2008-11-11 Alice Schroeder.Value Investing Conference

2008-11-11 Alice Schroeder.Value Investing Conference


Back in 2008, Alice Schroeder took the stage on the opening night of that year’s Value Investing Conference at the University of Virginia — and delivered a glimpse into the captivating mind of Warren Buffett.
在2008年，艾丽斯·施罗德在弗吉尼亚大学的当年价值投资会议开幕之夜登上讲台，展示了沃伦·巴菲特引人入胜的思想世界。

Drawing on her 2,000+ hours spent with Buffett while researching and writing The Snowball, she also unveiled insights into the legendary investor that go far beyond the pages of her acclaimed biography. Enjoy!
在研究和撰写《滚雪球》的过程中，她与巴菲特共度超过2,000个小时，因此揭示了许多未被收入她备受赞誉的传记中的独特见解。请欣赏！

John Macfarlane: As Alice \[Schroeder] and I were walking into the theater this afternoon, we looked at it and said, “You know, that looks an awful lot like the Orpheum Theater in Omaha.” For those of you who have been to the Berkshire Hathaway meetings over ten years ago, you know exactly what that is.
约翰·麦克法兰：今天下午，当我和艾丽斯（施罗德）走进剧场时，我们环顾四周，不禁说道：“你知道，这里看起来特别像奥马哈的奥芬剧院。”十多年前参加过伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东大会的人一定知道我说的是哪里。

We used to go to the meetings when shareholders could fit into that theater, which was probably about this size \[or] maybe a little bit larger. Of course, that was before the B shares. So we’ve been going back for years and watched it migrate to Ak-Sar-Ben and then ultimately the Qwest Center.
过去股东们还都能坐进那个剧院里参加股东大会，那座剧院大概跟这里差不多大，或许稍微大一点。当然，那时候还没有B类股票。因此，这些年来我们亲眼见证了会场的迁移，从最初的奥芬剧院，到后来迁到阿克萨本，最终搬到奎斯特中心。

Before I get to my comments about Alice, most of you guys probably know more than I’ll say about her. That is, those of you who are under 30 because she has a Facebook fan page — which I can’t view because my kids won’t let me or my wife be on Facebook.
在我对艾丽斯发表评论之前，你们大多数人可能已经对她了解得比我即将介绍的还要多了。尤其是30岁以下的人，因为她在Facebook上有粉丝专页——我看不到，因为我的孩子们不允许我和我妻子用Facebook。

So you guys already know more than I do about Alice — and I’ll attempt to fill in for those of us who are over 30, 40, 50, \[or] 60. (Laughs)
因此，你们对艾丽斯的了解肯定比我更多，我就试着为我们这些年龄在30、40、50甚至60岁以上的人做些补充吧。（笑声）

Rarely do practitioners have the opportunity to watch the undisputed master of their discipline in real-time. We are truly fortunate to live in the age of Warren Buffett. As rare is to have the work of a master chronicled in exacting detail during their lifetime. Alice Schroeder accomplished just that with The Snowball. In 838 pages, she provides unique insight into the individual who has largely shaped the field of value investing over the past three to four decades — and for that, Alice, we’re deeply indebted to you for your work.
很少有实践者能够实时见证他们领域里公认大师的风采。我们确实很幸运，生活在沃伦·巴菲特的时代。同样难得的是，一位大师的生平和思想能在其生前被如此精准而细致地记录下来。艾丽斯·施罗德通过《滚雪球》做到了这一点。这本书共838页，她为我们提供了独特的视角，深入剖析了过去三四十年间塑造价值投资领域最重要的人物——为此，艾丽斯，我们对你的工作深表感谢。

Alice’s career began in accounting. While working for \[the Financial Accounting Standards Board], she drafted some of the most important accounting standards affecting the insurance industry. She subsequently moved onto investment banking and ultimately, as many of you know, to research at Morgan Stanley where she became Institutional Investor’s top-ranked property and casualty insurance industry analyst. It was in that capacity that she met Warren and, as a result of a strong mutual respect, he granted her full access to his papers \[and] to his family and friends to write his biography.
艾丽斯的职业生涯始于会计领域。在为财务会计准则委员会工作期间，她起草了一些对保险业影响深远的重要会计准则。随后，她进入投资银行领域，最终转向摩根士丹利的研究部门，正如诸位所知，她在那里成为《机构投资者》杂志评选出的排名第一的财产与意外伤害保险行业分析师。正是在这个岗位上，她与沃伦·巴菲特相识，两人互相敬重，因此巴菲特授权她完全查阅自己的文献资料，并允许她采访他的家人和朋友，以撰写他的传记。

What makes The Snowball so special in my opinion are, in combination, four distinguishing characteristics: First of all, Alice’s very deep understanding of finance and the insurance industry. Secondly, the unprecedented access that she had to Warren and his work. Thirdly, her persistence and attention to detail. And fourthly — and most importantly — the integrity with which she undertook the task.
在我看来，《滚雪球》之所以如此特别，主要源于它的四个显著特质：首先，艾丽斯对金融与保险行业的深入理解；其次，她前所未有地近距离接触沃伦本人及他的事业；第三，她的坚持不懈与对细节的极致关注；第四，也是最重要的，她在写作过程中所展现的高度诚信。

Based upon our countless conversations over the past several years, I can assure you that she was relentless in her verification of fact. For those of you who have read the book — or at least flipped through it — the footnotes are certainly testimony to that.
基于过去数年我们无数次的交谈，我可以肯定地告诉你们，她在事实核查方面是非常执着的。那些读过此书或至少翻阅过的人，想必对书中详实的脚注印象深刻，它们正是最好的证明。

Not surprisingly, after a little more than a month on the shelves, The Snowball is now ranked by Amazon as the #1 business book of 2008. So it’s getting the recognition that it deserves. Those of you who have read it, you know why.
毫不意外的是，《滚雪球》上架一个多月后，就迅速登上亚马逊2008年度商业类书籍的第一名。这本书正获得它应得的认可。凡是读过此书的人，都明白其中的原因。

So, without further ado, it’s my pleasure to introduce to you Alice Schroeder.
那么，话不多说，我很荣幸向大家介绍艾丽斯·施罗德。

Alice Schroeder: John, thank you so much for that wonderful introduction — and thank you all for having me here at the University of Virginia and all of the people who were so welcoming. It’s really terrific.
艾丽斯·施罗德：约翰，非常感谢你精彩的介绍，也谢谢弗吉尼亚大学的各位以及热情欢迎我的所有人。这种感觉真是太棒了。

I especially want to say thank you to John because he was very modest in not playing up his role. He was one of my important sources in writing The Snowball because of his role at Salomon Brothers as the treasurer.
我特别想向约翰致谢，他在介绍中非常谦逊，没有强调自己所起的重要作用。他曾是所罗门兄弟公司的司库，也是我撰写《滚雪球》一书的重要资料来源之一。

I found that one of the things that occurs when you write a biography is that you do get a lot of conflicting information and John was my sounding board. I would call him and say, “These two people have said this and that. Which one should I believe?” And he would tell me — and I trusted him. He was an invaluable resource and also gave me a lot of great facts and information.
我发现写传记时经常会遇到互相冲突的信息，而约翰正是我很好的参谋。我经常会打电话问他：“有两个人分别告诉我这个和那个，我该相信哪一个？”他会给出答案，而我完全信任他。他不仅是一位极其宝贵的信息来源，还为我提供了许多重要的事实和资料。

It’s a real privilege to come before you tonight to talk about Warren Buffett, especially at this time of financial turmoil and crisis. As you all know, Warren Buffett is the only person of our time who’s managed to accomplish his wish of becoming so rich that when he writes a check, it’s the bank that bounces. (Laughs)
今晚能来到这里与各位谈谈沃伦·巴菲特，尤其是在眼下金融市场动荡和危机的时刻，我感到无比荣幸。大家都知道，沃伦·巴菲特是我们这个时代唯一实现了自己心愿的人：他富裕到当他开支票时，跳票的是银行。（笑声）

These days, it doesn’t take quite so large a check to make the bank bounce — but it’s interesting to see that, when it does happen, it’s Warren Buffett that they run to to cover the overdraft. He is really a singular figure in these times.
如今，要银行跳票并不一定需要金额如此庞大的支票了。但有趣的是，一旦银行真的遇到这种情况，他们求助的人却总是沃伦·巴菲特，以弥补资金缺口。他确实是这个时代里独一无二的人物。

When I started working on The Snowball, of course, things were very different. The internet bubble had just imploded and it was just after the aftermath of Enron. I never anticipated anything like this occurring — but I knew what he was like and, of course, much of the importance of him is that his ideas and principles haven’t really changed in fifty years.
当我开始写《滚雪球》时，情况自然是截然不同的。当时互联网泡沫刚刚破灭，安然事件的余波仍在持续。我从未料到后来会发生今天这样的情形，但我清楚巴菲特是什么样的人。事实上，他的重要性在很大程度上就在于，他的思想和原则在过去五十年几乎没有任何变化。

I thought that writing a book about him would actually be a fairly simple matter. When you ask Warren a question, he always had the answer. When I would present him with a business problem, he always would have the solution. So the job was just to write it down.
我原以为写一本关于他的书是一件非常简单的事。当你向沃伦提出问题时，他总能给出答案。当我向他提出商业上的难题时，他总能立即提供解决方案。因此，我的工作看起来似乎只是将这些记录下来就好。

