2003-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session

上午会议

1. Buffett welcomes “real shareholders”

巴菲特欢迎“真正的股东”

WARREN BUFFETT: (Applause) Thank you. We promise not to sing. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：（掌声）谢谢。我们保证不唱歌。（笑声）

Good morning, and we’re delighted to have you all here.

早上好，我们很高兴你们都在这里。

One of the things that makes it fun to run Berkshire is that we see real shareholders. We have — we probably have a larger proportion of our shares held by individuals and not by institutions than virtually any large company in America. And that’s the way we like it.

经营伯克希尔的乐趣之一是我们能见到真正的股东。我们大概拥有的个人股东比例比美国几乎所有大型公司都要高，这正是我们所喜欢的。

We love it when you come, we get to see you, you buy our products. You know, there’s still a few things left downstairs so — (laughter) — feel free to leave anytime during the meeting when Charlie’s talking — (laughter) — to go down and make a few purchases.

我们喜欢你们来这里，我们能见到你们，你们购买我们的产品。你知道，楼下还有一些产品剩下——（笑声）——在查理讲话期间，随时可以离开会议去买几样东西。

2. Andy Heyward and “Liberty’s Kids”

安迪·海沃德和《自由的孩子》

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’re going to do as we’ve always done.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们将一如既往地行事。

First of all, I’d like to — I would like to give very special thanks to Andy Heyward. Andy, would you stand up if you will please? (Applause) Andy is the man that — there he is. (Applause)

首先，我想——我想特别感谢安迪·海沃德。安迪，你能站起来吗？（掌声）安迪就是那个人——他在那里。（掌声）

Andy does those cartoons, he recruits Walter Cronkite and Bill Gates, and he does the script. He gets Charlie and me to do recordings. And it’s just wonderful the production he’s put on.

安迪制作那些卡通，他招募了沃尔特·克朗凯特和比尔·盖茨，并编写剧本。他让查理和我进行录音。他制作的作品真是太棒了。

And for those of you — last year I mentioned a program that’s on public broadcasting called “Liberty’s Kids.”

对于你们当中的一些人——去年我提到过一个在公共广播上播出的节目，叫做《自由的孩子》。

It’s running in — consecutively. There’s, I think, 40 episodes. It tells the story, really, of the founding of the country, and it’s a marvelous way to learn history.

它正在连续播放。我想有 40 集。它讲述了国家建立的故事，这是学习历史的绝妙方式。

I’ve watched a number of the sessions myself, and it kind of comes back to me from my early days, grade school and high school.

我自己看过很多集，这让我想起了我早期的小学和中学时光。

And Andy’s done, I think, the parents of America and the country, a real service in producing this. And I will predict that a hundred years from now, people will be watching “Liberty’s Kids.”

我认为，安迪为美国的父母和国家做了一件真正有意义的事情，制作了这个节目。我预测，一百年后，人们仍会观看《自由的孩子》。

So I really salute Andy Heyward, and be sure to catch it on public broadcasting. And Andy, thanks for a wonderful production. (Applause)

所以我真的向安迪·海沃德致敬，一定要在公共广播中收看。安迪，谢谢你制作了一部精彩的作品。（掌声）

3. Day’s agenda

当天议程

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’re going to follow our usual procedure of leisurely proceeding through the formal part of the business in three or four minutes. And — (laughter) — then we will —

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们将按照惯例，用三到四分钟的时间悠闲地进行业务的正式部分。然后我们将——（笑声）——

I’ll have a few comments, actually, on our business, and then — and a couple of acquisitions — and then we will spend the rest of the day, until 3:30 with a break for lunch, we will spend here to answer any questions you have.

实际上，我会对我们的业务发表一些评论，然后——以及几项收购——然后我们将在这里度过剩下的时间，直到 3:30，中间有午餐休息，我们将在这里回答您提出的任何问题。

We have microphones in various zones, and we will proceed around and try to get every — any subject that’s on your mind, fire away and I’ll answer the easy ones and Charlie will answer the tough ones. (Laughter)

我们在各个区域都有麦克风，我们会四处走动，尝试获取每一个——任何你们想到的话题，尽管提问，我会回答简单的问题，查理会回答困难的问题。（笑声）

4. Calibrating Munger’s answers

校准芒格的答案

WARREN BUFFETT: So now we will go through the formal part of the business, they’ve written a little script for me and I will go through this. The meeting will now come to order.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们将进入业务的正式部分，他们为我写了一小段脚本，我将通过这个。会议现在开始。

Oh, I should introduce Charlie over here, not that he needs an introduction. But Charlie — (Applause)

哦，我应该介绍一下这边的查理，虽然他不需要介绍。但是查理——（掌声）

Charlie and I have been partners of one sort or another since 1959. We both grew up a good bit here in Omaha, but we didn’t know each other at the time.

查理和我自 1959 年以来一直是某种形式的合作伙伴。我们都在奥马哈长大，但那时我们并不认识。

We both worked at the same grocery store. We had a similar experience, we found that neither one of us liked hard work. (Laughter)

我们都在同一家杂货店工作。我们有类似的经历，发现我们都不喜欢辛苦的工作。（笑声）

And if you go down to the Western Heritage Museum, they just opened an exhibit of that grocery store. It’s a permanent exhibit, and actually, I loved it. Charlie worked there a few years before I did in the past, but we didn’t actually meet until I was 28 or 29, and Charlie was a few years older, as he still is.

如果你去西方遗产博物馆，就会看到那个杂货店的新展览。那是一个永久展览，实际上，我很喜欢。查理比我早几年在那里工作，但我们直到我28或29岁时才实际见面，而查理比我大几岁，至今依然如此。

And — (laughter) — we have worked together now for — in one way or another — for 44 years. We’ve never had an argument. And we disagree sometimes on things.

而且——（笑声）——我们以这样或那样的方式已经合作了 44 年。我们从未争吵过。有时我们在某些事情上意见不一致。

He — you have to learn to calibrate Charlie’s answers. He — when I ask him whether he likes something, if he says, “No,” that means we put all our money in it. I mean, that is a huge — (Laughter)

他——你得学会校准查理的回答。他——当我问他是否喜欢某样东西时，如果他说“不”，那就意味着我们要把所有的钱都投进去。我的意思是，那是一个巨大的——（笑声）

If he says, “That’s the dumbest idea I’ve ever heard,” that’s a more moderate investment that we make. And then you have to calibrate his answers, but once you learn to do that you get a lot of wisdom.

如果他说：“那是我听过的最愚蠢的主意，”那是我们做出的一个较为温和的投资。然后你需要校准他的回答，但一旦你学会这样做，你就会获得很多智慧。

5. Berkshire directors introduced

伯克希尔董事介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: We have our directors with us, and I’ll introduce them. We have, if you’ll stand please as I call your name and then you can — it’ll be hard to do — but you can withhold your applause till they’re all standing.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们的董事们在这里，我将介绍他们。当我叫到你的名字时，请站起来，然后你可以——这可能很难做到——但你可以等他们都站起来后再鼓掌。

Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr., in addition to Charlie. Those are the directors of Berkshire Hathaway. (Applause)

苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世，此外还有查理。这些是伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的董事。（掌声）

As we mentioned in the annual report, we will be adding some directors who meet the four tests that I laid out in the report. We’ll be adding some of those, probably within the next year. When we’re required — whenever we’re required to do so, we will be doing it.

正如我们在年度报告中提到的，我们将增加一些符合我在报告中列出的四项标准的董事。我们可能会在明年内增加其中的一些。只要我们被要求这样做，我们就会去做。

And we will have people who have a lot of their own money on the line, just like you do, in Berkshire. And they will prosper or suffer in relation to how Berkshire does, and not in relation to their directors’ fees or other things.

我们会有一些人像你们一样，在伯克希尔投入了大量自己的资金。他们的成败将与伯克希尔的表现相关，而不是与他们的董事费或其他事情相关。

So they will be selected for business savvy, which they will have.

所以他们会因为商业头脑而被选中，而他们确实具备这种能力。

They will be selected for interest in the company, which is almost guaranteed by their holdings.

他们将因对公司的兴趣而被选中，这几乎可以通过他们的持股来保证。

They will be selected by their shareholder orientation, which, again, I think that their holdings will produce. And we will have those people on board, probably by our next meeting.

他们将根据股东导向进行选择，我再次认为，他们的持股将会产生这种结果。我们将这些人安排上岗，可能会在下次会议之前完成。

6. Formal business meeting begins

正式商务会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire. And I might say that almost any question would be appropriate.

沃伦·巴菲特：今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，他们是我们的审计师。他们可以回答您可能对他们公司审计伯克希尔账目的相关问题。我可以说，几乎任何问题都是合适的。

Mr. Forrest Krutter, secretary of Berkshire, he will make a written record of the proceedings. Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting, and she will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.

福瑞斯特·克鲁特先生，伯克希尔的秘书，他将对会议过程进行书面记录。贝基·阿米克小姐已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将对董事选举中投票的计数进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn to the — adjourn the formal meeting. After that we will entertain questions that you might have.

本次会议指定的代理人是沃尔特·斯科特二世和马克·D·汉堡。我们将进行会议事务，然后休会——结束正式会议。之后，我们将回答您可能有的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?

沃伦·巴菲特：秘书是否有关于伯克希尔公司在会议上有权投票和出席的流通股数量的报告？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 5, 2003, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,309,423 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，我有。正如在 2003 年 3 月 5 日发给所有登记股东的会议通知中所附的代理声明中所示，该日期为本次会议的记录日期，当时有 1,309,423 股伯克希尔·哈撒韦 A 类普通股流通，每股在会议上审议的动议中有一票表决权。

And 6,763,493 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

伯克希尔哈撒韦公司有 6,763,493 股 B 类普通股在外流通，每股在会议上审议的动议中享有 1/200 的投票权。

Of that number 1,071,967 Class A shares and 5,228,705 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, May 1.

在该数字中，1,071,967 股 A 类股票和 5,228,705 股 B 类股票在此次会议上由截至 5 月 1 日星期四晚间返回的代理投票代表出席本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place a motion before the meeting.

首先要处理的事项是宣读上次股东会议的会议记录。我承认沃尔特·斯科特先生将在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议免去上次股东会议记录的宣读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second? Motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say “aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：有人附议吗？动议已被提出并附议。有没有评论或问题？我们将通过口头表决对该动议进行投票。所有赞成的人请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? You can signify by saying, “I’m leaving.” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：反对吗？你可以表示“我退出。”（笑声）

The motion is carried. 动议通过。

7. Berkshire directors elected

伯克希尔董事当选

WARREN BUFFETT: The first item of business at the meeting is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.

沃伦·巴菲特：会议的第一项议程是选举董事。如果有股东希望撤回之前发送的代理投票并亲自对董事选举进行投票，他或她可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you.

此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交代理并希望亲自投票，您可以这样做。如果您希望这样做，请向过道的会议工作人员表明身份，他们会为您提供选票。

Will those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so we may distribute them?

请那些需要选票的人表明身份，以便我们分发选票

I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我现在请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Charles T. Munger, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr., be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议沃伦·E·巴菲特、查尔斯·T·芒格、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特 Jr.当选为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sounds good to me.

沃伦·巴菲特：听起来不错。

It has been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Charles T. Munger, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr., be elected as directors.

已经有人提议并附议选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、查尔斯·T·芒格、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特 Jr.为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?

还有其他提名吗？有任何讨论吗？

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

提名已准备好进行。如果有股东亲自投票，他们现在应在董事选举中标记选票，并允许将选票交给选举监察员。

Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors voting and proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received?

请代理持有人也根据他们收到的指示，向选举监察员提交一张关于董事选举投票和代理的选票

Miss Amick, when you’re ready you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，准备好后您可以开始报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 1,058,098 votes for each nominee.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已准备好。根据截至上周四晚收到的代理投票，代理持有人为每位提名人投了不少于 1,058,098 票。

That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

该数字远远超过了所有已发行 A 类和 B 类股票总票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的选票精确计数的认证，包括本次会议上代理持有人根据提交的代理投票所投的额外票数，以及任何在本次会议上亲自投下的票数，将交给秘书并附在本次会议的会议记录中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss. Amick. Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr., have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和小沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。

8. Proposal to include Class B shares in charity program

提议将 B 类股票纳入慈善计划

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a proposal put forth by Berkshire shareholder Christopher J. Fried, the owner of two Class B shares.

沃伦·巴菲特：接下来的议程是由伯克希尔股东克里斯托弗·J·弗里德提出的提案，他持有两股 B 类股票。

Mr. Fried’s motion is set forth in the proxy statement, and provides that the shareholders request the company allows Class B shareholders who own at least seven registered shares of Class B stock to become eligible to participate in the shareholder-designated contributions program.

弗里德先生的动议在代理声明中提出，要求公司允许至少拥有七股 B 类股票注册股份的 B 类股东有资格参与股东指定捐赠计划。

The directors recommended that the shareholders vote against this proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

We will now open the floor to recognize Mr. Fried, or his designee, to present his proposal.

我们现在将开放发言权给弗里德先生或他指定的人来介绍他的提案。

CHRIS FRIED: Thank you, Mr. Buffett. Good morning, my fellow shareholders.

克里斯·弗里德：谢谢你，巴菲特先生。早上好，我的股东同仁们。

My name is Chris Fried, and I am here to present a shareholder proposal.

我的名字是克里斯·弗里德，我在这里提出一项股东提案。

This proposal is designed to extend the shareholder-designated contribution program to include Class B shareholders.

本提案旨在将股东指定捐赠计划扩展至包括 B 类股东。

Let me first start off by saying in our shareholder’s “Owner Manual,” there is a statement that I’d like to quote at this time.

首先让我引用一下我们股东的《所有者手册》中的一句话。

“Although our forum is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charles Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners.

“虽然我们的组织形式是企业，但我们的态度是合作伙伴关系。查尔斯·芒格和我将股东视为所有者合伙人，而我们自己则是管理合伙人。”

“We do not view the company, itself, as the ultimate owner of our business assets, but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.”

“我们不认为公司本身是我们商业资产的最终所有者，而是将公司视为股东拥有资产的渠道。”

With that in mind, I present the following proposal for a vote.

鉴于此，我提出以下提案供投票。

This proposal would extend the shareholder contribution program to Class B shareholders who own at least seven registered shares of Class B stock. Under my proposal, each Class B stock would be allocated 1/30th the value to Class A donation rate.

该提案将股东贡献计划扩展到至少持有七股注册B类股票的股东。根据我的提案，每股B类股票的捐款将按A级捐款率的1/30分配。

Currently the Class A rate is $18 which translates to 60 cents per Class B share. The required minimum seven registered shares results in no less than $4.20 being donated by a Class B shareholder.

目前A级股票的捐款率为18美元，这转换为每股B类股票60美分。所需的最低七股注册股票意味着每位B类股东至少会捐赠4.20美元。

This figure is important, for when inflation is taken into account, the donation rate will be on par with the original 1981 donation level when the shareholder — proposal — designated program was initiated.

这个数字很重要，因为考虑到通货膨胀，捐款率将与1981年当股东指定计划启动时的初始捐款水平相当。

I do understand that there are certain perks involved with owning a Class A share. However, those perks should only be limited to voting rights and the ability to convert Class A shares to Class B shares.

我确实理解拥有 A 类股份涉及某些特权。然而，这些特权应仅限于投票权和将 A 类股份转换为 B 类股份的能力。

Therefore, I believe that is an appropriate — to extend the shareholder-designated program to Class B shareholders.

因此，我认为将股东指定计划扩展到 B 类股东是合适的。

If Berkshire Hathaway is to truly follow — truly follow what it preaches about this firm being a partnership among all of its shareholders, then Class B shareholders must have the right to at least have the option to take part in the shareholder-designated contribution program.

如果伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司要真正践行其所宣扬的关于这家公司是所有股东之间的合作伙伴关系的理念，那么 B 类股股东至少必须有权选择参与股东指定捐赠计划。

Thus, I ask my fellow Berkshire Hathaway shareholders to vote in affirmative on this matter. Thank you for your time.

因此，我请求我的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们对此事投赞成票。感谢你们的时间。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fried. And you’re absolutely right that Charlie and I do regard our shareholders as partners, and we have ever since we really started.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，弗里德先生。你说得完全正确，查理和我确实把我们的股东视为合作伙伴，自从我们真正开始以来一直如此。

In fact, Berkshire, in a sense, evolved out of a couple of partnerships. Charlie had a partnership, I had a partnership, we made an investment in certain things. And a lot of our original partners are still with us as shareholders.

事实上，从某种意义上说，伯克希尔是从几个合伙企业演变而来的。查理有一个合伙企业，我有一个合伙企业，我们在某些事情上进行了投资。我们许多最初的合伙人现在仍然是我们的股东。

The partnership — but partnerships have partnership agreements, and when we set forth — or when we issued the Class B shares some years ago, we set forth the relative terms of the partners. And the Class A and the Class B are quite similar in economic terms, but they’re not identical.

合作关系——但合作关系有合作协议，当我们制定——或者当我们在几年前发行 B 类股票时，我们规定了合伙人的相对条款。A 类和 B 类在经济条款上非常相似，但并不完全相同。

And at the time we issued those shares to a new group of partners, Class B partners, we explained, quite clearly I believe, exactly what differences there were.

当时我们向一组新的合伙人，即 B 类合伙人，发行了这些股份，我相信我们非常清楚地解释了其中的具体差异。

There was a difference in voting rights, there was a difference in that the Class A could be converted to B, but not the reverse. And there was a difference in the shareholder-designated contribution program.

在投票权上存在差异，Class A 可以转换为 B，但不能反过来。在股东指定的贡献计划中也存在差异。

Ever since we issued those shares, I don’t know, maybe six or seven years ago, we, in effect, have had a compact with both the A and B shareholders that they — that we would treat the two classes in a way consistent with what was explained at the time of issuance.

自从我们发行那些股票以来，我不知道，大概是六七年前，我们实际上与 A 类和 B 类股东达成了一种协议，即我们会以与发行时解释的一致的方式对待这两类股票。

So if we were to change the vote, the conversion ratio, or the shareholder-designated contribution program, we would, in effect, be changing a deal that was made, and that has been recognized as having been made, ever since the B shares were issued.

因此，如果我们要更改投票、转换比率或股东指定的贡献计划，我们实际上是在更改一项已经达成并被承认的交易，自 B 类股份发行以来就是如此。

People have bought the A shares in preference to B because of certain reasons. People have bought the B shares for other reasons. But they have relied on the fact that we would abide by what we said we would do at the time we issued those shares.

人们因为某些原因更倾向于购买 A 股而不是 B 股。人们出于其他原因购买了 B 股。但他们依赖于我们在发行这些股票时所承诺的事情。

We’ll not take anything away from the B, we’ll not take anything away from the A. We’ll run things just as they are.

我们不会从 B 中拿走任何东西，我们不会从 A 中拿走任何东西。我们会按原样运行。

And in the future, you know, I happen to have shares — my holdings — concentrated in A shares.

将来，你知道，我碰巧持有的股份——我的持股——集中在 A 股。

But the A will never get any advantage over the B except for the ones we laid out at the time of issuance of the B.

但是，A股除了我们在发行 B 时列出的那些优势外，永远不会获得任何其他优势。

It would actually be unfair to A shareholders, and particularly to A shareholders who have bought since the B was issued, to tell them that the economic relationship between the A and B was being changed, even though only in a slight way, to the benefit of the A — benefit of the B — and the detriment of the A.

对A股东来说，尤其是那些在B类股票发行后购买的A股东来说，改变A和B之间的经济关系，即使只是在轻微的方式上，从而使B类股东受益而使A类股东受损，实际上是不公平的。

We wouldn’t do that in either direction, so that’s why we recommended to vote against it.

我们不会在任何一个方向上这样做，所以这就是我们建议投反对票的原因。

Charlie, do you want to add anything?

查理，你想补充些什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, not only is all of that true, but the cost of getting down to all of B would — it would be a very inefficient process.

查理·芒格：不仅所有这些都是事实，而且达到所有B类股东的这个目标将是一个非常低效的过程。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well of course — and that’s the reason, back when we issued the B, I mean, we anticipated that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当然——这就是我们当初发行 B 股的原因，我的意思是，我们预料到了这一点。

So it seemed like something that would offer very little value to the B at a significant cost to the company, and therefore we spelled it out quite clearly, I believe, in the original prospectus, and it’s been spelled out in every annual report subsequently.

所以，这似乎是以公司为代价而对 B股几乎没有价值的事情，因此我相信我们在最初的招股说明书中已经非常清楚地说明了这一点，并且在随后的每年年度报告中都进行了说明。

So it’s the deal, and the deal is that — is also that we never change things to benefit the A in any way over the B, except as originally explained in the original prospectus, and subsequently in all the annual reports.

所以这就是协议，协议也包括我们绝不会为了让 A 在任何方面优于 B 而改变任何事情，除非在最初的招股说明书中已经解释过，并且随后在所有年度报告中也有说明。

Is there a second to Mr. Fried’s motion?

有没有人附议弗里德先生的动议？

What do we do if we don’t get a second, Charlie?

如果我们没有得到第二个机会，我们该怎么办，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It dies. 查理·芒格：它会消亡。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I guess it just died. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我想它刚刚坏了。（笑声）

But, there’s nothing inappropriate about bringing something like that up (inaudible).

但是，提起那样的事情并没有什么不妥（听不清）。

I mean, I understand exactly, you know, what you’re thinking about. But I think you have to think of fairness to both classes.

我的意思是，我完全理解你在想什么。但是我认为您必须考虑对两个类别的公平性。

Moving right along — figuring out where we are.

继续前进——弄清我们的位置。

9. Formal business meeting adjourned

正式商务会议休会

WARREN BUFFETT: I guess we’re moving along to adjournment of the meeting. And after that we will have the questions we talked about, and I’ll also tell you a little bit about the business, since the annual report come out — came out.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我们要继续进行会议的休会。之后，我们会进行我们谈到的问题环节，我也会告诉你们一些关于业务的情况，因为年度报告已经发布了。

Walter Scott, do you have a motion to put before the meeting?

沃尔特·斯科特，你有要在会议上提出的动议吗？

WALTER SCOTT: I move we adjourn the meeting.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议我们休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do we have a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second. 我附议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say, “aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已提出并获得附议。我们将通过口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say, “No.” The meeting’s adjourned. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：反对的请说“不”。会议结束。（笑声和掌声）

10. Microphones for questions

提问用麦克风

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, I’d like to bring you up to date on a couple of things, and then we will proceed with questions.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我想让大家了解一些最新情况，然后我们将继续进行提问。

We have eight microphones placed around the auditorium here, and we will proceed regularly around and just keep going around, and around.

我们在礼堂周围放置了八个麦克风，我们将定期绕着走，一直不停地绕圈。

And Marc, do we have anything in the — any microphones in the Music Hall or not? I’m not aware. Maybe if Marc could come up and inform me whether there’s (inaudible) Music Hall or not, we can —

马克，我们在音乐厅里有没有麦克风？我不太清楚。也许马克可以上来告诉我音乐厅里是否有（听不清），我们可以——

VOICE: There’s two in there.

声音：里面有两个。

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s two microphones in the Music —

沃伦·巴菲特：音乐中有两个麦克风——

VOICE: Yes, nine and 10.

声音：是的，九和十。

WARREN BUFFETT: Nine and 10 are in the Music Hall. And are there quite a few people there?

沃伦·巴菲特：九号和十号在音乐厅。那里有很多人吗？

VOICE: Yeah, it’s full. It’s full.

声音：是的，满了。满了。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s full?

沃伦·巴菲特：满了吗？

VOICE: Yeah. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好吧。

We haven’t put microphones out on the sidewalks yet, but we’ll get to that someday. (Laughter)

我们还没有在人行道上放置麦克风，但总有一天会做到的。（笑声）

11. McLane acquired from Walmart

从沃尔玛收购McLane

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve made — we’ve contracted to make — two acquisitions this year.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们已经完成——我们已经完成签约——今年的两项收购。

You just read about one, perhaps, in this morning’s paper, but it went on the tape at 7:45 yesterday morning, Central Time, and that involved the contract to buy McLane’s from the Walmart company.

你们或许在今天早上的报纸上读到了一项，但它是在昨天早上7:45（中央时间）在交易所发布的，涉及从沃尔玛公司收购麦克莱恩。

McLane’s is the very large wholesaler to all kinds of institutions, but convenience stores, quick-serve restaurants, the Walmart operation itself, theaters, restaurants.

麦克莱恩是一家大型批发商，服务于各种机构，包括便利店、快餐店、沃尔玛自身的运营、影院和餐馆。

And this year we’ll probably do something like 22 billion of business. So it’s a very substantial enterprise, with distribution centers around the country, with much in the way of transportation equipment.

今年我们预计将进行大约220亿美元的业务。所以这是一家非常庞大的企业，在全国各地设有分销中心，并拥有大量运输设备。

Walmart had owned McLane’s since about, I believe, 1990. It grew substantially while they owned it. It’s been run by a terrific manager who’s here with us today, Grady Rosier, and Grady took the business from 3 billion to 22 billion, or thereabouts.

自大约 1990 年起，沃尔玛就拥有麦克莱恩。我相信在他们拥有期间，麦克莱恩的业务大幅增长。今天在场的优秀经理格雷迪·罗西尔一直负责经营这家公司，格雷迪将业务从 30 亿增长到 220 亿左右。

Walmart, for very good reasons, wants to specialize in what they do extremely well, and through Goldman Sachs and Company, we were approached by them a little while back about the possibilities of buying the business.

沃尔玛出于非常好的理由，希望专注于他们非常擅长的领域，通过高盛公司，他们不久前联系了我们，探讨收购该业务的可能性。

It’s a — it really makes sense for both sides, because Walmart knows what to do with the capital very, very well in their own business, and has lots of opportunities. And this was something of a sideline to them.

这对双方来说确实很有意义，因为沃尔玛非常清楚如何在他们自己的业务中很好地利用资本，并且有很多机会。而这对他们来说是一个副业。

On the other hand, their ownership of McLane’s resulted in certain people that would be logical customers of McLane’s not wanting to do business because they didn’t want to do business with a competitor.

另一方面，他们对麦克莱恩的所有权导致一些理应成为麦克莱恩客户的人不愿意进行业务，因为他们不想与竞争对手做生意。

And we plan to see all those people very soon, and explain to them that that’s no longer the case, and they can sleep well at night doing business with us and not worry about benefiting their competitor, Walmart.

我们计划很快与所有这些人见面，向他们解释这种情况不再存在，他们可以放心地与我们做生意，而不必担心在无意中使他们的竞争对手沃尔玛受益。

So this deal — a representative of Walmart came up last Thursday to Omaha, a week ago this past Thursday, a CFO. And we made a deal in, maybe, an hour or two and shook hands. And when you shake hands with Walmart, you have a deal.

所以这个交易——上周四沃尔玛的一位代表来到奥马哈，就是上上周四，一位首席财务官。我们可能在一两个小时内达成了协议并握手。当你和沃尔玛握手时，你就达成了交易。

And so the time remaining until yesterday morning, a contract was put together and it must go through the Hart-Scott-Rodino process in — to be cleared. But there’s obviously no conflict, so we fully expect that, in just a few weeks, that McLane’s will become part of Berkshire.

因此，直到昨天早上剩下的时间里，一份合同被拟定，并且必须通过哈特-斯科特-罗迪诺程序以获得批准。但显然没有冲突，所以我们完全预计，在短短几周内，麦克莱恩将成为伯克希尔的一部分。

It serves, presently, about 36,000 of the 125,000 or so, convenience stores. If you take the 50 largest convenience store chains in the country, it does 58 percent of the business with those companies. Sells each convenience store an average of, perhaps, 300,000 or a slight bit more of product a year, which those convenience stores then resell to the consumer.

目前，它为大约36,000家便利店中的125,000家提供服务。如果你把美国最大的50家便利店连锁店算上，它为这些公司做了58%的业务。每家便利店平均每年出售大约300,000美元，或略多的产品，然后再转售给消费者。

It also serves about 18,000 quick-serve restaurants, primarily those operated by Yum! Brands: the Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut, and Kentucky Fried Chicken group.

它还为大约18,000家快餐店提供服务，主要是那些由百胜餐饮集团（Yum! Brands）运营的：塔可钟（Taco Bell）、比萨快递（Pizza Hut）和肯德基（Kentucky Fried Chicken）。

And it will have opportunities to serve many more as we go along. So we’re delighted.

它将有机会在我们前进的过程中为更多的人服务。所以我们很高兴。

If any of you get a chance to see Grady, or better yet, if any of you own a convenience store, step forward and we’ll be glad to give you our card. (Laughter)

如果你们有机会见到格雷迪，或者更好的是，如果你们拥有一家便利店，站出来，我们将很高兴地给你们我们的名片。（笑声）

It’s really — you know, Walmart knows that we will be a good owner, they know we’ll be good for the people that work at McLane’s.

这真的——你知道，沃尔玛知道我们会是一个好的主人，他们知道我们会对在麦克莱恩工作的人有好处。

They know our check will clear, that we won’t, you know, make a proposition and then run into financing difficulties, or try to jiggle around the contract later on.

他们知道我们的支票会兑现，我们不会提出建议后遇到融资困难，或者之后试图修改合同。

And it’s just an ideal way to do business, and we’re delighted to add McLane’s to the Berkshire group of companies.

这是一种理想的经营方式，我们很高兴将 McLane's 加入伯克希尔公司集团。

It’s a very narrow-margin business, obviously. I mean, when you get up to 22 billion of sales and you’ve got Hershey, and Mars, and people like that on one side, and you’ve got buyers like 7-Eleven and Walmart on the other side, they’re not going to leave a lot in between.

这显然是一个利润非常微薄的行业。我的意思是，当你的销售额达到 220 亿，并且你有好时、玛氏和类似的人在一边，而另一边有像 7-Eleven 和沃尔玛这样的买家时，他们不会留下太多的利润空间。

But you have to perform a valuable service for them in order to earn, you know, say, one cent on the dollar, pre-tax.

但是你必须为他们提供有价值的服务，才能赚到，比如说，每美元一分钱，税前。

But McLane’s knows how to do it. It’s a very efficient operation, and it will continue to deliver value to both their vendors and their customers.

但麦克莱恩知道怎么做。这是一个非常高效的操作，并将继续为他们的供应商和客户提供价值。

12. Clayton Homes purchase

购买Clayton Homes

WARREN BUFFETT: The other acquisition that is in the works is Clayton Homes. Clayton is the class of the manufactured home industry, and the acquisition came about in kind of an interesting way.

沃伦·巴菲特：正在进行的另一项收购是克莱顿家居。克莱顿是预制房屋行业的佼佼者，这次收购以一种有趣的方式进行。

Every year for the last five years, a group of about 40 finance students from the University of Tennessee in Knoxville would come up to Omaha, and they would have a lot of fun in Omaha. They’d go to the Furniture Mart.

在过去的五年里，每年都有大约 40 名来自田纳西大学诺克斯维尔分校的金融专业学生来到奥马哈，他们在奥马哈玩得很开心。他们会去家具市场。

And then in the afternoon they’d come to Kiewit Plaza and the 40 students or so, with their professor, Al Auxier, would have a session with me. We’d just have a classroom session for a couple of hours, and wonderful group of students.

然后在下午，他们会来到 Kiewit 广场，大约 40 名学生和他们的教授 Al Auxier 会和我一起上课。我们会进行几个小时的课堂讨论，这是一群很棒的学生。

And generally at the end of the session they would give me a football, or a basketball, they’ve got a great women’s basketball team at the University of Tennessee, and so we’d have a good time together.

通常在课程结束时，他们会给我一个足球或篮球，田纳西大学有一支很棒的女子篮球队，所以我们会一起度过愉快的时光。

And, matter of fact, a year ago, when they came up, Bill Gates, by chance, was in town. So I presented him as a substitute teacher, which is a post he’s always wanted. (Laughter) And students got quite a surprise.

事实上，一年前，当他们来到这里时，比尔·盖茨碰巧在城里。所以我让他当了一名代课老师，这是他一直想要的职位。（笑声）学生们感到非常惊讶。

This year when they came, 40 or so students, we had a good session together, a couple of hours at Kiewit Plaza. And when they got through, they gave me a book. And it was the autobiography of Jim Clayton, who started and ran Clayton Homes, and built it into a huge success.

今年他们来的时候，大约有 40 名学生，我们在 Kiewit 广场一起度过了一段美好的时光，持续了几个小时。当他们结束时，他们送给我一本书。这是吉姆·克莱顿的自传，他创办并经营了 Clayton Homes，并将其打造成一个巨大的成功。

And he’d written a nice inscription inside, and I mentioned to the students and the professor that the — that I was an admirer of Clayton. I’d followed the manufactured home industry in other ways, not always so successfully, and I’d seen what Clayton had done.

他在里面写了一段很好的题词，我向学生和教授提到，我是克莱顿的仰慕者。我以其他方式关注过预制房屋行业，并不总是那么成功，我见识过克莱顿所做的事情。

And so I said I look forward to reading the book, which I did. And then I called Kevin Clayton, Jim Clayton’s son, and Kevin is the CEO of the company. And I told him how I’d enjoyed his dad’s book.

于是我说我期待阅读这本书，我确实读了。然后我打电话给凯文·克莱顿，吉姆·克莱顿的儿子，凯文是公司的首席执行官。我告诉他我多么喜欢他父亲的书。

And I said we still had a little money left in Omaha — (laughter) — and, if they ever decided to do anything, you know, we would be interested. And I suggested at what price we might be interested in.

我说我们在奥马哈还剩下一点钱——（笑声）——如果他们决定做些什么，你知道，我们会感兴趣。我还建议了我们可能感兴趣的价格。

A phone call or two later, a couple of phone calls, we made a deal.

打了一两个电话后，经过几次通话，我们达成了协议。

And I had not been to Knoxville. You know, I checked out a few manufactured homes. Suggested that my family buy a repo. (Laughter)

我还没去过诺克斯维尔。你知道，我看了几套预制房。建议我的家人买一套回收房屋。（笑声）

But that deal came about in that manner. And that’s the way things tend to happen at Berkshire.

但那笔交易就是以那种方式达成的。这就是事情在伯克希尔发生的方式。

It, you know, the phone rings or we pick up the phone, in this particular case. And the manufactured home industry got into significant trouble, very significant trouble, because credit terms — well, they went crazy on credit four or five years ago.

你知道，电话响了，或者我们接起电话，在这个特定情况下。预制房屋行业陷入了严重的麻烦，非常严重的麻烦，因为信贷条件——四五年前他们在信贷方面变得疯狂。

And when you go crazy on credit, you suffer in a very big way, and that’s what happened to that industry.

当你在信用上疯狂消费时，你会遭受很大的痛苦，这就是那个行业所发生的事情。

Conseco, that some of you may have read about, ended up holding — or servicing I should say — $20 billion worth of manufactured home credit and they got in big trouble, for that and other reasons.

Conseco，你们中的一些人可能读到过，最终持有——或者我应该说是服务——价值 200 亿美元的预制房屋贷款，他们因此和其他原因陷入了大麻烦。

And Oakwood, where we own some junk bonds, went into bankruptcy. They’re a big operation in the country, most of the — couple of the other biggest players in the industry are losing significant money.

Oakwood，也是我们拥有一些垃圾债券的公司，最终破产了。他们是该国的一家大型企业，行业中最大的几个竞争者也在亏损。

Manufactured home companies have lost the ability to securitize the receivables they get when they sell these — when they sell homes. And so the industry’s been in the tank.

预制房屋公司失去了将其在销售房屋时获得的应收款证券化的能力。因此，该行业一直处于低迷状态。

This year, or this past year, there were maybe 160,000 new manufactured homes sold, but there were also about 90,000 repos came back and that depresses the market enormously. And like I say, financing sources have dried up. A lot of people that lent money have left the field.

今年，或者说过去一年，可能有 16 万套新制造房屋售出，但也有大约 9 万套被收回，这极大地压抑了市场。正如我所说，融资来源已经枯竭。许多放贷的人已经退出了这个领域。

So for the strong, as Clayton is, and particularly with the financial backer like Berkshire, it should be a good field. Twenty percent or so of all the new single-family homes are manufactured homes in this country.

因此，对于像克莱顿这样强大的公司，尤其是有伯克希尔这样的金融支持者，这应该是一个不错的领域。在这个国家，所有新建单户住宅中大约有 20%是预制房屋。

I mean, you can — we can put you in one for about $30 a square foot, and if you compare that to a site-built home, it’s quite a deal. I mean, I was amazed.

我的意思是，你可以——我们可以以每平方英尺大约 30 美元的价格为你建造一个，如果你将其与现场建造的房屋相比，这相当划算。我的意思是，我感到很惊讶。

They have 2,500 square foot homes, two stories, I mean, it’s changed a lot over the last 30 or 40 years.

他们有 2500 平方英尺的房子，两层楼，我的意思是，在过去的 30 或 40 年里变化很大。

And we’ve got an operation that is, even the competitors would admit, it’s clearly the class of the field.

而且我们的运营，即使是竞争对手也会承认，显然是行业中的佼佼者。

But even for Clayton, financing was getting more difficult. I mean, the lending community got burned very badly in manufactured homes, and people have sworn off them, from the lending standpoint.

但即使对于克莱顿来说，融资也变得更加困难。我的意思是，贷款界在预制房屋方面遭受了严重损失，人们从贷款的角度发誓不再涉足。

And Clayton did securitize an issue in February this year, but they had to keep more of the bottom layers of the securitization themselves.

克莱顿今年2月确实完成了一次证券化发行，但他们不得不保留更多证券化底层资产。

So it’s a good marriage, and it’s one where we will be useful to them. And we should do very well together in the future.

所以这是一个很好的合作，我们对他们会有用。我们在未来应该会合作得很好。

13. Earnings get insurance boost

收入受到保险业务的提振

WARREN BUFFETT: The first quarter, I’ll just — I don’t have final figures yet, and we’ll put this — what I say today — we’ll put it on the website so that everyone has the information before the opening on Monday.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一季度，我只是——我还没有最终数据，我们会把我今天所说的放到网站上，以便在周一开盘前每个人都能获得信息。

But the economy, as you know, has been quite sluggish. It’s really been sluggish for a very long time.

但是，正如你所知，经济一直相当疲软。实际上，它已经疲软了很长一段时间。

It’s interesting, I wrote in a letter that’s also on the website, right after September 11th, I put something up there.

有趣的是，我在网站上的一封信中写道，就在 9 月 11 日之后，我在那里放了一些东西。

And I said that we were in — we had been in a recession, which was not something that was generally acknowledged at that time, and I thought would be longer and deeper than most people anticipated.

我说我们处于——我们已经处于经济衰退中，这在当时并没有被普遍承认，我认为这将比大多数人预期的更长更深。

And what has happened is that, really since late 2000, housing and autos have done quite well, but the rest of the economy has just been plain sluggish. And it continues.

自 2000 年末以来，房地产和汽车行业表现相当不错，但经济的其他部分却一直疲软。而且这种情况还在持续。

During that time we’ve dropped the federal funds rate dramatically down to 1 1/4 percent. Charlie and I weren’t — probably wouldn’t have predicted that we might ever see that in our lifetime, and maybe it’ll even go lower.

在那段时间里，我们将联邦基金利率大幅下调至 1.25%。查理和我可能都不会预测到我们有生之年会看到这样的情况，也许它甚至会更低。

And we’re running a huge budget deficit now, but business continues to be sluggish.

而且我们现在的预算赤字很大，但商业活动仍然疲软。

So our non-insurance businesses generally did not do great in the first quarter.

所以我们非保险业务在第一季度的表现总体上不太好。

Our insurance businesses did extraordinarily well. And we will show — when the first quarter report is published — we will show an underwriting profit of about 290 million pre-tax, which is after about 140 million of charges for retroactive insurance, the acquisition costs on that — which I’m sure many of you that don’t love accounting — all I can tell you is that it’s a charge that many companies don’t bear but that we willingly bear because it gives us benefits.

我们的保险业务表现非常出色。当第一季度报告发布时，我们将显示税前承保利润约为 2.9 亿，这是在约 1.4 亿的追溯保险费用之后的，这些费用的获取成本——我相信你们中许多不喜欢会计的人——我只能告诉你们，这是许多公司不承担的费用，但我们愿意承担，因为它为我们带来了好处。

But our $290 million is after that charge.

但我们的 2.9 亿美元是在扣除该费用之后的。

Our float grew by, probably, at least 1.3 billion, so we’re up to 42 1/2 billion or so of float. And people — that means people have — are letting us use that money.

我们的浮存金增长了，可能至少有 13 亿，所以我们的浮存金大约达到了 425 亿左右。这意味着人们——让我们使用那笔钱。

And as I said in the first quarter, did it not only cost us nothing to use the money, but, in effect, people paid us to use the money, which we would like them to continue to do. (Laughter)

正如我在第一季度所说的，不仅使用这笔钱对我们没有任何成本，而且实际上，人们还付钱给我们使用这笔钱，我们希望他们继续这样做。（笑声）

And I don’t see our float growing much from this point. Charlie said last time that it was impossible for it to grow, but it probably would. I don’t know whether he’ll change his opinion on that, but I think — I really think our insurance businesses are in exceptionally good shape.

我认为从这一点来看，我们的浮存金不会增长太多。查理上次说它不可能增长，但可能会增长。我不知道他是否会改变他的看法，但我认为——我真的认为我们的保险业务状况非常好。

We have some of the best insurance businesses in the world.

我们拥有一些世界上最好的保险公司。

GEICO’s premium volume was up a little over 16 percent in the first quarter, and in April it was up just right at 17 percent. It had a 6 percent, roughly, underwriting profit in the first quarter.

GEICO 的保费收入在第一季度增长了略高于 16%，而在四月份则增长了正好 17%。在第一季度，它的承保利润大约为 6%。

Gen Re, thanks to an incredible job by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, has turned the corner in a big, big way, and it showed an underwriting profit in the first quarter.

通用再保险公司，由于乔·布兰登和塔德·蒙特罗斯的出色工作，已经大幅度扭转了局面，并在第一季度显示出承保利润。

Ajit Jain made so much money I don’t want to even tell you about it. (Applause)

阿吉特·贾因赚了很多钱，我甚至不想告诉你。（掌声）

Some of our primary operations — yeah, you should give him a hand. I mean, that — (Applause)

我们的一些主要操作——是的，你应该给他鼓掌。我的意思是，那——（掌声）

When you get Charlie to clap, you know he’s made us a lot of money. (Laughter)

当你让查理鼓掌时，你就知道他为我们赚了很多钱。（笑声）

And our primary businesses, particularly U.S. Liability and National Indemnity primary operations, and our Homestate Company, they’ve all done — they’re all doing remarkably well. And I —

我们的主要业务，特别是美国责任险和国家赔偿的主要业务，以及我们的Homestate Company，他们都做得非常好。我——

You never know what’s going to happen in insurance. I mean, there could be an 8.0 earthquake in California or Tokyo, or there could be one in New Madrid, Missouri, as there was a couple hundred years ago. And it could happen tomorrow, there could be huge hurricanes this summer, whatever.

你永远不知道保险业会发生什么。我是说，加州或东京可能会发生 8.0 级地震，或者密苏里州的新马德里可能会发生地震，就像几百年前那样。而且这可能明天就会发生，今年夏天可能会有巨大的飓风，等等。

But I can’t imagine having a much better group of companies or managers than we have, and they’re all working well now.

但我无法想象有比我们现在拥有的更好的公司或管理团队，而且他们现在都运作良好。

For a while, Gen Re was a drag, but that’s not true now. And I think that we have an excellent chance of having very low cost, and perhaps even no-cost or negative cost float over the next five years or so, or really as far as the eye can see.

有一段时间，通用再保险是个拖累，但现在情况并非如此。我认为我们有很好的机会在未来五年左右，甚至在可预见的未来，获得非常低的成本，甚至是无成本或负成本的浮存金。

Now, that doesn’t mean it won’t fluctuate around. But if you average it out, I think we will have our float at a very cheap price. And it’s — you know, as [TV personality] Martha [Stewart] would say, “Having 42 1/2 billion for nothing is a good thing.” (Laughter)

现在，这并不意味着它不会有波动。但如果你把它平均下来，我认为我们的浮动资金会非常便宜。而且，你知道，就像[电视名人]玛莎[斯图尔特]会说的，“拥有 425 亿而不花一分钱是件好事。”（笑声）

Now, with that, I think we’ve covered — the first quarter was a good quarter. Overall, it’s the best operating earnings we’ve ever had. Now, we’ve got more capital now than we’ve ever had, but nevertheless it will be a good quarter.

现在，我认为我们已经涵盖了——第一季度是一个不错的季度。总体而言，这是我们有史以来最好的运营收益。现在，我们拥有的资本比以往任何时候都多，但尽管如此，这将是一个不错的季度。

And I would estimate, I think it’s fair to say, Marc [Hamburg], that from operating earnings we will have something like 1.7 — in the range of 1.7 billion. We had some securities gains too, but I don’t count those because they can do anything from quarter to quarter. We don’t pay any attention to the timing of those.

我估计，我认为可以公平地说，Marc [Hamburg]，我们的经营收益大约在 17 亿左右。我们也有一些证券收益，但我不计算这些，因为它们每个季度的变化都可能很大。我们对它们的时机不太关注。

But we — from a straight operating standpoint, 1.7 billion or so after-tax. Am I safe with that number, Marc? Or — OK. What could he say? (Laughter)

但从直接的运营角度来看，税后大约是17亿美元。我这样说安全吗，马尔克？或者——好的。他能说什么呢？（笑声）

We don’t change numbers at Berkshire, I promise you that. There are — a lot of companies do, but fewer now than did a few years ago. (Laughter)

在伯克希尔，我们不会更改数字，我向你保证。很多公司会这样做，但现在比几年前少了。（笑声）

So, we’re going to get the questions in. Charlie, do you have anything to add about acquisitions or operations, or anything else you’d care to say?

那么，我们将开始提问。查理，你有没有关于收购或运营的补充，或者你想说的其他内容？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I hate to be an optimist, but — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我不想成为一个乐观主义者，但是——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Does he ever. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：他确实如此。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We really added a lot of wonderful businesses to Berkshire in the last few years. It’s been some delightful business.

查理·芒格：在过去的几年里，我们确实为伯克希尔增添了许多优秀的企业。这是一项令人愉快的业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s all you’re going to get out of him, folks. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：各位，这就是你们能从他那里得到的全部了。（笑声和掌声）

14. Bright future for NetJets but no profit this year

NetJets 前景光明，但今年无利润

WARREN BUFFETT: OK we’re going to start around and we — as we’ve added two microphones to the Music Hall — and let’s start with zone 1, which is over on my right. And do we have the first question?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们要开始了，我们在音乐厅增加了两个麦克风，让我们从我右边的第一区开始。我们有第一个问题吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m George Brumley from Durham, North Carolina.

观众成员：早上好。我是来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆的乔治·布鲁姆利。

My first question is related to Executive Jet. It’s been almost five years since the acquisition of Executive Jet, a purchase in a much different economic and geopolitical environment.

我的第一个问题与 Executive Jet 有关。自从收购 Executive Jet 以来，已经快五年了，当时的经济和地缘政治环境与现在大不相同。

What business metrics do you use to measure success in an industry with as much flux as this one, and what has changed in those metrics since the time of acquisition?

在像这样充满变动的行业中，你使用哪些业务指标来衡量成功？自收购以来，这些指标发生了哪些变化？

What are the prospects for Europe, and have those prospects changed?

欧洲的前景如何，这些前景是否发生了变化？

While none of the competitors approach Executive Jet in terms of scale and scope, what impact are they having on the competitive environment?

虽然没有任何竞争对手在规模和范围上能与 Executive Jet 相提并论，但他们对竞争环境有什么影响？

And lastly, would you please explain the long-term aspect of the business model, as many of the jets age out of the program?

最后，您能否解释一下商业模式的长期方面，因为许多喷气机将逐渐退出该计划？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK George, I got through college answering fewer questions than that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔治，我上大学时回答的问题都没那么多。（笑声）

But George’s uncle [Fred Stanback] was best man in my wedding, so he gets all he wants.

但乔治的叔叔[弗雷德·斯坦巴克]是我婚礼上的伴郎，所以他想要什么就有什么。

The — NetJets, as you will see in the first quarter, had a significant loss. A large portion of that loss was caused by the write-down of planes because there — of —

NetJets 在第一季度出现了重大亏损。亏损的很大一部分是由于飞机减值造成的，因为那里——

I love it, they call it in the trade, they call them pre-owned planes. I call them used planes. But the — they did the same thing in manufactured homes, so they call them pre-owned homes instead of used homes.

我喜欢，他们在行业中称之为，他们称之为二手飞机。我称之为旧飞机。但是——他们在预制房屋时也做了同样的事情，所以他们称之为二手房而不是旧房。

But in any event, putting aside the euphemisms, there — the used plane market, well the entire business aircraft market, is very soft. The used plane market has far more planes for sale than, say, three or four or five years ago.

但无论如何，撇开委婉语不谈，二手飞机市场，整个商务飞机市场，都非常疲软。二手飞机市场上待售的飞机比三四五年前多得多。

That’s going to affect the production of new planes — already has. And it affects pricing in used planes, and we have bought back planes from people leaving the programs, which we do and will continue to do.

这将影响新飞机的生产——实际上已经产生了影响。这也影响了二手飞机的定价，我们已经从退出项目的人那里回购了飞机，我们会继续这样做。

But we have bought during a declining market, some of those, and we have had write-downs in connection with those planes. And you will see in our first quarter report, I believe that that’s probably the only operation we have that’s losing money.

但是我们在市场下滑期间购买了一些飞机，并且在这些飞机上进行了减记。你会在我们的第一季度报告中看到，我相信那可能是我们唯一亏损的业务。

And we have — it’s a popular product, it’s a growing business, it’s going to be a very big business in my opinion over the years. And we see it every day. I mean, we write a lot of business, and customers are joining us.

我们有——这是一个受欢迎的产品，是一个正在增长的业务，在我看来，未来几年将成为一个非常大的业务。我们每天都能看到。我是说，我们做了很多业务，客户正在加入我们。

There are three main competitors. I think it’s fair to say that they’re losing significant money from operations, forgetting about any markdowns they might have on their own inventories.

有三个主要竞争对手。我认为可以公平地说，他们在运营中损失了大量资金，而不考虑他们自己库存可能有的任何减价。

Our market share, we get figures from the FAA as to registrations and as to people that are selling their planes.

我们的市场份额，我们从 FAA 获得有关注册和出售飞机的人员的数据。

And our share of market, which was always the largest, has gone up dramatically in the last couple of years. It’s gone up to roughly 75 percent, in terms of value of planes. And we’re talking 75 percent of the four-company market. It’s gone up even higher than that, in terms of net planes. In other words, new planes sold, less planes coming back.

我们的市场份额，一直以来都是最大的，在过去几年中大幅上升。按飞机价值计算，已经上升到大约 75%。我们谈论的是四家公司市场的 75%。按净飞机计算，甚至比这更高。换句话说，新售出的飞机减去退回的飞机。

But the pricing we are receiving does not — in the U.S. it would be — absent this one write-down — it would be very, very modestly profitable.

不过我们在美国获得的定价并没有太大变化——若不是这一次减值——其实会非常微薄的盈利。

In Europe, we have lost and we are losing significant amounts of money. Business jets in Europe, the total is about one — and I’m not talking about ours, I’m talking about all — are about roughly 1/10th the number as in the United States, even though the population is similar.

在欧洲，我们已经失去了并且正在失去大量资金。欧洲的公务机总数大约是美国的 1/10，尽管人口相似。

So we have grown from a small base quite rapidly over there. Nobody else will be taking us on. It’s part of a service that will be part of a very big business worldwide, in my view, over the years. I don’t think anybody else can come in after us.

因此，我们从一个小基础迅速成长起来。没有其他人会接替我们。在我看来，这项服务将成为全球一个非常大业务的一部分，未来几年都是如此。我认为没有其他人能在我们之后进入。

So I think it’s integral, and it is integral, to our operation. Half the — roughly half the miles flown in Europe arise from American owners. And that will just do nothing but get bigger over the years, because our number of — every month our number of owners goes up, goes up significantly.

所以我认为这对我们的运营是不可或缺的。大约一半的欧洲飞行里程来自美国的所有者。随着时间的推移，这只会越来越多，因为我们的所有者数量每个月都在显著增加。

We have people here from Marquis, who have essentially — they’ve become a customer of ours, and then they resell cards for 25 hours. And they have added 40 or 50 customers a month in recent months. So it’s a popular service, it will be a much bigger business.

