2000-04-29 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
1. Meeting introduction and welcome
会议介绍与欢迎辞
WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning.
沃伦·巴菲特： 早上好。
Well, first thing I’d like to do is to thank everybody that’s helped us put this on.
首先，我想感谢所有帮助我们组织此次会议的人。
As you saw in the movie, I think, at the time, we may have had 45,000 or so people working with Berkshire, with 12.8 at headquarters.
正如您在影片中看到的，当时伯克希尔可能有大约45,000名员工，其中12.8人在总部工作。
We’re probably up to about 60,000 now, and we still have 12.8, and they take care of putting on this whole meeting.
现在我们可能已经有大约60,000名员工了，但总部仍然是12.8人，他们负责安排整个会议。
We get help from people in internal audit, and we get terrific help from the people at all of our companies who work very hard to put on the exhibits. And we hope that you not only visit them, but patronize them, and we’ll give you ample time to do that.
我们得到了内部审计人员的帮助，也得到了我们各子公司员工的极大支持，他们非常努力地布置展台。我们希望大家不仅参观这些展台，还能光顾这些展台，我们会给您充足的时间。
As you can see, I enlisted my family for the movie, and I want to thank them. I want to particularly thank Kelly Muchemore and Marc Hamburg for their work in putting this on. It’s a real project to — (Applause)
正如您所见，我邀请了我的家人参与影片制作，我想感谢他们。我特别想感谢凯莉·穆切莫尔和马克·汉堡为会议的筹备所做的工作。这确实是一项重要的工程——（掌声）
A lot of companies have a whole department that does this and, at Berkshire, Kelly processes 25,000 requests for tickets, and coordinates everything with the exhibitors, and it’s a fabulous job.
许多公司都有一个完整的部门负责此类工作，而在伯克希尔，凯莉处理了25,000份门票请求，并与参展商协调所有事项，这是一项出色的工作。
Now, we’ll follow our usual routine. We do have a surprise at — a small surprise — at 11:45. It’s not that Charlie’s going to say anything — that would be a big surprise, but — (laughter) — we’ll — well, we’ll have this small surprise for you at 11:45.
接下来，我们会按照惯例进行。在11:45，我们有一个惊喜——一个小惊喜——这并不是查理会说些什么，那会是个大惊喜，但——（笑声）——我们会在11:45为大家带来这个小惊喜。
The plan is to go through the business part of the meeting here in just a second, and we’ll run from 9:30 to 12:00. Then, after conducting the business meeting, we’ll take your questions. We’ll go around the room. We have 10 stations. I guess we’ll probably only be using eight stations in this room.
我们的计划是马上进入会议的业务部分，从9:30持续到12:00。随后，我们会接受大家的提问。我们会在会场周围设置10个站点。我想这次可能只会用到其中的8个站点。
And we have microphones everyplace that the eight stations — that you’ll see, and you can step up to those. And we’ll just keep answering questions.
在这些站点，每个地方都会配备麦克风，您可以上前提问。我们会继续回答问题。
And we’ll break at 12 o’clock, and there will be food available down below, where you can also purchase things from us.
我们将在12点休息，楼下会提供食物，您也可以在那里购买我们的商品。
And we’ll reconvene about 12:45, and then we’ll stay until 3:30 and we’ll try and answer whatever questions you have. And then we will have to cut it off at 3:30.
我们将在12:45重新开始，然后持续到3:30，我们会尽量回答您提出的所有问题。然后我们将在3:30结束会议。
We have — we had about the same number of ticket requests as in the past, but we had a different mix this year. We — as most of you know — we had change the venue, and the time, because Ak-Sar-Ben is winding down.
我们——今年的门票请求数量与往年差不多，但人员构成有所不同。正如大家所知，由于Ak-Sar-Ben场地逐步关闭，我们更换了地点和时间。
And so, there’s a little different rhythm to this meeting. A much higher percentage of our tickets than usual were requested by people from Omaha.
因此，这次会议的节奏有些不同。比以往更多比例的门票是由奥马哈的人请求的。
And, of course, you’ve heard me say before that we’re a little suspicious of these figures because we know that a lot of people claim to be from Omaha that aren’t, for status reasons, and so — (laughter) — we can’t really give you the geographical breakdown we normally would.
当然，您之前听我说过，我们对这些数字有些怀疑，因为我们知道很多人为了面子原因声称自己是奥马哈人，但实际上不是——（笑声）——因此我们无法像往常那样提供详细的地理分布数据。
2. Introduction and election of BH directors
伯克希尔董事介绍与选举
WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to introduce, first, our directors, and then we’ll proceed into the formal business of the meeting. On my left here is the ever-animated Charlie Munger, our vice chairman. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想首先介绍我们的董事，然后我们会进入会议的正式环节。在我左边的是一向活力十足的查理·芒格，我们的副董事长。（掌声）
And if the other directors will stand up as I announce their names. We have the better voice in the movie, my wife, Susan Buffett. Susie? (Applause)
如果其他董事在我念到他们的名字时可以站起来。我们有影片中声音更好的那位，我的妻子，苏珊·巴菲特。苏茜？（掌声）
We have Howard Buffett. (Applause)
还有霍华德·巴菲特。（掌声）
You can see we find these names in the phone book, I mean —
你们可以看出，这些名字似乎是从电话簿里找来的，我的意思是——
And Kim Chace. Kim? (Applause)
还有金·蔡斯。金？（掌声）
Walter Scott, the star of “How to be a Gillionaire.” (Applause)
沃尔特·斯科特，“如何成为亿万富翁”的明星。（掌声）
And Ron Olson. Ron? (Applause)
还有罗恩·奥尔森。罗恩？（掌声）
OK, we’ll now take on the formal part of the meeting.
好的，现在我们开始会议的正式部分。
We’re going to try to set a new record, I think, 5:38.4, but the four-minute mile has always been our ambition on this. So I will go through this and then we’ll get to the questions.
我们会尝试创造一个新纪录，我想是5分38.4秒，不过我们一直的目标是完成“4分钟一英里”。所以我会快速完成这部分，然后我们再进入问答环节。
The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of this company.
现在会议正式开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席。
I welcome you to this 2000 annual meeting of shareholders. I’ve introduced the directors. Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
欢迎各位参加本公司2000年度股东大会。我已经介绍了董事。今天与会的还有我们审计公司德勤的合伙人，他们可以回答您关于德勤审计伯克希尔账目的相关问题。
Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.
福里斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书，他将记录会议过程。贝基·阿米克女士被任命为此次会议的选举监察员，她将对董事选举中投票的统计结果进行认证。
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg.
此次会议指定的代理投票人是沃尔特·斯科特二世和马克·D·汉堡。
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔已发行股票数量、拥有投票权的股票数量以及出席会议的股票数量的报告？
FORREST KRUTTER: I do. Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March, 3, 2000, being the record date for this meeting, there are 1,341,174 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 5,385,320 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
福里斯特·克鲁特： 我有。是的，我有。据本次会议通知随附的委托书声明显示，该通知于2000年3月3日通过一类邮件发送给所有记录在案的股东，这是此次会议的记录日期。伯克希尔哈撒韦公司现有1,341,174股A类普通股流通，每股在会议上有一票投票权；以及5,385,320股B类普通股流通，每股在会议上有1/200票投票权。
Of that number, 1,116,151 Class A shares and 4,342,959 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 27th.
其中，1,116,151股A类股票和4,342,959股B类股票通过委托书在4月27日星期四晚间之前完成了投票，并在此次会议中代表相应股权。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。这个数字表明我们达到了法定人数，因此我们将直接进入会议。
The first order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr., who will place a motion before the meeting.
会议的第一项事务是宣读上次股东大会的会议记录。我邀请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议免去宣读上次股东大会会议记录的环节。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议吗？
VOICE: I second the motion.
声音： 我附议该动议。
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this question by voice vote. All those in favor say, “Aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特： 动议已经有人提出并附议。对此有任何意见或问题吗？我们将通过口头表决对该问题进行投票。赞成的请说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye.
声音： 赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? You can signify by saying, “I’m leaving.” The motion is carried. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 反对的？可以通过说“我离开”来表达。动议通过了。（笑声）
The one item of business of this meeting is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.
本次会议的唯一事项是选举董事。如果有在场的股东希望撤回之前提交的委托书并亲自对董事选举进行投票，可以这么做。
Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy, and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.
此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交委托书，并希望通过亲自投票进行表决，可以这么做。
If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to the meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot for you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them?
如果您有此需求，请向走道上的会议工作人员表明身份，他们会为您提供选票。希望领取选票的人士请表明身份，以便我们分发选票。
I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting, with respect to election of directors.
现在，我邀请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出关于董事选举的动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森以及沃尔特·斯科特二世当选为董事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议吗？
VOICE: I second the vote.
声音： 我附议该动议。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特： 已有人提议并附议，沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世当选为董事。
Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person that should — they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election.
有没有其他提名？是否有任何讨论？提名已准备进行表决。如果有任何股东希望亲自投票，请现在在董事选举的选票上作出标记，并将选票交给选举监察员。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors voting the proxies, in accordance with instructions they have received? Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
委托投票人也请根据收到的指示，向选举监察员提交董事选举的选票。阿米克小姐，准备好后您可以作出报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 1,136,497 votes for each nominee.
贝基·阿米克： 我的报告已准备好。根据截至上周四晚收到的委托书，委托投票人对每位提名人至少投出了1,136,497票。
That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
这一数字远远超过了所有已发行A类和B类股票相关总票数的多数票。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as those cast in person at this meeting, if any, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证，包括由委托投票人在本次会议上提交的额外票数以及现场投票的票数（如有），将提交给秘书，并记录在本次会议的会议记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Becki. Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢你，贝基。沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世已当选为董事。
Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting.
在我们散会之前，有没有人还有其他事务需要提出来讨论？如果没有，我邀请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR: I move that this meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议本次会议休会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say, “Aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议吗？休会动议已提出并附议。我们将以口头表决的方式进行投票。有任何讨论吗？如果没有，请赞成的说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye.
声音： 赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed, “No.” This meeting’s adjourned. Thank you. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 反对的请说“反对”。会议休会，谢谢大家。（掌声）
We will advise Guinness of those results, and maybe we’ll get in the book.
我们会将这些结果告知吉尼斯，也许我们能进入记录。
Just want to make one more announcement and then we’ll start in the questions with area 1, which I believe will be right over here.
我想再做一个公告，然后我们会从第一区开始提问，我相信就在这里。
About — I think about 3,500 of you are attending the ballgame tonight. You know what you’re supposed to do, incidentally.
今晚大约——我想大约有3,500人将参加棒球比赛。顺便提一下，你们知道你们应该做些什么。
And we — in the past, we’ve had some traffic jams at — where the interstate goes off into 13th Street. So, the police, who are wonderfully cooperative throughout this whole weekend, in many ways, are going to do their darnedest to make sure that we don’t have much of a jam.
过去，在州际公路转入第13街的地方，我们遇到了一些交通堵塞。所以，警察在整个周末都非常合作，他们将尽全力确保不会有太多的堵车。
But if those of you who are attending the game would like to go a little early, that will probably be quite helpful.
但是，如果你们这些要参加比赛的人愿意早一点去，那可能会非常有帮助。
And I might say that we have probably got — well, we think it’s probably the best zoo in the world here, thanks in very large part to our director, Walter Scott, and his wife Sue, who have really turned our zoo into a huge attraction, draws well over a million people a year.
顺便说一句，我们这里可能有——我们认为可能是世界上最好的动物园，很大程度上要感谢我们的董事沃尔特·斯科特和他的妻子苏，他们确实把我们的动物园变成了一个巨大的吸引点，每年吸引了超过一百万人。
It’s right adjacent to the ballpark. So if you get out a little early, and you want to go to the zoo, and then you won’t even have to move your car. You can come over to the ballpark, and then there’s also food there. And we have a — we serve Coca-Cola products.
它就在棒球场旁边。所以，如果你们早一点出来，想去动物园，然后你甚至不需要移动你的车。你可以直接来到棒球场，那里也有食物供应。而且我们提供可口可乐产品。
And if you don’t all try to come at 6:45, it will be a help to us.
如果你们不要都在6点45分赶到，那对我们会有帮助。
I will be pitching at 7:05, but my fastball will arrive at the plate almost instantaneously with the moment that it leaves my hand, so unless you’re there, you’ll miss it. And — (Laughter)
我将在7点05分投球，但是我的快速球几乎会在离手的瞬间到达本垒板，所以如果你们不在现场，就会错过。（笑声）
3. Aesop’s investing primer: Birds in hands and bushes
伊索的投资入门：手中的鸟与灌木丛中的鸟
WARREN BUFFETT: So look with that, let’s start in area 1, and we will go around. And feel free to ask any questions. You might identify yourself and where you’re from before asking your question. Area 1?
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，接下来我们从第一区开始，我们会轮流进行。请随意提问。在提问之前，可以先介绍一下自己和来自哪里。第一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.
观众： 早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。
My name is Steve Yates (PH), I’m from Chicago. I’m a Berkshire shareholder and this is my sixth year coming to this meeting. I’d like to thank you for all your time and advice through the years. It’s been great.
我叫史蒂夫·耶茨（音），来自芝加哥。我是一名伯克希尔股东，这是我第六年来参加这个会议。我想感谢你们这些年来付出的时间和提供的建议，真是太棒了。
I’d also like to thank all those wonderful people who sold Berkshire this year for giving us an opportunity to purchase more of the world’s greatest company for dirt-cheap prices. (Applause)
我还想感谢那些今年出售伯克希尔股票的优秀人士，让我们有机会以非常便宜的价格购买更多这家世界上最伟大的公司的股票。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We will convey your thanks. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们会转达你的感谢。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I own another stock, which sells for four times current trailing earnings. Every quarter we get a report. Earnings go up, sales go up, cash flow goes up, the equity base expands, they gain market share, and the stock goes down.
观众： 我持有另一只股票，其市盈率为当前过去12个月的收益的四倍。每个季度我们都会收到一份报告。利润增加，销售额增加，现金流增加，股本扩大，市场份额也在增长，但股票价格却在下跌。
The company has a 60 percent five-year annualized growth rate and sells at four times earnings. I have two related questions.
这家公司五年的年均增长率为60%，但市盈率只有四倍。我有两个相关问题。
First, is this a growth stock or a value stock, and could you please give us your definitions of these terms?
第一，这是一只成长股还是价值股？能否请您为我们定义一下这些术语？
Second, the company sells recreational vehicles. Demographic trends in the recreation and leisure areas, RVs, cruise lines, golf equipment, et cetera, seem to be quite good. Do you see any opportunities for Berkshire here? Thanks.
第二，这家公司销售休闲车。在娱乐和休闲领域的趋势，例如房车、游轮、高尔夫设备等，似乎相当不错。您认为伯克希尔在这些领域有机会吗？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the question about growth and value, we’ve addressed in past annual reports. But they are not two distinct categories of business. Every business is worth the present —
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于成长股和价值股的问题，我们在过去的年报中已经探讨过。但它们并不是两类截然不同的业务。每家公司都基于当前的价值——
If you knew what it was going to be able to disgorge in cash between now and Judgment Day, you could come to a precise figure as to what it is worth today.
如果你知道它从现在到未来某一天可以产生的现金流量，那么你就可以精确地计算出它今天的价值。
Now, elements of that can be the ability to use additional capital at good rates, and most growth companies that are characterized as growth companies have that as a characteristic.
其中的一个要素是能否以良好的回报率使用额外资本，而大多数被认为是成长股的公司都具有这一特性。
But there is no distinction in our minds between growth and value. Every business we look at as being a value proposition. The potential for growth and the likelihood of good economics being attached to that growth are part of the equation in evaluation.
但在我们看来，成长和价值之间没有本质的区别。我们看待每一项业务都是基于其价值的提议。增长潜力和与增长相关的良好经济收益的可能性是评估方程式的一部分。
But they’re all value decisions. A company that pays no dividends growing a hundred percent a year, you know, is losing money. Now, that’s a value decision. You have to decide how much value you’re going to get.
但归根结底，它们都是价值决策。一家没有分红、年增长率达100%的公司，如果在亏损，那依然是一个价值决策。你需要决定可以获得多少价值。
Actually, it’s very simple. The first investment primer, when would you guess it was written?
实际上，这很简单。你猜第一本投资入门书是什么时候写的？
The first investment primer that I know of, and it was pretty good advice, was delivered in about 600 B.C. by Aesop. And Aesop, you’ll remember, said, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”
我知道的第一本投资入门书，大约是在公元前600年由伊索提出的，而且建议非常不错。你记得伊索说过：“手中的一只鸟胜过灌木丛中的两只鸟。”
Now incidentally, Aesop did not know it was 600 BC. He was smart, but he wasn’t that smart. (Laughter)
顺便说一句，伊索并不知道那是公元前600年。他很聪明，但还没聪明到那个地步。（笑声）
Now, Aesop was onto something, but he didn’t finish it, because there’s a couple of other questions that go along with that.
伊索点出了重点，但他没有完整说明，因为还存在几个相关的问题。
But it is an investment equation, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. He forgot to say exactly when you were going to get the two in the — from the bush — and he forgot to say what interest rates were that you had to measure this against.
但这确实是一个投资公式：手中的一只鸟胜过灌木丛中的两只鸟。他忘了说明何时可以从灌木丛中抓到那两只鸟，也没提到需要用什么利率来衡量这个问题。
But if he’d given those two factors, he would have defined investment for the next 2,600 years. Because a bird in the hand is — you know, you will trade a bird in the hand, which is investing. You lay out cash today.
但如果他加上了这两个因素，他就会为接下来的2600年定义了投资。因为手中的鸟——你知道，这是一种投资，你今天投入现金。
And then the question is, as an investment decision, you have to evaluate how many birds are in the bush. You may think there are two birds in the bush, or three birds in the bush, and you have to decide when they’re going to come out, and when you’re going to acquire them.
然后，作为一个投资决策，问题在于你需要评估灌木丛中有多少只鸟。你可能认为那里有两只或三只鸟，你还需要决定它们何时会出现，以及何时可以获得它们。
Now, if interest rates are five percent, and you’re going to get two birds from the bush in five years, we’ll say, versus one now, two birds in the bush are much better than a bird in the hand now.
假设利率是5%，而且你将在五年后从灌木丛中获得两只鸟，相比于现在的一只鸟，灌木丛中的两只鸟要好得多。
So you want to trade your bird in the hand and say, “I’ll take two birds in the bush,” because if you’re going to get them in five years, that’s roughly 14 percent compounded annually and interest rates are only five percent.
所以你愿意交易手中的鸟并说：“我要灌木丛中的两只鸟。”因为如果你五年后能获得它们，那大约是年复利14%，而利率只有5%。
But if interest rates were 20 percent, you would decline to take two birds in the bush five years from now. You would say that’s not good enough, because at 20 percent, if I just keep this bird in my hand and compound it, I’ll have more birds than two birds in the bush in five years.
但如果利率是20%，你就不会愿意在五年后去抓灌木丛中的两只鸟。你会说这不够好，因为在20%的利率下，如果我把手中的鸟保留并以复利增长，五年后我会有比灌木丛中的两只鸟更多的鸟。
Now, what’s all that got to do with growth? Well, usually growth, people associate with a lot more birds in the bush, but you still have to decide when you’re going to get them.
那么，这一切与成长有什么关系呢？通常，成长会让人联想到灌木丛中有更多的鸟，但你仍然需要决定何时才能抓到它们。
And you have to measure that against interest rates, and you have to measure it against other bushes, and other, you know, other equations.
你还需要将其与利率、其他灌木丛以及其他方程式进行衡量。
And that’s all investing is. It’s a value decision based on, you know, what it is worth, how many birds are in that bush, when you’re going to get them, and what interest rates are.
投资就是这样。这是一个基于价值的决策，取决于你知道的事情：它值多少钱，灌木丛中有多少只鸟，你什么时候能得到它们，以及利率是多少。
Now, if you pay $500 billion — and when we buy a stock, we always think in terms of buying the whole enterprise, because it enables us to think as businessmen, rather than as stock speculators.
现在，如果你支付5000亿美元——当我们买入一只股票时，我们总是以收购整个企业的角度来思考，因为这让我们能够像商人一样思考，而不是像股票投机者那样。
So let’s just take a company that has marvelous prospects, is paying you nothing now, and you buy it at a valuation of 500 billion.
假设有一家前景极好的公司，现在不支付任何收益，你以5000亿美元的估值买下它。
Now, if you feel that 10 percent is the appropriate rate of return — and you can pick your figure — that means that if it pays you nothing this year, but starts paying next year, it has to be able to pay you 55 billion in perpetuity, each year.
如果你认为10%是一个适当的回报率——这个数字你可以自己设定——这意味着，如果它今年不支付任何收益，而从明年开始支付，那么它必须每年能够支付给你550亿美元，并持续下去。
But if it’s not going to pay until the third year, then it has to pay you 60.5 billion in perpetuity — in perpetuity — to justify the present price.
但如果要等到第三年才开始支付，那么它必须每年支付605亿美元，并持续下去，才能证明当前的价格是合理的。
Every year that you wait to take a bird out of the bush means that you have to take out more birds. It’s that simple.
每等一年从灌木丛中抓鸟，就意味着你需要抓到更多的鸟。就是这么简单。
And I question, in my mind, whether — sometimes, whether people who pay $500 billion implicitly for a business by buying 10 shares of stock at some price, are really thinking of the mathematical — the mathematics — implicit in what they are doing.
我不禁怀疑，那些通过以某个价格买入10股股票而隐含支付5000亿美元来收购一家公司的人，是否真的思考过他们行为中隐含的数学逻辑。
To deliver, let’s just assume that’s — there’s only going to be a one-year delay before the business starts paying out to you, and you want to get a 10 percent return and you pay 500 billion. That means 55 billion of cash that they have to be able to disgorge to you year, after year, after year.
假设只有一年的延迟，然后公司开始支付给你，而你希望获得10%的回报，并支付5000亿美元。这意味着它必须每年能够向你支付550亿美元的现金。
To do that, they have to make perhaps $80 billion, or close to it, pretax.
为此，它们可能需要每年税前赚取800亿美元或接近这一数字。
Now, you might look around at the universe of businesses in this world and see how many are earning 80 billion pretax, or 70, or 60, or 50, or 40, or 30. And you won’t find any.
现在，你可以看看世界上的企业中，有多少能每年税前赚到800亿、700亿、600亿、500亿、400亿或300亿。你会发现几乎没有。
So it requires a rather extraordinary change in profitability to give you enough birds out of that particular bush to make it worthwhile to give up the one that you have in your hand.
因此，需要一个相当非凡的盈利能力变化，才能从那片特定的灌木丛中得到足够的鸟，使得放弃手中的鸟变得值得。
Second part of your question, about whether we’d be willing to buy a wonderful business at four times earnings, I think I could get even Charlie interested in that. But let’s hear it from Charlie.
关于你问题的第二部分，我们是否愿意以四倍的市盈率购买一家出色的企业，我想即使是查理也会对这个感兴趣。但让我们听听查理怎么说吧。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d like to know what that is. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我倒想知道那是什么。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He was hoping you would ask that. That fellow that’s got all his net worth in this stock — (laughter) — and who has a captive audience.
沃伦·巴菲特： 他希望你会问这个问题。那个把所有净资产都押在这只股票上的人——（笑声）——现在有一群听众。
Tell us what it is. You’ve got to tell us. We’re begging you. (Laughter)
告诉我们吧。你必须告诉我们。我们恳求你了。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You want the name of the company?
观众： 你们想知道公司的名字？
WARREN BUFFETT: We want the name of the company. We’re dying to get the name. Wait till I get my pencil out. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们想知道公司的名字。我们非常想知道。等我拿出铅笔来记一下。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It’s called National RV, and it’s based in California, and they sell recreational vehicles.
观众： 它叫 National RV，总部在加州，销售休闲车。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well, you’ve got a crowd of people with — who have birds in the hand, and we will see what they do — (laughter) — in terms of National RV.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，你有一群手里握着鸟的人，让我们看看他们会怎么做——（笑声）——关于 National RV。
Charlie, do you have anything further on growth and value, et cetera?
查理，你对成长与价值等还有什么补充的吗？
Watch him carefully, folks. (Laughter)
各位，仔细看着他。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree that all intelligent investing is value investing. You have to acquire more than you really pay for, and that’s a value judgment. But you can look for more than you’re paying for in a lot of different ways.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我同意所有聪明的投资都是价值投资。你必须获得比你支付更多的东西，而这是一种价值判断。但你可以用很多不同的方法来寻找比你支付更多的价值。
You can use filters to sift the investment universe. And if you stick with stocks that can’t possibly be wonderful to just put away in your safe deposit box for 40 years, but are underpriced, then you have to keep moving around all the time.
你可以使用筛选器来筛选投资领域。如果你坚持选择那些可能无法让你把它们放在保险箱里保存40年的优质股票，但价格低估的股票，那么你就得一直来回操作。
As they get closer to what you think the real value is, you have to sell them, and then find others. And so, it’s an active kind of investing.
当它们的价格接近你认为的真实价值时，你就得卖掉它们，然后再去寻找其他机会。所以，这是一种主动型的投资。
The investing where you find a few great companies and just sit on your ass because you’ve correctly predicted the future, that is what it’s very nice to be good at.
而当你找到几家优秀的公司并因为正确预测了未来而什么都不做，这种投资方式是非常值得擅长的。
WARREN BUFFETT: The movie was G-rated even though — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这部电影的评级是全年龄的，尽管——（笑声）
Is that it, Charlie? (Laughter)
就这样吗，查理？（笑声）
4. Munger on internet stocks: “If you mix raisins with turds, they’re still turds”
Munger在互联网股票上说：“如果你把葡萄干和大便混合在一起，它们仍然是大便”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We will move to area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好，我们移到第二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. Wayne Peters. And where I come from our ladies are referred to as birds. (Laughter)
观众： 早上好，先生们。我是Wayne Peters。在我们那儿，女士们被称为“鸟”。（笑声）
And I’m sure I know a lot that would trade one in the hand for two in the bush — (laughter) — irrespective of the interest rate. (Laughter)
我敢肯定，我认识很多人会愿意用手中的一个换取灌木丛中的两个——（笑声）——完全不考虑利率。（笑声）
I have two small questions.
我有两个小问题。
Firstly, with the speculation, and some would say rampant speculation, in the high tech and internet arenas, could you share your views on the potential fallout from the speculation for the general economy?
首先，在高科技和互联网领域存在的投机行为，有些人甚至会说是泛滥的投机，你能否分享一下对这种投机对整体经济潜在影响的看法？
And secondly, how long did it actually take you to perfect that curveball, and are we going to see it tonight?
其次，你实际上花了多长时间完善那个曲线球？我们今晚能看到吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The — I don’t think I want to give anything away about my pitches tonight. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯——我不认为今晚会透露任何关于我的投球的信息。（笑声）
Ernie Banks may be in the audience, I know he’s in town, and I just can’t afford to do that. But you’ll see it tonight, and you can describe it anyway you’d like.
Ernie Banks 可能在观众席上，我知道他在城里，我不能冒这个险。但你今晚会看到它的，你可以随意描述它。
The question about the high tech stocks and possible fallout, any time there have been real bursts of speculation in the market, you know that — it does get corrected, eventually.
关于高科技股票和可能的后果问题，每当市场中出现真正的投机浪潮时，你知道——最终会得到纠正。
Ben Graham was right when he said that in the short run it’s a voting machine, and the long run it’s a weighing machine.
本·格雷厄姆说得没错，短期来看，股市是一台投票机；长期来看，它是一台称重机。
Sooner or later, the amount of cash that a business can disgorge in the future governs the value it has — that the stock commands — in the market. But it can take a long time.
迟早，企业未来能够产生的现金流量将决定它的价值——以及它在市场中的股价。但这可能需要很长时间。
And, I mean, it’s a very interesting proposition. For example, if you take a company that, in the end, never makes any money, but trades — changes hands — representing a valuation of 10 or $20 billion for some time, there’s no wealth created. There’s a tremendous amount of wealth transferred.
我的意思是，这是一个非常有趣的命题。例如，如果有一家公司最终从未赚钱，但它的交易——换手——代表着一段时间内价值100亿或200亿美元的估值，那么并没有创造财富。只是发生了大量的财富转移。
And I think you will see, when we look back on this era, you will see this as a period of enormous amounts of wealth transfer, but in the end the only wealth creation comes about through what the business creates.
我认为，当我们回顾这个时代时，你会发现这是一个发生了大量财富转移的时期，但最终，唯一的财富创造来自企业本身所创造的价值。
There’s no magic to it. If a company that’s not worth anything sells for 20 billion and 5 percent of it changes hands, somebody takes a billion dollars from somebody else. But investors as whole gain nothing.
这没有任何魔法。如果一家公司不值钱，但它以200亿美元的价格出售，且5%的股份易手，那么某人就从另一个人那里拿走了10亿美元。但投资者整体并未获得任何收益。
They all feel richer. It’s a very interesting phenomenon. But they can’t be richer except — as a group — unless the company makes them richer.
他们都感觉自己更富有了。这是一个非常有趣的现象。但除非企业让他们变得更富有，否则整个群体不会变得更富有。
And it’s the same principle as a chain letter. If you’re very early on a chain letter you can make money. There’s no money created by chain letters. In fact, there’s the frictional cost of envelopes, and postage, and that sort of thing.
这与连锁信的原理相同。如果你参与得很早，你可以赚钱。但连锁信并不会创造财富。事实上，还会有信封、邮资等的摩擦成本。
So the net, there’s some money destroyed a little bit. And there’s money destroyed by the frictional cost of trading and investing, and that comes out of investor’s pockets.
所以，总体上有一部分钱被毁掉了。而交易和投资的摩擦成本也会消耗资金，这部分成本是从投资者口袋里出的。
But the manias that periodically take place — and not just in stocks. We had a similar mania — not necessarily similar — we certainly had a mania in farmland here in Nebraska 20 years ago.
但周期性出现的狂热现象——不仅仅是在股票中。我们曾经历过类似的狂热——不一定完全相同——20年前，内布拉斯加的农田就经历过一次狂热。
And land which couldn’t produce, we’ll say, more than 70 or $80 an acre would sell for 2,000 an acre at times when interest rates were 10 percent.
那时，土地每英亩的收益不会超过70到80美元，却能以每英亩2000美元的价格卖出，而当时的利率是10%。
Well, that math will kill you. And it killed the people who bought it at those prices, and it killed a great many banks here in Nebraska who lent based on that sort of thing.
这样的数学逻辑会毁掉你。它毁掉了以那些价格买入土地的人，也毁掉了内布拉斯加许多根据此类价值贷款的银行。
But while it was going on everybody thought it was wonderful, because every farm was selling for more than the similar farm had sold for a month earlier. And it was momentum investing in farmland.
但在狂热持续时，大家都认为这很棒，因为每块农田的售价都高于一个月前类似农田的售价。这是一种对农田的动量投资。
And, in the end, valuation does count. But it can go on a long time, and when you get a huge number of participants playing with ever increasing sums, you know, it creates its own apparent truth for a — what can be for a very considerable period of time.
最终，估值确实重要。但这种现象可以持续很长时间，当大量参与者投入不断增加的资金时，它会在相当长的一段时间内创造出一种看似合理的“真相”。
It doesn’t go on forever. And whether it has fallout to the whole economy, like it probably did in the late ’20s, or whether it’s just an isolated industry where the — or sector — where the bubble bursts and it really doesn’t affect other values, who knows? But five or 10 years from now, you will know.
但它不会永远持续下去。至于它是否会像1920年代后期那样波及整个经济，还是仅仅影响某个行业或板块的价值泡沫破裂，谁也无法预测。但五年或十年后，你会知道答案。
Charlie?
查理
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the reason we use the phrase “wretched excess” is that there are wretched consequences.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为我们使用“可悲的过度”这个词的原因是，它会带来可悲的后果。
If you mix the mathematics of the chain letter or the Ponzi scheme with some legitimate development, like the development of the internet, you are mixing something which is wretched and irrational, and has bad consequences, with something that has very good consequences.
如果你把连锁信或庞氏骗局的数学逻辑和某些合法的发展，比如互联网的发展混合在一起，你就在把一些可悲的、不理性的东西与一些有非常好结果的东西混在一起。
But, you know, if you mix raisins with turds, they’re still turds. (Laughter)
但是，你知道的，如果你把葡萄干和粪便混在一起，它们仍然是粪便。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why they have me write the annual report. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这就是为什么他们让我写年度报告。（笑声）
5. Evaluating the internet’s threat to Berkshire’s businesses
评估互联网对伯克希尔企业的威胁
WARREN BUFFETT: So, I think we better move on to sector 3. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想我们最好进入第3区的问题了。（笑声）
Way back there.
就在后面。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name —
观众： 我的名字是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Thomas Kamay (PH). I am 10 years old and I go to Bacich School in Kentfield, California. I have been a shareholder for two years. This is my third annual meeting. Here’s my question.
观众： 我的名字是托马斯·卡梅（音），我今年10岁，就读于加利福尼亚肯特菲尔德的巴奇奇学校。我已经是两年的股东了，这是我第三次参加股东大会。这是我的问题。
I know you won’t invest in technology companies, but are you afraid that the internet will hurt some of the companies that you do invest in, such as The Washington Post or Wells Fargo? Thank you.
我知道你们不会投资科技公司，但你们是否担心互联网会对你们投资的一些公司，比如《华盛顿邮报》或富国银行，造成影响？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s an absolutely terrific question. You know, I may turn my money over to you. (Laughter and applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这是一个非常棒的问题。你知道，我或许应该把我的钱交给你。（笑声和掌声）
There’s probably no better question we’ll get.
我们可能不会再收到比这更好的问题了。
And I hope Charlie answers in an appropriate vein considering your age. (Laughter)
我希望查理能考虑到你的年龄，用适当的方式回答。（笑声）
We do not — we have no — you know, it’s no religious belief that we don’t buy into tech companies.
我们并不是因为某种宗教信仰而不投资科技公司。
We just don’t — we have never found one — as conventionally defined — we’ve never found one where we think we know enough about what the business will look like in 10 years that we can make a rational decision as to how much we pay now for that business.
我们只是从未找到一个符合传统定义的科技公司，让我们觉得能足够了解它十年后的发展，以便我们能做出一个理性的决定，决定现在应该为这家公司支付多少。
In other words, we have not been able to find a business where we think we know what that bush will look like in 10 years, and how many birds will be in it, so that we know how many birds we can give up today to participate in that future.
换句话说，我们没有找到一家让我们认为可以预测其十年后样貌的公司，也无法预测它的潜力和价值，因此我们不知道今天应该放弃多少“手中之鸟”来参与这个未来。
Not any — there will be wonderful things, as Charlie so colorfully explained, that will evolve from many of these companies, but we don’t know how to make that decision.
当然，其中有些公司可能会发展出很棒的东西，正如查理生动描述的那样，但我们不知道如何做出这样的投资决定。
And you’re absolutely right that we should be thinking all of the time about whether developments in that tech area threaten the businesses that we’re in now, how you might counter those threats, how we might capitalize in opportunities because of it.
你完全正确，我们确实应该一直在思考，技术领域的发展是否会威胁到我们现在所投资的业务，我们如何应对这些威胁，以及如何利用其中的机会。
It’s a very, very, very important part of business now and will become more important in the years to come, including many of our businesses.
这是商业中一个非常、非常、非常重要的部分，并且在未来几年会变得更加重要，包括我们的一些业务。
For example, you mentioned The Washington Post. Even closer to home, we own a newspaper called The Buffalo News in Buffalo, New York. We own all of that. So we’re in a position to make our own decisions of an operating nature as to what we should do in respect to the internet.
比如，你提到的《华盛顿邮报》。更贴近一点，我们在纽约州布法罗拥有一家报纸，叫《布法罗新闻》。我们完全拥有这家报纸，所以我们可以自行决定在互联网方面该采取什么样的运营策略。
And believe me, Stan Lipsey, who’s here today, who runs that paper, and I have talked many, many hours, including considerable time yesterday about what we are doing on the internet, what we should be doing, what other people are doing, how it threatens us, how we can counter those threats, all of that sort of thing.
相信我，斯坦·利普西今天也在场，他负责运营这份报纸。我和他谈了很多、很多次，包括昨天也花了相当长的时间讨论我们在互联网领域的行动、我们应该做的事情、其他人正在做的事情、这些行动如何威胁到我们，以及我们如何应对这些威胁。
And newspapers are a category that, in my view, are very threatened by the internet because we had an example —
在我看来，报纸是一个受到互联网威胁非常大的行业，因为我们已经有过这样的例子——
The internet is terrific for delivering information. We have a product, World Book, that’s terrific for delivering information. And 15 years ago, print encyclopedias were the best tool, probably, for educating not only young children, but for educating me or Charlie when we wanted to look up something on a subject.
互联网在传递信息方面非常出色。我们有一款产品叫《世界图书》，它在信息传递方面表现出色。而15年前，印刷版的百科全书可能是教育小孩以及像我或查理这样的人的最佳工具，当我们想查阅某个主题时。
And the World Book is a marvelous product. But it requires chopping down trees, and it requires operating paper mills, and it requires binding it and printing, and it requires a delivery of a 70-pound, you know, UPS package. And it’s a —
《世界图书》是一个非常出色的产品。但是它需要砍伐树木、运行造纸厂、装订和印刷，还需要通过UPS递送一份重达70磅的包裹。这是一个——
It was put together in a way that was, for 4- or 500 years, the best technique for taking that information and moving it from those who assembled it to those who wanted to use it. And then the internet changed that in a very major way.
这种组合方式在四五百年间都是将信息从整理者传递给使用者的最佳技术。但互联网在这方面带来了重大改变。
So we have seen firsthand, and experienced the business consequences of the improvement offered by the internet and the delivery of information.
因此，我们亲眼见证并亲身经历了互联网在信息传递方面带来的改进及其对业务的影响。
And newspapers, although not as immediately susceptible to that problem, still face that overpowering factor.
虽然报纸不像百科全书那样立即受到这种问题的影响，但它仍然面临这种压倒性的因素。
When you eliminate the delivery cost — I mean, we pay a significant percentage of our circulation revenue to our carriers, and we pay additional money to the district managers, and we pay for the trucks to deliver the product out, and we pay for huge printing presses, and all of that sort of thing.
当你消除配送成本时——我们将发行收入中的很大一部分支付给送报员，还额外支付给地区经理，同时还要支付用于运送产品的卡车费用，以及巨大的印刷机成本，等等。
And people do chop down trees in order to give us the raw material to transmit information in Buffalo, you know, about what the Buffalo Bills did yesterday, on Sunday, with all the details.
而且，人们确实砍伐树木，为我们提供传递信息的原材料，比如在布法罗向读者提供布法罗比尔队昨天周日比赛的所有详细信息。
And now you have the internet that has virtually no incremental unit cost to anything and can deliver the information instantaneously. So it’s a big factor for newspapers.
而现在你有了互联网，它几乎没有任何单位增量成本，可以即时传递信息。这对报纸行业是一个重要因素。
And the newspaper world in my view will look very, very, very different in not that many years.
在我看来，报纸行业在未来几年内将会变得非常、非常、非常不同。
And I find it kind of interesting, because the people in the newspaper business are a little schizophrenic about this. They see this. They’re afraid of it. They’re, in almost all cases, trying to combat it on some way operationally.
我觉得这有点有趣，因为报纸行业的人对此有些矛盾。他们看到了这种变化，也对其感到害怕。在几乎所有情况下，他们都在试图通过某种运营方式来应对它。
But some of them, at least, continue to go out and buy papers at a price that sort of reflects the economics that used to exist 20 years ago, when it’s — to me it’s very clear that it doesn’t exist anymore.
但至少有些人仍然以某种反映20年前经济状况的价格去购买报纸，而对我来说，这种经济状况显然已经不存在了。
So they sort of have their billfold, you know, in the past, even though they see the future. And, you know, I think, probably, they’re making mistakes in many cases.
所以他们的思维仍停留在过去，即使他们已经看到了未来。而且，我认为，在许多情况下，他们可能是在犯错误。
All of our businesses, virtually — Coca-Cola will not be affected in any significant way by the internet, you know? The razor and blade business won’t be. Although you could dream up things about distribution or so on, but I think that it’s very unlikely.
我们的几乎所有业务，比如可口可乐，不会因为互联网而受到任何显著影响。剃须刀和刀片业务也不会。尽管你可以设想一些关于分销的可能性，但我认为这非常不可能。
But other businesses we have — our insurance business, particularly at GEICO, will be very affected by the internet. Now, that may turn out to be a big advantage to us over time. I wouldn’t be surprised if it is.
但我们的其他业务，比如保险业务，尤其是GEICO，将受到互联网的很大影响。现在，随着时间的推移，这可能会成为我们的一个巨大优势。如果真是这样，我不会感到惊讶。
But our retailing businesses are all threatened in one way or another by internet developments, and there may be some opportunities there, too. But it’s a change.
但我们的零售业务在某种程度上都会受到互联网发展的威胁，当然那里也可能存在一些机会。但这是一个变化。
It’s a change in — it’s going to be change in the world — how the world gets entertainment. It’s going to be a change in the world — how the world gets information. And it is incredibly low cost compared to the — most of the methods of conveying entertainment and information now.
这是一个变化——它将改变这个世界获取娱乐和信息的方式。而且，与目前大多数传递娱乐和信息的方式相比，它的成本低得令人难以置信。
Charlie?
查理
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he asked if we were afraid that the internet would hurt some of our business and I think the answer is yes. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，他问我们是否担心互联网会损害我们的一些业务，我认为答案是肯定的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m learning to appreciate these short answers, though, more as the day goes by. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不过，随着时间的推移，我越来越欣赏这些简短的回答了。（笑声）
I want to thank you for coming to our meeting, incidentally. You’re way ahead of me. I didn’t buy my first stock until I was 11, and so you’ve got a real jump on me. And I wish you well.
顺便说一句，我要感谢你来参加我们的会议。你比我走得更远。我到11岁才买了我的第一只股票，所以你已经遥遥领先于我了。我祝你一切顺利。
6. “There’s nothing magic about a one-year period”
一年期间并没有什么神奇之处
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 4.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第4区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren and Charlie, good morning. This is Mo Spence, Waterloo, Nebraska.
观众提问： 早上好，沃伦和查理。我是来自内布拉斯加州滑铁卢的莫·斯宾塞。
In 1999, Berkshire Hathaway managed to produce a positive gain in net worth of one-half of one percent.
1999年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的净值仅实现了0.5%的正增长。
That means that since present management took over 35 years ago, Berkshire Hathaway has realized a positive gain each and every year, and produced an average annual gain of 24 percent.
这意味着，自现任管理层35年前接手以来，伯克希尔·哈撒韦每年都实现了正增长，平均年增长率达24%。
Including the years you ran the Buffett Limited Partnership, you have had a run of 48 consecutive years of positive gains and net worth without one single down year, producing a compounded rate of return of almost 26 percent annually.
包括您经营巴菲特有限合伙企业的时期在内，您已经连续48年实现净值正增长，从未有一年亏损，年复合回报率接近26%。
On behalf of the long-term shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, we want to thank you from the bottom of our pocketbooks. (Applause)
代表伯克希尔·哈撒韦的长期股东，我们真心感谢您对我们口袋的贡献。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you. I hope your question isn’t going to be whether we can continue that, but go — you have a question?
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，谢谢。我希望您的问题不是关于我们是否还能继续保持这个成绩，但请问您的问题是什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is, don’t you think you could have ended the millennium with a bigger bang than one-half of one percent? (Laughter)
观众提问： 我的问题是，您不觉得结束千禧年时，0.5%的增长是不是有些缺乏亮点？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I certainly wish we could have. But the interesting thing about those figures — and, actually, the figures go back before that, because the very best period was pre-the partnership days, because the amount I was working with was so small.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我当然希望能做到更好。不过，这些数字的有趣之处在于——实际上，它们可以追溯到更早的时期，因为最好的阶段是在合伙企业成立之前，那时我管理的资金规模非常小。
But the — there’s nothing magic about a one-year period. I mean, it’s the way the measurements come out. We’ve — if you took all the half-year periods, for example, I’m sure — well, I know that there were a number that were down, you know —
但说到底，一年期间并没有什么神奇之处。这只是统计方式的结果。如果您统计半年的数据，我敢肯定——实际上我知道，有一些半年是下降的。
There’re going to be lots of years in the future — assuming I live long enough, that — we will have plenty of down years. It’s been a fluke, to some degree, that we have not had any down years in terms of underlying value.
未来会有很多年——假如我能活得足够久，我们肯定会有一些亏损的年份。从某种程度上来说，我们在基本价值方面没有出现亏损年份是种巧合。
The stock has gone up and down in ways that are not related to intrinsic value a few times, but that is totally a fluke. I mean, we’re not going to be up every day. We’re not going to be up every week. We’re not going to be up every month, or even every year.
股票的涨跌有时与内在价值无关，但这完全是偶然的。我是说，我们不可能每天都上涨，不可能每周都上涨，也不可能每个月甚至每年都上涨。
And it’s — the fact that, you know, the Earth revolves around the sun really is not totally connected to most business activities, or the fruition of most investment ideas, or anything of the sort.
而且您知道，地球绕着太阳转的事实，与大多数商业活动、投资理念的实现，或者类似的事情并没有必然联系。
So we have to report every year, and, you know, I care about the yearly figures in that sense. I don’t really care about them, totally, as a measure of what we’re doing.
所以，我们必须每年报告业绩，您知道，我从这个角度来说是关心年度数据的，但我并不完全将它们作为衡量我们工作的标准。
And, like I say, if we could’ve — we were — the capital allocation job that I did in 1999 was very, very poor. And it was partly because some of our main businesses did poorly.
就像我说的，如果可以——我们在1999年的资本配置做得非常糟糕。这部分是因为我们的一些主要业务表现不佳。
I mean, Coca-Cola and Gillette had bad years last year. They’ll have good years over time.
我的意思是，可口可乐和吉列去年表现不佳，但它们会随着时间的推移迎来好年份。
I wrote a few years ago — it’s interesting, I called their soft drink business and their razor and blade business as “Inevitables.”
几年前我写道——有意思的是，我将它们的软饮料业务和剃须刀业务称为“必然性”。
And the truth is they’ve got a higher market share now than they’ve ever had in history. They’re selling more units than any year in history. But certain other factors hurt their business and therefore hurt their stock performance.
事实是，它们现在的市场份额比历史上任何时候都高，销售的单位数量也超过了历史上的任何一年。但某些其他因素影响了它们的业务，从而影响了股票表现。
But I would still call the soft drink — Coca-Cola’s position in the soft drink business, and Gillette’s position in the razor and blade business — I would characterize them as “inevitable,” that they will gain share over time.
但我仍然认为，可口可乐在软饮料业务中的地位和吉列在剃须刀业务中的地位是“必然的”，它们将随着时间推移获得更大的市场份额。
Gillette has over 70 percent of the blade and razor business in the world, which is — measured by value. And that’s an extraordinary share.
吉列占全球剃须刀片和剃须刀市场的70%以上，这个市场份额是按价值计算的。这是一个非常惊人的比例。
Coke has 50 percent of the soft drink business in the world. That’s well over a billion eight-ounce servings per day. A billion per day.
可口可乐占全球软饮料市场的50%。这意味着每天有超过10亿份8盎司的饮料被消费。每天10亿份。
Eight percent of those are for the account of Berkshire, so over 80 million eight-ounce servings of soft drinks per day are being consumed by people for — where the economic benefit comes to Berkshire Hathaway.
其中8%的份额是伯克希尔的，这意味着每天有超过8000万份8盎司的软饮料被消费，其经济收益归伯克希尔·哈撒韦所有。
In effect, we have over six percent of the — for Berkshire Hathaway’s account — of the blade and razor business in the world. And it’ll go up.
实际上，伯克希尔在全球剃须刀片和剃须刀市场中占有超过6%的份额。而且这个比例还会增加。
So I don’t worry about the businesses in the least, long term. They will have bad years from time to time. And when they do, our performance will not look good in those years.
所以从长期来看，我一点也不担心这些业务。它们偶尔会有糟糕的年份，而当那种情况发生时，我们的业绩看起来也不会好。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s been a very interesting stretch. One of the most interesting things about the stretch is that, during pretty much the whole period, the company has owned marketable securities in excess of its net worth.
查理·芒格： 这是一个非常有趣的阶段。其中最有趣的一点是，在几乎整个阶段，公司持有的可交易证券价值超过了其净资产。
And so you have this extraordinary liquidity in a company that has performed very well, to boot. That advantage has not gone away and, in fact, it’s been augmented.
因此，公司不仅表现非常出色，还拥有如此非凡的流动性。这一优势并没有消失，实际上它还得到了增强。
Give us reasonable opportunities and we are prepared.
给我们合理的机会，我们已经准备好了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’ve heard what you’re supposed to do, now we’ll do the rest. Just give us the opportunities.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，你们已经知道该做什么了，剩下的交给我们。只需要给我们机会。
7. We want a “mathematical edge in every transaction”
我们希望在每笔交易中都拥有‘数学优势’
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第5区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Greg Blevins (PH) from Bargetown, Kentucky.
