growing demand and the best investment potential? And thank you for being two of the greatest professors I’ve ever had.
您能否详细解释一下您所说的“消费者心智”和“产品的本质”，以及您如何实际应用这些概念来寻找具有增长需求和最佳投资潜力的公司？感谢你们二位成为我遇到过的最伟大的老师。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。（掌声）
You know, what you really — when you get into consumer products, you’re really interested in finding out — or thinking about — what is in the mind of how many people throughout the world about a product now, and what is likely to be in their mind five or ten or 20 years from now?
你知道，当你研究消费品时，你真正感兴趣的是了解——或思考——世界上有多少人现在对某种产品的看法是什么，以及五年、十年或二十年后，他们对该产品的看法可能会是什么。
Now, virtually every person on the globe — maybe, well, let’s get it down to 75 percent of the people on the globe — have some notion in their mind about Coca-Cola. They have — the word “Coca-Cola” means something to them. You know, RC Cola doesn’t mean anything to virtually anyone in the world, you know, it does to the guy who owns RC, you know, and the bottler.
目前，几乎全球的每个人——或者说，让我们将范围缩小到全球75%的人——对可口可乐都有某种看法。对他们来说，“可口可乐”这个词有着某种意义。而RC可乐几乎对世界上的任何人都没有意义，除了拥有RC可乐的人和装瓶商。
But everybody has something in their mind about Coca-Cola. And overwhelmingly, it’s favorable. It’s associated with pleasant experiences.
但是每个人对可口可乐都有某种看法。而且绝大多数情况下，这种看法是积极的。它与愉快的体验联系在一起。
Now, part of that is by design. I mean, it is where you are happy. It is at Disneyland, at Disney World. And it’s at ballparks. And it’s every place that you’re likely to have a smile on your face, including the Berkshire Hathaway meeting I might add. (Laughter)
这其中有一部分是精心设计的。它存在于让你感到快乐的地方，比如迪士尼乐园、迪士尼世界。它也出现在球场上，以及其他任何可能让你面带微笑的地方，包括我可以补充的伯克希尔哈撒韦股东大会。（笑声）
And that position in the mind is pretty firmly established. And it’s established in close to 200 countries around the world with people.
这种心智中的定位已经非常牢固地建立起来了。而且这种定位在全球近200个国家的人们心中都已形成。
A year from now, it will be established in more minds. And it will have a slightly, slightly, slightly different overall position. In ten years from now, the position can move just a little bit more.
一年之后，它将在更多人的心中扎根。整体定位会有轻微的、非常轻微的变化。十年后，这种定位可能会再稍微发生一点变化。
It’s share of mind. It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts.
关键在于心智份额，而不是市场份额。重要的是心智份额。
Disney, same way. Disney means something to billions of people. And if you’re a parent of a couple young children and you got 50 videos in front of you that you can buy, you’re not going to sit down and preview an hour and a half of each video before deciding what one to stick in front of your kids. You know, you have got something in your mind about Disney. And you don’t have it about the ABC Video Company. Or you don’t even have it about other — you don’t have it about 20th Century. You know, you don’t have it about Paramount.
迪士尼也是一样。迪士尼对数十亿人来说有着特别的意义。如果你是有两个小孩的家长，面前有50部可以购买的视频，你不会花时间去预览每一部视频的90分钟内容来决定给孩子看哪部。你对迪士尼有印象，但对ABC视频公司却没有印象。甚至对其他公司，比如二十世纪影业或者派拉蒙，也没有相同的印象。
So that name, to billions of people, including lots of people outside this country, it has a meaning. And that meaning overwhelmingly is favorable. It’s reinforced by the other activities of the company.
所以这个名字，对包括很多外国人在内的数十亿人来说，有其特定的意义。这种意义是积极的，并且通过公司其他活动得到了强化。
And just think of what somebody would pay if they could actually buy that share of mind, you know, of billions of people around the world. You can’t do it. You can’t do it by a billion-dollar advertising budget or a $3 billion advertising budget or hiring 20,000 super salesmen.
想想看，如果有人真的可以购买这种“心智份额”，即获得全球数十亿人的认知，他们会付出什么代价？这是买不到的。你用十亿美元、甚至三十亿美元的广告预算，或者雇用两万名超级销售员，也做不到。
So you’ve got that. Now, the question is what does that stand for five or ten or 20 years from now? You know they’ll be more people. You know they’ll be more people that have heard of Disney. And you know that there will always be parents that are interested in having something for their kids to do. And you know that kids will love the same sort of things.
所以你已经拥有了这一点。现在的问题是，这种意义在五年、十年或二十年后将代表什么？你知道会有更多人。你知道会有更多人听说迪士尼。而且你知道父母总是希望为孩子寻找一些事情做。你也知道孩子们会喜欢同样的东西。
And, you know, that — (Munger accidentally knocks over his microphone) — what’s? (Laughter)
然后，你知道，这——（芒格不小心碰倒了他的麦克风）——怎么了？（笑声）
He emphasizes the key points when we get to those. (Laughter)
他总是在关键点上加以强调。（笑声）
But that is what you’re trying to think about with a consumption product. That’s what Charlie and I were thinking about when we bought See’s Candy. I mean, here we were. It’s 1972. You know, we know a fair amount about candy. I know more than when I sat down this morning. (Laughs)
但这就是你在考虑消费品时需要思考的问题。这也是查理和我在1972年购买See’s糖果时所考虑的。我是说，当时我们知道不少关于糖果的事情。我现在可能比今天早上坐下时知道得更多了。（笑声）
I mean, I had about 20 pieces already. (Laughter)
我已经吃了大约20块了。（笑声）
But, you know, what — whose, you know — does their face light up on Valentine’s Day, you know, when you hand them a box of candy and say, you know, it’s some nondescript thing and say, “Here, honey, I took the low bid,” you know, or something of the sort, and — (Laughter)
但是，你知道，当你在情人节递给他们一盒糖果时，他们的脸上会绽放笑容吗？而且你还说，“亲爱的，这是一种毫不起眼的糖果，我挑了最便宜的。”（笑声）
No. I mean, you want something — you know, you’ve got tens of millions of people — or at least many millions of people — that remember that the first time they handed that box of candy, it wasn’t that much thereafter that they got kids for the first time or something.
当然不是。我是说，你想要的是某种东西——比如，你有成千上万，甚至至少数百万的人记得，他们第一次递给对方那盒糖果后没多久，就有了第一个孩子之类的事情。
So it’s — the memories are good. The association’s good.
所以这是——美好的记忆和联想。
Total process. It isn’t just the candy. It’s the person who takes care of you at Christmastime when they’ve been on their feet for eight hours, and people have been yelling at them because they’ve been in line with 50 people in line, and that person still smiles at them.
整个过程。它不仅仅是糖果。还有那个圣诞节时照顾你的员工，他们已经站了八个小时，还有排着50人长队向他们大喊的顾客，但他们仍然对你微笑。
The delivery process. It’s the shop in which they get all kinds of things, the treat we give them. It’s all part of the marketing personality.
交付过程也是一部分。从他们进入商店、获取各种物品，到我们为他们提供的款待，这一切都是营销个性的一部分。
But that position in the mind is what counts with a consumer product. And that means you have a good product — a very good product — it means you may need tons of infrastructure, because you’ve got to have that — I had a case of Cherry Coke awaiting me at the top of the Great Wall when I got there in China. Now that — you’ve got to have something there so that the product is there when people want it.
但对于消费品来说，关键是心智中的定位。这意味着你需要一个好的产品——非常好的产品——同时，你可能需要大量的基础设施支持。比如，当我到达中国长城顶端时，有一箱樱桃可乐在那里等着我。你需要确保产品在消费者需要时能够随时到达。
And that happened — in World War II, General Eisenhower, you know, said to Mr. Woodruff that he wanted a Coca-Cola within arm’s length of every American serviceman in the world. And they built a lot of bottling plants to take care of that.
二战期间，艾森豪威尔将军告诉伍德拉夫先生，他希望全世界每个美国士兵都能随手喝到可口可乐。于是，他们建立了许多装瓶厂来满足这一需求。
That sort of positioning can be incredible. It seems to work especially well for American products. I mean, people want certain types of American products worldwide, you know, our music, our movies, our soft drinks, our fast food.
这种定位是非常强大的。尤其对美国产品特别有效。全球范围内，人们对某些类型的美国产品有极大的需求，比如我们的音乐、电影、软饮料和快餐。
You can’t imagine, at least I can’t, a French firm or a German firm or a Japanese firm having that — selling 47 or 48 percent of the world’s soft drinks. I mean, it just doesn’t happen that way. It’s part of something you could broadly call an American culture. And the world hungers for it.
你无法想象，至少我无法想象，一个法国公司、德国公司或日本公司能够做到这一点——占据全球47%或48%的软饮料市场。这种情况不会发生。这是你可以广义上称之为“美国文化”的一部分，而全世界都渴望它。
And Kodak, for example, probably does not have quite the same — and George Fisher’s doing a great job with the company. This goes back before that.
比如说，柯达可能不再拥有同样的地位——尽管乔治·费舍尔在领导公司时做得很棒。这种变化早在那之前就开始了。
But Kodak probably does not have the same place in people’s mind worldwide quite as it had 20 years ago. I mean, people didn’t think of Fuji in those days, we’ll say, as being in quite the same place.
但柯达在全球人们心中的地位可能不如20年前那么牢固。比如说，那时人们并不认为富士在市场上的地位与柯达相当。
And, then, Fuji took the Olympics, as I remember, in Los Angeles. And they just — they put them — they pushed their way to more of a parity with a Kodak. And you don’t want to ever let them do that.
后来，我记得富士赞助了洛杉矶奥运会。通过这种方式，他们逐渐提升自己的地位，接近了柯达的水平。而你绝不能让竞争对手做到这一点。
And that’s why you can see a Coca-Cola or a Disney and companies like that doing things that you think, well, this doesn’t make a hell of a lot of sense. You know, if they didn’t spend this $10 million, wouldn’t they still sell as much Coca-Cola?
这就是为什么你会看到像可口可乐或迪士尼这样的公司做一些看起来没什么意义的事情。比如，如果他们不花这1000万美元，难道他们就不会卖出同样多的可口可乐吗？
But, you know, that — I quoted from that 1896 report of Coca-Cola and the promotion they were doing back then to spread the word. You never know which dollar’s doing it. But you do know that everybody in the world, virtually, has heard of your product. Overwhelmingly, they’ve got a favorable impression on them and the next generation’s going to get it.
但你知道，我曾引用过1896年可口可乐的一份报告，描述了当时他们为了推广品牌所做的宣传活动。你永远不知道哪一美元的投入起到了作用。但你知道，几乎全世界的人都听说过你的产品。他们大多数对你的品牌有正面的印象，而下一代人也会延续这种印象。
So that’s what you’re doing with consumer products.
这就是你在消费品领域需要做的事情。
With See’s Candy, you know, we are no better — we want — no better than the last person who’s been served their candy or the last product they’ve been served.
对于See’s糖果来说，我们的声誉仅仅取决于最后一个购买糖果的顾客，或是最后一次提供的产品质量。
But as long as we do the job on that, people can’t catch us. You know, we can charge a little more for it because people are not interested in taking the low bid. And they’re not interested in saving a penny a bottle on colas. Remember we’ve talked about in these meetings, private labels, in the past.
只要我们把工作做到位，别人就无法赶上我们。你知道，我们可以多收一点钱，因为人们对选择最低价格并不感兴趣。他们也不愿意为了每瓶可乐省一分钱而选择替代品。记得我们在这些会议上谈过私人品牌的问题。
And private label has stalled out in the soft drink business. They want the real thing. And 900 and some odd million eight-ounce servings will be served today of Coca-Cola product around the world. Nine-hundred million, you know. And it’ll go up next year, the year after. And I don’t know how you displace companies like that.
私人品牌在软饮料行业已经停滞不前。消费者想要的是正品。今天，可口可乐的产品在全球范围内将提供超过9亿份8盎司的饮料。9亿份！明年还会更多，后年也会更多。我不知道你如何取代这样的公司。
茅台镇的各种假茅台。
I mean, if you gave me a hundred billion dollars — and I encourage if any of you are thinking about that to step forward — (laughter) — if you gave — and you told me to displace the Coca-Cola Company as the leader in the world in soft drinks, you know, I wouldn’t have the faintest idea of how to do it. And those are the kind of businesses we like.
我的意思是，如果你给我1000亿美元——如果有人真考虑这样做，我欢迎你站出来——（笑声）——你让我用这笔钱取代可口可乐成为全球软饮料的领导者，我根本不知道该怎么做。而这种企业正是我们喜欢的类型。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the See’s Candy example has an interesting teaching lesson for all of us.
查理·芒格： 是的，我认为See’s糖果的例子对我们所有人来说有一个有趣的启示。
Warren said we were — it’s the first time we really stepped up for brand quality. And it was a very hard jump for us. We’d been used to buying dollar bills for fifty cents.
沃伦说，这是我们第一次真正重视品牌质量。这对我们来说是一个非常大的飞跃。在此之前，我们习惯以五十美分的价格购买价值一美元的资产。
And the interesting thing was that if they had demanded an extra $100,000 for the See’s Candy company, we wouldn’t have bought it. And that was after Warren had been trained under the greatest professor of his era, and had worked 90 hours a week.
有趣的是，如果他们对See’s糖果的报价再多10万美元，我们就不会买下它。这是在沃伦接受了他那个时代最伟大的教授的训练，并且每周工作90小时之后发生的事情。
WARREN BUFFETT: And eaten a lot of chocolates, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 还吃了很多巧克力。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Absorbing everything in the world. I mean, we just didn’t have minds well enough trained to make an easy decision right. And by accident, they didn’t ask the extra $100,000 for it. And we did buy it. And as it succeeded, we kept learning.
查理·芒格： 是的，吸收了世界上的一切知识。但我想说，我们的思维训练得还不够好，无法轻松做出正确的决定。碰巧的是，他们没有多要那10万美元，于是我们买下了它。随着它的成功，我们不断学习。
I think that shows that the name of the game is continuing to learn. And even if you’re very well-trained and have some natural aptitude, you still need to keep learning.
我认为，这表明关键在于持续学习。即使你受过良好训练，并且有一些天赋，你仍然需要不断学习。
And that brings along the delicate problem people sometimes talk about: two aging executives. (Laughter)
这也带来了人们有时会提到的一个微妙问题：两个年事已高的高管。（笑声）
I don’t know what the hell that means as an adjective because I don’t know anybody that is going in the other direction. (Laughter and applause)
我不知道“年事已高”这个形容词究竟是什么意思，因为我从没见过有人在朝相反的方向前进。（笑声和掌声）
But you people who hold shares are betting, for a while at least, until younger successors come along, you’re betting to some extent on what we’ll now tactfully continue to call “aging executives” continuing to learn.
但是你们这些持有股票的人，至少在一段时间内，直到年轻的继任者出现为止，你们某种程度上是在押注我们这些“年事已高的高管”能够继续学习。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, if we hadn’t have bought See’s, with some subsequent developments after that because that made us aware of other things, we wouldn’t have bought Coca-Cola in 1988. I mean, you can give See’s a significant part of the credit for the, I guess, $11 billion-plus profit we’ve got in Coca-Cola at the present time.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，如果我们没有买下See’s糖果，而在此之后的某些发展使我们意识到了其他事情，我们在1988年就不会买下可口可乐。我想说，可口可乐目前超过110亿美元的利润，有很大一部分功劳可以归于See’s糖果。
And you say, “Well, how could you be so dumb as not to be able to recognize a Coca-Cola?” Well, I don’t know, but —
你可能会问，“你怎么会这么愚蠢，以至于看不出可口可乐的价值？”嗯，我也不知道，但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: You were only drinking about 20 cans a day.
查理·芒格： 毕竟你每天只喝了大约20罐而已。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Right. It wasn’t that I hadn’t been exposed to it, or — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，没错。这不是因为我没有接触过它，或者——（笑声）
It’s amazing. But it just made us start thinking more. I mean, we saw how decisions we made in relation to See’s played out in a marketplace and that sort of thing.
这很令人惊讶。但这确实让我们开始更多地思考。我的意思是，我们看到我们与See’s相关的决策在市场上是如何发挥作用的，以及类似的事情。
And we saw what worked and didn’t work. And it made us appreciate a lot what did work and shy away from things that didn’t work. But it led — it definitely led to a Coca-Cola. And we’ve had the good luck to buy some businesses themselves in their entirety that taught us a lot.
我们看到什么有效，什么无效。这让我们非常感激那些有效的事情，同时避免无效的事情。但这确实引导我们走向了可口可乐。而且我们很幸运，能够完全买下某些业务，而这些业务教会了我们很多东西。
You know, we bought — and it’s worked in the other direction. I mean, we were in the windmill business, one time. I was. Charlie stayed out of the windmill business. But I was in the windmill business and pumps and — third-level department — or second-level — department stores.
你知道，我们也曾向相反的方向尝试过。比如，有一次我们进入了风车业务。我参与了，查理则避开了风车业务。我还进入了泵业，以及三线或二线百货商店的业务。
And I just found out how tough it was and how it didn’t — you could apply all kinds of energy to them. And it didn’t do any good. It made a great deal of sense to figure out what pond to jump in. And what pond you jumped in was probably more important than how well you could swim.