我们这里有来自 Marquis 的人，他们基本上——他们已经成为我们的客户，然后他们转售 25 小时的卡片。最近几个月，他们每月增加了 40 到 50 个客户。所以这是一项受欢迎的服务，将会成为一个更大的业务。

I think there will be a shakeout at some point, and maybe fairly soon. You can look at the Raytheon prospectus and — or the Raytheon 10K, and you will find some interesting information about their operation. And you can — it’s not hard to figure out what’s going on.

我认为在某个时候会出现动荡，也许很快就会发生。你可以查看雷神公司的招股说明书或雷神公司的 10K 文件，你会发现一些关于他们运营的有趣信息。而且你可以——不难弄清楚发生了什么。

I don’t know the answer as to when the shakeout will occur. But I can assure you that we will not be one of the shook. (Laughter)

我不知道震荡何时会发生。但我可以向你保证，我们不会是被震的人。（笑声）

Charlie, do you want to comment on it?

查理，你想对此发表评论吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’ll comment on the profitable operations. He gives me the one —

沃伦·巴菲特：他会对盈利业务发表评论。他给了我一个——

The long-term business model is that, basically, we believe that, you know, perhaps 10 times the number of people that are now flying with us will be flying with us some years in the future.

从长远来看，我们的商业模式基本上是，我们相信，将来可能会有现在乘坐我们航班人数的十倍的人数选择我们的航班。

That having the best service, the best record, and the best policies for safety and security, will leave us very dominant in the field, and that people will pay an appropriate price for the service.

拥有最好的服务、最好的记录和最好的安全政策，将使我们在该领域占据主导地位，人们会为此服务支付适当的价格。

And we see all kinds of evidence of that. But we do not see a profit this year, in my view, at NetJets.

我们看到各种各样的证据。但在我看来，今年 NetJets 没有盈利。

15. “What we really want is cost-free float”

“我们真正想要的是无成本的浮存金”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第二个问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia.

观众成员：早上好。我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺夫。

I had two related questions for you gentlemen, basically both related to float.

我有两个相关的问题要问你们先生，基本上都与浮存金有关。

Float, as you indicated, has become a very large part of our asset base. Assuming our policy holders continue to renew with us and we keep control of our combined ratio, can we count the float as pseudo equity when calculating the intrinsic value of Berkshire?

正如您所指出的，浮存金已成为我们资产基础的一个非常重要的部分。假设我们的保单持有人继续与我们续约，并且我们保持对综合比率的控制，那么在计算伯克希尔的内在价值时，我们能否将浮存金视为准股本？

And the related question was, can we not expect the float to keep growing at, say, 10 percent per annum for the next five to 10 years given that we’re still really a minority player in this segment? Thank you.

相关问题是，鉴于我们在这个领域仍然是一个小玩家，我们能否期望浮存金每年都增长，比如说，未来五到十年增长 10%？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish it would grow at 10 percent or so, at least if it were profitable, which I do have a belief that it’s likely to be.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我希望它能以大约 10%的速度增长，至少如果它是盈利的，我确实相信它有可能会这样。

Our float is 42 1/2 billion on March 31st, roughly.

截至 3 月 31 日，我们的浮存金大约是 425 亿。

I think the entire float of the American property-casualty industry, you know, could be something in the — roughly — in the area of 500 billion. So we may be some figure like, you know, 8 percent or a little bit more, maybe even 9 percent, somewhere in that range.

我认为美国财产保险行业的整个浮存金，大概在 5000 亿美元左右。所以我们可能占到 8%左右，或者稍微多一点，甚至可能达到 9%，大概在这个范围内。

Of the total P-C float in the United States — now, it’s true we have a little outside the country, too, but the big part of the world P-C market is in the United States.

在美国的总财产-意外险浮存金中——现在，确实我们在国外也有一些，但全世界财产-意外险市场的大部分在美国。

When we started out in 1967, I think maybe we had 10 million of float. So to go from 10 million to 42 billion, frankly, surprises me. But it also — it’s going to be much harder to grow at significant percentage rates in the future.

当我们在 1967 年开始时，我想我们可能有 1000 万的浮存金。所以从 1000 万增长到 420 亿，坦率地说，这让我感到惊讶。但这也意味着——未来要以显著的百分比增长将会更加困难。

And our goal — we love the idea of growing — but what we really want is cost-free float. I mean, that is the goal, and growth is not a — not at the top of the list at all. I mean, I hold our managers responsible, not for delivering more float. I hold them responsible for delivering profitable float.

我们的目标——我们喜欢增长的想法——但我们真正想要的是无成本的浮存金。我的意思是，这是目标，增长并不是——根本不在首位。我的意思是，我让我们的经理负责，不是为了提供更多的浮存金。我让他们负责提供有利可图的浮存金。

And that is key in our mind at all the time. If it comes along, we love it. But we will find out whether it comes along or not.

这始终是我们心中的关键。如果它出现，我们会很喜欢。但我们会发现它是否会出现。

The first part of your question, if indeed 42 1/2 billion can be obtained at no cost, or even better yet at a profit, its utility to us is like equity.

如果确实可以无成本获得 425 亿，或者更好的是还能盈利，那么它对我们的效用就像权益一样。

Now, you couldn’t realize it upon liquidation, necessarily. Oh you wouldn’t realize it on liquidation. And you couldn’t necessarily realize it on sale, that would depend. So I’m not telling you how to count it as in terms — whether you count it in terms of intrinsic value, you have to make that decision.

现在，你不一定能在清算时实现它。哦，你不会在清算时实现它。而且你不一定能在出售时实现它，这要视情况而定。所以我不会告诉你如何计算它——是否按内在价值计算，你必须自己做出决定。

But it has the utility to us of 42 1/2 million — 42 1/2 billion — of funds derived from equity without issuing common shares. And that’s one of the reasons we’ve always been so enthused about it now for, what, 35 or 36 years. It’s a great business for us.

但它对我们的作用相当于 4,250 万——4,25 亿——来自权益的资金，而无需发行普通股。这就是为什么我们在过去的 35 或 36 年里一直对此充满热情的原因之一。对我们来说，这是一个很好的业务。

And every now and then we got off the track. You know, we got off the track in the early ’80s, we had a problem or two in the mid ’70s, and we had a problem with Gen Re for a few years.

有时候我们会偏离轨道。你知道的，我们在 80 年代初偏离过轨道，70 年代中期也遇到过一两个问题，还有几年的时间我们在通用再保险上也遇到了问题。

So it — there’s nothing automatic about it, and I will say this: I think, for most companies in the P-C business, that — the P-C business is not a great business. It’s a commodity business to too big a degree.

所以——这并不是自动的，我要说的是：我认为，对于大多数从事财产险业务的公司来说，财产险业务并不是一个很好的业务。在很大程度上，它是一个商品化的业务。

So I do not think most companies in the P-C business will get float at an attractive cost. We have to be an exception.

所以我认为大多数财产保险业务的公司不会以有吸引力的成本获得浮存金。我们必须成为一个例外。

But we have some exceptional companies and some exceptional managers, and I truly believe that we will obtain our float at considerably less cost than the industry. And that is the goal.

但是我们有一些杰出的公司和一些杰出的管理者，我真的相信我们将以远低于行业的成本获得我们的浮存金。这就是目标。

GEICO, if it would continue to grow at 16 percent, for example, this year, that adds a billion of premium volume. Well that doesn’t generate as much float at GEICO as it generates at Gen Re, but it generates float. So GEICO’s float will grow. I would, you know, I’d bet my life on that.

GEICO，如果今年继续以 16%的速度增长，例如，这将增加十亿的保费量。虽然这在 GEICO 产生的浮存金不如在 Gen Re 产生的多，但它确实产生了浮存金。所以 GEICO 的浮存金将会增长。我会，我愿意用我的生命来打赌。

But certain of our other transactions are more opportunistic in nature, and that float could even shrink.

但是，我们的其他某些交易在本质上更具机会性，并且这部分浮存金甚至可能会减少。

And if the float shrinks, you know, that is fine with me as long as we produce underwriting profits. We’ll go wherever it goes.

如果浮存金减少，你知道，只要我们能产生承保利润，我就没问题。我们会随波逐流。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, with interest rates as low as they are now, this float we have so laboriously built up isn’t worth so much to us on a short-term basis. After all, what — if — what do we have, $16 billion of cash on hand earning a very low rate of return?

查理·芒格：是的，鉴于目前利率如此之低，我们辛苦积累的这笔浮存金在短期内对我们来说并不那么有价值。毕竟，我们手头有 160 亿美元的现金，收益率非常低。

So the incremental dollar of float doesn’t look all that advantageous now. But we have a more long-term view than that. We figure that eventually, we’ll do a hell of a lot better than 2 percent.

因此，浮存金的增量美元现在看起来并没有那么有利。但我们有一个更长期的观点。我们认为最终我们会比 2%好得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re not getting 2 percent on that 16 billion, Charlie. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我们在那 160 亿上没有得到 2%的收益。（笑）

We have — we do have, incidentally on March 31st, we have roughly 16 billion in cash, not counting any cash in the finance operation, because that’s a little bit phony in terms of its utility. I mean, it’s offset by borrowed money.

我们确实有——顺便说一下，截至 3 月 31 日，我们大约有 160 亿现金，不包括金融业务中的任何现金，因为从实用性上来说，这有点虚假。我的意思是，它被借来的钱抵消了。

But it — other than the finance operation, we have right at 16 billion in cash and cash equivalents, and we also have a lot of bonds and things of that sort.

不过，除了金融业务外，我们拥有约 160 亿的现金和现金等价物，我们还有很多债券和类似的东西。

On that 16 billion, you know, we are probably getting about 7/10ths of 1 percent, three-quarters of 1 percent, call it, after-tax on $16 billion, which does not make us salivate.

在那 160 亿美元中，你知道，我们可能获得大约 0.7%到 0.75%的税后收益，这并没有让我们垂涎欲滴。

But — (laughter) — we would rather, you know, avoid salivation than to encounter problems. And we will use — Walmart put out the figure yesterday of roughly 1 1/2 billion for a combination of a small trucking company, plus what they sold us.

但是——（笑声）——我们宁愿避免流口水，也不愿遇到问题。我们将使用——沃尔玛昨天公布的数字，大约是 15 亿，这是一个小型卡车公司的组合加上他们出售给我们的业务。

And we will, you know, we will use money, but money keeps coming in, too. If we earn a billion-seven in the first quarter, that billion-seven is pretty much all cash. And then on top of that we had the billion — billion-three or so float increase.

我们会用钱，但钱也会不断流入。如果我们在第一季度赚了十七亿，那十七亿几乎全是现金。除此之外，我们还有大约十三亿浮存金增加。

So float increase plus retained earnings, not counting securities gains, maybe $3 billion. Now we’re not going to keep that up, but there’s a lot of money coming in.

因此，浮存金增加加上留存收益，不包括证券收益，可能是 30 亿美元。现在我们不会一直保持这种状态，但有很多资金流入。

And — but we are getting some chances to deploy it. And if we deploy — if we get it at less than — at zero or less cost, it has —it’s very close to, in our — it has the utility of equity in a very big way.

而且——但我们有一些机会来部署它。如果我们部署——如果我们以零或更低的成本获得它，它就——在我们看来，它在很大程度上具有股权的效用。

16. Black-Scholes option pricing model is “insane”

Black-Scholes期权定价模型是“疯狂的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 3 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman. My name is Hugh Stephenson (PH). I’m a shareholder from Atlanta.

观众成员：早上好，先生们。我的名字是休·史蒂芬森（音）。我是一名来自亚特兰大的股东。

You had indicated in the past that you did not think that the volatility base to Black-Scholes models for options pricing was correct.

您过去曾表示，您认为用于期权定价的Black-Scholes模型的波动率基础是不正确的。

Would you share with us how you would evaluate those options as you use them in the business or see them in the marketplace?

您能否与我们分享一下您在业务中使用这些期权或在市场上看到这些期权时会如何评估它们？

And also if you would update us on your thoughts on the asbestos tort situation, given the recent development of national settlement trusts, et cetera?

另外，鉴于最近国家和解信托等的发展，您能否更新我们关于石棉侵权情况的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — Charlie and I have thought about options all our life. I mean, my guess is Charlie was thinking about that in grade school.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我和查理一辈子都在考虑期权。我猜查理在小学时就已经在考虑这个问题了。

And — (laughter) — you know, and I — you have to understand— you don’t have to understand Black-Scholes at all — but you have to understand the utility and, in a general sense, the value of options. And you have to understand the cost of issuing options, which is very unpopular subject in certain quarters.

而且——（笑声）——你知道，我——你必须理解——你完全不需要理解Black-Scholes模型——但你必须理解期权的效用，以及一般意义上期权的价值。你还必须理解发行期权的成本，这在某些方面是个非常不受欢迎的话题。

Any option has value. I mean, I bought a house in 1958 for $31,500. And let’s assume the seller of that house had said to me, “I’d like an option on it, good in perpetuity, at $200,000.” Well, that wouldn’t have seemed like it’d cost me much if I’d give it to him, but an option has value.

任何选择权都有价值。我的意思是，我在 1958 年以 31,500 美元买了一栋房子。假设那时房子的卖家对我说：“我想要一个选择权，可以永久有效，以 20 万美元的价格。”如果我给他这个期权，这对我来说看似成本不高，但期权是有价值的。

Any option has value, and that’s why some people who are, you know, kind of slick in business matters sometimes get options for very little or for nothing. I’m not talking about stock options. I’m just talking about an option to purchase anything.

任何选择权都有价值，这就是为什么有些在商业事务上很精明的人有时能以很低的价格甚至免费获得选择权。我不是在谈论股票期权。我只是说购买任何东西的选择权。

They get options for far less than, really, a market value would be. Black-Scholes is an attempt to measure the market value of options, and it cranks in certain variables.

他们获得的期权远低于市场价值。布莱克-舒尔斯模型试图衡量期权的市场价值，并引入某些变量。

But the most important variable it cranks in that might be subject — well, might be a case where if you had differing views you could make some money — but it’s based upon the past volatility of the asset involved. And past volatilities are not the best judge of value.

但它引入的最重要变量可能是——嗯，可能是一个如果你有不同观点就可以赚钱的情况——但这是基于所涉及资产的过去波动性。而过去的波动性并不是评估价值的最佳标准。

I mean, if you had looked at a five-year option at — on Berkshire stock — at various times Berkshire stock’s had a fairly low beta, as they call it. Beta is a measure that — people in academia always like to give Greek names to things that are fairly simple, and so that they have sort of a priesthood. (Laughter)

我的意思是，如果你在不同时间点查看伯克希尔股票的五年期期权，伯克希尔股票的贝塔值相对较低。贝塔值是一个衡量标准——学术界的人总是喜欢给相对简单的事物起希腊名字，这样他们就有了一种类似祭司的地位。（笑声）

You know, it’s — so it’s like priests talking in Latin or something. I mean, it kind of cows the laity.

你知道，这就像是牧师用拉丁语说话之类的。我是说，这有点让俗人感到畏惧。

But they — beta is a measure of past volatility. Berkshire’s had a low volatility, but that didn’t mean that the option value of it, to anybody that really understood the business, was lower than a stock with a higher beta.

但它们——贝塔是衡量过去波动性的一种指标。伯克希尔的波动性较低，但这并不意味着对任何真正了解该业务的人来说，其期权价值低于贝塔较高的股票。

And I think Charlie — what Charlie said is that — last year, is that for over — that for longer-term options in particular, Black-Scholes can give some silly results.

我认为查理——查理去年说的是——对于长期期权，布莱克-斯科尔斯模型可能会给出一些荒谬的结果。

I mean, it misprices things, but it’s a mechanical system. And any mechanical system in securities markets is going to misprice things from time to time, and that’s —

我的意思是，它会错误定价，但它是一个机械系统。任何证券市场中的机械系统都会时不时地错误定价，那就是——

We made one — as I mentioned last year — we made one large commitment that basically was — had somebody on the other side of it using Black-Scholes and using market prices — took the other side of it and we made $120 million last year.

正如我去年提到的——我们做过一笔大投资，基本上是有某人在使用Black-Scholes模型并基于市场价格来做出相应的决策，而我们则采取了相反的立场，最终赚了1.2亿美元。

And we love the idea of other people using mechanistic formulas to price things, because they may be right 99 times out of 100 but we don’t have to play those 99 times. We just play the one time when we have a differing view.

我们喜欢其他人使用机械化公式来定价的想法，因为他们可能在 100 次中有 99 次是对的，但我们不必参与那 99 次。我们只在我们有不同看法的那一次参与。

Charlie, do you want to comment on —?

查理，你想评论一下——？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, Black-Scholes is a — what I would call a know-nothing value system.

查理·芒格：是的，Black-Scholes是一个我称之为一无所知的价值体系。

If you don’t know anything at all about value compared with price — in other words, if price is teaching you all that can be known — then Black-Scholes, on a very short-term basis, is a pretty good guess, you know, for what a 90-day option may be worth in some stock or another.

如果你对价值与价格的比较一无所知——换句话说，如果价格教会了你所有可以知道的东西——那么在非常短期的基础上，Black-Scholes模型是一个相当不错的猜测，你知道，对于某只股票的 90 天期权可能值多少钱。

The minute you get into longer-term options, or you don’t have the know-nothing factor so extreme, it’s crazy to use Black-Scholes. People use it just because they want some kind of a mechanical system.

一旦你进入长期期权，或者你对无知因素没有那么极端，使用Black-Scholes模型就很疯狂。人们使用它只是因为他们想要某种机械系统。

But at Costco, for instance, within a fairly short period, we issued stock options at 30, and we also issued stock options at 60. And Black-Scholes valued the options we issued at 60 as the strike price way higher than the options we issued at 30. Well, this is insane.

但在好市多（Costco）内部，在相对短的时间内，我们以30美元发行了股票期权，也以60美元发行了股票期权。而Black-Scholes将我们以60美元的行权价格发行的期权估值远高于以30美元行权价格的期权。这简直是疯狂的。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we like a certain amount of insanity. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们喜欢一定程度的疯狂。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, it’s good for Warren who picked up this extra $120 million. But —

查理·芒格：是的，对沃伦来说很好，他多赚了这 1.2 亿美元。但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — so he’s fonder of this kind of insanity than I am. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：——所以他比我更喜欢这种疯狂。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we will pay you real money if you will deliver to our offices at Kiewit Plaza somebody who wants to use the Black-Scholes model and is willing to price 100 options for three years, willing to — using the Black-Scholes model — and letting us pick and choose among those.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们确实会支付您真正的钱，如果您能把一个愿意使用Black-Scholes模型并愿意为100个3年期期权定价的客户送到我们的办公室，然后让我们从中挑选。

Because, as Charlie says, it’s a know-nothing affair. And we are know-nothing guys, in respect to an awful lot of things, but every now and then we find something where we think we know something, and anybody that’s using a mechanistic formula is going to get in trouble in that situation.

因为，正如查理所说，这完全是无知的。我们在很多事情上都是无知的人，但偶尔我们会发现一些我们认为自己知道的事情，而任何使用机械公式的人在那种情况下都将陷入麻烦。

But options have value. I mean, we issued options, in a sense, last year when we when we sold those — the 400 million of bonds. And we know what we’re giving up when we sell those bonds.

但期权是有价值的。我的意思是，去年我们在出售那些——4 亿债券时，某种意义上我们发行了期权。我们知道在出售这些债券时我们放弃了什么。

I mean, we may have gotten, what — a negative coupon of sorts, but that’s because we gave up option value. And it, you know, it wasn’t — it isn’t truly a negative cost instrument at all, because options have value.

我的意思是，我们可能得到了某种负收益券，但那是因为我们放弃了期权价值。而且，你知道，这根本不是真正的负成本工具，因为期权是有价值的。

17. Buffett recalls sneaking out to race tracks with high school golf coach

巴菲特回忆与高中高尔夫教练偷偷溜去赛马场

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 4 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Martin Wiegand from Bethesda, Maryland. And first I’d like to thank you, and all the folks working here at the microphones and staffing the booths, for hosting this wonderful shareholders’ weekend. We enjoy your efforts. (Applause)

观众成员：你好，我叫马丁·维根德，来自马里兰州的贝塞斯达。首先，我想感谢你们，以及所有在麦克风前工作和在展位上服务的工作人员，感谢你们举办了这个精彩的股东周末活动。我们很欣赏你们的努力。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks, Martin.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢，马丁。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is about a company getting its employee compensation aligned with shareholder interest.

观众成员：我的问题是关于公司如何使员工薪酬与股东利益保持一致。

Charlie Munger, in one of his “Outstanding Investor Digest” interviews, cites the case of FedEx getting it right.

查理·芒格在他的一次“杰出投资者文摘”采访中，提到了联邦快递做对的案例。

In the newspapers, we’ve all just read about American Airlines, Bethlehem Steel, and a lot of other companies getting it wrong. I find precious little written about compensation systems.

在报纸上，我们都刚刚读到关于美国航空、伯利恒钢铁和许多其他公司出错的报道。我发现关于补偿系统的文章少之又少。

Would you share with us how you get it right at Berkshire companies?

你能和我们分享一下你是如何在伯克希尔公司做对的吗？

Also, your old golf coach and racetrack friend, Bob Dwyer, asked me if you would like to share with us your pick in the Kentucky Derby. (Laughter)

另外，你以前的高尔夫教练和赛马场朋友鲍勃·德怀尔问我，你是否愿意与我们分享你在肯塔基德比赛马中的选择。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Is Bob back there with you, Martin?

沃伦·巴菲特：鲍勃和你在一起吗，马丁？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, in the middle.

观众成员：不，在中间。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. Bob and I did spend a lot of time at the racetrack in high school. He was not only the basketball coach at Woodrow Wilson High, but he was also the golf coach.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦。鲍勃和我在高中时确实花了很多时间在赛马场。他不仅是伍德罗·威尔逊高中的篮球教练，还是高尔夫教练。

And whenever I wanted to go the races he would write an excuse to my other teachers saying that we had to go out for the golf team. (Laughter)

每当我想去看比赛时，他就会给我的其他老师写个借口，说我们要去参加高尔夫球队。（笑声）

And then we would head off to Charles Town, or Havre de Grace, or Pimlico or someplace.

然后我们会前往查尔斯镇、哈弗德格雷斯、皮姆利科或其他地方。

And he cleaned up his act subsequently. (Laughter)

随后他改过自新。（笑声）

It’s good to have Bob with us. He was known for his famous three-iron shots. He was known as “Trolley Wire” Dwyer in those days.

很高兴有鲍勃和我们在一起。他以著名的三号铁杆击球而闻名。在那些日子里，他被称为“电车线”德怀尔。

18. “Crazy” to use stock options as compensation

用股票期权作为补偿的“疯狂”

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, do you want to talk about comp a little?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想谈谈补偿吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as the shareholders know, our system is different from that of most big corporations. We think it’s less capricious.

查理·芒格：正如股东所知，我们的体系与大多数大公司不同。我们认为它不那么任性。

The stock option system will give extraordinarily liberal awards sort of by accident to some people. And it’ll deny other people any reward at all at some different time, in spite of great contributions made by the people who are getting nothing.

股票期权制度会偶然地给予某些人极其慷慨的奖励。而在不同的时间，它会完全不给予其他人任何奖励，尽管这些人做出了巨大的贡献。

So except where we inherit it, we just don’t use it. But we must be in a minority — far less than 1 percent, right?

因此，除非我们继承了这种制度，否则我们根本不使用它。但我们一定是少数派——远远不到1%的比例，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s where we like to be, right.

沃伦·巴菲特：这正是我们喜欢的地方，对吧。

It’s interesting, we inherited some stock options at Berkshire, primarily in the General Re transaction. And, not through any failing of anybody or — there’s no aspersions to be cast at all, but those options turned out to be quite valuable.

有趣的是，我们在伯克希尔继承了一些股票期权，主要是在通用再保险交易中。而且，这并不是由于任何人的失误或——没有任何指责，但这些期权结果证明是相当有价值的。

They would not have been valuable if General Re had been left alone as a standalone company. They were — they profited from the fact that other parts of Berkshire did well, and the money went to the people that had these options who delivered nothing to the performance of Berkshire for a while.

如果通用再保险作为独立公司存在，这些期权就不会有价值。它们是因为伯克希尔其他部分表现良好而受益的，而那些持有这些期权的人在一段时间内并没有为伯克希尔的业绩做出贡献。

Now, that’s — that is not an indictment of anybody, in the least, at Gen Re. It’s an indictment of an options system which represents a lottery ticket, and also a royalty on the passage of time.

现在，这并不是对通用再保险公司任何人的指责。这是对一种期权制度的指责，该制度代表了一张彩票，同时也是对时间流逝的一种版税。

Because as you know, an option holder has benefits from retained earnings and benefits not at all from dividends. And that puts his interest, maybe, quite contrary to that of the shareholders.

因为如你所知，期权持有者从留存收益中受益，而从股息中完全没有受益。这使得他的利益可能与股东的利益完全相反。

So we believe in paying for performance, but we believe in tying performance to what is actually under the reasonable control of the person that’s being measured.

因此，我们相信按绩效付酬，但我们认为绩效应与被评估者实际可合理控制的因素挂钩。

And we — to give a lottery ticket on the overall results of Berkshire Hathaway to someone who is running a business that’s 1 percent of the whole is really crazy.

而我们——把伯克希尔·哈撒韦整体业绩的“彩票”交给一个经营着占整体 1%业务的人，实在是太疯狂了。

And I would say that you have seen probably more misdirected compensation throughout the corporate system — corporate America — in the last five years, you know, than in the hundred years before that. It’s been extraordinary.

我会说，在过去五年里，你可能在整个公司体系——美国公司——中看到的误导性补偿比之前的一百年还要多。这是非同寻常的。

There was wealth creation in the ’90s, just like in the ‘80s, in the ‘70s, in the ‘60s, in the ’50s. But there was a wealth transfer like had never been experienced before.

在 90 年代，就像在 80 年代、70 年代、60 年代和 50 年代一样，创造了财富。但出现了前所未有的财富转移。

And, you know, you can’t blame people for wanting to cash in on it. You know, if anybody wants to walk up and hand me a half a dozen lottery tickets for the Nebraska lottery, you know, I’ll accept them. But it will have nothing to do with how I do in terms of running Berkshire.

而且，你知道，你不能责怪人们想要从中获利。你知道，如果有人想走过来递给我六张内布拉斯加彩票，你知道，我会接受的。但这与我如何经营伯克希尔无关。

Actually, Charlie and I think a properly designed options system, which includes cost of capital and some other factors, and ties it to the performance of the people involved, we think that can make sense, when we’ve used various incentive programs that are similar to that.

实际上，查理和我认为，一个设计合理的期权系统，包括资本成本和其他一些因素，并将其与相关人员的绩效挂钩，我们认为这是有意义的，当我们使用类似的各种激励计划时。

But the idea of just passing them out and telling people that for 10 years they get a free ride and then repricing — you know, if your stock goes down, their stock doesn’t go down, their option price goes down. You know, that is not our idea of a great compensation system.

但是，仅仅把它们发放出去并告诉人们他们可以免费享受 10 年，然后重新定价——你知道，如果你的股票下跌，他们的股票不会下跌，他们的期权价格会下跌。你知道，这不是我们认为的一个很好的补偿系统。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, if we are right with our general approach, it has considerably important implications.

查理·芒格：是的，如果我们的总体方法是正确的，那将具有相当重要的影响。

Because the natural implication is that more than 99 percent of corporate compensation systems are more than a little crazy in America.

因为自然的暗示是，美国超过 99%的企业薪酬体系都有些疯狂。

And I want to emphasize that Berkshire is not illiberal. I mean, we’ve got various incentive systems out where people make tens of millions and may make hundreds of millions.

我想强调的是，伯克希尔并不是不公正的。我的意思是，我们有各种激励机制，人们可以赚到数千万甚至数亿美元。

And so, we’re not against rewards for people who make vast contributions.

因此，我们并不反对对做出巨大贡献的人给予奖励。

But a system that’s basically capricious, and which doesn’t tailor the results per person and per activity very well, we just think it’s crazy.

但是，一个基本上是反复无常的系统，并且不能很好地根据每个人和每项活动调整结果，我们只是觉得这很疯狂。

WARREN BUFFETT: We love to see people that are associated with Berkshire making money, as long as they’re making money for you at the same time. It’s very simple.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们喜欢看到与伯克希尔相关的人赚钱，只要他们同时也在为你赚钱。这很简单。

And — but we don’t want them to get a free ride off your money. (Applause)

但我们不希望他们白白从你们的钱中获利。（掌声）

Compensation’s an interesting subject and I’m going to write about it next year, some. But, you know, it’s not a market system. You can read all you want. I mean, you know, the PR people will tell you, you know, that “Joe Smith’s compensation was determined by a market system and he’s just like a baseball player,” anything of the sort.

补偿是一个有趣的话题，我明年会写一些关于它的内容。但是，你知道，这不是一个市场体系。你可以读你想读的所有东西。我的意思是，你知道，公关人员会告诉你，“乔·史密斯的补偿是由市场体系决定的，他就像一个棒球运动员，”诸如此类的说法。

But he’s not just like a baseball player. You know, the baseball player negotiates with somebody who’s spending his money to hire the baseball player, and making a calculation whether he’s better off laying out the money out of his own pocket — the owner of the team — to get that player.

但他并不像一个棒球运动员。你知道，棒球运动员与花钱雇用他们的团队老板进行谈判，评估自己是否值得从自己的口袋里拿钱去雇用那个球员。

But when you get a comp committee at a large American corporation, you have somebody with an enormous interest in the amount of comp on one side of the table.

但是，当你在一家大型美国公司设立薪酬委员会时，桌子的一边会有一个对薪酬金额有极大兴趣的人。

And you’ve got somebody on the other side of the table, who was not picked because they were the Doberman of the board, believe me — and who is dealing with what — many times is what my friend, Tom Murphy, used to call “play money.”

而你另一方的利益并不强烈，相信我——而且这个人通常并不是因为他们在董事会中是“杜宾犬”而被挑选出来的——而是与许多时候我的朋友汤姆·墨菲所称的“游戏钱”打交道。

I mean, you know, it’s almost meaningless to the person on one side of the table whether somebody gets 100,000 shares of restricted stock or a million shares of restricted stock, and it’s not meaningless to the guy on the other side of the table.

我的意思是，你知道，对于桌子一边的人来说，一个人获得 10 万股限制性股票还是 100 万股限制性股票几乎没有意义，而对于桌子另一边的人来说，这并不是没有意义的。

Almost every other negotiation in American business, you have some parity of concern. But you do not have a parity of concern, you know, in terms of the — in terms of comp at the top levels.

几乎在美国商业中的每一个其他谈判中，你都会看到某种利益的对等。但在许多情况下——显然并非所有情况——但在很多情况下，薪酬却根本不是一次真实的谈判。

You have a parity of concern when you get down to labor unions. I mean, the management wants to keep down the prices and the union wants to get more money. And that’s a real negotiation.

当涉及到工会时，你会有一种关切的平衡。我的意思是，管理层想要压低价格，而工会则想要获得更多的钱。这是一场真正的谈判。

And you have, you know, you have lots of other real negotiations in American business, but the compensation in many companies — not all, obviously — but in many, many companies has not been a real negotiation at all.

你知道，在美国商业中，你有很多其他真正的谈判，但在许多公司中——显然不是所有公司——但在许多公司中，薪酬根本不是一个真正的谈判。

And the management has hired comp consultants to come in, and I have never seen a comp consultant come in and say, “We ought to reduce this guy’s salary.”

管理层聘请了薪酬顾问进来，我从未见过薪酬顾问进来说：“我们应该降低这个人的工资。”

I’ve also never seen a comp consultant come in and say, “Why don’t you get rid of this bozo?” You know, I mean — (laughter) — they can’t all be wonderful.

我也从未见过薪酬顾问进来说：“你为什么不把这个笨蛋解雇呢？”你知道，我的意思是——（笑声）——他们不可能都很出色。

But — you know, can you imagine a comp consultant doing that and ever getting another assignment? It wouldn’t happen.

但是——你知道，你能想象一个薪酬顾问这样做还能再接到另一个任务吗？这不可能发生。

So it’s a bad system, and it needs improvement. And it may be getting a little improvement. And as I wrote in the annual report this year, what happens with comp is the acid test of corporate reform.

所以这是一个糟糕的系统，需要改进。它可能会得到一些改进。正如我在今年的年度报告中所写的，薪酬问题是公司改革的试金石。

Because frankly, the CEOs of America, they don’t care whether their boards are diverse, or not diverse, or anything of the sort. They care about how much money they make, in a great many cases.

坦率地说，美国的首席执行官们并不关心他们的董事会是否多元化或不多元化，或类似的事情。在很多情况下，他们关心的是他们赚了多少钱。

And you, the owners, and big owners in particular, you know, have to provide some countervailing force, or you’ll have what you’ve had in the last 20 years, which is an enormous disparity in the rates of compensation of people at the top compared to people at the bottom.

而你们，作为所有者，尤其是大股东，必须提供一些对抗力量，否则你们将会看到过去 20 年中所发生的情况，即高层人员与底层人员的薪酬差距巨大。

And also a disconnect between the comp of people running businesses and the results of the owners who gave them the money. So arise, (inaudible) shareholder. (Applause)

而且经营企业的人与给予他们资金的所有者之间也存在脱节。因此，股东们站出来吧。（掌声）

19. Low inflation helps investors, but keep expectations low

低通胀有助于投资者，但要保持低预期

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 5 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Good morning, my name is Matt Sauer and I’m from Durham, North Carolina.

观众成员：早上好。早上好，我叫马特·绍尔，来自北卡罗来纳州的达勒姆。

In a 1977 Fortune magazine article titled “How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor,” you argued that corporate earnings in aggregate acted like a bond coupon, and thus, were negatively impacted by high inflation.

在 1977 年《财富》杂志一篇题为“通货膨胀如何欺骗股权投资者”的文章中，你指出，企业整体收益就像债券息票，因此受到高通胀的负面影响。

Due to high inflation at the time, you posited a world where a 12 percent return on corporate equity would —was reduced to 7 percent after taxes, and netted out to 0 percent in real terms.

由于当时的高通胀，你假设了一个世界，在这个世界中，企业股本的 12%回报率在税后被减少到 7%，并在实际意义上净为 0%。

You have been sounding downcast about the prospects for equities for several years, much of which we assume relates to extreme starting valuations.

多年来，您一直对股票的前景感到悲观，我们认为这很大程度上与极高的初始估值有关。

If inflation was decidingly bad for investors in 1977, isn’t the relative lack of it in today’s economy at least one mark in the plus column for equity owners?

如果通货膨胀在 1977 年对投资者来说是显然不利的，那么在当今经济中相对缺乏通货膨胀至少是股权持有者的一个优势吗？

Is there also a future inflation expectation component in your warnings that investors are likely to be disappointed by equity results?

在您的警告中，投资者可能会对股票结果感到失望，是否也包含未来的通胀预期因素？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would — there’s no question that the lack of inflation is a plus for owners. I mean, the real return you will obtain, in my view, from owning American business — if purchased at similar prices — the real return will be higher if we have long periods of lower or close to no inflation, than if we had long periods of high inflation.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说——毫无疑问，缺乏通货膨胀对所有者来说是一个优势。我的意思是，从拥有美国企业中获得的实际回报——如果以类似价格购买——在我看来，如果我们经历长期的低通胀或接近无通胀时期，实际回报将会更高，而不是经历长期的高通胀。

I don’t think there’s any question about that. Because that article went onto explain how you got taxed on nominal returns and fictitious returns in real terms.

我认为这毫无疑问。因为那篇文章接着解释了你如何在名义回报和实际回报上被征税。

So your question about which period is better for investors — a low inflation period over any long period is better for investors.

所以你关于哪个时期对投资者更好的问题——在任何较长时期内，低通胀时期对投资者更好。

And the problem, as you pointed out also, was the starting point, in terms of predicting modest returns for equity investors.

正如你所指出的问题，起点在于预测股权投资者的适度回报。

The returns weren’t necessarily so modest, I predicted. They were just modest compared to what people had begun to think returns would be during that long bull market from 1982 to 1999.

回报不一定那么低，我预测。只是与人们在 1982 年至 1999 年那段长期牛市期间开始认为的回报相比，显得较为低调。

There were polls taken by Gallup working with, I think, PaineWebber at the time — now they’ve moved it over to UBS Warburg — that showed the expectancy of people in the stock market. And those returns that people expected got up to 14 or 15 percent, as I remember.

盖洛普与我认为当时的 PaineWebber 合作进行了一些民意调查——现在他们已将其转移到瑞银华宝——调查显示了人们对股市的预期。据我记得，人们预期的回报率达到了 14%或 15%。

And they were thinking they were going to get 14 or 15 percent in a low-inflation environment.

他们以为在低通胀环境中会获得 14%或 15%的收益。

Well that, you know, that was dreaming. And there’s nothing wrong, in a low-inflation environment, at all, in earning, you know, 6 or 7 percent. That’s probably as well —

嗯，你知道，那是在做梦。在低通胀环境中，赚取 6%或 7%的收益完全没有问题。这可能也是——

Well, it is as good as will happen, because in a low inflation environment how much is GDP going to grow? Well, GDP, you know, if you have a 2 percent inflation and even 3 percent real growth, you’re talking about 5 percent, in nominal terms, GDP growing.

嗯，这已经是最好的情况了，因为在低通胀环境下，GDP 能增长多少呢？你知道，如果有 2%的通胀率和 3%的实际增长率，从名义上讲，GDP 增长就是 5%。

If GDP grows at that rate, over time corporate profits will grow at — more or less, at that rate.

如果国内生产总值以那个速度增长，随着时间的推移，企业利润将以大致相同的速度增长。

And if corporate profits grow at 5 percent a year, the value of those corporate profits, the capitalized value, will probably grow at something like that over any long term with sort of a normal starting point.

如果企业利润每年增长 5%，那么这些企业利润的价值，即资本化价值，可能会在任何长期内以类似的速度增长，前提是有一个正常的起点。

And add that to dividends and, you know, you will get 6 or 7 percent before frictional costs. Investors incur a lot of frictional cost. They don’t have to, but they do. And that often is 1 1/2, 2 percent of their investment.

加上股息，你知道的，在摩擦成本之前你会得到 6 或 7 个百分点。投资者会产生很多摩擦成本。他们不必这样做，但他们确实这样做了。而这通常是他们投资的 1.5%到 2%。

So the math isn’t bad, it’s just bad for those people that got used to, or expected, very high returns based on looking in the rearview mirror back in 1998 or 1999.

所以，这种数学并不糟糕，只是对那些习惯或期望根据 1998 年或 1999 年后视镜中看到的非常高回报的人来说不利。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: My general attitude is just slightly more negative than Warren’s. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我的总体态度只是比沃伦稍微消极一点。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You’ve heard it, folks. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你们都听到了，伙计们。（笑声）

That isn’t the end of the world. I mean, in effect, if the people who own American business get 5 to 6 percent of the pie — $10 trillion economy now, someday a $20 trillion economy.

这不是世界末日。我的意思是，实际上，如果拥有美国企业的人获得5%到6%的收益——现在是 10 万亿美元的经济体，总有一天会成为 20 万亿美元的经济体。

But if we get 5 or 6 percent of the pie, those of us who put our capital out to produce goods and services for American business — for American consumers, American population — is that a, you know, I don’t know whether that’s — you know, that’s exactly what somebody who designed the universe would come up with.

如果我们获得5%或6%的收益，那些为美国企业提供商品和服务、投入资本的人——为美国消费者、美国人群服务的人——这算是什么，我不知道这是不是宇宙设计者会得出的结果。

But it doesn’t strike me as crazy in either direction. You know, I think that — that’s a lot of goods and services to go to people that put up the capital, but you — and you’ve got, you know, a hundred million-plus people in the working force that are working to turn that out for you, using your capital.

但在我看来，这无论从哪个方向看都不算疯狂。你知道，我认为——这是一大堆商品和服务要提供给那些投入资本的人，但你——你知道，有超过一亿的劳动人口在为你工作，利用你的资本来生产这些东西。

And it provides a — what I would regard as a pretty decent real return if you have low inflation.

而且，如果通货膨胀率较低，它提供了一个我认为相当不错的实际回报。

If you get into high inflation, as I wrote about back in ’77, you could easily have the real return, to investors, get to a very, very low number, and perhaps negative.

如果出现高通胀，正如我在 77 年写的那样，投资者的实际回报可能会变得非常非常低，甚至可能为负。

I mean, inflation can swindle the equity investor, as I wrote back then, and I used 7,000 words to explain why, and will be glad to send you a copy of that article if anyone’s still interested.

我的意思是，正如我当时所写的，通货膨胀可以欺骗股权投资者，我用了 7,000 字来解释原因，如果还有人感兴趣，我很乐意寄给你那篇文章的副本。

But inflation is the one thing that, over a long period of time, can turn investors’ results, in aggregate, into a negative figure. And it’s the investors’ enemy.

但通货膨胀是唯一一种可以在长时间内将投资者的整体结果变为负数的因素。它是投资者的敌人。

Charlie, does that bring forth any further thoughts?

查理，这引发了你更多的想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think you’ll get perfect help on these subjects from the economics profession, either. They have certain standard formulas.

查理·芒格：我认为你也不会从经济学界得到关于这些问题的完美帮助。他们有某些标准公式。

To an economist, when a manufacturing job goes to China, that’s just so much productivity increase. And if you ask one, well suppose all of the manufacturing jobs in America went to China. Wouldn’t that be a little too much efficiency increase?

对经济学家来说，当一个制造业工作岗位转移到中国时，那只是生产力的提高。如果你问一个经济学家，假设美国所有的制造业工作岗位都转移到中国，那会不会是效率提高得有点过头了？

And the answer would be no. And people actually get paid for thinking like this in major universities. (Laughter and applause)

答案是否定的。实际上，在主要大学里，有人因为这样思考而获得报酬。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if — what would get across the point, of course, is if all the teaching of economics got exported to China, in which — (laughter) — at that point a new insight would appear.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果——当然，如果所有的经济学教学都被出口到中国，（笑声）——在那时会出现一个新的见解。

20. Managers decide whether to come to annual meeting

经理决定是否参加年度会议

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jack Hurst (PH), Philadelphia. I have a question about the managers, and a comment and a question about the insurance operation.

观众成员：杰克·赫斯特（PH），费城。我有一个关于经理的问题，以及一个关于保险业务的评论和问题。

These meetings are a lot more fun with more subsidiaries and more managers. I also think more educational, because you get to interact with them.

这些会议有更多的子公司和经理参与会更有趣。我也认为更有教育意义，因为你可以与他们互动。

Is there any feed — do you get any feedback from the managers that they enjoy coming here and they get anything out of the meeting?

经理们是否有反馈说他们喜欢来这里，并从会议中获得了什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have a number of our managers here and I — but we don’t require anybody to come. I mean, we have managers that, very, very seldom have come to a meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们这里有一些经理，但我们不要求任何人来。我是说，我们有一些经理非常非常少来参加会议。

And I don’t keep names, I can’t even tell you which ones they are. But you know, if they enjoy it, they come.

我不记名字，我甚至不能告诉你他们是谁。但是你知道，如果他们喜欢，他们就会来。

Many of them, of course, have operations down below, selling you things, and some of them come to help out in that respect. But we’ve got a — you know, we have a sensational group of managers.

他们中的许多人当然在下面有业务，向你出售东西，其中一些人来帮助这方面的工作。但我们有一个——你知道，我们有一群出色的管理人员。

They run their own businesses, they’re extraordinary at doing what they do and we don’t get in their way. We don’t demand that, virtually, that they do anything, except work for the owners.

他们经营自己的生意，他们在自己的领域表现出色，我们不会妨碍他们。我们几乎不要求他们做任何事情，除了为业主工作。

But you will — I hope you meet some of them here today because they — you know, the ones that are here, obviously, enjoy interacting with the shareholders.

但我希望你今天能在这里见到他们中的一些人，因为他们——你知道，显然在这里的人喜欢与股东互动。

And it’s fun to put faces to functions. I mean, it — I enjoy it, I think a lot of them enjoy coming here.

把面孔和功能联系起来很有趣。我的意思是，我喜欢这样，我想他们中的很多人也喜欢来这里。

And the people that are working downstairs, you know, they volunteer to come. And they enjoy seeing the shareholders, and they enjoy bragging about their companies, and they’ve got a lot to brag about.

在楼下工作的人，你知道，他们是自愿来的。他们喜欢见到股东，喜欢夸耀他们的公司，而且他们有很多值得夸耀的地方。

And I hope you thank them when you see them because, you know, it’s a lot of effort for them.

我希望你见到他们时能感谢他们，因为你知道，这对他们来说是很大的努力。

I got here at six o’clock this morning, but there were people that were here a lot earlier than that, and they were working yesterday to get ready for this. And I want to thank them myself.

我今天早上六点到这里，但有些人比我早得多，他们昨天就在为此做准备。我想亲自感谢他们。

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think our managers who come to this meeting are picking up new tricks. Most of our managers know all the tricks that are related to their businesses.

查理·芒格：我不认为来参加这个会议的经理们会学到什么新技巧。我们的大多数经理都知道与他们业务相关的所有技巧。

But this is a very interesting place, and it gets more interesting every year. And part of what makes it interesting is not discreditable, and I think people like being part of it.

但这是一个非常有趣的地方，而且每年都变得更加有趣。使其有趣的部分并不是不光彩的，我认为人们喜欢成为其中的一部分。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, our managers — in a few respects, we’ll occasionally work together.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们的经理——在某些方面，我们偶尔会合作。

Sometimes a manager of subsidiary A will check with some of the others, not through Omaha, directly themselves. And they will say, you know, “What are you paying for software?” or “What are you paying for UPS?” or whatever it is, and “Can we make a better deal if we pool our efforts?”

有时，子公司 A 的经理会直接与其他一些经理联系，而不是通过奥马哈。他们会说，“你们的软件费用是多少？”或者“你们的 UPS 费用是多少？”或者其他类似的问题，“如果我们联合起来，能否达成更好的协议？”

There are times when we have saved money, sometimes pretty real money. But that has never been instituted by Omaha, it’s never been overseen by Omaha.

有时候我们会存下钱，有时是相当可观的钱。但这从来不是由奥马哈发起的，也从来没有由奥马哈监督。

It’s because manager A decides to call manager B. And you know, they like each other and they can make their own operation better, sometimes by combining purchasing power, and occasionally by just having an idea here or there. But there’s no organized way of going at that in Berkshire and nobody has to play.

这是因为经理 A 决定给经理 B 打电话。而且你知道，他们彼此喜欢，他们可以通过联合采购能力来改善自己的运营，有时只是通过在这里或那里有个想法。但在伯克希尔没有组织化的方法来处理这个问题，也没有人必须参与。

21. Decisions not based on “sweeping future projections”

决策不基于“全面的未来预测”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m John Bailey (PH) from Boston.

观众成员：我是来自波士顿的约翰·贝利。

I’d like to ask about our consumer businesses, which means that I have to ask about the consumer in general.

我想询问一下我们的消费业务，这意味着我必须询问一下消费者的整体情况。

The situation, as I understand it, is that over the last 30 years or so the median consumer has seen his income rise only a little faster than inflation, and much slower than GDP, overall.

据我了解，情况是，在过去大约 30 年中，中位消费者的收入增长速度仅略快于通货膨胀，但远远慢于整体 GDP 增长。

Income inequality is at a 400-year high. The present value of lifetime income for the median person has improved slowly. Yet the size of his lifetime liabilities, such as health care, housing, education, and retirement, has ballooned.

收入不平等达到了 400 年来的最高点。中位数个人的终身收入现值缓慢提高。然而，他的终身负债规模，如医疗、住房、教育和退休，已经膨胀。

The economic net worth, then, of the consumer may be poorer than they think.

消费者的经济净值可能比他们想象的要差。

To cope, the median guy has put his wife to work, borrowed against the house, and also the credit cards.

为了应对，中等收入的男人让妻子去工作，抵押房子，还刷了信用卡。

So I think this may have some implications for the sustainability of consumer businesses. And seeing that we’ve been buying a number of them recently, how do we think about this problem? And are there any non-obvious risks that we should be considering?

所以我认为这可能对消费类企业的可持续性产生一些影响。鉴于我们最近购买了其中的一些，我们如何看待这个问题？我们是否应该考虑一些不太明显的风险？

WARREN BUFFETT: The American consumer, overall, is better, but not dramatically better off than 10 years ago. Even somewhat better off than 20 years ago. But you’re quite right in that there’s been considerable inequality, in terms of the progress of people financially during that period.

沃伦·巴菲特：总体而言，美国消费者的状况比 10 年前有所改善，但并没有显著改善。甚至比 20 年前稍微好一些。但你说得很对，在那段时间里，人们在财务上的进步存在相当大的不平等。

We don’t have broad ideas about — I mean, we don’t make decisions on what business we buy based on some sweeping future projections about things.

我们没有广泛的想法——我的意思是，我们不会根据一些全面的未来预测来决定购买什么业务。

We think America will do pretty well over time. In fact, we’d — we’re quite sure it will do pretty well over time and that our kids will live better than we live. My kids would say that wouldn’t be so difficult. (Laughter)

我们认为美国随着时间的推移会表现得相当不错。事实上，我们——我们非常确定它会随着时间的推移表现得相当不错，并且我们的孩子们会过得比我们好。我的孩子们会说那不会太难。（笑声）

But the — and the grandchildren will live better. You know, that has been the history of the American economy. The real income per capita grew sevenfold, I believe, in the 20th century. That is huge.

但是——孙辈们会过得更好。你知道，这一直是美国经济的历史。我相信，20 世纪的人均实际收入增长了七倍。这是巨大的。

You know, it cost $18, as I remember, to make a three-minute station-to-station call from New York to San Francisco 40 years after the telephone was invented. And at the time the $18 was more than the average weekly wage in the United States.

你知道吗，电话发明 40 年后，从纽约到旧金山进行一次三分钟的站对站通话，费用是 18 美元，我记得。而当时的 18 美元超过了美国的平均周工资。

You know, think if some little kid had picked up the phone on the other end and there went the whole weekly wage while you tried to get, you know, your daughter on the phone, or whatever.

你知道，想想看，如果有个小孩接了电话，而你试图联系你的女儿或其他人时，整个一周的工资就这样没了。

So it — people will be better off in this country decade after decade. But we don’t — we’re not big on being futurologists or anything at Berkshire.

所以——这个国家的人们会在未来的几十年里生活得更好。但在伯克希尔，我们并不擅长做未来学家或类似的事情。

I will tell you this, in terms of our consumer businesses, right now, they’re very soft.

我会告诉你，就我们的消费业务而言，目前它们非常疲软。

Our furniture and jewelry businesses generally — candy business, businesses dealing with the consumer day by day — are soft, and the first quarter the earnings were down.

我们的家具和珠宝业务总体上——糖果业务、日常面向消费者的业务——表现疲软，第一季度的收益下降了。

22. “Desirable” GDP shows how economy affects households

“理想” GDP 显示经济如何影响家庭

WARREN BUFFETT: One of the things you have to think about — and people don’t — they don’t focus on this very much. But you read about GDP, and this is one reason I think — I really think we’ve been in a recession now — not a huge one, but — or not a violent one — but for over two years.

沃伦·巴菲特：你必须考虑的一件事——而人们没有——他们对此并不太关注。但是你读到关于 GDP 的内容，这就是我认为——我真的认为我们现在已经处于衰退中——不是一个巨大的衰退，但——或者不是一个剧烈的衰退——但已经超过两年了。

When the government talks about GDP, A, they talk about GDP, we’ll say, going up 2 percent. But of course, the population of the country, you know, goes up something over 1 percent per year. So it’s per capita GDP that counts. And that has gone very close to no place.

当政府谈论 GDP 时，他们会说 GDP 增长了 2%。但当然，你知道，国家的人口每年增长超过 1%。所以重要的是人均 GDP。而人均 GDP 几乎没有增长。

But the more important factor, to some extent, is that GDP counts the people that, you know, have you take off your shoes when you go to get on an airplane. You know, it counts extra police. It counts all of these things that don’t really translate into — they translate into goods and services that the country wants, but they are not goods and services — I mean, they’re goods and services we wish we didn’t want. And they — all of that counts the same way.

但更重要的因素是，GDP计算了那些在你上飞机时让你脱鞋子的人。这些额外的警察、各种安全措施等等，虽然它们确实转化为国家想要的商品和服务，但它们并不是我们希望拥有的商品和服务。这些所有的事情都以相同的方式计算。

If there’s a — 20 guards at the airport instead of three guards, that goes into GDP. But does it make you feel any better about how you’re spending your paycheck every month? Probably not.

如果机场有 20 名警卫而不是 3 名警卫，那就算入 GDP。但这会让你对每个月的薪水支出感觉更好吗？可能不会。

And when you get into a war, for example, if you drop planes into the ocean, you know, that’s part of GDP, the cost of manufacturing those planes. But it doesn’t do anything for you at your house.

