2008-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
上午会议
1. TV soap star Susan Lucci trades jobs with Buffett
电视肥皂剧明星苏珊·卢奇与巴菲特交换工作
NEWS ANCHOR (CNBC’s Becky Quick, on tape): Folks, this just in. It appears that Warren Buffett has struck a deal to trade jobs with daytime soap opera diva Susan Lucci.
新闻主播（CNBC 的 Becky Quick，录音）：各位，刚刚收到消息。沃伦·巴菲特似乎已经达成协议，与日间肥皂剧女星苏珊·卢琪交换工作。
Buffett has reportedly negotiated a permanent spot on the cast of All My Children. Apparently, Ms. Lucci is en route to Omaha as the new CEO of Berkshire. (Applause.)
据报道，巴菲特已经谈妥在《我的孩子们》剧组中获得一个永久角色。显然，露西女士正前往奥马哈，成为伯克希尔的新任首席执行官。（掌声。）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Where could he be? (Laughter and applause as actress Susan Lucci comes on stage)
查理·芒格：他会在哪里呢？（当女演员苏珊·卢琪上台时，笑声和掌声）
SUSAN LUCCI: Do you mean Warren, Charlie? He’s been detained at the TV studio. (Laughter)
苏珊·卢奇：你是说沃伦，查理吗？他被电视台扣留了。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Really? 查理·芒格：真的吗？
SUSAN LUCCI: Hi, Charlie. I’m Susan Lucci. Oh, haven’t you heard about the deal between Warren and me? He’s going to be a big star in All My Children, and I’m going to be taking over Berkshire Hathaway.
苏珊·卢奇：嗨，查理。我是苏珊·卢奇。哦，你没听说我和沃伦之间的交易吗？他将在《我的孩子们》中成为大明星，而我将接管伯克希尔·哈撒韦。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve certainly got some important qualities that Warren lacks. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，你确实有一些沃伦所缺乏的重要品质。（笑声）
SUSAN LUCCI: Well, thank you, Charlie. And you can relax now, you dear man. You just make yourself at home because I’ll take it from here, thank you.
苏珊·卢奇：好的，谢谢你，查理。你现在可以放松了，亲爱的。你就当自己在家一样，因为接下来由我来，谢谢。
I’ve been wanting to talk to our shareholders for quite some time now. There’s some changes I really think we need to make around here.
我一直想和我们的股东谈谈。有一些我认为我们确实需要在这里做出的改变。
The first thing we need to look at is our dividend policy. (Laughter)
我们首先需要查看的是我们的股息政策。（笑声）
I have never heard of anything so cheap and so unfair to our wonderful shareholders. We need to change it. (Applause)
我从未听说过对我们优秀的股东如此廉价和不公平的事情。我们需要改变它。（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Sounds good to me. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：听起来不错。（笑声）
SUSAN LUCCI: And, second, we need to look at giving guidance on earnings. And we need to do that every single week. (Laughter)
苏珊·卢奇：其次，我们需要考虑对收益进行指导。我们需要每周都这样做。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Sounds good to me. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：听起来不错。（笑声）
SUSAN LUCCI: And, third, we need to pay our directors more than $900 a year. (Cheers and applause)
苏珊·卢奇：第三，我们需要给我们的董事支付超过900美元的薪水。（欢呼和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Just one minute. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：请稍等一下。（掌声。）
SUSAN LUCCI: Hi, Warren. Warren, I thought you were at the All My Children studio.
苏珊·卢奇：嗨，沃伦。沃伦，我以为你在《我的孩子们》剧组。
WARREN BUFFETT: What’s that talk about dividends that I hear?
沃伦·巴菲特：我听到的关于股息的讨论是什么？
SUSAN LUCCI: Oh, nothing important, Warren. You just concentrate on your role on the show.
苏珊·卢奇：哦，没什么重要的，沃伦。你只要专注于你在节目中的角色就好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Susan, my show is Berkshire Hathaway. And my role is to run it. (Takes paper out of jacket pocket and rips it up)
沃伦·巴菲特：苏珊，我的节目是伯克希尔·哈撒韦。而我的角色是管理它。（从夹克口袋里拿出纸张并撕掉）
SUSAN LUCCI: Warren, you can’t do that.
苏珊·卢奇：沃伦，你不能那样做。
WARREN BUFFETT: I just did it. All My Children can’t do without you, and I can’t do without Berkshire. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：我就是这么做的。《我的孩子们》离不开你，我离不开伯克希尔。（掌声。）
SUSAN LUCCI: Oh, Warren. So you mean the deal is off?
苏珊·卢奇：哦，沃伦。你的意思是交易取消了吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The deal is off. I really want to thank you. You’ve brought me to my senses. You can go back to All My Children. I’ll stay here at Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：交易取消。我真的要感谢你。你让我恢复了理智。你可以回去拍《我的孩子们》。我会留在伯克希尔。
But I am so grateful to you Susan, that I want you to go out to Berkshire — not to Berkshire — to Borsheims and I want you to pick out anything you would like, and charge it to Charlie. (Laughter)
但我非常感激你，苏珊，我希望你去伯克郡——不，不是伯克郡——去 Borsheims，我希望你挑选任何你喜欢的东西，然后记在查理的账上。（笑声）
SUSAN LUCCI: Oh, Warren, you are darling. Thank you. (Applause.)
苏珊·卢琪：哦，沃伦，你真可爱。谢谢。（掌声。）
SUSAN LUCCI (to MUNGER): And you’re a darling, too.
苏珊·卢奇（对芒格）：你也是个可爱的人。
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, wait a second.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，等一下。
SUSAN LUCCI: Thank you. (Applause)
苏珊·卢琪：谢谢。（掌声）
2. Welcome
欢迎
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Charlie, let’s get this show on the road. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。查理，让我们开始吧。（笑声）
The — she spent more time with him than she did with me, but — (Laughter)
她——她花在他身上的时间比花在我身上的时间多，但是——（笑声）
The — we’re going to follow the usual procedure.
我们将遵循通常的程序。
The business meeting will start at 3:15. But between now and then, with a break for lunch, we’re going to answer your questions. We don’t screen them ahead of time, as you know — based on who gets lined up at the microphone first.
商务会议将于 3:15 开始。但在此之前，我们会在午餐休息期间回答您的问题。正如您所知，我们不会提前筛选问题——而是根据谁先排队到麦克风前来决定。
And we’ll go around from sections to sections and then go to the overflow rooms. My understanding is that our best estimate is that we have about 31,000 people here today. (Applause.)
我们将从一个区域到另一个区域，然后去到分会场。据我了解，我们的最佳估计是今天这里大约有 31,000 人。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Somewhere I have a map here. Marc, do we have that?
沃伦·巴菲特：我这里有一张地图。马克，我们有吗？
Pardon me? Can’t hear a thing up here. But in any event — on the yellow pad. OK. We’ll just mark them off as we go along.
抱歉？在这里什么都听不见。不过无论如何——在黄色便笺上。好的。我们会在进行时逐一标记。
The — I would like, before we start — I heard Ron Olson laughing there. I think he made it. I’m glad to hear it.
在我们开始之前——我听到罗恩·奥尔森在笑。我想他成功了。我很高兴听到这个。
Let me introduce our directors. I really wasn’t sure whether to go through with this part of the show after they showed that rousing applause for things like dividends and raising their — but we have up here — we have Charlie Munger on my left. He’s the one that can hear; I can see. We work together for that reason. (Applause.)
让我介绍一下我们的董事。在他们为股息和提高他们的——等事情热烈鼓掌之后，我真的不确定是否要进行节目的这一部分，但我们在这里——我左边是查理·芒格。他是能听见的那个；我是能看见的那个。我们因此而合作。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: And if the rest of you will just stand as I give your name. And if you’ll hold your applause to the end — or even longer if you would like — (laughter) — I will introduce them.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果我念到你的名字，请站起来。如果你们愿意，请把掌声留到最后——或者更久——（笑声）——我会介绍他们。
It’s Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott. The best directors in America. (Applause.)
是霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、比尔·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特。美国最优秀的董事。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I will take a break at noon because we will probably, by that time, have finished all of the things we have up here to eat, and we’ll need to have lunch.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我将在中午休息，因为到那时我们可能已经吃完了这里所有的东西，我们需要吃午饭。
I’d appreciate it if you would limit your questions to one question, and that means not embodying a three-parter or a four-parter or something like that.
我会很感激如果你能将问题限制为一个问题，这意味着不要包含三个或四个部分的问题或类似的东西。
And there’s no need to make a long introductory statement because we’ll get more questions answered that way, and we want to cover as many people as we can.
没有必要做长篇的介绍性陈述，因为这样我们可以回答更多的问题，并且我们希望尽可能多地覆盖到更多的人。
3. How NOT to be a lemming
如何不做一只旅鼠
WARREN BUFFETT: So with that, we’ll go right over to post number 1 and start in with the first question.
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我们将直接进入第一个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Very good morning to Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Rajesh Furor (PH) from Bombay, India.
观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，早上好。我是来自印度孟买的拉杰什·弗罗尔（音）。
I have been learning a lot from letters of yours. It’s been a great insight into investment philosophy that I haven’t learned from anywhere else. Great job.
我从你的信中学到了很多。这是我在其他地方没有学到的投资理念的极大见解。干得好。
That’s on the mind side. But on the heart side, what touches me the most is what you have achieved all these years is through a hundred percent honesty, and I salute to that. Thanks.
这在理智方面。但在情感方面，最让我感动的是你这些年来所取得的成就是通过百分之百的诚实，我对此表示敬意。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Now, my question is on what key steps would you recommend to correct the mind set of typical investor like me, which is what you noted as lemmings-like, the crowd mindset?
观众成员：现在，我的问题是，您会推荐哪些关键步骤来纠正像我这样的典型投资者的心态，也就是您所提到的类似于旅鼠的心态？
WARREN BUFFETT: What would we recommend — we got the question being repeated here — about the mindset of an investor? Is that —?
沃伦·巴菲特：我们会推荐什么——我们这里重复了这个问题——关于投资者的心态？是这样吗——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: He wants you to advise him as to how he can become less like a lemming. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：他希望你能给他建议，如何让自己不再像一只旅鼠。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, since you repeated the question, I’m going to let you give the first answer to that, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，既然你重复了这个问题，我就让你先回答，查理。（笑声）
Until he eats about a thousand calories, it — (Laughter)
在他摄入大约一千卡路里之前，它——（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: He wants to invest less like a lemming.
查理·芒格：他想要投资得不像一只旅鼠。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I understand that. I was giving you the first shot at it. Well, I will tell you what changed my own life on investing.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我明白。我只是让你先说。好吧，我会告诉你是什么改变了我自己的投资生活。
I started investing when I was 11. I first started reading about it — I believe in reading everything in sight. And I first started reading about it when I was probably six or seven years old.
我在 11 岁时开始投资。我最初开始阅读相关内容——我相信要阅读所有能看到的东西。我大概在六七岁时就开始阅读相关内容。
But for about eight years I wandered around with technical analysis and doing all kinds of things, and then I read a book called “The Intelligent Investor.” And I did that when I was 19 down at the University of Nebraska.
但大约八年间，我一直在研究技术分析和做各种事情，然后我读了一本名为《聪明的投资者》的书。我是在 19 岁时在内布拉斯加大学读的这本书。
And I would say that if you absorb the lessons of “The Intelligent Investor”, mainly in — I wrote a forward and I recommended particularly Chapters 8 and 20 — that you will not behave like a lemming and you may do very well compared to the lemmings.
我会说，如果你吸收了《聪明的投资者》的教训，主要是——我写了一篇前言，并特别推荐了第 8 章和第 20 章——你就不会像旅鼠一样行事，并且相比于旅鼠，你可能会做得非常好。
We have here in the Bookworm, copies of “The Intelligent Investor”, and I think it’s as great a book now as I did when I read it early, I guess, in 1950.
我们在书虫这里有《聪明的投资者》的副本，我认为这本书现在和我在 1950 年早期读它时一样伟大。
You will never — you can’t get a bad result if you follow the lessons of — Ben Graham taught in that book.
如果你遵循本·格雷厄姆在那本书中教授的课程，你永远不会——你不可能得到一个糟糕的结果。
I should mention that there’s a book out there also that I did not know it would be completed by this time.
我应该提到，有一本书我不知道会在这个时候完成。
My cousin, Bill Buffett, has written a book about our grandfather’s grocery store called “Foods You Will Enjoy.” And Bill will be out there. He’s signing books.
我的表弟比尔·巴菲特写了一本关于我们祖父杂货店的书，名为《您会喜欢的食物》。比尔会在那里签名售书。
I just got my first copy a couple days ago. Read it, and I enjoyed it a lot.
几天前我刚拿到我的第一本书。读了之后，我非常喜欢。
Charlie worked at the same grocery store — how many years ago? Probably a good 70 years ago in Charlie’s case. Neither one of us was very good. (Laughter)
查理在同一家杂货店工作——多少年前？在查理的情况下，可能是 70 年前。我们俩都不是很擅长。（笑声）
But my grandfather — you don’t want to pay much attention to his advice on stocks. He wrote a lot of letters, and he was very negative on the stock market and big on hard work at the grocery store.
但是我祖父——你不应该太在意他对股票的建议。他写了很多信，对股市持非常消极的态度，并且非常重视在杂货店的辛勤工作。
So we quit listening to him. (Laughter)
所以我们不再听他说话了。（笑声）
Instead, read The Intelligent Investor. That’s the book that gave me the philosophy that has taken me now for a lot of years.
相反，阅读《聪明的投资者》。这本书给了我多年来一直坚持的投资理念。
And there’s three big lessons in there which relate to your attitude towards stocks generally, which is that you think of them as parts of a business; and your attitude toward the market, which is that you use it to serve you and not to instruct you; and then the idea of a margin of safety, of always leaving some extra room and things.
其中有三个重要的教训与您对股票的总体态度有关：您将股票视为企业的一部分；您对市场的态度是利用市场为您服务，而不是让市场指导您；以及安全边际的理念，即始终留有一些额外的空间和余地。
But the people in this room, I think, have learned that important first lesson. I mean, I think most people that own Berkshire do not see themselves as owning something with a little ticker symbol or something that may have a favorable or unfavorable earnings surprise or something of the sort, but they’d rather think of themselves as owning a group of those businesses that are out there in the other room.
但是我认为，这个房间里的人已经学会了那个重要的第一课。我的意思是，我认为大多数拥有伯克希尔的人并不认为自己拥有的是一个带有小股票代码的东西，或者是可能有利或不利的盈利意外之类的东西，而是更愿意把自己看作是拥有那些在另一个房间里的企业群体。
And that’s the way to look at stocks. You’ll never be a lemming if you do that.
这就是看待股票的方式。如果你这样做，你就永远不会成为一只随大流的旅鼠。
4. Buffett will handle Cologne Re’s investment portfolio
巴菲特将负责科隆再保险的投资组合
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to Number two.
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们来看第二个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren. Good morning, Charlie. My name is George Iscis (PH) from Cologne, Germany.
观众成员：早上好，沃伦。早上好，查理。我的名字是乔治·伊斯西斯（音译），来自德国科隆。
My question: how is the operational integration of the Cologne Re progressing? Thank you very much.
我的问题是：科隆再保险的运营整合进展如何？非常感谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Cologne Re, for those of you who are not familiar with it, is a 95 percent-owned subsidiary of General Re, of which Berkshire Hathaway owns 100 percent.
沃伦·巴菲特：科隆再保险，对于那些不熟悉的人来说，是通用再保险公司 95%控股的子公司，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司拥有通用再保险公司 100%的股份。
And Cologne Re, I believe, is the oldest reinsurance company in the world. It’s done a magnificent job for us as part of, first Gen Re, and then Berkshire Hathaway.
科隆再保险公司，我相信，是世界上最古老的再保险公司。作为最初的通用再保险公司的一部分，然后是伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，它为我们做了出色的工作。
And we have a process in place that will, before too long, result in us owning a hundred percent of Cologne.
我们已经有一个流程，不久之后我们将百分之百拥有科隆。
One difference, then — there won’t be any difference in operation. It runs magnificently the way it’s being run. But at that point — up until this point, they have run their own investment portfolio. That portfolio and the equity portfolio of GEICO are the only two that I don’t run.
那么一个区别——在操作上不会有任何区别。它以目前的方式运行得非常好。但在那时——直到这一点，他们一直在管理自己的投资组合。那个投资组合和 GEICO 的股票投资组合是我唯一不管理的两个。
But when we own a hundred percent of Cologne, then I will take the responsibility for Cologne’s investment portfolio. Otherwise it would be hard to improve on the operation of the management of Cologne.
但是当我们百分之百拥有科隆时，我将负责科隆的投资组合。否则，很难改进科隆的管理运作。
So there will be — you will not see any other changes except we will consolidate in 100 percent of the earnings of Cologne rather than 95 percent.
因此，除了我们将合并科隆 100%的收益而不是 95%之外，您不会看到任何其他变化。
5. “Forget about the word ‘stock’”
“忘掉‘股票’这个词”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3. 沃伦·巴菲特：第三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Sam Reiner (PH) from Fort Lee, New Jersey, and my question concerns your comment this week about the recession, and the stock market going up so significantly in April.
观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫萨姆·雷纳（音），来自新泽西州的福特李，我的问题是关于您本周对经济衰退的评论，以及股市在四月份大幅上涨的情况。
Can you expand on where the market is going from here? (Laughter)
你能详细说明一下市场从这里会如何发展吗？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Hah. Well, I can expand, but I couldn’t answer. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：哈哈。嗯，我可以展开说，但我无法回答。（笑声）
Charlie and I haven’t the faintest idea where the stock market is going to go next week, next month, or next year. We never talk about it. You know, it never comes up.
查理和我完全不知道股市下周、下个月或明年会怎么走。我们从来不谈论这个。你知道，这个话题从未出现过。
Our directors will tell you that they’ve never been to a directors meeting where the subject of the direction of the stock market is — we are not in that business. We don’t know how to be in that business.
我们的董事会成员会告诉你，他们从未参加过讨论股市走向的董事会会议——我们不从事那种业务。我们不知道如何从事那种业务。
Obviously, if we could guess successfully a high percentage of the time where the stock market was going to go, we would do nothing but play the S&P futures market. There wouldn’t be any reason to look at businesses and stocks. So it’s just not our game.
显然，如果我们能够在大多数时间成功预测股市的走向，我们就只会参与标普期货市场的交易。就没有理由去研究企业和股票。所以这根本不是我们的游戏。
反过来也是成立的。
We don’t think — what we see when we look at the stock market is we see thousands and thousands and thousands of companies priced every day, and we ignore 99.9 percent of what we see, although we run our eyes over them.
我们不认为——当我们看股市时，我们看到的是每天有成千上万的公司被定价，而我们忽略了我们所看到的 99.9%，尽管我们会浏览它们。
And then every now and then we see something that looks like it’s attractively priced to us, as a business. Forget about the word “stock.”
然后，我们时不时会看到一些对我们来说价格看起来很有吸引力的东西，作为一个企业。忘掉“股票”这个词。
So when we buy a stock, we would be happy with that stock if they told us the market was going to close for a couple years. We look to the business.
因此，当我们购买一只股票时，如果他们告诉我们市场将关闭几年，我们会对那只股票感到满意。我们关注的是业务。
It’s exactly the same way as if you were going to buy a farm a few miles here outside of Omaha. You would not get a price on it every day, and you wouldn’t ask, you know, whether the yield was a little above expectation this year or down a little bit.
就像你要在奥马哈外几英里处买一个农场一样。你不会每天都得到一个价格，你也不会问今年的产量是否略高于预期或略低。
You’d look at what the farm was going to produce over time. You’d look at expected yields. You’d look at expected prices, the taxes, the cost of fertilizer, and you would evaluate the intelligence of your purchase based on what the farm produced relative to your purchase price.
你会查看农场随着时间的推移将会生产什么。你会查看预期的产量。你会查看预期的价格、税收、化肥的成本，然后根据农场的产出相对于你的购买价格来评估你的购买是否明智。
Quotes would have nothing to do with it. That’s exactly the way we look at stocks. We look at them as businesses. We make judgments about what the future of those businesses will be. And if we’re right about — in those judgments, the stocks will take care of themselves.
报价与此无关。这正是我们看待股票的方式。我们将其视为企业。我们对这些企业的未来做出判断。如果我们的判断是正确的，股票就会自行发展。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：没有什么可补充的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s been practicing for weeks. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他已经练习了好几个星期。（笑声）
6. We don’t cultivate great managers, we keep them
我们不培养优秀的管理者，我们留住他们
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to area 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们去第 4 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Chander Chavla (PH), and I am from Seattle, Washington.
观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是钱德·查夫拉（音），我来自华盛顿州的西雅图。
Berkshire Hathaway has some of the best managers in the world, and I am very bad at hiring good managers. The — some of the decisions that I’ve made, which were without any phone calls from Jamie Lee Curtis, I look back and I see — you know, what was I thinking.
伯克希尔·哈撒韦拥有世界上最优秀的管理者，而我在招聘优秀管理者方面非常糟糕。我所做的一些决定，没打过詹米·李·库里斯的电话，回想起来，我都在想——你知道，我当时在想什么。
What can you advise on, how in one hour you can assess the capability of a person to be a good manager?
能给我一些建议，在一个小时内如何评估一个人成为优秀管理者的能力？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you have to understand that we cheat. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你必须明白我们是作弊的。（笑）
We buy businesses with good managers. So if you give me a hundred MBAs — and I have these classes come out all the time to Omaha. I’ve had about 30 schools this year, and usually there’s 75 or a hundred men and women in the classes.
我们收购有优秀管理者的企业。所以如果你给我一百个 MBA——我经常让这些班级来奥马哈。今年我接待了大约 30 所学校，通常每个班级有 75 到 100 名男女学生。
I no more could take those hundred and spend a few hours and rank them from number one to a hundred in terms of their future achievements as managers, you know, than I could pick them — you know, it would be impossible for me.
我无法将那一百个人花几个小时按未来作为经理的成就从第一到第一百进行排名，就像我无法挑选他们一样——你知道，这对我来说是不可能的。
But what we do is we buy businesses with great managers in place. We’ve seen those people perform for, in many cases, decades. We’ve seen their record, and they come with the business.
但我们所做的是收购拥有优秀管理者的企业。我们看到这些人在许多情况下已经表现了几十年。我们看到了他们的业绩，他们与企业一同而来。
Now, our job is not so much to select great managers, because we do have this proven record that they come with. Our job is to retain them.
现在，我们的工作不是去挑选优秀的经理，因为他们已经有了证明自己的记录。我们的工作是留住他们。
记录很重要。
And many of the managers — a majority of the managers that work at Berkshire — are independently wealthy. We hand them checks, sometimes, in the billions, often in the hundreds of millions. So they do not have a monetary reason to work, in many cases.
许多经理——在伯克希尔工作的经理中大多数——都是独立富有的。我们有时给他们开出数十亿的支票，通常是数亿的。因此，在许多情况下，他们没有经济上的理由去工作。
So our job — we are dependent on them, incidentally. I mean, we have 19 or so people at headquarters, and we have 250,000 working for Berkshire around the world, and we can’t run their businesses.
所以我们的工作——顺便说一下，我们依赖于他们。我的意思是，我们在总部有大约 19 个人，而在全球为伯克希尔工作的人有 25 万，我们无法经营他们的业务。
And our job is to make sure that they have the same enthusiasm, excitement, passion, for their job after the stock certificate changes hands, than they had before.
我们的工作是确保在股票证书易手后，他们对工作的热情、兴奋和激情与之前一样。
Now, that requires some judgment on our part as to whether these people love the business or love the money. They all like money, but many of them — well, our managers in particular — they love their businesses. I mean, they’ve worked at them — they’re a work of art to them, and they’ve been in the family sometimes as many as four generations.
现在，这需要我们判断这些人是热爱业务还是热爱金钱。他们都喜欢钱，但他们中的许多人——尤其是我们的经理——热爱他们的业务。我的意思是，他们一直在从事这些业务——对他们来说，这是一件艺术品，有时这些业务在家族中已经传承了四代。
So we have to see the passion in their eyes, and if we see that, then we have to behave in a way that that passion remains.
所以我们必须看到他们眼中的热情，如果我们看到了，那么我们必须以一种保持这种热情的方式行事。
Can’t be done by contract. We don’t have contracts. It won’t — that doesn’t work.
不能通过合同完成。我们没有合同。那行不通。
But we can try to create an environment — and Berkshire, frankly, is the ideal environment — it’s even an ideal environment because of events like this.
但是我们可以努力创造一个环境——坦率地说，伯克希尔就是理想的环境——因为像这样的活动，它甚至是一个理想的环境。
Our managers feel appreciated. And they are appreciated. They’re not just appreciated by me and Charlie; they’re appreciated by you. And we want to give you a chance to applaud them. (Applause.)
我们的经理们感到被欣赏。他们确实被欣赏。他们不仅被我和查理欣赏，也被你们欣赏。我们想给你们一个机会为他们鼓掌。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: So I can’t be of enormous help. And if you’re looking at a group of MBAs, you know, it’s not easy. I mean, they know — they sort of learn by that point in life how to fool you, in terms of what answers you want to hear and all of that sort of thing.
沃伦·巴菲特：所以我不能提供很大的帮助。如果你在看一群 MBA，你知道，这并不容易。我的意思是，他们在生活的那个阶段已经学会了如何愚弄你，知道你想听什么答案以及所有那些事情。
I would look for the person with passion for the job. I mean, the person that is always doing more than their share. You look for people that are goods communicators and all of that sort of thing.
我会寻找对工作充满热情的人。我的意思是，总是做得比他们份内工作更多的人。你要寻找那些善于沟通的人以及类似的品质。
But I like my way better. It’s a lot easier just to take somebody that’s been batting .400 in baseball and say, “I think I’ll stick them in the lineup.”
但我更喜欢我的方式。说实话，挑选一个在棒球场上打了400的人，然后说，“我想我会把他们放进阵容。”要简单得多。
And the nice thing about our game is that, you know, in baseball, unless you’re Nolan Ryan or somebody, you have to hang up things at 40 or thereabouts, but in our game, they go on and on and on.
而我们游戏的好处是，你知道，在棒球中，除非你是诺兰·瑞安或其他人，否则你必须在 40 岁左右退役，但在我们的游戏中，他们可以一直继续下去。
I mean, I use as an example — we had a famous Mrs. B from the Furniture Mart, and she worked for us until she was 103, and then she left and she died the next year. And that is a lesson to our managers that — (Laughter)
我的意思是，我用一个例子来说——我们有一位著名的家具市场的 B 夫人，她为我们工作到 103 岁，然后她离开了，第二年去世了。这对我们的经理们是一个教训——（笑声）
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that was very useful advice. It reminds me very much of the late Howard Ahmanson.
查理·芒格：嗯，那是非常有用的建议。这让我想起了已故的霍华德·阿曼森。
And a young and starving business student once asked him for advice as to how to get ahead, and Howard said, “Well, I always keep a few million dollars laying around in case a good opportunity suddenly turns up.” (Laughter)
有一次，一个年轻且饥饿的商科学生向他请教如何出人头地，霍华德说：“嗯，我总是留几百万美元在身边，以防有好的机会突然出现。”（笑声）
7. Teaching option pricing is “totally nonsense”
教授期权定价是“完全无稽之谈”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s go to number 5. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，让我们来看第 5 个。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Joe Hutchin (PH), a shareholder from Culver, Indiana.
观众成员：早上好。我是乔·哈钦（PH），来自印第安纳州卡尔弗的股东。
Could you please comment on how you use stock options when trying to enter or exit a position in a public company?
您能否评论一下在尝试进入或退出一家上市公司的头寸时如何使用股票期权？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve — I think there’s one time we sold a put on Coca-Cola with the idea that, if it got exercised, we were very happy to own more Coca-Cola. It didn’t get exercised. We would have been better off if we had just bought the stock.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我记得有一次我们卖出了一份可口可乐的看跌期权，想法是如果期权被行使，我们会很高兴拥有更多的可口可乐股票。结果期权没有被行使。如果我们直接买入股票，情况会更好。
Usually, if you want to buy or sell a stock, you should buy or sell the stock.
通常，如果你想买卖股票，你应该买卖股票。
And using an option technique to buy a call on a stock instead of buying the stock outright with the idea that you get it a little cheaper that way means that about four times out of five you’ll be right and the fifth time the stock will have moved earlier and you’ll have missed, you know, the transaction you wanted to have.
使用期权技术购买看涨期权而不是直接购买股票，认为这样可以稍微便宜一点，这意味着五次中大约有四次你是对的，而第五次股票会提前上涨，你会错过你想要进行的交易。
And so we virtually have never used options as a way to enter a position or exit a position, and I would doubt very much if we do.
因此，我们几乎从未使用期权作为进入或退出仓位的方式，我非常怀疑我们是否会这样做。
We’ve used — we’ve sold these equity — long-term equity put options that were described in the press release yesterday and were described in the annual report, but that’s a different sort of thing.
我们已经使用——我们已经出售了这些股权——长期股权看跌期权，这在昨天的新闻稿中有所描述，并在年度报告中有所描述，但这是不同类型的事情。
If we want to buy something, we’ll just start buying it. And if we want to get out of it, we’ll start selling it. And we won’t get involved in any fancy techniques.
如果我们想买东西，我们就开始买。如果我们想退出，我们就开始卖。我们不会涉及任何花哨的技巧。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if I remember right, you wrote a letter when the public authorities were deciding whether we should have option exchanges for stocks. And Warren was all alone at that time, and he wrote a letter saying that he didn’t think it would do any good at all for the country to throw out the margin rules in this fashion.
查理·芒格：嗯，如果我没记错的话，当公共当局在决定我们是否应该有股票期权交易所时，你写了一封信。当时沃伦是孤身一人，他写了一封信说，他认为以这种方式抛弃保证金规则对国家没有任何好处。
I’ve always thought that Warren was totally right. We — it’s — the idea of turning financial markets into gambling parlors so the croupiers can make more money has never been very attractive to us.
我一直认为沃伦是完全正确的。我们——这——把金融市场变成赌场以便庄家能赚更多钱的想法对我们来说从来没有吸引力。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s very interesting to me when I talk to these MBA students. One of them from the University of Chicago, the very first question I got a few years ago, he says, “What are we being taught that’s wrong?”
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当我与这些 MBA 学生交谈时，我觉得非常有趣。其中一位来自芝加哥大学，几年前我收到的第一个问题是，他说：“我们被教的有什么是错误的？”
I love questions like that. I have to plant them in the future.
我喜欢这样的问题。我必须把这些问题种在未来。
The amount of time spent at business schools — maybe it’s a little less now — but teaching things like option pricing and that sort of thing, it’s totally nonsense.
在商学院花费的时间——也许现在少了一点——但教授期权定价之类的东西，完全是无稽之谈。
I mean, you need two courses in a business school: one is how to value a business, and — from the standpoint of investments — how to value a business and how to think about stock market fluctuations.
我的意思是，在商学院你需要两门课程：一门是如何评估一个企业，另一门是从投资的角度来看，如何评估一个企业以及如何看待股市波动。
But the idea that you would spend all of this time with formulas — but the problem, of course, is that the instructors know the formulas, and you don’t when they come, and so they’ve got something to fill the time explaining to you.
但是，你会花这么多时间在公式上——当然，问题在于，老师们知道这些公式，而当它们出现时你却不知道，所以他们有东西可以用来填补时间向你解释。
And, you know, it is no fun if you — I mean, if you were teaching Biblical studies, you know, and you could read three or four of the most important religious tomes forward and backward in five different languages, you would hate to tell somebody that it comes down to the Ten Commandments. I mean, any damn fool can do that.
你知道，如果你——我是说，如果你在教授圣经研究，你知道，你可以用五种不同的语言来读三四本最重要的宗教经典，你会讨厌告诉某人，它归结于十诫。我是说，任何傻瓜都能做到。
So there’s a great desire of the priesthood in finance to want to teach the things that they know and you don’t know and that they spent a long time learning and that maybe requires a fair amount of mathematics.
因此，金融界的专家们非常渴望教授他们所知道而你不知道的东西，这些东西是他们花了很长时间学习的，可能需要相当多的数学知识。
And it really has nothing to do with investment success. Investment success depends on buying into the right businesses at the right price. And you have to know how to value businesses, and you have to have an attitude that divorces you from being influenced by the market.
这实际上与投资成功无关。投资成功取决于以合适的价格购买合适的企业。你必须知道如何评估企业，并且必须有一种态度，使你不受市场影响。
You want the market there, not to influence you, you want it there to serve you. And that requires a mindset, which goes back to an earlier question, and it’s a mindset that’s described quite well in Chapter 8 of “The Intelligent Investor.”
你希望市场在那里，而不是影响你，你希望它在那里为你服务。这需要一种心态，这又回到了一个早期的问题，这种心态在《聪明的投资者》第八章中描述得很好。
8. Buffett praises sister Doris for her “retail” charity
巴菲特称赞妹妹多丽丝的“零售”慈善事业
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第六个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Irene from Bonn, Germany. Both of you are very generous person. What is your joy of giving, and what are the potential pits when donating money — pitfalls when donating money? I’m sorry.
观众成员：你好。我是来自德国波恩的艾琳。你们两位都是非常慷慨的人。你们在给予中获得的快乐是什么？在捐赠金钱时有哪些潜在的陷阱？抱歉。
WARREN BUFFETT: The joys and giving and the pitfalls of donating money, huh. The — I know personally I’ve never given up anything in my life that made a difference in my life.
沃伦·巴菲特：捐赠金钱的乐趣和陷阱，嗯。我个人知道，我从未放弃过任何对我生活有影响的东西。
I mean, there are people that will go to church this Sunday and they will drop money in a collection plate, and it will make the difference about where they take their family, or whether they take their family, in terms of where they eat, whether they go to a movie, whether they get an extra present at Christmas, whatever it may be.
我的意思是，这个星期天会有人去教堂，他们会在募捐盘里放钱，这会影响到他们带家人去哪里，或者是否带家人去哪里，比如他们在哪里吃饭，是否去看电影，是否在圣诞节多买一份礼物，诸如此类。
I mean, they are giving some money that makes a difference in their lives. I’ve never given a penny that way, and I never will.
我的意思是，他们正在给予一些对他们生活产生影响的钱。我从来没有以那种方式给过一分钱，也永远不会。
I mean, I get to do everything I want to do in life. But because I’ve lived a long time — which gives you an enormous advantage in terms of accumulating money — and most of the things I want in life don’t come from the expenditure of money.
我的意思是，我可以做我想在生活中做的一切。但因为我活了很长时间——这在积累财富方面给了你巨大的优势——而且我想要的大多数东西并不是通过花钱得到的。
So it accumulates, and basically I’m giving away excess. I’m not giving away anything from necessity.
所以它积累起来了，基本上我是在赠送多余的东西。我并不是在赠送任何必需品。
So I really — you know, I think what I’m doing is useful with the money, but I don’t think it’s on a par at all with the actions of somebody that’s giving money that really makes a difference in how they or their children live.
所以我真的——你知道，我认为我用这些钱做的事情是有用的，但我不认为这能与那些捐钱真正改变他们或他们孩子生活的人所做的事情相提并论。
Those are really charitable people. I think my sister Doris is here. She has given away money that made a difference in her life. She gives away time, too. She gives away eight or ten hours a day, in terms of actually looking into the real needs of people, and giving them things beyond the money — giving them help and advice and somebody to talk to.
那些人才是真正的慈善家。我认为我的妹妹多莉丝在这里。她捐出的钱改变了她的生活。她也投入了时间。她每天花八到十个小时，真正关注人们的实际需求，给他们提供超越金钱的帮助和建议，以及倾诉的对象。
And, you know, that’s real giving. And I admire her for it. I’m not emulating her. I mean, she is in the retail business of giving; I like wholesale much better.
你知道，那才是真正的给予。我很佩服她。我并没有模仿她。我的意思是，她是在慈善的零售业务中；我更喜欢批发的方式。
In terms of the pitfalls, you know, you can make mistakes in any area. But if you — you should give to things that you personally have an interest in and believe in, and that can be anything. I don’t — I’m not going to prioritize what should be done with gifts.
至于陷阱，你知道，任何领域都可能犯错。但如果你——你应该把钱捐给你个人感兴趣和相信的事情，这可以是任何事。我不会优先考虑捐赠应该如何使用。
Something you’re involved in. Something you want to give your time to as well as money. But beyond that, I’ll let Charlie carry on.
一些你参与的事情。一些你想要投入时间和金钱的事情。但除此之外，我让查理继续。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Regarding pitfalls, I would predict that, if you have an extreme political ideology, whether of the left or the right, you’re very likely to make a lot of dumb charitable gifts. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：是的。关于陷阱，我预测，如果你有极端的政治意识形态，无论是左派还是右派，你很可能会做出很多愚蠢的慈善捐赠。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: If you hang around Charlie like I do, you get the sunny side of life. I mean — (laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你像我一样和查理待在一起，你会看到生活的光明面。我的意思是——（笑声）
We ought to have that playing, “The Sunny Side of the Street.”
我们应该播放《阳光大道》（“The Sunny Side of the Street”）。
9. We don’t “tell the world how to run their business”
我们不会“告诉世界如何经营他们的业务”
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 7 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Okosh Vajay (PH), and I’m from India. I worship Mr. Buffett for his philanthropy, and I do hope to serve the Gates Foundation someday.
观众成员：早上好。我的名字是 Okosh Vajay（音），我来自印度。我崇拜巴菲特先生的慈善事业，并希望有一天能为盖茨基金会服务。
My question to Mr. Buffett is, what’s your level of involvement when one of your companies is faced with an ethical dilemma? For example, Fruit of the Loom’s competitors have sweatshops in Central America. So what do you do to ensure that you don’t fall into the same trap?
我想问巴菲特先生，当您的公司面临道德困境时，您会参与到什么程度？例如，Fruit of the Loom 的竞争对手在中美洲有血汗工厂。那么，您如何确保自己不陷入同样的困境？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we let our managers run their businesses. And we’ve got some terrific managers, not only in terms of ability, but I would say that what we have seen of the ethical standards of our managers has been extraordinary over the years.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们让我们的经理们经营他们的业务。我们有一些非常出色的经理，不仅在能力方面，而且我会说，我们多年来看到的经理们的道德标准也非常出色。
That doesn’t mean there isn’t — there aren’t slip ups here or there. But taken as a group, over decades, I think that I’m very happy, in effect, turning over the keys, not only to the financial performance of the business, but in terms of how they behave.
这并不意味着没有——这里或那里没有失误。但作为一个整体，经过几十年，我认为我非常高兴，实际上交出了钥匙，不仅是公司的财务表现，还有他们的行为方式。
And I would say that I think you’re quite wrong in terms of — Fruit of the Loom’s operations are conducted in absolutely terrific standards. John Holland is here. I’d be glad to have you meet with him later.
我想说，我认为你在某些方面完全错了——Fruit of the Loom 的运营是按照绝对出色的标准进行的。约翰·霍兰德在这里。我很乐意让你稍后与他会面。
But we — we’re proud of our businesses and how they operate.
但是我们——我们为我们的企业及其运营方式感到自豪。
We do not give them elaborate guidelines. I write them a letter every two years, roughly, and I ask them to send me a letter telling who they think should be the successor if anything happened to them that night. I keep those letters around. Fortunately, they don’t come into play very often.
我们不给他们详细的指导方针。我大约每两年给他们写一封信，并请他们回信告诉我，如果那天晚上他们发生了什么事，他们认为谁应该是继任者。我把这些信留着。幸运的是，它们很少派上用场。
But I also tell them we’ve got all the money we need. It’s nice to have more money, but we’re not going to lack for money at Berkshire Hathaway.
但我也告诉他们，我们有足够的钱。多一些钱当然很好，但在伯克希尔·哈撒韦，我们不会缺钱。
We don’t have a shred of reputation more than we need, and we never want to trade away reputation for money.
我们没有一丝多余的声誉可供挥霍，我们从来不想用声誉去交换金钱。
So we give them that same message that was given in the movie, in terms of the Salomon situation, which is that not only do they behave in a way that conforms with the laws, but that they behave in a way where, if a story were written by an unfriendly but intelligent reporter, the next morning, in their local paper, they would have no problem with their neighbors, their family reading it.
所以我们给他们的同样的信息，就是在所罗门情况的电影中所传达的信息，不仅要遵守法律行为，而且要以这样的方式行事，即如果一个不友好的但聪明的记者第二天在他们的地方报纸上写了一篇故事，他们不会担心他们的邻居、家人看到这篇文章。
And we run that in the movie every year, just because we like the managers to keep getting that message all of the time. There is no pressure from Berkshire’s corporate office to report X dollars per — of earnings in any quarter. They don’t give me budgets, so they don’t — there’s no feeling that they have to come through with given numbers or I’ll be embarrassed in public in terms of publishing earnings or anything of the sort.
我们每年都会在电影中播放这段内容，仅仅是因为我们希望管理者不断接收到这个信息。伯克希尔的公司总部并没有施加任何压力，要求在任何季度报告X美元的收益。他们不需要给我预算，所以他们并不会有必须报出特定数字的感觉，或者我会在公共场合因发布收益而感到尴尬。
We have no incentives to cause people to do anything that would go against their conscience or play games or cut corners or anything of the sort.
我们没有动机去促使人们做任何违背良心、玩弄手段或投机取巧的事情。
And, overall, I think it’s worked pretty well. It isn’t perfect. You can’t have 250,000 people in the city without having something going on at some point. And we do have 250,000 people working. But I’m not unhappy with our batting average.
总的来说，我认为效果相当不错。它并不完美。城市里有 25 万人，不可能不时发生一些事情。而且我们确实有 25 万人在工作。但我对我们的表现并不感到不满。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And, of course, Fruit of the Loom does have foreign plants, and we have no rule against that at all. We’ve got quite a few foreign plants now.
查理·芒格：是的。当然，Fruit of the Loom 确实有外国工厂，我们对此完全没有任何限制。我们现在有相当多的外国工厂。
We don’t favor foreign plants. We just do whatever makes sense under the circumstances.
我们并不偏好外资工厂。我们只是在具体情况下做出合适的决策。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we had a shoe business I’ve written about in Maine, and we had wonderful, wonderful workers there. They were more productive than workers around the world.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在缅因州有一家鞋业公司，我曾写过关于它的文章，我们那里有非常出色的工人。他们的生产力比世界各地的工人都要高。
But the United States was producing, 20 years ago, roughly a billion pairs of shoes a year, and we were a nation of Imelda Marcoses. I mean, it was wild.
但二十年前，美国每年生产大约十亿双鞋，而我们是一个伊梅尔达·马科斯（Imelda Marcos）式的国家。我的意思是，那真是疯狂。
And Brockton, Massachusetts, and you name the towns, revolved around the shoe business, as did a town called Dexter, Maine.
马萨诸塞州的布罗克顿（Brockton）以及其他一些小镇都围绕鞋业发展，还有一个名为德克斯特（Dexter），缅因州。
And we bought that business. And we tried to compete. We had a good brand name. We had great workmanship. And we found out that it just plain wouldn’t work against — competing against — shoes produced in China.
我们买下了那家企业，并尝试竞争。我们有一个好的品牌名称，我们有出色的工艺。但我们发现，与中国生产的鞋子竞争根本行不通。
So now of the — it’s over a billion pairs of shoes a year used in this country. Basically they all come from outside the borders. And you’re going to see that.
所以现在——这个国家每年使用超过十亿双鞋。基本上它们都来自国外。你会看到这一点。
And factories in China, factories in Central America — they do not have exactly the norms that we have in this country. And, you know, that’s going to be the situation.
中国的工厂，中美洲的工厂——它们并没有我们这个国家的标准。而且，你知道，这将是情况所在。
We are — we will not — we are not going to tell the world how to run their business in any great way.
我们——我们不会——我们不会以任何重大方式告诉世界如何经营他们的业务。
We — obviously we have some standards that have to be met, but we are not — they are not exactly the situation you are going to find in the United States.
我们——显然我们有一些必须达到的标准，但我们不是——它们并不完全是你在美国会发现的情况。
10. Buffett dismisses higher raw material costs
巴菲特不在意原材料成本上涨
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Mike McGowan (PH). I’m from Pasadena, California. I’m a shareholder in both Berkshire and Wesco. I run a website called FinancialFoghorn.com, and I write about precious metals and things.
观众成员：早上好。我的名字是迈克·麦高文（音）。我来自加利福尼亚州的帕萨迪纳。我是伯克希尔和韦斯科的股东。我经营一个名为 FinancialFoghorn.com 的网站，写关于贵金属和其他相关内容。
And I’ve asked you questions in the past about silver, and I didn’t really get them answered. So I thought I’d ask about a different commodity this time.
