2001-04-28 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
1. Formal business meeting
（视频录制开始时，会议已经进行中）
WARREN BUFFETT: And — (laughter) — Andy [Heyward], if you’re here, you could stand up, I think the crowd would like to say thanks. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：然后——（笑声）——安迪（Heyward），如果你在这里，可以站起来，我想大家会想对你表示感谢。（掌声）
We have one other guest, too. After doing an incredible job for all Berkshire shareholders and particularly for Charlie and me, Ralph Schey retired this year. But Ralph and Luci, I believe, are here. And [if] Ralph and Luci would stand up, the shareholders and I would like to say thanks. (Applause)
我们还有一位嘉宾。拉尔夫·谢伊（Ralph Schey）在为所有伯克希尔股东，尤其是为查理和我，做了出色的工作之后，今年退休了。不过，我相信拉尔夫和露西（Luci）在这里。如果拉尔夫和露西能站起来，股东们和我都想对你们表示感谢。（掌声）
Scott Fetzer was one of the best acquisitions we ever made, but the reason it was among the very best was Ralph. And a great many of the other companies that we own now, our ownership was made possible because of the profit that Ralph delivered over the years. So, thanks very much, Ralph.
Scott Fetzer是我们做过的最好的收购之一，但之所以它成为最好的之一，原因在于拉尔夫。我们现在拥有的许多其他公司，也是因为拉尔夫多年来所带来的利润，才使我们能够拥有它们。所以，非常感谢你，拉尔夫。
Now we will come to order. I will go through this fast. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company, and I welcome you to this 2001 annual meeting of shareholders.
现在会议开始。我会快速地进行。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司的董事会主席，欢迎大家参加2001年度股东大会。
I will first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present in addition to myself.
首先，我将介绍除我之外在场的伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事。
First of all, of course, is Charlie, on my left. And if you’ll — the directors will stand when I give your name.
首先，当然是查理，他在我左边。董事们在我报上你们的名字时请站起来。
Howard Buffett, Susan Buffett — she was the voice on the songs, the ones that were sang — sung well — Malcolm G. Chace, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr.
霍华德·巴菲特，苏珊·巴菲特——她是歌曲中的声音，那些唱得很好的歌——马尔科姆·G·查斯（Malcolm G. Chace），罗纳德·L·奥尔森（Ronald L. Olson），和沃尔特·斯科特·小（Walter Scott Jr.）。
Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
今天与我们同在的还有德勤（Deloitte & Touche）事务所的合伙人，他们是我们的审计师。他们会回答您可能对该公司审计伯克希尔账目的相关问题。
Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire, and he will make a written record of the proceedings. Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.
福雷斯特·克鲁特（Forrest Krutter）先生是伯克希尔的秘书，他将对会议的过程做书面记录。贝基·阿米克（Becki Amick）小姐被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将确认董事选举中投票的计数。
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. We will conduct the business of the meeting, and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you might have.
本次会议的指定代理人是沃尔特·斯科特·小（Walter Scott Jr.）和马克·D·汉堡（Marc D. Hamburg）。我们将进行会议事务，然后宣布正式会议休会。之后，我们将接受您可能有的问题。
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
秘书是否有伯克希尔股票的数量报告，已发行并有投票权的股份，以及出席会议的股份数量？
FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting, that was sent by First-Class Mail to all shareholders of record, on March 2, 2001, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,343,041 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting and 5,505,791 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，我有。如同在随会议通知发送的委托书声明中所指示的，会议通知通过一等邮件寄送给所有在册股东，会议记录日期为2001年3月2日。截至该日期，伯克希尔·哈撒韦A类普通股有1,343,041股流通，每股有权在会议上对提案投一票；伯克希尔·哈撒韦B类普通股有5,505,791股流通，每股有权在会议上对提案投1/200票。
Of that number, 1,116,384 Class A shares, and 4,507,896 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 26.
在这个数字中，1,116,384股A类股份和4,507,896股B类股份是通过4月26日星期四晚上归还的委托书在此次会议上代表的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表了法定人数，因此我们将直接继续进行会议。
First of order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place a motion before the meeting.
会议的首项事务是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特·小先生提出议案。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with.
沃尔特·斯科特·小：我提议省略上次股东大会会议记录的阅读。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：是否有第二人？
VOICES: Aye.
声音：同意。
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor, say, “Aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特：该提案已被提出并获得第二人支持。是否有任何评论或问题？我们将通过举手表决这项提案。赞成者请说“同意”。
VOICES: Aye.
声音：同意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed, say, “Bye, I’m leaving.” (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：反对者请说：“再见，我要走了。”（笑声）
The motion is carried. The first item of business of this meeting is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.
提案通过。会议的首项事务是选举董事。如果有股东希望撤回之前提交的委托书并亲自投票选举董事，他或她可以这么做。
Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy, and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles, who will furnish a ballot to you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them?
此外，如果有在场股东没有提交委托书，并希望亲自投票选举董事，您可以这么做。如果您希望这么做，请在过道上向会议工作人员表明身份，他们将为您提供选票。希望领取选票的股东请表明身份，以便我们分发选票。
I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
我现在请沃尔特·斯科特·小先生提出与董事选举相关的提案。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.
沃尔特·斯科特·小：我提议选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·查斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特·小为董事。
VOICE: I second the motion.
声音：我第二个提议。
WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?
沃伦·巴菲特：提案已被提出并获得第二人支持，提议选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·查斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特·小为董事。是否有其他提名？是否有讨论？
The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election.
提名已经准备好可以进行投票。如果有股东亲自投票，他们应该现在在选票上标明选举的董事，并将选票交给选举监察员。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received?
请代理人也将选票提交给选举监察员，根据他们收到的指示投票选举董事。
Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以做报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to the proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less 1,126,480 votes for each nominee.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好。代理人的选票，在响应截至上周四晚上收到的委托书时，为每位提名人投了不低于1,126,480票。
That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
这个数字远远超过了所有A类和B类流通股份相关的总票数的多数。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders, in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as those cast in person at this meeting, if any, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的票数精确计算证明，包括代理人根据会议上递交的委托书投出的额外选票，以及会议中亲自投票的选票（如果有的话），将交给秘书，并与会议记录一同存档。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。
Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors.
沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·查斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特·小已被选为董事。
The next item of business was scheduled to be a proposal put forth by Berkshire shareholder Bartlett Naylor. On April 20th, 2001, Mr. Naylor advised us he was withdrawing his proposal. Accordingly, we will not have the proposal presented at this meeting.
下一项事务原定是由伯克希尔股东巴特利特·内勒（Bartlett Naylor）提出的提案。2001年4月20日，内勒先生通知我们他撤回了他的提案。因此，我们不会在此次会议上提出该提案。
At the adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions you may have that relate to the business of Berkshire, but do not call for any action at this meeting.
在商务会议结束时，我会回答您可能有的与伯克希尔业务相关的问题，但不涉及任何需要在会议上采取行动的问题。
Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting, before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion for the meeting.
在我们休会之前，有人有任何其他事务要提出来吗？如果没有，我请沃尔特·斯科特·小先生提出休会动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move this meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特·小：我提议休会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say, “Aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特：休会提案已经提出并获得第二人支持。我们将通过举手表决。是否有讨论？如果没有，所有赞成者请说“同意”。
VOICES: Aye.
声音：同意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed say, “No.” Meeting’s adjourned. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：反对者请说“不同意”。会议休会。（掌声）
I ask you, am I getting slower in my old age? No, I’m — (Laughter)
我问你们，我在老年是不是变得越来越慢了？不，我——（笑声）
Now, the first — we’re going to go —
现在，首先——我们要开始——
We have eight microphones strategically placed. We have the first two on my right. Far back, three and four, and over to this back area, over here, and then up front for the seven and eight.
我们在关键的位置放置了八个麦克风。第一个和第二个在我右边，远处有第三和第四个，后面的区域有一个，然后前面有第七和第八个。
And if you have a question, just go to the microphone, and queue up at the microphone, and we’ll keep rotating, like I say, until noon. Then we’ll have a break, and then we’ll start again around 12:30, or thereabouts, and go until 3:30.
如果你有问题，只需走到麦克风前排队，我们会一直轮流发言，就像我说的那样，直到中午。然后我们会休息一会儿，大约12:30左右重新开始，持续到下午3:30。
2. Four-year-old and Buffett look ahead to Berkshire’s future
四岁的孩子和巴菲特展望了伯克希尔的未来
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, first question in area 1, we have a special guest.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，第一个问题来自区域1，我们有一位特别的嘉宾。
I received a letter from Mark Perkins on April 5th, telling me about his daughter, who has been a shareholder since she was six months old.
我收到了马克·帕金斯（Mark Perkins）先生的来信，信中提到他的女儿自六个月大起就是股东。
And she’s going to be four in November, and she would like — Marietta would like to ask the first question.
她将在十一月满四岁，她想——玛丽埃塔（Marietta）想提第一个问题。
And frankly, I take all the questions from four-year-olds, and Charlie handles them from anybody — (laughter) — that’s been around a little longer.
坦白说，我会回答所有四岁孩子的问题，而查理则处理那些稍微年长一些人的问题——（笑声）
So Marietta, if you’ve got the microphone there, would you ask your question, please?
所以玛丽埃塔，如果你手里拿着麦克风，能不能请你提问？
VOICE: Ask him. (Inaudible)
声音：问他。（听不清）
MARIETTA: (Inaudible)
玛丽埃塔：（听不清）
VOICE: I’m Marietta.
声音：我是玛丽埃塔。
MARIETTA: Marietta.
玛丽埃塔：玛丽埃塔。
VOICE: I’m three. Speak up.
声音：我三岁。说大声点。
MARIETTA: I’m three.
玛丽埃塔：我三岁。
VOICE: Berkshire Hathaway fistful of dollars.
声音：伯克希尔·哈撒韦，一把钞票。
MARIETTA: (Inaudible) dollars. (Laughter)
玛丽埃塔：（听不清）美元。（笑声）
VOICE: Her — actually, her question was, she said she was three, and she says, “Berkshire Hathaway fistful of dollars,” and she says, “What should we invest in now” so that she’ll be ready when she goes to college?
声音：她——实际上，她的问题是，她说她三岁，她说，“伯克希尔·哈撒韦，一把钞票，”然后她问，“我们现在应该投资什么，”以便等她上大学时准备好？
WARREN BUFFETT: What should she invest in, or what should Berkshire invest in?
沃伦·巴菲特：她应该投资什么，或者伯克希尔应该投资什么？
VOICE: What should Berkshire invest in?
声音：伯克希尔应该投资什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Berkshire would like very much to buy businesses of the same quality, and with managements of the same quality, and at prices consistent with the eight businesses that we’ve bought over the last 16 or 18 months.
沃伦·巴菲特：伯克希尔非常希望能够购买同样质量的企业，并且管理层也要具有相同的质量，价格也要与我们在过去16或18个月内收购的八家企业的价格一致。
Our first preference is, and has been for many decades — although I would say most observers didn’t seem to realize it — but our first preference has always to been — to be buying outstanding operating businesses. And we’ve had a little more luck in that respect lately.
我们一直以来的首选——并且已经有几十年——尽管我说大多数观察者似乎没有意识到——但我们的首选始终是——收购优秀的经营性企业。最近，在这一点上我们有了一些好运。
We also own lots of marketable securities. We’ve bought many of those, for example, in the mid-’70s, that did very well for us. But the climate has not been as friendly toward making money out of marketable securities.
我们也拥有大量的可交易证券。我们在许多时期收购了这些证券，例如在70年代中期，这些证券为我们带来了丰厚的回报。但目前的环境对从可交易证券中赚取利润并不友好。
And we, frankly, prefer — we prefer the activities associated with owning and operating businesses over time.
坦率地说，我们更倾向于——我们更喜欢长期拥有和运营企业所带来的活动。
从一朵花跳到另一朵花不是最好的选择。
So what we hope to do, Marietta, is by the time you’re ready to go to college, I would hope that
所以我们希望做到的是，玛丽埃塔，到你准备上大学时，我希望
well, first of all, I’d hope I’m still around. (Laughter)
首先，我希望我还在这儿。（笑声）
But beyond that, I would hope that we would have — you’ll be ready in about 14 years or so. I would hope that we would have another, maybe, 40 businesses or so that would be added. And I would hope that we would have every business that we have now.
但除此之外，我希望我们会有——你大概在14年左右准备好。我希望我们会增加大约40家公司左右。我也希望我们会保留现在所有的公司。
And I would hope we would not have more shares outstanding, or any — at least any appreciable number of more shares outstanding.
我希望我们不会有更多的流通股份，或者至少不会有显著增加的流通股份。
If we can get all that done, I think you’ll probably be able to afford college.
如果我们能做到这些，我想你大概就能负担得起大学学费了。
Charlie, do you have anything to add?
查理，你有什么要补充的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：没有。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And there’s some things in life, Marietta, you can really count on. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：玛丽埃塔，生活中有些事情，你真的可以依赖。（笑声）
3. Tech sector not comparable to pharmaceuticals
科技部门无法与制药部门相比
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to microphone number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，接下来我们听听第二个麦克风的问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger.
听众：早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。
VOICE: (Inaudible)
声音：（听不清）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, sorry. OK.
听众：哦，抱歉。好的。
If you want to trade a share of Berkshire A for 30 shares of Berkshire B, as you had mentioned before, a personal stock split, or vice versa, is this considered a wash sale for tax purposes?
如果你想将一股伯克希尔A类股票换成30股伯克希尔B类股票，就像你之前提到的个人股票拆分，或者反过来，这在税务上是否算作洗售（wash sale）？
Also, I’d like to ask you a question which you’ve heard before, but in a slightly different context. A few years ago, you said you had made a mistake by not buying shares of the major pharmaceutical companies around 1993.
另外，我还想问一个你们之前听过的问题，不过是稍微不同的背景。几年前，你们提到自己犯了一个错误，就是没有在1993年左右买入主要制药公司的股票。
You cited their value to society, as well as their terrific growth, high profit margins, and great potential. You said that while you didn’t know which companies would do the best, you could’ve made some kind of sector play, because the entire sector had been decimated.
你们提到了它们对社会的价值，以及它们惊人的增长、高利润率和巨大潜力。你们说，尽管你们不知道哪些公司会做得最好，但你们本可以在这个行业做一些投资，因为整个行业已经遭到重创。
These exact same words, including those about not knowing which businesses will dominate over time, can also be used to describe another industry, which has recently been decimated.
这些完全相同的话，包括那些关于不知道哪些企业会主导未来的说法，也可以用来描述另一个行业，这个行业最近同样遭遇了重创。
This is industry is, of course, technology. How do you see these two investment ideas, pharmaceuticals in ’93 and technology now, and what difference in the two situations makes the first a good opportunity for Berkshire, and the second not one?
这个行业当然就是科技行业。你们如何看待这两个投资理念，1993年的制药业和现在的科技行业，两个行业的情况有什么不同，为什么第一个对伯克希尔是一个好的机会，而第二个不是？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie answers all the questions about mistakes, so I will turn the second question over to him. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，关于错误的问题都是查理来回答的，所以我将第二个问题交给他。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Personally, I think that the future of the pharmaceutical industry was easier to predict than the future of the high-technology sector.
查理·芒格：就我个人而言，我认为制药行业的未来比高科技行业的未来更容易预测。
In the pharmaceutical sector, almost everybody did well, and some companies did extremely well. In the other sector, why, there are many permanent casualties in the high-tech sector.
在制药行业，几乎每家公司都表现不错，部分公司做得非常好。而在另一个行业中，许多高科技公司是永远的牺牲品。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say that there’s certainly nothing obvious to us about the fact that the tech sector — as a group — viewed in aggregate — would be a good buy or be undervalued.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我要说，从我们来看，科技行业——作为一个整体——从整体上来看，并没有什么显而易见的迹象表明它是一个值得购买的行业，或者它被低估了。
Whereas we should have had enough sense to recognize that the pharmaceutical industry, as a group, was undervalued.
而我们本应该有足够的眼光认识到，制药行业作为一个整体是被低估的。
But the pharmaceutical industry has a far, far better record of returns on large amounts of equity over time, and with a high percentage of the participants having those returns, than the tech industry. I wouldn’t regard those two as comparable at all.
但是，制药行业在长期内对大量股本的回报记录远远好于科技行业，而且参与者中获得这些回报的比例也高得多。我根本不认为这两个行业是可以相提并论的。
4. Tax implications for exchanging Berkshire share classes
交换伯克希尔股票类别的税收影响
WARREN BUFFETT: Your first question about exchanging and whether you have a wash sale, and I think you indicated exchanging from B into A.
沃伦·巴菲特：你第一个问题是关于交换和是否会出现洗售（wash sale），我想你提到的是从B类交换到A类。
If you actually, physically, have a share of A, and turn it in for 30 shares of B, that is not a taxable transaction, so there is no sale under such a circumstance. If you —
如果你实际持有一股A类股票，并将其换成30股B类股票，这不是一项应纳税的交易，因此在这种情况下没有发生出售。如果你——
There would be no reason, unless the B was at a significant discount, to actually sell the A and buy the B, but I — and I’m not giving tax advice on this — but I would think that they — I think the tax code refers to “substantially identical” securities when they talk about wash sales.
除非B类股票有显著的折扣，否则没有理由实际出售A类股票并购买B类股票，但我——我不是在给税务建议——但我认为税法提到“实质上相同”的证券时，是指洗售。
And I would think that you — that the IRS would be entitled to, at least, raise the question if you had an A share you were selling at a loss, and replacing it with 30 shares of B.
我认为如果你有一股A类股票在亏损的情况下出售，并用30股B类股票替代，至少美国国税局（IRS）有权提出这个问题。
You’d have a better argument than if you bought a share of A back the next day, if you were establishing a loss. If you were establishing a gain, you’d have no reason — you know, they’re not worried about wash sales in that respect.
如果你是在建立亏损的情况下，卖掉A类股票并第二天再买回来，那你的论点会更有力。如果你是在建立盈利的情况下，那就没有理由——你知道，在那种情况下他们并不担心洗售。
You can’t go from B to A by exchange, but you could go by selling 30 shares of B in the market, and buying a share of A.
你不能通过交换从B类转为A类，但你可以通过在市场上出售30股B类股票，再购买一股A类股票。
Again, if that were being done at a loss, I think the IRS could well argue that they were substantially identical, but you could argue otherwise.
同样，如果这是在亏损的情况下进行的，我认为美国国税局可能会争辩它们是实质上相同的，但你可以提出不同的观点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, I think the IRS would win.
查理·芒格：不，不，我认为美国国税局会赢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）
Charlie might even go state’s evidence, you know, if there was a fee to testify.
如果有证词费用，查理甚至可能会提供州政府的证据，你知道的。
5. Berkshire isn’t hindered by state insurance regulators
伯克希尔不受州保险监管机构的阻碍
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to zone 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，接下来我们听听第三区的问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Dan Blum (PH) from Seattle, Washington.
听众：我是丹·布卢姆（Dan Blum），来自华盛顿州西雅图。
As an insurance holding company, Berkshire Hathaway is subject to regulation by insurance departments in every state in which GEICO or your other insurance subsidiaries do business.
作为一家保险控股公司，伯克希尔·哈撒韦受到每个州保险部门的监管，这些州包括GEICO或其他保险子公司开展业务的地方。
Has that handicapped or affected your operations in any way? And do you have any trenchant or wise observations to make about governmental regulation in that context?
这是否在某种程度上妨碍或影响了你们的运营？在这种背景下，你们对政府监管有什么深刻或明智的看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve really not been impeded in any way by the fact that — Berkshire Hathaway itself is not an insurance company, but it owns various insurance companies. Of course, it owns a lot of other companies, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，事实上，伯克希尔·哈撒韦并没有因为——伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身不是一家保险公司，而是拥有多家保险公司——而受到任何妨碍。当然，它也拥有许多其他公司。
But being the holding company of insurance companies, which indeed are regulated by the states in which they’re admitted, it really has not slowed down any acquisition.
但作为保险公司的控股公司，这些公司确实受到它们所注册的州的监管，实际上这并没有减缓我们的收购进程。
They are not — whereas with the Public Utility Holding Company Act, under that statute, the authorities are directed to be concerned with the activities of the holding company. And in the banking business, to some extent, they are.
它们并不是——而根据《公共事业控股公司法》（Public Utility Holding Company Act），在该法案下，相关部门有责任关注控股公司的活动。在银行业务中，在某种程度上也是如此。
In the insurance business, there’s relatively little in the way of regulation or oversight that extends up to the holding company. So, it has not slowed us down in that business, but it’s been reported recently in the electric utility business.
在保险行业，监管或监督较少扩展到控股公司。因此，它并没有在这方面减缓我们的进展，但最近在电力公用事业行业中有所报道。
There’s a statute from 1935, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the acronym is that euphonious term, PUHCA. (Laughter)
有一部来自1935年的法案——《公共事业控股公司法》，其缩写是那个悦耳的词汇，PUHCA。（笑声）
The Public Utility Holding Company Act has a lot of rules about what the parent company could do. And that act was put on the books because the holding companies of the ’20s, most particularly ones held by — formed by — Sam Insull, but there were others.
《公共事业控股公司法》有很多关于母公司可以做什么的规定。这部法案之所以出台，是因为20世纪20年代的控股公司，特别是由萨姆·因苏尔（Sam Insull）所持有和成立的那些控股公司，但也有其他的公司。
There were many abuses, and a good many of those abuses involved what took place at the holding company. So it was quite understandable that that act was passed in the ’30s. And it achieved a pro-social purpose at the time.
当时存在许多滥用行为，其中很多滥用行为涉及控股公司内部发生的事情。因此，这部法案在30年代通过是完全可以理解的，并且它在当时实现了一个有益社会的目的。
I don’t think there’s anything, frankly, pro-social about limiting Berkshire’s ability to buy into other utilities. We can buy up to five percent of the stock. But we might well, in the last year or two, have bought an entire utility business if it were not — if that statute weren’t present.
坦率地说，我认为限制伯克希尔收购其他公用事业公司的能力并没有什么对社会有益的地方。我们最多可以购买5%的股票。但如果没有这部法案，我们在过去一两年内完全可能已经收购了一整个公用事业业务。
So we’re handicapped by the utility holding company statute, we are not handicapped, in my view, by any state insurance statutes.
所以我们受限于公共事业控股公司法，但在我看来，我们并没有受到任何州保险法的限制。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：没有什么可补充的。（笑声）
6. “Pain today, gain tomorrow” insurance transactions
“今天痛苦，明天收获”保险交易
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特：第4区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.
听众：早上好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning.
沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Steve Bloomberg, from Chicago. I have two questions regarding the insurance operations.
听众：我是来自芝加哥的史蒂夫·布卢姆伯格（Steve Bloomberg）。我有两个关于保险业务的问题。
With regard to the reinsurance contracts, which were written at what some consider and call “good losses,” you’ve discussed those insurance contracts in your report, indicating that it’s generated 482 million of losses in the year 2000.
关于再保险合同，这些合同被认为是“好损失”，你在报告中讨论了这些保险合同，指出它们在2000年产生了4.82亿美元的损失。
Do we need an annual schedule disclosing the aggregate amortized charges of all current and past such deals, to make our adjustments, to reflect economic reality?
我们是否需要一份年度计划，披露所有当前和过去此类交易的总摊销费用，以便进行调整，反映经济现实？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there are two unusual-type deals, and you referred to one type, what I call the “pain today, gain tomorrow,” or good losses-type deals.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，有两种不寻常的交易类型，你提到了其中一种，我称之为“今天痛苦，明天收获”型交易，或者称之为好损失型交易。
And under the deals you’re describing, we record a usually quite significant loss in the current year, and then we have the use of float for many years to come, and there are no subsequent charges against that.
在你描述的这些交易中，我们在当年通常会记录一个相当大的损失，然后我们会有多年来使用浮存金的机会，而对此没有后续费用。
So in respect to those contracts, the important thing is that we tell you — and we should tell you — really, every quarter if they’re significant, and certainly yearly, any significant items that fall in that category.
因此，关于这些合同，重要的是我们告知你——我们应该告知你——如果它们是重要的，实际上每个季度都应该告知你，并且每年都会告知你任何属于该类别的重大项目。
And as you mentioned, you know, we had over 400 million last year. We had a significant amount the year before.
正如你提到的，我们去年有超过4亿美元。前一年我们也有相当大的一笔。
We have not had a significant amount this year. I think, in the first quarter, there may have been a 12 million charge for one of those.
今年我们没有发生重大金额。我想，在第一季度，可能有一笔1200万美元的费用与其中一项相关。
If they’re significant, we’re going to tell you about them.
如果它们是重大的，我们会告诉你们。
It’s a one-time adjustment in your mind that, in effect, should — you should regard as different than any other type of underwriting loss that we experience, because we willingly enter into these.
这是你认为的一次性调整，实际上你应该将其视为与我们所经历的任何其他承保损失不同，因为我们是自愿参与这些交易的。
We take the hit the first year, and accounting calls for that. And over the life of the contract, we expect to make money. And our experience would be that we do make money.
我们在第一年承担损失，账务上是这样规定的。在合同的整个生命周期中，我们预计会盈利。我们的经验是，我们确实会盈利。
But we’ll tell you about any significant item of that sort, so that you will be able to make an adjusted cost to float. I reported our cost to float last year at 6 percent, which is high. It’s not unbearable, but it’s high, very high.
但我们会告知你任何此类重大事项，以便你能够调整浮存金成本。我在去年报告了我们的浮存金成本为6%，这个数字很高，虽然不至于无法承受，但确实很高，非常高。
And included in that 6 percent cost was — about a quarter of it came from these transactions that distorted the current year figure. And therefore, our cost of float, if we hadn’t willingly engaged in those transactions, would’ve been about 4 1/2 percent.
在这6%的成本中——大约四分之一来自这些扭曲了当年数据的交易。因此，如果我们没有自愿参与这些交易，我们的浮存金成本大约会是4.5%。
I should mention to you that I expect that our cost of float — I said in the annual report — that absent a mega-catastrophe — and I might define a mega-catastrophe as insured losses, we’ll say, of 20 billion or more, or something on that order — absent a mega-catastrophe, we expected our cost of float to come down this year, and I said perhaps substantially.
我应该提到，我预计我们的浮存金成本——我在年报中提到——如果没有巨大的灾难——我可以定义巨大的灾难为保险损失，假设为200亿或更多，或者类似的规模——如果没有这种巨大的灾难，我们预计今年浮存金成本会下降，我说过可能会大幅下降。
In the first quarter, our cost of float will probably run just a touch under 3 percent, and — on an annualized basis.
在第一季度，我们的浮存金成本可能会略低于3%，按年化计算。
And I think that — I think the trend is in that direction, absent a mega-catastrophe. I would expect the cost of float, actually, to come down substantially this year.
我认为——在没有巨大的灾难的情况下，我认为趋势是朝这个方向发展的。我预计浮存金成本实际上今年会大幅下降。
But if we were to take on some of these “pain today, gain tomorrow” transactions — and we don’t have any in the works at the moment — but if we were to take those on, then it would be reflected in our cost of float, and we would lay out the impact of that sort of transaction.
但如果我们进行一些“今天痛苦，明天收获”的交易——目前我们没有任何此类交易——但如果我们进行这些交易，那么它将反映在我们的浮存金成本中，我们将阐明这种交易的影响。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think almost all good businesses have occasions where they’re making today look a little worse than today would otherwise be, to help tomorrow. So I regard these transactions as very much the friends of the shareholders.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为几乎所有好的企业都会有一些情况，就是今天看起来稍微比实际更糟，但这是为了帮助明天。所以我认为这些交易非常有利于股东。
WARREN BUFFETT: We have a second type of transaction, just to complete, which we also described in the report, which also creates a large amount of float, but where accounting rules spread the cost of that transaction over the life of the float.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们有第二种类型的交易，为了完整说明，我们在报告中也描述了这种交易，这种交易同样会创造大量的浮存金，但会根据会计规则将该交易的成本分摊到浮存金的整个生命周期中。
And those do not distort the current-year figures, but they do create an annual charge that exists throughout the life of float. And that charge with us is running something over $300 million a year.
这些交易不会扭曲当年的数据，但它们会产生一个在浮存金生命周期内持续存在的年度费用。我们这项费用大约每年超过3亿美元。
But there again, it’s a transaction that we willingly and enthusiastically engaged in. And that has this annual cost attached to it.
但同样，这也是我们自愿并热衷于参与的交易，并且它附带了这项年度费用。
So when you see our cost to float at 3 percent, annualized, in the first quarter, it includes, probably, a $80 million charge or so, relative to those retroactive insurance contracts, which were the second kind described in the report.
所以，当你看到我们第一季度的浮存金成本按年化计算为3%时，它包括大约8000万美元的费用，这与报告中描述的第二种类型的追溯保险合同有关。
I recognize this accounting is, you know — and even the transactions — are somewhat Greek to some of you. But they are important, in respect to Berkshire, so we do want to lay them out in the annual report for those who want to do their own calculations of intrinsic value.
我知道这些会计处理，你们知道——甚至这些交易——对你们中的一些人来说可能有些难懂。但它们对伯克希尔很重要，所以我们确实希望在年报中阐明这些内容，供那些希望自己计算内在价值的人参考。
7. “What really costs … are the blown opportunities”
“真正代价的......是被吹走的机会”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
沃伦·巴菲特：第5区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen, my name is Jay Parker. I’m from Washington State. And this question regards mistakes. So that being the case, it should probably be directed to Mr. Munger.
听众：早上好，先生们，我是杰伊·帕克（Jay Parker），来自华盛顿州。这个问题涉及错误，所以可能应该问芒格先生。
Mr. Munger, I know you’re fond of evoking humility to promote rational thought. So my question is, what’s the most recent business mistake that you’ve made, Mr. Munger, and why did it occur? (Laughter)
芒格先生，我知道你喜欢提倡谦逊来促进理性思考。那么我的问题是，您最近犯的商业错误是什么，为什么会发生？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m going to take notes on this one. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我要记一下这个。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: The mistakes that have been most extreme in Berkshire’s history are mistakes of omission. They don’t show up in our figures. They show up in opportunity costs.
查理·芒格：在伯克希尔的历史上，最极端的错误是遗漏错误。它们没有出现在我们的数字里，而是出现在机会成本上。
In other words, we have opportunities, we almost do it. In retrospect, we can tell that we were very much mistaken not to do it.
换句话说，我们有机会，我们差点做成了。从回顾的角度看，我们可以明确知道当时错过了机会。
In terms of the shareholders, those are the ones in our history that it really cost the most. And very few managements do much thinking or talking about opportunity costs. But Warren, we have blown —
就股东而言，这些是我们历史上最昂贵的错误。很少有管理层真正考虑或讨论机会成本。但沃伦，我们错失了——
WARREN BUFFETT: Billions and billions and billions. I might as well say it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：数十亿，数十亿，数十亿。我不妨说出来。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right. And we keep doing it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：对，对。我们还在继续犯错。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Some might say we’re getting better at it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：有些人可能会说我们做得越来越好。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t like mentioning the specific companies, because the — you know, we may, in due course, want to buy them again and have an opportunity to do so at our price.
查理·芒格：我不喜欢提到具体的公司，因为——你知道，我们可能会在适当的时候再次想收购这些公司，并且希望以我们的价格进行收购。
But practically everywhere in life, and in corporate life, too, what really costs, in comparison with what easily might have been, are the blown opportunities. I mean, it just — it’s an awesome amount of money.
但实际上，在生活中的几乎每个方面，包括企业生活中，真正代价高的，是那些错失的机会。我的意思是——那简直是巨额资金。
When I was somewhat younger, I was offered 300 shares of Belridge Oil. Any idiot could’ve told there was no possibility of losing money, and a large possibility of making money. I bought it.
当我还年轻的时候，我曾被提供300股贝尔里奇石油（Belridge Oil）股票。任何傻子都知道，购买它没有亏损的可能，反而有很大可能赚钱。我买了。
The guy called me back three days later, and offered me 1,500 more shares. But this time, I had to sell something to buy the damn Belridge Oil. That mistake, if you traced it through, has cost me $200 million.
那个人三天后给我打电话，提供了1500股更多的股票。但这一次，我不得不卖掉一些东西才能购买那些该死的贝尔里奇石油。追溯到现在，这个错误已经让我损失了2亿美元。
And I — it was all because I had to go to a slight inconvenience and sell something. Berkshire does that kind of thing, too. We never get over it. (Laughter)
而且——这一切都是因为我不得不去忍受一些小的不便，卖掉一些东西。伯克希尔也会犯这种错误。我们永远无法克服它。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I might add that when we speak of errors of omission, of which we’ve had plenty, and some very big ones, we don’t mean not buying some stock where we — a friend runs it, or we know the name and it went from one to 100. That doesn’t mean anything. It’s only —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想补充一下，当我们谈到遗漏错误时，我们有很多这样的错误，甚至有些是非常大的错误，我们并不是指没有买某只股票，比如一个朋友经营的，或者我们知道它的名字，而且它的股价从1涨到了100。那并不意味着什么。只是——
We only regard errors as being things that are within our circle of competence. So if somebody knows how to make money in cocoa beans, or they know how to make money in a software company or anything, and we miss that, that is not an error, as far as we’re concerned.
我们只将错误视为那些在我们能力范围内的事情。因此，如果有人知道如何在可可豆中赚钱，或者他们知道如何在软件公司赚钱，或者任何其他领域，而我们错过了机会，那么就不是我们的错误。
What’s an error is when it’s something we understand, and we stand there and stare at it, and we don’t do anything. Or worse yet, what really gets me is when we do something very small with it. We do an eyedropper’s worth of it, when we could do it very big.
错误是当我们理解某个事物时，我们站在那里盯着它，却什么也不做。更糟糕的是，当我们做出非常小的举动时。我们做了滴管量的投资，而实际上我们可以做得更大。
Charlie refers to that elegantly when I do that sort of thing as when I’m sucking my thumb. (Laughter)
当我做这种事时，查理优雅地称之为我在“吸食拇指”。（笑声）
And there really — I mean, we have been thumbsuckers at times with businesses that we understood well. And it may have been because we started buying, and the price moved up a little, and we waited around hoping we would get more at the price we originally started — there could be a lot of things.
实际上——我的意思是，我们有时确实是在那些我们非常了解的业务上犯了“吸食拇指”的错误。这可能是因为我们开始购买时，价格上涨了一些，我们却在等待，期望以我们最初开始时的价格购买更多——有很多原因。
But those are huge mistakes. Conventional accounting, of course, does not pick those up at all. But they’re in our scorebook.
但这些是巨大的错误。当然，传统会计根本不会反映这些，但它们在我们的记分本里。
8. Not worried “at all” about product liability involving sugar
“完全”不担心涉及糖的产品责任
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：第6区，请。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Joseph Lapray (PH). I’m from Minneapolis, Minnesota.
听众：我的名字是约瑟夫·拉普雷（Joseph Lapray），来自明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达州。
In recent years, tobacco companies have been compelled to pay large damages for marketing their unhealthy, but discretionary, products. My question has two parts.
近年来，烟草公司因营销其不健康但属于可自由选择的产品而被迫支付巨额赔偿。我的问题有两个部分。
First, does the potential for similar damage liabilities reduce the intrinsic value of Coca-Cola, See’s Candies, Dairy Queen, or any other business, which sells discretionary products of questionable healthfulness? Not that I don’t like these products.
首先，类似的损害责任潜力是否会减少可口可乐、See’s糖果、Dairy Queen或其他销售可自由选择的、健康性存疑的产品的企业的内在价值？并不是说我不喜欢这些产品。
And second, are either of you concerned that a possible erosion in the principle of caveat emptor is undermining the legal basis of contracts, in general? Thank you for taking my question.
其次，你们是否担心，消费者自负风险原则的可能削弱正在侵蚀合同的法律基础？谢谢你们回答我的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the products you described, I’ve been living on for 70 years, so — (laughter) — they’ll probably haul me in as a witness if I — that they don’t do much damage.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你描述的这些产品，我已经吃了70年了，所以——（笑声）——如果有需要的话，他们可能会把我作为证人叫上来——证明这些产品并没有造成太大损害。
No, I think, if — you know, if you’re opposed to sugar and the — I think the average human being eats something like 550 pounds dry weight of food a year. And I think 125 pounds, or thereabouts — I’d have to look at it — it consists of sugar in one form or another.
不，我认为，如果——你知道，如果你反对糖——我认为一个普通人每年大约吃掉550磅干重的食物。我想其中大约125磅，或者差不多是——我得查证一下——是糖的形式，或者其他任何形式的糖。
I mean, it’s in practically every product that you have, and happens to be in Coca-Cola, it happens to be in See’s Candy, but it’s in practically everything you’re — I mean, it’s over 20 percent of what Americans are consuming, one way or another.
我的意思是，它几乎存在于你所有的产品中，它恰好出现在可口可乐中，出现在See’s糖果中，但几乎你所消费的一切都含有糖——我说的是，美国人消费的东西中，糖占了20%以上，不管以什么形式。
And, you know, the average lifespan of Americans keeps going up. So, I would not be worried at all about product liability in connection with those companies.
而且，你知道，美国人的平均寿命不断提高。所以，我一点也不担心与这些公司相关的产品责任问题。
But product liability, generally, is an area that is a fertile field for the plaintiff’s bar. And it’s — we are conscious in buying into businesses, and we have passed up some businesses, because we were worried about the product liability potential.
但通常来说，产品责任是原告律师的一个肥沃领域。我们在投资时非常关注这一点，曾因担心产品责任的潜力而放弃了某些企业。
Unless there is some legislative solution, I think you will see more and more of the GDP going into liability awards. And whether there will be any change by legislation, I don’t know. But, you know, it’s a big field.
除非有某种立法解决方案，否则我认为你会看到越来越多的GDP被用于赔偿金。是否会有立法上的变革，我不清楚。但，你知道，这是一个大领域。
And the lottery ticket aspect of it is so attractive. Because if an attorney can gamble a modest amount of time, or even a reasonable amount of time, and have a potential payoff of 10, or 20, or maybe, in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars, you know, that’s a decent lottery ticket. Who knows what 12 people, you know, are going to be on the jury?
而它的乐透式特性非常吸引人。因为如果一名律师能冒着适度的时间风险，甚至是合理的时间成本，却可能获得1000万、2000万，甚至在某些情况下几亿美元的回报，你知道的，这就是一张不错的乐透彩票。谁知道12个陪审员会是哪些人呢？
As one of my friends who’s a lawyer said, you know, he said, “Lincoln said, ‘You can fool all of the people some of the time, and all of the — some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but not all of them all the time.’” He says, “I’m just looking for 12 that you can fool all of the time.” You know, and — (Laughter)
正如我的一个朋友，一个律师所说的，你知道，他说，“林肯曾说过，‘你可以欺骗所有人中的一部分时间，或者所有人中的部分人全部时间，或者所有人中的部分人某些时候，但不可能一直欺骗所有人。’”他说，“我只是在找12个能永远被你欺骗的人。”你知道的——（笑声）
You know, and all you have to do is get an award. And the odds are fairly favorable in a nation where lots of zeros have sort of lost meaning to people. So it’s a very real concern in any business we get into, in terms of trying to evaluate product liability.
你知道，只要你拿到赔偿，就行。而在一个零的意义对人们来说已不再重要的国家，胜算是相当有利的。因此，在我们进入任何业务时，评估产品责任是一个非常现实的担忧。
这样的抱怨后面年度会少一些。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: What’s particularly pernicious is the increasing political power of the plaintiff’s contingency, the bar.
查理·芒格：特别有害的是原告团体——律师行业——日益增长的政治权力。
If you’re on a state Supreme Court, for — in most places, you’re on for life. If you — at least, you’re on for life if you want to stay for life.
如果你是州最高法院的法官——在大多数地方，如果你愿意，你可以终身担任法官。
And the one thing that could get you off the court would be to really irritate some important group. And I think that greatly helps a lot of abusive conduct in the courts.
而使你下台的唯一方式就是惹怒一些重要群体。我认为这极大地助长了法院中的很多滥用行为。
I think the judges of the country haven’t been nearly as tough as they should be on junk science, junk economic testimony, trashy lawyers. And I don’t see — (applause) — and I don’t see many signs that it’s getting better.
我认为全国的法官们在对待伪科学、虚假经济证词和不正当律师方面没有表现出应有的严厉。我没有看到——（掌声）——没有看到很多迹象表明情况正在好转。
In Texas, they actually improved the Supreme Court of Texas, which really needed it. So, there are occasional glimmers of life.
在德州，他们实际上改善了德州最高法院，那个法院确实需要改革。所以，偶尔也会看到一些生气的迹象。
WARREN BUFFETT: We make our decisions in insurance and in buying businesses with a very pessimistic attitude toward the chances of that particular ill that Charlie described being even moderated.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们在做保险决策和收购业务时，总是以非常悲观的态度看待查理所描述的那种问题是否得到缓解的可能性。
I mean, we think if — we would project out that the trend would accelerate, but that’s just our natural way of building in a margin of safety in decisions.
我的意思是，我们认为——我们预计这一趋势会加速，但这只是我们在决策中自然地建立安全边际的方式。
Don’t worry about eating the See’s candy, or the Dairy Queen, or the Coke.
别担心吃See’s糖果、Dairy Queen冰淇淋或可口可乐。
You know, if you read the papers long — I use a lot of salt, and, you know, I was always being warned about that. And then, you know, a few years ago they started saying, “You know, you can’t get enough salt” and all that. I don’t know what the answer is, but I feel terrific. (Laughter)
你知道，如果你看报纸看的久了——我用很多盐，你知道，我总是被提醒这点。然后，你知道，几年前他们开始说：“你知道，盐不够的话也不行”之类的。我不知道答案是什么，但我感觉非常好。（笑声）
9. We don’t “have cash around just to have cash”
我们不是“为了拥有现金而拥有现金”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：第7区。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Murray Cass from Markham, Ontario.
听众：早上好，我是来自安大略省马卡姆的穆雷·卡斯（Murray Cass）。
The financial community relies heavily on the P/E ratio when evaluating prospective investments.
金融界在评估潜在投资时，严重依赖市盈率（P/E）比率。
When you buy a company, you must certainly consider not just the future stream of earnings but also the company’s financial condition, among other things. By financial condition, I’m speaking mainly of cash and debt.
当你购买一家公司时，当然不仅要考虑未来的收益流，还要考虑公司的财务状况，主要是现金和债务等因素。
But the P/E doesn’t take into consideration either cash or debt. Occasionally, you see a company with consistently positive free cash flow trading just over cash value, effectively giving away the future earnings. In cases like this, the P/E looks terribly overstated unless adjusted for cash and debt.
但市盈率并未考虑现金和债务。有时你会看到一家公司长期有正的自由现金流，股价仅略高于现金价值，实际上是在让渡未来的收益。在这种情况下，市盈率看起来非常被高估，除非对现金和债务进行调整。
I’ve always preferred companies with oodles of cash to those burdened with lots of debt. And then I read Phil Fisher’s book, “Conservative Investors Sleep Well.”
我一直偏爱现金充裕的公司，而不是那些背负大量债务的公司。然后我读了菲尔·费舍尔的书《保守投资者睡得好》。
Well, I haven’t slept well since. He really confused me when he commented that “hoarding cash was evil.” He wrote that instead, “Companies should either put the cash to good use or distribute it to shareholders.” Can I get your thoughts on this?
自从那以后，我就没睡得好过。他评论说“囤积现金是邪恶的”时真的让我困惑不已。他反而写道：“公司应该把现金好好利用，或者分配给股东。”你能分享一下你们对此的看法吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there are times when we’re awash in cash. And there have been plenty of times when we didn’t have enough cash.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，确实有时候我们会现金充裕。也有很多时候我们现金不够。
Charlie and I, I remember in the late ’60s, we were — when bank credit was very difficult — we were looking for money over in the Middle East. You remember that, Charlie?
查理和我，我记得在60年代末，当时银行信贷非常紧张，我们曾在中东寻找资金。你记得吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I do.
查理·芒格：我记得。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，那个时候——
CHARLIE MUNGER: They wanted us to repay it in dinars.
查理·芒格：他们希望我们用第纳尔来还款。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yes, and the guy that wanted us to repaint it — repay him — in dinars — or “deeners,” or whatever the hell they call them — (laughter) — was also the guy that determined the value of those things.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，而那个要求我们用第纳尔——或者说“第纳尔”，或其他他们叫的名字——（笑声）还款的人，也是那个决定这些货币价值的人。
So, we — (laughter) — were not terribly excited about meeting up with him on payday and having him decide the exchange rate on that date. (Laughter)
所以我们——（笑声）——对在发薪日与他见面并让他决定当天的汇率并不感到特别兴奋。（笑声）
But we, obviously, are looking every day for ways to deploy cash.
但显然，我们每天都在寻找运用现金的方式。
And we would never have cash around just to have cash. I mean, we would never think that we should have a cash position of X percent. And I — frankly, I think these asset allocation things that tacticians in Wall Street put out, you know, about 60 percent stocks and 30 — we think that’s total nonsense.
我们绝不会仅仅为了持有现金而持有现金。我的意思是，我们从不认为我们应该有一个X百分比的现金头寸。坦率地说，我认为华尔街的这些资产配置方法，比如60%是股票、30%——我们认为那完全是胡说八道。
So, we want to have all our money — (applause) — working in decent businesses. But sometimes we can’t find them, or sometimes cash comes in (un)expectedly, or sometimes we sell something, and we have more cash around than we would like.
所以，我们希望让所有的钱——（掌声）——都投入到优质企业中。但有时我们找不到这样的企业，或者有时候现金不期而至，或者有时候我们卖掉了一些东西，结果我们手中持有的现金比我们希望的更多。
And more cash around than we would like means that we have 10 or 15 cents around. Because we want money employed, but we’ll never employ it just to employ it. And in recent years, we’ve tended to be cash heavy, but not because we wanted cash per se.
而现金多于我们所希望的，意味着我们手中可能只有10或15美分。因为我们希望让资金得到利用，但我们绝不会仅仅为了利用现金而利用它。近年来，我们倾向于持有较多现金，但这并不是因为我们单纯想要现金。
In the mid-’70s, you know, we were scraping around for every dime we could find to buy things. We don’t like lots of leverage, and we never will. We’ll never borrow lots of money at Berkshire. It’s just not our style.
在70年代中期，你知道，我们为每一分钱都在四处寻找，以便购买资产。我们不喜欢过多的杠杆，我们永远不会这么做。我们永远不会在伯克希尔借入大量资金。这不是我们的风格。
But you will find us quite unhappy over time if cash just keeps building up. And I think, one way or another, we’ll find ways to use it.
但如果现金不断积累，时间一长，你会发现我们会相当不高兴。我认为，不管以什么方式，我们都会找到利用这些现金的方法。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t add anything to that.
查理·芒格：我没有什么可补充的。
10. Costs vary by type of business
成本因业务类型而异
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第8区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Mark Dickson (PH) from Sarasota, Florida. And I’d like to thank you for providing this forum for all of us. It’s wonderful.
听众：早上好，我是来自佛罗里达州萨拉索塔的马克·迪克森（Mark Dickson）。我想感谢你们为我们提供这个平台，真是太棒了。
In past years, you’ve been very specific about some of the numbers related to Coca-Cola, Wells Fargo, Rockwood — specifically like with Coca-Cola — cost of aluminum, and sugar, and all that. It goes into the bottom line of Coca-Cola.
在过去的几年里，你们非常具体地提到了一些与可口可乐、富国银行、Rockwood相关的数字——尤其是关于可口可乐——铝的成本，糖和其他因素，这些都直接影响到可口可乐的底线。
Can you provide some of the specific numbers that go into some of your more recent purchases over the last couple years?
你能提供一些最近几年你们收购的一些公司的具体数字吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they have such different characteristics. That’s very difficult. I mean, we have service businesses such as FlightSafety, and Executive Jet is a service business.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，它们有非常不同的特点。这是非常困难的。我的意思是，我们有一些服务型企业，比如FlightSafety，Executive Jet也是服务型企业。
And, you know, in many of those companies, the big cost is personnel. I mean, we need people with — at a FlightSafety, we’ve got a lot of money invested in simulators. We’ll put over $200 million into simulators this year, just as we did last year.
而且，你知道，在这些公司中，最大的成本是人力。我的意思是，我们需要人——在FlightSafety，我们投入了大量资金用于模拟器。今年我们将投入超过2亿美元用于模拟器，就像去年一样。
So we have a big capital cost in that business, and then we have a big people cost because we are training pilots. And that’s very person-on-person intensive. NetJets, part of Executive Jet, very people-intensive. I mean, we are absolutely no better than the people that interact with our clientele.
所以我们在这个行业有很大的资本成本，然后我们有很大的人力成本，因为我们在培训飞行员。这是一个非常依赖人的行业。NetJets，作为Executive Jet的一部分，也非常依赖人力。我的意思是，我们绝对不比与客户互动的员工更出色。
You get into something like the carpet business, and maybe only 15 percent of your revenues will be accounted for by employment costs. And you’re a very heavy raw material buyer. I mean, you’re buying lots of fiber.