再比如，打仗时，如果你把飞机扔进海里，那也是GDP的一部分，制造这些飞机的成本也算入GDP。但这对你家里并没有任何帮助。

So in terms of what I would call “desirable GDP,” I think my guess is that, on a per capita basis, that has gone no place in the last few years as we’ve diverted resources to other things that don’t really translate to what goes into your house or onto your table.

因此，就我所称的“理想 GDP”而言，我猜想，按人均计算，过去几年中这一指标并没有增长，因为我们将资源转移到了其他并不真正转化为你家中或餐桌上的东西上。

And the quality of GDP is something that is not really talked about very much when you pick up the economic reports every day.

GDP 的质量是一个在每天阅读经济报告时并没有被广泛讨论的话题。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and the type of figures you gave us about inequality tend to obscure a basic and important fact. If the same families were permanently at the top of the economic heap there would be huge resentments about current inequality.

查理·芒格：是的，你给我们的有关不平等的数字往往掩盖了一个基本而重要的事实。如果同一家族一直处于经济顶端，人们对目前的收入不平等会有巨大的怨恨。

But when the coupon clippers and the DuPont family go down, and somebody creates something like Pampered Chef and comes up, in a real sense, something wonderful is happening in terms of equality, even though at the end it looks like there’s been no progress.

但当旧的富裕家族（如古董票务者或杜邦家族）衰落时，新的企业（如Pampered Chef）崛起，从某种意义上说，这在平等方面发生了一些美好的事情，即使从表面上看似乎没有任何进展。

That much churn makes people think the whole system is fairer. (Applause)

这种变化让人们觉得整个系统更公平。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We prefer not to be part of the churn, though, actually, at this point, I think. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，实际上，我认为在这一点上我们更愿意不参与这种变化。（笑声）

We were much more in favor of churn 30 or 40 years ago. (Laughter)

30 或 40 年前，我们更支持这种变化。（笑声）

23. Buffett didn’t learn accounting from books

巴菲特不是从书本上学会会计的

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 8 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Johann Freudenberg (PH). I come from Germany.

观众成员：我的名字是约翰·弗洛伊登贝格（音）。我来自德国。

I would like to know the accounting book you like best. Thank you. (Laughter)

我想知道你最喜欢的会计书。谢谢。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s been a long time since I’ve read an accounting book. I read Finney back when I was in college, I remember that. And I always liked accounting. And for any of you in business, you know, you basically can’t get enough accounting.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我已经很久没有读过会计书了。我记得我在大学时读过芬尼的书。我一直很喜欢会计。对于任何从事商业的人来说，你知道，你基本上永远不会觉得会计知识够用。

But I don’t — you know, I am not really up to date on accounting books. Maybe Charlie’s been reading some of those lately.

但我没有——你知道，我对会计书籍不是很了解。也许查理最近读过一些。

I would hope, actually, that if you read the Berkshire reports over time that you get certain, perhaps, lessons on accounting.

我其实希望，如果你长时间阅读伯克希尔的报告，你能从中获得某些关于会计的经验教训。

But I think you learn more accounting, probably, in terms of — well I mean, once you know the basics of it, by reading good business articles that deal with accounting issues, accounting scandals, that sort of thing.

但我认为你可能会通过阅读涉及会计问题、会计丑闻等方面的优秀商业文章来学习更多的会计知识，当然是在你掌握了基础知识之后。

I mean, what you really need to know is you need to know how the figures are put together, the underlying principles of it, and then you have to know what can be done with those.

我的意思是，你真正需要知道的是你需要了解这些数据是如何组合在一起的，其背后的基本原理，然后你还需要知道可以用这些数据做些什么。

And — you start with the accounting figures as the raw material of understanding a business, but you have to bring something additional to that.

而且——你以会计数据作为理解业务的原材料开始，但你必须为此带来一些额外的东西。

And I can’t think of any good books on that subject. I think I’ve read a lot of good magazine articles that contributed to my knowledge over the years.

我想不出关于那个主题的任何好书。我想我读过很多好的杂志文章，这些年来对我的知识有所贡献。

And I’ve just, you know, I’ve read a lot of annual reports, and seen what people can do with accounting.

我只是，你知道，我读了很多年度报告，见识了人们在会计方面能做些什么。

And as I’ve said before, if I don’t understand it, I figure it’s probably because the management doesn’t want me to understand it.

正如我之前所说，如果我不理解，我认为可能是因为管理层不想让我理解。

And if the management doesn’t want me to understand it, there’s probably something wrong going on. I mean, people don’t obfuscate with numbers, usually, without a purpose. And when you run into that the best thing to do is you stay away.

如果管理层不想让我理解，那可能是出了什么问题。我的意思是，人们通常不会无缘无故地用数字来混淆。当你遇到这种情况时，最好的办法就是远离。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, asking Warren, you know, what good books he knows about accounting would be — it’s like asking him what good books does he have about breathing. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，问沃伦他知道哪些关于会计的好书，就像问他有什么关于呼吸的好书一样。（笑声）

The — and — (applause) — what the implication of that is, is that you start by learning the basic rules of bookkeeping, which are sort of like the basic rules of addition and subtraction. And then you have to spend a lot of time before that accounting gets related to the larger reality, and that’s a lifelong process.

——和——（掌声）——这意味着你首先要学习簿记的基本规则，这有点像加法和减法的基本规则。然后，你必须花费大量时间才能将会计与更大的现实联系起来，而这是一生的过程。

24. Many credit insurers “don’t really know what they’re doing”

许多信用保险公司“并不真正知道自己在做什么”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re going to try to go to the Music Hall. Number 9. Is this working?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们要试着去音乐厅。9 号。这个有效吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I believe so.

观众成员：我相信是这样的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, good.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Bill Ackman from New York City, and my question is as follows:

观众成员：比尔·阿克曼，来自纽约市，我的问题如下：

Insurance companies — could you comment on insurance companies taking on credit risk through the sale of credit derivatives, the adequacy of the accounting for these derivatives?

保险公司——您能否评论一下保险公司通过出售信用衍生品承担信用风险，以及这些衍生品的会计处理是否充分？

And finally, could you explain why the financial guarantee insurers, who are the primary sellers of these derivatives, have the same triple-A rating Berkshire has, despite their more than 140-to-one leverage, and the correlated nature of the risks that they take on?

最后，您能解释一下为什么金融担保保险公司，作为这些衍生品的主要销售商，尽管其杠杆率超过 140 比 1，并且承担的风险具有相关性，却与伯克希尔拥有相同的三A 评级吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think you should go to work for Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为你应该去标准普尔或穆迪工作。

The question about credit insurance or credit guarantees of one sort or another, you know, that’s become very popular.

关于某种形式的信用保险或信用担保的问题，你知道，这已经变得非常流行。

And it’s become — actually, popular with, sort of, the standard insurance, property-casualty insurance, companies in recent years.

近年来，这实际上已经在标准保险、财产-意外保险公司中变得流行起来。

And I would say that, in many cases, the people participating in that business don’t really know what they’re doing.

我会说，在很多情况下，参与那项业务的人并不真正知道他们在做什么。

It’s so easy in the insurance business — it’s the curse of the insurance business — it’s also one of the benefits of it — is that people hand you a lot of money for writing out a little piece of paper.

在保险行业，这是一件很容易的事情——这也是保险行业的诅咒——同时也是它的一个好处——人们会给你很多钱，只是为了写一张小纸条。

And what you put on that piece of paper is enormously important. But the money that’s coming in that seems so easy can tempt you into doing very, very foolish things.

你写在那张纸上的内容极其重要。但那些看似轻松赚来的钱会诱使你做出非常非常愚蠢的事情。

We had a situation here in Omaha 15 or 20 years ago in the mid-’80s where Mutual of Omaha — largest health and accident association in the world, at least at one point — and they decided to go into the reinsurance — property-casualty reinsurance business.

大约 15 或 20 年前，在 80 年代中期，我们在奥马哈遇到了一种情况，当时世界上最大的健康和意外保险协会之一的奥马哈互助会决定进入再保险——财产和意外再保险业务。

And in a very, very, very short time they wrote not very many contracts, and it resulted in wiping out half of the net worth of everything that had built up over many, many decades.

在非常非常非常短的时间内，他们没有写很多合同，结果导致几十年来积累的一半净资产被抹去。

If you are willing to do dumb things in insurance, the world will find you.

如果你愿意在保险方面做愚蠢的事情，世界会找到你。

I mean, you do not — (Laughter)

我的意思是，你没有——（笑声）

You can be in a rowboat in the middle of the Atlantic and just whisper out, “I’m willing to write this,” and then name a dumb price, and you will have brokers swimming to you, you know — (laughter) — with their fins showing, incidentally. (Laughter)

你可以在大西洋中间的一艘小船上，只需轻声说：“我愿意写这个，”然后报一个愚蠢的价格，就会有经纪人游向你，你知道的——（笑声）——顺便说一下，他们的鳍会露出来。（笑声）

It is brutal. I mean, if you are willing to do dumb things, there are people out there, and it’s understandable. But they will find you, and you will get the cash up front.

这很残酷。我的意思是，如果你愿意做愚蠢的事情，外面有这样的人，这可以理解。但他们会找到你，你会预先拿到现金。

You will see a lot of cash and you won’t see any losses, and you’ll keep doing it because you won’t see any losses for a little while. So you’ll keep taking on more and more of this, you know, and then the roof will fall in.

你会看到很多现金，而不会看到任何损失，你会继续这样做，因为在短时间内你不会看到任何损失。所以你会不断地承担越来越多的这种情况，然后屋顶就会塌下来。

And I mentioned in the annual report how GEICO had taken in, you know, 70-odd thousand dollars — $70,000 — of premiums in the early ’80s for a few policies, and they thought they were just picking cherries at the time, and they reinsured a lot of it. And so far we’ve lost $93 million.

我在年度报告中提到，GEICO 在 80 年代初收取了大约 7 万美元的保费——7 万美元——用于几份保单，他们当时以为是在挑选好客户，并且再保险了很多。截至目前，我们已经损失了 9300 万美元。

Now, the most we could make was 70-odd thousand, and I don’t know what the most we can lose is. But I know that 93 million has gotten my attention. (Laughter)

我们能赚到的最多是 70,000 多美元，而我不知道我们能损失的最多是多少。但我知道 9300 万美元让我十分警觉。（笑声）

When you’re playing in a game like that, you can’t afford to make a mistake. I mean, it’s — the mistake — a single mistake or a few mistakes that are correlated, as you’ve mentioned — because these things do correlate — a few mistakes will overcome a lifetime of savings.

在那样的游戏中玩时，你不能犯错。我的意思是，错误——一个错误或几个相关的错误，正如你提到的——因为这些事情确实相关——几个错误会抵消一生的积蓄。

I mean, it is — you will make a few cents on the dollar when you’re right, and you will lose incredible sums when you’re wrong.

我的意思是，当你正确时，你只能赚到几分钱，而当你错误时，你会损失巨额资金。

And in credit insurance, when you go around — a lot of people went around guaranteeing credits based on ratings.

在信用保险方面，当你四处走动时——很多人根据评级来担保信用。

And they said, well, we’ll guarantee a whole bunch of single-A ratings, or we’ll create these structured arrangements that involve A-rated credits.

他们说，好吧，我们将保证一大堆A评级，或者我们将创建这些涉及 A 评级信贷的结构化安排。

And they would use a lot of studies that would show that X percent of A-rated credits defaulted per year, and you go back to the ’30s, and all these back-tested arrangements.

他们会利用很多研究显示，A 级信用每年违约的比例为 X%，并回溯到 30 年代的所有这些数据。

But the problem with that is that what the questioner mentioned is correlation. And when things go bad, all kinds of things correlate that no one ever dreamed correlated.

但问题在于提问者提到的是相关性。当事情变糟时，各种各样的事情都会相关，而这些相关性是没人曾想到的。

And what you had, of course, in the debt field was you had a whole bunch of, say, telecoms or energy companies, that were all rated similarly. But they were correlated in a huge way and you weren’t getting a diversification. You were getting a concentration that would — you didn’t realize.

当然，在债务领域，你会发现有一大堆，比如说，电信或能源公司，它们的评级都差不多。但它们之间有很大的相关性，你并没有得到多样化。你得到的是一种你没有意识到的集中。

And there’s nothing more deadly than unrecognized concentrations of risk, but it happens all the time.

没有什么比未被识别的风险集中更致命的了，但这种情况经常发生。

So I would say we see a B-double-A credit enhanced to a triple-A credit by somebody guaranteeing it, and they may guarantee it for 10 or 15 basis points. And yet the spread in market yield might be 100 basis points.

所以我会说，我们看到一个 B 级信用被提升到一个 AAA 信用，通过某个人的担保，可能他们为此担保 10 或 15 个基点。而市场收益的利差可能是 100 个基点。

That does not strike us as smart.

这在我们看来并不聪明。

And I would say this about the triple-A rating. They have a triple-A rating for claims paying, but they don’t carry, I don’t think, general triple-A.

我会说关于 AAA 评级，他们对索赔支付的确是 AAA，但我认为他们并没有获得一般的 AAA 评级。

There’s only, I think, eight or nine triple-As left in the United States. Berkshire Hathaway’s one of them. But I believe there’s only one other insurance company, which is AIG, and then there’s a half a dozen other companies.

我想，美国只剩下八九家 AAA 评级的公司。伯克希尔·哈撒韦是其中之一。但我相信只有另一家保险公司是 AIG，然后还有六家公司。

So those companies are not in the same class, credit-wise, as Berkshire, nor are they recognized as being in the same class.

因此，那些公司在信用方面与伯克希尔不在同一等级，也没有被认为在同一等级。

But I would say you could get into a lot of trouble at 140-to-one — at some point — insuring credits.

但我会说，在某种程度上，以 140 比 1 的比例进行信用保险可能会惹上很多麻烦。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, he also asked about the quality of accounting. And in my view, at least, the quality of accounting in America for derivative transactions is still terrible. And it’s terrible in that it’s too optimistic.

查理·芒格：是的，他还问到了会计质量的问题。在我看来，至少在美国，衍生品交易的会计质量仍然很糟糕。糟糕之处在于它过于乐观。

And one of the places where it’s most terrible is when you talk about guaranteeing future credits way, way out — years ahead.

其中最糟糕的地方之一就是当你谈论保证未来的信用时——遥远的未来，几年之后。

That sort of thing just lends itself to people getting very optimistic in their assumptions and in their audited figures.

这种情况往往会导致人们在假设和审计数据中变得非常乐观。

And people pay attention to the audited figures, not the underlying reality. So therefore, if the accounting is lousy, the business decisions are lousy. And I think that’s going on mightily as we sit here.

人们关注的是经过审计的数据，而不是潜在的现实。因此，如果会计糟糕，商业决策就会糟糕。而我认为这种情况正在加剧。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there are dozens of insurance organizations or trading organizations in the country that have written credit guarantee contracts in derivative form in the last few years, in fact, on a huge scale.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，过去几年里，国内有几十家保险机构或交易机构以衍生品形式签订了信用担保合同，实际上规模巨大。

I will guarantee you, virtually, that every single one of those contracts that was written, in the first week, whoever wrote it, you know, recognized some sort of an income account or an income entry, and that somebody got paid a little bit of money for writing each one of them.

我几乎可以向你保证，在第一周写的每一份合同中，无论是谁写的，你知道，都会确认某种收入账户或收入条目，并且有人因为撰写每一份合同而获得了一些报酬。

And you know that many of those are going to go bad, and maybe, as a category, that it’s going to be a terrible category. But nobody ever wrote a contract and recorded a loss at the time they wrote it. I mean, they just don’t do it.

你知道，其中许多会变得糟糕，也许作为一个类别，它将是一个糟糕的类别。但从来没有人在签合同时就记录损失。我的意思是，他们就是不会这样做。

And I will tell you that there are a lot of those contracts that if somebody wrote them for me, 10 seconds later I would’ve paid somebody to take them off my hands, so that I would’ve regarded them as having a built-in loss. Nobody ever records a built-in loss on a derivative contract.

我会告诉你，有很多这样的合同，如果有人为我写了它们，10 秒钟后我就会付钱让别人把它们从我手中拿走，所以我会认为它们有内在的损失。没有人会在衍生品合同上记录内在损失。

In fact, I find it extraordinary that you have two derivative dealers, and dealer A and dealer B write a ticket, and dealer A records a profit and dealer B records a profit, you know, particularly if it’s a 20-year contract, you know? I mean, that is the kind of world I’d love to live in, but I haven’t found it yet.

实际上，我觉得很奇怪的是，你有两个衍生品交易商，交易商 A 和交易商 B 写了一张合同，交易商 A 记录了利润，而交易商 B 也记录了利润，尤其如果这是一个 20 年的合同，我的意思是。这是我希望生活的世界，但我还没找到。

25. We try to look “a long way into the future”

我们试图“展望未来”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey, good morning, Charlie, Warren. Jerry McLaughlin from San Mateo checking in from the Music Hall.

观众成员：嘿，早上好，查理，沃伦。我是来自圣马特奥的杰里·麦克劳克林，从音乐厅报到。

You should see yourselves over here. We’re about 12 feet from wall-size images of both of you, which is interesting, but the See’s Candy box is so big, I understand what Tantalus went through now.

你们应该看看这里。我们离你们的墙面大小的图片大约12英尺，这很有趣，但巧克力的盒子太大了，我现在理解了塔坦卢斯经历了什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: How many people do you have in the Music Hall?

沃伦·巴菲特：音乐厅里有多少人？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We probably want to get a cop to estimate, but I’d say it’s a couple of thousand.

观众成员：我们可能需要找个警察来估计一下，但我想大概有几千人。

Anyway, moving right along — hoping I can get a twofer here.

好吧，继续前进——希望我能同时问两个问题。

One is, at Branders, small company we run, we’re seeing — we’re spending a lot more on employee benefits anymore.

一个是，在我们经营的Branders小公司，我们发现员工福利的开支越来越高了。

Health insurance in particular is going up and up again. And lots of times, in the press years ago and now again a little bit, you’re hearing the drumbeat of a health care crisis and what it costs employers to provide health insurance.

健康保险尤其在不断上涨。很多时候，无论是多年前的媒体报道还是现在的报道，你都会听到关于医疗危机的讨论，以及雇主提供健康保险的成本。

I got to figure that’s on the minds of a lot of Berkshire operating company managers. I’m wondering whether both of you feel — I mean, is crisis the right word, with respect to cost?

我想这一定是许多伯克希尔运营公司经理心中的问题。我想知道你们两位是否觉得——我的意思是，关于成本，“危机”这个词是否合适？

Looks like bigger percentages of our GDP are going to health care. Is that because we think we’re getting better health care, or is it really just sort of inflationary?

看起来我们国内生产总值的更大比例正在用于医疗保健。这是因为我们认为我们得到了更好的医疗保健，还是这实际上只是某种通货膨胀？

Second thing is, at the risk of you thinking we’re all a bunch of kooks over here, a couple of people over on this side of the hall have asked me to ask you, Warren, whether you’re seriously considering being cryogenically frozen at some point — (laughter) — I think, hopefully, in the distant, distant future.

第二件事，冒着你会认为我们这边都是一群怪人的风险，这边走廊上的几个人让我问你，沃伦，你是否认真考虑过在某个时候进行冷冻保存——（笑声）——我想，希望是在遥远的未来。

WARREN BUFFETT: What —? 沃伦·巴菲特：什么——？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Cryogenically frozen.

查理·芒格：低温冷冻。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, we had that last year.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我们去年有过。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, and the guy who asked the question last year has put me up to a follow-up for him.

观众成员：是的，去年提问的那个人让我为他做一个后续问题。

Hey, and finally, unrelated to those two —

嘿，最后一件事，跟这两个问题无关——

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I look like I’m closer to where I need it? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我看起来像是更接近我需要的地方了吗？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Last thing is, when you guys look at companies and you’re thinking about earnings into the future, just do you have any rule of thumb? How far in the future do you think you can look, typically, with a company you believe in, you think you understand the business?

观众成员：最后一个问题是，当你们看公司并考虑未来的收益时，你们有没有什么经验法则？通常情况下，对于一个你相信并认为了解其业务的公司，你认为可以展望多远的未来？

Is it five years, 10 years? Do you really think you’ve got, you know, sort of the perpetual, into infinity income stream to calculate the value on? Thanks.

是五年，十年吗？你真的认为你有那种永续的、无限的收入流来计算价值吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well we don’t project as far out as we might have to if we thought we could be successfully frozen. (Laughter).

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不会像可能需要的那样进行远期预测，如果我们认为能够成功地冷冻自己，那就另当别论。（笑声）。

But we really — you know, we’re going to own these businesses forever. So, we want a business that we think is going to have, if run well, some kind of competitive advantage — over many decades.

但我们真的——你知道，我们会永远拥有这些业务。所以，我们希望拥有一个我们认为如果经营得当会有某种竞争优势的业务——持续几十年。

I mean, we’re not going to resell them. And we better have something that is not only good now but that’s going to stay good.

我的意思是，我们不会转售它们。而且我们最好有一些不仅现在好而且将来也会保持好的东西。

So we don’t buy hula-hoop companies or pet rock companies, and we don’t buy companies in industries that we think will have great explosions in demand, but where we don’t know who the winners will be.

所以我们不购买呼啦圈公司或宠物石公司，我们也不购买那些我们认为需求会大幅增长但不知道谁会成为赢家的行业中的公司。

So we look a long — we try — we like to think we’re looking a long way into the future.

所以我们展望未来——我们努力——我们喜欢认为我们在展望遥远的未来。

26. Munger: 15 percent of GDP for health care is “not crazy”

芒格：用于医疗保健的 15% GDP“并不疯狂”

WARREN BUFFETT: On health care costs — the only company-wide managers meeting — and we had far fewer managers then — but we had a meeting of most of the then-smaller number of managers 15 or 20 years ago where we did talk about what the various companies were doing on health costs, because they were then the fastest increasing part of our cost structure.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于医疗成本——唯一一次全公司范围的经理会议——当时我们的经理人数要少得多——但在 15 或 20 年前，我们召开了一次大多数经理参加的会议，讨论各家公司在医疗成本方面的做法，因为当时它们是我们成本结构中增长最快的部分。

And today, workers’ compensation costs would probably be — and some other insurance costs unrelated to health would be also — would, at least in the last couple of years, have moved up even more dramatically than health costs.

而如今，工伤赔偿费用可能会——以及一些与健康无关的其他保险费用也会——至少在过去几年中，比健康费用上涨得更为显著。

But health costs are huge for us. In many cases, you know, running 6- or $7,000 per employee, but moving up at a fast rate.

但我们的健康成本非常高。在许多情况下，每位员工的费用为六千或七千美元，并且还在快速上升。

And you know, that is an inflationary part of the U.S. economy that we can’t solve and our employees can’t solve. And it becomes a big part of the kind of cost — it’s a raw material cost — we had higher energy costs in the first quarter.

这无疑是美国经济中一个通货膨胀性的部分，而我们和我们的员工都无法解决这个问题。这成为了我们成本结构中一个重要的原材料成本——我们在第一季度还面临着更高的能源成本。

But health costs are the ones that are going to just keep coming and coming, in my view, and I don’t have any great answers for it.

但在我看来，医疗费用将会不断增加，我对此没有很好的解决办法。

Charlie runs a hospital and knows a lot more about the health system than I do, so we’ll see what he has to say.

查理经营一家医院，对医疗系统的了解比我多得多，所以我们会看看他怎么说。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that the quality of the medical care delivered, including that from the pharmaceutical industry, has gone up enormously. And, of course, the cost has, too, but it’s a much richer country.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为提供的医疗服务质量，包括制药行业的服务质量，已经大幅提高。当然，成本也上升了，但这是一个更富裕的国家。

And I don’t think it’s crazy if the United States wants to spend 15 percent of GDP on health care. If it went to 16 or 17, I wouldn’t consider it the end of the world.

我不认为美国想把 15%的 GDP 花在医疗保健上是疯狂的。如果增加到 16%或 17%，我也不会认为这是世界末日。

Eventually, of course, there would be a place where it wouldn’t be smart to spend so much.

当然，最终会有一个临界点，在那个点上，花这么多钱就不明智了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you think, if we’re spending 13 or 14 percent and other countries that seem to have fairly good systems are spending 7 or 8 percent, that we’re getting our money’s worth, relative to them?

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为，如果我们花费 13%或 14%，而其他似乎拥有相当不错系统的国家花费 7%或 8%，我们相对于他们是否物有所值？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, certainly they’re getting more value per dollar out of their 7 percent than we’re getting out of our 15. But does that mean that it’s crazy for us to spend 15? I don’t know.

查理·芒格：当然，他们从 7%的投入中获得的价值比我们从 15%的投入中获得的更多。但这是否意味着我们花 15 是疯狂的？我不知道。

I would guess not. But I don’t see any sign from anything I see that it isn’t continuing to go up.

我想不是。但从我所见的任何迹象来看，我没有看到这方面有任何停止上涨的迹象。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a — I don’t know how much we — we never aggregate figures around Berkshire from the various companies because it wouldn’t mean anything. But we spend a lot of money on health care.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个——我不知道我们有多少——我们从不将伯克希尔旗下各个公司的数据汇总，因为这没有意义。但我们在医疗保健上花了很多钱。

And certain states, it’s far higher than others. It makes a lot of difference where you’re located.

而在某些州，这一比例远高于其他州。你所在的位置会产生很大的差异。

27. Buffett: Giving and getting love is true success

巴菲特：给予和获得爱是真正的成功

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1?

沃伦·巴菲特：第一名？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Justin Fung (PH). I am 13 years old, from California. This is my third consecutive year in attendance.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是贾斯汀·冯（音）。我今年 13 岁，来自加利福尼亚。这是我连续第三年参加。

First of all, I would like to wish you the best of health so we can continue to come to Omaha for many years to come. (Applause)

首先，我希望您身体健康，这样我们可以在未来的许多年里继续来到奥马哈。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for answering my question on friendship last year. My question this year is, how do you define success and happiness? Are they related? And how would one achieve that? Thank you.

观众成员：感谢您去年回答我关于友谊的问题。今年我的问题是，您如何定义成功和幸福？它们有关系吗？一个人如何实现这些？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I tell college students that when you get to be my age, you will be successful if the people that you would hope to have love you, do love you.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我告诉大学生，当你到了我这个年纪，如果那些你希望爱你的人确实爱你，那你就算成功了。

I mean, you — if — Charlie and I know a few people that have got a lot of money, and they get testimonial dinners, and they get their names on buildings, and the truth is, nobody loves them.

我的意思是，你——如果——查理和我认识一些有很多钱的人，他们会得到表彰晚宴，他们的名字会出现在建筑物上，但事实是，没有人爱他们。

And you know, not their family, not the people who name the buildings after them. You know, it’s sad.

你知道，不仅仅是他们的家人，连给他们命名的那些人也是如此。你知道，这很悲哀。

And it’s — unfortunately, you know, it’s something you can’t buy. I mean, Charlie and I have talked a lot of times, if we could just buy a million dollars’ worth of love, you know, I mean? It would be so much more satisfactory than to try and be lovable. (Laughter)

不幸的是，这种事是你买不到的。我和查理讨论过很多次，如果我们能买到价值一百万美元的爱，那该是多么令人满意啊！（笑声）

But it doesn’t work that way, you know?

但事情不是那样运作的，你知道吗？

The only way to be loved is to be lovable. It’s — and I hate to tell you that at 13, and — but the nice thing about it, of course, is that, you know, you always get back more than you give.

得到爱的唯一方法就是让自己变得值得被爱。很抱歉在你13岁的时候告诉你这个，但当然，好的地方在于，你总是得到的比付出的更多。

I don’t know whether it was Oscar Hammerstein or who said, you know, “A bell’s not a bell till you ring it, a song’s not a song till you sing it. Love in the heart isn’t put there to stay. Love isn’t love till you give it away.” And basically you’ll always get back more than you give away.

我不知道是奥斯卡·汉默斯坦还是谁说过，“钟不响就不是钟，歌不唱就不是歌。心中的爱不是用来停留的。爱不是爱，直到你把它给予他人。” 基本上，你总是会得到比你给予的更多。

And if you don’t give any, you don’t get any. It’s very simple.

如果你不给，你就得不到。很简单。

I don’t know anybody my age that is loved by a lot of people — we had a dinner the other night, Don Keough was there — everybody loves Don Keough, you know, and for good reason.

我不知道有谁在我这个年纪受到很多人的喜爱——我们前几天晚上有个晚宴，唐·基奥也在场——每个人都喜欢唐·基奥，你知道，这是有原因的。

And there is nobody I know that has — that commands the love of people around them, people they work with, their family, and their neighbors— that is other than a success or feels other than a success.

而我认识的没有人，能够得到周围人的爱——包括工作伙伴、家人和邻居——而不是成功，或者感到不成功。

I don’t know how the people feel that — where they know that nobody loves them, but I can’t believe they feel very good.

我不知道那些人是怎么感觉的——当他们知道没有人爱他们时，但我不相信他们会感觉很好。

So it’s very simple. You can’t get rid of love. If you try to give it out, you get it back more than you’ve given. And it’s the best thing.

所以这很简单。你无法摆脱爱。如果你试图给予它，你会得到比你给予的更多。而且这是最好的事情。

Charlie, what do you speak for? (Laughter)

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you don’t want to be like the motion picture executive in California, and they said the funeral was so large because everybody wanted to make sure he was dead. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，你不想成为加利福尼亚某位电影制片人的样子，有人说他的葬礼之所以如此庞大，是因为每个人都想确认他真的死了。（笑声）

And there’s a similar story about the minister saying at the funeral, “Won’t anybody stand up and say a good word for the deceased?” And there was this long silence, and finally one guy stood up and he said, “Well,” he said, “his brother was worse.” (Laughter)

有一个类似的故事，讲的是牧师在葬礼上说：“难道没有人愿意站起来为死者说句好话吗？”然后有很长一段沉默，最后有个人站起来说：“嗯，”他说，“他兄弟更糟糕。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Look, I would say this. Look around at, you know, people older than you are, look around at, you know, your older relatives or whatever, and you will not see a — an unhappy person who is loved by those around them.

沃伦·巴菲特：听着，我会这样说。看看你周围，比你年长的人，看看你的年长亲戚或其他人，你不会看到一个被周围人爱着却不快乐的人。

I mean it — and it’s — most people in this room are going to do very well financially. Most of the college students I talk to are going to do well financially.

我的意思是——而且——这个房间里的大多数人都会在经济上做得很好。我谈过的大多数大学生在经济上也会做得很好。

And some of them are going to have very few friends — real friends — as they get older, and others, people won’t be able to do enough for.

有些人随着年龄的增长，可能会有很少的真正的朋友，而其他人则会发现，周围的人会竭尽所能地帮助他们。

And I see it around me all the time. So that’s our advice for the day on that.

我在我周围总是看到这种情况。所以这是我们今天对此的建议。

28. Buffett doesn’t remember giving advice to Richard Rainwater

巴菲特不记得给理查德·雷恩沃特提过建议

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Kevin Truitt (PH) and I’m a shareholder from Chicago, Illinois.

观众成员：你好，我叫凯文·特鲁伊特（音），我是来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的股东。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for putting on this marvelous event for your shareholders and partners. I thoroughly enjoy and love coming here.

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢您为股东和合作伙伴举办这个精彩的活动。我非常喜欢并热爱来这里。

I get so much education from this, in that the people here are just wonderful.

我从中获得了很多教育，因为这里的人们实在太棒了。

I have three, hopefully short, questions. The first two questions are for you and Mr. Munger, and the third question is for you.

我有三个希望简短的问题。前两个问题是给您和芒格先生的，第三个问题是给您的。

My first question is, Mr. Munger, you are largely credited with moving Warren away from the cigar-butt approach to investing, as it was practiced by Ben Graham. It’s been stated that it was the purchase of See’s Candy that taught you this important lesson of buying good businesses.

我的第一个问题是，芒格先生，您在很大程度上被认为是将沃伦从本·格雷厄姆所实践的烟蒂投资法转变过来的。据说是购买 See's Candy 让您学到了购买好企业这一重要的投资理念。

At what point did you realize that this concept of buying good businesses was a better long-term investment strategy? And what was it in your discussions with Warren that allowed you to persuade him to move in that direction?

您是在什么时候意识到购买优质企业这一概念是一种更好的长期投资策略的？在与沃伦的讨论中，是什么让您能够说服他朝这个方向发展的？

Mr. Buffett, what was it in Mr. Munger’s arguments for buying good businesses that persuaded you to abandon the cigar-butt approach and move in his direction?

巴菲特先生，芒格先生关于购买好企业的论点中有什么说服了您放弃烟蒂投资法并转向他的方向？

My second question is, in both your experience have you or Mr. Munger ever known of a company that has regained or replaced its competitive advantage once it was lost?

我的第二个问题是，在你们的经验中，您或芒格先生是否知道有公司在失去竞争优势后重新获得或替换了它？

My third question for you, Mr. Buffett, is, early in his career Richard Rainwater sought you out and asked you what it took to become a successful investor. Can you tell us what he asked you and what you told him? Thank you. (Applause)

我的第三个问题是，巴菲特先生，理查德·雷恩沃特在他职业生涯的早期曾找过您，并询问您成为成功投资者所需的条件。您能告诉我们他问了您什么以及您告诉了他什么吗？谢谢。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: The last question, I don’t remember at all. I mean, Rainwater called me a couple of times, but I don’t really remember the conversation.

沃伦·巴菲特：最后一个问题，我完全不记得了。我的意思是，雷恩沃特给我打过几次电话，但我真的不记得谈话内容了。

That was a lot of years ago and I probably said the same — I would have said the same thing to his as if I got a question asked in this meeting.

那是很多年前的事了，我可能会说同样的话——就像在这次会议上被问到问题时我会对他说同样的话。

So I’ve really had no contact with Richard Rainwater over the years. Like I say, I think I met him once, I believe, and he called a couple of times, so —

所以这些年来我真的没有和理查德·雷恩沃特有过联系。就像我说的，我想我见过他一次，我相信，他打过几次电话，所以——

29. See’s Candies lesson: listen to criticism

See’s Candies 的教训：倾听批评

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, do you want to answer the first question about how you —

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想回答第一个关于你如何——的问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, I think there’s some mythology in this idea that I’ve been this great enlightener of Warren Buffett. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我认为这种认为我是沃伦·巴菲特的伟大启蒙者的想法有些神话色彩。（笑声）

Warren hasn’t needed much enlightenment, but we both kept learning all the time, so that the man we were five years earlier was less sensible than the man who ultimately was there.

沃伦并不需要太多启发，但我们一直在不断学习，所以五年前的我们比起最后的我们要愚蠢得多。

And See’s Candy did teach us both a wonderful lesson. And it’ll teach you a lesson if I tell you the full story.

而 See's Candy 确实给我们上了宝贵的一课。如果我把整个故事告诉你，它也会给你上一课。

If See’s Candy had asked $100,000 more, Warren and I would’ve walked. That’s how dumb we were at that time.

如果 See's Candy 多要 10 万美元，沃伦和我就会走人。那时我们就是那么傻。

WARREN BUFFETT: Ten-thousand more. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：再来一万。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And one of the reasons we didn’t walk is while we were making this wonderful decision we weren’t going to pay a dime more, Ira Marshall said to us, “You guys are crazy. There are some things you should pay up for,” quality of business — quality, and so forth. “You’re underestimating quality.”

查理·芒格：我们没有放弃的原因之一是，当我们做出这个绝妙的决定时，我们不打算多付一分钱，艾拉·马歇尔对我们说：“你们疯了。有些东西你们应该多付钱，比如业务质量——质量等等。你们低估了质量。”

Well, Warren and I instead of behaving the way they do in a lot of places, we listened to the criticism. We changed our mind.

好吧，沃伦和我没有像很多地方那样行事，我们听取了批评意见。我们改变了主意。

And that is a very good lesson for anyone. The ability to take criticism constructively is — well, think of all the money we made from accepting that one criticism.

这对任何人来说都是一个很好的教训。能够建设性地接受批评是——想想我们通过接受那一个批评赚了多少钱。

And if you count the indirect effects from what we learned from buying See’s, you can say that Berkshire’s been built, partly, by learning from criticism. Now, we don’t want any more today. (Laughter)

如果你算上我们从购买 See's 中学到的间接影响，你可以说伯克希尔的建立部分是通过从批评中学习而来的。现在，我们今天不想再要更多了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We also like the peanut brittle, too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们也喜欢花生脆糖。（笑声）

30. From “cigar butts” to high-quality companies

从“烟蒂”到高质量公司

WARREN BUFFETT: The — Charlie explained, I had learned investment, and got enormous benefit out of that learning, from a fellow who concentrated on the quantitative aspects, Ben Graham.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理解释过，我学会了投资，并从中获得了巨大的收益，这得益于一位专注于定量分析的人，本·格雷厄姆。

And who didn’t dismiss the qualitative aspects, but he said you could make enough money focusing on quantitative aspects, which were a more sure way of going at things and would enable you to identify the cigar butts.

他并没有忽视定性方面，但他说你可以通过专注于定量方面赚到足够的钱，这是一种更可靠的方法，可以让你识别出烟蒂。

He would say that the qualitative is harder to teach, it’s harder to write about, it may require more insight than the quantitative. And besides, the quantitative works fine, so why try harder?

他说，定性方面更难教授，更难写作，可能比定量方面需要更多的洞察力。而且，定量方面运作良好，所以为什么要更努力呢？

And on a small scale, you know, there was a very good point to that.

而且在小范围内，你知道，这确实是一个很好的观点。

But Charlie really did — it wasn’t just Ira Marshall — but Charlie emphasized the qualitative much more than I did when I started.

但查理确实如此——不仅仅是艾拉·马歇尔——查理比我刚开始时更强调定性方面。

He had a different background to some extent than did, and I was enormously impressed by a terrific teacher, and for good reason.

他在某种程度上有着不同的背景，而我对一位了不起的老师印象深刻，这是有充分理由的。

But it makes more sense, as we pointed out, to buy a wonderful business at a fair price, than a fair business at a wonderful price.

但正如我们所指出的，以合理的价格购买一家出色的公司，比以出色的价格购买一家普通的公司更有意义。

And we’ve changed our — or I’ve changed my focus anyway, and Charlie already had it — over the years in that direction. And then of course, we have learned by what we’ve seen.

我们已经改变了我们的——或者说我改变了我的重点，查理早就有了——多年来朝着那个方向发展。当然，我们也从所见中学到了东西。

I mean, we — it’s not hard when you watch businesses for 50 years, you know, to learn a few things about them, as to where the big money can be made.

我的意思是，我们——当你观察企业 50 年时，了解一些关于它们的事情并不难，比如在哪里可以赚大钱。

Now, you say when did it happen? It’s very interesting on that. Because what happens, even when you’re getting a new, important idea, is that the old ideas are still there. So there’s this flickering in and out of things. I mean, there was not a strong, bright red line of demarcation where we went from cigar butts to wonderful companies.

现在，你说它是什么时候发生的？这很有趣。因为即使当你获得一个新的、重要的想法时，旧的想法仍然存在。所以事情会时隐时现。我的意思是，我们并没有从烟蒂到优秀公司的一个鲜明的分界线。

And it — but we moved in that direction, occasionally moved back, because there is money made in cigar butts.

而且——但我们朝那个方向前进，偶尔会退回去，因为在烟蒂上可以赚钱。

But overall, we’ve kept moving in the direction of better and better companies, and now we’ve got a collection of wonderful companies.

但总的来说，我们一直在朝着越来越好的公司方向前进，现在我们拥有了一批优秀的公司。

31. Hard to regain a lost competitive advantage

难以重新获得失去的竞争优势

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of competitive advantage and then regain — lost and then regained — there aren’t many examples of that. In the property-casualty company, I’ve got a friend who always wants to buy lousy companies with the idea he’s going to change them into wonderful companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：在竞争优势方面，失去然后重新获得的例子并不多。在财产保险公司，我有一个朋友总是想买下糟糕的公司，想着要把它们变成优秀的公司。

And I just ask him, you know, “Where in the last hundred years have you seen it happen?”

我只是问他，“在过去的一百年里，你在哪里见过这种情况发生？”

I mean, GEICO got into trouble in the early ’70s, but it had a wonderful business model. It did get off the tracks, but it wasn’t because the model went astray, it’s because they’d started reserving incorrectly and went crazy on growth, and a few things like that. But the basic model was still underlying it.

我的意思是，GEICO 在 70 年代初遇到了麻烦，但它有一个很好的商业模式。它确实偏离了轨道，但不是因为模式出了问题，而是因为他们开始错误地储备，并在增长方面变得疯狂，还有一些类似的事情。但基本的模式仍然是其基础。

You might argue that one company that lost its competitive position and then came back in a different way, actually, was Pepsi-Cola. I mean, they were “Twice as much for a nickel, too.”

你可能会说，有一家公司失去了竞争地位，然后以不同的方式回归，实际上就是百事可乐。我的意思是，他们曾经是“同样的价格，双倍的量。”

They were selling on a quantitative basis, the fact that you got to guzzle more of the stuff for a nickel — twice as much, as the slogan went — and they lost that edge, post-World War II, when costs went up a lot.

他们以数量为基础进行销售，强调你可以用五分钱喝到更多的东西——正如口号所说的，两倍的量——但在二战后，当成本大幅上升时，他们失去了这一优势。

And so they basically changed their marketing approach successfully, and that’s very, very seldom done. But you have to give them credit for that.

所以他们基本上成功地改变了他们的营销方式，而这很少有人能做到。但你必须为此给予他们赞赏。

To some extent, Gillette lost its competitive position somewhat in the ’30s, lost market share against what they called penny blades and all that, and then regained it in a very big way in the next 10 or so years when their market share went up enormously.

在某种程度上，吉列在 30 年代失去了一些竞争地位，市场份额被他们称为“便士刀片”等产品抢走了一些，然后在接下来的大约 10 年里以非常大的方式重新获得了市场份额，市场份额大幅上升。

But generally speaking, if you lose your competitive position — the Packard Motor Company had the premier car in the mid-’30s. The Cadillac was not the premier — it was the Packard.

但一般来说，如果你失去了竞争地位——帕卡德汽车公司在 30 年代中期拥有顶级汽车。凯迪拉克不是顶级的——是帕卡德。

And then they went downscale one year and they never came back. They jumped their sales that one year because everybody wanted to own a Packard, and now you could own one a little cheaper. But they never regained that upscale image again.

然后他们有一年降低了档次，再也没有回来。那一年他们的销量猛增，因为每个人都想拥有一辆帕卡德，而现在你可以以稍微便宜一点的价格拥有一辆。但他们再也没有恢复那种高档形象。

And certain department stores have done that, too. They’ve had a upscale image. And you can always juice up your sales, particularly if you’ve got a great upscale image, by having, you know, this sale or that sale, and going downmarket.

某些百货公司也这样做过。它们拥有高档形象。而且，如果你有一个很好的高档形象，你总是可以通过举办这个促销或那个促销，并走向低端市场来提升销售额。

It’s very hard to back upmarket again, and you’ve seen some great department stores that have had that — or specialty stores — that had that problem.

再次向高端市场回归是非常困难的，你已经看到一些很棒的百货商店或专卖店遇到过这个问题。

Charlie, you got any thoughts on that?

查理，你对此有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No more. 查理·芒格：没有更多了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

32. “Fretful disposition” will hurt your long-term performance

“烦躁的性情”会损害你的长期表现

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Bruce Gilbert (PH), a stockholder from New York City.

观众成员：你好。我是布鲁斯·吉尔伯特（PH），来自纽约市的股东。

And about four or five years ago, I put most of my family’s portfolio — actually all of it — into Berkshire Hathaway.

大约四五年前，我把我家族投资组合的大部分——实际上是全部——投入了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司。

And over the past four or five years, the stock price has remained rather steady, and I’ve withstood the year 2000, when friends were making 50 percent and I was losing 50 percent on my investment.

在过去的四五年里，股价一直相当稳定，我挺过了 2000 年，当时朋友们赚了 50%，而我在投资上亏了 50%。

But I have to admit, when I read your Fortune article last year and you referred to the stock price as expensive, I felt badly.

但是我必须承认，当我去年读到你在《财富》杂志上的文章时，你把股票价格称为昂贵，我感到很难过。

Now I spend my days sometimes having fun, figuring out the value of Berkshire Hathaway.

现在，我每天花时间乐在其中，评估伯克希尔·哈撒韦的价值。

But at night after that comment I could also wake up in worry and fret. And I realize you talked, recently, a lot about the qualitative and quantitative aspects of things.

但在那句话之后的晚上，我也可能会因担忧和烦恼而醒来。我意识到你最近谈了很多关于事物的质和量的方面。

And I guess I would like you, with your self-reflective position, and knowing that I’m asking you to do something like maybe talking about your breathing, what went into that comment to call the stock price expensive, in terms of your weights and measures?

我想请你从自我反思的角度出发，考虑到我让你做的事情可能类似于谈论你的呼吸，是什么促使你发表了那个评论，称股票价格昂贵，从你的权重和衡量标准来看？

What price, what value? What do you think about the company and its stock price when you say it’s expensive?

什么价格，什么价值？当你说它很贵时，你对这家公司及其股价有什么看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think if you — I don’t remember the exact wording of that article, but I’m quite sure that I told the author of that article, and I’m almost positive it was in the article, that said I thought it was more attractive than owning the general market or the S&P.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想如果你——我不记得那篇文章的确切措辞，但我很确定我告诉了那篇文章的作者，我几乎可以肯定文章中提到，我认为这比拥有整个市场或标普更有吸引力。

So I was saying that I preferred it to the general market. I’m certainly happy having 99 and a large fraction percent of my net worth in it. I’ve never sold a share, I am not the least bit uncomfortable about holding it until the day I die, and quite a bit thereafter. (Laughter)

所以我当时说我更喜欢它而不是一般市场。我当然很高兴将我净资产的 99%和大部分比例投入其中。我从未卖出过一股，我一点也不觉得持有它直到我去世有什么不安，甚至在那之后也不觉得。（笑声）

But I have not thought stocks were cheap at all for some time. And I’ve never wanted to encourage anybody, particularly in the last few years, to buy Berkshire or any other stock because — the market — I felt that the — you know, I felt we had a great bubble.

但我已经有一段时间不认为股票便宜了。而且我从来不想鼓励任何人，尤其是在过去几年里，购买伯克希尔或任何其他股票，因为——市场——我觉得——你知道，我觉得我们有一个巨大的泡沫。

And you know, I think Berkshire’s value has improved — I think Charlie does, too, fairly significantly — in recent years.

你知道，我认为伯克希尔的价值有所提升——我认为查理也同意——在最近几年中相当显著。

And I would — if I had a chance to swap, tax-free, my Berkshire for the S&P 500, or for any mutual fund or anything, you know, I wouldn’t even give it a thought. But that does not mean I think, you know, either Berkshire or stocks are cheap.

如果我有机会免税地将我的伯克希尔股票换成标普 500 指数，或者任何共同基金或其他东西，我甚至都不会考虑。但这并不意味着我认为伯克希尔或股票便宜。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that.

查理·芒格：我对此没有更多补充。

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think we’ve ever recommended the purchase or sale of Berkshire, that I can remember. We did say at one time we would repurchase shares, which has a certain underlying message to it.

沃伦·巴菲特：据我所知，我不认为我们曾经推荐过购买或出售伯克希尔的股票。我们确实曾经说过会回购股票，这其中有一定的潜在信息。

And we said at other times we wouldn’t buy shares. That doesn’t mean we’d sell shares at all, but we wouldn’t have bought them under the prevailing conditions.

我们在其他时候说过我们不会买入股票。这并不意味着我们会卖出股票，但在当时的情况下我们不会买入。

But we have stayed away from recommending, actually not only the purchase or sale, not only of Berkshire, but just of any other specific shares.

但是我们一直避免推荐，实际上不仅是购买或出售，不仅是伯克希尔的股票，而是任何其他特定股票。

We’ve only given our views, occasionally, on what we think about the level of the stock market, generally.

我们只是偶尔表达了我们对股市整体水平的看法。

But I do think, if you go back and look at that article — I wish I had it here. But I think you’ll find that I said I preferred it to equities, generally. It —

我认为，如果你回去看看那篇文章——我希望我有它在这里。但是我认为你会发现，我说过我更喜欢它，相对于其他股票。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I do think that there’s a lot to be said for developing a temperament that can own securities without fretting. I think that the fretful disposition is the — it’s an enemy of long-term performance.

查理·芒格：我确实认为，培养一种能够持有证券而不烦恼的性情有很多好处。我认为，焦虑的性情是长期表现的敌人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s almost — I think it’s almost impossible if you’re — to do well in equities over a period of time if you go to bed every night thinking about the price of them. I mean, Charlie and I, we think about the value of them.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为如果你每天晚上都想着股票的价格，那么在一段时间内在股票市场上表现良好几乎是不可能的。我的意思是，查理和我，我们考虑的是它们的价值。

But we would be happy, just as in that movie — if they closed the Stock Exchange tomorrow, you know, Dick Grasso wouldn’t be happy and Jimmy Maguire, our specialist, wouldn’t be happy.

但是我们会很高兴，就像那部电影一样——如果他们明天关闭证券交易所，你知道，迪克·格拉索不会高兴，我们的专家吉米·马奎尔也不会高兴。

It wouldn’t bother me and Charlie, at all. We would keep selling bricks, selling Dilly Bars, selling candy, writing insurance. You know, a lot of people have private companies and they never get a quote on them.

这对我和查理来说一点也不烦。我们会继续卖砖头，卖 Dilly Bars，卖糖果，写保险。你知道，很多人有私人公司，他们从来没有给公司估价。

You know, we bought See’s Candy in 1972. We haven’t had a quote on it since. Does that make us wonder about how we’re doing with See’s Candy? No, we looked at the company results.

你知道，我们在 1972 年买下了 See's Candy。自那以后我们就没有对它进行过估价。这让我们对 See's Candy 的表现感到疑惑吗？不，我们查看了公司的业绩。

So you — there’s nothing wrong with focusing on company results. Focusing on the price of a stock is dynamite, because it really means that you think that the stock market knows more than you do.

所以你——专注于公司业绩没有错。专注于股票价格是危险的，因为这实际上意味着你认为股市比你更了解情况。

Now if the stock market may know more than you do, but then you shouldn’t be in stocks. I mean, you should have — the stock market is there to serve you and not to instruct you.

现在，如果股市可能比你知道得更多，那么你就不应该投资股票。我的意思是，股市是为你服务的，而不是指导你的。

So you need to formulate your ideas on price and value, and if the price gets cheaper and you have funds, you know, logically, you should buy more, if — and we do that all the time.

所以你需要制定关于价格和价值的想法，如果价格变得更便宜而你有资金，你知道，从逻辑上讲，你应该买更多，我们一直都是这样做的。

Where we make our mistakes, frankly, is where we focus on price and value and we start buying, and the price goes up a little and we quit, you know, like Charlie referred to, we might have done on See’s Candy.

实际上，我们犯错的地方在于，我们专注于价格和价值，开始购买，但价格略有上涨，我们就停止了，就像查理提到的，我们可能在See's Candy上做过类似的事情。

A mistake like that cost us $8 billion in the case of Walmart stock a few years ago, because it went up in price. And you know, we are not happy when things we’re buying go up in price.

像这样的错误在几年前让我们在沃尔玛股票上损失了 80 亿美元，因为它的价格上涨了。而且你知道，当我们购买的东西价格上涨时，我们并不高兴。

We want them to go down, and down, and down. And we’ll keep buying more and — hopefully we won’t run out of money. Of course, that’s a different story.

我们希望它们一直下降，下降，再下降。我们会继续买入更多——希望我们不会没钱。当然，那是另一个故事。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE: No. 查理：不。

33. Triple-A rating won’t “cause us to do anything stupid”

AAA评级不会“导致我们做出愚蠢的事情”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. David Anglin (PH) from St. Louis, Missouri. Thanks for the weekend, it’s very nice. It’s always entertaining here.

观众成员：你好。我是来自密苏里州圣路易斯的 David Anglin。感谢这个周末，这里非常好。这里总是很有趣。

According to an article in The Economist, the triple-A rating is very important quality for reinsurance to have. Swiss Re, Munich Re have lost their triple-A ratings. Gerling is out of the ballpark.

根据《经济学人》的一篇文章，AAA 评级对于再保险来说是非常重要的质量。瑞士再保险公司、慕尼黑再保险公司已经失去了他们的AAA评级。格林公司则完全不在这个范围内。

Will the reinsurance business at Berkshire become unintentionally exposed to higher risk because it is now a major reinsurer still holding a triple-A rating, even though it practices a very severe underwriting discipline?

