2011-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session

早晨会议

1. Welcome

欢迎

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren. He’s Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。我是沃伦。他是查理。

I can see, he can hear. That’s why we work together. (Laughter)

我能看见，他能听见。这就是我们合作的原因。（笑声）

Have trouble remembering each other’s names from time to time. (Laughs)

有时记不住彼此的名字。（笑）

We’re going to — we’re going to introduce the directors, we’re going to give you some information on the first quarter earnings.

我们将介绍董事，我们将为您提供第一季度收益的一些信息。

We’re going to talk briefly about the David Sokol/Lubrizol situation, and then we’re going to open it up for your questions.

我们将简要讨论大卫·索科尔/鲁布里佐尔的情况，然后我们将开放时间供您提问。

Anything as it relates to the Lubrizol matter is going to be transcribed and will be put up on the website — the Berkshire Hathaway website — just as promptly as we can, maybe this evening or this afternoon, maybe tomorrow morning, but very promptly, because we want to be sure that all shareholders hear — or get to read every word of what has been said here about the matter.

与 Lubrizol 事件相关的任何内容都将被转录并尽快发布在网站上——即伯克希尔哈撒韦的网站上，可能是今天晚上或今天下午，也可能是明天早上，但会非常及时，因为我们希望确保所有股东都能听到——或阅读到关于此事的每一个字。

2. Board of directors introduced

董事会介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: First thing I’d like to do is introduce the directors. And if they’d stand and remain standing, you can withhold your applause as they stand, but you can go crazy at the end, or you can continue to withhold your applause. That will be your call. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我首先想介绍一下董事们。如果他们能站起来并保持站立，你们可以在他们站立时不鼓掌，但在最后你们可以尽情欢呼，或者继续不鼓掌。这由你们决定。（笑声）

Charlie and I are up here, and we don’t like to stand up too often so we’ll skip our standing.

查理和我在这里，我们不喜欢太频繁地站起来，所以我们就不站了。

The — Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott. (Applause)

霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、比尔·盖茨、桑迪·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特。（掌声）

3. Q1 earnings hurt by Asian catastrophes

第一季度收益受到亚洲灾难的影响

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we have a few slides that deal with the first quarter earnings.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们有几张幻灯片来讨论第一季度的收益。

I think Marc Hamburg would like me to emphasize that these are preliminary. This is about as early as we ever have a meeting, in relation to the quarter.

我认为马克·汉堡希望我强调这些都是初步的。这是我们与季度相关的会议中最早的一次。

Normally it’s always the first Saturday in May, so they had to work a little harder than usual to get these numbers together.

通常是在五月的第一个星期六，所以他们不得不比平时更加努力地整理这些数字。

And I will tell you as background that basically pretty much all of our businesses, with the exception of those that are related to residential housing, are getting better, and you can almost see it with most of them quarter by quarter.

我可以告诉你，基本上我们所有的业务，除了与住宅住房相关的那些，都是在改善的，你几乎可以看到大多数业务每个季度都有所好转。

We have a wide diversity of businesses. We have more than 70 companies we list, but then Marmon itself has over a hundred businesses. So we are a cross section of not only the American economy, but to some extent we see a fair amount about what’s going on internationally, too.

我们有多样化的业务。我们列出了超过 70 家公司，但 Marmon 本身有超过一百个业务。因此，我们不仅是美国经济的一个横截面，在某种程度上，我们也能看到国际上发生的许多事情。

And in the first quarter, as has been the case, really, since the fall of 2009, both our nonresidential construction businesses, except for those nonresidential construction businesses, our other businesses have generally gotten better quarter by quarter, and there was no exception to that in the first quarter.

在第一季度，正如自 2009 年秋季以来的情况一样，除了那些非住宅建筑业务外，我们的非住宅建筑业务和其他业务一般都在逐季改善，第一季度也不例外。

What was very different in the first quarter was that we had a — probably the second worst quarter for the insurance industry, in terms of catastrophes around the globe.

在第一季度非常不同的是，我们经历了——可能是保险行业第二糟糕的一个季度，全球范围内的灾难情况。

Normally, the third quarter of the year is the worst period because that’s when hurricanes tend to hit the U.S. with most of them — well, about 50 percent of them occurring in September and then sort of forming a normal curve on either side of September — so the third quarter usually is the record quarter, and the third quarter was the record quarter back at the time of Katrina.

通常，年度的第三季度是最糟糕的时期，因为这时飓风往往袭击美国，其中大约 50%的飓风发生在九月份，然后在九月份的两侧形成一种正常分布曲线。因此，第三季度通常是创纪录的季度，而在卡特里娜飓风发生时，第三季度也是创纪录的季度。

But in the first quarter of this year, we had some major catastrophes in the Pacific Asian areas, and that hit the reinsurance industry particularly hard.

但在今年第一季度，我们在太平洋亚洲地区发生了一些重大灾难，这对再保险行业造成了特别大的冲击。

No one knows at this point. I mean it’s a wild guess, but probably those catastrophes cost the reinsurance industry on the order of $50 billion, and we usually participate to the extent of 3 to 5 percent.

目前没有人知道。我是说这只是一个大胆的猜测，但这些灾难可能给再保险行业造成了大约 500 亿美元的损失，而我们通常参与的比例在 3%到 5%之间。

First of all, I’ll give you our overall earnings the way we normally present them. And if we’ll put the first slide up.

首先，我将以我们通常的方式向您提供我们的整体收益。如果我们可以展示第一张幻灯片。

You can see that our insurance underwriting suffered an after-tax loss of $821 million.

您可以看到我们的保险承保在税后损失了 8.21 亿美元。

Now, when I wrote the annual report, I postulated normal earning power of Berkshire at about 17 billion pretax and about 12 billion after tax, assuming breakeven on insurance underwriting.

现在，当我撰写年度报告时，我假设伯克希尔的正常盈利能力在税前约为 170 亿美元，税后约为 120 亿美元，假设保险承保持平。

Our insurance underwriting has done better than breakeven. In fact, it’s made quite a bit of money for eight consecutive years.

我们的保险承保业绩超过了盈亏平衡。事实上，连续八年来它赚了相当可观的利润。

But I would say with a start of these catastrophes in the first quarter — or the catastrophes experience we had in the first quarter — I would say that it’s unlikely that we would have an underwriting profit for 2011.

但我想说，考虑到第一季度发生的这些灾难——或者说我们在第一季度经历的灾难——我认为我们在 2011 年获得承保利润的可能性不大。

If it was remarkably catastrophe-free from this point forward, including hurricanes in the United States, it’s conceivable we would break even or make a tiny profit.

如果从现在开始没有显著的灾难，包括美国的飓风，我们有可能会持平或获得微薄的利润。

But that’s an improbable assumption, so I think for the first time in nine years we will likely have an insurance underwriting loss this year.

但这是一个不太可能的假设，所以我认为在九年来的第一次，我们今年可能会出现保险承保损失。

I think our record may very well be quite a bit better than, certainly, most other reinsurers and it does not change my expectation that over time, our insurance underwriting should at least break even. And if you have followed the — what I’ve written in the annual reports — if insurance breaks even, we get the free use of float, and that’s been enormously valuable in the past and I would expect it to be in the future.

我认为我们的业绩可能比其他大多数再保险公司要好得多，这并没有改变我对未来的预期，即我们的保险承保至少应该持平。如果你关注过我在年报中写的内容——如果保险持平，我们就可以免费使用浮存金，这在过去是非常有价值的，我预计未来也会如此。

And if you look at the other lines, insurance investment income is down a little. That will go down more because our Goldman Sachs preferred was called in April.

如果你看看其他项目，保险投资收入略有下降。由于我们的高盛优先股在四月被赎回，这一数字还会进一步下降。

Our General Electric preferred is almost certain to be called in October. So we have lost — and we lost a — we had called a note from Swiss Re that was paying us 12 percent and came to something over $360 million a year when the Swiss franc went above par.

我们的通用电气优先股几乎肯定会在十月被赎回。因此我们损失了——我们损失了一笔——我们曾经从瑞士再保险公司获得的票据，这笔票据给我们支付 12%的利息，当瑞士法郎升值超过平价时，每年收益超过 3.6 亿美元。

So we have lost, or are losing, at least three very high-yield investments, which we cannot replace with similar investments at present. So that line will go down.

所以我们已经失去了，或者正在失去，至少三项非常高收益的投资，而我们目前无法用类似的投资来替代。因此，这条线会下降。

回头看，优先股不如普通的股票，有两种解释，一是当时是理性的决策；二是如果是真的看好就应该买入普通股。

On the other hand, at the end of the quarter we had 38 billion in cash, and that does not count the 5 1/2 billion that we were going to receive in April from our Goldman Sachs preferred. So that money is earning virtually nothing now, and I would not expect that to be part of the long-term picture, either.

另一方面，在季度末我们有 380 亿美元的现金，这还不包括我们将在四月从高盛优先股中收到的 55 亿美元。因此，这笔钱现在几乎没有收益，我也不认为这会是长期情况的一部分。

So there would — you know, just a few percent on that would be many, many hundreds of millions of dollars.

所以那样的话——你知道，仅仅几个百分点就会是数亿数百万美元。

So I think over time, our insurance investment income, even though it will dip throughout this year, I would expect that if we have a similar level of investments, to actually grow from the level we show here.

所以我认为随着时间的推移，我们的保险投资收入尽管在今年会有所下降，但我预计如果我们的投资水平保持相似，实际上会从我们在这里显示的水平上增长。

We had the full ownership of BNSF in the quarter this year. We only had it, I think, from February 12th last year, so that, in a significant way, accounts for the gain in that next line of railroad, utilities and energy.

我们在今年的这个季度完全拥有了 BNSF。我们只是在去年 2 月 12 日才拥有它，因此，这在很大程度上解释了下一条铁路、公用事业和能源的收益。

But the BNSF also had a significant gain in earnings and the railroad business looks to me like it will have a very good year this year, not just our railroad but all railroads, and the competitive advantage of railroads is becoming more and more evident, almost by the day, particularly as fuel prices increase.

但 BNSF 的收益也有显著增长，铁路业务在我看来今年将会有一个非常好的年份，不仅是我们的铁路，所有铁路都是如此，铁路的竞争优势变得越来越明显，几乎是每天都在显现，特别是在燃料价格上涨的情况下。

And in the remaining lines, we also had gains in most of our businesses.

在剩下的几行中，我们在大多数业务中也取得了收益。

So overall, we got hit very hard in the insurance business.

总体来说，我们在保险业务上受到了很大的打击。

And if we’ll move to slide 2, we list the three major catastrophes that occurred, which in aggregate we estimate we have a total loss of a billion, 673 pretax, and that figure, as with all estimates — early estimates about major catastrophes — is subject to a lot of change. Nobody knows what the insured losses will be from the Japanese earthquake.

如果我们转到第二张幻灯片，我们列出了发生的三大灾难，我们估计总损失为十亿六千七百三十万，税前，这个数字与所有关于重大灾难的早期估计一样，可能会有很大变化。没有人知道日本地震的保险损失将是多少。

But this is our best estimate now. You’ll notice that over 40 percent of the underwriting loss comes from a contract we have with Swiss Re where we get 20 percent of their business.

但这是我们现在最好的估计。您会注意到，超过 40%的承保损失来自我们与瑞士再保险公司的合同，我们从中获得 20%的业务。

That contract is in the fourth of its five years. They have indicated that they will not be interested in renewing it. I just wish they told us that a few months ago. (Laughs)

该合同处于五年期的第四年。他们表示不打算续签。我只希望他们几个月前就告诉我们。（笑）

But we’ve enjoyed the relationship with Swiss Re, it’s just that we enjoy it some quarters more than others.

但我们很享受与瑞士再保险的关系，只是有些季度我们比其他季度更享受。

Our estimate — we’ve added a little something into their estimate because on balance we feel that most catastrophe losses develop upward. It’s sort of the nature of the business.

我们的估计——我们在他们的估计中增加了一些内容，因为我们认为大多数灾难损失往往是向上发展的。这是这个行业的特性。

But that — incidentally, the tornadoes in April, just at GEICO, we expect — and all we’re talking about is automobiles here, cars, because we don’t insure homeowners. We act as agent in placing insurance for people, but we do not take the insurance risk.

但是，顺便提一下，四月份的龙卷风，正好在 GEICO，我们预计——而我们谈论的只是汽车，这里是汽车，因为我们不为房主投保。我们作为代理人为人们安排保险，但我们不承担保险风险。

We estimate that 25,000 cars will get automobile claims. That’s a lot of automobiles when you think about it, and our market share is about 9 percent, although it varies by state.

我们估计将有 25,000 辆汽车会提出汽车索赔。考虑到这一点，这是一大批汽车，而我们的市场份额大约为 9%，尽管这在各州之间有所不同。

But it’s been an extraordinary tornado season, as you know. That does not hit — I do not believe that that hits the reinsurance business particularly hard, because there are multiple, multiple events but no one event is anything like, say, the New Zealand earthquake.

但正如你所知道的，这个龙卷风季节异常。我认为这并不会对再保险业务造成特别大的影响，因为有多个事件，但没有任何一个事件像新西兰地震那样严重。

The New Zealand earthquake estimated at $12 billion of insured damage. Charlie, how many people are in New Zealand?

新西兰地震的保险损失估计为 120 亿美元。查理，新西兰有多少人？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — 查理·芒格：好吧——

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t practice these things, as will become evident here. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们并没有排练这些事情，稍后会变得明显。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d guess —

查理·芒格：我猜——

WARREN BUFFETT: What, about four million? Three million?

沃伦·巴菲特：大约四百万？三百万？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d guess a little more than that.

查理·芒格：我猜会多一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Four? 沃伦·巴菲特：四个？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Five, maybe.

查理·芒格：五，可能。

WARREN BUFFETT: Five, OK. Five million people. So that’s 1/60th of the population, we’ll say, of the

沃伦·巴菲特：五，好吧。五百万人。所以我们可以说，这占人口的 1/60。

United States. And if you take 12 billion and multiply it by 60, you come up with 720 billion, which is 10 times Katrina, in terms of the impact on a place like that.

美国。如果你把 120 亿乘以 60，你会得到 7200 亿，这在影响像那样的地方方面是卡特里娜的 10 倍。

So those — there’s been some really extraordinary earthquakes. And as I say, the worst part of the season is, generally speaking, for reinsurers, is yet to come. So this may be a year that the reinsurers will remember, although they might prefer to forget it.

所以那些——发生了一些非常特别的地震。正如我所说，通常来说，对于再保险公司来说，最糟糕的部分还未到来。因此，这可能是一个再保险公司会记住的年份，尽管他们可能更愿意忘记它。

There’s some good news on the insurance front. On the next slide I show the growth in policies at GEICO month by month this year versus last year.

在保险方面有一些好消息。在下一张幻灯片中，我展示了今年与去年相比，GEICO 每月保单的增长情况。

Now, if you’ll remember, in the annual report I gave an explanation, in talking about goodwill value, about how the goodwill of GEICO is carried on our books at about a billion dollars. And no matter how successful the business becomes, that goodwill value is never increased on the books, but it does grow.

现在，如果你还记得，在年度报告中我解释了关于商誉价值的内容，谈到 GEICO 的商誉在我们的账面上大约为十亿美元。无论业务多么成功，这个商誉价值在账面上永远不会增加，但它确实在增长。

And as I put in the annual report, I estimate its value currently, using the same sort of yardstick we used when we purchased the second half of the company back in 1995, I estimate that value has grown, maybe, to 14 billion.

正如我在年度报告中所提到的，我估计目前的价值，使用我们在 1995 年购买公司后半部分时所用的同样标准，我估计这个价值可能已经增长到 140 亿。

I mean, every policyholder at GEICO, on average, has a value to us, the way I calculate it, of something on the order of $1,500.

我的意思是，平均而言，GEICO 的每位保单持有者对我们来说，按照我的计算，价值大约在 1500 美元左右。

And when we add 318,000 — and as of yesterday it was up to 381,000 — when we add that, we’ve added something approaching $500 million to the goodwill value.

当我们增加318,000个保单——截至昨天已增至381,000——当我们增加这些保单时，我们为商誉增加了接近5亿美元的价值。

That does not count the earnings from underwriting, which were substantial for GEICO. That does not count the investment income from the float, it does not count the investment income from the net worth we have attributed to it. That is added goodwill value, the same sort of goodwill value that a Coca-Cola has, or a Mars has, or any company like that.

这并不包括来自承保的收益，对GEICO而言也是相当可观的收益。这也不包括来自浮存金的投资收入，也不包括我们为其归属的净资产的投资收入。这是额外的商誉价值，和可口可乐、玛氏等公司一样的商誉价值。

And people think of it differently when they think of most consumer products. But a policyholder to Berkshire at GEICO has very, very significant value.

人们在考虑大多数消费品时，通常会以不同的方式看待它。但对伯克希尔来说，GEICO的保单持有者是非常非常重要的资产。

There’s a very significant percentage have been there for 10 years or more. And it’s something that we do not realize on our balance sheet or income account, but it’s an asset that’s every bit as real as the numbers that we do put on the balance sheet.

有相当一部分人已在这里待了十年或更长时间。这是我们在资产负债表或收入账户上无法实现的资产，但它的价值与我们在资产负债表上显示的数字一样真实。

So there’s good news at GEICO. We are gaining market share every day.

在 GEICO 有好消息。我们每天都在增加市场份额。

As a matter of fact, if you think about it, we have some people in the adjacent room that will be glad to sell you GEICO policies, and if only 66 of you sign up, that’s a goodwill value of about $100,000, so it will take care of some of the expenses of this meeting. (Laughter)

实际上，如果你考虑一下，我们隔壁房间的一些人会很高兴为你出售GEICO保单，如果只有66个人签约，那将是接近10万美元的商誉价值，因此足以支付这次会议的一些费用。（笑声））

Not that I care whether you do it or not but — (Laughs)

我并不在乎你是否做，但——（笑）

Now, there’s one more item I want to go through on the earnings picture, just because it illustrates to some extent the capriciousness of accounting and how we value our securities — or whether we take write-downs on them, I should say.

现在，还有一项我想讨论的收益情况，因为它在某种程度上说明了会计的变幻莫测，以及我们如何评估证券——或者说我们是否对它们进行减值。

There’s something called “other than temporary impairment,” which is an accounting rule. It’s kind of a fuzzy accounting rule, but it says that if you own a security for a while, and you paid X for it, and it’s been selling at, say, 80 percent of X for quite a while, nobody knows exactly what quite a while means, and I’m sure they phrase it differently in the accounting textbooks, but anyway, if it sells there for quite a while, you’re supposed to mark it down to that new valuation and have that markdown go through your income account, through your profit and loss account.

有一种叫做“非暂时性减值”的会计规则。这是一种模糊的会计规则，但它的意思是，如果你持有某项证券一段时间，并且你为其支付了 X，而它已经以 X 的 80%出售了一段时间，没人确切知道“一段时间”意味着什么，我相信会计教材中会有不同的表述，但无论如何，如果它在那个价格上出售了一段时间，你就应该将其标记为新的估值，并将该减值计入你的收入账户，计入你的损益账户。

Now we mark it down in any event for the balance sheet, and the balance sheet is what gives you the number for book value and is our reference point.

现在我们无论如何都要在资产负债表上标记它，资产负债表为您提供账面价值的数字，并且是我们的参考点。

But only when it meets this other than temporary thing does the mark down actually get run through the profit and loss account.

但只有当它遇到这种非临时的事情时，折扣才会真正计入损益账户。

Now, on March 31, as is shown, I believe, on the next slide, we owned some Wells Fargo stock, which had a cost of about 8 billion and the market value was 11.3 billion.

现在，在 3 月 31 日，如下一张幻灯片所示，我们拥有一些富国银行的股票，成本约为 80 亿美元，市场价值为 113 亿美元。

But some of the Wells Fargo stock we bought had been bought at higher prices than the March 31 figure, whereas, as you can see, a lot of the stock, which had a gain in it of 3.7 billion, had been bought at lower prices.

但我们购买的一些富国银行股票的价格高于 3 月 31 日的数字，而正如你所看到的，许多股票的增值为 37 亿美元，是以更低的价格购买的。

Well, under the rules, we were required to mark down the stock we bought at a higher price by 337 million, whereas we ignored, in the income account, the 3.7 billion of gain.

根据规定，我们需要将以更高价格购买的股票减记 3.37 亿，而在收入账户中，我们忽略了 37 亿的收益。

Now, interestingly enough, there’s two ways you can account for securities, as I understand it, both fully meeting GAAP accounting requirements. And if we had — if we had used the average cost method, we would not have had to mark down.

现在，有趣的是，按照我的理解，有两种方法可以对证券进行会计处理，均完全符合 GAAP 会计要求。如果我们使用了平均成本法，我们就不需要减记。

But we use what they call the specific identification method. Now the specific identification method is actually useful to us from a tax standpoint, because it means whenever we sell a security we can pick out the highest priced security and attribute the sale to that.

但我们使用他们所称的特定识别方法。现在，从税务角度来看，特定识别方法对我们实际上是有用的，因为这意味着每当我们出售证券时，我们可以选择价格最高的证券并将销售归因于它。

So it actually saves us money, or the time use of money, to get into specific identification.

所以实际上，进行具体识别可以为我们节省金钱，或者说是金钱的使用时间。

But we could just as easily use the average cost method and then we would not have a write-down like we have and that’s why I — one of the reasons I emphasize that — the fact that you should ignore gains or losses in securities or derivatives on a quarterly basis, or even an annual basis.

但我们同样可以使用平均成本法，这样就不会像现在这样出现减值，这也是我强调这一点的原因之一——即你应该忽略证券或衍生品在季度或甚至年度基础上的收益或损失。

The important thing is what the operating earnings of our businesses are doing and what the gain in book value, generally, has been.

重要的是我们业务的经营收益表现如何，以及账面价值的增长总体上是什么。

And then on top of that, you have to make your own estimate for what intrinsic value is, which would include things like the goodwill value that has been developed at GEICO.

然后在此基础上，你还必须自己估算内在价值，这将包括在 GEICO 发展起来的商誉价值等因素。

I apologize for taking you through the accounting lessons, but the headlines often just say what the final net income is, as if that’s the all-important figure. And sometimes it’s the all-deceptive figure.

我为带你学习会计课程而感到抱歉，但头条新闻常常只说最终的净收入是多少，仿佛那是最重要的数字。有时这也是一个极具误导性的数字。

能够回到常识，回到基础的CEO极为罕见。

I mean, it really bears — if you include gains and losses — it bears, really, no connection to the reality of whether a quarter has been satisfactory from our standpoint.

我的意思是，如果你考虑到收益和损失，它实际上与我们从自身角度来看一个季度是否令人满意的现实没有任何关系。

But it does get a lot of attention in the press and that’s why we spend, perhaps, an inordinate amount of time trying to explain what really takes place in our financials.

但它确实在媒体上引起了很多关注，这就是为什么我们花费了大量时间试图解释我们的财务状况中实际发生的事情。

Now, I think we’re going to get to the questions and answers here in just a second. We’ll alternate between the press group on my right and 13 stations that — microphones that have been placed. I think a dozen of them in this room and maybe one in one of the overflow rooms.

现在，我想我们马上就要进入问答环节了。我们将交替进行，我右边的新闻组和放置的 13 个麦克风。我想这个房间里有十几个，也许在一个分会场里有一个。

4. David Sokol and Lubrizol: “inexcusable” and “inexplicable”

大卫·索科尔和卢布里佐尔：“不可原谅”和“不可解释”

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to just comment for a few minutes — and this will be transcribed and up on the internet at our web page — I’d like to comment for just a few minutes, and I’d like to ask Charlie then to give his thoughts, on the matter of David Sokol and the purchase of Lubrizol stock.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想花几分钟时间评论一下——这将被转录并在我们的网站上发布——我想评论几分钟，然后请查理发表他对大卫·索科尔和购买 Lubrizol 股票的看法。

You saw in the movie a clip from the Salomon situation, and that occurred almost 20 years ago. It will be 20 years ago this August.

你在电影中看到了关于Salomon事件的片段，那发生在将近 20 年前。今年八月就是 20 周年。

And at the time, it was a Sunday, Charlie was there, and I was elected the chairman at — what, about 3:00 in the afternoon or so I think on a Sunday at Salomon, and I went down to address a press group.

当时是星期天，查理在场，我在大约下午 3 点左右被选为主席，我下去向一组记者发表讲话。

And almost the first — somewhere in the early questions, somebody sort of asked me, you know, what happened?

几乎是第一个问题——在早期的问题中，有人问我，你知道发生了什么吗？

Well, A) I’d just gotten to Salomon fairly recently, so I didn’t know too much about it, but the phrase that came out of my mind then — out of my mouth then — sometimes my mind and my mouth are coordinated — (laughter) — the phrase that came out of my mouth then was that what happened was inexplicable and inexcusable.

好吧，A) 我最近才来到 Salomon，所以我对它了解不多，但当时我脑海中浮现出的短语——有时我的思维和口语是协调的——（笑声）——我当时说出的短语是，发生的事情是无法解释和不可原谅的。

Now, it’s 20 years later, and looking back on Salomon, I still find what happened inexplicable and inexcusable. You know, I will never understand exactly why some of the events that transpired did transpire.

现在20年过去了，回顾Salomon的事情，我仍然觉得发生的事情是不可解释的和不可原谅的。我永远无法理解为何会发生那些事件。

And to some extent, in looking at what happened a few months ago with Dave Sokol’s failure to notify me at all that he’d had any kind of contact with Citigroup. In fact, he directed my attention to the fact that they represented Lubrizol and never said a word about any contact with them.

从某种程度上看，几个月前大卫·索科尔没有通知我他与花旗集团的任何接触，这让我感到不解。他实际上引起了我对他们代表Lubrizol的注意，但没有提及与他们的任何接触。

And then the purchases of stock immediately prior to recommending Lubrizol to Berkshire, I think I — for reasons that are laid out in the audit committee report, which I urge you to read and which is on our website — I don’t think there’s any question about the inexcusable part that Dave violated, and that the code of ethics, he violated our insider trading rules, and he violated the principles I laid out — I lay out — every two years in a direct personal letter to all of our managers and which I’ve been doing for a long time. So I — you can read the audit committee report about that.

而在推荐Lubrizol给伯克希尔之前，他还购买了股票。我认为，正如审计委员会报告中所列出的原因，我敦促大家阅读，这份报告在我们的网站上可找到，毫无疑问，大卫违反了我们的道德规范、内幕交易规则以及我每两年给所有管理者的直接个人信件中列出的原则。因此，审计委员会报告中的内容非常清楚。

The inexplicable part is somewhat — well, it’s inexplicable, but I’d like to talk about it a little bit because I will tell you what goes through my mind in respect to it.

不可解释的部分有点——好吧，它确实是不可解释的，但我想稍微谈谈它，因为我会告诉你我对此的想法。

Certainly — well, one interesting point is that Dave, to my knowledge, at least, made no attempt to disguise the fact that he was buying the stock. I mean, you know, you read about insider trading cases and people set up trusts in Luxembourg, or they use neighbors who know neighbors, or they use third cousins — I mean, they have various ways of trying to buy the stock so that when it’s later — FINRA is a supervising organization — looks at the trading activity in the months prior to a deal, they do not see names that jump out at them as being associated with the deal.

首先，有趣的一点是，至少据我所知，大卫并没有试图掩饰他购买股票的事实。你知道，关于内幕交易的案件，人们会设立卢森堡的信托，或使用邻居的名义，或者利用远房亲戚——他们有各种方法试图购买股票，以便在交易发生前，FINRA等监管机构在查看相关交易活动时，看不到和该交易相关的名字。

To my knowledge, Dave did nothing like that, so he was leaving a total record as to his purchases.

据我所知，戴夫并没有做过这样的事情，所以他留下了关于他购买的完整记录。

Now, I think at least usually — and maybe always — we are queried after any deal. We are asked who knew about it when, and we supply a list of whether it’s people at the law firm or people that are in a secretarial position at our place or the law firm.

现在，我认为至少通常——也许总是——在任何交易后我们都会被询问。我们会被问到谁在什么时候知道这件事，我们会提供一个名单，列出是律师事务所的人还是我们公司或律师事务所的秘书职位的人。

We give them a list of everybody that might have known or did know about the deal prior to the public announcement. And I don’t know whether they do that 100 percent of the time, but certainly it’s my experience that you get that.

我们给他们一份可能知道或曾经知道这笔交易的所有人的名单，直到公开宣布为止。我不知道他们是否每次都这样做，但根据我的经验，确实会得到这样的名单。

And then a while later, you get a list of names of people that FINRA, again, has picked up as trading it, and they ask you whether any of those names ring a bell with you. So they’re trying to put together whether anybody did any inside trading ahead of time.

然后过了一段时间，你会收到一份名单，上面是 FINRA 挑选出的进行交易的人的名字，他们会问你这些名字中是否有让你想起的人。所以他们试图弄清楚是否有人提前进行了内幕交易。

So the odds that if you’re trading in your own name, and you’re on that list of people who know of a deal ahead of time, the odds that it’s not going to get picked up seem to me are very much against you.

因此，如果你以自己的名义交易，并且你在知道交易的名单中，几乎不可能不被发现。

But, to my knowledge, Dave did not disguise the trading. Which, you know, that’s somewhat inexplicable that if he really felt he was engaging in insider trading and knew the penalties that could be attached to it, that he essentially did it right out in the open.

但是，据我所知，戴夫并没有掩饰交易。你知道，这有点不可思议，如果他真的觉得自己在进行内幕交易，并且知道可能会面临的惩罚，他实际上是在公开场合进行的。

The second fact, which is less — perhaps less — puzzling, but Dave obviously has a net worth in very high numbers. He made, I think, close to $24 million. He earned it from Berkshire last year, and we got our money’s worth, but he did get $24 million, too.

第二个事实，虽然可能不那么令人困惑，但显然戴夫的净资产非常高。我认为他赚了接近 2400 万美元。他去年从伯克希尔赚到了这些钱，我们得到了物有所值，但他也确实得到了 2400 万美元。

So I would say that there are plenty of activities in this world that are unsavory that are committed by people with lots of money.

所以我想说，这个世界上有很多不光彩的活动是由有钱人所犯的。

So I don’t regard that as, you know, totally puzzling. But I will give you one instance that does make it puzzling. It makes it very puzzling to me.

所以我并不认为这完全令人困惑。但我会给你一个例子，这确实让人感到困惑。这让我感到非常困惑。

We bought MidAmerican at the end — Berkshire Hathaway bought MidAmerican — at the end of 1999. Berkshire Hathaway bought about 80 percent.

我们在 1999 年底购买了 MidAmerican——伯克希尔·哈撒韦购买了 MidAmerican——伯克希尔·哈撒韦购买了大约 80%。

Walter Scott, who I just introduced, and his family was the second largest holder, I think something over 10 percent, and then two operating people, Dave Sokol the senior one, owned or had options on a big piece, and Greg Abel, a terrific partner of Dave’s, also had a piece.

沃尔特·斯科特，我刚刚介绍过的，他的家族是第二大股东，我认为超过 10%，然后有两位运营人员，资深的戴夫·索科尔拥有或持有一大部分的期权，格雷格·阿贝尔，戴夫的一个出色的合作伙伴，也拥有一部分。

And Walter Scott — and I’ve told this story privately a few times but not — I don’t think I’ve done it publicly.

和沃尔特·斯科特——我私下里讲过这个故事几次，但我想我没有公开讲过。

Walter Scott came to me a year or two after we’d bought it, and Walter said, I think we ought to have some special compensation arrangement for Dave and Greg if they perform in a really outstanding manner. And he said — I think maybe he suggested something involving equity and he saw me turn white.

沃尔特·斯科特在我们买下它一两年后找到了我，沃尔特说，我认为如果戴夫和格雷格表现得非常出色，我们应该为他们制定一些特别的补偿安排。他还说——我想他可能提到了一些与股权有关的事情，他看到我脸色变白。

So he said, “Why don’t you design one and let me know.” So I just scribbled something out on a yellow pad. It didn’t take me five minutes.

所以他说：“你为什么不设计一个让我看看。”于是我就在一个黄色的便签纸上草草写了些东西。没花我五分钟。

And we call it, sort of in honor of Charlie, although he didn’t know about it, we called it the Lollapalooza.

我们称之为 Lollapalooza，算是为了纪念查理，尽管他并不知道这件事。

And it provided for a very large cash payout, which I’ll get to in a second, based on the five-year compounded gain in earnings. And we were starting from a high base, in other words this was not from any depressed level, and we set a figure that no other utility company in the United States was going to come close to.

它提供了一个非常大的现金支付，我稍后会提到，这基于五年的复合收益增长。我们是从一个高基数开始，换句话说，这并不是来自任何低迷水平，我们设定了一个其他美国公用事业公司无法接近的数字。

But if that figure were achieved, we were going to give $50 million to Dave and $25 million to Greg Abel.

但如果达成那个数字，我们将给戴夫 5000 万美元，给格雷格·阿贝尔 2500 万美元。

And I had Dave come to the office and I said, “Here’s what Walter and I are thinking,” and, “What do you think of this plan?”

我让戴夫来办公室，我说：“这是沃尔特和我在想的，”然后问，“你觉得这个计划怎么样？”

And it had these figures on per share that — that like I say, move forward at 16 percent compounded per year, and then I say, “Here’s the payout.”

上面有每股的数字——如我所说，按年复合增长16%推进，然后我说，“这是支付方案。”

And he looked at it for just a very short period of time and he said — he said, “Warren, this is more than generous.” But he said, “There’s just one change you should make.”

他只看了一小会儿，就说——他说，“沃伦，这个方案太慷慨了。”但他说，“你应该做一个改动。”

And I said, “What’s that?” And he said, “You should split it equally between me and Greg, instead of being 50 million for me and 25 for Greg. It should be 37 1/2 apiece.”

我说：“那是什么？”他回答：“你应该把它平均分给我和格雷格，而不是我 5000 万，格雷格 2500 万。应该是每人 3750 万。”

So I witnessed — and Walter witnessed, you can talk to him about it — we witnessed Dave voluntarily, without any — Greg had nothing to do with it, he wasn’t there — we saw Dave transfer over 12 1/2 million dollars — getting no fanfare, no credit whatsoever — to his, in effect, junior partner.

所以我目睹了——沃尔特也目睹了，你可以和他谈谈——我们看到戴夫自愿地，毫无——格雷格与此无关，他不在场——我们看到戴夫转移了超过 1250 万美元——没有任何宣传，完全没有得到任何认可——给了他的，实际上是，初级合伙人。

And I thought that was rather extraordinary, and what really makes it extraordinary is that $3 million, you know, 10 or so years later, would have led to the kind of troubles that it’s led to.

我觉得这相当了不起，真正让人惊讶的是，十年左右后，这300万美元就引发了这样的麻烦。

I find — that is really the fact that I find inexplicable, and I think I’ll probably — you know, it’s 20 years after Salomon — 20 years from now Charlie will be 107 — (laughter) — and we won’t mention what I’ll be — but I think 20 years from now, I will not understand what causes a man to voluntarily turn away 12 1/2 million dollars to an associate without getting any credit for it in the world, and then 10 or so years later, buy a significant amount of stock the week before he talked to me.

我发现——这确实是我认为不可解释的事实，我想我可能会——你知道，距离Salomon事件已经20年了，20年后的今天查理会107岁——（笑）——我们不提我会几岁——但我认为20年后，我仍然无法理解为何一个人会自愿将1250万美元转给一个伙伴，却没有得到任何认可，十年后却会在与我谈话前一周大量购买股票。

And when he talked to me about Lubrizol, it was either the 14th or 15th — he says it was 14th, I have no reason to disagree with that. The only reason I couldn’t say specifically was I had eight university groups, 160 students, in on that Friday. That’s the only thing that shows, and I spent most of the day with them.

当他跟我谈到 Lubrizol 时，是 14 号或 15 号——他说是 14 号，我没有理由不同意。唯一我不能具体说明的原因是那天星期五我有八个大学团体，160 名学生在场。这是唯一的证据，我大部分时间都和他们在一起。

And the 10K and the 10Q that got printed out on Saturday have that date on them, the 15th, when I looked at Lubrizol for the first time.

在星期六打印出来的 10K 和 10Q 上都有那个日期，15 号，那是我第一次查看 Lubrizol 的时候。

You might be interested in knowing, I’ve been looking up 10Ks and 10Qs for 20 or 30 years, but I don’t know how to print them out. So, fortunately, Tracy Britt was in the office, and I said, “Tracy, would you print this damn thing out? I don’t know how to do it yet.” (Laughter)

你可能会感兴趣，我已经查阅了 20 或 30 年的 10K 和 10Q，但我不知道怎么打印出来。所以，幸运的是，特雷西·布里特在办公室，我说：“特雷西，你能把这个该死的东西打印出来吗？我还不知道怎么做。”（笑声）

But that is why I don’t know whether it was the 14th or the 15th. The 10Q says the 15th.

但这就是我不知道是 14 号还是 15 号的原因。10Q 上说是 15 号。

But, at that time, when Dave called me on it, he said nothing about contact with Citigroup or anything of the sort and he — and I said, “I don’t know anything, really, about the company.” He said, “Well, take a look at it. It — you know, it might fit Berkshire.”

但是，当时，当戴夫提到这件事时，他没有提到与花旗集团的任何联系或类似的事情，我说：“我真的对这家公司一无所知。”他说：“好吧，看看它。你知道，它可能适合伯克希尔。”

And I said, “How come?” And he said, well — he said, “I’ve owned it and it’s a good company. It’s a Berkshire-type company.”

我问：“怎么会这样？”他说，好吧——他说：“我拥有过它，它是一家好公司。这是一家伯克希尔类型的公司。”

And, you know, I obviously made a big mistake by not saying, “Well, when did you buy it?”

而且，你知道，我显然犯了一个大错误，没有问：“那么，你是什么时候买的？”

But I think if somebody says I’ve owned the stock, you know it sounds to me like they didn’t buy it the previous week.

但我认为如果有人说我拥有这只股票，你知道在我听来，他们似乎并不是在上周买的。

So there we are with a situation, which is sad for Berkshire, sad for Dave, still inexplicable in my mind, and we will undoubtedly get more questions on that. We’ll be glad to answer them.

所以我们面临这样一种情况，这对伯克希尔来说是悲伤的，对戴夫来说也是悲伤的，在我看来仍然无法解释，我们无疑会收到更多关于这个问题的提问。我们很乐意回答这些问题。

Charlie, do you have any thoughts on this?

查理，你对此有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s generally a mistake to assume that rationality is going to be perfect, even in very able people. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为假设理性会在非常能干的人身上完美体现通常是个错误。（笑）

We prove that pretty well, regularly.

我们证明得相当好，定期。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you have any explanation for the irrational?

沃伦·巴菲特：你对非理性现象有什么解释吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think hubris contributes to it.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为自负对此有贡献。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve gotten quite a bit out of him, folks. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，大家，我们从他身上得到了很多。（笑声）

5. Journalists introduced

记者介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s go to work.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们开始工作吧。

We’ll start with Carol Loomis of Fortune Magazine. I might as well — I should introduce our group here.

我们将从《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯开始。我也应该介绍一下我们这里的团队。

Oh, we didn’t go alphabetical this time. We’ve got Carol, and then we’ve got Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times, and we have Becky Quick of CNBC. (Applause)

哦，这次我们没有按字母顺序排列。我们有卡罗尔，然后是《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索金，还有 CNBC 的贝基·奎克。（掌声）

In terms of my check-off system, I’m still going to go to Becky. That’s alphabetical.

在我的检查系统中，我仍然会去找贝基。这是按字母顺序的。

So, Andrew, it didn’t do you any good to try to move over there into the center spot. (Laughs)

所以，安德鲁，试图挪到中间的位置对你没有任何好处。（笑）

Carol, you’re on. 卡罗尔，你上场了。

CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning from all of us, and I will make the small preamble that I’ve made before.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：大家早上好，我将做一个我之前提到过的小前言。

We’ve been getting questions for a couple of months, each of us on our e-mail.

我们已经收到了一些问题，持续了几个月，每个人都在我们的电子邮件中。

Sometimes a question will be sent to all three of us and sometimes they’ll just send to one of us, therefore it becomes very hard to count how many we’ve had, but certainly it’s in the many hundreds and probably in the — up into a thousand, 2000.

有时候一个问题会发给我们三个人，有时候他们只会发给我们其中一个人，因此很难统计我们收到的问题数量，但肯定是几百个，可能达到一千，甚至两千。

And obviously we aren’t going to be able to ask every question — every good question. We have a lot of good questions we won’t be able to get to. But it’s just that you had to pick and choose.

显然，我们不可能问每一个问题——每一个好的问题。我们有很多好的问题无法涉及。但你必须进行选择。

And the other thing I should say is that whatever we do ask, Warren and Charlie have no idea of the question. None. No hint.

还有我应该说的另一件事是，无论我们问什么，沃伦和查理对问题一无所知。完全不知道。没有任何暗示。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sometimes we have no idea of the answer either, but go ahead. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：有时候我们也不知道答案，但请继续。（笑声）

6. Buffett’s David Sokol timeline

巴菲特的戴维·索科尔时间线

CAROL LOOMIS: So I will begin. I don’t think that anybody will be surprised that it is a Sokol question.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：那么我开始吧。我想没有人会对这是一个索科尔的问题感到惊讶。

And actually, the — this particular long-term shareholder believed, as Warren has believed, he says, “I do not see why he should have been expected to ask Sokol about his Lubrizol stock holdings when he said he owned the stock. That wouldn’t have been a natural question.

事实上，这位长期股东认为，正如沃伦所认为的，他说：“我不明白为什么他应该被期望询问索科尔关于他的Lubrizol股票持有情况，既然他说他拥有这只股票。这并不是一个自然的问题。

“But when you found out the details of his stock purchases a short time later, I do not understand your reaction.

“但是当你不久后发现他股票购买的细节时，我不理解你的反应。”

“Surely you realized immediately that these facts were going to become known and that they were going to damage Berkshire’s reputation, something you had said repeatedly you would be ruthless in protecting.

“你肯定立刻意识到这些事实会被曝光，并且会损害伯克希尔的声誉，而你曾多次表示你会毫不留情地保护这一点。”

“Being ruthless probably would have meant your firing Sokol on the spot, but you didn’t do that.

“无情可能意味着你当场解雇索科尔，但你没有这样做。”

“And then you put out a press release that many Berkshire shareholders that I have talked to found totally inadequate.

然后你发布了一份新闻稿，许多我交谈过的伯克希尔股东认为这完全不够。

“You have always been very direct in stating things. You were not direct in that press release, except in praising David Sokol. Otherwise you stated some facts and behavior that you said you didn’t believe was illegal.

“你一直都很直言不讳。你在那份新闻稿中并没有直截了当地说明，除了赞美大卫·索科尔之外。你只是陈述了一些事实和行为，而你认为这些并不违法。

“And then you ended the release, leaving us — now maybe you thought somehow we were going to read between the lines — without expressing any anger about what had happened. Why were you not incensed?

“然后你结束了发布，留下我们——也许你认为我们会读懂潜台词——却没有对发生的事情表示任何愤怒。你为什么不愤怒？”

“If you were, why did you not express your anger? Why did you handle this matter in the inadequate way you did?”

“如果你是这样，为什么不表达你的愤怒？你为什么以如此不充分的方式处理这个问题？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — (applause) — it wasn’t really immediately thereafter. I learned on March 14th, which was the day we announced it. Now bear in mind his first conversation when he said he owned the stock was January 14th.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。——（掌声）——这并不是立刻发生的。我是在 3 月 14 日得知的，那天我们宣布了这个消息。请记住，他第一次提到自己拥有这只股票是在 1 月 14 日。

In between January 14th and March 14th, Dave gave no indication that he’d had any contact with Citigroup of any kind, and as we learned later, I mean, he went — they met in, maybe, October or something like that where — and talked about possible acquisition candidates for Berkshire.

在 1 月 14 日和 3 月 14 日之间，戴夫没有表明他与花旗集团有任何接触，后来我们了解到，我的意思是，他去——他们在大约十月或类似的时间见面，讨论了伯克希尔可能收购的候选公司。

But none of that — he told me at one point, he said Evercore and Citi represent Lubrizol. One of them represents the directors and one of them represents the company, and not a word about any contact.

但他没有提到这一切——他曾告诉我，Evercore和花旗代表Lubrizol。其中一个代表董事会，另一个代表公司，却没有提及任何接触。

On March 14th, when the deal was announced in the morning, I got a call from John Freund. John Freund is probably here today. John Freund works for Citi in Chicago, and he handles — he’s handled the great majority of our business in equities for decades, and I’ve got a direct line to him. I talk to him frequently.

在 3 月 14 日，当交易在早上宣布时，我接到了约翰·弗罗伊德的电话。约翰·弗罗伊德今天可能在这里。他在芝加哥的花旗银行工作，处理——他处理了我们在股票方面的大部分业务已有几十年，我与他有直接的联系。我经常与他交谈。

And he called and said congratulations and — you know and aren’t you proud of our — words to the effect. You can talk to John directly, although I’ve been told that the Citi lawyers have told him not to talk, but that — knowing the press, they probably can work something out of him.

他打电话祝贺，说你知道的，你对我们的事情感到自豪——大致是这样的意思。你可以直接和约翰交谈，尽管我被告知花旗的律师告诉他不要说话，但考虑到媒体，他们可能会从他那里得到一些信息。

The — he’s — essentially his words were that Citi’s team had worked with Dave on this acquisition, and they were proud to be part of it, et cetera, et cetera.

他基本上是说，花旗的团队与戴夫一起参与了这次收购，他们为能成为其中的一部分而感到自豪，等等。

And this was all news to me, so that set up some yellow lights, at least. And the next day, I had Marc Hamburg, our CFO, call Dave, and Dave readily gave him the information about when he had bought the stock and how much.

这对我来说都是新消息，所以至少引起了一些警觉。第二天，我让我们的首席财务官马克·汉堡给戴夫打电话，戴夫很乐意告诉他他什么时候买的股票以及买了多少。

Marc also asked him what the participation of Citi had been in reference to Berkshire’s side of the transaction, and Dave said that he thought he called a fellow there to get their phone number, which turned out to be somewhat of an understatement.

马克还问他，花旗在与伯克希尔交易相关的参与情况如何，戴夫说他认为他打电话给那里的一个同事以获取他们的电话号码，结果这有点低估了情况。

Now, during the period when we announced the deal on March 14th, Lubrizol is the one that needed to prepare a proxy statement. We were not issuing shares at Berkshire. So there was no proxy statement, no — nothing of this — that sort — on our part.

现在，在我们于 3 月 14 日宣布交易的期间，Lubrizol 是需要准备代理声明的一方。我们在伯克希尔并没有发行股票。因此，我们没有代理声明，也没有任何类似的东西。

The Lubrizol legal team, Jones Day, went to work with Lubrizol management to start preparing the proxy statement.

Lubrizol 的法律团队 Jones Day 开始与 Lubrizol 管理层合作，着手准备代理声明。

We eagerly awaited to see the first draft of that because I was going to be leaving for Asia on Saturday, which, I guess, would be the 19th, and I wanted to see what Lubrizol had to say about this whole Citi matter or anything else.

我们急切地等待看到这个的第一稿，因为我将在星期六离开去亚洲，我想这应该是 19 号，我想看看 Lubrizol 对整个 Citi 事务或其他任何事情的看法。

The most interesting part of every proxy statement is something that says — it’s basically the history of the transaction, and it’s the first thing I read on any deal because it gives you a blow-by-blow of what has taken place.

每份代理声明中最有趣的部分是某些内容——基本上是交易的历史，这是我在任何交易中首先阅读的内容，因为它详细记录了发生的事情。

And as Marc Hamburg can tell you, I kept — and our law firm can tell you — I kept urging them to get that to me before I took off for Asia.

正如马克·汉堡可以告诉你的，我一直在催促他们在我前往亚洲之前把那个交给我，我们的律师事务所也可以告诉你。

We got that the afternoon of Friday the 18th, and it had a fair amount of material in it about Dave’s involvement with Citigroup.

我们在 18 日星期五的下午收到了它，里面有相当多关于戴夫与花旗集团关系的材料。

Then at that point — I believe it was at that point — our law firm got involved, Munger Tolles got involved, in their input to the Lubrizol lawyers as to what we had seen that was different or what we had seen that they didn’t know about that we could add.

然后在那个时候——我相信在那个时候——我们的法律事务所介入了，Munger Tolles参与了与Lubrizol律师讨论的内容，看看我们发现了哪些不同之处，或者他们不知道的内容，我们可以补充。

Ron Olson, the director of Berkshire and partner of Munger Tolles, was on the trip to Asia. So we got on the plane on Saturday the 19th and traveled over the next week until the 26th.

罗恩·奥尔森，伯克希尔的董事和芒格·托尔斯的合伙人，正在前往亚洲的旅途中。因此，我们在 19 日星期六登上了飞机，并在接下来的一个星期里旅行，直到 26 日。

And we knew at that point that his partners at Munger Tolles were interviewing Dave, as — maybe some other people too, but certainly Dave — and I believe that he was interviewed at least three times about both the stock purchases, the history of things with — of his relationship with Citigroup, and they were assembling this information.

我们那时就知道他在 Munger Tolles 的合伙人正在面谈Dave，也许还有其他人，但肯定是 Dave。我相信他至少被面谈了三次，内容包括股票购买、他与花旗集团的关系历史，他们正在收集这些信息。

I don’t have a BlackBerry or whatever it may be. Ron does. So he would get some information as we were over there. And he was getting some input but — and we decided that when we got back we would need to have a prompt meeting of the Berkshire board about this matter.