我发现这些业务有多难，无论你投入多少精力都没有效果。选择跳进哪片池塘是非常重要的，甚至比你游泳技巧有多高超更为重要。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s necessary that people be as ignorant as we were, as long as we were. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我认为人们不必像我们一样在那么长时间里表现得那么无知。（笑声）
I think American education could be better, but not in the hands of any of the people who are now teaching. (Laughter)
我认为美国的教育可以更好，但不是在现在这些教书人的手中。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there any group we’ve forgotten to offend? I mean — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们是不是漏掉了某个还没得罪的群体？我的意思是——（笑声）
52. Life advice: “You will do well in what you enjoy”
人生建议：“做你喜欢的事情会让你成功”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman. My name is Ha Tsin Tsu (PH) and originally from China. Now, I’m living Kansas. And it’s my honor to speak to you both.
听众： 下午好，主席先生和副主席先生。我叫Ha Tsin Tsu（音），原籍中国，现在住在堪萨斯州。很荣幸能和您们两位交流。
My question is, if someone like to form a company doing what you did 30 or 40 years ago, what is your suggestion to them? And would you share some of your wisdom with us? Thank you.
我的问题是，如果有人想创立一家像您们30或40年前那样的公司，您们对他们有什么建议？能否与我们分享一些智慧？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: First thing we’d suggest is they send us a royalty. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们的第一个建议是，他们应该先给我们付版税。（笑声）
Charlie, you take over on that. You’ve thought more about starting over again than I have. (Laughter)
查理，这个问题交给你回答。你比我更常思考如何重新开始。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I want to frankly say that that’s a question I ordinarily duck.
查理·芒格： 老实说，这是一个我通常会回避的问题。
I always believe in getting the fundamental mental tools in place. And I always believe in running reality, as it comes in, preferably vicariously through the newspaper, et cetera, instead of through personal painful experience, through the filter of these sound ideas.
我始终相信应该先掌握基本的思维工具。我也一直相信应该通过现实来检验这些工具，最好是通过阅读报纸等间接地学习，而不是通过亲身痛苦的经历。用这些正确的理念作为过滤器来解读现实。
And I not only think that that works in life to create success, I think it makes life more fun. So I argue for sound thinking. But the exact specific techniques of turning yourself into another Warren Buffett, I leave to you. (Laughter)
我不仅认为这在生活中有助于创造成功，还认为这让生活更有趣。因此，我主张坚持正确的思维方式。但至于如何具体地让自己成为下一个沃伦·巴菲特，我留给你们自己去探索。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the one thing I would advise is I would be — A, I think there’s a ton of opportunity out there. And I would do something I enjoyed.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我唯一的建议是，我认为外面有大量的机会。而且我会选择做我喜欢的事情。
I wouldn’t do something because I thought it was going to get me to a life I was going to enjoy later on, because if I made a lot of money I was going to be a lot happier, or anything like that.
我不会因为某件事可以让我以后过上想要的生活而去做它，比如说，赚很多钱会让我更快乐之类的理由。
I’ve never done that. And I think that you will do well in what you enjoy.
我从未那样做过。我认为你会在你喜欢的事情上做得很好。
And I think it’s crazy in life to endure a whole lot that — I don’t mean — Charlie and I worked in a grocery story. We didn’t really jump up and down over it all the time.
我觉得，在人生中忍受大量你不喜欢的事情是很疯狂的。当然，我不是说——查理和我曾在杂货店工作过。我们并不是每时每刻都对此感到兴奋。
But in terms of making a commitment to really being a business that you’re only in it for the money, I think that’s crazy.
但如果你只因为赚钱而全身心投入到一个业务中，我认为那是疯狂的。
And if we were in this only for the money, you know, we’d have quit a long time ago, obviously.
如果我们做这些只是为了赚钱，你知道的，我们早就退出了，这一点是显而易见的。
It just — you ought to have fun while you’re doing it. It should not be jam tomorrow and not jam today. It just doesn’t make any sense to me. And I think you’ll get better results that way, too.
你应该在做事情的过程中享受乐趣。不应该是“明天有果酱，今天却没有”。这对我来说毫无意义。而且我认为这种方式也会让你取得更好的结果。
53. Buffett rejects criticism of Disney over same-sex benefits
巴菲特反驳对迪士尼同性伴侣福利的批评
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? Or did we just do zone 2? I think we did. Yeah. It’d be zone 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是第二区吗？还是我们刚刚做了第二区？我想是的。那应该是第三区了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dave Youberg (PH) from Sac City, Iowa.
听众： 我是来自爱荷华州萨克城的戴夫·尤伯格（音）。
And I must —
我想说——
I haven’t heard you on the moral and ethical considerations of stocks like ABC and Disney. They are now getting more and more criticism from mainstream religious groups in this country, main — their reliance on sex and violence and their cronyism — homosexuality — and —
我还没听您谈过像ABC和迪士尼这样的股票在道德和伦理上的考量。它们现在受到美国主流宗教团体越来越多的批评，主要是因为它们对性和暴力的依赖，以及它们对同性恋的“裙带关系”——
VOICE: Did they hear it? I couldn’t hear it.
旁白： 他们听到了吗？我没听清楚。
(Scattered applause)
（零星的掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t — we didn’t cut anybody off there.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我没有——我们没有打断任何人。
CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible)
查理·芒格： （听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: What?
沃伦·巴菲特： 什么？
The — what I would — I would say, you know, I’m delighted to have my grandchildren exposed to the full range of Disney product. (Applause)
我想说的是，我很高兴让我的孙子孙女们接触到迪士尼的全系列产品。（掌声）
You know, I’d love to take them to Disneyland or Disney World or take them to Disney movies or Disney videos. You know, I think the Disney Company is being run in an absolutely first-rate way. And I have no problem whatsoever with gays being employed or receiving benefits or anything of the sort. (Applause)
你知道，我很愿意带他们去迪士尼乐园或迪士尼世界，或者看迪士尼的电影或视频。我认为迪士尼公司以绝对一流的方式在运营。我对同性恋者被雇用或获得福利等任何类似的事情完全没有任何问题。（掌声）
54. We don’t care who is buying or selling securities
我们并不关心谁在买卖证券
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone one?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett. Good afternoon, Mr. Munger. My name is Bashir Narema (PH) from Arlington, Texas.
听众： 下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是来自德克萨斯州阿灵顿的巴希尔·纳雷马（音）。
I see in the USA Today article about the shortage of labor in the state. And I was wondering when you analyze a company, do you take that into consideration by choosing companies who are not dependent so much on labor?
我在《今日美国》的文章中看到有关于劳动力短缺的报道。我想知道，当您分析一家公司时，是否会考虑选择那些对劳动力依赖较少的公司？
The second question is, I heard you in the beginning of the meeting that so much capital coming from foreign country, you mentioned so many different country, who buy — who bought the Berkshire Hathaway. And I’m sure they buy all companies in the Dow.
第二个问题是，我听到您在会议开头提到有大量资本来自外国，您提到许多不同国家购买了伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票。我确信他们也购买了道琼斯指数中的所有公司。
Do you feel like the analyst who analyze the Dow had that into consideration that the Dow now is becoming as the Walmart of the security business in the world, where all the national different country, they bypass their market and they come in and buy in the United States?
您是否认为分析道指的分析师考虑到这一点，即道琼斯指数现在已经成为全球证券市场的沃尔玛，不同国家绕过他们的市场来美国购买？
And as a result that the idea of [Federal Reserve Chairman] Mr. [Alan] Greenspan, as far as exuberant, it’s moot because if you remember how the Japanese were when they start to buy the real estate in America, they force us to pay high premium for the price. And I think that’s what’s going to happen in the market. And we, as Americans, who’ve been accustomed to low P/Es, now we’re going to miss on and the price is going to continue going up.
结果是，[美联储主席]格林斯潘先生关于市场繁荣的观点就显得无关紧要了。因为如果您还记得，当日本人开始在美国购买房地产时，他们迫使我们为价格支付高额溢价。而我认为，这将在市场上重演。我们美国人习惯了低市盈率，现在我们可能会错失机会，而价格将继续上涨。
And the third question is —
第三个问题是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Maybe we better stop at two. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 也许我们最好停在两个问题。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Alright. Thank you.
听众： 好的，谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thanks.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，谢谢。
We pay very little attention — we don’t pay any attention — to capital flows. In other words, we don’t really care who’s buying or selling any securities. Somebody is buying or selling each one.
我们很少关注——实际上完全不关注——资本流动。换句话说，我们并不关心谁在买或卖任何证券。因为每一份证券都有买方和卖方。
So, obviously, there’s, you know, you could focus on the buyers. You could focus on the sellers. But — you can say now that there’s 20 billion a month or so going into equity funds and all.
显然，你可以关注买方，也可以关注卖方。但——你可以说，现在每个月大约有200亿美元流入股票基金等。
But it doesn’t make any difference to us. All we’re interested is what the business is worth. And what people are paying attention to, in terms of capital flows or whatever — or market signals or whether the Fed’s going to move, that all changes.
但这对我们来说并没有任何影响。我们关心的只是业务的价值。人们关注资本流动、市场信号或者美联储是否会采取行动之类的事情，这些都会不断变化。
Do you remember ten years ago, it was, you know, it was M2 that everybody — every — whatever day of the week it was, you know, what’s M2 this week?
你还记得十年前吗？当时每个人都在关注M2，每周某一天都会问：“这一周的M2是多少？”
I always thought of having a mystery, you know, about whatever happened to M2? (Laughter)
我一直觉得可以拍一部悬疑片，讲讲M2到底发生了什么。（笑声）
There’s always something that people are talking about. There’s so much time to fill with chatter, you know, and pages to fill, that they write about all these things that, to us, don’t make much difference, because we don’t care if the market closes for the next five years.
总有些事情是人们谈论的。他们需要用各种闲聊来填补时间，用内容来填满版面，所以他们写了许多对我们来说没有多大意义的东西。因为即使市场接下来五年都关闭，我们也不在乎。
We care how much Coca-Cola has sold five years from now, and what percentage of the world market they have, and what they’re charging for it, and how many shares are outstanding, and that sort of thing.
我们关心的是五年后可口可乐的销量是多少，占据了全球市场的百分比是多少，定价是多少，流通股有多少，诸如此类的事情。
But we just — we don’t care who’s buying or selling it in the least, except we like it when the company’s buying it.
但我们完全不关心谁在买卖这些股票，除了公司本身在回购时我们会感到高兴。
The same way with Gillette. We care about whether people are trading up in the shaving experience.
对于吉列也是一样。我们关心的是人们是否在提升他们的剃须体验。
So capital flows and all of those macro factors that people like to write about a lot just have nothing to do with what we do. We’re buying businesses.
因此，资本流动和那些人们喜欢大书特书的宏观因素，与我们的业务没有任何关系。我们是在购买企业。
And I really think it is not a bad mindset, whenever you buy a stock to say, “Would I be happy buying this stock if the market closed for five years?” Because then you’re buying a business, if you say yes to that. If you don’t say yes to that, you may not be focusing on the proper thing.
我真的认为，当你买一只股票时，问问自己：“如果市场接下来五年关闭，我是否仍然愿意买这只股票？”这种思维方式并不坏。如果你的答案是肯定的，那你实际上是在购买一家企业。如果不是，那你可能没有关注正确的事情。
By its nature, the U.S. is running a substantial trade deficit, merchandise trade deficit.
从本质上讲，美国正在运行一个巨额的商品贸易逆差。
If you buy more from the rest of the world than you’re selling them, which is what happens when you’re running a trade deficit, you have to balance the books. I mean, they get something in exchange. And what happens is they get some sort of capital asset in exchange.
如果你从世界其他地方购买的东西多于你卖给他们的东西，也就是发生贸易逆差时，你必须平衡账目。换句话说，他们会得到某种形式的资本资产作为交换。
They may get a government bond. They may get a piece of the U.S. business or something. But the key thing in economics, whenever somebody makes some assertion to you about economics, you always want to say, “And then what?”
他们可能会得到一张政府债券，可能会得到美国企业的一部分股权，或者其他东西。但在经济学中，关键的问题是，无论何时有人对你提出某种经济主张，你总是需要问一句：“然后呢？”
In fact, it’s not a bad idea to say that about everything in life. But you always have to say, “And then what?”
事实上，这种思维方式不仅适用于经济学，还适用于生活中的任何事情。你总是需要问：“然后呢？”
So when you read that the merchandise trade deficit is nine billion, what else does that mean? Well, it means that somehow we have to have created nine billion of capital assets, claims on our production in the future, with somebody else in the world. So they have to invest. They don’t have any choice.
所以，当你读到商品贸易逆差为90亿美元时，这还意味着什么？这意味着，我们必须在某种程度上创造了价值90亿美元的资本资产，作为对未来我们生产的权益，由世界上其他国家持有。所以他们必须投资，他们别无选择。
When somebody says, “Won’t it be terrible if the Japanese sell all their government bonds?” They can’t sell all their government bonds without getting something else in exchange, you know, they get some other American asset in exchange because there’s no other way to do it.
当有人说：“如果日本人卖掉他们所有的政府债券，那不是很糟糕吗？”但他们不可能在不换取其他东西的情况下卖掉所有的政府债券。他们会以美国的其他资产作为交换，因为别无选择。
They could sell it to the French. But then the French have the same problem.
他们可以把债券卖给法国人。但随后，法国人将面临同样的问题。
So trace through where the transactions go anytime someone starts talking about one specific action in economics.
因此，每当有人开始谈论经济学中的某一具体行动时，追踪这些交易的流向是很重要的。
55. “We like a business with low labor costs”
“我们喜欢劳动力成本低的业务”
WARREN BUFFETT: Question about labor. Generally speaking, obviously, we like a business with low labor costs. But we like a business with low costs of every kind, I mean, because the rest is profit.
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于劳动力的问题。一般来说，很明显，我们喜欢劳动力成本低的业务。但我们喜欢各种成本都低的业务，因为剩下的部分就是利润。
So it would be true that on balance we would not be high on labor-intensive companies. But there’s some very good businesses that are labor intensive.
因此，总体来看，我们不会对劳动密集型公司有太高的偏好。但确实有一些非常好的业务是劳动密集型的。
(BREAK IN TAPE)
（录音中断）
WARREN BUFFETT: But if you say, “Would I rather have a labor-intensive business or a non-labor-intensive business and everything else is equal,” the answer is the less labor-intensive business. Charlie, you want to comment on either one?
沃伦·巴菲特： 但是，如果你问我，“在其他条件都相等的情况下，我是更愿意选择一个劳动密集型业务还是一个非劳动密集型业务？”答案是非劳动密集型业务。查理，你想对这点发表什么看法吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I don’t think I’ve got anything more. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 不，我没什么更多要补充的。（笑声）
56. Subsidiaries make own decisions on accepting American Express
子公司自行决定是否接受美国运通卡
WARREN BUFFETT: Area two?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: First, I’d like to thank you both for being so generous with your time and with your ideas for us today. (Applause)
听众： 首先，我想感谢您们今天慷慨地抽出时间与我们分享您的观点。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。
We get paid by the hour, so — (Laughs)
我们按小时收费，所以——（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I’ll try and talk quickly then.
听众： 那我尽量说快一点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh no. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，不用着急。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bob Costa (PH) from Evansville, Indiana. I’ve been a shareholder for four years.
听众： 我叫鲍勃·科斯塔（音），来自印第安纳州埃文斯维尔。我已经是股东四年了。
This is my first visit to Omaha. And I went to the mega mart. And I actually bought something there. And I tried to pay for it with American Express card.
这是我第一次来奥马哈。我去了那里的大型商场，还真的买了些东西。我试图用美国运通卡支付。
WARREN BUFFETT: Uh huh.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯哼。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And they told me, just like the ad, you can’t use it here. I hope you’d both comment on that or at least one of you.
听众： 他们告诉我，就像广告里说的那样，“你不能在这里用它”。我希望你们两位能对此评论一下，至少一位可以。
But my real question is that I just stumbled across the idea of intellectual capital and how that might be useful in valuing a business. And I was hoping that one or both of you could clarify that for me and whether that’s useful to us as investors or just another academic theory that we’d be better off ignoring.
但我真正的问题是，我刚刚接触到“明智资本”这个概念，以及它在评估企业价值时的作用。我希望你们能为我澄清这一点，并告诉我们作为投资者，这是否有用，或者这只是另一个我们最好忽略的学术理论。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Harvey Golub, who runs American Express and has done a terrific job of running it, has written me about the Furniture Mart as well as about See’s.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，哈维·戈卢布负责运营美国运通公司，并且做得非常出色。他曾给我写信谈到家具市场和See’s糖果的问题。
And we, basically, let our managers run their own businesses. So, the people at each entity — Borsheim’s takes American Express. Others of our businesses do, too. We let every manager make his decisions.
基本上，我们让我们的管理者自行经营各自的业务。因此，每个子公司的人，例如Borsheim’s珠宝，就接受美国运通卡。我们的其他一些业务也接受运通卡。我们让每位经理自行决定。
As soon as I start telling the managers that they ought to, say, take American Express or not take Visa or whatever it may be, you know, at that point, they’ve lost some of the responsibility for their operations and, perhaps, to an extent even, you know, some of the pride that comes from running them.
一旦我开始告诉经理们，比如他们应该接受美国运通卡，或者不接受Visa卡，或者其他类似的事情，你知道吗？从那一刻起，他们就会失去一部分对业务运营的责任感，甚至可能失去一部分因管理业务而带来的自豪感。
Most of our managers do not need to work for a living. They run their businesses for the same reason Charlie and I run Berkshire. They love doing it. They jump out of bed in the morning because it’s exciting to do.
