2005-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
上午会议
1. Welcome
欢迎
WARREN BUFFETT: Morning. I’m Warren, he’s Charlie. We work together. We really don’t have any choice because he can hear and I can see. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。我是沃伦，他是查理。我们一起工作。我们真的没有选择，因为他能听见，我能看见。（笑声）
I want to first thank a few people. That cartoon was done by Andy Heyward who’s done them now for a number of years. Andy writes them. He goes around the country and gets voices dubbed in. It’s a labor of love. We don’t pay him a dime. He comes up with the ideas every year. He’s just a terrific guy.
首先，我想感谢几个人。那部卡通是由安迪·海沃德制作的，他已经做了好几年了。安迪编写这些卡通，他走遍全国为其配音。这是一项爱的劳动。我们没有付他一分钱。他每年都会想出这些创意。他真是个了不起的人。
He’s unable to be here today because his daughter is having a Bat Mitzvah. But he’s a very, very creative fellow.
他今天不能来，因为他的女儿正在举行成人礼。但他是一个非常非常有创意的人。
He did something a few years ago called “Liberty’s Kids.” And if you have a child or a grandchild that wants to learn American history around the time of the Revolution, it’s a magnificent series.
几年前，他参与了一部叫做《自由的孩子》的作品。如果你的孩子或孙子想学习美国革命时期的历史，这是一部非常精彩的系列剧。
I think it’s maybe as many as 40 or so half-hour segments and it’s appeared on public broadcasting. It will be appearing again. You can get it and video form.
我认为可能有多达 40 个左右的半小时片段，并且它已经在公共广播中出现过。它将再次出现。你可以获得它的视频形式。
And, like I say, it’s just a wonderful way to — I’ve watched a number of segments myself. It’s a wonderful way to get American history.
而且，正如我所说，这真是一个很好的方式——我自己看过很多片段。这是了解美国历史的绝佳方式。
The only flaw in it is that the part of Ben Franklin is handled by [former CBS News anchor] Walter Cronkite, and Charlie is thinking of suing. A little bit upsetting when Charlie is available.
唯一的缺陷是本·富兰克林的角色由[前 CBS 新闻主播]沃尔特·克朗凯特扮演，而查理正考虑提起诉讼。当查理有空时，这有点让人不安。
Incidentally, we have “Poor Charlie’s Almanack” next door in the exhibition hall. And it’s an absolutely terrific book that Peter Kaufman has put together. And I think it’s going to be a seller, a huge seller, long after most books have been forgotten.
顺便提一下，我们在隔壁的展览厅有《Poor Charlie’s Almanack》。这是彼得·考夫曼编写的一本非常棒的书。我认为这本书会成为畅销书，在大多数书籍被遗忘后仍会是一本畅销书。
It’s Charlie at his best. And Charlie’s at his best most of the time, but it’s a real gem.
这是查理最好的表现。查理大部分时间都表现得很好，但这真是个瑰宝。
I want to thank Kelly Muchemore, who puts all of this together. I don’t give it a thought. Kelly takes charge of this. She works with over 200 people from our various companies that come in and help make this a success. She does it flawlessly.
我要感谢凯莉·穆切莫尔，她把这一切都组织起来。我对此不操心。凯莉负责这件事。她与我们各个公司的 200 多人合作，帮助使这次活动取得成功。她做得非常出色。
As I mentioned in the annual report, Kelly’s getting married in October. So this is just a warmup. I mean, we’re expecting a much bigger event than this come October.
正如我在年度报告中提到的，凯莉将在十月结婚。所以这只是一个热身。我是说，我们预计十月份会有一个比这更大的活动。
2. Where daughter Suze draws the line
女儿苏兹的底线在哪里
WARREN BUFFETT: I want to thank my daughter Suze, who does millions of things for me. She puts together that movie.
沃伦·巴菲特：我要感谢我的女儿苏茨，她为我做了无数的事情。她制作了那部电影。
She does draw the line, occasionally.
她确实偶尔会划清界限。
A few years ago — we have a dinner at [Omaha steakhouse] Gorat’s the day after the meeting. And we were in having — the whole family was there — having dinner. The place was packed and there was a big line that had formed outside.
几年前——我们在会议后的第二天在[奥马哈牛排馆] Gorat's 吃晚餐。我们全家都在那儿吃晚餐。餐厅里人满为患，外面排起了长队。
Be sure not to go to Gorat’s unless you have a reservation tomorrow, because they’re sold out.
除非你有预订，否则明天千万不要去 Gorat's，因为他们已经售罄了。
But the big line had formed and it started raining cats and dogs. And the waitress came to me. We were eating. Waitress said, “I got to tell you,” she said. “It’s raining like crazy outside and there’s a long line and [Walt Disney CEO] Michael Eisner is standing out there getting soaked.”
但是排起了长队，而且开始下起了倾盆大雨。然后服务员走到我面前。我们正在吃饭。服务员说：“我得告诉你，”她说。“外面下得很大，还有很长的队伍，[迪士尼首席执行官]迈克尔·艾斯纳就站在外面淋雨。”
So I turn to Suze — and Michael and Jane [Eisner] are friends of my mine, good friends — and I said to Suze, “Why don’t you go out there and help them out before they get drenched.”
所以我转向苏兹——迈克尔和简 [艾斯纳] 是我的朋友，好朋友——我对苏兹说：“你为什么不出去帮帮他们，免得他们被淋湿。”
And she looked at me and said, “I waited in line at Disneyland.” (Laughter)
她看着我说：“我在迪士尼乐园排队等了。”（笑声）
That seems to strike a responsive chord.
这似乎引起了共鸣。
3. Day’s agenda
当天议程
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve flipped things this year. We’re going to have the business session at about 3:15.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们今年改变了顺序。我们将在大约 3:15 进行业务会议。
The plan is to have questions and answers. We have 12 microphones here.
计划是进行问答。我们这里有 12 个麦克风。
We have an overflow room that’s filled also, so we got another few thousand people there.
我们还有一个分会场也满了，所以我们在那里又有几千人。
We’ll break at noon and when we break at noon — and anybody that’s been in the overflow room that wants to come in here, they’ll be, I’m sure, plenty of seats in the afternoon session.
我们将在中午休息，当我们中午休息时——任何在分会场的人想进来的话，下午的会议肯定会有很多座位。
We will start the questioning as soon as I get through with a few preliminary remarks. We’ll go to noon. We’ll take a break, you’ll have lunch.
我们将在我完成一些初步说明后开始提问。我们会进行到中午。我们会休息一下，你们可以吃午饭。
Many people find that it helps the digestion to shop while you eat. And we have thoughtfully arranged a few things next door that you can participate in while you eat your lunch. Even if it doesn’t help your digestion, it will help my digestion if you shop during that period.
许多人发现边吃边购物有助于消化。我们贴心地在隔壁安排了一些活动，您可以在吃午餐时参与。即使这对您的消化没有帮助，但如果您在这段时间购物，对我的消化会有帮助。
4. Buffett on what he won’t talk about
巴菲特谈他不愿谈论的话题
WARREN BUFFETT: During the question period, we can talk about anything that’s on your mind. Just, there’s 2 1/2 subjects that we can’t talk about.
沃伦·巴菲特：在提问环节中，我们可以谈论任何你们关心的话题。只是有两个半话题我们不能谈论。
We can’t talk about last year’s Nebraska football season. We’ll correct that next year. But that’s off limits.
我们不能谈论去年的内布拉斯加橄榄球赛季。我们会在明年纠正这一点。但这是禁区。
We can’t talk about what we’re buying and selling. I wish we were doing more of it, but we’re doing a little, and I’ll make reference to something on that a little later.
我们不能谈论我们正在买卖的东西。我希望我们能多做一些，但我们只做了一点，稍后我会提到这一点。
And finally, in connection with the investigation into the insurance industry practices that’s taking place, there are broad aspects of it we can talk about.
最后，关于正在进行的对保险行业惯例的调查，我们可以讨论其中的广泛方面。
I can’t talk about anything that I or other people associated with Berkshire have disclosed to the investigators.
我不能谈论我或与伯克希尔有关的其他人向调查人员披露的任何事情。
And there’s a very simple reason for that: to protect the integrity of any investigation like this, they do not, the investigators, do not want one witness talking with other witnesses, because people could tailor their stories or do various things.
这有一个非常简单的原因：为了保护此类调查的完整性，调查人员不希望一个证人与其他证人交谈，因为人们可能会修改他们的故事或做其他事情。
And so, witnesses are not supposed to talk to each other and, of course, if you talk — we don’t do that.
因此，证人不应该互相交谈，当然，如果你们交谈——我们不会那样做。
And then beyond that, if we were to talk in a public forum, that could be a way of signaling people as to what you’ve said and then they could adapt accordingly.
此外，如果我们在公开场合谈论这些事情，可能会成为向他人传递你所说内容的信号，然后他们会相应的调整。
So investigators, one thing they like to do, is they like to work fast if they can because they don’t want people collaborating on stories .
因此，调查人员喜欢做的一件事是，如果可以的话，他们喜欢快速工作，因为他们不希望人们串通编造故事。
And they — and to protect the integrity of the investigation, we won’t get into anything that’s specific to something that I or people associated with Berkshire may have told the authorities.
他们——为了保护调查的完整性，我们不会涉及我或与伯克希尔有关的人可能告诉当局的任何具体内容。
But there may be some broader questions that that we can talk about.
但我们可以讨论一些更广泛的问题。
5. Preliminary Q1 earnings
第一季度的初步收益
WARREN BUFFETT: I can give you a little preliminary view of the first quarter with certain caveats attached. These figures — our 10-K — or 10-Q — will be filed in the end of next week.
沃伦·巴菲特：我可以给你一个关于第一季度的初步看法，但需要附加一些注意事项。这些数据——我们的 10-K 或 10-Q——将在下周末提交。
And I caution you that, particularly in insurance underwriting, it’s been a better quarter than —considerably better quarter — than I would normally anticipate.
我提醒你，特别是在保险承保方面，这个季度比我通常预期的要好得多。
One of the reasons for that is that our business actually does have some — the insurance business has some — seasonal aspect.
其中一个原因是我们的业务确实有一些——保险业务有一些——季节性因素。
Now, it doesn’t have a seasonal aspect, particularly, at GEICO or at National Indemnity primary business.
现在，特别是在 GEICO 或 National Indemnity 的主要业务中，它没有季节性方面。
But when you get into writing catastrophe business, and we’re a big writer of catastrophe business, the third quarter — the biggest risk we write in big cat area is hurricanes. And those are concentrated — they’re actually concentrated in the month of September.
但是，当我们承保灾害业务时，而我们又是一个大型的灾害业务承保者，第三季度——我们在重大灾害领域承保的最大风险是飓风。这些飓风主要集中在九月份。
In this part of the world, 50 percent of the hurricanes, roughly, occur in September and about maybe 17 and-a-half percent in October and August, and the balance, maybe, in November and July.
在世界的这一部分，大约 50%的飓风发生在九月，大约 17.5%发生在十月和八月，其余的可能发生在十一月和七月。
But there’s a concentration in the third quarter. So when we write an earthquake — I mean when we write a hurricane policy, for example — we may be required to bring the earnings in monthly on the premiums. But all of the risk really occurs — or a very great percentage of it — late in the third quarter, and we don’t have any risk in the first quarter of hurricanes.
但是第三季度有一个集中。因此，当我们写地震——我的意思是当我们承保飓风保单时，例如——我们可能需要按月将保费收入计入收益。但实际上所有的风险——或者说很大一部分风险——都发生在第三季度末，而我们在第一季度没有任何飓风风险。
So we earn some premium during that quarter that really has no loss exposure. And then we get that in spades come September.
所以我们在这一季度赚取的保费实际上没有损失风险。然后到了九月，这些风险就会回归。
Even allowing for that we had an unusually good quarter. And I would still stick by the prediction I made in the annual report where I said that if we don’t have any really mega catastrophes, I think we’ve got a decent chance of our float costing us zero or less this year, which means, in effect, we have 45 billion or so of free money.
即便考虑到这一点，我们这个季度的表现也异常出色。我仍然坚持我在年度报告中所做的预测，我说过，如果我们没有遇到任何真正的大灾难，我认为我们有相当大的机会让我们的浮存金成本为零或更低，这实际上意味着我们有大约 450 亿的免费资金。
In the first quarter, our insurance underwriting income — and all of these figures are pretax — our insurance underwriting income came to almost $500 million, which was about 200 million better than a year ago.
在第一季度，我们的保险承保收入——所有这些数字都是税前的——我们的保险承保收入接近 5 亿美元，比去年增加了约 2 亿美元。
And GEICO had a very good quarter for growth. We added 245,000 policyholders, which is almost 4 percent, in one quarter to our base.
GEICO 本季度的增长非常好。我们增加了 245,000 名保单持有人，这几乎是我们基数的 4%。
We were helped very much by this huge reception we’re getting in New Jersey, because we weren’t in there a year ago, so we’re getting very good-sized gains there.
我们在新泽西受到的热烈欢迎对我们帮助很大，因为一年前我们还不在那里，所以我们在那里取得了相当大的进展。
We’re not getting 4 percent in a quarter from around the country, but the boost from New Jersey took us up to that.
我们在全国范围内的季度增长率没有达到 4%，但新泽西的推动使我们达到了这一水平。
And GEICO actually wrote at a 13 percent underwriting profit in the first quarter, which is considerably better than we expect over the full year. And we’ve reduced rates some places. And it’s been an extraordinary period for auto insurers, generally.
GEICO 实际上在第一季度实现了 13%的承保利润，这比我们对全年预期的要好得多。我们在一些地方降低了费率。总体而言，这对汽车保险公司来说是一个非同寻常的时期。
But all of our companies in the insurance business did well in the first quarter.
但我们所有的保险业务公司在第一季度表现良好。
Our investment income was up something over 100 million pretax.
我们的投资收入在税前增加了超过 1 亿。
Our finance business income was up, maybe, $50 million pretax. MidAmerican was about the same.
我们的金融业务收入可能增加了 5000 万美元税前。MidAmerican 大致相同。
And all of our other businesses, combined, were up about — close to $50 million pretax, led by Johns Manville, had the biggest increase. That businesses is very strong, currently.
我们所有其他业务合计增长了大约——接近 5000 万美元税前，由 Johns Manville 领头，增幅最大。该业务目前非常强劲。
So if you take all of our businesses before investment gains, which I want to explain, if you take them all before investment gains, our pretax earnings were up 400 million or a little more.
因此，如果你在投资收益之前考虑我们所有的业务，我想解释一下，如果你在投资收益之前考虑它们，我们的税前收益增加了 4 亿或更多。
Now, investment gains or losses: we don’t give a thought as to the timing of those. We take all investment actions based on what we think makes the most economic sense, and whether it results in a gain or a loss for quarter is just totally meaningless to us.
现在，投资收益或损失：我们不会考虑这些的时机。我们采取所有投资行动都是基于我们认为最有经济意义的事情，至于这是否导致季度收益或损失对我们来说完全没有意义。
A further complicating factor, slightly complicating factor, is that certain unrealized investment gains or losses go through the income statement, whereas others don’t. That’s just the way the accounting rules are.
另一个稍微复杂的因素是，某些未实现的投资收益或损失会通过损益表，而其他则不会。这就是会计规则的规定。
Our foreign exchange contracts are valued at market, really, every day, but you see it at quarter end.
我们的外汇合约实际上每天都按市场价值计算，但您会在季度末看到。
And those foreign exchange contracts, which total about 21 billion now, a little more than 21 billion, had a mark-to-market loss of a little over 300 million in the first quarter.
那些外汇合约总额约为 210 亿，现在略多于 210 亿，在第一季度的市值损失略高于 3 亿。
And they bob up and down. I mean, sometimes they bob as much as 200 million or more in a single day.
而且它们上下浮动。我的意思是，有时它们在一天之内波动多达两亿或更多。
And those mark-to-market quotations run through our profit and loss statement. Whereas if we own some Coca-Cola stock and it goes up or down, that does not run through our income statement. But with foreign exchange contracts, it does.
那些按市值计价的报价会反映在我们的损益表中。而如果我们持有一些可口可乐的股票，无论其价格上涨还是下跌，都不会反映在我们的损益表中。但外汇合约则会。
So there’s a $310 million mark- to-market — it shows as realized, it actually isn’t — investment loss on that.
所以有一个 3.1 亿美元的市值损失——它显示为已实现，但实际上并不是——在这项投资上。
And overall, the investment losses, including that 310, came to about 120. In other words, there was 190 million, or something like that, in other gains.
总体而言，包括那 310 在内的投资损失约为 120。换句话说，还有 1.9 亿左右的其他收益。
As I say, that means — at least to us — that means nothing.
正如我所说，这对我们来说——至少对我们来说——毫无意义。
And to underscore that point, if later in the year the Procter and Gamble-Gillette merger takes place, we are required under accounting rules, when we exchange our Gillette for Procter and Gamble stock, we are required under accounting rules to show that as a realized gain. Now that will show up as, probably, four-and-a-fraction billion dollars.
为了强调这一点，如果在今年晚些时候宝洁与吉列的合并发生，根据会计规则，当我们用吉列股票交换宝洁股票时，我们必须根据会计规则将其显示为已实现的收益。现在，这将显示为大约四十多亿美元。
We haven’t realized any gain at that time, in my view. I mean, we’ve just swapped our Gillette stock for Procter and Gamble stock, which we expect to hold for a very long time.
在我看来，那时我们并没有实现任何收益。我的意思是，我们只是将吉列的股票换成了宝洁的股票，而我们预计会长期持有这些股票。
So it’s no different, in our view, than if we’d kept our Gillette stock. But the accounting rules will require that.
所以在我们看来，这与我们保留吉列股票没有什么不同。但会计规则将要求这样做。
So if in the third quarter of this year the P&G-Gillette merger goes through, you will see this very large supposed capital gain recorded in our figures at that time.
因此，如果今年第三季度宝洁-吉列合并成功，你会在我们的数据中看到这一非常大的假定资本收益被记录下来。
And I want to assure you that it’s meaningless and you should ignore that as having any significance, in terms of Berkshire’s performance.
我想向你保证，这毫无意义，你应该忽略它对伯克希尔表现的任何重要性。
So, first quarter has gone by. We’ve got a good start on operating earnings this year. We won’t earn at the rate of the first quarter throughout the year, in my view. I think it would be very unlikely, in terms of operating earnings. But the businesses are performing, generally, very well.
所以，第一季度已经过去了。今年我们的运营收益有了一个良好的开端。在我看来，我们全年不会以第一季度的速度盈利。我认为，就运营收益而言，这种情况非常不可能。但总体而言，各项业务表现得非常好。
6. Insurance acquisition coming
保险收购即将到来
WARREN BUFFETT: One other thing I should mention, and then we’ll get on to the questions, that we can’t announce the name, because it isn’t quite complete in terms of the other party, but we will probably announce, very soon, an acquisition that is a little less — somewhat less — than a billion dollars, so it’s a huge deal, in reference to Berkshire’s size
沃伦·巴菲特：我还要提到一件事，然后我们会进入提问环节，我们不能宣布名字，因为在另一方方面还没有完全完成，但我们可能很快会宣布一项收购，金额略低于十亿美元，所以相对于伯克希尔的规模来说，这是一个大交易。
But it is in the insurance field. I mean, we love the insurance business. It’s been very good to us. We have some terrific managers in that field.
但这是在保险领域。我是说，我们热爱保险业务。它对我们非常有利。我们在这个领域有一些出色的经理。
You’ll see it in the first quarter figures, but you’ll also see how we feel about the business by the fact that this acquisition, which I would say is almost certain to go through, will probably get announced in the next few weeks.
您将在第一季度的数字中看到这一点，但您也会通过这一事实看到我们对业务的看法，即这项收购，我可以说几乎肯定会通过，可能会在接下来的几周内宣布。
We’re looking for bigger acquisitions. We would love to buy something that cost us 5 or $10 billion. Our check would clear, I assure you.
我们正在寻找更大的收购机会。我们希望购买一些花费我们 50 亿或 100 亿美元的东西。我们的支票会兑现，我向你保证。
I think we ended the quarter with about 44 billion of cash, not counting the cash in the finance operations. So, at the moment, we’ve got more money than brains and hope to do something about that.
我认为我们在本季度末拥有大约 440 亿现金，不包括金融业务中的现金。所以，目前我们有比智慧更多的钱，希望能对此有所作为。
7. Q&A begins
问答环节开始
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re going to go around the hall here. We’ve got 12 microphones and — get oriented here — and we’ll turn the spotlight on the microphone that is live.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们要在大厅里走一圈。我们有 12 个麦克风——在这里定位一下——我们会把聚光灯对准正在使用的麦克风。
People can line up to get their questions asked. I think we’ve got two microphones, also, in the overflow room.
人们可以排队提问。我想我们在分会场也有两个麦克风。
And like I say, after lunch everybody should come in here because there’s enough people that get so enthralled with shopping that they don’t return. They’d rather shop than listen to me and Charlie, and we’ll have plenty of seats for everybody in this main hall after lunch.
就像我说的，午饭后大家都应该到这里来，因为有很多人会被购物迷住，以至于不回来。他们宁愿购物也不愿听我和查理讲话，午饭后这个主厅会有足够的座位供大家使用。
And so, with that, let’s go to — have I forgotten anything, Charlie?
那么，就这样，我们去吧——我有没有忘记什么，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）
That may be the last you hear from him. You never can tell.
这可能是你最后一次听到他的消息。你永远无法预料。
8. What Buffett looks for in managers
巴菲特对管理者的要求是什么
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to microphone number 1, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到 1 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Simon Denison-Smith from London.
观众成员：来自伦敦的西蒙·丹尼森-史密斯。
You talk a lot about the importance of selecting terrific managers.
你经常谈论选择优秀经理的重要性。
I’d just like to understand what your three most important criteria are for selecting them, and how quickly you can assess that.
我只是想了解您选择它们的三个最重要标准是什么，以及您能多快评估这些标准。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’ll give you two different answers.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会给你两个不同的答案。
The most important factor, subject to this one caveat I’m going to give in a second, is a passion for their business.
最重要的因素是对他们业务的热情，不过我接下来要给出一个警告。
We are frequently buying businesses from people who we wish to have continue manage than them and where we are, in effect, monetizing a lifetime of work for them.
我们经常从那些我们希望继续管理的人那里购买业务，并且实际上是在为他们一生的工作变现。
I mean, they’ve built this business over the years. They’re already rich but they may not be rich in the liquid sense. They may have all their money, or a good bit of it, tied up in the business, so they’re monetizing it. They may be doing it for estate reasons or tax reasons or family reasons, whatever.
我的意思是，他们多年来建立了这个生意。他们已经很富有，但可能不是流动资金意义上的富有。他们可能把所有的钱，或者大部分的钱，都投入到了这个生意中，所以他们正在将其货币化。他们可能是出于遗产、税务或家庭等原因这样做。
But we really want to buy from somebody who doesn’t want to sell. And they certainly don’t want to leave the business.
但我们真的想从不想卖的人那里购买。而且他们当然不想离开这个行业。
So we are looking for people that have a passion that extends beyond their paycheck every week or every month for their business.
所以我们在寻找那些对他们的业务有超越每周或每月薪水的热情的人。
Because if we hand somebody a hundred million or a billion dollars for their business, they have no financial need to work. They have to want to work. And we can’t stand there with a whip. We don’t have any contracts at Berkshire. They don’t work, as far as I’m concerned.
因为如果我们给某人一亿或十亿美元用于他们的生意，他们在经济上就没有工作的需要。他们必须想要工作。而我们不能站在那里拿着鞭子。在伯克希尔，我们没有任何合同。据我所知，它们不起作用。
乔布斯持相同的观点。
So we hope that they love their business and then we do everything possible to avoid extinguishing, or in any way dampening, that love.
所以我们希望他们热爱自己的事业，然后我们尽一切可能避免熄灭或以任何方式削弱这种热爱。
I tell students that what we’re looking for when we hire somebody, beyond this passion, we’re looking for intelligence. We’re looking for energy. And we’re looking for integrity.
我告诉学生，当我们雇用某人时，除了这种热情，我们还在寻找智慧。我们在寻找活力。我们在寻找正直。
And we tell them, if they don’t have the last, the first two will kill you.
我们告诉他们，如果没有最后一个，前两个会杀了你。
Because if you hire somebody without integrity, you really want them to be dumb and lazy, don’t you? I mean, the last thing in the world you want is that they are smart energetic. So we look for those qualities.
因为如果你雇佣一个没有诚信的人，你真的希望他们又笨又懒，不是吗？我的意思是，你最不希望的就是他们聪明又有活力。所以我们寻找这些品质。
But, we have generally — when we buy businesses, it’s clear to us that those businesses are coming with managers with those qualities in them. Then we need to look into their eyes and say, do they love the money or do they love the business?
但是，我们通常——当我们收购企业时，我们很清楚这些企业是由具备这些素质的管理者来经营的。然后我们需要看着他们的眼睛，问他们是爱钱还是爱这个企业？
And if they love — there’s nothing wrong with liking the money. But if — what it’s really all about is that they built this business so they can sell out and cash their chips and go someplace else, we have a problem, because right now we only have 16 people at headquarters and we don’t have anybody to go out and run those businesses.
如果他们喜欢——喜欢钱没有错。但是如果——他们建立这个企业的真正目的就是为了套现然后去别的地方，那我们就有问题了，因为现在我们总部只有 16 个人，没有人可以出去管理这些业务。
So we — it’s necessary that they have this passion and then it’s necessary that we do nothing to, in effect, dampen that passion. Charlie?
所以我们——他们必须有这种热情，然后我们必须不做任何事情来抑制这种热情。查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The interesting thing is how well it’s worked over a great many decades and how few people copy it. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：是的。有趣的是，这种方法在许多几十年里都运作得很好，但很少有人去模仿它。（笑声和掌声）
9. Buffett on beer industry and its history
巴菲特谈啤酒行业及其历史
WARREN BUFFETT: Go to microphone 2, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到麦克风 2。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Charlie. My name is Walter Chang and I’m from Houston, Texas.
观众成员：早上好，沃伦和查理。我的名字是沃尔特·张，我来自德克萨斯州休斯顿。
Can you describe how you made your investment decision to invest in Anheuser-Busch and how you estimated its intrinsic value? How long did it take you to make this decision?
你能描述一下你是如何做出投资安海斯-布希的决定的吗？你是如何估算其内在价值的？你花了多长时间做出这个决定？
And is Budweiser inevitable, like Coca-Cola?
此外，百威（Budweiser）是否是必然的，像可口可乐（Coca-Cola）一样？
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m still drinking Coca-Cola.
沃伦·巴菲特：我仍然在喝可口可乐。
The meeting might get a little exciting if I we were drinking Bud here. (Laughter)
如果我们在这里喝百威，会议可能会变得有点刺激。（笑声）
We don’t get into much in the way of description of things we might be buying or selling, but the decision takes about two seconds.
我们不会详细描述我们可能要买卖的东西，但决策只需大约两秒钟。
But I bought 100 shares of Anheuser about — I haven’t looked it up — but I would say, maybe, 25 years ago when I bought 100 shares of a whole lot of other things .
但是我大约在——我没有查过——但我想，大概是在 25 年前买了安海斯的 100 股，当时我还买了很多其他东西的 100 股。
And I do that so I can get the reports promptly and directly. You can get them to your brokerage firm, but I’ve found that it’s a little more reliable to put the stock in a direct name.
我这样做是为了能及时直接收到报告。您可以让它们送到您的经纪公司，但我发现把股票直接登记在自己名下更可靠。
So I’ve been reading the reports for at least 25 years and I observe, just generally, consumer habits, and at a point — currently, the beer industry sales are very flat.
所以我已经阅读这些报告至少 25 年了，我观察到，消费者习惯总体上，在某个时刻——目前，啤酒行业的销售非常平稳。
Wine and spirits have gained in that general category at the expense of beer. So if you look at the industry figures, they’re not going anywhere.
葡萄酒和烈酒在这个大类中取得了增长，而啤酒则遭遇了损失。因此，如果您查看行业数据，它们没有明显的增长。
Miller’s has been rejuvenated to some degree. So Anheuser, which has had a string of earnings gains that have been quite substantial over the years and market share gains, is experiencing, as they’ve described — and they just had a conference call the other day — is experiencing very flat earnings, having to spend more money to maintain share, in some cases, having promotional pricing.
米勒（Miller）在某种程度上已被复兴。因此，安海斯-布希多年来一直有可观的盈利增长和市场份额增长，但根据他们所描述的情况——他们最近进行了电话会议——安海斯-布希的盈利正在经历平稳的局面，必须花费更多资金来维持市场份额，有时甚至要进行促销定价。。
So they are going through a period that is certainly less fun for them than was the case a few years ago.
所以他们正在经历一个时期，这段时期对他们来说肯定不如几年前那么有趣。
And it’s a fairly easy-to-understand product and consumer behavior is fairly easy to understand. It’s a very, very — exceptionally strong business.
这是一个相当容易理解的产品，消费者行为也相当容易理解。这是一个非常非常——极其强大的业务。
In fact, what’s happened in the beer industry over the last 50 years has been fascinating to me and to Charlie because this is a brewing town that we grew up in, and Charlie knew the members of the Storz family, a number of them, well.
事实上，过去50年间啤酒行业发生的变化让我和查理感到很有趣，因为这是我们成长的酿酒城镇，查理还认识斯托兹家族的几位成员。
Storz had over 50 percent of the Omaha market in beer post-World War II and then basically disappeared as the national brands took over. So it’s an interesting phenomenon.
斯托兹在二战后曾占据奥马哈市场超过50%的份额，但后来随着全国品牌的崛起而基本消失。这是一个有趣的现象。
Beer business is not going to grow significantly in the U.S.
啤酒业务在美国不会显著增长。
Worldwide, beer is popular in a great many places, and Anheuser will have a very strong position in it. But I would not expect the earnings to do much for some time, but that’s fine with us.
在全球范围内，啤酒在许多地方都很受欢迎，而安海斯将占据非常强势的地位。但我不指望短期内收益会有太大变化，不过这对我们来说没问题。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. At our scale of operation now, if we’re ever going to buy into a terribly well-regarded company, we almost need a little patch of unpleasantness. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的。以我们现在的运营规模，如果我们要投资一家备受推崇的公司，我们几乎需要一点不愉快的情况。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s been the best time to buy Berkshire, incidentally, too. I mean, we do —
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，那也是购买伯克希尔的最佳时机。我是说，我们确实——
What we’re looking for is businesses with a durable competitive advantage. I don’t think there’s any question that Anheuser has a very, very strong consumer position. Now, as I said, Miller has been rejuvenated to some degree.
我们寻找的是具有持久竞争优势的企业。我认为毫无疑问，安海斯有着非常非常强大的消费者地位。正如我所说，米勒在某种程度上已经焕发了活力。
But the other thing about it is, of course, in beer you do not see the prevalence of private labels or generic products that you see in a great many consumer products that are being — that had strong positions over the years, that are being attacked . That’s a small plus.
但另一方面，当然，在啤酒中你不会看到像许多消费者产品中那样普遍存在的自有品牌或通用产品，这些产品多年来一直占据强势地位，但现在正受到攻击。这是一个小小的优势。
But beer consumption per capita is going no place. And there’s nothing that will change that.
但人均啤酒消费量没有变化。而且没有什么能改变这一点。
Interestingly enough, the average person in this climate drinks about 64 ounces of liquid a year. And I think it’s roughly 27 percent of that will be carbonated soft drinks.
有趣的是，在这种气候下，普通人每年大约喝 64 盎司的液体。我认为其中大约 27%是碳酸软饮料。
So almost — and, of course, of that Coca-Cola will be about — Coca-Cola products — will be 40-odd percent.
所以几乎——当然，其中可口可乐将占——可口可乐产品——将占 40%左右。
So, of the 64 ounces of liquid that Americans are drinking every day, you can figure something like 11 ounces of that, man, woman, and child, will be a Coca-Cola product.
所以，在美国人每天饮用的 64 盎司液体中，可以估计其中大约 11 盎司，无论男女老少，都是可口可乐产品。
Beer, as I remember — I could be wrong on this — but I think beer is about 10 percent of all liquids. So, one out of every 10 ounces that’s consumed by Americans of any kind of liquid is, I believe, is beer.
据我记得，啤酒——我可能记错了——但我认为啤酒大约占所有液体的 10%。所以，我相信，美国人消费的每 10 盎司液体中，就有 1 盎司是啤酒。
Coffee, incidentally, despite what you read about — you know, the popularity of Starbucks, which is very real, of course, — but coffee has just gone down and down and down over the last 30 or 40 years.
顺便说一下，尽管你读到的关于星巴克的流行——这当然是非常真实的——但在过去的 30 或 40 年里，咖啡的受欢迎程度一直在下降。
Charlie, you have any thoughts about your consumption habits? That you can talk about? (Laughter)
查理，你对自己的消费习惯有什么看法吗？可以谈谈吗？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there are people here that may remember Metz beer.
查理·芒格：嗯，这里可能有人记得Metz啤酒。
In this country, we had more breweries — there were hundreds — and small places would have two or three brands. And this trend toward concentration into a few giants is, I think, permanent.
在这个国家，我们曾经有更多的啤酒厂——有数百家——小地方会有两三个品牌。而这种向少数巨头集中的趋势，我认为是永久的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. Schlitz was number one, as I remember, after World War II, for a while. I think Anheuser was number four at that time.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。据我记得，二战后，施利茨曾一度是第一。我想那时安海斯排在第四位。
There’s an interesting book, if you’re a beer enthusiast, it came out a few years — a few months — ago, maybe a little longer than that, by a Wall Street Journal reporter that sort of toured the country sampling beers. I don’t know how it affected his writing. But it’s a pretty good book, if you like reading about the history of beer.
如果你是啤酒爱好者，有一本有趣的书，它是几年前——几个月前——出版的，也许比那更久一点，是由一位《华尔街日报》的记者写的，他走遍全国品尝啤酒。我不知道这对他的写作有什么影响。但如果你喜欢阅读啤酒的历史，这本书相当不错。
10. Competition from hedge funds
对冲基金的竞争
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 3 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Greetings from Bonn, Germany. I’m (inaudible). Thank you for another great year added to your track record of investing. And thank you again for allowing us to be partners at these favorable terms.
观众成员：来自德国波恩的问候。我是（听不清）。感谢你们为你们的投资记录又增添了一个伟大的年份。再次感谢你们以这样有利的条件允许我们成为合作伙伴。
This year, I want to ask you another question about how you see Berkshire positioned versus others.
今年，我想问你们另一个问题，关于你们如何看待伯克希尔在当前环境中的定位。
Last year, I asked you how you see the increased competition for buying companies through the rise of the private equity industry and how that affects Berkshire’s ability to buy great businesses at fair prices, and you basically said that there are still enough business owners who would rather sell to Berkshire versus a private equity fund.
去年，我问过您，随着私募股权行业的兴起，您如何看待收购公司竞争的加剧，以及这如何影响伯克希尔以合理价格收购优秀企业的能力，您基本上说仍然有足够多的企业主更愿意将公司出售给伯克希尔，而不是私募股权基金。
This year, I would like to hear your views on the hedge fund industry.
今年，我想听听您对对冲基金行业的看法。
We see hedge funds going into all investment strategies. We know that you have spoken about the fees of the hedge fund industries, but I would like to hear from you how you see Berkshire positioned.
我们看到对冲基金进入所有投资策略。我们知道您曾谈论过对冲基金行业的费用，但我想听听您对伯克希尔定位的看法。
Are returns in strategies like merger arbitrage, like convertible bonds — are returns going down because of the increased competition? And are there other factors where Berkshire can be unique versus the hedge funds?
像并购套利、可转换债券这样的策略中的回报是否因为竞争加剧而下降？还有其他因素使伯克希尔能够与对冲基金不同吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a great question. It’s the $64 question.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。这是价值 64 美元的问题。
There’s no doubt about it that there is far more money looking at deals now than five years ago, and they’re willing to pay out more for the good, but mundane, businesses that we’ve been successful at buying in the past.
现在有比五年前更多的资金在寻找交易，并且他们愿意为一些优秀但平庸的公司支付比我们过去曾成功购买的价格更高的价格。
And you mentioned the private equity firms and they’re bigger than ever.
你提到了私募股权公司，它们比以往任何时候都更大。
The hedge funds have gotten into the game, to some degree. And if someone is auctioning off a business today — this has changed just very slightly in the last four or five weeks because of some change in the junk bond market, but not in any significant degree — there were people lined up to bid on almost anything.
对冲基金在某种程度上已经参与其中。如果今天有人拍卖一项业务——由于垃圾债券市场的一些变化，这在过去四五周内略有变化，但没有显著程度的变化——几乎任何东西都有排队竞标的人。
In fact, you have private equity firms selling their businesses to other private equity firms.
事实上，你有私募股权公司将他们的业务出售给其他私募股权公司。
And there are a lot of companies that are being sold, that are being sold to someone who’s buying them to resell in a fairly short period of time.
有很多公司正在被出售，这些公司被卖给那些在相对较短时间内买来转售的人。
We can’t compete in that field and that’s, you know, that’s a source of distress to us. But that’s the way it is.
我们无法在那个领域竞争，你知道，这对我们来说是一个痛苦的来源。但事情就是这样。
We will — it won’t go on forever, in our view. We still occasionally, as this deal I mentioned to you, the party on the other side and we just — we made a deal that did not go through an auction process. And we see that occasionally, but we don’t see it anything like we saw it four or five years ago.
我们认为，这不会永远持续下去。我们仍然偶尔会遇到这种情况，就像我提到的这个交易，对方和我们只是——我们达成了一个没有经过拍卖过程的交易。我们偶尔会看到这种情况，但不像四五年前那样频繁。
So, in terms of the near-term outlook for Berkshire, in terms of doing what it’s important that we do, do successfully, which is buy businesses and keep adding to this collection, we are not positioned favorably at all for that.
因此，就伯克希尔的短期前景而言，在成功完成我们认为重要的任务方面，即购买企业并不断增加这一系列，我们在这方面的定位并不理想。
And we do find it extraordinary, both Charlie and I have over the decades, just how fast things can change.
我们确实觉得这很不寻常，几十年来，查理和我都发现事情变化得有多快。
There have been at least three times, maybe more, where it’s looked to me in my own career, where it looked like there was so much money sloshing around that it would be impossible to do intelligent things with money.
至少有三次，也许更多，我在自己的职业生涯中认为，市面上有太多资金涌动，几乎不可能用资金做出明智的决策。
And I actually terminated a partnership back at the end of 1969 because I felt that that the money was coming out, you know, of the woodwork. There were all kinds of people that wanted to use it and compete, and I just didn’t feel we could do intelligent things.
实际上，我在 1969 年底终止了一个合伙关系，因为我觉得钱就像从木头缝里冒出来一样。有各种各样的人想要利用它并进行竞争，而我只是觉得我们无法做出明智的决策。
Within four years, I saw the greatest opportunities that I’ve ever seen in my lifetime. And we’ve had several experiences like that.
在四年内，我看到了我一生中见过的最大机遇。我们也有过几次类似的经历。
You know, in 1998, when Long-Term Capital Management got in trouble in the fall of 1998 and other things were happening, you had incredible opportunities available in the investment world.
你知道，在 1998 年，当长期资本管理公司在 1998 年秋季遇到麻烦时，还有其他事情发生，你在投资界有着难以置信的机会。
Now, people were just as smart then. They had all these people with 150 IQs running around, and they actually had money. But the world became paralyzed for a short period.
现在，人们当时也一样聪明。他们中有很多人智商达到 150，而且他们实际上有钱。但世界在短时间内陷入了瘫痪。
And you literally had so-called “on- the-run” Governments, which were the most recent issue, and “off-the-run” Governments, which were issued by the same government, the United States government, payable in dollars. You had a 30-basis point differential between the 30-year and the 29-and-a-half year.
你实际上有所谓的“在发行”政府债券，这是最近发行的，还有“非在发行”政府债券，这些都是由同一个政府，即美国政府发行的，以美元支付。30 年期和 29 年半期之间有 30 个基点的差异。
Both bonds issued by the U.S. government, you know, one a half-year shorter. Both quite liquid, but the “on-the-run” being more liquid. And a 30-basis point differential in yield means about a three-point difference in price.
两种由美国政府发行的债券，你知道，其中一种期限短半年。两者都有相当的流动性，但“在运行中”的更具流动性。收益率相差 30 个基点意味着价格相差约三个点。
Well, you wouldn’t believe that could happen in the United States of America in 1998, but it did happen.
好吧，你不会相信这会在 1998 年的美国发生，但它确实发生了。
And I think I have a slide here. Mark, if it — if we can put that up — that shows what high-yield bonds —the situation in those, just really less than three years ago.
我想我这里有一张幻灯片。马克，如果可以的话——我们可以放上去——展示高收益债券的情况，就在不到三年前。
In the fall of — yeah, there it is —I n the fall of 19 — in the fall of 2002, you had all these high IQ people in the financial world. You had lots of money.
对，就是那张。在2002年秋天，你有这么多高智商的金融界人士，有大量资金。
And I don’t know how easy it is to read those figures, but you’ll see that a bunch of high-yield bonds — this actually is a table that involves a friend of mine, but we were doing pretty much the same thing.
我不知道这些数字有多容易阅读，但你会看到一堆高收益债券——这实际上是一个涉及我朋友的表格，但我们基本上在做同样的事情。
And you can see that he was buying bonds at anywhere from a 25 percent to 60 or 70 percent yield basis, and within 12 or 14 months had sold these same bonds on a 6 percent yield basis.
你可以看到他购买这些债券时的收益率在25％到60％或70％之间，并且在12到14个月内以6％的收益率卖出这些债券。
You don’t need to do that very many times in a lifetime.
你一生中不需要做很多次这样的交易。
But that was two-and-a-half years ago after all these people had graduated with MBAs, and studied modern finance theory, and had money coming out of their ears, and all had a desire to make money, and yet conditions like that could exist.
但那毕竟是两年半前的事了，那时这些人都已经拿到了 MBA 学位，学习了现代金融理论，钱多得花不完，并且都渴望赚钱，然而这样的情况仍然存在。
We bought about seven billion of junk bonds during that period, because it was a fairly short period.
在那段时间里，我们购买了大约七十亿的垃圾债券，因为那段时间相当短。
But things do happen that change the landscape dramatically, I mean really dramatically, in financial markets from time to time.
但确实会有一些事情发生，从而在某些时候极大地改变金融市场的格局，我是说真的非常剧烈地改变。
But right now, we are positioned very badly in terms of buying businesses, and it’s a big negative.
但目前，在收购企业方面，我们的处境非常不利，这是一个很大的负面因素。
And your Berkshire stock will not do as well under these conditions as it would do if the conditions of five years ago or 20 years ago existed.
在这些条件下，你的伯克希尔股票表现不会像五年前或二十年前的条件下那样好。
And I don’t have any magic solution for that except just to tell you what the facts are.
我对此没有任何神奇的解决方案，只能告诉你事实。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. A lot of the buying by private equity funds in both real estate and stocks, and for companies, is fee-motivated.
查理·芒格：是的。私募股权基金在房地产、股票和公司中的大量购买都是以费用为动机的。
In other words, the investment manager will rationalize any price paid because he likes the extra fees for managing the extra assets.
换句话说，投资经理会为所支付的任何价格找到合理化的借口，因为他喜欢管理更多资产所带来的额外费用。
I have a friend that tried to buy warehouses with a lot of family money and he just stopped. Whatever he bid was always topped by some professional manager, managing other people’s money on a fee basis.
我有一个朋友试图用很多家族资金购买仓库，但他刚刚停止了。无论他出价多少，总是被一些专业经理超越，这些经理以收费的方式管理他人的资金。
So this is a very peculiar era where all these asset classes have been driven to very high valuations, by all historical standards.
所以这是一个非常特殊的时代，所有这些资产类别的估值都被推到了非常高的水平，按照所有历史标准来看。
Some investment operations are very ethical in this (inaubible).
某些投资操作在这方面是非常合乎道德的（听不清）。
I think Howard Marks is here today. He sent a lot of money back, and stopped soliciting money from his clients in certain activities where the opportunities went away.
我想霍华德·马克斯今天可能也在这里。他在机会消失时把很多钱还给了客户，并停止向客户募集资金。
That’s the right way to behave, but it’s not normal.
这才是正确的行为方式，但并不常见。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think he’ll mind — I didn’t know Howard was here today — but those actually are Howard’s figures for one of his funds.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想他不会介意——我不知道霍华德今天在这里——但那些实际上是霍华德的一个基金的数据。
And like I say, we were doing similar things. We didn’t know it at the time but we found out we had some similar positions later on.
就像我说的，我们在做类似的事情。我们当时不知道，但后来发现我们有一些相似的立场。
About five or six years ago, when the terms of these deals were somewhat different, I actually had a fellow call me, whose name most of you would recognize, and he started asking me questions about the reinsurance business because he was in — he said he was thinking about buying a given company, which got sold, and he didn’t really know much about the business, but that unless he spent these x dollars, he was going to have to give it back to his investors in a few months because the term of the initial sign up period expired at that point, and any unexpended funds were to be returned.
大约五六年前，当这些交易的条款有所不同时，我确实接到了一位先生的电话，他的名字大多数人都会认出来，他开始问我关于再保险业务的问题，因为他说他正在考虑购买一家被出售的公司，而他对这个业务并不太了解，但如果他不花掉这些钱，他就必须在几个月后将其退还给投资者，因为初始签约期在那时到期，任何未使用的资金都将被退还。
And he was going to get 2 percent a year on those funds regardless of how they did. So he was looking at businesses that he didn’t understand with the hope that he can place the money.
