1999-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session

1. Formal business meeting begins

正式商业会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. Really delighted we can have this many people come out for a meeting. It says something, I think, about the way you regard yourself as owners.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。非常高兴有这么多人来参加会议。我想这反映了你们对自己作为股东身份的重视。

We’re going to hustle through the business meeting. And then Charlie and I will be here for six hours or until our candy runs out — (laughter) — to answer any questions you have. We have people in a number of remote locations. And we have ways of bringing them into the questions as well.

我们会快速进行商业会议的内容。随后，查理和我会在这里待六个小时，或者直到糖果吃完——（笑声）——回答你们的所有问题。我们还有一些人在远程地点参与，并且我们也有方法将他们的提问纳入会议讨论中。

Incidentally, if you hadn’t figured it out already, this hyperkinetic bundle of energy here on my left is Charlie Munger — (laughter) — our vice-chairman. (Applause)

顺便提一下，如果你们还没有认出来，这位坐在我左边精力充沛的人是查理·芒格——（笑声）——我们的副董事长。（掌声）

And we will now run through the business of the meeting.

现在我们将进入会议的议程内容。

The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company. I welcome you to this 1999 annual meeting of shareholders.

现在宣布会议正式开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席。欢迎你们参加1999年度的股东大会。

I will first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present, in addition to myself. And if you’ll stand up. It’s a little hard for me to see — there, right down here in the front row.

首先，我来介绍今天到场的伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事，除了我自己之外，请各位站起来。我的视线有点受限——就在这里，前排的位置。

We have Susan T. Buffett. You stand and remain standing, please. (Applause)

苏珊·T·巴菲特。请站起来并保持站立。（掌声）

If you encourage her, she’ll sing another song. (Laughter)

如果你们鼓励她，她可能会再唱一首歌。（笑声）

Howard G. Buffett. Don’t encourage him to sing a song. (Laughter and applause)

霍华德·G·巴菲特。千万别鼓励他唱歌。（笑声和掌声）

Malcolm G. Chace. (Applause)

马尔科姆·G·蔡斯。（掌声）

Charlie, you’ve already met.

查理，刚才你们已经见过了。

Ronald L. Olson. Ron? (Applause)

罗纳德·L·奥尔森。罗恩？（掌声）

And Walter Scott Jr. (Applause)

以及沃尔特·斯科特二世。（掌声）

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天还有来自德勤会计师事务所的合伙人到场，他们是我们的审计师。如果你们有关于他们对伯克希尔账户审计的相关问题，他们可以回答。

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.

伯克希尔的秘书是福里斯特·克鲁特先生，他将对会议的过程进行书面记录。贝基·艾米克小姐被任命为本次会议的选举监票员，她将负责确认董事选举中的投票计数结果。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday, representing 1,133,684 Class A Berkshire shares and 3,485,885 Class B Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders, as indicated on the cards.

本次会议指定的代理投票人是沃尔特·斯科特二世和马克·D·汉堡。截至上周五，已收到的代理投票卡代表了1,133,684股伯克希尔A类股份和3,485,885股伯克希尔B类股份，这些股份将由代理投票人根据卡片指示进行投票。

That number of shares represents a quorum. And we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting. We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you might have.

这些股份数量已达到法定人数。因此，我们将直接开始会议。我们会进行会议的事务内容，然后正式结束会议。之后，我们将回答你们可能提出的问题。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

秘书是否有关于本次会议上具有投票权的伯克希尔股份总数的报告？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting, that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 5, 1999, being the record date of this meeting, there were 1,343,592 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

福里斯特·克鲁特：是的，我有。如随本次会议通知一起寄出的代理声明中所述，该通知于1999年3月5日通过头等邮件发送给所有登记在册的股东，这是本次会议的记录日期。当时伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司共计发行了1,343,592股A类普通股，每股在会议上对议案拥有一票投票权。

And 5,266,338 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

另外，伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司还发行了5,266,338股B类普通股，每股在会议上对议案拥有1/200票的投票权。

Of that number, 1,133,684 Class A shares and 3,485,885 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.

其中，截至上周五，已收到的代理投票卡代表了1,133,684股A类股份和3,485,885股B类股份出席本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, thank you Forrest.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，谢谢你，福里斯特。

The one item of business of this meeting is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.

本次会议的唯一议程是选举董事。如果在场的股东希望撤回之前寄送的代理投票并亲自就董事选举进行投票，可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.

此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交代理投票卡且希望亲自投票，可以索取选票进行投票。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them.

如果有意进行此操作，请向过道中的会议工作人员表明身份，他们将为您提供选票。请有需要选票的人士现在表明身份，以便我们分发选票。

2. General Re CEO Ron Ferguson declined to join board

通用再保险首席执行官罗恩·弗格森拒绝加入董事会

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to make one comment before we proceed to the election of directors. And that’s that in the General Re proxy material, material relating to the General Re merger, it was stated that the intention was to have Ron Ferguson, the CEO of General Re, join the board of Berkshire Hathaway.

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们进行董事选举之前，我想先发表一条评论。在通用再保险的代理材料中，与通用再保险合并相关的材料中提到，有意邀请通用再保险的首席执行官罗恩·弗格森加入伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事会。

And that offer was extended, and still remains open, and will remain open for his lifetime and mine, at least, for Ron to join the board.

这个邀请已经发出，并且仍然有效，至少在我和罗恩的有生之年，这个邀请都会保持开放状态。

After thinking about it, he decided that he preferred not to be on the board. And in that judgment, he concurs with my feelings, generally, about boards, in that they can restrict your — it can restrict your activities in purchase and sale of a stock.

经过深思熟虑，他决定不加入董事会。在这个判断上，他总体上与我对董事会的看法一致，因为董事会可能会限制你的活动，例如股票的买卖。

For example, if you do it in a six-month period, then you’re automatically in trouble with the — and you have to return any profit, as calculated in a rather peculiar way, to the company.

比如，如果你在六个月内买卖股票，那么你将自动陷入麻烦，并且需要按照一种相当特殊的计算方式，将任何利润归还公司。

It means that your compensation system is laid out for the world to see.

这也意味着你的薪酬体系将完全公开。

There may be some tax restrictions, in terms of the deductibility of salary paid. And so, Ron notified me a little bit before the proxy material went out that he preferred, at least, to defer any decision on joining the board.

此外，还可能存在一些税务限制，例如薪酬的扣除问题。因此，在代理材料发出前不久，罗恩通知我，他至少希望推迟关于加入董事会的决定。

3. Disadvantages of being a corporate director

成为公司董事的弊端

WARREN BUFFETT: I can tell you that it has cost Berkshire significant money by the fact that Charlie and I have been on various boards, because your hands are tied, in many respects, even if you don’t have any knowledge of anything that might be of material, plus or minus — the very fact that it might be imputed to you, can restrict actions significantly.

沃伦·巴菲特：我可以告诉你，查理和我在多个董事会任职的事实已经让伯克希尔付出了相当大的代价。因为在很多方面，你会受到约束，即使你对任何可能的重要信息一无所知——无论是正面还是负面——仅仅因为这些信息可能被归因于你，也会显著限制你的行动。

So, we make a point of not trying to be on very many boards. Charlie and I have only gone on boards where we have very significant investments by Berkshire.

因此，我们特别注意避免参与太多的董事会。查理和我只会加入伯克希尔有非常重大投资的公司董事会。

And sometimes those have caused us to take on a job that we didn’t intend originally, as that Salomon movie showed.

有时候，这些情况会导致我们承担一些原本无意接手的工作，正如那部关于所罗门的电影所展示的那样。

So, Ron — the offer is a hundred percent open to Ron at any time. And if he changes his mind in any way, he will be on the board.

所以，罗恩——这个邀请对他来说始终完全开放。如果他以任何方式改变主意，他将加入董事会。

But that explains the discrepancy between the actions that are being taken this morning and what was described as likely to happen in the proxy material.

但这也解释了今天上午所采取的行动与代理材料中描述的可能情况之间的差异。

4. Berkshire directors elected

伯克希尔董事选举结果

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, with that explanation, I would like to recognize Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors. Walter?

沃伦·巴菲特：在解释完上述事项后，我想请沃尔特·斯科特二世在会议上提议关于董事选举的动议。沃尔特？

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特二世：我提议沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世当选为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? Somebody should second it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是否有附议？应该有人附议。

VOICE: I second the —

某声音：我附议——

WARREN BUFFETT: We got a second out there, Susan?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有附议，苏珊？

VOICE: I second the motion.

某声音：我附议该动议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, good. OK. It has been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好。好的。已经有提议并获得附议，提议沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世当选为董事。

Are there any other nominations?

是否还有其他提名？

Long enough. Is there any discussion?

等待已久。是否有任何讨论？

Long enough. The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election.

等待已久。提名已准备好进行投票。如果有股东亲自投票，他们现在应在选票上标明自己的选择，并将选票交给选举监票员。

Will the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of election, a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received?

请代理投票人也向选举监票员提交一份董事选举的选票，并根据他们收到的指示进行投票。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

艾米克小姐，请在准备好后汇报结果。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Friday, cast not less than 1,145,271 votes for each nominee.

贝基·艾米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理投票人根据截至上周五收到的代理投票，共为每位候选人投了不少于1,145,271票。

That number far exceeds the majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

这一票数远远超过了所有已发行A类和B类股份所需的多数票。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as those cast in person at this meeting, if any, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的具体投票结果认证，包括代理投票人在本次会议期间根据新提交的代理票所投的额外票数，以及会议现场的亲自投票（如有），将提交给秘书存档在本次会议记录中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，艾米克小姐。

Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors.

沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世当选为董事。

5. Formal business meeting adjourns

正式商业会议结束

WARREN BUFFETT: After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the business of Berkshire, but do not call for any action at this meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：在商业会议结束后，我将回答你们可能提出的有关伯克希尔业务的问题，但这些问题无需在本次会议上采取任何行动。

Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?

在我们结束会议之前，还有人有其他议题需要在本次会议上讨论吗？

If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting.

如果没有，我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特二世：我提议结束本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：是否有附议？

VOICES: I second the motion.

众人：我附议该动议。

WARREN BUFFETT: A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say “aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：关于结束会议的动议已经被提出并附议。我们将通过口头表决进行投票。是否有任何讨论？如果没有，请赞成者说“赞成”。

AUDIENCE: Aye.

与会者：赞成。

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say, “I’m leaving.” No, say, “No,” I’m sorry. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：反对者请说“我要离开”。不，对不起，请说“反对”。（笑声）

OK, the meeting is adjourned.

好的，会议结束。

6. We buy businesses and don’t predict stock moves

我们购买企业而不是预测股市走势

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’ll move forward. (Applause) Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们继续进行。（掌声）谢谢。

I ask you, was Joe Stalin ever any better, I mean? (Laughter)

我问你们，乔·斯大林有比这更好的吗，我是说？（笑声）

We will — we have this room broken into eight zones, and then we have five more zones from various off-site locations. And we will move in order. We have microphones that you can go to, and we have a monitor at each microphone that will line people up.

我们——把这个房间分成了八个区域，然后还有来自不同远程地点的五个区域。我们将按照顺序进行。每个区域都有麦克风可以使用，还有监控设备负责组织提问者排队。

We will rotate around the 13 zones. There’s just one question per person. I’d ask that you identify yourself and state where you’re from.

我们会轮流从13个区域中提问。每人只能提一个问题。我希望你们在提问时先介绍自己并说明来自哪里。

Now, you have to be a little careful on that because a lot of people will say that — who really aren’t — will say that they’re from Nebraska for status reasons. But — (laughter) — if you get beyond that, we will try to identify where everybody is from. And we’ll start off in zone 1, which is on the right here at the front.

不过，你们要稍微注意一下，因为有些人——其实并不是——会为了身份认同而说自己来自内布拉斯加。但是——（笑声）——如果你们超越这个问题，我们会努力确认每个人来自哪里。我们将从1号区域开始，这里在前面的右侧。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Tim Spear (PH). And I’m from Hertfordshire, England.

提问者：我叫蒂姆·斯皮尔（发音），来自英国赫特福德郡。

I was thinking in Ben Graham’s book, “The Intelligent Investor,” he spends the first couple of chapters discussing the level of the market and whether it was safe for investment. I was wondering what you think of the market today?

我在想，在本·格雷厄姆的《聪明的投资者》一书中，他在前几章讨论了市场的水平以及是否适合投资。我想知道您对当前市场的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t — Charlie and I don’t think about the market. And Ben didn’t very much. I think he made a mistake to occasionally try and place a value on it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们——查理和我并不考虑市场。实际上，本也不是特别在意。我认为他偶尔尝试对市场估值是一个错误。

We look at individual businesses. And we don’t think of stocks as little items that wiggle around on the paper and that have charts attached to them. We think of them as parts of businesses.

我们关注的是具体的企业。我们并不认为股票是一些在纸上跳动、附带图表的小玩意儿。我们把它们视为企业的一部分。

And it is true that, currently, we have great trouble finding businesses that we both like and where we like the management and that they — and find them at an attractive price.

确实，目前我们很难找到我们喜欢的企业，同时我们也喜欢其管理层，并且它们的价格还具有吸引力。

So, we do not find bargains in this market among the larger companies that are our universe.

因此，在我们关注的大型企业范围内，我们并没有在当前市场中找到便宜货。

That is not a stock market forecast in any way, shape, or form. We have no idea whether the market is going to go up today, or next week, or next month, or next year.

这绝对不是对股票市场的预测。我们完全不知道市场今天、下周、下个月或明年会不会上涨。

We do know that we will only buy things that we think make sense, in terms of the value that we receive for Berkshire. And when we can’t find things, the money piles up. And when we find — when we do find things, we pile in.

我们知道的是，我们只会购买那些我们认为对伯克希尔有价值的东西。当我们找不到这样的东西时，资金就会积累起来。而当我们找到时——我们会大举投资。

But the stock market — I know of no one that has been successful at — and really made a lot of money predicting the actions of the market itself. I know a lot of people who have done well picking businesses and buying them at sensible prices. And that’s what we’re hoping to do.

但是股票市场——我不知道有谁能成功预测市场行为并真正赚大钱。我认识很多人通过选择企业并以合理价格购买取得了好成绩。这也是我们希望做的事情。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: How could you say it any better? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你还能说得更好些吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but the question is whether you can say it better, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但问题是你能不能说得更好些，查理。（笑声）

7. Expecting slow short-term growth of Gen Re’s float

预计通用再保险浮存金短期内增长缓慢

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to zone 2. That may be all you hear from him today. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们转到2号区域。你们今天可能听不到他说更多了。（笑声）

Get used to it.

习惯就好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.

提问者：早上好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.

提问者：我是大卫·温特斯，来自新泽西州的芒廷莱克斯。

Could you give us a few hints about the incremental value of Gen Re’s float under the Berkshire Hathaway umbrella and the potential for the growth of Gen Re’s float over the long term?

您能否谈谈通用再保险的浮存金在伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下的增值潜力，以及浮存金长期增长的可能性？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Gen Re’s float, which is now available to Berkshire — it’s a hundred percent-owned subsidiary, although part of that float is attributable to Cologne, which is only an 83 percent-owned subsidiary of Gen Re and also Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。通用再保险的浮存金现在已经属于伯克希尔——它是一家百分之百控股的子公司，不过这部分浮存金中有一部分属于科隆再保险，而科隆再保险是通用再保险和伯克希尔的83%控股子公司。

But that, I would say, the incremental value today, because it’s under the Berkshire umbrella, is zero. Because we are bringing nothing to the party that Gen Re’s own investment people would not have brought to the party.

但是，我认为，目前因为它在伯克希尔旗下，其增值是零。因为我们没有为其带来任何通用再保险自身的投资团队无法实现的价值。

We obviously think that there will be important incremental value over a long period of time. We — but when that value will appear or how much of it develops, is a matter that’s out of our hands.

显然，我们认为在长期内会有重要的增值出现。但这种价值何时显现以及规模会有多大，是我们无法控制的。

We, right now, have close to 24 billion in total invested assets at Gen Re and Cologne. Like I say, 83 percent of the Cologne part is ours and 17 percent is — belongs to somebody else.

目前，通用再保险和科隆再保险的总投资资产接近240亿美元。如我所说，科隆再保险中有83%的股份属于我们，17%属于其他人。

But we are bringing nothing to that party right now, in terms of any managerial skill that is going to add value. I would hope that over time, we would.

但在目前阶段，我们没有通过任何管理技能为其增加价值。我希望随着时间推移，我们能做到这一点。

The second question, as to the growth of float, the growth of float at General Re and Cologne will certainly be very slow in the short term. The growth of float at GEICO will be significant, percentage-wise.

关于第二个问题，关于浮存金的增长，通用再保险和科隆再保险的浮存金增长在短期内肯定会非常缓慢。相较之下，GEICO的浮存金增长幅度将显著。

The reinsurance business does not have the same potential for growth as we have at GEICO. And growth is much slower to come about, because there are longer-term contractual commitments — that people are reluctant to change reinsurers. And they should be. We agree with that.

再保险业务的增长潜力不如我们在GEICO的业务增长潜力。增长速度会慢得多，因为涉及长期的合同承诺——客户往往不愿意更换再保险公司。这一点我们也认可。

So you — at a level of 6 billion or so of premium volume and already 14 billion of float, you won’t have growth of float unless premium volume is — becomes significantly higher in the future.

因此，目前约60亿美元的保费规模和已经达到140亿美元的浮存金规模，如果未来保费规模没有显著提高，就不会看到浮存金的增长。

I think that will happen over time. It will not happen in the short term.

我认为这种增长会随着时间发生，但不会在短期内发生。

Charlie? If I may interrupt your breakfast? (Laughter)

查理？如果我可以打断你的早餐时间的话？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没什么可补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

8. How Berkshire’s enormous bid for Long-Term Capital Management failed

伯克希尔巨额收购长期资本管理公司（LTCM）的尝试为何失败

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：3号区域。（笑声）

You could always direct your questions to Charlie, incidentally. (Laughs)

顺便说一句，你们也可以把问题直接问查理。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. Thank you for hosting another wonderful weekend. My name is Che Wai Woo (PH). I’m a proud shareholder from right here in Omaha.

提问者：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。感谢你们再次举办如此精彩的活动。我叫胡志威（发音），是来自奥马哈的骄傲股东。

One of the most interesting financial news developments this previous year was the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital.

去年最有趣的金融新闻之一是对冲基金长期资本管理公司（LTCM）的几乎崩溃。

I’d like to get your thoughts and Mr. Munger’s thoughts about how these private partnerships operate, what your thoughts about the Long-Term Capital deal, and also the Fed’s intervention to save it.

我想听听您和芒格先生对这些私人合伙企业运作的看法、对长期资本管理公司交易的看法，以及美联储干预挽救它的意见。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in that movie you saw, the time when Yellowstone was — when Old Faithful was performing in the background and Bill was trying to get me to watch that while I was on the phone —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，在你们看到的那部电影里，当时黄石公园的老忠实泉正在喷发，背景中比尔试图让我看，但我当时正在打电话——

A lot of that trip was spent talking to New York about making a bid for, what we’ll call LTCM, Long-Term Capital Management.

那次旅行的大部分时间都用来与纽约沟通，讨论对LTCM（长期资本管理公司）的收购出价。

And the caption on that photo, incidentally, is known as the geezer and the geyser. (Laughter)

顺便说一句，那张照片的标题叫“老头和喷泉”。（笑声）

And we were up in — we started in Alaska. And we were going down these canyons in a boat.

我们当时在阿拉斯加，我们乘船穿越峡谷。

And the captain saying, you know, “Let’s go over there and look at the sea lions.” And I say, “Let’s stay right where we are, where we got a satellite channel,” because I was trying to talk on the phone all the time.

船长说，“让我们去那边看看海狮吧。”而我说，“我们还是待在这里吧，这里有卫星信号。”因为我一直在打电话。

Charlie was in Hawaii. And we never did get a chance to talk during that whole period. I didn’t want to bother him with a little thing like a bid for 100 billion-plus of securities, and I couldn’t find him.

查理当时在夏威夷。整个过程中我们都没机会通话。我也不想因为一个1000亿以上证券资产的出价这样的小事打扰他，而且我也联系不上他。

So it was — we were in an awkward place to pursue that. I think it’s possible that if I’d been in New York or Charlie had been in New York during that period, that our bid might have been accepted.

所以——当时我们处在一个不利的地点。如果当时我在纽约或者查理在纽约，我认为我们的出价可能会被接受。

There was just a report published within the last three or four days by a special committee representing the SEC, the Fed, I think, the Treasury and the CFTC — I think I’m right on those four. And it describes just a tiny bit of the events leading to the bid.

就在三四天前，一个特别委员会发布了一份报告，这个委员会代表了SEC、美联储、我认为还有财政部和CFTC——我想这四个是对的。报告中提到了一些关于此次竞标的细节。

It referred, on page 14, I remember, it talked about our transaction unraveling. It didn’t unravel from our side. I mean, we made a firm bid for 100 billion-plus of balance sheet assets and many hundreds of billions, in fact, over a trillion, of derivative contracts.

我记得在第14页提到，我们的交易未能成功。但问题不在我们这边。我是说，我们为1000亿以上的资产负债表资产，以及实际上超过一万亿的衍生品合约，提出了一个坚实的报价。

And, you know, this was in a market where prices were moving around very dramatically. And with that bulk of assets there, we thought we made a fairly good bid for a 45-minute or hour period. I don’t think anybody else would’ve made the bid.

在当时的市场中，价格波动非常剧烈。考虑到这笔庞大的资产，我们认为在那45分钟或1小时内我们给出了一个相当不错的报价。我不认为有其他人会出这样的价。

But in any event, the people at LTCM took the position that they could not accept that bid.

但无论如何，LTCM方面认为他们无法接受这个报价。

And therefore, the New York Fed in — had a group, largely investment banks there at the Fed. And that afternoon, faced with the prospect that LTCM could not or would not accept our bid, they arranged another takeover arrangement where additional money was put in.

因此，纽约联储召集了一些机构，主要是投资银行。当天下午，面对LTCM无法或不愿接受我们出价的前景，他们安排了另一个收购方案，注入了额外的资金。

9. The true first hedge fund

真正的第一个对冲基金

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s interesting. If you read that report, which is put together by these four very imminent bodies, I think on the first page, it says that the first so-called hedge fund — which is a term generally applied to entities like LTCM — first hedge fund was set up in 1949.

沃伦·巴菲特：这很有趣。如果你读那份由这四个非常权威的机构联合编写的报告，我记得在第一页上，它提到所谓的第一个对冲基金——通常用于形容像LTCM这样的机构——是于1949年设立的。

And I probably read that or heard that 50 times in the last — particularly in the last year. And of course, that’s not true at all, and I’ve even pointed this out once or twice before.

在过去的一年里，我可能已经读过或听过这句话50次。当然，这完全不是真的，我甚至以前提到过一两次。

But Ben Graham had — and Jerry Newman — had a classical hedge fund back in the ’20s. And I worked for — I worked dually for a company called Graham-Newman Corp, which was a regulated investment company and Newman and Graham, which was an investment partnership with, I think, a 20 percent participation in profits and exactly the sort of entity that, today, is called a hedge fund.

但本·格雷厄姆和杰里·纽曼早在20世纪20年代就有一个经典的对冲基金。而且我曾同时为一家叫做Graham-Newman Corp的公司工作过，这是一家受监管的投资公司，同时还有纽曼和格雷厄姆组成的投资合伙企业，我记得它有20%的利润分成，这与今天所谓的对冲基金完全一样。

So, if you read anyplace that the hedge fund concept originated in 1949, presumably with A.W. Jones, it’s a — it’s not an accurate history.

所以，如果你在任何地方读到对冲基金的概念起源于1949年，可能是与A.W. Jones相关的，那并不是准确的历史。

There are now — I ran something that would generally be called a hedge fund. I didn’t like to think of it that way. I called it an investment partnership. But it would’ve been termed a hedge fund. Charlie ran one from about, what, 1963 to mid ’70s or thereabouts.

现在回想——我曾经管理过一些通常被称为对冲基金的东西。我不喜欢这样称呼它，我称它为投资合伙企业。但它可能会被叫做对冲基金。查理也管理过一个，大约从1963年到70年代中期左右。

And they have proliferated in a big way. Did he blink? (Laughter)

如今，它们已经大量涌现。他刚刚眨眼了吗？（笑声）

There are now hundreds of them. And of course, it’s very enticing to any money manager to run, because if you do well, or even if you don’t do so well but the market does well, you can make a lot of money running one.

现在有数百个对冲基金。对于任何资金管理者来说，这都非常吸引人，因为如果你表现好，甚至即使你表现不太好但市场表现好，你也能通过管理对冲基金赚很多钱。

This report that just came out has really nothing particularly harsh to say about the operation.

刚刚发布的这份报告并没有对这种操作提出特别严厉的批评。

So, I think you will see hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hedge funds. I think the current issue of Barron’s may have a recap of how a large group did in the first quarter.

因此，我认为你将会看到越来越多的对冲基金。我想最新一期的《巴伦周刊》可能会总结一个大型群体在第一季度的表现。

And there’s a lot of money in those funds. And there’s a huge incentive to form them. And there’s a huge incentive to go out and attract more money if you run one. And when that condition exists in Wall Street, you can be sure that they won’t wither away.

这些基金里有很多钱。成立这些基金有很大的动力。如果你管理一个基金，也有巨大的动力去吸引更多资金。当这种情况存在于华尔街时，你可以肯定它们不会消失。

Charlie?

查理？

10. LTCM: Smart people’s dumb risks with derivatives

长期资本管理公司（LTCM）：聪明人用衍生品犯下的愚蠢风险

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what was interesting about that one is how talented the people were. And yet, they got in so much trouble. I think it also demonstrates that — I’d say, the general system of finance in America involving derivatives is irresponsible.

查理·芒格：是的，这件事有趣的地方在于这些人有多么有才华。然而，他们却陷入了如此大的麻烦。我认为这也表明——美国涉及衍生品的整个金融体系是不负责任的。

There’s way too much risk in all these trillions of notational value sloshing around the world. There’s no clearing system, as there is in a commodities market. And I don’t think it’s the last convulsion we’re going to see in the derivatives game.

世界上流动的这些数万亿美元的名义价值里风险太大了。没有像商品市场那样的清算系统。我不认为这是我们在衍生品市场中会看到的最后一次大动荡。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s fascinating, in that you had 16 extremely bright — I mean, extremely bright — people at the top of that. The average IQ would probably be as high or higher than organization you could find, among their top 16 people.

沃伦·巴菲特：令人着迷的是，这个公司有16位极其聪明的人——我真的说的是极其聪明——在领导层。他们的平均智商可能比你能找到的任何组织的领导层还高。

They individually had decades of experience and collectively had centuries of experience in operating in these sort of securities in which the LTCM was invested. And they had a huge amount of money of their own, up. And probably a very high percentage of their net worth in almost every case, up.

这些人每个人都拥有数十年的经验，合起来在操作LTCM投资的这种证券方面有着几百年的经验。而且他们投入了大量自己的资金，几乎每个人都将很高比例的净资产押了上去。

So here you had superbright, extremely experienced people operating with their own money. And, in effect, on that day in September, they were broke. And to me, that is absolutely fascinating.

所以，你看到的是极其聪明、非常有经验的人，用自己的钱进行操作。然而，实际上，在那个九月的日子里，他们破产了。这对我来说，简直太有意思了。

There was book written, “You Only Have to Get Rich Once.” It’s a great title. It’s not a very good book. Walter Gutman wrote it, but it — many years ago. But the title is right, you only have to get rich once.

有一本书叫《你只需要变富一次》。书名很好，但内容并不是很好。沃尔特·古特曼多年前写的。但书名是对的，你只需要变富一次。

And why do people, very bright people, risk losing something that’s very important to them, to gain something that’s totally unimportant? The added money has no utility whatsoever.

那么，为什么人们——这些非常聪明的人——会冒失去对他们非常重要的东西的风险，去获取完全无关紧要的东西呢？额外的钱完全没有任何实用价值。

And the money that was lost had enormous utility. And on top of that, reputation is tarnished and all of that sort of thing.

而失去的钱却有着巨大的实用价值。不仅如此，声誉也被损害，还有一系列的其他问题。

So that the gain/loss ratio, in any real sense, is just incredible. I mean, it’s like playing Russian roulette.

因此，从任何实际意义上讲，这种得失比率简直令人难以置信。我是说，这就像在玩俄罗斯轮盘赌。

I mean, if you hand me a revolver with six bullets — or six chambers — and one bullet and you say, “Pull it once for a million dollars,” and I say, “No.” And then you say, “What is your price?” The answer is there is no price.

比如，你递给我一个左轮手枪，有六个弹膛，其中一个装有子弹，你对我说，“扣一次扳机就给你一百万美元。”我会说，“不。”然后你问，“你的要价是多少？”答案是没有价格。

And there shouldn’t be any price on taking the risk when you’re already rich, particularly, of failure and embarrassment and all of that sort of thing. But people repeatedly do it. And they do it —

而当你已经很富有时，冒这种风险是没有任何价码的，尤其是失败和尴尬等事情。但人们却一再这样做。他们还会继续这样做——

Whenever a bright person, a really bright person, goes broke that has a lot of money, it’s because of leverage. It — you simply — you basically can’t — it would be almost impossible to go broke without borrowed money being in the equation.

每当一个聪明人，一个非常聪明的人，破产了，并且拥有很多钱时，这都是因为杠杆。你根本——基本上不可能——如果没有借来的钱参与其中，你几乎不可能破产。

And as you know, at Berkshire, we’ve never used any real amount of borrowed money. Now, if we’d used somewhat more, you know, we’d be really rich. But if we’d used a whole lot more, we might have gotten in trouble some times. And there’s just no upside to it, you know?

正如你所知道的，在伯克希尔，我们从未真正大量使用借款。现在，如果我们稍微多用一点借款，你知道，我们会非常富有。但如果用得太多，有时候我们可能会陷入麻烦。这根本没有好处，对吧？

What’s two percentage points more, you know, on a given year, that year? And run the risk of real failure. But very bright people do it, and they do it consistently, and they will continue to do it.

每年多赚两个百分点，你知道，又能怎么样呢？却要冒真正失败的风险。但许多聪明人确实这样做了，而且一直在这样做，并且还会继续这样做。

And as long as explosive-type instruments are out there, they will gravitate toward them. And particularly, people will gravitate toward them who have very little to lose, but who are operating with other people’s money.

只要这些高风险的爆炸性工具存在，人们就会趋之若鹜。尤其是那些没有什么可失去，却使用他人资金操作的人。

One of the things, for example, in the LTCM case — and Charlie mentioned it in terms of derivatives — in effect, there were ways found to get around the — and they were legal, obviously — to get around the margin requirements.

例如，在LTCM案例中——查理提到的关于衍生品的问题——实际上，他们找到了一些方法来规避保证金要求——显然是合法的。

Because risk arbitrage is a business that Charlie and I have been in for 40 years in one form or another. And normally, that means putting up the money to buy the stock on the long side and then shorting something against it where you expect a merger or something to happen.

因为风险套利是一种查理和我以某种形式从事了40年的业务。通常，这意味着投入资金购买一方的股票，同时做空另一方，期待并购或类似事件的发生。

But through derivatives, people have found out how to do that, essentially putting up no money, just by writing a derivative contract on both sides.

但通过衍生品，人们发现了如何做到这一点，基本上不用投入任何资金，只需在两边写一个衍生品合同。

And there are margin requirements, as you know, that the Fed promulgates that, I believe, still call for 50 percent equity on stock purchases.

正如你所知道的，美联储有保证金要求，我认为目前仍然要求股票购买需有50%的保证金。

But those requirements do not apply if you arrange the transaction in derivative form. So that these billions of dollars of positions in equities, essentially, were being financed a hundred percent by the people who wrote the derivative contracts. And that leads to trouble.

但如果你以衍生品的形式安排交易，这些要求就不适用了。因此，这些数十亿美元的股票头寸，实际上是由写衍生品合同的人100%融资的。这就引发了问题。

You know, 99 percent of the time it works. But, you know, 83 and a thirds percent of the time, it works to play Russian roulette with one bullet in there and six chambers. But neither 83 1/3 percent or 99 percent is good enough when there is no gain to offset the risk of loss.

你知道，99%的时候这方法有效。但83又1/3%的时间，玩六膛一弹的俄罗斯轮盘赌也管用。但当没有收益能抵消损失风险时，83又1/3%或99%的胜率都不足以令人满意。

地震也是这样，遇到一次大的地震损失是非常巨大的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would argue that there is a second factor that makes the situation dangerous. And that is that the accounting for being actively engaged in derivatives, interest rate swaps, et cetera is very weak. I think the Morgan Bank was the last holdout.

查理·芒格：我认为还有第二个因素使得这种情况更危险。那就是积极参与衍生品、利率掉期等交易的会计准则非常薄弱。我认为摩根银行是最后一个坚持较高标准的机构。

And they finally flipped to a lenient standard of accounting that’s favored by people who are sharing in the profits from trading derivatives. And that’s why they like liberal accounting.

但他们最终也转向了宽松的会计标准，这种标准受到那些从衍生品交易中分红的人欢迎。这就是他们喜欢宽松会计的原因。

So, you get an irresponsible clearing system, irresponsible accounting — this is not a good combination.

因此，你会得到一个不负责任的清算系统和不负责任的会计体系——这绝不是一个好的组合。

WARREN BUFFETT: JP Morgan shifted their accounting — I think — I’m not sure exactly when — around 1990. But Charlie and I, we probably became more familiar with that when we were back at Salomon.

沃伦·巴菲特：摩根大通在1990年前后改变了他们的会计标准——我想——但具体时间不确定。查理和我可能是在所罗门时期对这些情况更加熟悉的。

And this is absolutely standard. You know, it’s GAAP accounting. But it front-ends profits. And if you front-end profits and you pay people a percentage of the profits, you’re going to get some very interesting results, sometimes.

而这完全是标准的GAAP会计准则。它提前确认了利润。如果你提前确认利润并以利润的百分比支付奖金，有时候你会得到一些非常有趣的结果。

11. “Right approach” to estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value

“正确的方法”估算伯克希尔的内在价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

沃伦·巴菲特： 4号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Dan Kurs (PH) from Bonita Springs, Florida.

提问者：你好，我是丹·库尔斯（发音），来自佛罗里达州博尼塔斯普林斯。

You’ve given many clues to investors to help them calculate Berkshire’s intrinsic value.

您为投资者提供了许多线索，以帮助他们计算伯克希尔的内在价值。

I’ve attempted to calculate the intrinsic value of Berkshire using the discount of present value of its total look-through earnings. I’ve taken Berkshire’s total look-through earnings and adjusted them for normalized earnings at GEICO, the super-cat business, and General Re.

我尝试使用伯克希尔总透视收益的现值折现来计算其内在价值。我取了伯克希尔的总透视收益，并对GEICO、超级巨灾业务和通用再保险的正常化收益进行了调整。

Then I’ve assumed that Berkshire’s total look-through earnings will grow at 15 percent per annum on average for 10 years, 10 percent per annum for years 11 through 20. And that earnings stop growing after year 20, resulting in a coupon equaling year 20 earnings from the 21st year onward.

然后我假设伯克希尔的总透视收益在前10年平均每年增长15%，在第11到第20年平均每年增长10%。在第20年之后收益停止增长，从第21年起，每年的收益与第20年的收益持平。

Lastly, I’ve discounted those estimated earnings stream at 10 percent to get an estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value.

最后，我将这些预估收益流以10%的折现率折现，得出伯克希尔的内在价值估算。

My question is, is this a sound method? Is there a risk-free interest rate, such as a 30-year Treasury, which might be the more appropriate rate to use here, given the predictable nature of your consolidated income stream? Thank you.

我的问题是，这种方法是否合理？考虑到您合并收入流的可预测性，是否有更适合使用的无风险利率，比如30年期国债的利率？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that is a very good question. Because that is the sort of way we think in terms of looking at other businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个非常好的问题。因为这是我们在评估其他企业时所采用的一种思考方式。

Investment is the process of putting out money today to get more money back at some point in the future. And the question is, how far in the future, how much money, and what is the appropriate discount rate to take it back to the present day and determine how much you pay?

投资就是将今天的钱投出去，以便在未来的某个时间得到更多的钱。而问题是，未来有多远？可以得到多少钱？以及用什么样的折现率将这些未来收益折算成今天的价值，从而决定支付多少？

And I would say you’ve stated the approach — I couldn’t state it better myself. The exact figures you want to use, whether you want to use 15 percent gains in earnings or 10 percent gains in the second decade, I would — you know, I have no comment on those particular numbers.

我会说，你已经说明了方法——我自己都说不出比这更好的说法。至于具体的数字，比如前10年使用15%的收益增长率、后10年使用10%的收益增长率，我对此没有具体的意见。

But you have the right approach. We would probably, in terms — we would probably use a lower discount factor in evaluating any business now, under present-day interest rates.

但你采用的是正确的方法。在目前的利率环境下，我们在评估任何业务时可能会使用一个较低的折现率。

Now, that doesn’t mean we would pay that figure once we use that discount number. But we would use that to establish comparability across investment alternatives.

当然，这并不意味着我们会直接支付按照这个折现率计算出的数值。但我们会用它来建立不同投资选择之间的可比性。

So, if we were looking at 50 companies and making the sort of calculation that you just talked about, we would use a — we would probably use the long-term government rate to discount it back.

所以，如果我们评估50家公司，并进行类似你刚才提到的计算，我们可能会用长期国债的利率来折现这些收益流。

But we wouldn’t pay that number after we discounted it back. We would look for appropriate discounts from that figure.

但在折现出这个数值之后，我们不会直接支付这个数值，而是会寻找适当的折扣。

But it doesn’t really make any difference whether you use a higher figure and then look across them or use our figure and look for the biggest discount.

不过，不管你是用较高的利率进行评估然后比较，还是用我们的方法寻找最大折扣，最终的结果其实差别不大。

You’ve got the right approach. And then all you have to do is stick in the right numbers.

你已经掌握了正确的方法，接下来你只需要填入正确的数字。

And you mentioned, in terms of our clues, we try to give you all of information that we would find useful, ourselves, in evaluating Berkshire’s intrinsic value.

你提到线索的问题，我们尽力为你提供所有我们认为在评估伯克希尔内在价值时有用的信息。

In our reports, you know, I can’t think of anything we leave out that, if Charlie and I had been away for a year and we were trying to figure out — look at the situation fresh, evaluate things — there’s, you know, there’s nothing, in my view, left out of our published materials.

在我们的报告中，我想不出有遗漏的内容。如果查理和我离开了一年，再重新审视形势并进行评估，我认为我们的公开资料中没有遗漏任何重要信息。

Now, one important element in Berkshire, which is a secondary factor that gets into what you’re talking about there, is that because we retain all earnings and because we have a growth of float over time, we have a considerable amount of money to invest.

伯克希尔有一个重要的因素，与你提到的问题相关，那就是我们保留了所有的收益，并且浮存金随着时间增长，使我们有相当可观的资金可以投资。

And it really is the success with which we invest those retained earnings and growth and float that will have an important fact — that will be an important factor — in how fast our intrinsic value grows.

我们用这些留存收益和浮存金的增长进行投资的成功与否，确实是决定我们内在价值增长速度的一个重要因素。

And to an important extent, the — what happens there is out of our control. I mean, it does depend on the markets in which we operate.

而在很大程度上，这取决于我们运营的市场，是我们无法控制的。

So, if our earnings, plus float, growth equals $3 billion, or something like that, in a current year — whether that $3 billion gets put to terrific use, satisfactory use, or no use at all, virtually, really depends, to a big extent, on external factors.

比如，如果当年我们的收益加上浮存金的增长是30亿美元，这30亿美元能否得到绝佳利用、较好利用，还是几乎没有利用，很大程度上取决于外部因素。

It also depends, to some extent, on our energy and insights and so on. But the external world makes a big difference in the reinvestment rate. And, you know, your guess is as good as ours on that.

当然，这也在某种程度上取决于我们的精力和洞察力等。但外部世界对再投资率有很大影响。在这方面，你的猜测可能和我们的差不多。

But if we run into favorable external circumstances, your calculation of intrinsic value should — would — result in a higher number than if we run into the kind of circumstances that we’ve had the last 12 months.

如果我们遇到有利的外部环境，你对内在价值的计算结果应该会比过去12个月那样的环境得出的数值更高。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. For many decades around here, we’ve had roughly a hundred percent — more than a hundred percent — of book net worth in marketable securities and had a lot of wonderful wholly-owned subsidiaries, to boot.

查理·芒格：是的，过去几十年来，我们一直将大约100%——甚至超过100%的账面净值投资于可交易证券，同时还有很多出色的全资子公司。

And then we’ve always had a very attractive place to put new money in as we generate it.

我们总是能找到很有吸引力的地方来投资新产生的资金。

Well, we still got the wonderful businesses. But we’re having trouble with the new money.

现在，我们依然拥有优秀的业务，但我们在新资金的投资上遇到了一些困难。

But it’s not trouble, really, to have a pile of lovely money. (Laughter) This is not — I don’t think there should be tears in the house. (Laughter)

不过，手里有一堆可爱的资金并不算是麻烦。（笑声）这并不——我不认为这值得有人感到遗憾。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Have you ever run into any unlovely money, Charlie? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你有没有遇到过不可爱的资金？（笑声）

12. Internet will have a huge impact, but hard to predict winners

互联网将产生巨大影响，但难以预测赢家

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.

沃伦·巴菲特： 5号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Ronald Towell (PH). I’m from Brooklyn, New York, and very appreciative of your graciousness as a host for this wonderful weekend.

提问者：早上好，我叫罗纳德·陶威尔（发音），来自纽约布鲁克林，非常感谢您作为此次精彩活动的慷慨主人。

My question has to do with the — (Applause)

我的问题与——（掌声）

My question has to do with the retailing industry, particularly the department stores and mass merchants. My question has two parts.

我的问题与零售行业有关，尤其是百货商店和大型零售商。我的问题分为两部分。

Without resorting to comments about specific companies, may I ask your opinion as to the long-term prospects for growth and profitability of this industry group?

在不评论具体公司的情况下，能否请您谈谈您对这一行业群体长期增长和盈利前景的看法？

The second part of my question is, given the fact that it is difficult to pick up a newspaper or to be an investor without being bombarded by what is purported to be the potential for exponential growth in the internet e-business, particularly directly to consumers, which could possibly eat into the revenues of these retailers —

第二部分问题是，考虑到目前很难翻开一份报纸或作为一名投资者而不被所谓互联网电子商务的指数级增长潜力所冲击，特别是直接面向消费者的业务，这可能会侵蚀这些零售商的收入——

And even if we assume a relatively low impact of, say, 5 to 10 percent revenue reductions, and given the fact that top-line growth is critical to any business, especially the bricks and mortar retailers, with their high proportions of fixed overhead, what advice could you give to a CEO of such a company?

即使我们假设相对较低的影响，比如5%到10%的收入减少，考虑到收入增长对任何企业的重要性，尤其是实体零售商，它们的固定成本比例较高，您会给这样的公司CEO什么建议？

And in turn, based on the preceding scenario, what would be your opinion of the medium and long-term prospects for this industry?

反过来，根据上述情况，您对这一行业的中长期前景有何看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个非常好的问题。

And obviously, the internet is going to have an important impact on retailing. It will have a huge impact on some forms of retailing. Change them and maybe revolutionize them.

显然，互联网将对零售业产生重要影响。它将对某些形式的零售产生巨大影响，改变甚至可能彻底颠覆它们。

I think there’s some other areas where it’ll — the impact will be less. But anytime we buy into a business, and anytime that we’ve bought in for some time, we have tried to think of what that business is going to look like in five, or 10, or 15 years.

我认为在其他一些领域，影响会相对较小。但每当我们投资一项业务时，无论是过去还是现在，我们都会试图思考该业务在五年、十年或十五年后的样子。

And we recognize that the internet, in many forms of retailing, is likely to pose such a threat that we simply wouldn’t want to get into the business. I mean, it — not that we can measure it perfectly.

我们认识到，互联网可能会对许多形式的零售构成威胁，以至于我们根本不想进入这些领域。我并不是说我们能完全准确地衡量这种威胁。

But there are a number of retailing operations that we think are threatened. And we do not think that’s the case in furniture retailing. And we have three very important operations there.

但我们认为，有许多零售业务正面临威胁。而在家具零售方面，我们不认为情况会如此。在这个领域，我们有三家非常重要的企业。

We could be wrong. But so far, that, you know, that would be my judgment, that furniture retailing will not be hurt.

我们可能会错。但到目前为止，我的判断是，家具零售不会受到影响。

You’ve seen other forms of retailing where you’re already starting to see some inroads being made. But it’s just started. The internet is going to be a huge force in many arenas. But it’ll certainly be a huge force in retailing.

你可以看到其他一些形式的零售，已经开始受到一定的冲击。但这才刚刚开始。互联网将在许多领域成为一股巨大的力量，尤其会在零售业成为一股重要的力量。

Now, it may benefit us in certain areas. I would expect the internet to benefit Borsheims in a very big way. And you noticed in the movie that we talked about borsheims.com coming online in May. There’s something up there now. But you’ll see a new format within a month or so.

当然，在某些领域，互联网可能对我们有利。我预计互联网将极大地促进Borsheims的发展。你在电影中注意到，我们提到borsheims.com将于五月上线。目前已经有一些内容上线了，但你会在一个月左右看到一个全新的形式。

Now, you might say in jewelry retailing, you know, with millions of things that you can click onto, 10 years from now, you know, who is going to be important in terms of online retailing of jewelry? I would argue that two firms have an enormous advantage going in.

现在你可能会说，在珠宝零售领域，有成千上万的选项可以点击。10年后，谁会在珠宝在线零售中占据重要地位？我认为有两家公司拥有巨大的先发优势。

I would argue that Tiffany has such an advantage. We don’t own any Tiffany. But I would say that because of their name — brand names are going to mean very, very much when you have literally, you know, thousands and thousands of choices.

我认为蒂芙尼有这样的优势。我们没有持有蒂芙尼的股份。但我认为，由于它的品牌名称——当有成千上万种选择时，品牌名称将变得非常非常重要。

People can’t — they have to trust somebody. And I think that Tiffany has a name that people would trust.

人们无法——他们必须信任某人。我认为蒂芙尼的名字能够赢得人们的信任。

And I think Borsheims has a name that people would trust. And Borsheims sells jewelry a whole lot cheaper than Tiffany’s.

我也认为Borsheims的名字能够赢得人们的信任。而且Borsheims的珠宝价格比蒂芙尼便宜得多。

So I would say that people who are price conscious, but also want to deal with a jeweler that they trust implicitly, will find their way to Borsheims in increasing numbers, over the internet.

所以，我会说，那些对价格敏感，但也希望与一家值得完全信赖的珠宝商打交道的人，会通过互联网越来越多地选择Borsheims。

And I would say that people that like the blue box, you know, are going to find their way to Tiffany’s, over time. And they’ll pay more money.

而那些喜欢蓝色礼盒的人，你知道，他们会逐渐找到蒂芙尼，并愿意支付更多的钱。

But I don’t see them going for Brand X and buying fine jewelry over the internet.

但我不认为他们会选择某个无名品牌X，通过互联网购买高级珠宝。

So, I think that, with the brand that Borsheims has, and with careful nurturing of that brand, I would say that the internet offers Borsheims a chance to have the advantage in cost that comes from a huge one store location. And yet, also go into the homes of people in every part of the world. And that kind of a company should prosper.

因此，我认为，凭借Borsheims的品牌，并通过对该品牌的精心培育，我认为互联网为Borsheims提供了一个机会，既能利用单一大型店铺带来的成本优势，又能进入世界各地消费者的家中。这种公司应该会取得繁荣发展。

There are other of our companies, I worry about. You know, I can worry about them being hurt in various ways.

我对我们的一些其他公司感到担忧。你知道，我担心它们会以各种方式受到冲击。

GEICO is going to be a big beneficiary of the internet. We already are developing substantial business through it.

GEICO将是互联网的一大受益者。我们已经通过互联网发展了相当可观的业务。

But I — if I were to buy into any retailing business, whether I was buying a stock of it or buying a whole business, I would think very hard about what people are going to be trying to do to that business through the internet.

但是，如果我要投资任何零售业务，无论是购买其股票还是收购整个企业，我都会认真考虑互联网会如何对该业务产生影响。

And you know, it affects real estate that is dedicated to retailing. If you substitute 5 percent of the retail volume via the internet, where real estate is essentially free, you know, you can have a store in every town in the world through the internet without having any rental expense.

而且，这还会影响专用于零售的房地产。如果通过互联网替代了5%的零售量，且互联网上的“房地产”基本是免费的，你知道，你可以通过互联网在世界每个城镇开店，而无需任何租金成本。

So, I would be — I would give a lot of thought to that if I were owning a lot of retail rental space.

所以，如果我拥有大量零售出租空间，我会对此进行深入思考。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it is tricky predicting the technological change. Either it will or won’t destroy some business.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为预测技术变革的影响是很棘手的。它可能会，也可能不会摧毁一些业务。

When I was young, the department stores had a bunch of, sort of, monopolistic advantages. A, they were downtown where the streetcar lines met. B, they had sort of a monopoly on extending revolving credit. And D, they had one-stop shopping in all kinds of weather. And nobody else did. And they lost all three of those advantages.

在我年轻时，百货商店拥有一些垄断性的优势。首先，它们位于市中心，街车线路的交汇处。其次，它们几乎垄断了循环信用的扩展服务。最后，它们提供了在各种天气条件下的一站式购物体验。而其他人都做不到这些。但后来它们失去了这三种优势。

And yet, they’ve done well, a lot of them, for many decades since. At other times, you get a change and you just get destroyed.

然而，很多百货商店在之后的几十年里仍然表现良好。而有些情况下，一旦发生变革，你就会被彻底摧毁。

Our trading stamp business was destroyed by changes in the economic world. And our World Book business has been seriously hurt by the personal computer, and the CD-ROM, and so forth.

我们的交易印花业务因经济世界的变化而被摧毁。而我们的《世界图书》业务则因个人电脑、CD-ROM等的出现受到严重打击。

WARREN BUFFETT: I —

沃伦·巴菲特：我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We agree, it’s a big risk. But it’s not easy to make predictions in which you have great confidence.

查理·芒格：我们同意，这是一项巨大的风险。但要做出非常有信心的预测并不容易。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if you go down to 16th and Farnam, where the streetcar tracks used to cross, that was the best real estate in town. And people signed 100-year, 50-year leases on it. And it looked like there was nothing more safe, because they weren’t going to move the streetcar lines.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果你到16街和法纳姆街，那里曾是街车轨道的交汇处，那是镇上最好的地段。人们在那里签订了100年、50年的租约。这看起来再安全不过了，因为街车线路是不会搬走的。

The only thing was that they moved the streetcars. They just took and converted them into junk. And it seemed very permanent.

但唯一的问题是，他们后来移走了街车，把它们变成了废物。这本来看起来是非常永久的事物。

The advantage of the big department store, the Marshall Field in Chicago or the Macy’s in New York, was this incredible breadth of merchandise. You could go and you could find 300 different types of spools of thread, or 500 — you could see 500 different wedding dresses, or whatever.

