12. Q1 insurance update

第一季度保险更新

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re going to get to the questions in just one second.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们马上就会开始提问。

I thought I would give you a little update on, particularly, the insurance aspects of the first quarter, because insurance cost us a lot of money last year.

我想给大家做个简要更新，特别是关于第一季度的保险方面，因为保险去年给我们带来了很大的开销。

It’s our main business. It’s always going to be our main business. It’s a very, very big business, and it’s going to get bigger.

保险是我们的主要业务，它一直是我们的主要业务，而且是一个非常庞大的业务，未来还会更大。

And, there were some special events of last year, and there were some mistakes of our own that made it a bad year for insurance last year.

去年发生了一些特殊事件，也有一些我们自己的错误，导致保险业务去年表现不佳。

Our float last year cost us almost 13 percent, and that’s a lot to pay for money.

我们去年浮存金的成本几乎达到了13%，这对于资金来说是相当大的支出。

It’s not our record. We had a period in the ’80s when we ran into even more difficulties.

这不是我们的纪录。我们在80年代曾经历过更多的困难。

But I think there’s been — well, I know there’s been — there’s been a change in the market. There’s been a change, to a degree, in the culture at a very important unit.

但我认为——嗯，我知道——市场发生了变化。在一个非常重要的单位，文化也发生了一定的变化。

And, I think that, barring some really mega-catastrophe, and we’ll talk about those later — possibility — that we are — I think we’re doing pretty well.

我认为，除非发生一些真正的大灾难（我们稍后会谈到这些可能性），否则我认为我们做得相当不错。

And if we could have the first chart that I — yeah — the first chart, which I can’t see myself here, but I think it will be the insurance underwriting results for the first quarter.

如果我们能看到我刚才提到的第一张图表——是的——第一张图表，我自己看不清楚，但我认为它会显示第一季度的保险承保结果。

And you will see that two good things happened in the first quarter.

你们会看到第一季度发生了两件好事。

One is our float increased by $1.8 billion. That’s a lot of money to take in, net. I don’t think there’s any company, probably in the world, that had a gain in float that was even close to that.

第一件事是我们的浮动资金增加了18亿美元，这是一个很可观的净流入数字。我认为，世界上可能没有任何公司获得接近这种规模的浮动资金增长。

And we actually achieved that with a small underwriting profit. So the float not only cost of nothing in the first quarter, but we had a gain of a billion-eight in it. And all units contributed to that. (Applause)

我们实际上通过一个小的承保利润实现了这一点。所以浮存金在第一季度不仅没有成本，反而获得了18亿美元的收益。所有单位都为此做出了贡献。（掌声）

Our goal is to obtain more and more float at minimal or no cost. And there have been a number of years in the past when we’ve run an underwriting profit, which means that the use of that money is essentially free, or even better than free.

我们的目标是以最低成本或无成本获得越来越多的浮存金。在过去的几年中，我们曾有过承保利润，这意味着这些资金的使用基本上是免费的，甚至比免费更好。

And we’ve had one very bad year, and a couple of so-so years before that.

我们经历过一年非常糟糕的年份，还有几年的表现也一般。

But I think our cost of float over the next few years, unless we get into an extraordinary catastrophe, I think it should be pretty satisfactory.

但我认为，在未来几年，除非我们遇到特别重大的灾难，否则我认为我们的浮存金成本应该是相当令人满意的。

Now, you’ll notice there’s a note down at the bottom that’s slightly technical, but it’s an important enough item in Berkshire, and in understanding our cost of float, that I thought I’d just devote a minute to it.

现在，你们会注意到下面有一个稍微技术性的注释，但它是伯克希尔中一个足够重要的项目，并且在理解我们的浮存金成本时，我认为我应该花一分钟时间来解释它。

If you find this uninteresting, you can live a happy life without understanding what I’m about to explain next. You may even lead a happier life if you don’t understand it. (Laughter)

如果你觉得这不有趣，你可以过得很快乐而不理解我接下来要解释的内容。如果你不理解它，甚至可能过得更开心。（笑声）

As I look at the people that understand it and don’t understand it, I’m not sure which group is happier. (Laughter)

当我看到理解它和不理解它的人时，我不确定哪个群体更快乐。（笑声）

When we write — we write a good bit — and have written a good bit, I should say — of retroactive insurance.

当我们签订——我们签订了相当多——应该说，我们签订了相当多的追溯保险。

Now, in retroactive insurance, a company may come to us that’s merging with another company, and they want to put a cap on their liabilities, or define them better, from past incidents.

在追溯保险中，一家公司可能会来找我们，它与另一家公司合并，他们希望将过去的某些责任进行上限设定，或者更好地界定这些责任。

So they may come to us and say, we want you to pick up all the losses that are going to be paid from things that happened prior to, say, 1990.