他每年将从这些资金中获得 2%的收益，无论它们的表现如何。因此，他在研究自己不理解的业务，希望能投资这些资金。
Charlie and I are at a disadvantage in buying businesses because we have almost all of our net worth in the downside as well as the upside.
查理和我在购买业务时处于劣势，因为我们几乎把所有净资产都投入其中，承担着亏损的风险。
You know, if we had a 2 percent fee and 20 percent of the profits and a goodbye kiss for the losses, you know, that’s a different equation than exists at Berkshire.
你知道，如果我们有 2%的费用和 20%的利润分成，并且对损失说再见，你知道，那就是一个与伯克希尔不同的方程式。
We run it as if it’s 100 percent our money, which it is close to 100 percent of our net worth.
我们把它当作是100％我们自己的钱来管理，这几乎是我们净资产的100％。
And we will own the downside. And we don’t get paid for spending the money, we get paid for making money.
我们将承担损失。我们不是因为花钱而得到报酬，而是因为赚钱而得到报酬。
And it’s tough — competing right now is tough and likely to be relatively futile, although we have one or two things that could happen that could involve the expenditure of real money.
在这种情况下，竞争是非常困难的，而且可能没有什么成效，尽管我们有一两项交易可能会涉及到大笔资金的支出。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think any of the businesses that have sold to us over the years, which are run by the kind of people we like being associated with, would have wanted to sell to a hedge fund.
查理·芒格：我不认为那些多年来将公司卖给我们的人，会愿意把公司卖给对冲基金。
So there exists a class of assets out there that doesn’t want to deal with hedge funds or private equity funds.
所以市场上确实存在一些资产，它们不愿意与对冲基金或私募股权基金打交道。
Thank God. (Laughter) 谢天谢地。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve seen no deal anybody else has made the last year that we wish we had made.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们没有看到过去一年中有任何其他人达成的交易是我们希望达成的。
Now that was not the case 15 or 20 years ago when there used to be plenty of deals made with other people that we would have liked to have made if they’d come to us .
现在情况不同了，15 或 20 年前，曾经有很多交易是与其他人达成的，如果他们来找我们，我们也很想达成这些交易。
But I have seen nothing that — I’ve seen nothing that if it sold for 10 percent less than the advertised price that we would have had any interest in buying. So we are in a different world right now.
但是我没有看到任何东西——我没有看到任何东西，即使它的售价比广告价格低 10%我们会有兴趣购买。所以我们现在处于一个不同的世界。
11. Buffett’s early interest in stocks
巴菲特对股票的早期兴趣
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Dudley Shorter (PH) from Council Bluffs, Iowa.
观众成员：我是来自爱荷华州康瑟尔布拉夫斯的达德利·肖特（音）。
When you were younger, what first sparked your interest in investing, and what advice would you give a younger person if they wanted to invest in the stock market? Thank you.
当你年轻的时候，是什么首先激发了你对投资的兴趣？如果有年轻人想投资股市，你会给他们什么建议？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m not exactly — I got interested probably when I was, maybe, seven or thereabouts. I wasted my time before that. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不太确定——我大概是在七岁左右的时候开始感兴趣的。在那之前我浪费了时间。（笑声）
It’s a little like W.C. Fields. When he inherited some money, somebody asked him what he did with it and he said he spent half of it on whiskey and the rest he wasted. (Laughter)
这有点像 W.C.菲尔兹。当他继承了一些钱时，有人问他怎么处理这些钱，他说他把一半花在了威士忌上，剩下的都浪费了。（笑声）
So there I was, dawdling around. But I got — my dad [Howard H. Buffett] was in the business, so I would go down to his office, and I would see these interesting books, and I would read them and I would go down — he was on the fourth floor of what’s now known as the Omaha Building at 17th and Farnam, and on the second floor was Harris Supplement Company, and they had a board, and I would go down there.
所以我在那里闲逛。但我有——我爸爸 [霍华德·H·巴菲特] 在这个行业，所以我会去他的办公室，我会看到这些有趣的书，我会读它们，然后我会下去——他在现在被称为奥马哈大厦的四楼，位于第 17 街和法纳姆街的交界处，二楼是Harris Supplement Company，他们有一个公告板，我会去那里。
The market was open on Saturdays in those days, so I could — for two hours — so I could go down on Saturday, and I saw all these interesting things going across the tape.
那时候市场在星期六是开放的，所以我可以——两个小时——所以我可以在星期六去，我看到所有这些有趣的事情在屏幕上滚动。
And I just read a lot. I probably took every book in the Omaha Public Library, every book they had on investing — or the stock market — basically.
我只是读了很多书。我可能把奥马哈公共图书馆里的每一本书都借来读了，所有关于投资或股票市场的书，基本上都是这样。
I was very interested in the New York Stock Exchange. I thought maybe I’d want to become a specialist when I grew up and maybe I still will.
我对纽约证券交易所非常感兴趣。我想也许我长大后想成为一名专家，也许我仍然会。
But the — I took all the books out. I read them. And finally, when I was 11, I bought three shares of stock and I didn’t know — I was fascinated by the subject.
但是——我把所有的书都拿出来了。我读了它们。最后，当我 11 岁时，我买了三股股票，我不知道——我对这个主题很着迷。
My dad got elected to Congress, so now the library became even bigger, and I took all the books I could out of there on markets. And I used a chart and do all that sort of thing.
我爸爸当选为国会议员，所以现在图书馆变得更大了，我从那里借了所有关于市场的书。我还用了一张图表，做了所有那类事情。
And then, finally, I read [Benjamin] Graham’s book when I was at the University of Nebraska, “The Intelligent Investor,” when I was 19, and that just changed my whole framework.
然后，最后，当我 19 岁在内布拉斯加大学时，我读了[本杰明]格雷厄姆的书《聪明的投资者》，这彻底改变了我的整个框架。
But the advice I would give is to read everything in sight.
但我会给出的建议是阅读视线范围内的一切。
And to start very young. It’s a huge advantage in almost any field to start young.
要从很小的时候开始。在几乎任何领域，年轻时开始都是一个巨大的优势。
If that’s where your interest lies, and you start young, and you read a lot, you’re going to you’re going to do well.
如果那是你的兴趣所在，并且你从小就开始，并且你读很多书，你会做得很好。
I mean there are no secrets in this business that only the priesthood knows. I mean, you know, we do not go into temples and look at tablets that are only available to those who have passed earlier tests or anything.
我的意思是，这个行业里没有只有神职人员知道的秘密。我的意思是，你知道，我们不会进入庙宇查看只有通过早期测试的人才能看到的石板或其他东西。
It’s all out there in black and white. It’s a simple business.
一切都清清楚楚。这是一个简单的生意。
It’s not — it requires qualities of temperament way more than it requires qualities of intellect. I mean, if you’ve got more than 125 IQ, you can throw away the rest of the points or give them to your other members of the family or do something because you don’t need it in investing.
这不是——它需要的更多是性格特质，而不是智力特质。我的意思是，如果你的智商超过 125，你可以把剩下的分数扔掉，或者分给你的其他家庭成员，或者做点别的，因为在投资中你不需要它。
But you do need a certain temperament that enables you to think for yourself. And then you have to develop a framework — and I developed it from reading Ben Graham, I didn’t come up with it myself — very simple framework.
但你确实需要一种能够让你独立思考的性格。然后你必须建立一个框架——我从阅读本·格雷厄姆的书中发展了这个框架，我自己并没有想出来——一个非常简单的框架。
And then you have to look for opportunities that fit within that framework as you go through life, and you can’t do something every day. You know, you can learn every day, but you can’t act every day.
然后你必须在生活中寻找适合该框架的机会，而不是每天都能做些什么。你知道，你可以每天学习，但不能每天都采取行动。
And I talked about reading the annual reports of Anheuser-Busch for 25 years, but I’ve read the reports of Coca-Cola and Gillette and all kinds of companies long before we invested in them.
我谈到了阅读安海斯-布希公司 25 年的年度报告，但在我们投资之前，我早就阅读了可口可乐、吉列和各种公司的报告。
And if you enjoy the game, you know, you’ll find that like playing bridge or playing baseball or whatever, if you don’t enjoy it you probably won’t do well on it.
如果你喜欢这个游戏，你会发现就像打桥牌或打棒球或其他一样，如果你不喜欢它，你可能就不会玩得好。
But I would advise you to start early. Read everything in sight. Look for the successful framework that’s been successful for people, and there’s nothing like Graham’s, in my view, and you’ll have a lot of fun and you’ll probably make a lot of money.
但我建议你早点开始。阅读所有能看到的东西。寻找那些对人们成功的框架，在我看来，没有什么比格雷厄姆的更好，你会很开心，而且可能会赚很多钱。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m at a little disadvantage here. Warren has made himself into kind of a dean of investors, starting as a boy, and he has a greater respect for the process than I do.
查理·芒格：嗯，在这里我有点劣势。沃伦从小时候就开始，他已经让自己成为了投资领域的某种“领袖”，对这个过程有着很高的敬意。
I have a good bit of [economist John Maynard] Keynes’ attitude that money management is sort of a low calling, compared to being a surgeon or a lot of other things.
我有点像【经济学家约翰·梅纳德】凯恩斯那样的态度，认为与做外科医生或很多其他职业相比，资金管理算是一种较低的职业。
12. CEOs should know more about investing
首席执行官应更多了解投资
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the corporate types — the corporate managers — ought to study investing better because they’d be better managers.
查理·芒格：我认为企业管理者应该更好地学习投资，因为这样他们会成为更好的管理者。
And I think that everyone who thinks through the investment process learns more about how the world really works. And I think that’s very worth having.
我认为，每个认真思考投资过程的人都会更多地了解世界的实际运作方式。我认为这非常值得。
But I do not like as big a percentage of GDP as we now have going to money management and its attendant frictions.
但我不喜欢我们现在有如此大比例的GDP用于理财管理及其伴随的摩擦成本。
And I don’t like the percentage of the nation’s brainpower that is now in all of these different forms of highly-compensated money management.
我也不喜欢国家的脑力资源有这么大一部分都投入到这些形式繁多、收入极高的理财管理中。
I don’t think it’s a good thing for the country, and I hate the fact that we’ve contributed to it by our own predilections.
我认为这对国家不是一件好事，我讨厌我们因为自己的偏好而对此有所贡献。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is only sitting up here next to me as part of his outreach program, actually. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理坐在我旁边实际上是他外联计划的一部分。（笑声）
Please don’t take any pictures that you could blackmail him with, being associated with me.
请不要拍任何可以用来敲诈他的照片，表现他与我联系在一起。
Charlie made a very good point there about how managers would do better if they understood investments.
查理提出了一个非常好的观点，即如果经理们了解投资，他们会做得更好。
I find it absolutely fascinating, and I’ve seen this throughout my life, I’ve seen it close up.
我觉得这绝对令人着迷，而且我一生中都见过这种情况，我近距离见过。
I will have friends who are CEOs of companies and they’ll have somebody else handle their money.
我会有一些朋友是公司的首席执行官，他们会让其他人管理他们的钱。
If you say to them, you know, should you buy Coca-Cola or Gillette or something like that, they’ll say that’s much too tough. I don’t understand that sort of thing. What do I know about investing?
如果你问他们，你知道，应该买可口可乐还是吉列或类似的东西，他们会说那太难了。我不懂那种东西。我对投资了解多少呢？
And then some investment banker walks in the next day with the idea they buy a $3 billion company, which is just buying a lot of shares of stock in one company, and they’ll run through some little two-hour presentation and turn it over to a strategic planning group and think that they are then the ones that should make that decision as to whether to buy multibillion-dollar businesses when they really don’t feel they’re qualified to make $10,000 decisions with their own money.
然后，第二天有个投资银行家走进来，提出他们要收购一家价值 30 亿美元的公司，这实际上就是购买一家公司的大量股票，他们会进行一个小型的两小时演示，然后交给战略规划小组，并认为他们应该决定是否购买数十亿美元的企业，而实际上他们并不觉得自己有资格用自己的钱做出 1 万美元的决定。
And it’s extraordinary what you see in corporate America and the acquisition activity.
在美国企业界及其收购活动中，你会看到一些非同寻常的事情。
It’s a little like they say about making sausage and making laws, it’s better unobserved.
这有点像他们说的制作香肠和制定法律一样，最好不要亲眼目睹。
Charlie, you have any further thoughts on that? You’ve seen a lot of it with me. (Laughs)
查理，你对此有进一步的想法吗？你和我一起见过很多。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think that the present era has no comparable precedent in the past history of capitalism.
查理·芒格：嗯，我确实认为当前时代在资本主义的历史上没有可比的先例。
I think we have a higher percentage of the attention of our intelligent classes into buying little pieces of paper and getting — trying to get rich doing it, and in promotional activities with big profit sharing fees.
我认为我们有更高比例的聪明人把注意力放在购买小纸片上，并试图通过这样做致富，以及参与带有高额利润分成费用的促销活动。
I can recall no past era which had a similar concentration of this type of activity. Can you, Warren?
我回想不起有哪个过去的时代，曾有过如此集中于这种活动的情况。你呢，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, but I think you would say, probably, too, that we’ve seen sort of baby versions of this, something subsequently happened, that —
沃伦·巴菲特：不，但我想你可能也会说，我们已经看到过这种情况的小版本，随后发生了一些事情，那——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, yes. If you want to talk about what are the future implications, a lot that I see now kind of reminds me of Sodom and Gomorrah, and —
查理·芒格：哦，是的。如果你想谈论未来的影响，我现在看到的很多东西让我想起了Sodom和Gomorrah，以及——
WARREN BUFFETT: We weren’t there, incidentally. I mean — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，我们当时不在场。我的意思是——（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but there’s a published account. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：没错，不过有书面记录。（笑声）
And I think when you get as much sort of regrettable activity going on and sort of feeding on itself in frenzies of envy and imitation, that — it has happened in the past that there came bad consequences.
我认为，当你看到如此多令人遗憾的活动不断发生，并且这种活动在嫉妒和模仿的狂热中自我膨胀时，过去的历史证明了往往会有不好的结果。
13. PetroChina investment
中国石油的投资
WARREN BUFFETT: On that cheery note, we’ll move to number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：在这个愉快的时刻，我们将转到第 5 项。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Molly Fanner (PH). I’m 11-years-old and I’m from Long Island, New York.
观众成员：早上好。我的名字是莫莉·范纳（音）。我今年 11 岁，来自纽约长岛。
I have two questions today and I have put them in the form of a poem.
今天我有两个问题，我把它们写成了一首诗。
Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, to get here we had to fly.
巴菲特先生，芒格先生，为了到这里我们不得不乘飞机。
I came to hear your thoughts if PetroChina was at an all-time high.
我想听听你们对中石油处于历史高位的看法。
My second regards a job that I know is just right for me.
我的第二个问题是关于我知道自己很适合的工作。
To be a See’s Candy taster, my sisters and I would work for free.
为了成为 See’s Candy 的品尝员，我和我的姐妹们愿意免费工作。
(Laughter) （笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you come up front, I’ll put you to work.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果你上前来，我会让你工作。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Borsheims was for my mom.
观众成员：Borsheims 是我妈妈的最爱。
And my father loves his stock.
我父亲喜欢他的股票。
I have a future tasting chocolate.
我有一个未来品尝巧克力的机会。
This weekend has really rocked.
这个周末真是太棒了。
Thank you very much. 非常感谢。
And really, what is your view on PetroChina? (Laughter)
那么，您对中国石油的看法是什么？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: If you come up at the break, Charlie and I will have taken all the pieces out of here that we like best, and you will get the rest. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你在休息时过来，查理和我会把我们最喜欢的部分都拿走，剩下的就留给你们。（笑声）
Charlie, do you have anything to add to that?
查理，你有什么要补充的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: She wants to know what you think about PetroChina. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：她想知道你对中国石油的看法。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s funny. I saw her out there in the shopping area and I knew that she had PetroChina on her mind. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是，我在购物区看到她时，就知道她心里想着中石油。（观众笑声）
We bought PetroChina a few years ago, again, after reading the annual report. And fortunately it was in English.
几年前，我们在阅读年报后又买入了中国石油。幸运的是，年报是英文的。
It was the first stock — Chinese stock — and really the last.
这是第一只股票——中国股票——实际上也是最后一只。
I mean, it won’t necessarily be the last, but it’s the only one that we’ve owned so far. We put about $400 million into it.
我的意思是，这不一定是最后一个，但这是到目前为止我们唯一拥有的一个。我们投入了大约 4 亿美元。
At the time, and still, it produces about 3 percent of the world’s oil, which is a lot of oil. It produces, probably, 80 percent or so as much as Exxon Mobil will produce. And it’s a huge company.
当时，它仍然生产着世界约 3%的石油，这是一大笔石油。它的产量可能达到埃克森美孚的 80%左右。这是一家巨大的公司。
Last year it earned $12 billion. Now, if you look at the Fortune 500 list, my guess is you won’t find more than about five companies in the United States that earn $12 billion or more. So it’s a major company.
去年，它的利润是120亿美元。如果你查看《财富》500强排行榜，我猜在美国你不会找到超过五家公司能赚到120亿美元或更多。所以它是一家重要的公司。
At the time we bought it, the total market value was 35 billion. So we bought it at about three times what it earned last year. It does not have unusual amounts of leverage.
在我们购买时，总市值为 350 亿。因此，我们以大约是去年收益的三倍价格购买。它没有异常的杠杆。
It — in the annual report, they say something which very, very few companies do say, but which I think is actually fairly important. They say they will pay out about 45 percent of the amount they earn.
年报中提到了一点，这在很少有公司会提及，但我认为实际上相当重要。他们表示将支付大约45%的利润作为股息。
So, if you can buy it at three-times earnings, what turned out to be three times earnings, and you get 45 percent of 33 percent, you know, you’re getting a 15 percent yield on your — cash yield — on your investment.
所以，如果你能以三倍市盈率购买它，结果是三倍市盈率，你得到 33%中的 45%，你知道，你的投资现金收益率是 15%。
It’s a very good annual report. Chinese government owns 90 percent of the company. We own 1.3 percent. If we vote with them, the two of us control the business. (Laughter)
这是一份非常好的年度报告。中国政府拥有公司 90%的股份。我们拥有 1.3%的股份。如果我们与他们一起投票，我们两者就能控制这家公司。（笑声）
It’s a thought that hasn’t occurred to them, but I’ll keep pointing it out. (Laughter)
这是一个他们没有想到的想法，但我会继续指出来。（笑声）
But it’s, you know, it’s a very major business and a very, very attractive — at what was a very attractive price.
但你知道，这是一个非常重要的业务，而且价格非常、非常有吸引力。
Unfortunately, the government shares and our shares have the same economic interest but they are classified differently, so that the government’s 90 percent are called one thing and the 10 percent with the public are called A-shares.
不幸的是，政府持股和我们的持股具有相同的经济利益，但它们被分类为不同的类别，因此政府的 90%被称为一种，而公众持有的 10%被称为 A 股。
And we have to report in Hong Kong when we own 10 percent of a company — or we did then — 10 percent of a company shares, so unfortunately the 10 percent applied only to the 10 percent of A-shares and so we had to reveal our ownership when we only had 1 percent of the economic interest in the company.
我们在香港必须报告当我们拥有一家公司的 10%股份时——或者当时是这样——10%的公司股份，所以不幸的是，这 10%只适用于 A 股的 10%，因此当我们只有公司 1%的经济利益时，我们不得不披露我们的所有权。
So, we would have bought more but the price jumped up, and we are happy to have our 1.3 percent or whatever it is, and we think that they’ve done a good job in running the business.
所以，我们本来会买更多，但价格上涨了，我们对拥有 1.3%或其他比例感到满意，我们认为他们在经营业务方面做得很好。
They’ve got large gas reserves, which they’re starting to develop now.
他们拥有大量的天然气储备，现在正开始开发。
But it’s a very major enterprise. Employs almost 500,000 people.
但这是一家非常大的企业。雇佣了将近 50 万人。
And the interesting thing was, a few years ago relatively few people in the investment world probably even thought about the fact that PetroChina was over there and was a much larger business than most of the — well, just about any oil company in the world, except for BP and Exxon Mobil.
有趣的是，几年前，投资界可能很少有人想到中石油在那里，并且是一个比世界上大多数——除了 BP 和埃克森美孚之外的任何石油公司都要大的企业。
Charlie, do you have thoughts?
查理，你有什么想法吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It would be nice if this sort of thing happened all the time, but that hasn’t been true in recent years.
查理·芒格：是的。如果这种事情一直发生，那就太好了，但近年来情况并非如此。
WARREN BUFFETT: But we never — I should emphasize — I mean, the annual report of PetroChina, which, like I say, it’s easy to read. Understandable. They declare their policies. Anybody could get it. You can read it.
沃伦·巴菲特：但我们从未——我应该强调——我的意思是，中石油的年度报告，就像我说的，很容易阅读。可以理解。他们公布了他们的政策。任何人都可以得到它。你可以阅读它。
We did not — we did not go over and — we never had any contact with the management before we bought the stock. We’d never attended an investor presentation or anything of the sort.
我们没有——我们没有过去——在我们购买股票之前，我们从未与管理层有过任何接触。我们从未参加过投资者介绍会或类似的活动。
I mean, it’s right there in black and white, in a report that anybody can get.
我的意思是，这清清楚楚地写在报告里，任何人都可以获取。
And we just sit in the office and read those things, and we were able to put 400 million out that’s now worth about a billion-two or something like that.
我们就坐在办公室里读那些东西，我们能够投入 4 亿美元，现在价值大约 12 亿或类似的金额。
It was interesting. At the time — I think I’m right on this — at the time, Yukos, which is the big oil company in Russia, was probably far better known among the investment community in the United States than PetroChina.
这很有趣。当时——我想我没错——当时，尤科斯，这家俄罗斯的大型石油公司，可能在美国的投资界比中石油更有名。
And I compared the two. At the time, thought to myself, would I rather have the money in Russia or in China? PetroChina, in my view, was far cheaper. And I felt that the economic climate was likely to be better in China, you know.
我对两者进行了比较。当时，我心想，我是愿意把钱放在俄罗斯还是中国？在我看来，中国石油便宜得多。而且我觉得中国的经济环境可能会更好。
Would I have — if it had been selling at the same multiple as a U.S. domestic company, would I have regarded it as more attractive? No.
如果它的市盈率与一家美国本土公司相同，我会认为它更有吸引力吗？不会。
I mean, there’s some disadvantages, always, to being in a culture that you don’t perfectly understand, or where tax laws can change, your ownership rules can change.
我的意思是，总是有一些缺点，比如身处一个你不完全理解的文化中，或者税法可能会改变，你的所有权规则可能会改变。
But the discount at which PetroChina was selling, compared to other international oil companies, was, in my view at the time, ridiculous. So, that’s why we bought it.
但在我看来，彼时中国石油的售价相比其他国际石油公司有着荒谬的折扣。因此，这就是我们购买它的原因。
And we will have the candy available for you at the break.
休息时我们会为你准备好糖果。
14. Profit margins squeezed by rising commodity prices
利润率因商品价格上涨而受到挤压
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. My name is Matt Sauer (PH) and I’m from Durham, North Carolina.
观众成员：早上好，先生们。我的名字是马特·索尔（音），我来自北卡罗来纳州的达勒姆。
Many businesses are reporting rising costs and surcharges on such inputs as fuel, metals, and wood. They are often unable to pass along these costs to their consumers.
许多企业报告说燃料、金属和木材等原材料的成本在上升，并且附加费增加。但它们往往无法将这些成本转嫁给消费者。
If commodities stabilize at price levels above those of the past decade, will corporate margins be compromised into the future?
如果大宗商品的价格稳定在过去十年之上的水平，企业的利润率是否会在未来受到影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s a great question. I would say that that would depend very much on the industry you’re talking about.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个很好的问题。我会说这在很大程度上取决于你所谈论的行业。
But, in our carpet business [Shaw Industries], for example, we’ve just been hit time after time, as I mentioned in the annual report, with raw material increases, because there’s a big petroleum derivative factor there.
举个例子，在我们的地毯业务（Shaw Industries）中，正如我在年报中提到的，我们一再受到原材料价格上涨的冲击，因为地毯中有很多石油衍生品成分。
And we have lagged in terms of being able to put through those increases to our customers, simply because we want to protect the Nebraska Furniture Marts, or those that have ordered, for a reasonable period of time. And that squeezed margins in carpet.
我们在将这些涨价传递给客户方面有所滞后，仅仅是因为我们想在合理的时间内保护内布拉斯加家具市场或那些已经下订单的人。这压缩了地毯的利润率。
We use lots of natural gas at Johns Manville, use lots of natural gas at Acme Brick, and that’s tended to squeeze margins some.
我们在约翰斯·曼维尔使用大量天然气，在阿克梅砖公司也使用大量天然气，这往往会压缩一些利润。
I think, over time — I think there has been a lot more inflation in these basic materials. Steel has been off the chart.
我认为，随着时间的推移——我认为这些基本材料的通货膨胀已经大大增加。钢铁的价格已经超出预期。
I think, over time the businesses with strong competitive positions manage to pass through increases in raw material costs, just as they passed through increases in labor costs.
我认为，随着时间的推移，具有强大竞争地位的企业能够将原材料成本的增加转嫁出去，就像它们将劳动力成本的增加转嫁出去一样。
But you get these temporary situations where, sometimes, the costs are increasing faster.
但是，有时会出现这些暂时的情况，成本增长得更快。
I don’t think — I don’t think the American industry — I mean, a higher cost for oil, when we import 10 million barrels a day or more of oil, if we’re paying $20-or-so more per barrel than we were a year or two ago, that’s $200 million a day, is a tax, but it’s more of a tax on the American consumer, probably, than on American business. The American business will probably be able to pass through most of those raw material cost increases.
我不认为美国工业会有太大影响。更高的油价意味着我们每天进口超过1000万桶石油，而每桶油的价格比一两年前高出约20美元，这相当于每天多支付2亿美元的税，但这更多地是对美国消费者的税负，而不是对美国企业的。
It is worth pointing out that corporate profits, as a percentage of GDP, are right at the all-time high, leaving out a few aberrational periods.
值得指出的是，企业利润占GDP的比例目前处于历史最高水平，除了少数异常时期。
And I would — you know, if I had to bet on the direction of corporate profits, as a percentage of GDP, over the next five years, I would bet they would go down somewhat. But that’s because they’re right at this very high level.
如果让我对未来五年企业利润占 GDP 的比例的方向下注，我会赌它们会有所下降。但这是因为它们目前处于非常高的水平。
Interestingly enough, while corporate profits, as a percentage of GDP, are at this very high level, corporate taxes, as a percentage of total taxes raised in America, are very close to an all-time low.
有趣的是，尽管企业利润占 GDP 的比例处于非常高的水平，但企业税占美国总税收的比例却接近历史最低点。
So, American businesses managed to pull off a situation where they’re making extremely good profits and paying a very small percentage of the total tax bill, as measured in this country historically.
因此，美国企业设法实现了一种局面，即它们获得了极高的利润，而支付的税款占总税单的比例却非常小，这在该国的历史上是有记录的。
And I’m not sure whether that could, or should, or will continue, but it’s a very, very favorable period right now for corporate America.
我不确定这是否能够、应该或将会继续，但现在对美国企业来说是一个非常非常有利的时期。
But that’s nothing to get bullish about, because you might expect something of a reversion to the mean.
但这没什么值得看好的，因为你可能会预期某种均值回归。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I can’t add to that but I can restate it.
查理·芒格：我没什么可以补充的，但我可以再重复一遍。
It’s hard to know just which companies can pass through the increases in costs that come from higher commodity prices. And it’s also important to know.
很难知道哪些公司能够将大宗商品价格上涨带来的成本增加转嫁出去。而了解这一点也很重要。
WARREN BUFFETT: We like buying businesses where we feel that there’s some untapped pricing power.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们喜欢购买那些我们认为有未开发定价权的企业。
We haven’t been able to do much of that lately. But back in 1972, when we bought See’s Candy, I think it was either — was it $1.95 a pound?
最近我们没能做太多这样的交易，但在1972年，当我们收购喜诗糖果时，它每磅的售价是1.95美元左右。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Something like that.
查理·芒格：类似那样的东西。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And they were selling 16 million pounds of candy a year, making four million pretax, with about 25 million purchase price, which I would have very foolishly refused to budge on, and in history have cost us a lot of money.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们每年销售 1600 万磅糖果，税前利润为 400 万，购买价格约为 2500 万，我本来会非常愚蠢地拒绝让步，这在历史上让我们损失了很多钱。
But one of the questions we asked ourselves, and we thought the answer was obvious, was, you know, if we raised the price 10 cents a pound, would sales fall off a cliff?
但是我们问自己的其中一个问题，我们认为答案显而易见，就是，如果我们每磅涨价 10 美分，销量会不会骤降？
And of course, the answer, in our view at least, was that no, there was some untapped pricing power in the product.
我们的回答显然是，至少在我们看来，产品中存在尚未开发的定价权。
And it’s not a great business when you have to have a prayer session before you raise your prices a penny. I mean, you were in a tough business then.
当你在涨价一分钱之前不得不进行祈祷时，这不是一个好生意。我的意思是，那你在经营一个糟糕的业务。
迪士尼刚刚宣布新的票价，最高上涨了20%，过去10年上涨了100%，参考：《A Disneyland Visit Just Got More Expensive》，Youtube的订阅费也涨了，从 15.98/月调整到17.98/月，上涨12.52%。
And I would say you can almost measure the strength of a business over time by the agony they go through in determining whether a price increase can be sustained.
而且我认为，你几乎可以通过企业在涨价时所经历的痛苦程度来衡量一个企业随时间的强度。
And frankly, a good example of that is the newspaper business right now. Because 30 years ago, when the — whatever the local daily would be had an absolute lock on the economics of the community, because it had the megaphone through which merchants had to talk if they were going to get their message across to their audience — at that time, rate increases, both circulation and advertising, were something that were almost a big yawn to most publishers.
坦率地说，现在报纸行业就是一个很好的例子。因为 30 年前，无论当地的日报是什么，它在社区的经济上都有绝对的控制权，因为它是商家必须通过的扩音器，如果他们想把信息传达给他们的受众——在那个时候，无论是订阅费还是广告费的上涨，对大多数出版商来说几乎都是很轻松的决定。
They did it annually. They did not worry about the fact that Sears or Walmart or Penney’s or whomever would pull their advertising. They did not worry that people would drop their subscriptions to the paper.
他们每年都这样做。他们不担心西尔斯、沃尔玛、彭尼或其他人会撤回他们的广告。他们也不担心人们会取消报纸的订阅。
And they went merrily along, increasing prices, and they increased them when newsprint went up and they increased them when newsprint went down, and it worked.
他们愉快地继续提高价格，当新闻纸价格上涨时他们提高价格，当新闻纸价格下降时他们也提高价格，而且这奏效了。
And you got these very fat profit margins. And it looked like about as strong a business as you can imagine.
你获得了非常高的利润率。看起来这是一项你能想象到的最强劲的业务。
Now publishers find themselves in a position where they agonize over rate increases, both in advertising and in circulation, because they’re worried about driving away advertisers into other media.
现在，出版商发现自己处于一个痛苦的境地，他们对广告和发行价格的上涨感到苦恼，因为他们担心会把广告商赶到其他媒体。
And they’re worried about people, when they get a 20 cent increase, you know, per month, or whatever it may be, in their circulation prices, deciding, well, I think I’ll just drop it. And when they drop it they don’t usually take it up again.
他们担心，当人们的发行价格每月或其他时间上涨 20 美分时，会决定不再订阅。而一旦取消订阅，他们通常不会再重新订阅。
So, that world has changed. And you could recognize the change in that world, simply, if you could get inside the mind of the publisher, in terms of how they felt about price increases.
所以，那个世界已经改变了。你可以简单地通过进入出版商的思维来认识到那个世界的变化，了解他们对价格上涨的看法。
You can learn a lot about — you learn a lot about the durability of the economics of a business by observing the behavior of — the price behavior.
您可以通过观察 — 价格行为 — 了解有关 — 企业经济耐久性的许多信息。
I mean, you’re seeing that — talk about the beer business. Beer has moved up in price every year, but there have been some rollbacks in certain areas in the last year, which means that, you know, it’s getting a little bit more difficult to increase prices, even though they increase them at rates below inflation.
我的意思是，你看到的——谈论啤酒业务。啤酒的价格每年都在上涨，但在过去的一年里，某些地区出现了一些回调，这意味着，虽然他们的涨价幅度低于通货膨胀，但提高价格变得有点困难。
And those are not — that’s not a good economic sign.
而这些不是——这不是一个好的经济信号。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add to that.
查理·芒格：我没什么可以补充的。
15. Tax rate not a factor in Berkshire dividend calculus
税率不是伯克希尔股息计算的因素
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来看第 7 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Pete Banner (PH) from Boulder, Colorado.
观众成员：我叫皮特·班纳（PH），来自科罗拉多州博尔德。
First of all, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, we shareholders consider you our heroes. We appreciate and very much value who you are and what you do in the world. So, thank you.
首先，巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我们股东认为你们是我们的英雄。我们非常欣赏并重视你们是谁以及你们在世界上所做的事情。所以，谢谢你们。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you, Pete.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢你，皮特。
And I will say in return that we think we’ve got the best group of shareholders in the world. And to some extent, it’s evidenced by the fact we have the lowest turnover, and, I think, the most knowledgeable group, incidentally, too, of shareholders.
我会回应说，我们认为我们拥有世界上最好的股东群体。在某种程度上，这可以通过我们拥有最低的股东流动率来证明，而且我认为，我们的股东群体也是最有见识的。
So, with that our mutual love affair can go on. (Laughter)
所以，我们之间的“相互爱恋”可以继续下去了。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much.
观众成员：非常感谢。
Secondly, with taxes as they are today, 15 percent on dividends, how do you feel about declaring a dividend?
其次，考虑到目前的税收情况，股息税为 15%，您对宣布分红有何看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, you were setting me up. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，你是在给我设圈套。（笑声）
No, there’s no question about the fact that dividends are lightly treated now for taxation purposes.
不，现在股息在税收方面确实享有优惠待遇，这一点毋庸置疑。
But we have always said, and it’s been true, that if there were no tax on dividends, to this point at least, we would have followed an identical dividend policy, because the test with us is whether we think we can retain a dollar, and in turn — and have it worth, in present value terms, more than a dollar.
但我们一直强调，并且事实也是如此，即便没有股息税，到目前为止，我们的股息政策也会是相同的。因为对我们来说，关键在于我们是否能留住每一美元，并在现值上使其价值超过一美元。
If we can’t do that, we should distribute any money that we can’t — we can’t utilize on that basis.
如果我们不能做到这一点，我们应该分配任何我们无法利用的钱。
Now, when the cash piles up, like currently — it has currently — you can say it’s pretty dumb to hold, you know, billions of dollars at — last year the rates were less than 1 percent after-tax — and, you know, what are you doing for shareholders with that?
现在现金堆积如山，像当前的情况——去年税后利率不到1%——有人可能会问，这样持有几十亿的现金是不是有点愚蠢？你们到底在为股东做什么？
And I would say that the burden of proof will certainly shift if, within a few years, we can’t use a lot more money intelligently than we are now.
我会说，如果在几年内我们不能比现在更聪明地使用更多的钱，举证责任肯定会转移。
But, if we were — at the time at which we feel that the present value of the earnings we retain is not greater than a dollar comes, and it could come, and it’s more likely to come when you get large like we are, then we should have a — not only a, you know, dividend policy that’s X percent of earnings, we should pay out very substantial sums.
但是，如果我们觉得每一美元的保留收益的现值不再大于一美元，那时我们就应该有一个明确的分红政策，不仅仅是X%的收益分红，我们应该分发非常大的一笔资金。
The test is whether the money can be used effectively within the business. So far, it has been.
测试在于这些资金能否在企业内部得到有效使用。到目前为止，它已经做到了。
That doesn’t mean it was yesterday or the day before, but so far, it’s produced more than a dollar’s worth of market value for every dollar retained.
这并不意味着是昨天或前天，但到目前为止，它为每一美元的保留产生了超过一美元的市场价值。
But that will be discussed — our directors meet Monday — that will be discussed then, and you are certainly — if we sit here a couple of years from now and we have not successfully deployed more cash, then I think that the burden of proof has shifted dramatically to us to explain why we would be retaining earnings at that point.
我们董事会在星期一开会时会讨论这个问题。如果在几年后我们依然无法成功地部署更多的现金，那么责任将很大程度上转移到我们身上，我们必须解释为什么我们仍然要保留收益。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that, too.
查理·芒格：我对此没有什么要补充的。
16. U.S. trade deficit’s economic threat
美国贸易逆差的经济威胁
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8?
沃伦·巴菲特：第八号？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ola Larson (PH), from Salt Lake City, originally from Sweden.
观众成员：我的名字是奥拉·拉尔森（音），来自盐湖城，原籍瑞典。
I read your annual report where you mentioned how the current account deficit, or a trade deficit, has to eventually come to an end.
我读了你的年度报告，你提到经常账户赤字或贸易赤字最终必须结束。
And in the report, you were reluctant to give views, a forecast of how this would come down from $2 billion a day.
而在报告中，您似乎不愿预测这个每天20亿美元的赤字将如何消减。
Would you, nevertheless, be willing to share some thought on what — how it might come down, if you have any views on this?
尽管如此，您是否愿意分享一些想法，关于这可能会如何发展，如果您对此有任何看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that really is the $64 question, because, we are, in my view — and Charlie doesn’t — he’s not as on board on this as I am, so it’s important that you listen to him on this, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这确实是个价值 64 美元的问题，因为在我看来——而查理对此并不像我这样认同，所以你也要听听他的看法。
The — it does seem to me that a $618 billion trade deficit and a larger current account deficit, rich as we are, strong as this country is, that something will happen that will change that in a major way at some point, and that the longer that it goes before changing, the more likely it is that something fairly significant happens.
在我看来，6180 亿美元的贸易逆差和更大的经常账户逆差，即使我们很富有，这个国家很强大，某种事情将在某个时候发生，从而以重大方式改变这一状况，而且这种情况持续越久而不改变，就越有可能发生相当重大的事情。
But most economists — most observers — would still say that some kind of a soft landing is possible. Or they would say it’s likely. They never, to my mind, they never quite explain, you know, what the soft landing is.
但大多数经济学家——大多数观察家——仍然会说某种形式的软着陆是可能的。或者他们会说这很可能。他们从来没有，在我看来，他们从来没有真正解释过，软着陆到底是什么。
They just say it’s, you know, it’s likely to be a soft landing but it could be something different but we still think it will be a soft landing.
他们只是说，你知道，这可能是软着陆，但也可能会有所不同，但我们仍然认为这将是软着陆。
But I don’t know what a soft landing is, exactly, in the sense of how the numbers come down quite significantly, and if they don’t come down, the current account surplus — or deficit — means that we are transferring more and more wealth abroad and that we will, in addition to our trade deficit, we will, at some point, have a very significant deficit in terms of the net investment position that the rest of the world holds on us. So it becomes a compounding effect.
我并不完全清楚“软着陆”到底意味着什么，特别是在这些数字必须大幅下降的情况下。如果它们不下降，那么经常账户赤字就意味着我们正在将越来越多的财富转移到海外，而且随着时间的推移，除了贸易赤字之外，我们还将面临巨大的对外净投资赤字。这将带来复合效应。
I do recommend — there was an op-ed piece in The Washington Post on April 10 by [former Federal Reserve Chairman] Paul Volcker, and he has expressed himself some on this, and he gets into the question of whether it can be a soft landing or not. But I think he certainly expresses some real apprehension about whether a soft landing will be the likely result.
我确实推荐——4 月 10 日《华盛顿邮报》上有一篇由[前美联储主席]保罗·沃尔克撰写的专栏文章，他在这方面表达了一些看法，并探讨了是否可能实现软着陆的问题。但我认为他确实对软着陆是否可能成为最终结果表示了一些真正的担忧。
In the kind of world we live in, with so much of the assets of the world, whether they be foreign exchange or whether contracts or whether they be stocks or bonds or junk bonds or whatever, I think as high a percentage is on what I would call a hair trigger now as has ever existed.
在我们生活的这个世界中，无论是外汇、合同、股票、债券还是垃圾债券，世界上如此多的资产，我认为现在处于我所称的“随时引爆”状态的概率是有史以来最高的。
In other words, I think there are more people that go to bed at night with a position in foreign exchange, or bonds, or a carry trade, or stocks, or whatever, that some event that could happen overnight would cause them to want to change that position in the next 24 hours. I think that’s the highest, perhaps in history.
换句话说，我认为有更多的人在晚上持有外汇、债券、套利交易、股票或其他头寸入睡，而某些可能在一夜之间发生的事件会导致他们在接下来的 24 小时内想要改变该头寸。我认为这在历史上是前所未有的。
Somebody [economist Thomas Friedman] has referred to it as the “electronic herd,” that it’s out there.
有人[经济学家托马斯·弗里德曼]称其为“电子牛群”，它就在外面。
I mean people can with — they can give vent to decisions involving billions and billions and billions of dollars, you know, with the press of a key, virtually. And that electric — I think that electronic herd is at an all-time high.
我的意思是，人们可以——他们可以通过按下一个键，几乎瞬间就做出涉及数十亿、数十亿、数十亿美元的决定。并且我认为这个电子牛群正处于历史最高点。
I think that some exogenous event — it was almost Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 — but some exogenous event — and we will have them — will cause it — I think it could very well cause some kind of stampede by that herd.
我认为某个外部事件，类似于1998年长期资本管理公司（LTCM）的危机，可能会引发这种牛群的踩踏。
You can’t get rid — if you’re the rest of the world — you can’t get rid of dollars.
如果你是世界其他地方的人，你无法摆脱美元。
I mean, if you’re sitting in Japan, China, or someplace, and you own a lot of U.S. government bonds, if you sell them to somebody in the United States you get U.S. dollars. So you still have U.S. assets. If you sell them to somebody in France, you’ve now got euros but they’ve got the [debt.]
我的意思是，如果你身在日本、中国或其他地方，并且持有大量美国政府债券，如果你把它们卖给美国的某个人，你会得到美元。所以你仍然拥有美国资产。如果你把它们卖给法国的某个人，你现在有了欧元，但他们有了[债务]。
You can’t you can’t get rid of those assets. But you can have people trying to head for the door very quickly with them, under certain circumstances.
你不能，你不能摆脱那些资产。但在某些情况下，你可以让人们带着它们迅速离开。
Volcker said, in this thing, he said in the second paragraph, “Yet, under the placid surface there are disturbing trends: huge imbalances, disequilibria, risks — call them what you will. Altogether the circumstances seem to me as dangerous and intractable,” and I emphasize intractable, “as any I can remember, and I can remember quite a lot.”
沃尔克说，在这件事上，他在第二段中说：“然而，在平静的表面下，有一些令人不安的趋势：巨大的不平衡、不均衡、风险——你可以随便怎么称呼它们。总的来说，这些情况在我看来是危险且棘手的，”我强调棘手，“就像我能记得的任何情况一样，而我能记得的情况还不少。”
Well, Paul Volcker can remember quite a lot.
好吧，保罗·沃尔克记得很多。
And I agree with that. I don’t — I have no idea — I have no idea on timing, whatsoever. In economics, it’s far easier to tell what will happen than when it will happen.
我同意这一点。我不知道——我完全不知道——时间问题。在经济学中，预测会发生什么比预测何时发生要容易得多。
I mean, you can see bubbles develop and things, but you do not know how big the bubble will get. For example, you know, this happened five years ago in the market.
我的意思是，你可以看到泡沫的形成和发展，但你不知道泡沫会有多大。例如，你知道，这在五年前的市场上发生过。
So you — predicting timing is — I’ve just never been successful at it nor do I try to do it.
所以你——预测时机——我从来没有成功过，也不尝试去做。
Predicting what will happen, I think, is a much easier sort of thing. And I would say that what is going on, in terms of trade policy, is going to have very important consequences.
预测将会发生什么，我认为这要容易得多。而且我会说，就贸易政策而言，正在发生的事情将会产生非常重要的后果。
It was not addressed in the last presidential campaign by either candidate in any meaningful way at all.
在上次总统竞选中，任何一位候选人都没有以任何有意义的方式解决这个问题。
Now, I’m not sure if, you know, you were standing up in front of the American people, and somebody is giving you three minutes to explain this whole situation, when 90 percent of your audience couldn’t define current account, you know, it’s not an easy game. But it’s an important one.
现在，我不确定，如果你知道，你站在美国人民面前，有人给你三分钟来解释整个情况，而你 90%的观众可能无法定义经常账户，你知道，这不是一个简单的任务。但这是一个重要的任务。
Now, Charlie is less enthusiastic about our foreign exchange position, somewhat, than I am, so I want to yield the floor here for a significant period of time while he gives you the other view.
现在，查理对我们的外汇头寸的热情比我稍微低一些，所以我想在这里让出相当长的时间，让他给你们提供另一种观点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m, if anything, a little more repelled than you are by the lack of virtue in the way our nation uses consumer credit and the way we run the public finances.
查理·芒格：嗯，如果说有什么不同的话，我比你对国家的消费信贷使用方式和公共财政的管理更感到不安。
And I have a feeling that eventually a lack of virtue is going to hurt one.
我有一种感觉，缺乏道德最终会让人付出代价。
Where we differ is that I agree with [18th century Scottish economist] Adam Smith that a great civilization has a lot of ruin in that, meaning it will bear a lot of abuse.
我们的分歧在于，我同意[18 世纪苏格兰经济学家]亚当·斯密的观点，即一个伟大的文明中有很多折腾，这意味着它能够承受大量的滥用。
And so I think there are dangers in the current situation that make it unwise for anybody to swing for the fences. But I don’t think that we have a certainty that the system won’t stand a lot more of the kind of abuse it’s getting now.