如果进入像地毯行业这样的业务，也许只有15%的收入由人力成本构成。你是一个非常大的原材料买家。我的意思是，你买了很多纤维。
So it varies enormously by the kind of business you’re in.
所以，这取决于你所在的行业，差异非常大。
I mean, when we’re in the insurance business, you know, we’re in the business of paying future claims. And that’s our big cost. And that’s — obviously, involves estimates because sometimes we’re going to pay the claim five, 10, or 20 years later. We’re not going to know about it sometimes till 20 years later.
我的意思是，当我们进入保险行业时，我们从事的是支付未来赔偿的业务。这是我们的主要成本。而且，这显然需要估算，因为有时候我们可能要在五年、十年或二十年后支付赔偿。有时候我们甚至可能直到20年后才会知道。
So, it’s very hard to generalize among the businesses.
所以，在各个行业之间进行概括是非常困难的。
If you’re in the retail business, which we are in the furniture and jewelry in a significant way, purchased goods are very — obviously — very important. We don’t manufacture our own goods to any extent in those businesses.
如果你从事零售业务，我们在家具和珠宝领域有重要参与，那么购买的商品非常——显然——非常重要。在这些业务中，我们几乎不自己生产商品。
And then, the second cost, of course, is labor in a business like that.
当然，第二大成本是劳动力成本，特别是在这种行业。
But we don’t have any notions as to what we want to buy based on how their costs are segmented. What we really are looking for is an enduring competitive advantage. I mean, that’s what’s going through our mind all the time.
但我们并没有基于成本分配来决定我们想购买什么。我们真正寻找的是持久的竞争优势。我的意思是，这始终是我们心中的重点。
And then we want, obviously, top-notch people running the place, because we’re not going to run them ourselves. So those are the two factors we look at.
然后，显然，我们希望拥有顶尖的人才来运营这些公司，因为我们不会亲自管理它们。所以，这就是我们关注的两个因素。
We want to understand the cost structure, but Charlie and I can understand the cost structure of many companies — there’s many we can’t — but we can understand a good many companies.
我们希望理解成本结构，但查理和我可以理解许多公司的成本结构——虽然有些我们不能理解——但我们可以理解很多公司。
And we don’t really care whether we’re buying into a people-intensive business, a raw material-intensive business, a rent-intensive business. We do want to understand it and understand why it’s got an edge against its competitors.
我们其实并不在乎我们是否购买的是一个以人力密集型为主的企业，还是原材料密集型企业，或是租金密集型企业。我们确实希望理解它，并了解它为什么能在竞争中占有优势。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, basically, to some extent we’re like the hedgehog that knows one big thing. If you generate float at 3 percent per annum and buy businesses that earn 13 percent per annum with the proceeds of the float, we have actually figured out that that’s a pretty good position to be in. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，本质上，我们有点像那只知道一个大事的刺猬。如果你每年产生3%的浮存金，并用浮存金的收益去购买年收益13%的企业，我们实际上已经发现这是一种相当不错的位置。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It took us a long time. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们花了很长时间才明白。（笑声）
Incidentally, I would hope that we would — and actually expect that — absent a mega-catastrophe — that 3 percent figure will come down over the next, well, in the near future.
顺便说一下，我希望我们——实际上也预期——在没有发生重大灾难的情况下——这个3%的数字将在不久的将来下降。
But a mega-catastrophe could change all of that. I mean, if you had a $50 billion insured catastrophe — Tokyo earthquake, California earthquake, Florida hurricane — I mean, those — we’re in the business of taking those risks.
但一个巨大的灾难可能会改变这一切。我的意思是，如果发生一场500亿美元的保险灾难——比如东京地震、加州地震、佛罗里达飓风——这些——我们从事的就是承担这些风险的业务。
We’re the largest insurer, as you may know, of the California Earthquake Authority. I have a sister here who is from Carmel, and she used to call me when the dogs and cats start running in circles. (Laughter)
正如你们所知，我们是加州地震局的最大保险商。我有一个来自卡梅尔的姐姐，每当狗和猫开始绕圈子时，她都会给我打电话。（笑声）
So we’re exposed to some things that could change.
所以，我们确实面临一些可能改变的事情。
But absent a mega-catastrophe, experience is going in the right way at both — at really at all of our insurance companies. And I would expect that to continue for a while. And then at some point I’d expect it to reverse itself. Isn’t that helpful? (Laughter)
但在没有重大灾难的情况下，所有保险公司的经验都在朝着正确的方向发展。我预计这种趋势会持续一段时间。然后，在某个时刻，我预期它会发生反转。那不是很有帮助吗？（笑声）
11. Airlines must keep costs in line with competitors
航空公司必须保持成本与竞争对手一致
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 1, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 请转到第一区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Martin Wiegand from Chevy Chase, Maryland.
观众： 早上好。我是来自马里兰州雪维·切斯的马丁·威根。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good to have you here, Martin. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 很高兴你在这里，马丁。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Thank you for the wonderful shareholder weekend, and thank you for the leadership and education you give your shareholders and the general public.
观众： 谢谢您。感谢您为股东周末活动所做的一切，也感谢您为股东和公众提供的领导力与教育。
My question. Large airlines are in the news negotiating labor contracts. They claim they can’t pass along rising labor costs to their customers.
我的问题是，大型航空公司正在新闻中谈判劳工合同。他们声称无法将不断上涨的劳动力成本转嫁给客户。
In the annual report, you say Executive Jet is growing fast and doing great. Executive Jet seems to be able to pass along its rising labor cost to its customers.
在年报中，您提到执行航空（Executive Jet）增长迅速，表现出色。 Executive Jet似乎能够将不断上涨的劳动力成本转嫁给客户。
Is this because Executive Jet has a rational compensation plan that keeps employee salaries in line with billable services? If not, why does Executive Jet do well while the airlines experience troubles?
这是因为 Executive Jet有一个合理的薪酬计划，使员工工资与可收费服务保持一致吗？如果不是，为什么 Executive Jet表现良好，而航空公司却面临困境？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the big problem with the airlines is not so much what their aggregate payments will be. The real problem is when you’re in the airline business and your wage rates are out of line with your competitors.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，航空公司面临的主要问题并不完全在于他们的总体支付金额。真正的问题是，当你处于航空业务中时，薪资水平与竞争对手不一致。
When you get right down to it, the figure to look at with an airline — among a lot of other things — but you start with the cost per available seat mile. And then you work that through based on the capacity utilization to get to the revenue per — or the cost per — occupied seat mile.
说到底，你需要关注的一个数字是航空公司——除了很多其他因素外——首先是每座可用座位英里成本。然后根据座位利用率计算，得出每座占用座位英里的收入或成本。
And the — you could have labor costs or any other costs. You certainly have fuel costs up dramatically for the airlines from a couple of years ago.
此外，你可能会有劳动力成本或其他成本。航空公司的燃油成本肯定大幅上升，比几年前高得多。
As long as you’re more efficient than your competitor, and your costs are not higher than your competitor, people will continue to fly.
只要你比竞争对手更高效，而且成本不高于竞争对手，人们就会继续选择飞行。
It’s when you get your costs out of line with your competitor, which was the situation that — where Charlie and I were directors of USAir a few years back — and our costs per seat mile were far higher than competitors.
问题出在当你的成本与竞争对手不一致时，这正是几年前查理和我作为USAir董事时的情况——我们的每座座位英里成本远高于竞争对手。
And that was fine where we didn’t have competitors on some — many of the short routes in the East. But as the Southwest Airlines would move into our territory — and they had costs, we’ll say, of — and this is from memory — but they might have had costs below eight cents a seat mile. And our cost might have been 12 cents a seat mile.
当时在我们的一些短途航线（特别是在东部）没有竞争对手的情况下，这并不成问题。但当西南航空开始进入我们的领地时——我们可以说他们的成本——根据记忆——可能低于每座座位英里8美分。而我们的成本可能是每座座位英里12美分。
You know, that is a — you’re going to get killed, eventually. They may not get to this route this year, but they’ll get there next year or the year after.
你知道，这就是——你最终会被淘汰。他们今年可能不会进入这条航线，但明年或后年他们一定会进入。
So if you’re running a big airline at Delta or United or whatever, if your costs are on parity or less — labor costs — than your other major competitors, that is much more important to you than the absolute level.
所以，如果你经营着像达美航空、联合航空这样的航空公司，如果你的成本与其他主要竞争对手持平或更低——劳动力成本——这对你来说比绝对水平更为重要。
And the NetJets service is not really designed to be competitive with United Airlines or an American or something of that sort. It has a different group of competitors.
而NetJets的服务实际上并不是为了与联合航空或美国航空等公司竞争。它有一组不同的竞争对手。
And I think we have a absolutely terrific pilot force there. And we want them to be happy. But there’s a lot of other ways. I mean, you want to pay them fairly. But with our pilots for example, it’s extremely important to them, in many cases, to be able to live where they want to and to work the kind of shifts that we can offer. So we attract them in many other ways than bidding against United Airlines or American Airlines.
我认为我们那里的飞行员队伍非常棒。我们希望他们开心。但我们有很多其他方式来吸引他们。我的意思是，我们要公平地支付他们。但以我们的飞行员为例，在许多情况下，他们非常重视能够在自己喜欢的地方居住，并且能做我们能提供的班次。所以我们吸引他们的方式与与联合航空或美国航空竞标不同。
Big thing in — you just can’t take labor costs that are materially higher than your competitor in a business that has commodity-like characteristics such as airline seats. You just can’t do it over time.
在这种业务中——你不能让劳动力成本比竞争对手高出很多，尤其是在像航空座位这种商品化特征明显的行业中。你不能长期这样做。
很多低端的商业模式有这个特点。
And you can get away with it for a while. But sooner or later, the nature of a capitalist society is that the guy with the lower cost comes in and kills you.
你可能能勉强维持一段时间，但迟早，资本主义社会的本质是，成本更低的竞争者会进入并击败你。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: The airline unions are really tough. And it’s interesting to see a group of people that are paid as well as airline pilots with such a brutally tough union structure. That really makes it hard in a commodity-style business.
查理·芒格： 航空工会真的很强硬。看到一群像航空飞行员这样薪水高却有如此严酷工会结构的人，真的很有意思。这让像商品化业务的航空行业变得更加困难。
And no individual airline can take a long shutdown without having considerable effects on habit patterns and future prospects. It’s just a very tough business by its nature.
而且没有任何一家航空公司能够在长时间停运的情况下不对消费习惯和未来前景产生重大影响。航空业务本身就是一个非常艰难的行业。
Passenger rail travel, even in a previous era, was a pretty tough way to make a buck. And nothing is all that different with the airline travel.
即使在以前的时代，乘客铁路旅行也是一种非常艰难的赚钱方式。航空旅行和铁路旅行并没有太大区别。
We hope that our services are preferred by customers more than one airline seat is preferred compared to another.
我们希望我们的服务比其他航空公司的座位更能得到客户的青睐。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yes, fractional ownership is not a commodity business. I mean, the people care enormously about service and the assurance of safety. And I don’t think that, you know, I don’t think if you were buying a parachute you’d want to take the — necessarily take the low bid, and —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，分时所有权不是商品化业务。我的意思是，人们非常重视服务和安全保障。我不认为，如果你买降落伞，你会选择——一定选择最低报价的降落伞——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 对。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Now with the big commercial airlines with millions and millions of passengers, people, I think probably correctly assume, that there’s quite a similarity in both service and safety.
沃伦·巴菲特： 现在，像大商业航空公司这样有数百万乘客的公司，我认为人们可能正确地认为，无论是服务还是安全，都会有相当大的相似性。
But if you’re in a business that cannot take a long strike, you’re basically playing a game of chicken, you know, with your labor unions. Because they’re going to lose their jobs, too, if you close down. So you’re playing a game of chicken periodically.
但如果你处于一个无法承受长时间罢工的行业，你基本上是在和工会玩“对抗游戏”。因为如果你停业，他们也会失去工作。所以你会时不时地和工会进行对抗。
And it has a lot — there’s a lot of game theory that gets involved.
而且，这涉及到很多博弈论的因素。
To some extent, you know, the weaker you are, the better your bargaining position is. Because if you’re extremely weak, even a very short strike will put you out of business. And the people who are on the other side of the negotiating table understand that. Whereas, if you have a fair amount of strength, they can push you harder.
在某种程度上，你知道，你越弱，你的谈判位置就越好。因为如果你非常弱，即使是一次非常短的罢工也会让你破产。而且谈判桌另一方的人会明白这一点。相反，如果你有一定的实力，他们就能更强硬地施压。
But it is of — it is no fun being in a business where you cannot take a strike. We faced that one time back in the early ’80s when there were — we were in kind of a death struggle in Buffalo with The Courier-Express.
但是，处于一个无法承受罢工的行业并不有趣。我们曾在80年代初面临过这样的困境，当时我们在布法罗与《快递报》（The Courier-Express）进行着一场生死斗争。
And when I bought The Buffalo News — actually Charlie did. He was stranded there during a snowstorm, and he got bored. So, he called me and said, “What should I do?” I said, “Well, you might as well buy the paper.” (Laughter)
当我购买《布法罗新闻》时——实际上是查理买的。他在暴风雪中被困在那里，感到无聊。所以，他打电话给我说：“我该怎么办？”我说：“那你不如就买下这家报纸吧。”（笑）
And so we were in this struggle. And — but when we bought the Buffalo News, we had two questions of the management, and one of them I can’t tell you.
于是我们就陷入了这场斗争。但是，当我们购买《布法罗新闻》时，我们向管理层提出了两个问题，其中一个我不能告诉你。
But the second one was, we wanted to meet with the key union leaders, and we wanted to tell them, “Lookit, if you ever strike us for any length of — significant length of time — we’re out of business.
第二个问题是，我们想与关键的工会领导人会面，并告诉他们：“看，如果你们在任何重要时间段对我们罢工——我们就破产。”
“You know, you can make our investment valueless. So we really want to look you in the eye and see what kind of people you are before we write this check.” And we felt quite good about the people, and they were good people.
“你知道，你们可以让我们的投资变得一文不值。所以在我们写下这张支票之前，我们真的想看着你们的眼睛，看看你们到底是什么样的人。”我们对这些人感到非常满意，他们确实是好人。
And we had one situation in 1981, or thereabouts, where a very, very small union, I think, less than 2 percent of our employees, struck over an issue that the other 10 or 11 unions really didn’t agree with them that much on.
我们在1981年或大约那个时候遇到过一次情况，一个非常小的工会，我认为不到2%的员工，因为一个问题罢工，而其他10或11个工会对此并没有太多的意见。
But they struck, and the other unions observed the picket line, which you would expect them to do in a strongly pro-union town, such as Buffalo.
但他们罢工了，其他工会也站在了罢工线旁，这在像布法罗这样的强烈支持工会的城市是可以预料的。
And I think, as I remember, they struck on a Monday. And I remember leaders of some of the other unions actually with tears in their eyes over this, because they could see it was going to put us out of business.
我记得他们是在周一罢工的。我记得一些其他工会的领导人眼中含着泪水，因为他们看到这会让我们破产。
And frankly, I just took the position then, I said, “Lookit, if you come back in a day, I know we’re competitive. If you come back in a year, I know we will not be competitive.
坦率地说，我当时采取了这样的立场，我说：“看，如果你们一天后回来，我知道我们仍然有竞争力。如果你们一年后回来，我知道我们将不再具有竞争力。”
“And if you’re smart enough to figure out where exactly the point is that you can push us to and still come back and we have a business and you have jobs, I said, you’re smarter than I am. So, you know, go home and figure it out.”
“如果你们足够聪明，能够找出那个点，在哪个点你们可以对我们施压，并且最终我们还能有业务，你们还能有工作，我说，你们比我聪明。所以，你们回去想想吧。”
And they came back in on Thursday, and we became very competitive again. But they could’ve — I mean, it was out of my hands. I couldn’t make them work, and if they decided they were going to stay out long enough, we were not going to have a newspaper.
他们在周四回来了，我们再次变得非常有竞争力。但他们本可以——我是说，那已经不在我的控制之下。我无法让他们工作，如果他们决定长期罢工，我们就没有报纸了。
And that’s the kind of situation, occasionally, you find yourself in. And I would say the airline industry is a good example of people — where people find themselves in that position periodically.
这就是你偶尔会遇到的情况。我认为航空行业是一个很好的例子，说明人们会定期陷入这种境地。
Charlie, anything you want —
查理，您有什么想法吗——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well. The shareholders may be interested to know, vis-à-vis competitive advantages in our NetJets program, that the day that other charter plane crashed in Aspen, NetJets refused to fly into Aspen at all. People remember that kind of thing.
查理·芒格： 好吧。股东们可能会对我们的NetJets项目中的竞争优势感兴趣，那就是，当另一架包机在阿斯彭坠毁的那天，NetJets完全拒绝飞往阿斯彭。人们会记得这种事情。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
12. Berkshire’s advantages, and one big disadvantage
伯克希尔的优势与一大劣势
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
沃伦·巴菲特：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. David Winters from Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Thank you for hosting “Woodstock for Capitalists.” (Laughter)
观众：各位先生，早上好。我是来自新泽西州山湖市的David Winters。感谢你们举办“资本家伍德斯托克”。（笑声）
Berkshire seems to have an enormous long-term advantage in spite of its large size and high equity prices.
尽管伯克希尔规模庞大，股票价格也很高，但它似乎拥有巨大的长期优势。
The structure of the company’s activities, non-callable capital, substantial free cash flow, and improving insurance fundamentals, permit Berkshire to capitalize on potential asset price declines and dislocations in financial markets, while most investors would not either have the money or the cool minds to buy.
公司业务的结构、不可赎回的资本、大量的自由现金流以及不断改善的保险基本面，使伯克希尔能够利用潜在的资产价格下跌和金融市场错位，而大多数投资者要么没有资金，要么没有冷静的头脑去买入。
Am I on the right track here?
我这样理解对吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well I think, in certain ways, you are. But we do have disadvantages, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为，在某些方面，你是对的。但我们也有劣势。
But we have some significant advantages in buying businesses over time. We would be the preferred purchaser, I think, for a reasonable number of private companies and public companies as well.
但我们在长期收购企业方面有一些显著的优势。我认为，对于相当数量的私营和上市公司来说，我们都是首选的收购方。
And we — our checks clear. So we — (laughter) — we will always have the money. People know that when we make a deal, it will get done, and it will get done as fast as anybody can do it. It won’t be subject to any kind of second thoughts or financing difficulties.
而且——我们的支票可以兑现。所以我们——（笑声）——我们永远都有钱。人们知道，当我们达成交易时，交易一定会完成，而且会以最快的速度完成。不会有任何反复或融资困难。
And we bought, as you know, we bought Johns Manville because the other group had financing difficulties.
你们也知道，我们收购Johns Manville公司是因为另一方遇到了融资困难。
People know they will get to run their businesses as they’ve run them before, if they care about that, and a lot of people do. Others don’t.
人们知道，如果他们愿意，他们可以像以前一样经营他们的企业，很多人都关心这一点。也有人不在乎。
We have an ownership structure that is probably more stable than any company our size, or anywhere near our size, in the country. And that’s attractive to people, so —
我们的所有权结构可能比美国任何一家与我们规模相当或接近的公司都更稳定。这对人们很有吸引力，所以——
And we are under no pressure to do anything dumb. You know, if we do things dumb, it’s because we do things dumb. And it’s not — but it’s not because anybody’s making us do it.
而且我们没有压力去做任何愚蠢的事情。你知道，如果我们做了愚蠢的事情，那是因为我们自己愚蠢。而不是——但不是因为有人逼我们这样做。
So those are significant advantages. And the disadvantage, the biggest disadvantage we have is size.
所以这些都是显著的优势。而劣势，我们最大的劣势是规模。
I mean, it is harder to double the market value of a hundred billion dollar company than a $1 billion company, using our — what we have in our arsenal.
我的意思是，使用我们拥有的手段，要使一家千亿美元市值的公司翻一番，比使一家十亿美元市值的公司翻一番要难得多。
And that isn’t — I hope it isn’t going to go away. I mean, I hope we don’t become a billion dollar company and enjoy all the benefits of those. (Laughter)
我希望这种情况不会消失。我的意思是，我希望我们不会变成一家十亿美元的公司，然后享受所有这些好处。（笑声）
And I hope, in fact, we have the agony of becoming, you know, a much larger company.
我实际上希望，我们能承受成为一家规模更大的公司的“痛苦”。
So, you are on the right track. Whether we can deliver or not is another question. But we go into combat every day armed with those advantages.
所以，你的理解是对的。我们是否能够实现目标是另一个问题。但我们每天都带着这些优势投入战斗。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. This is not a hog heaven period for Berkshire. The investment game is getting more and more competitive. And I see no sign that that is going to change.
查理·芒格：是的。现在对伯克希尔来说不是最好的时期。投资竞争越来越激烈。我看不出这种情况会有任何改变的迹象。
WARREN BUFFETT: But people will do stupid things in the future. Even — there’s no question. I mean, I will guarantee you sometime in the next 20 years that people will do some exceptionally stupid things in equity markets.
沃伦·巴菲特：但人们将来会做愚蠢的事情。毫无疑问。我的意思是，我敢保证，在未来20年里的某个时候，人们会在股票市场上做一些非常愚蠢的事情。
And then the question is, you know, are we in a position to do something about that when that happens?
然后问题是，你知道，当这种情况发生时，我们是否有能力采取行动？
But we do — we continue to prefer to buy businesses, though. That’s what we really enjoy.
但我们仍然更喜欢收购企业。这才是我们真正喜欢做的事情。
When Charlie mentioned hog heaven, I thought we ought to open the peanut brittle here, which I recommend heartily. (Laughter)
当查理提到最好的时期时，我想我们应该打开花生脆糖，我衷心推荐。（笑声）
13. “There is no such thing as growth stocks or value stocks”
“不存在成长股或价值股这种说法”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：3号区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Mo Spence from Waterloo, Nebraska.
观众提问：早上好，我是来自内布拉斯加州滑铁卢的莫·斯宾塞。
You’ve often stated that value and growth are opposite sides of the same coin.
您经常提到，价值和成长是同一枚硬币的两面。
Would you care to elaborate on that? And do you prefer a growth company that is selling cheap or a value company with moderate or better growth prospects?
您能详细解释一下吗？您是更喜欢以低价出售的成长型公司，还是具有中等或更好增长前景的价值型公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually I think you’re — you may be misquoting me. But I really said that growth and value, they’re indistinguishable. They’re part of the same equation. Or really, growth is part of the value equation.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，实际上，我认为您可能误解了我的意思。我真正说的是，成长和价值是无法区分的。它们是同一个方程式的一部分。确切地说，成长是价值方程式的一部分。
So, our position is that there is no such thing as growth stocks or value stocks, the way Wall Street generally portrays them as being contrasting asset classes.
因此，我们的立场是，并不存在成长股或价值股这种说法，华尔街通常把它们描绘成对立的资产类别。
Growth, usually, is a chance to — growth, usually, is a positive for value, but only when it means that by adding capital now, you add more cash availability later on, at a rate that’s considerably higher than the current rate of interest.
成长通常是一个机会——成长通常对价值是有利的，但前提是现在投入资本，未来能够以显著高于当前利率的回报带来更多的现金流。
So, there is no — we don’t — we calculate into any business we buy what we expect to have happen, in terms of the cash that’s going to come out of it, or the cash that’s going to go into it.
因此，不存在所谓的——我们不会——我们在购买任何企业时，都会计算我们预期的现金流出和现金流入。
As I mentioned at FlightSafety, we’re going to buy $200 million worth of simulators this year. Our depreciation will probably be in the area of $70 million or thereabouts. So we’re putting $130 million above depreciation into that business.
正如我之前提到的FlightSafety，我们今年将购买价值2亿美元的模拟器。我们的折旧费用大概会在7000万美元左右。所以我们在这项业务中投入了超过折旧的1.3亿美元。
Now that can be good or bad. I mean, it’s growth. There’s no question about it. We’ll have a lot more simulators at the end of the year. But whether that’s good or bad depends on what we earn on that incremental $130 million over time.
这可能是好事，也可能是坏事。我的意思是，这是成长，这一点毋庸置疑。今年年底我们将拥有更多的模拟器。但这究竟是好还是坏，取决于我们随着时间在这1.3亿美元增量投资上的回报。
So if you tell me that you own a business that’s going to grow to the sky, and isn’t that wonderful, I don’t know whether it’s wonderful or not until I know what the economics are of that growth. How much you have to put in today, and how much you will reap from putting that in today, later on.
所以，如果您告诉我您拥有一家将会“成长到天际”的企业，而这难道不是很棒吗？我并不知道这是否很棒，除非我了解这种成长的经济效益。今天需要投入多少，未来能从今天的投入中获得多少回报。
And the classic case, again, is the airline business. The airline business has been a growth business ever since, well, you know, Orville [Wright] took off. But the growth has been the worst thing that happened to it.
一个经典的例子就是航空业。自从奥维尔·莱特起飞以来，航空业一直是一个成长型行业。但对航空业来说，成长却是最糟糕的事情。
It’s been great for the American public. But growth has been a curse in the airline business because more and more capital has been put into the business at inadequate returns.
对美国公众来说，这是一件好事。但对航空业而言，成长却是一种诅咒，因为有越来越多的资本被投入这个行业，而回报却不足。
Now, growth is wonderful at See’s Candy, because it requires relatively little incremental investment to sell more pounds of candy.
然而，在See’s糖果公司，成长是非常好的，因为销售更多糖果所需的增量投资相对较少。
So, its — growth, and I’ve discussed this in some of the annual reports — growth is part of the equation, but anybody that tells you, “You ought to have your money in growth stocks or value stocks,” really does not understand investing. Other than that, they’re terrific people. (Laughter)
所以，成长——我在一些年度报告中讨论过——成长是这个方程式的一部分。但任何告诉您“您应该把钱投在成长股或价值股”上的人，其实并不真正理解投资。除此之外，他们都是很棒的人。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s fair to say that Berkshire, with a very limited headquarters staff — and that staff pretty old — (laughter) — we are especially partial to laying out large sums of money under circumstances where we won’t have to be smart again.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为可以这么说，伯克希尔的总部员工非常少——而且这些员工相当老了（笑声）——我们特别偏好在不需要再次动脑的情况下花费大笔资金。
In other words, if we buy good businesses run by good people at reasonable prices, there’s a good chance that you people will prosper us for many decades without more intelligence at headquarters. And you can say, in a sense, that’s growth stock investing.
换句话说，如果我们以合理的价格收购由优秀的人经营的好企业，那么这些企业很可能会让我们繁荣几十年，而总部不需要再动太多脑筋。从某种意义上说，这就是成长股投资。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if you had asked Wall Street to classify Berkshire since 1965, year-by-year, is this a growth business or a value business — a growth stock or value stock — you know, who knows what they would have said.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果您从1965年起每年问华尔街，伯克希尔到底是成长型业务还是价值型业务，是成长股还是价值股，谁知道他们会怎么说。
But, you know, the real point is that we’re trying to put out capital now to get more capital — or money — we’re trying to put out cash now to get more cash back later on.
但真正的关键是，我们现在投出资本，是为了将来获得更多的资本或资金，我们现在投出现金，是为了未来收回更多的现金。
And if you do that, the business grows, obviously. And you can call that value or you can call it growth. But they’re not two different categories.
如果您这样做，业务显然会成长。您可以称之为价值，也可以称之为成长。但它们并不是两个不同的类别。
And I just cringe when I hear people talk about, “Now it’s time to move from growth stocks to value stocks,” or something like that, because it just doesn’t make any sense.
当我听到人们说“现在是时候从成长股转向价值股”之类的话时，我感到非常不舒服，因为这根本没有任何意义。
14. Advice to young people: Invest in yourself
给年轻人的建议：投资自己
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Steven Kampf (PH) from Irvine, California. I’m 10 years old and this is my fourth consecutive year here.
观众提问： 你好，我叫史蒂文·坎普（音译），来自加利福尼亚州欧文市。我今年10岁，这是我连续第四年参加这个活动。
WARREN BUFFETT: Terrific.
沃伦·巴菲特： 太棒了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How I got —
观众提问： 我之所以能——
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad to have you here.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们很高兴你能来这里。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks. This is my fourth consecutive year here, and how I got to owning stock is my dad taught me to start my own business. And I bought Berkshire Hathaway stock with my profits.
观众提问： 谢谢。这是我连续第四年来这里了。我能拥有股票，是因为我爸爸教我自己创业。我用赚到的钱买了伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票。
In school, they don’t teach you how to make and save money, not in high school or college. So my question is, how would you propose to educate kids in this area?
在学校里，他们并不教我们如何挣钱和存钱，无论是高中还是大学都没有。所以我的问题是，您建议如何在这方面教育孩子们？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. Sounds to me like — (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这是个好问题。在我听来——（掌声）
Sounds to me like you could do a good job yourself, too. And, you know, at 10, you’re way ahead of me. Unfortunately, I didn’t buy my first stock until I was 11, so I got a very slow start. And — (Laughter)
在我看来，你自己也做得很好。而且，10岁的你已经领先我了。不幸的是，我11岁才买了我的第一支股票，所以起步非常慢。（笑声）
It’s, you know, what it takes really is — and you find it in some classrooms and you don’t in others — but it takes teachers who can explain the subject. Charlie would say Ben Franklin was the best teacher of all in that respect.
要想学会这些，关键是要有能够把这门学科讲清楚的老师。有些课堂会教，但有些课堂不会。查理会说，本杰明·富兰克林是这方面最好的老师。
But, you know, it looks like you either got it from your parents — an education on that — and parents can do more education, really, in that respect, even, than teachers.
不过，看起来你是从父母那里学到的这些知识。实际上，父母在这方面的教育比老师能做得更多。
But it’s, you know, I get a chance to talk to students from time to time. And, you know, one of the things I tell them is, you know, what a valuable asset they have themselves.
我偶尔会有机会与学生们交流。我告诉他们的一件事是，他们自身就是一项宝贵的资产。
I mean, I would pay any bright student probably $50,000 for 10 percent of his future earnings the rest of his life. So he’s a $500,000 asset just standing there. And what you do with that $500,000 asset, in terms of developing your mind and your talents, is hugely important.
比如，我愿意花5万美元买下任何聪明学生未来一生10%的收入。这意味着，他站在那里本身就值50万美元。而你如何利用这项价值50万美元的资产，去开发自己的头脑和才能，这非常重要。
The best investment you can make, at an early age, is in yourself. And it sounds to me like you’re doing very well in that respect. I congratulate you on it.
在年轻时，你能做的最好的投资，就是投资你自己。而在我看来，你在这方面已经做得非常好了。对此，我祝贺你。
I don’t have any great sweeping program for doing it throughout the schools though. We have — here in Nebraska — we have an annual get-together of students from all the high schools throughout the state. And it’s a day or two of economic education. I think it’s a very good program.
不过，对于如何在学校推广这类教育，我并没有一个宏大的方案。在内布拉斯加州，我们每年都会邀请全州高中生们参加一到两天的经济教育活动。我认为这是个很好的项目。
But I think if you just keep doing what you’re doing, you may be an example to other students.
不过，我认为只要你继续做现在的事，你可能会成为其他学生的榜样。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d like to interject a word of caution. You sound like somebody who’s likely to succeed at what you’re trying to do. And that’s not always a good idea.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我想插一句话。你听起来很可能会在你正在做的事情上取得成功。但这并不总是个好事。
If all you succeed in doing in your life is to get early rich from passive holding of little bits of paper, and you get better and better at only that for all your life, it’s a failed life.
如果你一生中所做的事情只是通过被动持有一堆纸片（股票）来早早致富，并且你一生只擅长这件事，那你的人生是失败的。
Life is more — (applause) — than being shrewd at passive wealth accumulation. (Applause)
人生的意义远不止于在被动积累财富方面变得精明。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think he’s going to do well in both.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我相信他两方面都会做得很好。
芒格这种心态幸亏不是话事人。
15. Internet “was a chance for people to monetize the hopes of others”
互联网“让人们有机会将他人的希望变现”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第五区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Thomas Kamay (PH). I am 11 years old and from Kentfield, California. This is my fourth annual meeting.
观众提问： 早上好，我叫托马斯·卡迈（音译），来自加利福尼亚州肯特菲尔德，今年11岁。这是我第四次参加股东大会。
Last year, I asked how the internet might affect some of your holdings. Since a lot of the internet companies have gone out of business, how has your view of internet changed?
去年我问过互联网可能会如何影响你们的部分持股。由于很多互联网公司已经倒闭，您对互联网的看法有没有变化？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. I think that the internet probably looks to most retailers like less of a competitive threat than it did a couple of years ago.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这是个好问题。我认为，对大多数零售商来说，互联网现在看起来不像几年前那样具有竞争威胁。
For example, if you look at the jewelers who have been on the internet and, in many cases — in several cases, at least, had very large valuations a couple of years ago, so the world was betting that they would be very effective competitors against brick and mortar jewelry retailers.
例如，一些珠宝商曾经试图通过互联网销售珠宝，很多情况下，至少在几年前，这些公司的估值非常高。当时大家都在赌，他们会成为传统实体珠宝零售商的有力竞争者。
I think that that threat has diminished substantially. I think that’s been true in the furniture business. In both of those industries, very prominent dot-coms that had aggregate valuations in the hundreds of millions have vanished in short order.
但我认为，这种威胁已经大大减弱了。这在家具行业也是如此。这两个行业里，有些著名的互联网公司，几年前的估值高达数亿美元，但如今却在短时间内消失了。
So I would say that we think the internet is a huge opportunity for certain of our businesses. I mean, GEICO continues to grow at a significant rate in internet business.
所以，我认为互联网对我们的一些业务来说是巨大的机遇。比如，GEICO的互联网业务仍在以显著的速度增长。
See’s Candies’ internet business is up 40 percent this year. Last year it was up a much larger percent from the year before, and it grows and it will continue to grow.
See’s糖果的互联网业务今年增长了40%。去年，它的增幅比前一年更大。它在增长，而且会持续增长。
So the internet’s an opportunity, but I think the idea that you could take almost any business idea and turn it into wealth on the internet — many were turned into wealth by promoting them to the public. But very few have been turned into wealth by actually producing cash results over time.
所以，互联网是一种机会，但认为可以将几乎任何商业想法都转化成财富的观念——许多公司确实通过向公众宣传而获得了财富，但真正能长期产出现金流的少之又少。
So I think there’s been a significant change in the degree to which I perceive the internet as a possible threat to our retail businesses. There’s been no change in the degree to which I regard it as an opportunity for other of our businesses.
因此，在我看来，互联网对我们零售业务构成的威胁已经大大减弱。但它对我们其他业务来说仍是一个重要的机遇，这一点没有变化。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren, you and I were once engaged in the credit and delivery grocery business. And it was a terrible business. It barely supported one family for a hundred years with all of them working 90 hours a week.
查理·芒格： 嗯，沃伦，你和我曾经从事过送货上门的信用杂货生意。这是个糟糕的生意，一家人每天工作90个小时，勉强维持了100年。
And somebody actually got the idea that was the wave of the future and turned it into a great internet idea. That can only be described as mania. And it sucked in a lot of intelligent people.
但有人竟然认为这就是未来的潮流，把它包装成了一个伟大的互联网点子。这只能用“疯狂”来形容，而且吸引了许多聪明人参与其中。
对于自己擅长和不擅长的事都要非常谨慎，库克的这句话很有道理。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yes, Charlie is talking about the infamous Buffett & Son Grocery Store, which did barely support the family for a hundred years. And, only then did we support the family by hiring guys like Charlie for slave wages. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，查理说的是臭名昭著的“巴菲特父子杂货店”，这个店确实勉强支撑了家族百年。而我们支撑下来的办法，就是雇佣像查理这样的人，用最低工资来维持。（笑声）
But I used to go out on those delivery trucks, and it was pretty damned inefficient. You know, people would phone their orders in. And now it’s true we took them down with a pencil and an order pad instead of punching them into a computer.
我过去也会跟着送货车跑，那真是低效得要命。人们会打电话下订单，虽然我们当时是用纸和笔记下订单，而不是输入电脑。
But when we started driving around the trucks and hauling the stuff off and everything, you know, we ran into the same costs that Webvan is running into now.
但当我们开着送货车四处送货时，我们遇到了和现在Webvan公司一样的成本问题。
What the internet offered was a chance for people to monetize the hopes of others, in effect. I mean, you are able to capture the greed and dreams of millions of people and turn that into instant cash, in effect, through venture capital and the markets.
实际上，互联网提供的是将他人的希望变现的机会。通过风险投资和资本市场，人们能够利用数百万人的贪婪和梦想，将其迅速转化成现金。
And there was a lot of money transferred in the process, from the gullible to the promoters. But there’s been very little money created by pure internet businesses so far. It’s been a huge trap for the public.
在这个过程中，大量资金从轻信的人流向了那些推销者。但到目前为止，纯互联网业务真正创造出的财富很少。对公众来说，这就是个巨大的陷阱。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.
查理·芒格： 没什么补充的。
16. “We don’t have a master plan”
“我们没有一个总体规划”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第六区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for taking my question. My name is Frank Gurvich (PH). I’m from London, Ontario. It’s great to see all the young people asking questions. I even have my own 11-year-old here, Matthew, this year.
观众提问： 谢谢您回答我的问题。我叫弗兰克·古尔维奇（音译），来自加拿大安大略省伦敦市。看到这么多年轻人提问真是太好了。今年，我也带着我11岁的儿子马修一起来了。
I first want to start by passing on a message from my wife to you, Mr. Buffett. And that is, “Thank you, Mr. Buffett, for your autograph that Frank brought back last year. However, quite frankly, the ring in the Borsheims box you autographed was far more precious.”
观众提问： 首先，我要传达我妻子给您的话，巴菲特先生。她说：“谢谢您，巴菲特先生，弗兰克去年带回了您的签名。不过，说实话，您签名的那只Borsheims盒子里的戒指要珍贵得多。”
WARREN BUFFETT: You can repeat that if you’d like. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果你愿意，可以再重复一遍。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question relates to the future of Berkshire. Back in 1994, there was a PBS video interview of you at the Flagler Business School. And I believe you said Berkshire was not an insurance company.
观众提问： 我的问题和伯克希尔的未来有关。1994年，在Flagler商学院的一次PBS视频采访中，我记得您曾说，伯克希尔并不是一家保险公司。
It appears that’s not quite the case as much anymore, and I suppose insurance acquisitions will provide the financial fuel and the stability the Johns Mansvilles and MidAmerica types of acquisitions will need for their future growth.
现在情况似乎有些不同了。我想，保险业务的收购将为Johns Mansville和MidAmerica这类公司的未来增长提供财务支持和稳定性。
But I’m hoping that you and Charlie can describe for us an anticipated future look at, say, 20 years out, of how Berkshire might be different and — from how it is today — and perhaps a couple of the not so obvious problems that Berkshire will need to contend with.
但我希望您和查理能为我们描绘一下未来20年伯克希尔可能会变成什么样子，以及它与今天相比会有什么不同，也许还可以谈谈伯克希尔需要应对的一些不太明显的问题。
And thank you for all the apparently wonderful acquisitions you’ve made on our behalf in the last year.
感谢您过去一年为我们所做的那些显然很棒的收购。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you. I think you ought to take your wife another ring, too. (Laughter) But thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。我觉得你应该再给你妻子买一枚戒指。（笑声）但还是谢谢你。
We actually, as long ago as — I don’t remember whether it was in the 1980 annual report, but at least 20 years ago, we did say that we thought insurance would be our most significant business over time.
事实上，很久以前——我记不清是不是在1980年的年报里了，但至少20年前，我们就说过，保险业务会成为我们最重要的业务。
We had no idea that it would get to be as significant as it is. But we’ve always felt that that was — we would be in many businesses — but that insurance was likely to be our largest business.
我们当时没想到保险业务会变得如此重要。但我们一直认为，尽管我们会涉足许多行业，但保险很可能会成为我们最大的业务。
Right now, it’s not our largest business in terms of employment. It’s our largest business in terms of revenue. And we would hope it gets a lot bigger over time.
目前，从就业人数来看，保险不是我们最大的业务。但从收入来看，它是最大的业务。我们希望它未来会变得更大。
We don’t have a master plan. We don’t — Charlie and I do not sit around and strategize or talk about the future of various industries or do anything of that sort. It just doesn’t happen.
我们没有一个总体规划。查理和我不会坐在一起制定战略，或者讨论各个行业的未来，或者做类似的事情。我们根本不会这样做。
We try to look at what comes in — we try to survey the whole financial field. We try to look at what comes in and look for things we understand, where we think they have a durable, competitive advantage, where we like the management, and where the price is sensible.
我们只是尽力去看所面临的机会——我们审视整个金融领域，寻找那些我们理解的、具有持久竞争优势的、管理层值得信赖的、价格合理的公司。
But I would tell you in a general way that 20 or so years from now, we will own a lot more businesses.
不过，笼统地说，20年后，我们将拥有更多的业务。
I think it’s certain that insurance will be a bigger business for us in 20 years than it is now. Probably much bigger. And I think it’s also likely it will be our biggest business still.
我可以肯定，20年后，保险业务将比现在更大，可能大很多。而且，它很可能仍然是我们最大的业务。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s almost a sure thing that 20 years from now there’ll be way more strength and value behind each Berkshire share. I also think it is an absolutely sure thing that the annual percentage rate of progress will go way down from what it has been in the past.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为可以肯定的是，20年后，每股伯克希尔股票背后的实力和价值都会大大提升。但同样可以肯定的是，我们的年增长率将远低于过去的水平。
WARREN BUFFETT: No question about it.
沃伦·巴菲特： 毫无疑问。
17. Buffett’s cholesterol level
巴菲特的胆固醇水平
WARREN BUFFETT: On that happy note, we move to zone 7. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 在这个愉快的话题之后，我们进入第七区。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Gary Radstrom (PH) from right here in River City [Omaha]. I’ve been a shareholder since ’93, and have loved every minute of it.
观众提问： 早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫加里·拉德斯特罗姆（音译），就来自这里的“河城”[奥马哈]。我从1993年开始成为股东，至今每一刻都很享受。
Recently, there’s been medication available to reduce cholesterol. My doctor even gave it to me since mine is kind of high.
最近，有药物可以用来降低胆固醇。我的胆固醇有点高，我的医生也给我开了这种药。
Every time I hear what you like to eat, Warren, it makes me wonder what your cholesterol level is — (Laughter) — or if you even worry about it. I think everyone here wants you to be with us for a long time, so have you considered taking this new medication to reduce your cholesterol level? (Laughter)
每次听说您喜欢吃的食物时，巴菲特先生，我都会想您的胆固醇水平是多少——（笑声）——或者您是否在意这个问题。我想在座的每个人都希望您能长寿陪伴我们，所以您考虑过服用这种降低胆固醇的新药吗？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I do know the number, and I don’t remember it. My doctor tells me, “It’s a little high,” but if he says it’s a little high, it means it isn’t that high, or he would — because he always tries to push me into making a few changes in my life.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我确实知道那个数值，但我记不住了。我的医生告诉我，“有点高”，但如果他说“有点高”，那就意味着它并不是特别高，否则他早就——因为他总是试图让我在生活中做一些改变。
But he — I’ve got a wonderful doctor. And I was lucky last year, because I hadn’t been in to see him for about five years. And — (laughter) — due to — those guys cost a lot of money, I mean. (Laughter)
不过，他是个很棒的医生。我去年很幸运，因为我差不多五年都没去看过他了。而且——（笑声）——原因嘛，那些医生收费可不便宜啊。（笑声）
And due to purely an accident, a reaction to some other medicine I was given when I was out of the city, he got a hold of me, and then he shamed me into having a physical.
纯属偶然，由于我在外地服用其他药物产生了反应，他联系了我，然后劝说我去做了一次体检。
And it was extremely lucky, because I had a polyp in the colon that would have probably caused trouble, you know, within a couple of years.
这实在是非常幸运，因为他们在我的结肠里发现了一个息肉，如果没有及时发现，可能在几年内就会引发问题。
I would say that if you ask my doctor, he would want me to make a few changes, but he would also say that my life expectancy is probably a lot better than the average person of 70.
如果你问我的医生，他会希望我做一些改变，但他也会说，我的预期寿命可能比一般70岁的人要好得多。
You know, I have no stress whatsoever. Zero. You know, I mean, I get to do what I love to do every day. You know, and I’m surrounded by people that are terrific.
你知道，我完全没有压力。零压力。我每天都在做自己热爱的事情，而且身边的人都非常棒。
And so, you know, if you were an underwriter for a life company, you would rate me considerably better than the average. You’d rate Charlie better than average, too.
所以，如果你是人寿保险公司的核保员，你会给我远高于平均水平的评级。你也会给查理的评级高于平均水平。
And I’m sure that, you know, I could change it slightly, perhaps, on the probabilities, you know, if I change my diet dramatically or something. But it’s very unlikely to happen.
我也知道，如果我在饮食上做出很大的改变，可能会略微改善一些概率。但这件事基本不会发生。
Actually, when my mother got to be 80 — you know, the most important thing in life, in terms of how long you live, is how long your parents live. So I got her an exercise bike when she got to be 80. (Laughter)
事实上，当我母亲80岁时——你知道，决定人能活多久的最重要因素是父母的寿命。所以她80岁时，我给她买了一台健身脚踏车。（笑声）
She put 40,000 miles on it. And I told her to watch her diet and do all these things. And I mean, she lived to be 92, so you know, she did her share, and I helped her do it by giving her the exercise bicycle.
她在那台脚踏车上骑了4万英里。我告诉她要注意饮食，做这些事情。最终，她活到了92岁。所以，她做了她该做的，我也通过送她那台健身脚踏车帮了她。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I have a book recommendation which will be very helpful to all shareholders that worry about Warren’s health and longevity.
查理·芒格： 好的，我推荐一本书，这会让所有担心巴菲特健康和长寿的股东们安心。
And that’s this book called “Genome” by Matt Ridley, who was, for years, the science editor of The Economist magazine. And if Ridley is right, Warren has a very long life expectancy.
这本书叫《基因组》（Genome），作者是马特·里德利，他曾担任《经济学人》杂志的科学编辑多年。如果里德利是对的，巴菲特的预期寿命会很长。
There are very interesting correlations between people who cause stress to others instead of suffering it themselves. (Laughter and applause)
书中有个非常有趣的结论：那些给别人制造压力而自己不受压力的人寿命更长。（笑声和掌声）
And Warren has been in that position ever since I’ve known him. (Laughter)
而我认识巴菲特以来，他一直都是这种人。（笑声）
And the figures that Ridley quotes are awesomely interesting. It is a fabulous book.
书中的数据非常有趣。这是一本了不起的书。
Of course, I’m recommending a bestseller, but they’re selling it in the airport. It’s called “Genome,” and you’ll feel very good about Warren’s future if you agree with the science of the book.
当然，我推荐的是一本畅销书，机场里都有卖。这本书叫《基因组》，如果你相信书中的科学结论，你会对巴菲特的未来感到放心。
18. Unrealistic investment expectations for pension funds
对养老基金的不切实际的投资预期
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第8区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Charlie Sink (PH). I’m from North Carolina.
听众：我的名字是查理·辛克（音译），来自北卡罗来纳州。
Mr. Buffett, your article last year in Fortune Magazine was excellent.
巴菲特先生，您去年在《财富》杂志上的文章非常精彩。
I’m thinking — well, I’m wondering what your thoughts are on American business profit margins and return on equity in the future. I also would like your thoughts about the — some businesses today with their huge inventory write-offs, what your thoughts about those are.
我在想，您如何看待未来美国企业的利润率和股本回报率？我还想听听您对今天一些企业进行大规模库存冲销的看法。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, in that article I talked about the unlikelihood of corporate profits in the United States getting much larger than 6 percent of GDP. And historically, the band has been between 4 and 6 percent. And we’ve been up at 6 percent recently.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，在那篇文章中，我谈到美国企业利润占GDP比例不太可能大幅超过6%。从历史上看，这个区间一直在4%到6%之间。而最近，我们已经接近6%。
So, unless you think that profits, as a part of the whole country’s economic output, are going to become a bigger slice of the pie — and bear in mind, they can only become a bigger slice of the pie if other slices get diminished to some extent, and you’re talking about personal income and items like that.
因此，除非你认为企业利润作为全国经济产出的一部分会占据更大的份额——但要知道，它们只有在其他部分被压缩的情况下才能增加份额，比如个人收入等方面。
So, I think it’s perfectly rational and reasonable that in a capitalistic society the corporate profits are something like 6 percent of GDP.
所以，我认为在资本主义社会中，企业利润占GDP的6%左右是完全合乎逻辑且合理的。
That does not strike me as outlandish in either direction. It attracts massive amounts of capital, because returns on equity will be very good if you earn that sort of money.
这在我看来，无论哪个方向都不算极端。这会吸引大量资本，因为如果能赚取这样的利润，股本回报率将会非常可观。
And on the other hand, I think it would be very difficult in the society to get where they’d be 10 percent or 12 percent, or something of the sort because it just — it would look like an unfair division of the pie to the populace.
另一方面，我认为企业利润要达到GDP的10%或12%之类的水平在这个社会中是非常困难的，因为这样看起来就像是在对国民经济“分配不公”。
So, I don’t see any reason for corporate profits — they’re going to be down in the near future as a percentage of GDP from recently, but then they’ll go back up at some point. So I think 10 years from now, you’ll be looking at a very similar picture.