大百货商店的优势，比如芝加哥的马歇尔百货或纽约的梅西百货，是其令人难以置信的商品种类。你可以找到300种不同类型的线轴，或者500种——比如500种不同的婚纱，或者其他东西。

And you had these million square-foot, and even two million square-foot, downtown stores. And they were these huge emporiums.

这些店铺的面积达到数百万平方英尺，甚至有两百万平方英尺的市中心大商场，它们是庞大的商品集散地。

And then the shopping center came along. And of course, the shopping center created, in effect, a store of many stores. And so, you had millions of square feet now, but you still had this incredible variety being offered.

然后，购物中心出现了。购物中心实际上创造了一种“多商店的商店”。于是你现在有了数百万平方英尺的面积，但依然提供了丰富的商品种类。

The internet becomes a store in your, you know, computer, and it has an incredible variety of offerings, too.

而互联网成为了你电脑中的一个商店，它同样提供了令人难以置信的商品种类。

Some of them don’t lend themselves very well, it seems to me, to the retailing. And, you know, and others do.

在我看来，有些品类不太适合在线零售，而另一些则适合。

But Charlie’s right. It’s hard to predict exactly how it will turn out.

但查理是对的，很难准确预测事情会如何发展。

I would expect, you know, automobile retailing to change in some important ways. And in part — in very significant part, influenced by the internet.

我预计，汽车零售会在某些重要方面发生变化，其中很大程度上会受到互联网的影响。

But, I wouldn’t — you know, I can’t predict exactly how that’ll happen. But I don’t think it’ll look the same 10 or 15 years from now.

但我不会——你知道，我无法准确预测这将如何发生。但我不认为10到15年后汽车零售还会是现在这个样子。

13. Buffett praises analyst Alice Schroeder

巴菲特称赞分析师艾丽斯·施罗德

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

沃伦·巴菲特： 6号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ben Knoll, and I’m from Minneapolis. Although I’d like to enhance my status by noting that I was born and raised in Lincoln. (Laughter)

提问者：我是本·诺尔，来自明尼阿波利斯。不过，我想提高一下我的身份，提一下我是出生并成长于林肯的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You just moved up. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你的位置刚刚提高了。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Like, many others, I read Alice Schroeder’s analysis of Berkshire Hathaway with great interest this last year. And she described her analysis as a toolkit for investors.

提问者：和许多人一样，我去年非常感兴趣地阅读了艾丽斯·施罗德关于伯克希尔·哈撒韦的分析。她将自己的分析描述为一个投资者工具包。

And I’m wondering if you see any substantial flaws in any of her toolkit. And in particular, the float-based valuation model that she put together. What are your views on that?

我想知道您是否认为她的工具包中存在任何重大缺陷？尤其是她提出的基于浮存金的估值模型。您对此有何看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t want to comment on valuation.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不想对估值发表评论。

But I can tell you that Alice is a first-class and serious analyst who spent a lot of time on Berkshire, and probably produced the first comprehensive report, at least that’s been widely circulated, in the history of Berkshire.

但我可以告诉你，艾丽斯是一位一流且认真的分析师，她在伯克希尔上花费了大量时间，并且可能撰写了伯克希尔历史上首份广泛流传的综合报告。

一位年轻的金发妹子，也是《滚雪球》的作者，主要是长得不错。

It’s kind of interesting that we got to a hundred billion dollars of market value before anybody really published a report about the company, but —

有趣的是，我们的市值达到了一千亿美元，才有人真正发表了一份关于公司的报告，但——

Alice understands the insurance business very well. She’s an accountant, by background. So, she understands numbers. And she did a lot of work on the report. And I do recommend it to you as a toolkit. I make no comment at all about valuation.

艾丽斯非常了解保险业务。她的背景是会计师，所以她对数字很精通。她在报告上做了大量工作。我确实推荐这份报告作为一个工具包，但我完全不对估值发表任何评论。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没什么要补充的。

14. Different compensation plans with the same goal

不同的薪酬计划但目标一致

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特： 7号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Martin Wiegand from Chevy Chase, Maryland. I want to thank you for the hospitality this weekend and the wisdom you share with us each year in your annual reports.

提问者：你好，我是马丁·维甘德，来自马里兰州的切维·蔡斯。感谢您在这个周末的热情款待以及每年在年报中与我们分享的智慧。

As a small businessman, one of trickiest jobs I have is dividing up the profits of our business between the employees who generate them.

作为一名小企业主，我最棘手的工作之一是如何将我们业务的利润分配给那些创造了这些利润的员工。

Would you comment and share your thoughts on how you divide up the profits of the Berkshire Hathaway subsidiaries with the employees who generate them.

您能否评论一下并分享您对伯克希尔·哈撒韦子公司如何将利润分配给创造这些利润的员工的看法？

And the follow-up is, Mr. Munger, do you have any suggested reading on that subject?

后续问题是，芒格先生，您对此主题是否有推荐的阅读材料？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re glad to have you here, Martin. I went to high school and to the first couple years of college with Martin’s father, who’s also here today. And so, if you get a chance to meet Marty, Janie, and younger Martin, say hello to them.

沃伦·巴菲特：马丁，很高兴你能来。我和马丁的父亲一起上过高中以及大学的头两年，他今天也在这里。所以，如果你有机会见到马蒂、詹妮和年轻的马丁，请向他们问好。

In terms of the arrangements we have with compensation, they vary to an extraordinary degree among the various subsidiaries we have.

关于我们的薪酬安排，在我们不同的子公司之间有着极大的差异。

Because we have bought existing businesses. And we have tampered as little as possible with their cultures after we buy them. And some of those cultures are very different than others.

因为我们收购的是现有的企业。在收购后，我们尽量不改变它们的文化。而这些文化中的一些与其他的有很大不同。

I mean, you know, you saw [Nebraska Furniture Mart’s] Mrs. B earlier. You know, as you can imagine, she would leave a very strong imprint on any business with which she was involved.

我指的是，比如你们早些时候看到的[内布拉斯加家具商城]的B女士。你可以想象，她会对她参与的任何业务留下非常深刻的影响。

And we have a number of very talented managers who have worked out the systems that they believe to be best for their companies.

我们有许多非常有才华的经理，他们制定了他们认为对公司最好的系统。

Now, it is true that if we — if there’s a stock option plan at a company, we will substitute a plan that is performance-based, which ties much more clearly to the performance of the business than any option plan could.

确实，如果某家公司有股票期权计划，我们会用一个基于绩效的计划替代它，这个计划与业务表现的联系比任何期权计划都更加明确。

And we will have a — we will design one that has an expectable cost that’s equal to the expectable cost of the option plan. So, we try to equate the cost.

我们会设计一个预期成本与期权计划预期成本相等的计划。所以我们试图让成本平衡。

And we try to make it even more — much more sensible from both the owner’s standpoint and the employees’ standpoint, in terms of the way it pays off based on how that business performs.

我们试图让这个计划更合理，从所有者和员工的角度来看，这个计划根据业务表现进行支付的方式更加合适。

You probably read in our annual report how we put an across the board plan at GEICO that ties with our objectives. But basically, that was [CEO] Tony Nicely’s work in terms of developing that plan.

你可能在我们的年报中看到，我们如何在GEICO推出一个与我们的目标挂钩的全员计划。但基本上，这是[首席执行官]托尼·奈斯利开发的计划。

I mean, he and I thought alike about what counted. And he developed a compensation grid that applied to everybody in the whole place, based on achieving the objectives that he felt were important and that we felt were important.

我的意思是，他和我的想法一致，都认为什么是重要的。他开发了一个薪酬网格，适用于整个公司的所有人，这基于他认为重要的目标以及我们认为重要的目标。

You will find — if you go to any Berkshire subsidiary — you will probably find that they have a compensation plan that’s quite similar, with exception of options, to the plan that they had before we bought the operation. They have successful businesses.

你会发现——如果你到伯克希尔的任何子公司——你可能会发现他们的薪酬计划除了期权以外，与我们收购前的计划非常相似。他们有成功的业务。

And people get there different ways. Some people bat left-handed. Some people bat right-handed. You know, some people stand deep in the batter’s box. Some crowd the plate. They all have different styles.

每个人达到目标的方式不同。有些人用左手击球，有些人用右手击球。你知道，有些人站在打击区的后方，有些人靠近本垒板。他们都有不同的风格。

And the styles of our managers have proven successful in their own businesses. We keep the same managers. So, we don’t try to superimpose any system from above, with the exception of what I’ve mentioned.

我们的经理们的风格已经在他们自己的业务中证明了成功。我们保留了相同的经理。因此，除了我提到的以外，我们不会尝试从上而下地强加任何系统。

We do like the idea of paying for performance. I mean, that is kind of a fundamental tenet. Everybody says they like that. But then they design systems that payoff no matter what happens, in many cases. And we’ve been reluctant to do that.

我们确实喜欢基于绩效支付的理念。我是说，这是一种基本原则。每个人都说他们喜欢这个原则。但在许多情况下，他们设计了无论发生什么都能支付的系统。而我们一直不愿意这样做。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think it’s important for the shareholders to realize that we are probably more decentralized, in terms of personnel practices, than any company of our size, or bigger, in America. We don’t have a headquarters culture that’s forced on the operating businesses.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为股东们应该意识到，在人事管理方面，我们可能比美国任何同等规模或更大的公司都更加分散。我们没有将总部文化强加给各运营业务的做法。

The operating businesses have their own cultures. And I think in every case I can think of, it’s a wonderful culture. And we just leave them alone. It’s — comes naturally to me. (Laughter)

各运营业务都有自己的文化。而且在我能想到的每种情况下，这些文化都很出色。我们只是放手让他们自己发展。这对我来说很自然。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie says we don’t have a headquarters culture. Sometimes people think we don’t have a headquarters. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理说我们没有总部文化。有时候人们甚至以为我们没有总部。（笑声）

We have no human relations department at Berkshire. We have no legal department. We have no investor relations. We have no public relations. We don’t have any of that sort of thing.

伯克希尔没有人事部门，没有法律部门，没有投资者关系部门，也没有公共关系部门。我们没有任何这类的东西。

We’ve got a bunch of all-stars, as we’ve put on the screen, out there running businesses. We ask them to mail the money to Omaha, but — (Laughter)

我们有一群全明星级别的人才在经营业务。我们只是要求他们把钱寄到奥马哈——（笑声）

We’ll even give them a stamp if they request it. (Laughter)

如果他们要求，我们甚至会给他们提供邮票。（笑声）

But beyond that, we don’t really go. It would be foolish.

除此之外，我们不会过多干预。那样做是愚蠢的。

And what is interesting to me is how — I had a lot of preconceived ideas of what motivates people when I started out in business — but you can find certain organizations that resist paying stars on an individual basis. They like to think of themselves as a team and they’d rather have a team concept of payment.

令我感兴趣的是，我在创业时对人们的动机有很多先入为主的看法——但你会发现有些组织抗拒基于个人成就支付明星员工。他们喜欢把自己视为一个团队，更倾向于采用团队薪酬的理念。

And you can see others where they’re much more individually oriented. Actually, Charlie can probably tell you that in terms of law firms. I mean, some law firms have a culture that is much more star-oriented than others. And, you know, you’ve seen successes in both places, haven’t you, Charlie?

而在其他地方，你会发现他们更倾向于个人导向。实际上，查理可能会告诉你，在律所中有类似的例子。有些律所的文化比其他律所更注重明星个人表现。你知道，你在这两种环境中都见过成功的例子，是不是，查理？

激励方案需要匹配商业模式。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely.

查理·芒格：当然是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t remember a case when anybody has transferred from one operating Berkshire subsidiary to another. It’s very rare.

查理·芒格：我想不起来有任何一个人从伯克希尔的一个运营子公司转移到另一个运营子公司的情况。这种情况非常罕见。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t try and cross-fertilize. We just — we think we’ve got a good thing going in, you know, in every plot of ground and we just assume they’ll do best if left to their own initiative.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不试图进行交叉培养。我们认为，每块地里都有一些好的东西，我们只是认为，如果放手让他们发挥自己的主动性，他们会做得最好。

15. Low-cost float generates money for investing

低成本浮存金为投资提供资金

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特： 8号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Brian Phillips (PH) from Chickamauga, Georgia.

提问者：我是布莱恩·菲利普斯（发音），来自乔治亚州的奇卡莫加。

And my question is, with regards to an insurance company, if you can use the float for cheap financing, why would you issue a fairly-priced bond?

我的问题是，对于一家保险公司，如果你可以使用浮存金作为低成本融资工具，为什么还要发行一个定价合理的债券？

WARREN BUFFETT: Why would we do what?

沃伦·巴菲特：为什么我们要做什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Issue a fairly-priced bond.

提问者：发行一个定价合理的债券。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, the best form of financing for us is cheap float. Now, most insurance companies don’t generate cheap float. So, I mean, there are plenty of companies in the insurance business who have a cost of float that makes it unattractive, actually, to expand their businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，对我们来说，最好的融资形式是低成本的浮存金。然而，大多数保险公司无法产生低成本的浮存金。也就是说，许多保险公司拥有的浮存金成本高得使扩展业务变得不具吸引力。

Our insurance companies have had a terrific experience on cost of float. And we would develop it just as fast as we can.

我们的保险公司在浮存金成本方面表现出色。我们会尽可能快速地发展它。

Right now, we would have no interest in issuing a bond because we have more money around than we know what to do with. And it comes from low-cost float.

目前，我们对发行债券没有任何兴趣，因为我们拥有比我们能用掉的更多的钱。而这些资金来自低成本的浮存金。

But if there came a time when things were very attractive and we had utilized all the money from our float and from retained earnings and all of that to invest, and we still saw opportunities, we might very well borrow moderate amounts of money in the market.

但如果有一天，投资机会非常吸引人，而我们已经用光了浮存金、留存收益及所有其他资金用于投资，我们仍看到机会，我们可能会在市场上借入适量资金。

It would cost us more than our float was costing us. But it still, incrementally, would provide earnings.

这会比我们的浮存金成本更高，但它仍能增量地提供收益。

Now, we would try to gain more float under those circumstances as well. But we would not just quit when we ran out of money from float. We would go ahead and borrow moderate amounts of money. We would never borrow huge amounts of money, though.

当然，在这种情况下，我们也会尝试获取更多的浮存金。但当我们用光浮存金时，我们不会就此止步，而是会适量借入资金。不过，我们绝不会借入巨额资金。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree.

查理·芒格：我同意。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. You can see why we’ve been partners a long time. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。这就是为什么我们能长期合作的原因。（笑声）

16. Big returns are easier with small amounts of money

小额资金更容易获得高回报

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we go to some off — some sites away from this main hall. And not sure how exactly we’re going to do this. But we’ll go to zone 9 and see if zone 9 comes in.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们将转向一些远离主会场的场所。我不确定具体怎么进行，但我们将连接到9号区域，看看是否可以连线成功。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Howard Love. I’m from San Francisco. Thank you very much for this weekend in general and this meeting in particular.

提问者：你好，我叫霍华德·洛夫，来自旧金山。非常感谢您为这个周末和特别是这次会议所做的安排。

Recently, at a talk at the Wharton Business School, Mr. Buffett, you indicated that — you were talking about the problems of compounding large size, which I appreciate and understand.

最近，在沃顿商学院的一次演讲中，巴菲特先生，您提到了管理大规模资金的复利问题，我对此深表理解和欣赏。

But you indicated — you’re quoted in the local paper as saying that you are confident that if you were working with a sum closer to a million dollars, that you could compound that at a 50 percent rate.

但据当地报纸报道，您表示，您有信心，如果管理的资金接近一百万美元，您可以以50%的速度实现复利增长。

For those of us who aren’t saddled with the $100 billion problem — (laughter) — could you talk about what types of investments you’d be looking at and where in today’s market you think significant inefficiencies exist? Thank you.

对于我们这些没有背负千亿美元问题的人——（笑声）——您能否谈谈您会关注哪些类型的投资，以及您认为当今市场上存在哪些显著的低效区域？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think I may have been very slightly misquoted. But I certainly said something to the effect that working —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想我可能被稍微误引了。但我确实说过类似的话，大意是——

I think I talked about this group I get together every two years and how I poll that group as to what they think they can compound money at with a hundred thousand, a million, a hundred million, a billion, and other types of sums.

我提到过，我每两年和一个群体聚会一次，我会向他们调查，问他们认为自己在管理十万、一百万、一亿、一百亿及其他规模资金时，能够实现什么样的复利增长。

And I pointed out how this group of 60 or so people that I get together with every couple years — how their expectations of return would go very rapidly down this slope.

我指出，这个由大约60人组成的群体，他们每两年聚一次会，他们对回报率的预期会随着资金规模的增长迅速下降。

It is true. I think I can name a half a dozen people that I think could compound a million dollars — or at least they could earn 50 percent a year on a million dollars — have that as expectation, if they needed it.

确实如此。我可以列举出六个人，我认为他们可以以一百万美元为本金实现复利——或者至少可以年赚50%——如果他们需要的话，这是可以实现的。

I mean, they’d have to give their full attention to be working on the sum. And those people could not compound money, a hundred million or a billion, at anything remotely like that rate.

当然，他们需要全身心投入在这一百万美元上。而这些人如果管理一亿或十亿资金，则绝不可能以类似的速度实现复利。

I mean, there are little tiny areas which, if you follow what I said on the screen there, on that Adam Smith’s interview a few years ago.

我的意思是，有一些非常小的领域，如果你听从我几年前在亚当·斯密采访中所说的内容，可以找到机会。

If you start with A and you go through and you look at everything and you find small securities in your area of competence that you can understand the business, I think you — and occasionally find little arbitrage situations or little wrinkles here and there in the market —

如果你从A开始，逐一研究所有内容，并找到你能力范围内的小型证券且你能理解它们的业务，我认为你会——而且有时会在市场中发现一些套利机会或小的异常现象——

I think, working with a very small sum, that there is an opportunity to earn very high returns. But that advantage disappears very rapidly as the money compounds. Because I, you know, from a million to 10 million, I would say it would fall off dramatically, in terms of the expectable rate.

我认为，处理非常小的金额时，有机会获得非常高的回报。但这种优势会随着资金的复利增长迅速消失。比如从一百万到一千万，预期回报率会显著下降。

Because there are little — you find very small things that, you know, you can make — you are almost certain to make high returns on. But you don’t find very big things in that category today.

因为这些是非常小的机会，你几乎可以确定会获得高回报。但今天，你很难在这个类别中找到非常大的机会。

I’ll leave to you the fun of finding them yourselves. Terrible to spoil the treasure hunt.

我把寻找这些机会的乐趣留给你们自己。破坏寻宝游戏的乐趣可不好。

And the truth is, I don’t look for them anymore. Every now and then, I’ll stumble into something just by accident. But I’m not in the business of looking for them. I’m looking for things that Berkshire could put its money in, and that rules out all of that sort of thing.

事实上，我已经不再寻找这些机会了。偶尔，我会碰巧发现一些，但我现在的任务不是寻找这些。我寻找的是伯克希尔可以投钱的机会，而这排除了所有此类小机会。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would agree. But I would also say that what we did 40 or so years ago was, in some respects, more simple than what you’re going to have to do.

查理·芒格：嗯，我同意。但我还想说，我们在大约40年前做的事情在某些方面比你们现在要简单得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

沃伦·巴菲特：对的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We had it very easy, compared to you. It can still be done. But it’s harder now.

查理·芒格：与你们相比，我们当时的处境非常轻松。这种方式现在仍然可行，但难度更大了。

You have to know more. I mean, just sifting through the manuals until you find something that’s selling at two times earnings, that won’t work for you.

你需要知道更多。我是说，只是翻阅手册，直到找到一个市盈率只有两倍的标的，这种方法对你们来说行不通了。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’ll work. It’s just you won’t find any. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这方法行得通，只是你找不到这样的标的了。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

查理·芒格：是的。

17. “Surprisingly high” return on equity

“惊人高”的股本回报率

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 10, please?

沃伦·巴菲特：请接入10号区域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jonathan Brandt. I’m from New York City.

提问者：我叫乔纳森·布兰特，来自纽约市。

Warren, you wrote in 1977 that the return on equity and growth of book value for corporate America tended towards, and averaged, about 13 percent, no matter the inflation environment.

沃伦，您在1977年写道，美国企业的股本回报率和账面价值增长率趋于并平均为13%左右，无论通胀环境如何。

After properly expensing options and so-called non-recurring charges and taking into account the high price-earnings ratio paid for increasingly frequent acquisitions, do you think that 13 percent figure is still roughly correct?

在适当地将期权和所谓的非经常性支出费用化，并考虑到越来越频繁的收购所支付的高市盈率后，您认为13%的数字仍然大致正确吗？

Also, what quantitative method would you suggest that investors use for expensing the option grants of publicly traded firms where there is no realistic prospect for the substitution of such an options program with a cash-based performance incentive plan?

另外，对于那些实际上无法用基于现金的绩效激励计划替代期权计划的上市公司，您建议投资者使用什么定量方法来对期权授予进行费用化？

In other words, how do you derive the five to 10 percent earnings dilution referred to in this year’s Berkshire’s annual report? And is it possible that the dilution figure could be even higher than that? Thank you.

换句话说，您是如何得出今年伯克希尔年报中提到的5%到10%的收益稀释数字的？这个稀释比例是否可能比这还要高？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thanks, John. Just like Martin Wiegand, Jon Brandt is the son of a very good friend of mine, where we worked together for decades. And Jon is now an analyst with Ruane Cunniff and a very good one.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢你，乔纳森。和马丁·维甘德一样，乔纳森·布兰特是我的一位非常好朋友的儿子，我们一起工作了几十年。而乔纳森现在是Ruane Cunniff的一名分析师，非常优秀。

He also — he says it didn’t happen this way. But when he was about four years old, I was at his house for dinner with the parents. And he suggested to me, after dinner, he said, “How about a game of chess?”

他还——他说事情不是这样的。但在他大约四岁的时候，我曾在他家和他父母共进晚餐。晚餐后，他对我提议说，“下盘棋怎么样？”

I looked at this four-year-old. I thought, you know, “This is the kind of guy —”

我看着这个四岁的孩子，心想，“这就是那种……”

I said, “Should we play for money?” (Laughter)

我说，“我们要不要赌点钱？”（笑声）

And he said, “Name your stakes.” So, I backed off, and — (laughter) — we sat down.

他回答说，“随你开价。”于是，我退缩了——（笑声）——然后我们坐了下来。

And after about 12 moves, I could see I was in mortal trouble. So, I suggested it was time for him to get to bed. (Laughter)

下了大约12步棋后，我意识到自己陷入了致命的麻烦。于是，我建议他该睡觉了。（笑声）

The question about return on equity, it’s true. Back in 1977, I believe, I wrote an article for Fortune and talked about this, more or less, this figure of 12 or 13 percent that return on equity kept coming back to, and explained why I didn’t think it was affected by inflation, which was a hot topic of the day very much.

关于股本回报率的问题，确实如此。我记得在1977年，我为《财富》杂志写了一篇文章，谈到了12%或13%的股本回报率这一数字，并解释了为什么我认为它不会受到当时非常热门的通胀话题的影响。

And it wasn’t. But in recent — in the last few years, earnings have been reported at very high figures on the S&P, although you’ve had these very substantial restructuring charges, which every management likes to tell you doesn’t count.

确实如此。而在最近几年，尽管标普公司报告的收益数字非常高，但同时也有非常巨大的重组费用，而每个管理层都喜欢告诉你这些费用不算数。

I love that, when they, you know, they say, “Well, you know, we earned a dollar a share in total last year, but look at the two dollars a share that we tell you we really earned. The other dollar a share doesn’t count.” And then they throw in mistakes of the past or mistakes of the future. And every three or four years, ask you to forget this as if it doesn’t mean anything.

我很喜欢这种说法，比如他们说，“去年我们每股总共赚了一美元，但看，我们告诉你我们实际上赚了两美元，另一美元不算数。”然后他们会把过去的错误或未来的错误加进去。每隔三四年，他们会要求你忘记这些错误，好像它们毫无意义一样。

We’ve never had a charge like that that we’ve set forth in Berkshire and we never will.

在伯克希尔，我们从未有过这样的费用调整，我们也永远不会这样做。

It isn’t that we don’t have things we do that cost us money in moving around. But we do not ask you to forget about those costs.

这并不是说我们没有需要花钱调整的事情。但我们不会要求你忽略这些成本。

The report — even allowing for options costs and restructuring charge and everything, return on equity has been surprisingly — to me — surprisingly high in the last few years.

即使考虑到期权成本、重组费用等因素，过去几年股本回报率仍然——对我来说——出奇地高。

And there’s a real question in a capitalistic society whether if long-term rates are 5 1/2 percent, whether return on equity can be, across the board, some number like 18 or 20 percent.

而在资本主义社会中，存在一个现实问题：如果长期利率是5.5%，股本回报率是否可以普遍达到18%或20%这样的数字？

There’re an awful lot of companies out there that are implicitly promising you, either by what they say their growth in earnings will be, or various other ways, that they’re going to earn at these rates of 20 percent-plus. And, you know, I’m dubious about those claims. But we will see.

有许多公司在通过他们宣称的收益增长率或其他各种方式，隐含地向你承诺他们将以20%以上的回报率赚钱。而你知道，我对这些说法持怀疑态度。但我们拭目以待。

18. Corporations hooked on “corrupt” stock option accounting

企业沉迷于“腐败”的股票期权会计

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about how we charge for stock options is very simple. If we look at what a company issues in options over, say, a five-year period and divide by five — because the grants are irregular — or whatever’s — if there’s some reason why that seems inappropriate, we might use something else.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于我们如何对股票期权进行费用化的问题，这很简单。我们会看一家公司在五年期间发行的期权数量，然后除以五——因为期权的授予是不规则的——或者，如果有理由认为这种方法不合适，我们可能会使用其他方法。

But we try to figure out what the average option issuance is going to be. And then we say to ourselves, “How much could the company have received for those options if they’d sold them as warrants to the public?”

但我们试图计算出平均的期权发行量。然后我们问自己，“如果公司将这些期权作为认股权证出售给公众，它们可以获得多少钱？”

I mean, they can sell me options on any company in the world. I’ll pay some price for an option on anything.

我的意思是，他们可以向我出售任何一家公司的期权。我愿意为任何期权支付一定的价格。

And we would look at what the fair market value of those options would be that day if they were transferable options. Now, they aren’t transferable. But they also — employees sometimes get their options repriced downward, which you don’t get if you have public options.

我们会看这些期权当天如果是可转让的，其公平市场价值会是多少。当然，它们不是可转让的。但另一方面，员工有时会获得重新定价的期权，而公众持有的期权却没有这种待遇。

So, we say that the cost to the shareholder of issuing the options is about what could be received if they sold — turned those options into warrants — and sold them public or sold them as options.

所以，我们认为，向股东发行期权的成本大致等于如果将这些期权转为认股权证并向公众出售或作为期权出售所能获得的金额。

And that’s the cost. I mean, it’s a compensation cost.

而这就是成本。我的意思是，这是一种薪酬成本。

And just try going to a company that’s had a lot of options grants every year and tell them you’re going to quit giving the options and pay people the same amount of money. They’ll say, “You took away part of my earnings.”

试着去对一家每年大量授予期权的公司说，你打算停止授予期权，改用相同金额的现金支付。他们会说，“你夺走了我的部分收益。”

And we say, if you’ve taken away part of the earnings, then let’s show it in the income account and show it as a cost. Because it is a cost.

而我们会说，如果你减少了收益，那就让我们把它体现在收益表中，作为一项成本来显示。因为它确实是一项成本。

And I think, actually, a number of auditors agreed to that position many years ago. And they started receiving pressure from their clients who said, “Gee, you know, that might hurt our earnings if we reported that cost.”

实际上，我认为多年前有许多审计师同意这一立场。但随后他们开始受到客户的压力，客户说，“天哪，如果我们把这项成本报告出来，可能会影响我们的收益。”

And the auditors caved. And they put pressure on Congress when it came up a few years ago. And I think it’s a scandal. But it’s happened.

然后审计师妥协了。当几年前这个问题被提到国会时，他们向国会施加了压力。我认为这是一个丑闻。但它确实发生了。

We are going to — in evaluating a business, whether we’re going to buy the entire business or whether we’re going to buy part of it — we’re going to figure out how much it’s costing us to issue — and when the company issues those options every year.

无论我们是要收购整个企业，还是只购买其中的一部分，我们在评估业务时，都会计算公司每年授予这些期权的成本是多少。

And if they reprice them, we’re going to figure how much that particular policy costs us. And that is coming out of our pocket as investors. And I think people are quite foolish if they ignore that.

如果公司重新定价这些期权，我们也会计算这种政策的具体成本是多少。这些成本最终是由我们作为投资者承担的。我认为，忽视这些成本的人非常愚蠢。

I don’t think it’s going to change. It’s too much in corporate America’s interest to keep it out of the income account and keep issuing more and more options percentage-wise, and not have it hit the income account, and to reprice when stocks go down. But that doesn’t make it right.

我认为这种情况不会改变。对美国企业来说，将期权成本排除在收益表之外、持续以更高比例发行期权、不让其影响收益表、以及当股票下跌时重新定价，这些都太符合他们的利益了。但这并不代表它是正确的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I go so far as to say it’s fundamentally wrong not to have rational, honest accounting in big American corporations.

查理·芒格：是的，我会直言不讳地说，大型美国企业没有实行理性、诚实的会计处理是根本错误的。

And it’s very important not to let little corruptions start, because they become big corruptions. And then you have vested interest that fight to perpetuate them.

非常重要的是，不要让小的腐败行为萌芽，因为它们会发展成大的腐败行为。随后，既得利益集团就会拼命抗争，以维持这些行为的延续。

Surely, there are a lot of wonderful companies that issue stock options. And that stock options go to a lot of wonderful employees that are really earning them. But all that said, the accounting in America is corrupt. And it is not a good idea to have corrupt accounting.

当然，有许多优秀的公司发行股票期权，而这些期权也分配给了真正通过努力赢得它们的优秀员工。但尽管如此，美国的会计处理是腐败的。拥有腐败的会计制度绝不是一个好主意。

WARREN BUFFETT: You can see the problem of the creep in it, once it starts.

沃伦·巴菲特：一旦这种问题开始，你就能看到它逐步扩大的问题。

It’s much like campaign finance reform. I mean, if you let it go for a long time, the system becomes so embedded and the participants become so dependent upon it, that there becomes a huge constituency that will fight like the very devil to prevent any change, regardless of the logic of the situation.

这很像竞选财务改革。如果任由其发展很长时间，这个系统就会根深蒂固，参与者也会对它形成高度依赖，从而形成一个庞大的群体，不顾逻辑地拼命反对任何改变。

I mean, once you get a significant number of important players benefiting from any kind of corruption in any kind of system, you’re going to have a terrible time changing it. That’s why, you know, it should be changed early.

一旦在任何系统中，有大量重要参与者从某种腐败中受益，改变它将变得异常困难。这就是为什么应该尽早进行改变的原因。

大脑的思维方式也遵循相类似的规律。

And it would’ve been easier to change the accounting for stock options some decades back when it was first proposed, than now. Because, you know, basically corporate America’s hooked on it.

几十年前，当股票期权会计处理首次被提议时，改变它会更容易，而不是现在。因为，美国企业基本上已经对这种做法上瘾了。

This does not mean that we are against options, per se. If Charlie and I die tonight and you had two new faces up here who didn’t have the benefit of having bought a lot of Berkshire a long time ago, and they had responsibility for the whole enterprise, it would not be inappropriate to pay them in some way that was reflective of the prosperity of the whole enterprise.

这并不意味着我们本身反对期权。如果查理和我今晚去世了，而你们面前换成了两个新面孔，他们没有像我们很久以前那样大量买入伯克希尔的股份，但却对整个企业负有责任，那么以某种反映整个企业繁荣状况的方式支付他们的报酬并不是不合适的。

I mean, they would — it would be crazy to pay the people at Dairy Queen in options of Berkshire Hathaway or pay the people at Star Furniture or any one of our operations, because they have responsibility for a given unit. And what the price of Coca-Cola stock does could swamp their efforts in either direction. It just would be inappropriate.

我的意思是，比如，用伯克希尔·哈撒韦的期权支付Dairy Queen员工，或者支付Star Furniture的员工，或者我们任何一个业务部门的员工的薪酬，这是非常荒唐的。因为他们只对某个单元负责，而可口可乐股票价格的波动可能会完全掩盖他们的努力。这样做显然是不合适的。

But it would not be inappropriate to pay somebody that’s got the responsibility for all of Berkshire in a way that reflected the prosperity of all of Berkshire.

但是，以反映整个伯克希尔繁荣状况的方式支付那些负责整个伯克希尔的人薪酬，则不是不合适的。

And a properly designed option system, which would be much different than the ones you see, because it’d be much more rational, could well make sense for one or two people that had the responsibility for this whole place.

一个合理设计的期权系统，与现在常见的系统截然不同，因为它会更加理性。这样的系统对于负责整个伯克希尔的一两个人来说是合理的。

Charlie and I aren’t interested in that. But I think that you may be looking at two people up here, 50 years from now, I hope, where it would be appropriate.

查理和我对此并不感兴趣。但我认为，也许50年后，你们会看到两个人坐在这里，那时这样的方式会是合适的。

But any option system, A, should not involve giving an option of less than the place could be sold for today, regardless of the market price. Because once management’s in control, they can make that decision. And it should reflect the cost of capital. And very, very few systems reflect the cost of capital.

但任何期权系统，首先，都不应该授予低于今天公司可出售价格的期权，无论市场价格如何。因为一旦管理层掌控了公司，他们可以做出这个决定。而且这个系统应该反映资本成本。但非常少的系统会考虑资本成本。

But if we’re going to sit here and plow all the money back every year into the business and, in effect, use your earnings, interest-free, to increase our own earnings in the future, we think there has to be a cost of capital to have a properly designed option system.

如果我们每年把所有资金投入到业务中，实际上是用你们的收益，无息地增加我们未来的收益，我们认为一个合理设计的期权系统必须考虑资本成本。

People aren’t interested in that. The option consultants aren’t interested in that, because that isn’t what their clientele wants.

人们对此并不感兴趣。期权咨询顾问对此也不感兴趣，因为这不是他们客户想要的东西。

Charlie, you’re probably wound up a little more now on this, too?

查理，你对此是不是也更加激动了？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’ve wound up enough.

查理·芒格：不，我已经够激动了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

19. Why Buffett dissolved his partnership in 1969

巴菲特为何在1969年解散他的合伙企业

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to zone 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们接入11号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren and Charlie, good morning.

提问者：沃伦和查理，早上好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Maurus Spence from Waterloo, Nebraska.

提问者：我叫莫瑞斯·斯宾塞，来自内布拉斯加州的沃特卢。

Some 30 years ago, you disbanded your Buffett partnership saying that you felt out of step with the market and you feared a permanent loss of capital.

大约30年前，您解散了您的巴菲特合伙企业，说您感到与市场脱节，并担心永久性的资本损失。

Given today’s market and current valuations, if Berkshire Hathaway was a partnership of 100 partners, instead of a corporation, would you consider disbanding it as you did 30 years ago? And if not, why not? And was that the right decision back then?

考虑到今天的市场和当前的估值，如果伯克希尔·哈撒韦是由100位合伙人组成的合伙企业，而不是一家公司，您会像30年前那样考虑解散它吗？如果不会，为什么？当时的决定是正确的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if our activities were limited to marketable securities, and I had less than a hundred partners, and we were operating with this kind of money, so that there was a real limitation on what we could do, I would simply tell the partners and let them make the decision. That would be easy enough.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果我们的活动仅限于可交易证券，而我的合伙人少于100人，并且我们经营的资金规模使我们确实受到限制，我会直接告诉合伙人，并让他们自己做决定。这将是很容易的事情。

We’re not in that position. A, we’ve got a number of wonderful businesses. And those businesses will grow in value. And in some cases, very significantly, in value.

但我们现在不在那种情况下。首先，我们拥有许多优秀的企业。而这些企业的价值会增长，在某些情况下，甚至会有非常显著的增长。

And it’s not a feasible way. People have their own way, if they decide that — since we’re unable to find things, that they’d rather go on to something else — they have their own way of getting out. And they can get out at, certainly, a premium to the amount of money they put into the business over the years.

这并不是一种可行的方式。如果人们决定——由于我们无法找到机会，他们宁愿转向其他事情——他们有自己的退出方式。而且他们可以以远高于他们多年来投入资金的溢价退出。

So, if I were running a marketable securities portfolio now and were limited to that, I would explain very carefully to my partners how limited my ability to make money in this market would be. And then I would ask them to do whatever they wish to do. Some of them might want to pull out and others might want to stay.

所以，如果我现在在管理一个可交易证券投资组合并且仅限于此，我会非常仔细地向我的合伙人解释我在这个市场中赚钱能力的局限性。然后我会请他们根据自己的意愿做出选择。有些人可能会选择退出，而另一些人可能会选择留下来。

In the 1969 period when I closed up, A, I had a somewhat similar situation in terms of finding things.

在1969年我结束合伙企业时，第一，我在寻找投资机会方面遇到了与现在有些相似的情况。

And B, I really felt that the expectations of people had been so raised by the experience we’d had over the previous 13 years, that it made me very uncomfortable. And I felt unable to dampen those expectations.

第二，我感到，过去13年的表现已经大幅提升了人们的预期，这让我非常不安。我觉得我无法降低这些预期。

And I really just didn’t find it comfortable to operate where my partners, even though they might nod their heads understandingly and say that, “You know, we really know why you aren’t making any money while everybody else is.”

我确实不喜欢在这样的环境中经营，虽然我的合伙人可能会理解地点头，并说：“我们真的明白，为什么在别人都赚钱的时候你没有赚钱。”

I didn’t think I wanted to face the internal pressure that would come from that. I don’t feel any such internal pressure in running Berkshire.

我认为我不想面对由此带来的内部压力。而在经营伯克希尔时，我并未感受到这种内部压力。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that — I think there are some similarities between 1969-70 and the present time. But I don’t think that means that 1973-4 lies right ahead of us. We can’t predict that.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为1969-70年与现在确实有一些相似之处。但我不认为这意味着1973-74年的情况就在眼前。我们无法预测这些。

You can argue it worked out wonderfully for Warren to quit in ’69. And then have ’73-4 to come into with his powder dry. I don’t think we’re likely to be that quite that fortunate again.

可以说，沃伦在1969年退出的决定非常成功，然后在1973-74年期间，手握大量资金进入市场。我不认为我们会再次如此幸运。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it was a long time from ‘69, though, to ‘73. I mean, it sounds easy, looking back. But the Nifty Fifties, you may remember, sort of hit their peak in ’72. So, although there was a sinking spell for a while in that ’69-70 period, the market came back very strong.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，从1969年到1973年确实是很长的一段时间。回头看，这似乎很简单。但你可能记得，“漂亮五十”股在1972年达到了顶峰。所以，虽然在1969-70年期间市场有一段下跌期，但之后又非常强劲地反弹了。

But you know, that’s part of the game. I mean, it stayed cheap a long time from the ’73 period on.

但你知道，这就是投资的一部分。从1973年开始，市场便长期保持低估状态。

And you will find waves of optimism and pessimism. And they’ll never be exactly like they were before. But they will come in some form or other.

你会发现乐观和悲观情绪会轮番出现。虽然它们不会完全像以前那样，但它们会以某种形式出现。

1999年，SPY收盘价93.61，2002年最低点50.82，2007年收盘价105.92，2008年金融危机，2010年正式走出趋势，当年收盘价97.32，前后经历了10年时间，同时期的BRK，1999年收盘价36.60，2002年收盘价48.46，2007年收盘价94.72，2008年收盘价64.28，2010年收盘价80.11，前一个周期70年代，后一个周期就是当下，巴菲特说每20年有一个大的机会很可能指的是当下的这个机会，已经屯积了大量现金，很明显这个时候的指数基金不是好的选择，体质强健的个股可能是更好的选择。

That does not mean we’re sitting around with a bunch of cash because we expect stocks to go down, though.

但这并不意味着我们现在坐拥大量现金是因为我们预期股票会下跌。

We keep looking for things. We’re looking for things right now. We’re talking to people right now about things where we could expend substantial sums of money. But it’s much more difficult in this period.

我们一直在寻找机会。我们现在就在寻找机会。我们也正在与人洽谈一些我们可以投入大量资金的项目。但在当前这个时期，这变得更加困难。

20. Buffett’s musical family

巴菲特的音乐家庭

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 12?

沃伦·巴菲特： 12号区域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Jenna (PH). I’m from Long Island, New York.

提问者：早上好。我叫珍娜（音），来自纽约长岛。

And I was reading through your annual report.

我在阅读您的年报。

You made reference to Wagner and some country western song I never heard of.

您提到了瓦格纳和一首我没听过的乡村西部歌曲。

I was just wondering what kind of music influences you. And are you planning on doing, like, a musical video? (Laughter)

我很好奇是什么样的音乐影响了您。您是否打算制作一段音乐视频？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think with the performance I gave earlier in the movie, I don’t think there’s any future for me. But I do have a very musical family.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我觉得凭我在电影里早些时候的表现，我在音乐领域没有什么前途。不过，我的家庭非常有音乐天赋。

And since you asked, I will point out that my son Peter’s recent CD is available at the Disney booth outside. And Peter had a very successful experience here on public television in March and will be on tour later on. And my wife is extremely musical.

既然你问了，我想指出，我的儿子彼得最近的一张CD可以在外面的迪士尼展台找到。今年三月，彼得在公共电视台上非常成功，之后还会巡演。而且我的妻子也非常有音乐天赋。

But I don’t think I’ve got much of a future in it. So far, I get — no one ever asks me to come back. (Laughter)

但我认为我在音乐领域没有太大的未来。到目前为止，没有人要求我回来。（笑声）

I mean, I’ve had a lot of introductory appearances, but very few encores.

我的意思是，我有过很多介绍性的表演，但很少有返场演出。

I like all kinds of music. You know, I really — I’ve always liked music. We started out around the house singing church hymns. And in 1942, my two sisters who are here today, joined me in a 15-minute program on WOW, then the leading radio station in Omaha. And we sang “America the Beautiful.”

我喜欢各种类型的音乐。你知道，我真的——我一直都喜欢音乐。我们最初是在家里唱教会圣歌。1942年，我的两个姐姐（她们今天也在这里）和我一起参加了WOW广播电台的一个15分钟节目，当时这是奥马哈最主要的广播电台。我们演唱了《美丽的美国》。

And my dad got elected to Congress on the back of that program. (Laughter)

我的父亲因为那个节目当选为国会议员。（笑声）

We liked to take credit for it. And you — see my sisters at the end of the meeting.

我们喜欢把功劳归于自己。你可以在会议结束时见到我的姐姐们。

Charlie, what kind of music do you like?

查理，你喜欢什么样的音乐？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the one thing I agree with is that if we’re going to star Warren, it should be in a musical. The straight acting won’t do. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我同意的一点是，如果我们要让沃伦当主角，那应该是在音乐剧里。纯粹的表演可不行。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It took me an hour to get that bald for “Annie,” incidentally. It takes a long time to get bald — dressing room.

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，为了演《安妮》，我花了一个小时弄成秃头。化妆间里弄秃头需要很长时间。

21. Spotting a great industry doesn’t guarantee you’ll make money

识别一个伟大的行业并不保证你能赚钱

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 13, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请接入13号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Jack Sutton (PH) from Brooklyn, New York. Thank you for hosting today’s meeting.

提问者：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫杰克·萨顿（音），来自纽约布鲁克林。感谢您今天主持这场会议。

With reference to communication stocks, because of the growth of cellular communications and the internet, certain stocks hold the prospect of substantially above-average revenue and earnings growth.

关于通信类股票，由于移动通信和互联网的发展，某些股票有可能实现远高于平均水平的收入和利润增长。

AT&T and Nokia, as an example, earn respectable margins and return on common equity and would seem to fit Berkshire’s criteria from a financial perspective.

以AT&T和诺基亚为例，它们拥有可观的利润率和普通股权益回报率，从财务角度来看，似乎符合伯克希尔的标准。

Has Berkshire reviewed stocks in the area of communications? And would you consider an investment in this area at some time in the future?

伯克希尔是否研究过通信领域的股票？您是否会考虑未来某个时候在该领域进行投资？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s certainly no question amazing things have happened in communications.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，毫无疑问，通信领域确实发生了惊人的变化。

It’s interesting that you mention AT&T. Because AT&T’s return on equity over the last 15 years has been, you know, has been very, very poor. Now, they’ve had special charges time after time and said, “Don’t count this.”

你提到AT&T这点很有意思。因为AT&T过去15年的股本回报率一直非常糟糕。当然，他们一次又一次地计入特殊费用，并说：“不要计算这些费用。”

But the overall return on equity, if you calculate it for AT&T for the last 15 years, it’s not been good at all. They were the, you know, they were the leader in the field. But so far, what has happened has hurt them, at least relative to their competition, far more than it’s helped them.

但如果你计算AT&T过去15年的总体股本回报率，这表现完全不好。他们曾是该领域的领导者。但到目前为止，发生的事情至少相对于竞争对手，对他们的伤害远大于帮助。

We have a fellow on our board, Walter Scott, who’s right here in the front row — I can’t quite see him — who knows a lot more about this.

我们董事会里有一位成员沃尔特·斯科特，他现在就在前排——虽然我看不太清楚——他对此了解得多得多。

He used to try to explain to me these changes that were taking place. We’d ride down to football games on Saturday and Walter would patiently explain to me like he was talking to a sixth grader, what was going to happen in communications. And the problem was that he had a fourth grader in the car with him, namely me. (Laughter)

他过去常常试图向我解释正在发生的这些变化。我们会在周六一起去看橄榄球比赛的路上，沃尔特会像在对一个六年级学生解释一样耐心地告诉我通信领域将会发生什么。问题是，车上还有一个四年级学生，那就是我。（笑声）

So, I never got it. But Walter did. And he’s done very well in MFS and Level 3.

所以，我从来没弄明白。但沃尔特明白了。而且他在MFS和Level 3做得非常出色。

狐朋狗友。

And I think for people who understand it, and are reasonably early, you know, they could very well be substantial money to be made. There’s been an awful lot of money made in this town of Omaha by people who’ve participated in this. But I’m not one of them.

我认为，对于那些理解这个领域并且进入得比较早的人来说，他们很可能会赚到很多钱。在奥马哈这座城市里，有许多人通过参与这一领域赚了很多钱。但我不是其中之一。

And I have no insights that I bring to that game that I think are in any way superior, and — in, probably, many cases, not even equal to those of other participants.

我认为，在这个领域里，我没有任何优于他人的洞见，甚至在许多情况下可能还不如其他参与者。

There’s a lot of difference between making money and spotting a wonderful industry. You know, the two most important industries in the first half of this century in the United States — in the world, probably — were the auto industry and the airplane industry.

赚钱和发现一个伟大的行业之间有很大的区别。你知道，本世纪上半叶，美国——甚至可以说是全世界——两个最重要的行业是汽车工业和航空工业。

Here you had these two discoveries, both in the first decade — essentially in the first decade — of the century. And if you’d foreseen, in 1905 or thereabouts, what the auto would do to the world, let alone this country, or what the airplane would do, you might have thought that it was a great way to get rich.

这两个发现都发生在本世纪的第一个十年——基本上是第一个十年。如果你在1905年左右预见到汽车将如何改变世界，更不用说美国了，或者飞机将带来的影响，你可能会认为这是致富的好方法。

But very, very few people got rich by being — by riding the back of that auto industry. And probably even fewer got rich by participating in the airline industry over that time.

但是，通过参与汽车工业致富的人非常非常少。而通过参与航空工业致富的人可能更少。

I mean, millions of people are flying around every day. But the number of people who’ve made money carrying them around is very limited.

我的意思是，每天都有数百万人在飞行，但通过运输他们赚钱的人数却非常有限。

And the capital has been lost in that business, the bankruptcies. It’s been a terrible business. It’s been a marvelous industry.

而且这个行业中损失的资本很多，还有破产现象。这是一个糟糕的生意，但却是一个非凡的行业。

So you do not want to necessarily equate the prospects of growth for an industry with the prospects for growth in your own net worth by participating in it.

因此，你不应该将一个行业的增长前景与通过参与该行业而增加个人净值的前景划上等号。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it reminds me of a time in World War II when — where these two aircraft officers I knew, and they didn’t have anything to do at the time. And some general came in to visit. And he said to one of them, he says, “Lieutenant Jones, what do you do?” He says, “I don’t do anything.”

查理·芒格：这让我想起了二战时期的一件事，当时我认识两个航空军官，他们那时没有什么事可做。有一天，一位将军来访问。他对其中一个说，“琼斯中尉，你做什么？”他回答，“我什么也不做。”

And he turned to the second one. And he says, “What do you do?” And he says, “I help Lieutenant Jones.” (Laughter)

然后将军转向另一个人说，“你做什么？”他回答，“我帮助琼斯中尉。”（笑声）

That’s been my contribution on communications investments. (Laughter and applause)

这就是我在通信投资中的贡献。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You can address me as Lieutenant Jones for the rest of the meeting. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：在接下来的会议中，你们可以称呼我为琼斯中尉。（笑声）

22. Thank you, shareholders

感谢股东们

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, incidentally, some people have thanked us for providing this meeting. I want to thank you because the quality — I think we have the best shareholders meeting in the country.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，顺便说一下，有些人感谢我们举办这次会议。我想感谢你们，因为这次会议的质量——我认为我们举办了全美最好的股东大会。

And the quality of the meeting is absolutely — (applause) — in direct proportion to the quality of the shareholders.

会议的质量完全是——（掌声）——与股东的质量直接成正比的。

We would have nothing without this participation. And I really thank you. It’s a big effort to come here for a lot of you. And I thank you for that.

如果没有你们的参与，我们什么都没有。我真的很感谢你们。对许多人来说，来这里需要很大的努力。我对此深表感谢。

Our plan, incidentally, will be to take a break at noon. They have a lot of food outside that they will sell you. (Laughter)

顺便提一下，我们的计划是在中午休息。他们外面有很多食物要卖给你们。（笑声）

And then we’ll come back in 30 minutes or thereabouts or 45 minutes, depending on how the lines are out there.

然后我们将在30分钟左右或45分钟后回来，这取决于外面的排队情况。

And then we’ll reconvene for the afternoon. And those of you who are not in this main hall, if you want to come over and join the main hall, there will be enough seats for everybody in the afternoon. And then Charlie and I will continue till about 3:30.

接着我们将在下午继续开会。如果你们现在不在主会场，下午可以过来加入主会场，届时每个人都会有足够的座位。然后查理和我会继续到大约3:30。

23. Do you ever get tired of being Warren Buffett?

你有没有厌倦过成为沃伦·巴菲特？

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go back to zone 1, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请回到1号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, over here. Good morning. I’m Allan Maxwell. I live in Omaha.

提问者：巴菲特先生，我在这里。早上好。我叫艾伦·麦克斯韦，住在奥马哈。

When you walk down the street, heads turn to watch you. Do you ever get tired of being Warren Buffett? If you could come back again, would you want to be Warren Buffett? (Laughter)

当你走在街上时，大家都会转头看你。你有没有厌倦过成为沃伦·巴菲特？如果你可以重新来过，你还想成为沃伦·巴菲特吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think I’d probably want to be Mrs. B. She made it to 104, so I — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我可能会想成为Mrs. B。她活到了104岁，所以我——（笑声）

And incidentally, I think there were three siblings at her funeral. Now, that’s some set of genes. You don’t have to worry about the Furniture Mart.