过去我曾问过你关于白银的问题，但我并没有真正得到答案。所以这次我想问一个不同的商品。
I read about the Chinese raising the price of tungsten, and I think about your comment last year in buying ISCAR.
我读到中国提高了钨的价格，我想起了你去年关于购买 ISCAR 的评论。
Will commodity price increases in things like tungsten affect the profitability of ISCAR? And would that be the reason you’re locating a plant in China to build machine tools? Thanks.
商品价格上涨（如钨）会影响 ISCAR 的盈利能力吗？这会是您在中国设厂生产机床的原因吗？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The reason the plant was built in China was to serve the Chinese market, which is large and growing. And we opened in Dalian late last fall.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。工厂在中国建成的原因是为了服务于庞大且不断增长的中国市场。我们去年秋末在大连开业。
It’s nicer to be closer to the raw material, but it really had nothing to do with changes in the price of tungsten.
更接近原材料是更好的，但这实际上与钨价格的变化无关。
Generally speaking, if you’re creating a higher value-added product, as ISCAR is doing, from a raw material, there may be three months, six months, of adjustment to changes in raw material prices. And obviously, with some commodities, if it gets high enough you get into substitutes.
一般来说，如果你像 ISCAR 那样从原材料中创造出更高附加值的产品，可能需要三个月、六个月来调整原材料价格的变化。而且显然，对于某些商品，如果价格足够高，就会出现替代品。
But there isn’t going to be any substitute for tungsten in the cutting tools, and there won’t be — you know, we tried some substitutes for crude oil in terms of gasoline or — not so — heating oil but then the substitutes like natural gas go up in price, too.
但是在切削工具中不会有任何替代钨的材料，也不会有——你知道，我们尝试过用一些替代品来代替原油，比如汽油或者——不是那么——取暖油，但像天然气这样的替代品价格也会上涨。
So I think largely, in our businesses, raw materials get passed through.
所以我认为在我们的业务中，原材料基本上是被传递下去的。
Now, we’re having a tough time, for example, in the carpet business in passing through the cost increases that we experience in oil-based raw materials. But we would be having trouble — we probably would be having trouble in the carpet business regardless now because of the slowdown in residential housing. It does make it tougher.
现在，我们在地毯业务中遇到了困难，例如在转嫁我们在石油基原材料方面经历的成本增加时。但我们可能会遇到麻烦——由于住宅住房的放缓，我们现在可能无论如何都会在地毯业务中遇到麻烦。这确实使情况更加艰难。
But over a period of time, our businesses are going to reflect raw material costs. You know, the candy here I have, this fudge, which I can hardly wait to get into, you know, it’s going to reflect sugar and cocoa and things like that over time.
但随着时间的推移，我们的业务将反映原材料成本。你知道，我这里的糖果，这块软糖，我几乎迫不及待地想吃，你知道，它随着时间的推移会反映出糖和可可等成本。
And if you’re running an airline, it’s going to reflect the cost of fuel. So you can have little squeezes here and there, but it’s not a big deal, and it certainly isn’t the reason that we went to China to locate the ISCAR facility.
如果你经营一家航空公司，燃料成本会有所反映。所以你可以在这里那里有一些小的压缩，但这不是什么大问题，这当然不是我们去中国设立 ISCAR 工厂的原因。
That facility — incidentally ISCAR — we have a number of people here from ISCAR, and families in some cases.
那个设施——顺便提一下，是 ISCAR——我们这里有一些来自 ISCAR 的人，有些情况下还有他们的家属。
That is — I had very high expectations for that when we bought it. It’s exceeded it in every way. It’s exceeded in terms of financial performance. It’s exceeded in terms of the human relations we’ve developed with the people.
那就是——当我们购买它时，我对它有很高的期望。它在各方面都超出了预期。它在财务表现方面超出了预期。在我们与人们建立的人际关系方面也超出了预期。
I mean, it was — I told you it was a terrific acquisition a few years ago. It’s been a dream acquisition, and I know Charlie wants to add to that. (Applause)
我的意思是，我几年前告诉过你们这是一笔非常不错的收购。这是一笔梦寐以求的收购，我知道查理也想补充一下。（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I would say that the short answer is that, while we don’t like inflation because it’s bad for our country and our civilization, that we will probably make more money over time because there is inflation.
查理·芒格：是的。我会说，简短的回答是，虽然我们不喜欢通货膨胀，因为它对我们的国家和文明不利，但由于通货膨胀，我们可能会随着时间的推移赚更多的钱。
11. Lots of work to find a better buy than Berkshire
要找到比伯克希尔更好的买入机会需要做很多工作
WARREN BUFFETT: Go to number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：去第 9 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia.
观众成员：早上好。我叫马克·拉比诺夫，来自澳大利亚墨尔本。
My question is, Berkshire has bought a lot of shares over the last 12 months in listed companies. Do you expect the return on these investments to be between 7 and 10 percent per annum over many years, which is, I would say, well below what Berkshire has achieved in the past?
我的问题是，伯克希尔在过去 12 个月里购买了很多上市公司的股票。您是否预计这些投资的年回报率在未来多年间会在 7%到 10%之间，我认为这远低于伯克希尔过去的成就？
WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to that is yes. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：答案是肯定的。（笑）
The — we would be very happy if we could buy common stocks where our expectation over a long period, pretax, from a combination of dividends and capital gains — we’d be very happy if we thought it was going to be 10 percent, and we would probably settle for a little less than that.
如果我们能够购买普通股，并且预期在长期内通过股息和资本增值的组合获得税前 10%的收益，我们会非常高兴，我们可能会接受略低于这个水平的收益。
And there’s no question — absolutely no question — that returns from owning Berkshire will be less in the future than they have been in the past.
毫无疑问，持有伯克希尔的回报在未来将低于过去。
There’s no question that we will not do as well with the common stocks at Berkshire that we own in the future as we have over the last, really, 40 years or thereabouts.
毫无疑问，我们未来在伯克希尔持有的普通股表现不会像过去大约 40 年那样好。
We operate now in a universe of marketable stocks that — where we’re talking about companies with market caps of at least 10 billion but really, in most cases, to have a meaningful impact on Berkshire, we’re talking much bigger than that, maybe 50 billion and up.
我们现在在一个可交易股票的市场中运作——我们谈论的是市值至少为 100 亿的公司，但实际上，在大多数情况下，要对伯克希尔产生有意义的影响，我们谈论的规模要大得多，可能是 500 亿及以上。
Well, that universe is not as profitable a universe to operate in as if you have the entire universe of thousands and thousands of companies.
那么，与拥有成千上万家公司组成的整个市场相比，那个市场的运营利润并不高。
So we — if we — just take an example. If we find a company with a market cap of 10 billion and we can buy 5 percent of it — and usually that’s what we can buy without disturbing things — we can have a $500 million investment.
所以我们——如果我们——举个例子。如果我们找到一家市值为 100 亿的公司，并且我们可以购买其中的 5%——通常这是我们在不扰乱市场的情况下可以购买的——我们就可以进行 5 亿美元的投资。
Let’s say it doubles over a period of time. That’s 500 million. You pay a 35 percent tax. You have 325 million. That’s less than two-tenths of 1 percent in terms of Berkshire performance.
假设它在一段时间内翻倍。那就是 5 亿。你支付 35%的税。你有 3.25 亿。这在伯克希尔的表现中不到 0.1%。
So our universe has shrunk enormously, and we will not do as well in that universe — remotely as well — as we would if we were the operating in a much wider universe and could do all kinds of things.
所以我们的市场范围已经大大缩小，而在这个市场中，我们的表现不会那么好——远不如——如果我们在一个更广阔的市场中运作并能够做各种事情的话。
We’ve found little things to do from time to time where we’ve made some money. I may refer to them a little later, a couple things. And they’re nice, but they don’t move the needle very much at Berkshire.
我们时不时找到一些小事情来做，从中赚了一些钱。我可能稍后会提到它们，有几件事情。它们不错，但在伯克希尔并没有带来太大影响。
So anyone that expects us to come close to replicating the past should sell their stock. I mean, because it isn’t — it isn’t going to happen.
所以任何期望我们接近复制过去的人都应该卖掉他们的股票。我的意思是，因为这不会——这不会发生。
And, you know, I think we’re going to get decent results over time, but we’re not going to get indecent results. And in this field we prefer indecent, but we’re not going to get them.
您知道，我认为随着时间的推移，我们会得到不错的结果，但我们不会得到不合理的结果。在这个领域，我们更倾向于不合理的，但我们不会得到这样的结果。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you can take Warren’s promises to the bank.
查理·芒格：我认为你可以把沃伦的承诺当作银行的存款。
We are very happy making money at a rate in the future that is way less than the rate at which we made money in the past. And I suggest that you adopt the same attitude. (Laughter)
我们很高兴在未来以远低于过去赚钱的速度赚钱。我建议你们也采取同样的态度。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn’t condemn them to that. I think if you’re working with small amounts of money — I’ve talked —
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我不会让他们只能这样。我认为如果你手里的资金比较小——我曾谈过——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, yeah.
查理·芒格：哦，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Then you may have something very much better to do with your money than to buy Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。那么，您可能会有更好的投资选择，而不是购买伯克希尔。
I mean, if you’re working with small amounts of money, and you want to put in significant amounts of time, and examine thousands of securities, you will find things that are more intelligent to buy than Berkshire.
我的意思是，如果你在处理少量资金，并且愿意投入大量时间，研究成千上万的证券，你会发现比伯克希尔更聪明的投资选择。
You know, we still think Berkshire is an attractive investment over a long period of time. We think that it stacks up reasonably well with other very large companies.
你知道，我们仍然认为伯克希尔在长期内是一个有吸引力的投资。我们认为它与其他非常大的公司相比表现得相当不错。
We don’t think it’s the most attractive investment in the world, in terms of what you can find if you’re willing to go through those thousands of possibilities, which is what Charlie and I used to do many years ago. It’s not feasible for us to do it now and wouldn’t have any impact on Berkshire.
我们不认为这是世界上最有吸引力的投资，就像如果你愿意去研究成千上万种可能性时可以找到的那样，这正是查理和我多年前所做的。现在我们无法做到这一点，并且对伯克希尔也不会有任何影响。
What we really like at Berkshire is buying good-sized to very large first-class businesses with first-class management and just sitting there. Because the nice thing about that is you don’t have go from flower to flower. You can just sit there and watch them produce more and more every year and give you capital and you can buy more businesses.
我们在伯克希尔真正喜欢的是购买中型到大型的一流企业，并配备一流的管理团队，然后就坐在那里。因为这样做的好处是你不需要从一朵花飞到另一朵花。你可以坐在那里，看着它们每年生产越来越多的东西，给你资本，然后你可以购买更多的企业。
That’s a nice formula. It’s a formula that will work, I think, for us. It won’t produce returns like the past.
这是一个不错的公式。我认为这个公式对我们有效。但它不会产生像过去那样的回报。
12. PacifiCorp will follow regulators on Klamath River dam
PacifiCorp 将遵循克拉马斯河大坝的监管规定
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible). My name is Chu Chu (Inaudible), and I come here from the Klamath River, and I come here with a heavy heart.
观众成员：（听不清）。我的名字是楚楚（听不清），我来自克拉马斯河，我带着沉重的心情来到这里。
And I know this is a pretty light-hearted event, but I came here last year with a heavy heart, too. And I fasted for ten days driving over here to speak with you.
我知道这是一个相当轻松的活动，但我去年也是怀着沉重的心情来的。我在开车过来和你们讲话之前禁食了十天。
And, you know, we really were disrespected last year, because one of your subsidiaries, PacifiCorp, has dams on the Klamath River that are creating toxic algae blooms, along with multiple other things. I won’t go into it too far.
你知道，我们去年真的受到了不尊重，因为你们的一个子公司 PacifiCorp 在克拉马斯河上建了大坝，导致有毒藻类大量繁殖，还有其他多种问题。我就不多说了。
But I just come here today with a principle agreement between you and I, that you will sit down at the table and help us figure this out, help us make PacifiCorp accountable.
但我今天来这里是为了与你达成一项原则协议，你会坐下来帮助我们解决这个问题，帮助我们让 PacifiCorp 承担责任。
And being that I’m an indigenous American, and you’re a guest in my home as a European American, that you would do that in front of all your shareholders today in good faith, that you care, you know, as a philanthropist and you care about, you know, helping, you know, third-world countries, you know, fight poverty, disease, when you’re helping create it right here in the United States.
作为一名美洲原住民，而你作为欧洲裔美国人是我家的客人，你今天在所有股东面前这样做是出于善意，你关心，作为一个慈善家，你关心帮助第三世界国家对抗贫困和疾病，而您却在美国制造了这些问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: You may not — you may not — last year we read the order under which we acquired PacifiCorp.
沃伦·巴菲特：您可能不知道——去年我们阅读了我们收购太平洋电力公司的相关命令。
And, actually, as you may know, I’m prohibited from actually making decisions in that — in the area of PacifiCorp. That was part of the public utility commission ruling when we bought it.
而且，实际上，如你所知，我实际上被禁止在太平洋电力公司的那个领域做出决定。这是我们购买时公共事业委员会裁决的一部分。
But we have Dave Sokol here who can speak to that. I think the first dam was built in 1907, and we bought PacifiCorp a couple of years ago.
但是我们有戴夫·索科尔在这里可以谈论这个问题。我想第一座大坝建于 1907 年，而我们是在几年前收购了 PacifiCorp。
But David — if Dave could go to a microphone, I think that — I think he could address the issues that you brought up. I don’t think we meant in any way to be disrespectful last year.
但大卫——如果戴夫能去麦克风前，我想他可以解决你提到的问题。我认为我们去年并没有任何不尊重的意思。
Those of you who were here last year, we may have a difference of opinion on this, and incidentally there are strong differences of opinion, as I understand it, in your area about what should be done.
去年在这里的各位，我们可能在这个问题上有不同的看法，顺便说一下，据我所知，在你们的地区关于应该做什么也存在很大的意见分歧。
And — well, I think I should have Dave make the explanation on it. Dave? Somebody want to put a spotlight on the —
而且——嗯，我想我应该让戴夫来解释一下。戴夫？有人想把聚光灯打在——
DAVE SOKOL: Thanks, Warren. As you stated first, it would be inappropriate for Mr. Buffett to respond in any detail on this issue, because it’s part of the acquisition in 2006 of PacifiCorp.
戴夫·索科尔：谢谢你，沃伦。正如你所说，巴菲特先生对此问题作出详细回应是不合适的，因为这涉及到 2006 年对 PacifiCorp 的收购。
He specifically agreed in writing not to interfere with any decisions of our regulated assets within PacifiCorp. So having said that, these four dams that we operate on the Klamath River were built over the last 100 years.
他特别书面同意不干涉我们在 PacifiCorp 内受监管资产的任何决定。话虽如此，我们在克拉马斯河上运营的这四座大坝是在过去 100 年间建造的。
There are a whole series of issues in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission relicensing process as to what should occur.
在联邦能源监管委员会的重新许可过程中，有一系列问题需要解决。
These decisions, through that regulatory process, have been ongoing for eight years, and they won’t culminate for probably another six.
这些决定通过该监管程序已经持续了八年，可能还需要六年才能最终完成。
Having said that, there are 28 various parties from federal, state, and local agencies, Native Americans, fishery folks, local landowners, that are party to a discussion as to what should or should not happen with these assets — and I left out the irrigators.
话虽如此，有 28 个来自联邦、州和地方机构、美国原住民、渔业人员、当地土地所有者的不同团体参与讨论这些资产应该或不应该发生什么——而我遗漏了灌溉者。
Of those 28 parties, other than PacifiCorp, there are at least four different directions in which people think this process should go.
在这 28 个参与方中，除了 PacifiCorp 之外，至少有四种不同的方向，人们认为这个过程应该朝这些方向发展。
From our perspective, we will be pleased to find a resolution when the 28 parties agree as to how that resolution should go forward, how it would be funded, et cetera.
从我们的角度来看，当 28 个参与方就该决议如何推进、如何资助等达成一致时，我们将很高兴找到一个解决方案。
Fundamentally, it’s up to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, state and federal regulators, in addition to them, and then our specific regulators in each of the six states that PacifiCorp operates in.
从根本上说，这取决于联邦能源监管委员会、州和联邦监管机构，除此之外，还有我们在 PacifiCorp 运营的六个州中的具体监管机构。
So if public policy moves in a direction of dam removal, fish ladders, or maintaining the existing status quo, that would be the process in which we would go forward.
因此，如果公共政策朝着拆除大坝、建造鱼梯或维持现状的方向发展，那将是我们推进的过程。
We are working constructively with each of the various parties. We’ve met numerous times with each of the four tribes. And it’s a complicated situation and one that hopefully, over time, a cooperative resolution can be met. (Applause.)
我们正在与各方建设性地合作。我们已经与四个部落中的每一个多次会面。这是一个复杂的情况，希望随着时间的推移能够达成合作解决方案。（掌声。）
13. Eat what you want and love what you’re doing
吃你想吃的，热爱你所做的
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 11, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到 11 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m (inaudible) from Walnut Creek, California. Well, we learned something from the comic movie, but could you please expand on how do you maintain your good mental and physical health? (Laughter)
观众成员：早上好。我是来自加利福尼亚州核桃溪的（听不清）。嗯，我们从这部喜剧电影中学到了一些东西，但您能否详细说明您是如何保持良好的心理和身体健康的？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you start with a balanced diet. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你要从均衡饮食开始。（笑声）
Some Wrigley’s, some Mars, some See’s, some Coke.
一些箭牌，一些玛氏，一些喜诗，一些可口可乐。
Basically it — if Charlie and I can’t have a decent mental attitude, who can? I mean, we get to do what we love doing every day. We do it with people that are not only cheerful about it and like us, but they do their jobs extraordinarily — they like their jobs too.
基本上，如果查理和我不能保持良好的心态，那还有谁能呢？我的意思是，我们每天都能做自己热爱的事情。我们和那些不仅对此感到愉快并且喜欢我们的人一起工作，他们也非常出色地完成他们的工作——他们也喜欢他们的工作。
We’re forced to do virtually nothing we don’t want to. I have a trainer that comes three times a week. She — I think she’s probably here. And she may think I’m a little begrudging in that particular activity, but that’s only 45 minutes, three times a week.
我们几乎不被迫做任何我们不想做的事情。我有一个教练，每周来三次。她——我想她可能就在这里。她可能认为我对那项活动有点勉强，但那只是每周三次，每次 45 分钟。
The rest of the time I am doing almost — well, I’m doing whatever I love, you know, day by day by day by day. And I do it, you know, in air-conditioned offices and, you know, with all kinds of help and it — I mean, how could you be sour about life, you know, being blessed in so many ways?
剩下的时间我几乎——嗯，我在做任何我喜欢的事情，你知道，一天又一天。我是在空调办公室里做这些事情的，还有各种各样的帮助——我的意思是，生活在如此多方面被祝福，你怎么可能对生活感到不满呢？
And then the amazing thing is that Charlie is 84; I’m 77. And we’ve slowed down, I’m sure, in a lot of ways, but we pretend we haven’t, and it doesn’t seem to bother us. (Laughs) We get along fine.
然后令人惊奇的是，查理已经 84 岁了；我 77 岁。我们在很多方面肯定都慢下来了，但我们假装没有，这似乎并不困扰我们。（笑）我们相处得很好。
Great partners, great managers, you know, great families. I — there’s just no reason to look at any minuses in life and to focus on that. It would be crazy.
伟大的伙伴，伟大的经理，你知道，伟大的家庭。我——没有理由去关注生活中的任何负面因素并专注于此。那样做太疯狂了。
So we really do count our blessings because they’ve been many and they continue to come forth, and we’ll enjoy it as long as we can. There’s not much more to it than that.
所以我们真的很感激我们的福气，因为它们很多，并且还在不断出现，我们会尽可能地享受它。除此之外没有太多其他的了。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I wish we were poster boys for the benefits of running marathons and maintaining a very slim bodily state and so forth.
查理·芒格：嗯，我希望我们能成为长跑和保持非常苗条身体的好榜样。
But as nearly as I can tell, neither of us pays much attention to any health habits or dietary rules — (laughter) — and it seems to have worked pretty well so far. I don’t think we can recommend it to everybody, but I, for one, don’t plan to change. (Laughter and applause)
但据我所知，我们俩都不太注意健康习惯或饮食规则——（笑声）——而且到目前为止似乎效果不错。我不认为我们可以向所有人推荐这种做法，但就我个人而言，我不打算改变。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Really, from the moment we get up to when we go to bed at night, we get to do all kinds of things.
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，从我们起床到晚上睡觉，我们可以做各种各样的事情。
We get to — associating with wonderful people is about as good as it gets. And, you know, we live — we’re biased, obviously — but we think we live in the best country in the world and have all kinds of good things. I mean, just imagine — (Applause.)
我们能够——与优秀的人交往是最好的事情之一。而且，你知道，我们生活在——显然我们有偏见——但我们认为我们生活在世界上最好的国家，并拥有各种美好的事物。我的意思是，想象一下——（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: We could have stayed in my grandfather’s grocery store, and it would have been hell. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们本可以留在我祖父的杂货店，那将会是地狱。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, this relates to the subject of corporate compensation.
查理·芒格：顺便说一下，这与公司薪酬问题有关。
You’re in a job which you would pay to have, if that were the only way to get it, and you’re supposed to be an exemplar from other people — for other people. There’s a lot to be said for not paying yourself very well. (Applause.)
你现在的工作是那种即使需要付费才能得到，你也愿意去做的工作，而且你应该成为其他人的榜样。少给自己支付高薪有很多好处。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: He points that out to me regularly. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：他经常向我指出这一点。（笑）
Well, if you think about it, you know, the idea that CEO compensation represents a market system and that you have to pay some guy a $10 million retention bonus or something to stay around in the job that, you know, he’s been fighting to keep and stacking the board and everything so they keep him around.
好吧，想一想，CEO薪酬代表了一个市场体系，而你必须支付某个人1000万美元的留任奖金之类的，才能让他留在这份他一直在努力保住的工作中，并且将董事会成员都安排好以确保他能继续留下。
I mean, it’s — I don’t know of a CEO in America — I’m sure there are a few — but I don’t know of any that wouldn’t gladly do the job at half the price or a quarter of the price.
我的意思是，我不知道美国有哪个首席执行官——我相信有几个——但我不知道有哪个不会乐意以一半或四分之一的价格来做这份工作。
And I’ve seen some that have left jobs paying them eight figures and nobody’s offered them anything, you know, a year later or two years later. I wonder where that wonderful market system is that is supposed to have all these bidders for their services. It’s really sort of ridiculous, I think. (Applause.)
我见过一些人离开薪酬达到八位数的工作，而一两年后没有人再为他们提供任何机会。我想知道那种所谓的市场体系在哪里，应该有那么多对他们服务的竞标者。我认为这真的有点荒谬。（掌声）
14. Follow your passion and marry the right spouse
追随你的激情并与合适的配偶结婚
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go onto 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 12 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Richard Rentrop from Bonn, Germany.
观众成员：你好。我是来自德国波恩的理查德·伦特罗普。
At the moment I attend high school and would like your wisdom on how to approach the question of what to do with the rest of my life. So — (Laughter)
目前我在上高中，我想请教您关于如何思考我余生该做什么的问题。所以——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We prefer things a little more difficult than that if you’re got a — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你有一个——（笑声），我们更喜欢稍微困难一点的事情
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, if you were about to start all over again, what profession would you choose and why?
观众成员：所以，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，如果您要重新开始，您会选择什么职业，为什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would choose what I do because, A, I have fun at it. I’m reasonably good at it. You know, I meet a lot of interesting people through it. No heavy lifting. You know, it — it’s — it fits me.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会选择我所做的事情，因为，首先，我觉得很有趣。我在这方面还算不错。你知道，我通过它遇到了很多有趣的人。没有繁重的体力劳动。你知道，它——它——适合我。
It doesn’t — but that — that’s not advice for you. I mean, you have to find out what really — what’s your passion in life?
这并不是——但那——那不是给你的建议。我的意思是，你必须找出真正的——你生活中的激情是什么？
You know, it’s a terrible mistake to kind of sleepwalk through your life, because unless Shirley MacLaine is right, you know, it’s the only one you’re going to have.
你知道，漫无目的地度过人生是个可怕的错误，因为，除非雪莉·麦克莱恩（Shirley MacLaine）是对的，不然这将是你唯一的一次。
And the — so I’ve — I was very lucky in that I found my passion early. I mean, I — that’s not easy. You know, that takes some luck.
而且——所以我——我很幸运，因为我很早就找到了我的激情。我的意思是，我——这并不容易。你知道，这需要一些运气。
It just so happened my dad was in a business at a very small office and he had a bunch of books down there. And when I would go down there on Saturday or after school, I would start reading those books, and it turned me on.
碰巧我爸爸在一个很小的办公室里做生意，他那里有一堆书。每当我在星期六或放学后去那里时，我就开始读那些书，这让我很感兴趣。
And this was before Playboy actually existed. (Laughter)
这还是在《花花公子》真正存在之前。（笑声）
And so, you know, that was just plain lucky, you know. If he’d been a minister, I’m not so sure I would have been quite so enthused about visiting the office. (Laughter)
所以，这纯粹是运气。如果他是一名牧师，我不太确定我会如此热衷于去办公室。（笑声）
But that’s the way to go. And I can’t prescribe that for you. But I can tell you that if you’re going through the motions in life, you’re doing something — now, obviously, if you need the job you have and you can’t make a change and your kids have to eat and all of that, you deal with realities like that.
但这就是要走的路。我不能为你开出这样的处方。但我可以告诉你，如果你在生活中只是走过场，那你正在做的事情——当然，如果你需要你现在的工作，不能做出改变，而且你的孩子需要吃饭等等，你要面对这样的现实。
But when you’re in a position to make choices, you know, I always tell the kids that come visit me, I tell them, “Go to work for an organization you admire or an individual you admire.”
但是当你有能力做出选择时，你知道，我总是告诉来拜访我的孩子们，我告诉他们：“去为你钦佩的组织或个人工作。”
That means many of them become self-employed, but they — (Laughter)
这意味着很多人会选择自雇，但他们——（笑声）
The idea — you know, you can’t get a bad result. I went to work for Ben Graham when I was 24. I only worked for him for less than two years, but I jumped out of bed every day in the morning.
这个想法——你知道，你不会得到坏的结果。我 24 岁时为本·格雷厄姆工作。我只为他工作了不到两年，但我每天早上都兴奋地起床。
I was excited about what I was going to do. I was learning things. I was with a man I admired. I never asked my salary when I took that job. I moved to New York City and found out what my salary was when I got the check.
我对自己将要做的事情感到兴奋。我在学习东西。我和一个我钦佩的人在一起。我接受那份工作时从未问过薪水。我搬到纽约市，拿到支票时才知道我的薪水是多少。
So just be sure you — and be sure and get the right spouse. That’s enormously important.
所以一定要确保你——并确保找到合适的配偶。这非常重要。
You know, as Charlie says, the problem, you know, is that we talk about that fellow that spent 20 years looking for the perfect woman, and then he found her, and unfortunately she was looking for the perfect man. So you may have a problem in that respect. (Laughter)
你知道，正如查理所说，问题是，我们谈论那个花了 20 年寻找完美女人的家伙，然后他找到了她，但不幸的是，她在寻找完美的男人。所以在这方面你可能会有问题。（笑声）
But it’s enormously important who you marry. I mean, it’s a huge, huge, huge decision.
但你和谁结婚是非常重要的。我是说，这是一个非常非常非常重大的决定。
And, you know, if you’re lucky in a couple things like that, you’re going to have a happy life.
而且，你知道，如果你在那样的几件事情上幸运的话，你会有一个幸福的生活。
And you’re going to behave better as you go along. I mean, it’s a lot easier to behave well when things are going your way and you are enjoying your work and you like the — you’re thinking about things every day that are the kind of things that you like to think about.
随着时间的推移，你会表现得更好。我的意思是，当事情顺利进行时，你享受你的工作，并且每天思考你喜欢思考的事情时，表现良好要容易得多。
And Charlie has a lot better advice than I have about it. Go to it.
而且查理在这方面比我有更好的建议。去找他吧。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, you’ll do better if you develop a passion for something in which you have a considerable aptitude. I think if Warren had gone into the ballet — (laughter) - nobody would have ever heard of him.
查理·芒格：当然，如果你对某件事产生了热情，并且在这方面有相当的才能，你会做得更好。我想如果沃伦去从事芭蕾舞——（笑声）——就没有人会听说过他。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I think they’d have heard of me, just in a different way, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我想他们会听说过我，只是以不同的方式，查理。（笑声）
Well, the chances are, if you find something that turns you on, you probably do have some talent for it. I mean, it — I never — I don’t think I could have gotten turned on by ballet. (Laughs)
好吧，很有可能，如果你发现某件事让你感兴趣，你可能确实在这方面有一些天赋。我的意思是，我从来不认为我会对芭蕾感兴趣。（笑）
15. How Buffett overcame his fear of public speaking
巴菲特如何克服对公开演讲的恐惧
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go — we’re going to go now to 13, which is in an adjacent ballroom.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们走吧——我们现在要去 13 号厅，它在隔壁的宴会厅。
We have multiple overflow rooms, which is how we’re handling the 31,000. The grand ballroom is the only one we’ve got a microphone in. So let’s go to number 13. Somebody there?
我们有多个分会场，这就是我们处理 31,000 人的方式。大宴会厅是我们唯一安装了麦克风的地方。那么让我们去 13 号房间。那里有人吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Nancy Ancowitz. I’m from New York City, and I teach at New York University.
观众成员：我是南希·安科维茨。我来自纽约市，我在纽约大学任教。
Mr. Buffett, I’d love to get your advice on something that’s a little off the investing path but that taps into your business experience and wisdom.
巴菲特先生，我很想听听您对一些不太涉及投资但能利用您商业经验和智慧的事情的建议。
I’m writing a book to help people of a more introverted nature get the recognition they deserve.
我正在写一本书，帮助性格更内向的人获得应有的认可。
What advice would you give to the quieter half of the population to help them raise their visibility in their careers?
你会给人口中较为安静的一半什么建议，以帮助他们在职业生涯中提高知名度？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very good question. And I sort of faced that at one time.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个非常好的问题。我曾经也遇到过这种情况。
I was absolutely, throughout high school and college, terrified of public speaking.
在整个高中和大学期间，我对公开演讲感到非常恐惧。
And I would have — I avoided any classes, signing up for them, that would require it. I would get physically ill if I even thought about having to do it, let alone doing it.
我会避免报名参加任何需要它的课程。如果我甚至想到必须这样做，更不用说实际去做，我就会感到身体不适。
And I took a Dale — well, I’ve — first of all, I signed up — I went down to a Dale Carnegie course when I was at Columbia, and signed up for it, gave him a check for a hundred dollars, went back to my room and stopped payment on the check. (Laughter)
我参加过一个戴尔·卡耐基（Dale Carnegie）的课程——首先，我报名参加了，当时我在哥伦比亚大学，给他写了一张100美元的支票，回到我的房间后就停止了对支票的支付。（笑声）
This is a real man of courage you’re looking at up here. (Laughter)
你们现在看到的就是一个真正有勇气的人。（笑声）
And then I came out to Omaha, and I saw a similar ad. It was at the Rome Hotel, for you old-timers in Omaha, on 16th Street.
然后我来到奥马哈，看到了一则类似的广告。对于奥马哈的老居民来说，那是在 16 街的罗马酒店。
And I went down there, and this time I took a hundred dollars in cash and gave it to Wally Keenan, who some of you may know. He died some years ago. First time I’d met him.
我去了那里，这次我带了一百美元现金给了沃利·基南，你们中的一些人可能认识他。他几年前去世了。这是我第一次见到他。
And I took that course, and when I finished that course, I went right out to the University of Omaha and volunteered to start teaching, knowing that I had to get up in front of people.
我参加了那门课程，完成后，我直接去了奥马哈大学，自愿开始教学，因为我知道我必须站在大家面前。
I think the ability to communicate, both in writing and orally, is of enormous importance, under taught.
我认为书面和口头沟通能力都非常重要，但却没有得到足够的重视。
Most graduate business schools, they wouldn’t find an instructor to do it because it would sort of be beneath them to do something so supposedly simple.
大多数商学院，他们不会找一个讲师来做这件事，因为做这样一件看似简单的事情对他们来说有点掉价。
But if you can communicate well, you have an enormous advantage. And to you, who are talking to the group of introverted people — and, believe me, I was in certain ways quite introverted — it — you know, it’s important to get out there and do it while you’re young.
但是，如果你能很好地沟通，你就有巨大的优势。对于你们这些与内向人群交流的人来说——相信我，我在某些方面也相当内向——你知道，重要的是在年轻时走出去并做到这一点。
If you wait until you’re 50 it’s probably too late. But if you do it while you’re young, just force yourself into situations where you have to develop those abilities.
如果你等到 50 岁才开始，可能就太晚了。但如果你在年轻时就去做，只需强迫自己进入那些必须发展这些能力的情境中。
And I think the best way to do that is to get in with a whole bunch of other people who are having equal problems, because then you find you’re not alone, and you don’t feel quite as silly.
我认为最好的方法是和一群有同样问题的人在一起，因为这样你会发现自己并不孤单，也不会觉得那么傻。
And, of course, that’s what they did at the Dale Carnegie course. I mean, we would get up in front of 30 other people who could hardly give their own name, and after a while we’d find that we could actually pronounce our own name in front of a group.
当然，这就是他们在戴尔·卡耐基课程中所做的。我是说，我们会站在其他 30 个人面前，他们几乎都无法说出自己的名字，但过了一段时间，我们发现自己实际上可以在一群人面前说出自己的名字。
But we would stand on tables and do all kinds of silly things, just to get outside of ourselves.
但我们会站在桌子上，做各种愚蠢的事情，只是为了走出自我。
You may have thought — by this point you may think it went too far in my particular case, but that’s another problem. (Laughs)
你可能已经认为——到这个时候，你可能认为在我的特殊情况下它做得太过分了，但那是另一个问题。（笑）
But you’re doing something very worthwhile if you’re helping introverted people get outside of themselves. And working with them in groups, where they see other people have the same problem and they don’t feel quite as silly themselves, I think is — I think you’re doing a lot for some human beings when you help them do that.
但是，如果你在帮助内向的人走出自我，那你正在做一些非常有价值的事情。而且与他们一起在小组中工作，在那里他们看到其他人也有同样的问题，他们自己就不会觉得那么愚蠢，我认为——我认为当你帮助他们做到这一点时，你为一些人类做了很多事情。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s a real pleasure to have an educator come who is working to do something simple and important instead of something foolish and unimportant. (Applause)
查理·芒格：是的。很高兴有一位教育工作者来，他正在努力做一些简单而重要的事情，而不是愚蠢和不重要的事情。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I hope he’s not going to name names. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我希望他不会点名。（笑声）
16. Klamath River dam economics
克拉马斯河大坝经济学
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s go back to number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。让我们回到第 1 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett. My name is Regina Chichizola, and I’m the Klamath Riverkeeper.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生。我叫雷吉娜·奇奇佐拉，我是克拉马斯河的守护者。
I came here today with many of the other people from the Klamath that came here, and I thank you for having us, and I thank the shareholders for being a lot nicer to us this year than they were last year.
我今天和许多来自克拉马斯的人一起来到这里，感谢你们接待我们，也感谢股东们今年对我们比去年友好得多。
So my question is, I’m sure you’re familiar with the severe pollution issues in the Klamath River, such as the toxic algae problem that is 4,000 times allowable recreation levels, and that the fish are also now toxic due to the Klamath dams.
我的问题是，我相信您熟悉克拉马斯河的严重污染问题，比如毒藻问题，其浓度达到允许休闲水平的4000倍，并且由于克拉马斯河的水坝，鱼类也变得有毒。
I was wondering if you were familiar with the finances behind the Klamath dams? Many economic studies have shown that removing the Klamath dams would be up to hundreds of millions of dollars cheaper than relicensing them.
我想知道你是否熟悉克拉马斯大坝背后的财务情况？许多经济研究表明，拆除克拉马斯大坝比重新获得许可证要便宜数亿美元。
So my question is, what would you do if PacifiCorp decided to keep these dams, even though it would mean that your shareholders would lose money in the long run and that PacifiCorp’s ratepayers would also be losing money?
那么，我的问题是，如果太平洋电力公司决定保留这些水坝，即使这意味着您的股东从长远来看会亏损，而太平洋电力公司的用户也会损失钱，您会怎么做？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think the question about the ratepayers will be addressed by the public utility commissions.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为关于用户的问题将由公共事业委员会解决。
I mean, it is their job to represent the citizens of Oregon, and weigh a number of different considerations — for example, clean energy. Do you want to replace hydro energy with a — what you’re talking about — with coal, which emits carbons into the atmosphere? There are enormous tradeoffs.
我的意思是，他们的工作是代表俄勒冈州的公民，并权衡许多不同的考虑因素——例如，清洁能源。你想用煤炭来替代水能吗？煤炭会向大气中排放碳。这里有巨大的权衡。
Anytime the government gets involved in eminent domain — we have that with wind farms, for example, in Iowa — there’s some people that are unhappy with us using the land for wind farms. But, on the other hand, you get clean energy that way.
每当政府介入征用土地时——例如在爱荷华州的风电场——总会有一些人对我们将土地用于风电场感到不满。但另一方面，这样可以获得清洁能源。
There are tradeoffs involved in government policy. You get into that with the question of eminent domain, all of that sort of thing.
政府政策涉及权衡取舍。你会在征用权的问题上遇到这些情况。
But I think I’m going to let Dave talk to the more technical questions you get into.
但我想我会让戴夫来回答你提出的更技术性的问题。
But I would say, overall, you have people with widely different interests. Obviously, a big interest is the cost of electricity.
不过，我会说，总体而言，涉及到人们有广泛不同的利益。显然，一个重要的利益是电力的成本。
And to some extent, every public utility commission that makes a decision on gas versus coal versus wind versus solar is making a decision based partly on the economics to their ratepayers, partly on their feelings about what is the best for society, and those commissions are appointed state by state to make those decisions.
在某种程度上，每个公共事业委员会在天然气、煤炭、风能和太阳能之间做出决策时，部分是基于对其用户的经济影响，部分是基于他们对什么对社会最有利的看法做出决策的。这些委员会是由各州任命来做出这些决策的。
Now, in addition, in this case we have the FERC as it’s called, the Federal Energy Regulation Commission, that will also have to rule on it.
现在，此外，在这种情况下，我们还有所谓的 FERC，即联邦能源监管委员会，也将对此作出裁决。
They will listen to everybody. They’ll listen to you. They’ll listen to the 28 others that Dave mentioned. In the end we will do exactly what they say.
他们会听每个人的意见。他们会听你的意见。他们会听戴夫提到的其他 28 个人的意见。最后，我们会完全按照他们说的去做。
I mean, as a public utility, if they tell us to put up — not put up coal, we will not put up coal. If they tell us to put up wind, assuming that there is a place where there is wind, we will put up wind. We follow the dictates of the regulatory bodies that tell us what to do.
我的意思是，作为一家公共事业公司，如果他们告诉我们不要使用煤炭，我们就不会使用煤炭。如果他们告诉我们使用风能，假设有风能的地方，我们就会使用风能。我们遵循监管机构的指示，按照他们的要求去做。
And in the end they give us a fair return on the assets employed, and we will get that return whatever the assets may be. If they tell us to put in coal assets, we’ll get a return out of that.
最后，他们会给我们一个合理的资产回报，无论资产是什么，我们都会得到回报。如果他们让我们投入煤炭资产，我们也会从中获得回报。
So from our standpoint, from the standpoint of profitability, it’s neutral.
所以从我们的立场来看，从盈利的角度来看，这是中立的。
From the standpoint of society, weighing all these different things, that’s a decision society will make.
从社会的角度来看，权衡所有这些不同的事情，这是一个社会将要做出的决定。
But, Dave, let’s — do you want to talk to the algae question?
但是，戴夫，我们来——你想谈谈关于藻类的问题吗？
DAVE SOKOL: Sure. First, it’s important, the Karuk tribe did do a study and found bioaccumulation of microcystins, or blue-green algae, in the perch and the fresh water mussels in the Klamath River.
戴夫·索科尔：当然。首先，重要的是，卡鲁克部落确实进行了一项研究，发现克拉马斯河中的鲈鱼和淡水贻贝中有微囊藻毒素或蓝藻的生物累积。
What’s important to understand about that — and by the way, we disseminated that report immediately to state and federal health agencies because they should know about it.
重要的是要理解这一点——顺便说一下，我们立即将该报告分发给州和联邦卫生机构，因为他们应该知道这件事。
Microcystin is not unique to the Klamath River. There are 27 other lakes in the state of Oregon that have blue-green algae, 70 different countries, every province in Canada, and 27 of the U.S. states have lakes that have blue-green algae.
微囊藻毒素并非克拉马斯河所独有。俄勒冈州还有其他 27 个湖泊存在蓝藻，全球 70 个不同国家、加拿大的每个省份以及美国的 27 个州都有湖泊存在蓝藻。
It is created from lakes that have a high abundance of nutrients and naturally-forming algae. And at the head of the Klamath River is a lake known as Upper Klamath Lake, which is actually a Bureau of Reclamation reservoir — it’s a shallow, large reservoir, that is known as being hypereutrophic, which means a great abundance of algaes and various nutrients.
它是由富含营养物质和自然形成藻类的湖泊形成的。在克拉马斯河的源头有一个被称为上克拉马斯湖的湖泊，它实际上是一个垦务局的水库——这是一个浅而大的水库，以富营养化著称，这意味着有大量的藻类和各种营养物质。
Those nutrients then flow down the river and do pass through or, in cases, get backed up by the four reservoirs down below the Bureau of Reclamation-linked dam.
这些营养物质随后沿河流动，并通过或在某些情况下被下游与垦务局相关的水坝的四个水库阻挡。
The important issue is those things are, in fact, taken into account by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. They issued their environmental impact statement last November, which endorsed various fish passage methods on the dams but do not call for removal of the dams.
重要的问题是，这些事情实际上已被联邦能源监管委员会考虑在内。他们在去年十一月发布了环境影响声明，支持在大坝上采用各种鱼类通道方法，但并未要求拆除大坝。
But, again, those are decisions that all the state, federal, agencies, and the various involved parties will either have to come to agreement with or let them run their course through the FERC process.
但再次强调，这些都是各州、联邦机构以及各种相关方必须达成一致或让其通过FERC过程进行的决策。
17. Long-short strategy wasn’t a big money maker
多空策略并不是一个大赚的策略
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。2 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Henry Pattener (PH). I’m hailing from Singapore, most recently.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是亨利·帕特纳。我来自新加坡。
In one of your older letters, you — your older partnership letters in 1964 — you introduced a fourth investment method called “Generals — Relatively Undervalued.”
在你的一封较早的信中，你——你在 1964 年的较早合伙信中——介绍了一种投资方法，称为“普通股——相对低估”。
In your description you say, “We have recently begun to implement a technique which gives promise of very substantially reducing the risk from an overall change in valuation standards.
在您的描述中，您提到：“我们最近开始实施一种技术，这种技术有望大幅降低整体估值标准变化的风险。
“We buy something at 12 times earnings when comparables or poor-quality companies sell at 20 times earnings, but then a major revaluation takes place so that the latter only sell at ten times.”
“我们以12倍的收益购买某种股票，而可比或劣质公司则以20倍的收益出售，但随后发生了重大重新估值，使得后者仅以10倍出售。”
Is this technique pair trading and, if so, how did you think about and calculate the ratio of longs to shorts?
这种技术是配对交易吗？如果是这样，您是如何考虑和计算多头与空头的比例的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I didn’t remember we started as early as ’64, but certainly in the ’60s we did some of what, in a very general way, would be called pair trading now, which is a technique that’s used by a number of hedge funds, and perhaps others, that go long one security and short another, and often they try to keep them in the same industry or something.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不记得我们在 64 年就开始了，但可以肯定的是，在 60 年代我们确实做了一些现在被称为配对交易的事情，这是一种被许多对冲基金和其他人使用的技术，即买入一种证券并卖空另一种证券，通常他们会尝试将它们保持在同一行业或类似的领域。
They say that British Petroleum is relatively attractive compared to Chevron or vice versa, so they long one and short the other.
他们说，与雪佛龙相比，英国石油相对有吸引力，反之亦然，所以他们做多一个，做空另一个。
And actually that technique was employed first by Ben Graham in the mid-1920s when he had a hedge fund, oftentimes — I read articles all the time that credit A.W. Jones with originating the hedge fund concept in the late ’40s, but Ben Graham had one in the mid-1920s — and he actually engaged in pairs trading.