所以，我不认为企业利润有任何理由会大幅改变——它们在不久的将来会从最近的水平略微下降，但之后会在某个时候回升。因此，我认为10年后，你会看到一个非常类似的情况。
Now, if that’s your assumption and you’re already capitalizing those profits at a pretty good multiple, then you have to say that you have to come to the conclusion that the value of American business will grow at a relationship that’s not much greater than the growth in GDP.
现在，如果这是你的假设，并且你已经用相当高的倍数对这些利润进行了估值，那么你必须得出这样的结论：美国企业的价值增长速度不会比GDP的增长速度快多少。
And most of you would estimate that probably to be, you know, maybe 5 percent a year, if you expect a couple percent a year of inflation.
你们大多数人可能会估算出，每年的回报大约为5%左右，如果预期通胀率每年为几个百分点的话。
So, I wouldn’t change my thoughts about the profitability of American business over time. And I wouldn’t change my thoughts much about the relationship of stock prices over time to those profits. So, I — you know, I would come down very similarly.
所以，我不会改变对美国企业长期盈利能力的看法。我对股票价格与这些利润之间长期关系的看法也不会有太大变化。所以，我得出的结论会非常接近。
Now, interestingly enough, some of those same relationships prevailed decades ago, but you were buying stocks that were yielding you perhaps 5 percent or something like that, so that you were getting 5 percent in your pocket, plus that growth as you went along.
有趣的是，这些关系几十年前就存在了，但当时你购买的股票收益率可能在5%左右，也就是说，你每年能得到5%的现金收益，再加上股票价格的增长。
And of course, now if you buy stocks you get 1 1/2 percent, if you’re the American public, before the frictional cost. So that the same rate of growth produces a way smaller aggregate return. And some —
当然，现在如果你是美国公众，购买股票的收益率只有1.5%左右，还没考虑交易成本。所以，在相同的增长率下，总回报要小得多。而且——
You know, I think stocks are a perfectly decent way to make 6 or 7 percent a year over the next 15 or 20 years. But I think anybody that expects to make 15 percent per year, or expects their broker or investment advisor to make that kind of money, is living in a dream world.
我认为，在未来15到20年里，股票依然是实现每年6%到7%回报的一个非常合理的投资方式。但我觉得，任何期望每年赚取15%回报的人，或者期待他们的经纪人或投资顾问能够实现这种回报的人，都是在做白日梦。
And it’s particularly interesting to me that back when the prospects for stocks were far better — I even wrote something about this in the late ’70s — pension funds were using investment rate assumptions that were often in the 6 percent or thereabout range.
特别有趣的是，当股票前景远比现在更好时——我在70年代末曾写过相关内容——养老基金的投资回报假设通常在6%左右。
And now when the prospects are way poorer, most pension funds are using — building into their calculations — returns of 9 percent or better on investments. I don’t know how they’re going to get 9 percent or better on investments.
而现在，当前景明显更差时，大多数养老基金却在计算中使用9%或更高的投资回报率。我不知道他们如何能实现9%或更高的回报。
But I also know that they change the investment assumption down, it will change the charge to earnings substantially. And they don’t want to do that.
但我也知道，如果他们下调投资回报假设，这将显著影响企业利润的账面表现。而他们不愿意这样做。
So, they continue to use investment assumptions which I think are quite unrealistic. And with companies with a big pension component in their financial situation, and therefore in their income statement, that can be quite significant.
因此，他们继续使用我认为非常不现实的投资回报假设。对于那些养老金支出占财务状况很大比例的公司来说，这对其利润表的影响是非常显著的。
It will be interesting to me to see whether in the next couple years where pension funds are experiencing significant shortfalls from their assumptions, how quickly they change the assumptions.
我很好奇在未来几年，当养老基金的实际回报与假设之间出现显著差距时，他们会多快调整这些假设。
And the consulting firms are not pushing them to do that at all. It’s very interesting. The consulting firms are telling them what they want to hear, which is hardly news to any of us. But it’s what’s taking place.
而咨询公司根本没有推动他们这么做。这很有趣。咨询公司告诉他们想听的话，这对我们来说早已不足为奇，但现实就是如此。
The second question about inventory write-offs. You know, that gets into the category entirely of big-bath charges, which are the tendencies of management, when some bad news is coming along, to try and put all the bad news that’s happened into a single quarter or a single year —and even to put the bad news that they are worried about happening in the future into that year.
关于库存冲销的第二个问题。这完全属于“大浴缸费用”的范畴，也就是管理层的一个倾向：当坏消息出现时，他们试图将所有发生的坏消息都集中到一个季度或一年内，甚至将他们担心未来会发生的坏消息也计入那一年。
And it’s — it leads to real deception in accounting. The SEC has tried to get quite tough on that, but my experience has been that managements that want to do it usually can find some ways to do it.
这会导致会计上的真正误导。美国证券交易委员会（SEC）已经在这方面采取了严格措施，但根据我的经验，想这样做的管理层通常总能找到一些办法。
And managements, frequently, are more conscious of what numbers they want to report than they are of what has actually transpired in a given quarter or a given year.
管理层往往更关注他们想要报告的数字，而不是在某个季度或某一年实际发生了什么。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, pension fund accounting is drifting into scandal by making these unreasonable investment assumptions. It’s — evidently, it’s part of the human condition that people extrapolate the recent past.
查理·芒格：是的，养老金会计正在因这些不合理的投资假设而逐渐陷入丑闻。这显然是人性的一个特点，人们总是习惯性地外推最近的过去。
And so, since returns from common stocks have been high for quite a long period, they extrapolate that they will continue to be very high into the future. And that creates a lot of reported earnings, in terms of pension benefits, that aren’t available in cash and are likely not to be available at all.
因此，由于普通股的回报在过去很长一段时间里都很高，人们就推测未来还会继续保持很高的回报。这就导致了大量养老金收益的账面利润，但这些利润并不以现金形式存在，而且很可能根本无法实现。
And this is not a good idea, and it’s interesting how few corporate managements have just responded like Sam Goldwyn: “Include me out.”
这绝不是一个好主意。有趣的是，只有少数公司管理层像山姆·戈德温那样回应：“别把我算进去。”
You’d think more people would just say, “This is a scummy way to keep the books, and I will not participate.” Instead, everybody just drifts along with the tide, assisted by all these wonderful consultants.
你会觉得，应该有更多人站出来说：“这种账务处理方法太不体面了，我不会参与。” 但相反，大家都随波逐流，还有那些出色的咨询公司在推波助澜。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think — I don’t know of any case in the United States right now, and I’m sure there are some, but except for the pension funds that we take over, I don’t know of any case where people are reducing their assumed investment return.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我不认为——我不知道目前在美国有任何案例，尽管肯定存在一些例外，但除了我们接管的那些养老金之外，我不认识有谁下调了他们的投资回报假设。
Now you’d think if interest rates drifted down several percentage points that that might affect what you would think would be earned with money. It certainly is to bond holders or to us with float or something of the sort.
你会觉得，如果利率下降了几个百分点，这应该会影响你对资金收益的预期。对债券持有人来说是这样，对我们这种靠浮存金赚钱的情况也是这样。
But most major corporations, I believe, are using an investment return assumption of 9 percent or higher. And that’s with long-term governments below 6 percent, you know, and maybe high-grade corporates at 7.
但我相信，大多数主要公司使用的投资回报假设仍然是9%或更高，而长期政府债券的利率低于6%，高评级公司债券大概在7%左右。
They don’t know how to get it in the bond market. They don’t know how to get it in the mortgage market. I don’t think they know how to get it in the stock market. But it would cause their earnings to go down if they change their investment assumption.
他们无法从债券市场中获得这种回报，也无法从抵押贷款市场中获得。我也不认为他们能从股市中实现。但如果他们下调投资回报假设，公司的利润就会下降。
And, like I say, I don’t know of a major company that’s thinking about it. And I don’t know of a major actuarial consultant that’s suggesting it to the managements. It just — they’d rather not think about it.
正如我所说，我不知道有哪家大公司在考虑这一点，也不知道有哪个主要的精算咨询公司向管理层建议过这样做。他们宁愿对此视而不见。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The way they’re doing things would be like living right on an earthquake fault that was building up stress every year and projecting that the longer it’s been without an earthquake the less likely an earthquake is to occur.
查理·芒格：他们的做法就像住在一个逐年积累压力的地震断层上，并推测说越是长时间没有发生地震，未来发生地震的可能性就越小。
That is a dumb way to write earthquake insurance. (Laughter)
这种写地震保险的方法太愚蠢了。（笑声）
And the current practice is a dumb way to do pension fund planning and accounting.
目前的养老金规划和会计做法同样非常愚蠢。
WARREN BUFFETT: If you talk —
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你和——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Dumb and improper.
查理·芒格：又愚蠢又不合规。
WARREN BUFFETT: If you talk to a management or board of directors about that, you get absolutely no place.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你和管理层或董事会谈这个问题，你根本得不到任何回应。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, they — their eyes would glaze over before the hostility came. (Laughter)**
查理·芒格：不会的，他们的眼神会先变得呆滞，然后才开始变得充满敌意。（笑声）
19. Executive Jet won’t be a “mature” business “for decades”
Executive Jet“几十年来”都不会是一个“成熟”的业务
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：第1区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia. I had a question on two of our key operating businesses.
听众：早上好，先生们。我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺夫。我想问两个关于我们核心运营业务的问题。
Firstly, Executive Jet. Once this becomes a mature business, would it be fair to say that its net margin should be about 5 percent?
首先，关于Executive Jet。一旦这个业务成熟，它的净利润率大约会达到5%吗？
And secondly, would it be fair to say that our current insurance businesses are likely to grow aggregate float at about 10 percent over time?
其次，我们目前的保险业务是否可能随着时间的推移实现浮存金总量约10%的增长？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s really anybody’s guess. I mean, I don’t expect Executive Jet to become a mature business for decades. I mean, it — there’s a whole world out there on that one.
沃伦·巴菲特：这真的很难预测。我不认为Executive Jet会在几十年内成为一个成熟的业务。它有着广阔的发展空间。
And we have something over 2,000 customers in the United States at the current time. We have a little over a hundred, but in Europe.
目前，我们在美国有超过2000名客户，而在欧洲只有一百多名客户。
But there are tens and tens and tens of thousands, and perhaps hundreds of thousands, of people or businesses where it does make sense over time. So it’s going to be long time.
但随着时间的推移，有成千上万，甚至数十万的个人或企业可能会发现这项服务很有意义。所以这将是一个很漫长的过程。
I mean, there are only 700, roughly, jets a year being produced. And of course, up until a few years ago that was limited to people who wanted to buy single planes.
目前每年只生产大约700架飞机。而且，直到几年前，这个市场还仅限于那些想要购买整架飞机的人。
But you won’t change that output much in the next five years. But — so, you couldn’t really take on —
但在未来五年里，这个产量不会有太大变化。所以，你实际上无法承接——
We can take on about 600 customers a year, just in terms of the delivery schedule that we have built into our business. And we couldn’t change that — we couldn’t double that — because the planes simply aren’t available in the next year or two, although we have orders further out.
根据我们业务的交付计划，我们每年大约能新增600名客户。而且我们无法改变这一点——无法把这一数字翻倍——因为在未来一两年内，飞机的供应量根本无法满足，尽管我们有更长远的订单计划。
But I would say it will be a long time until Executive Jet is a mature business, and I would say that — a long, long time.
但我认为，Executive Jet距离成为一个成熟的业务还有很长的时间，真的是很长的时间。
I mean, we’re going to, when we get Europe — as we make progress in Europe, we’ll move to Asia. We’ll move to Latin America over time. And so we’re going to be, I think, growing that business significantly for a very long time.
我们会逐步开发欧洲市场，之后会扩展到亚洲，再到拉丁美洲。因此，我认为这个业务将会在很长一段时间内实现显著增长。
When it becomes mature, or close to it, you know, if you’re talking 5 percent after-tax margins, I’d say that that’s probably a reasonable figure. But we’re so far away from even thinking about that, that, you know, it’s pure speculation.
当它最终成熟，或者接近成熟时，如果你提到5%的税后利润率，我认为这个数字大概是合理的。但我们现在距离那一刻还太远了，甚至没有去考虑这个问题，所以，这完全是猜测。
20. “There’s an unlimited market for dumb insurance policies”
“愚蠢的保险单有一个无限的市场”
WARREN BUFFETT: In our insurance business, we’ve grown our float and then we’ve purchased businesses to add to the float.
沃伦·巴菲特：在我们的保险业务中，我们通过内生增长扩大了浮存金，同时收购了一些企业来进一步增加浮存金。
This year, I would certainly expect, unless one — a big transaction would fall through or something — I would certainly expect our float to grow at least 2 1/2 billion. And that is close to 10 percent of the beginning of the year float.
今年，除非某个大交易意外告吹，否则我预计我们的浮存金至少会增加25亿。这大约是年初浮存金的10%。
That’s a rational expectation. But whether it can grow 10 percent a year, you know, how far you can do that — I would say the total float of the property-casualty industry in the United States is — I’m pulling this out from making some other calculations in my head as I talk — but it wouldn’t be much more than 300 billion.
这是一个合理的预期。但是否能每年增长10%，以及这种增长能持续多久——我想，美国财产保险行业的总浮存金大约是3000亿左右，这是我在脑中进行一些计算得出的数字。
So, we are close to 10 percent of the entire U.S. float now, and I don’t think the U.S. float — the aggregate float — you know, is going to grow at a 10 percent rate.
因此，我们现在已经接近整个美国浮存金总量的10%。我不认为美国的浮存金总量还能以10%的速度增长。
So when you’re as big a part of the pie as we are, it may be difficult to sustain a 10 percent rate. But we’re doing everything possible that makes sense to grow float. I mean, that is a major, major objective. But the even bigger objective is to keep it low-cost.
当你已经占据市场如此大的份额时，要保持10%的增长率会变得很困难。但我们会尽一切合理的努力去增长浮存金。这是一个非常重要的目标。但更重要的目标是保持浮存金的低成本。
I don’t think you can see — unless the world changes in some way — I don’t think you can see 10 percent growth over 25 years. But we’ll do our darnedest to get it, you know, at the rate you suggest for at least the near future.
除非世界发生某种变化，否则我认为无法在25年内持续实现10%的增长。但我们会尽全力，至少在不久的将来，争取达到你提到的增长率。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree that long term, it’s not going to happen. Good, but not that good. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格：嗯，我完全同意，长期来看，这不可能实现。虽然表现很好，但不会好到那个程度。（巴菲特笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: But we’ve been surprised at what’s happened. I mean, there’s no — I mean, when we bought Jack Ringwalt’s company in 1967, you know, my memory is Jack had a float of, you know, less than 15 million.
沃伦·巴菲特：但我们过去的表现也给了我们一些惊喜。1967年我们收购杰克·林瓦尔特的公司时，我记得杰克的浮存金还不到1500万。
And would we have ever guessed that we might hit something close to 30 billion this year? We never dreamt of it. But we just kept doing things, and we’ll keep doing things.
我们能想到今天浮存金可能接近300亿吗？我们从未梦想过。但我们一直在做正确的事情，并将继续这么做。
But it can’t be at huge rates for a long period of time, because we’re too big a part of the pie now. We were nothing initially, and we kept grabbing a little more of the pie as we’ve gone along. And we like that, but it can’t go on forever.
但这种高增长率无法长期持续，因为我们现在已经占据市场太大的份额了。起初我们什么都不是，但随着时间的推移，我们逐渐获得了更多的市场份额。我们很喜欢这种情况，但这不可能永远持续下去。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. That’s what I call really low-cost float. If it ever should be advantageous for us to go into what I would call higher-cost float, that might change the figures upward, in terms of growth of float.**
查理·芒格：是的，这就是我所说的真正低成本的浮存金。如果未来有利可图，我们不得不接受所谓的“高成本浮存金”，浮存金的增长率可能会有所提升。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Although, that won’t be — I mean, it could happen that we could take on incrementally some higher-cost float under very special circumstances if we saw unusually good ways to use it, but that — we don’t even like to think about that.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。虽然在特殊情况下，如果我们发现非常好的机会，我们可能会逐步接受一些高成本浮存金，但——我们甚至不愿意去考虑这种情况。
We certainly don’t want the people running our businesses to think about that. Because keeping it low-cost, you know, that is the big end of the game.
我们当然不希望我们业务的管理者去考虑这个问题。因为保持浮存金的低成本是我们的核心目标。
Anybody can generate float. I mean, if we gave our managers a goal of generating 5 billion of float next year, they could do it in a minute, you know, and we would be paying the price for decades to come.
任何人都可以增加浮存金。如果我们让管理者明年增加50亿的浮存金，他们可以立刻做到，但我们可能需要为此付出几十年的代价。
You can write dumb insurance policies, you know. There’s an unlimited market for dumb insurance policies. And they’re very pleasant, because the first day the premium comes in and that’s the last time you see any new money. From then on, it’s all going out. And that’s not our aim in life.
你可以签订愚蠢的保险单。愚蠢的保险单有着无限的市场。最初保费进来时感觉非常好，但那是你最后一次看到新钱进账。从那时起，钱只会不断流出。而这并不是我们生活的目标。
21. GEICO focusing on U.S. instead of global expansion
GEICO专注于美国，而不是全球扩张
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
沃伦·巴菲特：第2区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Kjell Hagan (PH). I’m a Norwegian working in Tokyo in Japan.
听众：我的名字是谢尔·哈根（音译），我是一名在日本东京工作的挪威人。
I’m very satisfied to have more than 95 percent of our family’s savings in Berkshire. I have two questions.
我很满意将我们家族超过95%的储蓄投资在伯克希尔。我有两个问题。
In my work, I’ve seen a lot of insurance companies in Europe and Japan. And I think that GEICO’s business model is quite superior to most primary insurance companies in Europe and Japan.
在我的工作中，我接触过许多欧洲和日本的保险公司。我认为GEICO的商业模式远优于欧洲和日本的大多数初级保险公司。
And I think that GEICO would be very successful in Europe and Asia. So I’d like to hear what are the views and plans for GEICO doing business in Europe and Asia.
我认为GEICO在欧洲和亚洲会非常成功。所以我想听听你们对GEICO在欧洲和亚洲拓展业务的看法和计划。
Second, regarding Coca-Cola — living in Japan, I notice that Coke has a relatively low presence in advertising, although they are the largest player with 30 percent market share versus 15 for the number two. I think Coke is being too cheap on advertising, thus hurting the long-term position.
第二个问题，关于可口可乐——我在日本生活时注意到，尽管可口可乐拥有30%的市场份额，远高于第二名的15%，但他们的广告投入相对较少。我认为可口可乐在广告方面过于节俭，这可能会损害其长期市场地位。
I wonder if advertising strategy internationally is a high enough priority of Coke’s management, and if aggressiveness is sufficient. I’d like to hear if you have any comments on this.
我想知道，可口可乐管理层是否足够重视国际广告战略，以及他们的广告投入是否足够积极。对此，您有什么看法吗？
Also I’d just like to thank you very much for this experience and for the wonderful company you have created.
最后，我非常感谢您为我们带来这次机会，也感谢您创建了这样一家伟大的公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you very much.
沃伦·巴菲特：非常感谢你。
Clearly when you’ve got a business model that works as well as GEICO has in this country and it continues to work well, and has that fundamental advantage of being a low-cost operator, we think about every possible way that we can take that idea and extend it.
显然，当GEICO在美国市场上拥有如此出色的商业模式，并且继续表现优异，依托其低成本运营的根本优势时，我们确实会考虑各种可能的方法将这个理念延伸到其他市场。
It’s been remarkably hard to do it. I mean, the management has tried various things, ever since Leo Goodwin started the company in 1936, to take it into other areas, and those efforts have been modestly successful at certain things like life insurance, but then they got out of it, and various other things.
但这非常难做到。自从1936年利奥·古德温创立公司以来，管理层尝试过将业务扩展到其他领域，比如寿险业务，这些尝试取得了一些小成功，但后来也退出了其他业务领域。
But it’s an idea still. We have — you know, we have 4 percent or so of the market in the United States. This market is so huge.
不过，这仍然是一个可以考虑的想法。目前我们在美国的市场份额大约是4%。这个市场非常庞大。
And as we look at the drain on human resources involved in extending it into other countries, and we’ve looked at it a lot, and it may be something we’ll do at some time.
我们认真研究过向其他国家扩展所需要的人力资源消耗，未来某个时间点也许会去做。
But we’ve never felt that the possible gain, considering the rigidities of these other — both in Europe and in Asia — of breaking in — it’s not easy to get into those markets.
但我们从未觉得，考虑到欧洲和亚洲市场进入壁垒之高，所能获得的潜在回报足够让我们分散资源。
Chubb的自信缺少证据。
And the cost, the time, we just felt that it would be better to concentrate those same resources in this country.
从成本和时间角度来看，我们觉得把资源集中在美国市场会更好。
It’s not a question of capital at all. I mean, we’d put the money in in a second. And we’re doing it in something like NetJets in Europe. I mean, we — there’s a human cost to it, there’s a financial cost to it.
这根本不是资本的问题。如果需要，我们会立刻投入资金。比如在欧洲的NetJets项目，我们已经在做类似的事情。但这种扩展需要投入人力资源和时间成本。
Financial cost bothers us not at all. Human cost is a real question, because it gets back to Charlie’s opportunity cost.
资金成本对我们来说根本不是问题。真正的问题是人力成本，因为这涉及到查理所说的机会成本。
We have talented managers, but we have a finite number of them. And I would rather have Tony Nicely and Bill Roberts and their crew focusing on how to gain additional market share in this country at the right rates than I would starting in a project in Europe or Asia now.
我们拥有优秀的管理团队，但人数有限。我更希望托尼·尼克利和比尔·罗伯茨及其团队专注于在美国市场以合适的价格扩大市场份额，而不是现在在欧洲或亚洲启动新项目。
But that’s — it’s a very good question. It’s something I can guarantee you we think about all the time and will continue to think about.
不过，这是个非常好的问题。我可以保证，我们一直在思考这个问题，并将继续关注它。
We’ve tried to extend geography. Coke has been the most successful company in the world in extending geography.
我们曾努力拓展地域市场，而可口可乐是全球在这一领域最成功的公司。
We’ve tried to do it with See’s Candy, and it’s had limited — very limited — success. I mean, we’ve tried 50 different ways, because the trials are relatively cheap to do.
我们也尝试过将这一模式应用于See's Candy，但收效甚微，非常有限。我们尝试了大约50种不同的方法，因为这些尝试的成本相对较低。
And we think it should work, we just haven’t been able to make it work. But that — it’s a very good question.
我们认为这种方法应该能奏效，但我们就是没能让它成功。不过，这是一个非常好的问题。
22. Coca-Cola advertising in Japan
可口可乐在日本的广告
WARREN BUFFETT: The question about Coke’s advertising in Japan. As you know, Coke has a terrific presence in Japan.
沃伦·巴菲特：关于可口可乐在日本的广告问题。正如你所知，可口可乐在日本市场占据着非常强大的地位。
Japan’s an interesting market, because the percentage of soft drinks sold through vending machines is just far, far higher than any place in the world. And the United States is a very distant second. And then, the rest of the world, there’s very little done in the way of vending machines.
日本是一个有趣的市场，因为通过自动售货机销售软饮料的比例远高于世界上任何其他地方。美国排名第二，但与日本的差距很大。而世界其他地方，自动售货机的使用非常有限。
I don’t know the specifics of the advertising in Japan, but of course, Doug Daft who now is the CEO of Coke, comes with a huge background in Asia. I mean, that was his territory for much of his career.
我不了解可口可乐在日本具体的广告情况，但可口可乐现任CEO道格·达夫特在亚洲市场有着丰富的经验。他职业生涯的大部分时间都在负责亚洲市场。
And Doug — we have a new major — very major — advertising campaign coming up. And you probably read that Coke is going to spend 300 million-plus additional on marketing beyond the normal spend, which is huge.
此外，可口可乐即将推出一个非常重大的广告宣传活动。你可能已经看到新闻报道，可口可乐将额外投入超过3亿美元用于市场营销，这远超正常的支出规模，非常巨大。
And I can’t tell you the specific markets in which that will be, but I would be surprised if Japan isn’t a big part of it, because Japan is an enormous market for Coca-Cola.
我无法具体告诉你这些资金将投放在哪些市场，但如果日本不成为其中的重要部分，我会感到非常意外，因为日本是可口可乐的一个巨大市场。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.
查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。
23. Berkshire’s asbestos exposure
伯克希尔的石棉暴露
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3, please.
WARREN BUFFETT: 第三区，请。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Steve Rosenberg (PH). I’m from Ann Arbor, Michigan.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 你好，我叫史蒂夫·罗森伯格（音），来自密歇根州安娜堡。
First, I just want to thank both of you for being two phenomenal role models. I’ve really looked up to you both for a long time.
首先，我要感谢你们两位是如此杰出的榜样。我一直很崇拜你们两位很长时间了。
My first question is about reinsurance. I believe that you’re willing to write larger policies in reinsurance than anyone else, but that you still insist on the amount of your liability being capped.
我的第一个问题是关于再保险的。我相信你们愿意承保比任何人都要大的再保险单，但你们仍然坚持将责任金额限定。
I’m wondering, with your investments in companies with — that have exposure to asbestos, have you somehow capped that? Or is that unlimited, especially given joint and several liability?
我想知道，考虑到你们在涉及石棉的公司中的投资，你们是否以某种方式对这些风险进行了限制？还是没有限制，尤其是在共同和各自责任的情况下？
WARREN BUFFETT: The first question, on asbestos. We have not put any significant money, to our knowledge, in any company that has any asbestos exposure now.
WARREN BUFFETT: 第一个问题，关于石棉。根据我们的了解，我们并没有在任何有石棉暴露的公司中投入重大资金。
You know, we have a small amount of money in USG, where the subsidiary, United States Gypsum, has a major asbestos exposure. But that’s a very, very minor investment. The — and that would be the only one that I can think of.
我们确实在USG公司有少量资金投资，该公司的子公司美国石膏公司有较大的石棉暴露。但那只是一个非常微小的投资。——这是我能想到的唯一一个。
We’ve walked away from several deals that were quite attractive in every respect except asbestos. But that’s like saying to a 120-year-old, you know, “You’re in good health except for the fact that you’re dead.” (Laughter)
我们已经放弃了几个在各方面都非常吸引人的交易，唯一的问题是涉及石棉。但这就像对一个120岁的人说，“你身体很好，除了你已经死了。”（笑声）
So we don’t go near asbestos.
所以我们不会接触石棉。
Now, in terms of our retroactive insurance policies, we are taking over the liabilities of companies that have lots of asbestos exposure. And in that case, we assume that those exposure — that those contracts — will be paid in full.
现在，在我们回溯性的保险政策方面，我们接管了那些有大量石棉暴露的公司的责任。在这种情况下，我们假设这些暴露——这些合同——将会得到全额支付。
I mean, we make no assumption of any reduction in asbestos costs, but we do cap them.
我的意思是，我们不假设石棉成本会减少，但我们会对其进行限制。
There’s a couple things you can’t cap in insurance. You can’t cap workers’ compensation losses. I mean, they —you can as a reinsurer, but I mean, the primary insurer can’t do that.
在保险中有一些是无法限制的。你不能限制工伤赔偿损失。我的意思是，作为再保险人，你可以这样做，但主要的保险人不能这么做。
I believe in auto, for example, in the U.K., that it’s uncapped. And I think that nobody thought that was very serious until they had a recent accident that caused — I think it involved a car doing something that — an auto doing something to a train that was unbelievable.
我相信，例如，在英国，汽车保险是没有上限的。我认为，没有人认为这很严重，直到他们发生了一起最近的事故——我想是一起汽车与火车发生了难以置信的事件。
So they — there are a few areas where insurance is written on an uncapped basis. And in our case, we write some auto insurance in the U.K. and we write some workers’ compensation, primarily in California.
所以，确实有一些领域是以无限制的方式承保保险的。在我们的案例中，我们在英国承保了一些汽车保险，并且主要在加利福尼亚承保一些工伤赔偿保险。
But generally, in the reinsurance business, you are capping the liabilities you take on.
但一般来说，在再保险业务中，你会对承担的责任进行限制。
I mean, obviously, when we bought General Re, they had asbestos liabilities from reinsurance contracts they had written. But the reinsurance companies are pretty careful about writing unlimited policies.
我的意思是，显然，当我们收购General Re时，他们承担了来自其已签署的再保险合同的石棉责任。但再保险公司对于签署无限制保单非常谨慎。
We write huge limits. We’re the biggest — you know, if somebody wants to write a huge limit, or an unusual limit, they should call us. Because there’s no one else in the world that will act as big or as promptly as we will. But we don’t write things that are unlimited.
我们承保巨额限额。我们是最大的——你知道，如果有人想要承保巨额或不寻常的限额，他们应该联系我们。因为世界上没有其他人能像我们一样承保如此大额且迅速的保单。但我们不会签署无限制的保单。
Now, the interesting thing is that the biggest exposures, in our view, are the people that write a lot of primary business and don’t have the catastrophe cover they need.
现在，有趣的是，在我们看来，最大的风险来自那些承保大量主保险业务但没有所需灾难保险的人。
I mean, if you write 10 percent of all the business in homeowners on — or 15 percent — on Long Island or in Florida, I mean, you are writing a catastrophe cover that would blow your mind.
我的意思是，如果你承保了长岛或佛罗里达州所有房主业务的10%——或者15%——你就相当于承保了一个可能让你大吃一惊的灾难保险。
If you’re Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae and you’re guaranteeing mortgages, you know, for millions of people in areas like that, and they don’t have insurance — earthquake in California or property insurance in Florida — they’d be less likely to have earthquakes someplace — you are taking on enormous risks.
如果你是房利美或房地美，你为那些地区数百万人的抵押贷款提供担保，而他们没有保险——加利福尼亚的地震或佛罗里达的财产保险——他们可能没有地震等灾难发生的险种——你就承担了巨大的风险。
I mean, huge risks, far beyond what we would ever take on. They just — but you don’t get paid for them, unfortunately.
我的意思是，巨大的风险，远远超过我们会承担的风险。只是——但不幸的是，你并没有为这些风险得到报酬。
I mean, just take the New Madrid section of Missouri, down in the corner. That was the area of three of the greatest quakes, that are sort of related in time, in the — certainly in the recorded history, they were the three greatest quakes in the United States.
我的意思是，拿密苏里州的“新马德里”地区来说。那是三次最大地震发生的地区，它们在时间上是相互关联的——这些地震无疑是美国历史上三次最大的地震。
You know, how much homeowners’ business, how much commercial property business, does somebody have in that huge territory, which you know, supposedly caused church bells to ring in Boston when it happened back in whenever it was — 1807, or ’9, or something like that?
你知道，在那个巨大的地区里，有多少人承保房主业务，有多少商业财产业务呢？你知道，据说当时发生地震时，波士顿的教堂钟声都被震响了——大概是1807年，或者1809年，或者类似的时间？
So, there are all kinds of risks that can aggregate in huge ways that companies are not thinking about at all.
所以，存在着许多种风险可能会以巨大的方式聚集，而公司根本没有考虑到这些风险。
I mean, I don’t know whether Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae, for example, is demanding that all of the homes they insure in the, you know, 300-miles radius of New Madrid, have earthquake insurance.
我的意思是，我不知道例如房利美或房地美是否要求他们在“新马德里”半径300英里内承保的所有房屋，都必须购买地震保险。
But, you know, it — that sort of thing never comes to mind until the unthinkable happens. But in insurance, the unthinkable always happens.
但你知道，类似的事情从来不会想到，直到不可思议的事情发生。但在保险中，不可思议的事情总会发生。
24. Praise for State Farm
对State Farm的赞美
WARREN BUFFETT: State Farm, as a competitor, is a mutual company, and it has a huge amount of net worth.
沃伦·巴菲特：作为竞争对手，State Farm是一家互助保险公司，拥有大量净资产。
You referred to them as a higher-cost — a high-cost operator or higher cost — but they’re really a relatively low-cost operator. But they’re not anywhere near as low-cost as GEICO. But they’re a low-cost operator compared to many people in the insurance business.
你可能称他们为成本较高的运营商，但他们实际上是相对低成本的运营商。当然，他们的成本远不及GEICO低，但与保险行业中的许多人相比，他们的成本还是较低的。
And it’s certainly true that they do not have the demands for profitability, partly because they’ve done such a great job in the past and built up so much surplus.
他们确实不需要追求高盈利目标，部分原因是他们过去做得非常出色，积累了大量盈余。
I have nothing but basically good things to say about what State Farm has done over the years.
我对State Farm这些年来的表现基本只有好话可说。
They do not need — they can subsidize, to some extent, current auto policy holders with the profits that were derived from auto policy holders of the past. But that’s always true when a stock company competes with a mutual company. And, you know, we know that when we go in the business.
他们可以在一定程度上用过去车险客户产生的利润来补贴当前的车险客户。但当股份公司与互助公司竞争时，这种情况总是存在的。而且，我们在进入这个行业时就已经意识到了这一点。
And that’s true of — there are a lot of other mutual companies out there that operate without the demands of earning a high return on capital. But if I were State Farm, I’d, you know, I’d probably be doing what they’re doing. I don’t criticize them at all.
确实，还有很多其他的互助公司，它们不需要追求高资本回报。如果我是State Farm，我可能也会选择他们现在的做法。我完全不会批评他们。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t criticize State Farm, either. State Farm is one of the most interesting business stories in the United States.
查理·芒格：我也不批评State Farm。State Farm是美国最有趣的商业故事之一。
The idea that it could get as big as it is and has as good a distribution system as it does, it’s a thoroughly admirable company. In fact, Berkshire has bought insurance from State Farm. Not auto insurance. (Laughter)
它能够发展到今天的规模，并拥有如此优秀的分销体系，确实是一家值得钦佩的公司。事实上，伯克希尔也曾向State Farm购买过保险，不过不是车险。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: GEICO still has a lower cost structure. I mean, it is a great business operation. And we have invested significantly to build that, because it is so attractive.
沃伦·巴菲特：GEICO的成本结构仍然更低。我是说，GEICO是一项非常出色的业务运作。我们进行了大量投资来发展它，因为它非常有吸引力。
And, as I pointed out in the annual report, the incremental investment we made last year did not produce the same results as incremental investments in previous years.
正如我在年度报告中指出的那样，我们去年进行的新增投资并未像往年那样产生同样的结果。
So we are finding it hard to grow the business under current circumstances on a basis that we would like to.
因此，在当前形势下，我们发现业务的增长并没有达到我们理想的程度。
But it’s a wonderful business, and it has, you know, it has a business model that I wouldn’t, you know, I wouldn’t trade for anything.
但它依然是一项绝妙的业务，它拥有一种我绝不会拿去交换的商业模式。
25. “Nobody’s going to catch” NetJets
“没有人会抓住”NetJets
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特：第四区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name’s Dan Sheehan from Oakville, Canada.
观众提问：你好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫丹·希恩，来自加拿大奥克维尔。
Following up on your discussion about GEICO, you’ve often talked about their advantages as a direct seller and investor of float.
接着你们关于GEICO的讨论，你们经常提到GEICO作为直接销售商和浮存金投资者的优势。
My question is, how do you control claim costs versus your competitors, other than through good underwriting?
我的问题是，除了通过良好的承保之外，你们如何控制理赔成本以对抗竞争对手？
Some may have advantages in terms of economies of scale or cutting corners you won’t do. And this might allow them to eliminate some of the advantages you’ve gained on the other side of the combined ratio.
有些公司可能通过规模经济或采用你们不会做的偷工减料的方法，从而消除你们在综合成本率另一侧获得的部分优势。
And my second question is, you’ve said, “It’s hard to be smarter than your dumbest competitor.” And along that line, what are your thoughts about a recent Wall Street Journal article about a major airline getting into the fractional jet business? Thank you.
我的第二个问题是，你曾说过“要比最愚蠢的竞争对手更聪明是很难的。”基于此，你对最近《华尔街日报》提到某大型航空公司进入分时共享飞机业务有何看法？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t worry about the dumbest competitor in a business that’s service. The customer will figure that out over time.
沃伦·巴菲特：在提供服务的业务中，我不担心最愚蠢的竞争对手。顾客最终会弄明白谁更好。
And we have a huge advantage in the fractional ownership business. I mean, we have 265 planes flying around now, and you can get one on four hours’ notice at any one of 5,500 airports.
我们在分时共享飞机业务上拥有巨大的优势。现在，我们有265架飞机在飞行，只需提前四小时通知，就可以在5,500个机场中的任何一个机场拿到飞机。
We have planes in Europe for our American customers. We have planes here for our European customers. And nobody’s going to catch us, in my view, in fractional ownership.
我们在欧洲为美国客户提供飞机，也在这里为欧洲客户提供飞机。在我看来，没有人能在分时共享业务上追上我们。
And we’ve had some dumb competitors in the past in that business. And, you know, they bleed. And to the extent, you know, we’ve got more blood than they have.
过去我们在这个业务中确实遇到过一些愚蠢的竞争对手，他们流血亏损。而在这个领域，我们的“血量”比他们多。
26. Buffett on the “trick” of good underwriting
巴菲特谈良好承销的“诀窍”
WARREN BUFFETT: In the question of GEICO and underwriting, you know, that — it’s a fascinating business because there are — in this audience — there are people with hugely different propensities to have an accident. And of course, most people figure they’re better than average.
沃伦·巴菲特：关于GEICO和承保的问题，这是一个很有趣的业务，因为在场的观众中，每个人发生事故的概率存在极大差异。当然，大多数人都认为自己比平均水平更优秀。
Now, part of the propensity to have an accident will depend on how many miles you drive. Obviously, somebody who never takes the car out of the garage is — no matter what their driving skills might be — is not going to have an accident.
发生事故的概率部分取决于你开车的里程数。显然，一个从不把车开出车库的人——无论他的驾驶技术如何——都不太可能发生事故。
They drive 10 miles a year, you know, you’re pretty safe with almost anybody. But — so there’s a relationship to miles driven. But there’s a relationship to all kinds of other things.
如果他们每年只开10英里，那几乎任何人都很安全。因此，这与驾驶里程相关，但也与许多其他因素相关。
And the trick, in insurance, is being able to figure out the variables and not have them too many, because you still have to get people to fill out a form, and you don’t want something that has practically no significance.
在保险业务中，诀窍在于找出相关变量，而且不能太多，因为你仍然需要让人们填写表格，而你不希望那些几乎没有意义的问题出现。
But the trick is to find out what questions you need to ask to determine in which category to place people as to their propensity to have an accident.
关键在于找出需要问哪些问题，以便确定人们在发生事故概率上的分类。
Now, in the life insurance business, you know, even Charlie and I figured out that the older you get, the more likely you are to die in a given year.
在寿险业务中，连我和查理都明白：一个人年纪越大，在某一年去世的概率就越高。
Now that’s not the only factor, but everybody understands that. That the older you are, the mortality risks go up. And they’ve learned a few other things. They’ve learned that females live longer than males.
当然，这并不是唯一的因素，但每个人都理解：年纪越大，死亡风险越高。此外，他们还知道一些其他的规律，比如女性比男性寿命更长。
Now that doesn’t get into a judgment as to why or anything else. You just know it. So, you build that in if you’re pricing the product. And then you know a whole bunch of other things.
这并不是对原因的判断，只是事实如此。所以，当你为产品定价时，你会将这一点纳入考量。而且你还会知道许多其他因素。
You may even know that cholesterol’s bad — you know, that makes a difference in terms of predicting mortality.
你甚至可能知道胆固醇过高是不利的——这一点在预测死亡率时很重要。
But in the auto insurance business, there are lots of variables that correlate with the frequency with which a person will have an accident per mile driven.
但是在车险业务中，有许多变量与每英里驾驶中发生事故的频率相关。
And the more experience you have with a large body of people whom you’ve asked a lot of questions about and can draw conclusions there from, the better off you are.
你向大量人群提出问题，并根据他们的回答得出结论，积累的经验越丰富，你就越有优势。
State Farm has got a wonderful body of information. I mean, their actuarial judgments should be better than anybody else’s, because they’ve got more experience with more cars and drivers.
State Farm拥有丰富的信息数据。他们的精算判断应该比任何其他公司都更准确，因为他们与更多的车辆和驾驶员打交道，积累了更多的经验。
But our experience with close to five million policy holders enables us, I think, to underwrite quite intelligently. But every day, you know, we’re looking for some variable that will tell us more.
但我们与近500万保单持有人的经验使我们能够进行相当明智的承保。当然，每天我们都在寻找能够提供更多信息的变量。
People with a good credit history are better drivers by a significant margin than people with a lousy credit history.
信用记录良好的人，驾驶表现明显优于信用记录糟糕的人。
Why? We don’t care too much why, because it wouldn’t help. What we really need to know is that the two factors correlate. And we’re looking for correlations all the time, and we’re trying to avoid spurious correlations, which you can have.
为什么？我们并不太在意原因，因为这并没有帮助。我们真正需要知道的是这两个因素存在相关性。我们一直在寻找这样的相关性，同时尽量避免那些可能出现的虚假相关性。
And it’s, you know, it’s a moving target. You keep working on it all the time. But we’re better at it than we were five years ago and we’ll be better at it five years from now than we are now.
这本身是一个不断变化的目标，需要持续不断地努力。与五年前相比，我们现在做得更好；五年后，我们会比现在做得更好。
When we go into a new state, we will have a very small body of policy holders. And some of the factors, obviously, prevail over all states, but there’s certain things that you learn, actually, only if you’re in a given state for a while.
当我们进入一个新的州时，我们的保单持有人数量非常少。当然，有些因素在所有州都适用，但有些事情只有在某个州经营一段时间后才能真正了解。
You know, you’re more likely to have an accident if you’re a — everything else being equal — if you’re an urban driver — city driver in a big city — than if you’re driving in an area that’s very rural where the density of other cars is very low.
如果其他条件都相同，城市驾驶员（尤其是大城市的驾驶员）发生事故的概率要高于那些在车流稀少的乡村地区开车的人。
If you’re the only guy in the county with a car, you know, you’re not going to have a lot of two-car accidents.
如果你是县里唯一有车的人，那么你几乎不可能发生两车相撞的事故。
So, the underwriting question is all important. And fast, fair settlement of claims is very important, because people who really weren’t injured start feeling worse and worse as they talk to more and more lawyers.
因此，承保是至关重要的。快速、公平的理赔处理也非常重要，因为那些原本没有受伤的人，在与越来越多的律师交谈后，会感觉越来越糟。
So, you know, the claims delivery is a vital part of running a good property-casualty operation. And all I can tell you is, at GEICO, that we think very hard about those things, but we’ll be thinking about them tomorrow as well as today.
所以，理赔的执行是经营好财产保险业务的关键部分。我只能告诉你，在GEICO，我们对这些问题思考得很深入，而且今天如此，明天也会如此。
Charlie?
查理？
27. Challenges for United’s fractional jet venture
美联航部分喷气式飞机风险投资的挑战
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, vis-à-vis the fractional jet ownership program, which has been announced for United Airlines, I find that very interesting.
查理·芒格：关于联合航空宣布的分时共享飞机计划，我觉得这很有意思。
A senior United Airlines pilot now makes about $300,000 a year plus fancy fringes, including pension. And what he does is work a very limited hour — number of hours a month. And about half of that he spends sleeping in a comfortable bunk on long ocean flights.
联合航空的一名高级飞行员现在年薪约30万美元，还享受丰厚的福利，包括养老金。而他的工作时间非常有限，其中大约一半时间是在长途跨洋航班上睡在舒适的卧铺里。
That is not a culture that will work well in fractional jet ownership. Maybe they think they’ll get some advantage in recruiting new pilots or something. I don’t know why they’re doing it. I would not have done it.
这种文化不适合分时共享飞机业务。也许他们认为这样可以在招聘新飞行员方面获得一些优势。我不知道他们为什么要这么做，反正我不会这么做。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they haven’t done it yet, either, but the — many of the airlines have organized second companies to take care of commuter flights and all of that.
沃伦·巴菲特：他们目前还没真正这么做，不过，许多航空公司确实设立了子公司来负责短途通勤航班等业务。
And, you know, that does produce problems when the pilots of the subsidiaries start comparing their benefits to the pilots, you know, of the parent, and all that. I mean, they try to get lower cost structures by doing that.
但这确实会带来一些问题，比如子公司飞行员开始将自己的福利与母公司飞行员的福利进行比较等。他们试图通过这种方式降低成本结构。
But I would guess that if you were wanting to set up a fractional ownership company, that — and you were — you would probably not think about trying to align yourself with somebody that has extremely high costs in other areas.
不过，如果你想设立一家分时共享飞机公司，我猜你不会考虑与在其他领域成本极高的公司进行合作。
And the advertising campaign will be kind of interesting, too. You know, “Give up first class travel. Start traveling right,” you know, or something. It’ll be interesting.
他们的广告宣传也会很有意思，比如，“放弃头等舱旅行，开始真正舒适的旅程”之类的口号。这会很有趣。
But I would tell you that we have competitors in the fractional ownership business, the two largest being companies that are part of plane manufacturers. And you can understand why they went into it, but it is not an easy business. And we’ve got the best hand, frankly.
不过我可以告诉你，我们在分时共享飞机业务中确实有竞争对手，其中最大的两家是飞机制造商的附属公司。你可以理解他们为什么要进入这个行业，但这并不是一门容易的生意。坦白说，我们拥有最好的牌。
28. Calling it a “hedge fund” doesn’t make you any smarter
称它为“对冲基金”并不能让你变得更聪明
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
沃伦·巴菲特：第五区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Michael Wong (PH), San Diego, California. First of all, I would like to thank both of you.
观众提问：我是迈克尔·王，来自加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥。首先，感谢你们两位。
My question is, when you started your business, why you started an investment partnership instead of a mutual fund?
我的问题是，当你们开始业务时，为什么选择设立投资合伙企业而不是共同基金？
And also, can you recommend a good book, or books, regarding how to start an investment partnership fund and how to service clients, et cetera?
另外，您能推荐一些关于如何设立投资合伙基金以及如何服务客户的好书吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t know of any books on starting partnerships or hedge funds. Do you know, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道有哪些关于如何设立合伙企业或对冲基金的书。查理，你知道吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but people seem to manage to create them without the books. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不知道，但看起来人们不需要书也能设立这些基金。（笑声）
The incentives are awesome.
激励机制实在太诱人了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. And the one thing, I mean, it’s always interesting to both of us how you get certain things that are fashionable. And people think that by naming something a given name, that somehow that makes everybody smarter or able to make money in it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，有一件事总让我们感到有趣，就是某些时髦的东西。人们认为，只要给某个东西起个名字，就能让每个人变得更聪明，或者靠它赚钱。
I mean, there is no magic to private equity funds, international investing, hedge funds — all of the baloney that gets promoted in Wall Street.
比如，私募股权基金、国际投资、对冲基金——华尔街推销的所有这些噱头都没有任何魔法。
What happens is that certain things become very promotable, usually because there’s been recent successes by other people, and that the new entrants extrapolate the successes of a few people in the past to promote new money from people currently.
通常，某些东西变得容易推销，往往是因为最近其他人取得了一些成功。新进入者便会将少数人的成功加以夸大，以此吸引新资金的加入。
So, they adopt titles that, you know, that they think will attract money and they — but it doesn’t make anybody any smarter if they hang out a shingle in front of their house that says, “hedge fund” or they have a shingle that says “asset allocation firm” or something of the sort. The form doesn’t create talent.
于是他们起一些能吸引资金的名头，但挂块写着“对冲基金”或“资产配置公司”的牌子并不会让任何人变得更聪明。形式不会创造天赋。
I backed into the business. I mean, I’d worked for a mutual fund — closed-end investment company. In fact, there’s a fellow here today who’s a friend of mine that — the two of us worked there, and we were 40 percent of the whole company because there were three other people, all of whom outranked us considerably.
我是在不经意间进入这个行业的。我曾为一家共同基金公司——封闭式投资公司——工作过。事实上，这里有一位我的朋友，我们曾一起在那里工作。那时我们俩占了公司总人数的40%，因为公司总共只有五个人，另外三个人的职位都比我们高很多。
And that firm was Graham-Newman Corp, from 1954 to 1956.
那家公司就是1954年到1956年的格雷厄姆-纽曼公司。
And it was a regulated investment company. It was about $6 million in assets, which seemed like a big deal at the time. And Ben Graham was one of the best known investors in the world, and he had $6 million in his fund.
那是一家受监管的投资公司，资产规模大约是600万美元，在当时已经算是个大数字了。那时本·格雷厄姆是全球最著名的投资者之一，而他的基金规模也不过600万美元。
There was a sister partnership called Newman and Graham, which operated in what would, today, be called “hedge fund style,” as far as a partnership split of the profits and so on.
还有一个姊妹合伙企业叫纽曼与格雷厄姆，它的运作方式类似于今天所谓的“对冲基金”，比如利润分成的方式。
And when I left there in ’56 and I came back here, we had seven people, a couple of whom are here in the room, who said, “Do you want to manage money?” And I said, “Well, here’s what I learned at Graham-Newman,” that Newman and Graham is a better way to do it than Graham-Newman.