顺便提一下，我记得她的葬礼上还有三个兄弟姐妹。那真是一副好基因。你完全不用担心家具商城的未来。

No, you see a lot of the publicity bit here for a couple of days around the time of the meeting. But life goes on in a very normal way.

并不是这样的。你们可能在股东大会期间的几天里会看到很多关于我的宣传，但我的生活其实非常平常。

And I’ve had a lot fun. I have fun every day of my life. I had a lot of fun when I was 25. But I have just as much fun now. And I think, you know, if my health stays good, it’ll keep being the same way.

我过得很愉快。我每天都很开心。我25岁的时候很开心，现在也一样。而且我想，只要我的健康状况保持良好，这种状态就会一直持续下去。

Because, you know, I get to do what I want to do. And I get to do it with people I like and admire and trust. And it doesn’t get any better than that.

因为，我可以做我想做的事。而且我能和我喜欢、钦佩和信任的人一起做这些事。没有比这更好的事情了。

Charlie? Do you want to come back as Lieutenant Jones? (Laughter)

查理？你想重新来过时变成琼斯中尉吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think there are very few people who would change their skin for somebody else’s. I think we all want to play our own games.

查理·芒格：我认为，很少有人愿意与别人交换人生。我想我们每个人都想玩自己的游戏。

24. Goodwill costs should stay on the books

商誉成本应保留在账面上

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to zone 2 with those remarks. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们带着这些评论进入2号区域。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi.

提问者：你好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.

沃伦·巴菲特：你好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Liam O’Connor (PH). I come from County Kerry in Ireland. And I must admit the sun shines a little bit more over here than it does on the other side of the world.

提问者：我叫利亚姆·奥康纳（音），来自爱尔兰凯里郡。我必须承认，这里的阳光比世界另一端更多一些。

I was wondering, today, if you could shed some light on accounting for goodwill.

今天，我想请您谈谈关于商誉会计处理的问题。

You reference in your report, in several aspects, including your principles — owner principles — and as well as the fact — with the current merger of General Re.

您在报告中多次提到了商誉，包括您的原则——所有者原则——以及当前通用再保险的合并事实。

It seems to me there are several different methods that are used worldwide, through amortization, to direct write-off.

在我看来，全世界似乎有多种处理方法，从摊销到直接注销。

And the fact, when a merger like this is taken, it kind of skews the balance sheet. And I was wondering, in your view, what would you recommend as a more appropriate method for accounting for goodwill?

当发生这样的合并时，它会在某种程度上扭曲资产负债表。我想知道，您认为更适合商誉会计处理的方法是什么？

And secondly, if I could direct it to Charlie, one of the ideas — why not tie goodwill to the share price and have an intangible and a tangible part of shareholder’s equity, the intangible piece being the difference between the book value and the share value of a company?

其次，我想问问查理，有没有可能将商誉与股票价格挂钩，把股东权益分为有形和无形两部分，无形部分是公司账面价值与市值之间的差异？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I’ll take the first part. And it’s a good question about goodwill and the treatment of goodwill for accounting purposes.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我先回答第一个问题。关于商誉及其会计处理，这是一个很好的问题。

I actually wrote on that subject. I think it was in 1983 in the annual report. And if you click onto the berkshirehathaway.com you can look at the older letters. And you will see a discussion of what I think should be the way goodwill is handled. And then we’ve discussed it at various other times in the Owner’s Manual.

实际上，我曾就这个主题写过文章。我记得是在1983年的年报中。如果你访问伯克希尔的网站，可以查看以前的信件。在那里，你会看到我对商誉处理方法的讨论。此外，我们在《所有者手册》中也曾多次讨论过这个问题。

To give it to you briefly, in the U.K., for example, goodwill is written off instantly so it never appears in book value. And there’s no subsequent charge for it.

简要来说，比如在英国，商誉是立即注销的，因此从未出现在账面价值中，也没有后续的费用计提。

If I were setting the accounting rules, I would treat all acquisitions as purchases — which is what we’ve done, virtually, without exception at Berkshire — I would treat all acquisitions as purchases.

如果由我来制定会计规则，我会将所有收购视为购买——这实际上是我们在伯克希尔一贯的做法——将所有收购都视为购买行为。

I would set up the economic goodwill, because we are paying for goodwill when we buy a General Re. I mean, we are paying billions and billions of dollars for it. Or when we buy a GEICO or when we buy an Executive Jet. That is what we are buying, is economic — what I call economic goodwill.

我会将经济商誉设立为资产，因为当我们收购通用再保险时，我们实际上是在为商誉买单。我指的是，我们为此支付了数十亿美元。当我们收购GEICO或Executive Jet时也是如此。我们购买的正是经济商誉，我称之为“经济商誉”。

I believe it should stay on the balance sheet as reflective of the money you’ve laid out to buy it. But I don’t think it should be amortized. I think in cases where it is permanently impaired and clear that it’s lost its value, it should be charged off at that time.

我认为，商誉应保留在资产负债表上，以反映你为其支付的资金。但我认为它不应摊销。在那些显然永久性减值并且失去价值的情况下，应该在当时冲销。

But generally speaking — in our own case, the economic goodwill that we now have far exceeds the amount that we put on the books originally. And therefore, even by a great amount, exceeds the amount that remains on the books after amortization.

但总的来说——以我们自身为例，目前我们的经济商誉远远超过了最初记入账簿的金额。因此，它甚至大幅超过了摊销后账面上剩余的金额。

I do not think an amortization charge is appropriate at Berkshire for the goodwill that we have attached to our businesses. Most of those businesses have increased their economic goodwill — in some cases, by dramatic amounts — since we’ve purchased them.

我认为，对于伯克希尔附属于我们业务的商誉来说，摊销费用并不合适。自从我们收购这些业务以来，其中大多数的经济商誉都增加了——在某些情况下，增加幅度非常显著。

But I think the cost ought to be on the balance sheet. It shows what we paid for them. I think it should be recorded there.

但我认为，这些成本应该保留在资产负债表上。它显示了我们为这些业务支付的金额。我认为它应该记录在账上。

I don’t think that the coming change in accounting is likely to be along the lines that I’ve suggested here. But I do think it’s the most rational way to approach the problem.

我不认为即将到来的会计变更会遵循我这里所建议的方向。但我确实认为，这是解决这个问题最合理的方法。

And I think that because there is this great difference between purchase and pooling accounting, that some really stupid things are done in the corporate world.

而且，我认为，由于购买法和权益法之间存在巨大差异，企业界确实做了一些非常愚蠢的事情。

And I have talked to managers who deplored the fact that they were using their stock in a deal and going through some — various maneuvers to get pooling accounting because they thought it was economically a dumb thing to do.

我与一些经理人交流过，他们对在交易中使用股票并采用各种操作以获得权益法会计处理的事实感到遗憾，因为他们认为从经济角度来看，这是件愚蠢的事情。

But they did it, rather than record amortization charges that would result from purchase accounting. And, you know, they’re very frank about that in private. They don’t say as much about it in public.

但他们还是这么做了，而不是选择记录因购买法会计处理而产生的摊销费用。你知道，他们在私下对此非常坦率，但在公开场合却鲜有提及。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, generally speaking, I think that what Warren argues for would be the best system.

查理·芒格：是的，总的来说，我认为沃伦所主张的是最好的系统。

Namely, set up the goodwill as an asset and don’t amortize it in the ordinary case.

也就是说，将商誉作为资产记录，但在一般情况下不对其进行摊销。

Or there would be plenty of cases when — the cases wouldn’t be ordinary cases when amortization would be rational and, in fact, should be required.

或者在许多情况下——这些并非普通情况——摊销是合理的，并且实际上应该被要求进行摊销。

So, I don’t think there is any one easy answer to this one. And there’s a lot of crazy distortion in corporate practice because of all the changes.

所以，我认为这个问题没有一个简单的答案。由于所有这些变更，公司实践中出现了许多荒谬的扭曲。

I mean, Australia has cowboy accounting. And Europe has this write-it-all-off-immediately accounting, which is — what would you call it? — half-cowboy accounting. And maybe mining promoter accounting.

比如说，澳大利亚有“牛仔会计”。欧洲有这种立即全部冲销的会计处理，这算什么？——半牛仔会计，也许是采矿推销员会计。

We think the system should be better than that.

我们认为，这个系统应该比这些做法更好。

25. “We are not in the business of being white knights”

“我们不是以白衣骑士的身份做生意”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

沃伦·巴菲特： 3号区域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.

提问者：早上好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Mike, from Omaha.

提问者：我叫迈克，来自奥马哈。

And it’s been said that you’re the white knight of the investment world because you rescue companies from hostile takeovers. Are there any companies you are now trying to help out? And would you please name those companies? (Laughter)

人们说您是投资界的白衣骑士，因为您拯救公司免受敌意收购。您现在正在帮助哪些公司？您能不能说出这些公司的名字？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You have a cell phone that you’re going to place orders with? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你是不是准备用手机下订单？（笑声）

No, we — what we really want to buy into are wonderful businesses, or at least extremely good businesses. And we want them to have managements we like. And we want the price to be attractive.

不是的，我们真正想投资的是优秀的企业，或者至少是非常好的企业。我们希望这些企业有我们喜欢的管理团队，并且价格具有吸引力。

And we are not in the business of being white knights. We’re in the business of being investors in things that look sensible to us. And I don’t think I’ve been approached by anybody in connection with that.

我们不是以白衣骑士的身份做生意。我们的业务是投资那些我们认为合适的东西。而且我不认为有人因此来接洽过我。

We do get approached occasionally. I should say, we get approached when somebody, occasionally, when somebody has a takeover bid. And they say, “Would you like to top it or something?” To which our answer, invariably, is no.

我们偶尔确实会被接洽。我应该说，当有人提出收购要约时，他们会问：“你们想出更高的价格或做点什么吗？”对此我们的答案一贯是“不”。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’re very good at saying no. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我们非常擅长说“不”。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s better than I am, even.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理甚至比我更擅长。

26. China offers opportunities, but hard to pick winners

中国提供了机会，但很难挑选赢家

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

沃伦·巴菲特： 4号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Matt Haverty (PH). I’m from Kansas City.

提问者：早上好。我叫马特·哈弗蒂（音），来自堪萨斯城。

Twenty years ago, China unleashed capitalism within its borders. Since then, I believe it has benefited more from that economic system than any major country in history.

二十年前，中国在其境内释放了资本主义活力。从那时起，我相信它从这种经济体制中获益的程度超过了历史上任何一个主要国家。

I also believe that this momentum, combined with China’s size and demographics, will make it the most fertile economic environment in the world during the next few decades.

我还认为，这种势头，加上中国的规模和人口结构，将使其在未来几十年成为世界上最具活力的经济环境。

Nonetheless, there are many Chinese companies with easy-to-understand businesses and 20 percent per annum sales growth this decade, trading at five times or less last year’s earnings.

尽管如此，许多中国公司有着易于理解的业务，这十年来年销售增长率达到20%，却以不到去年盈利的五倍的价格交易。

What is your assessment of the risk/reward of investing directly in Chinese companies?

您如何评估直接投资于中国公司的风险与回报？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know that much about them. But I — certainly if I could buy companies that were earning 20 percent on equity and had promises — gave promise — of being able to continue to do that while reemploying most of the capital, and they were selling at five times earnings, and I felt good about the quality of the earnings, you know, I would say that would have to be an interesting field.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对它们了解不多。但如果我能买到那些股本回报率达到20%的公司，而且它们有望继续维持这种水平，同时能将大部分资本重新投入使用，并且它们的交易价格是五倍市盈率，而我对其盈利质量感到满意，那么，我会认为这是一个非常有趣的领域。

My guess is that it’s not a large enough field, in terms of the ones that meet those tests you named, for Berkshire to profitably participate. And whether you could buy all of those companies from the U.S., I think there’d be a lot of — there could well be a lot of problems in that.

我猜，对于满足您所列条件的公司来说，这个领域可能不足够大，不足以让伯克希尔盈利参与。至于是否可以从美国买下这些公司，我认为其中可能会存在许多问题。

But I would say, any time you can buy good businesses — really good businesses — which we define as businesses who earn high returns on capital at five times earnings — and you believe in the quality of the earnings, and they can reemploy a significant portion of those earnings, additionally, at the 20 percent rate, you know, you will make a lot of money if you’re right in your assessment on that.

但我想说的是，如果你能够购买好的企业——真正好的企业——我们定义为那些资本回报率高、交易价格是五倍市盈率的企业，而且你相信其盈利质量，并且它们能够以20%的回报率重新投资相当一部分盈利，那么，如果你的评估是正确的，你将赚到很多钱。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don’t know much about China. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我对中国了解不多。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But that is not to knock it in any way, shape or form. Because I mean, in terms of — there could well be opportunities in areas like that, if you can identify those kind of businesses. We would have trouble identifying those businesses, ourselves.

沃伦·巴菲特：但这并不是以任何方式贬低它。因为我认为，如果你能找到那种企业，在那样的领域可能确实会有机会。我们自己可能很难识别这些企业。

But that doesn’t mean that, you know, you will have trouble or other people who are much more familiar with the economy there, would have trouble.

但这并不意味着你会有困难，或者对那里经济更熟悉的人会有困难。

So, I encourage you to look at your own area of expertise in something like that. And you’ll do much better.

所以，我鼓励你在这类事情上关注自己擅长的领域。这样你会做得更好。

If the conditions you describe exist and you can identify the right company, you will do much better in that than you will in American markets, in my view.

如果你描述的条件存在，并且你能找到正确的公司，我认为你在那方面的表现会比在美国市场更好。

27. We prefer to buy companies, but stocks offer more bargains

我们更喜欢收购公司，但股票提供了更多便宜货

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.

沃伦·巴菲特： 5号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Fred Castano (PH), from East Point, Michigan. And I appreciate this opportunity.

提问者：早上好。我叫弗雷德·卡斯塔诺（音），来自密歇根州东点市。感谢有这个机会。

With Berkshire’s size becoming very large, are we to expect major future investments to be in the form of complete buyouts, such as the General Re acquisition? Or would you still consider nibbling in the stock market?

随着伯克希尔的规模变得非常大，我们是否可以预期未来的主要投资将以完整收购的形式进行，比如收购通用再保险？还是您仍然会考虑在股票市场上“啄食”？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t want to nibble. But we would like to take big gulps in the stock market from time to time.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们不想“啄食”，但我们确实希望不时在股票市场上大口吞下。

But we’ve always wanted to acquire entire businesses. People never seem to really believe that, back when we were buying See’s Candy or the Buffalo News or National Indemnity. But that’s been our number one preference right along.

但我们一直想收购整个企业。回想我们当初收购See’s糖果、布法罗新闻或National Indemnity时，人们似乎从未真正相信这一点。但这始终是我们的首要偏好。

It’s just that we’ve found that much of the time we could get far more for our money, in terms of wonderful businesses, by buying pieces in the stock market, than we could by negotiated purchase.

只是我们发现，大多数时候，通过在股票市场上买入股份，我们能用同样的资金购买到更好的企业，而不是通过谈判收购。

There may have been — there may be some movement, in terms of the availability of the two, toward the negotiated purchase, although you — it’s almost impossible to make a wonderful buy in a negotiated purchase.

在这两者的可用性方面，可能会有所倾斜，倾向于谈判收购，尽管——在谈判收购中几乎不可能获得一个绝佳的交易。

I mean, you will never make the kind of buy in a negotiated purchase that you can in a bad — that you can make via stocks in a stock — in a weak stock market. It just isn’t going to happen.

我的意思是，你永远无法通过谈判收购获得那种绝佳交易，而在疲软的股票市场上却可以通过股票买入获得。这是根本不可能发生的。

The person on the other side cares too much. Whereas, in the stock market, in a 1973 or 1974, you were dealing with the marginal seller. And whatever price they establish for the business, you could buy it.

对方对价格的关注度太高。然而，在股票市场上，比如1973或1974年，你面对的是边际卖家。无论他们为企业设定什么价格，你都可以以那个价格买入。

I couldn’t have bought the entire Washington Post Company for $80 million in 1974. But I could buy 10 percent of it from a bunch of people who were just operating, you know, based on calculating betas or doing something of the sort.

1974年，我不可能以8000万美元买下整个《华盛顿邮报》公司。但我可以从一群人手中买下其10%的股份，这些人仅仅是基于计算贝塔值或类似的操作。

And they were in a terrible market. And it was possible to buy a piece of it on that valuation. You never get that kind of buy in a negotiated purchase.

而当时的市场非常糟糕，这使得能够以那个估值购买其中一部分成为可能。在谈判收购中，你永远不会得到这样的交易。

We always are more interested in a negotiated — large negotiated — deals than we are in stock purchases. But we are not going to find a way, probably, to use all the money that way.

我们始终对谈判——尤其是大规模谈判交易——比对股票购买更感兴趣。但我们可能找不到一种方法通过这种方式用掉所有资金。

And we occasionally may get chances to put big chunks of money into attractive businesses that are — which we buy through the stock market, five, 10 percent of company or something of that sort.

偶尔我们可能会有机会将大笔资金投入到一些有吸引力的企业中，这些企业是通过股票市场购买的，比如公司5%、10%的股份或类似的份额。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: My guess is over the next five years, we’ll do some of both. Both the entire business and the big gulps in the stock market.

查理·芒格：我猜在未来五年内，我们会两者都做：收购整个企业以及在股票市场上进行大规模买入。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I agree with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我同意这一点。

We’ll keep working at both. We’re not finding a lot in either arena. We might be a little more likely to find it in the negotiated business. It won’t be any huge bargain. We’re not going to get any huge bargain in the — in a negotiated purchase.

我们会在两方面都继续努力。但在这两个领域，我们都没有找到很多机会。我们可能更有可能在谈判交易中找到一些机会。但那不会是一个巨大的便宜货。在谈判收购中，我们不可能获得巨大的折扣。

We are more likely to find what I would call a fair deal there under today’s circumstances, than we will in the market. But I agree with Charlie. Over the next five years, I think you’ll see us do both.

在当今的情况下，我们更可能在谈判中找到一个我称之为“公平交易”的机会，而不是在市场上。但我同意查理的观点。在未来五年里，我认为你会看到我们两者都做。

28. Being “wealthy” without having a lot of money

在没有很多钱的情况下也可以“富有”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

沃伦·巴菲特： 6号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Jane Bell (PH) from Des Moines, Iowa. (Mild applause)

提问者：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫简·贝尔（音），来自爱荷华州得梅因。（轻微掌声）

In response to an earlier question, you spoke of people being rich and very, very rich.

您在回答早前的问题时提到了“富有”和“非常非常富有”。

It seems to me there’s a difference between being rich and being wealthy. I assume you consider yourself to be both. Which is the more important to you?

在我看来，“富有”和“财富”之间是有区别的。我想您可能觉得自己两者兼具。对您来说，哪一个更重要？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think we may ask you to define. I don’t want to sound like President Clinton here, too much, but we may ask you — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我觉得我们可能需要请您先定义一下。我不想听起来像克林顿总统一样——不过我们还是想请您——（笑声）

I might want — if you’d really define the “rich” and “wealthy,” so that I get the distinction, then I think we can give you a better answer on it.

如果您能真正定义一下“富有”和“财富”的区别，我觉得我们可以更好地回答您的问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, in my mind, being rich is having an awful lot of money. Being very, very rich is having even more. And being wealthy doesn’t necessarily equate to having a lot of money.

提问者：在我看来，“富有”是拥有非常多的钱，而“非常非常富有”是拥有更多的钱。“财富”并不一定等同于拥有很多钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: What does it equate to, then? I just want — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：那它等同于什么呢？我只是想——（笑声）

I think I know what you mean. But I still want you to clear it up before I give you an answer on it.

我觉得我大概明白您的意思。但在回答之前，我还是希望您能先澄清一下。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, this, of course, is my opinion.

提问者：当然，这只是我的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: I mean, you could be wealthy in health, for example. And I agree with you, that certainly, there’d be nothing you’d value more than good health for you, you know, yourself and your family. But I — you go ahead.

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是，比如在健康方面你可以是“富有的”。我同意您的观点，毫无疑问，对自己和家人来说，健康是最宝贵的。但请您继续。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I believe you’re starting to get it. (Laughter)

提问者：嗯，我觉得您开始明白了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Have patience. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：请耐心一点。（笑声）

No, there’s no question about it. I mean, being — the money makes very little difference after a moderate level. I tell this to college students that I talk to.

是的，毫无疑问，我的意思是，在达到一定水平后，钱对生活的影响就很小了。我经常这样告诉那些我交谈过的大学生。

I mean, they are basically living about the same life I’m living. (Laughter)

我的意思是，他们基本上过着和我一样的生活。（笑声）

You know, we eat the same foods. I mean, that I can guarantee you. (Laughter)

我们吃的食物是一样的，我可以向你保证这一点。（笑声）

And, you know, there’s no important difference in our dress. There’s no important difference at all in the car we drive. There’s no difference in the television set that we sit there and, you know, watch the Super Bowl on or anything of the sort.

我们的衣着没有本质区别，我们开的车也没有重要差异。我们坐在那里看超级碗比赛的电视也没有什么不同，或者类似的任何东西。

There’s really no difference in — you know, they’ve got air-conditioning in summer. And I got air-conditioning and I got heat in winter. Almost everything of any importance in daily life, we equate on.

其实没什么区别——他们夏天有空调，我也有；他们冬天有暖气，我也有。日常生活中几乎所有重要的事情，我们都是相等的。

The one thing I do is I travel a lot better than they do, you know, NetJets. (Laughter)

唯一的不同是我旅行的条件比他们好很多，比如NetJets。（笑声）

So the travel is — travel I do a lot easier than they do.

所以旅行方面，我确实比他们轻松得多。

Everything else in their lives, it just — you know, I’ll switch places any time. It doesn’t make any difference.

至于生活中的其他方面，我随时可以和他们换位置，完全没有什么区别。

So, the — then you get down to the things of health and who loves you. I mean, that’s — you know, there’s nothing — if you have a minimum level of — I mean, you want to have enough so that you eat three times a day, and that you sleep in reasonably comfortable surroundings, and so on.

那么，接下来就是健康和谁爱你的问题。这些是最重要的——只要你有最低的生活标准，比如一天三顿饭，能在相对舒适的环境中睡觉，等等。

But everybody in this room has that. And yet, some of the people, by the definition that you’ve given, are obviously much more wealthy than others. And it’s not measured by their net worth, if you define it that way.

但在这个房间里的每个人都有这样的条件。然而，根据您给出的定义，有些人显然比其他人更“富有”。如果按照这种方式定义的话，这并不是用他们的净资产来衡量的。

I don’t disagree with that definition. I might not use the term, wealth, in describing it. But I’d certainly maybe call it well-being or something of the sort.

我并不反对这个定义。我可能不会用“财富”这个词来形容它。但我肯定会称其为“福祉”或类似的词语。

Charlie? (Laughter)

查理？（笑声）

He’s thinking.

他在思考。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure, there are a lot of things in life way more important than wealth. All that said, some people do get confused. I play golf with a man. He says, “What good is health? You can’t buy money with it.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：当然，生活中有许多东西远比财富重要。不过，有些人确实会感到困惑。我有个打高尔夫的朋友，他说，“健康有什么用？你又不能用健康买到钱。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Did I ever tell you about Charlie’s twin brother that he golfs a lot with? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我有没有告诉过你，查理的双胞胎兄弟经常和他一起打高尔夫？（笑声）

No, I’ll take health any time, incidentally.

不过，说真的，我随时都会选择健康。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So will I.

查理·芒格：我也是。

WARREN BUFFETT: The important thing, even in your work, I mean, is — to an extreme extent, it seems to me, is who you do it with.

沃伦·巴菲特：重要的是——甚至在工作中——我认为，这一点非常重要，就是你和谁一起工作。

I mean, it — you can have — if you’re going to spend eight hours a day working, the most important isn’t how much money you make, it’s how you feel during those eight hours, in terms of the people you’re interacting with, and how interesting what you’re doing is, and all of that.

我的意思是，如果你每天要花八个小时工作，最重要的不是你赚了多少钱，而是这八个小时里你的感受，比如你与什么样的人互动，以及你所做的事情是否有趣，等等。

Well, you know, I consider myself incredibly lucky in that respect. I can’t think of anything I’d rather do. And I can’t think of any group of people I’d rather do it with.

在这方面，我觉得自己非常幸运。我想不出还有什么事是我更愿意做的，也想不出还有什么人是我更愿意与之共事的。

And if you asked me to trade away a very significant percentage of my net worth, either for some extra years in life, or being able to do, during those years, what I want to do, you know, I’d do it in a second.

如果你让我用很大一部分净资产去换取额外的生命年限，或者让我在这些年里做自己想做的事，我会毫不犹豫地同意。

29. “We blew it” on pharmaceutical stocks

“在制药股上我们失误了”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特： 7号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is McCall Bang (PH). I’m from central Florida. It’s nice and sunny there.

提问者：嗨，我叫麦考尔·邦（音），来自佛罗里达州中部。那里的天气阳光明媚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Not so bad here either, now. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这里现在也还不错。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question was, last year somebody asked about the pharmaceutical companies and the aging baby boomers, et cetera. And you said it was difficult to single out individual companies. And I believe Mr. Munger succinctly said that we blew it on that one.

提问者：我的问题是，去年有人问到制药公司和老龄化的婴儿潮一代等话题。您说很难挑出个别公司。我记得芒格先生简洁地说，我们在这方面搞砸了。

I was wondering, however, if the idea of regulation and, you know, the specter of what happened in ’92, ’93 with an unelected politician kind of dampered the whole industry for a period, there — if that plays a part in giving you a little ambivalence about investing in that area for the future.

然而，我想知道，是否因为监管的观念，以及92、93年期间一位非选举产生的政治人物对整个行业造成了一段时间的打击，这是否让您对未来投资该领域感到有些犹豫？

Is that simply an unknowable? Or with all the, you know, a lot of the political — the things we see here today — if that causes you some concern about, you know, the future of that area?

这只是一个无法知晓的问题吗？还是因为我们今天看到的许多政治因素，这让您对该领域的未来感到担忧？

I know that you’re concerned about the growth of — in companies having to spend money, in Washington with regulation, et cetera. So, I’d like to know your thoughts, specifically if you have some ambivalence because of future regulation with pharmaceutical companies?

我知道您对公司在华盛顿为了应对监管等问题需要花费增长成本感到担忧。所以，我想知道您的具体看法，是否因为未来对制药公司的监管而感到有些犹豫？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we could buy a group of leading pharmaceutical companies at a below-market multiple, I think we’d do it in a second. And we had the opportunity to do that in that 1993 period, as you mentioned. And we didn’t do it. So, we did blow it.

沃伦·巴菲特： 如果我们能以低于市场倍数的价格买入一组领先的制药公司，我想我们会立刻去做。正如您提到的那样，在1993年期间我们有这个机会。但我们没有这么做。所以，我们确实搞砸了。

Because clearly, the pharmaceutical industry, as a whole, has done very well. And it has some of the threats that you enumerated, in terms of regulation and so on.

因为显然，整个制药行业表现得非常好。虽然它确实有您提到的监管等威胁。

But, you know, every industry has some problems. And the pharmaceutical industry has enough going for it that the threats you named should not cause, in my view, should not cause the securities to sell at a depressed multiple, which they did.

但是，每个行业都有一些问题。我认为，制药行业有足够的优势，您提到的那些威胁不应该导致其证券以低倍数出售，但它们确实发生了这种情况。

Now, that’s no longer the circumstance. We don’t like — you know, we’re not going to buy them at present prices. But, we — at least I think they’re, you know, as a group, they’re good businesses.

现在，这种情况已经不复存在。我们不喜欢，也不会以目前的价格购买它们。但至少我认为，它们作为一个整体来说，是不错的企业。

I do think it’s very hard to pick out the winner. You know, so if I did buy them, I would buy them — I would buy a group of the leading companies. But I wouldn’t be buying them at these prices.

我确实认为很难挑出赢家。所以，如果我要买的话，我会买一组领先的公司。但我不会以当前的价格买入。

Charlie?

查理？

30. Munger defends “almost obscene amounts of money” for drug companies

芒格为制药公司“近乎骇人听闻的利润”辩护

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I would argue that the pharmaceutical industry has done more good for the customers than almost any other industry in America. It’s just fabulous what’s been invented in my lifetime, starting with all the antibiotics that have prevented so much death and so much family tragedy.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为制药行业为客户带来的好处超过了美国几乎所有其他行业。在我的一生中，它所发明的东西是惊人的，从各种抗生素开始，这些药物避免了大量的死亡和无数家庭悲剧。

And I think the country has been very wise to have a system where the pharmaceutical companies can make almost obscene amounts of money. I think we’ve all been well-served by the large profits in the pharmaceutical industry.

我认为，美国有这样一个系统，让制药公司可以赚取近乎骇人听闻的利润，这是非常明智的。我认为，制药行业的巨额利润很好地服务了我们所有人。

31. Why Buffett buys small amounts of some stocks

巴菲特为何购买少量股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特： 8号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Gary Rastrum (PH) from right here in Omaha.

提问者：早上好，巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫加里·拉斯特鲁姆（音），来自奥马哈。

My question is, somewhere I thought I’d read that you buy at least one share of every company on the New York — or on the exchanges — to get the annual report. Is that true or is that a thing of the past? And if it is true, how do you keep track of all that information?

我的问题是，我似乎读到过，您会购买纽约证券交易所或其他交易所每家公司的至少一股股票，以便获取年度报告。这是真的吗？还是已经成为过去？如果是真的，您如何跟踪所有这些信息？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s got an element of truth in it. Many years ago, I did buy one share of a great many companies. And I’d get these dividend checks for eight cents and 10 cents. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这有一定的真实性。很多年前，我确实购买了许多公司的单股股票。我会收到一些8美分或10美分的股息支票。（笑声）

And I used to pay my bridge losses by endorsing these checks by the hundreds and giving them to the people who’d just won a dollar. And they — and then no one asked me to bridge games anymore. (Laughter)

我以前用这些支票来支付我的桥牌输局费用——我会签上自己的名字，然后把这些支票成百地送给那些刚赢了一美元的人。之后，没有人再邀请我玩桥牌了。（笑声）

So I have adopted a new program where I buy a hundred shares of a great many companies. Actually, I buy them in my foundation so I don’t go crazy at income tax time. And I probably, just as a guess, would have a couple hundred companies. So, it isn’t every company, by a long shot.

所以，我改用了一个新方法——我会购买许多公司的100股股票。实际上，我会通过我的基金会购买，这样在报税时不会太麻烦。我可能，大致估计一下，会持有几百家公司的股票。所以，这远不是每家公司都买。

But there are at least several hundred companies where I want to be a registered shareholder, and — to make sure I get the mailings promptly. And I do keep those around. And I very — even after I lose interest, I very seldom sell one. So, I’ll just keep buying more.

但确实有几百家公司，我希望成为注册股东，以确保及时收到邮件。我会一直保留这些股份。即使我对某家公司失去了兴趣，我也很少卖掉股份。所以，我只是会继续购买其他的。

And I’ll only buy a hundred shares in something I might want to keep track of, but I’ll probably buy a hundred shares in all of their competitors and — so that I keep reading about those companies as well.

我会只购买100股我可能想跟踪的公司的股票，但我也会购买它们所有竞争对手的100股，这样我也能持续了解这些公司的动态。

It does pay to have a flow of information come in over the desk.

让信息源源不断地来到桌面前确实是值得的。

32. Why some shareholders get the annual report sooner

为何有些股东更早收到年度报告

WARREN BUFFETT: And the answer to that question reminds me of a point which I’d like to bring up, briefly, here.

沃伦·巴菲特：回答这个问题让我想起了一个我想简要提到的事情。

And that is that our shareholders — unfortunately there’s no way around this — unless they go to the internet on the Saturday that we designate to read the annual report, and where it’s up on our home site, berkshirehathaway.com, are going to receive their reports at significantly different times.

我们的一些股东——很遗憾，这无法避免——除非他们在我们指定的周六上网，在我们的网站berkshirehathaway.com上阅读年度报告，否则他们收到报告的时间会有显著的不同。

And the ones who have their shares in their own names are very likely to get those reports faster than the ones that have it — have their shares held in street names. And from our standpoint, unfortunately, probably 90 percent of the shareholders we have, have their name — have their stock held in street names.

那些以自己名字持股的股东，很可能比那些以“街名”持股的股东更早收到报告。从我们的角度来看，不幸的是，我们大约90%的股东持股都以“街名”登记。

Now, what happens on that, is we print the reports up. We mail the ones to the shareholders who are of record, who have the stock in their own names. We send the balance to where their brokers or bankers tell us to send them.

目前的流程是，我们打印报告并邮寄给以自己名字登记的股东。对于剩下的部分，我们按照经纪人或银行的指示将报告寄往他们指定的地点。

About 90 percent go to one place in New Jersey, but that’s out of our control. I mean, if Merrill Lynch or Charles Schwab or whomever, Fidelity, turns their list over to that firm, they are the ones that mail the reports. We truck those reports back to them.

其中约90%的报告被寄往新泽西的某个地方，但这并非我们能控制。如果美林证券、嘉信理财或富达等公司将他们的名单交给该公司，那么由该公司负责邮寄这些报告。我们将报告运送到他们那里。

We may, next year, try to figure out a way to get them printed closer. But it’s out of our control when those reports go out. So our shareholders receive their reports on widely varying dates, which like I say, you know, I would rather not have that happen.

明年我们可能会试图找一种更接近的打印方式。但这些报告的发送时间并非我们能控制。因此，我们的股东会在非常不同的日期收到报告。正如我所说，我不希望这种情况发生。

It means that in terms of sending in your request for tickets to this meeting, many people we had this year as late as maybe the 10th of April, still hadn’t gotten their reports. And they wondered about their tickets.

这意味着，在提交此次会议门票的申请时，今年我们有许多人直到4月10日仍未收到报告，他们对门票问题感到困惑。

So if it’s convenient for you, you will — you know, it’s better to have your stock in your own name. Now, that isn’t convenient for many people. I understand that. But you will get our reports on a more reliable basis and a more prompt basis if you do it that way.

因此，如果方便的话，最好以自己的名字持有股票。当然，这对许多人来说可能并不方便，我理解这一点。但如果这样做，您会以更可靠和更及时的方式收到我们的报告。

If you have your stock in street name, you know, I urge you to look on those dates we’ve laid out in the report for next year, to click onto our homepage. Because then you will have the information just as quickly as everybody — as your fellow shareholder does.

如果您的股票是以“街名”登记的，我建议您在我们报告中为明年列出的日期点击我们的主页。这样您可以像其他股东一样快速获得信息。

We want very much to have a level playing field. And we want everyone to have access to the information as close to simultaneously as possible and during a time when the market is not open.

我们非常希望保持一个公平的竞争环境，并希望每个人能够尽可能同时获取信息，且是在市场关闭时获得信息。

We think that just makes sense. That’s the way we’d do it if we were running a partnership.

我们认为这是合理的。如果我们经营的是一个合伙企业，这就是我们的做法。

But there is this problem with street name holdings of somewhat erratic distribution. And that’s the reason why, when I want to keep track of, say, all of the companies in the pharmaceutical industry, I’ll buy a hundred shares of each one and I’ll stick them in the name of the foundation. And that mailing comes directly to me in Omaha.

但“街名”持股的分发确实有些不规律。这也是为什么当我想跟踪制药行业的所有公司时，我会购买每家公司100股，并以基金会的名义持有。这样，邮寄会直接送到我在奥马哈的手中。

33. “Deceptive accounting” at many companies

“许多公司的欺骗性会计”

WARREN BUFFETT: So let’s go onto zone 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，让我们转到9号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Lola Wells (PH) from Florida.

提问者：我是洛拉·威尔斯（音），来自佛罗里达州。

You have been recently quoted in the newspapers as saying that some major corporations have used questionable practices to make their operations seem more favorable. Would you be willing to be more specific about these practices?

您最近在报纸上被引用说，一些大公司使用了值得怀疑的做法来让它们的运营看起来更有利。您是否愿意更具体地谈谈这些做法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Not until I’m on my deathbed. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：除非我躺在临终床上。（笑声）

The — no, I have followed a policy of criticizing by practice and praising by name, and we will not —

嗯，不，我一直遵循“批评做法而非人名，表扬则点名”的政策，我们不会——

You know, we do — Charlie and I both find certain practices very deplorable. And they aren’t limited to a single, or a few, large corporations. But it would — we would probably be less effective in arguing for change if we went to a few specific examples.

您知道，查理和我都认为某些做法非常令人遗憾。而且这些做法并不限于一家公司或几家大公司。但如果我们针对一些具体案例，可能会降低我们倡导变革的效果。

A, they would not be that much different, probably, than hundreds of other, or at least dozens of other companies. And secondly, those who get critical of the world, find the world gets very critical of them, promptly.

首先，这些案例可能与数百家甚至几十家其他公司并没有多大不同。其次，那些批评世界的人会发现世界很快就对他们充满批评。

And I think we do more good by, in a sense, hating the sin and loving the sinner. So, we will continue to point out the sin. But we will not name the sinners.

我认为，从某种意义上讲，“憎恨罪恶但爱罪人”的做法更有益。因此，我们会继续指出罪恶，但不会点名罪人。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, I think she wants you to name the practices.

查理·芒格：沃伦，我觉得她想让你指出那些做法，而不是那些违法者。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, the practices?

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是那些做法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Not the miscreants.

查理·芒格：不是那些违规者。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, well, the practices are some — (laughter) — the practices are some of the things we’ve said.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，这些做法包括一些——（笑声）——我们已经提到的事情。

They relate to accounting charges that are designed to throw, into a given period, a whole lot of things that should’ve been covered in subsequent periods in the earnings account. Or to smooth out or to inflate earnings in future accounts.

它们涉及会计费用处理，这些费用被设计成集中到一个特定期间的许多项目，而这些项目本应该分摊到后续期间的收益中。或者通过这种方式平滑或夸大利润。

There’s a lot of that being done. There’s a lot that’s been done. The SEC, under Arthur Levitt, who I admire enormously for his efforts on this, is making a concerted attempt to get corporate America to clean up its act on that.

这种做法非常普遍。已经发生了很多这样的案例。在亚瑟·莱维特领导下的美国证监会（SEC）正在努力让美国公司在这方面改正行为，我非常钦佩他的这些努力。

But it’ll only be because somebody hits them over the head. I mean, it has become totally fashionable to play games with the timing of expenses and revenues. And frankly, until the SEC got tougher, in my view, the auditors were not doing enough about it.

但只有当有人对其严厉打击时才会有所改观。我的意思是，操控费用和收入的时间安排已经变得非常流行。坦率地说，在我看来，在SEC变得更强硬之前，审计师对此的应对并不够积极。

I think that, in terms of hiding compensation expense and not recording it, in the case of options and all of that, I think —

关于隐瞒薪酬成本并未记录，比如期权方面，我认为——

Companies now have the option of recording option costs in the income account. But you have not seen any great flood of people doing it.

公司现在可以选择将期权成本记录在收入账户中。但您不会看到有大量公司这样做。

And actually, the way they show it in the footnotes is quite deceptive, in my view, because they try to make assumptions that minimize what the income account impact would be.

实际上，在我看来，他们在财务附注中展示的方式非常具有欺骗性，因为他们试图通过假设来最小化对收入账户的影响。

But the cost to the shareholder is what counts. I mean, that is the compensation cost, as far as we’re concerned. And that’s been minimized.

但对股东而言，成本才是关键。换句话说，这是薪酬成本，而这一点被大大低估了。

The whole effort to engage in pooling rather than purchase accounting, I’ve seen a lot of — there’s been a lot of deceptive accounting, in that respect. There’s been deceptive accounting on purchase accounting adjustments. So those are the kind of things we’re talking about.

为了使用合并会计而非购置会计的所有努力，我看到过很多——在这方面有很多欺骗性会计手法。在购置会计调整方面也有欺骗性会计。这些就是我们所说的问题类型。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s the big bath accounting, and the subsequent release back into earnings of taking an overly large bath, that create a lot of the abuse.

查理·芒格：是的，就是“财务大洗澡”式会计，把过多的负担一次性冲掉，然后在后续期间逐步将其释放回收益中，造成了很多滥用行为。

WARREN BUFFETT: We could name names. We won’t. But I mean, we have seen, firsthand, managements who think they are doing — they say they’re doing what everybody else does. The truth is, they are now because everybody else is doing it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们可以点名，但我们不会。但我的意思是，我们亲眼看到过一些管理层认为他们正在做的事情——他们声称他们只是做了“其他人都在做的事”。事实上，他们之所以现在这样做，就是因为其他人也在这样做。

And it takes some outside force, in this case, probably the SEC — it should’ve been the auditors and — to clean up the act. Because once it becomes prevalent, the fellow who is — who says, “I’m going to do it fair and square,” all of a sudden becomes at a disadvantage in capital markets.

需要一些外部力量来清理这些行为，这里可能是SEC——本应该是审计师。但因为这种做法一旦普遍化，那些坚持“公平公正”做事的人会突然在资本市场处于劣势。

He’s penalized. And he says, “Why should I penalize my shareholders by doing something when, legally I can get away with doing something else?”

他受到惩罚。然后他会说，“如果从法律上讲，我可以通过做其他事情而不受惩罚，为什么我要因为坚持原则而让我的股东受损呢？”

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.

查理·芒格：没什么补充的。

34. Financial strength of our insurers is a big advantage

我们的保险公司财务实力是巨大的优势

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 10.

沃伦·巴菲特： 10号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Robert McClure (PH), and my wife and I live in Singapore. My question concerns insurance.

提问者：早上好，巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫罗伯特·麦克卢尔（音），我和我的妻子住在新加坡。我的问题与保险有关。

In the 1994 annual report, you made the following remarks. And I quote, “A prudent insurer will want its protection against true mega-catastrophes — such as a $50 billion windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in California — to be absolutely certain.

在1994年的年度报告中，您曾发表以下言论。我引用：“一位审慎的保险人希望确保其针对真正特大灾害的保护——例如长岛50亿美元的风灾损失或加州类似成本的地震损失——绝对可靠。

“That same insurer knows that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default. There’s not much sense in paying premiums for coverages that will evaporate precisely when they are needed.

“同样的保险人知道，那种让其依赖大型超级灾害再保险赔偿的灾害，也可能是导致许多再保险公司违约的灾害。在最需要时蒸发的保险保障，是没有太大意义的。

“So the certainty that Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.” End quote. As I said, that was in the 1994 annual report. Please give us an update on those remarks.

“因此，伯克希尔在无法想象的特大灾难后仍能保持偿付能力和流动性的确定性，是我们的一个主要竞争优势。”引用结束。正如我所说，这是1994年年度报告中的内容。请您更新对此的看法。

Would you say that that competitive advantage you described is intact? Or would you go so far to say that it has been enhanced over the past five years with the merger of General Re and with what’s happened in the super-cat insurance industry?

您认为您所描述的这一竞争优势是否依然完整？或者您是否认为在过去五年中，随着通用再保险公司的合并以及超级灾害保险行业的发展，这一优势得到了增强？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say that that reputation — certainly the reputation is a stronger — oh, it’s stronger than ever.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为这种声誉——毫无疑问，这种声誉更强了——哦，比以往任何时候都更强。

I mean, Berkshire’s preeminent position as the reinsurer most certain to pay after any conceivable natural disaster — that reputation is stronger today than it’s ever been, and General Re’s reputation right along with it.

我的意思是，伯克希尔作为最有可能在任何可想象的自然灾害后履行赔付责任的再保险公司的卓越地位——这种声誉如今比以往任何时候都更强，通用再保险公司的声誉也随之提升。

I would say the commercial advantage inherent in that reputation is very important. I can’t tell you exactly how it rates compared to 1994. But I can tell you that it’s important.

我认为，这种声誉所带来的商业优势非常重要。我无法确切告诉您它与1994年相比的具体差异，但我可以告诉您它非常重要。

It tends to be more important when we’re reinsuring other very large entities, either primary insurers or large reinsurers, than it is with the smaller company. The smaller company probably focuses on that less.

当我们为其他非常大的实体（无论是主要保险公司还是大型再保险公司）提供再保险时，这种优势往往更为重要，而对于较小的公司来说，可能关注较少。

But we are writing, probably this week, a very large cover for a very important reinsurer. I don’t think they’d want to buy that from almost anyone else. I mean, a couple of people, maybe, but —

但我们可能本周正在为一个非常重要的再保险公司设计一份非常大的承保范围。我不认为他们会愿意从其他任何人那里购买这样的保障，也许只有极少数人可以，但——

They may — they could decide not to buy it from us because they might not feel they wanted to buy it. I think in this case, they will. But I don’t think they would have a list of 10 people from whom they’d buy it. They’re too smart for that. Because it’s a very high-level cover. And if that is called upon, there will be a number of people whose checks will not clear. And Berkshire’s check, undoubtedly, will clear.

他们可能决定不从我们这里购买，因为他们可能觉得不需要。但在这种情况下，我认为他们会购买。不过，我不认为他们会有一个包含10个供应商的列表可供选择。他们非常聪明，因为这是一个非常高水平的保障。如果需要履行保障，将会有许多人无法兑现支票。而伯克希尔的支票毫无疑问会兑现。

So, it is a big — the reputation has never been better. The commercial advantage is significant. How much it translates into — you know, it — that can vary from year to year. But I think it’s a permanent advantage that Berkshire will have.

因此，这是一个巨大的——这种声誉从未如此之好。商业优势显著。它能转化为多少实际收益，您知道，这可能会每年有所不同。但我认为这是伯克希尔将长期拥有的一个优势。

I mean, I think five years from now and 10 years from now and particularly after there has been a huge super-cat, it will be a great asset to Berkshire to be thought of as, essentially, as I’ve described it, as Fort Knox.

我的意思是，我认为在五年或十年后，特别是在发生一场巨大的超级灾害之后，伯克希尔被认为本质上像“诺克斯堡”一样坚不可摧，将是一项巨大的资产。

And we will pay under any circumstances. And there aren’t many people in the insurance or reinsurance business that can truly say that. And when the very big cover comes along, we should have very few competitors.

我们将在任何情况下履行赔付责任。在保险或再保险行业中，没有多少人能真正说这句话。当有非常大的承保需求时，我们的竞争对手应该会非常少。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s exactly right.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这完全正确。

35. GEICO and Executive Jet boosted intrinsic value

GEICO和Executive Jet提升了内在价值

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，11号区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.

提问者：早上好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Richard Corry (PH) from England.

提问者：我是来自英国的理查德·科里（音）。

Could you please say what was the main factor which produced the very substantial gain in intrinsic value mentioned in your report?

您能否说明，您报告中提到的内在价值大幅增长的主要因素是什么？

I ask this because per share gains in portfolio and operating profits were modest. And you said that there was no (inaudible) gain from issuing shares for acquisitions.

我之所以问这个问题，是因为投资组合和运营利润的每股收益增长相对温和。而且您提到没有通过发行股票进行收购获得收益。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we did increase the float per share very significantly last year, I mean, invested assets per share. And I would say that, in the — GEICO’s business was worth far more at the end of the year than at the start of the year. And that was our largest subsidiary at the start of the year. And if anything, GEICO’s competitive position continues to improve.

沃伦·巴菲特：去年，我们确实大幅增加了每股浮存金，也就是说，每股投资资产。我想说的是，GEICO的业务在年末的价值远远高于年初。这是我们年初最大的子公司。而且如果说有什么变化，那就是GEICO的竞争地位还在继续提升。

I would say that Executive Jet is a natural fit into Berkshire. And we paid a significant sum for it. But that it will be a very, very big company 10 or 15 years from now.

我认为Executive Jet非常适合伯克希尔。我们为它支付了一笔可观的费用。但它将在未来10到15年内成为一家非常非常大的公司。

And perhaps — well, I’m almost sure it’ll get there sooner as part of Berkshire, than it wouldn’t gotten there otherwise. And its dominance may be even greater over the years as part of the Berkshire family than it would have independently. Although it would’ve done very well independently.

而且或许——嗯，我几乎可以肯定，作为伯克希尔的一部分，它会更快地达到这个目标，而独立存在可能做不到这一点。而且作为伯克希尔家族的一部分，它的主导地位可能会在未来几年更强，尽管即使独立存在，它也会做得很好。

I mean, it had a terrific management. It had — it started early, and they had the most service-oriented company you could imagine. So, it would’ve done fine without us, but I think it will do even considerably better and get there faster with us.

我的意思是，它有出色的管理团队。它起步较早，而且是您能想象到的最以服务为导向的公司。所以，即使没有我们，它也会做得很好。但我认为，作为我们的一部分，它会做得更好并更快地实现目标。

So, I think there — I think in the aviation field, certainly in the primary insurance field, we had large gains in intrinsic value. And I think that, additionally, we had a significantly greater amount of invested asset per share to work with.

所以，我认为，在航空领域，当然还有主要保险领域，我们的内在价值取得了很大的增长。我认为，此外，我们拥有的每股投资资产数量也显著增加。

So, I feel good about what happened with intrinsic value last year. The problem is doing it year after year after year.

因此，我对去年内在价值的变化感到满意。问题是如何年复一年地实现这一点。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Just basically, we have a wonderful bunch of businesses. And we have a float that keeps increasing and a pretty good record of doing pretty well in marketable securities. None of that has gone away.

查理·芒格：基本上，我们拥有一群出色的企业。我们的浮存金持续增长，在可交易证券方面也有相当不错的记录。这些优势都还在。

36. No need to “groom” potential Buffett successors

无需“培养”巴菲特的潜在继任者

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 12?

沃伦·巴菲特： 12号区域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Elias Kanner (PH). And I am from New York City.

提问者：你好，我叫伊莱亚斯·坎纳（音），来自纽约市。

Mr. Buffett, thank you for this entire weekend. I met you at the ballgame on Saturday and at Gorat’s yesterday. It was a great honor for me each time.

巴菲特先生，谢谢您为我们带来整个周末的活动。我在周六的棒球比赛和昨天的Gorat’s餐厅都见到了您。这对我来说是莫大的荣幸。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is this: Mr. Buffett, will you groom a younger man or woman as your heir apparent? If so, when might you do this?

提问者：我的问题是：巴菲特先生，您会培养一位更年轻的男性或女性作为您的接班人吗？如果会的话，您打算什么时候这样做？

When I say younger, I mean a person 15 to 20 years younger than yourself. Of course, I’m not complaining. You’re the best in the world.

我所说的“更年轻”是指比您年轻15到20岁的人。当然，我不是在抱怨，您是世界上最棒的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, 15 or 20 years younger is a lot easier to do than it used to be. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，比我年轻15或20岁，现在比过去容易得多了。（笑声）

A large percentage of the world’s population is now eligible.

现在世界上很大一部分人口都符合条件了。

The — we have, today, the people to take over Berkshire. There’s no problem about that at all. They have been named in letters that the directors have. And they are in place.

我们今天就有可以接管伯克希尔的人选。这完全不是问题。董事们手中有一封信，里面写明了这些人选。他们已经就位。

Exactly who will be the two people will of course — or it could be one person — will depend on when Charlie and I are out of the picture.