伯克希尔的再保险业务会不会因为现在是仍然持有AAA评级的主要再保险公司而无意中暴露于更高的风险，即使它实行非常严格的承保纪律？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, the triple-A can’t increase our risk, because it should not affect what we do.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，AAA不会增加我们的风险，因为它不应该影响我们的行动。

It may affect what gets offered to us. I mean, logically we should get business offered to us first, and last. I mean, we are the reinsurer that’s going to pay for sure, five years from now, 10 years from now.

这可能会影响我们得到的报价。我的意思是，从逻辑上讲，我们应该首先和最后得到业务报价。我的意思是，我们是再保险公司，肯定会在五年后、十年后支付。

So when — I mean, we have contracts, we have structured settlements with paraplegics that are counting on us to make a payment to them 50 years from now.

所以，当——我的意思是，我们有合同，我们有与截瘫患者的结构性和解，他们指望我们在 50 年后向他们付款。

And those people are in wheelchairs, they may be on — you know, they may be on oxygen, all kinds of things. And they are depending on a little piece of paper that has our name on it, and it says we’re going to pay them for the rest of their life. And it’s very, very important to them whose name is on it.

那些人坐在轮椅上，他们可能需要——你知道，他们可能需要氧气，各种各样的东西。他们依靠一张写有我们名字的小纸片，上面写着我们会支付他们余生的费用。对他们来说，纸上写的名字非常非常重要。

But that shouldn’t cause us to do — it shouldn’t cause us to do anything at all stupid. It just means that people that care about security of future promises should come to us.

但这不应该导致我们做——不应该导致我们做任何愚蠢的事情。这只是意味着关心未来承诺安全的人应该来找我们。

But there’s no reason at all, because Munich or Swiss Re loses their triple-A, that we should underwrite in any way differently than we do now. It just should mean that we have more to choose from.

但这完全没有理由，因为慕尼黑再保险或瑞士再保险失去其AAA评级，我们就应该以不同于现在的方式承保。这只意味着我们有更多的选择。

And I can assure you that, as these companies lose their triple-A — and a number have in the last year or year and a half — we have been tightening our underwriting very materially at Gen Re.

我可以向你保证，随着这些公司失去其AAA评级——过去一年或一年半内有不少公司失去了这一评级——我们在通用再保险公司的承保标准已经大幅收紧。

Now, it needed tightening — but we are now, in my view — we have the right — we have a great underwriting culture at Gen Re, and historically it had it most of the years. It drifted away from that, but I think it’s back in spades now. So I don’t think you have to worry about that.

现在，它需要收紧——但在我看来——我们现在有权利——我们在通用再保险公司有一个很好的承保文化，历史上大多数年份都有。它曾经偏离了这一点，但我认为现在已经完全恢复了。所以我认为你不必担心这个。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly hope we are better underwriters than Munich Re.

查理·芒格：嗯，我当然希望我们的承保能力比慕尼黑再保险公司更强。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s not name names. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们就不提名字了。（笑声）

No, no, Munich is a fine company. (Laughter)

不，不，慕尼黑是一家不错的公司。（笑声）

The rule at Berkshire is we praise by name and we criticize by category. (Laughter)

在伯克希尔的规则是，我们表扬时指名道姓，批评时泛泛而谈。（笑声）

And I do think Munich is a fine company, but they lost their triple-A, frankly, because they probably had — they were too exposed on the equity side — on the asset side — in equities, relative to net worth, and I think they probably agree with that.

我确实认为慕尼黑是一家不错的公司，但坦率地说，他们失去了AAA评级，可能是因为他们在资产方面——在股票方面——相对于净资产的风险敞口过大，我想他们可能也同意这一点。

But they have a very strong and important position in insurance. And we do a lot of business with Munich Re, and will continue to do so. But there are others we won’t do business with, incidentally.

但他们在保险业中占据着非常强大和重要的地位。我们与慕尼黑再保险公司有很多业务往来，并将继续这样做。但顺便说一下，还有一些公司我们不会与之合作。

I mean, there are some very weak reinsurers in the world and if there were to be a major natural catastrophe, or if there were to be a major financial catastrophe, there are a number of reinsurers, in my view, that would not pay. And we conduct our affairs so we’ll always be able to pay.

我的意思是，世界上有一些非常弱的再保险公司，如果发生重大自然灾害，或者发生重大金融灾难，在我看来，有一些再保险公司将无法支付。而我们处理事务的方式是确保我们始终能够支付。

34. Planned all along to exercise Cologne Re buy option

一直计划行使科隆回购选项

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：第五名？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. My name is Olaf Heine (PH) from Germany. And not surprisingly, I have a question concerning the German reinsurance market, fitting nicely in the context of the questions before.

观众成员：早上好，先生们。我的名字是奥拉夫·海因（音译），来自德国。不出所料，我有一个关于德国再保险市场的问题，这与之前的问题很契合。

When you acquired General Re, I believe you inherited, also, a substantial stake in Cologne Re. Now in your last letter to your shareholders, you hinted that a major reinsurance company might be in trouble, widely believed to be Gerling Re, just mentioned.

当你收购通用再保险公司时，我相信你也继承了科隆再保险公司的大量股份。现在，在你给股东的最后一封信中，你暗示一家主要的再保险公司可能有麻烦，普遍认为是刚提到的格林再保险公司。

You also mentioned, about an hour ago, that Germany was kind of a drag insurance-wise — (laughs) — if you are — if I understand you correctly.

你还提到，大约一个小时前，德国在保险方面有点拖后腿——（笑）——如果我没理解错的话。

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t — I mean, I don’t believe I — I didn’t mean to say that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我不是——我的意思是，我不相信我——我不是故意这么说的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK, but it helps to formulate the question. (Laughter)

观众成员：好的，但这有助于形成问题。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well, for the purpose of your question we’ll assume I said it — (laughter) — yeah. But I didn’t say it.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，为了回答你的问题，我们假设是我说的——（笑声）——是的。但我没有说过。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So now Gen Re decided to exercise a call option on the remaining shares of Cologne Re, another German reinsurance company. And my question simply is, what motivated you to do so?

观众成员：所以现在通用再保险决定行使对科隆再保险公司剩余股份的认购期权，另一家德国再保险公司。我的问题很简单，是什么促使你们这样做的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s a good question. And it was mis — it was sort of somewhat misreported in the press, what happened on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是个好问题。媒体对那件事的报道有些失实。

What really happened is that Gen Re — I don’t know whether it would be about six or seven years ago now — acquired a significant position in Cologne from the controlling shareholder, with a put and call arrangement for the remainder.

真正发生的事情是，大约六七年前，通用再保险公司从控股股东那里获得了科隆的一大笔股份，并为剩余股份安排了期权买卖协议。

I don’t even know the history, exactly, of why they went for this two-step transaction, but basically it was a two-step purchase.

我甚至不确切知道他们为什么选择这种两步交易的历史，但基本上这是一种两步购买。

So that all along we have accounted for Cologne as if we were going to exercise the option. Because, in effect, if we didn’t exercise, they would exercise. And it was fait accompli that we would buy that stock right from the start.

因此，我们一直以来都把科隆视为我们将行使期权。因为实际上，如果我们不行使，他们就会行使。从一开始，我们购买那只股票就是既成事实。

So we made no affirmative — we made an affirmative decision six or seven years ago to buy a very significant percentage of Cologne. We now have — will have about 89 percent when the option’s exercised.

所以我们在六七年前做出了一个积极的决定，购买科隆的一个非常重要的百分比。我们现在拥有——在期权行使后将拥有大约 89%。

But there’s nothing new in the fact that we are now doing it. The put and call arrangement, as I remember, became effective, essentially, this year.

但我们现在这样做并不是什么新鲜事。根据我的记忆，期权安排基本上在今年生效。

So this was the year that something had to be done, and was planned to be done all along. And it reflected no new judgment, no new decision about Cologne in the year 2003.

所以这一年必须要做一些事情，并且一直计划要做。这并不反映 2003 年对科隆的任何新判断或新决定。

It reflects a decision that was made in 1996 or ’97, whenever the original purchase was made.

这反映了一个在 1996 年或 1997 年做出的决定，无论最初的购买是在何时进行的。

And Cologne is an integral part of General Re. I mean, we knew all along that we would own 89 percent of it, pursuant to this contract. And it — that’s always been in our thinking, from the moment we sat down with the Gen Re management to make a deal some years ago.

科隆是通用再保险不可或缺的一部分。我的意思是，我们一直都知道根据这份合同我们将拥有其 89%的股份。从几年前我们与通用再保险管理层坐下来达成协议的那一刻起，这一直在我们的考虑之中。

So the press has sort of implied that there’s something new in this transaction that’s occurring this year, and there really isn’t.

所以媒体有点暗示今年发生的这笔交易中有一些新东西，但实际上并没有。

35. Berkshire buyback is possible, but not likely

伯克希尔回购是可能的，但不太可能。

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6. Charlie, you don’t have anything on that? No.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六。查理，你对此没有什么要说的吗？没有。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning — Mr. Buffett. This is Abhishek Dalmia coming from the land of Mr. Ajit Jain, (inaudible) India. The question is —

观众成员：早上好——巴菲特先生。我是阿比谢克·达尔米亚，来自阿吉特·贾因先生的故乡，印度（听不清）。我的问题是——

WARREN BUFFETT: If you have any more like Ajit over there, send them. We need them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你们那边还有像阿吉特这样的人，请送过来。我们需要他们。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Right. My question pertains to the allocation of a company’s free cash. And the question is, under what circumstances would Berkshire consider parting with its money for a share buyback program, as opposed to retaining it for future acquisitions? Thank you.

观众成员：好的。我的问题涉及公司自由现金的分配。问题是，在什么情况下伯克希尔会考虑将资金用于股票回购计划，而不是保留用于未来的收购？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s a good question and we addressed that a bit back a couple of years ago. In fact, I think our annual report for 1999 came out on March 12th — I believe it was March 12th — on a Friday night or a Saturday morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是个好问题，我们在几年前就稍微讨论过这个问题。事实上，我认为我们 1999 年的年度报告是在 3 月 12 日发布的——我相信是 3 月 12 日——在一个星期五晚上或星期六早上。

That was the day the NASDAQ hit its high and Berkshire hit its low, on that exact day. And we said we would — the next morning, on the internet — on a Saturday morning — we said we would repurchase, but we wanted you to have the annual report first, but we might repurchase at those levels.

那一天，纳斯达克达到高点，而伯克希尔达到低点，就在那一天。我们说我们会——第二天早上，在互联网上——在一个星期六的早晨——我们说我们会回购，但我们希望你们先拿到年度报告，但我们可能会在那些水平上回购。

And the NASDAQ never saw its level of 5100 again, and Berkshire never saw its level of whatever it was, 41,000 or thereabouts.

纳斯达克再也没有达到 5100 点的水平，伯克希尔也再没有达到它的水平，无论是 41,000 点还是大约那个水平。

Our preference — and we stated this 20 years ago, even to — is to buy businesses. We are — we want to add businesses of a quality with managers of a quality equal to those we already own, at prices that make sense. And that’s our number one preference.

我们的偏好——我们甚至在 20 年前就已经说明了这一点——是购买企业。我们希望以合理的价格增加与我们现有企业质量相当、管理者质量相当的企业。这是我们的首选。

If we thought Berkshire was significantly undervalued and we thought the likelihood of using the money to buy businesses — the probability was low — we would be buying stock in — we probably wouldn’t be able to buy a lot of stock in, but we would only buy stock in if we thought the stock was selling significantly below intrinsic value.

如果我们认为伯克希尔被严重低估，并且我们认为用这笔钱购买企业的可能性很低，我们会购买股票——我们可能无法购买大量股票，但我们只有在认为股票的售价显著低于内在价值时才会购买股票。

And there’s no magic figure for intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is a range. Charlie would name a different number than I would name, but our ranges would be quite similar, if we were to write them down on a piece of paper now. But they wouldn’t be identical.

没有一个神奇的数字代表内在价值。内在价值是一个范围。查理会给出一个与我不同的数字，但如果我们现在把它们写在纸上，我们的范围会非常相似。但它们不会完全相同。

So we leave a — we would leave a significant margin of safety and would want to buy at a — what would be a clear-cut, to us, discount from the lower levels of intrinsic value we might calculate.

因此，我们会留出一个——我们会留出一个显著的安全边际，并希望以一个——对我们来说显而易见的折扣购买，这个折扣是基于我们可能计算出的内在价值的较低水平。

It’s not our number one preference. We would rather add — we love it when we add good businesses to Berkshire.

这不是我们的首选。我们更愿意增加——我们喜欢将优秀的企业加入伯克希尔。

But we would have to — if the stock — if we could add intrinsic value per share by repurchasing, and we’ve given all the shareholders relevant information about the value so that we weren’t putting anything over on them, that they had the same information we had, we would buy in stock.

但是我们必须——如果股票——如果通过回购可以增加每股内在价值，并且我们已经向所有股东提供了有关价值的相关信息，以确保我们没有隐瞒任何信息，他们拥有与我们相同的信息，我们就会回购股票。

I think it’s unlikely that happens, that we don’t find other opportunities to do things at a time like that. But it could happen, and it almost happened in March of 2000, and then things turned around very, very abruptly.

我认为这种情况不太可能发生，我们不会在那样的时候找不到其他机会去做事情。但这可能会发生，而且在 2000 年 3 月几乎发生了，然后事情非常非常突然地转变了。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。

36. MidAmerican will grow, even if utilities law isn’t repealed

即使公用事业法未被废除，MidAmerican 也会增长

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Ken Goldberg (PH) from Sharon, Massachusetts.

观众成员：早上好。我是来自马萨诸塞州沙伦的肯·戈德伯格。

What is your long-term vision for MidAmerican Energy?

您对 MidAmerican Energy 的长期愿景是什么？

And specifically, assuming the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, what is the nature of the type of assets that you would be interested in acquiring, be they generation, transmission, distribution-type properties?

具体来说，假设废除《公共事业控股公司法》，您感兴趣的资产类型是什么性质的，无论是发电、输电还是配电类型的资产？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, MidAmerican already is a big part of Berkshire. I would say it’s likely to become much bigger. It will be easier to have it become much bigger if the Public Utility Holding Company Act, which was enacted in 1935 — if it were repealed.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，中美能源已经是伯克希尔的重要组成部分。我认为它可能会变得更大。如果 1935 年颁布的公共事业控股公司法被废除，那么它变得更大将会更容易。

Public Utility Holding Company Act, which is a melodiously named — called PUHCA — (laughter) — was enacted in 1935 in a reaction to what Sam Insull and people like that had done in the 1920s. It was very understandable.

公共事业控股公司法案，简称为 PUHCA（笑声），于 1935 年颁布，是对萨姆·因苏尔及其同类在 1920 年代所作所为的反应。这是非常可以理解的。

But I really think it is quite outdated now. I mean, it is now 68 years later.

但我真的认为它现在相当过时了。我的意思是，现在已经过去 68 年了。

And I think we bring something to the utility field. In fact, I think we brought it in the last year.

我认为我们为公用事业领域带来了一些东西。事实上，我认为我们在去年就已经带来了。

There might well be a couple of companies that wouldn’t — would be in bankruptcy now if we hadn’t been in a position to act very quickly on certain things.

如果我们当时没有能够迅速采取行动，可能确实会有几家公司现在已经破产了。

So — but with or without the repeal — and I think there’s a reasonable chance it’ll be repealed. But with or without repeal, MidAmerican, which is big now, will become quite a bit bigger. And it could become a whole lot bigger.

所以——但无论是否废除——我认为废除的可能性是合理的。但无论是否废除，MidAmerican 现在已经很大了，将会变得更大。而且它可能会变得非常大。

Now, in terms of what kind of assets we’ll buy, we don’t have a —any clear-cut preference, for example, as to whether it would be a natural gas pipeline, or whether it would be a domestic utility, or conceivably, a utility, even, in some country that we felt good about.

现在，关于我们将购买哪种资产，我们没有明确的偏好，例如，是天然气管道，还是国内公用事业，或者甚至是我们感觉良好的某个国家的公用事业。

We will look at things as they come along. We’re always ready to act. I would say that it’s certain we’ll look at a few big deals this year. Whether we get one done or not depends on competition, depends on the sellers, and some things like that.

我们会随时关注事态发展。我们始终准备采取行动。我可以说，我们今年肯定会考虑一些大交易。能否完成一笔交易取决于竞争、卖方以及类似的因素。

But something will happen with MidAmerican — over — you know, whether it’s this year, or next year, or the year after, we’ll get a shot at doing something significant.

但是 MidAmerican 会发生一些事情——无论是今年、明年还是后年，我们都会有机会做一些重要的事情。

And the nature of the energy field is you’re talking big money, always. I mean, these are not lemonade stands. And you know, we’re talking in the billions, frequently, on the kind of assets involved.

而且能源领域的性质就是你总是在谈论大笔资金。我的意思是，这些可不是柠檬水摊。你知道，我们经常谈论的是数十亿的相关资产。

So it will be a — we’ve got a fabulous management — we’ve got two people running that in Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, who are — they’re terrific businesspeople.

所以这将是一个——我们有一个出色的管理团队——我们有两个人在管理这个团队，分别是戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔，他们是非常出色的商人。

You know, they — and, incidentally — I should mention this publicly — they have done things that have made Berkshire significant money that had nothing to do with MidAmerican.

你知道，他们——顺便说一下——我应该公开提到这一点——他们做了一些让伯克希尔赚了不少钱的事情，这与中美能源无关。

In other words, they have spent their time and energy, weekends, putting together a couple of things that MidAmerican itself could not do, but Berkshire could. And they didn’t get paid a dime for that and MidAmerican did not get paid a dime for that.

换句话说，他们花费了时间和精力，利用周末，整合了一些中美能源公司自己无法做到的事情，但伯克希尔可以做到。而且他们没有因此得到一分钱的报酬，中美能源公司也没有因此得到一分钱的报酬。

So they have contributed to Berkshire’s welfare beyond what they’ve contributed simply as managers of MidAmerican.

因此，他们对伯克希尔的福利贡献超出了他们仅作为中美能源管理者的贡献。

So it’s a terrific asset. We love the idea of pouring money — (applause) — behind them, and you’ll see something happen.

所以这是一个极好的资产。我们喜欢投入资金的想法——（掌声）——在他们身后，你会看到一些事情发生。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — the really interesting thing about it is the fact that the field is so big. I mean, you’re talking about an enormous field.

查理·芒格：嗯，我——真正有趣的是这个领域如此之大。我的意思是，你在谈论一个巨大的领域。

One thing a modern civilization needs is energy, so we’ll be very disappointed if there aren’t more activities.

现代文明需要的一件事是能源，所以如果没有更多的活动，我们会非常失望。

37. Why Buffett doesn’t get a performance fee

为什么巴菲特不收取业绩费

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。

When we get through with number 10 we’re going to break for lunch, and then we’ll come back and start all over again after 30 or 40 minutes. But I’d like to get through 8, 9, and 10.

当我们完成第 10 项时，我们将休息一下吃午饭，然后在 30 或 40 分钟后回来重新开始。但我想先完成第 8、9 和 10 项。

Eight. 八。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Norman Rentrop from Bonn, Germany.

观众成员：我是来自德国波恩的诺曼·伦特罗普。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, I have a thank you and a question for you. Thank you for allowing us shareholders to invest with you on equal terms, with almost no management fee and no performance fee. (Applause)

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我有一个感谢和一个问题要对你们说。感谢你们允许我们股东以平等的条件与你们一起投资，几乎没有管理费和业绩费。（掌声）

I came to fully appreciate it when I compared my 10 years of holding Berkshire Hathaway to a private equity fund, which over the same 10 years earned 19.8 percent before fees, and 11.2 percent after fees. — (Buffett laughs)

当我将持有伯克希尔哈撒韦 10 年的经历与一家私募股权基金进行比较时，我才完全欣赏到这一点，该基金在同样的 10 年中在扣除费用前赚取了 19.8%，扣除费用后赚取了 11.2%。——（巴菲特笑）

Now my question. Back in the 1950s and 1960s when you had a partnership, Mr. Buffett, you asked for and got a performance fee of 25 percent of what was earned above 6 percent a year.

现在我的问题是。在 1950 年代和 1960 年代，当您有一个合伙企业时，巴菲特先生，您要求并获得了超过每年 6%收益的 25%的业绩费。

WARREN BUFFETT: Correct. 沃伦·巴菲特：正确。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What caused you to switch from that performance fee to that no fees we are enjoying today? Was it the wisdom that to give is better than to receive? (Laughter)

观众成员：是什么原因导致您从业绩费转变为我们今天享受的无费用？是出于“给予比接受更好”的智慧吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Try again. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：再试一次。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And do you feel that this switch from performance fee to no performance fee, that that is fully appreciated? And what did it mean to you personally?

观众成员：您是否觉得从绩效费转为无绩效费的变化得到了充分的认可？这对您个人来说意味着什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I appreciate what you had to say, and I will — I would pay to have this job I have. I would pay a lot of money. And I hope I don’t get tested on that, but you know, it’s —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我很感激你所说的话，我会——我愿意付钱来拥有我现在的工作。我愿意付很多钱。我希望我不会被考验，但你知道，这就是——

Why in the world — if I can work with people I like, and get the same result they have, and end up with all kinds of money, you know, why do I need to make some further override on them?

为什么——如果我能和我喜欢的人一起工作，并获得与他们相同的结果，最终赚到各种各样的钱，你知道，我为什么还需要对他们进行进一步的控制呢？

I was changing my position in life significantly when I started that partnership in 1956. A couple of the people that — well I guess, yeah, [Buffett’s sister] Doris may be the only original partner here. But Doris, would you stand up? She joined on May 5th, 1956, wherever she is.

在 1956 年我开始那个合伙关系时，我的人生位置发生了重大变化。几个人——嗯，我想，是的，[巴菲特的妹妹]多丽丝可能是这里唯一的原始合伙人。但是多丽丝，你能站起来吗？她在 1956 年 5 月 5 日加入，无论她在哪里。

And the — you know, those people gave me their money but I wasn’t — I needed some money then, too. And I did get an override, which I thought was fair.

而且——你知道，那些人给了我他们的钱，但我当时也需要一些钱。我确实得到了一个额外的收入，我认为这是公平的。

I got no management fee at all, though. I never charged — today, most of the people who run hedge funds charge 1 percent a year, and then some percentage of the profits. I did not do that.

不过，我根本没有收取管理费。我从未收费——如今，大多数管理对冲基金的人每年收取 1%的费用，然后再收取部分利润。我没有这样做。

And I did have all my money in after 1962, so that the downside would be equal to the upside.

而且在 1962 年之后，我确实把所有的钱都投入了进去，所以下行风险会等于上行潜力。

But I’ve always felt about the people as partners. And when we got into Berkshire — originally we got into Berkshire, Berkshire was owned by the partnership. So if I had taken a salary then I would’ve been double-dipping, in effect, by getting money out of Berkshire before, in turn, the partnership participated.

但我一直把人们视为合作伙伴。当我们进入伯克希尔时——最初我们进入伯克希尔，伯克希尔是由合伙企业拥有的。所以如果我当时领取薪水，那实际上就是双重获利，因为在合伙企业参与之前，我已经从伯克希尔拿到了钱。

And frankly, by the time I got — where I was running Berkshire I had all the money I needed. And you know, I’d rather get the same result as my partners than have me get a different result. And it can’t make any difference.

坦率地说，当我开始经营伯克希尔的时候，我已经有了我所需要的所有钱。而且你知道，我宁愿和我的合伙人得到相同的结果，而不是我得到不同的结果。这不会有什么区别。

I mean, it’ll make a difference in the size of my foundation someday, perhaps. You know, but so what? I like living the way I live.

我的意思是，总有一天这可能会影响到我基金会的规模。你知道，但那又怎样？我喜欢我现在的生活方式。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you raise a very interesting question, and it has parallels, if you go back.

查理·芒格：嗯，你提出了一个非常有趣的问题，如果你回顾过去，它有相似之处。

[Andrew] Carnegie was always very proud that the bulk of his fortune had been earned where he took no salary at all from Carnegie Steel. John D. Rockefeller the First took practically nothing in salary.

[安德鲁]卡内基一直非常自豪，他的大部分财富是在他没有从卡内基钢铁公司收取任何工资的情况下获得的。约翰·D·洛克菲勒一世几乎没有领取薪水。

Over the years — the original Vanderbilt prided himself on living on his dividends and taking no salary.

多年来，原始的范德比尔特以靠股息生活而不领取薪水为傲。

It was a common culture in a different era. And you realize that all those people had the psychology of being the founder, and maybe that’s what influenced Warren.

这在不同的时代是一种普遍的文化。你会意识到所有这些人都有成为创始人的心理，也许这就是影响沃伦的原因。

WARREN BUFFETT: What influenced you, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，是什么影响了你？

Charlie doesn’t take anything either, so —

查理也什么都不拿，所以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I was delighted to get rid of the psychological pressure brought by — brought on me by getting fees based on performance. I think Warren was, too.

查理·芒格：我很高兴摆脱了业绩费用带来的心理压力。我想沃伦也是如此。

If you’re highly conscientious in your relations with other people, and you hate to disappoint, you’re going to suffer more if you are liberally rewarded with performance fees.

如果你在与他人的关系中非常尽责，并且讨厌让人失望，那么如果你因表现而获得丰厚的奖励，你会更加痛苦。

So I think there was an enormous advantage to us, so I guess we should be thanking you.

所以我认为这对我们来说是一个巨大的优势，所以我想我们应该感谢你。

WARREN BUFFETT: I should — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我应该——（掌声）

Bill Gates has never taken an option at Microsoft, and takes a very small salary. And you’ll find it interesting. The only reason he takes the small salary is if there — he feels that, if there’s a bad year at some time in the future, he wants to be able to take a cut in salary at the same time he’s asking other people to cut back.

比尔·盖茨在微软从未选择过期权，并且领取的薪水非常少。你会发现这很有趣。他领取少量薪水的唯一原因是，如果未来某个时候出现不景气的年份，他希望在要求其他人削减薪水的同时，自己也能削减薪水。

And that is the reason. I mean, he takes peanuts as it is, but he just figures that — Bill is a very conservative guy, and he figures that some year there’ll be a bad year. And he wants — if he’s asking other people to take a 5 percent cut, he wants to be able to take a 90 percent cut, or something, himself.

这就是原因。我的意思是，他的薪水微不足道，但他认为——比尔是个非常保守的人，他认为总有一年会是糟糕的一年。他希望——如果他要求其他人削减 5%，他希望自己能够削减 90%或类似的比例。

But he’s never taken an option, and I don’t believe [Microsoft CEO] Steve Ballmer has either. They have gotten rich with their shareholders and not off their shareholders, and that’s an attitude we admire.

但他从未选择过期权，我也不相信[微软 CEO] 史蒂夫·鲍尔默选择过。他们是与股东一起致富，而不是从股东身上获利，这种态度是我们所钦佩的。

38. “Mild wakeup call” on derivatives

衍生品的“温和警钟”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：第九位？（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Whitney Tilson, a shareholder from New York City.

观众成员：早上好。我是惠特尼·蒂尔森，来自纽约市的股东。

There was a lot of talk among the Berkshire faithful when you took what I believe was the unprecedented step of pre-releasing a portion of your annual letter, published in Fortune, which focused primarily on the dangers of derivatives — which you called “financial weapons of mass destruction.”

当你采取我认为是史无前例的步骤，提前发布了你年度信的一部分时，伯克希尔的忠实拥护者中有很多讨论。这部分信件发表在《财富》杂志上，主要集中在衍生品的危险性上——你称之为“金融大规模杀伤性武器”。

I have two questions related to this — the first to you, Mr. Buffett.

我有两个相关的问题——第一个是给您的，巴菲特先生。

Could you tell us the story of how the Fortune article came about? Were you trying to draw extra attention to something that you feel strongly is a great risk to our financial system?

你能告诉我们《财富》文章是如何产生的故事吗？您是想特别引起大家对您认为对金融体系构成重大风险的事情的关注吗？

And the second question to both of you, since you’re warning about derivatives, there’s been a huge rally in the credit markets, in general. Does this reflect investors’ lack of concern for these systemic risks or is it caused by other factors?

第二个问题给你们两位，既然你们对衍生品发出警告，信贷市场总体上出现了大幅反弹。这是否反映了投资者对这些系统性风险缺乏关注，还是由其他因素引起的？

WARREN BUFFETT: The first question, my friend [Fortune Magazine journalist] Carol Loomis is the editor of the Berkshire report. And we wouldn’t get out the report without her. I mean, she is the world’s greatest editor, in addition to being the world’s greatest business writer.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一个问题，我的朋友 [《财富》杂志记者] 卡罗尔·卢米斯是伯克希尔报告的编辑。没有她，我们就无法发布这份报告。我的意思是，除了是世界上最伟大的商业作家之外，她还是世界上最伟大的编辑。

So when I gave the report to her to edit — and it did not come back unmarked, I might add — she and I talked about — I mean, I was interested in having the section on derivatives because I thought it had a broader — I hoped it would have a broader audience than just the Berkshire annual report.

所以当我把报告交给她编辑时——我可以补充一点，报告上没有任何标记——她和我谈到了——我的意思是，我对包含衍生品的部分很感兴趣，因为我认为它的受众更广——我希望它的受众比伯克希尔的年度报告更广。

And I felt that publishing it, which had no relationship to the Berkshire business, basically, except the history of Gen Re’s involvement, would not be, in any way, compromising fair disclosure, in terms of Berkshire’s results itself.

我觉得发表这篇文章，基本上与伯克希尔的业务没有关系，除了通用再保险参与的历史外，不会以任何方式妨碍伯克希尔自身业绩的公平披露。

So the primary reason for having it in Fortune was I hoped for a wider audience, basically, by having it in Fortune.

所以把它放在《财富》杂志上的主要原因是我希望通过《财富》杂志获得更广泛的读者群。

And you know, Charlie and I think there is a low, but not insignificant, probability — and low — that sometime, maybe in three years, maybe in five years, maybe in 20 years, and very possibly never, that derivatives could accentuate, in a major way, a systemic problem that might even arise from some other phenomenon.

你知道，查理和我认为，衍生品在某个时候可能会以重大方式加剧系统性问题的可能性很低，但并非微不足道——可能在三年后，可能在五年后，可能在二十年后，也很可能永远不会发生，这种问题甚至可能源于其他现象。

And we think that’s inadequately recognized. We think the problem grows as derivatives get more complex and as their usage increases.

我们认为这没有得到充分的认可。我们认为，随着衍生品变得更加复杂及其使用增加，问题会愈加严重。

So it was a call — what we hope was a mild wakeup call — to the financial world that these things could be very troublesome.

所以这是一个电话——我们希望这是一个温和的警钟——提醒金融界这些事情可能会非常麻烦。

And of course, we saw it in the energy field in the last two years. It almost destroyed, or destroyed certain institutions that never should have been destroyed.

当然，我们在过去两年的能源领域看到了这一点。它几乎摧毁了，或者摧毁了一些本不该被摧毁的机构。

And the — we also saw, in 1998, the whole financial system almost become paralyzed, particularly in the credit markets, you know, by the action of a firm, which was not solely based on derivatives, but would not have gotten into as much trouble as it did without derivatives.

而且——我们也在 1998 年看到，整个金融系统几乎陷入瘫痪，特别是在信贷市场，你知道，由于一家公司的行动，这家公司并不仅仅基于衍生品，但如果没有衍生品，它就不会陷入如此大的麻烦。

So it’s a subject that no one quite knows what to do with. Charlie and I would not know how to regulate it, but we think we have had some experience in seeing both the firm’s specific dangers in that field, and we think we have some insight into the systemic problems that could arise.

所以这是一个没有人确切知道如何处理的主题。查理和我不知道如何监管它，但我们认为我们在看到公司在该领域的具体危险方面有一些经验，并且我们认为我们对可能出现的系统性问题有一些见解。

And you know, that people really — they don’t want to think about it until it happens. But there are some things in the financial world that are better thought of before they happen, even if they’re low probabilities.

你知道，人们真的——他们不想在事情发生之前去考虑。但在金融世界中，有些事情即使发生的概率很低，也最好在它们发生之前考虑。

And we’re thinking about low probabilities all the time, in terms of Berkshire. I mean, we don’t want anything to go wrong in a big way at Berkshire. And we therefore, I think, think about things that a good many people don’t think about — simply because we worry about that.

我们一直在考虑低概率事件，就伯克希尔而言。我的意思是，我们不希望伯克希尔发生任何重大问题。因此，我认为我们会考虑许多人没有考虑过的事情——仅仅因为我们对此感到担忧。

And when we get our social hats on we think about it in terms of something like derivatives for financial systems of the world. And we have had some experience at both Salomon and at Gen Re.

当我们带上社会责任的帽子时，我们会从类似于世界金融系统衍生品的角度来思考这个问题。我们在所罗门和通用再保险公司都有过一些经验。

And Charlie was on the audit committee at Salomon, and he saw some things in the audit committee in relationship to trading itself, and derivatives in particularly, that made him wonder why in the world people were doing these sort of things. I’ll let Charlie expand on that.

查理是所罗门公司的审计委员会成员，他在审计委员会中看到了一些与交易本身，特别是衍生品相关的事情，这让他不明白人们为什么要做这些事情。我会让查理对此进行详细说明。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, in engineering, people put big margins of safety into systems — atomic power plants being the extreme example. And in the financial world, in derivatives, it’s as though nobody gave a damn about safety.

查理·芒格：是的，在工程领域，人们在系统中加入了很大的安全边际——核电站就是一个极端的例子。而在金融界，尤其是衍生品领域，似乎没有人关心安全问题。

And they just let it balloon, and balloon, and balloon in usage, and number of trades, and size of trades.

他们就这样让它在使用量、交易次数和交易规模上不断膨胀。

And that ballooning is aided by this false accounting, where people are pretending to make money they’re not really making.

而这种膨胀是由这种虚假会计助长的，人们假装赚到他们实际上没有赚到的钱。

I regard that as very dangerous, and I’m more negative than Warren in the sense that I’ll be amazed, if I live another five or 10 years, if we don’t have some significant blow-up.

我认为那是非常危险的，而且我比沃伦更悲观，因为如果我再活五到十年，如果我们没有发生一些重大危机，我会感到惊讶。

WARREN BUFFETT: They’ve been advertised, and sometimes in a fairly prominent way — they’ve been advertised as shedding risk for participants in the system, and reducing risk for the system.

沃伦·巴菲特：它们已经被宣传，有时是以相当显著的方式——它们被宣传为为系统中的参与者减少风险，并降低系统的风险。

And I would say that I think they have long crossed the point where they decrease risk to the system, and now they enhance risk. Because you have — the truth is, the Coca-Cola Company couldn’t bear the foreign exchange risk that they run, or the interest rate risk that they run, and all of that sort of thing.

我会说，我认为他们早已越过了降低系统风险的界限，现在他们在增加风险。因为事实是，可口可乐公司无法承受他们所承担的外汇风险或利率风险，以及所有类似的风险。

But when the Coca-Cola Company starts laying those off, and every other company in the world — major company — does with just a relatively few players, you have now intensified the risk that exists in the system.

但是当可口可乐公司开始裁员时，世界上其他每一个主要公司也都这样做，只是涉及相对较少的员工，你现在就加剧了系统中存在的风险。

You have not shed risk at all, you have transferred it, and you have transferred it to very few players. And those players have huge interdependencies with each other, and to some extent, central banks and all of those similar institutions are vulnerable to the weaknesses of those institutions.

你根本没有消除风险，你只是转移了风险，而且你把风险转移给了很少的参与者。而这些参与者之间有着巨大的相互依赖性，并且在某种程度上，中央银行和所有类似的机构都容易受到这些机构弱点的影响。

When Charlie and I were at Salomon, you know, they hated it if we brought up — and so therefore, we didn’t do it — that we were too big to fail.

当查理和我在所罗门公司时，你知道，他们讨厌我们提到——因此，我们没有这样做——我们大到不能倒。

But the truth was that if Salomon failed at that time, the problems for the rest of the system could well have been significant. They might’ve been — who knows exactly what they would have been? But they could have been quite significant.

但事实是，如果Salomon当时失败，系统其他部分的问题可能会相当严重。它们可能会是——谁知道它们究竟会是什么？但它们可能会相当严重。

And when you start concentrating risks in institutions which are highly leveraged, and who intersect with a few other institutions like that — all bearing same risks, all having the same motivations in the trading departments — to take on more and more esoteric things because they can book more and more immediate profits, you are courting danger.

当你开始将风险集中在高杠杆的机构中，并且这些机构与其他几个类似的机构交叉——所有机构都承担相同的风险，交易部门都有相同的动机——为了获得越来越多的即时利润而承担越来越多的深奥事务时，你就是在招惹危险。

And that’s why I wrote about it this time. And I — it’s not a prediction, it’s a warning.

这就是为什么我这次写了这篇文章。而我——这不是预测，而是警告。

39. Do managers love the business or the money?

39. 经理们是热爱业务还是热爱金钱？

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10, and then we will break for lunch right after this.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十个问题，然后我们就休息吃午饭。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, my name is Ho Nam from San Francisco, California. I have a two-part question regarding how you evaluate your managers.

观众成员：早上好，我叫何南，来自加利福尼亚州旧金山。我有一个关于您如何评估经理的两个部分的问题。

In your annual report, you wrote that Berkshire Hathaway owns “good to great” businesses and employs “great to great” managers, and we’re thankful for that.

在您的年度报告中，您写道伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司拥有“良好到伟大”的企业，并聘用“伟大到伟大”的管理者，我们对此表示感谢。

When you hire a manager, or are evaluating the management team of a business you’re thinking about buying, what are the qualities you look for?

当你雇用一位经理，或正在评估你考虑购买的企业的管理团队时，你会寻找哪些品质？

And some of your managers were entrepreneurs who started their businesses from scratch when their business models were unproven, and some of them took over businesses that were already performing well when they took charge.

而你们的一些经理曾是企业家，他们在商业模式尚未得到验证时从零开始创业，而其中一些人在接手时则是管理已经表现良好的企业。

What are the qualities of a great entrepreneur that might be different from those of a manager who can be great at running a company that’s established, but may not be able to start a business from scratch and tinker around with a business model and figure out how to make it successful?

伟大企业家的品质有哪些，这些品质可能与擅长经营已建立公司的经理不同，但这些经理可能无法从头开始创业，调整商业模式并找出如何使其成功？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well we love managers that have a passion for their business. And when we’re buying a business we have to ask ourselves, “Do they love the money or do they love the business?”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们喜欢对业务充满热情的经理。当我们收购一家公司时，我们必须问自己：“他们是爱钱还是爱业务？”

If they love the money, there’s nothing wrong with that, but they probably wouldn’t be running the business for us a year or two down the road.

如果他们喜欢钱，这没有什么错，但他们可能不会在一两年后继续为我们经营这项业务。

I think one difference is that people that create their own businesses, the entrepreneurs, probably, on average would have a significantly greater degree of passion for those businesses than somebody that was just brought in a few years ago and sees themselves as making a profit in a few years on reselling the business and leaving.

我认为一个区别是，那些创建自己企业的人，企业家，可能平均来说对这些企业的热情要比那些几年前才加入并认为自己在几年后通过转售企业获利然后离开的人要高得多。

I — you’ll find exceptions in both camps. But we’ve had terrific luck with the entrepreneurs who basically love their businesses the way I love Berkshire. I mean, they are not going to let anything happen to their businesses.

我——你会在两方面都找到例外。但我们在那些基本上像我爱伯克希尔一样爱他们企业的企业家身上取得了极大的成功。我的意思是，他们不会让任何事情发生在他们的企业上。

They can — you know, they’ll tell me to butt out if I’m going to screw up something in their operations, and they don’t regard them — I mean, in a certain sense, I mean, they know they’re part of Berkshire.

他们可以——你知道，如果我要搞砸他们的运营，他们会让我别插手，他们不认为——我的意思是，从某种意义上说，他们知道自己是伯克希尔的一部分。

But they regard them in a certain jealousy, almost, as being their businesses, and we love it that way.

但他们几乎以某种嫉妒的态度看待他们，认为这是他们的业务，而我们喜欢这样。

And you know, we can spot it when we see it. And we also can avoid it.

你知道，我们看到的时候能识别出来。我们也能避免它。

We have never — I just got one in the other day, something from an investment banker on somebody that wants to resell a business they bought a few years ago.

我们从未——就在前几天，我收到了一封来自投资银行家的信，关于某人想要转售他们几年前购买的一家企业。

Well you know, the chances that they haven’t doctored up the figures in some way or are trying to sell, I mean, you know, they’re — it’s a piece of meat to them. And if it’s a piece of meat to them, you know, what am I going to do with it?

你知道，他们没有以某种方式篡改数据或试图出售的可能性，我是说，你知道，对他们来说，这就是一块肉。如果对他们来说这是一块肉，你知道，我能用它做什么呢？

So we — if we make the proper judgment about the passion they have for their business, they’re going to keep running — they may have a lot of money in the bank — but they’re going to keep running the businesses for us, because they love those businesses.

所以，如果我们对他们对业务的热情做出正确的判断，他们会继续经营——他们可能银行里有很多钱——但他们会继续为我们经营这些业务，因为他们热爱这些业务。

And they really are motivated the same way I am. You know, it wouldn’t make any difference what I get paid, you know. I’m identified, in my own mind, with how Berkshire does.

他们的动力和我一样。你知道，我拿多少钱并不会有什么区别。我在自己的心里与伯克希尔的表现紧密相连。

I really don’t care how the rest of the world thinks about how Berkshire’s doing. I mean, in other words, when we looked like we were out of step a few years ago, that really doesn’t make any difference to me, as long as I feel OK about how Berkshire is doing.

我真的不在乎世界其他地方如何看待伯克希尔的表现。换句话说，几年前当我们看起来不合时宜时，这对我来说真的没有任何影响，只要我对伯克希尔的表现感到满意就行。

But I do — you know, that’s how I measure what I’m doing every day — not by the price of the stock, but by what’s going on in the business. And that’s what — we have a group of managers like that, and there —

但我确实如此——你知道，这就是我每天衡量自己所做事情的方式——不是通过股票价格，而是通过业务的进展。这就是我们拥有的一群这样的管理者，而且那里——

I don’t think there’s — well, there can’t be a company in the country, in my view, that, if you could figure out some way to measure the passion involved, in terms of running their business, I don’t think there’s anybody that could come close to matching the quantity that we have managed to marshal together at Berkshire.

我认为在这个国家没有任何公司——在我看来，如果你能找到某种方法来衡量经营业务时所投入的热情，我不认为有任何人能接近我们在伯克希尔所汇集的数量。

It’s been accidental over time, but it’s really almost unique. I think it is unique.

随着时间的推移，这一直是偶然的，但它确实几乎是独一无二的。我认为它是独一无二的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s very interesting to think about what matters most, the passion or the competence that was borne in?

查理·芒格：嗯，思考什么最重要是很有趣的，是与生俱来的激情还是能力？

Certainly Berkshire is full of people who have a peculiar amount of passion in their love for their own business. And I would argue that probably the passion is more important than the brainpower.

当然，伯克希尔充满了对自己业务有着特殊热情的人。我认为，热情可能比智力更重要。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and by the time they get to us, if they were passionate but incompetent, they don’t get to us.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当他们到我们这里时，如果他们充满热情但不称职，他们就不会到我们这里。

I mean, they’re not going to be there unless they’re competent, but the question is whether they had a passion for money or a passion for their business, to some degree.

我的意思是，他们不会在那里，除非他们有能力，但问题是他们是对金钱有热情还是对他们的业务有某种程度的热情。

And they all like money, and the reason — and they like it, partly, because it enables them to build the business they love.

他们都喜欢钱，原因之一是因为钱能让他们建立自己热爱的事业。

But they don’t — we’re not going to see an incompetent, but passionate, manager by the time we start laying out a lot of money for a business.

但他们不会——当我们开始为一项业务投入大量资金时，我们不会看到一个无能但充满激情的经理。

They got weeded out a long time ago. So I don’t have to weed those out, but I do have to weed out the ones who want to cash a big paycheck and go off and do something else at some time. And like I say, we’ve had great luck at that.

他们很久以前就被淘汰了。所以我不需要淘汰那些人，但我确实需要淘汰那些想要拿到一大笔薪水然后去做其他事情的人。就像我说的，我们在这方面运气很好。

But we have literally — I mean, we see lots and lots of businesses owned by — usually owned — by financial operator types, where it’s absolutely clear that, you know, they have come in, they’ve leveraged it up, they’ve played games with the accounting.

但我们确实——我的意思是，我们看到很多很多企业通常是由金融操作者类型的人拥有的，很明显，他们进来后进行了杠杆化，并在会计上玩了花招。

They — that has about run out, you know, and they want to sell it. And interestingly enough, fairly often, those are built by — bought by — other financial operators who think they’re going to play the game a second time.

他们——你知道，那已经差不多用完了，他们想要卖掉它。而有趣的是，相当频繁地，这些被其他金融运营商购买，他们认为自己会再玩一次这个游戏。

After session 会后

1. Pretax operating profits clarification

税前营业利润澄清

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We have no afternoon movie, so we’ll get to business in a second. And if everybody will just find their seats, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们下午没有电影，所以我们马上开始。请大家找到自己的座位。

I’ve been advised by [Berkshire CFO] Marc Hamburg to make sure I make clear what I may not have made clear earlier.

我已被[伯克希尔首席财务官]马克·汉堡建议，确保我澄清我之前可能没有澄清的内容。

In terms of the figures we gave you about the first quarter: A, I think I said we had 16 billion of cash or cash equivalents, which is correct. We had a $290 million pretax underwriting profit. I think I said that.

关于我们给你的第一季度数据：A，我想我说过我们有 160 亿的现金或现金等价物，这是正确的。我们有 2.9 亿美元的税前承保利润。我想我说过。

What possibly I may have misstated, we had a billion-seven-hundred million, pretax operational gain. We had actually also, by coincidence, very close to a billion-seven of after-tax, counting securities gains. But our operating gain, excluding security gains, was about a billion-seven, pretax.

如果我可能有误述，我们有十七亿美元的税前运营收益。实际上，巧合的是，我们的税后收益也非常接近十七亿美元，包括证券收益。但我们的运营收益，不包括证券收益，大约是十七亿美元的税前收益。

2. Read everything, ignore management, wait for “fat pitch”

2. 阅读一切，忽略管理，等待“肥球”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s start right in at number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们从第一条开始。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is Oliver Graussa (PH), and I’m from Vienna, Austria.

观众成员：是的。我的名字是奥利弗·格劳萨（音），我来自奥地利维也纳。

And my question has two parts. And so, the first part is, how do you get a few excellent investment ideas to be so successful? Do you read any special newspapers or industry magazines? Or do you visit the headquarters or any subsidiaries of companies?

我的问题分为两个部分。第一部分是，你如何让一些优秀的投资想法如此成功？你会阅读什么特别的报纸或行业杂志吗？或者你会访问公司的总部或任何子公司吗？

And which sources of information, like books, for example, Value Line, Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, databases like Reuters, Bloomberg, DataStream, annual reports, internet, and so on, do you use to get the right impression of a company?

您使用哪些信息来源，例如书籍、Value Line、标准普尔、穆迪、路透社、彭博社、DataStream 等数据库、年度报告、互联网等，以获得对公司的正确印象？

And the second part, if you (crowd noise) think that a company like The Washington Post, GEICO, or Gillette has a very competitive product, what are the steps before you ultimately decide to invest in the company?

第二部分，如果你（人群噪音）认为像《华盛顿邮报》、GEICO 或吉列这样的公司有非常有竞争力的产品，在最终决定投资该公司之前有哪些步骤？

Which publications do you read to get the best knowledge of the product? And how important is the balance sheet and profit and loss account statement of the company? Thank you very much.

你阅读哪些出版物以获得对产品的最佳了解？公司的资产负债表和损益表有多重要？非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

The answer to the first part is sort of — and maybe the second part — is sort of all of the above. I mean we — (laughter) — read a lot. And we read daily publications, we read weekly or monthly periodicals, we read annual reports, we read 10-Ks, we read 10-Qs.

第一个问题的答案是有点——也许第二个问题——是有点以上所有。我是说我们——（笑声）——读很多东西。我们读日报，我们读周刊或月刊，我们读年度报告，我们读 10-K，我们读 10-Q。

And fortunately, the investment business is a business where knowledge cumulates. I mean, everything you learn when you’re 20 or 30 — you may tweak some as you go along, but it all kind of builds into a knowledge base that’s useful forever.

幸运的是，投资业务是一个知识积累的行业。我的意思是，你在 20 岁或 30 岁时学到的所有东西——你可能会在过程中做一些调整，但这一切都会构建成一个永远有用的知识库。

And we — at least, you know, I read. Charlie used to read. May still read a fair amount.

我们——至少，你知道，我读书。查理过去常读书。可能现在仍然读不少书。

But I read a lot of 10-Ks, read a lot of annual reports. Forty or 50 years ago I did a lot of talking to managements. I used to go out and take a trip every now and then and really drop in on maybe 15 or 20 companies. I haven’t done that for a long, long time.

但我读了很多 10-K 文件，读了很多年度报告。四五十年前，我经常与管理层交谈。我过去常常出去旅行，偶尔拜访大约 15 或 20 家公司。我已经很久很久没有这样做了。

I find — everything we do, pretty much, I find through public documents.

我发现——几乎我们所做的一切，我都是通过公共文件发现的。

When I made an offer for Clayton Homes, I’d never visited the business. I’d never met the people. I’d done it over the phone. I’d read Jim Clayton’s book. I looked at the 10-Ks. I knew every company in the industry. I look at competitors.

当我对 Clayton Homes 提出收购要约时，我从未去过这家公司。我从未见过这些人。我是在电话中完成的。我读过 Jim Clayton 的书。我查看了 10-K 报告。我了解这个行业的每家公司。我研究了竞争对手。

And I try to understand the business and not have any preconceived notions. And there is adequate information out there to evaluate a great many businesses.

我努力去理解业务，而不带有任何先入之见。而且有足够的信息可以评估许多企业。

We do not find it particularly helpful to talk to managements. Managements frequently want to come to Omaha and talk to me, and they usually have a variety of reasons that they say they want to talk to me, but what they’re really hoping is we get interested in their stock. That never works.

我们发现与管理层交谈并没有特别的帮助。管理层经常想来奥马哈和我谈话，他们通常有各种各样的理由说想和我谈，但他们真正希望的是我们对他们的股票感兴趣。这从来没有用。

You know, managements are not the best reporting parties in most cases. The figures tell us more than a management does. So we do not spend any real amount of time talking to management.

你知道，在大多数情况下，管理层并不是最佳的报告方。数字比管理层告诉我们的更多。因此，我们并没有花费太多时间与管理层交谈。

When we buy a business, we look at the record to determine what the management’s like, and then we want to size them up, personally, as I said earlier, whether they will keep working.

当我们收购一家企业时，我们会查看记录以确定管理层的情况，然后我们想要亲自评估他们，正如我之前所说，看看他们是否会继续努力工作。

But we don’t give a hoot about anybody’s projections. We don’t even want to hear about them, in terms of what they’re going to do in the future. We’ve never found any value in anything like that.

但我们对任何人的预测都不在乎。我们甚至不想听到他们将来会做什么。我们从未在这类事情中发现任何价值。

But just a general business knowledge, you know, what we’ve seen work, what we’ve seen has not worked. There’s a lot you absorb over time. Charlie?

但只是一般的商业知识，你知道，我们看到什么有效，什么无效。随着时间的推移，你会吸收很多。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The more basic knowledge you have, I think the less new knowledge you have to get.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为你掌握的基础知识越多，你需要获取的新知识就越少。

And the game is a lot like that fellow that plays chess blindfolded. He’s got a memory of the board and everything that happened before. And that enables him to do the next move in a way he never could if you just showed him the board midgame, cold.

而这个游戏很像那个蒙眼下棋的人。他记得棋盘和之前发生的一切。这使他能够进行下一步，而如果你只是冷不防地在中局给他看棋盘，他是绝对做不到的。

And so there — and in terms of what publications, I don’t know, Warren. I would hate to give up The Wall Street Journal.

所以在那儿——至于哪些出版物，我不知道，沃伦。我不想放弃《华尔街日报》。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, you’d also hate to give up The Buffalo News.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，你也不愿意放弃《水牛城新闻报》。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But you could — well, you want to read lots of financial material as it comes along.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是你可以——嗯，你应该阅读大量的金融材料。

And actually, The New York Times has a far better business section than they had 25 years ago.

实际上，《纽约时报》的商业版块比 25 年前要好得多。

But you want to read Fortune, you know. You want to read lots of annual reports. You really want to have a database in your mind so that you can tell what kind of a business you’re looking at, in general, by looking at the figures.