1956年我离开那里回到这里时，有七个人（其中几位今天也在这里）问我，“你想管理资金吗？” 我说，“这是我在格雷厄姆-纽曼学到的：纽曼与格雷厄姆的模式要比格雷厄姆-纽曼更好。”
So I formed a little partnership, and then I met Charlie a few years later. And he figured, if I was making money doing it, he’d make a lot more. So — (laughter) — he formed one. And that was the carefully calculated strategy of how we both became involved in the partnership business.
于是我成立了一个小合伙企业。几年后，我遇到了查理。他觉得，如果我做这个能赚钱，那他做一定能赚更多。所以——（笑声）——他也成立了一个合伙企业。这就是我们如何进入合伙业务的“精心计算”的战略。
Charlie? (Laughs)
查理？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it is amazing how big the hedge fund industry has become. They have conventions on the subject now. And in the late ’20s, you could take a course on how to run a crooked security pool.
查理·芒格：是的，对冲基金行业变得如此庞大，确实令人惊讶。现在甚至还有关于它的大会。而在20世纪20年代末，你甚至可以上课学习如何运营不正当的证券投资池。
And these things come in great waves. I’m not suggesting the hedge funds are crooked, but I am suggesting that you get these waves of fashion that go to great extremes.
这些东西总是以巨大的浪潮形式出现。我并不是说对冲基金是欺诈的，但我想说的是，这些时尚的潮流往往会走向极端。
The amount of money, what is it now, Warren, in hedge funds?
现在，对冲基金管理的资金有多少，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s very big, although it’s a little less in a few quarters than it used to be. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：数额非常庞大，尽管最近几个季度略微有所减少。（笑声）
But I would be willing to put a lot of money up that if you take the aggregate experience of all the hedge funds — as starting right today and going for the next 15 years — I would bet a lot of money it will not hit 10 percent, in terms of return to partners. And I would, if you push me, I would bet at a lower figure than that.
但如果你将所有对冲基金的整体表现，从今天起算，延续未来15年，我愿意押一大笔钱赌它们的年回报率不会达到10%。如果你逼我再估算，我甚至会押一个更低的数字。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Then you have Bernie Cornfeld’s idea, the Fund of Funds. There are people who want to get paid for selecting hedge funds for other people. And that didn’t work very well for Bernie Cornfeld.
查理·芒格：接着还有伯尼·康菲尔德的“基金中的基金”想法。有人想靠替别人挑选对冲基金赚钱。而这对伯尼·康菲尔德来说并没有什么好结果。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it worked pretty well for Bernie for a while, but it didn’t work so well for his investors, actually. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，对伯尼本人来说，这一度进行得相当顺利，但对他的投资者来说，可就不太妙了。（笑声）
Yeah. That result was probably something Bernie had in mind at the start maybe.
是的，或许这就是伯尼一开始就预料到的结果。
29. Investing small amounts allows bigger opportunities
小额投资带来更大的机会
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第六区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Michael Zenga from Danvers, Massachusetts. That’s a town whose band Mr. Buffett so generously sent to the Rose Bowl parade last year, so you’re a very popular guy in my town.
观众提问：我是迈克尔·曾加，来自马萨诸塞州丹弗斯镇。去年，巴菲特先生慷慨资助我们镇的乐队参加玫瑰碗游行，所以您在我们镇非常受欢迎。
Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.
巴菲特先生、芒格先生，早上好。
Mr. Buffett, I wanted to ask you this question last week when I ran into you after Gillette’s annual meeting, but I choked. So now that there’s no pressure, here goes. (Laughter)
巴菲特先生，我上周在吉列公司年度会议后遇到您时本想问这个问题，但当时紧张得说不出来。所以现在没有压力了，我就问了。（笑声）
In the years from — from my reading — in the years from 1956 through ’69, you achieved the best results of your career quantitatively. Twenty-nine percent annually against only 7 percent for the Dow.
根据我的阅读，在1956到1969年间，您的投资业绩是您职业生涯中最出色的，年均回报率29%，而同期道琼斯指数只有7%。
Your approach then was different than now. You looked for lots of undervalued stocks with less attention to competitive advantage or favorable economics and sold them rather quickly.
您当时的方法与现在不同，您寻找大量低估的股票，不太关注竞争优势或有利的经济特性，而且卖出得相对较快。
As your capital base grew, you switched your approach to buying undervalued excellent companies with favorable long-term economics.
随着资本规模的增长，您转变为购买那些低估的、具有长期有利经济特性的优秀公司。
My question is, if you were investing a small sum today, which approach would you use?
我的问题是，如果您今天投资一笔小额资金，您会采用哪种方法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would use the approach that I think I’m using now of trying to search out businesses that — where I think they’re selling at the lowest price relative to the discounted cash they would produce in the future.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会使用我现在采用的方法，寻找那些我认为相对未来折现现金流来说价格最低的公司。
But if I were working with a small amount of money, the universe would be huge compared to the universe of possible ideas I work with now.
但如果我操作的是一笔小额资金，那么我可以选择的投资标的范围将会比现在要大得多。
You mentioned that ’56 to ’69 was the best period. Actually, my best period was before that. It was from right after I met Ben Graham in 19 — early 1951 — but from the end of 1950 through the next 10 years, actually, returns averaged about 50 percent a year. And I think they were 37 points better than the Dow per year, something like that.
你提到1956到1969是我的最佳时期，实际上，我最好的时期更早。从1951年初我遇到本·格雷厄姆之后，从1950年底到接下来的10年，年均回报率约为50%，每年大约比道琼斯指数高出37个百分点，差不多是这个水平。
But that — I was working with a tiny, tiny, tiny amount of money.
但那时我操作的是一笔非常非常小的资金。
And so, I would pour through volumes of businesses and I would find one or two that I could put $10,000 into or $15,000 into that just were — they were ridiculously cheap.
所以我会翻阅大量公司资料，找到一两个可以投入一万或一万五千美元的公司，那些公司简直便宜得不可思议。
And obviously, as the money increased, the universe of possible ideas started shrinking dramatically.
显然，随着资金的增长，可供选择的投资标的范围大幅缩小。
The times were also better for doing it in that time.
那个时代也更适合进行这样的投资。
But I think that, if you’re working with a small amount of money, with exactly the same background that Charlie and I have, and same ideas, same whatever ability we have — you know, I think you can make very significant sums.
但我认为，如果你操作的是一笔小额资金，拥有与我和查理完全相同的背景、想法，以及我们所拥有的能力，我相信你可以赚到非常可观的回报。
But you — but as soon as you start getting the money up into the millions — many millions — the curve on expectable results falls off just dramatically. But that’s the nature of it.
但一旦你的资金规模上升到数百万甚至更多，你所能预期的回报曲线就会急剧下降。这是投资的本质规律。
You’ve got to — you know, when you get up to things you could put millions of dollars into, you’ve got a lot of competition looking at that. And they’re not looking as I did when I started. When I started, I went through the pages of the manuals page by page.
当你需要将数百万美元投入某个标的时，你会面临大量的竞争对手。而他们的研究方法与我当初完全不同。我刚开始时，是逐页翻阅手册进行分析的。
I mean, I probably went through 20,000 pages in the Moody’s industrial, transportation, banks and finance manuals. And I did it twice. And I actually, you know, looked at every business. I didn’t look very hard at some.
我当时翻阅了《穆迪工业、运输、银行与金融手册》中的大约2万页内容，而且我看了两遍。我基本上把每家公司都浏览了一遍，虽然有些公司我没仔细研究。
Well, that’s not a practical way to invest tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. So I would say, if you’re working with a small sum of money and you’re really interested in the business and willing to do the work, you can — you will find something.
但这种方法不适合管理数千万甚至上亿美元的资金。所以我想说，如果你操作的是小额资金，并且真的对这个行业感兴趣、愿意去做研究，你一定会找到机会。
There’s no question about it in my mind. You will find some things that promise very large returns compared to what we will be able to deliver with large sums of money.
对此，我毫不怀疑。你会找到一些标的，其回报率将远高于我们使用大额资金所能获得的回报。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, I think that’s right. A brilliant man who can’t get any money from other people, and is working with a very small sum, probably should work in very obscure stocks searching out unusual mispriced opportunities.
查理·芒格：嗯，是的，我认为巴菲特说得对。一个有才华但无法从别人那里筹集资金的人，如果手头只有一小笔钱，应该专注于那些非常冷门的股票，寻找那些被严重错定价的机会。
But, you know, you could — it’s such a small world. It may be a way for one person to come up, but it’s a long slog.
但你也知道，这样的机会非常少。这或许是一个人崛起的方法，但这是一条漫长而艰难的路。
30. Promotion, not performance, is Wall Street’s biggest money maker
促销，而不是绩效，是华尔街最大的赚钱工具
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, most smart people, unfortunately, in Wall Street figure that they can make a lot more money a lot easier just by, one way or another, you know, getting an override on other people’s money or delivering services in some way that people —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，不幸的是，华尔街上大多数聪明人认为，通过某种方式，对他人的资金抽取分成，或者提供一些所谓的服务，他们可以更轻松地赚到更多的钱。
And the monetization of hope and greed, you know, is a way to make a huge amount of money. And right now, it’s very — just take hedge funds.
将人们的希望和贪婪变现，是一种赚取巨额利润的方式。现在的对冲基金就是一个很好的例子。
I mean, it’s — I’ve had calls from a couple of friends in the last month that don’t know anything about investing money. They’ve been unsuccessful and everything else.
我最近一个月接到了几个朋友的电话，他们根本不懂投资，之前做什么都失败了。
And, you know, one of them called me the other day and said, “Well, I’m forming a small hedge fund.” A hundred and twenty-five million he was talking about.
其中一个人前几天打电话给我，说他要成立一个“小型对冲基金”，规模是1.25亿美元。
Like, the thought that since it was only 125 million, maybe we ought to put in 10 million or something of the sort.
好像因为“只是1.25亿”，我们就应该投1000万进去之类的。
I mean, if you looked at this fellow’s Schedule D on his 1040 for the last 20 years, you know, you’d think he ought to be mowing lawns. (Laughter)
如果你看一下这位朋友过去20年报税单上的资本利得申报，你会觉得他还不如去给人剪草坪。（笑声）
But he may get his 125 million. I mean, you know, it’s just astounding to me how willing people are, during a bull market, just to toss money around, because, you know, they think it’s easy.
但他可能真的会筹到这1.25亿。令人震惊的是，在牛市中，人们总是愿意随意撒钱，因为他们觉得赚钱很容易。
And of course, that’s what they felt about internet stocks a few years ago. They’ll think it about something else next year, too.
当然，几年前他们对互联网股票也是这么想的。明年，他们还会把这种想法寄托在别的东西上。
But the biggest money made, you know, in Wall Street in recent years, has not been made by great performance, but it’s been made by great promotion, basically.
不过，近年来，华尔街赚到的最大一笔钱，基本上不是靠出色的业绩，而是靠出色的推销。
Charlie, do you have anything?
查理，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would state it even more strongly. I think the current scene is obscene.
查理·芒格：嗯，我会说得更直接一些。我认为当前的情形简直是丑陋不堪。
I think there’s too much mania. There’s too much chasing after easy money. There’s too much misleading sales material about investments.
现在的市场充斥着过度的狂热，过度追逐轻松赚快钱的心态，过多关于投资的误导性推销材料。
There’s too much on the television emphasizing speculation in stocks.
电视上过多地宣传股票投机行为。
31. Powerful forces don’t want to expense stock options
强大的力量不想花费股票期权
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第七区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Robert Piton (PH) from Chicago. The Honorable Warren Buffett and the Honorable Charlie Munger, I felt it would be appropriate to address you both in a manner that reflects the tremendous amount of value that the two of you have been instrumental in unleashing for your shareholders, your employees, and the good of society. (Applause)
观众提问：我是罗伯特·皮顿，来自芝加哥。尊敬的沃伦·巴菲特先生和查理·芒格先生，我认为应该用这样的方式称呼你们，以表达你们为股东、员工和整个社会释放的巨大价值。（掌声）
The area that I’d like to inquire about is stock options. As you are aware and have written about in the past reports, companies have been taking advantage of, and contributing to, FASB’s inadequate rules regarding stock options.
我想探讨的话题是股票期权。正如你们过去在报告中提到的，公司一直在利用并推动财务会计准则委员会（FASB）关于股票期权的缺陷规则。
In particular, the lack of having to expense them on the income statement and the lack of having to report them as a liability on the balance sheet.
尤其是，股票期权不需要在损益表中列支，也不需要在资产负债表中作为负债报告。
My question is, are either one of you doing anything to help FASB’s current stance on the issue?
我的问题是，你们是否正在做些什么来推动FASB在这个问题上的立场？
If not, have either one of you ever considered establishing a, quote, “real,” end quote, independent body of accountants that would actually try to make companies produce accounting statements that reflect economic reality?
如果没有，你们是否考虑过设立一个“真正的”独立会计机构，来促使公司制作反映经济现实的会计报表？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I’ll let you. You have the history on it.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，这个问题交给你。你对这个问题的历史更了解。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we don’t like the accounting, which we’ve called “corrupt,” or at least I have. And I don’t think that’s too strong a word. I think it’s corrupt to have false accounting because you like a certain outcome better than another.
查理·芒格：我们不喜欢这样的会计制度，我称之为“腐败”，至少我是这么说的。我不认为这个词太过分，因为根据你偏好的结果采用虚假会计，这确实是一种腐败行为。
All that said, I don’t think either of us spends a lot of time fighting with FASB or trying to create a better one.
话虽如此，我觉得我们两人都不会花太多时间与FASB抗争，或者试图建立一个更好的机构。
It’s like splitting your lance against stone or something. You can get a lot of back pressure from the butt of the lance.
这就像用长矛刺石头一样，结果反而会被长矛的反作用力伤到自己。
And we can’t be expected to cure all the ills of the world.
我们不能指望自己治愈世界上的所有弊病。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve written about it and talked about it. Obviously, you’ve picked up on it. And when it was an active issue whenever it was, about, I don’t know, four years ago or so, Senator [Carl] Levin of Michigan was one of those who felt as we did. And, of course, FASB felt as we did.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们写过这件事，也谈论过它。显然，你注意到了。当这个问题在大约四年前被积极讨论时，密歇根州的参议员卡尔·莱文和我们持相同观点。当然，FASB也与我们观点一致。
But the pressure was incredible that American business brought on Congress. They weren’t getting — they tried to put pressure on FASB and they weren’t getting a result, so they just said, “Well, we’re not going to let FASB set the accounting rules, we’ll have Congress set the accounting rules.”
但是，美国企业向国会施加的压力太大了。他们对FASB施压未果，于是干脆说，“我们不会让FASB制定会计规则，我们要让国会来制定会计规则。”
And I thought that was a bad idea, per se, but I thought in this — and, but they got plenty of supporters. Got a huge number of supporters. I mean, they —
我认为这本身就是个坏主意，但他们还是获得了大量支持者，真的非常多。
And at the time, I compared it, I think — there was a bill introduced in the Indiana legislature in the 1890s, I believe. And the bill was to change the value of the mathematical term “pi” to three even, instead of 3.1415... (Laughter)
当时，我把它比作19世纪90年代印第安纳州议会的一项提案。提案建议将数学常数“π”的值从3.1415...改为3。（笑声）
And the legislator who introduced it said that it was too difficult for the school children of Indiana to work with this terribly long, unending term. And it would be so much easier if pi was just three. And he thought they ought to enact that.
提出提案的议员说，印第安纳州的学生难以处理这个无止尽的数学常数，若将π定为3，会更简单易用。他觉得这项提案应该被通过。
Well, I thought that was quite rational compared to, you know, what the Congress of the United States was going to do in telling people that, since it — one of the arguments was that, “It makes it very tough for startup companies if they have to expense this.”
但我觉得，与美国国会试图做的事情相比，这个提案反倒显得理性多了。当时的论点之一是，“如果必须将股票期权列为费用，初创公司将面临极大困难。”
Well, it makes it tough if they have to pay their electricity bill, too. But, I mean, but those were the kind of arguments you got.
但如果要支付电费，他们也会面临困难啊。但这就是当时的论点。
And my memory is, Charlie is better on this than I am probably, but I think the accounting firms 40 years ago or 50 years ago were in accord with our position.
我记得，虽然查理可能比我记得更清楚，但大约四五十年前，会计公司其实与我们持相同立场。
But every client would put pressure on, you know, and they don’t want to report expenses. They particularly don’t want to report expenses that are paid to them, and that could be huge, and that might prove obnoxious if recorded by conventional accounting.
但每个客户都会施加压力，他们不愿意报告费用，尤其是不想报告支付给他们自己的费用。若按传统会计方式记录，这个数额可能非常大，也会显得难堪。
But if it’s sort of lost in a table in the proxy statement, people don’t pay much attention.
但如果这些费用藏在代理声明的某个表格里，人们就不会太注意。
So, the only way it will get changed — we wrote about it and I even talked to a few senators at the time — the only way it will get changed is — and this is the only way corporate governance problems generally will get changed — if 15 or 20 large institutional investors would band together in some way on this.
所以，唯一能改变这种状况的方法——我们写过这件事，当时我甚至和几位参议员谈过——唯一的办法是，15到20家大型机构投资者联合起来，采取行动。
But some of them have the same problem because they’re getting paid extraordinary sums for doing something that, you know, is really not adding that much value.
但问题是，其中一些机构也面临同样的问题，因为他们拿着高额薪酬，却未必真正创造了多少价值。
So, they’re not really inclined to call attention, in many cases, to what Charlie would refer to as “obscenities” in other people’s compensation.
因此，在很多情况下，他们不愿意去关注别人薪酬中查理所称的“丑陋”之处。
So, I think it’s going to go on. I mean, it’s a fascinating subject. But the institutional investors seem to focus very much on matters of form and not substance.
所以，我认为这种情况还会继续。这是个有趣的话题，但机构投资者似乎总是过于关注形式，而忽略了实质。
I mean, you get a lot of — they, you know, they cluck a lot about little things that don’t have anything to do with their economic return over time, whereas on stock options they’re something that’s terribly important.
他们对一些微不足道的事情唧唧喳喳，却对股票期权这种与长期经济回报息息相关的问题漠不关心。
They’re the ones that are paying the costs, and the costs are there whether they get recorded or not.
这些成本最终是由他们承担的，不论是否在账上记录，这些成本都实实在在存在。
But American management will not change its position on that voluntarily. Consultants will never change their position. They’re getting paid to encourage people to look at other companies, and it just keeps ratcheting up. So, I don’t think you’re going to see change unless institutional investors do it.
美国的管理层不会主动改变立场，咨询公司也绝不会改变，因为他们的收入来源于鼓励公司与其他公司攀比，这种现象只会愈演愈烈。因此，除非机构投资者采取行动，否则不会看到任何改变。
As I say, I get these questionnaires, you know, about the composition of the board or a nominating committee. None of that makes any difference in terms of how a business performs.
正如我所说，我经常收到关于董事会组成或提名委员会的问卷调查。但这些都对企业的经营表现毫无影响。
I got one form that said they wanted a list of directors broken down by sex. And I said, “None that I know of.” (Laughter)
我收到一份表格，要求按性别列出董事名单。我回答说：“我所知的没有。”（笑声）
But it just is not germane.
但这些根本就不是重点。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I can’t top that one. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，这个我实在没法补充了。（笑声）
32. No company should predict 15 percent annual growth
任何公司都不应该预测15%的年增长
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请8号区域提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Steve Casbell (PH) from Atlanta.
观众：来自亚特兰大的史蒂夫·卡斯贝尔（音译）。
My question concerns Gillette. Do you think their goal of trying to grow earnings at 15-plus percent kind of got them into their current inventory problems at the trade?
我的问题是关于吉列公司的。您认为他们追求15%以上盈利增长的目标是否导致了他们目前在贸易中的库存问题？
And as well, the Duracell acquisition. I know at the time, neither one of you were the biggest fans of the deal. I just want to know how you feel about it now.
还有，关于收购金霸王电池公司。当时你们两位对这笔交易都不太看好。我想知道你们现在的看法是什么。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say it’s a mistake. And I’ve said it. I think it’s a mistake for any company to predict 15 percent a year growth. But plenty of them do.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为这是一个错误。我之前也说过，我认为任何公司预测每年15%的增长都是错误的。但确实有很多公司这么做。
For one thing, you know, unless the U.S. economy grows at 15 percent a year, eventually any 15 percent number catches up with you. It just, it doesn’t make sense.
首先，除非美国经济每年增长15%，否则任何15%的增长目标最终都会让你难以为继。这根本就不合理。
Very, very few large companies can compound their earnings at 15 percent. It isn’t going to happen.
极少数的大公司能实现15%的复合盈利增长。这是不会发生的。
You can look at the Fortune 500, and if you want to pick 10 names on there that will compound their growth from — other than some extraordinarily depressed year, I mean, if they had a year where they just broke even so the number’s practically zero.
你可以看一看《财富》500强，如果你要从中挑选出10家公司——排除那些极其低迷的年份，比如有一年它们的盈利几乎为零，那之后的增长自然很高。
But if you pick any company on there that currently has record earnings, and you want to pick out 10 of them that over the next 20 years will average 15 percent or greater, I will, you know, I will bet you that more than half of your list will not make it.
但如果你选择其中任何当前盈利创新高的公司，并挑出10家在未来20年能平均达到15%或更高增长的公司，我敢打赌，你名单中超过一半的公司无法做到。
So, I think it’s a mistake, and as I’ve said in the annual report, I think it leads people to stretch on accounting. I think it tends to make them change trade practices.
因此，我认为这是一个错误。我在年度报告中也提到过，这种做法会导致人们在会计处理上做手脚，并倾向于改变贸易惯例。
And you know, I’m not singling out Gillette in the least, but I can tell you that if you look at the companies that have done it, you will find plenty of examples of people who have made those sort of mistakes.
我并不是单独批评吉列公司，但我可以告诉你，如果你看看那些追求高增长的公司，你会发现很多公司都犯了类似的错误。
And I think that, in connection with Duracell — I mean, obviously, Duracell has not turned out the way that the management of Gillette, at the time, hoped that it was going to do. And the investment bankers who came in and made the presentations, those presentations would look pretty silly now.
至于Duracell，显然，它的发展没有达到当时吉列管理层的预期。而那些提出建议的投资银行家，他们当时的演示报告现在看来会显得非常可笑。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think that kind of stuff happens all the time. It will continue to happen. It’s just built into the system.
查理·芒格：这种事情一直都在发生，以后还会继续发生。这是系统固有的一部分。
I see more predictions of future earnings growth at a high rate, not less. I mean, a few people have sort of taken an abstinence pledge, but it’s very few. It’s what the analysts want to hear.
我看到更多公司预测未来的高增长，而不是更少。虽然有少数人已经表示“戒掉”这种做法，但真的很少。因为这是分析师想听的内容。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s what the investor relations departments want the managements to say. It makes their life easier, you know. But they don’t have to be there five years from now or 10 years from now doing the same thing. It’s —
沃伦·巴菲特：这是投资者关系部门希望管理层说出来的话。这让他们的工作更轻松。但五年、十年后，他们不需要站在那里为这些话负责。
If we predicted 15 percent from Berkshire, you know, 15 percent means that — assuming the same multiples — I mean, that means in five years, 200 billion. In 10 years, 400 billion. You know, 15 years, 800 billion. A trillion-six in 20 years. And the values get to be crazy.
如果我们说伯克希尔会增长15%，那15%的复合增长意味着——假设市盈率不变——五年后市值将达到2000亿美元，十年后4000亿美元，十五年后8000亿美元，二十年后1.6万亿美元。这些数字开始变得荒唐。
And you know, if you have a business with a market value of 4- or 500 billion — and you had a few of those not so long ago — just think of what it takes to deliver, in the way of future cash, at a 15 percent discount rate to justify that.
如果你有一家市值4000亿或5000亿美元的公司——前不久确实有几家公司达到这种规模——你想想看，为了在15%的贴现率下证明这样的估值，它需要带来多少未来现金流。
If you’ve got a business that’s delivering you no cash today and it’s selling for $500 billion, you know, to give you 15 percent on your money, it would have to be giving you 75 billion this year.
如果一家公司今天没有产生任何现金，但市值却达到5000亿美元，那么要给你15%的回报，它今年就必须给你750亿美元的现金。
But if it doesn’t give you 75 billion this year, you know, it has to be giving you 86 and a quarter billion next year. And if it doesn’t do it next year, it has to be giving you almost a hundred billion in the third year.
如果今年没有给你750亿，那明年它就必须给你862.5亿美元。如果明年也没有做到，那么第三年它就必须给你接近1000亿美元。
It just — those numbers are staggering. I mean, the implications involved in certain market valuations really, you know, belong in Gulliver’s Travels or something. But people take them very seriously.
这些数字简直令人震惊。某些市场估值的含义，真的像是出自《格列佛游记》之类的幻想小说。但人们却把它们当真。
I mean, people were valuing businesses at $500 billion a year, a year-and-a-half ago, and there’s just no mathematical — almost no mathematical calculation you could make that would — if you demanded something like 15 percent on your money — there’s almost no mathematical calculation you could make that would — could possibly lead you to justify those valuations.
就在一年前或一年半前，人们给一些企业估值达到5000亿美元。而如果你要求15%的投资回报，几乎没有任何数学计算能够证明这样的估值是合理的。
Charlie, have any more?
查理，你还有什么补充吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, I said on another occasion that, to some extent, stocks sell like Rembrandts. They don’t sell based on the value that people are going to get from looking at the picture.
查理·芒格：我曾经说过，在某种程度上，股票的交易像伦勃朗的画作。它们的价格不是根据人们从画作中获得的实际价值来决定的。
They sell based on the fact that Rembrandts have gone up in value in the past. And when you get that kind of valuation in the stocks, some crazy things can happen.
它们的价格是基于过去伦勃朗画作升值的事实。当股票估值变成这种状态时，就会发生一些疯狂的事情。
Bonds are way more rational, because nobody can believe that a bond paying a fixed rate of modest interest can go to the sky, but with stocks they behave partly like Rembrandts.
债券则理性得多，因为没有人会相信一张支付固定利息的债券会无限升值。但股票有时候却像伦勃朗的画作一样。
And I said, suppose you filled every pension fund in America with nothing but Rembrandts? Of course, Rembrandts would keep going up and up as people bought more and more Rembrandts, or pieces of Rembrandts, at higher and higher prices.
我说，假设把美国所有的养老金基金全部用来买伦勃朗的画作？当然，随着人们以越来越高的价格购买更多伦勃朗的画作或碎片，伦勃朗的画作价格会不断上涨。
I said, “Wouldn’t that create a hell of a mess after 20 years of buying Rembrandts?” And to the extent that stock prices generally become sort of irrational, isn’t it sort of like filling half the pension funds with Rembrandts? I think those are good questions.
我问：“如果20年里都在买伦勃朗的画作，那不是会造成一团乱局吗？” 而当股票价格变得普遍不理性时，这不就像是把一半的养老金基金都用来买伦勃朗的画作一样吗？我觉得这些都是很好的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Once it gets going, though, people have an enormous interest in pushing Rembrandts. I mean, it creates its own constituency.
沃伦·巴菲特：一旦这种趋势开始，人们就会极力推动“伦勃朗”。这就形成了自己的利益群体。
33. “It’s stupid the way people are extrapolating the past”
“人们盲目地从过去外推，真是愚蠢”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
沃伦·巴菲特：1号区域？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Joe Schulman (PH). I’m a shareholder from Oxford, Maryland. Thank you for a wonderful meeting.
观众：巴菲特先生、芒格先生，我叫乔·舒尔曼（音译），来自马里兰州牛津，是一名股东。感谢你们举办如此精彩的会议。
In order for Berkshire to have an opportunity to hopefully grow its earnings by about 15 percent per year, if we can do that, at least for the next few years, it’s obvious that because of the redeployment of earnings and float, the existing businesses do not need to grow at 15 percent.
为了让伯克希尔有机会在未来几年实现大约15%的年均盈利增长，显然，由于利润和浮存金的重新部署，现有业务本身并不需要增长15%。
At what rate would you expect the existing businesses to grow to achieve an aggregate rate close to what I’m describing? And what do you think the probability is of achieving that?
您预期现有业务增长率是多少，才能达到我所说的整体增长水平？您认为实现这个目标的概率有多大？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. Well, I think the probability of us achieving 15 percent growth in earnings over an extended period of years is so close to zero, it’s not worth calculating.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我认为，伯克希尔在长期内实现15%的盈利增长的概率几乎为零，根本没有必要去计算。
I mean, we’ll do our best, and we have a lot of fun doing it. So it is not something where we have to come down and do things that are boring to us or anything of the sort.
当然，我们会尽力去做，而且我们也很享受这个过程。因此，这并不是我们需要去做一些让我们觉得无聊或其他类似的事情。
I mean, our inclination is to — very much — to do everything we can, legitimately, to add to Berkshire’s earnings in things we can understand. But it can’t happen, over time. You know, we will have years when we do it, but —
我们倾向于在我们理解的领域里，尽我们所能、合理地为伯克希尔增加利润。但从长期来看，这是不可能持续的。当然，我们会有一些年份能做到，但——
And you’re quite correct in pointing out we don’t need to do it from the present businesses — we will add things all the time — any more than we needed to do it from the current business back in 1965 with the textile business.
你说得很对，我们不需要单纯依赖现有业务来实现增长——我们会不断地增加新的业务，就像1965年我们拥有纺织业务时，并不依赖它来实现增长一样。
I mean, we have to improvise as we go along. And we will. And the businesses we have are good businesses, in aggregate. They will do well.
我们必须随时调整和创新，我们也会这样做。总的来说，我们目前的业务都是好业务，它们会表现得很好。
They won’t do anything like 15 percent growth per annum, but we will take a good rate of progress from those businesses, and we will superimpose upon that acquisitions which will add to that.
虽然它们不会达到每年15%的增长，但我们会在这些业务上取得稳定的进步，并通过收购来进一步推动增长。
But we can’t do 15 over a period of time, and — nor, incidentally, do we think any large company in the United States is likely to do.
但我们无法在长期内实现15%的增长。此外，我认为美国的大公司中也没有哪一家能够做到这一点。
There will be a couple that do it for a long period of time, but to predict which of the Fortune 500 will end up being the one or two or three, would be very hard to do.
当然，可能会有一两家公司能够长期做到这一点，但要预测《财富》500强中哪一两家公司会实现这一目标，是非常困难的。
And it won’t be more than a couple out of 500, if you take large companies not working from a deflated base year.
如果你不以低基数年份作为起点，那么从500家公司中能够做到的不会超过一两家。
I think our method is a pretty good one. I mean, I think the idea of having a group of good businesses to throw off cash in aggregate, in a big way, that themselves grow, that are run by terrific people, and then adding onto those, sometimes at a slow rate, but every now and then at a good clip, more businesses of the same kind, and not increasing the outstanding shares, I think that’s about as good a business model as you can have for a company our size. But what it produces, we’ll have to see.
我认为我们的方法相当不错。我们拥有一批优秀的企业，它们能合力产生大量现金流，且自身也在成长，并由出色的管理者运营。我们在此基础上，偶尔以较慢的速度，但也会有一些时候快速增加类似的企业，同时保持股份不增加。我认为对于我们这种规模的公司来说，这是最好的商业模式。但最终会产生什么结果，我们拭目以待。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I certainly agree that the chances of this 15 percent per annum progress extrapolated way forward is virtually impossible. I think, generally, the shareholding class in America should reduce its expectations a lot.
查理·芒格：我完全同意，持续实现15%的年均增长几乎是不可能的。我认为，美国的股东群体整体上应该大大降低他们的预期。
WARREN BUFFETT: Including the pension funds.
沃伦·巴菲特：包括养老金基金。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, including the pension funds, you bet.
查理·芒格：是的，当然包括养老金基金。
It’s stupid the way people are extrapolating the past. Not slightly stupid, massively stupid. (Laughter)
人们盲目地从过去外推，是愚蠢的。不只是有点愚蠢，而是极其愚蠢的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And this is a message, incidentally, if you think about it. I mean, nobody has any interest in saying this — a financial interest in saying it — whereas people have all kinds of financial interest in saying just the opposite.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，你仔细想想，这其实是一个值得注意的信息。没有人有经济利益站出来说实话，而那些说相反话的人，却有各种各样的经济利益。
I mean, so you do not get an information flow — if you listen to the financial world or read the financial press — you do not get an information flow that is balanced in any way, in terms of looking at the problem, because the money is in believing something different.
也就是说，当你听金融界的声音，或阅读财经媒体时，你不会得到任何平衡的信息，因为利益驱使人们去相信不同的东西。
And money is what, you know, it’s what causes people to become prominent, or it flows from becoming prominent in the investment world in terms of whether you go on television shows, or whether you manage money, or are trying to attract it through funds, or whatever it may be.
金钱就是这样运作的，它让人在投资界出名，或是通过上电视节目、管理资金、或吸引基金投资等方式，赚取金钱。
I don’t think if you were an actuarial consultant and you insisted that the companies that you gave your actuarial report to use a 6 percent investment rate, I don’t think you’d have a client.
我不认为，如果你是一个精算顾问，并坚持让你服务的公司在精算报告中使用6%的投资回报率，你还能找到客户。
So, it’s almost impossible for the advisors, in effect, in my view, to be intellectually honest on it. Don’t you think so, Charlie?
因此，在我看来，顾问们几乎不可能在这个问题上保持真正的知识诚实。查理，你不这么认为吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There was a very smart — there is a very smart investment advisor in my town, and he said that, “Years ago, some risk arbitrage firm would tell his clients, ‘We know how to make 15 percent per annum year in and year out.’”
查理·芒格：是的。我镇上有一位非常聪明的投资顾问，他说，“多年前，一些风险套利公司会告诉客户：‘我们知道如何每年稳定赚取15%的回报。’”
And he said, “Years ago, everybody said, ‘That’s impossible.’” He says, “Now in this climate, they say, ‘So what?’” You know, who’s interested in a lousy 15 percent?
他说，“多年前，每个人都会说‘这不可能’。但在当下的市场环境中，人们会说，‘那又怎么样？’ 现在还有谁会对区区15%的回报感兴趣？”
WARREN BUFFETT: And it was easier in the earlier climate, obviously, because the money hadn’t been attracted into it.
沃伦·巴菲特：很明显，在过去的市场环境中，这种回报更容易实现，因为当时资金还没有大量涌入。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Generally speaking, there’s more felicity to be gained by — from reducing expectations than in any other way. It is simply crazy for this group to have very high expectations. Moderate expectations will do fine for all of us.
查理·芒格：总的来说，降低预期能带来更多的幸福感，而不是其他方式。对于股东群体来说，抱有很高的预期简直是疯狂的。适度的预期对我们所有人都足够了。
34. No comment on USG investment
关于USG投资，不予置评
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll take one more before we go — we break for lunch. We’ll go to number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：好，我们再回答一个问题，然后休息午餐。2号区域，请提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Ken Goldberg from Sharon, Massachusetts.
观众：早上好。我叫肯·戈德堡，来自马萨诸塞州沙伦市。
A few questions ago, you mentioned the company’s investment in USG. I was wondering how the company — how you got comfortable with that as an investment, in light of the asbestos exposure?
在几个问题前，您提到公司投资了USG。我想知道，考虑到石棉诉讼风险，您是如何对这笔投资感到安心的？
Do you view the company — the stock — as cheap enough and the asbestos exposure as manageable enough over time, so that the investment is justified?
您是否认为，该公司股价足够便宜，石棉风险在未来能够得到控制，因此这笔投资是合理的？
Or do you view it as, in a worst-case scenario, if the subsidiary with asbestos exposure blows up, the rest of the solid businesses are insulated from that and are alone worth the price of the investment?
还是说，您认为即使最坏的情况发生，如果涉及石棉风险的子公司破产，其他稳定的业务仍然能与之隔离，单独就值回投资？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me answer that. I don’t think we want to comment. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格：让我来回答吧。我觉得我们不想对此置评。（巴菲特笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s one-tenth of one percent of Berkshire, roughly. I mean, but as Charlie says, that gets too close to giving stock advice.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这大概占伯克希尔总资产的千分之一。正如查理所说，这个话题太接近于提供股票建议了。
But I will tell you their asbestos problems are serious, and they would be the first to tell you that.
不过，我可以告诉你，他们的石棉问题确实很严重，他们自己也会坦诚这一点。
Afternoon session
35. “Insurance float has been a huge asset to Berkshire”
“保险浮存金一直是伯克希尔的重要资产。”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
I hope you’ve all had a cholesterol free lunch. And — (laughter) — we will move on. And when we stopped, we were about to go to zone 3.
我希望大家午餐没有摄入胆固醇。（笑声）我们继续。当我们停下时，我们正要前往第三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Jason Tank from Traverse City, Michigan.
观众提问：嗨，我叫杰森·坦克，来自密歇根州特拉弗斯城。
I’ve got one kind of quick question that I’m sure you can answer relatively quickly, if you’re not interested.
我有一个比较简单的问题，我相信你可以很快回答，如果你不感兴趣的话。
I know that Walter Scott’s on the board of directors and he’s also on the board of directors of a company called Level 3 Communications that is in an industry that’s — well, there’s been a lot of change happening and stock prices have been plummeting. I wonder if you’ve ever —
我知道沃尔特·斯科特是董事会成员，他也在一家叫Level 3通信公司的董事会中。而这家公司所在的行业正在经历许多变化，股价也大幅下跌。我想知道你是否曾经——
You’ve probably spoken to him at great length about the economics of that business. And have you ever expressed any interest that business, especially at the prices today?
你很可能与他深入讨论过那家公司的经济状况。你对这家公司有过兴趣吗，特别是考虑到今天的价格？
That’s the first question. The second question is — if you look at Berkshire Hathaway as a portfolio, you’ve got wholly owned subsidiaries as operating businesses, marketable securities, common stocks and bonds. If you strip out — and if my premise is wrong, just please tell me.
这是第一个问题。第二个问题是，如果你将伯克希尔·哈撒韦视作一个投资组合，其中包含全资子公司作为运营业务、可流通证券、普通股和债券。如果你剔除——如果我的假设有误，请指正。
If you strip out the leverage effect of the cost of the float being, you know, nearly zero or negative throughout the years — if you look at the portfolio minus that leverage piece, how fast do you think your book value would’ve grown over the last 30-plus years? Are we talking about 5 percent or 6 percent due to just the leverage piece on the insurance float?
如果你剔除多年来浮存金成本接近于零或为负所带来的杠杆效应——如果你看这个投资组合，在剔除这一杠杆因素的情况下，你认为过去30多年间，你们的账面价值会以多快的速度增长？仅由于保险浮存金的杠杆效应，我们是否谈的是5%或6%的增长？
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think it would run as much as 5 or 6 percentage points, but the float has been very useful to us. And actually, I’ve never made the calculation.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为不会高达5到6个百分点，但浮存金确实对我们非常有用。实际上，我从未做过这样的计算。
So you could well be correct that if it was 5 or 6 points, that would be a quarter of our book value gain over the years being attributable to insurance float.
所以你可能是对的，如果确实是5或6个百分点，那么我们这些年账面价值增长的四分之一可以归功于保险浮存金。
And I think that’s probably maybe on the high side but — and you can’t make it —
我认为这个估算可能有些偏高，但——而且你也无法——
We don’t look at insurance float 100 percent the same as we would look at equity, but we’ve looked at it a good bit, you know.
我们并不会把保险浮存金完全视为权益，但我们对它有过很多思考。
It’s largely tantamount to equity because we’ve had so much equity, we could afford to do it that way. So I — you’ll have to make that calculation yourself.
它在很大程度上等同于权益，因为我们拥有大量的权益，我们可以这样做。所以这个计算，你自己来做吧。
We think insurance float has been a huge asset to Berkshire. We think it’ll continue to be a huge asset. And we look for every way possible to increase the amount of low-cost float.
我们认为保险浮存金是伯克希尔的重要资产，我们也相信它将继续是我们的重要资产。我们一直在寻找各种可能的方式来增加低成本浮存金的数量。
On a small scale, we added US Liability last year, an excess surplus lines carrier based in Philadelphia. And so far, that’s working out extremely well. Got a terrific guy running it.
在较小的规模上，去年我们收购了US Liability，一家总部位于费城的超额赔偿险公司。目前，这项业务进展非常顺利，有一位非常出色的人在管理它。
And, you know, in a small way, we add float there. I just looked at the first quarter on it, and we had a significant underwriting profit and we had float added. And, you know, that’s the best of all worlds.
而且，我们通过这家公司小规模地增加了浮存金。我刚刚看了第一季度的表现，我们实现了显著的承保利润，同时也增加了浮存金。这是最理想的结果。
So we’ll keep working on it, and it will add — it’s a big asset that Berkshire has that a great many companies — I mean, virtually no other company has it to the degree that we have that also invests in other businesses and uses it as a source of money to invest in other businesses.
所以我们会继续努力，这将继续为我们带来价值。这是伯克希尔的一项重要资产，很多公司——事实上，没有其他公司能像我们一样，同时在其他业务中投资，并将浮存金作为投资资金来源。
The question about Level 3, I obviously can’t answer. I just — I can tell you that you have two enormously smart and high-grade guys in Walter Scott and Jim Crowe in that business.
关于Level 3的问题，我显然无法回答。我只能告诉你，沃尔特·斯科特和吉姆·克罗是这个业务中非常聪明且优秀的人才。
But it’s not a business I know a lot about. And if I did, I wouldn’t talk about it.
但这不是我熟悉的业务。如果我了解，我也不会谈论它。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I cannot talk just as well as you can. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我可以像你一样保持沉默。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Not always. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不总是这样。（笑声）
36. Accounting “shenanigans” and “gamesmanship”
会计“伎俩”和“策略”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Section 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第4部分。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Golob from Kansas City.
观众提问：约翰·戈洛布，来自堪萨斯城。
I have a follow-up question to your comments about how financial statements can be distorted by making over-optimistic assumptions about returns for the pension portfolio.
我想就您之前关于财务报表可能因养老金投资组合的过度乐观假设而被扭曲的评论提一个后续问题。
If you believe accounting statements, as published in annual reports, returns on equity for U.S. businesses are amazingly high — higher than in Europe, higher than they’ve been historically, higher than Japan.
如果相信年报中发布的会计报表，美国企业的股本回报率惊人地高——高于欧洲、高于历史水平，也高于日本。
Are these highs, do you think, completely attributable to accounting shenanigans? Or are there any fundamental reasons in addition that might make returns in the U.S. higher than in Europe or higher than they’ve been historically?
您认为这些高回报率完全归因于会计伎俩吗？还是说除了这些，还有其他基本原因使得美国的回报率高于欧洲，或高于历史水平？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that they certainly — to the extent that American returns have been higher than those around the world, at least in developed countries, I would say that they are not solely due at all to accounting shenanigans.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说，美国的回报率高于世界其他地区，至少在发达国家是如此，这肯定不完全是因为会计伎俩。
I think that the absence of honest accounting for option costs and — has been a factor. But American business has done very well, excluding — very well — excluding any accounting activities that Charlie and I might differ with.
我认为，缺乏对期权成本的诚实会计处理是一个因素。但撇开那些查理和我可能持不同意见的会计操作，美国企业的表现确实非常出色。
You know, I’m no expert on exactly what returns have been around the world in developed countries, but my impression definitely is that American business is well above averaged — average — for the developed world, in terms of profitability.
我并非全球发达国家回报率方面的专家，但我的印象是，美国企业在盈利能力上远高于发达国家的平均水平。
And, you know, I don’t have the answers as to why that’s occurred. I think that American business, and I think the whole American system, has reflected more of a meritocracy than exists in many countries.
至于为什么会这样，我没有确切答案。我认为美国企业，以及整个美国体系，更加体现了一种优绩主义，这在许多国家是不存在的。
And I think that a meritocracy works best. I think — and I think that mobility between classes, which is the flip side of a meritocracy, you know, does tend to get the Jack Welches into positions of — whether they run a General Electric or an Andy Grove or an Intel or, you know, go with Sam Walton at Walmart.
我认为优绩主义是最有效的。同时，阶层流动性是优绩主义的另一面，它有助于杰克·韦尔奇这样的人成为领袖——无论是领导通用电气，还是安迪·格鲁夫的英特尔，或是山姆·沃尔顿的沃尔玛。
I think if you’d taken those same individuals and dropped them down in most countries, they would’ve done very well. But I don’t think they would’ve done quite as well as here.
我认为，如果这些人被放在其他大多数国家，他们也会表现出色。但我不认为他们能像在美国这样成功。
And I think that what they have done well has spilled over, in a big way, to benefit the American economy.
我认为，他们的成功对美国经济产生了巨大的溢出效应，带来了巨大利益。
So I would not lay it all on the accounting shenanigans.
所以我不会将所有功劳归于会计伎俩。
And the pension funds accounting, that applies very heavily at some companies. And, of course, most newer companies don’t have pensions.
养老金会计问题在一些公司中很严重。当然，大部分新公司没有养老金计划。
Companies that have started in the last 20 or 30 years are much more inclined to have various kinds of profit sharing or 401(k)s.
过去20到30年成立的公司更倾向于实施利润分享计划或401(k)计划。
The older industries that took on pensions spurred, to a great degree, I think, by World War II, when you got excess profits taxes that ran to 90 percent.
我认为，较早的行业引入养老金计划，很大程度上是受到二战的推动。当时，超额利润税高达90%。
And there was a huge incentive to start pension plans and fund them heavily because the government, in effect, was funding 90 percent of your pension obligation.
当时有很大的动机去设立养老金计划并大量注资，因为实际上，政府承担了90%的养老金责任。
So there was a great boon — boom period in the inauguration of pension funds. And, of course, that meant steel and auto and all of those big industries of that time.
因此，那段时间是养老金基金创立的繁荣期。而受益的主要是当时的钢铁、汽车等大型行业。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It isn’t so much accounting shenanigans as it is deliberate financial practice. Take General Electric.
查理·芒格：是的，这与其说是会计伎俩，不如说是有意的财务操作。以通用电气为例。
There’s been a deliberate increase in financial leverage, which was made possible by the wonderful and deserved reputation.
他们有意增加财务杠杆，这是由于其良好且应得的声誉所支持的。
There’s been a deliberate increase in repurchase of stock, which General Electric has done even when they’re paying huge multiples of book value.
他们有意增加了股票回购，即使通用电气当时支付的价格是账面价值的数倍。
That sort of thing does wonders for returns on equity as reported, as does the process of writing off everything in sight and various extraordinary charges, removing the burden of past costs from future earnings.
这种做法对报告的股本回报率有奇效。同样的效果还来自于大量的资产核销和各种特殊费用，从而将过去成本的负担从未来的收益中剔除。
You put all those things together, and American returns on equity are higher partly because the management has deliberately set out to paint the company as unusually efficient in its use of capital, meaning that it earns a high return on shareholders’ equity.
综合来看，美国的股本回报率较高，部分原因是管理层有意把公司描绘成资本使用效率特别高的样子，也就是显示出股东权益的高回报率。
Think of how high we could drive our return on equity at Berkshire. I mean, we could make it almost any number you want if we just used enough leverage.
想想我们在伯克希尔如何提高股本回报率。如果我们使用足够的杠杆，我们几乎可以让这个数字达到任何水平。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we could run it with no (inaudible).
沃伦·巴菲特：是啊，我们甚至可以让它在没有（听不清）的情况下运作。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We could run Berkshire with no equity. And then people could say, “Gosh, these guys have finally learned how to manage the damn thing.” (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我们甚至可以让伯克希尔完全没有股本。然后人们会说：“天啊，这些家伙终于学会了如何管理这玩意儿了。”（笑声）
It’s not been an objective around here to reduce the equity to zero. But at other places, in order to make the reported return on equity good, they deliberately pound on the net worth as much as they can.
但我们从未将减少股本为零作为目标。而其他公司，为了让报告的股本回报率好看，故意压低净资产，尽可能降低账面价值。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The questioner may have seen — if you look at the S&P figures of the last 15 years, they report them both before special charges and after special charges. And there’s been a very significant difference between those two figures.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。提问者可能注意到，如果你查看过去15年标准普尔的数据，它们会分别报告扣除特殊费用前后的数字。这两个数字之间存在显著差异。
American business likes to frequently write off things and say that doesn’t count. And, of course, that takes the equity down. And it actually frequently benefits future earnings because you remove costs that would otherwise hit the income statement in future years.
美国企业经常喜欢核销一些项目，然后说这些不算数。当然，这会降低股本。而实际上，这也经常有利于未来的收益，因为它剔除了本应在未来几年损益表上出现的成本。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The truth of the matter is you have — part of this is shrewd and correct management of the companies’ financial structure and operations. And part of it can drift into gamesmanship.
查理·芒格：事实是，这其中一部分是对公司财务结构和运营的精明且正确的管理。而另一部分可能会变成一种策略性的操控。
37. Save money in your teen years and be very curious
在青少年时期存钱，并保持好奇心
WARREN BUFFETT: Region 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：第5区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett. My name is Mallory Marshall (PH). I am 11 years old and I am from Kearney, Nebraska. I have 2 questions.
