2012-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
早晨会议
1. Welcome
欢迎
WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren, and this hyperkinetic fellow is Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。我是沃伦，这位精力充沛的家伙是查理。
And we’re going to conduct this pretty much as we have in the past. We’ll take your questions, alternating among the media and analysts in the audience until 3:30, with a break around noon for an hour.
我们将会像过去一样进行这次活动。我们会回答你们的问题，在媒体和观众中的分析师之间轮流，直到 3:30，中午会休息一个小时。
And then we’ll have the regular meeting of the shareholders beginning at that time. Feel free to drift away and shop in the other room. We have a lot of things for you there.
然后我们将在那个时候召开股东的定期会议。请随意走开，在另一个房间购物。我们那里有很多东西供您选择。
2. See’s Candy lollypop group photo
See's Candy 棒棒糖合影
WARREN BUFFETT: We only have one scripted part of this meeting, and See’s Candy has placed on all of the seats a little packet.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们这次会议只有一个预先准备的部分，See's Candy 在所有座位上放置了一个小包。
And what we’d like you to do, we’re going to like — we’d like to videotape everyone eating their pop at the same time for posting on Facebook and for use by the media in today’s meeting.
我们希望您能做的是，我们想要录制每个人同时吃棒棒糖的过程，以便在 Facebook 上发布，并在今天的会议中供媒体使用。
So, if each of you will open up the lollipop now.
那么，如果你们每个人现在都打开棒棒糖。
Now, first of all, you’ve got them open. We’d like you to hold them up above your head. We’re going to get a shot of 18,000. Dennis, here we come. And we’ll get a few shots of that.
现在，首先，你们把它们打开。我们希望你们把它们举到头顶上。我们要拍摄 18,000 的镜头。丹尼斯，我们来了。我们会拍几张那样的照片。
We got it all, Mele?
我们全都明白了，梅勒？
OK. And now you can take off the cover and the good part comes, and Charlie and I have — we have fudge up here and we have peanut brittle.
好的。现在你可以把包装拿掉，精彩的部分来了，查理和我这里有软糖，还有花生脆糖。
And I said the meeting would run until 3:30. If we’ve consumed 10,000 calories each, we sometimes have to stop a little early at that point. (Laughter)
我说会议会持续到 3:30。如果我们每个人消耗了 10,000 卡路里，有时到那个时候我们不得不提前结束一点。（笑声）
3. Q1 earnings
第一季度收益
WARREN BUFFETT: The only slide we have at this point is we did put out our earnings — first quarter earnings — yesterday.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们目前唯一的一张幻灯片是我们昨天发布了我们的收益——第一季度收益。
And in general, all of our companies are — with the exception of the ones in the residential construction business, which was the case last year and it’s the case this year — that all of the companies, except those in that area, pretty much have shown good earnings.
总体而言，除了住宅建筑行业的公司（去年是这样，今年也是如此）之外，我们所有的公司几乎都表现出了良好的盈利。
And in the case of the bigger ones, the five largest non-reinsurance companies earned — all had record earnings last year, aggregating of those five companies something over 9 billion pretax.
在较大的公司中，五家最大的非再保险公司去年都创下了收益记录，这五家公司的税前总收益超过 90 亿美元。
And in the annual report I said I thought they would — if business didn’t take a nosedive this year — that they would earn over $10 billion pretax this year. And certainly nothing we’ve seen so far would cause me to backtrack on that prediction.
在年度报告中，我说我认为如果今年业务没有大幅下滑，他们将会在今年赚取超过 100 亿美元的税前利润。到目前为止，我们所看到的任何情况都不会让我改变这个预测。
The insurance — if you read our 10-Q and turn to the insurance section, you will see that there was an accounting change mandated for all property-casualty insurance companies, which — rather technical and I won’t get into the details of it — it changed something that’s called the deferred policy acquisition cost, called DPAC.
保险——如果您阅读我们的 10-Q 并转到保险部分，您会看到所有财产意外保险公司都被要求进行了一项会计变更——这相当技术性，我不会详细说明——它改变了一个叫做递延保单获取成本（DPAC）的东西。
It has no effect on the operations at all, on the cash, but it did change the earnings downward by about $250 million pretax for GEICO in the first quarter. It’s based on whether you defer some advertising.
这对运营没有任何影响，对现金也没有影响，但它确实使 GEICO 在第一季度的税前收益下降了约 2.5 亿美元。这取决于你是否推迟一些广告。
It has — GEICO had a terrific first quarter, had a real profit margin of almost 9 percentage points, and the float grew, and everything good happened at GEICO in the first quarter. We had good growth.
GEICO 在第一季度表现出色，实际利润率接近 9 个百分点，资金池增长，第一季度 GEICO 发生了一切好事。我们的增长良好。
But we did make that accounting change. That accounting change also affects, to a lesser degree, the second quarter, and it may even trail just a bit into the third.
但我们确实进行了那项会计变更。那项会计变更在较小程度上也影响了第二季度，甚至可能稍微延续到第三季度。
But the underlying figures are somewhat better than the figures that we’ve presented there.
但基本数据比我们在那里呈现的数据要好一些。
And so, overall, we feel good about the first quarter. We feel good about the year.
因此，总的来说，我们对第一季度感到满意。我们对这一年感到满意。
4. Berkshire directors introduced
伯克希尔董事介绍
Maybe we should — even though we’ll do it again at the meeting — but we should probably introduce the directors. And I don’t know whether the audience can see the people here but if you can turn up the lights or something so they can.
也许我们应该这样做——尽管我们在会议上还会再做一次——但我们可能应该介绍一下董事们。我不知道观众是否能看到这里的人，但如果你能调亮灯光之类的，让他们能看到就好了。
We’ll start off, of course, with Charlie, Charlie Munger. And then alphabetically — if the directors would just — (Applause)
我们当然会首先开始，查理，查理·芒格。然后按字母顺序——如果董事们能——（掌声）
I was going to suggest that you withhold your applause until the end, but I know he’s sort of irresistible, so we’ll make an excuse for him. (Laughter)
我本来想建议你们等到最后再鼓掌，但我知道他有点让人无法抗拒，所以我们就为他找个借口吧。（笑声）
For the remainder of the directors, if they stand and remain standing, and then you can applaud them at the end, if you will.
对于其余的董事，如果他们站着并保持站立，那么在最后你可以为他们鼓掌，如果你愿意的话。
We’ve got Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott, Jr.
我们有霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、比尔·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基欧、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世。
Now you can go wild. (Applause)
现在你可以尽情发挥了。（掌声）
5. Q&A begins
问答环节开始
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’ll start with the questions. And what we will do is we’ll start over here with the media —with one of them — move to one of the analysts, and then move to one of the shareholders, and we’ll go by stations with the shareholders.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们开始提问。我们将从媒体开始——从其中一位开始——然后转到一位分析师，再转到一位股东，我们将按顺序进行股东提问。
And if we get — sometimes we’ve had as many as 60 or 62 questions.
如果我们得到——有时我们有多达 60 或 62 个问题。
If we get to 54, at which point each person on the panel here has had a shot at 6 questions, then from that point on we’ll do nothing but the — but from the shareholders from 54 on.
如果我们达到 54 个问题，此时小组中的每个人都已经回答了 6 个问题，那么从那时起，我们将只处理来自 54 个问题以后的股东问题。
So we’ll see how that goes.
我们看看情况如何。
6. Buffett: My successor will also be the “chief risk officer”
巴菲特：我的继任者也将是“首席风险官”
WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, we’ll start off with Carol Loomis of Fortune Magazine.
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我们将从《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯开始。
CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. I’ll make my mini speech, which the most important point is that neither Warren nor Charlie have an idea of what we’re going to ask.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：早上好。我将进行我的简短发言，最重要的一点是沃伦和查理都不知道我们要问什么。
The other thing is that we received hundreds, if not thousands, of questions. We don’t know the exact count, so we certainly couldn’t use every one. If we didn’t use yours, we’re sorry.
另外，我们收到了数百个，如果不是数千个问题。我们不知道确切的数量，所以我们当然不能使用每一个。如果没有使用您的问题，我们深表歉意。
So for the first question, Warren, two shareholders wrote me about the heavy responsibilities that will fall on your successor and his or her ability to deal with them. So I’ll make this a two-part question.
所以对于第一个问题，沃伦，两位股东给我写信提到你继任者将面临的重大责任以及他或她应对这些责任的能力。因此，我将这个问题分为两部分。
From Chris Inge (PH), “Mr. Buffett, you have stated that you believe the CEO of any large financial organization must be the chief risk officer as well.
来自克里斯·英格（PH）：“巴菲特先生，您曾表示，您认为任何大型金融机构的首席执行官也必须是首席风险官。”
“So, at Berkshire, does the leading CEO candidate for successor, as well as the backup candidates, possess the necessary knowledge, experience, and temperament to be the Chief Risk Officer?”
“那么，在伯克希尔，作为接班人的主要首席执行官候选人以及备选候选人，是否具备担任首席风险官所需的知识、经验和性格？”
The related question is about the Goldman Sachs, GE, and Bank of America deals, all giving Berkshire warrants, that you have negotiated.
与您谈判的高盛、通用电气和美国银行的交易相关的问题，都是给予伯克希尔期权的。
Shareholder Jacques Cartier — Catere (PH), excuse me — asked whether these specific transactions could have been done with similar terms without your involvement.
股东雅克·卡地亚 — Catere（PH），抱歉 — 询问这些具体交易是否可以在没有您参与的情况下以类似条款进行。
If not, what implications would that have for Berkshire’s future returns?
如果不是，这对伯克希尔未来的回报会有什么影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — I do believe that the CEO of any large, particularly financial-related, company should — it really should apply beyond that, but certainly with a financially-related company — should be the chief risk officer.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我确实相信，任何大型公司，特别是与金融相关的公司，首席执行官应该——这实际上应该超越这一点，但对于与金融相关的公司来说，首席执行官应该是首席风险官。
It’s not something to be delegated. In fact, Charlie and I have seen that function delegated at very major institutions, and the risk committee would come in and report every week, every month, and they’d report to the directors, and they’d have a lot of nice figures lined up, and be able to talk in terms of how many sigmas were involved and everything, and the place was just ripe for real trouble.
这不是可以委托的事情。事实上，查理和我看到过在一些大型机构中将这个职能委托出去，风险委员会每周、每月都会进来报告，他们会向董事们汇报，并且会有很多漂亮的数据排列出来，能够谈论涉及多少个西格玛等等，而这个地方正好是麻烦的温床。
So I do — I am the chief risk officer at Berkshire. It’s up to me to understand anything that could really hit us in any catastrophic way.
所以我确实是——我是伯克希尔的首席风险官。了解任何可能以灾难性方式真正影响我们的事情是我的责任。
My successor will have the same responsibility, and we would not select anybody for that job that we did not think had that ability.
我的继任者将承担同样的责任，我们不会选择任何我们认为没有这种能力的人来担任这个职位。
It’s a very important ability. It ranks right up there with allocation of capital and selection of managers for the operating units.
这是一项非常重要的能力。它与资本分配和运营单位管理者的选择同样重要。
It’s not an impossible job. I mean, it — the basic risks could involve excessive leverage and they — and then the — they could involve excessive insurance risk.
这不是一项不可能的工作。我的意思是，基本风险可能涉及过度杠杆，然后它们可能涉及过度的保险风险。
Now, we have people in charge of our insurance businesses that themselves worry very much about the risk of their own unit and, therefore, the person at the top really has to understand whether those three or four people running the big insurance units are correctly assessing their risks, and then also has to be able to aggregate and think how they accumulate over the units.
现在，我们有负责保险业务的人，他们自己非常担心自己部门的风险，因此，最高层的人真的必须理解这三四个管理大型保险单位的人是否正确评估了他们的风险，并且还必须能够汇总并思考这些风险在各个单位之间是如何累积的。
That’s where the real risk is, unless you’re engaging in a lot of leverage in your financial structure, which isn’t going to happen. Before I answer the second, Charlie, would you like to comment on that?
这就是实际风险所在，除非你在财务结构中使用大量杠杆，但这不太可能发生。在我回答第二个问题之前，查理，你想对此发表评论吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, not only was it — this risk decision frequently delegated in America, but it was delegated to people who were using a very silly way of judging risk that they’ve been taught in some our leading business schools. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，这个风险决策不仅在美国经常被委托，而且还委托给那些使用一种非常愚蠢的风险判断方式的人，这种方式是他们在一些顶尖商学院学到的。（笑声）
So this is a very serious problem this man is raising. The so-called “Value at Risk” and the theories that outcomes in financial markets followed a Gaussian curve, invariably. It was one of the dumbest ideas ever put forward. (Laughter)
所以这个人提出了一个非常严重的问题。所谓的“风险价值”和金融市场结果总是遵循高斯曲线的理论，实在是最愚蠢的想法之一。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s not kidding, either. We’ve seen it in action.
沃伦·巴菲特：他不是在开玩笑。我们已经亲眼见证了这一点。
And the interesting thing is we’ve seen it in action with people that know better, that have very high IQs, that study lots of mathematics. But it’s so much easier to work with that curve, because everybody knows the properties of that curve, and can make calculations to eight decimal places using that curve.
有趣的是，我们已经看到那些更懂的人、智商很高、学习了大量数学的人在实际应用中使用它。但使用那条曲线要容易得多，因为每个人都知道那条曲线的性质，并且可以使用那条曲线进行到小数点后八位的计算。
But the only problem is that curve is not applicable to behavior in markets, and people find that out periodically.
但唯一的问题是，这个曲线不适用于市场行为，人们定期发现这一点。
The second question: we’re well equipped, Carol, to answer that question. We would not have anybody — we’re not going to have an arts major in charge of Berkshire. (Laughter)
第二个问题：我们有能力回答这个问题，卡罗尔。我们不会让任何人——我们不会让一个艺术专业的人负责伯克希尔。（笑声）
The question about negotiated deal, there’s no question that partly through age, partly through the fact we’ve accumulated a lot of capital, partly the fact that I know a lot more people than I used to know, and partly because Berkshire can act with speed and finality that is really quite rare among large American corporations, we do get a chance, occasionally, to make large transactions.
关于谈判交易的问题，毫无疑问，部分是因为年龄，部分是因为我们积累了大量资本，部分是因为我认识的人比以前多得多，部分是因为伯克希尔能够以在大型美国公司中非常罕见的速度和果断性行动，我们确实偶尔有机会进行大规模交易。
But that takes a willing party on the other side. When we got in touch with Brian Moynihan at the Bank of America last year, I had dreamt up a deal which I thought made sense for us, and I thought it made sense for the Bank of America, under the circumstances that existed.
但这需要对方愿意合作。去年我们联系了美国银行的布莱恩·莫伊尼汉，我构思了一个我认为对我们有意义的交易，我认为在当时的情况下，这对美国银行也有意义。
But I’d never talked to Brian Moynihan before in my life. I had no real connection with the Bank of America.
但我一生中从未与布莱恩·莫伊尼汉交谈过。我与美国银行没有真正的联系。
But when I talked to him, he knew that we meant what we said, so that if I said we would do 5 billion and — I laid out the terms of the warrants — and I said we’d do it.
但当我和他说话时，他知道我们说的是真心话，所以如果我说我们会做 50 亿——我列出了认股权证的条款——我说我们会做到。
And he knew that that was good and that we had the money.
他知道那是好的，我们有钱。
And that ability to commit, and have the other person know your commitment is good for very large sums and, maybe, complicated instruments, is a big plus.
这种承诺的能力，以及让对方知道你的承诺对于非常大的金额和可能复杂的工具是一个很大的优势。
Berkshire will possess that subsequent to my departure. I don’t think that every deal that I made would necessarily be makeable by a successor, but they’ll bring other talents as well.
伯克希尔将在我离开后继续拥有这些。我不认为我所做的每一笔交易都一定能被继任者完成，但他们会带来其他才能。
I mean, I can tell you the successor that the board has agreed on can do a lot of things much, much better that I can do.
我可以告诉你，董事会一致同意的继任者能做很多事情，远远比我做得好。
So, if you give up a little on negotiated financial deals, you may gain a great deal, just in terms of somebody that’s more energetic about going out and making transactions.
所以，如果你在谈判的财务交易上让步一点，你可能会获得很大的收益，尤其是从一个更积极主动去进行交易的人那里。
And those deals have not been key to Berkshire. If you look at what we did with General Electric and Goldman Sachs, for example in those two deals in 2008, I mean, they were OK, but they are not remotely as important as, you know, maybe buying Coca-Cola stock, which was done in the market over a period of six or eight months.
这些交易对伯克希尔并不是关键。如果你看看我们在 2008 年与通用电气和高盛的交易，我的意思是，它们还不错，但远没有像购买可口可乐股票那样重要，这笔交易是在六到八个月的时间里进行的。
We bought IBM over a period of six or eight months last year in the market. We bought all these businesses on a negotiated basis.
我们在去年市场上花了六到八个月的时间购买了 IBM。我们以协商的方式购买了所有这些业务。
So the values in Berkshire that have been accumulated by some special security transaction are really just peanuts compared to the values that have been created by buying businesses like GEICO or ISCAR or BNSF, and the sort.
所以，伯克希尔通过一些特殊证券交易积累的价值与通过购买像 GEICO、ISCAR 或 BNSF 这样的企业所创造的价值相比，真的只是微不足道。
It’s not a key to Berkshire’s future, but the ingredients that allowed us to do that will still be available and, to some extent, peculiar to Berkshire, in terms of sizable deals.
这不是伯克希尔未来的关键，但使我们能够做到这一点的因素仍然会存在，并在一定程度上是伯克希尔特有的，尤其是在大型交易方面。
If somebody gets a call from most people and they say, you know, we’ll give you $10 billion tomorrow morning, and we’ll have the lawyers work on it overnight, and here are the terms and there won’t be any surprises, they’re inclined to believe it’s a prank call or something of the sort. But with Berkshire, they believe it can get done.
如果有人接到大多数人的电话，他们说，你知道吗，我们明天早上会给你 100 亿美元，我们会让律师通宵工作，这里是条款，没有任何意外，他们倾向于认为这是恶作剧电话或类似的东西。但对于伯克希尔，他们相信这可以实现。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and in addition, a lot of the Berkshire directors are terrific at risk analysis.
查理·芒格：是的，此外，很多伯克希尔的董事在风险分析方面都非常出色。
Think of the Kiewit Company succeeding, as it has over decades, in bid construction work on oil well platforms and tunnels and remote places and so on.
想想基Kiewit公司在几十年里成功地承接石油井平台、隧道和偏远地区等投标建设工作的情况。
That’s not easy to do. Most people fail at that eventually, and Walter Scott has presided over that bit of risk control all his life and very routinely.
这并不容易做到。大多数人最终都会失败，而沃尔特·斯科特一生都在非常常规地掌控这一风险。
And Sandy Gottesman created one of my favorite risk control examples. One day he fired an associate, and the man said, “How can you be firing me when I’m such an important producer?”
而桑迪·戈特斯曼则创造了我最喜欢的风险控制案例之一。有一天，他解雇了一位合伙人，那个人说：“我怎么会被解雇，当我是如此重要的生产者？”
And Sandy said, “Yes,” he says. “But I’m a rich old man and you make me nervous.” (Laughter)
桑迪说：“是的，”他说。“但我是一位富有的老人，你让我感到紧张。”（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We do not have anybody around Berkshire that makes us nervous.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在伯克希尔没有任何让我们感到紧张的人。
7. We “reserve conservatively” at insurance operations
我们在保险业务中“保守预留”。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now we go to our new panel.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在我们进入我们的新小组。
Cliff Gallant of KBW, we’re getting the first question here from an analyst.
KBW 的克利夫·加朗特，我们在这里收到了分析师的第一个问题。
I don’t think that is on.
我认为那不可能。
CLIFF GALLANT: Oh, can you hear me?
克利夫·加兰特：哦，你能听到我吗？
BUFFETT: Yeah. 巴菲特：是的。
CLIFF GALLANT: OK, sorry. Thank you again for the opportunity. The subject, generally, still is mortality.
克利夫·加兰特：好的，抱歉。再次感谢您给予的机会。主题通常仍然是死亡。
In your 2011 annual report, Berkshire disclosed that Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group made changes in its assumptions for mortality risk, which resulted in a charge, specifically saying that mortality rates had exceeded assumptions in the Swiss Re contract.
在您 2011 年的年报中，伯克希尔披露伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团对其死亡风险假设进行了更改，这导致了一项费用，特别指出死亡率超过了瑞士再保险合同中的假设。
Conversely in Gen Re’s Life/Health segment, they reported lower than expected mortality, and I believe these trends continued into the first quarter that we saw in the report last night.
相反，在 Gen Re 的生命/健康部门，他们报告的死亡率低于预期，我相信这些趋势在我们昨晚看到的报告中延续到了第一季度。
What was the surprise in the Swiss Re contract? And is there a difference in basic assumptions and trends for things like mortality rates among Berkshire’s different businesses?
瑞士再保险合同中的惊喜是什么？伯克希尔不同业务在基本假设和趋势（如死亡率）方面是否存在差异？
In the property-casualty businesses, for example, are the same assumptions and reserving philosophies applied companywide?
在财产险和意外险业务中，例如，公司范围内是否应用相同的假设和准备金理念？
WARREN BUFFETT: Starting off with the Swiss Re example, we wrote a very, very large contract of reinsurance with Swiss Re — I would say, I don’t know, a year-and-a-half ago now, or thereabouts — and it applied to their business written, I think, in 2004 and earlier. And they had a lot of business. It was American business.
沃伦·巴菲特：首先以瑞士再保险为例，我们与瑞士再保险签署了一份非常非常大的再保险合同——我想，大约是一年半前，或者差不多——这份合同适用于他们在 2004 年及之前承保的业务。他们有很多业务。这是美国的业务。
And we started seeing — we got reports quarterly — and we started seeing mortality figures coming in quarterly that were considerably above our expectations and what looked like should be the case — should have been the case — looking at their earlier figures.
我们开始看到——我们每季度收到报告——我们开始看到每季度的死亡数字远高于我们的预期，以及根据他们早期的数据来看，应该是这样的情况。
So at the end of last year — we have a stop-loss arrangement on this — so we set up a reserve that really reserves it to the worst case, except we present-value that.
因此，在去年年底——我们在这方面有一个止损安排——我们设立了一个储备，实际上是按最坏情况来储备，当然我们进行了现值计算。
But until we get — until we figure out what can be done about that contract — and we have some possibilities in that respect — we will keep that reserved at this worst case. And so we took a charge for that amount.
但在我们弄清楚关于那份合同可以做些什么之前——我们在这方面有一些可能性——我们将把最坏的情况保留在这个水平。因此，我们为该金额计提了费用。
We do — we are reinsuring Swiss Re, and then they are reinsuring a bunch of American life insurers, and there is ability to reprice that business as we go along, but the degree to which we and Swiss Re might want to reprice that may be a subject of controversy, we’ll see, so we just decided to put it up on a worst-case basis.
我们确实在为瑞士再保险提供再保险，他们又为一些美国人寿保险公司提供再保险，因此随着时间的推移，重新定价这笔业务的能力是存在的，但我们与瑞士再保险可能想重新定价的程度可能会存在争议，我们会看看，所以我们决定以最坏情况来处理。
Getting to the question of how GEICO reserves, how Gen Re reserves, I would say that — it’s described to some extent in our annual report — but I would say that the one overriding principle is that we hope, and our plan is, to reserve conservatively.
接下来谈谈GEICO和通用再保险的储备，我会说——在我们的年报中有所描述——但我认为一个主要原则是，我们希望，并计划以保守的方式进行储备。
I mean, it’s a lot different reserving in the auto business, where on short-tail lines and physical damage and property damage, you know, you find out very quickly how you’re doing.
在汽车保险业务中储备情况与其他业务大为不同，短期赔偿和财产损失方面，你能很快发现你的情况如何。
And if you look at GEICO’s figures, you know, we’ve had redundancies year after year after year.
如果你看看 GEICO 的数字，你会知道，我们每年都有冗余。
Gen Re was under reserved at the time we bought it, and back in those 1999/1998 years, those developed very badly. Now they’ve been developing very favorably for some time. I think with Tad Montross, we’ve got a fellow that — where I feel very good about the way he reserves.
通用再保险在我们收购时储备不足，在1999年/1998年时发展得非常糟糕。现在他们已经好转了很长一段时间。我认为有塔德·蒙特罗斯在这里，我对他的储备方式感到非常满意。
But he is not — there’s no coordination between him and Tony [Nicely] at GEICO, nor with Ajit [Jain] at Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance. They all have, I think, the same mindset, but they don’t — they’re three very different, different businesses.
但他与GEICO的托尼·尼克利和伯克希尔·哈撒韦再保险的阿吉特·简之间没有协调，他们都有同样的心态，但他们是三种非常不同的业务。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s always going to be some contract where the results are worse than we expected. Why would anybody buy our insurance if that weren’t the case? (Scattered laughter)
查理·芒格：总会有一些合同的结果比我们预期的要差。如果不是这样，为什么还会有人购买我们的保险呢？（散发的笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s interesting how — I mean, just take 9/11. You know, it’s very hard to reserve after something like 9/11, because to what extent is business interruption insurance — when you close the stock exchange for a few days, are you going to be able to collect on insurance?
沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是——我意思是，拿9/11来说。你知道，9/11之后很难储备，因为在关闭股票交易所几天时，商业中断保险到底能否索赔？
And, you know, when you close restaurants at airports, you know, 2,000 miles away, because the airport is closed for a few days, is that business interruption insurance? There’s — a lot of questions come up.
而且，当你关闭距离2000英里之外的机场餐厅，因为机场关闭了几天，这算不算商业中断保险？会产生很多问题。
We turned out to be somewhat over-reserved for 9/11, as it turned out.
结果我们发现，在9/11事件中我们的储备略显过多。
You’ve got the same situation going on in both Thailand and Japan because, as you know, the supply chain for many American companies was interrupted by the tsunami in Japan and the floods in Thailand.
你在泰国和日本面临着相同的情况，因为你知道，许多美国公司的供应链因日本的海啸和泰国的洪水而中断。
And if you’re a car manufacturer in the United States and you aren’t getting the parts, you know, does your business interruption insurance cover the fact that there were floods for your supplier in Thailand or the tsunami hit in Japan? Sometimes that stuff takes years and years to work out.
如果你是美国的一家汽车制造商，而你没有获得零部件，你知道你的业务中断保险是否涵盖了泰国供应商的洪水或日本的海啸？有时候，这些问题需要多年才能解决。
On balance, I think you will find that our reserves generally develop favorably.
总体来说，我认为你会发现我们的储备通常会有利于发展。
8. “It’s amazing how little influence we’ve had”
“我们影响力如此之小，真是令人惊讶。”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We go to the audience now up at post number 1, and there he is.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们现在去观众那里，第一号岗位上，他在那里。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There he is. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman. My name is Andy Peake (PH), and I’m from Weston, Connecticut.
观众成员：他来了。早上好，主席先生，副主席先生。我叫安迪·皮克（PH），来自康涅狄格州韦斯顿。
In the past, you’ve made a few investments in China: PetroChina and BYD, to name two.
在过去，你在中国进行了一些投资：中石油和比亚迪，举两个例子。
Given the growing importance of China in the world, what advice would you give the new Chinese leadership and corporate CEOs such that you would make more investments in China? Xièxiè.
鉴于中国在世界上日益重要，您会给新的中国领导层和企业首席执行官什么建议，以便您能在中国进行更多投资？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie has made the most recent investment in China, so I’ll let him handle that one.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，查理最近在中国进行了投资，所以我让他来处理这个。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we’re not spending much time giving advice to China. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，我们没有花太多时间给中国提供建议。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s not because they’re not hungry for our advice. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：这并不是因为他们不渴望我们的建议。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: If you stop to think about it, China has been doing very, very well from a very tough start. To some extent, we ought to seek advice there instead of give it.
查理·芒格：如果你仔细想想，中国在一个非常艰难的起点上做得非常好。在某种程度上，我们应该向他们寻求建议，而不是给他们建议。
WARREN BUFFETT: We have — I would say that we’ve found it almost useless in 60 years of investing to give advice to anybody in business.
沃伦·巴菲特：我会说，在 60 年的投资中，我们发现给任何商界人士提供建议几乎是无用的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We have found that we have a lot of control — it’s kind of like controlling affairs by pushing on a noodle.
查理·芒格：我们发现我们有很多控制权——这有点像通过推一根面条来控制事务。
It’s amazing how little influence we’ve had when we had 20 percent of the stock.
令人惊讶的是，当我们拥有 20%的股份时，我们的影响力竟然如此之小。
And people have this illusion of mass control at headquarters. The beauty of Berkshire is that we created a system that doesn’t require much control at headquarters.
人们对总部的集体控制有这种错觉。伯克希尔的美在于我们创建了一个不需要总部过多控制的系统。
WARREN BUFFETT: But we — if you look at our four largest investments, which are worth, we’ll say — they’re certainly worth $50 billion today.
沃伦·巴菲特：但是我们——如果你看看我们四个最大的投资，它们的价值，我们可以说——今天它们的价值肯定超过 500 亿美元。
We’ve had some of them for 25 years — one of them — and another one for 20 years.
我们有其中一些已经 25 年了——其中一个——还有另一个已经 20 年了。
The number of times that we have talked — unless we were on the board, which I was at Coca-Cola — but the number of times we’ve talked to the CEO of those companies, where we have $50 billion, I would say doesn’t average more than twice a year, and we are not in the business of giving them advice.
我们与这些公司的CEO交流的次数——除非我们在董事会中，我在可口可乐担任过董事会成员——但我们与这些公司CEO的交流次数，我认为平均一年不超过两次，而且我们并不是在给他们提供建议。
If we thought that the success of our investment depended upon them following our advice, we’d go onto something else. (Laughter)
如果我们认为投资的成功取决于他们是否听从我们的建议，我们就会去做其他事情。（笑声）
9. No warnings when Berkshire shares are overvalued
当伯克希尔股票被高估时没有警告
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a shareholder named Ben Noll (PH), and I’ve got several different emails that were very similar to this one but I’m choosing Ben’s question.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自一位名叫本·诺尔（PH）的股东，我收到了几封与这个问题非常相似的电子邮件，但我选择了本的问题。
He writes that while pleased by your announcement to buy back stock at 110 percent of book value, he feels like a bit of a chump for sometimes having paid nearly 200 percent of book in the past few years.
他写道，虽然对你们宣布以账面价值的 110%回购股票感到高兴，但他觉得自己有点傻，因为在过去几年中，有时他支付了接近账面价值 200%的价格。
Since you’ve stated repeatedly that it’s as bad to be overvalued as to be undervalued, why didn’t you warn us previously when the price-book relationship was very different, or have you not felt that Berkshire was trading above intrinsic value over the last decade?
既然你一再表示，过高估值和过低估值一样糟糕，为什么在价格与账面价值关系非常不同的时候你没有提前警告我们，或者你没有觉得伯克希尔在过去十年里交易价格高于内在价值吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve written in the back of the report how we prefer to — not to see our shares sell at the highest possible price.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在报告的后面写了我们更倾向于——不希望我们的股票以最高价格出售。
I mean, we’ve got a whole different view on that than many managers.
我的意思是，我们对这件事的看法与许多经理截然不同。
If we could have our way, we would have the stock trade once a year, and Charlie and I would try to come up with a fair value for intrinsic business value, and it would trade at that.
如果我们能如愿以偿，我们会让股票一年交易一次，查理和我会努力得出一个公正的内在商业价值，然后股票就会按这个价格交易。
That’s incidentally what some private companies do, but you’re not allowed that luxury in the public market, and public markets do very strange things.
这恰好是一些私营公司所做的，但在公共市场中你不能享受这样的奢侈，公共市场会做出非常奇怪的事情。
If Charlie and I think Berkshire is overvalued, then it would be a very interesting proposition to have us announce, you know, a half an hour before the market opens someday, and have us both saying, gee, we think your stock is overpriced.
如果查理和我认为伯克希尔被高估，那么在某一天市场开盘前半小时宣布这个消息将是一个非常有趣的提议，我们两个人都说，哎，我们认为你的股票价格过高。
I mean, we would have to do that with every shareholder simultaneously, and they would — who knows how they would react. We have never — I don’t think — certainly never consciously done anything to encourage people to buy our stock at a price we thought was above intrinsic value.
我的意思是，我们必须同时对每个股东这样做，而他们会——谁知道他们会如何反应。我们从来没有——我认为——当然从来没有有意识地做过任何事情来鼓励人们以我们认为高于内在价值的价格购买我们的股票。
The one time we sold stock, under some pressure back in the mid-1990s when somebody was going to do something with the stock that we thought would be injurious to people, we created a stock and we thought the stock was a little on the high side then and we put on the cover of the prospectus something that I don’t think has ever been seen, which we said that neither Charlie nor I would buy the stock at the price, nor would we recommend that our family did it. (Scattered laughter)
我们在 1990 年代中期曾经一次出售股票，那时在某种压力下，有人打算对这只股票做一些我们认为会对人们造成伤害的事情。我们创造了一只股票，当时我们认为这只股票的价格有点高，因此在招股说明书的封面上写了一些我认为从未见过的内容，我们表示查理和我都不会以这个价格购买这只股票，也不会建议我们的家人这样做。（散场笑声）
And if you want a collector’s item for a proxy material — offering material — get that because I don’t think you’ll see that one again.
如果你想要一件代理材料或招标材料的收藏品，那份材料很值得，因为我认为你不会再看到这样的东西。
We think that if we are going to repurchase shares from people, that we ought to let them know what — that we think we’re buying it too cheap.
我们认为，如果我们要从人们那里回购股票，我们应该让他们知道——我们认为我们买得太便宜了。
I mean, we wouldn’t buy out — if we had two or three partners and somebody wanted to sell out — but we’d probably try to arrive at a fair price — but if it was established by a market and they were going to sell too cheap, we’d tell them we thought they were selling it too cheap.
我的意思是，如果我们有两到三个合伙人，有人想要退出——但我们可能会试图达成一个公平的价格——但如果是市场确定的价格，他们准备以太便宜的价格出售，我们会告诉他们我们认为他们出售的价格太便宜。
We are not selling it. We are not saying that 111 percent — we’re using 110 percent of book — 111 percent or 112 percent is intrinsic business value — we know it’s significantly above 110.
我们不会出售。我们并不是说111%——我们用的是110%的账面价值——111%或112%是内在业务价值——我们知道它显著高于110%。
And I don’t think we will ever announce — because I don’t see how we would do it — I don’t think we’ll ever announce that we think the stock is selling considerably above intrinsic business value, but we will certainly do nothing to indicate that we think the stock is attractively priced, if that comes about.
我认为我们永远不会宣布——因为我看不出我们会怎么做——我认为我们永远不会宣布我们认为股票的售价远高于内在商业价值，但如果出现这种情况，我们肯定不会做任何表明我们认为股票价格具有吸引力的事情。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）
10. We’ll buy “significantly” undervalued Berkshire shares
我们将购买“显著”被低估的伯克希尔股票
WARREN BUFFETT: Jay Gelb from Barclays.
沃伦·巴菲特：来自巴克莱的杰伊·盖尔布。
JAY GELB: Thank you. My question is also on share buybacks.
杰伊·盖尔布：谢谢。我的问题也是关于股票回购的。
Warren, in last year’s annual letter, you said not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years.
沃伦，在去年的年信中，你说在过去的 40 年里，伯克希尔没有一分钱现金用于分红或股票回购。
In 2011, Berkshire changed course and announced a share repurchase authorization.
在 2011 年，伯克希尔改变了方向，并宣布了一项股票回购授权。
What I’d like to focus in on is, what is Berkshire’s capacity for share buybacks, based on continued strong earnings power? How attractive is deploying excess capital and share buybacks compared to acquisitions, even above 1.1 times book value? And what are your latest thoughts on instituting a shareholder dividend?
我想关注的是，基于持续强劲的盈利能力，伯克希尔的股票回购能力是什么？与收购相比，部署多余资本和股票回购的吸引力有多大，即使超过账面价值的 1.1 倍？您对设立股东分红的最新看法是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: The 1.1 is a figure that we feel very comfortable with. So, we would probably feel comfortable with a figure somewhat higher than that, but we wanted to be dramatically — or very significantly — undervalued to do buybacks, and we want to be very sure that every shareholder that sells to us knows that we think that it’s dramatically — or significantly — undervalued when we do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：1.1 是我们感到非常满意的数字。因此，我们可能会对一个稍高的数字感到满意，但我们希望在进行回购时，价格明显——或非常显著——低于实际价值，并且我们希望确保每位向我们出售股份的股东都知道我们认为这个价格明显——或显著——低于实际价值。
But we have a terrific group of businesses.
但我们有一群出色的企业。
The marketable securities that we own, we think, are going to be worth more in the future, but we carry them at what they’re selling for today. So they’re not — that’s not an undervalued item, you know, in the balance sheet.
我们拥有的可交易证券，我们认为未来会更有价值，但我们按今天的售价来计价。因此，它们在资产负债表上并不是低估的项目。
But some of the businesses we own are worth far more money than we carry them, and we have no significant business that’s worth any significant discount from the carrying value.
但我们拥有的一些企业的价值远远超过我们所记录的价值，而且我们没有任何重要的业务，其价值显著低于账面价值。
So we would — from strictly a money-making viewpoint — we would love to buy billions and billions and billions of dollars’ worth of stock at — we’ll move that up to tens of billions — at 110 percent of book.
所以从纯粹的赚钱角度来看，我们非常希望以账面价值的 110%购买价值数十亿、数十亿、数十亿美元的股票。
You know, I don’t think it will happen, but it could happen. You never know what kind of a market you’ll run into.
你知道，我不认为这会发生，但它可能会发生。你永远不知道会遇到什么样的市场。
And if we get the chance to do it, as long as we don’t take our cash position below 20 billion, we will — we would buy very aggressively at that price. We know we’re making significant money for remaining shareholders.
如果我们有机会这样做，只要我们的现金头寸不低于 200 亿，我们就会在那个价格上非常积极地买入。我们知道我们为剩余股东赚取了可观的利润。
The value per share goes up when we buy at 110 percent of book, and therefore — and it’s so obvious to us that we would do it on a big scale if given the chance to, and if it did not take our cash position down below a level that leaves us comfortable.
当我们以账面价值的 110%购买时，每股价值会上升，因此——我们显然会在有机会的情况下大规模地这样做，只要这不会使我们的现金状况降到一个让我们感到不舒服的水平。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, some people buy their own stock back regardless of price. That’s not our system.
查理·芒格：嗯，有些人无论价格如何都会回购自己的股票。这不是我们的系统。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we think it’s — we think a lot of the share repurchases are idiotic.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们认为很多股票回购是愚蠢的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I was trying to say that more gently.
查理·芒格：我想说得更委婉一些。
WARREN BUFFETT: You’ve never done it before. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你从来没有这样做过。（笑声）
The — it’s — I mean, it’s for ego. I’ve been in a lot of board rooms where share repurchase authorizations have been voted, and I will guarantee you it’s not because the CEO is thinking the way we think at all.
这——我意思是，这出于自我满足。我在很多董事会上看到过回购授权的投票，我可以保证，这并不是因为CEO在想我们所想的。
They like buying their stock better at higher prices, and they like issuing options at lower prices. You know, it’s just exactly the opposite than the way we would think.
他们喜欢以更高的价格购买股票，而喜欢以更低的价格发行期权。你知道，这正好与我们想的相反。
We will only do it for one reason, and that’s to increase the per-share value the day after we’ve done it.
我们这样做只有一个原因，那就是在我们完成后第二天提高每股价值。
And if we get a chance to do that, we both, you know, in a big way, we’ll do it in a big way.
如果我们有机会做到这一点，我们都会在大规模上进行。
I don’t — strictly operating as a financial guy, I would hope we get a chance to do a lot of it. Operating as a fiduciary for hundreds of thousands of people, I don’t want to see them sell —
我不——严格来说，作为一个金融人士，我希望我们有机会做很多这方面的事情。作为数十万人的受托人，我不想看到他们出售——
CHARLIE MUNGER: We hope the opportunity never comes.
查理·芒格：我们希望这个机会永远不会到来。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But if it does, we’ll grab it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但如果它真的发生，我们会抓住机会。
11. U.S. banks are in better shape European banks
美国银行的状况比欧洲银行更好。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station two, shareholder?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二个站，股东？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr — Hi, Mr. Buffett. My name is Bernard Fura (PH) from Austria, Vienna.
观众成员：你好，巴菲特先生。我是来自奥地利维也纳的伯纳德·富拉。
My question is about banks. What’s your view on the European banks? What’s your view on the U.S. banks? And what must happen that you invest in European banks? Thank you.
我的问题是关于银行的。你对欧洲银行有什么看法？你对美国银行有什么看法？你认为发生什么事情才能让你投资于欧洲银行？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I have a decidedly different view on European banks than American banks.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对欧洲银行和美国银行的看法截然不同。
The American banks are in a far, far, far better position than they were three or four years ago. They’ve taken most of the abnormal losses that existed, or that were going to manifest themselves, in their portfolios from what’s now 3 1/2 or four years ago.
美国银行的状况比三四年前好得多。他们已经承担了大部分异常损失，这些损失在三年半或四年前的投资组合中存在或即将显现。
They’ve buttressed their capital in a very big way. They’ve got liquidity coming out their ears at the bigger banks. The American banking system is in fine shape.
他们以非常大的方式增强了他们的资本。大银行的流动性充足。美国银行系统状况良好。
The European banking system was gasping for air a few months back, which is why Mr. Draghi opened up his wallet at the ECB and came up with roughly a trillion euros of liquidity for those banks.
几个月前，欧洲银行系统喘不过气来，这就是为什么德拉吉先生在欧洲央行打开了他的钱包，为这些银行提供了大约一万亿欧元的流动性。
Now a trillion euros is about $1.3 trillion, and $1.3 trillion is about one-sixth of all the bank deposits in the United States.
现在一万亿欧元大约是 1.3 万亿美元，而 1.3 万亿美元大约是美国所有银行存款的六分之一。
I mean, it was a huge act by the European Central Bank, and it was designed to replace funding that was running off from European banks. European banks had more wholesale funding than American banks, on average.
我的意思是，这是欧洲中央银行的一项重大举措，旨在替代来自欧洲银行的资金流失。平均而言，欧洲银行的批发融资比美国银行更多。
If you look at the Bank of America or Wells Fargo, they get an enormous amount of money from a natural customer base. European banks tended to get much more of it on a wholesale basis, and that money can run pretty fast.
如果你看看美国银行或富国银行，他们从自然客户基础中获得了大量资金。欧洲银行往往更多地以批发方式获得资金，而这些资金可能会迅速流失。
So the European banks need more capital in many cases. They’ve done very little along that line.
因此，许多情况下，欧洲银行需要更多的资本。他们在这方面做得很少。
One Italian bank had a rights offering here three or four months ago, but basically they have not wanted to raise capital, probably because they didn’t like the prices at which they would have had to do so, and they were losing their funding base.
几个月前，有一家意大利银行进行了配股，但基本上他们不愿意增加资本，可能是因为他们不喜欢所需的价格，并且他们正在失去资金基础。
The problem on the funding base has been solved by the ECB because the ECB gave them this money for three years at 1 percent.
这个资金基础的问题已经被欧洲中央银行解决，因为欧洲中央银行以 1%的利率给他们提供了三年的资金。
I’d like to have a lot of money at three years at 1 percent, but I’m not in trouble, so I can’t get it. (Laughter)
我希望在三年内以 1%的利率拥有很多钱，但我没有麻烦，所以我无法得到它。（笑声）
But I just — if you look at our banking system, it’s really remarkable what’s been accomplished.
但是我只是——如果你看看我们的银行系统，所取得的成就真是令人瞩目。
I thought at the time that the Treasury and the Fed were maybe a little overdoing it when they brought those bankers to Washington and banged their heads together and said you’re going to take this money whether you like it or not.
我当时认为财政部和美联储可能有点过火，他们把那些银行家带到华盛顿，强迫他们接受这笔钱，不管他们喜不喜欢。
But overall, I think that policy was very sound for this country’s economy. And if some banks were forced to raise capital that they didn’t need, you know, which I might not have liked as a shareholder at one of them, overall, I think that our society benefited enormously.
但总体而言，我认为这一政策对这个国家的经济非常合理。如果一些银行被迫筹集它们并不需要的资本，虽然作为其中一家银行的股东我可能不太喜欢，但总体上，我认为我们的社会受益匪浅。
And I think the Fed and the Treasury has handled things quite sensibly during a period when if they hadn’t handled this sensibly, that our world today would be a lot different.
我认为美联储和财政部在一个时期内处理事情相当明智，如果他们没有明智地处理这些问题，我们今天的世界将会大不相同。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Europe has a lot of problems we don’t. We’ve got this full federal union, and the country that runs the central bank can print its own money and pay off its own debt and so on.
查理·芒格：是的。欧洲有很多我们没有的问题。我们有这个完整的联邦联盟，管理中央银行的国家可以印刷自己的货币，偿还自己的债务等等。
And in Europe, they don’t have a full federal union and that makes it very, very difficult to handle these stresses. So we’re more comfortable with the risk profile in the United States.
在欧洲，他们没有一个完整的联邦联盟，这使得处理这些压力变得非常非常困难。因此，我们对美国的风险状况感到更为舒适。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s night and day. I mean, it — in the fall of 2008, when essentially Bernanke and Paulson, and implicitly, the President of the United States, said we’ll do whatever it takes, you knew that they had the power, and the will, to do whatever it took.
沃伦·巴菲特：这简直是天壤之别。我的意思是，在2008年秋天，当伯南克、保尔森，隐含地还有美国总统说“我们会不惜一切代价”的时候，你知道他们有权力和意愿去做到这一点。
But when you get 17 countries that have surrendered their sovereignty, as far as their currency is concerned, you know, you have this problem. Henry Kissinger said it a long time ago. He said, “If I want to call Europe, what number do I dial?”
但是当你有 17 个国家在货币方面放弃了他们的主权时，你就会面临这个问题。亨利·基辛格很久以前就说过。他说：“如果我想打电话给欧洲，我该拨哪个号码？”
You know, and when you have 17 countries and — just imagine if we’d had 17 states in 2008, and we had to have the governors of those states all go to Washington and agree on a course of action when money market funds were — there was a panic in there, the panic in commercial paper, you name it — we would have had a different outcome.
你知道，如果我们在 2008 年有 17 个州，想象一下那些州的州长都必须去华盛顿达成一致的行动方案，当货币市场基金出现恐慌，商业票据也出现恐慌时，你可以想象——结果会是不同的。
So I would put European banks and American banks in two very different categories.
所以我会将欧洲银行和美国银行分为两个非常不同的类别。
12. Munger: “Idiotic” to use natural gas instead of coal
芒格：“用天然气代替煤炭是‘愚蠢的’”
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you Warren. This question comes from a shareholder who works at a coal mining company and he asked the following:
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。这个问题来自一位在煤矿公司工作的股东，他问了以下问题：
“Burlington Northern and MidAmerican are two key links in a critical supply chain. Can you describe your views on coal and natural gas investments, and can you discuss how the current low-price environments impact the prospect for each of these businesses?
“伯灵顿北方铁路和中美能源是一个关键供应链中的两个重要环节。您能描述一下您对煤炭和天然气投资的看法吗？您能讨论一下当前低价环境如何影响这些业务的前景吗？”
“You seem to have created an elegant hedge. As Burlington Northern suffers from the decline in coal, MidAmerican may benefit from the fire sale in its fuel sources.”
“您似乎创建了一个优雅的对冲。由于伯灵顿北方铁路受到煤炭下滑的影响，美洲能源可能会从燃料价格暴跌中受益。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, MidAmerican will never really benefit or be penalized too much by the price of coal, because if coal is cheap, the benefit is going to be passed on to customers, and if it’s expensive, the costs are going to be passed on.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，MidAmerican公司永远不会因为煤炭价格而受到太大的好处或惩罚，因为如果煤炭便宜，收益将会转嫁给客户；如果煤炭昂贵，成本也会转嫁。
You know, MidAmerican really is a — it’s a regulated public utility. It has several — we have two MidAmericans. We have a MidAmerican Holding and a MidAmerican that operates in Iowa, then we have utilities on the West Coast.