但你想读《财富》，你知道的。你想读很多年度报告。你真的想在脑海中有一个数据库，这样你就可以通过查看数据大致判断你在看的是哪种业务。

It’s far overrated — we never look at any analyst reports. I mean I don’t think I’ve, you know, if I read one it was because the funny papers weren’t available, you know — (Laughter)

这被高估得太多了——我们从不看任何分析师报告。我的意思是，我不认为我看过，如果我看过，那是因为没有搞笑漫画可以看——（笑声）

It just isn’t — I mean, it — I don’t understand why people do it.

这就是不——我的意思是，我——我不明白人们为什么这样做。

But there’s a lot of data out there. And, you know, the beauty of it is — it’s really what makes the investment game great — is you don’t have to be right on everything.

但是外面有很多数据。而且，你知道，这其中的美妙之处在于——这正是让投资游戏变得精彩的原因——你不必在所有事情上都正确。

You don’t have to be right on 20 percent of the companies in the world or 10 percent of the companies in the world or 5 percent. You only have to get one good idea every year or two.

你不需要在世界上 20%的公司、10%的公司或 5%的公司中是正确的。你只需要每年或每两年有一个好主意。

So it’s not something — you know, when — I used to be very interested in horse handicapping, and the old story was — and I hope Bob Dwyer is still here — that, you know, you could beat a race but you can’t beat the races. And you can come up with a very profitable decision on a single company.

所以这不是——你知道，当——我过去对赛马很感兴趣，老故事是——我希望鲍勃·德怀尔还在这里——你知道，你可以赢一场比赛，但你不能赢所有比赛。你可以对单个公司做出非常有利可图的决定。

I would hate to be measured — if somebody gave me all 500 stocks in the S&P and I had to make some prediction about how they would behave relative to the market over the next couple years, I don’t know how I would do.

如果有人给我标普 500 指数中的所有 500 只股票，并让我预测它们在未来几年相对于市场的表现，我会很讨厌被这样衡量，因为我不知道我会怎么做。

But maybe I can find one in there where I think I’m 9 in 10, 90 percent, in being right.

但也许我可以在其中找到一个，我认为我有九成、90%的把握是对的。

It’s an enormous advantage in stocks, is that you only have to be right on a very, very few things in your lifetime as long as you never make any big mistakes.

在股票投资中，一个巨大的优势是，只要你一生中在极少数事情上是正确的，并且从不犯任何重大错误。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What’s interesting is that at least 90 percent of the professional investment management operations don’t think the way we do at all.

查理·芒格：有趣的是，至少 90%的专业投资管理机构完全不以我们的方式思考。

They just think, if they hire enough people, they can be better at determining whether Pfizer or Merck is going to do better over the next 20 years.

他们只是认为，如果他们雇佣足够多的人，就能更好地判断辉瑞或默克在未来 20 年内谁会表现得更好。

And they can do that, stock by stock, all through the 500 and have wide diversification. And at the end of 10 years they’ll be way ahead of other people, and, of course, they won’t.

他们可以这样做，一只股票接一只股票，贯穿整个 500，并实现广泛的多元化。在 10 年结束时，他们将远远领先于其他人，当然，他们不会。

Very few people have this idea of searching for just a few opportunities.

很少有人有这种只寻找少数机会的想法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You wait for the fat pitch. Ted Williams wrote about that in a book called “The Science of Hitting.” He said the most important thing in being a good hitter, you know, is to wait for the pitch in the sweet spot, basically.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你要等待一个好球。泰德·威廉姆斯在一本名为《击球的科学》的书中写到了这一点。他说，成为一个优秀击球手最重要的事情就是等待在最佳击球点的球。

But, you know, I’ve always said that the way to get a reputation for being a good businessman is to buy a good business. You know? (Laughter)

但是，你知道，我一直说，获得好商人声誉的方法是买一个好生意。你知道吗？（笑声）

It’s much easier than taking a lousy business, you know, and showing how wonderful you are at it, because I haven’t seen that done very often.

这比接手一个糟糕的生意并展示你的出色能力要容易得多，因为我很少见到有人能做到这一点。

3. “We do our best to explain” Berkshire

3. “我们尽力解释” 伯克希尔

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. David Winters. Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Thank you again for hosting the Berkshire weekend. It’s just great.

观众成员：下午好。大卫·温特斯。新泽西州山湖。再次感谢您举办伯克希尔周末。这真是太棒了。

Interest rates are the lowest they’ve been in, I think, two generations. Equity values, in aggregate, are still high. Berkshire has meaningful free cash flow, a short-duration bond portfolio, and you’re a buyer of low-multiple, high-quality private businesses, and a few stocks.

我认为，利率是两代人以来最低的。整体而言，股权价值仍然很高。伯克希尔有可观的自由现金流、短期债券投资组合，并且您是低倍数、高质量私人企业和少数股票的买家。

Assuming that the stimulative economic policies to deal with the recession eventually cause interest rates to go up and, maybe, equity values to come down, Berkshire seems very well positioned to benefit. Would you comment?

假设应对经济衰退的刺激性经济政策最终导致利率上升，并且可能导致股权价值下降，伯克希尔似乎处于非常有利的位置以从中受益。您能对此发表评论吗？

And also, are there any concerns on both of your parts about investors inadequately understanding the conglomerate structure of Berkshire and, therefore, improperly pricing the shares?

而且，你们双方是否担心投资者对伯克希尔的企业集团结构理解不够，从而导致对股票定价不当？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to answer the second question first, we hope the latter wouldn’t be true, because we do our best to explain it. I mean I used 14,000 words in the last annual report, which caused certain members of my family to ask whether I was getting paid by the word. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，先回答第二个问题，我们希望后者不是真的，因为我们尽力去解释。我在上一份年度报告中用了 14,000 个字，这让我的某些家人问我是否按字数收费。（笑声）

The — we want you to understand Berkshire, and I hope that comes through. That’s why we have these kind of meetings. That’s why we spend a lot of time writing an annual report. We try to tell you what we would like if the position was reversed — if our positions were reversed.

我们希望你了解伯克希尔，我希望你能明白这一点。这就是我们举办这种会议的原因。这也是我们花很多时间撰写年度报告的原因。我们试图告诉你，如果我们的角色互换，我们希望得到什么。

And we think that the information in the annual report, if read by somebody that — they have to have some understanding of business and accounting, but if they don’t, you know, nothing is going to help, really, in terms of helping them with the business.

我们认为，年度报告中的信息，如果由某个对商业和会计有一定了解的人阅读——如果他们没有这种了解，你知道，实际上没有什么能真正帮助他们理解业务。

But we think if they have some understanding of it, we have given them the information that Charlie and I would need in order to come up with our rough ideas of a valuation of Berkshire, and we hope we get across what it’s all about.

但我们认为，如果他们对其有一定的了解，我们就已经向他们提供了查理和我需要的信息，以便提出我们对伯克希尔估值的粗略想法，并且我们希望能够传达出这其中的意义。

You know, there are a lot of companies in Berkshire, but it’s not important that you understand the nuances of every single one. Looking at what happens in aggregate, in many cases, will be sufficient.

你知道，伯克希尔有很多公司，但了解每一家公司的细微差别并不重要。很多情况下，整体来看就足够了。

4. “Strange things happen” in markets

4. 市场中“奇怪的事情发生”

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of how we’re positioned, you know, we have 16 billion of cash, not because we want 16 billion of cash, or because we expect interest rates to go up, or because we expect equities to go down.

沃伦·巴菲特：就我们的定位而言，你知道，我们有 160 亿美元的现金，不是因为我们想要 160 亿美元的现金，也不是因为我们预计利率会上升，或者因为我们预计股市会下跌。

We have 16 billion in cash because we don’t see anything that makes us want to part with that cash where we feel we’re getting enough for our money.

我们有 160 亿美元的现金，因为我们没有看到任何让我们愿意花掉这些现金的东西，我们觉得我们没有得到足够的回报。

But we would spend — we spent a Monday morning on the right sort of business, or even if we could find equities that we liked, or if we could find — like last year we found some junk bonds we liked. We’re not finding them this year at all, because prices have changed dramatically.

但是我们会花——我们花了一个星期一的早晨在合适的业务上，或者即使我们能找到我们喜欢的股票，或者如果我们能找到——比如去年我们找到了一些我们喜欢的垃圾债券。今年我们根本找不到，因为价格发生了巨大变化。

So, we’re not really ever positioning ourselves. We’re simply trying to do the smartest thing we can every day when we come to the office. And if there’s nothing smart to do, cash is the default option.

所以，我们并不是真的在定位自己。我们只是每天来到办公室时尽力去做最明智的事情。如果没有明智的事情可做，现金就是默认选项。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: In terms of future opportunities, the issue is, is it at all likely that there’ll be an opportunity like 1973-4, or 1982, even, when equities generally are just mouthwatering?

查理·芒格：就未来的机会而言，问题是，是否有可能出现像 1973-4 年或 1982 年那样的机会，当时股票普遍令人垂涎欲滴？

I think there’s a very excellent chance that neither Warren or I will live to see either of those occasions again.

我认为沃伦和我都很有可能再也看不到这两种情况的发生。

If so, Berkshire’s not going to have a lot of no-brainer opportunities. We’re going to have to grind ahead the way we’ve been doing it recently, which is not all bad.

如果是这样，伯克希尔将不会有很多显而易见的机会。我们将不得不继续像最近那样努力，这并不完全是坏事。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not impossible, though, we’ll get some mouthwatering opportunities. I mean you just don’t know in markets. It’s unbelievable what markets do over time.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，我们可能会得到一些令人垂涎的机会。这在市场中是有可能的。市场随着时间的推移所做的事情是难以置信的。

And since you brought up interest rates, you know, in Japan the 10-year bond is selling to yield 5/8ths of 1 percent. Five-eighths of 1 percent.

既然你提到了利率，你知道，在日本，10 年期债券的收益率是 5/8 的 1%。五分之五的 1%。

I don’t think there’s anybody in our annual meeting of 20 years ago, certainly including Charlie and myself, who would have dreamt that a 10-year bond of a country, you know, running a significant deficit would be selling at 5/8ths of 1 percent.

我认为在我们 20 年前的年度会议上，当然包括查理和我自己，没有人会想到一个有着巨大赤字的国家的 10 年期债券会以 5/8 的 1%出售。

I mean would you say so, Charlie? (Laughs)

我是说你会这么说吗，查理？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Would I ever. But strange things happen.

查理·芒格：当然会。但奇怪的事情会发生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Strange things happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：奇怪的事情发生了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But if that could happen in Japan, something much less horrible for the investing class could happen in the United States. It’s not unthinkable.

查理·芒格：但如果这种情况在日本发生，那么对投资阶层来说，在美国可能会发生不那么可怕的事情。这并非不可想象。

I mean we could be in for a considerable period when the average intelligent, diversified investor in common stocks, using fancy paid advisors, just doesn’t do very well.

我的意思是，我们可能会经历一个相当长的时期，普通的聪明、多元化的普通股投资者，即使使用昂贵的付费顾问，也表现得不太好。

WARREN BUFFETT: But you could argue that if what we warned against, and hope doesn’t happen, with derivatives should happen, it might create enormous opportunities for us in some arena. I mean, you know, but we — wouldn’t be good for society, but it might very well turn out to be good for us.

沃伦·巴菲特：但你可以争辩说，如果我们警告过的事情发生了，并且希望不会发生的衍生品问题真的发生了，它可能会在某些领域为我们创造巨大的机会。我的意思是，你知道的，这对社会不利，但对我们来说可能会非常有利。

If you get chaotic markets — you had a somewhat disorganized market in junk bonds last year, because there were a lot of them created much faster than the funds available to absorb them were coming in.

如果市场变得混乱——去年垃圾债券市场有些混乱，因为它们的创建速度远远快于可用资金的流入速度。

Now, this year you have just the opposite situation. You have money pouring in to junk bond funds. Billion dollars a week, roughly, and that’s changed the whole price situation. The world hasn’t changed that much. It’s just that the chaos has left the market for those instruments.

现在，今年你正好处于相反的情况。你有资金涌入垃圾债券基金。大约每周十亿美元，这改变了整个价格状况。世界并没有发生太大变化，只是混乱已经离开了这些工具的市场。

5. “Intrinsic value is terribly important and very fuzzy”

5. “内在价值非常重要，但也非常模糊”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Hello. Paul Tomasik. Thornton, Illinois.

观众成员：是的。你好。保罗·托马西克。伊利诺伊州桑顿。

Ben Graham and the model of value investing — I’d like to bring the discussion back to that.

本·格雷厄姆和价值投资模型——我想把讨论带回到这个话题。

And what’s interesting and exceptional about you, and Charlie, and Ben Graham, is the self-discipline. The incredible self-discipline.

有趣且特别的是你、查理和本·格雷厄姆的自律。令人难以置信的自律。

And if you look at the model and try to think how to present it to teach others that self-discipline, I think you have to make a little tweak to it in two areas. And that’s what I’d like you to comment on.

如果你查看这个模型并试图思考如何展示它以教导他人自律，我认为你需要在两个方面稍作调整。这就是我希望你评论的内容。

One, intrinsic value. It’s always discussed that you calculate intrinsic value. But in practice, I think you find a number that is guaranteed — 99 percent likely — to be less than intrinsic value.

一，内在价值。人们总是讨论如何计算内在价值。但在实践中，我认为你会找到一个保证——99%可能——低于内在价值的数字。

Classic example was in 2000 when you said you’d buy shares back at 45,000. You weren’t saying that Berkshire Hathaway’s intrinsic value was 45,000. You were saying it was significantly more. And anyone who bought it for less than 45,000 is grateful to you.

经典的例子是 2000 年，当时你说你会以 45,000 的价格回购股票。你并不是在说伯克希尔·哈撒韦的内在价值是 45,000。你是在说它的价值远不止于此。任何以低于 45,000 的价格购买它的人都对你心存感激。

The other area is the hidden assumption in the model. And that is, it’s assumed that once you find a value stock and you buy it, that the intrinsic value isn’t going to go down. And that’s a second part of the analysis that has to be part of the discipline.

另一个方面是模型中的隐藏假设。也就是说，假设一旦你找到一个价值股并购买它，其内在价值不会下降。这是分析的第二部分，必须成为纪律的一部分。

So even though you found a value stock, you still haven’t done all the work. You have to analyze, is the intrinsic value going to go down. In particular, companies throw away intrinsic value is the most common. Management gives it away.

所以即使你找到了一个价值股，你仍然没有完成所有工作。你必须分析，内在价值是否会下降。特别是，公司最常见的是丢弃内在价值。管理层把它送掉。

That hasn’t happened at Berkshire Hathaway, although I don’t want to give an unqualified comment on that, since I see you’re remodeling the offices, so we don’t know how much intrinsic value’s been thrown away there.

这在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司还没有发生，虽然我不想对此给出一个不加保留的评论，因为我看到你们正在重新装修办公室，所以我们不知道在那里浪费了多少内在价值。

So, if you could comment on the two things. Do you calculate intrinsic value, or a number that’s absolutely positivity under intrinsic value, that’s the number you put in the equation?

那么，您能否对这两件事发表评论。您是计算内在价值，还是一个绝对低于内在价值的数字，这是您放入方程式中的数字？

And even when you find a stock selling for less than this lower bound of intrinsic value, do you still do the homework on the second part and analyze, will the intrinsic value go down in the future? Thank you.

即使当你发现一只股票的售价低于这个内在价值的下限时，你是否仍然会做第二部分的功课并分析，未来内在价值是否会下降？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would feel somewhat better qualified to speak on self-discipline if I weighed about 20 pounds less, but — (laughter) — for the moment we’ll ignore that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果我体重轻 20 磅，我可能会觉得自己更有资格谈论自律，但——（笑声）——目前我们就忽略这一点吧。

The second part of your question, relating to intrinsic value going down. Actually, if you compute intrinsic value as reflecting the discounted value of future cash flows, that should have, built into it, a calculation that allows for the fact that certain businesses are going to earn less in the future than now.

你问题的第二部分，涉及内在价值下降。实际上，如果你将内在价值计算为未来现金流的折现值，那么其中应该包含一个计算，考虑到某些企业未来的收益将少于现在。

It isn’t that their intrinsic value goes down then, because you should build it into your calculation right now.

这并不是说它们的内在价值会下降，因为你现在就应该将其纳入你的计算中。

But, you know, as we point out many times in the past, intrinsic value is terribly important and very fuzzy, and we do our best to work with — in the kind of businesses where we think that we have the highest probabilities — where our predictions are of a fairly highly probable nature. And that leaves out all kinds of companies.

但是，你知道，正如我们过去多次指出的那样，内在价值是非常重要且非常模糊的，我们尽力在我们认为有最高概率的那类业务中工作——我们的预测具有相当高的概率性质。而这排除了各种各样的公司。

It’s pretty good. We’ll say it’s something like a natural gas pipeline. I mean the chances of big surprises in a pipeline should be relatively small. That doesn’t mean they’re zero, but they’re relatively small.

这相当不错。我们会说这有点像天然气管道。我的意思是，管道中出现大意外的可能性应该相对较小。这并不意味着它们为零，但相对较小。

Now, let’s assume that you had a gas pipeline, which some have, where either the supply of gas is going to run down or where there are competitive pipelines that may be trying to take away your contracts that you wrote 10 years ago and expire in two years and you’re going to have to cut prices.

现在，让我们假设你有一个天然气管道，有些人确实有这样的管道，要么是天然气供应即将耗尽，要么是有竞争的管道可能试图夺走你 10 年前签订的合同，而这些合同将在两年后到期，你将不得不降价。

I would say that two years from now, when you have to cut prices, the intrinsic value hasn’t gone down from today, if you properly calculate it today and build in the fact that profit margins in the future will be lower than today.

我会说，从现在起两年后，当你不得不降价时，如果你今天正确计算并考虑到未来的利润率将低于今天，那么内在价值并没有下降。

We looked at a pipeline recently where we think they are going to be vulnerable to competitive price pressures because of alternate ways of getting gas to market through other pipelines.

我们最近查看了一条管道，我们认为由于通过其他管道将天然气运送到市场的替代方式，他们将面临竞争性价格压力的脆弱性。

And the calculation is entirely different — the calculation isn’t different — the results are different, in terms of that pipeline versus the pipeline that is the low-cost way of delivering gas from one market to another, and will remain the low-cost producer.

计算完全不同——计算并没有不同——结果不同，就那个管道与从一个市场向另一个市场输送天然气的低成本管道而言，它将继续是低成本生产者。

But it isn’t — if properly calculated, you build in the prediction of decline in future operating years. You don’t wait till you get there to anticipate it.

但事实并非如此——如果计算得当，你会在未来经营年份中预测到下降。你不会等到到达那里才预料到它。

You know, Charlie’s famous for saying that all he wants to know is where he’s going to die so he’ll never go there. (Laughter)

你知道，查理有句名言，他只想知道他会在哪里死去，这样他就永远不会去那里。（笑声）

Well, that’s part of predicting in business. I mean, there — I love the — I really have never seen an investment banker’s book. I hope to see one someday, and I hope I can survive the shock when I do see it, where the earnings of the business being offered go down.

好吧，这就是商业预测的一部分。我的意思是，我喜欢——我真的从未见过投资银行家的书。我希望有一天能看到一本，并且希望当我看到时能承受住震惊，那就是所提供业务的收益下降。

Lots of businesses’ earnings go down. And they’re going to go down. And I get all this nonsense, you know, where they project it out for 10 years and it always goes up. It just isn’t the real world.

很多企业的收益下降。而且它们还会继续下降。我听到很多这种无稽之谈，他们预测未来 10 年收益总是会上升。这根本不是真实的世界。

And you have to analyze businesses — some businesses are going to be subjected to enormous competitive pressures that aren’t extant today.

你必须分析企业——有些企业将面临今天不存在的巨大竞争压力。

And we made that mistake, for example, at Dexter Shoe. I mean we bought a business that was earning $40 million, or so, pretax. And we assumed that the future would be as good as the past, and we couldn’t have been more — I couldn’t have been more wrong.

例如，我们在 Dexter Shoe 犯了那个错误。我的意思是，我们买下了一家税前盈利约 4000 万美元的公司。我们以为未来会和过去一样好，但我们错得离谱——我错得离谱。

So that was a case of projecting into the future, conditions which were not going to exist in the future — competitive conditions. That’s part of, you know, that’s part of business.

所以那是一个将未来不会存在的条件——竞争条件——投射到未来的案例。这是商业的一部分，你知道的。

And I will tell you that, you know, 20 percent of the Fortune 500 — but I don’t know which 20 percent — are going to be earning, you know, significantly less money probably five years from now than they are today.

我会告诉你，你知道，财富 500 强中有 20%——但我不知道是哪 20%——可能在五年后赚的钱会比现在少得多。

And that’s what the game is all about. Figuring out what those future cash flows are likely to be. And when you can’t — when you feel you can’t come up with reasonable estimates in that respect, you move onto the next one.

这就是游戏的全部内容。弄清楚未来的现金流可能是什么样的。而当你不能——当你觉得无法在这方面做出合理估计时，你就转向下一个。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We have this simple, old-fashioned discipline, which Warren likens to Ted Williams waiting for a fat pitch.

查理·芒格：是的。我们有这种简单、老派的纪律，沃伦将其比作泰德·威廉姆斯等待一个好球。

I don’t know about Warren, but if you said to me, “Charlie, you can go into the business of managing money the way other people do, where you’re measured against indexes and you got consultants choosing consultants that are reviewing you to committees,” I would just hate it.

我不知道沃伦怎么想，但如果你对我说，“查理，你可以像其他人一样进入管理资金的业务，你的表现将与指数进行比较，还有顾问选择顾问来对你进行委员会评审，”我会非常讨厌。

I would regard it as being put into shackles. And shackles where the very system was preventing me from delivering value. Warren, how would you feel about that —

我会认为这就像被戴上了镣铐。而且是那种系统本身阻止我创造价值的镣铐。沃伦，你对此有何感想——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we wouldn’t

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不会

CHARLIE MUNGER: —chore? 查理·芒格：—杂务？

WARREN BUFFETT: — do it. We wouldn’t do it. We never did do it, as a matter of fact.

沃伦·巴菲特：——不会这样做。我们不会这样做。事实上，我们从来没有这样做过。

And one of the, you know, the initial — when we formed the partnership on May 5th, 1956, I passed out to the seven limited partners something called the “ground rules.”

其中之一，你知道，最初的——当我们在 1956 年 5 月 5 日建立合伙关系时，我向七位有限合伙人分发了一份名为“基本规则”的东西。

And, you know, I said, “Here’s what I can do and here’s what I can’t do. And here’s some things I don’t know whether I can do or not, maybe.” It was fairly short.

你知道，我说：“这是我能做的，这是我不能做的。还有一些事情我不知道我能不能做，也许吧。” 这段话相当简短。

But the idea of setting out to do something that you know you can’t do, that can’t be — you know, that’s got to lead to problems.

但是，打算去做一些你知道自己做不到的事情，那是不可能的——你知道，那肯定会导致问题。

I mean, if somebody tells me I have to high jump seven feet, and we could even move that down to four feet now — (laughter) — you know, between now and sundown or I’ll be shot, you know, I will go out and buy a bulletproof vest. (Laughter)

我的意思是，如果有人告诉我必须跳过七英尺高的横杆，我们甚至可以把它降低到四英尺——（笑声）——你知道，在日落之前，否则我会被枪毙，你知道，我会去买一件防弹背心。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the general system for money management requires people to pretend that they can do something that they can’t do, and to pretend to like it when they really don’t. And I think that’s a terrible way to spend your life, but it’s very well paid. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，管理资金的一般系统要求人们假装他们能做一些他们实际上做不到的事情，并假装喜欢这些事情，即使他们实际上并不喜欢。我认为这是一种糟糕的生活方式，但报酬非常丰厚。（笑声）

6. Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and systemic derivatives risk

6. 房地美、房利美与系统性衍生品风险

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m John Golob from Kansas City. I have a follow up question on derivatives.

观众成员：你好。我是来自堪萨斯城的约翰·戈洛布。我有一个关于衍生品的后续问题。

After the press zeroed in on the comments in your annual letter, the head of Fannie Mae got up and said, well, Mr. Buffett’s criticisms don’t apply to Fannie because, number 1, we have simple vanilla derivatives that are priced in the market. And secondly, we need derivatives to protect against interest rate risk.

在媒体关注到您年度信中的评论后，房利美的负责人站出来说，巴菲特先生的批评不适用于房利美，因为，第一，我们有在市场上定价的简单香草衍生品。其次，我们需要衍生品来防范利率风险。

And I guess, given what happened to the savings and loan industry back in the ’80s, that seems reasonable.

我想，考虑到 80 年代储蓄和贷款行业发生的事情，这似乎是合理的。

So my first question is what is your rejoinder to Mr. Raines?

所以我的第一个问题是你对雷恩斯先生有什么回应？

And the second part of my question gets to your concern about the connection between derivatives and systemic risk. And that is, do Fannie and Freddie play a particularly prominent role in this concern? Thank you.

我问题的第二部分涉及您对衍生品与系统性风险之间联系的担忧。也就是说，房利美和房地美在这个问题上是否扮演了特别突出的角色？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I have a lot of respect for Frank Raines. I think he’s done a good job at Fannie Mae. I don’t know the situation intimately.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我非常尊重弗兰克·雷恩斯。我认为他在房利美做得很好。我对具体情况不太了解。

The problem, as you mention, is that an operation like Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or savings and loans in the past, had this problem, which is inherent in the mortgage instrument, in matching — or coming close to matching — assets and liabilities.

正如你提到的，问题在于像房利美或房地美这样的机构，或者过去的储蓄和贷款机构，都存在这个问题，这在抵押贷款工具中是固有的，即在匹配或接近匹配资产和负债方面。

And the reason they had that terrible problem, which did in many institutions, was the optionality in a mortgage instrument.

他们遇到那个严重问题的原因，正如许多机构所经历的，是抵押工具中的选择权。

And in a mortgage instrument, particularly as the years have progressed, you buy a — you know, if you buy a mortgage — or somebody else takes out the mortgage, you own it — you have a 30-year instrument if it’s a bad deal and you have about a 30-minute instrument if it’s a good deal.

在抵押贷款工具中，特别是随着时间的推移，你购买一个——你知道，如果你购买一个抵押贷款——或者其他人办理了抵押贷款，你拥有它——如果这是一个糟糕的交易，你有一个 30 年的工具，如果这是一个好的交易，你有一个大约 30 分钟的工具。

The buyer — the person who takes out the mortgage — can call off the deal at any time at relatively low cost. And the public has been sensitized to that more and more as time has gone by, so they’ve been quicker to refinance for very small differentials.

买方——即申请抵押贷款的人——可以随时以相对较低的成本取消交易。随着时间的推移，公众对此越来越敏感，因此他们会更快地因非常小的差价而进行再融资。

Now, many years ago, they had what they called due-on-sale clauses in California. I think — were they invalidated, Charlie, or what happened with those? So that there were ways of shortening up the mortgage expected maturities.

现在，很多年前，他们在加利福尼亚有他们称之为“出售到期”条款的东西。我想——它们被判无效了吗，查理，还是发生了什么？因此，有一些方法可以缩短抵押贷款的预期期限。

But it’s a fundamental problem when you are operating on borrowed money in a very big way, which is what S&Ls did and what Fannie does, and Freddie, that you have this very long-term instrument, and it — but it can be very short-term if it becomes advantageous to you, and rates go down and you want to keep it. Or it becomes very long-term if rates go up and nobody wants to refinance.

但当你在很大程度上依靠借来的资金运作时，这是一个根本性的问题，这就是储贷协会（S&Ls）所做的，也是房利美（Fannie）和房地美（Freddie）所做的，你有这个非常长期的工具，但如果对你有利，它可以变得非常短期，利率下降时你想保留它。或者如果利率上升且没有人想要再融资，它就会变得非常长期。

And under those circumstances, if you run a huge institution, or even a smaller one, but that has a high — highly leveraged, you are going to look for one way or another to try to match the duration of your liabilities as close as you can to the duration of your assets, and have various methods to protect yourself against the optionality that exists with the counterparty, in effect, your asset.

在这种情况下，如果你经营一个大型机构，或者即使是一个较小的机构，但具有高杠杆，你会想方设法尽量使你的负债期限与资产期限相匹配，并采用各种方法来保护自己免受与对手方相关的选择权影响，实际上就是你的资产。

That’s not easy to do. And Fannie, and Freddie, and other institutions, attempt to do that through various types of derivative instruments, as well as other things, in terms of the kind of debt they issue themselves and so on.

这并不容易做到。房利美、房地美和其他机构试图通过各种类型的衍生工具以及其他方式来实现这一点，比如他们自己发行的债务类型等等。

And they’re very smart, and they do it — you know, my guess is they do a better job than Charlie and I could do at it, but it can’t, by its nature, be perfect.

而且他们非常聪明，他们这样做——你知道，我猜他们做得比查理和我能做得更好，但从本质上讲，它不可能是完美的。

And under some circumstances, where you get large gaps — the thing you worry about in financial markets, and it doesn’t happen very often, but your — the thing that really destroys people are what the academics would call six-sigma, or five-sigma, or seven-sigma events, which are things that are never supposed to happen, basically.

在某些情况下，当出现大幅度差距时——在金融市场中你担心的事情，并不经常发生，但真正摧毁人们的事情是学术界所称的六西格玛、五西格玛或七西格玛事件，这些基本上是永远不应该发生的事情。

And sigma is a method of describing the probabilities that they will happen in any given period — the number of sigmas.

西格玛是一种描述它们在任何给定时期内发生概率的方法——西格玛的数量。

Financial markets don’t lend themselves well to modeling based on that. You know, they do most of the time, until it doesn’t work. And when it doesn’t work, you know, chaos reigns.

金融市场不太适合基于此进行建模。你知道，大多数时候它们是有效的，直到它不起作用。而当它不起作用时，你知道，混乱就会统治。

And there are more six-sigma events that happen in financial markets — or theoretical six- sigma events — than any study of probability curves would ever come up with.

而且在金融市场中发生的六西格玛事件——或理论上的六西格玛事件——比任何概率曲线研究所能得出的都要多。

And that’s — when you have gaps or discontinuities, when markets close, whatever it may be, those are what cause institutions to go out of business.

当你有差距或不连续性时，当市场关闭时，无论是什么，这些都是导致机构倒闭的原因。

And derivatives, in my view, anyway, accentuate the possibility of it happening and the extent of the damage, if and when it should happen.

在我看来，衍生品无论如何都加剧了其发生的可能性以及一旦发生时损害的程度。

Again, we don’t think we mathematically can tell you what the probabilities are of something like that, and we think anybody that does tell you, you know, is kidding you.

再说一次，我们认为我们无法用数学告诉你那样事情的概率，我们认为任何告诉你的人都是在开玩笑。

And I’ve had managers of hedge funds sit down with me and tell me that they had, you know, a 28 percent probability of returns between 30 and 40 percent. Come up with all these exact figures. Anybody comes up with exact figures in finance, watch out.

我曾与对冲基金的经理坐下来，他们告诉我，他们有 28%的概率获得 30%到 40%的回报。提出所有这些精确的数字。任何在金融领域给出精确数字的人，都要小心。

So, I would say that if I were running Fannie or Freddie, I would be terribly conscious of what was happening in there, and I would understand this basic problem I have, which I can guarantee you, Frank Raines understands extremely well, of the optionality built into his assets.

所以，我会说，如果我在管理房利美或房地美，我会非常清楚那里发生的事情，并且我会理解我所面临的这个基本问题，我可以向你保证，弗兰克·雷恩斯非常了解他资产中内置的选择权。

And I would try to come as close to matching that. And if I did it through derivative instruments or whatever, I would try to match — I would try to reduce the troubles that could be produced by that optionality to a minimum.

我会尽量做到接近匹配。如果我通过衍生工具或其他方式做到这一点，我会尽量匹配——我会尽量将由该选择性产生的问题降到最低。

And then I would get very worried about who the counterparties were, because anytime somebody promises to pay you a lot of money if something terrible happens to you, you better be very sure that they can and will pay, because the terrible thing that’s happening to you may be presenting terrible things to them.

然后我会非常担心对手方是谁，因为任何时候如果有人承诺在你遭遇不幸时支付你一大笔钱，你最好非常确定他们能够并且会支付，因为对你来说正在发生的不幸可能也会给他们带来不幸。

You know, that will happen in the insurance industry from time to time. And that’s why reinsurance recoverables are a dangerous asset to have.

你知道，这种情况在保险行业时有发生。这就是为什么再保险应收款是一种危险资产。

It will happen in the derivative markets.

这将在衍生品市场发生。

When LTCM had troubles with one type of asset, they had troubles with a lot of types of assets, and everybody else they were doing business with was having a lot of troubles with those same things.

当长期资本管理公司在一种资产上遇到麻烦时，他们在许多种资产上都遇到了麻烦，所有与他们有业务往来的人在这些相同的事情上也遇到了很多麻烦。

And that’s why the Federal Reserve stepped into something they never dreamt they would have stepped into. They stepped in to force, essentially, a solution, which may have been the right thing to do, incidentally.

这就是为什么美联储介入了他们从未想过会介入的事情。他们介入以强制实施一个解决方案，这可能是正确的做法。

But they — for some obscure hedge fund that nobody in the world virtually had heard of, until that point, and had started threatening the U.S. — the stability of the U.S. financial system.

但他们——为了某个几乎全世界都没听说过的模糊对冲基金，直到那时，开始威胁美国——美国金融体系的稳定。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you’re right to point to this creditworthiness of the counterparty risk.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为你指出交易对手风险的信用度是正确的。

My guess is that both Fannie and Freddie have been pretty intelligent at thinking through a whole lot of different scenarios where they’ll be OK, or close to OK, if all the counterparties pay.

我猜想，如果所有对手方都付款，房利美和房地美在考虑各种不同情境时都表现得相当聪明，他们会没问题或接近没问题。

And I would bet a lot of money that they weight the possibility that counterparties won’t pay a lot lower than we do.

我敢打赌，他们认为交易对手不付款的可能性比我们认为的要低得多。

I think a lot of the counterparties are behaving in a lot more dangerous way than Fannie and Freddie are, and that — and the counterparties can get in trouble because of that. And they can translate that trouble to people who assume that they’re hedged.

我认为很多交易对手的行为比房利美和房地美危险得多，而交易对手可能因此陷入困境。他们可以将这种困境转嫁给那些以为自己已对冲风险的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: And that’s true of the mortgage guarantee institutions that take part of the risk away.

沃伦·巴菲特：这同样适用于那些分担部分风险的抵押贷款担保机构。

Fannie and Freddie are very sophisticated institutions. Very, very sophisticated institutions.

房利美和房地美是非常复杂的机构。非常、非常复杂的机构。

But if you depend too much on other people, there can be periods in financial history where all the sophistication in the world may not save you. The best thing to do is to be able to count on your own resources.

但是，如果你过于依赖他人，金融历史上可能会有一些时期，即使世界上所有的复杂技巧也无法拯救你。最好的办法是能够依靠自己的资源。

And at Berkshire that’s basically the way we operate. And it may be safer than necessary, but, you know, Charlie and I are rich enough already. We do not need to stay up at night.

在伯克希尔，这基本上就是我们的运作方式。这样做可能比必要的更安全，但你知道，查理和我已经足够富有了。我们不需要熬夜。

7. “We do not run a big currency risk”

7. “我们没有承担很大的货币风险”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：第五位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Joseph Lapray (PH). I’m a shareholder from Minneapolis, Minnesota. Thank you for this opportunity to present a question.

观众成员：我的名字是约瑟夫·拉普雷（音）。我是一名来自明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯的股东。感谢您给我这个提问的机会。

At last year’s meeting, I believe that Mr. Munger made a comment to the effect that it was not inconceivable that the U.S. dollar could someday suffer a collapse in value, similar to that which had recently befallen the currency of Argentina.

在去年的会议上，我相信芒格先生发表了一条评论，认为美国美元有一天可能会遭遇类似于最近阿根廷货币崩溃的价值崩溃，这并非不可想象。

I am concerned that in the event of a collapse in the value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies, that Berkshire Hathaway’s insurance operations may find themselves having to pay for replacing property whose cost is denominated in sharply-appreciated foreign currency.

我担心，如果美元相对于外币的价值崩溃，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的保险业务可能会发现自己需要支付用大幅升值的外币计价的财产更换费用。

I have two specific questions. First, does Berkshire Hathaway have any way to protect itself from the effects of inflation induced by a possible currency collapse?

我有两个具体问题。首先，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司是否有办法保护自己免受可能的货币崩溃引发的通货膨胀影响？

And second, do you have any ideas about how individual investors can protect themselves from currency risk? Thank you.

其次，您对个人投资者如何保护自己免受汇率风险有何建议？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’ll ask Charlie first to comment on whether he said exactly what the gentleman said last year.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我会先请查理评论一下他去年是否确实说了这位先生所说的话。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t — I wasn’t predicting that the United States would go to hell as much as Argentina has. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我并没有预测美国会像阿根廷那样陷入困境。（笑声）

What I was predicting is that all kinds of things could happen here that are unthinkable, based on past recent experience. And Berkshire, Warren, by and large, our liabilities are denominated in dollars.

我所预测的是，这里可能会发生各种不可想象的事情，基于最近的经验。而伯克希尔，沃伦，总的来说，我们的负债是以美元计价的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t have a huge foreign currency exposure at all.

查理·芒格：我们几乎没有巨大的外汇风险敞口。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, well, we have — you know, we may have — we have a few billion dollars, at least, denominated in liabilities in other currencies, but we also have assets in those currencies, pretty much.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，嗯，我们有——你知道，我们可能有——我们至少有几十亿美元的负债是以其他货币计价的，但我们也有这些货币的资产，差不多。

So, we don’t think about it day by day in terms of matching euro assets against euro liabilities. But in a general way, we don’t get way out of whack, either.

所以，我们不会每天都考虑将欧元资产与欧元负债相匹配。但总体来说，我们也不会偏离太多。

I mean, we do not have lots of liabilities around the world in other currencies which are only matched by assets in U.S. dollars. Most of our assets and liabilities, overwhelmingly, are going to be in U.S. dollars.

我的意思是，我们在世界各地没有很多以其他货币计价的负债，而这些负债仅由美元资产来匹配。我们的大多数资产和负债绝大部分将是以美元计价的。

But we’ll have a — you know, we will have, maybe at the present time, a couple of billion that — of liabilities, primarily in euros, and we have at least that much in the way of assets.

但我们会有——你知道，我们可能在目前有几十亿的负债，主要是以欧元计的，同时我们至少有同等数量的资产。

So, we don’t run big — we do not run a big currency risk at Berkshire.

所以，我们没有承担大的——我们在伯克希尔没有承担大的货币风险。

Now, if you talk about the value of the dollar declining dramatically, you know, we all face that risk if we have a lot of dollar assets. I personally don’t worry about the American currency getting worth far less, relative to other currencies, as much as I worry — I don’t really worry about it.

现在，如果你谈论美元价值急剧下降，你知道，如果我们持有大量美元资产，我们都面临这种风险。我个人并不担心美元相对于其他货币大幅贬值，我并不真正担心这个问题。

But I think there’s a probability that sometime in the next 20 or 30 years that you could have rampant inflation in this country again. You’ll have probably have it around the world. And it’s probably more likely in a good many other countries than it is in the United States.

但我认为在未来的 20 或 30 年内，这个国家可能会再次出现猖獗的通货膨胀。你可能会在世界各地看到这种情况。而且在许多其他国家，这种情况可能比在美国更有可能发生。

But inflation is always a latent danger to an economy. I mean I always think of inflation as being in remission at all times, because it’s something that has a cause that will recur, in terms of human behavior, from time to time, I think, in terms of how legislatures behave and governments behave.

但通货膨胀始终是经济的潜在危险。我是说，我总是认为通货膨胀一直处于缓解状态，因为它是由某种原因引起的，会在某些时候因人类行为而复发，我认为这与立法机构和政府的行为有关。

So, I think that the probability of high inflation at some point during the next, say, 20 or 30 years is — it’s not a low probability. I hope it doesn’t happen.

所以，我认为在未来，比如说，20 或 30 年内出现高通胀的概率——这不是一个低概率。我希望这不会发生。

Charlie, do you have anything?

查理，你有什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in the long-term practically all currencies go to hell. In other words, it’s a product, like the Roman — what was it, denarius or something?

查理·芒格：嗯，从长远来看，几乎所有货币都会贬值。换句话说，这就像罗马的——是什么，德纳里乌斯还是什么？

You take the British pound, you take the American dollar, so far.

你拿英镑，你拿美元，到目前为止。

And if you want to go out 200 years, will some politicians in the United States ruin the currency? I think the answer is yes. But I wouldn’t anticipate some horrible event in the near future. And —

如果你想展望 200 年，美国的一些政客会毁掉货币吗？我认为答案是肯定的。但我不认为近期会发生什么可怕的事件。而且——

But if things really went to hell, Argentina started confiscating property of shareholders. And if that starts happening and the government is doing it, we probably won’t be able to protect you. (Laughter)

但如果事情真的变得糟糕，阿根廷开始没收股东的财产。如果这种情况开始发生，而且是政府在这样做，我们可能无法保护你。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That sounds like kind of a nervous laugh to me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：在我听来，这笑声有点紧张。（笑声）

8. Acquisition opportunities growing like a rolling snowball

8. 收购机会像滚雪球一样增长

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, hi. I’m Gautam Dalmia (PH) from India.

观众成员：你好。我是来自印度的高塔姆·达尔米亚（音）。

Sirs, if I would take you back to the start of your investing careers, I assume it would have been harder for potential acquisition opportunities to come by.

先生们，如果我把你们带回到投资生涯的开始，我想那时潜在的收购机会会更难得。

The question I would like to ask you sirs is, how did you ensure then that you had good enough deal flows coming to you to be able to choose from?

我想问你们的问题是，你们当时如何确保有足够好的交易流向你们，以便能够进行选择？

I have one more question. The Berkshire subsidiaries do not have a retirement policy. What are the implications of this on retaining and motivating employees who are potential successors to senior management?

我还有一个问题。伯克希尔的子公司没有退休政策。这对留住和激励可能成为高级管理层继任者的员工有什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: First question about deal flow. It’s a term I actually don’t like very much, because we don’t think of them as deals, exactly. That has a little too much of the connotation of something to be bought, and then again something to be sold.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于交易流的第一个问题。实际上我不太喜欢这个术语，因为我们并不完全把它们看作交易。这个词有点过于强调买卖的含义。

But we do like acquisition opportunities. And really that’s just achieving that so that we get the calls when we should get the calls. And there aren’t lots of those, because we’re talking about good-sized businesses. We’re talking about owners that love their businesses.

但是我们确实喜欢收购机会。实际上，这只是为了在我们应该接到电话时接到电话。这样的机会并不多，因为我们谈论的是规模较大的企业。我们谈论的是热爱自己企业的所有者。

And it’s going to happen occasionally, but it’s going to happen a few times a year, probably.

这将偶尔发生，但可能每年会发生几次。

I think in the U.S. now, that we get a pretty reasonable percentage of the calls that we should get, and that was not true 20 or 30 years ago. We didn’t hear from anybody 20 or 30 years ago, to speak of, because we were looked at much more as being a marketable securities operation. And we just weren’t as well known.

我认为现在在美国，我们接到的电话中有相当合理的比例是我们应该接到的，而 20 或 30 年前并不是这样。20 或 30 年前，我们几乎没有接到任何电话，因为我们更多地被视为一个可交易证券的操作。我们当时并不那么出名。

It feeds on itself, obviously. If we acquire companies, and the people from whom we acquire them are happy about the deal, you know, we’re going to hear from more people.

显然，这是一种自我循环。如果我们收购公司，而我们从中收购的人对这笔交易感到满意，你知道，我们会听到更多人的消息。

We bought our first furniture operation in 1983. That really led to four other transactions, because the people in the first one were happy and they talked to us about the second one. And the people in the second one were happy and so on.

我们在 1983 年购买了我们的第一个家具业务。这实际上导致了另外四笔交易，因为第一个业务中的人很满意，他们和我们谈到了第二个业务。第二个业务中的人也很满意，如此类推。

So, you know, it’s like — Charlie always describes compound interest as being like, you know, being at the top of a very large hill with wet snow and starting with a snowball and getting it rolling downhill. And that’s a little bit like the acquisition situation works.

所以，你知道，这就像——查理总是把复利描述为，就像在一个非常大的山顶上，有湿雪，然后开始用一个雪球让它滚下山。这有点像收购的情况。

We’ve been on a — by being around 38 years, it’s been a long — it’s been a high mountain, in terms of the length the snowball is going. By now, it’s going at a pretty good clip, and it’s a pretty good size, and it attracts a lot of snow. And that’s good for us.

我们已经存在了——大约 38 年，这是一段漫长的旅程——就雪球滚动的长度而言，这是一座高山。到现在，它已经滚得相当快，规模也相当大，并且吸引了很多雪。这对我们来说是好事。

Outside the United States we do not seem to be on the radar screen, so we don’t seem to hear about those as much. But we’re hearing about enough in the United States.

在美国以外，我们似乎不在关注范围内，所以我们似乎听到的不多。但我们在美国听到的已经够多了。

It’s not a flow, in the sense of — I don’t hear about one a week. You know, I don’t, probably, hear about one a month.

这不是一个持续的流动，从某种意义上说——我不会每周听到一个。你知道，我可能不会每个月听到一个。

But the ones we want to hear about, most of them, I think, we’re getting the calls now. I think we’re getting a higher percentage of the calls now than ever in our history we would have gotten.

但我们想听到的那些，我认为大多数，我们现在正在接到这些电话。我认为我们现在接到的电话比例比我们历史上任何时候都要高。

And, you know, that’s all to the good. And if we can do the same thing outside this country, that would be a plus, too. But this country’s a big market and we’ll just try and spread the word further.

而且，你知道，这一切都是好的。如果我们能在这个国家之外做同样的事情，那也会是一个加分项。不过，这个国家是一个大市场，我们会努力进一步传播这个信息。

And Charlie, what was that other question?

查理，另一个问题是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he talked some about deal flow, and there’s a general assumption that it must be easy to somehow arrange things that you just sat behind a desk and people brought in one wonderful opportunity after another, and you finally selected two out of 100 and it would be a virtual cinch.

查理·芒格：嗯，他谈到了一些交易流程，人们普遍认为这一定很容易，似乎只需坐在桌子后面，人们就会带来一个又一个绝佳的机会，最后从 100 个中选出两个，这将是十拿九稳的。

That was the attitude in venture capital until the last two or three years.

在过去两三年里，这就是风险投资的态度。

We didn’t have any of that in the early days, right, Warren?

在早期的时候，我们没有这些，对吧，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, that’s right.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，对的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We were finding our own securities. And we were just looking at the public markets to see what was available in securities.

查理·芒格：我们在寻找自己的证券。我们只是查看公开市场，看看有哪些证券可供选择。

And when we started buying companies, there must have been 20 years when we didn’t buy more than one or two a year.

当我们开始收购公司时，肯定有 20 年我们每年只收购一两家。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They were fairly few and far between. And we didn’t have the money to buy very big ones, either.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这样的机会很少见。而且我们也没有足够的钱去买很大的公司。

I mean it was a big deal when we bought Associated Cotton Shops for what, in effect, was 4 million, or when we bought Hochschild Kohn when we had to come up with 6 million of equity, as I remember, for that deal.

我的意思是，当我们以实际上是 400 万的价格收购 Associated Cotton Shops，或者当我们收购 Hochschild Kohn 时，我们必须为那笔交易筹集 600 万股本，这都是一件大事。

And National Indemnity, itself, was 7 million for National Indemnity, and I think a million-4, a million-7 for National Fire Marine. And I mean that was all we could handle in those days.

国家赔偿本身是 700 万用于国家赔偿，我认为国家火灾海洋保险是 140 万到 170 万。我是说，那就是我们当时所能处理的全部。

So the snowball has, you know, it’s built up as it’s gone down the mountain. And we hope there’s a lot of mountain left and a lot of wet snow, and we’re looking for it.

所以雪球在下山的过程中不断积累。我们希望山还有很长的路要走，还有很多湿雪，我们正在寻找它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s fair to say that we were rooting around for those opportunities. We weren’t sitting behind our desks and waiting for some commission salesman to come in and present us with opportunities to sign our name. I can’t think of anything we bought in the early days that way.

查理·芒格：但可以公平地说，我们一直在寻找这些机会。我们并没有坐在办公桌后面，等着一些推销员进来给我们提供签名的机会。我想不出我们早期以那种方式购买的任何东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. 沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, you chased down Jack Ringwalt. Didn’t you go to him?

查理·芒格：沃伦，你追着杰克·林瓦尔特跑。你不是去找他了吗？

9. Buffett tells how he didn’t let Jack Ringwalt wriggle out of National Indemnity deal

9. 巴菲特讲述他如何不让杰克·林格沃尔特摆脱国家赔偿交易

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Jack Ringwalt, who ran National Indemnity, and some of you here in the room knew, Jack was a very interesting guy and a friend.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，杰克·林瓦尔特，他经营国家赔偿公司，你们中有些人认识他，杰克是个非常有趣的人，也是我的朋友。

And Jack, for 15 minutes every year, would want to sell National Indemnity. Something would make him mad. A claim would come in or something of the sort. (Laughs)

而且每年有 15 分钟，杰克都会想要卖掉 National Indemnity。总会有事情让他生气。可能是一个索赔进来了或者类似的事情。（笑）

So, for 15 minutes every year he would want to sell. And a friend of mine, Charlie Heider — who may be here today — and I had discussed this phenomenon of Jack being in heat once a year for 15 minutes. (Laughter)

所以，每年有 15 分钟他会想要卖掉。而我的一个朋友，查理·海德——他今天可能在这里——和我讨论过杰克每年有 15 分钟发情的现象。（笑声）

And I told Charlie if you ever caught him in this particular phase to let me know.

我告诉查理，如果你在这个特定阶段抓到他，请告诉我。

And there was a day that Charlie called and said, “You know, Jack’s ready.” And I said — (laughter) —“Well, get him over here.” So, he came about 11:30 and we made a deal in that 15-minute zone. (Laughter)

有一天，查理打电话来说：“你知道吗，杰克准备好了。”我说——（笑声）——“好，把他带过来。”于是，他大约 11 点半来了，我们在那 15 分钟内达成了协议。（笑声）

And this is absolutely true. It’s a fascinating story, because Jack, having made the deal — and we really did make it in 15 minutes — Jack, having made the deal, really didn’t want to do it, and — but he was — he wouldn’t have backed out of a deal.

这绝对是真的。这是一个引人入胜的故事，因为杰克在达成协议后——我们确实在 15 分钟内达成了协议——杰克在达成协议后，实际上并不想这样做，但是他不会退出协议。

But he said to me after we’d shaken hands, he said, “Well,” he says, “I suppose you’ll want audited financial statements.” And if I’d said yes, he would’ve said, “Well, that’s too bad then. We can’t have a deal.” (Laughter)

但他在我们握手后对我说，他说：“好吧，”他说，“我想你会想要审计过的财务报表。”如果我说是，他就会说：“那就太糟糕了。我们不能达成交易。”（笑声）

So, I said, “I wouldn’t dream of looking at audited financial statements. They’re the worst kind,” you know. (Laughter)

所以，我说：“我绝不会去看审计过的财务报表。它们是最糟糕的那种。”你知道的。（笑声）

And then Jack said to me, he says, “I suppose you’ll want me to sell my agencies,“ and, “— to you as well.” And I said, “Jack, I wouldn’t buy those agencies under any circumstances.”

然后杰克对我说，他说：“我想你会希望我卖掉我的代理机构，”以及，“—也卖给你。”我说：“杰克，无论如何我都不会买那些代理机构。”

If I’d said yes to that, he would have — that I wanted him to sell the agencies — he’d say, “Well, yeah, I wouldn’t be able to do it, Warren. We must have misunderstood each other.”

如果我当时答应了，他会说——我想让他卖掉那些代理机构——他说：“嗯，是的，我做不到，沃伦。我们一定是误会了对方。”

So, we went through about three or four of those. And finally, Jack gave up and sold me the business.

所以，我们经历了大约三四次这样的情况。最后，杰克放弃了，把生意卖给了我。

He was an honorable guy, because he really, I don’t think, wanted to do it, but we met down at Charlie’s office at 19th, I think, and Douglas, and Jack was about 10 minutes late picking up this 7 million for National Indemnity.

