2011-03-23 Ajit Jain.Interview with NDTV

In 2011, Ajit Jain of Berkshire Hathaway granted a very rare interview[1] to NDTV India for a television special titled “Buffett’s Prince of Risk”. For close to thirty minutes, he fielded questions from journalist Anjana Menon on topics ranging from Berkshire’s insurance operations to matters of retirement, legacy, and philanthropy.

在 2011 年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的阿吉特·贾因接受了一个非常罕见的采访[1]，接受了 NDTV 印度的电视特别节目“巴菲特的风险王子”的采访。近三十分钟的时间里，他回答了记者安贾娜·梅农提出的问题，话题涵盖了伯克希尔的保险业务、退休、遗产和慈善等事务。

Over the past few weeks, I transcribed (and lightly annotated) his remarks for posterity and future study.

在过去几周，我为后人和未来的研究转录（并稍作注释）了他的讲话。

A few notes: 几点说明：

Each transcript is done entirely by hand — with no AI or software assistance — so any and all mistakes are my own.

每份记录完全是手工制作的——没有任何人工智能或软件的帮助——因此所有的错误都是我自己的。

I summarized and paraphrased a few of the questions for clarity and space. All of Ajit Jain’s answers are transcribed verbatim.

我总结并改写了一些问题以便于理解和节省空间。Ajit Jain 的所有回答均逐字转录。

I added footnotes — 20 in all — to provide additional information at relevant points. Hopefully, these will prove useful to readers.

我添加了脚注——总共 20 个——以在相关点提供额外信息。希望这些对读者有所帮助。

The full transcript is available to all paid supporters. Free subscribers have access to the first 1,800-ish words. (That’s longer than the typical Kingswell article.)

完整的文字记录对所有付费支持者开放。免费订阅者可以访问大约前 1800 个单词。（这比典型的Kingswell文章要长。）

I’ve tried to do my best to ensure that no one feels short-changed.

我尽力确保没有人感到被亏待。

Become a paid subscriber today and receive immediate access to this transcript — along with eight other annotated transcripts full of wit and wisdom from the top names at Berkshire Hathaway.

今天成为付费订阅者，立即获得此转录的访问权限——以及来自伯克希尔·哈撒韦顶尖人物的另外八个充满智慧和机智的注释转录。

Now, without further ado, here is the complete transcript of Ajit Jain’s discussion with NDTV India from 2011…

现在，事不宜迟，以下是阿吉特·贾因与 NDTV 印度在 2011 年的讨论完整记录……

Subscribed

Anjana Menon: Hello and welcome to our special show!

安贾娜·梅农：你好，欢迎来到我们的特别节目！

I’m Anjana Menon and my guest today is Ajit Jain, who looks after the reinsurance business of Berkshire Hathaway. Reinsurance[2] has been the pillar of Hathaway’s success. Ajit Jain has featured in many an article as a likely successor to the world’s smartest investor, Warren Buffett.

我是安贾娜·梅农，今天我的嘉宾是阿吉特·贾因，他负责伯克希尔·哈撒韦的再保险业务。再保险[2]一直是哈撒韦成功的支柱。阿吉特·贾因在许多文章中被认为是世界上最聪明的投资者沃伦·巴菲特的可能接班人。

I’m going to open the show with what Buffett had to say about the man I’m about to interview.

我将以巴菲特对我即将采访的那个人所说的话来开场。

Video of Warren Buffett: I owe the people of India an enormous amount for sending me Ajit Jain. Ajit, he walked in the office on a Saturday, I think, in 1985 and I knew I was looking at and talking with somebody with incredible talent.[3]

沃伦·巴菲特的视频：我欠印度人民一笔巨款，因为他们把阿吉特·贾因送给了我。阿吉特，我记得他在 1985 年的一个星期六走进办公室，我知道我正在和一个拥有非凡才能的人交谈。[3]

Ajit has probably made a lot more money for Berkshire Hathaway than I have. He loves what he does. He’s not looking to take my job. If he was, the Board of Directors would probably put him in there in a minute. He is extraordinary. He’s not just an extraordinary business executive — he’s an extraordinary human being. He’s one of the most remarkable… I really feel about him like I feel about a brother or a son.

阿吉特可能为伯克希尔·哈撒韦赚了比我多得多的钱。他热爱自己的工作。他并不想取代我的职位。如果他想的话，董事会可能会立刻让他上任。他非常出色。他不仅是一位杰出的商业高管——他还是一位杰出的人。他是最了不起的人之一……我对他的感觉就像对待兄弟或儿子一样。

针对印度人特有的幻觉。

AM: Is it easy to get used to that [kind of praise], though he has said it in different words many times before?

AM：虽然他以前用不同的话说过很多次，但习惯这种[赞美]容易吗？

Ajit Jain: As I’ve mentioned in the past, I would get used to it if I felt those comments were well-deserved. He’s been very generous with his comments. It has been a real pleasure for me to work for Berkshire Hathaway and to work for Warren. And, like he said, I love my job and there’s nothing I would trade it for.

阿吉特·贾因：正如我之前提到的，如果我觉得那些评论是当之无愧的，我会习惯它。他对我的评论非常慷慨。为伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作，为沃伦工作对我来说是一种真正的乐趣。正如他说的，我热爱我的工作，没有什么可以与之交换。

AM: But does it also act as a constant pressure to outperform because that’s the parameter he’s setting?

AM：但这是否也会成为一种持续的压力，促使超越，因为这是他设定的参数？

AJ: It does and it doesn’t. It does in as much as you always want to live up to the expectations people have for you. It doesn’t because, unlike a lot of executives, he’s very rational about expectations. And, more than rational, I think he’s one of the few executives and bosses that I can think of who does a very good job in terms of distinguishing between outcome and decision-making before the event happened.

AJ：有时候是，有时候不是。是因为你总是想要达到人们对你的期望。不是因为，与许多高管不同，他对期望非常理性。而且，我认为他不仅理性，他是我能想到的少数几位在事件发生之前能够很好地区分结果和决策的高管和老板之一。

苹果的文化更接近本质：做自己。

The world, the way it works, they look at outcome and you may have made a good decision which ends up in a bad outcome — and everyone comes down on [you] like a ton of bricks. By the same token, on the flip side, you might make a bad decision and end up with a good outcome and you get all of the glory under the sun. Warren does an incredible job in terms of decoupling the two — and measuring and evaluating people and the people who work for him in terms of the quality of the decision that was made before you know the outcome.

世界的运作方式是，他们关注结果，而你可能做出了一个好的决定，但最终却导致了不好的结果——然后每个人都会像一吨砖头一样压在你身上。反之，你可能做出了一个坏决定，却得到了一个好的结果，这时你就会获得所有的荣耀。沃伦在这方面做得非常出色，他将这两者分开——在你知道结果之前，衡量和评估人以及为他工作的人，关注的是所做决定的质量。

巴菲特的精髓，I.C.S。

In a sense, that makes it very easy to work for a human being who’s rational, who you’re very clear about what is it that’s important, and he sets very clear guidelines in terms of expectations [and] in terms of the ethics and how business should be conducted. And, pretty much, within those very broad boundaries he leaves you to manage the business as you think best.

