2013-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Welcome

欢迎

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。

I’m a little worn out. (Laughter)

我有点累了。（笑声）

We’re going to — well, first of all, I really want to thank Brad Underwood. He puts the movie together every year, does a terrific job. (Applause)

我们要——首先，我真的想感谢布拉德·安德伍德。他每年都把电影制作在一起，做得非常出色。（掌声）

Andy Heyward and Amy are responsible for the cartoon. They also produce “The Secret Millionaire’s Club,” which has been a huge hit this year, and I really want to thank them for their part in this, too. (Applause)

安迪·海沃德和艾米负责这部卡通。他们还制作了《秘密百万富翁俱乐部》，这部作品今年大获成功，我也非常想感谢他们在其中的贡献。（掌声）

And finally, Carrie Sova who — who puts this whole affair together, she’s four months pregnant. She got her MBA, I think, yesterday or — and, in addition, she is the ringmaster for all of this. Let’s give Carrie a terrific hand. (Applause)

最后，凯莉·索瓦——她把这一切都组织起来，她怀孕四个月。我想，她昨天获得了 MBA。此外，她还是这一切的总指挥。让我们为凯莉热烈鼓掌。(掌声)

We’ll go through a few figures, few slides. I’ll introduce the directors and make one or two more announcements, and then we’ll get on to the questions.

我们将浏览一些数据和幻灯片。我会介绍董事，并做一两项公告，然后我们将进入提问环节。

2. Q1 earnings

第1季度收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, if we could put up the first slide, which is the earnings that were released yesterday. And as you can see, it was a good quarter.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，如果我们可以展示第一张幻灯片，这是昨天发布的收益。如您所见，这是一个好季度。

It wasn’t quite as a good a quarter as it looks, which I’ll explain in a second. But really all of our businesses did very well.

这并不是看起来那么好的一个季度，我稍后会解释。但实际上我们所有的业务都表现得很好。

You should focus on operating earnings. Charlie’s getting a head start here on the peanut brittle and fudge, so I’ll catch up later.

你应该专注于运营收益。查理在花生糖和软糖方面已经领先一步，所以我稍后会赶上。

It was a very good — it was a benign quarter in insurance, but our other businesses, particularly our big businesses, did quite well, and I don’t remember whether we’ve ever had operating earnings of more than 3 point — almost 8 billion. But, in any event, it was quite satisfactory.

这是一个非常好的季度——在保险方面表现良好，但我们的其他业务，特别是我们的主要业务，表现得相当不错，不记得我们是否曾经有过超过 3 点 — 几乎 80 亿的营业利润。但无论如何，这都非常令人满意。

Now, we’ll put up slide two. The insurance earnings were helped a bit. They were still terrific without these factors, but they were helped a bit by the fact that the dollar was strong, and that reduces the liabilities we have on outstanding in foreign currencies.

现在，我们将展示第二张幻灯片。保险收益受到了一些帮助。尽管没有这些因素，它们仍然非常出色，但由于美元强劲，这在一定程度上帮助了我们，因为这减少了我们在外币上的未偿还负债。

So if we have losses we’re going to pay in the future and they’re payable in pounds or euros and the dollar appreciates against those currencies, we get a small benefit from that.

所以如果我们有未来要支付的损失，而这些损失是以英镑或欧元支付的，如果美元对这些货币升值，我们就会从中获得一些小好处。

We also have it — it hurts us in other ways. We have so many different kinds of businesses, and then we own other earnings through Coca-Cola that operate around the world, that I really never know whether when the dollar goes up or down, whether it helps us or not.

我们也有这种情况——这在其他方面伤害了我们。我们有许多不同类型的业务，然后我们通过可口可乐拥有其他全球运营的收益，所以我真的不知道当美元上涨或下跌时，这对我们是有帮助还是没有。

So I’ve never been able to figure it out. So we just sort of take it as it comes. And we do want to explain that to you, the insurance earnings.

所以我从来没有搞明白这一点。因此我们就顺其自然。我们确实想向你解释一下保险收益。

And then we had another item, which is kind of interesting. We’ve had a disagreement with Swiss Re about a life reinsurance contract, and that’s — the disagreement’s probably lasted for well over a year, and that was settled in the first quarter.

然后我们还有一项有趣的事项。我们与瑞士再保险公司就一份人寿再保险合同存在分歧，这种分歧持续了超过一年，并在第一季度得到了解决。

And as you can see, we showed a gain of 255 million pretax from settling this disagreement, but, interestingly, Swiss Re showed a gain of 100 million also from settling the disagreement. (Laughter)

正如您所看到的，我们通过解决这一争议获得了 2.55 亿的税前收益，但有趣的是，瑞士再保险公司也通过解决争议获得了 1 亿的收益。（笑声）

So, we are working on an arrangement with Swiss Re whether we’ll get in an argument every quarter (laughter), and both report higher earnings when we settle it.