你知道，MidAmerican 确实是一个——它是一个受监管的公共事业公司。它有几个——我们有两个 MidAmerican。我们有一个 MidAmerican 控股公司和一个在爱荷华州运营的 MidAmerican，然后我们在西海岸还有一些公用事业公司。
But those utilities are pass-through organizations. They need to be operated efficiently in order to achieve their rate of return, but if they are operated efficiently and in the public interest, whether coal or labor, whatever it is, may go up or down, really doesn’t affect them, although it affects their customers.
但这些公用事业公司是传递性组织。他们需要高效运营以实现投资回报，但只要他们高效地为公众利益服务，无论是煤炭还是劳动力，价格的涨跌实际上对他们没有影响，尽管会影响他们的客户。
Coal traffic is important to all railroads in the United States, and coal traffic is down this year.
煤炭运输对美国所有铁路都很重要，而今年煤炭运输量下降。
This may interest you. This year, in the first quarter, kilowatt hours used in the United States went down 4 percent — 4.7 percent. That is a remarkable decrease in electricity usage, 4.7 percent, and that affected, of course, the demand for coal.
这可能会引起你的兴趣。今年第一季度，美国的用电量下降了 4.7%。这是电力使用的显著减少，4.7%，这当然影响了对煤炭的需求。
But the other thing that’s happening, as you mentioned, natural gas got down under $2 — it’s a little higher now — but it got down under $2 at the same time oil was $100.
但你提到的另一件事是，天然气价格跌到了 2 美元以下——现在稍微高了一些——但在油价为 100 美元的时候，天然气价格也跌到了 2 美元以下。
And if you told Charlie or me five years ago that you’d have a 50-to-1 ratio between oil and natural gas, I think we would have asked you what you were drinking.
如果你告诉查理或我五年前，天然气与石油之间的比率会是50比1，我想我们会问你喝了什么。
Did you ever think that was possible, Charlie?
你有没有想过这是可能的，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. And I think what’s happening now is, to use your word, it’s idiotic.
查理·芒格：不。我认为现在发生的事情，用你的话来说，是愚蠢的。
We are using up a precious resource, which we need to create fertilizer and so forth, and sparing a resource which is precious but not as precious, which is thermal coal.
我们正在消耗一种宝贵的资源，这种资源是我们制造肥料等所需的，同时我们在节省一种虽然珍贵但不那么珍贵的资源，即热煤。
If I were running the United States, I would use up every ounce of thermal coal before I’d touch a drop of natural gas. But that’s — conventional view is exactly the opposite. I think those natural gas reserves we just found are the most precious things we could leave our descendants.
如果我在管理美国，我会在使用一滴天然气之前耗尽每一盎司的热煤。但这——传统观点正好相反。我认为我们刚刚发现的天然气储备是我们可以留给后代的最宝贵的东西。
I’m in no hurry to use it up, and the gas is worth more than the coal.
我并不急于用完它，汽油比煤炭更值钱。
WARREN BUFFETT: Despite the wild things we’ve seen in pricing, particularly this ratio of natural gas prices to oil, you can’t change — I mean the installed base is so huge when you get into electricity generation — that you can’t really change the percentages too much, although there has been a shift in recent months.
沃伦·巴菲特：尽管我们在价格方面看到了一些疯狂的事情，特别是天然气价格与石油的比率，但你无法改变——我的意思是，电力生产的装机容量是如此庞大——你实际上无法改变百分比太多，尽管最近几个月确实发生了一些变化。
Where gas generation is feasible, it has supplanted some coal generation. And certainly in the future, you’re going to see a diminution in the percentage of electricity generated from coal in this country.
在可行的情况下，天然气发电已经取代了一部分煤炭发电。可以肯定的是，在未来，你会看到这个国家中来自煤炭的电力生成比例减少。
But it won’t be dramatic because it can’t be dramatic. You just can’t — the megawatts involved are just too huge to have some wholesale change.
但这不会很戏剧化，因为它无法戏剧化。你就是不能——涉及的兆瓦数太大，无法发生一些彻底的变化。
It’s going to be very interesting to see how this whole gas-oil ratio plays out, because it has changed everyone’s thinking, and it’s changed in a very short period of time. I mean, three years ago, people wouldn’t have said this was possible.
这整个气油比的变化将会非常有趣，因为它改变了每个人的思维，而且在很短的时间内发生了变化。我的意思是，三年前，人们不会认为这是可能的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The conventional wisdom of the economics professors is if it happens in a free market it must be OK. It will work out best in the end.
查理·芒格：是的。经济学教授的传统观点是，如果在自由市场中发生，那一定是好的。最终会有最好的结果。
That is not my view with 100 percent accuracy. I think there are exceptions to that idea. And I think it’s crazy to use up natural gas at these prices.
这并不是我百分之百的看法。我认为这个观点有例外。而且我认为在这样的价格下使用天然气是疯狂的。
13. GEICO has no plans to use driver tracking technology
GEICO 没有计划使用驾驶员追踪技术。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary Ransom of Dowling.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。道林的加里·兰索姆。
GARY RANSOM: Telematics is the latest pricing technology in the auto insurance business whereby you put a little device in your car and you can either get a discount or some other determination of your pricing based on actual driving behavior.
加里·兰索姆：远程信息处理是汽车保险行业最新的定价技术，您可以在车内放置一个小设备，根据实际驾驶行为获得折扣或其他定价决定。
What is GEICO doing to keep pace with that change, and are there any other initiatives that GEICO has in place to maintain its competitive advantages in pricing?
GEICO 正在做些什么来跟上这种变化？GEICO 还有其他哪些举措来维持其在定价方面的竞争优势？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Progressive, as you know, has probably been the leader in what you just described. And we have not done that at GEICO, but it — if we think there becomes a superior way to evaluate the likelihood of anybody having an accident, you know, I think we have 50 — I think you have to answer 51 questions — which is more than I would like, if you go to our website to get a quote.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。正如你所知道的，Progressive 可能在你刚才描述的方面处于领先地位。而我们在 GEICO 并没有这样做，但如果我们认为有更好的方法来评估任何人发生事故的可能性，你知道，我想我们有 50 个——我认为你必须回答 51 个问题——这比我希望的要多，如果你去我们的网站获取报价。
And every one of those is designed to evaluate your propensity to get in an accident.
每一个都是为了评估你发生事故的倾向而设计的。
Obviously, if you could you could ride around in a car with somebody for six months, you might learn quite a bit about the propensity, particularly if they didn’t know you were there, you know, like with your 16-year-old son.
显然，如果你能在车里跟随某人六个月，你可能会了解他们的倾向，特别是如果他们不知道你在旁边，比如说你的16岁儿子。
But I do not see that as being a major change, but if it becomes something that gives you better predictive value about the propensity of any given individual to have an accident, we will take it on, you know, and we will try to get rid of the things that don’t really tell us that much all the time.
但我不认为这会是一个重大变化，但如果它能更好地预测任何个体发生事故的倾向，我们会接受它，你知道的，我们会努力去除那些并不总是告诉我们太多的信息。
指噪音。
But we’re always looking for more things that will tell us if we look around at these — the people in this room, one by one, you know — what tells us their likelihood of having an accident in the next year.
但我们总是在寻找更多的东西来告诉我们，如果我们环顾四周——这个房间里的每一个人，你知道——什么能告诉我们他们在下一年发生事故的可能性。
We know that youth is, for example. I mean, there is no question that a 16-year-old male is much more likely to have an accident than some guy like me that drives 3500 miles a year and is not trying to impress a girl when he does it, you know. (Laughter)
我们知道，年轻就是这样。例如，我的意思是，毫无疑问，一个 16 岁的男孩发生事故的可能性要比像我这样每年只开 3500 英里并且开车时不想给女孩留下深刻印象的人高得多，你知道的。（笑声）
So, you know, that one is pretty obvious. Some of these others — some things are very good predictors that you wouldn’t necessarily expect to be. Credit scores are, but — and they’re not allowed in all places — but they will tell you a lot about driving habits.
所以，这一点很明显。而其他一些因素——有些很好的预测因素是你可能不太会想到的。信用评分就是其中之一，但并不是所有地方都允许使用，但它们能告诉你很多关于驾驶习惯的信息。
We’ll keep looking at anything, but I do not see any — I don’t see in this new experiment — anything that threatens GEICO in any way. GEICO, in the first quarter of the year — now the first quarter is our best quarter — but we added a very significant number of policies.
我们会继续关注任何事情，但我在这个新实验中没有看到任何威胁到 GEICO 的东西。GEICO 在今年第一季度——现在第一季度是我们最好的季度——但我们增加了非常显著的保单数量。
I forget what the exact number was, but February turns out to be the best month for some reason. We were up there getting pretty close to 300,000 policies.
我忘了确切的数字是什么，但二月份出于某种原因似乎是最好的月份。我们接近 300,000 份保单。
So our marketing is working extremely well, and our risk selection is working extremely well, and our retention is working well. So GEICO is quite a machine.
所以我们的营销运作非常顺利，我们的风险选择运作也非常顺利，我们的客户留存情况也很好。因此，GEICO 就像一台机器。
That’s one of the — that’s the business that we carry, as I’ve mentioned in the past — I think we carry it at a billion dollars — roughly a billion dollars over its tangible book value. You know, it’s worth a whole lot more than that.
这就是我们所经营的业务之一，正如我之前提到的——我认为我们在其有形账面价值上大约有十亿美元——大约十亿美元。你知道，它的价值远远超过这个。
I mean, based on the price we paid, that figure would come up these days to, you know, certainly something more like $15 billion more than carrying value.
我指的是，根据我们支付的价格，这个数字现在肯定会比账面价值高出大约 150 亿美元。
And we wouldn’t sell it there. We wouldn’t sell it at all, but that would not tempt us in the least.
而我们不会在那里出售它。我们根本不会出售它，但这不会对我们造成任何诱惑。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。
14. Business schools are improving but still teach “nonsense”
商学院正在改善，但仍然教授“无稽之谈”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie and Warren. My name is Chris Reese. I’m here with a group of MBA students from the University of Virginia in Charlottesville.
观众成员：嗨，查理和沃伦。我叫克里斯·里斯。我和一群来自弗吉尼亚大学的 MBA 学生在这里，学校位于夏洛茨维尔。
In recent years, business schools have taken a lot of blame for some of the recent state of the economy.
近年来，商学院因近期经济状况不佳而受到很多指责。
What would you suggest to change the way that business leaders are trained in our country?
您会建议如何改变我们国家商业领袖的培训方式？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn’t — I don’t know. Charlie, I wouldn’t blame business schools particularly for most of the ills — would you?
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不知道。查理，我不会特别指责商学院造成大多数问题——你会吗？
I think they’ve taught to students a lot of nonsense about investments, but I don’t think that’s been the cause of great societal problems. What do you think?
我认为他们教给学生很多关于投资的胡说八道，但我不认为这造成了重大的社会问题。你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but it was a considerable sin. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，但这确实是一个相当大的罪过。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you want to elaborate on what was the more sin —
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，你想详细说明一下更罪恶的是什么——
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no. I think business school education is improving. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，不。我认为商学院的教育正在改善。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Is the implication from a low base or —
沃伦·巴菲特：这是否意味着从一个低基数开始，还是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’d agree with that. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我同意这一点。（笑声）
No, in investing, I would say that probably the silliest stuff that we’ve seen taught at major business schools probably has been — maybe it’s because it’s the area that we operate in — but has been in the investment area.
不，我想在投资方面，我们在主要商学院看到的最愚蠢的东西可能就是——也许是因为这是我们所处的领域——但确实是在投资领域。
I mean, it is astounding to me how the schools have focused on sort of one fad after another in finance theory, and it’s usually been very mathematically based.
我觉得，学校在金融理论上关注一种又一种潮流，这让我感到惊讶，而这些潮流通常都是非常数学化的。
When it’s become very popular, it’s almost impossible to resist if you’re — if you hope to make progress in faculty advancement.
当它变得非常流行时，如果你希望在教职晋升上取得进展，几乎不可能抵挡住。
Going against the revealed wisdom of your elders can be very dangerous to your career path at major business schools.
违背长辈的智慧可能会对你在顶尖商学院的职业道路造成很大的危险。
And you know, really, investing is not that complicated. I would have — you know, a couple of the courses. I would have a course on how to value a business, and I would have a course on how to think about markets.
你知道，实际上，投资并没有那么复杂。我会有——你知道的，几门课程。我会有一门关于如何评估企业的课程，还有一门关于如何看待市场的课程。
And I think if people grasped the basic principles in those two courses that they would be far better off than if they were exposed to a lot of things like modern portfolio theory or option pricing. Who needs option pricing to be in an investment business?
我认为，如果人们掌握了这两门课程的基本原则，他们的处境会比接触现代投资组合理论或期权定价等许多内容要好得多。谁需要期权定价才能进入投资行业呢？
You know, when people — you know, when Ray Kroc started McDonald’s, I mean, he was not thinking about the option value of what the McDonald’s stock might be or something. He was thinking about whether people would buy hamburgers, you know, and what would cause them to come in, and how to make those fries different than other people’s, and that sort of thing.
你知道，当人们——你知道，当雷·克罗克创办麦当劳时，我的意思是，他并没有考虑麦当劳股票的期权价值或其他什么。他在想的是人们是否会买汉堡包，你知道，是什么原因让他们进来，以及如何让那些薯条与其他人的不同，诸如此类的事情。
It’s totally drifted away — the teaching of investments.
投资的教学完全偏离了方向。
I look at the books that are used, sometimes, and there’s really nothing in there about valuing businesses, and that’s what investing is all about.
我有时会看看那些使用过的书，里面真的没有关于评估企业的内容，而这正是投资的核心所在。
If you buy businesses for less than they’re worth, you’re going to make money.
如果你以低于其价值的价格购买企业，你就会赚钱。
And if you know the difference between the businesses that you can value and the ones that you can’t value, you know, which is key, you’re going to make money.
如果你知道可以评估的企业和无法评估的企业之间的区别，你就会知道，这一点至关重要，你将会赚钱。
But they’ve tried to make it a lot more difficult and, of course, that’s what the high priests in any particular arena do. They have to convince the laity that the priests have to be listened to.
但他们试图把事情弄得更加复杂，当然，这就是任何特定领域的高僧所做的。他们必须让大众相信，必须倾听这些高僧的声音。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: The folly creeps into the accounting, too. A very long-term option on a big business you understand — the stock of a big business that you understand — or even a stock market index — should not be — the optimal way to price it is not by using Black Scholes, and yet the accounting profession does that.
查理·芒格：愚蠢也渗透到会计中。对于你理解的大型企业的长期期权——或者甚至是股票市场指数——最优定价方式并不是使用布莱克-斯科尔斯模型，但会计行业却这样做。
They want some kind of a standardized solution that requires them not to think too hard, and they have one. (Laughter)
他们想要某种标准化的解决方案，这样他们就不需要思考太多，而他们确实有一个。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there anybody we’ve forgotten to offend? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：还有谁是我们忘记冒犯的？（笑声）
If you’ll send a note up. (Laughs)
如果你有请记得告诉我们。（笑声）
15. Buffett Rule: minimum tax for “very, very high earners”
巴菲特规则：对“非常非常高收入者”的最低税率
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？
CAROL LOOMIS: Well, talking about not offending, “The talk of the “Buffett Rule” is all over newspapers and TV.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：嗯，谈到不冒犯，“巴菲特规则”的讨论在报纸和电视上随处可见。
“But I believe your concept of what should happen to taxation of very high earners is different from what is now promulgated as the ‘Buffett Rule.’
“但我相信你对非常高收入者的税收应该如何处理的概念与现在所宣传的‘巴菲特规则’是不同的。”
“Could you clear us up on this?” This is a question from Leo Slazeman (PH) from the Kansas City metropolitan area.
“您能帮我们澄清一下这个吗？”这是来自堪萨斯城大都市区的利奥·斯拉泽曼（PH）提出的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say this: it has gotten used in different ways.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想说的是：它已经以不同的方式被使用。
I think, intentionally, in some cases, because it was more fun to attack something that I hadn’t said than try to attack what I had said.
我认为，在某些情况下，故意地，因为攻击我没有说过的事情比攻击我说过的事情更有趣。
Basically the proposal is that people that make very large incomes pay a rate that is commensurate with what people think is paid by people of those incomes.
基本上，这个提案是指高收入者支付的税率应与人们认为那些收入水平应支付的税率相一致。
I mean, I think most people believe, when they look at the tax rates and all that, that if you’re making 30 or 40 or $50 million a year, that you’re probably paying tax rates in the 30 percent area, at least. And many people are.
我想，大多数人认为，当他们看到税率和所有这些时，如果你每年赚 3000 万、4000 万或 5000 万美元，你可能至少要支付 30%的税率。而且很多人确实是这样。
But the figures are such that if you look at the most recent year, and you aggregate both payroll and income taxes, because they both go to the federal government on your behalf, if you take the 400 largest incomes in the United States, they average $270 million each.
但数据表明，如果你查看最近的一年，并将工资税和所得税汇总，因为这两者都是代表你支付给联邦政府的，如果你考虑美国收入最高的 400 个家庭，他们的平均收入为每个 2.7 亿美元。
That’s per person, 270 million each. 131 of those 400 paid tax rates that were below 15 percent. Now — counting payroll taxes, too.
每人 2.7亿，400 人中有 131 人缴纳的税率低于 15%。现在——也算上工资税。
In other words, they were paying at less than what the standard payroll tax was — up till we’ve had this giveback here recently — but payroll tax was 15.3 percent for most of the last decade.
换句话说，他们的税率低于标准工资税——直到我们最近的这次调整之前，工资税在过去十年中大部分时间是15.3%。
So, under the “Buffett Rule,” we would have a minimum tax — only for these very, very high earners — that, essentially, would restore their rate to what it used to be back in 1992.
因此，根据“巴菲特规则”，我们将对这些非常高收入者征收最低税 — 这基本上会将他们的税率恢复到 1992 年的水平。
When the average income of the top 400 was only 45 million, there were only 16 of the 400 that were at 15 percent or below. But now there’s 131.
当时，前400名的平均收入只有4500万美元，而在400名中仅有16人税率在15%或以下。但现在有131人。
There’s still plenty of them that are paying in the 30s. I wouldn’t touch them.
当然，仍有很多人支付的税率在30%左右。我不会去触碰他们。
But I would say when we’re asking for shared sacrifice from the American public, when we’re telling people that we formally told — were given promises on Social Security and Medicare and various things — and we’re telling them we’re sorry but we kind of overpromised so we’re going to have to cut back a little, I would at least make sure that the people with these huge incomes get taxed at a rate that is commensurate with the way they used to be taxed not that long ago and probably — and is commensurate also with the way that two-thirds of the people in that area get taxed at higher rates.
但我会说，当我们要求美国公众共同承担牺牲时，当我们告诉人们，我们曾经给出的关于社会保障和医疗保险的承诺——并且告诉他们很抱歉，我们可能承诺过多，所以我们需要稍微削减一下——我至少希望确保这些高收入者的税率与不久前他们的税率相符，并且与这一领域中三分之二的人所承担的更高税率相一致。
So it’s gotten butchered a little bit, but it would affect very, very, very few people. It would raise a lot of money. (Applause)
所以这有点被搞砸了，但这会影响到非常非常少的人。它会筹集很多资金。（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, isn’t the suggestion that you can give about half of a 30 percent to charity instead of the government?
查理·芒格：沃伦，难道不是说你可以把 30%的一半捐给慈善机构而不是政府吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, but the tax rates, still, after the charitable deduction, after the charitable deduction, you have to give — if you’re going to give 50 percent and get a deduction — it has to be all cash. If you start giving appreciated securities —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但税率仍然在慈善捐款后——如果您要捐赠50%并获得扣除，那么必须是全现金。如果您开始捐赠增值证券——
And then if you give to a private foundation, you’re down to 20 percent. Yeah. But —
然后，如果你捐给一个私人基金会，你的比例就降到 20%。是的。但是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: But there is some exception in this proposal now isn’t it — Obama’s proposal — that charitable contributions help you?
查理·芒格：但是在这个提案中确实有一些例外，不是吗——奥巴马的提案——慈善捐款对你有帮助？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there is a — there’s a bill, actually, by Senator [Sheldon] Whitehouse of Rhode Island. I mean, that is the only actual bill. That was voted on, and it did not get the vote. It got 51 votes in the Senate and needed 60. I can’t tell you the exact precision on what it included there.
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，罗德岛的谢尔顿·怀特豪斯参议员提出了一项法案。我是说，这就是唯一的一项实际法案。它已经投票，但没有通过。它在参议院得到了 51 票，而需要 60 票。我不能告诉你它具体包含了什么。
I don’t have any — you know, there can be all kinds of other ways of getting at the same proposition. I just think that people like me that have huge incomes — and I have no tax planning, I don’t have any gimmicks, I don’t have Swiss bank accounts, I don’t have any of that kind of stuff.
我没有任何——你知道，可以有各种其他方式来达到同样的主张。我只是认为像我这样有高收入的人——我没有税务规划，我没有任何花招，我没有瑞士银行账户，我没有任何那种东西。
But when I get all through, you know, I’ve made the calculation four different — three different times — 2004, 2006, and 2010 — and in all three of those years, when my income was anywhere from 25 to 65 or so million, I came in with the lowest tax rate in our office. And we had maybe 15 to 22 or so people in the office at different times, and everybody in the office was surprised.
但是当我算完的时候，你知道，我在四个不同的时间——2004 年、2006 年和 2010 年——进行了三次不同的计算，在这三年中，当我的收入在 2500 万到 6500 万之间时，我的税率是我们办公室最低的。我们办公室在不同时间大约有 15 到 22 个人，办公室里的每个人都感到惊讶。
They were all in the 30s. And I was, several times, you know, in this area of 17 percent, and that’s because the tax law has gotten moved over the years in a way to favor people that make huge amounts of money.
他们都在 30 多岁。我曾多次处于 17%的税率区间，这因为税法多年来的变化使得高收入者受益。
Imagine having 270 million of income and there were — I believe there were — 31 of the 400 that were below 10 percent on tax rates, and that counts payroll taxes as well.
想象一下拥有 2.7 亿的收入，而在 400 人中——我相信有——31 人的税率低于 10%，这还包括工资税。
And like I say, you know, my cleaning lady — incidentally, I’ve been asked to explain — I keep talking about my cleaning lady.
就像我说的，我的清洁工——顺便说一下，我被要求解释——我一直在谈论我的清洁工。
Well, my wife wants it very clear, she doesn’t have a cleaning lady. This is the cleaning lady at the office, Mary that I — (laughter) — my wife has gotten very — she does not have a cook, she does not have a cleaning lady, and she got a little tired of me implying that she had one.
好吧，我妻子想要非常明确，她没有清洁工。这是办公室的清洁工，玛丽，我——（笑）——我妻子变得非常——她没有厨师，她没有清洁工，她有点厌倦我暗示她有一个。
So it’s my cleaning lady at the office has been paying 15.3 percent on Social Security taxes, at the same time that an appreciable number of people making hundreds of millions of dollars a year are paying less than 10 percent.
所以我办公室的清洁工一直在缴纳 15.3%的社会保障税，而与此同时，许多年收入数亿的人却缴纳不到 10%。
I think it’s time to take a look at that. OK — (applause)
我认为是时候看看那个了。好的——（掌声）
16. Catastrophe insurance: “nobody knows for sure what the right rate is”
灾难保险：“没有人确切知道正确的费率是多少”
WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff. 沃伦·巴菲特：悬崖。
CLIFF GALLANT: Over the past two years, the world has witnessed a number of surprisingly large financial losses from major catastrophes, including earthquakes in Chile, and Japan, New Zealand, as well as floods in Thailand.
克利夫·加朗特：在过去两年中，世界目睹了多起意外巨大的财务损失，主要来自于灾难，包括智利、日本、新西兰的地震，以及泰国的洪水。
Near term, what do you expect the impact on reinsurance pricing will be for catastrophe risk? And longer term, does this trend of increased frequency of major catastrophes affect Berkshire’s view on the global reinsurance business?
短期内，您预计灾难风险对再保险定价的影响是什么？而从长远来看，重大灾难频率增加的趋势是否会影响伯克希尔对全球再保险业务的看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s very hard, because of the random nature of quakes and hurricanes and that sort of thing, very hard to know when you really have had a trend.
沃伦·巴菲特：这非常困难，因为地震、飓风等自然现象的随机性，很难知道何时真正出现了趋势。
We’ve had that situation with global warming. I mean, it has been ungodly warm here in the last few months. A few years ago, it was extremely cold.
我们在全球变暖的问题上经历过这样的情况。我的意思是，过去几个月这里的天气异常温暖。几年前，这里非常寒冷。
Anything that moves as slowly as the things affecting our globe, separating out the random from new trends is really — is not easy to do.
影响我们星球的任何因素变化缓慢，要将随机性与新趋势分开，真的不容易。
We tend to sort of assume the worst. I mean, if we see more earthquakes in New Zealand than have existed, you know, in the last few years than existed over the last 100 years, we don’t say that we’ll extrapolate the last couple of years and say that’s going to be the case, this huge explosion of quakes. But we also don’t take the 100-year figure anymore.
我们往往倾向于假设最坏的情况。如果我们看到新西兰的地震发生频率在过去几年中超过过去100年的水平，我们不会简单地外推这几年发生的情况，认为未来会有大量的地震。但我们也不再参考100年的数据。
We have written — in the last few months — we have written far more business in Asia, and by that I mean New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and Thailand.
在过去几个月中，我们在亚洲——包括新西兰、澳大利亚、日本和泰国——承保了更多的业务。
We’ve written quite a bit more — a lot more business — than we wrote a year ago, or two years ago, or three years ago, because they’ve had some huge losses, and they have found that the rates they had been using were really inadequate. And they are looking for large amounts of capacity in some cases, and we are there to do that if we think the rate is right.
我们写的业务量比一年前、两年前或三年前多得多，因为他们遭遇了巨大的损失，发现之前的费率实在不够。他们在某些情况下寻求大量的承保能力，如果我们认为价格合适，我们会满足他们的需求。
But nobody knows for sure what the right rate is.
但没有人确切知道正确的费率是多少。
I mean, we can tell you how many 6.0 or greater quakes have happened in California in the last hundred years and how many Category 3 hurricanes have hit, you know, both sides of Florida, whatever.
我们可以告诉你过去100年内加州发生了多少次6.0级以上的地震，以及佛罗里达两岸遭受了多少次3级飓风。
There’s all kinds of data available on that, but the question is, how much does it tell you about the next 50 years?
关于这一点有各种数据可供参考，但问题是，这些数据能告诉你未来 50 年多少信息？
And so we — if we think we’re getting a rate that — if a fairly negative hypothesis would indicate — then we move ahead, and we’ve done that in the Pacific.
因此，如果我们认为得出的费率符合较为负面的假设，我们就会推进，我们在太平洋地区已经这样做。
I don’t know whether you know it, but if you — last year, we had two or three quakes in Christchurch, New Zealand, but I believe it was — the second one caused, like, $12 billion of insured damage.
我不知道你是否知道，但去年我们在新西兰克赖斯特彻奇发生了两三次地震，第二次造成了大约120亿美元的保险损失。
And if you think of that in relationship of a country of 4 or 5 million and you compare that to the kind of cats we’ve had in the United States, that’s ten Katrinas. You know, there’s been some really severe —
如果你把这个与一个拥有 400 万或 500 万人口的国家进行比较，再与我们在美国经历过的那种灾难相比，那就是十次卡特里娜。你知道，确实发生了一些非常严重的——
And Thailand was the same way with the floods.
泰国的洪水情况也是如此。
It was — the losses were just huge in respect to the entire premium volume in the country.
损失在整个国家的保费收入中占比巨大。
So when that happens, everybody reevaluates the situation, and we are perfectly willing to take on very big limits if we think we’re getting the right price.
所以当这种情况发生时，所有人都会重新评估情况，我们非常愿意承担非常高的风险限额，如果我们认为价格合适。
We have propositions out for as much as 10 billion of coverage, you know. Now, we don’t want that 10 billion to correlate with anything else, and we want to be sure we get the right price. But — and we may write some at some point.
我们已经为高达100亿美元的保险额度提交了申请。现在，我们希望这100亿美元与其他业务无关，并确保我们获得合适的价格。但是——我们可能在某个时候会承保。
It’s certainly — the market for cat business in some parts of the world is significantly better from our standpoint than it was a year or two ago, but that’s not true every place.
显然，在某些地区，自然灾害保险市场的状况对我们来说比一两年前要好得多，但并不是所有地方都如此。
17. Wind power wouldn’t “make sense” without subsidies
风能在没有补贴的情况下“没有意义”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 4 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Verne Fishenberry (PH), and I ask this question on behalf of a group of investors that made the trip up from Overland Park, Kansas.
观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫维恩·费申贝里，我代表一群从堪萨斯州奥弗兰公园赶来的投资者提问。
MidAmerican has a large investment in wind and solar power. What effect do subsidies and incentives have on that business, and could you share your thoughts on a sustainable energy policy?
MidAmerican 在风能和太阳能方面有大量投资。补贴和激励对该业务有什么影响？您能分享一下您对可持续能源政策的看法吗？
I gather we should be conserving our natural gas. What is the most appropriate use of that resource?
我认为我们应该节约天然气。最合适的使用方式是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I believe the — on wind — and we’re much bigger in wind than solar, although we’ve entered solar in the last six months or so. We’ve got two solar projects that we own about a half of each one of them.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我相信——在风能方面——我们在风能方面的投资远大于太阳能，尽管我们在过去六个月左右开始进入太阳能领域。我们有两个太阳能项目，每个项目我们大约拥有一半的股份。
But we’ve been doing wind for quite a while, and I think the subsidy is 2.2 cents for ten years per kilowatt hour, and that’s a federal subsidy.
但我们已经做风能很长时间了，我认为补贴是每千瓦时 2.2 美分，持续十年，这是联邦补贴。
And there’s no question that that makes wind projects — in areas where the wind blows fairly often — that makes wind projects work, whereas they wouldn’t work without that subsidy. The math just wouldn’t work out.
毫无疑问，这使得风能项目在风力较为频繁的地区得以运作，而没有补贴的话，这些项目是无法运作的。数学上根本无法成立。
So the government, by putting in that 2.2 cents subsidy, has encouraged a lot of wind development. And I think if there had been none, my guess is there would have been no wind development. I don’t think any of our projects would make sense without that subsidy.
因此，政府通过提供 2.2 美分的补贴，鼓励了大量的风能开发。我认为如果没有这个补贴，我猜测就不会有风能开发。我认为我们的任何项目在没有这个补贴的情况下都没有意义。
In the case of solar, the projects we have have got a commitment from Pacific Gas and Electric to a very long-term purchase commitment.
在太阳能方面，我们的项目已经得到了太平洋煤气电力公司长期采购承诺。
How that ties in with their particular obligations or anything, I mean, there may be some subsidy involved in why they wish to buy it at the price they do from us. I’m sure there is; I don’t know the specifics of it.
关于他们具体的义务或其他方面，我相信他们希望以我们所提供的价格购买其中可能涉及一些补贴。我确信有；但我不知道具体情况。
But neither one of those projects, neither solar nor wind — if Greg Abel is here and wants to go over to a microphone and correct me on this, it would be fine — but I don’t think any solar or wind would be working without subsidy.
但这两个项目，无论是太阳能还是风能——如果格雷格·阿贝尔在这里，想要走到麦克风前纠正我，这也没问题——但我认为没有补贴，太阳能或风能都无法运作。
And, of course, you can’t count on wind for your base load. I mean, it works and it’s clean, but if the wind isn’t blowing, you know, it does not mean that everybody wants to have their lights off.
当然，你不能依靠风能来满足基础负荷。我的意思是，它有效且清洁，但如果风不吹，这并不意味着每个人都想关掉灯。
So it’s a supplementary type of generation, but it can’t be part of your base generation.
所以这是一种补充性的发电方式，但不能作为你的基础发电方式。
Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that? And Greg, do we have Greg up here? Go ahead, Charlie.
查理，你对此有什么想法吗？格雷格，我们有格雷格在这里吗？请继续，查理。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think, of course, it — eventually we’re going to have to take a lot of power from these renewable sources and, of course, we’re going to have to help the process along with subsidies.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为，当然，最终我们将不得不从这些可再生能源中获取大量电力，当然，我们还需要通过补贴来帮助这个过程。
You know, I think it’s very wise that that’s what the various governments are doing.
你知道，我认为各国政府这样做是非常明智的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you could say the future is subsidizing, you know, oil and natural gas now, in a sense.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你可以说未来在某种意义上是在补贴石油和天然气。
Is Greg up there? 格雷格在那儿吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: He needs a mic.
查理·芒格：他需要一个麦克风。
WARREN BUFFETT: He needs a mic.
沃伦·巴菲特：他需要一个麦克风。
GREG ABEL: Zone 7. Yeah.
格雷格·阿贝尔：第 7 区。是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
GREG ABEL: Just to touch on the — both the wind projects and the solar, Warren, you were exactly right. Obviously the subsidy associated with the wind has allowed us to build, now, 3,000 megawatts across our two utilities.
格雷格·阿贝尔：关于风能项目和太阳能项目，沃伦，你说得完全正确。显然，风能相关的补贴使我们能够在两家公用事业公司中建设 3000 兆瓦的电力。
And you are absolutely correct, we would have not moved forward without that type of subsidy.
你说得完全正确，如果没有那种补贴，我们是绝对不会向前推进的。
On the solar, there’s actually a couple other incentives that are in place. You get a very large incentive associated with constructing the assets.
在太阳能方面，实际上还有其他一些激励措施。与建设资产相关的激励非常丰厚。
We get — we recover 30 percent of the construction costs as we build it.
我们在建造过程中回收 30%的建设成本。
Significant advantage there, relative to Berkshire being a full taxpayer, where a lot of other entities in the U.S. are not — or the corporate entities that are competing for those projects relative to ourselves often don’t have the tax appetite for those type of assets.
相对于伯克希尔作为一个完整纳税人来说，这在很大程度上是一个显著的优势，因为美国许多其他实体并没有——或者竞争这些项目的公司通常没有足够的税负来承担这些资产。
So we do benefit from the ongoing tax structure, there’s no question, both in wind and in solar.
所以我们确实从持续的税收结构中受益，毫无疑问，无论是在风能还是太阳能方面。
WARREN BUFFETT: Greg has hit on a point that people don’t — often don’t — understand about Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格提到了一个人们常常不了解的关于伯克希尔的观点。
We have a distinct competitive advantage. It’s not unique, but it’s a distinct competitive advantage in that Berkshire pays lots of federal income tax.
我们拥有明显的竞争优势。这并不独特，但它是一个明显的竞争优势，因为伯克希尔支付了大量的联邦所得税。
So when there are programs in the energy field, for example, that involve tax credits, we can use them because we have a lot of taxes that we’re going to pay, and therefore, we get a dollar-for-dollar benefit.
所以当能源领域有涉及税收抵免的项目时，我们可以利用这些项目，因为我们将要支付很多税款，因此我们可以获得一对一的收益。
I don’t have the figures, but I would guess that perhaps 80 percent of the utilities in the United States cannot reap the full tax benefits, or maybe any tax benefits, from doing the things that we just talked about because they don’t pay any federal income taxes.
我没有具体数据，但我猜测美国大约有 80%的公用事业公司无法从我们刚才讨论的事情中获得全部税收优惠，甚至可能根本无法获得任何税收优惠，因为它们不支付任何联邦所得税。
They’ve used bonus depreciation, which was enacted last year and where you get 100 percent write-off in the first year. They wipe out their taxable income.
他们利用了去年通过的超额折旧法案，可以在第一年获得100%的抵扣。他们消除了应纳税所得额。
And if they’ve wiped out their taxable income through such things as bonus depreciation, they do not — they cannot — have any appetite for wind projects where they get a tax credit or — in the solar arrangement.
如果他们通过诸如超额折旧之类的措施消除了应纳税所得额，那么他们就没有——他们无法——对风能项目或太阳能项目产生需求。
So, by being part of Berkshire Hathaway, which is a huge taxpayer, MidAmerican has extra abilities to go out and do a lot of projects without worrying about whether they sort of exhausted their tax capacity. It’s an advantage we have.
因此，作为伯克希尔哈撒韦的一部分，作为一个巨大的纳税者，MidAmerican有额外的能力去进行许多项目，而不必担心他们是否耗尽了税收能力。这是我们拥有的优势。
18. Political views shouldn’t affect investing decisions
政治观点不应影响投资决策
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from John in Brunswick, Georgia.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自乔治亚州布伦瑞克的约翰。
He says, “You are clearly entitled to speak your mind on any and all subjects as an individual, but the recent publicity around the Buffett tax has become quite loud.
他说：“作为个人，你显然有权在任何和所有主题上表达自己的想法，但最近关于巴菲特税的宣传变得相当喧嚣。”
“And as a shareholder, I fear it is limiting, to some degree, the interest in the Berkshire stock, on principal, for some people.
“作为一名股东，我担心这在某种程度上限制了部分人对伯克希尔股票的兴趣。”
“For instance my 84-year-old father is not interested in investing in Berkshire because of his opposition to this tax position, and otherwise, he likely would.
“例如，我84岁的父亲因为反对这个税务立场而不愿投资伯克希尔，而他本来可能会投资。
“While being a public company CEO, should some of the political dialogue be somewhat muted for the betterment of the company and its share price?”
“作为一家上市公司的首席执行官，是否应该为了公司的利益和股价，适度减少一些政治对话？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s a question that’s raised frequently. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是一个经常被提到的问题。（掌声）
But I really — in the end, I don’t think that any employee of Berkshire, I don’t think that the CEOs of any of the companies that we own stock in, should in any way have their citizenship restricted.
但我真的——最后，我认为伯克希尔的任何员工，我认为我们所持有股票的任何公司的首席执行官，都不应该以任何方式限制他们的公民身份。
We did not — (Applause)
我们没有——（掌声）
When Charlie and I took this job, we did not decide to put our citizenship in a blind trust. People are perfectly willing — it’s fine if they disagree with us. I think it’s kind of silly.
当查理和我接受这个职位时，我们并没有决定将我们的公民身份放入一个盲目信托中。人们完全可以——如果他们不同意我们，那也没关系。我觉得这有点傻。
I don’t know the politics of — necessarily — of [American Express CEO] Ken Chenault or [Coca-Cola CEO] Muhtar Kent or [Wells Fargo CEO] John Stumpf. I got a pretty good idea with [banker Richard] Kovacevich at one time. (Laughs)
我并不一定了解[美国运通首席执行官]肯·陈诺特、[可口可乐首席执行官]穆赫塔尔·肯特或[富国银行首席执行官]约翰·斯坦普的政治。我曾经对[银行家理查德]科瓦切维奇有过相当好的了解。（笑）
But they run these businesses in which we have ten — [IBM CEO] Ginni Rometty, I mean, we’ve got 11 or $12 billion with her. I don’t know what her politics are, and, you know, I don’t know what her religion is.
但他们经营的这些公司中，我们在其中投资了100亿或120亿美元。例如，[IBM首席执行官]金尼·罗梅蒂，我对她的政治立场和宗教信仰一无所知。
She’s got all kinds of personal views, I’m sure, that probably are better than mine, but it doesn’t make any difference. I just want to know how she runs the business.
她肯定有各种个人观点，可能比我的更好，但这并没有什么区别。我只想知道她是如何经营这家公司的。
And I really think that that 84-year-old man making a decision on what he invests in based on who he agrees with politically, sounds to me like you ought to own FOX. (Laughter and applause)
我真的觉得，这位84岁的老人根据与谁的政治观点一致来决定投资，听起来像是你应该拥有FOX频道。（笑声与掌声）
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I want to report that Warren’s view on taxes for the rich has reduced my popularity around one of my country clubs. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我想报告一下，沃伦对富人税收的看法使我在一个乡村俱乐部的受欢迎程度下降了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: If it keeps him from hanging around the country club, I’m all for it.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果这能让他不再出现在乡村俱乐部，我完全支持。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And it’s a disadvantage I am willing to bear in order to participate in this enterprise. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：这是我愿意承受的一个劣势，以便参与这个事业。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I, we don’t disagree on as many things as you might think, but we’ve certainly disagreed on some things over 53 years. It’s never — we’ve never had an argument in 53 years. Maybe you can get one started here if you work on it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我之间的分歧没有你们想象的那么多，但在53年中我们确实在一些事情上有过分歧。我们从未在53年中发生过争吵。也许你可以在这里试着让我们争论一下。（笑声）
But it — it’s just — it’s irrelevant. I mean, you know, roughly half of the country is going to feel one way this November and the other half is going to feel a different way.
但这——这只是——这无关紧要。我的意思是，你知道，国家大约一半的人在这个十一月会有一种感觉，另一半的人会有不同的感觉。
And if you start selecting your investments, or your friends, or your neighbors, based on trying to get people that agree with you totally, you’re going to live a pretty peculiar life, I think.
如果你开始根据寻找完全同意你的人来选择你的投资、朋友或邻居，我认为你会过上相当奇特的生活。
19. Size of potential deals limited by commitment to not use stock
潜在交易的规模受到不使用股票的承诺限制。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的，杰伊。
JAY GELB: Warren, this question is on acquisitions. Would you consider an acquisition in excess of $20 billion?
杰伊·盖尔布：沃伦，这个问题是关于收购的。您会考虑超过 200 亿美元的收购吗？
And if so, would it be funded in terms of existing cash, as well as issuing debt and equity, or perhaps even selling existing investments?
如果是这样的话，它会通过现有现金、发行债务和股权，或者甚至出售现有投资来融资吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We considered one here just a month or two ago which we would have liked — I wish we could have made it. There was probably about 22 billion.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在一两个月前考虑过一个，我们很想——我希望我们能做到。大约是 220 亿美元。
I mean, it gets — above 20 billion it gets to be more and more of a stretch, particularly because we won’t use our stock at all.
我想——超过200亿美元的收购越来越具有挑战性，特别是因为我们现在不会使用我们的股票。
We used stock in the Burlington Northern acquisition, and we felt that it was a mistake, but we were using it for what, in effect, turned out to be about 30 percent of the deal, and we felt that we were doing well enough with the cash that overall that the mix was OK.
我们在收购伯灵顿北方时使用了股票，我们觉得那是一个错误，但我们实际上只用股票完成了大约30%的交易，我们觉得现金表现得足够好，所以整体的组合还可以。
But we would not use our stock now, and we wouldn’t even use it for 30 or 40 percent of some deal. It’s hard to imagine. So we really —
但现在我们不会使用我们的股票，甚至不会为某笔交易的30%或40%使用股票。这很难想象。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s hard to imagine, but it could be conceivably happen.
查理·芒格：这很难想象，但这确实有可能发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: It could happen, it could happen.
沃伦·巴菲特：这可能会发生，这可能会发生。
But I don’t think it will happen. (Laughs)
但我不认为这会发生。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t either.
查理·芒格：我也不。
WARREN BUFFETT: So, we looked at this 22 or $23 billion-dollar deal, and we would have done it if we could have made the deal.
沃伦·巴菲特：所以，我们考虑了这个 220 亿或 230 亿美元的交易，如果我们能达成交易，我们就会去做。
But it would have stretched us, but we would not have pushed it to the point where it would have taken our cash below 20 billion.
但这确实会让我们有些紧张，但我们不会推到现金低于200亿的程度。
We would have sold securities, we would have done whatever was necessary to have a $20 billion cash balance when we got done with the deal.
我们本可以出售证券，我们本可以做任何必要的事情，以在交易完成时拥有 200 亿美元的现金余额。
But I would have had to sell some securities I didn’t want to sell. I liked the deal well enough so I would have done it.
不过，我会不得不出售一些我不想出售的证券。虽然我很喜欢这个交易，但我会这么做。
Now, if that had been 40 billion, I don’t think we, you know, no matter how well I liked it, I don’t think I would have wanted to peel off 25 billion or so of marketable securities trying to get it done, and I certainly wouldn’t want to be in limbo not knowing exactly where the money was going to come from, and therefore, be subject to some terrible shock in the world, in the market.
现在，如果那笔交易是400亿，我认为无论我有多喜欢它，我都不想为了完成交易而剥离250亿的可交易证券，我当然也不想陷入不确定的境地，不知道资金究竟从哪里来，因此面临市场上的巨大冲击。
If you have a $20 billion-dollar deal, though, I’ve got an 800 number, so — (Laughter)
如果你有一个 200 亿美元的交易，我有一个 800 电话，所以——（笑声）
But you’ve actually sort of hit the point where we start squirming a little bit as to where we would come up with the money.
但你实际上已经触及了我们开始有些不安的点，因为我们不知道该从哪里筹集资金。
On the other hand, the money is building up month by month so I — we will — if we can make the right $20 billion deal, we’ll do it. And next year, if we haven’t made a deal, I’ll probably say if we can find the right $30 billion deal, we would do it.
另一方面，资金每个月都在积累，所以如果我们能做出正确的200亿美元的交易，我们会去做。如果明年我们还没做成交易，我可能会说，如果能找到正确的300亿美元的交易，我们也会去做。
20. We can’t bring jobs back to the U.S. because they never left
我们无法将工作带回美国，因为它们从未离开。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Glenn Mollenhour (PH), Westlake, Ohio. First of all, I want to thank you for having us here today. Very nice. Now Warren, I’d like to have dinner with you tomorrow night at Gorat’s.
观众成员：格伦·莫伦豪尔（PH），俄亥俄州韦斯特莱克。首先，我想感谢你们今天邀请我们来。非常好。沃伦，我想明天晚上在戈拉特的餐厅和你共进晚餐。
WARREN BUFFETT: They’ll have a bidding at Glide here in June. It went for two million-six last year. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他们将在六月的 Glide 进行竞标。去年的价格是两百六十万。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is about jobs coming back to the U.S. I notice a number of companies have started to bring jobs back here.
观众成员：我的问题是关于工作回到美国。我注意到一些公司已经开始将工作带回这里。
Is Berkshire Hathaway looking at doing that for any job they’ve shipped out of the United States?
伯克希尔·哈撒韦是否考虑对他们已外包到美国以外的任何工作采取这样的措施？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I have to finish my fudge here — the — I would say that of the 200 — the number of jobs we have is listed in the back of the report — I think it’s about 270,000 — 270,858 at year-end.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我得先完成我的工作——我会说，我们的工作岗位数量在报告的最后有列出——我想大约是270,000个——到年底时是270,858个。
I’m just trying to think.
我只是在思考。
We probably — I don’t think we have more than 15,000 on the outside — of those 270 — outside the United States.
我们大概——我认为外部的岗位不超过15,000个——这270,000个中。
So as I put in the annual report, we invested in plant equipment — not in stocks, but in plant equipment, and not in acquisitions — over $8 billion last year, and 95 percent or so of that was in the United States.
因此，正如我在年报中所提到的，我们去年在工厂设备上的投资——不是在股票上，而是在工厂设备上，而且不是收购——超过80亿美元，其中大约95%是在美国。
So we don’t really have a lot around the world. (Applause)
所以我们在世界各地并没有很多。(掌声)
I’m not opposed to it. I mean, our ISCAR operation, which is based in Israel, operates throughout the world.
我并不反对。我是说，我们的ISCAR业务总部设在以色列，业务遍布全球。
I mean, they — I’ve been to their plants in Japan, I’ve been to their plants in Korea, I’ve been to their plants in India.
我的意思是，他们——我去过他们在日本的工厂，我去过他们在韩国的工厂，我去过他们在印度的工厂。
The product they sell is going to be sold throughout the world. The U.S. is an important market for them, but it’s not a majority of their business or anything like it.
他们的产品将会在全球范围内销售。美国是他们的重要市场，但并不是他们业务的主要部分或类似的东西。
So that company has about 11,000 employees or so, and relatively few of theirs are going to be in the United States.
那家公司大约有 11,000 名员工，其中在美国的员工相对较少。
We’d like to do more business in the United States, but we’d like to do more business in Korea and Japan and India and you name it.
我们希望在美国做更多的生意，但我们也希望在韩国、日本、印度等地做更多的生意。
We have utility operations in the UK, but other than — we have — we just bought a business in Australia at Marmon here, recently.
我们在英国有公用事业运营，但除此之外——我们刚在澳大利亚的 Marmon 收购了一家公司。
Well we bought — just the last day or so it’s been announced — we’re buying a — for CTB, which we’ve had a terrific history with. Vic Mancinelli has been a great man to manage businesses.