从某种意义上说，这使得与一个理性的人合作变得非常简单，因为你非常清楚什么是重要的，他在期望、伦理和商业运作方面设定了非常明确的指导方针。在这些非常宽泛的界限内，他基本上让你按照自己的想法来管理业务。

AM: You’ve got the reputation in the market that you take the biggest risks — be that the reinsurance of the Sears Tower, the Winter Olympics, the $1 billion sweepstakes that Pepsi has.[4] Some would say you have a gambler’s appetite for risk. Warren, on the other hand, always says about you that you’re very disciplined. How does all of that reconcile with the image of being very disciplined?

AM：你在市场上有这样的名声，说你承接了最大的风险——比如Sears Tower的再保险、冬奥会的保险，还有百事公司那个10亿美元的抽奖[4]。一些人说你有赌徒般的风险偏好。另一方面，沃伦总是说你非常有纪律。所有这些如何与“非常有纪律”的形象相协调呢？

AJ: Firstly, when you think about investment [and] when you think about insurance, it is about risk. And, in a sense, risk is synonymous with gambling. Gambling, unfortunately, has bad connotations. I like to refer to it as prudent risk-taking.

AJ：首先，当你考虑投资和保险时，这与风险有关。从某种意义上说，风险与赌博是同义的。不幸的是，赌博有负面的含义。我喜欢称之为谨慎的风险承担。

The fundamental aspect of risk-taking is you’ve got to be able to assess what are the odds of something bad happening to you — however subjective that process might be. And if something bad were to happen to you, how bad is that and being able to define how bad that is.

冒险的基本方面是你必须能够评估发生不幸事件的几率——无论这个过程多么主观。如果不幸真的发生在你身上，那有多糟糕，以及能够定义这种糟糕的程度。

That’s a fairly simple, straightforward equation — you don’t need more than high school algebra to be able to handle that. And, then, to make sure that you get paid so that you have a margin of safety over and above what you think are the odds and the expected value of a loss — without getting hyper-technical. People can complicate the process — and we do tend to complicate the process.

这是一道相当简单、直接的方程——你只需要高中代数就能处理它。然后，为了确保你能获得报酬，以便在你认为的赔率和预期损失值之上有一个安全边际——而不需要过于技术化。人们会使这个过程复杂化——而我们确实倾向于使这个过程复杂化。

We are in the risk-taking business. There are a lot of factors that come into play in terms of taking the risk. Clearly, one is the pricing of the risk. But, then, the business — the way it’s conducted — there’s a lot of pressure to do deals. You don’t want to lose market share. You don’t want to have your distribution force mad at you for not writing business. So a number of factors come into play. Besides the fact that people just like to take risks. I mean, that’s something they like to do.

我们从事风险投资业务。在承担风险时，有很多因素需要考虑。显然，风险的定价是其中之一。但是，业务的运作方式也有很大的压力去达成交易。你不想失去市场份额。你不想让你的分销团队因为没有成交而对你感到不满。因此，有许多因素需要考虑。除此之外，人们就是喜欢冒险。我是说，这确实是他们喜欢做的事情。

So I think the discipline is in terms of being able to say no — and having the ability and the willingness to say no if you feel you’re not getting the right price for taking the risk.

所以我认为这种自律体现在能够说“不”——如果你觉得所承担的风险没有得到合理的回报，就要有能力和意愿说“不”。

Now, having said that, we at Berkshire have an advantage in as much as there’s nothing forcing us to write risk if we don’t feel it’s adequately priced. So we can have a fairly rational approach to taking risk without regard to trying to meet some grand target or trying to conquer the world and get market share. We have a single-minded focus on making sure we can assess the risk — and, if we can’t assess the risk, we just say pass to it. And if we can assess the risk, we [still need to] get a price that adequately compensates us for risking our capital.

现在，既然如此，我们在伯克希尔有一个优势，因为没有什么迫使我们承担风险，如果我们觉得风险没有得到合理定价。因此，我们可以采取相对理性的风险管理方法，而不必考虑满足某个宏伟目标或试图征服世界并获取市场份额。我们专注于确保能够评估风险——如果我们无法评估风险，我们就会选择放弃。如果我们能够评估风险，我们仍然需要获得一个合理补偿我们资本风险的价格。

AM: Is that part of the three underwriting rules[5] that he constantly talks about?

AM：那是他不断提到的三项承保规则的一部分吗[5]？

AJ: You’ve done your homework. Absolutely. We all tend to overcomplicate it — but there’s some basic fundamental rules that he talks about. There will be a loss every now and then, but as long as you stick to it over the long run you’ll come out ahead.

AJ: 你做了功课。绝对如此。我们都倾向于把事情复杂化——但他谈到了一些基本的基本规则。偶尔会有损失，但只要你在长期坚持下去，你就会获利。

乔布斯的说法是碎片化，同一个意思。

AM: Warren Buffett also, a couple of years ago, mentioned that he would like his son Howard to be non-executive vice chairman at Berkshire Hathaway in order to preserve the culture. What is that culture that he talks about?

AM: 沃伦·巴菲特几年前也提到，他希望他的儿子霍华德担任伯克希尔·哈撒韦的非执行副主席，以保持公司的文化。他所说的文化是什么？

AJ: Firstly, he’s going to be the non-executive chairman.[6] I think you said vice chairman. Berkshire Hathaway has its unique culture which is very different from some of the other entities. Different people have different ways and they’re consistent about their strategy. GE has a very successful culture, but it is very different than the culture we have.

AJ：首先，他将担任非执行主席。[6] 我想你说的是副主席。伯克希尔·哈撒韦有其独特的文化，这与其他一些实体非常不同。不同的人有不同的方式，他们对自己的战略保持一致。通用电气有着非常成功的文化，但与我们拥有的文化非常不同。

I think the key aspects of our culture [are] the independent operating units tend to be separate standalone units without any kind of search for synergies across the operating units. And the absence of bureaucracy. And the ability of the individual executives, who are running their respective businesses, to feel like a true owner without getting sucked into the big company culture. And to run the business in terms of what’s in the best long-term interest of that particular business.

我认为我们文化的关键方面是独立的运营单位往往是独立的单元，没有任何跨运营单位寻求协同效应的努力。缺乏官僚主义。各个高管能够感觉到自己是真正的拥有者，而不被大公司的文化所吸引。并且能够根据该特定业务的最佳长期利益来运营业务。

AM: India presents an opportunity to businesses across the world. What sort of opportunities does India present to a group like Berkshire Hathaway and, more importantly, to you in reinsurance?