他是个可敬的人，因为我真的不认为他想这么做，但我们在 19 号和道格拉斯的查理办公室见面，杰克迟到了大约 10 分钟来拿这 700 万的国家赔偿金。

He was about 10 minutes late, because he was looking for a parking meter with a few minutes left on it. (Laughter)

他迟到了大约 10 分钟，因为他在找一个还有几分钟剩余的停车计时器。（笑声）

And that’s when I knew he was my kind of guy. (Laughter)

就在那时，我知道他是我喜欢的那种人。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But at any rate, this process is not easy, and practically anything where you sit behind that desk and this wonderful deal flow is just coming by, you’re in a very dangerous seat.

查理·芒格：但无论如何，这个过程并不容易，几乎任何你坐在那张桌子后面，看到这些精彩的交易流过来的情况，你都处在一个非常危险的位置。

10. No telecom stocks, but maybe junk bonds

10. 没有电信股票，但可能有垃圾债券

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name is Jim Maxwell (PH). I am from Omaha, Nebraska.

观众成员：先生们，我叫吉姆·麦克斯韦（PH）。我来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。

You put your toe in the water, so to speak, with Level 3 when you gave a deal, or, you know, got involved in that deal with them.

可以说，当你与他们达成协议或参与那项交易时，你在第三级试水。

And I’m wondering if there’s anything — any area — in the telecommunications industry that appeals to you now, or any specific company that appeals to you?

我想知道现在电信行业中是否有任何领域吸引你，或者是否有任何特定公司吸引你？

Much more importantly, I want to ask about Global Crossing. They’re in bankruptcy court right now. The U.S. military uses them for communications. Data, telecommunications, or something like that.

更重要的是，我想问一下关于 Global Crossing 的情况。他们目前正在破产法庭上。美国军方使用他们进行通信。数据、电信或类似的东西。

There are two companies that want to buy their assets out of the bankruptcy court. One is a Chinese company. One is a company from Singapore. The U.S. says, “No way, José.” They don’t want China to get control of the assets of Global Crossing, mainly because of the military security.

有两家公司想从破产法庭购买他们的资产。一家是中国公司，一家是新加坡公司。美国说：“绝对不行，José。”他们不希望中国控制环球电讯的资产，主要是因为军事安全的原因。

In the last week, the Chinese company has backed out. The Singapore company has come in and said, “We will buy the 80 percent stake and — that is now available.” But still, if that sale goes through Global Crossing will not be in U.S. hands.

上周，这家中国公司退出了。新加坡公司进来了，并表示：“我们将购买现在可用的 80%股份。” 但即便如此，如果这笔交易完成，Global Crossing 仍不会在美国手中。

Part of my concern is, if these two companies were in a relationship that was friendly, they were willing to be together, I could see the possibility that they would — the Singapore company would sell, later, its portion to the Chinese company.

我担心的一部分是，如果这两家公司关系友好，愿意在一起，我可以看到新加坡公司以后可能会将其部分出售给中国公司。

Have you ever considered — and if not, why not — buying the assets out of the bankruptcy court, which would be a fire sale? I think that would be good for Berkshire Hathaway.

你是否曾考虑过——如果没有，为什么不——从破产法庭购买资产，这将是一次甩卖？我认为这对伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司有好处。

In addition, it would be good for the United States and for future generations. I would suggest that would be your civic duty, gentlemen. (Laughter)

此外，这对美国和未来的几代人都有好处。我建议这将是你们的公民责任，先生们。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I hope I don’t get arrested for leaving without doing this. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我希望我不会因为没做这件事就离开而被逮捕。（笑声）

I, frankly, don’t have the faintest idea how to evaluate telecommunications companies down the road. That doesn’t mean I don’t understand, at all, what they do. I probably understand a little bit of what they do.

坦率地说，我根本不知道将来如何评估电信公司。这并不意味着我完全不理解他们的工作。我可能对他们的工作有一点了解。

But in terms of figuring out the future economics in that business, what they’re going to — this player or that player is going to look like five or 10 years down the road, I simply don’t know.

但要弄清楚该业务未来的经济状况，无论是这个参与者还是那个参与者在五年或十年后会是什么样子，我实在不知道。

And I think it’s — it looks like the people who thought they knew three or four years ago didn’t know either, I might add, but that’s another question.

我认为——看起来三四年前自以为知道的人其实也不知道，我可以补充说，但那是另一个问题。

Charlie, what do you know about the telecommunications business?

查理，你对电信行业了解多少？

CHARLIE MUNGER: A little less than you do. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：比你少一点。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s in trouble. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：他有麻烦了。（笑）

We don’t have any idea. You know, if you take — pull out a name, BellSouth, Verizon, I have no idea how that all comes together five or 10 years from now.

我们没有任何想法。你知道，如果你抽出一个名字，像是 BellSouth、Verizon，我不知道五到十年后这一切会如何结合在一起。

I mean, I know people are going to be chewing Wrigley’s chewing gum or eating Hershey bars or Snickers bars five, or 10, or 15, or 20 years from now.

我的意思是，我知道人们在五年、十年、十五年或二十年后仍然会嚼瑞格利的口香糖或吃好时巧克力或士力架。

They’re going to be using Gillette blades, they’ll be drinking Coca-Cola, you know. And I have some idea what the profitability of each one of those will be over time and all of that.

他们会用吉列的刀片，他们会喝可口可乐，你知道的。而且我对这些产品的长期盈利能力有一些想法。

I don’t have any idea how telecommunications shakes out. And I wouldn’t believe anybody in the business that told me they knew because, you know, what would they have been telling me five years ago? So, it’s just a game I don’t understand.

我不知道电信行业会如何发展。而且我不会相信任何业内人士告诉我他们知道，因为你知道，他们五年前会告诉我什么呢？所以，这只是一个我不理解的游戏。

That isn’t — there’s all kinds of things I don’t understand. I don’t know what cocoa beans are going to do next year. You know? I mean, it’d be a lot easier if I did. I could just make all my money on cocoa beans and be much simpler than trying to run a whole bunch of businesses out of Berkshire.

那不是——有很多事情我不明白。我不知道明年可可豆会怎么样。你知道吗？我的意思是，如果我知道的话会容易得多。我可以只靠可可豆赚钱，比试图经营伯克希尔的一大堆业务要简单得多。

But there’s — I don’t worry about what I don’t know. I worry about being sure about what I do know. And telecommunications doesn’t fall within that group.

但有一点——我不担心我不知道的事情。我担心的是对我所知道的事情有把握。而电信不属于那一类。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Mostly, Berkshire, in its history, has bought common stocks that practically couldn’t fail.

查理·芒格：伯克希尔在其历史上主要购买几乎不可能失败的普通股。

But occasionally, Berkshire just makes an intelligent gamble where there’s plenty of chance of failure, but there’s enough chance of success so the gamble is worth taking. And I think it’s fair to say that telecommunications falls in that so far.

但有时，伯克希尔会进行一次聪明的赌博，其中有很大的失败可能性，但成功的机会足够大，因此值得一试。我认为可以公平地说，电信业到目前为止就属于这种情况。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We might buy some junk bonds in that business. In fact, we have in several areas.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们可能会在那个业务中购买一些垃圾债券。事实上，我们在几个领域已经这样做了。

But as I put in the annual report, we expect losses in junk bonds. We expect, over all the probabilities, we’ll have a decent result — maybe better than decent.

但正如我在年度报告中所写的那样，我们预计垃圾债券会有损失。总体而言，我们预计会有一个不错的结果——也许比不错还要好。

But we do expect losses, because we are dealing with institutions that have demonstrated that they don’t have large margins of safety in their operations. Sometimes — not at all in Level 3, but sometimes, we’re dealing with managements that are quite suspect.

但是我们确实预期会有损失，因为我们正在与那些在运营中没有展示出较大安全边际的机构打交道。有时——在第三级中完全没有，但有时，我们正在处理的管理层相当可疑。

And I would say that in the history of Global Crossing you had that, although that doesn’t attach itself to the assets now.

我会说，在 Global Crossing 的历史中你有过这种情况，尽管这现在并不附属于这些资产。

But very often in the field, when people get highly leveraged, sometimes they get tempted to do things that they wouldn’t be tempted to do otherwise. And that’s happened in the junk bond field, obviously, and always will happen.

但是在这个领域中，很多时候，当人们高度杠杆化时，他们有时会被诱惑去做一些他们平时不会做的事情。这显然发生在垃圾债券领域，并且总是会发生。

But that’s the reason we expect to have significant losses, and actually we’ve — they haven’t been that significant.

但这就是我们预期会有重大损失的原因，实际上我们——它们并没有那么严重。

We’ve had losses. And — but they — we haven’t seen our biggest loss yet, believe me, in junk bonds. But we’ll make a lot of money out of some of them, too.

我们有过损失。而且——但是他们——相信我，我们在垃圾债券上还没有看到我们最大的损失。但我们也会从其中一些中赚很多钱。

It’s a different field. It’s like being an insurer of substandard risks. You’ll have more accidents, but you can charge a premium that makes it work out.

这是一个不同的领域。这就像是为次级风险提供保险。你会遇到更多的事故，但你可以收取使其可行的保费。

But our business — in general, when we buy businesses, we want to buy superior risks.

但我们的业务——一般来说，当我们收购企业时，我们希望购买优质风险。

We don’t want to buy a hundred businesses for operation by ourselves, with the idea that 15 of them are going to be train wrecks and that the other 85 will take care of it. That’s not our approach to building Berkshire.

我们不想自己购买一百家企业来运营，想着其中 15 家会出问题，而其他 85 家会解决问题。这不是我们建设伯克希尔的方式。

Charlie, got anymore? 查理，还有吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

11. Nobody can “successfully dethrone Coca-Cola”

11. 没有人能“成功推翻可口可乐”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is Pete Banner (PH) from Boulder, Colorado.

观众成员：是的。我的名字是皮特·班纳（PH），来自科罗拉多州博尔德市。

First of all, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, most of us consider you fellows our heroes, and thank you for that. (Applause)

首先，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我们大多数人都把你们当作我们的英雄，谢谢你们。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，谢谢你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. On a lighter note, versus the chaos —

观众成员：是的。换个轻松的话题，相对于混乱——

WARREN BUFFETT: You can stay on the same note. It doesn’t bother us. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你可以继续保持同样的音调。这不会困扰我们。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I wanted to ask what prompted you — considering your general aversion to technology — what prompted you to invest $100 million in Level 3 Communications convertible bonds?

观众成员：我想问一下，考虑到您对技术的一般反感，是什么促使您投资 1 亿美元于 Level 3 Communications 的可转换债券？

And if I get a twofer, I’d like to know, do you still consider Coca-Cola as you once described as “The Inevitable.”

如果我得到一个双重优惠，我想知道，你是否仍然像以前描述的那样将可口可乐视为“不可避免的”。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The answer to the second one first.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。先回答第二个问题。

The — Coca-Cola I think has — ever since I described it that way, in terms of the — I talked about in terms of the probabilities that they would dominate the soft drink market and not lose market share in any way. That they would grow over time.

我认为可口可乐自从我这样描述它以来，我谈到了他们主导软饮料市场的可能性，并且不会以任何方式失去市场份额。他们会随着时间的推移而增长。

You know, it’s happening year after year. I don’t think the global market share of Coca-Cola products has ever been higher than it is now, and I don’t see anything that changes that in the future.

你知道，这一年又一年地发生。我认为可口可乐产品的全球市场份额从未像现在这样高，而且我看不出未来有什么会改变这一点。

I mean, it is a huge distribution system that has been getting into the minds of more and more consumers since 1886, when John Pemberton, you know, Jacob’s Pharmacy in Atlanta, first served up the first one.

我的意思是，自从 1886 年约翰·彭伯顿在亚特兰大的雅各布药房首次推出以来，这个庞大的分销系统已经深入到越来越多消费者的心中。

It is in the minds of people, the product, all over the world, and it — there’ll be more people and it will be in their minds more firmly. And over time, they should make a little more per drink.

在人们的心中，这个产品遍布世界各地，而且——会有更多的人，它会更加牢固地存在于他们的心中。随着时间的推移，他们每杯饮料的收入应该会稍微增加。

So, I don’t know how in the world anybody would successfully dethrone Coca-Cola.

所以，我不知道这个世界上有谁能成功地取代可口可乐。

12. Buying Level 3 bonds is a “bet on the people”

购买 3 级债券是“对人的赌注”

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of Level 3, we like the people. We think they’re smart people, and they owed too much money, you know. And they recognized it. And they’ve done some very intelligent things, in the way of attacking that problem, and, you know, we bet on the people.

沃伦·巴菲特：就第三级而言，我们喜欢这些人。我们认为他们是聪明的人，但他们欠了太多的钱，你知道的。他们也意识到了这一点，并且在解决这个问题的过程中做了一些非常聪明的事情，你知道的，我们押注于这些人。

Charlie knows way more about the physical world than I do, but, you know, I have yet to see an electron. And I just have no working relationship with them at all. I can’t identify with them. So, I do not know a lot about the technology. I never would.

查理对物理世界的了解比我多得多，但是，你知道，我还没有见过电子。而且我与它们完全没有工作关系。我无法与它们产生共鸣。所以，我对技术了解不多。我永远不会。

I mean you could explain it to me and I could probably regurgitate it on some test or something, but I wouldn’t really understand it.

我的意思是，你可以给我解释一下，我可能可以在某个测试或其他东西上复述出来，但我不会真正理解它。

But I think I understand the people involved, and we were quite willing to make that bet. It’s of a different sort than we usually do, but we did it and we’re happy we did it.

但我想我了解相关的人，我们很愿意做出这样的赌注。这与我们通常做的不同，但我们做了，并且我们很高兴我们做了。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more to say.

查理·芒格：无可奉告。

13. Why Berkshire invested in Mark Byrne’s hedge fund, Value Capital

13. 伯克希尔为何投资马克·伯恩的对冲基金，价值资本

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 9 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, this is Steve Rosenberg (PH) from West Bloomfield, Michigan, now living in New York.

观众成员：你好，我是来自密歇根州西布鲁姆菲尔德的史蒂夫·罗森伯格（音），现在住在纽约。

Mr. Buffett, the values that you and Charlie stand for and your supreme integrity are an inspiration. Thank you both for serving as such exceptional role models.

巴菲特先生，您和查理所坚持的价值观以及你们的崇高诚信是我们的灵感来源。感谢你们两位作为如此杰出的榜样。

I have three quick questions for you. The first involves Value Capital — (applause) — L.P. Your preliminary FIN 46 disclosure appears to indicate leverage employed of roughly 20 billion in assets, 60 million in equity, or 30 to 35 times.

我有三个简单的问题要问你。第一个涉及到 Value Capital —（掌声）— L.P. 你们的初步 FIN 46 披露似乎表明大约 200 亿资产、6000 万股本的杠杆使用，或 30 到 35 倍。

Without revealing any proprietary strategies, how do you derive comfort from this investment given your aversion to risk, other highly-levered partnership blowups, your enthusiasm in shutting down Gen Re Securities’ black box activities as soon as possible, and all of this, aside from the fact that it’s less than 1 percent of Berkshire’s equity, and that Mark Byrne is running it?

在不透露任何专有策略的情况下，考虑到您对风险的厌恶、其他高杠杆合伙关系的崩溃、您热衷于尽快关闭 Gen Re Securities 的黑箱活动，以及这一切，除了它占伯克希尔股权不到 1%这一事实之外，Mark Byrne 正在运营它，您如何从这项投资中获得安慰？

My second question involves manufactured housing. Can you comment some more on your enthusiasm for the underlying economics of the business, given what appears to be a commodity product with a high level of seller fragmentation, over-capacity, and large blowups on the financing side?

我的第二个问题涉及工厂化住房。鉴于这似乎是一种商品化产品，卖方高度分散，产能过剩，以及融资方面的大规模崩溃，您能否多谈谈您对该业务基本经济状况的热情？

And what advantage — even if Berkshire’s advantage is in the financing, why not stick only to the financing and not the manufacturing?

即使伯克希尔的优势在于融资，为什么不只专注于融资而不涉及制造业呢？

And my final question involves the gains on securitization that you see in that segment.

我最后一个问题涉及您在该部分看到的证券化收益。

Does the preponderance of gains reported indicate a mispricing of credit risk somewhere in the chain, perhaps analogous to the disconnect you were talking about between triple-B and triple-A spreads in the synthetic market and in the bond market? Thank you.

报告的大量收益是否表明链条中的某个地方存在信用风险定价错误，这可能类似于您所说的合成市场和债券市场中三 B 级和三 A 级利差之间的脱节？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Why don’t you elaborate on that third point on securitizations just a bit more? I’m not sure I totally have your point on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：你能不能再详细说明一下关于证券化的第三点？我不太确定我完全理解你的意思。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just the fact that usually you see gains rather than losses on securitization —

观众成员：通常你会看到证券化带来的收益而不是损失——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — all the time. Does that indicate that somewhere, when you’re slicing and dicing it, someone is paying too much, not taking the credit risk into — not valuing it properly.

观众成员：——一直如此。这是否表明在某个地方，当你在切分和分析时，有人支付过多，没有考虑信用风险——没有正确评估它。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. OK. Three questions.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。三个问题。

Value Capital is run by Mark Byrne, as you mentioned.

价值资本由你提到的马克·伯恩经营。

We’ve made a lot of money with the Byrne family. We made money with Jack, and we like Mark and Patrick, who we know — Charlie and I know very well.

我们和伯恩家族赚了很多钱。我们和杰克一起赚钱，我们喜欢马克和帕特里克，查理和我都非常了解他们。

And Mark is a very, very bright guy who runs what is, in effect, a hedge fund specializing in fixed income-type securities around the world.

马克是一个非常非常聪明的人，他经营着一个实际上是专注于全球固定收益类证券的对冲基金。

And Mark and his family have significant money of their own in Value Capital, but we have 95, or so, percent of the capital in there. And we do not in any way guarantee their obligations.

马克和他的家人在 Value Capital 中有相当多的资金，但我们大约拥有 95%的资本。而且我们绝不以任何方式担保他们的义务。

Mark operates with a degree of leverage that is less than most people that operate in that field, but it’s a lot compared to the way we operate at Berkshire.

马克的杠杆操作程度低于该领域的大多数人，但与我们在伯克希尔的操作方式相比，这已经很多了。

And that’s OK with us. We wouldn’t do it with a hundred percent of our money. We wouldn’t do it with 50 percent of our money. But we think it’s a reasonable business, as run by Mark, as long as he’s got a lot of money on the downside as well as the upside, which he does.

这对我们来说没问题。我们不会用我们百分之百的钱去做。我们不会用我们百分之五十的钱去做。但我们认为这是一个合理的生意，只要由马克经营，只要他在下行和上行方面都有大量资金，而他确实有。

And he’s a very decent guy, in addition to being a very smart guy. So, we’re comfortable with that. It may have to get — the figures may have to get consolidated in our balance sheet.

他是个非常正派的人，而且非常聪明。所以，我们对此感到放心。可能需要将这些数字合并到我们的资产负债表中。

We disclose them all now in our first quarter report. You will see them set out. And, in effect, we’ve got 600 and some million, a couple hundred million of retained earnings that Mark has earned for us, and we feel quite comfortable with that as an investment.

我们现在在第一季度报告中全部披露。你会看到它们的详细列出。实际上，我们有六亿多，几亿的留存收益是马克为我们赚取的，我们对作为投资感到相当满意。

We do not regard it as a business part of Berkshire. The consolidated financial statements may make it look like we do, but it is not. We are a limited partner. We have a corporation in between. We have no guarantees of anything they do.

我们不将其视为伯克希尔的业务部分。合并财务报表可能会让它看起来像是，但事实并非如此。我们是有限合伙人。我们中间有一个公司。我们对他们所做的任何事情都没有保证。

And we’re very happy with Mark running that piece of money, even though he does it, as you say, in fixed-income strategies that involve a lot of — they involve derivatives, they involve borrowed money. But I’ve looked at the positions and they all make sense to me.

我们对马克管理那部分资金感到非常满意，尽管如你所说，他是在涉及大量衍生品和借款的固定收益策略中进行的。但我查看了这些头寸，它们对我来说都很合理。

And they would make sense, because Mark is a very smart guy, and the money means a lot more to him than it does to us. So, we feel OK with that.

这很合理，因为马克是个非常聪明的人，对他来说，钱比对我们更重要。所以，我们对此感到满意。

We don’t like the idea of consolidating, in the sense that we don’t think it will make — we think it makes our figures less representative of what’s really going on than the way we handle it presently, but the rules are the rules and we’ll do what they say.

我们不喜欢合并的想法，因为我们认为这会使我们的数据不如我们目前处理方式更能真实反映实际情况，但规则就是规则，我们会按照规定去做。

The second point. Charlie, do you want to comment on Value Capital at all?

第二点。查理，你想对价值资本发表任何评论吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

14. Clayton Homes is “class player” in manufactured homes industry

14. Clayton Homes 是制造房屋行业的“顶级玩家”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

The second. Manufactured housing. You know, it is — I mean practically everybody in manufactured housing is losing money now, and Clayton is making money.

第二，制造房屋。你知道，几乎所有制造房屋的人现在都在亏钱，而克莱顿在赚钱。

They’ve had much sounder policies, in terms of how they’ve operated over the years.

多年来，他们在运作方面采取了更为稳健的政策。

One of the things they do — most of their houses are sold through their own retail units. They have about, I think, 297 or so retail outlets of their own. And those managers are on a 50/50 profit split, basically, as I remember it, with Clayton. And they’re responsible for all of the paper they generate.

他们做的事情之一是——他们的大多数房屋都是通过自己的零售单位出售的。我记得他们大约有 297 个左右的自有零售网点。而那些经理基本上与 Clayton 进行 50/50 的利润分成。他们负责他们产生的所有文件。

So, unlike what was going on a few years ago in manufactured housing, where a manufacturer would sell a house, maybe a floor plan, to a dealer. And then that dealer could borrow, maybe — if I he got some kind of a purchaser on the note, maybe 125 or 130 percent of invoice price, if he could just create a warm body out there someplace that would give him some apparent down payment. That situation was just built for disaster.

因此，与几年前在制造房屋行业的情况不同，当时制造商会将房屋，可能是一个平面图，卖给经销商。然后那个经销商可以借款，也许——如果他能在票据上找到某种买家，可能是发票价格的 125%或 130%，如果他能在某个地方找到一个愿意给他一些表面上首付款的人。那种情况简直就是为灾难而生的。

But at Clayton, the profit or loss off that person who buys the product goes till the obligation is fully paid for.

但在克莱顿，购买产品的人的利润或损失会持续到义务完全支付为止。

So if a dealer takes inadequate down payments or sells to people he shouldn’t be selling to, it’s going to be his problem, and he’s going to get the repo back. He’s going to have to sell it himself. He’s going to get the loss on the paper charged to him. And that produces an entirely different kind of behavior at the retail level than occurred with many of the other manufactured housing manufacturers.

因此，如果经销商收取的首付款不足或将产品卖给不该卖的人，那将是他的问题，他将不得不收回赎回物。他将不得不自己出售。他将承担文件上的损失。这会在零售层面产生与许多其他制造房屋制造商不同的行为。

But it’s not an easy business. It’s — Clayton does it the right way. And in fact, if you read Jim Clayton’s book, he will — he tells in there about the time he bought his first home in Indiana. And he tells about a little of the funny business that went in, in terms of how the manufacturer behaved.

但这不是一项容易的业务。克莱顿以正确的方式经营。事实上，如果你读过吉姆·克莱顿的书，他会在书中讲述他在印第安纳州购买第一套房子的经历。他还讲述了一些制造商行为中的趣事。

And he described some of the systems that people use to gain the financing. And those activities are coming home to roost in a huge way for both the manufactured housing companies and for the people that finance the retail paper.

他描述了一些人们用来获得融资的系统。这些活动正在以巨大的方式对制造房屋公司和为零售票据融资的人产生影响。

Clayton did it right, basically, and they’ll continue to do it right. Even so, there is such a stain over the whole manufactured housing industry, in terms of financing, that even — Clayton is the only one that has — is able to securitize.

克莱顿基本上做得很好，他们将继续做好。即便如此，整个制造房屋行业在融资方面仍然存在污点，甚至——克莱顿是唯一能够证券化的公司。

And, as I said earlier, they cannot securitize to the extent — without us — they wouldn’t be able to securitize to the extent that they could have a year ago.

正如我之前所说，没有我们，他们无法像一年前那样进行证券化。

It’s an industry in big trouble. I think we’ll do fine in it, because I think we’re in with a class player. I think they’ve got these systems in place that have the right incentives, which you need all the way through the system. And I think Berkshire will make them even stronger, because we will not securitize. We’ll keep it for the portfolio.

这是一个陷入大麻烦的行业。我认为我们会在其中表现良好，因为我认为我们与一个优秀的参与者合作。我认为他们已经建立了这些系统，并且拥有正确的激励措施，这是整个系统所需要的。我认为伯克希尔会让他们更加强大，因为我们不会证券化。我们会将其保留在投资组合中。

The gains on securitization — the point you made is essentially correct, that some of the — when you see a company with lots of gains on securitization, you ought to get a little suspicious. I don’t want to get into more detail than that because it’s an accounting question.

证券化收益——你提到的观点基本正确，当你看到一家公司有大量的证券化收益时，你应该有点怀疑。我不想深入细节，因为这是一个会计问题。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that, either.

查理·芒格：我对此也无可奉告。

15. Goodwill impairment charge not needed for Gen Re

15. Gen Re 无需商誉减值费用

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Phil McCaw (PH), Warren, from Connecticut.

观众成员：菲尔·麦考（PH），沃伦，来自康涅狄格州。

Could you comment on Gen Re and goodwill impairment charges since you purchased it, and how it’s evolved in your thinking, and if it even became a part of your thinking?

你能评论一下自从你购买 Gen Re 以来的商誉减值费用，以及它在你的思考中是如何演变的，甚至是否成为你思考的一部分吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. The question is — relates to the fact that, if you buy a business at a price over tangible assets, that you set up a goodwill account.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。问题是——如果你以高于有形资产的价格购买一家公司，你就会设立一个商誉账户。

And if at any time in the future that that goodwill becomes impaired, you should, and must, if the accounting is proper, run a charge to reduce that goodwill item. You run a charge through the income account.

如果未来任何时候该商誉受到损害，你应该并且必须在会计处理正确的情况下，通过损益账户计提减值以减少该商誉项目。

We have a large goodwill item for Gen Re, because it was the biggest acquisition we ever made. We paid substantially more than book. And the question is whether that goodwill is impaired.

我们有一项关于 Gen Re 的大额商誉，因为这是我们有史以来最大的一笔收购。我们支付的金额远高于账面价值。问题在于该商誉是否减值。

And certainly, if the operations of Gen Re of the last couple of years — not including this year — but of the years ’98 through 2001, more or less, were representative of the future, you would say that there has to be a big goodwill charge there, and I would agree with you.

当然，如果不包括今年，Gen Re 在过去几年的运营——大致是指 1998 年至 2001 年——代表了未来，你会说那里必须有一笔巨大的商誉减值，我会同意你的看法。

I think that as Gen Re is operating now, and had the capacity to operate — and it’s being realized now, thanks to a couple of great managers we’ve got there — I think that — I personally think that Gen Re is worth more now today than at the time we bought it. And I think you will — its float has increased substantially, and I think that you will see the float turn out to be cost-free over time.

我认为，通用再保险公司现在的运营状况，以及它的运营能力——现在得益于我们那里的几位优秀经理，这一点正在实现——我个人认为，通用再保险公司现在的价值比我们购买时更高。我认为——它的浮存金已经大幅增加，我认为你会看到浮存金随着时间的推移变得无成本。

One thing I should have mentioned, actually, is — and I looked at a draft of our 10-Q. We have to — I think we should put this in there. We — Gen Re, up until this year, was discounting worker’s comp reserves at 4 1/2 percent, which was not conservative. That — we inherited that situation.

有一件事我本该提到的，实际上是——我看过我们 10-Q 的草稿。我们必须——我认为我们应该把这个放进去。我们——Gen Re 直到今年一直以 4.5%的折扣计算工人赔偿储备，这并不保守。那——我们继承了这种情况。

But we have changed that to discounting comp reserves going forward at 1 percent. So the accounting is more conservative going forward now — 2003 — by a fair margin, than it was in prior years and in a method we inherited.

但是我们已经将未来的储备折扣率改为 1%。因此，从现在起——2003 年——会计方法比以前更为保守，比我们继承的方法要保守得多。

So that the figures you see would be somewhat better if we had continued the old discounting at 4 1/2, rather than go to the new discount rate. And in the draft I saw, the 10-Q, that wasn’t in there. I think we should get that in there, [Berkshire CFO] Marc [Hamburg], while I think of this.

因此，如果我们继续以 4.5 的旧折扣率而不是采用新的折扣率，那么你看到的数字会稍微好一些。在我看到的 10-Q 草稿中，这一点没有提到。我认为我们应该把它加进去，[伯克希尔首席财务官]马克[汉堡]，趁我还记得这件事。

Charlie? 查理？

16. We “deplore solving operating problems by accounting maneuvers”

16. 我们“谴责通过会计手段解决运营问题”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. That accounting issue is of a type that is very common within Berkshire. We are so horrified by the terrible business decisions we see made all around us by people who are relying on over-optimistic accounting, that we tend to almost reach for opportunities to make our accounting very conservative. Way more than other people.

查理·芒格：是的。这个会计问题在伯克希尔内部是非常常见的。我们对周围的人依赖过于乐观的会计而做出的糟糕商业决策感到非常震惊，以至于我们几乎倾向于抓住机会使我们的会计非常保守。远远超过其他人。

We think it protects our business decision-making, as well as our financial integrity.

我们认为这可以保护我们的业务决策以及我们的财务诚信。

I don’t know why we ever got into this business of trying to get the accounting result as close to the chalk as we could possibly get it. What is wrong with the world when everything is a little bit under-reported? I mean —

我不知道我们为什么要进入这个尽可能接近准确会计结果的行业。当一切都有点少报时，这个世界怎么了？我的意思是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, generally people think that reporting, you know, and transparency and all that, has improved over the years. And I felt much better working with the financial statements in 1960 than I feel working with financial statements in 2000.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，一般来说，人们认为报告、透明度等等这些东西多年来有所改善。而我在 1960 年处理财务报表时感觉要比在 2000 年处理财务报表时好得多。

And, frankly, in many ways I thought they taught me more about what the company was really about than the current ones do, even though there was far less detail.

而且，坦率地说，在很多方面，我认为他们比现在的人更能让我了解公司真正的情况，尽管细节要少得多。

And what we really deplore is solving operating problems by accounting maneuvers.

我们真正痛惜的是通过会计手段解决运营问题。

And, you know, Gen Re had some problems in the mid-’80s, when everybody did, and they went to discounting their worker’s comp reserves. And they — you know, it was a quick fix, but it’s like heroin. And you get on it and it’s not easy to get off.

而且，你知道，通用再保险在 80 年代中期遇到了一些问题，当时每个人都遇到了问题，他们开始折扣他们的工人赔偿准备金。而且你知道，这是一种快速解决方案，但就像海洛因一样。你一旦上瘾，就很难戒掉。

And we — Charlie and I have seen that time and time again. People that think, you know, trade loading, whatever it may have been, they think they’re going to solve something by paying accounting games.

我们——查理和我一次又一次地看到这种情况。那些认为通过贸易装载或其他手段可以解决问题的人，他们以为可以通过会计游戏来解决问题。

And they’re encouraged by their CFOs sometimes and frequently they were encouraged by their big-name auditors, in one way or another, to really play with the numbers.

有时他们受到首席财务官的鼓励，并且经常受到知名审计师的鼓励，以某种方式真正地玩弄数字。

And it catches up with you. You might as well face reality immediately, and take whatever operating steps are necessary to solve problems. Or, if you can’t solve them, just give up on them.

它会追上你。你不妨立即面对现实，并采取必要的操作步骤来解决问题。或者，如果你无法解决它们，就放弃它们。

But whatever you do, playing with the numbers, it never works, although I guess if you’re 64 1/2 and you’re going to retire at 65, it might get kind of tempting. (Laughs)

但无论你怎么做，玩弄数字，它永远行不通，尽管我想如果你是 64 岁半并且打算在 65 岁退休，这可能会有点诱人。（笑）

17. Munger on recognizing “bullshit earnings”

17. 芒格谈识别“虚假收益”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. Andy Marino of Chapel Hill, by way of Boston.

观众成员：下午好，先生们。我是安迪·马里诺，来自波士顿，现在住在教堂山。

You have argued against the use of alternate measures of profitability, such as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, as measures of business performance.

您反对使用其他盈利指标，例如息税折旧摊销前利润，作为衡量企业绩效的标准。

At the same time, you have frequently cited the incompleteness of generally accepted accounting in reflecting economic reality for some businesses, implying that there are some necessary and proper adjustments.

同时，您经常提到公认会计在反映某些企业的经济现实方面的不完整性，这意味着需要进行一些必要和适当的调整。

Beyond what you recently described in the annual report as the folly of omitting depreciation, could you elaborate on your thoughts on other pitfalls of alternative financial presentations?

除了您最近在年度报告中描述的忽视折旧的愚蠢行为之外，您能否详细说明您对其他替代财务报告陷阱的看法？

Is EBITDA, in your view, just too often used as a shorthand for cash flow, or is the entire concept of recasting accounting data a suspect exercise?

在您看来，EBITDA 是否过于频繁地被用作现金流的简写，还是重述会计数据的整个概念是一个可疑的做法？

And which revisions might be appropriate, if any? And what might be viewed as red flags? And does it matter to you who is making those adjustments? Analysts, investors for their own purposes, or company managements, in terms of how that information should be viewed?

哪些修订可能是合适的，如果有的话？哪些可能被视为危险信号？对您来说，谁在做这些调整是否重要？分析师、投资者为了他们自己的目的，还是公司管理层，关于如何看待这些信息？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We regularly told you, for some years before the accounting change was made here a year or so ago — we told you, you should not count goodwill amortization.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在大约一年前进行会计变更之前的几年里，我们经常告诉你们，不应该计算商誉摊销。

You know, it was required under GAAP, and we, obviously, complied with GAAP, but we told you every year, virtually, that I can remember, we said, “This is not really an economic expense.”

你知道，根据 GAAP 的要求，我们显然遵守了 GAAP，但我记得我们几乎每年都告诉你，“这并不是真正的经济支出。”

And we ignore it in our own calculations of earnings, in terms of what we will pay for businesses. We don’t care whether there’s a goodwill item or not, because it’s immaterial to economic reality.

在我们自己的收益计算中，我们忽略了这一点，就我们将为企业支付的价格而言。我们不在乎是否有商誉项目，因为这对经济现实无关紧要。

So, we have been quite willing, at Berkshire, to tell our own owners to ignore certain things. And if they disagreed with us, they could look at the GAAP figures. But we felt they were getting misled by looking at the amortization of intangibles.

所以，我们在伯克希尔非常愿意告诉我们的股东忽略某些事情。如果他们不同意我们的看法，他们可以查看 GAAP 数据。但我们认为，通过查看无形资产摊销，他们会被误导。

That doesn’t mean we think all intangibles were good, but we just — we did feel that that was a — that was an arbitrary decision that didn’t make any sense at all.

这并不意味着我们认为所有无形资产都是好的，但我们只是——我们确实觉得那是一个——那是一个毫无意义的武断决定。

And we felt — obviously, as we’ve talked about — we felt the crazy pension assumptions have caused people to record phantom earnings, in many cases.

我们觉得——显然，正如我们所讨论的——我们觉得疯狂的养老金假设导致许多人在很多情况下记录了虚假的收益。

So we’re willing to tell you when we think there is data that is more important in economic analysis than GAAP figures. We’ll talk to you about it.

因此，当我们认为在经济分析中有比 GAAP 数据更重要的数据时，我们愿意告诉您。我们会和您谈论这个问题。

Not thinking of depreciation as an expense, though, strikes us as absolutely crazy.

不把折旧视为费用，这在我们看来是绝对疯狂的。

I can think of very few businesses — I can think of a couple — but I think of very few businesses where depreciation is not a real expense.

我能想到的很少有企业——我能想到几个——但我认为很少有企业折旧不是一个真正的费用。

Even at our gas pipelines, I mean, you know, at some point, A, they’ll need repairs, but beyond that, at some point they become obsolete. I mean there won’t be gas there 200 years from now, we know that.

即使在我们的天然气管道上，我的意思是，你知道，在某个时候，A，它们需要维修，但除此之外，在某个时候它们会变得过时。我的意思是，200 年后那里不会有天然气，我们知道这一点。

So, it — depreciation is real, and it’s the worst kind of expense. It’s reverse float. You know, you lay out the money before you get revenue. And you are out cash with nothing coming in.

所以，折旧是真实存在的，而且是最糟糕的一种费用。它是反向浮动。你知道的，你在获得收入之前就已经花了钱。而且你已经花掉了现金，却没有任何收入进来。

And depreciation — any management that doesn’t regard depreciation as an expense, you know, is living in a dream world, but of course they’re encouraged to do that, you know, by investment bankers who talk to them about EBITDA.

折旧——任何不将折旧视为费用的管理层都活在梦中，但当然，他们受到投资银行家的鼓励，这些银行家与他们谈论 EBITDA。

And then, you know, certain people have built fortunes on misleading investors by convincing them that EBITDA was a big deal.

然后，你知道，有些人通过误导投资者，让他们相信 EBITDA 是个大事，从而积累了财富。

And when we see companies that say, “Hey, we don’t pay any taxes, you know, because we don’t have any earnings for tax purposes, and don’t count depreciation and all of that,” you know, that’s coming — in our view, many times that’s coming very close to a flimflam game.

当我们看到一些公司说：“嘿，我们不交税，因为我们没有用于税务目的的收益，不计算折旧等等，”在我们看来，很多时候这非常接近于一种骗局。

You know, I get these people that show me — you know, they want to send me books with EBITDA in it, and I just tell them, you know, “I’ll look at that figure when you tell me you’ll make all the capital expenditures.”

你知道，我遇到这些人，他们给我看——你知道，他们想给我寄一些包含 EBITDA 的书，我就告诉他们，“当你告诉我你会承担所有资本支出时，我才会看这个数字。”

If I’m going to make the capital expenditures, there’s very few businesses where I think I can spend a whole lot less than depreciation year after year and maintain the economic strength of the business.

如果我要进行资本支出，我认为很少有业务可以年复一年地花费比折旧少得多的资金，同时保持业务的经济实力。

So I think the EBITDA has been a term that has cost a lot of investors a lot of money.

所以我认为 EBITDA 这个术语让很多投资者损失了很多钱。

You saw it in the telecom field. I mean the idea — they were spending money so damn fast, you know, I mean they couldn’t have it coming in the door fast enough from investors.

你在电信领域看到了。我是说这个想法——他们花钱的速度太快了，你知道，我是说他们从投资者那里进来的钱都不够快。

And then they pretended the depreciation was not a real expense. That’s nonsense. I mean it couldn’t be worse. And a generation of investors where sort of brought up to believe in that.

然后他们假装折旧不是真正的费用。这是无稽之谈。我的意思是，这再糟糕不过了。而且有一代投资者在某种程度上被培养成相信这一点。

We, at Berkshire, will spend more than our depreciation this year. We spent more than our depreciation last year. We spent more than our depreciation the year before that. You know, depreciation is a real expense, just as much as, you know, the expenditure for lights.

我们在伯克希尔今年的支出将超过折旧。我们去年的支出超过了折旧。前年我们的支出也超过了折旧。你知道，折旧是一项真正的费用，就像你知道的，灯光的支出一样。

It’s not a non-cash expense. It’s a cash expense. You just spend it first, you know. I mean the cash is gone, and it’s a delayed recording of cash. How anybody can turn that into something they use as a metric that talks about earnings is beyond me.

这不是非现金支出。这是现金支出。你只是先花掉了，你知道的。我的意思是现金已经没了，只是现金的延迟记录。怎么会有人把这变成一个用来谈论收益的指标，我无法理解。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think you would understand any presentation using the word EBITDA, if every time you saw that word you just substituted the phrase, “bullshit earnings.” (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的，我认为如果每次看到“EBITDA”这个词时，你都用“胡扯的收益”这个短语来替换，你就会理解任何使用这个词的演示。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I knew he’d do it sooner or later, folks.

沃伦·巴菲特：各位，我早知道他迟早会做到的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And the man —

查理·芒格：这个人——

WARREN BUFFETT: He made it through the morning, but never all day. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他撑过了早上，但从未撑过一整天。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And the man asked the question also, says, “What remaining big accounting troubles exist?”

查理·芒格：提问的人还说：“还有哪些重大的会计问题存在？”

The real lollapalooza is pension fund accounting, and, to some extent, post-retirement medical liabilities. Those are horribly understated now in America, and they’re very big numbers.

真正的重头戏是养老金基金会计，以及在某种程度上，退休后的医疗负债。这些在美国现在被严重低估，而且数字非常大。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve looked at financial statements, and you’ve seen them too in the last few months, where companies are recording pension income in the hundreds of millions, while at the same time being underfunded in their pension plan in the many billions.

沃伦·巴菲特：我查看过财务报表，你在过去几个月也见过这些报表，其中一些公司记录的养老金收入达数亿美元，而与此同时，他们的养老金计划却有数十亿美元的资金缺口。

And, you know, they just aren’t facing up to reality at all, and they don’t want to because they want to take the hit. And they’re this — you know, it’s the same mentality as stock option expenses.

而且，你知道，他们根本没有面对现实，他们也不想，因为他们想承受打击。而且他们是这样——你知道，这和股票期权费用的心态是一样的。

And they are paying people with stock options. But, you know, we pay people with cash bonuses, and I suppose, you know — well, it isn’t really true, but we might like it if we didn’t have to record cash bonuses as an expense. I mean it’s a way we pay people.

他们用股票期权支付给人们。但是，你知道，我们用现金奖金支付给人们，我想，你知道——嗯，这不是真的，但如果我们不必将现金奖金记录为费用，我们可能会喜欢。我是说这是一种我们支付给人们的方式。

And you can say, “Well, why don’t you put it in the footnotes and leave it out of the income account like they do with option expenses,” which is a form of compensation, too.

你可以说：“那么，为什么不把它放在脚注中，并像他们对待期权费用那样将其排除在收入账户之外呢？”这也是一种补偿形式。

But the — you know, the answer is that a bunch of people who cared very much about having their stocks float to unreasonable prices, at least in our view, found they could do it a lot easier if they didn’t count compensation expenses.

但是——你知道，答案是，一群非常关心让他们的股票涨到不合理价格的人，至少在我们看来，发现如果他们不计算补偿费用，这会容易得多。

And, you know, why not put all expenses in footnotes? Just have an item there that says “sales” and then have the same figure for net profit. And then just have all the — (laughter) — expenses in the footnotes, you know.

而且，你知道，为什么不把所有费用都放在脚注里呢？只需在那儿列一个“销售额”的项目，然后用同样的数字表示净利润。然后就把所有的——（笑声）——费用放在脚注里，你知道的。

And people with a straight face, you know, say, “Well, it’s in the footnotes, so therefore everybody knows about it and we don’t have to count it — put it in the income account.”

而且人们一本正经地说：“嗯，这在脚注里，所以每个人都知道，我们不必计算它——把它放在收入账户里。”

It’s amazing what people with high IQs will do to rationalize their own, you know, their own pocketbooks.

高智商的人为了合理化自己的利益，会做出令人惊讶的事情。

And Charlie has another explanation for why there’s been this denial of the reality of expense — option expense — in terms of people’s ego getting involved with their own records.

查理还有另一个解释，说明为什么在涉及到人们的自尊与他们自己的记录时，会否认费用的现实——期权费用。

You want to elaborate on that, Charlie? Don’t name names. (Laughter)

你想详细说明一下吗，查理？不要提名字。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’m so tiresome on this subject, and I’ve been on it for so many decades.

查理·芒格：不，我在这个话题上太令人厌烦了，而且我已经谈了几十年。

It’s such a rotten way to run a civilization. To make the basic accounting wrong is very much like making the engineering wrong when you’re building a bridge.

这是一种糟糕透顶的管理文明的方式。把基本的会计搞错，就像在建桥时把工程搞错一样。

And when I see reputable people making these perfectly ridiculous arguments to the effect that it’s unthinkable that options be expensed.

当我看到有声望的人提出这些完全荒谬的论点，认为将期权计入费用是不可想象的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Or it’s too difficult to value them.

沃伦·巴菲特：或者它们太难估值。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, because it’s too difficult to value, or God knows what reason.

查理·芒格：嗯，因为它太难估值了，或者天知道是什么原因。

And a lot of them are people you’d be glad to have marry your daughter. (Laughter)

他们中有很多人是你乐于让他们娶你女儿的人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, because they’re rich, for one thing. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，因为他们有钱，首先是这一点。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yet, the truth of the matter is they’re somewhere between crazy and crooked. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：然而，事实是他们介于疯狂和不诚实之间。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Put him down as undecided. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：把他算作未决定。（笑声）

It’s really astounding. The interesting thing is, of course, now, is that the four auditing firms left, what they call the Final Four now in the auditing — (Laughter)

这真是令人震惊。当然，现在有趣的是，剩下的四家审计公司，现在他们称之为审计界的“四大”——（笑声）

They have now — and listen, I’m glad they did it, too. And I tip my hat to them for doing it. But they’ve now said that they really do think options are an expense. So this is —

他们现在——听着，我也很高兴他们这样做了。我向他们致敬。但他们现在说，他们确实认为期权是一种费用。所以这是——

You know, it kind of reminds of you what happened during the Reformation, isn’t it? You know, when you’d have these places sway back and forward, you know, as they get carried by one argument or the other.

你知道，这有点让人想起宗教改革期间发生的事情，不是吗？你知道，当时这些地方会在不同的论点之间摇摆不定。

In fact, I think there was that famous vicar of Bray who would swing from Catholicism to Luther, back and forth, as this little town went back and forth in Germany.

事实上，我认为有那位著名的布雷牧师，他会在天主教和路德教之间来回摇摆，就像这个小镇在德国来回摇摆一样。

And finally, the townspeople gathered and they said to the vicar — they said, “It’s understandable that we’re confused by all that’s going on in theology, and we really don’t know much about it, and so we swing back and forth.”

最后，镇上的人们聚集在一起，他们对牧师说：“我们对神学中发生的一切感到困惑是可以理解的，我们对此确实知之甚少，所以我们在其中摇摆不定。”

But they said, “We find it a little disgusting that you, a man of the cloth, would also keep swaying back and forth.” And they said, “Have you no principle?” “And he said, “Yes, I have one principle.” He says, “It’s to remain the vicar of Bray.” (Laughter)

但他们说：“我们觉得有点恶心，你作为一个神职人员，也会来回摇摆。”他们说：“你没有原则吗？”他说：“是的，我有一个原则。”他说：“那就是保持布雷的牧师身份。”（笑声）

I think we’ve seen a little of that in the auditing profession, but I think they’ve actually found the true religion now, so I don’t want to sit here and criticize them.

我认为我们在审计行业中已经看到了一些这样的情况，但我认为他们现在实际上找到了真正的信仰，所以我不想坐在这里批评他们。

But, you know, you now have four firms that lobbied against options being counted as an expense in 1993 that have written the FASB and say that options should be an expense.

但是，你知道，现在有四家公司在 1993 年游说反对将期权计为费用，这些公司已经写信给 FASB，表示期权应该被计为费用。

And I don’t know how in the world something could have not been an expense in 1993 and be an expense in 2003.

我不知道怎么会有东西在 1993 年不是开支，而在 2003 年却成了开支。

Certainly didn’t apply to utility bills or, you know, raw materials or anything of the sort. But that’s the human condition.

当然不适用于水电费，或者，你知道，原材料或类似的东西。但这就是人类的状况。

18. No comment on “opportunistic” bond strategies

18. 对“机会主义”债券策略不予置评

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, hi. Sam Kidston. I’m a shareholder from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I have a couple of quick questions for you guys.

观众成员：你好，我是山姆·基德斯顿。我是来自马萨诸塞州剑桥市的股东。我有几个简单的问题想问你们。

First of all, other than your general criteria for investing in any company, what are your criteria for investing in banks? And has your general view toward investing in banks changed over time?

首先，除了您对投资任何公司的一般标准之外，您对投资银行的标准是什么？您对投资银行的总体看法随着时间的推移有变化吗？

Second question would be, in terms of a discount rate, do you feel it’s appropriate to use your cost of capital at the current risk-free rate?

第二个问题是，从折现率的角度来看，您认为使用当前无风险利率下的资本成本是否合适？

And then in the past, you’ve mentioned that you do some sort of pseudo-bond arbitrage, and would you please specify what types of trades you do in this area?

然后在过去，你提到过你进行某种伪债券套利，你能否具体说明你在这个领域进行哪些类型的交易？

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, you would like our buys and sells for Monday morning? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，你想知道我们周一早上的买卖情况吗？（笑）

We don’t — we’re not going to talk about specific strategies that, you know — we obviously they’re profitable or we wouldn’t be doing them, and we think other people might copy them if we talked about them, so —

我们不——我们不会谈论具体的策略，你知道——显然它们是有利可图的，否则我们就不会去做，而且我们认为如果我们谈论它们，其他人可能会效仿，所以——

And we have pointed out, incidentally, and we will continue to point it out, that there’s not a long life to these bond strategies. That doesn’t mean we might not reemploy them when circumstances called for it later on.

顺便提一下，我们已经指出，并将继续指出，这些债券策略的寿命不长。这并不意味着在以后情况需要时我们可能不会重新使用它们。

But they’re not like earning money out of See’s Candy or, you know, out of Fruit of the Loom or something. They’re opportunistic situations that we’re pretty well positioned to engage in at certain times.

但它们不像是从 See's Candy 或 Fruit of the Loom 之类的公司赚钱。它们是一些机会主义的情况，我们在某些时候非常适合参与其中。

19. Banks can be “surprisingly” profitable

19. 银行可以“出乎意料地”盈利

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about banking, you know, banking — if you can just stay away from following the fads, and really making a lot of bad loans, banking has been a remarkably good business in this country.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于银行业的问题，你知道，银行业——如果你能避免追随潮流，并且不做很多坏贷款，银行业在这个国家一直是一个非常好的行业。

Certainly, ever since World War II, it’s — the returns on equity from — for banks that have stayed out of trouble has really been terrific.

当然，自第二次世界大战以来，对于那些没有陷入困境的银行来说，股本回报确实非常出色。

And there are many — there are certain banks, I should say — in this country that are quite large that are earning, you know, maybe 20 percent on tangible equity.

而且在这个国家，有一些相当大的银行，应该说是某些银行，它们的有形股本收益率可能达到 20%。

And when you think you’re dealing in a commodity like money, that’s fairly surprising to me.

当你认为自己在处理像金钱这样的商品时，这对我来说相当令人惊讶。

So, I would say that I guess I’ve been surprised by the degree to which margins in banking have not been competed away in something as fundamental as money.

所以，我想说的是，我对银行业利润率在像货币这样基本的领域没有被竞争掉的程度感到惊讶。

How about you, Charlie? 你呢，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what you’re saying, in fair implication, is that we sort of screwed up the predictions, because banking was a way better business than we figured out in advance.

查理·芒格：嗯，你的意思是，我们在预测上有点搞砸了，因为银行业比我们事先想象的要好得多。

We actually made quite a few billions of dollars, really, out of banking, and more in American Express. But basically that was while we were misappraising it.

实际上，我们确实从银行业赚了几十亿美元，更多的是从美国运通赚的。但基本上那是在我们错误评估它的时候。

We did not figure it was going to be as good as it actually turned out to be. And my only prediction is that we’ll continue to make failures like that. (Laughter)

我们没想到结果会这么好。而我唯一的预测是我们会继续犯这样的错误。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s fairly extraordinary, in a world of — particularly a world of low interest rates, that you’d find financial institutions basically doing pretty much the same thing, you know, where A competes with B, and B competes with C, without great competitive advantage, and having them all earn really high returns on tangible capital.

沃伦·巴菲特：在一个特别是低利率的世界里，你会发现金融机构基本上在做同样的事情，你知道，A 与 B 竞争，B 与 C 竞争，没有很大的竞争优势，却都能在有形资本上获得非常高的回报，这相当不寻常。

Now, part of it is that they push — they have pushed the loan-to-capital ratios higher than 30 or 40 years ago, but that — nevertheless they earn high rates of returns. They earn much higher rates of returns on assets alone, and then they have greater leverage of assets-to-capital so that produces returns on capital that really are pretty extraordinary.

现在，部分原因是他们将贷款与资本的比率推高到了 30 或 40 年前的水平，但尽管如此，他们仍然获得了高回报率。他们仅在资产上就获得了更高的回报率，然后他们在资产与资本的杠杆上更大，因此产生的资本回报率确实相当非凡。

And, you know, banks — certain banks — get into trouble because they make big mistakes in lending, but it’s not required of you, in that business, to get into trouble. I mean you can — if you keep your head about you, it can be a pretty good business.