我们刚刚宣布，我们正在购买一个 CTB，我们与之有着很好的历史。Vic Mancinelli 是一位出色的商业管理者。
And just in the last day or two, we bought an operation based in The Netherlands [poultry-processing device maker Meyn Holding], although they have employment here.
就在过去一两天，我们收购了一家位于荷兰的公司[家禽加工设备制造商 Meyn Holding]，尽管他们在这里有员工。
But I would say that it’s extremely likely that 10 years from now, when you look at the breakdown of our employees, that we have many, many more employees, you know, maybe hundreds of thousands more employees. And some of those will be outside this country, but most of them will be in this country.
但我想说，十年后，当你查看我们员工的构成时，极有可能我们会有更多的员工，可能会多出数十万名员工。其中一些员工将会在国外，但大多数员工将会在国内。
We find — there’s lots of opportunity in the United States. There is no shortage of opportunity.
我们发现——在美国有很多机会。机会并不缺乏。
In that 8.2 billion, or whatever it was last year, we loved putting that money out, and we’ll put out more this year.
在那82亿美元的投资中，或者去年的其他金额，我们很乐意投入这些资金，今年也会继续投入。
And this is — I mean it’s a real land of opportunity. That’s not to knock opportunities elsewhere. But we find lots of things to do that make a — we think — make a lot of sense in this country.
这是真正的机会之地。这并不是说其他地方没有机会。但我们发现许多事情在这个国家做是有意义的。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: You can’t bring a lot back if it never left. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：如果工作岗位从未离开，那就无法带回很多工作岗位。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s the long version of my answer. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：这就是我答案的长版本。（笑声）
21. Buffett: prostate cancer treatment is “nonevent”
巴菲特：前列腺癌治疗是“无关紧要的事件”
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Well, Warren, I should say I was not planning to ask you this question, but in the past hour, I’ve received probably two dozen emails from shareholders in this room who want the question asked, so I will ask it, and it’s a very simple question. How are you feeling?
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦，我应该说我原本不打算问你这个问题，但在过去一个小时里，我收到了大约两打来自这个房间股东的电子邮件，他们希望我问这个问题，所以我会问，这是一个非常简单的问题。你感觉怎么样？
WARREN BUFFETT: I feel terrific. And — I always feel terrific, incidentally. That’s not news. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：我感觉很好。而且——顺便说一下，我总是感觉很好。这不是新闻。（掌声）
I love what I do. I work with people I love. It’s more fun every day.
我热爱我的工作。我和我爱的人一起工作。每天都更有趣。
And it — basically, I seem to have a good immune system. You know, I mean, my diet is such that, you know, as any fool can plainly see, I’m eating properly. (Laughter)
而且，基本上，我似乎有一个良好的免疫系统。你知道，我的饮食是这样的，任何傻瓜都能清楚地看到，我的饮食是正确的。（笑声）
All I can say is it works.
我能说的就是它有效。
And I have four doctors, at least a few of them, I think, own Berkshire Hathaway.
我有四位医生，至少其中几位，我认为，拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦。
Not a screen I put everybody through, but —
这不是我对每个人的筛选，但——
And my wife and my daughter and I listened to the four of them for an hour and a half about two weeks ago.
大约两周前，我和我的妻子以及女儿听了他们四个人一个半小时。
And they described various alternatives, and none of them — well, not that — the ones that they recommend, you know, do not involve a day of hospitalization.
他们描述了各种替代方案，而他们推荐的那些方案，您知道，并不需要住院一天。
They don’t require me to take a day off from work. The survival numbers are way up. I read one where it’s 99 1/2 percent for 10 years.
他们不要求我请假一天。生存率非常高。我读到过一个数据，十年的生存率是99.5%。
So, you know, maybe I’ll get shot by a jealous husband, but — (laughter) — this is not — this is a really minor event, and Charlie will tell you how minor it is.
所以，你知道，也许我会被一个妒忌的丈夫射中，但——（笑声）——这真的是一件非常小的事，查理会告诉你这有多小。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as a matter of fact, I rather resent all this attention and sympathy Warren is getting. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：实际上，我对沃伦所获得的所有关注和同情感到有些不满。（笑声）
I probably have more prostate cancer than he does. (Laughter)
我可能比他得的前列腺癌还要多。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s bragging.
沃伦·巴菲特：他在吹嘘。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know because I don’t let them test for it. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：我不知道，因为我不让他们测试这个。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s not kidding. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：他不是在开玩笑。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: At any rate, I want the sympathy. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：无论如何，我想要同情。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: My secretary was getting too much attention, so I decided I had to throw the spotlight back on myself. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我的秘书受到了太多关注，所以我决定把焦点重新放回到自己身上。（笑声）
In all seriousness, it is a nonevent, yeah.
说实话，这根本不算什么，是的。
The Med Center is about two minutes from the office, and for two months, I’ll have to drop over there every afternoon and it will take a few minutes. And I may have a little less energy, but that may mean I do fewer dumb things, who knows? (Laughter)
医疗中心离办公室大约两分钟的路程，接下来的两个月里，我每天下午都得去那里，花几分钟时间。我的精力可能会稍微少一些，但这可能意味着我会做更少的愚蠢事情，谁知道呢？（笑声）
22. We’ll take on runoff annuity liabilities at the right price
我们会以合适的价格承担年金承保债务
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。加里？
GARY RANSOM: Yes. Your insurance operations have taken on a good chunk of some runoff property-casualty businesses.
加里·兰索姆：是的。您的保险业务接手了一些处于清算阶段的财产和意外险业务。
There’s another business that has an increasing amount of runoff, and that’s the annuity business, Hartford, ING, Cigna, et cetera.
还有另一种业务也在增加清算量，那就是年金业务，比如哈特福德、ING、信诺等。
Is there a time, or are there conditions, under which you might consider taking on some of those liabilities?
是否有时间或条件，您可能会考虑接手这些负债？
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. In effect, in some of our businesses, we’re taking on some annuity, but not like — I mean, it’s generally classified as property-casualty.
沃伦·巴菲特：当然。实际上，在我们的一些业务中，我们正在承担一些年金，但并不像——我的意思是，它通常被归类为财产意外险。
But we would take on annuity books. The problem is there, we’re not going to assume anything much better than the risk-free rate in making a bid for that sort of thing.
但我们会考虑接手年金账户。问题是，我们不会在出价时承担比无风险利率更高的任何风险。
I mean, we do not like the idea of taking on long-term liabilities and paying 150 basis points, you know, above Treasuries or something, to do that.
我的意思是，我们不喜欢承担长期负债并支付 150 个基点，您知道的，超过国债之类的利率。
And there are people that will do that. They may not be quite as likely to fulfill those promises in the years to come as we would.
而且会有人这样做。他们在未来几年里兑现这些承诺的可能性可能没有我们那么高。
But we want to get money on the liability side at attractive rates. Now, the most attractive is if we can write property-casualty business at an underwriting profit and get it for nothing.
但我们希望在负债方面以有吸引力的利率获得资金。现在，最有吸引力的是如果我们能够以承保利润的方式承保财产意外险，并且不花一分钱。
But we’re willing to pay for annuity-type liabilities, and I don’t think it’s impossible you’ll see us do a little of that.
不过，我们愿意为年金类型的负债支付费用，我认为不久的将来你们会看到我们做一点这方面的业务。
We’ve done some in the UK. We’ve actually taken on a little bit, but it’s not huge. But we’re beginning to take on more.
我们在英国做过一些。实际上，我们接手了一小部分，但不是很大。不过我们开始接手更多了。
23. What Buffett would have done differently
巴菲特会有什么不同的做法
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Charlie. Glad you’re feeling well.
观众：早上好，沃伦和查理。很高兴你们感觉很好。
My name is Ryan Boyle, and I’m 26 and working for a private equity firm in Chicago.
我的名字是瑞安·博伊尔，我 26 岁，正在芝加哥的一家私募股权公司工作。
If you were me and had the chance to start over, what areas would you look to get into?
如果你是我，有机会重新开始，你会考虑进入哪些领域？
And do you think that my generation will have the same number of opportunities as yours? And if not, would you look to focus on emerging markets?
你认为我们这一代会有和你们一样多的机会吗？如果没有，你会考虑关注新兴市场吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I think you have all kinds of opportunities.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我认为你有各种各样的机会。
I would probably do very much what I have done in life, except I’d do it — I’d try and do it a little earlier, and I would have tried to be a little bit better when I was running a partnership, in terms of aggregating the money faster.
我可能会做我一生中做的事情，只是会尽早一点，并且在管理合伙企业时会尽量更好，以更快的速度聚集资金。
I used to work with $5,000 contributions from partners and, you know, I would try to develop an audited record of performance as early as I could.
我过去常常与伙伴们以5,000美元资金的开始投资，你知道，我会努力尽早建立一个经过审计的业绩记录。
I would try to attract some money, and then when I’d build up a fair amount of money out of investing, I would try to get into something much more interesting, which would be buying businesses to keep.
我会尝试吸引一些资金，然后当我通过投资积累了一定的资金后，我会尝试进入一些更有趣的事情，那就是购买企业以便持有。
You mentioned private equity, which very often is buying businesses to sell. I don’t want to be buying and selling businesses. I mean, if I establish relationships with people that come to me with their business, and they want to join Berkshire, I want it to be for keeps.
你提到了私募股权，私募股权通常是购买后出售的业务。我不想买卖企业。我的意思是，如果我和人们建立关系，他们想加入伯克希尔，我希望是为了长期合作。
And that’s been enormously satisfying. But it takes some capital to get into that business, and I didn’t have any capital when I started out, so I built it through managing money for myself and other people, combined.
这非常令人满意。但进入这个行业需要一些资金，而我在开始时没有任何资金，所以我通过为自己和其他人管理资金来建立它。
And like I say, I would get us through that process as fast as I could and then into a game where I could buy businesses of significance and interest to me. And I’d spend the rest of my life doing it, just as I’ve done.
正如我所说，我会尽快完成这个过程，然后进入一个可以购买对我有意义和兴趣的企业的游戏。我会用余生来做这个，就像我现在一样。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve got nothing to add to that, either.
查理·芒格：嗯，我对此也没有什么要补充的。
WARREN BUFFETT: And I’d do it with Charlie, incidentally. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，我会和查理一起做这件事。（笑）
24. Take advantage when “Mr. Market” acts like a “psychotic drunk”
当“市场先生”表现得像一个“精神失常的醉汉”时，抓住机会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol. 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗。
CAROL LOOMIS: This comes — this question comes from a man who believes the stock — that Berkshire stock — is being held down some by your talking about the Buffett Rule.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自一位认为伯克希尔股票因你谈论巴菲特规则而受到压制的男士。
I know you said you doubt that, but he suspects that at least 95 percent of the people in this arena believe that Berkshire Hathaway stock is undervalued.
我知道你说你对此表示怀疑，但他怀疑至少 95%的人在这个领域认为伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票被低估了。
If you don’t think it’s the Buffett Rule, could each of you give us your opinions about why the stock stays stuck at these levels?
如果您认为不是因为“巴菲特规则”，您能给我们分享一下为什么股票会停滞在这些水平吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve run Berkshire now for 47 years. There have been several times — oh, four or five times — when we’ve thought it was significantly undervalued.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们已经管理伯克希尔 47 年了。有几次——哦，大约四五次——我们认为它的价值被严重低估。
We saw the price get cut in half at least four times — or roughly in half — in fairly short periods of time.
我们看到价格在相对较短的时间内被削减了一半，至少四次——或大致削减了一半。
And I would say this: if you run any business for a long period of time, there are going to be times when it’s overvalued and sometimes when it’s undervalued.
我会说，经营任何企业久了，肯定会经历股票被高估和低估的时期。
Tom Murphy ran one of the most successful companies [Capital Cities] the world has ever seen, and in the early 1970s, his stock was selling for about a third of what you could have sold the properties for.
汤姆·墨菲经营过世界上最成功的公司之一[Capital Cities]，在1970年代初期，他的股票价格大约只有你能卖掉物业价格的三分之一。
And, you know, Berkshire, back in 2000/2001, whenever it was that I wrote in the annual report that we were also going to repurchase shares, was selling at what I thought was a very low price, and we didn’t get any repurchase.
而且，你知道，伯克希尔在 2000/2001 年，我在年报中写到我们也会回购股票时，股价我认为非常低，但我们没有进行任何回购。
But that — stocks — the beauty of stocks is they do sell at silly prices from time to time. That’s how Charlie and I have gotten rich. You know, Ben Graham writes about it in Chapter 8 of the Intelligent Investor.
但股票的美在于它们有时会以愚蠢的价格出售。这就是查理和我致富的方式。你知道，本·格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》第八章中写到了这一点。
You know, next to — well, Chapters 8 and Chapters 20 are really all you need to do to get rich in this world.
你知道，除了——好吧，第 8 章和第 20 章实际上就是你在这个世界上致富所需做的全部。
And Chapter 8 says that in the market you’re going to have a partner named “Mr. Market,” and the beauty of him as your partner is that he’s kind of a psychotic drunk — (laughter) — and he will do very weird things over time and your job is to remember that he’s there to serve you and not to advise you.
第8章说，在市场上你会有一个名叫“市场先生”的伙伴，他的美妙之处在于他有点像一个精神错乱的醉汉——（笑声）——他会随着时间的推移做出非常奇怪的事情，你的工作是记住他是来为你服务的，而不是来给你建议。
And if you can keep that mental state, then all those thousands of prices that Mr. Market is offering you every day on every major business in the world, practically, that he is making lots of mistakes, and he makes them for all kinds of weird reasons.
如果你能保持这种心态，那么市场先生每天提供的成千上万的价格，几乎每个主要企业，他都会犯很多错误，而这些错误是出于各种奇怪的原因。
And all you have to do is occasionally oblige him when he offers to either buy or sell from you at the same price on any given day, any given security.
你只需在他提出以相同的价格买入或卖出任何证券时，偶尔满足他的需求。
So it’s built into the system that stocks get mispriced, and Berkshire has been no exception to that.
所以系统内置了股票被错误定价的机制，而伯克希尔也不例外。
I think Berkshire, generally speaking, has come closer to selling around its intrinsic value, over a 47-year period or so, than most large companies.
我认为，伯克希尔一般来说，在大约 47 年的时间里，出售的价格更接近其内在价值，相比于大多数大型公司。
If you look at the range from our high to low in a given year and compare that to the range high and low on a hundred other stocks, I think you’ll find that our stock fluctuates somewhat less than most, which is a good sign.
如果你查看我们在某一年内的最高和最低范围，并将其与其他一百只股票的高低范围进行比较，我认为你会发现我们的股票波动程度比大多数股票要小一些，这是一种好迹象。
But I will tell you, in the next 20 years, Berkshire will someday be significantly overvalued, and at some points significantly undervalued.
但我会告诉你，在接下来的 20 年里，伯克希尔有一天会显著高估，而在某些时候又会显著低估。
And that will be true for Coca-Cola and Wells Fargo and IBM and all of the other securities that — I don’t — I just don’t know in which order and at which times.
这对可口可乐、富国银行、IBM 以及所有其他证券都是正确的——我只是不知道具体的顺序和时间。
But the important thing is that you make your decisions based on what you think the business is worth.
但重要的是，你要根据你认为这个业务的价值来做出决策。
And if you make your buy and sell decisions based on what you think a business is worth, and you stick with businesses that you think — you’ve got good reason to think — you can value, you simply have to do well in stocks.
如果你根据你认为企业的价值来进行买卖决策，并坚持选择那些你有充分理由认为能估值的企业，你就一定会在股票市场上表现良好。
The stock market is the most obliging, money-making place in the world because you don’t have to do anything.
股市是世界上最乐于助人、最赚钱的地方，因为你什么都不需要做。
You know, you sit there with thousands of businesses being priced at the same price for the buyer and the seller, and you don’t — and it changes every day, and you’ve got lots of information about most of those businesses, and you don’t have to do anything.
你知道，你坐在那里，成千上万的企业的买卖价格相同，而你不必做任何事情，这些价格每天都会变化，而且你对大多数企业有大量的信息，你不必做任何事情。
Compare that to any other investment alternative you’ve got. I mean, you can’t do that with farms.
与其他任何投资选择相比，这都是不可同日而语的。我的意思是，你不能在农场上做到这一点。
If you own a farm and the guy has the farm next to you and you’d kind of like to buy him out or something, he’s not going to name a price every day at which he’ll buy your farm or sell you his farm, but you can do that with Berkshire Hathaway or IBM.
如果你拥有一块农场，而你隔壁的人，你想收购他的农场，他不会每天都给你一个价格来买你的农场或卖给你他的农场，但你可以和伯克希尔哈撒韦或IBM这样做。
It’s a marvelous game. The rules are stacked in your favor, if you don’t turn those rules upside down and start behaving like the drunken psychotic instead of the guy that’s there to take advantage of it.
这是一场绝妙的游戏。规则对你有利，前提是你不要颠倒这些规则，开始像那个精神错乱的醉汉那样行为，而不是作为那个可以利用这些规则的人。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s interesting about this place is I think we’ve had a lot more fun and we got rich enough so we bought businesses and stocks to hold instead of to resell.
查理·芒格：嗯，这个地方有趣的是，我认为我们玩得更开心了，而且我们变得足够富有，以至于购买了企业和股票来持有，而不是转售。
It’s an enormously more constructive life. So as fast as you can work yourself into our position, the better off you’ll be. (Laughter)
这是一种极具建设性的生活。因此，越快适应我们的角色，你就会越好。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And you should be very encouraged by the fact he’s only 88 and I’m only 81. Just think, it may take you a little while. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：你应该对他只有 88 岁而我只有 81 岁这一事实感到非常鼓舞。想想，这可能需要你花一点时间。（笑）
25. We ignore headlines and macro factors
我们忽视头条新闻和宏观因素
WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff? 沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫？
CLIFF GALLANT: I guess along those lines, you talk about the drunken market, have systemic fear — systemic risk fears — ever caused you to pause in your eagerness to buy equities?
克利夫·加朗特：我想沿着这个思路问，您谈到醉汉市场，系统性风险恐惧是否曾让您在购买股票的热情上停顿过？
You know, back in 2008/2009, you know, why weren’t you more aggressive back then?
你知道，2008/2009 年时，你为什么当时没有更积极一些呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: You’ll probably find this interesting. Charlie and I, to my memory, in 53 years, I don’t think we’ve ever had a discussion about buying a stock or a business, or selling a stock or a business, that has been — where we’ve talked about macro affairs.
沃伦·巴菲特：您可能会觉得这很有趣。在我记忆中，查理和我在53年的时间里，从未讨论过购买或出售股票或企业时，涉及宏观事务。
I mean, if we find a business that we think we understand and we like the price at which it’s being offered, we buy it. And it doesn’t make any difference what the headlines are, it doesn’t make any difference what the Federal Reserve is doing, it doesn’t make any difference what’s going on in Europe. We buy it.
我的意思是，如果我们找到一个我们认为理解的业务，并且我们喜欢它的报价，我们就会购买。无论头条新闻是什么，无论联邦储备在做什么，无论欧洲发生了什么，这都没有关系。我们就买它。
You know, there’s always going to be good and bad news out there, and which gets emphasized the most, you know, depends on the moods of people or newspaper editors or whomever.
你知道，总会有好消息和坏消息，而哪种消息被强调得更多，取决于人们的情绪、报纸编辑或其他人的心情。
And there’s — you know, there’s a ton of bad — I bought my first stock, you know, in June of — in June of ’42, and what had happened?
而且，你知道，有很多糟糕的事情——我在 1942 年 6 月买了我的第一只股票，发生了什么呢？
You know, we were losing the war, until the Battle of Midway. I mean, so here was a country that — you know, all my older friends had gone, you know, disappeared.
您知道，我们在战争中处于劣势，直到中途岛战役。我的意思是，国家——您知道，我所有年长的朋友都消失了。
We weren’t going to make any kinds of goods that were — people wanted. We were going to build battleships and things to drop in the sea, and we were losing.
我们不会制造任何人们想要的商品。我们要建造战舰和一些投放到海里的东西，而我们正在失败。
But stocks were cheap.
但股票很便宜。
And I wrote that article in October of 2008 in the Times. I should have written it a few months later, but in the end, I said we’ve just had a financial panic and it’s going to flow over into the economy, you know, you’re going to read all kinds of bad news, but so what, you know?
我在 2008 年 10 月在《泰晤士报》上写了那篇文章。我本应该在几个月后再写，但最后我说我们刚经历了一场金融恐慌，这将会影响到经济，你知道的，你会看到各种坏消息，但那又怎么样呢？
America is not going to go away. Stocks are cheap.
美国不会消失。股票很便宜。
You’ve got to — we look to value, and we don’t look to headlines at all. And we really don’t — everybody thinks we sit around and talk about macro factors. We don’t have any discussions about macro factors.
你必须这样做——我们关注价值，而完全不关注头条新闻。我们真的不——每个人都认为我们坐在一起讨论宏观因素。我们并没有进行任何关于宏观因素的讨论。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but we did keep liquid reserves at the bottom of the panic that, if we’d known it was not going to get any worse, we would have spent, but we didn’t know that.
查理·芒格：是的，但在恐慌的底部，我们确实保留了流动资金。如果我们知道情况不会变得更糟，我们会花掉这些钱，但我们并不知道。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We know what we don’t know.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们知道我们不知道的事情。
We all — we know we don’t want to go broke. I mean, we start with that.
我们都——我们知道我们不想破产。我是说，我们首先要确保这一点。
And we know you can’t go broke if you’ve got a fair amount of liquid reserves around and you don’t have any near-term debts and so on.
我们知道如果有相当数量的流动资金而且没有短期债务，您就不会破产。
So our first rule is always to play it tomorrow, no matter what happens. But if we’ve got that covered, and we can find things that are attractive, we buy it.
所以我们的第一条规则始终是，无论发生什么都要为明天做准备。但如果我们确保了这一点，并且发现有吸引力的东西，我们就购买。
Well Charlie has a little company called the Daily Journal Company and he sat there with a whole lot of cash. And when 2008 came along, he went out and bought a few stocks. He won’t tell me the names of them, but —
查理有一家名为《每日新闻》的小公司，他手中有很多现金。在2008年时，他出去买了一些股票。他不会告诉我那些股票的名字，但——
You know, that was the time to use the money, not to sit on it.
你知道，那是用钱的时候，而不是坐在上面。
Was that the name of the stock, Charlie? (Laughter)
那是股票的名字吗，查理？（笑声）
You don’t get anything out of him. (Laughter)
你从他身上得不到任何东西。(笑声)
26. Big Berkshire subsidiaries have “done well” over past 5 years
大型伯克希尔子公司在过去五年中“表现良好”
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, thank you for your inspiration and insight.
观众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，谢谢你们的启发和见解。
When you look at the stable of businesses that Berkshire owns, which business has greatly improved its competitive position over the last five years, and why?
当你查看伯克希尔拥有的企业组合时，哪项业务在过去五年中大大改善了其竞争地位，为什么？
And then conversely, perhaps you might name a business that was not so lucky.
然后相反，也许你可以提到一个不那么幸运的企业。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We don’t like to dump on the ones that aren’t — that haven’t done as well. But there’s no question — and fortunately, the big ones have done well.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不喜欢抨击那些表现不佳的公司。但毫无疑问——幸运的是，大公司表现得很好。
There’s no question, even though we didn’t — well, we didn’t own all of it, but we actually have owned a significant piece of Burlington Northern over the last five.
毫无疑问，尽管我们没有——好吧，我们并没有完全拥有它，但在过去的五年里，我们实际上拥有了伯灵顿北方铁路的一部分。
But the railroad business for very fundamental reasons, which I should have figured out earlier, has improved its position dramatically over the last, really, 15 or 20 years, but it continues to this day.
但出于非常根本的原因，我早该意识到，铁路业务在过去的 15 到 20 年里，其地位显著改善，但至今仍在继续。
I mean, it is an extremely efficient and environmentally-friendly way of moving a whole lot of things that have to be moved.
我意思是，这是一种极其高效且环保的方式来移动大量必须移动的东西。
And it’s an asset that couldn’t be duplicated for, you name it, three, four, five, six times, you know, what it’s selling for. So that it’s a whole lot better business than it was five or 10 years ago.
这是一项无法复制的资产，无论你说多少次，三次、四次、五次、六次，你知道它的售价。因此，这比五年前或十年前的生意要好得多。
Now, GEICO is a whole lot better business than it was five or 10 years ago, although I think you could have predicted that the chances were good that that was going to happen.
现在，GEICO 的业务比五年前或十年前好得多，尽管我认为你可以预测到这种情况发生的可能性很大。
But, you know, we have — we’re approaching 10 percent of the market now. And you go back to 1995, we had 2 percent of the market.
但是，你知道，我们现在接近市场的 10%。如果回到 1995 年，我们只有 2%的市场份额。
We had the ingredients in place to become much larger, and then fortunately, we had [CEO] Tony Nicely who absolutely maximized what was there to be done.
我们具备了成为更大公司的条件，幸运的是，我们有[首席执行官]托尼·尼克利，他充分发挥了现有的潜力。
And GEICO’s worth billions and billions and billions of dollars more than when we bought it.
而 GEICO 的价值比我们购买时高出数十亿、数十亿、数十亿美元。
And the Burlington is worth considerable billions more than when we bought it, even though it was recently.
伯灵顿的价值比我们购买时高出数十亿，即使这只是最近的事情。
MidAmerican has done a great job. We bought that stock at 34 or so dollars a share in 1999, and I think we appraise it now at around $250 a share, and that’s in the utility business.
MidAmerican做得很好。我们在 1999 年以大约 34 美元的价格购买了那只股票，现在我认为它的估值大约在每股 250 美元，而这属于公用事业行业。
So ISCAR has been wonderful since we bought it. We bought that six years ago. And they just don’t stop. You know, they do everything well. And I would not want to compete with them.
自从我们购买 ISCAR 以来，它一直非常出色。我们六年前买的。他们就是不停地进步。你知道，他们做得很好。我不想和他们竞争。
So we’ve — there are a number of them. And —
所以我们——有很多这样的情况。还有——
CHARLIE MUNGER: We have 80 percent or so of our businesses, by value, at least, increased their market strength.
查理·芒格：我们80%左右的业务，按价值来看，至少增强了市场竞争力。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. By value, I would say more than 80 percent.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。按价值计算，我会说超过 80%。
CHARLIE MUNGER: More than, yeah.
查理·芒格：比这更多，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: But not by number, but by value.
沃伦·巴菲特：但不是按数量，而是按价值。
CHARLIE MUNGER: By value. We are not suffering at all. We’re never going to get the rate to 100 percent.
查理·芒格：按价值。我们并没有遭受损失。我们永远不会达到100%的比例。
WARREN BUFFETT: And the mistakes have been made in the purchasing. I mean, it’s where I misgauged the competitive position of the business.
沃伦·巴菲特：而错误发生在购买上。我是说，这是我对业务竞争地位的误判。
It isn’t because of the faults of management. It’s because I just — either because I had too much money around or because I was — been drinking too much Cherry Coke or whatever it was — I assessed the future competitive position in a way that was really inappropriate.
并不是因为管理的过失。是因为我——要么是因为手头资金太多，要么是因为喝了太多樱桃可乐，或者别的什么——我对未来竞争地位的评估是完全不恰当的。
But it wasn’t because it really changed on me so much. And, you know, we’ve done some of that.
但这并不是因为情况真的发生了重大变化。而且，您知道，我们确实有一些这样的情况。
But the big ones — the big ones have worked out very well.
但大型业务——大型业务的结果都非常好。
Gen Re, which took, like, real problems for some years. I mean, Tad [Montross] is running a fabulous operation there.
Gen Re，在过去的几年里经历了真正的问题。我是说，塔德（Montross）在那里运行着一个出色的业务。
Ajit [Jain] has created something from nothing that’s worth tens of billions of dollars. You know, he created that out of walking into the office in 1985 and entering the insurance business for the first time, but he just brought brains and energy and character to something, and we backed him with some money, and he’s created a business like nobody I’ve ever seen.
阿吉特（Ajit Jain）创造了一项从无到有的业务，价值数十亿美元。您知道，他是在1985年首次进入保险行业时走进办公室创造的，但他给这一业务带来了智慧、活力和品质，而我们给了他一些资金支持，他创造的业务无人可比。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’ve been very fortunate. And what’s interesting is the good fortune is not going to go away merely because Warren happens to die. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我们非常幸运。有趣的是，这种好运不会因为沃伦的去世而消失。（笑声）
It won’t help him but — (Laughter)
这对他没有帮助，但——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You’ll have an explanation of that in the second half of this. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你将在下半部分得到对此的解释。（笑声）
27. Derivatives are “not going to be a huge factor at Berkshire”
衍生品“不会在伯克希尔成为一个重要因素”
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Joel Bannister (PH) in Dallas, Texas, who says, “Warren, you personally run the derivative book.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自德克萨斯州达拉斯的乔尔·班尼斯特（PH），他说：“沃伦，您个人管理衍生品账户。”
“Who will manage these weapons of mass destruction after your tenure? We don’t want to end up like AIG under someone else’s watch.”
“在您任期结束后，谁将管理这些大规模杀伤性武器？我们不想在其他人的监督下像 AIG 那样结束。”
He also adds, “P.S. I am wearing the wedding ring you sold my wife last year at the annual meeting at Borsheims.”
他还补充道：“顺便说一下，我正戴着您去年在Borsheims年会上卖给我妻子的婚戒。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, obviously a man of intelligence. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：显然是一个聪明的人。（笑声）
Yeah, I don’t think there will be much of a derivatives book after I’m around. In fact, there won’t be much of a derivatives book when I am around. I mean, it’s not that big of a deal.
是的，我认为在我离开后，衍生品账户不会有太多。实际上，在我在的时候，衍生品账户也不会太大。我是说，这并不是一个大问题。
But there will be — there could well be — well, I’ll go back to will be, because it’s almost required in certain of our utility operations that they engage in certain types of derivative activities. The utility boards that they respond to want them to hedge out certain types of activities.
但会有——很可能会有——好吧，我还是回到会有，因为在我们某些公用事业运营中，几乎要求他们参与某些类型的衍生活动。公用事业委员会希望他们对某些类型的活动进行对冲。
And then they engage in swaps of generation. And there’s a number of activities that there’s some derivatives that fit into doing that, but it’s not of a huge scope.
然后，他们会进行发电的互换。还有一些活动中确实有一些适合使用衍生品的情况，但这并不大范围。
The railroad formerly hedged diesel fuel, for example. They may do that in the future; they may not. I mean — so there’s a few operating businesses that will have minor positions.
铁路曾经对柴油燃料进行了对冲。例如，他们未来可能会这样做；也可能不会。我的意思是——所以有一些运营业务会有小规模的头寸。
I don’t think that — I think it’s unlikely that whoever follows me — well, they’ll be in — there will be several investment guys that follow me, at least two, and they’re on board now, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler.
我不认为——我认为不太可能在我之后接替我的人会做——他们会有几个投资经理接替我，至少两个，他们现在已经在董事会了，托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒。
We hit a home run with both of them. We got better than we deserved, but Charlie and I like that.
我们和他们都取得了成功。我们得到了超出应得的，但查理和我都喜欢这样。
And they — it’s unlikely they do anything — very unlikely they do anything — in derivatives, although I wouldn’t restrict them from doing it because they’re smart people and sometimes derivatives get mispriced.
他们——不太可能会做任何事情——非常不可能会做任何事情——在衍生品方面，尽管我不会限制他们这样做，因为他们是聪明人，有时衍生品会被错误定价。
But it’s not going to be a huge factor at Berkshire. I think we’re going to do really, probably, quite well with the derivative positions that we have. We’ve done fine with the ones that have expired so far, and I like the positions.
但这在伯克希尔不会是一个重大因素。我认为我们在现有的衍生品头寸上会表现得相当不错。到目前为止，我们处理到期的那些头寸也做得很好，我喜欢这些头寸。
But the rules have changed in relation to collateralizing, and I don’t like ever exposing us to anything that would cause me to worry about Berkshire’s financial condition if the Federal Reserve were hit by a nuclear bomb tomorrow, or anything of the sort, or Europe, you know, something terrible happened.
但是，关于抵押的规则已经改变，我不喜欢让我们面临任何可能让我担心伯克希尔财务状况的事情，如果明天美联储遭遇核爆炸，或者欧洲发生什么可怕的事情。
We just — we think about worst cases all of the time around Berkshire. Charlie and I probably think about worst cases more than any two managers you’ll ever find, and we are never going to expose ourselves to a worst case.
我们总是考虑最坏的情况，查理和我可能比您能找到的任何两个经理都更关注最坏情况，我们永远不会让自己暴露在最坏的情况之下。
And a requirement to collateralize things means that you are putting yourself in a position where you may have to come up with some cash tomorrow morning, and we’re never going to do that on any significant scale, because we don’t know what tomorrow morning will bring.
而要求抵押意味着您将处于一个可能明天早上需要现金的境地，我们永远不会在任何重要的规模上这样做，因为我们不知道明天早上会发生什么。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: We wouldn’t — the derivatives have bothered some people. We never would have entered if we’d had to sign normal contracts.
查理·芒格：我们不会——衍生品让一些人感到困扰。如果我们必须签署正常的合同，我们绝对不会进入。
We had better credit than anybody else, and we got better terms. And I think by the time that has all run off, we will have made at least $10 billion, maybe a lot more.
我们有比其他人更好的信用，因此我们得到了更好的条款。我认为到这所有合约结束时，我们将至少赚到100亿美元，可能会更多。
In other words, we’re going to be very lucky we did those contracts.
换句话说，我们很幸运签订了那些合同。
28. Different valuation methods for different companies
不同公司采用不同的估值方法
WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？
JAY GELB: Warren, when you discuss Berkshire’s intrinsic value, why do you value the insurance business at only cash plus investments per share?
杰伊·盖尔布：沃伦，当你谈论伯克希尔的内在价值时，为什么你只将保险业务的价值定为每股现金加投资的总和？
And what’s a reasonable multiple to apply to the pretax earnings of the noninsurance businesses?
对于非保险业务的税前收益，适用什么样的合理倍数？
WARREN BUFFETT: I would — I don’t value the insurance business quite the way you say it. I would value GEICO, for example, differently than I would value Gen Re, and I would value even some of our minor companies differently.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不会像你说的那样看待保险业务。我会以不同的方式评估 GEICO，例如，我会以不同的方式评估 Gen Re，甚至我会以不同的方式评估我们的一些小公司。
But basically, I would say that GEICO is worth — has an intrinsic value — that’s greater — significantly greater — than the sum of its net worth and its float. Now, I wouldn’t say that about some of our other insurance businesses.
但基本上，我会说 GEICO 的内在价值——远远大于——其净资产和浮存金的总和。现在，我不会对我们其他一些保险业务这么说。
But that’s for two reasons. One is, I think it’s quite rational to assume a significant underwriting profit at GEICO over the next decade or two decades, and I think it’s likely that it will have significant growth.
但这有两个原因。其一，我认为在未来十年或二十年内，假设 GEICO 有显著的承保利润是相当合理的，我认为它很可能会有显著的增长。
And both of those are value — items of enormous value. So that adds to the present float value, but I can’t say that about some other businesses.
这两者都是有价值的——极其有价值的项目。因此，这增加了目前的浮存金价值，但我不能对其他一些业务这样说。
But in any event, once you come up with your own valuation on that, in terms of the operating business, obviously different ones have different characteristics.
但无论如何，一旦你对运营业务进行自己的估值，显然不同的业务具有不同的特征。
But I would love to buy a new bunch of operating businesses that had similar competitive positions in everything.
但我很想购买一批在各方面具有相似竞争地位的新业务。
Under today’s conditions, I would love to buy those at certainly nine times pretax earnings, maybe 10 times pretax earnings. I’m not talking about EBITDA or anything like that, which is nonsense. I’m talking about regular pretax earnings.
在今天的情况下，我非常愿意以九倍的税前收益，甚至十倍的税前收益来购买那些。我不是在谈论 EBITDA 或其他类似的东西，那是胡说。我是在谈论常规的税前收益。
If they have similar characteristics, we’d probably pay a little more than that, because we know so much more about them than we might know about some other businesses.
如果它们具有相似的特征，我们可能会多支付一点，因为我们对它们的了解远超过对其他一些企业的了解。
What would you say, Charlie?
你会怎么说，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: When you used the word EBITDA, I thought to myself, I don’t even like hearing the word. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：当你提到 EBITDA 这个词时，我心里想，我甚至不喜欢听到这个词。（笑声）
There’s so much nutcase thinking involving EBITDA. Earnings before what really counts in costs. (Laughter)
有很多关于 EBITDA 的疯狂思维。收益在真正重要的成本之前。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We prefer EBE, which is earnings before everything. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们更喜欢 EBE，即一切之前的收益。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. 查理·芒格：对。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s nonsense. I mean, if you compare a business that, you know, leases pencils or something like that where they all get depreciated in a two-year period and then compare that to some business that uses virtually no capital, you know, like See’s Candies, it’s just nonsense. But it works for the people that sell businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：这完全是胡扯。我是说，如果您比较一家租赁铅笔的公司，所有的铅笔在两年内都折旧完毕，而与一家几乎不使用资本的公司（比如See’s Candies）进行比较，那真是胡扯。但这对那些卖公司的人来说是有用的。
It’s like Charlie’s friend that used to sell fishing flies, Charlie, right?
就像查理的朋友曾经卖鱼饵一样，查理，对吧？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. They don’t sell these lures to fish. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格：没错。他们不把这些诱饵卖给鱼。（巴菲特笑）
29. Buffett’s negativity on gold “arouses passions”
巴菲特对黄金的消极态度“激起了热情”
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 8 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, hi, thanks. Neil Steinhoff (PH) from Phoenix. Thanks for holding the meeting today.
观众成员：哦，嗨，谢谢。来自凤凰城的尼尔·斯坦霍夫（音）。感谢你今天召开会议。
You mentioned a while ago that you were concerned about you and Charlie exposing yourself. Well, I for one am glad that you’re not doing that. (Laughter)
你之前提到过你担心你和查理暴露自己。好吧，我很高兴你们没有这样做。（笑声）
Since 1999, the Berkshire Hathaway stock has — we have not gone up appreciably, whereas gold has gone up multiple times. I don’t own your stock for the glamour. I own it to earn money. What happened?
自1999年以来，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票并没有显著上涨，而黄金则上涨了好几倍。我买您的股票不是为了吸引眼球，而是为了赚钱。发生了什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say this: when we took over Berkshire, gold was at $20 and Berkshire was at $15 so — gold is now at $1600 and Berkshire is at $120,000. So you can pick different starting periods. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：我想说的是，当我们接管伯克希尔时，黄金的价格是 20 美元，而伯克希尔的价格是 15 美元，所以——现在黄金的价格是 1600 美元，而伯克希尔的价格是 120,000 美元。因此，你可以选择不同的起始时期。（掌声）
Obviously, you can pick anything that’s gone up a lot in the last, you know, month or year. I mean, it will beat 90 percent of — or 95 percent — of other investments.
显然，你可以选择在过去一个月或一年中大幅上涨的任何东西。我的意思是，它将超过 90%或 95%的其他投资。
But the one thing I would bet my life on, essentially, is over a 50-year period, not only will Berkshire do considerably better than gold, but common stocks as a group will do better than gold, and probably farmland will do better than gold.
但我敢打赌，在 50 年的时间里，伯克希尔不仅会比黄金表现得好，普通股票整体也会比黄金表现得好，可能农田的表现也会优于黄金。
I mean, if you own an ounce of gold now and, you know, you caress it for the next hundred years, you’ll have an ounce of gold a hundred years from now.
我的意思是，如果你现在拥有一盎司黄金，并且你知道，接下来一百年你一直抚摸它，那么一百年后你仍然会拥有一盎司黄金。
If you own a hundred acres of farmland, you’ll also have a hundred acres of farmland a hundred years from now and you’ll have taken the crops for a hundred years and sold them and presumably bought more farmland in the process.
如果你拥有一百英亩的农田，那么在一百年后你仍然会拥有一百英亩的农田，并且你会在这期间收获作物并出售它们，假设你在这个过程中又购买了更多的农田。
It’s very hard for an unproductive investment to beat productive investments over any long period of time, and I recognize that —
从长远来看，非生产性投资很难超越生产性投资，我意识到这一点——
It’s very interesting. I can say bonds are no good and [Federal Reserve Chairman Ben] Bernanke still smiles at me. You know, and I can say some stock is no good, and people —
这很有趣。我可以说债券不好， [美联储主席本·伯南克] 听到我说这些仍然微笑。您知道，我可以说某只股票不好，大家会——
But if you say anything negative about gold, I mean, it arouses passions with people, which is kind of fascinating, because usually if you thought through something intellectually, it shouldn’t really make much difference what people say. It should be that, well, you know, the question is whether your facts are right and your reasoning is right.
但是如果您对黄金说一些负面的事情，我的意思是，它激起人们的激情，这很有趣，因为通常如果您经过深思熟虑，知识上应该没有太大的差别。应该是，嗯，问题在于您的事实是否正确，您的推理是否正确。
But when you run into people that are really excited about gold — and I came from a family where my dad loved gold.
但是当你遇到那些对黄金非常兴奋的人时——我来自一个我父亲热爱黄金的家庭。
And he was tolerant. He could take a discussion of it. I find many people have trouble with it.
而他很包容。他可以接受对这个话题的讨论。我发现许多人对此有困难。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have never had the slightest interest in owning gold. It’s a much better life to work with businesses and people engaged in business. I can’t imagine a worse crowd to deal with than a bunch of gold bugs. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我从未对拥有黄金感兴趣。与参与商业的人一起工作要好得多。我无法想象与一群黄金狂热者打交道会是什么样的生活。（笑声）
30. Buffett: “my best ideas are all in Berkshire”
巴菲特：“我最好的想法都在伯克希尔。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: We got a couple of questions on this topic.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我们在这个话题上有几个问题。
“You said in an interview on CNBC that you had bought shares in J.P. Morgan for your personal account.
“你在 CNBC 的采访中说过，你为个人账户购买了摩根大通的股票。”
“Can you explain how you decide to make a personal investment versus one in your role as a fiduciary for us as shareholders of Berkshire?
“你能解释一下你是如何决定进行个人投资与作为我们伯克希尔股东的受托人进行投资之间的区别吗？”
“And while you’re at it, could you please share some names of stocks you’ve recently bought for your own account?” (Applause)
“顺便问一下，您能否分享一些您最近为自己账户购买的股票名称？”（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The truth is I like Wells Fargo better than I like J.P. Morgan but I — but I also — we bought, and we’re buying, Wells Fargo stock, and that takes me out of the business of buying Wells Fargo. So therefore, I go into something that I don’t like quite as well but that I still like very much.
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，我更喜欢富国银行而不是摩根大通，但我们已经购买并仍在购买富国银行的股票，这让我无法购买富国银行。因此，我就转向了我不那么喜欢但仍然非常喜欢的其他投资。
And that’s one of the problems I have, is that I can’t be buying what Berkshire is buying, and I’ve got some money around, and therefore, I go into my second choices, or into tiny little companies like I did with Korean companies and that sort of thing.
这是我面临的问题之一，我不能购买伯克希尔正在购买的东西，而我手头又有一些资金，所以我就选择了次优选择，或者像我之前做的那样，投资一些小公司，比如韩国的公司。
But my best ideas are all in Berkshire. That I can promise you.
但我最好的想法都在伯克希尔。我可以向你保证。
Charlie? Charlie’s bought real estate, too, and different things to avoid that problem.
查理？查理也买了房地产，还有其他不同的东西来避免那个问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But basically the Munger family is in two or three things only.
查理·芒格：是的。但基本上，芒格家族只涉及两三件事。
Diversification is my idea of — not something I have practically no interest in, except as it happens automatically in a big place like Berkshire.
多元化是我认为的——不是我几乎没有兴趣的事情，除非在伯克希尔这样的大公司中自然而然发生。
I rejoiced the day I got rid of a quote — you know, a stock quoting machine.
我庆幸我摆脱了报价机——您知道的，股票报价机。
And I like this buy and hold investing. It’s a lovely way to live a life and you deal with a better class of people, and it’s worked pretty well for all of us.
我喜欢这种买入并持有的投资方式。这是一种美好的生活方式，你会接触到更高层次的人群，而且对我们所有人来说，这种方式效果很好。
And I don’t think you need to worry about Warren’s side investments. His investments in Berkshire are so huge and those are so small, relevantly, that if that’s your main problem in life, you have a very favored life.
我认为你不需要担心沃伦的副业投资。他在伯克希尔的投资非常庞大，而这些投资相对来说非常小，如果这就是你生活中的主要问题，那你过得真是太好了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you have 98 1/2 percent of your money in Berkshire and you really are trying to do your thinking about what’s best for the 1 1/2 percent, you’re a little bit crazy. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果你有 98.5%的钱在伯克希尔，而你真的在思考对那 1.5%最好的选择，那你有点疯狂。（笑）
You should be thinking about Berkshire, which I can assure you I do. But, there could be —
您应该关注伯克希尔，而我可以向您保证，我确实在这样做。但，也可能会有——
CHARLIE MUNGER: And he does like Wells Fargo better than J.P. Morgan.
查理·芒格：他确实更喜欢富国银行而不是摩根大通。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I do, yeah. And we have 400 and some million shares of Wells Fargo in Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我有。我们在伯克希尔拥有大约四亿多股富国银行的股票。
I like J.P. Morgan fine, obviously, but I know Wells better. It’s easier to understand.
我当然对摩根大通也很满意，但我对富国银行更了解。它更容易理解。
So, you know, we — well, we bought Wells Fargo in the first quarter. We bought Wells Fargo last year. We’ve bought it an awful lot of years.
所以，你知道，我们——好吧，我们在第一季度买了富国银行。我们去年买了富国银行。我们已经买了很多年。
And if I wasn’t managing Berkshire, you know, but instead was sitting with my own money, I’d have a lot of money in Wells Fargo and I’d probably have some money in J.P. Morgan, too.
如果我不是在管理伯克希尔，而是坐在自己钱旁边，我会在富国银行投资很多钱，同时也可能在摩根大通投资一些钱。
31. Why is BNSF a subsidiary of National Indemnity?
为什么 BNSF 是国家赔偿公司的子公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Gary? 沃伦·巴菲特：加里？
GARY RANSOM: When Berkshire bought BNSF, it raised the surplus of the property-casualty industry by about 4 percent. It’s unusual to have a property-casualty company own such a large non-operating company.
加里·兰索姆：当伯克希尔收购BNSF时，它使财产-意外保险行业的盈余增加了大约4%。一家财产-意外保险公司拥有如此大型的非运营公司是非常不寻常的。
I’d also characterize your whole organization chart as challenging, a lot of different pieces to it, which gives rise to the issue of capital efficiency.
我还会将你们整个组织结构描述为具有挑战性的，里面有很多不同的部分，这就引发了资本效率的问题。
And I’m just wondering, are there any parts of your organization structure that have any hindrance, whether it’s regulatory or otherwise, to making use of the capital in the best way, generally, and in particular for BNSF?
我只是想知道，你们的组织结构中是否有任何部分存在障碍，无论是监管方面还是其他方面，影响到以最佳方式利用资本，特别是对于 BNSF？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I would say that money in our life companies has less utility to us — I’d rather have $100 million in our property-casualty companies than 100 million in our life companies, because we’re more restricted as to what we can do with the money in the life companies.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说，我们的人寿保险公司的资金对我们来说效用较低——我宁愿在我们的财产-意外公司中拥有1亿美元，而不是在我们的人寿公司中拥有1亿美元，因为我们在使用人寿公司资金时受到更多限制。
So — and we’ve got a fair amount of money in life companies, and that money cannot be used as effectively over a period of years, in my view, as money we have in the property-casualty business. It’s a disadvantage to being in the life business versus the PC business.
所以——我们在寿险公司有相当数量的资金，我认为这些资金在多年内的使用效果不如我们在财产意外险业务中的资金。这使得从事寿险业务相比于财产意外险业务处于劣势。
And the best place — obviously, the number one place where we like to have money is in the holding company. And we’ve got about 10 billion in the holding company right now. That, you have the ultimate flexibility with.
最好的地方——显然，我们最喜欢把钱放在控股公司。我们现在在控股公司里大约有 100 亿。这样，你就拥有了最终的灵活性。
Most of our operating businesses keep more cash around than they need, but it’s there. And I’m — as long as I have 20 billion someplace, I feel comfortable. We’ll never have anything that can come up, remotely, that would cause me to lose any sleep as long as I start with the 20 billion.