观众提问： 我是来自肯塔基州巴德斯敦的格雷格·布莱文斯（音）。
I have a question about intrinsic value. It comes from comments that you made in your annual report this year. In there, you describe the extraordinary skills of [Berkshire reinsurance chief] Ajit Jain in judging risk.
我有一个关于内在价值的问题，源于您今年在年度报告中的评论。在报告中，您提到伯克希尔再保险主管阿吉特·贾因在评估风险方面的非凡能力。
When I think about Berkshire and its ability to increase intrinsic value, it seems to me that judging risk has been at least as important as an ability to calculate a net present value.
当我思考伯克希尔提升内在价值的能力时，我认为评估风险至少和计算净现值一样重要。
So my question to each of you is, would you give us some comments on how you think about risk?
因此，我的问题是，能否请您谈谈您对风险的看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we think of business risk in terms of what can happen — say five, 10, 15 years from now — that will destroy, or modify, or reduce the economic strengths that we perceive currently exist in a business.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，我们认为商业风险是指未来5年、10年或15年内可能发生的事情，这些事情可能会破坏、改变或削弱我们目前所认为的业务经济优势。
In some businesses that’s very — it’s impossible — to figure — at least it’s impossible for us to figure — and then we just — we don’t even think about it then.
在某些业务中，这种风险是非常难以——甚至不可能——评估的，至少对我们来说不可能评估，因此我们干脆不去考虑它。
We are enormously risk averse. We are not risk adverse, in terms of losing a billion dollars if there were an earthquake in California today. And we’re thinking of writing a policy, for example, in the next week or so, on a primary insurance risk of over a billion dollars.
我们极度规避风险。但如果今天加州发生地震导致我们损失10亿美元，我们并不会因此回避风险。比如，我们正考虑在接下来的一周左右，为一项超过10亿美元的主保险风险签署保单。
That doesn’t bother us as long as the math is in our favor. But in terms of doing a group of transactions like that, we are very risk averse. In other words, we want to think that we’ve got a mathematical edge in every transaction.
只要数学对我们有利，这种事情不会困扰我们。但如果要进行一组类似的交易，我们会非常规避风险。换句话说，我们希望在每笔交易中都拥有“数学优势”。
And we think that we’ll do enough transactions over a lifetime so that, no matter what the result of any single one, that the group expectancy would — gets almost to certainty.
我们认为，随着一生中交易的足够多，无论单笔交易的结果如何，整个组合的期望值都会趋近于确定性。
When we look at businesses, we try to think of what can go wrong with them. We try to look [for] businesses that are good businesses now, and we think about what can go wrong with them.
当我们审视一个业务时，我们会试图思考它可能出什么问题。我们会寻找那些当前是好业务的公司，并考虑它们可能会出现哪些问题。
If we can think of very much that can go wrong with them, we just forget it. We are not in the business of assuming a lot of risk in businesses.
如果我们能想到很多可能出问题的地方，我们就直接放弃。我们不从事承担高风险的业务。
That doesn’t mean we don’t do it inadvertently and make mistakes, because we do. But we don’t intentionally, or willingly, voluntarily, go into situations where we perceive really significant risk that the business is going to change in a major way.
这并不意味着我们不会无意中这样做并犯错，因为我们确实会。但我们不会有意、主动或自愿进入那些我们认为有重大风险、业务可能发生重大变化的局面。
And that gets down to what you probably heard me talk about before, is, what kind of a moat is around the business?
这就涉及到你可能听我之前提过的问题：这个业务周围有怎样的护城河？
Every business that we look at we think of as an economic castle. And castles are subject to marauders.
我们审视的每个业务都被视为一座经济城堡，而城堡总会受到掠夺者的威胁。
And in capitalism, any castle you have, whether it’s razor blades, or soft drinks, or whatever, you have to expect the —
在资本主义体系中，无论你的城堡是剃须刀业务、软饮料业务，还是其他任何业务，你必须预料到——
And you want the capitalistic system to work in a way that millions of people are out there with capital thinking about ways to take your castle away from you, and appropriate it for their own use. And then the question is, what kind of a moat do you have around that castle that protects it?
你希望资本主义体系能够运作，让成千上万拥有资本的人试图夺走你的城堡，并为他们自己所用。问题在于，你的城堡周围有什么样的护城河来保护它？
See’s Candy has a wonderful moat around its castle. And Chuck Huggins has taken that moat, which he took charge of in 1972, and he has widened that moat every year.
喜诗糖果的城堡周围有一道很棒的护城河。查克·哈金斯从1972年接管后，每年都在拓宽这道护城河。
He throws crocodiles, and sharks, and piranhas in the moat, and it gets harder and harder for people to swim across and attack the castle. So they don’t do it.
他往护城河里放了鳄鱼、鲨鱼和食人鱼，这使得人们越来越难以游过护城河攻击城堡。所以他们干脆不做了。
If you look, since 1972, Forrest Mars tried with Ethel M — I don’t know, 20 years ago. And I hate to think of how much money it cost him to try that. And he was a very experienced businessman.
看看自1972年以来，弗雷斯特·马尔斯用Ethel M糖果尝试过——大概是20年前吧。我都不敢想他花了多少钱去尝试。而他还是一位非常有经验的商人。
So we think of the — we think in terms of that moat and the ability to keep its width and its impossibility of being crossed as the primary criterion of a great business.
所以我们认为，那道护城河的存在以及保持它宽广和不可逾越的能力，是伟大企业的首要标准。
And to our managers, we say we want the moat widened every year. You know, that does not necessarily mean that the profit is more this year than last year, because it won’t be sometimes. But if the moat is widened every year, the business will do very well.
对我们的管理者来说，我们要求他们每年都拓宽护城河。这并不一定意味着今年的利润会比去年高，因为有时不会。但只要护城河每年都能拓宽，这项业务就会发展得很好。
When we don’t have a — when we see a moat that’s tenuous in any way — getting back to your question — it’s just too risky. We don’t know how to valuate that, and therefore we leave it alone.
当我们看到护城河任何方面都显得脆弱时——回到你的问题——风险就太大了。我们不知道该如何评估它，因此我们选择放弃。
We think all of our businesses — virtually all of our businesses — have pretty darn good moats, and we think the managers are widening them.
我们认为我们的业务——几乎所有的业务——都有非常好的护城河，并且我们的管理者正在拓宽它们。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: How could you say it better? (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 还能怎么说得更好了？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Here, have a — have some peanut brittle on that one. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 来吧，为这个问题吃块花生脆糖吧。（笑声）
8. Insurance “attracts chicanery” and we’ll have surprises
保险行业‘吸引欺诈行为’，我们会遇到意外
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第6区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.
观众提问： 早上好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning.
沃伦·巴菲特： 早上好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hugh Stevenson (PH). I’m a shareholder from Atlanta.
观众提问： 我叫休·史蒂文森（音），是来自亚特兰大的股东。
WARREN BUFFETT (to Munger): Why don’t you open that?
沃伦·巴菲特（对芒格说）： 你为什么不打开那个？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question involves the company’s activities before and shortly after the Gen Re acquisition.
观众提问： 我的问题涉及公司在收购通用再保险前后的一些活动。
I remember you saying once that, in insurance, virtually all surprises are negative ones.
我记得您曾经说过，在保险行业，几乎所有的意外都是负面的。
And I’m wondering, given the company’s operating experience in insurance over a long period of time, could you tell us what happened in the Unicover situation?
我想问的是，考虑到公司长期的保险运营经验，您能告诉我们Unicover事件中发生了什么吗？
How come in Gen — with Gen Re’s experience and the company’s experience, that it happened, they didn’t foresee it, we didn’t foresee it?
为什么在通用再保险和公司的经验下，仍然发生了这样的事情？他们没能预见到，我们也没能预见到？
What has the company done? I know they’ve taken a large reserve for the situation.
公司做了什么应对措施？我知道公司为此准备了一大笔准备金。
And how do they plan to operate in the future to prevent these things, find them out, and strengthen the company from these kind of situations in the future?
他们计划如何在未来防止这些事情的发生，及时发现问题，并通过这些措施加强公司的抗风险能力？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the Unicover situation was discovered in about, I don’t know, February of last year, or thereabouts. And it was a mistake, I mean, it should not have been made. A lot of other people made the same mistake, but that still didn’t mean that we should have made that mistake.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，Unicover事件大约是在去年二月份左右被发现的。这是个错误，我的意思是，这种错误本不该发生。很多其他人也犯了同样的错误，但这并不意味着我们也应该犯这种错误。
We set up a reserve of $275 million when the mistake was discovered, and that reserve looks like it’s about right still.
我们在发现这个错误时，设立了2.75亿美元的准备金，而这个准备金额度看起来仍然大致正确。
There have been quite a few developments at Unicover that have defined the limits of it better and resulted in the resolutions of many of the issues attached to it. Still looks like about a $275 million mistake.
Unicover事件随后发生了不少新进展，这些进展更清晰地界定了问题的范围，并解决了许多相关问题。但它仍然是一个价值2.75亿美元的错误。
Now, that’s a big mistake, but we’ve made bigger ones. We had one in the mid-’70s that probably cost Berkshire, measuring opportunity cost and everything, because we didn’t know how bad it was going to be —
这确实是个大错误，但我们犯过更大的错误。比如在70年代中期，我们有一次错误，可能让伯克希尔付出了巨大的代价，包括机会成本，因为当时我们不知道情况会有多糟糕——
I would say that Berkshire would now be worth at least 10 percent more if that mistake hadn’t occurred. Wouldn’t you say so, Charlie? The Omni situation?
我认为，如果没有发生那次错误，伯克希尔现在的价值至少会高出10%。你也这么认为吧，查理？就是Omni事件？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely.
查理·芒格： 绝对没错。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, so we had a mistake whose present value would be 8 or $9 billion. It cost us at least that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们犯了一个错误，其现值损失可能达到80亿到90亿美元，至少是这个数。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it cost us less than 4 million at the time.
查理·芒格： 是的，当时我们损失不到400万美元。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Though, it — but we didn’t know it for sure it was 4 million, so it tied our hands in other respects, too.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。但我们当时并不确定是400万，这也在其他方面束缚了我们的手脚。
In insurance you will get surprises. Now, the test of good management is how many surprises you get. But there’s no way you’ll get no surprises.
在保险行业，你肯定会遇到意外。衡量优秀管理的标准是你遇到意外的数量，但完全避免意外是不可能的。
And if you look at our history, you will see some years when our float cost us a lot of money. You will also see a history where over 33 or so years that it’s been a very, very attractive business.
回顾我们的历史，你会发现有些年份我们的浮存金成本很高。但你也会看到，在过去大约33年的时间里，这是一项非常有吸引力的业务。
But we have had cases, I mean, our name causes problems. I think National Indemnity — we had a fraud, as I remember, down in Texas where an agent was using our paper, which incidentally was the same problem we had, the one that cost us so much.
但我们确实有过一些案例，我的意思是，我们的名字有时会引发问题。我记得在德克萨斯州，National Indemnity发生过一次欺诈事件，一名代理商使用了我们的单据。巧合的是，这与导致我们巨大损失的问题是同一类情况。
And some guy is out there writing bonds on — surety bonds — on construction of schools. And he says he represents National Indemnity and the contract proceeds, and of course, we’ve never heard of the guy.
某人在学校建设项目上签发担保债券，并声称自己代表National Indemnity，合同继续推进，而我们当然从未听说过这个人。
But if you get a school district in Texas with a half-finished school, and the choice is whether the taxpayers ante up more or whether you find that this guy had apparent authority as an agent, and so on, and therefore we should pay on a policy we never heard of, written by a guy we never heard of, you know, on a school we never heard of. You know, we’ll end up paying.
但如果德克萨斯州某个学区的学校建了一半，面临的是让纳税人掏更多钱，或者认定这个人有代理人的表面权力，从而要求我们赔偿一份我们从未听说过的保单，是由一个我们从未听说过的人签发，针对一所我们从未听说过的学校的保单。你知道，我们最终会付钱。
So the surprises are unpleasant nine times out of 10. We’ll have more. We had another one last year that shouldn’t have happened. But they do happen.
所以，十次意外中有九次都是令人不愉快的。未来还会有更多意外。去年我们又遇到了一次本不该发生的意外。但它们确实会发生。
And General Re has a terrific record over time.
通用再保险公司长期以来有着出色的记录。
We knew last year would not be a good business in the reinsurance business. It was worse than we thought it would be. But that had nothing to do — if you told me the figures that General Re would have at the end of the year, we would have made the same deal in a moment.
我们知道，去年再保险业务的表现不会好，但它比我们预期的更糟。不过这并不影响——即使你提前告诉我通用再保险公司年底的业绩数据，我们仍然会毫不犹豫地达成这笔交易。
And, you know, we didn’t do so well with Coke and Gillette ourselves. So that the ratio of mistakes was probably fairly equal between the two organizations with me contributing our — my share.
而且你知道，我们自己在可口可乐和吉列的投资上也表现不佳。所以两家公司的失误比例大致相当，而我也贡献了我们那一部分的错误。
I think insurance, which will continue to have surprises in it, will turn out to be a very, very good business for Berkshire over time. It’s the best one I know about that we can do in increasing scale over time.
我认为，尽管保险行业会继续带来意外，从长期来看，它将成为伯克希尔一项非常非常好的业务。这是我所知我们能够随着时间扩大规模的最佳业务。
As a matter of fact, some of you may not have noticed but we announced another small insurance acquisition just last week.
事实上，可能有些人没有注意到，我们就在上周宣布了另一项小型保险收购。
It’s a tough field. The average company is going to do poorly. We think we have some very special companies, and we really do think, over time, we will acquire and utilize float at a cost that’s very, very attractive.
这是一个竞争激烈的领域。普通公司通常表现不佳。但我们认为，我们拥有一些非常特别的公司，我们真的相信，从长期来看，我们能够以非常具有吸引力的成本获得和利用浮存金。
It won’t be zero like it’s been in the past. I mean, we are in some lines of business where intentionally — I mean, we would be crazy to try to hold it to zero, because it’s way better to have twice as much money at one or two percent as have half as much money at 0 percent.
成本不会像过去那样是零。我的意思是，在某些业务领域，我们有意不再将其维持在零成本。因为用1%或2%的成本管理两倍的资金，远好于用0%成本管理一半的资金。
But we will fully acknowledge that — I mean, Unicover was a surprise. But I don’t know how many surprises I’ve had in insurance over the 33 years or so we’ve been in it.
但我们会完全承认——我的意思是，Unicover是一个意外。但在我们从事保险业务的大约33年里，我已经遇到过许多意外了。
One of the surprises, incidentally, you know, worked to our incredible benefit.
顺便说一句，其中一个意外实际上对我们产生了难以置信的好处。
GEICO has been a great, great company since I first went down to Washington, and even before that, and met Lorimer Davidson almost 50 years ago. But they made a mistake in the early ’70s that really did bankrupt the company.
自从我第一次前往华盛顿——甚至在那之前——遇到洛里默·戴维森差不多50年了，GEICO一直是一家非常出色的公司。但在70年代初，他们犯了一个错误，差点让公司破产。
But fortunately, there was an insurance commissioner named Max Wallach in the District of Columbia, who saw that it could be resuscitated, and that mistake enabled us to make many, many billions of dollars. So mistakes can be useful on occasion, too.
幸运的是，华盛顿特区有一位名叫马克斯·沃拉赫的保险专员，他认为这家公司可以被拯救，而这个错误最终让我们赚了许多许多亿美元。所以有时候错误也是有用的。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: All that said, it is perhaps the most irritating way to lose money there is, is to be taken by a sort of obvious lie. And — but it happens.
查理·芒格： 话虽如此，最令人恼火的赔钱方式之一，就是因为一种显而易见的谎言而受骗。但这种情况确实会发生。
I don’t think it’s likely to happen again on that scale.
我认为，这种规模的事情不太可能再次发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn’t say that. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我不这么认为。（笑）
I would say that it’s unlikely that — in any 20 year period, or anything like that, we will get a big surprise. And it will come about, very often, through one form or another of three or four methods of obvious fraud that we’ve observed in the past.
我会说，在任何20年的时间段内，发生重大意外的可能性不大。但它通常会以我们过去观察到的三四种明显欺诈形式之一再次出现。
But they spring up again. And there are plenty of people that are, I’d have to say, “crooked,” in insurance because it’s a product where you deliver a piece of paper and somebody hands you money.
但它们会再次出现。而且保险行业中确实有许多人是“狡诈的”，因为这是一种只需提供一张纸，对方就会交给你钱的产品。
And that intrigues people. You know, you don’t even hand them a Dilly bar, you know, or — (laughter) — or anything in exchange. They hand you a lot of money and you give them a little piece of paper.
这很吸引人。你甚至不用给他们一根雪糕，或者——（笑声）——其他任何东西作为交换。他们把一大笔钱交给你，而你只给了他们一张小纸片。
And of course, when you get into reinsurance and all that, then you hand that little piece of paper to somebody else and try and get them to hand you money.
当然，当你进入再保险领域时，你又将那张小纸片交给别人，试图让他们也给你钱。
And all the way along the line you have brokers who are getting big chunks of money for sort of papering over some of the weaknesses in the project, and sometimes they may even be in on it.
整个过程中，会有经纪人从中赚取大笔佣金，他们通过掩盖项目中的一些弱点获取利益，有时候甚至可能参与其中。
So it’s a field that attracts chicanery. And often they — the same people — come back again and again. It’s amazing to me.
所以这是一个吸引欺诈行为的领域。通常是同一批人一次又一次地卷土重来，这让我感到惊讶。
So, I would say that we will get a surprise or two over any 10-year period in insurance. It’s almost impossible to avoid.
因此，我会说，在任何10年的时间里，保险领域都会有一两次意外。这几乎是不可避免的。
We should try to minimize it. We do try to minimize it, but I would not want to bet my life that we’ve seen the last of a Unicover-type situation.
我们应该努力将其最小化。我们确实在努力，但我不会赌上我的生命说我们已经见过最后一次像Unicover这样的情况了。
They’re always just a little bit different enough so that it doesn’t get spotted, or somebody down the line doesn’t get the message, but —
这些问题总是稍微有些不同，以至于不容易被发现，或者某个环节的人没有收到警告，但是——
I don’t know. Don’t you think, Charlie, we’ll see another one? (Laughs)
我不知道。查理，你不觉得我们还会遇到类似的问题吗？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, perhaps so, but it was a long time from one to the other, and maybe I’ll be able to get through without another. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 嗯，也许会有，但从一个问题到下一个问题之间的时间很长，也许我能熬过去而不再遇到。（笑声）
One of these fraud artists, Warren caused me to meet years ago, and his proposition was that he had this perfectly marvelous business.
沃伦让我多年前遇到过一个骗子，他提出了一项他认为完美无缺的业务。
He says, “I — we only write fire insurance on concrete bridges that are under water.” He says, — (laughter) — “It’s like taking candy from babies.” And —
他说：“我们只为水下的混凝土桥梁提供火灾保险。”他说——（笑声）——“这就像从小孩手里抢糖果。”然后——
WARREN BUFFETT: We were the babies. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们就是那些小孩。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I looked in his eye. I thought he was kidding or something. He wasn’t kidding. I mean, these people believe this kind of stuff.
查理·芒格： 我看着他的眼睛，我还以为他在开玩笑或者什么的。他不是在开玩笑。我的意思是，这些人真的相信这样的事情。
WARREN BUFFETT: The truth is Charlie — if Charlie and I could see everybody we dealt with, we would screen out some perfectly honest people, too. I think we could probably screen out the crooked propositions. I mean, they do have similar characteristics to them.
沃伦·巴菲特： 事实是，查理——如果查理和我能够见到所有与我们打交道的人，我们可能也会把一些完全诚实的人筛选出去。我认为我们或许可以筛掉那些虚假的提议。我的意思是，这些提议确实有相似的特征。
And what happens is you get somebody out in the field who is eager to write business or is being wooed by producers, and the intermediaries get very good at it. It’s the same way lousy stocks get sold.
而实际发生的情况是，你会遇到一些急于签单的人，或者被销售者拉拢的人，而中介机构对此非常擅长。这就像那些劣质股票是如何被推销出去的一样。
I mean, you’ll get people who are getting paid very well to part, you know, separate you from your money. And that’s worked over the years. The good salesmen find out they can make more money, you know, selling phony products with big tickets attached to them than they can selling lollipops.
我的意思是，你会发现有人为了从你手中分离出资金而获得高额报酬。这种方法多年来一直奏效。优秀的销售员发现，销售附加高额票据的虚假产品比卖棒棒糖赚得更多。
9. Rules and fees for Buffett’s 1950′s partnerships
巴菲特1950年代合伙企业的规则和费用
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第7区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett, and good morning Mr. Munger. My name is Mohnish Pabrai and I’m from Long Grove, Illinois.
观众提问： 早上好，巴菲特先生，早上好，芒格先生。我是莫尼什·帕布莱，来自伊利诺伊州朗格罗夫。
I have been a student and disciple of yourself, Mr. Buffett, for some time, and especially Mr. Munger. And I have adopted, quite intensely, your theories of capital allocation, in the manner in which I run my business, as well as my portfolio, and quite pleased with the results so far.
我一直是巴菲特先生您的学生和追随者，尤其是芒格先生。我在经营业务和管理投资组合时，深入采用了你们的资本分配理论，目前对结果感到非常满意。
My question has to do with the original 1950s Buffett partnerships. There is some conflicting data in the various books about you pertaining to the rules of the partnership and the fees of the partnership.
我的问题与1950年代的巴菲特合伙企业有关。关于合伙企业的规则和费用，不同的书籍中存在一些矛盾的描述。
What I wanted to understand is, I think some of the books allude to the principle being guaranteed — I think six percent a year being guaranteed — and then you took a fourth, and the partners got three-fourths.
我想弄清的是，有些书提到本金是有保障的——好像每年保证6%的收益——然后您拿走四分之一，合伙人拿到四分之三。
In some cases they talk about four percent, and some cases they say there was no guarantee. I would just appreciate a clarification on that.
有些书提到是4%，有些书说根本没有保障。我希望您能对此作出澄清。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll make it short because I’m not sure how much general interest there is to that. But there was never any guarantee.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我会简短回答，因为我不确定这是否是大家普遍感兴趣的话题。但当时从来没有任何保障。
这个提问说明基本是个缺乏主动思考能力的傻子，但这个资质平庸的印度人后来做的也不错，方向很重要。
There was a guarantee that I wouldn’t get a penny myself — there was none of this one percent fee and all that sort of thing that hedge funds now normally have. After a short period of time I told people I’d have all my capital in it, basically.
唯一的保障是，我自己一分钱也拿不到——没有像现在对冲基金普遍收取的1%管理费之类的东西。没多久我就告诉大家，我会将自己的全部资本投进去，基本如此。
So there was a guarantee I would follow — have a common destiny. There was never any guarantee of principle of any sort.
因此，保障是我会与合伙人“同舟共济”。但从来没有任何关于本金的保障。
Originally, the thing started by accident, so that there 11 different partnerships before they all got put together on January 1st, 1962, into Buffett Partnerships.
最初，这个事情是偶然开始的，所以在1962年1月1日合并成巴菲特合伙企业之前，总共有11个不同的合伙企业。
So with the 11 different partnerships, they had different — some different arrangements — based on the preferences of the limited partners. I offered them an option of three or four different choices, and different families made different choices.
因此，这11个不同的合伙企业有各自的安排——根据有限合伙人的喜好。我给他们提供了三到四种不同的选择，不同的家庭选择了不同的方案。
When we put them together we settled on the 6 percent preferential with a quarter of the profits over that, with a carry forward of all deficiencies. Nobody was guaranteed anything on them.
合并后，我们决定采用6%的优先收益率，超过部分的利润我拿四分之一，并且所有的亏损可以结转。但没有人对这些安排有任何保障。
Charlie had a much better partnership. His was a third, as I remember, wasn’t it Charlie? (Laughter)
查理的合伙企业好得多。我记得他拿的是三分之一，对吧，查理？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, but we were smaller and operating specialist posts on the stock exchange. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格： 是的，但我们规模更小，还在证券交易所从事专门的岗位。（巴菲特笑）
The facts were different.
情况不同。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
10. American Express isn’t “inevitable” but has “huge value”
美国运通不是‘必然的’，但拥有‘巨大的价值’
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s go to 8.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们来看第8区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, good morning. My name is Pete Banner (PH), and I’m from Boulder, Colorado.
观众提问： 巴菲特先生，芒格先生，早上好。我是皮特·班纳（音），来自科罗拉多州博尔德市。
In the 1996 annual report, Mr. Buffett, you stated companies such as Coca-Cola and Gillette might well be labeled “The Inevitables,” and you just reaffirmed your view of Coca-Cola and Gillette.
在1996年的年度报告中，巴菲特先生，您提到可口可乐和吉列等公司可以被称为“必然性企业”，而您刚刚也重申了您对可口可乐和吉列的看法。
My question to you is, do you have the same view of American Express? That is, do you view American Express as, quote, “The Inevitable”?
我的问题是，您是否对美国运通也持有相同的看法？也就是说，您是否认为美国运通是所谓的“必然性”企业？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would like to clarify one point, too. I didn’t really say I regard the companies as “Inevitables.” I regarded the businesses, their dominance of soft drinks, or their competitive strength in soft drinks and in razors and blades.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我也想澄清一点。我并没有说我认为这些公司是“必然性”的。我指的是它们的业务，比如在软饮料领域的主导地位，或者在软饮料和剃须刀领域的竞争力。
And as a matter of fact, I actually pointed out in talking about that — a few paragraphs later, I pointed out the danger of having a wonderful business is the temptation to go into less wonderful businesses.
事实上，我在谈到这一点时，还在几段之后指出了拥有一家优秀业务的危险，那就是被诱惑进入不那么优秀的业务。
And to some extent, for example, Gillette’s stumble in the last year or two has not been the product of their razor and blade business, but it has been some other businesses, which are not at all inevitable.
在某种程度上，例如，吉列在过去一两年的失误并不是来自其剃须刀片业务，而是来自一些完全不具“必然性”的其他业务。
And that, you know, that is always a risk. And it’s a risk I pointed out, that when a company with a wonderful business gets into a mediocre business, that usually the reputation of the mediocre business prevails over the supposed invincibility of the management of the wonderful business.
而且你知道，这始终是一个风险。这是我提到的风险：当一家拥有优秀业务的公司进入一个平庸的业务领域时，通常是平庸业务的声誉压倒了优秀业务管理团队的所谓不可战胜性。
American Express, an interesting case study, because it does have a — we always think in terms of share of mind versus share of market because, if share of mind is there, market will follow.
美国运通是一个有趣的案例，因为它确实拥有——我们总是从“心智份额”与“市场份额”之间的关系来思考，因为如果心智份额在那里，市场份额也会随之而来。
People — virtually — probably 75 percent of the people in the world — have something in their mind about Coca-Cola. And overwhelmingly it’s favorable. Everybody in California has something in their mind about See’s Candy, and overwhelmingly it’s favorable.
世界上大约75%的人，对可口可乐都有某种印象，而且这种印象绝大多数是正面的。加州的每个人对喜诗糖果也都有某种印象，而且同样是压倒性地正面。
The job is to have it in a few more California minds — or world minds in the case of Coke — over the years, and have it even be a little more favorable as the years go by. If we have that, everything else follows. And consumer product organizations understand that.
我们的工作是让更多的加州人（对于喜诗糖果）——或者让全球更多的人（对于可口可乐）产生这种印象，并随着时间的推移让这种印象变得更加正面。如果我们能做到这一点，其他的一切都会随之而来。消费品公司都明白这一点。
American Express was — had a very special position in people’s mind about financial integrity over the years, and ubiquity of acceptance. When the banks closed in the early ’30s, American Express traveler’s checks actually substituted, to some extent, for bank activity during that period.
美国运通多年来在人们心中占据着关于金融诚信和普遍接受度的特殊地位。在20世纪30年代早期银行倒闭时，美国运通的旅行支票在某种程度上取代了当时的银行业务。
The worldwide acceptance of this name meant that when American Express sold traveler’s checks — for many years, their two primary competitors were what are now Citicorp — First National City — and the Bank of America.
这一名称的全球接受度意味着，当美国运通销售旅行支票时，它的两大主要竞争对手是现在的花旗集团（当时的第一国民城银行）和美国银行。
And, despite the fact that American Express charged you one percent when you bought your traveler’s checks, and you had two other premier organizations, Citicorp, imagine, and BofA, and — actually, Barclays had one and Thomas Cook had one.
尽管美国运通在你购买旅行支票时收取1%的费用，而还有两家顶级机构——花旗集团和美国银行——甚至还有巴克莱银行和托马斯·库克也提供旅行支票。
And American Express still had two-thirds of the market after 60 or 70 years — two-thirds of the worldwide market — while charging more for the product than these other very well-known competitors charged.
但在60或70年后，美国运通仍然占据了全球市场的三分之二，即便它的产品收费高于这些其他非常知名的竞争对手。
Anytime you can charge more for a product and maintain or increase market share against well-entrenched, well-known competitors, you have something very special in people’s minds. Same thing came about when the credit card came around.
任何时候，如果你能为一种产品收取更高的费用，并在面对根基深厚、知名的竞争对手时保持或增加市场份额，那就说明你在人们心中有一些非常特殊的东西。信用卡的出现也是同样的道理。
Originally, American Express wanted the credit card because they thought they were going to get killed on traveler’s checks. And they thought it was going to be a substitute, and therefore, they had to go into — it was a defensive move.
最初，美国运通进入信用卡业务，是因为他们认为旅行支票业务会被替代。他们认为信用卡将成为替代品，因此不得不涉足这一领域——这是一种防御性的举措。
It came about because a fellow named Ralph Schneider, and Al Bloomingdale, and a couple people came up with the Diners Club idea. And the Diners Club idea was sweeping, well, initially New York, and then the country in the mid-’50s.
这一切的起因是，拉尔夫·施耐德和阿尔·布鲁明戴尔等人提出了“大来俱乐部”（Diners Club）的概念。这一概念在20世纪50年代中期最初风靡纽约，然后迅速席卷整个美国。
And American Express got very worried because they thought, you know, people are going to use these cards. Nobody had ever heard of Visa at that point, or anything of the sort.
美国运通感到非常担忧，因为他们认为，人们将会使用这些卡。当时还没有人听说过Visa或类似的东西。
But people were going to use these cards instead of traveler’s checks. So they backed into the traveler’s check business — I mean, it backed into the credit card business.
但人们即将开始使用这些卡片代替旅行支票。所以他们从旅行支票业务转而进入信用卡业务——我是说，他们是被迫进入了信用卡业务。
Immediately, despite the jump the Diners Club had on the — on this business — because Diners Club had the restaurants signed up already, and they already had the high rollers carrying around their card, and nobody had an American Express card.
尽管“大来俱乐部”在这个业务上领先一步——因为“大来俱乐部”已经签下了餐厅，还吸引了很多高消费人群使用他们的卡，而当时没有人拥有美国运通卡。
But American Express went in and they started charging more than Diners Club for the card, and they kept taking market share away.
但美国运通进入了这个领域，并且他们的卡收费比“大来俱乐部”更高，但仍然不断蚕食市场份额。
Well, that is a great position to be in people’s minds where they are willing to — when faced with a choice — they’re willing to go with the newer product, at a higher price, and leave behind the entrenched product.
这是一种在人们心中占据极佳地位的体现——当面临选择时，他们愿意选择价格更高的新产品，而放弃已经根深蒂固的旧产品。
And it just showed the power of American Express. American Express had a special cache. It identified you as something special.
这正展示了美国运通的强大实力。美国运通拥有一种特殊的吸引力，能让用户感到与众不同。
When you pulled out your American Express, as opposed to your Diners Club card, and as opposed to the Carte Blanche card, which was the third main competitor at the time. Visa still did not exist. And you could see this dominance prevail.
当你拿出你的美国运通卡，而不是“大来俱乐部”卡，或者当时的第三大竞争对手Carte Blanche卡时，这种优势就显现了。当时Visa尚未出现，而美国运通的主导地位持续存在。
That told you what was in people’s minds. It’s why I bought into the stock in 1964. We bought 5 percent of the company for — a huge investment at the time for us. I was only managing $20 million at the time.
这告诉了你人们心中的想法。这就是我在1964年买入这只股票的原因。当时我们买了公司5%的股份——对我们来说这是一个巨大的投资。当时我只管理着2000万美元的资金。
But you could see that this share of mind, this consumer franchise had not been lost.
但你可以看到，这种“心智份额”和消费者特权并没有丢失。
In the — considerable period of time, American Express got into other businesses, they got into — Fireman’s Fund Insurance was a very big acquisition. And, to some extent, they let the Visas of the world and all of those get established. They still had this preeminent cache position, but it was eroding.
在相当长的一段时间里，美国运通涉足了其他业务，其中包括一个非常大的收购——消防员保险基金（Fireman’s Fund Insurance）。在某种程度上，他们让Visa这样的公司逐步站稳了脚跟。尽管他们仍然拥有这种卓越的吸引力，但它正在逐渐削弱。
But I would say that Harvey Golub, along with a lot of other people in the management, have done an extremely good job of reaffirming — intensifying — the cache. There will be probably $300 billion worth of charges, something in that area, put on American Express this year.
但我想说，哈维·戈卢布（Harvey Golub）和管理层的许多人在重新确立并强化美国运通的吸引力方面，做得非常出色。今年，美国运通的信用卡可能会有大约3000亿美元的消费金额。
The — 300 billion, those are big numbers, even in today’s world. The average discount fee is about 2.73 percent. If you look at the average discount fee on Visa, MasterCharge, you know, it’s going to be a —probably, a full percentage point beneath that.
3000亿美元，即使在今天，这也是一个庞大的数字。平均折扣费率大约是2.73%。如果你看看Visa或MasterCard的平均折扣费率，大概会比这个低整整一个百分点。
So you’ve got a percentage point on $300 billion, which is $3 billion of revenue that your competitor doesn’t get. You can do a lot of things for your clientele.
因此，你在3000亿美元上多出一个百分点，这就意味着30亿美元的收入，是你的竞争对手拿不到的。这使你能够为你的客户提供很多额外服务。
And they’ve segmented the card, as you know. They’ve even recently gone to this black card, and — which sells for a thousand dollars. It’s got a very special cache.
正如你所知，他们对信用卡进行了市场细分。他们甚至最近推出了一种售价1000美元的黑卡，这种卡有一种非常特殊的吸引力。
I would say that — I wouldn’t use the word “inevitable,” but I would say that nourished properly, that the American Express name has had — excuse me — has huge value and is very, very likely to get stronger and stronger as the years go by.
我想说——我不会用“必然”这个词，但我会说，如果经营得当，美国运通这个名字有巨大的价值，而且非常可能随着时间的推移变得越来越强大。
But I don’t — I think that what they went through showed that it could take quite a beating and come back. But I don’t want to — I don’t think you’d want to test it that way indefinitely.
但我认为，他们过去经历的事情表明，它可以承受相当大的打击并恢复过来。但我不认为你会希望用这种方式无限期地测试它的韧性。
Incidentally, that’s one of the things we look for in businesses, is how — you know, if you see a business take a lot of adversity and still do well, that tells you something about the underlying strength of the business.
顺便说一下，这正是我们在企业中寻找的特质之一。你知道，如果你看到一个企业经历了很多逆境却依然表现良好，这说明了这个企业的内在实力。
英雄的特质。
The classic case was on that was — to me, is AOL. Four or five years ago — you know, I’m no expert on this, but I got the impression there for a period of time when they were having a lot of problems, that a very significant percentage of AOL’s customers were mad at them.
一个经典的案例对我来说是AOL。四五年前——我对这方面并不是专家，但在一段时间里，他们遇到了很多问题，我感觉很大比例的AOL客户对他们非常不满。
But the number of customers went up every month. And that’s a terrific business. I mean, if you have a business where your customers are mad at you and you’re growing, you know, that has met a certain test, in my mind, of utility.
但客户数量却每个月都在增长。这是一项了不起的业务。我的意思是，如果你的客户对你感到不满，而你的业务还在增长，这在我看来，证明了其实用性通过了某种考验。
And you might argue that American Express had that, to some degree. It wasn’t that bad. But they had a lot of merchant unrest and all of that. So, occasionally, you will find that an interesting test of the strength of a business.
你可以说美国运通在某种程度上也有这种特质。虽然情况并不算糟糕，但他们确实遇到过很多商户的不满。这种情况有时会成为检验一家企业实力的有趣标准。
Coca-Cola had some problems, you know, in Europe. But it comes back stronger than ever. They certainly had problems with New Coke, and they came back stronger than ever.
比如，可口可乐在欧洲曾经遇到过一些问题，但它每次都能以更强大的姿态回归。他们在“新可乐”事件上也出现过问题，但同样以更强大的姿态回归。
So you do see that underlying strength. And that’s very impressive as a way of evaluating the depth and impenetrability of the moat that we talked about earlier.
因此，你确实能够看到这种内在的实力。这在评估我们之前提到的护城河的深度和难以逾越性时，给人留下了深刻的印象。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it would be easier to screw up American Express than it would Coke or Gillette. But it’s an immensely strong business, and it’s wonderful to have it.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为搞砸美国运通比搞砸可口可乐或吉列要容易。但它确实是一个非常强大的业务，拥有它是件很棒的事情。
巴菲特从来没有讲过这个话。
WARREN BUFFETT: We own about 11 percent of American Express. So when there are 300 billion of charges, we’re getting 33 billion of those for the account of Berkshire, and it’s growing at a pretty good clip. The first quarter, it grew very substantially in both cardholders and charges.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们拥有美国运通大约11%的股份。所以，当它的消费金额达到3000亿美元时，我们的账户能分得330亿美元的收益，而且它的增长速度相当不错。今年第一季度，无论是持卡人数还是消费金额都实现了显著增长。
My guess is that our 11 percent becomes more valuable over time. It’s hard to think of anything that would destroy it.
我猜测，我们的这11%的股份会随着时间的推移变得更加有价值。很难想象有什么事情能摧毁它。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The business is very interesting. They made a deal to put American Express cards into Costco. I think that is a very intelligent thing for American Express to have done. And it’s a very aggressive place that does a lot of interesting things.
查理·芒格： 这项业务非常有趣。他们与Costco达成了一项合作，把美国运通卡引入Costco。我认为这是美国运通做出的非常明智的决定。Costco是一个非常具有进取心的公司，总是做许多有趣的事情。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is a director of Costco, so he’s a — Costco is an absolutely fabulous organization. We should have owned a lot of Costco over the years and we — I blew it. Charlie was for it, but I blew it.
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理是Costco的董事，所以他很了解——Costco确实是一个极其优秀的公司。我们这些年来本应该持有大量的Costco股票，但我搞砸了。查理支持这么做，但我搞砸了。
11. “We don’t think in terms of absolutes”
我们不以绝对标准思考
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to number 1 again.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们再回到第1区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jin Xi Wan (PH) from San Diego, California.
观众提问： 我是来自加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥的金希万（音）。
First, I would thank both of you. My question is also about growth and value.
首先，我要感谢你们两位。我的问题也是关于增长和价值的。
If you look at the business in this country, most of them, if not all of them, are cyclical to various degrees. Certain businesses are, of course, more cyclical than other businesses.
如果你看美国的企业，大多数企业，甚至可能所有企业，都有一定程度的周期性。当然，有些企业的周期性比其他企业更强。
So when you buy a business or make a investment in a new stock, do you ever cut off — like if a business lose money in a downturn, we are not going to buy.
那么，当你购买一家企业或投资一只新股票时，你是否会设定一些限制——比如，如果一家企业在经济低迷时期亏损，我们就不会买入？
If its earning begin to decline or downturn, we’re not going to buy. But if the earning growth slows down, then we can look at a business and make an investment. So do you have a cutoff, in terms of this cyclical factor?
如果其盈利开始下降或低迷，我们就不买入。但如果只是盈利增长放缓，那么我们会考虑投资这家企业。对于这种周期性因素，你们是否有一个界限？
And also, when you buy a business — in terms of the current P/E ratio, also do you have a cutoff? Let’s say, if its P/E ratio is more than 15, 16, we are not going to buy the business, no matter how much the earning will grow in the future. So basically, it’s about the growth and the value.
另外，当你购买一家企业时——以当前的市盈率为基准，你是否也有一个界限？比如，如果市盈率超过15或16，我们就不买入这家企业，无论其未来的盈利增长如何。基本上，我的问题是关于增长和价值的平衡。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have — to answer your question directly — we have no cutoff, whatsoever.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，直接回答你的问题是，我们没有任何界限。
We don’t think in terms of absolutes that way because, again, we are trying to think of how many birds are in the bush. And sometimes the number that are currently being shown could be negative.
我们不会以那种绝对标准思考，因为我们关注的是“灌木丛中有多少只鸟”。有时候，当前的数字可能是负的。
One of the best buys we ever made was in 1976 when we bought a significant percentage — what became through repurchases — 50 percent of GEICO at a time when the company was losing a lot of money and was destined to lose a lot of money in the immediate future.
我们有史以来最成功的投资之一是1976年，当时我们买入了GEICO的大量股份——后来通过回购达到了50%的持股比例。当时这家公司亏损严重，而且短期内注定还会继续亏损。
And, you know, the fact they were losing money was not lost on us, but we thought we saw a future there that was significantly different than the current situation.
你知道，他们正在亏损这一事实并没有逃过我们的注意，但我们认为，我们看到了一个与当前状况大不相同的未来。
So it would not bother us in the least to buy into a business that currently was losing money for some reason that we understood, and where we thought that the future was going to be significantly different.
因此，购买一家因我们理解的原因而当前亏损的企业，但我们认为未来会有显著改善，这对我们来说完全不是问题。
Similarly, if a business is making some money — there’s no P/E ratio that we have in mind as being a cutoff point at all. There are businesses — I mean, you could have some business making a sliver of money on which you would pay a very, very high P/E ratio. But it’s basically —
同样地，如果一家企业有一定盈利——我们根本没有一个明确的市盈率作为判断标准。某些企业可能仅赚取微薄的利润，但我们仍然愿意以非常高的市盈率购买它们。基本上是这样的——
We look at all of these as businesses. We’re, for example, in — at Executive Jet — NetJets — we’re losing money in Europe. Well, we expect to lose money in Europe getting established.
我们将所有这些都视为企业。例如，在Executive Jet（NetJets）中，我们在欧洲亏损。但我们预期在欧洲建立业务时会亏损。
So does that mean it’s a bad thing to buy a hundred percent of, if you own the whole company, or three percent of, if Executive Jet was a public company and you were buying into? No. I mean, it —
那么，这是否意味着购买这家公司的100%股份（如果你拥有整个公司）或3%股份（如果Executive Jet是一家上市公司且你在投资其中）是一件坏事呢？不是的，我的意思是——
There are all kinds of decisions that involve the future looking different, in some important way, than the present. Most of our decisions relate to things where we expect the future not to change much.
有各种各样的决策涉及到未来在某些重要方面会与现在不同。我们的大多数决策都与我们预期未来不会有太大变化的事情有关。
But you get this — well, American Express was a good example. And when we bought it in 1964, a fellow named Tino DeAngelis had caused them incredible trouble. You know, it was one of those decisions that looked, for a time, as if it could break the company.
但你会遇到这种情况——美国运通就是一个很好的例子。当我们在1964年买入它时，一个名叫蒂诺·德安吉利斯的人给公司带来了巨大的麻烦。那是一个看起来可能会毁掉公司的决策。
So, we knew — if you’d been charging for what Tino had stolen from the company against the income account that year, or the legal costs that were going to be attached to it, you were looking at a significant loss.
我们知道——如果你将蒂诺从公司窃取的资金以及随之而来的法律成本记入当年的损益表，你会看到一个巨大的亏损。
But the question was, what was American Express going to look like 10 or 20 years later? And we felt very good about that.
但问题是，10年或20年后的美国运通会是什么样子？我们对此感觉非常好。
So there are no arbitrary cutoff points. But there is that focus on, how much cash will this business deliver, you know, between now and kingdom come? Now as a practical matter, if you estimate it for 20 years or so, the terminal values get less important.
因此，并没有什么武断的界限。但我们关注的是，这家企业从现在到永远（假设的“尽头”）能够带来多少现金？从实际操作来看，如果你估算20年左右，终端价值的重要性就会减弱。
So — but you do want to have, in your mind, a stream of cash that will be thrown off over, say, a 20-year period, that makes sense discounted at a proper interest rate, compared to what you’re paying today. And that’s what investment’s all about.
因此——你需要心中有一个明确的现金流预期，比如说20年内的现金流，这个预期用适当的利率折现，与今天支付的价格相比是合理的。这就是投资的本质。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the answer is almost the exact reverse of what you were pointing toward. A business with something glorious underneath, disguised by terrible numbers that cause cutoff points in other people’s minds, is ideal for us, if we can figure it out.
查理·芒格： 是的，答案几乎与你所指出的相反。一家底层业务非常出色但因糟糕的数据而被别人视为不值得投资的企业，如果我们能弄清楚，它对我们来说是理想的投资目标。
WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ve had a couple of those in our history that have made us a lot of money. I mean, we don’t want to wish anybody ill, but —
沃伦·巴菲特： 在我们的历史中，我们有过几个这样的投资案例，它们为我们赚了很多钱。我的意思是，我们并不希望任何人倒霉，但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I wouldn’t go that far —
查理·芒格： 哦，我不会说得那么直接——
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well Charlie — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，查理——（笑声）
I think he’s speaking for both of us. (Laughter)
我想他在为我们俩发言。（笑声）
12. Speculate a bit in tech? Not if we don’t understand it
在科技领域投机？如果我们不理解它，就不会。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll move on to number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们进入第2区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I would like to start my question by giving you and Charlie 10 lashes with a wet noodle, not because of 1999 and what happened to your net worth or our net worth, but because you have spoiled your shareholders into expecting 25 percent growth every year, since 1965.
观众提问： 巴菲特先生，我想先象征性地用湿面条鞭打您和查理10下，不是因为1999年您或我们的净资产发生了什么，而是因为自1965年以来，您让股东们习惯了每年25%的增长。
And then comes the bad, bad 199[9] and it hits all of us. But by my calculations, you personally, Mr. Buffett, have lost over 10 billion dollar — not million — billion dollars during 1999.
然后就出现了糟糕的1999年，影响了我们所有人。但根据我的计算，巴菲特先生，您个人在1999年损失了超过100亿美元——不是百万，而是十亿。
So I don’t think we should get too mad at you because probably all of us have, at this point in our life, increased our net worth and made a lot of money. So you don’t get a wet noodle today. (Laughter)
所以我觉得我们不该对您太生气，因为在我们人生的这个阶段，可能我们所有人都增加了净资产并赚了不少钱。所以今天您不用被湿面条鞭打了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Hmm.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And the shareholders have, I’m sure, lost thousands. And some have lost millions of dollars during the year 1999.**
观众提问： 我相信股东们损失了数千甚至数百万美元，这是1999年的情况。
Now after reading your biography in November of 1998 — unfortunately I didn’t know about you earlier — I started investing on November the 24th of ’98. And of course, I’m a poor little investor, so I bought your B stock at 23.08.
在1998年11月读了您的传记后——不幸的是，我没能更早认识您——我从1998年11月24日开始投资。当然，我只是一个小投资者，所以我以23.08美元买入了您的B类股票。
Then, because the market dropped, I bought some more on the 4th of December at 22.29. And then I bought, on January the 24th of 2000 at 16.89, so I do believe in dollar-cost averaging and I’ve been doing that for probably 30 years of my life.
然后，因为市场下跌，我在12月4日以22.29美元又买了一些。之后在2000年1月24日以16.89美元买入更多，所以我确实相信“定投”，而且我大概做了30年的定投。
My January investment, I’m happy to say, is up 15 percent, so the worst may be over.
我很高兴地说，我1月份的投资上涨了15%，所以最坏的情况可能已经过去了。
Now, I read your annual report and I want to compliment you that that is the easiest and most entertaining annual report I think created in the whole world. And your — and I hope you continue that kind of a report. (Applause)
另外，我读了您的年度报告，我想赞美您，我认为这是全世界最容易理解、最有趣的年度报告。我希望您能继续这种风格的报告。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。
VOICE: (Inaudible) Your name and —
工作人员： （听不清）请报上您的名字和——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh!
观众提问： 哦！
VOICE: — where you’re from
工作人员： ——您来自哪里。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m sorry. I was just told that I should have said who I am. My name is Gaylord Hanson and I’m from Santa Barbara, California — where investor Munger puts his big, multimillion-dollar boat in the water. (Laughter)
观众提问： 抱歉，我刚被提醒应该先报名字。我是盖洛德·汉森（Gaylord Hanson），来自加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉——也就是芒格先生把他价值数百万美元的大船下水的地方。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not going to make any comment on that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我对此不发表任何评论。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Please don’t. (Laughter)
观众提问： 请不要评论。（笑声）
Now, with technology, computers, electronics, and software transforming our entire world — not just here — the world, I must admit that I personally invested in four technology computer software and aggressive growth mutual funds and made up all of my 1999 losses on Berkshire Hathaway. (Laughter and applause)
现在，随着技术、计算机、电子产品和软件正在改变我们的整个世界——不仅是这里，而是全球。我必须承认，我个人投资了四个科技、计算机软件和激进增长型共同基金，并弥补了我在1999年伯克希尔哈撒韦上的所有亏损。（笑声和掌声）
Are we asking too much as shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway for you men to put your brains to work and possibly speculate a little bit, maybe 10 percent of our money, into the only play in town, which seems to be technology, electronic?