What I didn’t realize was how quickly I would encounter something called Sevareid’s Law, which is that the cause of problems is solutions. So, having asked all my questions and having listened to his stories and having gotten all of his solutions, very quickly I was presented with a problem, which was that I had far more “solutions” material — questions answered — than I knew what to do with.
但我没有料到，很快我就遇到了所谓的“塞瓦雷德定律”：即问题的根源往往在于解决方案本身。因此，在我提出所有问题、聆听了他的故事并得到所有答案后，我迅速面临了新的困扰：我手上这些所谓的“解决方案”（已回答的问题）材料太多，多到让我完全不知道该如何处理。

I began casting about for a way to construct a narrative, to come up with how to put together a book about this man’s life that would be meaningful and present a set of ideas. I had a few attempts that failed, but I thought you might like to hear about them. Here’s my first shot at it: “The story began with a journey through the life of a 78-year-old man. It traveled back through the decades, tracing and uncovering a common truth that lies at the core of the most powerful investment philosophies, teachings, and models in the world. What you will learn today is the single, secret, underlying law of The Snowball, a set of principles based on the most powerful law in the universe. All that Warren Buffett ever accomplished or tamed in the business of life was done in full accordance with this most powerful law. Using this simple, universal law, The Snowball offers the knowledge of how to create — intentionally and effortlessly — a joyful life. This is the secret. The secret to everything. The secret to unlimited happiness, love, health, and prosperity. This is the Law of Attraction, the secret of Warren Buffett.”
于是我开始尝试寻找合适的叙述方式，以构建一本关于这位传奇人物人生的书籍，希望它能有意义并且能传达一套思想体系。我进行了几次失败的尝试，不过我觉得或许你们会对我的尝试感兴趣。以下是我的第一个版本：“故事始于对一位78岁老人生命旅程的探索。这段旅程回溯数十年，揭示了世界上最强大的投资哲学、教义与模型所共同依赖的核心真理。今天你们将学到的是《滚雪球》背后唯一的秘密法则，一套基于宇宙最强大法则的原则。沃伦·巴菲特在生活与商业领域取得或驾驭的一切成就，皆严格遵循了这条至高无上的法则。利用这一简单且普遍适用的法则，《滚雪球》告诉你如何轻松而有意识地创造充满喜悦的人生。这就是秘密。一切的秘密。通往无限幸福、爱、健康与繁荣的秘密。这就是吸引力法则，这就是沃伦·巴菲特的秘密。”

Okay, well, I passed on that idea. I thought it was not too good, but somebody else went there.
好吧，这个想法最终被我放弃了。我觉得它并不太合适，但后来却被别人使用了。

My next attempt: “The Snowball’s action kicks off in modern-day New York where a bloodstained copy of *The Intelligent Investor* is found symbolically laid at the foot of the New York Stock Exchange. The quest for the Holy Grail of investing led to a search that spanned the globe from London to Los Angeles, leaving a gruesome trail of interview subjects behind as evidence. The result was an exhaustively researched page-turner about a secret investing cult, coverups of ancient mistakes, and savage vengeance against those who tried to capture the Holy Grail for themselves. In the end, I found the Grail guarded by an ancient 78-year-old heretic, buried deep in a maze of files under a pyramid in Kiewit Plaza.”
我第二个尝试是这样的：“《滚雪球》的故事从现代纽约拉开帷幕，一本沾有血迹的《聪明的投资者》象征性地摆在纽约证券交易所的门前。追寻投资界‘圣杯’的旅程穿越全球，从伦敦到洛杉矶，沿途留下了一串串采访对象的残酷踪迹作为证据。这是一部经过详尽调研的畅销巨作，讲述了一个神秘投资教派、对古老错误的掩盖，以及对那些试图独占‘圣杯’之人的残忍复仇。最终，我在基维特广场金字塔下一座文件迷宫深处，找到了由一位78岁的异教徒守护的圣杯。”

I loved that idea, but then there was this guy named Dan Brown who went ahead and used it before I got there. (Laughs)
我很喜欢这个点子，但有个叫丹·布朗的家伙抢先一步用了它。（笑声）

I was sure, however, that somewhere hiding in Kiewit Plaza there was a Holy Grail — because I spent 2,000 hours with Warren Buffett. I did get to go through all of his files and I got to ask him all of the questions and business problems that I wanted to.
不过，我坚信基维特广场里某个地方确实藏着圣杯——因为我与沃伦·巴菲特共度了2000小时。我确实翻阅了他的所有档案，也得以向他提出我想问的所有问题和商业难题。

I thought there had to be a Holy Grail because I had heard from so many investors a little bit of — irritation might not be the right word — but Warren always says that \[investing is] very simple. There are a few simple principles. And if you were only working with a smaller amount of money, he could earn 50% returns a year.
我之所以觉得一定有圣杯，是因为我听过太多投资者略带……“恼火”或许不是最准确的词……但沃伦总是说，投资很简单，有一些非常简单的原则。如果你只是管理一小笔资金，他每年可以获得50%的回报。

Well, I’ve had a lot of people say to me, “I am working with a smaller amount of money. If it is really that simple, why am I not earning 50% returns a year?” (Laughs) So the question is: Is it just that Warren Buffett is a genius? Is it just that we’re all dumb? Or is the truth somewhere in between?
很多人对我说：“我也只是管理一小笔钱啊。如果真的那么简单，那为什么我一年没赚到50%？”（笑声）所以问题来了：是因为沃伦·巴菲特是天才？还是我们都太笨？抑或真相在两者之间？

And I think the truth is somewhere in between.
我认为，真相确实介于两者之间。

I was sure that hiding somewhere in his office was the Holy Grail — and, in fact, while Warren is brilliant and he is definitely different from everybody else, there is something more to it. He does have a way of making the difficult look easy and he also has a hard time understanding or perhaps even admitting how hard he works. It’s sort of like asking a fish to describe water.
我一直相信，他办公室的某个角落一定藏着“圣杯”。事实上，虽然沃伦极其聪明，确实与常人不同，但还有更多内在原因。他总能让困难的事情看起来轻而易举，而且他很难意识到——或许说是不愿承认——自己究竟有多么努力。这有点像问一条鱼怎么描述水。

There are some concepts that are so ingrained in him and so embedded in him that he doesn’t really understand them himself. They’ve been there for so long. For example, take the rule that he follows about asset turnover. “No real investor likes to trade. It is never pleasant to part, probably forever, from an old friend.” Okay, that probably sounds like something Warren would say, right? Or it sounds like something that Ben Graham would say. But it’s not. That is from a book called *Bond Salesmanship* by Townsend, which Warren read when he was 7 years old. And he asked for this book for Christmas, by the way. (Laughs)
有些理念在他体内早已根深蒂固，以至于连他自己都不完全理解它们的来源，它们存在的时间太久了。举个例子，他奉行的资产周转率原则：“真正的投资者并不喜欢交易。与一个老朋友分别——很可能是永别——永远不是一件令人愉快的事。”听起来像是沃伦说的话吧？或者像是本杰明·格雷厄姆的名言。但不是。这句话出自一本名为《债券销售术》的书，作者是汤森德。沃伦七岁时就读了这本书，顺便说一句，这是他圣诞节许愿要的礼物。（笑声）

Whenever he reads a book, especially as a child, he usually read them four or five times and memorized them. So some of these ideas have been so ingrained in him from an early age that it’s hard to know whether they are innate, whether he invented them, or whether he picked them up from sources like this when he was very young. But he got a lot of reinforcement at a very early age.
他每次读书，尤其是在童年时，通常都会反复读四五遍，甚至记住内容。因此，其中一些观念从很小的时候就深深扎根于他脑中，以至于后来很难分辨这些想法是天生的、他自己发明的，还是在年幼时从类似书籍中习得的。但毫无疑问，他在非常早的阶段就得到了大量的理念强化。

Now, for those of us who didn’t, the question is: What in Warren’s papers and mental files will help us be better investors, even though we can’t be the next Warren Buffett? I did find some things, but let’s first start with reviewing \[the basics].
那么，对我们这些没有那样经历的人来说，问题就是：沃伦的资料和他头脑中的知识库中，有哪些能帮助我们成为更优秀投资者的东西？虽然我们无法成为下一个巴菲特，但我确实找到了一些东西。但让我们先从回顾一些基本概念开始。

There are four concepts that you hear over and over that are kind of the basics of value investing. They are (1) intrinsic value — and, especially, applying the Phil Fisher qualitative investing concepts to intrinsic value; (2) ignoring Mr. Market’s manic-depressive behavior; (3) the performance drag of too much turnover and too much diversification; and (4) the Ben Graham margin of safety concept — which arguably is the most important idea ever developed in investing.
你会反复听到的、属于价值投资基本范畴的四个概念是：（1）内在价值——尤其是将菲利普·费舍尔的定性投资理念应用于内在价值判断；（2）忽视“市场先生”的躁郁行为；（3）过度换手率和过度分散所带来的业绩拖累；（4）本杰明·格雷厄姆的“安全边际”概念——这可能是投资史上最重要的理念之一。

All of these are very important, but when I studied and spent so much time with Warren Buffett what I actually saw is that he uses these concepts — but what he actually does is a little bit different.
这些概念都非常重要，但在我长时间研究并接触巴菲特的过程中，我发现他确实运用这些概念——但他真正的实践方式与它们略有不同。