我没有黑莓手机或其他什么东西。罗恩有。所以当我们在那里的时候，他会获取一些信息。他确实得到了些反馈，但我们决定回去后需要召开一次关于此事的伯克希尔董事会紧急会议。

And we would also learn what — the full details, at least — of what Bob Denham, and maybe other attorneys at Munger Tolles learned from their interviews with Dave.

我们还会了解——至少是关于鲍勃·登汉姆和其他Munger Tolles律师从与戴夫的采访中了解到的全部细节。

And we back on — I guess it would be Saturday the 26th — and on the 28th we were going to bring Charlie into it before calling a board meeting.

我们在——我想是26日星期六回来的——在28日我们准备让查理参与进来，然后召开董事会会议。

But there would have been a board meeting that week. And then about five or so in the afternoon, a letter was delivered by Dave’s assistant, which really came out of the blue.

但那一周会召开董事会会议。然后大约在下午五点左右，戴夫的助理送来了一封信，这确实是出乎意料的。

And I — he said to me he felt he was retiring on a high point and he gave the reasons why he was retiring, which I laid out and so on.

他说他感觉自己在一个高点上退休，并给出了他退休的理由，我也一一列出了这些理由。

I don’t know whether the questioning the previous week had affected his attitude. He would say not.

我不知道上周的质询是否影响了他的态度。他会说没有。

But in any event, we had that resignation. That resignation as is — I believe it may have been put in the audit committee report — may have saved us some money.

但无论如何，我们收到了他的辞职信。根据情况，我相信这可能已被写入审计委员会报告——可能为我们节省了一些钱。

If we’d fired him, the question would be whether it was with cause or not with cause, and we would have said it was with cause, but that might have very well gotten litigated, and a retirement did provide, in effect, the same non-level of severance payments that a firing with cause provided.

如果我们解雇了他，问题就会是是否有正当理由，我们会说是有正当理由，但这可能会引发诉讼，而退休实际上提供了与有正当理由解雇相同的非水平遣散费。

So I drafted up a press release, which has since been the subject of at least mild criticism — (laughs) — and I laid out the good things that Dave had done, which he had done for the company. He’d done many good things, some extraordinary things.

所以我起草了一份新闻稿，后来这份稿件至少受到了一些轻微的批评——（笑）——我列出了戴夫为公司所做的好事。他做了很多好事，还有一些非凡的事情。

And then I laid out some actions which I said, based on what I knew then, did not seem to me to be unlawful, and incidentally, I talked with both Charlie and Ron about that.

然后我列出了一些行动，我说，根据我当时所知道的，这些行动在我看来似乎并不违法，顺便提一下，我和查理以及罗恩都谈过这个。

Ron would have been more careful in that wording. I’m not sure Charlie would have been. I’ll let him speak for himself on that.

罗恩在那种措辞上会更加小心。我不确定查理会不会。我会让他自己对此发言。

And we ran it by — I ran it by Dave Tuesday morning, just to be sure the facts were accurate, and he said — he objected very much to something I’d put in where I said that I thought that he was, in effect, had had his hopes dashed for succeeding me and that was part of the reason, and he said that was absolutely not true, that he had no hopes ever of succeeding me and that I — you know, basically he was telling me what was in his mind, and I shouldn’t be trying to second-guess what was in his mind.

我们在周二早上把这份稿子给戴夫过目，以确保事实准确，他对我写的一部分内容非常反对，我说我认为他实际上是对接替我的希望破灭，这也是部分原因，他说这绝对不是真的，他从来没有希望接替我，基本上他在告诉我他心中所想的，我不应该试图揣测他的想法。

So I took that part out. But he affirmed all of the other facts in that letter, and then I took it out, I sent it to him a second time to make sure that he was OK with the facts, and he said they were accurate.

所以我把那部分删掉了。但他确认了信中所有其他的事实，然后我把它删掉，再次发给他，以确保他对这些事实没有问题，他说这些都是准确的。

Now, in there was included the fact that Dave had no indication that Lubrizol had any interest in an approach from Berkshire and that, at least according to the final Lubrizol proxy, is not the case.

信中提到，戴夫没有表明Lubrizol对伯克希尔的接触没有任何兴趣，至少根据最终的Lubrizol代理声明，这是不准确的。

I have not talked to anybody except John Freund at Citigroup, so I have no idea what took place with the investment bankers at Citigroup, except for what I read in the Lubrizol proxy. But the Lubrizol proxy now says that Dave did know that Lubrizol had an interest on December 17th.

我除了与花旗集团的约翰·弗罗恩德交谈过之外，没有与其他人交谈过，因此我对花旗集团的投资银行家发生了什么毫无头绪，除了我在 Lubrizol 的代理文件中所读到的内容。但 Lubrizol 的代理文件现在说，戴夫确实知道 Lubrizol 在 12 月 17 日有兴趣。

But, both in the two chances he had to review it, and then when he went on CNBC on a Thursday and he talked for a half an hour, he made no attempt to correct any of the facts in it.

但是，在他有两次机会审查它时，以及在他周四上 CNBC 时谈了半个小时，他没有试图纠正其中的任何事实。

Now, on Wednesday, when we put out the report, we had to have a board meeting first. It was news to the board. They got the release a little bit ahead of time and then we had a board meeting.

现在，在星期三，当我们发布报告时，我们必须先召开董事会会议。这对董事会来说是个消息。他们提前收到了一些信息，然后我们召开了董事会会议。

We also delivered — well, through our law firm, we phoned the head of the enforcement division of the Securities and Exchange Commission and told him exactly the facts regarding the stock purchases and anything else that they might have cared to know.

我们还通过我们的律师事务所，打电话给证券交易委员会执法部门的负责人，向他详细说明了有关股票购买的事实以及他们可能想知道的其他任何信息。

So I think we acted in that case, very, very promptly, to make sure the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the top of the enforcement division, was well-versed on what had taken place, to our knowledge up to that point.

所以我认为我们在那个案件中行动得非常迅速，以确保证券交易委员会及其执法部门的高层充分了解截至那时我们所知的情况。

So, from our standpoint and my standpoint, Dave was gone, minimum severance costs, minimum chances for lawsuits about compensation due him, and we had turned over some very damning evidence, in my view, to both the public and to the SEC.

所以，从我们的角度和我的角度来看，戴夫已经离开，最低的遣散费用，最低的关于他应得赔偿的诉讼机会，而在我看来，我们向公众和证券交易委员会提供了一些非常有力的证据。

What I think bothers people is that there wasn’t some big sense of outrage or something in the release, and, you know, I plead guilty to that.

我认为让人们感到困扰的是，在发布时没有什么强烈的愤怒感或其他东西，而我承认这一点。

I — this fellow had done a lot of good things for us over 10 or 11 years, and I felt that if I’m laying out a whole bunch of facts that are going to create lots of problems for him for years to come, that I also list his side of the equation, in terms of what he’d done for Berkshire.

我——这个家伙在过去的 10 或 11 年里为我们做了很多好事，我觉得如果我列出一堆事实，这些事实将给他带来多年的麻烦，我也应该列出他在伯克希尔所做的贡献。

And I — and as I said a little bit earlier, you know, one thing I didn’t even lay out was this extraordinary act where, in effect, he turned over 12 1/2 million dollars to a fellow employee.

而我——正如我稍早所说的，有一件事我甚至没有提到，那就是他以一种非凡的方式将 1250 万美元交给了一位同事。

So that’s the history of my thinking on it.

所以这就是我对这件事的思考历程。

Charlie, do you want to add anything? (Applause)

查理，你想补充什么吗？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Well, I think we can concede that that press release was not the cleverest press release in the history of the world. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我认为我们可以承认，那份新闻稿不是世界历史上最聪明的新闻稿。（笑声）

The facts were complicated, and we didn’t foresee, appropriately, the natural reaction.

事实是复杂的，我们没有适当地预见到自然的反应。

But I would argue that you don’t want to make important decisions in anger. You want to display as much ruthlessness as your duty requires, and you do not want to add one single iota because you’re angry.

但我认为你不想在愤怒中做出重要决定。你想表现出尽可能多的无情，正如你的职责所要求的那样，而你不想因为愤怒而增加一丝一毫。

So, Tom Murphy, one of our best directors — (applause) — one of our best directors, always told the people at Cap Cities, you can always tell a man to go to hell tomorrow if it’s such a good idea. (Laughter)

所以，汤姆·穆菲，我们最好的董事之一——（掌声）——他总是告诉Cap Cities的人，如果这是个好主意，你可以在明天让一个人去地狱。（笑声）

So the anger part of it — and I don’t think it was wrong to remember the man’s virtues as well as his error. (Applause)

所以愤怒的部分——我认为记住这个人的优点和错误并没有错。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I might add as an aside, Charlie and I have worked together for 52 years, and we have disagreed on a lot of things. We’ve never had an argument.

沃伦·巴菲特：我可以补充一句，查理和我已经合作了 52 年，我们在很多事情上有过分歧，但我们从未争吵过。

I need Tom Murphy’s advice to remind myself of it a lot of times on other things, but with Charlie it’s never even been necessary. It was long before I met Murph.

我需要汤姆·墨菲的建议来提醒自己很多其他事情，但与查理在一起时从来没有必要。这在我遇到墨菲之前就已经很久了。

7. Market reaction when Fed ends stimulus

美联储结束刺激政策时的市场反应

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s go to area 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去第一区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mary Broderick, Berkeley, California. Good morning, Mr. Buffett. Good morning, Mr. Munger. And a big thank you. You probably aren’t aware of this, but you’ve been my personal financial and investment advisors for years.

观众成员：玛丽·布罗德里克，加利福尼亚州伯克利。早上好，巴菲特先生。早上好，芒格先生。非常感谢你们。你们可能不知道，但你们多年来一直是我个人的财务和投资顾问。

I would like to know what you think the effect of the government ending the POMO program mid-July this year will have on the stock market and the economy in general.

我想知道你认为政府在今年七月中旬结束 POMO 计划对股市和整体经济会产生什么影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: The government ending the — QE2 or —

沃伦·巴菲特：政府结束——QE2还是——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Permanent open market operation.

观众成员：永久公开市场操作。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re one acronym ahead of me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，您比我更了解一个缩写。(笑声)

The — well, just as we’re discussing it now, it’s no secret what they’re going to do.

这——好吧，正如我们现在讨论的那样，他们要做的事情并不是什么秘密。

I mean, it’s sort of the most advertised open market purchase in history, and probably in terms of defining the amount per month and when it comes to an end, you know, what the balance sheet will look like at the end of the Fed.

我的意思是，这几乎是历史上最公开的公开市场购买，可能在确定每月的金额和美联储结束时资产负债表的外观方面，都已进行了广泛的宣传。

So I don’t think — you know, if something is that well known by all participants in a market, I think any effect of it has been discounted by this point in time.

所以我认为——你知道，如果市场上所有参与者都对某件事非常了解，我认为到目前为止，它的任何影响都已经被折现了。

I mean, if you say you’re going to increase tax rates in a year, we’ll say, on corporations or decrease them or whatever it may be, and it’s really done and locked in stone, the market doesn’t wait until the date when the tax increases or decreases go through to build that into market prices. So I don’t — I see no reason — there may be some other things that happen then — but I see no reason why simply having that program come to an end will cause any significant change in stock or bond markets at that time.

我的意思是，如果你说你将在一年内提高税率，比如对企业，或者降低税率，或者其他什么，这一切都已经确定并固定下来，市场不会等到税率提高或降低的日期才将其纳入市场价格。因此，我不——我看不出有什么理由——可能会有其他事情发生——但我看不出仅仅因为这个计划结束会在那个时候对股票或债券市场造成任何显著的变化。

You know, obviously, a huge market force will be withdrawn.

你知道，显然，一个巨大的市场力量将被撤回。

I mean you buy $600 billion worth of Treasurys and, you know, you probably leave a few traces along the way that you’ve done it. And it has been 100 billion or so a month, and that purchasing will not be in the market but the government issuances of debt will still be at a level that are consistent with what they are now.

我的意思是，你购买价值 6000 亿美元的国债，你知道，你可能在这个过程中留下了一些痕迹。而且每个月大约是 1000 亿美元，这种购买不会出现在市场上，但政府的债务发行仍将保持在与现在一致的水平。

So it will be a different market, but I think it’s a different market that’s already been anticipated.

所以这将是一个不同的市场，但我认为这是一个已经被预见到的不同市场。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

8. Role of Berkshire’s next chairman

伯克希尔下任董事长的角色

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: I’d like to ask a question that comes from Ron Taracant (PH) from Sugar Land, Texas.

贝基·奎克：我想问一个来自德克萨斯州糖城的罗恩·塔拉坎特（PH）的问题。

He says, “Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. You have always put great emphasis on hiring and retaining managers that not only have exceptional talent but also adhere to the higher standards of corporate ethics and behavior.

他说：“早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。你们一直非常重视招聘和留住那些不仅具备卓越才能，而且遵循更高企业道德和行为标准的管理者。”

“Recent events surrounding Mr. Sokol’s actions have demonstrated that we were not very far from a situation where someone running Berkshire Hathaway had great talent, but lacked the other quality that has made Berkshire the envy of the business world.

“最近关于索科尔行为的事件表明，我们距离一个管理伯克希尔·哈撒韦的人才横溢但缺乏其他品质的情况并不遥远，这种品质正是使伯克希尔成为商业世界羡慕的原因。

In some ways, we are relieved these events happened when you were still at the helm.

在某种程度上，我们感到欣慰的是这些事件发生在你仍然掌舵的时候。

But coming back to the succession plan that you have in place, how can you ensure that there are no more Sokols in the lineup of successional managers that you have.

但回到您所制定的继任计划，您如何确保在您所拥有的继任经理名单中没有更多的索科尔？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, he made an assumption there about Sokol being the next in line, which I’m not sure was warranted.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他在这里假设索科尔是下一个接班人，我不确定这个假设是否合理。

But he certainly was entitled to think that he was a candidate. And there are — that is, one of the reasons that I think it’s a good idea if my son, Howard Buffett, who would have no — get paid nothing, and have no activities in the company, be the chairman after I’m not around, because you can make a mistake in selecting a CEO.

但他当然有理由认为自己是一个候选人。而且有——也就是说，我认为这是一个好主意的原因之一，如果我的儿子霍华德·巴菲特在我不在的时候担任董事长，他不会获得任何报酬，也没有公司活动，因为在选择首席执行官时可能会犯错误。

I mean, I think the odds of us making a mistake are very, very low. And certainly the candidate that I think is the leading candidate now, I wouldn’t — I would lay a lot of money on the fact that he is straight as an arrow.

我的意思是，我认为我们犯错误的可能性非常非常低。而且显然，我认为现在领先的候选人，我会对他是“正直如箭”深信不疑。

But mistakes can be made. You know, the — the Bible says the meek shall inherit the earth, but the question is, will they stay meek? (Laughter)

但错误是可以发生的。你知道，圣经说温柔的人将承受地土，但问题是，他们会保持温柔吗？（笑声）

The idea of having an independent chairman, who would be voting a lot of stock — because even at my death, because of the concentration of A stock and so on, the executors would have a very significant block of stock — and if some mistake were made, it would be easier to change if not only a very large block of stock were available to express an opinion, but also if the chairmanship was not locked in with the CEO.

设立一位独立董事长的想法是，因为即使在我去世时，由于 A 类股票的集中，执行人将拥有一大块股票，如果出现错误，改变会更容易，因为不仅有一大块股票可以表达意见，而且董事长的职位也不会与首席执行官锁定在一起。

It’s gotten less tough to change CEOs at companies where either their moral or their intellectual qualities are found lacking, but it’s still difficult.

在那些道德或智力素质被认为不足的公司，换 CEO 变得不那么困难，但仍然很难。

If — you know, it’s particularly difficult if they turn out to be a mediocre CEO. If the person is really bad, you know, people will rise up sometimes and — particularly if they have meetings without the CEO present.

如果——你知道，如果他们最终是一个平庸的首席执行官，那就特别困难。如果这个人真的很糟糕，你知道，人们有时会反抗——特别是如果他们在没有首席执行官在场的情况下开会。

But it’s not an easy job to displace a sitting CEO who also holds the chairman’s position and controls the agenda and all of that.

但要更换一位同时担任董事长并控制议程的现任首席执行官并不是一项容易的工作。

So I think an independent chairman, particularly one that represents a very large block of stock, and has no designs himself on taking over the place, is a safety measure for the possibility, however remote, that the wrong decision is made.

所以我认为一个独立的董事长，特别是一个代表着非常大一块股份，并且自己没有想要接管公司的意图，是一种安全措施，以防万一做出错误的决定。

But I will tell you that the directors at Berkshire will be thinking every bit as much about the quality of the person as a human being as they will be thinking about their managerial skills, because it’s vital that you have somebody at Berkshire, in my view, that is running the place that really cares more about Berkshire than he does about himself, in terms of advancement.

但我会告诉你，伯克希尔的董事们在考虑一个人的管理技能时，同样会考虑他作为人类的品质，因为在我看来，伯克希尔需要一个真正关心伯克希尔胜过关心自己晋升的人来管理这个地方。

And I think we have multiple candidates that fulfill that. And the idea of an independent chairmanship is a — is, you know, part of the belt and suspenders.

我认为我们有多个候选人符合这一条件。独立主席的想法是——这是，您知道的，带有双重保障的部分。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you know, your idea about the Buffett family has a precedent.

查理·芒格：嗯，你知道，你关于巴菲特家族的想法是有先例的。

The Rockefellers left the management of Standard Oil many, many decades ago, and they — but they did intervene once, and that was to throw out, what was it, the head of Standard of Indiana, and it was on moral grounds.

洛克菲勒家族在许多年前就离开了标准石油的管理，但他们确实干预过一次，那是为了罢免印第安纳州标准石油的负责人，理由是道德问题。

So that sort of thing can happen and you have put another string in our bow.

所以这种事情是可以发生的，您给我们的策略又增加了一条保障。

9. Picking tech stocks is difficult but could be profitable

挑选科技股很困难，但可能会有利可图。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to area 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去第二个区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Caroline Tile (PH), Boston, Massachusetts.

观众成员：卡罗琳·泰尔（PH），马萨诸塞州波士顿。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, if you were going to live another 50 years, and we sincerely hope you do, and could add one additional sector or asset class to your circle of competence, which sector would it be and why?

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，如果你们打算再活 50 年，我们真心希望你们能这样做，并且可以在你们的能力范围内增加一个额外的行业或资产类别，你们会选择哪个行业，为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very good question, and I particularly like the preamble. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个非常好的问题，我特别喜欢这个开场白。（笑声）

Well, you would — you would certainly pick a sector that’s large, because it isn’t going to make any difference to Berkshire if we get to be experts on some tiny little industry or business.

好吧，你肯定会选择一个规模较大的行业，因为如果我们成为某个小行业或小企业的专家，对伯克希尔来说并没有什么区别。

I would say that — that, you know, it would have to be something in the — this isn’t going to happen — but if I could really become expert — and I mean really expert, knowing more than most — almost anybody else about the subject — in the tech field, you know, I think that that would be terrific.

我会说，如果我能真正成为专家——我指的是非常专业，了解这个领域的知识比大多数人都要多——在技术领域，我认为那将是非常棒的。

It isn’t going to happen, but it’s going to be a huge field.

这不会发生，但这将是一个巨大的领域。

There are likely to be, you know, a few enormous winners, a lot of disappointments. So that the ability to pick the winners, you know, is far disproportionate to the ability to pick the winners, we’ll say, among integrated major oil companies where they’re all equated in price.

可能会有一些巨大的赢家，也会有很多失望。因此，挑选赢家的能力，您知道的，远远不成比例于在综合大型石油公司中挑选赢家的能力，因为它们的价格是相等的。

You’re not going to have a big edge in trying to pick Chevron against Exxon against Continental and Occidental, and you name it.

你在选择雪佛龙、埃克森美孚、康菲和西方石油等公司时不会有太大的优势。

But the degree of disparity in results among larger tech companies in the future is likely to be very, very dramatic. And if I had the skills where I could pick the winners there I would do a lot better than if I had the skills to pick the winners in the major integrated oil field.

但未来大型科技公司之间的结果差异程度可能会非常非常显著。如果我有能力选择赢家，我的表现会比在主要综合油田中选择赢家时要好得多。

You probably will have better luck with Charlie on this one because he knows a lot more about a lot of industries than I do. Charlie, what’s your answer?

你在这件事上可能会更幸运，因为查理对很多行业的了解比我多得多。查理，你的答案是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it would either be tech or energy. And I think that we’re the wrong people to develop the expertise. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那么，要么是科技，要么是能源。我认为我们不是发展这种专长的合适人选。(笑声)

I think if we were going to do it, it would have already happened.

我认为如果我们要做的话，早就应该发生了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I do think we might identify someone else who has abilities that we lack. That’s been very hard for us but — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我确实认为我们可能会找到其他具备我们所缺乏能力的人。这对我们来说非常困难，但——(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re not going to tell you. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会告诉你。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But we’ve done a little better lately.

查理·芒格：但我们最近做得稍微好了一些。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a good question.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个好问题。

10. Why Buffett got past his skepticism about Lubrizol

为什么巴菲特克服了对 Lubrizol 的怀疑

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from a shareholder named Ralph Coutant (PH) who asks, “In in your press release, your original press release, you noted that Dave ‘brought the idea of purchasing Lubrizol to me on either January 14th or 15th.’

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自一位名叫拉尔夫·库唐特的股东，他问：“在你们的新闻稿中，你们提到戴夫‘在 1 月 14 日或 15 日向我提出了购买 Lubrizol 的想法。’”

“Initially you said, ‘I was unimpressed.’ You went on to note that on January 24th you sent another note to Dave indicating your, quote, ‘skepticism’ about making an offer for the company.

“最初你说，‘我没有留下深刻印象。’你接着提到，在 1 月 24 日你给戴夫发了一封邮件，表示你对收购公司的‘怀疑’。”

“However, in a very short period of time after Dave’s discussion with Lubrizol’s CEO, you, quote, ‘quickly warmed’ to the idea.

然而，在戴夫与 Lubrizol 首席执行官讨论后的很短时间内，你，引用，‘迅速对这个想法表示赞同’。

“Please clarify what caused you to, quote, ‘warm’ to the idea so quickly if this didn’t strike you as being a great business at first glance. What changed? And what was David Sokol’s role in convincing you?”

“请澄清一下，如果这开始时并没有给你留下良好的商业印象，是什么原因让你如此迅速地对这个想法‘热情’起来？发生了什么变化？大卫·索科尔在说服你方面扮演了什么角色？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — it wasn’t that it didn’t — it struck me as a business I didn’t know anything about, initially.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，最初我觉得这是一项我完全不了解的业务。

You know, you’re talking about petroleum additives. I never would understand the chemistry of it, but I — but that’s not necessarily vital.

知道，您谈论的是石油添加剂。我从来不理解其中的化学原理，但这并不是决定性因素。

What is important is that I understand the economic dynamics of the industry. Is there — are there competitive moats? Is there ease of entry? All of that sort of thing. I did not have any understanding of that at all, initially.

重要的是我理解行业的经济动态。是否存在竞争壁垒？进入的难易程度如何？所有这些问题。起初我对此完全没有任何理解。

As a matter of fact, I suggested to Dave, I said, “Charlie is a lot smarter about oil than I am. Why don’t you give him a call because I don’t — you know, I just don’t know anything about that business?”

事实上，我对戴夫说：“查理对石油的了解比我聪明多了。你为什么不打个电话给他，因为我——你知道，我对那个行业真的一无所知？”

And I talked to Charlie a few days later, and I don’t remember whether I asked him whether Dave had called or anything, but I mentioned it to Charlie, and Charlie says, “I don’t understand it, either.”

几天后我和查理谈了谈，我不记得我是否问过他戴夫是否打过电话，但我提到了这件事，查理说：“我也不明白。”

So when I talked to Dave later he had not talked — he had not gotten ahold of Charlie. I told him, “Forget it. He’s as bad as I am.”

所以当我后来和戴夫谈话时，他还没有联系上查理。我告诉他：“算了。他和我一样糟糕。”

What Dave passed along to me after having that dinner with James Hambrick, and which I later confirmed in a lunch when James Hambrick came out here on February 8th, but it was the same thing.

大卫在与詹姆斯·汉布里克的晚餐后告诉我的事情，我后来在2月8日与汉布里克午餐时确认，但内容是相同的。

I thought I — and I still feel — I thought I got a good understanding of industry dynamics and how the business had developed over time, what the role of oil companies was and would be, in relation to a chemical additive.

我觉得我——而且我仍然觉得——我对行业动态有了良好的理解，了解这个商业是如何随着时间发展而变化的，石油公司在化学添加剂方面的角色和未来的作用。

The oil companies are the biggest customers. They sell base oil to a Lubrizol, but they buy the — they are the big customers, and they have gotten out of the business to quite a degree, although there’s two of them left in it.

石油公司是最大的客户。他们将基础油卖给Lubrizol，但他们是大客户，并在很大程度上退出了这一行业，虽然仍有两家公司在其中。

So this industry had consolidated over time. I looked at the question of ease of entry. You know, every time I look at a business — when we bought See’s Candy in 1972, I said to myself, if I had a hundred million dollars and I wanted to go in and take on See’s Candy, could I do it?

所以这个行业随着时间的推移已经整合了。我考虑了进入的难易程度。你知道，每次我看一个生意——当我们在 1972 年收购 See’s Candy 时，我对自己说，如果我有一亿美金，我想要进入并挑战 See’s Candy，我能做到吗？

And I came to the conclusion, no, so we bought See’s Candy. If the answer had been yes, we wouldn’t have done it.

我得出了结论，不，所以我们买下了 See's Candy。如果答案是肯定的，我们就不会这样做。

I asked myself that same question, you know, can I start a soft drink company and take on Coca-Cola if I have a hundred billion dollars, you know?

我问自己同样的问题，你知道吗，如果我有一千亿美元，我能否创办一家软饮料公司并与可口可乐竞争？

Richard Branson tried it some years ago in something called Virgin Cola. You know, the brand is supposed to be a promise. I’m not sure that’s the promise you want to get if you buy a soft drink but — laughter) — in any event, I felt after my conversation with Dave, subject to a second conversation with James Hambrick, but covering the same ground, that it’s not impossible at all for people to enter this business.

理查德·布兰森几年前尝试过一种叫做维珍可乐的饮料。你知道，这个品牌应该是一个承诺。我不确定如果你买一瓶软饮料，这是否是你想要的承诺，但——（笑）——无论如何，在与戴夫的谈话后，我觉得在与詹姆斯·哈姆布里克的第二次谈话中，虽然覆盖了相同的内容，但人们进入这个行业并不是不可能的。

But in terms of the service that — and the relatively low cost of what Lubrizol brings to the party, and in terms of people trying to break into a market and take them on — and it’s not a huge market, it’s probably only about a $10 billion market overall, I decided that there was a pretty good-sized moat around this.

但就 Lubrizol 所提供的服务以及相对较低的成本而言，以及人们试图进入市场并与之竞争——而且这并不是一个巨大的市场，整体市场规模大约只有 100 亿美元，我认为这个市场周围有相当不错的护城河。

They’ve got lots and lots of patents, but more than that, they have a connection with customers. They work with customers when new engines come along to develop the right kind of additive.

他们拥有很多专利，但更重要的是，他们与客户有着紧密的联系。当新发动机出现时，他们会与客户合作，开发合适的添加剂。

So I felt that I had an understanding — didn’t understand one thing more about chemistry than when I started — but I felt that I had an understanding of the economics of the business, the same way I felt that when the ISCAR people talked to me — I mean, who would think you can take some tungsten out of the ground in China and put it in the little carbide tools and that you could have some durable competitive advantage? But I decided ISCAR had a durable competitive advantage after looking at it for a while.

所以我觉得我有了一定的理解——对化学的理解并没有比我开始时多出什么——但我觉得我对这个行业的经济有了一定的理解，就像当 ISCAR 的人和我谈话时的感觉一样——我意思是，谁会想到你可以从中国的地下提取一些钨，然后放入小型的碳化物工具中，从而获得一些持久的竞争优势呢？但在观察了一段时间后，我决定 ISCAR 确实拥有持久的竞争优势。

That’s the conclusion — I have come to the conclusion that — and Charlie as well — that the Lubrizol position is the dominant — or the number one company, not dominant — but the number one company, in terms of market share, in that business — is sustainable and that it’s a very good business over time.

我得出的结论是——我和查理也得出了相同的结论——Lubrizol的市场地位是这个行业中市场份额最大的公司，具有可持续性，并且是一个非常好的业务。

It helps — you know, they are helping engines run longer, run smoother, you know. You know, when metal is acting on metal, the lubricants are important, and they’re always going to be around. And I think Lubrizol will be the leading company for a very, very long time.

它有帮助——你知道，他们帮助发动机运行得更久、更顺畅。你知道，当金属与金属接触时，润滑剂是很重要的，它们总会存在。我认为 Lubrizol 将会是一个非常、非常长时间的领先公司。

And that’s the conclusion I came to. And I did not have a fix on that, nor did Charlie, prior to Dave relaying on to me what he had learned at that dinner, which incidentally, Lubrizol had been telling the world — I mean they made investor presentations and all that quite extensively over the years.

这就是我得出的结论。在戴夫向我传达他在那次晚宴上了解到的内容之前，我和查理都没有掌握这一点。顺便提一下，Lubrizol 多年来一直在向世界宣传——我的意思是，他们进行了投资者演示等活动。

I simply hadn’t paid any real attention to it. And when it was explained to me, I thought I understood it, and I still think I understand it.

我根本没有真正关注过它。当有人向我解释时，我以为我理解了它，现在我仍然认为我理解它。

I think Lubrizol will be a very, very good addition to Berkshire. And I saw James Hambrick just yesterday, and despite the turmoil around this, they are very enthused about becoming part of Berkshire, that they regard it as the ideal home.

我认为 Lubrizol 将是伯克希尔非常非常好的补充。我昨天刚见到詹姆斯·哈姆布里克，尽管周围有一些动荡，他们对成为伯克希尔的一部分非常热衷，认为这是理想的归宿。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you know, ISCAR and Lubrizol, to some extent, are sisters under the skin.

查理·芒格：是的，你知道，ISCAR 和 Lubrizol 在某种程度上是同根生的姐妹。

You’ve got very small markets that aren’t really too attractive to anybody with any sense to enter, and fanaticism in service. So if you have any more like that why, please give Warren a call. (Laughter)

您有非常小的市场，这些市场对于任何有理智的人来说都没有太大吸引力，并且服务上有一种狂热的追求。所以，如果您还有其他这样的企业，请给沃伦打个电话。(笑声)

11. Using Berkshire’s stock for acquisitions

使用伯克希尔的股票进行收购

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is Hsiang Hsiao Chu (PH) from Ottawa, Ontario. Warren, Charlie, I admire you guys tremendously.

观众成员：我是来自安大略省渥太华的萧楚香（PH）。沃伦，查理，我非常钦佩你们。

I want to ask a question about the valuation of your company. You said, “Price is what you pay and value is what you get.”

我想问一个关于你们公司估值的问题。你说过：“价格是你支付的，价值是你得到的。”

In your letter to the shareholders this year, each Class A share owns about — investment about $95,000, and each share commands an earnings of $6,000.

在您今年给股东的信中，每股 A 类股票的投资约为 95,000 美元，每股的收益为 6,000 美元。

So in my simplistic way of calculation, each share is worth $95,000 of investment plus the earnings discounted at 7 percent. That’s another about $90,000. So it adds up to about 185,000. Is that correct?

所以在我简单的计算方式中，每股的价值是 95,000 美元的投资加上按 7%的折现收益。那大约是另外 90,000 美元。所以总共大约是 185,000 美元。这样说对吗？

Does that mean the complexity of your empire is a value trap?

这是否意味着你们帝国的复杂性是一个价值陷阱？

WARREN BUFFETT: We give those figures because we think they’re important, both the investments per share and the operating earnings per share, excluding earnings that come from the investments, and leaving out insurance underwriting profits or losses, because we think at worst they’ll break even, but they do bounce around from year to year.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们提供这些数据是因为我们认为它们很重要，包括每股投资和每股运营收益，排除来自投资的收益，并且不考虑保险承保的利润或损失，因为我们认为在最坏的情况下它们会持平，但它们确实会在每年之间波动。

Those figures are pretax on the operating earnings, so I’m not sure whether you’re applying your discount factor to pretax or after-tax.

这些数字是运营收益的税前数据，所以我不确定您是将折扣因子应用于税前还是税后。

But we think they’re important. And I would expect — well, the operating earnings, you know, are almost certain to increase. How much, you know, who knows? But that number is likely to go up.

但我们认为它们很重要。我预计——嗯，运营收益几乎肯定会增加。增加多少，谁知道呢？但这个数字很可能会上升。

The investments are still about the same as at year-end but that — they could go up or down based on whether we’re able to buy more operating businesses.

投资仍然与年末时差不多，但这——它们可能会根据我们是否能够收购更多运营业务而上涨或下跌。

Our goal is to build both numbers to some extent, but our primary goal is to build the operating earnings figures.

我们的目标是在某种程度上提高这两个数字，但我们的主要目标是提高运营收益数据。

We never — we — if Charlie and I had to stick a number in an envelope in front of us as to what we thought the intrinsic value of Berkshire was, well, neither one of us would stick a figure, we’d stick a range, because it would be ridiculous to come up with a single specific number, which encompasses not only the businesses we own, but what we’re going to do with the capital in the future.

我们从来没有——我们——如果查理和我必须在我们面前的信封里写下我们认为伯克希尔的内在价值是多少，那么我们都不会写一个具体的数字，我们会写一个范围，因为想出一个具体的数字是荒谬的，这不仅包括我们拥有的业务，还包括我们未来将如何使用资本。

But even our ranges would differ modestly, and they might differ tomorrow, in terms of how I would feel versus today, but not dramatically at all.

但即使我们的范围也会有所不同，而且它们明天可能会与今天的感觉有所不同，但并不会有太大的变化。

I would say this: I think — I certainly — well, you’ve received signals once or twice when we said we would buy in our stock, we obviously thought that it was selling below the bottom of a conservative range of intrinsic value, and we did that once some years ago.

我想说的是：我认为——我当然——好吧，你们曾经收到过一次或两次信号，当我们说我们会回购我们的股票时，我们显然认为它的价格低于保守的内在价值范围的底部，我们几年前确实做过一次。

And by saying so, of course, the stock went up, and so we never got any stock bought. So there’s sort of a self-defeating factor about taking the kind of approach to it that we do, in terms of really telling people that the only reason we’ll buy in stock is because we think it’s cheap. That is not standard practice in corporate America at all.

当然，正因为这样，股票上涨了，所以我们根本没有买到任何股票。因此，我们采取这种方式的确存在一种自我挫败的因素，实际上告诉人们我们购买股票的唯一原因是因为我们认为它便宜。这在美国企业中根本不是标准做法。

In fact, corporate America, to some extent, buys in their stock more aggressively when it’s high than when it’s low. But they may have some equation in their mind that escapes my reasoning power.

事实上，美国企业在股票价格高时比在低时更积极地回购股票。但他们可能心中有某种我无法理解的公式。

But the — I would — we do not regard Berkshire as overpriced. And I would say that we had, very recently, we had a very, very large international company that might well have been interested in doing something with Berkshire, and it’s a very nice company, but it’s bigger than we can handle unless we would use a lot of stock.

但我们——我们并不认为伯克希尔被高估。我可以说，最近我们有一家非常大型的国际公司，可能会有意与伯克希尔进行合作，而这是一家非常不错的公司，但它的规模超出了我们能处理的范围，除非我们会使用大量的股票。

And we won’t use the stock. We just think our shareholders would come out behind. It would be a wonderful company and, you know, make a lot of headlines, but in the end our shareholders would be poorer because our stock is a currency, and unless it’s fully valued, it’s a big mistake to use it as a currency.

我们不会使用股票。我们认为我们的股东会受到损失。这将是一家很棒的公司，您知道，会引起很多头条新闻，但最终我们的股东会变得更穷，因为我们的股票是一种货币，除非它被充分估值，否则将其作为货币使用是一个大错误。

Now, we used some in the Burlington deal, but we used a whole lot more cash, and, in effect, we only used 30 percent for stock, and it was worth doing, but it was painful.

现在，我们在伯灵顿交易中使用了一些，但我们使用了更多的现金，实际上我们只用了 30%的股票，这样做是值得的，但过程很痛苦。

And if Lubrizol had wanted to do a deal involving stock, we would not have done it. I told James Hambrick that right off the bat.

如果 Lubrizol 想要进行涉及股票的交易，我们是不会这样做的。我一开始就告诉了詹姆斯·哈姆布里克。

So we had absolutely no interest in buying Lubrizol — we were perfectly willing to give, you know, close to $9 billion in cash, and in my view, we’re getting our money’s worth.

所以我们绝对没有兴趣收购Lubrizol——我们完全愿意支付接近90亿美元的现金，而在我看来，我们得到了物有所值。

But we would not have given a significant portion of it in Berkshire stock, because we would be giving away part of the businesses we already own, and we like Burlington, and we like See’s Candy. We like ISCAR.

但我们不会将其大部分以伯克希尔股票的形式支付，因为那样我们就是在放弃我们已经拥有的部分业务，而我们喜欢伯灵顿，我们喜欢See’s Candy。我们喜欢ISCAR。

And to give away a portion of those, even to get another very good business, would not make financial sense for our shareholders.

将这些的一部分放弃，即使是为了获得另一家非常好的企业，对我们的股东来说并没有经济意义。

So you can draw your own deductions about our calculations of intrinsic value from that statement.

所以你可以根据那句话自行推断我们对内在价值的计算。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he’s obviously looking at two right factors. And I think that we have not permanently lost the ability to do some interesting things eventually with our enormous wealth in cash and marketable securities.

查理·芒格：嗯，他显然看到了两个正确的因素。我认为我们并没有永久性地失去利用我们巨额现金和可交易证券进行一些有趣交易的能力。

We won’t always be as inactive as we are now.

我们不会一直像现在这样不活跃。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re not that inactive, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们并没有那么不活跃，查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know. You practically crawl out of your skin, sometimes.

查理·芒格：我不知道。你有时简直快要爬出皮肤了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Nine billion is — you know, we say normal earning power is 12 billion. That uses up a good portion of one year’s quota.

沃伦·巴菲特：90亿美元——您知道，我们说正常的盈利能力是120亿美元。这消耗了相当一部分一年的配额。

Although we’d like to use more. I mean, there’s no question.

虽然我们想使用更多。我是说，这毫无疑问。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now you’re talking.

查理·芒格：现在你说得对。

WARREN BUFFETT: Can you see us using stock in the next few years?

沃伦·巴菲特：你能看到我们在未来几年使用股票吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: If the business were good enough, of course.

查理·芒格：如果生意足够好，当然可以。

Our trouble is — it’s a terrible trouble you people have — the businesses you already own are so good it’s not wise to part with them to get a business we don’t own. Ordinarily.

我们的麻烦是——这是你们面临的一个可怕的麻烦——你们已经拥有的业务太好，放弃它们以获得我们不拥有的业务是明智的，通常来说。

12. Buffett is always optimistic about American capitalism

巴菲特始终对美国资本主义持乐观态度。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This is for Warren — and Charlie, too — from your longtime Omaha friend Dick Holland.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这是来自你长期的奥马哈朋友迪克·霍兰德，献给沃伦和查理。

“Whenever you talk in a general way about America’s economic future, your remarks are invariably positive, even glowing, despite the severe problems of growing public and private debt, the huge budget imbalances that result, and no real policies to solve these problems.

“每当你以一般的方式谈论美国的经济未来时，你的言论总是积极的，甚至是光辉的，尽管面临着日益严重的公共和私人债务问题、由此产生的巨额预算失衡，以及没有真正的政策来解决这些问题。”

“Some experts believe that we may reach the point where future bond offerings to cover the rising debt might fail. Many wonder if we are not entering a time of national decline.

“一些专家认为，我们可能会面临未来债券发行无法覆盖不断上升的债务的情况。很多人担心我们是否进入了国家衰退的时代。

“How can a lousy long-term U.S. economy make you so happy, and why do you see gold nuggets where others see salt?”

“一个糟糕的长期的美国经济怎么会让你如此高兴，而你为何在别人看到盐时却能看到金块？”

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s from Charlie’s good friend as well, Dick Holland, who we both have known for 60-plus years.

沃伦·巴菲特：那是来自查理的好朋友迪克·霍兰德，我们都认识他超过 60 年。

I don’t see how anybody can be other than enthused about this country.

我不明白为什么任何人会对这个国家不感到热情。

If you look back to 1776 or 1789, whichever one you want to date it from, you know, it has been the most extraordinary economic period in the history of the world.

如果你回顾 1776 年或 1789 年，无论你想从哪个年份开始，你会知道，这段时间是世界历史上最非凡的经济时期。

In fact, if you go back — I was born on August 30th, 1930.

事实上，如果你追溯一下——我出生于 1930 年 8 月 30 日。

Now, if somebody had come to me in the womb and said, “Let me tell you what it’s like outside now. The stock market has just crashed, but you haven’t seen anything yet. 4,000 banks are going to fail.

现在，如果有人在我母亲的肚子里对我说：“让我告诉你外面的情况。股市刚刚崩溃，但你还没见过什么。4000 家银行将会倒闭。”

“The Dow Jones average is going to go down to 42. It was 381 back just a little bit before you were conceived, and it’s going to go to 42. They’re going to close the banks for a while. We’re going to have 25 percent unemployment. We’re going to have the dust bowl in the Midwest. The grasshoppers are going to take over.”

“道琼斯指数将下降到 42。它在你出生前不久是 381，现在将降到 42。他们会暂时关闭银行。我们将面临 25%的失业率。我们将在中西部经历尘暴。蚂蚱将会横行。”

You know, it would be like in that Woody Allen movie where he says, “Go back, go back.”

你知道，这就像伍迪·艾伦电影里他说的：“回去，回去。”

All that’s happened since August 30th, 1930, is that the standard of living of the average American has increased six-for-one. Six-for-one.

自 1930 年 8 月 30 日以来，发生的一切是普通美国人的生活水平提高了六倍。六倍。

You know, that’s absolutely incredible. I mean, you look at centuries where nothing happened for the average person. I mean, century after century. So we have a system that works magnificently.

你知道，这真是不可思议。我是说，你看几个世纪以来，普通人几乎没有什么变化。一个世纪接一个世纪。所以我们有一个运作得非常好的系统。

It gets gummed up periodically. And it always has troubles. I mean, you know, I — my father was very anti-New Deal, so my sisters and I sat around a dinner table from the first we can remember hearing how things were going to go to hell.

它偶尔会陷入困境。它总是有问题。我是说，我的父亲非常反对新政，所以从我们记事起，我和我的姐妹们就坐在餐桌旁听父亲说事情将会变糟。

As a matter of fact, my father-in-law told my wife-to-be and her mother that he wanted to have a talk with me before we got married.

事实上，我的岳父告诉我的未婚妻和她的母亲，他想在我们结婚之前和我谈谈。

And he was very much on my side, so I was not in a panic about this or anything, but I went down to his house shortly before the marriage and this wonderful man, Doc Thompson, sat in a chair for a couple of hours, and he said, “Warren,” he said. “I just want to tell you that you’re going to fail but it’s not your fault.” (Laughter)

他非常支持我，所以我并没有对此感到恐慌，但在婚礼前不久，我去了他的家，这位了不起的男人，汤普森博士，坐在椅子上几个小时，他说：“沃伦，”他说。“我只是想告诉你，你会失败，但这不是你的错。”（笑声）

And he said, “You and Susie, my daughter, if you starve, she would have starved anyway. I mean, it is not your fault. It’s because — you know, it’s because the Democrats are in, you know, and they’re going to take the country down the road to Communism and, you know, and just don’t worry about the fact you’re going to fail.”

他说：“你和苏西，我的女儿，如果你们饿死，她也会饿死。我是说，这不是你们的错。这是因为——你知道，是因为民主党在掌权，你知道，他们会把国家带向共产主义，你知道，别担心你们会失败的事实。”

And this went on for quite a while. And then he blessed me and we got married. It was a happy ending.

这持续了很长一段时间。然后他祝福了我，我们结婚了。这是一个幸福的结局。

But ever since — when I got out of school in 1951, the two people I admired the most in the world, my dad and Ben Graham, both said, you know, you’ve got a good future but don’t start in stocks now because there’s never been a year when the Dow Jones average has not ended up below 200, and it’s above 200 now. It’s much too high, and if you start now selling stocks to people they’re going to have bad experiences. So why don’t you wait a while and go work in the Omaha National Bank or do something, park yourself on the sidelines.

但自那以来——当我在1951年毕业时，我最钦佩的两个人，我的父亲和本·格雷厄姆，都告诉我：“你有一个美好的未来，但现在不要开始投资股票，因为历史上没有任何一年道琼斯指数没有低于200，而现在它高于200。现在的价格太高，如果你现在开始向人们推销股票，他们会经历糟糕的体验。所以为什么不等一等，去奥马哈国民银行工作，或者做点别的事情，先在旁边观察一下。”

There’s always negatives. The country always faces problems. I mean, this country went through, you know, it went through a civil war, you know. It — it’s gone through all kinds of things. But what happens?

总是有负面因素。这个国家总是面临问题。我的意思是，这个国家经历过，你知道，它经历过内战，你知道。它经历过各种事情。但是发生了什么？

You know, we have a few lousy years from time to time. We’ve had, probably, 15 recessions since the country started. And we will always have a list of 10 or 15 things at the start of the year that will tell you why this country can’t possibly work well.

你知道，我们有时会经历几年的糟糕时期。自国家成立以来，我们经历了大约 15 次经济衰退。每年年初，我们总会列出 10 到 15 个原因，告诉你这个国家为什么不可能运作良好。

But all I can tell you is that it doesn’t do it in a straight line, but the power of capitalism is incredible. I mean, you know, that’s what is bringing us out of this recession.

但我能告诉你的是，它并不是沿着一条直线发展的，但资本主义的力量是不可思议的。我的意思是，你知道，这就是把我们从这场衰退中带出来的原因。

I mean, monetary and fiscal policy add some utility, and certainly in the fall of 2008 the government was needed in a huge, huge way. It could do what — it was the only one that could do what was needed.

我的意思是，货币和财政政策提供了一些效用，当然在2008年秋天，政府的干预是非常、非常必要的。它是唯一能做必要事情的实体。

But if you look at the history of the United States, you know, probably half of our recessions have occurred during — we’ll say in the 19th century — when people didn’t even know what fiscal or monetary policy was.

但如果你看看美国的历史，你会发现，大约一半的衰退发生在——我们可以说在19世纪——那时人们甚至不知道什么是财政或货币政策。

I mean, what happened was that excesses would come in and then the resuscitative power of capitalism would set the country back on the right — on a stronger growth pattern — and that’s happened time after time after time.

我的意思是，发生的事情是，过度现象会出现，然后资本主义的复苏能力会让国家重新走上更强的增长轨迹——这一次又一次地发生。

And the game isn’t over. I mean, it is not like the potential of America has been used up.

游戏还没有结束。我的意思是，美国的潜力并没有被用尽。

What has happened is the rest of the world has caught on, to some extent, so you’re seeing some state capitalism in places like China, and they are turning economies loose that have been dormant for centuries.

发生的事情是，世界其他地方在某种程度上意识到了这一点，因此你会看到像中国这样的地方出现了一些国家资本主义，他们正在释放那些沉睡了几个世纪的经济。

But it’s not because the people are smarter. It’s not because they work harder. It’s just because they have tapped into a system that works marvelously over time.

但这并不是因为人们更聪明，也不是因为他们更努力工作。只是因为他们利用了一个随着时间推移而有效的系统。

And I will tell you, in the next hundred years you’re going to have probably 15, maybe as many as 20 lousy years, but we will be so far ahead of where we are now that it will be unrecognizable.

我告诉你，在接下来的百年里，你可能会经历 15 年，甚至多达 20 年的糟糕岁月，但我们将远远领先于现在的状态，以至于无法辨认。

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I can go back a lot farther than that. You know, Europe survived the Black Death, where about a third of the people died. The world is going to go on.

查理·芒格：好吧，我可以追溯得更远。你知道，欧洲经历了黑死病，那时大约三分之一的人口死亡。世界会继续存在。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s wildly optimistic for Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这对查理来说太过乐观了。（笑声）

Have you got anything more encouraging than that to say, Charlie? (Laughter)

查理，你还有比这更让人振奋的话要说吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know. I kind of — I understand a little bit of Dick Holland’s point of view.

查理·芒格：我不知道。我有点——我理解迪克·霍兰德观点的一点。

And by the way, I’ve known him a long time. He aced me out of any hope of being the chief candle snuffer at the Unitarian church. (Laughter)

顺便说一下，我认识他很久了。他让我失去了在统一教堂担任首席熄烛人的任何希望。（笑声）

He was so damn good at it. (Laughter)

他真是太擅长了。（笑声）

Anyway, what was the question? (Laughter)

无论如何，问题是什么？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Can you bring yourself to say anything optimistic?

沃伦·巴菲特：你能说出任何乐观的话吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have a little bit of a twist on that. And so I would say that you can be cheerful even if things are slightly deteriorating, and that’s a very good quality to have.