作为伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东，如果我们希望你们动用一下你们的智慧，或许稍微投机一点，比如将我们10%的资金投入唯一显得有吸引力的领域——科技和电子产品——这是不是要求太高了？
And I read your report, and I understand a lot of your reasoning that it’s difficult — and it is difficult — to project earnings of a lot — people are going to be a little bankrupt. Are they going to out of business?
我读了你的报告，我理解你们的很多理由，比如预测许多公司的盈利很困难——确实很困难——这些公司可能会破产，或者退出市场？
But isn’t there enough left in your brainpower to maybe pick a few and — (laughter) — see what’s going on? Because I made over a hundred percent profit in 1999 on my aggressive position in the technology field, so that’s —
但是，难道你们的智慧还不足以挑选几家，看看情况如何吗？（笑声）因为我在1999年通过科技领域的激进投资赚了超过100%的利润，所以——
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well —
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，嗯——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — my question.
观众提问： ——我的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: The answer is we will never buy anything we don’t think we understand. And our definition of understanding is thinking that we have a reasonable probability of being able to assess where the business will be in 10 years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 答案是，我们永远不会购买我们认为自己不了解的东西。我们的“了解”定义是：我们认为自己有合理的概率能够评估这项业务在10年后的表现。
But, you know, we’d be delighted — we have a man here who’s done very well. And if he has any business cards, you know, you could always invest with him, and — (Laughter)
不过，你知道的，我们很高兴——这里有一位表现非常出色的人。如果他有名片，你可以随时选择跟他投资——（笑声）
And we’d welcome — you know — you can — we’ll give you a booth in our exhibitor’s section. And anybody that wants to do that is perfectly — obviously — free to do it with you or through any other — through anybody else that they select.
我们非常欢迎——你知道的——我们甚至可以在展区为你提供一个展位。任何想要参与的人都可以自由地选择和你合作，或者通过任何其他他们选定的方式进行投资。
Now, you have a whole bunch of people out there that say they can do this. And maybe they can and maybe they can’t and maybe you can spot which ones can and can’t. The only way we know how to make money is to try and evaluate businesses.
现在，有很多人声称他们能够做到这一点。也许他们可以，也许他们不可以，也许你可以分辨出谁行谁不行。而我们唯一知道的赚钱方式是尝试评估企业。
And if we can’t evaluate a carbon steel company, we don’t buy it. It doesn’t mean it isn’t a good buy. It doesn’t mean it isn’t selling for a fraction of its worth. It just means that we don’t know how to evaluate it.
如果我们无法评估一家碳钢公司，我们就不会买它。这并不意味着它不是一个好的投资，也不意味着它的售价低于其价值的几分之一。这仅仅意味着我们不知道该如何评估它。
If we can’t evaluate the sensibilities of putting in a chemical plant or something in Brazil, we don’t do it. If somebody else knows how to do it, you know, more power to them.
如果我们无法评估在巴西建一座化工厂的合理性，我们就不会做这件事。如果其他人知道如何去做，那对他们来说就更好。
There are all kinds of people that know how to make money in ways that we don’t. But, you know, it’s a free world and everybody can invest in those sort of things. But they would be making a mistake, a big mistake, to do it through us.
有各种各样的人知道如何用我们不了解的方式赚钱。但是，这是一个自由的世界，每个人都可以投资这些东西。不过，如果通过我们来进行这类投资，那他们就会犯错，而且是个大错。
I mean, why pick a couple of guys like Charlie and me to do something like that with — when you can pick all kinds of other people that say they know how to do it.
我的意思是，为什么要选择像我和查理这样的两个人来做这种事情——当你可以选择其他声称知道如何操作的人时？
I would say this. Incidentally, you mentioned a point earlier, which is how the popular press tends to think of things. But we don’t consider ourselves — Charlie and I don’t — richer or poorer based on what the stock does. We do feel richer or poorer based on what the business does.
我要说的是，顺便提一下，你之前提到的一个观点是大众媒体如何看待事物。但我们并不认为自己的财富随着股价的涨跌而变化。我们的财富感受是基于企业的表现，而不是股票的表现。
So we look at the business as to how much we’re worth. And we do not look at the stock price, because the stock price doesn’t mean a thing to us. I mean, it doesn’t for a variety of reasons, but beyond that, imagine trying to sell hundreds of thousands of shares at the stock price.
所以我们通过业务的价值来判断我们的财富，而不是看股价，因为股价对我们来说毫无意义。我是说，这有多种原因。更重要的是，试想一下，如果尝试以当前股价卖出数十万股股票，那是不可行的。
We can always sell the business — we’re not going to do it — but we could always sell it for what the business is worth. We can’t sell our stock for what the — necessarily — what the stock price is. So we look at the business, entirely, in terms of evaluating our net worth.
我们随时可以出售这家公司——尽管我们不会这样做——但我们始终可以以业务的实际价值出售它。相反，我们的股票不一定能以当前股价售出。所以，我们完全是从评估企业的角度来看我们的净资产。
We figure our net worth went up very, very slightly — very slightly — in 1999. And we would figure that no matter what the stock was selling for — it just doesn’t make any difference — because we do look at the businesses.
我们估算1999年的净资产增长非常非常轻微——确实很轻微。而且无论股票的交易价格是多少，我们都会得出相同的结论——这完全没有区别——因为我们关注的是业务本身。
We really look at it as if there wasn’t any quote on the stock. Because we don’t know what the stock is going to do.
我们确实是以没有股价报价的视角来看待它。因为我们不知道股票的价格会怎么变化。
If we do — if the business gets worth more at a reasonable rate, the stock will follow, over time. But it won’t necessarily follow week by week, or month by month, or year by year.
如果我们的业务以合理的速度增长，股票的表现最终会跟上。但这未必会在每周、每月甚至每年都同步反映出来。
We had a lousy year in 1999, but the stock price did not calibrate with that in any perfect, or close to perfect, manner.
1999年我们表现不佳，但股票价格并没有以任何完美或接近完美的方式与之同步。
And we’ve had good years other times, when the stock price is way overpriced or over-described what happened during the year.
而在其他表现不错的年份，股票价格却被严重高估，甚至与实际表现完全不符。
So we really measure all the time by the business. We think of it as a private business, basically, for which there’s a quotation. And if it’s handy to use that quotation, either in buying more stock or something of the sort, we may do it. But it does not govern our ideas of value.
所以我们始终以业务为衡量标准。我们基本上将其视为一家有报价的私人企业。如果这种报价方便用于买入更多股票或类似操作，我们可能会利用它。但这并不会支配我们对价值的判断。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Generally, I would say that if you have a lot of lovely wealth in a form that makes you comfortable, and somebody down the street has found a way to make money a lot faster, in a way you don’t understand, you should not be made miserable by that process.
查理·芒格： 是的。我通常会说，如果你拥有很多让你感到舒适的财富，而街上的某个人用一种你不了解的方法更快地赚钱，你不应该因此感到痛苦。
There are worse things in life than being left behind in possession of a lot of lovely money. I mean — (Laughter)
人生中还有比手握大量财富却落后于人更糟糕的事情。我的意思是——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you want to name a couple? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 你想举几个例子吗？（笑声）
No, Charlie made — I mean, when farmland was — went from — farmland probably tripled here in the late ’70s, without any real change in yields per acre or the price of the commodity.
不，查理提到的——我的意思是，当农田的价格在70年代末大约翻了三倍，而每英亩的产量或商品价格并没有真正变化时——
You know, are we going to sit around and stew because, you know, they — we didn’t buy farmland at the start?
你知道，我们是否会因为没有在一开始买入农田而感到苦恼？
You know, are we going to stew because all kinds of stuff — uranium stocks in the ’50s — or you can go back — all kinds of things that have — the conglomerates in the late ’60s, the leasing companies, I mean, you can just go down the line.
我们是否会因为错过了很多东西——比如50年代的铀矿股票，或者你回顾历史，60年代末的企业集团，租赁公司等等，而感到苦恼？
And it just doesn’t make any — we’re not in that game.
这完全没有意义——我们不参与那种游戏。
We would know how to create a chain letter, believe me. I mean, we’ve seen it down some many times. You know, we know the game. But it just isn’t our game.
相信我，我们知道如何制造一个“连锁信”。我的意思是，我们见过太多这样的事情。我们知道其中的游戏规则，但这不是我们的游戏。
Charlie? (Applause)
查理？（掌声）
13. Currencies are “important but not knowable”
货币重要但不可预测
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第3区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Stacy Braverman (PH). I’m 15 years old, and I’m from South Setauket, New York. It was very nice meeting you Mr. Buffett, yesterday.
观众提问： 早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是斯泰西·布拉弗曼（音），15岁，来自纽约州南塞陶凯特。昨天见到您很高兴，巴菲特先生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢你。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I especially appreciated your internet stock tips. (Laughter)
观众提问： 我特别感谢您关于互联网股票的建议。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Yeah, keep it — keep it to yourself now, Stacey. That’s our deal. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： （笑）是的，斯泰西，这可是我们之间的秘密啊。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I bought the B shares two years ago, when I decided that I needed to save some money for college. When the share price dipped below 1,500 I decided to investigate correspondence courses. (Laughter)
观众提问： 两年前，我买了B类股，当时我决定存些钱上大学。当股价跌到1500美元以下时，我开始考虑函授课程。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Maybe you can get a scholarship. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 或许你可以申请奖学金。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I’m glad to see that things are back on track now.
观众提问： 所以我很高兴看到现在一切都回到了正轨。
My question is, a lot of the companies that you invest in, like Coca-Cola and Gillette, seem to do better when the dollar is weak and interest rates are falling. That seems to be the opposite of what’s happening now.
我的问题是，您投资的许多公司，比如可口可乐和吉列，似乎在美元疲软和利率下降时表现更好。而现在的情况似乎正好相反。
So how is Berkshire positioning itself to take advantage of the current economic position, with that assessment in mind?
在这种评估的基础上，伯克希尔是如何定位自己的，以利用当前的经济形势的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, that’s a good question. But if we thought we knew what the dollar was going to do, or interest rates were going to do, we would — we won’t do it — but we would just engage in transactions involving those commodities, in effect, or futures directly.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这是个好问题。但如果我们认为自己知道美元或利率的走势，我们就会——虽然我们不会这么做——直接进行相关商品或期货的交易。
In other words, it would not be — if we thought that the dollar was going to weaken dramatically — and we won’t get those kind of thoughts — but if we did, you know, we would buy other currencies.
换句话说，如果我们认为美元会大幅贬值——虽然我们不会有这样的想法——但如果有，我们会直接购买其他货币。
And it would be — it might benefit Coke, in dollar terms, if that happened.
当然，这种情况下，可口可乐的美元收益可能会受益。
But it would be so much more efficient, directly, to pursue a currency play or an interest rate play than an indirect way through companies that have big international exposure. We would probably do it directly.
但与通过国际化程度高的公司间接操作相比，直接进行货币或利率交易会高效得多。如果我们真的要做，大概也会直接进行交易。
We don’t really think much about that. Because — just take currency. If you look at what the yen has traded at, you know over the last — well, since World War II, you know. From — what was it? Three-sixty down to — what? Seventy-some, Charlie? At lowest?
不过，我们不会过多考虑这个问题。拿货币来说，如果你看看日元的汇率走势，比如二战以来的变化，从——多少？360日元兑1美元，降到最低点——多少？七十几吧，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Uh-huh.
查理·芒格： 嗯哼。
WARREN BUFFETT: And, you know, back up to 140-some. And now, I don’t know, 105, or wherever it may be. I mean, those moves are huge.**
沃伦·巴菲特： 然后又回升到140多。现在大概在105左右吧，或者别的水平。这些波动非常巨大。**
But, in the end, we’re really more interested in whether more people in Japan are going to drink Coca-Cola. And, over time, we’re better at predicting that than we are at predicting what the yen will do.
但归根结底，我们更关心的是日本是否会有更多人喝可口可乐。随着时间推移，我们在预测这个问题上比预测日元走势更有把握。
And if Coca-Cola satisfies people’s needs — liquid needs — for more and more people, we will probably get a reasonable percentage of their purchasing power of those people around the world for their right to drink Coca-Cola, or for shaving, or whatever it may be.
如果可口可乐满足了越来越多人的需求——比如饮用需求——我们可能会从世界各地的这些人的购买力中，获得合理的份额，无论是购买可口可乐，还是剃须用品，或其他产品。
So, if the world’s standard of living improves, bit by bit over time, in an irregular fashion, and we supply something the world wants, we will get our share in dollars, eventually.
因此，如果世界的生活水平随着时间逐步提高，尽管是不规则的方式，只要我们提供了世界需要的产品，最终我们就会以美元的形式获得我们的一份收益。
And what it — quarter-to-quarter or year-to-year — how that moves around, because of currency moves, really doesn’t make any difference to us.
货币波动对我们来说，每个季度或每年利润的变化真的没什么意义。
It makes a difference to reported earnings in that quarter or — but in terms of where Coca-Cola’s going to be 10 or 20 years from now, it would be a big mistake, I think, to focus on currency moves as opposed to focusing on the product itself.
这可能会对当季的财报盈利有所影响——但如果我们展望10到20年后可口可乐的表现，我认为将注意力放在货币波动上，而不是产品本身，会是一个大错误。
And Japan offers a good example of that because you had this — I mean, you really had a move from 360, or whatever it was, to the high 70s or thereabouts. I mean, that is an incredible move in currency, and it can overshadow in the short run, even, what’s happening in the business.
日本就是一个很好的例子，你会看到——我指的是，日元从360兑1美元左右降到了70多的高位左右。这是一次难以置信的货币波动，在短期内，这甚至可能掩盖企业的实际表现。
But long-range, what’s really made Coca-Cola strong in Japan is the fact that the Japanese people have accepted their products in a big way. And Coca-Cola’s built this tremendous, for example, vending machine presence.
但从长期来看，真正让可口可乐在日本强大的原因，是日本人广泛接受了它的产品。例如，可口可乐在日本建立了庞大的自动售货机网络。
And the Japanese market is very different than all the rest of the markets in the world, virtually, in that such a high percentage flows through vending machines.
日本市场几乎与世界上所有其他市场都不同，因为其很大比例的销售都通过自动售货机完成。
And my memory is that, you know, we may have something like 900-and-some thousand, out of something over 2 million, vending machines in the country.
据我记忆，我们在日本大约拥有超过200万台自动售货机中的90多万台。
So we’ve got this tremendously dominant position. It’s a little like billboards might be in this country. Plus, we have this terrific product, Georgia Coffee, which is huge over there.
所以我们在日本占据了非常主导的地位。这有点类似于在美国的广告牌市场。此外，我们还有一种非常棒的产品，乔治亚咖啡（Georgia Coffee），在日本非常受欢迎。
And that’s the sort of thing we focus on, because that’s something we understand.
这就是我们关注的事情，因为这是我们所理解的领域。
We don’t understand what currencies are going to do week-to-week or month-to-month or year-to-year. And we always try to figure on what — focus on what’s knowable and what’s important.
我们并不理解货币在每周、每月或每年的变化趋势。我们始终试图专注于“可知”和“重要”的事情。
Now, currency might be important, but we don’t think it’s knowable. Other things are unimportant, but knowable. But what really counts is what’s knowable and important.
货币或许重要，但我们认为它是不可预测的。而有些事情虽然可预测，但并不重要。真正关键的是既“可知”又“重要”的事情。
And what’s knowable and important about Coca-Cola is the fact that more and more people are going to consume soft drinks around the world, and have been doing so year after year after year, and that Coca-Cola’s going to gain share, and that the product is extraordinarily inexpensive relative to the pleasure it brings to people.
关于可口可乐，可以知道并且重要的一点是，全世界越来越多的人会消费软饮料，而且这种趋势每年都在持续增长。可口可乐将继续增加市场份额，而其产品相对于带给人们的享受来说是极其便宜的。
Coca-Cola — in the ’30s, when I was kid, I bought, you know, for — six for a quarter and sold them for a nickel each. That was a 6 1/2 ounce bottle for a nickel, at Coke.
在上世纪30年代，当我还是个孩子时，可口可乐的价格是六瓶一块钱，我每瓶卖五分钱。那是一瓶6.5盎司的可口可乐，仅售五分钱。
And you can buy a 12-ounce can now at — pick a supermarket sale — for not much more than twice per ounce what it was selling for in the ’30s. You won’t find many products where that kind of value proposition has developed over the years.
现在，你可以在超市打折时买到12盎司的罐装可乐，其每盎司价格并没有比30年代高出多少倍。这种价格价值主张在历经多年后依然如此的产品并不多见。
So that’s the kind of thing we focus on. And interest rates and foreign exchange rates, important as they may be in the short term, really are not going to determine whether we get rich over time.
这就是我们关注的事情。虽然利率和汇率在短期内可能很重要，但它们并不会决定我们是否能在长期内变得富有。
The best time to buy stocks, actually was, in recent years, you know, has been when interest rates were sky high and it looked like a very safe thing to do to put your money into Treasury bills at — well, actually the primary got up to 21 1/2 percent — but you could put out money at huge rates in the early ’80s.
实际上，在最近几十年里，买入股票的最佳时机是当利率高企的时候。当时将资金投入国债看似非常安全——事实上，基准利率一度达到21.5%——但在80年代初，你可以以极高的利率投资资金。
And, as attractive as that appeared, it was exactly the wrong thing to be doing. It was better to be buying equities at that time, because when interest rates changed, their values changed even much more.
尽管看起来很有吸引力，但这实际上是错误的做法。那时买入股票更好，因为当利率变化时，股票的价值变化会更大。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we have a willful agnosticism on all kinds of things. And that makes us concentrate on certain other things. This is a very good way to think, if you’re as lazy as we are. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 是的，对于许多事情我们有一种“故意的不可知论”。这让我们能够专注于其他特定的事情。如果你和我们一样懒惰，这是一个非常好的思考方式。（笑声）
14. We’ll “probably” own M&T Bank stock 10 years from now
十年后我们可能仍然持有M&T银行的股票
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to 4, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请到第4区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jerry Zucker (PH), Los Angeles, California. Good morning, boss. (Laughter)
观众提问： 我是杰里·扎克（音），来自加州洛杉矶。早上好，老板。（笑声）
Calling your attention to the annual report and major investments, I’d appreciate your comments on two companies.
请注意年度报告和主要投资，我想听听您对两家公司的看法。
Number one, M&T Bank, a new name to that list, but not exactly a household name, at least on the West Coast.
第一家是M&T银行，这是榜单上的新名字，但至少在西海岸还算不上家喻户晓。
And company number two, definitely a household name, but missing from the list this year, the Walt Disney Corporation.
第二家则绝对是家喻户晓的名字，但今年榜单中没有出现，那就是华特迪士尼公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t comment much on our holdings, particularly as to purchases or sales, but we do have the CEO — longtime CEO — of M&T here today, Bob Wilmers. Bob, would you stand up? He should be up here somewhere. There he is. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们很少对我们的持股发表评论，尤其是关于买入或卖出。但今天我们确实有M&T银行的长期CEO鲍勃·威尔默斯在场。鲍勃，你能站起来吗？他应该就在这儿。啊，他在那儿。（掌声）
Bob is a terrific businessman, a terrific banker, and a terrific citizen. I’ve known him a long time. A good friend of Stan Lipsey, our publisher in Buffalo. Bob runs the kind of a bank that allows Charlie and me to sleep very comfortably.
鲍勃是一位出色的商人、银行家和公民。我认识他很久了。他是我们布法罗出版商斯坦·利普西的好朋友。鲍勃经营着一种让查理和我可以睡得很安稳的银行。
Someone once said there are more banks than bankers, which is something worth thinking about a little bit. But believe me, Bob is a banker and he’s done a lot for Buffalo.
有人曾说银行比银行家多，这句话值得我们思考一下。但请相信我，鲍勃是一位真正的银行家，他为布法罗做了很多事情。
And he runs — he’s got a — he has a very big ownership position, which he achieved, at least in very large part, through purchase with his own money, as opposed to having options.
他经营的银行——他持有非常大的股份，而这很大程度上是通过用自己的钱购买获得的，而不是通过期权。
He’s got one of the largest ownership positions, probably, among the hundred largest banks in the United States.
他可能在美国前100家最大的银行中拥有最大的个人持股之一。
And it’s just a very attractive business for us to be in, and we’re very comfortable with it. And 10 years from now, Bob will be here, and I hope I’m here. We will — we’ll probably own M&T.
这是一个对我们非常有吸引力的业务，我们对它非常满意。十年后，鲍勃可能还在这里，我也希望我还在。我们可能仍然会持有M&T银行的股份。
The Disney Company, our ownership in that fell below the threshold level which we used, although we had ownership. And we think Disney is a terrific business. Michael Eisner’s done a great job there.
至于迪士尼公司，我们的持股比例降到了我们设定的门槛以下，尽管我们仍持有一些股份。我们认为迪士尼是一家非常出色的企业。迈克尔·艾斯纳在那里干得非常出色。
We have — as we put in the annual report — we have mildly reduced equities as prices began to — generally — began to get more and more full.
正如我们在年度报告中提到的，随着价格普遍开始变得越来越高，我们适度减少了股票持仓。
不愿意说。
We do not think the general ownership of equities is going to be very exciting over the next 10 or 15 years, so we would like to buy businesses.
我们认为在未来10到15年里，持有股票整体上不会非常令人兴奋，因此我们更倾向于收购企业。
We bought a few last year. We had this one we announced last week in the insurance field. We got another small acquisition where we’ve got an agreement with somebody. It’s very small.
去年我们收购了几家企业。我们上周宣布了一家保险领域的收购。我们还与别人达成了一项小规模的收购协议。这规模很小。
But we would love it if those were 10 times that size or 20 times that size, because — you will see more of that, relative to marketable securities, as we go along.
但如果这些收购的规模是现在的10倍或20倍，那将是我们非常乐意看到的。因为随着时间推移，你会看到我们相对于市场证券更倾向于这种操作。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, regarding equities generally, I think that Fortune article, which was sent out to the Berkshire shareholders this year, should be absolutely must-reading for everybody. In fact, it would be a good thing to read two or three times.
查理·芒格： 是的，关于股票，我认为今年发给伯克希尔股东的那篇《财富》文章是每个人的必读内容。实际上，读两三遍会是件好事。
The ideas there sound so simple, that — you know, people have the theory that they must understand it. But I think the world is more complicated than that. I think we are in for reduced expectations eventually, with respect to the kind of returns people have had from investing in stocks.
其中的观点听起来很简单，人们会以为自己一定能理解。但我认为这个世界比这复杂得多。最终，人们对股票投资回报的预期可能需要降低。
WARREN BUFFETT: You want to offer any thoughts as to what — that might — what the corollary might be?
沃伦·巴菲特： 你是否愿意谈谈这种情况可能带来的结果？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think if you have very unreasonable expectations of life, it makes life much more miserable. Much better to get your expectations within reason.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为，如果你对生活抱有非常不合理的预期，这会让生活更加痛苦。最好让你的预期保持在合理范围内。
It’s much easier to reduce expectations to some reasonable level than it is to get superhuman achievements.
降低预期到合理水平比追求超凡成就要容易得多。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why my kids were almost delirious when they heard that announcement I was going to give them $300 each and they — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这就是为什么当我宣布要给我的孩子每人300美元时，他们几乎欣喜若狂的原因——（笑声）
How to be — do you want to be a zillionaire, or whatever it was.
如何成为——你想成为亿万富翁，或者类似的东西。
Incidentally, that was terrific of Regis Philbin to do something like that. I mean, all of those appearances [in the video shown to shareholders] are nonpaid, I can assure you. (Laughter)
顺便提一下，雷吉斯·菲尔宾（Regis Philbin）做这种事真的很棒。我的意思是，我可以向你保证，视频中那些客串镜头都是无偿的。（笑声）
And those people are good — very, very, good sports. And I thank them.
这些人都非常非常有趣，我向他们表示感谢。
15. We’ll “never have a conventional dividend policy”
我们永远不会采用传统的分红政策
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to zone 5.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们到第5区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Monte Lefholtz from Omaha, Nebraska.
观众提问： 我是蒙特·莱夫霍尔茨，来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。
I have a two-part question. What is Berkshire’s philosophy on paying dividends and under what circumstances would Berkshire pay a dividend in the future?
我有两个问题。伯克希尔的分红理念是什么？在什么情况下伯克希尔会在未来支付股息？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. We paid a dividend in — what, 1969, Charlie? At 10 cents a share. The — I can’t remember it, but it’s in the records.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这是个好问题。我们在——是1969年吧，查理？支付过股息，每股10美分。我记不清了，但记录上肯定有。
We would pay — we would be very likely to pay either very large dividends or none at all, because our test is whether we think we can use money at a rate — in a way — that it creates more than a dollar of market value for every dollar we retain.
我们可能会支付非常大的股息，或者完全不支付，因为我们的判断标准是，看我们是否能够以某种方式使用资金，使每一美元留存收益创造出超过一美元的市场价值。
Obviously, if we can keep a dollar and it becomes, on a present-value basis, worth more than a dollar, it’s foolish to pay it out.
显然，如果我们能留下一美元，并让它在现值基础上变得比一美元更有价值，那支付它出去就显得愚蠢了。
Forget all about taxes. Assume it’s a tax-free society. We would have exactly the same dividend policy up to this point, whether there was any tax on dividends, capital gains, or anything else, or whether we were entirely tax-free.
抛开税收不谈，假设这是一个免税社会。无论股息、资本收益或其他形式是否需要缴税，或者是否完全免税，我们到目前为止都会采取完全相同的分红政策。
Because we have retained money because, to date, we have felt that if we keep a dollar and use it in buying other businesses, or whatever it may be, that it becomes worth more than a dollar on a present-value basis — I mean, not that it’s going to be worth a dollar-ten four years from now — but that it’s worth more than a dollar when we look at what it’ll be four years from now.
因为我们留存资金是因为迄今为止，我们认为如果我们留下一美元并用它购买其他业务或用于其他用途，它在现值基础上会变得比一美元更有价值——我的意思不是四年后它会值一美元零一角，而是当我们评估它四年后的价值时，它会比一美元更高。
That’s subjective, but any given decision like that is subjective. Over time, you get an objective test as whether that’s met by — whether we do indeed create more value than — each dollar retained earnings, we create an extra dollar-plus of value.
这是主观的，但任何类似的决策都带有主观性。随着时间的推移，你会得到一个客观的检验标准，即我们是否确实达到了目标——是否为每一美元的留存收益创造了额外的一美元以上的价值。
If that changed — and it could change — then we would give the money to the shareholders. And it might be done through repurchases or it might be done through dividends, but we would — there’s no reason to keep a dollar in the business that’s worth 90 cents if you keep it in the business.
如果情况发生变化——这种情况可能会发生——我们就会将资金返还给股东。可能通过回购，或者通过派发股息，但没有理由将一美元的价值留在企业中，而让它变成只有90美分的价值。
And there are companies that do that, but they don’t — they’re not necessarily intentionally doing it. They may have higher aspirations as they go along, but they’re not realized.
确实有些公司会这么做，但他们并不一定是有意为之。他们可能对未来抱有更高的期望，但未能实现。
We, I think, would be fairly objective about trying to figure out whether we are indeed creating value or destroying value by retaining earnings.
我认为，我们会相当客观地评估，通过留存收益，我们是否真正创造了价值，或者是在破坏价值。
We would never have a conventional dividend policy. I mean, the idea of paying out 20 percent of your earnings, or 10 percent, or 30 percent of earnings in dividends strikes us as nuts.
我们永远不会采用传统的分红政策。比如，将利润的20%、10%或30%作为股息派发给股东的想法，在我们看来是荒谬的。
I mean, you may get yourself in a position where you have to do it because you build these expectations in people’s minds, but it is — there is no logic to it whatsoever.
当然，你可能会处于不得不这么做的地步，因为你在股东心中建立了这样的预期，但这从逻辑上来说毫无道理。
The logic is basic. If you create more than a dollar value for a dollar retained, why in the world would you pay it out, because the people who want to get that dollar as a dividend can instead get a dollar-ten by selling the stock for — or whatever it may be — a dollar-twenty— for the value that was maintained — or retained.
逻辑非常简单。如果你能让每一美元的留存收益创造出超过一美元的价值，为什么还要派发它？那些希望通过股息拿到一美元的人，通过出售股价上涨的股票，可能获得一美元零一角或一美元两角。
So, that — it’s a very simple dividend philosophy, and one, I think, that’s in one of the past annual reports. We explain the logic of it. And I see no — nothing that would change, in terms of the principles of it.
所以，这是一个非常简单的分红理念。我想，这在我们过去的某份年度报告中已经解释过。我看不出这个原则有什么需要改变的地方。
Evaluating whether that’s the case — I mean, obviously we aren’t going to make a decision every week based on whether we can employ money that week at a higher rate of return, or every month.
当然，评估是否符合这一原则并不是每周甚至每月都在做决策，看看那段时间是否能以更高的回报率使用资金。
But in terms of a reasonable expectancy over a couple-year period, whether we think we can use retained earnings advantageously, that’s our yardstick.
而是在一两年的合理预期内，评估我们是否能以有利的方式使用留存收益。这是我们的衡量标准。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what’s interesting about what Warren is saying about logical dividend policy is that if you went to all the leading business schools of the United States, all the leading economics departments, all the professors of corporate finance — this wasn’t — wouldn’t be the way they teach the subject.
查理·芒格： 是的，沃伦所说的关于逻辑分红政策的有趣之处在于，如果你去美国所有顶尖的商学院、经济学系和企业财务教授那里，他们并不会用这种方式教授这个问题。
In other words, we’re basically saying we’re right and all the rest of academia is wrong. (Laughter)
换句话说，我们基本上是在说我们是对的，而其余的学术界都是错的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We love it when we do that. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们很喜欢这么说。（笑声）
16. We never sell a business and rarely sell a stock
我们从不出售企业，极少出售股票
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们到第6区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Mark Chere (PH) from Hong Kong.
观众提问： 我是马克·切雷（音），来自香港。
And Mr. Buffett, I’d like to ask you a couple of questions. The first one is how many insurance companies does Berkshire Hathaway own?
巴菲特先生，我想问您几个问题。第一个问题是伯克希尔哈撒韦拥有多少家保险公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Let me —
沃伦·巴菲特： 让我——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I can’t figure out the total.
观众提问： 我算不出总数。
WARREN BUFFETT: Let me answer that and then you go on to your second one.
沃伦·巴菲特： 让我先回答这个问题，然后你可以问第二个。
We have a great number of companies because, in many cases, a given strategy or a given operation operates through multiple companies.
我们拥有大量公司，因为在许多情况下，一项特定的战略或业务通过多个公司运营。
The company we announced the purchase of the other day is really one business, but it has three companies.
我们前几天宣布收购的一家公司实际上是一项业务，但它由三家公司组成。
I wouldn’t be surprised — I’ve never looked at the number — but it wouldn’t surprise me if we have 20 insurance companies or something. Maybe 25 or 30, who knows?
我从未去具体统计过，但如果我们拥有大约20家保险公司，或者可能是25到30家，我不会感到惊讶，谁知道呢？
We have about nine or 10 basic insurance operations for which a given management has responsibility, but there’s a lot of state laws applicable to insurance companies and different regulations.
我们大约有九到十项基本的保险业务，每项业务由一个特定的管理团队负责，但保险公司受到许多州法律和不同法规的约束。
It’s often advantageous to have a number of companies operating under one management to achieve one operational goal.
让多家公司在同一管理团队下运作，以实现一个运营目标，通常是有利的。
The big operations are General Re, and GEICO, and the National Indemnity reinsurance operation run by Ajit [Jain].
主要业务包括通用再保险（General Re）、GEICO，以及由阿吉特·贾因（Ajit Jain）负责的国家赔偿再保险业务。
And then we have a group of about five different operations that are all very decent businesses, but are not as big as the three I mentioned. Go ahead.
此外，我们还有大约五项不同的业务，它们都非常不错，但规模没有前面提到的三项业务大。继续问吧。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Yeah, my main question is this. Much has been written by you, and a lot more by other people, about your criteria, or the criteria you use when you make a purchase of a company, either in full or in part.
观众提问： 谢谢。我的主要问题是这样的：关于您购买一家公司的标准，无论是全部收购还是部分收购，您自己写过不少，其他人写的更多。
But almost nothing has been written by you, at any rate as far as I can tell, on your criteria for selling a company that you have already — you have previously purchased.
但据我所知，您几乎没写过关于出售您已收购公司的标准。
And I wonder if you could outline the criteria you might apply today to a sale of a company, and whether you would go — well, the simplest way to put it is this: Would you agree with Philip Fisher, who said there were two reasons to sell a company — or a stock?
我想知道，您是否可以概述一下您今天可能会应用的出售公司标准，以及您是否同意菲利普·费雪的观点——他认为出售公司或股票有两个理由？
One was when you’d discovered you’ve made a mistake in your analysis and the company was not what you thought it was.
第一个是，当您发现自己在分析中犯了错误，公司并不是您原本以为的那样。
And the second when — was when the — something within the company had changed, the management had changed or so on, so it no longer met your original criteria.
第二个是，当公司内部发生变化，比如管理层发生变化，导致公司不再符合您的原始标准时。
Would you — are those the principles that you apply or would you say there are different ones or others? Thank you.
您是否应用这些原则？或者您认为有其他不同的原则？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m glad you brought up Phil Fisher, because he is a terrific mind and investor. He’s probably in his 90s now, and — but his —
沃伦·巴菲特： 我很高兴你提到了菲利普·费雪，因为他是一位了不起的思想家和投资者。他现在可能已经90多岁了，不过他的——
A couple of books he wrote in the early ’60s are classics and I advise everybody here who’s really interested in investments to read those two books from the earlier ’60s.
他在60年代初写的几本书是经典之作。我建议这里所有真正对投资感兴趣的人都去读一读他那几本60年代的书。
And he’s a nice man. I went out to — 40 years ago, I dropped into his office in San Francisco, a tiny office. And he was kind enough to spend some time with me. And I’m a huge admirer of his.
他是个很好的人。40年前，我曾拜访过他位于旧金山的小办公室。他很友善地抽出时间与我交流。我非常钦佩他。
The criteria that we use for selling a business that we own control of are articulated in the annual report, under the ground rules.
我们出售控股企业的标准在年度报告的“基本规则”部分中有明确说明。
So in terms of businesses that we own, we have set forth — and I direct you there — we’ve written those same ground rules every year since 1983. And actually, we had those in our head for decades before that.
对于我们控股的企业，我们已经在年度报告中明确列出标准——我建议你去看看。从1983年以来，每年我们都在报告中重申这些基本规则。事实上，在此之前，这些规则已经存在于我们的脑海中几十年了。
And we have this quirk, which you should understand, and we want our shareholders to understand it, that even though we got offered a price that was far above its economic value, as we might calculate it going in — but if we got offered a price for that for a business that we have now, we have no interest in selling it.
我们有一个特性，你需要理解，我们也希望我们的股东理解：即使有人出价远远高于我们计算的经济价值，但如果这是针对我们目前拥有的企业的报价，我们也没有兴趣出售它。
You know, we just — we don’t break off the relationships that we develop simply because we get offered a fancy price for something. And we’ve had a chance to do that sometimes.
你知道，我们不会仅仅因为收到一个高价报价就中断我们建立的关系。有时我们确实有这样的机会，但我们没有这么做。
That may help us, actually, in acquiring businesses, because both of the companies that I’ve committed to buy in the last few weeks, both of them are very concerned about whether they have found a permanent home or not.
实际上，这种做法可能对我们收购企业有所帮助，因为过去几周我承诺收购的两家公司，都非常关心它们是否找到了一个永久的归属。
And people who build their businesses lovingly over 30, or 40, or 50 years, frequently care about that. A lot of people don’t care about that.
那些用心经营企业30年、40年甚至50年的人，通常会关心这个问题。当然，也有许多人不在乎这些。
And that’s one of the things we evaluate when buying a business. We look at the owner, and we say, “Do you love the — ” in effect, we ask ourselves, “Does he love the business or does he love the money?”
这也是我们在收购企业时评估的一个方面。我们会观察企业主，并问自己：“他更爱企业还是更爱钱？”
Nothing wrong with liking the money. In fact, we’d be a little disappointed if most of them didn’t like the money. But in terms of whether the primacy is loving the money or loving the business, that’s very important to us.
喜欢钱没有错。实际上，如果大多数人不喜欢钱，我们会有点失望。但他们究竟是更爱钱还是更爱企业，这对我们来说非常重要。
And when we find somebody that loves their business — and likes the money — but loves their business, we are a very, very desirable home for them, because we’re just about the only people that they can deal with, of size, where we can commit that they are going to be part of this operation, really, forever, and be able to deliver on that promise.
当我们遇到那些热爱自己的企业——同时也喜欢钱，但更热爱企业的人时，我们是一个非常理想的归属地。因为我们几乎是他们唯一可以合作的大型企业，我们能够承诺，他们的公司会永久地成为我们运营的一部分，并且我们能够兑现这一承诺。
要求对方不参与拍卖，那么要求别人做到的事自己也要做到。
I tell sellers that the only person that can double-cross them is me. I can double-cross them. But there’s never going to be a takeover of Berkshire. There’s never going to be a management consultant come in and say, “I think you’d better do this.”
我告诉卖家，唯一可能让他们失望的人是我。我可能让他们失望。但伯克希尔永远不会被收购，也永远不会有管理顾问进来说：“我认为你应该这么做。”
There’s never going to be a response to Wall Street saying, “Why aren’t you a pure play on this or that and therefore you ought to spin this off the—?” None of that’s going to happen.
也不会回应华尔街的要求，比如说：“为什么你们不专注于某个领域，因此你们应该剥离这个业务——？”这些都不会发生。
And we can tell them, with a hundred percent assuredness, that for a very long time — that if they make a decision to come with Berkshire, they — that decision will be the final decision as to where their company resides.
我们可以百分之百地向他们保证，如果他们选择加入伯克希尔，这将是他们公司归属的最终决定，并且会持续很长时间。
So, unless those couple conditions, which are extremely unusual, that are described in the ground rules prevail, we will not be selling operating businesses, even though someone might offer us far more than, logically, they’re worth.
因此，除非出现“基本规则”中描述的极其罕见的条件，否则我们不会出售经营中的企业，即使有人愿意出价远高于其逻辑价值。
The question about stocks is, we’re not quite with Phil Fisher on that, but we’re very close. We love buying stocks where we think the businesses are so solid, have such economic advantage, that we can essentially ride with them forever.
关于股票的问题，我们的观点与菲利普·费雪的看法不完全一致，但非常接近。我们喜欢购买那些业务稳固、经济优势明显的股票，这样我们基本上可以永久持有。
But you’ve heard me talk about newspapers earlier today. We would have thought newspapers — 20, 25 years ago, I think Charlie and I probably thought a daily newspaper, you know, in a single newspaper town — which practically all are — is probably about the solidest investment you could find.
不过，你们今天早些时候听我谈过报纸。20或25年前，查理和我可能认为，在一个只有一份日报的城市——几乎所有城市都是这样——日报可能是你能找到的最稳固的投资之一。
We might have thought a network TV-affiliated station was about as solid as you could find. And they were very solid.
我们可能会认为一家隶属于电视网络的电视台是你能找到的最稳固的投资之一。它们确实非常稳固。
But events have, over the last 20 or 25 years, have certainly changed that to some degree and maybe to a very, very big degree.
但过去20或25年的变化在某种程度上，甚至可能在很大程度上改变了这一点。
So we will occasionally reevaluate the economic characteristics that we see 10 years out from the ones that we saw 10 years ago and maybe come to a somewhat different conclusion.
因此，我们偶尔会重新评估我们对未来10年的经济特征的看法，与10年前的看法相比，可能会得出略有不同的结论。
The first 20 years of investing for me — or maybe more — my decision to sell almost always was based on the fact that I found something else I was dying to buy.
在我最初20年的投资生涯中——也许更长——我决定出售的理由几乎总是因为我发现了另一个迫不及待想买的东西。
I mean, I sold stocks at — you know, at three times earnings to buy stocks at two times earnings 45 years ago, because I was always running out of money. Now, I run out of ideas. I’ve got a lot of money but no ideas, and — (Laughter)
我的意思是，比如在45年前，我以三倍市盈率卖掉股票，然后用这些钱买入两倍市盈率的股票，因为那时我总是缺钱。现在，我缺乏的是想法。我有很多钱，但没有想法——（笑声）
You know, I’d — I’m not sure which is better. What do you think, Charlie? (Laughter)
你知道，我不确定哪种情况更好。你怎么看，查理？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you were way better off when you had 50 years ahead of you — (laughter) — and less money.
查理·芒格： 我认为，当你还有50年的时间可以期待，而手头钱少一些时，你的情况要好得多——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I still think I have 50 years ahead of me, Charlie. (Laughter)**
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，我仍然认为我还有50年的时间。（笑声）
You want to elaborate any more on selling?
你想进一步谈谈关于出售的问题吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We almost never sell an operating business. And when it does happen, it’s usually because we’ve got some trouble we can’t fix.
查理·芒格： 是的。我们几乎从不出售经营中的企业。而当这种情况发生时，通常是因为我们遇到了无法解决的问题。
17. Compensation based on stock price is a “lottery ticket”
基于股价的薪酬是一张“彩票”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第7区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, I’m Martin Wiegand from Chevy Chase, Maryland.
观众提问： 你好，我是马丁·威根德，来自马里兰州切维切斯。
And, though you’ve given yourself a D in capital allocation, on behalf of the shareholders, we would like to give you an A-plus in honesty and accounting, temperament for a long-term investing view, and hosting an annual meeting.
虽然您给自己在资本配置方面打了一个“D”，但代表股东们，我们愿意给您“诚实与会计处理”、“长期投资视角的气度”和“举办年度会议”的方面打“A+”。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。（掌声）
I went to school with Martin’s father. Good to see you here.
我和马丁的父亲是同学，很高兴见到你在这里。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Now my question. Do General Re’s competitors pay their employees with a rational incentive plan aimed at growing float and reducing its cost, or do they use something similar to General Re’s old plan, and is this a new, sustainable, competitive advantage for General Re?
观众提问： 谢谢。我的问题是：通用再保险的竞争对手是否通过理性的激励计划来支付员工报酬，以促进浮存金的增长并降低其成本？还是他们使用类似于通用再保险旧计划的方式？这是否构成了通用再保险新的、可持续的竞争优势？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think a rational compensation plan — and I think we have rational compensation plans — we certainly aim at that, and we don’t care what convention is.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我认为一个理性的薪酬计划——而且我认为我们有这样的计划——我们当然以此为目标，并且我们不在意行业惯例是什么。
Over time, we’ll select for people who are rational themselves, who have confidence in their abilities to deliver under a rational plan, and who really appreciate operating in that kind of an environment.
随着时间推移，我们会选择那些自身理性、对自己在理性计划下的表现有信心，并真正欣赏这种工作环境的人。
Now, who wouldn’t want a lottery ticket, you know? I mean, if anybody here wants to buy a few lottery tickets at the lunch break and come up and present them to me, I’ll be glad to take them.
谁不想要一张彩票，对吧？如果有人愿意在午餐休息时买几张彩票送给我，我会很高兴接受。
I don’t think it will have anything to do with, you know, my performance at Berkshire Hathaway or anything in the future.
但我不认为这会对我在伯克希尔哈撒韦的表现或未来有什么影响。
And so, we try to make plans that are very rational. And incidentally, we’ve never had any real problems at all in working with managements to do just that.
所以，我们试图制定非常理性的计划。顺便提一句，我们与管理层合作实施这些计划时从未遇到过任何实质性的问题。
The two operations that I’ve just recently agreed to buy, we will have rational compensation plans at those places. And they’ll be somewhat different, perhaps, than the ones they’ve had in the past, although not much different, as I think about it.
最近我同意收购的两家公司，将采用合理的薪酬计划。与他们过去的计划相比，或许会有些不同，不过我认为差别不会太大。
I think it’s been a huge advantage at GEICO to have a plan that is far more rational than the one that preceded it. And I think that advantage will do nothing but grow stronger over time because, in effect, compensation is our way of speaking to employees, generally.
在GEICO，我们采用了比之前更理性的薪酬计划，我认为这是一个巨大的优势。这个优势只会随着时间的推移而增强，因为薪酬实际上是我们与员工沟通的一种方式。
And with a place as large as GEICO, you can’t speak to them all directly. But it speaks to them all the time. It says what we think the rational measurement of productivity and performance in the business is.
像GEICO这样的大型企业，我们无法直接与所有员工对话。但薪酬始终在与他们对话，它传递了我们对企业生产力和绩效合理衡量的看法。
And over time, that gets absorbed by thousands and thousands of people. And it’s the best way to get them to buy into their goals.
随着时间推移，这种理念会被成千上万的员工吸收。这是让他们认同目标的最佳方式。
Whereas, if you use as your test what the stock market is going to do, people, I think, inherently know they got a lottery ticket. I mean, you’ve seen that in a lot of tech stocks in the last three or four months.
相比之下，如果你的标准是股市表现，我认为员工本能上会觉得自己拿到了一张彩票。过去三四个月的许多科技股就是一个例子。
You will find all kinds of options being repriced, or issued in great abundance at lower prices without repricing them because they don’t want to have the accounting consequences. Those people know they’re getting lottery tickets, basically.
你会发现，各种期权被重新定价，或者大量以较低价格发放但不重新定价，因为他们不想承担会计后果。这些人基本上知道自己拿到的是彩票。
And, you know, the market’s attitude toward tech stocks is what’s going to determine results far more than their own individual results.
市场对科技股的态度，比这些公司自身的业绩更能决定结果。
So, it’s silly to think of somebody working very hard at some very small job at Berkshire, with our aggregate market value of 90 billion, thinking that their efforts are going to move the stock.
所以，认为伯克希尔员工在一份很小的工作上努力就能推动公司价值900亿的股价，这是荒谬的。
But their efforts may very well move the number of policy holders we gain or the satisfaction of policy holders. And if we can find ways to pay them based on that, we are far more in sync with what they can do. And they know it makes more sense.
但他们的努力可能会增加保单持有者的数量或提高他们的满意度。如果我们能根据这些指标支付薪酬，就能更好地与他们的工作成果保持一致。他们也知道这样更有意义。
So, I hope our competitors do all kinds of crazy things on comp and everything else. I mean, the more dumb things they do, the better life is for us.
所以，我希望我们的竞争对手在薪酬等方面做出各种疯狂的举动。换句话说，他们做的蠢事越多，我们的日子就越好过。
And I think that — well, we’ve had incredible success at keeping managers. I don’t think there’s probably any company in the United States of size that has had better luck on that than Berkshire.
我认为，我们在留住管理人员方面取得了巨大的成功。我不认为美国有哪家大型公司在这方面比伯克希尔更幸运。
And partly, it’s because we appreciate, in terms of the comp plan, and partly because we just appreciate, generally, managers that do a terrific job for us. And we’ve got the best group in the world.
这部分是因为我们的薪酬计划，部分是因为我们普遍欣赏那些为我们做出卓越贡献的管理人员。我们拥有世界上最出色的团队。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, here again, we’re very much out of step with the conventions of the world.
查理·芒格： 是的，在这里我们再次与世界上的惯例大相径庭。
When I read annual reports, and I read a lot of them, I’m very frequently irritated by the presence of things that are totally absent from the Berkshire Hathaway annual report.
当我阅读年度报告时——我读了很多——我经常被一些东西激怒，这些东西在伯克希尔哈撒韦的年度报告中完全没有。
I think promising people free medical care forever, between age 60 and the grave, and maybe for a younger spouse after the grave, but the first one, regardless of what’s invented and regardless of what it cost, I don’t see how anybody who cared about the shareholders would be making promises like that.
我认为，承诺人们从60岁到去世的免费医疗，甚至可能在去世后为年轻的配偶继续提供免费医疗，无论有什么新发明，无论成本多高，我不明白一个关心股东的人为什么会做出这样的承诺。
There’s a lot of insanity in conventional corporate conduct on the pay front. And — but if convention determined what was sane and what was insane, we’re the oddballs. I mean, we’re the unusual example.
在传统的企业薪酬行为中存在很多荒唐之处。但如果惯例决定了什么是理性，什么是非理性，那我们就是异类。也就是说，我们是个不同寻常的例子。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think per — and I think it’s very subconscious, but I think, sometimes, that the desires of the top person to get an outrageous amount gets pyramided through the organization.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我认为，这可能是潜意识的，但我认为有时高层为了得到惊人金额的欲望会在整个组织中层层传递下去。
Because if they’re going to have some scheme that rewards them based on a lottery ticket, they feel they have to give lottery tickets to everybody else, although on a much-reduced scale.
因为如果他们设计了一个基于彩票机制的奖励计划，他们会觉得也必须给其他人一些彩票，尽管数量少得多。
And they really do. I mean, it’s just — it becomes accepted in the course. And then you hire consultants who come around and say, “Well, you’re getting more lottery tickets at someplace else. And we’ve got some added new schemes.” It becomes very, very reinforcing.