我们的大多数经理并不需要为了生计而工作。他们经营业务的原因与查理和我经营伯克希尔的原因一样。他们热爱自己的工作。每天早上，他们充满兴奋地跳下床，因为他们对工作充满激情。
And the one thing that would keep the two of us, or drive the two of us away from Berkshire, is if we were getting second-guessed all the time or somebody else was telling us when to swing or not to swing.
有一件事情会让我们留在伯克希尔，也可能会让我们离开伯克希尔，那就是如果我们总是被别人质疑，或者有人告诉我们什么时候该出手，什么时候不该出手。
We would have no interest in running it. We’d go run — we’d do something else then. And maybe our other managers aren’t as extreme as we are in that respect. But we feel they’ve built successful businesses. They know how to do it.
如果是那样，我们就对经营伯克希尔没有任何兴趣了。我们会去做别的事情。也许我们的其他经理在这方面不像我们这么极端。但我们觉得，他们建立了成功的业务，他们知道如何经营。
We do allocate the excess capital they generate. But aside from that, we really let them make their own decisions. So we have no companywide policy on virtually anything that I can think of, except send money to Omaha. (Laughter)
我们确实会分配他们产生的多余资本。但除此之外，我们确实让他们自己做决定。所以，在我能想到的几乎任何事情上，我们都没有统一的公司政策，除了“把钱送到奥马哈”。（笑声）
But — and, you know, we’re delighted to have American Express give the Furniture Mart the reasons why the Furniture Mart will be better off using American Express. And my guess is they have some very good reasons.
此外，我们很高兴看到美国运通向家具市场解释为什么使用美国运通卡会让他们的业务更好。我猜他们有一些非常好的理由。
But they’re going to have to sell them on that, and just like any vendor of anything has to sell each operation. We wouldn’t tell the people at See’s who to buy the nuts from, or who to buy the container from, or anything of the sort, how to design the stores, or whatever it may be. And that’s just the Berkshire philosophy on that.
但他们必须自己去说服对方，这就像任何供应商都必须向每个业务单元推销自己的产品一样。我们不会告诉See’s的人从哪里购买坚果，或者从哪里购买容器，或者如何设计商店，诸如此类的事情。这就是伯克希尔的哲学。
Charlie, you want to comment?
查理，你有什么想补充的吗？
57. Berkshire’s intellectual capital is its managers
伯克希尔的智力资本是其管理层
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Let me shift to intellectual capital.
查理·芒格： 是的，让我谈谈智力资本。
Berkshire has a lot of intellectual capital in these very able executives in the various businesses. And we hope we’ve got some intellectual capital in the few hundred square feet at headquarters. (Laughter)
伯克希尔在各个业务领域拥有许多非常能干的高管，这些都是我们的智力资本。我们也希望在总部这几百平方英尺的地方也有一些智力资本。（笑声）
But we are not in the business of designing oil refineries with armies of engineers, or developing software with armies doing complicated accounting work all over the world. We just haven’t drifted into that kind of a business.
但我们并没有从事设计炼油厂、组织大量工程师的工作，也没有开发复杂的会计软件，遍布全球从事这些工作的团队。我们没有涉足这样的业务领域。
And intellectual capital has gotten to be a new buzzword, because we’ve now developed huge businesses, like Microsoft, which really didn’t exist on that scale not so very long ago.
“智力资本”现在已经成为一个流行词，因为我们已经看到了像微软这样的大型企业，它们以前并不存在于这样的规模。
And so people have suddenly realized, my God, there’s really a lot of money in the aggregation effects and momentum effects when you get a bunch of really bright people working in the same direction. And that’s what’s made the concept so fashionable.
于是，人们突然意识到，当一群非常聪明的人朝着同一个方向努力时，由此产生的聚合效应和动量效应能够创造巨大的财富。这就是为什么这个概念变得如此流行。
By and large, we’ve avoided the field. Again, it’s hard for us to understand.
总体而言，我们回避了这个领域。因为我们很难理解它。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We look for brains and energy and integrity in people that we work with. And if you get that combination and you’re in a decent business, you know, you can own the world.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们寻找与我们合作的人是否具有智慧、活力和正直。如果你能找到这样的组合，并且从事一个不错的业务，你就能主宰世界。
And, you know, whether you call it intellectual capital or anything — you know, you can stick the names on it. And that’s who we try to associate with. I mean, it’s a lot easier than doing it yourself.
无论你是否称之为智力资本，或者其他什么，你都可以贴上各种标签。而我们正是试图与这样的人合作。这比自己动手要容易得多。
And when we get, in our own businesses — you saw that group there at the end of the movie — I mean, that’s a huge asset to Berkshire.
当我们在自己的业务中看到——你们在影片最后看到的那群人——这对伯克希尔来说是巨大的资产。
They talk about getting into accounting for it. That’s nonsense in my view. I mean, you don’t need to do that. But you should pay for it. And you should pay for it as shareholders. You should pay for it as managers.
他们谈到要把这种智力资本纳入会计核算。在我看来，这很荒谬。你不需要这么做。但你应该为它买单，股东应该为它买单，管理者也应该为它买单。
When we get people, you know, whether it’s Tom Murphy, or Al Zeien at Gillette, or Roberto Goizueta, or Michael Eisner, I mean, those people have added billions of dollars of value.
当我们获得像汤姆·墨菲、吉列的阿尔·泽恩、罗伯托·戈祖埃塔或迈克尔·艾斯纳这样的人才时，他们为公司创造了数十亿美元的价值。
And, it’s just — you know, that’s who we want to be associated with. And we don’t want to be associated with the mediocre managers because the difference is just — is huge.
而这正是我们想与之合作的人才类型。我们不想与平庸的管理者合作，因为两者的差距实在是——巨大。
But we don’t go through an elaborate exercise. We just recognize the people that have got those — we think we — we try to recognize the people who have got those qualities. And, then, we — and then if they’re in a good business and they’ve got those qualities, we want to take a big bite.
但我们不会进行复杂的分析。我们只是识别那些具备这些品质的人——我们努力去识别那些具备这些品质的人。如果他们从事的是一项好业务，并且具备这些品质，我们就会想要大举投资。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But take intellectual capital. People think patents. They think copyrights. Patents and copyrights have gotten to be way more valuable, as a percentage of the investment assets of the world.
查理·芒格： 说到智力资本，人们会想到专利和版权。专利和版权作为全球投资资产的一部分，变得更加有价值了。
And so people are very much more interested in intellectual capital.
因此，人们对智力资本的兴趣也大幅增加。
Think of the great drug companies and how small they were 20 years ago and how everything they have is, basically, intellectual capital. It’s the few products that have — that really work that have the patents. But by and large, we’re not in drug companies.
想想那些伟大的制药公司。20年前它们有多么小，而现在它们的一切基本上都是智力资本。它们的少数几款真正有效的产品拥有专利。但总体来说，我们没有投资制药公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. But that’s — there are different forms — as Charlie said, there’s businesses you sort of think of that way as their whole being being intellectual capital.
沃伦·巴菲特： 没错。但正如查理所说，这有不同的形式——有些业务整体上就是智力资本。
But I would argue that when Roberto Goizueta, 15 years ago, saw how to make the future of Coke — same product — dramatic — and basically the same system, although it required some changes — but saw how to make that dramatically more valuable by doing a lot of little things over a long period of time and doing them consistently and not getting his eye off the ball.
但我认为，15年前，当罗伯托·戈祖埃塔看到如何让可口可乐的未来变得更有价值时——产品是同样的，系统基本相同，尽管需要进行一些调整——他通过在很长一段时间内做许多小的改进，并始终专注于目标，极大地提升了其价值。
Michael Eisner did the same thing. Disney hadn’t gone anyplace, you know, in the 15 years or so after Walt died. Now, you know, we all knew who Mickey Mouse was and everything. But Michael really saw what the future should be. And he still does, you know.
迈克尔·艾斯纳也做了同样的事情。在华特·迪士尼去世后的15年里，迪士尼基本上没有任何进展。我们都知道米老鼠是什么，但迈克尔真正看到了迪士尼的未来，并且直到现在他依然清楚。
And you say it’s easy when it’s all over. But how many people were doing something about it at the time? The place was languishing, basically, 15 years ago. They had the assets.
你会说事后看来很简单。但在当时，有多少人采取了行动？15年前，迪士尼基本上处于停滞状态。他们有资产。
And, to me, that’s — you know, it’s different than what Bill Gates does or Andy Grove does. But it’s our form of intellectual capital. And it’s what we can understand better.
对我来说，这和比尔·盖茨或安迪·格罗夫做的事情不同。但这是我们的智力资本形式，也是我们更能理解的东西。
58. “Mistake” to not buy pharmaceutical stocks
“未投资制药股是一个错误”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone, what do we have? Three.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是第三区，对吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name’s Will Jacks (PH). I’m from Chicago, and I’m a happy shareholder.
听众： 巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我叫威尔·杰克斯（音），来自芝加哥。我是一名快乐的股东。
I, first, want to thank both of you for the unusual privilege you give us for your time and your expertise. This is very unusual. And I think it’s to be commended. (Applause)
首先，我想感谢你们为我们提供了宝贵的时间和专业知识。这种机会非常难得，我认为值得表扬。（掌声）
And my question has to do with one of the major American industries that, unless I missed something in the reading, that is the pharmaceutical industry, the companies that make medicines.
我的问题与美国的一个重要产业有关。如果我没读漏什么的话，那就是制药行业，也就是生产药品的公司。
I wonder under what circumstances you might consider those industries for investment by Berkshire Hathaway?
我想知道，在什么情况下伯克希尔哈撒韦会考虑投资这些行业？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, those industries — the pharmaceutical industry’s, obviously, been a terrific industry to invest in.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这些行业——显然，制药行业一直是一个非常优秀的投资行业。
We have trouble, or at least I have trouble, distinguishing among the companies, in terms of seeing which ones, ten years from now, might be the best ones to be in.
我们遇到了一些困难，或者至少我遇到了困难——在这些公司中，我很难判断十年后哪家公司会是最好的投资选择。
I mean, it’s easy for me to figure out that Coca-Cola’s the soft drink company to be in, or Gillette is the shaving company to be in, or Disney’s the entertainment company to be in, than it is for me to figure out which one in the pharmaceutical.
我的意思是，要我判断可口可乐是软饮料行业的首选公司，吉列是剃须行业的首选公司，或者迪士尼是娱乐行业的首选公司，这对我来说很容易。但要我判断制药行业中的哪家公司是首选，就要困难得多了。
But that — I’m not saying you can’t do it. I’m just saying that that’s difficult for me.
但这并不是说你不能做到。我只是说，对我来说这很难。
We have — we started buying one of them a couple of years ago. And we should’ve continued, but we didn’t because it went up an eighth, and — (Laughter)
我们几年前开始买入其中一家公司的股票。本来我们应该继续买入的，但没有，因为股价涨了八分之一——（笑声）
Your chairman was a little reluctant to follow it, a terrible mistake.
你的董事长有点犹豫不决，这是个可怕的错误。
But I would say the biggest — and we could’ve bought the whole industry and done very well at various times, particularly when the threat of — what people thought was the threat of the Clinton health program cast a big cloud over the pharmaceutical industry.
但我想说的是，最大的机会是——我们本可以在多个时期买入整个行业并获得非常好的回报，特别是当时人们认为克林顿医疗计划的威胁为制药行业蒙上了一层阴影的时候。
That was the time you could’ve just bought the whole industry and done very well. We didn’t do it. It was a mistake.
那是一个你可以买下整个行业并取得非常好收益的时机。但我们没有这么做，这是一个错误。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s hard to think of any industry that’s done more good for consumers, generally. When you think of the way children used to die and now, they very seldom die. And it’s been a fabulous business. And it’s been one of the glories of American civilization.
查理·芒格： 说实话，很难想象还有哪个行业比制药行业对消费者贡献更大。想想过去孩子们的死亡率有多高，而现在他们很少死亡。这一直是一个非常出色的行业，也是美国文明的一大荣耀。
But it’s — we’ve admired it. But we haven’t been part of it.
但尽管如此——我们一直非常钦佩这个行业，但我们并没有参与其中。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve missed a lot of things. And I’m dead serious about that. And we’ve missed things that should not have been beyond our capacity to grasp.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们错过了很多机会。我是认真的。我们错过了一些本不该超出我们能力范围的机会。
A lot of things that should be beyond our capacity to grasp, but there’s some that haven’t been. And we’ve just plain missed them.
当然，也有很多事情确实超出了我们的能力范围。但有些事情并没有超出，而我们就是简单地错过了。
59. Munger: Good general education helps investors
芒格：良好的通识教育对投资者有帮助
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m another Chicagoan, (inaudible), and a share owner.
听众： 你好，我是另一位来自芝加哥的股东。（声音模糊）
This question is directed, first, to Mr. Munger, and then to Mr. Buffett.
这个问题首先问芒格先生，然后是巴菲特先生。
Mr. Munger, I am intrigued by your marshalling of the Commodore [Cornelius Vanderbilt] and Aristotle to support your points. Very few of today’s money managers would, or could, do that.
芒格先生，我对您引用范德比尔特（Cornelius Vanderbilt）和亚里士多德来支持您的观点感到非常着迷。今天的基金经理很少有人会这样做，也很少有人能这样做。
Could you elaborate on what role a study of history of civilization plays in developing a sound investment philosophy? Thanks.
您能否详细说明文明史的研究在建立健全的投资哲学中起到什么作用？谢谢。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t want to praise Aristotle too much. You know, he was the one who thought that women had a different number of teeth from men — (laughter) — and never looked in his wife’s mouth. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 嗯，我不想过分赞扬亚里士多德。你知道，他是那个认为女性牙齿数量与男性不同的人——（笑声）——但他从来没看过他妻子的嘴。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Maybe his wife did. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 或许是他妻子这么认为的。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m all in favor of a good general education. And I think it helps investment performance. And it helps business performance. And it helps one be a better citizen.
查理·芒格： 我非常赞成接受良好的通识教育。我认为它有助于提升投资表现，也有助于提高业务表现，还能帮助人成为更好的公民。
And some of the things people say are quite memorable. And therefore, they’re helpful to the mind by the very ease of which they’re remembered.
有些人说的话很值得记住，因此，因为它们容易记住，就对思维很有帮助。
And I think you’d be surprised how many bright investment professionals could talk a lot about Aristotle, or even people I can’t stand — (laughter) — like [German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel.
我想你会惊讶地发现有多少聪明的投资专业人士能够谈论很多关于亚里士多德的内容，甚至是一些我不喜欢的人——（笑声）——比如[德国哲学家]黑格尔。
WARREN BUFFETT: You want to quote a little more from anybody to reinforce your —? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 你还想再引用点什么人来强化你的观点吗——？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: One of my favorite quotations in the whole world is from Einstein. He says everything should be made as simple as possible, but no more simple. And I think that describes the reality that we all face.
查理·芒格： 我最喜欢的一句名言之一是爱因斯坦的。他说，“一切都应该尽可能简单，但不要过于简单。”我认为这很好地描述了我们所面临的现实。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s favorite, though, is Ben Franklin. That’s probably true, isn’t it, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特： 不过，查理最喜欢的还是本杰明·富兰克林。这大概是真的吧，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
查理·芒格： 是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: We get more from Ben than anybody else. “Keep thy shop and it will keep thee,” that sort of thing. I mean, we’re just — we’re loaded with that stuff. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们从富兰克林那里学到的东西比从其他人那里多。“照管好你的商铺，它就会照管好你，”类似这样的箴言。我们真的——我们对此受益匪浅。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: “Three removes are as good [bad] as a fire.”
查理·芒格： “三次搬家犹如一次失火。”
“It’s hard for an empty sack to stand upright.” (Laughter)
“空口袋难以直立。”（笑声）
That’s the bible around Berkshire.
这就是伯克希尔的圣经。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I once heard Warren say, “The reason I’m so financially conservative is I don’t want to find out how badly I might behave if I were stretched.” (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我曾听沃伦说过，“我之所以在财务上如此保守，是因为我不想知道如果我被逼到极限，我可能会表现得有多糟糕。”（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we better cut him off here. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想我们最好在这里打住他了。（笑声）
60. “Why risk losing what you need and have for what you don’t need and don’t have?”
“为什么要冒险失去你需要和拥有的东西去追求那些你不需要和没有的东西？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区。
You better cut the thumping there.
你最好停止敲击声了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 是的。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Stanley Watkins and — from Manhattan, Kansas. And I’m a shareholder. And I have two questions.
听众： 我叫斯坦利·沃特金斯，来自堪萨斯州曼哈顿。我是伯克希尔的股东。我有两个问题。
And the first one, I know the answer. So you can just say yes or no. (Laughs)
第一个问题，我知道答案。所以你们可以只回答“是”或“否”。（笑声）
Would you consider investing in indexes such as OEX? Pure speculation, you’re going to say yes.
你们会考虑投资于像OEX这样的指数吗？纯粹是投机，我猜你们会说“是”。
And number two, would you encourage investors to, if they were trying to get a lot of their investment, to use LEAPS on investments such as Coca-Cola instead of buying the stock?