查理·芒格：嗯，我对此有一点不同的看法。所以我想说，即使情况稍微恶化，你也可以保持乐观，这是一种非常好的品质。

I have a personal saying that has always amused me. I say, the politicians are never so bad you don’t live to want them back. (Laughter)

我有一句个人的格言，总是让我感到好笑。我说，政治家从来没有那么糟糕，以至于你不想让他们回来。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on that note of wisdom — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，在这一点智慧的基础上——（笑声）

13. Best assets in an inflationary environment

通货膨胀环境下的最佳资产

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to area 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们去第 4 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Angie Janssen (PH) of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

观众成员：早上好。我是来自马萨诸塞州剑桥的安吉·扬森（音）。

My question is, aside from the need to put huge amounts of capital to work, do you still believe that a high return on tangible capital business, like See’s or Coke, is the best asset to hold in an inflationary environment, or do you now think an irreplaceable hard asset with pricing power, like a railroad or a hydroelectric dam, is superior?

我的问题是，除了需要投入大量资本之外，您是否仍然认为高回报的有形资本业务，比如See's或可口可乐，是在通货膨胀环境中持有的最佳资产，还是您现在认为具有定价能力的不可替代的硬资产，比如铁路或水电大坝，更具优势？

WARREN BUFFETT: The first group is superior. I mean, if you can have a wonderful consumer product — doesn’t have to be a consumer product — a product that requires very little capital to grow, and to do more dollar volume, as will happen with inflation even if you don’t have unit growth, and it doesn’t take much capital to support that growth, that is a wonderful asset to have in inflation.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一组是优越的。我的意思是，如果你能拥有一个出色的消费产品——不一定非得是消费产品——一个需要很少资本来增长的产品，并且随着通货膨胀的发生，即使没有单位增长，也能实现更多的美元销售额，而支持这种增长所需的资本也不多，那么在通货膨胀时期，这就是一个很好的资产。

I mean, the ultimate test of that is your own earning ability. I mean, if you’re an outstanding doctor, lawyer, whatever it may be, teacher, the — you — as inflation goes along, your services will command more and more in dollar terms, and you don’t have to make any additional investment in yourself.

我的意思是，最终的考验就是你自己的赚钱能力。我的意思是，如果你是一位杰出的医生、律师，或者其他职业，比如教师，随着通货膨胀的加剧，你的服务在美元方面的价值会越来越高，而你不需要对自己进行任何额外的投资。

People think of that, you know, with a very long-lived real estate asset or something of the sort, or a farm, or anything where additional capital is not required to finance inflationary growth.

人们将这种情况与一些长期持有的不动产或其他类似资产相提并论，或者是农场，或任何不需要额外资本来支持通货膨胀增长的东西。

The worst kind of businesses are the businesses with tons of receivables and inventories and all of that.

最糟糕的企业是那些有大量应收账款和库存的企业。

And in dollar terms, if their volume stays flat but the price level doubles, and they need to come up with double the amount of money to do that same volume of business, that can be a very bad asset.

如果它们的交易量保持不变，但价格水平翻倍，那么它们需要筹集双倍的资金来进行相同的业务量，这可能会成为一个非常糟糕的资产。

Now normally, we are not enthused about businesses that require heavy capital investment, just like utilities and the railroad.

现在通常来说，我们对需要大量资本投资的企业并不热衷，就像公用事业和铁路一样。

We think that, on the other hand, particularly with the railroad, that where you do not have any guaranteed lower rate of return, that you should be entitled to earn returns on assets that are becoming more and more valuable to the economy as — whether it’s because of inflationary factors or because of just natural growth factors, or in the case of the United States, I think it will be both.

我们认为，另一方面，特别是在铁路方面，如果没有任何保证的最低回报率，那么您应该有权在那些对经济变得越来越有价值的资产上获得回报——无论是由于通货膨胀因素，还是由于自然增长因素，或者在美国的情况下，我认为这两者都会存在。

But the ideal business — See’s Candy is doing — it was doing $25 million of volume when we bought it, and it sold 16 million pounds of candy — a little more than — well, it retails $1.90, and we had some quantity discounts, so we were doing close to $30 million worth of business.

但理想的商业模式——See's Candy就是这样——当我们收购时，它的销售额是2500万美元，售出1600万磅糖果——稍微多一点——零售价为1.90美元，我们有一些数量折扣，因此当时的销售额接近3000万美元。

Now, we’re doing well over $300 million worth of business. It took $9 million of tangible assets to run it when it was doing 30, and it takes about 40 million of tangible assets at 300-and-some.

现在，我们的业务超过了 3 亿美元。当业务达到 3000 万时，需要 900 万美元的有形资产来运营，而在超过 3 亿时，大约需要 4000 万美元的有形资产。

So we’ve only had to ploy back $30 million into a business which will make us — well, it’s made us, probably, a billion-and-a-half pretax during that period.

所以我们只需要再投入 3000 万美元到一个业务中，这个业务在那段时间里为我们赚了——好吧，可能是 15 亿美元的税前利润。

And if the price of candy doubles, we don’t have any receivables to speak of. Our inventory turns fast. We don’t store it or anything like that. We gear up seasonally and the fixed assets aren’t big, so that is a much better business to own than a utility business if you’re going to have a lot of inflation.

如果糖果的价格翻倍，我们没有任何应收账款可言。我们的库存周转很快。我们不储存它或其他类似的东西。我们按季节调整，固定资产也不大，因此如果你要面对大量通货膨胀，这比公用事业更适合经营。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: And what’s interesting about it is that we didn’t always know this. And so — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：有趣的是，我们并不总是知道这一点。所以——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And sometimes we forget it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：有时候我们会忘记这一点。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s true, too.

查理·芒格：这也是真的。

But it shows how continuous learning is absolutely required to have any significant achievement at all in the world.

但这表明，持续学习在世界上取得任何显著成就都是绝对必要的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and it does show — you know, I’ve said in the past that I’m a better businessman because I’m an investor and I’m a better investor because I’m a businessman.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这确实显示了——你知道，我过去说过，我是一个更好的商人，因为我是一个投资者，而我是一个更好的投资者，因为我是一个商人。

There’s nothing like actually experiencing the necessity, particularly in the 1970s when inflation was gathering strength, and early ’80s, you would see this absolutely required capital investment on a very big scale that really wasn’t producing anything commensurate in the way of earnings.

没有什么比实际体验更能证明这一点，尤其是在70年代通货膨胀加剧时，以及80年代初，你会看到这种需要非常大规模的资本投资，而这些投资实际上并没有产生相应的收益。

I wrote an article for Fortune called “How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor” back in 1977.

我在 1977 年为《财富》杂志写了一篇文章，标题是“通货膨胀如何欺骗股权投资者”。

You really want — the ideal asset, you know, is a royalty on somebody else’s sales during inflation, where all you do is get a royalty check every month, and it’s based on their sales volume.

你真的想要的——理想的资产，实际上就是在通货膨胀期间，对其他人销售的特许权，在这种情况下，你每个月只需收到特许权费，这取决于他们的销售量。

And you made — you came up with some product originally, licensed it to them, and you never have another bit of capital investment. You have no receivables, you have no inventory, and you have no fixed assets.

你最初开发了一些产品，授权给他们，然后你再也没有进行过任何资本投资。你没有应收账款，没有库存，也没有固定资产。

That kind of business is real inflation protection, assuming the product maintains its viability.

那种业务是真正的通货膨胀保护，前提是产品保持其可行性。

So even though we are going into some very capital-intensive businesses, part of that reflects the fact we can’t deploy the amount of capital we have in a whole bunch of See’s Candies. We just can’t find them. We would love to find them, but we can’t find them in that quantity.

所以即使我们正在进入一些资本密集型的业务，这部分反映了我们无法将我们拥有的资本投入到大量的 See's Candies 中。我们就是找不到它们。我们非常希望能找到它们，但我们无法以那种数量找到。

So we are not doing as well with capital when we have to invest many billions a year, as we would if we were investing a few millions a year. There’s no question.

所以当我们每年必须投资数十亿时，我们在资本方面的表现不如每年投资几百万时。毫无疑问。

That’s true in investments. It’s true in operating businesses. There is a real disadvantage to size, and we just hope that problem grows.

这在投资中是正确的。在经营企业中也是如此。规模确实存在一个真实的劣势，我们只希望这个问题能够加剧。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now you’re talking.

查理·芒格：现在你说得对。

14. No dividend, so sell a slice of Berkshire if you need cash

没有分红，所以如果你需要现金，就卖掉一部分伯克希尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: Aside from questions about Dave Sokol, the questions I’ve received most from shareholders have to do with dividends.

贝基·奎克：除了关于戴夫·索科尔的问题，我收到的股东们最多的问题与股息有关。

And Dave Corneal (PH), who is a shareholder who couldn’t be here this weekend because he’s at his daughter’s wedding, writes in, “I know that Berkshire is a great allocator of capital, but as an owner of stock and as I get closer to retirement, there will be a time when I will need income from my assets.

戴夫·科尔尼尔（PH），一位股东，因女儿的婚礼无法在这个周末出席，他写道：“我知道伯克希尔是一家优秀的资本配置公司，但作为一名股东，随着我逐渐接近退休，未来会有一段时间我需要从我的资产中获得收入。”

“Currently Berkshire does not pay dividends, yet it loves collecting on dividends on its investments. It also generates extensive cash flow in which it could pay dividends if it chooses to.

目前，伯克希尔不支付股息，但它喜欢从其投资中收取股息。它还产生了大量现金流，如果选择的话，可以支付股息。

“Currently the only real option to get income from your Berkshire investment is to sell a share or two of the stock. Is there a point in the future where Berkshire shareholders may expect a dividend payment, or what conditions would be needed for Berkshire to consider paying a dividend?”

“目前，从您的伯克希尔投资中获得收入的唯一真实选择是出售一两股股票。未来是否有可能让伯克希尔的股东期待分红支付，或者伯克希尔需要满足什么条件才能考虑支付分红？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will pay dividend — as a matter of fact, there may be an argument that when we pay dividends we should pay out almost 100 percent, because it does mean that we lost the ability to find ways to invest a dollar in a manner that creates more than a dollar of present value for the shareholders.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们会支付股息——实际上，有一种说法是，当我们支付股息时，应该几乎支付出100%的利润，因为这意味着我们失去了以创造超过一美元现值的方式投资一美元的能力。

But let’s assume you had a savings account, and the savings account paid 5 percent. And you had your choice of taking $50 a year out, or letting the $50 stay in and somebody would pay you 120 percent of that savings account any time you wanted to sell a piece of it.

但假设你有一个储蓄账户，而这个储蓄账户的利率是 5%。你可以选择每年取出 50 美元，或者让这 50 美元留在账户里，任何时候你想出售一部分时，别人会支付你这个储蓄账户 120%的价值。

Now, would you want to take the $5 out or would you rather let it accumulate and have the ability to sell at 120 cents on the dollar, that account?

现在，您想取出 5 美元，还是希望让它累积，并有能力以每美元 120 美分的价格出售该账户？

Every dollar that’s been reinvested in Berkshire has created more than a dollar of market value, so it’s much more intelligent, if you control the dividend policy of Berkshire, it’s much more intelligent for people to leave the dollar in, have it valued at $1.20 or $1.30 or whatever it may be valued, and then sell off a little piece if they want the income, or if they want to receive some cash.

每一美元再投资于伯克希尔都创造了超过一美元的市场价值，因此，如果你控制伯克希尔的分红政策，让人们将这美元留在公司里，按 1.20 美元或 1.30 美元或其他任何可能的估值来计算，显然更为聪明。如果他们想要收入，或者想要获得一些现金，可以出售一小部分。

And the logic of it, I think, is unquestionable. The execution of it is a problem. I mean, the question of whether we can keep investing dollars to create more than a dollar of present market value, you know, there’s an end to that at some point.

我认为这其中的逻辑是无可置疑的。执行这一点是个问题。我的意思是，是否可以继续投资美元以创造超过一美元的当前市场价值，这个问题在某个时刻是有尽头的。

But so far, people, by leaving 160 billion at the end of third quarter in the business, have $200 billion that they can cash out for at any time they wish.

但到目前为止，人们在第三季度末留下了 1600 亿美元在业务中，他们有 2000 亿美元可以随时兑现。

There will come a time and, you know, who knows how soon, because the numbers are getting big — there will come a time when we do not think we can lay out, you know, 15 or 20 billion a year and get something that’s immediately worth more than that for our shareholders.

会有那么一天，你知道，谁知道会有多快，因为数字在不断增加——会有那么一天，我们不再认为可以每年投入 150 亿或 200 亿，并为我们的股东获得立即更有价值的东西。

And like I say, when the time comes where a dollar is only buying us 90 cents of value, we’ll quit spending the dollar. We’ll give it to the shareholders.

正如我所说，当一美元只能为我们带来90美分的价值时，我们就会停止支出这美元。我们会把它分给股东。

But I predict that the day that Berkshire declares a dividend, the stock will go down. I mean, it will — and it should go down — because it’s an admission, essentially, that a compounding machine has lost its ability to continue on that course.

但我预测，当伯克希尔宣布分红的那一天，股票会下跌。我的意思是，它会下跌——而且应该下跌——因为这本质上是承认一个复利机器失去了继续沿着那条道路前进的能力。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, and there’s nothing wrong with selling a little Berkshire stock to buy jewelry if you do it in the right place. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你在合适的地方卖一点伯克希尔股票来买珠宝，那没有什么不对的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would like to announce that my niece, Cynthia, visited Borsheims yesterday around — I guess around 3:00 — and she was there with her boyfriend, and he proposed, and they bought a ring. Congratulations. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想宣布，我的侄女辛西娅昨天大约在3点钟拜访了Borsheims，她和她的男朋友在一起，他求婚了，他们买了一枚戒指。祝贺他们。（掌声）

Her mother did the same thing a few years ago. And, you know, these things become family traditions, so go out there and who knows what will happen? (Laughter)

她的母亲几年前也做过同样的事情。你知道，这些事情会成为家庭传统，所以去外面看看，谁知道会发生什么呢？（笑声）

15. Still bullish on bank stocks Wells Fargo and U.S. Bancorp

仍然看好富国银行和美国银行的股票

WAREEN BUFFETT: OK. Number 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第五个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jeremy Pozen (PH), Newton, Massachusetts.

观众成员：杰里米·波岑（PH），马萨诸塞州牛顿。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, Berkshire Hathaway has had large investments in Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank.

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，伯克希尔哈撒韦在富国银行和美国银行有大量投资。

What are the revenue outlooks and business prospects for these two banks, given the backdrop of slow U.S. growth, an extended U.S. consumer, a tepid rebound in the U.S. housing market with foreclosures and write-downs lessening but still at historically high levels, and the potential for greater-than-expected inflation, or worse, possibly, deflation similar to Japan?

考虑到美国经济增长缓慢、美国消费者支出延长、美国房地产市场温和复苏，尽管止赎和减记有所减少，但仍处于历史高位，以及潜在的高于预期的通货膨胀，或者更糟糕的，可能类似于日本的通货紧缩，这两家银行的收入前景和商业前景如何？

Thank you for your time and consideration.

感谢您的时间和考虑。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Wells Fargo and U.S. Bancorp are both among the best large banks, if not the best, in the country and they’re different than what you think of in terms of some money center banks, but they’re very large. Wells is four times as large as USB.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，富国银行和美国银行都是美国最好的大型银行之一，如果不是最好的话，它们与您所想的一些货币中心银行不同，但它们非常庞大。富国银行的规模是美国银行的四倍。

Banking as a whole — U.S. banking — profitability will be considerably less, in my view, in the period ahead than it was, say, in the early part of this century.

我认为，整体银行业——美国银行业——在未来一段时间内的盈利能力将大大低于本世纪初的水平。

And a very important reason is that the leverage will be reduced. And that’s probably a good thing for society.

一个非常重要的原因是杠杆将会减少。这对社会来说可能是件好事。

It’s — it may be a bad thing for individual banks that could use leverage intelligently, but the trouble was that they all thought they could use leverage intelligently, and the actions of one, or more, that were unintelligent about it, you know, had consequences for everybody, which you can see if you view HBO on whatever it is — is it May 26?

这对那些能够聪明地使用杠杆的个别银行来说可能是个坏事，但问题在于他们都认为自己能够聪明地使用杠杆，而其中一个或多个不聪明的行为对所有人都有影响，你可以在 HBO 上看到这一点，不管是什么——是 5 月 26 日吗？

The — so I would say that return on assets — even if return on assets were as good as it was some years ago, there will be less assets per dollar of common equity than before which means returns on common equity will be less.

所以我想说，资产回报率——即使资产回报率和几年前一样好，每美元普通股权益的资产将会减少，这意味着普通股权益的回报将会降低。

We still think that Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank are very good operations. We think they’re very decent businesses. They’re not as attractive as when leverage ratios could be higher.

我们仍然认为富国银行和美国银行是非常好的运营。我们认为它们是非常体面的企业。与杠杆比率可以更高时相比，它们的吸引力不那么大。

In terms of the troubles in banking, I think you’ve seen, by far, the worst in the past. And loan losses have been trending downward now for several quarters, and I think the expectation is that will continue, and I think banking is a very fundamental business.

在银行业的问题方面，我认为你已经看到过去最糟糕的情况。贷款损失在过去几个季度一直呈下降趋势，我认为这种趋势将会继续下去，我认为银行业是一个非常基础的行业。

But as John Stumpf said a few years ago at Wells Fargo, he said, “I don’t know why we keep thinking of new ways to lose money when the old ones were working so well.” (Laughter)

但是正如约翰·斯坦普夫几年前在富国银行所说的，他说：“我不知道为什么我们总是想出新的亏钱方法，而旧的方法运作得如此好。”（笑声）

And banks periodically go crazy. It’s always on the asset side.

银行会定期疯狂。这总是发生在资产一侧。

I mean, here you’ve got cheap money. You’ve got the federal government behind, although the federal government has never had to pay out anything on — in terms of the FDIC.

我的意思是，这里有廉价资金。联邦政府在背后支持，尽管联邦政府从未在 FDIC 方面支付过任何费用。

The FDIC has handled 3800 since it was established on January 1, 1934. The FDIC has paid out probably 3800, 3900 by now, institutions, 250 of them or so in the last couple years. And that has not cost the U.S. taxpayer a penny. I mean, that has all come from FDIC assessments on other banks. It’s been a mutual insurance company.

自1934年1月1日成立以来，FDIC处理了3800家机构，最近几年大约250家。这并没有让美国纳税人付出一分钱。我是说，这一切都是通过对其他银行的FDIC评估收回来的。它是一家互助保险公司。

Banking, if you just keep out of trouble on the asset side, is a very good business because you get your money so cheap and, you know, because of the implicit federal guarantee, and you do get to leverage up to a fair extent, and America’s been a pretty good place to lend money.

银行业，如果你在资产方面保持不出问题，是一个非常好的生意，因为你能以非常低的成本获得资金，而且由于隐含的联邦担保，你确实可以在相当程度上进行杠杆操作，而美国一直是一个相当不错的放贷地方。

So I like our positions in there. You will see that — if you looked at those totals — you’ll see we’ve added to Wells Fargo. And both those companies are very well run institutions, but they will not be able to earn — I don’t know what the figures were, but I think they were up 25 or — to 30 percent on tangible equity — and that’s not going to get repeated in the future, and it shouldn’t be.

所以我喜欢我们在这方面的投资。如果你查看这些总数，你会发现我们增加了对富国银行的投资。这两家公司都是运营非常好的机构，但它们无法像以前那样获得——我不知道具体的数字，但我认为它们在有形股本上的回报曾高达25%到30%，而这种情况在未来不会重现，也不应该重现。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, we might add that M&T Bank, which most people —

查理·芒格：嗯，是的，我们可能还要补充一下 M&T 银行，大多数人——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — never talk about, is headed by a really sensible fellow, and it’s been a wonderful investment for us.

查理·芒格：——从来不谈论，由一个非常理智的人领导，这对我们来说是一个很好的投资。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, as a matter of fact, if you get the M&T annual report, it’s written by Bob Wilmers, the letter, the first part of it is about M & T specifically, but the second part is about particularly the American financial economy, and I would really recommend you read that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上，如果你拿到 M&T 的年报，信件是由鲍勃·威尔默斯写的，第一部分是关于 M&T 的具体内容，但第二部分特别是关于美国金融经济的，我真的推荐你读一下。

Bob is a very smart guy and he has a lot of good observations.

鲍勃是个非常聪明的人，他有很多好的观察。

And, frankly, the other one I recommend you read is Jamie Dimon’s letter, at JPMorgan, is a tour de force, in terms of describing the banking scene, the economic scene. He has some real insights in there about some very important subjects.

坦率地说，我推荐你阅读的另一篇是杰米·戴蒙在摩根大通的信，这是一部力作，描述了银行业和经济形势。他在其中对一些非常重要的主题有一些真实的见解。

We don’t own that stock, but it’s a letter that I think everybody could learn a lot from reading, as they could from reading Bob Wilmer’s letter at M&T.

我们不拥有那只股票，但我认为这是一封大家都能从中学到很多的信，就像阅读 Bob Wilmer 在 M&T 的信一样。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And those people who like an element of morality in business, Wilmer sounds like an Old Testament prophet.

查理·芒格：那些喜欢在商业中加入道德元素的人，威尔默听起来像是一个旧约先知。

I mean, he really doesn’t like it that all the really big banks are making so much money out of trading, because he says you’re really trying to outsmart your own customers, and he’d rather serve them in a culture of deserved trust in both directions. It’s hard to think he’s totally wrong.

我的意思是，他真的不喜欢所有大型银行通过交易赚取这么多钱，因为他认为你实际上是在试图智胜你的客户，而他宁愿在相互信任的文化中为他们服务。在这一点上，很难认为他完全错了。

WARREN BUFFETT: He also expresses quite a dislike for the fact that a market system creates a reward system where money sort of disproportionally flows to people who work with money, and that that tends to attract a disproportional number of people that — of lots of ability that he thinks might be — at least some of them — might be better deployed elsewhere. It’s an interesting read.

沃伦·巴菲特：他还表达了对市场体系创造一种奖励机制的强烈不满，这种机制使得资金不成比例地流向那些与金钱打交道的人，而这往往吸引了大量他认为可能在其他地方更好发挥作用的高能力人才。读起来很有趣。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s one of the best annual reports that’s ever came out of banking. Right out of Buffalo.

查理·芒格：这是银行业历史上最好的年度报告之一。来自布法罗。

16. Productive assets will always beat gold

生产性资产总是会胜过黄金

WARREN BUFFETT: Ok. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question who comes from Neil Steinhoff (PH) who writes, “The commodity market, and particularly gold, have appreciated astronomically over the last few years.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自尼尔·斯坦霍夫（PH），他写道：“商品市场，特别是黄金，在过去几年中大幅上涨。”

“My Berkshire Hathaway stock is only slightly better — doing better — than it was in 2006. It’s barely kept up with inflation,” he says.

“我的伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票表现稍微好一些——比 2006 年时好一些。它几乎没有跟上通货膨胀，”他说。

“Please explain why you have not invested more heavily in commodities. As long as Ben Bernanke continues to print money and there’s no indication he’s going to stop any time soon, isn’t it right that commodities, and particularly gold, will continue to appreciate?”

“请解释一下为什么您没有在商品上进行更多投资。只要本·伯南克继续印钞，并且没有迹象表明他会很快停止，难道商品，特别是黄金，不会继续升值吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would point out that when we started with Berkshire, it was about 3/4 of an ounce of gold, and gold was $20 an ounce then, and it was 15.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我要指出的是，当我们开始投资伯克希尔时，它大约是 3/4 盎司的黄金，当时黄金的价格是 20 美元/盎司，而它是 15美元。

So gold, even at 1500, has a ways to go, and the — (Laughter and applause)

所以黄金，即使在 1500，也还有很长的路要走，——（笑声和掌声）

I think he’s right about inflation. But if you think about it, there are three major categories of investment. And you ought to think very hard about which category you want to be in before you start thinking about the choices available within that category.

我认为他对通货膨胀的看法是正确的。但如果你仔细想想，投资主要有三个大类。在你开始考虑该类别内的选择之前，你应该认真思考你想要进入哪个类别。

Now, the first category is anything denominated in a currency. It could be bonds, it could be deposits in a bank, it can be a money market fund, it can be cash in your pocket.

现在，第一类是以货币计价的任何东西。它可以是债券，可以是银行存款，可以是货币市场基金，也可以是你口袋里的现金。

And the — if you will reach in your pocket — I don’t like to do this, but — and pull out your wallet — you’re watching an historic event. (Laughter)

如果你伸手进你的口袋——我不喜欢这样做，但——把钱包拿出来——你正在见证一个历史事件。（笑声）

If you look at this — and I might point out this is a one. Charlie carries a — on the back of it, it says, “In God We Trust.” And that’s really false advertising.

如果你看看这个——我可能要指出这是一个。查理在背面带着一个——上面写着“我们信仰上帝”。这实际上是虚假宣传。

The — if Elizabeth Warren were here, she would say, quite properly, it should say, “In Government We Trust,” because God isn’t going to do anything about that dollar bill, you know, if government does the wrong things, in terms of keeping it as valuable as it was when you parted with it to buy a bond or put it in a bank.

如果伊丽莎白·沃伦在这里，她会说，确实应该写成“我们信任政府”，因为如果政府在维护你买债券或存入银行时所获得的价值方面做错了事，上帝是不会对那张钞票采取任何行动的。

Any currency-related investment is a bet on how government now, and in the future, will behave. And if you happen to be unfortunate to live — fortunate to live in Zimbabwe and you decided to make currency-related investments, you know, you — family would have left you by now, and it was not a good decision.

任何与货币相关的投资都是对政府现在和未来行为的赌注。如果你不幸地生活在津巴布韦，并决定进行与货币相关的投资，你知道，你的家人现在可能已经离开你，这并不是一个好的决定。

Almost all currencies have declined in value over time. I mean, it may be built into almost any economic system that it will be easier to work with a value of currency that declines in value than a currency that appreciates in value, and the Japanese might reaffirm that here with their experience.

几乎所有货币的价值随着时间的推移都在下降。我的意思是，几乎任何经济体系中都可能内置了这样一个事实：与贬值的货币打交道比与升值的货币打交道要容易，而日本人可能会通过他们的经验在这里重申这一点。

So as a class, currency-related investments, whether they are in the UK, or the United States, or anyplace else, unless we’re getting paid extremely well for having them, we do not think make much sense.

因此，作为一个类别，货币相关的投资，无论是在英国、美国还是其他地方，除非我们获得非常丰厚的回报，否则我们认为没有太大意义。

The second category of investments regard items that you buy that don’t produce anything but that you hope someone will pay you more for later on. And the classic case of that is gold.

第二类投资是指你购买的物品，这些物品并不产生任何收益，但你希望将来有人愿意为它们支付更高的价格。经典的例子就是黄金。

And I’ve used this illustration before, but if you take all of the gold in the world — don’t get too excited now — and put it into a cube, it will be a cube that’s about 67 feet on a side. That would be 165,000 or 170,000 metric tons.

我之前用过这个例子，但如果你把世界上所有的黄金——别太激动——放进一个立方体里，它的每一边大约是 67 英尺。这将是 165,000 或 170,000 公吨。

So you could have a cube — if you owned all the gold in the world — you could have a cube that would be 67 or 68 feet on a side, and you could get a ladder and you could climb up on top of it, and you could say, you know I’m sitting on top of the world, and think you’re king of the world.

所以如果你拥有世界上所有的黄金，你可以拥有一个边长 67 或 68 英尺的立方体，然后你可以找一个梯子爬上去，坐在上面，你可以说，我在世界的顶端，觉得自己是世界的国王。

You could, you know, you could fondle it, you could polish it, you could do all these things with it. Stare at it. But it isn’t going to do anything.

你可以，你知道，你可以抚摸它，你可以擦亮它，你可以用它做所有这些事情。盯着它看。但它不会有什么反应。

All you are doing when you buy that is that you’re hoping that somebody else a year from now, or five years from now, will pay you more to own something that, again, can’t do anything, but you’re hoping that the person then thinks that somebody else will buy something five years later from him.

你购买那个时所做的就是希望一年后或五年后会有人愿意支付更多的钱来拥有一些实际上什么都不能做的东西，但你希望那个人认为五年后会有人从他那里购买某些东西。

In other words, you’re betting on not just how scared people are now of paper money, you’re betting on how much they think a year from now people will be scared two years from then on.

换句话说，你在押注不仅是人们现在对纸币的恐惧程度，还押注他们一年后认为两年后人们会有多么恐惧。

Keynes described all of this. I think it was in Chapter 12 of “The General Theory,” when he talked about this famous beauty contest where the game was not to pick out the most beautiful woman among the group, but the one that other people would think was the most beautiful woman, and then he carried it on to second and third degrees of reasoning.

凯恩斯描述了这一切。我认为是在《通论》的第 12 章中，他谈到了这个著名的选美比赛，比赛的规则不是选出小组中最美丽的女人，而是选出其他人认为最美丽的女人，然后他将其推向第二和第三层推理。

Any time you buy an asset that can’t do anything, produce anything, you’re simply betting on whether somebody else will pay more for, again, an asset that can’t do anything.

任何时候你购买一个无法做任何事情、无法生产任何东西的资产时，你只是在押注是否会有人愿意为这个同样无法做任何事情的资产支付更多。

And actually, we did that with silver, but silver had an industrial use, and we — about 13 years ago I bought a whole lot of silver. And if you’ll notice, silver has moved recently, so my timing was only about 13 years off, but, you know, who’s perfect?

实际上，我们也这样做过白银，但白银有工业用途。大约 13 年前，我买了一大堆白银。如果你注意到，白银最近有所上涨，所以我的时机只差了大约 13 年，但你知道，谁是完美的呢？

The third category of asset is something that you value based on its — what it will produce, what it will deliver. You buy a farm because you expect a certain amount of corn or soybeans or cotton or whatever it may be, to come your way every year. And you decide how much you pay based on how much you think the asset itself will deliver over time. And those are the assets that appeal to me and Charlie.

第三类资产是基于它所能产生的东西来评估的。你购买农场是因为你期望每年能得到一定量的玉米、大豆、棉花或其他作物。你决定支付多少，是基于你认为资产本身能在一段时间内提供多少。这些资产对我和查理很有吸引力。

Now, there’s some logical follow-on to that. If you buy that farm, and you really think about how many bushels of corn, how much bushels of soybeans will it produce, how much do I have to pay the tenant farmer, how much do I have to pay in taxes and so on, you can make a rational calculation, and the success of that investment will be determined in your own mind by whether it meets your expectations as to what it delivers.

那么，这里有一个合理的推论。如果你买了那块农场，并且认真思考它能生产多少玉米、多少大豆，你需要支付给租户农场主多少，税务要多少等等，你可以做出一个理性的计算，投资的成功将由你自己对其交付的预期来决定。

Logically, you should not care whether you get a quote on that farm a day later, or a week later, or a month later, or a year later. We feel the same way about businesses.

从逻辑上讲，你不应该关心一天、一周、一个月或一年后该农场的报价如何。我们对企业也持有相同的看法。

When we buy ISCAR, or we buy Lubrizol, or whatever, we don’t run around getting a quote on it every week and say, you know, “Is it up or down or anything like that?” We look to the business.

当我们购买 ISCAR，或者购买 Lubrizol，或者其他任何东西时，我们不会每周四处询价，问“价格是涨还是跌？”我们关注的是业务。

We feel the same way about securities. When we buy a marketable security, we don’t care if the stock exchange closes for a few years.

我们对证券也有同样的看法。当我们购买可交易证券时，我们并不在乎股票交易所关闭几年。

So when we look at Berkshire, we are looking at what we think can be delivered from the productive assets that we own, and how we can utilize that capital in acquiring more productive assets.

所以当我们看待伯克希尔时，我们在关注我们所拥有的生产性资产能交付的东西，以及我们如何利用这些资本去收购更多的生产性资产。

And there will be times, you know, cotton doubled in price, much to our chagrin at Fruit of the Loom, but, you know, if you own cotton for the right six or eight months in the past year, you came close to doubling your money.

而且有时候，你知道，棉花的价格翻了一番，这让我们在 Fruit of the Loom 感到非常沮丧，但你知道，如果你在过去一年中拥有棉花的时间恰好是六到八个月，你几乎可以翻倍你的投资。

But if you go back a century and try to make money owning cotton over time, it has not been a very good investment.

但如果你回到一个世纪前，试图通过拥有棉花来赚钱，结果并不是一个很好的投资。

So to pick a product, crude oil, cotton, gold, silver, anything that — and, of course, cotton has utility. Gold really doesn’t have utility.

所以选择一种产品，比如原油、棉花、黄金、白银，任何东西——当然，棉花是有用的。黄金实际上没有什么用处。

I would bet on good-producing businesses to outperform something that doesn’t do anything over any period of time.

我会押注于优质生产型企业在任何时间段内的表现优于那些没有任何作为的企业。

But there’s no question that rising prices create their own excitement. So when people see gold go up a lot — I mean, if your neighbor owns some gold, and you think you’re smarter than he is, and you didn’t own any, and your wife says to you, you know, “How come that jerk next door is making money, you know, and you’re just sitting here?” It can start affecting behavior.

但毫无疑问，价格的上涨会引发自己的兴奋。因此，当人们看到黄金大幅上涨——我意思是，如果你的邻居拥有一些黄金，而你觉得自己比他聪明，但你没有拥有，假如你太太问你：“你怎么能让那个邻居赚钱，而你却什么都不做？”这可能会开始影响行为。

And people like to get in on things that have been rising in price and all of that. But over time, that has not been the way to get rich.

人们喜欢参与那些价格上涨的事物。但随着时间的推移，这并不是致富的方式。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that. And besides, something peculiar to buy an asset which only will really go up if the world really goes to hell. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我当然同意这一点。而且，购买一种资产的确很奇特，这种资产只有在世界真的要崩溃的时候才会上涨。（笑声）

It doesn’t strike to me as an entirely rational thing to do.

这对我来说并不是一个完全理性的事情。

I think you can figure on leaving the country because the country is going to kill you. And all the countries you might go to will also be thoroughly screwed up.

我认为你可以考虑离开这个国家，因为这个国家会杀了你。而你可能去的所有国家也会彻底混乱。

I think all those people should buy a little gold, but I think the rest of us would be better off with Berkshire Hathaway stock. (Laughter and applause)

我认为所有这些人应该买一点黄金，但我觉得我们其他人更适合拥有伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票。（笑声和掌声）

And, of course, there’s another class of people that think they can protect themselves by buying paintings of soup cans. (Laughter)

当然，还有另一类人认为他们可以通过购买汤罐的画作来保护自己。（笑声）

I don’t recommend that, either. (Laughter)

我也不推荐那个。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: One thing about gold, also, is that in addition to this 67-foot cube, more gold is being produced every year.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于黄金，还有一点是，除了这个 67 英尺的立方体，每年还有更多的黄金被生产出来。

So you have to have buyers not only to offset sellers in the natural course of events, but you have to absorb something like a hundred billion dollars’ worth of added items of no utility.

因此，你不仅需要买家来抵消自然情况下的卖家，你还需要吸收大约1000亿美元的无用新货。

I mean, it’s really interesting. I mean, they dig it up out of the ground in South Africa, and then they ship it to the Federal Reserve in New York and they put it back in the ground.

我意思是，这真的很有趣。我的意思是，他们在南非把它挖出来，然后把它运送到纽约的联邦储备银行，再把它放回地下。

I mean, if you were watching this from Mars you might think it was a little peculiar. But think of how many people it makes happy.

我的意思是，如果你从火星上看这个，你可能会觉得有点奇怪。但想想有多少人因此感到快乐。

I might mention that the value of that cube, all the gold in the world, is now about — valued at 1500-plus — it’s about $8 trillion. And there are a billion acres, roughly, of farmland in the United States. That’s a little a million-and-a-half square miles. And that’s valued at something over 2 trillion.

我可以提到，世界上所有黄金的价值，现在以1500多美元计算，约为8万亿美元。美国大约有十亿英亩的农田。这大约是一百五十万平方英里，价值超过两万亿。

And if you take ten Exxon Mobils, you get up, maybe, another 4 trillion and — maybe not that much even — and so you could own all the farmland in the United States, every bit of it, and you could own ten Exxon Mobiles and you could stick a trillion or so in your pocket for walking around money, and you could have your choice of that or this 67-foot piece of gold that you could fondle and — (Laughter)

如果你拥有十家埃克森美孚，或许再加上四万亿——甚至可能没有那么多——所以你可以拥有美国所有的农田、每一寸土地，你还可以拥有十家埃克森美孚，并且可以留下大约一万亿的零用钱，你可以选择这两者中的任何一个，或者这个你可以抚摸的67英尺的黄金立方体。（笑声）

That may seem like a close choice to some people, but not to me. (Laughter)

这对某些人来说可能看起来是一个接近的选择，但对我来说不是。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you would also need an army to defend the gold. And it’s really not a very good spot.

查理·芒格：嗯，你还需要一支军队来保卫黄金。而且这地方真的不是很好。

17. Buffett on getting his first investors

巴菲特谈他的第一批投资者

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第六个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Millard, Dallas, Texas.

观众成员：——米拉德，德克萨斯州达拉斯。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, when you were raising your first investment funds, how did you go about attracting investors, and once you had your first funds and your first investors, how did you go about growing them?

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，当你们筹集第一笔投资基金时，是如何吸引投资者的？一旦你们有了第一笔资金和第一批投资者，您是如何让它们增长的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sounds to me like a man that’s about ready to start a hedge fund. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：听起来像是一个准备开始对冲基金的人。（笑声）

The — in my case, I’d moved back here from New York in March or so of 1956, and a few members of my family said we’d like you to manage our investments just like I did when I was selling securities out here before I went to New York. And I didn’t like being in the securities selling business, partly because if I sold somebody a stock at 20 and it went down to 10, I wanted to buy more, but I couldn’t face the idea of people that had bought at 20 and, based only on confidence in me not because they understood it, and now they were feeling depressed, and it was — it just wasn’t — it wasn’t very satisfactory.

——就我而言，我大约在1956年3月从纽约搬回来，几位家人说希望我像之前在这里卖证券时那样管理他们的投资。我不喜欢证券销售的工作，部分原因是如果我以20美元卖给某人一只股票，而它跌到10美元，我想买更多，但我无法面对那些以20美元买入、仅凭对我的信任而不是理解而感到沮丧的人，这并不令人满意。

I could not do as well managing money if people were watching every decision as I could if I did it in a room all by myself.

如果人们在关注我的每一个决定，我就无法像一个人独自在房间里那样好好管理钱。

So I just told these seven members of the family — one of them, actually, was my roommate in college and his mother, they came in also — I said, you know, if you’d like to join up in a partnership, I’m not going to tell you what’s going on, but I will tell you that I will be doing with my own money what I’m doing with yours. Later on, I put all my own money in.

所以我就告诉这七位家人——其中一位其实是我大学时的室友，他的母亲也来参与——我说，如果你们想加入我的合伙企业，我不会告诉你们发生了什么，但我会告诉你们我会用自己的钱做我所做的事情。后来，我把我所有的钱也投入其中

And it just was very slow.

一切进展非常缓慢。

A few months later, Graham-Newman, that I’d worked for, was liquidating, and a fellow named Homer Dodge asked Ben Graham what he should do with the money he was getting out of Graham-Newman. He said, “This kid used to work for me and he’s OK.” And so he came out and went in with me.

几个月后，我曾工作过的格雷厄姆-纽曼正在清算，一位叫霍默·道奇的先生问本·格雷厄姆他该如何处理从格雷厄姆-纽曼得到的钱。他说：“这个小子以前在我这里工作过，他还不错。”于是他过来与我合作。

And another fellow, late in the fall, had seen the notice of partnership formed in some legal paper and he said, “What’s this?” and came in with me. It’s just — we just stumbled along.

还有另一位先生，秋天晚些时候，看到了某个法律文件中形成合伙的通知，他说：“这是什么？”然后也来找我。就是这样——我们就这样摸索着前进。

And for almost six years, I operated out of my house, no employee. I kept all the books, I filed the tax returns, I, you know, went out and picked up the stocks personally and stuck them in a safe deposit box.

在将近六年的时间里，我都是在家办公，没有员工。我负责所有账目，报税，亲自去收购股票，把它们放进保险箱里。

When Charlie came along, I kept chiding him about the fact — I met him in 1959 — and I said, “Law is OK as a hobby, but it’s no place for a man with your intellect to spend his time.” (Laughter)

当查理出现时，我不断责备他这一事实——我在 1959 年遇见了他——我说：“法律作为一种爱好还不错，但对于你这样聪明的人来说，这不是一个值得花时间的地方。”（笑声）

And, well, I’ll let Charlie take it over from there. (Laughs)

那么，我就让查理接着说吧。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It actually took me a long time to leave what was a family business.

查理·芒格：我花了很长时间才离开那个家族企业。

And so any of you who are having a slow time accepting good ideas, why, you should be cheered by my example, because it was some years after you started working on me, and you pounded on me, and I slowly got the point.

所以如果你们有时候很难接受好的想法，你们应该受到我的例子鼓舞，因为在你开始工作几年后，你不断劝说我，我才慢慢领悟。。

WARREN BUFFETT: And he was actually asking about attracting money.

沃伦·巴菲特：他实际上是在询问如何吸引资金。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, it helps if you conducted yourself in life so that other people trust you. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：当然，如果你在生活中表现得让其他人信任你，那是有帮助的。（笑声）

And then it helps even more if —

然后如果——这会更有帮助

WARREN BUFFETT: You can see why I was so slow and he was so fast. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你可以看到我为什么这么慢，而他却这么快。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And then it helps even more if other people are right to trust you. So the formula is quite simple. First one, then the other.

查理·芒格：如果其他人信任你，那就更有帮助。所以这个公式很简单。先一个，然后另一个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Unfortunately, with the present fee structure, just attracting money, rather than performing with it, can be enormously lucrative.

沃伦·巴菲特：不幸的是，在目前的收费结构下，吸引资金而不是利用资金进行投资，可能会带来巨额利润。

So the skill of attracting money may be — at least in the short run, and maybe the intermediate run — it may be a more important quality than the ability to manage money.

因此，吸引金钱的能力在短期内，甚至可能在中期内，可能比管理金钱的能力更为重要。

But we, neither one of us, ever charged any fixed fee of any kind.

但我们两人都没有收取任何固定费用。

Am I right on that, Charlie?

我说得对吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we stopped taking any significant overrides on other people’s money at very young ages and at very small amounts of net worth.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们在年轻时就停止了从他人资金中获得任何显著的提成，而且当时的净资产也非常少。

I wish our example were more common. But I like our compensation practices, too, and they’re spreading slowly.

我希望我们的例子更加普遍。但我也喜欢我们的薪酬做法，而且它们正在缓慢传播。

We get a new company every, what, five years?

每五年我们就会获得一家新公司，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

18. Berkshire isn’t a ’60s “Go-Go” conglomerate

伯克希尔不是一个 60 年代的“Go-Go”企业集团

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: This is from Jeff — sorry, Jeff Cunningham of Directorship.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这是来自杰夫——抱歉，杰夫·坎宁安，来自董事会。

“Berkshire’s corporate strategy resembles that of the go-go conglomerates of the 1960s: Geneen’s ITT, Teledyne, Textron.

“伯克希尔的公司战略与1960年代的go-go企业（如基尼的ITT、特乐丹、德克斯顿）相似。

“Small corporate team, tight financial controls, sector neutrality, and little involvement in subsidiary operations, and ultimately not fully valued for the sum of their parts. If you disagree with this, how does Berkshire differ?”

“它有一个小型的公司团队，紧密的财务控制，行业中立，以及对子公司运营的较少参与，最终未能充分体现其各部分的价值。如果您不同意这一点，伯克希尔又有什么不同之处呢？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it — we are a conglomerate and, you know, people shy from that name, but that’s exactly what we are.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的——我们是一个多元化企业，你知道，人们对这个名称有些避讳，但这正是我们所做的。

And I think I laid out in the annual report at least one of the advantages of being a conglomerate, namely the tax-efficient transfer of money from businesses that do not have good ways of using it to businesses that have better ways of using it, which is, if it’s carried out intelligently, is a very significant plus.

我想我在年报中列出了作为一个多元化企业的一个优势，即有效的将资金从没有好方式使用的业务转移到更有使用价值的业务上，这在合理运作时是一个非常重要的优势。

The conglomerates you mentioned — and I’m familiar with all of them — really became sort of stock issuance machines, where the idea was to get your stock to sell at a very high multiple, and then trade it for something else that was selling at a lower multiple, and voilà, you know, earnings per share went up, and then people said you’ll do it again.

你提到的那些企业集团——我对它们都很熟悉——实际上变成了某种股票发行机器，目的是让你的股票以非常高的倍数出售，然后用它换取其他以较低倍数出售的东西，瞧，每股收益上升了，然后人们就说你会再这样做。

So it was — it was really accepted and endorsed by Wall Street that if you had this sort of semi-Ponzi scheme of issuing shares constantly for things that had lower P/E ratios, everybody knew what the game was, but they thought the game would continue to succeed. And for a while it did.

所以，华尔街确实接受并支持这种半庞氏骗局的做法，不断发行市盈率较低的股票，大家都知道这是什么游戏，但他们认为这个游戏会继续成功。而且一段时间内确实如此。

And the Gulf and Westerns of the world, and the Littons of the world, and there were numbers of them, it was almost like an unspoken conspiracy that nobody will point out that this is kind of a perpetual motion machine, and if they don’t it will keep working.

Gulf与Westerns，以及利顿公司，还有许多这样的公司，几乎就像一种不成文的阴谋，没人会指出这是一种永动机，如果没有人提及，它就会继续运作。

But if something says anything about it, somebody says, “The emperor has no clothes,” it will all collapse.

但如果有人说了什么，比如有人说“皇帝没有衣服”，一切都会崩溃。

The interesting thing, of course, you mentioned Teledyne in there. Teledyne played that game, and then it ended, and all of this stuff came back to Earth, but then Teledyne went into reverse and bought in stock like crazy when their stock got underpriced.

有趣的是，当然你提到了 Teledyne。Teledyne 参与了那个游戏，然后结束了，所有这些东西都回到了地球，但随后 Teledyne 却逆转了局面，当他们的股票被低估时疯狂买入股票。

So they issued stock like crazy when it was overpriced, and they bought it in to an extraordinary degree when it was underpriced, and it created a sensational record.

他们在股票价格过高时疯狂发行股票，而在股票价格过低时则以惊人的程度回购，这创造了一个轰动的记录。

Most of those companies, though, I think have very little relationship to Berkshire.

不过，我认为那些公司与伯克希尔几乎没有什么关系。

It’s true that, I think, some of them were pretty decentralized, although I remember — didn’t Harold Geneen have some famous room that he brought everybody in —

确实，我认为他们中的一些公司相对分散，尽管我记得——哈罗德·基尼有一个著名的会议室，他每月召集所有人——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: —chewed them out, you know, monthly for not making their projections, so they learned to make them whether they were actually really making them or not.

沃伦·巴菲特：——每个月都训斥他们没有完成预期，所以他们学会了无论是否真的达成预期都要去完成它。

The managers were — if you took Charlie Bluhdorn at Gulf and Western, or, you know, take the group, they were primarily thinking about how — Jimmy Ling at LTV — they were primarily thinking about how they could pump the stock up to a level where they could buy big established businesses that were selling at lower P/E ratios and sort of have this perpetual motion game going. And it came to an end.

这些管理者——如果你拿Gulf和Western的查理·布拉赫多恩，或者说说这群人，他们主要在考虑如何——LTV的吉米·灵——他们主要在考虑如何将股价提升到可以收购那些以较低市盈率出售的大型成熟企业的水平，并持续进行这种永动机式的游戏。结果是，这种游戏结束了。

I don’t think there’s — you know, at Berkshire we are not in that game. We are in the game of trying to buy very good businesses that we’re going to keep forever and having them grow their earnings and have them also throw off cash that we can use to buy more similar businesses.

我认为在伯克希尔，我们并不参与这个游戏。我们想做的，是收购一些非常好的企业，并保持它们的长期经营，让它们的收益增长，同时也产生现金流，用来购买更多类似的企业。

It is a conglomerate. Conglomerates, generally, are unpopular, and I don’t disagree with why they are. But I think it’s a very rational way of running the business as long as you keep it focused on running businesses and not as a stock-issuance machine.

它是一个综合企业。综合企业通常不受欢迎，我不反对它们为什么不受欢迎。但我认为，只要你专注于经营业务，而不是作为一个股票发行机器，这是一种非常理性的经营方式。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes, and some of those companies got into really pretty heavy manipulation of the numbers.

查理·芒格：嗯，是的，有些公司确实进行了相当严重的数据操控。

One of them said, “I know what I’m going to report, I just don’t know how I’m going to do it.” (Laughter)

其中一家公司说：“我知道我将报告什么，只是不知道我将如何做到。”（笑声）

That’s not the attitude around this place.

这种态度在我们这里是不存在的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t know what we’re going to report. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不知道我们将要报告什么。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no. And sometimes we don’t know how to do it, either. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不，不。有时候我们也不知道该怎么做。（笑声）

19. Buffett’s preferred legacy: “teacher”

巴菲特的首选遗产：“老师”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Charlie. John Norwood from West Des Moines, Iowa.

观众成员：早上好，沃伦和查理。我是来自爱荷华州西德莫因的约翰·诺伍德。

I have a question on legacy. A hundred years from now, Warren and Charlie, what would each of you like to be remembered for?

我有一个关于遗产的问题。沃伦和查理，百年后，你们希望各自被记住什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Old age. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：老年。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve heard Warren say that what he wants said at his funeral is that’s the oldest looking corpse I ever saw. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我听沃伦说，他希望在他的葬礼上说的是“这是我见过的最老的尸体。”（笑声）

I have a different saying that came down from one of my great grandfathers. And I think it — he wanted to be remembered for a fortune fairly won and wisely used. That’s a pretty good system.