我们的大部分运营业务保持了比需要的更多现金，但这笔钱在那里。只要我手头有200亿美元，我就感到放心。只要我从200亿开始，没有任何事情会让我失眠。
That’s probably considerably more than we need, but it just leaves us comfortable, and it makes us feel we can do other things aggressively, as long as we know the downside is protected.
这可能远远超过我们的需求，但这让我们感到舒适，并使我们觉得只要知道下行风险得到保护，我们就可以积极地做其他事情。
The — having the railroad in National Indemnity was just something we thought was nice to have a huge asset like that there that should make the rating agencies and everyone feel comfortable, and there’s no disadvantage to us.
在国家赔偿中拥有铁路只是我们认为有这样一个巨大的资产在那里的好处，这应该让评级机构和所有人感到安心，而且对我们没有任何不利影响。
Very interesting, the rating agencies — at least one rating agency — said they didn’t want to give us any credit for that asset in there, although if we had 20 percent, like we had had earlier, they would have given us full credit for the market value. I didn’t push them too hard on that.
非常有趣的是，至少有一家评级机构表示，他们不想给我们任何关于那项资产的信用，尽管如果我们拥有20%的股份，就像以前那样，他们会给予我们市场价值的全部信用。我没有太过坚持这一点。
But there’s a fair amount of logic, I think, to where things are placed. If we were to make a big acquisition, it might require shifting some funds from one place to another, but we’ll always leave every place more than adequately capitalized.
但我认为，事物的摆放是有相当多的逻辑的。如果我们进行一次大规模收购，可能需要将一些资金从一个地方转移到另一个地方，但我们始终会确保每个地方的资本充足。
And if you can figure out a way that I could use the life funds more like I can use the property-casualty funds, call me. I’ve got an 800 number. (Laughs)
如果您能找出一种方法，让我能够像使用财产-意外基金那样使用人寿基金，请给我打电话。我有个800号码。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, two things are peculiar about that casualty operation. One is that it has so much more capital, in relation to insurance premiums, than anybody else. And the other is that it has, among the assets in that great surplus of capital, is something like the Burlington Northern Railroad, which makes it immensely stronger from the viewpoint of the policyholder.
查理·芒格：好吧，这个财产-意外业务的确有两个特点。其一是，与保险保费相比，它拥有的资本多得多。其二是，在那巨大的资本盈余中，像伯灵顿北方铁路这样的资产，使它在保单持有者的视角下强大无比。
It’s a huge advantage you’re talking about, not a disadvantage.
这是你所说的一个巨大优势，而不是劣势。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Here’s a property-casualty company that has an asset in it that, unrelated to insurance, will probably make $5 billion pretax or more.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这里有一家财产-意外公司，里面有一个与保险无关的资产，预计将带来超过50亿美元的税前收益。
So if we’re writing — well, in that entity, we’re writing less than that — but let’s say we’re writing 25 billion of premiums. That means we can write at 120, and just our railroad operation will bring us an underwriting neutrality. I mean, it’s a terrific — it’s like having a royalty or something.
所以如果我们在这个实体中写的保费——好吧，我们写的保费少于这个——但假设我们写250亿美元的保费。这意味着我们可以在120亿的价格下写保单，而我们的铁路业务将为我们提供承保中立性。这真是太棒了——就像拥有一项特许权或其他什么。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a wonderful position we have.
查理·芒格：我们所处的位置真是太好了。
WARREN BUFFETT: And nobody else has it.
沃伦·巴菲特：而且没有其他人拥有它。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And nobody else has it. And they wouldn’t let us do it if we weren’t so strong.
查理·芒格：其他人没有这个。如果我们不够强大，他们就不会让我们这样做。
32. We don’t want Berkshire’s stock to be too high or too low
我们不希望伯克希尔的股票过高或过低。
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. John Horton, Water Street Capital, Jacksonville, Florida.
观众成员：是的。约翰·霍顿，水街资本，佛罗里达州杰克逊维尔。
Since Berkshire will likely need to offer a stock component for very large acquisitions like Burlington Northern, wouldn’t Berkshire lower its cash outlay by increasing the price of its stock to near fair value, perhaps by offering a 2 to 3 percent dividend or a promised percentage of cash earnings?
由于伯克希尔可能需要在像伯灵顿北方这样的重大收购中提供股票组成部分，伯克希尔是否不会通过将股票价格提高到接近公允价值，来降低现金支出，例如通过提供2%到3%的股息或承诺一定比例的现金收益？
Might this have the effect of actually lowering the cash outlay needed for such acquisitions? As 30-year shareholders with almost $1 billion of exposure, we like this approach. Thank you.
这是否会降低进行此类收购所需的现金支出？作为拥有近10亿美元投资的30年股东，我们喜欢这种方法。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We would obviously prefer to have our stock sell at exactly intrinsic business value, even though we don’t know that precise figure, but Charlie and I would have a range that would not differ too widely.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们显然希望我们的股票以其内在商业价值出售，尽管我们不知道这个确切的数字，但查理和我会有一个不会相差太大的范围。
And if it’s over intrinsic business value, and we could use it as part of a consideration for buying something else at intrinsic business value, and then use cash for the balance, you know, we would like that situation.
如果它具有内在的商业价值，我们可以将其作为购买其他具有内在商业价值的东西的考虑因素，然后用现金支付余额，我们会喜欢这种情况。
And that — that’s very likely to occur in the future. It’s occurred in the past. Berkshire, without paying a dividend, has sold, probably, at or above intrinsic value as much of the time in the last 35 or so years as it has below.
这在未来很可能会发生。在过去也发生过。伯克希尔在没有支付股息的情况下，在过去35年中，可能在相当一段时间内以接近或高于内在价值的价格出售。
I mean, it will bob around. And I do not think a dividend would be a plus, in terms of having it sell at intrinsic value most of the time. I think it might be just the opposite.
我的意思是，它会上下波动。我认为股息不会对其以内在价值出售产生积极影响，我认为可能正好相反。
I mean, here we are, we’re willing to pay, you know, 110 cents on the dollar for what’s in there.
我的意思是，我们愿意以每一美元110美分的价格购买我们内部的东西。
So the idea of paying out money, which we think is worth at least 110 cents on the dollar within the place, and have it turn into 100 cents on the dollar when paid out, just is not very attractive to us, unless we find we can’t do things in the future that make sense.
因此，支付出现金，这在我们看来是每一美元的价值，而支付出去后变成每一美元的价值，对我们来说并不吸引人，除非我们发现将来无法做出明智的事情。
But our goal — and we put it in the annual report. Our goal is to have the stock sell at as close to intrinsic business value as it can.
但我们的目标——我们在年度报告中提到过。我们的目标是让股票尽可能接近其内在商业价值进行交易。
But with markets — you know, the way markets operate, most of the time it will be bobbing up or down from that level. And we’ve seen that now for 40-plus years, and we’ve tried to, at least in a way, point out what we think is going on.
但对于市场——你知道，市场的运作方式，大多数时候它会在那个水平上下波动。我们已经看到这一点超过 40 年了，我们试图以某种方式指出我们认为正在发生的事情。
And if it ever — if it — and it will. I mean, when it trades at intrinsic business value or higher, there may be times when we will use it.
如果它真的——如果它——而且它会。我是说，当它以内在商业价值或更高的价格交易时，可能会有我们使用它的时机。
We’d still prefer using cash, though. Cash is our favorite medium of purchase just because we’re going to generate a lot of it. And we hate giving out shares.
不过，我们仍然更愿意使用现金。现金是我们首选的购买媒介，因为我们将产生大量现金。我们不喜欢支付股票。
We do not like the idea of trading away part of See’s Candies or GEICO or ISCAR or BNSF. The idea of leaving you with a lower percentage interest in those companies because of any acquisition ambitions of ours is anathema to us.
我们不喜欢出让部分 See's Candies、GEICO、ISCAR 或 BNSF 的想法。因为我们的任何收购意图而让您在这些公司的持股比例降低的想法对我们来说是不可接受的。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what he suggested is a very conventional approach, and we think it’s better for the shareholders to do it the way we’re doing it. (Applause)
查理·芒格：他建议的方法是一个非常传统的做法，而我们认为以我们现在的方式做对股东更好。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I should point out, I’m in the position — giving away all of my stock between now and 10 years after my death when my estate is settled — but I’m giving it away every year.
沃伦·巴菲特：我应该指出，我将在我的死亡后的10年内赠送所有股票，直到我的遗产结算——但我每年都在赠送。
You know, it will do more good, in terms of its philanthropic consequences, if it’s at a higher price than lower price. I mean, there’s nobody here that has more of an interest in the stock selling at what I’ll call a fair value, as opposed to a discount value, than I do.
您知道，这对其慈善结果会有更好的影响，如果价格更高，而不是更低。我的意思是，没有人比我更关心股票以我所称的公允价值，而不是折扣价出售。
I know I’m not a seller, but I’m disposing of the stock, and I would rather have it buy, you know, X quantity of vaccines than 80 percent of X.
我知道我不是卖方，但我正在处置股票，我更愿意让它买到X数量的疫苗，而不是80%的X。
So it isn’t like we’ve got some great desire to have the stock sell cheap. If it does sell cheap, we’ll, you know, we’ll buy it in, but our interest is really in having it sell at, more or less, the fair value.
所以我们并不是非常希望股票便宜出售。如果它确实便宜出售，我们会买入，但我们真正的兴趣是让它以大致公平的价值出售。
And we think if we perform reasonably well, in terms of running the business, and if we tell the truth about the business, and explain to a selected group of shareholders who are interested in that aspect of investing, that over time, it will average that.
我们认为，如果我们在经营业务方面表现得相当不错，并且如实地告诉关于业务的情况，并向一小部分对这一方面感兴趣的股东解释，那么随着时间的推移，这将会平均化。
And that’s happened over the years, but it doesn’t happen every year. If people get excited enough about internet stocks, they’re going to forget about Berkshire. When they get disillusioned with internet stocks then — I’m going back 10 or 12 years on that.
这几年发生过这样的事情，但并不是每年都会发生。如果人们对互联网股票足够兴奋，他们就会忘记伯克希尔。当他们对互联网股票感到失望时——我说的是 10 到 12 年前的事。
But there have been times when people have gotten very excited about Berkshire, and there have been times when they’ve gotten very depressed.
但有时人们对伯克希尔感到非常兴奋，也有时他们感到非常沮丧。
Charlie, anything?
查理，有什么要补充的吗？
33. Buffett sees value in local newspapers
巴菲特看好地方报纸的价值
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗尔。
CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Kevin Getnowski (PH) of Yutan, Nebraska. And to it, I’ve added one question at the end, which came from another shareholder writing about the same subject.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自内布拉斯加州尤坦的凯文·盖特诺斯基。此外，我还添加了一个来自另一位股东的问题，关于同一主题。
“You’ve described the newspaper business in the past as chopping down trees, buying expensive printing presses, and having a fleet of delivery trucks, all to get pieces of paper to people to read about what happened yesterday.
“你曾经将报纸行业形容为砍伐树木、购买昂贵的印刷机，以及拥有一支送货卡车队，所有这些都是为了把纸张送到人们手中，让他们阅读昨天发生的事情。”
“You constantly mention the importance of future intrinsic value in evaluating a business or company. With all of the new options available in today’s social media and the speculation of the demise of the newspaper media, why buy the Omaha World-Herald?”
“考虑到今天社交媒体的众多新选择，以及对报纸媒体衰退的猜测，为什么还要购买《奥马哈世界先驱报》？”
“Was there some” — this is a question from the other one — “Was there some self-indulgence in this?”
“有没有这种自我放纵的成分？”——这是另一位股东的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I would say this about newspapers. It’s really fascinating, because everything she read is true, and it’s even worse than that. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我想说的是关于报纸的事。这真的很有趣，因为她读的所有内容都是真的，甚至比那更糟。（笑声）
The newspapers have three problems, two of which are very difficult to overcome, and one, if they don’t — the third — if they don’t overcome it, they’re going to have even worse problems, but maybe can be overcome.
报纸面临三个问题，其中两个非常难以克服，而第三个问题如果不克服，他们将面临更严重的问题，但也许可以克服。
Newspapers — you know, news is what you don’t know that you want to know. I mean, everybody in this room has a whole bunch of things that they want to keep informed on.
报纸——你知道，新闻就是你不知道但想知道的事情。我的意思是，这个房间里的每个人都有一堆他们想要了解的事情。
And if you go back 50 years, the newspaper contained dozens and dozens and dozens of areas of interest to people where it was the primary source. If you wanted to rent an apartment, you could learn more about renting apartments by looking at a newspaper than going anyplace else.
如果你回到 50 年前，报纸包含了许多许多与人们相关的兴趣领域，它是主要的信息来源。如果你想租公寓，通过查看报纸了解租公寓的信息比去其他地方更有效。
If you wanted a job, you could learn more about that job. If you wanted to know where bananas were selling the cheapest this weekend, you could find it out. If you wanted to know how — whether Stan Musial, you know, went two for four, or three for four, last night, you went to the newspapers.
如果你想找工作，你可以更多地了解那份工作。如果你想知道这个周末香蕉在哪里卖得最便宜，你可以找到答案。如果你想知道斯坦·穆西尔昨晚是两打四还是三打四，你可以去看报纸。
If you wanted to look at what your stocks were selling at, you went to the newspapers.
如果你想查看股票价格，你会去看报纸。
Now, all of those things, which are of interest to many, many people, have now found other means — they’ve found other venues — where that information is available on a more timely, often cost-free, basis.
现在，所有这些对许多人感兴趣的事物，已经找到了其他途径——它们找到了其他渠道——在这些渠道中，信息以更及时、通常是免费的方式提供。
So newspapers have to be primary about something of interest to a significant percentage of the people that live within their distribution area.
所以，报纸必须在一个对其分发区域内的相当一部分人感兴趣的领域中保持主要地位。
And the — there were so many areas where they were primary 30 or 40 years ago that you could buy a newspaper and only use a small portion of it and it still was valuable to you.
30或40年前有这么多个领域，购买报纸后，你只使用其中的一小部分，它对你来说仍然是有价值的。
But now you don’t use a newspaper to look for stock prices. You get them instantly off the computer. You don’t look for the newspapers for apartments to rent, in many cases, or jobs to find, or the price of bananas, or what happened in the NFL yesterday.
但现在你不再通过报纸查找股票价格。你可以立即在电脑上获取这些信息。在很多情况下，你也不再通过报纸寻找出租公寓、找工作、查香蕉价格，或者了解昨天 NFL 发生了什么。
So they’ve lost primacy in all of these areas that were important.
因此，他们在所有这些重要领域失去了主导地位。
They still are primary in a great many areas. The World-Herald tells me, every day, a lot of things that I want to know that I can’t find someplace else.
他们在很多领域仍然是主要的。《世界先驱报》每天告诉我很多我想知道的事情，而我在其他地方找不到。
They don’t tell me as many things as they did 20 or 30 or 40 years ago that I want to know, but they still tell me some things that I can’t find out elsewhere.
他们告诉我的事情没有 20、30 或 40 年前那么多了，虽然我想知道的事情不如从前，但他们仍然告诉我一些我在其他地方无法得知的事情。
Most of those items — overwhelmingly — those items are going to be local. You know, they’re not going to tell me a lot about Afghanistan or something of the sort that I want to know but I don’t know. I’m going to get that through other medium.
大多数这些内容——绝大多数——都是关于本地的。你知道，他们不会告诉我太多关于阿富汗的事情，我想知道但又不知道的事情。我会通过其他媒介了解。
微信朋友圈的粘性就在于此。
But they do tell me a lot of things about my city, about local sports, about my neighbors, about a lot of things that I want to know. And as long as they stay primary in that arena, they’ve got an item of interest to me.
但他们确实告诉我很多关于我的城市、当地体育、我的邻居以及我想知道的许多事情。只要他们在这个领域保持主要地位，他们就有我感兴趣的内容。
Now, the problem they have, they are expensive to distribute, as the questioner mentioned. And then the second problem is that, throughout this country, we had 1700 daily newspapers. We have about 1400 now.
现在，他们面临的问题是，正如提问者提到的，分发成本很高。第二个问题是，在这个国家，我们曾经有 1700 份日报，现在大约有 1400 份。
The — in a great many cases, they are going up on the web and giving free the same thing that they’re charging for in delivery. Now, I don’t know of any business plan that has sustained itself for a long time, maybe you can think of — maybe Charlie can think of one — but that has charged significantly in one version and offers the same version free to people, that had a business model that would work over time.
在很多情况下，他们在网上提供免费的与他们在交付中收费的相同内容。现在，我不知道有什么商业计划能够长期维持，也许你能想到——也许查理能想到一个——但那种在一个版本中收费而向人们提供相同版本免费的商业模式，无法长期运作。
And lately, in the last year even, many newspapers have experimented with, and to some extent succeeded, in those experiments, in getting paid for what they were giving away on the net that otherwise they were trying to charge for in terms of delivery.
最近，甚至在过去的一年中，许多报纸尝试并在某种程度上成功地让人们为他们在网上提供的内容付费，而这些内容之前是他们试图通过送报来收费的。
I think there is a future for newspapers that exist in an area where there’s a sense of community, where people actually care about their schools, and they care about what’s going on in the given geographic area. I think there’s a market for that.
我认为在一个有社区感的地方，报纸是有未来的，人们真正关心他们的学校，关心所在地区发生的事情。我认为这是有市场的。
It’s not as bullet proof, at all, as the old method when you had 50 different reasons to subscribe to the newspaper.
这并不像以前那种有 50 个不同理由订阅报纸的方法那样万无一失。
But I think if you’re in a community where most people have a sense of community, and you don’t give away the product, and you cover that local area in telling people about things that are of concern to them, and doing that better than other people, whether it be high school sports, you know.
但我认为，如果你身处一个大多数人都有社区意识的社区，而你不免费提供产品，并且在告诉人们关心的事情时覆盖该地区，并且做得比其他人更好，无论是高中体育，等等。
I’ve always used the example of obituaries. I mean, people still get their obituaries from the newspaper. It’s very hard to go to the internet and get obituaries.
我一直用讣告作为例子。我的意思是，人们仍然从报纸上获取讣告。上网获取讣告是非常困难的。
But I’m interested in Omaha and knowing who’s getting married, or dying, or having children, or getting divorced, or whatever it may be.
但我对奥马哈感兴趣，想知道谁结婚了，谁去世了，谁有了孩子，谁离婚了，或者其他任何事情。
When I lived in White Plains, New York, I really wasn’t that interested in it. I did not feel a sense of community there.
当我住在纽约的怀特普莱恩斯时，我并不太感兴趣。我在那里没有感受到社区的归属感。
So we have bought — and we own a paper in Buffalo where there’s a strong sense of community, and we make reasonable money in Buffalo. It’s declined, and we have to have a internet presence there where people have to pay to come on. We have to develop that.
所以我们已经购买了——并且我们拥有一份在布法罗的报纸，那里的社区意识很强，我们在布法罗赚得还不错。虽然有所下降，但我们必须在那儿建立一个互联网平台，让人们付费进入。我们需要发展这一点。
But I think that the economics, based on the prices we paid — and we may buy more newspapers — I think the economics will work out OK. It’s nothing like the old days, but it still fulfills an important function.
但我认为，基于我们支付的价格——而且我们可能会购买更多的报纸——我认为经济状况会好转。这与过去的日子完全不同，但它仍然发挥着重要的功能。
It’s not going to come back and tell you what your — and tell you on Wednesday what stock prices closed at on Tuesday and have you rush to the paper to find out.
它不会回来告诉你——并在星期三告诉你星期二股票价格的收盘情况，让你急忙去报纸上查找。
It’s not going to tell you what happened in basketball last night when you’ve gone to ESPN.com and found out about it. But it will tell you a whole lot about what’s going on, if you’re interested in your local institutions. And we own papers in towns where people have strong local interest.
它不会告诉你昨晚篮球比赛发生了什么，当你已经去 ESPN.com 了解了情况。但如果你对当地机构感兴趣，它会告诉你很多正在发生的事情。我们在那些人们对当地事务有强烈兴趣的城镇拥有报纸。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we had a similar situation years ago when World Book’s encyclopedia business was about 80 percent destroyed by Bill Gates. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：几年前，我们在《世界书》百科全书的业务中经历过类似的情况，那个时候它的业务有80%被比尔·盖茨摧毁了。（笑声）
He gave away a free computer with every bit of software.
他每卖出一款软件就赠送一台免费电脑。
WARREN BUFFETT: He charged $5, I think, Charlie —
沃伦·巴菲特：我想他收了 5 美元，查理——
CHARLIE MUNGER: And well, whatever it was. But we are still selling encyclopedias and we still make a reasonable profit but not nearly as much as we used to.
查理·芒格：无论是什么，我们仍在销售百科全书，仍然能获得合理的利润，但远不如以前那么多。
WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Some of these newspapers, we hope, will be the same kind of investments. They’re not going to be our great lollapaloozas.
查理·芒格：这些报纸的某些方面，我们希望将是类似的投资。它们不会成为我们的伟大成就。
WARREN BUFFETT: The prices were — well, we actually may be doing more in newspapers, and we will be going where there’s a strong sense of community.
沃伦·巴菲特：价格是——实际上，我们可能会在报纸上做更多的事情，我们将去那些有强烈社区感的地方。
But if you live in Grand Island, Nebraska, where we have a paper, or North Platte, and your children live there and your parents probably live there, your church is there, you are going to be quite interested in a lot of things that are going on in North Platte, and in the state of Nebraska, that you won’t find readily on television or the internet.
但是如果你住在内布拉斯加州的格兰岛，那里有我们的报纸，或者在北普拉特，而你的孩子们也住在那里，你的父母可能也住在那里，你的教堂也在那里，你会对北普拉特以及内布拉斯加州发生的许多事情非常感兴趣，而这些事情在电视或互联网中并不容易找到。
And you’ll be willing to pay something for it, and advertisers will find it a good way to talk to you, but it won’t be like the old days.
你会愿意为此付出一些代价，广告商会发现这是与您沟通的好方式，但这不会像过去那样。
34. Buffett: Amazon won’t affect Nebraska Furniture Mart
巴菲特：亚马逊不会影响内布拉斯加家具市场
WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff? 沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫？
CLIFF GALLANT: Thank you. Just on that general topic, it is true that in the past some of your investments have been fairly affected by technology, in newspapers or World Book.
克利夫·加兰特：谢谢。关于这个一般话题，确实在过去你们的一些投资受到了技术的相当影响，比如报纸或《世界书》。
Are there other businesses where you’re concerned about technology affecting them, for example, you know, Amazon or online grocery stores? Could they affect a business indirectly, like McLane?
您是否担心其他行业受到技术的影响，例如亚马逊或在线杂货店？它们是否可能间接影响像麦克莱恩这样的企业？
WARREN BUFFETT: Amazon is a tough one to figure. I mean, Amazon — it could affect a lot of businesses that don’t think they’re going to be affected today in the retailing area. It’s huge. It’s a powerhouse.
沃伦·巴菲特：亚马逊是一个难以捉摸的公司。我的意思是，亚马逊——它可能会影响许多今天认为不会受到影响的零售业务。它非常庞大，是一个强大的力量。
I don’t think it’s going to affect a Nebraska Furniture Mart, but I think it could affect some of the other retailing operations THAT we have. It won’t affect the Nebraska Furniture Mart.
我认为这不会影响内布拉斯加家具市场，但我认为它可能会影响我们其他的一些零售业务。它不会影响内布拉斯加家具市场。
I should report to you that in the first four days: Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday of this week, our business at the Furniture Mart is up about 11 percent over last year, so you people are doing your part there.
我应该向您报告，在本周的前四天：星期二、星期三、星期四和星期五，我们在家具市场的业务比去年增长了大约 11%，所以你们在这方面做得很好。
We had — on Tuesday we did over $6 million of business. Now, those of you who are in the retailing business, thinking about a Tuesday and 6 million-plus of volume, we’ll do more probably today, but those are huge, huge volumes.
我们在星期二的业务超过了 600 万美元。现在，对于那些从事零售业务的人来说，想想星期二和超过 600 万的交易量，今天我们可能会做得更多，但这些都是巨大的、巨大的交易量。
And we’re going to go to Dallas here in a couple of years. We’ve got a 433-acre plot of ground down there, and I think we’re going to have a store that will make any records we’ve set in the past look like nothing.
我们将在未来几年去达拉斯。我们在那里有433英亩的土地，我认为我们将建立一家商店，会让我们过去设定的任何记录显得微不足道。
Going back to Amazon, though, in terms — GEICO was very affected by the internet, and at first, we missed that.
不过，回到亚马逊，关于GEICO，它确实受到了互联网的很大影响，起初我们并没有意识到。
I mean, we — GEICO’s got an interesting history. It was mail originally, if you go back into the late ’30s and early ’40s, and it was very successful. And then it moved — not leaving mail totally behind — but it moved to television big time.
我意思是，GEICO 有一个有趣的历史。它最初是通过邮件的，如果追溯到 30 年代末和 40 年代初，它非常成功。然后它转向了电视，虽然并没有完全抛弃邮件，但它在电视上大举发展。
And then the internet came along, and I thought, originally, that only young people would look for quotes on the internet and that — you know, I mean, I never would have done it. I would have been calling on a rotary dial phone, you know, and saying — when they said number, please, first, I have to get my quote on GEICO — forever.
后来互联网出现了，我最初认为只有年轻人会在网上寻找报价——你知道，我从来不会这样做。我会在拨号电话上拨打电话，您知道，当他们说“请说号码”时，我得先获取GEICO的报价——永远如此。
But it just changed dramatically, you know, to the internet.
但它在互联网方面发生了剧烈变化。
So, things do change very significantly, and if the consumer finds something they like to do better in some new way — and Amazon has been an incredible success. It’s very hard to find people who have done business with Amazon that are unhappy about the transaction. They have happy customers.
所以，事情确实发生了很大的变化，如果消费者发现某种新的方式做他们喜欢的事情更好——而亚马逊取得了巨大的成功。很难找到与亚马逊做过生意的人对交易感到不满。他们有满意的客户。
And a business that has millions and millions of happy customers can introduce them to new items and then, you know, and it will be a powerhouse, and I think it could affect a lot of businesses. It’s hard for me to figure out.
一个拥有数百万快乐顾客的企业可以向他们介绍新产品，然后，这将成为一个强大的力量，我认为这可能会影响许多企业。这让我很难理解。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s almost sure to hurt a lot of businesses a lot.
查理·芒格：我几乎可以肯定这会严重影响许多企业。
WARREN BUFFETT: Which ones do you think it will hurt the most, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：你认为哪些企业会受到最大的影响，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, anything that can be easily bought by using a home computer, or an iPad, for that matter.
查理·芒格：嗯，任何可以通过家用电脑或 iPad 轻松购买的东西。
WARREN BUFFETT: Which of our businesses do you think it can hurt?
沃伦·巴菲特：你认为这会对我们的哪个业务造成伤害？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I won’t be buying the stuff because I’m habit bound. Besides, I almost never buy anything. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我不会去买这些东西，因为我习惯成性。此外，我几乎从不买东西。（笑声）
But I think it will hugely affect a lot of people. I think it’s terrible for most retailers. Not slightly terrible, really terrible.
但我认为这将对很多人产生巨大影响。我认为这对大多数零售商来说是可怕的。不是稍微可怕，而是真正可怕。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with that cheerful assessment, we’ll go to station 10. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，听了这个乐观的评估，我们去第 10 站吧。（笑声）
35. “Almost impossible” to copy Berkshire
“几乎不可能”复制伯克希尔
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. This is Hector from (inaudible) Industry Fund Management Company in China.
观众成员：嗨。我是来自中国（听不清）行业基金管理公司的赫克托。
My question is, you mentioned acquiring insurance float with zero, or even negative cost, is one of the key competitive advantages of Berkshire Hathaway. And we also found that an average leverage of Berkshire always about 100 percent.
我的问题是，您提到以零成本甚至负成本获取保险浮动资金是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的关键竞争优势之一。而且我们发现伯克希尔的平均杠杆率一直在100%左右。
I guess the net asset growth will significantly decline without using that leverage.
我想如果不使用那种杠杆，净资产增长将会显著下降。
Therefore, to own an insurance company acquiring insurance float would be an important strategy if (inaudible) want to copy Berkshire business model. Would you please give me a comment?
因此，如果（听不清）想要复制伯克希尔的商业模式，拥有一家保险公司并获取保险浮存金将是一个重要的策略。您能给我一些评论吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I didn’t get all that so you —
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我没听清楚，你——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t get it all, either. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我也没完全明白。（笑声）
But, we have a very peculiar model, and it works very well for us. I think it’s very hard for other people to get the same result.
但是，我们有一个非常独特的模型，它对我们非常有效。我认为其他人很难获得相同的结果。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think it’s almost impossible. Besides, I mean, it’s taken a long, long time to get here. It’s taken a great amount of consistency, and that consistency has been allowed because, basically, we’ve had a controlling shareholder during that time.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为这几乎是不可能的。此外，我的意思是，来到这里花了很长很长的时间。这需要极大的持续性，而这种持续性之所以能够实现，基本上是因为在这段时间里我们有一个控股股东。
So we’ve not had to bow to any of the urgings of Wall Street or, you know, whatever may be the fad of the day. But we have had a culture that — where we could write out 13 or 14 principles more than 30 years ago, and we’ve been able to stick with them.
所以我们不必屈从于华尔街的任何压力，或者说，任何当下的潮流。但我们有一种文化——在 30 多年前，我们能够写出 13 或 14 条原则，并且我们一直能够坚持这些原则。
And that’s very hard to do for most American corporations, and I think it’s very hard to do when managers come and go and they have small shareholdings. I think it takes a very unusual structure to be able to do it.
这对大多数美国公司来说是非常困难的，我认为当管理者频繁更换并且他们的持股比例很小的时候，这更难做到。我认为需要一种非常特殊的结构才能做到这一点。
And, you know, it took a long time to get to the point where people with large private businesses in this country really cared about where those businesses were lodged after they gave up their stewardship. Took a long time to have it get so that a great many of those people would think of Berkshire first.
而且，花了很长时间才能达到一个阶段，即很多大型私营企业在放弃管理后，真正关心这些企业的去向。很多人现在首先想到伯克希尔。
And the nice thing about it is, if they think of Berkshire first they don’t think of anybody second, so we get the call.
而这件事的好处在于，如果他们首先想到伯克希尔，他们就不会想到其他任何人，所以我们会接到电话。
We don’t do well buying businesses at auction. I mean, if somebody’s only interest is to get the top price for their business, you know, seldom we’ll get one.
我们在拍卖中购买企业的表现并不理想。也就是说，如果某人的唯一兴趣是获得他们企业的最高价格，我们通常很难拿下。
We did buy one at auction, I mean, but it was an add-on. The Dutch company we bought yesterday, we bought at auction. But that sometimes happens with our smaller acquisitions.
我们确实有在拍卖中买过一家企业，但那只是一个附加收购。我们昨天收购的荷兰公司就是通过拍卖获得的。但这在我们的小型收购中偶尔会发生。
But the big private acquisitions are going to come to Berkshire because they want to come to Berkshire. And that’s a significant competitive edge, and I don’t see how anybody really challenges us on that.
但大型私人收购将会来到伯克希尔，因为他们想要来到伯克希尔。这是一个显著的竞争优势，我看不出还有谁能在这方面真正挑战我们。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, not only do I think other people will have a hard time copying it effectively, I think if Warren went back to being 30 years of age with a modest amount of capital and not much else, he’d have a hell of a time doing it again, too.
查理·芒格：我不仅认为其他人很难有效地复制它，我认为如果沃伦回到 30 岁，手头只有一小笔资本和其他不多的东西，他也会很难再做到这一点。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to try. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我想试试。（笑声）
OK. Becky? 好的。贝基？
36. Rarely try to change companies in our stock portfolio
很少尝试更换我们股票投资组合中的公司
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from David Schermerhorn (PH) in Boulder, Colorado.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自科罗拉多州博尔德的戴维·舍默霍恩（PH）。
And he writes that “Berkshire Hathaway has several substantial investments in other publicly traded companies.
他写道：“伯克希尔·哈撒韦在其他几家上市公司中有一些重大的投资。
“As a shareholder, Berkshire is entitled to annually cast votes on matters such as election of directors, advisory vote on executive compensation, approval of stock option plans, and so forth.
作为股东，伯克希尔有权每年就董事选举、对高管薪酬的咨询投票、批准股票期权计划等事项投票。
“So could you tell us what goes into your thinking and decisions with respect to how you vote our shares in these companies?”
“那么，您能告诉我们在这些公司中投票时，您是如何思考和做出决定的吗？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We virtually never have voted against management, but we’ve done it a couple of times. There have been a —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们几乎从未反对管理层投票，但我们确实做过几次。有过一次——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, in 50 years.
查理·芒格：是的，五十年后。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There have been a couple of times when we thought — on the question of stock option expensing when that was put on a ballot.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们曾经有几次认为——关于股票期权费用化的问题，当时这被列入投票。
If we — there may have been a particularly egregious option grant or something, we might have voted against, but our general feeling is that when we’re a large shareholder of a company that we certainly generally like the business, we generally like the management.
如果我们——可能有一个特别严重的股票期权授予或其他什么情况，我们可能会投反对票，但我们的一般感觉是，当我们是一个公司的大股东时，我们通常是喜欢这个业务的，我们通常是喜欢管理层的。
We realize that they’re not going to subscribe to our views 100 percent, in many cases 90 percent or 80 percent. Doesn’t mean we think they’re bad people or anything. They just — they have a different — they’re sort of judging by behavior elsewhere. And they’re perfectly decent people, but they don’t think about things exactly the same way we do.
我们意识到，他们不会在很多情况下完全认同我们的观点，甚至可能不会有90%或80%的认同。这并不意味着我们认为他们是坏人。他们只是——他们在判断事情时有不同的考虑方式。而且他们是完全正派的人，只是他们的思维方式与我们不完全一致。
But that doesn’t rule out owning a big piece of the business. We are not in the business of trying to change people. We don’t try and change people when we buy the entire business. We think it’s like marrying somebody to change them. It just doesn’t work very well.
但这并不排除我们拥有这家公司的大部分股份。我们不想改变人。当我们收购整个公司时，我们也不试图改变他们。我们认为这就像嫁给一个人去改变他们。结果往往不太好。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Doesn’t work very well with children, either. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：对孩子们也不太有效。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: No. And we know we don’t want anybody to marry us to change us.
沃伦·巴菲特：没错。我们知道我们不希望任何人嫁给我们以改变我们。
So I mean, we’re not going to do it — we accept people the way they come, pretty much. Doesn’t mean we look — we decide we’ll associate with anyone, but we don’t expect everybody to be clones of us.
所以我的意思是，我们不会这样做——我们基本上接受人们的本来面貌。这并不意味着我们会决定与任何人交往，但我们不期望每个人都和我们一模一样。
And if we were to see a particularly dumb merger, a particularly egregious stock option plan, we might vote against it. It would pass anyway. We wouldn’t conduct a campaign against it.
如果我们看到一个特别愚蠢的合并或特别过分的股票期权计划，我们可能会投反对票。虽然这类提案仍会通过。我们不会进行任何运动来反对它。
But we have seen a few of our companies engage in some — what we thought were really dumb deals, and we’ve usually been right, but we couldn’t stop them.
但我们看到一些公司参与了一些我们认为真的很愚蠢的交易，而我们通常是对的，但我们无法阻止他们。
But we have — I think we’ve voted against maybe one or two of them.
但我们有——我想我们可能投票反对了一两个。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you’ve said it all.
查理·芒格：嗯，我想你已经说得很清楚了。
37. Good commercial insurance companies are hard to find
好的商业保险公司很难找到。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的，杰伊。
JAY GELB: This question is on Berkshire’s commercial insurance operations. Berkshire has a smaller presence in primary commercial lines insurance compared to its much larger reinsurance and auto insurance businesses.
杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于伯克希尔的商业保险业务。与其更大的再保险和汽车保险业务相比，伯克希尔在主要商业保险领域的存在较小。
Under what circumstances would Berkshire be open to increasing the scale of its primary commercial insurance operations, including acquisitions?
在什么情况下，伯克希尔会考虑扩大其主要商业保险业务的规模，包括收购？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if we thought we can either expand internally, which would be tough, or buy a great company in the commercial field, which would — that would be the more likely way — you know, we’d do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果我们认为可以内部扩展（虽然这会很困难），或者收购一家优秀的商业保险公司，这是更可能的方式，我们就会这样做。
Now, we got a chance, I don’t know, six or seven years ago to get in the medical malpractice field when GE wanted out and we bought that, and then we added to that with our Princeton Insurance acquisition last year.
现在，我们有机会，大约六七年前进入医疗事故领域，当时通用电气想退出，我们买下了它，然后去年通过收购普林斯顿保险进一步扩展了这一领域。
So we did get a chance to go into a first-class company with a first-class manager in Tim Kenesey about six or seven years ago, and we jumped at it. And GE was just getting out of the insurance business.
因此，我们确实有机会与一位优秀的管理者蒂姆·肯尼斯合作，进入一家一流公司，而我们果断采取了行动。当时，通用电气正好退出保险行业。
So it’s hard to think of very many commercial insurance companies that I would get excited about, a very few. There might be a couple, and we’d like the business. I mean, you know, there are very few personal lines companies we like, but love GEICO, obviously.
所以很难想到让我感到兴奋的商业保险公司，只有很少几家。可能有一两家，我们会喜欢这个业务。我的意思是，你知道，我们喜欢的个人保险公司很少，但显然我们非常喜欢 GEICO。
There are very few reinsurance companies we like, but we love the ones we’ve got. And if we could find a quality company in commercial lines and we — presumably it would have quality management — we’d buy it in an instant. We’ve got nothing against that business.
虽然我们喜欢的再保险公司也不多，但我们对已有的那些充满信心。如果我们能找到一家高质量的商业保险公司，且它有优秀的管理团队，我们会立刻收购。我们对这个业务没有任何偏见。
38. More flexible buyback threshold?
更灵活的回购门槛？
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 11.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, this is Whitney Tilson. I’m a shareholder from New York. I have a question for Debbie.
观众成员：芒格先生和巴菲特先生，我是惠特尼·蒂尔森。我是来自纽约的股东。我有一个问题要问黛比。
I’m just kidding. I applaud the fact that you’ve —
我只是开玩笑。我赞赏你已经——
WARREN BUFFETT: She’s in the president’s box. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：她在总统包厢里。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I applaud the fact that you’ve set a price above which you won’t buy back your stock, but it seems, based on the trading of the stock since the announcement, the wall may have put a floor on the stock. It also may have put a ceiling on it slightly above 1.1 times book value.
观众成员：我赞赏你们设定了一个不会回购股票的价格上限，但根据自宣布以来股票的交易情况，这个墙可能在股价上形成了一个底线。它也可能稍微在1.1倍账面价值的上方形成了一个上限。
If so, this is obviously contrary to your desire to have the stock trade close to intrinsic value, which you’ve said is far higher than 1.1 times book.
如果是这样，这显然与您希望股票交易接近内在价值的愿望相悖，您曾表示内在价值远高于账面价值的 1.1 倍。
Have you considered being a little more flexible in the price at which you’d buy back your stock depending on how well your business is going and what other opportunities are available?
你是否考虑过根据你的业务表现和其他可用机会，灵活调整回购股票的价格？
For example, I would much prefer it if you bought back 3.4 billion of your own stock at 1.15 times book value last quarter, rather than the stocks you bought of other companies.
例如，我更希望你在上个季度以 1.15 倍的账面价值回购 34 亿的自家股票，而不是购买其他公司的股票。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, so would I. But the — I’m afraid — I don’t think it puts a ceiling on, but I do think it certainly has an effect on a floor. It doesn’t make a floor. I mean, you and I have seen enough of markets to know that if things get chaotic or anything like that, floors disappear.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我也希望如此。但我担心——我不认为这设定了一个上限，但我确实认为它对底线有影响。它并不设定底线。我是说，你和我都见过市场的足够多，知道如果出现混乱，底线就会消失。
So, I think there could be circumstances under which we would buy a lot of stock, but I don’t think they’re, you know, highly likely at all.
所以，我认为在某些情况下我们可能会购买大量股票，但我并不认为这种情况非常可能。
I think if we were at 115 — and believe me 115 would not be a crazy price — I don’t think we’d probably buy a lot more stock. It might have the effect of the stock selling at, you know, a little above that or even a lot above it, just like 110 can do the same thing.
我认为如果我们在115——相信我，115并不是个疯狂的价格——我认为我们可能不会再大量回购股票。它可能会导致股价在那个价格之上，甚至远高于这个价格，就像110也可以产生同样的效果。
I do think it signals to a lot of people that they don’t have much to lose if they buy it just slightly above the price we’ve named and perhaps they’ve got a lot to gain. But I don’t think it sets a ceiling, Whitney.
我确实认为这向很多人发出了信号，如果他们以我们所说的价格稍微高一点买入，他们损失不多，或许能获得很多收益。但我认为这并没有设定上限，惠特尼。
When people feel differently in markets, it can sell it at a much different price.
当人们在市场上的感受不同时，它可以以截然不同的价格出售。
If I thought we would buy a whole lot more stock at a slightly higher price, I would probably adjust the price, but I don’t think that’s the case. I think it would just cause everybody to think, you know, I can buy it at this little higher price and have very little to lose, just like they may very well think now.
如果我认为我们会以稍高的价格购买更多的股票，我可能会调整价格，但我认为情况并非如此。我认为这只会让每个人觉得，你知道，我可以以这个稍高的价格购买，几乎没有什么损失，就像他们现在可能会想的那样。
But you get into any kind of a chaotic market — and we’ll have chaotic markets in the future — and we might buy a lot of stock.
但是你进入任何一种混乱的市场——我们未来会有混乱的市场——我们可能会买很多股票。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I’ve got nothing to add to that, either.
查理·芒格：哦，我对此也没有什么要补充的。
39. No permanent damage to Walmart from Mexico bribery scandal
墨西哥贿赂丑闻对沃尔玛没有造成永久性损害
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll just have one or two more and then we’ll break. Andrew?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们再来一两个问题，然后就休息。安德鲁？
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. This question comes from a shareholder named David Cass (PH) of Maryland.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的。这个问题来自一位名叫大卫·卡斯（音）来自马里兰州的股东。
He says, “One of Berkshire’s largest investments in recent years has been Walmart. Has your opinion of this company changed as a result of the Mexican bribery scandal?”
他说：“近年来，伯克希尔最大的投资之一是沃尔玛。由于墨西哥贿赂丑闻，你对这家公司的看法有改变吗？”
WARREN BUFFETT: No. I think — it looks — if you read the New York Times story, there’s always another side to it. But it looks like they may well have made a mistake in how that was handled, but I do not think it — and it may well result in a significant fine, you know.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。我认为——如果你读了《纽约时报》的报道，总是有另一面。但看起来他们在处理这件事时可能确实犯了一个错误，但我认为这——可能会导致一笔巨额罚款，你知道的。
But I don’t think it changes the fundamental dynamic. I mean, Walmart does operate on low gross margins, which means it offers low prices. And that works in retailing, and a lot of other things they do work in retailing.
但我认为这并没有改变基本的动态。我的意思是，沃尔玛的毛利率很低，这意味着它提供低价格。这在零售业中是有效的，他们做的很多其他事情在零售业中也有效。
So I do not see — I mean, it’s a huge diversion of management time and it’s costly and a whole bunch of things, but I don’t think the earning power of Walmart five years from now will be materially affected by the outcome of this situation.
所以我看不出——我的意思是，这会极大地分散管理层的时间，成本也很高，还有很多其他问题，但我不认为沃尔玛五年后的盈利能力会受到这个情况的实质性影响。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, these are interesting issues.
查理·芒格：嗯，这些是有趣的问题。
I’m unaware of any place where Berkshire is slipping on this, but we have so many employees that it’s not inconceivable we could have some slippage somewhere.
我不知道伯克希尔在这方面有没有失误，但我们有这么多员工，不排除我们在某个地方会出现失误。
And you get as big as Walmart, you’re going to have an occasional glitch. I don’t think there’s something fundamentally dishonorable about Walmart.
当你像沃尔玛一样庞大时，偶尔会出现一些小问题。我认为沃尔玛并没有什么根本上不光彩的地方。
WARREN BUFFETT: When you have something as big as Berkshire, you’re going to have an occasional glitch. I mean, we have 270,000 people today interacting with customers and government officials and vendors and all kinds of people. I will guarantee you somebody is doing something wrong.
沃伦·巴菲特：当你拥有像伯克希尔这样庞大的公司时，偶尔会出现一些问题。我是说，我们今天有 27 万人与客户、政府官员、供应商和各种各样的人互动。我可以保证，总会有人在做错事。
In fact, I would guarantee you at least, you know probably 20 people are doing something wrong. You can’t have a city of 270,000 people and not have something going on.
事实上，我可以保证至少有 20 个人在做错事。你不可能有一个 27 万人口的城市而没有任何事情发生。
And we can talk until we’re blue in the face about what people should do and not do, but people don’t get messages sometimes the same way that you give them, and you know, we’re layers removed from people operating and others. And a lot of people just do crazy things.
我们可以一直讨论人们应该做什么和不应该做什么，但人们有时接收到的信息并不是你所传达的那样，而且你知道，我们和那些操作的人之间有层级差异。很多人就是会做一些疯狂的事情。
So it is a — I mean, it is a real worry if you’re running a business like this that — you don’t worry about the fact somebody is doing something wrong, because there is going to be somebody doing something wrong. What you worry about is that it’s material and nothing gets done about it, and that you act fast if you hear about something.
所以这是一种——我的意思是，如果你经营这样的生意，这确实是一个真正的担忧——你不必担心有人在做错事，因为总会有人在做错事。你担心的是这件事是否重要，以及如果你听说了什么，迅速采取行动。
And, you know, we’ve got hotlines and we’ve got all communications and everything, but that does not stop the fact that right now, somebody is doing something wrong at Berkshire.
而且，你知道，我们有热线，我们有所有的沟通方式，但这并不能阻止现在在伯克希尔有人在做错事的事实。
And if we get twice as large someday we’ll have more people. And we try to convey to the managers that when they find out about something, you know, act on it, immediately let us know. We can handle bad news as long as we get it promptly.
如果有一天我们变得两倍大，我们会有更多的人。我们试图向管理者传达，当他们发现某件事情时，知道了就立即采取行动，及时告诉我们。只要我们能及时得到坏消息，我们就能处理。
But I’m very sympathetic to anybody running hundreds of thousands of people to the problems of the ones that — sometimes, you know, they don’t even think they’re doing something wrong. I mean, if you get 270,000 people together, maybe even a crowd this size, you’ll have some very peculiar people in it. (Laughter)
但我非常理解管理数十万人所面临的问题——有时，你知道，他们甚至都不认为自己在做错事。我的意思是，如果你把27万人聚在一起，甚至是这样规模的群体，你会遇到一些非常特殊的人。(笑声)
40. Update on Buffett’s wager against hedge funds
关于巴菲特对冲基金赌注的最新消息
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re at noon, roughly.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，差不多到中午了。
I made this bet four years ago with a group at Protege Partners about the S&P versus — or an index fund — versus five funds of funds. And I told them at the time I’d put up the results every year.
我在四年前与 Protege Partners 的一组人打了这个赌，关于标准普尔指数与——或者一个指数基金——与五个基金的基金。我当时告诉他们我会每年公布结果。
And as you can see — I can’t see it from here, but the first year they — it was a huge down year. And as you might expect, just like us, we beat the S&P a lot in a down year and the last three years, the S&P has beaten them, but we’re still a tiny bit behind the hedge funds at the end of four years.
如你所见——我在这里看不太清楚，但第一年他们——这是一个巨大的下跌年。正如你所料，我们在下跌年里击败了标普，过去三年，标普又击败了他们，但在四年结束时我们仍然略微落后于对冲基金。
There’s six years to go. You might find it interesting, we each bought a zero-coupon 10-year bond so that there would be $1 million to go to the charity of — selected by either them or by me, depending on who won the bet — and that zero-coupon bond has performed magnificently, much better than Berkshire. (Laughter)
还有六年时间。你可能会觉得有趣，我们每个人都买了一张零息 10 年期债券，这样就会有 100 万美元用于慈善事业——由他们或我选择，取决于谁赢得了赌注——而那张零息债券表现得非常出色，远远超过了伯克希尔。（笑声）
We should have bought nothing but zero-coupon bonds. But the zero coupon bond, because interest rates are so low, you know, is practically selling at par, so we have petitioned the stakeholder in this case — and I don’t think we’ve heard yet — but to let us sell the zero-coupon bond and put the money in Berkshire. And I’ll guarantee them that it will be worth more than a million bucks at the end of 10 years.