他们确实这样做了。这种做法就被逐渐接受了。然后你还会雇佣顾问，他们会说：“其他地方的人拿到的彩票更多，我们还有一些新方案。” 这一切就变得非常强化。
But what has happened at the top level is really unbelievable. I mean, it — if an executive said to his company, “I want an option on 300 — just for working here — I want an option on $300 million worth of S&P futures for the next 10 years,” you know, people would regard that as outrageous. They’d say, “What have you got to do with that?”
但高层的现状确实令人难以置信。比如，如果一个高管对公司说：“我只是为公司工作，但我希望未来十年内能拿到价值3亿美元的标普期货期权。”你知道，人们会认为这太荒唐了。他们会说：“这和你有什么关系？”
But in effect, if they get one on their own stock and it goes up based on the fact the S&P appreciates over 10 years, they think that that’s perfectly acceptable to have that kind of a ride.
但实际上，如果他们拿到的是自己公司股票的期权，而股价因标普指数十年内上涨而提升，他们却觉得这样享受股价增长完全可以接受。
So I would say that, you know, there’s been a lot of talk about the huge gap between, you know — that exists in pay. But it seems to me that the primary gap that is eating at American CEOs is the gap between the rich and the super-rich. That seems to be motivating the adoption of many plans.
所以我会说，现在关于薪酬差距的讨论很多。但在我看来，美国CEO们最在意的主要差距是富人与超级富人之间的差距。这似乎是许多计划出台的动机所在。
It’s really — it’s gotten out of hand, but it isn’t going to change. The CEO has his hand on the switch as a practical matter. I know people, and I’ve been on them myself, but on comp committees. And as a practical matter, you don’t stand a chance.
确实——这种情况已经失控了，但它不会改变。实际上，CEO掌控着开关。我认识一些人，也参加过薪酬委员会。而实际上，你毫无机会改变现状。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, a lot of the corporate compensation plans of the modern era worked just about the way things would work for a farmer or if you put a rat colony in the grainery. It — (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 是的，现代许多企业的薪酬计划与农民让一群老鼠进入粮仓的方式没什么两样。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Put him down as undecided. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 把他记作“未定意见”。（笑声）
Good to see you, Martin.
很高兴见到你，马丁。
18. We ignore book value for our stock investments
我们对股票投资忽略账面价值
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to 8.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们到第8区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Ram Tarecard (PH) from Sugar Land, Texas.
观众提问： 早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是拉姆·塔雷卡德（音），来自德克萨斯州的糖城。
I’ve been a Berkshire shareholder since 1987 and always battling with the idea of what really is the intrinsic value for the company.
自1987年以来，我一直是伯克希尔的股东，并且一直在思考公司真正的内在价值是什么。
We have seen that, over time, a change in book value is a big indicator of the change in intrinsic value of Berkshire. Although in absolute terms, you have said again and again, that intrinsic value far exceeds book value.
我们已经看到，随着时间的推移，账面价值的变化是伯克希尔内在价值变化的重要指标。尽管从绝对值来看，您一再表示，内在价值远远超过账面价值。
In calculating the book value of Berkshire, our partly-owned businesses, like Coke and Gillette, are valued at their market value. This component of book value fluctuates, often irrationally, depending on the mood of the market.
在计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们部分持股的业务，比如可口可乐和吉列，是按其市场价值计算的。这个账面价值的组成部分经常因市场情绪而波动，往往显得不理性。
Do you think that using a look-through book value, just like you used look-through earnings, is a superior measure for tracking changes in intrinsic value?
您是否认为，像您使用“透视收益”一样使用“透视账面价值”，是跟踪内在价值变化的更优方法？
In fact, I had written a letter to you last August and I was very pleased to get a response from you personally saying that this approach makes sense.
实际上，我去年八月曾写信给您，很高兴收到您的亲自回复，表示这种方法有道理。
My question is, does this approach really give you a better measure for tracking intrinsic value? And if so, would you consider publishing it in the annual report? Thank you.
我的问题是，这种方法是否真的能更好地衡量内在价值的变化？如果是，您是否会考虑将其发布在年度报告中？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, thanks for the question. I would say that — I’m not sure how you phrased it when you wrote me and how I phrased it going back, but look-through book value would not mean much, actually.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢你的提问。我不确定你写信给我的措辞，或者我回复的内容，但实际上，“透视账面价值”意义不大。
The very best businesses, the really wonderful businesses, require no book value. They — and we are — we want to buy businesses, really, that will deliver more and more cash and not need to retain cash, which is what builds up book value over time.
最优秀的企业，真正卓越的企业，并不需要依赖账面价值。我们真正想要收购的，是那些能不断产生更多现金而不需要保留现金的企业，而保留现金正是账面价值随着时间累积的原因。
Admittedly, the prices of marketable securities, at any given time, are not a great indication of their intrinsic value. They are far better, though, than the book value of those companies in indicating intrinsic value.
诚然，可交易证券的价格在任何特定时间点都无法很好地反映其内在价值。但与账面价值相比，它们在指示内在价值方面要准确得多。
Berkshire’s intrinsic value, in a very general way, and trends in it, are better reflected in book value than is the case at a very high percentage of companies. It’s still a very — it’s not a great proxy.
伯克希尔的内在价值及其趋势，在很大程度上比大多数公司更能通过账面价值反映出来。但即便如此，账面价值仍然不是一个很好的替代指标。
It’s a proxy that is useful in terms of direction, in terms of degree, in a general way over time. But it’s not a substitute for intrinsic value.
账面价值在某种程度上可以作为一种方向性或程度上的参考指标，但绝不是内在价值的替代品。
In our case, when we started with Berkshire, intrinsic value was below book value. Our company was not worth book value in early 1965.
以我们的情况来看，在伯克希尔的早期，内在价值是低于账面价值的。1965年初，我们公司的价值低于账面价值。
You could not have sold the assets for that price that they were carried on the books, you could not have — no one could make a calculation, in terms of future cash flows that would indicate that those assets were worth their carrying value.
当时，你无法以账面价格出售资产，也没有人能够通过未来现金流计算得出这些资产的价值能够达到账面价值。
Now it is true that our businesses are worth a great deal more than book value. And that’s occurred gradually over time. So obviously, there are a number of years when our intrinsic value grew greater than our book value to get where we are today.
现在确实如此，我们的业务远远超过了账面价值。这种情况是逐渐发生的。因此，很显然，在某些年份，我们的内在价值增长超过了账面价值，才有了今天的局面。
Book value is not a bad starting point in the case of Berkshire. It’s far from the finishing point. It’s no starting point at all of any kind in — you know, whether it’s The Washington Post or Coca-Cola or Gillette.
对于伯克希尔来说，账面价值是一个不错的起点，但距离终点还差得远。而对于《华盛顿邮报》、可口可乐或吉列来说，账面价值根本不是起点。
It’s a factor we ignore. We do look at what a company is able to earn on invested assets and what it can earn on incremental invested assets. But the book value, we do not give a thought to.
这是我们忽略的一个因素。我们关注的是公司在投资资产上能够获得的收益，以及在新增投资资产上可以实现的收益。但我们根本不会考虑账面价值。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s obviously correct. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我认为这显然是正确的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. He’ll come back next year.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦。他明年还会回来。（笑声）
19. Markets: “Wild things create their own truth for a while”
市场：‘疯狂的事情会暂时创造自己的真相’
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 第1区。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, gentleman. My name’s Dan Sheehan. I’m from Toronto, Canada.
观众提问： 你好，先生们。我是丹·希恩，来自加拿大多伦多。
First of all, I’d like to thank you for this weekend. It’s become more and more important to me as it’s become more and more difficult to find a rational discussion about the stock market. And this weekend really is a breath of fresh air for most of us, I think.
首先，我想感谢你们的这个周末。随着找到关于股市的理性讨论变得越来越困难，这个周末对我来说变得越来越重要。我认为，对我们大多数人来说，这真是一股清新的空气。
One of the places I refer to a lot is Benjamin Graham. And what worries me now is what he referred to — is a period in 1929, in the early ’30s — as a lab experiment that — where normal intrinsic values and margins of safety broke down, or seemed to, anyway.
我经常参考的一个地方是本杰明·格雷厄姆。而让我现在担心的是，他提到的一个时期——1929年到30年代初的实验室实验——在那个时期，正常的内在价值和安全边际崩溃了，或者至少看起来是这样。
And I wonder how much you think that might happen now or in the next few years, and how much you worry about that with the investments you’re making.
我想知道，您认为这种情况现在或未来几年发生的可能性有多大？以及您对自己的投资有多担心？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we generally believe you can just see anything in markets. I mean, just extraordinary what happens in markets over time. It gets sorted out, you know, eventually.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们通常认为市场中什么事情都可能发生。我的意思是，市场随时间推移会发生一些非同寻常的事情。最终，这些事情会被理顺。
But, I mean, we have seen companies sell for tens of billion dollars that are worthless. And at times, we have seen things sell for 20 percent — a number of things, not hard to find, perfectly decent running them — sell for literally 20 percent or 25 percent of what they were worth.
但我的意思是，我们曾看到市值数百亿美元的公司其实一文不值。与此同时，我们也看到一些东西——不难找到的，那些运营良好的公司——以它们实际价值的20%或25%的价格被出售。
So we have seen and will continue to see everything. It’s just the nature of markets. They produce wild, wild things over time.
因此，我们已经见过并将继续看到各种现象。这就是市场的本质。随着时间推移，它会产生各种疯狂的事情。
And the trick is, occasionally, to take advantage of one of those wild things and not to get carried away when other wild things happen.
诀窍是，偶尔利用其中的一些疯狂现象，但不要在其他疯狂现象发生时被冲昏头脑。
Because the wild things create their own truth for a while and you have to — you know, you — that’s the reason they’re happening, and people are getting pleasant experiences and all that. You’ll see everything if you’re around markets for a reasonable period of time.
因为这些疯狂现象会暂时创造自己的“真相”，你必须明白——这是它们发生的原因，人们因此经历了一些愉快的事情等等。如果你在市场中待足够长时间，你会见证一切。
We don’t see any great cases of dramatic undervaluation by this market. So it isn’t like we’re seeing — because there’s this — perhaps this speculative mania in a particular area of the market, we do not see that creating incredible undervaluation other places.
我们目前没有看到市场中存在任何显著低估的案例。所以这并不像是因为某些市场领域可能存在投机狂热，就导致其他地方出现不可思议的低估。
WARREN BUFFETT: What’s happening there may lead to undervaluation, you know, a few years from now. Or it may not, I don’t know that, but we’re —
那些情况可能会导致几年后出现低估。但也可能不会。我不确定，不过——
It isn’t like you can find things that are worth double or thereabouts what you’re paying because, frankly, there’s so much money sloshing around that if you found such a thing, it would be very likely corrected by some buyout types.
这并不像你能找到价值是你支付价格两倍或接近两倍的东西。坦白说，现在市场上有太多的资金在流动。如果你找到这样的机会，很可能会被一些收购类型的投资者迅速纠正。
I mean, we would love to find businesses that are selling for half of what they’re intrinsically worth. We don’t find that. We do find a lot of cases where we think the evaluations on the high side are just — are unbelievable.
我们当然希望找到那些按其内在价值一半出售的企业。但我们并没有找到这样的机会。我们确实发现了很多我们认为估值过高、难以置信的案例。
We have been in periods in the past where we felt almost everything was being given away, too. So you’ll get those extremes. Most of the time the market’s in a position where there’s a little of both, but every now and then, it gets into a position where there’s a lot of one or the other.
过去我们也经历过一些时期，我们觉得几乎所有东西都在被低价出售。因此，你会看到市场的极端情况。大多数时候，市场会同时存在高估和低估，但偶尔也会出现一边倒的情况。
And we would — you know, we would love it if we could find a lot of reasonable-sized companies that were selling at what we thought were half of the intrinsic value. We’re not finding them.
我们会非常乐意找到那些规模适中、按我们认为的内在价值一半出售的公司。但目前我们并没有找到。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think that the present time is a very unusual period. It’s hard to think of a time when residential real estate, and common stocks, and so on, rose so rapidly in price and there was so much easy money floating around. I mean, this is a very unusual period.
查理·芒格： 我确实认为当前是一个非常特殊的时期。很难想到还有哪个时期住宅房地产、普通股票等价格涨得这么快，同时市场上又有这么多的“轻松”资金流动。我是说，这是一个非常不同寻常的时期。
WARREN BUFFETT: What’s fascinating — and I’m sure you’ve thought of it — is that you can now have a business — we saw a few of them, you know, earlier this year we’ll say — that might’ve been selling for $10 billion where the business itself could not have borrowed, probably, a hundred million dollars in debt, with an equity evaluation of 10 billion.
沃伦·巴菲特： 令人着迷的是——我相信你们也想到了——现在的市场上可能会有一些企业，比如说今年早些时候我们看到的一些企业，估值可能高达100亿美元，而这些企业本身可能连1亿美元的债务都无法借到，尽管其股权估值是100亿美元。
But the business itself would not — as a private business — would not have been able to borrow a hundred million. But the owners of that business, because it’s public, can borrow many billions of dollars on their little pieces of paper, because they have this market valuation.
但如果是作为一家私人企业，这些公司本身甚至借不到1亿美元。然而，由于它们是上市公司，拥有这些股票的股东可以基于市场估值，用这些小小的纸片借到数十亿美元。
If it’s a private business, the company itself couldn’t borrow one-twentieth or so of what individuals could borrow.
如果是私人企业，公司本身可能连这些股东能借到金额的二十分之一都借不到。
That’s happened, to a degree, before. But this has probably been as extreme as anything that’s happened, probably, including the ’20s. That doesn’t mean there’s a parallel to it, but it’s been pretty extreme.
这种现象以前也发生过，但这次的情况可能是迄今为止最极端的，甚至包括1920年代在内。这并不意味着完全相同的历史在重演，但确实非常极端。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it probably is the most extreme that has happened in modern capitalism. In my lifetime, I would say the ’30s were the — it created the worst recession in the English-speaking world in 600 years.
查理·芒格： 我认为，这可能是现代资本主义历史上最极端的现象。在我的一生中，1930年代造成了600年来英语国家最严重的经济衰退。
And it was very extreme. You could buy a “all-you-can-eat” in Omaha through the ’30s for a quarter from Henderson’s Cafeteria.
那个时期非常极端。在奥马哈的1930年代，你只需要25美分就能在亨德森自助餐厅吃到“随便吃”。
And now we’re seeing the other face of what capitalism can do. And this is almost as extreme as the ’30s were, but in a different direction.
而现在我们看到了资本主义的另一面。这种极端几乎可以和1930年代相提并论，但方向完全相反。
It’s zero unemployment, rampant speculation, et cetera, et cetera. It’s an amazing period.
这是一个零失业、投机猖獗的时期，等等。这是一个令人惊叹的时代。
WARREN BUFFETT: That does not make it easy to predict, however, the outcome.
沃伦·巴菲特： 然而，这并不意味着结果会很容易预测。
It says to us, though, certain things we want to stay away from. I mean, basically that’s — it’s precautionary to us. It does not spell opportunity.
不过，这对我们来说意味着我们需要远离某些事物。基本上，这对我们是一个警示，而不是机会。
Although, there’s no question that the — in the last year, the ability to monetize shareholder ignorance has never been exceeded, I think. Wouldn’t you say so, Charlie? (Laughter)
虽然毫无疑问，在过去的一年里，利用股东无知变现的能力达到了前所未有的高度。你不这么认为吗，查理？（笑声）
20. “It’s so easy to copy in the internet”
在互联网上复制变得如此容易
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第2区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman. David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.
观众提问： 早上好，先生们。我是大卫·温特斯，来自新泽西州的山湖。
Thanks again for Berkshire Fest 2000 and having it on Saturday, for those of us who tap dance to work on Monday. (Buffett laughs)
再次感谢你们举办伯克希尔节2000，并安排在周六，让我们这些周一轻快上班的人可以参与。（巴菲特笑）
You know, over the previous 30 years or so, Berkshire has been a tactical participant in the insurance business. With the acquisition of Gen Re and the broadening of GEICO’s scope, the company’s been transformed into a mainstream activity.
过去30年左右，伯克希尔在保险行业一直是一名战术参与者。随着对通用再保险（Gen Re）的收购以及GEICO业务范围的扩大，公司已转型为一个主流活动者。
How will this transformation result in growth and low-cost float over time? I.e., how do you avoid becoming average?
这种转型如何在未来实现增长和低成本浮存金？换句话说，您如何避免变得平庸？
And to follow on with the very perceptive 10-year-old from California’s question, will Berkshire’s newspaper interest be able to make the successful transformation to the new electronic world, especially the unique content of the Washington Post? Thank you.
还有，接着那位来自加州非常敏锐的10岁小朋友的问题，伯克希尔的报业投资能否成功转型到新的电子化世界，特别是《华盛顿邮报》的独特内容？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Those are both good questions. I think, to answer your second one, I think the Buffalo News will do just as well as, if you take the top 50 papers in the country, in making a transition. How well the top 50 will do is really an open question.
沃伦·巴菲特： 这些都是好问题。回答你的第二个问题，我认为《布法罗新闻报》在转型方面的表现会和全美前50的报纸一样好。不过，前50的报纸究竟能表现得多好，这真的是一个悬而未决的问题。
And — but there is — you know, the industry factors will, in my view, just overwhelm any specific strategy. Because any strategy is —
并且——不过，我认为，行业因素会压倒任何具体的策略。因为任何策略——
It’s so easy to copy in the internet. That’s one of the problems of the internet. It’s one of the problems of capitalism.
在互联网上复制变得如此容易。这是互联网的问题之一，也是资本主义的问题之一。
I mean, if you open a restaurant that’s successful, somebody’s going to come in and figure out what your menu is and how — you know, the whole thing. And then they’re going to try to do it in a little bit better location, or at a lower price, or whatever. That’s what capitalism’s all about and it’s terrific for consumers.
我的意思是，如果你开了一家成功的餐馆，会有人进来研究你的菜单、你的运营方式——整个模式。然后他们会尝试在更好的地点开设、或者以更低的价格经营。这就是资本主义的本质，对消费者来说是很棒的。
The internet accentuates that process. I mean, it gives everybody in the world real estate. You know, there are no prime locations to speak of. I mean, I can give you the argument for how you develop one and all of that, but it really changes the world in a big way.
互联网加剧了这一过程。我是说，它为世界上的每个人提供了虚拟地产。你知道，没有什么可以称为黄金地段。我可以给你举例说明如何开发一个黄金地段等等，但这确实以一种巨大的方式改变了世界。
You know, if you were at 16th and Farnam in Omaha in the ’20s, with Woolworth — that’s the place where the streetcar tracks crossed, you know, and a whole bunch of them were going north/south there and east/west — and there wasn’t any better real estate in town.
比如说，如果你在1920年代奥马哈的16街和法纳姆街，有一家伍尔沃斯（Woolworth）——这是有轨电车轨道交汇的地方，南北、东西方向的轨道都在那里交汇——这是镇上最好的地段了。
I’m not sure if that’s worth as much now in nominal dollars as it was in the 1920s. But — and that looked permanent, incidentally. Who was going to rip up the streetcar tracks or — in 1910 or whenever it was?
我不确定现在以名义美元计算，这个地段是否还能值当时1920年代的价格。不过——顺便说一下，那时候看起来是永久性的。谁会想到1910年或其他时候，有轨电车的轨道会被拆掉？
So now, you rip up the tracks every day. You know, and so the fluidity is incredible, in terms of moving economic resources around compared to what it was.
而现在，你每天都在“拆掉”轨道。相比过去，经济资源流动的灵活性简直令人难以置信。
The newspaper industry is going to try and figure out how to be a very important information source in a new medium. And it may solve that problem, to a degree, and still have lousy economics. That’s — you know, that’s — unfortunately, the newspaper industry’s always —
报业正在努力找出在新媒体中如何成为一个非常重要的信息来源的办法。它可能在某种程度上解决这个问题，但仍然面临糟糕的经济效益。这就是——你知道，这就是——不幸的是，报业总是如此——
Historically, the way the industry structure worked, once you got into the majority of households and everything, somebody else could bring out a way better paper, but it wasn’t going to go any place against you.
从历史上看，行业结构的运作方式是，一旦你的报纸进入了大多数家庭，即使有人能做出一份更好的报纸，但它在竞争中也无法对你构成威胁。
I mean, you had such structural advantages that you could, you know — you could put your idiot nephew in and he would do fine — wonderfully — you know. And nothing could happen to him except when this different medium came along.
我的意思是，你拥有如此强大的结构性优势，你甚至可以让你的愚蠢侄子来管理，他也会做得不错——非常出色——你知道的。除了当一种全新的媒体出现时，否则不会有任何问题发生。
Now you can put in a genius and whether that will make any difference is an open question. I would say that it’s quite doubtful.
现在，即使你让一个天才来管理，是否会有任何不同仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。我认为这非常值得怀疑。
If you own a newspaper, you want to do everything that you can think of and, fortunately, everything anybody else can think of, because you can copy them so fast.
如果你拥有一家报纸，你需要做你能想到的一切事，幸运的是，还要做其他人能想到的一切事，因为你可以非常迅速地复制他们的做法。
And it may work in terms of product and it may not work in terms of product. And it may work in terms of product and still not work in terms of economics very well. And I don’t know the answer to that question.
在产品方面，这可能奏效，也可能无效。而即使在产品上奏效，也可能在经济效益上表现不佳。我对此问题没有答案。
I know that we will play it out — at the Buffalo News, for example — as strongly as we can. I don’t think other people are going to get way better results than we are.
我知道我们会尽力而为——比如在《布法罗新闻报》——我们会尽力做到最好。我不认为其他人会比我们取得更好的结果。
I don’t know what the other people are — what their results are going to be and how it will work.
我不知道其他人会做出什么样的结果，以及这些会如何发挥作用。
It would be crazy to sit on the sidelines and simply ignore what’s going on. So we will do our darnedest to have good economics when this is all through. But nobody knows how it’s going to play out, in my view.
如果坐在旁观者的位置上而对正在发生的事情视而不见，那将是疯狂的。所以，当这一切结束时，我们会尽最大努力实现良好的经济效益。但在我看来，没有人知道这将如何演变。
21. “Average is going be terrible in insurance”
在保险行业，平庸将是致命的
WARREN BUFFETT: The question about insurance, about whether we become average — average is not going to be good [in] insurance. Average is going be terrible in insurance over time. It’s not —
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于保险行业的提问，以及我们是否可能变得平庸——在保险行业，平庸是不可取的。随着时间推移，平庸在保险行业将是灾难性的。并不是——
It’s a commodity business, in many respects. And if you are average, you’re going to have a very poor business. You may limp along because you got a lot of capital that’s supporting the lousy business, but it’s not — it won’t be a good business, per se.
从许多方面看，保险是一个商品化的行业。如果你只是平庸的，你的业务会非常糟糕。也许你可以靠大量资本支持继续运转，但这本质上不会是一项好的业务。
But I think in GEICO, and in General Re, and some — and our other operations as well — we do not have average businesses, and there is nothing about the way the industry is going that would force us or lead us to have average operations.
但我认为，在GEICO、通用再保险（General Re）以及其他业务中，我们的业务都不是平庸的。行业的发展方式也没有任何因素会迫使或引导我们变成平庸的运营者。
I mean, we have special things we bring to the party in both cases I’ve named, and actually, in other cases as well. We have things we bring to the party that should make us considerably better than average.
我的意思是，无论是我提到的这两个案例还是其他业务，我们都有独特的优势。这些优势能够使我们明显优于行业平均水平。
It’ll show more in some periods than others, and it’ll be different in the way it is applied at GEICO or at General Re or at National Indemnity’s reinsurance operation. But none of those, in my view, will be average.
在某些时期，这些优势可能比其他时期更明显。在GEICO、通用再保险或国家赔偿再保险业务中，优势的体现方式会有所不同。但在我看来，这些业务都不会是平庸的。
But average — and there will be a lot of average, by definition — average is not going to be good.
但平庸——从定义上来说，行业内总会有很多平庸的公司——而平庸永远不是好事。
The other problem about it is average is not going to go away, either. So that is an anchoring effect, to some extent, on what even the skillful operator can achieve. I think insurance will be a very good business for us over time.
另一个问题是，平庸不会消失。这在某种程度上对即使是优秀运营者的成就也是一种制约。我认为，从长期来看，保险业务对我们来说会是一项非常好的业务。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Every once in a while, we have a business sort of die under us. Trading stamps is now off 99 3/4 percent from its peak volume, and we were able to do nothing to prevent that except wring all the money out and multiply it by about 100. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 是的。偶尔，我们的一些业务会消亡。比如，交易印花已经从高峰时期的业务量减少了99.75%，我们除了榨干所有剩余资金并将其乘以大约100之外，什么也做不了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We actually did about, what, 120 million, in the late ’60s, per year in trading stamps, far more dominant in our area than S&H was nationally.
沃伦·巴菲特： 实际上，在60年代末，我们每年的交易印花业务额约为1.2亿美元，远远领先于全国范围内的S&H。
And we have — by skillful management, Charlie and my constant attention to detail — have taken that business from 120 million a year down to, what, about 300,000 a year or so?
通过高超的管理，查理和我对细节的持续关注，我们将这项业务从每年1.2亿美元减少到大约每年30万美元左右？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, way less than that. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 哦，远远不到这个数。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We thought of having the sales chart here and turning it upside down to impress you, but it wouldn’t have worked very well.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们想过把销售图带到这里并倒过来展示给你们看，但这可能不会有太大效果。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s the nature of things that some businesses die. It’s also in the nature of things that, in some cases, you shouldn’t fight it. There is no logical answer, in some cases, except to wring the money out and go elsewhere.
查理·芒格： 我认为，一些业务消亡是事情的本质。有时候你不应该与之抗争。在某些情况下，唯一合理的答案就是榨干资金并将资源投向别处。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and that’s very tough for managements, too. In fact, they almost never face up to that. It’s very, very rare.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这对管理层来说也非常困难。实际上，他们几乎从不正视这一点。这种情况非常罕见。
And it’s logical that it’d be rare. In a private business, you can understand why people face up to it. In a public company, if you take the equation of the manager, he or she may be far better off ignoring that reality than accepting it.
这很合理，因为这种情况本来就罕见。在私人企业中，人们为什么会直面这些问题是可以理解的。而在上市公司中，从管理者的角度来看，忽视这种现实可能比接受它对他们更有利。
22. Competitive advantage is more important than short-term profits
竞争优势比短期利润更重要
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 让我们听第三位提问者的问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman. My name’s Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia.
观众提问： 早上好，先生们。我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺夫。
You’ve emphasized the importance of the moat around a business, or the sustainable competitive advantage. My question really relates to learning more about that.
您多次强调了企业护城河或可持续竞争优势的重要性。我的问题是，能否更详细地讲讲这一点？
Professor Michael Porter at Harvard has made a detailed study of this. Did you find his work useful and can you recommend any other sources of information on this?
哈佛大学的迈克尔·波特教授对此有详细研究。您觉得他的研究对您有帮助吗？是否能推荐其他相关信息的来源？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ve never really read Porter, although I’ve read enough about him to know that we think alike, in a general way. So I can’t refer you to specific books or anything. But my guess is that what he writes would be very useful for an investor to read.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我其实没有读过波特的著作，不过我读过一些关于他的评论，可以说我们的思路在总体上是一致的。所以，我无法推荐具体的书籍，但我猜他的著作对投资者来说会很有帮助。
I mean, I — again, I’ve never — I’ve just seen him referred to in some commentary. But I think he talks about durable or sustainable competitive advantage as being the core of any business. And I can tell you that that is exactly the way we think.
也就是说，我——再说一次，我并没有直接读过他的作品，只是从一些评论中看到提及。但我认为，他强调的持久或可持续竞争优势是每个企业的核心。我可以告诉你，我们的想法完全一致。
I mean, that — in the end, you — if you are evaluating a business year-to-year, you want to — the number one question you want to ask yourself is whether the — could the competitive advantage have been made stronger and more durable before — and that’s more important than the P&L for a given year.
最终，如果你在逐年评估一家公司，你要问自己的首要问题是，这家公司的竞争优势是否变得更强、更持久。这比某一年损益表上的数据更重要。
So I would suggest that you read anything that you find that’s helpful or —
所以，我建议你多阅读一些你认为有帮助的资料，或者——
Actually, the best way to do it is study the people that have achieved that and ask yourself how they did it and why they did it. I mean, why is it that in razor blades, which could —
实际上，最好的方法是研究那些已经做到这一点的人，问问自己他们是如何做到的，为什么能做到。比如说，为什么剃须刀这个行业——
I mean, everybody grows up in business school hearing that as a great example of a product that’s very profitable and why —
所有读商学院的人都会听到，剃须刀是一个非常有利润的产品的经典案例，为什么——
With it obvious that there’s going to be no reduction in demand for the next hundred years for the product, why are there no new entrants into the field? What it is that gives you that moat around the razor blade business?
很明显，在未来一百年里，对这种产品的需求不会减少，那为什么这个领域没有新的竞争者进入？是什么为剃须刀行业构建了那样的护城河？
Normally, if you’ve got a profitable business, you know, a dozen people want to go into it. If you’ve got a dress shop here in town and it looks like it’s doing well, you know, a couple of other people are going to want to open up a shop next door to it.
通常来说，如果你经营的是一个有利润的生意，很多人都会想进入这个领域。如果你在镇上开了一家生意兴隆的服装店，很快就会有人想在旁边开一家新的店。
And here’s a worldwide business, nothing can go wrong with the demand, to speak of. And yet, people don’t go into it.
这是一个全球性的生意，需求显然不会出问题。然而，却几乎没有人进入这个领域。
So, we like to ask ourselves questions like that. We like to ask ourselves, “Why was State Farm successful, you know, against people that had incredible agency plants and lots of capital?”
因此，我们喜欢问自己这样的问题。我们会问自己：“为什么 State Farm 能够成功，与那些拥有庞大代理网络和大量资本的公司竞争？”
And here’s some farmer out in Bloomington, Illinois named George Mecherle, you know, who’s in his forties. And he sets up a company that defies capitalistic imperatives.
还有一位来自伊利诺伊州布卢明顿的农民，叫乔治·梅克尔，他当时四十多岁。他创办了一家公司，完全不符合资本主义的传统规则。
I mean, it has no stock, it has no stock options, it has no big rewards. It’s, you know, it’s kind of half socialistic. And all it does is take 25 percent of the market away from all of these companies that had all these characteristics.
这家公司没有股票，没有期权，也没有丰厚的奖励。可以说，它有点像半社会主义性质。而它所做的一切，就是从那些拥有上述特点的公司手中拿走了25%的市场份额。
We believe you should study things like that. We think you should study things like Mrs. B out at the Nebraska Furniture Mart, who takes $500 and turns it, you know, over time, into the largest home furnishing store in the world.
我们认为你应该研究这样的案例。比如内布拉斯加家具市场的 Mrs. B，她用500美元，经过时间的积累，把它变成了全球最大的家居零售店。
There has to be some lessons in things like that. What gives you that kind of a result and that kind of competitive advantage over time?
这些案例里一定蕴含着一些教训或者启示。是什么让这些人获得了这样的成果，并在时间的推移中保持竞争优势？
And that is the key to investing. I mean, if you can spot that — particularly if you can spot it when others don’t spot it so well — you’re on the — you know, you will do very well. And we focus on that.
而这正是投资的关键所在。如果你能够识别出这样的模式，特别是当其他人尚未察觉时，你会因此做得非常出色。而我们正专注于这一点。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it — these factors — every business tries to turn this year’s success into next year’s greater success. And they all use pretty much every advantage they have in every direction from this year to make next year’s better.
查理·芒格： 是的，这些因素——每个企业都试图将今年的成功转化为明年的更大成功。他们会利用手头拥有的每一个优势，努力让下一年的表现更胜一筹。
Microsoft did exactly that, year after year after year and happened to win big.
微软年复一年地这么做，最终获得了巨大的成功。
And it’s hard to see — for me at least — to see why Microsoft is sinful because they tried to improve the products all the time and make next year’s business position stronger than last year’s business position. (Applause)
而且，我至少很难理解，为什么微软因为不断改进产品、让未来的商业地位更胜过去，就会被认为是“有罪的”。（掌声）
If that’s a sin, every subsidiary at Berkshire is a sinner, I hope. (Laughter)
如果这是罪过，那么我希望伯克希尔的每个子公司都是“罪人”。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah, yeah. We declare ourselves for sin. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，是的，我们自封为“罪人”。（笑声）
23. Promo for See’s Candies Barbie doll
关于 See’s 糖果芭比娃娃的宣传
WARREN BUFFETT: At this moment, I think we have a small interruption in the program here.
沃伦·巴菲特： 在这个时候，我想我们要稍微中断一下节目。
Charlie, on your left. (Laughs)
查理，看你的左边。（笑声）
It’s just a sample of what it’s like to be an officer at Berkshire. (Laughter)
这只是作为伯克希尔高管的一个小小体验。（笑声）
Oh, OK.
哦，好吧。
This is the new See’s Barbie doll. And — never before seen, it will be in the exhibitors section, lower level.
这是全新的 See’s 糖果芭比娃娃——首次亮相，它会出现在展区的地下楼层。
And believe it or not, we’ve come up with three more just like this young woman. And they will be down there to take your orders.
不管你信不信，我们还设计了另外三个类似这个年轻女士的娃娃。它们会在那里接受大家的预订。
We can’t ship them now, we won’t charge your credit card until they — until they’re available for shipment, which will probably be, I guess, around September or so.
我们现在还无法发货，也不会立即扣你的信用卡，直到这些娃娃可以发货，大概会是在九月份左右。
But we wanted our shareholders to be the first ones to have a shot at this new product, and —
不过，我们希望让我们的股东成为首批可以预订这个新产品的人——
The model is not included in the — (laughter) — delivered price.
不过，模特不包括在——（笑声）——产品的售价内。
Afternoon session
24. Most companies hide the true cost of stock options
大多数公司掩盖了股票期权的真实成本
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, if area one is ready, we’re ready to start answering.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好了，如果第一区准备好了，我们可以开始回答问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi.
观众提问： 你好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Steve Check. I’m from Costa Mesa, California.
观众提问： 我叫史蒂夫·切克，来自加利福尼亚州的科斯塔梅萨。
My question is regarding stock options. I’ve taken your suggestion and have been attempting to subtract stock option compensation from reported income when evaluating companies. When I read annual reports, I usually find companies estimating option costs using the Black-Scholes model.
我的问题是关于股票期权的。我听取了您的建议，尝试在评估公司时将股票期权补偿从报告的收入中扣除。当我阅读年报时，通常会发现公司用布莱克-舒尔斯模型来估算期权成本。
However, the assumptions going into the Black-Scholes model seem quite different from company to company. These assumptions, of course, are what is used for risk-free interest rates — quote unquote, “risk-free” interest rates, expected option lives — even though options have stated lives, and expected volatility.
然而，不同公司使用布莱克-舒尔斯模型的假设似乎差别很大。这些假设包括无风险利率——所谓的“无风险”利率、期权的预期寿命（尽管期权有明确的期限），以及预期的波动率等。
Help me out a little bit. What is the best way to calculate option costs? Do you think Black-Scholes is appropriate? If so, how should we normalize the assumptions?
请帮我解答一下，计算期权成本的最佳方法是什么？您认为布莱克-舒尔斯模型合适吗？如果合适，我们该如何规范这些假设？
And just one short follow-up: how can we possibly estimate future earnings for companies, when companies, such as even Microsoft last week, in response to a lower stock price, simply reissue a bunch of new options?
还有一个简短的后续问题：当公司（比如上周的微软）因为股价下跌而重新发行大量新期权时，我们如何可能估算公司的未来收益？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — I can tell you, from some personal experience, that companies attempt to use the lowest figure they can, even though it doesn’t hit the income account.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我可以根据一些个人经验告诉你，公司会尽量使用最低的数值，尽管这些数值不会影响收益账户。
So they like to make fairly short assumptions as to the life of the options, even though they’re granted on a ten-year basis. Because they’ll make certain assumptions about exercise date or forfeiture and so on.
因此，他们倾向于对期权的寿命做出较短的假设，即使这些期权是按十年期授予的。这是因为他们会对行权日期、期权失效等做出某些假设。
I think the most appropriate way, when you’ve got a pattern, which you have at many companies, of what they do on options, is simply to make an educated guess as to the average option issuance that they’re going to incur, or they’re going to elect to do over time.
我认为，对于很多公司在期权上的操作模式，最合适的方法是做一个合理的猜测，估算他们在未来平均会发行多少期权。
And, generally, what you really want to — if you were to be precise — you would try to figure out what they could’ve sold those options for in the open market. Because that’s the opportunity cost of giving them to the employees instead of selling the same option in the market.
通常，如果你想更精确一些，你需要计算出他们在公开市场上能够卖掉这些期权的价格。因为这就是把期权给员工而不是在市场上出售的机会成本。
I think you’ll find, generally, that if you take a value of about a third, for a ten-year option, if you take a value of about a third — obviously, it depends on dividend rate and volatility and a whole bunch of things — but about a third of the market value, strike price, at the time they’re issued, that’s the expectable cost.
我认为，对于十年期的期权，通常你可以取大约三分之一的价值——当然，这取决于股息率、波动率以及许多其他因素——大约是发行时市场价格和执行价格的三分之一，这可以作为预期成本。
We believe in using the expectable cost versus the actual cost. I mean, that is how we would look at it.
我们认为应该使用预期成本而不是实际成本来衡量。这是我们的看法。
If we were issuing options at Berkshire, and we issued options on $100 million worth of stock a year, we would figure it was costing us, probably in our case, with no dividend, at least $35 million a year to issue those options.
如果伯克希尔每年发行价值1亿美元的股票期权，我们会认为，鉴于我们没有分红，这些期权的成本可能至少为每年3500万美元。
And we would figure that if we gave people $35 million in some other form of result-oriented compensation, that it would be a wash. And that is not the way most managements, of course, figure. At least that’s my experience.
我们会认为，如果我们用3500万美元以其他形式的成果导向的补偿方式给予员工，这将是一种对等补偿。当然，大多数管理层并不是这样计算的。这至少是我的经验。
And we would figure we could use that 35 million in a more shareholder-oriented way and one where the employee (who) was productive would be sure of getting results, as opposed to having it be at the whims of the market.
我们会认为，可以用这3500万美元以一种更关注股东利益的方式进行分配，让有生产力的员工能够确定获得回报，而不是让回报取决于市场的波动。
And I think you’ll see a lot of option repricing. Everybody says they won’t reprice their options, until they do it. And, you’ll see that with a lot of schemes.
我认为，你会看到许多期权重新定价的情况。每个人都说他们不会重新定价期权，直到他们真的这么做。而且你会在许多计划中看到这种情况。
It would be interesting to see whether CONSICO is willing to bankrupt all the executives who made loans to buy the stock and had those loans guaranteed by the company.
有意思的是，看看 CONSICO 是否会让所有通过贷款购买股票并由公司担保的高管破产。
And the company initially said they would enforce those loans. And we’ll see whether they do it. I would say, in many cases, they won’t. I don’t know what CONSICO will do.
公司最初表示他们会执行这些贷款。我们将看看他们是否会这么做。我会说，在很多情况下，他们不会。我不知道 CONSICO 会怎么做。
But, a lot of things that are said in connection with executive option schemes and that sort of thing are what they’ll do if it works in their favor. And then they’ll do something else if it doesn’t work in their favor. And that’s not spelled out in the initial approval that’s granted.
但与高管期权计划相关的很多声明，都是在符合他们利益的情况下所说的。如果不符合他们的利益，他们会做其他事情。这些内容在最初的批准中并未明确说明。
Charlie, you have anything to add?
查理，你有要补充的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren’s somewhat critical attitude is very understated compared to mine. (Laughter)**
查理·芒格： 嗯，沃伦对这一问题的批评态度比我的要委婉得多。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going to leave raisins out of this particular — (laughter) — analysis. Let’s go to area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们在这次分析中就不涉及葡萄干了——（笑声）——让我们转到第二区。
We do believe, incidentally, if a company is going to end up giving out 10 percent of the company over a 10-year period or 15 percent on options, that is like buying an apartment house and letting the seller keep a 10 or 15 percent interest in the upside.
顺便说一句，我们确实认为，如果一家公司在10年内通过期权分发了公司10%或15%的股份，这就像买了一栋公寓楼，却让卖方保留了10%或15%的增值权益。
Or it’s like buying an oil field and giving somebody a 10 or 15 percent interest-free override. It changes the value of the property. Make no mistake about it.
或者就像买了一片油田，却让某人获得10%或15%的免息权益。这会改变资产的价值，这一点毋庸置疑。
It is a — it has a huge economic impact on the value of a property. And just go out and try and sell your house and say, “I want to keep 15 percent of the appreciation in it,” and ask the buyer whether he’s going to pay the same price for the house.
这对资产价值的经济影响是巨大的。试想，如果你去卖房子时说，“我要保留15%的增值收益”，然后问买家他是否还愿意支付同样的房价。
Options subtract value the moment they are granted. And, like I say, unless companies — some companies follow a practice of making a mega-grant every three or four or five years. A lot of them just issue a fairly constant amount annually. And you can figure out the cost.
期权在授予的那一刻就会减少价值。就像我说的，除非有些公司每隔三、四或五年进行一次大额授予，但很多公司每年都会发行相对固定的数量。你可以计算出其成本。
And, you know, they don’t want to tell the shareholders there’s a cost. And that’s why they fought through Congress and everything else in order to prevent it from being the truth. But, you know, Galileo had that problem many years ago and finally won out. So maybe we will, too. (Laughs)
你知道，他们并不想告诉股东这是有成本的。这也是为什么他们会通过国会及其他途径来避免真相被揭露。但你知道，加利略多年前也遇到了类似的问题，最终他胜利了。所以，也许我们也能胜利。（笑声）
25. Moody’s moat has “poisonous characters”
穆迪的护城河具有“毒性特质”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好了，第二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dennis Jean-Jacques from Chatham, New Jersey. I first would like to thank you personally for taking the time out of your busy schedule to visit MBA students throughout the country on a regular basis.
观众提问： 我叫丹尼斯·让-雅克斯，来自新泽西州查塔姆。首先，我个人非常感谢您能从繁忙的日程中抽出时间，定期拜访全国各地的MBA学生。
In fact, I consider your visit to the Harvard Business School campus many years ago my personal rational awakening.
事实上，我认为您多年前访问哈佛商学院是我个人理性觉醒的一个重要契机。
My question is in regard to Dun & Bradstreet. Many academics would argue that two of the many factors that determine a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage are the threat of new interest through imitation, and the threat of substitution through technological advances, such as, you know, the internet and things of that nature.
我的问题与邓白氏公司有关。许多学者认为，决定公司可持续竞争优势的众多因素中，有两个关键点：一是通过模仿带来的新进入者威胁，二是通过技术进步（例如互联网等）带来的替代威胁。
My question is, how deep is the moat around Moody’s and the operating company?
我的问题是，穆迪和运营公司周围的护城河有多深？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t want to go into too much detail about our marketable investments.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们不想过多谈论我们的股票投资的细节。
But I would say that the moat is, just in our view, is far wider, deeper, and infested with far more poisonous characters, in the case of Moody’s, than in the case of the operating company.
但我会说，在我们看来，与运营公司相比，穆迪的护城河不仅更宽更深，而且充满了更多“毒性特质”。
We’ve had experience — just in terms of making decisions about how you either obtain credit information, in the case of the operating company, or if you want to obtain ratings on securities or something — I think you’d conclude that Moody’s is a much stronger franchise than the operating company.
我们有这样的经验——无论是通过运营公司获取信用信息，还是通过穆迪获取证券评级信息，你都会得出结论，穆迪是一个远比运营公司更强大的品牌。
Doesn’t mean the operating company can’t turn out to be a better business. It might have more upside under certain circumstances, too.
这并不意味着运营公司不能成为一个更好的业务。在某些情况下，它也可能具有更大的上升空间。
But if you’re really thinking of, you know, what bad can happen to you, I think that you would regard Moody’s as a considerably stronger franchise than the operating company.
但如果你真的在思考可能会发生的最坏情况，我认为你会认为穆迪是一个比运营公司强大得多的特许经营企业。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d certainly agree. The —
查理·芒格： 嗯，我完全同意。这——
Moody’s is a little like Harvard. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy. (Laughter)
穆迪有点像哈佛大学。这是一种自我实现的预言。（笑声）
You know, I hate to think of how much you could mismanage Harvard now and still have it work out pretty well.
你知道，我不敢想象，即使现在哈佛被管理得多么糟糕，它仍然能运行得相当不错。
26. Harvard Business School isn’t affected by supply and demand
哈佛商学院不受供需法则的影响
WARREN BUFFETT: If you cut the price of the admission to the Harvard Business School by $10,000 a year, you would have less demand, in all probability, than an increase in demand.
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果你把哈佛商学院的学费每年降低1万美元，很可能需求反而会减少，而不是增加。
I mean, it’s totally counterintuitive in that respect. Because the cachet of the school, in that case, is not only reinforced, it almost makes it necessary, that it be priced toward the top.
我的意思是，这在这个情况下完全违背直觉。因为学校的声望不仅因此得到巩固，反而几乎必须将价格维持在高位。
So, it — you can throw away the demand and supply curves that they teach you in Economics 101 on something like that.
所以，你可以把经济学101里教的供需曲线丢到一边，对于这样的情况是完全不适用的。
I — frequently, I have a little fun with — when I attend business schools. Because I ask them, you know, what the definition of a wonderful business is, and we go through all this stuff.
我经常会在访问商学院时开点小玩笑。我会问他们，什么是一个了不起的生意的定义，我们会讨论这些内容。
And then I say, you know, I tell them that — really — the best business I’ve seen is the Harvard Business School or the Stanford Business School, because the more they increase the price, the more people want to get in, and the more people think the product is worth.
然后我告诉他们，实际上，我见过的最棒的生意就是哈佛商学院或者斯坦福商学院。因为他们学费涨得越高，越多人想进去，越多人觉得这个产品值钱。
And that is a marvelous position to be in. (Laughter)
这是一种令人惊叹的市场地位。（笑声）
And I thank you for your comments on the — you know, I was lucky enough to have a great, great teacher in Ben Graham at Columbia. And Ben didn’t need to go up to Columbia once a week, on Thursday afternoon, to talk to a bunch of us.
我也感谢你的评论——你知道，我很幸运在哥伦比亚大学遇到了一位伟大的老师本·格雷厄姆。本当时完全没必要每周四下午跑到哥伦比亚大学来给我们这一群人讲课。
So it — I really feel it’s — I enjoy, sort of, passing that along. I haven’t had any original ideas in this field at all. But I, you know, I had a terrific teacher. And it’s fun to talk to students.
所以，我真的觉得这是一件——我很喜欢以某种方式把这些知识传递下去。我在这个领域没有任何原创想法，但我确实有一位很棒的老师。和学生交流是很有趣的。
If you talk to a bunch of guys my age, nothing happens. I mean, they just want to be entertained. (Laughter)
如果你跟我这个年纪的一群人交谈，基本上什么都不会发生。他们只是想被娱乐一下。（笑声）
But they want predictions always and that sort of thing. So I don’t do any of that at all. I’d rather talk to students. And I thank you for coming.
但他们总是想要一些预测之类的东西。而我完全不做这些。我更愿意和学生们交谈。谢谢你今天的到来。
27. Energy and transportation need a lot of capital
能源和交通运输需要大量资本
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 让我们听第三位提问者的问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Jared Placeler (PH). I’m 15 from St. Louis.
观众提问： 我叫贾里德·普拉斯勒（音译），15岁，来自圣路易斯。
Are you considering investing in energy and transportation companies, such as ones that deal with fuel cell and environmentally friendly energy resources?
您是否考虑投资于能源和交通运输公司，比如涉及燃料电池和环保能源资源的公司？
And if you are, will you thus be replacing any other energy-based investments you may currently hold, such as your newly acquired holdings in MidAmerican Energy?
如果是这样，您会否因此替换现有的任何能源相关投资，比如您新收购的 MidAmerican Energy 的股份？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that energy and transportation, in the very broad sense, are both things that we’ve at least got a chance of understanding. So those are the kind of areas in which we would think about making investments.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我会说，从广义上讲，能源和交通运输都是我们至少有机会理解的领域。因此，这些领域是我们可能会考虑投资的方向。
We would probably think about it less in connection with new technology. We might expect the people who run MidAmerican Energy to be thinking about that all the time.
我们可能不会特别从新技术的角度去考虑这一点。我们会期望管理 MidAmerican Energy 的人一直在思考这些问题。
But Charlie would be better at it than I am, because he has a different background and thinks better about that, anyway, in terms of evaluating newer technologies. I wouldn’t be very good at it at all.
但查理在这方面会比我更擅长，因为他有不同的背景，并且在评估新技术方面更有见地。而我在这方面完全不擅长。
But those fields are, they’re big, in terms of capital investment, for one thing. So they’re very big fields.
不过，这些领域从资本投资的角度来看是非常庞大的。因此，它们是非常大的投资领域。
And then secondly, we would probably think we were capable of evaluating the potential, some years down the road, of many companies in energy and transportation.