观众提问：嗨，巴菲特先生。我叫马洛里·马歇尔（音），今年11岁，来自内布拉斯加州卡尼。我有两个问题。
First, my dad would like to know if you have any grandsons my age. (Laughter)
首先，我爸爸想知道您是否有和我同龄的孙子。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Any what her age?
沃伦·巴菲特：有什么？和她同龄的？
CHARLIE MUNGER: She wants to know if you have any grandsons her age.
查理·芒格：她想知道您是否有和她同龄的孙子。
WARREN BUFFETT: How many shares of stock do you have? And I’ll tell you. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你有多少股票？我告诉你答案。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Also, what investment advice do you have for young people of my generation?
观众提问：另外，您对我们这一代年轻人有什么投资建议？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I’ve got a grandson fairly close to your age and he probably would go for a younger woman anyway, so — (laughter) — I will mention him to you. Mention you to him.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我有一个孙子和你年纪差不多，反正他可能喜欢年纪小一点的女孩，所以——（笑声）我会跟他提起你，也会跟你提起他。
The — well, if you’re interested in financial matters, A, you’ve got to have something to work with.
嗯，如果你对金融感兴趣，第一，你得有资金作为起点。
I mean, I was fortunate in that respect because my dad paid for my education. If he hadn’t, I probably wouldn’t have become educated if I had to pay for it myself, but —
我在这方面很幸运，因为我父亲支付了我的教育费用。如果他没有这样做，而我需要自己支付学费的话，我可能根本不会受教育，但是——
So I was able to save $10,000 by the time I was 21. And, you know, that was a huge, huge head start.
所以，到我21岁时，我已经存了1万美元。那真是一个巨大的起步优势。
If I hadn’t have been able to do that and, you know, my first child came along when I was 22.
如果我当时无法做到这一点，你知道的，我22岁时就迎来了我的第一个孩子。
So it’s much easier to save in those teenage years if you’re lucky enough to be in a family where you don’t have — where your parents are taking care of your financial obligations.
所以，如果你足够幸运，处于一个父母能照顾你财务负担的家庭，青少年时期存钱就会容易得多。
Every dollar then is, you know, worth making $10 or $20 later on.
那时存下的每一美元，未来可能价值10美元甚至20美元。
And, so if you are interested in financial matters, getting a stake early is very useful, and getting knowledge early is very useful.
因此，如果你对金融感兴趣，早点积累资金非常有用，早点获取相关知识也非常有用。
So, you know, I would say you’re well on the way if, at 11, you’re even interested in coming to a meeting like this.
所以，我想说，如果你在11岁时就对参加这样的会议感兴趣，那你已经在正确的道路上了。
And I would — if that interest is maintained, you know, I would read financial publications. I would read whatever was of interest to me. I’d be curious about how the businesses around the town of Kearney operated.
如果你能保持这种兴趣，你可以多读一些财经出版物，阅读任何你感兴趣的内容。我会对卡尼镇周边的企业是如何运营的保持好奇心。
I would — to the extent that you can get people to talk to you — and people usually like to talk, you know — learn about who’s got good businesses in Kearney and why they’re good businesses.
如果可以的话，我会找人聊一聊——人们通常都乐意谈话，了解卡尼有哪些优秀的企业，以及它们为什么是优秀的企业。
And learn about the businesses that went out of business and why they went out of business.
也去了解那些倒闭的企业，以及它们为什么倒闭。
And just keep accumulating knowledge. That’s one of the beauties of the business that Charlie and I are in, is that everything is cumulative.
不断积累知识。这正是查理和我从事的行业的美妙之处之一：所有东西都是累积的。
The stuff I learned when I was 20 is useful today. Not in necessarily the same way and not necessarily every day. But it’s useful.
我20岁时学到的东西，今天依然有用。虽然用法不一定相同，也不一定每天都用得上，但它依然有用。
So you’re building a database in your mind that is going to pay off over time.
所以，你是在大脑中建立一个数据库，随着时间的推移，这将带来回报。
But you have to have a little money to work with. So there’s nothing like getting a few dollars ahead. Stay away from credit cards.
不过你得有一点资金作为起点。所以，攒下一些钱是最好的事。远离信用卡。
And you can have a lot of fun, if your mind goes along that track as you get older.
如果你的思维随着年龄增长沿着这条轨迹发展，你会发现乐趣无穷。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m glad to see somebody that has, so early, shown an interest in getting ahead. There’s nothing wrong with getting ahead. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我很高兴看到这么小的孩子就表现出想要进步的兴趣。追求进步没有什么不好。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And actually, she may have the best idea about getting ahead by learning the name of my grandson, too. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：事实上，通过了解我孙子的名字，她可能已经找到了追求进步的最佳方法了。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there, I can give the young lady some advice. Before your feelings totally take over, you should look carefully at both parents and all four grandparents. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我可以给这位小姑娘一些建议。在情感完全占据主导之前，你最好仔细看看他的父母和四位祖父母。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Write Charlie and let us know how it works out. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：给查理写封信，告诉我们最后的结果如何。（笑声）
38. GEICO policy retention rates
GEICO 保单续保率
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第6区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Jack Hurst (PH), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Three notes of thanks.
观众提问：我是杰克·赫斯特（音），来自宾夕法尼亚州费城。我有三点感谢。
First, for American Express for the terrific job they’ve done the last three times in scheduling reservations for me.
首先，感谢美国运通，他们过去三次为我安排预订的表现非常出色。
The second is thanks for the care you take with your annual report. There is nothing more accessible than the statistics in that report, and the text is just absolutely marvelous.
其次，感谢您对年报所付出的精心努力。这份报告中的数据非常易读，文本内容也绝妙无比。
The third one is the care and feeding you give to troubled businesses like World Book, which I’m glad has survived, and Dexter Shoes.
第三，感谢您对那些陷入困境的企业如 World Book 和 Dexter Shoes 的照顾和扶持。我很高兴看到 World Book 存活了下来。
They’re closing the plant in Milo, Maine, which is advantageous for the shareholders.
他们关闭了缅因州米洛的工厂，这对股东来说是有利的。
But they gave the people enough time that, because of the additional — Jackson Labs expanded, they’re hiring, and Fidelity brought 6,000 jobs into the area.
但他们给了工人们足够的时间，因为附近的杰克逊实验室扩展了，他们在招聘人员，富达也为该地区带来了6000个工作岗位。
So those people will have better chance for jobs than they had to — if they were kicked out right away.
因此，那些工人找工作的机会会比立即被解雇时要好得多。
The second point is a question about GEICO.
第二个问题是关于 GEICO 的。
You have a wonderful table in your annual report showing the number of policies issued and the policies in force at the end of each year, for the last seven or eight years.
您在年报中提供了一张很棒的表格，显示了过去七到八年间，每年发出的保单数量和年末有效的保单数量。
In general, at the end of one year, the policies in force are equal to 95 percent of the policies in force at the beginning of the year, plus 60 percent of those that have been issued in the year.
一般来说，一年结束时，有效保单数等于年初有效保单数的95%，再加上当年新发保单的60%。
And that’s been constant, up until this last year, when the amount in force at the end of 2000 is 24 percent of the policies issued in 2000 and 95 percent of those that were in force at the end of 1999.
这个比例一直保持稳定，直到去年发生了变化。2000年末的有效保单数等于2000年新发保单的24%和1999年末有效保单数的95%。
I’m curious if Mr. Nicely has asked, first, “Why is there such a large difference in lapse between the first year policies and the renewal policies?” and, “Why is there such a discontinuity in the year 2000?”
我很好奇尼克利先生是否调查过：第一，“为什么第一年保单和续保保单之间的失效率差异这么大？” 第二，“为什么2000年出现了这样的不连续性？”
WARREN BUFFETT: The — I’ll answer the last one first, about GEICO. The retention rate is affected overwhelmingly by two factors.
沃伦·巴菲特：我先回答关于 GEICO 的最后一个问题。续保率主要受到两个因素的影响。
One is the mix between the below-standard business, the standard business, and the better business, in terms of risk.
一个是低标准业务、标准业务和优质业务之间的风险构成比例。
In other words, we have — just making a calculation here — we have 75 percent or so of our business, plus, in the preferred category.
换句话说，我们大约有75%的业务属于优质业务类别。
But we have grown faster up till the last year or so — in the last three or four years before that — up till the last year in the standard and the non-standard business.
但在过去三四年里，直到去年，我们在标准业务和非标准业务上的增长更快。
Those latter two categories have far greater lapse — or non-retention ratios — or lapse ratios — than the preferred business.
这两类业务的失效率——或者说非续保率——远高于优质业务。
They’re two different businesses almost. So any change in the mix between preferred and the other two categories will change the aggregate retention ratio very substantially.
它们几乎是两种完全不同的业务。因此，优质业务和其他两类业务之间比例的任何变化，都会显著影响整体的续保率。
The second thing is that the first year has a much higher retention — lapse ratio — than the second year of a policy. And, in turn, than the third, and so on.
第二个因素是，保单第一年的失效率远高于第二年，第二年的失效率又高于第三年，依此类推。
In other words, if you get to preferred business that’s been with you five or more years, you have a very, very high retention ratio.
换句话说，如果一份优质业务保单持续五年或更长时间，续保率会非常高。
In the last few years, we’ve added more new business than we were adding in the years before that.
在过去几年里，我们新增的业务比此前几年要多。
So we have had a higher percentage of new business and we’ve had a higher percentage of non-preferred business, both of which would make the aggregate lapse ratio look higher, even though the lapse ratio, when categorized by class of business and age of business, really hadn’t changed very much.
因此，我们的新增业务比例更高，非优质业务比例也更高。这两个因素会使整体的失效率看起来更高，尽管按业务类别和保单年龄分类的失效率实际上并没有发生太大变化。
Now, it’s true, however, our retention ratio in the preferred business has fallen by a point or so.
不过，确实我们的优质业务续保率下降了大约一个百分点。
But that’s the big difference. And now, unfortunately, you know, our new business is not as strong.
但这就是主要的差异。现在，不幸的是，我们的新增业务并不那么强劲。
So you’ll actually see, and — but, our preferred business is running stronger than our standard and non-standard.
所以，你实际上会看到我们的优质业务表现优于标准和非标准业务。
So you are seeing the mix go back in the other direction, right now. I mean, currently, that’s going on.
所以目前，你会看到业务构成正在向另一个方向回归。
Through right to date this year, our preferred business is up in aggregate policy holders. And our standard and non-standard is down.
截至今年为止，我们的优质业务保单总数在上升，而标准和非标准业务在下降。
So what you’ve deduced from those figures reflects changes in mix and age of business far more than it does retention ratio, although there was a minor change in the retention ratio.
所以您从这些数据中得出的结论，更多反映的是业务构成和保单年龄的变化，而不是续保率，尽管续保率也有小幅变化。
And that will be true. And maybe I should explain that better in the annual reports in the future.
这就是事实。也许我应该在未来的年报中对此做更清晰的解释。
I touched on it once a year ago, but we can make that clearer in future reports.
我在一年前提到过一次，但我们可以在未来的报告中做得更清楚一些。
What you said about the American Express people, I echo. I mean, they have just done a fabulous job with people.
关于美国运通的评价，我完全同意。他们的服务表现非常出色。
We sort of turned the problem over to them of how people get here and where they stay and all of that. And we’ve had wonderful help from the local American Express office.
我们基本上把人们如何到这里、在哪里住宿等问题交给了他们，当地的美国运通办公室提供了极大的帮助。
And frankly, they’ve been so good, we don’t even think about it. We just refer people on to American Express. And I congratulate them for the job they’ve done. Thank you. (Applause)
说实话，他们的表现非常好，我们甚至不需要去操心这些问题。我们只是把人推荐给美国运通。他们的工作值得称赞。谢谢！（掌声）
39. “True synergy” between General Re and Berkshire’s reinsurance operations
General Re 与伯克希尔再保险业务之间的“真正协同效应”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请第7区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Chip Mann (PH) from Minneapolis, Minnesota. Thanks again for this open format and your direct answers to our questions.
观众提问：我是奇普·曼（音），来自明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯。再次感谢您开放的问答形式以及您对我们问题的直接回答。
You’ve talked a bit about the super-cat class level of risk that you write. Could you share your thoughts about expanding the competitive advantage and the scale advantages at General Re, referring more to their traditional or historical franchise and the type of contracts they would write?
您之前谈到过您承保的巨灾风险类业务。您能分享一下关于如何扩展 General Re 的竞争优势和规模优势的看法吗？特别是他们传统或历史业务及所签订的合同类型。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. General Re was a — is a — and General Re and Cologne are a very different operation than the historical reinsurance business of National Indemnity.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，General Re 和科隆再保险公司与 National Indemnity 的历史再保险业务截然不同。
National Indemnity had nothing like their distribution system. And they have a — and a knowledge base for a whole different form of reinsurance than we could ever accumulate at National Indemnity.
National Indemnity 没有像他们那样的分销系统。而且，他们的再保险知识体系与我们在 National Indemnity 积累的完全不同。
General Re did not — nor Cologne — did not take — retain — as much risk as we’re quite willing to retain because their financial profile was different before they joined Berkshire.
在加入伯克希尔之前，General Re 和科隆再保险公司并没有愿意承担像我们现在这样多的风险，因为他们的财务状况不同。
So it’s an opportunity for us, for two reasons, to make more money in that respect than General Re might’ve made on its own.
因此，从两个方面来说，这对我们而言是一个机会，使我们在这一领域赚取比 General Re 单独运营时更多的利润。
One is we can retain much bigger portions of what they would write in the first place, and which they’ve been writing over the years, but which they’ve laid off with other companies in what has the fancy name of retrocessionals.
第一，我们可以保留他们最初承保的大部分业务。这些业务他们多年来一直在做，但通常会通过再保险（retrocessionals）转嫁给其他公司。
And a second point is that they have a distribution capacity that may well have the ability to deliver to us a lot of big risks that we might not otherwise see.
第二，他们拥有强大的分销能力，能够为我们带来许多我们可能原本无法接触到的大风险业务。
And that, in the past, they might not otherwise have had a good outlet for.
而在过去，他们可能也无法为这些大风险业务找到一个好的去处。
So there is — there’s really true — I hate the word — but there’s really true synergy in General Re Cologne being married to Berkshire Hathaway.
因此，General Re 和科隆与伯克希尔的结合确实存在真正的——我不太喜欢这个词——但确实存在真正的协同效应。
And you’ve put your finger on, really, one point that has two aspects to it.
您提到的正是一个有两个层面的关键点。
And we haven’t fully exploited that. We probably won’t fully exploit it, you know, 10 years from now.
我们尚未完全挖掘这一点。即使在未来10年内，我们也不太可能完全挖掘出所有潜力。
But it’s very much in my mind and the minds of the managers at General Re and Cologne that we have expanded opportunities, simply because Berkshire is willing to take on more risk than just about anybody in the world knowingly takes on.
但我和 General Re 以及科隆再保险公司的管理层都深知，我们拥有了更广阔的机会，因为伯克希尔愿意承担比世界上几乎所有其他公司更多的、清楚了解的风险。
Although we think some other people take on a lot more risk, unknowingly.
尽管我们认为，某些公司承担了更多风险，但他们自己并不清楚。
But in terms of writing a specific contract, we are both bigger and faster, I think, than anybody in the world.
但在承保具体合同方面，我认为我们比世界上任何公司都更大、更快。
In effect, we have some of the abilities that used to be associated with going to a Lloyd’s of London.
实际上，我们具备了一些过去人们认为只有伦敦劳合社才拥有的能力。
I mean we can — now, I don’t know how true all that was over the years, because I wasn’t around there then.
当然，我不确定过去的劳合社是否真的如此，因为当时我并不在那里。
But we really can give an answer on something in an hour that other companies wouldn’t know what to do with in a month. And that should be a plus for us in the world.
但我们确实能在一小时内对某件事做出决定，而其他公司可能一个月都不知该如何处理。这对我们来说是一个竞争优势。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格：没什么要补充的。
40. Why Buffett doesn’t like to buy a new car
为什么巴菲特不喜欢买新车
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第8区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ethan Berg. I’m from Cambridge, Massachusetts and I’d like to thank you for the education you’ve provided, particularly with the annual reports. I’ve got three brief questions.
观众提问：我叫伊桑·伯格，来自马萨诸塞州剑桥。感谢您提供的教育，尤其是您写的年报。我有三个简短的问题。
Years ago, you wrote to your friend Jerry Orans that you were applying to Columbia’s Business School because they had a pretty good finance department and a couple of hot shots in Graham and Dodd.
多年前，您曾写信给您的朋友杰里·奥兰斯，告诉他您申请哥伦比亚商学院，是因为他们的金融系非常优秀，还有格雷厄姆和多德这样的大师。
If you were considering graduate or business school today, with which individuals or professors would you want to study?
如果您今天要考虑攻读研究生或商学院，您会想和哪些教授或人士一起学习？
The second question is, a friend who wants to know your thoughts on the concrete, cement and aggregates business.
第二个问题是，我有个朋友想知道您对混凝土、水泥和骨料行业的看法。
And the third question is from my wife.
第三个问题来自我的妻子。
You mentioned earlier if someone were buying a parachute, they wouldn’t buy based on lowest bid. We saw you tooling around in a car this week that, were it to be bought today, could probably be bought at a relatively low bid.
您之前提到过，如果有人要买降落伞，他们不会选择最低价的产品。我们看到您这周开着的车，如果今天买的话，价格可能会很便宜。
As someone interested in your health, she’s wondering whether you’ve considered a newer automobile, possibly one with lots of airbags. (Laughter)
作为关心您健康的人，她想知道您是否考虑过换一辆新车，可能是配备多个安全气囊的车。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Actually, I picked out the car I have based on the fact that it had airbags on both sides. So that was a factor. It may be the first car of its type ever made with airbags.
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，我选择我现在的车是因为它左右两侧都有安全气囊。这是一个重要的因素。它可能是同类车型中第一批配备安全气囊的车。
But I think my car actually — it’s both heavy and has airbags, and those are two primary factors in safety.
但我认为我的车又重又配备安全气囊，这是安全性最重要的两个因素。
I don’t think any — I don’t think a safer car is necessarily being made. It might be safer to drive around in a big, heavy duty truck or something but I’m not ready for that.
我不认为一定有更安全的车制造出来。或许开一辆重型卡车更安全，但我还没有准备好这样做。
Incidentally, on a car, I look at that like anything else. It would take me, probably, a half a day to go through, you know, the exercise of buying a car and reading the owner’s manual and all that.
顺便说一下，买车对我来说和其他事情一样。我可能需要花半天时间去买车，阅读使用手册之类的东西。
And that’s just a half a day I don’t want to give up in my life for no benefit.
而这半天的时间对我来说是无法割舍的，因为没有任何实际的好处。
You know, if I could write a check in 30 seconds and be in the same position I’m in now with a newer car, I’d be glad to do it this afternoon.
如果我可以在30秒内写张支票，然后用一辆新车回到现在的状态，我很乐意今天下午就去做。
But I don’t like to trade away when there’s really no benefit to me at all. I’m totally happy with the car.
但如果这对我没有任何好处，我不会愿意去折腾。我对现在的车完全满意。
I just don’t want to trade away the amount of time I’d have to spend fooling around to get familiar with and get title to and do all the rest of the things, pick one out, so a new car.
我只是不愿意花时间去折腾，去熟悉新车、办手续、挑选一辆车等等。
But if there’s a safer car made, you know, I’ll be driving in it.
不过，如果有更安全的车制造出来，我会去开它。
41. Concrete, cement, and aggregates are understandable
混凝土、水泥和骨料行业是可以理解的
WARREN BUFFETT: The aggregates business, concrete, all of that, those are businesses that — and Charlie probably knows more about them than I do. We’ve looked at businesses like that.
沃伦·巴菲特：骨料、混凝土等业务，查理可能比我更了解这些行业。我们也研究过类似的业务。
In fact, we’ve even owned a few shares at one time or another, because it’s an understandable business.
事实上，我们曾在某个时候持有过一些股票，因为这是一个可以理解的行业。
And it’s a business that — particularly if you get into concrete, cement, I mean, you know, there have been periods of substantial overcapacity, particularly on a regional basis.
这是一个这样的行业——尤其是混凝土和水泥行业，曾经历过产能严重过剩的时期，尤其是在区域层面上。
But those are fundamental businesses. And at a price, you know, for low-cost capacity and advantageously located raw materials and so on, you know, we would do it.
但这些是基础性行业。如果价格合适，例如低成本的产能、有利位置的原材料等条件满足，我们会投资这样的行业。
In fact, Charlie and I talked about one probably 10 or 15 years ago —
事实上，查理和我大约在10到15年前讨论过这样一个行业——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.
查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — quite a bit. And he’s had a fair amount of familiarity with it.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们讨论得很深入，他对这个行业有相当的了解。
And what was the other one? I jotted it down here. Let’s see.
还有另一个问题是什么？我在这里记下了，让我看看。
42. Business schools are “pathetic” at teaching how to invest
商学院在教授如何投资方面“很糟糕”
CHARLIE MUNGER: He wanted to know what business school a young man should —
查理·芒格：他想知道年轻人应该去哪个商学院——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, business schools.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，商学院啊。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — go to.
查理·芒格：——去就读。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I would say this, that I think Bruce Greenwald’s class at Columbia is very good.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说，布鲁斯·格林沃尔德在哥伦比亚大学的课程非常好。
He gets in a lot of people that are practitioners. So there’s a lot of practicality to the course.
他邀请了许多行业实践者参与课程，因此课程非常具有实用性。
And I think Bruce is good. He’s got a new book coming out probably within the next six months or so that will deal with that.
我认为布鲁斯很出色。他的新书大概在接下来六个月左右会出版，主题也是相关内容。
And then there also has been endowed, at the University of Florida, certain courses relating to value investing.
此外，佛罗里达大学也开设了与价值投资相关的课程。
And I think there’s been one at the University of Missouri.
我记得密苏里大学也有类似的课程。
So I would suggest you at least check out the curriculum at the University of Missouri and Columbia and Florida.
因此，我建议你至少看一下密苏里大学、哥伦比亚大学和佛罗里达大学的课程设置。
And do a little comparison and maybe check with a few graduates — recent graduates — as to what kind of experience they had.
做一些比较，最好和几位最近的毕业生聊聊他们的就读体验。
If you can find them, I think that’s the best system for evaluating a place.
如果能找到他们，我认为这是评估学校最好的方法。
But those three, at least, have courses that, based on the catalogue, sound like they might be of interest to you.
不过，至少这三所学校的课程，按课程目录来看，听起来可能会引起你的兴趣。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. A huge majority of the business school teaching on the field of investment of (inaudible) portfolios of securities is not what we believe and not what Warren was taught years ago by Ben Graham.
查理·芒格：是的，绝大多数商学院在投资领域教授的内容，尤其是证券投资组合相关的知识，并不是我们所相信的，也不是多年前沃伦从本·格雷厄姆那里学到的东西。
There’re just little pockets of our attitude left. There’s one at Stanford. Jack McDonald?
我们这种理念只存在于少数地方。斯坦福大学有一门课程，由杰克·麦克唐纳教授？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, sure. Yeah, that’s graduate school. But yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，那是研究生课程，没错。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s graduate school. And what’s interesting about that is I think it’s the most popular course in the whole Stanford Business School.
查理·芒格：那是研究生课程。有趣的是，这门课程可能是整个斯坦福商学院最受欢迎的课程。
They’ve got some kind of a bidding system. And yet, I asked Jack how he felt and he said he felt lonely.
他们有某种竞选选课的系统。但我问杰克的感受时，他说他感到很孤独。
He’s got the most popular course, but in the whole professoriate, dealing with investment matters, the Jack McDonalds are a little clan of their own in a side pocket, so to speak.
他教授的是最受欢迎的课程，但在整个投资领域的教授群体中，杰克·麦克唐纳们就像是被放到一个角落的小圈子里。
Now, they’re right. And they can take whatever consolation they get from that. But mostly, if you go to business school you will learn a lot of things we don’t believe. (Laughter)
当然，他们是正确的。但他们只能从中获得些许安慰。因为大多数情况下，如果你去商学院，你会学到很多我们不相信的东西。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Jack — Bob Kirby comes in and works with Jack sometimes, too. And Bob has got a terrific mind, in terms of investment. I mean, there’s no question about that.
沃伦·巴菲特：杰克——有时候鲍勃·柯比也会和杰克一起合作。鲍勃在投资方面的头脑非常出色，这一点毫无疑问。
You know, it’s not the easiest school in the world to get into and it is at the graduate level. But there are these occasional little anomalies, as they would say, in the teaching world.
你知道的，斯坦福并不是世界上最容易进入的学校，而且这是研究生水平的课程。但在教学界，偶尔会出现这种“小异常”。
I mean, what you really want a course on investing to be is how to value a business. That’s what the game is about.
我想说，真正有用的投资课程，应该教你如何给一家公司估值。这才是投资的本质。
I mean, if you don’t know how to value a business, you don’t know how to value a stock.
如果你不知道如何给企业估值，你也就不知道如何给股票估值。
And if you look at what is being taught, I think you’ll see very little of how to value a business.
如果你看看现在商学院在教什么，你会发现很少涉及如何估值企业的内容。
And the rest of it is playing around, maybe, with numbers or, you know, Greek symbols or something of the sort.
剩下的内容基本上就是玩弄数字、希腊符号之类的东西。
But it doesn’t do you any good. I mean, in the end, you have to decide, you know, whether you’re going to value a business at $400 million or $600 million or $800 million.
但这些对你毫无帮助。最终，你必须决定一家公司的估值是4亿美元、6亿美元，还是8亿美元。
And then you compare that with the price. And that’s what investing is. And I don’t know any other kind of investing, you know, basically to do.
然后你再将估值与价格进行比较，这才是投资。我不知道还有什么其他投资方法可以做。
And there — that just isn’t taught. And the reason it isn’t taught is because there aren’t teachers around, you know, who know how to teach it.
而这些内容在学校里根本没有教授。原因是，根本没有老师知道该如何去教它。
I mean, they don’t know themselves. And since they don’t know themselves, they teach something that says, “Nobody knows anything,” which is the efficiency market theory. (Laughter)
也就是说，他们自己都不懂。因为他们不懂，所以他们教的是“没有人知道任何东西”，也就是有效市场理论。（笑声）
And if I didn’t know how to do it — and if I ever teach physics, I’m going to come up with a theory that nobody knows anything, because it’s the only way I can get through the day, you know? But — (Laughter)
如果我自己不会做投资——假设我教物理，我会提出一个“没有人知道任何东西”的理论，因为这是我唯一能应付过去的办法，对吧？（笑声）
It’s fascinating to me how, you know, the really great universities operate in this respect.
令我感到有趣的是，所谓的顶尖大学在这方面是如何运作的。
If you get a sacred writ, I mean, you get in the finance department because you sign on, you know, to whatever the present group thinks.
如果有一套“圣经”般的教义，你想进入金融系，你必须认同当前教授们的观点。
And if they think the world is flat, you’d better think the world is flat too, you know?
如果他们认为地球是平的，你也必须这样认为。
And your students better answer that the world’s flat when they get it on exams.
你的学生在考试中也必须回答地球是平的。
I would say investment — finance — teaching in this country, in general, is kind of pathetic.
我认为，这个国家的投资和金融教育总的来说相当糟糕。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the business schools do a pretty good job when it comes to accounting —
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为商学院在教授会计方面做得还不错——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, accounting, sure, sure.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，会计，没错，确实不错。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — or personnel management, or — there’re a whole lot of subjects I think they do quite well with. But they miss one enormous opportunity.
查理·芒格：——或者人力资源管理等科目，很多领域他们做得都很好。但他们错失了一个巨大的机会。
If you learn to think intelligently about how to invest successfully in businesses, you’ll become a much better business manager than you will if you aren’t good at understanding what’s required for successful investment.
如果你能学会如何以智慧的方式思考如何成功地投资企业，你就会成为一个更优秀的企业管理者。而如果你不懂成功投资所需的要素，你的管理水平就会受限。
So they’re missing a huge opportunity to improve the management profession by doing such a lousy job in teaching investment.
因此，他们在投资教育方面表现糟糕，错失了提升管理职业水平的巨大机会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, see, Charlie and I see CEOs all the time who, in a sense, don’t know how to think about the value of businesses they’re acquiring.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我经常遇到一些 CEO，从某种意义上讲，他们并不知道如何思考所收购企业的价值。
And then, you know, so they go out and hire investment bankers.
于是，他们只能去聘请投资银行家。
And guess what? The investment banker tells them what to do, tells them to do it because they get 20X if they do it and X if they don’t do it.
你猜怎么着？投资银行家会告诉他们该怎么做，因为如果他们执行了这个建议，银行家能拿到20倍的报酬，而不执行的话只有1倍。
And guess how the advice comes out.
你猜这个建议会是什么？
So it’s a — when a manager of a business feels helpless, which he won’t say out loud, but inwardly feels helpless in the question of asset allocation, you know, you’ve got a real problem.
所以，当企业管理者在资产配置问题上感到无助——虽然他们不会公开承认，但内心却感到无助时，问题就真的来了。
And there aren’t — they have not gone to business schools that have given them any real help, I think, in terms of learning how to think about valuation in businesses.
我认为，他们所就读的商学院并没有真正帮助他们学会如何评估企业价值。
And, you know, that’s one of the reasons that we write and talk about it some, because there’s a gap there.
这就是我们写作和讨论这个话题的原因之一，因为这里存在一个巨大的缺口。
43. Credit card advice: “It’s crazy to get in debt
关于信用卡的建议：“负债是疯狂的”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，1号提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Martin Mitchell (PH). I’m from Bakersfield, California.
观众提问：我叫马丁·米切尔（音），来自加利福尼亚州贝克斯菲尔德。
My question, a two-part question, is concerning debt. We know that individual debt can be devastating.
我的问题分为两个部分，都是关于债务的。我们知道个人债务可能会带来毁灭性的影响。
Do you — are you concerned that the American consumer is so far in debt, as a whole, as to be a problem?
您是否担心美国消费者整体债务水平过高，从而引发问题？
And part two is, do you feel that our trade deficit with other countries is of concern to you?
第二部分是，您是否担心美国与其他国家之间的贸易逆差？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first question about debt, I think it’s very hard to answer about the consumer as a whole.
沃伦·巴菲特：关于第一个债务问题，我认为很难对整体消费者给出一个明确的答案。
I get letters every day from people who have problems in life. And they revolve — I mean, they’re either health or debt. And usually — frequently — the debt is connected with health, you know?
我每天都会收到人们寄来的信，讲述他们生活中的问题。这些问题通常与健康或债务有关。而且，债务往往与健康问题相联系，你知道吗？
But they — it’s been very easy for them to borrow money, and they’re in over their heads, and it’s all over then.
但借钱对他们来说太容易了，他们因此负债累累，最后陷入困境。
And there’s no question that the American consumer is somewhat more indebted, in aggregate.
毫无疑问，美国消费者的整体债务水平确实有所上升。
But it’s a very hard thing, I think, to come into conclusions about whether it poses a serious problem.
但我认为，很难得出一个结论，说明这是否会构成严重的问题。
You know, most people have had assets, directly or indirectly, that have gained in value enormously, particularly in real estate and some in securities.
大多数人，直接或间接地，拥有的资产价值已经大幅上升，尤其是在房地产领域，还有一些是证券。
So there’s a greater capacity to carry debt as earning power increases and assets held increases.
因此，随着收入能力和资产的增加，人们承担债务的能力也相应提高了。
I don’t — I can’t give you a useful answer, in terms of the world as a whole.
关于整体世界状况，我无法给出一个有用的答案。
But I constantly give advice to young people, and those are the only people I talk to, aside from our shareholder group: just don’t start out behind the eight ball.
但我经常给年轻人一个建议，除了我们的股东，这几乎是我唯一谈话的群体：不要一开始就背负沉重的债务。
I mean, it’s crazy to get in debt because it’s so hard to get out of debt.
我认为负债是疯狂的，因为一旦陷入债务，想摆脱就非常困难。
And, I mean, the idea of having credit card debt — and we issue credit cards in all our businesses and, you know, so does every other retailer.
再比如信用卡债务——我们旗下的公司也发放信用卡，你知道，所有零售商都这么做。
But the idea of trying to borrow money at 18 percent, you know, and thinking you’re going to get ahead in life, it isn’t going to work.
但你想通过借18%利率的高利息债务来改善生活，这是根本行不通的。
And I urge people — they can use their credit card, but I urge them to pay it off before it starts revolving because it’s just — it’s too expensive.
我建议人们——可以使用信用卡，但一定要在还款周期开始之前还清，否则成本实在太高了。
Charlie and I can’t make money with 18 percent money. I mean, we’re looking around for float because we don’t want to pay 5 percent for money.
查理和我都无法用18%成本的资金赚钱。我们一直在寻找低成本的浮存金，因为我们连5%的资金成本都不愿支付。
And, so I’m very sympathetic to people get in debt. But once you get in it, it is hell to get out.
所以，我很同情那些负债累累的人。但一旦你陷入债务，想要摆脱它简直是地狱般的困难。
I mean, Charlie will have a few Ben Franklinisms to quote on that subject.
查理在这个话题上，可能会引用一些本杰明·富兰克林的格言。
In fact, you want to give a few from Ben now? (Laughter)
事实上，你现在想引用几句吗，本杰明的名言？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, no.
查理·芒格：哦，不用了。
WARREN BUFFETT: He’d love to, but I led him into it the wrong way.
沃伦·巴菲特：他很愿意，但我把他引入了一个错误的开场白。
44. Long-term trade deficit is “a significant minus for the country”
长期贸易逆差“对国家来说是一个重大负面因素”
WARREN BUFFETT: And the second question about the trade deficit, that’s a very interesting thing.
沃伦·巴菲特：关于第二个贸易逆差问题，这是一个非常有趣的话题。
Because when you run a trade deficit, what you’re doing is you’re trading assets of one sort or another for goods, beyond what you’re sending abroad.
因为当你出现贸易逆差时，实际上你是在用某种形式的资产去换取超过你出口的商品。
So in effect, you are selling off a tiny bit of the farm so that the country can consume more than it’s producing.
换句话说，你是在“卖掉一点农场”，以便国家能够消费超过其生产的东西。
If you run a net trade deficit, the country, in aggregate, is consuming less than — or consuming more — than it’s producing.
如果存在贸易逆差，从整体上看，这个国家的消费超过了其生产能力。
And if you’re a very rich country, you can’t even see it because if you run a trade deficit of a few hundred billion dollars, you know, compared to an economy that’s maybe worth, what, 40 trillion or something like that, you don’t see it.
如果你是一个非常富裕的国家，你甚至感觉不到它。因为即使贸易逆差有几千亿美元，和一个价值可能40万亿美元的经济体相比，你看不到太大的影响。
But you’re trading off a tiny bit of the farm every year to live a little bit better than if you just lived off the produce of the farm that year.
但你每年都在“卖掉一点农场”，这样可以比只靠那一年的农场产出生活得更好一些。
And you can do it with IOUs if you’ve got a good record. You can’t do it with IOUs if you’re a country that’s got a terrible record.
如果你的信用记录良好，你可以用“欠条”（债务）来做到这一点。但如果你的信用记录糟糕，就无法用“欠条”来操作。
So they have to denominate their debt in dollars. And, of course, they don’t have the ability to denominate a lot of dollars, and people don’t want to accept a weak currency.
因此，他们必须用美元来计价债务。当然，他们无法发行太多美元，因为人们不愿接受弱势货币。
So a weak country can’t get away with doing that, unless it’s getting special-type loans from agencies set up to do that.
所以，一个弱势国家无法通过这种方式实现贸易逆差，除非它从专门提供贷款的机构获得特别的贷款。
We can do almost anything we want in this country, because we don’t confiscate property and we don’t — we haven’t destroyed a currency that the people have accepted, in terms of payment for their goods, over the years.
而我们国家几乎可以做任何想做的事，因为我们不会没收财产，也没有破坏作为商品支付手段、被人们接受的货币。
But I basically think a significant trade deficit over a long enough time is a significant minus for the country.
但我基本认为，长期、大规模的贸易逆差对国家来说是一个重大负面因素。
You won’t see it though, day-by-day, or week-by-week, or month-by-month.
不过，你不会在日常、每周或每月看到明显的影响。
But eventually, if you trade for trinkets or whatever you’re getting beyond what you’re sending, and you trade away your assets —
但最终，如果你用资产去换取小饰品或任何超过出口量的东西，你就是在出卖自己的资产。
Fortunately, some of the assets we traded not that many years ago, like movie studios and some of those things, the other people got the short end of the bargain on.
幸运的是，几年前我们交易的一些资产，比如电影工作室等，结果是其他人吃了亏。
顺差国很可能永远买不到对的资产，如果能买到就不会是顺差国。
But by and large, it’s not a good policy for the country to run large trade deficits year after year.
但总的来说，年复一年地维持巨额贸易逆差对国家并非良策。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s — that’s certainly true if what you’re trading for is trinkets, or consumer goods, or something.
查理·芒格：嗯，如果你用贸易逆差换来的是小饰品、消费品之类的东西，那肯定是个问题。
But, of course, a developing country that ran a trade deficit to put in power plants and what have, that might be a very smart thing to do.
但如果一个发展中国家通过贸易逆差投资于电厂等基础设施，那可能是一件非常明智的事情。
In fact, the United States once did that.
事实上，美国曾经也这么做过。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we did it with railroads in a huge way, you know, and —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们曾大规模地用贸易逆差修建铁路，没错，而且——
CHARLIE MUNGER: But under modern conditions, do we look like a twosome that would love a big trade deficit? (Laughter)
查理·芒格：但在现代条件下，我们看起来像是喜欢巨额贸易逆差的两个人吗？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: No. It’s one thing to build railroads with the process, but it’s another thing, you know, to buy radios and television sets.
沃伦·巴菲特：当然不是。用贸易逆差修建铁路是一回事，但用它去买收音机和电视机又是另一回事。
I mean, it depends what you’re getting.
我的意思是，这取决于你用贸易逆差换来了什么。
But by and large, we run a trade deficit on consumption goods. And that’s not a big plus over time.
但总体来看，我们的贸易逆差主要用于消费品。而从长期来看，这并不是什么好事。
45. Satisfied sellers are a “recruiting force”
满意的卖家是一种“招募力量”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：第2区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m Jim Hays (PH) from Alexandria, Virginia.
观众提问：下午好，我是吉姆·海斯（音），来自弗吉尼亚州亚历山德里亚。
I’d like to thank you and Mr. Justin for bringing his masterpiece into the Berkshire family.
我要感谢您和贾斯汀先生将他的杰作带入了伯克希尔家族。
But the question arises, will you soon run out of privately-held firms that meet the criteria for acquisitions of sufficient size to continue the returns to Berkshire?
但我的问题是，您是否很快会遇到没有足够符合您收购标准且规模足够大的私营公司，从而影响伯克希尔的投资回报？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question because people who sell to us have the option of — private business — selling elsewhere or going public.
沃伦·巴菲特：这是个好问题，因为那些卖给我们的私营企业有两个选择，要么卖给别人，要么上市。
There seem to be enough people that have built businesses lovingly over 50 or 100 years, and their parents before them and grandparents, that really do care about the eventual disposition of them in some way beyond getting the last dollar that day, that we have a supply from time to time of those businesses.
有不少人，他们的企业是用心经营了50年甚至100年，他们的父母和祖父母也是如此。这些人确实关心企业的最终归属，不仅仅是那一天能拿到的最后一块钱。因此，这样的企业时不时会成为我们的收购对象。
And I think we’ll continue to see them.
我认为我们今后还会继续遇到这样的企业。
You do raise an interesting question. How many businesses like that are worth, you know, a billion dollars or more in the whole economy?
你确实提出了一个有趣的问题：整个经济中，有多少这样的企业价值超过10亿美元？
There seem to be — you know, I wish there were more, but there are enough. So I think we will probably buy, on average, maybe two a year, something of that sort.
虽然这样的企业不多——我希望能有更多，但目前数量足够。我预计我们平均每年大概会收购两家这样的企业。
The really big ones — I mean, what we’d love to make is a 10- or $15 billion acquisition. And there would be very few private companies that would be in that category.
至于真正的大公司——我指的是我们希望做的那种100亿到150亿美元规模的收购，这类私营公司极少。
And then, from the ones that are in that category, you have to find somebody that is not going to conduct an auction.
而且，即使在这样的公司中，我们还需要找到那些不打算进行拍卖的人。
We don’t — we just are not interested in auctions. If somebody wants to auction their business, we’re not that excited about getting in with them because we need people to run it after we buy it.
我们不感兴趣——我们对拍卖过程毫无兴趣。如果有人想把他们的公司拍卖掉，我们就不会兴致勃勃地参与，因为我们在收购之后还需要有人来经营这些企业。
And, if that’s the way they look at their business, we may get more unpleasant surprises than we’ve tended to get in the past with the kind of criteria we’ve used.
如果他们是那样看待自己的企业，那么我们可能会比以往遇到更多不愉快的惊喜，因为那不符合我们的收购标准。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There’re two aspects of that situation. One is, are there going to be enough businesses? And two, how much competition are we going to get from other buyers?
查理·芒格：是的，这种情况有两个方面。一是，是否会有足够的企业可供收购？二是，我们会面临多少其他买家的竞争？
One thing we do have going for us is that if you are the kind of a business owner that likes the culture that’s in this room today, there isn’t anybody else like us.
我们拥有的一个优势是，如果你是喜欢今天这个房间里这种文化的企业主，那么没有其他人能与我们相比。
Everybody else is off on a different path with a different culture. (Applause)
其他人都走在不同的道路上，拥有不同的文化。（掌声）
So — and look at all you. I mean, this culture is popular, at least with a certain group.
所以——看看你们所有人。这种文化至少在特定人群中很受欢迎。
And surely, there’ll be other people who like this culture in the future, as in the past, and will feel right about joining it with their companies.
毫无疑问，未来还会有其他人像过去一样，喜欢这种文化，并愿意将他们的公司加入其中。
WARREN BUFFETT: We haven’t had any luck internationally so far, but we would hope that that could change.
沃伦·巴菲特：到目前为止，我们在国际市场上并不顺利，但我们希望这种情况会改变。
I was over in Europe about a month ago and I got asked the question a lot of times about whether we would be a prospect for businesses in Europe, for example.
大约一个月前，我去了欧洲，人们多次问我，我们是否会成为欧洲企业的潜在买家。
The answer is yes. And then they say, “Well, you know, why haven’t you bought anything?” And I said, “The phone’s never rung.”
我的答案是肯定的。但他们接着问：“那么，为什么你们还没有买下任何企业呢？” 我说：“从来没有人打过电话给我。”
I don’t know whether they thought that was a brilliant answer or not, but they — (Laughter)
我不知道他们是否觉得这个回答很高明，但他们——（笑声）
But I left my phone number a lot of places, you know? Every time I got a chance, I gave that answer. And maybe the phone will ring.
不过，我留下了我的电话号码，到处都留了。每次有机会，我都会说这个答案。也许电话会响。
I’ve got to believe that, if we were on the radar screen the same way in Europe over the last five years that we have been in the United States, we would’ve bought a couple of companies.
我相信，如果我们在过去五年里在欧洲的知名度和我们在美国的一样，我们应该已经收购了几家公司。
It’s just, they don’t think of us. And a lot of people don’t think of us in the United States, either, but more do now than did five or 10 years ago.
只是他们没有想到我们。在美国，很多人以前也没有想到我们，但现在想到我们的人比五年或十年前更多了。
And we have, actually — a reasonable percentage of our acquisitions come, directly or indirectly, because we’ve made another acquisition in the past where the seller was happy.
事实上，我们有相当一部分的收购，直接或间接地来源于过去收购时的卖家，他们对交易感到满意。
It’s very hard to find anybody that’s been unhappy dealing with us.
很难找到对与我们交易感到不满的人。
And they’re friends with other people in their industry, or whatever it may be. So, we hear about things now more often, because we actually have what you might call a recruiting force out there of people that have already done business.
他们和业内其他人是朋友，或与其他人有联系。因此，我们现在更经常听到收购机会，因为那些与我们做过交易的人，实际上成了我们的一种“招募力量”。
It’s very much like NetJets that way. I mean, we spend a lot of money advertising at Executive Jet, the NetJet service.
这与 NetJets 非常相似。我们在 NetJets 的服务上花了很多广告费。
But still, 70 percent or so of our business comes from owners who are with us. They’re, by far, the best salespeople we have.
但即便如此，大约70%的业务还是来自于现有客户。他们是我们最好的销售人员。
And incidentally, that’s the way I was introduced to the business. Frank Rooney, who’s in this room today, told me about his good experience with NetJets back in January or so of 1995.
顺便说一句，这也是我接触到这项业务的方式。今天在座的弗兰克·鲁尼，在1995年1月左右告诉我他在 NetJets 的良好体验。
And that’s when I joined in. And if Frank hadn’t told me, I might — six years later, I might not have ever looked into it.
那时候我才加入了。如果弗兰克没有告诉我，六年后我可能依然没有关注这项业务。
I mean, you know, I might’ve just turned the pages past the ads and —
也许我只是翻过广告，完全忽略了它——
But when Frank said, “You ought to look into this,” I did. Well, that’s what we hope we have going for us on the acquisition front.
但当弗兰克说“你应该看看这个业务”时，我就去看了。这也是我们希望在收购业务中所具备的优势。
And I think we do, to some degree. But we’d like it to be greater, and we would like it to be more widespread, geographically, than it is.
在某种程度上，我们已经具备了这种优势。但我们希望这种优势能更强大，地理范围更广泛。
CHARLIE MUNGER: When I was a lawyer, I used to say, “The best business getter any lawyer has is the work that’s already on his desk.”
查理·芒格：我当律师时常说：“律师最好的业务来源，就是已经在桌上的工作。”
And similarly, probably the best business getter that Berkshire Hathaway has is the business practice that’s already on our desk.
同样地，伯克希尔最好的业务来源，可能就是我们已经在做的业务实践。
That’s what’s driving the new businesses in, right, Warren?
这正是吸引新业务的原因，不是吗，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. Sure.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。
CHARLIE MUNGER: So it’s a very old-fashioned idea. You just do well with what you already have and more of the same comes in.
查理·芒格：这是一个非常传统的理念。把手头的业务做好，更多类似的业务自然会找上门来。
46. Why Berkshire sold its Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae stakes
为什么伯克希尔出售了房地美和房利美的股份
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请三号提问区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Steve Sondheimer. I live in Chicago and I’m 14 years old. I’m a third generation shareholder and my question is, I noticed that you sold our position in Freddie Mac. What risks do you see in that industry?
观众：我叫史蒂夫·桑德海默，来自芝加哥，今年14岁。我是第三代股东，我的问题是，我注意到您卖掉了我们在房利美（Freddie Mac）的持股。您认为这个行业有什么风险？
WARREN BUFFETT: Are you Joe’s granddaughter?
沃伦·巴菲特：你是乔的孙女吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah.
观众：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, good. We have an amazing number of second and third and even fourth generation shareholders, which I’m delighted with. I mean, I don’t think lots of companies — big companies on the stock exchange — are in that position.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，太好了。我们有很多第二代、第三代甚至第四代的股东，这让我非常高兴。我想，很多上市大公司都不太会出现这样的情况。
It is true, we sold the Freddie Mac stock last year. And there were certain aspects of the business that we felt less comfortable with as they unfolded — and Fannie Mae, too.
的确，我们去年卖掉了房利美的股票。随着一些业务发展，我们对它的某些方面感到不太放心——房地美（Fannie Mae）也是如此。
And the consequences of what we saw may not hurt the companies, I mean, at all. But they made us less comfortable than we were earlier, when, actually, those practices or activities didn’t exist.
我们观察到的情况可能并不会对这些公司造成损害，但它们让我们感到不如之前那样安心，尤其是当时这些做法或活动尚不存在时。
We did not — I would stress — we did not sell because we were worried about more government regulation of Freddie and Fannie. If anything, just the opposite, so —
我必须强调，我们并不是因为担心房利美和房地美面临更多政府监管而卖掉它们的股票。恰恰相反——
It was not — it was not — Wall Street occasionally will react negatively to the prospect of more government regulation and the stocks will react sometimes short-term for that reason. But that was not our reason. We were — we felt the risk profile had changed somewhat.
并不是这样——华尔街有时会对政府监管预期做出负面反应，导致股票短期波动。但这并不是我们的理由。我们是因为感觉风险状况发生了一些变化。
Charlie?
查理，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but that may be a peculiarity of ours. We are especially prone to get uncomfortable around financial institutions.
查理·芒格：是的，但这可能是我们的一个特点。我们对金融机构特别容易感到不安。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re quite sensitive to —
沃伦·巴菲特：我们对风险非常敏感——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
查理·芒格：没错。
WARREN BUFFETT: — risk in — whether it’s in banks, insurance companies or in what they call GSEs here, in the case of Freddie and Fannie.
沃伦·巴菲特：无论是银行、保险公司，还是像房利美和房地美这样的政府支持企业（GSEs），我们都对风险十分敏感。
We feel there’s so much about a financial institution that you don’t know by looking at just figures, that if anything bothers us a little bit, we’re never sure whether it’s an iceberg situation or not.