第二个问题是，如果投资者试图从投资中获得高回报，你们会鼓励他们使用LEAPS（长期股票期权）来投资可口可乐这样的公司，而不是直接购买股票吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Use what on? I missed that —
沃伦·巴菲特： 使用什么？我没听清——
CHARLIE MUNGER: LEAPS.
查理·芒格： LEAPS。
WARREN BUFFETT: Leak?
沃伦·巴菲特： 漏？
CHARLIE MUNGER: LEAPS, L-E-A-P-S.
查理·芒格： LEAPS，长期股票期权。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I see. We’re still on options.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，我明白了，我们还是在谈期权。
CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible)
查理·芒格： （听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Both the questions relate to futures of one sort, calls, or whatever they may be, and —
沃伦·巴菲特： 这两个问题都涉及某种形式的期货、看涨期权，或者其他类似的东西——
I think that investors should stick to buying ownership in businesses. It’s not that you can’t come up with a theoretical argument for buying, say, a —
我认为投资者应该专注于购买企业的所有权。这并不是说你不能为购买某些东西，比如——
I mean, if you think Coca-Cola’s attractive, you can say, well, I’d rather buy a five-year option on Coke than buy the stock directly because it introduces leverage without the risk of going broke.
我的意思是，如果你认为可口可乐很有吸引力，你可能会说，与直接购买股票相比，我宁愿购买一份可口可乐的五年期期权，因为这引入了杠杆，却没有破产的风险。
But I think that that’s a dangerous path to start down, because it —
但我认为这是一条危险的道路，因为它——
If it works well, it’s so — it’s dynamite to start playing with things that can expire and become worthless, or can be bought with very low margin, as the OEX options you were talking about.
如果它运作得好，这就像玩火一般——玩弄那些可能到期变得一文不值的东西，或者像你提到的OEX期权，可以用很低的保证金购买。
Borrowed money usually — or frequently — leads to trouble. And it’s not necessary.
借来的钱通常——或者经常——会导致麻烦。而这并不是必要的。
I mean, if you had some compelling reason — if you’re going — if you had to double your money by the end of the year or be shot, you know, then, I would head for the futures market because, you know, you need to do it. I mean, you have to introduce borrowed money.
我的意思是，如果你有某种迫不得已的理由——比如，如果你必须在年底前让你的钱翻倍，否则就要被处决，那么我会选择期货市场，因为这是你必须做的事。也就是说，你必须引入借贷资金。
But you really ought to figure out how you can be happy with the present amount of money you’ve got and, then, figure that everything else is, you know, all to the good as you go along, and —
但你真正需要做的是弄清楚如何对自己现有的资金感到满足，然后将其他的一切视为随行而来的好事——
I don’t think people — once they start focusing on short-term price behavior, which is the nature of buying calls, or LEAPS, or speculating in index futures, once you start concentrating on that, I think you’re very likely to take your eye off the main ball, which is just valuing businesses. I don’t recommend it.
我认为，一旦人们开始关注短期价格波动——这正是购买看涨期权、LEAPS或投机指数期货的本质——一旦你开始关注这些东西，我认为你很可能会忽视最重要的事情，那就是对企业进行估值。我不推荐这样做。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, this is a group of affluent investors. I don’t think many of them did it in LEAPS. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 嗯，这是一个富裕的投资者群体。我不认为他们中有多少人用LEAPS投资。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s certainly true. If we’d operate Berkshire with considerable borrowed money over the years, you know, it would’ve done very much better than it has.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这确实没错。如果这些年来我们以大量借贷资金运营伯克希尔，它的表现会比现在好得多。
But nobody knew what that amount of borrowed money would have — the appropriate level would have been.
但没有人知道应该借入多少资金才是合适的水平。
And it wouldn’t have made any difference to us. I mean, we have just as much fun doing what we’ve done than if we’d owned it on leverage and had it been twice as much. I mean, it just — it’s just — it’s not the way we approach it.
但这对我们来说并没有什么区别。我的意思是，我们通过自己的方式运作同样感到很快乐，即使使用杠杆让它的规模翻倍也不会让我们更开心。它根本就不是我们做事的方式。
If you have X and you think you’re going to be way happier when you’ve got 2X, it’s probably not true.
如果你拥有X，并认为当你拥有2X时会快乐得多，这可能并不是真的。
You really ought to enjoy where you are at a point. And if you can make, you know, if you can make 12 or 15 percent a year, and you desire to save, and you like piling it up, you know, it’ll all come in time.
你应该学会享受你所在的位置。如果你每年可以赚到12%或15%，而且你愿意储蓄，并喜欢积累财富，那么所有的一切都会随着时间而来。
And why, you know, why risk losing what you need, you know, and have, for what you don’t need and don’t have? It’s never made a lot of sense to us.
那么，为什么要冒着失去你需要和拥有的东西的风险，去追求那些你不需要也没有的东西呢？对我们来说，这从来没有多大意义。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren wrote a letter when they were developing the security options businesses. And he urged the civilization not to allow the new exchanges. And you can see how much attention they paid to him. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格： 在证券期权业务刚刚发展时，沃伦写过一封信，敦促社会不要允许新的交易所出现。而你也可以看到他们对他的意见有多么重视。（巴菲特笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: The usual amount.
沃伦·巴菲特： 和以往一样的重视程度。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right.
查理·芒格： 是的，没错。
61. Haven’t looked at hazardous waste business, but have seen toxic waste in markets
没有研究过危险废物处理行业，但在证券市场见过“毒废物”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name’s Greg Collart (PH), a shareholder from Calgary, Canada, the home of Bre-X Minerals. (Laughter)
听众： 你好，我是格雷格·科拉特（音），来自加拿大卡尔加里，我也是伯克希尔的股东。我们这里是Bre-X矿业公司的所在地。（笑声）
My question for you is, the companies in the hazardous waste disposal industry have underperformed the market for about a decade now. Do you see any value in that area?
我的问题是，危险废物处理行业的公司在过去十年里表现不如市场。你们认为这个领域有投资价值吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve never looked at that business. I’m familiar with the names of the companies. But that’s been a business that I’ve never looked at.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们从未研究过这个行业。我对这些公司的名字有所了解，但这个行业并不是我们关注的领域。
And maybe Charlie knows more about it than I do. He almost has to. (Laughs)
也许查理比我知道得更多，他几乎不得不比我了解更多。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. We have never really looked at the hazardous waste business.
查理·芒格： 不，我们确实从未认真研究过危险废物处理行业。
We’ve observed a lot of toxic waste in the securities market. (Laughter)
但我们在证券市场上见过不少“毒废物”。（笑声）
Maybe we’d get our fill that way. (Laughter)
或许我们已经通过这种方式看够了。（笑声）
62. Lesson of State Farm’s improbable success story
State Farm惊人成功的启示
WARREN BUFFETT: Area one.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hugh Stephenson. I’m a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia. My question involves GEICO.
听众： 我叫休·史蒂芬森，来自佐治亚州亚特兰大，我是伯克希尔的股东。我的问题与GEICO有关。
If I remember correctly from last year, GEICO had about 2 percent of the insurance market and had approximately $4 billion in float.
如果我没记错的话，去年GEICO在保险市场的份额大约是2%，并拥有约40亿美元的浮存金。
My question is, as their market share expands, will the float, in your expectation, expand in a somewhat linear fashion?
我的问题是，随着市场份额的扩大，你是否预计浮存金也会以某种线性方式增长？
And related to that, what is your guess might be the top end? Could they ultimately become as dominant as a Gillette or a Coke and their businesses?
此外，你猜测其增长的上限可能是什么？GEICO最终能否像吉列或可口可乐那样在各自领域占据主导地位？
Or is the nature of it such that, you know, they might stop at ten percent of the market or 15 percent when they start to hit a significant hurdle?
还是说，由于其业务的本质，当市场份额达到10%或15%时，会遇到显著的瓶颈而停止增长？
And second, to follow up on this other gentlemen’s question, if you don’t adjust for risk by using higher discount rates, how do you adjust for risk? Or do you?
其次，延续刚才另一位先生的问题，如果你不通过使用更高的折现率来调整风险，你是如何调整风险的？或者你会调整吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the second question: we adjust by simply trying to buy it at a big discount from that present value calculated using the risk-free interest rate.
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于第二个问题：我们通过尝试以较低于用无风险利率计算的现值的价格买入来调整风险。
So if interest rates are 7 percent and we discount it back to flows — which Charlie says I never do anyway and he’s correct — but in theory, if we discount them back at 7 percent then we would look at a substantial discount from that present value number in order to warrant buying.
所以，如果利率是7%，我们将其折现回现金流——尽管查理说我从来不这样做，他是对的——但理论上，如果我们以7%折现，那么我们会要求显著低于这个现值的折扣才会考虑买入。
The question about GEICO: the float will grow, more or less proportionately, to premium volume.
关于GEICO的问题：浮存金的增长将或多或少与保费收入的增长成比例。
There’s a moderate amount of our float, a very small amount of the float, that’s accounted for by some discontinued lines from the past. And, of course, that won’t grow the same way.
我们有一部分浮存金，比例很小，是由过去一些已停产业务贡献的。当然，这部分不会以同样的方式增长。
But if we double the size of GEICO on premium volume, we’ll come close to doubling the size of the float.
但如果我们将GEICO的保费规模扩大一倍，其浮存金的规模也将接近翻倍。
You know, the history of auto insurance is quite interesting. It’s something that isn’t studied at business schools and should be studied, because the great insurance companies of the early 1900s were, you know — whether it’s Aetna, Hartford, Travelers — they had these agency forces nationwide, and wrote what was then more property business.
你知道，汽车保险的历史非常有趣。这是商业学校没有研究但应该研究的东西，因为在20世纪初的伟大保险公司，比如Aetna、Hartford、Travelers——它们在全国范围内拥有代理网络，当时更多地从事财产保险业务。
They wrote a lot of fire business in those days. And, of course, the automobile only came in, you know, in the early 1900s. And so their orientation was to property business.
在那些日子里，他们承保了许多火灾保险业务。当然，汽车只是在20世纪初才出现，因此他们的业务重点是财产保险。
But they had this huge agency force throughout the United States. There were property insurance agents representing these big companies in every — throughout the country. And they had lots of capital.
但他们在全美国拥有庞大的代理网络。这些大型公司在全国各地都有财产保险代理人。他们拥有大量资本。
And now, if you look at the business in 1997, something well over 20 percent — probably close to 25 percent — of the personal, auto, and homeowners business in insurance is written by a company called State Farm.
现在，如果你看看1997年的保险业务，其中超过20%——可能接近25%的个人汽车和房主保险业务是由一家名为State Farm的公司承保的。
And State Farm was started, I believe, in the ’20s, by a fellow in Bloomington, Illinois with no capital to speak of, no agency force initially, and started as a mutual company, no incentive, I mean, no stock options, no capital invested where he could become a billionaire if he built the business up or anything.
而State Farm，我相信是在20世纪20年代由一个伊利诺伊州布卢明顿的人创立的，他几乎没有资本，最初也没有代理网络，并且是作为一家互助公司起步的，没有激励措施，比如股票期权或资本投资，他无法通过发展业务成为亿万富翁或其他类似的事情。
So here this company starts without any of the capitalist incentives that are we are taught are essential to a business growing, and in a huge industry, becomes the dominant player — has more than twice the market share of Allstate, the second player — becomes the dominant company against these extremely entrenched competitors with great distribution systems and loads of capital.
所以，这家公司在没有任何资本主义激励措施的情况下开始了——我们被教导这些激励措施对企业成长至关重要——并在一个巨大的行业中，成为主导者，其市场份额是排名第二的Allstate的两倍多，成为对抗那些拥有强大分销系统和大量资本的极具实力竞争者的主导公司。
Now I say that’s — and incidentally, State Farm, on the Fortune 500 list of companies, has the third largest net worth of any company in the United States. Number three from Bloomington, Illinois with a guy with no money in it.
顺便一提，State Farm在《财富》500强公司榜单中，其净资产在全美公司中排名第三。第三名的公司竟然是由伊利诺伊州布卢明顿的一个没有投入任何资金的人创立的。
Now, how does that happen? Well, I would say that’s a subject worth studying, you know, in business schools, because it —
这怎么可能发生？嗯，我认为这确实是一个值得在商学院研究的课题，因为它——
You know, Darwin used to say that any time he got any evidence that flew in the face of his previous convictions, he had to write it down in the first 30 minutes or the mind was such that it would reject contrary evidence to cherished beliefs.
你知道，达尔文曾说，每当他获得任何与他之前的信念相悖的证据时，他必须在头30分钟内记下来，否则心智会排斥与珍视信念相反的证据。
And certainly, there’s some cherished beliefs around business schools that might, at least, find some interesting aspects in studying how a company could become the third largest company in net worth in the country with no apparent advantage going in.
商学院里确实有一些根深蒂固的信念，至少在研究一家没有任何明显优势起步的公司如何成为全美净资产排名第三的大公司时，可以找到一些有趣的方面。
There’s another company down in Texas called USAA, United States —
在德克萨斯州还有另一家公司叫USAA，美国联合服务汽车协会——
It’s for the United Services Auto Association. And it’s been enormously successful, has billions of net worth, loads of satisfied policy holders, the highest renewal ratio among policy holders in the country. Nobody studies that, to my knowledge, either.
它是为联合服务人员提供的汽车保险协会。这家公司取得了巨大的成功，拥有数十亿美元的净资产，大量满意的保单持有人，以及全美保单续保率最高的记录。据我所知，这似乎也没有人研究过。
The people who started GEICO came from that company. In 1936, Leo Goodwin and his wife, who had worked for USAA, went over and started this little GEICO company with practically no capital. And, now, it’s — we have about 2.7 percent of the market. And we’re — we’ll write probably 3 1/2 billion of voluntary auto this year.
创立GEICO的人就来自这家公司。1936年，曾在USAA工作的里奥·古德温和他的妻子，几乎没有资本，就创立了这家小型的GEICO公司。而现在，我们大约占有2.7%的市场份额。今年我们可能会承保35亿美元的自愿汽车保险业务。
Catching a State Farm is going to be very difficult. So I wouldn’t want to predict we’d do that. I will predict that we will gain very materially in market share over the next ten years. And we’ll gain materially this year. But we will — we have got a very good mousetrap.
追赶State Farm将非常困难。所以我不会预测我们能够做到这一点。不过，我可以预测，在未来十年内，我们将在市场份额上取得显著增长。今年我们也会有显著增长。而且我们——我们拥有一个非常好的“捕鼠器”。
I said in the report that 40 percent of you would save money insuring with — I didn’t say a hundred percent or 80 percent or 60 percent, because there are areas and professions where somebody else is going to have a lower price than we are.
我在报告中提到，你们当中有40%的人可以通过GEICO节省保险费用。我并没有说是100%、80%或60%，因为在某些地区和职业类别中，可能会有其他公司比我们价格更低。
But across the country, we are going — and for all classes of citizens — we are going to have a low price — the low price — more often than anyone else.
但在全国范围内，对于所有类别的客户，我们将更频繁地提供最低价格——比任何其他公司都更常见。
And we’ve got that because we’ve got low costs. And our costs are going to get lower. And we’ve got a virtuous circle going, in terms of it feeding on itself.
我们之所以能做到这一点，是因为我们的成本低。而且我们的成本还会进一步降低。我们形成了一个良性循环，这种模式会不断自我强化。
So GEICO will grow a lot. But I — State Farm is plenty tough. So I’m not going to predict catching State Farm. I’m not even going to predict catching Allstate. But we’ll catch somebody.
所以GEICO会有很大的增长。但我——State Farm非常强大。所以我不会预测我们能够追上State Farm。我甚至不会预测我们能追上Allstate。但我们会赶超一些公司。
And Charlie, you want to say anything more?
查理，你还有什么要补充的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I love your example of State Farm. I mean, the idea of picking some extreme example and asking my favorite question, which is what in hell is going on here — (laughter) — that is the way to wisdom in this world.
查理·芒格： 我很喜欢你提到的State Farm例子。我觉得找到一个极端的例子，然后问我最喜欢的问题——“这到底是怎么回事？”（笑声）——这就是通往智慧的道路。
And it is too bad. A lot of the mutual companies are now trying to demutualize, helped by a bunch of consultants and so forth.
可惜的是，现在许多互助公司正试图进行“去互助化”，在一堆咨询公司的帮助下推进这件事。
And they are not looking at State Farm. They’re looking at some other model, and —
但他们没有研究State Farm的模式，而是关注一些其他模式——
Everybody can’t be a State Farm. That place got some fundamental values into its operating mechanics, the way it selected personnel, the way it selected agents, the way it discarded agents. It was huge discipline, wouldn’t you agree, in that operation?
不是所有公司都能成为State Farm。它将一些基本价值观融入到了运营机制中，比如挑选员工的方式、挑选代理人的方式，以及淘汰代理人的方式。这种操作展现出了极大的纪律性，你同意吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Somebody would — you would say somebody had to do something very right. But the question — I don’t know anybody studying what they did that was right.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。你会说，肯定有人做对了某些事情。但问题是，我不知道有谁在研究他们做对了什么。
You know, they don’t want to because it doesn’t fit the pattern. And you know, when something like a State Farm happens in this world, you should try to understand it.
你知道，他们不愿意研究，因为这不符合传统模式。而当这个世界上发生像State Farm这样的事时，你应该试着去理解它。
When something like a GEICO happens in this world, you should try to understand it.