我们应该只买零息债券。但是由于利率如此之低，零息债券几乎是以面值出售的，因此我们已经向相关方提出请求——我想我们还没有收到回复——希望他们允许我们出售零息债券，并将资金投入伯克希尔。我可以保证，10 年后它的价值将超过一百万美元。
But so far, the best thing you could have done was ignored both of us and just looked at where we were putting the money.
但到目前为止，你能做的最好的事情就是忽视我们两个，只关注我们把钱放在哪里。
And I will keep you up to date on this bet as we go along and we’re having a lot of fun.
我会在这个赌注的过程中随时向你们更新，我们玩得很开心。
We’ll come back in an hour, and then we’ll go till 3:30, and then we’ll have the business of the meeting.
我们一个小时后回来，然后我们会一直开到 3:30，然后我们将进行会议的事务。
Afternoon session
下午会议
41. Gen Re improving after “major fix-up operation”
Gen Re 在“重大修复行动”后有所改善
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Round two. Gary, you’re up.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二轮。加里，轮到你了。
GARY RANSOM: Am I up yet?
加里·兰索姆：我起来了吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re up.
沃伦·巴菲特：你上。
GARY RANSOM: OK. A question on General Re. If I look back at the General Re property-casualty premiums, it’s been cut in half, roughly, from 10 years ago, maybe a little more stable recently.
加里·兰索姆：好的，我有个关于通用再保险的问题。如果我回顾通用再保险的财产和意外险保费，差不多比十年前减少了一半，最近可能稍微稳定了一些。
Can you give us some idea of how you’ve had to adjust the personnel over that time, and then also what opportunities are there for General Re to grow as we go forward?
你能给我们一些关于你们在这段时间内如何调整人员的想法吗？同时，未来 General Re 有哪些增长机会？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Gen Re, I think, got off the track. It may — it was probably off the track when we bought it, and I didn’t spot it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，通用再保险，我认为，偏离了轨道。它可能——在我们购买时就已经偏离了轨道，而我没有发现。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure it was.
查理·芒格：当然是这样。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好的。（笑声）
I was in charge of that part. And, they had — I think they’d gotten more concerned about growth and satisfying certain personnel, in terms of their activities, than they had about emphasizing profitability, and it took us awhile to figure that out.
我负责那部分。他们更关注增长和满足某些员工的需求，而不是强调盈利能力，这点我认为是他们的问题，而我们花了一段时间才弄清楚这一点。
And when Joe Brandon came in, he operated 100 percent, in terms of focusing on underwriting profit instead of premium volume, and Tad Montross has followed through on that, with terrific results.
当乔·布兰登接手时，他100%专注于承保利润，而不是保费量，塔德·蒙特罗斯也在这一点上取得了极好的成果。
But it did mean getting rid of a lot of business that didn’t make any sense. They did an awful lot of what I would call “accommodation business.” So, it’s true that the PC volume dropped very significantly during that period, but it’s not volume that we miss.
但这意味着要剥离很多没有意义的业务。他们做了很多我称之为“适应性业务”的事情。所以，在那段时间内，财产险的保费量确实大幅下降，但这并不是我们所怀念的。
The life business kept growing consistently during that period. Their life business strikes me as very, very good. They’ve got a little long-term care mixed in there that we wish we didn’t have.
在这段时间内，寿险业务持续增长。他们的寿险业务给我留下了非常好的印象。他们的业务中有一些长期护理，我们希望没有这些。
But I think Gen Re is — it’s right-size, in terms of people. It’s got an underwriting discipline to it. And I wouldn’t be surprised if it grows at a reasonable rate in the future.
但我认为通用再保险在人员规模上已经适度合理。它有很好的承保纪律。我不会感到惊讶，如果未来它能够以合理的速度增长。
But it, there was a major change that had to be made in the culture at Gen Re. And, you don’t make that overnight, and you don’t keep a lot of the business — or some of the business — that you got through a wrong culture when you do straighten it out.
但这需要在通用再保险的文化中进行重大改变。而且，这不是一夜之间就能完成的，当你理顺文化时，你也无法保留通过错误文化获得的大部分业务或部分业务。
It’s a terrific asset to us now. And I think that, the life business will continue to grow, and I would bet the PC business grows, too. But it will only grow if we see the chance to do it on a profitable basis.
现在对我们来说，这是一个很好的资产。我认为寿险业务将继续增长，而我也敢打赌财产险业务也会增长。但只有在我们看到盈利机会时，它才会增长。
That’s one we feel enormously better about than we did some years back.
我们对这个问题的感觉比几年前好得多。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it was a major fix-up operation, but we finally got it done.
查理·芒格：嗯，这是一项重大修复工作，但我们最终完成了。
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t go looking for those, though.
沃伦·巴菲特：不过，我们并不主动寻找这些情况。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。
42. Threats to Berkshire’s culture after Buffett
巴菲特之后对伯克希尔文化的威胁
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 1。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Dan Lewis (PH) from Chicago.
观众成员：嗨。我是来自芝加哥的丹·刘易斯（音）。
I wanted to get your thoughts on two of my concerns about a post-Buffett Berkshire.
我想听听你对我对后巴菲特时代的伯克希尔的两个担忧的看法。
Do you worry that some of your key operating and investing managers might leave for more lucrative opportunities once they realize they’re working for one of their peers instead of a legend?
您是否担心一些关键的运营和投资经理在意识到他们为同行而非传奇人物工作后，会离开去追求更有利可图的机会？
And do you think it’s possible that a large investor or hedge fund could ever gain enough control of Berkshire to force a change in the unique culture and structure?
你认为大型投资者或对冲基金有可能获得足够的控制权来迫使伯克希尔改变其独特的文化和结构吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think that — I would say I virtually know — that the successor we have in mind will not be the kind that will turn off our managers because that — the manager in mind is a — successor in mind — has got the culture as deeply embedded in as I do.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我几乎可以说，我们心目中的接班人不会让我们的经理失去干劲，因为这位接班人将和我一样深入了解这种文化。
They would not — our managers would not — I don’t think it would be a question of leaving for more lucrative jobs.
他们不会——我们的经理不会——我认为这并不是他们会为了更有利可图的工作而离开的原因。
I think it would be because they love the kind of environment in which they exist. And if that environment didn’t exist, it wouldn’t be a question whether the alternative was more lucrative.
我认为这可能是因为他们喜欢自己所处的环境。如果那个环境不存在，那么是否有更有利可图的替代方案就不是问题了。
Many of them, a majority, could retire, wouldn’t need to work at all. They’re only going to work if it’s more fun for them to work than to do anything else, you know, in the world, because they’ve got the money to leave, in a great many cases.
他们中的许多人，大多数人，可以退休，根本不需要工作。他们只有在工作比做其他任何事情更有趣时才会工作，因为在很多情况下，他们有足够的钱可以离开。
The conditions — it’s the same reason I work. I mean, I’m 81, and I am doing what I find the most enjoyable thing to do in the world, and there are a couple reasons for that. I get to paint my own painting and, you know, I have a lot of fun, working with the people I work.
条件——这就是我工作的原因。我是说，我 81 岁了，我正在做我认为世界上最愉快的事情，这有几个原因。我可以画自己的画，而且，你知道，我和我一起工作的人在一起很开心。
And our managers work for the same reason. They do get to paint their own paintings. And my successor will understand that just as well as I do. And there would be a lot of people that might very well manage other companies that, I think if stuck in my position, would lose a fair number of managers. They just have a different style. And our managers don’t need that style.
我们的经理也是出于同样的原因工作。他们确实可以画自己的画。我的继任者会和我一样理解这一点。而且会有很多人可能非常适合管理其他公司，我认为如果他们被困在我的职位上，会失去相当数量的经理。他们只是有不同的风格。我们的经理不需要那种风格。
In terms of a takeover, I think that really gets unlikely. The size is a huge factor. And, even because of the A and B shares, the A shares get converted to B shares when I give them away.
关于收购，我认为这种可能性真的很小。公司的规模是一个巨大因素。而且，由于A股和B股的存在，当我赠送股份时，A股会转为B股。
And even 10 years from now, it would be likely that I would own, or my estate would own, something in the area, you know, perhaps, of 20 percent of the votes, thereabouts.
即使在十年后，我或我的遗产可能会拥有大约20%的投票权。
So the Buffett family will probably have 10 times the voting power, for a long time, of anybody else. So I really — I think it’s extraordinarily unlikely for both those reasons, size and the concentration that will exist.
因此，巴菲特家族在很长一段时间内可能会拥有其他人10倍的投票权。因此，我认为这两种原因都使得这种情况极不可能：公司的规模和现有的集中度。
And the longer we go, the larger we’ll get. So the — as the voting power aspect goes down, the size aspect goes up. So I don’t think there will be a takeover of Berkshire.
随着时间的推移，我们的规模会越来越大。因此，投票权的影响力下降时，规模的影响力就会上升。所以我认为不会发生对伯克希尔的收购。
And I really — you do not need to worry about my successor. You know, in many ways he’ll be better than I am.
而我真的——你不需要担心我的继任者。你知道，在很多方面他会比我更好。
He will be totally imbued with the culture. The company is imbued with the culture. It would reject anything. The board of directors reflect that culture. It’s everyplace you look around.
他将完全融入这种文化。公司充满了这种文化。它会拒绝任何违背文化的东西。董事会也反映了这种文化。你环顾四周都会看到。
Berkshire stands for something different than most companies, and, that’s not going to change.
伯克希尔代表着与大多数公司不同的东西，这一点不会改变。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what I said last night was that the first 200 billion was hard, and the second 200 billion, with the momentum in place, is likely to be pretty easy compared to what’s been accomplished in the past.
查理·芒格：我昨晚说的第一笔 2000 亿是困难的，而第二笔 2000 亿在势头已经形成的情况下，相比过去所取得的成就，可能会容易得多。
So, I don’t think it’s going to hell at all. I think the momentums are in place and the right kind of people are in place and the culture is, by and large, pretty well loved, I would say, by the people who’ve chosen to be in it. Nobody’s going to want to change it.
所以，我并不认为它会走向毁灭。我认为动能已经到位，合适的人也在其中，文化总体上是受到人们喜爱的，我会这么说，选择参与其中的人们。没有人会想要改变它。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the businesses are in place to take it to 400 billion.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这些业务已经到位，可以将其提升到 4000 亿美元。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Hmm? 查理·芒格：嗯？
WARREN BUFFETT: The business — we have the businesses to take it to 400 billion.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们有能力将业务推向 4000 亿美元。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but in addition to that, I think people of the type who have sold to us when we were the only acceptable buyer, I think will come to our successors because they will be the only acceptable buyer, at least for some significant part of what’s done.
查理·芒格：嗯，但除此之外，我认为那些在我们是唯一可接受买家时向我们出售的人，最终会转向我们的继任者，因为他们将是唯一可接受的买家，至少在某些重要的交易中是这样。
So I don’t think it’s going to be all that difficult.
所以我认为这不会太困难。
WARREN BUFFETT: Don’t make it sound too attractive, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：别把它说得太吸引人，查理。（笑声）
43. Buffett OK with 12 percent return for cash-consuming businesses
巴菲特对现金消耗型企业的 12%回报率表示满意
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？
CAROL LOOMIS: You’re interested in businesses that throw off lots of cash, for instance, See’s Candies, as well as those where you expect significant capital reinvestment needs, for example, Burlington Northern.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：您对那些产生大量现金的企业感兴趣，例如，See’s糖果，以及那些您预计需要大量资本再投资的企业，例如，伯灵顿北方铁路。
What is it about a capital-consuming business that persuades you to forego the cash yield you seem to have historically preferred?
是什么让您愿意放弃您历史上似乎更喜欢的现金收益，而选择资本消耗型企业？
How do you balance the expected need for reinvestment in a capital-consuming business against the other possible uses of cash Berkshire may have in the future, such as new investments or stock repurchases?
您如何在资本消耗型企业预计的再投资需求与伯克希尔未来可能有的其他现金使用（如新投资或股票回购）之间找到平衡？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, cash-consuming businesses, by their nature, are unattractive unless the cash they consume gets to earn a reasonable return.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，消耗现金的企业本质上是不吸引人的，除非它们消耗的现金能够获得合理的回报。
And, in the electric utility business, you know, we can expect, cash retained to perhaps earn an average of 12 percent or something like that, which we regard as quite satisfactory.
在电力公用事业中，我们可以预期，保留的现金可能平均赚取大约 12%的收益，我们认为这是相当令人满意的。
It’s not as exciting as having some business that’s going to grow 20 percent a year and not require any capital. I mean, there are a few wonderful businesses like that, but it’s perfectly satisfactory.
这并不像拥有一些每年增长 20%且不需要任何资本的业务那样令人兴奋。我的意思是，确实有一些这样的优秀企业，但这完全令人满意。
Same way with the railroad business. You know, we are going to invest a lot of capital over the next 10 years in railroads. Every year we will spend way more than depreciation charges. I think the prospect of earning reasonable returns on that are pretty darn good.
铁路业务也是如此。你知道，我们将在未来 10 年内在铁路上投资大量资本。每年我们的支出将远远超过折旧费用。我认为获得合理回报的前景非常不错。
But if I had to put a lot of money, you know, into some capital intensive business where all we were doing was staying alive with that money, you know, we would be in a terrible situation.
但是如果我不得不投入大量资金，你知道，进入一些资本密集型的业务，而我们所做的只是用那笔钱维持生存，你知道，我们将处于一个可怕的境地。
And we don’t have — in any meaningful way — we do not have any capital-consuming businesses where I see that as the prospect.
我们没有任何资本消耗型的业务，我认为这并不是一个有前景的方向。
It’s true, if you go back to a world where we thought we could earn 20 percent on equity or something of the sort, then there’s very few capital-consuming businesses where huge amounts of incremental capital can earn at a 20 percent rate.
确实，如果回到我们认为能够在股本上获得20%的世界，那么几乎没有资本消耗型企业能让大量增量资本以20%的速度盈利。
So that would be disadvantageous, but we don’t know how to make 20 percent on equity going forth in the future with the kind of sums we’re working with.
这将是一个不利因素，但我们不知道如何在未来以我们正在处理的资金规模上实现 20%的股本回报。
And we will be very happy if we can earn 12 percent or something like that on equity, particularly when some of that capital is being consumed is generated by float, which doesn’t cost us anything. We’ve got some small advantage there.
如果我们能在股本上赚取 12%或类似的收益，我们会非常高兴，特别是当部分资本是通过浮存金产生的，而这对我们没有成本时。我们在这方面有一些小优势。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s going to work pretty well. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这会运作得很好。（笑声）
There’s some Mungers here. I hope you won’t listen to the siren songs of others and kind of stay with the family heirloom.
这里有一些芒格家族的人。我希望你们不要听信他人的诱惑，继续坚守家族传承。
WARREN BUFFETT: My family is just hoping for an heirloom. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我的家人只是希望能有一件传家宝。（笑声）
44. Berkshire’s float growth rate likely to slow
伯克希尔的浮存金增长率可能会放缓
WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff? 沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫？
CLIFF GALLANT: Along those lines, in regard to float, in your annual letter this year, you say that you expect the rate of growth in your float to slow going forward.
克利夫·加兰特：在这方面，关于浮存金，在您今年的年度信中，您提到您预计未来浮存金的增长速度将放缓。
How slow? What are the drivers? Is it possible that float could shrink going forward?
有多慢？是什么原因？未来浮存金可能会缩小吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The float could shrink because we have lots of retroactive contracts, that by their nature, the float runs off, although not at a really rapid rate.
沃伦·巴菲特：浮存金可能会减少，因为我们有很多追溯性合同，这些合同的性质决定了浮存金会逐渐减少，尽管速度并不快。
And, the float at GEICO is going to grow. I mean, that — the float at our smaller insurance companies will probably net grow over time a little bit, but it’s not a lot of money.
而且，GEICO的浮存金将会增长。我的意思是，我们较小保险公司的浮存金可能会随着时间的推移稍微增长一些，但金额不大。
In Ajit’s operation, where we have a lot of the retroactive stuff, it’s very, very tough. You’ve always got a melting ice cube that you’ve got to, you know, add a little more water to.
在阿吉特的业务中，我们有很多追溯性业务，这非常困难。你总是面临一个融化的冰块，你必须不断地加水。
And I have felt — I felt when the float was 40 billion it probably wasn’t going to grow very much, and now we’re at 70 billion. So, we are looking for ways to intelligently grow the float all the time. That’s been true ever since I got in the insurance business in 1967.
我曾觉得当浮存金达到400亿时，可能不会有太大增长，而现在我们已经达到700亿。因此，我们一直在寻找明智地增长浮存金的方法。这自1967年我进入保险行业以来一直如此。
So, the desire is always there. We’ve been reasonably imaginative in figuring out ways to do it and still have the float cost us less than nothing. We’ve got the smartest guys in the business out there working on it. But the numbers are huge now, and you do have a natural runoff from the retroactive contracts.
所以，这种渴望一直存在。我们在想办法做到这一点的过程中相当富有想象力，并且仍然让浮存金成本低于零。我们有行业中最聪明的人在为此努力。但现在的数字非常庞大，而且你确实会从追溯合同中自然流失。
So I just thought that it was fair to tell the shareholders that they really should — while they look at that history of float growth, that they really can’t extrapolate that.
所以我认为告诉股东是公平的，他们在查看浮存金增长的历史时，真的不能简单推测未来的趋势。
If we get lucky, you know, we could add a fair amount more, but it’s also — it’s possible that it will actually dwindle down a little bit and — not at a fast rate — and it certainly is more than possible that it won’t grow at very much of a rate from here on.
如果我们运气好，你知道，我们可能会增加相当多的，但也有可能它实际上会稍微减少一点——虽然不是以很快的速度——而且从现在开始，它的增长速度也很可能不会太快。
Ajit told me that when I put that in the annual report that it became a challenge to him. So I’m glad I stuck it in there. He wants to make me look like an idiot, which isn’t too hard sometimes, and I may have to stick some other things in the annual report next year to get the attention.
阿吉特告诉我，当我把那个放进年度报告时，这对他来说成了一种挑战。所以我很高兴我把它放进去了。他想让我看起来像个傻瓜，这有时并不难，我可能明年还得在年度报告中放一些其他东西来引起注意。
I — if I had to bet on whether float will be higher or lower five years from now, I probably would bet just a slight bit higher, but I also wanted the shareholders to know there’s a possibility that it will decline a bit.
如果我不得不打赌五年后浮存金是会更高还是更低，我可能会稍微赌它会更高，但我也想让股东们知道它可能会略微下降。
We’re working on things, though. Every day we’re working on things to try to figure out how to increase it.
不过，我们每天都在努力，试图找出如何增加浮存金的方法。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The casualty insurance business, by its nature, is not a terribly good business. You have to be in the top 10 percent, really, to do at all well in it, and I think we’re very lucky.
查理·芒格：是的，财产意外保险业务本质上不是一个特别好的行业。你必须进入前10%才能有不错的表现，我认为我们非常幸运。
We probably have the best large-scale casualty insurance business in the world. Just because it came out of nothing doesn’t mean it’s nothing now. But I don’t think it will be wildly — it won’t grow wildly, will it, Warren?
我们可能拥有世界上最好的大规模财产意外保险业务。仅仅因为它起初一无所有，并不意味着现在它一无是处。但我认为它不会疯狂增长，不会吧，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. But if you have something that is very good and it doesn’t grow wildly, that’s not the end of the world.
查理·芒格：不。但如果你拥有一些非常好的东西，而它并没有疯狂增长，那也不是世界末日。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s certainly brought us to where we are today.
沃伦·巴菲特：它确实让我们走到了今天的位置。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s done wonders for us, and there’s been multiple people that have done — I mean, with the jobs that Tony has done at GEICO, I mean, he’s created billions and billions of dollars of value for Berkshire shareholders. That’s true certainly with Ajit. You know, it’s huge.
沃伦·巴菲特：它对我们做出了巨大的贡献，很多人都做得很出色。比如说，托尼在GEICO的工作为伯克希尔股东创造了数十亿美元的价值。这一点在阿吉特那里也同样成立。你知道，这是巨大的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We get used to having Ajit work miracles, and he’ll probably continue to do so for a long time. But if Matt Rose has to carry some of the future freight, well, that’s all right.
查理·芒格：我们习惯了让阿吉特创造奇迹，他可能会继续这样做很长一段时间。但如果马特·罗斯必须承担一些未来的重担，那也没关系。
45. Past mistakes buying declining businesses
过去购买衰退企业的错误
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station two.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Greetings to all of you from the Midwest of Europe. I’m Norman Rentrop from Bonn, Germany.
观众成员：来自欧洲中部的问候。我是来自德国波恩的诺曼·伦特罗普。
Warren, thank you very much for being so open about your health situation. You are in my thoughts and in my prayers, and I wish you a thorough healing.
沃伦，非常感谢你对你的健康状况如此坦诚。你在我的思念和祈祷中，我祝愿你早日康复。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As I have traveled a long way and can no longer ask questions in Pasadena, I’m hoping for an elaborate answer from you, Charlie, as well. (Laughter)
观众成员：由于我走了很长的路，无法在帕萨迪纳提问，因此我希望能听到您和查理的详细回答。（笑声）
My question is, how do you value declining businesses? You were talking about the encyclopedia businesses brought down by Encarta or retailing disrupted by Amazon and others by comparison shopping. How do you value declining businesses?
我的问题是，您如何评估衰退的企业？您曾提到过被Encarta冲击的百科全书业务，或被亚马逊等通过比价购物冲击的零售业。您如何评估衰退的企业？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Want me to answer that one? They’re not worth nearly as much as growing businesses. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：想让我回答这个问题吗？它们的价值远不如成长中的企业。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——
CHARLIE MUNGER: But they can still be quite valuable if a lot of cash is going to come out of them.
查理·芒格：但如果它们能带来大量现金，它们仍然可以非常有价值。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Generally speaking, it pays to stay away from declining businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。一般来说，远离衰退的企业是有利的。
It’s very hard. You’d be amazed at the offerings of businesses we get where they say, you know, it’s — I don’t want to upset Charlie, but they say, you know, it’s only six times EBITDA, and then they project some future that doesn’t have any meaning whatsoever.
这很难。你会对我们收到的商业报价感到惊讶，他们说，你知道的，我不想让查理不高兴，但他们说，这只是六倍的 EBITDA，然后他们预测一些完全没有意义的未来。
If you really think a business is declining, most of the time you should avoid it. Now, we are in several declining businesses.
如果你真的认为一个行业在衰退，大多数情况下你应该避免它。现在，我们正处于几个衰退的行业中。
You know, the newspaper business is a declining business. We will pay a price in that business. We do think we understand it pretty well. We will pay a price to be in that, but that is not where we’re going to make the real money at Berkshire.
你知道，报纸行业是一个衰退的行业。我们在这个行业会付出代价。我们确实认为我们对它有相当的了解。我们会为此付出代价，但这并不是我们在伯克希尔真正赚钱的地方。
The real money is going to be made by being in growing businesses, and that’s where the focus should be.
真正的财富将来自于参与成长中的企业，这才是应该关注的重点。
I would never spend a lot of time trying to value a declining business and think, you know, I’m going to get one free — what I call the cigar butt approach, where you get one free puff out of the cigar butt that you find.
我绝不会花很多时间去评估衰退的企业，想着我会得到一些免费收益——我称之为“烟蒂法”，就像你从找到的烟蒂中得到一口免费。
It just isn’t — the same amount of energy and intelligence brought to other types of businesses is just going to work out better. And so we — our general reaction, unless there’s some special case, is to avoid new ones.
这样的企业并没有——同样的精力和智慧投入到其他类型的企业上，结果会更好。因此，除非有特殊情况，我们的一般反应是避免新的衰退企业。
We’re playing out certain declining businesses, by their nature, but you know, we started with declining businesses. We started with textiles in New England and we tried U.S.-made shoes and we’ve —
我们正在逐步退出某些本质上处于衰退中的业务，但你知道，我们一开始就是从衰退的业务开始的。我们从新英格兰的纺织品开始，尝试了美国制造的鞋子，我们已经——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Department store in Baltimore.
查理·芒格：巴尔的摩的百货商店。
WARREN BUFFETT: Department store in Baltimore. Howard and Lexington Street.
沃伦·巴菲特：巴尔的摩的百货商店。霍华德街和列克星敦街。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Trading stamp company. We’re specialists in — (Laughter)
查理·芒格：交易印花公司。我们是专家——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have one business that did 120 million or so of sales in 1967 or ’8, and what did we do last year, about 20,000?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们有一项业务在1967年或1968年的销售额约为1.2亿，而去年我们做了多少，大约2万？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: 20,000. Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：20,000。是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I presided over it myself. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我亲自负责过这项业务。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I want to say I helped. I mean, he didn’t do it all by himself.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想说我有帮助。我是说，他并不是完全靠自己做到的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, but I sat there on the location and watched the —
查理·芒格：不，不，我坐在那里看着——
WARREN BUFFETT: We thought of bringing the sales chart down here and turning it upside down to impress you, but Charlie is still in charge of this business. He’s — (laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们考虑把销售图表拿到这里来，倒过来给你们看，以此来给你们留下深刻印象，但查理仍然负责这项业务。他——（笑声）
I can’t get him to sell it, but make me an offer. (Laughs)
我无法让他卖掉它，但给我一个报价吧。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: If you think what came out of those three declining businesses, all of which failed, it’s so many billions you — it’s hard to imagine how much came out of it. We’re not looking for an opportunity to do it again.
查理·芒格：如果你想想那三家衰退企业所带来的结果，所有这些企业都失败了，涉及的金额高达数十亿，真让人难以想象其中的数额。我们并不想再寻找这样的机会。
衰退中的企业有超过想象的势能，不是一般力量能够阻挡的。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. But it was — in 1966 — maybe we should, because in 1966, Sandy Gottesman — one of our directors and Charlie and I — we put $6 million into a company.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。但在 1966 年——也许我们应该，因为在 1966 年，桑迪·戈特斯曼——我们的一位董事，以及查理和我——我们向一家公司投资了 600 万美元。
We called it Diversified Retailing, although we only had one operation but, you know — (Laughter)
我们称之为多元化零售，尽管我们只有一个业务，但你知道——（笑声）
It was kind of like Angelo Mozilo calling his one location, you know, in New York, Countrywide Mortgage, at the time. (Laughter)
这就像安吉洛·莫齐洛当时称自己在纽约的那家分店为国民抵押贷款。（笑声）
And we bought a department store at Howard and Lexington Street. Now, in our defense, I would have to say there were four department stores at Howard and Lexington Street in Baltimore, and all four of them are gone.
我们在霍华德街和列克星顿街买了一家百货商店。为了辩护，我不得不说在巴尔的摩的霍华德街和列克星顿街上有四家百货商店，而现在这四家店都不复存在。
But that $6 million has turned into about $30 billion, starting with that —
但那 600 万美元已经变成了大约 300 亿美元，从那开始——
CHARLIE MUNGER: — failed business.
查理·芒格：——失败的生意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Failed business. Yeah, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：失败的生意。是的，是的。
And of course, Blue Chip Stamps was another example of that because that was another company that — and then, of course, Berkshire was the textile business.
当然，蓝筹印花也是一个例子，因为那是另一家公司——当然，伯克希尔是纺织业务。
So we were sort of masochistic in the early days. (Laughs)
所以我们在早期有点受虐倾向。（笑声）
Becky? 贝基？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Ignorant, too. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：也很无知。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, OK. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，好的。（笑声）
That was the word that came to mind, but I didn’t really like to use it. (Laughter)
那是我想到的词，但我并不太喜欢用它。（笑声）
46. Stay away from IPOs and big commissions
远离首次公开募股和高额佣金
BECKY QUICK: This question is from Bill Nolan who’s a shareholder from West Des Moines, Iowa.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自比尔·诺兰，他是来自爱荷华州西德莫因斯的股东。
He says, “Many of us are interested in what you,” meaning Berkshire, “are buying and you won’t tell us that.
他说：“我们很多人对你们，”指的是伯克希尔，“正在购买的东西感兴趣，但你们不会告诉我们。”
“Using Charlie’s principle of invert, invert, always invert, maybe you can help us by suggesting what to avoid and stay away from, specifically, what in the investment world today strikes you as folly, fad, unsustainable, crazy, or dumb?
“运用查理的原则：反转、反转、再反转，也许你可以通过建议我们应该避免和远离什么来帮助我们，具体来说，在今天的投资世界中，什么让你觉得是愚蠢、时尚、不可持续、疯狂或愚笨的？”
CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：很多。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. We — I think I would describe it as we try to stay away from the things, to start with, that we don’t understand. And when I say don’t understand, it isn’t that I don’t understand, you know, what a certain business does.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想我会这样描述：我们首先尽量远离那些我们不理解的事物。当我说不理解时，并不是说我不明白某个特定业务的运作。
But when I say understand, it means that I think I have a reasonably — a reasonable fix on about what the earning power and competitive position will look like in five or 10 years. So I’ve got some notion of how the industry will develop and where the company will stand within the industry.
但是当我说理解时，这意味着我认为我对未来五到十年内的盈利能力和竞争地位有一个合理的把握。因此，我对行业的发展以及公司在行业中的地位有一些概念。
Well, that eliminates a whole bunch of things. And then, beyond that, if the price is crazy, even though I understand it, that eliminates another bunch. So you get down to a very small universe, and you get down to a particularly small universe when we’re working with lots of money, as we are now.
好吧，这排除了很多东西。然后，除此之外，如果价格太离谱，即使我理解这一点，这也排除了另一部分。因此，你会缩小到一个非常小的范围，当我们处理大量资金时，尤其如此。
But we — well, I would say this: I can’t recall any time in the last 30 years, at least, that we’ve bought a new issue, have we, Charlie?
但是我们——好吧，我想我可以这么说：在过去的 30 年里，我记不起来我们买过新发行的债券，查理，是吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t think of one.
查理·芒格：我想不出一个。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. I mean, the idea, that somebody is bringing something to market today, a seller who has a choice of when to come to market, and that that security, where there’s going to be a lot of hoopla connected with it, is going to be the single cheapest thing to buy out of thousands and thousands and thousands of businesses in the world is nonsense, you know.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。我是说，有人今天将某个东西推向市场，卖家可以选择何时上市，而这种证券将是成千上万家企业中最便宜的，这纯粹是无稽之谈。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And then when it carries a 7 percent commission, or higher. It’s ridiculous.
查理·芒格：然后当它收取 7%的佣金，或者更高时。这太荒谬了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s ridiculous. So you know it can’t be the most attractive thing. But people get excited about what’s coming and all that sort of thing.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这太荒谬了。所以你知道这不可能是最吸引人的事情。但人们对即将到来的事情感到兴奋，诸如此类。
But I will guarantee you that if you have thousands of opportunities among stocks all over the world and most of them are not being promoted or being sold with special commissions in them or something else, and then some other security is coming to market that day, when the seller picks the time to bring it, as opposed to just this auction market operating otherwise, you know, it just doesn’t make any sense to spend five seconds thinking about new issues, so we don’t think about them.
但我可以保证，如果你在全球范围内有成千上万的股票机会，而大多数股票并没有被推广或附带特别佣金，然后那天有其他证券上市，卖家选择了上市时间，而不是通过正常的拍卖市场操作，你知道，花五秒钟思考新发行的股票是没有意义的，所以我们根本不考虑这些。
And we also — you know, there’s industries we know that may have a wonderful future, but we don’t have the faintest idea who the winners will be, so we don’t think about those, either.
而我们也知道，有些行业可能会有美好的未来，但我们对谁会成为赢家毫无头绪，所以我们也不考虑那些。
So there’s a whole lot of things we don’t think about. And we have a — Charlie and I have a number of filters that things have to get through very quickly before we’re willing to think about them.
所以有很多事情我们并不考虑。查理和我有很多过滤器，事情必须迅速通过这些过滤器，我们才愿意去思考它们。
And sometimes we’re thought of as rude — probably Charlie is thought of that way a little more often than I am — (laughter) — sometimes we’re thought of as rude because people will call us and they start explaining some idea to us, and it just doesn’t make it through the first filter or two.
有时候我们被认为是粗鲁的——可能查理被认为粗鲁的频率比我高一点——（笑声）——有时候我们被认为是粗鲁，因为人们会打电话给我们，开始向我们解释某个想法，但这个想法在第一道或第二道过滤器中就没能通过。
So we just — we think we’re saving their time if we just politely say, you know, that we just have no interest, and we don’t want to have you finish the sentence. (Laughter)
所以我们只是——我们认为如果我们礼貌地说，我们对这个没有兴趣，不想让你说完这句话，那就是在节省他们的时间。（笑声）
But we do that, don’t we, Charlie?
但我们这样做，对吧，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t have to do very many things that work. I mean, that’s the beauty of this business.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们不需要做很多有效的事情。我是说，这就是这个行业的魅力所在。
You don’t have to be able, you know, to spell 500 words or something to get to the end of the spelling bee and beat everybody else.
你不必能够拼写 500 个单词或其他什么才能在拼字比赛中走到最后并击败其他人。
You just have to do one or two things every now and then that — where you don’t make a big mistake and where every now and then one works out real well. And the solution — you know, you’ll get a good result.
你只需偶尔做一两件事——不犯大错，而偶尔有一件事做得很好。这样解决方案就会带来好的结果。
You can’t have a big disaster. You just — that is what we try to avoid. We do not ever want to lose a significant percentage of Berkshire’s net worth, and so far we haven’t.
你不能有重大灾难。这正是我们努力避免的。我们绝不希望失去伯克希尔净资产的显著比例，到目前为止我们还没有。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think there are a couple little rules of thumb. If it’s got a really large commission in it —
查理·芒格：我认为有几个小经验法则。如果它的佣金非常高——
WARREN BUFFETT: Forget it.
沃伦·巴菲特：算了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — don’t read it. Because the chance of somebody who is paying a very high commission to give you a big advantage is very low.
查理·芒格：——不要读它。因为支付非常高的佣金来给你带来巨大优势的机会非常低。
And the other thing that is, I think, helpful in reverse, is — as a place to look, looking at things that other smart people are buying. That is not a crazy search method as a sorting device for opportunities to consider.
还有一件我认为在反向思考中有帮助的事情是——作为一个观察的地方，看看其他聪明人正在购买的东西。这并不是一种疯狂的搜索方法，而是一个考虑机会的排序工具。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie knew me when, I used to look at — I grabbed the Graham-Newman reports as fast as they would come out. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理认识我时，我总是迅速查看——我一有机会就抓住格雷厄姆-纽曼的报告。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, sure.
查理·芒格：是的，当然。
WARREN BUFFETT: You know, if Graham Newman was doing something, it was certainly worth my time to look at it.
沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，如果格雷厄姆·纽曼在做某件事，那肯定值得我花时间去看看。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren has made a lot of people rich he doesn’t even know. Just copied him.
查理·芒格：沃伦让很多他甚至不认识的人变得富有。只是模仿了他。
WARREN BUFFETT: Don’t go into things with big commissions.
沃伦·巴菲特：不要参与高佣金的事情。
47. Berkshire is “not just an investment company”
伯克希尔“不仅仅是一家投资公司”
WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？
JAY GELB: On the subject of regulation, a question I often get from investors is, what are the implications if Berkshire ends up being subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 because of insurance becoming a smaller part of Berkshire’s overall business?
杰伊·盖尔布：关于监管，我常常收到投资者的问题是，如果由于保险在伯克希尔整体业务中占比下降，伯克希尔最终受到1940年投资公司法的影响，会有什么影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t — I may be —
沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道——我可能是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s too remote. That’s not going to happen.
查理·芒格：那太遥远了。那不会发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I used to — I read the Investment Company Act of 1940 probably 20 times because it was quite pertinent when I was setting up my partnership and all that.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我曾经——我大概读过1940年投资公司法20遍，因为在我建立合伙企业时，这非常相关。
I don’t remember every detail now, but I see no way that — that Berkshire comes close to that.
我现在不记得每个细节，但我看不出——伯克希尔有任何接近那种情况的可能。
We used to worry about both personal holding company status and investment company status, but we steered — we made very clear that we steered clear of both of those. But now — I think we’re a million miles away from it now.
我们过去担心个人控股公司地位和投资公司地位，但我们明确表示我们避免这两者。但现在——我认为我们与此相距甚远。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we really need the financial heft we have to make our basic businesses work. We are not just an investment company.
查理·芒格：是的，我们确实需要我们拥有的财务实力来使我们的基本业务运作。我们不仅仅是一家投资公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve got 270,000 employees. We own 8 companies that each would qualify for Fortune 500 stand-alone. So it’s — people thought of us as investment company long after we were nothing remotely —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们有 27 万名员工。我们拥有 8 家公司，每家公司都可以单独进入《财富》500 强。因此，人们在很长一段时间内将我们视为投资公司，而我们实际上与此毫不相关——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Like one.
查理·芒格：就像一个。
WARREN BUFFETT: — like one, and where we had no intention of going in that direction.
沃伦·巴菲特：——就像一个，我们并没有打算朝那个方向发展。
But the background of both of us caused people to hang on to that notion longer than it was appropriate.
但我们俩的背景使得人们对这个观念的坚持超过了合理的时间。
48. Great Chinese companies
伟大的中国公司
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：站点 3。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. Good afternoon. My name is Yung (PH). I’m from Toronto, Canada. I appreciate you giving me this opportunity to stand here and ask a question.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。下午好。我叫 Yung（拼音）。我来自加拿大多伦多。感谢您给我这个机会站在这里提问。
And my question is, how long do you think it will take China to appear a great company like Coca-Cola, and in which industry you think it will be? Thank you.
我的问题是，您认为中国需要多长时间才能出现像可口可乐这样的大公司，您认为它会出现在哪个行业？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: How long will it take China to do what?
沃伦·巴菲特：中国需要多长时间才能做到什么？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t quite get that one.
查理·芒格：我没太明白那一点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Connection to Coca-Cola, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：与可口可乐的关系，是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: How long will it take China to do what?
查理·芒格：中国需要多长时间才能做到什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, just how long do you think it will take China to appear a great company like Coca-Cola, and in which industry you think?
观众成员：哦，你认为中国需要多长时间才能出现像可口可乐这样的大公司？你认为在哪个行业？
CHARLIE MUNGER: China already has some great companies. It’s hard to think of a great branded goods company, but China has some very great companies already.
查理·芒格： 中国已经有一些伟大的公司。很难想到一家伟大的品牌商品公司，但中国已经有一些非常优秀的公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible). I can’t pronounce them, but they’ve got some very great companies. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：（听不清）。我无法发音，但他们有一些非常优秀的公司。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. So far it has not been Chinese fast food companies that have been exported to the United States as opposed to — you know, we’ve got over 500 Dairy Queens now in China.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。到目前为止，出口到美国的并不是中国快餐公司——你知道，我们在中国已经有超过 500 家冰雪皇后了。
We tend to export certain products well, some consumer products, entertainment products, that sort of thing.
我们倾向于很好地出口某些产品，比如一些消费品、娱乐产品之类的。
But China’s got some huge companies and they may eclipse in market value, you know, some of the ones such as Coca-Cola that we’re talking about.
但中国有一些巨大的公司，它们的市场价值可能会超过我们所谈论的可口可乐等公司。
49. Won’t invest in Apple or Google, but wouldn’t bet against them
不会投资于苹果或谷歌，但也不会与它们对赌。
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, that was station 3. Andrew?
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们看看，那是第 3 站。安德鲁？
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. This question comes from Larry Pitkowsky from the GoodHaven Fund, also another shareholder, also asked a similar question that I’ve tried to combine.
安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金：好的。这个问题来自 GoodHaven 基金的拉里·皮特科夫斯基，另一位股东也问了一个类似的问题，我试图将它们结合在一起。
Given that you’re now in IBM, are there any other entrenched leaders in technology that are, to use one of your terms, inevitable, in the same way that Coke and Gillette were?
鉴于您现在在投资IBM，是否还有其他根深蒂固的科技领袖，按照您的说法，是必然存在的，类似于可口可乐和吉列？
For example, is Google inevitable? Is it reminiscent of the advertising agencies you owned in the 1970s, i.e., a toll bridge on all digital spending that’s highly likely to keep growing over time?
例如，谷歌是必然存在的吗？它是否让你想起你在 1970 年代拥有的广告公司，即一个对所有数字支出收取通行费的桥梁，这种支出很可能会随着时间的推移而不断增长？
What are the one or two things about Google, for example, that you think are real risks? And what about Apple?
关于谷歌，你认为有哪些一两件事情是真正的风险？苹果呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, those are extraordinary companies, obviously, and both — they’re both huge companies. They make lots of money. They earn fantastic returns on capital. They look very tough to dislodge, where they have their strengths.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这些显然是非凡的公司，而且它们都是巨型公司。它们赚很多钱，资本回报率非常高。它们在自身优势领域看起来非常难以撼动。
You know, I would not be at all surprised to see them be worth a lot more money 10 years from now, but I wouldn’t want to buy either one of them.
你知道，我一点也不会感到惊讶，如果十年后它们的价值要高得多，但我并不想购买其中任何一家公司。
I do not get to the level of conviction that would cause me to buy them. But I sure as hell wouldn’t short them, either.
我并没有达到那种让我买入的信念水平。但我肯定也不会做空它们。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think we can fairly say that other people will always understand those two companies better than we do. We have the reverse of an edge. And we’re not looking for that. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我们可以公平地说，其他人总是比我们更了解这两家公司。我们正好相反，并且我们并不寻求这种优势。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Now he’s going to say isn’t the same thing true in IBM?
沃伦·巴菲特：现在他要说在 IBM 是不是也一样？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think it is. I think IBM is easier to understand.
查理·芒格：我认为不是。我认为 IBM 更容易理解。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The chances of being way wrong in IBM are probably less, at least for us, than being way wrong with Google or Apple. But that doesn’t mean that those — the latter two companies —aren’t going to do, say, far better than IBM.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。对于我们来说，在 IBM 上大错特错的可能性可能比在谷歌或苹果上大错特错的可能性要小。但这并不意味着后两家公司不会比 IBM 表现得更好。
2012年，iPhone已经发行到第5代。
But we wouldn’t have predicted what would happen with Apple 10 years ago. And it’s very hard for me to predict, you know, what will happen in the next 10 years.
但我们十年前并没有预测到苹果会发生什么。而且我很难预测，接下来十年会发生什么。
They’re certainly — you know, they’ve come up with these brilliant products. There’s other people trying to come up with brilliant products.
他们当然——你知道，他们想出了这些出色的产品。还有其他人也在努力想出出色的产品。
I just don’t know how to evaluate the people that are out there working, either in big companies or in garages, that are trying to think of something that will change the world the way they have changed it in recent years.
我只是不知道如何评估那些在大公司或车库里工作的人，他们正在努力思考一些能够改变世界的东西，就像他们近年来所做的那样。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And what do we know about computer science?
查理·芒格：我们对计算机科学了解多少？
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s no reply. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：没有回应。（笑声）
50. Strong freight railroad economics will overcome politics
强大的货运铁路经济将战胜政治
WARREN BUFFETT: Gary? 沃伦·巴菲特：加里？
GARY RANSOM: Politics sometimes affects your businesses. Recently we’ve seen some coal plant closings, turndown of XL pipeline, all of which seemed to have potential effect on BNSF revenues.
加里·兰索姆：政治有时会影响你的业务。最近我们看到了一些煤电厂的关闭，XL 管道的停工，这些似乎都对 BNSF 的收入产生了潜在影响。
Can you talk about how you manage that risk or what the impact might be of some of those political issues?
你能谈谈你是如何管理这种风险的，或者这些政治问题可能带来的影响吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, BNSF runs their own business very much. I went down to Fort Worth once after we bought it a few years ago, and I haven’t been there since. And I probably talk to Matt on the phone, I don’t know, once every three months or something of the sort.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，BNSF 非常独立地运营他们的业务。我在几年前收购它后曾去过一次沃斯堡，从那以后就没去过。我大概每三个月左右会和马特通一次电话。
But there’s no question that railroads, utilities, insurance companies, are all very much affected by the political process.
但毫无疑问，铁路、公用事业、保险公司都受到政治过程的很大影响。
Fortunately, I think, in the railroad industry, you know, we’ve got economics on our side. And economics usually win out.
幸运的是，我认为在铁路行业，我们有经济因素在支持我们。而经济因素通常会占上风。
I mean, we can move a ton of product 500 miles on one gallon of diesel, and that may be three times or so as efficient as trucking. And that may be why the railroads currently move, say, 42 percent of all intercity traffic.
我的意思是，我们可以用一加仑柴油将大量货物运输 500 英里，这可能是卡车运输效率的三倍左右。这可能就是为什么铁路目前运输大约 42%的城际交通。
I don’t think our percentage is going to go down, the railroad industry as a whole, no matter what the politics may be. It’s just too compelling to move heavy traffic long distances over steel rail. And in terms of congestion, in terms of emissions, all kinds of reasons.
我认为无论政治如何变化，铁路行业的份额不会下降。通过钢铁轨道长距离运输重货是非常有吸引力的。从拥堵、排放等各种原因来看也是如此。
So we’ve got a wonderful product, and there will always be struggles in the political arena between competitors and railroads, and customers and railroads. It’s just — it’s the nature of the game, and there will be some of that in utilities, too. But overall, I like our position in it.
因此，我们有一个很好的产品，在政治领域，竞争者与铁路、客户与铁路之间总会有斗争。这就是游戏的本质，在公用事业中也会有一些这样的情况。但总的来说，我喜欢我们的立场。
They do have to be involved in politics. I mean, the railroads — all four of the big railroads — are going to be involved in the political process because people have got a — who would like to change some of the rules, either as customers or competitors, are going to be in politics, too, and things will get decided in state capitals ,and more important in Washington, of importance.
他们确实必须参与政治。我的意思是，所有四大铁路公司都将参与政治过程，因为那些希望改变一些规则的人，无论是作为客户还是竞争对手，也会参与政治，而事情将在州府和更重要的华盛顿得到决定。
So they will — they’ll have lobbyists and they’ll play a political game and their opponents will.
所以他们会——他们会有游说者，他们会玩政治游戏，他们的对手也会。
I like our position. The — it would be very dumb for the country to do anything that discouraged the railroad industry from spending the kind of capital that will need to be spent to take care of the transportation needs of this country in the future.
我喜欢我们的立场。国家做任何事来打击铁路行业投资所需的资金是非常愚蠢的，这对满足未来国家的运输需求至关重要。
If you think about the money that will have to be spent on highways, and on the costs involved in there, and the congestion problems, the emissions problems, everything, the country has a strong interest in the railroad industry having every incentive to invest.
如果考虑到在高速公路上需要花费的资金，以及相关的成本、拥堵问题、排放问题等等，国家非常有兴趣让铁路行业拥有投资的所有激励。
And the railroad industry pays its own way, you know. We’ll spend $3.9 billion this year, and a lot of it will go to improve our present system an awful lot, and some will go toward expansion of a type. And the country will be better off on that, and the Federal Government will not write a check for it.
铁路行业自负盈亏，你知道的。今年我们将花费 39 亿美元，其中大部分将用于大幅改善我们现有的系统，部分将用于某种类型的扩展。国家在这方面会更好，而联邦政府不会为此开支票。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s in the nature of things that there are waves of good breaks and bad breaks.
查理·芒格：是的。这是事物的本质，存在着好运和坏运的波动。
Burlington Northern was enormously helped when you could double the container carriage by making the tunnels a little higher and the bridges a little stronger. And they were enormously helped when they found all this oil in North Dakota and there weren’t any pipelines.
伯灵顿北方铁路在将集装箱运输能力翻倍时受益匪浅，这得益于将隧道稍微加高和桥梁稍微加固。而当他们在北达科他州发现大量石油而没有管道时，他们也受益匪浅。
And they will get some bad breaks, too, occasionally, where somebody will take away a little break. But averaged out, it’s a terrific business with terrific management. I don’t think our main problems are political at all.