其次，我们可能会认为自己有能力评估能源和交通运输领域内许多公司的未来潜力。
So those would be fields we would consider. And of course, as you mentioned, we made an investment in MidAmerican Energy.
所以这些是我们会考虑的领域。当然，就像你提到的，我们已经投资了 MidAmerican Energy。
I doubt if the technology changes dramatically in any near term as to the product that they’re delivering.
我怀疑技术会在短期内对他们提供的产品发生显著变化。
But if there were changes on the horizon, I think we’ve got the management there that would be very good at spotting that ahead of time and capitalizing on it in a proper way.
但如果有变化即将发生，我认为我们的管理团队会很擅长提前发现这些变化，并以恰当的方式加以利用。
I wouldn’t take that function on myself.
我自己不会承担这样的职能。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, historically, we’ve done very little in either field. And mostly, the past is a pretty good guide to the future.
查理·芒格： 嗯，从历史上看，我们在这两个领域的投入都很少。而且大多数情况下，过去是未来的一个很好的指引。
WARREN BUFFETT: Historically, the transportation field, I mean, it’s been a terrible place to have money, and, whether it’s been in airlines or in the rails.
沃伦·巴菲特： 从历史来看，交通运输领域是一个不适合投钱的地方，无论是航空业还是铁路业。
If you — we’ve mentioned Value Line from here — from time to time.
如果你——我们偶尔会提到《价值线》。
If you go to the rail transportation section and just run your eye across on the revenues and look at the capital investment, the amount of capital required to produce incremental revenues is just — is horrible.
如果你看铁路运输板块，只需浏览一下收入和资本投资数据，就会发现，为了获得增量收入所需的资本投入是可怕的。
And on the other hand, there’s not much alternative here in the game to doing that. So there — many railroads will spend hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars. And it will not move the top line hardly at all. The ones where the top line has changed is where there’s been acquisitions or mergers.
另一方面，在这个行业中没有多少替代方案。许多铁路公司会投入数以亿计的资金，但几乎不会对收入总额产生太大影响。只有在收购或合并的情况下，收入总额才会有所变化。
Airlines, you’ll see just the opposite. You’ll see this great movement in the top line, but again, a disastrous amount of capital investment and very little in the way of returns. So, it hasn’t been a great field.
航空业则恰恰相反，你会看到收入总额的显著变化，但同时伴随着惊人的资本投资以及极少的回报。因此，这不是一个很好的领域。
Most fields that require heavy capital investment, most of the time, they don’t turn out very well over time. There are plenty of exceptions to that.
大多数需要大量资本投资的领域，大部分时间内的表现并不好。当然，也有很多例外。
But if you find a business that has to keep adding up huge sums of money every year, there always will be a reason why they’re doing it. But the net result, after five or 10 or 20 years usually isn’t very good.
但如果你发现一家企业每年都必须投入巨额资金，总会有某种原因促使他们这么做。然而，在五年、十年或二十年之后的净结果通常并不理想。
Charlie, got anything?
查理，有什么要补充的吗？
28. Buffett defends Coca-Cola CEO Doug Ivester’s big exit package
巴菲特为可口可乐前CEO道格·艾维斯特的巨额离职补偿辩护
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Bob Odem (PH) from Seattle, Washington.
观众提问： 下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是鲍勃·奥德姆（音译），来自华盛顿州西雅图。
I’d like to say, first of all, how nice it is to come out to Omaha, and how I am made to feel comfortable by its people. I hope you both are as enthusiastic about the meeting as you seem to be in years to come. Mr. Munger, by the way, I am looking forward to your book coming out.
首先，我想说来到奥马哈真是太好了，这里的人让我感到很舒适。我希望你们未来的几年仍然能像现在一样对股东大会充满热情。顺便说一句，芒格先生，我很期待您的书出版。
My question has to do with Doug Ivester’s severance package and what justifies it, considering he had a very short tenure as CEO and that he took the reins from some very strong performance from Goizueta and to be relieved of his dismal performance by Doug Daft.
我的问题与道格·艾维斯特的离职补偿有关，这笔补偿如何合理化？毕竟，他担任CEO的时间很短，而且是在戈伊苏埃塔的卓越业绩之后接手，却因表现不佳而被道格·达夫特接替。
My brother, still in the bottling and distribution business of Coke, cut this article from Bottlers’ World Magazine concerning the severance package. He said he also would retire, if he were offered this — (laughter) — 97.4 million in stock, 3 million per year for 2000 to 2002, 2 million per year, 2002 to 2007, 1.4 million per year from 2007 for the rest of his life.
我的兄弟仍然从事可口可乐的装瓶和分销业务，他从《装瓶商世界杂志》上剪下了一篇关于这笔离职补偿的文章。他说，如果能拿到这笔钱，他也会选择退休——（笑声）——包括9740万美元的股票，2000年至2002年每年300万美元，2002年至2007年每年200万美元，从2007年开始每年140万美元直至终身。
Anyway, I don’t see how — or here, car and cell phone, he gets that. That’s a Mercury Grand Marquis and mobile telephones, laptop computer, and the like. I don’t know why he’d need that. (Laughter)
而且，他还得到了汽车和手机等补偿，是一辆Mercury Grand Marquis，还有手机、笔记本电脑等等。我不知道他为什么需要这些。（笑声）
Anyway, I have been wondering how you voted on this, whether you supported it or not, or what degree, considering executive pay at Berkshire hasn’t risen except, perhaps, for the CFO who last got a raise, I believe, in 1997.
无论如何，我很好奇您对此的投票立场，您是否支持，或者支持到什么程度？毕竟，伯克希尔的高管薪酬并未上涨，除了CFO可能在1997年拿到过一次加薪。
WARREN BUFFETT: You asked — no, CFO’s gotten a raise every year.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你问到——不，CFO每年都获得了加薪。
But the — you asked whether I supported it. Yeah, I can tell you, I supported it. Because with my 35 percent interest in 8 percent of Coca-Cola, I paid almost 3 percent of it myself, personally.
但是——你问我是否支持这笔补偿。是的，我可以告诉你，我支持了它。因为我个人通过伯克希尔对可口可乐8%的持股承担了其中约3%的成本。
I probably paid more severance pay than any man in the history of the world, personally. (Laughter)
我可能是世界历史上个人支付离职补偿最多的人。（笑声）
I was not on the comp committee. But I will say this. Doug Ivester did all kinds of really wonderful things for the Coca-Cola Company, over time.
我并不在薪酬委员会里。但我要说，道格·艾维斯特为可口可乐公司做了许多非常出色的事情。
He was — for many, many years, when Roberto was running things, Doug — working with Don Keough, too, and I had this first hand from both of them. I wasn’t in Atlanta. But there was no question that he was a huge, huge asset and conceived and carried out many of the things that other people may have gotten even more credit for.
在罗伯托管理公司的许多年里，道格与唐·基奥合作密切。我从他们两人那里直接了解到这些情况。我当时不在亚特兰大，但毫无疑问，他是公司的一项巨大资产，他设想并实施了许多其他人可能获得更多荣誉的事情。
Most of what you described, not the little things at the end, but most of what you described was contractually in place at the time that he left. I mean, those were deals that were made, restricted stock and all of that, that really occurred, in significant part, when Roberto was the chief executive officer and at Roberto’s recommendation.
你提到的大部分内容——不包括最后那些小事——在他离职时实际上是合同规定好的。这些安排，例如限制性股票，主要是在罗伯托担任首席执行官时达成的，而且是根据罗伯托的建议制定的。
Doug’s devotion to Coke, his knowledge of Coke, I mean, he lived and ate and breathed Coke. But in my opinion, Doug Daft was the man for the job. And a change was made.
道格对可口可乐的奉献，他对公司的了解——他可以说是为可口可乐而生。但在我看来，道格·达夫特是更适合这份工作的那个人。所以做出了改变。
But it was not because of any lack of attention by Doug Ivester. It was not because he hadn’t done great things as CFO of the company.
但这并不是因为道格·艾维斯特不够用心，也不是因为他作为公司CFO没有取得出色的成绩。
But I think he was not the right man at the time he took over as CEO. He took over, as you know, when Roberto died quite suddenly. And there wasn’t any real option in terms of the —
但我认为，在他接任CEO时，他并不是最合适的人选。你知道，他是在罗伯托突然去世后接手的，当时没有其他真正的选择——
He was Roberto’s hand-picked successor. It’s almost inconceivable that somebody else would’ve been chosen at that time.
他是罗伯托亲自挑选的继任者。当时几乎难以想象会选择其他人。
And we made a decision, within a couple of years, that the company would move faster and better with Doug Daft in charge. And we made a deal in severance which was about 80 percent, or some very high percentage, embedded.
在几年内，我们做出了一个决定，公司在道格·达夫特的领导下会发展得更快更好。我们达成了一笔离职补偿协议，其中约80%或非常高的比例是既定的。
And like I say, I paid more of it than anybody else. So it isn’t like it was all academic.
就像我说的，我支付了其中最多的一部分。所以这并不仅仅是理论上的事情。
And I think, considering some other factors, which maybe I’ll put in a book sometime, that entered into it, it was definitely the right decision for the Coca-Cola Company.
我认为，考虑到一些其他因素（这些因素或许我会在将来的书中写到），这绝对是为可口可乐公司做出的正确决定。
Whether the computer should’ve been included or the car or anything, I can’t — I would not want to defend small item by small item. But I can — I think the Coca-Cola shareholders are going to be many billions of dollars ahead over time by what was done then. And it wasn’t easy to do.
至于是否应该包括电脑、汽车之类的补偿细节，我无法一一辩护。但我认为，可口可乐的股东通过当时的决策，在未来将获得数十亿美元的收益。而且这并不是一件容易的事。
We’ll go to 5 — Charlie, do you have anything to add on that? You paid a fair amount, too.
我们转到第5区——查理，你对此有什么补充吗？你也支付了一大笔钱。
29. Excessive CEO pay creates “hostility” to corporations
过高的CEO薪酬引发对企业的“敌意”
CHARLIE MUNGER: Generally speaking, I think it’s a mistake for corporate America to create as much hostility as it does, which is based on the way it compensates principal officers of corporations.
查理·芒格： 总体而言，我认为美国企业界通过对高管的薪酬安排引发如此多的敌意是一个错误。
It is simply maddening to add a little clause that the corporation will scratch the guy’s back for just tiny, little bits of stuff that looks terrible. To me, that is extremely stupid.
为那些看起来极其糟糕的小事情添加一些公司“护航”的条款，这实在令人恼火。在我看来，这非常愚蠢。
And I see it where the corporation helps him prepare his tax return for 10 years after he leaves and so forth.
我看到一些公司甚至会在高管离职后的十年里为其准备税务申报之类的事情。
I think that makes a terrible impression on shareholders, generally. And I think corporate America’s crazy to do it. They get sold this stuff by these damn consultants. (Laughter)
我认为，这通常会给股东留下极坏的印象。我觉得美国企业界这样做简直疯了。他们是被那些该死的顾问们“推销”了这些东西。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I agree with Charlie. And what — it is true — (applause) — what Charlie says.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我同意查理的看法。他所说的确实是事实——（掌声）——他说得很对。
We don’t have a contract, at least that I can think of, at Berkshire. It’s perfectly easy to run a company without them.
在伯克希尔，我们没有任何合同，至少我能想到的是这样。没有合同，经营一家公司完全没有问题。
We’ve got wonderful managers. You know, we’ve got things that might be called contracts. I mean, we’ve got deals with them, in terms of we work out compensation arrangements and all that.
我们有很棒的经理人。你知道，我们可能有一些可以被称为合同的东西。我的意思是，我们确实就薪酬安排等方面与他们达成了协议。
But I can’t remember a case of anybody that’s been with us that ever has called in a lawyer or anything of the sort, or where we even had to reduce things to writing, basically. And it works fine.
但我不记得我们这里的任何人曾经找过律师或类似的事情，也基本没有把这些事情写成正式的文件。而一切运行得很好。
And it is a little maddening, as Charlie says, to have a CEO, you know, show up with a lawyer with a 20-page contract. It’s become standard operating procedure.
正如查理所说，当一个CEO带着律师出现，并提出一份20页的合同时，这确实有些令人恼火。而这已经成了一种标准操作程序。
And once you get a big, public company with committees, consultants to the committees, consultants who, usually, are picked by the officers of the company, they look around at what everybody else is doing and say, “Well, that’s the way the other guy does it. So I’ll do it.”
而一旦你拥有一家大型上市公司，有各种委员会，还有顾问为这些委员会服务——这些顾问通常是由公司高管挑选的——他们就会环顾四周，看其他人怎么做，然后说：“哦，别人是这么做的，那我也这么做。”
I think you can — I think the proxy statements of the last 20 years, what that’s induced in the way of behavior by people at somewhat comparable companies that look at the proxy statements of their competitors and then say to their lawyer, “Well, Joe Blow got this. Why shouldn’t I have it?”
我认为，如果你看看过去20年的股东委托书，它引发了一种行为模式：同行公司的高管看着竞争对手的委托书，然后对他们的律师说，“乔·布洛得到了这些，为什么我不能有？”
It just escalates and escalates and escalates. And it ratchets. And it won’t stop. I have never seen a compensation consultant come into a public company and suggest a plan that, net, reduces the cost of compensation.
这种情况只会不断升级、加剧，形成螺旋上升的趋势，而且不会停止。我从未见过薪酬顾问走进一家上市公司，提出一个可以净减少薪酬成本的计划。
At — and I see all kinds of people leave companies with — who have made tremendous amounts of money. And nobody wants to hire them at half the price, or a quarter of the price, or a tenth of the price. I mean, it’s not a market system.
而且，我看到各种离开公司的高管，他们赚了巨额财富。没有人愿意以一半的价格，甚至四分之一或十分之一的价格雇用他们。这并不是一个市场系统。
CEO compensation is not a market system. And it’s not subject to market tests. And I don’t know what you do about that, particularly. But I — it doesn’t seem to bother shareholders very much. The ones that could change it —
CEO薪酬并不是一个市场化的系统，也没有接受市场的检验。我不知道该怎么特别地解决这个问题。不过——这似乎并没有太多困扰到股东们，而那些本可以改变它的人——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think it bothers them a lot, Warren. It’s just they feel powerless.
查理·芒格： 哦，我认为这确实让他们很困扰，沃伦。他们只是觉得无能为力。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but institutional shareholders could change that. My guess is that the top 30 institutions, probably, control — what — two-thirds of the big companies in the country. And they don’t seem to care that much.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，但机构股东可以改变这种情况。我猜，前30家机构大概控制了全国三分之二的大公司。而他们似乎并不太在意。
They — actually, they spend their time on what I regard as peripheral issues, usually. They talk about other things. They get involved in rituals of corporate governance that, frankly, don’t mean a damn in terms of how the company performs. And they seem to ignore these other issues.
实际上，他们通常花时间关注我认为是次要的问题。他们谈论其他事情，参与一些公司治理的形式化仪式，说实话，这些与公司业绩的实际表现毫无关系。而他们似乎忽略了这些更重要的问题。
But, you know, there’s — we’ve got enough to do running Berkshire. So we can’t reform the world on that.
不过你知道，我们有足够的事情要做来经营伯克希尔。所以我们无法在这方面改革整个世界。
做好自己。
We will run Berkshire in a rational manner. And we have yet to hire a compensation consultant. And we’ve yet to lose an important manager.
我们会以理性的方式管理伯克希尔。我们至今未聘请过任何薪酬顾问，也从未失去过任何重要的经理人。
30. Buffett: Economists aren’t needed
巴菲特：不需要经济学家
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to number 5. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们听第五位提问者的问题。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello.
观众提问： 你好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Diane Ryan (PH) from Prairie Village, Kansas. This is the fourth year I’ve attended the stockholder meeting. And I’d like to say, every year, I feel like I’ve learned a little bit more.
观众提问： 我是黛安·瑞安（音译），来自堪萨斯州的普雷里村。这是我第四年参加股东大会。我想说，每年我都感觉自己学到了一些东西。
This year, my question is, do you see a deflationary trend in the global economy? And if so, what is your investment advice?
今年我的问题是，您是否认为全球经济存在通缩趋势？如果是，您的投资建议是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Diane, I’m no good on the macro questions. And I’ve proven that by being way too worried about inflation for, probably, the last 20 years. Fortunately, it hasn’t made much difference, the fact that I’ve been wrong on that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，黛安，我在宏观问题上并不擅长。过去20年里，我对通胀过于担忧，这已经被事实证明了。而幸运的是，即使我在这一点上错了，也没造成太大影响。
So I don’t really think my judgment is any better than yours, at all, in terms of assessing what’s going to happen to global prices over time. My opinion would be that the world is not going in a deflationary situation.
因此，我并不认为自己在评估全球价格未来趋势上比你有更好的判断。我个人的看法是，世界不会进入一个通缩的局面。
But, you know, I’ve not earned any stars for my past economic predictions. And the good thing about my economic predictions, even if I do make them, is that I pay no attention to them myself, so. (Laughter)
不过，你知道，我在过去的经济预测中并没有值得称道的表现。而我对经济预测的唯一好处是，即使我做了预测，我自己也完全不理会。（笑声）
I really — and the way we pick our investments is we just don’t get into the macro factors. I can’t recall a time when Charlie and I have looked at a business, either buying it in its entirety or buying pieces of it through the stock market.
实际上，我们选择投资的方式是完全不考虑宏观因素。我不记得查理和我曾经在评估一家公司时，无论是全盘收购还是通过股市购买其股份，有过宏观层面的讨论。
I just — macro conclusions are — just never enter into the discussion. I mean, I’ll pick up the phone. We’ve had these two in recent months. And I’ll tell Charlie about it. And, you know, we talk about a few things. But we don’t talk about anything remotely macro. And that’s really the way it’ll stay.
宏观结论根本不会出现在我们的讨论中。比如，我会打电话给查理。最近几个月我们谈过两次。我会和他说一些事情，但从来不涉及任何宏观话题。而且，这种方式也会一直延续下去。
You know, I’ve seen a lot of bank mergers recently. And one of the things they do, because they want to cut the costs and justify a merger, which they’re dying to do, I mean, that’s the reason — so they cut costs they wouldn’t have cut if they weren’t dying to do the merger in the first place and get bigger.
最近，我看到很多银行合并。其中一个做法是，他们为了削减成本并为合并辩护，拼命推动合并。也就是说，他们会削减那些如果没有急于合并就不会削减的成本，只是为了变得更大。
But frequently — I know one in particular that I’m thinking of — you know, they’ll cut out the economics department. You know, I always wondered why the hell they had it in the first place. (Laughter)
但经常——我特别想到一家银行——他们会裁撤经济部门。我一直想不通，他们为什么一开始会有这个部门。（笑声）
You know, because what do they do? You know, I mean —the guy comes in and says, “I think GDP will be 4.6 this year instead of 4.3.” So what?
因为他们到底在做什么？一个人进来，说：“我认为今年的GDP会是4.6，而不是4.3。”那又怎么样呢？
You know, I mean, you’re still trying to make every good loan you can make. You’re still trying to take in deposits as cheap as you can. And you should be trying to cut costs wherever you can. It’s got nothing to do with running the business.
你还是要尽力发放每一笔好的贷款，尽可能以最低成本吸收存款，并尽量削减成本。这和经营业务毫无关系。
But, you know, it’s fashionable. And every bank had its economist and economics department. And when a big client would come in, they’d take him to lunch. And it just — it always has struck me as just a lot of nonsense.
但你知道，这是一种时尚。每家银行都有经济学家和经济部门。当有大客户来访时，他们会带客户去吃午餐。这在我看来完全是一派胡言。
So if we ever get an economics department at Berkshire, sell the stock short. (Laughter)
所以，如果伯克希尔哪天设立了经济部门，赶紧做空伯克希尔的股票吧。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6, please. Oh, Charlie, I didn’t —
沃伦·巴菲特： 第六位，请发问。哦，查理，我忘了——
CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible)
查理·芒格： （听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, OK. (Laughter) He’d rather eat peanut brittle.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，好吧。（笑声）他宁愿吃花生酥。
31. “Take on the qualities of other people you admire”
“汲取你所崇拜之人的品质”
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett —
观众提问： 您好，巴菲特先生——
WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Mr. Munger. My name is Aaron Wexler (PH). And I’m from Santa Maria, California.
观众提问： ——芒格先生，我是亚伦·韦克斯勒（音译），来自加利福尼亚州的圣玛丽亚。
I have — my question has two parts. The first part is, when you and Bill Gates had a television show some time ago, you were asked about the people who were — had different role models.
我的问题分为两部分。第一部分是，您和比尔·盖茨前段时间参加了一档电视节目，有人问到关于不同榜样人物的问题。
And you said, “Well, if I know a person’s role model, I can pretty well tell the kind of a person he is and what kind of a future he has.”
您说：“如果我知道一个人的榜样是谁，我几乎可以判断他是什么样的人，以及他将拥有怎样的未来。”
Mr. Buffett, my role model is Warren Buffett. Do you think I have a chance? (Laughter)
巴菲特先生，我的榜样是沃伦·巴菲特。您认为我有机会吗？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I hope you’re choosing me on the basis you hope to expect to live to an advanced age. I like to think that that’s what I bring to the party.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我希望你选择我作为榜样是因为你希望活得长寿。我喜欢认为这就是我带来的优势。
It does pay to have the right models. I mean, I was very lucky, early, very early in life, that I had certain heroes — and I’ve continued to develop a few more, as I’ve gone along — and they’ve been terrific. And they never let me down. And it takes you through a lot.
拥有正确的榜样确实很有价值。我很幸运，在人生非常早期就有了一些英雄榜样——随着人生的推进，我又继续找到了一些新的榜样——他们都很了不起，从未让我失望。这对你的人生帮助很大。
And I think that, you know, it just stands to reason that you copy, very much, the people that you do look up to, and particularly if you do it at an early enough age.
我认为，很显然你会大幅模仿那些你崇拜的人，特别是如果你在足够早的年龄就开始这么做。
So I think, if you can influence the model — the role models — of a 5-year-old or an 8-year-old or a 10-year-old, you know, it’s going to have a huge impact.
所以我认为，如果你能影响一个5岁、8岁或10岁孩子的榜样选择，这将对他们的人生产生巨大的影响。
And of course, everybody, virtually, starts out with their initial models being their parents. So they are the ones that are going to have a huge effect on them. And if that parent turns out to be a great model, I think it’s going to be a huge plus for the child.
当然，几乎所有人最初的榜样都是他们的父母。所以父母对他们会有巨大的影响。如果父母是一个伟大的榜样，我认为这将对孩子是一种巨大的正面影响。
I think that it beats a whole lot of other things in life to have the right models around. And I have — like I say, even as I’ve gotten older, I’ve picked up a few more. And it influences your behavior. I’m convinced of that.
我认为，拥有合适的榜样胜过生活中的许多其他事情。而且正如我所说，即使我年龄增长，我也找到了一些新的榜样。这确实会影响你的行为，我对此深信不疑。
And if you — you will want to be a little more, or a lot more, depending on your personality, like the person that you admire.
而且，无论程度大小，取决于你的性格，你都会想要更像你崇拜的人。
And I tell the students in classes, I tell them, you know, “Just pick out the person you admire the most in the class and sit down and write the reasons out why you admire them. And then try and figure out why you can’t have those same qualities.”
我告诉课堂上的学生们：“挑出班上你最崇拜的人，坐下来写下你崇拜他们的原因。然后试着弄清楚，为什么你自己不能拥有同样的品质。”
Because they’re not the ability to throw a football 60 yards, or run the 100 in ten flat, or something like that. They’re qualities of personality, character, temperament, that are — can be emulated. But you’ve got to start early. It’s very tough to change behavior later on.
因为这些品质并不是能投掷60码远的橄榄球，或在10秒内跑完100米之类的技能。这些是性格、品格和气质上的品质，是可以模仿的。但你必须早点开始。行为模式在后期是很难改变的。
And you can apply the reverse of it. Following Charlie’s theory, you can find the people that you don’t like — (laughter) — and say, “What don’t I like about these people?”
你也可以反过来应用这个方法。按照查理的理论，你可以找出那些你不喜欢的人——（笑声）——然后问自己，“我不喜欢这些人的什么地方？”
And then you can look — if, you know, it takes a little strength of character. But you can look inward and say, you know, “Have I got some of that in me?” and —
然后你可以反观自己——当然，这需要一点性格上的力量——问自己，“我是否也有类似的缺点？”然后——
It’s not complicated. Ben Graham did it. Ben Franklin did it.
这并不复杂。本·格雷厄姆做到了，本·富兰克林也做到了。
And it’s not complicated. Nothing could be more simple than to try and figure out what you find admirable and then decide, you know, that the person you really would like to admire is yourself. And the only way you’re going to do it is take on the qualities of other people you admire.
这不复杂。没有比弄清楚你欣赏什么更简单的事情了，然后决定，你真正想要崇拜的人就是自己。而实现这一点的唯一方法，就是汲取你所欣赏的人的品质。
Anyway, that’s a two-minute answer on something Bill and I did talk a little bit about.
总之，这是我和比尔曾稍微谈过的一件事的两分钟回答。
Charlie? (Applause)
查理？（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There is no reason, also, to look only for living models. The eminent dead are the — are, in the nature of things, some of the best models around.
查理·芒格： 是的。也没有理由只寻找还在世的榜样。那些杰出的已故人物本质上是最好的榜样之一。
And, if it’s a model is all you want, you’re really better off not limiting yourself to the living. Some of the very best models are — have been dead for a long time. (Laughter)
如果你只是想要一个榜样，那就更不该局限于活着的人。有些最优秀的榜样已经去世很久了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie has probably read more biography than any three people in this room put together. So he has put this into practice. And, as somebody mentioned earlier, Janet Lowe has a biography of Charlie coming out here in — later this year. So you can read all the secrets of Charlie’s life. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理读的传记可能比在座三个人加起来还多。所以他已经把这个理论付诸实践了。正如有人早些时候提到的，珍妮特·洛写了一本关于查理的传记，今年晚些时候会出版。你可以读到查理一生的所有秘密。（掌声）
32. Buffett and Munger have no interest in running the Federal Reserve
巴菲特和芒格对执掌美联储毫无兴趣
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好了，第七位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. My name is Gary Bradstrom (PH) from here in Omaha, Nebraska.
观众提问： 下午好，先生们。我是加里·布拉德斯特罗姆（音译），来自这里的内布拉斯加州奥马哈。
And my question is, if Alan Greenspan just decided to retire, and that job was offered, to either of you, would you take it?
我的问题是，如果艾伦·格林斯潘决定退休，而这份工作被提供给你们中的任何一位，你们会接受吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can tell you my answer is no, in a hurry. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我可以迅速告诉你，我的答案是不会。（笑声）
I think Charlie will give you his answer.
我想查理会给你他的答案。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say “no” more quickly. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我会更快地说“不会”。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You notice, we gave you very unequivocal answers. And of course, that alone would disqualify us from the job at the Fed. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 你注意到，我们给了你非常明确的答案。当然，仅凭这一点我们就不适合美联储的工作。（笑声）
I think it was Alan that said to one senator, he said, “Since you, you know, since you’ve seem to have stated my remarks so accurately, you must’ve misunderstood them.” (Laughter)
我记得好像是艾伦对一位参议员说过，“既然你似乎如此准确地表述了我的言论，那你肯定是误解了它们。”（笑声）
认为格林斯潘是脑残。
I don’t think you could find a job in public life that would entice either one of us.
我认为在公共领域中，你找不到任何工作能够吸引我们其中的任何一位。
And the truth is, we’re having too much fun. I mean, this — we’ve got the best job in the world. We get to work with people we like and admire and trust every day of the year. We get to do what we want to do the way we want to do it.
事实是，我们过得太愉快了。我的意思是，我们有全世界最棒的工作。我们每天都能和我们喜欢、敬佩、信任的人一起工作。我们可以按照自己的方式做自己想做的事情。
We should pay, and this is true of some other CEOs, too, but we should pay to have this job.
我们应该为这份工作付费，这对其他一些CEO也是适用的，但我们确实应该为拥有这份工作付费。
I mean, it is really interesting. I’ve often thought, if you could get, you know, you had a sealed envelope, and you got — and you had the compensation committee say what they would pay to have the job filled, but then you had the chief executive also say what he would do before he would leave, there would be a huge, huge gap.
我的意思是，这真的很有趣。我经常想，如果你能拿到一个密封的信封，让薪酬委员会说出他们愿意为填补这个职位支付多少钱，同时让首席执行官说出他在离职前愿意做什么，会有一个巨大的差距。
And I mean, it’s — there are all kinds of — I mean, it’s a lot of fun to start with interesting problems you come up with, interesting things to do, something different every day. You can’t beat the job. And to get paid for it is just the frosting on the cake.
我的意思是，这种工作有各种吸引人的地方——有趣的问题，有趣的事情做，每天都有不同的内容。没有工作能比这更棒。而且还能拿到薪水，这只是锦上添花。
And I don’t see any jobs like that in public life, myself.
我自己在公共领域里看不到任何这样的工作。
Charlie, have you got anything to add? Charlie takes on these public jobs. He runs a hospital and a few things. And he can tell you the wonders of it. Charlie?
查理，你有要补充的吗？查理还担任一些公共职务，他管理了一家医院和其他一些事情。他可以告诉你这些工作的奇妙之处。查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, yeah. There’s an old saying that, “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of a devaluation.” I never wanted to have a job where lying was a required part of the activity. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格： 哦，是的。有句老话说：“他撒谎得像货币贬值前夜的财政部长。”我从来不想要一份需要撒谎作为工作内容的职位。（笑声和掌声）
33. Berkshire is the “Metropolitan Museum of businesses”
伯克希尔是“企业界的大都会博物馆”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第八位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Norman Rentrop. I’m from Bonn, Germany. I want to thank you very much for so patiently listening and answering and sharing yesterday and today. And I’m a shareholder since 1992. And this is my first meeting.
观众提问： 巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是诺曼·伦特罗普，来自德国波恩。非常感谢您昨天和今天耐心倾听、回答并分享。我从1992年起成为股东，这是我第一次参加股东大会。
I came here being inspired by Robert Miles’ book, “101 Reasons to Own Berkshire Hathaway.” And I was very careful, listening to you, the reasons how you pick good people, that it’s love for the business and not so much love for the money.
我是受罗伯特·迈尔斯的书《拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦的101个理由》的启发来到这里的。我非常认真地听了您关于如何挑选优秀人才的理由：对事业的热爱远胜于对金钱的热爱。
And I’d like to hear a little bit more on your philosophies, now that Berkshire Hathaway is more and more buying companies. On this, how you make sure that it’s true love and how you pick people.
现在伯克希尔哈撒韦收购的公司越来越多，我想多听听您关于这个问题的理念。您如何确保这是对事业的真正热爱，又是如何挑选合适的人才的？
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a terrific question. I don’t know exactly how to answer. Maybe Charlie will think of it while I’m stumbling around, but —
沃伦·巴菲特： 这是个很棒的问题。我不太确定该怎么回答。也许查理会在我思考的同时想出答案，但——
I really — I think I can do that quite well. But I don’t know of any way to give somebody else a set of questions to ask, or, you know — I don’t know how to tell someone else how to select managers using those criteria: do they love the business or do they love the money?
事实上，我认为自己在这方面做得还不错。但我不知道如何给别人提供一套问题，或者说——我不知道如何教别人用这些标准来选择管理者：他们是热爱事业还是热爱金钱？
It’s very, very important. I mean, it’s crucial. Because it — well, we see it all the time. I mean, you’ve got people around who love the money. And you see them in public companies and doing things that we wouldn’t want to have associated with us.
这是非常非常重要的。我是说，这是关键。因为我们经常看到这种情况：有些人热爱的是金钱。你会在一些上市公司里看到他们，他们做的事情是我们不想与之扯上关系的。
And on the other hand, if they love the business, and we’ll tell — I’ll tell an owner this. I will say to them, “You built this business lovingly for 50 years, and maybe your parents before you, maybe even your grandparents.” One of these businesses we’re buying is fourth generation.
另一方面，如果他们热爱的是事业，我们会对他们说——我会对一个企业主说，“你花了50年的时间满怀热情地建设了这家公司，也许在你之前是你的父母，甚至是你的祖父母。”我们收购的其中一家公司已经是第四代传承了。
And the clincher, in fact, I used it with Jack Ringwalt back in 1967. I said to Jack, who had built it over a long period of time, “Do you want to sell this? You know, do you want to dispose of this, the most — you know, your creation, your painting? Or do you want some 26-year-old trust officer to do it the day after you die?”
实际上，我在1967年用这个理由说服了杰克·林格沃特。我对他这样说道，他花了很长时间建立了这家公司，“你真的想卖掉它吗？你是想处理掉它，你的创作，你的画作？还是让一个26岁的信托官在你去世的第二天来处理它？”
And the thought of who was going to handle this masterpiece, which he’d created himself, was important to him. And I tell him, If they want to put it in our museum, we will make sure, A, it doesn’t get resold, that it gets the proper respect, and that you can keep painting it.
想到谁会来接手这件他亲手创作的“杰作”，对他来说非常重要。我告诉他，如果他们愿意将它放入我们的“博物馆”，我们会确保：第一，它不会被转卖；第二，它会得到应有的尊重；第三，你可以继续创作它。
We won’t come in and tell you to use reds instead of yellows or anything like that. So even though it’s a masterpiece now, you can keep adding to it.
我们不会介入告诉你用红色代替黄色之类的事情。所以，即使现在它是一件杰作，你仍然可以继续完善它。
So we like to think that we’re the Metropolitan Museum of businesses and that we can get really outstanding creations to reside in our museum. But it — we’ve got to deliver the kind of museum to these painters of businesses, in effect, that we would want, if we were doing the same sort of thing.
所以我们喜欢把自己想象成企业界的大都会博物馆，我们希望真正出色的“作品”能够在我们的博物馆中“安家”。但实际上，我们必须为这些企业的“画家”提供一种博物馆，正如如果我们从事同样的事情时，我们希望拥有的那种环境。
To some people, that doesn’t mean a damn thing. I mean, all they want to do is auction their business, you know. And they probably cheat on their figures a little in the last year or two before they sell it to dress it up. And they do all kinds of things.
对某些人来说，这毫无意义。他们只想拍卖掉自己的企业。他们可能会在出售前的一两年里稍微调整数字美化一下业绩。他们会做各种各样的事情。
And they employ some investment banker who pretends that he’s getting bids from other people to jack it up some more. And that’s standard procedure for a lot of people.
他们会雇佣一些投资银行家，这些人假装从其他买家那里得到了报价，进一步抬高价格。这对很多人来说是标准操作流程。
We have no interest in buying in with them at any price because we don’t want to be on the other side of the table for the rest of our lives with somebody that’s going to do that.
无论价格如何，我们对与这些人进行交易毫无兴趣，因为我们不想在未来的人生中，与会这样做的人同桌共事。
If somebody loves their business — and I love Berkshire, I mean, you create something over a period of time — it means something to you.
如果有人热爱自己的企业——就像我热爱伯克希尔一样，我的意思是，当你在一段时间内创造了某些东西时，它对你来说是有意义的。
Some people get it out of how they decorate their home, or some people get it out of all kinds of different things, their golf game or whatever. But some of us get it out of building a business. And it has to be enormously important, what kind of a home it finds.
有些人通过装饰他们的家找到意义，有些人通过各种其他事情，比如他们的高尔夫球比赛或其他事情。而我们中的一些人则通过建立企业找到意义。而它最终的归宿是什么样的“家”是至关重要的。
And there comes a time, in many situations, for estate taxes, or because the kids don’t get along, or whatever the hell it may be, why people need to do something with that business. But they don’t want it auctioned off. And we get — we have a good home for that.
在许多情况下，会因为遗产税、子女之间的不和或其他任何原因，人们需要对企业做出某种安排。但他们不希望它被拍卖掉。而我们能提供一个好的归宿。
I think I can tell pretty well what people’s motivations are when they come in with a business. And so far, we’ve batted pretty well.
我认为，当人们带着企业找到我们时，我大致能够判断出他们的动机。到目前为止，我们的表现还不错。
We’ve made mistakes. There’s no question about that. But in a sense, I think they’ve gotten fewer over the years.
我们确实犯过错误，这毫无疑问。但从某种意义上说，我认为这些错误随着时间的推移变得越来越少了。
And we have — our disappointments with people have been very, very few. We’ve been wrong about the economics of the business sometimes. But that’s our mistake, not theirs. We’ve seldom been wrong about the people.
我们对人的失望非常少。我们有时会在企业的经济状况上判断错误，但那是我们的错误，不是他们的错误。而我们很少会看错人。
人是相对容易判断的。
And I wish I could give you a checklist that you could go down, and you could say, “Well, this guy loves the money. So he’s going to be gone in six months. And this one loves the business. So as long as I leave him alone to do his job and appreciate what he does, be fair with him, that he’s going to stay around here as long as he can.”
我希望能给你一份清单，你可以逐项检查，然后说，“这个人热爱金钱，所以他六个月后就会离开。而这个人热爱事业，所以只要我让他专注于自己的工作，欣赏他所做的一切，并公平对待他，他就会尽可能长久地留在这里。”
Charlie, have you got any thoughts on how you separate these people out?
查理，你对如何区分这些人有什么想法吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think our culture is very old fashioned. In other words, I think it’s Ben Franklin and Andrew Carnegie. It’s very old fashioned.
查理·芒格： 我认为我们的文化非常传统。换句话说，它是本·富兰克林和安德鲁·卡内基式的，非常传统。
And what I think is amazing about Berkshire is how well these very old-fashioned ideas still work.
而让我觉得惊讶的是，这些非常老派的理念在伯克希尔依然行之有效。
Can you imagine Andrew Carnegie calling in a compensation consultant or — (laughter) — an investment banker to tell him whether he should buy another steel mill? Or —
你能想象安德鲁·卡内基请一个薪酬顾问或者——（笑声）——一个投资银行家来告诉他是否应该买另一个钢厂吗？或者——
We don’t get imitated much. We’re imitating the behavior of a period that has been gone for a long time. But, I don’t see — a lot of the businesses we buy are kind of cranky like us and old fashioned. And I hope we continue it that way.
我们的做法并没有被广泛模仿。我们是在模仿一个早已过去的时代的行为。但我发现，我们购买的许多企业也像我们一样有些“古怪”和传统。我希望我们能一直保持这种方式。
WARREN BUFFETT: They’re sitting out there, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 他们就在那儿坐着呢，查理。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah. Well, but I think the businesses do have standards. See’s has standards. It has its own personality. But it’s — but maintaining standards is a huge part of it.
查理·芒格： 是的，是的。我认为企业确实需要有标准。See’s 有自己的标准，也有自己的个性。但保持这些标准是非常重要的一部分。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie hit on one thing. The idea of asking investment bankers or somebody to evaluate the businesses you’re going to buy, I mean, that strikes us as idiocy. If you don’t know enough about a business to decide whether to buy it yourself, you’d better forget it.
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理提到了一个关键点。请投资银行家或其他人来评估你要购买的企业，这对我们来说简直是愚蠢。如果你对一家企业的了解不足以让你自己决定是否购买，那你最好直接忘了这件事。
It does not make sense. (Applause) You bring in somebody who’s going to get a very large check if you buy it, and a very small check if you don’t, that displays a faith in human nature that would strain Charlie and me. (Laughter)
这毫无意义。（掌声）如果你找来一个人，他在你购买时能得到一大笔佣金，而在你不买时只能得到很少，这种对人性的信任会让查理和我都难以接受。（笑声）
It’s a key point, which you raise. And frankly, if I think there’s anything we’re good at, I think we’re pretty good at what you’re talking about there.
这是一个你提到的关键点。坦白说，如果我们擅长某件事，那我认为我们在你说的这方面确实相当擅长。
It’s an important part of capital allocation. Because we do not — we are not in a position to manage the businesses ourselves.
这是资本配置中非常重要的一部分。因为我们并不——我们没有能力自己管理这些企业。
And we want management as well as the business. And we’ve gotten it. And we’ve gotten it in spades from people that stay on and have done a terrific job for us. And it makes life a lot easier, too.
我们想要的不仅仅是企业，还有优秀的管理团队。而我们确实得到了这样的团队，而且这些团队表现非常出色。他们的存在也让我们的工作变得更加轻松。
34. What Buffett means when he can’t “understand” a business
巴菲特“无法理解”一家企业时的真正含义
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 1 again.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们再回到第一位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren. Hello, Charlie. My name is Doug Paterson. I’m from here in Omaha.
观众提问： 您好，沃伦。您好，查理。我是道格·帕特森，来自奥马哈本地。
I teach down the road at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. And I teach in theater, which is also the greatest job in the world. And I have to say that I enjoy the theater that you provide every year. Thanks so much.
我在内布拉斯加大学奥马哈分校教书，我教授戏剧，这是世界上最棒的工作之一。我想说，我非常享受您每年为我们带来的“戏剧”。非常感谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just sitting here, there are so many questions that come to those of us who have been sitting here for three or four hours. I’ve got three very disconnected questions.
观众提问： 坐在这里三个多小时，我们想到许多问题。我有三个完全不相关的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll do them one at a time.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们一个一个来回答。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Cool. In terms of these tech stocks, you say that you don’t understand them. Can you say if you think — I can’t imagine you not understanding something.
观众提问： 太好了。关于科技股，您说您不了解它们。您能不能解释一下？我无法想象有什么事情是您不理解的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, we understand the product. We understand what it does for people. We just don’t know the economics of it 10 years from now.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，我们了解这些产品，我们知道它们为人们提供了什么。但我们不了解它们在10年后的经济状况。
That, I mean, you can understand all kinds — you can understand steel. You can understand home building. But if you look at a home builder and try and think where it’s going to be in five or 10 years, the economics of it, that’s another question.
我的意思是，你可以理解各种东西——比如钢铁、住宅建筑。但如果你看一家住宅建筑公司，并试图预测它五年或十年后的经济状况，那是另一个问题。
I mean, it’s not a question of understanding the product they turn out or the means they use to distribute it, all of those sort of things. It’s the predictability of the economics of the situation 10 years out. And that — that’s our problem.
我的意思是，这不是关于理解他们生产的产品或分销方式的问题，而是关于十年后经济状况的可预测性。这才是我们的问题所在。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Right, and I’m not trying to provoke you into doing it. I’m glad you haven’t. Because I probably would’ve gone into cardiac arrest this last couple of months.
观众提问： 对，我不是想挑衅您去尝试。我很高兴您没有这样做。因为过去几个月，我可能已经因为这些事情心脏病发作了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, so would we.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们也是一样。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. So your projection is that you are not going to try to make an attempt to understand it. You think it’s — is it not comprehensible? Is that it, it’s not comprehensible?
观众提问： 是的。所以您的判断是，您不会尝试去理解它。您觉得这是——无法理解吗？是因为它无法理解吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Every business I look at, I think about its economics. It’s built into me. It’s built into Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我看待每个企业时都会思考它的经济学。这是根植于我心中的，也是根植于查理心中的。
So it isn’t like, when some — if I’m with Andy Grove, or actually, I knew Bob Noyce back at Grinnell in 1968 and ’69, when they were starting Intel.
所以，这不是说——比如说，如果我和安迪·格罗夫在一起，或者实际上，我早在1968年和1969年就认识了鲍勃·诺伊斯，那时他们正在创办英特尔。
I — when he talked to me about starting Intel, or anybody talks to me about a business, I think about its economics. I’ll think about the economics of UNO, you know, if we talk for three or four minutes.
当他和我谈论创办英特尔，或者任何人和我谈论一项业务时，我都会思考它的经济学。哪怕我们谈论内布拉斯加大学奥马哈分校（UNO）三四分钟，我也会思考它的经济学。
But — I — so it isn’t that we shut off the valve. It’s just that we don’t get anyplace. We don’t know what it’ll look like. And it’s, you know, there are a lot of things in life that, you can — they’re just beyond comprehension for many of us. And —
但——这不是说我们关闭了思考的阀门。而是我们没办法得到任何答案。我们不知道它会是什么样子。而且你知道，生活中有许多事情对我们大多数人来说是无法理解的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So you’d say that like, nobody, really, probably, can understand this, where it’ll be in 10 years. Nobody could understand it.
观众提问： 所以您是说，没有人真正能理解这个行业，也无法理解它在10年后的样子。没有人能理解它，对吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: We would be very skeptical about it. I would say that — and incidentally, my friend, Bill Gates, would say the same thing. And actually, Bob Noyce would’ve, and Bob died some years ago, but — or Andy Grove — they would say the same thing. I’ve taken long walks with Andy.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们对此会非常怀疑。我会这么说——顺便提一下，我的朋友比尔·盖茨也会这么说。实际上，鲍勃·诺伊斯会这么说——虽然鲍勃几年前去世了——安迪·格罗夫也会这么说。我和安迪散步时聊过很多次。
And they would not want to put down on paper their predictions about where 10 companies you would choose in the tech field would be in 10 years, in terms of their economics. They would say, “That’s too hard.”
他们不会愿意把他们对科技领域中您挑选的10家公司10年后经济状况的预测写在纸上。他们会说，“这太难了。”
35. Buffett: Berkshire will be fine if I’m hit by a truck
巴菲特：如果我被卡车撞了，伯克希尔依然会安然无恙
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Cool. A second question, again, not related. But I’ve heard this question several times today. And it comes up every year.
观众提问： 好，第二个问题，同样无关，但今天我已经听过好几次了，这个问题每年都会被提到。
I’d like to couch it in sort of a different phrase. Let’s say that you stepped outside of this building and were hit by a bus.
我想用一种稍微不同的表达方式。假设您走出这栋楼，被一辆公交车撞了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve got one fellow who objects to that here who’s a shareholder. It’s normally a truck.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这里有一个股东反对这种说法，他通常说的是卡车。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A truck, OK.
观众提问： 卡车，好吧。
WARREN BUFFETT: And he happened to be in the trucking business, so he —
沃伦·巴菲特： 他恰好从事卡车行业，所以他——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Or, given —
观众提问： 或者，鉴于——
WARREN BUFFETT: Just so it isn’t a GEICO driver. But — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 只要不是GEICO的司机就行。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Given Omaha, it could be a road grader.
观众提问： 鉴于这是奥马哈，也可能是一台平地机。
What kind, I mean, that would be a sudden — maybe you’d come out of it with a great fastball. Maybe that’s it. But you wouldn’t have your facility at stocks.
这种突发事件可能让您拥有更快的球速，但不会让您在股票投资上保持敏锐。
What kind of advice would you give people that hold Berkshire Hathaway at a moment such as that?
在那样的情况下，您会给持有伯克希尔哈撒韦股份的人什么建议？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s — I’ve got the ultimate test on that. Because my estate, at that point, would be 99 3/4 percent invested in Berkshire. And I feel totally comfortable, considering the arrangements that have been made, and the businesses we own, and the managers we have in place, in terms of that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这是一个终极测试。因为到那个时候，我的遗产有99.75%都会投资在伯克希尔。而根据现有的安排，以及我们所拥有的业务和在位的管理团队，我对此感到完全放心。
But no one will be more affected, financially, let alone in other manners, by that truck than me. (Laughter)
但从财务上来说，没人会比我更受那辆卡车的影响，更不用说其他方面了。（笑声）
So it’s a thought that’s crossed my mind.
所以这个问题确实在我的脑海中闪过。
And it’s a more important question to me than to anybody else. And I’ve answered it to my satisfaction. The directors have some of my thoughts on the subject. But the world will go on. The businesses will go on. And I think you’ll have terrific management in place.
对我来说，这个问题比对任何人都更重要。而我已经对这个问题给出了让我自己满意的答案。董事会也了解我对此的一些想法。但世界会继续运转，企业也会继续运转。我认为伯克希尔会有优秀的管理团队接替。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. I appreciate that. And thank you for taking all three of these. They’re so disconnected.
观众提问： 谢谢您，我很感激您的回答。也感谢您回答了我这三个毫无关联的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，谢谢你。
36. Buffett: No interest in buying the Omaha World-Herald newspaper
巴菲特：无意收购《奥马哈世界先驱报》
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Given your comments about newspapers, may we assume that you are probably not going to buy the Omaha World-Herald?
观众提问： 鉴于您对报纸的看法，我们是否可以假设，您可能不会收购《奥马哈世界先驱报》？
WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s a fair assumption. But that would probably be true regardless of my thoughts about newspapers. Because they’re not going to sell.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我认为这是一个合理的假设。但无论我对报纸的看法如何，这都可能是事实。因为他们不会出售这份报纸。
Charlie, have you got anything to add on any of those?
查理，你对此有任何补充吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that story about the World-Herald is interesting. The truth of the matter is that, if Warren had been offered the Omaha World-Herald 20 or 25 years ago, he would’ve cheerfully bought it. And now he doesn’t want it. And that isn’t because of the economics.
查理·芒格： 关于《世界先驱报》的故事很有趣。事实上，如果在20或25年前有人将《奥马哈世界先驱报》提供给沃伦，他会很乐意买下它。而现在他不想要了。这并不是因为经济因素。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s true. Yeah, I mean, there’s no question — I have not been offered it, never will be offered it. And all — the ownership’s all set. But what Charlie said is true.