当这个世界上发生像GEICO这样的事时，你也应该试着去理解它。
In 1948, I think it was two-thirds or three-quarters — I think it’s two-thirds — of GEICO was for sale because the fellow that had originally backed these two people from USAA died. And so they had the stock for sale in 1948.
在1948年，我记得GEICO三分之二或四分之三——应该是三分之二——的股份被挂牌出售，因为最初支持从USAA出来创业的两个人的资助者去世了。所以1948年，他们不得不出售股份。
You couldn’t sell it. That’s how Ben Graham ended up buying it for Graham-Newman, because they hocked it all over for six months.
当时根本卖不出去。这就是本·格雷厄姆最终通过Graham-Newman基金买下它的原因，因为他们推销了六个月都没成功。
They went to all the big insurance companies. And the insurance companies, who could see this company on a very, very tiny scale offering a product for way less money and making lots of money doing it, they simply couldn’t shake themselves loose from the mists of the past to step up and buy it.
他们找过所有的大型保险公司。这些保险公司明明可以看到，这家公司虽然规模很小，但提供的产品价格非常低，同时还赚了很多钱。但他们就是无法摆脱过去的陈旧观念，无法下决心去买下它。
They could’ve bought it for a million-two-hundred-thousand dollars, as I remember, and owned the whole company.
据我记得，他们当时只需花120万美元就能买下整家公司。
And instead, they’ve watched their own distribution system get their heads beaten in, you know, over the years. And all the time, you know, with these ideas from the past.
相反，他们眼睁睁地看着自己的分销体系在接下来的几年里被打得头破血流。而他们却一直抱着这些过时的观念不放。
So you have to be very careful to look hard at what’s really happening. You know, as Yogi Berra said, “You can observe a lot just by looking.” (Laughter)
所以，你必须非常认真地观察正在发生的事情。正如尤吉·贝拉所说：“只要用心看，你可以观察到很多东西。”（笑声）
63. Love it when a wonderful business buys back its stock
喜欢一家优秀的公司回购自己的股票
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone one?
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第一区？
EVERETT PUREE: I’m Everett Puree (PH) from Atlanta, Georgia. And I wanted to ask you if you could comment on the matter of intrinsic value as it applies to some of “The Inevitables,” given that the overpayment risk now is high and the share repurchases that are going on there.
埃弗里特·普瑞： 我是来自乔治亚州亚特兰大的埃弗里特·普瑞（音）。我想请您谈谈内在价值的问题，尤其是在一些“必然”的公司中，考虑到现在溢价风险较高以及这些公司正在进行的股票回购。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we won’t stick a price on them. We just — we tell you that they are absolutely wonderful businesses run by sensational people, and that they are selling at prices that are higher than they sold at most of the time. And then — but that — you know —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。嗯，我们不会为它们定一个价格。我们只是告诉您，它们是非常出色的企业，由卓越的人管理，而且目前的价格高于它们大多数时间的交易价格。但——不过——您知道——
They may be — they may well be worth it and worth a lot more, even in terms of present terms. Or it may turn out they’re a couple years ahead of themselves. We don’t know the answer to that. We know we’re very happy owning them.
它们可能——它们很可能是值得的，甚至在目前的情况下也值得更多。或者事实证明它们的估值可能超前了几年。对此我们并不知道答案。我们知道我们很高兴持有它们。
Gillette does not repurchase its shares, or hasn’t in any significant quantity for many years. Coke consistently repurchases its shares.
吉列没有回购自己的股票，或者说多年来没有进行大规模回购。而可口可乐则持续回购自己的股票。
We generally like the policy of companies that have really wonderful businesses repurchasing their shares.
我们通常喜欢那些拥有真正优秀业务的公司进行股票回购的政策。
There aren’t that many super businesses in the world. And the idea of owning more and more of a company like that over a period of time has an appeal to us, and almost an appeal regardless of price.
世界上没有多少超级企业。随着时间推移，逐渐持有一家这样的公司更多股份的想法对我们很有吸引力，几乎无论价格如何都具有吸引力。
The problem is that most companies that repurchase their shares, you know, are so-so — are frequently — so-so businesses. And they’re being done for motivations other than intensifying the interests of the shareholders in a wonderful business.
问题是，大多数进行股票回购的公司，您知道，往往是普通公司。它们进行回购的动机通常并不是为了加强股东在一家优秀企业中的利益。
But we really know you have a wonderful business. And we think most of the ones we own are anywhere from extremely good to wonderful. We think it usually makes a lot of sense.
但我们确实知道您拥有一家优秀的企业。我们认为我们持有的大多数企业都介于非常优秀到卓越之间。我们认为这通常非常有意义。
It’s hard to do things intelligent with money in this world. And Coke has been very intelligent about using their capital to, particularly, to fortify and improve their bottler network around the world. I mean, they’ve done a terrific job that way. That was a neglected area for a long time. And that comes first.
在这个世界上，用钱做聪明的事情很难。而可口可乐在使用资本方面表现得非常聪明，特别是用来加强和改进他们在全球的装瓶商网络。我是说，他们在这方面做得非常出色。这是一个被忽视了很长时间的领域，而这必须优先考虑。
But there’s only so far you can go with that — and to enhance the ownership of the shareholders in a company like Coca-Cola — when we bought our first Coca-Cola in ’88, we bought about 6.2 percent of the company. And at that time, they may have been 600 million servings — not any more than that — a day. So we had an interest in 36 or 37 million servings.
但在那方面能做的也有限——为了增强股东在像可口可乐这样的公司中的所有权——当我们在1988年第一次买入可口可乐时，我们买下了公司大约6.2%的股份。当时，他们每天可能有6亿份的销量——不会超过这个数字。所以我们拥有其中约3600万或3700万份的权益。
Now we have 8 percent of 900 million-plus. So we have an interest in 75 million or so servings a day. Seventy-five million people are drinking Berkshire Hathaway’s share of Coca-Cola products today, in an eight-ounce serving. And you know, the profit’s gone up a little per serving.
现在我们拥有超过9亿份销量中的8%。所以我们每天大约有7500万份的权益。今天，有7500万人正在饮用伯克希尔·哈撒韦所拥有份额的可口可乐产品，每份8盎司。您知道，每份的利润也略有增加。
So that gets pretty attractive. And we’d just as soon they keep doing that.
因此，这变得非常有吸引力。我们很希望他们继续这样做。
64. Coca-Cola history lesson: “One of the dumbest contracts” ever
可口可乐历史课：“最愚蠢的合同之一”
WARREN BUFFETT: The bottling thing’s actually kind of interesting. And a fellow from Omaha — or at least lived in Omaha for a long time — Don Keough, had a lot to do with this. And Roberto had plenty to do with it, too, obviously.
沃伦·巴菲特： 装瓶这件事实际上挺有意思的。有位来自奥马哈，或者至少在奥马哈住了很久的人——唐·基奥，与此有很大的关系。当然，罗伯托也在其中发挥了重要作用。
But Candler — Asa Candler — back in the late 1880s, in a series of transactions — I think some of it’s a little fuzzy, exactly, as to the timing of them — but he essentially bought the whole Coca-Cola Company for $2,000. And that may be the smartest purchase in the history of the world.
但坎德勒——阿萨·坎德勒——在19世纪80年代末，通过一系列交易——我想其中有些时间点可能有些模糊——他基本上以2000美元的价格买下了整个可口可乐公司。这可能是世界历史上最聪明的一笔收购。
And, then, in 1899, I believe it was, a couple of fellows from Chattanooga came down. And in those days, soft drinks were sold over the counter to people in drug stores, primarily. But there was a little bottling going on. There already was somebody bottling in Mississippi, as I remember.
然后，在1899年，我想是这一年，有几个来自查塔努加的人来了。在那个年代，软饮料主要是通过药店的柜台销售给顾客的。但也有一些装瓶的业务。我记得当时在密西西比州已经有人在做装瓶了。
But a couple fellows came down. And they said, “You know, bottling’s got a future. And you’re busy on the fountain side of the business. So why don’t you let us develop the bottling system?”
但这几个人过来说：“你知道，装瓶业务是有前途的。而你忙于饮水机业务，所以为什么不让我们来开发装瓶系统呢？”
And I guess Mr. Candler didn’t think much of bottling. So he gave them a contract, in perpetuity, for almost all of the United States, for a dollar he sold it to them, and gave them the right to buy Coca-Cola syrup at a fixed price forever.
我想坎德勒先生并没有太重视装瓶业务。所以他给了他们一份永久合同，以一美元的价格将几乎整个美国的装瓶业务卖给了他们，并赋予他们以固定价格购买可口可乐糖浆的永久权利。
So Asa, who had scored with his $2,000 — (laughs) — in a rather big way, managed to write what — you know, it’s easy for us to look back — but certainly looks like one of the dumbest contracts in history. (Laughs)
所以阿萨用他的2000美元大获成功——（笑）——却写下了一份——您知道，我们现在回头看很容易——但肯定可以算是历史上最愚蠢的合同之一。（笑）
And, of course, as the years went by, and particularly around World War II when the price of syrup was — the primary ingredient, in terms of cost, in syrup was sugar. And sugar went wild during and after World War I in price. And so here was a guy that, in effect, had contracted to sell sugar at a fixed price forever.
当然，随着时间的推移，特别是在第二次世界大战期间，糖浆的主要成本成分是糖。而糖在第一次世界大战期间和战后价格疯涨。所以，这位先生实际上签订了一份以固定价格永远出售糖的合同。
And he’d also given these people perpetual rights and so on. In those days, they sold the subrights to bottler contracts. And those were usually the distance that a horse could go in a day and come back. That was sort of the circle that you gave people.
此外，他还将这些永久权利赋予了那些人。在当时，他们会将装瓶合同的分权出售。而这些分权通常是以马一天往返的距离为基础。这大概就是他们给人们划定的范围。
And the Coca-Cola Company was faced, over the years, with a problem of having the bottling system, which soon became the dominant system for distribution of Coke, being subject to a contract where there was no price flexibility and where the contracts ran in perpetuity.
多年来，可口可乐公司一直面临着一个问题，即装瓶系统很快成为分销可口可乐的主要方式，但却受到一份没有价格灵活性且具有永久效力的合同的限制。
And, of course, every bottler on his death bed would call his children, his grandchildren around. And he propped himself up and croak out in his last breath, you know, “Don’t let them screw with the bottling contract.” You know, and then he’d croak. (Laughter)
当然，每个装瓶商在临终前都会召集他的子孙们。他们会撑起身子，用最后一口气说道：“千万别让他们改动装瓶合同。”然后他就咽气了。（笑声）
So the Coca-Cola Company faced this for decades. And they really couldn’t do much about that bottling system for a long time.
所以可口可乐公司几十年来一直面临这一问题。他们对那个装瓶系统很长时间都无能为力。
And Roberto and Don Keough and some other people spent 20 or 25 years getting that rationalized. There were lawsuits back in the ’20s and some things. But it was a huge project. But it made an enormous difference over time in the value of the company.
而罗伯托、唐·基奥和其他一些人花了20到25年的时间才将其理顺。在20世纪20年代期间曾有过诉讼等等。这是一个庞大的项目，但随着时间的推移，它对公司价值产生了巨大的影响。
And that’s what I mean when I talk about intellectual capital, because you know you aren’t going to get results on that in a day, or a week, or a month, or a year, if you set out to get that all rationalized. But they decided that to get the job done, they had to do this.
这就是我所说的智力资本的意义，因为您知道，要想完成这些合理化，不可能在一天、一周、一个月甚至一年内见到结果。但他们决定，要完成这项工作，就必须这样做。
And that took capital. And they used capital to get that job done. But they used capital beyond that to repurchase shares in a big way. And it’s been very smart. And I hope they keep — you know, I — they are repurchasing shares, probably, as we talk. And that’s fine with me.
这需要资本。他们利用资本完成了这项工作。但他们还进一步使用资本大规模回购股票。这非常聪明。我希望他们继续——您知道——他们可能就在我们谈话时正在回购股票。而我对此完全没有意见。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think Coca-Cola Company is one of the most interesting cases in the history of business. And it ought to be way more studied than it is. And there’s just lesson after lesson after lesson in the history of the Coca-Cola Company. But it’s too long a story for today. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格： 我确实认为，可口可乐公司是商业史上最有趣的案例之一。它理应比现在得到更多的研究。在可口可乐公司的历史中，有一课接一课的经验教训。不过，这个故事今天就太长了。（巴菲特笑）
65. Wesco is part of Berkshire due to “historical accident”
Wesco因“历史偶然”成为伯克希尔的一部分
WARREN BUFFETT: Section two?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二部分？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Jolene Crowley (PH) from San Diego. And I want to say I feel very lucky to be here today. When I tried to buy my first Baby Berkshire share last year, my stockbroker, who’s a value investing devotee, tried to talk me out of it, telling me that it was overvalued. So I feel lucky to be here.
观众： 我是来自圣地亚哥的乔琳·克劳利（音）。我想说今天能来到这里我感到非常幸运。去年当我尝试购买我的第一股伯克希尔B股时，我的股票经纪人，一个价值投资的拥护者，试图劝阻我，说它被高估了。所以我觉得今天能在这里很幸运。
I’ve recently also discovered Wesco stock. And I’d like you to explain to me the ownership and management relationships between Berkshire Hathaway and Wesco, and how you use them together.
我最近也发现了Wesco的股票。我想请您解释一下伯克希尔哈撒韦和Wesco之间的所有权和管理关系，以及您是如何将它们结合使用的。
And since I may not understand the answer to that question, could you just tell me, is it possible that buying Wesco today at about $20 a share is like buying Berkshire Hathaway was 20 years ago?
而且，如果我可能无法理解这个问题的答案，您能告诉我，今天以大约20美元的价格买入Wesco是否像20年前买入伯克希尔哈撒韦一样？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you could buy Wesco today at $20 a share, you should buy all you can.
查理·芒格： 嗯，如果今天你能以20美元一股的价格买到Wesco，你应该尽可能多买。
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) No, no —
沃伦·巴菲特： （笑）不，不——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Beg your pardon. Two —
观众： 抱歉。两——
WARREN BUFFETT: Two-hundred dollars a share.
沃伦·巴菲特： 两百美元一股。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Two-hundred.
观众： 两百。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie is — (laughter) — chairman of Wesco. And why don’t you talk about it first, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特： 对。查理是——（笑）——Wesco的主席。查理，你先谈谈吧？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Wesco’s 80 percent owned by Berkshire. And in terms of operating businesses now, it’s got two. And it has an immense percentage of its net worth in marketable securities in its insurance subsidiary.
查理·芒格： Wesco有80%的股份由伯克希尔持有。从目前的经营业务来看，它有两个业务。此外，它在保险子公司中的净资产中有很大一部分是可交易证券。
It’s a very quiet company. And as the chairman of Wesco, I have always delighted in saying that we have way less human value in the executive staff than Berkshire Hathaway does.
它是一家非常低调的公司。作为Wesco的主席，我一直很高兴地说，我们的管理层在“人力价值”方面远少于伯克希尔哈撒韦。
It’s a — it’s a — what is it Daniel Webster said about Dartmouth? He says, “A small school but there are those who love her.”
它是一个——它是一个——丹尼尔·韦伯斯特形容达特茅斯时怎么说的来着？他说，“一所小学校，但总有人深爱着她。”
Well, Wesco’s a small place. And it’s there in Berkshire as sort of an historical accident. But the main current of Berkshire is right here in the Berkshire shares.
嗯，Wesco是个小地方。它在伯克希尔中的存在可以说是一种历史上的偶然。但伯克希尔的主要核心就体现在伯克希尔的股票中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t know which one I would rather buy at present prices. I mean, I think it’s — you could flip a coin.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我不确定在当前的价格下我更愿意买哪一个。我觉得可以掷硬币决定。
It does not have dramatically better growth potential just because it happens to sell at $200 a share instead of 38,000 a share than Berkshire. I mean, I think the prospects, probably, are relatively close between the two.
它并不会因为每股价格是200美元而不是3.8万美元，就比伯克希尔具有显著更好的增长潜力。我认为它们的前景可能相对接近。
And they’re run by the same people, pretty much, in effect. Charlie may spend a little more time on Wesco than I do, but — they are — they’ve got the same prospects.
实际上，它们几乎是由同一批人管理的。查理可能在Wesco上花的时间比我多一点，但它们有着相同的前景。
But one problem that Wesco would have is that if people — and this is not a huge problem — but if people want to do a share exchange deal, they’re going to want to do it, probably, with Berkshire rather than Wesco.
不过Wesco面临的一个问题是，如果人们想做股份交换交易——虽然这不是一个大问题——他们可能会更倾向于选择伯克希尔而不是Wesco。
At Wesco, we have small acquisitions in fields we knew — Wesco’s a logical place to put them unless they happen to be in areas that Berkshire’s already in. And for the really large things, you know, Berkshire can do them and Wesco can’t.
在Wesco，我们在熟悉的领域有一些小型收购——除非这些领域是伯克希尔已经涉足的，否则Wesco是一个合适的归属。而对于真正的大型交易，您知道，伯克希尔能做，而Wesco不能。
But there’s nothing — I don’t think there’s anything significantly superior or inferior about investment in Wesco compared to Berkshire.
但我认为，相较于伯克希尔，投资Wesco并没有什么显著的优劣之分。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the long-run record of Berkshire is better.
查理·芒格： 嗯，从长期表现来看，伯克希尔更好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
The one thing — It is a mistake to think that just because it’s cheaper per share on a dollar price that it’s got way more potential, I think, because that just isn’t the case.