所以，我们正在与瑞士再保险公司商讨一个安排，看看我们是否每个季度都会争论一次（笑），而在我们解决争论时双方都报告更高的收益。

It’s magnificent what accounting can do. (Laughter)

太棒了，会计能做的事情。(笑声)

One real high point of the first quarter was the pickup which I noticed — which I noted — in the annual report, about the gain in both the closure rate and the persistency rate at GEICO. These are hugely important factors.

第一季度的一个真正亮点是我注意到的一季度年度报告中提到的 GEICO 的新客户和留存率的提升。这些都是非常重要的因素。

And if we’ll put up the chart showing the gain of GEICO’s auto policies, the strengths I mentioned in 2012, and not only continued in 2013, but the trend has become even stronger.

如果我们将 GEICO 的汽车保单收益图表展示出来，我 2012 年提到的优势不仅在 2013 年得以延续，而且趋势变得更加强劲。

And there’s a lot of seasonal to policy gains. But as you can see, month by month, our gains have — and policies have very significantly improved over 2012.

而且保单收益有很多季节性因素。但正如你所看到的，逐月来看，我们的收益和保单在 2012 年有了显著改善。

And, again, it’s because our closure ratio, in other words, the number of people that get a quote from us and then go on to buy a policy, that rate has improved very significantly this year, and with it we also had a gain in persistency, the people that renew the policies with us, and that’s pure gold.

同样，这也是因为我们的成交率，换句话说，从我们这里获得报价并继续购买保单的人数，今年的成交率有了非常明显的提高，而且我们的续保率（即续保人数）也有了提高，这可是纯金打造的。

A policy has a mathematical value to us of at least $1,500, so if we had a million policies in a year — and I’m hopeful we might do that this year — that’s a billion-and-a-half of value that gets built into our intrinsic value, which does not show up on the income statement or balance sheet at all, but it does increase the value of GEICO versus what we carry it for.

一份保单对我们来说至少有 1500 美元的数学价值，因此如果我们在一年内有一百万份保单——我希望我们今年能做到——那就是 15 亿美元的价值，这些价值会体现在我们的内在价值中，而这些在损益表或资产负债表上根本不会显示出来，但确实会提高 GEICO 的价值，相较于我们所持有的价值。

And I can’t resist a little sales pitch on that because this closure rate, which, like I say, is at incredible levels, means that when people go to our website or call us and get a quote, they find that they can save a lot of money.

我忍不住想多说几句，因为这个成交率，正如我所说，达到了惊人的水平，这意味着当人们访问我们的网站或给我们打电话询价时，他们发现可以节省很多钱。

I mean, people love our little gecko, but they buy the policies because we save them money.

我意思是，人们喜欢我们的小壁虎，但他们购买这些保险是因为我们为他们省钱。

And it just so happens that in the auditorium right near here, the exposition hall, we have a lot of very friendly people that will help you save money, too.

恰好在这里附近的礼堂展览厅里，有很多非常友好的人会帮助你省钱。

So I urge you — you can walk out anytime Charlie is talking (laughter) and go and get a quote, and a very high percentage of you could save money by doing that.

所以我鼓励你们——在查理讲话的时候你们可以随时走出去（笑声），去获取一个报价，很多人通过这样做可以省钱。

And, you know, that is in the Berkshire spirit, to save money at every opportunity. So I’m hoping you will check that out, and we will set a record for policies sold.

而且，你知道，这正是伯克希尔的精神，在每一个机会中节省开支。所以我希望你能关注这一点，我们将创下销售保单的记录。

And, finally, our railroad, this year, is doing very well. You saw the earnings in the first quarter report, if you’ve had a chance to look at that.

最后，我们的铁路在今年表现非常好。如果你有机会查看第一季度报告，你会看到收益情况。

And we’ve got some figures up that show our gain in car loadings in the first 17 weeks. It’s been 3.8 percent, whereas the other four major Class I railroads in the United States have had a gain of four-tenths of a percent.

我们有一些数据显示，在前 17 周我们的货车装载量增长了 3.8%，而美国其他四大一级铁路公司的增长仅为 0.4%。

That’s significant money that — and we don’t have the Canadian railroads here that operate in the United States. They both come down, the Canadian National, Canadian Pacific. But — but this is representative of what’s been happening.

这是一笔不小的数目--我们这里没有在美国运营的加拿大铁路公司。加拿大国家铁路和加拿大太平洋铁路都在美国运营。但是--但是这代表了一直在发生的事情。

We’ve been helped by the fact that, fortunately, a lot of oil has been found very, very close to our railroad tracks, and what better place to find oil? (Laughter)

我们很幸运地得到了帮助，因为在我们的铁路轨道附近发现了很多石油，还有什么地方更适合发现石油呢？（笑声）

And so we’ve been moving a lot of that, and it’s worth — and we’ll be moving a lot more the way things are going.

因此，我们已经转移了很多这些东西，值得——而且根据目前的情况，我们将会转移更多。

And the result of all this — we now will put up the next slide — we’re now the fifth most valuable company in the world. (Applause)

所有这些的结果——我们现在将展示下一张幻灯片——我们现在是世界第五大最有价值的公司。(掌声)

And that will change over time, but I hope it changes for the better.