So what I would like to do is take you on a little bit of a journey using a specific investment that I did not write about in the book. It was cut for length. It illustrates the principles that I talk about in the book, but it’s a little bit too technical and at too high a level to have been put into *The Snowball*, which is for more of a mass audience.
因此，我想带大家走一小段旅程，介绍一个具体的投资案例，这个案例没有出现在书中，因为篇幅限制被删掉了。它很好地说明了我在书中提到的一些原则，但技术性较强、层次较高，不太适合面向大众的《滚雪球》这本书。

Also, just as an overview, I should just say that so much of Warren’s success has come from training himself into good habits. It’s worth just saying that because he always says that the chains of habit are too light to be felt until they’re too heavy to be broken. He’s talking about bad habits \[there]. It was Aristotle who said, “We are what we repeatedly do,” and that, “Excellence is not an act, but a habit.”
另外，我还要强调一点，沃伦之所以取得如此成就，很大程度上源于他通过自我训练形成了良好的习惯。这值得一提，因为他常说：“习惯之链，在变得沉重到无法挣脱之前，轻得几乎无法察觉。”这句话是说坏习惯。而亚里士多德则说过：“我们就是我们反复做的事情”，“卓越不是一种行为，而是一种习惯。”

Warren is a creature of habit. He’s the ultimate creature of habit. His first habit was hard work. I write over and over in the book about the fact that he was at the Securities and Exchange Commission digging up documents before they were electronically available. He was down at the state insurance commission in the bowels of the basement looking up files. He was knocking on doors of businesses, talking to the managements when they were saying, “You’re a pest. Go away!” He was sending Dan Monen around the state buying up shares of National American Insurance. He was always thinking and working — and a lot of his work was not obvious. It was not repetitive or routine. He was always thinking, “What more can I do?” Especially, “What more can I do to get an edge on the other guy?”
沃伦是个受习惯驱动的人。他是终极的“习惯动物”。他最早养成的习惯就是勤奋。我在书中一再提到，他曾在证券交易委员会查阅纸质档案，那时候还没有电子文档。他还跑到州保险监管局的地下室深处翻查文件。他敲开一家家企业的大门，即使对方管理层对他说：“你很烦，走开！”他依然坚持不懈。他还派丹·莫南跑遍各地，买进National American Insurance的股份。他始终在思考和工作——而且他的大多数工作并不显眼，也不是机械重复的。他总在问：“我还能做些什么？”特别是：“我还能做什么来获得超越他人的优势？”

Now, importantly, I know a lot of people will point out that a lot of what he did you can’t do these days because either the information is so available electronically that everybody has it or it’s insider information that would be illegal to use. But the principle of the hard work that he did is still the same.
当然，很多人会指出，如今他当年所做的很多事情都已不可能再做：要么信息已经电子化、人人都能获得，要么是如今被认定为非法的内幕信息。但他所体现出来的“勤奋”原则依旧适用。

I was talking to somebody earlier and we were just sort of talking in awe of how hard Warren Buffett worked — and the fact that most people would not work that obsessively. But, for those few who do, there is a reward.
我早些时候和人聊起这事，我们都由衷敬佩沃伦·巴菲特的勤奋——大多数人都不会如此执着地工作。但对那极少数愿意这么做的人来说，确实会有回报。

The main thing that he worked at was learning. The guy is, as Charlie Munger puts it, a learning machine. And his learning has been cumulative. It has been a tremendous advantage to him in business. He’s got this mental file cabinet that’s been built up starting \[from] when he was a very small child, sitting in his stockbroker father’s office, reading the financial statements and descriptions of thousands of businesses and dozens and even hundreds of industries — over and over and over.
他最用功的事，其实是学习。正如查理·芒格所说，他是一个“学习机器”。而他的学习是累积式的，这在商业上为他带来了巨大优势。他的大脑里就像有一个庞大的“资料柜”，早在孩提时代就开始建立起来了。那时他坐在做股票经纪人的父亲办公室里，一遍又一遍地阅读成千上万家企业的财报和描述，涵盖几十、甚至上百个行业。

This is really why, when people call him with a business proposition, he can say yes or no instantly. Because he’s got that file cabinet in his mind that is so deep.
这也正是为什么，当有人向他提出商业提案时，他能立刻回答“可以”或“不行”。因为他脑海中那个“资料柜”太庞大太深了。

It does help to have a photographic memory — or near photographic memory — which he has, but at the same time that knowledge, that learning, is the second part of what makes him Warren Buffett. And the learning was cumulative.
拥有过目不忘的记忆力——或者接近于此的记忆力——确实是一种优势，而巴菲特就具备这样的能力。但与此同时，那些知识和学习经历，构成了他成为“沃伦·巴菲特”的另一关键因素。而且他的学习是长期积累的结果。

I think that’s worth mentioning, too, that he has chosen to learn in a field where the knowledge adds and builds on top of each other. And so I think we could all be better investors for knowing that.
我认为还值得一提的是，他选择了一个知识具有高度累积性的领域来深耕学习。因此，我们每个人都可以从中得出启示，成为更好的投资者。

Up to this point, there’s not any great mystery to it. I think everybody who has read *The Snowball* knows how hard Warren Buffett has worked and how much learning he has done. But there are three other factors to his success that I would like to talk about and focus \[on] a little bit differently than he normally explains the way he invests. And that is: handicapping, compounding, and the margin of safety.
到目前为止，其实并没有什么神秘之处。我想所有读过《滚雪球》的人都知道沃伦·巴菲特有多么努力工作，以及他积累了多少学习。但我接下来想谈的，是他成功的另外三个关键因素，我希望用不同于他公开解释的方式来切入。这三个因素分别是：判断胜率（handicapping）、复利（compounding）、以及安全边际（margin of safety）。

These are three concepts that work together. He uses them in a slightly different way than he would think of describing them publicly. They are all discussed in the book. I would like to take you through a little case study on an investment called Mid-Continent Tab Card Co. — this was a private investment that he did in his personal portfolio — and just kind of show you how I saw him invest based on his personal files and what he actually does. And then I’ll update that to the present day.
这三个概念是互相协作的。他在实际中运用的方式，和他在公开场合谈论时略有不同。《滚雪球》里也都提到了。我接下来想带大家看一个小案例，关于他曾经投资过的一家公司——Mid-Continent Tab Card Co.，这是他在个人投资组合里的一笔私人投资。借此，我希望向大家展示我从他的私人档案中观察到的实际投资方式。随后我还会把这个案例延伸到当代视角。

This company was an outgrowth of IBM. As you all know, in the 1950s Warren did not use computers — but he was very aware of them. IBM was the only computer company of any size or importance at that time and Warren’s Aunt Katie and his Uncle Fred had decided to invest in Control Data, which was a startup company that was going to compete with IBM.
这家公司源自IBM。大家知道，在20世纪50年代，沃伦并不使用电脑——但他非常关注这个领域。当时，IBM是唯一一家有规模、有影响力的计算机公司。而沃伦的凯蒂姑妈和弗雷德叔叔决定投资一家名为Control Data的新创公司，这家公司准备与IBM竞争。

Katie’s brother, who was Bill Norris, was founding Control Data because he wanted to create a business \[and] he thought IBM was slow and bureaucratic. Warren told Katie and Fred not to invest in Control Data. He said to them, “Don’t do it. Who needs another computer company?” Those were sort of his famous last words. They invested in Control Data anyway and they made a huge amount of money.
凯蒂的哥哥比尔·诺里斯是Control Data的创始人，他想创办一家公司，因为他觉得IBM太缓慢、太官僚。沃伦劝凯蒂和弗雷德不要投资Control Data。他对他们说：“别投，谁还需要另一家电脑公司？”这句话后来几乎成了他的“名言绝句”。然而他们还是投了Control Data，结果赚了很多钱。

What was notable about this incident is that Warren told them not to invest because he actually knew a lot about IBM. He had been studying IBM. Since 1952, it had been in court embroiled in an antitrust case for being a monopoly. Warren studied its financials even though, by then, he had already declared IBM outside his circle of competence. He felt that even though IBM might have to be broken up someday, its monopoly was so overwhelming — and, of course, he likes monopoly businesses — that to compete with it would probably be futile.
这个事件值得注意的地方在于，沃伦之所以劝他们不要投资，是因为他其实对IBM了解得非常深入。自1952年以来，IBM因涉嫌垄断一直卷入反垄断诉讼。尽管沃伦当时已将IBM排除在他的“能力圈”之外，他仍然研究其财报。他认为，即使IBM有朝一日会被拆分，它的垄断地位也依然强大——而他本人又偏爱垄断型企业——所以跟它竞争可能是徒劳的。

So what happened was that IBM did actually settle with the Justice Department and, as part of that settlement, it was required to divest of a business making tab cards.
后来发生的事情是，IBM最终确实与司法部达成了和解协议，并作为和解的一部分，被要求剥离其穿孔卡片制造业务。

Now, I can’t really see you very well, but there must be a few people who could throw their hands up in the air that are old enough to know what a tab card is. Anybody know what a tab card is? Yes, I see two people! Okay, that dates me. (Laughs)
我现在看不太清你们，但在座应该有一些年纪足够大的人会举手表示知道“tab card”（穿孔卡片）是什么。有人知道吗？哦，我看到有两位！好吧，这暴露我的年纪了（笑声）。