具体会是两个人中的谁——或者可能是一个人——这取决于查理和我何时退出舞台。

I mean, if we’d written the letter 10 years ago, it might have been different than today. It might be different 15 years from now.

我的意思是，如果我们在10年前写这封信，可能和今天不同。15年后可能也会有所不同。

So, our death or incapacity, the timing of it, will determine exactly who will be the current person in that letter. But we have those people in place. They don’t need to be groomed from this point forward.

因此，我们的去世或丧失能力，其时间点将决定那封信中所指的具体人选。但这些人选已经准备好了。从现在开始，他们不需要再被“培养”了。

They exist. They’re ready. They’d be ready to run Berkshire tomorrow morning.

他们已经存在。他们已经准备好了，明天早上就能接管伯克希尔。

And I think you’d be quite pleased with the job they did. And that’s why I don’t worry about having — I’ve got 99 3/4 percent of my net worth in Berkshire. And, you know, I don’t want any of it sold. If I knew I was going to die next week, I would not want it sold in the coming week. And I don’t want it sold after I die.

我相信他们会做得很好。这也是为什么我并不担心。我99.75%的净资产都在伯克希尔。而且，我不希望卖掉任何部分。如果我知道下周会去世，我也不希望在下周卖掉它们。我同样不希望在我去世后卖掉它们。

I feel comfortable with the businesses and the managers and the successor top management that we have at Berkshire. But I just don’t want them to take over too early. (Laughter)

我对伯克希尔的业务、管理团队以及继任高管感到放心。但我只是希望他们不要接管得太早。（笑声）

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I actually think that the prospects for continuity of corporate culture, to the extent we have one at Berkshire, is higher than prospects for continuity of corporate culture at most other large public companies.

查理·芒格：是的。我实际上认为，在伯克希尔公司文化延续性的前景，比大多数其他大型上市公司更有保障。

I don’t see Berkshire changing its way of operating, even if Warren were to expire tonight. And I think that the capital, the fresh cash, would be allocated less well. But as I’ve said at past shareholder meetings, well, that’s too damn bad. (Laughter)

即使沃伦今晚去世，我也不认为伯克希尔的运营方式会发生改变。但我确实认为资本和新增现金的分配可能会稍微逊色一些。不过，正如我在过去的股东大会上所说的，那没办法。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why we don’t have a public relations department.

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是为什么我们没有公关部门。

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：顺便说一句——（笑声）

I don’t think the job would be ill done, I just don’t think it would be done quite as well as Warren does it.

我并不认为工作会被做得很糟糕，我只是认为不会像沃伦做得那么出色。

37. One way to add Berkshire to S&P 500 without market disruption

将伯克希尔加入标普500而不引发市场动荡的方法

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Zone 13. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，13号区域。（笑声和掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m Cary Flecker (PH) from Wellington, Florida. Thank you for stopping by the convention center before, Mr. Buffett. It’s nice to see you again.

提问者：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自佛罗里达州威灵顿的凯瑞·弗莱克（音）。巴菲特先生，谢谢您之前光临会展中心，很高兴再次见到您。

WARREN BUFFETT: My pleasure.

沃伦·巴菲特：很高兴。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Recently, much has been made of the fact that Berkshire is the largest company to not be included in the S&P 500.

提问者：最近，很多人都在谈论伯克希尔是未被纳入标普500的最大公司这一事实。

Do you gentleman have an opinion as — or what is your opinion — as to whether Berkshire should be included and why? Thank you.

两位先生是否有意见，或者说您们的意见是伯克希尔是否应该被纳入标普500，以及为什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s a question we’ve gotten asked quite often since the General Re deal was announced.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，自从宣布通用再保险交易后，我们经常被问到这个问题。

Berkshire, if you talk to the S&P people, I think they would say — I think they’ve even said it publicly, or at least a representative has — that we certainly qualify in every way that — except from what they might term the liquidity standpoint.

如果你和标普的人交流，我想他们会说——我认为他们甚至公开说过，或者至少某位代表说过——我们在各个方面都符合标准，除了他们可能认为的流动性问题。

It’s probable that maybe it’s 6 percent, maybe 7 percent of the investment funds, the equity funds in the United States are indexed. And the number, or the amount, is going up somewhat as we go along. I saw an article to the contrary on that. But I think they had it wrong. The amount of index money is, in my view, rising month by month.

美国的投资基金或股票基金中，大约有6%或7%是指数化的。而且这个数字或金额正在逐渐增加。我看到过一篇持相反观点的文章，但我认为他们的结论是错的。在我看来，指数化资金的金额是逐月增长的。

So, if you were to put Berkshire into the index tomorrow, in effect, you’d have a market order to buy 6 to 7 percent of the company, or roughly 100,000 shares a day.

因此，如果明天将伯克希尔纳入指数，实际上就等于发出了购买公司6%至7%股份的市场订单，或者说每天约10万股的购买需求。

That would not be good, you know, if the stock would obviously spike up dramatically as some stocks already have when they’ve been added. I mean, there’ve been some — I’ve looked at the list of all the companies that have been added and some have moved up substantially.

那样的话就不好了，股票价格显然会像某些被纳入的股票一样大幅上涨。我查看过所有被纳入公司的名单，其中一些公司的股价确实大幅上升了。

And we would have even — there’d be even more impact at Berkshire than the typical stock because our stock is fairly tightly held. Most people don’t want to sell it.

对伯克希尔的影响会比普通股票更大，因为我们的股票持有非常集中。大多数人都不愿意卖掉它。

There are two solutions to that. Three solutions, one of them being not to put us in the index.

对此有两种解决方案。或者说三种，其中一种就是不把我们纳入指数。

But we are the most — I think, probably the most significant in the United States that isn’t in the index, in terms of market value and a lot of other factors.

但我们可能是美国市场上最重要的公司之一，按市值和许多其他因素来看，却未被纳入指数。

So, if you want to put Berkshire or a company like it in the index and not have some crazy market aberration, you could have one of two things happen. And this would be true, I think, more and more of other companies, as well, as they add them to the index and there’s more money against index.

因此，如果想把伯克希尔或类似的公司纳入指数，同时避免出现一些疯狂的市场异常，你可以采取以下两种方法之一。而且我认为，随着越来越多的公司被加入指数和更多资金追踪指数，这对其他公司来说也同样适用。

One, you could have the company agree that at the time it was added to the index that simultaneously, the company, itself, would sell an amount of stock that was about equal to the index buying that would be generated.

第一，公司可以同意在被纳入指数的同时，公司本身出售等量的股票，以平衡指数购买所产生的需求。

In other words, if we were to offer 100,000 shares, roughly, of A stock at the same as being added to the index, that would neutralize the index buying.

换句话说，如果我们在被纳入指数的同时发行约10万股A类股票，这将抵消指数购买的影响。

The only problem with that is we don’t want to sell 100,000 shares or 10,000 shares or 100 shares of A stock at Berkshire unless we had some very good use for the money. It isn’t going to happen. (Applause)

唯一的问题是，伯克希尔不想出售10万股、1万股甚至100股A类股票，除非我们有非常好的资金用途。这是不可能发生的。（掌声）

So we are not going to do something like that just because we want to be in an index.

所以我们不会为了加入指数而做这样的事情。

The other possibility, and I believe this was used in Australia, when a very large mutual life company converted to stock. I think it was the largest company in Australia — AMP. And that would be to phase in the weighting of a stock like Berkshire.

另一种可能性是，我认为澳大利亚曾经采用过这种方法，当时一家非常大的互助寿险公司转换为股票公司。我认为那是澳大利亚最大的公司——AMP。他们逐步引入股票权重，比如伯克希尔的股票权重。

And I think later on, I think they may have to do it for all stocks. But phase in the weighting, say, over a 12-month period. So that I was 1/12th weighted the first month, 1/12th weighted the second month and so on. That means, in effect, there would have to be a market order once a month for a half of 1 percent, roughly, of Berkshire.

我认为，以后他们可能需要对所有股票都这样做。比如，在12个月内逐步引入权重。第一个月分配1/12的权重，第二个月再分配1/12，依此类推。这实际上意味着每个月市场会有一笔约占伯克希尔0.5%的订单。

Well, I don’t think that would be very particularly disruptive. And I think there’d be a — once you knew that phase in was coming, there would be some anticipation so that you would not get big spikes in the stock and dips, subsequently.

我认为这不会引起特别大的市场干扰。而且一旦人们知道这种逐步纳入正在进行，就会有所预期，从而避免股票大幅波动和随后的回调。

I think that would be a logical way, but Standard and Poor’s, to date, has not had to do that sort of thing. And they may have various reasons, and various good reasons for not wanting to do that.

我认为这是一种合乎逻辑的方法，但到目前为止，标普并未采取这种措施。他们可能有各种原因，也可能有充分的理由不想这么做。

Now, if indexation continues to grow as it has and you get a situation where 15 percent of the money becomes indexed, you know, I think they’re going to have to come up with some approach similar to one of these two that I’ve named, or it will simply get too disruptive to the market.

现在，如果指数化继续像这样增长，达到15%的资金都变成指数化资金，我认为他们必须提出类似我提到的这两种方法之一，否则市场的波动性将变得过于剧烈。

It would be interesting. I know America Online has behaved very well since it was introduced to the S&P some time back.

这会很有趣。我知道美国在线（America Online）自从被纳入标普指数后表现得非常好。

But I would think that it might get to be the case that, if you simply shorted the companies that got added to the S&P after the S&P effect had been felt, that that might — you might find that those stocks would tend to underperform, as that one artificial buy order, in effect, its impact wore off.

但我认为，可能会出现这样的情况：如果你在标普效应消退后做空那些被加入标普指数的公司股票，你可能会发现这些股票往往表现不佳，因为这种人为买入的影响最终会消退。

So, I think something is going to happen. I think indexation has far exceeded what anybody anticipated, including S&P or including me or Charlie. And I think there’s been a good reason for it to develop.

所以，我认为一些变化会发生。我认为指数化投资的规模已经远远超出任何人的预期，包括标普，也包括我和查理。我认为它的发展有其正当理由。

I think as it continues to develop it will have more and more impact on the market in ways that, probably, S&P is not that excited about, nor would the index funds be excited about.

我认为，随着它的继续发展，它会以某种方式对市场产生越来越大的影响，而这种方式可能并不是标普或指数基金乐见的。

So, there’s likely to come a solution to the liquidity problem that might be particularly acute at Berkshire, but that prevails throughout the market, that occurs when stocks are added.

因此，可能会出现一种解决流动性问题的方法，这种问题在伯克希尔可能尤为突出，但实际上在整个市场中，当股票被纳入指数时，这种问题都存在。

And I would think if they adopt some solution, that certainly, if they adopt a solution of gradual weighting, that Berkshire would be a very logical candidate for the S&P.

我认为，如果他们采取某种解决方案，尤其是采用逐步引入权重的方法，那么伯克希尔将是标普指数的一个非常合理的候选公司。

It really makes no difference to us what is done along that line. We would not unhappy being in the S&P, as long as it didn’t have some huge market impact at the moment of putting it in.

对我们来说，采取哪种方法并没有什么区别。只要加入标普指数时不会对市场造成巨大的影响，我们不会介意被纳入标普指数。

On the other hand, you know, we love the owners we’ve got. And I don’t see how we could improve on this group much by having the index funds.

另一方面，我们非常喜欢现有的股东。我不认为通过引入指数基金投资者，我们能显著改善股东结构。

So, it — we’ll see what happens on it. It is not a big deal to us. And we want to be sure if we’re ever added, it isn’t too big a deal to the market.

所以，我们会看看会发生什么。这对我们来说不是大问题。但我们希望，如果我们被纳入指数，这对市场来说也不会是个大问题。

Because I would not like — you know, the people who sold that day, might like it — but I would not like the stock to jump up, you know, $20,000 a share on one day because there’s some market order for 100,000 shares, and then gradually work its way back down to where it should’ve been in the first place.

因为我不希望——尽管当天卖出的股东可能会喜欢——但我不希望股票因为有10万股的市场买单而在某一天跳涨2万美元一股，然后逐渐回落到原本应该的位置。

No one benefits from that except the people who sell in the very short-term. And that is not the group that I primarily worry about.

除了短期卖出的人，没有人会从中受益。而这并不是我主要关心的股东群体。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: My guess is that Berkshire will eventually be in the S&P index. Somebody will figure out how to do that, sensibly. Maybe not soon. But someday.

查理·芒格：我猜伯克希尔最终会被纳入标普指数。总有人会找到合理的方法实现这一点。也许不会很快，但总有一天会实现。

38. What we’d need to make an international acquisition

我们在进行国际收购时的要求

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第一区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is James Claus (PH), and I’m here from New York City.

观众：我叫詹姆斯·克劳斯（音），来自纽约市。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, today we’ve already heard you talk about a few countries outside of the U.S., here.

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，今天我们已经听您谈到了几个美国以外的国家。

And my question is, if you’re directly investing in equities outside the United States, what would be your requirements for the market as a whole?

我的问题是，如果您直接投资于美国以外的股票，您对整个市场有哪些要求？

And by this, I mean things like the transparency of the accounting system, the breadth and liquidity in the market, the rights of shareholders, the stability of the currency. And it’d be nice if you’d mention a few of these countries.

我的意思是会计系统的透明度、市场的广度和流动性、股东权利以及货币的稳定性。您能提到一些国家就更好了。

Kind of just a little addendum, there, is — for the companies in these countries, how relevant do you believe the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP contained in Form 20F really is?

另外一个小问题是，您认为这些国家公司的 Form 20F 文件中包含的与美国公认会计准则（GAAP）的调节有多大意义？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is most of those points you mentioned would be of interest to us.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，您提到的大多数点都会引起我们的兴趣。

We’d have to rule out anything where the markets aren’t big enough. I mean, we are looking to put hundreds of millions of dollars into any single investment, at a minimum. Certainly, we think in terms of 500 million as being a minimum. We make exceptions to that. And that’s going to rule out a great many companies.

我们必须排除那些市场规模不够大的地方。我的意思是，我们至少希望在任何单笔投资中投入几亿美元。具体来说，我们认为 5 亿美元是最低门槛。当然，我们会有例外，但这仍会排除很多公司。

Transparency of accounting and accounting rules: we care about that but we can make adjustments mentally. In some respects, we may think, in certain countries, accounting is better than here.

会计和会计规则的透明度：我们对此很关心，但我们可以在心里做一些调整。在某些方面，我们甚至可能认为某些国家的会计比美国更好。

And so, as long as we understand the accounting system, we will be looking toward the same kind of a discount model in our mind of how much cash is this business going to generate over years and how much is going to have to be put into it.

因此，只要我们理解会计系统，我们会用同样的折现模型来思考：这家公司在未来几年能产生多少现金，以及需要投入多少资金。

And it’s the same sort of calculation that goes into our thinking here. And here, we don’t follow strictly GAAP accounting in our thinking. So we don’t — the accounting differences would not bother us, as long as we understood those accounting differences.

这与我们在美国市场中的思考方式一致。而且，我们在思考时并不严格遵循美国公认会计准则（GAAP）。所以，只要我们理解这些会计差异，就不会因此感到困扰。

The nuances of taxes, the corporate governance that you mentioned could make a difference. If we thought corporate governance was far inferior to here, we’d have to make an adjustment for that fact.

税务的细微差异和您提到的公司治理可能会有所影响。如果我们认为公司的治理水平远不如美国，我们会根据这一事实进行调整。

But I would say that in most of the major countries, the countries that have stock markets that are big enough so we could take a real position, it’s a possibility that we would invest in any of them.

但我认为，在大多数主要国家，只要其股票市场规模足够大，能够让我们持有实质性头寸，我们都有可能投资。

We don’t — we wouldn’t rule out, you know, Japan, Germany, France, England, the major markets.

比如说，日本、德国、法国、英国这些主要市场，我们不会排除。

Now, it’s important to recognize that in all the world’s stock markets, something like 53 percent of the value is in the U.S. market. I mean, here we have 4 1/2 percent of the world’s population. But 53 percent of the value of all publicly held companies in the world is represented in — with companies in the U.S. market. So, we are a big part of the pie.

需要认识到的是，全球股票市场的总市值中，美国市场约占 53%。美国的人口只占全球的 4.5%，但全球所有上市公司的价值有 53% 体现在美国市场中。所以，我们是这个“蛋糕”的重要组成部分。

But we’re very willing to look at almost all of the rest of the pie as long as we’re talking about markets that are big enough to let us put real money into them.

但是，只要市场规模足够大，能让我们投入实质性资金，我们非常愿意去关注“蛋糕”的其他部分。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, so far, we haven’t done much, as Warren has said. But we don’t have a rule against it. What more can we say? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，到目前为止，我们确实没有做太多正如沃伦所说的。但我们没有禁止投资国际市场的规则。还能说什么呢？（笑声）

39. Bullish on Coca-Cola despite high P/E and dollar strength

看好可口可乐，尽管市盈率高且美元强势

WARREN BUFFETT: We can say, “Zone 2.” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们可以说“第二区域”。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett. My name is Jean-Philippe Cramers (PH), and I’m coming from London, England. I have a question regarding Coca-Cola.

观众：早上好，巴菲特先生。我叫让-菲利普·克雷默斯（音），来自英国伦敦。我有一个关于可口可乐的问题。

The first part is, are you worried that the earnings of Coca-Cola might continue to be affected by the weakness in the emerging markets and the strength of the dollar over the next few years?

第一部分问题是，您是否担心未来几年可口可乐的收益会持续受到新兴市场疲软和美元强势的影响？

And the second part is on the P/E ratio of Coca-Cola at 35 times earnings. Are you worried about the potential rise in interest rates? And is it linked to your views on inflation that you are not worried about the rise in interest rate? Thank you.

第二部分问题是，可口可乐当前的市盈率是 35 倍。您是否担心潜在的利率上升？这是否与您对通胀的看法有关，使您不担心利率上升？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in relation to the strength of the dollar, which means that profits in foreign currencies don’t translate into as many dollars, we — I — we don’t have any big feeling on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于美元的强势，这意味着外币利润转化为美元时会减少，我们——我——对此没有特别大的看法。

I mean, if I — if we had strong feelings about the dollar’s behavior, vis-à-vis the yen, or the euro, or the pound, or whatever it might be — you know, we could give vent to those views by actually buying or selling large amounts of foreign exchange.

我的意思是，如果我们对美元与日元、欧元或英镑等货币的走势有很强烈的看法，我们可以通过大规模买卖外汇来表达这些观点。

We don’t know what — which way the dollar’s going to go. So, I have no — I have nothing in my mind, in regard to any decision on buying or selling Coke, that would relate to any prediction in my mind about the course of the dollar.

但我们不知道美元未来的走向。因此，我在考虑买入或卖出可口可乐股票时，完全没有基于对美元走势的预测。

The earnings of Coke have been affected by the strength of the dollar in the last few years, particularly the strength against the yen when, you know, when it went from 80-odd to 140-odd. That was a huge hit, in terms of what the — in terms of the yen translation into dollars from those profits. And the strength of the dollar generally would hurt.

近年来，可口可乐的收益确实受到了美元强势的影响，尤其是美元兑日元从 80 多升至 140 多时。这在日元利润转化为美元方面是一个巨大冲击。总体来说，美元强势会对可口可乐造成不利影响。

But looking forward, I don’t have any prediction on that.

但展望未来，我对此没有任何预测。

It’s in Coke’s interest to have countries around the world prosperous. I mean, they will benefit from increased prosperity, increased standards of living, throughout the world. I think we’ll see that over any 10 or 20-year period. I think people’s preference for Coke will do nothing but grow Coca-Cola products.

可口可乐希望全球各国都能繁荣发展。因为全球的繁荣和生活水平的提高会给它带来好处。我认为，在未来 10 年或 20 年内，我们会看到这种趋势。我相信人们对可口可乐产品的偏好只会增加。

So, what I am concerned about is share of market and then, what I call share of mind. In other words, what do people think about Coca-Cola now, compared to 10 years ago or 20 years ago? What are they going to think about it 10 years from now?

所以，我更关心的是市场份额，以及我称之为“心智份额”的东西。换句话说，现在的人们对可口可乐的看法，与 10 年前或 20 年前相比如何？他们在 10 年后又会怎么看？

Coca-Cola has a marvelous share of mind around the world. Everybody in the world, almost, has something in their mind about Coca-Cola products and overwhelmingly, it’s favorable.

可口可乐在全球范围内拥有惊人的“心智份额”。几乎每个人对可口可乐产品都有一定的印象，而且大多数是正面的。

You can’t — you know, try to think of three other companies like it. I can’t do it, in terms of that ubiquity of good feeling, essentially, about the product.

你无法——试着想出另外三个类似的公司。我做不到，从产品带来的普遍良好感受来说，没有几家公司能与之相比。

We measure it by unit cases sold and by shares outstanding. And we want a lot more unit cases sold. And we like the idea of fewer shares outstanding over time.

我们通过售出的单位销量和流通股数量来衡量。我们希望售出的单位销量越来越多，同时流通股数量随着时间推移越来越少。

I’ll give you — I’ll be giving that same answer 10, or 15, or 20 years from now. And I think they’ll be a lot more unit cases sold then.

十年后、十五年后甚至二十年后，我还会给出相同的答案。我相信到那时可口可乐的销量会更多。

It is true that the case growth slowed starting in the second half of last year and continuing through the first quarter of this year. But that’s happened from time to time in the past.

确实，从去年下半年开始到今年第一季度，销量增长有所放缓。但这种情况过去也曾出现过。

In my view, you know, that is not — it’s not an important item. It may be an important item in what the stock does, you know, in a six-month period or a one-year period. But we’ll be around 10 years from now, and Coca-Cola will be around 10 years from now.

在我看来，这并不是一个重要的问题。它可能会对股票的表现产生影响，比如在六个月或一年的时间里。但十年后我们还会在，可口可乐也会在。

And right now, we own eight-point-one or two percent of Coca-Cola. And we’ll probably own a larger percentage 10 years from now, because they’ll have probably repurchased some stock.

目前，我们持有可口可乐 8.1% 或 8.2% 的股份。十年后，我们可能会持有更大的比例，因为他们可能会回购一些股票。

The P/E ratio of Coke, like virtually every other leading company in the world strikes us as, you know, they all strike us as being quite full.

可口可乐的市盈率，就像几乎所有全球领先公司的市盈率一样，在我们看来都相当高。

That doesn’t mean they’re going to go down. But it does mean that our enthusiasm for buying more of these wonderful companies is less than it was when the P/E ratios were substantially less.

这并不意味着它们会下跌，但确实意味着我们对增持这些优秀公司的热情低于它们市盈率大幅降低时的水平。

Ideally, those are the kind of companies we want to buy more of over time. We understand their businesses.

理想情况下，这些是我们希望随着时间推移增持的公司类型。我们理解它们的业务。

And my guess is that there’s a reasonable chance, at least, that sometime in the next 10 years, we buy more shares of either Coke or Gillette or American Express or some of those other wonderful companies we own.

我猜，未来十年里，我们至少有合理的可能性增持可口可乐、吉列、美国运通或其他一些我们拥有的优秀公司。

20年后也是这个名单。

We do not like the P/E ratios, generally. But, again, I stress that does not mean they’re going down. It just means that we got spoiled in terms of how much we got for our money in the past. And we hope that we get spoiled again.

总体来说，我们并不喜欢这些市盈率。但我再次强调，这并不意味着它们会下跌。这只是意味着我们过去在投资中得到的价值让我们变得挑剔了，我们希望未来还能继续这样挑剔。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I — if what matters to you is what you think Coke is going to look like 10 years out or even further out, you don’t really pay much attention to short-term economic developments in this country or that, or currency rates, or any other such things.

查理·芒格：是的，如果你关注的是可口可乐十年后甚至更远的未来，那么你不会过多关注某个国家的短期经济发展、汇率或其他类似的事情。

They don’t really help you in making the 10 or 15-year projection. And that’s the one we’re making. So, we have tuned out all this noise, as it’s called and what —

这些事情对你做 10 年或 15 年的预测并没有太大帮助。而我们正是在做这样的长期预测。因此，我们排除了所有这些所谓的“噪音”。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sometimes.

沃伦·巴菲特：有时候会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — communication networks — tune out the noise. And if you look at the big picture, we think Coke is fine.

查理·芒格： ——通讯网络——排除噪音。从大局来看，我们认为可口可乐很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s hard to think of a better business in the world, among big businesses. You know, there’s obviously companies that are starting from much smaller bases that could grow faster. But it’s hard to think of a much more solid business.

沃伦·巴菲特： 在大型企业中，想找到比可口可乐更好的业务是很难的。当然，也有一些从小规模起步、可能增长更快的公司。但很难找到比可口可乐更稳健的业务。

40. Nothing to say about Berkshire’s investment in silver

关于伯克希尔投资白银，没有更多要说的

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

沃伦·巴菲特：第三区域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Newport Beach, California, Bruce Lindsay. And formerly from Omaha, Nebraska. And I have a question.

观众： ——加利福尼亚州纽波特海滩，布鲁斯·林赛。之前来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈。我有一个问题。

Some time ago I read that you were buying silver. I never knew the reason why you were buying silver.

不久前，我读到您在购买白银。我从未知道您购买白银的原因是什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we covered silver purchase in the 1997 annual report for a special reason. A, it was part of a group of three unconventional investments we made. And one of those investments was of sufficient size so we felt people ought to know about it, specifically.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们在 1997 年的年度报告中提到了白银购买，这是出于特殊原因。首先，它是我们进行的三项非传统投资之一。其中有一项投资规模较大，我们觉得有必要让大家具体了解。

And then we felt our shareholders ought to know that we sometimes do things that they might not have guessed that we would do, from reading past annual reports. So we named the three unconventional investments.

其次，我们认为股东应该知道，有时我们会做一些从以往年度报告中无法预见的事情。因此，我们列出了这三项非传统投资。

But in this year’s report, we have stated we will not be naming those investments unless one of two things happened: one is that they become of a size that you should know about them specifically, in order to evaluate the kind of thing we do in Berkshire and the commitment of resources that has been made, or two, if regulatory authorities either — obviously, if they require us to report it, we’ll report it immediately.

但在今年的报告中，我们说明了，除非发生以下两种情况，否则我们不会再具体列出这些投资：一是它们的规模足够大，您需要了解它们以评估我们在伯克希尔的投资方式以及资源投入；二是监管机构要求我们披露，显然如果有要求，我们会立即报告。

Or in the case of silver, a year-plus ago, an important regulatory authority indicated they would’ve — that they’d prefer if we report it. We weren’t required to do so. But — and our desire is to cooperate on that, anyway. So, we did report it.

就白银而言，一年多前，一家重要的监管机构表示他们希望我们报告此事。虽然我们并非被要求这么做，但我们愿意配合。因此，我们报告了这项投资。

But we stated in this year’s report that absent those factors, we will not be giving details on unconventional investments any more than we give any more details on our regular equity holdings, than we’re, more or less, required to do.

但我们在今年的报告中说明，如果没有上述因素，我们不会详细披露非传统投资，正如我们不会超出必要要求详细披露常规股票持仓一样。

We did say that we had changed certain of the unconventional investments that were described in the previous year’s report. And we stated that we’d entered into several new ones.

我们确实提到，我们对前一年报告中描述的某些非传统投资进行了调整，并表示我们已经进入了几项新的投资。

So, we are in some things that most of you or maybe all of you don’t know about. But they aren’t of sufficient size so that they’re going to, in any material way at all, affect your investment.

所以，我们确实参与了一些大多数人甚至所有人都不知道的投资。但它们的规模不足以对您的投资产生任何实质性影响。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没什么可补充的。

41. Year 2000 computer problem won’t be a “big deal”

2000年计算机问题不会是“大问题”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Morning, Mr. Buffett. Wayne Lang (PH) from Toronto, Canada.

观众：早上好，巴菲特先生。我是来自加拿大多伦多的韦恩·朗（音）。

Last year, when you were asked about the Year 2000 computer issue, you expressed some concerns about the cost overruns and the federal government readiness.

去年，当有人问您关于2000年计算机问题时，您对成本超支和联邦政府的准备工作表示了一些担忧。

Our two countries are in much better shape this year. But could you update us on your current thinking and what concerns you may have about the impact of the lesser readiness, internationally, on our company’s revenues, supply chain, or on the stock market?

今年我们两国的情况好多了。但您能否谈谈您目前的看法，以及国际上准备不足可能对我们公司的收入、供应链或股票市场的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, last year I think I also told you I didn’t really consider myself an expert on this. And what I tell you is just what I pick up from being on audit committees or talking to people who are a lot smarter than I am in this sort of area.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，去年我想我也告诉过您，我并不认为自己是这方面的专家。我所说的只是我从审计委员会的工作中或与比我在这类领域更聪明的人交谈中获得的信息。

But that doesn’t mean they’re right on it. Because they weren’t talking about it 15 years ago, when they should have been talking about it.

但这并不意味着他们是对的。因为在他们应该讨论这个问题的15年前，他们并没有谈论它。

So I — my general feeling — and all secondhand — my general feeling is that the part of the world that we have to worry about is in pretty good shape.

所以我的总体感觉——虽然是二手信息——我的总体感觉是，我们需要担心的那部分世界的状况还不错。

It’s cost a lot of money in various places. It’s cost us a fair amount of money. But it’s — some companies, it’s cost a terrific amount of money.

在许多地方，这个问题花费了很多钱。对我们来说也花了一笔不少的钱。但对某些公司来说，这个问题花费了非常多的钱。

But I do not think it’s going to be a big deal. And, I — you know, I could be wrong. And I’m less worried about it being a big deal today than I was a year ago.

但我不认为这会是一个大问题。当然，我可能是错的。不过，相比一年前，我现在对这个问题成为大问题的担忧少了很多。

You know, and Charlie, do you have anything to add?

你知道的，查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

查理·芒格：没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: Does that mean you think it’s going to be less of a big deal than you thought a year ago?

沃伦·巴菲特：那是否意味着你认为这比你一年前预想的更不成问题？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it means I have nothing to add.

查理·芒格：不，这意味着我没有任何补充。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧。（笑声）

That’s probably what I should have said in the first place.

这大概是我一开始就应该说的。

42. Japan’s economic slump doesn’t affect Berkshire

日本的经济低迷不会影响伯克希尔

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第五区域。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Bob Brewer (PH). And I’m from down the road in Lincoln, Nebraska.

观众：早上好。我叫鲍勃·布鲁尔（音），来自内布拉斯加州林肯，就在附近。

I just wanted to ask you how you think the continuing economic turmoil in Japan is likely to affect the global economy and the U.S. stock market over the next five to 10 years?

我想请问您，您认为日本持续的经济动荡可能会如何影响未来五到十年的全球经济和美国股市？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie and I are no good on those macro questions.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理和我不擅长回答这种宏观问题。

But I would say this: I mean, the Japan problem has been around, now — in financial markets and banking systems — has been around for some time now. So, I see no reason why it should have more impact on the rest of world now than it has had in the last few years. And I would say it’s had certainly very little effect on the U.S. in the last few years.

但我想说的是，日本的问题，无论是在金融市场还是银行系统，都已经存在了一段时间。所以，我看不出为什么它现在会比过去几年对世界其他地方有更大的影响。而且，我认为过去几年它对美国的影响非常小。

It’s not — it’s no factor in our thinking at all, in terms of what we would buy or sell tomorrow morning. I mean, if we got offered a good business tomorrow — unless it was directly involved and its primary business was in Japan — but if it was a business in this country, that’s not something that we would be thinking about. We would be thinking about the specifics of that business.

它完全不是我们考虑的因素，无论是明天早上要买还是要卖。我是说，如果明天我们遇到一个好的生意——除非它直接与日本相关且主要业务在日本——但如果它是美国的业务，我们不会考虑日本问题。我们会关注的是这个业务的具体情况。

We don’t really get too concerned about the things that come and go. I mean, in the end, if we’re right about a business over a 10 or 20-year period — take See’s Candy.

我们不会过于担心那些来来去去的事情。我的意思是，最终，如果我们对一个业务在10年或20年的时间里判断正确——比如说See’s糖果。

问题是很多人活在来来去去的事情中。

We bought it in 1972. Look what happened in 1973 and 4, you know, and all the oil shocks and what this country was going through and inflation, all that sort of thing.

我们在1972年买下了它。看看1973年和1974年发生了什么，比如石油危机，这个国家经历的各种问题，以及通货膨胀，等等。

For us to — and let’s say in 1972 somebody laid out a roadmap from 1972 to 1982, with the prime rate going to 21 1/2 percent, long-term rates going to 15 percent. And all of the things happening, the Dow going to 570 or what — or 560.

假设在1972年，有人列出一份从1972年到1982年的路线图，说明基准利率会升到21.5%，长期利率会升到15%，还有其他各种事情，道琼斯指数会降到570点或560点。

That wasn’t the important thing. The important thing was that this peanut brittle tastes like it does, which is terrific. (Laughter)

这些都不是重要的事情。重要的是，这款花生脆糖的味道依然如同它本来的样子——非常棒。（笑声）

And that over time, we could get a little more money for it. So, you know. See’s made $4 million, pretax, in 1972, when we bought it. It made 62 million last year.

而且随着时间的推移，我们可以从中赚到更多钱。你知道的，1972年我们买下See’s时，它的税前利润是400万美元。去年，它赚了6200万美元。

It doesn’t — we don’t want to be thinking about the wrong things when we’re buying businesses. And that applies to marketable securities, just as much as it does as when we’re buying 100 percent of the business.

当我们购买业务时，我们不想考虑错误的事情。这一点同样适用于可交易证券，就像适用于我们购买一家公司100%的股份时一样。

If we’re right about the business, the macro factors aren’t going to make any difference, you know. And if we’re wrong about the business, macro factors are not going to bail us out.

如果我们对业务的判断是正确的，宏观因素不会产生任何影响。如果我们对业务的判断是错误的，宏观因素也救不了我们。

Charlie?

查理？

43. Munger’s lesson on not allowing accounting “slop”

芒格关于不要允许会计“混乱”的教训

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what I think is interesting in Japan is interesting to one, as a citizen.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为日本的情况很有趣，这对一位普通公民来说是很值得关注的。

Here’s a major industrial country. And we understand all about Keynesian economics and everything else. And when it starts sliding down into a big recession, it just keeps going and going, and floundering, and staying down. And year follows year, and you take the interest rates down to practically zero, and you run a big budget deficit. The economy still stays down.

这里有一个主要的工业国家。我们理解凯恩斯经济学和其他理论。但当它陷入一场大衰退时，却不断下滑、挣扎并停滞不前。一年又一年，你把利率降到几乎为零，实行巨额预算赤字，但经济仍然低迷。

I think this has been very interesting to the economists of the world. I don’t think any of them would’ve predicted that as modern a country as Japan could contract for as long as it did.

我认为，这对世界各地的经济学家来说非常有趣。我认为没有人会预料到像日本这样现代化的国家会经历如此长时间的经济收缩。

And I think the cause is related to the extremeness of its booms in both land prices and security prices, and the corruption in its accounting practices and in its regulation of financial system, including banks.

我认为，原因与其土地价格和证券价格的极端繁荣，以及其会计实践中的腐败和对包括银行在内的金融系统监管不力有关。

I think it’s an interesting lesson for the world, of how important it is not to let a lot of slop get into the accounting and regulatory systems. And how a lot of folly in markets doesn’t help, either.

我认为，这对世界来说是一个有趣的教训，即不要让大量的混乱进入会计和监管系统的重要性。而市场中的许多愚蠢行为也无济于事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sort of fascinating to, you know — people keep saying, “Why doesn’t Japan stimulate?” Well, they got short-term rates down to zero. And long-term rates at 2 percent. Well, that should stimulate me. But — (laughter) — it doesn’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：这有点令人着迷，你知道的，人们不断问：“为什么日本没有刺激经济？”他们把短期利率降到了零，长期利率降到了2%。这本该刺激经济，但——（笑声）——却没有。

As Charlie says, it sort of defied, a little bit, some of the classical Keynesian theory on that. But in the ’30s, we had the same problem in this country. We drove interest rates way down towards the latter half of the ’30s, and —

正如查理所说，这在某种程度上违背了一些经典的凯恩斯理论。但在20世纪30年代，我们国家也遇到了同样的问题。在30年代后半段，我们把利率大幅降低，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I would argue that probably the extreme prosperity in America is related to this so-called wealth effect, with stock markets going up and up. And I think people thought that was a smaller factor than maybe it is.

查理·芒格：我认为，美国的极端繁荣可能与所谓的财富效应有关，股市持续上涨。我认为，人们低估了这个因素的重要性。

44. Analyst coverage won’t affect Berkshire’s stock

分析师的关注不会影响伯克希尔的股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Jeff Lilly (PH) from Denver, Colorado.

观众：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自科罗拉多州丹佛的杰夫·利利（音）。

My question is as follows: over the last couple of years, I’ve read both of you quoted as not following the stock price on a day-to-day basis, not being terribly concerned about whether Berkshire is up or down.

我的问题如下：过去几年，我读到您们都表示不会每天关注股票价格，也不太关心伯克希尔的股价是涨是跌。

You now have analyst coverage. Perhaps you requested it, or perhaps you acquiesced to it.

现在，伯克希尔得到了分析师的关注。也许是您们要求的，也许是您们默认的。

But my question is whether this reflects any change in your attention paid to the stock price or your philosophy about investor relations, and whether you think the analyst coverage is going to have any impact on the stock price going forward?

但我的问题是，这是否反映了您们对股价关注程度或投资者关系理念的任何改变？您们认为分析师的关注会对未来股价产生影响吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no. It reflects no change in our attitude toward stock price. I mean, we are concerned about building the intrinsic value per share of Berkshire at the highest rate we can, consistent with a couple of other principles that we’ve set forth.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，不。这并未反映我们对股价态度的任何改变。我们的关注点是以我们设定的几项原则为基础，以最高的速度提高伯克希尔每股的内在价值。

And we hope very much that the stock price stays in a zone that is not too wide around intrinsic value — that there’s is going to be some zone of some sort, because intrinsic value itself is not precisely calculable. And in addition, you wouldn’t expect it to track it penny for penny.

我们非常希望股票价格能够保持在接近内在价值的一个合理范围内——虽然这个范围不可避免地会存在，因为内在价值本身无法精确计算。此外，也不指望股价与内在价值完全一致。

But we don’t want it to go crazy in either direction in relation to intrinsic value.

但我们不希望股价相对于内在价值在任何方向上出现过度波动。

When we made the deal with General Re, that attracted more analyst attention and institutional investor attention because General Re’s shareholder base was overwhelmingly institutional.

当我们与通用再保险（General Re）达成交易时，这吸引了更多分析师和机构投资者的关注，因为通用再保险的股东群体主要是机构投资者。

So, institutions had to decide whether they were going to continue with their investment or clean it out. And we knew we would end up with more institutional ownership, subsequently.

因此，这些机构必须决定是否继续持有投资，或退出持股。我们也知道，最终会有更多的机构持有我们的股票。

Alice Schroeder asked me, prior to the merger meeting, she said there were a group of institutions that were coming to the meeting, which I liked. I mean, the fact that they were serious enough about their investment to come and see what Berkshire was all about.

在合并会议之前，爱丽丝·施罗德问我，说有一群机构会参加会议，我对此感到高兴。我认为，这表明他们对自己的投资足够重视，愿意亲自来了解伯克希尔的情况。

And a few of them even had a requirement, I think, from their own boards that they, at least, have sat down with management. So, we spent — or I spent an hour or so with a group that she had put together and they came to Omaha.

我想，其中一些机构甚至有来自其董事会的要求，至少要与管理层坐下来交流。因此，我与爱丽丝组织的一组人花了大约一个小时，他们来到了奥马哈。

But that’s the last contact I’ve had with any institutional investor. And we will have no special meetings with institutional investors or anything. I mean, they are absolutely welcome to attend this meeting to get all of the information that’s dispensed.

但那是我与任何机构投资者的最后一次接触。我们不会与机构投资者举行任何特别会议或其他活动。我是说，他们完全可以参加这个会议，获取所有披露的信息。

I think it’s very useful, frankly, to have an analyst or two that is well-versed in Berkshire and that thinks straight and does their homework. And that’s a plus, because it means we don’t have to do it.

坦白说，我认为有一两个熟悉伯克希尔的分析师，他们思路清晰，做了功课，这是非常有用的。这是一个优点，因为这意味着我们不需要亲自做这些事情。

And in effect, that if institutions want to talk to somebody about it, they don’t call me. Because they’re not going to have much luck calling me. And they can call Alice or some other analyst that wants to do it.

实际上，如果机构想要和某人讨论伯克希尔，他们不会打电话给我。因为打给我也不会有多大效果。他们可以联系爱丽丝或其他愿意做这件事的分析师。

And that’s perfect. We have a non-paid — it is not investor relations because that’s thought of somebody as sort of pumping your stock — but at least we have a information office now — a non-paid information office.

这非常理想。我们有一个无偿的信息办公室——这不是投资者关系，因为那通常被认为是在推销股票——但至少我们现在有了一个非付费的信息办公室。

And you know, that goes along the grain of my nature. (Laughter)

而且你知道的，这非常符合我的性格。（笑声）

And we — people say, “Do you want individual owners? You want institutional owners?” What we want are informed owners who are in sync with our objectives, our measurements, our time horizons, all of that sort of thing.

有人会问，“你们更希望有个人投资者还是机构投资者？”我们希望拥有的是明智的股东，他们与我们的目标、衡量标准和时间跨度等完全一致。

I mean, we want people that are going to be comfortable owning Berkshire, and we don’t want people who are owning it for reasons different — in a way different — that are different from our reasons for owning.

我们希望的是那些能从容持有伯克希尔的人，而不是那些持有伯克希尔的原因与我们持有的原因截然不同的人。

We don’t want people that are concerned about quarterly earnings. We don’t want people who are concerned about stock splits. We don’t, you know — we don’t want people that need to be pumped up about the stock, periodically.

我们不希望那些关注季度收益的人，也不希望那些关注股票拆分的人。我们更不希望那些需要定期被“鼓舞”来持有股票的人。

It’s just not of interest to us. Because it just means we have to keep living that way in the future. And it’s not the way we want to live now, it’s not the way we want to live in the future.

这些都不是我们感兴趣的。因为如果这样，我们就必须在未来继续以这种方式生活。而这既不是我们现在想要的生活方式，也不是我们未来想要的。

What we really want are a bunch of people, like we have in this audience, who sit down and read, and think and understand that they’re making an investment. It’s not just a little ticker symbol. They’re buying part of a business. They know what the business is all about.

我们真正想要的是一群人，就像在座的各位，他们会坐下来阅读、思考，并理解他们正在进行的是一项投资。这不仅仅是一个股票代码。他们在购买的是一家企业的一部分。他们了解这家企业的本质。

They know how we think, they know how we measure ourselves. They’re comfortable with that.

他们知道我们的思维方式，他们了解我们如何评价自己。他们对此感到满意。

And they can come in individual or institutional form. And when we get them, we like to keep them.

无论是个人投资者还是机构投资者都可以。只要我们吸引到了这样的股东，我们希望能够长期留住他们。

So there’s no change in our attitude about that. There is a change in coverage, in that we — there is some limited amount of coverage in Wall Street, which I guess for a company with a 110 or 20 billion of market value, there should be.

因此，我们在这方面的态度没有改变。但报道的确有所增加——现在华尔街对伯克希尔有一定的关注，我想对于一家市值在1100亿到1200亿美元之间的公司来说，这种关注是应该的。

45. Executive Jet’s advantage

Executive Jet的优势

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll have one more question then we’ll break for lunch. We’ll go to zone 7. And after this question, we’ll break. We’ll come back in about 45 minutes or so, and those of you — as long as we see that everybody’s gotten served with food in that time — and we’ll — any of those who are offsite or over at the Holiday, I think, there are buses to bring you over, you can drive over, and there’ll be plenty of room here. You can also go out and tour the Boeing business jet. We’ll sell you as little as 50 hours a year, I believe, on it. So, take your wallets at lunch time. Yep?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们再回答一个问题，然后休息吃午饭。我们来到第七区域。回答完这个问题后，我们将休息，大约 45 分钟后回来。对于那些在场外或在 Holiday 的人，我们安排了巴士接送，或者你也可以自己开车过来，这里会有足够的空间。同时，你还可以参观波音公务机。我相信我们可以以最低 50 小时每年的套餐出售给你们。所以，午餐时间带上钱包吧。好吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name’s Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia.

观众：早上好，我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺夫。

I was wondering if you could help us out with the flight operations, which are now a large part of Berkshire. I think we’re still putting a lot of capital into them.

我想请您谈谈飞行业务，这是目前伯克希尔的重要组成部分。我认为我们仍然在为其投入大量资本。

I was wondering, you’ve pooled both of them together in the annual report. And I was hoping, perhaps, you could help us out with what return on equity you’re expecting for each of those divisions.

我注意到您在年报中将两部分业务合并在一起。我希望您能谈谈对这两个部门的股本回报率的预期。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the more capital intensive is the flight safety operation. Because every simulator costs real money. And we will add a number of simulators each year.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，更资本密集的是飞行安全业务。因为每台模拟器都需要真金白银购买。而且我们每年都会增加一些模拟器。

So, flight safety — you can look at their figures before we acquired them, and it’s reasonable to extrapolate those numbers out on a larger basis — base as we go along.

所以，关于飞行安全业务——你可以查看我们收购之前的数据，并合理地将这些数据外推到更大的规模上。

But flight safety’s return on equity is not going to move up or down by a dramatic amount. I mean, our simulator training prices are related to the cost of the simulator. And so, there’s not going to be way higher returns on equity, nor should there be way lower returns on equity.

但飞行安全业务的股本回报率不会有大幅波动。我是说，我们的模拟器培训价格与模拟器成本相关。所以，股本回报率不会特别高，也不应该特别低。

There is a growth on the equity employed in the business, because it is a growing business and we’re training more and more pilots every year. But that’ll be a fairly steady thing.

这个业务的股本投入在增长，因为这是一个正在成长的业务，我们每年都在培训越来越多的飞行员。但这将是一个相对稳定的增长。

The Executive Jet business is in an earlier part of its development, although it’s the leader in its field, by far. But we’re doing substantial investment spending in a place like Europe. And we’ll be doing that on an accelerated pace, if anything.

公务机业务仍处于发展的早期阶段，尽管它在该领域已经遥遥领先。但我们正在像欧洲这样的地区进行大量投资支出。如果有什么变化的话，我们可能会加快这个进程。

In the end, though, our customers end up owning the plane. So, we have an investment in a core fleet of planes, which supplements the customer’s planes.

但最终，飞机是由客户拥有的。所以，我们只需要投资一支核心机队，以补充客户的飞机。

But by its nature, it’s not a capital-intensive business. We are moving around a lot of capital every day. We’ll have 140 or so customer planes now and an aggregate, you know, just to pick a figure, that those planes are certainly worth a billion and a half or more.

但从本质上说，这不是一个资本密集型业务。我们每天处理大量资金流动。我们目前有大约 140 架客户飞机，总价值至少为 15 亿美元或更多。

And we’ve got 7 billion of planes on order, or some number like that. But we will sell those planes to our customers. So it could be, down the line, that it will be a business with a very good return on capital.

我们有价值约 70 亿美元的飞机订单。但我们会将这些飞机出售给客户。因此，未来这可能会成为一个资本回报率非常高的业务。

We’ll still have an investment in the core fleet and we’ll have some facilities — hanger facilities and that sort of thing. But our customers will have the big capital investment.

我们仍会投资于核心机队，并拥有一些设施——比如机库等。但大部分资本投资将由客户承担。

I should point out, they’ll have a whole lot less capital investment if they own their entire plane themselves. So, they will be getting a bargain as well.

我还要指出，如果客户完全自己拥有飞机，他们的资本投资会高得多。所以，他们通过这种方式也获得了很大的实惠。

Let’s take off for lunch. And I’ll see you back here in about 45 minutes, those of you who wish to rejoin us. Thank you. (Applause)

现在休息吃午饭。希望想要继续参加的朋友大约 45 分钟后回来见。谢谢。（掌声）

Afternoon session

46. General Re benefits won’t be felt for several years

通用再保险的收益将在几年后显现

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re going to be ready to go in just a minute if everybody gets their seats.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，如果大家都找到座位，我们马上开始。

VOICE: Warren? Just want to double check something. We’re just going to stick in —

旁白：沃伦？我想确认一下。我们接下来会——

WARREN BUFFETT: One through eight.

沃伦·巴菲特：一到八。

VOICE: (Inaudible)

旁白：（听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: One through eight.

沃伦·巴菲特：一到八。

VOICE: (Inaudible)

旁白：（听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

We’ve got 6 or 7000, anyway, sticking around, I think.

我想，还有六七千人留在这里。

OK. If anyone who has questions wants to go to the microphone, we’re going to start here in just a minute. And we will start — there will only be eight zones from this point forward, because we have everyone in attendance in the main hall. So we will rotate around eight zones. We’ll stay until about 3:30. And we’ll start in zone 1.

好的，如果有问题的人想去麦克风前发问，我们马上开始。从现在开始只有八个区域，因为所有人都在主会场。我们会轮流到八个区域，活动将持续到下午 3:30 左右。我们从第一区域开始。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Charlie Sink (PH). I’m from Lexington, North Carolina, as you can tell by the accent.

观众：我叫查理·辛克（音），来自北卡罗来纳州的列克星敦，从我的口音就能听出来。

My question relates to the General Re purchase. I wondered — I’ve read your letters through the years and I’ve been trying to learn a little bit investing in insurance companies.

我的问题与收购通用再保险有关。我读了您多年来的股东信，一直在学习一些关于投资保险公司的知识。

Did you buy General Re, mostly because — I know mostly because of the float — because you think you can grow the float? I know it’s not growing significantly now. Or did you buy it because you felt like you could do better with the investments?

您收购通用再保险，是主要因为——我知道主要是因为浮存金——因为您认为可以增长浮存金？我知道目前浮存金并没有显著增长。还是因为您觉得可以更好地管理投资？

I’ve read, also, that companies who seem to be trying to follow the Berkshire model are trying to get a certain amount of investments to equity — is that something that you focus on? That’s my question.

我还读到，有些公司似乎在尝试模仿伯克希尔模式，努力让投资与股本达到某种比例——这是您关注的吗？这是我的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The first two parts are correct. We certainly — we don’t think the float will grow rapidly in the near-term future at all. The float changed, it actually declined very slightly in the first quarter.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，前两个部分是正确的。我们当然——我们并不认为浮存金会在短期内快速增长。实际上，第一季度浮存金略微下降了一点。

And, at a level of 6 billion or so of premiums, the paid losses are likely to run at a rate that would cause the float to remain more or less steady. So it will take a period when premiums grow, for the float to grow.

在约 60 亿美元的保费水平下，已支付的赔付可能会以一个使浮存金基本保持稳定的速度运行。因此，需要等待保费增长的时期，浮存金才能增长。

And the premiums would have to grow fairly substantially to have any significant impact on the float. And like I say, that will not happen in the short term. We expect the float to grow over the longer term.

而且保费必须有相当大的增长，才能对浮存金产生显著影响。正如我所说，这不会在短期内发生。我们预计浮存金将在长期内增长。

We expect that General Re will probably grow considerably faster in international markets than the domestic market.