这会随着时间而改变，但我希望它能朝着更好的方向变化。

3. Directors introduced

介绍董事会

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like — the business part of this meeting starts at around 3:30, and at that time we’ll have the election of directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想——会议的商业部分将在大约 3:30 开始，届时我们将进行董事选举。

But I would like, nevertheless, for those of you who won’t stick around to the bitter end, I would like to introduce our directors, and — Charlie and I are directors.

但我仍然想为那些不会坚持到最后的人介绍我们的董事，查理和我都是董事。

And if our directors would stand and remain standing when I call your name. And no matter how strong the urge, withhold your applause until they’re all finished standing, and then you can withhold your applause then if you wish, too, but I plan to applaud. OK.

如果我们的董事在我叫你们名字时能站起来并保持站立，那就太好了。无论多么强烈的冲动，请在他们全部站好之前不要鼓掌，然后如果你愿意，也可以在那时再不鼓掌，但我打算鼓掌。好的。

Howard Buffett. Steve Burke. Susan Decker.

霍华德·巴菲特。史蒂夫·伯克。苏珊·德克。

So just stand and remain standing — there we are. OK.

所以就站着，保持站立——我们就在这里。好的。

Bill Gates. Sandy Gottesman. Charlotte Guyman. Don Keough. Tom Murphy. Ron Olson. Walter Scott, Jr.

比尔·盖茨。桑迪·戈特斯曼。夏洛特·古伊曼。唐·基欧。汤姆·墨菲。罗恩·奥尔森。沃尔特·斯科特（小）。

And our soon to be new member, Meryl Witmer.

我们的新成员，梅瑞尔·维特默。

OK. No more withholding. (Applause)

好的。没有更多的保留。（掌声）

4. Table tennis champ Ariel Hsing

乒乓球冠军阿里尔·辛格

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’ll start the questioning in just one minute, but there were one or two announcements to make.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们将在一分钟后开始提问，但有一两个公告要发布。

We did not put it in the — we did not put it in the annual report because we hadn’t firmed it up yet, but tomorrow at Borsheims, our friend Ariel Hsing will be available to play table tennis with any of you foolish enough to challenge her.

我们没有把它放在年度报告中，因为我们还没有确定，但明天在 Borsheims，我们的朋友 Ariel Hsing 将会在场，欢迎任何敢于挑战她的人来打乒乓球。

I met Ariel when she was nine, and she became the youngest women’s table tennis champion of the United States, and then last summer she went on to the Olympics.

我在她九岁时遇见了阿里尔，她成为了美国最年轻的女子乒乓球冠军，然后去年夏天她参加了奥运会。

And at the Olympics, she won her first two matches, and she won more games off the woman that became the eventual Olympic champion than any other participant in that event.

在奥运会上，她赢得了前两场比赛，并且她赢得的比赛数量超过了其他任何参赛者，击败了最终成为奥运冠军的那位女性。

So Ariel will be out there tomorrow at 1 o’clock. And if you’re courageous, you’ll show up with your paddle and end up looking like an idiot. (Laughter))

所以艾瑞儿明天一点钟会去那里如果你有勇气的话，就带着你的球拍出现，最后看起来像个白痴。（笑声）

5. Buffalo News publisher Stan Lipsey retires

布法罗新闻出版商斯坦·利普西退休

WARREN BUFFETT: One more introduction, I don’t know whether we can get a spotlight on him or not, but Stan Lipsey retired this year as publisher of The Buffalo News.

沃伦·巴菲特：再做一个介绍，我不知道我们是否能把聚光灯打在他身上，但斯坦·利普西今年退休，担任《布法罗新闻》的出版人。

And, as Charlie can attest, as well as I, back in 1978, ’79, ’80, we had an enormous business problem in the Buffalo News. We were locked in a competitive struggle. And we were not doing well, in part, because of we were operating under a tough judicial order for a while until it got reversed on appeal.

而且，正如查理和我所能证明的，早在 1978 年、1979 年和 1980 年，我们在《布法罗新闻》面临着巨大的商业问题。我们陷入了激烈的竞争斗争中。我们表现不佳，部分原因是我们在一段时间内受到了一项严格的司法命令的限制，直到它在上诉中被推翻。

And Stan gave up a wonderful life here in Omaha and asked no questions and for no pay came up to Buffalo, and The Buffalo News would not have turned out to be the paper that it’s turned out to be or produced the profits that have been produced for Berkshire, without Stan Lipsey.

斯坦放弃了在奥马哈的美好生活，没有提出任何问题，也没有得到报酬，来到布法罗。如果没有斯坦·利普西，布法罗新闻不会变成现在的样子，也不会为伯克希尔创造出如此丰厚的利润。

So, if Stan could stand, let’s give him a hand. Stan the Man. (Applause)

所以，如果斯坦能站起来，让我们给他一个掌声。斯坦这个人。（掌声）

6. Berkshire buys remaining ISCAR stake

伯克希尔收购剩余的 ISCAR 股份

WARREN BUFFETT: One other announcement, then we’ll go to the questions.