Before computers were digital, they actually read off of punch cards. They were called “mark sense" cards and these were big decks of cards that had holes punched in them. They would be stuck in the computer — they were not electronic — \[and] they were sent mechanically through the computer.
在计算机变成数字化设备之前，它们实际上是通过打孔卡片来读取信息的。这些卡片被称为“感应标记卡”，是一摞摞带有打孔的大卡片。它们会被插入计算机中——不是电子读取的——而是通过机械方式被送入电脑处理。

This company was formed because IBM had to divest of this business. It was an incredibly, incredibly profitable business. In fact, because these cards were trivial compared to the mainframe computers that IBM sold, it marked them up to get more than a 50% profit margin. This was IBM’s most profitable business.
这家公司之所以成立，是因为IBM被迫剥离了这块业务。事实上，这是一个极其、极其赚钱的业务。由于这些卡片相较于IBM销售的大型计算机来说成本极低，IBM对其大幅加价，毛利率超过50%。这是IBM利润最高的业务。

So Wayne Eaves and John Cleary, who were two friends of Warren’s, saw that IBM was going to have to divest of this business and they thought: We’re going to buy a Carroll press — which was the press that makes these cards — and we’re going to compete with IBM because we’re based in the Midwest, we can ship faster, \[and] we can provide better service.
于是，沃伦的两个朋友，韦恩·伊夫斯和约翰·克利里，看到了IBM将被迫出售该业务的机会。他们想：“我们要买一台卡罗尔印刷机——就是用来制作这些卡片的设备——然后和IBM展开竞争。因为我们位于中西部，可以更快发货，也能提供更优质的服务。”

They went to Warren and they said, “Should we invest in this company and would you come in with us?” And Warren said no.
他们去找沃伦，说：“我们该不该投资这家公司？你愿不愿意和我们一起投？”沃伦拒绝了。

Why did he say no?
他为什么说不呢？

He didn’t say no because it was a technology company. He said no because he went through the first step in his investing process. And this is where, I think, what he does that’s very automatic — but isn’t well understood. He acted like a horse handicapper.
他不是因为这是一家科技公司而说不。他说不，是因为他执行了自己投资流程中的第一步。而这一步，是我认为他最自动化、但常被误解的地方。他的做法像一个赛马赔率分析师（handicapper）。

The first step in Warren’s investing process is always to say, “What are the odds that this business could be subject to any kind of catastrophe risk that could make it just fail?” If there is any chance that any significant amount of his capital could be subject to catastrophe risk, he just stops thinking. No. And he won’t go there.
沃伦投资流程的第一步始终是问自己：“这家企业出现灾难性失败的几率有多大？”如果他的资金有任何可能面临重大灾难性风险，他就不再考虑。答案是“不”，他绝不会涉足。
Idea
商业原则的第4条：考虑最坏的情况，但确实是进入判断的第一个环节。
It’s backwards \[to] the way that most people invest because most people find an interesting idea, they figure out the math, they look at the financials, they do a projection, and then at the end they ask themselves, “Okay, what could go wrong?”
这与大多数人的投资方式是反过来的。大多数人是先发现一个有趣的投资点子，再做数学模型、查财务报表、进行预测，最后才问自己：“好吧，有什么可能出问题？”

Warren starts with what could go wrong. Here, he said, a start-up business competing with IBM could fail. Nope. Sorry. And he didn’t think another thing about it.
而沃伦是从“可能出错的地方”入手。在这个案例中，他说，一家与IBM竞争的初创公司可能失败。答案是“不考虑”。很抱歉。他就此打住，完全不再往下思考。

But Wayne Eaves and John Cleary went ahead anyway. They started up this business and, within a year, they were printing 35 million tab cards a month. So, at that point, they needed to buy more Carroll presses and they came back to Warren and they said, “We need money. Would you like to come in?”
但韦恩·伊夫斯和约翰·克利里还是照做了。他们启动了这家公司，并在一年内达到了每月打印3,500万张打孔卡片的产能。于是，他们需要购买更多卡罗尔印刷机，于是再次找沃伦，说：“我们需要资金。你现在想加入吗？”

Okay, so now Warren is interested because the catastrophe risk element of the equation is gone. They are competing successfully against IBM.
这时沃伦产生了兴趣，因为“灾难性风险”这个因素已经不再存在。他们已成功地与IBM竞争了下来。

He asked for the numbers and they explained to him that they were turning their capital over 7x a year. A Carroll press cost \$78,000 \[and] every time they run a set of cards through it and turn their capital over, they are making over \$11,000. So basically their gross profit a year on a press is enough to buy another printing press.
他向他们要了财务数据，对方解释说，他们每年可以让资本周转七次。一台卡罗尔印刷机成本为78,000美元，每次运行卡片并完成一次资本周转，就能赚11,000多美元。所以基本上，一年靠一台机器赚的毛利润，就足以再买一台新印刷机。

At this point, Warren is very interested. Their net profit margins are 40%. It’s like the most profitable business that he’s ever had the opportunity to invest in.
听到这里，沃伦非常感兴趣了。他们的净利润率高达40%。这是他有机会投资过的最赚钱的生意之一。

Notably, people are now bringing Warren special deals. It’s 1959 and he’s been in business for two-and-a-half years running the partnership. Why are they doing that? It’s not because they know he’s a great stock picker. They don’t know that. He hasn’t yet made that record. It’s because he knows so much about business and, because he started so early, that he has a lot of money.
值得注意的是，那时候人们开始主动把特别的投资机会带给沃伦。那是1959年，他运营合伙企业已经两年半。为什么人们会这样做？不是因为他们知道他是选股高手。他那时还没建立这样的声誉。他们之所以找他，是因为他对商业了解非常深入，而且由于起步早，他手上有不少资金。

This is something interesting about Warren Buffett. By 1959, people were already bringing him special deals — like they’re still doing today with Goldman and GE.
这正是关于沃伦·巴菲特的一个有趣现象：早在1959年，人们就开始主动向他提供特殊交易机会——就像今天的高盛和通用电气所做的一样。

He decided that he would come in and invest in this company — Mid-Continent Tab Card Co. — but, interestingly, he did not take Wayne and John’s word for it. The numbers they gave him were really enticing, but again he went through and he acted like a horse handicapper.
他决定要投资这家公司——Mid-Continent Tab Card Co.——但有趣的是，他并没有轻信韦恩和约翰的话。他们给出的数据非常诱人，但他依然按照自己的方式来判断，就像一个赛马赔率分析师那样。

Here’s another point of departure from what almost anybody else would do. Everybody that I know — or knew as an analyst — would have created a model for this company and would have projected out its earnings and would have looked at its return on investment in the future. Warren didn’t do that. In fact, in going through hundreds of his files, I’ve never seen anything that resembled a model.
这又是他和其他人截然不同的地方。就我所认识的分析师而言，他们都会给这家公司建个模型，预测未来盈利情况，评估未来的投资回报。但沃伦没有这样做。事实上，在我翻阅他上百份文件时，从未见过哪怕一个像样的财务模型。

What he did is he did what you would do with a horse. He figured out the one or two factors that could make the horse succeed or fail — and, in this case, it was sales growth and making the cost advantage continue to work. Then, he took all of the historical data, quarter by quarter for every single plant, he got the similar information as best he could from every competitor they had, and he filled pages with little hen scratches of all this information and he studied that information.
他的做法就像赛马行家。他找出一两项决定马匹胜负的关键因素——在这个案例中，是销售增长和成本优势是否能持续。然后他整理了所有工厂逐季度的历史数据，还尽可能地从所有竞争对手那里获得类似资料，用密密麻麻的笔记填满了好几页纸，仔细研究这些数据。

And, then, he made a yes/no decision. He looked at it: They were getting 36% margins \[and] they were growing over 70% a year on a million of sales. Those were the historic numbers. He looked at them in great detail — just like a horse handicapper studying the tip sheet — and then he said to himself, “I want a 15% return on \$2 million of sales.” And then he said, “Yeah, I can get that.” And he came in as an investor.
接着，他做出了“是/否”的决策。他看到了：他们的利润率为36%，年销售增长超过70%，基于百万美元的销售额。这是历史数据。他像一个分析马匹胜率的人研究小报一样，详尽地看完这些资料，然后对自己说：“我希望在200万美元的销售额基础上获得15%的回报。”接着他说：“是的，我可以得到。”于是他成为这家公司的投资者。

So what he did is he incorporated his whole earnings model and compounding discounted cash flow into that one sentence. “I want 15% on \$2 million of sales.”
换句话说，他把整个收益模型、复利、贴现现金流的逻辑都浓缩进了那一句话里：“我希望在200万美元的销售额上获得15%的回报。”

Why 15%? Because Warren is not greedy. He always wants a mere 15% day one return on an investment and then it compounds from there. That’s all he has ever wanted. He’s happy with that.
为什么是15%？因为沃伦并不贪心。他一贯的目标是在投资第一天就获得15%的回报，然后再靠复利来增长。这就是他始终以来的追求。他对此感到很满足。

You’re not laughing. What’s wrong?!? (Laughs)
你们怎么不笑？发生什么事了？（笑声）

It’s a very simple thing. There’s nothing fancy about it. I think that’s another important lesson because he’s a very simple guy. He doesn’t do any kind of discounted cash flow models or anything like that. For decades, he just says, “I want a 15% day one return on my investment and I want it to grow from there.” Ta da!
这是一件非常简单的事，毫不花哨。我觉得这是另一个重要的教训，因为他本人就是个非常简单的人。他不会去做任何贴现现金流模型或者类似的分析。几十年来，他一直只是说：“我希望我的投资在第一天就获得15%的回报，并从此复利增长。”就这么简单！