我们认为，金融机构有很多东西是无法仅从财务数据中了解的。如果有什么让我们稍微感到不安，我们就无法确定这是否会是“冰山”现象。
And that doesn’t mean it is an iceberg situation, in the least, at banks or insurance companies that we pass.
但这并不意味着我们放弃的银行或保险公司就一定存在问题。
But we have seen enough of what happens with financial institutions that push one way or another, that if we get some feeling that that’s going on, we just figure we’ll never see it until it’s too late anyway.
不过，我们见过太多金融机构因某种推动而出问题的情况。如果我们有这种感觉，我们就会认为，等我们真正看到问题时已经太晚了。
So we bid adieu without — and wish them the best — without any implication that they’re doing anything wrong. It’s just that we can’t be 100 percent sure of the fact they’re doing things that we like.
所以我们选择道别，并祝他们一切顺利——这并不意味着他们做错了什么。只是我们无法百分之百确定他们在做我们喜欢的事情。
And when we get to that situation, it’s different than buying into a company with a product or something, or a retail operation. You could spot troubles usually fairly early in those businesses. You spot troubles in financial institutions late. It’s just the nature of the beast.
在这种情况下，这与购买产品公司或零售业务的股票有所不同。在那些行业里，你通常可以很早发现问题。而在金融机构里，你往往发现得太迟。这就是其固有的特点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Financial institutions tend to make us nervous when they’re trying to do well. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，当金融机构试图表现出色时，它们反而会让我们感到紧张。（笑声）
That sounds paradoxical, but that’s the way it is.
这听起来有些矛盾，但事实就是如此。
WARREN BUFFETT: Financial institutions don’t get in trouble by running out of cash in most cases. Other businesses, you can spot that way.
沃伦·巴菲特：在大多数情况下，金融机构不会因为现金短缺而出问题。其他行业则可以通过这种方式早早发现麻烦。
But a financial institution can go beyond the point — and we had banks 10 years ago that did that, en masse — but they can go beyond the point of solvency even while they still have plenty of money around.
但金融机构可以在看似资金充裕时，早已超过了偿债能力的极限。10年前，我们见过银行集体陷入这种情况。
47. Debating whether it’s good moats are harder to find
争论是否是好的，更难找到
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请四号提问区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is George Brumley from Durham, North Carolina.
观众：下午好，巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫乔治·布鲁姆利，来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆。
We often consider evaluating companies in the context of Michael Porter’s model of position relative to competitors, customers, suppliers, substitute products. You state that much more simply when you say you seek for companies with the protection of wide and deep moats.
我们通常会根据迈克尔·波特的模型来评估公司，考虑其相对于竞争对手、客户、供应商、替代产品的地位。而您则用更简单的表述说，您寻找那些拥有宽广且深厚护城河保护的公司。
To complete the valuation of a company, we all seek to choose the appropriate future cash flow coupons. A qualitative assessment of the protected competitive position is required to precisely forecast those future coupons.
要完成对一家公司估值，我们都试图选择合适的未来现金流“贴现”。要准确预测这些未来的现金流，就需要对公司的竞争优势进行定性评估。
In your opinion, are the dynamic changes in the nature of competition, distribution systems, technology, and even changes in customers, making it more difficult to accurately forecast those future cash flow coupons?
在您看来，竞争性质、分销系统、技术，甚至客户变化等动态因素，是否让准确预测这些未来现金流变得更加困难？
Are good, protected businesses going to be more rare going forward in — than they have been in the past? And if so, does that make the few that do exist more valuable?
未来，那些具备良好保护的公司会比过去更稀缺吗？如果是这样，那么现存的少数公司是否会变得更有价值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’ve really described the investment process well. I can’t see from here, but which George are you? Are you the — are you Fred’s brother-in-law or are you one generation down?
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你很好地描述了投资的过程。我从这里看不清楚，但你是哪位乔治？你是弗雷德的姐夫，还是下一代？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: George III. My father is here as well.
观众：我是乔治三世，我父亲也在这里。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, good. The questions you ask are right on the mark. And we do think, to the extent I understand what — or have read what Porter has written, we think alike, basically, in terms of businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。你的问题非常精准。我所理解和阅读的波特理论，我们在商业理念上基本一致。
And we do call it a moat. And he makes it all into a book, but that’s the difference between the businesses we’re in. (Laughter)
我们称之为“护城河”，而他把它写成了一本书，这就是我们所处行业的不同之处。（笑声）
纸上谈兵，噪音比有用的知识更多。
I — and Charlie may have a different view on this. I don’t think that the quantity or sustainability of moats in American business has changed that dramatically in 30 or 40 years.
我——查理可能会有不同的看法。但我认为，在过去30到40年间，美国企业护城河的数量或可持续性并没有发生特别显著的变化。
Now, you can say that Sears and General Motors and people like that thought there were some very wide moats around their businesses, and it turned out otherwise when, in the case of Sears, Walmart, for example, came along.
当然，你可以说，西尔斯和通用汽车等公司曾经认为它们的业务有非常宽广的护城河，但后来事实证明并非如此，比如西尔斯面对沃尔玛的竞争时。
But, I think — the businesses we think about, I think the moats that I see now seem as sustainable to me as the moats that I saw 30 years ago.
不过，在我们关注的公司中，我认为现在看到的护城河，与30年前看到的护城河一样具有可持续性。
But I think there are many businesses — industries where it’s very hard to evaluate moats. There — those are the businesses of rapid change.
但我认为，在许多行业中，护城河是很难评估的。那些行业的特点就是变化非常迅速。
And are there fewer businesses around where change is going to be relatively slow than previously? I don’t think so, but maybe Charlie does.
现在，那些变化相对缓慢的公司是否比过去更少了？我不这样认为，但查理可能有不同意见。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I would argue that the old moats, some of them are getting filled in. And the new moats are harder to predict than some of the old moats. No, I would say it’s getting harder.
查理·芒格：不，我认为一些旧的护城河正在被填平。而新的护城河比旧的更难预测。所以，我认为情况变得更困难了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there you have it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好了，答案就在这儿了。（笑声）
Unanimity at Berkshire. OK.
在伯克希尔，我们达成了一致意见。
I think it’s a very good question. And I really don’t — you know, Charlie may be right, I may be right. I think it’s a very tough one to figure.
我认为这是个非常好的问题。说实话，查理可能是对的，我也可能是对的。我觉得这个问题确实很难判断。
But regardless of whether there are fewer or that — harder to find, that’s still what we’re trying to do at Berkshire. I mean, that is what it’s all about.
但无论护城河是否变少，或者更难找到，这依然是我们在伯克希尔努力的方向。这就是我们的核心目标。
Our instructions to our managers — we don’t have budgets and we don’t have all kinds of reporting systems or anything else. But we do tell them to try and not only protect, but enlarge, the moat. And if you enlarge the moat, everything else follows.
我们给管理者的指示是——我们没有预算，也没有各种复杂的报告系统或其他东西。但我们确实告诉他们，要努力不仅保护护城河，还要扩大护城河。如果你能扩大护城河，其他一切都会随之而来。
48. How derivatives become “potential dynamite”
衍生物如何成为“潜在炸药”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5?
沃伦·巴菲特：五号提问区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Bill Graham (PH) from Los Angeles.
观众：我是比尔·格雷厄姆，来自洛杉矶。
Warren, you’ve made it possible for outside shareholders to understand Berkshire’s financial businesses.
沃伦，您让外部股东能够理解伯克希尔的金融业务。
But there is one that seems, to me, anyway, hard to understand, which is the financial products business, which I guess, involves trading of derivatives.
但有一项业务对我来说似乎很难理解，就是金融产品业务，我猜它涉及衍生品交易。
And for the same — given the same kind of concerns that you and Charlie voiced in relation to financial businesses, can you help us out on that and why you’re comfortable with it?
鉴于您和查理对金融业务表达过的担忧，您能解释一下吗？您为什么对这项业务感到放心？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think you put your finger on it, Bill.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，比尔，我觉得你提到了关键点。
It is a hard business to understand. And it’s a hard business to understand if you own it, let alone read about it in somebody else’s annual report.
这确实是一个难以理解的业务。如果你拥有这项业务，尚且如此，更别提从别人的年报里去了解了。
And I would guess that most people who own complicated or extensive derivatives businesses, I would say that most of the CEOs probably don’t understand it. And how many of them stay awake at nights over that, I don’t know.
我猜，拥有复杂或庞大衍生品业务的公司，大多数CEO可能并不真正理解这些业务。我不知道他们有多少人因此夜不能寐。
Actually, in financial products, what you see on that one line of income on that, and also what you see in the balance sheet items, is a combination of several things.
实际上，金融产品这一行的收益和资产负债表上的项目，实际上包含了几种不同的业务。
It’s General Re Securities, which used to be GRFP, General Re Financial Products. It’s — and it’s a couple of other operations.
其中包括General Re Securities，以前称为GRFP，也就是General Re Financial Products，还有其他一些业务。
It actually had our — it has our — structured settlement business in it, which is quite predictable and a very easy business to understand.
其中也包括我们的结构性结算业务，这是一项相当可预测且易于理解的业务。
And it actually has some trading business that I do that falls in there. It’s not our normal investment business, but it may involve, what I think are — it tends to be fixed-income related.
还有一些我个人操作的交易业务也包括在内。这不是我们的正常投资业务，但它主要与固定收益相关。
It might involve arbitrage or semi-arbitrage of various types of fixed-income securities. It wouldn’t involve any equity arbitrage. That would not be in there.
可能包括各种固定收益证券的套利或半套利操作。但不会涉及股票套利，这不在其中。
But I would say that it would be a fair criticism to say that neither Charlie nor I know fully, or even in large part, what goes on in the derivatives business.
不过，说查理和我对衍生品业务完全了解，甚至大部分了解，都是不准确的，这样的批评是合理的。
Now, we have a fellow who is both smart and trustworthy running that in Mark Byrne. So we feel very good about the individual.
不过，我们有一位既聪明又值得信赖的人在负责这块业务，他就是马克·伯恩。所以我们对这个人非常放心。
We do not feel the instinctive understanding of everything that’s going on that we do, probably, in most of the businesses that we’re in.
但我们对这项业务并没有像对大多数其他业务那样有本能的了解。
I think we’ve probably got 17,000 outstanding tickets at General Re Securities. And those interplay in all kinds of ways.
我想，General Re现在大约有17,000张未结清的合约，它们之间存在各种复杂的关联。
And I don’t think that Charlie or I have my mind — our minds — around that book of products.
我认为，查理和我都无法完全理解那本合约账簿。
That means we want to be very comfortable with the fellow whose job it is to have his mind around those products. And I will tell you that, you know, there’s nobody that I’d feel more comfortable with than Mark Byrne.
这就意味着，我们必须对负责这些业务的人感到非常放心。而我可以告诉你，除了马克·伯恩，我对其他任何人都不会如此放心。
But it is — it’s not a natural-type business for us.
不过，这并不是我们自然熟悉的业务类型。
The other things in that area, and we made a fair amount of money in some things that aren’t related to the derivative business last year. And those are under my direct control. So I feel OK about that.
这个领域的其他业务中，去年我们在一些与衍生品无关的业务上赚了不少钱，这些业务在我的直接控制之下，所以我对此感到放心。
The structured settlement business is a minor profit area. But it’s made us some money. And right now, it’s not attractive. But it could be again in the future.
结构性结算业务是一项利润较小的业务，但它确实给我们带来了收入。目前它不再具有吸引力，但未来可能会再次变得有吸引力。
And there could be other financial-type things we would stick in there. But if we stuck in anything, it would be something that I would be running.
未来，我们也可能会在这个领域加入其他金融业务。但如果加入，那将是我直接负责的业务。
Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that mix includes what I would call oddball pastimes of Warren Buffett — (laughter) — outside —
查理·芒格：是的，这个组合包括我所称的沃伦·巴菲特的一些非同寻常的嗜好——（笑声）——在股票投资领域之外的。
WARREN BUFFETT: The ones that are publishable. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是那些可以公开的嗜好。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: — outside the common stock field. That I’m quite comfortable with, although I’m sure the results will be irregular.
查理·芒格：——是在普通股票投资领域之外的。这些我都很放心，尽管我确定结果会有些不规则。
The rest of it — and I think we also have what might be called oddball personal ideas of Mark Byrne, and I’m quite comfortable with those.
除此之外，我认为我们也有马克·伯恩的一些可以称之为奇特的个人理念，这些我也很放心。
As you get away from that, into what might be called more standardized derivative trading businesses, I think it’s fair to say I like them less than most of the people do who are in them.
如果你离开这些领域，进入那些所谓更标准化的衍生品交易业务，我认为可以公平地说，我比大多数从事这些业务的人更不喜欢它们。
WARREN BUFFETT: Quite a bit less. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：少得多。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we regard that area as potentially being dynamite because if you get a group — a large group — of people that, in many cases in that business — although we’ve tried to go away from it ourselves — but in many cases in that business are getting paid based on front-ending potential profits, you can get — I mean, that’s a dangerous situation to place a hundred people in. You’re going to find people who will crack under that, in terms of what they will do.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们认为那个领域可能是“炸药”，因为如果你有一群——一大群——人，而在那个行业的许多情况下——尽管我们自己努力远离这种模式——但在那个行业的许多情况下，人们的报酬是基于潜在利润的提前兑现来支付的，这会导致——我的意思是，把一百个人置于这样的环境中是很危险的。你会发现有人在这种情况下会“崩溃”，做出一些问题行为。
You know, they had — we had a case of it, actually, in the electric utility industry a year or two ago, when Edison in California, through a subsidiary, compensated people based on projecting the profitability of the business they were putting on the books that day.
你知道，其实我们在一两年前的电力公用事业行业中也看到过这种情况。当时，加州的爱迪生电力通过一家子公司，根据他们当天录入账面的业务预期盈利能力来给人们支付报酬。
That’s Wall Street practice and it was brought to the utility industry. And it produced I’d say predictable results.
这是华尔街的惯例，它被带入了公用事业行业。而它产生了我认为是可预见的结果。
So it’s dangerous to pay people to make deals where you won’t know the outcome for 15 or 20 years and give them a lot of money upfront for doing it.
因此，给人们支付报酬去做一些你在15或20年内都无法得知结果的交易，并提前支付大量报酬，这种做法是危险的。
And that’s fairly standard practice in the business. I mean, it was standard practice at Salomon when I was there. And as I say, people occasionally crack under that.
而这是行业中的相当标准的做法。我是说，当我在所罗门兄弟公司时，这是标准做法。正如我所说，有时人们会在这样的压力下“崩溃”。
It isn’t exactly analogous, but it’s worth reading Roger Lowenstein’s book entitled “When Genius Failed,” because it touches on some of the problems we’ve described that Charlie and I are apprehensive about.
这并不完全类似，但值得一读的是罗杰·洛文斯坦的书《天才的失败》，因为它涉及了一些我们描述过的、让我和查理感到担忧的问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the derivatives business has the very significant problem that the accounting profession sold out. The accounting is improper. It front-ends way too much income.
查理·芒格： 是的，衍生品业务存在一个非常严重的问题，那就是会计行业已经妥协了。会计处理不当，它过于提前确认了收入。
It’s irrationally optimistic because that’s the way the denizens of the field want it because it creates bigger compensation. This is intrinsically an irresponsible system. And it’s another case where the accounting profession has failed the wider civilization.
这是非理性地乐观，因为这是这个领域的人们所希望的方式，因为它能带来更高的报酬。这本质上是一个不负责任的体系。这又是一个会计行业未能对更广泛的社会负起责任的例子。
WARREN BUFFETT: We found — Charlie was on the audit committee at Salomon — and we found positions — single positions — mismarked by close to $20 million, for example, didn’t we, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们发现——查理当时在所罗门兄弟的审计委员会——我们发现某些头寸——单个头寸——被误标了接近2000万美元，例如，不是吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, yeah. But deliberate mismarkings was not the main problem. The main problem is the whole system of accounting is wrong. The whole system of accounting is too optimistic. It would be like going into the taxi cab business with a 30-year depreciation rate.
查理·芒格： 哦，是的。但故意的误标并不是主要问题。主要问题是整个会计体系是错误的。整个会计体系过于乐观。这就像是进入出租车行业，却用30年的折旧率一样。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Or it’d be like writing long, very long-tail insurance, and paying a big commission upfront based on the expected profit of that insurance over a 10-year period or something, with that prepared by the guy who wrote the policy.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。这就像承保长期、非常长尾的保险，然后根据那份保险在10年内的预期利润支付一大笔前期佣金，而这些数据是由承保那份保单的人准备的。
There are certain activities that are really just dangerous in the financial world. And when you get close to that kind of situation, you just have to be very careful.
在金融界，有些活动确实非常危险。当你接近这种情况时，你必须格外小心。
Now you — actually, Mark has been implementing a system that compensates — that accounts for this — significantly differently than occurs at many institutions. So, you know, you can try to attack it. But it’s also hard to get too far away from industry norms and still do business. I mean —
实际上，马克一直在实施一种体系，这种体系的补偿方式——会计处理方式——与许多机构有显著不同。所以，你知道，你可以尝试解决这个问题。但同时也很难完全远离行业规范而仍然能够开展业务。我的意思是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Our accounting is way more conservative than the standard derivative accounting of the country, thank God.
查理·芒格： 是的。我们的会计处理比全国标准的衍生品会计要保守得多，谢天谢地。
49. GEICO’s Lou Simpson manages “autonomously”
GEICO 的卢·辛普森“自主”管理投资
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第六区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Scott Tilson (PH). I’m from Owings Mills, Maryland.
观众提问： 我叫斯科特·蒂尔森（音译），来自马里兰州的欧因斯米尔斯。
Gentlemen, you have stated many times that Lou Simpson manages the GEICO investment portfolio on an independent and autonomous basis.
先生们，您们多次提到卢·辛普森是以独立自主的方式管理 GEICO 的投资组合的。
What unique or superior qualities does Mr. Simpson possess as an investor that has earned him this tremendous vote of confidence?
作为一名投资者，辛普森先生具备哪些独特或卓越的品质，使他赢得了如此巨大的信任？
Secondly, Berkshire invests in privately-held businesses as well as publicly-traded securities. While the skillset required to value public and private businesses may be the same, does Mr. Simpson also have the additional experience and skills necessary to negotiate a private transaction, if called upon to do so?
其次，伯克希尔投资于私营企业和上市证券。虽然评估上市和私营企业所需的技能可能相同，但如果有需要，辛普森先生是否还具备谈判私有交易所需的额外经验和技能？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think he could. But I hope he doesn’t get called on to very soon. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我认为他可以。但我希望很快不会有人要求他这么做。（笑声）
Lou is smart, and careful, and high-grade, and experienced.
卢很聪明、谨慎，品质高尚，且经验丰富。
So he does manage a couple billion dollars autonomously. He will buy things. I won’t know about them until I either look at a monthly sheet or sometimes read it in the paper. And that’s fine, you know? He doesn’t know what I’m doing. I don’t know what he’s doing.
因此，他自主管理着数十亿美元的资金。他会买一些东西，而我可能直到看月度报表或有时从报纸上看到才知道。这没关系，你知道吗？他不知道我在做什么，我也不知道他在做什么。
Every now and then, we’re in the same security, so we try and coordinate if we’re buying or selling under those circumstances.
偶尔，我们会投资于同一只证券，因此在这种情况下我们会尝试协调买卖操作。
And incidentally, you will occasionally read a headline, not a very big headline, but in the financial press that says, “Buffett buying X, Y, Z.” Well, sometimes it should say, “Simpson buying X, Y, Z.”
顺便说一句，你偶尔会在金融媒体上读到一条标题，不是特别大的标题，说“巴菲特买入了 X, Y, Z。”其实，有时标题应该写成“辛普森买入了 X, Y, Z。”
They — the reports we file would not necessarily tell the reader which one of us made the decision, because even if the reports show that something was bought in GEICO, that could be bought in — by me and placed in GEICO for various reasons.
我们的报告并不一定会告诉读者决策是由谁做出的，因为即使报告显示某些投资是由 GEICO 买入的，那也可能是我购买并放入 GEICO 的，出于各种原因。
Or conceivably, Lou can buy something and place it in National Indemnity or some other Berkshire company also for perfectly good reasons. But some of what gets reported as done by Berkshire is done by Lou entirely independent of me.
又或者，卢可能会购买一些东西并放入 National Indemnity 或其他伯克希尔的公司，也出于完全合理的原因。但有些被报道为伯克希尔所做的投资，其实完全是由卢独立完成的。
And most of it, in terms of dollars, is done by me. But Lou’s record is just as good as mine, so.
在金额上，大部分投资是我做的。但卢的投资业绩和我的一样好。
And Lou would know how to evaluate businesses, whether private negotiations or public securities, and — but I’m in no hurry to turn it over. (Laughs)
卢知道如何评估企业，无论是私有谈判还是上市证券，但我并不急于把事情交给他。（笑声）
50. Berkshire’s investment in Finova
伯克希尔对 Finova 的投资
WARREN BUFFETT: Seven.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第七个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Scott Croy (PH). I’m from Chicago, Illinois.
观众提问： 下午好，我叫斯科特·克罗伊（音译），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。
Mr. Buffett, could you please describe the situation — the extent, if any, of Berkshire Hathaway’s investment in Finova Group earlier this year? Finova’s back appears to be against the wall.
巴菲特先生，您能否描述一下伯克希尔·哈撒韦今年早些时候对 Finova 集团的投资情况？Finova 看起来已经陷入了困境。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s worse than against the wall. They’re in Chapter 11. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，比陷入困境还糟。他们已经申请了第十一章破产保护。（笑声）
But that was all contemplated, obviously.
但显然，这一切都是在预期之中的。
Finova is the old Greyhound leasing company, and grew to about 13 or $14 billion in assets. And then just about a year ago, now, ran into funding difficulties.
Finova 是以前的 Greyhound 租赁公司，资产规模增长到了大约130亿或140亿美元。而就在一年前左右，他们遇到了融资困难。
And when you run a highly leveraged finance business and you run into funding difficulties, they compound on you very quickly.
当你经营一家高度杠杆化的金融公司并遇到融资困难时，问题会很快累积并加剧。
You know, confidence is a real coward. I mean, it runs when it sees trouble.
你知道，信心是个真正的懦夫。我是说，一旦看到麻烦，它就会逃跑。
And in a finance business, you’re constantly faced with refinancing old obligations, and you have commercial paper out and all of that. So there’s no honeymoon period when you get in trouble in the finance business.
在金融行业，你需要不断为旧的债务再融资，还要处理商业票据等等。所以，一旦遇到麻烦，这个行业不会有任何缓冲期。
And we’ve even seen big ones in the past, like Chrysler Financial and all of that. I mean, it can strike anywhere when confidence disappears.
我们过去甚至见过一些大公司，比如克莱斯勒金融等。当信心消失时，这种情况可能发生在任何地方。
And so that hit Finova about a year ago. And it became clear not that many months later that Finova would have to either be sold or reorganized.
因此，大约在一年前，这种情况影响到了 Finova。几个月后很明显，Finova 要么得被出售，要么得进行重组。
And I think there were attempts made to sell the company to other finance companies, and even a couple of little portions of the portfolio were sold. But they didn’t make a sale.
我认为，他们曾尝试将公司出售给其他金融公司，甚至还卖掉了一些小部分资产组合。但他们没能完成整体出售。
And when the bonds started selling down to prices that I thought were very attractive, in the fall or whenever it was of last year — and by attractive, I mean, I thought that if they went into bankruptcy that the assets were considerably greater in relationship to the liabilities than indicated by the market — we started buying bonds.
去年秋天或某个时候，当他们的债券价格跌到我认为非常有吸引力的水平时——我指的有吸引力是，我认为即使他们破产，资产与负债的比例仍然远高于市场的反映——我们开始购买这些债券。
And we bought — we publicly announced it. We bought $1,428,000,000 face amount of bonds or bank debt. So we, out of 11 billion of aggregate debt at Finova, we own $1,428,000,000 face value. And we bought those at prices that looked attractive then and look attractive now.
我们购买了——我们公开宣布了——14.28亿美元面值的债券或银行债务。因此，在 Finova 总计110亿美元的债务中，我们拥有14.28亿美元的面值债务。而且，我们当时购买时价格看起来很有吸引力，现在看起来仍然很吸引人。
And it became clear — it was somewhat — it was clear all along that they were either going to sell or go into bankruptcy. And it became clearer that they weren’t finding a buyer as time went by. And so it became very likely that they would declare bankruptcy sometime earlier this year.
当时已经有点清楚——其实一直很清楚——他们要么被出售，要么会破产。而随着时间推移，他们找不到买家的事实变得更加清晰。所以，今年早些时候他们宣布破产的可能性变得非常高。
One of the reasons being is they didn’t want to use the available cash to pay out the creditors whose money was coming due tomorrow, and thereby shortchange creditors whose claims were due at later dates.
其中一个原因是，他们不想用现有现金偿还明天到期的债权人的钱，从而损害那些债权在以后到期的债权人的利益。
We thought, perhaps, somebody would come in with a plan of reorganization. And it got very close to where they — in our view — they were going to default. And so we jointly, with Leucadia, in a joint venture called Berkadia, put forth our own plan and made a — and arranged a transaction.
我们认为，也许会有某人提出一个重组计划。而且在我们看来，他们的情况已经非常接近违约。因此，我们与 Leucadia 共同通过一个名为 Berkadia 的合资企业，提出了自己的计划并促成了一项交易。
But they are now in Chapter 11, and there will be plans presented to the — a plan or plans — presented to the court in short order. And then the court will determine —
但他们现在已经进入了第十一章破产程序，并且很快会有一个或多个计划提交给法院。然后由法院决定——
I’m not — Charlie may know more about exactly how bankruptcy works than I do, although I don’t think he’s had any personal experience — that a plan gets submitted to creditors for approval.
我不——查理可能比我更了解破产程序的具体运作方式，尽管我不认为他有任何个人经验——最终计划会提交给债权人进行批准。
And we will have a plan, which will be — which has been outlined in the press, and will be submitted to the court, almost certainly within a week, and when you can read about it at that time.
我们会有一个计划，这个计划已经在媒体上简要说明，并且几乎可以确定会在一周内提交给法院，届时你可以了解相关情况。
And then we will see whether anything else happens. I mean, it may be that somebody else comes in with a plan. It may be that our plan is approved.
然后我们会看看是否会发生其他事情。我是说，可能会有人提出另一个计划，也可能是我们的计划获得批准。
And if our plan is approved, it involves a significant additional investment so that an initial payment can be made to the present debt holders. And then we’ll see what happens.
如果我们的计划获得批准，它将涉及一笔可观的额外投资，以便向现有债权人进行首次付款。然后我们会再看看接下来的情况如何发展。
We feel very good about Berkadia. I — we think Berkadia — well, we think the Leucadia part of Berkadia brings a lot to the party, in terms of efficiently managing the assets that are there. It makes it — when an entity gets in bankruptcy, it makes a lot of difference how it’s handled.
我们对 Berkadia 感觉非常好。我——我们认为 Berkadia——嗯，我们认为 Berkadia 中的 Leucadia 部分为这个合作带来了很大的优势，尤其是在高效管理现有资产方面。当一个实体进入破产程序时，处理方式会对结果产生很大的影响。
I mean it, you can — there can be a lot of wastage of assets in bankruptcy. Or there could be a reasonably efficient way of handling it.
我的意思是，在破产过程中，可能会出现大量的资产浪费。但也可能会有一种相对高效的处理方式。
We think that the Berkadia arrangement will maximize the value of the assets. And we think that’s important. But we’ll see what happens. I think our position is going to work out fine.
我们认为，Berkadia 的安排将最大化资产的价值。我们认为这一点很重要。但我们会看看会发生什么。我认为我们的立场会有一个很好的结果。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think it’s —
查理·芒格： 是的，我认为这是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Microphone.
沃伦·巴菲特： 麦克风。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — a very interesting transaction. And you would hope there would be more of it.
查理·芒格： ——一个非常有趣的交易。你会希望有更多这样的案例。
WARREN BUFFETT: There will be. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 会有的。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I mean, not more bankruptcy, but more cures of bankruptcy following this model. I think it’s a very intelligent model and a very clean, simple, prompt way of cleaning up a corporate mess.
查理·芒格： 不，我的意思不是更多的破产，而是有更多像这样采用这种模式来解决破产的案例。我认为这是一种非常聪明的模式，一种干净、简单、快捷地清理公司困局的方式。
And I hope the rest of the world feels about it the way I do, and that the judge and other people concerned will say, “Thank God,” and we want this one to go through and we want more like it to happen.
我希望其他人也像我一样对这种模式持积极看法，希望法官和其他相关人士会说：“谢天谢地”，并希望这个案例能够成功，也希望未来能有更多类似的案例出现。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s what we tried to do in Salomon, incidentally. I mean, we tried to behave in a somewhat different way, in terms of a corporate crisis, than typical.
沃伦·巴菲特： 顺便说一句，这也是我们在所罗门兄弟公司时尝试做的事情。我的意思是，我们尝试在处理企业危机时，以一种不同于典型方式的方式行事。
And we hoped that if that got a good result, that that might become a model that people might gravitate toward in future problems, because there will be future problems.
我们希望如果这种方式取得了良好的结果，它可能会成为一个模型，吸引人们在未来的问题中使用，因为未来肯定还会有问题出现。
We are the largest creditor of Finova now. So we have more money on the line than anybody else, and we don’t have an interest —
我们现在是 Finova 的最大债权人。所以我们承担的资金风险比任何人都多，而我们的利益——
You know, our interest is not primarily in getting fees or extending the bankruptcy or, you know, any of that sort of thing. We want to get the greatest realization of assets as possible. And the swing in that between doing it right and doing it wrong, you know, could be measured in the billions.
你知道，我们的利益并不主要在于收取费用、延长破产程序或类似的事情。我们希望尽可能最大化地实现资产价值。而在正确处理和错误处理之间的差距，可能以数十亿美元来衡量。
51. GEICO’s Lou Simpson bought Berkshire’s Gap shares
GEICO 的卢·辛普森买入了伯克希尔的 Gap 股票
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第八区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m Claudia Fenner (PH) from Long Island, New York and I have two questions.
观众提问： 下午好，我是克劳迪娅·芬纳（音译），来自纽约长岛。我有两个问题。
The first is, as a big fan of the Gap, I’d like to know why at this time you feel that the Gap is undervalued.
第一个问题是，作为 Gap 的忠实粉丝，我想知道为什么您认为目前 Gap 被低估了？
And the second question, if you could direct your answer to my husband, as a shareholder, would you agree that buying a large present at Borsheims this afternoon is like taking money out of one pocket and putting it back in another? (Laughter and applause)
第二个问题，请您能对我的丈夫说，作为一名股东，您是否同意今天下午在 Borsheims 买一份大礼物，就像是把钱从一个口袋拿出来又放回另一个口袋？（笑声和掌声）
相当于把种在地里的钱连根拔起，不是每块钱都应该种在地里，拔掉几根也是可以的。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll let Charlie handle the second one. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我会让查理回答第二个问题。（笑声）
He’s our expert on consumption at Berkshire.
他是我们伯克希尔在消费方面的专家。
The Gap is a good illustration of what I talked about earlier, because I think the world assumes that I made a decision to buy Gap at Berkshire. And actually, that’s totally, 100 percent a Lou Simpson portfolio investment.
Gap 是一个很好的例子，说明了我之前谈到的事情。因为我认为人们会以为是我在伯克希尔决定买入 Gap。但实际上，这完全是卢·辛普森的投资组合中的投资，百分之百是他做的决定。
I don’t think I’ve read the annual report of the — I know — I haven’t read the annual report of the Gap ever. And I don’t know anything about it. I mean, you probably know a lot more about it than I do, and I hope Lou knows a lot more about it than I do. (Laughter)
我不认为我读过——我知道——我从未读过 Gap 的年度报告。我对它一无所知。我的意思是，你可能比我更了解它，我希望卢比我更了解它。（笑声）
It’s not a company I’ve ever looked at.
这不是一家我曾经研究过的公司。
And Lou operates — and he has people that help him — Lou operates in somewhat — he can look at smaller securities, in terms of aggregate market caps, than I can, because I’m investing $2 billion. He can work with $200 million positions or even $100 million positions sometimes.
而卢进行投资时——他有团队帮助他——他在某种程度上可以研究市值规模比我小的证券，因为我投资的金额是 20 亿美元。而他有时可以操作 2 亿美元甚至 1 亿美元的头寸。
And I will do that occasionally, just because I happen to bump into them, in effect. But I’m really looking for things that we can put a billion or 2 billion or more in. And Lou’s universe of possible candidates for purchase is a bigger universe than mine.
我偶尔也会这么做，只是因为碰巧遇到机会。但我主要在寻找那些可以投资 10 亿或 20 亿美元甚至更多的标的。而卢的投资标的范围比我的要广得多。
And that may be a good thing, I mean, having two of us in there. Because he just is going to see things that I’m not going to see. So you’ll have to ask Lou about the Gap.
这可能是件好事，我的意思是，我们两人在这里，因为他会看到一些我看不到的东西。所以关于 Gap，你得去问卢了。
52. Buffett’s never regretted buying jewelry
巴菲特从未后悔买珠宝
WARREN BUFFETT: But, well, Charlie, give her a little advice on Borsheim’s. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，查理，给她一些关于在 Borsheim’s 买东西的建议吧。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think when you’re buying jewelry for the lady you love, it probably shouldn’t get too much financial calculation into it. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为当你为心爱的女士买珠宝时，可能不应该过多地考虑财务计算。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I will say this. And this is true. And you’re talking to a guy who does not normally go down this path, but I would say this:
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想说的是——这是真的。你正在和一个通常不会走这条路的人对话，但我要说的是：
I’ve never bought a piece of jewelry that I’ve regretted, in terms of what has happened subsequently, so it — (Laughter)
从后来的结果来看，我从未因为买过的珠宝而感到后悔，所以——（笑声）
Well, if that isn’t a sales pitch, I don’t know what is. (Laughter)
嗯，如果这都不算销售宣传，那我不知道什么算了。（笑声）
53. Why GEICO can’t give everyone a better deal
为什么 GEICO 不能给所有人更好的优惠
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You’re a tough act to follow.
观众提问： 你真是难以超越啊。
I’m Matt Richards. I’m from Parkton, Maryland.
我是马特·理查兹（音译），来自马里兰州帕克顿。
Last year at this meeting, a gentleman stood up and implored you, Mr. Buffett, to invest in some technology stocks to juice our returns. I would like to this year thank you for having not done that. (Applause)
去年在这个会上，有一位先生站起来恳求您，巴菲特先生，投资一些科技股以提高我们的回报。今年，我想感谢您没有那样做。（掌声）
My question is regarding GEICO. I’ve been a USAA preferred risk customer for something like 15 years now.
我的问题是关于 GEICO 的。我已经是 USAA 的优选风险客户大约15年了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You’ll do very well with USAA. They’re a perfect —
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。选择 USAA 会非常好。他们是一家完美的公司——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, well —
观众提问： 是的，但——
WARREN BUFFETT: — company.
沃伦·巴菲特： ——公司。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — I’d prefer to be a customer of the company that I own part of. Unfortunately, due to an accident and two speeding tickets in the last five years, they will not accept me as a preferred risk.
观众提问： ——我更希望成为一家我拥有部分股权的公司的客户。不幸的是，由于过去五年里有一次事故和两张超速罚单，他们不接受我作为优选风险客户。
And I wonder if this isn’t an untapped group of people who are preferred risks with their own company.
我想知道，这是否是一个未开发的客户群体，他们在自己的公司中本可以是优选风险客户。
Couldn’t GEICO possibly take their current preferred risk status into account when determining whether to accept them as a customer?
GEICO 是否可以在决定是否接受他们作为客户时，考虑他们当前的优选风险状态？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would — USAA, incidentally, is a terrific company.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我要说的是——顺便提一下，USAA 是一家非常优秀的公司。
And Leo Goodwin, who started GEICO, which was then called Government Employees Insurance Company in 1936 — Leo actually was a key employee of USAA, as was his wife, Lillian. They both came from USAA.
而 1936 年创立 GEICO（当时称为“政府雇员保险公司”）的利奥·古德温，其实是 USAA 的重要员工，他的妻子莉莲也是。他们都来自 USAA。
And, they felt that — I mean, USAA as you know, limits its clientele — at that time, they limited their clientele to the officers in the armed services. And Leo wanted to extend — and that was a preferred class, and history has shown it to be a preferred class.
他们觉得——我的意思是，正如你所知，USAA 的客户群是有限的——当时，他们的客户群仅限于军队的军官。这是一个优选的群体，而历史也证明了它确实是一个优选的群体。
Leo wanted to extend that to other classes that he felt also had similar characteristics that USAA was not interested in. And that’s the reason he formed Government Employees Insurance.
利奥希望将这种服务扩展到他认为具有类似特征但 USAA 不感兴趣的其他群体。这也是他创立政府雇员保险公司的原因。
He felt that the preferred characteristic that could be determined by employment in that area as to their propensity for accidents would extend beyond the officer ranks of the armed services. And he was right. It’s a fascinating story.
他认为，通过就业领域可以判断出的优选特征和事故倾向性，不仅局限于军队的军官阶层。他的判断是正确的。这是一个引人入胜的故事。
And there’s a good book about USAA that came out about two or three years ago, tells the whole story.
两三年前出版了一本关于 USAA 的好书，详细讲述了整个故事。
It’s hard for us to take away the preferred customers of USAA. It’s hard for them to take away our preferred customers, too.
我们很难从 USAA 那里争取到优选客户，他们也很难从我们这里争取到我们的优选客户。
But USAA has some of the same qualities that we have talked about in terms of State Farm. It has, as I remember, maybe a $6 billion, maybe larger now, surplus.
但 USAA 拥有一些与我们谈到的 State Farm 相似的特点。据我记得，它有大约 60 亿美元的盈余，或许现在更多了。
It’s slightly different than State Farm. It’s not a true mutual. It’s a reciprocal, as I remember. But, it’s tantamount to a mutual.
它与 State Farm 稍有不同。它不是一个真正的互助保险组织。据我记得，它是一个互惠保险，但这与互助组织非常相似。
So the 6 billion that has been accumulated over the years is working for present policy holders, which is a terrific asset for them.
因此，多年来积累的这 60 亿美元正在为当前的保单持有人服务，这对他们来说是一项极大的资产。
And the fact that they keep you as a preferred risk probably means you are a preferred risk. I mean, their underwriting judgment is very good.
他们将你保留为优选风险客户，这可能意味着你确实是一个优选风险客户。我的意思是，他们的承保判断非常出色。
You know, we have various categories that relate to speeding tickets or accidents and all of that sort of thing. And in aggregate, they are a good predictor of future accident potential. But it’s only in aggregate.
你知道，我们有各种与超速罚单或事故相关的分类。从总体上看，它们是未来事故可能性的良好预测指标。但这仅限于整体情况。
I mean, it’s like saying, you know, “Because I’m 70, that I have X percent chance of dying,” but it doesn’t say what’s going to happen to me specifically. But it does mean if you’re insuring 100,000 70-year-olds, you’d better get this sort of price.
这就像是在说，“因为我已经 70 岁了，所以我有 X% 的死亡几率。”但这并不能说明我具体会发生什么。但如果你要为 10 万个 70 岁的人投保，那你最好有这样的价格。
We have these predictors, too. And past driving history is an important predictor. But you’ve got this long history with USAA. And they, probably for very good reason on that total history, keep you in the preferred class.
我们也有这些预测指标。过去的驾驶记录是一个重要的预测指标。但你在 USAA 那里有这么长的历史。他们很可能基于这个完整的历史记录，将你保留在优选客户类别中，这是有很好的理由的。
And we, based on criteria that are developed from looking at 5 million policy holders, we can’t make the determination — we can’t come out and actually observe you driving, or anything of the sort.
而我们基于从 500 万保单持有人中得出的标准，无法做出这样的判断——我们无法出来实际观察你的驾驶情况或类似的事情。
We have to look at the information that comes to us, which if it says speeding tickets or accident, it does result in various scores being applied. So I really can’t offer you a better deal. I’d like to. I have a feeling you’d be a good client. If USAA ever gets mad at you, come over and see us.
我们必须查看传递给我们的信息，如果这些信息显示有超速罚单或事故，就会应用相应的评分。所以我真的无法为你提供更好的优惠。我很想这样做。我觉得你会是一个很好的客户。如果有一天 USAA 不高兴了，你就来找我们吧。
54. “We regard volatility as a measure of risk to be nuts”
“我们认为将波动性视为风险的衡量标准是荒谬的”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Bob Kline (PH) from Los Angeles.
观众提问： 我是鲍勃·克莱恩（音译），来自洛杉矶。
Wall Street often evaluates the riskiness of a particular security by the volatility of its quarterly or annual results. And likewise, evaluates money managers by their volatility — measures their risk by volatility, I should say.
华尔街通常通过某个证券季度或年度结果的波动性来评估其风险。同样，他们通过波动性来评估基金经理的表现——准确地说，是用波动性来衡量风险。
And I know you guys don’t agree with that approach. I wonder if you could give us some detail about how you come at the concept of risk, how you measure it, and just in general how you approach risk.
我知道你们并不同意这种方法。我想知道，你们能否详细说明一下你们是如何看待风险概念的，如何衡量风险，以及你们总体上是如何处理风险的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we regard volatility as a measure of risk to be nuts.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们认为将波动性作为风险的衡量标准是荒谬的。
And the reason it’s used is because the people that are teaching want to talk about risk. And the truth is, they don’t know how to measure it in business.
之所以使用这种方法，是因为那些教授相关内容的人想要讨论风险。而事实是，他们不知道如何在商业中衡量风险。
I mean, that would be part of our course on how to value a business. It would also be, how risky is the business? And we think about that in terms of every business we buy. And risk with us relates to —
我的意思是，这会成为我们如何评估企业价值课程的一部分，同时也涉及企业有多大的风险？我们在购买每一个企业时都会考虑这些。而风险对我们来说与——
Well, it relates to several possibilities. One is the risk of permanent capital loss. And then the other risk is just an inadequate return on the kind of capital we put in. It does not relate to volatility at all.
嗯，它与几种可能性有关。一种是永久性资本损失的风险。另一种风险是我们投入的资本回报不足。这与波动性完全无关。
Our See’s Candy business will lose money — and it depends on when Easter falls — but it’ll lose money in two quarters of the four quarters of the year. So it has a huge volatility of earnings within the year.
我们的 See’s Candy 业务会亏损——这取决于复活节的时间——但它在一年四个季度中会有两个季度亏损。所以它的年内收益波动非常大。
It’s one of the least risky businesses I know.
但它是我所知最不具风险的业务之一。
You can find all kinds of, you know, wonderful businesses that have great volatility and results. But it does not make them bad businesses. And you can find some very — you can find some terrible businesses that are very smooth.
你会发现各种优秀的企业，它们的业绩可能波动很大。但这并不意味着它们是糟糕的企业。同时，你也会发现一些非常——你会发现一些非常糟糕的企业，它们的业绩却非常平稳。
I mean, you could have a business that did nothing, you know? And its results would not vary from quarter to quarter, right? So it just doesn’t make any sense to translate — (laughter) — volatility into risk.
我的意思是，你可以有一个什么都不做的企业，对吧？它的业绩每个季度都不会变化，对吧？所以，将波动性转化为风险是没有任何意义的。（笑声）
And Charlie, you want to add anything on that?
查理，你想补充些什么吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it raises an interesting question, which is how can a professoriate that is so smart come up with such silly ideas and spread them all over the country? (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 这确实引出了一个有趣的问题，那就是一群如此聪明的教授们怎么会提出这么荒谬的想法并将其传播到全国各地？（笑声）
It is a — it’s a very interesting question. If all of us felt that — (Laughter)
这是一个——确实是一个非常有趣的问题。如果我们所有人都觉得——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, your Dilly Bar’s arrived.
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，你的 Dilly Bar 到了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, good.
查理·芒格： 哦，好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You’ve heard of getting a second wind.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，你听说过“重振旗鼓”吧。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, fine.
查理·芒格： 哦，太好了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Laughter and applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。（笑声和掌声）
You tip him. (Laughter)
你给他点小费吧。（笑声）
I didn’t think our cracks were that funny. (Laughter)
我没想到我们的玩笑会这么好笑。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right. But I’ve been waiting for this craziness to pass for several decades now. I do think it’s getting dented some. But it’s not passing.
查理·芒格： 对，对。但我已经等了几十年，期待这种疯狂能够过去。我确实觉得它已经有所削弱，但还没有过去。
WARREN BUFFETT: If somebody starts talking to you about beta, you know, zip up your pocketbook. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果有人开始和你谈论贝塔，你知道的，赶紧把你的钱包拉上拉链。（笑声）
100%正确的事实。
55. Zen Buddhism and the value of low expectations
禅宗与低期望的价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Brian Zen (PH) from China.
观众提问： 我是布莱恩·禅（音译），来自中国。
As a Coke addict myself, I’m excited to report to you — (laughter) — our worldwide promoter-in-chief, that the Cokes in Beijing taste just as wonderful as in Omaha.
作为一个可乐爱好者，我很兴奋地向您汇报——（笑声）——我们这位全球首席推广大使，北京的可乐喝起来和奥马哈的一样美味。
As a ex-Zen monk, today I feel like visiting the Buddha of the financial world. (Laughter)
作为一名前禅宗僧人，今天我感觉像是来拜访金融界的佛陀。（笑声）
We have an investment club, but with a name that ends in .com, believe it or not, which tells you that the frenzy — .com frenzy — even seduced Zen monks when we tried to follow you.
我们有一个投资俱乐部，名字竟然以“.com”结尾，相信吗？这说明那场狂热——.com 狂热——甚至迷惑了像我们这些试图追随您的禅宗僧侣。
We find that Mrs. Susan Buffett used to send Zen Buddhism books to her sorority sisters. That’s probably why she always has a peaceful smile due to her low expectation of life which, according to Buddha, is full of sufferings.
我们发现苏珊·巴菲特女士曾经给她的姐妹会成员寄送过禅宗书籍。也许这就是为什么她总是带着一种平和的微笑，因为她对生活抱有低期望，而根据佛陀的教义，生活充满了苦难。
But Mr. Munger would tell me that Susan’s smile is because you, as the husband, exceeded her low expectations.
但芒格先生会告诉我，苏珊的微笑是因为作为丈夫的您超出了她的低期望。
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s right. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 对的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And her father’s even lower expectations. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，还有她父亲的期望更低。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right.
查理·芒格： 对，对。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Anyway, my question is, did Susan also send those Zen books to your office or your bedroom?
观众提问： 总之，我的问题是，苏珊有没有也把那些禅宗书籍寄到您的办公室或卧室？
And if you have read those books, what are the key ideas that contributed to your investment tao, which even made sense to secluded, narrow-minded Zen monks like me? Thanks for the financial enlightenments you’ve given us today.
如果您读过那些书，这些书中有哪些关键思想对您的投资之“道”有所贡献，甚至让像我这样封闭、狭隘的禅宗僧侣都能理解？感谢您今天给我们的金融启示。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. I sent those books on to Charlie so I’ll let him answer. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。我把那些书转给了查理，所以我会让他来回答。（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Actually, I tend to be a follower of Confucius. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 实际上，我更倾向于做一个儒家思想的追随者。（笑声）
And I think this room is full of Confucian values, you know? If the first law of Confucianism is filial piety, particularly toward elderly males, you can see why I like that system. (Laughter)
而且我认为这个房间充满了儒家价值观，你知道吗？如果儒家思想的第一条准则是孝顺，尤其是对年长男性的孝顺，那你可以理解为什么我喜欢这个体系。（笑声）
56. Capital and opportunity costs
资本与机会成本
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区域。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Kevin Truitt (PH) from Chicago. I have three questions for you.
观众提问： 下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫凯文·特鲁伊特（音译），来自芝加哥。我有三个问题要问你们。
Mr. Munger, at last year’s shareholder meeting, you stated that you didn’t feel that the concept of the cost of capital made true economic sense. Would you explain why you felt this way and what you would do to replace it with anything?
芒格先生，在去年的股东大会上，您表示您认为资本成本的概念在经济学上没有真正的意义。您能解释一下为什么这样认为吗？以及您会用什么来代替它？
My second question is to Mr. Buffett. You’ve stated the importance of an occasional big idea. How were you able to, in fact, tell when you had a big idea?
我的第二个问题是问巴菲特先生的。您曾说过偶尔冒出的“大想法”的重要性。您是如何判断自己确实有了一个“大想法”的？
And my third question, Mr. Buffett, you have talked about the importance of the franchise and sustainable competitive advantage.
我的第三个问题是关于巴菲特先生提到的品牌和可持续竞争优势的重要性。
Companies like Kellogg and Campbell’s Soup are companies that most people would have said had those qualities. However, over time, those qualities were lost as a result of a change in consumer taste.
像凯洛格和坎贝尔汤这样的公司，过去大多数人都会说它们具备这些特质。然而，随着时间的推移，这些特质因为消费者口味的变化而丧失。
What gives you confidence that the same things won’t happen to Coke or Gillette?