我有一句来自我曾祖父的不同的说法。他希望被人们记住的是一个“公平赢得且明智使用的财富”。这是一种相当不错的方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would — if you really ask me, I’d probably like “teacher.” I enjoy teaching a lot.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果你真的问我，我可能会喜欢“老师”。我非常喜欢教学。

Some people think I do a little too much of the didactic stuff, but I like students coming. And, you know, I’ve benefited by some fabulous teachers, starting with my dad, but going on to Ben Graham, going on to Tom Murphy, I mean, lots of great teachers. So I would say that.

有些人认为我做的教学工作有点过多，但我喜欢学生们来。而且，你知道，我受益于一些出色的老师，从我父亲开始，再到本·格雷厄姆，再到汤姆·墨菲，我的确有很多伟大的老师。所以我会这么说。

I might point out that on Wilt Chamberlain’s gravestone, I think it says, “At last, I sleep alone.” (Laughter)

我想指出，在威尔特·张伯伦的墓碑上，我认为上面写着：“终于，我独自安睡。”（笑声）

Well, we have some people from Kansas here, anyway. (Laughs)

好吧，我们这里有一些来自堪萨斯的人。（笑）

20. Dollar will decline, but inflation won’t destroy the economy

美元将会贬值，但通货膨胀不会摧毁经济

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Pierre Sorel. He’s a portfolio manager at Fidelity and he says that the U.S. dollar has been depreciating against major currencies.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自皮埃尔·索雷尔。他是富达的投资组合经理，他说美元对主要货币正在贬值。

“The Federal Reserve continues to run a zero interest rate policy in contrast to other major economies that are raising rates or have stepped back from quantitative easing.

美联储继续实施零利率政策，这与其他主要经济体提高利率或已停止量化宽松的做法形成对比。

“A few years ago, Berkshire had a short U.S. dollar position to preserve the company’s value from the devaluating dollar.

几年前，伯克希尔持有短期美元头寸，以保护公司价值免受贬值美元的影响。

“So what’s the company’s management doing about the risk of further U.S. dollar weakness, given that most of the company’s assets and operating businesses are denominated in the U.S. dollar?”

“那么，考虑到公司大部分资产和运营业务以美元计价，公司管理层对美元进一步贬值的风险有什么应对措施？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we had a significance short position some years ago. Last year we had a small short position in two currencies, and we made about a hundred million dollars in them, but we have not been really active in the foreign exchange market.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们几年前有一个相当大的空头头寸。去年我们在两种货币上有一个小的空头头寸，赚了大约一亿美元，但我们在外汇市场上并没有真正活跃。

We think — shouldn’t speak for Charlie here on this — but I think that there’s no question that the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar will decline over time. The only question is at what rate.

我们认为——在这里不应该替查理发言——但我认为毫无疑问，美元的购买力会随着时间的推移而下降。唯一的问题是以什么速度下降。

But I also think that the purchasing power of most currencies around the world — almost most currencies around the world — will decline.

但我也认为，世界上大多数货币的购买力——几乎所有货币——将会下降。

And, of course, a short position is just a bet on which one declines at the faster rate, and I don’t have a strong conviction on that. I’ve got some mild feelings about it but not enough to where I want to back it up with a lot of money.

当然，做空头寸只是对哪个下跌速度更快的押注，而我对此并没有强烈的信心。我对此有一些轻微的感觉，但不足以让我用大量资金来支持它。

We do own some businesses — I mean, l take Coca-Cola.

我们确实拥有一些业务——我的意思是，我以可口可乐为例。

Coca-Cola — I don’t have the exact figures — but my guess is that 80 percent or thereabouts of the earnings will be non-dollar. And we’ve got exposure in various other ways.

可口可乐——我没有确切的数字——但我猜大约 80%的收益将是非美元的。我们在其他方面也有风险敞口。

But we are not — we’re unlikely to make another big currency bet, although I — you know, I do think that the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar is destined to decrease. And I have fears, but I’ve long had some unwarranted fears, of it declining at a rapid rate.

但我们并不这样——我们不太可能再进行一次大的货币押注，尽管我——你知道，我确实认为美元的购买力注定会下降。我有一些担忧，但我长期以来对其快速下跌有一些不必要的担忧。

Now, Charlie has pointed out to me that the dollar of 1930, when I was born, is worth 6 cents now. You know, 16-to-1 in terms of depreciation. And as he points out, we’ve both done pretty well.

现在，查理指出，1930 年的美元（我出生时）现在只值 6 美分。你知道，这意味着贬值率是 16 比 1。正如他所说，我们俩都过得不错。

So inflation has not destroyed us.

所以通货膨胀没有摧毁我们。

If somebody had said to me in 1930, In addition to this Great Depression you’re facing, and a World War where it looks like we’re even losing for a little while, and all these terrible things, on top of that that dollar that, you know, your grandfather is going to hand you when you’re born, is only going to be worth six cents in purchasing power, that might have been discouraging.

如果有人在 1930 年对我说，除了你面临的这场大萧条，还有一场看起来我们甚至会输一段时间的世界大战，以及所有这些可怕的事情，此外，你知道的，你出生时你祖父会给你的那美元，其购买力只值六美分，那可能会让我感到沮丧。

But overall, we’ve still done pretty well.

但总体来说，我们还是做得不错。

So, I hate inflation, but we’ve adapted pretty well to it over the years, and we have not had the total runaway-type inflation that really can be upsetting to a society, yet, but I think it’s something you always have to guard against.

所以，我讨厌通货膨胀，但多年来我们已经适应得很好，我们还没有经历过那种真正会让社会感到不安的失控型通货膨胀，但我认为这始终是需要防范的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but God knows where the world is headed. I just think that one way or another, the world muddles through.

查理·芒格：不，但上帝知道世界将走向何方。我只是认为，无论如何，世界无论如何都会熬过去。

Take a really god-awful culture, which is Greece, modern Greece.

以现代希腊为例，这个真是糟糕的文化。

I don’t mean there’s anything wrong with the Greeks, but — in their family life — but the way they manage their money and pay their taxes. The main industry in Greece — or one of the main industries — is tourist attractions, and they closed right — most of the time — during the tourist season.

我并不是说希腊人有什么问题，但——在他们的家庭生活中——他们管理金钱和缴纳税款的方式。希腊的主要产业——或者说主要产业之一——是旅游景点，而在旅游季节，他们大部分时间都是关闭的。

It’s a pretty dysfunctional government. (Laughter)

这是一个相当不健全的政府。（笑声）

And, of course, people don’t want to pay any taxes or do much work, and yet there it is. It’s — the people of Greece are surviving.

当然，人们不想缴纳任何税款或做太多工作，但事实就是如此。希腊人民的生活还在继续。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s lasted a long time.

沃伦·巴菲特：这已经持续很长时间了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah.

查理·芒格：是的，是的。

Adam Smith said it very well. He said, “A great civilization has a lot of ruin in it.”

亚当·斯密说得很好。他说：“一个伟大的文明有很多废墟。”

It takes a long time, and there’s a lot left after you’ve been through a good deal of ruin.

经历了许多毁灭之后，花费很长时间，仍然有很多东西留在身后。

In fact, it’s an easier game than the ordinary process of living and then dying.

事实上，这比普通的生活和死亡过程要简单。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think we’ll see a lot of inflation, but if I had a choice, I would rather be born in the United States today than any other place, any other time in history, so — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为我们会看到很多通货膨胀，但如果让我选择，我宁愿今天出生在美国，而不是历史上任何其他地方、任何其他时间，所以——（掌声）

21. Buy Berkshire stock or a mutual fund?

购买伯克希尔股票还是共同基金？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 8。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett. This is Mary Bundrick (PH) from Rochester, Minnesota.

观众：早上好，芒格先生和巴菲特先生。我是来自明尼苏达州罗切斯特的玛丽·邦德里克。

I was wondering, what factors would you consider in deciding between investment in Berkshire Hathaway versus a no-load mutual fund?

我在想，您在决定投资于伯克希尔·哈撒韦还是无负担共同基金时会考虑哪些因素？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I advise people to buy index funds, actually, if they’re not going to be active in investments.

沃伦·巴菲特：其实，我建议人们购买指数基金，如果他们不打算积极参与投资的话。

I mean, if you just are going — if you’ve got a day job, and you want to just put money aside over time, I think the average individual will do better buying an index fund consistently over time than almost anything else available to them.

我的意思是，如果你只是想——如果你有一份日常工作，并且想要随着时间的推移存钱，我认为普通人持续购买指数基金的效果会比几乎所有其他可用的投资方式要好。

I think it will be a perfectly satisfactory investment. It won’t be — it’ll never be regarded as a great investment, but it will be a perfectly satisfactory investment.

我认为这将是一个完全令人满意的投资。它不会——它永远不会被视为一个伟大的投资，但它将是一个完全令人满意的投资。

If I personally had a choice between an index fund and Berkshire at present prices, I would rather own Berkshire. But I wouldn’t be unhappy if you told me I had to leave all my money in an index fund for the rest of my life and then — but I like Berkshire better. (Laughs)

如果让我在目前的价格中选择一个指数基金和伯克希尔，我更愿意拥有伯克希尔。但如果你告诉我必须把所有的钱留在一个指数基金里过一辈子，我也不会不高兴——不过我更喜欢伯克希尔。（笑）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I like it a lot better, and I’d be very unhappy if I had to own an index fund. My ambitions are larger.

查理·芒格：嗯，我更喜欢这样，如果我不得不拥有一个指数基金，我会非常不开心。我的抱负更大。

I don’t think the average return of a skilled investor over the next 50 years is going to be as good after all factors as it was over the last 50 years.

我认为在考虑所有因素后，未来 50 年内一位熟练投资者的平均回报不会像过去 50 年那样好。

So I think reduced expectations are the best defense any investor has, and after that, I think Berkshire is a pretty good bet.

所以我认为降低期望是任何投资者最好的防御，之后，我认为伯克希尔是一个相当不错的选择。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s big on lowering expectations.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理非常注重降低期望。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：当然可以。（笑声）

That’s the way I got married. (Laughter)

这就是我结婚的方式。（笑声）

My wife lowered her expectations. (Laughter)

我妻子降低了她的期望。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And he lived up to them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他做到了这些。（笑声）

22. “Rules are not meant to be danced around”

“规则不是用来绕着走的”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: The question is, “Can you explain the company’s policy for your own personal investing outside of Berkshire and that of your other managers, and why aren’t all trades in investments first cleared through a compliance department like that of most other companies?”

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：问题是，“你能解释一下公司在伯克希尔以外的个人投资政策，以及你和其他经理的投资政策吗？为什么不像大多数其他公司那样，所有投资交易都要先通过合规部门审核？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think it is true of most other companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为这对大多数其他公司来说并不成立。

We have 260,000 employees, and we have one company that’s a subsidiary of General Re called New England Asset Management, but that’s the only company that advises other people on investments or operates in the investment field.

我们有 260,000 名员工，我们有一家名为新英格兰资产管理的子公司，隶属于 General Re，但这家公司是唯一一家为其他人提供投资建议或在投资领域运营的公司。

At Berkshire, there are presently three people that can execute trades, and then there are a few other clerical people that would see what was done.

在伯克希尔，目前有三个人可以执行交易，还有一些其他文员会查看所做的交易。

But we are not an investment advisory firm. We’re not a mutual fund or anything of the sort.

但我们不是一家投资顾问公司。我们不是共同基金或类似的机构。

So if we — we have some, I think, pretty clear rules that are going to be looked at, again, I can assure you, by the audit committee.

所以如果我们——我们有一些相当明确的规则，这些规则会被审计委员会再次审核。

But in terms of the Code of Conduct, Code of Ethics, and insider trading rules, which go to the managers, I don’t think there’s anything ambiguous in those.

但就行为准则、道德规范和内幕交易规则而言，这些都是针对管理层的，我认为其中没有任何模糊之处。

Now, to extend those beyond — I don’t know, Marc, how many people those go to but — whether 60 or 70 or something, I’m not sure of the number — but the problem with rules, you know, is, I mean, you’ve got to have them and we emphasize not only the letter of them, but the spirit. That’s why I write that letter every couple years.

现在，要将这些扩展到更远的地方——我不知道，马克，这些适用于多少人——无论是 60 还是 70 人，或者其他什么，我不确定具体数字——但规则的问题是，你知道的，我是说，你必须有规则，我们强调的不仅是规则的字面意义，还有其精神。这就是为什么我每隔几年就写那封信。

I was on the audit committee, for example, of Coca-Cola. And Coca-Cola has about one-fifth as many employees — or did then — had about 50,000 — had about one-fifth as many employees as Berkshire. And each time the audit committee met we had eight or 10 code violations.

我曾在可口可乐的审计委员会任职。例如，可口可乐的员工人数大约是伯克希尔的五分之一——当时大约有 50,000 名员工。每次审计委员会开会时，我们都有八到十项违规行为。

I mean, people — if you take Berkshire at 260,000 people, you know, that’s about the number of households in the greater metropolitan Omaha. And perfect as we like to think we are in Omaha, I will tell you there’s a lot of things going on in Omaha right as we sit here that, you know, do not match the rules. So it’s a real problem.

我的意思是，人们——如果你把伯克希尔看作有 260,000 人，你知道，这大约是大奥马哈地区的家庭数量。尽管我们喜欢认为奥马哈是完美的，但我告诉你，正如我们坐在这里，奥马哈有很多事情正在发生，这些事情与规则不符。所以这是一个真正的问题。

The problem, obviously, with the Sokol thing is it hit very, very high up, you know.

显然，索科尔事件的问题在于它影响到了非常高层的人士。

But we had a case sometime back where a fellow that was a friend of mine, vice president of one of our subsidiaries, and, like I say, a personal friend, and we supplied the evidence that sent him to jail.

但我们曾经有个案例，一位副总裁是我的朋友，来自我们的一家子公司，我提到过，他最终被我们提供的证据送进了监狱。

You know, it has happened. We had a — as I remember some years ago, I think it was in Woodbury, New York, we may have had a woman arrested in the offices just because we want to make very clear, you know, what — that we mean business and as the — as the audit committee said that this is not public relations, this is reality.

你知道，这件事发生过。我记得几年前，我想是在纽约的伍德伯里，我们可能在办公室里逮捕了一名女性，仅仅是因为我们想要非常明确地表明，我们是认真的，正如审计委员会所说，这不是公关，这是现实。

Here’s a letter that went out from Johns Manville. I didn’t know anything about it until Todd Raba gave it to me the other day, but it describes what — dated April 27, and it said, “The audit committee clearly found that Mr. Sokol compromised the integrity-related values of both Berkshire and JM have worked so hard to ingrain in the fabric of both companies.

这是来自约翰斯·曼维尔的一封信。我之前对此一无所知，直到托德·拉巴前几天把它给我，但信中描述了——日期为 4 月 27 日，信中提到：“审计委员会明确发现，索科尔先生损害了伯克希尔和 JM 在两家公司中努力根植的诚信相关价值观。”

“This should serve as a tragic lesson learned for every employee in JM.” And then in boldface, “There are no gray areas when it comes to integrity.” And it goes on.

“这应该成为 JM 每位员工的悲惨教训。” 然后用粗体字写道：“在诚信问题上没有灰色地带。” 然后继续。

So we hope to get some value out of this experience that will help us reinforce, with not only the 60 or 70 managers, but with 260,000 people that we do mean business on this, and we’ve showed them we mean business when we have sent more than one person to jail.

所以我们希望从这次经验中获得一些价值，以帮助我们强化这一点，不仅针对60或70名管理者，而且针对260,000名员工，我们确实对这一点是认真的，我们通过送人入狱多次来证明这一点。

But there will be, you know, we can have all the records in the world and if somebody wants to trade outside them or something, you know, I — they’re not going to tell us they’re trading in their cousin’s name. I mean, you know, it just doesn’t work that way.

但是，您知道，我们可以拥有世界上所有的记录，如果有人想在这些记录之外进行交易或者其他什么，您知道，我——他们不会告诉我们他们是以他们表亲的名义进行交易的。我的意思是，您知道，这种事情就是行不通的。

We will have occasions in the future when people do wrong things.

将来我们会有个别人员做错事的情况。

Usually they get handled at the subsidiary level. I mean, it’s somebody doing something, whether it’s getting a kickback from a vendor or stealing out of a cash register, whatever it may be, and then, you know, we get the occasional mega one, which is very painful.

通常这些问题是在子公司层面处理的。我的意思是，有人做了一些事情，无论是从供应商那里获取回扣还是从收银机里偷钱，不管是什么，然后，你知道，我们偶尔会遇到一些巨大的问题，这非常痛苦。

But we will — if there’s anything we can do in the rules that will make it even more explicit or get across further the idea that rules are not made to be danced around but rather that the spirit of them extends beyond them, we want to be sure we do it.

但如果我们能在规则上做些什么，让这一点更加明确，进一步传达“规则不是用来规避的，而是其精神超越了规则”，我们希望确保做到这一点。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, all that said, if you look at the greatest institutions in the world, they select very trustworthy people, and they trust them a lot. And it’s so much fun to be trusted. And there’s so much self-respect you get from it when you are trusted and are worthy of the trust, that I think your best compliance cultures are the ones which have this attitude of trust, and some of the ones with the biggest compliance departments, like Wall Street, have the most scandals.

查理·芒格：是的，尽管如此，如果你看看世界上最伟大的机构，它们会选择非常值得信赖的人，并且非常信任他们。被信任是如此有趣。当你被信任并且值得信任时，你会获得如此多的自尊，我认为你最好的合规文化是那些拥有这种信任态度的，而一些合规部门最大的机构，比如华尔街，反而有最多的丑闻。

So it’s not so simple that you can make your behavior better automatically just by making the compliance department bigger and bigger and bigger.

所以，仅仅通过不断扩大合规部门的规模，自动改善你的行为并不是那么简单。

This general culture of trust is what works. And, you know, Berkshire hasn’t had that many scandals of consequence, and I don’t think we’re going to get huge numbers, either.

这种普遍的信任文化就是有效的。而且，你知道，伯克希尔并没有发生过太多重大的丑闻，我也不认为我们会有大量的丑闻。

23. Deficit spending is economic stimulus

赤字支出是经济刺激。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 9. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第九个。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie and Warren. I’m Michelle from Decatur, Illinois.

观众成员：嗨，查理和沃伦。我是来自伊利诺伊州迪凯特的米歇尔。

Half the U.S. economy seems to be in a sluggish recovery while most foreign economies are showing solid growth numbers.

美国经济的一半似乎处于缓慢复苏中，而大多数外国经济则显示出稳健的增长数字。

Are there any significant changes that you think can be made to either current U.S. economic policy or Federal Reserve policy or tax laws to get the economy healthy and growing in the U.S.?

您认为在当前的美国经济政策、联邦储备政策或税法方面是否有任何重大变化可以促进美国经济健康增长？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve really had our foot to the floor in both monetary and fiscal policy.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在货币政策和财政政策上确实全力以赴。

You know, you’ve seen it, obviously, on the monetary side, with extended period of effectively zero interest rates and actually with the chairman, just the other day saying this is going to go on for an extended period.

你知道，你显然在货币方面看到了这一点，长期有效的零利率，实际上主席就在前几天说这将持续一段较长的时间。

And then they asked him what an extended period meant, and he was — he said an extended period. (Laughter)

然后他们问他什么是“较长一段时间”，他回答说就是“较长一段时间”。（笑声）

The — but we — it’s hard to imagine pushing harder on monetary policy than has occurred.

——但我们——很难想象在货币政策上比现在更大力度的推动。

The interesting thing is people think of fiscal policy and they think, well, we had a stimulus bill.

有趣的是，人们想到财政政策时，他们会想，我们有一项刺激法案。

Well, if you think about what stimulus really is, it’s not whether you call something a stimulus bill. If you had something that was called a stimulus bill and you didn’t run a deficit, it would not be, you know, it would not be a stimulus. You’d be —

好吧，如果你真正想明白刺激是什么，它并不是你是否称某个东西为刺激法案。如果你有一个叫做刺激法案的东西，而你没有出现赤字，那么这就不会是刺激。你就是—

And if you don’t have anything you call a stimulus bill at all, but you’re spending 10 percent more of your GDP than you’re taking in, you are applying an incredible stimulus — fiscal stimulus — to the economy.

如果你根本没有任何称为刺激法案的东西，但你支出比收入高出10% 的GDP，你实际上是在对经济施加巨大的财政刺激。

We have a huge fiscal stimulus program going on now, and it’s called taking in 15 percent of GDP and spending 25 percent of GDP. That’s extraordinary.

我们现在正在进行一个巨大的财政刺激计划，收入占GDP的15%，支出占GDP的25%。这非常惊人。

So, I think that we have used those levers in a way that’s almost unprecedented. And I think it’s been wise, in general, to do what’s done, and I think it was particularly wise what was done in the fall of 2008.

所以，我认为我们以一种几乎前所未有的方式使用了这些杠杆。我认为，总体来说，所做的事情是明智的，尤其是在 2008 年秋季所做的事情是特别明智的。

But I think, generally, we have followed the right policies. I think they’re less important than most people think they are.

但我认为，总的来说，我们采取了正确的政策。我认为它们的重要性没有大多数人想象的那么大。

I think if you did the wrong policies it would really screw things up. But I don’t — I don’t — I think the natural resuscitative powers of capitalism are — will be the biggest factor in taking us out.

我认为如果你采取错误的政策，事情会变得非常糟糕。但我不——我不——我认为资本主义的自然复苏能力将是我们走出困境的最大因素。

And I think you’ve seen that over the last two years and we’re seeing it month by month.

我认为你在过去两年中已经看到了这一点，我们每个月都在看到它。

I would say this: residential construction is flatlined at, you know, 500,000 or so units per year.

我想说的是：住宅建设保持在每年大约 50 万个单位的水平。

I think when it comes back, and it will, but it will take — it takes working off a crazy excess inventory we had, and there’s no way to do that except through creating fewer residential units than you create households. That’s how you reduce the oversupply.

我认为当它回来的时候，它会回来，但这需要——我们必须消化掉我们曾经拥有的疯狂过剩的库存，而唯一的方法就是创造的住宅单元少于家庭数量。这就是减少过剩供应的方法。

When that ends — when part comes back — I think you’re going to see much more of a pick-up in employment than you might think just by looking at construction workers.

当这结束时——当部分恢复时——我认为你会看到就业情况的改善，远超过你通过看建筑工人所想象的。

I mean, we have Shaw Carpets. You know, I’m sure they’re not counted as construction jobs, but we have thousands fewer people working there because residential construction is where it is.

我的意思是，我们有Shaw Carpets。你知道，我确信他们并不被视为建筑工作，但由于住宅建筑处于这种状态，我们的工人数少了几千。

And we have people at the Furniture Mart and how much carpet they’re selling or houses, so I think there’s a lot of indirect, as well as direct, reservoir of jobs that will be drawn upon, or utilized, when residential construction comes back.

我们还有家具市场，看看他们的地毯销售或者房屋销售，所以我认为有许多间接的以及直接的工作储备将在住宅建筑恢复时被利用。

I don’t think I’d measure it just by the number of construction workers that are being employed currently versus, say, four or five years ago.

我认为我不会仅仅通过目前雇佣的建筑工人数量与四五年前相比来衡量它。

It will come back. I don’t know when. I said in the annual report I thought you’d be seeing it by the end of the year. I may or may not be right on that, but that would be my best guess, still.

它会回来。我不知道什么时候。我在年度报告中说过，我认为你们会在年底之前看到它。我可能对这个判断是对的，也可能不是，但这仍然是我最好的猜测。

We are creating households faster than we’re creating housing units. And, you know, we lose housing units just — you know, you look at the — with the tornadoes recently.

我们创造新家庭的速度快于住房单位的创建。你知道，我们的住房单位正在流失——比如最近的龙卷风。

So there are — that problem will get cured. And I don’t think, when you mention we’re progressing more slowly than other places, certainly in terms of Asia, you know, there’s no question about it, or Brazil, but actually, I think our pace of coming out of this, while it’s been slow compared to the hit we took in 2008 — the American economy was paralyzed — it’s come back quite a distance, and we see that in our businesses.

所以这个问题会得到解决。我认为，当你提到我们进展比其他地方慢时，尤其是在亚洲，毫无疑问，或者在巴西，但实际上，我认为我们走出这个困境的步伐，尽管与 2008 年我们遭受的打击相比很慢——美国经济当时瘫痪——但实际上已经恢复了相当一部分，我们在我们的企业中看到了这一点。

Now, you know, our peak on railcar loadings were 219,000 one week, I believe, in 2006, but — and our bottom was 150- or 51-thousand. We’ll probably run 190,000, or thereabouts, currently, and that will pick up more as the year goes along.

现在，你知道，我们在 2006 年的某一周，铁路货车装载量达到了 219,000 辆的峰值，但最低时为 150,000 或 151,000 辆。目前我们可能会维持在 190,000 辆左右，随着年份的推移，这个数字会进一步增加。

So it’s come back a significant way. We have certain companies that are setting records that serve basic industries. If you look at TTI, which makes — which distributes — electronic components, has thousands and thousands of customers all over the world — it’s setting new records, and it’s way up in the first quarter and it set a record last year.

所以它已经回升了相当多。我们有一些公司在基础行业中创下了记录。如果你看看 TTI，它生产——它分销——电子元件，在全球拥有成千上万的客户——它正在创下新纪录，并且在第一季度大幅上升，去年也创下了记录。

If you look at ISCAR, which supplies nothing but basic industry, I mean, nobody buys little carbon cutting tools, you know, to put in their recreation room or anything. This stuff is used, you know, for making big things, and their business is going up and up and up, you know, month by month.

如果你看看 ISCAR，它只供应基础工业，我是说，没有人会购买小型碳切割工具，放在他们的休闲室里或其他地方。这些东西是用来制造大物件的，他们的生意一个月比一个月好。

So, the economy is coming back, and when residential construction finally gets this huge overhang largely eliminated I think — I think you’ll see a lot of improvement in the employment picture.

所以，经济正在复苏，当住宅建设最终大幅消除这个巨大的积压时，我认为——我认为你会看到就业形势有很大改善。

Charlie? 查理？

24. Munger tells how he’d take “an ax to our financial sector”

芒格讲述了他如何“对我们的金融部门下手”。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the one place that I feel we’re making a huge mistake is not learning enough from the big mess that came from wretched excess in our financial system.

查理·芒格：是的，我觉得我们犯下的一个巨大错误是没有从我们金融系统的极端过度中吸取足够的教训。

I don’t think we throttled the sin and folly out of that aspect of the economy nearly enough. And I think — if you look at all the panics and depressions in the United States, they all came from financial collapses, usually preceded by perfectly asinine and greedy behavior. And I think that would be a lot to be said for taking an ax to our financial sector and whittling it down to a more constructive size.

我认为我们没有足够地遏制经济中这一方面的罪恶与愚蠢。如果你查看美国历史上所有的恐慌与萧条，它们都是由金融崩溃引起的，通常是由完全愚蠢和贪婪的行为所引发的。我认为，削减我们的金融部门，让它变得更加建设性是非常重要的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell us more about how you use that ax. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉我们更多关于你如何使用那把斧头的事。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren, I’ll make myself ridiculous, but I guess I’m so old I’m entitled to do that.

查理·芒格：好吧，沃伦，我会让自己显得可笑，但我想我年纪大了，有权这样做。

The — I would have the tax system discourage trading. I would have various kinds of Tobin taxes.

我希望税制能抑制交易。我会引入各种类型的托宾税。

I would have securities trading more with the frequency of real estate than the trading by computer algorithms where one person’s computers outwit another person’s computers in what amounts to sort of legalized front running.

我希望证券交易的频率能更接近房地产交易，而不是由计算机算法进行交易，在这种情况下，一个人的计算机在合法的抢跑中胜过另一个人的计算机。

I don’t think we need any of that stuff. And I think making heroes out of the people who succeed at it is not good for the fiber of the country, either.

我认为我们不需要那些东西。而且，我认为把成功的人塑造成英雄对国家的本质也没有好处。

I hate the idea that 25 percent of our best engineers are going into the financial sector.

我讨厌 25%的优秀工程师进入金融行业这个想法。

So, I think it’s crazy what we’ve allowed. (Applause)

所以，我觉得我们所允许的事情真是疯狂。（掌声）

And I think the lack of contrition in our financial sector, after the disgraceful stuff they got us into, is perfectly awesome. It makes Dave Sokol look like a hero. (Applause)

而且，我认为金融部门在经历了那些可耻的事件后缺乏悔过之心，真是让人震惊。这样一来，戴夫·索科尔看起来像是个英雄。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s getting warmed up. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他正在热身。（笑声）

Just as a sidelight, how many of you know that if you trade an S & P future contract — 500 — S&P 500 contract — and you hold it for 10 seconds and you have a profit, that 60 percent of the gain is long-term gain and 40 percent is short-term gain. So, essentially, our Congress has said that this activity should be more lightly taxed, you know, than cleaning washrooms or doing all the things that you people do every day. You get a special tax treatment.

顺便提一下，知道吗，如果你交易标准普尔500的期货合约——并且你持有它10秒钟，如果你获利，那么60%的收益是长期收益，40%是短期收益。因此，实际上，我们的国会已经表示，这项活动的税负应该低于清洁洗手间或你们每天做的所有事情。你们获得了特别的税收待遇。

Now that illustrates one of the problems with the tax code, in that there’s a few people that care intensely about having that in there, and the cost of it, in terms of less revenue for the U.S. government, is diffused among a large group, none of whom have enough interest to want to go out and write their Congressman or hire a lobbyist to fight the other way.

这说明了税法的一个问题，因为有少数人非常关注这一点，而它带来的美国政府收入减少的成本则分摊到一个大群体中，没有一个人有足够的兴趣去写信给国会议员或雇佣游说者来反对。

But it’s pretty extraordinary that we have decided that that particular form of activity should get 60 percent taxed at a 15 percent maximum rate, even though it may only take 10 or 20 seconds and be just a little flicker on a screen.

但我们决定这种特定形式的活动应以 15%的最高税率征收 60%的税，这实在是相当不寻常，尽管它可能只需要 10 或 20 秒，并且只是屏幕上的一小闪烁。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And the hedge fund operators of America get a much lower tax rate than the professors of physics or the drivers of taxis. This is demented. (Applause)

查理·芒格：美国的对冲基金操作者的税率远低于物理教授或出租车司机。这是疯狂的。（掌声）

25. Update on Buffett’s bet against hedge funds

关于巴菲特对冲基金的赌注更新

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with that, we’re getting to our break at noon, and I promised — I made a bet three years ago with some fellows that run a fund of funds, and I promised to put the figures up every year as to how we’re doing.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，随着这个，我们要在中午休息了。我三年前和一些管理基金的朋友打了个赌，我承诺每年公布我们的业绩数据。

It’s a 10-year deal, and if we can put up the slide — what number would that be? Probably five.

这是一个为期 10 年的协议，如果我们能展示幻灯片——那会是哪个数字？可能是五。

As you can see, these funds of funds — these are five funds of funds groups chosen by these people who I like, Ted Seides and his friends, and Ted couldn’t be with us today, but we will put these figures up annually.

正如您所看到的，这些基金中的基金——这是由我喜欢的这些人，Ted Seides 和他的朋友们选择的五个基金中的基金组，Ted 今天无法与我们在一起，但我们将每年公布这些数据。

He got off to a very good start with his group. Obviously, hedge funds should do better in a down market. And we haven’t caught them yet with the S&P 500, but it will give you all a reason to keep coming back over the next seven years as I report regularly on how we are doing in the S&P 500 versus the five funds of funds.

他与他的团队开局非常顺利。显然，对冲基金在下行市场中的表现应该更好。我们还没有在标准普尔 500 指数中追上他们，但这将给你们一个理由在接下来的七年里继续关注，因为我会定期报告我们在标准普尔 500 指数与五个基金中的表现。

As [Fortune Magazine’s] Carol [Loomis] pointed out in an article recently or a — maybe it was on the web — in reporting on this, she looked at the bottom line where the investors in the S&P 500 are behind for the three years, and the investors in the funds of funds are behind, and the only people that are ahead so far are the investment managers. (Laughs)

正如《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯最近在一篇文章中指出的，或者也许是在网上报道中，她查看了标准普尔 500 指数投资者在过去三年中的表现，发现他们落后于市场，而基金中的基金投资者也落后，唯一领先的只有投资经理们。（笑）

They’re doing very well at this point. So we’ll keep you up to date on that.

他们目前做得很好。所以我们会随时向您更新情况。

Afternoon session

下午会议

26. Two clarifications on David Sokol and Lubrizol

关于大卫·索科尔和Lubrizol的两个澄清

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If you’ll all be seated.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。如果大家都就座的话。

I can’t see whether Ron Olson is in the front row or not.

我看不出罗恩·奥尔森是否在前排。

Ron, are you here? 罗恩，你在这里吗？

OK. Ron wanted to — well, we’ll get you a mic.

好的。罗恩想要——好吧，我们会给你一个麦克风。

Because we’re transcribing this and we want to get it all corrected, Ron has one point or two points that he wants to correct in terms of dates that I used. So we are going to give the microphone to him.

因为我们正在转录这个内容，并希望将其全部纠正，Ron 有一两点他想要纠正我使用的日期。因此我们将把麦克风交给他。

RON OLSON: Not that they’re all that telling, but I thought since we are creating a record, I wanted to clarify two points.

RON OLSON: 虽然它们并不是特别重要，但我想既然我们在创建记录，我想澄清两个要点。

The Berkshire law firm, namely Munger, Tolles & Olson worked with the Lubrizol counsel in pulling together what Warren described as Lubrizol’s proxy describing the background of the transaction.

伯克希尔律师事务所，即Munger、Tolles & Olson，与 Lubrizol 的法律顾问合作，整理了沃伦所描述的 Lubrizol 的代理文件，阐述了交易的背景。

We, as counsel for Berkshire, started to work on that gathering of facts pertaining to Berkshire’s involvement, essentially David Sokol’s and Warren’s, during the week of March 15.

作为伯克希尔的法律顾问，我们开始在3月15日那一周收集与伯克希尔的参与相关的事实，主要是关于大卫·索科尔和沃伦的事实。

Warren, in speaking to you about the facts this morning, I believe, placed the beginning of that work in the subsequent week. So I simply wanted to clarify that as we gathered the facts, and that gathering included several interviews of David Sokol during that week.

我相信沃伦在今早与你们谈论这些事实时，将这项工作的开始时间放在了随后的那一周。因此，我只是想澄清一下，因为我们在收集这些事实，这包括在那一周对大卫·索科尔的几次访谈。

Secondly, in describing internal policies at Berkshire to protect against misbehavior or negligent behavior, Berkshire maintains a — something that those in the trading business describe as restricted lists.

其次，在描述伯克希尔内部政策以防止不当行为或疏忽行为时，伯克希尔维持着一个被交易业务人士称为“限制名单”的制度。

And on that restricted list are any securities in which Berkshire is buying, selling, has a peculiar interest, and that prohibits any of the corporate officers or the top officers of the subsidiaries of Berkshire from participating in trades in those securities without the consent of the CFO, Marc Hamburg.

在该限制名单上，包含伯克希尔正在买入、卖出、具有特殊利益的任何证券，并且禁止伯克希尔的任何公司高管或子公司的高层在未获得首席财务官马克·汉堡的同意下参与这些证券的交易。

That is what I wanted to clarify, Warren.

这就是我想澄清的，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks, Ron.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，罗恩。

27. Munger still bullish on electric-car maker BYD

芒格仍然看好电动车制造商比亚迪

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll move right along. And we’re going to go to 3:30 and then we’ll adjourn for a couple minutes, and then we’ll go to the regular meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们继续。我们将在 3:30 结束，然后休息几分钟，接着进行常规会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol again leads off.

沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗再次开场。

CAROL LOOMIS: Warren and Charlie, both of your expressed a very positive view of BYD and its chairman, Wang Chuanfu, when MidAmerican bought its stake in 2008.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：沃伦和查理，你们两人都对比亚迪及其董事长王传福表达了非常积极的看法，当时MidAmerican在 2008 年购买了其股份。

Does BYD remain as attractive a long-term investment now as it was when you acquired your stake?

比亚迪现在作为长期投资是否仍然像您获得股份时那样有吸引力？

If so, why? Has BYD’s recent pattern of unexplained product launch delays affected your confidence in the operation?

如果是这样，为什么？比亚迪最近频繁的产品发布延迟是否影响了你对其运营的信心？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is the BYD expert, so I’m going to let him start on that one.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理是比亚迪的专家，所以我让他先谈谈这个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, the price is still way higher than the price Berkshire paid, and so almost by definition it’s not quite as cheap as it was then.

查理·芒格：当然，价格仍然远高于伯克希尔支付的价格，因此几乎可以说，它并不像当时那样便宜。

Any company that tries to move as fast as BYD does, and on as many fronts, is going to have various delays and glitches. But I would say I’m quite encouraged by what’s going on, and I expect delays and glitches.

任何一家试图像比亚迪一样快速发展，并在多个领域同时推进的公司，都会遇到各种延误和问题。但我想说，我对目前的情况感到相当鼓舞，并且我预期会有延误和问题。

They had trouble in the auto distribution, but they tried to double auto sales every year for six years, and it worked the first five times. (Laughter)

他们在汽车分销方面遇到了麻烦，但他们试图在六年内每年将汽车销量翻倍，前五次都成功了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I have nothing to add. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

28. Making money by trading oil is too hard

通过交易石油赚钱太难了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第十个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. My name is Catherine Brood (PH). I’m from Los Angeles, California.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我叫凯瑟琳·布鲁德（PH）。我来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。

I invest primarily in commodities and commodity equities. I started out back 2007 buying oil.

我主要投资于商品和商品股票。我在 2007 年开始投资石油。

In the summer of 2008, we reached the peak of the oil bubble. That’s when I reversed my holdings and started shorting oil.

在 2008 年夏天，我们达到了石油泡沫的顶峰。那时我反转了我的持仓，开始做空石油。

I made a nice profit.

我赚了不错的利润。

In 2009, I started buying oil again and oil equities, and I’ve been doing pretty well. But given the status of the world today and the price of oil, I’m questioning my investments.

在 2009 年，我开始再次购买石油和石油股票，并且做得相当不错。但考虑到今天世界的状况和石油价格，我开始质疑我的投资。

Is this another oil bubble? Has oil reached its peak? Should I keep my holdings? Should I short oil? Should I exit oil altogether and move into other commodities or other investments?

这又是一个石油泡沫吗？石油已经达到顶峰了吗？我应该继续持有我的资产吗？我应该做空石油吗？我应该完全退出石油，转向其他商品或其他投资吗？

So my question to you is, what your sentiments regarding oil?

我想问你的是，你对石油的看法是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say you’ve done a whole lot better than we have. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说你们做得比我们好多了。（笑）

I think the crowd would rather hear from you.

我认为人群更想听听你的意见。

We actually did take a position in oil — I don’t know how many years ago.

我们实际上在石油方面采取了一个立场——我不知道是多少年前。

CHARLIE MUNGER: A long time ago.

查理·芒格：很久以前。

WARREN BUFFETT: A long time ago.

沃伦·巴菲特：很久以前。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was $10 a barrel. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那时是每桶 10 美元。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It wasn’t that long ago though, incidentally. That was in the 1990s, although we’ve seen oil a lot cheaper than that.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，这并不是很久以前。那是在 1990 年代，尽管我们见过更便宜的石油。

East Texas Oil sold for a dime a barrel in 1932.

东德克萨斯州的石油在 1932 年以每桶十美分的价格出售。

The — we really don’t know.

我们真的不知道。

I mean, obviously, you’re dealing with a finite resource. I don’t know whether the world is up to 88 million barrels or — it was down around 85 million barrels, but there’s got to be some comeback, so I wouldn’t be surprised if the current figure is getting pretty close to 88 million barrels a day.

我想，显然，你正在处理一个有限的资源。我不知道世界是否达到了每日 8800 万桶——之前大约是 8500 万桶，但肯定会有一些反弹，所以我不会感到惊讶，如果目前的数字接近每日 8800 万桶。

That’s a lot of oil to take out of the ground every day. And, of course, there are — new frontiers have been found, but you are — you’ve stuck a lot of straws into the Earth, and it is a finite number.

每天从地下提取这么多石油。当然，新的前沿已经被发现，但你们已经在地球上插入了很多吸管，而这是一种有限的资源。

So, the one thing I can promise you is — almost promise you — is that oil will sell for a lot more someday.

所以，我可以向你保证的唯一一件事——几乎可以保证——就是石油将来会卖得更贵。

Interestingly enough, how many producing oil wells do you think there are in the United States?

有趣的是，你认为美国有多少口正在生产的油井？

The answer is something like 500,000. You know, there’s these stripper wells, there’s wells out near Charlie that have been going for a hundred years.

答案大约是50万口。你知道，有一些小型油井，还有一些在查理那附近的油井，已经开了整整一百年。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we have looked in a lot of places now.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们现在已经在很多地方寻找过了。

And what’s happening, of course, from the standpoint of United States companies, is that the smaller countries where oil is being found now are quite a bit smarter about how they grant their concessions than people were 50 or 75 or 100 years ago, so that they drive much more intelligent deals than was originally the case when we went exploring around the world.

当然，从美国公司的角度来看，现在发现石油的小国在授予特许权方面比 50、75 或 100 年前的人聪明得多，因此他们达成的交易比我们当初在全球探索时要聪明得多。

But I have no idea — you know, we — traditionally, BNSF had hedged a certain amount of oil and — because they obviously use huge quantities of diesel — and I suggested to them — although how they run the BNSF is up to them — but I really didn’t think we could guess the price of oil.

但我真的不知道——你知道，传统上，BNSF对某些石油进行了对冲——因为他们显然使用大量柴油——我建议他们——虽然如何运营BNSF是他们的决定——但我真的不认为我们能预测石油的价格。

And I thought if we could guess the price of oil, we didn’t need to run the railroad. I mean, it was a — took a lot of effort, time to run that railroad. And if we know how to make money just sitting in a room trading oil, why not do that instead?

我想如果我们能猜到石油的价格，就不需要经营铁路了。我的意思是，经营铁路需要付出很多努力和时间。如果我们知道如何只在一个房间里交易石油就能赚钱，那为什么不这样做呢？

So I don’t really — we don’t hedge — well, in terms of Berkshire’s parent company policies, we don’t hedge anything in the way of commodities. Some of our subsidiaries do, and that’s fine. They’re responsible for their businesses.

所以我真的——在伯克希尔母公司的政策方面，我们不对冲任何商品。我们的一些子公司确实这样做，这很好。他们对自己的业务负责。

But there are very, very few commodities that I’ve ever thought I was going to — would know the direction of their movement in the next six months or a year.

但我曾经认为我会知道未来六个月或一年的商品价格走势的商品非常非常少。

The one thing I’m quite convinced of, as we talked about this morning, is the fact the dollar will become less valuable over time, so that the dollar price of most things will go up, and maybe go up very substantially.

我非常确信的一件事，正如我们今天早上讨论的那样，美元会随着时间的推移而贬值，因此大多数东西的美元价格会上涨，甚至可能大幅上涨。

Whether they go up enough so that you have the same amount of purchasing power after you pay tax on your nominal gains is another question.

他们是否上涨到足够的程度，以便在你对名义收益缴税后仍然拥有相同的购买力，这是另一个问题。

I really think that an intelligent person can make more money, over time, thinking about assets that — productive assets — rather than speculating in commodities, or for that matter, fixed dollar investments, but that’s maybe my own bias.

我确实认为，一个聪明的人，随着时间的推移，通过考虑生产性资产会赚更多钱，而不是在大宗商品或固定美元投资中进行投机，但这也许是我个人的偏见。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we’d done nothing but oil from the very beginning, I’m confident that we would not have done nearly as well as we have.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果我们从一开始就只做石油，我相信我们的表现不会像现在这样好。

To me, that’s perfectly obvious. So I think what we’ve done is much easier than what you’re trying to do.

对我来说，这显而易见。所以我认为我们所做的比你们想做的要简单得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we like easy.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们喜欢简单。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re not trying to make it any more difficult than we have to.

查理·芒格：我们并不想让事情变得比必要的更困难。

WARREN BUFFETT: I really don’t know any way to have an edge in that sort of activity.

沃伦·巴菲特：我真的不知道在那种活动中有什么办法可以获得优势。

I mean, if you are going to try and figure out whether when to be long or short oil, or natural gas, or copper or cotton or whatever, I don’t know of people who I feel would have an edge in trying to do that over the next 10 years.

我的意思是，如果你要试图弄清楚何时做多或做空石油、天然气、铜、棉花或其他任何东西，我不知道有谁在接下来的 10 年里会在这方面有优势。

But I do know people where I think they’d have a very significant edge in investing in common stocks, and maybe distressed bonds, for that matter, too.

但我确实知道有些人，我认为他们在投资普通股票方面有很大的优势，也许在投资困境债券方面也是如此。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, trading oil worked best of all for the people who bribed Nigeria.

查理·芒格：是的，交易石油最成功的人是那些贿赂尼日利亚的人。

That’s not our milieu. 那不是我们的环境。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s an insight I hadn’t heard before. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是我之前没听过的见解。（笑声）

29. Clarification of the clarification on Sokol and Lubrizol

对 Sokol 和 Lubrizol 的澄清说明

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? Oh, I got Ron here.

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？哦，我这里有罗恩。

RON OLSON: I wanted to clarify my clarification. (Laughter)

RON OLSON: 我想澄清我的澄清。（笑声）

Sounds like a lawyer, doesn’t it?

听起来像个律师，不是吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: It sounds like a lawyer. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：听起来像个律师。（笑声）

RON OLSON: Marc Hamburg was concerned that when I spoke of our insider trading policy and mentioned that we had a restricted list, that it — somebody may interpret that as suggesting that Lubrizol was on that restricted list. It was not.

RON OLSON: 马克·汉堡（Marc Hamburg）担心，当我谈到我们的内幕交易政策并提到我们有一个限制名单时，可能会有人解读为卢布里佐尔（Lubrizol）在那份限制名单上。实际上并不是。

What goes on our restricted list are securities that we have a position in that we publicly reported.

我们限制名单上的证券是我们持有并已公开报告的证券。

So I just simply wanted clarify that point. Lubrizol was not on the restricted list.

所以我只是想澄清这一点。Lubrizol 不在限制名单上。

30. “I’m going to have Charlie write the next press release”

“我会让查理写下一个新闻稿。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: Charlie, I’ve got several variations of this question, but this one comes from Peter Kerr (PH) in Waterloo, Canada.

贝基·奎克：查理，我有几个版本的问题，但这个问题来自加拿大滑铁卢的彼得·凯尔（PH）。

He says, “Could you please let us know a couple of the most important things you learned during the last year?”

他说：“您能告诉我们去年您学到的几件最重要的事情吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll let Charlie go first. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我让查理先说。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I hate to admit this because I’ve ignored high-tech all my life, but I actually read that book “In the Plex” about Google, and I found it a very interesting book.

查理·芒格：我不想承认这一点，因为我一生都忽视高科技，但我实际上读了那本关于谷歌的书《In the Plex》，我发现这本书非常有趣。

And so here I am at my advanced age, and I find it interesting the way people have created these engineering cultures, which are quite peculiar and different from most of what we have at Berkshire.

所以在我这个年纪，我发现人们创造的这些工程文化非常有趣，它们与我们在伯克希尔所拥有的大多数文化截然不同。

And will I ever make any use of this? I doubt it. But I certainly enjoyed learning it.

我会用到这个吗？我怀疑。但我确实很享受学习它。

And if I enjoy learning it, I regard it as important, because I think that’s what you’re here for, is to go to bed every night a little wiser than you were when you got up.

如果我喜欢学习它，我就认为这很重要，因为我认为你来这里的目的就是每天晚上上床时比早上起床时更聪明一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m just trying to hold my own, actually. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我其实只是想保持自己的状态。（笑）

What I learned in the last year is that I’m going to have Charlie write the next press release. (Laughter)

我在过去一年学到的是，我会让查理写下一个新闻稿。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, I approved that damn press release with no objections. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：沃伦，我对那该死的新闻稿没有提出任何异议。（笑声）

The Berkshire shareholders are going to be in terrible trouble if they’re relying on me to fix your errors. (Laughter)

如果伯克希尔的股东依靠我来纠正你的错误，那他们可真要遭殃了。（笑声）

31. CEO should be left “dead broke” after a bailout

在救助后，首席执行官应该“一文不名”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s go to number 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们来看看第 11 个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Getting too close to confession time up here. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这里快要到忏悔时间了。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie. My name is Phil Drew (PH), and I’m here with my wife Tina and our good friends the Grummys (PH) and the Henriksens (PH).

观众成员：下午好，沃伦和查理。我叫菲尔·德鲁（PH），我和我的妻子蒂娜以及我们的好朋友格鲁米一家（PH）和亨里克森一家（PH）在这里。

We’re all from Indianapolis, and we’re all small businesspeople. So we are not too big to fail.

我们都来自印第安纳波利斯，我们都是小企业主。因此，我们并不是“太大而不能倒”。

And our question, basically, is simply this: do either of you gentlemen think that we might be headed down the same type of path years from now when we get into a situation as taxpayers, that we might have to bail out a company on Wall Street that is too big to fail? And if so, have we done anything to avert that?