我们预计通用再保险在国际市场的增长速度可能会显著快于国内市场。

We think that their reputation, which was as good as could be found, from an operational standpoint, from a technical standpoint, a managerial standpoint, will be further enhanced by Berkshire’s capital strength.

我们认为，从运营、技术和管理的角度来看，通用再保险的声誉已经非常优秀，而伯克希尔的资本实力会进一步提升他们的声誉。

So we think their reputation is likely to grow over the years and we think the premium volume will follow, but not in any major way at all for a few years, at least.

因此，我们认为他们的声誉在未来几年会进一步提升，保费收入也会随之增加，但至少在未来几年不会有显著的增长。

And then we addressed earlier in the meeting, we think there is the opportunity to do better with that float from time to time in the future.

此外，我们在早些时候的会议中提到，我们认为未来可能会有机会更好地利用这部分浮存金。

But right now that is not a plus that it’s in our hands, and it may not be a plus a year from now. We think at some point it will be a plus.

但目前，这部分浮存金在我们手中并没有显著优势，一年后可能仍然如此。不过，我们认为在某个时点，它会成为一个优势。

We also pointed out in — that there are some — there could be some tax advantages to be included as part of Berkshire as well. So there’s some things going for it.

我们还指出，作为伯克希尔的一部分，这笔业务可能会带来一些税收优势。所以，这也算是其中的一个好处。

But none of them will have — they will not have an impact in 1999, and they may well not have an impact in 2000.

但这些都不会在 1999 年产生影响，也可能不会在 2000 年产生影响。

We obviously think Berkshire, 10 years from now, will be worth more on a per share basis with General Re included than if it were — than if we had not made the deal.

我们显然认为，从每股价值来看，10 年后的伯克希尔，包含通用再保险的价值会比不包含它的价值更高。

We don’t necessarily think that’s the case on a one-year or two-year basis. But it is our judgment on a 10-year basis.

但我们不一定认为这一点会在一两年内显现出来。这是我们基于 10 年期的判断。

Charlie? (Laughter)

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say that if we, in the future, do as — one-third as well with the new float that came to us with General Re as we’ve done on average in the past, it will work wonderfully.

查理·芒格：我想说，如果未来我们能以过去平均水平的三分之一的效率利用通用再保险带来的新浮存金，那就已经是非常成功的了。

If you take our past use of float in the history of this company, it would be an interesting study if anybody ever stretched it out.

如果有人把我们公司过去对浮存金的使用历史延展开来研究，那将是一个很有趣的课题。

47. Technological change is bad for investments

技术变革对投资不利

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Greg Kaza (PH) from Oakland County, Michigan. I’d like to thank both of you gentleman for your hospitality this weekend.

观众：下午好。我叫格雷格·卡扎（音），来自密歇根州的奥克兰县。感谢两位先生在这个周末的热情款待。

My question deals with price deflation. Could you please explain how technological advances and productivity increases are affecting our non-fixed income holdings, especially insurance?

我的问题与价格通缩有关。您能否解释一下技术进步和生产力提高对我们的非固定收益持仓，特别是保险业务的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well I think that, to the extent your question implies — the question, how has technology affected the inflation rate, the advances in technology? I’ve heard Alan Greenspan make a lot of interesting comments on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为，从您的问题的含义来看，是在问技术进步对通货膨胀率的影响。我听艾伦·格林斯潘对此发表过许多有趣的评论。

I think it baffles him to some extent, but he also recognizes that there’s some important, very hard-to-measure factor that has caused inflation not to behave in the way that most people expected, with this drop of employment, general prosperity, et cetera.

我认为这在某种程度上让他感到困惑，但他也意识到，有一些重要且难以量化的因素导致通胀没有像大多数人预期的那样表现，比如就业下降、普遍繁荣等情况。

And I think he attributes it, in some part — but again, immeasurable — to what has been happening in the information technology world.

我认为他将其部分归因于信息技术领域的变化，但同样无法精确量化。

Obviously, low inflation is good for fixed-income investments, but that’s been reflected to a significant degree in a long-term rate that’s at about 5 1/2 percent now.

显然，低通胀对固定收益投资有利，但这已经显著反映在当前约 5.5% 的长期利率中。

You know, it is — it does look, at the moment, like an almost perfect world, in terms of the macroeconomic factors. And that probably is a reason why people are enthused about stocks.

从宏观经济因素来看，目前似乎是一个近乎完美的世界。这可能也是人们对股票充满热情的原因之一。

And it’s a reason — and it’s a good reason, in terms of price inflation — it’s a good reason why bonds have behaved well over the last, really, since 1982.

从价格通胀的角度来看，这是一个很好的理由，也解释了为什么自 1982 年以来，债券市场表现良好。

I don’t know the answers to what it means for the future. I have to believe that it’s very good for this country to have the lead in information technology that it does on the rest of the world. I mean, we —

我不知道这对未来意味着什么。但我相信，美国在信息技术方面领先于世界其他国家对本国是非常有利的。我的意思是，我们——

It seems to me, as a non-expert, that we are so far ahead of the rest of the world, in terms of the leading — having the leading companies and the money flowing into it, the brainpower flowing into it, that it’s hard to think of it — who’s in second place.

在我这个非专家看来，无论是领先的公司，还是流入其中的资金与人才，我们都遥遥领先于世界其他国家。甚至很难想到谁是第二名。

And I think that’s helped this country in some very significant way. But I don’t know how to measure it.

我认为，这在某些非常重要的方面帮助了美国。但我不知道该如何量化这一点。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I would say that Berkshire’s businesses, on average, are less likely to be obsoleted by new technology than businesses generally. New steel-toed work shoes? I do not anticipate a significant change in the technology. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我想说，伯克希尔的业务总体上比一般的企业更不容易被新技术淘汰。比如新的钢头工作鞋？我不认为这项技术会有显著变化。（笑声）

And I think we have more of the stuff that’s sort of basic and hard to obsolete than many other corporations do.

而且我认为，我们拥有的业务更多是基础性且不容易被淘汰的，比许多其他公司都更具优势。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. As we mentioned in the report, we think all of that activity is very beneficial from a societal standpoint. Our own emphasis is on trying to find businesses that are predictable in a general way, as to where they’ll be in 10 or 15 or 20 years.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。正如我们在报告中提到的，我们认为所有这些活动从社会的角度来看是非常有益的。而我们自己的重点是寻找那些从整体上看未来 10 年、15 年或 20 年可以预测的业务。

And that means we’re looking for businesses that, in general, are not going to be susceptible to very much change.

这意味着我们在寻找那些总体上不会受到太多变化影响的业务。

We view change as more of a threat into the investment process than an opportunity. That’s quite contrary to the way most people are looking at equities now.

我们认为变化对投资过程来说更多是一种威胁，而不是机会。这与现在大多数人看待股票的方式恰恰相反。

But we do not get enthused about — with a few exceptions — we do not get enthused about change as a way to make a lot of money.

但我们不会因为变化而感到兴奋——有少数例外——我们不会因为变化而视之为赚大钱的方式。

We try to look at — we’re looking for the absence of change to protect ways that are already making a lot of money and allow them to make even more in the future.

我们关注的是缺乏变化的领域，以保护那些已经赚钱的业务，并让它们在未来赚得更多。

So we look at change as a threat. And whenever we look at a business and we see lots of change coming, 9 times out of 10, we’re going to pass on that.

因此，我们将变化视为一种威胁。每当我们看到一个业务将发生许多变化时，十次有九次我们会放弃。

And when we see something we think is very likely to look the same 10 years from now, or 20 years from now, as it does now, we feel much more confident about predicting it.

而当我们看到某个业务在未来 10 年或 20 年后可能与现在看起来非常相似时，我们对其预测会更有信心。

I mean, Coca-Cola is still selling a product that is very, very similar to one that was sold 110-plus years ago. And the fundamentals of distribution and talking to the consumer, and all of that sort of thing, really haven’t changed at all.

我的意思是，可口可乐仍然在销售一种与 110 多年前非常相似的产品。其分销的基本原理、与消费者的沟通等方面几乎没有任何变化。

Your analysis of Coca-Cola 50 years ago can pretty well serve as an analysis now. We’re more comfortable in those kind of businesses.

你对可口可乐 50 年前的分析，现在基本上仍然适用。我们对这种类型的业务更有信心。

It means we miss some — a lot — of very big winners, but we would not have picked those out anyway.

这意味着我们错过了一些——甚至很多——非常成功的大赢家，但我们无论如何都不会选中它们。

It does mean also that we have very few big losers and that’s quite helpful over time.

但这也意味着我们很少有大亏损者，从长远来看，这非常有帮助。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the peanut brittle has very little technological change, too. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，花生脆糖的技术变化也很少。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: They better not change it. (Laughs) We like it just the way it is.

沃伦·巴菲特：最好不要改变它。（笑）我们就喜欢它现在的样子。

48. Stocks can’t keep growing at the same rate

股票不可能保持相同的增长率

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Esther Wilson. I live in South Sioux City, Nebraska.

观众：我叫埃丝特·威尔逊，住在内布拉斯加州的南苏城。

My husband and I will have some new money in the early 80s of our lifehood. We have a daughter, 50 years old, who will inherit anything we have.

我和丈夫在 80 多岁的时候会有一些新资金。我们有一个 50 岁的女儿，她将继承我们的一切。

My question is — I also have a four percent interest on a mutual fund that is non-taxable. Are there any better ways to invest our money? (Laughter)

我的问题是——我还有一个收益率为 4% 的免税共同基金。有没有更好的方式来投资我们的资金？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, those are tough questions. I mean, I — you know, I run into friends of mine all the time where they come into a lump sum at a given time.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个很棘手的问题。我是说，我经常遇到一些朋友，他们在某个时间点获得了一笔大额资金。

And, you know, Charlie and I do not have great answers about investing sums of money for people who are not really active in the process.

而且，你知道的，对于那些不主动参与投资过程的人，查理和我并没有什么特别好的答案。

主动意识是最重要的因素。

I mean, if, as we said earlier, if we were working with small sums now, we would start looking at a whole bunch of very small situations and some things that we might know how to do on a small scale.

我的意思是，就像我们之前提到的，如果我们现在管理的是小额资金，我们会开始研究一系列非常小的机会，以及一些我们可能知道如何在小规模上操作的事情。

But for the average investor who wants to own equities over a 20 or 30-year period, we think regular investment in some kind of very low-cost pool of money, which might well be an index fund, probably makes as much sense as anything. But it’s important to keep the cost down.

但对于想要在 20 或 30 年内持有股票的普通投资者来说，我们认为定期投资于一些非常低成本的资金池，比如指数基金，可能是最有意义的事情之一。但重要的是要控制成本。

You know, I have close to a hundred percent of my net worth in Berkshire. I’m comfortable with it because I like the businesses we own. And — but, you know, I didn’t buy it at this price either.

你知道的，我的净资产几乎百分之百都在伯克希尔。我对此感到很放心，因为我喜欢我们拥有的业务。而且——但你知道，我也不是以当前这个价格买入的。

So I don’t like to go — I never recommend anybody buy or sell it. And, Charlie, do you recommend anything?

所以我不想——我从不建议任何人买入或卖出。查理，你有什么建议吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s — if there’s anybody in the room who thinks it would be very easy to come up with a one-liner for a great no-brainer investment tomorrow with a great slug of new money, I wish they’d come up and tell me what it is. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我想说，如果现场有谁认为可以很轻松地找到一个简单明了的投资建议，能让明天用一大笔新资金赚大钱，我希望他们站出来告诉我是什么。（笑声）

We don’t have any solution to that one. It’s harder for us now than it has been at other times.

我们对此没有任何解决方案。现在对我们来说，比以往任何时候都更困难。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s been a couple of times — in 1974 there was something in Forbes — in ’69, the reverse of that situation. And then, I think, I wrote an article for Forbes — I can’t remember exactly when it was — about how equities almost had to be more attractive than bonds at that time. And bonds weren’t that unattractive.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，有过几次——1974年，《福布斯》有一篇文章——1969年则是相反的情形。后来，我想，我为《福布斯》写了一篇文章——具体时间我记不清了——文章讲的是，在当时股票几乎必然比债券更有吸引力。而债券当时并没有那么不吸引人。

I mean, every now and then you can say you’re getting a great deal for your money in equities. Or sometimes you can say you’re getting a great deal for your money in fixed-income investments.

我的意思是，有时候你可以说你在股票中得到了物有所值的投资；有时候你也可以说你在固定收益投资中得到了划算的回报。

You can’t say that now, so what do you do? You know? In terms of new money, we find ourselves sitting and waiting for something and we continue to look.

现在你不能这么说了，所以你该怎么办？你知道的，针对新资金，我们发现自己只能坐等机会，同时继续寻找。

But we are forced to look at bigger ideas. So if we were working with smaller funds we’d be much more likely to find something than we are in our present situation.

但我们被迫关注更大的投资机会。因此，如果我们操作的是较小规模的资金，找到机会的可能性会远高于我们目前的情况。

As Charlie says, we really don’t have any great one-line advice on it. I wish we did for you. Zone 4 —

正如查理所说，我们确实没有什么特别简单的一句话建议。我希望能给您提供这样的建议。第 4 区——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I —

查理·芒格：我——

WARREN BUFFETT: Go ahead.

沃伦·巴菲特：请继续。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The real long-term rate of return from saving money and investing it has to go down, from recent experience in America, particularly equity-related recent experience.

查理·芒格：从美国最近的经验来看，把钱存起来并投资的实际长期回报率必然会下降，尤其是与股票相关的最近经验。

The wealth of the world can’t increase at the kind of rates that people are used to in the American equity markets. And the American equity markets can’t hugely outperform the growth of the wealth of the world forever.

世界财富的增长速度不可能与人们在美国股市中习惯的那种速度相匹配。而且，美国股市也不可能永远远超世界财富的增长。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We ought to have reduced expectations regarding the future, generally.

查理·芒格：我们总体上应该降低对未来的预期。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, dramatically reduce them, because, you know — we mentioned earlier, 53 percent of the world stock market value is in the U.S.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，大幅降低预期，因为你知道——我们之前提到过，全球股票市场价值的 53% 在美国。

Well, if U.S. GDP grows at four percent, five percent a year, with one or two percent inflation, which would be a pretty — would be a very good result — I think it’s very unlikely that corporate profits are going to grow at a greater rate than that.

如果美国 GDP 每年增长 4% 到 5%，加上 1% 到 2% 的通胀率，这已经是一个非常好的结果了——我认为企业利润增长速度不太可能高于这个水平。

Corporate profits, as a percent of GDP, are on the high side already and you can’t constantly have corporate profits grow at a faster rate than GDP. Obviously, in the end, they’d be greater than GDP.

企业利润占 GDP 的比例已经偏高，而企业利润不可能长期以高于 GDP 增长的速度增长。显然，最终利润不可能超过 GDP。

And that’s like somebody said that New York has more lawyers than people. I mean — (laughter) — there’s certain — you run into certain conflicts with terminology as you go along if you say profits can get bigger than GDP.

这就像有人说纽约的律师比人口还多一样。（笑声）如果你说利润能比 GDP 更大，显然会遇到一些逻辑上的冲突。

So, if you really have a situation where the best you can hope for in corporate profit growth over the years is four or five percent, how can it be reasonable to think that equities, which are a capitalization of that corporate — of corporate profits — can grow at 15 percent a year?

因此，如果你面对的情况是企业利润每年的最佳增长预期是 4% 或 5%，那么你如何能合理地认为，股票作为企业利润的资本化，可以以每年 15% 的速度增长呢？

I mean, it is nonsense, frankly. And people are not going to average 15 percent or anything like it in equities. And I would almost defy them to show me, mathematically, how it can be done in aggregate.

坦率地说，这是无稽之谈。人们在股票上的平均回报不会是 15% 或类似的数字。我几乎可以挑战他们用数学证明这种总体回报率是如何实现的。

I looked the other day at the Fortune 500. They earned $334 billion on — and had a market cap of 9.9 trillion at the end of the year, which would probably be at least 10 1/2 trillion now.

前几天，我看了一下《财富》500 强数据。他们的利润是 3340 亿美元，而去年底的市值是 9.9 万亿美元，现在可能至少是 10.5 万亿美元。

Well, the only money investors are going to make, in the long run, are what the businesses make. I mean, there is nothing added. The government doesn’t throw in anything. You know, nobody’s adding to the pot. People are taking out from the pot, in terms of frictional cost, investment management fees, brokerage commissions and all of that.

从长期来看，投资者能赚到的钱只有企业赚到的钱。没有额外的增值，政府不会投入任何东西。你知道，没有人往池子里加钱，但各种摩擦成本、投资管理费和经纪佣金却会从池子里拿走钱。

But the 334 million [billion] is all that — is all the investment earns. I mean, if you want to farm, the — what the farm produces is all you’re going to get from the farm.

所以，这 3340 亿美元就是所有投资的收益。我的意思是，如果你想经营农场，农场产出的就是你唯一能从中得到的。

If it produces, you know, $50 an acre of net profit, you get $50 an acre of net profit. And there’s nothing about it that transforms that in some miraculous form.

如果农场每英亩产出 50 美元净利润，你就只能得到每英亩 50 美元的净利润，不会有任何神奇的方式将其转化为更多。

If you own all of American — if you own all of the Fortune 500 now, if you owned a hundred percent of it, you would be making 334 billion. And if you paid 10 1/2 trillion for that, that is not a great return on investment.

如果你现在拥有整个美国的《财富》500 强企业，拥有其 100% 的股份，你每年可以赚到 3340 亿美元。如果你为此支付了 10.5 万亿美元，这并不是一个很好的投资回报率。

And then you say to yourself, “Can that double in 5 years?” It can’t — the 334 billion — it can’t double in 5 years with GDP growing at 4 percent a year, or some number like that. It would just produce things that are so out of whack, in terms of experience in the American economy, it won’t happen.

然后你问自己，“利润能在 5 年内翻倍吗？”不可能——3340 亿美元的利润不会在 GDP 每年增长 4% 的情况下翻倍。这种预测与美国经济的实际经验完全不符，是不可能发生的。

So any time you get involved in these things where if you trace out the mathematics of it, you bump into absurdities, then you better change expectations somewhat.

因此，当你遇到这些在数学上推导下来就会得出荒谬结论的事情时，你最好调整一下自己的预期。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: There are two great sayings. One is, “If a thing can’t go on forever, it will eventually stop.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：有两句很棒的名言。第一句是，“如果一件事情不能永远持续下去，那它最终会停止。”（笑声）

And the other I borrow from my friend, Fred Stanback, who I think is here. “People who expect perpetual growth in real wealth in a finite earth are either mad men or economists.” (Laughter)

第二句是我从我的朋友弗雷德·斯坦贝克那里借来的，我想他今天也在这里。“那些在有限的地球上期待财富无限增长的人，不是疯子就是经济学家。”（笑声）

49. “Best contribution” is low-cost goods and services

“最好的贡献”是提供低成本的商品和服务

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请到第 4 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good evening. My name is Sharukoi Chin (PH). I’m from Des Moines, Iowa.

观众：晚上好。我叫沙鲁科伊·秦（音），来自爱荷华州得梅因。

While we have been discussing of how much return that a company has helped us to get in the past few years, and for the future, too, though, I believe there are many people who are concerned about how much have we given to the society in return.

虽然我们讨论了公司在过去几年以及未来为我们带来的回报，我相信也有很多人关心我们为社会做出了多少回馈。

And gentlemen, would you please share with us about your philosophy and the company policies and how much the Berkshire has done in terms of philanthropy and charities? Thank you.

先生们，您们能否与我们分享一下您的哲学、公司政策以及伯克希尔在慈善和公益方面做了多少贡献？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. There are figures in the annual report that bear on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，年报中有相关的数据。

One thing we did wasn’t entirely voluntary, is that I think we gave about 2.6 billion to the federal government last year in — (laughter) — in income taxes. (Applause)

有一件事我们做得并非完全出于自愿，我想我们去年向联邦政府缴纳了大约 26 亿美元的所得税。（笑声）（掌声）

I’m not sure. I looked at General Electric and Microsoft and a couple of large — we may have paid more in federal income tax than any other U.S. company. I’m not — don’t take my word for that, because it could be Walmart paid more. I wouldn’t be surprised if Walmart paid more.

我不确定。我查看了通用电气和微软以及其他一些大公司——我们可能支付的联邦所得税比任何其他美国公司都多。我不——不要完全相信我的话，因为可能沃尔玛支付得更多。如果沃尔玛支付得更多，我也不会感到惊讶。

But there’s — I did look at a couple of the biggest ones and we did pay more than GE or Microsoft, both of which have market caps that are three times our size.

但我确实查看了一些最大的公司，我们支付的税款比 GE 或微软都多，而它们的市值是我们的三倍。

And the shareholder-designated contribution program was 18-or-so million, as I remember, and then we detailed the contributions in the report made by the other companies.

股东指定捐款计划的金额是大约 1800 万美元，我记得是这样。然后我们在报告中详细列出了其他公司的捐款情况。

But I would argue that to the extent that GEICO, for example, is a more efficient way of delivering personal auto insurance than, overwhelmingly, than its competitors are, and that, if 15 percent is a fair indication of how much it is saving people, that — and then, on a $4 billion of premium volume — that there is something more than $600 million that consumers save by a more efficient way of distribution, which has been honed to a fine art by the GEICO management.

但我会认为，例如，GEICO 提供个人汽车保险的效率远高于绝大多数竞争对手。如果 15% 是一个合理的节省比例，那么在 40 亿美元的保费收入中，消费者通过这种更高效的分销方式节省了超过 6 亿美元，而这种高效分销方式是由 GEICO 管理层精心打磨出来的。

Really, delivering the goods and services that people want in an economical way is a very important part, I think, of the contribution that any company makes to society, as well as the taxes they pay and their actual corporate philanthropy.

实际上，我认为，以经济实惠的方式向人们提供他们需要的商品和服务，是任何公司对社会贡献的一个非常重要的部分，除此之外还有公司缴纳的税款和实际的企业慈善活动。

We are not big believers in giving away the money of the owner — of Berkshire acting as their representatives and giving away their money to philanthropy. We think that the shareholder should — it’s their money.

我们并不热衷于以伯克希尔作为股东代表的身份，将股东的钱用于慈善捐赠。我们认为，这笔钱属于股东。

And if we had a partnership of 10 people, if I were the managing partner, I would not feel I should make the decisions on philanthropy for the other 9 people. I would let them all make their own decisions.

如果我们有一个由 10 人组成的合伙企业，而我是管理合伙人，我不会认为我有权为其他 9 人做慈善决策。我会让每个人自己做决定。

We do not think that corporations, generally, should be passing out money to the pet charities of the CEO. And we don’t do it at Berkshire.

我们不认为公司应该随意将资金捐给 CEO 偏爱的慈善机构。而伯克希尔也不会这么做。

But we do let the shareholders make those designations. And, as I say, I think our primary — (applause) — thank you.

但我们会让股东做出这些决定。正如我所说，我认为我们的主要贡献是——（掌声）——谢谢。

I think that the best contribution actually we can make, this is ideal, over 10 or 15 years, is finding ways to deliver goods and services, that people want, to them at lower cost than the alternatives that were previously available to them.

我认为，我们可以做出的最佳贡献——从理想角度来看——是在未来 10 或 15 年中找到以更低成本向人们提供他们需要的商品和服务的方式，而不是以往可供选择的替代品。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I applaud the questioner’s yearning for an answer to the question of, “Isn’t there something more in this game than making and piling up money?” and “Shouldn’t we be thinking about what we owe in return and what’s going to go back in return?”

查理·芒格：是的。我赞赏提问者对这样一个问题的渴望解答：“这场游戏难道不应该有比赚钱和积累财富更多的意义吗？”以及“我们是否不应该考虑我们对社会的回馈以及回馈的方式？”

In the Munger case, I think a hundred percent is going to go back in return, for a reason different from that of the Buffett case. You know, there’s an old saying: “How much did old Charlie leave?” And the answer is, “I believe he left it all.” (Laughter)

在我（芒格）的情况下，我认为 100% 的财富都会回馈社会，但这与巴菲特的情况有所不同。你知道，有句老话说：“查理留下了多少钱？”答案是，“我相信他全都留下了。”（笑声）

And in essence, the — it all has to go back one way or another. You can’t take it with you, that’s the iron rule of the game. And I do think it’s important to think about what you do for other people and what example do you set with your own life or your own corporate life.

本质上，这些财富最终都会以某种方式回馈社会。你无法带走它们，这是游戏的铁律。我确实认为，思考你为他人做了什么，以及你用自己的生活或企业生活树立了什么样的榜样，这是很重要的。

And I do think that Berkshire stacks up pretty well in that respect. And in due course, when we get into gargantuan charities bearing the name Buffett, my guess is that’ll be done pretty well, too. This is likely to be a pretty good run.

我确实认为，在这方面伯克希尔的表现相当不错。而在适当的时候，当我们看到以巴菲特之名的巨大慈善项目时，我猜测这些项目也会做得非常出色。这可能会是一段相当成功的历程。

50. No “insight” on oil or silver

关于石油和白银没有“见解”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：第五区域。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Michael from New York. First, I’d like to address Mr. Munger.

观众：你好，我是来自纽约的迈克尔。首先，我想向芒格先生提问。

Mr. Munger, it’s so — it’s such a pleasure to be here with you, as well as Mr. Buffett. And if you could just say hi —

芒格先生，很高兴能和您以及巴菲特先生在这里。如果您能向我妻子——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You got those in the right order.

查理·芒格：你排的顺序是对的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — to my — (laughter) — wife for a second, her name is Jane.

观众： ——向我的——（笑声）——妻子问声好，她的名字是简。

Next, I understand your secrecy on unconventional investments. But Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, could you please tell me your insight on market conditions for oil and silver? (Laughter)

接下来，我理解您们对非传统投资的保密态度。但巴菲特先生和芒格先生，您们能否告诉我对石油和白银市场状况的见解？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He asked you, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他问的是你，查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But we’ve already said that we’re not going to comment about commodity investments.

查理·芒格：但我们已经说过，我们不会对商品投资发表评论。

I will cheat a little on that. Eventually the price of oil has to go way up. (Laughter)

不过我会稍微作弊一点。最终，石油价格必须大幅上涨。（笑声）

That does not mean you can make any money from buying it now, counting the interest factor.

但这并不意味着你现在买石油能赚钱，考虑到利息因素。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Zone 6. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）第六区域。（笑声）

Fortunately, I don’t know whether — I listened carefully when he phrased his question. He said “insights” and — (laughs) — I don’t have any insights, so —

幸运的是，我不确定——我仔细听了他的问题措辞。他说“见解”——（笑）——我没有任何见解，所以——

51. Cable TV systems: more promise than results so far

有线电视系统：承诺多于实际效果

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to zone 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们到第六区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Merritt Belisle from Austin, Texas.

观众：我叫梅里特·贝利斯，来自德克萨斯州奥斯汀。

And the company has a large investment in the Washington Post Company, which has many cable television systems serving non-major metropolitan areas, as well as a recent investment in TCA Cable.

这家公司在《华盛顿邮报》公司有大量投资，该公司在许多非主要都市区拥有有线电视系统，同时最近还投资了 TCA Cable。

And so, I was hoping to get a comment about the cable television business generally.

因此，我希望您能对有线电视业务总体上发表一些看法。

And the other question is about your philosophy of children handling money and inheriting money.

另一个问题是，您关于孩子处理财富和继承财富的理念是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: The first question about cable, the Washington Post Company does have — and we own about 17, or so, percent of the Washington Post Company, and I believe they have 700,000-plus homes. And as you say, they’re in largely — in smaller areas.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一个问题是关于有线电视的。《华盛顿邮报》公司确实拥有有线电视系统——我们持有该公司约 17% 的股份，我相信他们的服务覆盖 70 多万个家庭。正如您所说的，这些主要位于较小的地区。

It’s been a good business. And as you know, cable prices have been galloping here in the last year, or thereabouts. From the standpoint of the Post that’s bad news, because the Post would have been a net buyer of cable and will not be a seller.

这一直是一项不错的业务。正如您所知，过去一年左右，有线电视价格大幅上涨。从《华盛顿邮报》的角度来看，这其实是坏消息，因为邮报是有线电视的净买家，而不是卖家。

And it’s very, very much like our attitude towards stocks and stock prices. It is not good news for the Washington Post Company when cable prices go up, because the Washington Post Company’s going to be investing funds. It’s going to be a generator of funds over time. And if it wants to put money in cable, it’s way better off if cable prices go down than up.

这与我们对股票和股价的态度非常相似。当有线电视价格上涨时，这对《华盛顿邮报》公司来说不是好消息，因为公司计划投资资金。随着时间的推移，公司会产生资金。如果它想把钱投入到有线电视中，价格下降会比价格上涨更有利。

The TCA is not — Lou Simpson runs a separate portfolio at GEICO — equity portfolio — so I’ve never read an annual report of TCA Cable. I know nothing about it.

至于 TCA Cable——这是卢·辛普森在 GEICO 管理的独立投资组合的一部分，是一项股权投资——所以我从未读过 TCA Cable 的年报，我对它一无所知。

If he still has it, it’s an investment of Lou’s at GEICO, for GEICO, and it’s not something that falls under my management at all.

如果卢仍然持有这项投资，那就是他在 GEICO 为 GEICO 所做的投资，这完全不属于我的管理范围。

It’s a point I should mention, because, periodically, the press picks up some item that says that Berkshire — or sometimes it says that I am buying X, Y, or Z.

我需要提到一点，因为媒体时不时会报道一些消息，说伯克希尔——有时说是我——在购买某些东西，比如 X、Y 或 Z。

And sometimes that’s true, but sometimes it isn’t true, because filings are made on behalf of various other entities that are associated with us, and I don’t know anything about them.

有时这些消息是准确的，但有时并不准确，因为一些与我们相关的实体会提交申报，而我对这些申报一无所知。

I saw one here a couple of weeks ago reporting that I was — I don’t know if it was me or Berkshire — I think it was me personally — it was buying some real estate investment trust with the name Omega in it. I’d never heard of it. But that story appeared various places.

几周前，我看到一则报道，说我——我不确定是我还是伯克希尔——我想报道说的是我个人——在购买一个带有 Omega 名字的房地产投资信托。我从未听说过这个名字，但这个消息出现在了多个地方。

Well, I can assure you, I filed no form with the federal government that said that I was buying that stock, although you would have deduced that from certain press accounts.

我可以向你保证，我没有向联邦政府提交任何表格说明我在购买那只股票，尽管你可能从某些新闻报道中得出了这样的结论。

But various other entities, I think that there may be a subsidiary of General Re, New England Asset Management, that may have to report periodically on what they do.

但其他一些实体，比如我想通用再保险的一家子公司，新英格兰资产管理公司，可能需要定期报告他们的操作。

And since General Re is owned by Berkshire, and New England Asset Management’s a part of General Re, you know, who knows what they pick up on that.

由于通用再保险属于伯克希尔，新英格兰资产管理公司又是通用再保险的一部分，所以你知道，这些报道可能是从那里得来的。

So I do caution you, generally, to be a little careful about reports as to what is being bought or sold by me or by Berkshire Hathaway.

因此，我建议大家对关于我或伯克希尔正在买卖什么的报道多加小心。

Now, as I remember, there was second question that I didn’t like quite as well to answer. (Laughs)

现在，我记得还有第二个问题，我不太愿意回答。（笑声）

Charlie, you want to tackle that one?

查理，你想回答这个问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there was more interest in the future of cable. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我想大家对有线电视的未来更感兴趣。（笑声）

That is, we have demonstrated a signal lack of aptitude in correctly diagnosing the future of cable in a way that made us a lot of money.

也就是说，我们在正确预测有线电视的未来，并以此赚取大量金钱方面，表现出了明显的能力不足。

And we’ve done that in spite of the fact that in retrospect it seems like a lot that was perfectly obvious was lying around.

尽管回头来看，似乎有许多显而易见的机会摆在眼前，但我们还是错过了这些机会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Today cable is not, I mean, cable has been here for what, 30 years or so. Cable has not made extraordinary returns on invested capital, at all.

沃伦·巴菲特：今天的有线电视，已经存在了大约 30 年左右。有线电视在资本投资回报方面并没有取得非凡的收益。

But it’s always had the promise of greater returns and it’s had the promise that you wouldn’t have to keep investing money in it the way that you’ve had to date.

但它总是带有更高回报的希望，并且承诺不需要像现在这样持续投入资金。

But currently, people think that unusual returns will be made in cable, relative to invested capital, not relative to the purchase price of them, but relative to the invested capital in the property itself. And, as I say, that has not really been the case as — it’s been the case with cable programming. Cable programming, there’s been a lot of money made in relation to capital investment.

不过，目前，人们认为相较于资本投资，尤其是资产本身的资本投入，而非它们的购买价格，有线电视可能会带来非同寻常的回报。然而，正如我所说，这种情况并不适用于有线电视系统，而更适用于有线电视节目内容。有线电视节目内容相对于资本投入确实赚了很多钱。

相较于硬件，软件通常是更赚钱的业务。

But in terms of the actual investment in cable facilities, the capital investment has been such, the expenditures in developing systems have been such, that the returns so far have not been great.

但就对有线电视设施的实际投资而言，资本投资的规模以及开发系统的支出，都使得目前的回报并不理想。

But the prices for cable systems now would indicate that people think that those returns are finally going to start flowing in, in a big way.

不过，目前有线电视系统的价格表明，人们认为这些回报最终将开始大幅涌现。

52. Buffett and Munger differ on influence of inherited wealth

巴菲特与芒格在遗产对后代影响上的看法不同

WARREN BUFFETT: What was the second part of that question that you had?

沃伦·巴菲特：你刚才提问的第二部分是什么？

VOICE: Children and wealth.

旁白：孩子和财富。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, inherited wealth and children —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，遗产和孩子——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It was about kids inheriting money.

观众：是关于孩子继承财富的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well — (laughter) — we have a minority viewpoint down here in the front row. (Laughter and applause).

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。那么——（笑声）——我们前排的意见可能不太主流。（笑声和掌声）

I think my views on that subject changed when I was about 18. (Laughs)

我对这个问题的看法大概在我 18 岁的时候发生了改变。（笑声）

Until that point I thought it would be a great idea.

在那之前，我觉得这会是个好主意。

No, I am quite a believer in a meritocracy and I think a part of that is not having people start way, way ahead of other people in life, based on whether they were lucky enough to come from the right womb or not.

不，我非常相信精英治国的理念，我认为这其中的一部分是，不应让人们仅仅因为是否幸运地出生在正确的家庭而在人生中远远领先于他人。

So I’ve never been big on the idea that either society benefited or, in many cases, the kids — although I think that’s much more problematic, but — by the fact that great transfers of wealth will go from one generation to another.

因此，我从未认同财富的大量代际转移对社会有益，或者在许多情况下对孩子有益——尽管我认为这更具有争议性。

You know, I would rather see the degree of talent possessed by individuals determine the resources they command in this world, and their ability to influence other people’s lives and command the labor of other people, and all of that, than any divine right of the womb.

我宁愿看到个人的才能决定他们在这个世界上拥有的资源、影响他人生活的能力以及指挥他人劳动的能力，而不是所谓的“出身权”。

So that’s — and Charlie has a somewhat different view on that.

所以，这是我的看法——而查理对此有些不同的看法。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I am a little more willing to let the world take the succeeding generations down. It’s — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我更倾向于让世界来决定下一代的发展。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He believes in crossing it —

沃伦·巴菲特：他认为要“传递下去”——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think they need much help. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为他们并不需要太多帮助。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie believes in passing it along, as long as you’re sure they’re going to blow it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理支持财富传承，只要你确定他们会挥霍掉。（笑声）

OK. Zone —

好的。下一区域——

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you stop —

查理·芒格：如果你停下来想一想——

WARREN BUFFETT: Go ahead.

沃伦·巴菲特：继续。

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you stop to think, Warren, of the great fortunes of yore — if you go back to 1900, 1870 and, you know — name me the people that have vast power because they are in the fourth generation in that family. Some of them are living awfully well, but they are not running the world.

查理·芒格：如果你仔细想想，沃伦，过去那些巨大的财富——如果你回到 1900 年或 1870 年——告诉我，有哪些人因为他们是家族的第四代而拥有巨大权力？其中一些人生活得很好，但他们并没有在掌控世界。

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say the Rockefeller family had considerably more influence than if their name had been, you know, just plain Rock. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我会说，洛克菲勒家族的影响力显然比他们的名字仅仅是“洛克”时要大得多。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s true, but you’re picking probably the strongest, single family of the piece. And now that it’s dispersed among 60 or 70 or 80 Rockefellers, it —

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这是对的，但你选择了可能是最强大的单一家族。而现在，这个家族的财富已经分散到 60、70 或 80 个洛克菲勒之间了——

I think it’s true there were four or five brothers there that had an unusual share of worldly influence. I must say, in that case I think they handled it very well.

确实，那家族里有四五个兄弟对世界事务有着不寻常的影响力。我必须承认，在这种情况下，我认为他们处理得非常好。

53. Avoiding tech: we’re “willing to trade away a big payoff for a certain payoff”

避免投资科技：我们愿意为了一个确定的收益放弃一个更大的收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Alan Negan (PH) from Reston, Virginia.

观众：我叫艾伦·内根（音），来自弗吉尼亚州雷斯顿。

I know you like to buy into success stories but you don’t like to buy high tech. And it seems to me, say in the case of Microsoft, that 10 years from now they’ll be doing software development, just like 10 years from now Coke will be selling sugared water.

我知道您喜欢投资成功的企业，但您不喜欢投资高科技公司。在我看来，比如微软，十年后他们依然会从事软件开发，就像可口可乐十年后依然会销售含糖饮料一样。

And what I’m wondering is why you feel that way when it seems certain companies, high-tech companies, are predictable.

我想知道为什么您会有这样的看法，尽管某些高科技公司似乎是可预测的。

And it also seems that in the early ’90s you were — you mentioned you were going to buy a pharmaceutical company, which also seems like high tech to me. So that’s my question.

而且在 90 年代初，您似乎提到您准备购买一家制药公司，而这在我看来也像是高科技行业。这就是我的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we — I think we said that with the pharmaceutical companies we wouldn’t have known how to pick out which one. We would have thought the industry as a group would do well.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我想我们当时说过，对于制药公司，我们并不知道该如何挑选哪一家。我们只是认为整个行业会表现良好。

From those levels of 1993, you cannot buy high tech companies at anything like — at levels that are commensurate with the levels that the pharmaceutical companies were selling at in ’93.

以 1993 年的水平来看，你无法以类似的估值购买高科技公司，而制药公司当时的估值则相对更合理。

You know, I would — and getting to the first part of your question, I think it’s much easier to predict the relative strength that Coke will enjoy in the soft drink world than the strength — the amount of strength — that Microsoft will possess in the software world.

关于您的第一个问题，我认为相比微软在软件领域未来的实力，预测可口可乐在软饮料领域的相对优势要容易得多。

That’s not to knock Microsoft at all. If I had to bet on anybody, I’d certainly bet on Microsoft, bet heavily if I had to bet. But I don’t have to bet. And I don’t see that world as clearly as I see the soft drink world.

这绝不是对微软的否定。如果我非得选择押注，我肯定会押注微软，而且押注很多。但我并不需要押注。而且我对软件领域的未来看得没有软饮料领域那么清楚。

Now somebody that has a lot of familiarity with software may very well see it that way and they’re entitled to — if it’s true they have superior knowledge and they act on it, they’re entitled to make money from that superior knowledge. There’s nothing wrong with that.

当然，有些对软件领域非常熟悉的人可能能看得很清楚。如果他们确实拥有更高的专业知识并基于此采取行动，他们理应从中获利。这没有任何问题。

I know I don’t have that kind of knowledge, and I simply — and I do think that it’s — that if you have a general knowledge of business over decades, that you would regard the industry they’re in as less predictable than the soft drink industry.

我知道我没有那种专业知识，我也确实认为，如果你对商业有几十年的整体了解，你会认为他们所在的行业比软饮料行业的未来更难预测。

Now it may also be that even though it’s less predictable that there’s a whole lot more money to be made, so that if you’re right, that the payoff is much larger.

当然，即使这个行业更难预测，也可能有更多的钱可赚。如果你判断正确，回报会更大。

But we are perfectly willing to trade away a big payoff for a certain payoff. And that’s the way we’re put together.

但我们非常愿意为了一个确定的收益，而放弃一个更大的收益。这就是我们的天性。

It does not knock the ability of other people to make those decisions. I mean, I asked — first time I met Bill Gates in 1991, I said, “If you’re going to go away on a desert island for 10 years, you had to put your stock in two companies in the high-tech business, which would they be?”

这并不是否定其他人做出这些决策的能力。我记得，1991 年我第一次见到比尔·盖茨时，我问他，“如果你要去一个荒岛上呆 10 年，只能将股票投资于两家高科技公司，你会选哪两家？”

And he named two very good stocks. And if I’d bought both of them, we’d have made a lot more money than we made, even buying Coca-Cola.

他提了两只非常优秀的股票。如果我当时买了它们，我们会赚得比买可口可乐还要多得多。

But he also would have said at the same time that if he went away he’d rather buy Coca-Cola, because he would have felt sure about that happening.

但他也说过，如果他要离开，他宁愿买可口可乐的股票，因为他对可口可乐的发展更有信心。

It’s — you know, different people understand different businesses. And the important thing is to know which ones you do understand and when you’re operating within what I call your “circle of competence.”

不同的人对不同的行业有不同的理解。重要的是知道哪些行业是你理解的，以及你何时在自己所谓的“能力圈”内运作。

And the software business is not within my circle of competence, and I don’t think it’s within Charlie’s.

而软件行业不在我的能力圈内，我也认为它不在查理的能力圈内。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that. I think there are interesting questions, too, about how far the whole field can go.

查理·芒格：嗯，我完全同意这一点。我认为还有一些有趣的问题，比如这个领域到底能发展到什么程度。

Take jet airplane travel below the speed of sound. It’s been pretty static in terms of the technology for a long, long time. You know, the big Boeing airliner is much the same as it was 20 or 30 years ago.

比如亚音速的喷气式飞机旅行。在技术方面，它已经停滞了很长时间。你知道，大型波音客机和 20 或 30 年前的机型差别不大。

And I think it’s — a lot of these businesses are quite dependent on the technology continuing to gallop and do more and more for people.

我认为，很多行业在很大程度上依赖于技术的持续进步，为人们提供越来越多的服务。

Take pharmaceuticals, if they had never invented any more pharmaceuticals, it would be a terrible business.

以制药行业为例，如果从未发明任何新药，这将是一个非常糟糕的行业。

I don’t know what happens once you get unlimited bandwidth into the house and way more options, and —

我不知道当家庭拥有无限带宽和更多选择时，会发生什么——

Beyond a certain point, it strikes me that there might be a surfeit of anybody’s interest in the field. I don’t know where that point is, whether it’s 20 years out or 30 years out, but it would affect me a little.

在某个时点之后，我觉得这个领域可能会超过人们的兴趣承载能力。我不知道这个点在哪里，是 20 年后还是 30 年后，但这对我来说会产生一些影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: The Dilly Bar is more certain — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特： “Dilly Bar”比任何我们知道的软件应用在 10 年后更确定地存在——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — to be here in 10 years than any software application that we know. But that’s, maybe, because we understand Dilly Bars and not software.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们更能确定“Dilly Bar”会在 10 年后继续存在，而不是某些软件应用程序。但这可能是因为我们更了解“Dilly Bar”而不了解软件。

In the whole United States, which is, you know, is by far the most prosperous country in the world — the whole United States, there are probably around 400 companies, 400 total companies, that are earning $200 million a year, after-tax.

在整个美国，作为世界上最富有的国家——整个美国，可能只有 400 家左右的公司，其年税后利润达到 2 亿美元。

Of those 400, you could name them. I mean, you could start, you know — if you say “bank,” you can say Citigroup and Chase and Wells Fargo, and you name 10 or 15 of them. And if you name consumer goods, you’re going to say Procter & Gamble and Coca-Cola and Gillette, and you can name a whole bunch of them.

在这 400 家公司中，你可以一个个列举出来。比如，你提到“银行”，可以说花旗银行、摩根大通和富国银行，可以列出 10 到 15 家。如果你提到消费品公司，你会想到宝洁、可口可乐和吉列，还可以列出很多公司。

You can almost, of those 400, you can probably name 350. If, five years from now, instead of 400 being on that list, there’ll probably 450 on the list, maybe 475.

在这 400 家公司中，你几乎可以列出 350 家。如果五年后，这个名单上的公司数量不是 400 家，而是 450 家，甚至 475 家，我也不会感到意外。

A lot of those will be companies that are earning between 150 and $200 million now. So there’ll probably be 20 — some number like 20 — that, call it, come from nowhere.

其中很多将是目前年利润在 1.5 亿至 2 亿美元之间的公司。所以可能会有 20 家左右的公司“从无到有”进入这个行列。

Now if you look at the number of companies that are selling today at a price which implies 200 million or more of earnings right today, you will find dozens and dozens in the high-tech arena. And, you know, a very large percentage of those companies are not going to fulfill people’s expectations.

但如果你看看今天那些股票价格已经反映出 2 亿美元或更多利润的公司，在高科技领域有几十家。而且，其中很大一部分公司不会达到人们的预期。

I can’t tell you which ones, but I know there won’t be dozens and dozens and dozens of those companies making a couple hundred million dollars a year. And I know they are now selling at prices that require them to be making that much money or more. It just doesn’t happen that often.

我无法告诉你具体是哪些公司，但我知道不会有几十家这样的公司每年赚到 2 亿美元。而我也知道它们现在的股价要求它们赚到这么多甚至更多。这种情况并不常见。

You know, biotech was all the rage some years back. How many of those companies are making a couple hundred million dollars a year? It just doesn’t happen.

比如，几年前生物科技曾经风靡一时。那么现在有多少这样的公司每年赚到 2 亿美元？几乎没有。

It’s not that easy to make lots of money in a business in a capitalistic society.

在资本主义社会中，要在一项业务中赚到大量的钱并不容易。

People that are looking at what you’re doing every day and trying to figure out a way to do it better and to, you know, underprice you or bring out a better product, or whatever it may be. And a few companies make it.

每天都会有人盯着你在做什么，试图找到一种更好的方法来击败你，比如定价更低或推出更好的产品，等等。只有少数公司能够成功。

But here in the United States, after all of these decades and decades and decades of wonderful economic development, we’ve got about 400 companies that have hit the level that would be required of a company that would have a market cap of $3 billion.

但在美国，经过几十年甚至上百年的经济发展，目前大约有 400 家公司的水平符合 30 亿美元市值所需的盈利能力。

And some companies are getting $3 billion of market cap the day they come out, virtually, — so.

但现在有些公司几乎在上市的第一天就达到了 30 亿美元的市值——所以，

There’s some — you want to think about the math of all this.

这其中的数学逻辑值得你好好思考。

54. Don’t “dance in and out of the companies you really love”

不要在你真正喜欢的公司之间“进进出出”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Larry Whitman (PH) from Minot, North Dakota.

观众：你好，我叫拉里·惠特曼（音），来自北达科他州迈诺特。

You’ve already hinted about Coke and Gillette’s current valuations, and also about their great prospects for the future. But in the past year, both stocks have been down 30 to 50 percent from their highs.

您已经提到过可口可乐和吉列的当前估值，以及它们未来的美好前景。但在过去一年中，这两只股票的股价都从高点下跌了 30% 到 50%。

How much farther would they have had to fall before your criteria of margin of safety had been satisfied and allowed you to purchase more shares?

它们的股价还需要再下跌多少，才能满足您的安全边际标准并让您购买更多股份？

And two, has the Disney/Cap Cities merger gone as well as you would have hoped, and has the future prospects of Disney changed in your opinion?

第二个问题，迪士尼与首都城市（Cap Cities）的合并是否达到了您的预期？您对迪士尼的未来前景是否有新的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: First question, that’s a good question on Coke and Gillette, because obviously, we think about the businesses that we’re the most familiar with and where we’re committed.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一个问题是个好问题，关于可口可乐和吉列。显然，我们会特别关注那些我们最熟悉、且已经投入的业务。

But neither one of those businesses got to the price that left us happy putting new money in. But we’re quite happy, very happy, owning those businesses and will be happy owning them for a very long time to come. But they —

但这两家公司都没有达到一个让我们满意到愿意投入新资金的价格。不过，我们非常高兴能够持有这些业务，并且在未来很长一段时间内都会为拥有它们而感到满意。但它们——

It’s some evidence of where the market has been and is, that, even when they ran into some tougher business conditions than they anticipated, that their stocks did not go down to the prices that cause us to get excited about them.

这也从某种程度上反映了市场的现状，即使它们遇到了一些比预期更艰难的经营条件，它们的股价也没有下跌到让我们兴奋并买入的水平。

Charlie, you want to comment on that or the second part?

查理，你想评论一下这个问题还是第二个问题？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. But I do want to remind people that the Dilly Bar is a Dairy Queen product. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不，我不想评论。但我想提醒大家，“Dilly Bar”是德克士冰淇淋的产品。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And they are good. I can tell you that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：它们确实不错，我可以告诉你。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I wouldn’t want the shareholders to believe that the commercial standards of this operation are faltering. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我不希望股东认为我们的商业标准在动摇。（笑声）

Generally speaking, trying to dance in and out of the companies you really love, on a long-term basis, has not been a good idea for most investors. And we’re quite content to sit with our best holdings.

总的来说，从长远来看，试图在你真正喜欢的公司之间进进出出，对大多数投资者来说并不是一个好主意。而我们对持有自己最好的投资感到非常满意。

WARREN BUFFETT: People have tried to do that with Berkshire over the years. And I’ve had some friends that thought it was getting a little ahead of itself from time to time. And they thought they’d sell and buy it back cheaper and everything.

沃伦·巴菲特：多年来，有人尝试对伯克希尔这么做。我有一些朋友，有时觉得它的价格有些过高，打算卖掉然后更便宜地买回来。

It’s pretty tough to do. You have to make two decisions right. You know, you have to sell it right first, and then you have to buy it right later on. And usually you have to pay some tax in-between.

这很难做到。你必须做对两个决定。首先，你得正确地卖出；其次，你得在之后正确地买入。而且通常你还得在中间支付一些税款。

It’s — if you get into a wonderful business, the best thing to do is usually to stick with it.

如果你进入了一项优秀的业务，最好的办法通常是坚持持有它。

Coke and Gillette both experienced disappointments to their management, below what they anticipated a year, a year and a half ago, or whenever it was, and below what we anticipated. But that will happen over time.

可口可乐和吉列的管理层都经历了一些令人失望的时刻，其表现低于他们在一年前、一年半前或其他时候的预期，也低于我们的预期。但这在长期中是会发生的。

It happens with some of our wholly-owned business from time to time. Sometimes they do better than we anticipate, too.

我们的某些全资子公司也会时不时地出现这种情况。有时候，它们的表现也会好于我们的预期。

But it’s not the nature that everything — that things — everything goes in a nice, straight, smooth line upward.

但事情的本质并不是所有东西都会以一条平滑的上升直线增长。

You mentioned Cap Cities. Parts of Cap Cities have done extraordinarily well, for example. But in the network business, if you go back 30 years and look at what network has been on top, you find that no one stays on top, or on the bottom, indefinitely there.