而且，你知道，银行——某些银行——会陷入困境，因为它们在贷款方面犯了大错，但在这个行业中，你并不需要陷入困境。我的意思是，如果你保持冷静，这可以是一个相当不错的生意。

20. Look at opportunity costs, not “cost of capital”

20. 看机会成本，而不是“资本成本”

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about a discount rate, when you talk about our cost of capital, that’s worth bringing up, because Charlie and I don’t have the faintest idea what our cost of capital is at Berkshire, and we think the whole concept is a little crazy, frankly.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于贴现率的问题，当你谈到我们的资本成本时，这值得提出来，因为查理和我对伯克希尔的资本成本没有丝毫概念，坦率地说，我们认为整个概念有点疯狂。

But it’s something that’s taught in the business schools, and you have to be able to answer the questions or you don’t get out of business school.

但这是商学院教授的内容，你必须能够回答这些问题，否则你就无法从商学院毕业。

But we have a very simple arrangement in terms of what we do with money. And, you know, we look for the most intelligent thing we can find to do.

但是在处理金钱方面，我们有一个非常简单的安排。而且，你知道，我们寻找我们能找到的最聪明的事情去做。

If we’ve got money around or — if we look — we don’t buy and sell businesses this way, but in terms of securities we would — if we find something that’s at 50 percent of value, and we own something else at 90 percent of value, we might very well move from one to another. We will do the most intelligent thing we can with the capital we have.

如果我们有资金，或者——如果我们观察——我们不会以这种方式买卖企业，但就证券而言，如果我们发现某个东西的价值是 50%，而我们拥有的其他东西的价值是 90%，我们很可能会从一个转到另一个。我们会用我们拥有的资本做出最明智的决定。

And so, we measure alternatives against each other, and we measure alternatives against dividends, and we measure alternatives against repurchase of shares.

因此，我们将各种选择相互比较，并将选择与股息进行比较，还将选择与股票回购进行比较。

But I have never seen a cost of capital calculation that made sense to me.

但我从未见过一个对我有意义的资本成本计算。

How about you, Charlie? 你呢，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Never. 查理·芒格：从不。

And this is a very interesting thing that’s happened. If you take the most powerful freshman text in economics, which is by [Greg] Mankiw of Harvard, and he says on practically the first page that “intelligent people make their decisions based on opportunity cost.”

这是一件非常有趣的事情。如果你看哈佛大学[格雷格]·曼昆编写的最有影响力的经济学入门教材，他几乎在第一页就说“聪明的人根据机会成本做出决策。”

In other words, it’s your alternatives that are competing for the use of your time or money, that matter in judging whether you take action or not.

换句话说，是你的其他选择在竞争你的时间或金钱的使用，这在判断你是否采取行动时很重要。

And of course, those vary greatly from time to time and from company to company. And we tend to make all of our financial decisions based on our opportunity costs, just as like they teach in freshman economics.

当然，这些在不同时间和公司之间差异很大。我们往往根据机会成本来做出所有的财务决策，就像他们在大学一年级经济学中教的那样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And the rest of the world has gone off on some crazy kick where they can create a standard formula, and that’s cost. They even get a cost of equity capital for some business that’s old and filthy rich. It’s a perfectly amazing mental malfunction.

查理·芒格：而世界其他地方则陷入了一种疯狂的想法，他们认为可以创造一个标准公式，那就是成本。他们甚至为一些古老且非常富有的企业计算股本成本。这简直是一个令人惊讶的思维故障。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s a — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是一个——（笑声）

21. PetroChina investment not a “big deal”

21. 中国石油投资不算“大事”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3. Is there anybody we’ve forgotten to offend? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第三。有没有人是我们忘记冒犯的？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Karen Kalish. I’m from St. Louis. And I think I’m the first woman to ask a question today. (Applause)

观众成员：你好。我的名字是凯伦·卡利什。我来自圣路易斯。我想我是今天第一个提问的女性。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re all for that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们完全支持。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My late uncle, Bill Shield at Robert W. Baird, first bought Berkshire for our family when it was $337.

听众成员：我已故的叔叔，比尔·希尔德在罗伯特·W·贝尔德首次为我们家购买伯克希尔时，价格是 337 美元。

And I’m very grateful to you two, because I’ve been able to start a foundation in St. Louis and give money away. And I give it to reading and literacy programs.

我非常感谢你们两位，因为我已经能够在圣路易斯成立一个基金会并捐赠资金。我把钱捐给阅读和识字项目。

But I’m very curious about the Buffett-Munger philosophy and practice of philanthropy.

但我对巴菲特-芒格的慈善哲学和实践非常好奇。

And my second question has to do with China. You made an acquisition recently, PetroChina, and I’m curious of what you think about China.

我的第二个问题与中国有关。你最近收购了中国石油，我很好奇你对中国的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the second question, we have about — I think — about five equity investments in companies that are domiciled and that operate primarily, or entirely, outside the United States.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，关于第二个问题，我们大约有——我想——大约有五项股权投资在那些主要或完全在美国以外注册和运营的公司。

We don’t list all our investments. We listed, I believe, last year, all those above $500 million. And we have never had — I think maybe since Guinness some years back — I don’t think we’ve ever had one hit the threshold of reporting in the Berkshire report, although we’ve owned some.

我们不会列出我们所有的投资。我相信去年我们列出了所有超过 5 亿美元的投资。而且我认为自从几年前的健力士以来，我们从未有过一个达到在伯克希尔报告中报告的门槛，尽管我们拥有一些。

And the Hong Kong stock exchange has just recently changed their requirements so that you have to report 5 percent of the holding of any company listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange.

香港证券交易所最近刚刚更改了他们的要求，现在您必须报告在香港证券交易所上市的任何公司持股的 5%。

And our PetroChina holdings, actually, are now, whatever it is, 13 percent, but they’re only 13 percent of something called the H shares.

而我们的中石油持股实际上现在是 13%，但它们只是所谓 H 股的 13%。

The Chinese government owns 90 percent of the company. The H shares own 10 percent. They sold that to the public a few years back. So we own 13 percent of a very small percentage. And it’s kind of a fluke of reporting that we’re required to report that particular holding. And like I say, we own four or so others in international securities.

中国政府拥有该公司 90%的股份。H 股拥有 10%的股份。他们在几年前将其出售给公众。因此，我们拥有一个非常小比例的 13%。由于报告的偶然性，我们被要求报告这一特定持股。正如我所说，我们在国际证券中还拥有其他四个左右的股份。

We don’t make any great judgment about China. You probably know more about China than I do. We simply look at investments around the world and we try to buy into things that we think offer the most value.

我们对中国没有做出任何重大判断。你可能比我更了解中国。我们只是观察世界各地的投资，并尝试购买我们认为最有价值的东西。

And if they’re in the United — we might prefer, slightly, that they be in the United States, and we might have strong preferences against — or strong biases against certain countries.

如果他们在美国——我们可能稍微更倾向于他们在美国，并且我们可能对某些国家有强烈的偏见或强烈的反感。

We would regard the United States as number one because we understand the game the best here. We understand the tax laws and all that sort of thing, and the corporate cultures and so on. But we would regard a number of other countries as virtually equivalent to the U.S.

我们认为美国是第一，因为我们在这里最了解这个游戏。我们了解税法和所有类似的事情，以及企业文化等等。但我们认为其他一些国家几乎与美国相当。

And there’s others that would have been marked down some, and then we’d have a whole bunch we wouldn’t go into under any circumstances because we just don’t understand them well enough.

还有一些会被降级，然后我们会有一大堆在任何情况下都不会涉及的，因为我们对它们的理解还不够。

But, you know, we think we understand something like the oil business in China reasonably well. And at a price relative to what we think the future cash generation is, we would make a decision on something like that.

但是，你知道，我们认为我们对中国的石油业务有相当好的理解。根据我们对未来现金流的预期，我们会对类似的事情做出决定。

But it’s not a big deal. It’s a big — it became reportable because of this peculiarity of the law, where if you own a certain percentage of something that’s only 10 percent of the whole pie, you still have to report it.

但这不是什么大问题。它之所以成为可报告的事项，是因为法律的这一特殊性，即使你拥有的某个部分仅占整体的 10%，你仍然必须报告。

The Chinese government is firmly in control of PetroChina. I mean, if we vote with the Chinese government, the two of us will control PetroChina. (Laughter)

中国政府牢牢控制着中国石油。我是说，如果我们和中国政府一起投票，我们两个人就能控制中国石油。（笑声）

22. Why we’re giving money “back to society”

22. 为什么我们要把钱“回馈给社会”

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about philanthropy. Charlie, you want to swing at that one first?

沃伦·巴菲特：关于慈善事业的问题。查理，你想先回答这个问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s fair to say that both of us feel that the very fortunate owe a duty to the general civilization, and even to the country of which he’s a member.

查理·芒格：我认为可以公平地说，我们两人都觉得非常幸运的人对整个文明，甚至对他所属的国家负有责任。

Whether you give as you go along or have the Buffett system of moderate giving as you go along and immense giving in due course, I regard as a matter of personal taste.

无论你是随时给予，还是采用巴菲特的方式，适度地随时给予并在适当的时候大量给予，我认为这都是个人喜好的问题。

I would understand the second position in that I would hate to spend all my time every day having people ask me for money. And I don’t think Warren could stand it. Is that right, Warren?

我能理解第二种立场，因为我不想每天都花时间让人们向我要钱。我觉得沃伦也受不了。是这样吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s not even try. Let’s not even try, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们还是别试了。我们还是别试了，查理。（笑声）

No, we — I mean, it’s a matter of record, and it hasn’t changed for, I don’t know, 25 years, probably, but basically everything I have at the date of the later of the death of myself or my wife, goes to charity.

不，我的意思是，这是有记录的，而且大概 25 年来都没有改变，但基本上在我或我妻子去世后，我所拥有的一切都会捐给慈善机构。

I mean 99 and a significant fraction. And since my children are here, I’m not going to carry it out to 8 decimal places. But — (laughter) — you know, why not? It —

我的意思是 99 和一个重要的分数。既然我的孩子们在这里，我就不把它精确到小数点后 8 位。但是——（笑声）——你知道，为什么不呢？它——

Think of it this way. Here’s — let’s just assume that, instead of being born as I was in a single birth, that I were in the womb and there was an identical twin next to me. Same DNA. Same everything. Personality. Propensity to work. Propensity to say — whatever. Identical twin. Wasn’t Charlie. Might look like him, but — (Laughter)

这样想吧。假设我不是以单独出生的方式出生，而是在子宫里有一个和我一模一样的双胞胎。相同的 DNA。所有一切都一样。性格。工作的倾向。说话的倾向——不管是什么。完全相同的双胞胎。不是查理。可能看起来像他，但——（笑声）

And there we are, the two of us. And a genie appeared. And the genie said, “I’ve got a proposition for the two of you. You’re going to be born in 24 hours. Same talents. Everything identical. And one of you is going to be born in Omaha, and one of you is going to be born in Bangladesh.

于是我们两个人在那里。一个精灵出现了。精灵说：“我有个提议给你们两位。你们将在 24 小时内出生。拥有相同的才能。一切都相同。你们中的一个将出生在奥马哈，另一个将出生在孟加拉国。”

“And I’m going to let you two decide which one gets to be born in Bangladesh and which one gets to be born in Omaha. And I’ve got this system. And I’m going to — the way I’m going to work it is that we start the bidding, and whichever one of you bids the highest proportion of your estate to go to society when you die, gets to go — be born in the United States.” I think you’d bet a hundred percent, you know.

“我会让你们两个决定谁出生在孟加拉国，谁出生在奥马哈。我有一个系统。我的方法是，我们开始竞价，你们中谁出价最高比例的遗产在你死后捐给社会，谁就能出生在美国。”我想你会下注百分之百。

You hear all of this about, you know, grit and pluck and all of these things, and how, you know, you have applied yourself working all your life, and you’ve done all these wonderful things.

你听到的都是关于毅力和勇气这些事情，以及你如何一生都在努力工作，并完成了所有这些美好的事情。

Well, just imagine if I’d been born in Bangladesh. You know, and I’d walked down Main Street and said, you know, “I allocate capital.” You know? “Let me show my stuff.” (Laughter)

好吧，想象一下如果我出生在孟加拉国。你知道，我走在主街上说，“我分配资本。”你知道吗？“让我展示我的本事。”（笑声）

I’d have died of malnutrition. I mean, it would — I wouldn’t have made it through the first few months.

我本会因营养不良而死。我的意思是，我不会撑过最初的几个月。

The society that Charlie and I work in, I mean we were luckier than hell. I mean when we were born, the odds were 50-to-1 against us being born in the United States. So we hit the jackpot.

查理和我工作的这个社会，我的意思是我们非常幸运。我的意思是，当我们出生时，我们出生在美国的几率是 50 比 1。所以我们中了头奖。

And basically, it — you know, we’ve had all of the fun of working with this and working with good people. And money, obviously, opens lots of doors in life to interesting things.

基本上，你知道，我们一直在享受与此合作以及与优秀的人合作的乐趣。而且，显然，金钱在生活中为有趣的事情打开了许多大门。

And it goes back to society. Like Charlie says, it can go back on the installment system through life. It can go back in a lump sum at death.

它回归到社会。就像查理所说的，它可以通过生活中的分期付款系统回归，也可以在死亡时一次性回归。

I’ve mixed the two to some extent, but I weight heavily the lump sum.

我在某种程度上混合了这两者，但我更重视一次性付款。

But, you know, that’s where it belongs. I mean, it — there’s no reason why little — generations of little Buffetts, now and the next one, you know, and a hundred years from now, should all be commanding the resources of society just because they came out of the right womb. You know, what sort of justice is that?

但是，你知道，那才是它应该在的地方。我的意思是，没有理由让一代又一代的小巴菲特们，现在和未来的，甚至一百年后，仅仅因为他们出生在合适的家庭，就可以支配社会的资源。你知道，那是什么样的正义呢？

So basically, it’s going back to society. (Applause)

所以基本上，这是回归社会。（掌声）

Were my children applauding there? Did we check that out? (Laughter)

我的孩子们在那里鼓掌了吗？我们查过了吗？（笑声）

23. Many great businesses can’t boost profits by spending more capital

23. 许多优秀企业无法通过增加资本支出来提高利润

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi there. My name is Alex Rubalcava. I am a shareholder from Los Angeles.

观众成员：你好。我叫亚历克斯·鲁巴尔卡瓦。我是来自洛杉矶的股东。

I have a question about the financial characteristics of the businesses that you like to acquire and invest in.

我有一个关于您喜欢收购和投资的企业财务特征的问题。

In your reports and other writings, Mr. Buffett, you state that you like to acquire businesses that can employ a large amount of capital to high returns.

在您的报告和其他著作中，巴菲特先生，您表示您喜欢收购能够将大量资本用于高回报的企业。

And in reading the writings and speeches of yourself, Mr. Munger, I’ve seen you say in Outstanding Investor Digest and other publications, that you enjoy investing in companies that require very little capital.

在阅读您和芒格先生的著作和演讲时，我看到您在《杰出投资者文摘》和其他出版物中说过，您喜欢投资于需要很少资本的公司。

And I was wondering if these statements are at odds, or if they are two sides of the same coin? And if you could elaborate using Berkshire companies, that would be great.

我想知道这些说法是否相互矛盾，或者它们是否是同一枚硬币的两面？如果你能用伯克希尔的公司来详细说明，那就太好了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. It’s a good question.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。这是个好问题。

The ideal business is one that earns very high returns on capital and could keep using lots of capital at those high returns. I mean that becomes a compounding machine.

理想的企业是能够在资本上获得非常高的回报，并且能够在这些高回报下继续使用大量资本。我指的是，这样的企业就成为了一个复利机器。

So if you have your choice, if you could put a hundred million dollars into a business that earns 20 percent on that capital — say 20 million — ideally, it would be able to earn 20 percent on 120 million the following year, and 144 million the following year and so on. That you could keep redeploying capital at these same returns over time.

所以，如果你有选择权，如果你能将一亿美元投入一个能赚取 20%回报的企业——比如 2000 万——理想情况下，第二年它能在 1.2 亿美元上赚取 20%，接下来一年在 1.44 亿美元上赚取 20%，依此类推。这样你就可以在这些相同的回报率下不断重新部署资本。

But there are very, very, very few businesses like that. The really — unfortunately, the good businesses, you know, take a Coca-Cola or a See’s Candy, they don’t require much capital.

但是像这样的企业非常非常非常少。真正的——不幸的是，好的企业，比如可口可乐或 See's 糖果，它们不需要太多资本。

And incremental capital doesn’t produce anything like the returns that this fundamental return that’s produced by some great intangible.

而新增资本所产生的回报远不及由某些伟大无形资产所产生的基本回报。

So we would love the business that earn — that could keep deploying, in fact, even well beyond the earnings. I mean we’d love to have a business that could earn 20 percent on a hundred million now. And if we put a billion more in it, it would earn 20 percent more on that billion.

所以我们希望拥有能够持续投入的业务，实际上甚至远超其收益。我的意思是，我们希望拥有一个现在能在一亿上赚取 20%的业务。如果我们再投入十亿，它在这十亿上也能赚取 20%。

But like I say, those businesses are so rare. There are a lot of promises of those businesses, but we’ve practically never seen one. There’ve been a few.

但正如我所说，那些企业是非常罕见的。虽然有很多关于这些企业的承诺，但我们几乎从未见过这样的企业。确实有过一些。

Most of the great businesses generate lots of money. They do not generate lots of opportunities to earn high returns on incremental capital.

大多数伟大的企业会产生大量的资金。它们不会产生许多机会来获得高增量资本回报。

You know, we can deploy X at See’s and earn a lot of money, but if we put 5X in we don’t earn any more money to speak of. We can earn high returns on X at The Buffalo News, but if we try to make it 5X we don’t earn any more money.

你知道，我们可以在 See's 部署 X 并赚很多钱，但如果我们投入 5X，我们就赚不到更多的钱。我们可以在 The Buffalo News 上获得 X 的高回报，但如果我们试图将其变为 5X，我们就赚不到更多的钱。

They just don’t have the opportunities to use incremental capital. We look for them, but they don’t.

他们只是没有机会使用增量资本。我们寻找这些机会，但他们没有。

So, the great — you’ve seen — I mean, we will talk theoretically about the businesses that can earn more and more money with incremental capital at high returns.

所以，伟大的——你已经看到了——我的意思是，我们将从理论上讨论那些能够通过增量资本以高回报赚取越来越多钱的企业。

But what you’ve seen is that we’ve bought businesses, largely, that earn good returns on capital, but in many cases, have limited opportunities to earn anything like the returns they earn on their basic business with incremental capital.

但你所看到的是，我们购买的企业大多在资本上获得了良好的回报，但在许多情况下，用增量资本赚取类似于其基本业务回报的机会有限。

Now, the one good thing about our structure at Berkshire is that we can take those businesses that earn good returns in their business but don’t have the opportunity for returns of those similar magnitude on incremental money, and we can move that money around to buy more businesses.

现在，关于我们在伯克希尔的结构，有一件好事是，我们可以将那些在其业务中获得良好回报但没有机会在增量资金上获得类似规模回报的业务中的资金转移，用来购买更多的业务。

Normally, if you’re in the — take the newspaper publishing business, which has been a fantastic business over the years — you earned terrific returns on your own invested capital.

通常，如果你从事——以报纸出版业为例，这多年来一直是一个极好的行业——你会在自己投资的资本上获得极好的回报。

But if you went out to buy other newspapers, you had to pay a very fancy price, and you didn’t get great returns on incremental capital.

但是，如果你出去购买其他报纸，你必须支付非常高的价格，而且在增量资本上没有获得很好的回报。

But the people in that business felt that the only thing they knew was newspaper publishing or media of one sort or another, so they felt that their options were limited.

但那个行业的人觉得他们唯一了解的就是报纸出版或某种媒体，所以他们觉得自己的选择有限。

We can move money anyplace that it makes sense, and that’s an advantage of our structure. Now, whether we do a good job of it or not’s another question, but the structure is enormously advantageous in that respect.

我们可以将资金转移到任何合理的地方，这是我们结构的一个优势。至于我们是否能做好，那是另一个问题，但在这方面，这种结构是非常有利的。

We can take the good business, the See’s Candy — See’s has produced probably a billion dollars pretax for us since Charlie and I wouldn’t have gone up 100,000, you know, back in 1972.

我们可以接手好的生意，See's Candy——自从查理和我在 1972 年不会增加 10 万美元以来，See's 可能已经为我们创造了十亿美元的税前利润。

If we tried to employ that in the candy business we’d have gotten terrible returns over time. We would have gotten anything to speak of. But because we moved it around it enabled us to buy some other businesses over time, and that’s an advantage of our structure.

如果我们尝试在糖果业务中使用这一点，随着时间的推移，我们会得到糟糕的回报。我们几乎得不到任何值得一提的东西。但因为我们进行了调整，这使我们能够随着时间的推移购买其他一些业务，这就是我们结构的一个优势。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And if you take a business that is a good business, but not a fabulous business, they tend to fall into two categories.

查理·芒格：是的。如果你看一个好的企业，但不是一个极好的企业，它们往往分为两类。

One is the business where the whole reported profit just sits there in surplus cash at the end of the year. And you can take it out of the business and the business will do just as well without it as it would if it stayed in the business.

一种业务是，全年报告的利润全部以剩余现金的形式存在。而且你可以将其从业务中取出，业务在没有这些现金的情况下仍然会表现得一样好。

The second business is one that reports the 12 percent on capital but there’s never any cash. It reminds me of the used construction equipment business of my old friend, John Anderson. And he used to say, “In my business, every year you make a profit, and there it is, sitting in the yard.”

第二种业务是报告资本回报率为 12%的业务，但从来没有现金。这让我想起了我老朋友约翰·安德森的二手建筑设备业务。他常说：“在我的生意中，每年你都能盈利，而利润就在那里，停在院子里。”

And there are an awful lot of businesses like that, where just to keep going, to stay in place, there’s never any cash.

而且有很多这样的企业，仅仅是为了维持运营，保持现状，始终没有现金。

Now, that business doesn’t enable headquarters to drag out all the cash and invest it elsewhere. We hate that kind of a business. Don’t you think that’s a fair statement?

现在，那种业务不允许总部抽走所有现金并投资到其他地方。我们讨厌那种业务。你不觉得这是一个公平的说法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s a fair statement. We like to be able to move cash around and have it find its best use. And, you know — but that’s our job. And sometimes we find good uses.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是一个公正的说法。我们喜欢能够调动现金并让它找到最佳用途。而且，你知道——但这是我们的工作。有时我们会找到好的用途。

It would be terrific if every one of our great businesses, and we’ve got a lot of great businesses, had ways to deploy additional capital at great rates, but we don’t see it.

如果我们所有优秀的企业——而我们确实有很多优秀的企业——都有办法以极佳的利率部署额外的资本，那将是极好的，但我们没有看到这种情况。

And, frankly, you know, it doesn’t happen — I mean Gillette has a great razor and blade business, I mean, fabulous.

而且，坦率地说，你知道，这种情况并不常发生——我的意思是吉列有一个很棒的剃须刀和刀片业务，我的意思是，真是太棒了。

There’s no way they can deploy the money they make in the razor and blade business to keep putting more money in that kind of business. It just doesn’t take that kind of capital. They have to deploy some money of it, but it’s peanuts compared to the profits.

他们不可能将他们在剃须刀和刀片业务中赚到的钱用于继续投入更多资金到那种业务中。那种业务根本不需要那么多资本。他们必须投入一些资金，但与利润相比，这只是九牛一毛。

And the temptation then is to go out and buy other businesses, and of course that’s what Charlie and I do when we face that, but we don’t think that, overall, the batting average of American industry in redeploying capital has been great. Nevertheless, it’s what we try and do every day.

然后诱惑就是出去收购其他企业，当然这也是查理和我在面对这种情况时所做的，但我们并不认为美国工业在重新配置资本方面的整体表现很好。尽管如此，这也是我们每天努力去做的事情。

In a sense, we sort of knock the very procedure that has gotten us to where we are. Is that a fair statement, Charlie? (Laughs)

从某种意义上说，我们有点否定了让我们走到今天的这个过程。这样说公平吗，查理？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely. And that has always worried me. I don’t like being an example of an activity where most people who try and follow it will get terrible results. And we try and avoid that by making these negative comments. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：当然。这一直让我感到担忧。我不喜欢成为一个活动的例子，大多数尝试跟随的人都会得到糟糕的结果。我们试图通过发表这些负面评论来避免这种情况。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’d make negative comments anyway. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：无论如何，我们都会发表负面评论。（笑）

Number 5. It’s more fun.

数字 5。更有趣。

24. Buffett: I don’t ask my friends for favors

24. 巴菲特：我不向朋友请求帮忙

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Will Graves from Winter Park, Florida. I’m a graduate instructor with Webster University. And I’d like to address two questions to Mr. Buffett.

观众成员：我是来自佛罗里达州温特帕克的威尔·格雷夫斯。我是韦伯斯特大学的研究生导师。我想向巴菲特先生提出两个问题。

I appreciate the accessibility of Mr. Buffett. He makes us feel so warm here. Could I call you Dad?

我很感激巴菲特先生的平易近人。他让我们在这里感到如此温暖。我可以叫您爸爸吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ve got one question regarding a National Treasury situation and one considering a national treasure.

观众成员：我有一个关于国家财政状况的问题和一个关于国家宝藏的问题。

Back in September 11, you appeared on “60 Minutes” and performed a national service, taking your valuable time and giving up your private life for a few moments by speaking about the general stock market, and how people should not be getting too excited, and they shouldn’t be worried about investing for the long-term.

早在 9 月 11 日，你出现在《60 分钟》节目中，履行了一项国家服务，花费了你宝贵的时间，放弃了片刻的私人生活，谈论了整体股市，并指出人们不应该过于兴奋，也不应该担心长期投资。

And what I was wondering is, if you would ever consider making another appearance on “60 Minutes” at the time when whoever the president is at the time brings up the Social Security debate.

我想知道的是，当时任总统提出社会保障辩论时，您是否会考虑再次出现在《60 分钟》节目中。

I spend a lot of time with non-profit organizations, and the outrage that you hear from the working poor is that we talk about the tech turnaround, the tech profits of the last few years.

我花了很多时间与非营利组织在一起，你从在职贫困者那里听到的愤怒是我们谈论科技行业的复苏和过去几年科技行业的利润。

They’ve gone through a whole cycle where people became multimillionaires at a time when the working poor never even got a minimum wage increase.

他们经历了一个完整的周期，在这个周期中，人们成为了百万富翁，而工作贫困者却从未获得最低工资的提高。

And if you think of people like this who have a net worth of a thousand dollars or less, just as an example, and just imagine what it’s like for them to be forced, in the future, to be horrible investors because the U.S. government forces them to have something called Social Security, which they can’t get out of, and they get a lousy return.

如果你想到那些净资产为一千美元或更少的人，仅作为一个例子，并想象一下他们在未来被迫成为糟糕的投资者，因为美国政府强迫他们拥有一种叫做社会保障的东西，他们无法摆脱，并且得到一个糟糕的回报。

What I’m wondering is, if you would consider, when we have a candidate, whoever it might be at the time, say that you don’t want to put a small portion of Social Security into the long-term stock market because it’s a risky proposition? If you would take your track record on “60 Minutes” and say, “I don’t think so.” That’s the first question.

我想知道的是，当我们有一个候选人时，无论当时是谁，你是否会考虑说你不想将一小部分社会保障金投入长期股市，因为这是一项有风险的提议？如果你会在“60 分钟”节目中根据你的过往记录说，“我不这么认为。”这是第一个问题。

And number two, while I’m asking you to volunteer for something, I found myself being thrust into something in the last three weeks.

第二，当我请求你自愿做某事时，我发现自己在过去三周被推入了一些事情。

I went to Cypress Gardens the last day with about 20,000 people there. And the lady was handing out 15,000 fliers. Several weeks from now I’ll be before Governor [Jeb] Bush with the Friends of Cypress Gardens. We have a website, FriendsOfCypressGardens.org, trying to keep a developer from clear-cutting the trees in Cypress Gardens, a national treasure.

我在最后一天去了柏树花园，那里大约有两万人。而那位女士正在分发一万五千张传单。几周后，我将和柏树花园之友一起在州长杰布·布什面前。我们有一个网站，FriendsOfCypressGardens.org，试图阻止开发商在柏树花园砍伐树木，这是一项国家瑰宝。

And my question is, would you consider contacting your cousin, [musician] Jimmy Buffett, about possibly helping us in some way? Doesn’t have to be money. It might be an appearance. Just might be some connections, where you might be able to help us in our efforts.

我的问题是，您是否会考虑联系您的表亲，[音乐家] 吉米·巴菲特，看看他是否能以某种方式帮助我们？不一定是金钱上的帮助。可能是一次露面。也可能是一些人脉，您可能能够在我们的努力中帮助我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: I get asked to contact — probably the one I get asked to get contact the most is Bill Gates, but I get asked to contact all kinds of people.

沃伦·巴菲特：我被要求联系的人中，可能最多的是比尔·盖茨，但我被要求联系各种各样的人。

And I mean, everybody is slipping me envelopes with letters in them, sending things to the office and saying, “Won’t you get this person?” and all they can say is no. I don’t do — I don’t make requests of my friends, basically, for anything.

我的意思是，每个人都在给我塞信封，里面有信，往办公室寄东西，说：“你能不能找这个人？”而他们只能说不。我基本上不向朋友提出任何请求。

And I just — I would spend the rest of my life doing it. They would feel — I would never know — (applause) — you know, what they were doing — you know, I would never know what they were doing because I was asking, versus what they really felt. I mean it’s an impossible — from my standpoint at least — that’s an impossible game to get into, in terms of that.

我只是——我愿意用余生去做这件事。他们会觉得——我永远不会知道——（掌声）——你知道，他们在做什么——你知道，我永远不会知道他们在做什么，因为我在问，而不是他们真正的感受。我的意思是，从我的立场来看，这是一场不可能参与的游戏。

I mean when [Washington Post publisher] Kay Graham was alive, everybody, you know, wanted her for one reason or another. And they’ve all got causes.

我的意思是，当[《华盛顿邮报》发行人]凯·格雷厄姆还活着的时候，每个人都因为这样或那样的原因想要她。而且他们都有各自的原因。

And, frankly, they, you know, they want to use me to get her, or Jimmy Buffett, or whomever, to say yes to something that they’re saying yes to, partially because they feel they don’t want to say no to me.

而且，坦率地说，他们，你知道，他们想利用我去让她，或者吉米·巴菲特，或者其他人，同意他们正在同意的事情，部分原因是他们觉得不想对我说不。

And I, you know, that — I just don’t want to use my friendship for that purpose, frankly. And I don’t do it, even for things that I strongly believe in, myself. I do them — they may know what I’m doing, and if they want to pick up on it, fine.

而我，你知道，我只是坦率地说，不想为了那个目的利用我的友谊。我自己也不这样做，即使是我强烈相信的事情。我做这些——他们可能知道我在做什么，如果他们想接手，那就好。

But I have never — I can’t remember ever requesting anybody to make a contribution or do anything myself. I mean what I do is a matter of record, and, you know, if other people want to pick up on it, fine.

但我从未——我不记得曾要求任何人捐款或自己做任何事情。我的意思是我所做的事情是有记录的，你知道，如果其他人想接手，那也很好。

But I’ve never had one of those honorary dinners where they send out, you know, to all the suppliers to Berkshire and everything and start leaning on them and saying, you know, “We’re honoring Warren.”

但我从来没有参加过那种荣誉晚宴，就是他们给所有伯克希尔的供应商发邀请函，然后开始对他们施压，说：“我们在表彰沃伦。”

Well, hell, if they want to honor me they can honor me without soliciting all my friends for money. I mean, I don’t consider that much of an honor if the reason they picked me was because I got rich friends. So, I just don’t do that.

好吧，见鬼，如果他们想要表彰我，他们可以在不向我所有朋友募款的情况下表彰我。我的意思是，如果他们选择我的原因是因为我有富有的朋友，我不认为那是多大的荣誉。所以，我就是不这样做。

25. “There’s something unattractive about a very rich guy that pops off on everything”

25. “一个非常富有的人对所有事情都大发雷霆，这有些不讨人喜欢。”

WARREN BUFFETT: On the public policy question, what I did on September 11th, when [former General Electric CEO] Jack Welch and [former Treasury Secretary] Bob Rubin and I went on there, you know, I will do those things occasionally. I’ve written some op-ed pieces.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于公共政策问题，9 月 11 日时，我和[前通用电气首席执行官]杰克·韦尔奇以及[前财政部长]鲍勃·鲁宾一起上了节目，你知道，我偶尔会做这些事情。我写过一些专栏文章。

I think — and I get tempted very often, in fact I’ve written some that I haven’t sent in.

我想——而且我经常感到诱惑，事实上我写了一些但没有寄出。

But I do think that there’s something unattractive about a very rich guy that pops off on everything. And you may think, by listening to us today that you’ve got two guys up here that do like to pop off on everything. And we do have opinions on almost everything.

但我确实认为，一个非常富有的人对所有事情都发表意见是有些不讨人喜欢的。你可能会认为，今天听我们讲话时，你面前有两个喜欢对所有事情发表意见的人。我们确实对几乎所有事情都有看法。

But I just think there are some things I get — you know, I wrote on campaign finance reform, and I’ve written on taxes. And I will do more of that, but I do try to hold myself in check, somewhat, because there’s a little bit of, you know, this, “I’m rich, therefore I’m right”- type stuff that I don’t think sits very well.

但我只是觉得有些事情我明白——你知道，我写过竞选财务改革，也写过税收。我会继续写这些，但我确实尽量克制自己，因为有一点那种“我很富有，所以我很正确”的东西，我觉得这不太合适。

And I know when I see it in other people I don’t like it that, you know, “I’m a celebrity therefore, you know, you got to listen to me on everything that I say.” It just — it turns me off at some point.

我知道当我在其他人身上看到这种情况时，我不喜欢这样，你知道，“我是名人，所以你知道，你必须听我说的每一句话。” 这让我在某种程度上感到反感。

But like I say, I have done it, and there could be occasions — and there will be occasions — I’m sure, when I’ll cross my threshold level and figure I really want to say something and people can ignore it or otherwise.

但就像我说的，我已经做到了，而且可能会有一些场合——而且肯定会有一些场合——我确信，当我会跨过我的门槛，觉得我真的想说些什么，人们可以忽略它或以其他方式处理。

And — but I think there’s some danger of overexposure on that sort of thing, and I think you’ve seen it with certain people.

但是，我认为在那种事情上有过度曝光的危险，我想你已经在某些人身上看到了。

Charlie? 查理？

26. Keep Social Security money out of stocks

26. 不要将社会保障资金投入股票市场

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, would you agree or disagree that forcing a certain part of Social Security into common stocks is a good idea?

查理·芒格：沃伦，你是否同意或不同意将部分社会保障资金强制投入普通股是个好主意？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I would not. Actually, I would not agree with the one that the gentleman suggested.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我不会。实际上，我不同意那位先生提出的建议。

I think that, actually, Social Security has been a tremendous thing for the working people of this country. It’s been an intergenerational pact. It’s not insurance.

我认为，实际上，社会保障对这个国家的劳动人民来说是一件了不起的事情。这是一个跨代的协议。它不是保险。

It simply says, like a family might say, except it extends the concept of family to the whole United States, that if you produce for this country when you’re between the ages of — and I think the upper age limit should be extended — but between the ages of X and 65, that society will provide some base level of income for you for the rest of your life.

它只是简单地说，就像一个家庭可能会说的那样，只是它将家庭的概念扩展到整个美国，即如果你在 X 岁到 65 岁之间为这个国家做出贡献——我认为应该延长最高年龄限制——那么社会将为你提供一些基本的生活收入。

And I think a rich society should do that. So, I think the when you have a $10 trillion society, you know — (applause) — we should do that.

我认为一个富裕的社会应该这样做。所以，我认为当你拥有一个 10 万亿美元的社会时，你知道——（掌声）——我们应该这样做。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would agree. I think Social Security, you can argue, is one of the most successful governmental programs we have. And people treat it as a pure disaster coming or something like that.

查理·芒格：我同意。我认为你可以说，社会保障是我们最成功的政府项目之一。而人们却把它当作即将到来的纯粹灾难或类似的东西。

That’s not my view at all, and I wouldn’t put it in common stocks, either. I think Social Security works pretty well just about the way we’re doing it.

这完全不是我的看法，我也不会把它投入普通股。我认为社会保障的运作方式几乎已经很好了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will give a base income to every — and we should in this country — to everybody that leads a reasonably productive life. And they don’t have to worry about how long — you know — whether they live to be 90 or 100.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们会给每一个人——在这个国家我们应该这样做——给每一个过着相对有生产力生活的人提供基本收入。他们不必担心自己能活到 90 岁还是 100 岁。

And people do worry in their old age. And we don’t need a bunch of people who, you know, go off to war when we need to defend, you know, the rights of our country, and act in every way as good citizens, but they just don’t happen to have the ability to make a lot of money, you know, well, like maybe Charlie and I can.

人们在年老时确实会担心。而我们不需要一群人，当我们需要捍卫国家权利时，他们去参战，并在各方面表现得像好公民，但他们恰好没有赚很多钱的能力，你知道，就像也许查理和我能做到的那样。

I think they need a base level, and I think that an intergenerational compact like we have — it’s really a magnificent idea. And I think the country’s a lot better off for it.

我认为他们需要一个基本水平，我认为像我们这样的代际契约——这真是一个宏伟的想法。我认为国家因此受益良多。

I think that telling them that they can save 500 bucks or a thousand bucks and put it into stocks and have everybody lobbying Washington about, you know, who will handle it. You know, everybody thought it was a great idea a few years ago, and I think it’s a very bad idea, frankly.

我认为告诉他们可以省下 500 美元或 1000 美元并将其投入股票，并让每个人在华盛顿游说，关于谁会处理这件事。你知道，几年前每个人都认为这是个好主意，而坦率地说，我认为这是个非常糟糕的主意。

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I like it a lot less than you do. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我比你喜欢得少多了。（笑声）

27. Simple compensation plans and no consultants

27. 简单的补偿计划和没有顾问

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Ravi Gilani. I come from New Delhi, India.

观众成员：下午好。我的名字是拉维·吉拉尼。我来自印度新德里。

I have questions regarding management policies. Since you follow quite different management policies, I would like to know the impact of them on the management CEO’s motivation.

我对管理政策有疑问。由于你们遵循的管理政策相当不同，我想了解这些政策对管理层首席执行官动机的影响。

Mr. Munger has mentioned that where capital is unimportant in a business, you tend to give the CEO a part of the earnings. You have also mentioned that you do not greet good work by raising the bar. Clearly, static earnings over a period of time may become successively less valuable.

芒格先生提到，在资本在业务中不重要的情况下，你倾向于给首席执行官一部分收益。你也提到过，你不会通过提高标准来奖励好的工作。显然，随着时间的推移，静态收益可能会变得越来越不值钱。

My question is in, now, four parts. Bearing the above in mind, could you give us an example of compensation policy in Berkshire subsidiaries which illustrate your thinking on the subject of executive compensation?

我的问题现在分为四个部分。考虑到上述情况，您能否举一个伯克希尔子公司中补偿政策的例子，以说明您对高管补偿问题的看法？

Number two, though you do change — charge — subsidiaries for using capital, and believe in linking rewards to bottom line performance, Mr. Munger does not respect economic valued added as a concept. Could we have your thinking on EVA as a tool to monitor and reward corporate performance?

第二，尽管您确实对子公司使用资本进行收费，并相信将奖励与底线业绩挂钩，但芒格先生并不尊重经济增加值这一概念。我们能否了解您对经济增加值作为监控和奖励企业绩效工具的看法？

Number three, do you restrict yourself to setting compensation policy for the CEO, or do you involve yourself in larger part of the organization?

第三，你是否仅限于为首席执行官制定薪酬政策，还是参与到更大范围的组织事务中？

And finally, you do not have any retirement age for the CEO. Does it impact the morale, motivation, of the people below the CEO?

最后，您没有为首席执行官设定退休年龄。这是否会影响首席执行官以下人员的士气和积极性？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？（笑声）

He knew that was coming.

他知道那会发生。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, one, you’re right. Where a business requires practically no capital, we tend to reward the management based on the earnings. The minute the business starts requiring capital we tend to put a capital factor into this compensation system.

查理·芒格：嗯，首先，你是对的。对于几乎不需要资本的业务，我们倾向于根据收益来奖励管理层。一旦业务开始需要资本，我们往往会在这个补偿系统中加入资本因素。

We don’t have any one standard system. They’re all different, based on accidents of history and circumstances.

我们没有任何一个标准系统。它们都是不同的，基于历史的偶然性和环境。

But where capital’s an important factor, of course, we take it into account.

但在资本是重要因素的地方，我们当然会考虑到这一点。

As far as the effects on morale, as far as I’ve ever been able to see, the morale’s pretty good in the Berkshire subsidiaries. And the Berkshire managers practically never leave. And my guess is we have about as low a turnover rate as any place around. Is that right, Warren?

就士气的影响而言，据我所知，伯克希尔子公司的士气相当不错。而且伯克希尔的经理几乎从不离开。我的猜测是，我们的员工流动率几乎是周围最低的。是这样吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I’m sure of that. And besides, the “no retirement policy” is wonderful for my morale. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我对此很确定。而且，“不退休政策”对我的士气非常有益。（笑声）

And Charlie’s. 和查理的。

The — you also asked about EVA. We would not dream of using something like that, although I think actually a few of our subsidiaries may use it in some way.

您还问到了 EVA。我们绝不会考虑使用那样的东西，尽管我认为实际上我们的一些子公司可能会以某种方式使用它。

So, the subsidiaries set their policies for the pay of the people below the CEO, and the — all — they have all kinds of systems, because we have all kinds of businesses.

因此，子公司为 CEO 以下人员的薪酬制定政策，并且——所有——他们有各种各样的系统，因为我们有各种各样的业务。

And, frankly, we’ve never had big problems with compensation because, I think, our arrangements are rational.

而且，坦率地说，我们从未在薪酬方面遇到过大问题，因为我认为我们的安排是合理的。

When capital is an important part of the business, we stick a charge for capital in. If it’s an unimportant part of the business, we don’t stick it in. We don’t believe in making things more complex than needed.

当资本是业务的重要组成部分时，我们会为资本收取费用。如果它是业务中不重要的部分，我们就不会收取费用。我们不相信让事情变得比需要的更复杂。

So, we don’t try for little — all kinds of little refinements — which a compensation consultant would come in and tell you was needed, because that’s how he would justify a large bill. And he would also come in and tinker with it a little the following year, and the following year, and so on.

所以，我们不追求那些细枝末节的改进——各种各样的细微改进——因为薪酬顾问会进来告诉你这些是必要的，因为这就是他为高额账单辩护的方式。他还会在接下来的一年、再接下来的一年，等等，稍微调整一下。

We have very simple systems on comp. But some of our businesses are terrific businesses, and so we have very high standards of performance before people get performance bonuses.

我们的薪酬系统非常简单。但我们的一些业务是非常出色的业务，因此我们对绩效有很高的标准，只有在达到这些标准后，员工才能获得绩效奖金。

Some of our businesses are very tough businesses, and the threshold is much lower, but the managerial talent needed to reach that threshold is just as much as in the — with the higher threshold in other businesses.

我们的一些业务是非常艰难的业务，门槛要低得多，但达到这个门槛所需的管理人才与其他门槛较高的业务一样多。

It’s not a — compensation is not rocket science. I mean, people will want you to think it is, and you read these proxy statements and it blows your mind, what they get into. I mean, the proxy statements are thicker than the annual reports because they’re talking about the compensation of people.

这不是——薪酬不是火箭科学。我的意思是，人们会想让你认为它是，你读这些委托书时会感到震惊，他们涉及的内容。我是说，委托书比年度报告还要厚，因为他们在谈论人们的薪酬。

And it is not that complicated. We’ve had — in 38 years, we have never had a CEO leave us to go to another business, except a few we’ve — where we’ve made the decision ourselves, but very few.

这并不复杂。在 38 年里，我们从未有过首席执行官离开我们去另一家公司，除了少数我们自己做出的决定，但非常少。

And it is — you know, I see all of the time and effort put in because, frankly, it pays off for the CEO to do it. And then they create a whole department that spends all their time attending conferences about, you know, compensation methods, and they have consultants in, and it becomes an industry.

你知道，我看到投入的所有时间和精力，因为坦率地说，这对首席执行官来说是有回报的。然后，他们创建了一个整个部门，花费所有时间参加关于薪酬方法的会议，并聘请顾问，这就变成了一个行业。

And it isn’t going to break itself up. I mean you — when you get those — when you get a huge bureaucracy involved in making all kinds of pay determinations and everything, it’s never going to go away unless you do something about it. But that’s true of any bureaucracy we run into. We don’t have much bureaucracy at Berkshire done.

而且它不会自行解散。我的意思是，当你让那些庞大的官僚机构参与到各种薪酬决定和其他事务中时，除非你采取措施，否则它永远不会消失。但这对我们遇到的任何官僚机构都是如此。在伯克希尔，我们没有太多的官僚作风。

I think that there’s no question that our “no retirement policy” means that somebody who’s just itching to be the CEO of a business, and they see that the CEO is 65, and then 70, and then 75, above them at some of our companies, is probably not going to stick around.

我认为毫无疑问，我们的“无退休政策”意味着那些渴望成为企业 CEO 的人，当他们看到某些公司里的 CEO 已经 65 岁、70 岁、75 岁时，可能不会继续留下来。

I mean we don’t develop, naturally, lots of number twos because we can’t promise them that number one is going to go out the door. But as long as number one doesn’t go out the door, from our standpoint, that’s just fine.

我的意思是，我们自然不会培养很多二号人物，因为我们不能向他们保证一号人物会离开。但只要一号人物不离开，对我们来说，这就没问题。

And we occasionally have to replace managements, but it’s very occasional. I mean if — on an expectancy basis, you know, even with all the subsidiaries we have, you know, we may face one management succession problem, perhaps, every 18 months or something of the sort. And we’ve got all kinds of other businesses. So it’s not a big deal at Berkshire.

我们偶尔需要更换管理层，但这种情况非常少见。我的意思是，即使在我们所有的子公司中，可能每 18 个月左右才会遇到一次管理层继任问题。而且我们还有各种其他业务。所以在伯克希尔这不是什么大问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And on EVA, there are ideas implicit in that that we use. For instance, hurdle rates by — based on opportunity costs. Perfectly reasonable concept.

查理·芒格：是的。在经济附加值（EVA）中，有一些我们使用的隐含理念。例如，基于机会成本的障碍率。这是一个非常合理的概念。

But to us, that system, with all its labels and lingo, has a lot of baggage that we don’t need. We just use the implicit, simple stuff that’s buried in EVA.

但对我们来说，那套系统及其所有标签和术语，带有很多我们不需要的包袱。我们只使用埋藏在 EVA 中的隐含、简单的东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We could spend a million bucks a year on consultants to get an answer we can get in five minutes, frankly. I mean it is — it just isn’t that complicated.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。坦率地说，我们可以每年花一百万美元请顾问来得到一个我们五分钟内就能得到的答案。我的意思是，这并没有那么复杂。

But can you imagine a consultant coming around and saying, “I’ve got a one-paragraph compensation arrangement for you?”

但是你能想象一个顾问过来对你说：“我为你准备了一段话的补偿方案吗？”

Are they going to be able to send you a large bill for, you know, their consultancy? Of course not. So, they’ve got to make things complicated, and we don’t believe in that. We want things that are very easy to understand, and we’ve just never had a problem with it.

他们会给你寄一张大额账单，比如他们的咨询费吗？当然不会。所以，他们必须把事情搞得复杂，而我们不相信那一套。我们希望事情非常容易理解，而且我们从来没有遇到过问题。

And we get good results out of our managers.

我们从经理那里获得了良好的结果。

The main reason we get good results out of our managers is that, you know, they like hitting .400. They like hitting .400 and being fairly paid, but they — the fact that they batted .400 is the biggest thing to them, in life.

我们从经理那里获得好成绩的主要原因是，他们喜欢打出.400 的成绩。他们喜欢打出.400 并获得合理的报酬，但对他们来说，人生中最重要的是他们打出了.400 的成绩。

And it’s, you know, it’s sort of the way we feel. If we get a good batting average in our business performance, the pay is incidental.

这就是我们的感觉。如果我们的业务表现有一个好的打击率，报酬只是附带的。

Now, it shouldn’t be incidental to our managers. It’s got to be fair or they’re going to — nobody wants to work in an environment where they feel they’re being treated unfairly, but —

现在，这对我们的经理来说不应该是偶然的。必须要公平，否则他们会——没有人愿意在一个他们觉得被不公平对待的环境中工作，但是——

That is not a complicated procedure. And we do make them very specific to the enterprise that’s under their control. We do not pay the people of See’s Candy based on how The Buffalo News does or vice versa.

这不是一个复杂的程序。而且我们确实根据他们控制下的企业制定得非常具体。我们不会根据《水牛城新闻》的表现来支付 See's Candy 员工的薪水，反之亦然。

And I can show you a lot of crazy compensation systems in corporate America where that really is the ultimate effect of what’s happening.

我可以给你展示美国企业中许多疯狂的薪酬体系，其最终效果确实就是这样。

28. Buffett OK with large brokerages holding his stocks

巴菲特对大型经纪公司持有他的股票表示认可

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. This is — I’m Paul Butterfield from Clarksville, Maryland.

观众成员：下午好。我是来自马里兰州克拉克斯维尔的保罗·巴特菲尔德。

You wrote in the annual report about the dangers — the systemic dangers — of derivatives and the growth in derivatives.

您在年度报告中写到了衍生品的危险——系统性危险——以及衍生品的增长。

An example would be a six-sigma event that would cause domino effect and dangers to the solvency and operations of, maybe, financial institutions and other firms, possibly including brokerage firms.

例如，一个六西格玛事件可能会对金融机构和其他公司（可能包括经纪公司）的偿付能力和运营造成多米诺效应和危险。

Would this — do you think this recommends to an individual investor that we might consider not holding stocks in street name?

您认为这是否建议个人投资者考虑不以街名持有股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, how do you — they addressed that, somewhat.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你怎么看待这个问题，他们在某种程度上已经解决了。

There were some domino effects in the very early ’70s in Wall Street. I think, certainly, the failures of some brokerage firms, in part, led to failures of others.

在七十年代初期，华尔街出现了一些多米诺效应。我认为，某些经纪公司的倒闭在一定程度上导致了其他公司的倒闭。

It wasn’t a classic domino situation, and of course we had domino effects in banks if you go back a hundred years in this country.

这不是一个典型的多米诺骨牌情况，当然，如果你回到一百年前的这个国家，我们在银行中也有多米诺效应。

Anytime you have financial institutions that interrelate in many ways, and have big receivables and payables, balances with everything, you’ve always got the danger of domino effects.

任何时候，当你有在多方面相互关联的金融机构，并且有大量应收和应付款项，与所有事物都有余额时，总是存在多米诺效应的危险。

And that’s a factor in the insurance business. It’s a factor in banking business. I think it’d be less in the brokerage business.

这在保险业务中是一个因素。在银行业务中也是一个因素。我认为在经纪业务中会少一些。

I would think, if you owned securities in a cash account with any large stock exchange firm, you know, it wouldn’t worry me.

我想，如果你在任何大型证券交易公司拥有现金账户的证券，你知道，这不会让我担心。

We’ve got lots of — I’ve got lots of personal securities, you know, sitting with a very large stock exchange firm, and that does not bother me. But I mean, obviously, there have been little firms that have been fly-by-night types.

我们有很多——我有很多个人证券，你知道的，存在一家非常大的证券交易公司，这对我来说没什么困扰。但我的意思是，显然有一些小公司是那种一夜之间消失的类型。

And I don’t even know all the rules on margin accounts. But if somebody has got the right to repledge your securities and they get in trouble themselves, I don’t know any more what the SIPC — there’s a SIPC protection, but I’m —

我甚至不知道保证金账户的所有规则。但如果有人有权重新质押你的证券，而他们自己遇到麻烦，我就不知道 SIPC——有 SIPC 保护，但我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not unlimited. You’re liable.

查理·芒格：这不是无限的。你是有责任的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think that’s true.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为那是真的。

And no, I would think twice between having all my securities rehypothecated by somebody else.

不，我会三思而后行，不会让我的所有证券被其他人再抵押。

A cash account. I think the cash accounts are segregated, aren’t they, Charlie?