是什么让您有信心认为同样的事情不会发生在可口可乐或吉列身上？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well —
查理·芒格： 嗯——
WARREN BUFFETT: Cost of capital.
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于资本成本。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Cost of capital, first.
查理·芒格： 先说资本成本。
Obviously, considerations of cost are important in business. And obviously, opportunity costs, which is a doctrine of economics, really a doctrine of lifesmanship, are also very important. And we’ve always had that kind of basic thinking.
显然，成本的考虑在商业中非常重要。同样显然的是，机会成本——经济学中的一个原则，也可以说是人生管理学中的一个原则——也非常重要。而我们一直都有这样的基本思维方式。
Of course, capital isn’t free. And, of course, you could figure cost of capital when you’re borrowing money. Or at least you can figure cost of loans. But the theorists had to develop some theory for what equity cost. And there, they just went bonkers.
当然，资本不是免费的。当然，当你借钱时，你可以计算资本成本。至少你可以计算贷款成本。但理论家们不得不为股本成本发展出一些理论。在这个过程中，他们彻底疯了。
They said if you earned a hundred percent on capital because you had some marvelous business, your cost of capital was a hundred percent. And therefore, you shouldn’t look at any opportunity that delivered a lousy 80 percent.
他们说，如果你因为某个了不起的业务而在资本上赚取了100%的收益，那么你的资本成本就是100%。因此，你不应该考虑任何仅能带来糟糕的80%回报的机会。
That is the kind of thinking, which came out of the capital assets pricing models and so forth, that I’ve always considered inanity.
这种思维模式源于资本资产定价模型等理论，我一直认为这很荒谬。
What is Berkshire’s cost of capital? We have this damn capital. It just keeps multiplying and multiplying. What is its cost? You have perfectly good, old-fashioned doctrines like opportunity cost, you know?
伯克希尔的资本成本是什么？我们有这笔“该死的”资本，它不断地增加和增长。那么它的成本是什么？你有一些完全合理的、老式的原则，比如机会成本，对吧？
At any given time when we consider an investment, we have to compare it to the best alternative investment we have at that time. We have perfectly good, old-fashioned ideas that are very basic to use, but they weren’t good enough for these modern theorists.
在任何时候，当我们考虑一项投资时，我们必须将其与当时最好的备选投资进行比较。我们有一些完全合理的、老式的基本原则可以使用，但这些原则对现代理论家们来说似乎还不够。
So they invented all this ridiculous mathematics, which concluded that the companies that made the most money had the highest costs of capital.
所以他们发明了这些荒谬的数学理论，得出一个结论：那些赚钱最多的公司拥有最高的资本成本。
Well, all I can say is, it’s not for us.
嗯，我只能说，这不适合我们。
Now, the other half of that question I leave for Mr. Buffett.
现在，这个问题的另一部分留给巴菲特先生来回答。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, what you find, of course, is that the cost of capital is about a quarter percent below the return promised by any deal that the CEO wants to do. It’s — (laughter) — very simple.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，你会发现资本成本通常比 CEO 想要做的任何交易所承诺的回报低大约 0.25%。这——（笑声）——非常简单。
You know, we have three questions on capital — with capital, throughout — leaving aside whether we want to borrow money, which we generally don’t want to do.
关于资本，我们有三个问题——在讨论资本时——暂且不谈我们是否想要借钱，因为我们通常不想这么做。
And one is, does it make more sense to pay it out to the shareholders than to keep it within the company? A sub-question on that is if we pay it out, is it better off to do it via repurchases or via dividend?
第一个问题是，将资金分配给股东是否比留在公司更有意义？关于这个问题的一个子问题是，如果我们分配出去，是通过回购股票更好，还是通过派发股息更好？
The test for whether we pay it out in dividends is, can we create more than a dollar of value within the company with that dollar than paying it out? And you never know the answer to that. But so far, the answer as judged by results is yes, we can.
判断是否派发股息的标准是，我们能否用这一美元在公司内部创造超过一美元的价值，而不是将其支付出去？对此，你永远无法确切知道答案。但迄今为止，从结果来看，答案是肯定的，我们可以。
这里假定股东拿到钱以后不能进行有效的投资。
And we think that prospectively, we can. But, that’s a — you know, that’s a hope on our part. And it’s justified to some extent by past history, but it’s not a certainty.
而且我们认为从未来的角度来看，我们可以。但这——你知道，这只是我们的一个希望。在某种程度上，它可以通过过去的历史得到证明，但并不确定。
Once we’ve crossed that threshold, then do we repurchase stock? Well, obviously, if you can buy your stock at a significant discount from conservatively calculated intrinsic value, and you could buy it in reasonable quantity, that’s a use for capital.
一旦我们跨过了这个门槛，那么我们是否回购股票？显然，如果你能以远低于保守计算的内在价值的价格回购你的股票，并且可以合理地购买一定数量的股票，这就是一种资本的用途。
Beyond that, then the question becomes, if you have the capital, you think you can create more than a dollar, how do you create the most with the least risk? And that gets to business risk. It doesn’t get to any calculation of the volatility.
除此之外，问题就变成了，如果你有资本并认为你能创造超过一美元的价值，那么你如何以最小的风险创造最大的价值？这涉及到商业风险，而不是波动性的计算。
I don’t know the risk in See’s Candy as measured by its stock volatility because the stock hasn’t been outstanding since 1972. Does that mean I can’t determine how risky a business See’s is, because we don’t have a daily quote on it?
我不知道如何通过 See’s Candy 的股票波动性来衡量它的风险，因为自 1972 年以来它的股票就没有公开交易。这是否意味着我无法确定 See’s 这项业务有多大的风险，因为我们没有它的每日报价？
No. I can determine it by looking at the business, and the competitive environment in which it operates, and so on.
不。我可以通过研究业务本身以及其运营的竞争环境等来判断。
So once we cross the threshold of deciding that we can deploy capital so as to create more than a dollar of present value for every dollar retained, then it’s just a question of doing the most intelligent thing that you can find. And, you know, that is —
因此，一旦我们跨过了这个门槛，决定可以通过部署资本为每一美元创造超过一美元的现值，那么接下来就是寻找最明智的方式去做。这——你知道，就是这样。
The cost of every deal we do is measured by the second best deal that’s around at a given time, including more — doing more of some of the things we’re already in.
我们做的每笔交易的成本都是通过当时第二好的交易来衡量的，包括我们已经参与的一些事情是否可以投入更多资金。
And I have listened to cost of capital discussions at all kinds of corporate board meetings and everything else. And, you know, I’ve never found anything that made very much sense in it except for the fact that it’s what they learned in business school and that’s what the consultants talked about.
我听过各种企业董事会会议和其他场合关于资本成本的讨论。你知道，除了这是他们在商学院学到的内容以及咨询顾问谈论的东西之外，我从未发现其中有任何真正有意义的东西。
And most of the board members would nod their head without knowing what the hell was going on. And that’s been my history with the cost of capital.
大多数董事会成员都会点头表示同意，但实际上并不知道到底发生了什么。这就是我对资本成本的经历。
57. How Buffett knows when he’s had a “big idea”
巴菲特如何判断自己有了一个“大想法”
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, moving onto the big ideas, you know when you’ve got a big idea. And I can’t tell you, you know, exactly what happens within your nervous system or brain at that time.
沃伦·巴菲特： 现在来说说“大想法”，当你有一个大想法时，你会知道的。我无法确切告诉你，在那一刻你的神经系统或大脑里发生了什么。
But we’ve had relatively few big ideas, good ideas, over the years. I don’t know how many you think we’ve had in aggregate, probably, career, maybe 25 each or something?
但多年来，我们有的“大想法”或“好想法”相对较少。我不知道你认为我们一生中总共有多少，也许每人有 25 个左右？
CHARLIE MUNGER: If you took the top 15 out of Berkshire Hathaway, most of you people wouldn’t be here. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 如果你从伯克希尔·哈撒韦的历史中去掉前 15 个想法，你们大多数人今天就不会在这里了。（笑声）
So, roughly one every two years.
所以，差不多每两年一个。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, one every year or two. And sometimes there’ll be a bunch of them, like in 1973 and -4. But the problem is, for us is that big, now, really means big. I mean, it has to be billions of dollars to move the needle very much at Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，大概每一到两年一个。有时会有一系列的大想法，比如在 1973 和 1974 年。但对我们来说，问题是现在“大”真的意味着非常大。我的意思是，它必须达到数十亿美元才能显著影响伯克希尔的表现。
But I would say that when I would turn those pages, 50 years ago in the Moody’s Manuals, I would know when I hit a big idea. I’ve got half a dozen of them that I keep the Xeroxes from those reports around from 50 years ago just because it was so obvious that they just — they were incredible. And that happens every now and then.
但我想说的是，50 年前，当我翻阅《穆迪手册》的页面时，我知道自己遇到了一个“大想法”。有六七个这样的想法，我还保留着那些报告的复印件，就因为它们当时显而易见——它们太了不起了。而这种情况偶尔会发生。
When I met Lorimer Davidson, you know, in end of January, 1951, and he spent four hours or five hours with me explaining GEICO, I knew it was a big idea.
1951 年 1 月底，当我见到洛里默·戴维森时，他花了四五个小时向我解释 GEICO，我知道那是一个“大想法”。
Eight months later, no, probably 10 months later, I wrote an article for The Commercial and Financial Chronicle on “The Security I Like Best.” It was a big idea.
八个月后，不，可能是十个月后，我为《商业与金融年鉴》写了一篇题为《我最喜欢的证券》的文章。那是一个“大想法”。
When I found Western Insurance Securities, I knew it was a big idea.
当我发现 Western Insurance Securities 时，我知道那是一个“大想法”。
I couldn’t put billion — millions — of dollars into it, but I didn’t have millions so it didn’t make any difference.
我当时无法投入数百万或数十亿美元，但因为我也没有这么多钱，所以这并不重要。
And I — we’ve seen things subsequently. And we’ll see, you know. If we have a normal lifespan, we’ll see a few more before we get done, but I can’t tell you that —exactly how —
而且我们后来还看到了一些事情。我们会继续看到，如果我们有正常的寿命，在结束之前我们可能还会看到几个，但我无法确切告诉你——具体如何——
I can’t tell you exactly what transpires in my mind that says, you know, flashes a neon sign up that says, “This is a big idea.”
我无法确切告诉你，在我的脑海里发生了什么，会让我看到“这是一个大想法”的霓虹灯在闪烁。
What happens with you, Charlie?
查理，你会怎么判断？
(Laughter)
（笑声）
Actually, one of my — I’ve have a real system. (Laughter)
事实上，我有一个真正的系统。（笑声）
My idea of a truly big idea is, one I get it and I call Charlie and he only says no, rather than, “That’s the worst idea I’ve ever heard of.” But if he just says no, it’s a hell of an idea.
我对“大想法”的定义是，当我想到一个想法并打电话给查理时，他只说“不”，而不是说“这是我听过最糟糕的主意”。但如果他只是说“不”，那就说明这是一个了不起的想法。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, the game in our kind of life is being able to recognize a good idea when you rarely get it, and — or when it rarely is presented to you. And I think that’s something you have to prepare for over a long period.
查理·芒格： 你知道，我们这种人生的关键在于，当一个好想法难得出现时，能够认出它，或者当它难得被展示给你时能够把握住。我认为，这是需要长期准备的事情。
What is the old saying? That opportunity comes to the prepared mind? And I don’t think you can teach people in two minutes how to have a prepared mind. But that’s the game.
有句老话怎么说的来着？机会青睐有准备的人？我不认为你能在两分钟内教会人们如何拥有一颗准备好的头脑。但这就是游戏规则。
WARREN BUFFETT: Things we learned 40 years ago, though, will help and recognize the next big idea.
沃伦·巴菲特： 然而，我们40年前学到的东西会帮助我们识别下一个“大想法”。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And on opportunity costs, going back to that, the current freshman economics text, which is sweeping the country, has right in practically the first page. And it says, “All intelligent people should think primarily in terms of opportunity cost.” And that’s obviously correct.
查理·芒格： 说到机会成本，回到这个问题，目前席卷全国的经济学新生教材几乎在第一页就写着，“所有聪明人都应该主要以机会成本的角度思考问题。” 这显然是正确的。
But it’s very hard to teach business based on opportunity cost. It’s much easier to teach the capital assets pricing model where you could just punch in numbers and out come numbers. And therefore, people teach what is easy to teach, instead of what is correct to teach.
但基于机会成本来教授商业非常困难。教授资本资产定价模型要容易得多，因为你只需输入数字，就能得出结果。因此，人们倾向于教授那些容易教授的内容，而不是那些正确的内容。
It reminds me of Einstein’s famous saying. He says, “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no more simple.”
这让我想起爱因斯坦的名言。他说：“一切应该尽可能简单，但不要过于简单。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Write that down. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 把这记下来吧。（笑声）
58. Big retailers are attacking big brand-name moats
大型零售商正在攻击知名品牌的护城河
You asked an interesting question about franchises, too, and mentioned Campbell’s Soup and Kellogg.
你还提出了一个关于品牌的问题，并提到了坎贝尔汤和凯洛格公司。
And, you know, I’m no expert on that but I would say that, just based on my general observation over the years, is that the problems there came from two different things.
我并不是这方面的专家，但根据我多年来的总体观察，我认为这些问题源于两个不同的方面。
I think that the problems with cereal — ready-to-eat cereal — were not so much changes in taste or consumption patterns. But I think they maybe just pushed their pricing too far to the point that they lost market share without getting — without having — the moat that they thought they had, as opposed to the General Mills cereals, and the General Food cereals, and all of that sort of thing.
我认为谷物食品——即食谷物——的问题并不是口味或消费模式的变化。而是它们可能将定价推得太高，以至于失去了市场份额，同时没有获得它们认为存在的护城河，与通用磨坊的谷物食品、通用食品的谷物食品等相比。
I mean, if your pricing really gets out of whack and people regard Wheaties or Grape-Nuts in the same category as they regard Kellogg’s Corn Flakes, you know, you’re going to lose share. And once you start losing share, it’s hard to get back.
我的意思是，如果你的定价真的失去平衡，人们将 Wheaties 或 Grape-Nuts 与凯洛格的玉米片视为同一类别，你就会失去市场份额。而一旦你开始失去份额，就很难夺回。
The problems with soup I think relate more to lifestyle. I think it’s become — it’s a little less — it fits in a little less well with current lifestyles, maybe, than 40 years ago.
而我认为汤的问题更多与生活方式有关。与 40 年前相比，它可能稍微不太适应当前的生活方式。
Soft drinks, — the consumption of soft drinks — I don’t have the figures here, but I would wager that in 110 years, the per capita of soft drinks has gone up virtually every year throughout that history.
软饮料——软饮料的消费——我手头没有具体数字，但我敢打赌，在过去的 110 年里，软饮料的人均消费几乎每年都在增长。
I mean, it’s now 30 — close to 30 percent — of U.S. consumption of liquids. So, if the average American has about 64 ounces of liquids a day, you’re talking about, say, 18 ounces of that being soft drinks and 43 percent of that 18, or almost 8 ounces a day, of being Coca-Cola products.
我的意思是，现在软饮料占美国液体消费的近 30%。如果平均每个美国人每天饮用大约 64 盎司的液体，其中大约 18 盎司是软饮料，而这 18 盎司中有 43%，即每天接近 8 盎司，是可口可乐的产品。
In other words, 1/8th of all the liquid man, woman and child in the United States take in comes from Coca-Cola products. But that has gone up, virtually — well, throughout the world it’s gone up on a per capita basis, you know, almost since soft drinks were discovered.
换句话说，美国每人每天摄入的液体中，有八分之一来自可口可乐的产品。而这种增长几乎在全球范围内都持续存在，几乎自软饮料被发明以来一直如此。
I would say that that trend is almost impossible to reverse on a worldwide basis. I mean, there’s so much potential in countries where per capita consumption is like — well, I think it’s, you know, maybe 8 per capita, which is — 8-ounce servings they talk in terms — 64 ounces a year.
我认为，这一趋势在全球范围内几乎不可能逆转。我的意思是，在一些人均消费仅约为 8 的国家——以 8 盎司计算，也就是每年 64 盎司——还有巨大的潜力。
So you have 1/50th of the consumption, per capita, on Coke products in many — in some important countries — that you have here. I don’t — I just don’t see it as being —
所以，在一些重要国家，可口可乐的人均消费量仅是这里的 1/50。我不——我确实看不到它——
Now, you can push pricing too far. I mean, there comes a point — it depends on the country in which you’re doing it, but that depends even on areas within the country in which you do it.
当然，定价也可能推得太高。我的意思是，定价到达某个点时——这取决于你所在的国家，甚至取决于该国内的地区。
But if you establish too wide a differential between Coke and a private label product, you will change consumption patterns somewhat. Not huge, but enough so that you don’t want to do it. But I don’t think you’ll see —
但如果你将可口可乐与自有品牌产品之间的价格差距拉得过大，会在一定程度上改变消费模式。不至于太大，但足够让你不愿意这样做。但我认为你不会看到——
It’s interesting. Coffee’s gone down every year. People talk about Starbucks and all that, but if you look at coffee consumption in this country, if you look at milk consumption in this country, you know, per capita, it just goes down, down, down, down, year, after year, after year, after year.
有趣的是，咖啡的消费量每年都在下降。人们谈论星巴克等等，但如果你看这个国家的咖啡消费，如果你看牛奶消费，你会发现人均消费每年都在下降，一年又一年地下降。
And I think it’s pretty clear what people like to drink once they get used to it, and with the price right.
而我认为，一旦人们习惯于某种饮品，并且价格合理，他们喜欢喝什么就很清楚了。
Interesting thing about Coca-Cola is, when I was born in 1930, a 6 1/2-ounce Coke cost a nickel and you put a two cent deposit on the bottle. But forget about that, just take the nickel.
关于可口可乐，有趣的是，当我 1930 年出生时，一瓶 6.5 盎司的可乐只要 5 美分，你还要为瓶子交 2 美分押金。但撇开押金不谈，就按 5 美分算。
Now you buy a 12-ounce can or a larger product, and you’re paying, if you buy it on the weekends in the supermarket special or something, you’re paying maybe a little more than twice per ounce what you were paying in 1930, 70 years ago.
现在，你可以买一罐 12 盎司或更大的产品，如果你在周末超市特价时购买，你每盎司支付的价格可能仅是 1930 年的两倍多一点，那是 70 年前的价格。
And compare that to the price behavior of almost any product, you know, that you can find except raw commodities. But compare it to cars, housing, anything. And there’s been very, very little price inflation in it.
与几乎任何其他产品的价格行为相比——除了原材料之外——你会发现它的价格几乎没有通胀。但与汽车、住房或其他任何东西相比，它的价格通胀非常少。
And I think that’s a contributor, of course, to the growth in per capitas over time.
而且我认为，这当然是人均消费增长的一个重要原因。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, how about cereals and soup?
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，关于谷物和汤，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think those are examples where the moats got less hostile for the competitors.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我认为这些是护城河对竞争对手不再那么具有威胁性的例子。
Part of the trouble was the buying power got more concentrated and tougher.
部分问题在于购买力变得更加集中和强势。
I mean, the big grocery chains now have a lot of clout. And then you add the Walmarts and the Costcos and the Sam’s and the — it’s a different world faced by the Kelloggs than the one they had 30 or 40 years ago.
我的意思是，现在的大型连锁超市有很大的影响力。再加上沃尔玛、Costco 和 Sam’s Club，这对凯洛格而言是一个完全不同的世界，与他们30或40年前面临的情况截然不同。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there will be a battle, always, between brands and retailers, because the retailer would like his name to be the brand.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，品牌和零售商之间总会有一场争斗，因为零售商希望自己的名字成为品牌。
And, to the extent that people trust Costco or Walmart more than they — or as much as — they trust the brand, then the value of having the brand moves over to the retailer from the product itself.
而当人们对 Costco 或沃尔玛的信任超过——或者至少等同于——他们对品牌的信任时，那么品牌的价值就从产品本身转移到了零售商身上。
And that’s gone on for a long, long time. You know, the first — I would — cases I know about in any real quantity were back with A&P in the ’30s. And A&P, I believe, was the largest food retailer in this country. And they were also a big promoter of private labels. Ann Page I think was a big private label with them, for example.
这种情况已经持续了很长时间。我知道的第一个比较有规模的案例是在 20 世纪 30 年代的 A&P。我相信 A&P 是当时美国最大的食品零售商。他们也是自有品牌的大力推广者。例如，Ann Page 就是他们一个重要的自有品牌。
And they felt they could convince the consumer in the ’30s that their brand meant more than having Del Monte on it or Campbell’s or whatever it might be in the different categories. And people thought they were going to win that war for a while.
他们认为，在 20 世纪 30 年代，他们可以说服消费者，他们的品牌比贴着 Del Monte 或 Campbell’s 的标签，或者其他类别的品牌更有意义。人们一度认为他们会赢得这场战争。
And who knows? I mean, I don’t know all the variables that went into A&P’s decline, but it was dramatic. I mean, it was one of — it was a great American success story for a while, and then it was a great American failure.
但谁知道呢？我的意思是，我并不了解导致 A&P 衰落的所有变量，但它的衰退确实是戏剧性的。曾经，它是一个伟大的美国成功故事，而后来，它成为了一个伟大的失败故事。
Charlie, you —?
查理，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: The muscle power of the Sam’s Clubs and the Costcos has gotten very extreme. A little earlier this morning, when I was autographing books, a very good looking woman came up to me and said she wanted to thank me.
查理·芒格： Sam’s Club 和 Costco 的影响力变得非常强大。今天早上稍早些时候，当我在签书时，一位非常漂亮的女士走到我面前，说她想感谢我。
And I said, “For what?” And she said, “You told me to buy this pantyhose I’m wearing from Costco.”
我问：“感谢什么？” 她说：“你告诉我从 Costco 买我现在穿的这条连裤袜。”
And I’d evidently made some previous comment about how amazing it was that Costco could get Hanes, of all people, to allow a co-branded pantyhose, Hanes-dash-Kirkland, in the Costco stores. That wouldn’t have happened 20 years ago.
显然，我之前曾提到过，Costco 能说服 Hanes 公司在其门店里推出联合品牌的连裤袜（Hanes-Kirkland），这实在令人惊叹。这在 20 年前是不可能发生的。
WARREN BUFFETT: She must’ve been pretty desperate if she was consulting with you on where to buy pantyhose, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 如果她要向你咨询在哪里买连裤袜，查理，那她一定是很绝望了。（笑声）
59. Selling short is “tempting” but “very painful”
做空“有诱惑力”，但“非常痛苦”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s move to area 5.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，我们来看第 5 区域。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right.
查理·芒格： 好的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Dave Staples from Hanover, New Hampshire and I’ve got two questions for you.
观众提问： 你好，我是戴夫·斯台普斯（音译），来自新罕布什尔州的汉诺威，我有两个问题要问你们。
First, I’d like to hear your thoughts on selling securities short and what your experience has been recently and over the course of your career.
首先，我想听听你们对卖空证券的看法，以及你们最近和整个职业生涯中对此的经验。
The second question I’d like to ask is how you go about building a position in a security you’ve identified.
第二个问题是，您们是如何建立一个您们已经识别出的证券头寸的？
Using USG as a recent example, I believe you bought most of your shares at between 14 and $15 a share. But certainly, you must’ve thought it was a reasonable investment at 18 or 19.
以最近的 USG 为例，我相信您们大部分股票是以每股 14 到 15 美元的价格买入的。但显然，您们肯定认为在 18 或 19 美元时也是一个合理的投资。
Why was 14 and 15 the magic number? And now that it’s dropped to around 12, do you continue to build your position? How do you decide what your ultimate position is going to be?
为什么 14 和 15 是一个“神奇数字”？现在它已经跌到大约 12 美元，您们是否会继续增加头寸？您们是如何决定最终头寸规模的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we can’t talk about any specific security, so — our buying techniques depend very much on the kind of security we’re dealing in. Sometimes, it’s a security that might take many, many months to acquire. And other times, you can do it very quickly. And sometimes, it may pay to pay up. And other times, it doesn’t.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们不能讨论任何具体的证券，所以——我们的买入技巧很大程度上取决于我们所交易的证券类型。有时候，这是一种可能需要花费许多个月才能获得的证券；而有时候，你可以非常快速地完成。有时支付溢价是值得的，有时则不是。
And the truth is, you never know exactly what the right technique is to use as you’re doing it, but you just use your best judgment based on past purchases. But we can’t discuss any specific one.
事实上，在操作过程中你永远无法确切知道哪种技巧是正确的，但你只能基于过去的经验做出最佳判断。不过，我们不能讨论任何具体的案例。
Short selling, it’s an interesting item to study because it’s, I mean, it’s ruined a lot of people. It is the sort of thing that you can go broke doing.
至于做空，这是一项有趣的研究内容，因为我的意思是，它毁掉了很多人。这是一种可能让你破产的操作。
Bob Wilson, there’re famous stories about him and Resorts International. He didn’t go broke doing it. In fact, he’s done very well subsequently.
鲍勃·威尔逊有一些关于他和国际度假村（Resorts International）的著名故事。他并没有因为做空而破产。事实上，他后来表现得非常好。
But being short something where your loss is unlimited is quite different than being long something that you’ve already paid for.
但做空意味着你的损失是无限的，这与做多已经支付的资产有很大的不同。
And it’s tempting. You see way more stocks that are dramatically overvalued in your career than you will see stocks that are dramatically undervalued.
而且它很有诱惑力。在你的职业生涯中，你会看到远比被低估的股票多得多的股票被严重高估。
I mean there — it’s the nature of securities markets to occasionally promote various things to the sky, so that securities will frequently sell for five or 10 times what they’re worth, and they will very, very seldom sell for 20 percent or 10 percent of what they’re worth.
我的意思是，这是证券市场的本质，它偶尔会将某些东西推到天价，因此证券的售价经常是其实际价值的五倍或十倍，而它们很少以其实际价值的 20% 或 10% 的价格出售。
So, therefore, you see these much greater discrepancies between price and value on the overvaluation side. So you might think it’s easier to make money on short selling. And all I can say is, it hasn’t been for me. I don’t think it’s been for Charlie.
因此，你会发现价格和价值之间的这种巨大差距更多地出现在高估的一方。所以你可能会认为做空更容易赚钱。而我只能说，这对我来说并不是如此。我也不认为对查理来说是这样。
It is a very, very tough business because of the fact that you face unlimited losses, and because of the fact that people that have overvalued stocks — very overvalued stocks — are frequently on some scale between promoter and crook. And that’s why they get there. And once there —
这是一个非常、非常艰难的行业，因为你面临无限的损失，而且因为拥有被高度高估股票的人——那些被严重高估的股票——通常在推广者和骗子之间有某种程度的联系。这就是它们达到这种状态的原因。一旦到达——
And they also know how to use that very valuation to bootstrap value into the business, because if you have a stock that’s selling at 100 that’s worth 10, obviously it’s to your interest to go out and issue a whole lot of shares. And if you do that, when you get all through, the value can be 50.
他们还知道如何利用这种高估值为业务注入价值，因为如果你有一只股票，售价是 100，而实际价值是 10，显然你会很乐意发行大量股票。而如果你这样做了，最终的价值可能会达到 50。
In fact, there’s a lot of chain letter-type stock promotions that are sort of based on the implicit assumption that the management will keep doing that.
事实上，有许多类似传销信的股票推广活动，其基本隐含假设是管理层会继续这样操作。
And if they do it once and build it to 50 by issuing a lot of shares at 100 when it’s worth 10, now the value is 50 and people say, “Well, these guys are so good at that. Let’s pay 200 for it or 300,” and then they could do it again and so on.
如果他们这样做了一次，通过以100的价格发行大量股票（实际价值仅为10）将价值提升到50，人们会说，“这些人太擅长了。我们愿意为它支付200甚至300的价格。”然后他们可以再次重复这个过程，如此往复。
It’s not usually that — quite that clear in their minds. But that’s the basic principle underlying a lot of stock promotions. And if you get caught up in one of those that is successful, you know, you can run out of money before the promoter runs out of ideas.
这通常不会如此清晰地表现在他们的头脑中。但这是许多股票推广活动的基本原则。而如果你卷入了其中一个成功的案例，你可能会在推广者用尽创意之前，先耗尽你的资金。
In the end, they almost always work. I mean, I would say that, of the things that we have felt like shorting over the years, the batting average is very high in terms of eventual — that they would work out very well eventually if you held them through.
最终，这些活动几乎总是奏效。我的意思是，对于我们这些年来觉得适合做空的股票，从长远来看，命中率非常高——如果你能坚持持有的话，最终会有不错的结果。
But it is very painful and it’s — in my experience, it was a whole lot easier to make money on the long side.
但这非常痛苦。而根据我的经验，在做多方面赚钱要容易得多。
I had one situation, actually, an arbitrage situation when I was in — well, it was when I moved to New York in 1954, so it would’ve been about June or July of 1954 — that involved a surefire-type transaction, an arbitrage transaction that had to work.
实际上，我遇到过一个情况，一个套利机会——那是在1954年我搬到纽约的时候，大概是1954年的六月或七月——涉及一种必定成功的交易，一个必须奏效的套利交易。
But there was a technical wrinkle in it and I was short something. And I felt like a — for a short period of time — I felt like Finova was feeling last fall. I mean, it was very unpleasant.
但其中有一个技术问题，而我做空了一些股票。在那段时间里——短暂的时间里——我感觉自己就像 Finova 去年秋天的感受一样。我的意思是，这种感觉非常不愉快。
It — you can’t make — in my view, you can’t make really big money doing it because you can’t expose yourself to the loss that would be there if you did do it on a big scale.
在我看来，你无法通过这种方式赚取真正的大钱，因为你不能让自己暴露在可能出现的巨大损失中。
And Charlie, how about you?
查理，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Ben Franklin said, “If you want to be miserable, you know, during Easter or something like that,” he says, “borrow a lot of money to be repaid at Lent,” or something to that effect.
查理·芒格： 本·富兰克林说过，“如果你想在复活节期间感到痛苦，”他说，“那就借一大笔钱，在四旬斋期间还。”或者类似的意思。
And similarly, being short something, which keeps going up because somebody is promoting it in a half-crooked way, and you keep losing, and they call on you for more margin — it just isn’t worth it to have that much irritation in your life.
同样地，做空某些股票，而这些股票因为有人用半欺诈的方式推广而持续上涨，你不断亏损，他们又要求你补充保证金——生活中有这样的烦恼是完全不值得的。
It isn’t that hard to make money somewhere else with less irritation.
在别的地方用更少的烦恼赚钱并不难。
WARREN BUFFETT: It would never work on a Berkshire scale anyway. I mean, you could never do it for the kind of money that would be necessary to do it with in order to have a real effect on Berkshire’s overall value. So it’s not something we think about.
沃伦·巴菲特： 无论如何，这种方式在伯克希尔的规模下是行不通的。我的意思是，你永远无法用需要的大量资金来操作它，以对伯克希尔的整体价值产生实际影响。所以，这不是我们会考虑的事情。
It’s interesting though. I mean, I’ve got a copy of The New York Times from the day of the Northern Pacific Corner. And that was a case where two opposing business titans each owned over 50 percent of the Northern Pacific Company —the Northern Pacific Railroad.
不过，这很有趣。我的意思是，我有一份关于“北太平洋股票逼空”的那天的《纽约时报》。在那个案例中，两位对立的商业巨头分别拥有北太平洋公司——北太平洋铁路——超过 50% 的股份。
And when two people each own over 50 percent of something, you know, it’s going to be interesting. And — (laughter) — Northern Pacific, on that day, went from 170 to a thousand. And it was selling for cash, because you had to actually have the certificates that day, rather than the normal settlement date.
当两个人都各自拥有某个东西超过 50% 的股份时，你知道，这肯定会很有趣。（笑声）那天，北太平洋的股价从 170 飙升到了 1000。而且交易是用现金支付的，因为你必须当天实际持有股票证书，而不是按正常的结算日期。
And on the front page of The New York Times — which, incidentally, sold for a penny in those days. It’s had a little more inflation than Coca-Cola — front page of The New York Times, right next to the story about it, it told about a brewer in Newark, New Jersey who had gotten a margin call that day because of this.
在《纽约时报》的头版——顺便说一句，那时候《纽约时报》只卖一分钱。它的价格通胀比可口可乐稍微多了一些——在有关此事的报道旁边，有一则关于新泽西州纽瓦克市的一位酿酒师的故事，他因为这件事在当天收到了追加保证金的通知。
And he jumped into a vat of hot beer and died. And that’s really never appealed to me as, you know, the ending — (laughter) — of a financial career.
他跳进了一桶热啤酒中，死亡了。你知道，这种作为金融职业生涯的结局从未吸引过我。（笑声）
And who knows? You know, when they had a corner in Piggly Wiggly, they had a corner in Auburn Motors in the 1920s. I mean, there were corners. That was part of the game back when it was played in kind of a footloose manner. And it did not pay to be short.
谁知道呢？当时，他们对 Piggly Wiggly 和 1920 年代的奥本汽车进行了逼空。我的意思是，那时候逼空是游戏的一部分，因为当时的规则相对宽松。而做空是没有好处的。
Actually, during that period — you might find it interesting — in the current issue of The New Yorker, maybe one issue ago, the one that has the interesting story about Ted Turner, there’s also a story about Hetty Green.
事实上，在那段时间——你可能会觉得有趣——在最近一期或前一期的《纽约客》杂志上，其中有一个有趣的故事是关于特德·特纳的，同时也有一个故事是关于赫蒂·格林的。
And Hetty Green was one of the original incorporators of Hathaway Manufacturing, half of our Berkshire Hathaway operation, back in the 1880s. And Hetty Green was just piling up money. She was the richest woman in the — maybe in the world. Certainly in the United States. Maybe some queen was richer abroad.
赫蒂·格林是 1880 年代 Hathaway Manufacturing（伯克希尔哈撒韦的一部分）的创始人之一。赫蒂·格林积累了大量财富。她是——也许是世界上最富有的女性。当然在美国是最富有的。也许在国外有某位女王更富有。
But Hetty Green just made it by the slow, old-fashioned way. I doubt if Hetty was ever short anything.
但赫蒂·格林是通过缓慢而传统的方式积累了财富。我怀疑赫蒂是否曾经做空过任何东西。
So as a spiritual descendent of Hetty Green, we’re going to stay away from shorts at Berkshire.
因此，作为赫蒂·格林的精神继承人，我们伯克希尔将远离做空。
OK, area 6.
好了，第六区域。
Hetty, incidentally — this story, it’s a very interesting story. As I read the story, it’s almost conclusively clear to me that she forged a will to try and collect some significant money from, I believe, her aunt.
顺便说一句，赫蒂的故事非常有趣。当我读这个故事时，我几乎可以肯定，她伪造了一份遗嘱，试图从她的姑妈（我相信是姑妈）那里获得一些巨额财产。
And it was a very, very famous trial back in whenever it was, 1860 or ’70. And they found against Hetty when it got all through, but she still managed to become the richest woman in the country.
这是一个非常、非常著名的审判，发生在1860或1870年。当审判结束时，法院的裁决对赫蒂不利，但她仍然设法成为了这个国家最富有的女性。
60. The value of Berkshire’s “loyalty effect”
伯克希尔“忠诚效应”的价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第六区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, hi. I’m James Halperin from Dallas, Texas. And I’ve been a shareholder since 1995. And I feel great about it, so thank you.
观众提问： 你好，我是詹姆斯·哈尔佩林（音译），来自德克萨斯州达拉斯。从1995年起，我就是一名股东，我对此感到非常满意，所以谢谢你们。
This question has to do with Berkshire’s so-called permanent holdings and whether, when making investment decisions, you somehow mathematically calculate a value to Berkshire’s reputation for loyalty to its public investees.
我的问题与伯克希尔所谓的永久持股有关。是否在做投资决策时，你们以某种数学方式计算了伯克希尔对其公开投资对象忠诚声誉的价值？
Let’s say you are confident enough that Pepsi or Procter and Gamble would grow cash flow faster than Coke or Gillette would. And that the replacement value of the stock was less expensive enough to more than make up for the taxes.
假设你们足够确信百事可乐或宝洁的现金流增长速度会快于可口可乐或吉列。而且其股票的替代价值足够便宜，足以弥补税收成本。
Would you then sell Coke, for example, to buy Pepsi? And if not, why not? And how do you value this reputation for loyalty aspect in those decisions?
那么，你们会卖掉可口可乐的股票去买百事可乐吗？如果不会，为什么不会？在这些决策中，你们如何评估这种忠诚声誉的价值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that’s a very good question.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我认为这是一个非常好的问题。
I don’t think we would ever — I think it’s very unlikely we would come to the conclusion that we were that certain that — you mentioned P&G and Pepsi versus the ones — but that some major consumer products company would do better than the ones we’re in.
我不认为我们会——我认为我们很难得出这样的结论，即我们可以确定地认为——你提到的宝洁和百事可乐与我们所持有的公司相比——某家主要的消费品公司会表现得更好。
We might very well decide that some other one is going to do quite well and buy that additionally.
我们很可能会决定某些其他公司表现不错，并额外购买它们的股票。
As a practical matter, if I’m on the board of a company, or Charlie were to be, representing Berkshire, it’s very difficult — I would say it’s almost impossible for us to trade in their securities.
实际上，如果我在某家公司董事会中，或者查理代表伯克希尔进入董事会，我们很难——我会说几乎不可能交易该公司的证券。
It just — it creates too many problems. People would think we knew something we didn’t. Or, you know, particularly if we were selling it, you know, we would have people questioning very much whether we had detected something within the company that was not available to the rest of the world.
这会带来太多问题。人们会认为我们知道一些他们不知道的事情。特别是当我们出售它时，人们会质疑我们是否发现了公司内部一些外界无法得知的问题。
So we really give up an enormous amount of investment mobility when we go on a board.
所以，当我们进入董事会时，我们实际上放弃了很大一部分投资的灵活性。
And so I don’t even think about doing what you’re suggesting, although I might very well if I were just a money manager running the business.
因此，我甚至不会考虑你所建议的那种操作，尽管如果我只是一个管理资金的经理人，我可能会这么做。
We certainly, and we’ve laid it out in the ground rules in the back of the — in our Owner’s Manual back in the annual report — we’ve certainly said, in terms of businesses we buy control of, that they just aren’t for sale. And a fancy price will not tempt us.
我们明确表示过——我们在年度报告附录的《股东手册》中也制定了规则——对于我们控股的企业，它们是绝不会出售的。即使是一个极具诱惑力的高价也不会打动我们。
And that we lay out that exception relating to businesses where we think there’s a permanent loss of cash for as far as the eye can see, or businesses where we have labor troubles, which we — I described earlier in the day, we might’ve had at The Buffalo News at that one period.
当然也有例外，比如那些我们认为在可预见的未来会产生永久性现金损失的企业，或者那些存在劳资问题的企业——就像今天早些时候我提到的《水牛城新闻》在某段时期的问题。
But otherwise, simply because we can use the money better someplace else, we’re not interested in it.
但除此之外，仅仅因为我们可以在其他地方更好地使用这笔钱，我们对此并不感兴趣。
You know, I can’t really dig into my psyche and tell you how much of that is because I think that will help us buy businesses in the future if we behave that way, or how much is just my natural inclination that when I make a deal with somebody and I’m happy with how they behave with me, that I want to stick with them. It’s probably both, you know?
我无法深入内心告诉你，这有多少是因为我认为如果我们以这种方式行事，会帮助我们未来购买企业；又有多少只是因为我的自然倾向——当我与某人达成交易并对他们的行为感到满意时，我会愿意坚持与他们合作。这可能两者都有，你知道吗？
And I wouldn’t want to try and weight the two. I’m happy, you know, with the results of the first and I’m happy with the way I feel, essentially, about the second.
我不想尝试去权衡这两者。你知道，我对第一种结果感到满意，也对第二种带给我的感觉本质上感到满意。
I just think it’s crazy — I know if I owned all of Berkshire myself, I wouldn’t dream of trading around businesses with people that have trusted in me and that I like and have been more than fair with me.
我只是觉得那样做很疯狂——我知道，如果我自己拥有整个伯克希尔，我绝不会想要与那些信任我、我喜欢并且对我非常公平的人的周围进行业务交易。
I wouldn’t dream of trading around businesses so that my estate was 105 percent of some very large number instead of 100 percent of some large number. I just would regard that as a crazy way to live.
我不会为了让我的遗产达到某个非常大的数字的105%而不是100%去进行业务交易。我只是会认为那是一种疯狂的生活方式。
And I don’t want the fact I run a public company to cause me to behave in a way that I would be uncomfortable behaving if we were a private company.
我也不希望因为我经营一家上市公司而导致我以一种让我在经营私人公司时会感到不舒服的方式行事。
But I also feel that you, as shareholders, are entitled to know that that’s an idiosyncrasy of mine. And therefore, I lay it out, and have laid it out for 20 years, as something that you should understand, as an investor or before you become an investor.
但我也认为，作为股东的你们，有权知道这是我的一个特殊癖好。因此，我将其明确说明，并且已经说明了20年，作为投资者或者在成为投资者之前，你们应该了解这一点。
I’m sure it helps us in acquisitions over time. But whether that in any way compensations the opportunity costs that Charlie talks about of making an occasional advantageous disposal, I don’t know and it’s something I’ll never calculate.
我确信，这在长期来看有助于我们的收购。但是否在某种程度上弥补了查理提到的因偶尔错过有利的处置机会而产生的机会成本，我不知道，这也是我永远不会去计算的事情。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do tend to calculate it, at least roughly. And so far, I think that the loyalty effect is a plus in our life.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我倾向于至少大致地计算一下。到目前为止，我认为忠诚效应对我们的生活是一个加分项。
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you regard that as true though in both public — I mean, both marketable securities and owned businesses?
沃伦·巴菲特： 你认为这一点在公开公司和自有企业中都成立吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, no. I don’t think the loyalty effect in lots of public companies is nearly as important as it is with the private companies.
查理·芒格： 哦，不。我不认为忠诚效应在许多上市公司中像在私营公司中那样重要。
WARREN BUFFETT: You can say it’s a mistake for us to be directors of companies, because we give up huge amount of flexibility in investment because we are directors. I — and there’s no question that we do.
沃伦·巴菲特： 你可以说我们成为公司董事是一个错误，因为我们放弃了大量的投资灵活性，仅仅因为我们是董事。这一点是毫无疑问的。
It’s — if you’re thinking solely of making money, you do not want to be a director of any company. So there’s just no question about that.
我的意思是，如果你的目标只是赚钱，你绝不想成为任何公司的董事。所以，这一点是毫无疑问的。
61. Confidence that Berkshire’s culture will endure
对伯克希尔文化延续的信心
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第七区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Tom Harrison (PH) from Claremore, Oklahoma. Good afternoon, gentlemen. And thanks for a wonderful weekend.
观众提问： 我是汤姆·哈里森（音译），来自俄克拉荷马州克莱尔莫尔。下午好，先生们。感谢你们带来的精彩周末。
This question’s for Mr. Buffett. Being somewhat pessimistic by nature, I have a recurrent nightmare of a Wall Street Journal headline proclaiming, “Buffett kicks bucket.”
这个问题是问巴菲特先生的。由于天性有点悲观，我经常做噩梦，梦到《华尔街日报》的头条写着：“巴菲特与世长辞。”
WARREN BUFFETT: They may phrase it a little more elegantly than that — (laughter) — but someday, the headline will be there. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 他们可能会用稍微优雅一点的措辞——（笑声）——但总有一天，这个头条会出现。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And, of course, Charlie’s no spring chicken either. (Laughter)
观众提问： 当然，查理也不再是“小伙子”了。（笑声）
In light of these concerns, could you please go into a little more detail than that presented in your annual report regarding the succession issue? And my apologies for the morbid nature of the question.
考虑到这些担忧，您能否比年度报告中提供的内容更详细地谈谈接班问题？对这个问题的“晦气”性质，我深感抱歉。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, there’s no reason to apologize. I mean, it’s a question I ask our managers, incidentally, every couple of years.
沃伦·巴菲特： 噢，这没有什么可道歉的。我的意思是，这也是我每隔几年会问我们经理们的问题。
I — about every two years, I send them a letter and I say, you know, “If you die tonight, what will you — what will I wish you had told me tomorrow morning?” You know, because I have to make that same decision and I’m not conversing with them every night.
大约每两年，我会给他们写一封信，我会说：“如果你今晚去世，明天早上我会希望你之前告诉我些什么？”你知道的，因为我也需要做出同样的决定，但我并不是每晚都能和他们交流。
So I want them to put in writing to me, once every couple of years, what they think about the subject, who they think should succeed them, or whether there are several candidates, or what the strengths and weaknesses are. And I have that information available.
所以我希望他们每隔几年以书面形式告诉我，他们对此的想法、他们认为谁应该接替他们、是否有多个候选人，以及这些候选人的优点和缺点。我手头是有这些信息的。
And, you know, you’re entitled to the same sort of answer about succession. It’s a part of buying into this business.
而且，你知道，关于接班问题，你们有权得到同样的答案。这是投资这家企业的一部分。
And it — I can tell you that no one has more of an interest in it than I do. And Charlie has a similar interest, because, we have a very high percentage of our net worth in the business.
而且——我可以告诉你们，没有人比我对这个问题更关注。查理也有类似的关注，因为我们将我们净资产的很大一部分都投入到了这家公司。
Plus, we’ve got a lifetime of effort in the business. And we want it to succeed for both, in our cases probably, at least my case, the ultimate reward, the foundation I have.
此外，我们已经为这家公司倾注了一生的努力。我们希望它能成功，这对我们来说可能是最终的回报，至少对我而言，是为了我设立的基金会。
But also because we just want — we like what’s happened so far and we want to prove that it can — it’s not dependent upon a couple of guys like us, but that it can be institutionalized, in effect.
但也因为我们希望——我们喜欢迄今为止的成果，并希望证明它并不依赖于我们这样的两个人，而是可以制度化的。
And we have, and Charlie and I, we know who will succeed me in what are likely to be two jobs, one marketable securities and one business operations.
查理和我已经知道谁会接替我，承担两个可能的角色，一个是市场化证券投资，另一个是业务运营。
We want to be very sure that the culture is maintained. And I think it’s so strong that I think it’d be very hard to change it.
我们非常希望确保这种文化能够得以维持。我认为它已经非常强大，以至于很难被改变。
But in addition, the stock ownership situation with me is such that it can — if there were any inclination to change it, it can be prevented from happening. I don’t think it would, anyway.
此外，我持有股票的状况决定了即便存在任何改变的意图，也可以阻止其发生。不过我认为这种情况不会发生。
Now, in terms of who succeeds me, that depends when I die. I — and there’s no sense telling you who it would be today. There’d be no plus to that, and it might not be the same 20 years from now.
至于谁接替我的问题，这取决于我何时去世。我——现在告诉你谁会接任没有意义。这不会带来任何好处，而且20年后可能会发生变化。
I mean, 20 years ago, it would’ve been Charlie, obviously. But it won’t be Charlie now because of his age. And it’ll be somebody else.
我的意思是，20年前，这个人显然会是查理。但现在不会是查理了，因为他的年龄。这会是其他人。
But 20 years from now or 15 years from now it might be some third party. But we’ve got —we feel very good about the succession situation.
但20年或15年后，这可能是某个第三方。但我们对继任的安排感到非常满意。
We feel very good about the stability of the organization, in terms of the stock ownership situation, because that is insured for a very, very long time to come. We couldn’t feel better about the managers we have in place and the culture we have in place. And, you know, the individual will be named.
我们对组织的稳定性感到非常满意，就股权状况而言，这已经为未来很长时间得到了保障。我们对现有的经理人团队和文化非常满意。而且，接任者的人选会被明确。
I think I’ve mentioned, though, that when they open that envelope — all of the contents of that envelope are already known to the key people — but when they open that envelope, the first instruction is, you know, take my pulse again. (Laughter)
不过，我记得提到过，当他们打开那个信封时——信封中的所有内容关键人物已经知道——但当他们打开信封时，第一个指示是：“再检查一下我的脉搏。”（笑声）
But if I flunk that test, there will be somebody very good in place.
但如果我没通过那个测试，那么会有非常优秀的人选接任。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The main defense, of course, is to have assets that will do well, more or less, automatically. And we have a lot of those.
查理·芒格： 当然，主要的防御措施是拥有可以或多或少自动表现良好的资产。而我们有很多这样的资产。
And to the extent you improve that further by having very good managers in place and very good individualized systems for bringing new managers into the places, there’s a lot of momentum here that would go on very nicely with the present management gone.