沃伦·巴菲特：还有一个公告，然后我们将进入提问环节。

It was announced a couple of days ago that we bought out the final 20 percent of ISCAR held by the family for about $2 billion. It’s a transaction they’re happy with, we’re happy with.

几天前宣布，我们以约 20 亿美元收购了家族持有的 ISCAR 最后 20%的股份。他们对此交易感到满意，我们也感到满意。

As a matter of fact, if you saw Eitan Wertheimer dancing at “Dancing with the Stars” there, you could have seen how happy he was.

事实上，如果你看到艾坦·维尔特海默在《与星共舞》中跳舞，你会看到他是多么快乐。

So we will now own 100 percent of ISCAR, but our relationship with the Wertheimer family will continue.

所以我们现在将拥有 ISCAR 的 100%股份，但我们与 Wertheimer 家族的关系将继续。

It’s been a sheer joy. The business has done terrifically. The people have behaved magnificently, and ISCAR will be part of Berkshire forever. So I want to thank Eitan and his family.

这真是一个纯粹的快乐。业务发展得非常好。人们表现得非常出色，ISCAR 将永远成为伯克希尔的一部分。所以我想感谢艾坦和他的家人。

And, Eitan, are you here? Can you stand up, and your family? Thank you. (Applause)

艾坦，你在这里吗？你和你的家人能站起来吗？谢谢。（掌声）

Let’s have a light here in the front row. OK. (Applause)

让我们在前排这里开个灯。好的。（掌声）

7. Q&A begins

问答环节开始

OK. We’ll now move on to our questions. We’ll continue these until about noon. We’ll take an hour break for lunch. We’ll come back, and then we’ll continue until about 3:30, at which time we will convene the business meeting.

好的。我们现在将进入提问环节。我们会持续到中午左右。我们会休息一个小时吃午餐。我们会回来，然后继续到大约 3:30，此时我们将召开商务会议。

And we will start off — we have three journalists who have been here before on the right, and we have a distinguished panel on the left, including a short seller, perhaps the first at any annual meeting, and we will start off with Carol Loomis.

我们将开始——右边有三位曾经来过的记者，左边有一个杰出的专家小组，包括一位做空者，也许是任何年度会议上第一位，我们将从卡罗尔·卢米斯开始。

8. Berkshire lagging the S&P 500

伯克希尔落后于标准普尔 500 指数

CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. Speaking for the three of us, I hope here, we have received into the thousands of questions. We don’t even know how many. And if we didn’t pick your question, it was because we just didn’t get to it.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：早上好。代表我们三个人，我希望在这里，我们收到了成千上万的问题。我们甚至不知道有多少。如果我们没有选择你的问题，那是因为我们根本没有时间处理。

I do want to tell you that Warren and Charlie have no idea of what our questions are going to be, no hints at all, and so we look forward to sending them curve balls.

我确实想告诉你，沃伦和查理对我们的问题毫无头绪，完全没有任何暗示，因此我们期待着给他们出一些难题。

I’ll start off here. Warren, you measure Berkshire — this is from William Bernard (PH) of Colleyville, Texas.

我在这里开始。沃伦，你衡量伯克希尔——这是来自德克萨斯州科利维尔的威廉·伯纳德（PH）。

You measure Berkshire’s corporate performance based on growth and book value per share. The table on page 103 of the annual report shows book value per share has grown at less than an average 12 percent a year for 9 of the last 11 5-year periods, yet in your last annual letter, you state, quote, “The S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12 percent on net worth,” and then you say, “That seems reasonable for Berkshire also.”

您根据增长和每股账面价值来衡量伯克希尔的企业表现。年报第 103 页的表格显示，在过去 11 个 5 年期中，有 9 个期间每股账面价值的年均增长率低于 12%，然而在您最近的年度信中，您表示，引用，“标准普尔 500 指数的净资产收益率远高于 12%”，然后您说，“这对伯克希尔来说似乎也合理。”

Why do you say that, given the past record showing that Berkshire has not been earning that much, or is it that you expect to earn that much, recognizing that it is not assured in the future?

你为什么这么说，考虑到过去的记录显示伯克希尔并没有赚那么多，还是说你期望能赚那么多，意识到这在未来并不确定？

WARREN BUFFETT: It certainly is not assured in the future. And the last ten or so years have not been the best for business, generally.

沃伦·巴菲特：未来肯定没有保障。而过去十年左右的时间对商业来说总体上并不是最好的一段时期。

But if the stock market continues to behave in 2013 as it has so far, this will be the first five-year period where the gain in book value per share has fallen short of the market performance, including dividends, of the Standard & Poor’s.

但如果股市在 2013 年的表现继续如目前一样，这将是首次五年期间每股账面价值的增长低于标准普尔的市场表现（包括股息）。

And that won’t be a happy day, but it won’t be — it won’t totally discourage us because it will be a period where the market has gone up in every one of the five years. And as we’ve regularly pointed out, we’re likely to be better in down years as we did in 2008, for example, which is the year that gets dropped this year. We’re likely to do better in down years, relatively, than we do in up years.