他们有时也会遇到一些坏运气，比如有人会夺走他们的一些小机会。但总体来看，这是一项出色的业务，管理也很出色。我认为我们主要的问题根本不是政治方面的。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. The railroad industry —
沃伦·巴菲特：不。铁路行业——
CHARLIE MUNGER: For one thing, we’re headed by a prominent Democrat.
查理·芒格：首先，我们由一位杰出的民主党人领导。
WARREN BUFFETT: The railroad industry was — (laughter) — that may not be a help, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：铁路行业曾经——（笑声）——这可能并没有帮助，查理。（笑声）
Right after World War II — now, there was a lot of passenger traffic then — but the railroad industry, I think, had as many as 1,700,000 employees in the United States.
第二次世界大战结束后——那时乘客流量很大——但我认为美国的铁路行业有多达 1,700,000 名员工。
And here we are today, there’s less than 200,000. I mean, railroads have become so much more efficient, just by a huge factor, and it’s a fundamentally very good way to move heavy stuff a long distance.
今天我们在这里，数量不到 200,000。我是说，铁路变得更加高效，效率提高了很多，这是一个从根本上来说非常好的长途运输重物的方式。
I mean, it’s hard to conceive of anything — it’s be nice maybe to have barge traffic, but you only got a few rivers that are going to lend themselves to real volume along that line.
我意思是，很难想象有什么——也许有驳船交通会很好，但你只有几条河流能够真正适合沿线的大量运输。
And so, you know, you have air, pipeline, you know, vehicles, planes, trains. Trains are pretty darn good.
所以，你知道，你有航空、管道、车辆、飞机、火车。火车非常不错。
51. No question from station 4
站台 4 没有问题
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 4 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Section 4 does not have any questions at this time. Thank you.
观众成员：第 4 节目前没有任何问题。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a first. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，这是第一次。（笑声）
52. Comparing Berkshire to the S&P
将伯克希尔与标准普尔进行比较
WARREN BUFFETT: Carol, have you run out?
沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗，你用完了吗？
CAROL LOOMIS: Unprepared as I am, this is a question about the table on the first page of the annual letter, which shows the relative performance of the S&P 500 index against Berkshire’s book value.
卡罗尔·卢米斯：尽管我没有准备好，但我有一个关于年度信第一页表格的问题，该表格显示了标普500指数与伯克希尔账面价值的相对表现。
“This is an unfair apples-to-oranges presentation. An investor in the S&P 500 index can easily earn the returns shown for the S&P, but an investor in Berkshire will not earn the returns implied by the company’s book values figures shown.
“这是一个不公平的苹果与橘子的比较。投资于标准普尔 500 指数的投资者可以轻松获得所示的标准普尔回报，但投资于伯克希尔的投资者将无法获得公司账面价值所暗示的回报。”
“Instead, he or she will earn returns over any given period that depend on the market’s assessment thereof, that is, the price-to-book value ratio, and we’ve seen that go down in the last few years.
相反，他或她将在任何给定时期内获得回报，这取决于市场对此的评估，即市净率，而我们已经看到这一比例在过去几年中下降。
“A fairer comparison would be against the annual percentage change in the book value per share of the S&P 500 with dividends included. Wouldn’t your shareholders be better served by better information?”
“更公平的比较应该是与包含股息的标准普尔 500 指数每股账面价值的年度百分比变化进行比较。难道您的股东不会通过更好的信息得到更好的服务吗？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually you can make the calculation two different ways as alternatives to what we do. You could have the market value of the S&P, which is in there with dividends added back, versus the market value of Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，你可以用两种不同的方式来进行计算，作为我们所做的替代方案。你可以将标普 500 的市场价值（包括已加回的股息）与伯克希尔的市场价值进行比较。
Berkshire would show up better on that table than it does in the table I present. In other words, our advantage over the S&P would be larger if calculated that way because we started at a discount from book value and we ended up at a premium.
伯克希尔在那张表上的表现会比我呈现的表更好。换句话说，如果以那种方式计算，我们相对于标准普尔的优势会更大，因为我们起初是以低于账面价值的折扣开始的，而最终则以溢价结束。
So it would bounce around the years. But overall, our gain would be probably at least — well, it would be about 35 or so percent higher in aggregate over the time than is shown by the book value gain, which is a lot of dollars when you make the calculation.
所以它会在这些年中波动。但总体而言，我们的收益可能至少会比账面价值的增益高出大约 35%左右，这在计算时是相当可观的金额。
You could also show the book value of the S&P versus the book value of Berkshire. That figure will be a wash, pretty much, because if you take the S&P’s price to book value, if that maintains the ratio at the beginning to the same ratio at the end, it’s a wash as to how that calculation comes out.
您还可以展示标准普尔的账面价值与伯克希尔的账面价值。这个数字基本上是持平的，因为如果您将标准普尔的市净率保持在开始时的比例到结束时的相同比例，那么这个计算的结果就是持平的。
So I think we could show — we could make a calculation that was more favorable to Berkshire. I don’t think what the person suggests there would result in a calculation that’s less favorable to Berkshire.
所以我认为我们可以展示——我们可以做一个对伯克希尔更有利的计算。我认为那个人所建议的不会导致一个对伯克希尔不利的计算。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Long-term, the stock value has tracked fairly well with book value.
查理·芒格：从长远来看，股票价值与账面价值的走势相当一致。
WARREN BUFFETT: But it’s over-performed book value —
沃伦·巴菲特：但它的表现超过了账面价值——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — for the whole time. Which is the point this question seems —
沃伦·巴菲特：——一直以来。这就是这个问题似乎要表达的观点——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve been criticized for making yourself look worse.
查理·芒格：嗯，你因为让自己看起来更糟而受到批评。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s all right. You can bear it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：没关系。你可以忍受的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve done the other, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我也做过其他的事情。（笑）
53. We don’t even try to coordinate our subsidiaries
我们甚至不尝试协调我们的子公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff. 沃伦·巴菲特：悬崖。
CLIFF GALLANT: In studying the collapse of AIG, one of the things we learned is there were parts of the company that understood there were certain financial risks in the market and they were lowering their exposure.
克利夫·加朗特：在研究 AIG 的崩溃时，我们了解到公司内部有一些部门意识到市场上存在某些金融风险，并且他们正在降低自己的风险敞口。
While, at the same time, there were other parts of AIG which were actually increasing their exposure to the same risk.
与此同时，AIG 的其他部分实际上在增加对同一风险的敞口。
In terms of enterprise risk management at Berkshire, how do you share information across units to make sure that the same mistakes aren’t made?
在伯克希尔的企业风险管理方面，您如何在各个部门之间共享信息，以确保不再犯同样的错误？
WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t totally get that. Did you get that, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：我没完全明白。查理，你明白了吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he was talking about how do we share information across units.
查理·芒格：嗯，他在谈论我们如何在各个部门之间共享信息。
Well, if there’s any sharing, they’re doing it; we’re not.
好吧，如果有任何分享，他们在分享；我们没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We don’t —we don’t have any — we’re the most uncoordinated pair of individuals, operating both in sports or at the executive level.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们没有——我们是最不协调的一对，无论是在体育还是在高管层面。
There are certainly some people at Berkshire that have some contact with other people at Berkshire, but there’s nothing in the way of an organized way of doing that.
在伯克希尔确实有一些人与其他伯克希尔的人有接触，但并没有以组织化的方式进行。
I mean, [Gen Re CEO] Tad [Montross] and [GEICO CEO] Tony [Nicely] and [reinsurance chief] Ajit [Jain] are friends, and [National Indemnity President] Don Wurster, and they see each other sometimes so they’re — and I’m sure they talk insurance.
我的意思是，[Gen Re CEO] Tad [Montross]、[GEICO CEO] Tony [Nicely] 和 [再保险主管] Ajit [Jain] 是朋友，还有 [National Indemnity 总裁] Don Wurster，他们有时会见面，所以他们——我相信他们会谈论保险。
But we don’t make any attempt — if somebody goes in to get a quote from Gen Re and gets a quote from Ajit, there’s no — we have no system that prevents — or that coordinates — our two units to give the same quote or anything of the sort.
但我们并没有采取任何措施——如果有人去 Gen Re 获取报价并从 Ajit 那里获得报价，我们没有任何系统来防止——或者协调——我们的两个部门给出相同的报价或类似的事情。
We want our businesses to run very autonomously, and we want the managers of those businesses to feel like they’re their own business. That’s enormously important at Berkshire.
我们希望我们的业务能够非常自主地运作，并希望这些业务的管理者感觉他们是在经营自己的公司。这在伯克希尔是非常重要的。
So we don’t tell the people at Clayton Homes to buy their carpet from Shaw or to buy their paint from Benjamin Moore. We just don’t do that.
因此，我们不会告诉克莱顿住宅的人从肖氏买地毯或从本杰明·摩尔买油漆。我们就是不这样做。
And you could say that’s kind of silly, but it’s — any gains we would get from doing that, by selling incremental units, I think would be far offset by the change in the feeling of the manager as to whether they’re really running their own business.
你可以说这有点傻，但我们从中获得的任何增量销售收益，我认为都无法抵消管理者对是否真正管理自己业务的感受的改变。
主动是所有正面力量的起点。
We hand people billions of dollars and they hand us stock certificates and they have been running those businesses for decades in many cases.
我们把数十亿美元交给人们，他们则交给我们股票证书，在许多情况下，他们已经经营这些企业几十年了。
And we want them to feel the same way the next day, when they’ve got the money and we’ve got the stock certificates, as the day before when they had the stock certificates and we had the money.
我们希望他们在第二天也有同样的感觉，那时他们有了钱，而我们有了股票证书，就像前一天他们有股票证书而我们有钱时一样。
And the moment we start telling them how to change the way they operate, or to coordinate with this guy, or get this person’s approval, or anything like that, you know, that just erodes that advantage, which we think is very substantial, that they have this proprietary feeling about their business.
一旦我们开始告诉他们如何改变他们的运作方式，或者如何与这个人协调，或者获得这个人的批准，或者类似的事情，你知道，这就削弱了他们的优势，而我们认为这个优势是非常显著的，因为他们对自己的业务有一种专有的感觉。
Have I answered that, Charlie?
我回答过这个问题吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We’re trying to fail at what you wanted us to succeed at. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的。我们正在努力在你希望我们成功的事情上失败。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll have to think about that a little. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我需要好好想想这个。（笑声）
54. Acquisition of a forest products company unlikely
收购一家森林产品公司的可能性不大
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 5?
沃伦·巴菲特：第五站？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Charlie and — Warren.
观众：你好，查理和——沃伦。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m Warren, yeah. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我是沃伦，是的。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Well, my name is Richard Cooper, and I’m from Honor, Michigan. And I’m a professional forester.
观众成员：是的。我叫理查德·库珀，来自密歇根州的霍诺。我是一名专业的林务员。
Trees are one of America’s greatest resources, and it seems that a well-run forest products firm would fit well with Berkshire’s holdings.
树木是美国最宝贵的资源之一，似乎一家运营良好的森林产品公司与伯克希尔的投资组合非常契合。
You’ve got the transportation system to move the product. You have the construction firms to use the product — furniture companies, home builders — and you’ve got insurance companies to cover the insurance end of the holdings.
你有运输系统来移动产品。你有建筑公司来使用这些产品——家具公司、房屋建筑商——还有保险公司来承担资产的保险。
Have you given any thought to getting a forest products firm?
你有没有考虑过开一家森林产品公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, your question touches on the answer we just gave. We would not really consider the other activities that Berkshire has in determining whether we would get into forest products.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你的问题涉及到我们刚才给出的答案。在决定我们是否会进入森林产品时，我们实际上不会考虑伯克希尔的其他活动。
We’ve looked at forest products companies, but we don’t think about them in terms of how they may divert their products to some other subsidiaries of ours, or how other subsidiaries might benefit from selling them something.
我们曾经研究过林产品公司，但我们不会考虑它们如何将产品转移到我们的其他子公司，或其他子公司如何从中受益。
To date, we’ve looked at several. To date, we’ve never really found any that met our test for returns against purchase price.
迄今为止，我们已经看过几个。到目前为止，我们从未真正找到任何符合我们对购买价格回报测试的标准。
I mean, it’s a business that’s easy — or reasonably easy — to understand, I mean, in terms of the economics and its permanence and all that sort of thing. But the math has escaped us, in terms of being compelling.
我的意思是，这是一项容易理解的生意——或者说相对容易——我指的是从经济学和其持久性等方面来看。但在吸引力方面，数学却让我们感到困惑。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot of forest products companies convert themselves into flow-through partnerships of some kind so they don’t pay normal full corporate income taxes the way we do.
查理·芒格：很多林产品公司将自己转变为某种通道型合伙企业，这样它们就不会像我们一样支付正常的全额企业所得税。
Berkshire is actually organized so that we’d be a disadvantage — we’d be at a disadvantage — in bidding for forests.
伯克希尔的组织方式实际上使我们在竞标森林产品公司时处于劣势。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’re at a disadvantage in terms of any kind of activity that people manage to convert into pass-through organizations.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。对于任何人们能够转变为通道型组织的活动，我们都是处于劣势。
So particularly — take REITs, Real Estate Investment Trust, you know, they have eliminated one tax in their structure that we would bear.
所以特别是——以房地产投资信托（REITs）为例，你知道，他们在其结构中消除了我们需要承担的一项税。
And like Charlie says, you know, you have firms like Plum Creek Timber and those sort of operations where they have eliminated the federal income tax, and we don’t have any structure like that. So just going in, we have a structural disadvantage that is really quite significant.
正如查理所说，你知道，像Plum Creek Timber这样的公司，它们消除了联邦所得税，而我们没有这样的结构。因此，单从结构上来看，我们确实存在一个相当显著的劣势。
55. No magic formula for calculating risk
计算风险没有魔法公式
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Scott Bondurant who is from Chicago, Illinois, and he’s a shareholder.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自于来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的斯科特·邦杜兰特，他是一名股东。
And he asks, “Can you please elaborate your views on risk? You clearly aren’t a fan of relying on statistical probabilities, and you highlight the need for $20 billion in cash to feel comfortable. Why is that the magic number, and has it changed over time?”
他问：“你能详细阐述一下你对风险的看法吗？显然你不喜欢依赖统计概率，并且你强调需要 200 亿美元的现金才能感到安心。为什么这个数字是魔法数字，它是否随着时间而变化？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it isn’t the magic number, and there is no magic number.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。其实这不是一个魔法数字，也没有魔法数字。
I would get very worried about somebody that walked in every morning and told us precisely how many dollars of cash we needed to be, you know, secured at three sigma or something like that.
我会非常担心那些每天早上进来告诉我们需要多少现金才能在三倍标准差的情况下保持安全的人。
Charlie and I have had a lot of — we saw a lot of problems develop in an organization that expressed their risks in sigma, and we even argued sometimes with the appropriateness of how they calculated their risk.
查理和我经历了很多——我们看到一个组织在以西格玛表达他们的风险时出现了很多问题，有时我们甚至争论过他们计算风险的合理性。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It was truly horrible.
查理·芒格：这真是太可怕了。
WARREN BUFFETT: And they were a lot smarter than we were. (Laughs) That’s what’s depressing.
沃伦·巴菲特：他们比我们聪明得多。（笑）这让人感到沮丧。
But we both have the same bend of mind whereby we think about worst cases all the time, and then we add on a big margin of safety, and we don’t want to go back to go.
但我们俩都有相同的思维方式，总是考虑最坏的情况，然后再加上一个很大的安全边际，我们不想回到起点。
I mean, I enjoy tossing those papers in the other room, but I don’t want to do it for a living again.
我是说，我喜欢把那些纸扔到另一个房间，但我不想再以此为生。
So we undoubtedly build in layers of safety that others might regard as foolish, but we’ve got 600,000 shareholders and we’ve got members of my family that have 80 or 90 percent of their net worth in the company.
所以我们无疑建立了其他人可能认为愚蠢的安全层，但我们有 60 万股东，还有我的家族成员将 80%或 90%的净资产投入到公司中。
And I’m just not interested in explaining to them that we went broke because there was a one-hundredth of 1 percent chance that we would go broke and there was a — the remaining probability was filled by the chance of doubling our money, and I decided that that was just a good gamble to take.
我对此没有兴趣向他们解释，我们破产是因为有0.01%的机会破产，而剩余的概率是我们翻倍的机会，我决定这是一个值得冒的好险。
We’re not going to do that. It doesn’t mean that much. We are never going to risk what we have and need for what we don’t have and don’t need. We’ll still find things to do where we can make money, but we don’t have to stretch to do it.
我们不会那样做。这并没有那么重要。我们永远不会冒险去牺牲我们拥有和需要的东西，去追求我们没有和不需要的东西。我们仍然会找到可以赚钱的事情，但我们不必勉强去做。
And it’s my job — and Charlie thinks the same way. We don’t have to talk about it much.
这就是我的工作——查理也是这么认为的。我们不需要多谈这个。
But it’s our job to figure out what can really go wrong with this place and, you know, we’ve seen September 11th, and we’ve seen September of 2008, and we’ll see other things of a different nature but similar impact in the future.
但我们的工作是弄清楚这个地方可能出现的真正问题。你知道，我们见过 911 事件，也见过 2008 年 9 月的情况，未来我们还会看到其他性质不同但影响相似的事件。
And we not only want to sleep well all those nights, we want to be thinking about things to do with some excess money we might have around.
我们不仅希望在那些夜晚睡得很好，还希望考虑如何利用我们可能有的多余资金。
So it is — if you’re calibrating it in some mathematical way, I would say it’s really dangerous. I could give you a couple examples on that, but unfortunately I’ve learned about them on a confidential basis.
所以，如果你以某种数学方式进行校准，我会说这真的很危险。我可以给你几个例子，但不幸的是，我是以保密的方式了解到这些的。
But some really great organizations have had dozens of people with advanced mathematical training and make — and thinking about it daily, making computations, and they don’t really — they don’t really get at the problem.
但一些非常优秀的组织拥有数十名受过高级数学训练的人，他们每天都在思考这个问题，进行计算，但他们实际上并没有真正解决这个问题。
So it’s at the top of the mind, always, around Berkshire, and your returns in 99 years out of 100 will probably be penalized by us being excessively conservative, and one year out of a hundred, we’ll survive when some other people won’t.
所以这始终是伯克希尔最重要的事情，99%的年份里，你的回报可能会因为我们过于保守而受到惩罚，而在 100 年中，有一年我们会生存下来，而其他一些人则不会。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, how do these super-smart people with all these degrees in higher mathematics end up doing these dumb things?
查理·芒格：是啊，这些拥有高等数学学位的超级聪明的人怎么会做出这些愚蠢的事情呢？
I think it’s explainable by the old proverb that, “To a man with a hammer, every problem looks pretty much like a nail.” They’ve learned these techniques and they just twist the problem so they fit the solution, which is not the way to do it.
我认为这可以用一句古老的谚语来解释：“对一个手握锤子的人来说，所有问题看起来都像钉子。”他们学会了这些技巧，只是把问题扭曲成适合解决方案的样子，这并不是正确的方法。
WARREN BUFFETT: And they have a lack of understanding of history, I would say.
沃伦·巴菲特：我会说他们对历史缺乏理解。
One of the things — in 1962, when I set up our office in Kiewit Plaza, where we still are, it’s a different floor, I put seven items on the wall. Our art budget was $7, and I went down to the library, and for a dollar each I made photo copies of the pages from financial history.
1962年，我在我们仍然在的基维特广场设立了办公室，虽然在不同的楼层，我把七项内容贴在墙上。我们的艺术预算是7美元，我去图书馆，每页花一美元复印了金融历史的页面。
And one of those cases, for example, was in May of 1901 when the Northern Pacific Corner occurred, and it’s kind of interesting in terms of being in Omaha because Harriman was trying to get control of the Northern Pacific, and James J. Hill was trying to control the Northern Pacific.
其中一个例子是1901年5月北太平洋铁路角事件，这在奥马哈特别有趣，因为哈里曼试图控制北太平洋铁路，詹姆斯·J·希尔也在试图控制北太平洋铁路。
And unbeknownst to each other, they both bought more than 50 percent of the stock. Now, when two people buy more than 50 percent of the stock each, and they both really want it, they’re not just going to resell it. You know, interesting things happen.
而他们互不知情地都买了超过50%的股票。当两个人都购买超过50%的股票，并且他们都非常想要时，他们不会简单地转售。你知道，会发生有趣的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGER: To the shorts.
查理·芒格：这对空头来说。
WARREN BUFFETT: And in that paper of May 1901, the whole rest of the market was totally collapsing because Northern Pacific went from $170 a share to $1000 a share in one day, trading for cash, because the shorts needed it.
沃伦·巴菲特：在1901年5月的那篇报道中，整个市场完全崩溃，因为北太平洋的股价在一天内从170美元飙升至1000美元，现金交易，因为空头需要它。
And there was a little item at the top of that paper, which we still have at the office, where a brewer in Troy, New York, committed suicide by diving into a vat of hot beer because he’d gotten a margin call.
而在那篇报道的顶部有一个小消息，我们现在仍然在办公室里有记载，纽约特洛伊的一位酿酒师因收到保证金催缴通知而跳入热啤酒桶自杀。
And to me, the lesson — that fellow probably understood sigmas and everything and knew how impossible it was that in one day a stock could go from 170 to 1,000 to cause margin calls on everything else.
对我来说，这个教训——那家伙可能理解了西格玛和一切，并知道在一天之内，一只股票从 170 涨到 1,000 是不可能的，这会导致其他所有股票的保证金追缴。
And he ended up in a vat of hot beer, and I’ve never wanted to end up in a vat of hot beer. (Laughter)
他最后掉进了一个热啤酒的桶里，我从来不想掉进热啤酒的桶里。（笑声）
So those seven days that I put up on the wall — life in financial markets has got no relation to sigmas.
所以我在墙上贴的那七个例子——金融市场的生活与西格玛没有任何关系。
I mean, if everybody that operated in financial markets had never had any concept of standard errors and so on, they would be a lot better off.
我的意思是，如果所有在金融市场运作的人都没有任何标准误差等概念，他们会过得好得多。
Don’t you think so, Charlie?
你不这么认为吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sure. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：当然可以。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Here, have some fudge. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：来，吃点软糖。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s created a lot of false confidence and — now, it has gone away.
查理·芒格：这造成了很多虚假的信心——现在，这一切都消失了。
Again, as I said earlier, the business schools have improved. So has risk control on Wall Street. They now have taken the Gaussian curve and they’ve just changed its shape.
再说一次，正如我之前所说，商学院已经有所改善。华尔街的风险控制也是如此。他们现在已经采用了高斯曲线，并且只是改变了它的形状。
WARREN BUFFETT: Threw it away.
沃伦·巴菲特：把它扔掉了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: They threw it away. Well, they just made a different shape than Gauss did, and it’s a better curve now, even though it’s less precise.
查理·芒格：他们把它扔掉了。好吧，他们只是做了一个与高斯不同的形状，现在它是一个更好的曲线，尽管它的精确度较低。
WARREN BUFFETT: They talk about fat tails, but they still don’t know how fat to make them. They have no idea.
沃伦·巴菲特：他们谈论肥尾，但他们仍然不知道该多肥。他们没有头绪。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but they knew — they’ve learned through painful experience they weren’t fat enough.
查理·芒格：嗯，但他们知道——通过痛苦的经验，他们意识到之前的设计不够“肥”。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They learned the other was wrong, but they don’t know what’s right.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们知道之前的方法是错的，但不知道什么才是正确的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We always knew there were fat tails. Warren and I, in the Salomon meetings, would look over at one another and roll our eyes when the risk control people were talking.
查理·芒格：我们一直知道存在肥尾现象。沃伦和我在所罗门会议上，会互相看一眼，翻个白眼，当风险控制人员在讲话时。
56. Swiss Re contract expiration is “nonevent”
瑞士再保险合同到期是“无事件”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。杰伊？
JAY GELB: This question is on Swiss Re.
杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于瑞士再保险的。
Berkshire’s quota share treaty with Swiss Re, covering 20 percent of Swiss Re’s property-casualty risk, ends in 2012. Does Berkshire plan to replace that premium volume through another transaction?
伯克希尔与瑞士再保险的份额协议，涵盖瑞士再保险20%的财产及意外风险，将于2012年结束。伯克希尔是否计划通过其他交易来替代这部分保费收入？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we would hope to — we always hope to get more good volume, but what we do has no relationship to the expiration of that contract.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们希望——我们总是希望能获得更多的良好交易量，但我们所做的与该合同的到期没有关系。
I mean, that contract was a five-year contract. It’s a big contract, billions of dollars a year. But the fact that that expires and our premium volume will go down by multiple billions does not cause us to do one thing differently than we would do otherwise.
我指的是，那份合同是一个五年的合同。这是一个大合同，每年数十亿美元。但合同到期后，我们的保费收入将减少数十亿，这并不会导致我们做出与之前不同的任何决定。
We’ve got the capacity to write billions and billions of business, and we would love to do it if we were expanding the Swiss Re contract, and we don’t want to write any dumb business when we lose that contract. It’s just — it’s a nonevent, in terms of future strategy.
我们有能力撰写数十亿的业务，如果我们扩展瑞士再保险合同，我们非常乐意这样做，而在失去该合同时，我们不想撰写任何无意义的业务。这只是——在未来战略方面，这并不重要。
It’s not a nonevent, in terms of losing some business that we like, but it’s a nonevent in terms of any future strategy.
这并不是一个无关紧要的事件，因为我们失去了一些我们喜欢的业务，但在未来的战略方面，它是一个无关紧要的事件。
We regard every decision, you know, as independent. We don’t do — if money comes in, that doesn’t cause us to want to think about doing something today that we weren’t thinking about doing the day before. We just don’t operate that way.
我们将每个决定视为独立的。我们不会因为有钱进来就想今天做一些昨天没想到的事情。我们就是不以这种方式运作。
We’ll have things that come along that are terrific, and that doesn’t mean the next day we don’t want to look for something in addition that’s terrific. Every decision is sort of independent.
我们会遇到一些很棒的事情，这并不意味着第二天我们就不想再寻找其他很棒的东西。每个决定都是相对独立的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think there’s another large insurance operation in the world that is more cheerful about losing volume than we are. If it doesn’t make sense —
查理·芒格：我认为世界上没有其他大型保险公司比我们更乐于接受业务量下降。如果这没有意义——
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t want it.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们不想要它。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — if the business has to shrink, we let it shrink.
查理·芒格：——如果业务必须缩小，我们就让它缩小。
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t measure ourselves in any way —
沃伦·巴菲特：我们不以任何方式来衡量自己——
CHARLIE MUNGER: By size. 查理·芒格：按大小。
WARREN BUFFETT: — by size, except by the growth in value over time.
沃伦·巴菲特：— 按规模，唯一的衡量标准是价值的长期增长。
57. Housing problems after Fannie and Freddie “left the tracks”
法尼梅和弗雷迪“脱轨”后的住房问题
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wendy Wasserman (PH) from Boston. Warren, best wishes on a speedy and complete recovery.
观众成员：来自波士顿的温迪·瓦瑟曼（PH）。沃伦，祝你早日康复，完全恢复。
My question is regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. You wrote that you expected the housing market to be improved by now but that it hasn’t improved.
我的问题是关于房利美和房地美的。你写道你预计住房市场现在会有所改善，但实际上并没有改善。
You spoke about demographics and the housing-dependent parts of the business. You did not, however, speak about Fannie and Freddie. Fannie Mae, the Federal Reserve, and Freddie Mac are the three largest financial institutions.
您谈到了人口统计和依赖住房的业务部分。然而，您没有提到房利美和房地美。房利美、联邦储备和房地美是三大金融机构。
Then comes J.P. Morgan and Bank of America. Fannie and Freddie have been in conservatorship for 3 1/2 years, the longest. Initially they had combined assets of 1.6 trillion, each a Lehman Brothers.
然后是摩根大通和美国银行。房利美和房地美已经处于监管状态 3 年半，是时间最长的。最初它们的总资产为 1.6 万亿美元，各自相当于雷曼兄弟。
Now they have 5.5 trillion, adding 4 trillion of off-balance sheet items and government mortgage modification programs.
现在他们有 5.5 万亿，再加上 4 万亿的表外项目和政府抵押贷款修改计划。
They are public companies with operating losses, a negative net worth, owned by the government, acting at times with the power of the government, financed with a blank check from Treasury, and taxpayers, who are usually also homeowners.
它们是运营亏损、净资产为负的上市公司，由政府拥有，有时拥有政府的权力，得到财政部的“空白支票”融资，纳税人通常也是房主。
Most near-bankrupt companies shed assets. These two added assets and liabilities. AIG and General Motors have emerged; these two have not.
大多数接近破产的公司会剥离资产。这两家公司却增加了资产和负债。美国国际集团和通用汽车已经崛起；而这两家则没有。
Contrary to popular belief, the securities law did not need the biggest rewriting since the Great Depression. The 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts worked. Sarbanes-Oxley works.
与普遍看法相反，证券法并不需要自大萧条以来进行最大的重写。1933 年和 1934 年的证券法有效。萨班斯-奥克斯利法案也有效。
Fannie and Freddie, and the 1938 and 1968 governing laws, do not, no matter how much they have contributed to U.S. housing standards.
房利美和房地美，以及1938年和1968年的相关法律，不管它们对美国住房标准的贡献有多大，都没有发挥作用。
What is the solution? How many years can they stay in conservatorship? Can the resolution trust authority be used? Are they truly too big to fail? What role will banks like Wells Fargo and U.S. Bancorp, who are leading mortgage players — (applause) — play now that they are well capitalized?
解决方案是什么？他们可以在监护下待多少年？可以使用解决信托机构吗？他们真的太大而不能倒闭吗？像富国银行和美国银行这样的银行，作为主要的抵押贷款参与者——（掌声）——在他们资本充足的情况下将扮演什么角色？
What happens to the MBS market and the (inaudible) system? How can housing improve even with better demographics without an answer to Fannie and Freddie?
抵押贷款支持证券市场和（听不清）体系将如何发展？在没有对房利美和房地美的解决方案的情况下，住房如何改善，即使人口统计有所改善？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I got through college answering fewer questions than that. (Laughter and applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我在大学时回答的问题比这少得多。（笑声和掌声）
I would say that the overall tone of your remark, which indicates that you think Fannie and Freddie are a mess, is probably justified.
我想说，你的评论整体语气表明你认为房利美和房地美一团糟，这可能是有道理的。
And of course, the reason they’re a mess is we haven’t figured out yet, or we can’t get agreement, on what the best structure is to have in this country going forward to generally finance mortgages.
当然，它们之所以一团糟，是因为我们还没有弄清楚，或者说我们无法达成一致，未来在这个国家通常融资抵押贷款的最佳结构是什么。
There’s no question that a government guarantee program brings down the overall cost of financing mortgages over time.
毫无疑问，政府担保计划在长期内降低了融资抵押贷款的总体成本。
And then we had one, of course — we’ve had several — but we had one in Fannie and Freddie that went wild when we introduced the profit motive into the mix of two institutions that really were half trying to serve a housing mission and half trying to serve a profit mission, and gradually the profit mission sort of overcame the housing mission.
然后我们当然有一个——我们有几个——但我们在房利美和房地美引入利润动机时，情况变得失控。这两个机构实际上一半在努力服务于住房使命，一半在努力服务于利润使命，逐渐地，利润使命在某种程度上压倒了住房使命。
Congress hadn’t sorted that out yet. It’s a huge item, obviously. There are roughly 50 million residential mortgages in the United States, you know, and they total 10 trillion or so.
国会还没有解决这个问题。这显然是一个重大事项。美国大约有 5000 万笔住宅抵押贷款，总额大约为 10 万亿美元。
It’s important that you have a market that does minimize costs for borrowers who have adequate down payments and adequate income and all of that.
重要的是，您需要一个能够为有足够首付款和足够收入的借款人降低成本的市场。
And I think for a while, we were going in that direction with Fannie and Freddie, and then they left the tracks.
我认为有一段时间，我们在与房利美和房地美的方向上走得不错，但后来他们偏离了轨道。
But that’s going to get — how long they can stay in conservatorship? They can stay there a long time.
但这将会变成——他们能在监护状态下待多久？他们可以待很长时间。
They will stay there, in my view, until politically we get some kind of a resolution that — as to a future policy — that both parties can go along with, and it looks to me that’s a ways off.
在我看来，他们会在那里待着，直到我们在政治上达成某种解决方案——关于未来政策——双方都能接受，而在我看来，这还需要一段时间。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, the interesting thing is that Canada, right to the north, kept a more responsible real estate lending system, and they had almost no trouble.
查理·芒格：当然，有趣的是，北边的加拿大保持了一个更负责任的房地产贷款系统，他们几乎没有遇到任何麻烦。
We departed completely from sanity and decency and morality in mortgage lending in the United States, and the government of the United States participated in the folly, and they did it in a big way.
我们在美国的抵押贷款中完全背离了理智、体面和道德，而美国政府也参与了这一愚蠢行为，并且参与得非常彻底。
And it was wrong not to step on the boom that was obviously so full of fraud and folly. And I sometimes say that [former Federal Reserve Chairman] Alan Greenspan overdosed on [author] Ayn Rand when he was young. (Laughter)
没有遏制明显充满欺诈和荒谬的繁荣是错误的。我有时会说，[前美联储主席] 阿兰·格林斯潘年轻时对[作家] 安·兰德的思想过度沉迷。（笑声）
He thought if an ax murder happened in a free market, it was probably all for the best.
他认为如果在自由市场发生了一起斧头谋杀，那可能都是为了更好的结果。
And so we had — there’s a lot of disgraceful behavior we have to regret, in terms of what happened, and it caused enormous damage. And a modest little country like Spain, and another one called Ireland, you had something somewhat similar.
因此，我们有很多可耻的行为必须感到遗憾，这导致了巨大的损失。像西班牙这样的小国，还有一个叫爱尔兰的国家，经历了类似的情况。
People just allowed craziness to go unchecked, and that was a big mistake. And Greenspan was really wrong. It’s the duty of the government to step on crazy market booms — (applause) — and prevent them by keeping sound policies, as Canada did.
人们任由疯狂的现象失控，这是一个大错误。而格林斯潘确实错了。政府有责任遏制疯狂的市场繁荣——（掌声）——并通过保持健全的政策来防止它们，就像加拿大所做的那样。
And so you put your finger on a very disgraceful episode in United States history.
因此，你指出了美国历史上一个非常不光彩的事件。
But once we were into it, I think we had no option but to do exactly as the government did, which was to nationalize Fannie Mae and Freddie and try to make them behave better in the future, and that’s what’s happened.
但一旦我们进入这个局面，我认为我们别无选择，只能完全按照政府的做法，国有化房利美和房地美，并试图让它们在未来表现得更好，这就是发生的事情。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s going to be a long runoff.
沃伦·巴菲特：这将是一个漫长的过渡期。
And Congress, it wasn’t just the Fed— Congress did their share in that, too. But it was —
国会不仅是美联储——国会在这方面也做出了贡献。但这—
CHARLIE MUNGER: Everybody did.
查理·芒格：每个人都参与了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Everybody did. I mean, it —
沃伦·巴菲特：每个人都参与了。我的意思是—
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, we didn’t. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：顺便说一下，我们没有。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, we resigned from the Savings and Loan League a good many years ago just because we thought such nutty stuff was going on and —
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我们很多年前就从储蓄和贷款联盟辞职了，因为我们认为那种疯狂的事情正在发生——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It was disgraceful.
查理·芒格：这真是丢脸。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And Charlie got lectured for it, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理也因此被训斥了。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I did.
查理·芒格：是的，我做了。
WARREN BUFFETT: They made him go to school, learn how to loan money, and I think one of the regulators said, “Well, what kind of people do you lend money to?”
沃伦·巴菲特：他们让他去上学，学习如何放贷，我想其中一位监管者问：“那么，你们借钱给什么样的人？”
And I think Charlie said, “Well, the one thing we do is we don’t lend money to people like you.” (Laughter)
我想查理说：“好吧，我们唯一不做的就是不借钱给你这样的人。”（笑声）
And for some reason we had regulatory problems after that. (Laughter)
而且由于某种原因，我们在那之后遇到了监管问题。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I was not popular because he said you’re using the government’s credit in our savings and loan, and therefore, you have to make a lot of dumb loans because we’re telling you to.
查理·芒格：我不受欢迎，因为他说你在我们的储蓄和贷款中使用了政府的信用，因此你必须做很多愚蠢的贷款，因为我们告诉你这样做。
And I said, “We’re not using the government’s credit. As a condition of one of our mergers, Berkshire Hathaway agreed you’d never have trouble with our savings and loan. We’re paying you insurance premiums, and you’re using our credit.” This did not make me popular.
我说：“我们并没有使用政府的信用。作为我们合并的条件之一，伯克希尔·哈撒韦同意你们永远不会在我们的储蓄与贷款中遇到麻烦。我们在支付你们保险费，而你们在使用我们的信用。”这并没有让我受欢迎。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: And he was a florid-faced alcoholic. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：他是一个面色红润的酒鬼。（笑声）
I remember it very well.
我记得非常清楚。
WARREN BUFFETT: I do, too, but —
沃伦·巴菲特：我也是，但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: We left the savings and loan business.
查理·芒格：我们退出了储蓄和贷款业务。
WARREN BUFFETT: We have more problems when Charlie wins an argument. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：当查理赢得争论时，我们会遇到更多问题。（笑声）
But it’s a lot of fun. (Laughter)
但这很有趣。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well. 查理·芒格：好吧。
58. How Todd Combs and Ted Weschler are compensated — and taxed
托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒的薪酬和税务情况
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, here’s the question:
安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，问题是：
“Please tell us more about your experience this past year with Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. What did they do well, and did they make any mistakes? And please discuss how you compensate them a bit more.
请告诉我们您过去一年与托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒的经历。 他们做得很好，是否犯过错误？ 请多谈谈您是如何补偿他们的。
In an interview, you said that Todd Combs was well compensated for the performance of his stock picks last year.
在一次采访中，你说托德·科姆斯因去年股票选择的表现得到了很好的报酬。
Should we be worried about a short-term horizon for compensation? How do you ensure that Todd and Ted don’t chase high-flying stocks for the sake of compensation?
我们是否应该担心短期的薪酬前景？你如何确保托德和泰德不会为了薪酬而追逐高飞的股票？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve always been more concerned about how our record is achieved than the precise record itself. And with both Todd and Ted, Charlie and I were struck by, not only a good record, but intellectual integrity and qualities of character, a real commitment to Berkshire, a lifelong-type commitment.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们一直更关心的是我们的业绩是如何取得的，而不是具体的业绩本身。对于托德和泰德，查理和我不仅被良好的业绩所打动，更被他们的知识诚信和品格品质所吸引，对伯克希尔的真正承诺，这是一种终身的承诺。
And we’ve seen hundreds and hundreds of good records in our lifetimes; we haven’t seen very many people we want to have join Berkshire.
我们在一生中见过成百上千的好记录；但我们没有见过很多我们想要让他们加入伯克希尔的人。
But these two are perfect, and we pay them each a salary of a million dollars a year, and we give them 10 percent of the amount by which their portfolios beat the S&P.
但这两个人非常出色，我们每年给他们各支付一百万美元的薪水，并且给予他们投资组合超越标准普尔 500 指数部分的 10%的奖金。
So that if they beat the S&P by 10 points, they get one point, for example, and we get nine points. But we do it on a three-year rolling basis so you don’t get the seesaw effect.
因此，如果他们比标准普尔指数高出 10 点，他们就得到 1 分，而我们得到 9 分。例如，我们以三年滚动的方式进行评估，这样就不会出现起伏效应。
And each one gets paid 80 percent based on their own efforts and 20 percent based on the other person’s, so that they have every incentive to operate in a collaborative way rather than sit there jealously guarding their own ideas and hoping the other guy doesn’t do very well.
每个人的收入是基于自己的努力获得 80%，基于其他人的努力获得 20%，这样他们就有充分的动力以合作的方式运作，而不是坐在那里嫉妒地守护自己的想法，希望其他人表现不好。
So it’s a — I don’t think we could have a better — it’s the same structure on pay, basically, that we had with Lou Simpson for 20-some years, except he did not have a partner.
所以这是一个——我认为我们不能有更好的——基本上在薪酬结构上与我们与卢·辛普森合作的 20 多年是一样的，只是他没有合作伙伴。
To the extent that they employ people underneath them, that comes out of their performance record, and it’s worked far better than either Charlie and I had hoped, and we had pretty high hopes.
他们雇佣的下属也会从他们的业绩记录中得到补偿，这种做法的效果远超出查理和我预期的效果，我们的期望本就很高。
We had 1 3/4 billion with each of them at year end, but we’ve added another billion each on March 31, so they’re running 2 3/4 billion apiece.
我们在年末时与他们各有 17.5 亿，但在 3 月 31 日我们又各增加了 10 亿，所以他们现在各有 27.5 亿。
I don’t look at what they do. I see it eventually when I look at a GEICO portfolio at the end of the month or something of the sort.
我不关注他们的做法。我最终会在月底查看 GEICO 的投资组合时看到这些，或者类似的情况。
But they operate through their own brokers. They don’t — I’ve told them that the only thing I want to know is, if they’re getting into a new name, I just want to know the name so I’m certain that it isn’t something that I am familiar with some inside information on, or something, so that there’s no inadvertent appearance that we would be — or that their purchase would have been influenced by something that I knew about.
但他们通过自己的经纪人进行操作。我告诉过他们，我只想知道一个新公司的名字，以确保这不是我熟悉的有内幕信息的公司，或者其他事情，这样就不会无意中出现我们会受到我所知道的信息影响的情况。
That’s never come up. They can’t — they can’t — if there’s something we would have to file a 13D on, they would have to check with me. But basically none of that’s going to happen. Never happened with Lou, either.
这种情况从未发生过。如果有我们需要提交13D表格的情况，他们必须与我确认。但基本上不会发生这种情况。卢也是如此，从未发生。
They operate in different stocks. They’ve got a much bigger universe than I have because they’re working with 2 3/4 billion instead of 150 billion, so they can look at a lot more things.
他们在不同的股票中运作。他们的投资范围比我大得多，因为他们使用的是 27.5 亿而不是 1500 亿，所以他们可以关注更多的事物。
And they’ve cheerfully pitched in for other duties that they don’t really get compensated directly on, but that are helpful to Berkshire. And they will — they’ll do a great job for Berkshire when they’re running a whole lot more money than they are now.
他们愉快地参与了其他职责，虽然这些职责并没有直接得到报酬，但对伯克希尔是有帮助的。当他们管理的资金比现在多得多时，他们会为伯克希尔做得非常出色。
Ted only joined us this year. Todd did substantially better than the S&P last year, so he racked up a big performance gain, a third of which was paid to him in the first year, but the two years is deferred and he could lose that back if he were to underperform.
泰德今年才加入我们。托德去年的表现远超标准普尔，因此他获得了巨大的业绩增长，其中三分之一在第一年支付给了他，但两年的部分是递延的，如果他的表现不佳，他可能会失去那部分。
So I think we’ve got a good system and terrific people.
所以我认为我们有一个好的系统和出色的人才。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: What’s interesting about it is that at least 90 percent of the investment management business of the United States would starve to death on our formula. I think — and I think these people will do pretty well with it. So —
查理·芒格：有趣的是，美国至少 90%的投资管理业务在我们的公式下会死得很惨。我认为——我认为这些人会做得很好。所以——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And not only that, they’ll be terrific for the long pull for Berkshire. They’re the kind of people we like having around headquarters.
查理·芒格：不仅如此，他们对伯克希尔的长期发展将非常有利。他们是我们喜欢在总部周围的人。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I hope they get into that — those 400 taxpayers I mentioned, but if they do, even under the present haul, they’ll be paying taxes in the mid-30s.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我希望他们能进入我提到的那400个纳税人之中，但如果他们这样做，即使是在目前的情况下，他们也会支付中等30%的税率。
They are doing what they did before which — they ran hedge funds — but they’re going to work every day thinking about the same things, and they get taxed at 35 percent-plus.
他们正在做他们以前做的事情——他们经营对冲基金——但他们每天上班时都在考虑同样的事情，而且他们的税率超过 35%。
And if they were running hedge funds, they’d get taxed at 15 percent. And for all of those in the audience who can reconcile that, there’ll be a free Dilly Bar. (Laughter)
如果他们在经营对冲基金，他们将被征收 15%的税。对于在场的所有能够理解这一点的人，将会有一个免费的 Dilly Bar。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think each of them could earn more money in a different format but with a less desirable lifestyle.
查理·芒格：我认为他们每个人都可以以不同的方式赚更多的钱，但生活方式却不那么理想。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have a little free Coke machine at our office. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们办公室有一台免费的可乐机。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, they get to hang around with a fellow eccentric of the same type as Warren.
查理·芒格：好吧，他们可以和一个和沃伦一样的怪人一起待着。
59. GEICO’s profit hurt by Florida decision on auto insurance liabilities
GEICO 的利润受到佛罗里达州关于汽车保险责任的裁决影响
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gary, before we go too far with this. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，盖瑞，在我们继续之前。（笑）
GARY RANSOM: My next question is on GEICO, a little bit more detailed question.
加里·兰索姆：我的下一个问题是关于 GEICO 的，问题会更详细一些。
In the fourth quarter of last year, the GEICO combined ratio went up over 100 percent for the first time since, I think, in some quarter in 2001.
去年第四季度，GEICO 的综合比率首次超过 100%，我认为这是自 2001 年某个季度以来的第一次。
Now I realize a quarter doesn’t make a trend, but something unusual happened in the quarter. Can you tell us more about that?
现在我意识到一个季度并不能代表趋势，但在这个季度发生了一些不寻常的事情。你能告诉我们更多关于这件事的情况吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The biggest thing that happened was a decision, or maybe a couple of decisions — Tony Nicely could elaborate more on them — but they involved Florida and some interpretation down there, I think, of the PIP coverage that caused us to set up some extra reserves that — they weren’t extra — I mean, they were called for by what was happening in Florida at that time.
沃伦·巴菲特：发生的最大事情是一个决定，或者说几个决定——托尼·尼克利可以对此做更多的阐述——但它们涉及佛罗里达州，以及我认为对当时 PIP 保险的某种解释，这导致我们设立了一些额外的准备金——它们并不是额外的——我的意思是，它们是根据当时佛罗里达州发生的事情所要求的。
But it was a one-time sort of arrangement. And in the first quarter of this year, on a comparable basis, as you’ve probably seen in our Q, we wrote at about 91.
但这是一种一次性的安排。在今年第一季度，从可比的角度来看，正如您在我们的季度报告中看到的，我们的比率大约是91。
So, the basic business is good, but the Florida decision cost us significant money because it changed our potential liability for a bunch of claims already outstanding.
所以，基本业务很好，但佛罗里达的决定让我们损失了大量资金，因为它改变了我们对一堆已存在索赔的潜在责任。
And my guess is you’re more familiar with the exact terms of that than I am, but that is the bottom line answer on it.
我的猜测是你对这方面的具体条款比我更熟悉，但这就是最终的答案。
And GEICO — every metric for GEICO that I’ve seen this year, in terms of retention, combined ratio on seasoned business versus new, all of that sort of thing, is quite consistent with our general record.
而 GEICO——我今年看到的关于 GEICO 的每一个指标，无论是客户保留率、成熟业务与新业务的综合比率，所有这些都与我们的整体记录非常一致。
GEICO is a terrific asset for Berkshire. I mean, it will be worth — it’s worth a lot of money now. It will be worth a lot more money in the future.
GEICO 是伯克希尔的一个绝佳资产。我的意思是，它现在值很多钱。未来它的价值会更高。
60. Environmental benefits of freight railroads
货运铁路的环境益处
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Charlie and Warren. My name is Stuart Kaye from Matarin Capital Management in Stamford, Connecticut.
观众成员：你好，查理和沃伦。我是来自康涅狄格州斯坦福的 Matarin Capital Management 的斯图尔特·凯。
You mentioned earlier today that one of Burlington Northern Santa Fe’s competitive advantages is its environmentally-friendly business relative to transportation alternatives.
您今天早些时候提到，伯灵顿北方圣菲铁路的竞争优势之一是其相对于运输替代方案的环保业务。
When evaluating other investment opportunities, what financial statement or other publicly available data do you use to gauge whether a company is both environmentally responsible and a good investment?