沃伦·巴菲特： 这是真的。是的，我的意思是，毫无疑问——我没有被提供过这个机会，也永远不会被提供。而且所有权已经安排好了。但查理所说的是事实。
If it were still owned by an individual, and they offered it to me, for economic reasons, I wouldn’t want to buy it. And for other reasons, I wouldn’t want to buy it.
如果它仍然是个人所有，并且他们把它提供给我，无论是出于经济原因还是其他原因，我都不想买它。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But you wouldn’t want to buy it now, because your life would be less congenial afterward than before. There’d be more people after you.
查理·芒格： 但现在你不想买，是因为你以后的生活会比现在更不愉快，会有更多的人追着你。
WARREN BUFFETT: There’d be no plus in life to owning the World-Herald, at all. Yeah. (Laughter)**
沃伦·巴菲特： 拥有《世界先驱报》对生活来说完全没有任何好处。是的。（笑声）
And, as Charlie said, that’s probably not the way we would’ve thought 30 years ago.
正如查理所说，这可能不是我们30年前会有的想法。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Not at all.
查理·芒格： 一点也不是。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we’re right now.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我认为我们现在是对的。
37. Internet is good for society, bad for businesses
互联网对社会有益，但对企业不利
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Howard Winston (PH) from Chicago, Illinois. I wanted to thank Charlie and you for your hospitality.
观众提问： 您好，我是霍华德·温斯顿（音译），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。我想感谢查理和您对我们的热情接待。
My question is, Berkshire has benefitted enormously over the years from the low cost of its float. Do you think the internet will make the insurance business more competitive and, therefore, raise the cost of your float?
我的问题是，多年来伯克希尔从低成本的浮存金中受益匪浅。您认为互联网会让保险行业竞争更激烈，从而提高您的浮存金成本吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. I would say that the internet, from what I see now, is unlikely to increase the cost of Berkshire’s float.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这是个好问题。根据我目前看到的情况，互联网不太可能增加伯克希尔浮存金的成本。
It will have different effects on different aspects of our insurance business. And it will change the insurance industry in some ways, not — and I can’t tell you exactly what. But I —
它会对我们的保险业务的不同方面产生不同的影响。它会在某些方面改变保险行业，但我无法准确告诉你会有哪些变化。
You know that any system of distribution is going to be affected by something that changes the economics of distribution as much as the internet does. So there’s no question it’ll have an impact.
你知道，任何分销系统都会受到某些改变分销经济性因素的影响，而互联网的影响非常大。所以毫无疑问，它会产生影响。
I think in the end, the competitive advantages we have among our group of insurance companies, net, will not be hurt by the internet. But I could be wrong on that. And therefore, I don’t think that our cost of float will be changed much.
我认为最终，互联网不会伤害我们保险集团的竞争优势。但我可能会错。因此，我认为我们的浮存金成本不会有太大变化。
I don’t think industry economics, in aggregate, for insurance companies, are going to be changed very much. The economics haven’t been that good. I think they’ll be about, you know, in that same range.
我认为保险业的整体经济性不会有太大变化。这个行业的经济性本来就不是特别好，我觉得它会保持在大致相同的范围内。
And I don’t think our competitive advantage will be cut. So therefore, I think our cost of float, in the future, is going to be higher than it has been in the past. But that’s for reasons other than the internet. I still think we’ll have an attractive cost of funds over time on float.
我也不认为我们的竞争优势会被削弱。因此，我认为我们未来的浮存金成本会比过去高一些，但这并不是因为互联网的原因。我仍然认为我们长期来看会拥有有吸引力的资金成本。
It’s a good business for us. I don’t think it’s necessarily a good business for the average company.
这对我们来说是个好生意。但对普通公司来说不一定如此。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s a marvelous issue buried in your question. Will the internet, by making competition so much more efficient, make business generally harder for American corporations, meaning more competitive, lower returns on capital? And my guess would be yes.
查理·芒格： 嗯，你的问题中隐藏着一个很棒的议题。互联网通过让竞争更加高效，是否会让美国企业的经营普遍变得更困难？也就是说，竞争会更激烈，资本回报率会降低？我的猜测是，会的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. My guess would be yes, too. I would say that, on balance, for society, the internet is a wonderful thing. And for capitalists, it’s probably a net negative.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我的猜测也是肯定的。总体而言，对社会来说，互联网是一件很棒的事情。但对资本家来说，可能是一个净负面影响。
CHARLIE MUNGER: So all of you can be happy that the progress of the species will affect your economic futures for the worse. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 所以你们所有人都可以高兴了，因为人类的进步会让你们的经济未来变得更糟。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: A sacrifice, at which our ages, we’re willing to do. But we wouldn’t be at your age. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 这是我们这个年纪愿意做出的牺牲。但如果是你们这个年纪，我们就不会愿意了。（笑声）
That — incidentally, that — there’s plenty to think about there.
顺便说一下，这里有很多值得思考的地方。
The internet, I mean, if you analyze it, you have to think it’s much more likely that it will reduce the profitability of American business than improve it.
互联网——我的意思是，如果你分析它，你会发现它更可能降低美国企业的盈利能力，而不是提高。
It will improve the efficiency of American business. But all kinds of things improve the efficiency of American business without making it more profitable.
它会提高美国企业的效率。但有很多事情可以提高美国企业的效率，却不会让它们更有盈利能力。
And I think that the internet is likely to fall into that category. So far, it’s improved the monetized value of American business.
我认为互联网很可能属于这一类。目前为止，它确实提高了美国企业的货币化价值。
But that will eventually follow the underlying economics of what the internet does. And I think it’s way more likely to make American business, in aggregate, worth less than compared to what it would’ve been otherwise.
但最终，它将遵循互联网带来的基本经济规律。我认为，与其他情况相比，互联网更可能让美国企业的整体价值下降。
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, that’s perfectly obvious and very little understood. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 顺便说一下，这非常显而易见，但却很少有人理解。（笑声）
结果正好相反，S&P500的ROE是提高的。
WARREN BUFFETT: So there. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 就这样吧。（笑声）
38. Egos and proxy statements fuel excessive CEO pay
自负和代理声明助长了过高的CEO薪酬
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第三位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, good afternoon. My name is Tom Gayner from Richmond, Virginia.
观众提问： 是的，下午好。我是汤姆·盖纳，来自弗吉尼亚州的里士满。
And in the current environment, it seems that the attacks on the moats of wonderful businesses are coming from inside the castle, in the form of option-based compensation, just as much as from outside competitors.
在当前环境下，似乎对优秀企业护城河的攻击不仅来自外部竞争者，还来自城堡内部的期权薪酬制度。
One of your role models, Ben Franklin, said, “Even a small hole can sink a great ship.” It seems like the holes are getting bigger.
您的一位榜样本·富兰克林说过，“即使是一个小洞也能让大船沉没。” 现在这些洞似乎变得越来越大了。
Can you discuss what, if any, forces may cause this to change? Is it a problem that will get worse or get better?
您能否谈谈可能会促使这一情况改变的力量是什么？这是一个会变得更糟还是会改善的问题？
My second is specifically, in your role as directors of companies like Coke and Gillette, are you seeking to change these practices? And what kinds of success do you expect there? Do they let you on the comp committee?
第二个问题是，作为可口可乐和吉列等公司董事，您是否试图改变这些做法？您对此预期什么样的成功？他们会让您加入薪酬委员会吗？
And three, if these compensation practices are irrational, does Berkshire benefit from this irrationality? Thank you.
第三个问题是，如果这些薪酬做法是不理性的，伯克希尔是否从中受益？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to carry the castle analogy further, we not only look for a great economic castle, but we look for a great knight in charge of that castle. Because that’s important. He’s the one that throws the crocodiles into the moat and widens the moat over time.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，继续用城堡的比喻来说，我们不仅寻找一座伟大的经济城堡，还寻找一位管理这座城堡的出色骑士。因为这很重要。他是那个将鳄鱼扔进护城河并随着时间推宽护城河的人。
And of course, the question is, you know, how much does the knight get of the castle for doing that? And I think, generally speaking, at Berkshire, you get a very fair deal in terms of the amount that —
当然，问题在于，这位骑士为此能从城堡中获得多少回报？我认为，总体来说，在伯克希尔，这种分配是非常公平的——
We’ve got a lot of castles around. And we try to pay people fairly. But I don’t think that the division of — is unfair between the owners of the castle and the knights that are around there, protecting the moat.
我们拥有许多城堡。我们努力做到公平地支付报酬。但我不认为在城堡的所有者与周围保护护城河的骑士之间的分配是不公平的。
The — it’s hard for me to imagine how the compensation practices — the question of how much the knight gets of the castle — how that changes in favor of the owners of the castle over time. The ratcheting effect is just unbelievable.
很难想象薪酬制度——也就是骑士从城堡中获得多少报酬的问题——会随着时间的推移变得有利于城堡的所有者。这种逐步上升的效果简直难以置信。
No one, no compensation committee in America, will be listening to a consultant who walks in and says, “I think your management should have an arrangement that ends up in them being in the lower half.”
在美国，没有任何薪酬委员会会听取这样一位顾问的建议：“我认为你们的管理层应该有一个让他们处于下半区的薪酬安排。”
And if no one wants to be in the lower half, believe me, the median is going to move up.
如果没有人愿意处于下半区，相信我，中位数会不断上升。
I mean, there is no way around that. I mean, these people meet yearly or more often. And they sit there with a proxy statement of every other company in their business. You know, and they pick out the ones that have the biggest numbers in them.
这没办法避免。这些人每年或更频繁地开会。他们坐在那儿，手里拿着行业内每家公司的代理声明，然后挑出其中数字最大的一家。
And they say, “Well, gee, we need a management at least as good as this. And how are we going to attract people?” and all this other stuff.
然后他们说：“哎呀，我们至少需要一个和这家一样优秀的管理团队。我们怎么吸引到这样的人？”等等类似的说辞。
And it’ll only ratchet upward. And I think that’s a fact of life. And I think that it’s important for shareholders to understand that.
薪酬只会逐步上升。我认为这是生活中的一个事实，股东们需要理解这一点。
I’ve been on the board of 19 companies, not counting any Berkshire subsidiaries or anything like that. The last comp committee I was on was at Salomon. And I was chairman of the comp committee, I think. I may be wrong on that. There were three of us. And the other two guys were terrific guys.
我曾在19家公司的董事会任职，这还不包括伯克希尔的子公司之类的。我参与的最后一个薪酬委员会是所罗门兄弟的。我想我当时是薪酬委员会的主席，但我可能记错了。我们当时有三个人，另外两位是非常优秀的人。
And the earnings came in one year, $100 million or so — I think it was 1990 — below the previous year. And comp was up a fair amount.
那一年，公司收入比上一年少了大约1亿美元——我想是1990年——但薪酬却大幅增加。
And I’d found that there had been some earlier issues involved and so on. I just said, I couldn’t swallow it anymore. And I voted against it.
我发现之前存在一些问题等等。我只是说，我再也无法接受了，于是我投了反对票。
I can’t remember whether I was chairman or not. But in any event, it was two to one against me. And I think it would’ve been two to one against me if I’d been chairman.
我记不清当时我是否是主席。但无论如何，投票结果是两票对一票反对我。我想即使我是主席，结果也会是两票对一票。
And the other two fellows were perfectly rational. They said, “How do we keep these people? And, you know, how can we repudiate our management?” All the sort of things you get.
另外两位委员完全是理性的。他们说：“我们怎么留住这些人？我们怎么能否定我们的管理层呢？”这类问题屡见不鲜。
So as a practical — I’ve got one friend, terribly well-regarded businessman — and he’s been — they don’t throw you off the comp committee. They just don’t re-nominate you.
实际上，我有一位朋友，是非常受尊敬的商人——他经历过类似情况。他们不会把你从薪酬委员会赶走，只是不会再提名你了。
And he’s been bounced from two of them simply by raising some questions that — about things you would find outrageous.
他因为提出了一些关于你可能会觉得离谱的事情的问题，就被两个委员会踢了出去。
I’m not on the comp committee. I’ve been on only one comp committee. And they saw what I did. So that was the end of it.
我不在薪酬委员会。我只在一个薪酬委员会待过一次，他们看到我的所作所为后，那就是结束了。
People say, “We love your ideas,” And, you know, “You think creatively. We don’t want to hear about your thoughts on compensation.” And that, you know, it’s understandable.
人们说：“我们喜欢你的想法，”然后又说，“你很有创意。但我们不想听你对薪酬的看法。” 这可以理解。
You know, and every — and you run into some terrific cases of people. I mean, the fellow who runs Fastenal, for example, they are just outstanding. And there are a number of cases where people behave very well.
你知道，有时候你会遇到一些很优秀的人。例如，经营Fastenal的那位，他就非常出色。还有许多表现得很好的例子。
But most of them, I think some — I don’t think it’s money so much, sometimes. I just think it’s ego. They just can’t stand to see some guy that they think is batting .280, and they’re batting .300, and he’s getting paid more money. And, you know, and that process is endless.
但大多数情况下，我认为有些——有时候不是因为钱。我只是认为是因为自负。他们无法忍受看到一个他们认为打击率是.280的人，却比他们这些打击率是.300的人挣得更多。你知道，这个过程是无止境的。
And that, I, you know, that’s understandable. It’s like who gets top billing in a movie or something of the sort. People care about, you know, where their name is compared to somebody else’s. And their name, in this case, is compensation. And it — I doubt if it reverses itself.
这，我觉得，这是可以理解的。这就像谁在电影里能排在演员名单的最前面之类的事情。人们在意自己的名字和别人的名字相比位置如何。而这里的“名字”是薪酬。我怀疑这种情况是否会有反转。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think we can confidently expect that the situation will get worse. And I think we can confidently expect that that is bad for Berkshire Hathaway to the extent that it’s a passive shareholder in big corporations.
查理·芒格： 不，我认为我们可以有把握地预期这种情况会变得更糟。我还认为，对于伯克希尔哈撒韦作为大型公司被动股东的情况来说，这是不利的。
There is one place where we get an advantage: our own culture and attitude being so different, it does attract some of these people that own wonderful businesses.
但我们有一个优势：我们自己的文化和态度非常不同，这确实吸引了一些拥有优秀企业的人。
I mean, we literally, on occasion, find people for whom we’re the only acceptable buyer. They don’t like this culture of other big corporations any better than you do. And that does give us an advantage.
我的意思是，有时候我们确实发现一些人，对于他们来说，我们是唯一可以接受的买家。他们也和你一样不喜欢其他大公司的这种文化。这确实给了我们一个优势。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You asked us a question, also, about the — how active we might be in saying this. We’re not going to ever sit here and tell you what we say in other boardrooms, because it would reduce any effectiveness we might have. And we probably don’t have that much effectiveness anyway. But —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。你还问了我们一个问题，关于我们在这方面会多么积极地表达立场。我们不会坐在这里告诉你我们在其他董事会说了什么，因为这会削弱我们可能有的任何影响力。而且说实话，我们可能本来就没有多大影响力。但是——
You can only belch so many times at the dinner table and get invited back. And — (laughter) — we’ve probably done enough of our share of that.
你在餐桌上只能打有限次数的饱嗝，之后还能被邀请回来。（笑声）我们大概已经做得够多了。
And you — we try to run Berkshire in a way that we find admirable. And we try to spell out our reasoning on it and everything else. And we hope that maybe somebody latches onto that as a model someplace.
我们试图以我们认为值得赞赏的方式经营伯克希尔，并努力阐明我们的理由和其他所有内容。我们希望也许有人会将其作为某种模范。
But going around condemning people by name does not work. And so we, you know, we hate the sin and love the sinner and all that sort of thing. And it doesn’t have much effect.
但到处点名批评别人是行不通的。所以，我们——你知道，我们憎恶罪恶，但热爱罪人，诸如此类的事情。而且它没什么效果。
39. Hard to predict how demographics will affect markets
难以预测人口结构如何影响市场
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie. My name is Erras (PH). I’m from Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. And my first time in Nebraska, in Omaha, first time hearing you guys live.
观众提问： 下午好，沃伦和查理。我是埃拉斯（音译），来自加拿大马尼托巴省温尼伯。这是我第一次来内布拉斯加州奥马哈，也是第一次现场听你们讲话。
And there’s a big ice cream man behind you.
而且你们身后有一个大冰淇淋供应商。
WARREN BUFFETT: Hmm. There we go!
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这来了！
FEMALE VOICE: Here you go.
女性声音： 给你们。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, thank you.
查理·芒格： 哦，谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: And you think there are no management perks at Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你以为在伯克希尔没有管理层的福利吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, boy. (Laughter) All right, let’s get down to business.
观众提问： 哦，天哪。（笑声）好吧，让我们开始正题。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is in reference to your article in Fortune magazine last November, where you talked about corporate earnings and what the market — are you guys listening? Or…
观众提问： 我的提问是关于您去年11月在《财富》杂志上的一篇文章，您谈到了企业盈利和市场——你们在听吗？还是……
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m listening. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我在听。（笑声）
We can chew gum and listen at the same time.
我们可以一边嚼口香糖一边听。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right, all right, all right. As I was saying —
观众提问： 好吧，好吧，正如我刚才所说——
WARREN BUFFETT: But if we had —
沃伦·巴菲特： 但如果我们有——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — the point in your article in Fortune about corporate earnings and what the market is paying for them, painting a pretty gloomy picture for equities and market levels going forward.
观众提问： ——在您《财富》杂志的文章中提到企业盈利和市场对其的估值，这为股票和未来的市场水平描绘了一幅相当暗淡的图景。
Now, as you may know, there exists a very strong trend in demographics. We see, in Canada and the United States, the aging of the population and, more importantly, the bulk of this population reaching their peak savings years, all at the same time.
现在，如您所知，人口结构中存在一个非常强劲的趋势。我们看到，在加拿大和美国，人口正在老龄化，更重要的是，大量人口正在同时进入储蓄高峰期。
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re getting a little rude. But go ahead. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 你有点失礼了，但继续吧。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I can’t believe this. Warren actually called me rude.
观众提问： 我简直不敢相信，沃伦居然说我失礼了。
WARREN BUFFETT: I wanted to prove to you I was listening. Go ahead. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我只是想证明我在听你的话。继续吧。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Anyways, OK, so there’s a major retirement crisis as a majority of Canadians and Americans between the ages of, especially between 22 and 55, are worried that they won’t have enough money to fund their retirement or let alone, last.
观众提问： 好吧，无论如何，现在存在一个严重的退休危机，大多数加拿大人和美国人，尤其是22到55岁之间的人，担心他们没有足够的资金来支撑退休生活，更不用说维持下去了。
So for this reason, I mean, this population is expected to invest in equities, as opposed to fixed-income instruments, to get the necessary long-term rates of return to fund their nest egg for retirement.
因此，这部分人群预计会投资于股票，而不是固定收益工具，以获得必要的长期回报率来为他们的退休储蓄提供资金。
And therefore, many are calling for massive amounts of money to flow into the markets over the next five, 10, 15 years through stocks and mutual funds and, consequently, fueling market prices and market levels. Many predicting the biggest growth ever in the stock markets.
因此，许多人预测未来5、10、15年，大量资金将通过股票和共同基金流入市场，从而推动市场价格和水平。很多人预测股市将迎来有史以来最大的增长。
So what is your opinion on this potential trend, separately or in conjunction with what you said in that article in Fortune? Thanks very much.
那么，您对这种潜在趋势怎么看？无论是单独看，还是结合您在《财富》杂志文章中所说的内容。非常感谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good. To be, I’m not being rude here, but we don’t think it means a thing, frankly. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我不是故意失礼，但坦率地说，我们认为这没什么意义。（笑声）
The savings rate, the private savings rate, you know, is not high now. It doesn’t need to be high.
储蓄率，现在的私人储蓄率并不高。这也不需要很高。
What really determines how the people who are either aged or very young, because either way, the people who are in their nonproductive years depends, in aggregate, on aggregate production of goods and services, and then the division between those who are in their productive years and in their nonproductive years. And that’s what Social Security argument’s about and everything.
真正决定那些年长或年幼人群生活水平的，是整体商品和服务的总产出，以及生产年龄人口和非生产年龄人口之间的分配。这也是关于社会保障争论的核心所在。
The biggest single thing working for people in their nonproductive years on both ends, young and old, is the fact that the pie keeps growing. And that makes it easier to attack the problems of the nonproductive.
对处于非生产年龄的年轻人和老年人来说，最大的好处是“蛋糕”在不断增长。这使得解决非生产年龄人口的问题变得更容易。
And when I say, “nonproductive,” there’s obviously no — nothing derogatory about that term. It just relates to who’s in the employable age and who isn’t.
当我说“非生产年龄”时，这个词显然没有任何贬义。它只是指谁处于就业年龄，谁不在就业年龄。
And our society is going to do extremely well in terms of being able to take care of the people in their nonproductive years.
我们的社会在照顾非生产年龄人口方面会表现得非常出色。
If there — there is a shift, obviously, as people live longer. And of course, there should be a shift, perhaps, in defining — I think there should be — in defining what’s productive, because 65 was decided back in the ’30s. And I think that’s changed.
如果——显然，随着人们寿命延长，会发生变化。当然，可能需要重新定义“生产年龄”，我认为这是必要的。因为65岁这个界限是上世纪30年代决定的，而现在情况已经改变了。
But the fact that the pie keeps growing is what makes it — it makes the problem easy. And — not easy — but it’ll be easier 30 or 40 years from now, in my view, you know, than it was 30 or 40 years ago.
但蛋糕不断增长这一事实使得这个问题变得更容易——也不是说容易，但我认为30或40年后，这个问题会比30或40年前更容易解决。
Because there’ll be so much more in the way of goods and services produced per capita that the productive can take care of the nonproductive and the — or the aged — in a way that will be easier for them to sustain than it was in the past.
因为到时候每个人生产的商品和服务会多得多，这样生产年龄人口能够更轻松地养活非生产年龄人口或老年人，比过去更加可持续。
It’s low amounts of output that strains society. I mean, when you get very small amounts of output, or huge disparities in the division of that, that you put real strains on a society.
是低产出让社会承受压力。我的意思是，当产出量非常低，或者在分配上存在巨大差异时，社会会承受真正的压力。
But a society whose output is growing 3 percent a year and whose population is growing 1 percent a year is going to have way less in the way of strains than existed 20, 30, 50, 100 years ago.
但如果一个社会的产出每年增长3%，而人口每年增长1%，它所承受的压力将远小于20、30、50或100年前。
But, you know, we will need no big boom in savings or anything of the sort. The present savings rate will do — will just do fine for the world. In the United States, I mean, I’m not speaking to the — I shouldn’t speak to the whole world on that.
但是，我们不需要储蓄的大幅增加或类似的事情。当前的储蓄率对世界来说已经足够了。对于美国而言，我的意思是，我不应该代表整个世界发表看法。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, generally, you can say that stocks are valued in two different ways.
查理·芒格： 嗯，总体来说，你可以说股票的估值有两种方式。
One, they’re valued much the way wheat is valued, in terms of its perceived practical utility to the user of the wheat.
一种是类似于小麦的估值方式，根据用户对小麦的实际效用的认知来估值。
And there’s a second way that stocks are valued, which is the way Rembrandts are valued.
另一种是类似于伦勃朗画作的估值方式。
And to some extent, Rembrandts are valued high, because in the past, they’ve gone up in price.
某种程度上，伦勃朗画作的估值很高，是因为过去它们的价格上涨过。
And once you get a lot of Rembrandt element into the stock market, and you fuel the stock market with massive retirement system purchases, you can get stocks selling at very high prices by past historical standards. And that can go on for a long, long time.
一旦股票市场中有大量“伦勃朗元素”，再加上退休体系的大规模购买推动，股票可能会以过去历史标准来看非常高的价格交易。这种情况可能持续很长时间。
That’s what makes life so interesting. It isn’t at all clear how it’s going to work out. It isn’t even clear what the level of interest rates is going to be.
这就是生活的有趣之处。未来会如何发展根本不清楚。甚至利率水平将会如何都不清楚。
And nobody in this room ever expects to see 3 percent interest rates continue for a long time again. But that could happen. That would have an enormous effect on the price of equities.
在座的没人会认为3%的利率会长期持续。但这种情况是可能发生的。这将对股票价格产生巨大影响。
You live in a world where you can’t really predict these macroeconomic changes.
你生活在一个无法真正预测这些宏观经济变化的世界里。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, you can argue that increases in savings will drive down the returns on capital. The more capital is around, that the lower the returns will be on capital.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，你可以说，储蓄的增加会降低资本回报率。资本越多，资本回报率就越低。
But I don’t think you’ll — I don’t think it will help you make any decisions about businesses, you know, over your lifetime by — actually by thinking about matters like that. We’re a little biased on that. But you’ll find all kinds of guys that will tell you. I mean, that’s what books are written about. Because everybody likes predictions and books. So, you could all —
但我不认为——我不认为通过思考这些问题能帮助你在一生中做出任何商业决策。我们对此有些偏见。但你会发现有各种各样的人会告诉你这些。我是说，这就是写书的内容。因为每个人都喜欢预测和书籍。所以，你们都可以——
Go ahead.
继续吧。
CHARLIE MUNGER: In addressing this question, you can see that we have acted much as one of my old Harvard Law professors acted. He used to say, “Let me know what your problem is. And I’ll try and make it more difficult for you.” (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 在回答这个问题时，你可以看到我们的行为很像我以前一位哈佛法学院教授的风格。他常说：“告诉我你的问题是什么，我会试着让它变得更难。”（笑声）
40. Buffett: The best book on how I invest
巴菲特：关于我投资方式的最佳书籍
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请第五区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Eric Tweedie from Shavertown, Pennsylvania. Thanks again for another great meeting.
观众提问： 我是埃里克·特维迪，来自宾夕法尼亚州的谢夫敦。再次感谢你们带来一场精彩的会议。
During last year’s meeting, my wife picked up a copy of a book called Buffettology at one of the shops around town that is written by Mr. Buffett’s former daughter-in-law, a very well-written book, very interesting. And it attempts to outline the Warren Buffett approach to investing.
在去年的会议期间，我的妻子在城里的一家商店买了一本叫《巴菲特投资法》的书，是由巴菲特先生的前儿媳写的。这本书写得很好，非常有趣，试图概述沃伦·巴菲特的投资方法。
My question is, I don’t know if either of you gentlemen are familiar with the content or have read it. And if so, if you could comment on if you think it is a good outline of that type of investing.
我的问题是，我不知道您或查理是否熟悉这本书的内容或读过。如果读过，您是否认为它是对这种投资方式的良好概述？
My second question related to that, I wonder if you — if Mr. Buffett could comment on why you bought the original textile mill in Massachusetts, and if that represented an earlier phase, when you were more of a strictly Graham-style, value investor, versus your current investing style.
第二个相关问题是，巴菲特先生是否能评论一下，为什么当初购买了马萨诸塞州的那家纺织厂？那是否代表了一个早期阶段，即您更严格地遵循格雷厄姆风格的价值投资，而不是现在的投资风格？
WARREN BUFFETT: Probably the best, I would say, the most representative book on my views is the one that Larry Cunningham has put together, because he essentially has taken my words and rearranged them in a more orderly — he’s taken from a number of years. And what he has put together there best represents my views.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我认为最好的、最能代表我观点的书，可能是拉里·坎宁安编写的那本书。因为他基本上把我的话整理成更有条理的内容——他从多年的资料中整理而来。他所编写的内容最能代表我的观点。
We’ve got 20 years of annual reports or so, or more, on the internet, plus articles in Fortune, all kinds of things.
我们在互联网上有20年的年度报告，甚至更多，还有《财富》杂志的文章和各种其他内容。
So it’s probably a bias I have. But I would — I like to think that I laid out those views better than somebody who’s rewriting them. But that’s — I’ll let you make that decision.
这可能是我的偏见。但我更愿意相信，我自己阐述的观点比其他人改写的更好。不过——这个决定由你来做。
But I do think Larry’s done a very good job of taking a number of those reports and rearranging them by topic in a way that makes it a lot easier to read than trying to go through year after year.
但我确实认为，拉里把这些报告按主题重新整理得很好，这使得阅读起来比逐年翻阅更容易。
And actually, you’ll have this book about Charlie, pretty soon, to read, too.
实际上，关于查理的书也很快会出版，你们也可以读到。
We’ve said what — we’ve said in these meetings, we’ve said in the annual reports, we’ve said exactly what we do.
我们在这些会议上已经说了，我们在年度报告中也说了，我们确切地说明了我们的所作所为。
And some of the books, I would say, try to take that and — because people are looking for mechanistic things or formulas or whatever it may be. They try to hold — they may try to hold out that there’s some secret beyond that. But I don’t think there probably is.
而有些书试图抓住这些内容——因为人们总是试图寻找某种机械化的方法或公式。他们可能试图声称有某种超越这些的秘密。但我认为大概没有。
Charlie? You’ve read the books.
查理？ 你已经读过这些书了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I skimmed that book. The —
查理·芒格： 哦，我浏览过那本书——
I think what we have done all these years is, it wasn’t all that hard to do. And it’s not that hard to explain. All that said and done, I think a lot of people just don’t get it. (Laughter)
我认为这些年来我们所做的并不难做到，也不难解释。但话虽如此，我觉得很多人就是无法理解。（笑声）
As Samuel Johnson said, famously, “I can give you an argument, but I can’t give you an understanding.” (Laughter)
正如塞缪尔·约翰逊那句著名的话所说，“我可以给你一个论点，但我无法给你理解。”（笑声）
41. Buying Berkshire Hathaway was a “terrible mistake”
收购伯克希尔哈撒韦是一项“严重错误”
WARREN BUFFETT: What was the second part again?
沃伦·巴菲特： 刚才第二部分问题是什么来着？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just asked you if you could maybe comment on why you bought the original —
观众提问： 我刚才问的是，您是否可以评论一下，为什么您买下了最初的——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Berkshire textile mill.
观众提问： ——伯克希尔纺织厂。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why I didn’t remember. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 怪不得我记不起来了。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If I could say —
观众提问： 如果我可以补充一下——
WARREN BUFFETT: It was —
沃伦·巴菲特： 那是——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — one of the things, someone tapped me on the shoulder and asked me for you not to forget to give the current year’s recommended books.
观众提问： 其中一件事是，有人拍了拍我的肩膀，让我提醒您别忘了推荐今年的书籍。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s — I’ve got to recommend the book on Charlie. But I’ll let Charlie recommend one, too.
沃伦·巴菲特： 那是——我必须推荐关于查理的那本书。不过我也会让查理推荐一本书。
The original purchase of Berkshire was a terrible mistake and my mistake. No one pushed me into it.
最初购买伯克希尔是一项严重错误，是我的错误。没有人逼我这么做。
It was — I bought it, because it was what we used to call the cigar —
那是——我买下它，是因为我们过去所说的“烟蒂”——
It was a cigar butt approach to investing, where we would look around for something with a free puff left in it. You know, it was soggy and kind of disgusting and everything. But it was free. (Laughter)
这是一种“烟蒂式”投资法，我们会寻找那些还有一口免费“烟”的东西。你知道，那些已经湿透、有点恶心的东西。但它是免费的。（笑声）
And Berkshire was selling below working capital, had a history of repurchasing shares periodically on tender offers. And it was selling, the first purchase was, I think, at $7 1/2 a share. In fact, I’ve got the broker’s ticket up in the office, 2,000 shares.
当时伯克希尔的股价低于营运资金，并且有定期通过要约回购股份的历史。我第一次购买时，股价好像是7.5美元一股。事实上，我的办公室里还留着经纪人的交易单，买了2000股。
And they — it looked to me like they were going to have a tender offer periodically. And it would probably be at some figure closer to working — net working capital — which might’ve been 11 or $12 a share, some such number.
当时看来，他们似乎会定期发起要约收购。而收购价格可能会更接近净营运资金，可能是11美元或12美元一股，类似这样的数字。
And we would sell on the tender. And that was — we had other securities we owned that way. And we bought some that way.
我们本打算通过要约出售股份。我们当时还有其他证券是以这种方式持有或购买的。
And then, actually, I met Seabury Stanton one time, who was running Berkshire. And he told me and made me an insider, so I couldn’t do anything, but he said he was thinking of having a tender. And he wondered what price we’d tender at.
后来，我见到了当时管理伯克希尔的西伯里·斯坦顿。他告诉我一些事情，使我成为了内部人士，因此我暂时不能采取任何行动。但他说他在考虑发起一次要约收购，并问我们会以什么价格出售股份。
And I — as I remember, I may be wrong on this, I could look back on it, but I think I said, “11 3/8.” And he said again to me, “Well, if we have a tender at 11 3/8, will you tender?” And I said, “Yes, I will.”
我记得——可能记错了，我以后可以再查查——我当时说的是“11又3/8美元”。他又问我：“如果我们以11又3/8美元发起要约，你会出售吗？”我回答说：“是的，我会。”
And then I was frozen out, obviously, of doing anything with the stock for a little while. But then he came along with the tender offer.
之后，我显然被暂时禁止对股票进行任何操作。但后来他确实发起了要约收购。
And as I remember, I opened the envelope, and it was 11 1/4. I may be wrong. It may have been 11 1/2, 11 3/8. But it was 1/8 below what he had said to me and what I had agreed to.
我记得，我打开信封，发现价格是11又1/4美元。我可能记错了，也许是11又1/2美元，或者11又3/8美元。但比他之前告诉我的和我同意的价格低了1/8美元。
So I found that kind of irritating. And I didn’t tender. And then I bought a lot of stock.
这让我有点生气，所以我没有出售股份，反而买了很多股票。
Kim Chace was a director. His father had some members of the family, not his direct family, but related family, that wanted to sell a block. And we bought several blocks. And before long, we controlled the company.
金·查斯是一名董事。他的父亲有一些亲戚（不是直系亲属，但有血缘关系）想卖出一部分股份。我们买下了几个大宗股份。不久之后，我们就控制了这家公司。
So at an eighth of a point difference, we wouldn’t have bought it, the company, if they’d actually tendered at that price.
所以，如果他们按照之前说的价格发起要约收购，我们就不会买下这家公司。
We had a somewhat similar thing happen with Blue Chip, actually, later on, too.
后来我们在蓝筹公司（Blue Chip）上也遇到了类似的事情。
We would’ve been much better off, if we hadn’t bought it. Because then things like National Indemnity and all of that, instead of buying it into a public company with a great many other shareholders, we would’ve bought it privately in the partnership. And our partners would’ve had a greater interest.
如果我们当初没有买下它，我们的情况会好得多。因为像国家赔偿公司（National Indemnity）这样的公司，我们本可以通过合伙企业私下收购，而不是放入一家拥有众多股东的上市公司中。那样我们的合伙人会拥有更大的利益。
So Berkshire was exactly the wrong vehicle to use for buying a bunch of wonderful companies over time. But I sort of stumbled into it. And we kept moving along.
因此，伯克希尔完全是一个用来收购一批优秀公司的错误平台。但我阴差阳错地做了这个决定，我们一路坚持了下来。
And when I disbanded the partnership, I distributed out to Berkshire. Because it seemed like the easiest and best thing to do. And I followed through. And I enjoyed it enormously. I’m glad it all worked out this way.
当我解散合伙企业时，我将资产分配给了伯克希尔。因为这似乎是最简单、最好的选择。我坚持了下来，并且非常享受这一过程。我很高兴事情是以这样的方式发展起来的。
It did not work out the best way, economically, in all probability. It was the wrong base to use to build an enterprise around. But maybe, in a way, that’s made it more fun.
从经济角度来说，这可能不是最好的方式。这是一个用来构建企业的错误基础。但也许某种程度上，这让过程变得更有趣了。
Charlie, do you have anything to add on that? You can tell them about the Blue Chip story. (Laughs)
查理，你有什么补充吗？你可以讲讲蓝筹公司的故事。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, one such story is enough. (Buffett laughs)**
查理·芒格： 不，一个这样的故事就够了。（巴菲特笑）
But it is interesting that a wrong decision has been made to work out so well.
但有趣的是，一个错误的决定竟然能有如此好的结果。
We’ve done a lot of that, scrambled out of wrong decisions. I’d argue that’s a big part of having a reasonable record in life.
我们做了很多这样的事，从错误的决定中脱身。我认为这是在生活中取得合理成果的重要部分。
You can’t avoid the wrong decisions. But if you recognize them promptly and do something about them, you can frequently turn the lemon into lemonade, which is what happened here.
你无法避免错误的决定。但如果你能及时认识到并采取措施，你通常可以把“柠檬”变成“柠檬水”。这正是这里发生的事情。
Warren twisted a lot of capital out of the textile business and invested it wisely. And that’s why we’re all here.
沃伦从纺织业务中挤出了大量资本，并明智地进行了投资。这就是我们今天在这里的原因。
WARREN BUFFETT: But Berkshire comes from three companies that came together: Diversified Retailing, Blue Chip Stamps, and Berkshire. Those were the three base companies.
沃伦·巴菲特： 伯克希尔源于三个公司合并而成：Diversified Retailing（多元化零售公司）、Blue Chip Stamps（蓝筹印花公司）和伯克希尔。这是三个基础公司。
And Diversified started when we bought a company called Hochschild Kohn in Baltimore in 1966, a department store. And that company disappeared over time.
多元化零售公司的起点是我们在1966年购买了一家位于巴尔的摩的百货商店，叫Hochschild Kohn。这家公司后来逐渐消失了。
Fortunately, in 19 — I think — 70, we sold it to Supermarkets General. Blue Chip, we’ve told you about the record of that.
幸运的是，我记得在1970年，我们把它卖给了Supermarkets General公司。至于蓝筹印花公司的记录，我们之前已经提到过。
So, we started out with three disasters, and put them all together. (Laughter)
所以，我们一开始是从三个“灾难”起步，把它们合并到了一起。（笑声）
And it’s worked out pretty well.
结果还算不错。
But it was a mistake to be working from that kind of a base. Don’t follow our example in that respect. Start out with a good business and then keep adding on good businesses.
但以这样的基础起步是一个错误。不要在这方面效仿我们的例子。应该从一个好业务开始，然后不断添加更多的好业务。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But the example of quickly identifying the mistakes and taking action, there, our example is a good one.
查理·芒格： 但我们迅速识别错误并采取行动的例子，在这方面是个好榜样。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
42. Buffett would never trade Berkshire stock for gold
巴菲特：永远不会用伯克希尔股票换黄金
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第六位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. Kathleen Lane (PH) from New York.
观众提问： 下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是凯瑟琳·莱恩（音译），来自纽约。
I have a question out of left field for you. You say you like to be entertained? This question will entertain you. It’s also a serious question.
我有一个有点离题的问题要问您。您说过喜欢被娱乐？这个问题会让您感到有趣，同时也是一个严肃的问题。
I know you don’t like to speculate about the future. You won’t do so. I appreciate that.
我知道您不喜欢对未来进行猜测，您也不会这么做。我对此非常理解。
But some people do. For example, Edgar Cayce was one. He didn’t pick stocks or investments. But if he had, he would’ve probably gone for that farmland that you were talking about earlier this morning.
但有些人会，比如埃德加·凯西（Edgar Cayce）。他不选择股票或投资。但如果他选择的话，他可能会投资您今天早上提到的那片农田。
Because he had a dream that in the year 2158, Omaha would be located on the west coast of the United States. And you know how beachfront property goes. So it would be a good bet.
因为他曾梦到，在2158年，奥马哈将位于美国西海岸。而您知道，海滨物业的价值是如何上涨的。所以这可能是个不错的投资。
WARREN BUFFETT: It will be good for our super catastrophe business, if that happens. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果那真的发生了，对我们的超级灾难保险业务会很有利。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As you both said earlier, we’re living in an extraordinary time, financially especially.
观众提问： 正如您二位早些时候提到的，我们生活在一个非凡的时代，尤其是在金融方面。
You can’t help but to hear disaster scenarios concerning the impending collapse of worldwide financial markets, about major physical changes in the world as we know it, about a future when the world’s resources will be better measured by their prospects for ensuring our basic survival than their value as speculative commodities. That’s where that farmland would come in again.
您一定听到过一些灾难性的预测，比如全球金融市场即将崩溃，或者我们所知的世界将发生重大的物理变化，或者在未来，世界资源的价值将更多地由它们保障基本生存的前景决定，而不是作为投机商品的价值。这又涉及到农田了。
Nobody does better what you two do. But even if your investment acumen wasn’t what it is, I would invest with you, because you’re honest.
没有人能比你们二位做得更好。但即使你们的投资智慧没有现在这么高，我仍然会投资给你们，因为你们诚实。
In short, I came here to ask you, what would you tell a single mother to exchange her Berkshire share hold for gold coins? When, under what circumstances?
总之，我来这里是想问您，您会在什么情况下建议一个单亲妈妈用她的伯克希尔股票换成金币？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can’t imagine ever exchanging any of my shares for gold coins. But —
沃伦·巴菲特： 我无法想象用我的任何股票换成金币。但是——
I would rather trust in the intrinsic value of a bunch of really fine businesses run by good managers selling products that people like to buy and have liked to buy for a long time, and then exchanging their future efforts, the money that comes from their wages, for See’s Candy or Coca-Cola or whatever, than take some piece of metal that people dig out of the ground in South Africa and then put back in the ground at Fort Knox, you know, after transporting it and insuring it and everything else. (Laughter)
我更愿意信任那些由优秀经理人经营的、销售长期以来人们喜欢购买的产品的高质量企业的内在价值，而不是选择一块金属——这种金属是人们从南非的地底挖出来的，然后经过运输、保险等等之后，又被放回诺克斯堡的地底。（笑声）
I’ve never been able to get real excited about gold. Now, my dad was a huge enthusiast for a gold standard. So I grew up in a family where gold was revered, if not possessed. And I would — I gave it its full chance.
我从未对黄金感到真正兴奋过。不过，我的父亲是金本位的狂热支持者。所以我在一个崇拜黄金的家庭中长大，尽管并不拥有黄金。我已经给了它充分的机会。
But I’ve never understood what the intrinsic value of gold is. And, you know, we’ll sell you some at Borsheims, but I would never exchange —
但我从未理解过黄金的内在价值是什么。当然，我们可以在Borsheims卖给你一些黄金，但我永远不会换成黄金——
The idea of exchanging a producing asset for a nonproducing asset would be pretty foreign to me.
用一个能生产收益的资产换成一个无收益的资产，对我来说是非常陌生的想法。
43. Why Buffett ignores predictions
巴菲特为什么无视预测
WARREN BUFFETT: And I would say this: in terms of the predictions, and I know the spirit in which you asked the question, but in terms — there’s a market out there all the time.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想说的是，关于预测，我理解你提问的初衷，但要说的是——市场永远在那里。
And people love to hear predictions. If I said I was going to offer a bunch of predictions today, we would have a million people here. I mean, they’re dying to have predictions and speeches at rotary clubs or trade associations or whatever. That’s — they just plain love it.
人们喜欢听预测。如果我今天说要做一堆预测，我们这里可能会有一百万人。我是说，人们迫切希望听到预测，无论是在扶轮社还是贸易协会的演讲。他们就是纯粹喜欢预测。
And that’s what a whole industry is built upon, you know, the people coming out of Washington to talk about political predictions and the — I don’t read those in the paper at all. Because it’s just — it’s space fillers, basically.
整个行业就是建立在这种需求之上的，比如华盛顿的一些人谈论政治预测之类的——我完全不看报纸上的这些内容，因为这基本上只是用来填补版面的。
And, you mentioned Edgar Cayce. Ben Graham knew Edgar Cayce pretty well. But I just have never seen any utility to any of that at all.
你提到了埃德加·凯西（Edgar Cayce）。本·格雷厄姆对埃德加·凯西很熟悉。但我从未发现这些东西有任何实用性。
There will be some huge surprises in the world. There’s no question about that. But I don’t think that betting on any specific one is a very smart policy.
这个世界上肯定会有一些巨大的意外，这毫无疑问。但我不认为押注于任何特定的意外是一个明智的策略。
In fact, our — we usually bet against them, in terms of super catastrophes. We know there will be a 7.0 or greater quake in California in the next 50 years. We don’t know where it’ll be or when it’ll be or anything like that. We are willing to pay out a lot of money if it happens tomorrow.
事实上，我们通常会在超级灾难方面与之对赌。我们知道加利福尼亚在未来50年内会发生7.0级或更大的地震。我们不知道它会发生在何处、何时或其他任何信息。但如果它明天发生，我们愿意赔付很多钱。
And because people do worry about catastrophes. And in this case, it’s perfectly proper, with insured values. But it just isn’t any way, in our view, to get through economic life.
因为人们确实担心灾难。在这种情况下，通过保险的方式是完全合理的。但在我们看来，这不是应对经济生活的正确方式。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I suppose the one time when a single mother might want to own gold compared to anything else is if she faced conditions like a Jew in Vienna in 1939, or —
查理·芒格： 我想，单亲母亲可能会选择持有黄金而不是其他任何东西的唯一情况是，如果她面临类似1939年维也纳的犹太人那样的条件，或者——
I mean, there are conditions you can imagine where some form of transportable wealth would be useful, compared to anything else.
我的意思是，你可以想象一些情况下，可携带的财富形式会比其他任何东西更有用。
But absent those extreme conditions, I think it’s for the birds. Now, silver… (Laughter)
但在没有这些极端条件的情况下，我认为这是毫无意义的。现在，说到白银……（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s hard to think of anything other than fleeing the country. And Charlie and I don’t give a lot of thought to fleeing the country.
沃伦·巴菲特： 除了逃离国家，很难想到其他情况。而查理和我并没有太多考虑逃离国家的事情。
44. Buffett: “I’m a little crazy, I don’t mind paying taxes”
巴菲特：“我有点疯狂，但我不介意缴税”
WARREN BUFFETT: Although, I must say that the one thing I really find reprehensible is the people that make a lot of money in this country and then leave to, you know, to get another tax jurisdiction or something like this. I really — I don’t —
沃伦·巴菲特： 不过，我必须说，我觉得真正让人反感的一件事是，那些在这个国家赚了很多钱的人却离开这里，去选择另一个税务辖区或类似的地方。我真的——我无法认同这种行为。
But I’m a little crazy. I don’t mind paying taxes. (Applause)
但我有点疯狂，我不介意缴税。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to 7.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们请第七位提问者。
There are plenty of reasons, I think, perfectly valid reasons — I mean, people may want to live someplace else — but the ones who carefully arrange it so that they actually live here as much as they can.
我认为有很多理由——完全合理的理由——比如说，人们可能想住在别的地方。但那些精心安排自己尽可能多地住在这里的人呢？
I think one of them wanted to be appointed — he wanted to go to some very small entity, where there was no tax. And then he wanted to be appointed an ambassador to the United States, so that he could enjoy living here but enjoy the taxes of something else.
我记得有一个人，他想去一个非常小的地方，一个没有税收的地方，然后想被任命为美国的大使，这样他就可以享受住在这里的生活，却承担别处的税收。
And, you know, that is not my role model. Yup.
而你知道的，这绝不是我的榜样。对。
45. Costs vary for Berkshire’s float
伯克希尔的浮存金成本各不相同
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren. Hi, Charlie. Two questions. First, was anybody dumb enough to sell you Berkshire at less than 45,000 a share?
观众提问： 你好，沃伦。你好，查理。我有两个问题。第一个，有人傻到以每股低于45,000美元的价格把伯克希尔的股票卖给你吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: We did not repurchase any shares.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们没有回购任何股份。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My second question concerns float. The float has been low cost most years for Berkshire and probably zero cost in many years, except last year, possibly.
观众提问： 我的第二个问题是关于浮存金的。伯克希尔的浮存金大多数年份成本很低，可能很多年份是零成本，除了去年可能不是。
When you think about float in terms of intrinsic value, do you have an idea in mind when you add new float for how much it will increase the intrinsic value of Berkshire?
当你从内在价值的角度考虑浮存金时，在增加新的浮存金时，你是否会预估它会为伯克希尔的内在价值增加多少？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we add — that’s a good question — but we consciously add float sometimes at a given cost. And then we, other times, add float at no cost. So we have different layers of float, if you will, that we’ve entered into.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们增加——这是个好问题——但有时我们会以一定的成本有意识地增加浮存金。而有时，我们会以零成本增加浮存金。所以可以说，我们进入了不同层次的浮存金。
We’ve entered in some transactions in the last month or two, where we will take on some float, which will not have zero cost. But it’s acceptable to us. And we couldn’t get it at zero cost, although we’re also creating float which, I think, will be close to zero cost or better.
在过去一两个月中，我们达成了一些交易，我们将承担一些浮存金，这些浮存金不会是零成本。但对我们来说是可以接受的。虽然我们不能以零成本获得它，但我们也在创造一些浮存金，我认为它们的成本接近零或更低。
So, we would be willing to take on float, obviously, at costs only modestly below the Treasury rate, if that was the only way we could get that float, and it didn’t impede our ability to get other float, you know, at zero cost or something.
因此，如果获得这些浮存金的唯一方式是以略低于国债收益率的成本承担它，我们显然会愿意这样做，只要它不会妨碍我们以零成本或类似的方式获得其他浮存金。
We don’t want to raise the cost overall by a single transaction that would have an effect on other transactions.
我们不想通过单笔交易提高整体成本，从而影响其他交易。
But float, if you look at our historical record, and our future record can’t be as good, but it’s not — it’s the cost of float, and it’s the amount of growth of float.