这不会是一个快乐的日子，但也不会--不会让我们完全气馁，因为在这五年中，市场每一年都在上涨。正如我们经常指出的，我们很可能在下跌的年份里表现得更好，比如 2008 年，也就是本期下跌的那一年。相对而言，我们在下跌年份的表现可能比上涨年份更好。

Charlie, how do you feel about the prospects of — I should point out, incidentally, that we use book value because it’s a calculable figure, and it does serve as a reasonable proxy of the year-to-year change in the intrinsic value of Berkshire.

查理，你对伯克希尔的前景有何看法--我想顺便指出，我们使用账面价值是因为它是一个可以计算的数字，而且它确实可以合理地代表伯克希尔内在价值的逐年变化。

If we could really give you a figure for intrinsic value, and back it up, that would be the important figure.

如果我们真的能给你一个内在价值的数字，并且有依据支持，那将是一个重要的数字。

As I pointed out, if we gain a million policyholders at GEICO, that actually adds a billion-and-a-half to intrinsic value, and it doesn’t add a dime to book value.

正如我所指出的，如果我们在 GEICO 获得一百万个保单持有者，这实际上会使内在价值增加十五亿，而不会增加一分钱的账面价值。

So, there’s a significant gap, which is why we’re willing to buy in stock at 120 percent of book value — a significant gap between the two. But book value is a useful tracking device.

所以，存在一个显著的差距，这就是为什么我们愿意以账面价值的 120%购买股票——两者之间存在显著的差距。但账面价值是一个有用的跟踪工具。

I should point out also — I did this in the annual report in respect to Marmon — when we buy the ISCAR stock, which we pay about 2 billion for, the day we buy it, we mark it down in terms of our book value by roughly a billion dollars.

我还应该指出——我在关于 Marmon 的年度报告中提到过——当我们购买 ISCAR 股票时，我们支付大约 20 亿美元，在购买的当天，我们将其账面价值大约减记 10 亿美元。

So a billion dollars comes off our book value for making a purchase which we regard as quite satisfactory. And so there are these distortions that occur.

所以我们为了进行一项我们认为相当满意的购买，账面价值减少了十亿美元。因此，出现了这些扭曲。

But in the end, we have to do better for you than you would do in an index fund. And if we don’t, we aren’t earning our pay.

但最终，我们必须为您提供比指数基金更好的回报。如果我们做不到这一点，我们就不配获得报酬。

And I think we’ll do that in the future, but I don’t think we’ll do it every year, and we’ve proven that in the last few years.

我认为我们未来会做到，但我不认为每年都能做到，而我们在过去几年中已经证明了这一点。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I confidently expect that Berkshire’s going to do quite well over the long term.

查理·芒格：我有信心预计，伯克希尔在长期内会表现得相当不错。

I don’t pay much attention to whether it’s five years or three years or — I think we have momentums in place that are going to do OK.

我不太关心是五年还是三年，或者——我认为我们已经有了可以做好的势头。

Of course, we won’t do as well in the future, in terms of annual gain averaged out, because our past returns were almost unbelievable.

当然，未来我们的年均收益不会像过去那样好，因为我们的过去回报几乎令人难以置信。

So, we’re slowing down, but I think it’ll still be very pleasant.

所以，我们在放慢速度，但我认为这仍然会非常愉快。

WARREN BUFFETT: At 89, Charlie is not really concerned about this stuff year-to-year. I mean, he’s taking a longer-range view. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：在 89 岁时，查理并不太关心这些年复一年的事情。我的意思是，他在考虑更长远的观点。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m trying to take care of my old age, which might come on at any time. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我正在努力照顾我的晚年，可能随时就会到来。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I haven’t noticed it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我没有注意到。

9. Jonathan Brandt introduced

乔纳森·布兰特介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan Brandt, who is a newcomer to the panel, his area is the other-than-insurance aspects of Berkshire Hathaway.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。乔纳森·布兰特是小组的新成员，他的领域是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的非保险方面。

And I can assure you that no one has paid more — I played Jonny in chess when he was about four years old, and, I don’t know, I must have been 40 or something at the time, and he kept insisting during dinner that we play chess afterwards.

我可以向您保证，没有人比我更了解他——我在他四岁时和他下过棋，当时我大概四十岁左右，他在晚餐时一直坚持要我们下棋。

And we started playing, and, of course, he got me into some impossible position in a few moves, and I told his parents to put him to bed. (Laughter)

我们开始下棋，当然，几步棋他就把我弄成一个不可能的局面，我告诉他的父母把他哄睡了。（笑声）

So, Jonny, I still have kind of comebacks in me, so be careful what you ask. Jon Brandt. (Laughs)

所以，乔尼，我还是有些反击的能力，所以你要小心你问的问题。乔恩·布兰特。（笑声）

10. ISCAR vs Sandvik

ISCAR vs Sandvik

JONATHAN BRANDT: Good to see you, Warren.

乔纳森·布兰特：很高兴见到你，沃伦。

A question about ISCAR: what do you feel are the specific competitive advantages that ISCAR has over its primary competitor, Sandvik, and, in turn, what advantages does Sandvik have over ISCAR as the larger player?