因此，我认为当前局势存在一些危险，使得任何人都不明智地全力以赴。但我不认为我们可以确定这个系统不会承受更多它现在所遭受的那种滥用。
WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think the end will be?
沃伦·巴菲特：你认为结局会是什么？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Bad. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：糟糕。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I knew I could count on him. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我知道我可以指望他。（笑声）
No, we are truly, in this country, like an incredibly, I mean incredibly, rich family that owns, we’ll say metaphorically, millions of acres of land. They can’t see, they can’t travel to the outer reaches of their domain.
说真的，我们这个国家，真的是一个非常富有的家庭。我们可以比喻说，这个家庭拥有数百万英亩的土地，甚至无法看到它的边界。
But, nevertheless, they sit on the front porch and wait for the produce to come in from this vast holding, and when they get it all they still want to consume about 6 percent more than everything that’s been produced on the farm.
但是，尽管如此，他们还是坐在前廊上，等待这片广阔土地上的农产品送来，而当他们得到所有产品时，他们仍然想要消费比农场生产的多6%。
And they have the ability to do that by simply selling off a little piece of the farm every day, and every year, that they can’t even see. So they don’t feel any poorer at the end of the day or the end of the year, because it’s still, as far as their eyesight can see, they own everything that God ever created.
他们能够做到这一点，只需每天卖掉农场的一小部分，每年卖掉一小部分，他们甚至看不见。因此，在一天结束或一年结束时，他们并不觉得自己更穷，因为在他们的视线范围内，他们仍然拥有上帝创造的一切。
And they can sell that little piece or they can mortgage it. They can send IOUs to these people that are giving them the extra goods to consume.
他们可以出售那小块土地，或者他们可以抵押它。他们可以向那些给他们额外商品消费的人发送借据。
And we are very, very, very rich family. And we produce a whole lot and we consume a little bit more than we produce.
我们是一个非常非常非常富有的家庭。我们生产很多，消费比生产的稍多一点。
And we trade away a little bit of the farm or put a little bit of a mortgage on every day and the rest of the world is happy to take a little piece of our farm or take a mortgage on it because it’s such a terrific asset and we’ve behaved so well over the years.
我们每天都在出让一点农场或抵押一点，而世界其他地方乐于接受我们农场的一小部分或抵押，因为它是如此出色的资产，而且我们多年来表现得很好。
And so they’re willing to work a little harder to send us something so that we can consume a little bit more than we produce.
所以他们愿意更加努力地工作，给我们送来一些东西，这样我们就可以消费得比生产得多一点。
It’s been going on a while. It’s accelerated a lot in the last few years. And more and more the rest of the world is owning part of us and we’re going to have to service that ownership, either through interest if they took it in IOUs, or in some other way.
已经持续了一段时间。过去几年中，这一趋势加速了。越来越多的世界其他地方拥有我们的一部分，我们将不得不为这种所有权提供服务，无论是通过利息（如果他们以借据的形式持有），还是通过其他方式。
And it can go on a long time. But if it goes on a long time, the world will own a good bit of us and our children will be paying, one way or another, for the fact that we got to consume more than we produced.
这可能会持续很长时间。但如果持续很长时间，世界将拥有我们的一大部分，而我们的孩子将以某种方式为我们消费超过生产的事实买单。
It could happen — you could have — you’ve obviously had some less interest in the rest of the world accepting dollars by the fact that the dollar has declined somewhat in value in the last few years.
这可能发生——你可能有——显然，由于美元在过去几年中价值有所下降，世界其他地区对接受美元的兴趣有所减少。
In other words, the investment in us is always going to be equal to the overconsumption. I mean, it’s an equation.
换句话说，对我们的投资总是等于过度消费。我的意思是，这是一个等式。
But if people get a little less excited about one — enthused about one side of the equation — it reflects itself in the pricing mechanism.
但是，如果人们对方程式不那么兴奋，它就会反映在定价机制中。
And the world has demonstrated a diminishing enthusiasm for dollars in the last few years as they get flooded with them. We send $2 billion out every day, whether we like it or not and whether they like it or not.
近年来，随着美元泛滥，世界对美元的热情逐渐减弱。无论我们是否愿意，也无论他们是否愿意，我们每天都会输出 20 亿美元。
Now, the question is, does that reach some tipping point at some point or does some exogenous event come about that causes people to want to rush for exits? Who knows?
现在，问题是，这是否会在某个时刻达到某个临界点，或者是否会出现某个外部事件导致人们想要急于退出？谁知道呢？
I have a hard time thinking of any outcome from this that involves an appreciating dollar, but, as Charlie will point out in just a second, there have been times when we’ve been surprised.
我很难想出任何会导致美元升值的结果，但正如查理马上会指出的，有时候我们也会感到惊讶。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the counter-argument is that, what does it matter if the foreigners own 10 percent more of the United States, if, at that time, the total wealth of the United States is 30 percent higher than it is now.
查理·芒格：是的，反对的观点是，如果在那个时候，美国的总财富比现在高出 30%，那么外国人多拥有美国 10%的股份又有什么关系呢。
And so, people who have that point of view just roll with it.
因此，持有这种观点的人就顺其自然。
And some of them think that if we didn’t manufacture anything in the United States and just sat here running hedge funds, we would have a wonderful economy because it comports with Republican principles.
他们中的一些人认为，如果我们在美国不制造任何东西，只是在这里经营对冲基金，我们将拥有一个美好的经济，因为这符合共和党的原则。
WARREN BUFFETT: We could cut each other’s hair, too, actually, I mean —
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，我们也可以给对方理发，我的意思是——
But back in the late 18th century, obviously, the idea of taxation without representation caused a certain amount of trouble, and ownership of the rest of the world — by the rest of the world of this country would be seen as a form of taxation, I think, 20 years from now, by the people who resided here.
在18世纪末，无代表不纳税的理念显然引发了某些问题。而世界其他地方拥有我们国家的一部分资产，可能会在未来20年内被美国人民视为一种税收形式。
If we — if, instead of fighting the Revolutionary War, we’d simply made a deal with England and said we’ll give you three percent or five percent of our national product forever and you let us be free and we’ll just mail it — send the royalty over every day — that might have looked like a good alternative to war in, you know, in 1776.
如果我们——如果我们没有打独立战争，而是直接与英国达成协议，说我们将永远给你们我们国民生产总值的百分之三或百分之五，你们让我们自由，我们每天就把这笔钱寄过去——在 1776 年，这可能看起来是一个比战争更好的选择。
But I don’t think that subsequent generations would have reacted well. I mean, something would have happened over time.
但我认为后代不会有好的反应。我的意思是，随着时间的推移，总会发生一些事情。
And I have a feeling that the idea of America paying tribute to the rest of the world because of the overconsumption patterns of a previous generation seems to be — I don’t think that’s a particularly stable scenario.
我觉得，由于上一代的过度消费模式，美国向世界其他国家支付贡品的想法似乎——我认为这不是一个特别稳定的局面。
But that’s why we have only 21 billion in foreign exchange contracts.
但这就是为什么我们只有 210 亿美元的外汇合约。
Charlie might have a little less, or maybe none, if he were running it entirely, and I might have somewhat more, if I didn’t know I’d have him sitting up here next to me next year. (Laughs)
如果查理完全负责的话，他可能会少一点，或者根本没有，而如果我不知道明年他会坐在我旁边，我可能会多一点。（笑）
17. Housing market bubbles and irrationality
房地产市场泡沫与非理性
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 9 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Johann Freudenberg (PH) from Germany.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是约翰·弗洛伊登伯格（PH），来自德国。
What do you think would be the consequences of a strong decline of the housing market for sales of carpet retailers and manufacturers? Thank you.
您认为房市大幅下滑对地毯零售商和制造商的销售会有什么后果？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if there’s a strong decline in the housing market, my guess is that whatever we lose in carpet we’ll be making up for somewhere else, because it would — a lot of the psychological well-being, as well as the financial well-being, of the American people is tied up with the fact — or comes from the fact that they feel so good about what has happened with their home ownership over the years. And with many people it’s been, by far, the best-behaving asset that they’ve had.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果房地产市场大幅下滑，我猜我们在地毯方面的损失会在其他地方得到弥补，因为美国人的心理健康和财务健康在很大程度上与他们多年来对房屋所有权的良好感受有关。对于许多人来说，这一直是他们表现最好的资产。
So, if there is indeed some kind of a bubble and it’s pricked at some point, my guess is that we would feel that in various ways in our operating businesses, but that in terms of what we could do with our capital, the net effect to Berkshire might well be quite positive.
所以，如果确实存在某种泡沫并在某个时候被刺破，我猜我们会在运营业务中以各种方式感受到这一点，但就我们可以用资本做的事情而言，对伯克希尔的净影响可能会相当积极。
We’re not big on macro forecasts. I mean, this foreign exchange thing is quite different than what we’ve done over time and the way we’ve made money.
我们不太注重宏观预测。我的意思是，这个外汇交易与我们一直以来所做的以及我们赚钱的方式有很大不同。
So, we are — it isn’t like we’ve got some great track record predicting macro factors and have made a lot of money doing that.
所以，我们——并不是说我们在预测宏观因素方面有很好的记录，并且通过这样做赚了很多钱。
We’ve made money by looking at things like PetroChina, or whatever it may be, and just deciding that here is a very good business that’s selling at a very cheap price.
我们通过研究像中石油这样的公司，或者其他类似的公司，发现这是一个非常好的业务，正在以非常便宜的价格出售，从而赚到了钱。
Certainly at the high end of the real estate market in some areas, I mean, you’ve seen some extraordinary movement.
当然，房市的高端市场，特别是某些地区，确实出现了非常异常的波动。
And I’ve referred to this before, but 25 years ago or so we saw the same thing in farmland in Nebraska and Iowa and surrounding areas. We had people running from cash — “cash is trash” — and people wouldn’t, you know — they were worried about the fact that inflation was out of control in the late ’70s, and before [former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul] Volcker did his stuff, people were fleeing from cash.
我之前提到过这一点，大约 25 年前，我们在内布拉斯加州、爱荷华州及周边地区的农田中看到了同样的情况。人们纷纷抛弃现金——“现金是垃圾”——他们担心 70 年代末的通货膨胀失控，在[前美联储主席保罗]沃尔克采取措施之前，人们正在逃离现金。
And one of the ways they gave vent to that fear was to rush into farmland. There was a farm about 30 miles north of here that sold for about $2000 an acre in, roughly, 1980. And a few years later, I bought it from the FDIC for $600 an acre.
他们宣泄这种恐惧的方式之一就是涌入农田。大约在 1980 年，这里以北约 30 英里处有一个农场以每英亩约 2000 美元的价格出售。几年后，我从联邦存款保险公司以每英亩 600 美元的价格买下了它。
And you can say, how can you go crazy about farmland? It’s going to produce about 45 bushels an acre of soybeans, about 120 bushels an acre of corn. And there’s no way you could dream about a tripling, or the internet causing, you know, cornmeals to go up or something of the sort.
你可能会问，怎么会对农田如此着迷呢？它每英亩大约能生产 45 蒲式耳的大豆，约 120 蒲式耳的玉米。你绝对无法想象产量会翻三倍，或者互联网会导致玉米价格上涨之类的事情。
But people went crazy on it. And the consequences were huge, in terms of banks failing, lots of banks failing in this area, banks that had gone through the Great Depression. But the people went — they just want a little crazy.
但是人们对此感到疯狂。其后果是巨大的，许多银行倒闭，这个地区的许多银行倒闭，这些银行曾经历过大萧条。但人们还是——他们只是有点疯狂。
People go crazy in economics, periodically, in all different kinds of ways.
人们在经济学中会周期性地以各种不同的方式变得疯狂。
And, you know, you had the Resolution Trust Corp. come out of the savings and loan nuttiness that took place in real estate, where they finance everything that was put before them.
储蓄与贷款协会的房地产泡沫导致了清算信托公司（Resolution Trust Corp.）的成立，他们为摆在面前的一切提供融资。
And, you know, I will not — I don’t know where we stand in terms of the residential housing cycle in that it has different behavior characteristics, simply because people live in the houses in many, a great many cases. So it will not behave, necessarily, the same as other markets.
而且，你知道，我不会——我不知道我们在住宅周期中的位置，因为它有不同的行为特征，仅仅因为在许多情况下，人们住在房子里。所以它不一定会像其他市场一样表现。
But when you get prices increasing at far, far greater rates than construction costs or inflationary factors, sometimes there can be some pretty serious consequences.
但是，当价格以远远高于建筑成本或通货膨胀因素的速度上涨时，有时可能会产生一些相当严重的后果。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s — in a place like Omaha, there’s not much of a housing price bubble, is there, Warren?
查理·芒格：是的。在像奥马哈这样的地方，房价泡沫并不大，对吧，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, there’s not been a bubble, but I would say that residential real estate, probably, has increased in price at a rate quite a bit faster than the general inflation rate.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，没有出现泡沫，但我会说，住宅房地产的价格上涨速度可能比一般的通货膨胀率快得多。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but if you get to Laguna, California or Montecito, California, or the better suburbs of Washington, D.C., you have a real asset price bubble.
查理·芒格：是的，但如果你去加利福尼亚的拉古纳或蒙特西托，或者华盛顿特区的较好郊区，你会发现一个真正的资产价格泡沫。
I have a relative that, to move to a good school district in the suburbs of Virginia, she had to pay four times as much as she can get from selling her nice Omaha house.
我有一个亲戚搬到弗吉尼亚的一个好学区，她必须支付她在奥马哈出售房子的四倍价钱才能买到一所房子。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I sold —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我卖了——
CHARLIE MUNGER: So that’s a price bubble.
查理·芒格：所以那是一个价格泡沫。
WARREN BUFFETT: I sold a house a few months ago in Laguna for $3 1/2 million. Now it sold the first day, so I probably listed it too cheap. So don’t count on me for residential real estate advice.
沃伦·巴菲特：几个月前，我在拉古纳卖了一栋房子，售价为 350 万美元。房子在第一天就卖掉了，所以我可能定价太低了。所以不要指望我能给你住宅房地产方面的建议。
But that house, the physical house, would probably cost a half a million or thereabouts. So, in effect, the land went for $3 million, implicitly, and the land is probably on the area of 2000 square feet, which is a little less than one-twentieth of an acre. Now, you’ve got streets and all that sort of thing involved.
但那套房子的建筑成本大概是50万美元左右。实际上，隐含的土地价格达到了300万美元，而那块地大约只有2000平方英尺，差不多不到1/20英亩。现在，你还得考虑街道和其他类似的东西。
But basically, I think that land sold for about $60 million an acre, which that fellow that you saw in the farm outfit in the movie finds like — sounds like a pretty, pretty fancy price for almost any kind of land.
但基本上，我认为那块土地的售价大约是每英亩 6000 万美元，而你在电影中看到的那个穿农场服装的人觉得这听起来像是一个相当相当高的价格，几乎适用于任何类型的土地。
Charlie, you’ve witnessed it firsthand, though, out there.
查理，不过你亲眼目睹了那里的情况。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah. There’s — one of the Berkshire directors lives adjacent to what I regard as a pretty modest little house, which sold for $27 million recently.
查理·芒格：是的。我们的一位伯克希尔董事的房子旁边有一套我认为相当普通的小房子，最近以2700万美元的价格出售了。
Now these are houses that look right at the ocean, and there isn’t a great deal of available shoreline in California, and there are a lot of people.
现在这些房子正对着大海，而在加利福尼亚可用的海岸线并不多，而且人很多。
But you have some very extreme housing-price bubbles going on. And you would think there might be a real possibility that it could go in the other direction someday.
但是你们有一些非常极端的房价泡沫。而且你可能会认为，将来有一天它可能会朝另一个方向发展。
WARREN BUFFETT: At $27 million, I’d rather stare at my bath tub. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：花 2700 万美元，我宁愿对着我的浴缸发呆。（笑声）
18. Catastrophe insurance: “everything correlates”
灾难保险：“一切都相关”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.
观众成员：大卫·温特斯，新泽西州山湖市。
How do you try to manage risk at Gen Re and National Indemnity to be comfortable and maximize returns? Especially, how do you prevent a catastrophic loss or unexpected correlation? Thank you.
您如何在通用再保险和国家赔偿公司尝试管理风险，以便感到舒适并最大化回报？特别是，您如何防止灾难性损失或意外的相关性？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, that’s a very good question because we are doing things in different parts of our insurance operation where there is correlation.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是一个非常好的问题，因为我们在保险业务的不同部分正在做一些有相关性的事情。
And there’s not only correlation among the insurance risks.
而且保险风险之间不仅存在相关性。
I mean, just, you know, take a major, really major, earthquake in California, in the wrong place. There have been about 25 6.0s or larger in the last hundred years, but most of them don’t occur where a lot of people are.
举个例子，如果加州发生一次大地震，而且发生在错误的地方。在过去的100年里，我们大约经历了25次6.0级或更大的地震，但大多数都没有发生在人口稠密的地方。
But if you get the wrong one in the wrong place, it would not only hit National Indemnity and General Re, as you mention, but it might very well have a severe effect on See’s Candy. It might very well have a severe effect on Wells Fargo.
但是，如果你在错误的地方得到了错误的结果，这不仅会影响到你提到的国家赔偿和通用再保险，还可能对 See's Candy 产生严重影响。它也可能对富国银行产生严重影响。
We don’t own Freddie [Mac] or Fannie [Mae] now, but we owned Freddie at one time. It could have had a severe effect on Freddie. It can have all kinds of secondary and tertiary effects that you might not think of initially.
我们现在不拥有房地美或房利美，但我们曾经拥有过房地美。这可能对房地美产生严重影响。它可能会有各种次要和第三层次的影响，这些影响你最初可能没有想到。
So, we find when there’s trouble, everything correlates. And it’s — part of my job is to have at least a general idea of the sort of risk that the various enterprises might be running operationally, and then integrate that into my own notion of the risk that we run, in terms of investments, in terms of all kinds of things. And, you know, that is my job.
所以，我们发现当有麻烦时，一切都是相关的。而且——我的工作的一部分是至少对各种企业可能在运营上面临的风险有一个大致的了解，然后将其整合到我自己对我们所面临的风险的概念中，包括投资方面的风险以及各种事情的风险。你知道，这就是我的工作。
The most likely mega-cat, at any time, is a hurricane. But we have more exposure to that.
最有可能的超级灾难，随时可能发生的，是飓风。但我们对此有更多的了解。
On the other hand, if you’re talking 25 billion and up, maybe 100 billion and up, insured catastrophes, you know, a quake might be just as likely as some Force 5 hurricane that would come in at the wrong place.
另一方面，如果你谈论的是 250 亿及以上，甚至 1000 亿及以上的保险灾难，你知道，地震可能和某个五级飓风在错误的地方登陆一样有可能。
But that — my job is to think absolutely in terms of worst case. And to know enough about what’s going on, in both investments and operations, to make sure that no matter what happens, you know, I don’t lose sleep that night, you know, over what can, you know, whether there’s a 9.0 quake someplace or whether there’s a Force 5 hurricane that actually goes up the East Coast and enters at places that very seldom does it enter.
但我的工作就是从最坏的情况来考虑问题。并且要对投资和运营的情况有足够的了解，以确保无论发生什么，我都不会因为可能发生的事情而失眠，比如某地发生 9.0 级地震，或者 5 级飓风沿东海岸登陆并进入很少进入的地方。
Long Island, for example: huge amount of exposure. How often is Long Island going to, you know, really have a major hurricane? Not very often. I think there was one back in the ’30s, but there were potato fields there in the ’30s and now there’s all kinds of insured value.
比如长岛：风险暴露非常大，虽然那里不常有大飓风。上世纪30年代可能有过一次飓风，但那时长岛大多是土豆田，现在则拥有巨大的保险价值。
Everything will — everything that can happen, will happen.
一切都会——一切可能发生的事情，都会发生。
I mean, in terms of our — what we know of history in this country, last three or four-hundred years, and then with the most severe quake, by far, was at New Madrid, Missouri.
我的意思是，就我们对这个国家历史的了解而言，过去三四百年中，最严重的地震无疑是发生在密苏里州的新马德里。
And who would have guessed, you know, that that quake would happen? And there were two subsequent quakes that were far enough apart so that didn’t exactly seem like aftershocks.
谁能想到，那场地震会发生呢？而且随后发生了两次地震，相隔得足够远，所以看起来不像是余震。
All three of those were higher than 8 on the Richter scale. Nobody thinks about that, but they’ve had them in Charleston, South Carolina.
这三次地震的震级都超过了里氏 8 级。没有人想到这一点，但它们曾发生在南卡罗来纳州的查尔斯顿。
They’ve had, I mean, it’s — you will see things, maybe not in your lifetime, but if you take the centuries, some extraordinary things can happen. And it’s Berkshire’s job to be prepared, absolutely, for the very worst.
他们已经经历过，我的意思是，你会看到一些事情，也许不是在你的一生中，但如果你考虑几个世纪，一些非凡的事情可能会发生。而伯克希尔的任务就是绝对要为最坏的情况做好准备。
And, by and large, I would think hurricanes and quakes are the biggest thing now, but a few years ago we did not have nuclear, chemical, and biological risks excluded in policies, and we had huge exposure, subsequently gotten rid of.
总的来说，我认为飓风和地震是目前最大的威胁，但几年前我们的保单中并没有排除核、化学和生物风险，因此我们面临巨大的风险，后来才摆脱了这些风险。
But we take on large risks. I’ll give you a couple of examples.
但我们承担了很大的风险。我给你举几个例子。
Just the other day — and nobody else will write this stuff, basically, because they would want to reinsure it with somebody else and they’re not set up to do it — but one large airport, one large international airport, came to us and we wrote a policy for $500 million, excess of 2 1/2 billion, from any action that was not caused by nuclear, chemical, or biological sources.
就在前几天——基本上没有其他人会写这些东西，因为他们会想要和其他人再保险，而他们没有能力这样做——但有一个大型机场，一个大型国际机场，来找我们，我们为其制定了一份 5 亿美元的保单，超过 25 亿美元，针对任何非核、化学或生物来源引起的行动。
So, if that airport is taken out in some way, but not by nuclear, chemical, or biological activities, the first 2 1/2 billion, somebody else worries about, and we get the next half-billion. There’s a — sublimit is only a billion-six can be counted for business interruption. So you would need — and that airport would have to be out for a couple of years to have a billion-six of business interruption. So you need 900 million of physical damage on top of that.
所以，如果那个机场以某种方式被摧毁，但不是通过核、化学或生物活动，前 25 亿由其他人负责，我们负责接下来的 5 亿。有一个——上限是只有 16 亿可以算作业务中断。因此，你需要——那个机场必须关闭几年才能有 16 亿的业务中断。因此，你还需要 9 亿的物理损害。
But somebody is willing to buy that policy and there is a real risk.
但是有人愿意购买该保单，并且确实存在风险。
We insured the NCAA Final Four down in St. Louis against being canceled, not postponed, or having the games, those final four games, moved to another city. But if it was canceled totally, and again, not through nuclear, chemical, or biological, we would have paid $75 million. Same thing at the Grammys.
我们为在圣路易斯举行的 NCAA 四强赛投保，以防比赛被取消，而不是推迟或将这四场比赛移至其他城市。但如果比赛完全取消，并且不是由于核、化学或生物原因，我们将支付 7500 万美元。格莱美奖也是如此。
I mean, we take on risks that very few people want to write. But in the end, we’re willing to lose a lot of money in one day, but we’re not willing to do anything that causes us any discomfort, in terms of writing checks the following morning.
我的意思是，我们承担了很少有人愿意承保的风险。但最终，我们愿意在一天内损失很多钱，但我们不愿意做任何让我们感到不安的事情，比如第二天早上开支票。
Incidentally, while I’m on the nuclear — while we’re talking about the pleasant subjects — I recommended in the annual report that book, “Nuclear Terrorism.”
顺便说一下，当我谈到核问题时——当我们谈论这些愉快的话题时——我在年度报告中推荐了那本书，《核恐怖主义》。
And if you go to lastbestchance.org, you can obtain, or will soon be able to obtain, a tape, free, that the Nuclear Threat Initiative has sponsored, which has a dramatization of something that is now fictional, but it’s not fanciful. It’s something that could happen, and which the Nuclear Threat Initiative is working to minimize the chances of.
如果你访问 lastbestchance.org，你可以获得，或者很快就能获得一盘由核威胁倡议赞助的免费录像带，其中有一个现在是虚构的，但并非异想天开的戏剧化场景。这是可能发生的事情，而核威胁倡议正在努力减少其发生的可能性。
And on that program, in addition to this dramatization of what could happen in that field, you have [former Senator] Sam Nunn and Senator [Richard] Lugar with [NBC News anchor] Tom Brokaw, discussing the subject.
在那个节目中，除了对该领域可能发生情况的戏剧化演绎外，还有[前参议员]萨姆·纳恩和参议员[理查德]卢格与[NBC 新闻主播]汤姆·布罗考讨论这个话题。
It’s an important subject. It didn’t get a lot of attention, again, in this last campaign, although I think both candidates fully recognize the importance.
这是一个重要的话题。在最近的竞选中，它没有得到太多关注，尽管我认为两位候选人都充分认识到其重要性。
But we would regard ourselves as vulnerable to extinction, as a company, if we did not have nuclear, chemical, and biological risks excluded from virtually all of our policies, although we intentionally take on the risk periodically, but only in an amount that we feel we can handle.
但是，如果我们没有在几乎所有的政策中排除核、化学和生物风险，尽管我们有意定期承担这些风险，但仅限于我们认为可以应对的程度，我们会认为自己作为一家公司面临灭绝的风险。
We do not write it and give it away for free. And we do not want to write it promiscuously, because there could be events happen that would make it impossible for our checks to clear the next day, and we’re not going to get ourselves in that position.
我们不会写它然后免费赠送。我们也不想随意写它，因为可能会发生一些事件，使得我们的支票无法在第二天兑现，我们不想让自己陷入那种境地。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We’re likely to do better than most other people in dealing with what concerns you. We care more about it, that kind of correlation.
查理·芒格：是的。我们在处理您关心的问题上可能会比大多数其他人做得更好。我们更关心这种相关性。
We just naturally have minds that think about tidal waves in California, where they’ve never had one in modern California civilization.
我们自然而然地会想到加利福尼亚的海啸，而在现代加利福尼亚文明中，他们从未经历过海啸。
Can you imagine what a 60-foot tidal wave would do in California? There’s nothing physically impossible in having a 60-foot tidal wave in an earthquake zone, which California is in. But it’s never happened in modern history. But it’s the kind of thing that we do think about.
你能想象一场 60 英尺高的海啸在加利福尼亚会造成什么影响吗？在地震带发生 60 英尺高的海啸在物理上并非不可能，而加利福尼亚正处于这样的地震带。但在现代历史上，这从未发生过。不过，这正是我们会考虑的事情。
And you think any other company has as much, as rigorous, nuclear and so on, exclusion as we do?
你认为其他公司在核能等方面的排除措施有我们这么多、这么严格吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, nobody’s attacked it any more vigorously than we’ve attacked, I would say.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想没有人比我们更积极地解决这个问题了。
I mean, what you have here is, individually, we probably worry more about the downside than that just about any manager you can find. And collectively, you know, it’s Armageddon around here every day. (Laughs)
我的意思是，就个人而言，我们可能比你能找到的任何经理都更担心负面情况。而集体上，你知道，这里每天都是世界末日。（笑）
But that’s — you know, we care about that. We’ve never used a lot of borrowed money. Back when I started out, I mean, I had $10,000. But I just didn’t want to borrow any significant amount of money.
但那是——你知道，我们关心这个。我们从来没有使用过很多借来的钱。回到我刚开始的时候，我是说，我有一万美元。但我就是不想借入任何大量的钱。
There’s no reason to. You know, we’re living fine. We were living fine when I had $10,000.
没有理由这样做。你知道，我们过得很好。我有一万美元的时候，我们也过得很好。
And the idea that you risk what you need and is important to you for something that you don’t need and it is unimportant, is just craziness. And we try to run Berkshire that way.
你为了不需要且不重要的东西而冒着需要且对你重要的东西的风险，这简直是疯狂。我们试图以这种方式经营伯克希尔。
And you know, I had a 98- year-old aunt, my Aunt Katie [Buffett], that died last year. She had everything she had in Berkshire.
你知道，我有一个 98 岁的姑姑，我的凯蒂姑姑（巴菲特），去年去世了。她把所有的钱都投在伯克希尔。
And the idea that I should be doing something to try and add a few dollars to my net worth, or a few percentage points to the record, and be risking the fact that she would go back to Social Security, is, you know — I just think that’s kind of crazy for a manager.
我应该做点什么来试图为我的净资产增加几美元，或者在记录上增加几个百分点，并冒着她会回到社会保障的风险，你知道——我只是觉得这对一个经理来说有点疯狂。
But, you know, maybe if I had a two-and-twenty percent arrangement with my Aunt Katie, I’d be — differently, but I hope not. (Laughs)
但是，你知道，也许如果我和我的凯蒂姨妈有一个二加二十的安排，我会——不一样，但我希望不会。（笑）
19. Public education reform
公共教育改革
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Martin Wiegand from Chevy Chase, Maryland.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是马丁·维根德，来自马里兰州的切维·蔡斯。
On behalf of the assembled shareholders, we appreciate you and the Berkshire staff hosting this weekend and would like to thank you for building this community of shareholders.
代表在场的股东，我们感谢您和伯克希尔的员工举办这个周末，并感谢您建立这个股东社区。
WARREN BUFFETT: Martin, thank you. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：马丁，谢谢你。（掌声）
I should point out that I dated Martin’s aunt, but she only went out with me once. Maybe you could explain that, Martin. (Laughs)
我应该指出，我和马丁的姑姑约会过，但她只和我出去过一次。也许你可以解释一下，马丁。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: New board member Bill Gates has been talking about education reform in America, and columnist George Will quoted you in an article about Patrick Byrne’s efforts to reform education in America.
观众成员：新董事会成员比尔·盖茨一直在谈论美国的教育改革，专栏作家乔治·威尔在一篇关于帕特里克·伯恩努力改革美国教育的文章中引用了你。
Could you share with us some of your thoughts about these two efforts, or your efforts, to reform education? Thank you.
您能否与我们分享一下您对这两项努力或您在教育改革方面的努力的一些看法？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, interestingly enough, we just dedicated a school here in Omaha yesterday which is named after my Aunt Alice, who taught in the Omaha public schools.
沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是，我们昨天刚刚在奥马哈为一所学校举行了落成典礼，这所学校是以我姑姑爱丽丝的名字命名的，她曾在奥马哈的公立学校任教。
And we’ve — I think we’ve maintained quite an excellent public school system in Omaha. We also have an outstanding parochial school system here.
我们——我认为我们在奥马哈保持了一个相当优秀的公立学校系统。我们这里也有一个出色的教会学校系统。
You know, it takes the interests of parents and, frankly, it takes the interests of the well-to-do in the school system to keep a first-class school system.
你知道，要维持一个一流的学校系统，需要家长的兴趣，坦率地说，也需要富裕阶层在学校系统中的利益。
I’ve said that, to some extent, a public — a good public school system is a lot like virginity. It can be preserved but not restored.
我曾说过，在某种程度上，一个好的公立学校系统很像贞洁。它可以被保持，但不能恢复。
In Omaha, we preserved it, but you preserve it by having the parents interested and involved in the public school system.
在奥马哈，我们保留了它，但你通过让家长对公立学校系统感兴趣和参与来保留它。
And Patrick’s got an ingenious idea to make sure that more of the money goes to teaching and less to administration and overhead.
帕特里克有一个巧妙的主意，以确保更多的钱用于教学，而不是用于行政和管理费用。
There’s a variety of ideas around about how to correct a system where it’s broken. And Charlie, as a big Ben Franklin enthusiast, has always said that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and I think we’ve been spending that ounce of prevention, or providing it, here in Omaha.
关于如何修复一个有缺陷的系统，有各种各样的想法。查理作为本杰明·富兰克林的忠实爱好者，总是说预防胜于治疗。我认为我们一直在奥马哈花费或提供这种预防措施。
I think it’s a — you know, Charlie will have a lot more to say on this.
我认为这是一个——你知道，查理会有更多的话要说。
I admire the fact that people like Patrick and Bill Gates and a lot of other people, John Walton and Teddy Forstmann, all kinds of people — Bob Wilmers, up in Buffalo — are attacking the problem.
我钦佩像帕特里克、比尔·盖茨以及很多其他人，约翰·沃尔顿和泰迪·福斯特曼，各种各样的人——鲍勃·威尔默斯，在布法罗——正在解决这个问题。
It’s probably the — next to the nuclear, chemical, and biological problem — I mean, it’s the number one problem of the country is making sure that the educational system is the best in the world.
这可能是——仅次于核、化学和生物问题——我的意思是，这是国家的头号问题，就是确保教育系统是世界上最好的。
We’ve got the resources and we’re not providing it, we’re not delivering it.
我们有资源，但我们没有提供，也没有交付。
So, it’s very complicated when you operate through thousands and thousands of school districts and you work with many, many unions, and you’ve had, to a great extent in many areas, the rich opt out of the system and set up a separate system.
因此，当你在成千上万个学区中运作，并与许多工会合作时，这就变得非常复杂，并且在许多地区，富人很大程度上选择退出系统并建立一个独立的系统。
You know, I am not as concerned about the public golf courses in Omaha as I might be if I played them every day instead of playing at a country club.
你知道，如果我每天都在奥马哈的公共高尔夫球场打球而不是在乡村俱乐部打球，我可能会更关心这些球场。
And if you have a two-tier school system, one for the rich and one for the poor, it’s going to be hard to pass bond issues that benefit the people that don’t have the money to send their kids to private schools.
如果你有一个双轨制的学校系统，一个为富人，一个为穷人，那么通过有利于那些没有钱送孩子上私立学校的人的债券问题将会很困难。
I’m a big believer in the public school system, though, in terms of equality of opportunity in this country. (Applause)
我非常相信公立学校系统，因为它在这个国家提供了平等的机会。（掌声）
Charlie’s thought about education. He’s actually come close to running a school. Cares about it enormously, so I’ll turn it over to him.
查理对教育的看法。他实际上曾经接近于开办一所学校。他非常关心这个问题，所以我把它交给他。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I learned something rather interesting about Omaha public schools on my way to this meeting.
查理·芒格：在我来参加这个会议的路上，我了解到了一些关于奥马哈公立学校的有趣事情。
I stopped to sign some books in a warehouse in South Omaha, and one of the very nice people in the warehouse was married to an eighth grade teacher in the Omaha public schools. And we got to talking about “No Child Left Behind.”
我在南奥马哈的一个仓库停下来签了一些书，仓库里的一位非常友好的人与奥马哈公立学校的一位八年级老师结婚。我们开始谈论“一个都不能少”政策。
And he said his wife, this eighth grade teacher, had a very interesting system. For the numerous children who couldn’t read, she records “books on tape,” speaking slowly in her own voice.
他说，他的妻子，这位八年级老师，有一个非常有趣的系统。对于那些不会读书的孩子，她录制了“磁带上的书”，用自己的声音慢慢地讲述。
And when some children are reading the books, other children are listening to the tapes, and that way the children who listen to the tapes are not left out when they ask questions about what went on in the books
当一些孩子在读书时，其他孩子在听录音带，这样当他们问起书中发生的事情时，听录音带的孩子就不会被落下
Well, this is “No Child Left Behind,” in a sense, but it’s also a failure, in a sense. And I think it’s very hard for a civilization to fix the situation once somebody is in the eighth grade and can’t read.
嗯，这在某种意义上是“一个都不能少”，但在某种意义上也是一种失败。我认为，一旦有人到了八年级却不会读书，一个文明要解决这种情况是非常困难的。
So I think there’s a lot of failure, even in relatively advantaged places like Omaha. And it’s very serious failure. We never should have allowed it to happen.
所以我认为，即使在像奥马哈这样相对有优势的地方，也存在很多失败。而且这是非常严重的失败。我们绝不应该允许这种情况发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. My friend Bill Ruane, who is here — I believe he’s here — is doing something extraordinary, in terms of a program he has teaching kids to read. In fact, journalists who are here should seek out Bill and learn something about the story of what he’s done in the last 10 years, in terms of moving reading abilities, and kids’ enthusiasm for reading, which is more important because it’s, you know — I talked about our managers and the important thing is that they have a passion for their business.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我的朋友比尔·鲁安，他在这里——我相信他在这里——正在做一些非凡的事情，他有一个教孩子们阅读的项目。事实上，在场的记者应该去找比尔，了解一下他在过去 10 年中所做的事情，关于提高阅读能力和孩子们对阅读的热情，这更重要，因为你知道——我谈到了我们的经理，重要的是他们对自己的业务充满热情。
Well, passion for reading can be developed and Bill has shown that in programs that he — I think he first started them in Harlem. He sort of adopted a block up there and went from there. And he would be a very interesting fellow to get some views from on this subject.
好吧，阅读的热情是可以培养的，比尔在他的一些项目中展示了这一点——我想他最初是在哈莱姆开始的。他在那里认领了一片街区，然后从那里开始。他在这个话题上会是一个非常有趣的人，可以从他那里获得一些见解。
You know, we’ve had this great success story in this country and a lot of it is because of people have had something closer to equality of opportunity in the United States than they’ve had in most parts of the world.
你知道，我们在这个国家取得了巨大的成功，其中很大一部分是因为人们在美国拥有比世界大多数地方更接近的机会平等。
And you do not have equality of opportunity when my kids get to go to some school where I can attract outstanding teachers and where they’re in the company of other kids that are also motivated and they’re getting encouraged at home and all sorts of other things, and somebody else, who is born into a less advantageous family, really doesn’t have a chance.
而当我的孩子能够去一个我能吸引到优秀老师的学校，而他们又和其他同样有上进心的孩子在一起，受到家庭的鼓励和支持时，而另一些孩子出生在较不优越的家庭，实际上并没有机会。
They go into something that’s close, maybe, to an armed camp where the teachers are just sort of pushing them through. And there’s no stimulus from the other kids except to do things that are counter to the interests of society.
他们进入的环境可能像一个武装营地，教师只是让他们应付过去。与其他孩子的互动中，几乎没有任何正向的刺激，反而会做出违背社会利益的行为。
And that just isn’t a situation that really should be allowed to exist in a country where the GDP is almost $40,000 per capita
而在一个人均 GDP 接近 4 万美元的国家，这种情况实在不应该存在。
20. Bill Gates tops Churchill, Jesus, and Napoleon in survey
比尔·盖茨在调查中超过丘吉尔、耶稣和拿破仑
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go on to number 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们继续第 12 个问题。
Oh, incidentally, I have to make one —
哦，顺便说一下，我得做一个——
It was mentioned about Bill Gates being a director and I did — I got a little survey here that came out. Pricewaterhouse and the Financial Times cooperated on the survey.
提到比尔·盖茨是董事，我确实——我这里有一个调查结果。普华永道和《金融时报》合作进行了这项调查。
And they asked CEOs around the world to choose — if they could pick anybody to choose from history or today to join their company’s board, who would they choose?
他们询问了全球的首席执行官，如果可以从历史或当今选择任何人加入他们公司的董事会，他们会选择谁？
And I’m happy to report that Bill came in number two. And, actually, number three was Winston Churchill. [Auto executive] Carlos Ghosn came in fourth. Jesus Christ came in fifth. Napoleon Bonaparte was sixth. And I won’t give you the rest of the list but —
我很高兴地报告，比尔排在第二位。实际上，第三位是温斯顿·丘吉尔。[汽车高管]卡洛斯·戈恩排在第四位。耶稣基督排在第五位。拿破仑·波拿巴排在第六位。我就不告诉你剩下的名单了，但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Who was one?
查理·芒格：第一位是谁？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, one was [former General Electric CEO] Jack Welch. I knew you’d ask. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，其中一个是[前通用电气首席执行官]杰克·韦尔奇。我就知道你会问。（笑）
But we didn’t ask Jack, we asked Bill.
但我们没有问杰克，我们问了比尔。
So, actually, I thought this quite an interesting list because I think many of the CEOs of the world would prefer people that are dead to be on their board. (Laughter and applause)
所以，实际上，我认为这是一个相当有趣的名单，因为我认为世界上的许多首席执行官更愿意让已故的人在他们的董事会中。（笑声和掌声）
VOICE: It’s too funny. 声音：太搞笑了。
21. Zero-down mortgages fueling housing price bubble
零首付抵押贷款助长房价泡沫
WARREN BUFFETT: Now let’s see. Where were we? We were going to number 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在让我们看看。我们刚才说到哪了？我们要去第 12 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Robert Piton (PH) from Chicago, Illinois.
观众成员：你好，我叫罗伯特·皮顿（PH），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。
And on that note, maybe a merger of some sorts between Berkshire and Microsoft is in the works.
在此，我想提到，也许巴菲特和微软之间的某种合并正在酝酿之中。
WARREN BUFFETT: I keep hinting but it doesn’t do any good. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我一直在暗示，但这没有任何效果。（笑）
AUIDENCE MEMBER: The question that I have is, do you think the shift in the banking system during the ’90s to finance home purchases with zero percent down impacted the overall savings rate, as home purchases are the largest investment most people make, and the overall rise of home prices driven by these marginal buyers?
观众成员：我想问的问题是，您是否认为 90 年代银行系统转向以零首付融资购房影响了整体储蓄率，因为购房是大多数人最大的投资，而这些边际买家推动的房价整体上涨？
If so, how would you suggest that we correct the problem.
如果是这样，您建议我们如何解决这个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Of course, any time a home is constructed, it represents somebody’s savings.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当然，任何时候建造一套房子，都代表着某人的储蓄。
I mean, the home buyer may buy it for nothing down, but that means he’s borrowing 100 percent of the mortgage through a mortgage that somebody else has saved somewhere, maybe intermediated three or four times or something of the sort.
我的意思是，购房者可能零首付购买，但这意味着他通过某种方式借了 100%的抵押贷款，而这笔贷款是由其他人在某个地方存下来的，可能经过了三四次中介或类似的过程。
But home construction comes about through savings.
但住房建设是通过储蓄实现的。
Now there’s no question that terms have become easier and easier, and I’ve talked to certain mortgage bankers about this subject, but terms have become easier and easier as prices have increased.
现在毫无疑问，贷款条件变得越来越宽松，我和一些抵押贷款银行家谈过这个问题，但随着价格的上涨，贷款条件确实变得越来越宽松。
Now, that is absolutely counter to, you know, how people think about lending in general. Generally, the more the asset class becomes inflated, the less a prudent banker will lend.
现在，这完全与人们对借贷的普遍看法相反。通常，资产类别越膨胀，谨慎的银行家就会借出越少。
But of course, in this country, now you have mortgages intermediated in a way that the person buying the mortgage, in the case of — I’m thinking of Freddie [Mac] and Fannie [Mae] and other forms like that, so we’re talking about the lower-priced houses — but the mortgage buyer does not need to care about what kind of mortgage — what kind of a financial transaction the purchase is.
当然，在这个国家，现在你有抵押贷款的某种中介，购买抵押贷款的人——我想到的是房地美和房利美以及其他类似形式，所以我们谈论的是价格较低的房屋——但抵押贷款购买者不需要关心购买的是哪种抵押贷款——是哪种金融交易。
All they have to do is look at the guarantee, and they look at that rather than whether somebody’s put any money down, or anything of the sort.
他们只需关注担保，而不是某人是否有任何首付，或其他任何事情。
So I think you’ve had easy financing facilitating a boom in real estate prices, even at the higher levels. And I think that that that, which has occurred in other asset classes in the past — I mean, that farm bubble I talked about was facilitated by the fact that banks in small towns, who generally had been very conservative in lending, went crazy around 1980 and they lent amounts that the farm itself could never repay.
所以我认为，便捷的融资促进了房地产价格的上涨，即使是在更高的层次。我认为，这种情况在过去的其他资产类别中也曾发生过——我指的是我提到的农场泡沫，那时小镇的银行通常在借贷时非常保守，但在1980年左右变得疯狂，他们贷出的金额远远超过农场本身能够偿还的数额。
They started saying a farm was an asset appreciation investment, not an income investment.
他们开始说农场是一种资产增值投资，而不是收入投资。
And once you talk about something that’s an asset appreciation investment, ignoring the underlying economics of what you’re lending on, you’re really talking about the bigger-fool game.
一旦你谈论某样东西是资产增值投资，忽视你所借款的基础经济情况，你实际上是在谈论一个更大傻瓜的游戏。
You’re saying, you know, this is a silly price but there’ll be a bigger fool that comes along. And that actually can be a profitable game for a while. But it’s nothing that bankers should engage in.
你是说，你知道，这是一个愚蠢的价格，但会有一个更大的傻瓜出现。而这实际上在一段时间内可能是一个有利可图的游戏。但这不应该是银行家参与的事情。
So I would say that easy lending, obviously, does contribute to, overall in the country, to a lower savings rate. But, in effect, somebody has to save for somebody else to borrow.
所以我会说，显然，宽松的借贷确实会导致全国整体储蓄率的下降。但实际上，必须有人储蓄才能让其他人借贷。
And what is happening now is the rest of the world is saving. So then in the U.S. — in global terms, I’m talking — but the rest of the world is saving.
现在发生的事情是世界其他地方在储蓄。所以在美国——我是说在全球范围内——但世界其他地方在储蓄。
And they’re sending us $2 billion — I mean, we’re sending them, in effect, claims for ownership of $2 billion — they’re investing $2 billion a day in the United States.