他们可能会来找我们，说，我们希望你承接所有在1990年之前发生的事情所产生的损失。

And we think that we owe $1 billion — have yet to be paid in losses from that period — but we want to protect ourselves up to, say, $2 billion, or some number like that.

我们认为我们有10亿美元的未支付损失，但我们希望将自身的责任保护到20亿美元，或者类似的数字。

So they write us a check and we take over — this is called retroactive insurance — we take over their losses from the past for a specific period and for a specific amount.

所以他们给我们开支票，我们接管——这叫做追溯保险——我们接管他们过去特定时期和金额的损失。

And, when we do that, the accounting — it’s not accounting you run into every day — we’ve explained it in the past — but it creates a charge which will occur over time in the future.

当我们这么做时，会计处理——这不是你每天都会遇到的会计问题——我们之前已经解释过——但它会产生一个费用，这个费用会随着时间推移逐渐出现。

And, as you can see, in the first quarter, the 20 million of underwriting profit we made was after a total of 112 million for the amortization of this charge that is set up.

如你所见，在第一季度，我们获得的2000万美元承保利润，是在为这一费用摊销1.12亿美元之后的结果。

So, if a company comes in and says, for example, we want you to protect us up to a billion-and-a-half for losses that occurred in the past, and we’ll give you a billion dollars for it, we will debit cash for a billion dollars and we’ll debit this deferred charge for half a billion and we’ll set up a liability for a billion-and-a-half.

因此，如果有公司来说，例如，我们希望您为过去发生的损失提供15亿美元的保护，并为此支付10亿美元，我们会将10亿美元记入现金账户，同时将5亿美元记入递延费用账户，并设立15亿美元的负债。

只有极少数能把问题解释的足够简单，反过来，真正理解问题的是极少数，指所有问题。

And that 500 million we set up as a deferred charge, we amortize over a period of time as we expect to pay the claims.

我们将这5亿设为递延费用，并根据预计支付的赔付时间进行摊销。

Now, there would be a lot of room for judgement — there is a lot of room for judgement — in terms of how fast we amortize that.

现在，在我们如何摊销这笔费用上，会有很大的判断空间——这有很大的判断空间。

We try to be conservative. We make an estimate of when we will pay those claims and how much we will pay, and we try to amortize it over a reasonable period.

我们力求保守。我们估算什么时候支付这些赔偿金，支付多少，并努力在合理的期限内摊销它。

I’ve got another slide that shows how those amortization charges will work over time.

我有另一张幻灯片，展示这些摊销费用如何随时间变化。

And we’re going to put these slides on the internet, because we feel that our shareholders should understand the impact of these charges that will come against underwriting profits.

我们会将这些幻灯片放到网上，因为我们认为我们的股东应该理解这些费用对承保利润的影响。

In the year 2002, we will have a 400 million-plus charge for this. It’s built into the figures now.

在2002年，我们将为此产生超过4亿美元的费用。这些费用已经计入当前的数字中。

And if we do 20 billion of premium volume, that’s about a 2 percent charge.

如果我们完成200亿美元的保费量，那大约是2%的费用。

So, to have our float be cost free, we have to make 400-plus million on underwriting elsewhere, in order to offset that.

因此，为了使我们的浮动资金无成本，我们需要在其他地方通过承保赚取超过4亿美元来抵消这一费用。

And as you can see, we did that the first quarter and we’ll find out whether we do it for the full year.

如你所见，我们在第一季度做到了这一点，我们将看看是否能做到全年。

It’s a — not many companies do this kind of business and it’s a big item with us, so I really want all the shareholders to understand it, and for that reason, we’ll put it on the internet.

这是一项——很少有公司做这种业务，而且对我们来说是一项大事，所以我真的希望所有股东理解它，为此我们将把它放到网上。

I should emphasize that in all of these contracts, we cap our liability. So a lot of these contracts apply to liabilities that primarily — or not primarily — but in a significant way, and often primarily, arise from asbestos.

我还要强调，在所有这些合同中，我们都对我们的责任设置了上限。所以这些合同中的许多适用于那些主要——或者说不是主要——但在很大程度上，通常是主要，来源于石棉的责任。

But when you read about asbestos claims accelerating and all of that, the numbers are capped in our case, in all of these contracts. So really don’t care whether we pay it on an asbestos claim or whether we pay it on an old auto liability claim, or whatever.

但是，当你看到石棉索赔加速等新闻时，我们的情况是这些数字在所有这些合同中都有限制。因此，我们不太在意是支付石棉索赔，还是支付旧汽车责任索赔，或者其他什么。

The question is whether we’ve been correct in estimating the speed at which we will pay. And in some cases, we may pay even less than our maximum amount.