The \$2 million of sales was pretty simple, too. It had \$1 million \[and] it was growing 70%. There was a big margin of safety built into these numbers. It had a 36% profit margin and he said, “I’ll take half that.”
那200万美元的销售额计算也很简单。当时只有100万美元的销售额，并以70%的速度增长。这些数字本身就内含了巨大的安全边际。利润率有36%，而他只按照其中一半来计算。

He ended up putting \$60,000 of his personal non-partnership money into this company, which was about 20% of his net worth at the time. He got 16% of the company’s stock, plus some subordinated notes.
他最终投了6万美元的私人资金（不是合伙基金）进这家公司，这相当于他当时净资产的20%。他获得了公司16%的股份，还有一些次级债券。

The way he thought about it was really simple. It was a one-step decision. He looked at historical data and then he had this generic return that he wants on everything. It was a very easy decision for him — and he relied totally on historical figures with no projections. I think that that’s a really interesting way to look at it because I saw him do it over and over in different investments.
他的思考方式极其简单。这是一个一步到位的决策。他先看历史数据，再用他一贯设定的目标回报要求来衡量。这个决策对他来说非常容易——而且他完全依赖历史数据，没有任何预测模型。我觉得这是个非常有意思的方式，因为我在他其他很多投资中也反复看到他这样做。

So what happened? The company changed its name to Data Documents. He owned the investment for 18 years. He ended up putting another \$1 million into it over time. It was bought out by Dictograph in 1979 and he earned a 33% compounded return over the 18 years that he owned the investment. So it was not too bad.
那么后来发生了什么？这家公司改名为Data Documents。他持有这笔投资长达18年，期间又陆续追加了100万美元。1979年，该公司被Dictograph收购，他在18年间获得了33%的年复合收益率。所以，这笔投资可以说是非常不错了。

And that was typical. I gave you this example in part because it was the other time besides GEICO that he got a Phil Fisher-type growth company at a Ben Graham-like price. It was the most vivid example of that that I found, but it was a private investment and there’s not a lot of public information about it available.
这其实是很典型的案例。我讲这个例子，部分原因是除了GEICO之外，这是他用“本·格雷厄姆式价格”买到的又一个“菲利普·费舍尔式成长公司”。这是我找到的最鲜明的例子之一，但因为它是私下投资，公开信息非常少。

Fast forwarding a little bit \[to] why he thinks so much about catastrophe — Firestone’s Law of Forecasting is always on his mind. Firestone said that Chicken Little only had to be right once. That’s always the first thing that Warren thinks about.
快进一点讲讲他为何如此重视灾难风险——他脑子里始终铭记着“Firestone预测法则”：福尔斯通说，“小鸡丽丽只要对一次就够了。”这始终是沃伦考虑问题时的第一要素。

So why is Berkshire Hathaway today not dealing with some of the problems that other people are? It’s because Warren passed on investing in a lot of things that he could have — because the first question he always asks himself is: What’s the cat risk? And if the business or investment has cat risk, then he just says no.
那为什么今天的伯克希尔·哈撒韦没有像其他企业一样陷入各种麻烦？就是因为沃伦放弃了很多本来可以投的项目——只因为他始终会先问自己一句话：“这项投资有没有灾难性风险？”如果答案是“有”，那他就直接说“不”。

We could probably get into an interesting discussion about some things like AIG. That was a stock that I was wrong on for a long time, until I finally turned around. He never invested in AIG because of the cat risk. People brought him Bear Stearns and Lehman and he never invested in them — because of the cat risk.
我们其实可以就像AIG这样的案例展开有趣的讨论。那只股票我曾长期判断错误，直到后来才意识到。而他从未投资过AIG，就是因为它有“灾难性风险”。别人曾把贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟的项目带给他，他也从未投资过——还是因为“灾难性风险”。

He saves himself a lot of time and energy this way. Because if you ask yourself the cat risk question first, then you don’t have to do any of the other work \[with] all those pages of numbers, historical data.
用这种方式，他为自己省下了大量时间和精力。因为只要你先问一句“有没有灾难性风险”，你就可以免去后面那些页页数据和历史资料的分析工作了。

So, because Warren is basically focused on efficiency, that’s why he does that. He’s also very good at being realistic. Once he figures out that something does have the cat risk, he never ever kids himself and tries to talk himself out of changing a decision.
所以，沃伦之所以这样做，是因为他非常注重效率。他也非常擅长现实判断。一旦他意识到某件事存在灾难性风险，他绝不会自欺欺人，也不会试图说服自己改变决定。

Today, when you think about what’s happening right now with deals like GE and Goldman Sachs, people are still bringing him special deals that nobody else can get. He is still making sure that they don’t have the cat risk — as best he can. He’s making a bet there on the management, but also his own reputation as an investor to some extent can cat-proof these deals.
放到今天，当你想到他现在在处理像GE和高盛这样的交易时，人们仍在给他提供别人拿不到的特殊机会。他仍然尽其所能确保这些交易没有灾难性风险。在这类投资中，他既是在押注管理层，同时也是在用自己作为投资者的声誉，为这些交易“防灾”。

And they’re giving him a 10% guaranteed return — and that’s the minimum. He’s going to get his 15%. He still wants the 15%. At times, he has taken less and lowered his standards — and he usually has been sorry when he has.
这些交易给了他10%的保证回报——那只是底线。他最终还是要拿到15%的。他至今仍然追求15%。有时候他也接受了更低的回报，降低了标准——而他通常为此感到后悔。

When it comes to the market as a whole, he uses somewhat the same technique. He recently said that he finds the stock market attractive now. In his 1999 Sun Valley speech, he talked about investing in the market when the stock market’s value was between 70-80% of GDP. It’s somewhat the same method because, at that level, obviously the whole stock market is not going to go to zero. He’s got a huge margin of safety built into that. Just as the 15% return and the \$2 million included a huge margin of safety versus how fast Mid-Continent Tab Card Co. was actually growing and the margins that it was actually getting.
在面对整个市场时，他运用的方法也类似。他最近表示自己认为现在的股市具有吸引力。在1999年Sun Valley的演讲中，他曾说过，只有当股市总市值相当于GDP的70%到80%时，他才会认为值得投资。这其实也是一种类似的判断方式，因为在那种估值水平下，整个股市显然不可能归零。他在其中内嵌了巨大的安全边际——就像他在Mid-Continent Tab Card Co.上的投资一样：15%的目标回报、200万美元的销售额，相对于该公司实际的增长速度和利润率，内含了巨大的安全边际。

He has put his margin of safety into the return expectations and he’s using only historical data. He’s gone back \[through] years and years and years of data to arrive at the conclusion that again — probabilities — he’s handicapping that it’s the right price to buy. And he doesn’t really care if it goes up or down for the next year or two. He just knows that at this price, the odds are that it will do well.
他将安全边际体现在了对回报的预期中，而且他只使用历史数据。他回顾了多年、甚至几十年的数据，通过概率分析来判断当前价格是否合理、值得买入。而他并不在意接下来一两年内股价是否会上下波动。他只关心一件事：在这个价格下，成功的概率非常高。

I do think it’s really amazing that, right now, three weeks later, there are pundits out there who are saying that the greatest living investor of our time — and possibly ever — is wrong for having made these investments and having predicted that the stock market is a buy right now. It is really ironic and interesting that somebody, who as far as I know has never been wrong in making a prediction… The people who make wrong predictions every day and have been, in the past, wrong in saying he’s wrong are out there once again saying that he’s wrong.
我确实觉得很惊讶的是，就在短短三周之后，竟然有评论家公开说我们这个时代、也可能是史上最伟大的在世投资者做错了投资、错判了市场。真是讽刺又有趣：一个据我所知从未在重大判断上出错的人，却被那些每天都预测错误、过去屡次错误地说他“错了”的人，再次批评说他错了。

Also, I think it’s worth mentioning — because we’re talking about this handicapping concept — something else. This is just a little quote from *The Intelligent Investor*, which is that, “The margin of safety is always dependent on the price paid. If, as we suggest, the average market level of most growth stocks is too high to provide a margin of safety for the buyer, then a simple technique of diversified buying in this field may not work out satisfactorily.”
另外，我觉得还值得补充一段话——既然我们在谈论“判断赔率”的概念。这段话来自《聪明的投资者》：“安全边际始终取决于你支付的价格。如果像我们所说的那样，大多数成长股的平均市场价格过高，无法为买家提供安全边际，那么在这个领域采用简单的分散买入法可能并不会带来满意的结果。”

That obviously applies to the market as a whole. One thing that I think Warren Buffett should get a huge amount of credit for and a round of applause for is never ever having advocated dollar cost averaging. Because it’s wrong. It’s led many people off a cliff. It’s not right to buy the market at any price. And you’ve never heard him suggest that anybody should do it. I think he should get a lot of credit for that.
这显然适用于整个市场。我认为，沃伦·巴菲特应该因此获得极高的评价和掌声：他从未提倡过“定期定额投资法”（dollar cost averaging）。因为这种做法是错误的，它把很多人带下了悬崖。在任何价格下都买入市场并不是合理的行为。而你从未听过他建议任何人去这么做。我认为他这一点非常值得称赞。