有一件事——我认为，认为每股价格较低就意味着有更大潜力是错误的，因为事实并非如此。
A very large percentage of Wesco’s value is represented by its interest in Freddie Mac. And a very large percentage of Berkshire’s interest is represented — Berkshire’s value — is represented by an interest in Coke, for example.
Wesco很大一部分的价值体现在它持有的房地美股份中。而伯克希尔的很大一部分价值——例如，体现在它持有的可口可乐股份中。
So there’s different emphasis between the two places. I think Wesco owns some Coke. And Berkshire owns some Freddie, but in different proportions. That’s an historical accident.
因此，这两者之间的重点不同。我认为Wesco持有一些可口可乐，而伯克希尔持有一些房地美，但比例不同。这是一种历史上的偶然。
We’d love to see them both do well, obviously. There’s another family that’s in Wesco that we like a great deal. And we would hope that Wesco would perform as well or better than Berkshire. It’s performed fine over the years. But it hasn’t performed quite as well as Berkshire.
显然，我们希望它们都能表现出色。Wesco中还有一个我们非常喜欢的家族。我们希望Wesco的表现能够与伯克希尔一样好，甚至更好。多年来，它的表现一直不错，但还没有伯克希尔那么出色。
66. How Buffett surpassed Benjamin Graham
巴菲特如何超越本杰明·格雷厄姆
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Hi. It’s Jeff Hawthorne (PH), Toronto, Canada.
观众： 是的，你好。我是来自加拿大多伦多的杰夫·霍桑（音）。
Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, you’re both a positive influence on all of us and our generations to come. There were a few significant individuals that had helped to guide your way in the beginning.
巴菲特先生和芒格先生，你们对我们以及未来的几代人都有积极的影响。在你们起步阶段，有几位重要人物曾帮助你们指引了道路。
Could you please share the current percentage of impact and evolution on your investment philosophy and approach between Graham-Dodd’s — Graham and Dodd’s versus Philip Fisher, and comment on each please.
能否请您分享格雷厄姆-多德（Graham and Dodd）与菲利普·费舍（Philip Fisher）在您的投资哲学和方法演变中所占的影响比例，并对两者进行评论？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to —? If you’ve got it worked out there. Calibrate —
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，你想——？如果你已经算出来了。校准一下——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Weren’t you —
查理·芒格： 你不是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Do you want that to tenths of a percent or hundredths of a percent? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 你想要到十分之一还是百分之一？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: You were closer to Ben Graham.
查理·芒格： 你与本·格雷厄姆的关系更近。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Ben — yeah — things would’ve happened — good things would’ve happened with following either party irrespective the other.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。本——是的——无论追随哪一方都会发生好事，与另一方无关。
Graham, obviously, had way more influence on me than Phil. I worked for Ben. I went to school under him.
显然，格雷厄姆对我的影响远大于菲利普。我为本工作过，在他的指导下学习过。
And his — what I call the three basic ideas that underlie successful investing — which is to look at stocks as businesses, and to have the proper attitude toward the market, and to operate with a margin of safety — they all come straight from Graham. I didn’t think of any of those.
他所提出的三大成功投资的基本理念——将股票视为企业，对市场保持正确的态度，以及以安全边际原则操作——这些都直接来自格雷厄姆。我没有想到任何这些理念。
And Phil Fisher opened my eyes more to the idea of trying to find the wonderful business.
而菲利普·费舍让我更意识到寻找卓越企业这一理念。
Charlie did more of that than Phil did, actually, so you’d have to put Charlie —
实际上，查理在这方面比菲利普做得更多，所以你得把查理——
But Phil was espousing that entirely. And I read his books in the late ’50s, early ’60s. So, you know, I — Phil’s still alive as you know. And, you know, I owe Phil a lot. But I — it doesn’t compare to what I owe Graham.
但菲利普完全主张这一点。我在50年代末和60年代初读过他的书。所以，你知道——菲利普还健在，你知道的。我欠菲利普很多。但与我欠格雷厄姆的相比，这无法相提并论。
WARREN BUFFETT: And that, in no way, reflects poorly on Phil. Ben was one of a kind.
沃伦·巴菲特： 这绝不代表对菲利普的不敬。本·格雷厄姆是独一无二的。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Ben Graham was a truly formidable mind. And he also had a clarity in writing.
查理·芒格： 本·格雷厄姆确实是一位非凡的头脑。他的写作也非常清晰明了。
And we’ve talked over and over again about the power of a few simple ideas thoroughly assimilated. And that happened with Graham’s ideas, which came to me indirectly through Warren, but also some directly from Graham.
我们一再谈到，彻底吸收几条简单理念的力量。格雷厄姆的理念就是如此，这些理念一部分通过沃伦间接传达给我，还有一些直接来自格雷厄姆。
The interesting thing for me is to watch Buffett the former protégé — and by the way, Buffett was the best student Graham had in 30 years of teaching at Columbia. And — but what happened — and since I knew both men — was that Buffett became way better than Graham.
对我来说，有趣的是看到巴菲特从一名学生成长起来——顺便说一句，巴菲特是格雷厄姆30年哥伦比亚教学生涯中最好的学生。然而，事情的发展——而且因为我认识他们两位——是巴菲特后来远超格雷厄姆。
That is a natural outcome. It’s what Newton said. He said, “If I’ve seen a little farther than other men, it’s by standing on the shoulder of giants.”
这是一个自然的结果。正如牛顿所说：“如果我比别人看得更远，那是因为我站在巨人的肩膀上。”
And so Warren may have stood on Ben’s shoulders, but he ended up seeing farther. And no doubt, somebody will come along in due course and do a lot better than we have.
所以沃伦可能站在本的肩膀上，但他最终看得更远。毫无疑问，总会有人在适当的时候出现，并比我们做得更好。
WARREN BUFFETT: I enjoyed making money more than Ben. I mean, candidly.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我比本更享受赚钱的过程。我是说，坦率地说。
With Ben, it just — it really was incidental, at least by the time I knew him. It may have been different when he was younger. But it just didn’t — the process didn’t — of the whole game did not interest him more than a dozen other things may have interested him.
对本来说，赚钱真的只是偶然的，至少在我认识他的时候是这样。他年轻时可能不一样。但整个过程——投资这个“游戏”的过程——并不比其他十几件让他感兴趣的事情更能引起他的兴趣。
With me, I just find it interesting. And therefore, you know, I’ve spent way more — a way higher percentage of my time thinking about investing and thinking about businesses. I’ve probably thought way more about businesses than Ben ever did. He had other things that interested him.
而对我来说，我觉得这很有趣。因此，我花了更多的时间——比重大得多的时间——在思考投资和企业上。我可能比本花更多时间在企业的思考上。他还有其他感兴趣的事情。
So I’ve pursued the game a little — quite a bit — differently than he did. And therefore, measuring the record is really — the two records — it’s not a proper measurement. I mean, he was doing victory laps while I still thought I was out there running against, you know, the whole field.
所以，我追求这个“游戏”的方式与他稍有——很大——的不同。因此，比较我们的成就——两者的成就——其实并不合适。我的意思是，他已经在绕着胜利圈庆祝了，而我还在场上努力竞争。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But Graham had some blind spots, partly of sort an ethical professorial nature. He was looking for things to teach that would work for every man, that any intelligent layman could learn and do well.
查理·芒格： 但格雷厄姆确实有一些盲点，部分是出于一种教授式的伦理观。他寻找的是可以教给所有人的方法，任何有智慧的普通人都能学会并做得好的东西。
Well, if that’s the limitation of what you’re looking for, they’ll be a lot of reality you won’t go into, because it’s too hard to figure out and too hard to explain.
如果这是你的限制，那么你会错过很多现实，因为这些东西太难弄清楚，也太难解释。
Buffett, if there was money in it, had no such restriction. (Laughter)
而巴菲特，如果能赚钱，就不会有这种限制。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Ben sort of thought it was cheating if we went out and talked to the management, because he just felt that the person who read his book, you know, living in Pocatello, Idaho, could not go out and meet the management. So he didn’t — and we didn’t do it. I mean, when I worked for Graham-Newman, I don’t think I ever visited a management in the 21 months I was there. He just —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。本认为，如果我们出去与管理层交谈，有点像是在“作弊”，因为他觉得读他书的人，比如住在爱达荷州波卡特洛的人，无法亲自见到管理层。所以他没有做——我们也没有做。我在格雷厄姆-纽曼工作期间，21个月内我不记得曾拜访过任何一家公司的管理层。他就是——
But, you know, he wasn’t sure whether it would be useful, anyway.
不过，您知道，他也不确定这是否有用。
But if it would be useful, you know, that meant that his book was not all that was needed, that you had to add something to it.
但是如果这有用，那就意味着他的书并非全够用，你还需要额外添加一些内容。
I found it fun to go out and talk about their businesses with people, or to check with competitors, or suppliers, or customers, and all that.
我觉得出去和别人谈论他们的业务，或者与竞争对手、供应商、客户等交流很有趣。
But — Ben didn’t think there was anything wrong with that. He just felt that if you had to do that, then his book was not the complete answer. And he didn’t really want to do anything that the reader of his book couldn’t do if he was on a desert island, you know, basically, with just one line to a broker.
但是——本并不认为这有什么问题。他只是觉得，如果你不得不这样做，那说明他的书并不是完整的答案。他基本上不希望做任何一本书的读者在一个孤岛上仅凭一条与经纪人的通讯线做不到的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But if you stop to think about it, Graham was trying to play the game of “Pin the Donkey,” wearing very dark glasses. And Warren, of course, would use the biggest search light he could find. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 但如果你仔细想想，格雷厄姆就像是在戴着非常暗的眼镜玩“盲人贴驴尾”游戏。而沃伦当然会用他能找到的最大探照灯。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And we still can’t find any donkeys these days. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 而如今，我们还是找不到任何“驴子”。（笑声）
67. Gillette customers more loyal than McDonald’s customers
吉列的客户忠诚度高于麦当劳客户
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Joe Nobbe (PH) from Seattle, a shareholder.
观众： 我是来自西雅图的股东乔·诺贝（音）。
Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, I wonder if you could comment a little bit further on McDonald’s, carrying forward your comments of this morning, but more oriented toward how McDonald’s would stack up against “The Inevitables” in international-type business. What your vision would be on their growth potential in places like Germany, China, so on and so forth.
巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我想请您进一步评论一下麦当劳，延续您今天早上的评论，但更多地关注麦当劳在国际业务中与“必然性”公司相比如何。您对其在德国、中国等地的增长潜力有何看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I guess I just would have to stick with my comment that you won’t get the inevitability in food that you will get in a single consumer product, you know, such as blades.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我想我必须坚持我的观点，那就是在食品领域，你不会得到像单一消费品（比如剃须刀片）那样的“必然性”。
I mean, if I’m using a Gillette Sensor blade today, the chances are I’ll try the next generation that comes out. It’ll be the Sensor Excel right now. But I will try the next one that comes out, obviously. But I will not fool around at all in between.
我的意思是，如果我今天在使用吉列的Sensor刀片，我很可能会尝试下一代产品。目前是Sensor Excel，但下一代推出时我肯定会试试。而且在这期间我绝不会轻易换用其他产品。
And a very high percentage of people that shave, including women in shaving, they’re happy with the product.
而且，使用剃须刀的消费者中（包括女性），很大比例对这一产品感到满意。
You know, it’s not expensive. It’s 20-odd dollars a year, you know, if you’re a typical user. And if you’re getting a great result, you’re not going to fool around.
您知道，它并不贵。如果您是一个典型用户，每年花费大约20美元左右。而如果它效果很好，您是不会轻易更换的。
Whereas a great many of the decisions on fast food, as to where you eat, is simply based on which one you see. I mean, convenience is a huge factor.
而在快餐方面，许多决定吃在哪里只是基于您看到哪一家。我是说，便利性是一个巨大的因素。
So if you are going by a McDonald’s, or a Burger King, or a Wendy’s, and you happen to be hungry at that point, if you’re traveling on the road and you see one of those signs up, you’re probably going to stop at — you may very well — stop at the one you see.
所以，如果您经过一家麦当劳、汉堡王或温迪餐厅，恰好饿了，尤其是在路上旅行时看到这些招牌，您可能会停下——很可能停在您看到的那一家。
So there’s — there is not the — there’s a loyalty factor, but it’s just not going to be the same in food.
因此，虽然有一定的忠诚度因素，但在食品领域，这种忠诚度不会像剃须刀片那样。
People want to vary their — I don’t. I mean, I’m happy to eat there every day. But most people want to vary where they eat as they go through the week, or the month, or the year.
人们会想要改变他们的——我不会。我很乐意每天都去麦当劳吃饭。但大多数人会希望在一周、一个月或一年中改变他们吃饭的地方。
And they don’t really have any great desire to vary their soft drink the same way. It’s not the same thing.
沃伦·巴菲特： 而且他们并没有很强烈地想像选择快餐那样频繁更换他们的软饮料。这是完全不同的情况。
So it’s no knock on McDonald’s at all. It’s just the nature of the kind of industry they’re in.
所以这绝不是对麦当劳的批评。这只是他们所处行业的特性。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t think of anybody else who, before McDonald’s, ever did what McDonald’s did to create a chain of restaurants on such a scale, that worked.
在麦当劳之前，我想不出还有谁能够像麦当劳那样成功地创建一个如此规模的连锁餐厅体系。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, Howard Johnson’s tried.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，霍华德·约翰逊试过。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There were a lot of failures. Some of you are old enough around Omaha to remember Reed’s.
查理·芒格： 是的，有很多失败的例子。奥马哈的老一辈可能还记得Reed's。
WARREN BUFFETT: Harkert’s.
沃伦·巴菲特： 还有Harkert's。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Or Harkert’s — Harkett’s Hamburgers.
查理·芒格： 或者Harkert's——Harkett's汉堡。
WARREN BUFFETT: Harkert’s.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，Harkert's。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Harkert’s Holsum Hamburgers.
查理·芒格： Harkert's优质汉堡。
WARREN BUFFETT: Right.
沃伦·巴菲特： 没错。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And they came and they went, those chains, and — but the —
查理·芒格： 是的，那些连锁餐厅来了又走了，但——
It is a much tougher business that McDonald’s is in.
麦当劳所处的行业确实要艰难得多。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s price sensitive, too, I mean, obviously.
沃伦·巴菲特： 而且显然，这个行业对价格也非常敏感。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Part of that’s comparative. You can spend a lot more money on hamburgers in the course of a year than razor blades. I mean, you can’t save that much by changing razor blades.
查理·芒格： 部分原因是相对的。一年下来，你在汉堡上的花费可能会比剃须刀片多得多。我是说，通过更换剃须刀片，你无法省下那么多钱。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The average person will buy 27 — in the United States — 27 Sensor Excels a year. You know, that’s one every, roughly, 13 days.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。在美国，普通消费者每年会购买27个Sensor Excel剃须刀片。也就是说，大约每13天用一个。
And I don’t know what the retail price is because they give them free to us as directors, but the — (laughter) — you know —
我不知道零售价是多少，因为他们免费送给我们这些董事。（笑声）
If they’re a dollar, it’s 27 bucks, I mean, and —
如果是每个一美元，那就是27美元了，我是说——
It makes a lot of difference. That’s what’s happening, of course, around the world is people that are using cheap double-edged blades, or whatever is, they keep moving up the comfort scale — the comfort ladder. And Gillette is a direct beneficiary of —
这确实是一个很大的区别。当然，目前全球范围内的情况是，那些使用廉价双刃刀片或其他刀片的人们，正在不断提升他们的舒适度需求——“舒适阶梯”。而吉列是这一趋势的直接受益者。
If it’s a difference between having great shaves and very so-so shaves, and lots of nicks and scratches and everything, is ten bucks a year or 12 bucks a year. I mean, that is not going to cause many people to change their habits, and —
如果能从普通剃须体验提升到出色剃须体验，避免很多划痕和刮伤，这一年只需要多花10美元或12美元。我认为，这不会让许多人改变他们的习惯，而且——
Incidentally, the Sensor for women has just been a huge success. I think they’ve had more razors go out on that in the same period than when the original Sensor was — came out for men.
顺便说一句，专为女性设计的Sensor剃须刀刚刚取得了巨大成功。我认为，在相同的时间段内，其销量甚至超过了最初为男性推出的Sensor剃须刀。
So that’s been an enlargement of the market. I would not have guessed that would work that well. Before that, all the women just used the disposables, or their husband’s — boyfriend’s — razor. But thank God they’ve gotten over that. (Laughter)
因此，这扩展了市场。我原本没想到它会表现得这么好。在此之前，所有女性只是使用一次性剃须刀，或者她们丈夫或男友的剃须刀。但谢天谢地，她们已经不再这样了。（笑声）
68. “Invisible hand does not work perfectly”
“看不见的手并非完美运作”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name is Ted Downey. I live in Mankato, Minnesota.
观众： 各位先生，我叫泰德·道尼，住在明尼苏达州的曼凯托。
Mr. Munger, your reference to Einstein, I happen to have an article called “Strange Is Our Situation Here On Earth,” which is somewhat related to my question.
芒格先生，您提到爱因斯坦，我正好有一篇名为《我们在地球上的处境真是奇怪》的文章，这与我的问题有些关联。
This morning, you brought up the shortcomings of accountability. And I would like you to address the aspects of the environmental impact in our accounting system and how this might relate to a social screen for investment in other areas.