你提到了首都城市（Cap Cities）。举个例子，首都城市的一些部分表现非常出色。但在网络业务中，如果你回顾过去 30 年，看看哪些网络在领先地位，你会发现，没有一家网络能够无限期地保持在顶端或底端。

It’s a competitive world, as I mentioned earlier. And sometimes your competitors’ correct moves, your own incorrect moves, the world environment — all of those things can interrupt trend lines.

正如我之前提到的，这是一个竞争激烈的世界。有时，竞争对手的正确举动、你自己的错误决策、以及全球环境——这些因素都可能打断趋势线。

I see nothing that’s happened in the last year, in terms of the long-term trend line, of the blade and razor business, which is the one I’ve referred to as “inevitables” at Gillette. I mean, they are in other businesses that are not in the same category as the blade and razor business.

过去一年，我没有看到任何影响吉列刀片和剃须刀业务长期趋势线的情况。我曾称其为“必然性业务”。我的意思是，他们的其他业务并不属于与刀片和剃须刀业务相同的类别。

Coke, fortunately, has virtually its entire business in soft drinks. And so it comprises almost a hundred percent of the whole there.

幸运的是，可口可乐的业务几乎完全集中在软饮料领域。因此，这几乎构成了它的全部业务。

But I see nothing that would change my thinking about the long-term future of either the blade and razor business or Coke’s position in the soft drink business.

但我没有看到任何会改变我对刀片和剃须刀业务或可口可乐在软饮料业务中长期地位看法的事情。

55. Deflation unlikely, but would be good for bondholders

通货紧缩不太可能，但对债券持有人有利

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：一号提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Steve Cohn (PH) from Peoria, Illinois.

观众：我是来自伊利诺伊州皮奥里亚的史蒂夫·科恩（音）。

First of all, I just had my first Dilly Bar a half an hour ago, and thank you for introducing me to that.

首先，我刚刚半小时之前吃了我的第一根“Dilly Bar”，谢谢你们让我认识了它。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good.

沃伦·巴菲特：很好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You spoke —

观众：您之前提到——

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll sell you a second, too if — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你需要，我还可以再卖你一根——（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You spoke earlier about the threat of change. Can you comment on the threat of deflation and, if it were to occur, what its likely impact would be on the economy, Berkshire Hathaway, and personal investment decisions?

观众：您之前提到变化的威胁。您能否评论一下通货紧缩的威胁？如果发生通货紧缩，它对经济、伯克希尔·哈撒韦和个人投资决策可能会产生什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well now, displacement in what respect? I didn’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，你说的是哪方面的“变化”？我没有——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: -flation.

观众：是“紧缩”。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, inflation.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是通货膨胀。

AUDIENCE MEMBER and CHARLIE MUNGER: Deflation.

观众和查理·芒格：是通货紧缩。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, deflation.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是通货紧缩。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Deflation.

查理·芒格：通货紧缩。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I’m over — I’m getting there. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我反应过来了——我明白了。（笑声）

Well I think it’s very, very unlikely, but I would — I have been wrong consistently now for a decade or more about the degree to which inflation has at least been tamed for that period.

我认为通货紧缩的可能性非常非常低。但我承认，在过去十多年里，我一再对通胀被抑制的程度预期错误。

I would have expected — if you’d showed me all the other things that were going to happen in the world in the last — if I’d seen that ahead of time 10 or 15 years ago — I would have thought we would have had more inflation, so —

如果你让我在 10 到 15 年前看到过去几年世界上发生的所有事情，我会认为我们应该经历更多的通胀，所以——

I have trouble envisioning a world of — where the U.S. experiences deflation. But, you know, my record is not great on that.

我很难想象一个美国会经历通货紧缩的世界。但你知道，我在这方面的预测记录并不太好。

And again, we don’t — we do not spend a lot of time thinking about macro factors.

再次说明，我们不会花太多时间考虑宏观因素。

I mean, if you ran into deflation that means, you know, capital is appreciating, so you need much lower nominal rates of return on capital to be in the same place under deflation as would be the case if you had inflationary conditions.

我的意思是，如果你遇到通货紧缩，这意味着资本在升值，所以在通货紧缩条件下，你需要更低的名义资本回报率才能达到与通胀条件下相同的位置。

So deflation, everything being equal — and it isn’t equal — is good for investors because it — you know, the value of money appreciates. The buying power of money appreciates. But it would have other consequences, too.

因此，通货紧缩，在其他条件相同的情况下——虽然实际上并不相同——对投资者来说是有利的，因为货币的价值在升值，货币的购买力在提高。但它也会带来其他影响。

I don’t think it’s likely. I’m not — I have no great record at all in macro forecasting and I — if it does happen, the truth is, I don’t know what the effects would be.

我认为通货紧缩的可能性不大。我在宏观预测方面的记录并不好，如果真的发生了通货紧缩，坦白说，我不知道它会带来什么影响。

Charlie.

查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve seen what deflation is doing in Japan, and it’s been quite unpleasant for the people there. On the other hand, it hasn’t been a catastrophe. I mean, nothing like the ’30s in the United States.

查理·芒格：你已经看到了通货紧缩在日本的影响，对那里的人民来说确实很不愉快。但另一方面，这也不是灾难。比如，与美国 30 年代的情况相比，完全不同。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, and actually, in Japan, if you had owned long bonds, you would have had a tremendous bonanza from deflation, because your — the value of your bonds would have gone up dramatically as interest rates came down. And then that money, in turn, would buy more.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上在日本，如果你持有长期债券，你会从通货紧缩中获得巨大的收益，因为随着利率下降，你的债券价值会大幅上涨。随后，这笔钱又能买到更多的东西。

So it would — it was a very — if you happened to be the person that owned longer bonds issued at higher coupons some years back, that’s worked to your advantage.

因此，如果几年前你持有较高票息发行的长期债券，这对你来说是非常有利的。

But — and presumably that would work in this country. If we actually ran into consistent deflation, my guess is that people who owned long bonds, even bought at 5 1/2 percent, would find their position in the world dramatically improved compared to people who owned most other asset classes.

但——在美国可能也是如此。如果我们真的遇到持续的通货紧缩，我猜持有长期债券的人，即使是以 5.5% 的收益率买入，也会发现他们的全球地位相较于持有其他大多数资产类别的人显著改善。

56. Markets are “fairly” efficient, but efficient market theory is “silly”

市场“相对”有效，但有效市场理论是“荒谬的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Murray Cass from Markham, Ontario. First off, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I’d like to thank you for being so generous with your time every year at these meetings.

观众：你好，我是来自安大略省马克汉姆的穆雷·卡斯。首先，巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我想感谢你们每年在这些会议上慷慨地分享你们的时间。

Mr. Buffett, many in the academic community call you lucky, or a statistical outlier. Mr. Munger, I’m not sure what they call you. (Laughter)

巴菲特先生，学术界的许多人称您是幸运的，或者是一个统计上的特例。芒格先生，我不确定他们怎么称呼您。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re free to speculate on what they call him. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，你可以随意猜测他们怎么称呼他。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I know you don’t like to forecast the equity markets, but maybe you would dare to forecast the evolution of the debate between proponents of the efficient market theory and value investors.

观众：我知道您不喜欢预测股市，但您是否愿意预测一下有效市场理论支持者与价值投资者之间辩论的演变？

Do you think there will ever be a reconciliation? And I’m talking especially about what’s taught at the business schools.

您认为双方是否会有和解？我特别指的是商学院教授的内容。

And as an addendum, are your designated successors, are they outliers as well?

另外，您的指定接班人是否也属于“特例”？

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) Well, we like to think they are. And then, they may be more outliers than we are.

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑声）嗯，我们喜欢认为他们是，而且他们可能比我们更“特例”。

The market is generally — you know, I — to me, it’s almost self-evident if you’ve been around markets for any length of time, that the market is generally fairly efficient.

市场通常是——你知道，对我来说，如果你在市场中待过一段时间，这几乎是不言而喻的，市场总体上是相对有效的。

It’s fairly efficient at pricing between asset classes, it’s fairly efficient in terms of evaluating specific businesses.

在不同资产类别的定价上，它是相对有效的；在评估特定企业方面，它也是相对有效的。

But being fairly efficient does not suffice to support an efficient market theory approach to investing or to all of the offshoots that have come off of that in the academic world.

但仅仅是“相对有效”并不足以支持有效市场理论的投资方法，也不足以支持学术界从这一理论衍生出的所有观点。

So, if you’d believed in efficient market theory, and been taught that and adapted — adopted it for your own 20 or 30 years ago, or 10 years ago — I think it probably hit its peak about 20 years ago — you know, it would have been a terrible, terrible mistake.

因此，如果你相信有效市场理论，并在 20、30 年前或 10 年前被教授并采用这一理论，我认为这个理论的巅峰大概在 20 年前。你会发现，这可能是一个非常、非常大的错误。

It would have been like learning the earth is flat. It just — you would have had the wrong start in life.

这就像学习地球是平的理论一样。这只会让你的人生起点出错。

Now, it became terribly popular in the academic world. It almost became a required belief in order to hold a position.

后来，这一理论在学术界变得非常流行。几乎成为了获得学术职位的必备信念。

It was what was taught in all the advanced courses. And a mathematical theory that involved other investment questions was built around it, so that, if you went to the center of it and destroyed that part of it, it really meant that people who’d spent years and years and years getting Ph.D.s found their whole world crashing around them.

它是所有高级课程中教授的内容。围绕它还建立了一套涉及其他投资问题的数学理论。所以，如果你触及核心并推翻这一部分理论，意味着那些花费多年攻读博士学位的人，会发现他们的整个世界坍塌了。

I would say that it’s been discredited in a fairly significant way, over the last decade or two. I mean, you don’t hear people talking the same way about it as you did 15 or 20 years ago.

我认为，在过去的十到二十年里，这一理论已经在相当大的程度上被质疑。我是说，你不会再听到人们像 15 或 20 年前那样谈论它了。

But the market generally is fairly efficient in most ways. I mean, it is hard to find securities that are inefficiently priced. There are times when it’s relatively easy. But right now, for example, it’s difficult.

不过，总体来说，市场在大多数情况下是相对有效的。我是说，要找到价格明显低估的证券是很难的。有时候会相对容易，但比如现在，这种机会很难找到。

There — I don’t know exactly how much it’s holy writ, still, in business schools.

我不确定在商学院里，这一理论如今还被视为“神圣教义”的程度如何。

I certainly get the impression, as I go around talking to business schools, that it is far less regarded as, you know, sort of unquestioned dogma that it — like it was 15 or 20 years ago.

但我可以肯定地说，当我到各个商学院演讲时，感觉这一理论远不像 15 或 20 年前那样被视为无可置疑的教条了。

The University of Florida now has some courses in valuing businesses. University of Missouri’s putting in one.

比如，佛罗里达大学现在有了一些关于企业估值的课程，密苏里大学也正在开设这样的课程。

And I think the high priests of efficient market theory are probably not in the same demand for speaking engagements and seminars and all of that as they were a decade or two ago.

我认为，有效市场理论的“高僧”们如今的演讲需求和研讨会邀请，可能远不如十年或二十年前那么多了。

It’s hard, though — it’s very interesting. It’s hard to dislodge a belief that becomes sort of — becomes the dogma of a finance department.

然而，这很有趣。一旦一种信念成为金融系的教条，推翻它是很困难的。

It’s so challenging to them and, you know, they have to, at age 30 or 40, to go back and say, “What I’ve learned up to this point, and what I’ve been teaching students and all of that, is silly,” that doesn’t come easy to people.

这对他们来说是巨大的挑战。他们必须在 30 或 40 岁的时候回头说：“我到目前为止所学的，以及我教给学生的所有东西，是荒谬的。”这对人来说是很难做到的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you know, Max Planck, the great physicist, said that even in physics, the old guard really didn’t accept the new ideas. The new ideas prevail, in due course, because the old guard fades away, clinging to the asininities of the past.

查理·芒格：你知道，伟大的物理学家马克斯·普朗克说过，即使在物理学领域，旧势力也并不真正接受新思想。新思想最终会占上风，因为旧势力会逐渐消退，抱着过去的荒谬观念不放。

And that’s what’s happened to the hard-form efficient market theorists. They’re an embarrassment to the scene and they will soon be gone. On the — (Laughter)

这正是硬派有效市场理论学者的命运。他们现在是这一领域的尴尬存在，很快就会消失了。（笑声）

People who think the market is reasonably efficient, or roughly efficient, of course, are absolutely correct and that will stay with us for the long pull.

那些认为市场是相对有效或大致有效的人，当然是完全正确的，这种观点会长期存在下去。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thinking it’s roughly efficient, though, does nothing for you in academia. You can’t build anything around it. I mean, that — what people want are what they call elegant theories. And it just — it doesn’t work.

沃伦·巴菲特：尽管认为市场是相对有效的，但这在学术界毫无帮助。你不能基于这个假设构建任何理论。人们想要的是所谓的“优雅理论”。但这根本行不通。

You know, what investment is about is valuing businesses. I mean, that is all there is to investment. You sit around and you try to figure out what a business is worth. And if it’s selling below that figure you buy it.

你知道，投资的本质就是评估企业的价值。这就是投资的全部内容。你坐下来，试图弄清楚一家企业的价值。如果它的价格低于这个价值，你就买入。

That, to my — you can’t find a course virtually in the country on how to value businesses. You can find all kinds of courses on how to, you know, how to compute beta, or whatever it may be, because that’s something the instructor knows how to do. But he doesn’t know how to value a business. So, the important subject doesn’t get taught. And it’s tough to teach.

就我所知，你几乎找不到一门关于如何评估企业价值的课程。你可以找到各种关于如何计算贝塔系数（Beta）或其他东西的课程，因为这是老师知道怎么做的事情。但他不知道如何评估企业价值。所以，这个重要的话题并没有被教授。而且这确实很难教。

I think Ben Graham did a good job of teaching it at Columbia, and I was very fortunate to run into him many decades ago.

我认为本杰明·格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学教授这一内容时做得很好。我非常幸运在许多年前遇到了他。

But if you take the average Ph.D. in finance and ask him to value a business, he’s got a problem.

但如果你让一个普通的金融学博士评估一家企业的价值，他会遇到困难。

And if he can’t value it, I don’t know how he can invest in it, so therefore, he — it’s much easier to take up efficient market theory and say it doesn’t make any difference because everybody knows everything about it, anyway.

如果他无法评估企业价值，我不知道他如何能进行投资。因此，他更容易接受有效市场理论并说：“这没什么区别，反正市场上的每个人都知道一切。”

And there’s no sense in trying to think about valuing businesses. If the market’s efficient, it’s valued them all perfectly.

这样就没有必要去思考如何评估企业价值了。如果市场是有效的，那它已经完美地给所有企业定价了。

I never known what you talk about on the second day in that course. I mean — (Laughter)

我不知道这门课第二天会讲什么。我是说——（笑声）

The first — you walk in, you say, you know, “Everything’s valued perfectly, and class dismissed.” So, it puzzles me. But I encourage you to look for the inefficiently priced.

第一天你走进教室，说：“所有东西都被完美定价了，下课。”这让我困惑。但我还是鼓励你寻找那些定价不合理的标的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. Berkshire, incidentally, was inefficiently priced for a long time. And it wasn’t on the radar screen of — if you asked an academic how to value it, they wouldn’t have known what to look at exactly. Yep.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三区。顺便提一下，伯克希尔的定价在很长一段时间里都不合理。而且它并不在学术界的视野中。如果你问一个学者如何评估它的价值，他们根本不知道该看什么指标。没错。

57. We try to grow cheap float quickly

我们努力快速增长低成本浮存金

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ken Shuvenstein (PH). I’m from New York City. First, thank you very much for this great, educational forum.

观众：我叫肯·舒文斯坦（音），来自纽约市。首先，非常感谢你们举办这个非常有教育意义的论坛。

You’ve taught us that a key concept of Berkshire is the amount of float it has, the cost of the float, and how fast it grows.

你们教会我们，伯克希尔的一个关键概念是浮存金的数量、成本以及增长速度。

Can you please help us understand, currently, what amount of float Berkshire has and what the goals are in the future for that growth rate over a sort of one to two-decade period, understanding that it will be a lumpy advance?

您能否帮助我们理解，伯克希尔目前拥有多少浮存金？未来在一到二十年的时间内，其增长率目标是什么？我们理解，这种增长会是波动的。

Because, looking at the historical data you’ve provided us for Gen Re and Berkshire, regarding the amount of float and its cost, it’s grown at a great rate — high teens, lows 20s. And if you could please comment on the future expectations we should have, that would be great.

因为根据您为我们提供的有关 Gen Re 和伯克希尔的浮存金数量和成本的历史数据，这些浮存金的增长率非常高——大致在 15% 到 20% 之间。如果您能评论一下我们对未来应该抱有什么样的期望，那就太好了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it’s an important question. It — but I don’t know how to give you a good answer.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个重要的问题。但我不知道该如何给你一个明确的答案。

The — it’s grown at a much faster rate, since 1967 when we went into the insurance business, than I thought it would.

自 1967 年我们进入保险业务以来，它的增长速度远超我的预期。

I mean, I did not — I didn’t anticipate it would grow that way. I didn’t anticipate necessarily we would get a chance to buy GEICO. I didn’t necessarily know we’d ever acquire a General Re or — so it’s been very hard to forecast.

我的意思是，我从未预料到它会以这样的方式增长。我也没预料到我们会有机会收购 GEICO，更没想到我们会收购 General Re——因此，这很难预测。

What we’ve tried to do is grow cheap float as fast as we could. And sometimes it’s been easy, sometimes it’s been impossible.

我们一直在努力以尽可能快的速度增长低成本的浮存金。有时这很容易，有时却完全不可能。

But I don’t know — if you had asked me that question 30 years ago, I’d have given you an answer that really hasn’t proven out very well. And I —

但我不知道——如果你在 30 年前问我这个问题，我可能会给你一个后来并不准确的答案。

So, I don’t know how to give you the answer now, except to tell you this: it’s very much a goal of Berkshire to grow that float at as fast as it can, while maintaining a very low cost to it.

因此，我现在也无法明确回答，只能告诉你：伯克希尔的目标是尽可能快地增长浮存金，同时保持其成本非常低。

And again, you mentioned it’d be lumpy. Well, it’ll be lumpy on cost. It’ll be lumpy on growth rate. But, I mean, we are — it’s something we think about all of the time, in both our operating decisions and perhaps some big capital commitment decision.

再说一次，你提到这种增长会是波动的。没错，其成本和增长率都会有波动。但我想说，这确实是我们一直在考虑的事情，无论是在运营决策中，还是在某些重大资本承诺决策中。

It’s — we know that if we can solve that problem of how to grow it at — with it costing us relatively little, that we will make Berkshire a whole lot more valuable in the process.

我们知道，如果我们能解决如何以较低成本增长浮存金的问题，就能让伯克希尔的价值在这个过程中大幅提升。

And people, I mean — we always laid out the facts as to what we were doing, but people basically seem to ignore that.

而人们——我是说，我们一直在阐明我们正在做的事情的事实，但人们基本上似乎忽略了这些。

And we have had this growth rate, which we can’t maintain, the numbers are too big. But it’s something that Charlie and I think about all the time.

我们的确取得了这种增长率，但这种增长率我们无法维持，因为数字已经太大了。但这是查理和我一直在思考的问题。

We’ve got some good vehicles for growing it. But we don’t have any vehicles that will grow it in aggregate at anything like the rate it’s been grown in the past.

我们确实有一些不错的工具来推动增长。但我们没有任何工具能像过去那样以相似的整体增长速度推动它增长。

So we may have to — we may get a chance to do something that adds to our ability to do it. If we get a chance and it’s at the right price, we’ll add it. If we won’t, we’ll do as much as we can internally.

因此，我们可能会有机会去做一些增强这种能力的事情。如果机会合适且价格合理，我们会抓住它。如果没有，我们会尽可能通过内部努力来实现。

But the question you ask, the growth in intrinsic value of Berkshire over the next 10 years, will be determined, in a very significant way, by the rate at which we do grow it and if — and also the added fact of what it costs us to achieve that float.

但你提的问题是，伯克希尔未来 10 年内的内在价值增长，很大程度上将由我们浮存金的增长速度决定，还包括实现这种增长所需的成本。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. If we grow very low-cost float at the same rate that it’s grown in the past for another 30 years, you can be confident of one thing: if you look to the heavens there will be a star in the east. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的。如果我们能以过去的速度再增长 30 年低成本浮存金，你可以确信一件事：如果你仰望天空，东方将会有一颗星星出现。（笑声与掌声）

58. Two reasons Berkshire isn’t selling life insurance

伯克希尔不从事人寿保险的两个原因

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第四区域。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m David Levy (PH) from Newport Beach, California.

观众：我是来自加利福尼亚州纽波特海滩的大卫·利维（音）。

Berkshire has been investing in the property and casualty and reinsurance business.

伯克希尔一直在投资财产保险和再保险业务。

I notice, except for annuities, you’ve been avoiding the life insurance business. Do you have — do you anticipate investing in the life insurance business?

我注意到，除了年金业务外，你们一直在回避人寿保险业务。你们是否计划投资人寿保险业务？

Also, I have a second question, and that is the relationship of Berkshire A and Berkshire B. Last year there was a slight premium for Berkshire B over Berkshire A.

另外，我还有一个问题，关于伯克希尔 A 股和 B 股的关系。去年，伯克希尔 B 股比 A 股有一点溢价。

About now, Berkshire B is selling at about a 3 to 4 percent discount. I also notice that certain people are shorting Berkshire A and Berkshire B. I wonder if you could comment on that.

现在，伯克希尔 B 股的价格比 A 股低了大约 3% 到 4%。我还注意到，有些人在做空伯克希尔 A 股和 B 股。您能对此发表评论吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. On the life business, we have no bias against the life business, we just — we are in the life reinsurance business in a fairly significant way through General Re. As you mentioned, we’ve done a little on annuities.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。关于人寿保险业务，我们并没有偏见。实际上，通过 General Re，我们在生命再保险业务上已经有了相当重要的涉足。正如你提到的，我们也涉及了一些年金业务。

The problem with the life business is that it isn’t very profitable — and you can look at the records of the big companies on that — and that a lot of the activity in the area is, in some way, equity-related.

问题在于，人寿保险业务的利润并不高——你可以看看大公司的记录——而且这个领域的许多活动在某种程度上与权益相关。

And Charlie and I have never wanted to get in the business of managing equities for other people. I mean, we want our sole interest on equities to be Berkshire Hathaway itself. So, we do not want to wear two hats.

而查理和我从来不想从事为他人管理权益的业务。我的意思是，我们希望我们在权益上的唯一兴趣集中在伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身。所以，我们不想戴两顶帽子。

We would never go into the mutual fund management business or any kind of investment management business because, if we were to be managing 20 or $30 billion in the investment management business, and we get a good idea that we can put a billion dollars in, you know, whose money do we put in it?

我们永远不会进入共同基金管理业务或任何形式的投资管理业务，因为，如果我们管理着 200 亿或 300 亿美元的投资基金，并且我们有一个可以投入 10 亿美元的好主意，那么你知道我们该用谁的钱来投资？

So, we’d rather just be wearing one hat. And that we want that hat to be Berkshire Hathaway.

所以，我们宁愿只戴一顶帽子。而我们希望这顶帽子是伯克希尔·哈撒韦。

And we don’t want to be promising other people that for, you know, half of one percent or one percent fee that they’re going to get our best ideas, because those ideas belong to Berkshire and we’d be misleading people if we promised otherwise.

我们也不想向别人承诺，为了收取 0.5% 或 1% 的管理费，他们可以获得我们的最佳投资想法，因为这些想法属于伯克希尔。如果我们做出其他承诺，那就是在误导别人。

So, anything that involves an equity component to it — and that’s a big part of what’s going on in the life business now — it’s just something we wouldn’t be comfortable being involved with.

因此，任何涉及权益成分的业务——而这现在是人寿保险业务中很大的一部分——我们都不会感到舒服去参与。

If you look at term life insurance, we’ve looked at that, in terms of putting it on the internet. It’s — it is priced at rates that we find very hard, even with the absence of commissions, to make sense.

如果你看看定期寿险，我们研究过将其放到互联网上的可能性。它的定价——即使没有佣金——我们仍然觉得很难理解并盈利。

But it’s a business we understand. So, we’re — we’d be perfectly willing to be in the life insurance business if we thought there was — if we had a way of doing it where we thought there was reasonable profitability attached to it.

但这是一个我们理解的业务。因此，如果我们认为有一种方式能够以合理的盈利水平来开展，我们会非常愿意进入人寿保险业务。

Charlie, do you want to comment on the life business before I get to the A versus B thing, or —

查理，在我谈论 A 股和 B 股问题之前，你想评论一下人寿保险业务吗，还是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

查理·芒格：不需要。

We do those structured settlements. That is sort of like the annuity business. And the life business we’re doing is mostly annuities and on a very low-cost basis.

我们确实在做结构化结算业务，那有点像年金业务。而我们从事的人寿保险业务主要是年金，且以非常低的成本运作。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Anyone that wants to buy a non-equity-related annuity should go to our website and find, in terms of the — weighting for the safety of the product and everything, you’ll find a very, very competitive product because we —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，任何想要购买与权益无关的年金产品的人都应该访问我们的网站。在产品的安全性等权重方面，你会发现我们提供的是一个非常具有竞争力的产品，因为我们——

It’s a low-cost operation. And if you’re buying it to get paid 30 years from now, you are certain to get paid from Berkshire and you’re not necessarily certain to get paid from various other entities. So, we’ve got a very competitive product there, but it’s not a big business.

这是一个低成本运作的业务。如果你是为了在 30 年后领取付款，那么你可以确定伯克希尔会支付给你，但你未必能确定其他一些机构能做到。所以，在这里我们有一个非常具有竞争力的产品，但这不是一个大业务。

59. Price differences between Class A and B shares

A 类和 B 类股票价格差异

WARREN BUFFETT: On the question of A versus B, I’ve written something — I wrote it some months ago and stuck it up on the website — regarding my own thoughts on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于 A 类股和 B 类股的问题，我几个月前在网站上写了一些内容，表达了我对这个问题的看法。

Obviously, the most the B can be worth is 1/30th of the A, because you can always convert an A into 30 shares of B.

显然，B 类股的最高价值是 A 类股的 1/30，因为你总是可以将一股 A 类股转换成 30 股 B 类股。

The B may sell a slight bit above that 1/30th price before it gets to a level where it induces arbitrage between the two. So, it can theoretically sell, and it will sell, a fraction of a percent above 1/30th of the price of the A. But if it gets above that, you know, I’ll buy the A and sell you the B.

在 B 类股达到引发两者套利的水平之前，它可能会以略高于 A 类股 1/30 价格的水平交易。因此，理论上，它可以以略高于 A 类股 1/30 价格的水平交易。但如果它高于这个水平，你知道的，我会买入 A 类股并卖出 B 类股。

There’s an arbitrage profit to be made, and probably the way markets work, most of that profit will be captured by the specialist, because he’s in the best position to effectuate trades of that sort.

这里面会有套利利润，而根据市场的运行方式，这种利润的大部分可能会被专业交易员捕获，因为他们最适合进行这种交易。

But the B can never be worth more than a thirtieth of the A, and it can never sell for more than slightly above 1/30th of the A.

但 B 类股的价值永远不会超过 A 类股的 1/30，且交易价格永远不会高于略高于 A 类股的 1/30。

On the other hand, B is not convertible into A stock, so it can sell at a discount.

另一方面，B 类股不能转换为 A 类股，因此它可能会以折扣价格交易。

I put on the web some months ago that I thought — just my opinion — but I thought that when the B is selling for less — selling for more — than a two percent discount, I personally would rather buy B than A under those circumstances.

几个月前，我在网站上表达了我的一个观点——这只是我的个人看法——当 B 类股的折扣超过 2% 时，我个人会更愿意买入 B 类股而不是 A 类股。

If it’s selling for the same price as the A — 1/30th the price of the A, but it’s selling on a parity basis — and I were buying 30 shares or more of B, I would rather buy A, because you can always go one direction and you can’t go the other direction.

如果 B 类股的价格与 A 类股相同——即 A 类股价格的 1/30，并且是以平价交易——如果我想购买 30 股或更多的 B 类股，我会更愿意买入 A 类股，因为你总是可以从 A 转向 B，而不能反向操作。

I think, if you take the next 10 years — I would think that a fair percentage of the time, it’s going to be selling right about 1/30th of the price of the A, and there will be periods of time when it sells it at a modest discount.

我认为，如果你看未来 10 年——我认为相当大一部分时间里，B 类股的价格会与 A 类股价格的 1/30 相当，并且在某些时候它会以适度折扣交易。

And I would say that when it gets in the 3 to 4 percent range, I regard that as quite a wide discount. If I didn’t have a tax to pay myself, I might sell A and buy B if I was getting four percent more in the — in economic equivalent on B. It’s not practical for me to do it.

而且，我会说，当折扣达到 3% 到 4% 时，我认为这已经是一个相当大的折扣。如果我自己不需要支付税款，我可能会卖出 A 类股并买入 B 类股，如果在经济等值上我能多获得 4%。不过，对我来说，这种操作并不现实。

Some — I know of some tax-exempt investors that have actually done that sort of thing, and —

有一些免税投资者确实做过这种操作，而且——

Long range, we will always treat the B exactly as we laid it out in the prospectus. There are two differences between the A and B. One is in the voting power, relatively. And the other is in the shareholder-designated contributions program. And otherwise, in all respects, B will be treated on the same basis as the A.

从长远来看，我们将始终按照招股说明书中的说明对待 B 类股。A 类股和 B 类股之间有两个区别：一个是相对的投票权；另一个是股东指定捐赠计划。除此之外，在所有其他方面，B 类股将与 A 类股一视同仁。

We have no — even though Charlie and I own a lot of A and we don’t own any B to speak of, we regard the B shareholders as being 100 percent on a parity, except for those two differences we laid out at the time of issuance, with A shareholders.

即使查理和我持有大量的 A 类股，但几乎没有 B 类股，我们仍然认为，除发行时说明的那两个差异外，B 类股股东在各方面都与 A 类股股东完全平等。

We would never — there won’t be a deal ever made for Berkshire anyway — but if there would be we would always treat the A and B on a 1-for-30 basis.

我们永远不会——伯克希尔不会进行任何交易——但如果有交易，我们会始终以 1 比 30 的比例对待 A 类股和 B 类股。

We would not — we’ve been in situations where people haven’t done that and we’ve never been very happy with it. So we would always treat people proportionally.

我们不会——我们经历过一些人没有这样做的情况，我们对此从来都不满意。所以，我们会始终按比例对待每个人。

Charlie.

查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with all of that.

查理·芒格：嗯，我完全同意这一切。

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about shorting, it doesn’t make a difference whether anybody shorts any stock or not, really.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于做空的问题，实际上，无论是否有人做空股票，都没有任何影响。

I mean, if you were arbitraging between A and B, and the B was selling a little higher than the A, you might be buying some A and shorting some B, and you might delay conversion because you might figure the B might go to a discount. And then you’d unwind the whole transaction rather than convert.

我的意思是，如果你在 A 类股和 B 类股之间进行套利，而 B 类股价格稍高于 A 类股，你可能会买入一些 A 类股并做空一些 B 类股；你可能会推迟转换，因为你可能认为 B 类股会出现折扣。然后，你可以在解除整个交易时选择不进行转换。

I mean, there’s a lot of techniques that Charlie and I have engaged in over the years, and other securities that apply to that sort of thing.

我想说，查理和我多年来参与过许多这样的技术交易，在其他证券上也有类似的情况。

But shorting doesn’t hurt us in any way, shape or form. I mean, it doesn’t make any difference.

但做空对我们没有任何形式的影响。我是说，这根本无关紧要。

I don’t care whether the short interest in the A is a thousand shares or 100,000 shares. You know, somebody sells it at one point and somebody buys at another point, and whether you reverse the buying and selling doesn’t make any difference.

我不在乎 A 类股的空头仓位是 1,000 股还是 100,000 股。有人在某个点卖出，有人在另一个点买入；买卖是否反转都无关紧要。

What counts is the intrinsic value of Berkshire. And if we increase the value of Berkshire at a reasonable rate, you know, the shorts will have to figure out how to eat three times a day. (Laughter)

关键在于伯克希尔的内在价值。如果我们以合理的速度提高伯克希尔的价值，你知道，那些做空的人就得想办法解决一天三顿饭的问题了。（笑声）

60. Investing advice: start early and think for yourself

投资建议：早起步，独立思考

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 5, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五区域，请。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Grant Morgan (PH), I’m here from New York City.

观众：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫格兰特·摩根（音），来自纽约市。

Earlier, you had acknowledged that it is a more difficult investment and business environment today than it was when you first started out.

早些时候，您承认如今的投资和商业环境比您刚开始时更具挑战性。

My question is, if you are starting out again today in your early 30s, what would you do differently or the same in today’s environment to replicate your success? In short, Mr. Buffett, how can I make $30 billion? (Laughter)

我的问题是，如果您今天再次出发，在三十出头的年纪，您会在当今环境中做哪些不同或相同的事情来复制您的成功？简而言之，巴菲特先生，我如何赚到 300 亿美元？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Start young. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特： 提早开始。（笑声）

Charlie’s always said that the big thing about it is we started building this little snowball on top of a very long hill. So we started at a very early age in rolling the snowball down.

查理总是说，关键在于我们是在一座非常长的山顶上开始滚动这个小雪球的。所以我们很早就开始滚雪球了。

And, of course, the snowball — the nature of compound interest is it behaves like a snowball of sticky snow. And the trick is to have a very long hill, which means either starting very young or living very — to be very old.

当然，雪球——复利的本质就是它像一个黏性雪的雪球。诀窍在于有一座很长的山坡，这意味着要么从很年轻的时候开始，要么活得非常长寿。

The — you know, I would do it exactly the same way if I were doing it in the investment world. I mean, if I were getting out of school today and I had $10,000 to invest, I’d start with the As.

如果是在投资领域，我会完全以同样的方式去做。我的意思是，如果我今天刚从学校毕业，手头有 10,000 美元可投资，我会从 A 类公司开始。

I would start going right through companies. And I probably would focus on smaller companies, because that would be working with smaller sums and there’s more chance that something is overlooked in that arena.

我会逐一研究公司。我可能会专注于小型公司，因为这涉及较小的资金量，在这个领域里更有可能找到被忽视的机会。

And, as Charlie has said earlier, it won’t be like doing that in 1951 when you could leaf through and find all kinds of things that just leapt off the page at you. But that’s the only way to do it.

正如查理早些时候所说，这不会像 1951 年那样，你可以翻阅资料，找到各种显而易见的机会。但这是唯一的正确方式。

I mean, you have to buy businesses and you — or little pieces of businesses called stocks — and you have to buy them at attractive prices, and you have to buy into good businesses.

我的意思是，你必须购买企业——或者说是企业的一小部分，也就是股票——你必须以有吸引力的价格买入，并投资于优秀的企业。

And that advice will be the same a hundred years from now, in terms of investing. That’s what it’s all about.

这一建议在一百年后仍然适用。这就是投资的全部。

And you can’t expect anybody else to do it for you. I mean, people will not tell — they will not tell you about wonderful little investments. There’s — it’s not the way the investment business is set up.

你不能指望别人替你做这些事。我的意思是，人们不会告诉你那些美妙的小投资机会。投资行业的运作方式并不是这样的。

When I first visited GEICO in January of 1951, I went back to Columbia. And I — that rest of that year, I subsequently went down to Blythe and Company and, actually, to one other firm that was a leading — Geyer & Co. — that was a leading analyst in insurance.

1951 年 1 月，我第一次访问 GEICO 后回到了哥伦比亚大学。当年剩下的时间里，我随后去了 Blythe and Company 和另一家保险领域的顶尖分析公司——Geyer & Co。

And, you know, I thought I’d discovered this wonderful thing and I’d see what these great investment houses that specialized in insurance stocks said. And they said I didn’t know what I was talking about. You know, they — it wasn’t of any interest to them.

当时，我以为自己发现了一个了不起的机会，想听听这些专门研究保险股票的顶级投资公司怎么说。但他们说我根本不知道自己在说什么。他们对这完全没有兴趣。

You’ve got to follow your own — you know, you’ve got to learn what you know and what you don’t know. Within the arena of what you know, you have to just — you have to pursue it very vigorously and act on it when you find it.

你必须遵从自己的判断。你必须弄清楚自己知道什么，不知道什么。在你了解的领域里，你必须非常积极地去追求，并在发现机会时采取行动。

And you can’t look around for people to agree with you. You can’t look around for people to even know what you’re talking about. You know, you have to think for yourself. And if you do, you’ll find things.

你不能期待别人认同你的想法，甚至不能指望别人理解你在说什么。你必须独立思考。如果你这样做了，你就会发现机会。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The hard part of the process for most people is the first $100,000. If you have a standing start at zero, getting together $100,000 is a long struggle for most people.

查理·芒格：是的。对大多数人来说，这个过程最困难的部分是攒到第一个 10 万美元。如果你从零开始积累，对大多数人来说，这是一个漫长的挣扎过程。

And I would argue that the people who get there relatively quickly are helped if they’re passionate about being rational, very eager and opportunistic, and steadily underspend their income grossly. I think those three factors are very helpful.

我认为，那些相对较快攒到 10 万美元的人，如果他们对保持理性充满热情，非常积极抓住机会，同时长期显著低于收入水平消费，他们就能更快实现目标。我认为这三个因素非常有帮助。

61. How Buffett learned the insurance business

巴菲特如何学习保险业务

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you very much for your hospitality. Excuse me, my name is Yvonne Edmonds (PH) and I’m from St. Petersburg, Florida. And thank you also for being so kind as to spend all this time answering our questions.

观众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，非常感谢你们的热情款待。不好意思，我叫伊冯·埃德蒙兹（音），来自佛罗里达州圣彼得堡。也非常感谢你们花这么多时间回答我们的问题。

I have two related questions regarding insurance. The first is, I suspect that many of us know less about insurance than about equities and I wonder if you could please put some references for us on the Berkshire Hathaway website that might help us increase our knowledge about insurance.

我有两个与保险相关的问题。第一个是，我猜我们许多人对保险的了解少于对股票的了解。我想知道，您是否可以在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的网站上提供一些参考资料，帮助我们增加对保险的知识？

The second question is, perhaps, related to the first, I just — the fact that I don’t understand it, but The Wall Street Journal, on March 19, published an article entitled, “When Insurers Pass Trash, Some Are Left Holding the Bag.” And that “some” included Berkshire Hathaway.

第二个问题可能与第一个问题有关，这只是因为我不理解。华尔街日报在 3 月 19 日发表了一篇文章，标题是《当保险公司转嫁垃圾业务时，有些人不得不接盘》。其中提到的“有些人”包括伯克希尔·哈撒韦。

It focused on passing the workers comp trash to, among other groups, to Cologne Re.

文章集中在将工人补偿保险垃圾业务转嫁给其他公司，其中包括科隆再保险公司。

And to make a long story short, the assistant general counsel for General Re, which, as I understand, now owns most of Cologne Re, said this is a classic example of an insurance company seeking growth in a very competitive market by writing business outside its area of expertise — namely within workers’ comp — when their area of expertise is life reinsurance.

简而言之，据我了解，现在拥有科隆再保险公司大部分股份的通用再保险公司的一位助理总法律顾问表示，这是一个典型的例子：一家保险公司在竞争激烈的市场中，通过开展其专业领域以外的业务来寻求增长——即工人补偿保险，而其专长领域是生命再保险。

Mr. Graham went on to say, and then I’ll stop, “Don’t write business you don’t understand. Second, proper controls are critical in the insurance business. Lastly, if a business opportunity appears to be too good to be true, it probably is.”

格雷厄姆先生接着说，我马上结束，“不要做自己不了解的业务。第二，适当的控制在保险业务中至关重要。最后，如果某个商业机会看起来好得令人难以置信，它可能确实不真实。”

If this is true, could you tell us how this came about? What measures are being taken to see that it won’t happen again? And what might be the ultimate cost to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders? Because I gather that the — only the tip of the iceberg has been represented in the charge to Cologne Re.

如果这是真的，您能告诉我们这件事是如何发生的吗？正在采取哪些措施以确保不再发生？以及，这对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东可能造成的最终成本是多少？因为我猜科隆再保险目前的损失只是冰山一角。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Those are good questions.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。这是些很好的问题。

And let’s take the first one first about the website and having a list of reference documents, or something that would help you understand insurance. You sound like you understand it pretty well already. The — (Laughter)

让我们先回答第一个问题，关于在网站上提供一些参考资料或帮助理解保险的内容。听起来你已经对保险了解得相当不错了。（笑声）

I can’t think of a good book that I’ve read on the subject. I got my knowledge of insurance by reading — well I got this huge head start by having a fellow named Lorimer Davidson, who is now 96, spend four hours or so with me one Saturday morning in January 1951, explaining to me how GEICO worked.

我想不出有什么好书是我读过的。我对保险知识的获取是通过阅读——更重要的是，我在 1951 年 1 月的一个周六上午，有幸与一位名叫洛里默·戴维森的先生（现在 96 岁）共度了大约四个小时，他向我解释了 GEICO 的运作方式。

And I — it was a marvelous education, and it got me so interested, in not only how GEICO worked, but how its competitors worked, how the industry worked, that I just started reading a lot of other reports.

那次经历是一场极好的教育，不仅让我对 GEICO 的运作方式产生了兴趣，也让我想了解其竞争对手的运作方式以及整个行业的运作机制。于是，我开始阅读许多其他报告。

I never — I guess I took one course in school on insurance. I don’t remember a thing from it. I have no idea what the text book was or anything. It had no value to me.

我从未——我猜我在学校上过一门关于保险的课程。但我一点都记不得内容，也不记得教材是什么。这对我毫无价值。

So I never really had any background in insurance. My — you know, nobody in the family was in the insurance business.

所以，我其实没有任何保险相关的背景。我家里也没有人从事保险业务。

And until I talked to Davy, I really — it just hadn’t been something that crossed my mind. The only reason I was down there was because I’d — my hero, Ben Graham, was listed in Who’s Who as being the chairman of Government Employees Insurance. That’s —

直到我与戴维谈话之前，我真的从未考虑过这个领域。我去 GEICO 的唯一原因是因为我的英雄本·格雷厄姆在《名人录》中被列为政府雇员保险公司的主席。

If he had been the chairman of, you know — he was also the chairman of the Market Street Railway Company in San Francisco.

如果他当时是其他公司的主席，比如旧金山市场街铁路公司的主席——

Fortunately, I went down to GEICO instead of out to see the Market Street Railway Company. (Laughter) It was closer.

幸运的是，我去了 GEICO，而不是跑去研究市场街铁路公司（笑声）。而且 GEICO 离我更近。

But I — my own education about insurance came from just reading lots of, lots of reports.

但我的保险知识教育主要来源于阅读大量的报告。

I mean, I would say that if I started the day fresh and I didn’t know anything about the insurance industry to speak of, and I wanted to develop some expertise, I would probably read the reports of every property-casualty company around.

我的意思是，如果我今天从零开始，对保险行业一无所知，但想要培养一些专业知识，我可能会去阅读所有财产保险公司的报告。

And I would go back some time and I would read — I would probably get the best manuals and look at them.

然后，我会回溯一些时间，寻找最好的手册来阅读。

I would just do a lot of reading. I used to go down to the Department of Insurance in Lincoln and go through the convention reports and the examination reports.

我会进行大量的阅读。我过去常去林肯的保险部门查阅会议报告和检查报告。

I’d — they’d give me some little table someplace and I’d keep asking them — (laughs) — for these reports and they’d have to go way down in the bottom of the Capitol to get them out for me. But they didn’t have much else to do so they were always happy to do it.

他们会给我安排一个小桌子，然后我不停地请求他们提供这些报告（笑声）。他们得跑到国会大厦的地下把它们拿出来。但他们没什么别的事可做，所以总是乐意帮忙。

And that’s the way I learned about it. And it happened to be a productive field to learn about it that way. And I really think that something akin to that is the best way now.

这就是我学习保险的方式。这种方式碰巧在这个领域非常高效。我确实认为现在类似的方法依然是最好的方式。

I can’t think of — you know, you can read some analyst reports.

你可以阅读一些分析师的报告。

I think you can learn something, frankly, by reading the Berkshire Hathaway annuals for 20 years and reading the insurance section. I think it’ll teach you something about the economics of insurance. So, I would do it by reading.

坦率地说，我认为你可以通过阅读伯克希尔·哈撒韦过去 20 年的年报，特别是保险部分，学到一些东西。我认为这能教会你一些关于保险经济学的知识。所以，我建议通过阅读来学习。

And if you can find somebody that knows the business well, who’s willing to spend some time talking to you about it, they can probably shorten the educational period and give you some help on that.

如果你能找到一个非常了解这个行业的人，并且他们愿意花时间与你交流，他们可能会缩短你的学习周期并提供一些帮助。

62. Unicover losses are “rare lapse” for General Re

通用再保险在 Unicover 损失中犯了“罕见失误”

WARREN BUFFETT: The second question about what’s been called — what’s the Unicover [Managers Inc.] affair that Cologne Re set up a 275 million — Cologne Life, I should say — set up a $275 million reserve against.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二个问题是关于所谓的 Unicover [Managers Inc.] 事件，科隆再保险公司——准确地说，是科隆生命再保险公司——为此设置了 2.75 亿美元的准备金。

First of all, I would say for the losses to be incurred on that business, the 275 still represents the best estimate.

首先，我想说，对于该业务可能产生的损失，这 2.75 亿美元仍然是最好的估计。

In other words, it may be the tip of the iceberg in terms of the loss to the industry, because no one else has acknowledged any losses. This is amazing. I mean, believe me, there are plenty of other losses out there.

换句话说，就整个行业的损失而言，这可能只是冰山一角，因为其他任何人都没有承认任何损失。这太令人惊讶了。相信我，外面还有很多损失没有被披露。

We said we were going to lose 275 million. I think that’s a good estimate. But I think a lot of other people are going to lose very — they have to lose significant money. Somebody has to lose some significant money besides us on that.

我们说过我们将损失 2.75 亿美元。我认为这是一个不错的估计。但我认为还有许多人也会损失巨额资金。除了我们之外，肯定还有人会承担重大损失。

And so what we have reported may be the tip of the industry iceberg. I don’t think it’s the tip of the General Re or Berkshire Hathaway iceberg.

因此，我们报告的内容可能只是整个行业冰山一角。我不认为这是通用再保险或伯克希尔·哈撒韦冰山的一部分。

It’s our best estimate today of what that loss will be. If that estimate changes, I will let you know through the quarterly reports or, if it was really material, we’d have some announcement. But I don’t anticipate that.

这是我们目前对损失的最佳估计。如果该估计发生变化，我会通过季度报告通知您，或者如果情况真的很重要，我们会发布公告。但我并不预期会有这种情况。

But we’ll report to you faithfully, I promise to you, as to how that loss develops over time.

但我们会如实向您报告该损失随时间的发展情况，我向您保证。

The — what you read makes a great deal of sense about when something’s too good to be true, it usually is and that sort of thing.

你提到的那句话非常有道理：当某事好得难以置信时，它通常确实如此。

The distribution of the losses in the Unicover affair will, probably, not be fully settled 10 years from now.

在 Unicover 事件中损失的分配问题，可能在 10 年后也无法完全解决。

I mean, I have seen these things before in insurance and in other areas, but particularly in insurance, where there are multitudes of parties, and there are allegations of stupidity, there’s allegations of fraud, there’s allegations of misrepresentation, there’s allegations of everything.

我的意思是，我在保险和其他领域都见过类似的事情，尤其是在保险领域，这里涉及多个当事方，指控愚蠢、指控欺诈、指控虚假陈述——各种指控都有。

There are so many people involved, there are so many factual matters to be determined. There will be lots of litigation. It will take a long, long time to sort out the litigation. In the end, the losses will get paid by somebody. Our best estimate we’ve put up is 275 million.

牵涉的人太多，事实问题也很多。将会有大量的诉讼。理清这些诉讼将需要很长的时间。最终，这些损失会由某些人支付。我们目前最好的估计是 2.75 亿美元。

But we may find out far more in coming months and years, as to the involvement of other parties or — we can find out a great many things, because there will be lots of litigation, not necessarily involving us, but that we will, as a — even as a viewer of — we will be learning things about what took place.

但在接下来的几个月或几年里，我们可能会发现更多情况，比如其他方的参与——我们可以发现许多事情，因为会有大量诉讼，即使这些诉讼未必直接涉及我们，但即使作为旁观者，我们也会了解事情的来龙去脉。

Unfortunately, there have been some similar things in insurance. We were involved in something that had some similarities to this at National Indemnity, 20-odd years ago. And it was very expensive to us.

不幸的是，在保险行业里类似的事情确实发生过。20 多年前，我们在 National Indemnity 也经历过与此类似的事情，那对我们来说非常昂贵。

It didn’t cost us that many millions of dollars, but it happened at exactly the time that the stock market was down around 600 on the Dow, and we did not know how big the losses would be. And therefore, it caused us to have to be more conservative in investing in equities than would have otherwise been the case if this hadn’t been hanging over our head.

这次事件虽然没有让我们损失数百万美元，但它发生在道琼斯指数约 600 点时，正是股市低迷的时期。由于我们不知道损失会有多大，因此这迫使我们在股票投资方面不得不更加保守，否则情况可能会有所不同。

So conventional accounting will never pick up the loss that we suffered in that.

所以，传统会计方法永远无法反映出我们因此蒙受的损失。

It was called the Omni affair. And like I said, it had some — I’m sure it had many differences, too, but it had some similarities. And, you know, it can — it’s distracting to have something like this that obviously — there was some mix of mistakes, there’s some mix of misinformation. All of that will have to get sorted out.

这次事件被称为 Omni 事件。正如我所说，这件事和现在的情况有些相似，但也肯定有很多不同之处。这种情况会让人分心，显然其中既有一些错误，也有一些信息误导。所有这些都需要厘清。

Our best guess right now is that, when it’s all done — 10 years from now, 15 years from now — the 275 million will be our loss. That most certainly won’t be the exact figure. But like I say, if there’s any reason to revise that number upward, we’ll let you know promptly.

我们现在的最佳估计是，当一切尘埃落定时——10 年后或 15 年后——2.75 亿美元将是我们的损失。这肯定不会是确切的数字。但正如我所说，如果有任何理由上调这一数字，我们会立即通知您。

It is the nature of insurance that you get unpleasant surprises from time to time.

保险行业的本质决定了你会不时遇到不愉快的意外。

Loews Corp. bought CNA in the early 1970s. And just in the last few years, there was a fiberboard settlement on a policy, I believe, that was written in the late ’50s. And there was a, as I remember, a billion and a half dollar loss on something where the premiums were a few thousand dollars.

例如，Loews 公司在 1970 年代初购买了 CNA。而就在最近几年，有一份我记得是在 1950 年代末签订的保单，因为纤维板和解造成了 15 亿美元的损失，而当时的保费只有几千美元。

GEICO has lost, as I remember, $60 million on a book of business that was written in the early 1980s, where the total premium was less than $200,000. You know, how much of that is stupidity, how much of it is fraud, or who knows exactly? But you can get some very unpleasant surprises in insurance.