现金账户。我认为现金账户是分开的，对吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

29. States shouldn’t buy stocks with taxpayer money

29. 各州不应使用纳税人的钱购买股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is John Norwood and I hail from Des Moines. Thank you for providing this opportunity to speak today.

观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是约翰·诺伍德，我来自得梅因。感谢您提供今天发言的机会。

I have two questions, one as an individual investor and one as a state resident.

我有两个问题，一个是作为个人投资者，另一个是作为州居民。

The first has to do with intrinsic value. Can you provide some additional Cliff Notes for working with the Berkshire Hathaway annual report and calculating an intrinsic value for the stock? I’m a little bit hazy.

首先是关于内在价值。您能否提供一些额外的简要说明，以便处理伯克希尔·哈撒韦的年度报告并计算股票的内在价值？我有点模糊。

And the second question has to do with public sector investing. As an example, the state of Iowa is considering the creation of a $1 billion Values Fund.

第二个问题与公共部门投资有关。举个例子，爱荷华州正在考虑设立一个 10 亿美元的价值基金。

What sorts of guidelines, strategies, and advice would you employ if you were responsible for investing this money on behalf of the general public?

如果你负责代表公众投资这笔钱，你会采用哪些指导方针、策略和建议？

Are there any significant differences when representing shareholders versus the general public? Thank you.

在代表股东与代表公众时是否有任何显著差异？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, elaborate if you will just a second, because I am not familiar with that billion dollar — is the state of Iowa literally creating a billion dollar fund to invest in equities on behalf of the people?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，请稍微详细说明一下，因为我不太了解那个十亿美元——爱荷华州是否真的在为人民创建一个十亿美元的基金来投资股票？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That’s what’s being proposed.

观众成员：这就是被提议的内容。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is that right? Oh.

沃伦·巴菲特：是这样吗？哦。

Charlie, what do you think about that? That’s a new one to me.

查理，你怎么看？这对我来说是个新鲜事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s a pretty dumb idea. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：我认为这是个相当愚蠢的主意。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He lives in California. That’s why I had him answer. I live right on the border here, so I — (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他住在加利福尼亚。这就是为什么我让他回答。我就住在边境这里，所以我——（笑）

Yeah, I would — I mean, I guess Iowa doesn’t have any bonded debt, so I’m not sure what — they probably wouldn’t be creating a margin account.

是的，我会——我的意思是，我想爱荷华州没有任何有担保的债务，所以我不确定他们可能不会创建一个保证金账户。

But I would think that most states or municipalities would want to let the citizenry invest on its own and would not want to be taxing people in order to set up an equity fund. So that strikes me as a pretty novel idea. Charlie —

但我认为，大多数州或市政当局会希望让市民自行投资，而不希望通过征税来设立一个股票基金。所以这对我来说是一个相当新颖的想法。查理——

CHARLIE MUNGER: In California, certainly the — of the investment management partnerships — use all kinds of political contributions to finagle their way into managing state pension funds, et cetera, et cetera. It’s not a pretty scene.

查理·芒格：在加利福尼亚，投资管理合伙企业确实使用各种政治捐款来巧妙地进入管理州养老金等。这不是一个好看的场景。

To the extent that Iowa can dampen it down, why, I think they’re better off.

在某种程度上，如果爱荷华能够抑制它，我认为他们会更好。

30. Intrinsic value: “fuzzy,” but essential

30. 内在价值：“模糊”，但至关重要

WARREN BUFFETT: The question on intrinsic value — you know, we’ve written about it in reports. I don’t think there’s much additional to say.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于内在价值的问题——我们在报告中写过。我认为没有太多额外的内容可说。

I mean, the intrinsic value of any financial asset, you know, is the stream of cash that it’ll produce between now and Judgment Day, discounted by an interest rate that equates between all the different possible assets.

我的意思是，任何金融资产的内在价值，就是从现在到审判日之间它将产生的现金流，以一个在所有不同可能资产之间等价的利率进行折现。

That’s true of an oil royalty, a farm, an apartment house, an equity, a business operation, you know, a lemonade stand. And that — you have to decide what sort of businesses that you think you can understand well enough to make a — some kind of reasonable calculation.

这适用于石油特许权、农场、公寓楼、股票、商业运营，甚至是一个柠檬水摊。而且，你必须决定你认为自己能够充分理解以进行某种合理计算的业务类型。

It’s not scientific, but it is the intrinsic value. I mean the fact that it’s fuzzy to calculate doesn’t mean that it’s not the proper way to think about it.

这不是科学的，但它是内在价值。我的意思是，尽管计算起来模糊不清，但这并不意味着这不是思考它的正确方式。

And at Berkshire, you’ve got two questions. You’ve got the question of what the businesses we own now are worth. And then, since we redeploy all the capital they generate, you have to figure out what you’re willing to assume about what we do with the capital.

在伯克希尔，你有两个问题。你需要知道我们现在拥有的业务价值多少。然后，由于我们会重新部署他们产生的所有资本，你需要考虑你愿意对我们如何使用这些资本做出什么假设。

And you can look back and say that, 35 years ago or so, that people perhaps underestimated what would be done with the capital that was generated, so that it looks very cheap if you look back on it now. But we’re in a whole different game now with huge amounts of capital.

你可以回顾一下，大约 35 年前，人们可能低估了所产生的资本会被如何利用，所以如果你现在回头看，它显得非常便宜。但我们现在处于一个完全不同的局面，拥有大量的资本。

And you have to make a decision as to whether the billions and billions and billions of dollars we generate will be deployed in a way that creates lots more cash later on. And it’s what Charlie and I think about, but we can’t give any prediction on it.

你必须决定我们产生的数十亿、数十亿、数十亿美元是否会以一种能够在未来创造更多现金的方式进行部署。这是查理和我所考虑的，但我们无法对此做出任何预测。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think our reporting, considering the complexity of the enterprise as now constituted, is better than that of any similar enterprise I know, in terms of enabling a shareholder to calculate intrinsic value.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为考虑到企业目前的复杂性，我们的报告比我所知道的任何类似企业都要好，这有助于股东计算内在价值。

So, I think we’ve done better than anybody else, and we do it conscientiously. And if you ask, “Will we improve from here?” I don’t think so.

所以，我认为我们做得比其他任何人都好，而且我们是认真地去做的。如果你问，“我们会从这里改进吗？”我不这么认为。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve worked hard at doing what you’re talking about, and it — but even working hard at it, I mean, we’ve given you the data we would want ourselves. We don’t know the answer, but we do know it’s what you have to think about.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在努力做你所说的事情，即使努力去做，我的意思是，我们已经给了你我们自己想要的数据。我们不知道答案，但我们知道这是你必须考虑的事情。

And we do it when we buy McLane’s, when we buy Clayton Homes. When we buy anything, we are attempting to look out into the economic future and say, “What kind of cash can this business generate over time? How sure do we feel about it? And how does the purchase price compare with that?”

我们在购买麦克莱恩公司、购买克莱顿家居时就是这样做的。无论我们购买什么，我们都在试图展望经济未来，并问自己：“这项业务能在未来产生什么样的现金流？我们对此有多确定？购买价格与之相比如何？”

And if we feel we’re getting a — we have to feel fairly good about our projections. Won’t feel perfect, because we — no one knows the answer precisely. We have to feel pretty good about our projections, and then we have to have a purchase price that’s rational in relation to those.

如果我们觉得我们正在得到一个——我们必须对我们的预测感到相当满意。不会感到完美，因为我们——没有人能准确知道答案。我们必须对我们的预测感到相当满意，然后我们必须有一个与之合理相关的购买价格。

And we get some surprises in both directions. Actually, if you go way back, we’ve had more pleasant surprises than we would have expected. But we won’t get them from this point, mostly because of size, and also because the world’s a little more competitive.

我们在两个方向上都得到了些惊喜。实际上，如果回顾过去，我们得到的惊喜比预期的要多。但从现在开始，我们不会再有这样的惊喜，主要是因为规模的原因，还有因为世界变得更加竞争激烈。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.

查理·芒格：仅此而已。

31. Munger: Tort lawsuit system is “crazy”

31. 芒格：侵权诉讼制度是“疯狂的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：第九。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Vic Cunningham. I’m a shareholder from Wilton, Connecticut.

观众成员：我叫维克·坎宁安。我是来自康涅狄格州威尔顿的股东。

I heard your comments earlier about popping off. But actually, I find it admirable the way you guys, the two of you, have leveraged your clout as investors to be advocates for change.

我早些时候听到你们关于突然发声的评论。但实际上，我觉得你们两位利用作为投资者的影响力来倡导变革的方式令人钦佩。

You know, your outspoken comments on expensing stock options promoted, you know, productive discussions, in not only corporate boardrooms throughout this country, but more importantly on Capitol Hill.

你知道，你对股票期权费用化的直言不讳的评论促进了，不仅在全国各地的公司董事会中，而且更重要的是在国会山的富有成效的讨论。

Currently, tort spending in this country continues to rise as a percentage of GDP, and I would argue a lot of that’s unproductive spending.

目前，这个国家的侵权支出占 GDP 的比例持续上升，我认为其中很大一部分是非生产性支出。

Is there a point — and it seems like right now that, you know, they’re trying to stretch their tentacles, not only from, you know, tobacco companies but to consumer product companies like McDonald’s and possibly even Coca-Cola.

有没有一个点——现在看起来，他们似乎不仅试图从烟草公司扩展触角，还试图伸向像麦当劳这样的消费品公司，甚至可能包括可口可乐。

Is there a point where you would use your considerable clout to try to guilt Congress into moving towards some kind of comprehensive tort reform for this country?

有没有一个时机，你会利用你相当大的影响力来试图让国会朝着某种全面的侵权改革方向努力？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m sympathetic to the — what you’re saying. I would say that our considerable clout is nothing compared to the clout of the plaintiffs’ lawyers.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对你所说的表示同情。我会说，我们的影响力与原告律师的影响力相比不算什么。

There’s no question that — in a certain way, it’s appalling when you look at the frictional costs to society of the tort system we have.

毫无疑问，从某种角度来看，当你看到我们现有侵权制度对社会的摩擦成本时，这令人震惊。

But Charlie is a lawyer. He can probably speak much more intelligently than I can as to how you could modify this, because there are plenty of things wrong, too.

但查理是一名律师。他可能比我更能聪明地谈论如何修改这个问题，因为也有很多问题。

I’ve — I mean it’s sort of infuriating to see specious shareholder suits raised on, you know, any kind of a deal, just because there’s a lot of DO — D&O insurance — and they know people will pay off rather than go through the nuisance of a suit.

我——我的意思是，看到那些毫无根据的股东诉讼在任何交易中被提起，这有点让人恼火，因为有很多董事和高管责任保险——他们知道人们会选择支付赔偿，而不是经历诉讼的麻烦。

And we never — we don’t pay off — but corporate America does. And so, it’s a game.

而我们从不——我们不付钱——但美国企业会。所以，这是一场游戏。

And the people that pursue that activity, you know, are not pursuing it, I think in many cases, because of a great pursuit of justice, but because it’s a damn profitable sort of game.

而从事这种活动的人，我认为在很多情况下，并不是因为对正义的极大追求，而是因为这是一种非常赚钱的游戏。

And, you know, the people that are paying. It usually doesn’t come out of their own pocket, so it gets back to that — the lack of parity in the interest of the people on both sides.

而且，你知道，付款的人通常不是自己掏腰包，所以这又回到了——双方利益缺乏平等的问题。

But then, when I look at some of the things that have happened in corporate America, I certainly don’t want to get rid of the plaintiffs’ lawyers either — entirely — because I think some terrible things have happened and I think people should pay.

但是，当我看到美国企业界发生的一些事情时，我当然也不想完全摆脱原告律师，因为我认为发生了一些可怕的事情，我认为人们应该付出代价。

I just wish the people paid rather than the D&O carriers, because when a D&O carrier pays, or when a company pays, it — the costs get socialized, and the people that did the wrong things seldom pay out of their own pockets.

我只是希望由个人支付，而不是由董事和高管责任保险公司支付，因为当董事和高管责任保险公司支付或公司支付时，成本会被社会化，而做错事的人很少自掏腰包。

I — Charlie, what — tell me, how do we improve the tort system?

我——查理，什么——告诉我，我们如何改进侵权制度？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you define the tort system to include the workmen’s compensation system, which I would, you get terrible abuses.

查理·芒格：嗯，如果你把侵权制度定义为包括工人赔偿制度，我会这样做，你会发现可怕的滥用。

In California, Costco has about one-third of its employees and two-thirds of its workmen’s compensation expense.

在加利福尼亚，Costco 大约有三分之一的员工和三分之二的工人赔偿费用。

California is an institutionalized fraud. Fraudulent chiropractors, fraudulent lawyers, fraudulent what have you. And they put this enormous burden on business. And of course, eventually the jobs will leave.

加利福尼亚是一个制度化的骗局。欺诈性的脊椎按摩师、欺诈性的律师、各种欺诈行为。他们给企业带来了巨大的负担。当然，最终工作机会将会流失。

I had a friend who took a plant away from Texas where he had workmen’s compensation expense of 30-odd percent, and took it to Ogden, Utah, where it went to 2 percent.

我有一个朋友，他把一个工厂从德克萨斯州搬走，在那里他的工人赔偿费用大约是 30%，然后把它搬到了犹他州的奥格登，费用降到了 2%。

So fraud, allowed to run, builds on itself. And then you’ve got all these lawyers and lobbyists who like the fraud. And chiropractors and God knows what.

因此，欺诈行为一旦被允许进行，就会自我积累。然后你会有所有这些喜欢欺诈的律师和说客。还有脊椎按摩师和天知道什么。

And so, it’s a major problem. And in California, it’s gotten so bad that my guess is there will be some reform, even with the two-thirds Democratic legislature.

因此，这是一个重大问题。在加利福尼亚，情况已经变得如此糟糕，我猜即使在三分之二的民主党立法机构中，也会进行一些改革。

WARREN BUFFETT: What would you change, in terms of the shareholder situation?

沃伦·巴菲特：在股东情况方面，你会改变什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s harder, because if you take the worst of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, half the time they’re suing somebody that’s behaved terribly.

查理·芒格：嗯，那就更难了，因为如果你看那些最糟糕的原告律师，他们有一半的时间是在起诉那些行为极其糟糕的人。

Now, they’re suing in a process where a lot of money is paid out, as you say, on a socialized basis, and doesn’t really go to the people that were hurt. So, they’re like a public scold that gets paid an enormous sum out of the public.

现在，他们正在进行一场诉讼，在这个过程中，如你所说，大量资金以社会化的方式支付，但实际上并没有给到受害者。因此，他们就像一个公共批评者，从公众那里获得巨额报酬。

But certainly, a lot of the defendants in these cases that are screaming about the plaintiffs’ bar have done some very regrettable things. So, I think that gets very hard to figure out what should be done.

但可以肯定的是，这些案件中许多对原告律师团大喊大叫的被告确实做了一些非常令人遗憾的事情。所以，我认为很难弄清楚应该怎么做。

The present system is crazy, and I don’t know how I’d improve it. You could easily improve it if you could count on government being rational and fair, but how do you do that?

目前的系统很疯狂，我不知道该如何改进它。如果你能指望政府理性和公平，你可以轻松地改进它，但你怎么做到这一点呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Would you do anything toward making the people who are defendants in D&O situations pay any portion of it themselves or not?

沃伦·巴菲特：你会采取任何措施让在董事和高管责任险案件中的被告自己支付部分费用吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think there would be a great improvement, net, in Omaha — in America — if there were no D&O insurance. Zero. I think people — (applause) — would behave a lot better.

查理·芒格：我认为，如果没有董事和高管责任保险，奥马哈——美国——的整体情况会有很大改善。零。我认为人们——（掌声）——会表现得更好。

The counterargument is you’d never get anybody with any money who was willing to serve on a board. But my guess is that, net, even after taking into account that little problem, the system would work better than the present one.

反驳是你永远找不到任何有钱的人愿意在董事会任职。但我猜，即使考虑到这个小问题，净而言之，这个系统也会比现有的系统运作得更好。

32. “It’s tough to buy things out of bankruptcy”

32. “从破产中购买东西是很困难的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Goss (PH), Key West, Florida.

观众成员：约翰·戈斯（PH），佛罗里达州基韦斯特。

You mentioned last year your frustration with buying companies out of bankruptcy. Were you surprised, from your past experience, that the court would not allow a breakup fee regarding your Burlington bid?

去年你提到过你对从破产中收购公司的挫败感。根据你过去的经验，法院不允许关于你对伯灵顿的竞标的分手费，这让你感到惊讶吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a good question. We submitted a bid to the court. The management agreed to our offer and we submitted a bid in the bankruptcy of Burlington Industries. And our bid was 500-and-some million dollars.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个好问题。我们向法院提交了一个投标。管理层同意了我们的报价，我们在伯灵顿工业的破产案中提交了一个投标。我们的出价是五亿多美元。

And we provided a — what’s called a breakup fee. I’ll get to that in a second, but I think it was $14 million.

我们提供了一个——所谓的分手费。我稍后会谈到这个，但我想是 1400 万美元。

Now really, when we submit that bid of 500-and-some-odd million, our bid has to remain outstanding for a good many months. So in effect, by making that bid, I get back to the earlier statements I made about option value.

现在实际上，当我们提交那份五亿多的投标时，我们的投标必须保持有效好几个月。因此，实际上，通过做出这个投标，我回到了我之前关于期权价值的陈述。

For $14 million, we were telling the creditors of Burlington that, for a period of maybe four months or five months, that they could sell us that business for our number or, for a considerable period, they could get more money for it.

对于 1400 万美元，我们告诉伯灵顿的债权人，在大约四个月或五个月的时间内，他们可以按我们的价格将该业务卖给我们，或者在相当长的一段时间内，他们可以获得更多的钱。

Now that is a very low price, in my view, for a put. In fact, it’s an inadequate price, but it’s become sort of a customary percentage in terms of bankruptcy proceedings.

现在在我看来，这个认沽期权的价格非常低。事实上，这个价格是不够的，但在破产程序中，这已经成为一种习惯性的百分比。

The court said that that was too much to charge as a breakup fee, or what I would call a put fee, and so they have set up a new procedure, which will result in Burlington getting sold some months from now to people who follow this new procedure.

法院表示，这作为分手费或我称之为期权费的费用太高了，因此他们制定了一个新程序，这将导致伯灵顿在几个月后根据这个新程序被出售。

I think that — I frankly think 14 million is inadequate, but it’s roughly in the range of what has been allowed in many cases.

我认为——坦率地说，我认为 1400 万是不够的，但这大致在许多情况下被允许的范围内。

But we would never agree to that sort of a sum for that sort of exposure, outside of bankruptcy. It just doesn’t make any sense. The world changes too much.

但我们绝不会同意在破产之外为那种曝光支付那样的金额。这根本没有意义。世界变化太快了。

If you look at the value of businesses, as measured on the New York Stock Exchange, you’ll see fluctuations of a hundred percent in a year. And for 2 or 3 percent, to commit 500-and-some million dollars at a fixed price for a business in a tough industry, I mean that’s — that does not make a lot of sense.

如果你查看纽约证券交易所衡量的企业价值，你会看到一年内有百分之百的波动。而为了 2%或 3%，在一个艰难的行业中以固定价格投入五亿多美元，我的意思是——这没有太多意义。

I did it, so — but it got rejected. We would not — we will not participate in a procedure where we’re going to bid hundreds of millions of dollars and where our bid has to remain outstanding.

我做了，但被拒绝了。我们不会——我们将不会参与一个程序，在这个程序中我们要出价数亿美元，而且我们的出价必须保持有效。

And if the — you know, if there’s a twin — if there’s a World Trade Center disaster, or there’s an earthquake in California, or there’s a suspension of trading on the stock exchange, or all kinds of things, that our bid sits out there and we’ve gotten paid $5 million or something for it.

如果——你知道，如果有一个双子——如果有一个世贸中心灾难，或者加州发生地震，或者股票交易所暂停交易，或者各种各样的事情，我们的报价就在那里，我们已经因此获得了 500 万美元或类似的报酬。

It just doesn’t make any sense to me.

这对我来说就是没有任何意义。

So, it’s tough to buy things out of bankruptcy, although we’ve done it twice now. And both situations have worked out well.

所以，从破产中购买东西是很困难的，尽管我们已经这样做了两次。而且这两种情况都取得了良好的效果。

But then we tried it a third time with Burlington, and we spent a considerable amount of time and money generating that bid. Weeks and weeks and a good many dollars, and it wasn’t accepted.

但是后来我们第三次尝试与伯灵顿合作，我们花费了大量的时间和金钱来生成那个投标。好几个星期和很多钱，但它没有被接受。

So, you know, when I look at these experiences, I say to myself it’s a lot easier to make a deal with Walmart, where I talk with them for an hour and we shake hands and we got a deal.

所以，你知道，当我看这些经历时，我对自己说，与沃尔玛达成交易要容易得多，我和他们谈一个小时，我们握手达成协议。

Or the other deals we’ve made in the last year where we buy Northern Natural in a day or two, or where we buy Kern River Pipeline in a few days, or the various businesses we’ve bought.

或者是我们在去年达成的其他交易，比如我们在一两天内收购了 Northern Natural，或者在几天内收购了 Kern River Pipeline，或者我们收购的各种业务。

And bankruptcy, I think it’s probably a necessary part of the procedure. I mean you have to comply with bankruptcy laws. But I would say it’s a very awkward way to buy a business.

破产，我认为这可能是程序中必要的一部分。我的意思是你必须遵守破产法。但我会说这是一种非常尴尬的购买业务的方式。

And if we have to submit bids that will remain outstanding for many months when people can top us, and only have a 1 percent fee for giving that sort of a put, we will not be making many bids.

如果我们必须提交那些可能会在几个月内被人超越的投标，并且只收取 1%的费用来提供这种选择权，我们将不会进行很多投标。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we know it was unreasonable, from our point of view, to have a transaction that didn’t have that modest 2 percent commitment fee in it. The court had a different view, and he thought that the figure should have been different. And who knows. We’ll see how it all works out.

查理·芒格：嗯，从我们的角度来看，没有包含那笔适度的 2%承诺费的交易是不合理的。法院有不同的看法，他认为这个数字应该有所不同。谁知道呢。我们会看看事情如何发展。

33. “We like to go in heavy” when buying a stock

33. “我们喜欢大举买入”股票时

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, Wayne Peters from Sydney, Australia.

观众成员：先生们，我是来自澳大利亚悉尼的 Wayne Peters。

My question goes to stock reweightings. Could you describe your thought process in, firstly, determining your commitment weighting level in a new investment? Now, marketable securities is what I’m referring to.

我的问题是关于股票重新加权的。您能否描述一下您在确定新投资的承诺权重水平时的思考过程？我指的是有价证券。

And secondly, your thoughts on potential reweighting. Your record, and clearly in the earlier days as opposed to now, would indicate that on average, you’re either in a stock or out of it, though on occasion you’ve topped up and lightened up.

其次，您对潜在重新加权的看法。您的记录，显然在早期与现在相比，表明您平均而言要么持有股票，要么不持有，尽管偶尔您会增持或减持。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? I’ll let you have one. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？我让你来一个。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t fully understand that question.

查理·芒格：我没有完全理解那个问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Charlie, I was just referring to how you make an initial commitment to a marketable security investment, in regards to making it maybe a 5, 10, 15 percent commitment. How heavy you decide to go into a position, initially.

观众成员：查理，我刚才提到的是你如何对可交易证券投资做出初步承诺，可能是 5%、10%、15%的承诺。你最初决定在一个仓位上投入多重。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we ordinarily don’t like small positions.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们通常不喜欢小额头寸。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we like to go in heavy. I mean, if we want to invest in a business through the stock market, we want to put a lot of money in. You know, we do not believe in a little of this and a little of that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们喜欢大举投资。我的意思是，如果我们想通过股市投资一家企业，我们希望投入大量资金。你知道，我们不相信分散投资。

So, at our present size, we’re limited primarily by the availability of the quantity we want, rather than restricting ourselves based on some percentage of a total portfolio.

所以，以我们目前的规模，我们主要受限于我们想要的数量的可用性，而不是根据总投资组合的某个百分比来限制自己。

I can’t — it’s very hard for me to think of a stock we quit on, in terms of buying, except because we were going to run into some 10 percent limit where we would get liable for short-swing profits or become insiders or that sort of thing. But we almost never want to quit. Isn’t that right, Charlie?

我无法——对我来说，很难想到我们放弃购买的股票，除非是因为我们会遇到一些 10%的限制，在这种情况下我们可能会因短期交易利润而承担责任，或者成为内部人士之类的事情。但我们几乎从不想放弃。对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, not unless the price goes up.

查理·芒格：嗯，除非价格上涨。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And of course that’s where we made our big mistakes. I mean we have — or I’ve made the big mistakes, actually. I —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当然，那就是我们犯下重大错误的地方。我的意思是我们——或者实际上是我犯了重大错误。我——

There have been a couple of things that we knew enough to buy, that were in our circle of competence, where we could have bought lots of stock, except it went up a little bit and then we faded because of price.

有几件事情是我们了解得足够多并且在我们的能力圈内的，我们本可以购买大量股票，只是因为价格稍微上涨了一点，我们就因为价格而退缩了。

We didn’t fade because we didn’t want to put more than X dollars in. If we find an idea that we want to put $500 million in, we probably would be even happier if we could put 3 or 4 billion in.

我们没有退出，因为我们不想投入超过 X 美元。如果我们找到一个想投入 5 亿美元的想法，我们可能会更高兴能投入 30 或 40 亿美元。

Good ideas are too scarce to be parsimonious with once you find them.

一旦找到好主意，就不应吝啬。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, having narrowly averted the mistake of being unwilling to pay up at See’s Capital [Candies], we’ve gone on and made the same damn mistake several times, with respect to marketable securities. We evidently learn very slowly. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，在差点犯下不愿意为 See's Capital [糖果]支付高价的错误后，我们在可交易证券方面多次犯了同样的错误。显然，我们学习得非常慢。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s cost us many, many, many billions of dollars, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：这也让我们损失了很多很多很多数十亿美元。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Those are opportunity cost billions. They don’t show up on the financial statements, but the amount of money that’s been blown by dumb decisions at headquarters at Berkshire Hathaway is awesome. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那些是机会成本的数十亿。它们不会出现在财务报表上，但伯克希尔·哈撒韦总部因愚蠢决策而浪费掉的钱数目惊人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well said.

沃伦·巴菲特：说得好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

34. Short-term rates don’t affect investment decisions

34. 短期利率不影响投资决策

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Steve Casbell (PH) from Atlanta. My question involves interest rates.

观众成员：你好，我是来自亚特兰大的史蒂夫·卡斯贝尔（音）。我的问题涉及利率。

When you calculate the intrinsic value of a business in a period of low interest rates, like we have currently, do you use a higher discount rate to factor in higher rates in the future?

当你在低利率时期计算企业的内在价值时，比如我们目前的情况，你是否使用更高的折现率来考虑未来更高的利率？

And also, when — do you ever look at a company’s free cash flow yield relative to current rates?

而且，你是否曾经查看过一家公司的自由现金流收益率相对于当前利率的情况？

And if I could also get your thoughts on the dividend tax cut. If, by some miracle, the politicians think logically and get rid of the dividend taxes, would Berkshire ever pay a dividend?

如果我也能听到你对股息税削减的看法就好了。如果奇迹般地，政客们理性思考并取消了股息税，伯克希尔会支付股息吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The question on discount rates, we use the same discount — I mean in theory — we would use the same discount rate across all securities, because if you really knew the cash they were going to produce, you know, that would take care of it.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于贴现率的问题，我们使用相同的贴现率——我的意思是理论上——我们会在所有证券上使用相同的贴现率，因为如果你真的知道它们将产生的现金，那就可以解决问题。

We may be more conservative in estimating the returns of cash from some, but the discount rate we would use is a constant.

我们在估算某些现金回报时可能会更保守，但我们使用的折现率是恒定的。

Now, in terms of where we commit, you know, we don’t want to use the fact that short-term rates are 1 1/4 percent to think that something that yields us 3 percent or 4 percent is a good deal.

现在，就我们承诺的方向而言，你知道，我们不想因为短期利率是 1.25%就认为收益率为 3%或 4%的东西是个好交易。

So we sort of have a minimum threshold in our mind about which we’re — below which — we’re unwilling to commit money. And we’re unwilling to commit it whether interest rates are 6 or 7 percent, or whether they’re 3 or 4 percent, or whether they’re, on a short-term basis, 1 percent.

所以我们心中有一个最低门槛，低于这个门槛我们就不愿意投入资金。无论利率是 6%或 7%，还是 3%或 4%，或者短期内是 1%，我们都不愿意投入。

We just — we don’t want to get hooked into long-term investments at low rates just because they’re a little bit better than short rates would be or low Government rates would be. So, we have minimum thresholds in our mind.

我们只是——我们不想因为长期利率稍微好于短期利率或低政府利率就被套入低利率的长期投资。因此，我们心中有最低门槛。

I can’t tell you precisely what they are, but they’re a whole lot higher than present Government rates would be.

我无法确切告诉你它们是什么，但它们比目前政府的利率要高得多。

And at other times, we’d be very happy owning Governments, just because we feel that they offer attractive enough rates.

而在其他时候，我们会非常乐意持有政府债券，只是因为我们觉得它们提供的利率足够有吸引力。

I would — when we’re looking at a business, we’re looking at holding it forever. And we want to be sure we’re getting an adequate return on capital. We don’t regard what we can get on short-term rates now as adequate, but we’ll still sit in — rather than bend a little bit and start settling for lower rates for 30 years because rates for 30 days are so low, we would rather just sit it out and wait a while.

当我们在审视一个企业时，我们是以永远持有的心态来看的。我们希望确保获得足够的资本回报。我们不认为现在能获得的短期利率是足够的，但我们宁愿保持观望，而不是因为 30 天的利率太低而稍微妥协并开始接受 30 年的较低利率，我们宁愿等待一段时间。

35. Dividends should be taxed

35. 股息应当征税

WARREN BUFFETT: The tax on dividends — you know, I’ve used this illustration before, but I’m paying about the same percentage of my income to the federal government as my secretary does.

沃伦·巴菲特：股息税——你知道，我以前用过这个例子，但我支付给联邦政府的收入比例和我的秘书差不多。

Now, I pay more in income tax rates than she does. I pay a higher marginal tax rate, by some margin, than she does.

现在，我支付的所得税税率比她高。我的边际税率比她高出一些。

But she pays way more in Social Security taxes than I do, because I only pay on the first whatever it is, 70,000 or 80,000 of income. And so, she is paying, between what we pay at the company for her and what she pays, we’re paying 12 percent or 13 percent or whatever it is of that.

但她支付的社会保障税比我多得多，因为我只在前面无论是 70,000 还是 80,000 的收入上缴税。因此，她支付的部分，加上我们公司为她支付的部分，我们总共支付了 12%或 13%或不管是多少的税。

So, we both end up paying fairly similar percentages of our income to the federal government every year.

所以，我们每年都向联邦政府支付相对类似比例的收入。

If Berkshire were to declare a billion-dollar dividend, and my share of it was 330 million, and it were tax-free as the Bush people originally suggested — and it would be tax-free. I mean, we have lots of taxable earnings at Berkshire.

如果伯克希尔宣布发放十亿美元的股息，而我其中的份额是 3.3 亿，并且像布什政府最初建议的那样免税——而且确实会免税。我是说，我们在伯克希尔有很多应税收入。

You know, I might be paying 1/10th of the rate to the federal government of my income that she would be.

你知道，我可能只支付她要支付给联邦政府的收入税率的 1/10。

Now, I can make the argument about the fact that structure shouldn’t govern tax rates. That Subchapter S, and Subchapter C, and partnerships, and all of these things, that the tax codes should be neutral between them. And I’ve made those kind of arguments in the past.

现在，我可以就结构不应决定税率这一事实提出论点。关于 S 子章、C 子章、合伙企业以及所有这些，税法应该在它们之间保持中立。我过去也提出过这类论点。

But I can make no argument in my mind that says that I, with everything that — you know, all the luck I’ve had in life, you know, I was wired a certain way at birth that enabled me to make a lot of money.

但我无法在心中找到任何理由来解释，尽管我在生活中有过那么多的好运，我天生就有某种能力让我赚了很多钱。

And, frankly, it was better to be born a boy than a girl, in terms of money-making possibilities, in 1930. And probably still is, but not to the same degree.

而且，坦率地说，就赚钱的可能性而言，1930 年出生为男孩比女孩更好。现在可能仍然如此，但程度不同。

I mean the fact that I would send 1/10th the portion of my income in a year to the federal government that my secretary would, I — it just — it screams at injustice to me, in terms of what the society gives back to me. (Applause)

我的意思是，我一年中将收入的十分之一寄给联邦政府，而我的秘书也会这样做，这对我来说简直就是一种不公正，就社会对我回馈的角度而言。（掌声）

So I am not for the Bush plan. Charlie?

所以我不支持布什的计划。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you. Even if you assume that the whole economy would work better if we’d never gotten into this double-taxation system on corporate earnings, which I don’t think is a clear thing anyway.

查理·芒格：嗯，我同意你的看法。即使你假设整个经济会更好地运作，如果我们从未进入这种对公司收益的双重征税体系，我认为这也不是一件明确的事情。

But even if you assume that, I think when you live in a democracy where there’s lots of envy and resentment and what have you, to have the absolutely most fortunate people paying practically no income taxes, I just think it’s unacceptable.

但即使你假设如此，我认为当你生活在一个充满嫉妒和怨恨的民主社会中，让那些绝对最幸运的人几乎不缴纳所得税，我只是觉得这是不可接受的。

I think there has to be some fairness in some of these arrangements, even if there’s some theoretical argument that the economy might work a little better some other way.

我认为在这些安排中必须有一些公平性，即使有理论上的争论认为经济可能以其他方式运作得更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there are IRAs now, obviously, that work very well for people with modest amounts of dividends. That they — they’re getting tax deferred for a very long period of time, which has huge benefits.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，现在显然有一些个人退休账户（IRA）对拥有少量股息的人非常有效。因为他们——他们的税款被递延了很长一段时间，这带来了巨大的好处。

The big benefits of exempting dividends would go to fellows like me and Charlie, you know. And that’s not going to stimulate the economy. It’s going to stimulate us, but — (Laughter)

免除股息的最大好处将惠及像我和查理这样的人，你知道的。这不会刺激经济。它会刺激我们，但——（笑声）

And it’s going to result in us sending a very small percentage of the income — of our income — to Washington compared to what the people, you know, working in our shoe factories send.

这将导致我们将收入——我们的收入——中非常小的一部分送到华盛顿，相比之下，你知道，在我们鞋厂工作的人所送的要多得多。

And that — you know, when somebody says, you know, “What did you do during the war, Grandpa?” I’m not sure that’s what I want to explain to them.

当有人问：“爷爷，你在战争期间做了什么？”我不确定这就是我想要向他们解释的。

36. Why Berkshire wants at least a 10 percent return

为什么伯克希尔希望至少获得 10%的回报

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m Patrick Wolff from Arlington, Virginia.

观众成员：下午好。我是来自弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿的帕特里克·沃尔夫。

Charlie, I can’t resist telling you that I’m actually the fellow who plays the chess games blindfolded.

查理，我忍不住告诉你，我其实就是那个蒙着眼下棋的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, I look forward to not seeing you there tomorrow. (Laughter)

观众成员：所以，我期待明天不见到你。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. 查理·芒格：对。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I actually have a two-part question. I’d like to ask you to elaborate a bit how you think about opportunity costs. And I’m — I think I’m going to be elaborating very much on the very last question that was asked.

观众成员：我其实有一个由两部分组成的问题。我想请您详细说明一下您如何看待机会成本。而且我——我想我会在很大程度上详细说明刚才提出的最后一个问题。

First of all, in the annual report you say explicitly that you look for a 10 percent pretax return on equity, in looking at common stocks. And I think you talked earlier about how you built up from that for 5 to 6 percent after-tax return, and then you layer on inflation, and then layer on taxes.

首先，在年度报告中，您明确表示在考虑普通股时，您寻求 10%的税前股本回报率。我想您之前谈到过如何从中构建出 5%到 6%的税后回报率，然后再加上通货膨胀，再加上税收。

My first question would be, how do you adjust that required rate of return across periods of time? So, for example, when interest rates are higher. And do you look for a different equity premium return over different periods of time?

我的第一个问题是，您如何在不同时期调整所需的回报率？例如，当利率较高时。您是否在不同时期寻找不同的股权溢价回报？

My second question would be, Warren, you just said that you actually would apply the same discount rate across the stocks.

我的第二个问题是，沃伦，你刚才说你实际上会对所有股票应用相同的折扣率。

And I’m sure you know that modern finance actually suggests that you should not do that — that you should be thinking about the timing of cash flows and, in particular, the covariance with the general market.

我相信你知道，现代金融实际上建议你不应该那样做——你应该考虑现金流的时机，特别是与整体市场的协方差。

Now, you’ve made a point of emphasizing that when you think of risk, you think of risk primarily in terms of, will you get the cash flows that you predict you will get over time?

现在，您已经强调了，当您考虑风险时，您主要是从这样的角度考虑风险：您是否会获得您预测的现金流？

Sort of numerator risk, if you think in terms of discounted cash flow, which I think everyone here will have to acknowledge — your results speak for themselves — has probably been a very effective way of thinking about risk.

如果你从贴现现金流的角度考虑，某种程度上的分子风险，我想在座的各位都必须承认——你的结果不言自明——这可能是一种非常有效的思考风险的方式。

But there is a true economic cost to think about the timing of cash flows as well. And it may be a much smaller cost, but it is still a real cost.

但是，考虑现金流的时间安排也有真正的经济成本。虽然这可能是一个更小的成本，但它仍然是一个真实的成本。

I might, for example, suggest you think about somebody deciding between two jobs. The jobs are completely identical and the person expects to make the same amount of money from each job, but there’s one difference. And the difference is one job will pay him more when the economy’s in the tank, and the other job will pay him more when the economy’s going gangbusters.

例如，我可能会建议你考虑一个人在两个工作之间做出选择。这两个工作完全相同，并且这个人预计从每个工作中赚到的钱是一样的，但有一个区别。区别在于，一个工作在经济低迷时会支付他更多，而另一个工作在经济繁荣时会支付他更多。

Now, if he asked you which job was actually worth more, my guess is you would tell him that the one that would pay him more when the economy’s in the tank. And the reason is, if he wanted to make more money by moonlighting or doing something else, it’d be much easier when the economy’s doing better.

现在，如果他问你哪个工作实际上更有价值，我猜你会告诉他，当经济不景气时，那个能给他更多报酬的工作更有价值。原因是，如果他想通过兼职或做其他事情来赚更多的钱，当经济状况好转时会容易得多。

That’s the essential logic behind the idea that you look at the covariance of when cash flows come in with the overall market.

这就是你观察现金流入与整体市场协方差这一想法背后的基本逻辑。

It’s a real cost, even though it is difficult to measure, and even if it is a smaller risk than numerator risk, the risk of getting the actual cash flows, since it’s a real cost, I imagine you must think about it.

这是真实的成本，尽管很难衡量，即使它比分子风险更小，是获得实际现金流的风险，但由于它是一个真实的成本，我想你一定会考虑到它。

And so, my second question to you would be how do you think about it? And if you decide not to, why?

那么，我的第二个问题是你如何看待它？如果你决定不这样做，为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, first of all, I would like to say, Patrick, we appreciate you coming out, because Patrick — now, I don’t know how many years it’s been, but it’s been a number, has volunteered on Sunday to play.

沃伦·巴菲特：首先，我想说，帕特里克，我们感谢你出来，因为帕特里克——我不知道已经多少年了，但已经有好几年了——自愿在星期天演奏。

Now, I think he’s playing six people or so, blindfolded, simultaneously, and after hearing that question you can understand how he does it. (Laughter)

现在，我想他正在同时与大约六个人下棋，而且是蒙着眼睛的，听了那个问题后你就能理解他是怎么做到的。（笑声）

But Patrick, as well as [champion bridge player] Bob Hamman, and then this year, [champion Scrabble player] Peter Morris and [champion backgammon player] Bill Robertie, all come out. And on Sunday they — we’ve got these extraordinary talents out there. And for people who like the various games they play, they devote an afternoon for it and ask nothing in return.

但是帕特里克，以及[桥牌冠军]鲍勃·哈曼，然后今年，[拼字游戏冠军]彼得·莫里斯和[西洋双陆棋冠军]比尔·罗伯蒂，都出来了。星期天，他们——我们有这些非凡的人才在那里。对于喜欢他们所玩的各种游戏的人来说，他们为此投入一个下午，并且不求回报。

So, I — we really appreciate it, Patrick, and I’ll look forward to seeing if you’re peeking out of your blindfold tomorrow. (Laughter)

所以，我——我们真的很感激，帕特里克，我期待着看看你明天是否会偷看。 (笑声)

The question on opportunity costs and the 10 percent we mention. You know, basically that’s the figure we quit on. And we quit on buying — we don’t want to buy equities where our real expectancy is below 10 percent.

关于机会成本和我们提到的 10%。你知道，基本上那是我们放弃的数字。我们放弃购买——我们不想购买实际预期低于 10%的股票。

Now, that’s true whether short rates are 6 percent or whether short rates are 1 percent. We just feel that it would get very sloppy to start dipping below that.

现在，无论短期利率是 6%还是 1%，这都是正确的。我们只是觉得开始低于这个水平会变得非常松散。

And we would add, we feel also, obviously, that we will get opportunities that are at least at that level, and perhaps substantially above.

而且我们还要补充说，我们显然也觉得，我们将获得至少在那个水平的机会，甚至可能远远超过。

So, there’s just a point at which we drop out of the game. And it’s arbitrary. There’s no — we have no scientific studies or anything.

所以，我们在某个点退出游戏。而这个点是任意的。我们没有科学研究或其他依据。

But I will bet you that a lot of years in the future we, or you, will be able to find equities that you understand, or we understand, and that have the probability of returns at 10 percent or greater.

但我敢打赌，在未来的很多年里，我们或者你将能够找到你理解的，或者我们理解的股票，并且这些股票有可能获得 10%或更高的回报。

Now, once you find a group of equities in that range, and leaving aside the problem of huge sums of money, which we have, then we just buy the most attractive. That usually means the ones we feel the surest about, I mean, as a practical matter.

现在，一旦你找到处于那个范围内的一组股票，并且撇开我们拥有的大量资金问题不谈，那么我们就买入最有吸引力的股票。实际上，这通常意味着我们最有把握的那些。

There’s just some businesses that possess economic characteristics that make their future prospects, far out, far more predictable than others. There’s all kinds of businesses that you just can’t remotely predict what they’ll earn, and you just have to forget about them.

有些企业具有经济特征，使得它们的未来前景比其他企业更容易预测。有各种各样的企业，你根本无法预测它们会赚多少钱，你只能忘记它们。

But when we get — so, we have, over time, gotten very partial to the businesses where we think the predictability is high. But we still want a threshold return of 10 percent, which is not that great after-tax, anyway.

但是随着时间的推移，我们变得非常偏爱那些我们认为可预测性高的业务。不过，我们仍然希望达到 10%的门槛回报率，尽管税后并不是那么高。

Charlie, do you want to comment on that portion of that question first?

查理，你想先对那个问题的那部分发表评论吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The — I think in the last analysis, everything we do comes back to opportunity cost. But it, to some extent — in fact, to some considerable extent — we are guessing at our future opportunity cost.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为最终分析中，我们所做的一切都归结为机会成本。但在某种程度上——实际上在相当大的程度上——我们是在猜测我们未来的机会成本。

Warren is basically saying that he’s guessing that he’ll have opportunities in due course to put out money at pretty attractive rates of return, and therefore, he’s not going to waste a lot of firepower now at lower returns. But that’s an opportunity cost calculation.

沃伦基本上是在说，他猜测他将有机会在适当的时候以相当有吸引力的回报率投入资金，因此，他现在不会在较低的回报率上浪费大量的火力。但这是一种机会成本计算。

And if interest rates were to more or less permanently settle at 1 percent or something like that, and Warren were to reappraise his notions of future opportunity cost, he would change the numbers.

如果利率或多或少永久性地稳定在 1%左右，而沃伦重新评估他对未来机会成本的看法，他就会改变这些数字。

It’s like [economist John Maynard] Keynes said, “What do you do when you change your view of the facts? Well, you change your conduct.” But so far at least, we have hurdles in our mind which are basically — well, they involve, implicitly, future opportunity cost.

就像[经济学家约翰·梅纳德]凯恩斯所说的，“当你改变对事实的看法时，你会怎么做？你会改变你的行为。” 但至少到目前为止，我们心中有一些障碍，这些障碍基本上——嗯，它们隐含地涉及未来的机会成本。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right now, with our 16 billion that’s getting 1 1/4 percent pretax, that’s $200 million a year. We could very easily buy Governments due in 20 years and get roughly 5 percent. So, we could change that 200 million a year to 800 million a year of income.

沃伦·巴菲特：目前，我们的 160 亿美元获得 1.25%的税前收益，即每年 2 亿美元。我们可以很容易地购买 20 年期的政府债券，获得大约 5%的收益。因此，我们可以将每年的 2 亿美元收入变为 8 亿美元。

And we’re making a decision, as Charlie says, that it’s better to take 200 million for a while, on the theory that we’ll find something that gives us 10 percent or better, than to commit to the 800 million a year and then find that, in a year or thereabouts, when the better opportunities came along, that what we had committed to had a big principal loss in it.

我们正在做出一个决定，正如查理所说，宁愿暂时拿着 2 亿美元，基于我们会找到一些能给我们 10%或更高回报的机会的理论，而不是每年投入 8 亿美元，然后发现大约一年后，当更好的机会出现时，我们所承诺的投资有很大的本金损失。

But that’s — you know that’s not — it’s not terribly scientific. But it — all I can tell you is, in practice, it seems to work pretty well. People —

但那是——你知道那不是——这不是非常科学。不过——我只能告诉你，实际上，它似乎效果很好。人们——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Years ago, when Warren ran a partnership, and to some extent the partnership that I ran was the — operated in the same way — we implicitly did what you’re suggesting, in that part of the partnership funds were in so-called event arbitrage investments.

查理·芒格：多年前，当沃伦经营一个合伙企业时，我经营的合伙企业在某种程度上也是以同样的方式运作的——我们隐含地做了你所建议的事情，因为部分合伙资金用于所谓的事件套利投资。

And those tended to generate returns, occasionally, when the market, generally, was in the tank. And alternative investments would more mimic the general market. So, we were doing what this academic theory prescribes, you know, 40 years ago. And — but we didn’t use the modern lingo.

那些投资往往会在市场普遍低迷时偶尔产生回报。而另类投资则更像是一般市场的表现。所以，我们在 40 年前就已经在做这个学术理论所建议的事情了。不过，我们没有使用现代术语。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve got some preferences for having a lot of money coming in all the time.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们更喜欢一直有大量资金流入。

But we do go into insurance transactions with huge volatility, which could mean that a big chunk of money could go out at one time, or in a very short period of time.

但是我们确实参与了波动性很大的保险交易，这可能意味着一大笔钱可能会在某个时间点或在很短的时间内流出。

And we won’t give up a lot in expectable return for smoothness, but if you give us a choice of having money come in every week and the same present value of money coming in in very lumpy ways that we wouldn’t know about, we would choose the smooth.

我们不会为了平稳性而放弃很多可预期的回报，但如果让我们选择每周都有资金流入，或者以我们无法预知的方式大笔流入但现值相同的资金，我们会选择平稳的方式。

But if you give us a choice of a higher present value for the lumpiness, we will take the lumpiness. And that’s usually the choice that’s — I mean that’s usually — we get offered that choice. And other people value smoothness so highly that we do get a spread, in our view, for lumpy returns.

但是，如果你给我们一个更高的现值选择来应对波动性，我们会选择波动性。这通常是我们被提供的选择。其他人对平滑性的重视程度如此之高，以至于在我们看来，我们确实能从波动的回报中获得差价。

37. Berkshire insures $1B Pepsi contest

伯克希尔为 10 亿美元百事可乐比赛提供保险

WARREN BUFFETT: We are writing — and then we’re going to close this up — but you will read a lot, or you may hear a lot, maybe you’ve heard it already, Pepsi-Cola’s having a contest. They’re going to have a drawing in September.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们正在写——然后我们将结束这个——但你会读到很多，或者你可能会听到很多，也许你已经听说过了，百事可乐正在举办一个比赛。他们将在九月份进行抽奖。

The contest goes through a lot of little phases, but in the end, there’s going to be one person who’s going to have one chance in a thousand of winning a billion dollars. That billion dollars will have a present value of maybe 250 million.

比赛经历了许多小阶段，但最终，将有一个人有千分之一的机会赢得十亿美元。那十亿美元的现值可能是 2.5 亿。

If whoever gets to that position hits the number, we will pay it. And we don’t mind paying out $250 million as long as we get paid appropriately for us. And that would create bad cash flow that particular week. We’re willing to — maybe even for two weeks. (Laughter)

如果任何一个到达那个位置的人达到了那个数字，我们会支付。只要我们得到适当的回报，我们不介意支付 2.5 亿美元。这会在那一周造成不良的现金流。我们愿意——甚至可能持续两周。（笑声）

We’re willing to assume that for a payment, and very, very few people in the world are. Even those that can afford it. We would even assume it for 2 1/2 billion, present value.

我们愿意为此支付，而世界上愿意这样做的人非常非常少。即使是那些负担得起的人。我们甚至愿意以 25 亿的现值来承担。

We’d want more proportionally to assume it for that, but Charlie and I, I think, would agree that we would take that on if we got paid well enough for it.

我们希望按比例多一些来承担这个，但我和查理，我想，我们会同意，如果报酬足够高，我们会接受这个。

We wouldn’t do it for 25 billion, but we will do things, and therefore, you know, we get the calls on that sort of thing. And that is more profitable business, over time, than bread and butter business.

我们不会为了 250 亿去做，但我们会做一些事情，因此，你知道，我们会接到那种事情的电话。从长远来看，这比日常业务更有利可图。

It also can, you know — it can lead you having an intense interest in watching the television show when the drawing takes place — (laughter) — making sure who draws the number, too.

它也可以，你知道——它可以让你对抽奖时观看电视节目产生浓厚的兴趣——（笑声）——还要确保是谁抽的号码。

Charlie, you have anything to add? Then we’ll —

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？那么我们就——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, once you’re talking about opportunity cost that’s personal to yourself and your own situation and your own abilities, you’ve departed from modern finance, totally. And that’s what we’ve done.

查理·芒格：是的，一旦你谈论机会成本，这就与个人自身的情况和能力有关，你就完全偏离了现代金融。而这正是我们所做的。

We’re intelligently making these guesses, as best we can, based on our own circumstances and our own abilities. I think it’s crazy to do it based on somebody else’s circumstances and somebody else’s abilities.

我们在尽最大努力的情况下，根据我们自己的情况和能力来做出这些明智的猜测。我认为根据别人的情况和能力来做决定是很疯狂的。

2003-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2003-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Buffett welcomes “real shareholders”

2. Andy Heyward and “Liberty’s Kids”

3. Day’s agenda

4. Calibrating Munger’s answers

5. Berkshire directors introduced

6. Formal business meeting begins

7. Berkshire directors elected

8. Proposal to include Class B shares in charity program

9. Formal business meeting adjourned

10. Microphones for questions

11. McLane acquired from Walmart

12. Clayton Homes purchase

13. Earnings get insurance boost

14. Bright future for NetJets but no profit this year

15. “What we really want is cost-free float”

16. Black-Scholes option pricing model is “insane”

17. Buffett recalls sneaking out to race tracks with high school golf coach

18. “Crazy” to use stock options as compensation

19. Low inflation helps investors, but keep expectations low

20. Managers decide whether to come to annual meeting

21. Decisions not based on “sweeping future projections”

22. “Desirable” GDP shows how economy affects households

23. Buffett didn’t learn accounting from books

24. Many credit insurers “don’t really know what they’re doing”

25. We try to look “a long way into the future”

26. Munger: 15 percent of GDP for health care is “not crazy”

27. Buffett: Giving and getting love is true success

28. Buffett doesn’t remember giving advice to Richard Rainwater

29. See’s Candies lesson: listen to criticism

30. From “cigar butts” to high-quality companies

31. Hard to regain a lost competitive advantage

32. “Fretful disposition” will hurt your long-term performance

33. Triple-A rating won’t “cause us to do anything stupid”

34. Planned all along to exercise Cologne Re buy option

35. Berkshire buyback is possible, but not likely

36. MidAmerican will grow, even if utilities law isn’t repealed

37. Why Buffett doesn’t get a performance fee

38. “Mild wakeup call” on derivatives

39. Do managers love the business or the money?

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