问题是我们在估算支付速度时是否准确。在某些情况下，我们支付的金额甚至可能低于我们的最大额度。

So, anyway, that’s available for those of you who have previously were unhappy not understanding this and now are thrilled to know how it all works. (Laughter)

无论如何，对于那些之前不理解这一点而感到不满的股东，现在你们一定会兴奋地知道这一切是如何运作的。（笑声）

19. All banks aren’t the same

20. Detecting fraud and the evils of EBITDA

21. Quick decision to buy Larson-Juhl

22. Buffett shows little interest in cryonic suspension

23. Fruit of the Loom: good management for good company

24. Three book recommendations

25. How to make the “right” friends

26. One thing you don’t need for investing

27. Coca-Cola’s domestic marketing

28. How long does it take to dig a moat?

挖一条护城河需要多长时间？

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：区域4。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Jerry McLaughlin. I’m from San Mateo, California.

听众：早上好，巴菲特先生，蒙格尔先生。我叫杰瑞·麦克劳夫林，来自加利福尼亚州的圣马特奥。

First, I just want to thank you for all the effort you put into the annual reports, the letters, and these conversations.

首先，我想感谢你们在年报、信件和这些对话中所付出的努力。

I’ve learned a lot, and they’re terrific, which is why I’m here from half a country away. (Applause)

我学到了很多，它们都非常棒，这也是我从远在半个国家的地方来到这里的原因。（掌声）

You know, you’ve said that great companies are those that have an economic moat, and I understand that phrase to mean a sustainable competitive advantage.

你们说过，伟大的公司是那些拥有经济护城河的公司，我理解这个词意味着可持续的竞争优势。

Do businesses begin their lives with sustainable competitive advantages, or must that be developed over a very long time?

企业在创立时就拥有可持续的竞争优势吗，还是必须经过很长时间才能发展出来？

And then, what are the fundamental bases upon which you’ve seen companies successfully develop sustainable competitive advantages?

那么，您认为公司成功发展可持续竞争优势的基本基础是什么？

Of those, which do you think is the most enduring and which is the least?

其中，您认为哪种是最持久的，哪种是最不持久的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, sometimes they can develop it very quickly.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，有时它们可以非常迅速地发展出竞争优势。

I mean, I would say that Microsoft, in terms of the operating system, you know, that was a relatively quick development. But that was an industry that was exploding, and things were changing very fast.

我的意思是，我认为微软在操作系统方面，那个是相对较快的开发。但那是一个正在爆炸式增长的行业，事情变化得非常快。

On the other hand, if you go back to See’s Candy, which started in 1921, you know, there was no way you could build a sustainable competitive advantage, at least that would be recognizable, in times measured shorter than decades.

另一方面，如果你回到1921年成立的See's糖果，你知道，在不到几十年的时间里，根本不可能建立起一个可持续的竞争优势，至少是一个可识别的优势。

I mean, you opened up one shop at a time, and nobody’d heard of you originally, and then a few people did.

我的意思是，你一次开设一间商店，最初没有人听说过你，后来才有一些人知道。

And boxed chocolates were something that, you know, people may have bought once or twice a year for a holiday occasion or whatever.

而盒装巧克力是那种人们可能一年只会在节假日买一两次的东西，或者其他什么场合。

So, you weren’t going to embed yourself in the minds of Californians in one or two or five years just because you were turning out, you know, outstanding box of chocolates.

所以，仅仅因为你生产出色的盒装巧克力，你不可能在一两年或五年内就把自己深植于加利福尼亚人心中。

So it depends on the way the industry itself is developing.

所以这取决于行业本身的发展方式。

Walmart has done a fabulous job in a — an incredible job — in quite a short period of time. But even they, you know, they took it in the small towns, and they progressed along, and refined their techniques as they went.

沃尔玛在相当短的时间内做得非常出色——简直是不可思议的。但即使是他们，你知道，他们从小镇开始，逐步推进，并在过程中不断完善他们的技术。

But I would say that there could be things in new industries.

但我认为，在新兴行业中，可能会有一些事情。

I would say with NetJets, we have a sustainable competitive advantage. And that’s an industry that was only originated in 1986 when Rich Santulli got the idea, and it was in its infancy — I mean total infancy — for a good many years after that.

我认为，像NetJets那样，我们拥有一个可持续的竞争优势。那是一个仅在1986年由Rich Santulli提出创意的行业，在那之后的很多年里，它还处于完全的初期阶段。

But what he has built, and is building and fortifying, is that sustainable competitive advantage.

但他所建立的，正在建设和巩固的，就是那个可持续的竞争优势。

But it depends very much on the industry you’re in.

但这在很大程度上取决于你所在的行业。

And I mean, Coca-Cola, 1886, Jacobs Pharmacy, Atlanta, Georgia, you know, John Pemberton came up with a product. And did he have a sustainable competitive advantage that day? If he did, he blew it because he sold the place for 2,000 bucks to Asa Candler.