我们的基本问题是：你们两位先生是否认为，几年后当我们作为纳税人面临一种情况时，我们可能会走上同样的道路，必须救助一家“太大而不能倒”的华尔街公司？如果是这样，我们是否做了什么来避免这种情况？

WARREN BUFFETT: There are institutions around the world that I think governments should properly — although people won’t like it — but I think that there are institutions around the world that governments would properly — I think bailout has got a little bit of a pejorative term on it, in the sense that stockholders should not be saved, managers should not be saved — but certainly the institutions, in some cases, should not be allowed to collapse immediately.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为世界各地有一些机构，政府应该适当地——尽管人们可能不喜欢——但我认为世界各地有一些机构，政府应该适当地——我认为“救助”这个词有点贬义，意思是股东不应该被拯救，管理者不应该被拯救——但我认为这些机构在某些情况下不应该立即崩溃。

I mean, right now, we’re continuing to follow that policy, for example, with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. I mean, they have not reconstituted themselves, as many of the banks and the auto companies.

目前，例如，房利美（Freddie Mac）和房地美（Fannie Mae）就继续遵循这种政策。它们并没有像许多银行和汽车公司那样重新恢复。

I mean, Chrysler is even paying back, which, you know, surprises me, but my hat is off to them, and I mean that sincerely. I was really on the fence on saving the auto companies, but I think the administration did the right thing.

比如，克莱斯勒（Chrysler）正在偿还贷款，这让我感到惊讶，但我对他们表示敬意，这一点我真心如此。我在救助汽车公司时曾经非常犹豫，但我认为政府做了正确的决定。

I mean, there were — they weren’t saving the auto companies, per se, they were still working at saving a very fragile economy.

我的意思是，他们并不是在拯救汽车公司，而是在努力拯救一个非常脆弱的经济。

And, like I say, particularly in retrospect, they certainly, in my view, made the right decision.

而且，正如我所说，特别是回顾起来，他们在我看来确实做出了正确的决定。

There are — right now, you know, in Europe they’re deciding whether countries are too big to fail.

现在，在欧洲，他们正在决定哪些国家太大而不能倒闭。

And so I think that problem will always be with us.

我认为这个问题将永远伴随我们。

I think for that reason that you have to do things to reduce the propensity to fail, and among those things, I think you have to make it so that the CEO, and to some extent the board — but not to the draconian degree that I’ll suggest for the CEO — I think that any institution that requires society to come and bail it out for society’s sake should have a system in place that leaves their CEO, basically, and his spouse, dead broke, because I think that the upside and downside incentives are vastly different. (Applause)

因此，出于这个原因，你必须采取措施来降低失败的倾向，其中之一是使CEO，以及在某种程度上董事会——但对CEO的建议不会那么严厉——我认为任何需要社会出手救助的机构，应该有一个制度，让他们的CEO基本上和他们的配偶一无所有，因为我认为这样可以使得风险和收益的激励机制更加合理。（掌声）

And I think the board of directors of those institutions should suffer severe penalties. Nothing like that, but they certainly, you know, should give back, say, the last five years of directors’ fees or whatever it may be that they received.

我认为那些机构的董事会应该受到严厉的惩罚。虽然不至于如此，但他们确实应该退还，比如说，过去五年的董事费用或他们所获得的其他任何东西。

Because they — if you run an institution that actually needs — society can suffer such a blow if you fail — that society needs to come in and save you, you ought to have somebody running that institution, and you ought to have incentive practices in place that make it very, very, very painful to the people involved for the failure if it indeed happens.

因为如果你管理的机构确实需要——如果你失败，社会将遭受如此重大的打击——社会需要出面拯救你，那么你就应该有一个人来管理该机构，并且应该有激励机制，使得参与者在发生失败时承担非常非常大的痛苦。

And you also ought to reduce leverage in the system, and I think we’ve gone, to some degree, in that direction.

你还应该减少系统中的杠杆，我认为我们在某种程度上朝这个方向走了。

But there will be too big to fail institutions 10 years from now or 20 years from now. Right now Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae are sort of too big to figure out.

但在未来 10 年或 20 年内，将会有一些过于庞大的机构无法倒闭。目前，房利美和房地美在某种程度上是过于庞大而难以解决的。

We just sit there — and incidentally, here’s nothing wrong with that. It’s more important to come up with the right solution than it is to come up with an immediate solution on those.

我们就坐在那里——顺便说一下，这没有什么不对。想出正确的解决方案比立即找到解决方案更重要。

But particularly, I would say, in Europe there are banking institutions in countries that people are facing the question of whether they are too big to fail.

但特别是在欧洲，有一些国家的银行机构，面临着是否“太大而不能倒”的问题。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my answer is that the past panics and depressions, by and large, started on Wall Street or in stock brokerages.

查理·芒格：我的回答是，过去的恐慌和经济萧条大体上都是从华尔街或股票经纪公司开始的。

They tended to involve great waves of excessive speculation and bad behavior in the people who were profiting from those waves as salesman, or market makers, or promoters or what have you.

它们往往涉及到大量过度投机和从中获利的人们的不良行为，这些人可能是销售员、市场制造者、推广者或其他角色。

And I think that this last mess, which created so much danger, should have caused something like happened in the aftermath of the ’30s, where we prevented a new mess for a long, long time, but, of course, it hasn’t done that.

我认为这次混乱，造成了如此大的危险，应该引发一些像20世纪30年代之后那样的变革，从而很长一段时间内防止新的危机，但显然，它并没有做到这一点。

And so I think you can confidently expect a new mess or two before you career is over, and I think it is really stupid for our country to have allowed this.

所以我认为你可以有信心地预期，在你的一生中还会出现一两次新的危机，我认为允许这种情况发生对我们的国家来说是非常愚蠢的。

Partly the failure is not one of evil, it’s one of stupidity. And part of the stupidity is in our great academic institutions who believe a whole lot of things that aren’t true. And that is a really hard problem to solve.

部分失败并不是出于邪恶，而是出于愚蠢。而这种愚蠢部分存在于我们伟大的学术机构中，它们相信许多不真实的事情。这是一个非常难以解决的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re talking about particularly in finance?

沃伦·巴菲特：你是在特别谈论金融吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, of course, and economics, too.

查理·芒格：是的，当然，还有经济学。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Those are not hard sciences, finance and economics. And finance really attracts people who should have gone into snake charming or — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：金融和经济学并不是硬科学。金融确实吸引那些本该去学蛇魅术的人——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If there’s anybody we’ve forgotten to insult, just pass a note up, and we’ll get to you. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们忘记了侮辱谁，请传个纸条上来，我们会处理的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

32. No Washington Post shares will be sold after board resignation

董事会辞职后将不再出售华盛顿邮报的股票

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from a shareholder based in Washington, DC, who has asked to remain anonymous.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自一位位于华盛顿特区的股东，他要求匿名。

This person says, “Warren, in the past year you and Melinda Gates resigned from the board of the Washington Post. What does this say about Berkshire’s intention to hold the Washington Post stock over the long term, and is this related to the problems at its for-profit education business, Kaplan?”

这个人说：“沃伦，在过去的一年里，你和梅琳达·盖茨辞去了华盛顿邮报的董事会职务。这说明了伯克希尔对长期持有华盛顿邮报股票的意图吗？这与其营利性教育业务 Kaplan 的问题有关吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I made this statement, actually, publicly, and they may have only run it in the Post, I’m not sure about elsewhere.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我实际上是公开发表了这个声明，他们可能只在《邮报》上刊登过，我不确定其他地方是否有。

But I made the statement that we would not be selling any stock, and it had nothing to do with that, that I’m a phone call away from Don Graham or anybody else at the Post, and they can just save a lot of directors fees and I can save a lot of travel if at age 80 I decide that I’d rather spend a few more days at Berkshire and less on the road.

但我已经明确表示，我们不会出售任何股票，这与此无关。我随时可以打电话给唐·格雷厄姆或《邮报》的任何其他人，他们可以节省很多董事费，而我也可以节省很多旅行费用。如果我在80岁时决定更愿意多待几天在伯克希尔，而不是在路上，我觉得这样更简单。

I am — we will not be selling any Post shares.

我们不会出售任何《邮报》的股份。

Normally I won’t comment about what we’ll do on marketable securities, but I’ll be unequivocal about that.

通常我不会对我们在可交易证券上的行动发表评论，但我会对此毫不含糊。

And my enthusiasm for the Post itself and the management is 100 percent what it’s always been, and I — I’m just available a lot cheaper than before if the Post management wants any advice.

我对《邮报》及其管理层的热情依然是百分之百的，我——如果《邮报》管理层需要任何建议，我现在的可用性比以前便宜得多。

I don’t think Melinda did it on the basis of age. You’ll have to ask her.

我不认为梅琳达是基于年龄这样做的。你得问她。

I really decided at 80 that I’d been there since 1974, with an interruption when I was at Cap Cities/ABC, and it’s just a lot easier this way.

我在80岁时决定，考虑到我自1974年以来就一直在这里（除了在Cap Cities/ABC的那段时间），这样做更简单。

Charlie, do you have any thoughts on serving on boards generally? Charlie is on the Costco board.

查理，你对一般担任董事会成员有什么看法？查理在好市多的董事会任职。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s because I really admire Costco. And that’s one of the pleasures of my life, is interfacing with those people.

查理·芒格：嗯，那是因为我非常欣赏好市多。这是我生活中的乐趣之一，就是与那些人交流。

But that’s the only one where we don’t — where I don’t have a big ownership interest.

但这也是我唯一一个没有大额持股的董事会。

I think, generally speaking, serving on a whole lot of different boards is for the birds. (Laughter)

我认为，总的来说，担任很多不同董事会的职务是没什么意义的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I agree. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我同意。（笑）

33. Can’t predict if Berkshire will outperform the Australian dollar

无法预测伯克希尔是否会超过澳大利亚元

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 12.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 12。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia.

观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺夫。

As an investor from the Asian region, I am concerned that a weaker dollar will erode the value of my Berkshire stock.

作为来自亚洲地区的投资者，我担心美元贬值会削弱我在伯克希尔股票上的价值。

However, Berkshire is highly productive with real pricing power, so can I be confident that over the long term any fall in the dollar will be offset by a rise in the value of my Berkshire stock? And by that I mean in addition to any intrinsic growth in the underlying business.

然而，伯克希尔的生产力很高，具有真实的定价能力，所以我能否有信心，从长远来看，美元的任何下跌将被伯克希尔股票的价值上涨所抵消？我指的是在潜在业务的内在增长之外。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer is no. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：答案是否定的。（巴菲特笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: It would be a lot easier if you just had the Australian dollar go down. The Australian dollar was one of two currencies that we did own last year that contributed to the $100 million profit.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果澳大利亚元下跌，那就简单多了。澳大利亚元是我们去年拥有的两种货币之一，为 1 亿美元的利润做出了贡献。

But, no, I cannot tell you what policies will be followed in the United States and what policies will be followed in Australia that will — what they will be and how they will affect the relative value of those two currencies, say, 10 years from now.

但是，我无法告诉你美国将采取什么政策，以及澳大利亚将采取什么政策，这些政策将会是什么，以及它们将如何影响这两种货币的相对价值，比如说，10 年后。

I think the movement could be quite dramatic, and I think it actually could be dramatic in either direction. That’s why I don’t know what to do.

我认为这个运动可能会非常戏剧化，而且我认为它实际上可能会朝任一方向戏剧化。这就是为什么我不知道该怎么做。

But the only promise you’ll get from Charlie and me about Berkshire is that we do every day, as I said in the annual report, try to think about increasing the earning power and the intrinsic value of Berkshire.

但你从查理和我这里得到的关于伯克希尔的唯一承诺就是，正如我在年报中所说的，我们每天都努力思考如何提高伯克希尔的盈利能力和内在价值。

And to the degree we increase it, the shareholders will — or to the degree we decrease it — the shareholders will share in exactly the same proportion as Charlie and I do.

在我们增加它的程度上，股东将会——或者在我们减少它的程度上——股东将会与查理和我以完全相同的比例分享。

We will — our interests are 100 percent aligned. We will make or lose money through our stock and luck, to some extent, will depend — will determine — how well we do.

我们的利益是100%一致的。我们通过股票的盈亏将获利或遭受损失，某种程度上，运气将决定我们的表现。

We know we can’t do remotely as well in the future as we have in the past.

我们知道，未来的表现无法接近过去的成就。

There is no way to compound — there’s no way we know to compound the kind of sums we’re working with now at rates that are anywhere close to what we were able to do when working with much smaller sums. But you’ll get our best efforts.

我们无法以接近我们在处理较小资金时所能做到的速度来复合现在所处理的庞大金额。但你会得到我们最好的努力。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t add to that.

查理·芒格：我无法对此再补充什么。

Australia has these fabulous open pit mines, and at a time when Asia is just totally booming with its demand for metals, I can’t tell you how Berkshire stock is going to perform vis-a-vis mines in Australia.

澳大利亚有这些令人惊叹的露天矿，而在亚洲对金属需求蓬勃发展的时期，我无法告诉你伯克希尔股票相对于澳大利亚矿业的表现如何。

I think we’ll do pretty well compared to companies here in the United States.

我认为我们与美国的公司相比会做得很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think so, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我也这样认为。

34. We’re not neglecting the stock portfolio

我们并没有忽视股票投资组合

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This shareholder wishes to be known only by his initials, AJ.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这位股东希望只用他的首字母 AJ 来称呼。

The importance of Berkshire’s equity portfolio has diminished other the past few decades. Today I view Berkshire’s appetite for equity as an afterthought and instead see its focus as being on large acquisitions.

伯克希尔的股票投资组合的重要性在过去几十年中已经减弱。今天，我认为伯克希尔对股票的兴趣只是附带考虑，而其重点则是大型收购。

Would you agree with this, and where do you see the equity portfolio going over the next five or 10 years?

你同意这个观点吗？你认为未来五到十年股票投资组合会如何发展？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I prefer large acquisitions, but it’s not an afterthought at all in terms of the portfolio.

沃伦·巴菲特：我更喜欢大型收购，但在投资组合方面，这绝对不是附带考虑。

I mean, we — Charlie and I spend — well, we probably spend more time thinking about the portfolio because it’s only occasionally that we get a chance to think about acquisitions that are sizable and that are available to us.

我的意思是，我们——查理和我花——好吧，我们可能花更多时间考虑投资组合，因为我们只有偶尔才有机会考虑那些规模较大且可供我们收购的项目。

So we are equally interested in both aspects of Berkshire’s operations. But where we hope we really get lucky is in adding significant companies to what we have already, and having our — the companies that we already own — make various bolt-on acquisitions.

所以我们对伯克希尔的运营两个方面都同样感兴趣。但我们希望真正走运的是能够在我们已有的基础上增加一些重要的公司，并让我们已经拥有的公司进行各种附加收购。

We’ve had several of those already this year that you don’t read about.

我们今年已经有好几件这样的事情了，你并没有听说过。

A lot of our companies have the potential to do — to earn — considerably more money five or 10 years from now than they’re earning now.

我们许多公司在未来五年或十年内有潜力赚取比现在多得多的钱。

So both the development of those businesses, which really resides with the managers — Charlie and I don’t contribute anything on that — but we will — we spend as much time thinking about the portfolio as we ever did.

所以这些公司的发展实际上掌握在管理者手中——查理和我对此没有任何贡献——但我们在投资组合上的思考时间没有减少。

And, you know, it’s important. I mean, if you talk about $150-some billion in cash and marketable securities, the performance of that particular segment is going to have a lot to do with how well Berkshire does over time.

而且，这一点很重要。要知道，手中有1500多亿美元的现金和可交易证券，这一部分的表现将对伯克希尔的长期表现产生重大影响。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we’ll always have a fair amount of marketable securities because of our insurance subsidiaries and — but as we get forced by our size into the bigger and bigger stocks, of course we’re going to do less well than we did when we had a bigger universe of practicable things to consider.

查理·芒格：是的，我们会因为我们的保险子公司而始终持有相当数量的可交易证券——但随着我们规模的扩大，我们被迫进入越来越大的股票领域，当然我们在这一领域的表现将不如以前好，因为我们曾经可以考虑的选择范围更广。

WARREN BUFFETT: A lot less well. I mean, it really is the nature of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：情况要差得多。我是说，这真的是事物的本质。

We are buying securities where we have to put billions of dollars in them in most cases, and that is not a field that is unlooked at by other analysts.

在大多数情况下，我们购买的证券必须投入数十亿美元，而这不是其他分析师所未关注的领域。

So it’s impossible to have a big edge. We hope we have a small edge.

所以不可能有很大的优势。我们希望有一个小的优势。

CHARLIE MUNGER: On the other hand, when we were doing so well in marketable securities, nobody called us and said, I have a wonderful business, and you’re the only place in the world where I would want to transfer it.

查理·芒格：另一方面，当我们在可交易证券上表现出色时，没有人打电话告诉我们，我有一个很好的生意，而你是我唯一想要转让的地方。

And now that happens, what, a couple times a year at least?

现在这种情况每年至少发生几次，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I really prefer, in some ways, this part of the game to the earlier game. It’s more fun to create permanent partners doing constructive things than just outsmart other people and shuffling little pieces of paper.

查理·芒格：在某种程度上，我更喜欢这部分游戏，而不是早期的游戏。与其智胜他人、交易小纸片，创建持久的合作伙伴关系做一些有建设性的事情更有趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s fun to do both, actually. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：其实两者都很有趣。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I don’t see you holding back. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：是的。我没看到你有所保留。（巴菲特笑）

35. “We have an unbelievable insurance operation”

“我们有一个令人难以置信的保险业务”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s go to the other room. 13.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去另一个房间。13。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Whitney Tilson, a shareholder from New York. Thank you for including in your latest annual letter such complete and clear valuation information regarding Berkshire.

观众成员：嗨，我是来自纽约的股东惠特尼·蒂尔森。感谢您在最新的年度信中提供如此完整和清晰的关于伯克希尔的估值信息。

You stated that the operating earnings of the insurance businesses are excluded from your earnings table, and I know you said this morning that 2011 is going to be a break-even year at best.

您表示保险业务的运营收益不包括在您的收益表中，我知道您今天早上说 2011 年充其量将是一个持平的年份。

But in light of the disclosure in the annual report that Berkshire earned $17 billion in profit over the last eight years without a single money-losing year, are you being overly conservative?

但考虑到年报中披露的伯克希尔在过去八年中获得了170亿美元的利润，没有任何一年出现亏损，您是否过于保守？

Don’t you think the intrinsic value of your insurance businesses is more than just their float, especially GEICO, for the reasons you discussed this morning?

您不认为您的保险业务的内在价值不仅仅是其浮存金，尤其是GEICO，正如您今天早上讨论的那样？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’d agree with that, Whitney, but I — it’s very hard to estimate, you know, what the normal underwriting profit might be — might be over the next 20 years or something of the sort.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我同意，惠特尼，但我——很难估计，您知道，正常的承保利润在接下来的 20 年或类似的时间里可能会是多少。

And so I agree with you. I don’t know whether I’d call it overly conservative. I would say it’s conservative to assume break-even underwriting.

所以我同意你的看法。我不知道是否可以称其为过于保守。我会说，假设盈亏平衡的承保是保守的。

But as you — I mean, if we had another Katrina or something of the sort — and forget about, you know, winter storms in Europe and all that — I mean, we could lose significant money in underwriting this year, and we expect to lose significant money in underwriting, you know, maybe every fifth year, every tenth year, whatever it might be.

但是如果我们再遇到像卡特里娜那样的事情——还有，别提欧洲的冬季风暴——我的意思是，我们可能在承保方面损失大量资金，而我们预计在承保方面每五年、每十年，或者其他什么情况下，可能会损失大量资金。

But I think you’re right in saying it would not be inappropriate to include some normalized underwriting profit in addition to the calculation that I made in the annual report.

但我认为你说得对，除了我在年报中所做的计算之外，加入一些标准化的承保利润并不不合适。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Whitney, let me help you by asking another question of Warren. Is there any other large casualty insurance operation in the world that you know of that you would trade for ours?

查理·芒格：惠特尼，让我来问沃伦另一个问题。您知道世界上还有其他大型财产意外险公司能与我们的相提并论吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Not remotely — no, no. Nothing close. I mean, we — however we lucked into it, we’ve got — we have an unbelievable insurance operation.

沃伦·巴菲特：根本没有——不，不。没有任何接近。我是说，我们——无论我们是怎么走运的，我们有——我们有一个令人难以置信的保险业务。

And, I mean, GEICO, you know, is fabulous. And, you know, if you think about — since 1936, the idea has been out there, but, you know, with all the strength that all the other companies had, and the agency plants and everything else, GEICO has now moved to where it’s the third largest in the United States and gaining ground every day on the two ahead of them, and doing it very profitably.

而且，我的意思是，GEICO，您知道，真是太棒了。而且，您知道，如果您考虑一下——自 1936 年以来，这个想法就已经存在了，但是，您知道，考虑到其他公司所拥有的所有实力，以及代理机构和其他一切，GEICO 现在已经发展到成为美国第三大公司，并且每天都在追赶前面的两家公司，而且盈利能力非常强。

GEICO’s combined ratio — GEICO had an underwriting profit of close to eight points, as I remember it, in the first quarter. Now that’s going to be, probably, the best quarter of the year, I should add, but it’s a marvelous business.

GEICO 的综合比率——我记得在第一季度，GEICO 的承保利润接近八个百分点。现在，这可能是今年最好的一个季度，我应该补充一下，但这是一项了不起的业务。

Ajit [Jain] has built an insurance business from scratch in the reinsurance business, that, in many respects, you know, he operates all alone.

阿吉特（贾因）在再保险行业从零开始建立了一家保险业务，在许多方面，他几乎是独自一人运营。

He may not see a lot of transactions in any given period of time, but there are certain things, where if somebody wants huge amounts of insurance and a quick answer, or even a slow answer sometimes — we’ll give them a quick one — there’s really nobody else to call. It’s a little like Charlie mentioned on acquisition opportunities.

他可能在某个时间段内没有很多交易，但在某些情况下，如果有人想要大量保险并且想要快速得到答复——或者有时甚至慢一点的答复——我们会给他们一个快速答复——实际上没有其他人可以联系。这就像查理提到的收购机会一样。

So he’s — and he’s done it. I mean, it didn’t exist when he got there.

所以他——他做到了。我是说，当他到达时，这个业务是不存在的。

Tad Montrose has got a magnificent operation at Gen Re. It had to get shaken out to quite a degree, but Tad has got a very, very disciplined business there.

塔德·蒙特罗斯在 Gen Re 有一个宏伟的业务。虽然经历了相当大的动荡，但塔德在那里的业务非常、非常有纪律。

And then we have a group of smaller companies that some of them have some very unusual franchises.

然后我们有一组较小的公司，其中一些拥有一些非常独特的特许经营。

So there really — you know, I didn’t have anything to do with it, so I can brag about these people, but they have really done a job in building an insurance company that I don’t think there’s anything like it.

所以实际上——你知道，我与此无关，所以我可以夸耀这些人，但他们确实在建立一家保险公司方面做得非常出色，我认为没有任何公司能与之相比。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Some of you people that have been around a long time, you invested with an Omaha boy, and you ended up owning part of the best casualty insurance business in the world.

查理·芒格：你们中一些人已经在这里待了很长时间，你们和一个奥马哈的男孩投资，结果你们拥有了世界上最好的意外保险业务的一部分。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you go to 30th and Harney, you’ll see a building there, National Indemnities. We paid 7 million for National Indemnity, a million-four for its sister company National Fire & Marine, and that’s the same building that we operated out of in 1967, we’re operating out of today.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你去到第 30 街和哈尼街，你会看到那里的一个建筑，国家赔偿公司。我们为国家赔偿支付了 700 万美元，为它的姐妹公司国家火灾与海洋公司支付了 140 万美元，这就是我们在 1967 年运营的同一栋建筑，今天我们仍在这里运营。

The only difference is that today it’s got more net worth than any insurance company in the world.

唯一的区别是，今天它的净资产比世界上任何保险公司都要高。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, so we — it’s not that great a business as a business, casualty insurance.

查理·芒格：是的，所以我们——作为一个业务，财产意外险并不是一个伟大的业务。

It’s a tough game. There are temptations to be stupid in it. It’s like banking. (Laughter)

这是一场艰难的游戏。里面有诱惑让人变得愚蠢。这就像银行业一样。（笑声）

And — but if you’re in it, I think we’ve got the best one.

但是，如果你在这个行业，我认为我们拥有的是最好的。

36. Why See’s Candies does well in inflationary times

为什么 See's Candies 在通货膨胀时期表现良好

WARREN BUFFETT: With those modest statements, we’ll move onto Becky. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：在这些谦虚的陈述之后，我们来谈谈贝基。（笑）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Mark Jordan (PH) in Charleston, South Carolina.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿的马克·乔丹（PH）。

He writes, “In a period of high inflation, which particular businesses owned by Berkshire Hathaway will perform the best, and which will perform the worst and why?”

他写道：“在高通胀时期，伯克希尔哈撒韦旗下哪些特定企业表现最好，哪些表现最差，为什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the businesses that will perform the best are the ones that require little capital investment to facilitate inflationary growth and that have strong positions that allow them to increase prices with inflation.

沃伦·巴菲特：表现最好的业务是那些对资本投资要求较少、能够随通货膨胀增长而提升价格的强势企业。

And, you know, we have a candy business, for example, and the value of the dollar since we bought that candy business has probably fallen at least 85 percent, I would say — 80 to 85 percent — and that candy business sells 75 percent more pounds of candy than it did when we bought it, but it has ten times the revenues and it doesn’t take a lot more capital.

而且，你知道，我们有一个糖果生意，例如，自从我们购买那个糖果生意以来，美元的价值可能下降了至少 85%，我会说——80%到 85%——而那个糖果生意的糖果销售量比我们购买时多了 75%，但它的收入是之前的十倍，而且所需的资本并没有多很多。

以少量资本跟着通胀爬升，只有少数消费品能做到，可口可乐是很好的例子，汽车保险也是例子，苹果或许也能做到。

So that kind of a business — any business that can — that has enough freedom to price to offset inflation and doesn’t commensurate invest — or huge investment — to support it, will do well.

因此，这种类型的业务——任何能够自由定价以抵消通货膨胀并且不需要大量投资来支撑的业务，都会表现良好。

Businesses like our utilities which get, in effect, a bond-like return but require — you know, if you’re going to build a generating plant and it costs twice as much per kilowatt hour of capacity, and all you’re going to get is a fixed return and yields on bonds go up, perhaps dramatically, to get high inflation, is not going to do that well in an inflationary period, just because it has certain aspects of a bond-like investment, and bonds generally are not going to do well in inflation.

像我们的公用事业业务那样，实际上获得类似债券的回报，但如果您要建设一个发电厂，而其每千瓦时的建设成本翻倍，而您只能获得固定回报，同时债券收益率也可能因高通货膨胀而显著上升，那么在通货膨胀时期，它的表现就不会很好，因为它具备某些债券投资的特征，而债券在通货膨胀中通常不会表现良好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but like our insurance operations, our capital intensive railroad business is certainly one of the best railroads in the world. And our utility operations are certainly one of the best utility operations in the world.

查理·芒格：嗯，但就像我们的保险业务一样，我们资本密集型的铁路业务无疑是世界上最好的铁路之一。我们的公用事业业务无疑是世界上最好的公用事业之一。

And so it isn’t all bad to be up there, world class, in your main businesses.

因此，在您的主要业务中，位于世界级的地位并不全是坏事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Our railroad — the government has talked about building a high-speed rail system in California.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们的铁路——政府谈论过在加利福尼亚州建设高速铁路系统。

I think they’re talking about 800 miles of track, and their estimated cost was about 43 billion, and estimated costs on construction and things like that go up dramatically much more often than they get reduced even by a minor amount.

我想他们在谈论800英里的轨道，估计成本约为430亿美元，估计的建设费用和其他方面的成本上涨通常远远高于它们减少的幅度。

And, of course, we paid 43 billion, counting debt assumed, for our rail system, which has 22,000 miles of main track and 6,000-plus locomotives, and 13,000 bridges, if you ever want to buy a bridge.

当然，我们为我们的铁路系统支付了 430 亿美元（包括承担的债务），该系统拥有 22,000 英里的主轨道和超过 6,000 台机车，以及 13,000 座桥梁，如果你想买一座桥的话。

So that — the replacement value of that asset during inflation already is huge and it would grow dramatically, and the world — our country will always need rail transportation. So it — it is a terrific asset to own, I’ll just leave it at that.

因此——在通货膨胀期间，该资产的替代价值已经很高，并且会大幅增长，而世界——我们的国家将始终需要铁路运输。所以——拥有它是一个很棒的资产，我就说到这里。

37. “May you live until the A stock splits”

愿你活到 A 股拆分。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 1 again.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 1 再次。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Martin Greenberger, UCLA Anderson School, where I work in disruptive technologies, not finance.

观众成员：我是马丁·格林伯格，来自加州大学洛杉矶分校安德森商学院，我从事颠覆性技术，而不是金融。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re forgiven. Go ahead. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：你被原谅了。继续吧。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My friend Walt would like to know if Berkshire has been considering splitting its Type A shares, like it did its Type B shares, and if so, what are the pros and cons, in your opinion? And what would be the short-term and longer-term effects?

观众成员：我的朋友沃尔特想知道伯克希尔是否考虑过像拆分其 B 类股票那样拆分 A 类股票，如果是的话，您认为有什么利弊？短期和长期的影响是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, in effect, we’ve already split it, you know, 1500-for-one by having the B available.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。实际上，我们已经通过提供 B 类股票实现了 1500 比 1 的拆分。

And, you know, we have a situation where the company will never be sold, but if any transaction involves the A stock, the B shares are going to get treated exactly the same. So there’s really no disadvantage to owning the B stock, except it has somewhat less voting power than the A stock.

我们有一种情况，即公司永远不会被出售，但如果涉及A股的任何交易，B股将得到完全相同的对待。因此，拥有B股并没有什么缺点，除了它的投票权低于A股。

But in every other way it’s the same instrument, and so we already have a split stock available.

但在其他方面，它是相同的工具，因此我们已经有了可用的拆分股票。

So I would tell Walt that he really should not count heavily on the A stock getting split.

所以我会告诉沃尔特，他真的不应该过于期待A股会被拆分。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, Warren used to cheer up his old friends by telling them, may you live until the A stock splits. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，沃伦过去常常通过告诉他的老朋友们，希望你们活到 A 股拆分那天来让他们开心。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And I would love to make that deal myself. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我自己也很想达成那个交易。（笑）

38. Buffett’s best deal: hiring Ajit Jain

巴菲特的最佳交易：雇佣阿吉特·贾因

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Matthew Palmer of North Andover, Massachusetts.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自马萨诸塞州北安多佛的马修·帕尔默。

And he writes, “Mr. Buffett, you have praised [Berkshire Hathaway reinsurance chief] Ajit [Jain] as a possible successor. Since he may be in line as our next CEO, can you give us a concrete example of a policy that he’s written that’s impressed you, and can you talk a little about the way he thinks since we rarely get an opportunity to hear from him?”

他写道：“巴菲特先生，您曾称赞[伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险主管]阿吉特[Jain]是一个可能的接班人。既然他可能是我们下一个首席执行官，您能否给我们一个他所写的让您印象深刻的保险的具体例子，并且能否谈谈他的思维方式，因为我们很少有机会听到他的声音？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Ajit is not exactly a publicity hound.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，阿吉特并不完全是个爱出风头的人。

Ajit — (laughs) — he —

阿吉特——（笑）——他——

I can’t think of any decision he’s ever made that I think I could have made better.

我想不出他做过的任何决定，我认为我能做得更好。

And I’ve — I’m not privy to all of his transactions anymore. There just — there are lots of them that are not of huge size or of great interest, but he tells me about all the interesting things that come along and all the very big things that come along. And I would say this: you’d be better off voting with him than with me after listening to any proposition he brings up.

而我——我不再了解他所有的交易了。只是——有很多交易并不大或不太有趣，但他会告诉我所有有趣的事情和所有非常大的事情。我想说的是：在听取他提出的任何提议后，你投票支持他会比支持我更好。

He is as rational a thinker as Charlie is, as anybody I’ve met. He loves what he does.

他是一个和查理一样理性的思考者，也是我见过的任何人中最理性的。他热爱自己的工作。

He’s creative. He’s very creative. We have moved into one area after another in reinsurance when people came in copying us in one area of business that we would be operating in. Ajit comes up with something else.

他很有创意。他非常有创意。当人们在我们经营的某个业务领域模仿我们时，我们已经进入了一个又一个再保险领域。Ajit 又想出了其他的东西。

Lately we’ve been much more active in life reinsurance, but who knows tomorrow brings. I mean, if there happens to be a huge cat in the third quarter of this year or something of the sort, that might open up all kinds of opportunities in writing covers when — if capacity got strained.

最近我们在生命再保险方面变得更加活跃，但谁知道明天会发生什么。我是说，如果在今年第三季度发生重大灾害，可能会打开各种写保单的机会——如果承保能力受到限制。

But who knows what will happen. All I know is that Ajit’s mind works like a machine, you know, day after day. And he does love what he does, which is an important part of doing well at any activity.

但谁知道会发生什么。我只知道阿吉特的思维像机器一样运转，日复一日。而且他确实热爱自己所做的，这在任何活动中都是做得好的重要部分。

And I really — I don’t know what his best deal was. I know what my best deal was, which was hiring him.

我真的不知道他最好的交易是什么。我知道我最好的交易是什么，那就是雇佣了他。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Sir William Osler, who created a model medical school for the world, used to say that the secret of success in a field is getting very interested in it.

查理·芒格：是的。威廉·奥斯勒爵士，他为世界创建了一个模范医学院，曾经说过，成功的秘诀在于对某个领域产生浓厚的兴趣。

Well, Ajit is real interested in what he does. Many of you don’t know this, but every Thanksgiving, Ajit flies to London because they don’t have a Thanksgiving holiday. (Laughter)

好吧，Ajit 对他所做的事情非常感兴趣。你们中的许多人可能不知道，但每年感恩节，Ajit 都会飞往伦敦，因为那里没有感恩节假期。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We give him Christmas off, though. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不过我们让他圣诞节放假。（笑）

Ajit, we just — he — I say how invaluable he is, and I’m not exaggerating when we talk about him. He is — to an extraordinary degree, he thinks of Berkshire first.

阿吉特，我们刚刚——他——我说他是多么宝贵，我并不是在夸大我们谈论他时的感受。他——在极大程度上，他总是把伯克希尔放在第一位。

Ajit, at various periods when insurance companies became popular for one reason or another, there was, you know, there was the big thing about Bermuda companies some few years ago, Ajit could have monetized himself to an incredible degree. Still could do it.

阿吉特在某些时期，保险公司因某种原因而受到欢迎，比如几年前的百慕大公司，阿吉特本可以实现巨额获利，甚至现在仍可以。

I mean, people would hand him a significant percentage of any company being formed with lots of money, so that immediately he could create, I would guess, in the hundreds of millions of wealth without lifting a finger, just by somebody putting up, you know, a couple billion dollars and saying you’ve got 20 percent of it or whatever it may be.

我的意思是，人们会把任何成立公司的相当大一部分股份交给他，带着大量资金，这样他就可以立即创造出，我猜，数亿的财富，而不需要付出任何努力，仅仅是因为有人投入了几十亿美元，并说你拥有其中的 20%或其他什么。

I mean, listen, he’s smart. He knows that, and it doesn’t cross his mind to do anything like that.

我意思是，听着，他很聪明。他知道这一点，他不会想到做那样的事情。

I mean, he — we have, in comp — he always thanks me for what I do at the end of the year, and I feel I’ve left off a zero, you know, when I get all through. (Laughs)

我的意思是，他——我们在公司里——他总是在年末感谢我所做的事情，而我觉得我好像漏掉了一个零，你知道的，当我完成所有事情的时候。（笑）

He’s just a remarkable human being. And we are very, very lucky that, I think, he has a lot of fun in what he does at Berkshire.

他真是一个了不起的人。我们非常非常幸运，我认为他在伯克希尔所做的事情中乐在其中。

He’s got a cadre of about 30 people that work with him. There’s many more that are settling claims and doing that sort of thing on runoff business, but it’s — you won’t find anything like it, in my view, not only in the insurance world, but really in almost any part of the business world. (Applause)

他有大约 30 人的团队与他一起工作。还有更多人在处理索赔和类似的事务，但在我看来，这种情况在保险界乃至几乎任何商业领域都找不到。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go —

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们继续——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You didn’t answer the question. Maybe you avoided it on purpose.

查理·芒格：你没有回答这个问题。也许你故意回避了它。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He said, what are our worst businesses?

查理·芒格：他说，我们最糟糕的业务是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: What are our worst businesses?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们最糟糕的业务是什么？

Well, generally speaking — and this is general — I have — well, made certain mistakes in going into smaller businesses that really never had the potential of becoming big.

我们最差的业务？嗯，总体而言——这是个总的说法——我确实在一些小型业务上犯了错误，这些业务从一开始就没有成为大型企业的潜力。

But I would say overall, probably, I would call retailing — you know, Dexter was our worst business, but I’ve — the Furniture Mart, obviously, is a terrific operation. But we have not made — despite being in numerous retailing — quite a few — retailing business for quite a while, we have not created major earning power there.

但我可以说，整体上，我会把零售业视为——你知道，德克斯特是我们最糟糕的业务，但家具市场显然是个不错的运营。但尽管我们已经在多家零售业务上经营了相当一段时间，我们并没有创造出主要的盈利能力。

Wouldn’t you agree on that, Charlie?

查理，你同意吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but luckily it’s a small part of the operation.

查理·芒格：是的，但幸运的是，这只是运营的一小部分。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But you’re right. That’s been the hardest game for us. And, you know, if we were a little smarter we could have figured that out better. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：但你说得对。这对我们来说是最难的游戏。你知道，如果我们聪明一点，我们本可以更好地弄明白这一点。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we were a little smarter we could have done a lot of things. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果我们聪明一点，我们可以做很多事情。（笑）

Of course, See’s is a retailing business, to some degree.

当然，See's 在某种程度上是一家零售业务。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we had enormous success there, so maybe we started thinking we were geniuses. We are like the duck on the pond when it was raining, and we thought we were rising in the world because of merit and it was just because it was raining. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在那里取得了巨大的成功，所以也许我们开始认为自己是天才。我们就像池塘里的鸭子，当下雨时，我们以为是因为自己的功劳而在这个世界上崭露头角，其实只是因为在下雨。（笑声）

39. “Forget about goodwill” when evaluating a business

在评估一项业务时“忘记商誉”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们来看看第二个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Joe Tellinghas (PH), Boston, Massachusetts.

观众成员：乔·泰林哈斯（PH），马萨诸塞州波士顿。

What’s the proper way to think about goodwill and return on capital?

如何正确看待商誉和资本回报率？

Berkshire’s manufacturing, service, and retail businesses earn pretax returns on tangible capital over 20 percent, which suggests either skilled managers or fantastic businesses. But the return on allocated equity is in the single digits, which looks drab.

伯克希尔的制造、服务和零售业务在有形资本上的税前回报超过 20%，这表明要么是优秀的管理者，要么是出色的企业。但分配股本的回报率仅为个位数，显得乏善可陈。

Accountants treat intangibles similarly because they have different economics. (Inaudible)

会计师对无形资产的处理类似，因为它们具有不同的经济特性。

For an indestructible brand like See’s or Coca-Cola, I can see why the intangibles should not be amortized because it’s worth more every year, and your comments on GEICO policyholders were one way to think about that.

对于像See's或可口可乐这样的无可摧毁的品牌，我能理解无形资产不应该摊销，因为它每年都更有价值，而您对GEICO投保人的评论是一个思考方式。

But all the tobacco companies have billions of dollars of goodwill in unit sales of cigarettes to claim every year in developed countries, so perhaps they should be amortized. And for Time Warner- AOL, goodwill definitely needed to be amortized.

但所有的烟草公司每年在发达国家都有数十亿美元的商誉，以支持其香烟的单位销售，因此也许应该摊销。而对于时代华纳-美国在线，商誉绝对需要摊销。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, goodwill — you mention AOL-Time Warner or something of the sort, it should be written off, actually. It was just a mistake in purchase price.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，商誉——你提到的 AOL 时代华纳之类的东西，实际上应该被注销。这只是购买价格上的一个错误。

Goodwill should not be used in evaluating the fundamental attractiveness of a business. There you should look at return on tangible assets, and even then there’s some minor — some other adjustments you may want to make.

在评估企业的基本吸引力时，不应考虑商誉。您应关注有形资产的回报，即使在那时也可能需要做一些小的调整。

But basically, in evaluating the businesses we own, in terms of what the management are doing and what the underlying economics of the business are, forget about goodwill.

但基本上，在评估我们拥有的企业时，考虑管理层的表现和企业的基本经济状况，忘掉商誉。

In terms of evaluating the job we’re doing in allocating capital, you have to include goodwill, because we paid for it.

在评估我们在资本分配方面的工作时，必须考虑商誉，因为我们为此付出了代价。

So if we buy — you know, Coca-Cola goes back to 1886 and John Pemberton at Jacobs Pharmacy in Atlanta, and there was not a whole lot of goodwill put on the books when he sold that first Coca-Cola.

所以如果我们购买——你知道，可口可乐可以追溯到 1886 年，约翰·彭伯顿在亚特兰大的雅各布药房，当他出售第一瓶可口可乐时，账面上并没有太多的商誉。

If you were to buy the company now, the whole company, you’d be putting a figure, you know, of 100 billion or something like that on it.

如果你现在要收购这家公司，整个公司，你可能会给出一个大约 1000 亿这样的数字。

You shouldn’t amortize that, and you shouldn’t, in judging the economics of the business, look at that.

你不应该摊销那个，在评估业务的经济性时也不应该考虑那个。

But in terms of judging the economics of the business that purchased it — we’ll call it Berkshire — then you have to allow for the goodwill, because we are allocating capital and paying a lot for it.

但在判断收购该公司的经济时——我们可以称之为伯克希尔——那么您必须考虑商誉，因为我们正在配置资本，并且为此支付了很多。

I don’t think the amortization of goodwill makes any sense. I think write-offs of it, when you find out you’ve made the wrong purchase and the business doesn’t earn commensurate with the tangible assets employed plus the goodwill, I think write-offs of it make sense.

我认为商誉的摊销没有任何意义。当你发现自己做出了错误的购买，而企业的收益与所使用的有形资产加上商誉不成比例时，我认为对其进行减值是有意义的。

But when looking at businesses as to whether they’re good businesses, mediocre businesses, poor businesses, look at the return on net tangible assets.

但是在评估业务是否是好业务、中等业务或差业务时，请关注净有形资产的回报。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s right. But as the gentleman says, when we buy a business, a whole business, we never get a huge bargain and, of course, we may get down toward 10 percent pretax earnings on what we pay.

查理·芒格：我认为这是对的。但正如这位先生所说，当我们收购一家企业时，我们从来没有得到过巨大的便宜，当然，我们可能在支付的价格上，税前收益会接近10%。

That isn’t so awful as you think when you — a lot of the money comes from insurance float that costs you nothing.

这并不像你想的那么糟糕，因为——很多钱来自于保险浮存金，这对你来说没有任何成本。

In other words, if you have 60 billion of float and God gives you 6 billion a year earnings, it’s not all bad.

换句话说，如果你有 600 亿的浮存金，而上帝每年给你 60 亿的收益，那也不是全坏事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on Lubrizol we’re paying close to 9 billion for the equity, and it earns — and you should make adjustments for debt but it’s not an important factor there — and, you know, current rate of earnings is probably a billion pretax.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于 Lubrizol，我们为股权支付接近 90 亿美元，它的收益——你应该对债务进行调整，但这不是一个重要因素——而且，你知道，目前的收益率大约是税前 10 亿美元。

And now Lubrizol itself is employing far — you know, they’re employing, you know, call it 2 1/2 billion of equity to earn that billion of pretax, so it’s a very good business, in terms of the assets that are employed. But when we end up paying the premium we pay to buy into it, it becomes a billion pretax on something close to 9 billion.

而现在，Lubrizol 本身正在使用大约 25 亿美元的股本来赚取那 10 亿美元的税前利润，因此就所使用的资产而言，这是一个非常好的业务。但是，当我们最终支付的溢价来投资于它时，这就变成了接近 90 亿美元的 10 亿美元税前利润。

You have to judge us based on close to a $9 billion investment. You have to judge James Hambrick in running the business based on the much lower capital that he has employed.

您必须根据接近90亿的投资来评估我们。您必须根据詹姆斯·汉布里克所运营的公司使用的较低资本来评估他。

It can turn out to be a very good business, and we could turn out to have made at least a minor mistake if it isn’t as good a business as we think it is now, but still is a very satisfactory business based on the tangible capital employed.

这可能会成为一个非常好的生意，如果它没有我们现在认为的那么好，我们可能会犯一个小错误，但基于所投入的有形资本，它仍然是一个非常令人满意的生意。

Charlie, can you make that clearer? (Laughs)

查理，你能把这个说得更清楚吗？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s just — we are not going to buy, in the climate we’re in now, operating businesses that are at all decent for low prices. It’s just not going to happen.

查理·芒格：嗯，实际上——在我们现在所处的环境中，我们不会以低价购买任何体面的运营业务。这是不可能发生的。

40. Munger really loves Costco

芒格真的很喜欢好市多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: In a book about Charlie, “Damn Right!” by Janet Lowe, Charlie talks about his view on teaching finance.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：在珍妮特·洛的书《Damn Right!》中，查理谈到了他对教授金融的看法。

He says that he would use the histories of a hundred or so companies that did something right or wrong as a basis for teaching the course.

他说他会用大约一百家在某方面做对或做错的公司的历史作为授课基础。

Could each of you — and since this concerned Charlie, could each of you — we’ll start with Charlie — give us an example or two from either category, right moves or wrong moves?

你们每个人都可以举一个或两个例子，关于正确或错误的决策吗？我们先从查理开始。

WARREN BUFFETT: I predict Charlie is going to talk about Costco. Go ahead, Charlie. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我预测查理会谈论好市多。继续，查理。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Costco, of course, is a — (laughter) — a business that became the best in the world in its category, and it did it with an extreme meritocracy and an extreme ethical duty, self-imposed, to take all its cost advantages as fast as it could accumulate them and pass them onto the customers. And, of course, that created ferocious customer loyalty.

查理·芒格：好吧，当然，Costco 是一家——（笑声）——在其类别中成为世界最佳的企业，它以极端的精英制度和自我施加的极端道德责任来实现这一点，尽可能快地将所有成本优势转移给客户。当然，这创造了强烈的客户忠诚度。

And it’s been a wonderful business to watch, and, of course, strange things happen when you do that and do that long enough.

这是一门令人惊叹的生意，当然，当你这样做并且坚持足够长的时间时，会发生奇怪的事情。

Costco has one store in Korea that will do over 400 million in sales this year. These are figures that can’t exist in retailing, but, of course, they do.

好市多在韩国有一家店，今年的销售额将超过4亿美金。这些数字在零售业中是无法想象的，但它们确实存在。

And so that’s an example of somebody having the right managerial system, the right personnel selection, the right ethics, the right diligence and et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. That is quite rare.

所以这是一个例子，展示了管理系统的正确性、人员选择的合适性、伦理的正确性、勤奋等，这些都是非常罕见的。

And if you — if once or twice in a lifetime you’re associated with such a business, you’re a very lucky person.

如果你一生中有一两次与这样的事业相关联，那你就是一个非常幸运的人。

And the more normal business is a business like, say, General Motors, which became the most successful business of its kind in the world and wiped out its common shareholders, what, last year?

而更常见的企业，比如说通用汽车，曾经是全球同类企业中最成功的，但去年却使普通股东破产了。

That is a very interesting story, and if I were teaching in a business school, I would have Value Line-type figures that took people through the entire history of General Motors. And I would try and relate the changes in the graph and in the data to what happened in the business.

这是一个非常有趣的故事，如果我在商学院授课，我会使用类似价值线的图表，带领学生回顾通用汽车的整个历史。我会尝试将图表和数据的变化与企业发生的事情关联起来。

And to some extent, they faced a really difficult problem: heavily unionized business, combined with great success, and very tough competitors who came up from Asia and elsewhere, and to some extent from Europe. And that is a real problem, which, of course — to prevent wealth from killing you, your success turning into a disadvantage, is a big problem in business.

在某种程度上，他们面临着一个非常棘手的问题：高度工会化的企业，加上巨大的成功，以及来自亚洲和其他地方，某种程度上也来自欧洲的强大竞争对手。这确实是一个问题，当然——为了防止财富毁掉你，让你的成功变成劣势，这在商业中是一个大问题。

And so there are all these wonderful lessons in those graphs. And I don’t know why people don’t do it. The graphs don’t even exist that I would use to teach.

这些图表中包含了许多宝贵的教训。我不明白为什么人们不这样做。根本没有我想用来授课的图表。

I can’t imagine anybody being dumb enough not to have the kind of graphs I yearn for. (Laughter)

我无法想象有人会愚蠢到没有我渴望的那种图表。(笑声)

But so far as I know there’s no business school in the country that’s yearning for these graphs.

但据我所知，国内没有任何商学院渴望这些图表。

Partly the reason they don’t want it is if you taught a history of business this way you’d be trampling on the territories of all the little professors in subdisciplines. You’d be stealing some of their best cases.

部分原因是，如果你以这种方式教授商业历史，你就会侵犯所有小教授在子学科中的领域。你会窃取他们一些最好的案例。

And in bureaucracies, even academic bureaucracies, people protect their own turf. And, of course, a lot of that happened at General Motors. (Applause)

在官僚机构中，甚至在学术官僚机构中，人们会保护自己的利益。当然，这在通用汽车也发生了很多。（掌声）

Yeah. 是的。

It’s a — I really think the world — that’s the way it should be taught. Harvard Business School once taught it much that way, and they stopped.