实际上，这种技术最早是由本·格雷厄姆在 1920 年代中期使用的，当时他有一个对冲基金。我经常读到一些文章，将对冲基金概念的起源归功于 A.W.琼斯，认为是在 40 年代末，但本·格雷厄姆在 1920 年代中期就已经有一个对冲基金了——而且他实际上参与了配对交易。
And he found out it worked modestly — very modestly — well because he was right about four times out of five but the time he was wrong tended to kill him on the other four.
他发现这种方法有效——非常有限地有效——因为他在五次中对四次是正确的，但他错误的那一次往往会让他在其他四次中遭受损失。
We did — we shorted out the general market for about five years in the partnership, to a degree. We borrowed stocks directly from some major universities. I think we were probably quite early in that.
我们确实——在合伙企业中，我们在一定程度上做空了大约五年的大盘。我们直接从一些主要大学借入股票。我想我们可能在这方面相当早。
We went to Columbia and Harvard and Chicago and different places and actually arranged for direct borrowing. They weren’t — it wasn’t as easy to facilitate in those days as it is now.
我们去了哥伦比亚大学、哈佛大学、芝加哥大学和其他不同的地方，并实际安排了直接借用。在那些日子里，这并不像现在这样容易促成。
And so we would take their portfolios and we would just say, “Give us any of the stocks you want, and then we’ll return them to you after a while and we’ll pay you a little fee.”
所以我们会拿他们的投资组合，然后我们就说：“把你想要的任何股票给我们，然后过一段时间我们会还给你，并支付你一点费用。”
And then we went long things that we thought were attractive. We did not go short things that we thought were unattractive; we just shorted out the market generally.
然后我们就会做多那些我们认为有吸引力的股票。我们并没有做空我们认为不吸引的股票；我们只是做空了整体市场。
It was always kind of interesting to me, when I would visit the treasurer of Columbia or something like and I’d say, “We’d like to borrow your stocks to short,” and, you know, he thought his stocks were pretty good at that point.
我总是觉得有点有趣，当我去拜访哥伦比亚的财务主管或类似的人时，我会说：“我们想借用你的股票来做空。” 你知道，他当时认为他的股票相当不错。
And he’d say, “Which ones do you want?” And I said, “Just give me any of them — (laughs) — I’m happy to short your whole damn portfolio.” (Laughter)
他会说：“你想要哪一个？”我说：“随便给我一个——（笑）——我很乐意做空你整个该死的投资组合。”（笑声）
I needed the Dale Carnegie course to get me through that kind of thing, you know.
我需要戴尔·卡耐基课程来帮助我度过那种事情，你知道的。
We didn’t have any specific ratios in mind. We were always limited by the number of institutions that would give us the stocks to short.
我们并没有心中设定任何具体比例。我们总是受到愿意借给我们股票的机构数量的限制。
So it was not a big deal, but we probably made some extra money on it in the ’60s. It’s not something that would fit our — what we do these days at all.
所以这不是什么大事，但我们可能在 60 年代从中赚了一些额外的钱。这完全不符合我们现在所做的事情。
And, generally speaking, I think if you’ve got some very good ideas on businesses that are undervalued, it’s really unnecessary to do any shorting out of the market.
一般来说，我认为如果你有一些关于被低估的企业的好想法，实际上没有必要在市场上做空。
There’s a — for those of you who are in the field — I mean, there’s a — kind of a popular proposal — money managers always have some popular proposal that’s being sold to the potential investors — and now there’s something called 130-30, where you’re long 130 percent long, short 30 percent.
对于那些在这个领域的人来说，我的意思是，有一个——一种流行的提议——资金管理者总是向潜在投资者推销一些流行的提议——现在有一种叫做 130-30 的东西，你是 130%做多，30%做空。
That stuff is all basically a bunch of stuff just to try and sell you the idea of the day. It doesn’t really have any great statistical merit.
那些东西基本上就是一堆东西，只是为了向你推销当天的想法。它实际上并没有什么很大的统计价值。
But the fish bite, as Charlie says. Charlie can elaborate on that.
但鱼咬钩了，正如查理所说。查理可以详细说明。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We made our money by being long some wonderful businesses. We didn’t make it by a long-short strategy.
查理·芒格：是的。我们通过持有一些优秀的企业赚到了钱。我们不是通过长短策略赚到的。
18. Big opportunities often don’t last long
大机会往往不会持续很久
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Mr. Buffett, dear Mr. Munger. My name is Oliver Krautscheid from Frankfurt in Germany.
观众成员：亲爱的巴菲特先生，亲爱的芒格先生。我叫奥利弗·克劳特沙伊德，来自德国法兰克福。
The subprime crisis has led to inconsistent pricing in capital markets. Credits are trading at large discounts, and at the same time, the equities do not reflect this.
次贷危机导致资本市场的定价不一致。信用债券以大幅折扣交易，同时，股票并未反映这一点。
My question is, when will this be over, and how do you take advantage of market dislocations?
我的问题是，这什么时候会结束，以及如何利用市场错位？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, when there are market dislocations, there are always ways to take advantage of it, but we’ll leave for you the joy of searching for those.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，当市场出现错位时，总有办法利用它，但我们会把寻找这些机会的乐趣留给你。
But there have been some really important dislocations. And I brought along, just for your amusement, a few figures on something that we’ve done recently. But it doesn’t have any big significance for Berkshire. I mean, Berkshire will make some extra money out of this.
但是确实发生了一些非常重要的错位。我带来了一些我们最近做的事情的数据，仅供你们娱乐。不过这对伯克希尔没有什么重大意义。我的意思是，伯克希尔会从中赚取一些额外的钱。
It doesn’t take any time to think about. But it does illustrate just how dramatic the changes were. And the ones I brought along relate to the tax-exempt money market funds.
这不需要花时间去思考。但这确实说明了变化是多么的巨大。而我带来的那些与免税货币市场基金有关。
There were 330 billion of these. That’s a lot of money — 330 billion. And they relied on repricing of — really, in almost all cases — first-grade municipal bonds.
这类基金有3300亿美元。这是一笔巨款——3300亿美元。它们依赖于——实际上几乎所有情况下——优质市政债券的重新定价。
Every seven days they have these auctions, and it was all set up very elaborately so that people could have their money, more or less, in their minds, instantly available and something that was tax exempt, and they were marketed extensively.
每七天他们就会举行这些拍卖会，整个安排得非常精细，以便人们可以在心里或多或少地立即获得他们的钱，并且这些是免税的，而且它们被广泛推广。
And I brought along — for example, here’s one that related to the — they were backed by various municipal issues. This one happens to be one by the LA County Museum of Art. Just pulled that out.
我带了一些例子——例如，这里有一份与之相关的，它们是由各种市政问题支持的。这份是洛杉矶县艺术博物馆的一份。我刚好抽出来。
And on January 24, it was marketed at 3.15 percent; January 31, 4.0; February 7, 3.5; February 14, 8 percent.
1 月 24 日，它的市场价格为 3.15%；1 月 31 日，4.0%；2 月 7 日，3.5%；2 月 14 日，8%。
Now, how can a tax-exempt bond of short-term nature be selling at a 3 1/2 percent rate one week, and one week later on Valentine’s Day be at 8 percent, and one week after that be at 10 percent?
现在，为什么一个短期免税债券在一周内以 3.5%的利率出售，而在情人节后一周达到 8%，再过一周达到 10%？
It’s now back to 4.2 percent. Now, those are huge dislocations in markets. That’s crazy.
现在回到了 4.2%。这些是市场上的巨大错位。这太疯狂了。
It would be one thing to be some little obscure item, but this happened with billions and billions and billions of dollars of securities.
这件事如果只是一些不起眼的小物件倒也罢了，但这却发生在数十亿、数十亿、数十亿美元的证券上。
It even happened — we get these bid sheets every day, and this happens to be a bid sheet, I think, from Citigroup. And they were repricing these every seven days.
它甚至发生了——我们每天都会收到这些投标单，而这恰好是我认为来自花旗集团的一张投标单。他们每七天重新定价一次。
And what you would find on these — you’ll see there’s lots of issues involved — the same issue would appear on several different pages, because it would represent some different auction, although handled by the same broker at the same time.
在这些单子上，您会发现涉及很多问题——同一个问题可能出现在几页上，因为它会代表一些不同的拍卖，尽管由同一个经纪人同时处理。
On one page you would find an issue — we would bid all these — we happened to bid these at 11.3 percent.
在一页上你会发现一个问题——我们会投标所有这些——我们碰巧以 11.3%的价格投标这些。
On one page, we bought them at 11.3 percent. On another page, the same issue, we bid the 11.3 percent and somebody else bid 6 percent.
在一页上，我们以 11.3%的价格买下了它们。在另一页上，同样的问题，我们出价 11.3%，而其他人出价 6%。
So you have the same issue with the same broker at the same time being sold at 11.3 percent and 6 percent. Those are marks of extreme dislocation, and you find those occasionally.
所以你在同一时间与同一个经纪人有同样的问题，一个以 11.3%出售，另一个以 6%出售。这些是极端错位的标志，你偶尔会发现这些情况。
You found that after the Long-Term Capital Management crisis is 1998. You found the equivalent of it in the stock market in 1974, and so on.
在1998年的长期资本管理危机后，您会发现类似的现象。在1974年的股票市场也会出现这样的情况，等等。
And those are great times to make unusual amounts of money. And if you — there’s certain things we can’t figure out.
这些时候是赚取异常高额收入的好时机。而如果你——有些事情我们无法弄清楚。
I see — in the Wall Street Journal — I see advertisements these days of auctions taking place in some esoteric mortgage securities. If you had enough time, you could probably figure out some of those that were very mispriced. We don’t fool around with that. We just don’t have the time.
我在《华尔街日报》中看到，最近有一些广告，涉及一些冷门的抵押贷款证券拍卖。如果您有足够的时间，您可能能找出一些严重错误定价的证券。我们不去碰那些。我们实在没有时间。
We were able to do four — we have about 4 billion in this right now. When we get all through, we’ll have made some extra money for a couple of months.
我们目前有大约40亿美元的投资。等我们完成后，可能会在几个月内赚一些额外的钱。
It won’t be significant, in relation to Berkshire’s size, but it’s something that’s very easy to do.
相对于伯克希尔的规模来说，这不会很显著，但这是一件非常容易做的事情。
You may be able to find — by working very, very hard on some smaller issues — you might be able to find in this mess in mortgages — and it’s gone beyond subprime. It’s gone into Alt-As and it’s gone into Option ARMs and that sort of thing.
您可能能够通过非常努力地研究一些小的项目，在这场混乱的抵押贷款中找到一些机会——这已经超越了次贷，涉及到Alt-A和选择性可调抵押贷款等。
There very well could be some great opportunities out there that Charlie and I will no longer spot because we just can’t be looking at that many things.
外面很可能有一些很好的机会，查理和我将不再发现，因为我们无法关注那么多事情。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. What is interesting is that — how brief these opportunities to take advantage of dislocations frequently are.
查理·芒格：是的。有趣的是，利用这些错位的机会往往是多么短暂。
Some idiot hedge fund bought unlimited municipal bonds at, you know, incredible margins. I think they bought 20 times more municipal bonds than they could afford with their own money, borrowing all the rest.
有个傻瓜对冲基金以难以置信的利润率购买了无限量的市政债券。我想他们购买的市政债券是他们自己资金承受能力的 20 倍，其余的都是借来的。
And when those things were dumped on margin calls, municipal bonds suddenly got mispriced in America. But the dislocation was very brief. So you —
当这些东西因追加保证金被抛售时，美国的市政债券突然被错误定价。但这种错位非常短暂。所以你——
WARREN BUFFETT: But very extreme.
沃伦·巴菲特：但非常极端。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But very extreme.
查理·芒格：但非常极端。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: So if you can’t think fast and act resolutely, it does you no good.
查理·芒格：所以如果你不能快速思考并果断行动，那对你没有好处。
So you’re like a man standing by a stream trying to spear a fish and the fish just comes by once a week or once a month or once every ten years. And you’ve got to be there to throw that spear fast before the fish swims on. It’s a pretty demanding business if you do it right.
所以你就像一个站在溪边试图用矛刺鱼的人，而鱼每周、每月或每十年才来一次。你必须在鱼游走之前快速投掷长矛。如果你做得对，这是一项相当苛刻的工作。
WARREN BUFFETT: But there have been times. I mean, in the junk bond market, there was a three- or four-month period in 2002 where some really incredible things happened and they happened on a large scale. So —
沃伦·巴菲特：但有些时候，我的意思是，在垃圾债券市场上，2002 年有三到四个月的时间里发生了一些非常不可思议的事情，而且这些事情发生的规模很大。所以——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It happens about twice a century.
查理·芒格：是的。这大约每个世纪发生两次。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）
Which means he and I have only had four or five times when we could do it. (Laughter)
这意味着他和我只有四五次可以做到。（笑声）
19. “Automatic formula for getting ahead”
“向前发展的自动公式”
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 4 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Svinneyvaz Canadival (PH). I’m from Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是斯维尼瓦兹·卡纳迪瓦尔（音）。我来自佛罗里达州的劳德代尔堡。
I read all your letters and annual reports multiple times, and every time I get a different insight. So thanks for doing it.
我多次阅读了你所有的信件和年度报告，每次都有不同的见解。所以谢谢你这样做。
My question is about converting the successful small businesses into large enterprise. I have a good and successful small business from the last few years, and I’m unable to grow it to the next level. It seems like there are some components are missing, so I wanted to take your advice on it.
我的问题是关于将成功的小企业转变为大型企业。过去几年我有一个良好且成功的小企业，但我无法将其提升到下一个水平。似乎有一些要素缺失，所以我想听取您的建议。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Berkshire was a small business at one time. I mean, it just takes time. I mean, it’s the nature of compound interest. You know, you can’t build it in one day or one week.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，伯克希尔曾经也是一家小公司。我的意思是，这需要时间。这就是复利的本质。你知道的，你不可能在一天或一周内建立起来。
So Charlie and I — you know, we’ve never tried to do in some master stroke — convert Berkshire into something four times as large. People have done that sometimes in business.
所以查理和我——你知道，我们从未尝试通过某个重大举措——将伯克希尔转变为四倍大的公司。有时候在商业中有人这样做。
But we’ve sort of felt that if we kept doing what we understood, and did it consistently, and had fun while we were doing it, that it would be something quite large at some point.
但是我们有一种感觉，如果我们坚持做我们理解的事情，并且始终如一地去做，同时在过程中享受乐趣，那么它在某个时候会变得相当大。
But there’s nothing magic — it would be nice to attract a whole bunch of money into some great idea and have it — you know, multiply it manyfold in a few weeks or something of the sort. But that has really not been our approach.
但这没有什么神奇之处——吸引一大笔资金投入某个伟大的想法，然后在几周内将其乘以几倍，这听起来很好，但这并不是我们的做法。
We have just — we have done — in a general way, we’ve done the same thing. Now, we do little variations of it, but we kept doing the same thing for years and we’ll keep doing it.
我们刚刚——我们已经——总的来说，我们做了同样的事情。现在，我们做了一些小的变化，但多年来我们一直在做同样的事情，并且我们会继续这样做。
You know, we will have more businesses a few years from now than we have now. And we’ll have all the ones we have presently. Most of them will do better. Some won’t. And we will have added something.
你知道，几年后我们的业务会比现在更多。而且我们现在拥有的所有业务也都会保留。大多数会做得更好，有些不会。而且我们会增加一些新的业务。
And that’s an automatic formula for getting ahead, but it’s not an automatic formula for galloping ahead.
这是一种获得进步的自动公式，但并不是一种迅速进步的自动公式。
But we don’t really feel — we’re not unhappy because we’re not galloping. We’re not happy if we’re not moving at all.
但我们并不真的感到——我们并不因为没有疾驰而不快乐。如果我们完全不动，我们就不快乐。
But, you know, we’ve got 76 or so, in most cases, pretty darn wonderful businesses. And, like I say, we’ll have more as we go along. So it’s a very simple formula.
但是，你知道，我们大约有 76 家，在大多数情况下，非常出色的企业。而且，正如我所说，随着时间的推移，我们会有更多。所以这是一个非常简单的公式。
Gypsy Rose Lee said once — she said, “I have everything I had five years ago. It’s all that it’s 2-inches lower,” you know.
吉普赛·罗斯·李曾经说过——她说：“我拥有的一切与五年前相同，只不过低了2英寸。”您知道。
Well, what we want to have five years from now is a whole bunch of businesses we had before that are 2-inches higher, plus some more businesses. And that’s the formula.
那么，我们希望五年后拥有的是一大批比之前高出两英寸的企业，再加上一些新企业。这就是我们的公式。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You’ve got to remember that it’s the nature of things that most small businesses will never be big businesses.
查理·芒格：是的。你必须记住，大多数小企业永远不会成为大企业，这是事物的本质。
It’s also in the nature of things that most small — most big businesses — eventually fall into mediocrity or worse. So it’s a tough game out there.
事情的本质也是如此，大多数小企业——大多数大企业——最终会陷入平庸或更糟。因此，这是一场艰难的竞争。
In addition, the players of the game all have to die, and that is — those are just the rule of the game, and you have to get used to it.
此外，游戏的玩家都必须死去，这就是游戏的规则，你必须习惯它。
We’ve only created from scratch one small business that became a huge business that I can think of, and that’s the reinsurance department.
我们从零开始创建的唯一一个我能想到的小企业，后来成为了一个大企业，那就是再保险部门。
And there, Warren and Ajit and others have created a great and valuable business out of air. But can you think of anything other that’s large that we’ve done in all these decades?
在那里，沃伦、阿吉特和其他人凭空创造了一个伟大而有价值的业务。但在这些几十年里，你能想到我们做过的其他任何大事吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: No. No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve only done it once, so we’re a one-trick pony.
查理·芒格：我们只做过一次，所以我们是一个一招鲜的公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We were lucky on that one, too. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在那件事上也很幸运。（笑声）
Yeah, and incidentally, without Ajit we wouldn’t have done it at all.
是的，顺便说一下，如果没有阿吉特，我们根本做不到。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right.
查理·芒格：对，对。
WARREN BUFFETT: It isn’t that we did it. Ajit did it. We just sat there cheering.
沃伦·巴菲特：不是我们做的，是阿吉特做的。我们只是坐在那里加油。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Somebody asked us once what was the best investment we ever made, and I answered the fee we paid to the executive recruiter to find Ajit Jain. (Applause.)
查理·芒格：有人曾经问我们，我们做过的最好的投资是什么，我回答说是我们支付给猎头公司以找到阿吉特·贾因的费用。（掌声。）
20. Bond insurance business off to strong start
债券保险业务开局强劲
WARREN BUFFETT: In that connection, I’d like to give you a little report.
沃伦·巴菲特：在这方面，我想给你们做一个简短的报告。
We went into the municipal bond insurance business a few months ago, and naturally, we did it through Ajit. And he got our companies up, licensed, and running.
几个月前，我们进入了市政债券保险业务，自然是通过阿吉特进行的。他让我们的公司成立、获得许可并开始运营。
And in the first quarter of 2008 — I don’t have the figures for all the other people — but our premium volume came to over $400 million.
在 2008 年第一季度——我没有其他所有人的数据——但我们的保费总额超过了 4 亿美元。
And I think — now, that was overwhelmingly written in the secondary market, but I think our premium volume was not only larger than any other municipal bond insurer in the United States, I wouldn’t be surprised if it’s as large as all of the rest of them combined.
我认为——现在，那主要是在二级市场上写的，但我认为我们的保费规模不仅比美国任何其他市政债券保险公司都大，我也不会惊讶如果它和其他所有公司的总和一样大。
And this was from a standing start that Ajit accomplished this. And I have here a list of, what, 300 and — this is the end of the quarter — 278, I believe it is, transactions.
这就是阿吉特从零开始完成的。我这里有一份清单，什么，300 个——这是季度末——我相信是 278 个交易。
Now, that’s all done out of an office with 29 or 30 people who are doing a lot of other things, too. I mean, it’s a remarkable, remarkable place.
现在，这一切都是由一个有 29 或 30 人的办公室完成的，他们也在做很多其他事情。我的意思是，这是一个非常了不起的地方。
One of the interesting things about this is that almost all of this business — although not all the premium volume — all of — almost all of this business was — came from people who came to us with municipal bonds asking us to insure them, and in every case, except two or three, they already had insurance from the other bond insurance, most of whom are rated triple-A.
关于这项业务的一个有趣的事情是，几乎所有的业务——尽管不是所有的保费收入——几乎所有的业务都是来自那些持有市政债券的人，他们来找我们要求保险，而在除了两三起案例外，他们已经有其他债券保险的保障，绝大多数都是评级为AAA的。
So they were paying us a fee which was higher to write insurance which would only be paid, not only if the municipality didn’t pay, but the original bond insurer didn’t pay.
所以他们支付给我们的费用更高，以便我们撰写保险，这种保险只有在市政府不支付且原始债券保险公司也不支付的情况下才会支付。
So we were writing business at an average rate of two and a fraction percent for the quarter, and the original insurer had charged, perhaps, an average of 1 percent. And they had to pay and they — in fact, the only way we’re going to pay is if they went broke.
因此，我们在这个季度以平均 2 点几的百分比签订业务，而原保险公司可能收取了平均 1%的费用。而他们必须支付，实际上，唯一我们会支付的方式是他们破产。
So it tells you something about the meaning of triple-A in the reinsurance — in the bond insurance — field in the first quarter of 2008.
所以，这说明了2008年第一季度在再保险——在债券保险领域中，AAA评级的含义。
Ajit has done a remarkable job in this arena. And Berkshire wrote a couple of primary policies for the Detroit Sewer District and the Detroit Water District that — each about 370 or 380 million — and people have found our insured bonds trading in the secondary market at a more attractive yield to the issuer. In other words, at lower yields than from any other bond insurer.
阿吉特在这个领域做得非常出色。伯克希尔为底特律下水道区和底特律水区制定了几项主要政策，每项约为 3.7 亿或 3.8 亿美元，人们发现我们承保的债券在二级市场上的交易收益率对发行人更具吸引力。换句话说，其收益率低于任何其他债券保险公司。
So this whole company has been built, just in a matter of a couple of months, by Ajit in his small office in Connecticut. It’s pretty remarkable, and I congratulate him for it. (Applause.)
因此，这整家公司仅在几个月内，由阿吉特在他位于康涅狄格州的小办公室中建立起来。真是令人惊叹，我对此表示祝贺。（掌声）
21. We prefer “the business which drowns in cash”
我们更喜欢“淹没在现金中的业务”
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to area 5, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到第 5 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Stuart Kaye, and I’m from New York City.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是斯图尔特·凯，我来自纽约市。
I wanted to know, if you could not talk with management, could not read an annual report, and did not know the stock price of a company, but were only allowed to look at the financial statements of a company, what metric would you look at to help you determine whether you should buy the company?
我想知道，如果你不能与管理层交谈，不能阅读年度报告，也不知道公司的股价，但只允许查看公司的财务报表，你会看哪个指标来帮助你决定是否应该购买这家公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what we’re doing in investment, and what everybody is doing in investment, is they’re laying out money now to get more money back later on.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们在投资中所做的事情，以及每个人在投资中所做的事情，就是现在投入资金，以便以后获得更多的回报。
Now, let’s leave the market aspect of the asset out. I mean, when you buy a farm, you really aren’t thinking about what the market on it’s going to be tomorrow or next week or next month.
现在，让我们撇开资产的市场方面。我是说，当你购买一个农场时，你并不是真的在考虑明天、下周或下个月的市场会怎样。
You’re thinking about how many — what the — how many bushels of beans per acre can you get or corn per acre and what the price is likely to be. You’re looking to the asset itself.
你在考虑每英亩能收获多少蒲式耳的豆子或玉米，以及价格可能是多少。你关注的是资产本身。
In the case you lay out, the first question you’d have to make is do I understand enough about this business so that the financial statements will tell me the information that’s useful to me in making a judgment about what the future financial statements are going to look like.
在你提出的情况下，你首先要问的问题是，我是否对这个业务有足够的了解，以便财务报表能告诉我对判断未来财务报表将会是什么样子有用的信息。
And in many cases, the answer would be no. Probably in a great majority of the cases it would be no.
在很多情况下，答案是否定的。可能在绝大多数情况下，答案都是否定的。
But I’ve actually bought stocks the way you’re describing many times, and they were in businesses that I thought I understood where, if I knew enough about the financial past, it would tell me enough about the financial future that I could buy.
但实际上，我确实多次按照你描述的方式购买股票，而且这些股票是在我认为我了解的业务中，如果我对其财务过去了解足够多，它就会告诉我足够多的财务未来信息，以至于我可以购买。
Now, I couldn’t say the stock was worth X or 105 percent of X or 95 percent of X, but if I could buy it at 40 percent of X, I would feel that I had this margin of safety that Graham would talk about, and I could make a decision.
现在，我不能说这只股票值 X 或 X 的 105%或 X 的 95%，但如果我能以 X 的 40%买入，我会觉得我有格雷厄姆所说的安全边际，我就可以做出决定。
Most times I wouldn’t be able to make it. I wouldn’t know — if you hand me a bunch of financial statements and you don’t tell me what the business is, there’s no way I could make a judgment as to what’s going to happen. It could have been a hula hoop business; it could have been a pet rock business. You know, on the other hand it could have been Microsoft early on.
大多数时候我无法做到。如果你给我一堆财务报表而不告诉我这是什么业务，我无法判断会发生什么。它可能是一个呼啦圈业务；也可能是一个宠物石头业务。你知道，另一方面，它也可能是早期的微软。
So unless I know the nature of the business, the financial statements aren’t going to tell me much, you know. If I know the nature of the business and I see the financial statements, you know, if I see the financial statements on Wrigley, I know something about the business. Now I have to know something about the product before I can make that judgment.
因此，除非我了解业务的性质，否则财务报表对我来说意义不大。如果我了解业务的性质，并查看财务报表，例如，如果我看到箭牌的财务报表，我对这个业务有一定了解。现在我还需要对产品有一些了解，才能做出判断。
But we’ve bought lots and lots of securities. The majority of the securities Charlie and I bought, we’ve never met the management and never talked to them, but we have primarily worked off financial statements, our general understanding of business, and some specific understanding of the industry in the business we’re buying.
但是我们买了很多很多证券。查理和我买的大多数证券，我们从未见过管理层，也从未与他们交谈过，但我们主要依靠财务报表、我们对业务的一般理解以及对我们所购买业务所在行业的一些具体理解。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think there’s one metric that catches a lot of people. We tend to prefer the business which drowns in cash. It just makes so much money that the main — one of the main — principles of owning it is you have all this cash coming in.
查理·芒格：是的。我认为有一个指标吸引了很多人。我们倾向于喜欢那些现金流充裕的企业。它赚了很多钱，以至于拥有它的主要原则之一就是你有源源不断的现金流入。
There are other businesses, like the construction equipment business of my old friend John Anderson. And he used to say about his business “You work hard all year, and at the end of the year there’s your profit sitting in the yard.”
还有其他业务，比如我老朋友约翰·安德森的建筑设备业务。他过去常说他的生意是“你辛苦工作了一整年，年底的时候，你的利润就坐落在院子里。”
There was never any cash. Just more used construction equipment.
从来没有现金。只有更多的二手建筑设备。
We tend to hate businesses like that.
我们往往讨厌那样的企业。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s a lot easier to understand a business that’s mailing you a check every month. But that’s what an apartment house — you know, if you own — you can probably value an apartment property pretty well if you know anything about, you know, the city in which it’s in.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。理解一个每月给你寄支票的业务要容易得多。但这就是公寓楼的情况——你知道，如果你拥有——如果你对它所在的城市有所了解，你可能可以很好地评估一个公寓物业的价值。
And if you have the financial statements, you could make a reasonable guess as to what the future earnings are likely to be. But that’s because it is a business that gives you cash. Now, you can — there can be surprises in that arena as well.
如果你有财务报表，你可以对未来的收益做出合理的猜测。但那是因为这是一项能给你带来现金的业务。当然，在这个领域也可能会有意外。
But I’ve bought a lot of things off financial statements. There are a lot of things that I wouldn’t buy, you know, if I knew the — actually, there are a lot of businesses I wouldn’t buy if I thought the management was the most wonderful in the world because, if they were in the wrong business, it really doesn’t make much difference.
但我从财务报表上买了很多东西。有很多东西，如果我知道的话，我是不会买的——实际上，有很多企业我不会买，即使我认为管理层是世界上最出色的，因为如果他们在错误的行业，实际上并没有太大区别。
所处环境的影响具有决定性的作用。
22. Pollution in Klamath River
克拉马斯河的污染
WARREN BUFFETT: Number six?
沃伦·巴菲特：第六个？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Mike Palmateer (PH), fisheries supervisor for Karuk Fisheries.
观众成员：早上好。我叫迈克·帕尔马蒂尔（音），是卡鲁克渔业的渔业主管。
Mr. Buffett, you grew up and still live in the banks of the Missouri River. I, too, live on a river called the Klamath. My family has lived there since time immemorial.
巴菲特先生，您在密苏里河畔长大并且仍然住在那里。我也住在一条叫克拉马斯的河边。我的家族自古以来就住在那里。
In 2002, 68,000 fish died at the mouth of the Klamath River due to disease and bad water quality. These fish are also my relations.
2002 年，由于疾病和水质差，68,000 条鱼在克拉马斯河口死亡。这些鱼也是我的亲属。
If another company polluted your river and killed all the fish and made the river unswimable and unfishable, how would you approach this problem? Thank you.
如果另一家公司污染了你的河流，杀死了所有的鱼，使河流无法游泳和捕鱼，你会如何解决这个问题？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think society would — as a whole — should approach that problem by looking at the net benefits from whatever is taking place in that situation and what the costs of electricity would be and what the farmer’s situation would be if he went to a different form of water distribution.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我认为社会整体上应该通过权衡这种情况中发生的事物的净收益，以及如果改用其他形式的水资源分配，电力的成本和农民的情况如何来解决这个问题。
I mean, there are a lot of competing ideas and desires in a large society, and it’s up to government, basically, to sort out those.
我的意思是，在一个大型社会中，有许多相互竞争的想法和愿望，基本上由政府来解决这些问题。
We’re sorting it out — right now, we’re building coal plants in the country. We’re building gas plants. We’re doing various things.
我们正在解决这个问题——目前，我们正在国内建造煤电厂。我们正在建造燃气电厂。我们正在做各种事情。
People are coming to different conclusions about what kind of tradeoffs they want to make, and generally these are being made at the state level, although you could have a national energy policy that would override individual states’ decisions.
人们对他们想要做出什么样的权衡得出了不同的结论，通常这些是在州一级做出的，尽管你可以有一个国家能源政策来推翻各个州的决定。
We’re responsive to national policy on that. We’re responsive to local policy. The Oregon Public Utility Commission, I’m sure, is aware of exactly what you’ve discussed and they have to consider that, but they have to consider a lot of other things in determining what is the best way to generate the electricity required for the citizens of Oregon.
我们对国家政策做出响应。我们对地方政策做出响应。我相信俄勒冈州公共事业委员会非常清楚您所讨论的内容，他们必须考虑到这一点，但他们还必须考虑许多其他因素，以确定为俄勒冈州公民发电的最佳方式。
And, Dave, would you want to add anything to that?
戴夫，你想补充些什么吗？
DAVE SOKOL: Warren, just one comment. And not in any way to be disrespectful of the fishermen, but it — we are not polluting the river.
戴夫·索科尔：沃伦，我只想说一句。这并不是对渔民的不尊重，但我们并没有污染这条河。
We’re not doing — adding — anything to the water that isn’t coming out of Upper Klamath River, and we do recognize the different views as to whether the irrigation is a good thing or a bad thing, whether renewable power such as hydro is better than returning the river to its prior 1907 date.
我们没有对水进行任何添加——没有添加任何不来自克拉马斯河上游的东西，我们也认识到关于灌溉是好还是坏，水电作为可再生能源是否优于将河流恢复到1907年之前的不同看法。
But the one thing that — just to be clear — is that PacifiCorp is not adding anything. The water is flowing through penstocks, creating electricity, and coming out the rear end, and it did so under a 50-year FERC license.
但需要明确的是，PacifiCorp 并没有添加任何东西。水流通过压力管道，产生电力，然后从后端流出，这都是在一个 50 年代 FERC 许可证下进行的。
Again, we understand the varying concerns, and hopefully, over the next six years a societal answer that balances all those concerns will be reached.
再次，我们理解各种不同的担忧，并希望在未来六年内能够找到一个平衡所有这些担忧的社会答案。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声。）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d like to — I’d like to point out how refreshing it is to have people addressing a pollution problem which has nothing to do with burning carbon. (Applause.)
查理·芒格：我想指出，有人正在解决一个与燃烧碳无关的方案，这多么令人耳目一新。（掌声）
23. Buffett’s advice to a 12-year-old
巴菲特给 12 岁孩子的建议
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey. I’m Jack Range (PH). I’m from Philadelphia. I’m in seventh grade, and I’m 12-years-old.
观众成员：嘿。我是杰克·兰奇（音）。我来自费城。我上七年级，今年 12 岁。
I just wanted to ask, what kind of things should I be reading, like, in my grade? ’Cause I know there are a lot of things that they don’t teach you in school that you should know, but what things should I be looking into? (Applause.)
我只是想问一下，我这个年级应该读些什么东西？因为我知道有很多东西学校里不教但你应该知道的，但我应该关注哪些东西呢？（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would get in the habit, if you don’t have it already — but you sound like you very well may — of reading a daily newspaper, which is not the most popular thing in the world among younger people these days.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会养成一个习惯，如果你还没有的话——但听起来你很可能已经有了——那就是每天阅读报纸，这在当今年轻人中并不是最受欢迎的事情。
But you want to learn as much as you can about the world around you. And Bill Gates, I think, quit at the letter P in the World Book. Doesn’t seem to have hurt him too much to quit there.
但你想尽可能多地了解你周围的世界。而比尔·盖茨，我想，他在《世界百科全书》的字母 P 处停下了。似乎在那里停下对他没有太大影响。
But you can have a set of World Books. You can read the newspapers. You should just sop it up. And you’ll find out what’s the most interesting to you.
但是你可以拥有一套《世界图书》。你可以阅读报纸。你应该尽情吸收这些信息。这样你会发现什么对你来说是最有趣的。
I mean, you know, there’s a certain point where the sports pages were most interesting to me, then the finance pages. I happen to be a political junkie. But you just can’t learn enough in life.
我的意思是，你知道，有一段时间体育版对我来说最有趣，然后是财经版。我恰好是个政治迷。但在生活中你永远学不够。
And I think the fact — what you’ll find is the more you learn, the more you want to learn. I mean, it is fun, and — but you sound to me like a young person that’s going to do a lot of that on their own.
我认为，事实上——你会发现你学得越多，就越想学。我是说，这很有趣，而且——但在我看来，你像是一个会自己做很多事情的年轻人。
Do you have any suggestions, Charlie? You’d probably suggest reading Ben Franklin.
你有什么建议吗，查理？你可能会建议读本·富兰克林的书。
CHARLIE MUNGER: My suggestion would be that the young person that just spoke has already figured out how to succeed in life. You’ve got it made. (Applause)
查理·芒格：我的建议是，这位年轻人已经找到了如何在生活中取得成功的方法。你已经成功了。（掌声）
24. “We never urge people to sell good businesses”
“我们从不敦促人们出售好企业”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Greetings to all of you from the Midwest of Europe, from Bonn, Germany, on the Rhine River. I’m Norman Rentrop. I’m a shareholder in Berkshire, Wesco, and Cologne Re.
观众成员：向你们所有人问好，来自欧洲中西部，德国波恩，莱茵河畔。我是诺曼·伦特罗普。我是伯克希尔、韦斯科和科隆再保险的股东。
I want to thank you and Eitan Wertheimer to take the initiative and the time to come to four cities in Europe, and potentially throughout the world, to tell owners of family businesses what great alternative Berkshire Hathaway is to selling their businesses to buyout funds.
我想感谢你和埃坦·沃特海默主动抽出时间来到欧洲的四个城市，甚至可能在全球范围内，向家族企业的所有者介绍伯克希尔·哈撒韦是一个多么好的替代方案，而不是将他们的企业出售给收购基金。
Now, my question regarding the chocolate industry. I’m challenged since I cannot buy See’s Candy in my hometown, Bonn, Germany. You gave that great example of the great business, the good business, and the gruesome business.
现在，我关于巧克力行业的问题是：我面临挑战，因为我无法在我的家乡德国波恩购买 See's Candy。你举了一个关于伟大企业、良好企业和可怕企业的好例子。
See’s Candy, you cited, having sent, like, $1.3 billion in cash profits to Omaha. There’s another company called Lindt and Sprungli.
你提到的 See’s Candy，已经向奥马哈发送了大约 13 亿美元的现金利润。还有另一家公司叫 Lindt 和 Sprungli。
Now, while See’s Candy achieves more than 20 percent profit on sales, you describe that their growth has been “OK.” Lindt and Sprungli does only 14 percent on sales, but they did go almost global.
现在，虽然 See’s Candy 的销售利润超过 20%，但你形容他们的增长是“还可以”。Lindt 和 Sprungli 的销售利润只有 14%，但他们几乎实现了全球化。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Could you get to the question, please, on this? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。你能直接提问吗？（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. The question is in — whether you want to have a company with high profitability but OK growth versus a company going global but lower profits? What are your considerations?
观众成员：是的。问题是——你是想要一家高盈利但增长一般的公司，还是一家全球化但利润较低的公司？你的考虑是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: It really makes no difference to us. We evaluate all kinds of businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：这对我们来说真的没有区别。我们评估各种类型的业务。
And what we do want is we want a business with a durable competitive advantage, which both of the companies you named do.
我们想要的是一家具有持久竞争优势的企业，而你提到的两家公司都具备这一点。
And we want something we understand. And we want a management that we like and trust. And then we want a price that makes sense.
我们想要一些我们能理解的东西。我们想要一个我们喜欢和信任的管理层。然后我们想要一个合理的价格。
And we try to look at — we probably looked at every confectionary business, you know, for 20 years that was publicly owned where we got the figures. And sometimes we find something where we can take action, and most of the time we don’t.
我们试图查看——我们可能查看了过去 20 年间每一家公开上市的糖果公司，你知道，只要我们能拿到数据。有时候我们会发现一些可以采取行动的机会，但大多数时候我们没有。
When they’re private businesses, we don’t determine — a really good private business — I always tell the manager, the best thing to do if you’ve got a wonderful private business is just keep it. It’s going to be worth more next year and the year after.
当他们是私人企业时，我们不会决定——一个非常好的私人企业——我总是告诉经理，如果你有一个很棒的私人企业，最好的做法就是保留它。明年和后年它会更值钱。
So there’s no reason to sell a wonderful business except for kind of extraneous factors. It may be family situations. It may be taxes. It may be that there isn’t another potential heir or whatever it may be.
所以，除了某些外部因素，没有理由出售一个出色的企业。可能是家庭情况，可能是税务问题，可能是没有其他潜在继承人，或者其他原因。
But there’s no need — if you’ve got a business worth a billion dollars, you don’t need the billion dollars — you’ve got a business that’s worth a billion dollars — any more than if you’ve got a farm that’s worth a million dollars. You’ve already got the million dollars. You just happen to have it in the farm. And if you like farming, you keep it.
但是没有必要——如果你有一个价值十亿美元的企业，你不需要那十亿美元——你已经有一个价值十亿美元的企业——就像如果你有一个价值一百万美元的农场一样。你已经拥有了一百万美元。你只是碰巧把它放在了农场里。如果你喜欢务农，你就保留它。
So we never urge people to sell good businesses. We urge them to keep them.
所以我们从不敦促人们出售好企业。我们敦促他们保留这些企业。
But there comes times when they do want to sell for one reason or another — maybe once every 20 or 50 years — and we do think if they have a business that they’re enormously proud of — it’s a really fine business — that they can keep more of the attributes that they love in that business by selling it to Berkshire than they can, by far, selling it to anyone else.
但是，有时候他们确实想出于某种原因出售——也许每隔 20 年或 50 年——我们确实认为，如果他们有一个令他们非常自豪的企业——这是一个非常优秀的企业——通过将其出售给伯克希尔，他们可以在这个企业中保留更多他们所爱的特质，而不是卖给其他任何人。
So we are the logical buyer. As you mention, I’m going to Europe — Eitan, who’s been wonderful about setting this up — and we’re going to make presentations, not to try to get anybody to sell us their business now, because most people shouldn’t sell us their business now.
所以我们是合乎逻辑的买家。正如你提到的，我要去欧洲——伊坦在安排这件事上非常出色——我们将进行演示，但不是为了让任何人现在就把他们的业务卖给我们，因为大多数人现在不应该把他们的业务卖给我们。
But we do want them to think of us when the time comes when an event occurs that does cause them to think about selling. And we want to be on their radar screen.
但是我们确实希望当他们遇到某个事件并考虑出售时，会想到我们。我们希望能在他们的视野中。
And we’re more on the radar screen in the United States than we are in Europe, and we’re going to try to correct that.
而且我们在美国的关注度比在欧洲更高，我们将努力纠正这一点。
But if you take a firm like you name, a Lindt, you know, there’s a price at which we would buy stock in Lindt. There’s a price at which we’d buy the whole business. But it’s unlikely to be selling there.
但是，如果你考虑像你提到的公司，比如瑞士莲，你知道，我们会在某个价格买入瑞士莲的股票。我们也会在某个价格买下整个公司。但它不太可能以那个价格出售。
You know, the — if you think about hundreds and hundreds of wonderful companies — I get all these managers that — just got a CEO yesterday who called me — and they want to tell me about their business, and they imply their businesses — or they think — their business is the most attractive investment in the world.
你知道，如果你想想成百上千家优秀的公司——我接到所有这些经理的电话——昨天刚有一个首席执行官打电话给我——他们想告诉我他们的业务，他们暗示他们的业务——或者他们认为——他们的业务是世界上最有吸引力的投资。
It isn’t the most attractive investment in the world. There are thousands of possible investments. And, you know, the idea that all these managers are saying “Our stock is the most wonderful in the world” is crazy.
这不是世界上最有吸引力的投资。有成千上万种可能的投资。而且，你知道，所有这些经理都在说“我们的股票是世界上最好的”这个想法是疯狂的。
But it’s our job to look at hundreds of things and, in terms of marketable securities, buy what we think are the most attractive ones, among the ones we understand and like as a businesses.
但我们的工作是查看数百种事物，并在可出售证券方面，购买我们认为在我们理解和喜欢的业务中最有吸引力的那些。
And then occasionally we get the chance to buy an entire business. We never do that at a bargain price. It just doesn’t happen. People don’t do that. The stock market gives you bargain prices; individual owners won’t. But when we get a chance to do that at a fair price, we like doing it.
然后偶尔我们有机会收购整个企业。我们从来不会以便宜的价格这样做。这是不可能的。人们不会这样做。股市会给你便宜的价格；但个体业主不会。但是当我们有机会以合理的价格这样做时，我们喜欢这样做。
We love building Berkshire with a bunch of businesses with favorable long-term economic characteristics.
我们喜欢通过一系列具有良好长期经济特征的企业来建设伯克希尔。
But the chance that any one of them — you know, we aren’t going to look for a given confectionary company and say, “Regardless of price, we’re going to do this,” because we don’t do anything when the phrase “regardless of price” enters into the sentence.
但是，他们中任何一个的机会——你知道，我们不会去寻找某个特定的糖果公司并说：“不管价格如何，我们都要这样做，”因为当“无论价格如何”这句话进入句子时，我们什么都不做。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I watched a man build up a business in southern California, which was a wonderful business. And the time came to sell it — and he devoted his whole life to creating it — he sold it to a known crook who was obviously going to ruin the business just because he could get a slightly higher price.
查理·芒格：是的。我看到一个人在南加州建立了一家很棒的企业。到了出售的时候——他把一生都投入到创建这家企业中——他把它卖给了一个众所周知的骗子，这个骗子显然会毁掉这家企业，只是因为他能得到稍微高一点的价格。
I think that’s an insane way to live a life if you own a prosperous business. I think the better course is to sell to somebody you know is going to be a good steward of what you’ve created. (Applause.)
如果您拥有一个繁荣的企业，我认为这种生活方式是不理智的。我认为更好的做法是将公司卖给您知道会成为好管家的那个人。（掌声）
25. Dollar will probably weaken over time
美元可能会随着时间的推移而走弱
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 9, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请看第 9 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Johann Freudenberg (Ph) from Germany.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是约翰·弗洛伊登伯格（音），来自德国。
How would you, as a European investor that invests in U.S. equities, hedge the U.S. dollar risk? Thank you.
作为投资美国股票的欧洲投资者，您将如何对冲美元风险？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: How would I what?
沃伦·巴菲特：我会怎么做？
CHARLIE MUNGER: How do you hedge the U.S. dollar?