他们每天向我们投资 20 亿美元——我的意思是，我们实际上向他们发送了价值 20 亿美元的所有权索赔——他们每天在美国投资 20 亿美元。
But they — a lot of economists will say, well, that’s what’s really going on. The world loves our assets so much and they have so much confidence in America that the present current account deficit is driven by the fact they want to invest.
但他们——很多经济学家会说，这就是实际情况。世界如此热爱我们的资产，对美国充满信心，以至于当前的经常账户赤字是由他们想要投资的事实所驱动的。
I don’t believe that at all. I think it’s just silly, frankly, to make that argument. They are investing because they have to, because of our consumption habits, and not because they want to. And I think the declining dollar is evidence of that.
我一点也不相信。我认为提出这样的论点实在是愚蠢。他们之所以投资，是因为他们不得不这样做，是因为我们的消费习惯，而不是因为他们想这样做。而且我认为美元的贬值就是证明。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that. It’s obvious that the easy lending on houses causes more houses to be built and causes housing prices to be higher, probably, in the new field.
查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。显然，宽松的房贷会导致更多的房屋建造，从而可能导致新领域的房价上涨。
Eventually, of course, if you construct enough of new anything, you can have a countervailing effect.
当然，最终，如果你建造的东西太多，可能会导致相应的价格下跌。
If you build way too many houses, you’d eventually cause a price decline
如果你建造太多房子，最终会导致价格下跌
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll give you a fanciful illustration.
沃伦·巴菲特：我给你一个虚构的例子。
Let’s just assume that Omaha had a totally constant population. No one was allowed to leave. No one entered. Birth rate equals death rate, all of that sort of thing.
让我们假设奥马哈的人口完全不变。没有人被允许离开。没有人进入。出生率等于死亡率，诸如此类的事情。
So the population was constant, and nobody could build any more houses. We just passed a city ordinance to that effect.
所以人口是恒定的，没人能再建房子。我们刚刚通过了一项城市条例来实现这一点。
But every year, everybody sold their house to their neighbor. So, first year, everybody sold their $100,000 house to their neighbor, and they both switched houses, and that was fine.
但是每年，每个人都把房子卖给邻居。所以，第一年，每个人都把他们价值 10 万美元的房子卖给邻居，他们互换了房子，这样就没问题了。
And then the next year, they agreed we were going to do it at 150,000. And you’d say, well, how could that be?
然后到了第二年，他们同意我们要以 150,000 来做。你会说，这怎么可能呢？
Well, we would all go to Freddie or Fannie and get our mortgages guaranteed for a larger amount, and somebody in New York or Tokyo or someplace would buy the Freddie or Fannie paper.
好吧，我们都会去房利美或房地美，获得更大金额的抵押贷款担保，然后纽约、东京或其他地方的某个人会购买房利美或房地美的证券。
And we’d have an influx of $50,000 per household. We’d all have the same number of houses. We’d all be living one house to a family. And we’d have marked up our houses, and we now have a bigger mortgage, but we’d have $50,000 more of income that year, just to service a little higher mortgage.
我们每个家庭将有 5 万美元的流入。我们都会有相同数量的房子。我们每个家庭都住在一所房子里。我们会把房子的价格提高，现在有更高的抵押贷款，但那一年我们会有 5 万美元的额外收入，只是为了支付稍高的抵押贷款。
And we’d do the same thing the following year for 200,000, and so on.
我们第二年也会做同样的事情，为 20 万，依此类推。
Now, that would be very transparent, and people might catch on to the fact there was something funny going on in Omaha.
现在，这将是非常透明的，人们可能会意识到奥马哈发生了一些奇怪的事情。
But you can have an accidental aggregation of behavior that somewhat leads to the same effect.
但你可以有一种意外的行为聚合，某种程度上导致同样的效果。
I mean, if you keep marking up something, and in the process, the payment for the marked up price comes from someone else who feels they are bearing no risk because they’ve got the government guarantee in between, the money can just flood in and everybody feels very happy for a long time.
我的意思是，如果你不断地提高价格，而在这个过程中，支付加价的人是那些觉得自己没有风险的人，因为他们有政府担保在中间，那么资金就会源源不断地涌入，每个人都会在很长一段时间内感到非常高兴。
And we don’t have anything like the fanciful thing I’ve set forth, in terms of Omaha. But we have certain aspects of that, I think, going on in the economy.
而在奥马哈，我们没有我所描述的那种奇妙的事物。但我认为，在经济中，我们有某些方面正在发生。
Charlie, would you — I’m throwing this one at you. Would you agree or not?
查理，我把这个问题抛给你。你同意还是不同意？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I do agree with that.
查理·芒格：是的，我同意。
You have varied Ponzi effects in various parts of any modern economy. And they’re very important and they’re very little studied in economics.
在现代经济的各个部分中，你会发现各种庞氏效应。它们非常重要，但在经济学中研究得很少。
22. “Not enthused” about gold
“不热衷”于黄金
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s try number 13. I think, maybe, that’s in the other room and we’ll see whether we get a response and if not we’ll —
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们试试 13 号。我想，也许，那是在另一个房间，我们看看是否能得到回应，如果没有，我们就——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger My name is Martin O’Leary (PH) and I’m from Austin, Texas.
观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫马丁·奥莱利（音），来自德克萨斯州奥斯汀。
Mr. Buffett, given your past essays concerning the U.S. dollar and foreign exchange forward contract holdings that you have, and many countries’ economic policies that have a tendency to debase their currencies, do you think that gold can be considered a viable investment alternative to paper currencies?
巴菲特先生，鉴于您过去关于美元和外汇远期合约持有的文章，以及许多国家的经济政策倾向于贬值其货币，您认为黄金可以被视为纸币的可行投资替代品吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re not enthused about gold.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们对黄金不感兴趣。
People, historically, have felt that was the first refuge from a currency that was going to be — decline in value.
历史上，人们认为这是货币贬值时的第一个避难所。
But, you know, so is a barrel of oil. So is an acre of land. So is a piece of Coca-Cola. So is See’s Candy.
但是，你知道，一桶石油也是如此。一英亩土地也是如此。一块可口可乐也是如此。See's Candy 也是如此。
See’s candy — if the dollar goes down 50 percent, we will be selling See’s candy for double the present price. We’ll be getting the same real price for See’s candy.
See's 糖果——如果美元贬值 50%，我们将以目前价格的两倍出售 See's 糖果。我们将获得相同的 See's 糖果实际价格。
People will work the same number of minutes or hours per week in order to buy a pound or two-pound box of the candy.
人们将花费相同的工作分钟或小时数，以购买一磅或两磅的糖果。
So we would much prefer a — some asset that is going to be useful whether the currency is worth what it is today, or 10 percent of what it is today, or whether people are using seashells in order to transact business.
因此，我们更倾向于拥有一种资产，无论货币的价值是今天的水平，还是今天的 10%，或者人们用贝壳进行交易，这种资产都将是有用的。
Because people will go on eating and they’ll go on drinking and doing various things. And their preferences will translate, in real dollars, into more or less the same economics for us.
因为人们会继续吃喝，继续做各种事情。他们的偏好将以实际美元的形式转化为对我们来说大致相同的经济状况。
And we would not trade the ownership of those kind of assets for us for a hunk of yellow metal, which has very little real utility except for people who are looking to flee from the dollar and, in our view, really haven’t thought through the consequences of what fleeing would — where they should flee.
我们不会用这些资产的所有权去换一块黄色金属，这种金属除了对那些想要逃离美元的人有一点实际用途外，几乎没有什么实际用处，而且在我们看来，这些人并没有真正考虑过逃离的后果——他们应该逃往哪里。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. If you have the opportunities of Berkshire Hathaway, averaged out, gold is a dumb investment.
查理·芒格：是的。如果你拥有的机会是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的机会，平均来看，黄金是一个愚蠢的投资。
WARREN BUFFETT: My dad [Howard G. Buffett] was a huge gold enthusiast. So I sat around the dinner table — my two sisters are here, too. They will testify to it.
沃伦·巴菲特：我父亲（霍华德·G·巴菲特）是一个非常热衷于黄金的人。所以我坐在餐桌旁——我的两个姐妹也在这里。她们可以作证。
We sat around listening to the virtues of gold, and that was in, we’ll say, 1940. And gold, at that time, was $35 an ounce. And we would’ve had some storage and insurance costs.
我们坐在一起听关于黄金的优点，那是在 1940 年。那时黄金的价格是每盎司 35 美元。我们还会有一些存储和保险费用。
And, you know, here it is, 65 years later. World wars, nuclear bombs, all kinds of things. And the compound rate from $35 to a little over $400, less those expenses, is not something that causes me to salivate.
你知道，65 年过去了。世界大战、核弹，各种事情。从 35 美元到略高于 400 美元的复合增长率，扣除那些费用，并不是让我垂涎的东西。
23. The danger of earnings expectations
预测收益的风险
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 14.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十四号。
Do we have a second microphone in the overflow room? Oh, there’s only one in there. OK, then we’ll go back to number one.
我们在分会场里有第二个麦克风吗？哦，那里只有一个。好的，那我们回到第一个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Andrew Noble (PH) from England.
观众成员：来自英格兰的安德鲁·诺布尔（PH）。
Apart from the catastrophic insurance events or Armageddon scenarios that you’ve been talking about earlier, in relation to the operations of Berkshire Hathaway, what are your greatest fears?
除了您之前提到的灾难性保险事件或世界末日情景之外，关于伯克希尔·哈撒韦的运营，您最大的担忧是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the greatest, I would say — we don’t worry about the economics of the businesses we have.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说的是，我们不担心我们所拥有的业务的经济状况。
We’ve got a very diverse group. By and large, they’re very good businesses. By and large, they’re run by some of the best managers in the country. But we worry about something going wrong.
我们有一个非常多元化的团队。总体来说，他们是非常优秀的企业。总体来说，它们由全国一些最优秀的管理者运营。但我们担心会出问题。
I mean, you know, you heard about the Salomon [Brothers] thing in the movie. And, I mean, we’ve got 180,000 people out there, and I’ll guarantee you something is going wrong someplace, as we talk. That’s just the nature of it.
我的意思是，你知道的，你在电影里听说过所罗门[兄弟]的事情。我的意思是，我们有 18 万人在那里，我向你保证，在我们谈话的时候，总有些地方出了问题。这就是事情的本质。
But, what you hope is that it’s relatively unimportant or that we catch it. And — but that’s, you know, that is something that we know will happen.
但是，你希望它相对不重要，或者我们能发现它。而且——但你知道，那是我们知道会发生的事情。
We try to have a culture that minimizes that. And I think we do have a culture that minimizes that.
我们努力营造一种尽量减少这种情况的文化。我认为我们确实有一种尽量减少这种情况的文化。
We — it’s very important, in our view, to have the right incentives. And many places, we think, have incentives that aren’t so good.
我们认为，拥有正确的激励措施是非常重要的。而在许多地方，我们认为激励措施并不是那么好。
I mean, when I get on an airplane, and we own the company, like NetJets, the last thing in the world I want to tell the pilot is that I’m running late and I hope we can get to New York a little faster.
我的意思是，当我登上飞机，而我们拥有这家公司，比如 NetJets 时，我最不想告诉飞行员的是我迟到了，希望我们能快点到达纽约。
I mean, that is dumb, to incent a pilot, who may be worried that, you know, somehow you affect his job or something, to get in a hurry about the takeoff or the checklist or whatever it may be.
我的意思是，这很愚蠢，去激励一个可能担心你会以某种方式影响他工作的飞行员，让他匆忙进行起飞或检查清单或其他任何事情。
And companies do that time after time in their compensation plans or things that they incent people, in our view at least, some of the wrong things.
公司在他们的薪酬计划或激励措施中一次又一次地这样做，至少在我们看来，有些是错误的。
OKR整体上是错误的，BRK和AAPL都不会使用这种方法。
That doesn’t mean nothing wrong will happen under any circumstances. But you should not have a system that causes people to, for example, worry about quarterly earnings.
这并不意味着在任何情况下都不会出错。但你不应该有一个让人们担心季度收益的系统。
None of our — our managers do not submit budgets into Omaha. I have no idea what we’re going to earn next quarter.
我们的经理都不向奥马哈提交预算。我不知道我们下个季度会赚多少钱。
And I have no implicit body language out there, or anything of the sort, to our managers that I’m hoping to earn X dollars per share in the quarter.
而且我没有向我们的经理传达任何隐含的肢体语言或类似的东西，表示我希望在这个季度每股赚取 X 美元。
Because in the insurance business particularly, you can report any numbers, basically, that you want to, if you write long-tail business for a short period of time.
因为特别是在保险业务中，如果你在短期内承保长期业务，基本上可以报告任何你想要的数字。
And, you know, we’ve got 45 billion of loss reserves. Well, who knows whether the right figure is 45 billion or 46 or 44?
而且，你知道，我们有 450 亿的损失准备金。嗯，谁知道正确的数字是 450 亿还是 460 亿或 440 亿？
And if the desire is to report some given number in a given quarter, instead of saying 45 billion, you say 44-and-three-quarters billion, or something of the sort.
如果想要报告某个季度的某个数字，与其说 450 亿，不如说 4450 亿，或者类似的说法。
So we have no incentives, in terms of how people are paid, or in terms of the fact they just don’t want to let me down.
所以我们没有激励措施，无论是在薪酬方面，还是在他们不想让我失望的事实方面。
Let’s assume at the start of the year I asked everybody to submit budgets and then I went on Wall Street and preached a bunch of numbers.
假设在年初我要求每个人提交预算，然后我去了华尔街并宣讲了一堆数字。
Even if their compensation didn’t depend on it, the managers would feel, you know, we don’t want to let Warren down on this. So, you know, we’ll take an optimistic view of reserves, and that’s easy to do, at the end of the quarter and we won’t let him down and then he won’t look like a jerk in front of Wall Street.
即使他们的报酬不依赖于此，经理们也会觉得，你知道，我们不想在这方面让沃伦失望。所以，你知道，我们会对储备持乐观态度，这在季度末很容易做到，我们不会让他失望，这样他在华尔街面前就不会显得像个傻瓜。
So we try to avoid that sort of thing. But even then, that is what we worry about.
所以我们尽量避免那种事情。但即便如此，那也是我们担心的。
We don’t worry about this place making money. I mean, we’ll make money. And if we don’t, it’s my fault. That’s not that’s not the problem.
我们不担心这个地方赚钱。我的意思是，我们会赚钱。如果我们不赚钱，那是我的错。那不是问题所在。
The problem right now, in addition to the one we just talked about, the problem is deploying capital, and that’s my job, too.
现在的问题，除了我们刚刚谈到的问题之外，就是资本的部署，这也是我的工作。
And, you know, I haven’t done a very good job of that recently, but with a little luck, you know, we will — and a different kind of market situation — we will get a chance to do that.
而且，你知道，我最近在这方面做得不是很好，但如果有一点运气，你知道，在不同的市场情况下，我们将有机会做到这一点。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, if you stop to think about it, the history of much of which we don’t like in modern corporate capitalism comes from an unreasonable expectation, communicated from headquarters, that earnings have to go up with no volatility and great regularity — corporate earnings, I mean.
查理·芒格：是的。如果你仔细想想，我们不喜欢的现代企业资本主义的很多历史都源于来自总部的不合理期望，这种期望要求盈利必须稳步上涨，没有波动，且具有很强的规律性——我指的是企业收益。
That kind of an expectation from headquarters is not just the kissing cousin of evil. It’s the blood brother of evil.
总部的那种期望不仅仅是邪恶的近亲，而是邪恶的亲兄弟。
And we just don’t need that blood brother in our headquarters.
我们只是不需要那个结拜兄弟在我们的总部。
WARREN BUFFETT: Businesses do not meet expectations quarter after quarter and year after year. It just isn’t in the nature of running businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：企业不会一季度又一季度、一年又一年地达到预期。这并不是经营企业的本质。
And, in our view, people that predict precisely what the future will be are either kidding investors, or they’re kidding themselves, or they’re kidding both.
而在我们看来，那些准确预测未来的人要么是在愚弄投资者，要么是在自欺欺人，要么是在愚弄两者。
Charlie and I have been around the culture, sometimes on the board, where the ego of the CEO became very involved in meeting predictions which were impossible, really, over time.
查理和我曾接触过这种文化，有时在董事会中，CEO 的自我意识过于强烈，导致他们试图实现实际上不可能的预测。
And everybody in the organization knew, because they were very public about it, what these predictions were and they knew that their CEO was going to look bad if they weren’t met. And that can lead to a lot of bad things.
在这个组织里，每个人都知道这些预测是什么，因为他们对此非常公开，他们知道如果这些预测没有实现，他们的 CEO 会显得很糟糕。而这可能导致很多不好的事情。
You get enough bad things, anyway, I mean. But setting up a system that either exerts financial or psychological pressure on the people around you to do things that they probably really don’t even want to do, in order to avoid disappointing you, I mean, I just think that that’s — it’s a terrible mistake. And, you know, we’ll try to avoid it.
无论如何，我是说，你已经得到了足够多的坏事。但是建立一个系统，对你周围的人施加经济或心理压力，让他们去做一些他们可能根本不想做的事情，只是为了避免让你失望，我是说，我只是觉得那是——这是一个可怕的错误。而且，你知道，我们会尽量避免这种情况。
24. We look for managers with great track records
我们寻找有优秀业绩记录的经理人
(Gap in video recording resumes in middle of question)
（视频录制的间隙在问题中间恢复）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — quality is largely innate.
观众成员：——素质在很大程度上是天生的。
So if these characteristics are inherent and you were to attempt to consistently identify future great managers or entrepreneurs before there’s a track record, how would you go about doing it?
因此，如果这些特征是固有的，并且你试图在没有过往记录的情况下持续识别未来的优秀经理或企业家，你会如何去做呢？
And in particular, could there be a way to know that — before someone’s made a lot of money, before they built the business that they love and feel passionate about, that they will develop those types of qualities later in life?
尤其是，有没有办法在某人赚很多钱之前，在他们建立自己热爱并充满激情的事业之前，就知道他们在以后的人生中会发展出这些品质？
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a terrific question. And we have dodged it, largely, over the years by actually buying businesses from people where we’ve seen the record.
沃伦·巴菲特：这是个很好的问题。多年来，我们基本上通过从我们了解记录的人那里购买企业来避免这个问题。
In other words, I’m not sure I can go — in fact, I’m quite sure I can’t go — to an MBA class of 50 and sit down and talk with each one, examine their grades, examine their extracurricular activities, and whatever, talk to their parents, I’m not sure I could rank those 50 very well in terms of their potential for future business success. And, of course, some of it would depend on what areas they entered into in business.
换句话说，我不确定我能——实际上，我非常确定我不能——去一个50人的MBA班级，和每个人坐下来交谈，检查他们的成绩，查看他们的课外活动，和他们的父母交谈，我不确定我能很好地对这50个人进行排名，以评估他们未来的商业成功潜力。当然，这也取决于他们进入商业的领域。
So, I think it’s tough. I think it’s tough to go out to the practice tee, where people are not actually hitting balls but just taking practice swings, and say which one is, you know, is a 2 handicap and which one’s a 15 handicap, and which ones, you know, can make it on the tour
所以，我认为这很难。就像在练习场上看那些人只是在做练习挥杆而不是实际打球一样，很难判断谁是2个差点，谁是15个差点，谁有可能进入巡回赛。
I think I can tell a little bit, maybe, but not — but it’s very hard to calibrate.
我可能可以稍微判断一下，但要准确地校准却非常困难。
And I don’t think we’ve had much success, but we also haven’t tried very much, to identify people before they’ve had a record, to try and identify the ones that are superstars.
我认为我们没有取得太多成功，但我们也没有做太多尝试，在他们有记录之前识别出那些超级明星。
Instead, we’ve taken the easy way, and we go — and if somebody comes to us with a business that’s done phenomenally for 10 or 15 or 20 years, or maybe for 50 years, and we’ve seen how — what their batting average is — we’ve actually seen they batted .350, or whatever it may be, in the major leagues. And we just make the assumption that we won’t screw it up by hiring them.
相反，我们选择了简单的方式，如果有人带着一个已经成功经营了 10 年、15 年、20 年，甚至 50 年的企业来找我们，我们已经看到了他们的表现——比如他们在大联盟中的打击率是.350，或者其他什么数据。我们只是假设我们不会因为雇用他们而搞砸。
And we also make the assumption that they’ll live to be 100 or 120 or something and we buy the business.
而且我们还假设他们会活到 100 岁或 120 岁之类的，然后我们买下这家公司。
And that’s far easier — it is far easier to tell the great baseball batters after you’ve seen a couple seasons of their batting than it is to go to a college — in college baseball teams or high school baseball teams — and pick out the superstars.
这要容易得多——在你看过他们几个赛季的打击表现后，辨认出伟大的棒球击球手要比去大学——在大学棒球队或高中棒球队——挑选超级明星容易得多。
The one interesting thing, and I wish I could remember where I saw this study and it may not even be a valid study, but I do remember seeing something many, many years ago where they tried to correlate business success with various variables.
有一件有趣的事情，我希望我能记得我在哪里看到过这项研究，它甚至可能不是一项有效的研究，但我确实记得很多很多年前看到过他们试图将商业成功与各种变量相关联的内容。
And they took grades in school and whether they got MBAs and all that sort of thing, and they found that the best correlation was with the age at which they started their own business first.
他们查看了在学校的成绩以及他们是否获得了 MBA 学位等等，发现最好的相关性是他们第一次创业的年龄。
The people that got very interested in starting a lemonade stands, or whatever, tended to have better — it tended to correlate better with business success than other variables.
那些对开柠檬水摊位或其他类似事情非常感兴趣的人往往与商业成功的相关性比其他变量更高。
We have found ourselves — we’ve got a lot of MBAs running businesses for us, but they ran them for a long time before we hired them or before we made the deal. And we’ve got others that never set foot in a business school.
我们发现自己——我们有很多 MBA 在为我们经营业务，但他们在我们雇用他们或达成交易之前已经经营了很长时间。我们还有一些人从未踏入过商学院。
And I do think there’s a lot to wiring. I think there’s also a lot to working with the wiring you have and developing it over time.
我确实认为有很多与“天赋”有关的因素。我也认为很多与如何利用已有的天赋并随着时间的发展进行改进有关。
I don’t think that it’s all innate, and I don’t think you can’t improve. I know you can improve on what you’re given at birth, but I do think an awful lot of it is wiring, more so than I would have thought 30 or 40 years ago.
我不认为这一切都是天生的，我也不认为你无法提高。我知道你可以在出生时获得的基础上有所提高，但我确实认为很大一部分是先天的，比我 30 或 40 年前想象的要多。
I’ve certainly seen it in business. I can — there are people, no formal business train — Charlie never went to business school, I mean, but he thought about it. I mean, I never heard him — Charlie say anything dumb about business yet, except when he disagrees with me. (Laughs)
我确实在商业中见过这种情况。我可以——有些人，没有正式的商业培训——查理从未上过商学院，我的意思是，但他考虑过。我是说，我从未听过查理在商业上说过什么愚蠢的话，除了当他不同意我的时候。（笑）
The truth is I’ve never heard him say anything dumb about business, period.
事实是，我从未听他说过任何关于商业的愚蠢话。
And there are other people. I’ve never heard [GEICO CEO] Tony Nicely say anything dumb about business, ever.
还有其他人。我从未听过 [GEICO CEO] Tony Nicely 说过任何关于商业的蠢话。
They just — they’re wired so that they — that the, you know — it doesn’t flicker. I mean, they get the answers. It doesn’t mean they can — you know, they’d be a great ballroom dancer or a great baseball player, you know, or a great politician, but they are wired for business.
他们只是——他们的思维方式就是这样——你知道的——它不会闪烁。我的意思是，他们能得到答案。这并不意味着他们可以——你知道，他们会成为一个出色的舞厅舞者或一个出色的棒球运动员，或者一个出色的政治家，但他们天生适合做生意。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Part of it is intelligence and part of it is temperament.
查理·芒格：是的。部分是智力，部分是性格。
I don’t know if Bill Ginn is in the audience, but by the time I was 14 years of age, I knew Bill Ginn would be rich.
我不知道比尔·金（Bill Ginn）是否在听众中，但到我14岁时，我就知道比尔·金会变得富有。
He was a classmate of mine in high school, and a very intelligent man, and he wanted to be rich. And he was sensible in the way he handled life.
他是我高中的同学，是个非常聪明的人，他想要变得富有。他在处理生活方面很明智。
I think sensible people with the right temperament and the right intelligence, if they live long enough in our system, will get rich. But temperament is, I think to some extent, inherited, too. Don’t you?
我认为有正确性格和正确智慧的理智的人，如果在我们的体系中生活足够长时间，就会变得富有。但我认为性格在某种程度上也是遗传的。你不这样认为吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
His daughter, incidentally, is a partner with my daughter in a knit shop, which I hope you patronize while you’re — (Laughs)
顺便说一下，他的女儿和我的女儿是一个针织店的合伙人，我希望你们在参观时能光顾一下（笑）。
We’ve united the Ginn and the Buffett family. (Laughs)
我们把金恩家族和巴菲特家族联合起来了。（笑）
Charlie, when did you first think business was something of interest to you?
查理，你第一次觉得商业对你有兴趣是什么时候？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Very early. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：很早。（笑声）
I loved games of chance and I love trying to learn how to win at them.
我喜欢赌博游戏，也喜欢尝试学习如何赢得这些游戏。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s interesting for me, you know, simply to think about the question of whether the Final Four of the NCAA will be will be canceled, as opposed to postponed or transferred in locale, and decide if we’re going to pay out $75 million the next day if it is canceled, and how much we want to receive in today to take care of that.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。对我来说，思考 NCAA 四强赛是否会被取消，而不是推迟或更换地点，这个问题很有趣，并决定如果它被取消，我们是否会在第二天支付 7500 万美元，以及我们今天想要收到多少来应对这一情况。
And that probably wouldn’t interest — all kinds of people that wouldn’t be interesting to. And since my dad wouldn’t let me become a bookmaker, I went into investments. (Laughter)
这可能不会引起——各种各样的人都不会感兴趣。由于我爸爸不让我成为一个庄家，我就进入了投资行业。（笑声）
25. Cologne Re stake
科隆再保险股份
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Jens (PH) from Germany.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自德国的延斯。
After buying almost all of Cologne Re, how happy are you about the progress, and what are the plans for the remaining minority shareholders?
在几乎收购了科隆再保险公司之后，您对进展有多满意，对于剩余的少数股东有什么计划？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. General Re, at the time we bought it in 1998, owned something in the 80s of Cologne Re, a large German company that they bought this 80-odd percent in, a few years earlier.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在 1998 年收购通用再保险时，它拥有科隆再保险 80 年代的股份，这是一家大型德国公司，他们在几年前购买了这 80 多的百分比。
It’s actually slightly more complicated than that because there was an arrangement where a certain purchase was deferred, but as a practical matter they owned in the 80s.
实际上，这比那稍微复杂一些，因为有一个安排是某项购买被推迟了，但实际上他们在 80 年代就拥有了。
Right now, Gen Re owns about 91 percent of Cologne Re.
目前，通用再保险公司拥有科隆再保险公司约 91%的股份。
That’s a subject that, obviously, it’s not pressing with us, because we’ve owned it for seven years without taking our interest up, except periodically through small purchases.
这是一个显然对我们来说并不紧迫的话题，因为我们已经拥有它七年了，除了通过小额购买定期增加我们的兴趣外，并没有提高我们的兴趣。
And there’s no particular reason to — why 100 would be better than 91 percent.
没有特别的理由说明为什么 100 会比 91 百分比更好。
But if the price is attractive and shares are offered to us, we will always contemplate buying it. But it’s not key to any strategy.
但是如果价格有吸引力并且股票向我们提供，我们将始终考虑购买。但这对任何策略都不是关键。
26. Munger defends AIG
芒格为 AIG 辩护
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Christian Tukenberger (PH) from Switzerland, Europe.
观众成员：我是来自欧洲瑞士的克里斯蒂安·图肯伯格（PH）。
What do you think of the two insurance — reinsurance, AIG and Converium, from Switzerland? Thank you.
你对两家保险公司——再保险公司、AIG 和来自瑞士的 Converium 有什么看法？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m going to give you a chance at a second question because I don’t really think I should comment on AIG.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我会给你一个提第二个问题的机会，因为我认为我不应该对 AIG 发表评论。
There’s, you know, they have said that they’re going to have their 10-K. They hope to have it by, I guess, today.
你知道，他们说他们会有他们的 10-K。我想他们希望在今天之前完成。
I haven’t received any late word whether it’s been filed but they have — there’ll be more disclosure on the situation at AIG, and I really don’t know anything about what will be in that statement, and I’ll just — I’ll wait to read it. I’ll read it with interest. But I — I have no particular insights on that.
我还没有收到任何关于是否已提交的最新消息，但他们会对 AIG 的情况进行更多披露，我真的不知道声明中会有什么内容，我会等着看。我会感兴趣地阅读它。但我对此没有特别的见解。
Converium has had troubles in the United States, has been announced, but they also raised additional money. But again, I don’t really have any specific commentary on those two companies.
Converium 在美国遇到了麻烦，这已经被宣布了，但他们也筹集了额外的资金。不过，我对这两家公司没有任何具体的评论。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ll be bold enough to make one comment about AIG. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，我会大胆地对 AIG 发表一个评论。（笑声）
I think whatever comes along, people are going to find that a lot that was very right was done over the years by AIG. There’s a lot of ability in that place.
我认为无论发生什么，人们都会发现多年来美国国际集团做了很多非常正确的事情。那里确实有很多能力。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah. Extraordinary. I mean, Hank Greenberg was — he was the number one man in insurance. I mean, he developed an extraordinary company, in his lifetime.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。非凡。我是说，汉克·格林伯格是——他是保险业的头号人物。我是说，他在他的一生中发展了一家非凡的公司。
It wasn’t that much when it was handed to him. And he became the most important factor, I would say, by some margin, in the property-casualty business.
当公司交到他手里时并没有那么大。而他使AIG成为财产保险行业最重要的因素，毫无疑问，比其他公司有明显的优势。
But in terms of evaluating where it stands now and what will be revealed when the 10-K comes out, I just have no idea.
但是要评估AIG现在的状况以及10-K文件公布时会透露什么内容，我真的不知道。
27. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the home mortgage mess
房利美、房地美和住房抵押贷款混乱
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：第五位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name’s Mike Nolan. I’m here from Montclair, New Jersey with my 18-year-old son Brian, who’s experiencing his first Berkshire annual meeting.
观众成员：早上好。我叫迈克·诺兰。我和我 18 岁的儿子布莱恩从新泽西州蒙特克莱尔来到这里，他正在体验他的第一次伯克希尔年度会议。
My question, and you touched on it a little bit in a couple of earlier questions, deals with the current regulatory environment in Washington, which appears to be growing much more negative on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac, and so forth.
我的问题，以及你在之前的几个问题中稍微提到过的，涉及到华盛顿当前的监管环境，这似乎对房利美、房地美、农业信贷等越来越不利。
What might the implications for the U.S. consumer specifically, and the U.S. economy generally, be if the GSEs are effectively bridled or significantly restricted from their past charters?
如果政府资助企业（GSEs）被有效限制或显著限制其过去的特许权，这对美国消费者特别是对美国经济总体而言可能意味着什么？
Could this prick what you earlier referred, and some private economists are calling, a real estate bubble and what will be the fallout?
这是否会刺破你之前提到的，以及一些私人经济学家称之为的房地产泡沫，后果会是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The GSEs, in effect, expanded their original charter and reason for being.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。实际上，政府资助企业扩大了它们最初的公司章程和存在的理由。
The thought, originally, was that they would guarantee mortgages and they had this very limited, I think, two-and-a-quarter billion dollar line of credit from the Treasury.
最初的想法是，他们将担保抵押贷款，并且我认为他们从财政部获得了非常有限的二十五亿美元的信贷额度。
But they were they were brought in, to an extent, to do what FHA and VA had done for mortgages in their arena, was to give people confidence in borrowing money — or in lending money — far away from their own geographical location.
但他们在某种程度上被引入，是为了在他们的领域中做联邦住房管理局（FHA）和退伍军人事务部（VA）为抵押贷款所做的事情，即让人们对借钱或放贷到远离自己地理位置的地方有信心。
I mean, when the local — when I borrowed money on my house in 19 — bought it 1958 — I mean, I went down to see Mr. Brownlee (PH) at the Occidental Building and Loan, and he, you know, he knew something about me, and he knew something about my parents, and he knew where the house was and all of that.
我的意思是，当地——当我在 19——1958 年买房时借钱——我的意思是，我去见了西方建筑和贷款公司的布朗利先生，他对我有所了解，他也知道我的父母的一些情况，他知道房子在哪里，诸如此类的事情。
But as the mortgage market became more institutionalized and it became more — the source of funds became geographically far more distant from the user of the funds, in order to have a market in which — which would be efficient, the GSEs were a very logical development.
但是，随着抵押贷款市场变得更加制度化，资金来源与资金使用者之间的地理距离变得更远，为了拥有一个高效的市场，政府资助企业（GSEs）的发展是非常合乎逻辑的。
And the GSEs came in, Freddie and Fannie, and the idea was that for a fee, which used to average about 25 basis points, they would guarantee these mortgages so somebody living 3000 miles away could buy them through securities and not worry about the individual property.
GSEs 进来了，Freddie 和 Fannie，想法是他们会收取一笔费用，通常平均约为 25 个基点，以保证这些抵押贷款，这样住在 3000 英里外的人就可以通过证券购买它们，而不必担心单个物业。
And then, the portfolio operations developed over the following years and, of course, they enabled the GSEs to earn high rates of return on capital, because, in effect, the GSEs were looked at as government guaranteed so that people would lend them money without worrying about the degree of leverage employed.
然后，投资组合业务在接下来的几年中得到了发展，当然，这使得政府支持企业能够获得高资本回报率，因为实际上，政府支持企业被视为政府担保，因此人们会在不担心杠杆程度的情况下借钱给它们。
And, in effect, the GSEs became huge — they hugely developed what might be called the carry trade, using the government’s credit, in effect, and the spread between what they paid on their money and what they got on mortgages.
而且，实际上，政府资助企业变得非常庞大——它们极大地发展了可以称为套利交易的东西，实际上利用了政府的信用，以及它们为资金支付的利率与从抵押贷款中获得的利率之间的差额。
So that became the dominant source of their earnings. They got very carried away with delivering promised rates of growth.
因此，这成为了他们收入的主要来源。他们非常热衷于实现承诺的增长率。
I remember reading in the Freddie Mac report some years ago, where they talked about delivering in the mid-teens or low-teens or something like that.
我记得几年前在房地美的报告中看到，他们谈到了要实现中低十位数或中高十位数的增长率。
And I thought to myself, you know, that this is madness, because you can’t do that when you’re running a big carry trade operation. Interest rate — the slope of the curve will develop.
我当时心想，你知道，这简直是疯狂，因为当你在经营一个庞大的套利交易业务时，不能这样做。利率——曲线的斜率会发展。
There’s no way to lend money for 30 years to somebody who can pay you off 30 seconds later, to actually match assets and liabilities in a way that’s risk-free.
没有办法把钱借给一个可能在 30 秒后还清的人长达 30 年，以一种无风险的方式真正匹配资产和负债。
The only way you could do it would be to issue a 30-year bond of your own, which you could call 30 seconds later, and people don’t buy those bonds.
你唯一能做到的方法就是发行你自己的 30 年期债券，然后在 30 秒后赎回，而人们不会购买这些债券。
So, as a practical matter, you could not perfectly handle the risk of significant interest rate changes.
因此，实际上，你无法完美地应对重大利率变化的风险。
But the GSEs got caught up with delivering increasing earnings all the time to Wall Street.
但是政府资助企业一直忙于向华尔街提供不断增加的收益。
So they first enlarged their portfolios and later, as we’ve seen, they got involved in some accounting shenanigans, which really sort of boggle the mind when you think of two of the most important institutions in the country, with all kinds of financial experts on the board and top-named auditors and everything, and turning out that billions and billions and billions of dollars were misreported.
所以他们首先扩大了他们的投资组合，后来，正如我们所见，他们参与了一些会计欺诈行为，当你想到这个国家两个最重要的机构，董事会中有各种各样的金融专家和顶级审计师，结果却是数十亿、数十亿、数十亿美元被错误报告时，真的让人感到震惊。
It shows you what can happen in a system.
它向你展示了在一个系统中可能发生的事情。
Now Congress is reacting, administration is reacting, [Federal Reserve Chairman] Alan Greenspan is reacting, in terms of saying that, you know, what have we created?
现在国会在反应，政府在反应，[美联储主席]艾伦·格林斯潘在反应，他们在说，我们到底创造了什么？
What is this — the situation where these two companies have a trillion-and-a half or more of mortgages they own, and people really think the federal government is on the hook, and the federal government does — wants to say it isn’t on the hook.
这是什么情况——这两家公司拥有超过一万五千亿美元的抵押贷款，人们真的认为联邦政府有责任，而联邦政府却想说它没有责任。
But the truth is, it is on the hook. And institutions worldwide own the credit — own the securities — based on this implied promise. And it was all being done just because, basically, these companies wanted earnings per share to go up.
但事实是，它确实有责任。而全球的机构拥有这些信用——拥有这些证券——基于这种隐含的承诺。而这一切都是因为，基本上，这些公司希望每股收益上升。
Now, they say they did it to maintain an orderly market, and all that stuff, in the mortgages. But they were really set up to guarantee mortgage credit.
现在，他们说这样做是为了维持一个有序的市场，以及所有那些关于抵押贷款的事情。但他们实际上是为了担保抵押贷款信用而设立的。
And there’s going to be reaction in Congress. It will be a huge fight.
国会将会有反应。这将是一场激烈的斗争。
Both of those institutions have been heavy supporters of various legislators over the years. They’ve got lots of clout. Not as much clout as they had a year ago, but they’ve got lots of clout in Congress.
这两个机构多年来一直是各种立法者的坚定支持者。他们有很大的影响力。虽然没有一年前那么大的影响力，但他们在国会中仍然有很大的影响力。
And on the other hand, people have lost faith, to some degree, in what they’ve done.
另一方面，人们在某种程度上对他们所做的事情失去了信心。
And they’ve also seen that the consequences of the government issuing a blank check to two institutions that are trying to produce annual gains in earnings per share of 15 percent, and doing it by accounting means when they ran out of the ability to do it by other means.
他们也看到了政府向两家试图通过会计手段实现每股收益年增长 15%的机构开出空头支票的后果，当他们无法通过其他手段实现这一目标时。
So it’s something that Congress should be giving a lot of attention to. They can’t cut them off, in my view and, I think, most people’s view. They can’t say get rid of your portfolios or anything like that.
所以这是国会应该给予高度关注的事情。在我看来，以及我认为大多数人的看法，他们不能切断这些。他们不能说清除你的投资组合或类似的事情。
So my guess is that some kind of a curtailment comes in, some kind of tougher accounting requirements come in, sometimes it may be tougher capital ratios. And that over a long period of time, the government tries to figure out something that sort of eases them out of this position, where they were basically backing two entities that, at times, acted like the two biggest hedge funds in history.
所以我猜测会有某种限制措施出台，某种更严格的会计要求出台，有时可能是更严格的资本比率。长期来看，政府会尝试找出某种方法，使他们摆脱这种局面，因为他们基本上是在支持两个实体，而这两个实体有时表现得像历史上最大的两个对冲基金。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, he was asking, partly, is what happens if the government reins these two institutions in and forces a big reduction in asset base.
查理·芒格：是的。嗯，他部分是在问，如果政府对这两个机构进行限制并迫使大幅减少资产基础，会发生什么。
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think they’ll — I don’t think the government is going to do something worse, they sell off hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgages, at all.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不认为他们会——我不认为政府会做更糟糕的事情，他们根本不会抛售数千亿美元的抵押贷款。
But if they curtail it — let’s just say they say that from now on you got to operate in a runoff mode for a few years. There are plenty of people out there to buy mortgages.
但如果他们削减——假设他们从现在起要求你以缓慢的模式运作几年。外面有很多人愿意购买抵押贷款。
They’re already buying the securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie that are financing the mortgages. So it isn’t like Fannie and Freddie, independently, were coming up with the funds to finance these mortgages.
他们已经在购买房利美和房地美的证券，这些证券正在为抵押贷款提供融资。因此，并不是房利美和房地美独立筹集资金来为这些抵押贷款提供融资。
They got them from somebody else and that somebody else can leave Freddie and Fannie out of the picture and buy the mortgages through some other form.
他们是从其他人那里获得资金，那些人可以在不考虑房利美和房地美的情况下购买抵押贷款。
It would not be the end of the world, at all, if Freddie and Fannie no longer had new portfolio purchases. I don’t think it would change things in any significant way, in terms of the cost of homeownership or anything else.
如果房利美和房地美不再进行新的投资组合购买，实际上这不会是世界末日。我认为这在住房成本或其他任何方面不会有显著的变化。
How about you, Charlie? 你呢，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree. I don’t think it would have enormous macro effects if future growth were curtailed.
查理·芒格：嗯，我同意。如果未来增长受到限制，我认为这不会对宏观经济产生巨大影响。
I do think a lot of the troubles that came, came from a large use of derivative books, and from Fannie and Freddie both believing a lot of silver-tongue salesmanship from derivative traders.
我确实认为，许多问题的出现，源于大量使用衍生品，以及房利美和房地美都相信衍生品交易员的花言巧语。
And, as many of you know, I think there is much wrong with derivative accounting and derivative trading operations in the United States, and I don’t think the full penalties have yet been paid.
而且，正如你们许多人所知，我认为美国的衍生品会计和衍生品交易操作存在许多问题，我认为尚未支付全部代价。
WARREN BUFFETT: When you can have a $5 billion mismark in one direction at one of these — and bear in mind these are among the most scrutinized companies in the world, and with outstanding people on their boards, in terms of financial expertise — if you can have a $5 billion mismark in one direction, while at the same time the other one has a 9 billion mismark in the other direction, you know, I would say we’ve come a long way from Jimmy Stewart and “It’s a Wonderful Life.” (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：当你在其中一家可以有50亿美元的错误评估时——请注意，这些是全球受监管最严的公司之一，拥有杰出的财务专业人才在董事会中——如果你能在一个方向上有50亿美元的错误评估，而与此同时，另一家在另一个方向上有90亿美元的错误评估，你知道，我想说的是，我们距离吉米·斯图尔特和“生活是美好的”已经走了很远。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
28. UK reporting requirements are a deterrent
英国的报告要求是个障碍
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, this is Peter Webb from London, U.K.
观众成员：你好，我是来自英国伦敦的彼得·韦布。
The question I wanted to ask you: I’ve been an investor for many years and done very well following a similar sort of style to yourself. So thank you for that.
我想问你的问题是：我多年来一直是一名投资者，并且通过类似于你的风格做得很好。所以谢谢你。
The big question I have is —
我有一个大问题是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you want to quantify that? You can always send us a check. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：你想量化一下吗？你可以随时给我们寄支票。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But if there’s a deal to be had, maybe we can speak afterwards.
观众成员：但如果有交易可做，也许我们可以之后再谈。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑）
AUIDENCE MEMBER: The question that I have for yourself and Charlie is, over the time I’ve bought many different companies in the U.K. and Europe, and I’ve seen many American value funds buying the same companies, but I see very little activity from Berkshire and its subsidiaries.
观众成员：我对您和查理的问题是，随着时间的推移，我在英国和欧洲购买了许多不同的公司，我看到许多美国价值基金也在购买这些公司，但我几乎没有看到伯克希尔及其子公司有任何活动。
And I didn’t know whether that was a reflection on your views on U.K., Europe, and the world. Whether you just see a lack of investment opportunity? Is it outside your sphere of competence? Or is there some other reason that I see less activity from you in Europe?
我不知道这是否反映了你对英国、欧洲和世界的看法。你是否只是看到缺乏投资机会？这是否超出了你的能力范围？或者是否有其他原因导致我看到你在欧洲的活动减少？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s a good question. We own, of course, as you know, 80 percent or so of MidAmerican Energy, which has a very large business in the U.K., but that’s an operating business.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是个好问题。当然，如你所知，我们拥有大约 80%的 MidAmerican Energy 股份，该公司在英国有很大的业务，但那是一个运营业务。
As you know, in the U.K. there’s a rule that requires reporting when you own three percent of a company’s stock. And actually, there’s some conditions under which the ownership will be reported even sooner than that three percent.
如你所知，在英国有一项规定，要求在持有公司 3%股份时进行报告。实际上，在某些条件下，持股情况甚至会在达到 3%之前就被报告。
There’s a provision that — I think if there is an inquiry or anything, that it has to be responded to.
有一项规定——我认为如果有询问或其他事情，必须作出回应。
So, if you take a company with a market cap of, you know, £5 billion, if we bought £150 million of it, we would have to report, and that tends to mess up subsequent purchases.
所以，如果你考虑一家市值为 50 亿英镑的公司，如果我们购买了其中的 1.5 亿英镑，我们就必须报告，而这往往会影响后续的购买。
So, we bought stock — we own stock in Diageo, which was Guinness at the time. We’ve owned stock in some other U.K. companies.
所以，我们购买了股票——我们持有帝亚吉欧的股票，当时是健力士。我们还持有一些其他英国公司的股票。
But we’ve thought twice before going over three percent, because of the reporting requirements, and then we’d have to report if we were selling, and all of that.
但是我们在超过百分之三之前会三思，因为有报告要求，然后如果我们在出售，我们就必须报告，等等。
So that’s a deterrent, but it’s not an overwhelming deterrent. And if we, you know, if we get a chance to buy a significant piece of something that we think is cheap, particularly if we could buy it in one purchase. But there’s a lot of special rules that kick in, over in the U.K., that do not in the United States.