这是一种——我真的认为世界——应该这样教授。哈佛商学院曾经以这种方式教授过，但他们停止了。

I’d like to make a case study as to why they stopped. (Laughter)

我想做一个案例研究，探讨他们为什么停止了。（笑声）

I think I can — I think I can successfully guess. It’s that, of course, the history of business trampled on the territory of barons of other disciplines like the baron of marketing, the baron of finance, the baron of whatever.

我想我可以——我想我可以成功地猜测。事实是，商业历史踩踏了其他学科的男爵的领地，比如市场营销男爵、金融男爵、以及其他男爵。

And IBM is an interesting case. I mean, there’s just one after another that are utterly fascinating, and I don’t think they’re properly taught at all because nobody wants to do the full sweep.

IBM 是一个有趣的案例。我的意思是，接连不断的案例都非常吸引人，而我认为它们根本没有得到适当的教学，因为没有人想要全面了解。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I were on a plane recently that was hijacked.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我最近坐的一架飞机被劫持了。。

CHARLIE MUNGER: With what?

查理·芒格：用什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: It was hijacked. I’m telling about our experience on that hijacked plane when the hijackers picked us out as the two dirty capitalists that they really had to execute.

沃伦·巴菲特：它被劫持了。我在讲述我们在那架被劫持的飞机上的经历，当劫机者把我们选为他们真的必须处决的两个肮脏的资本家。

But they were a little abashed about it. They didn’t really have anything against us, so they said that each of us would be given one request before they shot us, and they turned to Charlie and they said, “What would you like as your request?”

但他们对此有些尴尬。他们其实并不反对我们，于是他们说每个人在被枪决之前可以提出一个请求，然后他们转向查理，说：“你想要什么请求？”

Charlie said, “I would like to give once more my speech on the virtues of Costco, with illustrations.” (Laughter)

查理说：“我想再一次发表关于好市多优点的演讲，并附上插图。”（笑声）

And the hijacker said, “Well, that sounds pretty reasonable to me.”

劫机者说：“嗯，这对我来说听起来很合理。”

And he turned to me and said, “And what would you like, Mr. Buffett?”

他转向我说：“巴菲特先生，您想要什么？”

And I said, “Shoot me first.” (Laughter)

我说：“先把我杀了。”（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Anyway. 查理·芒格：无论如何。

41. Incentivizing kids

激励孩子们

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第三个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sumat Mehra (PH) from Kashmir in India. Mr. Buffett, hope you enjoyed your first trip to India.

观众成员：来自印度克什米尔的 Sumat Mehra（PH）。巴菲特先生，希望您喜欢您第一次来印度的旅行。

WARREN BUFFETT: I sure did.

沃伦·巴菲特：我确实做了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Here’s my question. One of the most important things that drive people are incentives, but if you live in a rich society it’s very hard to get your kids to work hard and reach their full potential because they just don’t need to.

观众成员：这是我的问题。推动人们的最重要因素之一是激励，但如果你生活在一个富裕的社会中，很难让你的孩子努力工作并发挥他们的全部潜力，因为他们根本不需要这样做。

So if you or Charlie decide to have a kid in the next five years — (Laughter)

所以如果你或查理决定在接下来的五年里要一个孩子——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It would be a star in the east.

查理·芒格：这将是东方的一颗明星。

WARREN BUFFETT: It will take more than a decision. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这需要的不仅仅是一个决定。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How would you incentivize him or her —

观众成员：你会如何激励他或她——

WARREN BUFFETT: I thought you were going to say, “How would you?” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我以为你会说，“你会怎么做？”（笑声）

No, it’s a good question. I apologize for interrupting.

不，这个问题很好。我为打断你而感到抱歉。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How would you incentivize him or her to compete among the hungry and highly motivated kids from emerging markets like China, Brazil, Russia, or India?

观众成员：您会如何激励他或她与来自中国、巴西、俄罗斯或印度等新兴市场的渴望和高度积极的孩子们竞争？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think certainly that if you are very rich and you bring up your kids to think that they are more important in society, or that they have some special privilege, simply because they came out of the right womb, that, you know, that’s just a terrible mistake.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为，确实如果你非常富有，并且让你的孩子认为他们在社会上更重要，或者他们因为出身名门而享有某种特殊特权，那这无疑是一个可怕的错误。

But Charlie has raised eight children that I know quite well, most of them, and I don’t think any of them have that sense.

但查理养活了八个我很熟悉的孩子，我认为他们大多数都没有那种感觉。

But it’s — if you really are going to raise your kids to think that other people should do all the work for them and that they will be entitled to sit around and fan themselves for the rest of their lives, I mean, you know, you will probably not get a good result.

但是，如果你真的打算让你的孩子认为其他人应该为他们做所有的工作，而他们有权利坐在那里享受余生，我的意思是，你知道，你可能不会得到一个好的结果。

I — you know, in my — Charlie has been rich most of the time when his kids — many of his kids — were growing up — some of his kids were growing up,

在我的经验中——查理在他的孩子成长期间大部分时间都是富有的—

I’ve been rich while my kids were getting — certainly when they got into high school and college — but I don’t think — I certainly didn’t want to give them the idea that they were special just because their parents were rich.

而我在我的孩子进入高中和大学时也是富有的——但我并不想让他们觉得，因为父母富有他们就是特别的。

And I don’t think you necessarily have to get a bad result or have children that don’t have any incentives simply because their parents are rich.

我认为，孩子们并不一定因为父母富有而得到不好的结果或缺乏激励。

The one thing I don’t think you want to give them an incentive to do is try and outdo their parents at what their parents happen to be good at.

我觉得，你绝对不想让他们的激励变成超越父母在某个领域的能力。

I don’t think that makes sense, whether if you are a professional athlete, or a rich person, or whatever it may be, a great novelist, you name it.

我认为这没有意义，无论你是职业运动员、富人，还是其他什么，伟大的小说家，随你怎么说。

But I really think if you’re rich and your kids turn out to have no incentives, I don’t think you should point at them. I think you should probably point at yourself.

但我真的认为，如果你很富有而你的孩子没有任何动力，我认为你不应该指责他们。我认为你可能应该指责自己。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think you can raise children in an affluent family and have them love working 60 hours a week in the hot sun digging fence post holes or something. That’s not going to work.

查理·芒格：我认为你不能在富裕家庭中抚养孩子，让他们喜欢在炎热的阳光下每周工作 60 小时挖栅栏柱洞之类的事情。这是行不通的。

So to some extent, you are destroying certain kinds of incentives. And my advice to you is to lose your fight as gracefully as you can. (Laughter)

所以在某种程度上，你在破坏某些激励。我的建议是尽量优雅地接受这个现实。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure if you’re poor if you can get your kids to love the idea of working 60 hours a week. They may have to, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：我不确定如果你穷，能否让你的孩子热爱每周工作60小时的想法。他们可能不得不这样做，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Kids that really get interested in something will work no matter how rich they are.

查理·芒格：真正对某件事感兴趣的孩子，无论多富有都会努力工作。

But it’s rare to have an Ajit-like intensity of interest.

但像阿吉特那样强烈的兴趣是很少见的。

You know, if you were a proctologist, you might not like your day as it went on and on. (Laughter)

你知道，如果你是一名肛肠科医生，可能不喜欢自己的一天不断重复下去。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think we better move along. Becky? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我们最好继续往下走。贝基？（笑声）

42. Compensation incentives for Berkshire’s next CEO

伯克希尔下任首席执行官的薪酬激励措施

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a shareholder from central Iowa who asks, “Berkshire Hathaway does well, in part, because its managers want to be there for nonpecuniary reasons. But it seems likely that the next operations CEO will be best be filled by someone who insists on a salary of more than $100,000.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自中央爱荷华的一位股东，他问：“伯克希尔·哈撒韦之所以表现良好，部分原因是其管理者希望出于非金钱原因留在这里。但下任运营首席执行官似乎最好是那些要求超过10万美元薪水的人。

“What kind of compensation structure do you expect for the next generation of Berkshire leadership?”

“您对下一代伯克希尔领导层的薪酬结构有什么期望？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think the next CEO will make a lot of money and should make a lot of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为下任首席执行官会赚很多钱，并且应该赚很多钱。

I mean, the responsibility for running a company with a couple hundred billion dollars of market value should pay well.

我的意思是，负责管理一家市值几千亿美元的公司，应该有相应的报酬。

I think that whatever the level the board decides then, in terms of a base salary, should be supplemented by, probably, an option system that incorporates a couple things that are perhaps unusual.

我认为，无论董事会决定的基本工资水平如何，都应该通过一个期权系统来补充，这个系统可能包含一些不寻常的因素。

I don’t think the option price — the original strike price — should be less than if the company were for sale, the assets would bring.

我认为期权价格——原始行使价格——不应该低于如果公司出售时，资产所能带来的价格。

So the idea of giving somebody an option during some depressed part of the stock market at the market price, I think, is crazy because you wouldn’t sell your business at that price and why sell part of it on that basis.

因此，在股票市场某个低迷阶段给予某人以市场价格的期权，我认为是疯狂的，因为你不会以那个价格出售你的业务，为什么要以那种方式出售部分业务呢？

So I think the base price should be what the business is worth at the time you start, and then I think if, because of the compounding feature of leaving money there — you know, no management at all would produce some gain in value over time — so I think there should be an increase in the base price annually at some rate, and then minus the dividend that’s being paid.

所以，我认为基础价格应该是你开始时公司价值的价格，然后，我认为由于将资金留在那里所产生的复利特性——你知道，没有管理也会随着时间的推移带来价值的增长——所以我认为应该每年以某种比例增加基础价格，然后减去所支付的股息。

So, if you assume a 3 percent dividend was paid, and you wanted to have a hurdle rate of increasing at 7 or 8 percent a year, then you would have the option price accelerate, maybe, at 4 or 5 percent.

因此，如果假设支付了3%的股息，而你希望有一个7%或8%的增长门槛，那么你将期权价格的加速率设定为4%或5%。

But with that kind of a structure, I think you can give a very large option because you — if somebody is creating excess value above a given rate on a very large sum, I think they deserve something quite significant in terms of that excess earned.

但在这样的结构下，我认为可以提供一个非常大的期权，因为如果某人以非常大的金额创造了超过某一特定比率的额外价值，我认为他们在这方面值得获得相当可观的回报。

Now, they — the present compensation system has no relevance at all to what my successor should earn. The main thing is getting the right person with the right values who interacts well with the managers and who knows how to allocate capital.

现在，他们——目前的薪酬体系与我的继任者应该赚多少钱完全没有关系。最重要的是找到合适的人，具备正确的价值观，能够与管理者良好互动，并且懂得如何分配资本。

And as you just heard a little earlier, our managers who accomplish a lot, if they — and if they’re working with big operations so that it turns into a lot of dollars — they can make a lot of money with Berkshire.

正如你刚才听到的，我们的管理者如果取得了很大成就，且他们在大规模运营中工作，能为伯克希尔创造大量利润——他们能在伯克希尔赚很多钱。

They — nothing is worked off the eccentricities of Charlie and me at the top level.

他们的收入与查理和我在顶层的怪癖没有关系。

So, you know, people make well into eight figures, sometimes, at Berkshire. But they earn it, and they don’t get it because of any phony targets or anything of that sort. They get it because they really deliver incredible, in some cases, excess value to Berkshire.

所以，你知道，人们在伯克希尔的收入往往超过八位数。但他们是靠自己的努力赚来的，并不是因为任何虚假的目标或类似的原因。他们之所以能赚到这些，是因为他们确实为伯克希尔提供了令人难以置信的、在某些情况下是超额的价值。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I hope it will be a long time in the future, and I don’t regard it as absolutely inconceivable that Warren’s spot will someday be occupied by a very rich man who has adopted Warren’s system of pay.

查理·芒格：我希望这还要很久才会发生，我并不认为沃伦的职位在某天会被某个非常富有的人占据，而这个富人会采用沃伦的薪酬制度。

I think somebody in America has to be the exemplar for not grabbing all that you can. I think it’s a very important part of the whole scheme. (Applause)

我认为美国必须有人成为不贪婪的典范。我认为这是整个计划中非常重要的一部分。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think you better run an ad, though, after I go, that says CEO wanted, $100,000 pay plus pleasant surroundings. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，我觉得在我走后，你最好不要打广告，写着“招聘首席执行官，年薪 10 万美元加上愉快的工作环境。”（笑）

43. Societal issues are important but don’t affect investment decisions

社会问题很重要，但不会影响投资决策。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们来看看第 4 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Vern Cushenbery and this question is on behalf of a group of investors that made the trip up today from Overland Park, Kansas.

观众成员：嗨，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫维恩·库申伯里，这个问题是代表一群今天从堪萨斯州奥弗兰帕克赶来的投资者提问的。

Given your interest in renewable energy and natural resources, I wonder if you’d be willing to share your thoughts on how a world of limited and depleting clean water supplies and declining food stocks affects your investment strategies and thinking on the future.

鉴于您对可再生能源和自然资源的兴趣，我想知道您是否愿意分享一下在清洁水资源有限和逐渐减少的粮食储备的世界中，这对您的投资策略和对未来的思考有何影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say it’s an important subject but it doesn’t affect our investment strategy to any real degree.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会说这是一个重要的话题，但它对我们的投资策略没有实质性的影响。

In other words, you know, we would love to buy another GEICO. We would love to buy another BNSF. We’d love to buy another MidAmerican.

换句话说，我们非常希望再买一个 GEICO。我们非常希望再买一个 BNSF。我们非常希望再买一个 MidAmerican。

And we look at those businesses over a long time frame, but we are looking at what we expect their earning power to be three, five, 10, 15 years down the road compared to what we are paying.

我们从长远的时间框架来看这些企业，但我们关注的是我们预计它们在未来三年、五年、十年、十五年内的盈利能力与我们所支付的价格相比。

So I would say that there are a number of societal issues that really do not enter into our investment or purchase of business-type decisions.

所以我想说，有许多社会问题实际上并不影响我们的投资或商业决策。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would advise not paying too much attention to the clean water issue. If there’s enough energy, you can always get enough clean water.

查理·芒格：嗯，我建议不要过于关注清洁水的问题。如果有足够的能源，你总是可以获得足够的清洁水。

Israel sometimes goes month after month making half its water from sea water. With enough energy, why, you have — the water problem goes away. And that’s very helpful in considering the future.

以色列有时连续几个月将一半的水从海水中提取。只要有足够的能源，水的问题就会迎刃而解。这在考虑未来时非常有帮助。

And regarding the agricultural productivity, I think one of the main reasons for being restrained in the use of hydrocarbons is that modern agriculture won’t work without them.

关于农业生产力，我认为限制使用碳氢化合物的主要原因之一是现代农业离不开它们。

So I’m a great believer in being conservative, in terms of blowing all the hydrocarbons on heating houses and running cars. I think that — think of how happy we’d be if we’d taken a bunch of that dollar oil in the Middle East and just carted it here and put it in salt caverns.

所以我非常相信保守的做法，尤其是在用碳氢化合物来加热房屋和驱动汽车方面。我认为——想想如果我们把中东的那些美元石油运到这里并存放在盐穴里，我们会有多开心。

I mean you could argue that we really screwed up the past, and you could argue all the people who think that our main solution is to drill, drill, drill. They’re all nuts. (Laughter and applause)

我的意思是，你可以说我们真的搞砸了过去，你也可以说那些认为我们主要的解决方案就是不断钻探的人，他们都是疯子。（笑声和掌声）

It’s probably quite wise to use up the other fellow’s hydrocarbon while preserving our own.

利用其他人的碳氢化合物，同时保护我们自己的，可能是相当明智的。

It’s not going away because we are not drilling it now.

它不会消失，因为我们现在没有进行钻探。

But you can see that this will lead into unproductive discussion. (Laughter)

但你可以看到这会导致无效的讨论。（笑声）

44. We wouldn’t participate in an auction for any company

我们不会参与任何公司的拍卖。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll move right onto Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们直接进入安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This next question, actually, just came in by email from someone in the audience from their BlackBerry, actually a prominent investor that asked that his name not be named.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：下一个问题实际上是通过电子邮件从观众中某人发来的，实际上是一位不愿透露姓名的知名投资者。

And his question is the following: He writes, “Your purchase of Lubrizol was done in a negotiated transaction. The board of Lubrizol did not market the company for sale nor run an auction.

他的提问如下：他写道：“你对 Lubrizol 的购买是通过谈判交易完成的。Lubrizol 的董事会没有将公司推向市场出售，也没有进行拍卖。”

“According to the proxy, you did not permit the company to run a go-shop process, despite the requests you allow them to do so.

“根据代理声明，你们没有允许公司进行‘去商店’流程，尽管有要求允许他们这样做。

“Did the board of Lubrizol breach its fiduciary duty by not running a more competitive process to sell the company? And if not, why not?”

“Lubrizol的董事会是否违反了其信托责任，未能进行更具竞争力的公司出售流程？如果没有，为什么？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me do this.

查理·芒格：让我来回答这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Charlie will. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，查理来回答。（笑声）

He volunteers — 他自愿参加——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer is no, the board at Lubrizol did not breach its duty because we were not going to participate in the transaction if they didn’t do it our way. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：答案是否定的，Lubrizol 的董事会没有违反其职责，因为如果他们不按照我们的方式进行交易，我们就不会参与。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we basically don’t participate in auctions.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们基本上不参与拍卖。

And actually, just very, very recently we were asked to participate in one, and we’re just not interested.

实际上，最近我们被要求参与一次拍卖，但我们对此并不感兴趣。

They may end up getting less money than they would have gotten from us. But if they want to auction it, the one thing I can guarantee them, you know, is that when they get all through, we will not pay them what we would have them paid originally if they stepped up.

他们最终可能得到的金额比他们从我们这里得到的要少。但如果他们想要拍卖，我可以保证他们的一件事，你知道的，就是当他们完成所有事情后，我们绝对不会支付他们最初愿意接受的价格。

So they get a very certain deal, they got a very significant price, in my view, and in the view of two advisors.

所以他们得到了一个非常确定的交易，在我看来，以及两位顾问的观点中，他们得到了一个非常重要的价格。

And if they had said we want to conduct an auction, we would have said good luck, and we’d have looked at something else.

如果他们说我们想进行拍卖，我们会祝他们好运，然后我们会去看其他的事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Has anybody else got an easy question? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：还有其他人有简单的问题吗？（笑声）

45. How to judge if Buffett is doing a good job of allocating capital

如何判断巴菲特在资本配置方面是否做得好

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第五个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie. I think I have an easy question. My name is —

观众成员：嗨，查理。我想我有一个简单的问题。我的名字是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Give it to me then. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：那就给我吧。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Stuart Kaye from Matarin Capital Management in Stanford, Connecticut.

观众成员：我叫斯图尔特·凯来自康涅狄格州斯坦福的马塔林资本管理公司。

And, Warren, you’ve often described a big part of your job is allocating capital.

沃伦，你常常说你工作的一大部分是分配资本。

Going forward, by just looking at Berkshire’s financial statements, how can we determine how good of a job you have done at allocating capital?

往前看，仅通过查看伯克希尔的财务报表，我们如何能判断你在资本配置方面做得有多好？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the real test will be whether the earnings progress at a rate that’s commensurate with the amount of capital that’s being retained. And over time, a market value test — but markets can be very volatile and capricious — but over time, obviously, we — unless the market value of Berkshire is significantly greater than the amount of capital that we have kept from you, retained, and used to buy businesses, you know — the verdict is against us if we ever start selling at a discount to that factor.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，真正的考验将是收益的增长速度是否与保留的资本量相称。随着时间的推移，还有一个市场价值的考验——但市场可能非常波动和反复无常——但随着时间的推移，显然，除非伯克希尔的市场价值显著高于我们从你们那里保留的资本量，并用于收购企业，否则，如果我们开始以低于这个因素的折扣出售，判决将对我们不利。

But you just have — and, you know, it is not a perfect measurement and certainly is not on any three-month or six months or even one-year basis, but over time, if we’re going to keep your money, we have to earn a better-than-average return on that money we keep and that has to translate into the stock selling at a premium over the money we retain from you.

但你只能——你知道，这并不是一个完美的衡量标准，当然在任何三个月、六个月甚至一年的基础上都不是，但随着时间的推移，如果我们要保留你的资金，我们必须在这笔保留的资金上赚取超出平均水平的回报，而这必须转化为股票以溢价出售，超过我们从你那里保留的资金。

And so far we’ve done OK on that, but the job gets tougher every year.

到目前为止，我们在这方面做得还不错，但这份工作每年都变得更加艰难。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We have continued to beat the market averages. We just aren’t beating our own past record. And I guarantee that will continue, at least the last half of it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我们继续超越市场平均水平。我们只是没有超越我们自己过去的记录。我保证这将继续，至少在后半部分。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Only the last half of it, right?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。只有后半部分，对吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

46. Don’t compare opportunities now to your best-ever deal

不要将现在的机会与你曾经最好的交易进行比较

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Mike Rifkin (PH). He wants to ask about five transactions you’ve made in recent years with very different terms.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自迈克·里夫金（PH）。他想询问你近年来进行的五笔条款非常不同的交易。

Goldman, 5 billion at 10 percent plus warrants; GE, five billion at ten percent plus warrants; Dow Chemical, 3 billion at 8.5 percent convertible to common; Wrigley- M&M Mars, 4.4 billion at 11.45; Swiss Re 2.7 billion at 12 percent.

高盛，50 亿美元，10%加权证；通用电气，50 亿美元，10%加权证；Dow Chemical，30 亿美元，8.5%可转换为普通股；威利-玛氏，44 亿美元，11.45%；瑞士再保险，27 亿美元，12%。

Now, why the different interest rates you set and how about why the warrants in some cases, and why did the rich Mars family need 4.4 billion to do a deal, and at 11.45 percent?

现在，为什么你们设定了不同的利率，以及在某些情况下为什么会有认股权证，为什么富有的马斯家族需要 44 亿来达成交易，利率又为何是 11.45%？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll let the Mars family speak for themselves.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们让Mars家族自己发声。

But in terms of comparing those five deals, it was 3 billion with GE, and the Mars deal actually involved a $2.1 billion preferred stock, which has some usual characteristics, so you have to look at it as a package.

但在比较这五笔交易时，通用电气的交易金额为 30 亿美元，而玛氏的交易实际上涉及 21 亿美元的优先股，这具有一些常见特征，因此你必须将其视为一个整体。

But the important thing is that every one of these deals was done at a different time, although the Goldman and the GE deals were done in close proximity with each other.

但重要的是，这些交易都是在不同的时间进行的，尽管高盛和通用电气的交易是在相近的时间内完成的。

And market conditions — you know, you heard Charlie in the movie talk about opportunity costs. Our opportunity costs were different in every single one of those five transactions. And incidentally, we could have done a much better — I could have done a much better — job of allocating our money, you know, in terms of the post-panic period.

市场条件——你听查理在电影中谈到机会成本。我们在这五笔交易中的机会成本都是不同的。顺便说一句，关于后期市场，我们本可以更好地——我本可以更好地——分配我们的资金，你知道，在危机后的时期。

I was early on Goldman and GE, compared to the situation five months later. But, you know, we don’t have — we not only don’t have perfect foresight, sometimes it’s pretty bad.

与五个月后的情况相比，我在高盛和通用电气方面较早做出了决定。但你知道，我们并不是——我们不仅没有完美的预见，有时预见甚至相当糟糕。

But each deal — when I did the Swiss Re deal, I was not thinking about the Dow Chemical deal, which was committed to, maybe, a year-plus earlier. I was thinking about what else I could do with $2.7 billion, and that’s the way all the decisions are made.

但每笔交易——当我进行瑞士再保险交易时，我并没有考虑到Dow Chemical的交易，那笔交易可能早在一年多前就已经承诺了。我在考虑我还可以用 27 亿美元做些什么，这就是所有决策的方式。

So they are not related — they’re not related to each other. They go through a mind that is looking at everything available that day, including the amount of cash we have, the likelihood of being able to do something else next week or next month, what else we can do that day. And past deals we’ve made don’t really make any difference.

所以它们之间没有关系——它们彼此之间没有关系。它们经过一个在看待当天所有可用机会的头脑，包括我们拥有的现金量、下周或下个月能否做成其他交易、当天还可以做什么。而过去的交易对我们并没有实质性的影响。

In fact, one of the things — one of the errors people make in business — and sometimes it can be a huge error — is that they try and measure every deal against the best deal they’ve ever made.

事实上，人们在商业中犯的一个错误——有时这可能是一个巨大的错误——就是他们试图将每一笔交易与他们所做过的最佳交易进行比较。

So they say, you know, I made this wonderful deal for, maybe, an insurance policy written, or it might be a company bought, it might be a stock bought, and they’re determined that they’re never going to make a deal that isn’t that attractive in the future.

所以他们说，你知道，我做了这个很棒的交易，可能是写了一份保险单，或者可能是买了一家公司，或者可能是买了一只股票，他们决心在未来永远不会做出不那么有吸引力的交易。

So they, in effect — sometimes they take themselves out of the game.

所以他们实际上——有时他们会让自己退出比赛。

The goal is not to make a better deal than you’ve ever made before. The goal is to make a satisfactory deal that’s the best deal you can make at the time. And Charlie relates it to marriage, and I’ll let him expand on that. (Laughter)

目标不是达成比以往更好的交易。目标是达成一个令人满意的交易，这是你当时能达成的最佳交易。查理将其与婚姻联系起来，我让他进一步阐述。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, those are — of course, we’re going to make different deals at different times based on different opportunity costs. There’s no other rational way to make deals.

查理·芒格：不，这些——当然，我们会根据不同的机会成本在不同的时间达成不同的交易。没有其他合理的方式来达成交易。

47. You don’t have to read quickly but you should read

你不必快速阅读，但你应该阅读。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们来看看第 6 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Keith McGowan, Norfolk, Massachusetts. Thank you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. Thank you for being a role model.

观众成员：基思·麦戈万，马萨诸塞州诺福克。谢谢您，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。感谢您们成为榜样。

Your ethics, frugality, sense of humor, honesty, sharing your ideas on investing, sharing your ideas on business, make this world a better place for everyone. (Applause)

你的伦理观、节俭、幽默感、诚实、分享投资理念、分享商业想法，让这个世界对每个人来说变得更好。（掌声）

Charlie mentioned in a prior answer about continuous learning. Mr. Buffett, you read about five newspapers a day. You also read many annual reports and other business-related reports.

查理在之前的回答中提到了持续学习。巴菲特先生，您每天阅读大约五份报纸。您还阅读许多年度报告和其他与商业相关的报告。

You have the ability to read much faster than the vast majority of people. Reading is a fantastic thing.

你有能力比绝大多数人阅读得更快。阅读是一件很棒的事情。

What advice would you give to children in high school, college, or adults who want to increase their ability to read faster?

你会给高中生、大学生或想提高阅读速度的成年人什么建议？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you know that’s an interesting question because I do read, as you described, the five papers and lots of 10Ks and 10Qs.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你知道这是个有趣的问题，因为我确实会阅读你所描述的五份文件以及大量的 10K 和 10Q。

Unfortunately, I’m not a fast reader, and I’m not as fast as I used to be on reading.

不幸的是，我不是一个快速阅读者，而且我阅读的速度也没有以前那么快。

But I don’t know how effective various speed reading classes may be, but if they are effective, you know, I would — I would really suggest anybody that can improve their speed — I wish I could read a lot faster than I can.

但我不知道各种速读课程的效果如何，但如果它们有效的话，我会——我真的建议任何可以提高阅读速度的人——我希望我能比现在读得快得多。

Charlie can read faster than I can. And it’s a huge advantage to be able to read fast.

查理的阅读速度比我快。这种快速阅读是一个巨大的优势。

And, you know, there’s a that old Woody Allen story about how he took the speed reading course, and he met somebody, he was telling him how wonderful it was, and the guy said, “Well, give me an example.”

你知道，有一个老的伍迪·艾伦的故事，讲的是他参加了速读课程，遇到了一个人，他告诉那个人这课程有多棒，那个人说：“好吧，给我一个例子。”

And Woody Allen said, “Well,” he said. “I read ‘War and Peace’ last night in 20 minutes. It’s about Russia.” (Laughter)

伍迪·艾伦说：“好吧，”他说。“我昨晚花了 20 分钟读完《战争与和平》。这是关于俄罗斯的。”（笑声）

That’s the problem I have when I try and read fast. I get all through reading the book, and I say, it’s about business, you know, so —

这就是我在尝试快速阅读时遇到的问题。我读完了整本书，然后我说，这本书是关于商业的，你知道的，所以——

I really don’t know the effectiveness of speed reading-type courses, but if you know of any friends or — you can learn more about that, and there are effective techniques.

我真的不知道速读课程的有效性，但如果你知道任何朋友或者可以了解更多的，你可以学习一些有效的技巧。

Obviously, the thing to do is to learn them very young because there really — there’s nothing — there’s hardly anything more pleasurable, you know, than reading and reading and reading and reading.

显然，最好的方法是尽早学习这些，因为阅读是世上最愉快的事情之一，阅读、阅读、再阅读。

And Charlie and I do a lot of it. We continue do a lot of it. But I don’t do it as fast as I would like to.

查理和我做了很多阅读。我们继续进行很多阅读。但我并没有达到我希望的速度。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think speed is overestimated. I had a roommate at Caltech who had a very distinguished mind, and I could do problems faster than he could, but he never made a mistake, and I did. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为速度被高估了。我在加州理工学院有一个室友，他的思维非常出色，我能比他更快地解决问题，但他从不犯错，而我会。（笑声）

So, I wouldn’t be too discouraged if you have to go a little slower. What the hell difference does it make? (Laughter and applause)

所以，如果你需要慢一些，不用太沮丧。这有什么关系呢？（笑声和掌声）

Pass that peanut brittle, Warren.

把那个花生糖递过来，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you. Thank you.

查理·芒格：谢谢你。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: You may have noticed we have a 15-pound box out for sale in the other room, but Charlie is looking for a 25-pound box.

沃伦·巴菲特：你可能注意到我们在另一个房间里有一个 15 磅的盒子在出售，但查理正在寻找一个 25 磅的盒子。

48. Buffett: There shouldn’t even be a debt ceiling

巴菲特：根本不应该有债务上限

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Eric Wiseman (PH) who asks, “Are you worried about Congress playing politics with the raising of the debt ceiling? What would this do to Berkshire Hathaway stock and to the overall economy?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自埃里克·维斯曼（PH），他问：“你是否担心国会在提高债务上限时玩政治？这会对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票和整体经济产生什么影响？”

WARREN BUFFETT: You mean if they didn’t raise it?

沃伦·巴菲特：您的意思是如果他们不提高上限？

BECKY QUICK: If they didn’t raise it, right.

贝基·奎克：对，如果他们不提高。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. It would probably be the most asinine, you know, act that Congress has ever performed.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯。这可能是国会所做过的最愚蠢的行为。

One time in Indiana back in the 1890s, I think they passed a bill — I know it was introduced — you can look it up on a search engine. They passed a bill to change the value of pi, the mathematical term pi, to an even 3 — (laughter) — because they said it would be easier for the school children to work with.

在 1890 年代的印第安纳州，我记得他们通过了一项法案——我知道它被提出过——你可以在搜索引擎上查找。他们通过了一项法案，将数学术语π的值改为整的 3——（笑声）——因为他们说这对学生来说更容易计算。

Well, that’s the only bill I can think of that would give competition to a refusal to raise the debt ceiling.

好吧，这是我能想到的唯一一项法案，它会对拒绝提高债务上限形成竞争。

I mean, it’s extraordinary. I mean, it really is extraordinary that with our deficit running, you know, well over $100 billion a month, and all kinds of items that can’t be changed — I mean, there’s — having a debt ceiling to start with is a mistake.

这真是太荒唐了。我们的赤字每月超过1000亿美元，许多项目是无法更改的——我认为一开始设定债务上限就是个错误。

I mean, it doesn’t — the United States of 2011 has a different debt capacity than the United States of 1911, and we’re always — it’s going to be a growing country, and we’re going to have a growing debt capacity.

我的意思是，2011 年的美国与 1911 年的美国在债务能力上是不同的，我们总是——这将是一个不断发展的国家，我们将拥有不断增长的债务能力。

That doesn’t mean I think it’s a great idea at all to have debt growing, as a percentage of GDP.

这并不意味着我认为债务占 GDP 的比例增长是个好主意。

But this — the debt ceiling’s on — so that these games get played and all the time that gets wasted and everything, and, you know, the amount of — number of — silly statements that you hear. It just seems such a waste of time for a country that’s got a lot of things to do.

但是这一点——债务上限已经设定——所以这些游戏就会被玩，而所有浪费的时间和一切，还有你听到的那些愚蠢的言论数量。对于一个有很多事情要做的国家来说，这似乎真是浪费时间。

But in the end, they won’t, in my view — there’s no chance that they don’t increase the debt ceiling and I would love to see them — well, I’d love to see them eliminate the idea, because it results in these periodic kind of stalemate operations where everybody uses it for posturing purposes and everything of the sort.

但最终，我认为他们不会——没有机会不增加债务上限，我希望他们能够——我希望他们能彻底消除这个想法，因为这导致了周期性的僵局，大家都利用它来进行姿态展示等。

The United States is not going to have a debt crisis of any kind as long as we keep issuing our notes in our own currency. You know, the difference between being able to borrow in your own currency and having to borrow in another currency is night and day.

美国只要继续以自己的货币发行债券，就不会出现任何形式的债务危机。你知道，能够以自己的货币借款和不得不以其他货币借款之间的区别是天壤之别。

The only thing we have to worry about is the printing press and inflation. And if you’re a member of the euro, European Monetary Union, you have to worry about — you can’t print money. You can go and get your co-members to try and help you out.

我们唯一需要担心的是印刷钞票和通货膨胀。如果你是欧元区的成员，欧洲货币联盟，你就必须担心——你无法印钞票。你可以去寻找你的伙伴，试图让他们帮助你。

But giving up the right to issue debt in your own currency is a huge step. And the United States has not done it. I don’t know whether we’ve ever issued U.S. bonds in any other currency but we certainly haven’t made a habit of it.

但放弃以自己货币发行债务的权利是一个巨大的步骤。而美国并没有这样做。我不知道我们是否曾以其他货币发行过美国债券，但我们肯定没有养成这样的习惯。

And the Japanese, incidentally, which have a very ratio of debt-to-GDP, also have consistently borrowed in their own currency.

顺便提一下，日本的债务与 GDP 比率非常高，但他们一直以自己的货币借款。

And believe me, when it’s time to pay somebody back, and you have a choice of paying — and you’re forced to pay somebody else’s currency versus paying in your own — it’s entirely a different proposition.

相信我，当是时候偿还债务时，如果你可以选择偿还自己货币与被迫偿还其他货币，这完全是两码事。

As a matter of fact, Charlie and I, we were trying to buy that bank back in —

事实上，查理和我，我们当时正试图收购那家银行——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Chicago. 查理·芒格：芝加哥。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in Chicago in the late 1960s, and this was a time of really tight money.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，在 1960 年代末的芝加哥，那是一个资金非常紧张的时期。

And tight money was different then than tight money is today. I mean, tight money meant no money.

而当时的紧缩货币与今天的紧缩货币是不同的。我的意思是，紧缩货币意味着没有钱。

And somebody — we wanted to buy this bank, and they wanted — the only place we could find some money, I think, was in Kuwait in dinars, wasn’t it?

我们想买一家银行，只有在科威特找到了一些资金，我认为是以第纳尔借的，是吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Kuwaiti dinars. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：科威特第纳尔。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And I thought to myself, and Charlie concurred, who the hell knew what they were going to say the value of the dinar was when we went to pay it back. It was not something over which we had a lot of control. So we decided not to borrow the money in dinars even though I kind of wish we’d bought the bank.

沃伦·巴菲特：我心想，查理也同意，谁知道我们到时候偿还时第纳尔的价值会是什么。这不是我们能控制的事。所以我们决定不以第纳尔借钱，尽管我有点希望我们能买下那家银行。

Charlie, do you have anything to say on that?

查理，你对此有什么要说的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：没有。（笑声）

I do think — I do think — you know, I remember an era when we had a bipartisan foreign policy and all that, and I liked that era. And that was the Marshall Plan, and a lot of wonderful constructive things were done, and they were generous things.

我确实认为——我确实认为——你知道，我记得一个我们有两党外交政策的时代，我喜欢那个时代。那是马歇尔计划，做了很多美好的建设性事情，而且那些事情是慷慨的。

Now, it seems to me that both parties are trying to compete to see who can be the most stupid — (laughter) — and they keep topping one another. (Laughter and applause)

现在，在我看来，两党似乎都在竞争谁能更愚蠢——（笑声）——而且他们不断超越对方。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You can tell Charlie is a fellow who has always filed an accurate income tax form. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你可以看出查理是一个总是准确填写所得税表的人。（笑声）

He’s not worried. 他不担心。

49. Nuclear power is “important” and “safe”

核能是“重要的”和“安全的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m John Gorrie (PH) from Iowa City, Iowa, where I’m a happy customer of MidAmerican Energy.

观众：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自爱荷华州爱荷华市的约翰·戈里（PH），我是MidAmerican的满意客户。

Around 2004, Mr. Buffett, you told us of a great attention you had given to limiting Berkshire’s exposure to mega-catastrophes so that one could not break Berkshire.

大约在 2004 年，巴菲特先生，您告诉我们您非常关注限制伯克希尔对超级灾难的暴露，以便不会有任何一场灾难能够摧毁伯克希尔。

Today, MidAmerican Energy is seeking approval to build a nuclear power plant in eastern Iowa. At the same time, another utility company, Tokyo Electric and Power, faces claims that Merrill Lynch has estimated as exceeding 12 trillion yen, or $140 billion, to compensate residences and businesses that have been displaced and farmers that cannot produce.

今天，MidAmerican正在寻求批准在爱荷华州东部建设一座核电站。与此同时，另一家公用事业公司东京电力公司面临着美林证券估计超过 12 万亿日元或 1400 亿美元的索赔，以补偿被迫迁移的居民和企业以及无法生产的农民。

Do you believe that the bond-like return that MidAmerican Energy might receive from a nuclear power plant can justify the mega-catastrophe risk that it would pose to Berkshire?

你相信MidAmerican从核电站可能获得的类似债券的回报能够证明它对伯克希尔所构成的巨大灾难风险是合理的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think it does pose — I don’t know the details of it, and Greg Abel can speak to it better than I can, but I don’t think there’s anything like the exposure that you refer to.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为这并没有造成——我不知道具体细节，格雷格·阿贝尔可以比我更好地解释，但我认为没有你所提到的那种风险暴露。

I think nuclear power is an important part of the world’s equation, really, in dealing with its problems on — it’s very long term because you’re not going to change the installed base in any hurry.

我认为核能在解决世界问题方面确实是一个重要的组成部分——这是一项非常长期的工作，因为你不可能迅速改变现有的基础设施。

And as you know, France has a very high percentage of nuclear power. And, actually, 20 percent of the electricity generated in the United States comes from nuclear power.

正如您所知，法国的核能比例非常高。实际上，美国 20%的电力来自核能。

I probably am getting some of mine from — we have — at Fort Calhoun, we have a nuclear facility — not we, but Omaha Public Power District has a nuclear facility I’ve actually been in.

我们有一座核设施——并不是我们，而是奥马哈公共电力区（Omaha Public Power District）有一座核设施，我实际上去参观过。

But I think nuclear power is important, and I think it’s safe. I think that — I know — I don’t think nuclear power is going to go any place in the United States for a while — maybe quite a while — because of the reaction to what happened in Tokyo — with Tokyo Electric Power.

但我认为核能是重要的，我认为它是安全的。我知道——我并不认为核能在美国会有任何进展，至少在一段时间内——可能会很长一段时间——因为人们对东京发生的事情反应很大。

But that doesn’t change my view as to the advisability of continuing to develop nuclear power, not only in the United States, but around the world.

但这并不改变我对继续发展核能的看法，这不仅适用于美国，也适用于全世界。

I think some people misinterpreted what I said when I was interviewed, when I said that I thought it would have a major setback in its development, just because of the popular reaction to what happened in Japan.

我认为有些人误解了我在接受采访时所说的话，当我说我认为由于公众对日本发生的事情的反应，它的发展将会遭遇重大挫折。

But that does not change my view that nuclear power is important for the future of this country and the world.

但这并不改变我认为继续发展核能的可取性，无论是在美国还是在全球。

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we can’t be so risk averse that things that have a very tiny chance of making a big dent in one subsidiary are unendurable for us. We have to have a certain reasonable amount of courage in operating this company.

查理·芒格：是的，我们不能因为有非常微小的几率会对某个子公司造成重大损害而变得过于回避风险。我们必须在运营公司时保持一定的勇气。

WARREN BUFFETT: We have pipelines — we have gas pipe — you can dream of all kinds of worst-case situations.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有管道——我们有天然气管道——你可以想象各种最坏的情况。

We have to carry toxic materials. We’re required by law to carry those on the railroad, and, you know, you can picture the wrong place, the wrong time, the wrong everything. But we are not bearing any risks, in my view, ever, that threaten the enterprise.

我们必须运输有毒材料。法律要求我们在铁路上运输这些材料，你知道的，想象一下错误的地点、错误的时间、错误的一切。但在我看来，我们永远不会承担任何威胁企业的风险。

I mean, that is one thing I think about all the time. I regard myself as the Chief Risk Officer of Berkshire, and that is not something to be delegated to a committee, in my view, at all.

我想，这是一件我一直在思考的事情。我把自己视为伯克希尔的首席风险官，在我看来，这绝不是可以委托给委员会的事情。

So I think about — whether I think about derivative positions, whether I think about leverage, whether I’m thinking about nuclear power plants or anything, I mean, we are not doing anything that I know of that — pressing my imagination as far as I can — threatens me losing a night’s sleep over Berkshire’s well-being.

所以我考虑——无论是考虑衍生头寸，还是考虑杠杆，或者我在考虑核电站或其他任何事情，我的意思是，就我所知，我们没有做任何事情——尽我所能地想象——会让我因为伯克希尔的安危而失去一夜的睡眠。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I think you’d also count on any new nuclear plant built in Iowa will be a hell of a lot safer than the ones we already have. We are learning as we go along here. (Applause)

查理·芒格：我认为你也可以相信，在爱荷华州建造的任何新核电站将比我们现有的核电站安全得多。我们在不断学习中前进。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Obviously, more people — more people have lost their lives, by far, in coal mine accidents, you know, than ever in the United States — have suffered no losses from anything involving nuclear — with it producing 20 percent of the electricity used by 309 million people.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。显然，煤矿事故中失去生命的人数远远超过美国历史上任何时候——与之相比，涉及核能的事件没有造成任何损失——核能为 3.09 亿人提供了 20%的电力。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And if a tsunami gets to Iowa, it will a hell of a tsunami. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：如果海啸到达爱荷华州，那将是个可怕的海啸。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And our railroad won’t do so well, either. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们的铁路也不会太好。（笑声）

50. Charity program fell victim to pressure groups

慈善项目成为压力团体的牺牲品

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Mary and Jim Beaumont (PH) from Springfield, Illinois. They’ve been Berkshire shareholders since 1971, and I should note that we received several questions from some long-term shareholders along these lines, and this one reads:

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自伊利诺伊州斯普林菲尔德的玛丽和吉姆·博蒙特（PH）。他们自 1971 年以来就是伯克希尔的股东，我应该提到，我们收到了几位长期股东提出的类似问题，这个问题是：

“Would Berkshire ever consider reinstating its shareholder-directed charitable giving program now that you have a big cash position and are urging people to give away their wealth to worthy causes?

“伯克希尔会考虑恢复其股东主导的慈善捐赠计划吗？现在你们有了大量现金，并且在鼓励人们将财富捐赠给值得的事业。”

“When you had that program, we were able to support many local schools and charities over the years.”

“当您有该计划时，我们能够多年来支持许多地方学校和慈善机构。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I love that program, which we had for, maybe, 20 or so years. Charlie loved it. A lot of the shareholders loved it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我喜欢那个项目，我们大约有 20 年了。查理喜欢它。很多股东也喜欢它。

And it was interesting because it was a tax-efficient way to let shareholders give away some money to whatever they chose, as long as it was a 501(c)(3), and they could pick up to three charities.

这很有趣，因为这是一种税收高效的方式，让股东可以将一些钱捐赠给他们选择的任何机构，只要它是 501(c)(3)组织，他们可以选择最多三个慈善机构。

And some families, for example, used it as a learning device. When they would get the form from us, they’d get their kids around the table and they’d talk about philanthropy and why they were choosing what they did.

例如，一些家庭将其作为一种学习工具。当他们从我们这里收到表格时，他们会把孩子们聚集在一起，讨论慈善事业以及他们为什么选择这样的捐赠。

Two things — well, one thing that was very interesting about it is nobody else copied it. I mean, the rest of corporate America was not interested in having their shareholders direct contributions. They were much more interested in having the CEO direct contributions. So it did not catch on, despite a fair amount of publicity.

有两件事——嗯，有一件事非常有趣，那就是没有其他人模仿它。我的意思是，其他美国企业并不想让股东直接贡献。他们更感兴趣的是让首席执行官来指挥贡献。因此，尽管有相当多的宣传，它并没有流行开来。

We always had a small backlash of sorts from people who didn’t like the charities that our shareholders were choosing.

我们总是会受到一些反对声音，来自那些不喜欢我们股东所选择的慈善机构的人。

So Berkshire’s name was on the check. The shareholders would tell us we want $20 a share, let’s say — and they own ten shares, so they can direct $200 — they’d say, we want our $200 to go to more —churches and synagogues, actually, were number one — but there were schools and there were all kinds of things.

所以伯克希尔的名字出现在支票上。股东会告诉我们，我们想把每股20美元，比如说，他们拥有10股，所以他们可以指定200美元——他们会说，我们希望这200美元用于更多——实际上，教堂和犹太教堂是第一位——但还有学校和其他各类机构。

And we would always get some letters where Berkshire would be contributing to, say, Planned Parenthood of California, and people would say, “Well, we’re not going to buy See’s Candy because Berkshire is supporting Planned Parenthood in California.”

我们总是会收到一些信件，伯克希尔会向加利福尼亚的计划生育组织捐款，人们会说：“好吧，我们不打算购买 See's 糖果，因为伯克希尔在加利福尼亚支持计划生育。”

And sometimes I would write the people a letter and tell them that when See’s bought almonds or milk or anything like that we didn’t get into the charitable preferences of the person supplying us, but it never really amounted to anything.

有时候我会给人们写信，告诉他们当 See's 购买杏仁、牛奶或其他类似的东西时，我们并不考虑供应商的慈善偏好，但这从来没有真正产生过什么影响。

Then we bought the Pampered Chef, and that was a different situation because with the Pampered Chef we operated through 50,000-plus independent contractors.

然后我们购买了Pampered Chef，那是另一种情况，因为在Pampered Chef我们通过50,000多名独立承包商进行运营。

These are women, largely, women, who sometimes, to supplement their income — we have at least one in the office that — a woman that sells Pampered Chef products — sometimes as a main source of income — were — these 50,000 were independent contractors, and a campaign developed where people said that because Berkshire Hathaway gives money, probably primarily to pro-choice organizations, and that was at the direction — we had other people giving them to pro-life organizations.

这些人主要是女性，有些人为了补充收入——我们在办公室至少有一个——有一位女士销售Pampered Chef的产品——有时候是她们的主要收入来源——这些50,000名独立承包商面临了一场运动，人们声称由于伯克希尔哈撒韦捐赠的钱，主要是给支持堕胎的组织，而那些给支持反堕胎组织的捐款。

I mean, these reflected the views of our shareholders, not of Berkshire management — but that they were going to boycott these independent contractors.

我的意思是，这些反映了我们股东的观点，而不是伯克希尔管理层的观点——但他们打算抵制这些独立承包商。

And these were people who depended on the income, who had nothing to do with Berkshire’s policies, and they were being hurt, in terms of their livelihood, and in some cities it became a radio campaign, and in some cities people regularly started interfering with the parties arranged for our Pampered Chef consultants.

而这些人依赖于这些收入，与伯克希尔的政策毫无关系，他们的生计受到了影响。在一些城市，这变成了电台运动，有些城市的人们开始定期干扰我们的Pampered Chef顾问安排的聚会。

And it was hurting a whole lot of innocent people who had nothing to do with Berkshire’s policies, who had nothing to do with Berkshire.

这严重影响了大量无辜的人，他们与伯克希尔无关。

And at that time, reluctantly, we decided to end the program.

在那个时候，我们不情愿地决定结束这个项目。

I did not — I didn’t mind at all losing some See’s Candy business or whatever to some people.

我并不在意失去一些See's Candy的生意或其他任何生意。

But when we start affecting individuals — most of these are not high-income individuals — and we’re cutting off their livelihood because of something Berkshire is doing, it became — it just became apparent to me that it was unfair to continue it, and reluctantly, we stopped it, and I think it’s too bad.

但是当我们开始影响个人时——这些人大多数并不是高收入者——而我们因为伯克希尔的某些行为切断了他们的生计时，我意识到继续这样做是不公平的，因此我们不情愿地停止了，我认为这太可惜了。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t want the parent company involved in distracting arguments about the social issues of the times.

查理·芒格：我们不想让母公司参与那些关于时代社会问题的分歧争论。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we certainly don’t want it where it affects —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们当然不希望它影响到——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — people who are just bystanders, basically, who have counted on us over the years to work with them. And it was literally affecting the income of thousands, primarily women, concentrated in certain communities around the country. OK.

沃伦·巴菲特：——那些只是旁观者的人，他们多年来一直依赖我们与他们合作。这确实影响到了数千人的收入，主要是女性，集中在全国的某些社区。好的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot of stock — Berkshire stock — is given away every year. It isn’t like we’ve lost the flow of charity totally.