我的意思是，1896年，Coca-Cola，乔治亚州亚特兰大的Jacobs药房，你知道，约翰·彭伯顿发明了一种产品。他那天有可持续的竞争优势吗？如果有，他把它弄砸了，因为他以2000美元把这个地方卖给了Asa Candler。

He did — and it took decades, thousands of competitors over that time, and — you know, but they were painting one barn at a time and designing one Saturday Evening Post ad at a time, and all of that.

他确实这样做了——并且花了几十年时间，经历了成千上万的竞争者——你知道，但他们是一点一点地涂画一间谷仓，设计一则《星期六晚邮报》的广告，诸如此类。

And — and pebbles — you know, around the world in World War II, General Eisenhower went to Mr. Woodruff and he said, “I want a Coke within the arm’s length of every American serviceman.” He said, “I want something to remind them of home.”

而且——而且在二战期间，艾森豪威尔将军找到伍德拉夫先生，他说：“我想让每个美国军人手边都有一瓶可口可乐。”他说：“我想要一些能让他们想起家的东西。”

And so he built a lot of bottling plants for Coke around the world. And that was a huge impetus.

于是他在全球建了很多可口可乐的瓶装厂。这是一个巨大的推动力。

类似于茅台，通过外部注力的广告资源，影响巨大的广告资源。

But that was, what, 60 years or so after the product was invented. So it takes — it takes a long time in certain kinds of products, but I could see certain areas of the world where a huge competitive advantage is built in a very short period of time.

但那是产品发明后大约60年左右的事。所以，在某些类型的产品中，这需要很长时间，但我可以看到在世界某些地方，巨大的竞争优势可以在非常短的时间内建立起来。

I would say that probably, in terms of animated feature-length films, for example, Walt Disney did that.

我想说，大概在动画长片方面，举个例子，沃尔特·迪士尼做到了这一点。

And after “Snow White” and a few more, it took him a while until he could cash in on it, but he — it became Disney and nobody else in that field for quite a while, and fairly quickly.

在《白雪公主》和其他几部影片之后，他花了一段时间才开始从中获利，但他——它成为了迪士尼，并且在那个领域里很长一段时间内没人能与之竞争，而且相当迅速。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there are a lot of different models that create a sustainable competitive advantage. And there are also some models of where you can lose it very fast.

查理·芒格：是的，创造可持续竞争优势的模型有很多种。同时，也有一些模型你可以很快失去它。

Just ask Arthur Andersen. That was a very good name in America not very long ago.

只要问问亚瑟·安德森，那是美国不久前的一个非常好的名字。

And I think it would be harder to lose the good name of Wrigley’s gum than the good name of Arthur Andersen.

我认为，失去Wrigley口香糖的好名声比失去亚瑟·安德森的好名声要难。

I think there’s some perfectly remarkable competitive advantages that people have gotten over time.

我认为，有一些人随着时间推移获得了相当显著的竞争优势。

And the great trouble with the investment process is that they’re so damned obvious that the stocks sell at very high prices.

而投资过程中最大的难题是，它们非常显而易见，以至于股票卖出了非常高的价格。

WARREN BUFFETT: Snickers has been the number one candy bar for probably 30 or 40 years now.

沃伦·巴菲特：士力架可能已经是排名第一的巧克力棒有30或40年了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and —

查理·芒格：是的，和——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — in Russia, it turns out that everybody likes Snickers.

查理·芒格：——在俄罗斯，结果发现每个人都喜欢士力架。

WARREN BUFFETT: What — how do you really knock it off?

沃伦·巴菲特：什么——你怎么才能真正打败它？

You know, I mean, we make candy, we would love to displace Snickers, but it’s hard to think of ways to knock them from the number one spot.

你知道，我是说，我们做糖果，我们希望取代士力架，但很难想出方法把它们从第一的位置上打下去。

I mean, my guess is that they’ll be number one in, you know, 10 years from now in candy bars, and the list doesn’t change much in that field because — if you think about the nature of how you make that choice as to what candy bar —

我的猜测是，10年后的糖果棒市场上，它们仍然会是第一，而且这个领域的榜单变化不大，因为——如果你考虑到你在选择什么巧克力棒时的习惯——

If you were chewing Spearmint chewing gum five years ago, and you buy a pack of some chewing gum today, it’s likely to be Spearmint.

如果你五年前嚼的是绿薄荷口香糖，而今天你买了一包口香糖，很可能还是绿薄荷口香糖。

I mean, there’s just things that you experiment a lot with, and there’re things that you don’t fool around with once you’re happy.

我的意思是，有些东西你会尝试很多次，而一旦你满意了，就不再随便尝试。

And, you know, you can understand that if you observe your own habits and people’s habits around you.

你知道的，如果你观察你自己的习惯以及周围人的习惯，你就能明白这一点。

But there’s other — usually if something can gain competitive advantage very quickly, you have to worry about them losing it quickly, too.