AM: 印度为全球企业提供了机会。印度为像伯克希尔·哈撒韦这样的集团，以及更重要的是，为您在再保险领域提供了什么样的机会？

AJ: Clearly, the projections are — in the next four or five years — this will be the third-largest economy in the world overtaking all of the western economies other than the U.S. [and] after China.[7] So, clearly, the size of the marketplace is what makes it attractive. The market is growing at a phenomenal rate. Capital is pouring in. And there are businesses that are flourishing.

AJ：显然，预测是——在接下来的四到五年内——这将成为世界第三大经济体，超过除美国之外的所有西方经济体。[以及]在中国之后。[7]所以，显然，市场的规模使其具有吸引力。市场以惊人的速度增长。资本正在涌入。并且有一些企业正在蓬勃发展。

The country is democratic and does have the rule of law. And we are certainly hoping that over the next few years we end up finding the right set of opportunities where we can deploy significant chunks of capital in this part of the world.

这个国家是民主的，确实有法治。我们当然希望在接下来的几年里，能够找到合适的机会，在这个地区投入大量资本。

AM: You said democratic and rule of law, but unfortunately over the last couple of weeks and months India has been in the headlines for some of the wrong reasons. Corruption is one of them.[8] Do you think that’s going to be a huge deterrent for people who want to come and invest in India?

AM：你说民主和法治，但不幸的是，在过去几周和几个月里，印度因一些错误的原因登上了头条。腐败就是其中之一。[8]你认为这会对想来印度投资的人造成巨大的威慑吗？

AJ: Well, it certainly is a factor. But is it a knockout factor? I don’t believe so. All countries have their issues and we in the U.S. have issues as well.

AJ：嗯，这确实是一个因素。但它是决定性因素吗？我不这样认为。所有国家都有他们的问题，而我们美国也有问题。

It is a factor. I think recent events, if nothing else, have certainly brought the issue into focus — and I hope the country does something about it. And hopefully it will be a more business-friendly environment to invest in.

这是一个因素。我认为最近的事件，至少在某种程度上，确实使这个问题变得更加突出——我希望国家能对此采取行动。希望这将是一个更有利于投资的商业环境。

AM: Going back to reinsurance, do you feel a bit stymied because the market is not open for reinsurance in India? Is that something that you’re likely to lobby for a change?

AM：回到再保险的问题，您是否觉得有些受阻，因为印度的再保险市场并未开放？这是您可能会游说改变的事情吗？

AJ: Even in the U.S, we are not good at lobbying — at least certainly not our division. So, no, we don’t intend to lobby. Our approach is simple-minded: You tell us what the rules are and we play by the rules. We might not like the rules, but that’s life. The fact that there are constraints in terms of caps on foreign ownership[9], that is certainly an issue when it comes to setting up an insurance company in India.

AJ：即使在美国，我们的游说能力也不强——至少我们部门肯定不行。所以，不，我们不打算游说。我们的方法很简单：你告诉我们规则是什么，我们就按照规则来。我们可能不喜欢这些规则，但这就是生活。关于外资持股上限的限制[9]，在印度设立保险公司时，这无疑是一个问题。

In terms of reinsurance, I’m not sure it’s that much of a constraint. Our operating unit in the U.S. can serve the Indian market, as a reinsurer, from the U.S. The constraint on the reinsurance side for us — and we’d love to spread our wings a lot broader — the constraint on the reinsurance side is not so much the cap on foreign ownership, but the pricing and the price competitiveness of the business in India — which, unfortunately, doesn’t meet our hurdle requirements and, as a result of which, we are not writing as much business as we would like to write.

在再保险方面，我不确定这是否是一个很大的限制。我们在美国的运营单位可以作为再保险人从美国服务印度市场。对我们来说，再保险方面的限制——我们希望能够更广泛地拓展——并不是外资持股上限，而是印度市场的定价和价格竞争力——不幸的是，这并没有达到我们的门槛要求，因此我们没有写出我们希望写的业务量。

Now, hopefully that will change. Our portfolio in India right now is close to about $20 million and, as the market keeps growing, we are in a state of readiness. We’d love to write as much as 10x that. But, once again, we don’t have a specific target. Our approach is see the opportunities as they come up and take one step at a time.

现在，希望这一点会有所改变。我们在印度的投资组合目前接近 2000 万美元，随着市场的不断增长，我们处于准备状态。我们希望能够写出多达 10 倍的金额。但再一次，我们没有具体的目标。我们的方法是看到机会时就抓住，并一步一步来。

AM: Are you saying that it’s very poorly priced?

AM：你是在说它的定价非常糟糕吗？

AJ: Price, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. (Laughs) I mean, we certainly feel that given the capital that we need to deploy to take the risk, the reinsurance pricing in the Indian marketplace right now is not attractive for us. Some people may disagree with me, but it’s certainly not attractive for us.

AJ：价格就像美一样，存在于观察者的眼中。（笑）我的意思是，考虑到我们需要投入的资本来承担风险，目前印度市场的再保险定价对我们来说并不具吸引力。有些人可能不同意我的看法，但对我们来说，确实没有吸引力。

AM: The insurance business that you have with Bajaj Allianz, as an agent for selling auto insurance, is it anything more than sort of dipping your toes in the water?

AM：您与 Bajaj Allianz 的保险业务，作为汽车保险的代理，是否只是稍微尝试一下而已？

AJ: Well, it is a small step — but it’s an important step. What it leads to, we have no preconceived notion.[10] I just hope that it leads to something big fairly quickly — but it is a small step. It gives us a chance to have a presence in India, to get a firsthand feel for the opportunities in India. Both from the perspective of the customer, in terms of what the unmet needs are, and in terms of the government restrictions and in terms of the legal infrastructure and the legal setup that is going to be welcome here.

AJ：好吧，这是一小步——但这是一重要的一步。它将引向何处，我们没有先入之见。[10]我只是希望它能很快引向一些重要的事情——但这确实是一小步。它给了我们在印度建立存在的机会，让我们亲身感受印度的机会。从客户的角度来看，了解未满足的需求，以及政府的限制和法律基础设施及法律设置，这些在这里都会受到欢迎。

So, when the right set of opportunities present themselves, we’ll be better positioned to move and act rapidly — as opposed to sort of taking time over it.

所以，当合适的机会出现时，我们将更好地准备迅速行动，而不是拖延时间。

AM: When you say “right opportunities” and you hope it will be something bigger, are you implying market size or are you implying a deeper alliance with Bajaj?

AM：当你说“正确的机会”，并希望它会是更大的东西时，你是在暗示市场规模，还是在暗示与Bajaj的更深层次的联盟？

AJ: In terms of deeper lines with Bajaj, that is certainly something… The auto is what we started it with right now and we will certainly move into the other personal lines fairly rapidly. But, as you rightly said, it is not going to move the needle in economic terms for us — but, nevertheless, it’s a very important step for us to get a feel, get firsthand experience about the market — and position ourselves to hopefully, over the next several years, to have a more meaningful, sizable presence in the Indian market.