所以这是一个障碍，但并不是压倒性的障碍。如果我们有机会以合理的价格购买某个显著的股份，尤其是如果我们能够一次性购买的话。但在英国，有很多特殊的规则启动，而这些在美国是没有的。
Incidentally, there was something in the Journal the other day that said that we had to report if we bought over five percent of a company within 10 business days in the U.S.
顺便提一下，前几天的《日报》上有一篇文章说，如果我们在美国购买超过公司 5%的股份，必须在 10 个工作日内报告。
That is not true. That was a mistake in the report. But it is the case in the U.K. that at 3 percent, reporting is triggered.
那不是真的。那是报告中的一个错误。但在英国，达到 3%时会触发报告。
But there — we would feel very comfortable with lots of U.K. businesses. And, you know, they’d have — it’d be the same criteria we applied over here: a durable competitive advantage, and a management that we like and trust, and a reasonable price.
但是在那里——我们会对许多英国企业感到非常放心。而且，你知道，他们会有——我们在这里应用的相同标准：持久的竞争优势，我们喜欢和信任的管理层，以及合理的价格。
And we have seen some of those. There was an insurance company in the U.K., a year or so back, that I would very much have liked to have bought, but we couldn’t come to terms on price.
我们已经看到其中一些。大约一年前，英国有一家保险公司，我非常想收购，但我们无法在价格上达成一致。
But we have no bias whatsoever against buying businesses in the U.K. And as I say, we’ve — at Yorkshire and Northern Electric, you know, we have a business that, shows in our report, made close to $300 million after-tax.
但是我们对在英国收购企业没有任何偏见。正如我所说的，在约克郡和北方电力公司，你知道的，我们有一个业务，在我们的报告中显示，税后盈利接近 3 亿美元。
And actually, considering my views on currency, you know, I would have — I’d give a slight edge to buying something where the earnings would be in sterling in the future, rather than in dollars.
实际上，考虑到我对货币的看法，你知道，我会稍微倾向于购买未来收益以英镑计价的东西，而不是以美元计价的东西。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I regard it as kind of amusing that we ended up preferring the currencies of Europe when it’s so much more socialized than the United States is. That’s a queer occurrence.
查理·芒格：嗯，我觉得我们最终更喜欢欧洲的货币有点好笑，因为欧洲比美国更加社会化。这是一个奇怪的现象。
不参与具体事务的好处，旁观者清，当局者迷。
WARREN BUFFETT: You actually prefer them or not, Charlie? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：你实际上更喜欢它们还是不喜欢，查理？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, certainly in recent — over a considerable period of recent months — we’ve actually preferred the currencies of socialized Europe to our own currency.
查理·芒格：当然，最近——在最近几个月的相当长一段时间内——我们实际上更喜欢社会化欧洲的货币而不是我们自己的货币。
I just regard that as an odd occurrence for both of us. That wouldn’t have happened.
我只是把那看作是我们俩的一个奇怪事件。那本该不会发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. Up till three years ago, if I came back from Europe and I had a euro in my pocket I couldn’t wait to run to the bank or someplace. I was afraid it would depreciate before I could get rid of it. But I changed my views a few years ago.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。直到三年前，如果我从欧洲回来，口袋里有一个欧元，我迫不及待地想跑到银行或其他地方。我担心在我处理掉它之前它会贬值。但几年前我改变了看法。
We hope to buy businesses, and stocks, other places in the world. And Charlie mentions the difference in political climate.
我们希望在世界其他地方购买企业和股票。查理提到了政治气候的差异。
One thing: you read about slow growth in Europe and Japan and all those, and it’s true. But usually — but the growth figures that you see are usually not on a per capita basis. And since the population of Europe has been, generally, very little changed, whereas the population of the United States grows one or one- and-a-half percent a year, if you look at growth figures in the United States and somebody says three- and-a-fraction percent, that’s not on a per capita basis.
有一点：你读到关于欧洲和日本等地的缓慢增长，这是真的。但通常你看到的增长数据通常不是按人均计算的。由于欧洲的人口通常变化很小，而美国的人口每年增长百分之一到百分之一点五，如果你看美国的增长数据，有人说是百分之三点几，那不是按人均计算的。
I mean, you’ve got to — you have to deflate that by the growth in population. Whereas, if you read about the growth in Europe, generally, you’re dealing with a population base that hasn’t changed.
我的意思是，你必须通过人口增长来抵消这一点。而在欧洲的增长中，你通常面对的是一个没有变化的人口基数。
So the differences in growth rate on a per capita basis are not as wide as the headlines would suggest.
因此，人均增长率的差异并不像标题所暗示的那样大。
29. Legal liability for someone else’s accounting?
对他人会计工作的法律责任？
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name’s Mike McCloskey. I’m from Toronto, Canada.
观众成员：先生们，我叫迈克·麦克洛斯基。我来自加拿大多伦多。
My question is: what obligation does a financial intermediary, or a party to a transaction, have to ensure that the other party to the transaction properly accounts for it.
我的问题是：金融中介或交易一方有何义务确保交易的另一方正确核算该交易。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that question may come up in a very real sense. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：这个问题可能会以非常真实的方式出现。（笑）
But, you know, we have lots of reinsurance transactions, obviously. Banks have lots of transactions with people.
但是，你知道，我们显然有很多再保险交易。银行与人们有很多交易。
Certainly, if you knowingly are doing something that causes a company that are participating in it, you know, you may have very serious obligations on that.
当然，如果你明知故犯地做某事导致参与其中的公司受到影响，你可能会因此承担非常严重的责任。
But on the other hand, if you’re — I mean, we reinsure hundreds of companies. They have legal departments. They have auditors.
但另一方面，如果你是——我的意思是，我们为数百家公司再保险。他们有法律部门。他们有审计员。
And there could be somebody out there today — well, they could be doing anything with their accounting. It probably wouldn’t be limited to the contract they had with us. It might well be other things.
今天可能会有人——他们可能在用他们的会计做任何事情。这可能不仅限于他们与我们的合同。很可能还有其他事情。
But it really gets down to whether there’s knowing participation, I would say. Isn’t that right, Charlie?
但我想说，这实际上归结于是否有知情参与。对吧，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as you say, it’s a subject rife with ambiguities and different issues.
查理·芒格：正如你所说，这是一个充满歧义和不同问题的主题。
You have had some bartender liability, if you serve a drink to somebody that’s already inebriated, why, some people say the bartender is liable.
如果你给已经醉酒的人提供饮料，你就有一定的酒保责任，有些人说酒保要承担责任。
On the other hand, radio stations are allowed, in America, to sell advertising time to people that use it for perfectly obvious fraud, and nobody ever sues the radio station.
另一方面，在美国，电台被允许将广告时间出售给那些明显用于欺诈的人，而且从来没有人起诉电台。
It’s very hard to predict what things are going to get legally shifted around so a supplier gets liability for its customer’s behavior.
很难预测哪些事情会在法律上发生变化，以至于供应商对其客户的行为承担责任。
30. Invest in yourself and ignore asset allocation
投资自己，忽略资产配置
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is (UNINTEL). I live in Sacramento, California.
观众成员：我的名字是（听不清）。我住在加利福尼亚州的萨克拉门托。
My question is related to the issue of U.S. trade deficit again and its implications on the future value of the dollar.
我的问题再次与美国贸易逆差及其对美元未来价值的影响有关。
Do you think an individual or a business owner here in U.S. should be concerned about the purchasing power of his future dollar earnings or savings, and diversify his or her investments in non-dollar-based securities?
您认为美国的个人或企业主应该担心未来美元收入或储蓄的购买力吗？他们是否应该在非美元证券中多样化投资？
WARREN BUFFETT: I think it’s very tough for individuals to either select individual stocks, select individual times to enter the market, select currencies.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为个人很难选择个别股票、选择进入市场的具体时机、选择货币。
I mean, I just think that’s a game that they tend to get interested in at the wrong time. There’s some adverse selection, in terms of when people who do not follow stocks carefully get interested in stocks.
我的意思是，我只是觉得那是一个他们往往在错误时间感兴趣的游戏。在某种程度上，当那些不仔细关注股票的人对股票感兴趣时，会出现一些逆向选择。
I think that, you know, the best investment you can have, for most people, is in your own abilities.
我认为，对大多数人来说，最好的投资是投资于自己的能力。
I mean, when I talk to students, you know, I would pay a student — in many cases, I would be glad to, you know, pay them $100,000, cash up front, for 10 percent of all their future earnings.
我的意思是，当我和学生交谈时，你知道，我愿意支付给一个学生——在很多情况下，我很乐意，支付他们 10 万美元，现金预付，换取他们未来收入的 10%。
So, I’m willing to pay 100,000 for 10 percent of them, I’m valuing the whole person at a million dollars, just capital value standing there in front of me.
所以，我愿意支付 10 万来获得他们 10%的股份，我将整个人的估值定为一百万美元，仅仅是站在我面前的资本价值。
And those — anything you do to develop your own abilities is probably going to be — or your own business — is probably going to be more productive for you than starting to think about individually making commitments into foreign exchange.
而且，任何你用来提高自身能力的事情都将——或用于你自己的事业——都将比开始单独考虑在外国交易所做出承诺更有效率。
If you have a good business in this country earning money in dollars, you’ll do ok. I mean, you may live in a world 20 years from now where a couple percent of the GDP is going to service the debts and the ownership that we’ve created now by running these deficits.
如果你在这个国家有好的生意，用美元赚钱，你会做得很好。我的意思是，20 年后，你可能会生活在这样一个世界里：国内生产总值的几个百分点将用来偿还债务，以及我们现在通过赤字所创造的所有权。
But you’ll do fine in America. So, I wouldn’t worry about that much.
但你在美国会过得很好。所以，我不会太担心这个。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you look at Berkshire, you will find that it really doesn’t do much of conventional asset allocation to categories.
查理·芒格：嗯，如果你看看伯克希尔，你会发现它在类别上的传统资产配置并不多。
We are looking for opportunities and we don’t much care what category they’re in, and we certainly don’t want to have our search for opportunities governed by some predetermined artificial bunch of categories.
我们是在寻找机会，我们并不太在乎它们属于哪个类别，我们当然不希望我们寻找机会的过程被一些预先设定的虚假类别所支配。
In this sense, we’re totally out of step with modern investment management, but we think they’re wrong.
在这方面，我们完全与现代投资管理脱节，但我们认为他们是错误的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And incidentally, we have 80 percent of our money, or more — well over 80 percent — tied to this country and to the dollar. So it’s not like, you know, we’ve left the country or anything of the sort.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。顺便说一下，我们有 80%或更多的钱——远远超过 80%——与这个国家和美元挂钩。所以这并不是说，我们已经离开了这个国家或类似的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGER: When have you done a big asset allocation strategy?
查理·芒格：你什么时候进行过大规模的战略性的资产配置？
WARREN BUFFETT: Never. 沃伦·巴菲特：从不。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
We end up with peculiar asset mixes. I mean, if the junk bond thing had gone on a little longer, instead of having 7 billion in there, we might have had 30 billion in.
我们最终得到了一些奇特的资产组合。我的意思是，如果垃圾债券的事情持续得久一点，我们可能就不是有 70 亿，而是有 300 亿。
But we were doing that simply based on the fact that it was screaming at us.
但我们这样做只是因为它在对我们大喊大叫。
And we do the same thing with equities. I mean, back — for many years, we had more than the net worth of Berkshire in equity positions. But they were cheap.
我们对股票也做同样的事情。我的意思是，回顾过去——很多年前，我们的股票头寸超过了伯克希尔的净资产。但它们很便宜。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I want you to remember one of my favorite sayings as you do this asset allocation. “If a thing’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well.” (Laughter)
查理·芒格：在进行资产配置时，我希望你记住我最喜欢的一句格言：“如果一件事情根本不值得做，那就不值得做好。”（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You can see why Ben Franklin turned the mantle over to Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你可以理解为什么本·富兰克林把这个权力交给了查理。（笑声）
31. Lunch break
午休
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going to take a break now, so you can all go out there and enjoy yourself in the adjoining room, and have lunch, and we’ll be back here at 12:45.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们现在要休息一下，所以你们可以到隔壁房间去享受一下，吃午饭，我们将在 12:45 回来。
And those in the other room might come back to this area because I think we’ll have enough seats for everybody after lunch.
而在另一个房间的人可能会回到这个区域，因为我想午餐后我们会有足够的座位给每个人。
Afternoon session
下午场
32. Q&A resumes
问答恢复
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re going to start in just a minute or two, if you have a chance to sit down.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们将在一两分钟内开始，如果你有机会，请坐下。
OK, let’s go to station 9. And I’ve — I’ll — we will go till 3 o’clock. We’ll break until 3:15, when we’ll convene the business meeting. No one has submitted any proposals for that meeting, so it may be relatively short.
好的，我们去 9 号站。我——我——我们会进行到 3 点。我们会休息到 3 点 15 分，然后召开业务会议。没有人提交任何提案，所以会议可能会比较短。
At 4 o’clock, Charlie and I will meet in another room here — I’m not sure where — with any of those of you from outside North America that are here. We would like to especially thank you for coming this long distance.
在四点钟，查理和我将在这里的另一个房间与来自北美以外的各位会面——我不确定具体在哪里。我们特别感谢你们长途跋涉前来。
33. We’ll “do pretty well” when inflation is high
当通货膨胀高企时，我们会“表现得相当不错”
WARREN BUFFETT: So, with that, we’ll go to area 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我们将前往第 9 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Ken Goldberg from Sharon, Massachusetts — Massachusetts, having the distinction of being the birthplace of Benjamin Franklin.
观众成员：下午好。我叫肯·戈德堡，来自马萨诸塞州的沙伦——马萨诸塞州以本杰明·富兰克林的出生地而闻名。
And, thanks to New Jersey, the only state in the Union where one cannot buy GEICO auto insurance. (Laughter)
而且，这要感谢新泽西州，这是联盟中唯一一个无法购买 GEICO 汽车保险的州。（笑声）
Earlier this morning, you discussed policies that have eroded, and that threaten to continue to erode, the U.S. dollar.
今天早上，你讨论了已经削弱并可能继续削弱美元的政策。
In some of your earlier letters to shareholders, you warned about the dangers of inflation and cautioned that shareholders should fully take inflation into account when evaluating the performance of a business.
在您之前的一些致股东信中，您警告了通货膨胀的危险，并提醒股东在评估企业业绩时应充分考虑通货膨胀。
To what degree do you expect a large decline in the value of the dollar to trigger inflation that would adversely impact Berkshire’s equity holdings and its businesses?
您在多大程度上预计美元价值的大幅下降会引发通货膨胀，从而对伯克希尔的股权持有和业务产生不利影响？
And to what extent should we calibrate Berkshire’s overall performance against the backdrop of a weakening dollar?
我们在多大程度上应该将伯克希尔的整体表现与美元走弱的背景进行校准？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we think, by and large, we have businesses that will do pretty well in inflation. But inflation destroys value, but it destroys it very unequally.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们认为，总的来说，我们的业务在通货膨胀中会表现得相当不错。但通货膨胀会破坏价值，而且破坏得非常不均衡。
The best business to have during inflation is one that retains its earning power in real dollars without commensurate investment to, in effect, fund the inflation-produced nominal growth.
在通货膨胀期间，最好的生意是能够在不需要相应投资的情况下，以实际美元保持其盈利能力，从而有效地支持由通货膨胀产生的名义增长的业务。
The worst kind of business is where you have to keep putting more and more money into a lousy business.
最糟糕的生意是你不得不不断投入越来越多的钱到一个糟糕的生意中。
In effect, the airlines have been hurt by inflation over the last 40 years, because now they have to put a whole lot of money in a lousy investment, which is a plane, compared to 30 or 40 years ago.
实际上，在过去的 40 年里，航空公司受到了通货膨胀的影响，因为现在他们不得不将大量资金投入到一个糟糕的投资中，即飞机，相比 30 或 40 年前。
And they have to stay in the game. They have to keep buying new planes. And the new planes cost far more now, and the returns continue to be inadequate.
他们必须留在这个行业中。他们必须继续购买新飞机。而现在新飞机的成本要高得多，回报仍然不足。
So the best protection is a very good business that does not require big capital investment.
因此，最好的保护是一家不需要大额资本投资的非常好的企业。
And, you know, the best investment at all — of all — I mean, if you’re the leading brain surgeon in town or the leading lawyer in town or the — whatever it may be — you don’t have to keep re-educating yourself to be that in current terms.
而且，你知道，最好的投资——总的来说——我的意思是，如果你是镇上首屈一指的脑外科医生或首屈一指的律师，或者无论是什么，你不必不断重新教育自己以适应当前的标准。
You bought your expertise when you went to medical school or law school in old dollars, and you don’t have to keep reinvesting. And you retain your earning power in current dollars.
你在上医学院或法学院时用旧美元购买了你的专业知识，而你不必继续再投资。而且你在当前美元中保留了你的赚钱能力。
We — Charlie and I are always suspicious that inflation will regain some of the momentum it had a couple of decades ago. We always think it’s in sort of remission.
我们——查理和我总是怀疑通货膨胀会重新获得几十年前的一些动力。我们总是认为它处于某种缓解状态。
We thought the talk about deflation was total nonsense. And certainly, the trade picture is one that you would think would accentuate any inflationary trends that might otherwise be experienced. I mean, obviously, the price of oil in euros has gone up far less than the price has gone up in dollars.
我们认为关于通货紧缩的讨论完全是无稽之谈。当然，贸易形势是一个你会认为会加剧任何可能出现的通胀趋势的因素。我的意思是，显然，以欧元计的油价上涨幅度远小于以美元计的油价上涨幅度。
And you and I are buying gasoline in dollars, so we have seen a bigger increase in our fuel costs because of the decline of the dollar than we would’ve seen if we lived in Europe, or some other — or Australia, for that matter.
你和我用美元购买汽油，因此由于美元贬值，我们的燃料成本增加幅度比我们住在欧洲或其他地方——或者澳大利亚——要大。
So, it’s — inflation is always a factor in calculating the kind of investment, the kind of business, that we want to buy. But it doesn’t — it isn’t like it crowds out all other factors. I mean, it’s always been with us. We’ll think about it always.
所以，通货膨胀在计算我们想要购买的投资类型和业务类型时总是一个因素。但这并不是说它排除了所有其他因素。我的意思是，它一直伴随着我们。我们会一直考虑它。
See’s Candy has done fine during an inflationary period because it does not have huge capital investments that have to be made in current dollars.
See's Candy 在通货膨胀时期表现良好，因为它不需要用当前美元进行巨额资本投资。
Other businesses we have, you know, if we’re — the public utility business, for example — it costs a lot more money to maintain capital expenditures now in dollar terms than it would’ve 30 years ago.
其他业务，比如说公共事业业务，现在以美元计算的资本支出维护成本比 30 年前要高得多。
So you have to keep putting more and more money into a public utility. And you’d better hope that the rate of return allowed is commensurate in times of high inflation the same way that it might have been in low inflation with a lower rate of return.
所以你必须不断地向公用事业投入越来越多的钱。你最好希望在高通胀时期允许的回报率与低通胀时期较低回报率时相称。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, so far, the facts that are driving the dollar down in relation to other currencies have been restraining inflation in the United States.
查理·芒格：是的。到目前为止，使美元相对于其他货币贬值的因素一直在抑制美国的通货膨胀。
In other words, it’s the competitive export advantages of the other people that are — that have so far restrained inflation here. So, it’s —
换句话说，是其他国家的竞争性出口优势——迄今为止抑制了这里的通货膨胀。所以，这是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you’re paying less for shoes. You know, we got killed in the — in parts of our shoe business.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你买鞋花的钱更少了。你知道，我们在鞋业的某些部分遭受了重创。
And 30 years ago, of the billion-plus pairs of shoes used in the United States, a very high percentage were made here. And now, virtually none are. But if they were all being made here, you would be paying more for shoes. There’s no question about that.
30 年前，美国使用的十亿多双鞋中，很大一部分是在本地生产的。而现在，几乎没有在本地生产的了。但如果这些鞋都在本地生产，你会为鞋子支付更多费用。这是毫无疑问的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
34. Buffett: Don’t bet against America
巴菲特：不要押注美国失败
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m a physician from St. Louis. And I want to thank you and everyone here, because I’m one of these doctors that really doesn’t know anything about money or finance. The money comes in, but I don’t know what to do with it.
观众成员：我是一名来自圣路易斯的医生。我想感谢您和在座的每一位，因为我是那种对金钱或财务一无所知的医生之一。钱进来了，但我不知道该怎么处理。
I’m not able to really evaluate the financial strength of a company, but I can evaluate the ethical strength of a company. And that’s why I feel real comfortable — I think most of us here — having our savings in Berkshire Hathaway. And the —
我无法真正评估一家公司的财务实力，但我可以评估一家公司的道德实力。这就是为什么我感到非常安心——我想我们大多数人在这里——把我们的储蓄放在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司。而且——
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question has probably been asked in different ways already, but several years ago, a fellow I know who was — had been manager of Magellan Fund — warned that we were going to have a terrible decade or so in the stock market because of all the things people have brought up so far.
观众成员：这个问题可能已经以不同的方式被问过了，但几年前，我认识的一个曾经是麦哲伦基金经理的人警告说，由于人们迄今为止提到的所有事情，我们将在股市中经历一个糟糕的十年左右。
The increasing interest rates, and runaway spending, and decreasing dollar, and stagflation may be right around the corner, Social Security problems.
利率上升、失控的支出、美元贬值和滞胀可能即将到来，社会保障问题。
And even what Charlie Munger referred to, is that most of our best and brightest graduates, I find, are going into money management rather than — they’re not becoming doctors or molecular biologists or Ph.D.s in chemical engineering.
甚至查理·芒格提到的，我发现我们最优秀的毕业生大多进入了资金管理领域，而不是成为医生、分子生物学家或化学工程学的博士。
And so, in view of the fact that a year or two ago, people — there was still an ebullience of emotion about the stock market going up and making everyone rich just by having their money in the stock market — it seems like that ebulliences dropped, and I’m hearing, in anticipation of a bear market.
鉴于一两年前，人们对股市上涨充满了情感的高涨，认为只要把钱放在股市里就能让每个人变得富有——现在这种高涨情绪似乎已经消退，我听到的是对熊市的预期。
And you wrote, I think several years ago, that it’s hard to make money in a bull market. And the real opportunities come in a bear market.
你写过，我想是几年前写的，在牛市中赚钱很难。而真正的机会出现在熊市中。
So, I’m wondering if you would give us a clue as to what your strategies are going to be, if it’s really true that the market gets dismal over the next few years.
所以，我想知道如果市场在未来几年真的变得惨淡，您是否能给我们一些关于您的策略的线索。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if the market gets cheaper, we will have many more opportunities to do intelligent things with money. Now whether we will blow on the money in the meantime or something is another question.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果市场变得更便宜，我们将有更多机会用钱做聪明的事情。至于我们是否会在此期间挥霍这些钱，那是另一个问题。
But, you know, we are going to be buying things — one thing or another — operating businesses, stocks, high-yield bonds, whatever — we’re going to be buying things for as long as I live, just like I’m going to be buying groceries —
但是，你知道，我们会一直购买各种东西——经营企业、股票、高收益债券等等——只要我活着，我们就会一直购买东西，就像我会一直买杂货一样——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Longer than that, Warren.
查理·芒格：比那更久，沃伦。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）
Yeah. Charlie’s just waiting to take over after I’m — (Laughter)
是的。查理正等着在我之后接手——（笑声）
And I’m going to be buying groceries the rest of life. Now, would I rather have grocery prices go up or down if I’m going to be buying groceries tomorrow and next week and next month and next year? And the answer is obviously, if I’m a net buyer, I would — I will do better if prices are lower.
我余生都要买杂货。现在，如果我明天、下周、下个月和明年都要买杂货，我是希望杂货价格上涨还是下跌？答案显然是，如果我是净买家，价格越低我就越好。
We have no — we’re not good at forecasting markets. I mean, we, in a general way, knew that we were getting enormous bargains in the mid-’70s. We knew that the market went crazy to some extent in the late ’90s.
我们不擅长预测市场。我的意思是，我们大致知道在 70 年代中期我们得到了巨大的便宜货。我们知道市场在 90 年代末有些疯狂。
But we don’t have much — we don’t spend any time — Charlie and I spend no time — thinking or talking about what the stock market is going to do, because we don’t know.
但是我们没有太多——我们不花任何时间——查理和我不花时间——去思考或谈论股市会怎么走，因为我们不知道。
We do know, sometimes, that we’re getting very good value for our money when we buy some stocks or some bonds, as it may be. But we are not operating on the basis of any kind of macro forecast about stocks.
我们确实知道，有时候，当我们购买一些股票或债券时，我们的钱得到了很好的价值。但我们并不是基于任何关于股票的宏观预测来操作的。
And there’s always a list of reasons — you gave a few — there’s always a list of reasons why the country will have problems tomorrow. But there’s always a list of opportunities which don’t get mentioned quite as often.
总是有一系列的理由——你提到了一些——总是有一系列的理由说明国家明天会有问题。但总是有一系列的机会却不常被提及。
So, we don’t sit down and make a list of the bad things that are happening in the economy and the good things that are happening, and therefore expecting the stock market —
所以，我们不会坐下来列出经济中正在发生的坏事和好事，然后因此期待股市——
It might not — it doesn’t behave that way even if you could correctly forecast some of the bad things or good things.
它可能不会——即使你能正确预测一些坏事或好事，它也不会那样表现。
Overall, I’m an enormous bull on the country. I mean, over time — I mean, this is the most remarkable success story in the history of the world, if you think about it. I mean, in 1790 we had less than four million people in this country.
总的来说，我对这个国家非常看好。我的意思是，从长远来看——如果你仔细想想，这是世界历史上最显著的成功故事。我的意思是，1790 年时，我们国家的人口还不到四百万。
We had — there were 290 million people in China. There were 100 million people in Europe. You know, and they all had the same intellect we had. They’re in the same general climate. They had lots of natural resources.
我们有——当时中国有 2.9 亿人。欧洲有 1 亿人。你知道，他们都有和我们一样的智力。他们处于相同的一般气候中。他们有很多自然资源。
And 215 years later, those 3.9 million people, I think, actually, you know, have 30 percent or so of the world’s GDP. So, it does not make sense to bet against America.
215 年后，那 390 万人实际上拥有世界 GDP 的 30%左右。所以，押注美国失败是没有意义的。
That doesn’t mean all our policies are smart or anything, but I would not — I do not get pessimistic on the country. You know, I worry about the — I mean, the big worry is what can be done by either terrorists or governments that have access to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
这并不意味着我们所有的政策都是明智的，但我不会——我对这个国家并不悲观。你知道，我担心的是——我的意思是，最大的担忧是恐怖分子或拥有核、化学或生物武器的政府可能会做什么。
But, in terms of the basic economics of the country, your children are going to live better than you live. And your grandchildren are going to live better than your children live. And we do not focus on macro factors.
但是，就国家的基本经济而言，你的孩子们将会生活得比你更好。你的孙辈将会生活得比你的孩子们更好。而我们不关注宏观因素。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you that the economics of the country are probably going to increase for a considerable period ahead. But I suspect that, in very important ways, we are at or near the apex of a great civilization. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我同意你的看法，国家的经济可能会在未来相当长的一段时间内增长。但我怀疑，在非常重要的方面，我们正处于或接近一个伟大文明的顶峰。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You heard it here first, folks. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：各位，你们是第一次在这里听到这个消息。（笑声）
If you leave the NCB — nuclear, chemical, biological — out of it, I do not feel that way. But, you’ll get to see which one of us is right 20 or 30 years from now.
如果你把核、生化因素排除在外，我并不这样认为。不过，20 或 30 年后你会看到我们谁是对的。
It — I have seen more people pass up opportunities because they get focused on a single economic variable or a single problem that the country faces, and they forget about the good things.
我见过更多的人因为专注于单一的经济变量或国家面临的单一问题而错失机会，他们忘记了好的事情。
I mean, if you can buy very good businesses at attractive prices, it’s crazy to say, “I think I’ll sit this out because it might get a little cheaper next year,” or something of the sort, and because the world’s going to go to hell.
我的意思是，如果你能以有吸引力的价格购买非常好的企业，那么说“我想我会退出，因为明年可能会更便宜”或者类似的话是很疯狂的，因为世界将会变得糟糕。
We just — we’ve never operated that — we’ve never decided not to buy a business we liked because of a macro view. Have we?
我们只是——我们从未因为宏观观点而决定不购买我们喜欢的业务。是吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Not yet. 查理·芒格：还没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）
It’s hard to get him to really agree with you. (Laughter)
很难让他真正同意你的观点。（笑声）
I’ve been working on it for years.
我已经做了好几年了。
35. GM and Ford haunted by past commitments
通用汽车和福特被过去的承诺所困扰
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Randall Bellows. I’m from Chicago. And many years ago, Lauren, my wife, did a portrait of you drinking a can of Coke. Next year I’ll bring one, drinking a can of Bud.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是兰德尔·贝洛斯。我来自芝加哥。很多年前，我的妻子劳伦为你画了一幅喝可乐的肖像。明年我会带一幅喝百威啤酒的。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think you’d better stick with Coke. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为你最好坚持喝可乐。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, OK. I would like you to speculate on a couple of questions.
观众成员：哦，好吧。我想请你对几个问题进行推测。
The first is, given the competitive disadvantage of General Motors and Ford with their huge health care liability costs for their employees and retirees, what do you think might happen there? Do you think there might be a bankruptcy to get rid of the liabilities or a government bailout?
首先，考虑到通用汽车和福特由于其员工和退休人员的巨额医疗责任成本而处于竞争劣势，你认为那里可能会发生什么？你认为可能会通过破产来摆脱这些责任，还是会有政府的救助？
And along that line, Charlie, you spoke several years ago about tort issues.
顺着这个思路，查理，你几年前谈到过侵权问题。
Do you feel there’s anything coming in the way of asbestos reform or correction for those issues and the insurance companies that have been paying those billions? Thank you.
您认为就石棉问题和保险公司支付的数十亿赔偿金而言，是否有什么改进的希望？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that Rick Wagoner at General Motors and Bill Ford at Ford, both have been handed, by managers of the past, extremely difficult hands to play.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说，通用汽车的里克·瓦格纳和福特的比尔·福特，都被过去的管理者交给了极其困难的局面。
They’re not the consequences of their own doing at all, but they have walked into what people call legacy situations.
他们根本不是自己行为的后果，而是陷入了人们所称的遗留问题。
But they have inherited a cost structure brought about by contracts that were put in place, maybe decades ago, that make it very difficult for them to be competitive in today’s world.
但是，他们继承了可能几十年前签订的合同所带来的成本结构，这使得他们在当今世界中很难具有竞争力。
I mean, just imagine if Ford or General Motors had signed contracts that made them pay several thousand dollars a ton more for steel than their competitors did. I mean, it would — people would immediately feel that was untenable.
我的意思是，想象一下，如果福特或通用汽车签署了合同，使他们为钢材支付的价格比竞争对手高出几千美元一吨。我的意思是，人们会立刻觉得这是不可接受的。
So, General Motors and Ford are in the position of having commitments, which are, in strong contractual terms, to pay sums for retired, particularly, workers in both the annuity field and in the health field that are staggeringly high compared to some of their competitors.
因此，通用汽车和福特处于一种需要履行承诺的境地，这些承诺在严格的合同条款中，要求支付给退休工人，特别是在年金和健康领域的款项，与他们的一些竞争对手相比，这些款项高得惊人。
And their competitors can buy steel at the same price, and they can buy aluminum at the same price, they can buy rubber at the same price.
他们的竞争对手可以以相同的价格购买钢材，他们可以以相同的价格购买铝材，他们可以以相同的价格购买橡胶。
And when you get all through with it, if they have huge advantages on the health care and the annuity side, it’s not going to be a fair fight.
当你完成这一切时，如果他们在医疗保健和年金方面有巨大的优势，这将不是一场公平的竞争。
And those contracts, to some day — to some extent — go back to when General Motors had, for example, 50 percent-plus of the U.S. auto market. And now it has 25 percent. But I think even if it had 50 percent today it would be having trouble.
那些合同可以追溯到某一天——在某种程度上——通用汽车曾经占据美国汽车市场 50%以上的份额。而现在它只有 25%。但我认为，即使它今天仍然占有 50%的份额，也会遇到麻烦。
So, it’s a very, very tough situation. I’m not sure what I would do if you put me in charge of — I mean, as Bill Buckley said many years ago when he ran for mayor of New York, they said, “What’s the first thing you’re going to do if you get elected?” He said, “I’ll ask for a recount.” (Laughter)
所以，这是一个非常非常艰难的局面。我不确定如果你让我负责，我会怎么做——我的意思是，就像比尔·巴克利多年前竞选纽约市长时所说的那样，他们问他：“如果你当选，你要做的第一件事是什么？”他说：“我会要求重新计票。”（笑声）
Well, that’s a little the way I would feel if I got elected CEO of General Motors.
嗯，如果我当选为通用汽车的首席执行官，我会有点这样的感觉。
From the standpoint of the UAW, you know, they have a contract, they made a deal. And they’ve got $90 billion in the pension fund.
从美国汽车工人联合会的立场来看，你知道，他们有一个合同，他们达成了一项协议。而且他们的养老金基金中有 900 亿美元。
It’s kind of interesting. The pension fund of General Motors possesses roughly $90 billion. The health care fund has a little more, too, another 20-some billion as I remember.
这有点有趣。通用汽车的养老金基金大约有 900 亿美元。医疗保健基金也有多一点，我记得还有 20 多亿美元。
The whole equity of General Motors is selling for about 14 billion. So after all these years, there’s 90 billion set aside for the retirees, and there’s 14 billion of equity value that’s been heading south for the owners.
通用汽车的全部股权售价约为 140 亿美元。所以经过这些年，为退休人员预留了 900 亿美元，而股东的股权价值为 140 亿美元，并且一直在下降。
And, it would seem that if General Motors had a steel contract that called for — let’s say there’s a ton of steel in every car — and I’m not saying there is — and if they were paying $2,000 a ton over market — or what their competitors were paying — people would say that that is not a viable situation for the long term.
而且，似乎如果通用汽车有一个钢铁合同，比如说每辆车有一吨钢——我并不是说确实有——如果他们支付的价格比市场价或竞争对手支付的价格高出每吨 2000 美元，人们会说这在长期来看不是一个可行的情况。
But they’re in a similar situation because the contracts they voluntarily signed.
但他们处于类似的情况，因为他们自愿签署了合同。
And part of the reason they signed those — and undoubtedly — was that they bore no accounting consequences at the time.
部分原因是他们签署了这些协议——毫无疑问——是因为当时没有会计后果。
It’s a terrible mistake for managers not to think in terms of reality rather than the accounting numbers.
管理者不从现实而是从会计数字的角度思考是一个严重的错误。
But back in the ’60s, you did not have to account for pensions on an accrual basis. And up till the ’90s, you didn’t have to account for health care — or the late ’80s, whenever it was — on an accrual basis.
但在 60 年代，你不需要以应计制计算养老金。直到 90 年代，你也不需要以应计制计算医疗保健——或者是 80 年代末，不管是什么时候。
And so people said, “Well, if we don’t have to count it, it isn’t real.” Well, believe me, it’s real. And the managers today are facing the consequences of that.
所以人们说：“好吧，如果我们不必计算它，那它就不是真的。” 相信我，它是真的。而今天的管理者正在面对这一后果。
So, you know, they’ve got very tough hands to play.
所以，你知道，他们有非常难打的牌。
And, you know, I read about it in the papers. I don’t know what’s going on there necessarily, but something will have to — in my view — something will have to give in that matter.
而且，你知道，我在报纸上读到了这件事。我不一定知道那里发生了什么，但在我看来，在这个问题上必须有所改变。
And before you answer the asbestos thing, Charlie, what do you think about them?
在你回答石棉问题之前，查理，你对他们怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren gave a very optimistic prognosis — (laughter) — in my view.
查理·芒格：在我看来，沃伦给出了一个非常乐观的预测——（笑声）。
I think — just because it hasn’t happened yet doesn’t mean that the problem isn’t real.
我认为——仅仅因为它还没有发生，并不意味着问题不是真实的。
If you jump out of the window on the 42nd floor, and you’re still doing fine on the way down as you pass the 20th — (laughter) — it doesn’t mean you don’t have a serious problem. (Laughter)
如果你从 42 楼的窗户跳出去，在下落过程中经过第 20 层时仍然感觉良好——（笑声）——这并不意味着你没有严重的问题。（笑声）
If I were the governor of Michigan, or the president of the United States, or a director of General Motors or Ford, or a family member of Ford, I would want to address the problem right now.
如果我是密歇根州州长，或者是美国总统，或者是通用汽车或福特的董事，或者是福特的家庭成员，我会想立即解决这个问题。
I do not think it’s getting better or that Yehuda is going to come over the mountain with a magic wand and make it go away. I think it would be better faced.
我不认为情况会好转，也不认为耶胡达会带着魔杖翻过山来让它消失。我认为最好是直面它。
WARREN BUFFETT: You want to try the asbestos? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你想试试石棉吗？（笑声）
Give us another cheery — (Laughter)
再给我们一个欢呼——（笑声）
Around the office he’s known as Pollyanna. (Laughter)
在办公室里，他被称为乐天派。（笑声）
36. Munger: “Terrible” and “gutless” behavior led to asbestos problem
芒格：“可怕”和“无胆”的行为导致了石棉问题
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the asbestos thing has involved terrible behavior by some lying doctors, terrible behavior by a bunch of lawyers who suborned perjury, and gutless behavior by certain important courts, and even more gutless behavior by politicians who take care of themselves first, naturally.
查理·芒格：嗯，石棉事件涉及一些撒谎医生的可怕行为，一群律师教唆作伪证的可怕行为，以及某些重要法院的懦弱行为，甚至还有政客们自私自利的更懦弱行为，这些都是很自然的。
And it’s — these are the forces that are bearing on the problem. It’s obviously not going to be handled very well. So, it’s a perfectly terrible situation. You keep hoping that it will be so obviously bad that it will finally be addressed.
这就是影响问题的力量。显然，这个问题不会得到很好地处理。所以，这是一个非常糟糕的情况。你一直希望它会糟糕到显而易见的程度，以至于最终会得到解决。
Some of that happened in California. The workmen’s comp system in California had immense fraud in it, particularly egregious fraud by lots of doctors and lots of lawyers and lots of claimants. And it was so awful that it affected the whole employment prospects in California.
加利福尼亚发生了一些这样的事情。加利福尼亚的工人赔偿系统存在巨大的欺诈行为，特别是许多医生、律师和索赔人进行的极其恶劣的欺诈行为。这种情况糟糕到影响了加利福尼亚的整体就业前景。
And with the [California Governor Arnold] Schwarzenegger revolution, that was partly corrected — I would say maybe 15 percent corrected. And, but it took —
随着[加州州长阿诺德]施瓦辛格的改革，这个问题部分得到了纠正——我会说大约纠正了 15%。但是，这花费了——
WARREN BUFFETT: Five hundred pushups, Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特：五百个俯卧撑，查理。
CHARLIE MUNGER: What? 查理·芒格：什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Five hundred pushups unless it’s 100 percent. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：五百个俯卧撑，除非是百分之百。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: So, I think that if it gets bad enough, there is some possibility there will be more correction.
查理·芒格：所以，我认为如果情况变得足够糟糕，有可能会有更多的调整。
In a sense, it’s totally crazy for a court system to be paying tons of money to people that have smoked two packs of cigarettes all their life and have one little spot on a lung that no honest doctor would know what the hell it caused.
从某种意义上说，法院系统为那些一辈子抽两包烟的人支付大量金钱是完全疯狂的，而这些人肺上有一个小斑点，没有诚实的医生会知道到底是什么引起的。
And they aren’t yet sick, and they’re nearly dead anyway from their other behaviors and longevity.
而且他们还没有生病，但由于其他行为和寿命，他们几乎已经快死了。
And it’s just, it never should have been allowed.
而且，这本不应该被允许。
But once you get a powerful political force, even judges fear consequences. And it’s very easy just to drift along with an evil system.
但是，一旦你获得了强大的政治力量，连法官也会害怕后果。顺应一个邪恶的体制是非常容易的。
Luckily, we aren’t using this particular — there are two kinds of asbestos, one of which is virtually harmless and the other which caused all this damage. And we stopped using the damaging asbestos.
幸运的是，我们没有使用这种特定的——石棉有两种，其中一种几乎无害，另一种则造成了所有这些损害。而我们已经停止使用有害的石棉。
And eventually the asbestos problem will go away. But how many people it will leave in some kind of financial wreckage before the storm is over, I can’t tell.
最终，石棉问题将会消失。但在风暴结束之前，它会让多少人陷入某种财务困境，我无法预料。
I don’t think the last Indian has bit the dust, do you, Warren?
我不认为最后一个印第安人已经倒下了，你觉得呢，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I’m — no.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我——不。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the — but the behavior is so terrible. It’s that kind of behavior that makes me talk about apexes of the civilization.
查理·芒格：我认为——但这种行为太糟糕了。正是这种行为让我谈论文明的顶点。
37. Our successors will provide the “same wonderful lack of oversight”
我们的继任者将提供“同样美妙的缺乏监督”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十二号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Now, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia.
观众成员：现在，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我的名字是马克·拉比诺夫，来自澳大利亚墨尔本。
I think it’s rare for diverse collections of businesses to be successful. And I believe an important part of Berkshire’s success has been your skillful oversight of the wholly-owned subsidiaries.
我认为多元化的企业集合的成功是很少见的。而我相信伯克希尔成功的重要部分是您对全资子公司的巧妙管理。
My question is, what advice would you give to your successor in managing our diverse portfolio of businesses?
我的问题是，您会给您的继任者什么建议来管理我们多元化的业务组合？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it’s a very good point that Charlie and I have been known to rail a bit about companies that go and buy this business and that business. And, of course, that’s exactly what we’ve done ourselves over the years.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，查理和我确实曾经批评过那些到处收购企业的公司。当然，这正是我们多年来自己所做的事情。
I think the motivations have been somewhat different, perhaps, than in many of the cases. And then I think the way we’ve approached it has been different.
我认为动机可能在某种程度上与许多情况有所不同。然后我认为我们处理它的方式也有所不同。
We’ve — we have been reasonably successful although we’ve had some notable failures. But we’ve been reasonably successful in creating a climate where the people who built the businesses continue to run them with the same enthusiasm and energy after they sell to us that they possessed early on.
我们——我们取得了相当的成功，尽管我们也有一些显著的失败。但我们在创造一种氛围方面相当成功，使得那些建立企业的人在卖给我们之后，仍然以他们最初拥有的同样的热情和活力继续经营这些企业。
And I think that you can find all kinds of illustrations in the histories of businesses that are diversified. I mean, Gillette bought 20-some businesses. I remember, back in the ’60s, Coke bought all kinds of businesses.
我认为你可以在多元化企业的历史中找到各种例子。我的意思是，吉列收购了二十多家公司。我记得在 60 年代，可口可乐收购了各种各样的公司。
And certainly the cigarette companies did, all kinds of people. The oil companies for a while were doing it. And generally, the experiences were not very good when they got outside of their own fields.
当然，香烟公司确实这样做了，各种各样的人。石油公司也曾这样做过。而且通常，当他们走出自己的领域时，经历并不是很好。
But I think when those companies bought businesses, they really thought they were going to take them over and run them themselves. And Charlie and I are under no illusions that we can run the businesses that we buy as well as, or nearly as well as, the people that have been running them over time.
但我认为，当那些公司收购企业时，他们真的以为自己会接管并亲自运营这些企业。而查理和我并不幻想我们能像那些长期经营这些企业的人一样好，或者几乎一样好地运营我们所收购的企业。
And, we don’t have group vice presidents that — in Omaha — we don’t have a whole bunch of directives going out. We don’t have companies that were run one way and then we’re going to run them entirely differently, and have them reporting in all kinds of special ways to us, and have a human relations department and a public relations department, then the legal department — all kinds of things in Omaha — telling them how to run their businesses.
而且，我们在奥马哈没有集团副总裁，我们没有发出一大堆指令。我们没有那些以一种方式运营的公司，然后我们会完全不同地运营它们，并让它们以各种特殊的方式向我们报告，并设有人力资源部门和公共关系部门，然后是法律部门——奥马哈的各种部门——告诉他们如何经营他们的业务。
We think that destroys — can destroy — many good businesses — certainly can destroy the incentive of the people that have already gotten rich to stay around and make us rich in turn. So, I think that has been an important difference.
我们认为这会摧毁——可以摧毁——许多优秀的企业——当然也可以摧毁那些已经致富的人留下来并反过来让我们致富的动力。所以，我认为这是一个重要的区别。
I think it’s been demonstrated well enough to all of those around Berkshire that it’s been a very good place, generally, I think, for people, in terms of how they feel about working there. And I think they recognize it works.
我认为，对于伯克希尔周围的所有人来说，这已经很好地证明了它是一个非常好的地方，总的来说，我认为人们对在那里工作感到满意。而且我认为他们认识到这确实有效。
So, the successor, to me, will come from within Berkshire. They will have seen how it worked. They will believe in it. They will be surrounded by people who have worked in this manner. And I don’t think it will be the most difficult job in the world to keep that engine going down the tracks at 90 miles an hour.
所以，对我来说，继任者将来自伯克希尔内部。他们会看到它是如何运作的。他们会相信这一点。他们将被以这种方式工作的人包围。而且我认为要让这台引擎以每小时 90 英里的速度继续前进并不是世界上最困难的工作。
I mean, it isn’t like they have to create the system. They will inherit a system.