在评估其他投资机会时，您使用哪些财务报表或其他公开可用的数据来判断一家公司是否既对环境负责又是一个好的投资？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in terms of what’s a good investment, you know, we try to look at every aspect, everything we can that will tell us how the world is going to develop for both that industry and the company in the future.
沃伦·巴菲特：在什么是好的投资方面，我们尽量从各个方面考虑，尽可能多地了解将来这个行业和公司将如何发展。
And sometimes we feel a lot of confidence about that. If we’re looking at Coca-Cola, we think we know a lot about how the world will look with the Coca-Cola Company over the next five or 10 or 20 years.
有时我们对此很有信心。如果我们看可口可乐，我们认为我们了解未来五年、十年或二十年可口可乐公司的发展状况。
If we’re looking at some retail business or something, we would not have the same degree of conviction at all.
如果我们在考虑一些零售业务或其他事情，我们的信心程度完全不同。
I mentioned the environmentally-friendly aspect of it. It is just — you know, it is just — requires less, in the way, of the world’s resources to move goods, you know, on a steel rail in large containers, you know, with only a couple people involved with 120 cars, a train a mile long, than it does if you’re working, you know, with trucks that have many, many more people and much more in the way of fuel to deliver the same kind of tonnage.
我提到了环保的这一方面。你知道，利用钢铁铁路运输大宗货物所需的世界资源更少，仅需几个人操作一列120辆车、长达一英里的火车，而如果使用卡车的话，就需要许多更多的人和更多的燃料来运输同样的吨位。
So there’s no — we don’t — there’s no magazine we go to or books we go to or anything like that. We just look at the dynamics of the specific industry and company.
所以我们没有——我们没有去任何杂志或书籍之类的东西。我们只是关注特定行业和公司的动态。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, even though he’s an unseasoned young man, was able to figure out that if you used a lot less fuel per ton of freight, you were causing fewer undesired particles to go into the air.
查理·芒格：沃伦，尽管他还是个年轻人，但他能明白，如果每吨货物使用的燃料少得多，就会向空气中释放更少的有害颗粒。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s about the limit of my capabilities, folks. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：这大约是我能力的极限，伙计们。（笑声）
61. Berkshire lets managers paint their own pictures
伯克希尔让管理者自己描绘蓝图
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 8 站。
We’ve gotten into the — we’ve covered 36 questions from the two panels, so we’re now going to keep going around the audience as long as the questions last, we’re going to give you more than your share at this point.
我们已经进入了——我们已经从两个小组中覆盖了 36 个问题，所以我们现在将继续在观众中进行提问，只要问题还在，我们会给你们更多的机会。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie. Up here.
观众成员：下午好，沃伦和查理。在这里。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I see ya.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我看到了你。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right. Very good.
观众成员：好的。非常好。
John Norwood from West Des Moines, Iowa. We spent a lot of time today talking about two out of the three things you fellows said you spend a lot of time thinking about. One is allocating capital; one is managing risk.
约翰·诺伍德来自爱荷华州的西德莫因斯。我们今天花了很多时间讨论你们提到的三件事情中的两件。一是资本分配；二是风险管理。
We’ve had just one question related to motivating your people and tied into executive compensation. So that’s what I’m interested in learning more about: executive compensation, how you motivate Berkshire managers, financial versus nonfinancial incentives. Can you speak more about that?
我们只收到一个与激励员工和高管薪酬相关的问题。因此，我想了解更多关于高管薪酬、如何激励伯克希尔的管理者、财务激励与非财务激励之间的区别。你能多谈谈这个吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, obviously, Charlie and I have thought a few times about why do we do what we do when we don’t need the money at all. And we jump out of bed excited about what we’re going to do every day, and why is that the case?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。显然，查理和我曾几次思考，为什么我们在完全不需要钱的情况下还要做我们所做的事情。我们每天都兴奋地跳下床，期待着要做的事情，这到底是为什么呢？
Well, we get the opportunity to paint our own painting every day, and we love painting that painting, and it’s a painting that will never be finished.
好吧，我们每天都有机会画自己的画，我们喜欢画那幅画，而这幅画永远不会完成。
And you know, if we had somebody over us that was saying why don’t you use more red paint than blue paint, and we had all the money in the world, we might tell them what they could do with the paint brush. (Laughter)
你知道，如果我们有一个人在上面说为什么不多用红色油漆而不是蓝色油漆，而我们又有世界上所有的钱，我们可能会告诉他们可以怎么用画笔。（笑声）
But we get to paint our own painting, and ours overlap. We have more fun doing it together than we would have doing it singly, because it is more fun to do with people around you that are pleasant and interesting to be around, and we also like applause.
但我们能够画出自己的画，我们的画是交叠的。我们一起做事情比单独做更有乐趣，因为和周围愉快和有趣的人在一起更有趣，我们也喜欢掌声。
So if that works with us, we say to ourselves — (applause) — that was not a brazen — (Laughs)
所以如果这对我们有效，我们就会对自己说——（掌声）——这并不是一种放肆的表现——（笑）
If that works for us, why shouldn’t it work for a bunch of other people who have long been doing what they like to do and now, in many cases, have all the money they possibly need? But still, they may have to sell us their business for one reason or another connected with family or taxes, who knows what else?
如果这对我们有效，为什么不适用于其他一些人呢？这些人长期以来一直在做自己喜欢的事情，现在在许多情况下，他们可能拥有所需的一切财富？但他们仍可能出于与家庭或税收有关的某种原因向我们出售他们的业务，谁知道还有什么？
But they really like what they’ve been doing. That’s the reason — probably — the reason they’ve been so good at it — part of the reason they’ve been so good at it.
但他们确实喜欢他们所做的事情。这就是——可能是——他们之所以做得如此出色的原因——部分原因在于此。
So we give them the paint brush, let them keep the paint brush, and we don’t go around and tell them to use more red paint than blue paint or something of the sort. And we applaud and we try to compensate them fairly, because though they aren’t primarily doing it for the money in many cases, nobody likes to be taken advantage of.
所以我们把画笔给他们，让他们保留画笔，我们不会四处告诉他们要多用红色油漆而不是蓝色油漆之类的。我们会赞赏他们，并努力公平地补偿他们，因为尽管在许多情况下他们并不是主要为了钱而做这件事，但没有人喜欢被利用。
But that has not been a big problem at Berkshire. We have not had compensation problems over time. If you think about it, over 40-odd years, the times when compensation has been of importance are practically nil.
但这在伯克希尔并不是一个大问题。我们在这段时间内没有出现过薪酬问题。如果你想想，四十多年来，薪酬重要的时刻几乎是零。
And it — we don’t — we’ll just take that we’ve talked about the investment — the compensation of two investment people. Those people are making below hedge fund standards, below private equity standards, and having a less favorable tax treatment.
而且——我们只谈论过投资——两位投资人员的薪酬。这些人的薪酬低于对冲基金标准，低于私募股权标准，税收待遇也不如人意。
They’ll still make a lot of money, I mean, huge amounts of money. And I hope that they are having a good time doing what they’re doing. I think that’s why they’re here.
他们仍然会赚很多钱，我是说，巨额的钱。我希望他们在做自己正在做的事情时过得愉快。我想这就是他们在这里的原因。
And I think they’ll enjoy it a lot more over the years than going around to a bunch of people explaining why they’re worth two and twenty even in the years that aren’t so good and trying to attract new money when other people are making bigger promises someplace else. It’s just a different way to live your life.
我认为他们会在多年后更享受这种生活，而不是到处去向一堆人解释为什么即使在不太好的年份，他们的价值是二加二十，并试图吸引新资金，而其他地方的人则在做更大的承诺。这只是一种不同的生活方式。
So we want to have our managers enjoying their lives and enjoying their business lives. And we get rid of some of the things they don’t like, a lot of them.
所以我们希望我们的经理们享受他们的生活和商业生活。我们去掉一些他们不喜欢的事情，很多。
I was with a fellow the other day that had come from England. And he’s got plenty of business problems to work on, and he’s spending a significant part of his time talking to investors, which does him no good.
我前几天和一个来自英国的朋友在一起。他有很多商业问题需要解决，并且他花了大量时间与投资者交谈，这对他没有任何好处。
I mean, he ought to be talking to customers or, you know, employees or something, but he — I think a number of managers may have to spend time talking to lawyers or talking to bankers or talking to investors and what they really like to do is run their businesses, and we give them the best opportunity to do that.
我意思是，他应该和客户或者员工之类的人交谈，但他——我认为许多经理可能不得不花时间与律师、银行家或投资者交谈，而他们真正想做的是经营他们的业务，我们给他们提供了最佳的机会去做到这一点。
So I can’t put passion into somebody about their jobs, but I can certainly create a structure that will take that passion away from them.
所以我不能让某人对他们的工作充满热情，但我可以创造一个结构，让他们的热情不再消失。
And Berkshire is a negative art in that way. We focus on not messing up something that’s already good, and that’s my job. And I think the person that follows me will have a very similar job.
而伯克希尔在这方面是一种消极的艺术。我们专注于不搞砸已经好的东西，这就是我的工作。我认为接替我的人将会有非常相似的工作。
But we have a unique — we have a bunch of managers nobody else can hire and, you know, how many companies of size can you say that about around the country these days?
但我们有一个独特的优势——我们有一群其他公司无法招聘的经理，你知道，现在全国有多少家大公司可以这样说呢？
And I think we will retain that advantage for many, many decades to come. It works, and people know that it works within the company.
我认为我们将在未来的许多年里保持这一优势。这是有效的，人们知道这在公司内部是有效的。
So it’s self-reinforcing, and there’s nothing like getting proof that what you’ve designed works, to cause you desire to perpetuate it and to build upon it.
因此，这是自我增强的，没有什么比获得你所设计的有效性的证明更能让你渴望延续它并加以完善。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, and we don’t have any standard formulas like they have in some big companies where X percent is on diversity and Y percent is on something else and Z percent is on something else and everybody is putting all this stuff through a big human resources department.
查理·芒格：嗯，我们没有像一些大公司那样的标准公式，X 百分比用于多样性，Y 百分比用于其他东西，Z 百分比用于其他东西，所有人都把这些东西交给一个大型人力资源部门处理。
And every incentive arrangement with a key executive is different from every other, so we can’t help you with a standard formula. We don’t have one.
与每位关键高管的激励安排都是不同的，因此我们无法为您提供标准公式。我们没有一个。
WARREN BUFFETT: Our businesses are all so different. It would be crazy to try and have some master arrangement, you know, that involved return on capital — there are some businesses that don’t use any capital in our companies — or operating margins. They’re just — you know, we could hire consultants in compensation to come in and they —
沃伦·巴菲特：我们的业务千差万别。如果试图做出一些总体安排，你知道，涉及资本回报--我们公司有些业务不使用任何资本--或营业利润率，那就太疯狂了。他们只是--你知道，我们可以聘请薪酬方面的顾问，让他们--
CHARLIE MUNGER: We never have.
查理·芒格：我们从来没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, we never will.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们永远不会。
But, you know, they would want to please the people they were working for and get referred elsewhere.
但你知道，他们会想要取悦他们工作的对象，并希望得到推荐。
I mean, I will guarantee that you can go to many corporations, if you’ve got a comp committee, it meets periodically, and the human relations VP comes in and probably suggests a compensation consultant to take. And, you know, who does a human relations VP want to — whose approval do they want? The CEO’s.
我的意思是，我可以保证你可以去很多公司，如果你有一个薪酬委员会，定期开会，人力资源副总裁会进来，可能建议选择某个薪酬顾问。你知道，人力资源副总裁想要谁的认可？首席执行官的。
Whose approval does the compensation consultant want? Well, they want to get recommended elsewhere by the CEO and the human relations VP. So what kind of a system do you get? You get what I call ratchet, ratchet, and bingo, you know.
薪酬顾问想要谁的认可？他们希望得到首席执行官和人力资源副总裁的推荐。那么你会得到什么样的系统呢？你就得到了我所说的“齿轮、齿轮、然后成功”的情况。
We’re not going to have any of that at Berkshire, and like I say it’s worked very well.
我们在伯克希尔不会有那种情况，正如我所说，这样做效果很好。
Now, we’ve had people make lots of money at Berkshire. I mean, we’ve got numbers in eight figures, you know, a page-and-a-half or so, I saw it the other day, that would be at a million dollars and over, and we’ll have more.
现在，我们在伯克希尔有很多人赚到了钱。我的意思是，我们有很多数字达到了八位数，您知道，前几天我看到的差不多有一页半，都是百万美元以上的数字，我们会有更多。
But it does relate to logical measures of performance in practically all cases. And the amount of time we spend on it is just — I am the compensation committee for 60 or 70 people, and I’m not overworked. (Laughs)
但在几乎所有情况下，这与合理的业绩指标相关。我们在这方面花费的时间只是——我是 60 或 70 人的薪酬委员会成员，我并没有过于忙碌。（笑）
Anything further on that, Charlie?
还有什么想补充的吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in past years, I’ve made the remark about compensation consultants that prostitution would be a step up for them. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好吧，过去几年，我曾提到过薪酬顾问，卖淫对他们来说会是一个提升。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is also in charge of diplomacy at Berkshire. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理还负责伯克希尔的外交事务。（笑声）
We told you we’d get to everybody in terms of offending them before the day was over. (Laughter)
我们告诉过你们，我们会在今天结束之前让每个人都感到冒犯。（笑声）
It didn’t even take until 3:30.
甚至没有等到 3:30。
62. Modest GDP growth creates “staggering” increases over time
温和的 GDP 增长随着时间的推移带来“惊人的”增加
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon gentleman. (Inaudible), Arlington, Virginia. I have a question for you.
观众成员：下午好，先生们。（听不清），弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿。我有一个问题要问你们。
What will it take to get America growing by 4 percent again?
要让美国再次实现 4%的增长，需要什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie, that’s too easy for me. You take it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，查理，这对我来说太简单了。你来吧。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot. A lot. It’s not going to be easy.
查理·芒格：很多。很多。这不会容易。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. But if population grows 1 percent a year and GDP, in real terms, grows 2 1/2 percent a year, by the standards of 2,000 or 5,000 years, that would be remarkable.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。但是如果人口每年增长 1%，而 GDP 以实际计算每年增长 2.5%，按照 2000 年或 5000 年的标准，这将是非常显著的。
I mean, it would result in, you know, a quadrupling of real GDP per capita every century.
我的意思是，这将导致每个世纪人均实际 GDP 增长四倍。
We don’t — it’s nice to have 4 percent in real terms, but 2 1/2 percent, it may be slow in getting us out from the slump that we entered into a few years ago, but it’s a really — it’s a remarkable rate of growth for a country that already enjoys a very high standard of living.
我们并不这样认为——在实际意义上有 4%的增长是不错的，但 2.5%的增长可能会让我们从几年前进入的低迷中缓慢复苏，但对于一个已经享有很高生活水平的国家来说，这确实是一个显著的增长率。
It’s a remarkable rate of growth for a country that has 1 percent a year gain in population. It is huge over one person’s lifetime. I’ve used this a lot of times, but in my lifetime, the real GDP per capita has increased six-for-one.
对于一个每年人口增长 1%的国家来说，这是一种显著的增长率。在一个人的一生中，这个增幅是巨大的。我多次提到过，在我的一生中，人均实际 GDP 增长了六倍。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s nowhere near 4 percent per annum.
查理·芒格：但这远远不到每年 4%。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. It’s staggering. It’s staggering. And we have $48,000 or thereabouts of GDP per capita in the United States. We are unbelievably rich.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。这是令人震惊的。这是令人震惊的。我们在美国的人均 GDP 大约是 48,000 美元。我们富得不可思议。
But an awful lot of people are not feeling that way, and in many cases for good reason. But we’ve got a tremendous country to work for — to work with.
但很多人并不是这样感觉的，很多情况下是有充分理由的。但我们有一个伟大的国家可以为之努力——与之合作。
It’s got all kinds of strengths. And it has this huge abundance that — if my parents back in 1930, if you’d told my mother and father that when I was 81, that I would be living in a country that had six times the per capita output of their day, they would have thought, you know, that this would be a utopia. And it hasn’t been bad, I might add.
它有各种各样的优势。而且它有这种巨大的富饶——如果在 1930 年你告诉我的父母，当我 81 岁时，我会生活在一个人均产出是他们那个时代六倍的国家，他们会认为，这简直是一个乌托邦。而且，我可以补充说，这并没有那么糟糕。
But our country is not a mess. Our politics may be a mess, but the output is — (applause) — you know, it’s terrific.
但我们的国家并不是一团糟。我们的政治可能一团糟，但我们的产出是——（掌声）——你知道的，太棒了。
Charlie, if you had to guess the real growth rate per capita over the next 20 years in the United States, what do you think it would be?
查理，如果你必须猜测未来 20 年美国的人均实际增长率，你认为会是多少？
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s after inflation?
查理·芒格：那是扣除通货膨胀后的结果吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: No. This is just real.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。这就是真实的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Real, that’s what I mean. After taking inflation out of it?
查理·芒格：确实，我的意思是。去掉通货膨胀后呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if God were making the guarantee, I would settle for a very low figure. I think we’re a very mature economy, with a lot of social safety net, and a lot of competition from new nations rising, I think 1 percent per capita in real growth would be a sensational result.
查理·芒格：好吧，如果上帝在做保证，我会满足于一个非常低的数字。我认为我们是一个非常成熟的经济体，拥有很多社会保障网，并且面临来自新兴国家的激烈竞争，我认为人均实际增长 1%将是一个惊人的结果。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, which in 20 years means people would be living close to 25 percent better on average. That’s not bad. That’s the next generation — in one generation.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这意味着在 20 年内，人们的生活水平平均会提高接近 25%。这不错。这是下一代——在一代人内。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You get your expectations too high. When you think that 4 percent is what the world ought to provide, you’re asking for trouble.
查理·芒格：你对自己的期望太高了。当你认为 4%是世界应该提供的回报时，你就是在自找麻烦。
WARREN BUFFETT: It won’t do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：这不会发生。
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s what happened in the housing boom. People got these foolish dreams, and they just started doing foolish things to try and reach unattainable objectives.
查理·芒格：这就是在房地产繁荣时期发生的事情。人们产生了这些愚蠢的梦想，并开始做一些愚蠢的事情，试图达到无法实现的目标。
WARREN BUFFETT: But if you had the 1 percent, you would be talking about each generation living something over 20 percent better than their parents did.
沃伦·巴菲特：但是如果你拥有 1%的增长，你就会看到每一代人的生活水平比他们的父母高出 20%以上。
CHARLIE MUNGER: For this base, it would be a sensational result.
查理·芒格：对于这个基础来说，这将是一个惊人的结果。
WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll probably get it, in my view.
沃伦·巴菲特：在我看来，我们可能会得到它。
It won’t come in even increments, but the system still works.
它不会以均匀的增量出现，但系统仍然有效。
And incidentally, you’ve actually seen — even after the incredible crash, in effect, that we had in the fall of 2008, you’ve seen an enormous amount of resilience here and, of course, you compare it with Europe and it looks particularly strong, but —
顺便提一下，实际上你已经看到——即使在 2008 年秋季我们经历了令人难以置信的崩溃之后，这里仍然展现出巨大的韧性，当然，你将其与欧洲进行比较时，它显得特别强劲，但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, but the resilience has been better for the businesses than it has been for the employment situation —
查理·芒格：是的，但这种韧性对商业的帮助大于对就业形势的帮助——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — which is too bad.
查理·芒格：——这太可惜了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Business has done extraordinarily well.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。商业表现非常出色。
Business profits as a percent of GDP were right at the height, you know, last year — and of course our own worth.
商业利润占GDP的比重去年达到了高点——当然，我们自身的价值也是如此。
I mean, that produces a lot of strains on the political system.
我意思是，这对政治系统造成了很大的压力。
Well, we’ve mused enough on that.
好吧，我们对此已经思考得够多了。
63. Buffett won’t contribute to super PACs
巴菲特不会向超级政治行动委员会捐款
WARREN BUFFETT: So let’s go to station 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：那么我们去第 10 站。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Arthur Lewis (PH) from Denver, Colorado, new home of Peyton Manning. But my question is —
观众成员：嗨，沃伦。我是来自科罗拉多州丹佛的亚瑟·刘易斯（音），佩顿·曼宁的新家。但我的问题是——
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s also the home of Johns Manville. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：这里也是约翰斯·曼维尔的家。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is with the election coming up, have you thought about making a donation to a super PAC to try to protect a competitive advantage?
观众成员：我的问题是，随着选举临近，您是否考虑过向超级政治行动委员会捐款，以试图保护竞争优势？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I won’t. You know, I wish it never — (applause) — [U.S. Supreme Court case] Citizens United never happened.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我不会。你知道，我希望这永远不会发生——（掌声）——公民联合案永远不会发生。
It’s very tempting, and I will hear this argument put forth to me. People will say, well, you know, we don’t believe in it either, but they’re doing it on the other side, and, you know, you’ve got hundreds of millions pouring in on the other side and you’re going to tie your hands behind your back, you know, just over principle.
这非常诱人，我会听到这个论点被提出。人们会说，好吧，你知道，我们也不相信这个，但他们在另一边这样做，而你知道，另一边有数亿资金涌入，而你却要因原则而束手束脚。
But, you know, I think the whole idea of super PACs is wrong, and I think the idea of huge money by relatively few people influencing politics, I think we’ve got enough of a push toward a plutocracy from a lot of other factors that we don’t need to throw it into the voting process.
但是，你知道，我认为超级政治行动委员会的整个想法是错误的，我认为少数人用巨额资金影响政治的想法也是错误的。我认为我们已经因为许多其他因素朝着财阀政治的方向发展得够多了，我们不需要把它引入投票过程。
And I might say that — I’ll say this for [Las Vegas Sands CEO and GOP contributor] Sheldon Adelson who was — you know, he and his wife I think have probably put 12 million in or something. He says this, and I believe him entirely. He says the same thing. He thinks the system is wrong, but he says that’s the way the system is. So he has to — you know, he has to play or other people will play and he won’t be.
我可能会说——我会为[拉斯维加斯金沙集团首席执行官和共和党捐助者]谢尔顿·阿德尔森说这句话，他和他的妻子我想大概投入了 1200 万美元。他这样说，我完全相信他。他说同样的话。他认为这个系统是错的，但他说这就是系统的运作方式。所以他必须——你知道，他必须参与，否则其他人会参与，而他不会。
I can understand that, but I don’t want to do it. I just think that, you know, you’ve got to take a stand someplace.
我能理解，但我不想这样做。我只是觉得，你知道，你必须在某个地方表明立场。
And the idea that I should toss $10 million into some super PAC which is going to spend its whole time kind of misleading people about the opponent’s behavior or record, I don’t want to see democracy go in that direction.
而我应该把1000万美元投入某个超级政治行动委员会，而它会整天误导人们关于对手的行为或记录，我不想看到民主朝那个方向发展。
Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m ordinarily so negative and I am extremely negative about our — the nature of our politics with both parties doing the gerrymandering and requiring this unified thought so that the crazies on each side get all this power.
查理·芒格：好吧，我通常是如此消极，我对我们的政治性质极为消极，两党都在进行选区划分，并要求统一的思想，以至于两边的疯狂分子都获得了如此大的权力。
And I remember when we did the Marshall Plan with bipartisan support. That’s more my kind of a world. So I don’t like it.
我记得我们在两党支持下实施马歇尔计划的时光。那是我更喜欢的世界。所以我不喜欢现在的情况。
That said — (applause) - I think we’re lucky to have two candidates as good as we have. Considering the system, I think we’ve done pretty well this year.
话虽如此——（掌声）——我认为我们很幸运有两位如此优秀的候选人。考虑到这个系统，我认为我们今年做得相当不错。
WARREN BUFFETT: How would you feel about contributing to a super PAC if the other side had way more going to their super PACs?
沃伦·巴菲特：如果对方的超级政治行动委员会有更多资金，你会如何看待向一个超级政治行动委员会捐款？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there are certain subjects where I would give money to a super PAC if I thought it would work. If I thought I could really reduce legalized gambling in the United States by a major amount, I would be willing to spend some money to get it done. (Applause)
查理·芒格：嗯，有些话题我会考虑向超级政治行动委员会捐款，如果我认为这样做有效。如果我认为我真的能够大幅减少美国的合法赌博，我会愿意花一些钱来实现这一目标。（掌声）
I think it does us no good. And to the extent we have allowed our securities markets to be more like gambling casinos, I think that’s a dumb outcome, too. (Applause)
我认为这对我们没有好处。我们在多大程度上允许我们的证券市场更像赌博赌场，我认为这也是一个愚蠢的结果。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If you’ve got a super PAC out there, call on Charlie, not me.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果你有一个超级政治行动委员会，找查理，不要找我。
64. Don’t worry about Berkshire’s short-term stock moves
不要担心伯克希尔的短期股票波动
WARREN BUFFETT: 11. 沃伦·巴菲特：11。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Glenn Tongue, T2 Partners, shareholder from New York.
观众成员：格伦·汤格，T2 Partners，来自纽约的股东。
In an interview with Becky yesterday, Mr. Munger commented that in the old days, the vast majority of Berkshire’s value was embedded in the investment portfolio, which is presumably worth around book value.
在昨天与贝基的采访中，芒格先生评论道，在过去，伯克希尔的大部分价值都体现在投资组合中，这个投资组合的价值大约等于账面价值。
Today the majority is in the controlled businesses, which we believe are worth a substantial premium to book. In light of this, Berkshire Hathaway’s intrinsic value, as a multiple of book value, should be increasing over time, yet Berkshire’s price-to-book value has been declining. I’m trying to understand this.
今天大多数是在受控企业中，我们认为这些企业的价值远高于账面价值。鉴于此，伯克希尔哈撒韦的内在价值作为账面价值的倍数应该随着时间的推移而增加，但伯克希尔的市净率却在下降。我正在试图理解这一点。
Since the beginning of the year, Berkshire’s investment portfolio — I’m sorry — since the beginning of last year, Berkshire’s investment portfolio has increased in value by $20 billion and you’ve acquired Lubrizol. The controlled businesses are going gangbusters, yet the stock price hasn’t budged. Is “Mr. Market” simply in one of his manic moods?
自去年年初以来，伯克希尔的投资组合价值增加了 200 亿美元，并且你们收购了 Lubrizol。受控企业发展势头强劲，但股价却没有动静。“市场先生”是否只是处于他的一种狂躁情绪中？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d say no, but I’d say it’s in the nature of things that the market is not going to do exactly what you want when you want it.
查理·芒格：我会说不是，但我会说市场的本质就是不会在你想要的时候完全按照你的意愿行事。
I think over time, “Mr. Market” will treat the Berkshire shareholders fine, and I wouldn’t worry too much about what happens over this six months or this 12 months.
我认为随着时间的推移，“市场先生”会善待伯克希尔的股东，我不会太担心这六个月或这十二个月发生的事情。
I don’t think you’re really all that welcome in this room if the short-term orientation is what turns you on. (Applause)
我认为如果短期导向让你感兴趣的话，你在这个房间里并不太受欢迎。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think you’d agree, though, probably, that Berkshire is somewhat cheaper relative to its price than it was a year ago.
沃伦·巴菲特：我想你会同意，伯克希尔相对于其价格来说，确实比一年前便宜了一些。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, absolutely, if that’s your test. Should you feel better about the margin of safety in Berkshire? Yes, it’s fine.
查理·芒格：是的，绝对如此，如果这是你的标准。你是否应该对伯克希尔的安全边际感到更好？是的，没问题。
65. Why Berkshire hasn’t paid a dividend
为什么伯克希尔没有支付股息
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 1。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Based on your earlier — oh, this is Roberta Cole (PH) from the Twin Cities of Minnesota.
观众成员：下午好。根据您之前的——哦，这是来自明尼苏达州双子城的罗伯塔·科尔（音）。
Based on your earlier comments you made this morning, we understand you will buy back shares to help increase share value.
根据您今天早些时候的评论，我们了解到您将回购股票以帮助提高股价。
Our confusion, and appreciate clarification, arises as to why you are unwilling to distribute a dividend on a sporadic basis when the stock is too expensive to buy back, and you have the excess cash so that you could do that, particularly in a low interest rate environment. We look forward to clarification. Thank you.
我们的困惑，并希望得到澄清，源于您为何不愿在股票回购过于昂贵且您有多余现金的情况下，偶尔分配股息，特别是在低利率环境下。我们期待您的澄清。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. By and large, we feel, perhaps unjustifiably, but so far justified, that we can create more than a dollar of present value by investing.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，总的来说，我们觉得，也许是不合理的，但到目前为止是合理的，我们通过投资可以创造超过一美元的现值。
Sometimes, if the stock is cheap, we can create more than a dollar of present value by simply repurchasing shares. But even if that option isn’t available, we feel that by every dollar we retain, we can — overall — we can turn that into a greater than a dollar of present value.
有时候，如果股票便宜，我们可以通过简单地回购股票创造超过一美元的现值。但即使没有这个选项，我们认为每保留一美元，总体上我们可以将其转化为超过一美元的现值。
And for 47 years, that’s worked. I mean, we have — every dollar retained is turned into more than a dollar of value.
而且在过去的 47 年里，这种方法一直有效。我的意思是，我们每保留一美元，就能创造出超过一美元的价值。
So, if somebody wanted to create their own income stream out of it, they were much better off selling a little bit of stock every year than they were by getting a dividend out of it.
所以，如果有人想从中创造自己的收入来源，他们每年卖一点股票要比获得股息要好得多。
They would have more money working per share in Berkshire if they sold off 2 percent of their holdings than if we actually paid them out in 2 percent dividends.
如果他们卖掉2%的股份，他们在伯克希尔的每股投资将有更多资金运作，而不是我们实际支付给他们2%的红利。
So the math has been compelling to this point. Now, the question is whether we can keep doing that in the future.
所以到目前为止，这个数学是令人信服的。现在的问题是我们是否能在未来继续这样做。
But so far, at any point in our history, if we had paid out dividends — and I paid out 10 cents a share back in the 1960s which was a big mistake, but — we won’t repeat that.
但到目前为止，在我们历史上的任何时刻，如果我们支付了股息——我在 1960 年代支付过每股 10 美分，这个决定是个大错误，但——我们不会重蹈覆辙。
If we paid out dividends, our shareholders, net, would be worth less money than they are by having left it in, and I think that will continue to be the case, but who knows?
如果我们支付股息，我们的股东净值将比留在里面时少，我认为这种情况将继续存在，但谁知道呢？
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the dividends will come in due course because eventually we’ll find it difficult to multiply the rabbits, but we hope that that evil day is delayed.
查理·芒格：我认为分红会在适当的时候到来，因为最终我们会发现繁殖兔子变得困难，但我们希望那一天的到来能够推迟。
WARREN BUFFETT: And even events of the last few years are encouraging in that respect.
沃伦·巴菲特：近年来的事件在这方面也令人鼓舞。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, absolutely, particularly encouraging.
查理·芒格：是的，绝对如此，特别令人鼓舞。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would feel better about — well, the last few years have been better than we anticipated, in terms of being able to put money to work in ways that we think are creating more than a dollar of present value at the time we did it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会更看好——好吧，过去几年的表现超过了我们的预期，能够以我们认为能够在当时创造超过一美元现值的方式投入资金。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, MidAmerica may have very unusual opportunities in the next ten or fifteen years to employ an enormous amount of capital at a very reasonable return.
查理·芒格：你知道，未来十到十五年，MidAmerica可能会有非常独特的机会，以非常合理的回报来使用大量资本。
WARREN BUFFETT: Perhaps 100 billion.
沃伦·巴菲特：也许是 1000 亿。
CHARLIE MUNGER: What? 查理·芒格：什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Perhaps 100 billion.
沃伦·巴菲特：也许是 1000 亿。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Perhaps $100 billion. And you can see why that doesn’t make us too excited about dividends.
查理·芒格：也许是 1000 亿美元。你可以理解为什么这让我们对分红不太兴奋。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll think about it when we’re older. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：等我们年纪大了再考虑吧。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot older. (Laughs)
查理·芒格：老了很多。（笑）
66. “Learning and learning and learning”
学习、学习再学习
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：第二。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. This is Thomas Schulz (PH) from Germany.
观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我是来自德国的托马斯·舒尔茨（音）。
You once said that if you had just $1 million to invest now, you could achieve returns of 50 percent per year.
你曾说过，如果你现在只有 100 万美元可以投资，你每年可以获得 50%的回报。
Given what you know now, how would you be able to improve on the already spectacular performance of when you started out with your partnership?
考虑到你现在所知道的，你将如何能够改善你与合作伙伴开始时已经非常出色的表现？
CHARLIE MUNGER: We can’t do with our present resources what we did once. There are a lot of things I can’t do that I used to do better. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我们现在的资源无法做到以前的事情。有很多我不能做的事情，我以前做得更好。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you can confess to those, Charlie. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理，你可以坦白这些。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: And so —
查理·芒格：所以——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, but I think he may be driving it to the point that have we learned things in managing since we were at that level where we can do even better with $1 million now than we could have done with $1 million then, and I would say the answer to that is yes. Wouldn’t you?
沃伦·巴菲特：不过，我认为他可能是想问，我们是否在管理方面学到了东西，现在能以100万美元做得比以前更好，我会说答案是肯定的。你不这样认为吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think that’s true.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为这是真的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s enough craziness out there. If you have endless time and only a very small amount of money, I think you could find ways to do pretty well.
查理·芒格：外面有足够的疯狂。如果你有无尽的时间而只有很少的钱，我认为你可以找到不错的方式来做得很好。
WARREN BUFFETT: And in the course of 50 or so years, we have probably learned more, or been exposed to more, that if we were back at the million-dollar level we would know more places to look, I think.
沃伦·巴菲特：在过去的五十年里，我们可能学到了更多，或者接触到了更多的知识。如果我们回到100万美元的水平，我认为我们会知道更多的投资方向。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I say what’s interesting about Berkshire, and many of you have been around for so long you’ve actually seen it happen, Berkshire’s record would have been terrible compared to the way it turned out if Warren hadn’t kept learning and learning and learning all the way.
查理·芒格：我想说，关于伯克希尔有趣的是，许多人在场这么久，实际上见证了这一切的发生。如果没有沃伦不断学习、不断学习、不断学习，伯克希尔的业绩将会糟糕得多。
I mean, each decade, to make the record decent, he had to learn to do some things he didn’t know how to do at the start of the decade. And I think that’s pretty much the human condition, and of course, he’s getting old. I worry about him a lot. (Laughter)
我的意思是，每十年，为了让记录变得体面，他必须学会一些在十年开始时不知道怎么做的事情。我认为这基本上就是人类的状况，当然，他也在变老。我很担心他。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll resist commenting. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我会忍住不发表评论。（笑声）
67. Learning from the follies of others
向他人的愚蠢行为学习
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Jeff Chen (PH). I’m from San Francisco. I’m 26, and I run a software start-up out there.
观众成员：嗨，我叫杰夫·陈（音）。我来自旧金山。我 26 岁，正在那里经营一家软件初创公司。
My question is about mistake minimization. I found that I’ve made a lot of mistakes in my business, looking back, and I want to know besides thinking harder and learning from your own mistakes, what are the most effective techniques you’ve used to minimize the mistakes?
我的问题是关于错误最小化的。我发现回顾过去，我在生意中犯了很多错误，我想知道除了更加努力思考和从自己的错误中学习之外，你使用过的最有效的技术是什么，以最小化错误？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I — we made mistakes; we’ll make more mistakes.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我——我们犯了错误；我们还会犯更多错误。
We do — we think not so much — we think in terms of not exposing ourselves to any mistakes that could really hurt our ability to play tomorrow.
我们考虑的不仅仅是思考错误，而是要避免让自己暴露于可能严重影响我们明天能力的错误中。
And so we are always thinking about, you know, worst-case situations and there are — on the other hand, we have a natural instinct to do things big, both of us.
因此，我们总是在考虑最坏的情况，另一方面，我们俩都有一种天然的倾向去做大事情。
So we have to think about whether we’re doing anything really big that could have really terrible consequences.
所以我们必须考虑我们是否在做一些可能会产生非常严重后果的重大事情。
And, I would say this, that A) I don’t worry much about mistakes, I mean, the idea of learning from mistakes. The next mistake is something different. So I do not sit around and think about my mistakes and things I’m going to do differently in the future or anything of the sort.
我想说的是，A) 我不太担心错误，我的意思是学习错误的想法。下一个错误是不同的事情。所以我不会坐在那里想我的错误和未来我将要做的不同的事情或类似的事。
I would say that the — you may get some advantage — I think I’ve learned something over the years. I haven’t learned more about a basic investment philosophy. I got that when I was 19 and I still —
我想说的是，您可能会获得一些优势——我认为多年来我学到了很多。我并没有在基本投资理念上学到更多。我19岁时就得到了这些，现在仍然是这样。
I think I’ve learned more about people over the years. And I’ll make mistakes with people. You know, that’s inevitable. But, I think I’ll make more good judgments about people. I’ll recognize the extraordinary ones better than I would have 40 or 50 years ago.
我觉得这些年来我对人们的了解更多了。我会在与人交往中犯错误。你知道，这是不可避免的。但是，我认为我会对人做出更好的判断。我会比 40 或 50 年前更好地识别出那些非凡的人。
So I think that improves, but I don’t think it improves by certainly any conscious sitting around and focusing on what mistake did I make with that person or this person. I just don’t operate that way.
所以我认为这方面是有所改善的，但我不认为这是通过坐下来专注于我在那个人或这个人身上犯了什么错误而改善的。我就是不以这种方式运作。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, I would argue that what you’ve done, and what I’ve done to a lesser extent, is to learn a lot from other people’s mistakes. That is really a much more pleasant way to learn hard lessons. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：沃伦，我认为你所做的，以及我在较小程度上所做的，就是从其他人的错误中学到了很多。这确实是一种更愉快的学习艰难教训的方式。（笑声）
And we have really worked at that over the years, partly because we find it so interesting, the great variety of human mistakes and their causes. And I think this constant study of other people’s disasters and other people’s errors has helped us enormously, don’t you, Warren?
而且我们多年来一直在努力，部分原因是我们发现人类错误及其原因的多样性非常有趣。我认为这种对他人灾难和错误的持续研究对我们帮助巨大，你不觉得吗，沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah, well that’s true. In terms of reading of financial history and all that sort of thing, I’ve always been absolutely absorbed with reading about disasters. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的，这是真的。在阅读金融历史和所有这些事情方面，我一直对阅读灾难充满了兴趣。（笑）
And there’s no question. I mean, when you look at the folly of humans — you know, I’ve focused on the folly in the financial area — there’s all kinds of folly elsewhere — but just the financial area will give you plenty of material if you like to be a follower of folly.
毫无疑问。我是说，当你看到人类的愚蠢时——你知道，我专注于金融领域的愚蠢——其他地方也有各种愚蠢——但仅仅金融领域就会给你提供大量的素材，如果你喜欢追随愚蠢的话。
And I do think that understanding — and that’s what gave us some advantage over these people that have IQs of 180, you know, and can do things with math that we couldn’t do.
我确实认为理解力——这就是我们相对于那些智商 180 的人所拥有的一些优势，他们能够做我们做不到的数学题。
They just — they really just didn’t have an understanding of how human beings behave and what happens. 2008 was a good example of that, too.
他们确实——他们根本没有理解人类的行为和发生的事情。2008年就是一个很好的例子。
So we’ve — we have been a student of other people’s folly, and its served us well.
所以我们一直在研究他人的愚蠢，这对我们很有帮助。
68. We don’t build strong barriers to entries, we buy them
我们不建立强大的进入壁垒，我们购买它们。
WARREN BUFFETT: Station 4, have we got a question yet?
沃伦·巴菲特：第四站，我们有问题了吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Boxters (PH), Dartmouth, Massachusetts, which as you know is next door to New Bedford, a former home of Berkshire.
观众成员：约翰·博克斯特（PH），马萨诸塞州达特茅斯，您知道这里紧邻新贝德福德，曾是伯克希尔的故乡。
My question is how do you build barriers to entry, especially in industries which have few?
我的问题是如何建立进入壁垒，特别是在那些壁垒较少的行业中？
WARREN BUFFETT: Industries which have?
沃伦·巴菲特：哪些行业有？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Few barriers to entry.
查理·芒格：入门门槛很低。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦。
CHARLIE MUNGER: How do we build barriers?
查理·芒格：我们如何建立壁垒？
WARREN BUFFETT: Pretty tough. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：相当艰难。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We sort of buy barriers; we don’t build them. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的。我们是购买壁垒，而不是建立它们。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, think about that because it’s true. It’s very — there are some industries that are just never going to have barriers to entry.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，想想这个，因为这是真的。确实有一些行业永远不会有进入壁垒。
And in those industries, you better be running very fast because there are a lot of other people that are going to be running and looking at what you’re doing and trying to figure out, you know, what your weakness is or what they can do a little bit better.
在这些行业中，你最好跑得很快，因为有很多其他人也在奔跑，他们会关注你在做什么，并试图找出你的弱点或者他们能做得更好的地方。
很多科技创新的业务。
You really — you know, a great barrier to entry, you know, is something like this. If you gave me 10, 20, $30 billion and told me to go in and try and knock off the Coca-Cola Company with some new cola drink, I wouldn’t have the faintest idea how to do it.
你真的知道，一个很好的进入壁垒，比如说，如果你给我100亿、200亿或300亿美元，让我去尝试用一种新的可乐饮料来击败可口可乐公司，我根本不知道该怎么做。
I mean, there are billions of people around the world that have something in their mind about Coca-Cola, and you’re not going to change that with 10 or $20 billion.
我意思是，世界上有数十亿人对可口可乐有某种看法，而你不可能用 100 亿或 200 亿美元来改变这一点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but our great brands we bought, we didn’t create.
查理·芒格：是的，但我们伟大的品牌是我们购买的，而不是我们创造的。
WARREN BUFFETT: We didn’t create them, no.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们没有创造它们，不。
We eat them but we don’t create them. (Laughter)
我们吃它们，但我们不创造它们。（笑声）
But you know, not so many years ago, you remember Richard Branson, he came to this country and he came up with something called Virgin Cola. And, you know, they say a brand is a promise. Well, I’m not sure what promise he was trying to convey by that particular branding — (laughter) — but you know, you haven’t heard anything about that since.
但是你知道，不久前，你还记得理查德·布兰森，他来到这个国家，推出了一种叫做维珍可乐的饮料。你知道，他们说品牌就是一种承诺。好吧，我不确定他通过那个特定的品牌想传达什么承诺——（笑声）——但你知道，自那以后你就没有听说过它。
I don’t know how many cola drinks there have been in the history. Don Keough would probably know but there’s been hundreds, I’m sure.
我不知道历史上有多少可乐饮料。唐·基欧可能知道，但我相信有数百种。
And those are real barriers, but it’s hard to do.
这些是真正的壁垒，但这很难做到。
I mean, the people — as Pfizer finds out with Lipitor, you know, the time runs out and what was an absolute gold mine still is a pretty good mine, it’s not what it was by a long shot.
我是说，正如辉瑞公司在立普妥上的发现，时间耗尽了，曾经的绝对金矿现在仍然是一个不错的矿，但远没有以前那么好。
But we’ve got a number of businesses that have — well, nobody’s going to build another railroad, you know. We have a competitor and we will have competitors in alternative methods of transportation and all of that.
但是我们有很多企业——好吧，没人会再建一条铁路，你知道的。我们有一个竞争对手，并且在其他交通方式上我们将会有竞争对手。
But if you’re buying something at a huge discount from replacement cost and it’s an essential sort of activity, you’ve certainly got a barrier to new competition.
但是如果你以远低于替代成本的价格购买某样东西，并且这是一项必需的活动，那么你无疑就有了对新竞争者的壁垒。
But the UP is out there fighting for every bit of business every day, of course.
但联合太平洋铁路（UP）每天都在为每一笔生意而战，当然。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We have found in a long life that one competitor is frequently enough to ruin a business.
查理·芒格：是的。在漫长的生活中，我们发现一个竞争对手通常足以毁掉一项业务。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I did find that out. I started with a gas station out at 30th and Redick here in Omaha, and we had a Phillips station next to it. I had a Sinclair station. And you know, whatever he charged for gas was my price. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我确实发现了这一点。我在奥马哈的 30 街和雷迪克街开了一家加油站，旁边有一家菲利普斯加油站。我有一家辛克莱加油站。你知道，他的油价就是我的价格。（笑）
I didn’t have much choice. You don’t like to be in a business like that.
我没有太多选择。你不喜欢做那样的生意。
69. Munger on China’s BYD and electric cars
芒格谈中国的比亚迪和电动车
WARREN BUFFETT Number 5. 沃伦·巴菲特 第 5 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Kyle Miller (PH) from Kansas City, Missouri, and I was wondering about the BYD electric car company and if — with the new cars going on sale in the U.S., if that will hopefully increase the value of the company.
观众成员：嗨。我是来自密苏里州堪萨斯城的凯尔·米勒，我想问一下比亚迪电动车公司，随着新车在美国上市，这是否有望提高公司的价值。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is our expert on BYD, and he will now carry forth. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理是我们在比亚迪方面的专家，他现在将继续。 （笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the car market in China is a huge market, and they happen to be located in China. So that’s the main focus of BYD.
查理·芒格：嗯，中国的汽车市场是一个巨大的市场，而他们恰好位于中国。所以这就是比亚迪的主要关注点。
I think the first cars they will try and bring here will be for fleets in California where we have environmental troubles and so on, and there may be a market for electric cars with that.
我认为他们首先会尝试将汽车带到加利福尼亚的车队，因为那里有环境问题等等，可能会有电动车的市场。
And of course, there are various subsidies that come to people who use electric cars.
当然，使用电动车的人会获得各种补贴。
I have some relatives who commute into Washington, D.C., and they can only use the fast lane on the freeway if they buy a Prius, and that’s been very helpful to Toyota. And we’ll see a lot more of that sort of thing.
我有一些亲戚通勤到华盛顿特区，他们只有在购买普锐斯时才能使用高速公路的快速车道，这对丰田很有帮助。我们会看到更多类似的情况。
Generally speaking, I think BYD is an interesting company, if you stop to think about it.
一般来说，我认为比亚迪是一家有趣的公司，如果你仔细想想的话。
Here’s one of eight children of a peasant that becomes a famous engineering school professor, and before he’s reached 50, he’s won the equivalent of China’s Nobel Prize.
这是一个农民的八个孩子中的一个，成为了一位著名的工程学院教授，在他不到 50 岁时，他获得了相当于中国诺贝尔奖的荣誉。
And he has created a company which has 180-some thousand employees, a land holding about the size of Macau, and 100-and-some million square feet of buildings.
他创建了一家公司，拥有大约十八万名员工，土地面积与澳门相当，建筑面积超过一亿平方英尺。
It’s a very interesting start-up company.
这是一家非常有趣的初创公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: What percent of the cars do you think in 2030 will be electrics?
沃伦·巴菲特：你认为到 2030 年，电动车的比例会是多少？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Not many. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不多。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I shouldn’t have asked.
沃伦·巴菲特：我不应该问。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think society — it’s like the wind power that’s being subsidized in Iowa.
查理·芒格：我认为社会——这就像在爱荷华州被补贴的风能。
We should subsidize electric cars in various ways, as they do in Washington, D.C. by letting them use the fast lane on the freeway, in order to get the technology going so that we can wean ourselves from oil more quickly.
我们应该以各种方式补贴电动汽车，就像华盛顿特区那样，让它们在高速公路上使用快速车道，以推动技术发展，从而更快地摆脱对石油的依赖。
So I think there will be more subsidies, and there will be more electric cars, but I’m not expecting a sudden revolution.
所以我认为会有更多的补贴，也会有更多的电动车，但我不期待会有突然的革命。
I drove the latest version of BYD’s electric car. I was driven around the block Tuesday, and I was flabbergasted at how much improved that car was.
我驾驶了比亚迪最新版本的电动车。星期二我被带着绕着街区转了一圈，我对那辆车的改进感到震惊。
It’s simply amazing how fast people in China are learning to do what took us a long time to learn. The world is getting very much more competitive.
中国人在学习那些我们花了很长时间才学会的事情上，速度真是惊人。世界变得竞争越来越激烈。
70. Berkshire’s insurance float and low interest rates
伯克希尔的保险浮存金和低利率
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 6。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie. Jay (inaudible) from Mumbai, India, residing in Austin, Texas.