查理·芒格：每年都有很多股票——伯克希尔的股票——被赠送出去。并不是说我们完全失去了慈善的流动。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, a huge amount is given away. Partly that’s because Charlie and I started our partnerships back in the 50s and 60s, and we’ve got a number of partners that are now in their 80s, and some of them have given away some exceptional amounts of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，捐赠了大量资金。部分原因是查理和我在 50 年代和 60 年代开始了我们的合伙关系，我们有一些合伙人现在已经 80 多岁，其中一些人捐赠了相当可观的金额。

You had a question earlier from Dick Holland, for example, and Dick Holland — I think it’s a matter of record as to exact numbers — but he’s given away huge amounts of money over the years and continues to.

例如，您之前问到迪克·霍兰（Dick Holland），他——我想确切的数字是众所周知的——但他多年来捐赠了巨额资金，并继续如此。

And we’ve got dozens like that that I would say are going to end up giving back 90 percent or more of all the money they’ve made in Berkshire.

我们还有几十位这样的股东，我敢说，他们最终将回馈90%或更多他们在伯克希尔获得的所有财富。

51. Why we hate projections

我们为什么讨厌预测

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

Number 8. 数字 8。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Tanya Laneva (PH), Boston, Massachusetts.

观众成员：塔尼亚·莱涅娃（PH），马萨诸塞州波士顿。

When you think about long-term cash flows, do you try to forecast growth? Or do you just think about certainty?

当你考虑长期现金流时，你会尝试预测增长吗？还是只是考虑确定性？

If you have an indestructible company like Coca-Cola or Burlington Northern, do you try to estimate growth?

如果你有像可口可乐或伯灵顿北方这样的坚不可摧的公司，你会尝试估计增长吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we think — are you finished on that?

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们认为——你说完了吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, thank you.

观众：是的，谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: We — growth is part of the investment equation, and obviously, we love profitable growth. So we would love to figure out a way to, say, take a See’s Candy, to move it geographically into new areas, all kinds of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们——增长是投资方程的一部分，显然，我们喜欢盈利增长。因此，我们希望找到一种方法，比如将 See's Candy 地理上扩展到新的区域，做各种事情。

I mean, if we could find areas for growth with See’s, it would be likely to be very, very profitable.

我的意思是，如果我们能找到See's Candy的增长机会，它可能会非常非常有利可图。

If Coca-Cola, which is in 200 countries, I mean they have pursued that policy successfully now for 125 years. And some products travel way better than others.

如果是可口可乐，它已经在200个国家运营，我的意思是，他们成功地实施了这一政策已经125年了。有些产品的传播能力远超其他产品。

But when we look at a business and we’re looking out in the future, obviously, if we see growth in that picture and it’s growth which is — produces a high return on incremental capital involved, we love it, but we do not rule out companies where we think there will be little or no growth, if the price is attractive relative to the earning power.

但是当我们看一个企业并展望未来时，显然，如果我们看到那幅图景中有增长，并且这种增长能够带来高额的增量资本回报，我们会非常喜欢，但如果价格相对于盈利能力具有吸引力，我们也不会排除那些我们认为几乎没有或没有增长的公司。

You know, there will be some growth, over time, in something like lubricants, you know, at Lubrizol, but it won’t be dramatic growth.

你知道，随着时间的推移，像润滑剂这样的产品在 Lubrizol 会有一些增长，但不会是剧烈的增长。

Would we love it if it, you know, if it were going to grow ten percent a year in units or something of the sort? Sure. But that’s not going to happen.

如果我们能预见到它每年在单位上增长10%之类的事情，我们当然希望，但这不太可能发生。

So it’s a factor in every investment decision because we’re really looking out to the future as to future earning power, but also future capital requirements.

因此，这在每个投资决策中都是一个因素，因为我们实际上是在展望未来的盈利能力，同时也考虑未来的资本需求。

And we think plenty about whether any business we go into is likely to grow profitably, and sometimes we’re right and sometimes we’re wrong. But we don’t rule out companies that have very slow growth or no-growth possibilities.

我们会认真考虑我们进入的任何业务是否有可能盈利增长，有时我们是对的，有时我们是错的。但我们并不排除那些增长非常缓慢或没有增长可能性的公司。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, the interesting thing is that in our country, the business schools teach people to make these projections way in the future, and they program these computers to grind these projections out. And then they use them in their business decision making, et cetera, et cetera.

查理·芒格：是的，有趣的是，在我们国家，商学院教人们进行长期的预测，并让这些计算机进行这些预测的运算。然后，他们在商业决策等方面使用这些预测。

I’ve always regarded those projections as doing more harm than good. And Warren has never prepared one that I know of, and where an investment banker prepares one, we tend to throw them aside without reading them.

我一直认为那些预测弊大于利。而我所知道的，沃伦从来没有准备过这样的预测，而投资银行家准备的预测，我们往往会在不阅读的情况下将其抛弃。

WARREN BUFFETT: We them upside down, actually.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们实际上是把它们颠倒过来的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What? 查理·芒格：什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: We turn them upside down.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们把它们倒过来。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah. And I think an enormous false precision gets into things when you program computers to make forward projections for a long period of time.

查理·芒格：是的，是的。我认为，当你编程计算机进行长期的前瞻性预测时，会产生巨大的虚假精确性。

We make rough projections in our head all the time.

我们总是在脑海中进行粗略的预测。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we don’t do any of those formal projections, because the fact that they’re there on paper and came out of a computer makes some people think they must be significant. I really think they do more damage than they do good.

查理·芒格：我们不做任何正式的预测，因为它们在纸上存在并且来自计算机，这让一些人认为它们一定很重要。我真的认为它们造成的伤害大于好处。

WARREN BUFFETT: When we bought Scott Fetzer, which was back in about 1985, it had been shopped by First Boston to more than 30 parties. They never got around to calling us.

沃伦·巴菲特：当我们购买Scott Fetzer时，大约是在1985年，它曾被第一波士顿（First Boston）推销给超过30个参与方。他们从来没有联系过我们。

So after shopping it to about 30 parties, Scott Fetzer, finally, was working on a deal with an ESOP after something else had fallen through, I forget the exact details.

所以在向大约 30 个买家推销后，Scott Fetzer最终在与一个员工持股计划（ESOP）达成交易，之前的其他交易失败了，我忘记了具体细节。

And I sent a letter to Ralph Schey. I’d read about it in the paper. I’d never met him, never talked to the guy. But I sent him a letter.

我给拉尔夫·谢伊写了一封信。我在报纸上读到过这件事。我从未见过他，也从未和他交谈过。但我给他写了一封信。

I figured I’d gamble 21-cents, or whatever the first class rate was then, and I said, “We’ll pay $60 a share. If you like the idea, I’ll meet you in Chicago Sunday, and if you don’t like the idea tear up the letter.”

我想，我愿意花21美分，或许是当时的首类邮票费，然后我说：“我们愿意以每股60美元的价格购买。如果您对此感兴趣，我会在周日与您在芝加哥见面，如果您不感兴趣，就撕掉这封信。”

So that took place and Ralph met me, and we made the deal, and we paid the $60 a share or whatever it was.

所以那件事发生了，拉尔夫见了我，我们达成了交易，我们支付了每股 60 美元或其他金额。

And Charlie and I went back to sign up the deal, and the follow from First Boston was there, and he was a little abashed since he had not sent us — contacted us at all — when they were looking for something. But naturally he had a contract that called for a few million dollars of commission even though he’d not bothered to ever contact us and we made the deal by ourselves.

查理和我回去签署交易，第一波士顿的跟进人员在场，他有些尴尬，因为在他们寻找某些东西时，他根本没有联系过我们。但自然他有一份合同，要求几百万美元的佣金，即使他从未费心联系过我们，而我们是自己达成了交易。

So, in a moment of exuberance while he was collecting his few million dollars, he said to Charlie, he said, “Well, we prepared this book in connection with Scott Fetzer, and since you’re paying us a couple million dollars and have gotten nothing so far,” he said, “maybe you would like to have this book.”

所以，在他收取几百万美元的时候，他兴奋地对查理说：“好吧，我们准备了这本关于Scott Fetzer的书，既然你给我们支付了几百万美元却没有得到任何东西，”他说，“或许你想要这本书。”

And Charlie, with his usual tact, said I’ll pay you $2 million if you don’t show me the book. (Laughter)

查理一如既往地机智地说，如果你不让我看那本书，我就给你 200 万美元。（笑声）

And I should mention, this will — in connection with Lubrizol, Dave Sokol met James Hambrick, I think on whatever it was, January 25, or whatever the date, and he — Lubrizol had already made projections publicly out to 2013.

我应该提到，这与 Lubrizol 有关，Dave Sokol 在 1 月 25 日或其他日期与 James Hambrick 见面，而 Lubrizol 已经公开做出了 2013 年的预测。

And Dave told me that they had — they — that James had also given him some projections, I guess out to 2015 or something, and did I want to see them? And I told him no.

戴夫告诉我，他们——詹姆斯还给他提供了一些预测，我想是到2015年的预测，您想看看吗？我告诉他不想看。

I mean, I don’t want to look at the other follow’s projections. I’ve never seen a projection from an investment banker that didn’t show the earnings going up over time, and believe me, the earnings don’t always go up over time.

我的意思是，我不想看其他跟随者的预测。我从未见过投资银行家给出的预测不显示收益随时间上升，相信我，收益并不总是随时间上升。

So, it’s just — you know, it’s the old story: don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut, you know.

所以，这就是——你知道的，老生常谈：不要问理发师你是否需要剪头发，你知道的。

You do not want to ask an investment banker what he thinks the earnings are going to be in five years of something he’s trying to sell.

你绝对不想问投资银行家他认为某个他正在试图出售的东西五年后的利润会是多少。

So I pay no attention to that sort of thing.

所以我对那种事情不予理睬。

But we do, as Charlie says, we are doing projections in our head, obviously, when we look at a business. I mean, when we look at any company to buy, or any stock to buy, we are thinking in our mind, we’ve got a model in our mind, of what that place is likely to look like over some period of years. And then we also have some model in our mind of how far off we can be.

但是正如查理所说，当我们看一个企业时，我们的脑海中显然会进行预测。我的意思是，当我们考虑购买任何公司或任何股票时，我们心中都有一个模型，想象着那个地方在未来几年内可能的样子。然后我们心中也有一个模型，考虑到我们可能会有多大的偏差。

I mean there’s some things we can be way off on, there’s other things we’re likely to be in a fairly narrow range on.

我的意思是，有些事情我们可能会有很大的偏差，而其他事情我们可能会在一个相对狭窄的范围内。

So all that is taking place, but we sure don’t want to listen to anybody else’s projections.

所以所有这些事情都在发生，但我们肯定不想听取其他人的预测。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Those of you about to enter business school, or who are there, I recommend you learn to do it our way, but at least until you’re out of school you have to pretend to do it their way. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：即将进入商学院的你们，或者已经在那里的你们，我建议你们学习我们的方式，但至少在你们毕业之前，你们必须假装按照他们的方式去做。（笑声和掌声）

52. Buffett owns a few stocks and lots of bonds

巴菲特拥有一些股票和大量债券

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: On Berkshire’s quarterly 13F filings at the SEC, three stocks are held only by the entity recorded on the form as Warren E. Buffett, and not by a Berkshire subsidiary company.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：在伯克希尔的季度13F报告中，有三只股票仅由在表格上记录为沃伦·E·巴菲特持有，而不属于伯克希尔的子公司。

Please clear up some confusion on this matter. Are these holdings your own personal investments outside of Berkshire, or do they belong to Berkshire Hathaway?

请澄清一下这个问题的混淆。这些持股是您个人在伯克希尔之外的投资，还是属于伯克希尔哈撒韦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’ll have to tell me what the names are.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，你得告诉我那些名字是什么。

CAROL LOOMIS: Unfortunately, the questioner didn’t include those. But these are the three, I think, that are — that say Warren E. Buffett is the owner.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：不幸的是，提问者没有包括这些。但这三只，我想，都是显示为沃伦·E·巴菲特所有的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Marc Hamburg prepares those forms. Marc, do you have a microphone that you can — you could —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，马克·汉堡准备那些表格。马克，你有麦克风吗？你可以——

MARC HAMBURG: I think —

马尔克·汉堡：我认为——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Go ahead.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。请继续。

MARC HAMBURG: Well, those are securities that are owned by certain employee benefit plans and so that — Warren is directed into those plans, but it doesn’t — they’re not owned by Warren, or there’s no indication that they’re owned by Warren.

马尔克·汉堡：这些证券是某些员工福利计划拥有的，所以—沃伦被指派到这些计划中，但它们并不属于沃伦，或没有任何迹象表明它们属于沃伦。

Warren is part of the filing because he’s considered to be a controlling shareholder of Berkshire. So every security listed on there shows Warren as one of the — one of the owners.

沃伦是该文件的一部分，因为他被视为伯克希尔的控股股东。因此，列在上面的每一项证券都显示沃伦是其中之一——其中之一的所有者。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Do we file stocks owned by pension plans?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们是否提交养老金计划所持有的股票？

MARC HAMBURG: To the extent that you direct — have directed —

马尔克·汉堡：在您指示的范围内—您已经指示—

WARREN BUFFETT: I got you, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：我明白了，是的。

MARC HAMBURG: Right. 马尔克·汉堡：对。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No, I don’t — I don’t think I — well, Marc knows the rules on it better than I do. I own very, very few securities.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不—我不认为我—好吧，马克对这些规则了解得比我多。我拥有的证券非常非常少。

I really spend my time thinking about Berkshire, so I’ve got a lot of the very security I’ve been telling you not to buy, which is government bonds, but that’s not because it’s a good investment. It’s a place to have some money and forget about it, and I’ll work on Berkshire.

我真的花很多时间思考伯克希尔，所以我拥有的是我一直告诉你们不要买的那种证券，就是政府债券，但这并不是因为这是一个好投资。这是一个放一些资金并且可以忘记它的地方，我会继续专注于伯克希尔。

53. Evaluating a company outside the U.S.

评估美国以外的公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 9. 沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, it’s an honor and a pleasure. My name is Ben Anderson (PH), I’m from Los Angeles.

观众成员：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，很荣幸也很高兴。我的名字是本·安德森，我来自洛杉矶。

When you’re looking at an investment in China, where the business culture is a lot different than it is here in the U.S., and successful business practices are, again, very different than they are here, what are the characteristics you look for when placing investment in that company, and is that any different than the general principles at Berkshire?

当你在考虑在中国投资时，那里商业文化与美国大相径庭，成功的商业实践也与这里非常不同，你在对那家公司进行投资时会关注哪些特征？这与伯克希尔的一般原则有何不同？

WARREN BUFFETT: We follow the same principles, but we recognize that we know less about tax laws, about customs, about attitudes towards shareholders, any time we get outside the United States, than we know in the United States. Now, to varying degrees, we weigh in that uncertainty.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们遵循相同的原则，但我们意识到，任何时候我们走出美国，我们对税法、海关、对股东的态度的了解都比在美国时要少。因此，在不同程度上，我们会考虑这种不确定性。

At the time I bought PetroChina stock, which, I don’t know, was probably 2003 or thereabouts, it was extraordinarily cheap, in relation to any calculation of reserves or refining capacity or cash flow or you name it. And at the same time, Yukos in Russia was similarly very, very cheap, and they were both huge.

在我购买中国石油股票的时候，我不知道，大概是 2003 年左右，它的价格非常便宜，无论是与任何储备、炼油能力、现金流的计算相比，还是其他任何指标。同时，俄罗斯的尤科斯也同样非常便宜，而且它们都是巨头。

And I’m no geopolitical expert or anything of the sort, but I decided I was more comfortable buying PetroChina than I was buying Yukos. Now, was I as comfortable buying PetroChina as I would have been buying, you know, some domestic company of similar size?

我并不是地缘政治专家或类似的东西，但我决定购买中国石油比购买尤科斯更让我感到舒适。现在，我购买中国石油的舒适度是否与购买某个类似规模的国内公司一样呢？

No, because I don’t know as much — I didn’t know then, and I don’t know as much now, about all the intricacies of Chinese tax law and what the policies might be.

不，因为我了解的较少——我那时并不知道，现在也对中国税法的复杂性了解得不够多。

But I was fairly impressed — quite impressed — when I read the report of PetroChina.

但是，当我读到中石油的报告时，我确实印象深刻——相当印象深刻。

For one thing, they said they were going to pay out 45 percent of — as I remember — 45 percent of their earnings in dividends. That’s more than any company — oil company — in the United States would tell me.

他们说他们将支付 45%的——我记得——45%的收益作为股息。这比美国任何一家石油公司告诉我的都要多。

So I regarded it as a plus and an indication of intent that I thought would be fulfilled, and it has been fulfilled.

因此，我将其视为一个积极的信号，表明他们的意图，我认为这会得到实现，结果也是如此。

So we do make allowances for our lack of understanding, as well as we might in the United States, various key factors.

所以，我们确实会考虑我们理解不足的因素，以及在美国可能存在的各种关键因素。

But the basic principles of trying to value the business, trying to find managements in which we have confidence, in both their ability and integrity, and then finding attractive purchase price, those principles apply wherever in the world we would be investing.

但是，评估企业价值的基本原则、寻找我们信任的管理层（无论是能力还是诚信），然后找到有吸引力的购买价格，这些原则适用于我们在世界任何地方的投资。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we make so few investments in China that trying to draw general lessons from us would be hard.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们在中国的投资非常少，因此从我们身上得出一般性的教训是很困难的。

It reminds me of the time a professor went west for the summer and came back to his faculty and he said, “I’ve learned that Indians always walk single file.” And they said, “How did you figure that out?” And he said, “I saw one and he did.” (Laughter)

这让我想起一位教授在夏天去西部旅行，回来后跟他的同事们说：“我发现印第安人总是单列行走。”同事们问他：“你是怎么发现的？”他说：“我见过一个，他就是这样做的。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: How did we get from there to China? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们是如何从那里到达中国的？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we only had a couple of things in China. They’re like the one Indian. You can’t draw general lessons from them.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们在中国只有几项投资。它们就像那位印第安人。你无法从他们身上得出普遍的教训。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we’re willing to look tomorrow.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们愿意明天继续关注。

I mean, obviously, if we had a call on some — that could be a significant size investment because we — it just doesn’t make any sense for us to look at things we can just put a couple of hundred million dollars in — but we, you know, I love the idea of looking at various ideas.

显然，如果我们能够接触到一些可以进行的重大投资，因为对我们来说，考虑我们只能投入几亿美元的事情是没有意义的——但我们，我喜欢了解各种想法的机会。

I mean, I find it a fascinating game to hear about companies or businesses that are new to me. And the problem now is that the universe has gotten much smaller because of our size. But we welcome a call from a lot of countries.

我发现听到对我来说是新公司的情况非常有趣。现在的问题是，由于我们的规模，投资的范围已经变得小得多。但我们欢迎来自很多国家的电话。

There’s some countries that are just too small. They’re not going to have businesses that could move the needle at a place like Berkshire, and so those are off the list, but —

有些国家实在太小了。它们不会有能够在像伯克希尔这样的地方产生影响的企业，因此这些国家被排除在外，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: China has at least one private company that makes over $3 billion a year after taxes. There’s some big things out there.

查理·芒格：中国至少有一家私人公司年税后利润超过30亿美元。这里面有一些大的机会。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll get the name from him later, but I don’t want you to hear. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我稍后会从他那里得到名字，但我不想让你听到。（笑声）

54. Where Berkshire’s short-term cash goes

伯克希尔的短期现金去向

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Ed Schmidt (PH) in Alaska. He’s asking about Berkshire’s cash.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自阿拉斯加的埃德·施密特（PH）。他在询问伯克希尔的现金情况。

He writes, “Where is that money held? All in Treasury bills or notes? If so, what will happen in June when the biggest buyer, the Fed, quits buying? Where is all that money on the sidelines? Is it under the mattress we saw two years ago?

他写道：“那笔钱存在哪里？全都在国债或票据里吗？如果是这样，随着最大的买家——美联储退出购买，到六月份会发生什么？那些在场外的钱都在哪？是我们两年前看到的在床垫下面吗？

“I don’t see how any significant amount of money can be in banks that aren’t paying interest, corporate bonds that are risky and not paying much interest, or government bonds that seem less and less sound as each day passes.”

“我看不出有多少可观的资金会存在那些不支付利息的银行、风险较高且利息不高的公司债券，或者似乎每天都越来越不可靠的政府债券中。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he’s certainly right that all of the choices are lousy for short-term money now, but we don’t play around with short-term money. So we did not own commercial paper in 2008 before problems occurred. We did not own money market funds.

沃伦·巴菲特：他当然是对的，现在所有的短期投资选择都很糟糕，但我们不玩短期投资。因此，在 2008 年问题发生之前，我们没有持有商业票据。我们也没有持有货币市场基金。

When I say we didn’t own them, maybe small amounts at various subsidiaries, but in terms of the big money, which we run out of Berkshire, we basically keep it in Treasurys.

当我说我们并不拥有它们时，也许在各个子公司有少量头寸，但就我们从伯克希尔运出的巨额资金而言，我们基本上将其保存在国债中。

And we get paid virtually nothing now for it, and that’s irritating, but the last thing in the world we would do at Berkshire is to try and get 5 or 10 or 20 or 30 basis points more by going into some other things with our short-term money.

我们现在几乎没有为此获得任何报酬，这让人感到恼火，但在伯克希尔，我们绝对不会试图通过将短期资金投入其他项目来多赚 5 个、10 个、20 个或 30 个基点。

It is a parking place. It’s an unattractive parking place, but it’s a parking place where we know we’ll get our car back when we want it.

这是一个停车场。虽然这个停车场不太吸引人，但我们知道在需要的时候可以把车取回来。

You know, when we need — certainly the case — in September of 2008, we had committed for some time to put $6.5 billion in Wrigley when the Mars/Wrigley deal occurred, and we certainly didn’t contemplate at the time we made that commitment, which was probably in the summer, that the events would take place like they did in September and — but we had the money.

你知道，当我们需要的时候——这确实是个例子——在 2008 年 9 月，我们已经承诺在 Wrigley 投资 65 亿美元，当 Mars/Wrigley 交易发生时，我们当然没有想到在我们做出那个承诺的时候，也就是大概在夏天，会发生像 9 月那样的事件——但我们有资金。

I knew I had to show up with 6 1/2 billion dollars — I think it was on October 6 — and, you know, I had to show up. (Laughs)

我知道我必须带着 65 亿美元出现——我想是在 10 月 6 日——你知道，我必须出现。（笑）

I couldn’t show up with a money market fund or some commercial paper or anything of the sort. I had to show up with cash.

我不能带着货币市场基金或一些商业票据之类的东西出现。我必须带着现金。

And the only thing I feel — virtually the only thing I feel good about, in terms of having large amounts of ready cash is Treasury bills, and that’s where we’ve got — if you look at our March 31st statement, I think you’ll see 38 billion, and overwhelmingly that will be in Treasurys.

我唯一感到好的事情——几乎是我唯一感到好的事情，关于拥有大量现成现金的，就是国库券，而这就是我们所拥有的——如果你查看我们 3 月 31 日的财务报表，我想你会看到 380 亿美元，而绝大部分将会在国债中。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, I’ve watched a lot of people struggle who thought it was their duty in life to get an extra 10 basis points on the short-term money.

查理·芒格：当然，我看到很多人挣扎，他们认为自己的人生职责是从短期资金中多赚取 10 个基点。

I think it’s really stupid to try and maximize returns on short-term money if you’re in an opportunist game the way we are, where we want to suddenly deploy money.

我认为如果你像我们一样在一个机会主义的游戏中，想要突然投入资金，那么试图最大化短期资金的回报是非常愚蠢的。

Some of those pipelines we bought, they came for sale on Saturday, and we had to close on Monday or something?

我们买的一些管道是在星期六出售的，我们必须在星期一或其他时间完成交易吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Why fool around with some dubious instrument when we had sudden needs for money like that?

查理·芒格：当我们突然需要钱时，为什么要玩弄一些可疑的工具呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: We bought one pipeline where the seller was worried about going bankrupt the following week. And there’s a Hart-Scott-Rodino clearance required through the FTC, and they needed the money right away, and we — I wrote a letter, as I remember, to the FTC, and I said that we will do whatever you tell us to do later on.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们买了一条管道，卖方担心下周会破产。而且需要通过联邦贸易委员会的哈特-斯科特-罗迪诺审批，他们需要立即用钱，我记得我给联邦贸易委员会写了一封信，我说我们会按照你们稍后告诉我们的方式去做。

You can look at this all you want. We’ll give you all the data you want. And if you tell us, you know, to unwind the deal, whatever you tell us, we will do.

你可以随意查看这些。我们会提供你想要的所有数据。如果你告诉我们要解除交易，无论你告诉我们什么，我们都会照做。

But these guys need the money, and so we closed it earlier. And our ability to come up with cash when people need it and when the rest of the world is petrified for some reason, has enabled several deals to get done.

但这些人需要钱，所以我们提前完成了交易。我们能在他人需要时提供现金，而此时其他地方可能因某种原因而陷入恐慌，这使得几笔交易得以完成。

We don’t know whether — that could happen tomorrow. I mean, if — you know, Ben Bernanke runs off to South America with Paris Hilton or something — (laughter) —I mean, who knows what will happen. And we want to be able, at that moment, to have our check clear.

我们不知道——这种情况可能在明天发生。我的意思是，如果——比如本·伯南克跑去南美和巴黎·希尔顿约会，谁知道会发生什么。（笑声）——我们希望在那一刻能够确保支票能够兑现。

So, we figure we never know what tomorrow will bring, although it won’t bring that, I want to — leave that off the transcribed part of the report. (Laughter)

所以，我们想我们永远不知道明天会带来什么，尽管它不会带来那个，我想——把那部分从报告中去掉。（笑声）

But we are — when somebody comes to us and they say, we need a deal right now, we can do it, and they know we can do it, and it can be big. It just has to be attractive.

但我们可以做到——当有人来找我们并说，我们现在需要达成一笔交易时，我们可以做到，他们也知道我们可以做到，而且这笔交易可能很大。它只需要有吸引力。

55. Wind power needs government subsidies

风能需要政府补贴

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 10。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. Thank you very much for taking the time to have a terrific shareholders meeting.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。非常感谢你们抽出时间召开精彩的股东大会。

Four years ago we announced that we’re naming our son after you, so we’re happy to say hi to both you and Charlie.

四年前我们宣布要以你的名字给我们的儿子命名，所以我们很高兴向你和查理问好。

Charlie, since Berkshire bought Wesco, we wanted to see if you can take some time to host a meeting of your own? It can be anywhere, anytime.

查理，自从伯克希尔收购了Wesco，我们想看看你是否能抽出时间主持一次自己的会议？地点和时间都可以。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re going to do that.

查理·芒格：我们会这么做的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Great. 观众：太好了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We won’t call it a Wesco meeting. We’ll call it, “An Afternoon with Charlie.”

查理·芒格：我们不会称之为 Wesco 会议。我们称之为“与查理的下午”。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Great. 观众：太好了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s only for hard-core addicts. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这只适合死忠的粉丝。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren, MidAmerican Energy is investing over a billion dollars in wind power. How do you feel about wind power as a source of renewable energy and its economics? Will this scale of investment continue and what type of returns do you expect to come from wind power?

观众成员：沃伦，MidAmerican正在投资超过十亿美元用于风能。您对风能作为可再生能源的来源及其经济性有何看法？这种规模的投资会继续吗？您期望从风能中获得什么样的回报？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s terrific, but wind power is terrific, but only when the wind blows. And the wind blows about — as I remember— about 35 percent of the time in Iowa.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这很好，但风能很好，但只有在风吹的时候。而我记得在爱荷华州，风大约有 35%的时间在吹。

So you never can count on wind power, obviously, for your base load. And, you know, that is a real limitation.

所以显然你永远不能依赖风能来满足基础负荷。而且，这确实是一个真实的限制。

On the other hand, wind power, you know, is basically, I guess, the cleanest energy you can come up with, except for the fact that it can’t be relied on. It — the economics only make sense with an incentive credit — tax credit — provided by the federal government, which they’ve been doing for a considerable period of time.

另一方面，风能基本上是你能找到的最清洁的能源，除了它不能被依赖。其经济效益在很大程度上依赖于由联邦政府提供的激励信贷——税收抵免——这已经持续了一段相当长的时间。

It does not — standing on their own, the investment will not return anything like an adequate return on capital. So there is a tax credit that your government has made a decision that it wants to subsidize, in effect, wind power.

如果没有税收抵免，单靠风能的投资回报远不足以达到资本回报的标准。因此，政府已决定以某种方式补贴风能。

And Iowa has been — Iowa is a good wind state. This whole central belt is good and — central part of the country is good — so it’s made sense to locate a lot of megawatts of generating capacity in Iowa, and we have more under construction now, and I think we’re now, I think, number one in the country in respect to wind power.

爱荷华州是一个很好的风能州。这个国家的中部地带都很好，因此在爱荷华州建立了大量兆瓦的发电能力，我们现在还有更多正在建设中，我认为我们在风能方面现在可能是全国第一。

So we’ll be doing more. It is dependent, in terms of the price you can get, the percentage of the time that you’re generating capacities actually get used and everything, it only makes sense with the tax credits.

所以我们会做更多。这取决于你能获得的价格、你实际利用的发电能力的百分比等等，只有在有税收抵免的情况下才有意义。

And one thing that is kind of interesting — one of the assets of Berkshire is that it pays a lot of taxes. That doesn’t sound like much of an asset, but in these days, a lot of utilities, when you get both a hundred percent depreciation, which has been put in now by the federal government for a short period of time, and you get these sort of tax credits on wind, they really don’t have the tax paying capacity to be able to use the tax credits.

有一件有趣的事情——伯克希尔的一个资产是它缴纳了很多税。这听起来似乎不算什么资产，但在如今，许多公用事业公司在获得联邦政府短期内提供的百分之百折旧以及风能税收抵免时，实际上并没有足够的纳税能力来使用这些税收抵免。

So they are in a different position than Berkshire, which pays a lot of taxes. We’ve probably paid something like 2 percent of all the corporate taxes in the United States, maybe, over the last five years. I want to check that, but it’s not — I don’t think that’s way off.

所以他们的情况与伯克希尔不同，伯克希尔支付了很多税。过去五年里，我们可能支付了美国所有公司税的约 2%。我想确认一下，但我认为这并没有太大偏差。

So we have a lot of tax paying capacity. We can use it to build more wind projects. And I think it’s very likely we will continue to do it.

所以我们有很强的纳税能力。我们可以利用它来建设更多的风能项目。我认为我们很可能会继续这样做。

It helps our Iowa customers. Because these projects are successful, it’s enabled us to keep rates — among other reasons — it’s helped to keep rates absolutely unchanged now for more than a decade, which is very unusual among electric utilities in the United States.

这帮助了我们的爱荷华州客户。由于这些项目取得了成功，使我们能够保持费率——除了其他原因——它帮助我们在过去十多年里保持费率完全不变，这在美国的电力公司中是非常不寻常的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：不，我没有什么要补充的。

56. We would not have let NetJets go bankrupt

我们不会让 NetJets 破产。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Well, this is not a David Sokol question, but it relates to him. It’s actually a NetJets question.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好吧，这不是一个关于大卫·索科尔的问题，但它与他有关。实际上这是一个关于 NetJets 的问题。

This shareholder asked, “I was struck by your statement when you praised Sokol for, quote, ‘having resurrected an operation that was destined for bankruptcy.’

这位股东问：“我对你赞扬索科尔的声明感到震惊，引用，‘他使一个注定要破产的业务复活了。’”

“This really got my attention because I don’t recall you or Berkshire Hathaway saying earlier that NetJets was on the verge of bankruptcy at the time that his predecessor, Richard Santulli, had stepped down.

“这真的引起了我的注意，因为我不记得你或伯克希尔·哈撒韦之前提到过 NetJets 在他的前任理查德·桑图利辞职时濒临破产。”

“In fact, at the time, the company seemed to give the impression it was dealing with a few short-term problems but that it was fundamentally sound. In truth, how close was it to bankruptcy? And if that was the case, why didn’t you tell us?

事实上，当时公司似乎给人一种印象，认为它只是在处理一些短期问题，但基本上是健康的。实际上，它离破产有多近？如果是这样，为什么不告诉我们？

“And finally, was it ethical for NetJets to be asking perspective clients to part with their money at a time when it was, in the eyes of its main shareholder, quote, ‘destined for bankruptcy?’”

“最后，NetJets 在其主要股东眼中‘注定要破产’的时刻，向潜在客户索要资金是否合乎伦理？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think I said it was — maybe we can find the exact words here — but I think I said it was destined for bankruptcy, absent the fact that Berkshire Hathaway owned it, if it had been a standalone entity.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想我说过——也许我们可以找到确切的词——但我认为我说过，如果没有伯克希尔·哈撒韦的拥有，它注定会破产，如果它是一个独立的实体。

如果业务的长期性没有问题，只是穿越周期中遇到困难，穿越比重建的成本要低得多。

And Berkshire never had any intent, never would have had any intent of any kind, to bankrupt NetJets.

而伯克希尔从未有过任何意图，也绝不会有任何意图去使 NetJets 破产。

But if it had been owned as a standalone by somebody else, the public, that’s what would have happened to it.

但如果它是由其他人单独拥有的，公众，这就是它会发生的事情。

With Berkshire’s ownership, Berkshire has had two insurance companies that would have gone bankrupt as standalone insurance companies. And we — it never crossed our mind that we would let them do it.

在伯克希尔的拥有下，伯克希尔有两家保险公司，如果作为独立的保险公司，它们本会破产。我们从未想过会让它们这样做。

So we put money into companies that were bankrupt that Berkshire owned to make them whole, basically. And, essentially, we were doing the same thing with NetJets when we put in — we got it up to 1.9 billion.

所以我们向伯克希尔拥有的破产公司注入资金，以使它们恢复正常。基本上，我们在向 NetJets 注入资金时也做了同样的事情——我们将其提升到 19 亿美元。

But NetJets, in my opinion — well, it would have been bankrupt, absent somebody like Berkshire owning it. I’m almost positive that I said that, that absent Berkshire’s ownership, or some words to that effect — let’s see if I can find it.

但在我看来，NetJets 如果没有像伯克希尔这样的公司拥有它，早就破产了。我几乎可以肯定我说过，如果没有伯克希尔的拥有权，或者类似的话——让我看看我能否找到。

Maybe Charlie can be commenting while I’m looking for this.

也许查理可以在我寻找这个的时候进行评论。

In any event — (Laughter)

无论如何——（笑声）

Well, I’m not finding it immediately where I even discussed it, but I know I talked about it on the bankruptcy thing, but I also know that I conditioned it on not being owned by Berkshire.

好吧，我没有立即找到我讨论过的地方，但我知道我在破产的事情上谈过这个，我也知道我把它的条件设定为不是伯克希尔拥有。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No comment.

查理·芒格：没有评论。

WARREN BUFFETT: No comment. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：没有评论。（笑声）

We’ve pointed that out to Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. We look at — Berkshire has a lot of different companies, but we feel that it’s one entity and, you know, Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s has to look at each one separately and all of that, but Charlie and I did not — have not been running this business to walk away from some company.

我们已经向标准普尔和穆迪指出这一点。我们认为，伯克希尔有许多不同的公司，但我们觉得它是一个整体，你知道，穆迪或标准普尔必须分别看待每一家公司等等，但查理和我并没有考虑放弃某家公司。

We had one in Louisiana, Southern Casualty, and we had another one in Chicago, both of which, if left to their own devices, would have gone bankrupt, and we didn’t even think about not making them whole.

我们在路易斯安那州有一家南方意外保险公司，在芝加哥还有一家，如果任其自生自灭，它们都会破产，我们甚至没有考虑过不让它们恢复正常。

57. Buffett’s advice: invest in your own skills

巴菲特的建议：投资于自己的技能

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 11? 沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Christopher David (PH). I’m an entrepreneur from Arlington, Virginia. My question is about the youth.

观众成员：下午好。我叫克里斯托弗·大卫（PH）。我来自弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿，是一名企业家。我的问题是关于年轻人的。

I work with a lot of high school and college students and recent graduates who are facing a job market with 20 percent youth unemployment, and at the same time one of the most favorable entrepreneurial environments. It’s easier than ever to start a business or get involved with a startup.

我与许多高中和大学学生以及最近毕业的学生合作，他们面临着 20%的青年失业率，同时又处于最有利的创业环境之一。现在比以往任何时候都更容易创办企业或参与初创公司。

So considering that these kids are politically savvy, they like studying economics, they’re brilliant and they’re willing to learn, what advice can you give them from an investment perspective that could help them chart their own course, as opposed to get a nine-to-five job?

考虑到这些孩子政治敏感，喜欢学习经济学，聪明且愿意学习，从投资的角度，你能给他们什么建议，帮助他们规划自己的道路，而不是去找一份朝九晚五的工作？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the main thing you could do — and people do it different ways. I used to do it by doing a lot of reading — I was — practically lived at the Omaha Public Library for three or four years in pre- — when I was 9 or 10 or 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你可以做的主要事情——人们有不同的方式。我过去是通过大量阅读来做到这一点——在我 9、10 或 11 岁的时候，我几乎每天都待在奥马哈公共图书馆里，持续了三四年。

I mean, anything you do to improve your own skills, you know, you never know where it’s going to pay off later on.

我意思是，任何你用来提升自己技能的事情，你永远不知道它将来会在哪里带来回报。

I only — I have one diploma hanging in my office, and I got a couple of others, but the one diploma I have hanging up there is one I got from a Dale Carnegie course, which cost me a hundred bucks back in 1951, and I can’t — it’s incalculable how much value I got from that hundred dollars.

我只有——我办公室里挂着一个文凭，还有几个其他的，但我挂在那里的那个文凭是我从戴尔·卡耐基课程获得的，1951 年花了一百美元，我无法计算我从那一百美元中获得了多少价值。

There’s nothing like working to improve your own skills, and I would say communications skills are the first area I would work on to enhance your value throughout life, no matter what you do.

没有什么比提升自己的技能更重要，我认为沟通能力是我会首先着手提升的领域，这将增强你在生活中的价值，无论你做什么。

I mean, if I had stayed in the same position I was in, in terms of communicating, back in 1950 or ’51, my life would have turned out differently. I mean, I started selling securities. If you can’t talk to people, you’ve got a real problem selling securities.

我的意思是，如果我在 1950 或 1951 年时在沟通方面保持原来的状态，我的生活会有所不同。我的意思是，我开始卖证券。如果你不能和人交流，你在卖证券方面就会遇到真正的问题。

The — so I — you know, I think people — I think the — if you get lucky, you find your passion early on, but you want to work at something you’re passionate about, and then you want to work to improve your skills in that. And I think if you do both of those things, I think you’re likely to do very well.

所以我认为，人们如果运气好，能够早早找到自己的热情，但你想要从事自己热爱的工作，然后你想要在这方面提升自己的技能。我认为如果你做到这两点，你很可能会做得很好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think economics is a really tough subject, and I think it’s easy to teach the basic microeconomics and certain of the basic ideas, but the minute it gets into the full range of complexity, you have the difficulty that the experts disagree.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为经济学是一个非常困难的学科，我认为教授基本的微观经济学和某些基本概念是很简单的，但一旦涉及到复杂的全貌，就会出现专家之间意见不一致的问题。

So, I don’t think I would hurry if I were trying to learn something into the parts of the fields where none of the experts can agree among themselves. I would master the easy stuff first.

所以，如果我在学习时，我不会急于进入这些专家之间无法达成共识的领域。我会先掌握简单的知识。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think — yeah, I would not advise taking lots of courses in economics to somebody going to school.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为——是的，我不会建议一个上学的人去上很多经济学课程。

I’m just trying to think back. It’s been a long time since I took my economics courses at Wharton, but I don’t regard them as the ones that pushed me forward in any significant way.

我只是试着回想一下。自从我在沃顿上经济学课程以来已经很久了，但我并不认为这些课程在任何重要方面推动了我前进。

58. Reinsurance is a lot harder than it looks

再保险比看起来要困难得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: Question from Jon Brandt. Does Berkshire’s equity ownership in Munich and Swiss Re reduce the amount of catastrophe-exposed insurance business you are willing to write directly?

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这是来自乔恩·布兰特的问题。伯克希尔在慕尼黑再保险和瑞士再保险的股权投资是否会减少你愿意直接承保的灾难性保险业务？

If so, assume that prices return to being attractive, would you then limit the quantity of other reinsurance stocks you buy so that you could do more direct business?

如果是这样，假设价格再次变得有吸引力，你是否会限制购买其他再保险股票的数量，以便能够进行更多的直接业务？

WARREN BUFFETT: We have invested in Munich and Swiss Re less than — well, let’s see what it would be — it’s less than $4 billion, so we’re talking 2 1/2 percent of our net worth.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在慕尼黑再保险和瑞士再保险的投资不到——好吧，让我们看看——不到 40 亿美元，所以我们谈论的是我们净资产的 2.5%。

So those investments, in aggregate, are not of a magnitude that would cause me to change at all what we’re willing to do — the risks we’re willing to bear — in the reinsurance field.

因此，这些投资的总和并不足以让我改变我们在再保险领域愿意承担的风险和我们愿意做的事情。

We’re way below, sort of, capacity, in terms of risk that we will tolerate in insurance. I mean, I put in the report, you know, I expect our normal earning power to be in the $17 billion or something pretax range.

在保险中，我们的风险承受能力远低于可承受的容量。我在报告中提到，我预计我们的正常盈利能力将在170亿美元的税前范围内。

Well, that is so unlike any other reinsurance company in the world. We went through the worst quarter in reinsurance history, except for Katrina’s quarter, you know, and we end up earning, you know, very substantial sums.

好吧，这与世界上任何其他再保险公司都截然不同。我们经历了再保险历史上最糟糕的一个季度，除了卡特里娜的那个季度，你知道的，我们最终赚取了非常可观的金额。

So those investments are no constraint at all on our willingness to write insurance. We would love to have a lot more attractive reinsurance business on the books, we just — we just can’t find it at prices that we think are commensurate for the risk. But it’s not because of an aversion to risk overall.

因此，这些投资对我们愿意承保保险没有任何限制。我们非常希望能有更多有吸引力的再保险业务，但我们就是——我们就是找不到我们认为与风险相称的价格。但这并不是因为我们对整体风险的厌恶。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s — insurance, and particularly reinsurance, it’s not that easy a business. It’s taken you a long time to do as well as you do. And if it weren’t for Ajit, why, we wouldn’t — we’d be a lot smaller business.

查理·芒格：是的，保险，特别是再保险，这并不是一门简单的生意。你们能做到现在的成绩花了很长时间。如果没有阿吉特，我们的业务会小得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it should be pointed out, we really didn’t succeed at all in the reinsurance business in the first 15 years.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，应该指出的是，我们在前 15 年里在再保险业务上根本没有成功。

We started in reinsurance around 1970, and we had a fellow that I thought the world of running it, George Young, but net, counting the value of float, it was not a good business for us for 15 years until Ajit came along. It is not an easy business. It looks easy most of the time. I mean —

我们在 1970 年左右开始做再保险，我非常看重一个叫乔治·杨的同事来管理这项业务，但综合考虑浮动价值，这对我们来说并不是一个好的业务，直到阿吉特的出现。在这个行业里并不简单。它看起来大部分时间都很简单。我的意思是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s the trouble with it. It looks easier than it is.

查理·芒格：这就是问题所在。看起来比实际要简单。

WARREN BUFFETT: It looks way easier than it is.

沃伦·巴菲特：看起来比实际要简单得多。

And, you know, it’s like having a pair of dice, and, you know, accepting bets on boxcars or something like that, and, you know, it’s going to come up once in 36 times, so you can win a lot of bets by giving the wrong odds, but if you keep do it long enough, you lose a lot of money.

而且，你知道，这就像有一对骰子，你知道，接受关于双六的赌注之类的东西，你知道，它每 36 次会出现一次，所以通过给出错误的赔率你可以赢很多赌注，但如果你这样做的时间够长，你会亏很多钱。

So these infrequent events, you better have factored in to your pricing, and not fool yourself by whether you make money in a given year or two years or even three or four years. And most people have a little trouble with that, and we had a little trouble with it for about 15 years.

所以这些不频繁的事件，你最好在定价时考虑进去，不要被你在某一年、两年甚至三四年内是否赚钱所迷惑。大多数人对此有一点困难，我们也为此困扰了大约 15 年。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And incidentally, the investment bankers of the world, now that they trade so much for their own account and derivatives, they have sold some of these products where most of the time the customer wins but when the customer loses, he really loses big.

查理·芒格：顺便说一句，全球的投资银行家现在因为他们为自己账户和衍生品进行交易，销售了一些产品，大多数情况下客户获胜，但当客户失败时，他真的会遭受重大损失。

In other words, they’re smarter than the customers, and they have caused some of the most horrendous losses to ordinary businessmen. It happened in Korea, it happened in Mexico, it happened —

换句话说，他们比客户更聪明，并且给普通商人造成了一些最可怕的损失。这种情况发生在韩国，发生在墨西哥，发生在——

Just beware of the salesman who’s selling a new derivative product.

只要小心那些在销售新衍生产品的销售员。

WARREN BUFFETT: Or an old one. An old one, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：或者老的产品。老的产品也要小心。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but new ones are worse.

查理·芒格：是的，但新的更糟。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

59. How Buffett first met Todd Combs

巴菲特是如何第一次见到托德·科姆斯的

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 12.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 12。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Bottle Pondy (PH). I’m from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

观众成员：嗨，我的名字是 Bottle Pondy（PH）。我来自宾夕法尼亚州的费城。

Question’s about Todd Combs, the young money manager you hired late last year.

关于你去年年底聘用的年轻资金经理托德·科姆斯的问题。

For Mr. Munger, I understand you introduced him to Berkshire. Could you talk a little bit about that — how that relationship started, and how we as shareholders, are we going to be able to assess his progress?

对于芒格先生，我了解到您将他介绍给了伯克希尔。您能谈谈这段关系是如何开始的吗？作为股东，我们将如何评估他的进展？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I hate doing this because I may get more letters than I want, but he sent me a letter. That’s how it happened. It was like Warren’s letter to the guy at — Ralph Schey.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不喜欢这么做，因为我可能会收到比我想要的更多的信件，但他给我写了一封信。这就是事情的起因。就像沃伦给——拉尔夫·谢伊的信一样。

And at any rate, I had a meal with him, and then I called Warren and I said, “I think this is the guy you should talk to.” We have a very complicated business and very elaborate procedures, as you can tell. (Laughter)

无论如何，我和他一起吃了顿饭，然后我打电话给沃伦，我说：“我觉得这个人是你应该谈谈的。” 我们的业务非常复杂，程序也很繁琐，正如你所看到的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And his results will be known over a five-year period or something. I mean, you cannot judge an investor by what they do in six months or a year.

沃伦·巴菲特：他的业绩将在五年左右的时间内显现。我是说，你不能仅仅通过他们六个月或一年的表现来评判一个投资者。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Todd has the advantage that he’s been thinking about financial companies like Berkshire for a great many years. That’s useful for us to have around.

查理·芒格：托德的优势在于他多年来一直在思考像伯克希尔这样的金融公司。这对我们来说是非常有用的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And as we put in the annual report, it’s more likely than not, but not a sure thing, that over time, we have more than one investment manager.

沃伦·巴菲特：正如我们在年度报告中所提到的，随着时间的推移，我们有超过一个投资经理的可能性大于不可能，但这并不是一件确定的事情。

You know, there’s a lot of money at Berkshire to be managed. And it would not be a bad idea, but we have to find the right people, and the right people just does not mean a given IQ or a given past record, it means a lot of things.

你知道，伯克希尔有很多资金需要管理。这并不是一个坏主意，但我们必须找到合适的人，而合适的人并不仅仅意味着一定的智商或过去的记录，它意味着很多事情。

And if we end up with two or three, you know, that — that’s a plus. But it’s not — we don’t mandate that sort of a result.

如果我们最后有两个或三个投资经理，那是一个加分项。但我们并不强制要求这样的结果。

60. Acquisitions and stock

收购和股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes in from Scott Wilkin, and he’s from Chicago, but he’s sitting in the audience right now.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自斯科特·威尔金，他来自芝加哥，但他现在正坐在观众席上。

Johnson & Johnson is one of Berkshire’s biggest holdings, and he asks for your thoughts, Warren, on Johnson & Johnson’s recent acquisition of Synthes for $21 billion.

强生是伯克希尔最大的投资之一，他想听听你的看法，沃伦，关于强生最近以 210 亿美元收购 Synthes 的事情。

You were quite outspoken in your opposition of Kraft’s deal for Cadbury, particularly because of their use of stock. J&J’s deal also is primarily with stock, and do you support this deal?

你在反对卡夫收购吉百利的交易时非常直言不讳，特别是因为他们使用了股票。强生的交易也主要是以股票为主，你支持这个交易吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I have not talked to anybody in the Johnson & Johnson management, and I have no specific knowledge of the company, but basically, I would like the deal a whole lot better if it was all for cash.

沃伦·巴菲特：我没有与强生公司的管理层交谈过，也对该公司没有具体了解，但基本上，如果这笔交易全部以现金进行，我会更喜欢。

The idea — when a management trades away — I think this deal is about two-thirds stock, roughly, and one-third cash. And Johnson & Johnson has plenty of ability to pay cash for a $22 billion deal. And when they trade away their present businesses for some other business, they’re either saying their own businesses are pretty fully valued, or they’re saying the guy is making a hell of a mistake that’s selling to them.