So, in the end, I would like to just say thank you for listening to this story and I hope it gives you a little bit of insight into how he thinks. But it’s also indefinable. There are certain things about him that are a mystery and will never be explainable.
最后，我只想说感谢大家聆听这个故事。我希望这能让你们对他的思维方式有一些启发。但其中有些东西是无法定义的。他身上有一些神秘的特质，永远无法完全解释清楚。

There’s one thing about him that you can emulate — but only if it comes from the right place inside you. It’s been said — and this came early to Warren — that, "The only person really qualified to advise you as to what you can do is yourself.” He calls this his inner scorecard. “You know yourself better than anyone else does. You, and you alone, know how determined you are to make a success of any undertaking.”
有一点是你可以效仿他的——但前提是，它必须源自你内心真正的驱动力。曾有人说——而沃伦很早就明白这一点——“唯一真正有资格告诉你自己能做什么的人，是你自己。”他称之为“内部计分卡”。“没有人比你更了解你自己。你自己最清楚，你在一项事业上成功的决心有多强。”

And then the last analysis: “About 90% of being successful in business is that indefinable thing which for a lack of a better name we call guts.” That is from the book One Thousand Ways to Make $1,000.
而最后的总结是：“商业上成功的90%都取决于一种说不清的东西，我们只能叫它——胆识。”这句话出自《一千种赚一千美元的方法》一书。

Thank you and I’d be very happy to take any questions now.
谢谢大家，我现在非常乐意回答大家的问题。

Question: Your book has been extremely well-received. Do you have plans for a future work? And, if so, what subject might you look to cover and why?
提问： 您的书广受好评。请问您是否有写作下一本书的计划？如果有，您打算写什么主题？为什么？

Schroeder: I do. I’m sure that I’ll write another book. I don’t expect to write another biography similar to this one because a subject worthy of following this one, I can’t think of who it would be. I have enough material to write a very interesting investment book — and I would be very likely to be writing about some of what I talked about tonight. But I’ve thought about some other ideas, [too], and it’s best to just kind of keep them here. [Schroeder motions to her head]
施罗德： 有的。我肯定还会再写一本书。但我不打算再写类似这本的传记，因为我想不出还有谁值得成为这本书之后的主角。我手上已经有足够的材料写一本非常有趣的投资类书籍——很可能会涉及我今晚所谈到的一些内容。当然我也考虑过其他点子，但还是先留在脑子里比较好。（施罗德指了指自己的头）

Question: One of the things I thought was interesting is, given your background as an insurance analyst and his experience with GEICO, when he stepped in in the early ‘70s, I think you mentioned in the book, he said to somebody, “I might have put money to work where I could lose all of it.” But also, if I remember correctly, you talked about how he said to Gutfreund [at Salomon], “I’ll backstop this.” Although that sounds contradictory, it also sounds like maybe he was gaming it because he could recapitalize it if they still had a durable competitive advantage, even net of their gross liabilities. Is that the right interpretation or did I miss something?
提问： 有一点我觉得很有意思。鉴于您是保险行业分析师，而巴菲特也曾在70年代初介入GEICO的事，您在书里提到他当时说过，“我可能把钱投进一个随时可能全赔的地方。”但另一方面，我记得您也提到他曾对所罗门的古特弗鲁因德说：“我会兜底。”这听起来似乎自相矛盾，但也有可能他其实在算计，如果企业仍有持久竞争优势，即使有巨额负债，他也可以注资重组。这个理解对吗？还是我漏掉了什么？

Schroeder: I think there was a similarity between the two situations in that, in both cases, he knew that his reputation was the backstop. He said, “I put something into a situation where I could lose all my money tomorrow” — but, honestly, the margin of safety was himself.
施罗德： 我觉得这两件事确实有相似之处，在于他都清楚，真正的“兜底”其实是他自己的声誉。他说，“我投进了一个明天可能赔光的钱坑”，但说实话，他那时的安全边际，就是他自己。

And, with Salomon, I don’t think he knew he’d have to call upon it, but basically he was selling his reputation to them. And that’s why he got the high price. In the end, he actually had to reach in and pull that reputation out and use it. Something that was very painful for him and I don’t think he ever thought he would have to do it, but I think that’s what the situations actually have in common.
在所罗门的事情中，我不认为他一开始就预料到自己真的会动用声誉。但他基本上是在“出售”自己的声誉，这也是他能要到高价格的原因。最后他确实不得不亲自出面、动用自己的声誉。这对他来说是极其痛苦的事，我想他从未预料到会走到那一步。但我认为，这正是这两个案例的共同之处。

He was the margin of safety.
他本人就是安全边际。

Question: A lot of Berkshire’s success has come from Warren Buffett’s partnership with Charlie Munger. Can you describe the dynamics of that and how that contributes to the company’s success?
提问： 伯克希尔的成功有很大一部分要归功于巴菲特与查理·芒格的合作关系。您能谈谈他们之间的互动，以及这种关系如何促成公司的成功吗？

Schroeder: Historically, Charlie Munger was somebody who kind of kept Warren on the straight and narrow because he’s one of the few people who really will challenge Warren’s thinking. Warren is sort of awe-inspiring and there aren’t a lot of people who will tell him that he’s wrong.
施罗德： 从历史来看，查理·芒格一直扮演着“让沃伦不偏离正轨”的角色，因为他是极少数真正敢于挑战巴菲特想法的人之一。沃伦的存在感极强，让人敬畏，不是很多人敢对他说“你错了”。

Warren does not listen to advice. I mean, he really doesn’t even listen to advice from Charlie. He has this saying, “When I get up in the morning, I look in the mirror and at that point everybody has had their say.” And that’s true. You should try giving him advice. I have. Believe me, you literally see his eyes kind of go off into some weird direction. He does not listen. So Charlie is somebody who he actually listens to.
沃伦基本上不听别人的建议。我的意思是，他甚至不怎么听查理的建议。他有句名言：“我每天早上起床照镜子的时候，那就是所有人都已经发表完意见的时刻。”这是真的。你试着给他提意见看看，我试过。相信我，你会看到他的眼神飘到一个很奇怪的方向。他真的不会听。所以查理是唯一一个他真正会听的人。

In the early days, of course, that changed Warren’s investing style because Charlie kept getting him to focus on good companies, quality companies. These days, they are social friends. Charlie doesn’t have any role at all in running Berkshire — and he kind of makes jokes about that — but they are social friends.
早年间，这种关系确实改变了沃伦的投资风格，因为查理不断劝他专注于优秀企业、有质量的公司。而到了今天，他们主要是朋友关系。查理现在完全不参与伯克希尔的经营——他自己还时不时拿这个开玩笑——但他们确实是密友。

Question: What are [some] messages and teachings that Mr. Buffett gives to younger folks like me and college students in general?
提问： 巴菲特先生对我们这些年轻人，比如我这样的大学生，有哪些忠告或教诲？

Schroeder: I think the most important thing that he tells students — that I’ve heard him say [and] that I hope people really listen to — is to follow your passion [and] to do what you really want to do and not waste time with resume-filling jobs. And not work for anybody who makes your stomach churn. Because you can’t really get ahead that way. It may seem like it for a while, but in the end the odds are better, if you really love what you’re doing, that you’ll really really succeed.
施罗德： 我认为他对学生最重要的忠告——这是我亲耳听到的，我也希望大家认真听进去——就是要追随你的热情，去做你真正想做的事情，不要把时间浪费在那些只是为了填简历的工作上。也不要为那些让你“倒胃口”的人工作。因为那样你不可能真正进步。也许短期看起来不错，但从长远来看，如果你热爱自己所做的事，你成功的几率会更大得多。

Question: This is something that really surprised me. Having watched how painful the Salomon experience for Warren was, were you surprised that he invested in Goldman? And why do you think he did it?
提问： 有件事让我挺意外的。考虑到沃伦当年在所罗门的经历那么痛苦，你对他后来投资高盛感到惊讶吗？你认为他为什么要投？

Schroeder: I was a little surprised because he’s taking some of the same risks. I think he’s had a longer time to get to know Goldman’s management over decades and I think he’s more comfortable that he understands the inner workings of that bank — but it’s still an investment bank.
施罗德： 我确实有点惊讶，因为他其实是在承担类似的风险。但我想他与高盛的管理层认识得更久，对这家银行的内部运作也更熟悉，所以他心里更有底——但归根结底，它还是一家投行。

I think that Warren has been impulsive once or twice in his career — and Salomon was a case where he fell in love with John Gutfreund. Warren loves Goldman’s management. He’s getting another rich premium to do it, just like with Salomon.
我认为沃伦一生中确实有过一两次冲动的时刻——所罗门那次就是，他对约翰·古特弗鲁因德非常欣赏。沃伦同样也喜欢高盛的管理层。这次他又得到了很丰厚的溢价回报，就像当初对所罗门那样。

I do think the one factor that’s different is that Goldman is going to be transformed into a deleveraged commercial bank. And it’s going to be operated with different regulation. That is enough of a factor that I could say, “Okay, I can understand this.” But, yeah, it is kind of similar. (Laughs)
我认为唯一不同的是，高盛将转型为一家去杠杆的商业银行，而且会受到不同的监管体系管理。这一点足以让我说：“好吧，这个我能理解。”但说到底，确实还是有点相似的地方。（笑声）

[Unintelligible follow-up question]
听不清的问题

Schroeder: Yes, that’s the other problem. Warren doesn’t love paying people to begin with. That’s something he does, I won’t say reluctantly, but you hear him say, “So and so, it would take three people to replace them.”
施罗德： 是的，那也是另一个问题。沃伦一开始就不太喜欢“给人开高薪”。我不会说他是勉强，但你会听到他说：“某某某这个人，得用三个人来替代他。”