关于 ISCAR 的问题：您认为 ISCAR 相对于其主要竞争对手 Sandvik 具体有哪些竞争优势？反过来，作为更大的参与者，Sandvik 又有哪些优势相对于 ISCAR？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Sandvik is a very good company, and ISCAR is a much better company.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，桑德维克是一家非常好的公司，而 ISCAR 是一家更好的公司。

The advantage it has is brains and incredible passion for the business.

它的优势在于智慧和对业务的巨大热情。

It’s interesting to reflect on ISCAR because if you go back to — what would it be? — 1951 or thereabouts, when Stef Wertheimer, who had come from Germany, was in Israel, started ISCAR, just think of the prospect that was facing him.

反思ISCAR是很有趣的，因为如果你回到——大约1951年，当时斯特夫·韦尔特海默（Stef Wertheimer）从德国来到以色列，创办了ISCAR，想象一下他面临的前景。

Here was a company like Sandvik, or in this company — country — Kennametal, or different countries, well-entrenched companies, well-entrenched, well-financed.

当时有像山特维克这样的公司，或者在这个国家的肯纳梅塔尔（Kennametal）等不同国家的公司，都是根深蒂固、资金雄厚的企业。

And here’s this fellow in Israel, 25 years old, and the raw material for these cutting tools comes from China. It isn’t that the raw material is in Israel.

这里有一个25岁的年轻人在以色列，切削工具的原材料来自中国。原材料并不在以色列。

So everybody buys their tungsten from China, and they sell to customers that are using large machine tools throughout the world, but they’re selling it to heavy industry to a significant extent.

所以每个人都从中国购买钨，然后将其卖给全球使用大型机床的客户，但他们销售的主要是重工业。

So they’re selling to people like Boeing or General Motors or big industrial companies in Germany, and there’s no great locational advantage, in terms of being in Israel doing this.

他们正在向波音、通用汽车或德国的大型工业公司销售，而在以色列进行这项业务并没有什么显著的地理优势。

But here’s this 25-year-old fellow getting the tungsten from thousands of miles away, selling it to customers thousands of miles away, competing against people like Sandvik, and this remarkable business, ISCAR, comes from that.

但这个25岁的年轻人从几千英里外获取钨，卖给几千英里外的客户，与像山特维克这样的人竞争，这个了不起的企业——ISCAR正是从中诞生的。

And there’s no other answer you can give to your question when you see that result than to say that you have had some incredibly talented people who never stopped working, never stopped trying to improve the product, never stopped trying to make customers happy, and that continues to this day.

看到这个结果，你对于你的问题没有其他答案，只能说这是因为有一些非常有才能的人从未停止工作，始终努力改进产品，始终努力让客户满意，这种精神至今依然在继续。

Sandvik is a very good company. I can tell you that based not only on the figures, but on every other aspect of business observation that I possess, that ISCAR is one of the great companies of the world, and we feel very fortunate to own it and to be associated with their management.

桑德维克是一家非常好的公司。我可以告诉你，不仅仅基于数据，还有我所拥有的其他商业观察方面，ISCAR 是世界上伟大的公司之一，我们感到非常幸运能够拥有它并与他们的管理层合作。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s a good comparison. Sandvik is a fabulous company, and it’s a particular achievement to really do a little better in the competitive market, as ISCAR has done.

查理·芒格：这是一个很好的比较。山特维克是一家绝佳的公司，而ISCAR在竞争市场上确实取得了一些成绩。

WARREN BUFFETT: Quite a bit better.

沃伦·巴菲特：取得了相当大的成就。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’ve gained.

查理·芒格：他们已经获得了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Have you really ever seen much — a better operation than ISCAR in the manufacturing business?

沃伦·巴菲特：你真的见过比ISCAR在制造业运营更好的公司吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s the only place I was ever in where I saw nothing but robots and engineers working computers.

查理·芒格：这是我唯一去过的地方，看到的只有机器人和工程师在操作计算机。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a —

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一场——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You cannot believe how modern ISCAR is.

查理·芒格：你无法想象 ISCAR 有多现代。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And the game’s not over yet, either.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。游戏还没有结束。

11. Preserving Berkshire’s culture after Buffett

在巴菲特之后保护伯克希尔的文化

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now we go to a shareholder in station number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在我们去 1 号站的股东那里。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Dan Lewis (PH) from Chicago. First of all, I wanted to thank you for letting us in the building early today. But let’s not — (Applause)

观众成员：嗨。我是来自芝加哥的丹·刘易斯（音）。首先，我想感谢你们今天让我们提前进入大楼。但我们不要——（掌声）

Let’s not do that again next year, though. I don’t want to wake up any earlier to get in line.

明年我们就不要再这样做了。我不想为了排队而早起。

WARREN BUFFETT: If we had a company that sold coats, we would have left you out there. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们有一家卖外套的公司，我们就会把你留在外面。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Always a comeback.

观众成员：总是有回归。

When you think about Berkshire in the decade after you’re gone, my question is what worries you the most? What — I know nothing keeps you up at night — but what are your big worries and, you know, what can go wrong?