而且，如果你进一步通过优秀的经理人和非常完善的个性化制度引入新的经理人，这里的发展动力将非常强劲，即使现任管理层离开也会继续很好地运转。
And now, I don’t think our successors are going to be as good as Warren at actually — (applause) — allocating the money. (Louder applause and laughter)
而现在，我不认为我们的继任者在资金分配上会像沃伦那样优秀——（掌声）——（更热烈的掌声和笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: No, we ran a little test case 10 years ago because for nine months and four days, I took another job at Salomon. And things went fine at Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特： 不，10年前我们做过一个小测试，因为我在所罗门公司工作了九个月零四天。而伯克希尔的运转一切正常。
We’ve got — the managers don’t need me. We have to allocate capital. We have to make sure they’re treated fairly. And —
我们已经有了——经理人们不需要我。我们需要分配资本。我们需要确保他们得到公平的待遇。而且——
But we are not making decisions around the place, except in the allocation of capital. And that will be important. But some of that is semiautomatic. And others, you know, it does require, you know, some imagination sometime or something of the sort.
但我们并没有在公司内做出所有决策，除了资本分配。这很重要。但其中一部分是半自动化的。还有一些，确实需要一些想象力或类似的能力。
But for nine months and four days in 1991, you know, Salomon was primarily on my mind and Berkshire wasn’t. And everything went on just as before. And we are far, far, far stronger now than we were 10 years ago.
但在1991年的九个月零四天里，你知道，所罗门主要占据了我的思维，而不是伯克希尔。而一切运转如常。现在的我们比10年前强大得多得多得多。
So I’m very comfortable with 99 percent of my estate being in Berkshire shares. And I think it’s an intelligent holding, eventually, for the foundation. And knowing that, you know, I won’t be around at some point before the foundation gets it.
所以，我非常放心将我99%的遗产都放在伯克希尔的股票中。我认为，这对基金会来说是一个明智的持有。而且我知道，在基金会接收这些遗产之前，我某个时候将不在了。
62. “We don’t want to talk about silver”
“我们不想谈论白银”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area 8.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，第八区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name’s Matt Ahner (PH). I’m from Tucson, Arizona. It’s a tremendous pleasure to be here today.
观众提问： 你好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是马特·阿赫纳（音译），来自亚利桑那州图森。今天能够来到这里真是我的荣幸。
This question probably falls into Charlie Munger’s realm of oddball investment activities.
这个问题可能属于查理·芒格先生的“另类投资活动”领域。
But considering Berkshire’s previous experience in silver, what are your thoughts on the silver market today? How do you analyze this market? Have you determined an equilibrium price for silver? And if so, would you share that price, or explain to us how you determined it?
但鉴于伯克希尔之前在白银方面的投资经验，您们对当前白银市场的看法是什么？您们是如何分析这个市场的？是否已经确定了白银的均衡价格？如果是，您们能否分享这个价格，或向我们解释您们是如何确定它的？
CHARLIE MUNGER: The short answer is we don’t want to talk about silver. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 简短的回答是，我们不想谈论白银。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’re not going to comment, you know, on oil or the prices of anything in terms of making any forecasts about it.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我们不会对石油或任何商品的价格发表评论，也不会对其进行任何预测。
The equilibrium price though I can tell you is whatever it’s selling for today. But there will be a different equilibrium price a year from now or five years from now. But we can’t tell you what it’ll be.
不过，我可以告诉你，今天的均衡价格就是它现在的市场价格。但一年后或五年后会有一个不同的均衡价格。不过我们无法告诉你那会是多少。
63. Electricity deregulation led to damaging shortages
电力市场的放松管制导致了严重的短缺
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第一区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name’s Bob Odem (PH) from Seattle, Washington.
观众提问： 你好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是鲍勃·奥登（音译），来自华盛顿州的西雅图。
Considering the political climate, and what seems to be a more regulated environment than not in the electric utilities market, and politicians that seem to be pacifying their constituents rather than the common sense of price and quantity —
鉴于政治环境，以及电力公用事业市场看起来更倾向于受管制的环境，而政治家们似乎更关注安抚选民，而非价格和数量的基本常识——
Is it not a risky venture to participate in these markets more than what has already been done with MidAmerican, considering that, even with a possible repeal of the PUHCA laws, that they may be reinstated some years later, with the addition or subtraction of any other legislation that a politician may dream up, and then put the investment at risk?
参与这些市场是否是一个风险较高的尝试，超出了已经在 MidAmerican 的投入范围？尤其是考虑到，即使 PUHCA 法律可能被废除，但几年后可能重新实施，再加上或减去任何政治家可能想到的其他立法，从而使投资面临风险？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you’re a resident of California. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理，你是加利福尼亚州的居民。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the production of electricity, of course, is an enormous business. And it’s not going away.
查理·芒格： 嗯，电力生产当然是一个庞大的行业。而且它不会消失。
And the thought that there might be something additional that we might do in that field is not at all inconceivable. It’s a very fundamental business.
我们可能在这一领域中采取更多行动的想法并非难以想象。这是一个非常基础的行业。
Now, you’re certainly right in that we have an unholy mess, in California, in terms of electricity.
现在，你说得对，加利福尼亚州的电力市场确实是一团糟。
And again, it reflects, I would say, a fundamental flaw in the education system of the country, that is many smart people of all kinds, utility executives, governors, legislators, journalistic leaders, they have difficulty recognizing that the most important thing with a power system is to have a surplus of capacity.
而且，这再次反映了我认为的国家教育体系的根本缺陷，即各种聪明人——公用事业公司高管、州长、立法者、新闻界领袖——都难以认识到，电力系统最重要的是需要有过剩的产能。
Is that a very difficult concept? (Laughter)
这是一个很难理解的概念吗？（笑声）
You know, everybody understands that if you’re building a bridge, you don’t want a bridge that will handle exactly 20,000 pounds and no more.
你知道，每个人都明白，如果你在建一座桥，你不会想要一座只能承载恰好 20,000 磅的桥，不能多一点。
You want a bridge that’ll handle a lot more than the maximum likely load. And that margin of safety is enormously important in bridge building.
你需要一座能承载远高于最大可能负载的桥梁。而这种安全裕度在桥梁建设中非常重要。
Well, a power system is a similar thing. Now, why do all these intelligent people, you know, ignore the single most obvious and important factor and just screw it up to a fare-thee-well?
电力系统也是类似的东西。那么，为什么所有这些聪明人，忽视了这个最明显和最重要的因素，并且把事情搞得一团糟呢？
So I’m giving you a response which is, of course, another question. As the — my old professor used to say, “Let me know what your problem is and I’ll try and make it more difficult for you.” (Laughter)
所以我的回答当然是另一个问题。正如我以前的教授常说的：“告诉我你的问题是什么，我会试着让它变得更复杂。”（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to me, the interesting thing is that you had a system — I mean, Charlie’s obviously right in that you’ve got about three goals in terms of — from a societal standpoint — you’ve got perhaps three goals in what you would like your electric utility business to be.
沃伦·巴菲特： 在我看来，有趣的是，你有一个系统——查理显然是对的，从社会的角度来看，你可能希望电力公用事业业务能够实现三个目标。
One is you would like it to be reasonably efficiently operated.
首先，你希望它能够合理高效地运营。
Secondly, since it does tend to have, in many situations, monopoly characteristics, you would want something that produced a fair return, but not a great return for capital. But enough to attract capital.
其次，由于它在许多情况下具有垄断特性，你希望它能够为资本提供一个公平的回报，但不是一个过高的回报，而是足以吸引资本的回报。
And then third, you’d want this margin of safety, this ample supply.
最后，你希望有一定的安全裕度，保证充足的供给。
Now, when you’ve got a long lead time to creation of supply, which is the nature of putting on generation capacity, you have to have a system that rewards people for fulfilling that obligation to have extra capacity around.
现在，由于电力供应需要较长的建设周期，这是发电能力建设的特性，因此你必须有一个系统来奖励那些履行额外产能义务的人。
A regulated system does that. If you give people a return on the capital employed, if they keep a little too much capital employed so that they have this margin of safety on generation, and they get paid for it, they stay ahead of the curve. They always have 15 or 20 percent more generating capacity than needed.
受监管的系统可以做到这一点。如果你为人们投入的资本提供回报，如果他们投入略多的资本以确保发电的安全裕度，并因此获得报酬，他们就能领先于需求曲线。他们总是比需求多出 15% 或 20% 的发电能力。
And one of the disadvantages of that regulation and the monopoly nature is that it doesn’t have the spur to efficiency. They try to build it in various ways, but it’s difficult to have a spur to great efficiency if somebody can get a return on any capital they spend.
这种监管和垄断性质的一个缺点是，它缺乏对效率的激励。他们尝试以各种方式解决这个问题，但如果有人可以对其支出的任何资本获得回报，那么很难激励出高效率。
So utility regulators have always been worried about somebody just building any damn thing and getting whatever the state-allowed return is.
因此，公用事业监管机构总是担心有人建造任何东西都能获得州允许的回报。
But I would say that the problems that would arise from, say, a little bit of sloppy management are nothing compared to the problems that arise from inadequate generation.
但我认为，与发电能力不足导致的问题相比，比如稍微松散的管理导致的问题几乎可以忽略不计。
So here you have in California — my view as an outsider — you had a situation under regulation where the utilities had the incentive to have a little extra generating capacity because they got allowed to earn a decent return on it, a return that would attract capital.
所以在加州——以我作为一个局外人的观点来看——在监管之下，公用事业公司有动力去维持一定的额外发电能力，因为他们被允许从中获得体面的回报，这种回报足以吸引资本。
Then you had, I think, the forced sell-off of half of their generating capacity or something like that. And they sold it at multiples of book value to a bunch of people who were now just generators who were deregulated.
然后，我认为，你们有强制出售其一半发电能力的情况。他们以账面价值的数倍价格将其出售给了一群现已被放松监管的发电商。
They’ve got — they don’t have an interest in having too much supply. They’ve got an interest in having too little supply.
这些人——他们没有兴趣维持过多的供给。他们的利益在于供给过少。
So you’ve totally changed the equation because the fellow that now has the deregulated asset, for which he paid three times book, now has to earn a return on a three times book what the fellow was formally earning under the regulated environment at one times book.
所以，你完全改变了平衡，因为现在拥有被放松监管资产的人，以账面价值三倍的价格购买了这些资产，现在必须赚取基于三倍账面价值的回报，而原来在监管环境下仅基于账面价值赚取回报。
And so, he is not going to build extra generating capacity. That — all that does is it brings down the price of electricity. You know, he hopes things are tight.
因此，他不会建设额外的发电能力。因为那只会降低电价。你知道，他希望供给紧张。
So you’ve created, in my view, a situation where the interests of the companies in the business have diverged in a significant way from the interests of society. And I — it just doesn’t make any sense to me. And I really think that the old system made more societal sense.
因此，在我看来，你创造了一种情况，即这些公司在业务中的利益与社会利益有了显著的背离。这对我来说毫无意义。我确实认为旧系统从社会角度更有意义。
Let people earn a good return, not a great return, but a return that attracts capital, on an investment that has built into it the incentives to keep ahead of the game on capacity because you can’t fine tune it that carefully. And you do have this long lead time, so.
让人们获得合理的回报，而不是过高的回报，但这个回报足以吸引资本，并且这种投资内含有动力，可以在产能上保持领先。因为你无法如此精细地调整产能，而这确实需要很长的建设周期。
Now, what you do with the scrambled eggs now, you know, is something. And with all the political forces back and forth, I think that you’d better have a system that encourages building extra capacity.
至于你现在如何处理这盘“炒蛋”，你知道，这确实是一个问题。考虑到所有的政治力量来回拉锯，我认为你最好有一个鼓励建设额外产能的系统。
Because you don’t know how much rainfall there will be in the Pacific Northwest and, therefore, how much hydro will be available. And you don’t know what natural gas prices will do. And therefore, you know, whether it’s advantageous for a gas-fired turbine to be operating.
因为你无法预测太平洋西北地区会有多少降雨，因此也无法预测可用的水力发电有多少。而且你不知道天然气价格会如何变化，因此不知道是否有利于燃气涡轮机的运行。
And it — the old system really strikes me as somewhat better than this semi-deregulated environment that we’ve more or less stumbled into.
所以，我真的觉得旧系统比我们现在半放松管制的环境要好一些，这个环境我们可以说是无意中陷入的。
But Charlie, what do you think on that?
但是查理，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course, even the old system got in some troubles in that since everybody had the NIMBY syndrome — “Not In My Back Yard” — everybody wanted any new power plant to be anyplace not near me.
查理·芒格： 当然，即使是旧系统也遇到了一些问题，因为每个人都有“NIMBY综合症”——“不要建在我家后院”。每个人都希望任何新的电厂建在离自己远的地方。
And if everybody feels that way, and if the political system means that the obstructionists are always going to rule, which is true in some places in terms of zoning and other matters, you get in deep trouble.
如果每个人都这么想，而政治体制意味着阻挠者总是会占上风，这在一些地方的分区规划和其他事务中是事实，那么你会陷入深深的困境。
If you let the unreasonable, self-centered people make all the decisions of that kind, you may well get so you just run out of power. That was a mistake.
如果你让不合理、自私的人来做出所有此类决定，你很可能最终会耗尽电力。这是一个错误。
And we may make that mistake with oil refineries. It is — you know, we haven’t had many new, big oil refineries in the last, well, period. So you may get to do this all over again.
我们可能会在炼油厂上犯同样的错误。你知道，过去很长一段时间里，我们几乎没有建新的大型炼油厂。所以，你可能会重蹈覆辙。
WARREN BUFFETT: All of that being said, there will be need for more generation capacity. I mean, the electric utility industry will be — will grow. It will need lots of capital.
沃伦·巴菲特： 话虽如此，但确实需要更多的发电能力。我的意思是，电力公用事业行业将会增长。它将需要大量的资本。
And there should be ways to participate in that where we get reasonable returns on capital. We would not expect to get great returns on capital. But we would, you know, we would be happy to do that. We generate a lot of capital and we would be comfortable in that business.
而且应该有一些方式可以参与其中，并获得合理的资本回报。我们不会指望获得很高的资本回报。但我们会很乐意参与。我们生成了大量资本，并且在这个行业感到很自在。
We would not feel the risks were undue, as long as we didn’t go around paying incredible prices for somebody else’s capacity and then have people get very upset at what that meant in terms of their electric rates.
我们不会觉得风险过高，只要我们没有四处花费天价购买别人的产能，而这些价格会让人们对电费上涨感到非常不满。
If you’ve got a utility plant in this country that was put in place at X and then you go out and encourage entrepreneurs to buy in at 3X, you cannot expect utility prices — electricity prices — to fall. And that was, in my view, a very basic mistake. I may not understand it fully.
如果这个国家的一个电厂建造成本是 X，然后你出去鼓励企业家以 3X 的价格购买，你就无法期待电力价格会下降。在我看来，这是一个非常基本的错误。我可能没有完全理解其中的逻辑。
64. Can a good business make up for bad management?
好的业务能否弥补糟糕的管理？
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Pavel Begun. I am from Minsk, Belarus. And I have two questions.
观众提问： 下午好。我叫帕维尔·贝贡（音译），来自白俄罗斯明斯克。我有两个问题。
And before I’ll have questions for you, I’d like to say thank you for recommending to read Intelligent Investor. It’s a terrific book and it reshaped me tremendously, literally, overnight. So I’d like to thank you for that.
在提问之前，我想感谢您推荐阅读《聪明的投资者》。这是一本非常棒的书，它在字面意义上彻底改变了我，几乎是一夜之间。所以我想对此表示感谢。
And now the question. Say I’m an owner of the business. And the business has a durable competitive advantage and superior business model and is run by able people.
现在的问题是，假设我是一个企业的所有者。这家企业拥有持久的竞争优势和卓越的商业模式，并且由能干的人管理。
And then, you know, I start noticing that, basically, management starts doing things which are far from intelligent.
然而，我开始注意到，基本上，管理层开始做一些完全不明智的事情。
So what should I do as an owner, as an investor? Should I try to tell them how they should run the business? Or should I just sit back and do nothing because superior business model should overcome poor management? That’s the first question.
那么，作为一个所有者，作为一个投资者，我应该怎么做？我应该试图告诉他们如何经营这家公司吗？还是应该袖手旁观，因为卓越的商业模式应该能克服糟糕的管理？这是第一个问题。
And the second question is, how important is nominal experience in the business of investing? And by saying nominal, I mean the number of — the actual time you’ve been in the business, as opposed to real experience that also includes experience you acquire from, say, Ben Graham, or you, or Peter Lynch, when you read books? So those are the questions.
第二个问题是，在投资业务中，名义上的经验有多重要？我所说的名义经验，是指实际从业时间，而不是包括从书籍中获得的经验，比如从本·格雷厄姆、您或者彼得·林奇那里获得的经验。
WARREN BUFFETT: On your first question, did you assume that you had control of the business, or you just owned a marketable security?
沃伦·巴菲特： 对于第一个问题，你假设你控制了这家公司，还是仅仅拥有可交易的证券？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, if I own, say, 20 percent of marketable securities.
观众提问： 是的，假设我拥有，比如说，可交易证券的 20%。
WARREN BUFFETT: All right. Well, the situation you described is not hypothetical, in the first case. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，你描述的情况在第一个问题中并非假设。（笑声）
And I would say that the history that Charlie and I have had of persuading decent, intelligent people, who we thought were doing unintelligent things, to change their course of action has been poor.
我想说，查理和我在说服那些我们认为不够明智的正直、聪明的人改变行动方向的历史是糟糕的。
Would you agree with that, Charlie, or no?
查理，你同意这个说法吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Worse than poor.
查理·芒格： 比糟糕还糟糕。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。（笑声）
So I would say that if you really think you’re in with people that have got a good business, but they’re going to keep doing dumb things with your money, you’ll probably do better to get out and get in with people who’ve got a good business and you think they’re going to do sensible things with it. I mean, you’ve got that option.
所以，我想说，如果你认为自己和一些拥有好业务的人在一起，但他们却不断用你的钱做愚蠢的事情，那么你最好还是离开，转而投向那些既有好业务又会合理利用资源的人。我是说，你有这个选择。
Now, you also have the option of trying to persuade them to change their mind. But it’s just very, very difficult. I mean it is, you know, that’s been something we’ve faced for 50 years.
当然，你也可以选择尝试说服他们改变主意。但这真的非常、非常困难。我是说，你知道，这就是我们过去50年来所面临的问题。
And initially, we faced it from a position where nobody even knew who the hell we were, or anything of the sort.
起初，我们是在一个几乎没人知道我们是谁的情况下面对这种问题的，也没人关心类似的事情。
So we’ve acquired a certain stature over time, perhaps in talking on the subject. And we’ve written on the subject. And we still don’t get very far. I mean, when people want to do something, they want to do something.
随着时间的推移，我们在这个主题上或许获得了一定的地位。我们也在这个主题上写过文章。但即便如此，我们依然没有取得太大的进展。我的意思是，当人们想做某件事时，他们就是想做某件事。
And they didn’t rise to become the CEO of a company to have some shareholder tell them that their most recent idea is dumb. I mean, that is just not the type that gets to the top.
而且，他们并不是通过成为一家公司CEO的方式，来让某些股东告诉他们自己的最新想法有多愚蠢。我的意思是，这根本不是那些能够走到高位的人会接受的事情。
So I would say that, as a matter of investment technique, and maybe as a matter of, you know, avoiding stress in your life and all of that sort of thing, that it’s — and dealing with smaller quantities of stock so it’s easier to sell and buy and all that sort of thing — I would say that it’s better to be in with a management you’re simpatico with, than simply to be in a great business with a management that’s bent on doing things that don’t make much sense to you.
所以，我想说，作为一种投资技巧，或者为了避免生活中的压力之类的原因——比如，处理较小规模的股票，这样更容易买卖等等——我会说，与一个志同道合的管理团队合作比单纯投资于一个好业务但管理层一意孤行做出不合理决策的公司要好得多。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我完全同意。
65. Having “your head screwed on right in the first place”
首先要“思路正确”
WARREN BUFFETT: Second question — (laughs) — I gather is, sort of, how much does our actual business experience versus book experience help us?
沃伦·巴菲特： 第二个问题——（笑声）——我猜是关于实际商业经验与书本经验对我们的帮助有多大？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, it’s, you know, if you look at a person who has just made two years of being in the business of investing, versus a person who has been for 10 years in the business of investing.
观众提问： 嗯，如果你看一个刚进入投资行业两年的人，与一个已经在投资行业工作十年的人。
And say the person who has been for two years, you know, has read a lot about, you know, Ben Graham’s techniques, and your techniques, and, say, Peter Lynch’s techniques. So would you say that the person who has only two years of experience may do much better than the second person?
假设这个两年的人读过很多关于本·格雷厄姆的技术、您的技术，以及比如彼得·林奇的技术。您是否认为这个仅有两年经验的人可能比那个十年经验的人做得更好？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if everything else is equal, I mean, everything else is equal, except the amount of experience you have, I think the experience is probably useful. But it isn’t going to be equal. And I don’t think that — I don’t think that the —
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，如果其他条件都相等，我是说，除了经验年限之外，其他都相等的话，我认为经验可能是有用的。但实际上不会相等。我不认为——我不认为——
I think it’s way more important what you’ve thought about for two years than what you’ve practiced for 10 years. If you’re — if the direction — if there’s a divergence in techniques applied, I would rather be with the one that I’m philosophically in sync with.
我认为你在两年里思考的内容，比你在十年中实践的内容更重要。如果应用的技术方向不同，我更愿意选择与我哲学一致的人。
If I’m philosophically in sync with both and one’s had 10 years of experience, the chances are they will know a little bit more about more businesses if they’ve been around for 10 years, looking at them, than if they’ve been around for two years.
如果两个人都与我的理念一致，但其中一个有十年经验，那他可能会因为观察过十年的企业而比观察两年的人多了解一些业务。
But the biggest thing is that, you know, basically they’ve got their head screwed on right in the first place, in terms of how they value businesses and how they look at stocks.
但最重要的是，他们首先在看待业务和股票的方式上是否“思路正确”。
Whether they look at them as pieces of businesses or whether they look at them as little things that move around, and that you can tell a lot by looking at charts or listening to strategists on or something of the sort.
他们是否将股票视为企业的一部分，或者只是看作会波动的小东西，通过看图表或听策略师的意见就能了解很多。
We have — Charlie and I have learned a lot about a lot of businesses over 40 or 50 years. But I would say that, in terms of the new things that would come to us, at the end of the second year, we were probably about as good judges of them as we would be today.
查理和我在过去的40或50年里学到了很多关于企业的知识。但我会说，就新的事物而言，在我们进入行业的第二年，我们对它们的判断可能和今天差不多好。
But I think there’s a little plus to having seen — more in terms of human behavior and that sort of thing — than knowing about the specifics of a given business model.
但我认为，观察过更多人类行为之类的内容，比了解某个特定商业模式的细节更有帮助。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think that — I’ve watched Warren for a long time now, and I would say he’s actually getting better as he gets older. Not at golf or — (Buffett laughs) — many other activities, but —
查理·芒格： 是的，我认为——我已经观察沃伦很久了，我会说他确实随着年龄增长变得更好了。虽然不是在打高尔夫或——（巴菲特笑）——其他许多活动上，但——
WARREN BUFFETT: Stay with generalities.
沃伦·巴菲特： 保持在总体范围内。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — as an investor, he’s better — (laughter) — which I think’s remarkable. It shows that scale of experience matters.
查理·芒格： ——作为投资者，他更优秀了——（笑声）——我认为这很了不起。这说明经验规模很重要。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it helps somewhat to have seen a lot of business situation — I mean, Charlie talks about models and you construct your models as you go along based on observation.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，见过很多商业情境是有帮助的——我的意思是，查理谈到模型，而你是在观察的基础上逐步构建自己的模型。
And your models will — if you’re paying attention, your models will be somewhat better the more years you’ve spent really observing and not just trying to make everything fit into what you saw the first few years.
而你的模型——如果你认真观察的话，你的模型会随着观察时间的增加而有所改进，而不仅仅是试图把所有东西都套进你最初几年看到的框架中。
66. Berkshire stock recommendations would be “big mistake”
伯克希尔股票推荐将是“重大错误”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第三区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Richard Marvel (PH) from Washington, D.C. And my question has to do with the intrinsic value of Berkshire Hathaway.
观众提问： 你好，我是理查德·马维尔（音译），来自华盛顿特区。我的问题与伯克希尔·哈撒韦的内在价值有关。
You’ve stated several times that you would prefer the stock to be neither overvalued nor undervalued so that the time people spend owning the security represents a gain from what the security — the results during that period of time.
您多次表示，您希望股票既不过高估值也不过低估值，这样人们持有股票的时间就能从股票在该期间的表现中获益。
However, it’s a very difficult security to value because of the disparate pieces.
然而，由于其各部分业务的差异性，这是一支很难估值的股票。
And, as we saw last year, when you provide a little bit of guidance — in last year’s annual report you said that when the stock price hit $45,000 a share, you considered buying, but thought it was unfair until the annual report came out so everyone had the same information.
正如我们去年看到的，当您提供了一些指导时——在去年的年度报告中，您说当股价达到每股 45,000 美元时，您曾考虑过买入，但认为在年度报告发布前这样做对其他人不公平，因为大家没有相同的信息。
And while I also realize that you don’t feel there is a particular quote-unquote “correct” number, would you ever consider giving any guidance in this direction?
虽然我也明白，您并不认为有一个特别的“正确”数字，但您会考虑在这个方向上提供任何指导吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The answer is we really wouldn’t. I mean, to the extent that we were going to repurchase shares, you could certainly interpret that as indicating that we thought it was attractive from the standpoint of remaining shareholders to do so.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，答案是我们确实不会。我是说，在我们决定回购股票的情况下，你当然可以将其解读为，我们认为从剩余股东的角度来看，这么做是有吸引力的。
And we certainly wouldn’t be paying over intrinsic value, at least in our judgment, and benefiting the exiting shareholders to the disadvantage of the continuing shareholders. So you might draw that conclusion at that point.
而且我们肯定不会支付超过内在价值的价格，至少根据我们的判断，不会为了让退出的股东受益而使继续持有的股东处于不利地位。因此，在那种情况下，你可以得出这样的结论。
But other than that, we’ve — you know, we would prefer Berkshire’s shares to fluctuate far less than they do. Because we would like the — ideally — we would like the experience of every investor during the time they held the shares to be exactly proportionate to the progress, or lack thereof, of the business.
除此之外，我们更希望伯克希尔的股价波动比现在要小得多。因为我们希望——理想情况下——每个投资者在持股期间的体验能与公司业务的进展或停滞完全成比例。
And I think we’ve come, over the years, reasonably close to that, compared to most companies. But the nature of markets is such that reasonably close is as, you know, probably as good as it’s going to get.
我认为，与大多数公司相比，这些年来我们在这方面已经相当接近了。但市场的性质决定了，这种“相当接近”可能已经是最好的情况了。
We don’t know the exact intrinsic value of Berkshire, obviously. And if you looked at the figures, we — if we had written down secret figures over the — ever since 1965 — they would — some of them would look silly now, in terms of what has actually transpired.
显然，我们不知道伯克希尔的确切内在价值。如果你查看这些数据——如果我们从 1965 年起记录了一些秘密数据——其中一些现在看起来可能会显得很荒谬，与实际发生的情况相比。
But we try to give you — I think Berkshire is easier to value than most businesses, actually, because we give you all the information that, at least, is important to us in valuing it.
但我们尽力为你提供——实际上，我认为伯克希尔比大多数企业更容易估值，因为我们向你们提供了所有对我们估值来说至少是重要的信息。
And then the biggest judgment you have to make is how well capital will be deployed in the future.
然后，你必须做出的最大判断是未来资金的使用效率如何。
Because it’s easy — it’s relatively easy — to figure out the present value of most of our businesses, but the question becomes, “What do we do with the money, as it comes in?”
因为计算我们大多数业务的现值是容易的——相对容易的——但问题在于，“当资金流入时，我们该如何使用它？”
And that will have a huge impact on the value 10 years from now. And that will depend a lot on the environment in which we operate over the next 10 years. There’ll be a lot of luck in it.
这将对10年后的价值产生巨大的影响。这在很大程度上取决于我们在未来10年所处的环境。其中会有很多运气的成分。
I think — you know, I think there’s a reasonable chance of good luck. But who knows?
我认为——你知道，我认为有相当大的可能性会有好运。但谁能知道呢？
It would be a mistake for us to do anything — I mean, a big mistake — to ever recommend buying or selling the stock. I mean, how would you tell everybody to do it at once? You know, you would negate your own advice.
如果我们做任何事情——我的意思是，做出任何推荐买入或卖出股票的行为——都会是一个错误，一个大错误。你要怎么让所有人同时去做呢？这样会否定你自己的建议。
You’re certainly not going to tell one person, you know, to the advantage or the disadvantage of somebody else.
你当然不会对某一个人说一些话，而让另一个人因此受益或吃亏。
So there’s really no way for us to ever talk about whether we think the stock — whether we think it’s a buy or a sale, except to the extent, like I say, on repurchases where there’s obviously an implicit judgment being given the shareholders.
所以，我们真的没有办法讨论是否认为股票是买入或卖出的好时机，除了像我所说的那样，在回购的情况下，显然会向股东传递一种隐含的判断。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I rather like the way it’s worked out.
查理·芒格： 是的。我相当喜欢它运作的方式。
If you average out the period that we’ve been through, we’ve come within hailing distance of the objective of having our stock track its intrinsic value. It gets a little ahead sometimes and a little behind other times, but averaged out, it’s worked pretty well.
如果你平均一下我们经历的时期，我们的股票与其内在价值相吻合的目标基本接近。有时会稍微超前，有时会稍微落后，但平均来看，它表现得相当不错。
67. Would Benjamin Graham’s “cigar butt” strategy work now?
本杰明·格雷厄姆的“烟蒂”策略现在还有效吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第四区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Martin O’Leary (PH) and I’m from Houston, Texas. My question to you is this.
观众提问： 下午好。我叫马丁·奥利里（音译），来自德克萨斯州休斯顿。我想问您这个问题。
In your annual report this year, in the letter to the shareholders, you indicated that it was 50 years ago that you met Benjamin Graham, and that he had a major impact in your life, especially in your investment success.
在您今年的年度报告中，致股东的信中提到，您在50年前遇到了本杰明·格雷厄姆，他对您的生活，特别是您的投资成功产生了重大影响。
Moreover, you’ve stated in the past that The Intelligent Investor is, by far, the greatest book ever written on investing.
此外，您过去还说过，《聪明的投资者》是迄今为止关于投资的最伟大的书。
One of the central tenets in the book was that if you bought a group of stocks, say, 10 or 20, that traded at two-thirds or less than net current assets, that you would be assured of a margin of safety, coupled with a satisfactory rate of return.
书中的核心理论之一是，如果你买入一组股票，比如10只或20只，其交易价格低于净流动资产的三分之二，那么你就能确保有一定的安全边际，同时还能获得令人满意的回报率。
Today, if you were to find 10 or 20 stocks that trade at two-thirds of net current assets, would you be inclined to purchase those stocks for your own personal portfolio, not for Berkshire Hathaway?
今天，如果您能找到10或20只股票，其交易价格低于净流动资产的三分之二，您会倾向于将这些股票买入您个人的投资组合，而不是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资组合吗？
And the second question, since I’ve mentioned the book, I was wondering which books that you and Mr. Munger have been reading lately and would recommend. Thank you.
第二个问题是，既然我提到了这本书，我想问您和芒格先生最近读了哪些书，并会推荐哪些书？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in respect to your first question, you could probably — if you found a group like that — and you won’t, I don’t think — you’d probably do all right buying the group.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，关于您的第一个问题，如果您找到一组这样的股票——不过我认为您可能找不到——那么买入这组股票可能会表现不错。
But not because the businesses themselves worked out that well over time, but because there would probably be a reasonable amount of corporate activity in a group like that, either in terms of the managements taking them private, or takeovers, or that sort of thing.
但这并不是因为这些企业本身随着时间的推移表现得很好，而是因为在这类股票中可能会出现大量的企业活动，比如管理层将其私有化，或发生收购等。
But those sub-working capital stocks are just almost impossible to find now. And if you got into a market where a lot of them existed, you’d probably find wonderful businesses selling a lot cheaper, too. And our inclination would be to go with a cheap, wonderful business.
但这些低于净流动资产的股票现在几乎不可能找到。如果你进入了一个有很多这种股票的市场，你可能也会发现很多价格非常便宜的优质企业。而我们的倾向是选择那些便宜的、优质的企业。
I don’t think you’ll get — in a high market or something close to it — I don’t think you’ll get a lot of sub-working capital stocks anymore. There’s just too much money around to promote deals before they really get to that point.
在高市值市场或接近高市值的市场中，我认为你不太可能再找到许多低于净流动资产的股票。因为在达到这种水平之前，市场中有太多资金可以促成交易。
But that was a technique. It was 50 years ago.
但这确实是一种技术，那是50年前的事情了。
And is Walter Schloss here still? Walter, are you here? Stand up if you’re here.
沃尔特·施洛斯还在这里吗？沃尔特，你在吗？如果在，请站起来。
I met Walter 50 years ago when I met Ben Graham. I know Walter’s — came out this year, but he already knows everything I’ve been talking about, so he may have left.
我50年前遇见本·格雷厄姆时，也遇见了沃尔特。今年他也来过，但他已经知道了我所谈论的一切，所以他可能已经离开了。
But Walter, actually, has practiced in securities, much closer to the original — he’s run a partnership now for 46 years, I guess it is. And he’s done it much more with the type of stocks that Ben was talking about in those days.
但实际上，沃尔特在证券领域的实践更接近于本的原始方法——我想，他经营了46年的合伙企业。他更专注于那些本·格雷厄姆当年谈论的类型的股票。
And he has a record that is absolutely sensational, that is far better than people who get promoted and go on television shows and do all of that sort of thing.
他的投资记录非常出色，比那些通过宣传登上电视节目的人要好得多。
And he’s done it in, you know, what I tend to call cigar butt companies. You know, you get one free puff and that’s about it, but they don’t cost anything.
他在我通常称之为“烟蒂公司”的领域中取得了成功。你知道，这种公司就像烟蒂一样，你可以免费抽一口，但也仅此而已，而且它们几乎不花钱。
And that’s — that was the sub-working capital type situations. Walter’s had to extend that somewhat, but it’s been a great, great record over a considerable — I mean, 46 years — a very considerable period of time.
那就是低于净流动资产类型的情况。沃尔特在某种程度上扩展了这个方法，但他的记录非常出色——46年——这是一个相当长的时间。
So I think, if you found that kind of a group and did it as a group operation, and Ben always emphasized a group operation because when you’re dealing with lousy companies but you expect a certain number to be taken over and all that, you’d better have a group of them.
所以我认为，如果你找到一组这样的公司，并以组合作业的方式进行——本·格雷厄姆总是强调组合作业，因为当你处理劣质公司时，如果你期望其中的一部分被收购或类似的情况发生，你最好拥有一个组合。
Whereas if you deal with wonderful companies, you only need a couple. But I think, if you see that period again, we’ll be very active. But it won’t be in those kind of securities.
而如果你处理的是优秀公司，你只需要几家。但我认为，如果再次出现那样的时期，我们会非常活跃。但我们不会选择那些类型的证券。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And there’s another change. In the old days, if the business stopped working, you could take the working capital and stick it in the shareholders’ pockets.
查理·芒格： 是的，还有一个变化。在过去的年代，如果业务停止运作，你可以把营运资金拿出来直接分配给股东。
And nowadays, as you can tell from all the restructuring charges, when things really go to hell in a bucket, somebody else owns a lot of the working capital. The whole culture has changed.
而现在，从所有的重组费用中你可以看出，当事情真的变得一团糟时，其他人往往已经占有了大量的营运资金。整个文化已经改变了。
If you have a little business in France and you get tired of it, as Marks & Spencer has, the French say, “What the hell do you mean trying to take your capital back from France? There’re French workers in this business.”
如果你在法国有一家小公司，像马莎百货那样，当你不想继续经营时，法国人会说：“你凭什么想从法国拿回你的资本？这家公司里有法国工人。”
And they don’t care. They don’t say, “It’s your working capital. Take it back,” when the business no longer works for you. They say, “It’s our working capital.” The whole culture has changed on that one.
他们根本不在意。他们不会说，“这是你的营运资金，拿回去吧，”而是在业务不再为你服务时说，“这是我们的营运资金。”这一点的整个文化已经改变了。
Not completely, but a lot from Ben Graham’s day. There’re a lot of reasons why the investment idiosyncrasies of one era don’t translate that perfectly into another.
虽然不完全如此，但比起本·格雷厄姆的时代已经有了很大的不同。有很多原因导致一个时代的投资特性不能完全延续到另一个时代。
WARREN BUFFETT: That list that was published, I forget whether it was published in the 1951 edition of Security Analysis or the ’49 edition of Intelligent Investor, but there were a list of companies.
沃伦·巴菲特： 那个名单，我不记得是发表在1951年的《证券分析》还是1949年的《聪明的投资者》中，但其中列出了一些公司。
There was Saco-Lowell, there was Marshall-Wells, there was Cleveland Worsted Mills, there was Foster Wheeler, and all those companies were sub-working capital companies selling at three or four times earnings.
有 Saco-Lowell，有 Marshall-Wells，有 Cleveland Worsted Mills，还有 Foster Wheeler，这些公司都是低于净流动资产的公司，交易价格是其盈利的三到四倍。
And there was a — if you bought a group of stocks like that, you were going to do well. But, you know, I — you certainly don’t see that in companies of any size today.
如果你买入一组这样的股票，你会有不错的表现。但是，你知道，我——今天你肯定在任何规模的公司中都看不到这样的机会了。
And I’ve seen a few lists of tech companies selling below cash. But they’re determined to use that cash. And it may not be there in a year or two.
我确实见过一些技术公司以低于现金价值的价格出售股票的名单。但他们决心使用这些现金，而这些现金可能在一两年内就不复存在了。
It was a different breed of animal, to some extent, in Ben’s list at that time.
在某种程度上，本·格雷厄姆当时的名单是一种完全不同的投资标的。
68. Book recommendations
书籍推荐
WARREN BUFFETT: Did you ask a second question?
沃伦·巴菲特： 你刚才问了第二个问题吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Books you’ve read.
查理·芒格： 你读过的书。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, books I’ve read.
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，我读过的书。
Well, tell him what books you’ve read, Charlie. (Laughter)
嗯，查理，你告诉他你读过哪些书吧。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I mentioned that one book Genome. I have a hell of a time putting the accent on the first syllable. But that is a marvelous book.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我提到过一本书《基因组》（Genome）。我在把重音放在第一个音节上时有点困难。但那是一本极好的书。
And some shareholder sent me a book that not many of you will like, by Herb Simon I think, Models of My Life. And it’s a very interesting book for a certain academic type.
还有一位股东寄给我一本书，我想你们中的大多数人可能不会喜欢，赫伯特·西蒙写的《我的生活模型》（Models of My Life）。对于某种学术类型的人来说，这是一本非常有趣的书。
But that Genome, you know, which is the history of a species in 23 chapters, and it’s a perfectly amazing book, and very interesting.
但那本《基因组》，你知道的，是一本用23章讲述一个物种历史的书，非常精彩，也非常有趣。
WARREN BUFFETT: I may have recommended it before, but if you haven’t read Personal History by Katharine Graham, I think you’d find that it’s a fascinating story. And more amazing yet, it’s an honest story.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我可能之前推荐过，但如果你还没读过凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆的《个人历史》（Personal History），我认为你会发现这是一个引人入胜的故事。更让人惊讶的是，这是一个诚实的故事。
You know, if I ever write my autobiography, I’m going to look like Arnold Schwarzenegger, but — (Laughter)
你知道，如果我写自传，我会让自己看起来像阿诺德·施瓦辛格，但——（笑声）
But she is compulsively honest about what’s happened. And it’s really quite a saga.
但她对所发生的事情极其诚实。这真的是一段传奇。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It is a good book.
查理·芒格： 那是一本好书。
That Janet Lowe book about me I find has had a very interesting sub-chapter, so to speak, in its distribution.
珍妮特·洛写的关于我的那本书，我发现它的发行过程有一个非常有趣的“副章节”，可以这么说。
I notice a considerable number of people buying that book and sending one copy to each descendant.
我注意到相当多的人购买那本书，并把每人一本寄给他们的后代。
They believe that if they just do that, the descendants will behave more like the parents. It’ll be interesting to see if that works. If it does, it’s going to outsell the Bible. (Laughter)
他们认为，如果他们这样做，后代会更像父辈的行为。看看这是否有效会很有趣。如果真的有效，那本书销量会超过《圣经》。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Hold your breath — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 屏住呼吸吧——（笑声）
69. Congress should loosen capital restrictions for utilities
国会应放宽对公用事业资本的限制
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5.
沃伦·巴菲特： 第五区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m Laura Rittenhouse (PH) from New York City. And I want to say it’s a great pleasure to be here. You talked earlier about companies that monetize greed. And it’s great to be with people and with leaders who monetize values.
观众提问： 下午好。我是劳拉·里滕豪斯（音译），来自纽约市。我很高兴能来到这里。您之前提到了一些通过贪婪获利的公司。而今天能与通过价值观获利的人和领导者在一起，真是太好了。
You — a couple years ago, you spoke very passionately about campaign finance reform, and I wondered if you could comment on your views of this, given recent developments related to another question in Washington.
您几年前热情地谈论了竞选资金改革。我想问问您对此的看法，尤其是考虑到最近华盛顿的相关进展。
What’s your expectation for the passage of the repeal of PUHCA? I know there was some recent activity in a Senate sub-committee.
您对《公用事业控股公司法》（PUHCA）废除的通过有什么期待？我知道参议院的一个小组委员会最近有一些相关的活动。
And lastly, a question for Charlie. How would you, or do you, apply the principles of intrinsic investing to real estate?
最后一个问题给查理。您会如何，或者是否，将内在价值投资的原则应用到房地产中？
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. In respect to PUHCA, it’s hard for me to — you know, I have no great record of handicapping legislative action.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的。关于《公用事业控股公司法》，我很难——你知道，我并不擅长预测立法行动的结果。
But I would say that the awareness of the public problems in the electric utility industry under current circumstances, you know, has mushroomed. I mean, it’s ballooned.
但我认为，在当前情况下，公众对电力公用事业行业问题的认识大幅增加了。我是说，这种认识已经膨胀起来了。
And so I think that — I think it’s likely that Congress is more receptive to the idea that they need to do something that ensures that the power supply is adequate.
所以我认为——我认为国会更可能接受这样的观点，即他们需要采取一些措施，以确保电力供应充足。
And I think that there’s probably a number of them that would think that PUHCA is a barrier to capital entering the industry from a lot of sources where capital is available. And that it’s going to take capital to solve this problem.
而且，我认为可能有不少人会认为，《公用事业控股公司法》阻碍了大量可用资本流入该行业。而解决这个问题需要资本。
Now, they don’t have to solve it by letting Berkshire do more things. But it’s not a crazy approach to say that if Berkshire has billions of dollars to invest, that it might be a net plus for the availability of electricity down the road.
当然，他们不一定非得通过让伯克希尔做更多的事情来解决问题。但说伯克希尔如果有数十亿美元可以投资，可能会对未来电力供应的可用性是一个净积极因素，这并不是一个疯狂的观点。
So I think that certainly the chances of repeal or major change are far higher now than they were a couple of years ago. And, I mean, politicians do not like to face major brownouts.
因此，我认为废除或重大改变的可能性现在比几年前要高得多。而且，我的意思是，政治家们不喜欢面对大规模的断电问题。
I mean, they can try and blame it on someone else and they may well be accurate in blaming it on someone else.
我的意思是，他们可以试图将责任推给别人，而且可能确实是别人的问题。
But the public is going to at least partially blame political leaders if this country runs out of electricity, because it hasn’t run out of the ability to build generators.
但如果这个国家的电力供应不足，公众至少会部分地指责政治领导人，因为并不是我们失去了建造发电机的能力。
You know, we could create all the generators we needed to have plenty of electricity. And we could create the transmission lines and all of that.
你知道，我们完全可以建造所有我们需要的发电机，以确保充足的电力供应。我们也可以建造输电线路等等。
But you do need a flow of capital to the industry. And PUHCA restricts that flow to quite a degree, I would say.
但你确实需要资本流入这个行业。而《公用事业控股公司法》在很大程度上限制了这种资本流动，我是这么认为的。
70. More regulation needed for campaign contributions
竞选资金捐助需要更多监管
WARREN BUFFETT: Campaign finance reform, you’ve read about it as much as I have. You know, I happen to admire enormously what McCain and Feingold have done.
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于竞选资金改革，你对此的了解可能和我一样多。你知道，我非常钦佩麦凯恩和费恩戈尔德所做的事情。
I don’t think it’s a panacea. I mean, money is going to find its way into trying to buy political influence one way or another.
我不认为这是一种灵丹妙药。我的意思是，无论如何，金钱总会找到方法去购买政治影响力。
But the present situation, in my view, has gotten totally out of control and, incidentally, totally out of sync with what the American Congress, even, as well as the public, intended, because in 1907, Congress said, and it’s never been changed, that corporations shall not contribute money to federal elections.
但在我看来，当前的状况已经完全失控了，而且与美国国会甚至公众的初衷完全背道而驰。因为早在1907年，国会就规定——这一规定从未改变过——企业不得向联邦选举捐款。
And in 1947, they said the same thing about labor unions. And then they enacted campaign legislation in the early ’70s which, when later interpreted by the Federal Election Commission, enabled corporations and unions to do on an unlimited scale, what Congress had said they shouldn’t do at all.
1947年，他们对工会也做出了同样的规定。后来，在70年代初期，他们颁布了竞选立法，但之后被联邦选举委员会解释为允许企业和工会在无限的范围内做国会最初完全禁止的事情。
And politicians did not really understand the potential in that, initially. I remember the first guy that called me, Senate candidate, called me for a soft money contribution probably in 1985, or so.
最初，政客们并没有真正意识到其中的潜力。我记得第一个打电话给我的人——一名参议员候选人——大约是在1985年，他向我寻求“软钱”捐款。
And he was kind of embarrassed about it and sort of danced around the subject about how this money was going to find its way into his campaign and everything. And he was asking me for an amount of money that was illegal under the law, except if I did it via soft money.
他对此感到有些尴尬，绕着弯子说这些钱将如何进入他的竞选等。他向我要了一笔根据法律非法的金额，除非我通过“软钱”的方式提供。
And that has developed to the point where I have literally had people, where I have firsthand knowledge, of requesting million dollar contributions or larger, which would never be reported. We’d never be required to report it. And I regard that as a perversion of the system.
这件事发展到后来，我确实遇到过一些人，他们直接要求提供数百万美元甚至更高的捐款，而这些捐款从未被要求上报。我认为这是对制度的一种扭曲。
But I think we’re going to get some significant improvement. I think it was only possible because of the credibility that McCain built up with the public and the fact that he just wouldn’t let go of this issue.
但我认为我们会看到一些重要的改善。我认为这只是因为麦凯恩在公众中的信誉，以及他对这个问题的坚持不懈。
So I’m — but I’m not hopeful about it changing the whole course of American democracy or anything of the sort.
所以，我——但我并不指望它会改变美国民主的整个进程或类似的事情。
But I am hopeful that the system of government where access is sold to the highest bidder, and where the bidding starts at a higher level, by a material amount, in every election cycle, will at least be checked for a while.
但我希望这种将进入政府的机会卖给出价最高者，并且每个选举周期的起拍价都显著提高的制度，至少能暂时被遏制住。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my trouble with campaign finance reform is that I fear career politicians just staying on and on just about as much as I fear special interests protecting themselves with money. And I never know exactly how the reform is going to work.
查理·芒格： 嗯，我对竞选资金改革的问题在于，我对职业政客永远留任的担忧，几乎和对特殊利益集团用金钱保护自己的担忧一样大。而且，我从未确切知道改革将如何运作。
When I came to California, we had sort of a semi-corrupt, part-time legislature dominated by race tracks and saloons and liquor distributors, and so on.
当我来到加利福尼亚时，我们有一个半腐败的兼职立法机构，由赛马场、酒馆和酒类经销商等主导。
And people went up and entertained the legislators with prostitutes and what have you. And I really sort of prefer that government, in retrospect — (laughter) — to the full-time legislators I have now.
当时，人们用妓女等方式招待议员。而回想起来，我真的有点喜欢那样的政府——（笑声）——比我现在拥有的全职议员更好。
So I just am more skeptical about my ability to predict which reform I’m going to like the results of and which I would like to trade back in for my former evils.
所以，我对预测哪种改革结果会让我满意，哪种我宁愿用过去的弊端换回，持更加怀疑的态度。
71. Munger has moved on from real estate investing
芒格已不再从事房地产投资
WARREN BUFFETT: Laura, you had one more, did you on —? Was it for Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特： 劳拉，你还有一个问题，对吗——是问查理的吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It was a question about the principles of intrinsic value investing applied to real estate.
观众提问： 是关于将内在价值投资原则应用于房地产的问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, that period of my life involved the remote past. And I much prefer business investment to real estate investment.
查理·芒格： 哦，那段人生涉及的是遥远的过去。我更喜欢商业投资，而不是房地产投资。
72. Q&A concludes
问答结束
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. It’s 3:30. We’re going to have a directors meeting here, we do that once a year, following this meeting. And so I’ll ask the directors to stick around.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好，现在是3点半。我们会在这里开一个董事会议，这是我们每年在这个会议之后举办一次的活动。所以，我请董事们留下来。
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