AJ：关于与 Bajaj 的更深层次合作，这无疑是一个……我们现在开始的就是汽车业务，我们肯定会很快进入其他个人保险领域。但是，正如你所说的，这在经济上对我们来说不会有太大影响——不过，尽管如此，这对我们来说是一个非常重要的步骤，让我们感受市场，获得第一手经验——并为我们在未来几年内在印度市场拥有更有意义、更大规模的存在做好准备。

AM: The global reinsurance business, over the last couple of years, the prices have been somewhat soft. But with the quake in Japan, is that going to be a game-changer? Will it lead to a hardening[11] of prices, at least when it’s linked to catastrophic events?

AM：全球再保险业务在过去几年中，价格有些疲软。但是日本的地震会成为游戏规则的改变者吗？这会导致价格的上涨[11]，至少在与灾难事件相关时？

AJ: It’s still early days. If you had asked me this question about a week ago — if you had asked me about ten days ago — I would have said yes to that question that this was likely to be a game-changing event.[12] Because, initially, right after the quake, we all felt this was going to be a fairly significant event and, again, not based on any kind of calculation or anything, but people felt —and I felt as well — that the loss could well be north of $50 billion or so — to the insurance industry. The insured loss is obviously multiples of that.

AJ：现在还为时尚早。如果你在大约一周前问我这个问题——如果你在大约十天前问我——我会对这个问题说是的，这很可能是一个改变游戏规则的事件。[12]因为，最初，在地震发生后，我们都觉得这将是一个相当重大的事件，再次强调，这并不是基于任何计算或其他因素，但人们感觉——我也有这种感觉——损失可能会超过 500 亿美元左右——对于保险行业来说。显然，保险损失是这个数字的几倍。

I ended up spending all of last week in London and London is certainly a center where a lot of the international catastrophic business goes through. Having spent time there last week, talking to a lot of my peers and a lot of people who have firsthand exposure to Japan, I certainly got the sense that they felt the loss was not as big as it initially was thought to be. There were numbers being thrown around that this loss may be well below $20 billion. I don’t know whether people in the London markets are suffering from post-event denial or whether they genuinely feel that this is not going to be a market-changing event — but whether it is a market-changing event or not depends on the size of the loss. And my guess is if it’s less than $20 billion, it will probably not be a market-changing event. There will be slow firming of prices because we had the earthquake in Christchurch before that.

我上周在伦敦待了整整一周，伦敦无疑是许多国际灾难性业务的中心。上周我在那里与许多同行和一些对日本有第一手了解的人交谈，我确实感受到他们认为损失并没有最初想象的那么大。有些数字被提出来，认为这次损失可能远低于 200 亿美元。我不知道伦敦市场的人们是否在经历事件后的否认，还是他们真的觉得这不会是一个改变市场的事件——但是否是改变市场的事件取决于损失的规模。我的猜测是，如果损失低于 200 亿美元，可能不会是一个改变市场的事件。由于我们之前在基督城发生了地震，价格会缓慢回升。

But if it is a $50 billion plus event — and some people still believe that it could well be a $50 billion plus event to the insurance industry — then I think it will be a market-changing event. Because if you take that $50 billion and superimpose the earlier catastrophe losses that we’ve had that will add up to another $15-20 billion, then you start talking about real numbers. And a lot of the excess capital in the industry starts to get drained out. We, much like other industries, have this certain mentality and we swing from one end of the spectrum to the other. If this is a $50 billion loss event, it will have a significant impact in terms of changing the market.[13]

但如果这是一个超过 500 亿美元的事件——一些人仍然认为这可能对保险行业来说是一个超过 500 亿美元的事件——那么我认为这将是一个改变市场的事件。因为如果你把这 500 亿美元与我们之前发生的灾难损失叠加，这将再增加 150 亿到 200 亿美元，那么你就开始谈论真正的数字了。行业中的大量过剩资本开始被抽走。我们和其他行业一样，拥有这种特定的心态，我们在光谱的两端摇摆。如果这是一个 500 亿美元的损失事件，它将对市场的变化产生重大影响。[13]

AM: When you say that a lot of the excess capital will be drained out, will that have a knock-on effect on all kinds of reinsurance pricing?

AM：当你说大量的过剩资本将被抽走时，这会对各种再保险定价产生连锁反应吗？

AJ: Indirectly, certainly. Directly, [it] may not be immediately — that’s why I said indirectly. It depends on the line of business that you’re talking about.

AJ：间接地，当然可以。直接地，可能不会立刻——这就是我说间接的原因。这取决于你所谈论的业务领域。

If you’re talking about workers compensation, which is a specialized class of business in the U.S. which is a very localized line of business, probably not. But if you’re talking about international lines of businesses like property insurance and general marine insurance, I think they will react with a shorter lead time.

如果你在谈论工人赔偿，这在美国是一种专业的商业类别，属于非常本地化的业务，可能不会。但如果你在谈论国际业务，比如财产保险和一般海洋保险，我认为他们会以更短的提前期做出反应。

AM: What’s going to be the next big opportunity for reinsurance? In some ways, what’s the next big threat? A lot of people are saying that climate change is going to change the way we do business because the imponderables are so high now.

AM：再保险的下一个重大机会是什么？在某种程度上，下一个重大威胁又是什么？很多人都在说气候变化将改变我们的商业方式，因为现在的不确定性太高了。

AJ: I think longer-term that is certainly true, but don’t forget most of the reinsurance treaties have a time horizon of twelve months. So in terms of trying to factor in the impact of climate change over the next twelve months — yes, we all talk about it but, at the end of the day, pricing is more a function of the reality of supply and demand of capital. The availability of excess capital really has more of a role on pricing than long-term factors like climate change.

AJ：我认为从长远来看，这确实是正确的，但不要忘记大多数再保险合同的时间范围是十二个月。因此，在试图考虑气候变化在接下来十二个月内的影响时——是的，我们都在谈论这个，但归根结底，定价更多是资本供需现实的函数。过剩资本的可用性在定价上确实比气候变化等长期因素更具影响力。

AM: Where’s the next big opportunity in reinsurance?

AM:再保险领域下一个大机会在哪里？

AJ: In reinsurance? Clearly, if the catastrophic reinsurance market takes a $50 billion hit that will see a skyrocketing of prices in the catastrophic reinsurance business. Now, having said that, the question you’ve got to step back and ask yourself is: Are the prices going high because we’ve had these four big events in the last thirteen months starting from the quake in Chile? Are these four big events that we’ve had, are they random events or is it telling us something? And are the odds of the next quake that much higher than what they were two years before?