当你想到伯克希尔在你离开后的十年时，我想问你最担心的是什么？我知道没有什么让你夜不能寐，但你最大的担忧是什么，你知道，可能会出错的事情有哪些？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s a good question. It’s one we think about all the time.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。我们一直在思考这个问题。

And that’s why the culture is all important, the businesses we own are all important, because those trains will keep running and people will keep calling GEICO the day after I die. There’s no question about that.

这就是为什么文化至关重要，我们拥有的企业也至关重要，因为那些火车会继续运行，人们在我去世后的第二天仍会拨打 GEICO 的电话。这毫无疑问。

And the key is preserving the culture and having a successor as CEO that will have more brains, more energy, and more passion for it, even than I have.

关键在于保护文化，并拥有一位继任的首席执行官，他将比我更聪明、更有活力、更有热情。

And it’s the number one subject that our board considers at every meeting, and we’re solidly in agreement as to whom that individual should be.

这是我们董事会在每次会议上考虑的头号议题，我们对这个人应该是谁达成了共识。

And I think the culture has just become intensified year after year after year. And I think Charlie would agree with that.

我认为这种文化年复一年地变得更加强烈。我想查理会同意这一点。

I mean, we always knew what we were about when we first got involved with Berkshire, but making sure that everybody that joined us, that the owners, the shareholders, directors, managers, everybody that bought into this what I think very special culture. That took time, and — but it is — I think it’s really one of a kind now, and I think that it will remain one of a kind.

我的意思是，当我们第一次参与伯克希尔时，我们一直知道我们在做什么，但确保每一个加入我们的人，包括所有者、股东、董事、经理，以及每一个认同我认为非常特别的文化的人，这需要时间。但是——我认为现在它确实是独一无二的，我认为它将继续保持独一无二。

I think that anything that came in — any foreign-type behavior would be cast out because people have self-selected into this group, into the company, and it would be rejected like a foreign tissue if we got the wrong sort of person in there.

任何外来的行为都会被排斥，因为人们已经自我选择进入这个团队、这个公司，如果我们引入了错误的人，那将会被拒绝，像外来组织一样。

We have a board that is especially devoted to Berkshire. We don’t hold them by paying them huge amounts, it may be noted.

我们的董事会对伯克希尔特别忠诚。我们并不是通过支付高额报酬来留住他们。

And we have people who have brought their companies to Berkshire because they want to be part of it, as did ISCAR.

我们有一些人把他们的公司带到伯克希尔，因为他们想成为其中的一部分，就像 ISCAR 一样。

So, I think that whoever succeeds me — and it will be a lot of newspaper stories and people — after six months, there will be a story that says, you know, it isn’t the same thing.

所以，我认为无论是谁接替我——这将会有很多报纸报道——在六个月后，可能会有报道说，你知道的，事情不一样了。

It will be the same thing. You can count on that.

但事情会是一样的。你可以对此放心。

Charlie, what are your thoughts?

查理，你有什么想法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — my thoughts are very simple. I want to say to the many Mungers in the audience, don’t be so stupid as to sell these shares. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我的想法很简单。我想对在场的许多芒格家族的人说，不要傻到卖掉这些股票。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That goes for the Buffetts, too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这对巴菲特家族也是如此。（笑声）

12. Partnering with 3G Capital for $23B Heinz deal

与 3G 资本合作进行 230 亿美元的亨氏交易

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This is a question that comes from Ben Knoll, who happens to be the chief operating officer at the Greater Twin Cities United Way.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自本·诺尔，他恰好是the Greater Twin Cities United Way的首席运营官。

And he writes in that after the Heinz deal, there was a column that was written indicating that you had gotten the better end of the Heinz deal from your Brazilian partners [3G Capital].

他在文中写道，在亨氏交易之后，有一篇专栏指出你从巴西合作伙伴[3G 资本]那里获得了亨氏交易的更好结果。

That column said that your return was likely to come from the preferred stock dividends, with the common equity portion being dead money.

那篇专栏文章说，您的回报可能来自优先股股息，而普通股部分则是死钱。

It also said that the way the deal was structured indicated your low expectations for the market overall.

它还表示，交易的结构方式表明你对整体市场的低期望。

Is this an accurate portrayal of the deal and of your expectations for the market overall?

这是否准确地描述了交易以及您对整体市场的期望？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. It’s totally inaccurate.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。这完全不准确。

The — it’s interesting. [3G Capital co-founder] Jorge Paulo Lemann and I were in Boulder, Colorado, in early December. And I can’t remember if it was — yeah, on the way to the airport or when we got in the plane. But he said that he was thinking about going to the people at Heinz and proposing a deal and would I be interested.

这很有趣。[3G 资本联合创始人]豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼和我在 12 月初的时候在科罗拉多州的博尔德。我记不清是去机场的路上还是上飞机的时候，但他说他在考虑去亨氏的人那里提一个交易，问我是否感兴趣。

And I, because I knew both Heinz and I knew Jorge Paulo, and I thought highly, very highly, of both, I said, “I’m in.”