但还有其他——通常，如果某个东西能很快获得竞争优势，你也得担心它会很快失去这个优势。

I mean, when an industry is in flux, there are a lot of people that think they’re the survivors, or the ones that are going to prosper, where it turns out otherwise.

我的意思是，当一个行业处于变动中时，有很多人认为他们是幸存者，或者是将要繁荣的人，结果却发现情况并非如此。

29. Bullish on Coca-Cola & Gillette

30. Staying rational and avoiding confirmation bias

31. Blue Chip Stamps plunges under Buffett and Munger

32. Shareholders share the wealth through philanthropy

33. Hard to pick pharmaceutical winners

很难挑选出制药行业的赢家

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s hear from area 8, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们听听第8区的声音。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Jennifer Pearlman from Toronto, Canada.

听众：你好，我叫詹妮弗·珀尔曼，来自加拿大多伦多。

Mr. Buffett, in 1998, you were asked to comment on the pharmaceutical industry, and at that time your answer was that you considered it a mistake not to have taken a basket approach to the industry.

巴菲特先生，1998年，您被问及关于制药行业的问题，您当时的回答是，您认为没有采取行业整体策略是一个错误。

I was wondering if you could revisit the issue, now that valuations have contracted so dramatically.

我想知道，既然估值已经大幅收缩，您是否能重新审视这个问题。

And also, considering that health care spending is outpacing inflation, and that there are significant moats in the industry, I was wondering if you could share with us your thoughts on the health care industry at large.

此外，考虑到医疗保健支出超过了通货膨胀，并且该行业有显著的护城河，我想知道您是否能与我们分享您对整个医疗保健行业的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie may be better equipped on that than I am, but it certainly — it’s been, as an industry, a very, very good business over time. And if you take the aggregate capital in it and what it’s earned over time, it’s been a very good business.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理可能比我更擅长这个问题，但从整体来看，这个行业长期以来一直是一个非常非常好的生意。如果你考虑到这个行业的总资本以及它随时间赚取的利润，它一直是一个非常好的生意。

And we did make a mistake, your memory’s 100 percent accurate, in we’d — in what we said in earlier meetings, because we should have taken a package approach. We actually did buy a tiny, tiny bit, but that’s worse than buying none almost. I mean, it’s just aggravating — back there in ’93.

我们确实犯了一个错误，你的记忆完全正确，正如我们在之前的会议中所说的，因为我们本应采取整体策略。实际上我们确实买了一点点，但几乎不如什么都不买。我是说，这真让人恼火——回到1993年。

It’s certainly the — they’re certainly the kind of businesses that, as an industry, we can understand. We would not have great insights on specific companies. So, if we did something, we would be more inclined to do it on an industry-wide basis.

这些无疑是——它们无疑是我们能够理解的那种行业。如果我们做什么，我们更倾向于采取行业整体策略，而不是集中在具体公司上。

It’s hard to evaluate the individual companies. As you know, Bristol-Myers has recently had a big stumble, and even Merck has fallen back. And so, it’s hard to pick the winners.

很难评估个别公司。正如你所知道的，布里斯托尔-迈尔斯最近出现了大的失误，甚至默克也回落了。所以，很难挑选出赢家。

But that’s no reason not to have a basket approach to the industry. And at some valuation level, it would be something we would think very hard about. And it’s something where we could put quite a bit of money if it happened, which is another plus to us.

但这不是不采用行业整体策略的理由。在某个估值水平下，它会是我们非常认真考虑的事情。而且，如果发生，我们可以投入相当大的一笔资金，这对我们来说是另一个好处。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I mean, failed to get it right the last time. We’ll probably fail to get it right the next time. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我的意思是，上次没弄对。下次我们可能还是弄不对。（笑声）

芒格的立场更偏向于价值观，巴菲特的立场是不可知论者。

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know what he had for lunch. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道他午餐吃了什么。（笑声）

34. Accounting at Coca-Cola and its bottlers

35. Accounting is a starting point, but it doesn’t always reflect reality

36. New goodwill accounting is “making sense”

37. I used a hearse to pick up your aunt for a date

38. General Re’s “cultural drift”

39. “Demented” and “immoral” stock options

40. Float size isn’t limiting investments

浮存金的规模不会限制投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2?

沃伦·巴菲特：第2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.

听众：下午好，我是来自新泽西州山湖市的戴维·温特斯。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for hosting “Woodstock for Capitalists.” I know it’s a lot of fun for everybody, and I think a lot of fun for you, too.

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢你们举办“资本家的伍德斯托克”。我知道这对大家来说非常有趣，我想对你们来说也一样。

Assuming growth of low-cost float and the sins of the past do not impede progress, does the sheer size of the float create constraints that change the allocation of future investments to more high-quality fixed-income obligations rather than equity coupons or workouts that can grow over time?