GEICO 也曾在 1980 年代初的一组业务中损失了 6000 万美元，而当时的总保费还不到 20 万美元。这其中有多少是愚蠢造成的，有多少是欺诈造成的，谁又能完全搞清楚呢？但在保险业务中，你确实会遇到一些非常不愉快的意外。

And unfortunately, this will not be the last one. It won’t occur in the same place, it won’t occur exactly the same way. But the nature of insurance is that the surprises are on the unpleasant side.

不幸的是，这不会是最后一次。它不会以同样的方式发生，也不会发生在同一个地方。但保险的本质是，这些意外通常是不愉快的。

It’s not the kind of thing that happens when you’re writing personal auto insurance or anything of the sort. But when you write business where the claims pop up 10 or 20 or 30 years later — I think we’ve got a claim, a small workers’ comp company that we have, that goes back 20-odd years, 25 years or so, and it’s just popped up to life in the last year or so. And it costs real money.

这种情况不会发生在个人汽车保险或类似业务中。但当你签订的业务是那种索赔会在 10 年、20 年或 30 年后才出现时——我们有一家小型工人赔偿保险公司，就有一份保单可以追溯到 20 多年前，大约 25 年，而它在过去一年左右才浮现出来。这确实需要花费真金白银。

So it’s a business where the surprises can come big and they can come late. And that will happen even with good management. But with good managements, you’ll have fewer such surprises.

因此，这是一种可能出现巨大意外且延迟很久的业务。这种情况即使在良好的管理下也会发生。但有良好管理的公司，这样的意外会更少。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that was a marvelous question. And imagine anybody asking a question of how to get educated — who knows how to educate people? It’s the same way you educate the dog by rubbing his nose in it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这是个非常棒的问题。想想有人会问如何受教育——谁知道如何教育人？这就像教育狗一样，把它的鼻子按在错误上。（笑声）

And generally speaking, that was a dumb error. That was an amateur’s mistake.

总体来说，这是一个愚蠢的错误，是一个外行犯下的错误。

It doesn’t mean that General Re is suddenly full of amateurs. It was a rare lapse, just as at Berkshire, we think the Omni affair was a rare lapse. I don’t think we’ve repeated it since. Have we, Warren? I can’t think of a single one.

这并不意味着通用再保险突然变成了一家外行公司。这是一次罕见的失误，就像伯克希尔的 Omni 事件一样，我们认为那也是一次罕见的失误。从那以后我们还重复过这种错误吗，沃伦？我想不到任何一次。

WARREN BUFFETT: But again, you know, we don’t know that we’ve repeated it.

沃伦·巴菲特：但同样，你知道，我们并不知道是否重复了这样的错误。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well but —

查理·芒格：好吧，但——

WARREN BUFFETT: These things pop up later. No. No, the answer is we haven’t repeated it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这种事情往往是后面才会冒出来。不，不，我们没有再犯这种错误。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: So yes, it was a dumb, amateurish error. These things do happen. We don’t think it reflects a sudden lowering of the intellectual standards of General Re, which are probably the best in the world. It’s just one of those things that does happen once in a while.

查理·芒格：所以，是的，这是一次愚蠢的、外行式的错误。这种事情确实会发生。但我们并不认为这反映了通用再保险智力标准的突然下降。它们可能是世界上最高的智力标准。这只是偶尔发生的一件事。

And there’s one good side to these things, it does make you more careful. It really refreshes your attention to get banged on the nose like that.

而这种事情也有一个好的一面，它确实让你变得更加小心。被撞一下鼻子会让你的注意力重新集中起来。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and it remains to be seen where the costs of that will be born. Because the entire set of facts, in terms of what was committed to and all of that, it has not been resolved yet.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，目前尚未确定最终由谁承担这些成本。因为关于所有承诺以及相关事实的整个情境，仍未完全厘清。

In the Omni situation, we had significant disputes on the facts for some time, and we eventually recovered a fair amount of money that, for a time, it didn’t look like we would recover.

在 Omni 事件中，我们在事实问题上曾经有过一段时间的重大争议。最终，我们追回了一笔可观的资金，而在一开始，这看起来几乎不可能。

So, you know, the final chapter on this is not going to be written for some time, but it was appropriate to set up $275 million as a reserve, in terms of what we know at this time. And that number could go up. It could also go down, depending on the facts that we discover.

所以，这件事情的最终结局在短期内不会揭晓，但根据我们目前掌握的信息，设立 2.75 亿美元的准备金是适当的。这个数字可能会增加，也可能会减少，这取决于我们后续发现的事实。

63. Berkshire buyback unlikely

伯克希尔回购可能性不大

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Mike Seeley (PH) from Summit, New Jersey.

听众：我是来自新泽西州萨米特的迈克·希利（音）。

Would you please revisit the question of share repurchase for Berkshire Hathaway?

您能否重新谈谈伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票回购问题？

We have heard, today, your comment about the price of Berkshire having been inefficiently priced from time to time in the past. We know that there are now more shares outstanding.

我们今天听到了您提到伯克希尔股价在过去某些时候存在定价效率不高的情况。我们也知道现在流通股数量更多了。

And I’m curious as to whether the buildup of cash is causing you to spend more time looking for investment situations where you’re more comfortable on the 10-year outlook. Thank you.

我想知道，现金积累是否让您花更多时间寻找那些您对未来十年更有信心的投资机会？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: The question of repurchasing shares — and I made that comment about it being inefficiently priced at times — at those times it always seemed to us — and we were incorrect in some cases — it always seemed to us that there were other securities that were even less efficiently priced.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于股票回购的问题——我确实提到过在某些时候股票定价效率不高——但在那些时候，我们总觉得（尽管在某些情况下判断有误）还有其他证券的定价效率更低。

When Berkshire in 1974 sold at $50 a share, I might have thought it was cheap. But I also was looking at the whole Washington Post Company selling for 80 million when I thought it was clearly worth 400 million. And I did not think that Berkshire was underpriced then as the Washington Post Company was.

1974年，伯克希尔股价为每股50美元，当时我可能觉得它很便宜。但我还在看整个《华盛顿邮报》公司，当时它市值仅为8000万美元，而我认为它的价值明显在4亿美元以上。我认为伯克希尔当时的低估程度远不及《华盛顿邮报》。

And that has been true at various times when — there have been times when I thought Berkshire has been underpriced, or even significantly underpriced, but at the same time I was finding other things which I felt were even more attractive.

这在各种情况下都是真实的——有时候我觉得伯克希尔被低估了，甚至被严重低估，但与此同时，我总能找到一些我认为更具吸引力的投资对象。

And like I said, many times I was wrong. We would have been better off buying our own stock instead of buying the things that I was buying.

正如我所说的，很多时候我是错的。如果我们买回自己的股票，而不是我选择的其他投资对象，可能会更好。

But the — if we have money around, and we think Berkshire is significantly underpriced, and we’re not finding other things to do with money, it obviously makes sense for us to repurchase Berkshire shares.

不过，如果我们手头有资金，并且认为伯克希尔的股价被显著低估，同时又找不到其他资金用途，那么显然回购伯克希尔股票是有意义的。

I think it’s difficult for most companies in this market, even though repurchases are probably at close to an all-time high, if not at an all-time high, I think it’s difficult for most companies to be repurchasing — have a repurchase of shares make a whole lot of sense these days.

我认为在当前市场环境下，大多数公司回购股票的合理性不高。尽管股票回购可能已经接近历史最高水平，甚至可能已经达到历史高点，但对大多数公司来说，目前进行股票回购很难有太大的意义。

I mean, I do not think they’re getting much for their money, because we don’t want to buy those shares ourselves. And it’s — and I’m talking about the stock of various companies in America.

换句话说，我认为他们没有很好地利用资金，因为我们自己也不愿意买那些公司的股票。我指的是美国各家公司的股票。

And yet, companies are much more enthusiastic about repurchasing shares now than they were 20 years ago when they were getting far, far greater returns from repurchasing.

然而，现在的公司对股票回购的热情比20年前高得多，而那时回购能够带来远远更高的回报。

We will always — it’s an option that we will always think about. And we’re unlikely to do it unless we think it’s fairly dramatically underpriced because it’s simply — we would want a big margin for error in making that kind of a decision that — not want to — we would not want to buy a dollar bill for 95 cents, or 94 cents, or 93 cents.

我们会一直将回购作为一个备选项进行考虑。但除非我们认为股价被严重低估，否则我们不太可能采取回购行动。因为我们需要在这种决策中留有较大的错误余地——我们不会愿意用95美分、94美分甚至93美分的价格买1美元的钞票。

But there is some level where we would start getting excited, if we didn’t have other uses for the money. Charlie.

不过，如果没有其他资金用途，在某个价位上我们会开始感到兴奋。查理，你怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that.

查理·芒格：我没什么可以补充的。

64. Strong reputation will help us with internet commerce

良好声誉将助力我们的互联网业务

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Wes Thurman from Stanford, California.

听众：下午好，我是来自加利福尼亚州斯坦福的韦斯·瑟曼。

You mentioned earlier about the power of the brands on the internet. And I really can’t think of a better brand, at least in my name, as the Berkshire Hathaway brand.

您刚才提到品牌在互联网中的力量。在我看来，没有哪个品牌能比伯克希尔哈撒韦更优秀，至少在我的印象中是这样的。

And, I guess, going forward, have you thought about ways to use that Berkshire Hathaway name, you know, further on the internet to capitalize on the reputation you’ve built over the past decades as a —

那么，展望未来，您是否考虑过如何进一步在互联网上利用伯克希尔哈撒韦的名字，以充分发挥您过去几十年所建立的声誉？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s a very good point and it is something that could be of real value. It’s already probably of some value to us with the brands that we’re associated with.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是一个非常好的观点，这确实可能具有真正的价值。对我们目前相关联的品牌来说，这或许已经产生了一定的价值。

I mean, I do think that Executive Jet or the NetJets program associated with Berkshire Hathaway, that — Borsheims associated with Berkshire Hathaway, Berkshire Hathaway Life associated with Berkshire Hathaway — I think those brands are enhanced by the association with Berkshire, as some other brands would be.

我认为，与伯克希尔哈撒韦相关联的品牌，比如Executive Jet或NetJets项目、Borsheims珠宝、伯克希尔哈撒韦人寿保险，这些品牌因为与伯克希尔的联系而得到了提升，其他一些品牌也会如此。

But I think that’s got a long way to go. I think you’re dead right on that, that the internet reinforces the necessity for trust in dealing with people.

但我认为还有很大的发展空间。您完全正确，互联网强化了人与人之间交易中信任的重要性。

I mean, you are getting further and further removed from the face-to-face dealing where you can go back to the store the next day or look at the person who sold it to you the next day and get an adjustment or something of the sort.

换句话说，人们越来越少进行面对面的交易，不能像过去那样第二天回到店里，或者直接找到卖东西的人进行调整或解决问题。

You’re really having to place more and more trust in somebody you’re never going to see. And I think you’re right that Berkshire Hathaway, if it behaves itself properly, can get a reputation for trust that will be far greater than that possessed by the average company.

你必须把越来越多的信任交给一个你永远不会见到的人。我认为，伯克希尔哈撒韦只要表现得当，就能够建立起远超普通公司所拥有的信任声誉。

And that when we properly associate that with some of our brands that those brands will be enhanced by the association.

当我们将这种声誉与某些品牌适当关联时，这些品牌会因此而受益。

So I — no, I’ve thought a lot about what you’re talking about there and so have our managers. And it’s something that we intend to capitalize on in the future.

所以，我确实思考过您提到的这些问题，我们的管理团队也做过类似的考虑。这是我们未来计划加以利用的一项优势。

It’s rather interesting, I mean, if you look at the companies that do business with people where there’s no face-to-face interaction, either with the company itself or some intermediary like a retailer or anything of the sort, I mean, you’ve got Dell Computer, now you have Amazon.com.

这很有意思，如果你看看那些与客户没有面对面接触的公司，无论是直接与公司本身还是通过像零售商这样的中介进行交易，比如戴尔电脑，现在还有亚马逊这样的公司。

But GEICO is doing business with, now, 3.7 million policy holders and it’ll do — before the year is out — it’ll be close to 4 1/2 million, and probably 4 billion-8 or so of business with people that have never met anyone from GEICO, they’ve talked to someone on the phone.

但GEICO目前与370万保单持有人进行交易，在今年结束前，这个数字将接近450万，业务金额可能达到约48亿美元。这些客户从未见过GEICO的任何人，只是通过电话与公司联系。

But we are one of the largest companies in the United States, in terms of doing business on a direct-to-consumer basis. We’re doing it with people who on average are paying us $1,200 a year or thereabouts for a promise.

在以直销方式与消费者交易的公司中，我们是美国最大的公司之一。我们的客户平均每年支付我们大约1200美元，换取一份承诺。

So we have a connection that people that talk about the Amazons of the world, where people are buying X dollars’ worth of books, we’re — have a much more direct connection with people who tend to renew with us year after year.

因此，与那些像亚马逊这样的公司相比，我们与客户的联系更加直接。亚马逊的客户可能只是买了一定金额的书，而我们的客户往往会年复一年地与我们续约。

That is based on trust. I mean, it’s not based on the neighbor next door who is — who they can go to if they have a problem. It’s based on the fact they trust this company that’s in — back in the District of Columbia, Washington, to perform in the future.

这完全基于信任。不是因为他们可以找邻居或某个具体的人解决问题，而是因为他们相信这家位于华盛顿哥伦比亚特区的公司在未来会履行承诺。

And that’s a huge asset. And it’s growing daily. I mean, we are adding policy holders every day who are signing up with us, who have never met anybody from the company. And that, already, I mean, it’s a very big asset. It will be many times bigger, in my view, 10 years from now.

这是一项巨大的资产，而且每天都在增长。我们每天都在新增保单持有人，他们从未与公司中的任何人见过面。在我看来，这已经是一项非常重要的资产，十年后它会变得更加庞大。

The Berkshire Hathaway umbrella that gets involved in one company after another like that, that people trust, I mean, we can be in an awful lot of homes over the years.

伯克希尔哈撒韦旗下越来越多这样的公司被人们信任。我认为，未来我们将进入非常多的家庭。

And as more and more business becomes done on an indirect basis, or a direct basis with the consumer, the power of that, in my view, should grow. And we just have to be very smart about how we maximize that growth.

随着越来越多的交易以间接或直接的方式与消费者完成，我认为这种信任的力量会不断增强。我们需要非常聪明地利用这一点来最大化增长。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没什么可以补充的。

65. Management, moats, and the certainty of future earnings

管理层、护城河与未来收益的确定性

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第一区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is David Zelker (PH) and I currently live in Redmond, Washington where I work for one of your good friends. So if I get into trouble for having taken a busy Monday off work, maybe if I give you a call you could put in a word for me.

听众：你好，我叫大卫·泽尔克（音），目前住在华盛顿州雷德蒙德，为您的一位好朋友工作。如果因为今天周一繁忙的工作日我请假而遇到麻烦，也许您可以帮我说几句话。

WARREN BUFFETT: If it’s without pay, we won’t complain. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果是无薪假，我们不会抱怨的。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It’s vacation, yeah.

听众：是带薪休假。

My question is about how you two assign value to certain intangibles that I know you look at when you value companies.

我的问题是，关于您们在评估公司时如何对某些无形资产进行估值。

Anyone who’s read your writings knows that you look for great management and economic moats, as you call them, that enable companies to raise prices and margins.

读过您文章的人都知道，您会寻找优秀的管理层和所谓的“经济护城河”，这些能让公司提高价格和利润率。

I’d like you to drill down with us and tell us what, to you, are the signs of great management and economic moats.

我想请您深入讲解一下，您认为优秀管理层和经济护城河的具体标志是什么？

And furthermore, do you try to put a dollar value on those management and moats and other intangibles when you value companies? And if so, can you guide us through your thinking there?

此外，您是否会尝试在评估公司时为管理层、护城河和其他无形资产赋予一个具体的美元价值？如果会的话，能否向我们解释您的思考过程？

And lastly, I’m interested in how you pick your discount rate. I’m actually a — an alma mater of yours from business school and I learned a bunch of junk about beta, too.

最后，我很好奇您如何选择折现率。我也是您的商学院校友，也学过一堆关于贝塔值的无用知识。

I read that you just assign the Treasury rate. And I’m not sure if that’s right, but I’d love for you to talk about your discount rate. And I’d really appreciate as much detail about your thinking as you can give us, please.

我读到您只是采用了国债收益率作为折现率。不确定这是否准确，但我很想听您谈谈折现率的问题。如果可以的话，请尽可能详细地分享您的思考过程，非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We do — we think, in terms of the Treasury rate, but as I said earlier, that doesn’t mean we think once we’ve discounted something at the Treasury rate, that that’s the right price to pay. We use the Treasury rate just to get comparability across time and across companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们确实会使用国债收益率作为参考。但正如我之前提到的，这并不意味着我们在用国债收益率折现后就认为那是应该支付的正确价格。我们使用国债收益率只是为了在不同时期和不同公司之间获得可比性。

But a dollar earned from a horseshoe company is the same as a dollar earned from an internet company, in terms of the dollar.

从马蹄铁公司赚来的1美元，与从互联网公司赚来的1美元，在“美元”的意义上是相同的。

So it is not worth more, based on whether somebody — it comes from somebody named dot-com, you know, or somebody that — named, you know, the Old-Fashioned Horseshoe Company. The dollars are equal.

因此，无论是来自某个名为“dot-com”的企业，还是某个名为“传统马蹄铁公司”的企业，这些美元的价值是相等的。

And our discount rates, they reflect different expectations about future streams of income, but they don’t reflect any difference in terms of whether it comes from something that the market is all enthused about or otherwise.

我们的折现率反映了对未来收入流不同的预期，但并不会因为收入来自市场热捧的行业或其他行业而有所不同。

The moat and the management are part of the valuation process, in that they enter into our thinking as to the degree of certainty that we attribute to the stream of income — stream of cash, actually — that we expect in the future and the amount of it.

护城河和管理层是估值过程的一部分，它们影响我们对未来收入流（实际上是现金流）确定性的判断，以及对现金流规模的预期。

I mean it is, you know, it is — it’s an art, in terms of valuation of businesses. The formulas get simple at the end.

可以说，对企业的估值是一门艺术。最终的公式可能会很简单。

But if you and I were each looking at the chewing gum business — we own no Wrigley, so I use Wrigley fairly often in class — pick a figure that you would expect unit growth of chewing gum, you know, to grow in the next 10 or 20 years.

但如果你和我一起评估口香糖行业——我们没有持有Wrigley公司的股份，所以我经常在课堂上用它作为例子——你需要给出一个预测数字，比如未来10到20年间口香糖销量单位增长的预期。

Give me your expectations on how much pricing flexibility you have, how much danger there is that Wrigley’s share of market is dramatically reduced. You can go through all of that. That’s what we go through.

再告诉我，你对定价弹性有何预期，Wrigley市场份额大幅减少的可能性有多大。你需要分析这些问题，而我们也是这样分析的。

That is — and in the — in that case, we are evaluating the moat. We are evaluating the price elasticity, which interacts with the moat in certain ways. We’re evaluating the likelihood of unit demand changing in the future. We’re evaluating the likelihood of the management being either very bright with the cash that they develop, or being very stupid with it.

在这个过程中，我们是在评估护城河。我们评估价格弹性及其与护城河的某些交互关系。我们评估未来单位需求变化的可能性。我们还会评估管理层对其生成现金的利用能力——他们是会聪明地使用这些资金，还是会非常愚蠢地使用它们。

And all of that gets into our evaluation of what that stream of money looks like over the years.

这些因素都会纳入我们对未来多年现金流的评估中。

But the value of — how the investment will — works out depends on how that stream develops over the next 10 or 20 years.

但投资的价值——以及它最终的结果——取决于未来10到20年间这条现金流的发展情况。

We had a question earlier today that made certain suppositions about what could happen at Berkshire. And the formulation was exactly right. The question of what numbers to use is another question, but the formulation was proper. And that formulation — the moat enters into that. If you have a big enough moat, you don’t need as much management.

今天早些时候有人问了一个关于伯克希尔未来可能发生情况的问题，其表述方式非常准确。至于使用什么具体数据是另一个问题，但表述方式本身是恰当的。而这种表述方式——护城河就在其中。如果护城河足够宽广，所需的管理就会少一些。

You know, it gets back to Peter Lynch’s remark that he likes to buy a business that’s so good that an idiot can run it, because sooner or later one will. Well — (Laughter)

这让我想起彼得·林奇的一句话：他喜欢买那些业务优秀到即使是一个傻瓜都能经营的公司，因为迟早会有傻瓜来经营。（笑声）

That’s — I mean, he was saying the same thing. I mean, he was saying that what he really likes is a business with a terrific moat where nothing can happen to the moat. And there aren’t very many businesses like that. But then — so you get involved in evaluating all these shadings.

这实际上是在表达同样的观点。他的意思是，他真正喜欢的是那些护城河极其宽广的企业，那些护城河几乎无法被削弱的企业。而这样的企业并不多见。所以，你就需要对这些护城河的细微差别进行评估。

This [a can of Coca-Cola], not the cherry version, but the regular version — this one, has a terrific moat around it. There’s a moat even in this, you know, in the container.

这个（指一罐可口可乐），不是樱桃味，而是普通版的，这罐饮料本身就有着极强的护城河。甚至它的容器也构成了一部分护城河。

You know, I — there was some study made as to what percentage of the people could identify blindfolded what product they were holding just by grabbing the container. And there aren’t many that could score like Coca-Cola in that respect.

有研究显示，通过触摸容器就能蒙着眼辨认产品的人占多大比例。在这方面，能与可口可乐媲美的品牌寥寥无几。

So here you’ve got a case where that product has a share of mind. If there’s 6 billion people in the world — I don’t know what percentage of them have something in their mind that’s favorable about Coca-Cola, but it would be a huge number.

因此，你可以看到这是一个心智占有率极高的产品。全世界有60亿人——我不知道其中有多大比例对可口可乐持正面印象，但这个数字肯定非常庞大。

And the question is, 10 years from now is that number even larger, and is the impression just a slight bit more favorable, on average, for those billions of people that have it? And that’s what the business is all about.

问题在于，十年后这个数字是否会更大，这数十亿人的平均印象是否会略微更加正面？这就是这门生意的核心所在。

If that develops in that manner, you’ve got a great business. I think it’s very likely to develop in that manner, but that’s my own judgment.

如果发展确实如此，那这就是一门伟大的生意。我认为这种情况很可能会发生，但这只是我的个人判断。

美国文化的正面形象。

I think it is a huge moat at Coca-Cola. I think it varies by different parts of the world and all of that. And I think, on top of it, it has a terrific management.

我认为可口可乐的护城河非常宽广。当然，它在世界不同地区的表现有所不同。此外，我认为它还有非常优秀的管理层。

But that — there’s no formula that gives you that precisely, you know, that says that the moat is 28 feet wide and 16 feet deep, you know, or anything of the sort. You have to understand the businesses.

但是，这里没有一个公式可以精确地告诉你护城河有多宽多深，比如28英尺宽、16英尺深之类的说法。你必须真正了解这些业务。

And that’s what drives the academics crazy, because they know how to calculate standard deviations and all kinds of things, but that doesn’t tell them anything. And that what really tells you something is if you know how to figure out how wide the moat is and whether it’s likely to widen further or shrink on you.

这就是学术界抓狂的地方，因为他们知道如何计算标准差和各种指标，但这些并不能告诉他们真正有用的信息。而真正重要的是，你是否知道如何判断护城河有多宽，以及它是可能继续扩大还是会缩小。

白痴对世界的认识局限于表格，离了表格就不认识这个世界了。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you aren’t sufficiently critical of the academic approach. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，你对学术方法的批评还不够严厉。（笑声）

The academic approach to portfolio management, corporate finance, et cetera, et cetera, is very interesting. It’s a lot like Long-Term Capital Management. How can people so smart do such silly things? And yet, that’s the way it is.

学术界对投资组合管理、公司金融等领域的研究方法非常有趣。这有点像长期资本管理公司（LTCM）。怎么会有这么聪明的人做出如此愚蠢的事情？但事实就是如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s the great book that needs to be written, really, is, you know, why do smart people do dumb things?

沃伦·巴菲特：其实，这需要写一本伟大的书，题目是“为什么聪明人会做蠢事？”

And it’s terribly important, because we’ve got a lot of smart people working with us and, you know, if we can just exorcise all the dumb things, you know, it’s just amazing what’ll happen.

这非常重要，因为我们身边有许多聪明人。如果我们能消除所有愚蠢的事情，那结果会令人难以置信。

And to some extent, the record of Berkshire, to the extent it’s been good, has been because we — not because we’ve done brilliant things, but we’ve probably done fewer dumb things than most people.

某种程度上，伯克希尔的良好业绩并不是因为我们做了什么惊人的事情，而是因为我们可能比大多数人犯的错误更少。

But why smart people do things that are against their self-interest is really puzzling. Charlie, tell me why. (Laughs)

但为什么聪明人会做一些违背自身利益的事情，这确实令人费解。查理，你来说说为什么。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well the — you can argue that the very worst of the academic inanity is in the liberal arts departments of the great universities.

查理·芒格：嗯，你可以说，学术界最荒谬的现象就存在于那些名校的文科部门。

And there, if you ask the question, what one frame of mind is likely to do an individual the most damage to his happiness, to his contribution to others — what one frame of mind will be the worst?

在那里，如果你问这样一个问题：哪种思维模式最有可能对一个人的幸福和对他人的贡献造成最大损害？哪种思维模式是最糟糕的？

And the answer would be some sort of paranoid self-pity. Couldn’t imagine a more destructive frame of mind. Now you have whole departments that want everyone to feel a victim. And you pay money to send your children to places where this is what they teach them.

答案就是某种偏执的自怜。我无法想象有比这更具破坏性的思维方式了。然而，现在有一些整个系都在教学生要觉得自己是受害者。而且你还花钱把你的孩子送到这些地方去接受这样的教育。

It’s amazing how these pockets of irrationality creep into these eminent places.

令人惊讶的是，这些非理性的思维竟然能渗透到如此卓越的机构中。

One of the reasons I like the Berkshire meetings is I find fewer of those silly people. (Laughter and applause)

我喜欢伯克希尔股东大会的一个原因是，我发现这里的这种愚蠢人群比较少。（笑声与掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He excluded the head table from (inaudible). (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：他把主席台上的人排除在外了。（听不清）（笑声）

66. Berkshire B can sell at a discount to the A shares

伯克希尔B股可能低于A股价格出售

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Gaylord Hanson. I’m from Santa Barbara, California.

听众：我叫盖洛德·汉森，来自加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉。

And I’m a rookie as an investor with Berkshire Hathaway, because I only started investing last November. And if this is a typical annual meeting, I will be here every first Monday of May the rest of my life. (Laughter)

作为伯克希尔哈撒韦的投资者，我是一个新手，因为我去年11月才开始投资。如果这就是典型的年度会议，那么我以后每年五月的第一个星期一都会来参加。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll be glad to have you. Thanks. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们非常欢迎你。谢谢。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Now I’m very proud to have finally uncovered Berkshire Hathaway and am an investor. But I may have made a slight error in which issue to buy, A or B.

听众：现在，我非常自豪能最终发现伯克希尔哈撒韦并成为其投资者。但在选择买A股还是B股时，我可能犯了一个小错误。

I watch my investments rather closely, and I do believe in buying and holding. I don’t buy and trade at all. I buy — I’ve got things I bought 10, 15 years ago, and I still have them, and I’ve made a lot of money.

我非常关注我的投资，而且坚信买入并持有。我根本不做买卖交易。我买入的股票，比如10年、15年前买的，现在还持有，并且赚了很多钱。

But I made an — I make an analysis, every December 31st, on my portfolio. And I looked at Hathaway A and I looked at Hathaway B on January 1st, and again on the 23rd of April. Hathaway A was up 10 percent since January 1st. Hathaway B was 5.3 percent. Now I don’t like that.

但我每年12月31日都会分析我的投资组合。我查看了1月1日和4月23日的伯克希尔A股和B股。自1月1日以来，A股上涨了10%，而B股上涨了5.3%。我可不喜欢这样的情况。

Now, I must confess that I’m not inclined to buy a $77,000 stock and buy one of your 5 or 10 shares. But in this instance, because I bought a fair little bit of it, I bought the B and my increase in value, per share, is 4.7 percent less in B than in A. And I got to have that explained to me — (laughter) — by Mr. Buffett.

现在，我必须承认，我并不倾向于买一只价值77,000美元的股票，哪怕只买5股或10股。但在这种情况下，因为我买了一些B股，我每股的增值比A股少了4.7%。我需要巴菲特先生给我解释一下这个问题。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Have one other — one further comment. (Laughter)

听众：我还有一个——一个进一步的评论。（笑声）

You mentioned the 30 times the B being an A value. Well, if I multiply the value on the 23rd of May — of April — of $2,474 per share by 30, I come up with 74,220 but the price of A was 77,000.

您提到过B股的价值是A股的1/30。如果我用4月23日每股2,474美元的B股价格乘以30，得出的是74,220美元，而A股的价格是77,000美元。

Now I want to know whether I’m stupid or some good intelligent answer from Mr. Buffett.

现在我想知道我是愚蠢的，还是可以从巴菲特先生那里得到一个合理的解释。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. The — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，（笑声）

If you read what we’ve got, both in the original offering on the B, as well as on the website, explaining everything, the A can always be converted into 30 shares of B.

如果您看过我们最初对B股的发行说明以及网站上的所有说明，就会知道A股可以随时转换成30股B股。

So, it can’t sell for anything other than a very tiny amount less than 30 shares of B. And if it went below that, arbitrage would occur. But it doesn’t convert the other way.

因此，A股的价格只能比30股B股的总价略低。如果低于这个价格，就会发生套利。但反过来，B股不能转换为A股。

So there’s no question that, whereas a share of B can never be worth more than about 1/30th of A, it can be worth less, because the conversion doesn’t run the other way.

因此，毫无疑问，B股的价格永远不会超过A股的1/30，但它的价格可能会低于这个比例，因为B股无法转换成A股。

Now at year-end, I didn’t look at the prices, but obviously the A and B were at almost parity, or probably at parity from what you say.

去年年底，我没有查看价格，但显然，根据您所说，A股和B股的价格几乎是平价的，或者大致相等。

And at that level we say that if you’re buying at least 30 shares of B, you’re better off buying the A because you can always go — you can always convert it into 30 shares of B. And without having paid any premium, you can’t lose money and you can gain money if the B goes to a discount.

在这种情况下，我们会建议，如果您要买至少30股B股，那么买A股会更划算，因为您可以随时将其转换为30股B股。如果B股折价，您不会损失任何钱，反而可以获利。

The B will periodically go to a discount against the A. It depends on the supply and demand of the two securities. The B will not go to a premium above the A of any significant amount because then conversion occurs. And we’ve had a lot of conversion occur.

B股会周期性地相对于A股折价，这取决于两种证券的供需关系。而B股不会以显著高于A股的溢价交易，因为这时会发生转换。事实上，我们已经经历了许多转换。

I have personally said on the website, for example, that I think when the B is at more than a two percent I would rather buy the B, if it was me.

例如，我个人在网站上说过，当B股的溢价超过2%时，如果是我，我会更愿意买B股。

But if it’s at less than a two percent discount, I’d probably buy the A, because I just think that you’ve always got the right to go one direction and you don’t have the right to go the other direction.

但如果折价低于2%，我可能会选择买A股，因为这样您始终可以选择转换成B股，而无法反向操作。

I would predict, as I think I did just a little earlier, that if you take the next 10 years, you’re going to find a significant number of months when the two stocks trade at parity, at a 30-to-1 relationship, and you’re going to find a significant number of months when the B sells at a discount.

我可以预测，就像我刚才提到的，如果你看未来10年，会发现有相当多的月份两种股票以30:1的比例平价交易，也会发现有不少月份B股以折价交易。

When people who are buying smaller amounts are the more aggressive buyers of the stock, they will push the B up to the point where A gets converted into B. And that means that the B is selling at a slight, very slight, premium over the A.

当那些购买少量股票的投资者成为更积极的买家时，他们会将B股价格推高到A股转换为B股的程度。这意味着B股的价格会相对于A股出现轻微的溢价，非常微小的溢价。

And when you find times when people are, on balance, preferring their larger buyers, maybe institutional buyers, then the A will tend to sell at some premium.

而当市场上较大买家的偏好占主导地位，比如机构投资者，这时A股通常会以一定的溢价交易。

I think that — you may have picked on April 23rd. My guess is it’s narrowed a little bit, because I think it’s a 3-and-a-fraction percent discount at the moment.

我想你提到的是4月23日。我猜这个差距已经缩小了一些，因为目前我认为折扣大约是3点几个百分点。

But I would sort of use that guideline I stuck on the website, although there’s nothing magical about it. Those will be the prevailing facts.

不过，我建议参考我在网站上提到的指导方针，尽管它并没有什么神奇之处。这就是通常的市场事实。

I mean, if the B is selling at 2,500 and the A is selling at 75,000, a 30-to-1 relationship, and you were buying at least $75,000 worth of stock, I’d advise you to buy the A because you — the next day, if you wanted to you could convert it into 30 shares of B.

例如，如果B股的价格是2,500美元，而A股的价格是75,000美元，呈现30:1的比例，而你打算购买至少价值75,000美元的股票，我会建议你买A股，因为第二天如果你想，你可以把它转换为30股B股。

And — but you can’t buy 30 shares of B and convert it into one share of A.

但你不能买30股B股然后将其转换为1股A股。

So, I’m not sure on the day you actually bought — if you bought B, it sounds as if you did — on the day that you actually bought B, I don’t whether you were buying it at a discount or not. Most of the time last year it did not sell at a discount.

所以，我不确定你实际购买的那一天——听起来你买的是B股——那天B股是否以折价交易。去年大部分时间里，B股并未以折价出售。

Most of the time this year it has sold at a discount. There will be times when it will sell at parity and there will be times when it sells at a discount.

而今年的大部分时间里，B股以折价出售。未来会有它与A股平价的时间，也会有它以折价交易的时候。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. When you made your original decision to buy the lower priced of the two stocks, you made a mistake. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，当你最初决定购买价格较低的那只股票时，你犯了一个错误。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if he was buying at least 30 shares —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果他买的是至少30股——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Yeah. If you were buying at least 30 shares.

查理·芒格：是的，是的。如果你买的是至少30股。

And now that the stock, the B stock, is down to such a discount versus the A, Warren is saying he would hold the B. What could be simpler? (Applause and laughter)

而现在B股相对于A股有了这么大的折扣，沃伦的意思是他会持有B股。这还有什么比这更简单的呢？（掌声和笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll try and make both the A and B work out fine. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会努力让A股和B股都表现良好。（笑声）

But it — there — you should understand the relationship of the two. And we tried to be extremely clear about that when we brought up — we had a page that — which we devoted precisely to that point.

不过，你应该理解这两者之间的关系。当我们推出B股时，我们努力非常清楚地解释过这一点——我们专门有一页完全是针对这个问题的说明。

And we have put — I put this thing up on the website because I was getting some mail that was questioning this. People clearly didn’t understand it, so I put this up on the website.

后来我把相关内容放到了网站上，因为我收到了一些邮件，里面对这个问题提出了疑问。显然，有些人没有理解这个关系，所以我把它放到了网站上。

And if you click on the — our homepage, you will see some reference to something else you can click that says the relative situation on the A and B. And I hope it’s clear.

如果你点击我们的网站首页，你会看到一个可以点击的参考链接，说明A股和B股之间的相对情况。我希望这样可以更清楚。

67. “The average insurance company is going to remain very average”

“普通保险公司将仍然保持普通”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is John Loo (PH) from New York City.

听众：你好，我叫约翰·卢（音），来自纽约市。

First, let me start out by thanking both of you for the incredible education that you’ve provided me through your annual reports and various presentations that you’ve given in public and in publication.

首先，我要感谢你们通过年报以及公开场合和出版物中的演讲，给我提供了极大的教育。

I was about to send you my tuition check last week, but instead I decided to buy more shares of your company. I hope you’ll forgive me.

上周我本来打算把学费支票寄给你们，但最后我决定买更多你们公司的股票。我希望你们能原谅我。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, you learned well. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，你学得很好。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question basically centers around the insurance industry at present.

听众：我的问题主要围绕当前的保险行业。

Right now, there’s excess capacity, which comes and goes, typically speaking. But there seems to be a trend towards international consolidation. And also, there seems to be a trend towards demutualization in the life insurance companies in the U.S.

目前，保险行业存在过剩的承保能力，这种情况通常是周期性的。但似乎也有一个趋势是国际整合。此外，美国寿险公司也似乎在走向非互助化的趋势。

I was wondering if you could give us your thoughts on what the future face of the insurance industry will look like.

我想知道您对未来保险行业的看法是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I — both of those trends do exist, that you talked about.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你提到的这两个趋势确实存在。

I don’t think that consolidation usually solves many problems. I mean, if you have two lousy businesses and you put them together, you’ve got a big, lousy business, usually. (Laughter)

我不认为整合通常能解决很多问题。如果你有两家糟糕的公司，把它们合并起来，你通常就会得到一家更大的糟糕公司。（笑声）

And I am not a big fan of consolidation where the theory is that you’re going to — you really have two very mediocre businesses and you’re going to wring the costs out of one. And it doesn’t — it just doesn’t work that way in my experience.

而且，我并不太认同那种整合理论，即将两家非常平庸的公司合并，通过削减一家公司的成本来取得成功。在我的经验中，这种方法通常行不通。

But the consolidation will go on, and the demutualization of life companies will go on.

但整合将会继续，寿险公司的非互助化也会继续。

It’s not inconceivable that we would play some part in one or the other in some way, although it’s not high on our list. But I’ve learned in this business never to say never because things do happen that have caused me to want to retract some earlier statements.

我们参与其中的可能性并不是完全不存在，尽管这并不是我们优先考虑的事项。但在这个行业中，我学会了永远不要说“绝不”，因为总有一些事情会发生，让我想收回以前的某些话。

The winners are going to be the people that have some franchise based on specialized talents, on terrific distribution systems, managerial know-how, even the ability to use the float effectively.

未来的赢家将是那些拥有基于专业技能的特许经营权、优秀的分销系统、管理专长，甚至能够有效利用浮存金的公司。

And in the case of something like GEICO, on the superior — it’s combined with a franchise — a superior distribution system. We have the low-cost method of distributing personal auto insurance on a — on an all-comers basis.

以GEICO为例，它拥有一个卓越的特许经营权，结合了卓越的分销系统。我们以最低成本向所有客户提供个人汽车保险的分销方式。

USAA does a terrific job of delivering low-cost insurance to a specialized group.

USAA在为特定群体提供低成本保险方面表现非常出色。

GEICO actually came — in a sense — came out of USAA. Leo Goodwin and his wife, Lillian, who founded the company in 1936, were both employed by USAA. And I — Leo, as I remember, was an officer of the company.

事实上，GEICO某种意义上可以说是源自USAA。GEICO的创始人利奥·古德温和他的妻子莉莲在1936年创立了公司，他们都曾是USAA的员工。据我所知，利奥曾是USAA的一名管理人员。

So the idea of GEICO came out of a USAA, but they’ve limited it to a given class. We offer it to everybody in the country, except we can’t offer it in New Jersey or Massachusetts because we can’t figure out any way to make any money there.

所以，GEICO的理念来源于USAA，但USAA的服务仅限于特定群体。而我们则将服务提供给全国的所有人，除了新泽西和马萨诸塞，因为我们无法找到任何方法在这些州盈利。

Twentieth Century has done a terrific job of becoming a low-cost operator in a given urban area, in the greater Los Angeles area.

二十世纪保险公司在洛杉矶大都市地区，作为低成本运营商表现得非常出色。

But in terms of an all-comers, all-geography, all-occupation-type operation, in my view, GEICO is the best operation in the United States. And better yet, consumers around the world are agreeing — around the country — are agreeing with that view.

但就覆盖所有客户、所有地理区域、所有职业类型的运营模式而言，我认为GEICO是美国最优秀的运营公司。更重要的是，全国的消费者正在同意这个观点。

GEICO gained, last year, 20.8 percent policy holders. This year, in the 12 months ended March 31st, it’s up 22.5 percent policy owners.

去年，GEICO的保单持有人增长了20.8%。在截至今年3月31日的12个月内，这一数字增长了22.5%。

These are on big numbers. The base and the growth has accelerated. So that kind of — that sort of advantage will make for a good insurance — a very good insurance business over time.

这些增长是基于庞大的基数，而且增长速度在加快。这种优势将长期推动保险业务发展，成为一个非常优秀的保险公司。

I think the average insurance company is going to remain very average, and there is a lot of capital in the industry, as you pointed out. There’s more capital in the industry than there is opportunity to use it intelligently.

我认为普通的保险公司会继续保持普通的水平。正如你指出的，行业内的资本过剩，资本的数量远超能够明智使用它的机会。

And nevertheless, it doesn’t go away. You are not seeing consolidation that takes away a lot of the capital of the industry, you’re not seeing massive repurchases or anything of the sort.

尽管如此，这些资本并没有消失。行业内并没有看到会消耗大量资本的整合，也没有出现大规模的股票回购或类似的行为。

So the capital is there. It’s seeking an outlet in premium volume. That actually hurts a General Re to an extent because it means that the primary companies want to retain more of the premium they generate, just so they can show some kind of growth against this capital base.

因此，这些资本仍然存在，并试图通过增加保费收入找到出路。这实际上在一定程度上对General Re（通用再保险公司）产生了不利影响，因为初级保险公司希望保留更多自己生成的保费，以便在这些资本基础上显示出某种增长。

I think generally, we’re very well positioned in the industry. I think the industry will be tougher in the next few years by a significant margin in the personal auto business. But frankly, I look forward to it because I think we — it may offer us the opportunity to grow even faster.

总体而言，我认为我们在行业中的地位非常有利。我认为在未来几年，个人汽车保险业务将面临更加艰难的环境。但坦白讲，我对此感到期待，因为我认为这可能会为我们提供更快增长的机会。

We — you know, we have the best vehicle in a very, very big industry, the auto insurance business. And we’ve got incredibly good management to take advantage of that. And we’ve got policies available as you leave at the door. (Laughter)

你知道，我们在一个非常庞大的行业——汽车保险行业中，拥有最佳的运营模式。而且，我们有着非常出色的管理团队能够利用这一点。如果需要，在离开时门口就有保单可以领取。（笑声）

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没什么可以补充的。

68. China: huge growth potential for Coca-Cola and Gillette

中国：可口可乐和吉列的巨大增长潜力

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon and thank you. My name is Paul Worth. I’m from Wichita, Kansas. And my question is as follows.

听众：下午好，谢谢。我叫保罗·沃斯，来自堪萨斯州的威奇托。我的问题如下。

For the consumer franchise companies that Berkshire owns, Coca-Cola and Gillette in particular, in which emerging markets do you see the greatest 10-year potential for unit sales growth? And what economic, political, or social changes are precipitating that growth?

对于伯克希尔拥有的消费品特许经营公司，特别是可口可乐和吉列，您认为在哪些新兴市场中，它们未来10年的单位销售增长潜力最大？是什么样的经济、政治或社会变化推动了这种增长？

Secondly, do you believe that the U.S. market cap, as a percent of the world’s, at 53 percent, is near its zenith? And which countries do you believe will likely show the greatest percent growth in total market cap?

其次，您是否认为目前美国市场市值占全球市值的53%已经接近其顶峰？您认为哪些国家可能会在总市值增长百分比上表现最突出？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish I had the answers. The first question, though — obviously, when you’re dealing with something like Coke, is raw numbers. I mean, there’s huge potential in a country, you know — with the largest country in the world, and in China, where the per capita consumption is very low but is growing very fast.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我希望我能有确切的答案。关于第一个问题，显然，当你谈论像可口可乐这样的公司时，需要关注的是绝对数字。比如，在世界上最大的人口大国——中国，那里的人均消费量目前很低，但增长非常迅速，这显示了巨大的潜力。

So it’s very easy for me to predict, and probably be right, absent some tremendous upheaval or some real surprise, that China would be the fastest growth market among countries of any size in the world for Coke from this level.

因此，在没有发生巨大动荡或意外的情况下，我可以很容易地预测（并且很可能是正确的），中国将是可口可乐当前水平上在全球所有规模国家中增长最快的市场。

But that’s based on the fact that you’ve just got a huge number of people that clearly like the product, that are starting from a very low base, and where a lot more bottling infrastructure is going to be needed, but which will be supplied to facilitate that growth.

这基于这样一个事实：中国有大量的人口，他们显然喜欢这个产品，目前的消费基数很低，同时需要更多的灌装基础设施，而这些设施会被建设以支持这种增长。

With Gillette, it’s a little different. People are already shaving. What you do is you upgrade the shaving experience that they have. So you have great differences in the quality of the blades available throughout the world. They call them shaving systems when you get into the more advanced ones.

而吉列的情况有些不同。人们已经在使用剃须刀，你需要做的是提升他们的剃须体验。世界各地剃须刀片的质量差异很大，当谈到更高级的产品时，它们被称为“剃须系统”。

And what happens is that, as people’s disposable income grows, they are — they trade up. And they get a much more enjoyable shaving experience, and they get better shaves than was the case when they were forced to rely on the lowest-priced product.

随着人们可支配收入的增加，他们会选择升级产品。他们将获得更愉快的剃须体验，比以前只能依赖低价产品时的剃须效果更好。

But both of those companies have tremendous opportunities as the prosperity around the world — as the standard of living grows.

但这两家公司都有巨大的机会，随着全球繁荣和生活水平的提高。

And there’s just no doubt in my mind that in the blade and razor business for Gillette, which is only a third of their business, but — and in the soft drink business for Coke, they’re going to share in it. It’ll be uneven in the years that it happens and all of that sort of thing.

在吉列的刀片和剃须刀业务上（尽管这仅占其业务的三分之一），以及可口可乐的软饮料业务上，我毫无疑问它们会从中获益。虽然这种增长在具体年份会有些不均衡。

But I would almost guarantee you that 10 or 20 years from now, both of those companies will be doing a lot more business in their — in those areas I named than currently.

但我几乎可以保证，10年或20年后，这两家公司在我提到的这些领域的业务量都会比现在大得多。

And, you know, it — we don’t fine tune it a lot more than that. I mean, I do not sit and work out — try and work out — country by country, what’s going to happen with a Gillette or Coke. It would be a waste of time. I wouldn’t know the answer anyway.

而且，我们并不会对这个问题做更多的细化分析。我不会坐下来试图逐个国家地分析吉列或可口可乐的表现如何。那只是浪费时间，况且我也不可能知道答案。

But I’m pretty sure the conclusion that both of them will prosper a great deal — and I would hate to be competing with either one of them — here or anywhere else in the world. I mean, they have the winning hand.

但我非常确定，这两家公司将会取得极大的成功。而且我绝不想与它们中的任何一家竞争——无论是在这里还是世界上的其他地方。它们拥有无可匹敌的优势。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with everything you said. And I’d like to add that, if I knew for sure that the United States share of worldwide market capitalization was going to go from 53 percent down to 40 percent, I wouldn’t know how to make money out of that insight by running around buying foreign securities.

查理·芒格：嗯，我同意你说的一切。我还想补充一点，如果我确切知道美国在全球市场总市值中的占比将从53%下降到40%，我也不知道该如何通过这一洞察去购买外国证券赚钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we just don’t operate on that basis. And, I mean, you know, a few years ago emerging markets were all the rage.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们并不是以这种方式运作的。而且，你知道，几年前新兴市场一度非常流行。

And every institution in the country was getting promoted by somebody who said, “I’m going to run an emerging markets fund.” And they felt they had to participate in it and their advisors told them they had to participate.

当时国内的每个机构都被人推销说：“我要运行一个新兴市场基金。”这些机构觉得自己必须参与，他们的顾问也建议他们参与。

We regard that all as nonsense. You know, in the end, you’ve just got to think for yourself about what you know and what you don’t know and go where that leads you.

我们认为这完全是无稽之谈。最终，你必须根据自己知道的和不知道的内容独立思考，并根据这些信息采取行动。

And you don’t do it by buying into things with names on them, or sectors, or country funds, or that stuff. You know, that’s merchandise that’s designed to sell to people and it’s usually sold to people at the wrong time.

而你不应该通过购买某些名字、行业或国家基金之类的东西来投资。这些都是为了卖给人们的商品，通常是在错误的时间推销给人们的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Our game is to find a few intelligent things to do. It’s not to stay up on every damn thing that’s going on in the whole world.

查理·芒格：是的，我们的任务是找到一些明智的事情去做，而不是关注世界上发生的每一件事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

69. Munger recommends a book about Buffett

芒格推荐一本关于巴菲特的书

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：第5区域。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Everett Puri. I’m from Atlanta, Georgia and I’ve two questions.

听众：大家好，我叫埃弗雷特·普里，来自乔治亚州亚特兰大。我有两个问题。

One is for Mr. Munger in our never-ending effort to have the Munger Book Club surpass the Oprah Book Club. I was wondering if you could make some recommendations.

第一个问题是，芒格先生，为了让“芒格读书俱乐部”超过“奥普拉读书俱乐部”，您能推荐一些书吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

查理·芒格：好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The second is, it seems that with the pharmaceutical industry earlier, that the threat of government regulation or government appropriation of those cash flows led to a reasonable market opportunity, and the same thing with Sallie Mae.

听众：第二个问题是，早些时候对于制药行业，政府监管或对这些现金流的干预威胁似乎创造了一个合理的市场机会，萨利梅公司（Sallie Mae）也是如此。

And I’m wondering if you feel that that’s going on with the tobacco industry now or if that is a larger threat to that industry, larger and permanent threat.

我想知道您是否认为烟草行业现在也面临这种情况，或者这种威胁是否对该行业更大、更持久？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, number one, the books.

查理·芒格：首先说书的问题。

[Robert] Hagstrom sent me chapters of his latest book on Warren Buffett called, The Buffett Portfolio. And I didn’t read them because I thought his first book was a respectable book, but didn’t contribute too much to human knowledge, and — (Laughter)

[罗伯特]·哈格斯特罗姆寄给我他最新的关于沃伦·巴菲特的书《巴菲特投资组合》的部分章节。我当时没读，因为我觉得他第一本书算是一部值得尊敬的作品，但没有对人类知识贡献太多。（笑声）

(Inaudible) sent me the second book, a full version, and I read it and I was flabbergasted to find it not only very well written, but a considerable contribution to the synthesis of human thought on the investment process.

后来，他把第二本书的完整版寄给了我。我读了以后非常震惊，发现这本书不仅写得很好，而且对投资过程中的人类思想综合做出了相当大的贡献。

And I would recommend that all of you buy a copy of Hagstrom’s second Buffett book.

我建议你们所有人都买一本哈格斯特罗姆的第二本关于巴菲特的书。

I notice the airport was heavily promoting it. It’s called The Warren Buffett Portfolio. It doesn’t pick any stocks for you, but it does illuminate how the investment process really works, if you think about it rationally.

我注意到机场在大力推广这本书，书名是《巴菲特投资组合》。它不会为你挑选股票，但它确实阐明了如果用理性思维考虑，投资过程是如何运作的。

Another book that I liked very much this year was Titan, the biography of the original John D. Rockefeller. That’s one of the best business biographies I have ever read. And it’s a very interesting family story, too.