That’s true and then they wonder, “Why aren’t I getting paid three times as much?” The people who work for Berkshire Hathaway are not paid like Wall Streeters or even like they might make somewhere else.
这句话是事实，然后那个人就会疑惑：“那我为什么没有拿三倍的工资？”伯克希尔·哈撒韦的员工薪酬，并不像华尔街那样高，甚至也比不上他们在其他公司可能能拿到的薪酬。

When he started being on the board of Salomon, he was just stunned at the way people on Wall Street are paid — and really almost with a moral repugnance at it. There was some justification to that because it’s a “heads they win, tails they don’t lose” situation. So Goldman, yeah, he’s not on the board — and somehow he has reconciled himself to this.
他刚加入所罗门董事会时，简直对华尔街的薪酬体系震惊到了——几乎是带着道德上的反感来看待这件事。这种反感也不无道理，因为那种“赢了归自己，输了也没损失”的机制确实让人反感。而对于高盛，虽然他没有担任董事，但不知怎么的，他已经对这件事有所妥协。

Question: Given the deep dive you did with Buffett and Berkshire and given your background in the insurance industry, it certainly appears that the company is trading at a meaningful discount to the group. It seems like there is a tremendous disconnect — particularly the way that you describe the company. There’s a disconnect for me. What am I missing?
提问： 鉴于您对巴菲特和伯克希尔的深度研究，加上您在保险行业的背景，目前这家公司看起来与同类公司相比处于明显折价状态。尤其是您对公司的描述让我觉得存在巨大的落差。我是不是遗漏了什么？

Schroeder: I always found, as an analyst, that the way Berkshire traded and the actual value of the company didn’t have much connection to each other. There just wasn’t a connection. Particularly, it was rare that you ever saw — and I think this is true of stocks in general — companies that don’t… There’s not a penalty for taking excessive risk. Which also means there’s not a reward for taking less risk.
施罗德： 作为分析师，我一直觉得伯克希尔的股价走势与公司的实际价值之间关系不大。两者之间几乎没有联系。尤其是在股市中，这种现象非常普遍——企业承担过度风险通常不会受到惩罚，而相应地，承担较少风险也不会得到奖励。

The only way you see it is over a long period of time, where a company like Berkshire is able to build its book value.
只有在较长的时间维度上，你才能看到伯克希尔这样的公司通过持续积累账面价值而显现优势。

Warren and Charlie have this saying, “Don’t go back to GO.” You see these other companies that are losing billions of dollars because they’ve taken the risk. Their stocks are getting killed whereas Berkshire isn’t, so to some extent they’re not going backwards. But, in terms of the value, it’s trading at what you can argue is a discount to its fair value. It’s not the cheapest it’s ever been — but it’s certainly not getting the kind of premium that you might think. That may be because of Warren’s age.
沃伦和查理常说：“不要退回起点。”你看看那些冒风险的公司，亏掉数十亿美元，股价暴跌；而伯克希尔没有这样的问题，在某种程度上它没有退步。不过就估值而言，它的交易价格确实低于其合理价值。虽然不是历史最低点，但它也没有获得应得的估值溢价。也许这跟沃伦的年纪有关。

Question: I’m interested in hearing more about your relationship as a research analyst and some of the content of your research reports, specifically your philosophy for valuation of Berkshire?
提问： 我想听您多说一些您作为研究分析师的经历，以及您在分析报告中的内容，尤其是您对伯克希尔的估值理念。

Schroeder: Well, it’s been five years since I’ve done any research on Berkshire, but I had a model that I used where I basically valued the float of the company and looked at its future growth and then, in effect, added that to the book value or put a P/E on the rest of the earnings. I suggest that people use their own growth assumptions because it could be anything. I don’t have it in front of me, but I believe it’s published on the internet if anybody would like to have a copy of it. (Laughs)
施罗德： 嗯，我已经有五年没对伯克希尔做过研究了。但我当时有一个模型，基本上是对公司浮存金进行估值，并分析其未来增长，然后将其加总到账面价值上，或者对剩余盈利部分给予一个市盈率。我建议大家用自己的增长假设，因为这个变量可以有很多种。我现在手头没有这份模型，但我记得网上有发布，有兴趣的人可以去找来看看（笑）。

Question: I’m really interested in your view of the managers of Berkshire and the ability of Berkshire to retain them after Warren Buffett.
提问： 我很关心您对伯克希尔管理层的看法，以及在巴菲特之后，这家公司留住这些管理者的能力。

Schroeder: A lot of them are actually quite old and they won’t be retainable anyway because it’s time for them to be retired. And there are some that I think are just hanging around because they like working for Warren. So that’s going to be a very significant challenge that the next CEO will face.
施罗德： 实际上，很多管理者年纪都很大了，他们本身也到了该退休的阶段，无法再长期留下来。我觉得其中有些人还留在公司，是因为他们喜欢为沃伦工作。所以，这将是下一任CEO将面临的一个重大挑战。

Now, they have got successors that they’ve identified for Warren. I think another challenge the next CEO will face is: Are those the right people? Because he has let the managers name their own successors. It’s going to be a challenge. Really, a lot of it depends on who they pick [as the next CEO]. They could make a great or a terrible decision of choosing the next CEO, the board could.
现在，公司已经为沃伦选定了接班人。但我认为下任CEO还面临另一个挑战：这些接班人是不是合适人选？因为沃伦允许各子公司管理者自行提名继任者。这会是一个不小的挑战。说到底，这一切都取决于董事会选出的下一任CEO是谁。他们可能会做出一个非常出色，也可能是一个非常糟糕的决定。

Question: At the risk of getting too granular, I’m kind of interested in the scratch notes that you were talking about in the Mid-Continent Tab Card Co. case. If someone who is very quantitatively oriented and knows Excel looked at that and put it into a model, do you think that people could understand what’s going on inside Warren’s head when he’s trying to value a company and then actually replicate that?
提问： 可能这个问题有点细节了，但我很好奇您提到的Mid-Continent Tab Card Co.那一案中的“手写草稿”。如果有个人非常擅长量化分析和Excel，把那些资料输入模型中，您觉得他能不能理解巴菲特在估值公司时的思维方式，甚至复制他的做法？

Schroeder: Yes. What you would see is a column that said “Sales” and a column that said “Expenses” and a column that said “Profits”. It would have the Louisville plant, the Kansas City plant, this plant, that plant — and it would have first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, fourth quarter 1958, [etc.] And then it would end with the last quarter that was reported. That’s what his is. That’s all it is.
施罗德： 可以。你会看到的，就是一列写着“销售额”，一列写着“支出”，一列写着“利润”。会列出路易斯维尔工厂、堪萨斯城工厂、这个厂、那个厂……然后是1958年第一季度、第二季度、第三季度、第四季度……直到最近一个已公布的季度。这就是他的“模型”。仅此而已。

The difference from a model is [Buffett’s] would not add the quarters up and it would not project anything into the future. Nothing.
与一般模型的不同在于：他的表格不会把各季度数据加总，也不会做任何未来预测。完全不会。

In other words, he looked at what had been reported and he said, “They’ve had a million in sales. They’ve earned this many thousand. I want this much. They’ve earned this and I want this. Can they do it? Yes [or] no.” That’s the decision.
换句话说，他只看已有报告数据，然后说：“他们销售额是100万美元，利润是几千美元，我要这么多利润。公司现在赚了这么多，我要赚这么多，他们能不能做到？能？不能？”他的决策就是这么简单明了。

There’s a saying — I think it’s from The Intelligent Investor — that the purpose of the margin of safety is to render forecasts unnecessary.
有句名言——我记得出自《聪明的投资者》——说：“安全边际的目的就是使预测变得不必要。”

Question: On a little bit of a different note, a number of political pundits are throwing out Mr. Buffett’s name as a potential candidate for the next Secretary of Treasury under President-elect Obama. From your experiences with Mr. Buffett, do you really think this would be something he would be willing to leave Berkshire for?
提问： 换个话题，有一些政治评论人士提议让巴菲特担任奥巴马当选总统政府下任财政部长。以您对巴菲特的了解，您真的觉得他会为这个职位离开伯克希尔吗？

Schroeder: He would have to be shot with a blowdart and dragged in chains to Washington to do this. (Laughs) I think they’ve already semi-announced who the candidates are and the reason he’s not one of them is because he would never ever be taken away from Berkshire. He would never spend his day in meetings. He would never let somebody else schedule his time.
施罗德： 除非有人用吹箭把他射晕，然后用铁链拖到华盛顿去，否则他绝不会去干这个（笑）。我觉得现在财政部长人选差不多已经半公开了，他之所以不在名单里，就是因为他绝不会离开伯克希尔。他绝不会把一天时间都耗在会议中，也绝不会允许别人安排他的时间。

But there’s going to be kind of a kitchen cabinet of informal advisors — he did that for Schwarzenegger [and] he’ll do that for Obama.
但他会担任“厨房内阁”那样的非正式顾问角色——他以前为施瓦辛格担任过这样的角色，也会为奥巴马这么做。
1. At Berkshire Hathaway’s annual shareholders meeting in 1994, Buffett commended Macfarlane (and a few others) for doing an “exceptional job under extraordinarily difficult circumstances” during the Salomon Brothers crisis. On that fateful Sunday (August 18, 1991), Macfarlane was actually pulled off a triathlon course to help tackle the dire situation.
在1994年伯克希尔·哈撒韦的年度股东大会上，巴菲特表扬了麦克法兰（以及其他几位）在所罗门兄弟危机期间“在极其困难的情况下做出了卓越贡献”。在那个关键的星期天（1991年8月18日），麦克法兰甚至被从一场铁人三项比赛中叫走，以协助处理紧急局势。