观众成员：下午好，沃伦和查理。我是来自印度孟买的杰伊（听不清），现居于德克萨斯州奥斯丁。
I want to thank you for a great show again, and over the few years that I’ve been here, I’ve truly enjoyed hearing both of you speak and especially ability to synthesize and clarify so many issues on important things like, you know, valuation, the philosophy of life, or sometimes even the trivial things, Warren, like you clarifying two years ago about, you know, your joke on Charlie Rose about Sophia Loren.
我想再次感谢你们带来的精彩表演。在我在这里的这几年里，我真的很享受听你们两位的发言，尤其是你们能够综合和澄清许多重要问题，比如估值、生活哲学，或者有时甚至是一些琐事，沃伦，就像你两年前澄清的关于查理·罗斯和索菲亚·罗兰的笑话。
They’ve all been extremely beneficial.
它们都非常有益。
My question is regarding some clarification around the insurance business, and especially how you value it. Now, typically we’ve had, you know, a lot of float information and the underwriting profit or loss info.
我的问题是关于保险业务的一些澄清，特别是你们如何评估它。通常，我们有很多浮存金以及承保利润或亏损的信息。
So, in one way we’ve been geared to think about it is the value of the investments that you get — the present value of the investments that you get — from the future expected float.
所以，从某种意义上说，我们一直在考虑你们所获得的投资价值——你们从未来预期的浮存金中获得的投资现值。
However, I think last year, you also talked about the economic goodwill, especially in GEICO, and I think you were using some ratio, 90 percent of that year’s insurance premiums.
然而，我想去年你们还谈到了经济商誉，尤其是在GEICO，我想你提到过一些比例，那个年度保险保费的90%。
So I was wondering if you could just talk to us a little bit about the different ways you could look at valuing the different insurance businesses. That would be of huge help. Thank you.
所以我想知道，您能否给我们谈谈评估不同保险业务的不同方式。这将非常有帮助。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the economic value comes from the ability to utilize float if obtained at a bargain rate.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，经济价值来自于以低廉的成本利用浮存金的能力。
Now, if interest rates were 7 or 8 percent and float even cost you 2 percent to obtain, it still would be very valuable.
现在，如果利率为7%或8%，而浮存金的获取成本为2%，那么它仍然是非常有价值的。
But the economic — at GEICO, for example, I think it’s quite reasonable to expect a fairly substantial underwriting profit, on average, for as far as the eye can see, and growth for as far as the eye can see.
但在经济方面——以 GEICO 为例，我认为可以合理地预期，未来可见的时间里，平均会有相当可观的承保利润，以及可持续的增长。
And then coupled with that is a growing float, because float grows with the premium volume. Well, that’s the most — you know, that is a very attractive combination of factors that comes about because GEICO is a low-cost producer.
然后还有不断增长的浮存金，因为浮存金与保费量的增长相伴。嗯，这就是最——你知道，这是一个非常有吸引力的因素组合，因为 GEICO 是一个低成本生产者。
And it has some real advantages, in terms of scale, in terms of the whole method of operation, that makes it very hard for other companies to duplicate their cost structure. It’s always good, though, to own a low-cost producer in any business, but it’s very, very nice in the insurance business.
它在规模和整体运营方式上具有一些真正的优势，这使得其他公司很难复制它们的成本结构。不过，在任何行业拥有一个低成本生产者总是好的，但在保险行业尤其好。
Now, Ajit’s business did not come the same way at all. I mean, at GEICO we have, you know, almost — we have well over 10 million policies, and that’s a statistical-type business.
现在，Ajit 的生意完全不是这样。我是说，在 GEICO，我们有，您知道，几乎——我们有超过 1000 万份保单，这是一种统计类型的业务。
And so we have, you know, hundreds of thousands of drivers in New York, and we have them by age and profession and all kinds of things. So it’s a very statistical-type business, and that coupled with a low cost, is very, very likely to produce a good result over time.
因此，我们在纽约有成千上万的司机，我们按年龄、职业和各种因素进行分类。所以这是一种非常统计化的业务，加上低成本，非常有可能随着时间的推移产生良好的结果。
In Ajit’s business, he has to be smart on each deal, because something comes along and somebody wants to buy coverage for events causing the loss of more than $10 billion in Japan in the next year.
在阿吉特的业务中，他必须在每笔交易中都很聪明，因为会有情况发生，有人想要购买超过100亿美元的赔偿覆盖，以应对明年日本的事件。
That is not — you can’t look it up in any book, and you can’t do enough transactions just like that one to even know whether your calculation was right on that specific deal.
这不是——你无法在任何书中查到，也无法进行足够的类似交易以了解你在特定交易中的计算是否正确。
Now, if you make 100 calculations on 100 of these type of deals, you’ll soon find out whether you have the right person making those calculations or not.
现在，如果你对这 100 笔交易进行 100 次计算，你很快就会发现你是否找到了合适的人来进行这些计算。
But the economic goodwill with Ajit’s operation is based much more on the skill to price individual transactions and the ability to find the people even that want those transactions. Whereas at GEICO, it’s based basically on a machine.
但阿吉特的业务的经济商誉更多地基于对个别交易定价的能力和找到需要这些交易的人。而在 GEICO，这基本上是基于一台机器。
But it’s enormously important how that machine is run, and Tony Nicely has absolutely knocked the ball out of the park, in terms of managing it.
但如何运作这台机器是极其重要的，而托尼·尼克利在管理方面绝对做得非常出色。
In the years prior to when he took over, it was — you know, it had gone along at 2 percent of the market and really hardly gone anyplace.
在他接手之前的几年里，市场份额一直维持在 2%，几乎没有什么变化。
And Tony is — quintupled, virtually, our share of the market, while at the same time producing great underwriting results.
而托尼几乎将我们的市场份额增加了五倍，同时也产生了良好的承保结果。
So he took a machine that had a current — had a lot of potential — and then he exceeded even the potential that I thought it had. So you get the value in different ways.
所以他使用了一台有电流的机器——有很大的潜力——然后他甚至超越了我认为它所具有的潜力。因此，你可以以不同的方式获得价值。
It does relate in the end to a combination of growing a large float, and extremely low-cost float, and in our case, the cost of float has been negative, so people are actually paying us to hold $70 billion of their money, and that’s a lot of fun. (Laughter)
这最终确实与增加大量浮存金和极低成本的浮存金相结合，在我们的案例中，浮存金的成本是负的，因此人们实际上在支付我们持有700亿美元资金的费用，这真是太有趣了。（笑声）
And I think that the chances of that continuing are really quite high, although I don’t think the chances of the 70 billion growing at a fast clip are high at all. I think we’ll be lucky to hold onto the 70 billion.
我认为这种情况继续下去的可能性非常高，尽管我认为 700 亿快速增长的可能性并不大。我认为我们能保持 700 亿就已经很幸运了。
But I think the chances of the fact of us being able to get that at a less-than-zero cost is good, and I think that will even be true if interest rates go up to 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 percent. I think we may very well be able to do it, and that’s a huge asset under circumstances like that.
但我认为我们能够以低于零的成本获得这一点的机会是很大的，我认为即使利率上升到 4、5、6 或 7 个百分点，这一点也会成立。我认为我们很可能能够做到，在这样的情况下，这将是一个巨大的资产。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And we’re currently in a low-return environment from conventional investment float, but that won’t last forever.
查理·芒格：是的。我们目前正处于传统投资浮存金的低回报环境中，但这不会永远持续下去。
And there were times in the past when Ajit would generate a lot of one-of-a-kind float, and Warren would make 20 or 30 percent with it before we had to give it back. That was a lot of fun, and we did it over and over and over again.
过去有很多时候，Ajit 会产生大量独一无二的浮存金，而 Warren 会在我们不得不归还之前赚取 20%或 30%的利润。这非常有趣，我们一次又一次地这样做。
Whether that will ever come again on that scale, I don’t know, but it doesn’t have to.
我不知道那种规模的事情是否会再发生，但它并不一定需要。
WARREN BUFFETT: You know, when we have 30 — presently our cash position — well, really if you counted all the companies, it’s probably 36 or 7 billion — you know, we’re essentially getting nothing on that.
沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，当我们有30——目前我们的现金头寸——如果算上所有公司，可能是360亿或370亿——你知道，我们实际上没有获得任何收益。
So if you — our earning power today is being affected by current Fed policies.
所以，如果你——我们今天的赚钱能力正受到当前美联储政策的影响。
And I — you know, that is not going to be a normal rate for many, many — for over the longer term. So we — in that sense, our normal earning power is being depressed by Mr. Bernanke but probably for very good reason.
我——你知道，从长期来看，这不会是一个正常的利率。所以在这个意义上，我们的正常盈利能力被伯南克压制，但这可能是出于非常好的原因。
71. Munger: Energy independence is a “stupid idea”
芒格：能源独立是一个“愚蠢的想法”
WARREN BUFFETT: Seven? 沃伦·巴菲特：七？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ola Larson (PH), Salt Lake City.
观众成员：奥拉·拉尔森（PH），盐湖城。
Five, six years ago, you wrote in your annual shareholders report that the current account deficit, the trade deficit, couldn’t go on indefinitely. Of course, a very large part of that is crude oil import.
五、六年前，你在年度股东报告中写道，当前账户赤字和贸易赤字不能无限期持续。当然，其中很大一部分是原油进口。
Now some people in the energy markets are sort of talking about United States becoming independent in the energy market.
现在一些能源市场的人在谈论美国在能源市场上变得独立。
Could you shed some light on how this might affect the trade deficit? Thank you.
您能否阐明这可能如何影响贸易赤字？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It will be a huge plus, obviously, if our total energy production increases substantially and what we have to import costs us less. I mean, it is a big factor in the current account deficit.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果我们的总能源生产大幅增加，而我们需要进口的成本降低，这显然将是一个巨大的好处。我的意思是，这在当前账户赤字中是一个重要因素。
We’re doing a lot in oil. I don’t see us getting self-sufficient in oil, but gas is huge. We — our picture has changed a lot in the last three years, in terms of energy.
我们在石油方面做了很多。我不认为我们会在石油上实现自给自足，但天然气是巨大的。我们——在过去三年中，我们的能源格局发生了很大变化。
预测很难。
Charlie and I might argue that, over time, we’d still be better off using somebody else’s up and keeping our own for a long time.
查理和我可能会争辩，随着时间的推移，我们仍然会更好地使用别人的，而把自己的保留很长时间。
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s my view.
查理·芒格：这是我的看法。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. For a long time — we were an oil exporter in my lifetime, a substantial oil exporter. And it might have been better if we would have been using Saudi —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在很长一段时间里——在我的一生中，我们是一个石油出口国，是一个重要的石油出口国。如果我们使用沙特的石油，可能会更好——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It would have been better.
查理·芒格：那会更好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑）
You can’t get by with much with Charlie here.
和查理在一起，你无法轻松应对。
It would have been better. OK. It would have been better if we had been using Saudi Arabia’s oil then and just, in effect, treated all of those huge reserves we had in places like East Texas and such as a strategic petroleum reserve which we just kept around for another century, but —
那样会更好。好的。如果那时我们使用沙特阿拉伯的石油，并实际上将我们在东德克萨斯州等地的巨大储备视为战略石油储备，留着再用一个世纪，那就更好了，但是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It would have been much better.
查理·芒格：那会好得多。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it would have.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，确实会。
But our picture has changed for the better, and that means our current account deficit picture has changed for the better.
但我们的情况已经好转，这意味着我们的经常账户赤字状况也已经好转。
We still got a ways to go, but it does look better than three or four years ago. Don’t you think so, Charlie?
我们还有很长的路要走，但看起来比三四年前好很多。你不觉得吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the — those — that’s a very complex interaction.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为那是一个非常复杂的互动。
My view is that the single-most precious resource in the United States are its hydrocarbon reserves, the ones that are right here and, of course, I want to use up —
我认为美国最宝贵的资源是其碳氢化合物储备，正是在这里的那些，当然，我想要利用它们——
I’m a puritan. I always want to suffer now to make the future better, because I think that’s the way grown-ups should behave. So I’m all for — (applause) — using up the other fellow’s oil and conserving our own.
我是一个清教徒。我总是想现在忍受痛苦，以便让未来变得更好，因为我认为这就是成年人应该表现的方式。所以我支持——（掌声）——耗尽别人的石油，节约我们自己的。
You know, I think the idea of energy independence is one of the stupidest ideas I’ve ever heard grown people talk about.
你知道，我认为能源独立的想法是我听过的成年人谈论过的最愚蠢的想法之一。
Think of what terrible shape we’d been in if we’d achieved total energy independence way earlier.
想想如果我们更早实现完全能源独立，我们会处于多么糟糕的境地。
We wouldn’t have any oil and gas left at all. Wouldn’t that be a wonderful condition? We don’t want energy independence. We want to conserve this stuff.
我们根本不会剩下任何石油和天然气。这不是一个美好的状态吗？我们并不想要能源独立。我们想要节约这些资源。
And thank God other people have some of this precious stuff they’re willing to sell.
感谢上帝，其他人也有一些愿意出售的珍贵东西。
I have the exact opposite idea on this subject than most people and, of course, I think I’m right. (Laughter)
我在这个问题上的想法与大多数人完全相反，当然，我认为我是对的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: This is Charlie’s version of saving up sex for your old age. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：这是查理把性保存到老年时的版本。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we’re going to use the oil. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，我们会使用石油。（笑声）
72. Wealth inequality and economic growth
财富不平等与经济增长
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 7. Was that 7?
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 7 个。是 7 吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jim Powers (PH), Newton, Massachusetts.
观众成员：吉姆·鲍尔斯（PH），马萨诸塞州牛顿。
A few minutes ago you were talking about per capita GDP, and if it went up 1 percent a year, each generation would be 20, 25 percent better off than the previous one.
几分钟前你在谈论人均 GDP，如果每年增长 1%，那么每一代人将比前一代人富裕 20%到 25%。
In Boston right now, we have a big controversy where the executive officer of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company has been making over 50 million a year in compensation plus other perks.
在波士顿，目前我们有一个大争议，Liberty Mutual 保险公司的执行官每年获得超过 5000 万美元的薪酬以及其他福利。
And that amount of money, in an hour or two, is more than 95 percent of the employees of that company make in the course of a year.
而那笔钱，在一两个小时内，就超过了该公司 95%以上员工一年的收入。
The newspapers have been commenting on the concentration of the profits of that mutual insurance company not going to the insurance policyholders who own the company because it’s a mutual insurance company, and the lack of compensation going to the average employee.
报纸评论指出，作为互助保险公司的利润集中没有惠及那些拥有该公司的保单持有人，以及普通员工缺乏补偿的情况。
What good does it do the average American for the economy to improve 1 percent of GDP per year if they don’t — if they don’t enjoy some of that themselves?
如果普通美国人自己没有享受到经济每年提高 1%的 GDP 的好处，这对他们有什么好处呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: We certainly agree — (applause) — without commenting on any specific individuals, but obviously, if we start out with $48,000 per capita GDP and we do increase by 20 percent or so each generation, you would certainly hope that that would not keep bubbling to the people at the top as it has during the past generation.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们当然同意——（掌声）——不对任何特定个人发表评论，但显然，如果我们从每人 48,000 美元的 GDP 开始，并且每一代增加约 20%，你当然希望这不会像过去一代那样不断涌向顶层人士。
I mean, the past 20 years we have not seen the progress that the country overall has made distributed in any kind of way except very, very much at the top.
我意思是，在过去的 20 年里，我们没有看到这个国家整体所取得的进展以任何方式分配，除了非常非常少的顶层。
And the tax code has encouraged that. The tax code is — you know, the tax code, which was taking those people making the $45 million incomes in 1992, was taking 27 or 28 percent from them. When they got up to 270 million now, it’s taking a figure that’s more like 18 percent.
税法对此也有所鼓励。税法——你知道，1992年，税法对那些收入为4500万美元的人征收27%或28%的税。但现在他们的收入达到2.7亿时，征税的比例变得更像18%。
So, we’ve got a tax code that has become more and more pro the ultra-rich, and coupled with what you see, and you’ve seen in compensation, and what the CEO makes in relation to the average worker and all that, you know, we’ve gone a long direction — a long way — in making sure that what we were promised in the way of trickle-down benefits has not been achieved.
所以，我们的税法越来越偏向超富人，结合你所看到的高管薪酬，以及CEO与普通工人之间的薪酬关系，你知道，我们走得很远——我们确保承诺的涓滴效应并没有实现。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s also true that most of the great mutual insurance companies — and there are a lot of them in the United States — do not have that kind of compensation abuse in them.
查理·芒格：大多数伟大的互助保险公司——在美国有很多这样的公司——确实没有那种薪酬滥用的现象。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s true, for example —
沃伦·巴菲特：这是真的，例如——
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s quite fair.
查理·芒格：这很公平。
WARREN BUFFETT: — State Farm, or something like that, does not have that.
沃伦·巴菲特：——State Farm，或者类似的东西，没有这个。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no. Most of them don’t. That’s a very egregious example, but Boston has always led in egregious examples. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，不。大多数都没有。这是一个非常恶劣的例子，但波士顿总是以恶劣的例子而闻名。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: No — it’s — the corporate world —
沃伦·巴菲特：不——这是——企业界——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It got there early, you know. It mastered the art. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：它很早就达到这一点，你知道。它掌握了这门艺术。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The corporate world has been — there’s been a lot more egregious behavior in the corporate world than the mutual world.
沃伦·巴菲特：企业界的行为比互助界更加恶劣。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s why it’s so anomalous, really.
查理·芒格：这就是为什么这实际上是如此异常。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No wonder it’s drawing some attention.
查理·芒格：难怪它引起了一些关注。
WARREN BUFFETT: The rich like it that way. You have to understand that. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：富人喜欢这样。你必须理解这一点。（笑）
But the tax code is basically — you know, that is an important place where people decide, you know, who actually bears the cost of this government, and we have moved away from the rich on that as they have gotten further and further away from the middle class, in terms of earnings.
但是税法基本上是——这是一个重要的地方，人们决定了谁实际上承担了这个政府的成本，而我们在这方面已越来越远离富人，因为他们在收入上离中产阶级越来越远。
And, you know, there’s a — there may be a natural tendency in a democracy to work toward a plutocracy. If you think about the effect of money in politics, if you think of the nature of how market systems work, you know, there may be some underlying trends that push a democracy toward plutocracy, and you need countervailing factors to prevent it.
而且，你知道，在民主制度中，可能存在一种自然倾向，朝着寡头政治发展。如果你考虑金钱在政治中的影响，考虑市场系统的运作方式，你会发现可能有一些潜在的趋势将民主推向寡头政治，而你需要对抗的因素来防止这种情况发生。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think you ought to be too discouraged about Boston, either, because when I first went to Boston, the mayor was running the city from the federal penitentiary. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我也认为你不应该对波士顿感到太沮丧，因为我第一次去波士顿时，市长在联邦监狱里管理城市。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Was that Curley or —
沃伦·巴菲特：那是库利还是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, Mayor Curley.
查理·芒格：是的，库利市长。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And nobody in Boston saw anything peculiar about it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：而波士顿没有人觉得这有什么奇怪的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: If you live long enough, you’ll see everything. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你活得够久，你会看到一切。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right.
查理·芒格：对，没错。
73. Sovereign debt and “fiscal virtue”
主权债务与“财政美德”
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8. 沃伦·巴菲特：第 8 区。
VOICES FROM AUDIENCE: Nine, nine.
观众的声音：九，九。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nine, he says.
查理·芒格：他说九。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, 9? OK. Nine.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，9？好的。九。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Brian Chilton (PH), also from the Boston, Massachusetts, area.
观众成员：我的名字是布赖恩·奇尔顿（PH），也来自马萨诸塞州的波士顿地区。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m surprised you admit it. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我很惊讶你承认这一点。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was tempted.
观众成员：我很想这么做。
Warren, a lot of today’s questions referenced risk. It seems to me one of the biggest risks facing us is the (inaudible) sovereign debt levels both here in the U.S. and in many countries in Europe.
沃伦，今天很多问题都提到了风险。在我看来，我们面临的最大风险之一是（听不清）主权债务水平，无论是在美国还是在许多欧洲国家。
The liquidity injections by the Fed, and more recently the ECB, have given us some breathing room, but how do these large debts get balanced and do they concern you? (Applause)
美联储和最近欧洲央行的流动性注入给了我们一些喘息的空间，但这些巨额债务如何平衡，它们是否让你感到担忧？（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the nice thing about sovereign debt is they can not pay you in the end and you can’t grab anything from them, unlike other kinds of debts.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，主权债务的好处在于，他们最终可能无法偿还你，而你也无法从他们那里拿走任何东西，这与其他类型的债务不同。
And, you know, the truth is that the world has seen many, many failures of sovereign debt. I remember when Walt Wriston, back in the early 1980s, said sovereigns don’t default.
你知道，事实是，世界上有很多主权债务的失败。我记得在1980年代早期，沃尔特·维斯顿曾说主权国家不会违约。
Well, the truth is they’ve defaulted many, many times over history. And what happens then is you get a big reallocation of wealth.
好吧，事实是他们在历史上违约了很多次。然后发生的事情是财富的大规模重新分配。
Now, the wealth doesn’t go away. I mean, you don’t lose the farms, you don’t — you lose the (inaudible), you don’t lose the people with their skills and all of that sort of thing. I mean, there may be some marginal losses.
现在，财富并不会消失。我的意思是，你不会失去农场，你不会——你失去的是（听不清），你不会失去那些有技能的人等等。我的意思是，可能会有一些边际损失。
But I don’t know how it plays out in Europe. We have seen the ECB here recently give the trillion dollars to banks which are loaded with sovereign debt, which really is questionable in many cases.
但我不知道在欧洲情况如何。我们最近看到欧洲央行向负有主权债务的银行提供了万亿美元，这在许多情况下确实是值得怀疑的。
And I wouldn’t be surprised, in some cases, if they haven’t used some of those — some of the borrowing to even buy more of it.
在某些情况下，如果他们没有用借来的钱去购买更多的主权债务，我不会感到惊讶。
So it’s like giving a guy with a margin account with some perhaps bad assets in it even more money to play with to further leverage themselves up and make an even bigger bet.
所以这就像是给一个有保证金账户、里面可能有一些不良资产的家伙再提供更多的钱，让他进一步加杠杆，进行更大的赌注。
But when they did that at MF, or whatever it was, Global, you know, then it had a bad ending, and it might have a bad ending over there.
但当他们在MF（或其他什么）全球公司这样做时，你知道，最终结果不好，而这在那边也可能有不好的结局。
I would much prefer, you know, a world that was getting its fiscal house in order, including in the United States.
我更希望看到一个财政状况逐渐改善的世界，包括美国在内。
The counterargument, of course, is that when you’re in a recession, or close to it, as some or all of Europe might be, that that will feed on itself and be destructive in the same way that it was in the early ’30s in the United States.
当然，反对意见是，当你处于经济衰退，或者像欧洲某些国家那样接近衰退时，这种情况将自我循环，并以与美国30年代早期相似的方式造成破坏。
But we have been having in the United States — it’s very interesting. We talk about the fact that there was a stimulus bill a few years ago, even though they didn’t call it that, and whether it was adequate and inadequate and all that.
但在美国，我们已经——这很有趣。我们谈到几年前有一项刺激法案，尽管他们没有称之为刺激法案，以及它是否足够等。
When the government is operating at a deficit that’s 8 to 9 percent of GDP, that is stimulus on a huge, huge level. They don’t call it — they may not call it, but that is, by definition, huge fiscal stimulus.
当政府的赤字占 GDP 的 8%到 9%时，这就是一种巨大的刺激。他们可能不称之为——他们可能不这样称呼，但这从定义上来说就是巨大的财政刺激。
So we have been having consistent, huge fiscal stimulus in this country, and we will have to wean ourselves off of that fairly soon.
所以我们在这个国家一直有持续的大规模财政刺激，我们必须很快戒掉这种刺激。
And the interesting, I think, almost — leaders of both parties realize that you probably have to get revenues up to something around 19 percent of GDP and you have to get expenses down to 21 percent of GDP.
我认为有趣的是，几乎两党领导人都意识到，你可能需要将收入提高到大约占 GDP 的 19%，并将支出降低到占 GDP 的 21%。
And that that will work fine over time, but you have a situation where both sides feel they will show weakness by going first.
这在一段时间内是可行的，但你有一个情况，两边都觉得先行动会显示出软弱。
And you also have a situation where the leader, probably, of at least one party can’t speak for their party, so that you can’t have negotiations in private, which are probably the way to get something like this solved.
而且你还面临一种情况，至少有一个政党的领导人可能无法代表他们的政党发言，因此你无法进行私下谈判，而这可能是解决此类问题的有效方式。
I would avoid — I would — certainly at these rates, I would totally avoid buying medium-term or long-term government bonds. I think that’s the obvious answer. I wish I had answers that would solve the problem further beyond than that.
我会避免——我会——在这些利率下，我绝对会避免购买中期或长期的政府债券。我认为这是显而易见的答案。我希望我能有更进一步解决问题的答案。
But in terms of your own situation, I would stay away from medium- or long-term government bonds, our own, or those of other countries.
但就你自己的情况而言，我建议远离中期或长期的政府债券，无论是我们自己的还是其他国家的。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, he’s asking the really intelligent question of the day, and of course we’re having difficulty answering it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：当然，他提出了今天真正聪明的问题，当然我们在回答这个问题时遇到了困难。（笑声）
It is very hard to know how much of this Keynesian stuff will work after you’ve lost all your fiscal virtue.
在你失去所有财政美德之后，很难知道这些凯恩斯主义的东西会有多少效果。
You know you come to a time, if you’re a government which has pretty much lost all its fiscal virtue, that the Keynesian stuff won’t work, and the money printing won’t work, and it’s all counterproductive, and you’re heading for calamity.
你知道，当一个政府几乎失去了所有财政美德时，你就会意识到凯恩斯主义的东西是行不通的，印钞也无济于事，所有这些都是适得其反的，你正走向灾难。
We don’t know the precise point at which it stops working. And somebody like Paul Krugman — who I think is a genius — but I also think he’s more optimistic about doing well with various economic tricks after you’ve lost a lot of fiscal virtue than I think is justified by the facts.
我们不知道它停止工作的确切时刻。像保罗·克鲁格曼这样的人——我认为他是个天才——但我也认为他对在失去大量财政美德后通过各种经济手段取得成功的乐观程度，超出了事实所能证明的合理性。
I think it’s very dangerous to go low on fiscal virtue and, of course, here in the United States, we’ve used up some of our store.
我认为在财政美德上降低标准是非常危险的，当然，在美国，我们已经耗尽了一些我们的储备。
And it’s very important that we not go too far in that direction because we want to be able to do what we did in the Great Recession, where we avoided a huge calamity because we had enough fiscal virtue left so the economic tricks would work.
而且我们必须非常注意不要在这个方向上走得太远，因为我们希望能够像在大萧条期间那样，避免巨大的灾难，因为我们还有足够的财政美德，使经济手段能够奏效。
So it’s a terrible problem, and I ask you the question, Warren. Is it inconceivable that we could get a very mediocre result in the United States as a result of all this trouble?
所以这是一个可怕的问题，我问你，沃伦。我们是否无法想象，由于所有这些麻烦，我们在美国会得到一个非常平庸的结果？
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we’ll get a good result over time.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为随着时间的推移，我们会取得良好的结果。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I know you do, but — (Buffett laughs) — is it inconceivable? I’m trying —
查理·芒格：我知道你这样做，但——（巴菲特笑）——这难以想象吗？我在尝试——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we can have problems, but —
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们可能会遇到问题，但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m a little less optimistic than he is. I’m roughly in his position. I think there’s some slight chance that we can get a pretty mediocre result.
查理·芒格：我比他稍微不那么乐观。我大致上和他的观点相同。我认为我们有一些微小的机会可以得到一个相当平庸的结果。
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s say I came to you right now with a budget that made sense in general — in what it achieved — it had a 19 percent revenue built into it and 21 percent of expenditures. Would you want to adopt that now?
沃伦·巴菲特：假设我现在来找你，带着一个在总体上合理的预算——它实现了 19%的收入和 21%的支出。你想现在采纳这个吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the reason intelligent people disagree on this subject is because it’s so difficult.
查理·芒格：我认为聪明的人在这个问题上意见不一致的原因是因为这太困难了。
Everybody wants fiscal virtue but not quite yet. They’re like that guy who felt that way about sex. He was willing to give it up but not quite yet. (Laughter)
每个人都想要财政美德，但还没准备好。他们就像那个对性有这种感觉的人。他愿意放弃，但还没准备好。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Saint Augustine.
沃伦·巴菲特：圣奥古斯丁。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Saint Augustine, yes.
查理·芒格：圣奥古斯丁，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s a hero to many of us. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他是我们许多人的英雄。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think these are very, very hard questions. And I have one thing I’m sure of: that it is safer, if you’re going to these deficit financing things, to use the money intelligently to build something you’re sure to need than it is to just throw it off the end of trains or give it to crooked lawyers. (Applause)
查理·芒格：我认为这些问题非常非常困难。我有一件事是肯定的：如果你要进行这些赤字融资，明智地使用资金去建设一些你确定需要的东西，比随便把钱扔掉或给那些不诚实的律师要安全得多。（掌声）
And so I think we all have an interest in making sure that whatever tricks we play are intelligently used because it will protect our reputation and reality in having this fiscal virtue.
所以我认为我们都有兴趣确保我们采取的任何措施都能得到明智的使用，因为这将保护我们的声誉和财政美德的现实。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll let you design the 21 percent that gets expended.
沃伦·巴菲特：我会让你设计那 21%的支出。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, if I were doing it, I would expend it sensibly on infrastructure that I knew we were going to need, and I would have a massive program — (applause) — and I would have the whole damn country pay more cheerfully, like we were so many Romans in the Punic Wars.
查理·芒格：哦，如果是我来做，我会明智地将其用于我知道我们将需要的基础设施上，我会有一个大规模的计划——（掌声）——我会让整个国家更乐意地支付，就像我们在Punic战争中的许多罗马人一样。
The Punic Wars, the Romans paid off two-thirds of the war debt before the war was over. That’s my kind of —
Punic战争期间，罗马人在战争结束前偿还了三分之二的战争债务。这正是我喜欢的——
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s our campaign slogan, folks. Punic Wars again. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：这就是我们的竞选口号，大家。又是Punic战争。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: But the answer is, I think we do need more sacrifice. I think we need more patriotism, we need more sensible ways of spending money, and we need more civilized politics. (Applause)
查理·芒格：但答案是，我认为我们确实需要更多的牺牲。我认为我们需要更多的爱国主义，我们需要更合理的花钱方式，我们需要更文明的政治。（掌声）
But it’s still a hard question. I think we should go on to an easier one. (Laughter)
但这仍然是个难题。我认为我们应该换一个简单点的。(笑声)
Warren is not strained, but I’m at my limit. (Laughter)
沃伦没有感到压力，但我已经到达极限了。（笑声）
74. Economy held back by health costs, not tax rates
经济受到医疗成本的制约，而非税率。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll do one more question, from area 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们再来一个问题，来自第 10 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This will be an easier question.
观众成员：这个问题会简单一些。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good. 沃伦·巴菲特：好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you so much both for being here today, and I hope when you’re both in your 90s and your 100s, you’ll still be here doing these meetings. (Applause)
观众成员：非常感谢你们今天的到来，我希望当你们都到了 90 岁和 100 岁时，仍然能在这里参加这些会议。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And I’m Candy Lewis (PH) from Denver, Colorado.
观众成员：我是来自科罗拉多州丹佛的坎迪·刘易斯。
And my question has to do with taxes and what do you feel is the ideal corporate tax rate to get this economy started and excited?
我的问题与税收有关，您认为理想的企业税率是多少，以启动和激励这个经济？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Last year the actual taxes paid were about 13 percent of profits, as I remember.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。去年实际支付的税款大约是利润的 13%，我记得。
So the corporate rate is 35 percent, and last year you were allowed to write off 100 percent of most kinds of fixed-asset purchases.
所以公司税率是35%，而去年你可以将大部分固定资产的100%抵扣。
I don’t think the — corporate profits are not the problem, or corporate balance sheets, or corporate liquidity, is not the problem in the economy moving.
我认为公司利润并不是经济发展的问题，公司的资产负债表或流动性也不是经济停滞的原因。
I mean, there is money available, huge amounts of money available in the corporate world, including at Berkshire, to push forward on opportunities.
我的意思是，企业界，包括伯克希尔，有大量可用资金，可以推动机会的发展。
You know, we will — we’re spending money where we see opportunity. And we spent lots of money in the railroad business, we spent lots of money in the energy business, and we built plants elsewhere and did other things.
你知道，我们会——我们会在看到机会的地方花钱。我们在铁路业务上花了很多钱，在能源业务上也花了很多钱，我们在其他地方建了工厂，还做了其他事情。
But — so it is not a lack of capital at all that’s holding back, nor is it tax rates, in my view, that are holding back, at all, investment.
但在我看来，阻碍投资的并不是资本的缺乏，也不是税率。
You know, this country prospered in the ’50s and the ’60s when the corporate rate was 52 percent and people actually paid it.
你知道，这个国家在 50 年代和 60 年代繁荣，当时企业税率是 52%，而人们实际上是缴纳了这个税率。
When it was cut to 48 percent, we all rejoiced. And our GDP per capita grew. So it is not a factor holding back.
当它被削减到 48%时，我们都欢欣鼓舞。我们的每人 GDP 也增长了。因此，这并不是一个制约因素。
I will tell you, I mean, corporate tax rates last year were 1.2 percent of GDP. Medical costs were 17-and-a-fraction percent of GDP. And there we have at least a 7 percentage point disadvantage against the rest of the world, which is a big multiple of all the corporate taxes paid.
我告诉你，去年企业税率占 GDP 的 1.2%。医疗费用占 GDP 的 17%多一点。我们在这方面至少比世界其他地方有 7 个百分点的劣势，这相当于所有企业税收的多倍。
So if you ask me about the tapeworm of American industry, you know, it’s basically our medical costs. We’ve got a huge cost disadvantage against the rest of the world. (Applause)
所以如果你问我关于美国工业的寄生虫，那就是我们的医疗成本。我们在与世界其他地方的竞争中有巨大的成本劣势。（掌声）
Now, that’s unbelievably tough to address, but that is where — as Willie Sutton would say — that’s where the money is.
现在，这确实很难解决，但正如威利·萨顿所说，这就是钱所在的地方。
And you can fiddle around with corporate tax rates. I don’t think that will have any big effect on the economy.
你可以调整企业税率。我认为这对经济不会产生太大影响。
You may achieve greater fairness within the corporate tax code, I wouldn’t argue about that at all.
您可能会在企业税法中实现更大的公平，我对此一点也不反对。
And incidentally, the Treasury — I mean, I think both parties agree that they would like to see a lower overall corporate tax rate but one that applies more equally across corporations so that the —
顺便提一下，财政部——我的意思是，我认为两党都同意他们希望看到一个更低的整体企业税率，但这个税率应该更公平地适用于各个公司，以便——
But getting from here to there is going to be very, very difficult, because it’s fine when you talk about it in the terms I just used. But once you put specific proposals out, everyone whose tax rate is going to go up — and some have to go up if others are going to go down — everyone whose tax rate is going to go up will fight with an intensity against that bill that far outstrips the intensity with which those on the other side fight.
但是，从这里到那里将会非常非常困难，因为当你用我刚才使用的术语谈论时，这很好。但是一旦你提出具体的提案，所有税率将会上升的人——如果其他人的税率要下降，有些人的税率就必须上升——所有税率将会上升的人将以远远超过另一方的强度来反对那项法案。
It’s a real complex problem that way. But corporate tax rates are not our country’s problem, in my view.
这在某种程度上是一个真正复杂的问题。但在我看来，企业税率并不是我们国家的问题。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I used to say when I was younger that I expected to live to see a value-added tax, and now I’m not so sure. But I think it’s going to come eventually and probably should.
查理·芒格：我年轻时常说我期待看到增值税的出现，现在我不太确定了。但我认为它最终会来，可能是应该的。
It equalizes the import-export effect of the taxes, and I think it’s quite logical to tax consumption.
它平衡了税收的进出口效应，我认为对消费征税是相当合乎逻辑的。
I think we get in a lot of trouble when we give people the money and then come around later and try and take it back.
我认为当我们把钱给人们，然后再回来试图收回时，我们会陷入很多麻烦。
Human nature really resists that. And I think it’s much better, if you’re going to rely on taxes, to have taxes that are sort of taken out right off the top, and they don’t vary so much from year to year.
人性确实对此有抵触。我认为，如果你要依赖税收，最好是那些从一开始就扣除的税收，并且每年变化不大。
I come from a state where the state income tax is based on capital gains — go way up and then they collapse. And of course, the politicians spend like crazy when they go up, and there’s agony when — it’s a crazy way to have a tax system.
我来自一个州，该州的所得税是基于资本利得的——上涨时会大幅上升，然后又崩溃。当然，当资本利得上涨时，政客们会疯狂花钱，而当它崩溃时则会痛苦不堪——这是一种疯狂的税制。
We have a lot of problems.
我们有很多问题。
And I don’t think a 52 percent tax rate — we may have gotten by with it when we sort of led the world, but I’m not so sure it would be such a good right now to have our tax at 52 percent and the rest of the world taxing corporate profits at 15 percent or something.
我认为 52%的税率并不合适——当我们引领世界时或许可以接受，但现在我不太确定在我们税率为 52%的情况下，其他国家对企业利润征收 15%或其他税率是否合理。
That might have a lot of perverse consequences. And since so little money is involved, it’s not where the game should be played.
这可能会带来很多扭曲的后果。而且由于涉及的钱很少，这不是游戏应该进行的地方。
And if Warren could save a lot of money on medical expense for everybody, why, he probably would have done it already. It’s really hard.
如果沃伦能够为每个人节省很多医疗费用，那他可能早就做到了。这真的很难。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s hard. So we’ll end with a hard one. And I thank you all for coming. We’re going to reconvene in about ten minutes to conduct the business of the meeting, and thank you. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：这很难。所以我们将以一个难题结束。感谢大家的到来。我们将在大约十分钟后重新开始会议，进行会议的事务，谢谢大家。（掌声）
75. Formal business meeting begins
正式商务会议开始
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll now go to the business meeting. We follow a script here, at least to quite a degree. And the meeting will now come to order.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们现在将开始商务会议。我们在这里遵循一个脚本，至少在很大程度上是这样。会议现在开始。
I’m Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the company. I welcome you to this 2012 annual meeting of shareholders.
我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席。欢迎您参加 2012 年股东年会。
This morning, I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present.
今天早上，我介绍了在场的伯克希尔哈撒韦董事。
Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，他们是我们的审计师。他们可以回答您可能对他们公司对伯克希尔账户审计的相关问题。
Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings.
福雷斯特·克鲁特是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对会议进行书面记录。
Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting and she will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motions to be voted upon at this meeting.
贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将对董事选举中投票的计数以及本次会议上将要投票的动议进行认证。
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.
本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股份数量、投票权和出席会议的报告？
FORREST KRUTTER: As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 7, 2012, being the record date for this meeting, there were 934,158 shares of Class A common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,075,302,988 shares of Class B common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/10,000th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
福雷斯特·克鲁特：正如随本次会议通知一起发送给 2012 年 3 月 7 日所有登记股东的代理声明中所示，本次会议的登记日期为 2012 年 3 月 7 日，届时共有 934,158 股 A 类普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权；同时，B 类普通股在外流通的股份为 1,075,302,988 股，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有 1/10,000 的投票权。
Of that number, 640,153 Class A shares, and 664,293,280 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, May 3rd.
在这个数字中，640,153 股 A 类股份和 664,293,280 股 B 类股份通过截至 5 月 3 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。
The first order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders, and I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.
会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录，我请沃尔特·斯科特先生提出一项动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录的阅读，并批准会议记录。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？
The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?
动议已被提出并获得支持。有没有任何评论或问题？
We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor, say aye. Opposed? The motion’s carried.
我们将通过口头表决对这个提案进行投票。赞成的请说“赞成”。反对的？提案通过。
76. Election of directors
7董事的选举
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。
If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, you may do so.
如果有股东在场并希望撤回之前发送的代理投票并亲自投票选举董事，您可以这样做。
Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.
此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交委托书并希望亲自投票，您可以这样做。
If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to one of the meeting officials in the aisles, who will furnish a ballot to you.
如果您希望这样做，请向走道中的一位会议官员表明您的身份，他们会为您提供一张选票。
I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？
It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.
已提议并得到支持，选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。
Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?
还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？
The motions are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
动议已准备好进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并允许将选票交给选举监察员。
Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。
The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 697,021 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
代理持有人对截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票的投票结果显示，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 697,021 票。这个数字远远超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。
Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott have been elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。
77. Shareholder proposal for written CEO succession planning policy
股东提案：书面首席执行官继任计划政策
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by the AFL-CIO Reserve Fund. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement.
沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由美国劳工联合会-产业工会储备基金提出的动议。该动议在委托书中列出。
The motion requests Berkshire Hathaway to amend its corporate governance guidelines to establish a written succession planning policy, including certain specified features.
该动议要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦修订其公司治理准则，以建立书面的继任计划政策，包括某些特定的特征。
The directors have recommended that shareholders vote against this proposal.
董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。
I will now recognize Ken Mass to present the motion. To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I ask Mr. Mass to limit his remarks to five minutes.
我现在请肯·马斯提出动议。为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我请马斯先生将他的发言限制在五分钟内。
KEN MASS: Mr. Buffett — Mr. Buffett, members of the board of directors. My name is Ken Mass. I represent the AFL-CIO, a federation of 56 unions, representing more than 12 million members.
肯·马斯：巴菲特先生——巴菲特先生，董事会成员们。我的名字是肯·马斯。我代表美国劳工联合会-工业组织联合会，这是一个由 56 个工会组成的联合体，代表着超过 1200 万的成员。
I’m here today to introduce the AFL-CIO shareholders proposal for succession planning.
我今天在这里介绍 AFL-CIO 股东关于继任计划的提案。
Our proposal urges the board of directors to adopt and disclose a policy on CEO succession planning.
我们的提案敦促董事会采纳并披露首席执行官继任计划的政策。
Planning for the succession of CEO is one of the most important responsibilities of the board of directors. Having a succession plan in place is particularly important at a company like Berkshire Hathaway where the CEO has created tremendous value.
规划首席执行官的继任是董事会最重要的职责之一。对于像伯克希尔·哈撒韦这样的公司，制定继任计划尤为重要，因为首席执行官创造了巨大的价值。
Shareholders are thankful for Warren Buffett’s leadership as CEO.
股东们对沃伦·巴菲特作为首席执行官的领导表示感谢。
Last year, shareholders became concerned when David Sokol resigned from the company after allegations of improper trading.
去年，当大卫·索科尔因不当交易指控辞去公司职务时，股东们感到担忧。
Mr. Sokol has been rumored to be a possible successor to Mr. Buffett.
索科尔先生被传闻可能成为巴菲特先生的继任者。
We filed our proposal last fall because we feel that an internal CEO candidate is needed to carry out Mr. Buffett’s legacy.
我们在去年秋天提交了我们的提案，因为我们认为需要一位内部首席执行官候选人来延续巴菲特先生的遗产。
Internal candidate may be maintain — can help maintain — Berkshire Hathaway’s strong culture.
内部候选人可能会维护——可以帮助维护——伯克希尔哈撒韦的强大文化。
In Mr. Buffett’s letter to shareholders earlier this year, he disclosed that the board of directors had identified his successor, as well as two superb backup candidates.
在巴菲特先生今年早些时候给股东的信中，他透露董事会已经确定了他的继任者，以及两位出色的备选候选人。
We were relieved to hear this news.
我们听到这个消息时感到松了一口气。
We are not asking the company to disclose the name of Mr. Buffett’s successor. All we’re asking for is the board of directors update shareholders annually on the status of its succession planning.
我们并没有要求公司披露巴菲特先生的继任者的名字。我们所要求的只是董事会每年向股东更新继任计划的状态。
We are pleased that Berkshire Hathaway has adopted all of these practices we recommended in our shareholders proposal, except for an annual reporting.
我们很高兴伯克希尔·哈撒韦采纳了我们在股东提案中推荐的所有这些做法，除了年度报告。
We hope the company will continue to keep shareholders informed about the status of its succession plan.
我们希望公司能继续让股东了解其接班计划的进展情况。
Thank you again — AFL-CIO — for considering this proposal. Thank you.
再次感谢 AFL-CIO 考虑这个提案。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you Mr. Mass.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，马斯先生。
Is there anyone else that wishes to speak?
还有其他人想发言吗？
OK, if there’s no one — no one else, I would say, Mr. Mass, you know, we are on the same page.
好的，如果没有其他人，我想说，马斯先生，您知道，我们是一致的。
We regard it — and I speak for all the directors — we regard it as the number one obligation of the board to have a successor, and one that we’re very happy with, as to both ability and integrity, and that we know well, to step in tomorrow morning if I should die tonight.
我们认为——我代表所有董事——我们认为董事会的首要责任是有一个继任者，并且我们对这个继任者的能力和诚信都非常满意，并且我们非常了解他，以便如果我今晚去世，他明天早上能够接任。
And we spend more time on that subject than any other subject that might come before the board.
我们在这个主题上花费的时间比任何其他可能提交给董事会的主题都要多。
So we do not disagree with you on the importance of it. We have taken it very seriously, and I note that you do not ask us to name the candidates, and I think there are obvious disadvantages to doing that. So again, we’re on the same page on that.
所以我们在这件事的重要性上是一致的。我们非常认真地对待它，我注意到您并没有要求我们列出候选人，我认为这样做显然有一些缺点。因此，我们在这一点上是意见一致的。
And so as I understand it, you basically want to be sure that we report annually to you that the subject continues to be at the top of the list, and I can assure you that it will. And in terms of affirming that fact, I would say that certainly more often than once a year, I get — in some public forum — I get asked questions where I get to answer precisely the question that you want me to address, and I think that will continue in the future.
因此，按照我的理解，您基本上希望我们每年向您报告该主题仍然位于列表的顶部，我可以向您保证，它会的。就确认这一事实而言，我可以说，确实比一年一次更频繁地，我在某些公共论坛上会被问到问题，我能够准确回答您希望我讨论的问题，我认为这种情况在未来也会继续。
We have not built it into any formal item in the proxy statement, which your organization has suggested we do, but we have covered it in the annual report. We cover it at these meetings. We cover it when I’m interviewed, frequently.
我们没有将其纳入代理声明中的任何正式项目，尽管贵组织建议我们这样做，但我们在年度报告中进行了说明。我们在这些会议上进行了说明。在我接受采访时，我们也经常提到这一点。
And I don’t think that anything would be gained by putting it in some other form, but I do want to say that we — I’m glad you take it seriously. We take it seriously. And I think we’re going to get a result that you’ll be very happy with, although I hope it doesn’t happen too soon. (Laughter)
我认为以其他形式表达并没有什么意义，但我想说的是，我们——我很高兴你认真对待这个问题。我们也很认真。我认为我们会得到一个你会非常满意的结果，尽管我希望这不会太快发生。（笑声）
So, with that I would say that the motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person they should now mark their ballots on the motion and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
因此，我要说这个提案现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在提案上标记他们的选票，并允许选票交给选举监察员。
Miss Amick, when you’re ready, may you give your report.
阿米克小姐，您准备好后，请您做报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。
The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 32,179 votes for the motion and 672,285 votes against the motion.
代理持有人对上周四晚上收到的代理投票的投票结果显示，支持该动议的票数为 32,179 票，反对该动议的票数为 672,285 票。
As the number of votes against the motion exceed a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed.
由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份的多数票，该提案已被否决。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。
WARREN BUFFETT: The vote was about 95 percent — 5 percent, and thank you, Miss Amick. The proposal fails.
沃伦·巴菲特：投票结果是 95%对 5%，谢谢你，阿米克小姐。提案未通过。
78. Formal meeting adjourns
正式会议休会
WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone else have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?
沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有其他人想在会议上提出任何事务吗？
If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.
如果没有，我请斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？
A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice.
已提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。
Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say yes. Aye. Yes.
有讨论吗？如果没有，赞成的请说“是”。赞成。是的。
All opposed say no. 所有反对者请说“不同意”。
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