今年我非常喜欢的另一本书是《巨人》（Titan），它是关于第一代约翰·D·洛克菲勒的传记。这是我读过的最好的商业传记之一，同时也是一个非常有趣的家族故事。

That is was just a wonderful, wonderful book. And I don’t know anybody who’s read it who hasn’t enjoyed it. So I would certainly recommend that latest biography of John D. Rockefeller the first.

这真是一本非常精彩的书。我不知道有谁读过它而不喜欢的。所以我绝对推荐这本关于第一代约翰·D·洛克菲勒的最新传记。

The third book is sort of a revisitation of the subject matter of the book I recommended a year or two ago called Guns, Germs, and Steel, which was a physiologist’s view of the economic history of man. And it was a wonderful book.

第三本书可以看作是对一两年前我推荐过的一本书《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》内容的再探讨。那本书从生理学家的视角讲述了人类的经济史，是一本非常精彩的书。

And much of that same territory has now been covered by an emeritus history professor from Harvard, who just knows way more economics and science than is common for a history professor. And that gives him better insight.

现在，这一领域的许多内容已经由一位哈佛大学的荣休历史教授进行了探讨。这位教授的经济学和科学知识远远超过一般历史学者，这赋予了他更深刻的洞见。

And his book is a takeoff in title on Adam Smith, and the title is, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. And the guy’s name is [David] Landes. So I would heartily recommend those 3 books.

他的书名取自亚当·斯密的灵感，名为《国家的财富与贫穷》（The Wealth and Poverty of Nations），作者是[大卫]·兰德斯。我衷心推荐这三本书。

70. Tobacco far more threatened than pharmaceuticals

烟草面临的威胁远大于制药行业

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now what was the third question?

查理·芒格：第三个问题是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: The other question was about tobacco and pharmaceutical —

沃伦·巴菲特：另一个问题是关于烟草和制药——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, tobacco.

查理·芒格：哦，烟草。

I don’t know about Warren, but I think the legislative threat to tobacco is serious, and I haven’t the faintest idea of how to predict it.

我不知道沃伦怎么看，但我认为对烟草的立法威胁是非常严重的，而且我完全不知道如何预测它的走向。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that there’s no comparison between the threat to tobacco, currently, with the threat to pharmaceuticals in 1993 — that the problems of the tobacco companies are of a far different order than the problems of the pharmaceutical companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为，目前烟草面临的威胁与1993年制药行业面临的威胁无法相比。烟草公司的问题远比制药公司的问题更加严重。

Nobody was against pharmaceuticals. They were just — had different ideas about maybe pricing, and distribution, and all of that. But tobacco’s a different story. I mean, tobacco companies — well, you can figure it out for yourself.

没人反对制药行业。他们只是对定价、分销等方面有不同的看法。但烟草就是另一个故事了。烟草公司——嗯，你可以自己想明白其中的差别。

71. Buffett’s book recommendations

巴菲特的书籍推荐

WARREN BUFFETT: The — in terms of books, I would recommend — many of you have may have read it, but this goes back more than a year, but I would — if you haven’t read Katharine Graham’s autobiography Personal History, it is one terrific book.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于书籍，我推荐——许多人可能已经读过了，这本书出版已经超过一年了。但如果你还没读过凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆的自传《个人历史》（Personal History），这是一部非常棒的书。

It’s a very incredibly honest book. And it’s a fascinating story. I mean, it’s a life that’s seen all kinds of things in politics and in business and in government. So I — it’s a great read.

这本书非常坦诚，讲述了一个引人入胜的故事。它描绘了一段经历了政治、商业和政府各方面的精彩人生。我觉得——这是一本值得阅读的好书。

A book that came out just in the last few months in the investment world that I would certainly recommend to everybody is Common Sense on Mutual Funds, by Jack Bogle.

最近几个月投资界出版的一本书，我肯定会向每个人推荐，它是杰克·博格尔的《共同基金的常识》（Common Sense on Mutual Funds）。

Jack is an honest guy, and he knows the business. And if mutual fund investors listen to him, they would save billions and billions of dollars a year. And he tells it exactly like it is. So I — he asked me for a blurb on the book, and I was delighted to provide it.

杰克是个非常诚实的人，他了解这个行业。如果共同基金的投资者听从他的建议，他们每年可以节省数十亿美元的费用。他在书中直言不讳。所以——他邀请我为这本书写推荐语，我很高兴提供了支持。

72. Expect “huge impact” from internet, but too hard to pick winners

互联网将带来“巨大影响”，但很难挑选赢家

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to zone 6, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们去第6区吧。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and good afternoon, Mr. Munger. My name is Mohnish Pabrai and I’m from the Chicago area.

听众：下午好，巴菲特先生，下午好，芒格先生。我叫莫尼什·帕布莱，来自芝加哥地区。

Mr. Buffett, I’d like to thank you for all your insights over the years. I’m especially amazed at the pace of which you answer my letters, point by point.

巴菲特先生，多年来感谢您分享的所有智慧。我特别惊叹于您逐一解答我信件中问题的速度。

I have a question for you related to circle of competence. I have a notion that both Mr. Munger and yourself understand the Kleiner Perkins model of early-stage venture capital investing and, currently, their focus in the internet space, extremely well.

我有一个关于能力圈的问题。我觉得您和芒格先生都非常了解凯鹏华盈（Kleiner Perkins）的早期风险投资模式，尤其是它们目前对互联网领域的关注。

My notion is that I think it is well within your circle of competence to understand what they do, just like you understand what your managers at See’s Candy or Executive Jets do.

我的想法是，我觉得你完全有能力理解他们在做什么，就像你理解在See’s Candy或Executive Jets的经理们所做的工作一样。

So the question is, that with the internet, I think we’re seeing a change that has not been seen in the last 500 years as humans. We haven’t seen something that is as dramatic and as profound that’s going to come upon us.

因此，问题在于：关于互联网，我认为我们正在见证人类在过去五百年里从未经历过的变革。我们从未见识过即将到来的如此剧烈且深远的影响。

If, let’s say, a John Doerr at Kleiner Perkins approached you and said that they were starting, let’s say, a billion-dollar early-stage or later-stage internet investment fund that Kleiner would manage, would you consider that — would you consider participating in that investment to be within your circle of competence, if it were offered at terms that looked attractive?

假设John Doerr（来自Kleiner Perkins）找到你，说他们打算设立一个可能是10亿美元规模的互联网投资基金（无论是早期还是后期），由Kleiner来管理——如果他们提出的条件看上去很有吸引力，你会不会认为参与这项投资属于你的能力圈范围之内？

WARREN BUFFETT: I agree with the first part of what you said. I mean, I’m not sure that it’ll, necessarily, will be the most important in the last 500 years in the commercial world. But it could well be. And if it isn’t, it’s right up there.

沃伦·巴菲特：我同意你说的第一部分。我不确定这是否一定会成为过去500年商业世界中最重要的事件，但它很可能是。如果不是最重要的，那也是排在前列的。

I mean, it is — and we talked about this last year and maybe even the year before — I mean, it is a huge development. But — and I would say that Charlie and I both understand the process of early investment/promotion probably as well as anyone.

这是一个巨大的发展，我们去年甚至前年都谈到过这个问题。而且，我想说查理和我都可能像任何人一样了解早期投资和推广的过程。

We haven’t participated in it. There are certain things we don’t even like about it. But we do understand it. Right, Charlie? (Laughs)

我们没有参与过其中。有些方面我们甚至不喜欢。但我们确实了解它，对吧，查理？（笑声）

And I would say that no, we would not have an interest in investing in the fund. It — we do not necessarily regard the internet —

而且我要说的是，不，我们不会对投资这种基金感兴趣。我们并不一定认为互联网——

There’s no question, if you’re in the early stages of promotion, and you — particularly if you’ve got a reputation as a successful in that — but in this case, it wouldn’t make much difference, because the whole field has gone wild — you will make a lot of money selling to the next stage, and the next stage, and the next stage.

毫无疑问，如果你处于早期推广阶段，尤其是如果你在这个领域有成功的声誉——但在这种情况下，这可能并不重要，因为整个领域已经疯狂了——你可以通过向下一阶段、再下一阶段出售来赚很多钱。

But, in terms of picking out businesses that are going to do wonderfully as businesses — not as stocks for a while, but as businesses — I don’t think it’s necessarily so easy in the internet world.

但如果要挑选那些作为企业能表现出色的公司——而不仅仅是在某个时期作为股票表现良好的公司——我认为在互联网领域并不是那么容易。

And I would say that, if you were to ask some very top names in the field to name the next five companies out of the chute, or the next 10 companies out of the chute, and predict that one of them will earn, say, the $200 million I used as a threshold, six or seven years from now, I’m not so sure, if they gave you a list, that they would name a single one.

如果你问一些该领域的顶尖人物，能否预测接下来会出现的五家公司或十家公司，并预测其中一家在六七年后会赚到比如2亿美元的门槛利润，我不确定如果他们给出一个名单，是否能命中一家。

That doesn’t mean they might not make a lot of money by being early investors in them because they sell out to the next group and so on.

这并不意味着他们不能通过早期投资这些公司赚到很多钱，因为他们可以将股份出售给下一批投资者，依此类推。

But in the end, they have to succeed as businesses. And a few will succeed as businesses. The internet will have a huge impact on the world. But I’m not so sure that makes it an easy investment decision.

但最终，这些公司必须作为企业取得成功。而少数公司会作为企业取得成功。互联网会对世界产生巨大的影响。但我不确定这会让它成为一个容易的投资决定。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at least it’s not an easy investment decision for us. And that’s what we’re looking for.

查理·芒格：嗯，至少对我们来说这不是一个容易的投资决定，而我们追求的是容易的决定。

73. “We will never turn our money over to somebody else”

“我们永远不会把资金交给别人管理”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We will never turn our money over to somebody else. You know, if we’re going to lose your money as Berkshire shareholders, we’re going to lose it ourselves and we’re going to come back and look you in the eye and tell you how we lost it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们永远不会把我们的资金交给别人管理。如果我们作为伯克希尔的股东，亏掉了你的钱，那是我们自己亏掉的，我们会回来直视你的眼睛，告诉你我们是如何亏掉的。

We are not going to say this game is too tough, so we’ll give our money to somebody else. You can give your money to somebody else, and you don’t need the intermediaries of me and Charlie to do it for you.

我们不会说这个游戏太难了，所以我们要把钱交给别人。如果你想把钱交给别人管理，你可以直接这么做，而不需要通过我和查理作为中间人。

So, we get approached all the time. I had a call, you know, within the last couple of days, on something you would know very well about participating in some fund or — they always have — it’s always stage one, stage two, stage three.

我们经常会被人接洽。就在过去几天，我接到一个电话，是关于某种基金的参与——他们总是分阶段，比如第一阶段、第二阶段、第三阶段。

And the idea is we get some more people to come in later at twice the price, and maybe the fact that our name is involved, and it will cause people to pay even more, and all of that sort of thing. We’re not in that game.

他们的想法是让更多人以两倍的价格在后期加入，也许因为我们的名字参与其中，会让人们愿意支付更多的钱。我们不玩这种游戏。

And we’re not going to turn the money over to someone else to manage. It’s your money. You gave it to us to manage. We’ll manage it. If you decide you don’t want us to manage it, you decide who you give it to. We’re not going to be intermediaries on it.

我们也不会把钱交给别人管理。这是你的钱，你把它交给我们管理，我们就负责管理。如果你决定不想让我们管理了，那你自己决定把它交给谁。我们不会作为中间人。

And if we don’t understand something ourselves, we’re not looking for anybody else to do it for us. It — the world doesn’t work very well that way, anyway.

如果我们自己都不理解某件事情，我们不会找别人替我们做。说实话，世界也不是这样运作的。

I mean, it — usually you end up in the hands of the promoters and not the hands of the people who really know how to make money.

通常情况下，最终你会落入那些推销者的手中，而不是那些真正知道如何赚钱的人的手中。

Charlie? You want to? He said it.

查理？你还有什么要补充的吗？他已经说完了。

74. Selling McDonald’s was bad; postmortems are good

卖掉麦当劳是个错误，反思是有益的

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第七区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Peter Kenner from New York City. Good afternoon, Warren, Charlie.

听众：我是来自纽约市的彼得·肯纳。下午好，沃伦，查理。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi, Peter.

沃伦·巴菲特：你好，彼得。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good to see you. I’d like to ask you what your thought process was when you, or share with us your thoughts, when you decided to sell McDonald’s.

听众：很高兴见到你。我想问一下，当你决定卖掉麦当劳时，你的思考过程是怎样的？或者能与我们分享一下你的想法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: That must have been Charlie’s idea, Peter. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：彼得，那肯定是查理的主意。（笑声）

Peter, incidentally, is in a family that four generations have essentially invested with us. And they’re all terrific people, I might add. His dad was a wonderful guy.

顺便说一句，彼得一家有四代人基本上都与我们一起投资。他们都是非常棒的人，我必须补充一句，他的父亲是个很了不起的人。

The — you know, I said it was a mistake to sell it, and it was a mistake. And I just reported that in the interest of candor. And there were some reasons why I thought it was something we — I didn’t think it was, obviously, that it was any great short sale, or even a great sale.

我说过卖掉麦当劳是个错误，确实是个错误。我坦率地承认了这一点。当时我有一些理由认为我们应该卖掉它，但显然，这既不是一个伟大的做空操作，也不是一个出色的卖出决定。

But I didn’t think it belonged in the list of eight or 10 of the businesses, of the very few businesses, that we want to own in the world. And I would say that that particular decision has cost you, hmm, in the area of a billion dollars-plus.

但我当时觉得它不应该在我们想要长期持有的八到十个全球最优质业务的名单中。我可以说，这一决定让我们损失了大约10亿美元以上。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You want me to rub your nose in it? You’re doing a — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你是想让我在这件事上狠狠嘲笑你吗？不过你已经自己做得很好了。（笑声）

You’re doing a pretty good job by yourself. (Laughter)

你已经自己把这件事说得够清楚了。（笑声）

By the way, that’s a good practice around Berkshire. We do rub our own noses in it. We don’t even need the help of the Kenners. (Laughter)

顺便说一下，这其实是伯克希尔的一种好习惯。我们确实会在错误中反思自己，甚至都不需要像肯纳家族这样的朋友来提醒我们。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We believe in postmortems at Berkshire. I mean, we really do believe — one of the things I used to do when I ran the partnership is I contrasted all sale decisions versus all purchase decisions.

沃伦·巴菲特：在伯克希尔，我们非常相信事后反思。我过去管理合伙企业时会对所有的卖出决定和买入决定进行对比分析。

It wasn’t enough that the purchase decisions worked out well, they had to work out better than the sale decisions. And managers tend to be reluctant to look at the results of the capital projects or the acquisitions that they proposed with great detail a year or two earlier to a board.

仅仅买入决定表现得不错还不够，它们必须比卖出决定表现得更好。而且，管理者往往不愿意详细审视他们一两年前向董事会提出的资本项目或收购提案的实际结果。

And they don’t want to actually stick the figures up there as to how the reality worked out against the projections. And that’s human nature.

他们不愿意将实际结果与之前的预测数字放到台面上比较。这是人性使然。

But, I think you’re a better doctor if you drop by the pathology department, occasionally. And I think you’re a better manager or investor if you look at every one of the decisions you’ve made, of importance, and see which ones worked out and which ones didn’t and, you know, what is your batting average.

但我认为，如果你偶尔去一下病理科，你会成为更好的医生。同样，如果你能审视自己所做的重要决定，看看哪些决定成功了，哪些失败了，以及你的成功率如何，你会成为更好的管理者或投资者。

And if your batting average gets too bad, you better hand the decision making over to someone else.

如果你的成功率太低，那你最好把决策权交给别人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Charlie, want to rub my nose anymore?

查理·芒格：查理，你还想再嘲笑我一下吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

查理·芒格：不想了。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, that’s OK. OK. We’re —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，那就这样吧。我们——

75. Looked “a little” at health insurance partners

对健康保险合作伙伴有过“一些”研究

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Ian Sacks from New York City.

听众：下午好，我是来自纽约市的伊恩·萨克斯。

This afternoon, through various questions and comments, we’ve mentioned the fact that the word “trust,” which Berkshire Hathaway and the brand has. We’ve mentioned, basically, health, and the importance of health, and that being above everything else.

今天下午，通过各种问题和评论，我们提到了“信任”这个词，这是伯克希尔哈撒韦及其品牌所具有的特质。我们还提到了健康的重要性，健康高于一切。

With Berkshire’s competencies in the insurance industry and with the health care services sector being relatively depressed, is — although the dynamics would be different in the industry how risk is managed on an overall basis — has Berkshire looked at all, in terms of taking a position or buying a health insurance business?

鉴于伯克希尔在保险行业的能力，以及目前医疗服务领域相对低迷，尽管行业的风险管理方式总体上有所不同，伯克希尔是否考虑过持有或收购一家健康保险业务？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie runs a hospital so I’m going to let him talk about this.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理经营着一家医院，所以我让他来谈这个问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure. We’ve looked a little. We’ve looked at everything in turmoil that’s important in the world. But so far it hasn’t seemed to yield our particular mental approach.

查理·芒格：当然，我们看过一些。我们研究过世界上所有重要但处于动荡中的领域。但到目前为止，这些并未符合我们的特定思维方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t know who I would want to get in with in that business at the moment. That’s not — I’m not condemning the people in the business, it just means I don’t know. I’m not — I haven’t been able to evaluate that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我现在不知道该与谁在这个行业合作。这并不是说我否定这个行业中的人，只是我不知道。我还没办法对此作出评估。

And I think it would make an enormous difference, in terms of wanting to get in with a quality operation and quality people and at a sensible price. And we haven’t seen that, but that doesn’t mean we’ve canvassed the whole field either.

我认为，如果要进入这个行业，与一家高质量的运营机构和优秀的人才合作，并以合理的价格进行投资，这会带来巨大的不同。但我们还没有看到这样的机会，这并不意味着我们已经全面研究过这个领域。

CHARLIE MUNGER: There is a significant percentage of schlock operators in the field who are painting the reality different than it is. That makes it harder.

查理·芒格：在这个领域，有相当一部分劣质运营商，他们将现实描绘得与实际不同。这让事情变得更难了。

76. “Journalistic process” good for learning about companies

“新闻式研究过程”有助于了解公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Eric Tweedie from Shavertown, Pennsylvania.

听众：我是来自宾夕法尼亚州沙夫敦的埃里克·特威迪。

I just wanted to express our appreciation of — regarding all the operating businesses that we’ve visited. They’ve been very warm and hospitable.

我想表达我们对所参观的所有运营公司的感谢。他们都非常热情好客。

In fact, when we visited Executive Jets at the airport, the tour was so impressive my wife wanted to buy an airplane. (Laughter)

实际上，当我们参观机场的Executive Jets时，整个旅程非常令人印象深刻，我的妻子甚至想买一架飞机。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: What’s her name? What’s her name? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：她叫什么名字？她叫什么名字？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I won’t say that —

听众：嗯，我不会说的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Spell it out!

查理·芒格：拼出来吧！

AUDIENCE MEMBER: American Express declined the $500,000 we tried to put on my card. (Buffett laughs)

听众：我们试图在我的卡上支付50万美元，但被美国运通拒绝了。（巴菲特笑了）

But you can thank the chairman for me next time you see him. Just kidding, but —

不过，下次见到主席时，可以替我向他致谢。开个玩笑——

My question regards, basically, approach to investing. I’ve been investing my own money in equities for about 10 years. And my results, overall, have been relatively good.

我的问题主要与投资方法有关。我用自己的钱投资股票大约有10年了，总体来看，结果还算不错。

In the process, however, I’ve taught myself some very painful and costly lessons. For instance, my first equity ever purchased was a share of Berkshire Hathaway for $5,500 in 1990 and I sold it 3 months later for something over $8,000 and congratulated myself for the rapid and shrewd profit. (Laughter)

然而，在这个过程中，我也给自己上了很多非常痛苦且昂贵的课。例如，我买的第一只股票是1990年以5,500美元买的一股伯克希尔哈撒韦股票，但我3个月后以8,000多美元卖掉了，还为快速而精明的获利而庆祝自己。（笑声）

And earlier this year, I repurchased the same share for $70,000. (Laughter) And I intend to own it for the rest of my life. (Laughter) So you can see I’m growing. (Laughter)

今年早些时候，我又以7万美元买回了同一股股票。（笑声）我打算持有它到我的余生。（笑声）所以你可以看到，我在成长。（笑声）

My question is, I have no formal education in accounting and finance. And I would just like some advice from you regarding an approach to educate myself and a reading list of basic texts, obviously, starting with the Berkshire Hathaway annual reports. Thank you.

我的问题是，我没有接受过正式的会计和金融教育。我想请教您一些建议，如何自我教育，以及是否有基本书籍的阅读清单？显然，我会从伯克希尔哈撒韦的年报开始。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, particularly for your comments about the people from our operating companies, because they have just been terrific. They come out here — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：感谢你，特别是你对我们旗下运营公司员工的评价，因为他们确实非常出色。他们来到这里——（掌声）

They are here at five in the morning. They — I mean, they do a tremendous amount of work over this weekend. They’re cheerful. I’ve met with them all on Saturday at lunch and, I mean, they’re just one sensational group of people, and —

他们早上五点就到了这里。这个周末他们做了大量的工作。他们非常乐观。我周六午餐时和他们见了面，他们真是一群了不起的人——

You know, I’m very proud of them. And the managers should be very proud of the people they brought with us. And I hope you get a chance to thank as many of them as possible personally.

我为他们感到非常自豪。各位经理也应该为他们带来的员工感到骄傲。我希望你有机会亲自感谢他们中的尽可能多的人。

Incidentally, at the See’s counter you’ll find Angelica Stoner, who’s been with us for 50 years and, you know — here she comes from California to help us out and sell peanut brittle, and she’s having a good time doing it. (Applause)

顺便提一下，在See’s糖果的柜台，你会找到安杰利卡·斯托纳，她已经跟随我们50年了。她从加州赶来帮忙卖花生脆糖，并且非常享受这个过程。（掌声）

And the question you ask is a very good one about — you know, in terms of accounting and finance — what’s the best way to teach yourself?

关于会计和金融的自学，您提的问题非常好——如何是最好的学习方式？

I was always so interested in it from such a young age, that I — my approach was go to the Omaha — originally, was to go to the Omaha Public Library and just take out every book there was on the subject. And I learned a lot — (laughs) — I learned a lot that wasn’t true in the process, too. I got very interested in charting and all that sort of thing and buying stocks.

从小我就对这些非常感兴趣。我的方法是去奥马哈的公共图书馆，把所有相关的书借出来。我学到了很多——（笑）——当然也学到了一些不正确的东西。我对图表和股票买卖非常感兴趣。

But I did it by just a tremendous amount of reading, but it was easy for me because, you know, it was like going to baseball games or something of the sort.

但我通过大量的阅读来学习。对我来说这很容易，因为这对我而言就像去看棒球比赛一样令人愉快。

And in terms of naming specific texts in accounting, you know, I think you may want to read some of the better, even, magazine articles that have appeared. I mean, there’ve been — or newspaper articles.

至于具体推荐哪些会计书籍，我认为您可以看看一些优秀的杂志文章，甚至是报纸文章。

There have been some good commentary about accounting there.

关于会计，有些地方确实有很好的评论文章。

I don’t have — can you think, Charlie, of any specific texts or anything that we could recommend?

我没有什么特别推荐的，查理，你有可以推荐的书籍吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think both of us learned more from the great business magazines than we do anywhere else. It’s such an easy, shorthand way of getting a vast variety of business experience, just to riffle through issue after issue after issue, covering a great variety of businesses.

查理·芒格：我认为我们两人都从优秀的商业杂志中学到的东西比其他任何地方都多。通过翻阅一期又一期的杂志，涵盖各种业务领域，这是获得广泛商业经验的快捷方式。

And if you get the mental habit of relating what you’re reading to the basic structure of the underlying ideas being demonstrated, you gradually accumulate some wisdom about investing.

如果你养成一种思维习惯，将你读到的内容与其所展示的基本理念结构联系起来，你会逐渐积累一些关于投资的智慧。

I don’t think you can get to be a really good investor over a broad range without doing a massive amount of reading. I don’t think there’s any one book that will do it for you.

如果没有大量的阅读，我认为你无法成为一个在广泛领域内优秀的投资者。我不认为有哪一本书能让你完成这个目标。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You might think about picking out five or 10 companies where you feel quite familiar with their products, maybe but not necessarily so familiar with their financials and all of that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你可以考虑选出五到十家公司，这些公司是你对其产品非常熟悉的，可能对它们的财务情况不那么熟悉，但这没关系。

But pick out something, so at least you understand what — if you understand their products, you know what’s going on in the business itself. And then, you know, get lots of annual reports. And, through the internet or something else, get all the magazine articles that have been written on it — on those companies for five or 10 years.

选择一些公司，至少你了解它们的产品，那么你就会知道它们的业务本身在发生什么。然后，获取大量的年报，并通过互联网或其他方式获取过去五到十年关于这些公司的杂志文章。

Just sort of immerse yourself as if you were either going to work for the company, or they’d hired you as the CEO, or you’re going to buy the whole business. I mean, you could look at it in any of those ways.

让自己沉浸其中，就好像你要去这家公司工作，或者他们雇用你作为CEO，或者你打算买下整个公司一样。你可以从这些角度来看待它。

And when you get all through, ask yourself, “What do I not know that I need to know?”

当你完成这一切后，问自己：“我还有哪些需要知道的内容却不知道？”

And back many years ago, I would go around and I would talk to — I would talk to competitors, always. Talk to employees of the company, and ask those kinds of questions. That’s, in effect, what I did with my friend Lorimer Davidson when I first met him at GEICO, except I started from ground zero. But I just kept asking him questions.

很多年前，我会四处走访，与竞争对手交谈，与公司员工交谈，问各种问题。这实际上是我当初与洛里默·戴维森在GEICO初次见面时所做的事情，只不过当时我是从零开始的。我不断向他提问。

And that’s what it really is. You know, one of the questions I would ask if I were interested in the ABC Company, I would go to the XYZ Company and try and learn a lot about it. Now, you know, there’s spin on what you get, but you learn to discern it.

这就是关键。如果我对某家公司感兴趣，我会去找它的竞争对手，试着了解很多关于它的事情。当然，你得到的信息可能有些偏颇，但你会学会分辨这些信息。

Essentially, you’re being a reporter. I mean, it’s very much like journalism. And if you ask enough questions — Andy Grove has in his book — he talks about the silver bullet, you know.

本质上，你是在扮演记者的角色。这非常类似于新闻业。如果你问足够多的问题——安迪·格罗夫在他的书中提到过“银弹”这一概念，你知道的。

You talk to the competitor and you say, “If you had a silver bullet and you could only put it through the head of one of your competitors, which one would it be and why?” Well, you learn a lot if you ask questions like that over time.

你去问竞争对手：“如果你有一颗银弹，只能用它击中一个竞争对手的要害，你会选择谁？为什么？” 如果你长时间问类似的问题，你会学到很多东西。

And you ask somebody in the XYZ industry and you say, “If you were going to go away for 10 years and you had to put all of your money into one of your competitors — the stock of one of your competitors, not your own — which one would it be and why?” Just keep asking, and asking, and asking.

你可以问某个行业的人，“如果你要离开十年，必须把所有的钱投到一家竞争对手的股票上，而不是你自己公司的股票，你会选哪家？为什么？” 不断问，不断深入。

And you’ll have to discount the answers you get in certain ways, but you will be getting things poured into your head that then you can use to reformulate and do your own thinking about why you evaluate this business at this or that.

当然，你需要以某种方式对得到的答案进行调整，但你会不断从中吸取信息，并用这些信息重新思考，为什么你会以某种方式评估这家公司。

The accounting, you know, you just sort of have to labor your way through that. Might — I mean, you may be able to take some courses, even, in that. But the biggest thing is to find out how businesses operate.

至于会计知识，你需要努力钻研，甚至可以考虑修一些相关课程。但最重要的是了解企业是如何运作的。

And, you know, who am I afraid of? If we’re running GEICO, you know, who do we worry about? Why do we worry about them? Who would we like to put that silver bullet through? I’m not going to tell you. (Laughter)

比如，我们在经营GEICO时，最怕谁？为什么要担心他们？如果有一颗“银弹”，我们会想对谁使用？这个问题我不会告诉你。（笑声）

You know, it’s — you keep asking those questions. And then you go to the guy they want to put the silver bullet through and find out who he wants to put the silver bullet through.

就是这样，你需要不断地问这些问题。然后去问那个他们想用银弹击中的人，看看他又想对谁使用银弹。

It’s like who wakes up the bugler, you know, in the Irving Berlin song?

这就像欧文·柏林的歌曲《谁叫醒了号手？》一样。

And that’s the way you approach it. You — and you’ll be learning all the time.

这就是你研究的方式——你会一直在学习。

You can talk to current employees, ex-employees, vendors, suppliers, distributors, retailers, I mean, there’s customers, all kinds of people and you’ll learn.

你可以和现任员工、前员工、供应商、经销商、零售商，甚至客户等各种人交谈，你会从中学到很多东西。

But it is a — it’s an investigative process. It’s a journalistic process. And in the end, you want to write the story. I mean, you’re doing a journalistic enterprise.

但这是一个调查的过程，一个新闻报道的过程。最终，你要写出一篇故事。也就是说，你是在进行一项新闻式的研究工作。

And six months later, you want to say the XYZ Company is worth this amount because, and you just start in and write the story.

六个月后，你应该能够说，XYZ公司值多少钱，为什么，然后把这个故事写出来。

And some companies are easy to write stories about, and other companies are much tougher to write stories about. We try to look for the ones that are easy.

有些公司很容易写出故事，而另一些公司就要困难得多。我们会尽量寻找那些容易分析的公司。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. For the histories of the thousand biggest corporations laid out in digest form, I think Value Line is in a class by itself. That one volume really tells a lot about the histories of our best companies.

查理·芒格：是的，对于总结千家最大公司的历史概况而言，我认为《Value Line》（价值线）独树一帜。那一卷书确实讲述了很多关于这些优秀公司历史的内容。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If you just look, there’s 1,700 of them. If you look at each page and you look at sort of what’s happened in terms of return on equity, in terms of sales growth, (inaudible), all kinds of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，里面有1,700家公司。如果你翻开每一页，查看权益回报率的变化、销售增长情况，以及其他各种数据。

And then you say, “Why did this happen? Who let it happen?” You know, “What’s that chart going to look the next 10 years?” Because that’s what you’re really trying to figure out, not the price chart, but the chart about business operation.

然后你问自己，“为什么会发生这种情况？是谁促成的？”你知道，“未来10年这个图表会是什么样子？”因为你真正需要搞清楚的是业务运营的图表，而不是价格图表。

You’re trying to print the next 10 years of Value Line in your head. And there’s some companies that you can do a reasonable job with, and there’s others that are just too tough. But that’s what the game is about.

你是在试图在脑海中印出《价值线》中未来10年的内容。有些公司你能分析得比较合理，而有些公司则太难了。但这就是这个游戏的意义所在。

And it can be a lot of — I mean, if you have some predilection toward it, it can be a lot of fun. I mean, the process is as much fun as the conclusion that you come to.

如果你对这方面有兴趣，这可能会非常有趣。这个过程和最终得出的结论一样有趣。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course, what he’s saying there, when he talks about why — that’s the most important question of all. And it doesn’t apply just to investment. It applies to the whole human experience.

查理·芒格：当然，他刚才提到的“为什么”是最重要的问题。这不仅适用于投资，也适用于整个人类的经验。

If you want to get smart, the question you’ve got to keep asking is: Why? Why? Why? Why?

如果你想变得聪明，你必须不断地问：“为什么？为什么？为什么？为什么？”

And you have to relate the answers to a structure of deep theory. And you’ve got to know the main theories. And it’s mildly laborious, but it’s also a lot of fun.

你需要将答案与深层理论的结构联系起来。你必须了解主要的理论。这可能稍微有些费力，但也非常有趣。

77. Creating value for subsidiaries by leaving them alone

通过“放手”来为子公司创造价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m Patrick Wolff, formerly from Cambridge, Massachusetts, and soon to be from the San Francisco area.

听众：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是帕特里克·沃尔夫，之前来自马萨诸塞州的剑桥，不久后将搬到旧金山地区。

Like many people around the world who want to learn about business, I’ve read all of your letters to the shareholders. And like many people here in this room, I was so impressed that I bought a piece of the company.

像世界上许多想学习商业的人一样，我阅读了您写给股东的所有信件。而且像这里许多人一样，我非常感动，于是买下了公司的一部分股份。

But I must admit that, in studying Berkshire Hathaway, there’s one element that I didn’t quite understand, and I’d love it if you could please explain it. And that is the following.

但我必须承认，在研究伯克希尔哈撒韦时，有一个方面我不太理解，我希望您能解释一下。这个问题是：

How does Berkshire Hathaway add value to the various wholly-owned companies in the manufacturing services and retail division?

伯克希尔哈撒韦如何为制造业、服务业和零售业部门的全资子公司增加价值？

And the reason I ask this question is, as you yourself said earlier this morning, it’s very difficult in a negotiated purchase agreement to buy a company for anything other than what it’s truly worth.

我之所以问这个问题，是因为您今天早上提到，在谈判收购协议中，以公司实际价值以外的价格收购一家企业是非常困难的。

So if Berkshire Hathaway is going to create value by buying such fantastic companies as the Nebraska Furniture Mart, or See’s Candies, or any of the other fantastic businesses we have, there must be some way in which Berkshire Hathaway adds to that value. Could you please explain how we do that?

因此，如果伯克希尔哈撒韦通过收购像内布拉斯加家具商场或See’s糖果这样的优秀公司来创造价值，那一定有某种方式可以增加这些公司的价值。您能解释一下我们是如何做到的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: In certain specific cases, the case of General Re being the most recent example, we actually laid out in the proxy material why we thought there was at least a reasonable chance that the ownership by Berkshire would add value.

沃伦·巴菲特：在某些具体情况下，比如最近的通用再保险（General Re）案例，我们确实在股东代理材料中列出了为什么我们认为伯克希尔的拥有权有可能增加价值的理由。

And we got into various reasons about the ability to use the float, and tax advantages, and the ability to move faster around the world, and that sort of thing. So we’ve actually spelled that out in that case.

我们谈到了各种理由，比如利用浮存金的能力、税收优势，以及在全球范围内更快行动的能力等等。在那个案例中，我们实际上已经详细说明了这些。

I think in the case of something like Executive Jet, you might well figure that there are some reasons why association with Berkshire would put Executive Jet on the map and in the minds of people who could afford to buy fractional ownerships of planes, faster than might otherwise be the case.

以Executive Jet为例，你可能会认为，与伯克希尔的关联能更快地让Executive Jet在市场上有名气，并在那些能够负担飞机部分所有权的人的心目中建立起形象。

But usually the situation — so there are specific cases where we bring something to the party. But the biggest thing we bring to the party on a generalized basis is what I spelled out a little bit in the annual report this year in talking about GEICO.

但通常情况下——虽然在某些具体情况下我们确实带来了一些额外的价值——但我们在普遍意义上带来的最大优势是我在今年的年报中谈到GEICO时提到的一点。

We enable terrific managers to spend, in many cases, to spend a greater percentage of their time and energies on what they do best, and what they like to do best, and what is the most productive for owners than would be the case without our ownership.

我们让优秀的管理者能够在许多情况下将更多的时间和精力花在他们最擅长、最喜欢、并且对股东最有生产力的事情上，而不是在没有我们持有权的情况下所面对的其他事务。

In other words, we give them a very rational owner who expects them to spend all of their time focused on what counts for the business and eliminates the distractions that often come with running a business, particularly a publicly-owned business.

换句话说，我们为他们提供了一位非常理性的所有者，这位所有者希望他们把所有时间都集中在对企业真正重要的事情上，并消除了运营企业（特别是上市公司）时经常会遇到的干扰。

一定程度上消除噪音。

I would guess that the CEOs of most public companies waste a third of their time, at least, in all kinds of things they do that really don’t add a thing to the business — in many cases subtract, because they’re trying to please various constituencies and waste their time with them, that take the company backwards.

我猜测，大多数上市公司的CEO至少浪费了三分之一的时间在各种对企业毫无贡献的事情上——在许多情况下，这些事情反而会拖累公司，因为他们试图取悦各种利益相关者，并在这些事情上浪费时间。

But we eliminate all of that. So, we simply can create an ownership — we think we can create the best ownership environment, frankly, that can exist — other than maybe owning it a hundred percent yourself — for any business.

但我们消除了所有这些干扰。我们认为，我们可以为任何企业创造一个所有权环境——坦白说，这是除了完全自己拥有企业之外，能够存在的最佳所有权环境。

And that happens to also go along with how we like to lead our lives, because we don’t want to run around and attend a lot of meetings and do all of these things that people do. And that’s — that can be a significant plus.

这也正好符合我们想要的生活方式，因为我们不想东奔西跑地参加许多会议，也不想做其他人通常做的那些事。这可以说是一个显著的优势。

I think that GEICO has probably grown a fair amount faster as a subsidiary of Berkshire than it would have if it had remained an independent company, although it was a hell of an independent company and would have continued to be one.

我认为，GEICO作为伯克希尔的子公司，可能比作为一家独立公司时增长得更快，尽管它是一家非常优秀的独立公司，并且本来也会继续如此。

But I think billions and billions of dollars will be added to the value of GEICO, over and above what would have happened if it had remained a public company. Not because, as I put in the report —

但我认为，与其作为上市公司相比，GEICO的价值将额外增加数十亿美元。这并不是因为我们教给了他们什么——

Now we haven’t taught the management one thing about the classification of insurance risk, or how to run better ads, or anything of the sort. We’ve just let them spend a hundred percent of their time focused on what counts. And that is a rare occurrence in American business.

我们没有教管理层任何关于保险风险分类的知识，也没有教他们如何制作更好的广告或类似的东西。我们只是让他们将100%的时间集中在重要的事情上。这在美国商业中是很少见的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Just not having a vast headquarters staff to tell the subsidiaries what to do — that helps most of the kind of subsidiaries that we buy. They are not looking for a lot of people looking over their shoulder from headquarters, and a lot of unnecessary flights back and forth, and so on.

查理·芒格：是的，不设立庞大的总部来指挥子公司如何运作——这一点对我们收购的大多数子公司来说是有帮助的。这些子公司并不希望总部派大量人手来监视他们的工作，也不希望有许多不必要的来回飞行等干扰。

So, I would say most of what we do, or at least a great part of what we do, is just not interfere in a counterproductive way. And that non-interference has enormous value, at least with the kind of managers and the kind of businesses that have joined us.

因此，我认为我们所做的大部分事情，或者至少很大一部分事情，就是避免以反生产力的方式干预。而这种不干预的方式至少对我们加入的这些管理者和企业有着巨大的价值。

WARREN BUFFETT: And a great many — you have to see it to believe it — but in a great many corporate operations, the importance of a large group of people is tied to how much they meddle in the affairs of other people who are out there doing the work.

沃伦·巴菲特：你得亲眼见到才会相信，在许多企业运营中，一个庞大的团队的存在重要性往往与他们干涉那些真正从事工作的人事务的程度相关。

And, you know, we stay out of the way. And we’re appreciative owners and we’re knowledgeable owners. We know when somebody has done a good job and we know when they’ve done a good job when industry conditions are terribly tough.

而我们会避开干扰。我们是感激的所有者，也是有见识的所有者。我们知道什么时候有人做得很好，即使在行业环境非常困难的情况下，我们也知道他们表现优异。

So, we can look at our shoe operations, for example. And, you know, they are in tough industry conditions now. We’ve got some absolutely terrific people. And we are knowledgeable enough about that, so we don’t go simply by a bunch of figures and make a determination whether people are doing the right thing.

比如，我们可以看我们的鞋业运营。你知道，现在这个行业环境很困难。但我们有一些非常出色的人才。我们对此了解得足够深刻，所以我们不会仅仅依据一些数字来判断他们是否在做正确的事情。

So, we’ve got — we’re knowledgeable owners and we have no one whose job at headquarters is to go around and tell our managers how to run their human relations departments, or how to run their legal departments, or a dozen other things.

我们是有见识的所有者，而且在总部没有人专职到处跑，告诉我们的管理者如何管理他们的人力资源部门，或如何管理他们的法律部门，或者其他十几个方面的事务。

And not only do people have more time to work on the productive things, but I think they probably actually appreciate the fact that they’re left alone.

这不仅让他们有更多的时间专注于生产性的事务，而且我认为他们可能实际上也很感激被放手管理这一事实。

So, I think you even get more than the proportional amount of effort out of them than would be indicated simply by the amount of time you free up, because I think you get even an added enthusiasm for the job.

因此，我认为你从他们身上获得的努力不仅仅是时间释放的直接比例，因为我认为你还会获得一种额外的工作热情。

And I think having people in a large organization that truly are enthusiastic about what they’re doing, that doesn’t happen all the time. But I think it does happen to a pretty good degree at Berkshire.

我认为，让一个大型组织中的人真正对自己的工作充满热情，这并不是随时都能发生的事情。但我认为在伯克希尔，这种情况发生的程度相当高。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No more.

查理·芒格：没有更多要补充的了。

78. Intrinsic value of marketable securities

可流通证券的内在价值

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第三区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, hi, I’m David Butler from here in Omaha. A comment and then two quick questions.

听众：先生们，你们好，我是来自奥马哈的戴维·巴特勒。我有一个评论，然后是两个快速的问题。

The comment is regarding the annual reports. I read a lot of annual reports for a living, and I sort of start off with the assumption that I’m going to have to spend 20 to 30 hours looking at 5 years of 10-Ks and 5 years of annuals, probably some 10-Qs and going through a lot of numbers to have any kind of idea how the company really is working.

我的评论是关于年报的。我以阅读许多年报为职业，我通常会假设需要花费20到30小时，审查5年的10-K文件和年报，可能还需要一些10-Q文件，以及大量的数字，才能大致了解一家公司的实际运作情况。

And comparing that to Berkshire, which has basically crystal-clear clarity, it’s quite refreshing to read honesty, and it’s quite refreshing to see accounting that’s actually presented in a clear fashion and that doesn’t try to hide facts.

相比之下，伯克希尔的年报几乎像水晶一样清晰，阅读它让人感到耳目一新。能够看到以清晰方式呈现的会计信息，而不是试图掩盖事实，这令人非常欣慰。

So as a shareholder and as an investor, I’m very grateful for the effort and for the high quality of your annual report. And I think we ought to give Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger a hand — (applause) — for that.

作为一名股东和投资者，我非常感谢你们付出的努力以及年报的高质量。我认为我们应该为巴菲特先生和芒格先生鼓掌——（掌声）——感谢他们。

OK, now that I’ve brown-nosed a little bit. (Laughter)

好了，现在我奉承完了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Here comes the zinger, huh? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：接下来该是“刁难”了，对吧？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. I’m nervous about the derivative operations that General Re has. Now, right now the balance sheet figure says that there’s a $400 million net asset position, but there are also some really hairy derivatives, the swaps and the floors and caps.

听众：是的。我对通用再保险（General Re）的衍生品操作感到有些担忧。目前，资产负债表显示有4亿美元的净资产头寸，但还有一些非常复杂的衍生品，包括掉期、利率下限和上限。

And knowing that, in the past, you haven’t used those types of leveraged derivatives, I’m wondering if that’s going to change now.

考虑到在过去你们并没有使用这种杠杆衍生品，我想知道这一点是否会改变。

And then secondly, in terms of going through an intrinsic value calculation, when you and Mr. Munger think about intrinsic value, obviously, a big part of that is the marketable securities portfolio.

第二个问题是，在计算内在价值时，当您和芒格先生考虑内在价值时，很显然其中很大一部分是可流通证券组合。

Do you think of intrinsic value, in terms of the marketable securities, as what their market value is, in terms of their look-through earnings, or is there a separate intrinsic value calculation that you sort of roll into the overall Berkshire intrinsic calculation?

在考虑可流通证券的内在价值时，您是否将其市场价值视为其内在价值的一部分，或者基于其透视收益（look-through earnings）？还是说，您会单独计算内在价值并将其纳入伯克希尔的整体内在价值计算？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’ll answer the second part first. On the intrinsic value, we tend to use the market prices in the way we think about things, although there are times when we feel that we own securities that are worth far more than they’re carried for.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我先回答第二部分的问题。关于内在价值，我们倾向于以市场价格作为参考，尽管有时我们觉得我们拥有的证券价值远高于它们的账面价值。

And we’ve mentioned that once or twice. There was a time in the mid-1970s, if you’d look back at our 1975 annual report — I may be off by a year, one direction or other — probably 1974, because I — we valued the securities at market.

我们曾提到过一两次。大约在20世纪70年代中期，如果你回顾我们1975年的年报——时间可能有点误差，大概是1974年——我们按市场价值对证券进行了估值。

But I — in the body of the report, I said we really think these things are going to be worth a hell of a lot more than they’re selling for currently. That was an unusual remark for somebody, if you knew me, that would be an unusual remark for me.

但在年报正文中，我说我们确实认为这些证券的实际价值远远高于当前的市场价格。对于了解我的人来说，这样的评论是比较罕见的。

And at that time, I would have said that, in looking at the intrinsic value of Berkshire, I would have said that I was quite comfortable marking these things up in my mind. I wouldn’t have done it with the public, but I would have done it in my mind.

在那个时候，我会说，在考虑伯克希尔的内在价值时，我很愿意在自己的思维中将这些证券的价值标高一些。我不会公开这样做，但在心里我是这么看的。

But under most circumstances, we tend to think of the market value as being representative of it, that that is the price at which we could buy or sell that day.

但在大多数情况下，我们倾向于认为市场价值具有代表性，因为那是我们当天可以买入或卖出的价格。

And if we thought they were ridiculously high in relation to intrinsic value, we’d probably do something about it. And they certainly haven’t been so low that we’ve ever felt like marking them up in recent — in our own minds — in recent years.

如果我们认为它们的市场价格相对于内在价值高得离谱，我们可能会采取一些行动。而近年来，它们的价格显然没有低到让我们觉得需要在心里标高它们的价值。

79. Must look “very carefully” at derivatives accounting

必须非常仔细地审视衍生品会计

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about the derivatives business, it’s a good business — it’s a good question — because it involves big balance sheet numbers and big off-balance sheet numbers in relation to the amount of money made, and particularly in terms — in relation to the amount of money made in terms of the capital employed.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于衍生品业务的问题，这是个好问题，因为它涉及到与盈利金额相比的大量资产负债表内和表外数据，尤其是与投入资本所赚金额的关系。

And the credit guarantees, the long-term nature, all of that makes that something that we will want — we do want to look at always very hard.

信用担保、长期性质等因素让这一领域成为我们必须始终非常仔细审视的对象。

It’s a business that people can get in trouble in and they can get in trouble while the accounting sails along merrily.

这是一个人们可能陷入困境的业务，而会计记录却可能看起来完全正常。

I remember when Charlie and I were at Salomon, we found — we didn’t find it, other people found it finally, but — mismarked derivative positions that were very substantial that had gone on for a long period of time.

我记得查理和我在所罗门兄弟时，我们发现——实际上是其他人最终发现了——被错误标记的衍生品头寸，这些错误已经持续了很长时间，而且规模非常可观。

And this was with paying a lot of money to auditors to look at them.

即便是支付了高额费用给审计师来审查，问题依然存在。

Am I right about that, Charlie, on that? Charlie was on the audit committee.

在这方面我是对的吗，查理？查理当时在审计委员会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The worst glitches were that the books just got so out of control, not in the derivative department, but there were just multimillion dollar errors.

查理·芒格：最严重的问题是账目完全失控，不仅仅是在衍生品部门，其他地方也出现了数百万美元的错误。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we found mismarks, as I remember —

沃伦·巴菲特：但据我记得，我们确实发现了错误标记——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.

查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — in the 20-odd millions on —

沃伦·巴菲特：——金额大约在2000万美元左右的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Both.

查理·芒格：是的。两方面都有。

WARREN BUFFETT: — positions —

沃伦·巴菲特：——头寸上的问题——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.

查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: In some cases, because the contracts got so complicated that the people that were valuing them didn’t understand them, and — at least partially didn’t understand them.

沃伦·巴菲特：有些情况下，合同太复杂，以至于负责估值的人无法完全理解它们——至少是部分无法理解。

There’s a lot of potential for mischief when people can write down a few numbers on a piece of paper and nothing changes hands for a long time and their compensation, you know, next month and this year, depends on what numbers are attached to a bunch of things that are not really — where they don’t come to fruition for a long time. And particularly when you’re guaranteeing credit or anything of the sort.

当人们只需在纸上写下一些数字，且这些交易长期没有资金流动，而他们的薪酬却依赖于这些未实现的数字时，就有很大的潜在问题。尤其是在信用担保或类似的情况下。

So, you’re very correct in observing that, when the numbers are big in relation to the amount of profits, you want to look very carefully, because if anything goes wrong, it could go wrong on a fairly big scale, and you’re not getting paid a lot for running that type of risk.

因此，你的观察非常正确。当这些数字与利润金额相比非常庞大时，你需要非常仔细地审视，因为如果出现问题，可能会是很大的问题，而你所获得的回报并不足以弥补承担这种风险。

80. “We don’t sugarcoat things”

“我们不会粉饰太平”

WARREN BUFFETT: I very much appreciate what you said about the annual reports, though. We may disappoint you in how the business performs over time. I mean, that is not totally within our control. We’ll try hard, but we can make no promises.

沃伦·巴菲特：我非常感谢您对年报的评价。不过，我们的业务表现可能会在一段时间内让您失望。这并不完全在我们的控制之内。我们会尽力而为，但无法做出任何承诺。

But we shouldn’t ever disappoint you in either our accounting or in the candor of the reporting. I mean, that is in our control. We may not like what we have to tell you, but there’s no reason for failure — there can be no reason for failure in the accounting or candor.

但我们绝不应该在会计处理或报告的坦诚度上让您失望。这是我们能够控制的事情。尽管我们可能不喜欢告诉您一些事实，但在会计处理或坦诚度上失败是没有理由的——我们绝不能在这些方面失败。

I mean, that is — there’s — if we fail there it’s because we set out to fail.

换句话说，如果我们在这方面失败了，那是因为我们故意失败的。

We can fail in terms of operating performance for a lot of reasons, some within our control and some without our control. But — and that can happen. And if so, we’ll tell you about it.

我们可能因为许多原因在运营表现上失败，其中一些是我们可以控制的，一些是我们无法控制的。但这确实可能发生。如果发生了，我们会如实告诉您。

But we’re going to try very hard to make sure that you see the business in a form exactly like we see the business, and that we don’t sugarcoat things, and we don’t put spin on things.

但我们会尽力确保您看到的业务状况与我们看到的完全一致，我们不会粉饰太平，也不会扭曲事实。

And we’ll judge ourselves in a — to a significant degree by how we handle that particular part of the problem. We’ll also try to do a good job in operations.

我们会很大程度上以我们在这方面的处理方式来评价自己。当然，我们也会努力在运营中做得更好。

Charlie, do you have anything to add on that?

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

查理·芒格：没有要补充的。