我的意思是，他们不需要创建系统。他们将继承一个系统。
And I would be amazed if any of the three successors that we will talk about with the directors on Monday, if any of them would not recognize the inherent special values in the system as it now works and take up one of these other models that clearly has been disastrous for one company after another that’s diversified.
如果我们在周一与董事们讨论的三位继任者中有任何一位不承认当前系统中固有的特殊价值，并采用那些显然对一个又一个多元化公司造成灾难的其他模型，那我会感到惊讶。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t agree with you that the success at Berkshire has come from our oversight of the subsidiary —
查理·芒格：是的。我不同意你说伯克希尔的成功来自于我们对子公司的监督——
WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — companies. It’s come from our lack of oversight of the subsidiary companies. And I think our successors will be able to provide the same wonderful lack of oversight — (laughter) — that we have provided.
查理·芒格：——公司。这是由于我们对子公司的缺乏监管。我认为我们的继任者将能够提供与我们一样出色的监管缺失——（笑声）——正如我们所提供的那样。
And if you’re not going to use a lot of oversight, you’ve got to be very careful in what you bring into your corporate family. And you’ve got to be very careful in treating, honorably and well, the people who are running the businesses over which you’re not giving any oversight to speak of.
如果你不打算进行大量监督，你就必须非常谨慎地选择带入公司大家庭的事物。你还必须非常谨慎地对待那些经营你没有进行任何监督的业务的人，给予他们应有的尊重和良好的待遇。
And I think our system is — it’s very different from a General Electric system. And I think their system works very well for them, but I don’t think it’s the only system in the world that works in corporate capitalism. And I think the Berkshire system will work very well after we’re gone.
我认为我们的系统与通用电气的系统非常不同。我认为他们的系统对他们来说运作得很好，但我不认为这是世界上唯一在企业资本主义中有效的系统。我认为伯克希尔的系统在我们离开后也会运作得很好。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a very simple system. I mean, GE works exceptionally well. But when I go back to some of the conglomerates — and that’s not a term that I shrink from, but most people do because they think it brings down their P/E or something — but we are a conglomerate. And I hope we become more of a conglomerate.
沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个非常简单的系统。我的意思是，通用电气运作得非常好。但当我回顾一些企业集团时——这不是一个我会回避的术语，但大多数人会，因为他们认为这会降低他们的市盈率或其他什么——但我们就是一个企业集团。我希望我们能成为更多的企业集团。
The — we don’t — we haven’t succeeded because we had great complicated systems or some magic formulas we apply or anything. We’ve succeeded because we don’t have — we have simplicity itself.
我们并没有因为有复杂的系统或我们应用的某种魔法公式而成功。我们之所以成功，是因为我们没有复杂性——我们有的就是简单。
We take people that know how to play their game very well, and we let them play the game. And it’s just worked in one field after another. And every now and then we make a mistake. And we’ll — you know, there’ll be more mistakes made.
我们选择那些非常擅长玩他们游戏的人，让他们去玩游戏。这种方法在各个领域都奏效了。而且时不时地我们会犯错。你知道，还会有更多的错误发生。
But overwhelmingly, it works. And it doesn’t require some great business insight or anything like that, in terms of whoever’s running this place, to keep that kind of machine in motion. I mean, it is not complicated.
但总体来说，它是有效的。而且，这并不需要经营这个地方的人具备什么伟大的商业洞察力或类似的东西来维持这种机器的运转。我的意思是，这并不复杂。
The bigger worry would be that the culture would get tampered with in some way and people would try to oversteer, basically.
更大的担忧是文化会以某种方式被篡改，人们会试图过度引导。
But that won’t happen. Our board won’t let it happen. And the ownership won’t let it happen.
但那不会发生。我们的董事会不会让它发生。所有者也不会让它发生。
And I think we’ve got something that’ll work for a very, very, very long time. And that’s why I’m comfortable with the fact that every share I have will go to a foundation that I care about having — getting good financial results in the future.
我认为我们有一些东西可以长期有效运作。这就是为什么我对我所持有的每一股股票都将捐给我关心的基金会感到放心，因为我希望它在未来能获得良好的财务结果。
And I’m quite happy to have them have 100 percent of their money in Berkshire.
我也很乐意让他们将100%的资金投资于伯克希尔。
38. Berkshire’s best-ever investments: GEICO and Ajit Jain
伯克希尔有史以来最好的投资：GEICO 和阿吉特·贾因
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：第一名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jonathan Mills (PH) from London, England.
观众成员：来自英国伦敦的乔纳森·米尔斯（PH）。
What has been the single best investment of your careers? And why do you consider it to be the best, excluding Berkshire Hathaway itself?
在您的职业生涯中，哪项投资是最好的？为什么您认为它是最好的，排除伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司本身？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well probably the best investment, if you’re talking about business, was getting Charlie as a partner. And he works cheap, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，可能最佳的投资，如果你谈论的是业务，那就是让查理成为我的合作伙伴。他的工作成本也很低。（笑声）
The — we’ve had — you can’t measure it by dollar terms because, obviously, we’re doing bigger things now than early on.
我们已经——你不能用美元来衡量它，因为显然，我们现在做的事情比早期要大得多。
I mean, See’s was an enormously important part of our success. It doesn’t contribute a huge percentage of our net income now, but it provided income that let us buy other things in the past. It taught us a lot of lessons about business, all kinds of things.
例如，See’s糖果在我们成功中占据了极其重要的部分。虽然现在它对我们的净收入贡献并不大，但它为我们过去的其他投资提供了收入，并教会了我们许多商业经验，诸如此类。
So, we’ve — probably, in terms of what it’s done already and where it’s going to go over time, probably the single best investment was the first half of GEICO, which we purchased for $40 million. Now the second half cost us 2 billion. I’m glad I didn’t buy it in thirds. (Laughter)
所以，我们——可能就它已经完成的事情以及未来的发展而言，可能最好的单笔投资是我们以 4000 万美元购买的 GEICO 的前一半。现在，后一半花费了我们 20 亿美元。我很高兴我没有分成三部分购买。（笑声）
But, you know, that 40 million will — for half the company — will turn out very well.
但是，你知道，那 4000 万——对于公司的一半——结果会非常好。
But GEICO — some of our businesses have growth potential, some don’t. And we don’t require growth potential as part of a business.
但 GEICO——我们的一些业务有增长潜力，一些没有。我们不要求业务必须有增长潜力。
If a business makes good money and we can use it to buy other businesses, one of the advantages of the Berkshire system is we have a tax efficient and kind of frictionless way of moving money to the best opportunities. And GEICO, internally, has still enormous possibilities for growth.
如果一家公司赚了很多钱，我们可以用它来收购其他公司，伯克希尔体系的一个优势是我们有一种税收高效且几乎无摩擦的方式将资金转移到最佳机会。而 GEICO 在内部仍然有巨大的增长潜力。
Incidentally, we’ve — you know, I watched that movie and I kept touting the American Express card. But here is our GEICO card, which I’m sure all of you are eligible for.
顺便说一下，我看了那部电影，并一直在宣传美国运通卡。但这是我们的 GEICO 卡，我相信你们所有人都有资格获得。
And I don’t advise people using credit cards to revolve. But the truth is that people do, so use a GEICO card if you’re going to behave in — if you’re going to charge anything.
我不建议人们使用信用卡循环借款。但事实是人们确实这样做，所以如果你要这样做的话，就使用 GEICO 卡。
I still advise you to pay off your account before it starts revolving. And I think it’s a terrible mistake for people to get hooked on revolving credit at high interest rates.
我仍然建议你在账户开始循环之前还清账单。而且我认为人们沉迷于高利率的循环信贷是一个可怕的错误。
And I — that’s the first thing I tell students is that, if they don’t remember anything else I say, just, you know, don’t fool around with charge cards and run up balances that keep getting larger and larger.
我告诉学生的第一件事就是，如果他们不记得我说的其他任何事情，只要记住，不要随便使用信用卡并累积越来越多的余额。
But GEICO — GEICO has well over six million customers now. As was mentioned, we entered New Jersey last year. We’re adding very rapidly there. It’s a great, great business model.
但 GEICO——GEICO 现在拥有超过六百万客户。如前所述，我们去年进入了新泽西州。我们在那里发展得非常迅速。这是一个非常出色的商业模式。
And it’s run by a superb human being and businessman, Tony Nicely. And I think it’s got a huge potential. But I love them all.
它由一位出色的人和商人托尼·奈斯利经营。我认为它有巨大的潜力。但我爱他们所有人。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but GEICO, after all, cost $2 billion for the second half and —
查理·芒格：不过，毕竟 GEICO 花费了 20 亿美元用于下半部分，而且——
WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — a significant number of tens of millions for the first half.
查理·芒格：——前半部分花费了数千万。
Now the search expenses that brought us Ajit Jain, now there was an investment that really paid a dividend. I can think of no higher return investment that we’ve ever made that was better than that one. (Applause)
现在，寻找阿吉特·贾因的费用，现在那是一项真正带来回报的投资。我想不出我们曾经做过的任何投资比这更高回报的了。（掌声）
And I think that’s a good life lesson. In other words, getting the right people into your system can frequently be more important than anything else.
我认为这是一个很好的生活教训。换句话说，把合适的人引入你的体系往往比其他任何事情都更重要。
39. NYSE should not being trying to earn a profit
纽约证券交易所不应该试图盈利
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s try number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。让我们试试第二个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Maggie Gilliam (PH) from New York City.
观众成员：我是来自纽约市的玛吉·吉利安（PH）。
As someone who visited the New York Stock Exchange at a very early age and have been touting its merits over the years, could you comment a little bit about what you think of the shenanigans going on currently?
作为一个在很小的时候就参观过纽约证券交易所并多年来一直宣扬其优点的人，您能否稍微评论一下您对当前正在发生的恶作剧的看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Where? 查理·芒格：哪里？
WARREN BUFFETT: At the exchange.
沃伦·巴菲特：在交易所。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh. 查理·芒格：哦。
Warren, you’re so good at this. (Laughter)
沃伦，你真擅长这个。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You mean at shenanigans or —
沃伦·巴菲特：你是指恶作剧还是——
I personally think it would be better if the New York Stock Exchange remained as a neutral — and it’s not strictly a non-profit, it’ll earn some money — but as a not-for-big-profit, we’ll put it, institution.
我个人认为，纽约证券交易所最好保持中立——严格来说，它并不是非营利组织，它会赚一些钱——但可以说是一个不以大盈利为目的的机构。
I mean, the exchange has done a very good job over centuries. It’s one of the most important institutions in the world. And the enemy of investment performance is activity. And the creator of profit in a profit-minded exchange is activity.
我的意思是，交易所几个世纪以来做得非常好。它是世界上最重要的机构之一。而投资业绩的敌人是交易活动。盈利导向的交易所的创造者则是交易活动。
So, I personally would rather not have an exchange which is trying to increase its earnings per share annually, and thereby wanting to encourage people to trade more actively and create more income for itself.
所以，我个人宁愿不选择一个试图每年增加每股收益的交易所，从而希望鼓励人们更积极地交易并为自己创造更多收入。
That will not be, in my view, good for the American investor. So, I think that the exchange of yesterday may be better for the American investor than what looks like it may be the exchange of the tomorrow.
在我看来，这对美国投资者并不好。因此，我认为昨日的交易所可能对美国投资者更有利，而不是看起来明天的交易所。
Now there may be all kinds of reasons that are — people find compelling why they want to turn it into a for-profit exchange.
现在可能有各种各样的原因让人们觉得有必要将其转变为一个营利性交易所。
But I know the American investor will not be better off if volume doubles on the New York Stock Exchange.
但我知道，如果纽约证券交易所的交易量翻倍，美国投资者不会因此受益。
And I know that the New York Stock Exchange as a for-profit institution would be trying to figure out ways to have that volume increase and to perhaps even charge more money one way or the other.
我知道，作为一个营利性机构，纽约证券交易所会试图找出方法来增加交易量，甚至可能通过某种方式收取更多费用。
I mean, you know, the profit of an exchange, the profit of the people working on them, in a sense that’s the frictional cost of capitalism. That’s coming out of the earnings of the businesses.
我的意思是，你知道，交易所的利润，工作人员的利润，从某种意义上说是资本主义的摩擦成本。这是从企业的收益中扣除的。
And, you know, IBM or General Motors or General Electric will not earn more money because their stock turns over more frequently.
而且，你知道，IBM、通用汽车或通用电气不会因为他们的股票更频繁地周转而赚更多的钱。
But a for-profit exchange will earn more money. And I do not like the idea of the exchange getting on the side that’s against the long-term interest of investors.
但是一个营利性交易所会赚更多的钱。而且我不喜欢交易所站在与投资者长期利益相悖的一方。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I feel, on this one, the same as you do with — much more strongly.
查理·芒格：嗯，我对这个问题的感觉和你一样，只是更强烈。
I think we have lost our way when people like the governors of the stock exchange and the CEO fail to realize that they had a duty to the rest of us to act as exemplars, there was — of the right behaviors.
我认为，当像证券交易所的管理者和首席执行官这样的人未能意识到他们有责任为我们其他人树立榜样时，我们就迷失了方向，应该表现出正确的行为。
Once your activity is that freighted with public significance, I think you’ve got a duty to create the right appearances. You have a duty as an exemplar.
一旦你的活动具有如此重大的公共意义，我认为你有责任创造正确的形象。你有作为榜样的责任。
I mean, you do not want your first grade school teacher to be fornicating on the floor or drinking booze in the classroom or —
我的意思是，你不希望你一年级的老师在地板上乱搞或者在教室里喝酒或者——
And similarly, you — I don’t think you want your stock exchange to be all over the headlines with wretched excess. And I certainly don’t think you want to turn the major stock exchange of the country into even more of a casino than it is already.
同样地，我认为你也不希望你的证券交易所因过度行为而频繁登上头条。我当然不认为你想把国家的主要证券交易所变得比现在更像一个赌场。
I think we have totally lost our way on this stuff. And I agree with Warren that it ought to be — (applause) — a public institution that cares deeply about its duties as exemplar.
我认为我们在这些事情上完全迷失了方向。我同意沃伦的观点，它应该是一个非常关心其作为榜样职责的公共机构。
WARREN BUFFETT: I wish I’d gone to first grade where he did. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我希望我能去他上的一年级。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t hear that.
查理·芒格：我没听到。
WARREN BUFFETT: I said I wish I’d gone to first grade where you did.
沃伦·巴菲特：我说我希望我上的是你那所小学。
40. Buffett (D) and Munger (R) both endorse Social Security
巴菲特（D）和芒格（R）都支持社会保障
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. My name is Glen Strong (PH). I’m from Canton, Ohio. I want to extend a warm thank you to Warren’s daughter, Susan, for the fine introduction that she provided for this gathering.
观众成员：下午好，先生们。我的名字是格伦·斯特朗（音）。我来自俄亥俄州的坎顿。我想向沃伦的女儿苏珊表示衷心的感谢，感谢她为这次聚会提供了精彩的介绍。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Also, a special thank you to your wife, Susan. I thank her for the contributions that she made to the company and for the outstanding example that she obviously set for her husband and the many people that she must have come into contact with. (Applause)
观众成员：另外，特别感谢您的妻子苏珊。我感谢她为公司所做的贡献，以及她显然为她的丈夫和她必定接触过的许多人树立的杰出榜样。（掌声）
Today, I’m asking for your opinion on Social Security. Shall we call it the government-sponsored Ponzi scheme for retirees?
今天，我想征求你对社会保障的看法。我们是否应该称其为政府资助的退休人员庞氏骗局？
I am interested in your views on private accounts, age adjustments for retirees, and tax adjustments for the employees. What would you promote if you were in the Oval Office? Thank you.
我对您关于私人账户、退休人员年龄调整和员工税收调整的看法感兴趣。如果您在椭圆形办公室，您会提倡什么？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the Social Security was introduced in the, what, ’36 or ’37. My grandfather used to have Charlie bring two pennies to work at the Buffett & Son Grocery Store on Saturday in order to pay his share of Social Security.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，社会保障是在 1936 年或 1937 年引入的。我祖父过去常让查理在星期六带两分钱到巴菲特父子杂货店，以支付他那份社会保障。
Didn’t want Charlie getting any false ideas that there was a free lunch in this world. And he gave him a half-hour lecture on the evils of socialism. So, we’ve had a lot of exposure to Social Security, the various arguments on it.
不想让查理产生任何这个世界上有免费午餐的错误想法。他给他讲了半小时关于社会主义弊端的课。所以，我们对社会保障以及围绕它的各种争论有了很多了解。
It was proposed, of course, as insurance, because basically that was the only way [President Franklin] Roosevelt could get it passed. The idea of transfer payments did not — would not have washed in the ’30s, certainly.
当然，这是作为保险提出的，因为基本上这是[总统富兰克林]罗斯福唯一能让它通过的方式。转移支付的想法在 30 年代是行不通的，当然不会。
You know, and I think the first woman that received a Social Security check paid in a total of $22 or something and got 2,400. So, it wasn’t insurance. It wasn’t insurance at all.
你知道，我认为第一个领取社会保障支票的女性总共支付了 22 美元左右，却得到了 2400 美元。所以，这不是保险。这根本不是保险。
And the transfer payment by the people who are in their productive years to the people who are past their productive years — and we’ll get into definitial require — terms as to whether it’s 65 or 67 now, you’re past productive years — but essentially it’s a transfer payment.
在生产年龄段的人向超过生产年龄段的人进行转移支付——我们将深入探讨定义要求——无论是 65 岁还是 67 岁，现在你已超过生产年龄段——但本质上这是一种转移支付。
I basically believe that anything that would take Social Security payments below their present guaranteed level is a mistake.
我基本上认为，任何将社会保障支付降低到目前的保障水平以下的做法都是错误的。
I think that in this country — extraordinarily rich country — that the people in their productive years can take care of those outside in both areas, even though the ratio of productive to non-productive has changed and is changing.
我认为在这个国家——一个极其富有的国家——在生产年龄段的人可以照顾到这两个领域之外的人，尽管生产性与非生产性人口的比例已经改变并正在改变。
But we take care of our young. And a rich country takes care of its young and it takes care of its old.
但我们照顾我们的年轻人。一个富裕的国家会照顾它的年轻人，也会照顾它的老人。
And incidentally, taking care of its young, when we educate five children in the family, we don’t expect that family to pay, you know, five times the tax or something like that.
顺便说一下，照顾孩子时，当我们在一个家庭中教育五个孩子时，我们并不期望那个家庭支付五倍的税款或类似的东西。
We recognize that in taking care of the young, that it should not be based on a per capita basis or based on the size of the family. We provide good school — we try to provide good schools — and health and everything for the young overall as part of our overall responsibility.
我们认识到，在照顾年轻人时，不应以人均或家庭规模为基础。我们提供好的学校——我们努力提供好的学校——以及健康和一切作为我们整体责任的一部分来照顾年轻人。
I believe that a rich country should be doing the same for the older people. There are — you know, Charlie and I came into this world wired in a way that enables us to get very, very, very rich — rich far beyond any possible needs that we could have. And not everybody’s wired the same way.
我相信，一个富裕的国家应该为老年人做同样的事情。你知道，查理和我来到这个世界时的思维方式使我们能够变得非常非常非常富有——富有得远远超出我们可能的需求。而不是每个人的思维方式都一样。
Now if you come into this world wired with an I.Q. of 85 or something of the sort, or disabled or whatever it may be, you know, you are not going to do as well in a market economy, remotely as well, as we do.
现在，如果你来到这个世界时的智商是 85 或者类似的水平，或者有残疾或其他情况，你知道的，在市场经济中，你的表现不会像我们这样好，甚至远远不如。
But you still provide much of what makes Charlie and I very rich. And, you know, and when it comes to fighting in Iraq or something of the sort, you know, then that becomes an equal opportunity type thing. But when it comes to making a lot of money, it’s not equal opportunity in this country.
但你们仍然提供了很多让查理和我非常富有的东西。而且，你知道，当涉及到在伊拉克作战或类似的事情时，那就变成了一种平等机会的事情。但是，当涉及到赚很多钱时，这个国家就没有平等机会。
So I believe that a rich country like ours should not give lower benefits than what takes place now. And I certainly don’t think that — and we’ve got all kinds of mechanisms for saving that are extremely good.
所以我相信，像我们这样富裕的国家不应该提供比现在更低的福利。我当然不认为——而且我们有各种非常好的储蓄机制。
We have 401(k)s in the country. We have taxes on dividends and capital gains at 15 percent, so the money I earn gets taxed at a lower rate than the money that a receptionist in our office may earn.
在我们国家，我们有 401(k)计划。我们的股息和资本利得税率为 15%，所以我赚的钱的税率比我们办公室接待员赚的钱的税率要低。
And I would not be doing so well if I were stuck over in Bangladesh or someplace. So this society is providing huge benefits to me that other societies would not.
如果我被困在孟加拉国或其他地方，我就不会过得这么好。所以这个社会为我提供了其他社会无法提供的巨大好处。
And I think that the obligation for the people who do well in this society is to provide a reasonable level of sustenance for those beyond their productive years.
我认为，在这个社会中做得好的人有义务为那些超出其生产年龄的人提供合理的生活保障。
We’ve got the capability to do it. You know, right now we quit taxing for Social Security at $90,000. But — and that means that everybody in my office is paying — or most of them — are paying 12.4 — 12.2 or 12.4 percent, counting what the company contributes, toward this.
我们有能力做到这一点。你知道，现在我们在 9 万美元的收入上停止征收社会保障税。但这意味着我办公室里的每个人——或者大多数人——都在支付 12.4%或 12.2%，包括公司贡献的部分，用于这个。
People talk about double taxation of dividends; they’re getting taxed for Social Security and they’re getting taxed for income on their income. And they’re paying a higher rate, or an equal rate overall, in many cases, to the same rate — compared to the rate that I pay. And I think that’s sort of nonsense in this society.
人们谈论股息的双重征税；他们为社会保障缴税，他们为收入缴税。而且在很多情况下，他们支付的总体税率更高或相同，与我支付的税率相比。我认为在这个社会中，这有点荒谬。
So, I don’t want to do anything — anything — that hurts the level of the bottom 20 or 30 percent, in terms of their income.
所以，我不想做任何伤害底层 20%或 30%收入水平的事情。
I see people living with fear about health care or living with fear about running out of money in their old age. And I think a society should try to minimize the fear that their inhabitants experience.
我看到人们对医疗保健感到恐惧，或者对年老时钱不够用感到恐惧。我认为一个社会应该努力减少其居民所经历的恐惧。
And that doesn’t mean just fear of getting mugged or something. It means fear that the last 25 years of their life, they’re not going to have much income.
这不仅仅意味着害怕被抢劫或其他事情。这意味着害怕在他们生命的最后 25 年里，他们不会有太多收入。
So, I would — and the degree to which the administration or other people are worrying about the deficit in Social Security 25 years out, when they have a $500 billion deficit excluding the Social Security surplus now, I mean, just strikes me as nonsense. (Applause)
所以，我会——而且目前的政府或其他人正在担心社会保障在25年后会出现的赤字，而目前他们的赤字是5000亿美元（不包括社会保障盈余），我认为这简直是胡说。（掌声）
Here we are deploring something that’s going to happen in 20 years that’s a fraction of what is happening right now while they’re cheering, you know, basically, and talking about further favoritism in the tax laws.
在我们这儿，正在谴责一件将在20年后发生的事情，而这只是目前发生的情况的一小部分，同时他们却在鼓掌，并谈论进一步的税收优惠。
So, I have great trouble with people that say, you know, that this system can’t sustain — right now, 4 and a fraction percent of our GDP goes to Social Security.
所以，我对那些说这个系统无法维持的人感到非常困扰——目前，我们的 GDP 中有 4%多一点用于社会保障。
Fifty years from now, 6 percent — no, 6 and a fraction percent — well, believe me, our GDP will be far larger 50 years from now. And going from 4 percent to 6 percent does not strike me as a terrible prospect.
五十年后，6%——不，6 点几——相信我，我们的 GDP 在五十年后会大得多。从 4%到 6%在我看来并不是一个可怕的前景。
If you ask me what I would do to change it now, I would means test it. I would lift the $90,000 way up. In fact, I might apply it, you know, on all income. Then you’d really get people’s attention.
如果你问我现在会做什么来改变它，我会进行收入测试。我会把90,000美元的门槛大幅提高。实际上，我可能会将其适用于所有收入。那样你真的会引起人们的注意。
But — and I would gradually — and we’re in the process of doing this — but I would certainly increase the retirement age. I mean, the world in 2005 is much different than the world in 1937, in terms of longevity prospects and the ability to function productively.
但是——而且我会逐渐——我们正在进行这个过程——但我肯定会提高退休年龄。我的意思是，2005 年的世界在长寿前景和生产能力方面与 1937 年的世界大不相同。
Charlie, what do you say?
查理，你怎么说？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s the view from Berkshire’s Democratic chairman. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：嗯，那是伯克希尔民主党主席的观点。（笑声和掌声）
And the odd part of Berkshire on this issue is that the right-wing Republican who is speaking feels more strongly than Warren that the Republicans are out of their cotton-picking minds to be — (applause) — taking on this issue right now.
伯克希尔在这个问题上的奇怪之处在于，正在发言的右翼共和党人比沃伦更强烈地认为，共和党人现在在处理这个问题时简直是疯了。
I do not — If the country is going to get richer at 1 or 2 percent per annum for a long time ahead, and it’s going to have more old people who are living longer and spending money on medical care, the idea that eventually a higher share of GDP would be going through Social Security to retirees and so on than we now have is not anathema to me.
我不——如果国家在未来很长一段时间内每年增长 1%或 2%，并且会有更多的老年人活得更久并在医疗保健上花费更多，那么最终通过社会保障给退休人员的 GDP 份额比现在更高的想法对我来说并不令人反感。
It’s exactly — it’s an exactly logical way to be spending money under different circumstances.
这正是——在不同情况下合理支出资金的方式。
And if the government runs out a little short of money as it gets more Social Security obligations, I see nothing wrong with having some consumption taxes or whatever to pay in a reasonable way for what is a very reasonable expenditure.
如果政府在承担更多社会保障义务时资金有些短缺，我认为通过一些消费税或其他方式来合理支付这笔非常合理的开支没有什么不妥。
Social Security is very successful. Apart from the disability element, which is relatively small, there’s practically no fraud. It’s hard to fake being dead. (Laughter)
社会保障非常成功。除了相对较小的残疾部分，几乎没有欺诈。假装死亡是很难的。（笑声）
And furthermore, it’s a reward for work. All kinds of people are working in this country because they want to eventually qualify for Social Security, just as many people are doing dangerous military service because they want the pension that will come eventually.
而且，这是一种工作的回报。这个国家的各种人都在工作，因为他们希望最终能获得社会保障，就像许多人从事危险的军事服务，因为他们想要最终获得的养老金。
So, Social Security is a very capitalistic institution with profoundly good effects. It’s one of the most successful things the government has ever done in terms of efficiency and good effects.
所以，社会保障是一个非常资本主义的机构，具有极好的效果。就效率和良好效果而言，这是政府做过的最成功的事情之一。
And a Republican administration that may shortly have to do something really unpleasant, like face down North Korea or Iran over atom bombs, is wasting its good will over some twaddle that a bunch of economists that haven’t thought it through properly devoutly believe? It’s a very sad occurrence. (Applause)
而一个可能很快就不得不做一些非常不愉快事情的共和党政府，比如在原子弹问题上与朝鲜或伊朗对峙，正在浪费他们的良好意愿，去解决一堆一群没有深入思考的经济学家们认为非常重要的问题？这是一件非常悲哀的事情。（掌声）
41. Don’t blame the ratings agencies
不要责怪评级机构
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Bill Ackman from New York, New York.
观众成员：谢谢。比尔·阿克曼，来自纽约，纽约。
Four of the handful of triple-A rated companies — AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and MBIA — are under formal investigation for accounting shenanigans and are in the process of restating their financials.
四家获得三A 评级的公司——AIG、房利美、房地美和 MBIA——正因会计违规行为接受正式调查，并正在重新编制其财务报表。
Like Charlie said before, I think of a triple-A rated company as an exemplar, a company that should behave with the highest accounting and ethical standards.
正如查理之前所说，我认为一家三 A 级公司是一个典范，一家公司应该以最高的会计和道德标准行事。
My questions this leads me to are, how can investors comfortably invest in any financial service company when even — when a decent percentage of the triple-A rated companies have false and misleading financials?
我的问题是，投资者如何能放心地投资于任何金融服务公司，即使是那些获得三 A 级评级的公司中也有相当一部分存在虚假和误导性的财务信息？
And I guess the follow-up question is, why don’t the rating agencies do some independent due diligence from an accounting standpoint so that they can help serve as a watch on this issue?
我想接下来的问题是，为什么评级机构不从会计角度进行一些独立的尽职调查，以便帮助监督这个问题呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, financial companies are more difficult to analyze than many companies.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，金融公司比许多公司更难分析。
I mean, the — it is more — if you take the insurance business, you know, the biggest single element that is very difficult to evaluate, even if you own the company, is the loss and loss adjustment expense reserve.
我的意思是，——更——如果你看保险业务，你知道，即使你拥有公司，最难评估的最大单一因素是损失和损失调整费用准备金。
And that has a huge impact on reported earnings of any given period. And the shorter the period, the more the impact can be from just small changes in assumptions.
这对任何特定时期的报告收益都有巨大影响。而且，时间越短，来自假设的小变化对报告利润的影响可能越大。
You know, we carry, we’ll say 45 billion of loss reserves. But, you know, if I had to bet my life on whether 45 billion turned out to be a little over or a little under, I mean, it’d be a — I’d think a long time.
你知道，我们持有，我们会说 450 亿的损失准备金。但是，你知道，如果我必须赌上我的生命来判断 450 亿是多了一点还是少了一点，我的意思是，我会考虑很长时间。
And you could just as easily have a figure of 45 1/2 billion or 44 1/2 billion. And if you were concerned about reporting given earnings in a given period, that would be an easy game to play.
你同样可以得到 455 亿或 445 亿的数字。如果你关心在特定时期报告特定收益，那将是一个容易玩的游戏。
In a bank, you know, it basically is whether the loans are any good. And I’ve been on the boards of banks. And that’s — you know, I’ve gotten surprises. It’s tough to tell.
在银行，你知道，基本上就是贷款是否良好。我曾在银行的董事会任职。我也遇到过一些意外。这很难判断。
It’s — financial companies — if you’re analyzing something like WD-40, you know, or See’s Candy, or our brick business, or whatever, you know, they may have good or bad prospects but you’re not likely to be fooling yourself much about what’s going on currently. But with financial institutions, it’s much tougher.
这是——金融公司——如果你在分析像 WD-40、See's Candy 或我们的砖块业务之类的东西，你知道，它们可能有好的或坏的前景，但你不太可能在当前的情况上自欺欺人。但是对于金融机构来说，这要困难得多。
Then you add — throw in derivatives on top of it, and, you know, it’s — no one probably knows, you know, perfectly, what some of the — or even within a reasonable range — the exact condition of some of the biggest, you know, banks in the world.
然后你再加上——在此基础上加入衍生品，而且，你知道，可能没有人确切知道，一些——甚至在合理范围内——世界上一些最大银行的确切状况。
And — but that brings you back to the due diligence question of the agencies. You had very high-grade, very smart — financially smart — people on the boards of both Freddie and Fannie. And yet, you know, one was five billion and one was apparently nine billion.
这就回到了对机构尽职调查的问题。你在房利美和房地美的董事会中都有非常高素质、非常聪明——在财务上非常聪明——的人。然而，你知道，一个是五十亿，另一个显然是九十亿。
Those are big numbers. And I don’t think those people were negligent. And it’s just, it’s very, very tough to know precisely what’s going on in a financial institution.
那些数字很大。我不认为那些人是疏忽的。要准确了解金融机构中发生的事情是非常非常困难的。
Charlie and I were directors of Salomon [Brothers]. And Charlie was on the audit committee. And I forget the size of a few of those things that you found. But, you know, what wasn’t found — and that doesn’t mean that people below are crooks or anything like that.
查理和我是所罗门兄弟公司的董事。查理是审计委员会的成员。我忘记了你发现的那些事情的具体规模。但是，你知道，未被发现的事情——这并不意味着下面的人是骗子或类似的东西。
It just means that it’s very tough with thousands and thousands and thousands of complicated transactions, sometimes involving — the computations involving — multiple variables, it can be very hard to figure out where things stand at any given moment.
这只是意味着在成千上万的复杂交易中，有时涉及多个变量的计算，可能很难在任何给定时刻弄清楚事情的状况。
And, of course, when the numbers get huge on both sides, and you get small changes in these huge numbers, they have this incredible effect on quarterly or yearly figures because it all comes lumped in — those adjustments — come lumped in a short period of time.
当然，当双方的数字都变得巨大时，即使这些巨大数字有微小的变化，也会对季度或年度数据产生巨大影响，因为所有这些调整都会集中在短时间内。
So I just think you have to accept the fact that insurance, banking, finance companies — we’ve seen all kinds of finance company — both frauds and just big mistakes over time — of just one after another over the years.
所以我认为你必须接受这样一个事实，即保险、银行、金融公司——我们见过各种各样的金融公司——多年来接连不断地出现欺诈和重大错误。
And the — it’s just a more dangerous field to analyze. It doesn’t mean you can’t make money in it. We’ve made a lot of money on it. But it’s difficult.
而且——这只是一个更危险的领域来分析。这并不意味着你不能在其中赚钱。我们在这上面赚了很多钱。但这很困难。
Now, obviously a GEICO, where you’re insuring pretty much the same thing — auto drivers — and you get — your statistics are much more valid in something like that than they will be if you’re taking something that — like asbestos liability — you’re subject to far greater errors in estimation.
现在，很明显在像 GEICO 这样的公司中，你基本上为相同的东西——汽车驾驶员——投保，你得到的统计数据在这种情况下要比在处理像石棉责任这样的事情时更为有效，因为后者在估算中容易出现更大的误差。
Doesn’t mean that people aren’t operating in good faith. But, you know, I would take — just take the asbestos estimates of the 20 largest insurance companies. I will bet you they’re way off, but I don’t know in which direction. And that’s sort of the nature of financial companies.
这并不意味着人们不是在善意行事。但是，你知道，我会拿——就拿 20 家最大保险公司的石棉估算来说。我敢打赌他们的估算大错特错，但我不知道是哪个方向。这就是金融公司的本质。
I wouldn’t fault the rating agencies in terms of not being able to dig into the financials and find things that —
我不会责怪评级机构无法深入财务状况并发现问题——
You know, all of the companies that you’ve talked about have had big name auditors. And our auditors at Berkshire, how many hours did they spend last year?
你知道，你提到的所有公司都有知名的审计师。而我们在伯克希尔的审计师，去年花了多少小时？
You know, I don’t know whether — what it would be, probably 60, 70,000 hours. And I’m sure at other — you know, if you take major banks, they’re spending more than that. But, you know, can they be certain of the numbers? I doubt it.
你知道，我不知道会是多少，可能是六万到七万小时。我确信其他——你知道，如果你看主要银行，他们花费的时间比这还多。但是，你知道，他们能确定这些数字吗？我对此表示怀疑。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Warren is obviously correct that where you’ve got complexity, which by its very nature provides better opportunities to be mistaken and not have it come to notice, or to be fraudulent and have it not be found out, you’re going to get more fraud and mistakes than you are if you’re selling a business where you shovel sand out of the river and sell it by the truckload.
查理·芒格：是的。沃伦显然是正确的，当你有复杂性时，这种复杂性本质上提供了更多的机会让错误不被注意到，或者进行欺诈而不被发现，你会比在经营一个从河里铲沙然后按卡车出售的生意中遇到更多的欺诈和错误。
And just as a business that sells natural gas is going to have more explosions than a business that sells sand, a business like these major financial institutions, by its nature, is going to have way more problems.
就像销售天然气的企业比销售沙子的企业更容易发生爆炸一样，这些大型金融机构这样的企业，因其性质，必然会有更多的问题。
And that will always be true. And it’s true when the financial institutions are owned by governments.
这将永远是真实的。当金融机构由政府拥有时，这也是事实。
In fact, some of the worst financial reporting in the world is done by governments and governments — institutions like government banks in China, et cetera.
事实上，世界上一些最糟糕的财务报告是由政府和政府机构完成的，比如中国的国有银行等。
So, if you don’t like the lack of perfect accounting in financial institutions, you’re in the wrong world.
所以，如果你不喜欢金融机构中不完美的会计，那么你就处在错误的世界里。
42. We like our stocks but aren’t buying more now
我们喜欢我们的股票，但现在不再购买更多。
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5?
沃伦·巴菲特：第五名？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. Thank you very much for your wisdom and all your investment advice. I’m Adrian Sherr (PH) and I’m from Hong Kong.
观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。非常感谢你们的智慧和所有的投资建议。我是 Adrian Sherr（音），我来自香港。
Back in the old days in Hong Kong when somebody turned 100, they got to have tea at Buckingham Palace with the queen. I don’t know what you have here in America, but I hope that in 2030 we come back to watch you do 50 pushups at the White House. (Laughter)
在香港的旧时光里，当有人年满 100 岁时，他们可以在白金汉宫与女王共饮下午茶。我不知道你们在美国有什么，但我希望在 2030 年我们能回来观看你在白宫做 50 个俯卧撑。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not the way to bet.
查理·芒格：这不是下注的方式。
WARREN BUFFETT: Will you settle for 10? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你愿意接受 10 吗？（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question comes in two parts.
观众成员：我的问题分为两个部分。
Firstly, in 1968-69, you liquidated all your partnerships. And I guess, aside from your holdings in Berkshire Hathaway, you got completely out of the market and stayed out.
首先，在 1968-69 年间，你清算了所有的合伙企业。我想，除了你在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的持股之外，你完全退出了市场并保持观望。
In 2000-2001, you mentioned to us that in the coming decade the markets would go, at best, nowhere.
在 2000-2001 年间，你曾提到在未来十年内，市场充其量也不会有太大变化。
However, despite $50 billion in cash, you and therefore us, remain substantially invested in the market.
然而，尽管我们有500亿美元的现金，你和我们仍然大量投资于市场。
So my first question was, how and why is the investment climate different today than in 1968-69 that makes you comfortable remaining substantially invested?
所以我的第一个问题是，是什么原因导致今天的投资环境与 1968-69 年不同，使您能够安心地保持大量投资？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, we do own certain securities which we wouldn’t — we probably wouldn’t — buy at these prices. Some of them we would. Some of them we wouldn’t.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们确实持有某些证券，但我们可能不会在这些价格下购买。有些我们会买，有些我们不会。
We’re not unhappy with anything we own. We’re not happy with putting more money in, so we’re in a zone in some of those securities that — where we wouldn’t buy and we wouldn’t sell.
我们对自己拥有的任何东西都不感到不满。我们也不愿意投入更多资金，所以在某些证券中，我们处于一个既不买也不卖的状态。
Now part of it — that decision relates to the kind of quantities that we deal in. I mean, if we owned 100 shares of each one of the stocks that we own, you know, many billions of dollars’ worth, it would be an easier decision to go in and out.
这一决定的部分原因与我们处理的数量有关。我的意思是，如果我们拥有每只股票100股，很多数十亿的资产，那进出市场的决定会简单得多。
But we would face significant costs — including taxes, but on top of taxes — in trying to go in and out of the big positions we have. And basically we like the businesses.
但是，我们在进出我们所持有的大头寸时会面临巨大的成本——包括税收，但不仅限于税收。而且基本上我们喜欢这些业务。
So, we are not unhappy. We may feel like we wouldn’t want to buy more here. But we are not unhappy about being in the businesses in which we have big equity holdings.
所以，我们并不不开心。我们可能觉得不想在这里再买更多。但对于我们持有大量股权的业务，我们并不感到不开心。
Now notwithstanding all of that, a lower percentage of our intrinsic value is represented by the common stocks we own than just about at any time of our history, with the exception of a couple — well, the period right there at the end of 1969 when we liquidated the partnership.
尽管如此，当前我们所拥有的普通股在我们内在价值中所占的比例比我们历史上的大多数时间都要小，除了1969年底我们清算合伙企业的那段时间。
So, we have not made any big statement by purchases of stocks or the ownership of stocks that says we — in any way — says that we think that this is a particularly attractive time to own them.
所以，我们并没有通过购买股票或持有股票来发表任何重大声明，也没有以任何方式表示我们认为这是一个特别有吸引力的持有股票的时机。
But we are not unhappy with Coca-Cola. We are not unhappy with American Express. We are not unhappy with — we are not unhappy with Wells Fargo or Moody’s. Those are very, very good businesses that we own.
但是我们对可口可乐并不不满。我们对美国运通并不不满。我们对——我们对富国银行或穆迪也并不不满。那些是我们拥有的非常非常好的企业。
Would we be buying them at today’s prices if we, you know — well, the answer is we’re not. You know, we’ve got money. And we may buy more later on. We’re more likely to buy more later on than to sell those sort of investments.
如果我们以今天的价格购买它们，你知道——答案是我们没有。你知道，我们有钱。我们可能会在以后购买更多。我们更有可能在以后购买更多，而不是出售这类投资。
But there is a zone, which because of size, because of taxes, where we would neither be a buyer nor a seller.
但是有一个区域，由于规模和税收的原因，我们既不会是买家也不会是卖家。
And we do not see lots of attractive stocks, but we also don’t think that there’s as much silliness in the market, by far, as there was 5 years ago roughly.
我们没有看到很多有吸引力的股票，但我们也不认为市场上有像大约 5 年前那样多的荒谬现象。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. One of the things that’s interesting about Berkshire lately is that if you take the last four or five things we did in the stock market, with a goodly number of millions, but — billions, really — but small in relation to Berkshire’s overall size — our record is much like it used to be in some of the best days.
查理·芒格：是的，最近伯克希尔的一件有趣的事情是，如果你拿最近我们在股票市场上做的四五笔交易来说，金额虽然不小，但相对于伯克希尔的整体规模来说却比较小，我们的记录和以往的一些最佳时期非常相似。
Where we were able to move around with small amounts of money, the results were quite respectable. But where we were facing the problems of being enormously rich the way we were prevented from the nimble moneymaking record of the past, I don’t think that’s a permanent state of affairs, but it’s never going away either. But it —
在我们能够用小额资金灵活运作的时候，结果相当可观。但当我们面临如此巨额的财富时，就会妨碍我们过去的灵活赚钱记录。我不认为这种状态是永久的，但也不会消失。但—
WARREN BUFFETT: Explain that one. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：解释一下这个。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I mean, it’s that I think we may be able to deploy large amounts —
查理·芒格：嗯，我的意思是，我认为我们可能能够部署大量的——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — of money eventually at very satisfactory rates. Whereas in recent times, we have deployed small amounts of money at very satisfactory rates.
查理·芒格：嗯，我的意思是，我们可能能够最终以非常令人满意的利率部署大额资金。尽管在最近的时间里，我们以非常满意的利率部署的小额资金。
And better small than nil. And small is still billions. (Laughter)
更好的是小额资金，而不是零。小额资金仍然是数十亿美元。 （笑声）
43. “I don’t see gold as a store of value”
“我不认为黄金是价值储存”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：第六。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Mike McGowan (PH) and I’m from Pasadena, California.
观众成员：下午好。我的名字是迈克·麦克高文（音），我来自加利福尼亚州帕萨迪纳。
I had a pretty good question on Prop 13, but after watching the movie I don’t think I’ll ask it.
我本来对第 13 号提案有个不错的问题，但看完电影后我觉得我不会问了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：很好。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What I’d like to ask about, I guess, is one quibble and then a question. The question being about financial education, or a study of financial history, that might help people in handling these markets or in — just dealing with investing at or near the apex of Western civilization.
观众成员：我想问一个小问题，然后是一个问题。我的问题是关于金融教育或金融历史的研究，这可能有助于人们在市场顶峰时期进行投资。
When you mentioned your dad’s lectures about “buy gold” back in the 1930s, and then saying, “Well, 60 years later, it hasn’t done very well,” gold was pretty much pegged at a set price back in the ’30s for years and they didn’t really let it loose until 1971.
当你提到你爸爸在上世纪 30 年代关于“买黄金”的讲座，然后说“嗯，60 年后，它表现得并不好”时，黄金在 30 年代的价格基本上是固定的，直到 1971 年才真正放开。
And then it caught up. And then it’s kind of bounced around. If you looked at gold maybe now, and derivatives and real estate bubbles and lots of other things, maybe gold wouldn’t be such a bad investment, looked at in current terms.
然后它赶上了。然后它有点波动。如果你现在看看黄金、衍生品和房地产泡沫以及许多其他东西，也许从当前的角度来看，黄金不会是一个糟糕的投资。
So, my question would be, do you consider that you have some sort of an obligation or duty as financial exemplars to maybe pay a little attention to that classical kind of gold is the benchmark or the bedrock of a financial system, to some extent?
所以，我的问题是，您是否认为作为金融典范，你们有某种义务关注一下黄金，或者说黄金在某种程度上是金融体系的基石？
And that it might be nice to talk about it, in your — at least your annual letter to your stockholders — about how people might protect themselves in what’s a fairly bubbleous kind of environment from, really, the decline in purchasing power or problems caused by the financial domination that we have today? Thanks.