今天上午，您提到了问责制的缺陷。我想请您谈谈在我们的会计系统中环境影响的相关方面，以及这如何与其他领域的社会投资筛选相关联。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, again, that is broad enough and tough enough so that I think I should pass. (Applause)
查理·芒格： 嗯，这个问题足够广泛，也足够棘手，所以我觉得我应该跳过。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
The — I would say the “unseen hand” — or [Adam Smith’s] “invisible hand” — you know, does not work perfectly for all aspects of an economy, so —
我想说，“看不见的手”——或者说亚当·斯密的“无形的手”——您知道，它并不能在经济的所有方面完美运作，所以——
But in terms of accounting for it — in terms of an individual balance sheet or income account, you know, that would be way beyond me. But there are things that the “invisible hand” won’t do, and therefore, that unfettered market-driven economic action will not lead to the best result for society in my view.
但在会计核算方面——比如在个人资产负债表或收益表方面——这超出了我的能力范围。但“无形的手”有一些无法完成的事情，因此在我看来，不受限制的市场驱动的经济活动不会为社会带来最佳结果。
I think the market works awfully well in an awfully — in a tremendous number of ways. It produces what people want in increasing quantities. And it — you know, it’s enormously beneficial to have a market-driven society. But a pure market-driven society will do things that will have anti-social consequences.
我认为市场在许多方面表现得非常出色。它以不断增加的数量生产人们想要的东西。您知道，有一个市场驱动的社会是极其有益的。但一个纯粹由市场驱动的社会会做出一些带来反社会后果的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You certainly need environmental rules.
查理·芒格： 环境规则是必须的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The pioneers died like flies because the drinking water was too near the sewage. And one of the glories of the world we live in now is that the sewage systems are so good.
查理·芒格： 早期的拓荒者像苍蝇一样大批死亡，因为饮用水离污水太近了。而我们如今生活的世界的一大成就是下水道系统非常完善。
And, you know, you don’t think about it much, but it’s dramatically changed our prospects and the general quality of how we live.
您知道，您可能不会经常想到这一点，但它极大地改变了我们的前景和生活质量。
And there are a lot of other places where you need environmental rules.
在许多其他领域，我们也需要环境规则。
All that said, some of the environmental stuff has gone way too far. But it’s too complicated to try and offer precise lines.
话虽如此，一些环境保护的内容已经走得太远了。但试图给出明确界限太复杂了。
69. Aim to increase both operating earnings and investments
目标是同时增加运营收益和投资收益
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Gul Asnani (PH). I’m from Allentown, Pennsylvania.
观众： 我叫古尔·阿斯纳尼（音），来自宾夕法尼亚州的阿伦敦。
I have a question concerning page four of the annual report where you talk about the investments per shares, et cetera.
我有一个关于年报第4页的问题，涉及每股投资等内容。
WARREN BUFFETT: Right.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And my question is, how much claim do the operating businesses have on these marketable securities?
观众： 我的问题是，这些经营业务对这些可交易证券的占有权有多大？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that table’s a very important table in my view. And we measure our progress, to some extent, by the figures in both columns of that table, one of which shows the investments per share. And the other shows the operating earnings from everything other than investments.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。在我看来，那张表格非常重要。我们在一定程度上通过表中两列的数据衡量我们的进展，其中一列显示了每股投资，另一列显示了除投资以外的所有运营收益。
The operating businesses have first claim on anything that relates to their business. I mean, if See’s is going to buy a new plant, which it probably is now — or buy an additional building, I shouldn’t say a new plant — you know, that comes first. The business has grown. It’ll produce some economies and all that. We do that. You know, we try and do it as intelligently as possible. But that comes first. The —
经营业务对与其业务相关的任何资金具有优先权。我是说，如果See’s要买一座新厂房——也许是现在正在买——或者购买一个附加建筑，不应该说是新厂房——您知道，这会是优先考虑的。业务已经增长，这会带来一些经济效益等等。我们会这样做，并尽可能明智地执行。但这是第一优先事项。
That doesn’t use but a small fraction of the capital. All of those needs don’t use but a small fraction of the capital that Berkshire will generate. The investments reside largely in insurance companies because that’s where largely the liquid funds are.
但这只用了一小部分资本。这些需求只用了伯克希尔将产生资本的一小部分。投资主要分布在保险公司，因为那里是流动资金的主要所在地。
They have to have capital strength, obviously, because they have huge promises outstanding.
显然，它们必须具备资本实力，因为它们承担了巨大的未履行承诺。
But where they reside does not determine who manages them. Lou Simpson manages GEICO’s portfolio specifically. But in effect, Charlie and I manage everything else.
但它们的所在地并不决定谁来管理它们。卢·辛普森专门管理GEICO的投资组合。但实际上，查理和我管理着其他所有的投资。
So where they precisely reside really makes no difference. I mean, they’re sitting someplace. They’re not for the operating management to use in projects that are far afield from what they’re doing.
所以它们具体存放在哪里并不重要。我的意思是，它们放在某个地方。但这些资金不会被经营管理层用在远离其业务范围的项目上。
But if they need money in any operating business, you know, we’ll have a check there that day. FlightSafety, for example, will be a fairly capital-intensive business.
但如果他们在任何经营业务中需要资金，我们会在当天提供支票。例如，FlightSafety就是一个相当资本密集型的业务。
I mean, if our project with Boeing goes as we hope it goes, you know, there will be substantial money in there because there — you know, we will have many more simulators around the world, and we’ll be paying our proportional cost of it.
我是说，如果我们与波音的项目按预期进行，那么会有大量资金投入其中，因为——您知道——我们将在世界各地拥有更多的模拟器，我们将支付我们的相应份额成本。
But they don’t need to keep money around to prepare for that day, which they would if they were a standalone operation. We can — money’s fungible.
但他们不需要提前留出资金为那一天做准备。如果他们是独立运营的企业，可能就需要这样做。我们可以——资金是可以调配的。
We can deploy it all the time. And whenever anybody needs it, we’ll come up with it. But we don’t leave it around awaiting the day when some specific operation needs it.
我们可以随时部署资金。无论谁需要，我们都会提供资金。但我们不会将资金闲置在那里等待某个具体业务需要它的那一天。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: The odds are very good that the marketable securities will keep going up, even as the businesses expand. That’s the way the game has worked in the past. And we hope it’ll keep going that way.
查理·芒格： 很有可能，即使业务扩展，可交易证券的价值仍会继续增长。这就是过去的运作方式。我们希望它能继续这样下去。
WARREN BUFFETT: What we are doing is trying to increase the numbers in both columns. We don’t have any favoritism for this over that or anything of the sort. But we’re looking, all the time, for things that will do — will help both columns. And we’d be disappointed if five or 10 years from now that they both haven’t increased significantly.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们正在做的是努力增加表中两列的数字。我们没有偏向其中任何一项，或者类似的倾向。但我们始终在寻找能够同时推动这两列增长的东西。如果五年或十年后，两者都没有显著增加，我们会感到失望。
But which column will increase at the greater rate, we don’t know.
但哪一列会以更高的速度增长，我们并不知道。
70. “We wouldn’t be surprised” if stock returns are lower
“如果股票回报降低，我们不会感到惊讶”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 1?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good day, my name is John Semanovich (PH) from Ottawa, Canada, which, incidentally, has nothing to do with Bre-X whatsoever. (Laughter)
观众： 你好，我叫约翰·塞马诺维奇（音），来自加拿大渥太华，顺便说一下，这与Bre-X毫无关系。（笑声）
My question more goes back to the discussion of intellectual capital, in particular, perhaps, your intellectual reserves.
我的问题更多是回到关于智力资本的讨论，尤其是您们的智力储备。
And so, speaking of Security Analysis, the first edition in 1934, Ben Graham talked about the development of the “New Era Theory” and its consequences on the security business.
说到《证券分析》的1934年第一版，本·格雷厄姆谈到了“新纪元理论”的发展及其对证券业务的影响。
In today’s terms, we see a lot of the same words and phrases being repeated by analysts on Wall Street. And with the historical returns on common stocks, dating back to the 1800s, coming in at about 7 percent, pair that together with the concept of regression to the mean in statistics, do you not think that we’re in a very dangerous period?
在当今的环境中，我们发现华尔街分析师重复了许多相同的词句。而普通股的历史回报率可追溯到19世纪，大约为7%。结合统计学中均值回归的概念，您不认为我们正处于一个非常危险的时期吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer — we never know, I mean, we — in terms of what markets will do, we —
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，答案是——我们从未知道。我的意思是，对于市场将会如何表现，我们——
I don’t think that the Coca-Cola Company’s in a dangerous position, you know — in a dangerous era — or Gillette is in a dangerous era, or McDonald’s, or Wells Fargo, or whatever, but — or See’s Candy, or the businesses we own in their entirety, Kirby, whatever it may be.
我不认为可口可乐公司处于危险的境地——处于一个危险的时代——或者吉列处于危险的时代，或者麦当劳、富国银行，或者任何其他公司——比如See's Candy，或我们完全拥有的企业，比如Kirby，无论是什么。
Whether valuations are too high gets back to the question that we said — we talked about earlier. If businesses, in aggregate, they keep earning very high returns on equity and interest rates stay where they are, we are not in an overvalued period.
估值是否过高回到我们之前讨论的问题。如果整体来看，企业能够持续获得很高的股本回报率，而利率保持在当前水平，那么我们并不处于一个估值过高的时期。
If it turns out that these returns are not sustainable, or interest rates go higher, we will look back and say this was a high point, at least for a while.
如果事实证明这些回报率无法持续，或者利率上升，我们回头会说，这曾经是一个高点，至少在一段时间内是如此。
But we have no notion on that. And we really don’t think about it, basically, because we don’t know. You know, our job is to focus on things that we can know and that make a difference.
但我们对此没有任何看法。基本上，我们不会考虑这些事情，因为我们不知道。我们的任务是专注于我们能够知道并且能够带来影响的事情。
And if something can’t make a difference or we can’t know it, you know, we write that one off. So we’re looking for the —
如果某件事无法产生影响或者我们无法了解它，我们就把它排除在外。所以我们寻找的是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: But Warren, you would expect average returns from stock market index-type investing to regress somewhat down —
查理·芒格： 但沃伦，你会预期股票市场指数型投资的平均回报率会有所回落——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I don’t think the —
沃伦·巴菲特： 噢，我不认为——
CHARLIE MUNGER: — where they’ve been the last few years?
查理·芒格： ——达到过去几年那样的水平？
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think you’ll get the investment result from owning the S&P over the next 10 years that you’ve gotten over the past 10 years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我不认为未来10年持有标普500的投资结果会像过去10年那样。
I would — if someone wanted to put some real money on that, they would find a taker with me. That’s very unlikely to happen.
我会——如果有人愿意对此下注真金白银，我愿意接招。但这种结果很难发生。
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s not predicting a crash.
查理·芒格： 这并不是在预测崩盘。
WARREN BUFFETT: No.
沃伦·巴菲特： 不是。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s just saying that the guaranteed result from the next 10 years is almost certain to be less than —
查理·芒格： 只是说，未来10年的预期结果几乎肯定会低于——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — that of the last.
查理·芒格： ——过去10年的结果。
WARREN BUFFETT: It wouldn’t surprise — I mean, this is no way predictive. But I mean, it wouldn’t surprise us in the least if stocks averaged 4 percent a year, you know, for the next 10 years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 这不会让我们感到惊讶——我的意思是，这并非预测。但如果未来10年股票的平均年回报率是4%，我们一点也不会感到意外。
S&P500，1997年年初开盘价47.40，2006年收盘价100.74，年化复合增速7.8%，当时的情况是1995年涨了35.02%，1996年涨了20.01%，巴菲特的这个判断还是合理的。
That doesn’t mean they will. We don’t know the number. But that would not be a surprising outcome. And it wouldn’t bother us particularly, either.
这并不意味着一定会如此。我们不知道具体的数字。但这不会是一个令人惊讶的结果。我们对此也不会特别在意。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
查理·芒格： 不会。
71. “We don’t want to talk down something in order to buy it”
“我们不想通过贬低某些事物来买入它”
WARREN BUFFETT: Two.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区。
LARRY WHITMAN: Hello. My name is Larry Whitman (PH) from Minot, North Dakota.
拉里·惠特曼： 你好，我叫拉里·惠特曼（音），来自北达科他州的迈诺特。
You have both talked today about the shrinking universe of stocks you could purchase, less margin of safety than ever, and a higher opportunity cost.
您们今天都提到，现在可供购买的股票范围正在缩小，安全边际比以往更少，而机会成本更高。
And you’ve also talked about looking to, potentially, purchase your great companies that you already have at reasonable prices.
您们还提到过可能会在合理的价格下，购买您们已经拥有的优秀公司股票。
And so I wonder if by talking so positively about some of your stocks — in particular Disney, such as in the ’95 annual report when you talked about actually telling everyone that you were buying more shares on the open market and, again, at the ’97 meeting — at their meeting — when you talked about maybe not selling the shares — those were both opportunities, maybe, when Disney may have dropped, because of such things as increased debt, or even people’s concern about the Ovitz compensation package.
因此，我想知道，当您们如此积极地谈论您们的某些股票——特别是迪士尼，比如在1995年年报中提到您们实际上告诉大家您们正在公开市场上买入更多股票；还有1997年的会议上——在他们的会议上——提到可能不会出售股票时——这些可能都是机会，尤其是在迪士尼因为债务增加，或者人们对奥维茨薪酬方案的担忧导致股价下跌的时候。
And I just wondered if that may hurt your ability to buy these great companies at reasonable prices by talking so positively about them when, in fact, maybe you could buy them at lower prices when people get irrational.
我只是想知道，当您们如此积极地谈论这些伟大的公司时，这是否会损害您们以合理价格购买这些公司股票的能力？实际上，也许当人们变得不理性时，您们可以以更低的价格买入。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You’re saying that — which I probably agree with — that if we would say the world is going to hell at Coke or Disney or Gillette — (laughs) — we might be better off, in terms of being able to buy more stock.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。您的意思是——我可能会同意——如果我们说可口可乐、迪士尼或吉列的世界正在崩塌——（笑）——我们可能会在能够买入更多股票方面处于更有利的位置。
But, you know, I got asked the question at Disney and I answered it. And that’s my general approach, that —
但是，您知道，我在迪士尼被问到问题，我就回答了。这是我的一般做法——
I think it’s usually a bad mistake to sell your interest in wonderful businesses. I don’t think people find them that often. And I think they get hung up, if they’ve sold them at X that they want to buy them back at 90 percent of X, or 85 percent of X, so they’ll never go back in at 105 percent of X.
我认为，出售您在优秀企业中的权益通常是一个严重的错误。我认为人们不常能找到这样的企业。我还认为，他们会陷入这样的纠结：如果他们以X的价格卖出了股票，他们就想以X的90%或85%的价格买回来，因此他们永远不会以X的105%的价格再次买入。
I think, on balance, if you are in a business that you understand and you think it’s a really outstanding business, that the presumption should be that you just hold it and don’t worry.
总体来看，如果你投资了一家你了解且认为是非常优秀的企业，那么基本的假设应该是持有它，而不用担心。
And if it goes down 25 percent in price or 30 percent in price, if you have more money available, buy more. And if you don’t, you know, so what? Just look at the business and judge how it’s doing.
如果它的价格下跌了25%或30%，如果你有更多资金，就买入更多。如果没有，那也没关系。只需要关注企业，评估它的运营表现。
But there’s no question. I mean, we try not to talk very much about the businesses, except maybe to use them as an illustration in a teaching mode or something of the sort. We’re not touting anything.
但毫无疑问，我们尽量少谈论这些企业，除非是以教学的方式将它们作为示例。我们不是在宣传任何东西。
And I did try to stick those precautions in when I do talk about them as being wonderful businesses, so people don’t take it as an unqualified buy recommendation or something of the sort.
而且，当我谈论这些优秀企业时，我确实尽量强调这些注意事项，以免人们误以为这是一个无条件的买入建议或类似的东西。
But we won’t try and put any spin on any — when we’re talking about businesses generally.
但我们不会对企业进行任何的夸大宣传，特别是当我们在谈论一般的企业时。
We may not talk about them at all. You know, if we’re buying something, we might be — particularly if no one knows that we’ve been in that stock at all — we might be somewhat quiet about the fact. But we don’t want to talk down something in order to buy it.
我们可能根本不谈论它们。比如，如果我们正在买入某些股票，尤其是没有人知道我们已经持有这些股票时，我们可能会对此保持低调。但我们不会为了买入而故意贬低某些东西。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I always — Jerry Newman, as I understand it, didn’t like Ben Graham giving all these courses explaining what Newman and Graham were doing, and —
查理·芒格： 嗯，据我所知，杰瑞·纽曼并不喜欢本·格雷厄姆开设那些课程，向人们解释纽曼和格雷厄姆在做什么，——
But Graham’s attitude was that he was a professor first. And if he made just slightly less money by being very accurate in what he taught, why so be it.
但格雷厄姆的态度是，他首先是一名教授。如果他因为在教学中非常准确而少赚了一点钱，那又有什么关系呢？
And I think it’s fair to say that Warren has assimilated a bit of that ethos. And I think it’s all to the good. And if it costs us a tiny, little bit of money from time to time, there are probably compensating benefits. And if there aren’t, it’s probably the right way to behave anyway.