查理·芒格：你如何对冲美元？
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. Well, whether you’re thinking about starting in Germany and hedging the dollar risk of investing here or vice versa, we are happy to invest in businesses that earn their money in euros in Germany, or whether it’s there, or France, or Italy, or earn their money in sterling in the UK, because we do not have a feeling — at least I don’t have a feeling — that those currencies are likely to depreciate in a big way against the U.S. dollar.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦。无论您是考虑在德国开始投资并对冲美元风险，还是反之亦然，我们都乐于投资于在德国以欧元赚钱的企业，无论是在德国、法国、意大利，还是在英国以英镑赚钱的企业，因为我们没有感觉——至少我没有感觉——这些货币可能会对美元大幅贬值。
That would be how we would get hurt. We could offset that by borrowing the money in those countries and borrowing in their currency to make the purchases.
这就是我们会受到伤害的方式。我们可以通过在那些国家借钱并以他们的货币借款来进行购买，从而抵消这种影响。
But, overall, I think that the U.S. is going to continue to follow some policies that have made the dollar weaker in recent years.
但是，总的来说，我认为美国将继续执行一些近年来导致美元走弱的政策。
So if I had to bet my life one way or another over 10 years, I would probably bet that the dollar would weaken against other major currencies, and, therefore, I feel no need — if we buy companies whose earnings primarily arise elsewhere in major countries — I feel no need to try and hedge those purchases.
所以如果让我对未来十年做出预测，我可能会押注美元会相对于其他主要货币贬值。因此，如果我们购买那些主要在其他主要国家产生收益的公司，我觉得没有必要去对冲这些购买行为。
I mean, if I landed from Mars today with a billion of Mars dollars or whatever they call them on Mars, and I was thinking about where to put my money, you know, I went to the local — wherever my UFO landed — and went to the bank and said, “I’ve got this billion of Mars currency,” and they said, “Well, what would you like to exchange here?” I don’t think I’d put all the billion in U.S. dollars.
我的意思是，如果我今天从火星降落，带着十亿火星币或者他们在火星上称之为其他什么的货币，并且我在考虑把钱放在哪里，你知道，我去了当地——无论我的飞碟降落在哪里——然后去了银行，说：“我有这十亿火星货币，”他们说，“那么您想在这里兑换什么？”我想我不会把所有的十亿都换成美元。
So it doesn’t bother me to buy businesses around the world, unhedged in terms of their currency, and have a fair amount of our earnings coming from earnings that originate in other currencies and which I will convert at current rates to dollars at some time in the future.
所以，我不介意在全球范围内购买企业，不对其货币进行对冲，并且我们相当一部分的收益来自其他货币的收益，这些收益我将在未来某个时候按当时的汇率转换为美元。
If you take Coca-Cola — we own 200 million shares of Coca-Cola. And if their earnings are roughly $3 a share, that means our share of the earnings of Coca-Cola are $600 million a year.
如果你看可口可乐——我们拥有 2 亿股可口可乐的股票。如果他们的每股收益大约是 3 美元，这意味着我们在可口可乐的收益中每年有 6 亿美元。
And of those earnings of 600 million, you know, maybe close to 500 million will be from around the world — all different kinds of currencies.
在这 6 亿的收入中，可能接近 5 亿将来自世界各地——各种不同的货币。
Basically I like that. I think that that will be a net plus to us over time, and it certainly has been a net plus to us in recent years.
基本上我喜欢这样。我认为从长远来看，这对我们将是一个净增益，最近几年这对我们肯定是一个净增益。
So we are not in the business of hedging currencies, basically. We do not have a lot of hedges set up.
所以我们基本上不从事货币对冲业务。我们没有设置很多对冲。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格：没什么补充的。
26. Small stocks and mispriced bonds offer opportunities
小盘股和定价错误的债券提供了机会
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey. How you doing? I’m Eric Schleien from Larchmont, New York.
观众成员：嘿。你好吗？我是来自纽约拉奇蒙特的埃里克·施莱恩。
This is actually a follow-up question from a question that I asked last year at the meeting. I’d asked you guys, you know, what you would do with small sums of money since — you know, I run a small portfolio, under a million dollars.
这实际上是我去年在会议上提问的一个问题的后续问题。我曾问过你们，你们会如何处理小额资金，因为——你知道，我管理着一个小型投资组合，少于一百万美元。
And I asked you if you’d be doing things, you know, like the net-nets that Benjamin Graham used to talk about and, you know, liquidation arbitrage. You know, a lot of things you used to do at the Buffett Partnership.
我问你是否会做一些事情，比如本杰明·格雷厄姆过去常谈的净净值投资，还有清算套利。你知道的，很多你在巴菲特合伙公司时做的事情。
And you acknowledged that you wouldn’t be just a buy-and-hold investor, that you — as you are today — but we would be doing a lot of those transactions.
而且你承认你不会只是一个买入并持有的投资者，你——就像你今天一样——但我们会进行很多这样的交易。
And, Mr. Buffett, you also talked about how a lot of the investments you would do with under a million dollars would have nothing to do with stocks and would be with other types of securities, and you really don’t elaborate — neither of you really elaborated any more than that.
而且，巴菲特先生，您还谈到过，很多您会进行的投资在一百万美元以下的情况下与股票无关，而是与其他类型的证券有关，您并没有详细说明——你们两位都没有进一步详细说明。
So I guess I was wondering if you could elaborate a little bit more on how your investment strategy, you know, back then, you know, in reference to non-stock investments, would be different than your buy- and-hold strategy today?
所以我想知道您能否详细说明一下，当时您的投资策略，特别是非股票投资，与您今天的买入并持有策略有何不同？
So what kind of stuff would you be doing? Maybe you could give me a past example that you did in the ’50s and the ’60s. That would be great. Thank you. Appreciate it.
那么你会做些什么呢？也许你可以给我一个你在五六十年代做过的例子。那就太好了。谢谢。感激不尽。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if I work with small sums of money — and I’d be happy doing that — it would just open up thousands of possibilities to me.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果我处理小额资金——我会很乐意这样做——这将为我打开成千上万的可能性。
And you might very well — certainly we found very mispriced bonds, where we could come nowhere near buying a position of enough size in Berkshire to make a difference, but where it would have made a difference if you were working with a million dollars.
而且你很可能——我们确实发现了一些定价错误的债券，在伯克希尔我们无法买到足够规模的头寸以产生影响，但如果你是用一百万美元操作，那就会有所不同。
But it would be bonds. It would be stocks of both in the United States and elsewhere. We found them in Korea a few years ago that were ridiculously cheap.
但会是债券。会是美国和其他地方的股票。几年前我们在韩国发现它们非常便宜。
You know, you basically had to make very significant returns, but you couldn’t put big money on it.
你知道，你基本上必须获得非常可观的回报，但你不能投入大笔资金。
So it could be in stocks. It could be in bonds. It wouldn’t be in currencies with small amounts.
所以可能是在股票中，可能是在债券中，小额资金不会用于货币。
But, you know, I had a friend who used to buy tax liens — you know, Tom Knapp, he’s got some relatives here. An enterprising person can find a lot of different ways to make money.
但是，你知道，我有一个朋友过去常买税收留置权——你知道，汤姆·克纳普，他在这里有一些亲戚。一个有进取心的人可以找到很多不同的方法来赚钱。
You’ll find most of them will be in small stocks. If you’re working with small money, they’ll be in small stocks or in some specialized bond situations. Wouldn’t you say that, Charlie?
您会发现其中大部分是在小型股票上。如果您用小额资金，他们将会在小型股票或一些特定的债券情境中。查理，您会同意吗？
除非有迹象或者证据能成为伟大的企业，否则以这种方式投入时间和精力的机会成本很大。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：当然。（笑声）
27. Pandering politicians behave better in office
迎合选民的政客在任职期间表现更好
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 11 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Dr. Silber from the Infertility Center of St. Louis. And we feel that by making many, many babies, we’re doing the best we can to help salvage the solvency of Social Security. (Laughs)
观众成员：你好。我是来自圣路易斯不孕症中心的西尔伯博士。我们认为，通过生育许多许多婴儿，我们正在尽最大努力帮助挽救社会保障的偿付能力。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t pursue the logic of that too far. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会把这个逻辑推得太远。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We need someone to pay into the system, and with the demographic implosion that we’re facing and the current anti-immigration feeling, that this is the real cause of the Social Security dilemma that we’re facing. And it’s true in most of the developed world.
观众成员：我们需要有人为这个系统支付费用，而我们面临的人口崩溃和当前的反移民情绪，这才是我们面临的社会保障困境的真正原因。这在大多数发达国家都是如此。
But my question is, everybody is looking very closely at what you and Charlie are going to say at this meeting because there’s just a huge amount of confusion since the credit crisis, and I guess you’ve been through many, many years and decades of confusion.
但我的问题是，大家都在密切关注你和查理在这次会议上会说些什么，因为自信贷危机以来存在着大量的困惑，我想你们已经经历了许多年的困惑。
But everybody really wants to know what you think, because we have three candidates, one of whom I like, which I won’t mention, but all three of whom seem to be pandering to voters and not really demonstrating a profound understanding of economics.
但每个人都想知道你的看法，因为我们有三位候选人，其中一位我喜欢，我不会提及，但这三位似乎都在迎合选民，而没有真正展示出对经济学的深刻理解。
And we’re going to decrease interest rates to help the credit crisis, and we’re going to inject $180 billion as free gifts into the economy, and yet our dollar is down 50 percent, and we certainly don’t want a recession and all the misery that would bring.
我们将降低利率以帮助解决信贷危机，并将向经济体注入 1800 亿美元作为免费赠款，但我们的美元已经下跌了 50%，我们当然不希望出现衰退及其带来的所有痛苦。
But aren’t we going to eventually have a gigantic inflation here in the U.S.?
但我们最终不会在美国出现巨大的通货膨胀吗？
And so — in China, which is our major partner in this, the stock market has gone down and people are losing money because they’re worried about the U.S.
因此，在中国，作为我们在这方面的主要合作伙伴，股市下跌，人们因为担心美国而亏损。
So I’m wondering if you could just shed some words of wisdom on, if you were the presidential candidate — which I would like to see happen — what would be your position or your policy?
所以我想知道，如果您是总统候选人——我希望能看到这种情况发生——您会持有什么立场或政策，您能否分享一些智慧之言？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it was Bill Buckley that ran for mayor of New York, you know, 40 years ago or something like that, and they asked him what the first thing he would do if he were elected. He said, “I’d ask for a recount.” (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想是比尔·巴克利在40年前还是更早时竞选纽约市长，当时他们问他如果当选第一件事会做什么。他说：“我会要求重新计票。”（笑声）
It’s not an easy game. I think we have — just personally— I think we have three pretty good candidates this time — quite good candidates.
这不是一场简单的比赛。我认为我们有——就我个人而言——我认为这次我们有三个相当不错的候选人——相当好的候选人。
But I think that your comments about the pandering and all that, I’m afraid that’s just part of — if you have a very long political process, and you have people only generally willing to listen to ideas in fairly short form, and you’re trying to make the other candidates look bad one way or another — I think that the truth is you do get a lot of pandering in the policies that are proposed.
但我认为你关于迎合的评论，我担心这只是——如果你有一个非常漫长的政治过程，而人们通常只愿意以相当简短的形式听取意见，并且你试图以某种方式让其他候选人看起来很糟糕——我认为事实是，在所提出的政策中确实有很多迎合。
I think you have candidates that are pretty smart about economics. I happen to think two of the three are maybe a little smarter about economics than the third, but the third may be just as smart, too. They may just be forced into a different position.
我认为你有一些对经济学非常聪明的候选人。我碰巧认为其中两个可能在经济学方面比第三个更聪明一点，但第三个也可能同样聪明。他们可能只是被迫处于不同的位置。
You know, a political process is something that doesn’t lend itself to Douglas-Lincoln debates on the fine points of policy, and it’s a tough game.
你知道，政治进程并不适合道格拉斯-林肯式的政策辩论，这是一场艰难的游戏。
And I don’t — the one thing I think is I think they will behave better in office than on the stump. I think that’s true of all three of them, and I think — but I think that’s just built into the system.
我认为他们在办公室的表现会比在竞选时更好。我认为这对他们三个人都是如此，而且我认为这只是系统内在的。
We — you know, we have a country that works awfully well. You know, whether Warren Harding is in office or Franklin Pierce, or whatever it may be over the years.
我们——你知道，我们的国家运作得非常好。你知道，无论是沃伦·哈丁在任，还是富兰克林·皮尔斯，或者其他任何年份。
And it gets back to that saying I’ve said many times that you want to buy stock in a business that’s so good that an idiot can run it because sooner or later one will. (Laughter)
这让我想起我多次说过的一句话：你要买一家好到即使傻瓜也能经营的股票，因为迟早会有一个傻瓜来经营。（笑声）
And we live in a country, frankly, that is so good that your children and grandchildren will live a lot better than you live, even though an idiot or two runs it from time to time in between.
我们生活在一个非常好的国家，说实话，即使偶尔有一两个傻瓜管理它，你的子孙后代的生活也会比你过得好得多。
But we’ve got a lot better than idiots running. Believe me. I think we’ve got three very good candidates, and I wish — whichever one of them wins, I wish them well.
但我们有比傻瓜更好的人参选。相信我。我认为我们有三个非常优秀的候选人，我希望——无论他们中的哪一个获胜，我都祝他们好运。
You know, it’s the toughest job in the world, the most important job in the world, and I think the motivations of the people running it are a lot better sometimes than their proclamations as they go along in the political process.
你知道，这是世界上最艰难的工作，也是世界上最重要的工作，我认为那些从事这项工作的人们的动机有时比他们在政治过程中所做的宣言要好得多。
I think it’s very hard to run in Iowa without being for ethanol. You know, it may be — you may win some badge for courage or something in the end, but you won’t win the presidency.
我认为在爱荷华州竞选而不支持乙醇是非常困难的。你知道，最终你可能会因为勇气而获得某种徽章，但你不会赢得总统职位。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d like to address the recent turmoil and its relation to politics.
查理·芒格：嗯，我想谈谈最近的动荡及其与政治的关系。
After Enron totally shocked the nation with the gross amount of folly and misbehavior, our politicians passed Sarbanes-Oxley, and it has now turned out that they were shooting at an elephant with a pea shooter.
在安然公司以极大的愚蠢和不当行为震惊全国之后，我们的政客通过了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》，而现在看来，他们是在用豌豆射击大象。
And low and behold, we have a convulsion that makes Enron look like a tea party.
结果，我们遇到了一个让安然事件看起来像茶话会的动荡。
And I confidently predict that we will have changes in regulation and that they won’t work perfectly. (Laughter)
我有信心地预测，我们将会有监管方面的变化，但它们不会完美地运作。（笑声）
Human nature always has these incentives to rationalize and misbehave, and the learned professions very often fail in their basic responsibility to be learned. And we’re going to have this turmoil as far ahead as you can see.
人性总是有这些合理化和不当行为的动机，而所谓的学术职业往往未能履行其基本责任。可以预见，我们将继续经历这种动荡。
WARREN BUFFETT: But look at it this way: I have a job here I love. You know, I’d gladly pay to have this job.
沃伦·巴菲特：但从这个角度看：我在这里有一份我热爱的工作。你知道，我很乐意付钱来拥有这份工作。
Now, I have enough stock so that I’m reasonably assured of keeping the job, but let’s just assume for the moment that there are three other candidates out there, and none of us had any stock, and we were all up here making a pitch to you.
现在，我有足够的股份，所以可以合理地保证我能保住这份工作，但假设有三位其他候选人在这里，而我们都没有任何股份，我们都在这里向你们推销自己。
My answers might have been a little different today, you know, in terms of what Berkshire’s prospects would be under me and all that sort of thing going forward. It’s a corrupting process.
我的回答今天可能会有些不同，你知道的，关于伯克希尔在我领导下的前景以及未来的各种事情。这是一个腐化的过程。
Now, you know, it works pretty well, but the process itself has to be corrupting.
现在，你知道，它运作得相当好，但这个过程本身一定是腐化的。
Just take the boom in commodity prices we’ve had. We’ve had a boom in the price of oil, but we’ve had a boom in the price of corn and soybeans.
只要看看我们经历的商品价格繁荣。我们经历了石油价格的繁荣，但我们也经历了玉米和大豆价格的繁荣。
Now, I’ve heard no political candidate say you’ve had this huge increase in the price of corn and soybeans. That means all these poor people throughout the country, they’ll be paying more for food, so we ought to put an excess profits tax on farmers. That is not something you’re going to hear.
现在，我没有听到任何政治候选人说过玉米和大豆的价格大幅上涨。这意味着全国各地的穷人将支付更多的食物费用，所以我们应该对农民征收超额利润税。这不是你会听到的事情。
On the other hand, when it happens in oil and it happens to be Exxon, you know, people will propose occasionally we ought to put a terrible tax on Exxon because the price of oil has gone up.
另一方面，当这种情况发生在石油行业，并且恰好是埃克森美孚时，你知道，人们偶尔会提议我们应该对埃克森美孚征收重税，因为石油价格上涨了。
There’s a lot of situational ethics, or situational policymaking, that depends on how many voters there are in any given category and what state you happen to be in and all that. But I don’t think I’d behave any better.
有很多情境伦理或情境政策制定，这取决于在任何特定类别中有多少选民，以及你所在的州等等。但我不认为我会表现得更好。
If my ambition were to be President of the United States, you know, I would — I’m sure it would affect my — what I talked about and my behavior. You know, we’re all human beings.
如果我的志向是成为美国总统，你知道，我肯定会影响到我所谈论的内容和我的行为。你知道，我们都是人。
So I don’t condemn the people for the fact that when they, you know, are working 18 hours a day and the other guy is shooting at them and they start exaggerating things a little, I just don’t think you should expect more of human beings than — and I think that they will tend — I think any one of the three candidates — will tend to behave quite well in the White House.
所以我不谴责那些每天工作 18 小时、被别人攻击时开始有些夸大其词的人，我只是认为你不应该对人类有过高的期望——我认为他们会倾向于——我认为任何一个候选人——在白宫都会表现得相当好。
They’ll succumb to all the things that presidents do in terms of having to — certain groups that helped them get there and all that sort of thing. But I think, on balance, they will end up doing what they think is best for the country, and I think they’re all smart people.
他们会屈服于总统在某些方面必须做的事情，比如帮助他们上台的某些团体等等。但我认为，总的来说，他们最终会做他们认为对国家最好的事情，而且我认为他们都是聪明人。
28. “There will be no gap after my death”
“在我死后不会有空白”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12?
沃伦·巴菲特：第十二号？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is John Ebert (PH). I’m from Bremerton, Washington. I’m very pleased to see that both you and Charlie look so healthy, and I’m also glad to know that your goal is to work to at least 102 before you retire.
观众成员：我的名字是约翰·艾伯特（音）。我来自华盛顿州的布雷默顿。我很高兴看到您和查理看起来都很健康，也很高兴知道您的目标是在退休前至少工作到 102 岁。
I think your secret must be the Cherry Coke and the See’s Candy by evidence of what you’re doing on the screen there.
我想你的秘密一定是樱桃可乐和 See's 糖果，因为你在屏幕上所做的事情证明了这一点。
My question, obviously, deals with succession. At last year’s meeting, you spoke about your plan for your chief financial officer. Could you please update us on where you stand on succession?
我的问题显然与继任有关。在去年的会议上，您谈到了您对首席财务官的计划。您能否更新一下您在继任方面的进展情况？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve said, on the CEO front, we have three that any one of which could step in and do a better job than I do in many respects.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们已经说过，在首席执行官方面，我们有三个人，其中任何一个都可以在很多方面比我做得更好。
And the board is unanimous, I believe, in terms of knowing which one it would be if it were tomorrow morning, but that might be different two or three years from now.
而且我相信，董事会在知道如果是明天早上会是哪一个方面是一致的，但两三年后可能会有所不同。
I think in any event, when the time comes, they’ll want to pick somebody reasonably young, because I think, on balance, it’s good idea to have a long run at this job, and I think it aids in acquisition and being able to make promises to people about how their businesses will be treated and so on.
我认为无论如何，当时机到来时，他们会想选择一个相对年轻的人，因为我认为，总的来说，长期从事这项工作是个好主意，我认为这有助于获取资源，并能够向人们承诺他们的业务将如何被对待等等。
In terms of the investment officer, the board has four names. We’ve discussed the four. Any one or all of the four would be good at doing my job, probably better in some ways, and — but they all have good jobs now. They’re happy where they are now.
就投资经理而言，董事会有四个名字。我们已经讨论过这四个人。任何一个或全部四个人都能很好地胜任我的工作，可能在某些方面更好，而且——但他们现在都有不错的工作。他们对目前的工作感到满意。
They would — I think any one of the four would be here tomorrow if I died tonight and they were offered the job by the board. They’re all reasonably young. They’re all very well to do or rich, and compensation would not be a major factor with them.
他们会——我想如果我今晚去世，董事会向他们提供这份工作，他们四个人中的任何一个明天都会在这里。他们都相对年轻，都很富有或富裕，薪酬对他们来说不会是一个主要因素。
I think any of the four would take the job at less money than they’re making now, but there’s no reason for them to come now.
我认为他们中的任何一个都愿意以比现在更少的薪水接受这份工作，但没有理由现在就让他们这么做。
I would still end up making the decisions, and they would probably chafe at the idea of not being able to make the decisions.
我最终还是会做出决定，而他们可能会对无法做出决定的想法感到不满。
I actually worked for Ben Graham for a few years. And I loved the man enormously. I learned an amount from him. I named my older son, middle name, is after him.
我实际上为本·格雷厄姆工作了几年。我非常爱戴他。我从他那里学到了很多东西。我给我大儿子取的中间名就是以他的名字命名的。
But in the end, I wanted to make decisions, and I — if Ben Graham made them differently — you know, I actually prefer to make my own decisions. And anybody that manages money well is going to feel that way.
但最终，我想自己做决定，如果本·格雷厄姆做出了不同的决定——你知道，我实际上更喜欢自己做决定。任何管理好资金的人都会有这样的感觉。
So it’s just better in this case. It can happen tomorrow. It could happen five years from now. But whenever I’m not around to make the decisions, the board will decide whether to have one, two, three, or four of these people.
所以在这种情况下更好。它可能明天发生，也可能五年后发生。但无论何时我不在做决定时，董事会将决定是否有一、二、三或四个人。
They’ll decide — you know, they may decide to have four and divide it up four ways. They may decide to have only one. They will probably be heavily influenced by how the incoming CEO feels about exactly how he wants to work with a group or with one.
他们会决定——他们可能会决定四个人一起分工，也可能只选一个。他们可能会受到新任首席执行官的影响，因为他可能有自己关于如何与一个团队或一个人一起工作的想法。
And they’ll come. So there will not — there will be no — there will be no gap after my death in terms of having somebody managing the money, and they’ll probably be a lot more energetic than I am now.
他们会来的。所以在我去世后，不会有——不会有——不会有管理资金的空档期，而且他们可能会比我现在更有活力。
And they’ll — they could very easily have a much better record. Some of them have a much better recent record than I do.
他们——他们很可能会有更好的记录。其中一些人最近的记录比我好得多。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you know, we still have a rising young man here named Warren Buffett. And having — (Applause)
查理·芒格：嗯，你知道，我们这里还有一个年轻有为的人，名叫沃伦·巴菲特。而且——（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s the advantage of working with a guy 84. You always look young. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：这就是和一个 84 岁的人一起工作的好处。你总是显得年轻。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I think we want to encourage this rising young man to reach his full potential. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：我认为我们应该鼓励这位年轻人充分发挥他的潜力。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: One thing I should point out, with our average age being 80, people talk about aging managements. We haven’t found a management that isn’t aging. If we ever find them, we want to start eating what they eat.
沃伦·巴菲特：我应该指出的是，随着我们的平均年龄达到80岁，人们谈论衰老的管理层，但我们还没有发现不在变老的管理层。如果我们发现了，我们就会开始吃他们吃的东西。
And what I can point out about your management, since our average age is 80, we’re only aging at the age of 1 1/4 percent a year, and that is the lowest rate of aging that I know of in corporate America.
我可以指出，考虑到我们的平均年龄是80岁，我们的衰老速度只有每年1.25%，这是我所知的美国企业中最低的衰老速度。
I mean, some of these companies have 50-year-olds, and they’re aging at 2 percent a year, and just think how much riskier that is. (Laughter)
我的意思是，其中一些公司有 50 岁的人，他们每年老化 2%，想想这有多危险。（笑声）
29. “Diversification is for the know-nothing investor”
“多元化是为无知的投资者准备的”
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to 13.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 13 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Isaac Dimitrovski (PH) from New York City. Mr. Buffett, it’s great to be here.
观众成员：我是来自纽约市的艾萨克·迪米特罗夫斯基（音）。巴菲特先生，很高兴来到这里。
I’ve read that there were several times in your investing career when you were confident enough in one idea to put a lot of your money into it — say, 25 percent or more.
我读到在你的投资生涯中，有几次你对一个想法非常有信心，以至于将大量资金投入其中，比如 25%或更多。
I believe a couple of those cases were American Express and the Washington Post in the ’70s. And I’ve heard you discuss your thinking on those.
我相信其中有几个案例是 70 年代的美国运通和华盛顿邮报。我也听过您讨论这些案例。
But could you talk about any of the other times you’ve been confident enough to make such a big investment and what your thinking was in those cases?
但是，您能谈谈其他几次您有足够信心进行如此大投资的情况，以及在这些情况下您的想法是什么吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I have been confident enough — if we were only running our own net worth — I’m certain a very significant number of times, if you go over 50 years, there have been a lot of times when you would have put at least 75 percent of your net worth into an idea. Wouldn’t there, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我一直很有信心——如果我们只是在管理自己的净资产——我确信在过去的 50 年里，有很多次你会把至少 75%的净资产投入到一个想法中。不是吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but 75 percent of your worth outside Berkshire has never been a very significant amount.
查理·芒格：是的，但是75%的净资产在伯克希尔之外从未是一个非常重要的数额。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. Well, I’m going back — let’s just assume it was. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不。好吧，我要回去——就假设是这样吧。（笑声）
Let’s just assume you didn’t have Berkshire in the picture. There have been times — I mean, we’ve seen all kinds of ideas we would have put 75 percent of our net worth in.
假设你没有伯克希尔在其中。有时候——我的意思是，我们见过各种各样的想法，我们会把 75%的净资产投入其中。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, there have been times in my life when I’ve had more than a hundred percent of my net worth invested in things.
查理·芒格：沃伦，我人生中有些时候，我的净资产有超过百分之百都投资在一些事情上。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s because you had a friendly banker; I didn’t. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：那是因为你有一个友好的银行家；我没有。（笑声）
That — there have been times — well, initially, I had 70 — several times I had 75 percent of my net worth in one situation.
那——有些时候——嗯，最初，我有 70——好几次我有 75%的净资产在一个情况下。
There are situations you will see over a long period of time. I mean, you will see things that it would be a mistake — if you’re working with smaller sums — it would be a mistake not to have half your net worth in.
有些情况是你会在很长一段时间内看到的。我的意思是，你会看到一些事情，如果你在处理较小的金额时，不把你一半的净资产投入进去将是一个错误。
没有确定相信的东西。
I mean, there — you really do, sometimes in securities, see things that are lead-pipe cinches. And you’re not going to see them often and they’re not going to be talking about them on television or anything of the sort, but there will be some extraordinary things happen in a lifetime where you can put 75 percent of your net worth or something like that in a given situation.
我的意思是，有时在证券中，你确实会看到一些十拿九稳的事情。你不会经常看到它们，也不会在电视上或类似的地方谈论它们，但在一生中会发生一些非凡的事情，在某种情况下你可以投入你净资产的 75%或类似的比例。
The problem has been the guys that have put 500 percent of their net worth in. You know, I mean, if you look at — just take LTCM. Very smart guys. Very decent guys. Some friends of mine. High grade. Knew their business.
问题是那些投入500%净资产的人。比如长期资本管理公司（LTCM），他们都是非常聪明的人，都是我的一些朋友，高素质，精通他们的业务。
But they put, you know, maybe 25 times their net worth into things that were a cinch, if they hadn’t have gone in that heavily. I mean, they were in things that had to converge, but they didn’t get to play out the hand.
但是他们投入了，也许是他们净资产的 25 倍到那些本来是十拿九稳的事情上，如果他们没有投入那么多的话。我的意思是，他们参与的事情本来是一定会成功的，但他们没有机会完成。
But if they’d have had a hundred percent of their net worth in them, it would have worked out fine. If they would have had 200 percent of their net worth in it, it would have worked out fine. But they instead went to, you know, maybe 2500 percent or something like that.
但是如果他们将百分之百的净资产投入其中，那会很好。如果他们将百分之二百的净资产投入其中，那也会很好。但他们却投入了，比如说，可能是百分之二千五百或类似的比例。
So there are stocks — I mean, actually, there’s quite a few people in this room that have close to a hundred percent of their net worth in Berkshire, and some of them have had it for 40 or more years.
所以有些股票——我的意思是，实际上，这个房间里有相当多的人，他们的净资产几乎百分之百都在伯克希尔，而且其中一些人已经持有了 40 年或更长时间。
Berkshire was not in a cinch category. It was in the strong probability category, I think.
伯克希尔不属于铁定成功的类别。我认为它属于强概率类别。
But I saw things in 2002 in the junk bond field. I saw things in the equity markets.
在2002年，我在垃圾债券领域看到了机会。我在股票市场上看到了机会。
If you could have bought Cap Cities with Tom Murphy running it in the early — in 1974, it was selling at a third or a fourth what the properties were worth and you had the best manager in the world running the place and you had a business that was pretty damn good even if the manager wasn’t.
如果你能在 1974 年由汤姆·墨菲管理的情况下购买 Cap Cities，当时它的售价仅为其资产价值的三分之一或四分之一，而你拥有世界上最好的经理来管理这个地方，即使没有这个经理，这也是一个相当不错的业务。
You could have put a hundred percent of your net worth in there and not worry. You could put a hundred percent of your net worth in Coca-Cola, earlier than when we bought it, but certainly around the time we bought it, and that would not have been a dangerous position.
你本可以把你百分之百的净资产放在那里而不用担心。你可以在我们购买之前就把百分之百的净资产投入可口可乐，但至少在我们购买的时候，这样做并不是一个危险的选择。
It would be far more dangerous to do a whole bunch of other things that brokers were recommending to people.
这样做的风险远远低于经纪人向人们推荐的其他许多东西。
Charlie, do you want to —?
查理，您想说些什么吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. If you — students of America go to these elite business schools and law schools and they learn corporate finance the way it’s now taught and investment management the way it’s now taught.
查理·芒格：是的。如果美国的学生去这些精英商学院和法学院，他们会按照现在的教学方式学习公司金融和投资管理。
And some of these people write articles in the newspaper and other places and they say, “Well, the whole secret of investment is diversification.” That’s the mantra.
有些人在报纸和其他地方写文章，他们说：“投资的全部秘诀就是多元化。” 这就是他们的口头禅。
They’ve got it exactly back-ass-ward. The whole secret of investment is to find places where it’s safe and wise to non-diversify. It’s just that simple.
他们完全搞反了。投资的整个秘诀在于找到那些安全且明智的不分散投资的地方。就是这么简单。
Diversification is for the know-nothing investor; it’s not for the professional.
多元化是为无知的投资者准备的；它不适合专业人士。
WARREN BUFFETT: And there’s nothing wrong with the know-nothing investor practicing it. It’s exactly what they should practice. It’s exactly what a good professional investor should not practice. But that’s — you know, there’s no contradiction in that.
沃伦·巴菲特：对于一无所知的投资者来说，实践这种方法没有任何问题。这正是他们应该实践的。正是一个好的专业投资者不应该实践的。但这——你知道，这并不矛盾。
It — a know-nothing investor will get decent results as long as they know they’re a know-nothing investor, diversify as to time they purchase their equities, and as to the equities they purchase. That’s crazy for somebody that really knows what they’re doing.
一个一无所知的投资者只要知道自己是一无所知的投资者，并在购买股票的时间和所购买的股票上进行多元化，就会获得不错的结果。对于真正知道自己在做什么的人来说，这很疯狂。
And you will find opportunities that, if you put 20 percent of your net worth in it, you’ll have wasted the opportunity of a lifetime, you know, in terms of not really loading up.
你会发现一些机会，如果你只投入净资产的 20%，那就浪费了一生的机会，因为你没有真正地全力以赴。
And we’ve had the chance to do that, way, way in our past, when we were working with small sums of money. We’ll never get a chance to do that working with the kinds of money that Berkshire does.
我们曾有机会在很久很久以前做到这一点，那时我们处理的是小额资金。处理伯克希尔那样的大额资金时，我们永远没有机会做到这一点。
We try to load up on things. And there will be markets when we get a chance to from time to time, but very seldom do we get to buy as much of any good idea as we would like to.
我们尽量多囤积一些东西。我们会在有机会的时候去市场，但我们很少能买到我们想要的那么多好主意。
30. Parents Television Council and appropriate ads
家长电视委员会和适当的广告
WARREN BUFFETT: Go to number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：去第一位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Charlie. I’m Father Val Peter.
观众成员：早上好，主席先生和查理。我是瓦尔·彼得神父。
For 25 years I was lucky to be head of Boys Town. Expanded across the whole country. Warren was very kind to me, very helpful, over long periods of time.
在过去的 25 年里，我很幸运能担任Boys Town的负责人。业务扩展到全国各地。沃伦对我非常友好，在很长一段时间里给予了很大帮助。
What I represent today is Parents Television Council, where 1.2 million folks across the country, and our concern is to help keep toxicity off television programs — excessive violence, et cetera.
今天我代表的是家长电视委员会，全国有120万人加入我们的组织，我们的关注点是帮助电视节目远离有毒内容——过度暴力等。
And I was very surprised, being on a parents television council board, when I read a report — I hope it’s not true, but it might be — that says that of the best and most troublesome advertisers, Berkshire Hathaway, is near the bottom at 444 out of 452. I hope that’s not true.
我非常惊讶，当我在一个家长电视委员会时，读到一份报告——我希望这不是真的，但可能是——说在最佳和最麻烦的广告商中，伯克希尔·哈撒韦在 452 个中排名第 444 位。我希望这不是真的。
But my point is this: when I was head of Boys Town and somebody said something like that, I’d say, “Go find out. Correct it.” My question is would you be kind enough to say, “Go find out,” if it’s necessary, “Correct it.” Thank you.
但我的意思是：当我负责Boys Town时，如果有人说了那样的话，我会说：“去查明情况。纠正它。”我的问题是，如果有必要的话，您能否好心地说：“去查明情况，纠正它。”谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say this: I don’t know where the rankings come from. I mean, I see the — certainly by far our biggest advertiser would be GEICO.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会这样说：我不知道这些排名是从哪里来的。我的意思是，我看到的——当然我们最大的广告商无疑是 GEICO。
We spend over $700 million a year on advertising. I see their ads all over the place, and, you know, I don’t regard them as offensive or inducing antisocial behavior or anything like that.
我们每年在广告上花费超过 7 亿美元。我到处都能看到他们的广告，而且，你知道，我并不认为这些广告具有攻击性或引发反社会行为或类似的东西。
But I would be glad for you to contact Tony Nicely because I can’t think of any other company at Berkshire that does, remotely, the amount of advertising. And Tony is an easy fellow — he’s here now, actually, but you could write him at GEICO or you could find him at the GEICO booth, probably, later in the day and just talk to him about that. I’d be glad to have you do that, Father Peter.
不过，我很高兴你能联系托尼·奈斯利，因为我想不出伯克希尔的其他公司有做过如此大量的广告。托尼是个很好相处的人——实际上他现在就在这里，但你可以写信给他，或者你可以在今天晚些时候在 GEICO 展台找到他，直接和他谈谈。我很高兴你能这样做，彼得神父。
31. Diversification, IRAs, and brokerage accounts
多元化、个人退休账户和经纪账户
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Deb Caviello, (PH) and I’m from Windsor, New Jersey.
观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我的名字是 Deb Caviello，我来自新泽西州温莎。
I’m 45-years-old and have achieved financial independence in that I’m able to manage the money of my spouse and myself full time. And that goes to marrying well, part of that. I was —
我今年 45 岁，已经实现了财务独立，因为我能够全职管理我和我配偶的资金。这部分归功于我嫁得好。我是——
WARREN BUFFETT: That can be a big part of it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：这可能是其中很大一部分。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Marrying well in the sense that I received the encouragement and the confidence to pursue that.
观众成员：在我得到鼓励和信心去追求这一点的意义上，嫁得好。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s terrific.
沃伦·巴菲特：那太棒了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was going to ask you a question more along the lines of diversification, but I think I will put it this way. I’ll skew it a little differently.
观众成员：我本来想问一个关于多元化的问题，但我想我会这样表达。我会稍微改变一下。
Each of us has a traditional IRA, a Roth IRA, and together we have a brokerage account. Should the assets in those accounts be separated or better managed as a whole pile?
我们每个人都有一个传统 IRA，一个 Roth IRA，并且我们一起有一个经纪账户。那些账户中的资产应该分开管理还是作为一个整体更好地管理？
In other words, have overlapping securities in each account or different types of securities relegated to a specific account?
换句话说，每个账户中都有重叠的证券，还是将不同类型的证券分配到特定账户中？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I would say your marriage sounds like it’s going to last, so I think you should think of yourself and your husband as a unit.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我会说你的婚姻听起来会长久，所以我认为你应该把自己和你的丈夫看作一个整体。
And I would — you should — in my view, you should look at your overall financial condition and not worry about where the location of the assets will be.
在我看来，你应该关注你的整体财务状况，而不必担心资产的位置。
So if you have a net worth of X and you have 20 percent of it in a 401(k) and 30 percent outright and so on like that, just look at the whole picture and decide what mix of assets, what type of assets you want, and don’t treat them as being in separate pots.
所以，如果你的净资产为 X，其中 20%在 401(k)账户中，30%是直接持有的，等等，看看整体情况，决定你想要什么样的资产组合，什么类型的资产，不要把它们视为分开的部分。
I mean, at Berkshire, you know, we own stocks in a whole bunch of different — our insurance companies own stocks in separate portfolios and we even have a portfolio in Cologne as mentioned earlier.
我的意思是，在伯克希尔，你知道，我们拥有一大堆不同的股票——我们的保险公司在不同的投资组合中持有股票，正如之前提到的，我们甚至在科隆也有一个投资组合。
I don’t even think about what entity anything is in. You know, it’s all working for Berkshire, and I think you should — the way to think about your situation is to think about it all working for your family.
我甚至不考虑任何事物属于哪个实体。你知道，这一切都是为伯克希尔工作，我认为你应该——思考你情况的方法是把它看作是为你的家庭工作。
Now, if you’re — you strike me as having a very solid marriage, and I think your husband would be crazy if he split with you. But the — if you’re just starting out, you may want to keep your money separate for a while until you see how it plays out, because a significant percentage do end up in divorce.
现在，如果你——你给我的印象是有一个非常稳固的婚姻，我认为如果你丈夫和你分开，那他就是疯了。但如果您刚刚开始，您可能想把钱分开管理一段时间，看看情况如何，因为有相当一部分婚姻最终会离婚。
Listen, I don’t get into marriage counseling very often. (Laughter)
听着，我不经常参与婚姻咨询。（笑声）
But I can feel the ground sort of disappearing between my feet here. But I will turn it over, therefore, to our marital expert, Charlie Munger. (Laughter)
但我能感觉到脚下的地面有点消失了。因此，我将把它交给我们的婚姻专家，查理·芒格。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Occasionally, you’ll find an investment that is going to produce a huge amount of taxable income. It’s a junk bond paying a high yield that’s taxable or something.
查理·芒格：是的。有时，你会发现一项投资会产生大量的应税收入。比如一个支付高收益的垃圾债券，这种收益是应税的，或者类似的东西。
So some items are more suitable for those retirement accounts that get tax-deferral benefits. But apart from that, it’s all one pot. Sure.
所以有些项目更适合那些享受税收递延优惠的退休账户。但除此之外，所有的都是一个整体。当然。
32. Eventually power will have to come from the sun
最终，能源将不得不来自太阳
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. I’m Doug Hicks (PH) from Akron, Ohio. And you hear on the news lately a lot of people say that oil will run out during this century.
观众成员：嗨，沃伦。我是来自俄亥俄州阿克伦的道格·希克斯（音）。最近你在新闻中听到很多人说石油将在本世纪耗尽。
Considering the U.S. policy is to do nothing until the very last second, how do you think the end of oil will play out?
考虑到美国的政策通常是在最后一刻才采取行动，您认为石油耗尽的结果会如何？
For example, do you think that this would, unfortunately, result in World War III? Or do you think alternative energy will be available, the day that oil runs out, to take its place?
例如，你认为这会不幸导致第三次世界大战吗？或者你认为在石油耗尽的那一天，替代能源会出现以取代它吗？
And maybe, do you think these oil companies’ value will go to zero when oil runs out?
你认为当石油耗尽时，这些石油公司的价值会归零吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Oil won’t run out. It doesn’t work that way.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。石油不会耗尽。事情不是那样运作的。
What oil will do at some point — who knows when — people predict a lot of different things — oil at some point, daily productive capacity throughout the world will first level off and then start declining very gradually.
石油在某个时候会发生什么——谁知道什么时候——人们预测了很多不同的事情——石油在某个时候，全球的日常生产能力将首先趋于平稳，然后开始非常逐渐地下降。
The nature of oil extraction is such that wells don’t — with rare exceptions — they don’t go to a given point producing a hundred barrels a day and then all of a sudden quit or anything like that. So you run into this depletion aspect and get into decline curves and that sort of thing.
石油开采的性质使得油井不会——除了少数例外——达到某个点每天生产一百桶，然后突然停止。所以您会遇到这种枯竭问题，进入衰退曲线等。
So we won’t — we’re producing in the world, 86 or 87 million barrels a day of oil, which is more than we’ve ever produced before.
所以我们不会——我们每天在全球生产 8600 万或 8700 万桶石油，这比我们以前生产的任何时候都多。
We are closer — by at least my calculations — we are very much closer to producing almost as much as our productive ability is in the world, with fields in their current stage of development, than we’ve ever been.
根据我的计算，我们非常接近生产力的上限，比以往任何时候都接近。
I mean, our surplus capacity, I think, is less than, well, any time I can remember. And it’s quite a bit less than most periods.
我的意思是，我认为我们的剩余产能比我记忆中的任何时候都要少。而且比大多数时期要少得多。
So we don’t have the ability to crank up, in any short period of time, the 86 or 7 to a hundred million barrels a day.
因此，我们没有能力在短时间内将日产量从8600万或8700万桶增加到1亿桶。
But whatever that peak will be, and whether we hit it five years from now or 50 years from now, and then it will just gradually taper down, and the world will adjust to it, and hopefully we’ll be thinking about it, you know, well before it happens, and various adjustments will be made in the world that will cause the demand to somewhat taper down as the available supply.
但无论那个峰值是什么，无论我们是在五年后还是五十年后达到它，然后它将逐渐减少，世界将适应它，并且希望我们在它发生之前就已经考虑到了，并且世界上会做出各种调整，这将导致需求随着可用供应的减少而有所下降。
But we will be producing oil far beyond this century. It’s just — the question is whether we’re producing 50 million barrels a day, or 75 million, or 25 million barrels a day. I don’t know the answer to that.
但我们将在本世纪之后继续生产石油。只是——问题在于我们每天生产 5000 万桶、7500 万桶，还是 2500 万桶。我不知道答案。
There’s a lot of oil in place in the world. We’ve messed up the recovery of a lot of the oil. I mean, we never recovered the, you know, the total potential of fields. And some fields we’ve mis-engineered in ways so that we will recover a very small percentage. Now, maybe there will be better engineering, tertiary recovery, and that sort of thing in the future.
世界上有很多石油储量。我们在石油开采方面做得很糟糕。我的意思是，我们从未完全开发油田的全部潜力。有些油田由于我们的错误设计，导致我们只能回收很小的百分比。也许将来会有更好的工程技术、三次采油等方法。
It’s nothing like an on and off switch, though, in terms of the world producing oil or adjusting to reduced capacity or anything like that.
不过，这并不像一个开关那样简单，无论是从世界生产石油的角度，还是适应产能减少或其他类似情况。
You may still have enormous political considerations to — access to the available oil — because it’s going to be so darn important to our society for so long.
你可能仍然需要考虑巨大的政治因素——获取可用的石油——因为它在很长一段时间内对我们的社会将是极其重要的。
There’s nothing we can do, in any short period of time, that will wean the world off of oil. You know, that is a fact of life.
在短时间内，我们无法做任何事情来让世界摆脱对石油的依赖。这是生活的事实。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we get another 200 years of economic growth pretty well disbursed over the world, while the population of the world also goes up, all of the oil, coal, natural gas, and uranium reserves of the world are like nothing.