这可能会很好地在您的——至少是您给股东的年度信中——谈论一下，在一个相当泡沫化的环境中，人们如何保护自己免受购买力下降或由我们今天的金融主导地位引起的问题的影响？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that gold would be way down on my list as a store of value. I mean, I would much prefer owning a hundred acres of land near here in Nebraska, or an apartment house, or an index fund.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说，黄金在我心目中作为价值储存的排名会很低。我的意思是，我更愿意在内布拉斯加州附近拥有一百英亩的土地，或者一栋公寓楼，或者一个指数基金。
Gold, we’ll say, was freed up 30-odd years ago. But it adjusted to a market that still, if you go back to 1900, you know, you were talking $20 gold. Well, you take 20 to 400 in a hundred years.
我们可以说，黄金在30多年前被解放了。但它的调整仍然是——如果你回到1900年，当时黄金的价格大约是20美元。那就意味着100年后从20美元涨到了400美元。
The Dow went from 60 to, what, 12- or 13,000 — 12,000 or whatever it might have been — in that same period, and paid you dividends during the time you owned it.
道琼斯指数从 60 点涨到，什么，12,000 或 13,000——12,000 或不管是多少——在同一时期，并在你持有期间支付了股息。
It was 66, I think, at the start of the century. And I forget where it ended, but it’s 11- or 12,000. And like I say, it was paying you something every quarter during that period.
我想，在世纪初是 66。我忘记它在哪里结束，但大约是 11,000 或 12,000。就像我说的，在那段时间里，它每个季度都会给你一些回报。
And if you owned gold, you paid $20 in 1900 or thereabouts. And then you — we’ll say you had $400 a hundred years later. And in the meantime, you paid insurance and perhaps some storage cost.
如果你拥有黄金，你在 1900 年左右支付了 20 美元。然后——我们假设一百年后你有 400 美元。在此期间，你支付了保险费，也许还有一些存储费用。
It really is not — it’s not a store of value. And it’s — I’m not arguing for paper money, but if you’re worried about paper money —
这真的不是——它不是一种价值储存。而且——我不是在为纸币辩护，但如果你担心纸币——
And I think, you know, it makes a lot of sense to worry about paper money over long periods of time — but it’s just about — you know, it’s just about the last thing I would want to own under those circumstances.
我认为，从长远来看，担心纸币是很有道理的——但在那种情况下，纸币是我最不想拥有的东西。
You know, it has — a farm has utility, an apartment house has utility, a business, you know, will produce earnings. And some businesses will produce them in real terms as they go along.
你知道，农场有实用性，公寓楼有实用性，企业会产生收益。而且有些企业会随着发展产生实际收益。
You know, I’d rather have the ability to sell people a pound of candy 20 years from now. And if they’re dealing in seashells, I’ll get an appropriate number of seashells instead of paper money for it.
你知道，我宁愿在 20 年后还能卖给人们一磅糖果。如果他们用贝壳交易，我会得到相应数量的贝壳，而不是纸币。
But I — it — I just don’t — I don’t see gold as a store of value. And it’s — the truth is, it hasn’t worked very well.
但我——它——我就是不——我不认为黄金是价值储存。而且事实是，它并没有很好地发挥作用。
But forget about whether it’s worked well the last hundred years or the last 50 years or the last 10 years, I see no reason, you know, why it would work well in the future.
但不管它在过去的一百年、五十年或十年里是否运作良好，我看不出有什么理由认为它在未来会运作良好。
I forget whether we’re turning about three- or four-thousand tons of gold a year. And, you know, we take it out of the ground in South Africa and we put it in the ground at Fort Knox or someplace, you know, or in the New York Fed. I mean, and it doesn’t do much along the way, for anybody.
我忘记我们每年是提炼三千吨还是四千吨的黄金。你知道，我们在南非把它从地下挖出来，然后把它放到像诺克斯堡或纽约联邦储备银行这样的地方。我的意思是，在这个过程中，它对任何人都没有太大作用。
So, I — 所以，我——
Charlie, how do you feel about gold?
查理，你对黄金有什么看法？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think gold was — and similar items — that was a great thing to have if you were a well-to-do Jewish family in Vienna in 1935, because you had hazards where that gold had enormous utility to you. But for Berkshire Hathaway sitting here in 2005, it just doesn’t interest us at all.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为黄金和类似的东西——如果你是 1935 年在维也纳的一个富裕的犹太家庭，那是一个很好的东西，因为你面临的风险使得黄金对你有巨大的实用价值。但对于 2005 年坐在这里的伯克希尔·哈撒韦来说，我们对此完全不感兴趣。
44. No stock bubble right now, but no bargains, either
目前没有股票泡沫，但也没有便宜货
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Al Henderson (PH) from Minnesota. I’d like to thank you both of you for being yourselves and doing so much for all of us and to help enrich ourselves and everyone else.
观众成员：我叫艾尔·亨德森，来自明尼苏达州。我想感谢你们俩，感谢你们一直做自己，为我们做了这么多，帮助我们和其他人更富有。
My question I have is — actually, you already referred to it — that you devote very little time to looking at the total market and look for individual opportunities most.
我的问题是——实际上，你已经提到过——你很少花时间关注整个市场，而是更多地寻找个别机会。
But I was wondering, in the past you made some excellent presentation on points to consider in projecting reasonable 10-year returns for the stock market and had to devise reduced expectations.
但我想知道，过去你们对股市合理的10年回报进行了一些出色的演讲，并提出降低预期。
Where do we stand now on your stock market and economic measurements and expected 10-year returns?
那么，在你们的股市和经济测量以及预期的10年回报上，我们现在处于什么样的状态？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Every now and then — I mean, and I agree — very infrequently, you probably can say something intelligent about markets as a whole.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。偶尔——我的意思是，我同意——非常不经常地，你可能可以对整个市场说一些有见地的话。
I mean, that you do see circumstances that are extreme enough that you can make a statement that is likely to look reasonably intelligent five or 10 years later.
我的意思是，你确实会看到一些极端的情况，以至于你可以做出一个声明，这个声明在五到十年后可能看起来相当聪明。
And I’ve seen a few of those times in my lifetime. I mean, I — and I’ve spoken out a couple of times. And I did in ’69 and ’74 and a few times. Most of the time, you know, you’re in some in between zone.
在我的一生中，我见过几次这样的情况。我的意思是，我——我也曾几次发声。我在 1969 年和 1974 年以及其他几次这样做了。大多数时候，你知道，你处于某种中间地带。
Obviously, you get more for your money in equities now than you got, say, in the summer of 1999, which is when I delivered a talk out of Sun Valley that later got turned into an article for Fortune.
显然，现在投资股票比 1999 年夏天时更划算，那时我在太阳谷发表了一次演讲，后来被《财富》杂志转成了一篇文章。
But that was an — I spoke out then because it was extreme. I mean, I knew in a general way that I was going to be right, particularly in certain aspects of the market, but I didn’t know when, and then I didn’t know how right or anything of the sort. And you could’ve done the same thing in the other direction back in the mid-’70s.
但那是一个——我当时发声是因为情况极端。我的意思是，我大致知道我会是对的，特别是在市场的某些方面，但我不知道什么时候，也不知道会有多对或类似的事情。而在 70 年代中期，你也可以在另一个方向做同样的事情。
I think that if you had to make a choice between owning long-term bonds, which are now yielding — the Treasury — only a little over 4 1/2 percent, or owning equities for the next 20 years, and you couldn’t make — change that decision, I would certainly prefer equities.
我认为，如果你必须在拥有长期债券（目前国债收益率仅略高于 4.5%）和在未来 20 年内拥有股票之间做出选择，并且不能改变这个决定，我肯定会更倾向于股票。
But I think people that have expectations that they can earn more than 6 or 7 percent in equities, and certainly when they start expecting double digits, I think the degree to what they have expectations, they can do that or that they can find somebody else to do it for them, I think they’re making a big mistake.
但我认为那些期望在股票中赚取超过 6%或 7%收益的人，尤其是当他们开始期望两位数收益时，我认为他们对这种期望的程度，他们自己能做到或能找到别人为他们做到，我认为他们犯了一个大错误。
But 6 or 7 percent is not the end of the world at all. In fact, it — and it gets treated better tax-wise right now than it has almost any — well, really anytime in my lifetime.
但是 6%或 7%根本不是世界末日。事实上，它——而且在税收方面的待遇比我一生中几乎任何时候都要好。
So — I don’t think we’re in bubble-type, at all, valuations in equities. And I don’t think we’re anywhere close to — remotely close to bargain valuations. And I don’t think it’s an extreme enough period that you can speak out in some very definitive way about the outlook.
所以——我认为我们在股票估值方面根本不处于泡沫状态。我也不认为我们接近——甚至远远没有接近便宜的估值。我也不认为这是一个极端的时期，可以用非常明确的方式来谈论前景。
But if you told me I had to go away for 20 years and choose between what’s obtainable in an index fund of equities or be committed to long-term bonds, I would rather take equities.
但是，如果你告诉我必须离开 20 年，并在股票指数基金和长期债券之间做出选择，我宁愿选择股票。
But I think you will get a chance to do something that is more screamingly intelligent in not too many years — and maybe a lot shorter — than the alternatives that you’re offered now.
但我认为你将有机会在不太多的几年内——也许更短的时间内，比现在提供的选择——做一些更聪明的事情。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I can’t improve on that at all.
查理·芒格：嗯，我对此没有更好的补充。
45. “Bubble valuation problems” for real estate
房地产的“泡沫估值问题”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well then we’ll go to number 8. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：那么我们就去第 8 号吧。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Hamid Rezapour. I’m from Orinda, California. I had a question about real estate.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是哈米德·雷扎普尔。我来自加利福尼亚州的奥林达。我有一个关于房地产的问题。
And I know this question was asked in previous shareholder meetings about, “How come Berkshire doesn’t invest in real estate?” And I believe the answer was that, “We like operating business.” So I want to make my question a little bit more specific towards commercial real estate.
我知道在之前的股东大会上有人问过这个问题：“为什么伯克希尔不投资房地产？”我相信答案是：“我们喜欢经营业务。”所以我想把我的问题更具体地指向商业房地产。
So, considering the characteristics of larger-size commercial real estate investments like REITs that can have the behavior and financial returns of an operating business, why not invest in real estate?
那么，考虑到像房地产投资信托基金（REITs）这样的大型商业房地产投资的特性，它们可以表现出类似于经营业务的行为和财务回报，为什么不投资房地产呢？
Is it because you just don’t like the returns? Or the business is just not attractive?
是因为你不喜欢回报吗？还是这个生意本身就没有吸引力？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Charlie got his start in real estate. Right, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理最初是在房地产行业起步的。对吧，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I would say, number one, that in a corporation like Berkshire, that’s taxable under subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code, owning real estate is grossly disadvantaged compared to owning it directly by individuals such as yourself. That’s number one.
查理·芒格：是的。我想说，首先，在像伯克希尔这样的公司中，根据《国内税收法典》C 章征税，拥有房地产与个人直接拥有房地产相比是极为不利的。这是第一点。
And number two, real estate — investment real estate — is having bubble valuation problems of its own right now.
第二，房地产——投资房地产——目前正面临泡沫估值问题。
All my rich friends who own real estate are selling their worst properties. And they’re getting bids that come in higher than their highest expectations. And people are competing to take these things off their hands.
我所有拥有房地产的富有朋友都在出售他们最差的房产。而且他们收到的出价比他们的最高预期还要高。人们争相把这些东西从他们手中买走。
I do not find it exciting. And it certainly doesn’t fit Berkshire. Name me a lot of C corporations that have been passive holders in real estate and have done well over a whole lot of years. It’s almost a null class.
我对此并不感到兴奋。对于伯克希尔而言，这种做法肯定不合适。给我举一些在房地产中被动持有并且在许多年中表现良好的C类公司，几乎没有这样的类别。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I — I mean, both — more Charlie than I — we’ve had certain personal real estate investments over time. And it — you know, it’s a field that, in general, we understand.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我——我是说，查理比我更多——我们在一段时间内有过一些个人房地产投资。而且，你知道，总体来说，这是一个我们理解的领域。
We don’t bring that much special to the game, but we understand it. We’ve made money in it.
我们在游戏中没有带来太多特别的东西，但我们理解它。我们在其中赚了钱。
And actually, at the time that the NASDAQ about hit its high, REITs were quite cheap in my view. And I have less than 1 percent of my net worth outside of Berkshire, but basically I had that portion all in REITs. They were all small ones at that time.
实际上，在纳斯达克接近其高点的时候，我认为房地产投资信托基金（REITs）相当便宜。我的净资产中有不到 1%是在伯克希尔之外，但基本上我把那部分全部投入了房地产投资信托基金。当时它们都是小型的。
And — but they were selling at discounts. At that time they were selling at discounts to the values of properties. And those values of properties were much more conservatively figured than today.
而且——但他们当时是以折扣价出售的。那时，他们以低于物业价值的折扣价出售。而那些物业的价值比今天计算得要保守得多。
Today, you have very fancy prices on real estate. And on top of that, you have the REITs often selling at a premium, though. So, I regard REITs as quite unattractive now, certainly compared to five or six years ago. But that’s a group of —
今天，房地产的价格非常高。而且，房地产投资信托基金（REITs）通常还以溢价出售。因此，我认为现在的房地产投资信托基金相当没有吸引力，尤其是与五六年前相比。但那是一个群体——
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s for an individual, you regard them as unattractive?
查理·芒格：对于个人来说，你认为他们没有吸引力吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And for a corporation, that much more so?
查理·芒格：对于公司来说，更是如此？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, right. Right. It — the situation changed dramatically from five or six years ago. I mean, the stock market, in many respects, from the 1999-2000 period, is down significantly. REITs are up significantly.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，对。情况与五六年前发生了巨大变化。我的意思是，从 1999-2000 年期间来看，股市在很多方面大幅下跌。房地产投资信托基金则大幅上涨。
REITs were very unpopular five or six years ago. Now they’re popular.
五六年前，房地产投资信托基金（REITs）非常不受欢迎。现在它们很受欢迎。
It’s better to pay attention to something that is being scorned than something that’s being championed. And there’s really been a big change in the REIT situation in the last five or six years.
关注被轻视的事物比关注被推崇的事物更好。在过去的五六年里，房地产投资信托基金的情况确实发生了很大变化。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And the REITs have phony accounting.
查理·芒格：房地产投资信托基金的会计是假的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Otherwise, we love them.
沃伦·巴菲特：除此之外，我们爱他们。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You don’t want to bring up anything in these meetings. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：在这些会议上，你可不要提起什么事情。（笑声）
46. Global prosperity helps the U.S.
全球繁荣有助于美国。
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：第九。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Carlos Lock (PH). I’m from Lawrence, Kansas.
观众成员：下午好。我的名字是卡洛斯·洛克（音）。我来自堪萨斯州的劳伦斯。
The U.S. has had a dominant role in the world economy for about a hundred years. This dominance resembles that of an economic monopoly.
美国在世界经济中占据主导地位已有大约一百年。这种主导地位类似于经济垄断。
Would you say that the U.S. is a quote- unquote, “a castle with a moat?” And if so, how can we make the moat any bigger? Thank you.
你会说美国是所谓的“有护城河的城堡”吗？如果是这样，我们怎样才能让护城河更大？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, the U.S. has been pretty remarkable, as I indicated in my earlier comment. I mean, you know, essentially, the same population pool pretty much, and they’ve garnered over this 215-year period, a remarkable share of the world’s wealth.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，正如我之前所说，美国确实相当了不起。我的意思是，基本上是相同的人口群体，在这 215 年间，他们获得了世界财富的显著份额。
And it’s an interesting question as to just why this group of people here have been able to do so much better than the rest of the world, considering we’re not any smarter or anything of the sort.
这是一个有趣的问题，为什么这里的这群人能够比世界其他地方做得更好，考虑到我们并不更聪明或类似的原因。
It’s not an economic castle anymore. I wouldn’t call it that.
我认为这不再是一个经济城堡。我不会这样称呼它。
What we do is no secret. And I think that the relative importance of America — I mean, we have been a dominant factor in the world, and post-World War II — and I think it will decline somewhat, although I’m not an alarmist on that.
我们所做的并不是秘密。我认为美国的相对重要性——我的意思是，我们一直是世界上的主导因素，二战后——我认为这会有所下降，尽管我对此并不感到惊慌。
But I think to some extent, the rest of the world, or much of the rest — or some of the rest of the world — is catching on and adopting, you know, sort of best practices, as they say in industry.
但我认为在某种程度上，世界其他地区，或者大部分其他地区——或者世界其他一些地区——正在赶上并采用所谓的行业最佳实践。
And our castle will grow in size, but there will be more castles around it. And I basically think that’s a very good thing for the world.
我们的城堡会变得更大，但周围会有更多的城堡。我基本上认为这对世界来说是件好事。
I think the more prosperous, generally, the rest of the world is, you know, the better, generally, it will be for us. And, you know, I’ve talked about our trade problems. The more trade we have, the better.
我认为，通常来说，世界其他地方越繁荣，对我们来说就会越好。而且，你知道，我已经谈过我们的贸易问题。我们进行的贸易越多，就越好。
We had 1.1 trillion of real trade last year in the country. We would’ve — with the world — and then we had another 600 billion — 6/10ths of a trillion — that, unilaterally, we bought.
去年我们国家的实际贸易额达到 1.1 万亿美元。我们本可以——与世界——然后我们又有另外 6000 亿——6/10 万亿——是我们单方面购买的。
Well, I would love to see the 1.1 trillion grow and grow and grow. It’d be good for us and good for the rest of the world. But I don’t think that our prosperity will come — in the future will come at the expense of the rest of the world at all.
好吧，我希望看到这 1.1 万亿不断增长。这对我们和世界其他地方都有好处。但我不认为我们的繁荣——未来的繁荣——会以牺牲世界其他地方为代价。
I do think that there were parts of the world that will grow economically from a lower base, but much faster than the U.S. And basically, I think that’s a good thing.
我确实认为，世界上有些地区将从较低的基础上实现经济增长，但速度会比美国快得多。而且基本上，我认为这是一件好事。
I mean, there are six billion people in this world, and a lot of them don’t live very well. And I would hope that 20 or 50 years from now that it’s a higher percentage of them would live well and that — but I don’t think it comes out of our hide at all.
我的意思是，这个世界上有六十亿人，其中很多人生活得并不好。我希望在未来的二十或五十年里，会有更高比例的人生活得好——但我不认为这会损害我们的利益。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think it comes out of our hide in that sense, but if we are now the richest and most powerful nation in the world and 50 or a hundred years from now we’re a poor third to some country in Asia, sure, we’re richer, but it’s a peculiar type of richness where you’ve lost your relative position in the world.
查理·芒格：嗯，我不认为这会以那种方式损害我们，但如果我们现在是世界上最富有和最强大的国家，而在五十或一百年后我们在某个亚洲国家面前变成了一个贫穷的第三名，当然，我们更富有了，但这是一种奇特的富有，因为你在世界上的相对地位已经丧失。
It’s not all — I think if I had to bet, I would bet that the part of the world that does best is Asia, in terms of percentage gains per annum.
我认为，如果让我下注，我会押注在年增长百分比方面表现最好的地区是亚洲。
And I think it might do amazingly well if it doesn’t blow up in some way. And if it does amazingly well, it will eventually be a much richer place than ours.
我认为如果亚洲能够不以某种方式爆炸，它可能会表现得极为出色。若果真如此，它最终将成为一个比我们更富有的地方。
WARREN BUFFETT: Mm-hmm. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯嗯。
47. “Unwise” economic policies, but no “Armageddon”
“不明智”的经济政策，但没有“世界末日”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. I’m Thorsten Kramer (PH) from Cologne, Germany.
观众成员：下午好，先生们。我是来自德国科隆的托斯滕·克雷默。
You’ve criticized the extraordinary large stake that the financial sector in the United States is currently representing in relation to GDP, which is also reflected in a total credit volume exceeding GDP by roughly 250 percent, significantly up from the level we’ve seen a decade ago.
您批评了美国金融部门在国内生产总值（GDP）中所占比例过大的现象，反映在总信贷规模超过GDP约250%的水平上，这一比例显著高于十年前。
A current account deficit and budget deficit running at 6 percent of GDP, in combination with a still accommodating easy money policy, and high asset prices, will have to be consolidated sooner or later.
经常账户赤字和预算赤字占 GDP 的 6%，再加上仍然宽松的货币政策和高资产价格，迟早需要进行整合。
How do you think the adjustment will take place? What are your two most likely scenarios how these huge imbalances might be consolidated? And is the dollar devaluation scenario your most favorite one?
你认为调整将如何进行？在这巨大的不平衡中，你认为最有可能的两种情形是什么？美元贬值的情形是你最喜欢的吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as I said earlier, I don’t see how the situation resolves itself with a stronger dollar.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，正如我之前所说，我看不出这个局势如何通过美元走强来解决。
Most people still seem fairly sanguine about the fact that there won’t be anything terribly bumpy about it, that there’ll be this so-called soft landing.
大多数人似乎仍然相当乐观，认为不会有任何严重的波动，所谓的软着陆将会实现。
And I don’t know whether that’ll be the case or not. But I would say that we’re running the risk of having markets that could get chaotic if certain events converged, superimposed upon those factors that you just listed.
我不知道是否会是这种情况。但我会说，如果某些事件汇聚在一起，再叠加上你刚才列出的那些因素，我们就有可能面临市场变得混乱的风险。
But I don’t — I’m not an Armageddon type at all on the economy. I mean, the things you named are important factors.
但我并不——我完全不是那种对经济持末日论的人。我的意思是，你提到的那些都是重要因素。
I think that absent something happening in the terrorism field, I think that, you know, the citizens of the United States, on balance, will be living better ten years from now than now, and 20 years from now than now.
我认为，如果恐怖主义领域没有发生什么事情，我认为，总的来说，美国公民在十年后会比现在生活得更好，二十年后会比现在生活得更好。
But I do think that we’re following policies that are unwise. But we’ve done that plenty of times over history. I mean, [investor] Peter Lynch has always said, you know, “Buy a business that’s so good that an idiot can run it, because sooner or later one will.” (Laughter)
但我确实认为我们正在遵循不明智的政策。但在历史上我们已经这样做过很多次。我的意思是，[投资者]彼得·林奇总是说，“买一个好到即使傻瓜也能经营的企业，因为迟早会有一个傻瓜来经营。”（笑声）
We’ve got a country that’s so good that we can have policies that are counterproductive — (applause) — and we’ll still come out OK.
我们有一个如此优秀的国家，以至于我们可以制定适得其反的政策——（掌声）——而我们仍然会没事。
Just think of what we’ve had over the years. I mean, you know, Warren Harding, Chester Arthur?
想想我们这些年来经历的事情。我是说，你知道，沃伦·哈丁，切斯特·阿瑟？
I mean, we’ve had a lot of things in this country. We had the Civil War. We had all kinds of things over the years.
我的意思是，我们这个国家经历了很多事情。我们经历了内战。多年来，我们经历了各种各样的事情。
But the society has marched forward, with some fits and starts, but still at a very significant clip.
但是社会已经向前发展，虽然有时断断续续，但仍然以非常显著的速度前进。
The real GDP per capita is seven times, in the U.S., what it was a hundred years ago. Just think of that. One century in the human pageant, and a sevenfold increase in GDP per capita. It’s remarkable.
美国的人均实际 GDP 是 100 年前的七倍。想想看。在人类历史的一个世纪中，人均 GDP 增长了七倍。这是非常了不起的。
So, I acknowledge, you know, consumer debt doing what it’s done and the trade deficit being what it is. And I think that those things — particularly the trade deficit — should be addressed, and promptly. But I don’t think they pull down the whole place.
所以，我承认，你知道，消费债务的现状以及贸易逆差的情况。我认为这些问题——尤其是贸易逆差——应该得到解决，并且要迅速解决。但我不认为它们会拖垮整个局面。
They may create, you know, very severe dislocations in financial markets from time to time. But that’s been the history of this country. I mean, we have had very dramatic things happen in financial markets over the years. And the country survives despite that.
他们可能会在金融市场中不时造成非常严重的混乱。但这就是这个国家的历史。我的意思是，多年来我们的金融市场发生过非常戏剧性的事情。尽管如此，这个国家依然存续。
And sometimes there’s great opportunity in those dislocations. There’s likely to be.
有时在这些错位中会有很大的机会。很可能会有。
So I’m not pessimistic about the U.S. at all. You know, I can’t imagine anyplace that I would rather be.
所以我对美国一点也不悲观。你知道，我无法想象有任何地方比这里更让我想待的。
But whether — when you say the two most likely outcomes, I think the eventual outcome is that the country does fine. But I think a — there’s a significant possibility that you do have some chaotic financial markets at one time or another. But we’ve had them historically.
但是无论如何——当你说到两个最可能的结果时，我认为最终的结果是国家会没事。但我认为有一个——有相当大的可能性，你确实会在某个时候遇到一些混乱的金融市场。但我们在历史上也经历过。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we don’t have any great record as macroeconomic predictors. And I don’t see any reason why we should really start now.
查理·芒格：是的，我们在宏观经济预测方面没有任何出色的记录。我看不出我们现在有什么理由真正开始。
Obviously, there are more chances for convulsion now. I mean, everybody from [former Federal Reserve Chairman] Paul Volcker on has looked at the current figures and said we could have some kind of convulsion as a consequence of (inaudible). Apart from knowing that, we have no contribution to make.
显然，现在发生动荡的可能性更大了。我的意思是，从[前美联储主席]保罗·沃尔克开始，所有人都看过当前的数据，并表示我们可能会因此而出现某种动荡。除了知道这一点之外，我们没有其他可以贡献的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I do think, as I mentioned earlier, that far greater sums, relatively, in one asset class after another, are held by people who — where it’s really on a hair-trigger type mechanism.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我确实认为，正如我之前提到的，在一个又一个资产类别中，相对而言，远远更大的一部分资金是由那些——实际上处于一种高度敏感机制中的人持有的。
So, the creation of lots of new financial instruments, the piling up of huge amounts by intermediaries or agency activities in terms of money management, I think they lend themselves to more explosive outcomes on any given day than might have been the case some years back when I was selling utility stocks to people, a hundred shares at a time in Omaha.
因此，创造大量新的金融工具，中介机构或代理活动在资金管理方面积累了巨额资金，我认为它们比几年前我在奥马哈一次向人们出售一百股公用事业股票时，更容易在任何特定的一天导致更具爆炸性的结果。
I mean, those — that money was not on a hair-trigger basis. But as you turn it over to fund managers who think their job is to beat the S&P in — on a short-term basis — you are getting very short time horizons on huge amounts of money.
我的意思是，那些——那些钱并不是处于一触即发的状态。但是，当你把它交给那些认为自己工作是要在短期内击败标普的基金经理时，你就会在大量资金上得到非常短的时间视野。
And those people may think they are operating independently in one sense. But they’re responding to the same stimuli. And they can, as they did in the fall of 1998, they can all head for the exits — or try to head for the exits — at one time.
那些人可能认为在某种意义上他们是独立运作的。但他们对相同的刺激作出反应。正如他们在 1998 年秋天所做的那样，他们可能会同时涌向出口——或者试图同时涌向出口。
And the thing about financial instruments is there is no exit. I mean, the only way that you get rid of a financial — the only way you leave your seat in a burning theatre in financial markets is to find somebody else to take the seat. And that is not always easy.
关于金融工具的问题是没有退出。我是说，你摆脱金融的唯一方法——在金融市场中离开燃烧剧院座位的唯一方法是找到其他人来接替这个座位。而这并不总是容易的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it —
查理·芒格：我认为这——
WARREN BUFFETT: However — go ahead.
沃伦·巴菲特：不过——请继续。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — I think it’s also true that the amount of credit being used, not only by hedge funds but by ordinary investors, is way heavier than most people realize.
查理·芒格：——我认为，不仅对冲基金使用的信贷量，而且普通投资者使用的信贷量，都比大多数人意识到的要多得多。
It wasn’t even controversial in this country when we came to introduce single-stock futures and what — you know, commonly traded puts and calls.
当我们开始引入单一股票期货以及常见的看涨期权和看跌期权时，在这个国家甚至没有引起争议。
And ordinary people got in trouble. If I’d been running the country, I never would have allowed that. I don’t know what good it does for the country to have a wonderful — a lot of trading in puts and calls.
普通人陷入了麻烦。如果我在管理这个国家，我绝不会允许那样的事情发生。我不知道对国家有什么好处，拥有大量的期权交易。
One of my children knew a nice man who had a $2 1/2 million house and $5 million worth of wonderful securities.
我的一个孩子认识一个好人，他有一栋价值 250 万美元的房子和价值 500 万美元的优质证券。
But he couldn’t live as comfortably — he never worked — as he liked to live on the income from his $5 million of securities. And he got in the habit of picking up easy money with the credit systems of the world. He kept selling naked puts secured by his account, including puts on a whole lot of internet stocks.
但他无法像他希望的那样舒适地生活——他从未工作过——仅靠他 500 万美元证券的收入。他养成了利用全球信用体系赚取轻松钱的习惯。他不断出售由他的账户担保的裸卖空期权，包括大量互联网股票的期权。
And in due time, he didn’t have the $5 million of securities, and he didn’t have the house, and he now works in a restaurant.
最终，他没有 500 万美元的证券，也没有房子，现在在一家餐馆工作。
That kind of self-destruction wasn’t possible before we created all these wonderful trading opportunities involving credit.
在我们创造了所有这些涉及信贷的绝佳交易机会之前，那种自我毁灭是不可能的。
It was not a smart thing for this country to do, to legalize gambling everywhere and to bring it in a more facile form into our investment practices. (Applause)
这个国家到处将赌博合法化，并以更便捷的形式将其引入我们的投资行为，这并不是明智之举。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there anyone we’ve forgotten to offend? I mean, we — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们有没有忘记冒犯谁？我的意思是，我们——（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — we don’t want to miss anyone. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：——我们不想错过任何人。（笑声）
48. Why Berkshire’s board is better
为什么伯克希尔的董事会更好
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 11 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman. My name is Andy Peake. I’m from Weston, Connecticut.
观众成员：下午好，主席先生，副主席先生。我的名字是安迪·皮克。我来自康涅狄格州的韦斯顿。
Recently, we’ve seen a number of corporate boards take forceful action — Hewlett-Packard and Boeing, for example. We have also seen board members from WorldCom pay large amounts to personally settle lawsuits.
最近，我们看到许多公司董事会采取了强有力的行动——例如惠普和波音。我们还看到 WorldCom 的董事会成员支付了大笔金额以个人名义解决诉讼。
Today we see Morgan Stanley embroiled in a bitter battle, largely based on divergent views of how to govern the firm.
今天，我们看到摩根士丹利陷入了一场激烈的斗争，主要是基于对公司治理方式的不同看法。
What responsibilities do directors have in this new environment? And what do you look for in your directors?
在这种新环境中，董事有哪些责任？您对董事有什么要求？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, why don’t you take that one first?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你为什么不先回答这个问题？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we are completely out of step with modern practices with directors.
查理·芒格：嗯，我们与现代董事会的做法完全不一致。
The modern practice is to have one from each diversity category, and to have a whole lot of people who need, more or less, the 100,000 or $200,000 per year that they’re paid for being a director. And people think this makes the system better.
现代的做法是从每个多样性类别中选出一个人，并有很多人需要或多或少每年 10 万或 20 万美元的董事薪酬。而人们认为这使得系统变得更好。
At Berkshire, all the directors are rich and they own a lot of stock in Berkshire. And they’re all very smart. And they don’t get any liability insurance provided by Berkshire.
在伯克希尔，所有董事都很富有，他们拥有大量伯克希尔的股票。而且他们都非常聪明。他们没有得到伯克希尔提供的任何责任保险。
So, we’ve been waiting for our system to spread, but it — we seem to be losing. (Laughter)
所以，我们一直在等待我们的系统传播，但——我们似乎在失败。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s a tough job, at times, to be a director.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，有时候，担任董事是个艰难的工作。
The real problem that you can face, and may often face, is when you’re dealing with mediocrity.
你可能会面临的真正问题，往往是处理平庸的事情。
I mean, if you have a baseball team and you have a .240 hitter in the majors, a .240 hitter in the majors is still a pretty good baseball player. But if your job is to have a winning team, you get rid of him. And you find somebody that can bat .280 or .290 and field just as well.
我的意思是，如果你有一支棒球队，而你有一个在大联盟中击球率为.240 的球员，那么在大联盟中击球率为.240 的球员仍然是一个相当不错的棒球运动员。但如果你的工作是要有一支获胜的球队，你就会把他淘汰掉。然后你找一个能击球率达到.280 或.290 并且守备同样出色的人。
In business, the tough part is to get rid of something a notch or two above mediocrity, but not the best one that could be found.
在商业中，艰难的地方在于如何摆脱一些稍微好于平庸的东西，而不是最优秀的人。
And when people meet every couple of months, and they come from different parts of the country, and they have the normal social instincts — they don’t like to have rump meetings or to sort of talk behind people’s backs — it’s very difficult for a group, and particularly if it’s a group like Charlie described where a significant number of them, the directors’ fees they earn are important to their well-being, and they like — they’d love to be recommended for another board and add another $100,000 a year to their income.
当人们每隔几个月见面一次，他们来自全国各地，并且有正常的社交本能——他们不喜欢开小会或在别人背后说闲话——对于一个团体来说，这非常困难，尤其是如果这个团体像查理描述的那样，其中有相当一部分人，他们赚取的董事费对他们的生活很重要，他们希望——他们希望被推荐到另一个董事会，再增加每年 10 万美元的收入。
It’s very difficult for somebody to lead a charge and all of a sudden start at the meeting or trying to arrange a rump meeting of some sort to say, you know, “We really think this guy at the head of the table’s no good.”
对于某人来说，带头发起行动并突然在会议上开始，或者试图安排某种非正式会议来说，“我们真的认为坐在桌子前面的人不行”是非常困难的。
And changing — dealing with mediocrity is — or, like I say, a notch above it, is a difficult problem if you’re a board member.
而处理平庸问题，或者说，稍微好于平庸的东西，是董事们面临的一个困难问题。
And we believe that, you know, independence is — it’s a state of mind. I mean, it — and it’s a willingness, but not the eagerness, to challenge the ideas of others.
我们相信，独立是一种心态。我的意思是，它是一种意愿，而不是急于挑战他人观点的态度。
And to — if you see a merger that doesn’t make sense — and Charlie and I have seen a lot of them, and we’ve been on the boards, and sometimes we’ve spoken up and sometimes we haven’t spoken up — to be able to — you know, you can — the group around you, in terms of social behavior, can only tolerate a certain amount of obnoxiousness on the part of yourself.
如果你看到一个不合理的合并——查理和我见过很多这样的情况，我们也曾在董事会中，有时我们会发声，有时我们没有发声——你知道，你可以——你周围的群体，在社会行为方面，只能容忍你自己一定程度的令人反感的行为。
You have to sort of ration it out. And so you save yourself for big ones. And then, it’s not necessarily an easy equation.
你必须有点节制。因此，你要为重要的事情保存自己。然后，这不一定是一个简单的方程式。
And certainly, I would say, of the things I’ve seen proposed in the way of major acquisitions and — a significant percentage of them I wouldn’t do myself. But would I overrule somebody else?
当然，我会说，在我所见过的重大收购提案中，有相当一部分我自己不会去做。但我会否决其他人的决定吗？
I wouldn’t get the votes probably anyway. And it’s a very difficult thing to do. You could occasionally fire a bullet if you think it’s important enough, and usually it doesn’t do any good.
我可能无论如何都得不到选票。而且这是一件非常困难的事情。你可以偶尔开一枪，如果你认为这足够重要，但通常没有什么好处。
So, I — we have a group that has — every one of them has significant money invested in Berkshire. They all bought it in the market just like you did. I mean, nobody — I mean, I’ve been on all these boards and they keep handing me things.
所以，我——我们有一个小组，其中每个人都在伯克希尔投资了大量资金。他们都像你一样在市场上购买。我是说，没有人——我是说，我参加过所有这些董事会，他们一直在给我东西。
And, you know, I had shares of this one and that one are given to me, or options or whatever, matching charitable contributions, all kinds of things.
而且，你知道，我有这家和那家的股份被给了我，或者期权或其他东西，匹配慈善捐款，各种各样的东西。
But we have real owners on our board. And what they make for being board members is really inconsequential, as I get reminded occasionally — (laughter) — compared to their investment. And they’re friends of mine.
但是我们董事会里有真正的所有者。他们作为董事会成员所赚的钱实际上是无关紧要的，正如我偶尔被提醒的那样——（笑声）——与他们的投资相比。而且他们是我的朋友。
They’re smart. They’re very smart. I mean, they are hand-picked, in terms of business brainpower and quality of a human being. And I really think that, you know, we have the best board in the country.
他们很聪明。他们非常聪明。我的意思是，他们在商业头脑和人品方面都是精挑细选的。我真的认为，我们拥有全国最好的董事会。
But the people that want — who make their evaluations by checklist, you know, whether — either in terms of diversity or in terms of supposed independence — although I don’t know how anybody that’s getting half their income from board memberships can be independent — you know, we don’t — we may not stack up so well.
但是那些想要——通过清单来进行评估的人，你知道，无论是从多样性方面还是所谓的独立性方面——尽管我不知道那些一半收入来自董事会成员的人怎么能独立——你知道，我们可能在这方面表现得不太好。
But it’s the kind of board that I want to have, knowing that if I die tonight that virtually everything I have goes to a foundation. I want that foundation to have as much money over the years to spend as possible.
但这正是我想要的董事会，因为我知道如果我今晚去世，我的几乎所有财产都会捐给一个基金会。我希望这个基金会在未来几年里有尽可能多的钱可以花。
And there’s no group of people I’d rather have in charge of the decision subsequent to my death than the people that we’ve got on our —
没有任何一群人比我们团队中的人更适合在我去世后负责决策。
49. Short gap due to tape change at time of recording
录制时因换磁带而短暂中断
Text on screen: “Tape Change”
屏幕上的文字：“更换磁带”
50. Gates is smart but we must stock to our “circle of competence”
盖茨很聪明，但我们必须坚持我们的“能力圈”
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) No, the answer is that Charlie and I, in managing Berkshire, try to do things — put money in things — that we understand.
沃伦·巴菲特：（笑声）不，答案是查理和我在管理伯克希尔时，尽量把钱投入到我们理解的事物中。
And when I mean understand, I mean, that we — where we think we know, in a reasonable way, what the economics will look like in five or 10 or 20 years.
当我说理解时，我的意思是，我们——我们认为我们以合理的方式知道，五年、十年或二十年后的经济状况会是什么样子。
And Bill [Gates] is a lot smarter about a whole lot of things than I am. But it’s still Charlie and I that have the responsibility for managing the money.
比尔·盖茨在很多事情上比我聪明得多。但管理资金的责任仍然在查理和我身上。
And we’ll stick in what we consider to be our circle of competence. And the fact that somebody else’s circle is wider or different, you know, that’s the way the world is.
我们会坚持在我们认为是自己能力圈的范围内。至于其他人的能力圈更广或不同，那就是世界的样子。
I’ll listen to any idea Bill has. Believe me, I will listen to him. I mean, he is a — he’s not only a smart manager, but he’s a smart investor. And I think, actually our ideas on investment overlap to quite an extent.
我会听取比尔的任何想法。相信我，我会听他的。我是说，他不仅是一个聪明的经理，而且是一个聪明的投资者。而且我认为，实际上我们在投资上的想法有很大程度的重叠。
But I still wish I’d bought a little Microsoft when I first met him. (Laughs)
但我还是希望在第一次见到他时买了一些微软的股票。（笑）
Charlie? 查理？
51. If corporate directors need the money, they’re not independent
如果公司董事需要钱，他们就不独立。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think what has happened at Berkshire is just wonderfully for the good. And I do think we have a perfectly marvelous board. What makes me sad, as I said earlier, is I don’t see more of the same practice followed elsewhere.
查理·芒格：我认为伯克希尔发生的事情非常好。我确实认为我们有一个非常出色的董事会。让我感到难过的是，正如我之前所说，我没有在其他地方看到更多类似的做法。
A director getting $150,000 a year from a company, who needs it, is not an independent director. That director automatically becomes an inside director. And so it’s a typical government intervention. It’s just — it says it’s doing one thing and it does another.
一个从公司获得每年 15 万美元的董事，如果他需要这笔钱，就不是独立董事。该董事自动成为内部董事。因此，这是一种典型的政府干预。它只是——声称在做一件事，实际上却在做另一件事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I have never — I’ve been on 19 boards — I have never seen a director, where the directors’ fees were important to them, object to an acquisition proposal, object to a compensation arrangement of the CEO. It’s just never happened, you know — in my experience.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我从来没有——我曾在 19 个董事会任职——我从未见过一个董事会成员，因为董事费对他们很重要，而反对收购提案或反对 CEO 的薪酬安排。在我的经验中，这从未发生过。
And you know, they do not — they frequently do not — behave as they would if they owned the place. And basically we want people that behave as if they own the place.
而且，他们的行为往往不如他们自己拥有这家公司的时候那么谨慎。我们基本上希望董事们表现得就像他们拥有这家公司一样。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The correct system is the Elihu Root system. Elihu Root, who had three different cabinet appointments, if I remember right, said no man was fit to hold public office who wasn’t perfectly willing to leave it at any time.
查理·芒格：正确的制度是伊莱胡·鲁特制度。如果我没记错的话，曾担任过三个不同内阁职位的伊莱胡·鲁特说过，任何不愿随时离开公职的人都不适合担任公职。
And if Elihu Root didn’t approve of something the government asked him to do, he could always go back and be the most sought after lawyer in the world. He had an identity to go back to and he didn’t need the government’s salary.
如果伊莱胡·鲁特不赞成政府要求他做的某件事，他总是可以回去成为世界上最受欢迎的律师。他有一个可以回去的身份，并且不需要政府的薪水。
And I think that ought to be more the test in corporate directorships. Is a man really fit to make tough calls who isn’t perfectly willing to leave the office at any time? My answer is no.
我认为这应该更多地成为公司董事会的考验。一个人如果不愿意随时离开办公室，他真的适合做出艰难的决定吗？我的答案是否定的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have one of our directors who was — who’s been removed twice from compensation committees of other corporations because he had the temerity to actually question whether the compensation arrangement being suggested was the appropriate one.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有一位董事，他曾两次被其他公司的薪酬委员会除名，因为他大胆地质疑所建议的薪酬安排是否合适。
I mean, it — the — it’s not — being put on the comp committee of American corporations, as I’ve said, they’re not — they’re looking for Chihuahuas, and not Great Danes and Dobermans and —
我的意思是，它——它——不是——被安排在美国公司的薪酬委员会上，正如我所说，他们不是——他们在寻找吉娃娃，而不是大丹犬和杜宾犬——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And I hope I’m not insulting any of my friends that are on comp committees. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我希望我没有冒犯到任何在薪酬委员会的朋友。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re insulting the dogs. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：你这是在侮辱狗。（笑声和掌声）
52. Why we keep companies despite disappointing results
为什么我们在公司业绩不佳时仍然保留它们
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 1. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第一点。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Rory Johnson (PH). I’m from Suffolk in the U.K.
观众成员：你好。我是罗里·约翰逊（PH）。我来自英国的萨福克。
Do you have, or are there, any appropriate criteria, beyond purely financial returns, in assessing the success or otherwise of your investments?
在评估您的投资是否成功时，除了纯粹的财务回报之外，您是否有或是否存在任何适当的标准？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that the financial returns, achieved in a way that we want them to be achieved, are the determinant of whether we’ve made an intelligent commitment.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说，以我们希望的方式实现的财务回报，是判断我们是否做出了明智承诺的决定因素。
Now, we don’t get rid of companies that don’t meet our original expectations. There’s a section in the back of our annual report on the economic principles. And I forget which one it is. It’s toward the end.
现在，我们不会因为公司未达到我们最初的期望而将其淘汰。在我们的年度报告中有一个关于经济原则的部分。我忘记具体是哪一条了，它在报告的后面。
But we say that Charlie and I have this quirk, which business schools would teach is a mistake, in that if we have a business that’s underperforming and we could sell it and put — and achieve greater returns someplace else, we don’t do it.
但是我们说查理和我有这个怪癖，商学院会教这是一个错误，因为如果我们有一个表现不佳的业务，我们可以卖掉它并在其他地方获得更高的回报，我们却不这样做。
We say that if a business is going to permanently lose money, we’ll get rid of it. If it has major labor problems over a period of time, we might get rid of it. But we are not going to engage in what we call gin-rummy type management where we pick up one card and discard another.
我们说，如果一个企业将永久亏损，我们就会放弃它。如果它在一段时间内有重大劳工问题，我们可能会放弃它。但我们不会进行所谓的“金拉米式管理”，即拿起一张牌，丢掉另一张。
And so we will not — if a business has been disappointing to us, but we like the people there and we’re not having — not because of labor problems — and we’re not going to have to put money in incessantly, we will stay with it when business school theory and management theory would say get rid of it and do something else.
因此，如果一家企业让我们失望，但我们喜欢那里的员工，并且我们没有——不是因为劳工问题——而且我们不需要不断投入资金，我们会坚持下去，即使商学院理论和管理理论会建议放弃它并做其他事情。
We don’t disagree with the people that do it that way. It’s just that we don’t want to live our lives that way. And if we owned 100 percent of Berkshire we wouldn’t do it that way.
我们并不反对以那种方式做事的人。只是我们不想以那种方式生活。如果我们拥有伯克希尔 100%的股份，我们也不会那样做。
And we don’t — we just — we want the shareholders to know that we have this mindset that may produce slightly suboptimal returns because of our attitude. But that’s the way we’re going to play it, and we tell people ahead of time that that’s the way we’re going to play it.