假设低成本浮存金的增长和过去的错误不会妨碍进展，那么浮存金的庞大规模是否会创造出限制，改变未来投资的配置，转向更多的高质量固定收益债务，而不是可以随着时间增长的股票分红或其他资产重组？

It seems otherwise Berkshire is incredibly well positioned if valuations ever decline.

否则，如果估值下跌，伯克希尔似乎将处于极好的位置。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think the answer is we probably are pretty well positioned if valuations decline.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为答案是，如果估值下降，我们可能会处于非常有利的位置。

And it’s a good question. If you have 37 billion of float, are you going to be more constrained to conventional investments than if you were working with a half a billion or a billion, as we were not so long ago?

这是个好问题。如果你有370亿美元的浮存金，你是否会比拥有5亿或10亿资金时更受到传统投资的限制，正如我们不久前的情况一样？

As long as you have a huge capital position, which we have and will continue to have, and as long as you have a lot of outside earning power, which we have and will continue to have, I don’t think we’re constrained very much.

只要你有巨大的资本规模，这是我们拥有并将继续拥有的，且只要你有大量的外部收益能力，这是我们拥有并将继续拥有的，我认为我们不会受到太多限制。

I mean, that — we’ll always want to have a significant level of liquidity, relative to any kind of payment pattern that we see for a good length of time.

我的意思是——我们始终希望保持一个相对较高的流动性水平，以应对我们在较长时间内可能遇到的任何支付模式。

But we will probably be operating with so much capital and with so much earning power, independent of the insurance business, and with so much liquidity, that we really will be able to make decisions as to where — as to how — the assets should be deployed, in terms of, simply, where we see the best returns and virtually no risk.

但我们可能会拥有如此庞大的资本、如此强大的盈利能力，不依赖于保险业务，并且保持足够的流动性，这样我们就能根据我们看到的最佳回报和几乎没有风险的地方，来决定如何配置资产。

用非保险业务的现金流对冲保险业务的波动性。

And sometimes we see virtually no risk in equities when they’re extremely cheap. We don’t see that situation now, but we could see it again. And I don’t think we’ll be much — I don’t think we’ll be very constrained when the time comes.

有时，当股票极其便宜时，我们几乎看不到风险。我们现在没有看到这种情况，但我们可能会再次看到。我认为，等到时机来临时，我们不会受到太多限制。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, our constraint doesn’t come from structure, it comes from a lack of enthusiasm for stocks generally. The bonds are held as a default option.

查理·芒格：是的，我们的限制不是来自结构，而是来自我们对股票普遍缺乏热情。债券作为一种默认选项被持有。

41. Price of gold not a factor in valuing a business

黄金和房地产对某类人群特别有吸引力，在新加坡交易的ETF中，成交量最大的是GLD SG$ (GSD)和LION-PHILLIP S-REIT (CLR)。

42. Warning: Speculating is not investing

43. Hard to predict when a bubble will burst

44. Stock options as compensation isn’t sinful, but …

45. Hard to predict what happens after a bubble bursts

46. Ben Graham and the long/short model

47. “Creative accounting is an absolute curse”

48. How to stay in your “circle of competence”

49. Population growth and “carrying capacity”

50. Expect “satisfactory” results

51. Discipline is more important than location

52. Life advice: take care of your most important asset

53. Why Berkshire won’t be providing guards to airports

54. Finova deal won’t be as profitable as expected

55. “Hard to find real estate that’s really mispriced”

56. The problem with how Black-Scholes values options

Black-Scholes估值模型的弊端

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3?

沃伦·巴菲特：第三个问题？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Joseph Lepre (PH). I’m a shareholder from Minneapolis, Minnesota, and I’d like to thank you for this opportunity to ask a question.

听众：您好，我叫Joseph Lepre（音译），是来自明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯的股东，非常感谢您给我机会提问。

Mr. Buffett, you mentioned earlier today that you’d be willing to sell insurance in exchange for stock options. If possible, could you please describe a methodology for the valuation of stock options, particularly in cases where there is no market pricing data available for the option being valued?

沃伦·巴菲特：巴菲特先生，您今天早些时候提到，您愿意以股票期权交换保险。如果可能的话，您能否描述一下股票期权的估值方法，特别是当没有市场定价数据可供参考时？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would — I could figure out what I would pay for an option on a private business. I could figure out what I could pay for an option on a public business. It might be a little easier. I could figure out what I’d pay for an option on an apartment house or a farm.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我可以——我可以计算我愿意为私人企业的期权支付多少。我也能计算我为上市公司的期权支付多少，可能稍微容易一些。我也可以计算我愿意为一栋公寓或一块农田的期权支付多少。

I had a friend, I mean, when I was 20 years old, we developed a big plan and we were going to go out and option out — option farms, you know, outside of what were then the city limits of Omaha.