查理·芒格：如果我们在未来200年继续经济增长，同时世界人口也在增长，那么世界上的所有石油、煤炭、天然气和铀储量就显得微不足道了。
So eventually, of course, you have to use the sun. There is no other alternative. And I think we can confidently predict that there will be some pain in this process of adjusting to a different world.
所以最终，当然，你必须使用太阳能。没有其他选择。我认为我们可以有信心地预测，在适应一个不同的世界的过程中会有一些痛苦。
Personally, I think it’s extremely stupid to use up the hydrocarbon reserves of the world as fast as we are.
就我个人而言，我认为以我们这样的速度耗尽世界的碳氢化合物储备是极其愚蠢的。
I don’t think we’ve got any good substitutes for those things as chemical feed stocks, and I think it’s perfectly crazy to use up something so precious for which you have no alternative that’s sure to be available.
我认为我们没有任何好的替代品来作为这些东西的化学原料，而且我认为用掉如此珍贵的东西是完全疯狂的，因为你没有确定可用的替代品。
And if you look at it backwards, what should we have done? Hell, we should have bought all the oil in the ’30s in the Middle East and take it over here by tankers and put it in our own ground.
如果你倒过来看，我们本该怎么做？见鬼，我们本该在 30 年代买下中东所有的石油，用油轮运到这里，放在我们自己的土地上。
I mean, it’s obvious to see what should have been done in the past.
我的意思是，很明显过去应该做些什么。
Even though that’s obvious, are we doing the equivalent of that now? And the answer is, basically, no.
即使这一点很明显，我们现在有没有做类似的事情？答案基本上是否定的。
So I think the governmental policy tends to be way behind in terms of rationality. And I think we’ll just have to soldier through. But eventually the — if we’re going to have a prosperous civilization — we have no other alternative than the sun.
所以我认为政府政策在理性方面往往滞后。我认为我们只能坚持下去。但最终，如果我们要拥有一个繁荣的文明，我们别无选择，只能依靠太阳。
WARREN BUFFETT: What’s your over-under figure for 25 years from now, world production oil per day?
沃伦·巴菲特：你认为 25 年后全球石油日产量的预估值是多少？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Down. 查理·芒格：下跌。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）
That’s not an insignificant prediction. I mean, it — believe me. If oil production is down 25 years from now, it will be a different world.
这不是一个无关紧要的预测。我的意思是，相信我。如果 25 年后石油产量下降，世界将会有所不同。
I mean, you — China’s going to sell over 10 million cars this year. I mean, the demand is going to keep — even at these prices — it’s hard for me to imagine demand falling off a lot. So if production falls off, you’ll have some interesting consequences.
您知道，中国今年将销售超过1000万辆汽车。即使在这些价格下，我也很难想象需求会大幅下降。因此，如果产量下降，会产生一些有趣的后果。
33. Higher taxes for the superrich under Pres. Buffett
巴菲特总统对超级富豪征收更高的税款
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Guy Pope, and I’m from Portland, Oregon.
观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我叫盖伊·波普，来自俄勒冈州波特兰。
I enjoyed the cartoon this morning, and I’d like to expand on that.
今天早上我很喜欢那部动画片，我想对此进行进一步的探讨。
I, too, like the idea of both of you serving as a single term as the President of the United States. During — hypothetically, let’s say, Mr. Buffett, you served the first term; Mr. Munger, you served a second term.
我也喜欢你们两人分别担任一届美国总统的想法。假设，巴菲特先生，您担任第一届；芒格先生，您担任第二届。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think the other way around is better, but go ahead. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为反过来更好，不过请继续。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Each of you please name three difficult policy decisions you would implement during your term to better the country.
观众成员：请你们每个人列出三项在任期内为改善国家而实施的艰难政策决策。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie is going to serve the first term, so I’m going to let him name his three.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理将担任第一任期，所以我让他先说他的三个决策。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think that one takes us so far afield that I think it’s asking too much. Three perfect solutions to the major problem of mankind from each of us in a few minutes?
查理·芒格：我认为这个问题太过偏离主题，我觉得这要求太高了。让我们每个人在几分钟内提出三个完美的解决方案来解决人类的主要问题？
We’ve just barely managed to stagger through life as well as we have, and I don’t think we’re quite up to it. (Laughter)
我们只是勉强地度过了生活，我觉得我们还没有完全准备好。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We’d probably have a massive federal program for retirement homes, actually. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，我们可能会有一个大规模的联邦退休之家的计划。（笑声）
I would probably do something about the tax system that would change things so that the superrich paid a little more and the middle class paid a little less, but — (Applause.)
我可能会对税收制度做一些改变，让超级富豪多付一点，中产阶级少付一点，但是——（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: That might be why you’d prefer to have Charlie serve first.
沃伦·巴菲特：这可能就是为什么你们更愿意让查理先担任的原因。
34. Munger: Ethanol is “monstrously dumb”
芒格：乙醇是“极其愚蠢的”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：第五位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Ryan Johnson (PH) from Arizona, and I wanted to ask what you think about the food shortages in the world and what trends you see in the next decade or two?
观众成员：你好。我是来自亚利桑那州的瑞安·约翰逊（PH），我想问一下您对世界粮食短缺的看法，以及您在未来十年或二十年中看到的趋势是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, again, I’m no expert on that. Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对此不是专家。查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I said last year that I thought that the policy of turning American corn into motor fuel was one of the dumbest ideas, in terms of the future of the world — (applause) — that I’d ever seen.
查理·芒格：嗯，我去年说过，我认为美国把玉米转化为汽车燃料的政策是我见过的关于世界未来最愚蠢的想法之一——（掌声）——。
I came out here with the head of an academic institution, and he called the idea stunningly stupid.
我来这里时，同行的是一个学术机构的负责人，他称这个想法“惊人地愚蠢”。
Now, I’m here in Nebraska where I like Nebraskans to prosper. But this idea was so monstrously dumb that I think it’s probably on its way out.
现在，我在内布拉斯加州，我希望内布拉斯加州人繁荣。但这个想法太愚蠢了，我认为它可能即将消失。
35. Amateurs should stick with low-cost index funds
业余投资者应坚持低成本指数基金
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve now — oh, no. We’ve got time for a couple more. Let’s go to number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们现在——哦，不。我们还有时间再问几个问题。让我们看看第 6 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Timothy Ferriss. I am a guest lecturer at Princeton University twice a year. And I’d like to touch on an earlier question about investing with small sums of money.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是蒂莫西·费里斯。我每年两次在普林斯顿大学担任客座讲师。我想谈谈之前关于用小额资金投资的问题。
I’d like to ask both of you, if you were 30-years-old again and had your first million in the bank, how would you invest it, assuming you’re not a full-time investor, you have another full-time job, you can cover your expenses with other savings for about 18 months, no dependents, and it would be really helpful for my students, for myself and others here, if you could be as specific as possible about asset classes, percentages, whatever you’re willing to offer. (Crowd noises)
我想问你们两位，如果你们再次回到30 岁，并且在银行有第1个100万，你们会如何投资，假设你们不是全职投资者，还有另一份全职工作，可以用其他储蓄支付大约 18 个月的开支，没有抚养人，如果你们能尽可能具体地谈论资产类别、百分比或任何你们愿意提供的信息，这对我的学生、我自己和在场的其他人会非常有帮助。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll be very simple: I — under the conditions you name, I’d probably have it all in a very low-cost index fund, and it would probably be — you know might be Vanguard — somebody I knew was reliable, somebody where the cost was low.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会很简单：在你提到的条件下，我可能会把所有资金投入一个非常低成本的指数基金，可能是——你知道的，可能是先锋基金——我认识的可靠的人，成本低的地方。
And because you postulated that you’re not going to become a professional investor, I would recognize the fact that I’m an amateur investor, and I would feel that a — unless bought during a strong bull market, which this hasn’t been — I would feel that that was going to outperform, to a degree, bonds, under current conditions over a long period of time, and then I’d forget it and go back to work.
因为你假设自己不会成为专业投资者，我会承认自己是一个业余投资者，并且我会觉得，除非是在强劲的牛市中购买的，而这并不是如此，我会觉得在当前条件下，长期来看，这将会在一定程度上跑赢债券，然后我会忘掉它，回去工作。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s in the nature of things that you aren’t going to have a whole lot of screamingly successful professional investors.
查理·芒格：是的。事情的本质就是你不会有很多极其成功的职业投资者。
You’ve got a great horde of professionals taking croupiers profits out of the system, most of them by pretending to be professional investors, and that is in the nature of things, too.
你有一大群专业人士从系统中获取庄家的利润，其中大多数人假装是专业投资者，这也是事物的本质。
But if you don’t have any rational prospects of being a very skilled professional investor, of course you should compromise on some simple thing like an index fund.
但是，如果你没有成为非常熟练的专业投资者的合理前景，你当然应该在指数基金这样简单的事情上妥协。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And that — you will not get that advice from anybody because nobody gets paid to give you that advice.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且——你不会从任何人那里得到这样的建议，因为没有人会因为给你这样的建议而得到报酬。
So you will have all kinds of people telling you how much better they can do for you than that, and how if you just give them a wrap fee, or give them commissions, or whatever it may be, that they will do better, but they won’t do better.
所以会有各种各样的人告诉你，他们能为你做得比那更好，并且如果你给他们一个管理费，或者给他们佣金，或者其他什么，他们会做得更好，但他们不会做得更好。
On average, you know, if a thousand other people like you do the same thing, that group of a thousand will do worse if they listen to the people that make pitches at them.
你知道，平均而言，如果有一千个像你这样的人，那么如果他们听那些向他们推销的人，这一千人的表现会更糟。
And in the end, why should you expect — I mean, you’ve got a very perfectly decent return over a 30- or 40-year period by doing what I suggest.
最后，为什么您应该期望得到更多呢？通过我建议的方式，您在30年或40年的时间内可以得到非常体面的回报。
And why should you expect more than that when you don’t bring anything to the party? The salesman will tell you that you’ll get it, but you won’t.
而当您没有带任何专业知识来投资时，为什么要期望得到更多呢？销售人员会告诉您会有更好的回报，但事实并非如此。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would give you another word of warning: do not judge stockbrokers generally by the ones you meet at this meeting. We attract some of the most honorable, intelligent stockbrokers in the world. They are not representative of the class.
查理·芒格：我会给你另一个警告：不要根据你在这个会议上遇到的股票经纪人来判断股票经纪人。我们吸引了一些世界上最有声望、最聪明的股票经纪人。他们并不代表这个群体。
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) The politician in him just came out
沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）他政治家的那一面刚刚显露出来了。
36. No “extreme frugality” but don’t spend more than you make
不要“极端节俭”，但不要花超过你赚的钱。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll do one more, and then we’ll break for lunch. Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们再做一个，然后我们就去吃午饭。第 7 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Tim Fam (PH). I’m from Austin, Texas.
观众成员：早上好。我的名字是蒂姆·范（音）。我来自德克萨斯州奥斯汀。
For my children, I would like to hear from both of you as far as the temptation to keeping up with the Joneses.
对于我的孩子们，我想听听你们两位关于与邻居攀比的诱惑的看法。
And can you give them advice that they can live by with respect to frugality, debt, and work ethic?
你能给他们一些关于节俭、债务和职业道德的生活建议吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Just tell them to keep up with the Buffetts. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。就告诉他们跟上巴菲特的步伐。（笑声）
Well, Charlie and I have always been big fans of living within your income, and if you do that, you’ll have a whole lot more income later on.
嗯，查理和我一直是量入为出的忠实拥护者，如果你这样做，以后你会有更多的收入。
And, you know, it — I think they will, to a considerable extent, not a perfect extent, they will follow the example of their parents.
我认为，孩子们在很大程度上会效仿他们父母的榜样，虽然不是百分之百，但影响是显而易见的。
I mean, if their parents are coveting, you know, every possession of their neighbor, you know, or trying to figure out ways to increase their cost of living without necessarily their standard of living, the kids are likely to pick up on it.
我的意思是，如果他们的父母在觊觎邻居的每一件财物，或者试图想办法增加他们的生活成本而不一定提高生活水平，孩子们很可能会注意到这一点。
But now you can get the reverse effect. If you get too tough with them, they go crazy later on. (Laughs)
但也可能会产生相反的效果，如果您对他们太苛刻，他们后来会变得非常疯狂。（笑声）
But the — it’s — people make that election.
但是——这是——人们做出的选择。
Incidentally, there are people — there are plenty of people that I don’t advise to save.
顺便说一下，有些人——有很多人我不建议去拯救。
I mean, the real — if you’re struggling along and making a reasonable income and you have a job with a 401(k) being put aside for you, and you have Social Security, who’s to say whether it’s better to defer a dollar of expenditure on your family on a trip to Disneyland or something that they’ll get enormous enjoyment out of so that when you’re 75 you can have a, you know, 30-foot boat instead of a 20-foot boat?
我的意思是，真正的——如果你在努力工作并获得合理的收入，并且你有一份工作为你存入 401(k)，还有社会保障，谁能说推迟花费1美元在家庭旅行上，比如去迪士尼乐园，或者其他能让他们获得巨大乐趣的事情，是否更好，以便当你 75 岁时，你可以拥有一艘 30 英尺的船而不是 20 英尺的船呢？
I mean, there are choices and there are advantages to spending money in various forms for your family when it’s young, and giving them various forms of enjoyment or education or whatever it may be.
我的意思是，当你的家庭还年轻时，可以选择以各种形式花钱，并为他们提供各种形式的享受或教育或其他任何东西，这其中是有好处的。
So I don’t — I don’t advocate — I may practice — but I don’t advocate extreme frugality.
所以我不——我不提倡——我可能会实践——但我不提倡极端节俭。
The — and I don’t say that it’s always better to be saving 10 percent of your income instead of 5 percent of your income.
我并不是说总是把收入的 10%存起来比存收入的 5%更好。
I think it’s crazy to be spending 105 percent of your income, and I think that leads to all kinds of problems, and I get letters from people every day that have experienced those problems.
我认为花费超过收入的 105%是疯狂的，我认为这会导致各种问题，我每天都收到经历过这些问题的人的来信。
But, you know, in the end you want to have an internal score card. I mean, you are not a better person or a worse person because you live a different kind of life than your neighbor. Live a life that, you know, is true to yourself.
但是，你知道，最终你想要有一个内在的评分标准。我的意思是，你并不是因为过着与邻居不同的生活而成为更好或更坏的人。过一种对自己真实的生活。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s obviously the best method to train your children to provide the proper example.
查理·芒格：是的。显然，训练孩子的最佳方法是提供正确的榜样。
(A person in the audience is shouting)
观众中有一个人在喊叫
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we’re hearing a child that didn’t get that advice. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我想我们听到了一个没有得到那个建议的孩子。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: But of course, even if you do provide the proper example, it’s likely not to work —
查理·芒格：但当然，即使你提供了正确的榜样，它也可能不起作用——
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s noon.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在是中午。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — some of the time anyway.
查理·芒格：——有时也未必奏效。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s noon now. We’ll take about a 30 to 40-minute break. We’ll come back. Some of those who are in the other room — we always have some openings here after lunch so you might be able to move into the main room.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在是中午，我们休息30到40分钟。午餐后，总有一些座位空出，所以您可能可以进入主会场。
We’ll reconvene, we’ll say, at 12:45. We’ll go to 3 o’clock.
我们将在 12:45 重新集合。我们会进行到 3 点。
Afternoon session
下午场
37. No more Klamath Dam questions
不再有克拉马斯坝的问题
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’re going to go back to work here. We broke off at area seven last time.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们要回去工作了。上次我们在第七区停下来的。
I have asked — just so everybody’s aware of it — we’ve had three questions relating to the Klamath situation, and I think that’s more than proportional to the interest of the crowd. (Applause)
我已经问过——只是为了让大家知道——我们有三个问题是关于克拉马斯情况的，我认为这超过了观众的兴趣比例。（掌声）
So we’ll skip any more like that. I think the position is known.
所以我们就不再讨论类似的事情了。我认为立场已经明确。
38. “Too big to fail” banks can’t have “too much risk to manage”
“大而不倒”的银行不能有“过多无法管理的风险”
WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll go onto number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们将继续第 8 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ola Larson (PH). I live in Salt Lake City. And I think — on Lou Rukeyser, Wall Street Week, 1981 or something. So you must really have impressed me, Warren.
观众成员：我的名字是奥拉·拉尔森（音）。我住在盐湖城。我想——在 1981 年或类似的《华尔街周刊》节目中看到过卢·鲁凯瑟。所以你一定给我留下了深刻的印象，沃伦。
What I’d like to ask you is that looking at the future, have the business practices of the investment banks become so complex that it is not possible for the head of the investment bank to be aware of the exposures to financial risks day-to-day or week-to-week?
我想问你的是，展望未来，投资银行的业务实践是否变得如此复杂，以至于投资银行的负责人无法每天或每周了解金融风险的敞口？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s an exceptionally good question, and I think the answer, probably, is yes, at least in some places, although there’s a few investment bank heads I’ve got enormous respect for their ability to sort of get their minds around risk.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是一个非常好的问题，我认为答案可能是肯定的，至少在某些地方是这样，尽管有一些投资银行的负责人我非常尊重他们在理解风险方面的能力。
But I decided, for example, when we bought Gen Re, it had about 23,000 derivative contracts, and I think I could have spent full time on that and not really been able to get my mind around how much risk we could — we were running — under some fairly extreme conditions that I did not think were impossible, but that the people who were running the operation might have thought were impossible, or that might not have cared about it that much because their own incentive compensation was such that if they made a lot of money one year on something, it would work 99 years out of a hundred, they would feel the chances of something going wrong big were very slim.
但是我决定，例如，当我们收购通用再保险时，它大约有 23,000 份衍生品合约，我想我可能需要全职投入其中，但仍然无法真正理解在某些我认为并非不可能的极端情况下，我们可能承担了多少风险，而那些负责运营的人可能认为这些情况是不可能的，或者他们可能并不太在意，因为他们的激励性薪酬是这样的：如果他们某一年在某件事情上赚了很多钱，而这件事情在一百年中有九十九年是有效的，他们会觉得出现重大问题的几率非常小。
But I don’t want to have it slim. I want to have it none. So I regard myself as the Chief Risk Officer at Berkshire.
但我不想让它变小。我想让它不存在。所以我把自己视为伯克希尔的首席风险官。
If something goes wrong at Berkshire because of — in terms of risk — of the way we run the place, there’s no way I can assign that to a risk committee or have some mathematicians come in and make a bunch of calculations and tell me I’m only running a risk that will happen once in the history of the universe or something of the sort.
如果伯克希尔出现问题，因为——就风险而言——我们管理公司的方式，我不可能把责任推给风险委员会，也不可能让一些数学家进来做一堆计算，然后告诉我我只是在承担一个宇宙历史上只会发生一次的风险或类似的事情。
I think the big investment banks, a number of them — and big commercial banks — I think they’re almost too big to manage effectively from a risk standpoint in the way they’ve elected to conduct their business.
我认为大型投资银行，其中一些——以及大型商业银行——我认为从风险管理的角度来看，它们几乎太大而无法有效管理，因为它们选择了这样的经营方式。
And it’s going to work most of the time. So you don’t see the risk in a way that — I mean, you don’t — if you have a 1 in 50-year risk that a place will go broke, it may not be in the interest of a 62-year-old executive that’s going to retire at 65 to worry too much about that.
大多数时候它会奏效。所以你不会以某种方式看到风险——我的意思是，你不会——如果一个地方有 1/50 的风险会破产，对于一个 62 岁、将在 65 岁退休的高管来说，可能没有太大兴趣去过多担心这个问题。
I worry about everything at Berkshire. So I would say they’re too — they’re very hard to manage, very hard to have your mind around. I mean, clearly, you’ve seen cases in the last year where very big institutions, if the CEO knew what was going on, he certainly hasn’t admitted it subsequent to what’s happened.
而我在伯克希尔担心每件事情。所以我会说他们确实很难管理，难以理解这些风险。显然，过去一年里，我们看到了一些大机构，如果首席执行官知道发生了什么，他显然没有承认这些事情的发生。
It’s embarrassing either way, but it’s less embarrassing to say I didn’t know what was going on than to acknowledge that you knew these kind of activities were going on and you let them go on.
无论如何，这都让人尴尬，但相比承认知道这些活动的存在却仍然允许它们继续，承认不知道发生了什么要少些尴尬。
It’s — I’ve been asked for advice on regulation sometimes, and we’ve seen an extraordinary example, which somehow the press really hasn’t picked up on much.
有时我被要求就监管提供建议，我们看到一个非同寻常的例子，但媒体似乎并没有太多关注。
But you had an organization called OFHEO whose sole job was to supervise two big companies, and these big companies were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
但是你有一个名为 OFHEO 的组织，其唯一职责是监督两家大公司，而这两家公司是房利美和房地美。
And they had a large element of public purpose in them, and they were chartered by the federal government, and they had — their activities had overtones for the whole mortgage and securities markets.
他们具有很大的公共目的成分，并且由联邦政府特许，他们的活动对整个抵押贷款和证券市场产生了影响。
So Congress said, “If we’re going to give you all this ‘too big to fail’-type protection, in terms of the federal government stepping in and giving you special privileges, we want to keep an eye on you.”
因此，国会表示：“如果我们要给予你们所有这些‘大而不倒’类型的保护，即联邦政府介入并给予你们特殊特权，我们希望对你们进行监督。”
So they formed OFHEO and they had 200 people going to work, I presume at 9 o’clock every morning, and going home at 5, and their sole job was to see what these two places were doing. And they turned out to be two of the biggest accounting misrepresentations in the history of the world.
所以他们成立了OFHEO，有200人，每天早上9点上班，下午5点下班，唯一的工作就是看看这两家公司在做什么。结果这两家公司成了世界历史上最大的财务造假案例之一。
So they were two for two with the only things they had to examine. And I fear that if you tried to do the same thing with the biggest commercial banks or the biggest investment banks, I’m not sure you can keep track of it.
所以他们在唯一需要检查的事情上取得了两全其美的结果。而我担心，如果你试图对最大的商业银行或最大的投资银行做同样的事情，我不确定你能否跟踪它。
What you need is somebody at the top whose DNA is very, very much programmed against risk. And he is going to have to resist the entreaties of those who work beneath him who say everybody else is doing it, and if they can do it over there and make all this money doing it, why can’t we be doing it here?
您需要一个最高层的人，DNA中充满了对风险的抗拒，他需要抵制那些下属的请求，那些下属说“其他公司都在做，如果他们能通过这种方式赚到钱，为什么我们不能做？”
And that’s not easy to do. When you’ve got a bunch of high-powered people who are used to making in seven figures every year, and they want to do things and they say, “If you don’t do them here, we’re going to go elsewhere,” it’s a very tough system to be.
这并不容易，当您手下有一群习惯每年赚取七位数收入的人，他们想做一些事情，并说“如果你们不让我们做，我们就去别处做”，这是非常困难的情况。
So I would say that, in many ways, there are firms that, in terms of risk, are simply — they are conducting themselves in a way that they’re too big to manage.
所以我会说，在很多方面，有些公司在风险方面的表现简直是——它们的运作方式使得它们过于庞大而难以管理。
And if at the same time the government says they’re too big to fail, that has some very interesting policy implications.
如果同时政府表示他们大而不倒，这会带来一些非常有趣的政策影响。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that you say that very well. It does have interesting policy implications.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为你说得很好。这确实有有趣的政策影响。
It’s crazy to have people get so big and so important that you can’t allow them to fail, and allow them to be run with as much knavery and stupidity as permeated the major investment banks.
让人们变得如此庞大和重要，以至于你不能让他们失败，同时允许它们像一些主要投资银行那样充满欺诈和愚蠢地运营，这真是疯狂。
It’s not that Berkshire hasn’t had wonderful service from investment banking all these years, because we have. It’s just that, as an industry, this crazy culture of greed and overreaching and overconfidence in trading algorithms and so on creeps in.
伯克希尔这些年来确实从投资银行获得了出色的服务，但作为一个行业，这种对贪婪、过度扩张以及对交易算法的过度自信的疯狂文化逐渐渗透进来。
I would argue it’s quite counterproductive for the country, and it ought to be reigned way back.
我认为这对国家来说是相当适得其反的，应该大幅度收敛。
These institutions are too big to fail, and it was demented to allow derivative trading to end up the way it’s ended up and with the current risks that are embedded in the present system.
这些机构大到不能倒，允许衍生品交易发展到现在的状况以及当前系统中嵌入的风险是疯狂的。
And it’s amazing how few people spoke against it as it was happening. There was just so much easy money to be reported.
令人惊讶的是，竟然很少有人在这种情况发生时站出来反对。因为有太多容易赚钱的机会。
A lot of the money that was reported as being earned wasn’t really being earned. It was in that wonderful category of assets that I call “good until reached for.”
很多被报告为赚取的钱实际上并没有真正赚到。它属于我称之为“好到无法触及”的那种奇妙资产类别。
They sit there on the balance sheet, and when you reach for it, it just fades away like — (laughter)
它们就在那里，坐在资产负债表上，当你想要抓住它时，它就像——（笑声）一样消失了
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s not kidding.
沃伦·巴菲特：他不是在开玩笑。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — mist. 查理·芒格：— 雾。
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s not kidding.
沃伦·巴菲特：他不是在开玩笑。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We had 400 million of that “good until reached for” assets we got with General Re.
查理·芒格：我们有 4 亿美元的“好到触及为止”资产是通过通用再保险获得的。
WARREN BUFFETT: And they were behaving honorably.
沃伦·巴菲特：他们表现得很有道德。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. But at any rate, people pushed it way too far.
查理·芒格：是的。但无论如何，人们把它推得太远了。
In the drug business, they say, “Prove that this works” before they certify the drug.
在制药行业，他们会说：“证明这有效”然后才会认证该药物。
On Wall Street, they start believing in the tooth fairy, and if one guy is reporting a lot of money, why, everybody else is asking, “Why aren’t we betting on the tooth fairy?”
在华尔街，他们开始相信牙仙，如果有一个人报告赚了很多钱，其他人就会问：“我们为什么不押注牙仙呢？”
It’s a crazy culture, and to some extent it’s an evil culture, and it needs a huge reigning in.
这是一个疯狂的文化，在某种程度上是一个邪恶的文化，需要大力加以控制。
And the accounting profession utterly failed us. The worst behaving were the people who set the accounting practice standards. And they’re very bureaucratic and take forever, and they don’t want to do anything real difficult that displeases people.
会计行业完全让我们失望了。表现最差的是那些制定会计实务标准的人。他们非常官僚，办事拖拖拉拉，而且不愿意做任何真正困难的事情，因为那会让人不满。
This is not a combination of wonderful qualities when your job is to set accounting standards, which ought to be dealt with sort of like engineering standards. And they don’t even have the right approach. So there’s a lot wrong.
当您的工作是制定会计标准时，这样的做法显然不是好的品质。会计标准应该像工程标准一样对待，但他们甚至没有正确的方法。所以有很多问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie and I first got to Salomon, we noticed that they were trading with Marc Rich, who had fled the country. And we suggest — well, we told them — we wanted to quit trading with Marc.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我刚到所罗门时，我们注意到他们正在与逃离美国的马克·里奇进行交易。我们建议——实际上是告诉他们——我们想停止与马克的交易。
And they said, well, they were making money doing it one way or another, and they said, what the hell did we know about crude oil trading, and they wanted to keep trading with him.
他们说，嗯，他们通过某种方式赚钱了，而且他们说，我们对原油交易了解什么呢？他们想继续与他交易。
And only by just total directive could we stop our own employees from trading with Marc Rich.
只有通过彻底的命令，我们才阻止了自己的员工继续与马克·里奇进行交易。
Now, if you can’t stop your people trading with Marc Rich, you know, when you’re focusing on it, just imagine what goes on, you know, in those trading rooms elsewhere.
现在，如果你无法阻止你的人与马克·里奇进行交易，你知道，当你专注于此时，想象一下在其他交易室里会发生什么。
It’s — if Bear Stearns — I think the Fed did the right thing by stepping in on Bear Stearns.
如果是贝尔斯登——我认为美联储在贝尔斯登事件中介入是正确的。
If Bear Stearns had failed on Sunday night — and it would have — they would have walked over to a federal judge and handed him a bankruptcy petition, I guess, a little after 6 o’clock Midwest time, because that’s when Tokyo opened.
如果贝尔斯登在星期天晚上倒闭——而且它确实会倒闭——他们会走到联邦法官面前，把破产申请递给他，我猜，大约在中部时间晚上 6 点多一点，因为那时东京开市。
If they had failed, the next day, as I understand it, they had about 14 1/2 trillion — which isn’t as bad as it sounds — but 14 1/2 trillion of derivative contracts.
如果他们失败了，据我所知，第二天他们大约有 14.5 万亿的衍生品合约——这听起来并没有那么糟糕——但确实是 14.5 万亿的衍生品合约。
Now, the parties that had those contracts that had a claim against Bear Stearns would have been required, I think, almost by the contracts they signed, but they would have been required to undo those contracts very promptly to establish the damages they would have against the bankrupt estate.
现在，那些与贝尔斯登有合同并对其提出索赔的各方，我认为几乎是根据他们签署的合同，几乎需要立即撤销这些合约，以确定他们对破产财产的索赔。
Just imagine thousands of counterparties around the world, you know, trying to undo contracts, everybody knowing they had to undo contracts in a very, very short period of time.
试想一下，世界各地有成千上万的交易对手，你知道，他们试图解除合同，每个人都知道他们必须在非常非常短的时间内解除合同。
The 400 million we tried to reach for and didn’t find — we had the luxury of spending about four or five years unwinding those contracts. These people would have had four or five hours to do the same thing with everybody else doing it simultaneously.
我们试图寻找但未找到的 4 亿资金——我们有幸花了大约四到五年的时间来解除这些合同。而这些人可能只有四到五个小时来同时与其他人一起完成同样的事情。
It would have been a spectacle that would have been of, I think, of unprecedented proportions, and, of course, it would have resulted, in my view, of another investment bank or two going down, you know, within a matter of days.
我认为，这本会是一场前所未有的盛况，当然，在我看来，这也会导致一两家投资银行在几天内倒闭。
Because nobody has to lend you money. In fact, that was one of the interesting things that was said at the testimony when they called them down to the Senate Finance Committee.
因为没有人必须借钱给你。事实上，这正是他们被召到参议院财政委员会作证时所说的有趣事情之一。
They — I think two of the witnesses said, we didn’t understand — we understood we couldn’t borrow money unsecured, if people started looking at us with askance, but they said, we didn’t dream we couldn’t borrow money secured.
我记得有两位证人说，我们知道如果人们对我们产生怀疑，我们就不能无担保借钱，但他们说，我们从未想过我们不能有担保地借钱。
Well, we’d found that out at Salomon that we were having money borrowing money secured 17 years earlier.
好吧，我们在所罗门发现，我们借钱是用 17 年前的担保。
When the world doesn’t want to lend you money, ten basis points doesn’t do much, you know, or 20 basis points, or 50 basis points much, or a bigger haircut on collateral.
当世界不愿意借钱给你时，十个基点没什么用，或者二十个基点，或者五十个基点，或者对抵押品更大的折扣。
If they (don’t) want to lend you money, they don’t want to lend you money. And if your dependent on borrowed money every day, you have to wake up in the morning hoping the world thinks well of you.
如果他们（不）想借钱给你，他们就是不想借钱给你。而如果你每天都依赖借来的钱，你就得每天早上醒来，希望这个世界对你有好感。
And there was a period there a few months ago when I think every investment bank in the United States was plenty worried about whether people were going to think well of them the next morning.
几个月前有一段时间，我认为美国的每家投资银行都非常担心人们第二天早上是否会对他们有好的看法。
39. Why we don’t do ‘due diligence’ for even the biggest deals
为什么我们即使在最大交易中也不进行“尽职调查”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s go on to number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，让我们继续第 9 个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Harry Beguy (PH), San Francisco.
观众成员：哈里·贝盖（PH），旧金山。
Mr. Buffett, I was reading recently in Fortune magazine that when you invested $500 million in PetroChina back in 2001 or 2002, all you did was read the annual report.
巴菲特先生，我最近在《财富》杂志上读到，当您在 2001 年或 2002 年投资 5 亿美元于中石油时，您所做的只是阅读年度报告。
Now, I was thinking that most professional investors with the kind of resources that you have would have liked to have done a lot more research and talked to management, maybe regulators, et cetera, et cetera.
现在，我在想，像您这样拥有资源的大多数专业投资者可能会希望进行更多的研究，并与管理层、监管机构等进行交流。
The question I have is, how — what is it that you look for when you’re reading an annual report like that? How is it that you were able to, and did, make an investment purely on the back of reading that report?
我想问的是，当你阅读这样的年度报告时，你在寻找什么？你是如何能够仅仅通过阅读那份报告就做出投资决策的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it was in 2002 and 2003, and the report came out in the spring, and I read it. And that’s the only thing I ever did. I never contacted any management. I never got a brokerage report. I never asked for anybody’s opinion.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，那是在 2002 年和 2003 年，报告在春天出来，我读了它。这是我唯一做的事情。我从未联系过任何管理层。我从未获得过经纪报告。我从未询问过任何人的意见。
But what I did do is I came to the conclusion that the company — and it’s not hard to understand crude oil production and refining and marketing and the chemical operation they have. I mean, you can do the same thing with Exxon or BP or any of them, and I do that with all — I look at them.
但我确实得出了一个结论，那就是这家公司——理解原油生产、炼油、营销以及他们的化工业务并不难。我的意思是，你可以对埃克森美孚或英国石油公司或任何其他公司做同样的事情，我对所有公司都是这样看的。
And I came to the conclusion it was worth a hundred billion, and then I checked the price and it was selling for 35 billion, roughly.
我得出的结论是它价值一千亿，然后我查看了价格，发现它大约以三百五十亿出售。
What’s the sense of talking to management? I mean, basically, if you talk to management of almost every company, they’ll say they think their stock is a wonderful buy, and they’ll give you all the good stuff and skip over things that — it just doesn’t make any difference.
跟管理层谈话有什么意义？我的意思是，基本上，如果你和几乎每家公司的管理层交谈，他们都会说他们认为自己的股票是一个很好的买入机会，他们会告诉你所有好的方面，而跳过那些——这根本没有任何区别的事情。
Now, if I thought the company was worth 40 billion and had been selling for 35 billion, then at that point you have to start trying to refine your analysis more. But there’s no reason to refine your analysis.
现在，如果我认为公司的价值是 400 亿，而它的售价是 350 亿，那么在那时你就必须开始尝试进一步完善你的分析。但没有理由去完善你的分析。
I mean, I didn’t need to know whether it was worth 97 billion or 103 billion if I was buying it at 35 billion.
我的意思是，如果我以 350 亿的价格购买它，我不需要知道它是值 970 亿还是 1030 亿。
So any further refining of analysis would be a waste of time when what I should be doing is buying the stock.
因此，任何进一步的分析都是浪费时间，而我应该做的是购买股票。
So we really like things that you don’t have to carry out to three decimal places, you know.
所以我们真的喜欢那些不需要精确到小数点后三位的东西，你知道的。
If you have to carry it out to three decimal places, it’s not a good idea. And, you know, it — with something like PetroChina — it’s like if somebody walked in the door here and they weighed somewhere between 300 and 350 pounds. I might not know how much they weigh, but I would know they were fat. (Laughter)
如果你必须精确到小数点后三位，那就不是个好主意。而且，你知道的，对于像中石油这样的东西，就好比如果有人走进这里，他们的体重在 300 到 350 磅之间。我可能不知道他们具体有多重，但我知道他们很胖。（笑声）
That’s all I’m looking for, is something that’s financially fat. And whether PetroChina weighed 95 billion dollars or 105 billion didn’t make much difference. It was selling for 35 billion. If it had been selling for 90, it would have made a difference.
我所寻找的就是财务上丰厚的东西。无论中石油是 950 亿美元还是 1050 亿美元，差别不大。它当时的市值是 350 亿美元。如果市值是 900 亿美元，那就会有差别。
So if you can’t make a decision on something like PetroChina off the figures, forget about going further, and that’s basically what we did. It’s a straightforward report, just like reading another — just like reading Chevron’s or ConocoPhillips or something like that. Just as informative.
所以，如果你不能根据数据对中石油这样的公司做出决定，那就别再深入研究了，这基本上就是我们所做的。这个报告很直接，就像读雪佛龙或康菲石油的报告一样。信息同样丰富。
And you weren’t going to learn more, you know, by going out and deciding whether you thought — they’ve got one huge field in China where the life of it was 13 years or 14 years or something of the sort. They should hit you between the eyes.
您不会通过外出了解它们在中国的一个大油田是13年还是14年寿命这样的事情而学到更多的东西，这应该是显而易见的。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I would argue that we have lower due diligence expenses than anybody else in America — (laughter) — and that we have had less trouble because we had less expense.
查理·芒格：是的。我认为我们的尽职调查费用比美国其他任何人都低——（笑声）——而且我们遇到的问题更少，因为我们的费用更低。
I know of an investment operation in America that pays over $200 billion a year that —
我知道美国有一个投资项目，每年支付超过 2000 亿美元——
WARREN BUFFETT: Two-hundred million.
沃伦·巴菲特：两亿。
CHARLIE MUNGER: 200. 查理·芒格：200。
WARREN BUFFETT: Million. 沃伦·巴菲特：百万。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 200 million. Pardon me.
查理·芒格：是的。2 亿。请原谅我。
WARREN BUFFETT: Uh-huh. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯哼。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — every year to its accountants, a lot to help them with due diligence.
查理·芒格：——每年给他们的会计师很多，以帮助他们进行尽职调查。
And I think our operation is safer because we think like engineers. We want these margins of reliability. And they’re trying to do something really difficult, which is to have fine-grain judgments in very complex areas, and rely on other people to do it who are getting paid fees.
我认为我们的操作更安全，因为我们像工程师一样思考。我们希望有这些可靠性的余量。而他们正在尝试做一些非常困难的事情，即在非常复杂的领域做出细致的判断，并依赖其他人来完成这些工作，而这些人是通过收取费用来获得报酬的。
It’s a very dicey process to do that. I think it’s much safer to do our way.
这样做是一个非常冒险的过程。我认为按照我们的方式做要安全得多。
WARREN BUFFETT: If you think the auditors know more about making an acquisition than you do, you ought to take up auditing and let them run the business, as far as we are concerned.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你认为审计师比你更了解如何进行收购，那么就应该去做审计，让他们来经营业务，就我们而言。
We are not — I mean, when we get a call on something like the Mars-Wrigley situation, if we don’t know enough about Mars and Wrigley by this point so that we have to go out — I still like to go out, of course, and sample all the bars.
我们不是——我的意思是，当我们接到关于Mars-Wrigley的电话时，如果我们到现在还不了解Mars-Wrigley，以至于我们必须出去——当然，我仍然喜欢出去，品尝所有的巧克力棒。
So we have a 15 — I mean, I feel I owe that to the Berkshire shareholders (Laughter)
所以我们有 15——我的意思是，我觉得我欠伯克希尔的股东们这个（笑声）
But I’m not going to look at their labor contracts or their leases or anything like that.
但我不会去查看他们的劳动合同或租约或类似的东西。
If the value of Wrigley depends on a specific lease someplace or a specific commitment to this or that, you know, or a given environmental problem, forget it, you know.
如果 Wrigley 的价值取决于某个地方的特定租约或对某事的特定承诺，或者某个环境问题，那就算了。
The — there are these overriding considerations that are enormously important, and then there’s a whole lot of trivia that doesn’t mean anything.
这些压倒性的考虑因素极其重要，然后还有很多无关紧要的琐事。
We have never made a — we’ve made plenty of big investment — I’ve made plenty of big investment mistakes. I’ve never made one, in my view, that would have been avoided by conventional due diligence.
我们从未做过——我们做过很多大投资——我有过大的投资错误。在我看来，我从未犯过一个可以通过常规尽职调查避免的错误。
And we would have spent a lot of money, and we would have wasted a lot of time and, in some cases, we would have missed deals, simply because we wouldn’t have committed fast enough.
如果我们做了尽职调查，我们可能会花很多钱，浪费很多时间，在某些情况下，我们甚至可能错过了交易，因为我们无法快速做出承诺。
We have a significant advantage, and it gets bigger as we get bigger, because, in terms of big deals, people rely more and more often on process, in that when people want to get a deal done, they want to know it’s going to be done, they will come to us.
我们有显著的优势，而且随着我们规模的扩大，这种优势也在扩大，因为在大的交易方面，人们越来越依赖流程，当人们想要完成交易时，他们希望知道交易会完成，他们会来找我们。
I mean, the Mars people wanted to deal — in terms of this financing aspect of the Wrigley situation — they only wanted to deal with Berkshire because they knew we didn’t have any lawyers involved. I’ll admit to this group we didn’t even have any directors involved.
我的意思是，Mars公司的人想要处理——就Wrigley事件的融资方面而言——他们只想和伯克希尔打交道，因为他们知道我们没有律师参与。我向这个小组承认，我们甚至没有董事参与。
We just — you know, we got a call, it made sense, and we said yes. And when we say yes, we don’t say yes with a material adverse change clause. We don’t say yes, if financing is available. We just say yes.
我们只是——你知道，我们接到了一个电话，这很有道理，我们就答应了。而当我们答应时，我们不会附加重大不利变更条款。我们不会说，如果融资可用，我们就答应。我们只是答应。
So I can tell people when we make a deal that, if we’re going to have 6 1/2 billion available, it’s going to be available, you know, whether there’s a nuclear bomb goes off in New York City, or whether there’s a flu epidemic, or whether Ben Bernanke runs off to South America with Paris Hilton. (Laughter)
所以当我们达成交易时，如果我们需要65亿美元，这笔钱会到位，无论是在纽约市发生核爆炸，还是流感疫情爆发，还是本·伯南克和帕丽斯·希尔顿私奔到南美洲。（笑声）
The check is going to clear.
支票即将兑现。
And if you’re making a deal, you know, the guy that wants the 6 1/2 billion, that assurance is worth something. And you really can’t get anyplace — they say, “Well, I’ll do it, but I’ve got to have a due diligence team check this out and do all of that.” So it’s a real advantage to us, and I don’t think there’s any disadvantage to us.
如果您要达成交易，想要65亿美元，那种保证是非常有价值的。而如果有人说，“我会做，但我必须让尽职调查团队检查这个，做所有这些事情。”这样的话，您真的就走不远了。所以这对我们来说是一个真正的优势，我认为对我们没有任何劣势。
40. Buffett on religion: “I’m a true agnostic”
巴菲特谈宗教：“我是真正的不可知论者”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett. My name is Matthew Millard (PH). I’m from Norman, Oklahoma, and —
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生。我叫马修·米拉德（音），我来自俄克拉荷马州的诺曼市，——
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll forgive that as Nebraskans. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：作为内布拉斯加人，我们会原谅这一点。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That’s OK. Thank you.
观众成员：没关系。谢谢。
I’ve been a long-time Berkshire shareholder since I was 16. Really like the company. Really like your investment style, buy and hold forever, kind of beyond the grave.
我从 16 岁起就是伯克希尔的长期股东。非常喜欢这家公司。非常喜欢你们的投资风格，买入并永久持有，甚至超越生命的界限。
But my question actually had to do with, do you know and believe in Jesus Christ and have a personal relationship with him.
但我的问题实际上是，你是否认识并相信耶稣基督，并与他有个人关系。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. I’m an agnostic. And I grew up in a religious household. And if you’d have asked that question of my mother and father, you’d have gotten a different answer.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我是不可知论者。我在一个宗教家庭中长大。如果你问我父母这个问题，你会得到不同的答案。
And I’m a true agnostic. I’m not closer to either a theist or an atheist. I simply don’t know, and maybe someday I’ll know and maybe someday I won’t, but that’s the nature of being an agnostic.
而我是真正的不可知论者。我既不接近有神论者，也不接近无神论者。我只是不知道，也许有一天我会知道，也许有一天我不会知道，但这就是不可知论者的本质。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t want to talk about my religion.
查理·芒格：我不想谈论我的宗教信仰。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Well — (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。那么——（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Being an agnostic, I don’t have to talk about religion. It’s very simple. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：作为一个不可知论者，我不需要谈论宗教。这很简单。（笑声）
I don’t — obviously I have no opinion on anybody else’s religion because that’s the nature of being an agnostic.
我没有——显然我对其他人的宗教没有意见，因为这就是不可知论者的本质。
I wish everybody well on their own.
我祝愿每个人都能找到自己的信仰。
41. Berkshire takeover after Buffett dies is “very unlikely”
巴菲特去世后伯克希尔“不可能”被接管
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie. I want to thank you for hosting this annual meeting.