我认为可以公平地说，沃伦吸收了一些这种精神。我认为这是完全有益的。如果我们偶尔因此损失了一点点钱，可能会有其他补偿的好处。如果没有，这也可能是正确的行为方式。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, if you were in a less charitable mood, I might point out I didn’t behave that way till I got rich. (Laughter and applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，如果你心情不那么宽容，我可能会指出，我直到变得富有才这么做。（笑声和掌声）
Actually, I used to teach a course at what was then the University of Omaha. And we’d use all these current examples. And things were cheap then — (laughs) — that nobody paid any attention.
实际上，我曾经在当时的奥马哈大学教过一门课。我们会用很多当前的例子。而且那时候东西都很便宜——（笑）——所以没有人注意到。
72. We don’t want to “hear stories” or buy from “jerks”
我们不想“听故事”或与“混蛋”做交易
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett. My name is Liza Rema (PH) from Burbank, California.
观众： 你好，芒格先生和巴菲特先生。我是来自加利福尼亚州伯班克的丽莎·雷玛（音）。
I wanted to find out — earlier, you mentioned you looked at — you used filters to look at a company. So could you elaborate on what those filters are?
我想知道——您们之前提到，您们用筛选条件来评估一家公司。能否详细说明这些筛选条件是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to —?
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，你想——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’ve tried to do a good deal of that, and —
查理·芒格： 嗯，我们确实花了不少功夫在这方面——
Opportunity cost is a huge filter in life. If you’ve got two suitors who are really eager to have you, and one is way the hell better than the other, you do not have to spend much time with the other. And that’s the way we filter stock buying opportunities.
机会成本是生活中一个巨大的筛选标准。如果有两个追求者都非常想得到你，而其中一个明显比另一个好得多，你根本不需要在另一个身上花太多时间。我们筛选股票购买机会的方法就是这样。
Our ideas are so simple, people keep asking us for mysteries, when all we have is the most elementary idea.
我们的理念非常简单，但人们总是问我们一些深奥的东西，而我们拥有的只是最基本的想法。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The first filter we probably put it through is whether we think — and we know instantly — whether it’s a business we’re going to understand, and whether it’s a business that — if it passes through that, it’s whether a company can have a sustainable edge, you know.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们可能首先筛选的是，看看这是不是一个我们能够理解的业务——我们通常能够瞬间判断出这一点——以及这家公司是否能够具有持续的竞争优势。如果通过这一点，就继续评估。
And that gets rid of a very significant percentage of the things people have —
这一筛选就会淘汰掉人们推荐给我们的很大一部分东西。
They always want to tell you some story or anything. And I’m sure they regard me and Charlie as very arbitrary, in terms of, you know, in the middle of the first sentence saying, “Well, you know, we appreciate the call, but we’re not interested.”
他们总是想给你讲一些故事之类的东西。我确信，他们会认为我和查理非常武断，比如在第一句话说到一半时，我们就说：“嗯，我们很感谢您的来电，但我们没兴趣。”
I mean, you know, they just think if they explain something — and I get letters on this all the time.
我的意思是，他们可能认为，只要他们能解释清楚——而我经常收到这类信件。
But we really can tell, in the middle of the first sentence, usually, whether those two factors exist. And if we can’t understand it, obviously, it’s not going to have — we can’t make a decision as to whether it has a sustainable edge.
但我们通常能在第一句话中途判断出是否具备这两个条件。如果我们无法理解它，那显然无法判断它是否有持续的竞争优势。
And if we can’t understand it, we, very often, can come to the conclusion that it’s not the kind of the business where it will have a sustainable edge.
而且如果我们无法理解它，我们很容易得出结论，这不是那种能够拥有持续竞争优势的业务。
So 98 percent of the conversations we can end, you know, in the middle of somebody’s first sentence, which, of course, goes over very big with the caller, but — (Laughter)
所以，我们可以在98%的对话中，在对方第一句话的中途就结束交谈。当然，这对打电话的人来说可能很令人沮丧——（笑声）
And then, sometimes if you’re talking about an entire business, we can tell by who we’re dealing with whether a deal’s ever going to work out or not.
然后，有时候当我们讨论一个完整的企业时，我们可以通过和谁打交道来判断这笔交易是否可能成功。
I mean, it — if there’s an auction going on, we don’t want to — we have no interest in talking about it. And it just isn’t going, you know, it isn’t going to work.
我的意思是，如果有拍卖正在进行，我们不会感兴趣——我们根本不会谈论它。这是行不通的。
If someone is interested in, essentially, doing that with their business, you know, they’re going to sit down and want to renegotiate everything with us all over again after the deal is done. And we’re going to have to buy the business two or three times before we get through.
如果有人基本上是想通过拍卖来处理他们的企业，您知道，他们可能会在交易完成后与我们重新坐下来，想要再谈一遍所有的条款。而我们可能需要“购买”这家公司两三次才能完成。
You just see all these things coming.
您会预见到所有这些问题的到来。
And on the other hand, we’ve had, you know, terrific experience, basically, with the people we have associated with.
另一方面，我们与合作过的人基本上有着非常好的合作经历。
So it works. It’s efficient. You know, we don’t want to listen to stories all day. And we don’t read brokerage reports of anything of the sort. It’s just — there’s other things to do with your time.
所以这种方式有效率。您知道，我们不想整天听故事。我们也不看任何类似经纪报告的东西。时间还有其他更值得花费的事情。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Another filter that Warren was eluding to is this concept of the “quality person.” And, of course, most people define “quality person” as somebody very much like themselves. (Laughter) But —
查理·芒格： 是的，沃伦提到的另一个筛选标准是“优秀的人”。当然，大多数人把“优秀的人”定义为非常像自己的人。（笑声）不过——
WARREN BUFFETT: Identical, actually, is the word you’re searching for. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 实际上，您在寻找的词是“完全相同”。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: But there’s so many wonderful people out there. And there’s so many awful people out there. And there’s signs frequently, like flags, particularly over the awful people. And generally speaking, those people are to be avoided.
查理·芒格： 外面有很多优秀的人，也有很多糟糕的人。而且这些糟糕的人常常会有一些明显的迹象，像是标志，尤其是在那些糟糕的人身上。通常来说，应该避免与这些人打交道。
It just — the amount of misery you bring into your life by trusting some awful person and the amount of felicity that you can bring in by making the right business associations — look around this room.
生活中，信任一个糟糕的人会给你带来多少痛苦，而通过建立正确的商业关系你能带来多少幸福——看看这个房间。
And there’s some wonderful people who have created some wonderful businesses. And their customers can trust them. The employees can trust them. The problems can trust them to be fairly faced and reasonably solved. And those are the kind of people you want. And people who take their promises seriously.
这里有一些出色的人，他们创建了卓越的企业。顾客可以信任他们，员工可以信任他们，问题可以信任他们来公平地面对并合理解决。这些就是你想要的人，而那些对承诺认真的人。
I had some experience, recently, with a company. And they have their brand on a particular product. And somebody invented a better product in the same field. And they’re taking their brand off their product. (Laughs) If it isn’t the best, they don’t want their brand on it.
最近，我与一家公司有些经验。他们的品牌放在一款特定的产品上。然后有一个人在同一领域发明了更好的产品。于是他们决定将自己的品牌从这个产品上撤掉。（笑）如果这款产品不是最好的，他们不想让自己的品牌出现在上面。
People who think like that frequently do very well in business. And the flags are flying.
有这样想法的人通常在生意上做得非常好，而这些标志就像是迎风飘扬的旗帜。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s like they got a sign on their chest that just says, “Jerk. Jerk. Jerk.” (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 就像他们胸前挂着一个牌子，上面写着：“混蛋。混蛋。混蛋。”（笑声）
And then you think you’re going to buy the business and they aren’t going to be a jerk, you know, anymore. I mean, it’s — (Laughter)
然后你以为自己买下了这家企业，他们就不再是混蛋了，您知道的。我的意思是——（笑声）
73. Why Dr Pepper has a future
为什么 Dr Pepper 有前途
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, shareholder.
观众： 你好，我是大卫·温特斯，来自新泽西州山湖的股东。
I’m just wondering if there’s an organizational model where you deal with a plethora of information so you can physically and intellectually organize it so you have your maximum output and retain focus.
我想知道是否有一种组织模式，可以处理大量的信息，将其在身体上和智力上组织起来，以实现最大的输出并保持专注。
And secondly, if I may, in the domestic soft drink business, is it winner take all? I mean, is there room for three competitors? And, honestly, does Dr Pepper have a future?
其次，如果可以的话，在美国国内的软饮料行业中，是赢家通吃吗？我的意思是，是否有三个竞争者的空间？坦率地说，Dr Pepper 还有未来吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say Dr Pepper has a future. I’ll answer the second one.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我会说 Dr Pepper 是有未来的。我先回答第二个问题。
But sure, there’s room for more than one. I think Coke’s market share will go up pretty much year after year. But not — you know, we’re talking tenths of a percent in that business. But tenths of a percent are important.
当然，不止一个企业有空间。我认为可口可乐的市场份额基本上每年都会增加一点点。但是，您知道，我们谈论的是这个行业中的十分之一百分点的变化。而十分之一百分点是很重要的。
The U.S. market is what? It must be 10 billion cases. So, you know, one percent’s a hundred million cases.
美国市场是多少？应该有100亿箱。所以，您知道，1%就是1亿箱。
There will be — Dr Pepper appeals to a lot of people.
Dr Pepper 吸引了很多人。
It’s interesting how regional tastes can be. I mean, Dr Pepper will have a share in Texas that’s, you know, far higher than it will be in Minnesota or something. But there are people who are going to prefer it.
地域性口味差异是很有趣的。比如说，Dr Pepper 在德克萨斯州的市场份额远高于它在明尼苏达州的份额。但是，总会有人更喜欢它。
And an interesting thing, though, is that the high percentage of people that prefer cola, for example.
有趣的是，比如说，有很大比例的人喜欢可乐。
Although the cola percentage has gone down a little bit, the fastest growing big beverage at Coke is Sprite. Sprite has had huge gains in sales. It does well over a billion cases a year. And it sells very well in a whole bunch of countries.
尽管可乐的比例略有下降，但可口可乐公司增长最快的大型饮料是雪碧。雪碧的销量增长巨大，每年销量超过10亿箱。而且它在很多国家都卖得很好。
So they’ll — you can make money with a soft drink company that doesn’t dominate the business. You’ll do a lot better with one that does dominate. But it’s not a winner take all. It’s not like two newspapers in a town of 100,000 or 200,000.
因此，您可以通过一家并不主导行业的软饮料公司赚钱。如果您拥有一家主导行业的公司，您的表现会更好。但这不是赢家通吃的行业。这不像在一个有10万或20万人口的小镇上的两家报纸。
多数人不愿意浪费时间挑选软饮料，27年后，Dr Pepper市值437亿，Coke市值2690亿。
There are certain businesses that are winner take all, clearly, but soft drinks, not one of them.
有一些行业显然是赢家通吃的，但软饮料行业不是其中之一。
74. “Advantage of accumulation of useful information”
“积累有用信息的优势”
WARREN BUFFETT: What was the first question? Oh, the part about organizing —
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一个问题是什么？哦，关于组织信息的部分——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, I’m just wondering, for those of us on the other side of the table, we get barraged with information. And I’m wondering how do you both — do you just read annuals, 10-Ks, and talk to people, and ignore everything else? And how do you keep track of everything, intellectually —?
观众： 哦，我只是想知道，对于我们这些坐在桌子另一侧的人来说，总是被信息淹没。我想知道你们是如何处理的——是只看年报、10-K报告，与人交谈，而忽略其他一切吗？你们如何在智力上掌控一切——？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t keep track of everything. But the beauty of — to some extent — of evaluating businesses — large businesses — is that it is all cumulative. I mean, if you started doing it 40 or so years ago, you really have got a working knowledge of an awful lot of businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们并不掌控一切。但评估企业——尤其是大型企业——在某种程度上的妙处在于，这一切都是累积的。我的意思是，如果你从40年前开始做这件事，你实际上已经对许多企业积累了实用的知识。
But there aren’t that many, to start with, that are, you know —
但一开始也没有那么多，您知道——
And you can get a fix. You know, how many — what are there? Seventy-five, maybe, or so important industries. And you’ll get to understand how they operate.
而且您可以掌握这些。您知道，有多少个——大约有多少个？也许有75个左右的重要行业。而您会逐渐理解它们是如何运作的。
And you don’t have to start over again every day. And you don’t have to consult a computer for it or anything like that, it —
而且您不需要每天从头开始，也不需要借助电脑或其他类似的工具。
So it has the advantage of accumulation of useful information over time. And, you know, you just add the incremental bit at some point.
因此，它具有随着时间积累有用信息的优势。而且，您知道，您只需要在某个时间点添加一些增量信息。
You know, why did we decide to buy Coca-Cola in 1988? Well, it may have been, you know, just a couple small incremental bits of information. But that came into a mass that had been accumulated over decades.
您知道，我们为什么在1988年决定买入可口可乐？嗯，也许只是因为几条小的增量信息。但这些信息融入了几十年来积累的大量知识中。
And it’s a very — it’s a great business that way. It’s why we like businesses that don’t change too much, because the past is useful to us.
这是一个非常——这种方式很棒。这也是我们喜欢变化不大的企业的原因，因为过去对我们有用。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t add a thing to that.
查理·芒格： 我对此无可补充。
75. We’d “push” to buy cheap stocks, but not enough to lose sleep
我们会“努力”买入廉价股票，但不会冒险到失眠的地步
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Over there in 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Barbara Morrow (PH) from Wisconsin and New York.
观众： 我是芭芭拉·莫罗（音），来自威斯康星和纽约。
If you both live as long as I believe you will, it could happen that they’ll be a year when you write two big checks for super-cat claims when the market is throwing away things at really silly prices.
如果你们都像我相信的那样长寿，有一年可能会发生这种情况：你们为超级巨灾保险理赔开出两张大额支票，而此时市场正在以非常荒谬的价格抛售股票。
Could you share your thinking about how much debt you would consider taking on to buy great businesses that’s cheap in that kind of a situation?
能否分享一下，在这种情况下，你们会考虑承担多少债务来购买廉价的优秀企业？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we had both a big hurricane in the northeast or in Florida, and we had a big quake in California in the same year, and we had a financial market — the financial markets tanked, perhaps because of those events, but perhaps for other reasons, we would be thinking about ways — it might not be borrowing money directly — but we would be thinking to ways to buy securities if they got cheap enough.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，如果同一年东北部或佛罗里达发生了一场大飓风，同时加州发生了一场大地震，而金融市场因此下跌，也许是由于这些事件，也许是因为其他原因，我们会考虑如何以某种方式——也许不是直接借款——但我们会考虑以某种方式购买那些足够便宜的证券。
I mean, any time securities get cheap — Charlie, you’re thumping again here — (laughter) — any time securities get cheap, you know, we don’t like to go to the office and not write a ticket. I mean, that, so —
我的意思是，每当证券变得便宜——查理，你又在这里敲桌子了——（笑声）——每当证券变得便宜时，您知道，我们不喜欢去办公室却不写购买票据。所以——
We certainly would have the ability to borrow some money. We would never borrow a ton of money, relative to capital. We’re just not set out that way.
我们当然有能力借一些钱。但我们永远不会相对于资本借入大量资金。我们并不是以这种方式行事的。
We don’t want to disappoint anybody in this world. We don’t even want to worry about disappointing anybody in this world. So, we’re not going to do that.
我们不想让这个世界上的任何人失望。我们甚至不想担心可能让任何人失望。所以，我们不会那么做。
But we have a lot of extra firepower overall.
但整体上，我们有相当多的额外“火力”。
And I would say under almost any conditions that cause securities to get very cheap, we would find a way to buy some of them.
我想说，在几乎任何导致证券变得非常便宜的情况下，我们都会找到一种方式来购买其中一些。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: The beauty of our situation is that it has enormous flexibility built into it.
查理·芒格： 我们的情况的妙处在于，它具有巨大的灵活性。
If something were large enough and cheap enough, we could stop writing super-cats. We’re measuring opportunities one against the other, and we understand the way the numbers interplay.
如果某个机会足够大且价格足够便宜，我们可以停止承保超级巨灾保险。我们会将各种机会进行比较，并理解这些数字之间的相互作用。
And so we have a lot of different options.
因此，我们有很多不同的选择。
And that’s a huge advantage. There’s so many places in business life where you have practically no options at all. You’re just in a channel that you have to — waltz down the channel and you don’t have any options to do anything else.
这是一个巨大的优势。在商业生活中，有许多地方几乎没有任何选择。你只能在一个固定的轨道上行进，没有任何其他选择的余地。
We have enormous options. We may not exercise them. But we have enormous flexibility.
我们有很多选择。我们可能不会使用它们。但我们拥有巨大的灵活性。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We know they’re there, and —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们知道它们在那里，而且——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
查理·芒格： 是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — and there’s no reason to push on anything now. At least, we don’t have any reason to push ourselves.
沃伦·巴菲特： ——目前没有理由在任何事情上施加压力。至少，我们没有任何理由逼迫自己。
But if it ever became advantageous to push somewhat, we would push, although never to a degree that, in any way, causes us to lose a minute of sleep about fulfilling every obligation we had.
但如果在某些情况下推动一些事情变得有利可图，我们会去推动。不过，我们绝不会将其推到任何会让我们对履行所有义务感到失眠的程度。
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