AJ：在再保险方面？显然，如果灾难性再保险市场遭受 500 亿美元的损失，灾难性再保险业务的价格将会飙升。话虽如此，你必须退一步问自己：价格上涨是因为我们在过去十三个月中经历了从智利地震开始的四个重大事件吗？这四个重大事件是随机事件，还是在告诉我们某些事情？下一个地震的发生几率是否比两年前高得多？

So the prices going up may be a function of people getting more nervous about the cost of risk having skyrocketed as well.

因此，价格上涨可能是因为人们对风险成本飙升感到更加紧张。

But the catastrophic end of the business, it’s an interesting line of business. It’s a very volatile line of business. It’s a very capital-intensive line of business. And, therefore, the return requirements need to be that much higher. Because it’s such a volatile class of business, there are several years where the numbers look great — but if you look at it over any meaningful length of time, it’s not a great business to be in.[14] Unless prices really skyrocket, it’s difficult to get excited about that line of business.

但是这个行业的灾难性结局，这是一个有趣的行业。这是一个非常波动的行业。这是一个资本密集型的行业。因此，回报要求需要更高。因为这是一个如此波动的行业，有几个年份的数字看起来很不错——但如果你从任何有意义的时间长度来看，这并不是一个好的行业。[14]除非价格真的飙升，否则很难对这个行业感到兴奋。

AM: Do you have any exposure to Japan?

AM: 你对日本有了解吗？

AJ: As a reinsurer and as a retrocessionaire — retrocessionaire means [being] a reinsurer to reinsurers — we have exposure to Japan. The most obvious one is we reinsure Swiss Re and we get a slice of 20% of what they do in the non-life space. So they just recently announced their initial estimate of a loss of $1.2 billion and, since we get 20% of their gross, it means they will cede us about $300 million of that loss.

AJ：作为再保险公司和再再保险公司——再再保险公司是指对再保险公司进行再保险——我们在日本有风险敞口。最明显的一点是我们为瑞士再保险公司提供再保险，我们获得他们在非寿险领域 20%的份额。因此，他们最近宣布了初步估计的损失为 12 亿美元，而由于我们获得他们毛额的 20%，这意味着他们将向我们转让大约 3 亿美元的损失。

In addition, we have some clients in Japan that we directly reinsure. Some of them are fairly, fairly high-level, so it’s not clear whether we’ll get a loss or not. But I will not be surprised if we end up getting losses from our clients in Japan as well.

此外，我们在日本有一些客户，我们直接进行再保险。其中一些客户的级别相当高，因此我们不确定是否会出现损失。但如果我们最终从日本的客户那里遭受损失，我也不会感到惊讶。

AM: Many call you the pioneer of finite reinsurance, which has seen its fair share of controversies because some were misusing the products and hedging them as loans instead of insurance cover. Do you think that the days of finite insurance are over because of the huge controversies attracted over the last couple of years?

许多人称你为有限再保险的先驱，但由于一些人将这些产品误用并将其作为贷款而非保险保障，因此引发了不少争议。你认为由于过去几年引发的巨大争议，有限保险的时代已经结束了吗？

AJ: When you say days of finite reinsurance[15] are over, the definition of what is finite reinsurance and what is risk transfer… I mean, the [term] finite reinsurance — because of the negative connotations — is not really used. But the definition of risk transfer has been made more explicit by the regulators, by the accountants.

AJ：当你说有限再保险的日子[15]已经结束时，有限再保险的定义和风险转移的定义……我的意思是，有限再保险这个[术语]——由于其负面含义——实际上并不常用。但是，监管机构和会计师对风险转移的定义已经变得更加明确。

So, within those boundaries of what is considered to be adequate risk transfer, there are a number of transactions that are done that meet the constraints and are within the boundaries of what is considered acceptable risk transfer.

因此，在被认为是适当风险转移的界限内，有许多交易符合这些限制，并在被认为是可接受的风险转移的范围内。

The term finite reinsurance, finite insurance, is a misleading term in many respects because all insurance is finite at some level. The question is how much of the loss do you draw the line on? And that line was not well-defined — as a result of which, you know, some people took liberties and pushed it all the way down.

有限再保险、有限保险这个术语在许多方面都是一个误导性的术语，因为所有保险在某种程度上都是有限的。问题在于你在损失上划定的界限是多少？而这个界限并不明确——因此，有些人就越界了，把它推到了极限。

After the recent events, that issue has been clarified and there’s a fairly bright line in terms of what is accepted as risk transfers. Within that, we ourselves now make sure that our transactions have what is considered adequate risk transfer — but, nevertheless, have gaps that make sure that our loss doesn’t go all over the place.

在最近的事件之后，这个问题已经得到澄清，关于什么被视为风险转移有了相当明确的界限。在这方面，我们现在确保我们的交易具备被认为是足够的风险转移——但尽管如此，仍然存在一些空白，以确保我们的损失不会四处蔓延。

AM: Have you ever regretted pioneering a concept which then was opened up to abuse?

AM：你是否曾后悔过开创一个概念，结果却被滥用？

AJ: Firstly, I think you are giving me more credit than is due in terms of pioneering the concept. (Laughs) It was a concept that existed well before I joined the insurance industry, as well.

AJ：首先，我认为你对我在开创这个概念方面的评价过高了。（笑）这个概念在我加入保险行业之前就已经存在了。

Again, it was a class of business that we were fairly active in — but, no, I do not have any regrets in terms of having been active in that class of business. There are some things that I might have done differently, but in general if I look at the portfolio of what we did and when we did, I’m very happy with what we did and when we did. It has stood the test of time. Even by today’s standards, I think all of our transactions met the risk transfer requirements.

再说一次，这是我们相当活跃的一个业务领域——但是，不，我对自己在这个业务领域的活跃没有任何遗憾。有些事情我可能会做得不同，但总体来说，如果我回顾我们所做的投资组合以及我们做的时间，我对我们所做的事情和时机非常满意。它经受住了时间的考验。即使按照今天的标准，我认为我们所有的交易都符合风险转移的要求。

So, no, I do not at all regret what we did in that space.

所以，不，我一点也不后悔我们在那个空间里所做的事情。

AM: What would you have done differently?

AM：你会有什么不同的做法？

AJ: What we would have done differently is, on some transactions, we… Again, even though we got approval from the regulators, our clients accounted for it one way [and] we accounted for it in another way. Both of us, with complete knowledge and blessing of our regulators and our auditors — and, in some cases, it was the same auditor on both sides. Legally, mirror accounting is not a requirement, even today.

AJ：我们本可以采取不同的做法，在某些交易中，我们……尽管我们得到了监管机构的批准，但我们的客户以一种方式进行会计处理，而我们以另一种方式进行会计处理。我们双方都在监管机构和审计师的完全知情和认可下进行操作——在某些情况下，双方使用的是同一位审计师。从法律上讲，即使在今天，镜像会计也不是一种要求。

But, nevertheless, the fact that it tends to sort of get a bad name in the press, we’d be a little more sensitive about issues like that.