观众成员：你好。下午好，沃伦和查理。我想感谢你们举办这次年度会议。
My name is James (inaudible) from East Brunswick, New Jersey.
我的名字是詹姆斯（听不清）来自新泽西州东布伦瑞克。
I don’t want to sound morbid, but my question is, once you two are gone and Warren’s stock is placed in trust and slowly forced to be sold over the years, what safeguards are in place to prevent a hedge fund or LBO shops from joining together and acquiring Berkshire Hathaway, and putting in play and breaking up this wonderful company and endangering the culture of this company?
我不想显得悲观，但我的问题是，一旦你们两位不在了，沃伦的股票被放入信托并在未来几年逐渐被迫出售，有哪些保障措施可以防止对冲基金或杠杆收购公司联合起来收购伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，并将其拆分，从而危及这家优秀公司的文化？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my stock would be sold over about a 12-year period after my death.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我的股票将在我去世后大约 12 年内被出售。
During the time of settling the estate, it gets disposed of in the same manner as presently, and then it gets on a time clock.
在遗产处理期间，股票的处理方式与现在相同，然后就会进入一个定时的计划。
So that takes a lot of time. I may live a little longer, even, than now, but even if that started now, you would be dealing, I hope, with a company that had a market value much larger than even we presently have, and you’d still have large blocks of stocks held by institutions or people that certainly had a similar philosophy.
所以这需要很多时间。我可能会活得更久，甚至比现在还久，但即使从现在开始，我希望你们面对的是一家市值比我们目前还要大的公司，而且你们仍然会有大量股票由持有类似理念的机构或个人持有。
There’s no guarantee that if somebody wanted to try a 6- or $700 billion takeover — and it might be, you know, a lot larger than that if you go out a ways — that it can’t be done.
不能保证如果有人想尝试一场6000亿或7000亿的收购——而且如果再过些年，可能会大得多——那是不可能的。
But I think it would be about as unlikely to happen in the case of Berkshire as any company I can think of in the world.
但我认为在伯克希尔的情况下，这种情况发生的可能性和我能想到的世界上任何公司一样小。
It can’t happen at all, in effect, until sometime after I die. There will be a lot of votes concentrated until that period.
基本上，在我去世前，这种事情不可能发生。在那之前，会有大量的投票权集中在一处。
And like Charlie says, I’ve told — there’s this period after I die before this 10-year distribution period kicks in — so I’ve told my lawyer to make sure that my estate lasts for quite a while. And he says that’s like telling your teenage son to have a normal sex life, when you tell a lawyer that.
就像查理说的，我也告诉了我的律师，在我去世后的这段时间内，在10年的分配期开始之前，我的遗产需要持续相当长一段时间。而他说，跟律师讲这件事，这就像告诉你的青少年儿子要有正常的性生活一样。
But it will be a long time. And like I say, if we do anything in the way of decent rates of compounding, you really are talking, you know, one of the very largest companies in the United States.
但这将会是一段很长的时间。就像我说的，如果我们能以适当的复利增长率做到这一点，您真的会看到我们成为美国最大的公司之一。
And I don’t think anybody’s going — I don’t think there’s going to be an LBO of General Electric or Exxon, and I think it would be equally difficult with Berkshire. There’s no 100 percent guarantee, however.
我不认为会有人收购通用电气或埃克森美孚，我认为收购伯克希尔同样困难。然而，没有百分之百的保证。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And, besides, Warren doesn’t plan to leave very early.
查理·芒格：是的。而且，沃伦也不打算很早离开。
I’ve heard him say several times when people ask him what he wants said at his funeral. And he always gives the same answer. He says he wants people to say, “That’s the oldest-looking corpse I ever saw.” (Laughter)
我听过好几次有人问他希望在葬礼上人们怎么评价他。他总是给出同样的答案。他说他希望人们说：“这是我见过的最老的尸体。”（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And I’m unlikely to change my views on that subject. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我不太可能在这个问题上改变我的看法。（笑）
But thanks for asking. (Laughs)
但还是谢谢你的关心。（笑）
42. It’s hard to challenge a well-established, popular brand
很难挑战一个知名的、受欢迎的品牌
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12?
沃伦·巴菲特：第十二号？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Harold Yulean (PH). I’m from Chicago, Illinois.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是哈罗德·尤利安（音）。我来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。
I’d like you to describe the economic characteristics of the Kraft Corporation, why you feel this is a good business.
我想请你描述一下卡夫公司的经济特征，并说明你为什么认为这是一家好公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say most of the big food companies are good businesses in that they earn good returns on tangible assets.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说大多数大型食品公司都是好企业，因为它们在有形资产上获得了良好的回报。
And I don’t want to get into — particularly into specifics on Kraft — but if you own important, branded products in this country, whether it’s Wrigley’s or Mars or Coca-Cola, or a number of the Kraft brands, or See’s Candy, you have good assets.
我不想特别深入讨论卡夫的细节，但如果您拥有一些国家重要的品牌产品，无论是箭牌（Wrigley）、玛氏（Mars）、可口可乐（Coca-Cola），还是卡夫的一些品牌，或是喜诗糖果（See’s Candy），那您就拥有了不错的资产。
It’s not easy to take on those products. Just imagine, you know, taking on — Coca-Cola will sell a billion and a half eight-ounce servings of its product around the world today.
很难去挑战这些产品。试想一下，今天可口可乐在全球销售15亿个8盎司的份量。
There’s something in everybody person’s mind virtually in the globe about Coca-Cola. It’s a product of — since 1886 has been associated with happiness and good value in terms of refreshment and all that.
在全球每个人的心中都有关于可口可乐的某种印象。自 1886 年以来，这款产品一直与快乐和物有所值的清爽体验等联系在一起。
It’s just about impossible, you know, to, in my mind, anyway, to take on a product like that. It’s clearly satisfies people in a huge way, you know, everywhere on the globe.
在我看来，挑战像可口可乐这样的产品几乎是不可能的。这显然是一个能满足全球人们需求的巨大产品。
And, you know, it may not be the same — Kraft, for example, has Kool-Aid in the powdered soft drink business. You know, I don’t think I’d want to take on Kool-Aid. I’d rather have Coca-Cola. But it’s a tough product.
虽然可能不会完全相同，但例如卡夫有柯露爱（Kool-Aid）粉末饮料。我认为我不想去挑战柯露爱。我更喜欢可口可乐，但这确实是一个强大的产品。
And to get implanted — just think of — to get implanted in people’s mind RC Cola around the world. And RC Cola has been around a long, long time. You know, it isn’t going to go anyplace. I mean, that is very, very difficult.
想要在人的头脑中植入一种新的可乐品牌，比如RC可乐，而RC可乐已经存在了很长时间，但它始终无法大有作为。这是非常非常困难的。
And actually, Richard Branson came over to this country — you know, they say that a brand is a promise. I mean, there’s a promise involved in picking up a Milky Way, or picking up a Coca-Cola, as to what it’s going to deliver to you.
实际上，理查德·布兰森（Richard Branson）几年前来到这个国家——人们常说品牌是一种承诺。拿起一块麦丽素（Milky Way）或可口可乐，其中包含一种承诺，关于它将会为您带来什么。
Richard Branson came over seven or eight years ago, 10 years ago, you know, a fellow with a famous airline and all of that, and he came out with something called Virgin Cola. And I thought that was kind of an unusual promise to have in a product. (Laughter)
理查德·布兰森大概七八年前，或者十年前，推出了一款叫做“维珍可乐”（Virgin Cola）的饮品。我觉得这产品的承诺有些不寻常。（笑声）
Never could quite figure that one out, what the promise was. But whatever it was, it didn’t work.
从来没能弄明白，那承诺是什么。但不管是什么，它没有奏效。
And there have been — I don’t know how many — Don Keough would know — but there have been hundreds of colas over the years. But in the end, who is going to, you know, buy some substitute cola for a penny a can less, or two cents a can less, than Coca-Cola, or the same thing with See’s Candy, or the same thing with Kool-Aid, or whatever it may be.
而且有过——我不知道有多少——Don Keough 会知道——但多年来有数百种可乐。但最终，谁会为了便宜一分钱或两分钱去买某种替代可乐，而不是可口可乐呢？对于喜诗糖果、柯露爱等产品也是如此。
So we feel pretty good about branded products when they’re runaway leaders in their field. And there’s nothing unusual about Kraft in their position versus Kellogg or some other people like that.
所以，当品牌产品在市场中处于绝对领先地位时，我们对它们的表现感到满意。卡夫的地位并没有什么特别之处，与凯洛格（Kellogg）等公司类似。
So there’s — the specifics of which one we buy may depend a little bit how we feel about the price. It certainly will make a difference how we feel about the price, the management, and some other factors.
具体选择哪一个可能取决于我们对价格的感觉，也肯定会取决于价格、管理层以及其他一些因素。
But if you buy in with good branded products and you don’t pay too much, you’re probably going to do OK.
但如果您买入优质的品牌产品并且不支付过高的价格，那么大概率会有不错的回报。
On the other hand, you’re not going to get super rich because the attributes that I’ve just laid out are pretty well recognized.
另一方面，您不太可能因此变得超级富有，因为我刚刚提到的这些优点已经被广泛认可了。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.
查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
43. Avoid low-probability problems that could destroy the company
避免可能毁掉公司的低概率问题
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t — do we need to go to the other room or not? Well, let’s just go to number 1. If I’m skipping the other room and there are still people in there, somebody can let me know, and we’ll go back for them. Number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不——我们需要去另一个房间吗？好吧，我们就先去 1 号。如果我跳过了另一个房间而那里还有人，有人可以告诉我，我们会回去找他们。1 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Kevin Truitt (PH) from Chicago, Illinois.
观众成员：你好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫凯文·特鲁伊特（音），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。
My question is this: you have identified four investment professionals who will at some point in time be running the portfolio for Berkshire Hathaway.
我的问题是：你已经确定了四位投资专业人士，他们将在某个时间点管理伯克希尔哈撒韦的投资组合。
What was the criteria that you used to select the four people and what will be the criteria for evaluating them going forward?
你用什么标准来选择这四个人，今后将用什么标准来评估他们？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The criteria for selecting, I think, we laid out pretty well in the 2006 annual report.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为我们在 2006 年的年度报告中很好地阐述了选择标准。
We obviously look for people that have had pretty good records, but that criteria alone is nowhere near sufficient to come up with the candidates we want.
我们显然会寻找那些有良好记录的人，但仅凭这一标准远远不足以找到我们想要的候选人。
I mean, we care enormously about human qualities, and we think we can make that judgment in some cases, and in some cases we can’t.
我的意思是，我们非常关心人的品质，我们认为在某些情况下我们可以做出判断，而在某些情况下我们不能。
I mean — and it’s no negative vote on people we skipped over. We just decided we didn’t know whether they would be the right kind of person.
我的意思是——这并不是对我们跳过的人的否定投票。我们只是决定不确定他们是否是合适的人。
We made an affirmative judgment on four, as to both their ability and their integrity.
我们对四个人的能力和诚信做出了肯定的判断。
And I would like to — there was one other item in here, I believe, which I think achieved a little added relevance in the last year. I said, “We therefore need someone genetically programmed to recognize and avoid serious risks,” and then I put in italics, “including those never before experienced.”
我还想说其中有一个项目，我相信在过去一年中其重要性得到了提升。我曾说，“因此，我们需要一个基因里有识别并避免重大风险能力的人”，然后我用斜体字强调“包括那些以前从未经历过的风险”。
And then I said, “Certain perils that lurk in investment strategies cannot be spotted by one of the models — by use of the models — commonly employed today by financial institutions.”
然后我说：“投资策略中潜伏的某些风险无法通过金融机构今天常用的模型来发现。”
Well, I think that proved to be somewhat prophetic of what happened last year. All of these places had models. I mean, the major banks, the major investment banks.
嗯，我认为这在某种程度上预示了去年发生的事情。所有这些地方都有模型。我的意思是，大型银行、大型投资银行。
They would meet weekly at a risk committee, probably, and go over their models, and all of the statistics would be printed in nice columns and everything. And they didn’t have the faintest idea what risk they were involved.
他们可能会在一个风险委员会每周开会，审查他们的模型，所有的统计数据都会被打印成整齐的列等等。而他们对自己所涉及的风险一无所知。
You really need, in the investment world, someone very solid, someone you trust, reasonable analytical skills.
在投资领域，你确实需要一个非常稳重、值得信任、具备合理分析能力的人。
But you also need someone that actually can contemplate problems that haven’t popped up yet but which are starting to become possibilities, in terms of new financial instruments or new behaviors in markets and that sort of thing.
但你也需要一个能够思考尚未出现但开始成为可能的问题的人，这些问题可能涉及新的金融工具或市场中的新行为等。
And that’s a rare quality. I mean, that inability to envision something that doesn’t show up in your past model, you know, can be fatal.
而这是一种罕见的品质。我的意思是，那种在你过去的模型中无法想象和没有出现的东西的能力，你知道，可能是致命的。
And Charlie and I spend a lot of time thinking about things that could hit us out of the blue that other people don’t include in their thinking.
查理和我花了很多时间思考那些可能会突然袭击我们的事情，而其他人没有考虑到。
And we may miss some opportunities because of that, but we feel it’s essential when managing other people’s money or, for that matter, managing our own money.
因此，我们可能会错过一些机会，但我们认为在管理他人资金时，或者在管理我们自己的资金时，这一点是至关重要的。
So I would say that you might go back and read the 2006 annual report again, but those are the criteria we’re looking for and we have identified as being met by the four people we’re thinking about.
所以我会建议你回去再读一遍 2006 年的年度报告，但这些是我们正在寻找的标准，我们已经确定这四个人符合这些标准。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You can see how risk averse Berkshire is. In the first place, we try and behave in a way so that no rational person is going to worry about our credit.
查理·芒格：是的，你可以看到伯克希尔有多么厌恶风险。首先，我们会尽量以一种不会让任何理性的人担心我们信誉的方式行事。
And after we’ve done that, and done it for many years, we also behave in a way that, if the world suddenly didn’t like our credit, we wouldn’t even notice it for months, because we have such liquidity and are so unlikely to be — unable to be — pressured by anybody.
在我们这样做了很多年之后，我们的行为方式是，即使世界突然不喜欢我们的信用，我们几个月都不会注意到，因为我们有如此充足的流动性，并且不太可能受到任何人的压力。
That double layering of protection against risk is like breathing around Berkshire. It’s just part of the culture.
那种双重的风险保护就像伯克希尔的呼吸一样。这只是文化的一部分。
And the alternative culture is just the opposite. You call a man the Chief Risk Officer, but often he is functioning as a guy that makes you feel good while you do dumb things. (Laughter)
而另一种文化正好相反。你称一个人为“首席风险官”，但他往往只是一个在你做蠢事时让你感觉良好的人。（笑声）
So he’s like the Delphic oracle that convinced the Persian king to attack somebody or other. I mean, it’s — he’s just a dumb soothsayer.
所以他就像是那个说服波斯国王去攻击某个国家的德尔斐神谕。我是说，他只是个愚蠢的预言家。
And how can a guy be dumb when he’s got a Ph.D. and he can do all this advanced math?
一个拥有博士学位并能做所有这些高等数学的人怎么会愚蠢呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Easy. 沃伦·巴菲特：简单。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You can — (laughter) — but you can. It’s very — all you’ve got to do is crave system and computation so much that you torture reality into fitting some model — mathematical model — which really doesn’t match, particularly, under extreme conditions.
查理·芒格：你可以——（笑声）——但你可以。非常——你所要做的就是如此渴望系统和计算，以至于你将现实扭曲成符合某种模型——数学模型——而这种模型在极端条件下实际上并不匹配。
And then, because of this work that you’re putting into everything and these computations about daily trading, risk, and so forth, you feel confident that you’ve clobbered the risk, but you haven’t. You’re just clobbered up your own head. (Laughter)
然后，由于你在所有事情上投入的工作以及对日常交易、风险等的计算，你感到自信，认为自己已经消除了风险，但实际上并没有。你只是把自己的脑袋搞得一团糟。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We really want to run Berkshire, you know — (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们真的想经营伯克希尔，你知道的——（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll even applaud that one. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我甚至会为这个鼓掌。（笑）
We really want to run Berkshire so that if the world isn’t working tomorrow the way it’s working today and it’s working in a way nobody expected, that we don’t have a problem.
我们真的想以这样的方式经营伯克希尔：如果明天世界的运作方式与今天不同，并且以无人预料的方式运作，我们也不会有问题。
We do not want to be dependent on anybody or anything else. And yet we want to keep doing things.
我们不想依赖任何人或任何事。然而，我们想继续做事情。
So, we’ve found a way to do it — we think we found a way — to do that. It may give up some of the — well, obviously gives up earning higher returns 99 percent of the time, and maybe 99.9 percent of the time.
所以，我们找到了一个方法来做到这一点——我们认为我们找到了一个方法——来实现这一点。这可能会放弃一些——显然在 99%的时间里放弃了获得更高回报的机会，甚至可能在 99.9%的时间里。
Obviously, we could have run Berkshire with more leverage over the years than we have. But we wouldn’t have slept as well, and we wouldn’t feel comfortable — we’d have a lot of people in this room that have almost all their net worth in Berkshire, including me — and we wouldn’t feel comfortable running a business that way.
显然，多年来我们本可以用更多的杠杆来运营伯克希尔。但那样我们就不会睡得那么安稳，也不会感到舒适——在座的很多人，包括我在内，几乎所有的净资产都在伯克希尔——而我们也不会觉得以那样的方式运营公司是舒适的。
Why do it? I mean, it doesn’t — it just doesn’t make any sense to us to be exposed to ruin and disgrace and embarrassment and — for something that’s not that meaningful.
为什么要这样做？我的意思是，这对我们来说毫无意义，去冒着毁灭、耻辱和尴尬的风险——为了某些并不那么重要的事情。
If we can earn a decent return on capital, you know, what’s an extra percentage point? It just isn’t that important.
如果我们能获得不错的资本回报，你知道，多一个百分点又如何？这并不是那么重要。
So we will always try to behave in a way that, A, is not dependent on anybody else evaluating the risk except for us. It cannot be farmed out.
所以我们将始终努力以一种方式行事，A，不依赖于任何其他人评估风险，除了我们自己。它不能被外包。
And you’ve seen what happened to some institutions where the management thought they were farming it out. And, you know, if that means a reasonable return instead of a slightly unreasonable return, we just accept it.
你见过一些机构的情况，那里的管理层认为他们是在外包。而且，你知道，如果这意味着合理的回报而不是略微不合理的回报，我们只能接受它。
44. “If we can’t make a decision in five minutes, we can’t make it in five months”
“如果我们在五分钟内无法做出决定，那么五个月内也无法做出决定。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett. Hello, Mr. Munger. My name is (inaudible) (PH), and I’m from Munich, Germany.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生。您好，芒格先生。我的名字是（听不清）（PH），我来自德国慕尼黑。
I would like to get back to your point that, as a professional investor, one should be able to act quickly and decisively. That means being able to know what the intrinsic value is and to act within a day or within an hour if the market offers an opportunity.
我想回到您的观点，作为一名专业投资者，应该能够快速而果断地行动。这意味着要能够知道内在价值是什么，并在市场提供机会时在一天内或一小时内采取行动。
My question is, how large is the universe of companies which you have in your head whose intrinsic value you know, where you would be able to act within a day or two if the market offered an attractive price to you?
我的问题是，你脑海中那些你知道其内在价值的公司有多大规模，如果市场给出一个有吸引力的价格，你能在一两天内采取行动？
And, secondly, how come you suddenly invest in southern Korea or China?
其次，你怎么突然在南韩或中国投资了？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We can act — our immediate decision is whether we can figure the — what’s being offered out to us or not. I mean, there’s a go/no-go signal.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们可以采取行动——我们的直接决定是我们是否能弄清楚向我们提供的东西。我是说，这是一个继续/不继续的信号。
And Charlie and I are often thought to be rude when we think we’re just being polite and not wasting the other person’s time. So as they start mid-sentence in their first conversation with us, we just say, “Forget it.” And Charlie is pretty good at that, and I’m picking it up. (Laughter)
查理和我经常被认为是粗鲁的，但我们认为我们只是出于礼貌，不浪费对方的时间。所以，当他们在第一次与我们对话的中途开始时，我们就会说“忘了吧”。查理在这方面很擅长，我也正在学会。（笑声）
It’s — we know very, very, very early in a conversation whether somebody’s talking about something that there’s any chance is actionable by us.
我们在谈话中非常非常非常早就知道某人是否在谈论我们有可能采取行动的事情。
And we don’t worry about the ones we miss. We want to make sure that we don’t waste any time thinking about things that, when we get all through thinking about them, we’re not going to know enough to make the decision on. So we just rule those out. And that rules a lot of things out.
我们不担心那些我们错过的事情。我们要确保不浪费时间去思考那些即使想透了也无法做出决定的事情。所以我们就把这些排除在外。而这排除了很多事情。
But then, if it gets through a couple of these filters and makes it into an area where it says this is something that we know enough about to make a decision on, we’re ready to move right then.
但是，如果它通过了其中几个过滤器并进入一个区域，在那里它表明这是我们足够了解以做出决定的事情，我们就准备立即行动。
So we make decisions — we can make a decision in five minutes very easily. I mean, it just is not that complicated.
所以我们做决定——我们可以很轻松地在五分钟内做出决定。我的意思是，这并不那么复杂。
Now, we know about a number of businesses and industries, and there’s a lot of businesses and industries we don’t know anything about.
现在，我们了解许多企业和行业，但还有很多企业和行业我们一无所知。
We know a lot of things about certain kinds of bonds, and we know — there’s a variety of things we know about, and it’s nice if we can expand that universe of knowledge. But the most important thing is that anything that gets through is in an area of knowledge.
我们对某些类型的债券了解很多，我们知道——我们了解各种各样的事情，如果我们能扩展这个认识领域，那就很好。但最重要的是，任何通过过滤的东西都在认识范围内。
And the truth is, if we can’t make a decision in five minutes, we can’t make it in five months. You know, we’re not going to learn enough in the followings five months to make up for the fact that we went in deficient in the first place.
事实上，如果我们不能在五分钟内做出决定，那么我们在五个月内也做不了这个决定。在接下来的五个月内，我们不会学到足够的东西来弥补一开始的不足。
So it’s just not a problem around Berkshire. If we get a call and somebody says either they’ve got a business for sale or — that’s what we’re going to get on the calls — or if I’m reading a paper, or a magazine, or an annual report, or a 10-K, and I look at a price and there’s a significant differential between price and value, we move right then.
因此，在伯克希尔这根本不是问题。如果我们接到一个电话，有人说他们有一家公司要出售——这就是我们接到的电话——或者如果我正在读报纸、杂志、年度报告或10-K报表，我看到了价格与价值之间存在重大差异，我们就会立即采取行动。
And Charlie and I don’t need to talk to each other about it. I mean, we both think the same way, and we have generally similar spheres of knowledge.
查理和我不需要就此事互相交谈。我的意思是，我们的想法相同，并且我们通常有相似的认识领域。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s — the answer to your question is, we could make a lot of decisions about a lot of things very fast and very easily.
查理·芒格：答案是，我们可以对很多事情做出快速且轻松的决定。
And the — and we’re unusual in that respect. And the reason we’re able to do that is there’s such an enormous other lot of things that we won’t allow ourselves to think about at all.
在这方面，我们是与众不同的。我们能够做到这一点的原因是有大量其他事情，我们根本不允许自己去思考。
It’s just that simple. I mean, I have a little phrase when people make pitches to me, and about halfway through the first sentence, I say, “We don’t do startups.” They don’t exist.
就是这么简单。我有一个小习惯，当人们向我推销时，我在他们说到一半时会说，“我们不做初创公司。”它们对我们不存在。
Well, if you blot out startups, there’s a whole layer of complexity that goes out of your life. And we’ve got other little blotter-out systems. And using those, we finally find out that what remains is still a pretty large territory that we can handle. You think that’s fair, Warren?
如果你把初创公司排除在外，你生活中的一大层复杂性就被剔除了。我们还有其他一些“抹去系统”。通过使用这些方法，我们最终发现剩下的部分仍然是我们可以处理的相当大的领域。你觉得这样说公平吗，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: And an awful lot of giveaways that people, in the first sentence or two, throw out that, you know, we just know we aren’t — you know, it isn’t going to work. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：而且有很多赠品，很多人在最初的一两句话中透露的东西，我们知道我们不会——你知道，这行不通。（笑）
And we waste very — I would say — we waste a lot of time, but we waste it on things we want to waste our time on. (Laughs)
而且我们浪费了很多——我会说——我们浪费了很多时间，但我们把时间浪费在我们想浪费的事情上。（笑）
We’re very selective about that, and then we’re good at it. We waste a lot of time. But we’re not going to waste it on things we don’t want to waste it on.
我们在这方面非常挑剔，并且非常擅长它。我们确实浪费了很多时间，但我们不会浪费在我们不想浪费的事情上。
45. No thoughts on Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim
对墨西哥亿万富翁卡洛斯·斯利姆没有想法
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, thank you very much for this wonderful rite. Coming — my name is Jorge Garza (PH), and I’m coming from Mexico City.
观众成员：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，非常感谢你们举办这个精彩的仪式。我叫豪尔赫·加尔萨（音），我来自墨西哥城。
Coming from there, you have been occasionally compared to — or rather Carlos Slim has been occasionally compared to you, for other reasons than your love of the game of baseball. Can you please share your thoughts on him?
既然如此，你偶尔会被拿来与卡洛斯·斯利姆相比，或者更确切地说，卡洛斯·斯利姆偶尔会因为其他原因而被拿来与你相比，而不是因为你对棒球的热爱。你能分享一下你对他的看法吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — he came up once with two of his boys, and we had lunch. But that was probably 15 years ago. So I really have no special — I mean, you probably know a lot more about Carlos Slim than what I do.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我——他有一次带着他的两个儿子来，我们一起吃了午餐。但那可能是 15 年前的事了。所以我真的没有什么特别的——我的意思是，你可能比我更了解卡洛斯·斯利姆。
I read the news stories and all of that. And we had a perfectly pleasant lunch. But that was a long time ago.
我读了新闻报道等等。我们吃了一顿非常愉快的午餐。但那是很久以前的事了。
And, Charlie, do you have anything?
查理，你有什么要说的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I think you speak for the total knowledge of both of us about Carlos Slim. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不。我认为你已经代表我们两人对卡洛斯·斯利姆的全部了解发言了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go down the rest of the Forbes 400 for you, too, if you would like. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你愿意，我们也可以为你列出福布斯 400 富豪榜的其他人。（笑声）
46. Human rights issues shouldn’t keep a country out of the Olympics
人权问题不应使一个国家被排除在奥运会之外
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第四个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Andre Stalty (PH). I come from New York City, and I’m thrilled to be here. I’m greatly inspired by you. We follow you in our analyze business class in New York City, a small group of small investors. And my —
观众成员：您好。我叫安德烈·斯托尔蒂（PH），来自纽约市。我很高兴能在这里。我深受你们的启发。我们在纽约的一门投资分析课程中都会关注你们，一小群小投资者。
VOICE SHOTING: There are human rights violations in the Klamath.
语音报道：克拉马斯存在侵犯人权的行为。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is, would you, or have you, considered asking Coca-Cola to withdraw sponsorship from the Beijing Olympics in light of the immense human rights violations in Tibet, possibly inspiring a new business model that would value humanitarian interest as well as monetary interest?
观众成员：我的问题是，您是否会，或者是否曾考虑过要求可口可乐撤回对北京奥运会的赞助，鉴于西藏存在巨大的侵犯人权行为，这可能会激发一种新的商业模式，既重视人道主义利益又重视金钱利益？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I personally — you know, I personally think that the Olympics — and I hope they are — you know, conducted forever with everybody participating.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我个人认为奥运会——我希望它能够永远举行，所有国家都能参与其中。
I think that, personally, it’s a mistake to start deciding whether this country should be allowed and this country shouldn’t be allowed. (Applause.)
我觉得，个人来说，开始决定哪个国家应该被允许参加，哪个国家不应该被允许参加，这是错误的。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think it’s very hard to grade a couple hundred countries that might be participating, according to how their behavior was.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为根据他们的行为来评判可能参与的几百个国家是非常困难的。
I mean, we didn’t let women vote in the United States, you know, until 1920. So we went 140 or so, 130 years, and I would say that was a great human rights violation, but I would have hated to see the United States banned from the Olympics, you know, in the years prior to that because of that.
比如，在美国，直到1920年女性才获得投票权。我们走了140年，或者说130多年，我会说这是一个重大的人权侵犯，但我会不希望在此之前，美国因为这个原因被禁止参加奥运会。
So I just think it’s a terrible mistake to try to get into — the Olympics have a wonderful event. I think the more people participate in them, the better. And I think that, on balance, they contribute to a better world over time.
所以我只是认为尝试以惩罚的方式处理这是一个可怕的错误——奥运会是一个精彩的赛事。我认为参与的人越多越好。而且我认为，总的来说，它们随着时间的推移有助于创造一个更美好的世界。
So I would not start getting punitive about it. But I understand your motives on it. Thank you.
所以我不会因此而采取惩罚措施。但我理解你的动机。谢谢。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren understates my position. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，沃伦对我的立场有些低估。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I usually understate his position. This is a man of strong opinion.
沃伦·巴菲特：我通常低估了他的立场。这是一个有着强烈观点的人。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I would say to you people who are distressed by imperfections in China, ask yourself your question — the question — is China more, or less, imperfect as the decades have gone by?
查理·芒格：我想对那些对中国不完美感到困扰的人说，问问自己这个问题——随着几十年的过去，中国是变得更完美还是更不完美了？
And the answer is China is moving in the right direction. And as long as that’s happening, I think it’s a grave mistake to just pick the worst thing about somebody you don’t like and obsess about it.
答案是中国正在朝着正确的方向前进。只要这种情况在发生，我认为仅仅挑出你不喜欢的人的最糟糕的事情并对此过分关注是一个严重的错误。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The U.S. has moved in the right direction over years. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。多年来，美国一直在朝着正确的方向前进。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Our Constitution said blacks were three-fifths of a person, you know. We’ve moved a long way, and we’re far from perfection.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们的宪法曾经规定黑人是五分之三的人。你知道，我们已经走了很长的路，但我们离完美还很远。
But I think you do better with people that you’re working with to — if they’re going in the right direction, largely, to encourage them.
但我认为，如果他们大体上朝着正确的方向前进，你与他们合作时会做得更好，应该鼓励他们。
You may want to nudge them a bit, but I don’t think the Olympics is the right way to do it.
你可能想稍微推动他们一下，但我认为奥运会不是合适的方式。
47. We’ll reduce our reliance on coal, but not soon
我们将减少对煤炭的依赖，但不会很快。
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 5 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Jessica Helmers (PH), and I’m from Scottsdale, Arizona.
观众成员：你好。我的名字是杰西卡·赫尔默斯（音），我来自亚利桑那州的斯科茨代尔。
My question is, what future trends do you see in the coal industry? Do you think its cost advantage will outweigh its environmental impact?
我的问题是，您认为煤炭行业未来的发展趋势是什么？您认为其成本优势会超过其对环境的影响吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think in the short-term the world is going to use more coal, you know, and I think that there’s no question that there’s an environmental disadvantage to it.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为在短期内，世界将会使用更多的煤炭，你知道的，我认为毫无疑问这对环境是不利的。
And as the — I think the world will slowly — maybe more rapidly than that — but we will figure out better ways to do the things that coal does, that will be more environmentally friendly over time, but it isn’t going to happen fast.
我认为，世界将慢慢地——也许比这更快地——找到更好的方法来做煤炭所做的事情，这些方法随着时间的推移会更加环保，但这不会很快发生。
I mean, if you shut down the coal-generated utilities in the United States, you know, this — we would not be able to hold this meeting in a room with the lights on.
我的意思是，如果你关闭美国的燃煤发电设施，你知道，我们就无法在灯光明亮的房间里举行这次会议。
So it’s a very tough problem to solve, or to even make big inroads on in a short period of time.
所以这是一个非常难以解决的问题，或者即使在短时间内也很难取得重大进展。
Now, we — at MidAmerican — we’ve put in a lot of wind capacity in the last five years or so — probably about as much as anybody has.
现在，我们——在 MidAmerican——在过去五年左右投入了大量的风能容量——可能和任何人一样多。
But we are dependent a lot on coal. It’s cleaner coal than it was 20 years ago, but — and we will be dependent on it for a long time.
但我们在很大程度上依赖煤炭。现在的煤炭比 20 年前更清洁，但——我们将长期依赖它。
And, you know, it’s a worldwide problem, obviously. The Chinese are building coal plants at a very rapid rate.
而且，你知道，这显然是一个全球性问题。中国正在以非常快的速度建造燃煤电厂。
It’s going to require cooperation and leadership on a worldwide scale. And, frankly, the United States is not in a great position in terms of leadership because, you know, per capita, we’ve done as much to this planet of a negative nature as any country in the world.
这将需要在全球范围内的合作和领导。坦率地说，美国在领导方面并不处于有利地位，因为你知道，就人均而言，我们对这个星球造成的负面影响与世界上任何国家一样多。
So we — it’s a little tough for us to go around preaching to people, but we will need a leader, in my view, that can sort of transcend our record of the past and get cooperation from major countries around the world.
所以我们——对我们来说，到处向人们宣讲有点困难，但在我看来，我们需要一个能够超越我们过去记录并获得世界主要国家合作的领导者。
I don’t think it’s going to be — but I don’t think it’s going to be fast. Charlie is less pessimistic on this than I am.
我不认为会这样——但我不认为会很快。查理对此比我更乐观。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the people who are very against the use of coal should reflect: which one they’d rather use up fast — the hydrocarbons, the oil and natural gas, or the coal?
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为那些非常反对使用煤炭的人应该反思一下：他们更愿意快速消耗哪一种——碳氢化合物、石油和天然气，还是煤炭？
I would rather use up the coal because it’s less desirable as a chemical feed stock for what we need to feed the world.
我宁愿用完煤，因为作为化学原料来说，它不太适合我们需要来养活世界的需求。
And so I would argue that there’s an environmental reason, in terms of human kind, for being very pro-coal use.
因此，我认为从人类的角度来看，有一个支持使用煤炭的环境理由。
Most people don’t think that way, but I do. (Laughter)
大多数人不是那样想的，但我是。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie does not find comfort in numbers.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理并不在乎大多数人的看法。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。
48. Don’t lump regional banks together
不要将地区银行混为一谈
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Rosat Bastar (PH). I live in Sacramento, California.
观众成员：我的名字是罗萨特·巴斯塔（音）。我住在加利福尼亚州萨克拉门托。
The stock prices of most small, regional banks have become more attractive in the past one year. Do you have any opinions about regional banks as investments? And if you were going to purchase shares, what are the areas that you would carefully examine?
过去一年，大多数小型地区银行的股票价格变得更具吸引力。您对地区银行作为投资有什么看法？如果您打算购买股票，您会仔细研究哪些方面？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think you should make a categorical decision about something like — however you define them — small, mid cap, whatever, regional, or national banks for that matter.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为你不应该对某些事情做出绝对的决定——无论你如何定义它们——小型、中型、无论是地区性还是全国性的银行。
So much depends on the character of the institution, which will probably be a reflection, to a great degree, of the type of CEO you have.
银行的特点在很大程度上取决于机构的性质，这很可能与CEO有很大的关系。
And I — a bank can mean anything. It can — you know, it can mean an institution that’s doing all kinds of crazy things.
而我——银行可以意味着任何东西。它可以——你知道，它可以意味着一个正在做各种疯狂事情的机构。
It can — there was one called the Bank of the Commonwealth up in Detroit many years ago that went to extremes, and it was very popular on Wall Street for a while.
它可以——多年前在底特律有一家叫做联邦银行的银行走到了极端，并且在华尔街一度非常受欢迎。
It could mean the soundest of institutions. We had one — we owned a bank — the only bank Berkshire’s ever owned in its entirety — in Rockford, Illinois, run by a fellow named Gene Abegg.
这可能意味着最稳健的机构。我们曾经拥有一个银行——伯克希尔唯一全资拥有的银行——位于伊利诺伊州罗克福德，由一位名叫吉恩·阿贝格的人经营。
And, you know, it wouldn’t make any difference whether it was a super-regional or a regional or a small or a mid-cap bank, there’s no way Gene Abegg could run anything other than a super-sound bank.
而且，你知道，无论是超级区域银行、区域银行、小型银行还是中型银行，Gene Abegg 只能经营一家超级稳健的银行。
So I don’t think you should — I think you should know something about the culture of the management and the institution to make a firm buy decision on a bank, and that’s hard to do for 99 percent of the banks.
所以我认为你应该对管理层和银行的文化有所了解，才能对银行做出坚定的购买决策，但对于99%的银行来说，这很难做到。
We own stock, as you know — it’s in our report — Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank and M&T up in Buffalo. And in all three cases, I think I understand quite well the DNA of the institution, in terms of how it behaves.
正如你所知道的，我们在报告中持有富国银行、美国银行和位于布法罗的M&T银行的股票。在这三种情况下，我认为我对这些银行的基因文化有相当深的了解，知道它们如何行事。
That doesn’t mean those places are immune from problems, because they’ll have problems. But it means — but it does mean — they’re immune, in my view, from what I would call institutional stupidity. And I would not say that all banks are immune from that.
这并不意味着这些银行不会出现问题，因为它们肯定会有问题。但这意味着——但在我看来，这确实意味着——它们免于我所称的制度性愚蠢。而我不能对所有银行都这么说。
As a matter of fact, there was a very wise man named — I think it was Morris Cohen (Morris Schapiro) — that said, “There are more banks than bankers,” and if you think about that awhile, you’ll get my point. (Laughs)
事实上，有一位非常聪明的人——我想他叫莫里斯·科恩（莫里斯·沙皮罗）——说过：“银行比银行家多。”如果你仔细想想，就会明白我的意思。（笑）
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the questioner is onto something.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为提问者说得有道理。
So many of our very large banks, both here and in Europe, have sort of cast a pall of disgrace over the whole industry, and that is undoubtedly pounded down the stocks of some small banks that there’s nothing at all wrong with.
我们这里和欧洲的很多大型银行在某种程度上给整个行业蒙上了一层耻辱的阴影，这无疑打击了某些没有任何问题的小型银行的股票。
So I think you’re prospecting in a likely territory.
所以我认为你正在一个可能的领域进行探索。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but you can find a few big banks —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但你可以找到一些大银行——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. (Crosstalk)
查理·芒格：是的。（交谈声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And it — I don’t know if you took the 20 smallest banks in Florida and the 20 largest banks in Florida which group would be in better shape, in terms of the Florida real estate situation.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道如果你把佛罗里达州最小的 20 家银行和最大的 20 家银行进行比较，哪一组在佛罗里达房地产状况方面会更好。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a territory that has some promise. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：这是一个有希望的领域。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That is a wildly bullish statement from Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理的这句话是一个非常乐观的陈述。（笑声）
49. Nuclear proliferation is the “primary problem of mankind”
核扩散是“人类的主要问题”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7. I’m going to go out and buy that stuff as soon as we get out of here. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：第七。我一离开这里就去买那些东西。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Matt Thurman (PH), Chicago, Illinois.
观众成员：下午好。我的名字是马特·瑟曼（音），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。
Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, what are your thoughts on preventing further nuclear proliferation, given recent events in Syria, Iran, North Korea, and other countries? Thank you.
巴菲特先生，芒格先生，鉴于最近在叙利亚、伊朗、朝鲜和其他国家发生的事件，您对防止进一步核扩散有何看法？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it’s the great problem of mankind, along with proliferation or the spread of other weapons of mass destruction in the chemical and biological field.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是人类面临的重大问题，与化学和生物领域其他大规模杀伤性武器的扩散或传播一起。
The genie is out of the bottle on nuclear knowledge, and more and more people are going to know how to do enormous damage to the rest of the human race as the years go by.
核知识的“魔鬼”已经放出了，随着时间的推移，越来越多的人将知道如何对其他人类造成巨大伤害。
You’ll have a given percentage of the population that are psychotics or megalomaniacs or religious fanatics or whatever, and will wish ill on their neighbors.
你会发现一定比例的人口是精神病患者、妄想狂、宗教狂热者或其他类型的人，他们会对邻居心怀恶意。
And the choke point will be — presumably — will be materials, and to a degree, deliverability.
而关键点将是——假设——是材料，以及在某种程度上，交付能力。
I think there — people generally associate weapons of mass destruction threats these days with terrorists and rogue organizations of some sort and not so much with nations.
我认为——人们如今普遍将大规模杀伤性武器的威胁与恐怖分子和某种流氓组织联系在一起，而不是与国家联系在一起。
But I regard both as being enormous threats to the future of mankind, and we have not made much progress in that respect to — we should be doing everything possible to reduce access to materials — and I’ve even had a few thoughts on that which you can look up on the Nuclear Threat Initiative, probably on the website.
但我认为这两者都是对人类未来的巨大威胁，而在这方面我们并没有取得太大进展——我们应该尽一切可能减少对材料的获取——我甚至对此有一些想法，你可以在核威胁倡议的网站上查找。
And we’ve got a proposal, actually, that might reduce by a tiny bit the rationale, at least, for all kinds of nations having highly-enriched uranium and that sort of thing.
实际上，我们有一个提议，至少可以在一定程度上减少各国拥有高浓缩铀等物质的理由。
But it’s the — it is the primary problem of mankind. If you’ve got 6 1/2 billion people, you’re probably going to have — in the world — you’re probably going to have close to twice the number of people who wish ill on their neighbor than you had when you had 3 billion people.
但这确实是人类的首要问题。如果你有65亿人，可能会有——在这个世界上——你可能会有近两倍的人希望对邻居不利，这比30亿人时要多得多。
And for a long time, if you were a psychotic or something, you could pick up a stone and throw it at the guy in the next cave, and you moved onto bows and arrows and rifles and cannon. But for millennia, the ability to inflict massive damage was quite limited, no matter how crazy you were.
很长一段时间以来，如果你是个精神病患者或类似的人，你可以捡起一块石头扔向隔壁洞穴的人，然后你就发展到弓箭、步枪和大炮。但几千年来，无论你多么疯狂，造成巨大伤害的能力都相当有限。
And since 1945, when Einstein said that the atomic bomb, as they called it then, “has changed everything in the world except how men think.” That was a comment made shortly after Hiroshima.
自 1945 年以来，爱因斯坦说原子弹（当时他们这样称呼）“改变了世界上的一切，除了人类的思维方式。” 这是在广岛事件后不久发表的评论。
We live in a world where exponentially — has experienced exponential growth — in the ability to inflict harm on somebody else, and we haven’t gotten rid of the nuts or the people who want to do it.
我们生活在一个这样的世界中，伤害他人的能力呈指数级增长，而我们还没有消除那些疯子或想要这样做的人。
And it is — whether it’s, you know, Iran or you name it, or whether it’s terrorist organizations or whatever, you know, we live in a very, very, very dangerous world on that that is getting more dangerous as we go along.
无论是伊朗，还是你能想到的其他国家，或者是恐怖组织或其他什么，我们生活在一个非常非常非常危险的世界中，而且随着时间的推移，这个世界变得越来越危险。
And we’ve been very lucky since 1945, you know, when the Cuban missile crisis came along in the ’60s, you know, it might have been 50-50, and I think we were lucky we were dealing with Khrushchev and we were lucky that Kennedy behaved the way he did. But we were lucky, and Charlie and I talked a lot about it in the ’60s at the time.
自 1945 年以来，我们一直很幸运，你知道，当 60 年代的古巴导弹危机出现时，可能是五五开，我认为我们很幸运当时是和赫鲁晓夫打交道，也很幸运肯尼迪的表现。但我们很幸运，查理和我在 60 年代时对此进行了很多讨论。
But it won’t go away. And you would hope, at least in the United States, that we have an administration, whether it’s Republican or Democrat, where that’s at the top of the agenda, trying to figure out a way to minimize that risk.
但它不会消失。你会希望，至少在美国，我们有一个政府，无论是共和党还是民主党，都将其列为议程的首要任务，努力找出一种方法来尽量减少这种风险。
You can’t eliminate it. It is out of the bottle. But we’ve got to — it should be paramount to minimize the risk that we really get into something that involves, you know, deaths on a scale that nobody’s ever contemplated before.
你无法消除这种风险。它已经放出了。但我们必须——这应该是首要的任务，尽量减少我们真正卷入到某种导致前所未有的大规模死亡的事件中。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, you talk about deaths on a scale that people have never contemplated before.
查理·芒格：是的。嗯，你谈论的是人们从未想象过的规模上的死亡。
People have recently figured out that the population of Mexico probably had a population decline of 95 percent caused by European man bringing in his pathogens. And it was a pretty big civilization that went through that little knothole.