但是浮存金，如果你看我们的历史记录，我们未来的记录不可能像过去那么好，但关键是浮存金的成本以及浮存金的增长量。
I mean, if you told me I could add $50 billion of float and have a 3 percent cost to that, you know, I would take that any day over adding 10 billion at zero cost.
我的意思是，如果你告诉我，我可以增加500亿美元的浮存金，并为此支付3%的成本，我会毫不犹豫地选择这个方案，而不是以零成本增加100亿美元的浮存金。
So there are a lot of different ways, in the insurance business, that we can and will think about developing float.
所以在保险业务中，我们有许多不同的方式可以考虑开发浮存金，并且我们会继续这样做。
And usually, one doesn’t preclude another. Occasionally, one bumps into another. But usually, one doesn’t preclude another.
通常情况下，一种方式并不会排除另一种方式。偶尔会有些冲突，但通常它们是互不排斥的。
And believe me, we spend a lot of time thinking about that. And we’ll continue to as long as we run Berkshire. It’s a big part of our strategy.
相信我，我们花了很多时间思考这个问题。只要我们还在运营伯克希尔，就会继续这样做。这是我们战略的重要组成部分。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve been amazed how well we’ve done with the float. And I’ve been watching it from the inside for a long, long time.
查理·芒格： 我对我们在浮存金上的表现感到惊讶。我从内部观察这一切已经很久了。
It is a very wonderful thing to generate millions and millions, and then billions and billions, of dollars of float at a cost way below the Treasury rate. There are people who would kill for such opportunities.
能够以远低于国债收益率的成本产生数百万、数十亿乃至数百亿美元的浮存金，是一件非常了不起的事情。有人会为这样的机会不惜一切代价。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And of course, that makes it competitive. We do — we — there are plenty of other people that are thinking about it in a similar vein and probably observed what we do and all of that. So like everything else in capitalism, it’s competitive.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。当然，这使得这个领域充满竞争。确实有很多其他人以类似的方式思考这个问题，可能也观察了我们的做法。所以像资本主义中的所有事情一样，这也是一个竞争性的领域。
We think we’ve got an edge in several very important respects. And we think that edge is sustainable for quite a — as far as we can see. And we intend to push it as hard as we can. And then we’ll see where it leads.
我们认为自己在几个非常重要的方面具有优势。而且我们认为，这种优势在可预见的未来是可以持续的。我们计划尽全力推进，然后看看它会带我们走向何方。
I would’ve had no idea, 10 or 20 years ago, that we would have the present situation. But we do find, if you just show up every day, like Woody Allen said, and you answer the phone and read the paper, every now and then, you see something that makes sense to do.
十或二十年前，我根本没想到我们会有今天的局面。但我们发现，只要你每天出现，就像伍迪·艾伦说的那样，接电话、读报纸，你时不时就会发现一些值得做的事情。
And we do find them occasionally. The hard part is finding them where they are material relative to our present size. If we were running a very small business, we would find plenty of things that would make good sense.
而我们确实偶尔会找到这样的机会。难点在于找到相对于我们当前规模来说具有实质性意义的机会。如果我们经营的是一家非常小的企业，我们会发现很多非常合理的事情可以做。
We find a few things that make good sense now, relative to our size. And there’s really no answer for that except to shrink dramatically, which is not a action we’re contemplating.
就我们目前的规模而言，我们确实发现了一些合理的机会。但除了大幅缩小规模之外，几乎没有其他解决办法，而这是我们不打算采取的行动。
46. Munger on Wesco succession
芒格谈Wesco的继任计划
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第八位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: James Pan (PH) from New York City.
观众提问： 我是詹姆斯·潘（音译），来自纽约市。
I really have a question on Wesco, which is your 80 percent-held subsidiary, just a couple questions dealing with that.
我有一个关于Wesco的问题，这是你们控股80%的子公司，主要有几个相关问题。
First question is, last time I checked, that was trading below intrinsic value.
第一个问题是，上次我查看时，它的交易价格低于其内在价值。
And given that most of Wesco’s assets are tied up in Freddie Mac, and Freddie Mac will arguably grow intrinsic value in the low teens for the next couple of years, how are you guys going to manage the, I guess, how would you manage the gap between intrinsic value, and what — the current price, and what intrinsic value will be two or three years from now?
鉴于Wesco的大部分资产与Freddie Mac挂钩，而Freddie Mac未来几年可能会以低两位数的速度增长内在价值，你们将如何管理当前价格与内在价值之间的差距，以及两三年后内在价值的变化？
And also, is there a succession plan at Wesco or some kind of roll-up plan at Wesco eventually?
此外，Wesco是否有继任计划或最终的整合计划？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is the boss at Wesco. So —
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理是Wesco的负责人。所以——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. We have paid almost no attention to the price of Wesco stock. So the chance to make any meaningful gain for the Wesco shareholders by buying in a few shares of Wesco stock is so tiny that we don’t really bother thinking about it very much. The —
查理·芒格： 是的。我们几乎没有关注Wesco股票的价格。通过回购一些Wesco股票为股东创造任何有意义的收益的可能性微乎其微，所以我们并不太费心思去考虑这个问题。
As to succession, we are gradually making me so useless that I won’t be missed. (Laughter)
至于继任计划，我们正在逐步让我变得毫无用处，以至于我的离开不会被人注意到。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, incidentally, you talked about Wesco being significantly undervalued compared to intrinsic value. I’m not sure that’s the case. Charlie, would — you’re more of an expert on that than I am.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，顺便说一下，你提到Wesco的交易价格明显低于其内在价值。我不确定情况是否如此。查理，你比我更是这方面的专家。
必须有的诚实。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s certainly no huge gap.
查理·芒格： 当然没有巨大的差距。
And, we don’t spend a lot of time thinking about things that will make, practically, no money. (Laughter)
而且，我们不会花太多时间去思考那些实际上不会赚钱的事情。（笑声）
47. Munger: EVA valuation is “twaddle” and “medieval theology”
芒格：EVA估值是“胡扯”和“中世纪神学”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Jason Tang (PH) from Traverse City, Michigan. Before I ask my question, I want to know that it’s true that you guys are going to be here tomorrow at 9:30 to answer more questions. (Laughter)
观众提问： 你好，我叫杰森·唐（音译），来自密歇根州的特拉弗斯城。在我提问之前，我想知道你们明天早上9:30是否还会在这里回答更多的问题。（笑声）
My question, I just recently read the book, “Quest for Value,” by — I think the author is Bennett Stewart, from Stern Stewart consulting firm.
我的问题是，我最近读了一本书，叫《追寻价值》（Quest for Value），我想作者是斯特恩·斯图尔特咨询公司（Stern Stewart）的贝内特·斯图尔特（Bennett Stewart）。
And I want to talk to you a bit about — just ask you about different valuation methodologies, and EVA in particular, and how that may or may not be more valid than, let’s say, other benchmarks of value, like P/E, or price-to-book, or price-to-sales.
我想和你们聊聊不同的估值方法，尤其是经济增加值（EVA），以及它是否比其他价值基准，比如市盈率（P/E）、市净率（Price-to-Book）、或市销率（Price-to-Sales），更有效。
Is that something closer? I noticed that the language that was used in this book was real similar to the type of language you guys use in your writings. So I’d like you to talk a little bit about EVA, if you could.
这是更接近你们的吗？我注意到这本书中使用的语言和你们写作中使用的语言非常相似。所以，如果可以的话，我想让你们谈谈EVA。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, why don’t you take EVA?
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，你来谈谈EVA吧。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think there’s an awful lot of twaddle and bullshit. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我认为这里面有很多胡扯和废话。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I knew that’s what he was going to say. And I thought it deserved it, so I — and I didn’t want to say it myself.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我知道他会这么说，我也觉得这个评价是应得的，所以我就不亲自说了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: In EVA, we keep stating, over and over again, that the game is to turn the retained dollars into something more than dollars.
查理·芒格： 在EVA中，我们不断重复地说，游戏的目标是把留存的美元变成比美元更多的东西。
And EVA tends to incorporate cost of capital ideas that just make no sense at all. They make it sound very fashionable.
而EVA倾向于包含一些完全没有意义的资本成本理念，只是让它听起来很时髦。
And, God knows, it’s correct that a corporation that earns a huge return on capital and keeps retaining it for a long time has a great record in terms of EVA. But the mental system, as a whole, does not work. It’s like medieval theology. (Laughter)
天知道，一个公司如果获得了巨大的资本回报并长期保留它，在EVA指标上会有出色的记录。这是正确的。但整个思维系统是行不通的。这就像中世纪的神学。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I like that second term better than the earlier one. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我更喜欢他说的“中世纪神学”这个词，比前一个更好。（笑声）
48. How Buffett became friends with Bill Gates
巴菲特如何与比尔·盖茨成为朋友
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My — excuse me — my name is Stewart Hartman from Sioux City, Iowa.
观众提问： 下午好。抱歉，我叫斯图尔特·哈特曼（音译），来自爱荷华州苏城。
First, I’d like to thank you both for allowing a couple of Berkshire employees to migrate north to Sioux City. I work with Corey Wrenn and Mark Sisley (PH). They’re both great guys. You did a terrific job training them.
首先，我想感谢你们允许伯克希尔的两位员工迁居到苏城。我和科里·雷恩（Corey Wrenn）和马克·希斯利（音译，Mark Sisley）一起工作。他们都是非常优秀的人才，你们对他们的培训非常出色。
Mr. Buffett, you’ve known Bill Gates for several years and probably spent more time with him than any of us in this room. Would you feel —?
巴菲特先生，您认识比尔·盖茨已经有好几年了，而且可能比我们房间里的任何人都更了解他。您是否愿意——？
WARREN BUFFETT: That isn’t the case, if Jeff Raikes is here. I don’t know. Is Jeff here?
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果杰夫·雷克斯（Jeff Raikes）在这里，那就不是这样了。我不知道杰夫今天在吗？
Anyway, go ahead. But we did have a local fellow who comes from 30 miles from here, Jeff Raikes, who’s a key Microsoft employee. And I think he’s in town this weekend. I thought he was in the meeting.
不管怎样，你继续。但我们确实有一位本地人，来自距离这里30英里的地方，杰夫·雷克斯，他是微软的一位重要员工。我想他这个周末在城里，我还以为他在这个会议上。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I didn’t mean to make the broad generalization to be argumentative. (Laughter)
观众提问： 我并不是想通过这种笼统的概括来引起争论。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I just didn’t want to think Jeff — I was trying to muscle him out.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我只是想澄清一下，不想让杰夫觉得我在排挤他。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sure, sure. That being said, I guess, here’s a way I’ll rephrase this. Would you feel comfortable sharing with us how your relationship began and how it evolved with Mr. Gates?
观众提问： 好的，好的。既然如此，我想重新措辞一下。您是否愿意与我们分享您与盖茨先生的关系是如何开始并发展的？
And with regard to his spirit and competitive nature, how vigorous do you expect him to defend his company’s position against the government and state’s current antitrust suit?
关于他的精神和竞争性，您认为他会以多大的力度为他的公司在当前政府和州的反垄断诉讼中辩护？
And then for both of you, Mr. Munger included, what, in your opinion, are the odds that the government and the states will prevail and split his company into pieces?
然后，我想问您们两位，包括芒格先生，你们认为政府和各州赢得诉讼并拆分他的公司的可能性有多大？
And then since Mr. Munger mentioned, I guess I’d ask, could we have an update on the company’s silver position and its future as an investment, as well? (Laughter) Thank you for opening that door.
最后，既然芒格先生提到了，我想问一下，能否更新一下公司在白银头寸上的情况及其作为投资的未来前景？（笑声）感谢您开启了这个话题。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well, he can close them, too. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，他也可以把这个话题关上。（笑声）
Yeah, I really don’t feel comfortable speaking for Bill at all in terms of what he’s going to do. In fact, I think they’ve been quite outspoken, he and Steve Ballmer both, about what Microsoft will do.
是的，关于比尔会做什么，我确实不愿代他说话。事实上，我认为他和史蒂夫·鲍尔默（Steve Ballmer）都非常坦率地表达了微软会做什么。
So I don’t want to try and rephrase that or modify it or do anything else. Because they know what they’re saying when they say it. And I would take them at their word. And I really shouldn’t be adding anything to it.
所以我不想重新措辞或修改他们的话，也不想做其他任何事情。因为当他们说这些话时，他们知道自己在说什么。我相信他们的表述，也不应该对此再做任何补充。
I met Bill, because a very good friend of mine, Meg Greenfield, was the editorial page editor at the Post. She called me one time, 10 or more years ago. And — she said, “Warren,” — she loved the state of Washington and had grown up out there. So she said, “Can I afford to buy a second home?”
我认识比尔是因为我的一位非常好的朋友梅格·格林菲尔德（Meg Greenfield），她是《华盛顿邮报》的社论版编辑。有一次，大约10年前或更久，她打电话给我，说：“沃伦，”——她非常喜欢华盛顿州，因为她在那里长大。于是她问我：“我能负担得起买第二套房子吗？”
She was living in Washington, D.C. now. And so she says, “Can I afford to buy a second home in Washington?” And I said — and she said, “I’ll send you all my financial information.”
当时她住在华盛顿特区。她说：“我能负担得起在华盛顿州买第二套房子吗？”她还说：“我会把所有的财务信息寄给你。”
I said, “Meg, you don’t need to.” Anybody that asks me whether they can afford something can afford it. It’s the people that don’t ask me that never can afford it. So I said, “Just go do it.” And, “It’ll make you happy.” And so she did.
我说：“梅格，你不需要寄。任何问我‘能否负担得起某件事’的人，其实都负担得起。倒是那些从来不问我的人永远负担不起。所以我说，‘去做吧，这会让你高兴的。’”于是她就买了。
And, then a year or two later, she wanted to have me come out and see what she’d done with my mild encouragement. And so I went out there and visited. It was the July 4th weekend in 1991. And they had this parade on this island and everything she wanted me to see. And she had a few other people out, too.
一年或两年后，她想让我去看看她在我的轻微鼓励下做了些什么。于是我去了，那是1991年的7月4日周末。他们在岛上有一个游行活动，还有其他一些她想让我看的东西。她还邀请了一些其他人一起。
And then, she was a friend of the — of Bill’s parents. And so we went down there, to the Hood Canal, to visit them when I was back there, to meet the parents. And I think Bill didn’t want to come. But Kay Graham was coming. And he wanted to meet her. He didn’t want to meet me.
后来，她是比尔父母的朋友。当我回到那里时，我们去了胡德运河（Hood Canal）拜访他们，见见比尔的父母。我想比尔当时并不想来，但凯·格雷厄姆（Kay Graham）要去，他想见她，而不是见我。
And, so he came in. And then we hit it off immediately. We had a great time. And, I mean, he had this chimpanzee, to whom he was going to try and explain this technical stuff. But it was a — I was kind of an interesting chimpanzee to him. So, we — and he’s a terrific teacher.
于是他来了，然后我们立即聊得很投机。我们度过了一段非常愉快的时光。他带着一种“解释技术内容给黑猩猩听”的心态来谈话，但对他来说，我似乎是个有趣的黑猩猩。比尔是一位出色的老师。
So, we spent a number of hours. And we just plain hit it off. And, I found it very interesting, what he had to say. And, we’ve had a good time ever since.
我们聊了好几个小时，非常合拍。我觉得他所说的内容非常有趣。从那以后，我们一直相处得很好。
And we play bridge together and golf together. So I can tell you that he’s quite competitive in those games. But I can’t tell you anything about Microsoft or anything. I don’t know that much about it. And it wouldn’t be right, if I didn’t know anything personal, to be talking about it. Charlie, you know Bill.
我们一起打桥牌和高尔夫。我可以告诉你，他在这些游戏中非常有竞争心。但关于微软的事情，我不能告诉你什么，因为我并不了解这些内容。如果我对微软没有任何私人了解的话，谈论它是不合适的。查理，你了解比尔。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I don’t want to speak for anybody else, either. I happen to be quite sympathetic to the Microsoft side of the pending antitrust case. But — (Applause)**
查理·芒格： 是的。我也不想替其他人发言。但我对微软在当前反垄断案件中的立场相当同情。（掌声）
And regarding silver, all I can say is, so far, it’s been a dull ride. (Laughter)
至于白银，我只能说，到目前为止，这是一段无聊的旅程。（笑声）
49. Buffett and Munger on the antitrust case against Microsoft
巴菲特和芒格谈微软的反垄断案
WARREN BUFFETT: I would say this about the Microsoft case. That — and I’ve expressed this to a couple news organizations who asked the question earlier.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想说一下关于微软反垄断案的看法。我之前也对一些提问的新闻机构表达了这个观点。
Twenty years ago, this country really had sort of an inferiority complex about its place in the world economic order.
二十年前，美国确实对自己在全球经济秩序中的地位有些自卑。
And we talked about having a country of hamburger flippers. And, we thought we were going to lose our steel industry and our auto industry. And we really didn’t quite see how America fit into the world where it looked like the Japanese and the Germans, to some extent, and all those, were eating our lunch.
我们谈论着一个“只会翻汉堡”的国家，认为我们可能会失去钢铁和汽车工业。我们真的不知道美国在一个看起来像是被日本人、德国人“吃掉午餐”的世界中能如何立足。
And that — there are many of you are too young to remember that. But there are many of you in this room who will remember that. And we were very depressed about our economic situation in this country.
这里的很多人可能年纪太小，记不得那个时候，但也有很多人会记得。当时，我们对国家的经济状况感到非常沮丧。
And then this, whatever you want to call it, information age or whatever, came along, fueled by technology. And we’ve just swept the world aside. I mean, it — we are so far number one that it’s difficult to think who’s number two. So here we have —
然后，所谓的信息时代，或者其他什么时代，由科技推动到来了。我们横扫了全世界。我们遥遥领先第一的位置，甚至难以想象谁是第二。于是我们——
And it’s changed — in some way, it’s contributed to a change, I should say — in the national mood. And it — whether — what part of our prosperity is accounted for by it, no one knows. But I think everybody in the room would agree that it’s significant.
这改变了——我应该说，它在某种程度上促进了国家情绪的变化。至于这种繁荣有多少部分归因于它，没有人知道。但我想在座的每个人都会同意它的意义重大。
And that age is going to get — and that development — is going to get more and more important in the years to come. It’s going to be fueling much of what happens in the world and for this country to be the world leader. And like I say, you can’t even see who’s in second place, and moving faster, even, to increase that lead, with all the benefits that brings, you know, I think that —
这个时代，这种发展，在未来几年会变得越来越重要。它将推动世界上许多事情的发生，使这个国家成为世界领导者。正如我所说，你甚至看不到谁是第二名，而且我们正在更快地扩大领先优势，这带来了许多好处。
I think we’ve got something working very well that probably doesn’t make a lot of sense to tinker with too much. So I would not want to go in with a meat axe into something that is pulling this country along, in my view, in a huge way.
我认为我们拥有某些运作良好的东西，不应过多干预。所以我不希望用一把“肉斧”砍掉某些在我看来正在大力推动国家前进的东西。
And I just, I don’t like to tinker with success. And it’s an important success. It’s really an important success.
我真的不喜欢对成功的东西动手脚。而且这是一个重要的成功，确实是一个重要的成功。
Charlie and I may not understand how to play that, in terms of buying the companies that are going to do well 10 or 15 years from now. But we know some companies will do well. And we certainly know it’ll have a huge benefit to society, even if it makes business less profitable but makes the society more efficient.
查理和我可能无法判断哪些公司在未来10到15年内会表现得很好，但我们知道某些公司会成功。而且我们可以肯定的是，这对社会会带来巨大好处，即使这让企业的盈利能力下降，但使社会变得更加高效。
I mean, that is a huge edge to have. I would love to have the most efficient industry in the world in this country, even though it might pull down returns on capital against the less-efficient system.
这确实是一个巨大的优势。我希望这个国家拥有世界上最有效率的产业，即使这可能会降低与效率较低的系统相比的资本回报率。
So we — I think neither one of us would be inclined to go in there and mess around with something that’s working.
所以我们——我认为我们两人都不会倾向于干预那些正在运作良好的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think — (Applause)
查理·芒格： 我认为——（掌声）
If you look at the big picture, in patriotic terms, having lost totally in radios, stereos, television sets, et cetera, and in many other places, and having lost position in other major industries to the Japanese and others, we finally get huge leadership in a new and wonderful field — software — that’s needed all over the Earth.
如果从大局和爱国的角度来看，我们曾在收音机、立体声、电视机等行业，以及许多其他领域，完全失败了；在其他主要产业中也被日本等国家超越。而如今，我们终于在一个新兴且极具前景的领域——软件——中取得了巨大的领导地位，这是全世界都需要的。
And somebody who’s drawing a salary from the United States government gets the bright idea that they should dramatically weaken the one place where we’re winning big. (Applause)
而现在，一个领取美国政府薪水的人突发奇想，觉得应该大幅削弱我们唯一取得巨大胜利的领域。（掌声）
And he actually goes home at night and is proud of himself. (Laughter)
而他晚上回家时，还为自己感到自豪。（笑声）
50. GEICO benefits from smaller industry-wide profit margins
GEICO从行业整体利润率下降中受益
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第三位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Joe Levinson (PH) from New York.
观众提问： 下午好，我是来自纽约的乔·莱文森（音译）。
You mentioned, in this year’s annual report, that the operating environment that GEICO is facing, especially with regard to pricing, is going to get even tougher this year.
您在今年的年报中提到，GEICO面临的经营环境，特别是在定价方面，今年将变得更加艰难。
I’m wondering if this tough environment that GEICO’s been facing over the last few years, is it something cyclical? Or is there something more structural going on here that we should be concerned about?
我想知道，GEICO过去几年面临的这种艰难环境是周期性的，还是我们应该担心某种更深层次的结构性问题？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually, what has happened is that it’s been unduly benign the last few years. So I would regard this as much more a return to normalcy, what’s happening.
沃伦·巴菲特： 实际上，过去几年这个行业的环境过于友好了。我认为目前发生的情况更多是回归正常状态。
The profits in auto insurance, industrywide, have been far higher than, I think, are sustainable and higher than I would’ve predicted, five years ago, would’ve occurred.
整个汽车保险行业的利润，远高于我认为可持续的水平，也高于我五年前预测的水平。
So the industry got very, very lucky for a while. That wasn’t necessarily good for us, incidentally.
因此，这个行业有一段时间非常幸运。但顺便说一句，这对我们来说未必是好事。
We made more money than we would’ve otherwise made. But there was a big umbrella over the industry, too, so that less-efficient competitors still did very well.
我们赚的钱比我们本该赚的更多。但整个行业也有一把“大伞”，以至于效率较低的竞争对手也表现得非常好。
We do not find the environment, which is going to be lower profits, we do not find that undesirable at all. We do not like having a huge umbrella over an industry. We want the most efficient to be the ones that do well and the less-efficient ones to have plenty of problems.
对于利润将下降的环境，我们一点也不觉得不理想。我们不喜欢行业内有一把巨大的保护伞。我们希望表现良好的公司是最有效率的，而效率较低的公司遇到很多问题。
So, we are not unhappy about the fact that margins in the auto insurance business are going down. We think they should go down.
因此，对于汽车保险业务利润率下降的事实，我们并不感到不满。我们认为它们本该下降。
We will — as long as we feel that we are adding policyholders at a cost that’s less than their net value to us over time, we will continue to do it. We’ll love to do it.
只要我们认为增加保单持有者的成本低于他们长期带给我们的净价值，我们就会继续这样做。我们会非常乐意这么做。
But we won’t be making the kind of money, in the year 2000, that we made in 1999, which was not as good as 1998. But that doesn’t — that’s — as far as we’re concerned, that’s fine. Because we will be the low-cost producer, over time or will — that is our goal. And I think we’ve got a lot of things going in our direction to enable us to do that.
但是在2000年，我们不会赚到像1999年那样的钱，而1999年也不如1998年。但这并不——对我们而言，这没问题。因为我们将成为长期的低成本生产者，或者说，这是我们的目标。我认为我们有很多因素在推动我们实现这一目标。
The low-cost producer in a huge industry is going to do very well over time.
在一个庞大的行业中，低成本生产者从长远来看会表现得非常好。
And then the question is just — is, it costs money to sign up people and bring them into our fold. Then we have to keep them in our fold. And we lose some every year. It’s an hourglass problem, to a degree.
然后的问题就是——签约客户并将他们纳入我们的体系是需要成本的。接下来，我们需要留住他们。但每年我们都会失去一些客户。这在某种程度上是一个“沙漏”问题。
But that’s all part of the equation. And the GEICO equation is fundamentally good. It’s not as good as it was a couple of years ago, just in terms of overall profitability, because there isn’t this big umbrella over the whole industry.
但这都是方程的一部分。而GEICO的整体方程是非常好的。虽然从整体盈利能力上看，不如几年前，因为整个行业上方没有那个“大伞”了。
But that umbrella was going to go away. And it doesn’t hurt us to have it go away at all.
但那个大伞迟早会消失，而它的消失对我们完全没有影响。
The second thing is that we are, as I pointed out in the report, it is costing us more to develop inquiries than it did a couple of years ago. We knew that would be the case. It’s going to cost more three years from now than it costs now.
其次，正如我在年报中指出的那样，现在我们获取潜在客户的成本比几年前更高。我们知道情况会是这样。而且三年后，这个成本还会比现在更高。
So we believe in pouring it on. And we think that we can attract business at a lower cost and then run it at a lower cost than most of the competition, if not all. And we intend to plow ahead with that.
因此，我们相信在这一领域加大投入。而且我们认为我们可以以更低的成本吸引客户，并以比大多数竞争对手（如果不是所有的话）更低的成本来运营。我们打算在这一方向上继续前进。
We will write — I said, in the annual report, I ventured that the industry might write at three points worse than last year. Well, three points on 120 billion of volume is $3.6 billion difference in the profitability, if that forecast happens to be correct.
我们将接受——正如我在年报中提到的，我预测整个行业的指标可能比去年下降3个百分点。而在1200亿美元的保费规模上，3个百分点意味着36亿美元的利润差异，如果这个预测正确的话。
That bothers us not at all. In fact, we will not only take that three points of industry worsening, but on top of that, we will spend even more money to bring in business, which will make our figures, specifically, look that much worse in the near term.
这对我们来说完全不成问题。事实上，我们不仅会接受行业恶化的这3个百分点，还会额外投入更多资金来吸引业务，这在短期内会让我们的数字看起来更糟糕。
But that, you know — in the end, it is so much more attractive to bring in that kind of business, we’ll say, than some e-retailer, who is losing cash by the ton, bringing in customers who are spending far, far less than our customers spend with us, and where the retention rate, I would venture to say, will be lower than our kind of retention rate.
但最终，这种业务吸引力比某些电子零售商要高得多。那些电子零售商通过巨额亏损吸引客户，而这些客户的消费远远低于我们客户的消费。我敢说，他们的客户保留率也会低于我们这种类型的保留率。
We’ve got a very good business model. It’s not as good as it was a couple of years ago. It’s probably better than it will be a couple of years from now. But it’s still far superior, I think, to the business model of most of the competition.
我们有一个非常好的商业模式。虽然它不如几年前那么好，也可能比几年后更好。但我认为，它仍然远远优于大多数竞争对手的商业模式。
We’ve got a great machine at GEICO. And we’ve got a sensational man running it in Tony Nicely. He is the best in the world at running that business.
GEICO是一台非常出色的“机器”。而且我们有托尼·尼斯利（Tony Nicely）这样一位卓越的人在管理它。他是全球管理这类业务的最佳人选。
And he’s been there since he was 18 years old. And he knows it every way from Sunday, in terms of how to run that business.
他从18岁起就在GEICO工作，对如何运营这项业务了如指掌，无所不知。
I’ve known Tony for a good many years. I’ve never heard him say anything that didn’t make sense. It’s really interesting.
我认识托尼很多年了。我从未听过他说任何不合情理的话。这真的很有趣。
If you take a whole bunch of people with 140 IQs, it’s a very uneven performance in what they actually do. Some of them say all kinds of things that make a lot of sense about 90 percent of the time. And then 10 percent of the time, they go crazy.
如果你找到一群智商140的人，他们的实际表现会非常不均。有些人在90%的时间里说的都是合理的，但在剩下的10%的时间里却会“发疯”。
And Tony is — everything Tony says and does makes sense. And he is a huge, huge asset to Berkshire. And he’s working with a business model that — that’s very, very powerful.
而托尼——他所说和所做的一切都合情合理。他是伯克希尔的一项巨大资产。他正在与一个非常非常强大的商业模式一起工作。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格： 无需补充。
51. MidAmerican Energy: “Decent” but not “extraordinary” returns
中美能源：回报“不错”，但非“非凡”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第四位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Andrew Sole. And I’m from New York City.
观众提问： 下午好，巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我是来自纽约市的安德鲁·索尔（音译）。
I was hoping, if you wouldn’t mind, turning your attention to MidAmerican Energy. You’ve spoken about how much you respect the management of that company.
我希望您能谈谈中美能源（MidAmerican Energy）。您曾表示非常尊重这家公司的管理层。
But if you could elaborate upon what you see are the long-term competitive advantages of MidAmerican Energy, where you see the company 10 years from now, and is it your hope or your intention to make MidAmerican Energy the lowest-cost provider of electricity in the United States?
您能否详细说明您认为中美能源的长期竞争优势是什么？您认为公司在未来10年会发展到何种程度？您是否希望或计划让中美能源成为美国电力的最低成本提供商？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you — you’re not going to do a great deal about the embedded cost that you have in generation. I mean, if you have a group of plants, they are, in the United States, they’re relatively low-cost generation.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你无法对发电中已有的嵌入成本做太多改变。如果你有一批电厂，它们在美国算是相对低成本的发电。
But if somebody else has a hydro plant or something that has built-in advantages that are going to enable them to turn out electricity cheaper than we can do it in Iowa with coal, so be it. I mean, it —
但如果其他人有一个水电站或其他内在优势，可以让他们生产电力的成本比我们在爱荷华州用煤炭发电更低，那就这样吧。
So it is relatively well positioned as a generator, but we have nothing we could do there to specifically, dramatically change the cost of generation compared to other competitors.
因此，它作为发电商的位置相对不错，但我们无法在发电成本上与其他竞争对手相比，做出具体且显著的改变。
But — and you shouldn’t expect to make extraordinary profits in a business that is selling an essential, like electricity, to virtually every consumer in the country.
但你不应该指望在像电力这种基本服务的业务中获得非凡的利润，因为它几乎面向全国的所有消费者。
The whole idea behind the utility industry is not to allow extraordinary profits. But we think it’s a very good business.
公用事业行业的核心理念就是不允许获得超额利润。但我们认为这是一项非常好的业务。
We do think that Dave Sokol has demonstrated ability, in the time he has been running that, to come up with a lot of ideas about doing various things that have made sense, various projects.
我们确实认为戴夫·索科尔（Dave Sokol）在管理期间展现了能力，他提出了许多有意义的想法和各种项目。
Not everything works. But his batting average is very high. And a good mind like that, we will expect that he’ll produce more ideas over time.
并不是每件事都奏效，但他的成功率非常高。像他这样优秀的人才，我们期待他随着时间推移能提出更多想法。
But, it’s not the sort of thing you get fireworks in. It’s conceivable that, you know, we would get a chance to do something very big in that field at some time, just because it’s a big field. It is the kind of field where you can write a $5 billion check. So it’s not the jelly bean business.
但这并不是一个会有“烟花效果”的领域。可以想象，我们可能会在某个时候有机会在这个领域做一些大事，因为这是一个很大的领域。这是一个你可以开出50亿美元支票的行业，而不是“糖豆生意”。
But whether we do or not depends on a lot of things, including regulatory restraints. Because there are a lot of rules in that business, starting with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
但我们是否会这么做取决于很多因素，包括监管限制。因为这个行业有很多规则，从1935年的《公用事业控股公司法》开始。
But there may be ways to do some very big things. And we’ve got the right management to do it. We’ve got the financial wherewithal to do it. And we’ll see what happens.
但可能会有机会做一些非常大的事情。我们有合适的管理团队，有财务实力，我们将拭目以待。
I think MidAmerican is a very — we’ll get, in my view, we’re very likely to get a very decent return on it. But we shouldn’t get an extraordinary return, because it isn’t that kind of business.
我认为中美能源是一项非常——我们很可能会从中获得非常不错的回报。但我们不应该指望获得非凡的回报，因为它并不是那种业务。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格： 无需补充。
52. We can do almost anything with insurance float
我们可以用保险浮存金做几乎任何事
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第五位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is John Shayne (PH) from Nashville, Tennessee. I want to join the other shareholders and thank you for the results you’ve achieved, but also for the example that you’ve set for business, generally.
观众提问： 巴菲特先生，我是来自田纳西州纳什维尔的约翰·谢恩（音译）。我想与其他股东一起感谢您取得的成果，同时感谢您为整个商业界树立的榜样。
My question is about float proceeds and whether they can go into common stocks. You’ve been asked that question before in prior years. Once, I asked you something on that. And I think at least one other shareholder has.
我的问题是关于浮存金收益及其是否可以投资于普通股。过去几年，您曾被问到这个问题。我自己也曾问过您一次，我认为至少还有另一位股东也问过。
But I’m wondering if you might go into a little more detail. If I’ve understood you in the past, you’ve said, “Yes, you can — the float’s available to go into common stocks.”
但我想知道您是否可以详细解释。如果我没理解错，您过去曾说过：“是的，浮存金可以用于投资普通股。”
I think it’s an important question because it affects the intrinsic value of that float. If that float is locked into fixed income, it’s worth one thing. If it could go into stocks at one point, it’s obviously worth quite a bit more.
我认为这是一个重要问题，因为它影响了浮存金的内在价值。如果浮存金仅限于固定收益，它的价值是一种情况；如果它可以投资于股票，其价值显然会高得多。
What I’ve had trouble understanding is, I think you must have some way that you can guarantee that the policyholders will be protected. Obviously, you can invest everything in a low market, and the market goes even lower.
我不太明白的是，您一定有某种方法可以保证保单持有人的权益不会受损。显然，如果您在低迷的市场中将一切投资进去，而市场又进一步下跌，这该如何应对？
Is it simply the size of the capital you’ve got that you think that’d be extraordinarily unlikely? Or do you use future insurance revenues, premium revenues, to pay off claims? Would you borrow to pay off claims?
是因为您认为庞大的资本规模使这种情况极不可能发生？还是您会用未来的保险收入或保费收入来支付理赔？您会借款来支付理赔吗？
If you could give some detail on that, maybe we could get some comfort as to how you’re thinking about that.
如果您能详细说明一下，我们或许能更安心地理解您的想法。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The float, in no way, is limited to fixed-income securities. The float is really available for anything that we feel is the most intelligent at any given time.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。浮存金绝对不限于投资固定收益证券。浮存金实际上可以用于任何我们认为在特定时间点上最明智的选择。
And the reason we can say that, and other insurance companies can’t say that, is because we have an incredible abundance of capital, plus other streams of earning power which are unrelated to the insurance business.
我们可以这么说，而其他保险公司不能，因为我们拥有非常充裕的资本，以及其他与保险业务无关的收益来源。
So we could have the float entirely in equities. And we have had that, in the past, or tantamount to that. And we could have a lot of it in operating businesses. We can have it anyplace it makes the most sense.
因此，我们可以将浮存金完全投资于股票。而且过去我们也确实这样做过，或者几乎等同于这样做。我们也可以将浮存金大量用于运营业务。我们可以把它用在任何最合理的地方。
But the only reason we can do that is because we have extraordinary capital. And we don’t have much debt.
但我们之所以能这么做，仅仅是因为我们拥有充裕的资本，而且负债不多。
We run the business differently than, or think about it differently, than probably 90 percent of managements do.
我们经营业务的方式，或者说我们思考问题的方式，可能与90%的管理团队不同。
We look at the assets on a consolidated basis with a few little exceptions. We look at the asset and the liability side — completely absent any linkage for specific assets and liabilities.
我们在整体基础上看待资产，只有少数例外。我们观察资产和负债两侧时，不会为特定资产和负债之间建立直接的联系。
So our job at Berkshire is to get the liabilities as cheaply as possible. We want all the liabilities we can get and not have any worries about fulfilling as cheap as we can, plus a lot of capital. And then we want all the assets to be employed as intelligently as possible.
因此，在伯克希尔，我们的工作是以尽可能低的成本获取负债。我们希望获得所有可以获取的负债，并确保毫无顾虑地履行责任，同时拥有充足的资本。然后，我们希望所有资产都能被尽可能聪明地利用。
And we don’t match up, you know, a billion dollars of assets on the asset side against a billion of specific liabilities on the right-hand side. There’s one or two exceptions to that, but that’s — where we’re required to — but that’s the basic approach.
我们不会将资产方的10亿美元资产与负债方的特定10亿美元负债一一对应。只有一两种情况下例外，但那是因为我们被要求这样做。这是我们的基本方法。
So, when Charlie and I think about Berkshire, we’re thinking about, how do we get as much money as we can as cheap as we can without, in any way, endangering our ability, ever, to pay anybody, under any circumstances?
因此，当查理和我思考伯克希尔时，我们考虑的是如何以尽可能低的成本筹集尽可能多的资金，而又不会在任何情况下影响我们支付任何人款项的能力。
And then, how do we put it out in a way that we feel the most comfortable on the asset side, at the best returns? And frequently, that will be equities. And it has been, over the past. Sometimes, we — it won’t be. We can’t find them. But that’s the goal.
然后，我们再考虑如何在资产方面以我们最为放心的方式部署资金，并获得最佳回报。通常情况下，这会是股票投资。过去如此，有时如果找不到机会，就不会是股票投资。但这是我们的目标。
And float is available just like — in virtually all cases — just like common equity. We don’t distinguish those in our mind.
浮存金的使用几乎在所有情况下都类似于普通股权益。在我们的思维中，这两者没有区别。
And that flexibility gives us some edge and, perhaps, quite an edge, at times, over other — over our competitors.
这种灵活性使我们在某些时候相较于其他竞争对手具有一定的优势，有时甚至是相当大的优势。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, you can see that in the results to date. We have used that edge in the past. And we hope to use it in the future.
查理·芒格： 是的，从迄今为止的结果中可以看到，我们过去已经利用过这种优势。我们希望在未来也能继续利用它。
53. Liz Claiborne and Jones Apparel investments
利兹·克莱本和琼斯服饰投资
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第六位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I am Kevin Pilon (PH) from Simsbury, Connecticut.
观众提问： 大家好，我是来自康涅狄格州辛斯伯里的凯文·皮隆（音译）。
Let me just say, quickly, that I’m really looking forward to Charlie’s book. And I hope it expands on the talks he gave that were reported in (inaudible) with regard to having a certain number of models that you need to understand and prosper in life.
我想先说一下，我非常期待查理的书出版。我希望书中能扩展他此前演讲的内容，比如提到需要掌握一定数量的模型来理解并在生活中取得成功。
I have two questions. And I’ll ask them quickly, in succession. Because you may want to punt on the first one.
我有两个问题，会依次快速提问，因为第一个问题可能你们不太想回答。
The first question is, I’m interested in any comments you might have that would expand on your general interest in the branded apparel companies, Liz Claiborne and Jones.
第一个问题是，我想听听您对品牌服饰公司利兹·克莱本和琼斯服饰的投资兴趣是否有更多的评价。
And the second question is, I wonder if you would comment on the future of Freddie Mac with all the current brouhaha.
第二个问题是，关于房利美（Freddie Mac）目前的各种争议，您是否愿意谈谈其未来的发展？
Every year, there’s new brouhaha, as you know, with the buyback of the 30-year bond and the search for a new benchmark and the Treasury saying that, perhaps, the agency securities were not backed by the full faith and credit of the government.
每年都会有新的争议，比如30年期债券的回购、新基准的探索，以及财政部声称机构证券可能不完全由政府信用支持。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — we’re not going to be able to help you too much on some of those. Because we may have some views, but they may be things that we don’t really want to talk about.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，在某些问题上，我们可能无法提供太多帮助。因为即使我们有一些观点，也可能是我们不便讨论的内容。
The Liz Claiborne and the Jones Apparel investments you’re talking about, the Jones Apparel is a decision that was made by Lou Simpson at GEICO.
关于利兹·克莱本和琼斯服饰的投资，琼斯服饰的决策是由GEICO的卢·辛普森做出的。
Lou runs a separate portfolio of equities for Berkshire. They’re held in GEICO. But obviously, they’re for the account of Berkshire. And that portfolio is well over 2 billion. And to some extent, it can be expanded or contracted based on what Lou would like to do.
卢为伯克希尔管理着一个独立的股票投资组合，这些股票是由GEICO持有的，但显然是为伯克希尔的利益服务。这个投资组合的规模超过20亿美元，并且可以根据卢的判断适当扩大或缩小。
And he runs that 100 percent on his own. And he’s compensated based on how that portfolio does. He makes decisions, buying and selling, without talking to me at all, which is the way we like it.
他完全独立管理该组合，他的薪酬与投资组合的表现挂钩。他可以完全自主地做出买卖决策，不需要与我商量，我们很喜欢这样的方式。
Sometimes, there’s an overlap in our decisions. But when I, for example, when I first found out about Jones Apparel, I’d never read an annual report of the company. I didn’t know what they did or anything.
有时我们的决策会有些重叠。例如，当我第一次了解到琼斯服饰时，我从未读过该公司的年报，对他们的业务一无所知。
But that’s Lou’s baby. And he’s very good at managing money. And he’s a fellow that has 100 percent of my trust.
但那是卢的项目。他非常擅长管理资金，是一个我百分之百信任的人。
So I know his general criteria for investing, which is quite similar to mine, not identical, but quite similar to mine. And he’s got a familiarity with businesses that, again, is quite similar to mine but not identical.
所以我知道他的投资标准总体上和我的很相似，尽管并不完全相同。而且他对企业的熟悉程度也和我类似，但也不是完全一致。
And he runs a good portfolio. And it makes life a little easier for me, not to have that two and a fraction billion added to all the rest that I’m having trouble investing.
他管理着一个不错的投资组合，这让我轻松了一些，因为那超过20亿的资金不用再加到其他让我头疼的投资中去。
Liz Claiborne came about a little differently. I got a call one weekend, actually, on purchasing a large block that someone was going to sell. And we bought that on a Monday morning in London, as I remember.
利兹·克莱本的情况则有些不同。某个周末我接到了一个电话，提到有人要出售一大批股票。然后据我记得，我们在伦敦的一个周一上午完成了这笔交易。
It was never reported on any exchange. I’m not quite sure even how it happened. But the broker that handled it arranged the trade over there.
这笔交易从未在任何交易所报告过。我甚至不确定是如何完成的，但经手的经纪人在那边安排了交易。
And, you know, they’ve had a very, very decent record. They buy in their shares. I like the business that they run.
而且，他们有非常不错的业绩记录。他们会回购股票。我喜欢他们的经营方式。
It’s not a Coca-Cola-type business or a Gillette-type business or even an American Express business. But we were offered that stock at a very attractive price. And it’s worked out fine.
这不是一个类似可口可乐、吉列甚至美国运通的业务类型。但当时我们以一个非常有吸引力的价格买入了这只股票，结果也挺不错。
The Freddie question, I’d rather not get into it, frankly. Because there’s a lot of political overtones to that. But Charlie?
至于房利美的问题，说实话，我不想深入探讨。因为这其中有太多的政治意味。查理，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I can pass as well as you can.
查理·芒格： 我和你一样也可以选择跳过这个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧。（笑声）
54. Berkshire’s next CEO won’t be a “caretaker”
伯克希尔的下一任CEO不会是“看守型”角色
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第七位提问者。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Garesh Paku (PH) from Croton, New York. First, regarding — I just have a couple of questions.
观众提问： 我是来自纽约克罗顿的加雷什·帕库（音译）。首先，我只有几个问题想问。
First, regarding the succession issue. I just can’t imagine that you would allow someone else to paint over your picture afterwards, I guess, post-truck.
首先，关于继任问题。我实在无法想象，在“卡车事件”之后，您会允许其他人随意改变您所创建的“画作”。
So I was wondering, would the — is your — is the nature of your succession plans more of a caretaker role of the museum? Or is it more active? That’s the —
所以我想知道，您的继任计划的本质是更偏向于一个“博物馆看守人”的角色，还是更为积极主动？这是我的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: It would be more active. No, the last thing in the world I would want would be a caretaker. That would be — no, that would not — I would not want that to be my legacy.
沃伦·巴菲特： 继任者会更积极主动。我绝不会希望下一任是一个“看守型”角色。这绝对是我最不希望看到的事情。我不希望这成为我的遗产。
55. Potential impacts of inflation on GEICO
通货膨胀对GEICO的潜在影响
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And the second question is regarding inflation. While I appreciate your focus on the specific businesses and your insistence that you not try to predict it, we’ve been very fortunate by successively lower rates of inflation.
观众提问： 第二个问题关于通货膨胀。我理解您专注于具体业务，并坚持不尝试预测通胀率。我们确实很幸运地经历了一段通胀率逐渐降低的时期。
And I’m wondering, with all of the money sloshing around and between real estate and stocks and all the other places, whether you are concerned about inflation, what effect that would have on the insurance businesses at Berkshire, and what you can do to guard against those risks.
我想知道，在房地产、股票等领域资金泛滥的情况下，您是否担心通货膨胀？这对伯克希尔的保险业务会有什么影响？以及您如何应对这些风险？
WARREN BUFFETT: My record is just terrible, in terms of predicting the inflation rate. So, it is not something that enters into our decision making.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我在预测通货膨胀率方面的记录非常糟糕。因此，这并不是我们决策中的考虑因素。
The big danger in — a speed-up of inflation would lead to more dollar volume in the insurance business. And more dollar volume is basically good for us, even though there might be a lag in pricing, that would eventually catch up and all that.
通货膨胀加速的主要影响是会导致保险业务的美元总量增加。而更高的美元总量对我们基本上是有利的，即使定价可能会滞后，但最终会追上来。
So, absent the next factor I’m going to mention, inflation is not necessarily harmful at all to something like a GEICO.
因此，如果不考虑我要提到的下一个因素，通货膨胀对像GEICO这样的公司不一定有害。
As you get into longer-tail liability lines, such as a General Re might have, inflation has this effect of hitting liabilities that were created four, five, 10 years earlier, maybe, and they get resettled in current dollars. And obviously, that ratchets up the cost of settling those liabilities, in kind of an unpredictable way.
但当涉及到长期责任险业务时，比如General Re，通货膨胀可能会影响到四、五年甚至十年前产生的负债，这些负债需要以当前美元结算。这显然会以一种不可预测的方式增加结算成本。
The danger in inflation to something like GEICO would be that people get, during inflation, they get irritated about the price of everything going up.
对GEICO来说，通货膨胀的风险在于，人们可能会因为物价普遍上涨而感到愤怒。
And there are some things they can do something about. And there’s others they can’t. And then there are some they think they can, even though they can’t. And one of those might be the cost of insurance.
有些事情他们能做点什么，有些事情他们无能为力，还有一些事情他们以为自己能做什么，其实并不能。其中之一可能就是保险费用。
So the people might get very upset with the system of auto insurance, when they see a very significant part of their annual budget. Because an auto insurance policy, on average, is significant to people, and virtually every consumer in the country.
当人们发现汽车保险占了他们年度预算的很大一部分时，他们可能会对整个汽车保险体系感到非常不满。因为平均来看，汽车保险对几乎所有消费者来说都是一项重要开支。
And there could be a lot of pressure on legislatures to do a variety of things that might change the system in a major way.
这可能会给立法机构施加很大的压力，促使他们采取各种措施，从而以重大方式改变体系。
It wouldn’t reduce the number of cars that crashed into each other or the injuries that were done or anything else. But it would be a way of striking out against higher rates.
通货膨胀不会减少车祸的发生次数，也不会减少由此造成的损害或其他后果。但这可能成为对抗更高保费的一种方式。
And people would be unhappy about those rates. And that also might reflect itself in difficulty getting the increases that were required to take care of the costs that were ratcheting up fast.
人们会对这些保费感到不满，这种情绪可能会体现在保险公司难以获取足够的保费涨幅上，而这些涨幅是为了应对快速攀升的成本所必需的。
So net, I think, inflation is bad for the auto insurance business. Although, you can argue that, you know, GEICO —
所以总体来看，我认为通货膨胀对汽车保险业务是不利的。不过，你可以说，GEICO——
I think when I first got interested in GEICO, they had about a — it was in 1951, I wrote it up in “Security I Like Best.” I think they had about 175,000 policies. And I think they were writing about 7 million of business, which would be about 40 bucks a policy.
我第一次对GEICO感兴趣是在1951年，当时我在《我最喜欢的证券》中写到过它。我记得他们大约有17.5万份保单，业务规模大约是700万美元，每份保单的平均保费大约是40美元。
Now, if we were getting $40 a policy now, you know, our premium volume would — the company would be a whole lot less valuable than it is.
如果我们现在每份保单仍然是40美元，你可以想象，我们的保费总量会低得多，公司也会比现在的价值少得多。
And so one way or another, it ended up going from that period of $40 an average policy to 12 — or $1,100 an average policy without the roof caving in on it.
但无论如何，这期间保单的平均价格从40美元增长到了1200美元或者1100美元，而这并没有导致公司陷入困境。
And it has been made more valuable, in dollar terms, by a combination of inflation and a great business model, without it getting destroyed in the process.