“He was yanked from that [competition] and came down,” said Buffett. “I think John was over in New Jersey, holed up in the Downtown Athletic Club. It was his job to keep funding what was then a $150 billion balance sheet during a period when people right and left were canceling. It’s not because we weren’t a good credit, but because they just didn’t want to have anything to do with us for a while.”
“他是被从比赛现场直接叫走的，”巴菲特说，“我记得约翰当时在新泽西的市中心运动俱乐部。他的任务是，在人们纷纷撤资的时期，继续为当时那张1500亿美元的资产负债表提供资金支持。这并不是因为我们信用不好，而是因为大家一时间都不想与我们有任何瓜葛。”

Over the next forty days, Macfarlane managed to sell $50 billion of securities — shrinking Salomon’s embattled balance sheet and stabilizing the firm during one of its darkest hours.
接下来的四十天里，麦克法兰设法卖出了500亿美元的证券，大幅压缩了所罗门岌岌可危的资产负债表，并在公司最黑暗的时刻稳定了局面。

2. Coined by journalist Eric Sevareid in a July 1968 article for The Progressive about the unintended consequences of progress. In it, he observed that the widespread adoption of Xerox machines — intended to streamline communication — had instead fueled a surge in paper consumption and, in turn, deforestation. “That, of course, will create other problems,” he wrote, “but that is the nature of progress. The greatest intellectual discovery of this generation is that the real cause of problems is solutions.”
“问题的根源是解决方案”这个说法出自记者埃里克·塞瓦雷德在1968年7月为《进步》杂志撰写的一篇文章，探讨进步所带来的意外后果。他指出，原本为了提升沟通效率而广泛推广的施乐复印机，反而造成纸张使用量激增，进而引发森林砍伐。“这当然会带来其他问题，”他写道，“但这正是进步的本质。这一代人最伟大的智识发现，就是：问题的真正根源，是解决方案本身。”

3. Schroeder is joking here, referencing the uber-popular bestseller The Secret by Rhonda Byrne — which helped popularize the concept of the “Law of Attraction”. It posits that your positive or negative thoughts will “attract” corresponding outcomes into your life.
施罗德在这里开玩笑，指的是朗达·拜恩的超级畅销书《秘密》，这本书使“吸引力法则”的概念广为流传。该理论认为，人们的正面或负面想法会将相应的结果“吸引”到自己的人生中。

4. Another joke, this time in reference to The Da Vinci Code.
又是一个玩笑，这次她指的是《达·芬奇密码》。

5. Bond Salesmanship by William W. Townsend was published in 1924 — a comprehensive guide to the bond sales process, including reflections on the attitude and psychology needed to be a success in this field.
《债券销售术》是威廉·W·汤森于1924年出版的一本书，全面讲解了债券销售流程，同时也深入探讨了在这个领域取得成功所需的心态与心理素质。

6. Schroeder is referring to National American Fire Insurance — one of Buffett’s earliest investment coups — here. What started out as a worthless stock in 1919 eventually grew into an undervalued moneymaker under the guidance of Howard Ahmanson.
施罗德在这里指的是National American Fire Insurance，这是巴菲特最早的一笔成功投资之一。起初这是一只1919年发行的“垃圾股”，后来在霍华德·阿曼森的带领下逐渐发展成一只被市场低估的赚钱股。

The market was slow to catch on to the thinly-traded stock’s slow turnaround — but Buffett did not miss it. While poring over Moody’s manuals, he spotted the insurer trading at an astonishing 1x earnings.
这只交易量稀少的股票逐步反转，但市场反应迟钝——唯独巴菲特没错过。他在翻阅穆迪手册时发现这家保险公司当时竟然只以1倍市盈率交易。

Intrigued, he dug deeper — visiting the state insurance commissioner’s office to compile a list of the company’s earliest directors and investors. “With that list,” wrote Schroeder, “Monen barreled down two-lane highways in his red-and-white Chevrolet, pulling into small rural towns to track down the [shareholders].”
他受到启发，进一步调查，甚至亲自前往州保险监管局查阅文件，整理出公司最早的董事和投资人名单。“带着这份名单，”施罗德写道，“莫南开着红白相间的雪佛兰，沿着两车道高速公路一路狂奔，开进一个又一个小镇，追踪这些股东。”

By 1957, Buffett’s partnership owned 10% of National American Fire Insurance — and sold it a year later to lock in the profit.
到1957年，巴菲特的合伙企业已经持有该公司10%的股份，并在一年后卖出，成功获利。

7. Uncle Fred and Aunt Katie were unsung role models for both Buffett and Munger when they worked at the Buffett family grocery store. Their ethical management, in particular, made a big impression on the boys. “We were both influenced by the fundamental decency of Katie and Fred Buffett,” said Charlie.
弗雷德叔叔和凯蒂阿姨是巴菲特和芒格年轻时在巴菲特家族杂货店工作时的无名榜样。他们坚持伦理的管理方式，给两个男孩留下了深刻印象。查理说：“我们俩都受到凯蒂和弗雷德·巴菲特那种根本上的正直精神的影响。”

8. In 1956, IBM signed a consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice to resolve the antitrust investigation launched four years earlier. The lawsuit alleged that IBM had monopolized the punched-card tabulating machine market, stifling competition through restrictive practices. The decree sought to promote a more competitive landscape by opening the tab card market to new companies like Mid-Continent.
1956年，IBM与美国司法部签署了一项同意法令，以了结四年前启动的反垄断调查。该诉讼指控IBM垄断了穿孔卡片统计机市场，并通过限制性措施打压竞争。该法令的目的是开放卡片市场，引入像Mid-Continent这样的新公司，从而促进更加公平的竞争环境。

9. In the fall of 2008 — as the global economy teetered on the brink — Warren Buffett leapt into action. He reached separate deals with Goldman Sachs and General Electric to purchase billions of dollars worth of preferred stock (which paid a mouthwatering 10% annual dividend in both cases). Berkshire also received warrants to purchase billions of common stock in each company at any time over the next five years.
2008年秋季，全球经济摇摇欲坠之际，沃伦·巴菲特果断出手。他分别与高盛和通用电气达成协议，购买数十亿美元的优先股（年股息率高达诱人的10%）。此外，伯克希尔还获得了在未来五年内可随时购买两家公司普通股的认股权证。

10. Catastrophe risk.
灾难性风险（Cat Risk）。

11. You can read Carol Loomis’s adaptation of Buffett’s 1999 Sun Valley speech here.
你可以在网上找到卡萝尔·卢米斯整理的1999年巴菲特在太阳谷的演讲稿。

12. While this may have been true at the time, Buffett has since expressed at least some appreciation for dollar cost averaging. Notably, in a 2017 CNBC interview, he recommended the strategy for building a retirement fund. “Consistently buy an S&P 500 low-cost index fund,” he said. “Keep buying it through thick and thin — and especially through thin.”
虽然这个说法在当时可能成立，但巴菲特后来对“定期定额投资法”（Dollar Cost Averaging）也表达了一定程度的认可。特别是在2017年接受CNBC采访时，他建议用这种策略建立退休基金。他说：“持续买入低成本的S&P 500指数基金，市场好坏都买——尤其是在市场低迷时更要买。”

13. One Thousand Ways to Make $1,000 by Frances C. Minaker — a treasure trove of inspiring stories about triumphant business moguls and actionable strategies for aspiring entrepreneurs — made a profound impression on a young Warren Buffett. “Very early, probably when I was seven or so, I took this book out of the Benson Library,” he recalled in 2017, and “virtually memorized” it.
《一千种赚一千美元的方法》，作者为弗朗西斯·C·米纳克，是一本收录众多成功企业家故事与实用创业策略的宝库，对年幼的巴菲特产生了深远影响。“很早，大概我七岁左右的时候，我从本森图书馆借了这本书，”他在2017年回忆道，“我几乎把它背了下来。”

14. To date, Schroeder has not written any more books after The Snowball. Which is a shame because her first effort is still one of my favorites.
迄今为止，施罗德在《滚雪球》之后没有再出版其他书籍。令人遗憾的是，她的第一本作品至今仍是许多读者的最爱之一。

15. John Macfarlane, former treasurer of Salomon Brothers, asked this question.
约翰·麦克法兰——所罗门兄弟公司的前财务主管——提出了这个问题。

16. Buffett served as a senior economics advisor to Arnold Schwarzenegger during his campaign for and tenure as governor of California (2003–2011). “Warren is helping me bring together a world-class team to assist me in addressing the problems and challenges facing businesses, investors, and job creators in California,” Schwarzenegger said at the time. Buffett admitted that he was motivated by the urgency of the state’s economic crisis.
在阿诺·施瓦辛格竞选并担任加州州长（2003–2011）期间，巴菲特曾担任其高级经济顾问。施瓦辛格当时表示：“沃伦正在帮助我组建一个世界级的团队，协助我应对加州在企业、投资人和就业创造者方面所面临的问题和挑战。”巴菲特承认，他之所以愿意出山，是出于对加州经济危机紧迫性的担忧。

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