人们最近发现，墨西哥的人口可能因为欧洲人带来的病原体而减少了95%。这是一个经历了这一切的大文明。
These things can happen and have happened. And look at Mexico today. I don’t think it’s going to wipe out the species.
这些事情可能发生并且已经发生。看看今天的墨西哥。我不认为这会导致物种灭绝。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，那是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I hope that cheers you up. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我希望这能让你高兴起来。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The cockroaches will survive.
沃伦·巴菲特：蟑螂会存活下来。
It’s a very good question. I wish I knew a better answer.
这是个很好的问题。我希望我知道一个更好的答案。
50. Buffett’s advice for young people
巴菲特给年轻人的建议
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m (inaudible) from Apopka, Florida. I would like to thank you for this wonderful opportunity to learn so much more about finances and, at the same time, have a wonderful time. It’s been fun.
观众成员：下午好。我是来自佛罗里达州阿波普卡的（听不清）。我想感谢您提供这个美好的机会，让我能学到更多关于财务的知识，同时也度过了一段美好的时光。这很有趣。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s great.
沃伦·巴菲特：太好了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I teach at Valencia Community College in Orlando, Florida. I teach office administration and business.
听众成员：我在佛罗里达州奥兰多的瓦伦西亚社区学院任教。我教授办公室管理和商业课程。
I applaud my students for investing in themselves by enrolling in college. I also want to stress financial independence and financial freedom. I do this by telling them that slow and steady wins the race; also, good, sound financial management; and then the law of reciprocity.
我赞扬我的学生通过上大学来投资自己。我也想强调财务独立和财务自由。我通过告诉他们，慢而稳才能赢得比赛；还有良好、稳健的财务管理；以及互惠法则。
I have them track every expense over a period of time. Also they buy, theoretically, one stock and track that, too, over a period of time. We keep track of the current financial news, current news, and also they have research papers. (Applause.)
我让他们追踪一段时间内的每一项支出。此外，他们还理论上购买一只股票并跟踪这只股票的表现。我们跟踪当前的财务新闻和时事新闻，还有研究论文。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. (Laughter)
观众成员：谢谢。（笑声）
They research FICO scores, the credit reports, Clark Howard, Suze Orman, the top ten billionaires, not because — (Applause)
他们研究 FICO 评分、信用报告、克拉克·霍华德、苏兹·奥曼、前十名亿万富翁，不是因为——（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think —
沃伦·巴菲特：我想——
Could you move onto your question, then, please? (Laughter)
请问你能直接问你的问题吗？（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. 观众成员：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: But thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：但谢谢你。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. What else should I be doing to lead them — (laughter) — to make sound financial decisions and to have happy, sound financial life?
听众成员：好的。我还应该做些什么来引导他们——（笑声）——做出明智的财务决策，并拥有快乐、稳健的财务生活？
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m ready to hire your entire class right now. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我现在准备雇用你们整个班级。（笑声）
Well, I think you’re telling — you’re giving them some very good advice. I think that the most important investment you can make is in yourself.
嗯，我认为你在给他们一些非常好的建议。我认为你能做的最重要的投资就是投资自己。
I mean, very, very, very few people get anything like their potential horsepower translated into the actual horsepower of their output in life.
我的意思是，极少数人能将他们潜在的马力转化为生活中实际输出的马力。
And potential exceeds realization to just an enormous factor with so many people.
潜力远远超过实现，对于许多人来说，这是一个巨大的因素。
And I — one illustration you might try with your class — I tell them this when I talk to high school groups — just imagine that you’re 16 and I was going to give you a car of your choice today, any car you wanted to pick, and — but there was one catch attached to it — it was the only car you were going to get in the rest of your life, so you had to make it last there. You can pick out the fanciest you want, a Maserati, whatever it might be.
我告诉他们这个例子，当我和高中生群体交流时，你可以试着在课堂上使用这个例子——想象一下你 16 岁，我今天要送你一辆你选择的车，任何你想要的车——但有一个条件——这是你一生中唯一能得到的车，所以你必须让它持久。你可以选择你想要的最豪华的车，一辆玛莎拉蒂，或者其他任何车。
How would you treat it? Well, of course you would read the owner’s manual about five times before you turn the key in the ignition. You’d keep it garaged. Any little rust, you would get taken care of immediately. You’d change the oil twice as often as you were supposed to, because you know it has to last a lifetime.
你会怎么对待它呢？当然，你会在点火前把用户手册读上五遍。你会把它停在车库里。任何一点小锈，你都会立刻处理掉。你会比规定的频率多换两次机油，因为你知道它必须用一辈子。
And then I tell the students, you get one body and one mind, and it’s going to have to last you a lifetime, and you better treat it the same way, and you better start treating it right now, because it doesn’t do you any good to start worrying about that when you’re 50 or 60 and the rust — that little speck of rust — has turned into something big.
然后我告诉学生们，你只有一个身体和一个大脑，它们必须陪伴你一生，你最好以同样的方式对待它们，而且你最好现在就开始好好对待它们，因为等到你 50 或 60 岁时才开始担心这件事是没有用的，那时那一点点锈迹已经变成了大问题。
So anything your students do to invest in their mind and body — particularly your mind — we didn’t work too hard on the bodies around here, but — (laughter) — you know, it pays off. It pays off in an extraordinary way.
所以，无论你的学生做什么来投资他们的身心——特别是你的心灵——我们在这里并没有太过努力地锻炼身体，但是——（笑声）——你知道，这会有回报的。这会以一种非凡的方式得到回报。
Your best asset is your own self. And you can become, to an enormous degree, the person you want to be.
你最好的资产就是你自己。你可以在很大程度上成为你想成为的人。
When I get classes in universities, I just ask them to imagine they were going to buy one of their classmates to own 10 percent of for the rest of their life. Which one would they pick?
当我在大学上课时，我只是让他们想象要买下他们的一位同学，拥有其余生 10%的股份。他们会选择哪一个？
They wouldn’t pick the one with the highest IQ, or necessarily the one with the highest grades. They’d pick the person that’s going to be effective.
他们不会选择智商最高的人，也不一定选择成绩最好的人。他们会选择那个能够有效发挥作用的人。
And the reason people are effective is because other people want to work with them. They want to be around them. And other people they don’t want to be around.
人们之所以有效，是因为其他人愿意与他们合作。他们想要与他们在一起。而其他人则不想与他们在一起。
And those are qualities than an individual picks up — being generous, being humorous, being on time, not claiming credit for more than you do but rather less than you do, helping out other people — all kinds of human qualities that turn other people on, and then there’s things that turn other people off.
这些都是一个人所具备的品质——慷慨、幽默、守时、不夸大自己的功劳而是谦虚、帮助他人——所有这些人性品质都会吸引他人，而有些则会让他人反感。
And those are habits, and they’re the habits that you pick up when they’re the age of your students. The habits they have today will follow them throughout life, so why not have good ones? So that’s the only message I would give your students. (Applause)
这些就是习惯，而这些习惯是你在他们这个年龄时养成的。他们今天的习惯会伴随他们一生，所以为什么不养成好的习惯呢？所以这就是我想给你们学生传达的唯一信息。（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve got a specific suggestion that answers your specific question. I would add to that extensive repertoire of yours by teaching them to avoid being manipulated to their disadvantage by vendors and by lenders using the standard tricks of the vendor and lender trade.
查理·芒格：嗯，我有一个具体的建议来回答你的具体问题。我会在你广泛的知识库中增加一项内容，教他们避免被供应商和贷款人利用供应商和贷款行业的标准技巧来操控，从而使自己处于不利地位。
And you couldn’t start with a better book than Cialdini’s “Influence,” and I think Bob Cialdini, who is a shareholder, is here somewhere in this audience.
你不可能找到比齐亚尔迪尼的《影响力》更好的书作为开始，我想鲍勃·齐亚尔迪尼，这位股东，就在这个观众席的某个地方。
And so I have a new textbook to — I suggest you add to your class — which is Cialdini’s “Influence.” And he’s just got a new book that’s coming out and for sale in Omaha today, I think, for the first time, and that’s called “Yes.”
所以我有一本新教材要——我建议你添加到你的课程中——那就是 Cialdini 的《影响力》。他刚刚有一本新书要出版，我想今天第一次在奥马哈出售，那本书叫《Yes》。
So here’s two books that I suggest you add to your class.
所以我建议你把这两本书加入到你的课程中。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声。）
51. Buffett on owning sports teams
巴菲特谈拥有体育团队
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 9 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Andrew (inaudible) from Chicago, Illinois, and I’m nine years old, and I’m a big baseball fan. I know you like baseball, and my favorite team is the Chicago Cubs.
观众成员：我是安德鲁（听不清）来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥，我九岁，我是一个棒球迷。我知道你喜欢棒球，我最喜欢的球队是芝加哥小熊队。
Would you like to buy the Chicago Cubs from Sam Zell? (Laughter)
你想从萨姆·泽尔手中购买芝加哥小熊队吗？（笑声）
And my question is, do you think buying baseball teams is a good investment? (Applause)
我的问题是，你认为购买棒球队是一个好的投资吗？（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s been a good investment. It’s been a good investment. It’s not been a good investment necessarily because the earnings have gone up so much, although cable television multiplied the value in a big way.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是一项不错的投资。这是一项不错的投资。这并不一定是因为收益大幅增加，尽管有线电视在很大程度上增加了价值。
In effect, television expanded the stadium. Wrigley Field, I think, probably seats less than 40,000, maybe.
实际上，电视扩大了体育场。我想，瑞格利球场可能容纳不到 40,000 人。
So you had 40,000 seats available when I went there for my first major league baseball game in 1939. But then along came television, and then cable television, and pay — in effect, pay-cable television for baseball or sports networks, and that multiplied the seats in a huge way.
所以当我在 1939 年第一次去那里观看职业棒球比赛时，有 40,000 个座位可用。但随后电视出现了，然后是有线电视，以及付费——实际上是棒球或体育网络的付费有线电视，这大大增加了座位的数量。
Now, a lot of that went to the players, but some of it stuck to the owners.
现在，很多都给了球员，但有些留给了老板。
I am not a — when I was your age, I would have thought if I made a lot of money, I would have bought a team.
我并不是——当我在你这个年纪时，我会认为如果我赚了很多钱，我会买一支球队。
But there were a lot of things I thought I would do then — (laughter) — I haven’t done subsequently.
但那时我想做的很多事情——（笑声）——后来我并没有做到。
So, I don’t think — if the Cubs sell for 700 million, and you’ve got a percentage of that in your bank account — now, I don’t think I would buy in at that price.
所以，我不认为——如果小熊队以 7 亿美元出售，而你的银行账户中有一部分——现在，我不认为我会以那个价格买入。
There’s a psychic income to many people in owning sports teams. I mean, it makes them famous. Maybe not in the way they anticipated when they bought the team, but the — you know, it is a way to instant celebrity and recognition and all that.
拥有体育团队对许多人来说有一种精神上的收益。我的意思是，这让他们出名。也许并不是他们买下球队时所预期的那种方式，但这确实是一种迅速获得名声和认可的方式。
And as long as we live in a society where people have loads and loads of money, a certain percentage of people are going to want to become known for the fact that they have done very well in life, and a sports team is certainly one way of doing it. That isn’t the only reason people buy them, obviously.
只要我们生活在一个有很多很多钱的社会中，某些人就会想要因为他们在生活中取得了很大成功而出名，而拥有一支体育队无疑是实现这一目标的一种方式。当然，这并不是人们购买它们的唯一原因。
买球队看着等同于娶女明星。
But I will say this, you are not the first one that’s asked me about buying the Cubs. (Laughs)
不过我会说，你不是第一个问我关于购买小熊队的人。（笑）
I’ve had calls — not from Sam — but from other people, and it’s — I think I’ll leave that to you.
我接到过电话——不是来自山姆——而是来自其他人，我想我会把这留给你。
Charlie? You know anything about buying a sports team? He would be a tougher sell than I would. I might do something kind of stupid like that, but —
查理？你对购买体育队有什么看法？他会比我更难说服。我可能会做一些傻事，比如那样，但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve already done it once.
查理·芒格：嗯，你已经做过一次了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter) Touche.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）说得好。
52. U.S. may be so rich it doesn’t need to save
美国可能富裕到不需要储蓄
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, my name is Andy Peake (PH), and I’m from Weston, Connecticut.
观众成员：主席先生，副主席先生，我叫安迪·皮克（音），我来自康涅狄格州的韦斯顿。
Americans at the individual, municipal, state, and federal levels, historically, do not save.
美国人在个人、市政、州和联邦层面上，历来不储蓄。
On the other hand, Asians save approximately 40 percent of their income. Living beyond one’s means is an American way that obviously cannot continue.
另一方面，亚洲人约有40%的收入用于储蓄。生活超出自己能力的范围显然是美国的一种方式，但这显然无法持续下去。
First, why is it that Americans do not save, and, secondly, what can we do to correct this long-term problem? Thank you.
首先，为什么美国人不储蓄，其次，我们可以做些什么来纠正这个长期问题？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well certainly the savings rate in this country is — has fallen significantly and may even be negative, although it does seem to me that the value of the country, in real terms, I think, does increase quite significantly decade to decade.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这个国家的储蓄率确实大幅下降，甚至可能为负数，尽管在我看来，这个国家的实际价值每十年确实显著增加。
So I’m not sure exactly how it happens without savings, but it does seem to me that this country, as a whole, is worth considerably more than it was 10 or 20 or 30 or 40 years ago, in real terms. So something good has happened.
所以我不太确定在没有储蓄的情况下它是如何发生的，但在我看来，这个国家整体上比 10 年、20 年、30 年或 40 年前的实际价值要高得多。所以一定发生了一些好事。
But the propensity to save, that almost seems innate, in at least the great majority of cases. I mean, we’ve got our friend from Florida teaching children to save, and I think that has some impact.
但是，储蓄的倾向几乎似乎是天生的，至少在绝大多数情况下是这样。我的意思是，我们有一位来自佛罗里达的朋友在教孩子们储蓄，我认为这有一定的影响。
And I should have thanked Andy Heyward for that terrific cartoon this morning, and he’s got a program that I’m participating in that we think — in cartoon form — might influence a few younger people towards saving.
我本应该感谢安迪·海沃德今天早上的精彩卡通，他有一个我参与的项目，我们认为以卡通形式可能会影响一些年轻人去储蓄。
If you own Berkshire stock, you’re automatically saving, because we retain earnings, and you’re indirect interest in those retained earnings is a form of saving.
如果你拥有伯克希尔的股票，你就自动在储蓄，因为我们保留了收益，而你对这些保留收益的间接权益是一种储蓄形式。
So you can spend every dollar of your income that comes in the other way, and if you own Berkshire, you are, net, saving, which is a practice I have now been following for 40 years. Sometimes to my family’s consternation.
因此，你可以花掉你每一美元的收入，而如果你拥有伯克希尔，你实际上是在储蓄，这是一种我已经坚持了 40 年的做法。有时这让我的家人感到不安。
I don’t know that the — you know, the savings rate is based on calculations made on consumption and imports and so on. We are importing $700 billion more of goods and services than we’re exporting. And that means that somebody else is doing our savings for us, basically, as we export ownership and claims against America.
我不知道储蓄率的计算是基于消费、进口等数据。我们每年进口的商品和服务比出口多出7000亿美元。这意味着，基本上是别人为我们储蓄，因为我们在输出所有权和对美国的索赔。
I think that’s going to have consequences over time, but we are so rich that it may not be really apparent.
我认为这随着时间的推移会产生后果，但我们如此富有，以至于可能并不明显。
I think the average American’s standard of living is going to improve, in real terms, although I think it may be very, very, very disproportionate, the extent to which the — particularly the super-rich — benefit compared to those in the middle class.
我认为，尽管可能会非常、非常、非常不均衡，但平均而言，美国人的生活水平将会在实际意义上得到改善，尤其是超级富豪相比中产阶级受益的程度。
But, net, I think the country will be — even with our present policies, the net — in net real terms, the value on a per capita basis of the country will increase from decade to decade.
但是，总的来说，我认为即使按照我们目前的政策，从净实际价值来看，这个国家的人均价值将会在每个十年中增加。
But nothing like it will, in places like a China or Korea percentage-wise, where the savings rate is very high.
但在像中国或韩国这样的地方，储蓄率非常高，情况不会像这样。
This country may not save very much because it may not need to save very much. We have $47,000 of GDP per capita. It may not be distributed very well, but we are one very, very, very rich country.
这个国家可能不会存很多钱，因为它可能不需要存很多钱。我们的人均 GDP 为 47,000 美元。分配可能不是很好，但我们是一个非常非常非常富有的国家。
And a very rich country may not need to save as much as a country that’s trying to reach its potential.
一个非常富有的国家可能不需要像一个努力实现其潜力的国家那样多的储蓄。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that.
查理·芒格：我对此没有什么要补充的。
53. Why Buffett is going to Germany
巴菲特为何前往德国
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 11 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger —
观众成员：巴菲特先生，芒格先生——
WARREN BUFFETT: This sounds serious.
沃伦·巴菲特：这听起来很严肃。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is — (Laughter)
观众成员：我的名字是——（笑声）
I’m used to that. My name is Uta Bauda (PH) from Munich. Again, a guy from Germany.
我习惯了。我的名字是乌塔·鲍达（音译），来自慕尼黑。又是一个来自德国的家伙。
We’re going to meet in around about 14 days’ time again in Germany, in Frankfurt at the Union Club. May I ask you a little bit ahead of the others, what your reasons for coming to Germany? Thank you.
我们大约在 14 天后将在德国法兰克福的联合俱乐部再次见面。我能否提前问一下您，您来德国的原因是什么？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s very simple. We want more — not that there have been hardly any so far — but we would like more family owners of German businesses — in some cases in the family, maybe a hundred years, maybe 20 years, whatever it might be — we want more owners who, when they feel some need to monetize their business, think of Berkshire Hathaway.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这很简单。我们想要更多——并不是说到目前为止几乎没有——但我们希望更多的德国企业家族所有者——在某些情况下可能已经有一百年的历史，也可能有二十年，无论是什么——我们希望更多的所有者在他们感到需要变现自己企业的时候，能够想到伯克希尔·哈撒韦。
We want to be on their radar screen. We want to be in the same position — we want them to be in the same position that the Wertheimer family was or Paul Andrews’ family was here not so long ago, or the Pritzker family was.
我们希望能够在他们的视野中。我们希望处于相同的位置——我们希望他们处于不久前 Wertheimer 家族或 Paul Andrews 家族在这里的位置，或者 Pritzker 家族的位置。
When they have some reason — could be a variety of them — that they wanted to convert a — the ownership of a good — very good — company about which they care a great deal — translated into money, to think about calling us. And if they care about their business, we are their best call.
当他们有某种理由——可能是多种原因——想将一个非常好的公司（他们非常关心的公司）的所有权转换为金钱时，能够想到联系到我们。如果他们关心他们的企业，我们就是他们最好的选择。
And I don’t think we’re anywhere near as prominent on the radar screen in Germany as we are in the United States, and it’s something I probably should have done more about earlier, but now I’m going to hit four countries in Europe in a few weeks.
我认为我们在德国的知名度远不如在美国那么高，这可能是我早些时候应该多加注意的事情，但现在我将在几周内访问欧洲的四个国家。
And when we leave, I think we’ll be somewhat better known — what we’re looking for, what we can do for those companies, why they should give us a call — I think we’ll be better known a month from now than we are now.
当我们离开时，我想我们会更为人所知——我们在寻找什么，我们能为那些公司做些什么，为什么他们应该给我们打电话——我想一个月后我们会比现在更为人所知。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And Germany is a particularly advanced civilization, in terms of inventiveness and engineering.
查理·芒格：是的。德国在发明和工程方面是一个特别先进的文明。
You go into an American printing plant now, and the names on the machines are all German — not all, but mostly.
你现在走进一家美国印刷厂，机器上的名字都是德文——不是全部，但大多数是。
Now, some of the German names are Germans that came over here to America and formed printing equipment businesses. But it’s just amazing the influence that the Germans have had on field after field in America. It’s a very logical place for us to be looking.
现在，一些德国名字是那些来到美国并成立印刷设备公司的德国人。但令人惊讶的是，德国人在美国的各个领域都有影响。这是我们应该关注的一个非常合乎逻辑的地方。
WARREN BUFFETT: Sounds like maybe Charlie should go. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：听起来也许应该让查理去。（笑声）
54. Munger on housing: A “particularly foolish mess”
芒格谈住房：“特别愚蠢的混乱”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十二号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Len Yaffe. My wife, Ruth, and I live in Tiburon, California.
观众成员：我叫伦·亚菲。我和我的妻子露丝住在加利福尼亚的蒂布龙。
I was wondering if the current economic stresses remind you of any prior period in U.S., or any other nation’s, history, and, if so, is there anything we can learn from the prior period that might help us manage the current period better?
我想知道当前的经济压力是否让您想起美国或其他国家历史上的任何先前时期，如果是这样，我们能否从先前时期中学到一些东西，以帮助我们更好地管理当前时期？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they’re all a little different and they all have similarities. But this one, obviously, had more of its origins in the mortgage field and in terms of the residential real estate bubble.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，它们都有些不同之处，也有相似之处。但显然，这次的起源更多是在抵押贷款领域以及住宅房地产泡沫方面。
But the troubles that begin in one area have a way of spreading to other areas.
但在一个领域开始的问题往往会蔓延到其他领域。
But I would say that, in my lifetime, it’s been — I can’t remember one where this particular residential real estate bubble has sent out the shock waves and the exposure of other practices elsewhere to — as to their weaknesses — like this one.
不过，我想说，在我一生中，我记不起来有哪个时期像这个特定的住宅房地产泡沫那样发出的震荡波，暴露了其他地方的其他做法的弱点。
But I don’t think there’s any magic to the analysis or anything like that. I think that some stupid things were done that won’t be done soon again, and they won’t be done exactly the same again, but variations of them will pop up at some point.
但我不认为分析或类似的事情有什么神奇之处。我认为有些愚蠢的事情已经做了，不会很快再做，而且不会完全相同地再做，但它们的变体会在某个时候出现。
Because humans are what lead to stupidity in behavior, and there are these sort of primal urges that — in terms of getting rich and using leverage and all of that sort of thing, and wanting to believe in the tooth fairy — that pop up from time to time in human behavior, and sometimes they pop up on a very big scale.
因为人类导致了行为上的愚蠢，并且存在这些原始的冲动——比如致富、利用杠杆以及所有这些事情，还有想要相信牙仙的愿望——这些冲动时不时地在人类行为中出现，有时它们会大规模地出现。
The — in terms of having any great insights on solutions or anything of the sort, I don’t have them.
至于是否有任何关于解决方案的重大见解，我没有。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. It was a particularly foolish mess. Now, at earlier meetings we talked about some idiot that decided that a credit delivery grocery business, like the old Buffett store —
查理·芒格：不。这是一个特别愚蠢的混乱。现在，在早些时候的会议上，我们谈到了某个白痴，他决定开一家信贷送货杂货店，就像旧的巴菲特商店一样——
WARREN BUFFETT: Webvan. 沃伦·巴菲特：Webvan。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, Webvan. You know, internet-based delivery service for groceries. A really asinine idea. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，Webvan。你知道，基于互联网的杂货配送服务。一个非常愚蠢的想法。（笑声）
And, of course, it met an ignominious failure.
当然，它以耻辱的失败告终。
That was smarter than what the people did in this mortgage field. (Laughter)
那比人们在抵押贷款领域做的事情要聪明得多。（笑声）
It was a lot smarter. I just wish we had those brilliant people back that gave us Webvan. (Laughter)
那时候聪明多了。我只是希望我们能找回那些给我们带来 Webvan 的聪明人。（笑声）
Which, by the way, reminds me of my general attitude toward political developments.
顺便说一下，这让我想起了我对政治发展的总体态度。
I have a rule and it’s as follows: the politicians are never so bad you don’t live to want them back. (Laughter)
我有一个规则，那就是：政治家从来没有那么糟糕，以至于你不会想念他们回来。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Pollyanna. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：乐观主义者。（笑）
55. Financial crisis-era assets should be valued at market
金融危机时代的资产应按市场价值评估
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：第1个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Bob Kline (PH) from Los Angeles.
观众成员：我是来自洛杉矶的鲍勃·克莱恩（PH）。
Following up on the last question, can you speak to the accuracy of the financial statements of the world’s major financial institutions?
继上一个问题之后，您能谈谈世界主要金融机构财务报表的准确性吗？
What should be done to properly value their assets, like mortgages, leverage loans, CDOs, and other assets that are, as Charlie says, as good until reached for?
应该采取什么措施来正确评估它们的资产，例如抵押贷款、杠杆贷款、CDO（担保债务义务）以及其他资产，正如查理所说的那样，这些资产在被触及之前都是“可用的”？
Since the leverage at these banks and brokerage firms is generally 15 to 20 times their tangible net worth, there isn’t much margin for error. So what can be done to improve the integrity of financial statements?
由于这些银行和经纪公司的杠杆率通常是其有形净值的 15 到 20 倍，因此没有太多的错误余地。那么，如何提高财务报表的完整性呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s a very tough thing.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是一件非常困难的事情。
I still lean strongly — there’s a lot of controversy now about whether you should use fair value, however that may be determined. In many cases, it’s very hard to determine.
我仍然强烈倾向于——现在有很多争议，关于是否应该使用公允价值，不管那如何确定。在很多情况下，很难确定。
But whether you should use that or some other figure like cost because people say that the present values are unrepresentative and so on.
但是否应该使用公允价值，或者使用某种其他数字，比如成本，因为人们说当前的价值并不代表实际情况，等等。
I think that you get into more troubles as a society when you start openly valuing things at prices that make no sense in terms of what’s going on, than whether you do your best to estimate them, even though those estimates may prove, many cases, optimistic later on, and certainly inaccurate in some respects.
我认为，当社会开始公开按价格评估那些在实际情况中毫无意义的东西时，会陷入更多麻烦，而不是尽力估计它们，即使这些估计在许多情况下可能后来证明过于乐观，并且在某些方面肯定不准确。
So I would stick with financial institutions at least having to attempt to report their assets on a fair value basis.
因此，我会坚持金融机构至少需要尝试以公允价值为基础报告其资产。。
But when you get into instruments — I’ve used this illustration before — but when you get into a CDO-Squared, if you read a standard mortgage — residential mortgage-backed certificate — security — it may consist of thousands of mortgages backing up this instrument.
但当你进入工具——我以前使用过这个例子——但当你进入CDO平方（CDO-Squared）时，如果你阅读标准的抵押——住宅抵押贷款支持证券（RMBS），它可能由成千上万的抵押贷款支撑这个工具。
And then that instrument may be traunched into 30 or so different traunches where each party has a different claim on the waterfall of funds received.
然后，该工具可能会被分成大约 30 个不同的分层，每个参与方对收到的资金瀑布有不同的索赔。
Now, that instrument itself can be kind of difficult to understand. But then you take that and you create a CDO by taking some of the lower junior tranches of a bunch of these RMBSs, maybe 50 of them, and then you create a CDO out of this.
现在，那种工具本身可能有点难以理解。但随后你将其用于创建 CDO，通过从一堆这些 RMBS 中提取一些较低级的部分，可能有 50 个，然后你用这些创建一个 CDO。
So now you create, out of a whole bunch of junior — and perhaps — and very correlated — and perhaps kind of lousy instruments — and then you put them in a CDO and say that because you put them all together and diversified, in theory, you’ve got a lot of triple-A traunches of that — was a big error to start with.
所以现在你用一大堆初级的——也许是——而且非常相关的——也许有点糟糕的工具来创建，然后你把它们放在一个 CDO 中，并说因为你把它们放在一起并进行了多样化，理论上，你得到了很多 AAA 级的部分——这从一开始就是一个大错误。
And then when you took the lower tranches of a bunch of CDOs and stuck them into a CDO-Squared, that was nuttiness squared.
然后，当你把一堆 CDO 的低级部分放入一个 CDO 平方时，那就是疯狂的平方。
And if a residential mortgage-backed security had a 300 page prospectus and you had to read 50 of those to understand a CDO, you’re up to 15,000 pages.
如果一份住房抵押贷款支持证券有 300 页的招股说明书，而你需要阅读其中的 50 份才能理解一个 CDO，那么你就要读 15,000 页。
And if you had to read 50 more CDO prospectuses, and the material behind that, to evaluate a CDO-Squared, you had to read 750,000 pages, presumably, to evaluate one security, and that was madness.
如果你必须再阅读 50 份 CDO 说明书，以及其背后的材料来评估一个 CDO-Squared，那么你必须阅读 750,000 页，显然，为了评估一个证券，这简直是疯狂。
To let people value that sort of thing, because they say the market at ten cents on the dollar is unrepresentative, so instead of using that, I’ll use the hundred cents I paid, I think would be an abomination.
让人们去评估这样的东西，因为他们说市场上每一美元的价值都不代表实际情况的，所以我将使用我支付的每一美元的价值，我认为这是一个可憎的行为。
And I think that the discipline, mild as it may be, of telling managements that you’re going to have to value this stuff at market may keep them from doing things that they would otherwise do that would be very stupid if they think they can get away with valuing them at some fictitious — or at cost — which would be fictitious, in terms of markets.
我认为，告诉管理层你必须以市场价值来评估这些东西的纪律，虽然可能温和，会阻止他们做一些愚蠢的事情——如果他们认为可以通过虚构的或基于成本的评估方式逃避责任的话。
I lean toward the market value approach. I don’t know — when you get into really complex instruments — I just don’t know how you value them.
我倾向于市场价值法。我不知道——当你涉及到非常复杂的工具时——我就是不知道该如何评估它们。
Charlie was on the audit committee at Salomon, and they would spend hours and hours and hours — and I think you found one that was mismarked by 20 million or something like that, back when 20 million was real money.
查理是所罗门的审计委员会成员，他们会花很多很多时间——我想你发现了一个被错误标记了两千万的东西，那时候两千万还是真正的大钱。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a floating plug.
查理·芒格：那是一个浮动插头。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we had the floating plug, too, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们也有浮动塞子，是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I — there’s a lot that goes on in the bowels of American industry that is not pretty. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，我——在美国工业的内部，发生了很多不光彩的事情。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: So you can add sausage and laws — maybe you should add accounting practices to the things that people shouldn’t have to witness the making of. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：所以你可以把香肠和法律——也许你应该把会计实务加到人们不应该目睹制作过程的事情中去。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think that part of the trouble comes from some prominent members of my own Republican Party.
查理·芒格：我认为部分问题来自我所在共和党的一些知名成员。
Some of these people overdosed on Ayn Rand and what they learned in Economics 101, and they sort of got to thinking that if anything happened as a natural response of human nature in a free market system, even if it was an ax murder, it was a desirable development and part of a wise distribution of risk.
这些人中有些人过度沉迷于安·兰德和他们在经济学 101 中学到的东西，他们开始认为，如果在自由市场体系中，任何事情作为人性自然反应发生，即使是用斧头谋杀，也是一个理想的发展，是明智的风险分配的一部分。
I don’t know why grown-ups get these silly ideas, but they do. And one of them headed the Federal Reserve. I think Alan Greenspan did a very good job, averaged out, but he did overdose a little on Ayn Rand, and he had this tendency to believe that, if it happened in a free market, it had to be all right.
我不知道为什么成年人会产生这些愚蠢的想法，但他们确实有。其中一位还领导了美联储。我认为艾伦·格林斯潘总体上做得很好，但他对安·兰德有点过于痴迷，他有这种倾向，认为只要是在自由市场中发生的事情，就一定是对的。
I think there’s some things that should be forbidden. And I think that the world would have worked better if a lot of things that were described as follows: this is a financial innovation which will diversify risk — if that phrase had been banned from all discourse, the country would have worked better. (Applause.)
我认为有些事情应该被禁止。我认为如果很多被称为“这是一个金融创新，可以多样化风险”的事情在所有讨论中都被禁止，这个国家的运作会更好。（掌声）
56. Plea from audience to read the U.S. Constitution
来自观众的请求：阅读美国宪法
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2. 沃伦·巴菲特：第二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Larry Tidrick (PH) from Elk Grove Village, Illinois.
观众成员：我是来自伊利诺伊州埃尔克格罗夫村的拉里·蒂德里克。
My question is really more a plea. Get out your copies of the U.S. Constitution, read over Article 1, Section 8, the enumerated powers; the Ninth Amendment; the Tenth Amendment; and give Roger Pilon a call at the Cato Institute.
我的问题实际上更像是一个请求。拿出你们的美国宪法副本，阅读第一条第八款，列举的权力；第九修正案；第十修正案；然后给卡托研究所的罗杰·皮隆打个电话。
I think everything that’s gone on today, regarding finance and economics, has to do with our Constitution, which was really based upon property rights and contract rights.
我认为今天发生的一切，关于金融和经济的事情，都与我们的宪法有关，而我们的宪法实际上是建立在财产权和合同权利的基础上的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do you have a question, though, or not?
沃伦·巴菲特：不过，你有问题吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir.
观众成员：是的，先生。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, no, I don’t. (Laughter)
观众成员：其实，我没有问题。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I sort of suspected that.
沃伦·巴菲特：我有点怀疑。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I made — yeah. I made the plea and —
观众成员：我已经——是的。我提出了这个恳求——
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — that’s really it.
观众成员：— 就是这样。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Well, thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。谢谢。
57. American’s distaste for mass transit won’t change soon
美国人对公共交通的反感不会很快改变
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go on to number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们继续第三个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is Dan Schmidt (PH) from Burnsville, Minnesota.
观众成员：是的。我的名字是丹·施密特（音），来自明尼苏达州的伯恩斯维尔。
And I’d like your opinion on the future of mass transit and how it relates to railroads, and will these transit systems and railroads be expanding in the future?
我想听听你对大众交通未来的看法，以及它与铁路的关系，这些交通系统和铁路在未来会扩展吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of passenger traffic?
沃伦·巴菲特：这是关于乘客交通吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Correct.
观众成员：正确。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The American public, basically, doesn’t like mass transit. I mean, it endures it when it needs to, but there — the American love affair with the car, which translates to aversion to mass transit, is sort of overwhelming.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。美国公众基本上不喜欢公共交通。我的意思是，当需要时，他们会忍受，但美国人对汽车的热爱，也就是对公共交通的反感，是相当强烈的。
I used to be involved in bus companies. And, you know, you can make all kinds of rational arguments to people about the use of mass transit, but one person to a car seems to be an enormously popular method of moving around.
我曾经参与过公交公司。你知道的，你可以向人们提出各种关于使用公共交通的合理论点，但一个人一辆车似乎是一种极其受欢迎的出行方式。
And I think it’s unlikely that we see a large expansion in mass transit in this country. I think the American public is, for one reason or another, whether they’re trained to it or whether it’s just something in their genetic makeup, they do not like going out and waiting for buses or whatever it may be or trams.
我认为在这个国家大规模扩展公共交通的可能性不大。我认为美国公众出于某种原因，无论是因为他们被训练成这样，还是因为这与他们的基因构成有关，他们不喜欢出去等公交车或电车之类的交通工具。
And they want to get in their car. And even with gas at close to $4 a gallon, they want to go someplace and pay a lot of money to park, and they don’t want to double up in the cars very much.
他们想要上车。即使汽油接近每加仑 4 美元，他们也想去某个地方，并支付高额停车费，而且他们不太愿意拼车。
And that just seems to be human nature. Maybe it will change, but I never like to bet on something that has gone in one direction for a long time reversing unless the evidence is pretty strong.
这似乎就是人性。也许它会改变，但我从不喜欢押注于长期以来一直朝一个方向发展的事物会逆转，除非证据非常有力。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: You have a more optimistic view of it than I have. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：你对此的看法比我乐观。（笑声）
58. Munger’s in “awkward position of agreeing with Al Gore”
芒格处于“同意阿尔·戈尔的尴尬境地”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Tom Nelson (PH) from North Oaks, Minnesota.
观众成员：你好。我是来自明尼苏达州北橡树的汤姆·尼尔森。
My question is for Charlie. If you were in charge of this country, how would you handle Al Gore’s alleged climate crisis?
我的问题是给查理的。如果你负责这个国家，你会如何处理阿尔·戈尔所谓的气候危机？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, I’m in the awkward position of agreeing with Al Gore that we shouldn’t be burning up so many hydrocarbons. (Applause)
查理·芒格：当然，我处于一个尴尬的境地，同意阿尔·戈尔的观点，我们不应该燃烧这么多的碳氢化合物。（掌声）
I’ve just got a different reason. His brain doesn’t work the way mine does, and you’ll have to judge for yourself which you prefer. (Laughter)
我只是有不同的理由。他的大脑运作方式与我的不同，你得自己判断你更喜欢哪种。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll have a vote a little later. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们稍后会进行投票。（笑声）
59. Disagreement on danger of CDOs
关于 CDO 风险的分歧
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：第五位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie. This is Frank Martin from Elkhart, Indiana.
观众成员：下午好，沃伦和查理。我是来自印第安纳州埃尔克哈特的弗兰克·马丁。
WARREN BUFFETT: Nice to have you here, Frank.
沃伦·巴菲特：很高兴你能来，弗兰克。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks, Warren. One of my favorite aphorisms from you is, “To win, first you must not lose.” The excerpt that you read a few moments ago from the 2006 annual report contemporized that aphorism, and I think was both prescient and prophetic. Notice I said “prophetic” and not “pathetic.”
观众成员：谢谢你，沃伦。你的一句名言是：“要赢，首先必须不输。”你刚才在2006年年报中读到的摘录使这一名言更具现代意义，我认为是具有预见性和预言性的。注意，我说的是“预言性”，而不是“可悲的”。
WARREN BUFFETT: I noticed.
沃伦·巴菲特：我注意到了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, thank you. (Laughter)
观众成员：是的，谢谢。（笑声）
On several of occasions disagreeing with Alan Greenspan, you have called derivatives “weapons of financial mass destruction.” We both have our own record as believing the country is currently in recession.
在几次与艾伦·格林斯潘意见不合的情况下，你称衍生品为“金融大规模毁灭性武器”。我们都曾认为国家目前正处于经济衰退中。
If corporate default rates, which are currently benign, escalate — should the recession deepen and we get back to default rates common in 2002 or back in the early 1990s — will the credit default swap problem materialize as a serious threat to financial stability?
如果目前良性的公司违约率上升——假如经济衰退加深，我们回到 2002 年或上世纪 90 年代初常见的违约率——信用违约掉期问题是否会成为对金融稳定的严重威胁？
I respect you as one of the all-time great pricers of risk. You and Charlie must consider selling insurance without reserves, without really understanding pricing risk, to be an abomination.
我尊重你作为有史以来最伟大的风险定价者之一。你和查理一定认为，在不理解定价风险的情况下出售无准备金的保险是一种可憎的行为。
Is there a chance, in your judgment, that the CDS market may eclipse the subprime mortgage market as the next element of the financial meltdown?
在您看来，CDS 市场有可能成为继次级抵押贷款市场之后的下一个金融崩溃因素吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The credit default swap market — you can see these figures — and I’m repeating them, but I’m not validating them — but the last number that came out was over 60 trillion.
沃伦·巴菲特：信用违约掉期市场——你可以看到这些数据——我在重复它们，但我并没有验证它们——但最后公布的数字超过了 60 万亿。
Now, there’s lots of double counting in these things and all that sort of thing. But there’s no question there’s a lot of money on both sides of the credit default market. They call them credit default swaps.
现在，这些事情中有很多重复计算之类的事情。但毫无疑问，信用违约市场的双方都有大量资金。他们称之为信用违约掉期。
You can think of it as insurance against a company going bankrupt. And actually, we have written two types of derivatives on a big scale. We explained them in the annual report. We explained them again in the press release that was issued yesterday.
你可以把它看作是对公司破产的保险。实际上，我们大规模地写了两种类型的衍生品。我们在年度报告中解释了它们。我们在昨天发布的新闻稿中再次解释了它们。
And we have insured in the — we’ve written insurance that pays off to somebody else in the event of default by companies listed on given indices.
我们已经投保——我们写了保险，在特定指数中上市的公司违约时支付给其他人。
There’s a high-yield two, a high-yield three, and so on, through high-yield nine. And we’ve written various traunches of risk on those things, and I think we’re going to make significant money, although we could lose money, too. It will depend on credit experience in the next few years.
有高收益二、高收益三，依此类推，到高收益九。我们在这些东西上写了各种风险分级，我认为我们会赚很多钱，尽管我们也可能会亏钱。这将取决于未来几年内的信用经验。
I think there’s no question that the corporate default rate will rise. That’s been cranked into the calculations I make in writing this insurance.
我认为公司违约率上升是毫无疑问的。这已经被纳入我在撰写这份保险时所做的计算中。
The question of whether the credit default swap — the size of that market — will lead to any kind of chaos in the financial markets, I think probably not.
至于信用违约掉期——这个市场的规模——是否会导致金融市场的混乱，我认为大概不会。
Although if a Bear Stearns had failed, for example, you would have had a huge unwinding of contracts by counterparties who had to establish their claims and all that.
尽管如果像贝尔斯登那样的公司倒闭，例如，你会有大量合约的解除，交易对手必须确立他们的索赔。
So you would have had rather chaotic conditions. Any time — a credit default swap is merely a payment by one party to another. So it’s a negative-sum item. When somebody loses money on a subprime loan, on a mortgage loan, they’ve lost real money.
所以你会有相当混乱的情况。任何时候——信用违约掉期仅仅是一方对另一方的支付。因此，它是一个负和项目。当有人在次级贷款或抵押贷款上亏钱时，他们就损失了真正的钱。
Now, somebody may be buying the house later on cheaper than they would have bought it earlier on, but there is not an equivalent swap of dollars at the time that a subprime loan goes bad.
现在，可能有人会在以后以比之前更便宜的价格买下这所房子，但在次级贷款出现问题时，并没有等值的美元交换。
With the credit default swaps, there is a swap of dollars. So as long as the counterparties pay, if A is up a million dollars, B is down a million dollars.
对于信用违约掉期来说，有美元的交换。所以只要交易对手支付，如果A赚了一百万，B就赔了一百万。
And the question is, is if you get a Bear Stearns-type situation that didn’t get interrupted by the Fed, whether counterparties would fail and you get a lot of trip hammer effects, I don’t think that’s going to happen, and I think the chances of it happening were reduced significantly by what happened — by the fact that the Fed stepped in at Bear Stearns.
问题是，如果出现类似贝尔斯登的情况而没有被美联储干预，是否会导致交易对手失败并产生大量连锁反应，我认为这不会发生，而且我认为由于美联储在贝尔斯登事件中的介入，这种情况发生的可能性已经大大降低。
We’ve had enormous payments from one party to another, in terms of credit default swaps. Just — there’s a firm called Fairfax Financial that made — a relatively small firm — that made, as I remember, well over a billion dollars in credit default swaps.
我们已经看到一方对另一方的巨额支付，涉及信用违约掉期。就像——有一家名为 Fairfax Financial 的公司——一家相对较小的公司——据我记得，通过信用违约掉期赚了超过十亿美元。
Well, somebody else lost the billion, but it didn’t pose a threat to the system. It posed a threat to the guy that lost the billion, but he had to keep up putting up collateral, presumably, as he went along. So it wasn’t like he was called overnight for the billion.
嗯，是其他人损失了十亿，但这对系统没有构成威胁。对那个损失了十亿的人构成了威胁，但他必须继续提供抵押品，可能是随着时间的推移。因此，并不是说他在一夜之间就被要求拿出十亿。
So even though credit defaults — they’ve been the most volatile of instruments in the last 18 months. There’s been nothing that’s swung as much — maybe there’s some subprime index that has — but virtually it’s credit default swaps.
所以即使信用违约——在过去的 18 个月里，它们一直是最不稳定的工具。没有什么波动得像它们那么大——也许有一些次级贷款指数——但实际上是信用违约掉期。
And that really hasn’t created a problem in the system. So I do not think — particularly if the Fed is going to step in when they see investment banks that they regard as too big to fail, or banks too big to fail — I don’t think that that will probably be the cause of the problem.
这并没有在系统中造成问题。所以我不认为——特别是如果美联储在他们认为投资银行或银行大到不能倒闭时介入——我不认为那可能是问题的原因。
It may be a cause of enormous losses to some institutions, but those will be matched by enormous gains by other institutions.
这可能会对某些机构造成巨大的损失，但这些损失将由其他机构的巨大收益相抵消。
I do think there’s that — the problem of the overnight disruption in the system, which Bear Stearns, I think, would have produced.
我确实认为存在这样的问题——系统的突然中断，我认为贝尔斯登会导致这种情况。
But maybe something else could produce it — a nuclear bomb going off in Manhattan, you know, or something of the sort. That kind of thing — where there’s a discontinuity, where the collateral posted the previous day was totally inadequate in terms of the kind of movement that occurred — certainly at that time something like having a large amount of CDSs out there, it could cause a — it could exacerbate — the chaos to a considerable degree.