但是，尽管如此，它在媒体中往往会受到一些负面评价，我们会对这样的事情更加敏感。

AM: I’m not suggesting that this is the last stage of your career at Berkshire Hathaway, but what would you like your legacy to be at Hathaway?

AM：我并不是说这是你在伯克希尔哈撒韦职业生涯的最后阶段，但你希望自己在哈撒韦的遗产是什么？

AJ: I love my job right now and I hope I keep doing it for a long time![16]

AJ：我现在热爱我的工作，希望我能长期继续做下去！[16]

I don’t think about the legacy. I’m so focused in terms of the next few months and the next few deals that, quite honestly, I just hope I don’t do something stupid.17 I’ve enjoyed and I’ve had a lot of fun doing what I’ve done over the last 25-26 years and I just hope I keep doing it for as many years as I’m allowed to keep doing it.18

我不考虑遗产。我专注于接下来的几个月和几笔交易，老实说，我只希望自己不要做傻事。[17] 在过去的 25-26 年里，我享受并乐在其中，我只希望能继续做我被允许做的事情，尽可能多年。[18]

AM: Would you say in some ways that Hathaway has spoiled you for any other business organization?

AM：你会说在某种程度上，Hathaway让你对其他商业组织感到失望吗？

AJ: Oh, absolutely. I cannot work with any other company in my life — which is fine. (Laughs) I’ve enjoyed what I’ve done and I certainly don’t want to take a step backwards.[19]

AJ：哦，绝对是的。我一辈子都无法与其他公司合作——这没问题。（笑）我享受我所做的事情，我当然不想退步。[19]

AM: One last question before I let you go. Warren Buffett is in India saying people should give. Do you personally follow that mantra?

AM：在我让你离开之前最后一个问题。沃伦·巴菲特在印度说人们应该给予。你个人是否遵循这个信条？

AJ: When you say give —

AJ: 当你说给——

AM: In terms of charity.

AM：在慈善方面。

AJ: It’s a very difficult question. It’s a very personal question. My views have also sort of changed over time. Without getting into a lot of the details — which aren’t relevant to you and your audience — we have a son that has been diagnosed with a serious illness. Before he was diagnosed with the illness, I always sort of thought much like the Buffett philosophy. I always felt, “Gee, I’ve got this fame, I’ve got this wealth, I didn’t deserve it, and it doesn’t belong to me.”

AJ：这是一个非常困难的问题。这是一个非常个人的问题。我的看法也随着时间的推移而有所改变。在不涉及很多细节的情况下——这些细节对你和你的观众并不相关——我们有一个儿子被诊断出患有严重疾病。在他被诊断出这种疾病之前，我总是有点像巴菲特的哲学。我总是觉得，“天哪，我有了这种名声，我有了这种财富，我不配拥有它，它不属于我。”

But, after my son’s illness, things did change. I felt I didn’t deserve my son’s illness, either. He didn’t deserve what he’s getting.

但是，在我儿子生病之后，事情确实发生了变化。我觉得我也不配得到我儿子的病。他不应该遭受这样的痛苦。

So, in terms of my giving… Again, without getting into too much detail, two things have changed: One is that we focus on a foundation[20] that is trying to find a cure for his illness. And, secondly, I feel guilty in as much as in the earliest days of his life, while he was healthy, I didn’t let him spend money and have a nice time. So I’ve done a u-turn on that and I spend a lot more money a lot more freely than what I used to.

所以，在我的给予方面……再次，不想过多细节，有两件事发生了变化：第一，我们专注于一个[20]正在努力寻找治愈他疾病的基金会。其次，我感到内疚，因为在他生命的最初阶段，当他健康时，我没有让他花钱和享受美好时光。所以我在这方面做了个 180 度的转变，我花更多的钱，花得也更加随意，远比以前多。

AM: Mr. Jain, thank you for a wonderful interview.

AM: 贾因先生，谢谢您进行了一次精彩的采访。

AJ: Not at all. Thank you very much.

AJ: 一点也不。非常感谢。

[1]Ajit Jain strongly prefers to stay out of the media spotlight. He once declined an interview request with the following note: “Any disappointment I have caused you by declining the interview is far less than the disappointment I would have caused you by granting it.”

阿吉特·贾因强烈倾向于远离媒体的聚光灯。他曾经拒绝了一次采访请求，并附上了以下说明：“我因拒绝采访而给您带来的任何失望，远远小于我如果接受采访所带来的失望。”

I occasionally get requests to appear on podcasts and I think I’m going to steal this line.

我偶尔会收到参加播客的请求，我想我会偷用这句话。

[2]In layman’s terms, reinsurance is insurance for insurers. For example, a reinsurer might agree to cover insured losses above a certain threshold in the event of a catastrophic event.

简单来说，再保险是保险公司的保险。例如，再保险公司可能同意在发生灾难性事件时，覆盖超过某个阈值的保险损失。

[3]Ajit Jain graduated from the Indian Institute of Technology with a degree in mechanical engineering. After a short stint at IBM, he moved to the United States and earned his MBA from Harvard. After that, Jain went to work at McKinsey & Co. as a management consultant.

阿吉特·贾因毕业于印度理工学院，获得机械工程学位。在 IBM 工作了一段时间后，他移居美国，并获得哈佛大学的 MBA 学位。之后，贾因在麦肯锡公司担任管理顾问。

He walked into Buffett’s office that day thanks to the persistent efforts of one Michael Goldberg. Jain had previously worked for Goldberg at McKinsey and had now been recruited to follow him to Berkshire’s insurance operation. “After talking to him for a couple of hours,” Buffett said, “I knew that we’d struck gold — and that he would be a great guy to run our reinsurance business.” (Buffett eventually began calling Goldberg “St. Mike” for bringing Ajit into the Berkshire fold.)

他那天走进巴菲特的办公室，得益于迈克尔·戈德堡的坚持不懈的努力。贾因之前在麦肯锡为戈德堡工作，现在被招募到伯克希尔的保险业务。巴菲特说：“和他聊了几个小时后，我知道我们找到了宝藏——他将是管理我们再保险业务的好人。”（巴菲特最终开始称戈德堡为“圣迈克”，因为他把阿吉特带入了伯克希尔。）

“Mr. Buffett told [Goldberg] to find some people to join the new insurance business he was planning to enter,” Jain once joked. “Goldberg, being a lazy guy, instead of doing a proper search, called his flunky at McKinsey who had been useful in carrying his bags. That’s how I went to work at Berkshire.” 🤣

“巴菲特先生告诉[戈德堡]找一些人加入他计划进入的新保险业务，”贾因曾开玩笑说。“戈德堡这个懒家伙，没有进行适当的搜索，而是打电话给他在麦肯锡的助手，那个人在帮他提包时很有用。这就是我去伯克希尔工作的原因。”🤣

[4]If the price is right, Jain is not afraid to take a big swing. Berkshire insured both the Sears Tower and the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City shortly after 9/11 — when both were considered to be prime targets for terrorism. In 2003, Berkshire received a seven-figure premium to underwrite Pepsi’s “Play for a Billion” promotion.