通过通货膨胀和优秀的商业模式的结合，公司以美元计的价值得到了提升，而没有在这个过程中被破坏。
Nevertheless, I would prefer a noninflationary environment. It’s better for the whole world, over time. And that the way our hope goes.
尽管如此，我还是更倾向于非通胀环境。从长远来看，这对整个世界更有利。这也是我们的期望。
And then we have this, so far, unwarranted fear that the kind of conditions that have existed over the last 15 years might cause a re-ignition of inflation, which to date, it hasn’t.
至于我们对过去15年存在的那些条件可能会引发通货膨胀的担忧，目前来看这些担忧还没有成为现实。
I don’t know any more about what’s going to happen than you do on that.
对于未来会发生什么，我并不比你们知道得更多。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know anything, either. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我也不知道。（笑声）
56. International expansion: interesting but not easy
国际扩张：有趣但不容易
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第八位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. My name is Zeke Turner, and currently finishing up my senior year at Taylor University in Indiana. So four more weeks, and I’m out of there. (Buffett laughs)
观众提问者： 下午好，先生们。我叫齐克·特纳，现在正在印第安纳州泰勒大学读大四，再过四周我就毕业了。（巴菲特笑了）
As someone studying finance, I do appreciate your comments as to the teaching of investment in academia. It certainly has some development it can make there. I do say that with hope that very few grad school admissions officers are listening right now.
作为一名金融专业的学生，我非常感谢你们对学术界投资教学的评论。这方面的确还有很大的改进空间。我说这话时希望听众中没有太多研究生院招生官员。
But I do want to say a special thank you quickly, if I could, to all those professors who do have the intelligence and the guts to actually teach value investing on that level and go away from efficient market theories. I do kind of wish Benjamin Graham were still teaching.
不过，我想特别感谢那些有智慧和勇气在这一层面教授价值投资、远离有效市场理论的教授。我真希望本杰明·格雷厄姆还能教书。
Many questions have been asked as far as technology and its development into the business model. I think the greatest effect of this will probably be in the globalization of the economy. This has had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on the business model as we know it today.
关于技术及其对商业模式发展的影响，已经有许多问题被提及。我认为这方面最大的影响可能是经济的全球化。这种影响已经显现，并将继续对我们今天所知的商业模式产生重大影响。
Now, except for certain growth opportunities, this may have a smaller effect on companies such as See’s Candy or Nebraska Furniture Mart, but has had and probably will continue to have a dramatic effect on companies like Gillette, Coke, who have significant international presence.
当然，除了某些增长机会外，这种影响对像See's糖果或内布拉斯加家具商城这样的公司可能较小，但对像吉列和可口可乐这样具有显著国际影响力的公司来说，已经并可能继续产生深远的影响。
My question is, how does your approach change, if at all, in light of the international expansion?
我的问题是，在国际扩张的背景下，你们的投资方法是否会有所改变？
I’m particularly interested in the introduction of greater difficulty in understanding the business models, in the understanding of the economic future and the economic risk associated with the international scene. In addition, do you actively search for a global scene for investment opportunities?
我尤其感兴趣的是国际化背景下，对商业模式、经济前景和经济风险的理解是否会变得更加困难。另外，你们是否会主动寻找全球范围的投资机会？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The answer is that we obviously like businesses that are good businesses at present volume and that have the chances to expand significantly with similar economics.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们的答案是，我们显然喜欢那些在现有规模下表现良好的业务，并且有机会以类似的经济模式大幅扩张的公司。
And with any business that’s been around the United States a long time, there’s probably more opportunity, potentially anyway, around the rest of the world than here.
对于任何已经在美国长期经营的业务来说，其潜在的机会可能更多地存在于世界其他地区，而不是美国本土。
And Coke has grown faster. Oh, it’s grown well here. But it’s grown faster around the world than here. And that’s been true at Gillette, also, just because we were a more mature market.
可口可乐的增长更快。哦，它在这里表现很好，但在世界其他地方的增长速度更快。吉列的情况也是如此，因为我们是一个更成熟的市场。
So we love the idea of products that will travel. Some travel well. Some don’t. I mean, it’s an incredible world that way.
我们非常喜欢那些具有全球适应性的产品。有些产品适应性很好，有些则不然。我觉得世界真是奇妙。
Candy bars don’t seem to travel so well, you know. Soft drinks travel terrifically. And razor blades travel terrifically. But the Cadbury bars sell in England. And, you know, and the Hershey bars sell here. And it’s very hard, with some items, to try —
巧克力棒似乎不太适合全球市场，而软饮料和剃须刀片则非常适应。但在英国，卖得好的是吉百利巧克力棒；而在美国，卖得好的是好时巧克力棒。有些产品很难进行市场扩展——
In fact, within this country, it’s amazing to me. We talk about having a mobile society. And people are moving all the time. And we’re all watching the same television and everything else.
事实上，即使在美国国内，我也觉得很惊讶。我们总说这是一个高度流动的社会，人们经常搬迁，而且大家都在看同样的电视节目和其他内容。
And the supermarket share of Dr. Pepper in Dallas is 18 and a fraction percent. And in Boston, it’s six-tenths of one percent. I mean, 18 to 0.6, 30 times the market share.
比如，在达拉斯，超市里Dr. Pepper的市场份额是18点几，而在波士顿却只有0.6%。也就是说，18%对0.6%，差了30倍。
Dr. Pepper’s been around forever. You know, people move back and forth and everything. And how can you have that sort of a differential in this country?
Dr. Pepper已经存在了很久，人们经常来来往往，但为什么在同一个国家，市场份额会有这么大的差异？
Royal Crown Cola, 3 percent in Chicago, one-tenth of a percent, you know, maybe, in Detroit, a couple hundred miles away, same kind of people, all that sort of thing. And Royal Crown’s been around for 75 years or whatever it may be, 50 years, at least.
比如皇家皇冠可乐，在芝加哥的市场份额是3%，但在几百英里外的底特律可能只有0.1%。这两地的人口构成差不多，而皇家皇冠可乐已经有至少50年的历史了。
And you get these incredible differences in what people do, even within this country. So it’s not easy to predict how — if you can’t predict how Dr. Pepper — if you can’t figure out how to make Dr. —
即使在美国国内，人们的消费行为也有如此惊人的差异。所以，要预测产品的适应性并不容易。如果你连Dr. Pepper的市场行为都无法预测——
If I owned Dr. Pepper and was selling 18 percent of the market in the supermarkets of Dallas, it would drive me crazy, you know, I was getting six-tenths of a percent in Boston. Or, I think it’s five-tenths, maybe, in Detroit. That would drive me crazy, although maybe I should just be grateful that I’ve got 18 percent in Dallas.
如果我拥有Dr. Pepper，在达拉斯的超市里占了18%的市场份额，而在波士顿只有0.6%，或者在底特律只有0.5%，我一定会疯掉。虽然或许我应该感激在达拉斯有18%的份额。
It just — it’s very hard to predict how products will travel. With See’s Candy, you know, we have this incredible penetration in the West and particularly in California. We know it’s the best candy.
很难预测产品的适应性。Take See’s Candy来说，它在西部特别是加州的渗透力非常强，我们知道它是最好的糖果。
Now, boxed chocolates just do not sell big in this country. The annual consumption is low. But it still seems that, if we can make a lot of money in California, we ought to be able to make some money in New York or Pennsylvania.
现在，盒装巧克力在美国并不算畅销，年消费量很低。但如果我们能在加州赚很多钱，似乎也应该能在纽约或宾夕法尼亚赚些钱。
But we haven’t figure out how to do it. And we’ve tried a lot of things.
但是，我们还没找到办法，尽管我们尝试了很多方法。
So, the answer is we’re always interested in geographical expansion, whether it’s even in the United States or, going beyond that, into other countries.
所以，我们对地理扩展始终感兴趣，无论是在美国国内还是扩展到其他国家。
It’s not as easy as it looks. But when the chance to do it comes, then you ought to just pound and pound and pound.
虽然这看起来并不容易，但一旦有机会，你就必须不断努力去争取。
And we occasionally have bought stocks in other countries. I wrote a fellow the other day that I read about in Germany about his business. I’ve never met him or anything else. But it sounded like he had a pretty good business. And it sounded like he might be my type of guy.
我们有时也会购买其他国家的股票。不久前，我给德国一位商人写了一封信，关于他经营的生意。我从未见过他，但他的生意听起来很不错，而且他可能是我的类型。
So I just wrote him a letter. Haven’t heard back, either. But I may. The odds are against it. But it sounded to me like I’d buy his business, if he chose to write back and wanted to do something.
所以我就写了信，虽然还没收到回信，但可能会有。成功的可能性不大，但如果他回信并愿意合作，我很愿意买下他的生意。
And we’re very willing to do business, you know, in any country in the world, where we think we understand the nuances of the corporate governance system and taxation and that sort of thing.
我们非常愿意在全球任何国家开展业务，只要我们认为对其公司治理体系、税收等细节有足够的了解。
We don’t understand all 200 countries, by a long shot. But there’s plenty we’d love to be in business in.
当然，我们不可能理解200个国家，但我们对其中很多国家充满兴趣。
We looked at a very significant company in Japan a couple years ago. And some other fellow I know bought it and has done very well. It would’ve made sense for us. And we missed it.
几年前，我们研究了一家日本的大公司，但后来被另一位我认识的人买走了，而且他做得很成功。我们原本应该买下它，但错失了机会。
We will continue to look at things, internationally. It makes a lot of sense. And we’ve got a lot of capital to employ.
我们会继续关注国际市场，这很有意义。而且我们有大量的资本可以投放。
We’re more likely, by some margin, to find things here. But we may find a big one outside of this country.
虽然在美国国内找到投资机会的可能性稍大，但我们也可能在国外找到重大的机会。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格： 没什么补充的。**
57. Spending to expand GEICO’s business
关于扩大GEICO业务的支出
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第一位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m John Bailey (PH) from Boston, Massachusetts.
观众提问者： 我是来自马萨诸塞州波士顿的约翰·贝利（音）。
You commented, in the annual report, that only part of GEICO’s marketing expense last year was required to maintain the business.
您在年报中提到，GEICO去年只有一部分营销费用是用于维持业务的。
This seems to get to the heart of owner earnings, where, in the first part, you can value the existing business very well through this observation. And you get a direct measure of the dollars invested in new business.
这似乎触及了“所有者收益”的核心。从第一部分来看，通过这一观察，您可以很好地评估现有业务的价值，并且可以直接衡量投入到新业务的资金。
And it seems that you should be able to make similar observations about other businesses that you may be interested in investing in.
看起来，您应该能够对其他可能感兴趣的业务进行类似的观察。
So could you use this as a jumping off point to describe examples, perhaps, of how you contemplate companies’ marginal investment opportunities or their return on marginal capital?
那么，您能否以此为起点，举例说明您如何考虑企业的边际投资机会或边际资本回报？
And how much weight do you give to the value of the existing business in your investment decisions or the value of the, so to speak, in-force book?
在您的投资决策中，您会多大程度地重视现有业务的价值，或者所谓的现有保单价值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we, as we explained earlier, are looking for ways to create more than a dollar of value per dollar we lay out.
沃伦·巴菲特： 正如我们之前解释的那样，我们在寻找每投入1美元能够创造超过1美元价值的方法。
We’d love to create $3 of value or $4 of value. But we’ll settle for $1.10, if that’s all we can get.
我们当然希望创造3美元或4美元的价值，但如果只能达到1.10美元，我们也能接受。
We don’t consciously make decisions that are 90-cent decisions for a dollar laid out. None of this is that precise, when you get into the application of it.
我们不会刻意做出每投入1美元只得到90美分价值的决策。不过，当实际应用时，这些都没有那么精确。
What we do know, is that there is enough of a margin at, say, a GEICO expansion effort, that it’s pretty compelling that it makes sense. Part of the limitation there, as I explained in the report, too, is a question of infrastructure and all of that.
我们所知道的是，比如在GEICO的扩张努力中，有足够的利润空间，这让这种投入显得非常合理。但正如我在报告中提到的，部分限制还涉及基础设施等问题。
So, it isn’t solely a question of saying, you know, “Can we lay out another dollar?” and “Will that have a value of $1.10?” because if we strain the organization beyond its ability to service people, we may be hurting the business already on the books.
因此，这并不仅仅是问“我们是否可以再投入1美元？”和“这是否能带来1.10美元的价值？”的问题。如果我们让组织超出其服务能力，就可能损害已有的业务。
回答的质量远高于问题。
I used the GEICO example in the report, because it’s big enough, so it’s meaningful to shareholders. I mean, we’re doing things all the time that cost us money in the short run that we think will more than produce a commensurate value over time, but not on the scale that we’re doing it at GEICO currently. And we may step up that scale even.
我在报告中举了GEICO的例子，因为它规模足够大，对股东具有意义。我是说，我们一直在做一些短期内花钱，但长期看会产生更大价值的事情，但这些投入的规模远不如我们目前在GEICO的规模。而且我们可能会进一步扩大这一规模。
So, I thought it important to lay out those figures, even though I can’t be precise. When I say, you know, that it might be $50 million to maintain, I don’t know that figure. It could be 70. It could be 30. Maybe I’m off even more than that.
所以，我认为把这些数据列出来很重要，尽管我无法做到精确。当我说可能需要5000万美元来维持时，我并不确定这个数字。它可能是7000万，也可能是3000万，或者偏差更大。
But that’s my best guess. And I think the shareholders are entitled to my best guess. And they’re entitled to know how much we are spending, beyond that maintenance cost, to build the business for the future, which we don’t, obviously, capitalize on the balance sheet.
但这是我能给出的最佳估计。我认为股东有权了解我的最佳估计，也有权知道我们在维护成本之外，为未来发展业务所投入的资金，这些资金显然并未在资产负债表上体现。
So those — GEICO’s, by far, the most dramatic. And we don’t have comparable expenditures like that going on elsewhere.
因此，GEICO的投入是迄今为止最显著的。我们在其他地方没有类似规模的支出。
But we are spending significant money, for example, to take NetJets to Europe. And we’ll be spending it this year and next year.
不过，例如，我们正在为将NetJets扩展到欧洲投入大量资金，而且今年和明年都会继续投入。
And then as soon as that starts looking good, we’ll be going to Asia and spending more money. I mean, all of those decisions are made that way. They’re not on the scale of the GEICO decision, though, at all.
一旦欧洲的业务开始走上正轨，我们将会进入亚洲，并投入更多资金。我是说，所有这些决策都是以这种方式做出的，但它们的规模完全无法与GEICO的决策相比。
We want to give you the information in the report that, related to the size of the enterprise, would be material to Charlie or me, if we were reading the report and not involved in the business, in trying to figure out what our investment was all about.
我们希望在报告中向您提供相关信息，这些信息与企业规模相关，如果我们是读者而非经营者，会认为这些信息对查理或我非常重要，有助于理解我们的投资究竟是什么。
That’s the goal in what we write and then to keep it to a size that doesn’t have to be sent UPS.
这就是我们撰写报告的目标，同时还要控制报告篇幅，以免需要通过UPS寄送。
58. Problems with Berkshire annual report distribution
关于伯克希尔年度报告分发的问题
WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, I’m glad I got wandering along on that line. Because we did have a lot of shareholders this year that got their reports even later than they received them in past years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 顺便说一下，我很高兴聊到这个问题。今年确实有很多股东比往年更晚收到他们的报告。
Now, they were delivered — the reports that go to registered holders were put in the mail a few days after we go up on the internet here in Omaha. And they seem to get delivered OK.
现在，那些寄给登记股东的报告，是在我们在奥马哈的网络发布几天后寄出的，看起来这些报告的递送情况还不错。
Street-name holders, which are ten times in number what the registered holders are, so we’re really talking about nine out of ten shareholders, get their reports from a firm in New Jersey that is designated, by their broker, to take the reports from us and re-mail them. And we pay those people a fair amount of money to do that.
而以经纪公司名义登记的股东数量是登记股东的十倍，也就是说，我们实际上谈的是十分之九的股东。他们的报告是通过一家位于新泽西的公司分发的。这家公司由他们的经纪人指定，从我们这里领取报告并重新寄出，我们为此支付了相当可观的费用。
We know when we deliver those reports to them, which is promptly. And we know when they tell us that they send them out. And we inquire every day, or more than once a day, to find out whether they’ve gone out.
我们知道何时将这些报告交付给他们，我们会及时交付。我们也知道他们告诉我们何时寄出的时间。我们每天甚至每天多次询问，以确认报告是否已经寄出。
And we got a lot of complaints this year that people hadn’t received them at a time when you would’ve thought they would’ve received them.
但今年我们收到很多投诉，人们表示在他们预计应该收到报告的时间内却没有收到。
So, we can either — we know when the designated mailer received them. We don’t know for sure when they got them out. And we don’t know for sure what happens at the post office.
因此，我们只能确定指定的分发商何时收到报告，但我们无法确定他们何时发出，也无法确定邮局的具体处理情况。
But we were — the mailing went out about the same as in previous years. But the receipt, apparently, was somewhat later. And all we can say is that we apologize, but we don’t have any better system.
不过，邮件的发出时间与往年差不多，但显然收到的时间有所延迟。我们只能表示歉意，但目前没有更好的解决办法。
The people that have them in their own name will always get them dropped in the mail a couple of days after the report appears on the internet. We can assure you of that.
那些以自己名义登记的股东，总是在报告上线后几天内通过邮件收到报告，这一点我们可以保证。
We can’t assure you of when the street-name holders will get their reports, because that is a mailing that we don’t handle. And no other companies handle them, to my knowledge.
但我们无法保证以经纪公司名义登记的股东何时能收到报告，因为这部分邮件不是由我们处理的。据我所知，也没有其他公司处理这些邮件。
There is a firm that seems to do about 95 percent of that and is designated by the specific broker with whom you have your shares.
一家专门的公司处理了其中大约95%的分发工作，这家公司是由您所持股票的经纪公司指定的。
Charlie, you got anything to add?
查理，你有什么补充吗？
59. The internet’s effect on GEICO and auto insurance pricing
互联网对GEICO和汽车保险定价的影响
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第二位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Will Obendorf (PH). I’m from San Francisco, California, and I’m 11 years old. I have been a shareholder for six years at Berkshire Hathaway.
观众提问者： 您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫威尔·奥本多夫（音），来自加利福尼亚州旧金山。我今年11岁，已经是伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东六年了。
My questions are, what are GEICO’s sustainable competitive advantages? And my other one is, what are the implications of the internet on pricing for the auto insurance industry?
我的问题是，GEICO的可持续竞争优势是什么？另外，互联网对汽车保险行业定价有哪些影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we — we’re going to get your name and send it to human relations or whatever they call those departments. We want to hire you. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们得记下你的名字，然后发给人力资源部或者其他相关部门。我们想雇用你。（笑声）
The sustainable competitive advantage at GEICO is to be the low-cost producer providing very good service.
GEICO的可持续竞争优势在于，它是低成本的服务提供者，同时提供非常优质的服务。
And there will be a number of companies that provide good services. So that does not distinguish us from a great many competitors.
当然，还有许多公司提供优质服务，这一点并没有使我们与众多竞争者区别开来。
Having the low cost is crucial. There are companies that specialize in given groups of policyholders, but smaller groups, such as USAA, that have very good costs. So they are very, very competitive with us in their chosen area.
低成本是至关重要的。有些公司专注于特定群体的保单持有人，比如USAA，它们的成本非常有竞争力，因此在其选择的领域中，与我们竞争非常激烈。
There’s another company in Los Angeles that, geographically, called 21st Century Insurance, that has costs like ours. And so they are extremely competitive within that geographic area.
洛杉矶还有一家名为21世纪保险的公司，在地理范围内，其成本与我们相当，因此在该地区的竞争非常激烈。
I don’t think anybody is any better than us who operates nationwide. We don’t operate in Massachusetts or New Jersey. But in the other 48 states, we will have a quote for about anyone.
在全国范围内经营的公司中，我认为没有人比我们做得更好。我们不在马萨诸塞州和新泽西州经营，但在其他48个州，我们可以为几乎所有人提供报价。
So, in terms of a broad-based insurance — auto insurance competitor — our competitive advantage has to be low cost over time.
因此，对于广泛的汽车保险竞争者来说，我们的竞争优势必须是长期保持低成本。
Now, we also have to be as good at distinguishing among the risks posed by different kinds of drivers as other people. In other words, we have to be able to select people who are going to be better-than-average drivers. And we have to be able to understand who is likely to be a poorer-than-average driver.
此外，我们还需要像其他公司一样，能够很好地区分不同类型驾驶员所带来的风险。换句话说，我们必须能够选择出那些驾驶表现优于平均水平的人，同时也要理解哪些人可能表现低于平均水平。
But — and the ability to do that, to distinguish those people, would be a competitive advantage. I think that many companies tend to be fairly equal on that point. So it’s really at this cost level.
但是，具备这种能力去区分这些人，确实是一种竞争优势。不过，我认为在这一点上，许多公司可能处于较为均等的水平。因此，竞争的关键还是成本。
And we care very much about cost, the same way that Charlie mentioned a company called Costco does, you know, in terms of retailing. They figure their expense ratios out to hundredths of a percent. And that is important.
我们非常重视成本，就像查理提到的零售业中的Costco公司一样。他们会精确计算成本比例到百分之零点几，这一点非常重要。
So that is the competitive advantage. Now when you get — and we have to sustain and widen that, if possible.
因此，这就是我们的竞争优势。现在我们需要维持并尽可能扩大这种优势。
The question of the internet, it’s going to be very important. It already is important to GEICO. It will be more and more important. It will be important to the insurance industry.
至于互联网的问题，它将变得非常重要。对于GEICO来说，它已经很重要了，并且会变得越来越重要。对于整个保险行业也是如此。
Because when you have the internet, you have a situation where somebody thinking about insuring a car can click to one place, find out what that rate will be. They can click to someplace else and find out what that rate will be.
因为在互联网的环境下，想要给汽车投保的人可以点击一个网站，查到相关报价；然后再点击另一个网站，查询另一家的报价。
So, in effect, they can shop all around without going from place to place to place and driving all over town or calling lots of agencies. They can just do it right there in their den. And that makes it very important, again, that we be the low-cost company.
这样一来，实际上他们可以货比三家，而不用到处跑、开车穿越整个城市或者拨打多家代理的电话。他们只需在家中就能完成，这再次凸显了成为低成本公司的重要性。
I think it’s going to be an advantage for us, over time. For one thing, I think it makes brand very important. Because we want people to be thinking of GEICO as one of the possibilities to call.
我认为，从长远来看，这对我们来说将是一种优势。首先，这让品牌变得非常重要。我们希望人们在考虑投保时，把GEICO作为一个选项。
And if you’ve got the XYZ Company that nobody’s ever heard of, nobody’s going to think about clicking on them.
如果是一家没人听说过的XYZ公司，就没有人会想到点击它。
And GEICO’s brand is becoming extremely familiar to people throughout the country, and we’re spending a lot of money to make it even more familiar.
而GEICO的品牌正在变得被全美人民熟知，我们也投入了大量资金让它变得更加广为人知。
So you’ve asked two very good questions. And I think we’re in pretty good shape on both of them. Thank you.
所以，你问了两个非常好的问题。我认为我们在这两个方面的表现都不错。谢谢你。
Charlie?
查理？
60. We’ll do real estate deals, but only at the right price
我们会做房地产交易，但前提是价格合适
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Berkshire and Mr. Hathaway. (Laughter)
观众提问者： 下午好，伯克希尔先生和哈撒韦先生。（笑声）
My name’s Anthony Priest. I’m from Washington, D.C.
我叫安东尼·普里斯特，来自华盛顿特区。
A couple months ago, I saw an ad in the Wall Street Journal, where it said, “Berkshire Hathaway wants to see real estate finance opportunities in excess of $100 million.”
几个月前，我在《华尔街日报》上看到一则广告，上面写着：“伯克希尔哈撒韦正在寻找超过1亿美元的房地产融资机会。”
**I was curious about your thoughts in this area, the real estate field, some of your goals, if you can talk about any of the deals you may have made, and if Donald Trump has given you a call yet. (Laughter) **
我很好奇您在房地产领域的想法、一些目标，是否可以谈谈您可能已经完成的交易？还有，唐纳德·特朗普是否已经给您打电话了？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think Donald Trump will give us a call.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我不认为唐纳德·特朗普会给我们打电话。
We have got about, what, three deals that we’ve put on in the last couple of years in real estate. And they are in this $100-million-and-up category.
过去几年里，我们大概完成了三笔房地产交易，它们都属于1亿美元及以上的规模。
And we’re willing to put billions and billions of dollars in, if we can find the right sort of opportunities. Or nothing may happen, depending on — just depending on the market.
如果有合适的机会，我们愿意投入数十亿美元。但如果市场没有机会，那我们也不会有任何动作。
Most — a lot of places have a mortgage department, or they have a real estate department. And they sort of have a budget. And they put money out based on using up the budget. And they have a whole bunch of people that don’t have a job, unless they do that.
很多公司有按揭部门或者房地产部门，这些部门通常会有预算，他们会根据预算分配资金。这些部门里的人，除非完成交易，否则就没有工作可做。
That’s not the way we operate at Berkshire. We’re willing — if the deals are right, you know, we’ll do many billions. If the deals aren’t right, we don’t have anybody whose job is dependent on keeping busy in a field like that. So, we look at the deals when they come in.
但在伯克希尔，我们不是这么运作的。如果交易合适，我们会投入数十亿美元；如果不合适，我们不会有人因为没有交易而无事可做。我们只在有交易机会时进行评估。
Mike Goldberg is in charge of that operation. And we kick things around. He’s in the office right next to mine. So, if he hears about a deal, you know, we’ll discuss it for three minutes. And we’ll sort of know whether it passes the first threshold. And then we’ll go on to the second and the third.
迈克·戈德伯格负责这个业务。他的办公室就在我旁边。如果他听说有交易机会，我们会讨论三分钟左右，大致判断是否通过了第一道门槛，然后再看第二道和第三道门槛。
But we don’t waste a lot of time on things. And we don’t care whether we make another deal or not. We’d like to, if the terms are right. And that ad produced some inquiries, not from Donald Trump.
但我们不会浪费太多时间。如果交易条件合适，我们当然愿意完成交易。那则广告确实带来了一些咨询，不过不是来自唐纳德·特朗普。
And, you know, one or — there’s one or two of — a couple of them are alive at the present time. And we’ll see whether they work out.
现在有一两个交易还在洽谈中，我们会看看是否能够达成。
Real estate deals, by their nature, take longer to put to bed than the kind of thing we normally do. In fact, I can buy a business faster than we can make a real estate deal, usually. That’s just the way they work.
房地产交易的性质决定了它通常需要更长的时间来完成。事实上，我买下一家企业的速度通常比完成一笔房地产交易更快。这就是房地产交易的运作方式。
But we could end up with a — We’re very happy with the three deals that we’ve got. They’re good uses of money. And I hope we find a lot more. But if we don’t, I won’t be upset.
但我们已经完成的三笔交易让我们很满意。它们是资金的好用途。我希望未来能找到更多这样的机会，但如果没有，我也不会感到失望。
Charlie, do you have anything to add? Charlie’s our real estate expert.
查理，你有什么补充的吗？查理可是我们的房地产专家。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Hardly.
查理·芒格： 算不上。
WARREN BUFFETT: We are not financing Charlie’s boat, incidentally, despite the rumors. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 顺便说一下，尽管有传言，但我们并没有资助查理的游艇。（笑声）
61. Berkshire is not a “fund”
伯克希尔不是一家“基金”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Joel. I’m an undergraduate student at the University of Virginia. Just — I have two questions.
观众提问者： 你好，我叫乔尔，是弗吉尼亚大学的本科生。我有两个问题。
My first question is, how important do you think the structure of your fund is to its long-term success?
第一个问题是，您认为基金的结构对其长期成功有多重要？
And by that, I mean, in the last couple weeks, some other legendary investors, like Julian Robertson, Stanley Druckenmiller, have been forced to either close or restructure their funds as a result of a kind of vicious cycle of underperformance and subsequent redemptions and then even worse performance.
我的意思是，最近几周，一些传奇投资者，比如朱利安·罗伯逊和斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒，被迫关闭或重组他们的基金。这是由于一种恶性循环：业绩不佳，随后投资者赎回，导致业绩进一步恶化。
Do you think that the structure of your fund, as a publicly-traded company, as opposed to a private partnership, like Tiger and Quantum, has protected your business from a similar fate?
您是否认为，您的基金作为一家上市公司，而非像老虎基金和量子基金那样的私人合伙企业，这种结构保护了您的业务免于类似的命运？
Or phrased a different way, do you think that, if Tiger or Quantum were structured the way that Berkshire Hathaway is, that they might still be in business in the same way today?
或者换一种问法，如果老虎基金或量子基金的结构与伯克希尔哈撒韦相同，您认为它们今天是否还能以类似的方式运营？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t consider ourselves in remotely the same business as Tiger. I mean, they are managing a securities operation. And we aren’t doing anything like what they do.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们认为自己与老虎基金的业务完全不同。我是说，他们在管理证券业务，而我们并没有做任何类似的事情。
Thirty years ago, when I had the partnership, it was much more along their lines, although still far from what they do. But it was structured much more like what they did.
三十年前，当我经营合伙企业时，我们的模式与他们的业务更加相似，尽管仍与他们现在的操作方式有很大区别。但当时的结构更接近他们的模式。
And I — and, although we had bought control of businesses and all that, we were functioning much more — or, focusing much more on securities.
虽然当时我们已经购买了一些企业的控股权，但我们的运作模式还是更侧重于证券投资。
We don’t care whether we own a stock or a bond. We will over the next 20 years. But that’s not what we’re about.
我们并不在意是否持有股票或债券，未来20年也不会在意。但这并不是我们的核心业务。
We’re not a fund. We are an operating business that generates a lot of capital and uses that to buy other businesses in whole or part.
我们不是一家基金。我们是一家运营企业，通过运作产生大量资本，并用这些资本收购全部或部分其他企业的股份。
And we prefer in whole. But we sometimes do it in part.
我们更喜欢全资收购，但有时也会部分持股。
But I would — I don’t consider — which is a reason why I don’t consider book value that important, although it — it’s got the importance I attributed to it earlier.
因此，我并不认为账面价值特别重要，尽管它在某种程度上有它的重要性。
But, we could easily have 90 percent of the value of Berkshire, ten years from now, be represented by businesses that we own and 10 percent by securities. Or we could very easily have 60 or 70 percent represented by securities, depending on how markets develop.
十年后，伯克希尔的价值可能有90%由我们拥有的企业构成，而10%由证券构成；也可能60%到70%是由证券构成，这取决于市场的发展。
I hope it develops in the former way. But I’m perfectly willing to go the other way, too. But it just has no relationship to the kind of funds you talk about.
我希望是前一种情况，但我也完全愿意接受后一种情况。这与您提到的基金类型没有任何关系。
We are structured poorly, from a tax standpoint, compared to those fellows, and compared to what I used to have in the ’60s.
从税收角度看，我们的结构不如那些人好，也不如我在60年代的结构优越。
But that’s, you know, that’s a decision we made. And we’re stuck with it, more or less.
但这是我们自己做的决定，我们或多或少要接受这一点。
It’s not a great tax structure, if you’re going to own securities. But we may not own that many securities over time.
如果打算持有大量证券，这不是一个理想的税收结构。但从长期来看，我们可能不会持有那么多证券。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think that the people in the relative performance game, who are trying to attract so-called hot money, are living in a totally different world from ours.
查理·芒格： 我确实认为，那些参与相对业绩竞争、试图吸引所谓“热钱”的人，生活在一个与我们完全不同的世界。
I mean, Soros, in the end, was not willing to have a lot of people make a lot of money in high-tech stocks and not be part of that game. And they got killed.
比如索罗斯，最终他不愿意在高科技股上让别人赚很多钱却自己不参与这个游戏，结果被严重拖累了。
We’re perfectly willing to let something we don’t understand very well rage on while a lot of other people make a lot of money we don’t.
我们完全愿意让那些我们不太理解的事情继续进行，哪怕别人因此赚了很多钱，而我们没有参与。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — it’s just not a securities operation that we have. We own a lot of securities at present. And we’ll probably own a lot five or 10 years from now. But it’s not what Berkshire is necessarily about.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们不是一家证券公司。我们目前确实持有很多证券，五到十年后可能仍会持有不少。但这并不是伯克希尔的核心业务。
Ideally, you know, I would love it if we could move all the money in securities into businesses that we liked. But that’s — that isn’t going to happen, in all probability.
理想情况下，我当然希望我们能把所有证券投资转移到我们喜欢的企业上。但这在很大程度上是不可能实现的。
It’s too tough, because we can’t find multi-billion-dollar businesses to buy right and left. We find a few. But they tend to be small.
这太难了，因为我们无法轻易找到数十亿美元规模的企业进行收购。我们确实找到了一些，但它们往往规模较小。
62. We wouldn’t buy a company that lies to itself
我们不会收购自欺欺人的公司
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第五位？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Paul Tomasik from Chicago. My question is about intellectual honesty and your incredible ability of raising intellectual honesty in organizations.
观众提问者： 我叫保罗·托马西克，来自芝加哥。我的问题是关于智识诚实以及您提升组织智识诚实水平的非凡能力。
In particular, you look at General Re, a large, well-managed, publicly-traded firm. And if you think about it, if you raise the intellectual honesty in an organization like that, initially, you’re going to have an aberration, as you called it.
尤其是您提到的通用再保险公司，它是一家规模大、管理良好的上市公司。如果您在这样的组织中提高智识诚实水平，起初可能会出现一种您称之为“反常”的现象。
In particular, Berkshire Hathaway was the first company to write down the Uni — what is it — Unicover write-down, whereas Aon pushed it on into the year 2000.
具体来说，伯克希尔哈撒韦是首家对Unicover亏损进行减记的公司，而怡安将其推迟到了2000年。
Can you comment, give us some hints, on how you raise the intellectual honesty in an organization?
您能否对此发表评论，并给出一些提高组织智识诚实的方法？
And somebody whispered in my ear, they wanted to know Charlie’s reading list. I guess they finished “Guns, Germs, and Steel.” Thank you.
另外，有人悄悄对我说，他们想知道查理的阅读书单。我猜他们已经读完了《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: We really don’t want to buy into any organization that we felt would be lacking that quality, in the first place. Because we really don’t believe in buying into organizations to change them.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们首先不会想要收购缺乏这种品质的组织，因为我们并不相信通过收购来改变组织。
We may, you know, we may change the comp system a little or something of the sort.
我们可能会稍微调整一下薪酬体系，或者做类似的事情。
But, I’m not going to name names, but there are a whole lot of organizations that, if we bought into them, we wouldn’t move their needle one point in terms of how they operate. And we wouldn’t be comfortable with how they operated.
不过，我不会点名，但确实有许多组织，如果我们收购了它们，也无法对它们的运营方式产生任何实质性的影响。而且我们对它们的运营方式也不会感到满意。
So, we try to buy into organizations that we think are very much like ours, at bedrock. And General Re would’ve recognized that Unicover loss just as quickly if we hadn’t owned it, as we had.
因此，我们尽量选择那些在根本上与我们非常相似的组织。即使我们没有拥有通用再保险公司，它们也会像我们一样迅速承认Unicover亏损。
Now, that was not true of some other people. But they didn’t need any prodding from us in order to realize something like that.
而其他一些公司就不是这样了。但通用再保险并不需要我们推动就能意识到这一点。
We want people joining us who already are the type that face reality and that tell us, basically, tell us the truth but tell themselves the truth, which is even more important.
我们希望加入我们的人是那些能够面对现实的人，他们不仅能如实告诉我们情况，更重要的是，他们能够对自己说实话。
And once you get an organization that lies to itself, and there are plenty that do, I just think you get into all kinds of problems.
一旦一个组织开始自欺欺人，而这种情况确实很多，我认为问题就会层出不穷。
And people know it throughout the organization. And they adopt the norms of what they think is happening up above them.
整个组织内的员工都会感知到这种氛围，他们会模仿他们认为来自高层的行为准则。
And particularly in a financial organization — really in any organization — but particularly in a financial organization, you know, that is death over time.
尤其是在金融机构中——实际上在任何机构中都是如此——但特别是在金融机构中，自欺欺人最终会导致失败。
And we wouldn’t buy into something that we felt had that problem, with the idea that we would correct it. Because we wouldn’t.
如果我们觉得某个组织存在这样的问题，我们不会因为想要纠正它而去收购它。因为我们做不到。
You know, it — Charlie and I have had a little experience with some organizations that have had that sort of problem. And it’s not correctable, at least, you know, based on the lifespan of humans. It’s too much to commit to.
查理和我确实与一些存在这样问题的组织有过一点接触。这种问题是无法纠正的，至少以人类的寿命来看是如此。投入去解决这样的问题代价太大了。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you’re totally right about General Re. We didn’t improve behavior at General Re. They already had a behavior just like ours.
查理·芒格： 我认为您关于通用再保险的说法完全正确。我们并没有改善通用再保险的行为，因为他们的行为本来就和我们的行为准则一致。
And regarding a reading list, by the mischances of life, I didn’t read one book last year that I thought was a lollapalooza. Therefore, I didn’t make any recommendations to that bookstore at the airport.
至于阅读书单，由于种种意外，去年我没有读到一本让我觉得特别出色的书。因此，我没有向机场书店推荐任何书籍。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, how many books do you think you’ve read, though? He reads a lot.
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，你觉得去年你读了多少书？你可是读了很多书的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t count. And some of them, I skim through pretty fast. But there was no lollapalooza. A book like Guns, Germs, and Steel doesn’t come along every year.
查理·芒格： 我没有具体统计。有些书我翻得很快。但确实没有特别出色的书。像《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》这样的书不是每年都会有的。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK —
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧——
CHARLIE MUNGER: And by the way, that guy was a little nuts in one way.
查理·芒格： 顺便说一句，作者在某些方面有点古怪。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s hard to get an A from Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 想从查理那里得到一个“A”可不容易。（笑声）
63. Berkshire’s competitive advantages in reinsurance
伯克希尔在再保险领域的竞争优势
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, is it 6 we’re going to?
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，现在是第六位吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name’s James Armstrong (PH) from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Thanks for having us.
观众提问者： 你好，我叫詹姆斯·阿姆斯特朗（音），来自宾夕法尼亚州的匹兹堡。感谢让我们有机会参与。
I’d like you to comment, please, on the reinsurance business and how it might look over the next 10 or 20 years.
我想请您谈谈再保险业务，以及未来10到20年的发展前景。
At Berkshire, we’ve usually bought businesses that are insulated to some degree from easy entry by new competitors and from commodity-type pricing. We want businesses that possess defensible franchises, few substitutes, resistance to cyclical factors, et cetera.
在伯克希尔，我们通常收购那些对新竞争者进入有一定屏障、避免商品化定价的业务。我们希望这些业务拥有可防御的品牌、少量的替代品，以及对周期性因素的抵抗力等特性。
The reinsurance business carries a lot of characteristics that are the opposite of what we usually look for. There’s a lot of excess capacity. We’re hindered by irrational and unwise pricing decisions by competitors.
然而，再保险业务却具有许多与我们通常寻找的特性相反的特点。市场上有大量的过剩产能，我们还受到竞争对手非理性和不明智定价决策的影响。
For GenRe to prove out as an investment for us, we need better underwriting. And we also need prices to harden.
要让通用再保险公司证明其作为我们的投资是成功的，我们需要更好的承保能力，同时也需要价格走强。
But in a world with great global liquidity, where capital moves very rapidly from place to place, why wouldn’t the reinsurance business gradually evolve into a poor business, where all excess returns are competed away, where price is never firm for very long because a new entrant arises and throws capital at the business?
但是，在一个全球流动性充裕、资本快速流动的世界里，为什么再保险业务不会逐渐演变成一个糟糕的行业？其中所有的超额收益都因竞争而消失，价格始终难以坚挺，因为总有新进入者涌入并投入资本？
So I’d like you to comment on how GenRe could be made to work. And also, give us a broad view of how the reinsurance business might unfold in the next 10 or 20 years. Thanks.
因此，我希望您能谈谈通用再保险如何能够成功运作，以及对未来10到20年再保险业务发展的总体看法。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. You made some good points. And, I — we have been, actually, in the reinsurance business, at Berkshire Hathaway, for 30 years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，你提到了一些很好的观点。实际上，伯克希尔哈撒韦已经在再保险行业经营了30年。
So it’s a business, obviously, that we’ve paid a lot of attention to. And we’ve gotten some scars from it at times. But overall, we’ve done extremely well.
显然，这是一个我们非常关注的行业。虽然有时也经历过一些挫折，但总体来说，我们做得非常好。
And the reason we’ve done extremely well is because we’ve had an absolutely sensational manager in Ajit Jain, who I wrote about, running that business.
我们之所以能够做得非常好，是因为我们拥有一位极为出色的管理者Ajit Jain。我在报告中写过，他负责管理这一业务。
But Ajit is a good example of what somebody with brains and energy and discipline and the right temperament and some capital behind him can do in a business.
阿吉特是一个很好的例子，他展示了一个拥有智慧、精力、纪律、合适气质并获得资本支持的人在行业中可以做到什么。
It’s not the world’s most efficient business. And it never will be the world’s most efficient business, because it’s not strictly actuarial.
再保险并不是世界上效率最高的行业，也永远不会成为效率最高的行业，因为它并不完全是精算驱动的。
All excess returns will not be competed away. There will be people that will earn very subnormal returns in the business. There will be people who get killed in the business. And that means there will be quite a deviation from the mean in terms of the results of individual insurers.
行业中的所有超额收益不会被完全竞争掉。在这个行业中，有些人会获得远低于正常水平的回报，有些人则会被彻底淘汰。这意味着，不同保险公司之间的结果会有很大的偏差。
And we think that both at National Indemnity, under Ajit, and at General Re, that we have advantages, so that our returns will be significantly better than average.
我们认为，无论是在由阿吉特领导的国家赔偿公司还是在通用再保险公司，我们都具备一定的优势，因此我们的回报会显著高于行业平均水平。
But both of our businesses are subject to getting killed in any single year, will get killed in specific years, but also, in our view, will do better than average and more than satisfactory, in terms of Berkshire Hathaway’s results.
不过，这两家公司在某些年份也有可能出现严重亏损，但从伯克希尔哈撒韦的整体结果来看，我们认为它们会表现优于平均水平，并且超出令人满意的预期。
You know, I can’t prove that to you now. I can show you what’s happened over the past years.
我现在无法向您证明这一点，但我可以展示过去几年的情况。
I don’t think the situation in reinsurance is way different than some years back. There’s always dumb competitors. There’s always a lot of capital in the business.
我不认为再保险行业的现状与过去几年有很大的不同。行业中总是会有一些不明智的竞争者，也总是会有大量资本涌入。
In the ’85, 1985, 1986 period, people felt very poor. But it wasn’t really a lack of financial capital. It was psychological capital that disappeared. People were just plain scared. And that was the best of times to be writing business, obviously.
在1985年到1986年间，人们感到非常艰难。但这并不是缺乏金融资本，而是心理资本的消失。人们只是单纯地感到害怕。而那显然是开展业务的最佳时机。
Prices are somewhat better now. But there are always people that misevaluate risk. And when they misevaluate risk, it’s our job to let them have the business.
现在的价格稍微好一些，但总是会有人错误评估风险。当他们评估错误时，我们的任务就是让他们去接手这些业务。
That’s easier to do with Ajit’s business in National Indemnity than it is with General Re, because General Re has long-term relationships with many accounts.
在国家赔偿公司，由阿吉特负责的业务更容易实现这一点，而在通用再保险则更困难，因为通用再保险与许多客户保持着长期关系。
And the question of what you do when your competitor offers a price that’s a little too low, with somebody you’ve been doing business with for 50 years, is a very tough decision to make.
当竞争对手向与您合作了50年的客户提供略低的报价时，该如何应对，这是一个非常艰难的决策。
And so sometimes, they probably do some business that might be labeled as “necessarily evil.” And Charlie always says that he doesn’t mind an occasional transaction like that, as long as you underline evil and not necessary.
因此，有时他们可能会进行一些可以称之为“必要之恶”的业务。查理总是说，他不介意偶尔进行这样的交易，只要强调“恶”而不是“必要”。
The nature of people in the business, usually, particularly the frontline guy, who was calling on the account, is to underline necessary. And as owners, our tendency is to underline evil.
在这个行业中，从业人员的本性，尤其是一线负责客户的人员，是倾向于强调“必要”。而作为所有者，我们更倾向于强调“恶”。
GenRe has done a terrific job, over the years, of balancing the necessity of continuing a relationship so long with the discipline of making sure they get paid enough.
多年来，通用再保险公司在平衡长期维护客户关系的必要性与确保足够盈利的纪律性方面做得非常出色。
That was not done perfectly last year. And the conditions were very difficult for doing it perfectly, I might add, too.
去年这一点没有做到完美。此外，我要补充的是，去年完成这一目标的条件非常困难。
But I think that, both at Ajit’s operation and at General Re, we have two businesses that will do very well, in terms of what we get out of them and very well compared to their competition, but occasionally will have a very bad year.
但我认为，无论是阿吉特负责的业务，还是通用再保险，我们这两项业务的表现都将非常优秀，不仅对我们来说收益很好，相较于竞争对手也表现出色，但偶尔会经历非常糟糕的一年。
I mean, we could have something happen tomorrow, you know, a Tokyo earthquake. Or, I can name a bunch of them that would result in a very bad year. And that’s what we’re getting paid for.
比如，明天可能会发生东京地震，或者其他一系列事件，这些都可能导致我们经历非常糟糕的一年。但这正是我们从事这一行业所获得的报酬的原因所在。
And if we price with discipline, our 20-year results can’t be bad, no matter what any one year produces. And if we don’t price with discipline, we’ll get killed over time.
只要我们坚持纪律性定价，无论某一年情况如何，我们20年的总体结果都不会糟糕。如果我们不坚持纪律性定价，长期来看就会被淘汰。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t think the reinsurance business is quite as much of a commodity business as might first appear. It’s not like an execution transaction when you sell government bonds or something, where one broker is roughly just as good as another.
查理·芒格： 是的。我认为再保险行业并不像初看起来那样具有商品化特性。它不像卖国债这样的交易，哪里一个经纪人都差不多。
There’s such a huge time lag between the time the premium is paid and the time the performance is given that you’re making a — the customer is making a big prediction about the insurer’s, A, willingness to pay what it really owes and, B, its ability to pay what it really owes.
在保费支付与履行赔付义务之间存在巨大时间差，因此客户实际上是在对保险公司的两方面进行预测：A，它是否愿意支付它真正欠下的赔款；B，它是否有能力支付这笔赔款。
I think we have a huge edge in reputation and actuality, with reference to both those two factors.
我认为我们在声誉和实际能力方面，在这两个因素上都有巨大的优势。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have a reputational advantage. And I think that, in actuality, it’s even stronger than the reputational advantage.**
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们确实有声誉上的优势。我认为我们的实际能力比声誉优势还要强。
I mean, I can’t think of a case where there’s been any problem with having Berkshire or General Re write a check very promptly for anything it owed.
比如，我无法想象伯克希尔或通用再保险在及时支付任何应付金额方面会出现任何问题。
I mean, we’ve, you know, we have never been subject to people suing us and getting money later on or anything like that after fighting us out in courts.
我们从未出现被人起诉、经过法庭争斗后才支付赔款之类的情况。
It just — it’s not the nature, it’s not the attitude we bring toward the reinsurance transaction.
这不是我们的本质，也不是我们对待再保险交易的态度。
And we have a reputational advantage. But like I said, I don’t think it’s quite as wide as it should be in some cases, even.
我们确实拥有声誉优势。但正如我所说，在某些情况下，这种优势还没有达到应有的广度。
And then we have a huge attitudinal advantage in that we have no need, none, to write more business, or the same amount of business, or even something close to the amount of business, next year that we wrote this year.
此外，我们有巨大的态度优势，那就是我们完全没有必要在明年签下比今年更多的业务、同样多的业务，甚至接近今年业务量的业务。
We — there is no — there are no volume goals at Berkshire Hathaway at all. And that is not true at most insurance organizations.
在伯克希尔哈撒韦，我们完全没有业务量目标。而这一点在大多数保险机构中是不存在的。
We report the results as they come in and as we see them, which also, I think, gives us an advantage in being realistic about all aspects of our business.
我们根据实际情况和我们的观察来报告结果。我认为，这也使我们在客观评估业务的各个方面上具备了一定优势。
We have huge amounts of capital behind us. So we can take large pieces of attractive business and keep them all for our own accounts.
我们拥有巨额的资本支持。因此，我们可以承接大量有吸引力的业务，并将其全部保留在我们的自留账户中。
So we have a lot of advantages in the business. And they will translate into something better than the rest of the world gets.
因此，我们在这个行业中有很多优势。这些优势将转化为比其他同行更好的结果。
I don’t know how much better. And I don’t know how much the rest of the world will get. But it’s not insignificant, the advantages we have in the business.
我不知道会好多少，也不知道其他同行会表现如何。但我们在这个行业中的优势绝对不容忽视。
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