我们并不——我们只是——我们希望股东知道，由于我们的态度，这种心态可能会产生略微次优的回报。但这就是我们要采取的方式，我们提前告诉大家这就是我们要采取的方式。
We like being associated with the managers that we are, even the ones that are in — facing headwinds. I mean, but in a sense you almost identify more with the ones that are facing headwinds because they’re doing a hell of a job under very tough conditions.
我们喜欢与我们这样的管理者联系在一起，即使是那些面临逆风的管理者。我的意思是，从某种意义上说，你几乎更能认同那些面临逆风的管理者，因为他们在非常艰难的条件下做得非常出色。
从一朵花跳到另一朵的成本更高。
And every business decision or investment decision isn’t going to work out perfectly. And some businesses are going to run into unexpected surprises.
每个商业决策或投资决策都不可能完美无缺。有些企业会遇到意想不到的惊喜。
But the people that have gone in with us have stuck with us in times like that. And our attitude is we’ll stick with them.
但是那些和我们一起进去的人在那样的时刻一直支持我们。我们的态度是我们也会支持他们。
So to the — I would say that how the people behave with us after we buy the business is an important part of how we feel about, you know, the whole relationship as well as the returns achieved.
所以，我会说，在我们收购业务后，人们对我们的行为方式是我们对整个关系以及所获得回报的感受的重要部分。
Charlie? 查理？
53. Moral distinction between buying a stock and a company
购买股票与购买公司的道德区别
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think he’s asking in part, are there some businesses we won’t have as subsidiaries in Berkshire even though they’re wonderful businesses? So, are we rejecting some business opportunities on moral grounds?
查理·芒格：是的。我认为他部分是在问，是否有一些业务尽管很优秀，但我们不会将其作为伯克希尔的子公司。所以，我们是否基于道德原因拒绝某些商业机会？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well we’ve referred in past meetings to one we did on that basis. We will own stocks of companies where we wouldn’t want to own the whole business. I mean, you know, you can —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在过去的会议中提到过我们在这种基础上做过的一个例子。我们会持有一些公司的股票，即使我们不想拥有整个业务。我的意思是，你知道，你可以——
I’m not sure that the logic is perfect on that, but we would not have trouble owning stock in a cigarette company. We wouldn’t want to manufacture cigarettes, you know. We might own a retail company that sells cigarettes. I mean, there’s all kinds of gradations.
我不确定这其中的逻辑是否完美，但我们在拥有一家香烟公司的股票上不会有问题。你知道，我们不想制造香烟。我们可能会拥有一家销售香烟的零售公司。我的意思是，这其中有各种各样的层次。
But we do not — there are things we don’t want to own and be responsible for their businesses, where we have no problem owning their stocks or bonds. And some years back, Charlie and I went down to, where, Memphis?
但是我们不——有些事情我们不想拥有，也不想对他们的业务负责，而我们对拥有他们的股票或债券没有问题。几年前，查理和我去了哪里，Memphis？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we looked at a — and we were invited down, and we looked at a company that made a product that — perfectly legal — probably one of the best businesses I’ve ever seen, in terms of the economics of it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们去看了一家——我们被邀请去的——公司，这家公司生产一种产品——完全合法——可能是我见过的经济效益最好的企业之一。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely.
查理·芒格：绝对如此。
WARREN BUFFETT: Still doing very well. And we met in the room with — we went to a hotel. We met in the room with the people that had the business. And people were perfectly decent people. And they described the business to us. And we went down in the lobby.
沃伦·巴菲特：仍然做得很好。我们在一个房间里见面——我们去了一个酒店。我们在房间里与拥有这项业务的人见面。那些人都是非常正派的人。他们向我们描述了这项业务。然后我们下到大堂。
And as I remember, we sat down in the lobby and just decided that we didn’t want to be in that business. And, you know, the lines are not perfect on this sort of thing.
我记得，我们坐在大厅里，决定不想从事那种业务。而且，你知道，这种事情的界限并不完美。
I mean, it — I’m sure that there may be ads in the Buffalo News that are selling some investment service or something that I would cringe at if I knew the people involved or what they were selling.
我的意思是，我确信《布法罗新闻》上可能有一些广告在出售某种投资服务或其他东西，如果我知道涉及的人或他们在卖什么，我会感到不安。
And it — if you own a big retail establishment, a retailer, general merchandise, you know, you’re probably going to be selling cigarettes when you don’t think that you should smoke yourself or that your children should smoke. And it’s — they’re not perfect.
如果你拥有一家大型零售机构，一家零售商，销售综合商品，你可能会卖香烟，即使你认为自己不应该吸烟或者你的孩子不应该吸烟。而且，他们并不完美。
But we have turned down some — the most dramatic being that one because we went — took us a trip of 1,000 miles or so to finally face up to the fact that we didn’t want to own it.
但我们确实拒绝了一些——其中最显著的就是那个，因为我们走了大约1000英里，最终面对现实，我们不想拥有它。
Charlie, you have anything to add on it?
查理，你有什么要补充的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but that was interesting because we were young and poor then by modern standards. And, you know, we’re very human. And we could see it was just, like, putting $100 million in a bushel basket and setting it on fire as we walked away. And — (Laughter)
查理·芒格：没有，但这次经历很有趣，因为那时我们年轻而且按现代标准来看很贫穷。你知道，我们很有人情味。我们可以看到，这就像是把1亿美元放在一个筐子里，然后在走开时把它点燃。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re making me feel bad. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你让我感觉很糟糕。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: We made the decision all right and with no difficulty. But there was a certain twinge. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我们做出了正确的决定，而且毫不费力。但还是有一点不舍。（笑声）
54. Munger’s collected wisdom
芒格的智慧集锦
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is J Dwight. I’m from a small town in Maine called Wilton, Maine. My question comes more of a request.
观众成员：我的名字是 J Dwight。我来自缅因州的一个小镇，叫做威尔顿，缅因州。我的问题更像是一个请求。
And could Charlie Munger create a curriculum, or a list of reading and experiences, which he believes would lead to his concept of worldly wisdom? This would serve two great — three great purposes.
查理·芒格能否创建一个课程，或者一份阅读和体验的清单，他认为这将引导他实现世俗智慧的概念？这将服务于两个伟大——三个伟大的目的。
One, it would pass on the most valuable possession — that is your knowledge and experience — to us and to others in the future.
一，它将传递最有价值的财富——也就是你的知识和经验——给我们以及未来的其他人。
Two, it would preserve and enhance that wealth beyond the material riches endowed on future generations.
二，它将保护并提升超越物质财富的财富，赋予子孙后代。
And three, it would begin to remedy the stunted educations of those like — Mr. Munger — are plunging along with ordinary will, with time to improve ourselves. Thank you.
第三，它将开始弥补像我们这样的普通人教育水平低下的问题，帮助我们有时间来改善自己。谢谢。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, Peter Kaufman has tried to do that in that book that he stitched together out of my old speeches plus a lot else.
查理·芒格：当然，彼得·考夫曼在他编写的那本书中尝试过这样做，那本书是由我过去的演讲和其他很多内容拼凑而成的。
And I didn’t want to do it. And he went and saw Warren, and Warren got enthusiastic. And Warren suggested this ridiculous name, “Poor Charlie’s Almanack.” (Laughter)
我不想做这件事。他去见了沃伦，沃伦变得很热情。沃伦建议了这个荒谬的名字，“Poor Charlie’s Almanack.”（笑声）
And between the two of them, they really got me to do it. But the whole idea of doing it is with just the motivation you’re talking about.
在他们两人的劝说下，我才勉强同意。但这个想法的初衷正是出于你所提到的动机。
I think if you assimilate everything in that simple book, you will know a lot more than about 95 percent of your compatriots.
我认为，如果你能吸收那本简单书中的所有内容，你将比大约 95%的同胞知道得更多。
And it’s not that hard to do. So, Peter Kaufman has made it easy for you.
而且这并不难做到。所以，彼得·考夫曼已经为你简化了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I couldn’t be more enthusiastic about what you suggested. And it’s been done. And it’s a sensational book. And anybody that reads it is going to learn a whole, whole lot about life.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我对你所建议的事情感到非常热情。而且已经完成了。这是一本轰动的书。任何读过它的人都会学到很多关于生活的知识。
And you’ll learn even — to get you to read it, I’ll tell you you’ll even learn something about making money. The — and it’s right next door here, they haven’t sold out.
你甚至会学到一些东西——为了让你去读它，我会告诉你，你甚至会学到一些关于赚钱的东西。就在隔壁，他们还没有卖完。
55. Future of pharmaceuticals is “too hard”
制药业的未来“太难”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3, please?
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我三号？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Scott Jeffords (PH) from Davidson, North Carolina.
观众成员：下午好。我是来自北卡罗来纳州戴维森的斯科特·杰福兹（音）。
The major pharmaceutical companies have faced a myriad of fundamental and legal challenges in recent years.
近年来，大型制药公司面临着无数的基本和法律挑战。
With that in mind, and given the apparent ongoing nature of those obstacles, how should investors be thinking about the long-term prospects for this very important industry?
鉴于此，并考虑到这些障碍的明显持续性，投资者应如何看待这个非常重要行业的长期前景？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my answer is, I don’t know. But maybe Charlie will. And it’s — you know, it’s a terrific question.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我的回答是，我不知道。但也许查理会知道。而且，你知道，这是个很好的问题。
It’s just that — that industry is in a state of flux now. It does very important things for mankind. It’s historically earned good returns — very good returns — on invested capital.
只是那个行业现在正处于变动状态。它为人类做了非常重要的事情。历史上，它在投资资本上获得了良好的回报——非常好的回报。
But it’s going — it could well be that the world will unfold differently for those companies in the future than the past. It may — that may not be the case.
但事情正在发展——未来这些公司的发展可能与过去不同。也许——情况可能并非如此。
And I’m — I don’t think I’m really qualified to give you a good answer on that because much of it is in the political realm. And my judgment about the — what politicians will do is probably not better than yours.
我——我认为我没有资格给你一个好的答案，因为这很大程度上属于政治领域。而我对政治家会做什么的判断可能并不比你更好。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I share Warren’s agnosticism on the subject. We just throw some decisions into the “too hard” pile and go on to others. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：在这个问题上，我和沃伦一样持不可知论态度。我们只是把一些决策放到“太难”堆里，然后继续处理其他事情。（笑声）
56. No “degree of difficulty” adjustment for investing
投资没有“难度系数”调整
WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, there’s a lot of wisdom in that remark. I mean, there are things in life that you don’t have to make a decision on and that are too hard.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一句，那句话中蕴含了很多智慧。我的意思是，生活中有些事情你不必做出决定，而且太难了。
And many years ago on one of the reports, I said one of the interesting things about investment is that there’s no degree of difficulty factor.
多年前在其中一份报告中，我说投资的一个有趣之处在于没有难度系数。
I mean, if you’re going to go diving in the Olympics and try to win a gold medal, you get paid more, in effect, for certain kinds of dives than others because they’re more difficult. And they properly adjust for that factor.
我的意思是，如果你要参加奥运会跳水比赛并尝试赢得金牌，实际上你会因为某些类型的跳水比其他类型更困难而获得更多报酬。他们会适当地调整这个因素。
But in terms of investing, there is no degree of difficulty. If something is staring you right in the face and the easiest decision in the world, the payoff, can be huge. And we get paid, not for jumping over 7-foot bars, but for stepping over 1-foot bars.
但在投资方面，没有难度等级。如果有些事情就摆在你面前，是世界上最简单的决定，那么回报可能会很大。而我们获得报酬，不是因为跳过 7 英尺的横杆，而是因为跨过 1 英尺的横杆。
And the biggest thing we have to do is decide which ones are the 1-foot bars and which ones are the 7-foot bars so when we go to step we don’t bump into the bar. And that is something that I think we’re reasonably good at.
我们必须做的最大事情是决定哪些是 1 英尺的横杆，哪些是 7 英尺的横杆，这样当我们迈步时就不会撞到横杆。我认为我们在这方面相当擅长。
Now maybe we cast out too many things as being too hard and thereby narrow our universe. But I’d rather have the narrow — the universe be a little too — interpret it as being a little too — a little smaller than it really is, than being interpreted as larger than it is.
现在，也许我们把太多事情视为太难，从而缩小了我们的世界。但我宁愿让这个世界被解读得比实际稍微小一点，也不愿被解读得比实际大。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Obviously.
查理·芒格：显然。
57. Avoiding emotional investment traps
避免情感投资陷阱
WARREN BUFFETT: 4. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：4。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m Whitney Tilson, a shareholder from New York City.
观众成员：下午好。我是惠特尼·蒂尔森，来自纽约市的股东。
And one of the things I find most refreshing and admirable about you, as corporate leaders, is that you’re very candid about making mistakes, and — as you put it last year, Mr. Munger — rubbing your noses in it.
我发现你们作为企业领导者最令人耳目一新和钦佩的一点是，你们对犯错误非常坦诚，而且——正如你去年所说的，芒格先生——直面自己的错误。
Last year, Mr. Buffett, you talked about the $10 billion mistake of starting to buy Walmart and then stopping after it had ticked up a little bit.
去年，巴菲特先生，您谈到了开始购买沃尔玛并在价格稍微上涨后停止的 100 亿美元错误。
Today, you seem to allude to a somewhat similar mistake. You bought a stake in PetroChina. Then after it was disclosed that you owned it, it popped up a bit. And obviously in hindsight, you could have made a lot of money had you continued buying it.
今天，你似乎暗示了一个有些类似的错误。你购买了中国石油的股份。然后在你持有股份的消息披露后，股价略有上涨。显然，事后看来，如果你继续购买，你本可以赚很多钱。
If these emotional traps — I think you called it “anchoring” at last year’s annual meeting — are the traps that even people as experienced as you gentlemen are, occasionally fall into, I sort of wonder what hope do the rest of us have?
如果这些情感陷阱——我记得你们在去年的年度会议上称之为“锚定”——是即使像你们这样有经验的人偶尔也会陷入的陷阱，我有点想知道我们其他人还有什么希望？
So, my question is, is how do you — what are the mental tricks you have? Or how do you overcome these behavioral and emotional traps like anchoring? And what advice do you have for us?
所以，我的问题是，你是如何——你有什么心理技巧？或者你是如何克服这些行为和情感陷阱，比如锚定效应的？你对我们有什么建议？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. And, of course, it first — the first step is in recognition of the fact that they can be traps and that you will be affected by them. And you will make some mistakes because of them.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。当然，第一步是认识到它们可能是陷阱，并且你会受到它们的影响。你会因为它们而犯一些错误。
But Charlie in his — in “Poor Charlie’s Almanack,” which I probably do take credit for the name of, and the — he talks about the various psychological traps that people fall into. And simply reading that section, you will come away wiser than before you started on it.
但查理在他的——在《穷查理宝典》中，我可能确实为这个名字感到自豪，他谈到了人们陷入的各种心理陷阱。仅仅阅读那一部分，你就会比开始时更有智慧。
We will — our personalities are such that Charlie and I probably are a little less prone to some of those mistakes than other people are. But as our record clearly indicates, we still are prone to them. And we make them and we’ll make them again.
我们的个性使得查理和我可能比其他人更不容易犯其中的一些错误。但正如我们的记录清楚表明的那样，我们仍然容易犯这些错误。我们犯过错误，也会再犯。
We’re probably a little less inclined to make some of them than we were 30 or 40 years ago. But, you know, the nice thing about it is, though, is that if you make fewer of those mistakes than others, you know, they will continue making their share and you’ll get very rich.
我们可能不太愿意像 30 或 40 年前那样去做其中的一些事情。但是，你知道，这其中的好处是，如果你比别人犯的错误少，他们会继续犯他们的错误，而你会变得非常富有。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You don’t have to have perfect wisdom to get very rich. All you’ve got to do is have slightly more than other people, on average, over a long time. (Applause)
查理·芒格：是的。你不需要拥有完美的智慧就能变得非常富有。你所需要做的只是比其他人平均稍微多一点，持续很长时间。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You know, it’s the old story about the guy outrunning the bear. I mean, I don’t have to outrun the bear. I just have to outrun that other fellow. And — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，这就像那个关于跑赢熊的老故事。我不需要跑赢熊。我只需要跑赢另一个人。然后——（笑声）
58. Low Treasury yields are a mystery
低国债收益率是一个谜
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：第五位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Steve Casbell (PH) from Atlanta.
观众成员：嗨，我是来自亚特兰大的史蒂夫·卡斯贝尔（音）。
With signs of inflation, you know, in commodities and oil, why do you think the 10-year is still — you know, the yield is 4.2 percent? And, you know, is it that the market sees signs of deflation coming in the future?
随着商品和石油出现通胀迹象，你知道，为什么你认为 10 年期国债收益率仍然是——你知道，收益率是 4.2%？而且，你知道，是不是市场看到未来有通缩的迹象？
And in addition to that, if you thought rates would stay at this level for an extended period, would you have a more favorable view of the market?
除此之外，如果您认为利率会在这个水平上保持较长时间，您会对市场有更积极的看法吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to the second part is yes. I mean, if somebody guaranteed me that the 10-year rate would never go above 4.2 percent for the next 50 years, we would have to readjust, recalibrate every decision we make around Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，第二部分的答案是肯定的。我的意思是，如果有人向我保证未来 50 年 10 年期利率永远不会超过 4.2%，我们将不得不重新调整、重新校准我们在伯克希尔做出的每一个决定。
I think it was [Federal Reserve Chairman] Alan Greenspan, I don’t know whether he’s talking about the 10-year or what is the closest thing now to the 30-year — we don’t issue 30-years anymore — but the — he referred to it as a conundrum.
我认为是[美联储主席]艾伦·格林斯潘，我不知道他是否在谈论10年期，或是现在最接近30年的国债——我们现在不再发行30年期国债——但他提到过这被称为一个“难题”。
And after I looked it up, I decided I agreed with him. (Laughter)
在我查阅后，我发现我同意他的看法。（笑声）
I don’t understand it. And — but that’s OK. There’s a lot of things in financial markets I don’t understand. And that doesn’t mean I have to make a decision.
我不理解它。不过——没关系。金融市场上有很多事情我不理解。这并不意味着我必须做出决定。
I don’t have to either go long or go short, the 10-year. Although by keeping as much money as we do short, we are in effect at least making the decision that we don’t want to be long, long bonds.
我不必非得做多或做空 10 年期债券。尽管我们将大量资金保持在短期债券上，实际上至少是在做出不想持有长期债券的决定。
That doesn’t mean we think it necessarily would be smart to be short them. But we do not want to be long, longer bonds. And I —
这并不意味着我们认为做空它们一定是明智的。但我们不想持有长期债券。而我——
If you’d told me two years ago that every move that the Fed would make in the last two years, and you told me all the other variables that would take place, and you’d asked me what the 10-year rate would be at this time, I would have been very wrong.
如果你在两年前告诉我美联储在过去两年中的每一个举动，并告诉我所有其他将发生的变量，然后问我此时的 10 年期利率会是多少，我会非常错误。
So, you know, it’s not a game I’ve excelled at so far. I’m puzzled by it. And we’ll see where it is next year when we meet.
所以，你知道，到目前为止这不是我擅长的游戏。我对此感到困惑。我们明年见面时再看看它的发展。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think the one thing you can confidently predict is there won’t be some automatic and rational correlation between inflation and interest rates. There will be weird diversions.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为你可以自信地预测的一件事是，通货膨胀和利率之间不会有某种自动和理性的关联。会有奇怪的偏差。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do you want to elaborate on how these weird things will manifest themselves?
沃伦·巴菲特：你想详细说明这些奇怪的事情将如何表现出来吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no. All I know is it happens.
查理·芒格：不，不。我只知道它会发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Frequently very surprising.
查理·芒格：经常非常令人惊讶。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it surprised us on this so far, didn’t it?
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，到目前为止，这确实让我们感到惊讶，不是吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure. 查理·芒格：当然。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
59. “Finite” insurance
“有限”保险
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Glenn Tongue from New York City. I hope this does not overstate your ground rules.
观众成员：你好，我是来自纽约市的 Glenn Tongue。我希望这不会过分夸大你的基本原则。
I’ve read what you have written about finance reinsurance in the annual report. There’s been much erroneous stuff written recently about finite reinsurance. Can you simply explain the product and its importance to Berkshire?
我已经阅读了您在年度报告中关于金融再保险的内容。最近关于有限再保险有很多错误的报道。您能简单解释一下这个产品及其对伯克希尔的重要性吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well it’s a good question because the term has been used, “finite reinsurance.” And, you know, basically almost all insurance is finite.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是个好问题，因为“有限再保险”这个术语已经被使用。而且，你知道，基本上几乎所有的保险都是有限的。
I mean, if you have a $200,000 homeowner’s policy, or if you have a 100/300 auto liability, that’s a finite policy. The insurance company will pay you that much and pay you no more.
我的意思是，如果你有一份 20 万美元的房主保险，或者你有一份 100/300 的汽车责任险，那就是一个有限的保单。保险公司会支付给你这么多，不会再多支付。
And with the exception of workers’ comp, and maybe there’s something else I’m forgetting about, but basically all insurance is denominated in some amount with a limit.
除了工伤赔偿外，也许还有其他我忘记的东西，但基本上所有保险都是以某个限额为单位的。
That 500 million we wrote on that airport, I mean, we can lose 500 million but I don’t think we can lose 501 million. And so the — I think the term finite has gotten — it’s gotten to be convenient to use without anybody totally describing it well.
我们在那个机场写的 5 亿，我的意思是，我们可以损失 5 亿，但我不认为我们可以损失 5.01 亿。因此，我认为“有限”这个词已经变得——它变得方便使用，而没有人能很好地完全描述它。
Actually, when the SEC sent out its first request for information, I think they called it non-traditional insurance. And I think that may be a better term to use in terms of what’s being looked at.
实际上，当美国证券交易委员会发出第一次信息请求时，我认为他们称之为非传统保险。我认为这可能是一个更好的术语来描述正在被审查的内容。
And there is nothing wrong — I mean, there’s nothing wrong at all with finite insurance. We’re issuing finite insurance policies every day at our — on our auto policies and everything else.
而且有限保险没有任何问题——我的意思是，有限保险根本没有任何问题。我们每天都在为我们的汽车保险和其他保险签发有限保险单。
And there’s nothing wrong, in my view, at all with retroactive contracts. For example, we wrote — a few years back we wrote a — and this is very rough, but it’d been in the press, so that I’m not violating any confidences of clients —
在我看来，追溯合同完全没有问题。例如，几年前我们写了一份——这只是一个大概，但因为已经在媒体上报道过，所以我并没有违反任何客户的保密协议——
We wrote a contract as I remember — and I may be just a little off on this — that to pay, when INA was being sold to ACE, we — to pay 2 1/2 billion of claims from the past. And I think we got a premium around 1 1/4 billion on it.
据我记得，我们写了一份合同——我可能记得不太准确——在 INA 被出售给 ACE 时，我们要支付过去的 25 亿美元的索赔。我想我们从中获得了大约 12.5 亿美元的保费。
Now, we were making an estimate or a guess as to whether the whole 2 1/2 billion would be paid, how fast it would be paid, and a lot of things.
现在，我们正在估计或猜测整个 25 亿是否会支付，支付的速度有多快，以及很多其他事情。
And ACE, on the other hand, was getting rid of 2 1/2 billion of potential liabilities, and they did not have the capital strength of Berkshire.
另一方面，ACE 正在摆脱 25 亿的潜在负债，他们没有伯克希尔的资本实力。
And that contract went before the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. It was improved. I mean, it had value to both parties. It had — you can argue it had value to the public in that Berkshire was a stronger insurer.
这份合同经过了宾夕法尼亚州保险部门的审批，得到批准。对双方都有价值。你可以争论说对公众也有价值，因为伯克希尔是一家更强的保险公司。
Actually, in the first quarter of last year in our 10-Q, you will see that we recorded a loss of $100 million because the payment pattern on that contract turned out to be faster than we anticipated.
实际上，在去年第一季度的 10-Q 报告中，你会看到我们记录了 1 亿美元的亏损，因为该合同的付款模式比我们预期的要快。
I mean, there was risk involved. But it was all retroactive and a perfectly proper contract, in my view, or I think anybody’s view. And we would do more of that business. In fact, we looked at a very, very big one here recently.
我的意思是，存在风险。但在我看来，这都是追溯性的、完全正当的合同，或者说任何人都这么认为。我们还会进行更多这样的业务。实际上，我们最近还在考虑一个非常大的一笔交易。
What I think the — and understandably — the authorities are looking for is that contracts that had no purpose and that were possibly misused by some party in accounting. And the facts on that remain to be seen.
我认为——可以理解的是——当局正在寻找的是那些没有目的的合同，并且可能被某些方在会计中滥用的合同。而事实如何还有待观察。
But I think calling it finite, it just isn’t the right descriptive word. I think that, like I say, non-traditional — we can have a lot of non — we issue non-traditional products all the time.
但我认为称其为有限的，这不是一个合适的描述词。我认为，就像我说的，非传统——我们可以有很多非——我们一直在发行非传统产品。
I mean, I talked last year about the billion-dollar thing for PepsiCo. That certainly isn’t traditional. But it’s real insurance.
我的意思是，我去年谈到了百事公司价值十亿美元的事情。那当然不是传统的。但这是真正的保险。
And the question is whether risk is transferred. But the risk on the ACE contract, for example, was several.
问题是风险是否被转移。但例如，ACE 合同上的风险有几个。
One is, we had a risk as to whether the whole 2 1/2 billion would be paid. Second, was how fast it would be paid. And the third risk is what you can do with the money in between. And money hasn’t been worth very much to us lately. So, there was risk in that. And that’s what insurance is all about.
首先，我们面临的风险是整个 25 亿是否会被支付。其次，是支付的速度有多快。第三个风险是你在这期间可以用这笔钱做什么。而且最近这笔钱对我们来说并不值钱。所以，这其中存在风险。这就是保险的意义所在。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with you about the word finite reinsurance. It’s — absolutely — you could hardly not invent a worse word to use to describe a new class of insurance. It’s just a meaningless rubric.
查理·芒格：嗯，我当然同意你对有限再保险这个词的看法。这是——绝对是——你几乎不可能发明一个更糟糕的词来描述一个新的保险类别。这只是一个毫无意义的标签。
And, of course, non-traditional is imperfect, too, because we have traditionally issued non-traditional insurance. (Laughter)
当然，非传统的也不完美，因为我们传统上就发行非传统保险。（笑声）
And — but we have to use some words to describe what’s happening.
而——但我们必须用一些词来描述正在发生的事情。
There’s no question about the fact that the corporate world has gotten more and more interested over the last 10 years in having regularity in earnings reports. And they’ve turned to a huge variety of ways to try and do that.
毫无疑问，过去十年中，企业界对财报的稳定性越来越感兴趣。他们已经采取了各种方法来实现这一目标。
And reinsurance is a very minor part of the whole picture. But there has been more reinsurance sought because people were more anti-volatility, in terms of reported results.
再保险在整个图景中是一个非常小的部分。但由于人们在报告结果方面更加反对波动，因此寻求更多的再保险。
WARREN BUFFETT: But, of course, insurance is a way to reduce volatility, and a perfectly proper way. I mean, if you pay $1,000 a year on your auto premiums for the next 30 years, it isn’t —
沃伦·巴菲特：但是，当然，保险是一种减少波动性的方法，而且是一种完全合适的方法。我的意思是，如果你在接下来的 30 年里每年支付 1000 美元的汽车保险费，这并不是——
You are going to have a more regular income stream than if you wait and have one $25,000 accident one year and don’t pay the premiums in the other years.
如果你等待并在一年内发生一次 $25,000 的事故，而在其他年份不支付保费，那么你的收入流将比这更稳定。
So, I mean, people have bought insurance to reduce the volatility in their own personal results and their own business results. So, reducing volatility, per se, is not bad at all. It’s the reason —
所以，我的意思是，人们购买保险是为了减少个人和企业业绩的波动性。因此，减少波动性本身并没有什么不好。这就是原因——
极其愚蠢的账，是比赌场更好的生意。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。
WARREN BUFFETT: — there are $400 billion worth of insurance premiums paid in this country every year. But that doesn’t — you know, you can also get into abuses of that. And that’s what they’re — the people are looking to find and see what the real situation is.
沃伦·巴菲特：——每年在这个国家支付的保险费总额为 4000 亿美元。但是，这并不意味着——你知道的，这其中也可能存在滥用的情况。这就是人们正在寻找并想要了解真实情况的原因。
60. Buffett: I make mistakes but don’t agonize over decisions
巴菲特：我会犯错，但不会为决策而苦恼
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7?
沃伦·巴菲特：第七号？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wow, this more nerve-wracking than I thought it would be. Hello, Warren, Charlie. My name is Aki Progakis. I’m from Montreal, Canada.
观众成员：哇，这比我想象的更让人紧张。你好，沃伦，查理。我的名字是阿基·普罗加基斯。我来自加拿大蒙特利尔。
Warren, I wrote a letter back in January. I wrote a letter to you recommending a beautiful Canadian retail company in which I described my analysis to you.
沃伦，我在一月份写了一封信。我写信给你，推荐了一家美丽的加拿大零售公司，并在信中向你描述了我的分析。
I’d like to thank you for taking the time to respond to me. You said some nice kind words. That meant a lot to me. And I think you’re an amazing individual. My question go — (audio dropout) — people, what is the single most difficult decision you’ve had to make in your lifetime, whether it be business or personal?
我想感谢你抽出时间回复我。你说了一些友善的话。这对我意义重大。我认为你是一个了不起的人。我想问的问题是——（音频中断）——人们，你一生中做出的最困难的决定是什么，无论是商业上的还是个人的？
WARREN BUFFETT: I think I’m going to let Charlie answer that one first. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我想我会让查理先回答这个问题。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I would argue that that may be one that you shouldn’t ask. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：是的。我认为这可能是一个你不应该问的问题。（笑声和掌声）
Or let’s put it this way, I think you should answer it with several interesting examples before you ask us to answer it. (Laughter)
或者这样说吧，我认为在你让我们回答之前，你应该用几个有趣的例子来回答这个问题。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a (Inaudible). (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：那是一个（听不清）。（笑声）
It’s interesting. As Charlie was talking, I was — I have — I can’t think of a lot of difficult — I can think of a lot of wrong decisions I’ve made. But I certainly can’t think of anything I agonized over making for any long period of time.
这很有趣。当查理在说话时，我——我——我想不出很多困难——我能想到很多我做出的错误决定。但我肯定想不出有什么事情是我长时间痛苦思考后才做出的。
Like I say, that isn’t — you know, I mean, it’s calling balls and strikes. I mean, you got a second there and if you don’t do it in that — you’re no longer an umpire.
就像我说的，那不是——你知道，我的意思是，这就是判断好球和坏球。我的意思是，你有一秒钟的时间，如果你不在那一刻做出判断——你就不再是裁判了。
So, I’ve made plenty of wrong decisions. I’m going to make plenty more. That’s just part of living.
所以，我做了很多错误的决定。我还会做更多。这只是生活的一部分。
But I don’t think in terms of being difficult as measured by the time it took me to do it or the — not a lot of them pop to mind. And if they do I’ll probably give you the same answer as Charlie.
但我不认为困难是通过我完成它所花的时间来衡量的，或者——没有很多让我想起的。如果有的话，我可能会给你和查理一样的答案。
Charlie, have you thought of any more there while we were talking?
查理，我们谈话的时候你有没有想到更多的东西？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Let’s go on to another.
查理·芒格：不。让我们继续下一个。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter) That was not a bad decision.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）那不是一个糟糕的决定。
61. Real estate brokerage will get a “lot bigger”
房地产经纪业务将会“变得更大”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8. (Laughter) But thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：第八。（笑声）但谢谢你。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Franklin Grin (PH). I’m from Philadelphia. And I’m interested in real estate.
观众成员：下午好。我的名字是富兰克林·格林（音）。我来自费城。我对房地产感兴趣。
You’ve already covered many different areas today about real estate, such as the real estate bubble, the long-run performance most people have obtained in their personal holdings of real estate, the GSEs, the REITs.
今天你已经讨论了许多关于房地产的不同领域，比如房地产泡沫、大多数人在个人房地产持有中获得的长期表现、政府资助企业（GSEs）、房地产投资信托基金（REITs）。
But one of the things that appears in today’s newspaper is quoting Mr. Buffett about building a brokerage powerhouse. And that seems to say that you envision changes in the way in which people buy and sell their houses and other kinds of related things.
但是今天的报纸上有一件事引用了巴菲特先生关于建立经纪业巨头的言论。这似乎表明您设想人们买卖房屋和其他相关事物的方式会发生变化。
So, I was wondering if you could tell me a little bit more about that area of where you envision Berkshire Hathaway going.
所以，我想知道您是否可以多告诉我一些关于您对伯克希尔哈撒韦未来发展的设想。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ll be glad to. But the — we are hoping to build a powerhouse that’s built very much on the model of today. In other words, we do not envision big changes in residential real estate brokerage, which is what we’re in.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我很乐意。但我们希望建立一个非常基于当今模式的强大企业。换句话说，我们不设想在住宅房地产经纪方面会有大的变化，这正是我们所从事的领域。
We — as we put in — they talk about sides in real estate, the buy side and the sell side. We participated in sides that totaled $50-odd billion last year. And we are the second largest residential real estate brokerage firm in the country.
我们——正如我们所说的——他们在房地产中谈论买方和卖方。去年我们参与的交易总额超过 500 亿美元。我们是全国第二大住宅房地产经纪公司。
But we expect that business really to be conducted quite similarly in the future to how it has been in the past. Now there are people that disagree with that and think that way more will happen via the internet.
但我们预计未来的业务将与过去的业务非常相似地进行。现在有些人不同意这一点，认为更多的事情将通过互联网发生。
But, you know, the purchase of a home is the single most important transaction for most people in their lifetimes. It’s — it can be partly emotional. It’s partly something that they appreciate people guiding them through.
但是，你知道，购买房屋是大多数人一生中最重要的交易。这在某种程度上可能是情感上的。在某种程度上，他们也欣赏有人引导他们完成这个过程。
It’s something where I think one-on-one will be very important in the future as it has been so far.
我认为一对一在未来会像迄今为止一样重要。
And in this country, there are going to be millions and millions and millions of homes that get sold every year. It’s — just in terms of people moving and dying and moving up in their economic potential.
在这个国家，每年将有成千上万的房屋被出售。这仅仅是因为人们的搬迁、去世以及经济潜力的提升。
So, there — the real estate brokerage business is going to be a very, very big business. And I think it will tend to be a very local business.
所以，房地产经纪业务将会成为一个非常非常大的行业。我认为它将倾向于成为一个非常本地化的业务。
And we have bought leading local firms in a number of markets. And they have retained their individual identity. We have not gone for a Century 21 or something approach, where we put them all under the umbrella of a single brand.
我们在多个市场收购了领先的本地公司，并且它们保留了各自的独立身份。我们没有采用类似 21 世纪不动产的方式，将它们全部置于单一品牌的旗下。
Rather we have these individual brands in given communities. And they’re usually very strong brands in each community. But we’ve only scratched the surface.
相反，我们在特定社区中拥有这些独立品牌。它们通常在每个社区中都是非常强大的品牌。但我们只是触及了表面。
And I would expect — and it has nothing to do with the potential for real estate or anything. It just relates to the fact that tens and tens and tens of millions of people own their own homes. And some are going to move around every year.
我预计——这与房地产的潜力或其他任何事情无关。这只是因为数以千万计的人拥有自己的房屋。而且每年都会有一些人搬家。
And there’s — I think that they’re going to continue to have a real estate broker involved in most of the transactions. And we would like to be very big in that business. We already are big, but we’re going to —
我认为他们会继续在大多数交易中涉及房地产经纪人。我们希望在这个行业中占据重要地位。我们已经很大，但我们将会——
I would think it’s almost certain that we will be a lot bigger in that business five or 10 years from now — I mean, a lot bigger — than we are now. And it’s a question of acquiring these firms.
我认为几乎可以肯定的是，五到十年后我们在那个业务上会比现在大得多——我的意思是，大得多。而这涉及到收购这些公司。
Generally, they’re — you know, they’re proprietorships. They’re owned by a single individual or a family. And they come up periodically because of the family circumstances or the individual circumstances of somebody.
一般来说，它们是——你知道，它们是独资企业。它们由个人或家庭拥有。由于家庭情况或某个人的个人情况，它们会定期出现。
But there’s a lot of them out there. And we’re a logical buyer. And we’ve been found to be a good owner. So I think it’s going to be a good-sized field for us over time.
但是外面有很多。而且我们是一个合乎逻辑的买家。我们被认为是一个好的所有者。所以我认为随着时间的推移，这对我们来说将是一个相当大的领域。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we voted by buying the brokerage operation instead of the real estate. Obviously, we regard it as having better economics than the underlying real estate which Berkshire could buy.
查理·芒格：是的，我们通过购买经纪业务而不是房地产来投票。显然，我们认为它的经济性比伯克希尔可以购买的基础房地产更好。
62. Munger: “Stupid and dishonorable accountants”
芒格：“愚蠢且不光彩的会计师”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：第九。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Martin White. I’m in the insurance business in London. And quite separately, together with other volunteers, I also help to run the only independent lobby group for private shareholders in the U.K.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是马丁·怀特。我在伦敦从事保险业务。此外，我还与其他志愿者一起帮助运营英国唯一的独立私人股东游说团体。
I would like to ask you your thoughts on two aspects of worldwide solvency and how assets and liabilities are recognized in everyone’s accounts. I suppose both are about whether the regulators have the bottle to do the right thing in spite of possible complaints from companies.
我想请教您关于全球偿付能力的两个方面，以及各公司如何在账目中确认资产和负债的看法。我想这两个方面都与监管者在面对公司可能的抱怨时是否有勇气采取正确的措施有关。
One aspect is about how insurance liabilities and assets are valued for solvency purposes and the discussions that are going on to develop new accounting standards worldwide. The other aspect is about derivatives, the potential “weapons of financial mass destruction.”
一个方面是关于保险负债和资产在偿付能力方面的估值，以及当前正在进行的全球新会计标准的讨论。另一个方面是关于衍生品，潜在的“金融大规模毁灭性武器”。
For those derivatives which don’t have quotes, I suspect we could find out how big a black hole there might be if the regulators around the world required everyone to report at the same date for each derivative they have, their current recognized asset or negative assets, and most importantly, who the counterparty was.
对于那些没有报价的衍生品，我怀疑如果全球的监管机构要求每个人在同一日期报告他们所持有的每种衍生品的当前确认资产或负资产，最重要的是，谁是交易对手，我们可能会发现可能存在多大的黑洞。
So, the regulators, sharing information collected from both sides, could see what the worldwide aggregate misstatement was.
因此，监管机构通过共享从双方收集的信息，可以看到全球范围内的总体误报情况。
On insurance solvency, if we started with a fair attempt at mean discounted liabilities, and then added a large chunk for safety, and for reinsurance assets, did the same, discounted, but this time the safety chunk was deducted, life would be a lot simpler and there would be a lot more consistency and, I suspect, safety, than under the current undiscounted regime.
关于保险偿付能力，如果我们从合理的平均折现负债开始，然后添加一大笔安全费用，再把再保险资产同样折现，但这次安全费用被扣除，生活将会简单得多，预计会有更多的一致性和我怀疑的安全性，而不是现在的未折现制度。
I think both problems need regulatory attention. What are your thoughts?
我认为这两个问题都需要监管关注。你有什么看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on a subject of discounting reserves — which essentially means taking what you expect to pay in the future and then taking in the appropriate interest rate and carrying at some lower figure now, because you don’t have to pay now, but later —
沃伦·巴菲特：关于储备折现的问题——这基本上意味着将你预计未来要支付的金额，按照适当的利率折算成现在的较低金额，因为你现在不需要支付，而是以后支付——
You know, I can certainly make the purist argument — or the argument of the purist — for the fact that that might be the most accurate way. And certainly, of course, in the life insurance field, it is prevalent.
你知道，我当然可以为这一事实提出纯粹主义者的论点——或者说纯粹主义者的论点——认为这可能是最准确的方法。当然，在人寿保险领域，这种情况很普遍。
But I would say there has been such a tendency of managements to understate reserves worldwide, and in some cases by extraordinary amounts, that I think anything that pushes in the direction of carrying those reserves at even lower amounts —
但我会说，全球管理层普遍存在低估储备的倾向，有些情况下甚至低估得非常严重，因此我认为任何推动以更低金额持有这些储备的做法——
And I realize you stuck in that part about the healthy bumping of them, too — but I think anything that — any accounting that lets — gives people a rationale for making reserves even lower than they have been, on balance, is dangerous.
我意识到你也提到了他们健康增长的那部分——但我认为任何让人们有理由让储备比以前更低的计算，总体上都是危险的。
There is such a tendency on what they call long-tail business — or business where you don’t expect to actually make the payments for a few years or more — I think there’s such a tendency to view those with optimism, particularly when somebody’s going to retire in a couple years or their options are about to run out or whatever it may be, that I don’t like giving them the extra leeway of discounting on top of that.
在他们所谓的长尾业务中有这样一种趋势——或者说在那些你不期望在几年或更长时间内实际付款的业务中——我认为有这样一种倾向，以乐观的态度看待这些业务，特别是当某人将在几年内退休或他们的期权即将到期或无论是什么情况时，我不喜欢在此基础上再给予他们额外的折扣余地。
The derivatives question you raise is really interesting, but it would be mind-boggling to implement.
你提出的衍生品问题确实很有趣，但实施起来会让人难以置信。
I mean, it’s always fascinating to me how people can write a derivative contract, you know. And both sides of it — the trader will be, perhaps at least, showing a profit on it, you know, by the end of the month or something of the sort, that — you know, usually the contracts aren’t that precisely matched because you have all kinds of other contracts that bear on the one you’re doing.
我的意思是，我总是对人们如何能写出衍生合同感到着迷。你知道，合同的双方——交易员可能至少会在月底或类似的时间显示出利润。通常合同并不是那么精确匹配的，因为你有各种其他合同会影响你正在做的那个。
But I would say that the trader’s estimate, and maybe the auditor’s estimate, of the value of all derivatives contracts outstanding in the world, would end up with — quite a large positive sum for something that essentially will wash out as a zero sum.
但我会说，交易员的估计，也许还有审计员的估计，关于全球所有未结衍生品合约的价值，最终会得出一个相当大的正数，而这本质上会作为一个零和游戏消除。
And I can tell you from the fact that I inherited a book of 23,000 contracts that’s far, far, far from the largest or the second largest or the third largest in the world.
我可以告诉你，我继承了一本包含 23,000 份合同的书，这远远不是世界上最大、第二大或第三大的。
And the complexity of those contracts, and the complexity of unwinding them now where we’re three years into it — and we’ve done an awful lot of it, but we’ve been operating in a benign environment —
这些合同的复杂性，以及现在解除这些合同的复杂性，我们已经进行了三年——我们已经做了很多工作，但我们一直在一个良性的环境中运作——
I don’t think any regulator, and I’m not sure any auditor, when you get up to really extensive derivative books, in effect, can get their minds around evaluation.
我认为没有任何监管机构，也不确定任何审计员，能够真正理解非常庞大的衍生品账簿的评估。
I know that, you know, as I pointed out in our report, ours were supposedly marked to market. And people think of that as something that you just go out and hit bids and, you know, within a few days wind up something.
我知道，正如我在我们的报告中指出的那样，我们的资产据说是按市值计价的。人们认为这就是你出去接受报价，然后在几天内完成某件事情。
And if you’re trading government bonds, you know, you can do that. And if you’re trading actually active equities, you can do it. But when you start trading derivatives, it’s unbelievable what you can find. And I’ve had a couple of experiences with them.
如果你在交易政府债券，你知道，你可以这样做。如果你在交易活跃的股票，你也可以这样做。但是当你开始交易衍生品时，你会发现难以置信的东西。我有过几次这样的经历。
Charlie, what are your thoughts?
查理，你有什么想法？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my thoughts are that stupid and dishonorable accountants allowed the genie of totally improper accounting to come out of the bottle and descend in the derivative books of the world.
查理·芒格：嗯，我的想法是愚蠢和不光彩的会计师让完全不当的会计魔鬼从瓶子里出来，并降临到世界的衍生品账簿中。
Once that has happened and people have used it to create masses of assets and masses of earnings reports and bonuses and status and so on and so on and so on, getting the genie back in the bottle is no small task because you have these huge vested interests who are fighting you.
一旦发生这种情况，人们利用它创造了大量资产、大量收益报告、奖金、地位等等，要把精灵重新装回瓶子就不是一件小事，因为你面临着这些巨大的既得利益者的阻力。
And what ordinary housewife, as she puts the toast in in the morning, is thinking, “My god, I’ve got to do something about derivatives?” You know? (Laughter)
而且，普通家庭主妇在早上把吐司放进烤箱的时候，谁会想到，“天哪，我得做点什么来处理衍生品？”（笑声）
So the people that are — have vested interest in the current system are powerful. And the rest of the people don’t care. And so this evil genie stays out of the bottle and does more and more mischief with each passing day.
所以那些在现行制度中有既得利益的人是有权势的。而其他人并不关心。因此，这个邪恶的精灵留在瓶子外面，每天都在制造越来越多的麻烦。
If you’re trying to fix this, you are going to have a very interesting life. (Laughter)
如果你试图解决这个问题，你将会有一个非常有趣的生活。（笑声）
63. Q&A ends
问答结束
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s 3 o’clock now. If you haven’t had enough, [TV journalist] Charlie Rose has a show on, on Channel 12 tonight at 8 o’clock where there’s another hour and a half of interviews he did with me and with Bill Gates and various people.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在是 3 点钟。如果你还没看够，[电视记者]查理·罗斯今晚 8 点在第 12 频道有一个节目，他对我、比尔·盖茨和其他一些人的采访还有一个半小时。
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