如果价格合适，贾因不怕大举投资。伯克希尔在 911 事件后不久为西尔斯塔和 2002 年盐湖城冬季奥运会投保——当时这两者都被视为恐怖主义的主要目标。2003 年，伯克希尔收到了七位数的保费来承保百事可乐的“亿万游戏”促销活动。

Another notable example is when Jain cut deals with Brandywine, Equitas, and CNA to assume their future asbestos liabilities. The premiums added up to more than $10 billion.

另一个显著的例子是，贾因与布兰迪温、艾基塔斯和 CNA 达成协议，承担他们未来的石棉责任。这些保费总计超过 100 亿美元。

“It’s known throughout the world that if you go to [Ajit Jain] with an idea — a big idea — you’ll get an answer,” said Buffett. “It may not be the answer you want, but you’ll get it. You’ll get it fast. Nothing is too big for us to do.”

“全世界都知道，如果你带着一个想法——一个大想法——去找[Ajit Jain]，你会得到答案，”巴菲特说。“这可能不是你想要的答案，但你会得到。你会很快得到。没有什么是我们做不到的。”

[5]Anjana Menon might be referring to Buffett’s four disciplines of a sound insurance operation. In his 2014 annual letter to Berkshire shareholders, Buffett wrote: “[A sound insurance operation] must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.”

安贾娜·梅农可能是在提到巴菲特关于健全保险运营的四个原则。在他 2014 年致伯克希尔股东的年度信中，巴菲特写道：“[一个健全的保险运营]必须（1）了解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险；（2）保守地评估任何风险实际导致损失的可能性及其可能的成本；（3）设定一个平均能够在覆盖未来损失成本和运营费用后仍能盈利的保费；（4）如果无法获得适当的保费，愿意放弃。”

[6]Howard Buffett is slated to become the non-executive chairman of Berkshire Hathaway once his father leaves the post. His task: preserve the company’s unique culture. “He will be very owner-oriented and is interested in preserving the unusual and peculiar culture at Berkshire,” the elder Buffett said. When Howie (as he is known) takes over, not much will change. Berkshire HQ will remain in Omaha and the new chairman will commute there a couple of times each week.

霍华德·巴菲特预计将在他父亲离任后成为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的非执行主席。他的任务是维护公司的独特文化。“他将非常关注股东，并且对维护伯克希尔独特而奇特的文化感兴趣，”老巴菲特说。当霍华德（他被称为霍威）接任时，变化不会太大。伯克希尔总部将继续设在奥马哈，新主席每周会往返几次。

[7]India currently ranks as the fifth-largest economy in the world — trailing only the United States, China, Japan, and Germany.

印度目前是世界第五大经济体，仅次于美国、中国、日本和德国。

[8]At the time of Buffett and Jain’s visit to India in 2011, the country was engulfed in massive anti-corruption protests. Indian citizens were fed up by corruption at the highest levels of government and business — and took to the streets for marches and other demonstrations. The following month, one of the movement’s leaders (Anna Hazare) went on a 12-day hunger strike until the government agreed to consider the anti-corruption Lokpal Bill.

在巴菲特和贾因于 2011 年访问印度时，该国正陷入大规模的反腐败抗议活动。印度公民对政府和商业最高层的腐败感到厌倦，纷纷走上街头进行游行和其他示威活动。下个月，运动的一位领导者（安娜·哈扎雷）进行了为期 12 天的绝食抗议，直到政府同意考虑反腐败的洛克帕尔法案。

[9]Interestingly, this cap on foreign ownership is what spurred Ajit Jain to leave India in the first place. After college, he had been working in sales and marketing for IBM — until the government’s restrictions on foreign ownership led IBM to shut down operations on the subcontinent. Jain then left India for a new start in the United States. If not for this rule, who knows where Jain would be today?

有趣的是，这项对外资持股的限制正是促使阿吉特·贾因离开印度的原因。大学毕业后，他在 IBM 从事销售和市场营销工作——直到政府对外资持股的限制导致 IBM 在次大陆关闭了业务。贾因随后离开印度，前往美国寻求新的开始。如果没有这项规定，谁知道贾因今天会在哪里呢？

[10]Sadly, it didn’t really lead anywhere. In 2011, Berkshire became a corporate agent of Bajaj Allianz General through a newly-created Berkshire India subsidiary — and started off by selling auto insurance online to the Indian marketplace. But, just two years later, Berkshire shuttered this operation after lackluster results.

遗憾的是，这并没有真正带来什么结果。2011 年，伯克希尔通过新成立的伯克希尔印度子公司成为了巴贾吉·阿利安兹保险公司的企业代理，并开始在印度市场在线销售汽车保险。但仅仅两年后，由于业绩不佳，伯克希尔关闭了这一业务。

[11]What does “hardening” mean in insurance terms? According to Insurance Business America, “A hard market is the upswing in a market cycle, when premiums increase and capacity for most types of insurance decreases. This can be caused by a number of factors, including falling investment returns for insurers, increases in frequency or severity of losses, and regulatory intervention deemed to be against the interests of insurers.”

保险术语中的“收紧”是什么意思？根据《美国保险商业》，“收紧市场是市场周期的上升阶段，此时保费增加，而大多数类型保险的承保能力减少。这可能是由多种因素造成的，包括保险公司的投资回报下降、损失的频率或严重性增加，以及被认为不利于保险公司的监管干预。”

[12]On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit off the coast of northeast Japan — causing tsunami waves, devastation on land, and the nuclear emergency at Fukushima. It resulted in nearly 20,000 deaths.

2011 年 3 月 11 日，东北日本海岸发生了 9.0 级地震——引发了海啸、陆地上的破坏以及福岛的核紧急情况。造成了近 2 万人死亡。

[13]As it turned out, the cost to reinsurers pretty much split the difference between the American and London estimates. According to most sources, the earthquake ended up being a $35-40 billion loss event.

结果显示，再保险公司的成本基本上介于美国和伦敦的估计之间。根据大多数来源，这次地震最终造成了 350 亿到 400 亿美元的损失。

[14]“Long-tail reinsurance is a terrifying business,” Warren Buffett admitted in 1980. “You can have an obligation pop up twenty years later with a huge price tag that you never anticipated. Reinsurance rarely turns out to be what it’s sold as.”

“长尾再保险是一项可怕的业务，”沃伦·巴菲特在 1980 年承认。“你可能会在二十年后面临一个你从未预料到的巨额义务。再保险很少能如其所售那样。”

In 1990, he told Forbes much the same thing. “Sometimes [insurance] is a very good business — and that’s not very often — and sometimes it’s a terrible business.”