我有一个朋友，我记得在我20岁的时候，我们有一个大计划，要去外面给农场提供期权，你知道，就在当时奥马哈的市区外。

And we figured that if we offered a farmer a modest amount, which would be annual income to him, to option his farm at double the price it was bringing then, that it would, you know, he would be happy to sell for double the price that year, and maybe we could do something. And it might have worked out OK.

我们算计，如果我们给农民提供一笔适中的金额，相当于他的年收入，来让他把农场的期权定价为当时价格的两倍，那他可能会很高兴地以两倍的价格出售，并且我们也许能做些什么。这可能最终会顺利进行。

Every option has value. You know, I’ve got a house worth X. If you offer me a few dollars to give you an option at 2X for 10 years, I’m not going to take it, because there are all kinds of possibilities in terms of inflation.

每个期权都有价值。你知道，我有一栋房子，价值X。如果你给我几美元，让我给你一个价值2X、期限为10年的期权，我是不会接受的，因为通货膨胀等因素会有很多变数。

All options have value. And people that get options usually understand that better than people that give options. I’m not talking about stock options now, but in other arenas.

所有期权都有价值。获得期权的人通常比给出期权的人更能理解这一点。我现在说的不是股票期权，而是其他领域的期权。

So we would be happy, you know. I mean, what I could get — let’s say — we’ll just pull one out of the air. Let’s take an untraded company like Mars, Inc.

所以，我们很高兴，知道吗。比如我可以拿到——我们随便举个例子。假设是一家没有上市的公司，像Mars公司。

Would I be happy to have an option, a 10-year option on a piece of Mars, Inc. at some given price?

如果我能得到一份10年期的Mars公司期权，以某个价格购买一部分股权，我会感到高兴吗？

Sure, I would. And there’s an amount I would take for that — I would take in lieu of getting cash if I was writing a big insurance policy with Mars, Inc. They’re not going to do this with me, but that —

当然会。而且我会接受一定的金额——如果我为Mars公司写一份大额保险合同，我会选择用期权代替现金。他们不会和我做这个，但这是——

And I would be happy, you know, instead of if you buy homeowner’s insurance from me, if you want to give me an option on your house for 10 years, I’ll take that in lieu of the premium.

我会很高兴，如果你不是购买房主保险，而是愿意给我10年期的房产期权，我会接受它代替保险费用。

I’ll make my own calculation as to value. It won’t be Black-Scholes, although that might be the best arrangement under many circumstances, but I would probably crank into — in my own case.

我会自己计算价值。它不会是Black-Scholes模型，尽管在许多情况下它可能是最好的安排，但我可能会根据自己的情况来调整。

We’ve bought and sold options some. And as a matter of fact, on June 3rd, Berkshire Hathaway will receive $60 million if the S&P 500 closes at 1150-something or below.

我们曾经买卖过一些期权。事实上，如果标准普尔500指数在6月3日收盘时低于1150点，伯克希尔·哈撒韦将收到6000万美元。

And two years ago, when the S&P was 14-something, we agreed for — on that June 3rd option, or whatever it was — $400 million nominal value, where, in effect the counter party would get the profit above 2,000 and something, 42 percent up from the current cash price. And we got the profit between 5 and 20 percent on the downside on a put.

两年前，当标准普尔指数在1400多点时，我们为6月3日的期权达成协议，名义价值为4亿美元，在这种情况下，交易对方将在超过2000点时获得利润，而我们则获得了在下跌5%到20%之间的利润。

People who were calculating the values of options at that time, under traditional methods, felt that that was a cashless transaction — that the value of the call that we gave was equal to the value of the put that we received. You know, I decided differently.

当时计算期权价值的人，按照传统方法认为那是无现金交易——我们给出的看涨期权的价值等于我们收到的看跌期权的价值。你知道，我做了不同的决定。

So, we don’t accept, blindly, option values as determined by the calculations of people who win Nobel Prizes. Instead, you know, we actually put an aspect of judgment into some.

所以，我们不会盲目接受诺贝尔奖得主计算出来的期权价值。相反，我们实际上在某些情况下加入了自己的判断。

影响Black-Scholes模型的波动率和价值投资者的看法有比较大的差异。

There would be businesses that would come out with identical Black-Scholes values on options for 10 years, and we would pay a different amount for one than the other, maybe a significantly different amount.

有些公司可能会发布相同的Black-Scholes期权价值，但我们为其中一个支付的金额可能会比另一个高，甚至相差很大。

But we would pay something for just about any option. And you know, it is the nature of prices in this world to change, and economic conditions to change. And an option is a chance to participate in a change without giving up anything other than that original premium you pay.

但几乎任何期权我们都会支付一定的金额。你知道，世界上的价格会变化，经济条件也会变化。而期权则是参与变化的机会，除了你支付的原始溢价外，并不需要放弃任何东西。

Many people just don’t seem to grasp that, but believe me, the people who are getting options on stock do grasp that.