但也许其他事情可能会导致这种情况——比如在曼哈顿引爆一颗核弹，或者类似的事情。那种情况——出现不连续性，前一天提供的抵押品在发生的变动面前完全不足——在那种时候，市场上有大量的信用违约掉期（CDS），这可能会导致——可能会加剧——混乱程度。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the answer to your question is — could we have a big-time mess out of credit default swaps — is yes, we certainly could.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为对你问题的回答是——我们是否可能因为信用违约掉期而出现大规模混乱——是的，我们当然可能会。
I think the stupidity, while it’s extreme, is not as bad as sweeping bums off skid row to give them mortgages to buy houses, but it’s pretty bad.
我认为愚蠢的程度虽然极端，但并没有像把流浪汉从街头清理出来以便给他们抵押贷款买房那样糟糕，但这还是相当糟糕。
One of the things that’s interesting about credit default swaps, which isn’t much commented on, is, let’s say you’re insuring against the outcome that people will lose money on a hundred million dollar bond issue.
关于信用违约掉期，有一件有趣但不常被评论的事情是，比如说，你是在为人们在一亿美元债券发行中亏损的结果投保。
And the credit default swaps, instead of amounting to a hundred million, amount to 3 billion. Now you’ve got people with $3 billion worth of contracts that really have a big incentive in having somebody fail.
信用违约掉期不再是 1 亿美元，而是 30 亿美元。现在，有人持有价值 30 亿美元的合约，他们确实有很大的动机让某些人失败。
And, of course, they may manipulate, in some fraudulent or extreme way, with the little loss in order to make the big collection.
当然，他们可能会以某种欺诈或极端的方式操控小损失，以便获得大收益。
It was insane for the regulators to allow this outcome to occur in America. It used to be illegal for people who had no insurable interest just to buy life insurance on people they didn’t know, because society was afraid that people would do that and then kill the person.
监管机构允许这种结果在美国发生是疯狂的。过去，对于没有可保利益的人来说，仅仅为他们不认识的人购买人寿保险是非法的，因为社会担心人们会这样做然后杀掉那个人。
And that happened in Los Angeles. We had sweet, little, old ladies that got bums off skid row. They’d take out life insurance on them. And when two years went past, they murdered them with fake hit-run accidents.
这件事发生在洛杉矶。我们有一些可爱的小老太太，她们把流浪汉从贫民区带走。她们会为他们购买人寿保险。两年过去后，她们通过伪造的肇事逃逸事故谋杀了他们。
So human nature is up to this kind of venality where you have big payoffs. And why we wanted these enormous bets to be made, in relatively unregulated markets, where the bets are 10, 20 times the size of the original bond issue, it’s crazy.
所以人性就是这样一种贪婪，当有巨额回报时。而我们为什么希望在相对不受监管的市场中进行这些巨大的赌注，这些赌注是原始债券发行规模的 10 倍、20 倍，这很疯狂。
If I did this as a satire, you’d say I was overstating. I’m understating. We have a major nut case bunch of regulators and proprietors in this field. (Applause.)
如果我把这当作讽刺来做，你会说我夸大其词。我是在轻描淡写。我们在这个领域有一群严重的疯子监管者和所有者。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, one; invisible hand, zero.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理一分，无形之手零分。
60. Buffett’s test on when to pay a dividend
巴菲特关于何时支付股息的测试
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第六个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Neharick Aneela (PH), and I’m from Houston, Texas. I’m a seventh grader, and I’m 12 years old.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是 Neharick Aneela（音），我来自德克萨斯州休斯顿。我是七年级学生，今年 12 岁。
I was wondering why you do not believe in dividends, Mr. Buffett, when your mentor, Ben Graham, believed in dividends?
我想知道为什么您不相信股息，巴菲特先生，而您的导师本·格雷厄姆却相信股息？
He influenced you in so many ways, but why weren’t you influenced into believing in dividends? Thank you.
他在很多方面影响了你，但为什么你没有受到影响去相信股息呢？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I had to show a little individuality in some respect. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我必须在某些方面表现出一点个性。（笑声）
Well, the answer is I do believe in dividends in a great many situations, including many of the ones at companies in which we own stock.
好吧，答案是我确实相信在许多情况下的股息，包括我们持有股票的许多公司。
The test about whether to pay dividends is whether you can continue to create more than one dollar of value for every dollar you retain.
关于是否支付股息的考验在于您是否能够为每一美元的留存创造超过一美元的价值。
And there are many businesses — take See’s Candy, which we own. See’s Candy has paid everything, virtually, out to us that they earn because they do not have the ability within See’s Candy to use large sums, which they earn, intelligently in their business.
有很多企业——比如我们拥有的 See's Candy。See's Candy 几乎把他们赚到的所有利润都支付给了我们，因为在 See's Candy 内部，他们没有能力在业务中明智地使用他们赚取的大笔资金。
So it would be an enormous mistake for See’s Candy to retain money. So they distribute to Berkshire, and we hope that we move that around in some other area where that dollar becomes worth $1.10, or $2.10, in terms of present value terms.
因此，See's Candy 保留资金将是一个巨大的错误。所以他们将资金分配给伯克希尔，我们希望将其转移到其他领域，使那一美元在现值方面变得值 1.10 美元或 2.10 美元。
If we do that, the shareholder — whether they’re taxable or whether they’re not taxable, whether they’re a foundation or whether they’re living on income, even — they are better off if we retain the money.
如果我们这样做，股东——无论他们是否需要纳税，无论他们是基金会还是依靠收入生活——如果我们保留这笔钱，他们的情况会更好。
Because if they were going to get a dollar in dividends and it became worth $1.10 or $1.20 in market value immediately on a present value basis, they’re better off selling a small percentage of their stock and realizing the required amount that way, and they will have more money when they get all through doing that than if we paid it in dividends.
因为如果他们要获得一美元的股息，而这在市场价值上立刻变成了1.10美元或1.20美元的现值，他们通过出售一小部分股票以这种方式实现所需金额会更好，并且在完成这一切后，他们将比我们以股息支付时拥有更多的钱。
BRK基于PB的估值跟这个逻辑是直接相关联的。
But if the time comes — and it will come someday — when the — if the time comes when we don’t think we can use the money effectively to create more than a dollar of market value per dollar retained, then it should be paid out.
但如果有一天——这一天总会到来——如果我们认为无法有效利用这笔资金来创造超过一美元的市场价值，那么就应该支付股息。
And, like I say, we do that individually within Berkshire. But because we have this ability to redistribute money in a tax-efficient way within the company, we probably had more — we had more reason — to retain all of our earnings.
而且，正如我所说，我们在伯克希尔内部是单独这样做的。但由于我们有能力在公司内部以税收高效的方式重新分配资金，我们可能有更多的理由保留我们所有的收益。
If See’s Candy were a standalone company, we would simply pay out a lot of the earnings, practically all of the earnings, in dividends. Just like we do now, except it goes to Berkshire.
如果喜诗糖果是一家独立公司，我们会将大部分收益，几乎所有收益，以股息的形式支付出去。就像我们现在所做的那样，只是收益流向伯克希尔。
We like our — we like the companies in which we have investments to pay to us the money they can’t use efficiently in their own business.
我们喜欢我们的——我们喜欢我们投资的公司将他们在自身业务中无法高效使用的钱支付给我们。
In some cases that’s a hundred percent of what they earn; in some cases it’s 0 percent of what they earn. We own some stocks that don’t pay any dividends.
在某些情况下，那是他们收入的百分之百；在某些情况下，那是他们收入的百分之零。我们持有一些不支付股息的股票。
Costco paid a very small — did they pay any dividend for a while, Charlie, or —?
Costco 支付了很小的——他们有一段时间支付过股息吗，查理，还是——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: They — while they were growing very rapidly, they paid no dividend. And finally they are paying one.
查理·芒格：他们在快速增长期间没有支付股息。最终，他们支付了一个股息。
Berkshire’s policy is much the same. Warren has always planned on paying large dividends out of Berkshire, and he does it in the mode of Saint Augustine when he said, “God give me chastity, but not yet.”
伯克希尔的政策大致相同。沃伦一直计划从伯克希尔支付大额股息，他的做法就像圣奥古斯丁所说的：“上帝赐予我贞洁，但不是现在。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Right. I’ve always admired that.
沃伦·巴菲特：对。我一直很钦佩这一点。
61. Electricity in the Southwest
西南地区的电力
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, shareholders. My name is Richard Meyers (PH). I’m from (inaudible), California.
听众成员：下午好，沃伦·巴菲特先生，查理·芒格，股东们。我的名字是理查德·梅耶斯（音）。我来自加利福尼亚州（听不清）。
In respect to your opinion earlier, I will go down to southern California, Arizona, and ask a question: if you have knowledge or interest of the corridor for electricity coming in from Arizona into California, or is it going from California back into Arizona?
关于您之前的意见，我将前往南加州和亚利桑那州，问一个问题：您是否了解或对从亚利桑那州进入加州的电力走廊感兴趣，还是电力从加州返回亚利桑那州？
As California is known as a sunny state, we should be able to have our own solar systems.
由于加利福尼亚被称为阳光之州，我们应该能够拥有自己的太阳能系统。
I have one more. I have saved $20 by staying in line since 2:30 this morning, and I would like to know which one of these books that I could buy that would do me the most good and my tribe. Thank you.
我还有一个。我从今天早上 2:30 开始排队，已经省下了 20 美元，我想知道这些书中哪一本对我和我的部落最有帮助。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, tell us about the books. You mean the whole list?
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，告诉我们关于这些书的事。你是指整个列表吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Which one I can buy for $20. (Laughter)
观众成员：我可以用 20 美元买哪个。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Probably the ones that haven’t sold very well today. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：可能是那些今天卖得不太好的。（笑声）
Yeah, I’m not that familiar with the prices of the books. We try to have a good selection in there.
是的，我对书的价格不太熟悉。我们尽量在那儿提供一个好的选择。
I’m a little partial to Larry Cunningham’s books because — Larry Cunningham’s book — because it consists of a rewriting of all my own stuff. (Laughs)
我对拉里·坎宁安的书有点偏爱，因为——拉里·坎宁安的书——因为它是对我所有作品的重写。（笑）
But, no, we — I think the whole collection is fine. I wouldn’t want to recommend one over the other.
但是，不，我—我认为整个系列都很好。我不想推荐其中任何一个。
And I know nothing about that first subject. Charlie, do you?
我对第一个话题一无所知。查理，你呢？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I know a little. You know, California did cause coal plants to be built near the Grand Canyon because California didn’t want the pollution and it needed the electricity and they were nearer the coal mines.
查理·芒格：嗯，我知道一点。你知道，加州确实导致在大峡谷附近建造了燃煤电厂，因为加州不想要污染，但需要电力，而这些电厂更靠近煤矿。
And eventually that caused huge uproar, a lot like we heard about the Klamath River. And the Grand Canyon, that started having some visibility problems.
最终，这造成了巨大的骚动，这有点像我们听到的克拉马斯河的情况。大峡谷开始出现一些可见性问题。
And I think those things are, maybe, decommissioned, or about to be decommissioned, so it’s a very complicated subject. And I’m glad to (inaudible) it back to you.
我认为那些东西可能已经退役，或者即将退役，所以这是一个非常复杂的话题。我很高兴把它交还给你。
62. Berkshire’s international ambitions
伯克希尔的国际雄心
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 8 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Argin Row (PH).
观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是阿金·罗（音）。
I am in the eighth grade and live in Pearland, Texas. I ask everybody to call me Tony after reading your 2006 annual report. (Buffett laughs)
我在八年级，住在德克萨斯州的皮尔兰。看了你们 2006 年的年度报告后，我请大家叫我托尼。（巴菲特笑）
My question is, do you foresee Berkshire buying any businesses in either India or China in the near future?
我的问题是，您是否预见到伯克希尔在不久的将来会在印度或中国收购任何企业？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Tony, I — (laughter) — we would like to. The odds are somewhat against us buying in any major country except the United States, if you’d name any specific one.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，托尼，我——（笑声）——我们很想。在美国以外的任何主要国家进行收购的可能性有些不利，除非你能具体指出一个。
I would hope in the next three years that we might get a chance to buy one or two companies of size. We’re always buying little companies that fit in with our present operations.
我希望在未来三年内，我们有机会收购一两家规模较大的公司。我们一直在收购与我们现有业务相符的小公司。
Right now, MiTek has several possibilities outside the United States. But in terms of major businesses that Berkshire would buy, you know, if we get lucky, we’ll buy one or two in the next three or four years that’s based outside the United States. We’re trying to increase our chances of doing that.
目前，MiTek 在美国以外有几种可能性。但就伯克希尔会收购的主要业务而言，你知道，如果我们运气好，我们将在未来三到四年内收购一到两个总部位于美国以外的公司。我们正在努力增加实现这一目标的机会。
Whether it turns out to be China or India or Germany or the UK or Japan, who knows? There’s a lot of luck in that, just in terms of specific families thinking of us specifically. But we certainly wouldn’t rule it out.
无论是中国、印度、德国、英国还是日本，谁知道呢？这其中有很多运气的成分，仅仅是因为某些特定家庭特别想到我们。但我们当然不会排除这种可能性。
We’ve looked into developing an insurance company in some countries. Both India and China restrict the percentage ownership that Berkshire could have in any domestic insurance company.
我们也曾考虑在一些国家发展保险公司。但印度和中国都对伯克希尔在任何本地保险公司中的持股比例有一定限制。
They both have laws that would keep us — I know it’s 25 percent in China, and I think it’s 25 percent, but it may have been changed in the last year or so, in India.
他们都有法律会限制我们——我知道在中国是 25%，我认为在印度也是 25%，但可能在过去一年左右有所改变。
We do not probably want to go into a country to own 25 percent of a company like that. We would want the laws to allow us to do more than that to make it worth our while.
我们大概不会愿意只持有一个公司25%的股份，我们更希望法律允许我们持有更高比例，才值得我们的投入。
But I hope we own something. You know, certainly at your age, you will see the day that Berkshire owns businesses — in my view, you’ll see the day — that they own — we own — businesses in both countries.
但我希望我们能有所收获。我认为，当然在你这个年纪时，你一定会看到伯克希尔在这两个国家拥有业务的那一天。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格：没有什么可补充的。
63. Parents, spouses, and books are the best teachers
父母、配偶和书籍是最好的老师
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name is Jim James (PH) from Minnesota, actually Minneapolis.
观众成员：先生们，我叫吉姆·詹姆斯（PH），来自明尼苏达州，实际上是明尼阿波利斯。
And clearly you’ve inspired 38,000 people here today. Books have been written about you, not solely for your financial prowess, but because of the people you are.
显然，今天你在这里激励了 38,000 人。关于你的书已经写成，不仅仅是因为你的财务才能，而是因为你这个人。
Could you share two or three influences on you — those kinds of people, educators, who have shaped your thinking on life and on investing? Thank you.
您能分享两到三个对您有影响的人——那些类型的人，教育者，塑造了您对生活和投资思维的人吗？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think the biggest educator — certainly in my case — initially was my father. I think probably Charlie would say the same thing.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为最大的教育者——至少在我看来——最初是我的父亲。我想查理可能也会这么说。
And I think— it’s very, very, very important who you marry, and I’ve been lucky there, and those are great teachers.
我认为——你和谁结婚非常非常非常重要，我在这方面很幸运，他们是很好的老师。
And, of course, I had Ben Graham. I had Dave Dodd. I’ve learned from all kinds of people who have written books over the years. I’ve just devoured those and picking up things here and there.
当然，我有本·格雷厄姆。我有戴夫·多德。我从多年来写书的各种人那里学到了东西。我只是贪婪地阅读这些书，并在各处汲取知识。
Charlie learned a lot from Ben Franklin, obviously. (Laughter)
查理显然从本·富兰克林那里学到了很多。（笑声）
Many people think Ben Franklin learned a lot from Charlie but — (laughter) — we both learned a few things from my grandfather at the grocery store.
许多人认为本·富兰克林从查理那里学到了很多东西，但——（笑声）——我们俩都从我祖父在杂货店学到了一些东西。
But your parents — I tell the students, you know, the most important job you have, you know, is being the teacher to your children.
但是你的父母——我告诉学生们，你知道，你最重要的工作就是成为你孩子的老师。
I mean, you’re the ultimate teacher. You’re this big — great big thing. You provide warmth and food and everything else, and they’re learning about the world, and they’re not going to change a lot of that when they get into graduate school or sometime.
我的意思是，你是终极老师。你是这个大——非常大的存在。你提供温暖、食物和其他一切，他们正在学习关于世界的知识，当他们进入研究生院或某个时候，他们不会改变很多。
So it’s — and you don’t get any rewind button. You don’t get to do it twice. So you have to do your best as a teacher, and you teach by what you do, not by what you say, with these young things.
所以——你没有倒带按钮。你不能重来一次。所以你必须尽力做好老师，通过你的行为而不是言语来教导这些年轻人。
And by the time they’ve got to a place where they’re entering a formal school, they probably learned more from you than they’re ever going to learn from anybody else.
等到他们进入正规学校的时候，他们可能已经从你那里学到了比从其他任何人那里学到的更多的东西。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that differing people learn in differing ways.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为不同的人以不同的方式学习。
With me, I was put together by nature to learn from reading. If some guy’s talking to me, he’s telling me something I don’t know, I don’t want to know, I already know, or he’s doing it too slow or too fast.
对我来说，我天生就通过阅读来学习。如果有人在跟我说话，他要么在告诉我一些我不知道的事情，我不想知道的事情，我已经知道的事情，或者他讲得太慢或太快。
In reading, I can learn what I want at the speed that works. So, to me, reading is the — is what works for my nature. And to all of you who are at all like me, I say welcome. It’s a nice fraternity.
在阅读中，我可以以适合的速度学习我想要的东西。所以，对我来说，阅读是——是适合我本性的东西。对于所有和我有点像的人，我说欢迎。这是一个不错的团体。
WARREN BUFFETT: You probably learn more from your father than you learned from all the reading you did, don’t you think? In terms of actually forming you?
沃伦·巴菲特：你可能从你父亲那里学到的东西比你从所有阅读中学到的还要多，不是吗？在实际塑造你方面？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. And my father was the type that always did more than his share of the work and took more of his share of the risk.
查理·芒格：嗯，是的。我的父亲总是那种做更多工作并承担更多风险的人。
All that kind of example was, of course, very helpful, and you learn it better from a person close to you.
所有这些例子当然都非常有帮助，而且你从身边的人那里学得更好。
But in terms of the conceptual stuff, I’d say I learned it from books.
但就概念性的东西而言，我想我是从书本中学到的。
Now, those are fathers in a difference sense.
现在，那些是另一种意义上的父亲。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The people who wrote the books.
查理·芒格：写书的人。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, one book, obviously, changed my whole financial life when I — you know, by happenstance, probably, I picked it up. I can’t even remember why I bought it back when I was in school.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，显然有一本书改变了我的整个财务生活，当时我——你知道，可能是偶然，我拿起了它。我甚至不记得我为什么在上学时买了它。
But if you just keep picking up enough books, you’ll find some — you’ll learn a lot. And I used to go through the Omaha Public Library and just go down the shelves.
但是如果你不断地拿起足够多的书，你会找到一些——你会学到很多。我过去常常去奥马哈公共图书馆，沿着书架走下去。
It’s kind of an inefficient way, maybe, of doing it, but I — if you read 20 books on a subject you’ve got an interest in, you’re going to learn one hell of a lot. You don’t know which one you’re going to learn it in, though.
这可能是一种效率不高的方法，但如果你对某个主题感兴趣并阅读了 20 本书，你会学到很多东西。不过，你不知道会在哪本书中学到。
So I would take having — if you get the right parents, you’re very, very lucky, and it’s better than going to the right school or anything of the sort. And to get the right spouse, you’ve just doubled down.
所以我认为，如果你有合适的父母，你就非常非常幸运，这比上对的学校或其他任何事情都要好。而找到合适的配偶，你的好运就加倍了。
64. Big institutional shareholders should take stand on CEO pay
大型机构股东应对首席执行官薪酬表态
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name is Mark Slaybe (PH). I’m from Chicago. I probably am going to be one of the last guys speaking today or asking a question, so on behalf of 31,000 people, I’m going to thank you —
观众成员：先生们，我叫马克·斯莱比（音）。我来自芝加哥。我可能是今天最后一个发言或提问的人之一，所以我代表 31,000 人感谢你们——
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — for the respect and the common courtesy that you’ve exhibited to the shareholders today.
观众成员：——感谢您今天对股东表现出的尊重和基本礼貌。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声。）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is this: I work for a fairly large computer company that’s a competitor of Mr. Gates up there.
观众成员：我的问题是这样的：我在一家相当大的计算机公司工作，该公司是上面盖茨先生的竞争对手。
And I’m curious. As a common, ordinary person and a common shareholder, what can we do, 31,000-some odd folks here do, about the outrageous salaries, bonuses, perks, of these enormous corporations that we will never have a chance at, a shot at, you know, working with them and that amount of wealth?
我很好奇。作为一个普通人和普通股东，我们能做些什么，像这里的 31,000 多名普通人，关于这些巨大公司令人发指的薪水、奖金、福利，我们永远没有机会接触到的财富呢？
What would you advise us as common shareholders that we can do to get this country going the right way and get this issue going the right way? (Scattered applause)
作为普通股东，您会建议我们做些什么来让这个国家走上正轨，并让这个问题得到正确的解决？（零星的掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that, particularly on the compensation part, you can’t do much. But there are a relatively few people that could do a lot.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说，特别是在薪酬方面，你们做不了太多。但有相对较少的人可以做很多。
If the half a dozen or so largest institutional owners took a position on extreme cases — I don’t advise them trying to go after each one — but when they see something egregious, if they would simply withhold their votes and issue a short statement as to why they’re doing it, that has an effect on — particularly on boards of directors.
如果半打左右最大的机构所有者在极端情况下采取立场——我不建议他们试图针对每一个案例——但当他们看到某些情况极其恶劣时，如果他们只是简单地拒绝投票并发表简短的声明解释他们为何这样做，这对——特别是对董事会有影响。
Big shots don’t like to be embarrassed. You know, they don’t — that gets their attention.
大人物不喜欢尴尬。你知道，他们不喜欢——那会引起他们的注意。
The press is an enormous factor. Press is more of a factor in changing corporate behavior than regulations or Sarbanes-Oxley or that sort of thing.
媒体是一个巨大的因素。媒体在改变企业行为方面的影响比法规或萨班斯-奥克斯利法案或类似的东西更大。
You want a good press. But the press needs the material, and material — the raw material — for that could be — I won’t name the organizations — but if you take the half a dozen largest investment organizations, I think it would have a lot of impact if they would — if they could get together on short statements when they felt pay was really egregious.
你想要好的媒体报道。但媒体需要材料，而材料——原材料——可能是——我不会点名这些组织——但如果你看看六大投资组织，我认为如果他们能够在他们认为薪酬确实过分时就简短声明达成一致，这将产生很大影响。
And I don’t know what you individually can do about that, and I don’t know how you create the incentives for the big institutions to do that. I mean, it doesn’t really do that much for them personally.
我不知道你们每个人对此能做些什么，我也不知道如何为大机构创造激励措施来做到这一点。我的意思是，这对他们个人来说并没有太大作用。
I don’t think — I think the — a lot of the checklists that institutions use as determining whether they approve of corporate practices are asinine. I mean, they — you know, they get sort of the “issue du jure” and they get — and they get people recommending how they vote their proxies, which is kind of silly. I don’t know why they can’t make up their minds themselves as to what they think is proper or not proper.
我不认为——我认为，大多数机构用来决定是否认可公司行为的检查表是愚蠢的。我的意思是，他们——你知道，他们有点像“法律问题”，他们让人们推荐如何投票？如何行使他们的委托权？这有点傻。我不知道他们为什么不能自己决定什么是合适的，什么是不合适的。
And Ben Graham, many years ago, bemoaned investors as a bunch of sheep. And with big institutions, I haven’t seen much difference.
多年前，本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）多年前曾抱怨投资者是一群羊。而对于大型机构，我没有看到太大的区别。
But it wouldn’t take many of them. It would take — just take a few of the biggest ones and the willingness to speak out. And the press would do the rest and boards would respond to that. But they’re not going to respond to you. I mean, I have to be, you know, totally candid about that.
但这并不需要很多人。只需要几个最大的人物和愿意发声的人。媒体会完成剩下的工作，董事会会对此作出回应。但他们不会回应你。我的意思是，我必须对此完全坦诚。
A small shareholder can write the most persuasive arguments in the world, and I’ve been on the board where they’ve received those kind of letters. And basically they turn them over to the corporate secretary and say, “Take care of this,” or something of the sort.
一个小股东可以写出世界上最有说服力的论点，我曾在董事会中见过他们收到那种信件。基本上，他们会把信件交给公司秘书，并说：“处理一下这个”或类似的话。
It takes real effective pressure to change behavior where the behavior is in the self-interest of that person. People do not give up self-interest easily.
要改变一个人的行为，尤其是当这种行为符合其自身利益时，需要施加真正有效的压力。人们不会轻易放弃自身利益。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s an old question. In England, where they had a lot of class warfare, they at one time got the income taxes up to, like, 90 percent, so there just wasn’t any possibility of having a large earned income except, you know, by not reporting it. The tax rate got that high.
查理·芒格：这是一个老问题。在英国，他们曾经有很多阶级斗争，一度将所得税提高到 90%左右，所以除了不报告收入之外，几乎没有可能获得大量的劳动收入。税率就是这么高。
That was quite counterproductive for England. And so you can get a politics of envy that sort of ruins the economic system because of the natural resentments and jealousies and so forth involved in excessive compensation.
这对英格兰来说是相当适得其反的。因此，你可能会产生一种嫉妒的政治，这种政治会破坏经济体系，因为过高的补偿涉及到自然的怨恨和嫉妒等等。
I think the people taking the compensation have a moral duty not to take it. I would argue that, when you rise high enough in American business, you get a moral duty to be underpaid, not to get all you can, but to actually be underpaid.
我认为接受高薪的人有道德责任不接受它。我会争辩说，当你在美国商业界达到足够高的位置时，你有道德责任接受较低的薪酬，而不是尽可能多拿，而是实际上应该接受较低的薪酬。
If people are going to be generals and archbishops and everything else at low pay, I don’t see why leaders of great big enterprise can’t take less than the last dollar. (Applause.)
如果人们愿意以低薪担任将军、大主教和其他职务，我不明白为什么大型企业的领导者不能少拿一点钱。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Do you have any suggestions on how to implement those sentiments? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：你对如何实现这些想法有什么建议吗？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s very difficult.
查理·芒格：这非常困难。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie has always said that envy is — strikes him — as the silliest of the seven deadly sins, because when you’re envious of somebody, you feel worse, and they don’t feel any — they feel fine. In fact, maybe they even feel better because you’re envious.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理总是说嫉妒是七宗罪中最愚蠢的一种，因为当你嫉妒某人时，你自己感觉更糟，而他们没有任何感觉——他们感觉很好。事实上，也许他们甚至感觉更好，因为你嫉妒。
So it’s such a counterproductive type of thing. So we — rule out as envy as part of your repertoire. And gluttony — (laughs) — I mean, that has some upside to it. (Laughter)
所以这是一种适得其反的事情。所以我们——排除嫉妒作为你的一部分。至于暴食——（笑）——我意思是，这其中有一些好处。（笑声）
Maybe temporary, may have some side effects, but, you know, there’s something to gluttony. And so lust, of course, I’ll let Charlie speak to. (Laughter)
也许是暂时的，可能会有一些副作用，但是，你知道，贪吃是有其道理的。至于色欲，当然，我会让查理来谈谈。（笑声）
65. It’s OK to buy pharmaceuticals as a group
可以买入一组制药企业
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Clemmon Low (PH) from Toronto, Canada. I want to thank you for the wonderful meeting, and I think I’ve learned a lot more here in a few hours than many, many more hours during university days.
观众成员：你好。我是来自加拿大多伦多的克莱蒙·洛（音）。感谢你们举办这次精彩的会议，我觉得在这里的几个小时里学到的东西比大学时期的许多小时还要多。
My question is, you have invested in drug companies such as Johnson & Johnson and Sanofi. How do you evaluate the pipeline of these companies and know if their competitive advantage is, indeed, enduring?
我的问题是，您投资了像强生和赛诺菲这样的制药公司。您如何评估这些公司的产品线，并判断它们的竞争优势是否确实持久？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. And unlike many businesses, when we invest in something like pharma, we don’t know the answer on the pipeline. It will be a different pipeline anyway five years from now.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。与许多企业不同，当我们投资于制药行业时，我们并不知道研发管线的答案。无论如何，五年后它将是一个不同的管线。
So we don’t know whether Pfizer or Merck, you know, or you name it — Johnson & Johnson — we don’t know which of those will come up with a blockbuster commercial drug three or four years from now, and we don’t try to assess it.
所以我们不知道辉瑞、默克，或者你说的任何公司——强生——我们不知道其中哪一家会在三四年后推出一款重磅商业药物，我们也不试图评估它。
What we do feel is, if we have a group of those companies bought at reasonable prices, that, overall, pharma will do well. Maybe not quite as well as they have in the past, but they’re doing something enormously important. They’re doing something that should offer chances for decent profits over time.
我们确实感到，如果我们以合理的价格购买这些公司的股票，总体而言，制药行业会表现良好。也许不会像过去那样好，但他们正在做一些极其重要的事情。他们正在做一些应该在长期内提供可观利润机会的事情。
And we do not pick one by one. I could not tell you what’s the number one potential in the pipeline of a J&J or Sanofi — whatever which one you want to name.
而且我们不是一个一个挑选。我无法告诉你在强生或赛诺菲的产品线中哪个是最有潜力的——无论你想提哪个。
So I think in that area, actually, a group approach makes sense, which is not the way we would go at the banks or something of that sort.
所以我认为在那个领域，实际上，采用组合方法是有意义的，这不是我们在银行或类似地方会采取的方式。
I do think if you buy pharma stocks at a reasonable multiple, a group of them, you know, you’ll probably do OK five or 10 years from now. I would not know how to pick the specific winner.
我确实认为，如果你以合理的倍数购买一组制药股票，你知道，五到十年后你可能会表现不错。我不知道如何挑选出具体的赢家。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you speak from a position where you have a monopoly of our joint knowledge about pharmacology. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，你说话的立场是，你垄断了我们共同的药理学知识。（笑声）
66. Why Berkshire sold PetroChina
伯克希尔为何出售中石油
WARREN BUFFETT: We will move on to number 12. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们将继续第 12 号。（笑声）
He gets cranky later in the day. (Laughter)
他在一天的晚些时候会变得暴躁。（笑声）
And we’re just about to the end, but we can take a couple more.
我们快到结束了，但我们还可以再多做几个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. My name is Chow (PH). I’m coming from Woshi, China. Thank you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, for your unbiased opinion on China and Olympics.
观众成员：谢谢。我的名字是周（音）。我来自中国卧石。感谢巴菲特先生和芒格先生对中国和奥运会的公正看法。
To support your (inaudible), we have a group of chairmen and CEOs from Chinese public companies to come to Omaha and try to learn from the best of how public companies should be run. (Applause.)
为了支持您的（听不清），我们有一组来自中国上市公司的董事长和首席执行官来到奥马哈，试图向最优秀的人学习如何经营上市公司。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Quick question. We observed that you made a quick trade on PetroChina, not a typical buy and hold approach you do on investment.
观众成员：请问一个问题。我们注意到您对中国石油进行了快速交易，而不是您通常在投资中采用的买入并持有的方法。
Our question is, when it’s come to selling PetroChina, what comes to your mind, and what suggestions you may have to these group of executives?
我们的问题是，当谈到出售中国石油时，您会想到什么，您对这群高管有什么建议？
There are positive forces in China, and we welcome everyone to our Olympics.
在中国有积极的力量，我们欢迎大家参加我们的奥运会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声。）
And I met Dr. Guo from the China Investment Corp here a few months ago. Was very impressed by him, had lunch with him here in Omaha.
几个月前，我在这里遇到了来自中国投资公司的郭博士。对他印象深刻，在奥马哈和他共进了午餐。
The PetroChina decision, just as we made it to buy it at a valuation overall of 35 to 40 billion when we thought it was worth a hundred billion, when oil was at $70 a barrel, roughly, 75, I figured the value was about 275 or 300 billion and we could sell it at that price.
中石油的决定，就像我们决定以整体估值 350 亿到 400 亿美元购买它时，我们认为它价值 1000 亿美元，当时石油价格大约是每桶 70 美元，75 美元左右，我估计其价值大约是 2750 亿或 3000 亿美元，我们可以以这个价格出售。
And we no longer felt it was undervalued compared to other oil companies, so we sold our stock. Now, incidentally, right after we sold it, it went up dramatically because, as you know, they issued A shares in in China, and it became very popular.
我们不再觉得它相比其他石油公司被低估了，所以我们卖掉了我们的股票。顺便说一下，就在我们卖掉之后，它大幅上涨，因为正如你所知，他们在中国发行了 A 股，并且变得非常受欢迎。
And at one time, PetroChina became the most valuable company in the world, measured by market value, which would have come as enormous surprise to investors seven or eight years earlier. So they’ve done a terrific job.
曾几何时，中国石油成为全球市值最高的公司，这对七八年前的投资者来说是个巨大的惊喜。所以他们做得非常出色。
And if it went down to a price that we thought was a discount — a significant discount — to its valuation, we would buy PetroChina again. The — in terms of — I’m not so sure we don’t have a lot to learn from the Chinese in terms of business currently, more than they have to learn from us. I’m not sure we would want some of our practices to spread to China.
如果它的价格降到我们认为是折扣——一个显著的折扣——相对于其估值，我们会再次购买中石油。在商业方面，我不太确定我们是否有很多东西需要向中国人学习，可能比他们向我们学习的还多。我不确定我们是否希望我们的一些做法传播到中国。
It’s a remarkable society, what’s going on there now. And I did go to Dalian not long ago, and I must have traveled for 45 minutes from the center of town out to our plant there. And I just saw, really, hundreds of plants that — factories that had developed in recent years.
这是一个非凡的社会，现在那里正在发生的事情。我不久前确实去了大连，我一定是从市中心出发，花了 45 分钟才到达我们在那里的工厂。我看到的确实是数百家近年来发展起来的工厂。
The economy is — the Chinese people are starting to realize their potential. I mean, what it amounted to is you had — for centuries — you had people of lots of ability but a system that did not unleash their potential.
经济是——中国人民开始意识到他们的潜力。我的意思是，归根结底，几个世纪以来，你有很多有能力的人，但没有一个释放他们潜力的制度。
And now it’s starting to be unleashed, and that’s why you’re getting very substantial GDP growth per capita, and I think it will continue.
现在它开始被释放，这就是为什么你们的人均 GDP 增长非常可观，我认为这种趋势将会持续下去。
I would just look for the best practices in American industry as you see them and copy them, and I would discard the rest. And I think it’s — you know, it’s how you learn about human behavior. You try to — if you look at an effective individual, you try to figure out why they’re effective.
我会寻找美国工业中你所看到的最佳实践并加以复制，而将其余的抛弃。我认为这就是你了解人类行为的方式。你试着——如果你看到一个有效率的人，你会试着弄清楚他们为什么有效率。
You know, why is Don Keough, why are Tom Murphy — why are they so effective? Why do people want to be around them? Why are they leaders? Why do people love them? And you see certain human qualities, and you should copy those qualities.
你知道，为什么唐·基奥和汤姆·墨菲——他们为什么如此有效？为什么人们想要围绕在他们身边？为什么他们是领导者？为什么人们爱他们？你会看到某些人类特质，你应该模仿这些特质。
And when you see some guy that should have everything going for him and everybody in town hates him, you know, you want to make sure you don’t have any of those qualities.
当你看到一个本该一切顺利的人，却被镇上的每个人讨厌时，你知道，你要确保自己没有那些特质。
Well, I would do the same thing in terms of looking at businesses in this country, and try to look for what I admire and emulate it, and make sure that — try very hard — not to let the things that you find over here that are distasteful to you creep into your own system.
好吧，我会用同样的方法来看待这个国家的企业，努力寻找我所钦佩的并加以效仿，并确保——非常努力地——不让你在这里发现的那些令你反感的东西渗入到你自己的体系中。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I hope you’ll go back to China and tell them that you met at least one fellow that really approves the Confucius emphasis on reverence for elderly males. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我希望你能回到中国，告诉他们你至少遇到了一个真正赞同孔子强调尊敬年长男性的人。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think you should dig yourself out of that by including females too, Charlie. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为你也应该把女性包括在内，查理。(笑)
CHARLIE MUNGER: That wasn’t Confucius’s idea.
查理·芒格：那不是孔子的想法。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, OK. No reason why you can’t modify it. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好的。没有理由不能修改它。（笑）
67. Future hopes for Berkshire
伯克希尔的未来希望
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll have one more, and then we’ll take a break and come back for the business meeting in a few minutes. Number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们再回答一个问题，然后休息一下，几分钟后回来参加业务会议。第一号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Cynthia Beeman (PH), and I’m from Atherton, California.
观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我叫辛西娅·比曼（音），我来自加利福尼亚州的阿瑟顿。
This is my question: what is your fondest hope for Berkshire Hathaway moving forward in time?
这是我的问题：您对伯克希尔哈撒韦未来的发展有何最美好的期望？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in a general way, I hope for two things — obviously, I hope for decent performance, and I hope that the culture we have is maintained, which is both shareholder-oriented and manager-oriented, and that we are regarding as the best home in the world for large, wonderful, family businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：总的来说，我希望有两件事——显然，我希望有良好的业绩，我希望我们所拥有的文化能够保持下去，这种文化既以股东为导向，也以管理者为导向，并且我们被视为世界上大型、优秀、家族企业的最佳归宿。
And I think the performance and those two goals will be intertwined, in a way.
我认为表现和那两个目标会以某种方式交织在一起。
And I not only hope, but I fully expect, that what we’ve tried to build into Berkshire lives far beyond, you know, my tenure as CEO. And I think it will because, A, we’ve got the right candidates to succeed me.
我不仅希望，而且完全期待，我们试图融入伯克希尔的东西能远远超越我作为首席执行官的任期。我认为这会实现，因为，首先，我们有合适的候选人来接替我。
And, beyond that, we have a board, we have a bunch of managers, that have all seen how well the system works. So I think that we have about as strong a culture as you could find in this country among American businesses.
而且，除此之外，我们还有一个董事会，还有一群经理，他们都看到了这个系统的良好运作。所以我认为，在美国企业中，我们的企业文化是这个国家中最强的之一。
And if that’s continued, as I’m really sure it will be for a long, long, long time, I think we will get decent results. We won’t get great results, because you can’t get them from our size base.
如果这种情况持续下去，我非常确信会持续很长很长时间，我认为我们会得到不错的结果。我们不会得到很好的结果，因为从我们的规模基础上无法获得。
But that’s my hope — that people 20 years from now, if they have a fine business they’ve spent a couple of generations building, and they immediately think — if they have to sell it for some reason — they think Berkshire Hathaway is the place where we want the ownership of this business and we want — as managers, we want to continue working at that company for the rest of their lives.
但这就是我的希望——20 年后的人们，如果他们有一个花了几代人建立起来的优秀企业，并且他们立刻想到——如果因为某种原因必须出售它——他们会认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦是我们希望这个企业归属的地方，并且我们希望——作为管理者，我们希望在这家公司继续工作一辈子。
And if we can achieve that, we’ll have something fine for shareholders, and we’ll have something fine for managers and owners of those businesses we buy.
如果我们能做到这一点，我们将为股东提供良好的回报，并为我们收购的企业的管理者和所有者提供良好的成果。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I would say that I would like to see Berkshire even more deserved to be an exemplar, and I would like to see it have more actual influence on changes in other corporations.
查理·芒格：是的。我想说的是，我希望伯克希尔能够更加当之无愧地成为一个典范，并且我希望看到它对其他公司的变革产生更多实际影响。
I think there are things that have happened here that will be useful to others.
我认为这里发生的一些事情对其他人会有用。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’d also like it to have the oldest living managers, but that’s a minor point. (Applause.)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们也希望它拥有最年长的管理者，但这只是一个小问题。（掌声。）
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。谢谢。谢谢。谢谢。
68. Break before formal business meeting
正式商务会议前的休息
WARREN BUFFETT: The — now what we’ll do is we’ll just break for five or so minutes, and then we’ll reconvene and have the formal business meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们要做的是休息大约五分钟，然后我们将重新集合并举行正式的业务会议。
After that, at 4 o’clock, for the international visitors, those from outside of North America, we will — Charlie and I — will meet with them personally.
之后，在四点钟，对于国际访客，即来自北美以外的访客，查理和我将亲自与他们会面。
And I thank you all for coming. I hope you come back next year and bring your friends. Thank you. (Applause)
感谢大家的到来。希望明年你们能再来，并带上你们的朋友。谢谢。（掌声）
69. Formal business meeting
正式商务会议
WARREN BUFFETT (in progress): — appropriate questions you may have concerning their firm’s audit or the accounts at Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特（进行中）：——关于他们公司审计或伯克希尔账目的相关问题。
Mr. Forrest Krutter, our secretary at Berkshire, he will make a written record of the proceedings.
福瑞斯特·克鲁特先生，我们在伯克希尔的秘书，他将对会议过程进行书面记录。
Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.
贝基·阿米克小姐已在本次会议上被任命为选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数进行认证。
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.
本次会议指定的代理人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and representative at the meeting?
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔公司在会议上有投票权和代表权的流通股数量的报告？
FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 5, 2008, being the record date for this meeting, there 1,081,013 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 14,033,343 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，我有。正如在 2008 年 3 月 5 日发给所有登记股东的会议通知中所附的代理声明中所示，作为本次会议的记录日期，伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 A 类普通股有 1,081,013 股流通，每股在会议上考虑的动议中有一票投票权，伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 B 类普通股有 14,033,343 股流通，每股在会议上考虑的动议中有 1/200 票投票权。
Of that number, 883,428 Class A shares and 10,921,716 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, May 1.
在该数字中，883,428 股 A 类股份和 10,921,716 股 B 类股份在此次会议上由截至 5 月 1 日星期四晚间返回的代理投票代表。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we’ll therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。
First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place a motion before the meeting.
首先要处理的事项是宣读上次股东会议的会议记录。我承认沃尔特·斯科特先生将在会议上提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议免去上次股东会议记录的宣读，并批准会议记录。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：有没有第二个？
Barely, I hear a second. The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say “aye.”
勉强，我听到一个附议。动议已被提出并附议。有没有评论或问题？我们将通过口头表决对该动议进行投票。所有赞成的人说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion is carried.
沃伦·巴菲特：反对？动议通过。
70. Election of board of directors
董事会选举
WARREN BUFFETT: First item of business is to elect directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：第一项议程是选举董事。
If a shareholder is present and wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.
如果股东出席并希望撤回先前发送的代理投票并亲自对董事选举进行投票，他或她可以这样做。
Also, if any shareholders are present who not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.
此外，如果有任何股东在场且未提交委托书并希望获得选票以便亲自投票，您可以这样做。
If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so that we may distribute them.
如果您希望这样做，请在过道中向会议工作人员表明身份，他们会为您提供选票。希望获得选票的人请表明身份，以便我们分发选票。
I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
我现在请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特当选为董事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second to the motion? Somebody second the motion.
沃伦·巴菲特：有人附议这个动议吗？有人附议这个动议。
VOICE: Second. 语音：第二。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott be elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。已经有人提议并附议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特为董事。
Are there any other nomination? Is there any discussion? The nominations are ready to be voted upon.
还有其他提名吗？有任何讨论吗？提名已准备好进行投票。
If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
如果有股东亲自投票，他们现在应在董事选举中标记选票，并将选票交给选举监察员。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they’ve received.
请代理持有人也向选举监察员提交一张关于董事选举的选票，并根据他们收到的指示投票。
Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.
阿米克小姐，准备好后您可以开始报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 935,155 votes for each nominee.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告已准备好。代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，每位被提名人获得不少于 935,155 票。
That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
该数字远远超过了所有已发行 A 类和 B 类股票总票数的多数。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的选票精确计数的认证，包括本次会议上代理持有人根据提交的代理投票所投的额外票数，以及任何在本次会议上亲自投下的票数，将交给秘书并附在本次会议的会议记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keogh, Tom Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott have been elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。
71. Formal business meeting adjourns
正式商务会议休会
WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?
沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有其他事项需要在本次会议上讨论吗？
If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.
如果没有，我承认斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move this meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：有第二个吗？
VOICES: Second. 声音：第二。
WARREN BUFFETT: A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor, say “aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特：有人提出了休会动议并获得了附议。我们将通过口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。
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