在 1990 年，他对福布斯说了差不多相同的话。“有时候[保险]是一个非常好的生意——而这并不常见——有时候它是一个糟糕的生意。”

[15]Finite reinsurance fell out of favor because a few bad apples took advantage of the inherent gray area of this type of contract — is it insurance or is it a loan? — to make their financials look better. Companies would advantageously book these deals as insurance, even though they covered very little and transferred minimal risk. As you might expect, this became fertile ground for malfeasance and controversy.

有限再保险逐渐失宠，因为少数不良分子利用这种合同固有的模糊地带——它是保险还是贷款？——来改善他们的财务状况。公司会有利地将这些交易记为保险，尽管它们覆盖的范围很小，转移的风险也很有限。正如你所料，这为不当行为和争议提供了肥沃的土壤。

There were plenty of honest and forthright finite reinsurance contracts, too. But, as Ajit Jain admits above, this term had “negative connotations” for a reason.

也有很多诚实和坦率的有限再保险合同。但是，正如 Ajit Jain 在上面所承认的，这个术语有“负面含义”是有原因的。

[16]Jain speaks to Buffett by phone almost every single day. That’s decidedly not the norm at decentralized Berkshire Hathaway. “We’ve got 70 or 80 companies, but he’s the only manager I talk to every day,” Buffett said. “Some of them I don’t even talk to once a year. There’s no one I talk to more than once a week. Except Ajit. I talk to him every day virtually. I’m just interested in what he’s doing.”

贾因几乎每天都通过电话与巴菲特交谈。这在去中心化的伯克希尔哈撒韦中显然不是常态。巴菲特说：“我们有 70 或 80 家公司，但他是我每天都和他交谈的唯一经理。有些人我一年甚至都不和他们交谈一次。没有人我每周交谈超过一次。除了阿吉特。我几乎每天都和他交谈。我只是对他在做什么感兴趣。”

Here’s how Jain describes his own job: “All I do is take the cash [from insurance operations] and throw it into the black box in Omaha and, hopefully, Uncle Warren keeps doing his magic with it.”

这是贾因对自己工作的描述：“我所做的就是把保险业务的现金拿来，扔进奥马哈的黑箱子里，希望沃伦叔叔能继续用他的魔法来处理它。”

[17]“It’s so easy to make dumb mistakes in this business,” Jain told author Robert Miles. “Even though you can do a lot of good deals, if you do one lousy deal you give it all back. It’s that one rotten apple — that’s what you guard against.”

“在这个行业里犯愚蠢的错误是如此简单，”贾因对作者罗伯特·迈尔斯说。“即使你能做很多好交易，如果你做了一笔糟糕的交易，你就会把所有的收益都还回去。就是那一个烂苹果——这就是你要防范的。”

[18]This answer would not surprise Warren Buffett. It doesn’t sound like Ajit Jain is the retiring type. “[Ajit’s] mind likes to stay active,” he said. “He would not be good at playing shuffleboard in Florida.”

这个答案不会让沃伦·巴菲特感到惊讶。听起来阿吉特·贾因并不是那种会退休的人。“[阿吉特]的头脑喜欢保持活跃，”他说。“他不适合在佛罗里达玩滑板球。”

[19]More than anything, Jain relishes the chance to work with Warren Buffett. “The opportunity to work for Warren is like winning a giant lottery,” he once said. “Quite honestly, no amount of money can substitute for working for a boss for whom you have the utmost respect — almost to the extent of worshipping him.”

贾因最享受的就是与沃伦·巴菲特合作的机会。“为沃伦工作就像赢得了一场巨大的彩票，”他曾说过。“坦率地说，任何金钱都无法替代为一位你极为尊敬的老板工作——几乎到了崇拜他的程度。”

The feeling is mutual. Here is a short selection of Buffett lavishing praise on Ajit Jain.

感觉是相互的。以下是巴菲特对阿吉特·贾因的赞美的简短摘录。

“If Charlie [Munger] and I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat — and you can only save one of us — swim to Ajit.”

“如果查理（芒格）、我和阿吉特在一只沉船上——而你只能救我们中的一个——那就游去救阿吉特。”

“In Ajit, we have an underwriter equipped with the intelligence to properly rate most risks; the realism to forget about those he can’t evaluate; the courage to write huge policies when the premium is appropriate; and the discipline to reject even the smallest risk when the premium is inadequate. It is rare to find a person possessing any one of these talents. For one person to have them all is remarkable.”

在 Ajit，我们有一位承保人，他具备正确评估大多数风险的智慧；能够忘记那些无法评估的风险的现实主义；在保费合适时勇于承保巨额保单的勇气；以及在保费不足时拒绝即使是最小风险的纪律。拥有其中任何一种才能的人都很少。一个人同时具备这些才能是非常了不起的。

“I knew he would do a terrific job, but I had no notion that we would ever get to where we are. Starting from scratch, he has built a reinsurance company that in terms of the way we would measure it, I think is the best the world has seen. Sure, we’d get arguments from some of our competitors, but I wouldn’t trade his operation for anybody else’s. I wouldn’t trade him for anybody else.”

“我知道他会做得非常出色，但我从未想过我们会达到现在的这个地步。从零开始，他建立了一家再保险公司，就我们衡量的标准而言，我认为这是世界上最好的。当然，我们会听到一些竞争对手的争论，但我不会把他的业务换成其他任何人的。我也不会把他换成其他任何人。”

Once, Buffett wrote a letter to Jain’s parents in India asking them if they had another son like him at home. His parents were tickled pink by Buffett’s compliment — and even framed the letter and proudly displayed it in their living room. Ajit, though, “put his foot down” and asked them to remove the letter because it made him feel awkward.

曾经，巴菲特给贾因的父母写了一封信，询问他们家里是否还有像他一样的儿子。他的父母对巴菲特的赞美感到非常高兴，甚至把信装框并自豪地挂在客厅里。然而，阿吉特“坚决反对”，要求他们把信拿掉，因为这让他感到尴尬。

[20Ajit Jain and his wife Tinku have twin sons — one of whom suffers from muscular dystrophy caused by dysferlin protein deficiency. The Jain Foundation was “established by Ajit Jain of Berkshire Hathaway in the hopes of curing dysferlinopathy — also referred to as LGMD2B, LGMDR2, or Miyoshi Myopathy 1 — which afflicts his son”.

阿吉特·贾因和他的妻子廷库有一对双胞胎儿子——其中一个因缺乏肌营养不良蛋白而患有肌肉萎缩症。贾因基金会是“由伯克希尔·哈撒韦的阿吉特·贾因成立的，旨在治愈肌营养不良症——也称为 LGMD2B、LGMDR2 或宫崎肌病 1——这种疾病困扰着他的儿子”。

2011-03-23 Ajit Jain.Interview with NDTV

2011-03-23 Ajit Jain.Interview with NDTV

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