许多人似乎并没有理解这一点，但相信我，获得股票期权的人完全理解这一点。

And the people who are giving them, which are the shareholders, you know, represented by a group like this, who don’t have any real voice in giving it, but they sometimes don’t fully realize what’s being given away.

而那些给出期权的人，也就是股东，像这样代表股东的群体，他们并没有实际的话语权去授予期权，但有时他们并没有完全意识到自己正在放弃什么。

Imagine, you know, going up a few miles away from here and having two farms for sale. And you say to the guy, “How much do you want for them?” and they both say a thousand dollars an acre, but the one guy says, “But every year, I want you to option, you know, I want you to give me 2 percent of the place back at a thousand. So, you know, at the end of 10 years, 20 percent of the upside belongs to me, but you’ve got all the downside.” I mean, which farm are you going to buy? The one without the options or the one with the options? It’s not very complicated.

想象一下，离这里几英里远有两块待售的农场。你问卖家：“你想卖多少钱？”他们都说每英亩1000美元，但其中一个卖家说：“但是每年，我希望你给我2%的期权，按照1000美元的价格。所以，10年后，20%的增值属于我，而你负责承担全部的亏损。”那么，你会选择买哪个农场？没有期权的那个，还是有期权的那个？其实不复杂。

And we will — we are dead serious when we say we will take options in lieu of cash. Incidentally, the company that gives us those options in lieu of cash for an insurance premium has to record the expense in terms of the fair value of the option they’ve given us.

我们说我们会以期权代替现金，这是认真的。顺便提一句，提供期权代替现金支付保险费的公司，必须根据期权的公允价值来记录这一费用。

The only item for which they don’t have to record that as expense is compensation. But if they give it to us for their light bill, or if they give it to us for their insurance premium, or they give it to us for their rent, they have to call it a cost.

唯一不需要作为费用记录的是薪酬。但如果他们用期权支付我们的电费，或者支付我们的保险费，或者租金，他们必须将其作为成本。

But only when it comes to the CEO’s compensation, and other people like it, do they not have to record it as a cost, and that’s because they’ve been able to get Congress to bow to their will and to their campaign contributions.

但只有在涉及CEO薪酬等人群时，他们才不需要将其作为成本记录，而这正是因为他们能够让国会屈服于他们的意愿和政治献金。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the Black-Scholes crowd really did get a Nobel Prize for inventing this formula to value options, not executive stock options, but just options generally.

查理·芒格：是的，Black-Scholes团队确实凭借发明这个期权定价公式获得了诺贝尔奖，当然，不是针对执行股票期权，而是一般期权。

And if you don’t know anything about the company, except the past price history of stock transactions —

而如果你对公司一无所知，只知道过去的股票交易价格历史——

WARREN BUFFETT: And dividends.

沃伦·巴菲特：还有股息。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and if the option is over a very short term, it’s a very good way of approximating the value of the option.

查理·芒格：——如果期权是短期的，那么这就是一种非常好的近似期权价值的方法。

But if it’s a long-term option and you think you know something, it’s an insane way to value the option.

但如果是长期期权，而你认为自己知道些什么，那么这就是一种疯狂的期权估值方法。

And Wall Street is full of people with IQs of 150 that are using Black-Scholes to value options that shouldn’t be tortured into the model.

而华尔街充满了IQ达到150的人，他们用Black-Scholes模型来估值那些根本不该被套入这个模型的期权。

And all of corporate — of America is using Black-Scholes to price stock options in the footnotes of the accounting statements, and they do that because it comes up with the lowest cost number.

美国的所有企业都在使用Black-Scholes模型来为财务报表附注中的股票期权定价，他们这么做是因为它能得出最低的成本数字。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they not only do that, but they assume the term is less than the actual term of the option. And I mean, they’ll do everything they can, and I’ve been in on these discussions. They’ll do everything they can to make the number look as low as possible. It’s that simple.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们不仅这么做，还假设期权的期限短于实际期限。我是说，他们会尽一切努力，我也参与过这些讨论。他们会尽一切努力让数字看起来尽可能低，事实就是这么简单。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And they’re using a phony process to determine the number in the first place. So, it’s a Mad Hatter’s tea party, and the only thing that’s consisting — consistent — in it is that the whole thing is disgusting. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：而他们最初用的是一种虚假的方法来确定这个数字。所以，这就像疯狂帽子先生的茶话会，唯一的一致性就是——整个过程让人反感。（笑声与掌声）

57. Investment bankers are “in the lucky part of society”

58. Dexter Shoe acquisition was a mistake

59. Contrarian shareholder thinks annual report is too short

60. Simplicity helps keep audit fees low

61. Arthur Andersen as Enron’s collateral damage

62. No formula to pick out great investors

63. Why See’s won’t be sold at Costco

64. Why Berkshire issued its B shares

65. Leasing of silver doesn’t affect its price

66. Buffett criticizes ABC News report on Kirby vacuums