这个想法——当管理层进行交易时——我认为这笔交易大约是三分之二的股票，粗略地说，三分之一的现金。而强生公司有足够的能力支付 220 亿美元的现金交易。当他们将现有业务换成其他业务时，他们要么是在说自己的业务已经被充分估值，要么是在说那个卖给他们的人犯了一个大错。

So I would — like I say, if it was all for cash, I would like it a lot better. And I think that it is — by using a lot of stock for a deal like this, that it certainly — you can — you can draw the inference that J&J is not valuing its own businesses, you know, as attractively as you might think they should be evaluated.

所以我想——就像我说的，如果这一切都是现金，我会更喜欢。 我认为，通过在这样的交易中使用大量股票，确实可以推断出强生并没有像你可能认为的那样看待自己的业务。

And if you use your own company stock to pay 20 percent or more than market for some other company and, you know, there probably are not a lot of synergies involved or anything in the management. There may be some, but there’s usually some offsets too.

如果你用自己公司的股票支付超过市场价格 20%或更多的价格来收购其他公司，而你知道，可能没有很多协同效应或管理方面的东西。可能会有一些，但通常也会有一些抵消。

But like I said, I would have much preferred it if they’d done it for cash.

但正如我所说，我更希望他们能用现金支付。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you also have the disadvantage in (inaudible) that you know a hell of a lot more about chocolate and pizza than you know about medical devices.

查理·芒格：是的，你在（听不清）方面也有劣势，因为你对巧克力和比萨的了解远远超过你对医疗设备的了解。

WARREN BUFFETT: You think I know more about chocolate?

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为我对巧克力了解得更多吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，你——（笑声）

But at Kraft, I mean, you’re talking about businesses that Warren knew a lot about, and neither of us knows much about medical devices.

但在卡夫，我的意思是，你谈论的是沃伦非常了解的业务，而我们两个人对医疗设备都不太了解。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the pizza has business has done pretty well since it was sold by Kraft. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，自从被卡夫出售以来，披萨业务表现得相当不错。（笑）

61. Why we won’t issue stock to make an acquisition

为什么我们不会发行股票来进行收购

WARREN BUFFETT: We go to 13 in the other room.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们去另一个房间的 13 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Glenn Tongue from New York. First off, thank you for a terrific day.

观众成员：嗨，我是来自纽约的格伦·汤。首先，感谢你们带来美好的一天。

My question deals with acquisitions. Pre-Lubrizol, we estimated Berkshire’s year-end 2011 cash balance could approach $60 billion.

我的问题涉及收购。在收购 Lubrizol 之前，我们估计伯克希尔在 2011 年年末的现金余额可能接近 600 亿美元。

I believe you commented recently on an elephant that you thought was too big.

我相信你最近评论了一头你认为太大的大象。

What is your acquisition appetite? What size is too big? Has the phone been ringing lately? And what if anything can we, as shareholders, do to help?

你的收购意愿是什么？什么规模太大？最近电话响了吗？作为股东，我们能做些什么来帮助？

WARREN BUFFETT: I got through college answering fewer questions than that. But the — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我上大学时回答的问题还没有那么多。不过——（笑声）

But anything you can do to help, I appreciate, Glenn.

但你能做的任何事情，我都很感激，格伦。

The — you know, it’s hard to name a precise figure. This one, you know, was way too big unless we used a lot of stock, which, like I say, we wouldn’t do.

你知道，确切地说出一个数字很难。这个交易，你知道，除非我们用大量股票，这笔交易就太大了，我刚才提到过，我们不会这样做。

Our appetite is always there. We are not going to borrow a lot of money. We’re not going to issue shares, except perhaps in some minor amount to make a deal that couldn’t get made otherwise.

我们的胃口总是存在。我们不会借很多钱。我们也不会发行股票，除非为了达成一些不然就无法达成的小交易。

But — and, obviously, we’ll never sell a business to buy some other business. So, you know, our cash balances will tend to build month to month unless we do something.

但是——显然，我们永远不会出售一项业务来购买其他业务。因此，你知道，除非我们采取行动，否则我们的现金余额将倾向于逐月增加。

And we can, and will, sell some portfolio securities. But doing Lubrizol requires close to $9 billion of cash, and obviously we could do another one of that size.

我们可以，也会出售一些投资组合证券。但进行Lubrizol的交易需要近90亿美元的现金，显然我们可以做另一笔同样规模的交易。

In fact, we’re looking at a couple, but they’re no more than a gleam in the eye, but they would take sums roughly similar to Lubrizol, and, you know, we would be comfortable doing those, and they would add significant — significantly to Berkshire’s earning power. They’re worth doing.

事实上，我们正在考虑几个，但它们只是一个眼中的闪光点，但它们将需要大致类似Lubrizol的资金，我们对此感到舒适，并且这些交易将显著提升伯克希尔的盈利能力。这些都是值得做的交易。

But we can’t do a really — a really big elephant now, and we won’t — you know, we won’t stretch. We never — we’ve never really taken any risks because we don’t need to, and we will not trade something that we have and need for something that we don’t have and don’t need, even if we’d kind of like to have it.

但我们现在不能做一个真正的大象，我们也不会——你知道，我们不会去勉强。我们从来没有真正冒过任何风险，因为我们不需要这样做，我们不会用我们拥有且需要的东西去交换我们没有且不需要的东西，即使我们有点想要它。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with all that.

查理·芒格：我当然同意这一切。

We are very reluctant to issue shares. And in that, we’re different from most places.

我们非常不愿意发行股票。在这一点上，我们与大多数地方不同。

I have a friend that sold out to a socialist country, and they issued shares in a controlled corporation, and the socialist executive said, “Isn’t this wonderful we’re getting this business for nothing.”

我有一个朋友，他向一个社会主义国家出卖了自己，他们在一个受控公司中发行了股份，社会主义高管说：“这真是太好了，我们白得到了这个生意。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Some people really have that, and, of course, there are some companies — and we talked about the wave that took place in the late ’60s, but periodically — one certainly happened during the internet period — companies just couldn’t issue shares fast enough, because they basically were trading confetti for real assets. And that is a business model that has been applied successfully for some periods of time by certain companies in the past.

沃伦·巴菲特：有些人真的有这种想法，当然，也有一些公司——我们在讨论20世纪60年代末发生的浪潮时提到过，但定期会发生这种情况——某些公司根本无法快速发行股票，因为他们基本上是在用纸屑交换真正的资产。这是一种商业模式，过去曾被某些公司成功应用过一段时间。

It usually ends in some kind of a fiasco, but — well, I shouldn’t say it usually does, but it runs out of gas at some point.

通常以某种灾难收场，但——好吧，我不应该说通常是这样，但它在某个时刻会耗尽燃料。

But, you know, essentially, we’ve never been in that game.

但是，你知道，基本上，我们从来没有参与过那个游戏。

We hate issuing shares and the idea of selling our — when we issue shares we’re divesting ourselves of a portion of every wonderful business we have, from GEICO to ISCAR to you name it. And we don’t like doing that. We like owning those businesses. We’d like to own more of them.

我们讨厌发行股票以及出售我们的想法——当我们发行股票时，我们就相当于剥离了我们每一个优秀业务的一部分，从 GEICO 到 ISCAR，您可以随便说。我们不喜欢这样做。我们喜欢拥有这些业务。我们希望拥有更多。

We — you know, we have a deal, for example, on Marmon where we bought some more of it this year, and we will buy the rest of it a few more years, and we feel good about that. We pay a fair price for it, but we get a business we know, a management we like, and that’s really what we’d like to continue doing at Berkshire. In fact, we will continue doing it.

我们——你知道，我们有一个交易，比如在Marmon，我们今年买了一些，接下来几年还会买剩下的，我们对此感到满意。我们为此支付了公平的价格，但我们得到了一个我们熟悉的业务，一个我们喜欢的管理层，这正是我们希望在伯克希尔继续做的事情。事实上，我们会继续这样做。

62. Housing market is terrible, but we’ll profit on the rebound

住房市场糟糕，但我们将在反弹中获利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Larry Pitkowsky, who is a long-time shareholder, I think he’s in the audience, from the GoodHaven Fund.

安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金：这个问题来自拉里·皮特科夫斯基，他是长期股东，我想他在观众中，来自 GoodHaven 基金。

He asks, “Over the years, you built or acquired a significant number of businesses that are related to the residential and commercial real estate markets, including such segments as brokerage servicing, insulation, carpeting, construction products, painted furniture.

他问：“多年来，你建立或收购了大量与住宅和商业房地产市场相关的企业，包括经纪服务、节能、地毯、建筑产品、涂漆家具等领域。”

“Berkshire’s ownership with these businesses would seem to give you a unique window through which to view current conditions. Could you give us some insight into the current state of the housing and commercial real estate market and what we might expect to see in these businesses over” — and this might be a long shot — “over the next decade.”

“伯克希尔对这些企业的拥有权似乎为您提供了一个独特的视角，以观察当前的状况。您能否为我们提供一些关于当前住房和商业房地产市场的见解，以及我们在未来十年内可能会看到这些企业的情况？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the immediate situation is it’s terrible. It’s been flatlined now for a long time, and it affects Shaw, it affects MiTek, it affects Acme Brick, it affects Johns Manville, it affects our HomeServices operation.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，当前的情况确实很糟糕。它已经平稳了很长时间，这影响了Shaw、MiTek、Acme Brick、Johns Manville以及我们的HomeServices运营。

And there has been no bounce, at all, but you see that in the housing start figures, too.

根本没有反弹，您也可以从住房开工数据中看到这一点。

I’m not telling you anything you don’t see, except I see it with pain as I look at the monthly earnings figures.

我没有告诉你任何你看不到的东西，只是当我看到每月的收入数字时，我感到痛苦。

But those are good businesses. And as I mentioned in the annual report, we bought the largest brick operation in Alabama. And I think Alabama uses more brick per capita than any state in the union, but that doesn’t mean much currently, because nobody is using any brick to speak of.

但这些都是不错的生意。正如我在年报中提到的，我们收购了阿拉巴马州最大的砖块生产企业。我认为阿拉巴马州的人均砖块使用量超过了美国任何一个州，但目前这并没有太大意义，因为几乎没有人在使用砖块。

But we bought it. We wrote a check for cash, and we like improving our position.

但我们买下了它。我们开了一张现金支票，我们喜欢改善我们的处境。

MiTek has bought operations. Shaw is spending a couple hundred million dollars this year, partly because of a change in the nature of the carpet business.

MiTek也在收购其他业务。Shaw今年投资了大约两亿美金，部分是因为地毯业务性质的变化。

This country, over time, will build houses at a rate, overall, in total, commensurate with household growth, and I think we’re going to see plenty of household growth in future decades, and I think that our companies are well-positioned to make significant money when we get to a normalized level of home building.

随着时间的推移，这个国家将会根据家庭增长的比例建设住房，而我认为未来几十年我们将会看到大量的家庭增长，而我们的公司在恢复正常的住房建设水平时将能赚取可观的利润。

I said in the annual report I thought it would — we would be seeing the upswing by year-end. I’ve seen nothing since I wrote the annual report that makes it look like I’m certain to be correct or anything, that there’s been no movement that I’ve seen so far in the two months since I wrote the report.

我在年度报告中说过，我认为到年底我们会看到好转。自从我写了年度报告以来，我没有看到任何让我确信我会是正确的迹象，过去两个月里我没有看到任何变化。

I would think it would start occurring by then, but if it doesn’t, you know, it may be a year later. I don’t think anybody knows the answer on that.

我认为那时可能会开始发生，但如果没有，你知道，可能会晚一年。我觉得没有人知道这个问题的答案。

If I had to bet one way or another, though, I think it will be turning up by year-end.

如果我必须下注的话，我认为到年底它会出现。

It really isn’t that important to us. When I made the decision to buy the brick company in Alabama, it was not because I thought brick was going to turn in two months or six months or a year.

这对我们来说真的不是那么重要。当我决定购买阿拉巴马州的砖块公司时，并不是因为我认为砖块在两个月、六个月或一年内会有转变。

I thought that over time, being a very important brick manufacturer and distributor in Alabama adjacent to our strong operation in Texas, it would be a good investment at the price that we paid. And I feel good about the decision, but I won’t feel good about our brick results in the next six months. I can be sure of that.

我认为，随着时间的推移，作为阿拉巴马州一个非常重要的砖块制造商和分销商，紧邻我们在德克萨斯州的强大业务，以我们支付的价格进行投资是一个不错的选择。我对这个决定感到满意，但我对我们在接下来的六个月里的砖块业绩并不乐观。我对此可以确定。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, one advantage of buying these very cyclical businesses is a lot of people don’t like them. And what difference does it make to us if the earnings average, say, 300 million a year, if it comes in in a very lumpy fashion?

查理·芒格：嗯，购买这些非常周期性的企业的一个好处是很多人不喜欢它们。如果收益平均每年大约 3 亿，而是以非常不均匀的方式出现，这对我们有什么影响呢？

In the big scheme of things, what do we care if it’s lumpy, as long as it’s a good business? And we have an advantage on that stuff. Nobody else was bidding for a brick plant in Alabama with no customers to speak of. (Laughter)

在大局中，我们在乎它是否不平整吗，只要它是一个好生意？而且我们在这方面有优势。没有其他人竞标阿拉巴马州的砖厂，根本没有客户可言。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll be there if you need brick in Alabama. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你需要砖块，我们会在阿拉巴马州待命。（笑声）

You know, See’s Candy, a wonderful business, loses money roughly eight months of the year.

你知道，See’s Candy，这是一家很棒的公司，差不多每年有八个月都在亏损。

Now, it just so happens we know the seasonal pattern, so we don’t worry in July that somehow Christmas won’t come, you know. We’ve got a couple thousand years on our side. (Laughter)

现在，正好我们知道季节性模式，因此我们在七月的时候不会担心圣诞节不会到来，你知道的。我们有几千年的历史在支持我们。（笑声）

So the — but that’s — you know, that’s easy to see. If you just looked at one month of See’s earnings or looked at one quarter, you’d think, what are these guys doing in this business?

所以——但那是——你知道，这很容易看出。如果你只看一下 See's 的一个月的收益或一个季度的收益，你会想，这些家伙在这个行业里干什么？

Now, obviously, cyclical businesses, you know, are not going to behave exactly the same as seasonal businesses, but why look at it any differently?

现在，显然，周期性业务与季节性业务的表现不会完全相同，但为什么要以不同的方式看待它呢？

I mean, if you take the next 20 years, there will be, you know, three or four terrible years for residential housing, and there will be a lot of them that are pretty good, and there will be a few that are terrific.

我的意思是，如果你看接下来的 20 年，住宅市场会有三四年糟糕的年份，但也会有很多年表现不错，还有一些年份会非常好。

And I don’t know the order in which they’re going to appear, but I know if I can buy the assets cheap enough to participate in those 20 years, that we’ll do OK over that time. So that’s why we’re in the brick business.

我不知道它们将以什么顺序出现，但我知道如果我能以足够便宜的价格购买这些资产，以参与这 20 年，我们在这段时间内会做得不错。这就是我们进入砖块业务的原因。

63. Short adjournment before formal business meeting

正式商务会议前的短暂休会

WARREN BUFFETT: Now let’s see. Yeah, we’re at 3:30, so we will adjourn for about five minutes, and then we will conduct the business meeting of Berkshire Hathaway, and we can turn the lights up, and we’ll rejoin you in just a couple of minutes. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：现在让我们看看。是的，我们现在是 3:30，所以我们将休息大约五分钟，然后我们将进行伯克希尔·哈撒韦的业务会议，我们可以把灯调亮，我们将在几分钟后重新与您见面。（掌声）

64. Berkshire formal annual meeting begins

伯克希尔正式年度会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If you’ll settle down, we’ll conduct a little business.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。如果你们安静下来，我们就来进行一些业务。

This morning I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present.

今天早上我介绍了在场的伯克希尔哈撒韦董事。

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人出席，他们是我们的审计师。如您对他们对伯克希尔的账目审计有任何适当的问题，他们将随时作答。

Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings.

福雷斯特·克鲁特是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对会议进行书面记录。

Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motions voted upon at this meeting.

贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数以及本次会议上投票的提案进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?

秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股份数量、投票权和出席会议的报告？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do.

福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，有的。

As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 2, 2011, being the record date for this meeting, there were 942,559 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,059,055,810 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/10,000th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

根据随本次会议通知一起发送给 2011 年 3 月 2 日所有登记股东的代理声明，本次会议的登记日期为 2011 年 3 月 2 日，伯克希尔哈撒韦 A 类普通股共有 942,559 股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权；伯克希尔哈撒韦 B 类普通股共有 1,059,055,810 股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有 1/10,000 的投票权。

Of that number, 663,042 Class A shares, and 659,697,109 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 28th.

在这个数字中，663,042 股 A 类股份和 659,697,109 股 B 类股份通过截至 4 月 28 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。

The first order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.

会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生发言，他将向会议提出一项动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录的阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

VOICE: Second. 声音：第二。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并获得支持。有没有任何评论或问题？

We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor, say aye. Opposed? The motion is carried.

我们将通过口头表决对这个提案进行投票。赞成的请说“赞成”。反对的？提案通过。

65. Election of directors

董事选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。

If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, you may do so.

如果有股东在场并希望撤回之前发送的代理投票并亲自投票选举董事，您可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.

此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交委托书并希望亲自投票，您可以这样做。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to one of the meeting officials in the aisles, who will furnish a ballot to you.

如果您希望这样做，请向走道中的一位会议官员表明您的身份，他们会为您提供一张选票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基欧、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并得到支持，选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?

还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

提名已准备好进行投票。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并允许选票交给选举监察员。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。

The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 701,770 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

代理持有人对截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票的投票结果显示，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 701,770 票。这个数字远远超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。

66. Shareholder advisory vote on Berkshire’s executive compensation

股东对伯克希尔高管薪酬的咨询投票

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers.

沃伦·巴菲特：议程上的下一个项目是对伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬的咨询投票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting on this item.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生就此事项在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including compensation discussion and analysis, the accompanying compensation tables, and related narrative discussion, in the company’s 2011 annual meeting proxy statement.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议公司股东以咨询的方式批准根据 S-K 规则第 402 条披露的公司指定高管的薪酬，包括薪酬讨论与分析、附带的薪酬表以及相关的叙述讨论，这些内容均在公司 2011 年年度股东大会的委托书中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.

沃伦·巴菲特：已提议并获得第二次支持，公司的股东以咨询的方式批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。

Is there any discussion? 有讨论吗？

The motion is ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the motion and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

动议已准备好进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并允许选票交给选举监察员。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。

The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 720,883 votes to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.

代理持有人对截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票的投票结果显示，至少有 720,883 票支持以咨询方式批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。

That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

该数字远远超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份总投票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

The motion to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers has passed.

对公司指定高管所支付的薪酬进行咨询性批准的动议已通过。

67. Shareholders decide to hold a compensation vote every three years

股东决定每三年举行一次薪酬投票。

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item is an advisory vote on the frequency of a shareholder advisory vote on compensation of named executive officers.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是对股东就指定高管薪酬的咨询投票频率进行咨询投票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to this item.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生就此事项向会议提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company determine, on an advisory basis, the frequency, whether annual, bi-annual, or tri-annual, with which they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation of the company’s named executive officers, set forth in the company’s proxy statement.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议公司股东以咨询方式决定他们对公司代理声明中列出的公司指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率，是否为年度、半年度或季度。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: If has been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company determine the frequency with which they shall have an advisory vote on compensation of named executive officers, with the options being every one, two, or three years.

沃伦·巴菲特：已提议并得到支持，由公司的股东决定他们对指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率，选项为每年、每两年或每三年一次。

Is there any discussion? 有讨论吗？

动议已准备好进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并允许选票交给选举监察员。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。

The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 112,395 votes for a frequency of every year; 4,615 votes for a frequency of every two years; and 609,699 votes for a frequency of every three years, of an advisory vote on the compensation of named executive officers.

代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，112,395 票支持每年一次的频率；4,615 票支持每两年一次的频率；609,699 票支持每三年一次的频率，关于指定高管薪酬的咨询投票。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

The shareholders of the company have determined, on an advisory basis, that they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers every three years.

公司的股东已决定，基于咨询性质，他们将每三年对公司指定高管的薪酬进行一次咨询投票。

68. Shareholder motion on reduction of greenhouse gases

股东提案关于减少温室气体

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by Miss Coward, a Berkshire shareholder represented by Mr. Bruce Herbert and Mr. Larry Dorrs (PH).

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由伯克希尔股东卡沃德小姐提出的动议，由布鲁斯·赫伯特先生和拉里·多尔斯先生（PH）代表。

The motion is set forth in the proxy statement.

该动议在委托书中提出。

The motion requests Berkshire Hathaway to establish goals for the reduction of greenhouse gas at its subsidiaries’ power plants, and prepare a report for shareholders on how it will achieve these goals.

该提案要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦为其子公司的发电厂设定温室气体减排目标，并为股东准备一份关于如何实现这些目标的报告。

The directors recommend that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize Mr. Herbert to present the motion. To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I ask Mr. Herbert to limit his remarks to five minutes.

我现在请赫伯特先生提出动议。为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我请赫伯特先生将他的发言限制在五分钟内。

The microphone at, well, let’s have Mr. Herbert first, if we can turn up the lights.

麦克风在，嗯，让我们先请赫伯特先生，如果可以的话，请调亮灯光。

BRUCE HERBERT: Thank you.

布鲁斯·赫伯特：谢谢。

Good day, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Bruce Herbert and I’m chief executive of Newground Social Investment in Seattle, Washington.

各位女士们、先生们，大家好。我叫布鲁斯·赫伯特，是位于华盛顿州西雅图的 Newground 社会投资公司的首席执行官。

It is such a pleasure to be here today, representing a life-long owner of Berkshire Class A shares. And I stand to present the resolution found on page 12 of the proxy, that asks our company to set goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions at its energy holdings.

今天能在这里代表一位终身持有伯克希尔 A 类股票的股东，我感到非常高兴。我在此提出代理文件第 12 页上的决议，要求我们的公司为其能源资产设定减少温室气体排放的目标。

This is because serious investors know, and studies show, that climate change creates financial liability.

这是因为严肃的投资者知道，研究表明，气候变化会带来财务责任。

The Investor Network on Climate Risk, whose members manage more than $10 trillion, and the Carbon Disclosure Project, representing more than $70 trillion in assets globally, call on companies to disclose risks related to climate change, as well as the actions taken to mitigate those risks.

气候风险投资者网络的成员管理超过 10 万亿美元的资产，而碳信息披露项目代表全球超过 70 万亿美元的资产，呼吁公司披露与气候变化相关的风险，以及为减轻这些风险所采取的行动。

In 2010, 66 percent of U.S. electric utilities had already set greenhouse gas emission reduction goals. Sixty-six percent. Unfortunately, Berkshire MidAmerican was not among them.

在 2010 年，66%的美国电力公司已经设定了温室气体减排目标。66%。不幸的是，伯克希尔MidAmerican并不在其中。

Now, investors have cause to be concerned. Just last year, the SEC announced that climate risks are material, and that they must be disclosed.

现在，投资者有理由感到担忧。就在去年，证券交易委员会宣布气候风险是重要的，必须披露。

We do applaud MidAmerican for having the largest wind energy portfolio of any utility in the United States.

我们确实赞扬 MidAmerican，因为它拥有美国任何公用事业中最大的风能投资组合。

However, it is also true that MidAmerican generates close to three-quarters of its power burning coal. Investors, globally, want to reduce risk through cleaner generation, and 66 percent of public utilities have already published their plans for doing so.

然而，MidAmerican 确实有近四分之三的电力是通过燃烧煤炭产生的。全球的投资者希望通过更清洁的发电方式来降低风险，而 66% 的公共事业公司已经公布了他们的计划。

But MidAmerican offers no such plan, despite the public proclamation via its website, that, quote, “We will set challenging goals and assess our ability to continually improve our environmental performance,” unquote.

但尽管 MidAmerican 在其网站上公开宣称“我们将设定具有挑战性的目标，并评估我们持续改善环境表现的能力”，但并没有提供这样的计划。

There is no more important environmental goal for a coal-burning utility than to reduce pollution. But more than this, Berkshire is uniquely vulnerable, in that the financial burdens of climate change are pushed onto insurance companies, and as a major insurer, this has serious financial ramifications for our company.

对于一个燃煤公用事业公司来说，减少污染是最重要的环境目标。但更重要的是，伯克希尔在这方面特别脆弱，因为气候变化的财务负担被转嫁给保险公司，而作为一家主要的保险公司，这对我们的公司有严重的财务影响。

Berkshire enjoys a remarkable and well-earned reputation, earned over many decades, for being practical visionaries. Addressing climate change offers an opportunity for our company both to uphold and to enhance this reputation.

伯克希尔享有卓越且名副其实的声誉，这一声誉经过数十年的积累，源于其务实的远见。应对气候变化为我们的公司提供了一个机会，不仅可以维护这一声誉，还可以进一步提升它。

So in closing, the world’s largest institutional investors call on companies to set greenhouse gas reduction goals. Such goals are key tools for managing the extraordinary business risk of climate change.

因此，最后，全球最大的机构投资者呼吁公司设定温室气体减排目标。这些目标是管理气候变化带来的巨大商业风险的关键工具。

Two-thirds of utilities in the United States have already set these types of reduction goals, and this resolution, importantly, gives Berkshire managers the freedom to determine what those goals should be and to shape the process for meeting them.

美国三分之二的公用事业公司已经设定了这些类型的减排目标，而这一决议重要的是赋予了伯克希尔的管理者自由，来决定这些目标应该是什么，并塑造实现这些目标的过程。

And the major proxy advisory firms have repeatedly recommended voting for similar resolutions.

主要的代理咨询公司已多次建议投票支持类似的决议。

So I will close with a request and a question. The request is for all of you here to please join us in supporting this common sense proposal.

所以我将以一个请求和一个问题结束。请求是希望在座的各位能支持这个常识性的提案。

And the question, gentlemen, is, have you evaluated the business risk of climate change to our companies and what did you find out? Thank you.

先生们，问题是，您们是否评估了气候变化对我们公司的商业风险，您们发现了什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Herbert.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，赫伯特先生。

We have a microphone at zone 1. It’s available for anyone wishing to speak for or against the motion. You’ve seen where zone 1 is there.

我们在区域 1 有一个麦克风。任何希望支持或反对提案的人都可以使用。你们已经看到了区域 1 的位置。

I’ll wait just a minute or two in case anybody would like — is there an additional speaker there that —?

我会等一两分钟，以防有人想要——那里还有其他发言者吗——？

I’ll ask that, for the benefit of those present, I ask that each speaker for or against the motion limit themselves to two minutes and confine your remarks solely to the motion.

我请求，为了在场人员的利益，请每位支持或反对该动议的发言者将发言时间限制在两分钟内，并将您的发言仅限于该动议。

So go ahead. 所以继续吧。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Paul Herman, founder of HIP Investor. HIP stands for Human Impact and Profit. We’re a registered investment advisor in the states of California, Illinois, and Washington.

观众成员：嗨，我是保罗·赫尔曼，HIP 投资的创始人。HIP 代表人类影响和利润。我们是加利福尼亚州、伊利诺伊州和华盛顿州的注册投资顾问。

Climate change is obviously one of the risks to Berkshire Hathaway conglomerate companies, including MidAmerican Energy and Burlington — the Burlington railway — which transports coal, much of which is getting exported to China.

气候变化显然是伯克希尔哈撒韦集团公司面临的风险之一，包括中美能源和伯灵顿铁路——该铁路运输煤炭，其中大部分煤炭被出口到中国。

So we are concerned about, also, about the disclosure, quantification, and impact on profit, of greenhouse gases, as well as the quantification of the asset of the carbon credits that might be available for eco-efficient companies.

因此，我们也关注温室气体的披露、量化及其对利润的影响，以及可能对生态高效公司可用的碳信用资产的量化。

So we strongly support this resolution for increased disclosure, increased transparency and evaluation of the financial returns that are possible, or the financial liabilities, especially with your expertise in reinsurance, because reinsurance companies typically put a quantification of potential carbon exposure and liabilities, whereas traditional insurance companies may not do so.

因此，我们强烈支持这一决议，以增加披露、提高透明度并评估可能的财务回报或财务责任，特别是考虑到您在再保险方面的专业知识，因为再保险公司通常会量化潜在的碳风险和责任，而传统保险公司可能不会这样做。

So we strongly advocate for transparency, disclosure, and quantification as to the potential risks and liabilities. The SEC has encouraged this type of disclosure, though they have not mandated it. So Berkshire Hathaway would be a leader in doing this, as companies like GE, which their Ecomagination initiative, the 10 percent of revenue that they generate from their Ecomagination products, and other leaders from Jeff Immelt to the leaders of Duke Power that take a positive position on the financial returns that are possible for addressing climate change and carbon efficiency. Thank you.

因此，我们强烈倡导透明度、披露和对潜在风险与责任的量化。美国证券交易委员会鼓励这种类型的披露，尽管他们并没有强制要求。因此，伯克希尔·哈撒韦将在这方面发挥领导作用，像通用电气这样的公司，其 Ecomagination 计划，来自 Ecomagination 产品的 10%收入，以及从杰夫·伊梅尔特到杜克电力的领导者们，他们对应对气候变化和碳效率所带来的财务回报持积极态度。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

We have some more speakers there?

我们那里还有一些扬声器吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Jefferson Lilly (PH), a long-term Berkshire shareholder. It’s my personal opinion that it’s the previous two speakers that are the hot air in the problem around global warming, and that we — (applause) — that we not regulate Berkshire Hathaway to force it to have carbon disclosure or other silly rules.

观众成员：巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫杰弗逊·莉莉（音），是伯克希尔的长期股东。我个人认为，前两位发言者才是全球变暖问题中的空谈，我们——（掌声）——不应该对伯克希尔·哈撒韦进行监管，强迫其进行碳披露或其他愚蠢的规则。

It’s fine if the managers of the individual businesses choose to do that on their own, but it’s completely inappropriate to bring this false religion of global warming to try and regulate Berkshire Hathaway.

如果各个企业的管理者选择自己这样做，那是可以的，但将这种关于全球变暖的虚假信仰引入来试图监管伯克希尔哈撒韦是完全不合适的。

You guys are doing a great job on your own. (Applause)

你们自己做得很好。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Are there any other speakers there that —?

沃伦·巴菲特：那里还有其他发言者吗——？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Munger and Warren Buffett. I would just like to say one thing, which I think is really important.

观众成员：芒格先生和沃伦·巴菲特。我只想说一件事，我认为这非常重要。

Berkshire Hathaway can be a leader in the environment. And I’m for transparency, as I know these two gentlemen are, and John Doerr, who is very passionate about the environment, and I know if he was here today, he would have the same sentiments as these two gentlemen.

伯克希尔哈撒韦可以在环境方面成为领导者。我支持透明度，因为我知道这两位绅士也是如此，而约翰·多尔对环境非常热情，我知道如果他今天在这里，他会与这两位绅士有相同的感受。

And it’s important that as American citizens, we care about the environment. And not keep polluting the environment. And I’m with these two gentlemen 100 percent.

作为美国公民，我们关心环境是很重要的。我们不能继续污染环境。我百分之百支持这两位绅士。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

Do we have any others that haven’t spoken?

我们还有其他没有发言的吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is Eric Shlime (PH). I am not for this, so against the motion.

观众成员：是的。我叫埃里克·施莱梅（音）。我反对这个提案。

I think Berkshire Hathaway has a pretty good reputation at being clean, being environmentally responsible. I don’t think anyone is saying that either Mr. Buffett or Mr. Munger is somehow — doesn’t care about the environment.

我认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦在保持清洁和对环境负责方面有很好的声誉。我不认为有人会说巴菲特先生或芒格先生在某种程度上不关心环境。

I think most people care about the environment. But it doesn’t mean that we should for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, or any of the CEOs, to tell them how to run their business.

我认为大多数人关心环境。但这并不意味着我们应该让巴菲特先生、芒格先生或任何首席执行官告诉他们如何经营他们的业务。

You guys care a lot about Berkshire’s reputation. If Berkshire’s subsidiaries are just polluting oceans and ponds and destroying the reputation in different towns and cities, I don’t think that would be too cool with either Buffett or Munger.

你们非常关心伯克希尔的声誉。如果伯克希尔的子公司只是污染海洋和池塘，并在不同的城镇和城市破坏声誉，我认为这对巴菲特和芒格来说都不会太好。

So, doesn’t mean you don’t care about the environment just because you’re not going to somehow regulate and tell other people how to run their business. Let’s just do things voluntarily, do things to make money, and be responsible. At the end of the day, that’s what wins. Thank you.

所以，仅仅因为你不打算以某种方式监管并告诉其他人如何经营他们的生意，并不意味着你不关心环境。让我们自愿地做事情，赚钱，并负责任。归根结底，这才是成功之道。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

Anyone additional? 还有其他人吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, my name’s Larry Dorrs (PH) and I support this resolution.

观众成员：是的，我的名字是拉里·多尔斯，我支持这个提案。

I don’t think anybody is saying anything other than you’re gentlemen of great integrity. But this is a dollars and cents issue. And the EPA is releasing new rules that are calling for more regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.

我认为没有人会说你们不是有着伟大诚信的绅士。但这是一个涉及金钱的问题。环保局正在发布新的规则，要求对温室气体排放进行更多的监管。

So this — you know, we’re really approaching this from a point of view of a conglomerate that has insurance holdings, and it really is insurance companies that are bearing the great costs.

所以我们从一个拥有保险资产的企业集团的角度来看这个问题，实际上是保险公司承担了巨大的成本。

So I’m looking very much forward to your point of view on this. Thank you.

我非常期待您对此的看法。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

Anyone else? 还有其他人吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, thank you. David Hughes (PH), a shareholder.

观众：是的，谢谢。大卫·休斯（PH），一名股东。

It’s my opinion that this is the right thing to do and I think that it makes sense to do it, as an organization, prior to being forced to do it.

我认为这是正确的做法，我觉得作为一个组织，在被迫这样做之前，做这件事是有意义的。

And if this gives you the tools to set the rules your way, as you see fit, then I think that’s far more powerful and sets a precedent, as Berkshire has done in the past, so I am for the resolution.

如果这能给你工具，让你以自己的方式设定规则，那么我认为这更有力量，并且树立了一个先例，就像伯克希尔过去所做的那样，所以我支持这个提案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（零星的掌声）

Anyone additional? 还有其他人吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Thomas Dankenburter (PH) and my background was in biochemistry, and I’m very passionate about the environment, and I think it’s very important for Berkshire to work to be a leader, and so I’m very much in support of this proposition.

观众成员：你好。我叫托马斯·丹肯伯特，我的背景是生物化学，我非常热衷于环境问题，我认为伯克希尔努力成为领导者是非常重要的，因此我非常支持这个提案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（零星的掌声）

Got somebody else there? 你那里还有其他人吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Sarah Cleveland. I’m from Portland, Oregon.

观众成员：嗨，我叫萨拉·克利夫兰。我来自俄勒冈州的波特兰。

I want to just also put a voice in favor of this resolution, and I think it’s not about rights or wrong. It’s about a willingness to take a look at risks and opportunities. And also for Berkshire Hathaway to be a leader. And also work with the subsidiary companies on specific possibilities.

我也想为这个决议发声，我认为这不是关于对与错的问题，而是关于愿意审视风险和机会。同时，伯克希尔·哈撒韦也应该成为一个领导者，并与子公司合作探索具体的可能性。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（零星的掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. 观众：你好。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re on.

沃伦·巴菲特：你开始吧。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Sam Roy (PH). This is my first meeting.

观众成员：我叫萨姆·罗伊（PH）。这是我的第一次会议。

Mr. Munger and Warren Buffett, I’m so impressed how you run your business, but I think you will care for the environment as well. I don’t know whether we should impose a route, but at least you will, by your act, how the local businesses are run, and all the operating goes out and appears, and there is no question that we do everything possibly that we never pollute the air that cannot be changed.

芒格先生和沃伦·巴菲特，我对你们的商业运作印象深刻，但我认为你们也会关心环境。我不知道我们是否应该强制执行某条路线，但至少你们的行为会影响当地企业的运作，所有的运营都会显现出来，毫无疑问，我们会尽一切可能不污染无法改变的空气。

It is not hot air, but it is something I’m very passionate about. You can do anything with your environmental, but if you are not taking charge right now, we don’t know what the implications would be for our kids and grandkids.

这不是空话，而是我非常热衷的事情。你可以对环境做任何事情，但如果你现在不采取行动，我们不知道这对我们的孩子和孙子孙女会有什么影响。

I request you give it total investigation, and I think you will do that. Thank you for this opportunity.

我请求你对此进行全面调查，我相信你会这样做。感谢你给我这个机会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（零星的掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Bob Stein (PH). I’m a registered, professional engineer, and I have a couple comments, and I’m a Berkshire stockholder.

观众成员：是的。巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我的名字是鲍勃·斯坦（音）。我是一名注册的专业工程师，我有几个评论，我是伯克希尔的股东。

One, I think we all support very sound environmental protection. But the science before this — that’s being used by EPA for greenhouse gases is not necessarily sound, and is not necessarily in the best interests of Berkshire Hathaway shareholders.

我认为我们都支持非常合理的环境保护。但是在这之前的科学——即环保署用于温室气体的科学，并不一定是可靠的，也不一定符合伯克希尔哈撒韦股东的最佳利益。

Also, everything that the EPA has proposed is not practical and has caused a lot of problems making U.S. competitive in the world industrial market. Thank you.

此外，环保局提出的所有措施都不切实际，并导致了许多问题，使美国在全球工业市场中的竞争力下降。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们。（零星的掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jason Bang (PH), Palo Alto, California. For me, one thing that’s been very interesting about the issue is that it is something that deserves the passion that people bring to it. And I actually side with many of these people on the science of the issue.

观众成员：杰森·邦（PH），加利福尼亚州帕洛阿尔托。对我来说，这个问题有趣的一点是，它值得人们投入的热情。实际上，我在这个问题的科学上与许多人站在同一边。

What concerns me is, not necessarily that Berkshire agrees to the motion, I’m actually against it, but that the enterprises under Berkshire are about to help evangelize the true science behind what’s actually going on and help the American public get a better understanding, so they can also bring about change, rather than have it all occur from the executive level.

我关心的是，伯克希尔是否同意这一动议并不是重点，我实际上是反对的，而是伯克希尔旗下的企业即将帮助传播真正的科学知识，让公众更好地理解实际情况，以便他们也能推动改变，而不是一切都从高层执行。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Bill Guenther. I’m a shareholder from Newfane, Vermont.

观众成员：下午好。我叫比尔·根瑟。我是来自佛蒙特州纽芬的股东。

I work as a state forester back home and I want to say for folks that don’t believe global warming is reality, I wish you would follow me around in the woods. It definitely is.

我在家乡做州森林管理员，我想对那些不相信全球变暖是真实存在的人说，我希望你们能跟着我在森林里走一趟。它确实存在。

I want to support this resolution and I hope that the rest of the shareholders will feel it important enough to see it through. Thank you.

我想支持这个决议，希望其他股东也能觉得这个决议足够重要，愿意坚持下去。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们。（零星的掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m (inaudible). I care about energy. I care about energy and environment more than anybody else because I’m currently still studying energy and environment issues.

观众成员：下午好。我是（听不清）。我比任何人都更关心能源。我关心能源和环境，因为我目前仍在研究能源和环境问题。

But I truly believe the power of private sector, the power of free markets. And I think it’s not your responsibility to put the resources of the shareholder for this issue. It’s not your expertise.

但我真的相信私营部门的力量，自由市场的力量。我认为将股东的资源用于这个问题不是你的责任。这不是你的专业。

I can personally do a better job to provide (inaudible) to do environmental advocacy than you do. So actually, against this resolution. Thank you.

我个人可以做得更好，提供（听不清）来进行环境倡导，而不是你。所以实际上，我反对这个决议。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（零星的掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sorry, I have a friend to say something. I can translate it.

观众成员：抱歉，我有一个朋友想说点什么。我可以翻译。

(OFF-MICROPHONE SPEAKING)

（麦克风外讲话）

OK. He says the development of the solar panel has great impact on China. And the question — and he also thinks that, actually, Berkshire should do something, as should think about the implication of that.

好的。他说太阳能电池板的发展对中国有很大影响。还有一个问题——他也认为，实际上，伯克希尔应该采取一些行动，并考虑到这一点的影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们。（零星的掌声）

OK. Whoops, we have one more.

好的。哎呀，我们还有一个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Kevin Thompson (PH). I’m a shareholder.

观众成员：嗨，我是凯文·汤普森（PH）。我是股东。

I’m for the motion. I am a career engineer that works with an oil company. And what we found when we started looking at greenhouse gas emissions was that what we thought was going to end up costing the company more money actually created more revenue for the company.

我支持这个提案。我是一名职业工程师，供职于一家石油公司。当我们开始研究温室气体排放时，我们发现我们原以为会让公司花费更多资金的事情，实际上为公司创造了更多的收入。

And those are some of the stories that generally don’t get told, but they are out there. And I would recommend that you take a look at it, because in actuality, what you may be dismissing may actually be revenue for your shareholders. Thank you.

这些是一些通常不被讲述的故事，但它们确实存在。我建议你去看看，因为实际上，你可能忽视的东西实际上可能是你股东的收入。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（零星的掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett. I’m Mike from (inaudible) and there’s obviously a fine line between, like, cutting down the Amazon forest and, like, just burning some coal.

观众成员：你好，巴菲特先生。我是来自（听不清）的迈克，显然，在砍伐亚马逊森林和仅仅燃烧一些煤之间有一条微妙的界线。

So sometimes you can give up a little but you can’t really give up that much. So that’s why I don’t support the motion.

所以有时候你可以放弃一点，但你不能真的放弃太多。这就是为什么我不支持这个提案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（零星的掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You’re welcome.

观众成员：不客气。

MEETING OFFICIAL: There do not appear to be any further comments.

会议官员：似乎没有其他评论。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢。（掌声）

Democracy in action at Berkshire.

伯克希尔的民主实践。

The — a couple of questions that were raised. In terms of material information, or material risks, in respect to Berkshire and specifically to our insurance operation, annually in the 10-K, there’s a recitation of risk. And, in my own opinion, in terms of our insurance operation, this question does not pose material risk to Berkshire’s insurance operations.

有几个问题被提出。关于伯克希尔及其保险业务的重大信息或重大风险，每年在 10-K 报告中都会列出风险。在我看来，就我们的保险业务而言，这个问题对伯克希尔的保险业务并不构成重大风险。

The question one gentleman, toward the end, mentioned the fact that it might even be more profitable for Berkshire, in terms of what might happen if we followed the motion. Ironically, he could well be right if it were in our determination, but just take our three major states in electric utility operation, where we serve almost two million customers, Iowa, Utah, and Oregon, but it’s true of other states as well.

一位绅士在最后提到的问题是，如果我们采取这一动议，伯克希尔可能会更有利可图，这一点甚至可能是正确的，尽管这取决于我们的决策。但只需看看我们在电力公用事业运营中的三个主要州，我们为近两百万客户提供服务，爱荷华州、犹他州和俄勒冈州，其他州也是如此。

We operate under the dictates of the utility commissions in those three states, all of which — or each of which — sets their own rules regarding operation, and each of which we end up obeying.

我们在这三个州的公用事业委员会的指示下运营，这些委员会各自制定自己的运营规则，而我们最终都遵守这些规则。

If we were to unilaterally, for example, decide to close down significant coal generation, we would be told to depreciate those plants over a shorter period, and that would translate, not in the cost to Berkshire, it would translate into higher rates for electricity there.

如果我们单方面决定关闭重要的煤电厂，我们会被要求在更短的时间内折旧这些电厂，这将不会体现在伯克希尔的成本上，而是会转化为那里的电价上涨。

We are entitled to a return on our investment and the faster the depreciation, the higher the rates have to be in order to achieve allowed returns.

我们有权获得投资回报，折旧越快，费率就必须越高，以实现允许的回报。

So there was a woman from Oregon speaking, for example. And the burden of any unilateral attempt by us — and we couldn’t do it without the approval of the utility commissions — but the burden would fall on customers.

所以有一个来自俄勒冈州的女性在发言。例如，我们任何单方面的尝试都将面临负担——而且没有公用事业委员会的批准我们是无法做到的——但负担将落在客户身上。

And it is true, actually, that we would recoup accelerated depreciation and we would probably have a much larger investment on which we would be allowed a return in other generating facilities.

实际上，我们确实会收回加速折旧，并且我们可能会在其他发电设施上有更大规模的投资，从中获得回报。

But this is a question — this is not something that the stockholders of Berkshire end up incurring the costs of. It’s something that the rate, or the users of electricity in these various states, will pay for. And that judgment, quite properly, should be made by the public utility commissions of those various states. And whatever they decide, you know, we will follow.

但这是一个问题——这不是伯克希尔的股东最终承担的成本。这是各个州的电力用户将要支付的费用。而这个判断，理所当然地，应该由各个州的公共事业委员会来做出。无论他们决定什么，你知道，我们都会遵循。

And over time, there’s no question, just like we’ve talked about our wind generation in Iowa, this country will move toward a different composition of electricity generation.

随着时间的推移，毫无疑问，就像我们谈到爱荷华州的风能发电一样，这个国家将朝着不同的电力生成组成发展。

And as I stated earlier, I personally favor more nuclear over time, but that will be determined both at the state level, and in some ways, at the national level.

正如我之前所说，我个人更倾向于逐渐增加核能，但这将由州级和在某种程度上由国家级来决定。

So it’s our recommendation that the motion be voted down. And I think the motion is now ready to be acted upon.

因此，我们建议对该动议投反对票。我认为该动议现在可以进行表决。

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the motion and allow the ballot to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在提案上标记他们的选票，并允许将选票交给选举监察员。

Miss Amick, when you are ready you may give your report?

阿米克小姐，您准备好后可以提交您的报告吗？

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。

The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 67,733 votes for the motion, and 608,576 votes against the motion.

代理持有人对上周四晚上收到的代理投票的投票结果显示，支持该动议的票数为 67,733 票，反对该动议的票数为 608,576 票。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed.

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份的多数票，该提案已失败。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

The proposal fails. 提案失败。

69. Formal meeting adjourns

正式会议休会

WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有人要在这个会议上提出其他事务吗？

If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.

如果没有，我请斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second it. 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将通过口头表决。

Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say aye.

有讨论吗？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成”。

All opposed say no. 所有反对者请说“不同意”。

2011-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2011-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Welcome

2. Board of directors introduced

3. Q1 earnings hurt by Asian catastrophes

4. David Sokol and Lubrizol: “inexcusable” and “inexplicable”

5. Journalists introduced

6. Buffett’s David Sokol timeline

7. Market reaction when Fed ends stimulus

8. Role of Berkshire’s next chairman

9. Picking tech stocks is difficult but could be profitable

10. Why Buffett got past his skepticism about Lubrizol

11. Using Berkshire’s stock for acquisitions

12. Buffett is always optimistic about American capitalism

13. Best assets in an inflationary environment

14. No dividend, so sell a slice of Berkshire if you need cash

15. Still bullish on bank stocks Wells Fargo and U.S. Bancorp

16. Productive assets will always beat gold

17. Buffett on getting his first investors

18. Berkshire isn’t a ’60s “Go-Go” conglomerate

19. Buffett’s preferred legacy: “teacher”

20. Dollar will decline, but inflation won’t destroy the economy

21. Buy Berkshire stock or a mutual fund?

22. “Rules are not meant to be danced around”

23. Deficit spending is economic stimulus

24. Munger tells how he’d take “an ax to our financial sector”

25. Update on Buffett’s bet against hedge funds

26. Two clarifications on David Sokol and Lubrizol

27. Munger still bullish on electric-car maker BYD

28. Making money by trading oil is too hard

29. Clarification of the clarification on Sokol and Lubrizol

30. “I’m going to have Charlie write the next press release”

31. CEO should be left “dead broke” after a bailout

32. No Washington Post shares will be sold after board resignation

33. Can’t predict if Berkshire will outperform the Australian dollar

34. We’re not neglecting the stock portfolio

35. “We have an unbelievable insurance operation”

36. Why See’s Candies does well in inflationary times

37. “May you live until the A stock splits”

38. Buffett’s best deal: hiring Ajit Jain

39. “Forget about goodwill” when evaluating a business

40. Munger really loves Costco

41. Incentivizing kids

42. Compensation incentives for Berkshire’s next CEO

43. Societal issues are important but don’t affect investment decisions

44. We wouldn’t participate in an auction for any company

45. How to judge if Buffett is doing a good job of allocating capital

46. Don’t compare opportunities now to your best-ever deal

47. You don’t have to read quickly but you should read

48. Buffett: There shouldn’t even be a debt ceiling

49. Nuclear power is “important” and “safe”

50. Charity program fell victim to pressure groups

51. Why we hate projections

52. Buffett owns a few stocks and lots of bonds

53. Evaluating a company outside the U.S.

54. Where Berkshire’s short-term cash goes

55. Wind power needs government subsidies

56. We would not have let NetJets go bankrupt

57. Buffett’s advice: invest in your own skills

58. Reinsurance is a lot harder than it looks

59. How Buffett first met Todd Combs

60. Acquisitions and stock

61. Why we won’t issue stock to make an acquisition

62. Housing market is terrible, but we’ll profit on the rebound

63. Short adjournment before formal business meeting

64. Berkshire formal annual meeting begins

65. Election of directors

66. Shareholder advisory vote on Berkshire’s executive compensation

67. Shareholders decide to hold a compensation vote every three years

68. Shareholder motion on reduction of greenhouse gases

69. Formal meeting adjourns

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