我因为认识海因茨，也认识豪尔赫·保罗，并且对他们俩都非常看重，所以我说：“我参与。”

And maybe a week later — I don’t remember exactly how long — I received from Jorge Paulo, who I had known for many years starting at Gillette when we were both directors — I received a term sheet on the deal and another sheet on the governance procedures that he suggested.

大约一周后——我不记得具体多长时间——我收到了来自豪尔赫·保罗的文件，我们在吉列时认识了很多年，当时我们都是董事——我收到了关于交易的条款清单和他建议的治理程序的另一份文件。

And he said, “If you got any thoughts about changing this, just let me know.” They were just his thoughts.

他说：“如果你有任何想法想要改变这个，告诉我一声。”这只是他的想法。

It was an absolutely fair deal, and it was — I didn’t have to change a word in either the term sheet or the governance arrangement.

这是一笔绝对公平的交易，我不需要在条款清单或治理安排中更改一个字。

Now, we actually, Charlie and I, probably paid a little more than we would have paid if we had been doing the deal ourselves, because we think that Jorge Paulo and his associates are extraordinary managers.

现在，查理和我实际上可能支付的比我们自己做交易时要多一点，因为我们认为霍尔赫·保罗和他的合伙人是非凡的管理者。

They’re both classy, and they’re unusually good, and so we stretched a little because of that fact.

它们都很优雅，而且异常出色，因此我们因此稍微放宽了一些。

We like the business, and the design of the deal is such that if we do quite well over time at Heinz, that their 4.1 billion will achieve higher rates of return than our overall 12 billion.

我们喜欢这项业务，交易的设计是这样的，如果我们在亨氏的表现相当不错，那么他们的 41 亿美元将获得比我们整体的 120 亿美元更高的回报率。

We have a less-leveraged position in the capital structure than they have. We created — they wanted more leverage, and we provided that leverage on what I regard as fair terms and what they regard as fair terms.

我们在资本结构中的杠杆水平低于他们。我们创造了——他们想要更多的杠杆，而我们在我认为公平的条款和他们认为公平的条款上提供了这种杠杆。

If anybody thinks that the common is dead money, you know, we think they’re making a mistake.

如果有人认为普通股是“死钱”，我们认为他们犯了一个错误。

But we’ll know the answer to that in five years.

但我们将在五年后知道答案。

But the design of the deal, essentially — we have more money than operating ability at the parent company level, and they have lots of operating ability and wanted to maximize their return on 4 billion.

但这笔交易的设计本质上是——我们在母公司层面拥有更多的资金而不是运营能力，而他们有很强的运营能力，并希望最大化他们对 40 亿的回报。

So my guess is that five years from now or ten years from now, you will find that they’ve earned a higher rate of return on their investment. But because we put more dollars in, we will have received that same rate of return on our 4 billion, plus of cap common equity, but we also will have received a very fair return on the 8 billion that we put in that created more leverage for them.

所以我猜五年后或十年后，你会发现他们的投资回报率更高。但因为我们投入了更多资金，我们将在我们的 40 亿加权普通股上获得相同的回报率，同时我们也会在我们投入的 80 亿上获得非常合理的回报，这为他们创造了更多的杠杆。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as you said, the report was totally wrong. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，正如你所说，报告完全错误。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’ll teach them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这会让他们长记性。（笑声）

13. Moving into commercial insurance

进入商业保险领域

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We have Cliff Gallant from Nomura who will ask insurance-related questions for this meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们有来自野村的克里夫·加朗特，他将在本次会议上提问与保险相关的问题。

CLIFF GALLANT: Thank you.

克利夫·加朗特：谢谢你。

At Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance group, Mr. Ajit Jain appears to be employing a new strategy recently with some high profile actions.

在伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团，阿吉特·贾因先生最近似乎正在采取一种新策略，并采取了一些引人注目的行动。

Berkshire signed a portfolio underwriting arrangement with Aon to do business with Lloyd’s. And then last week, there was the hiring of several AIG executives.

伯克希尔与安联签署了一项投资组合承保协议，以便与劳合社开展业务。然后上周，几位 AIG 高管被聘用。

It appears that Berkshire may be taking a broader share of the market.

看来伯克希尔可能正在占据更大份额的市场。

What is the goal of these moves, and won’t these actions eventually produce more average results?

这些举动的目标是什么？这些行动最终不会产生更平均的结果吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you — the goal is to take a greater share of the market.

沃伦·巴菲特：目标是获取更大的市场份额。

There have been two important moves made by Ajit’s operation in the last month or so.

在过去一个月左右，Ajit 的操作做出了两个重要举措。

One is the — the first one that was announced — was this participation of 7 1/2 percent in all of the business.

第一个是宣布参与所有业务7.5%的份额。

Originally, it was announced as applying to the Lloyd’s market. I believe it’s been extended to the entire London market.

最初，它被宣布适用于劳埃德市场。我相信它已经扩展到整个伦敦市场。

And, now, bear in mind that the people that are insured still have the right to pick who their insurers shall be, so it isn’t totally automatic that we receive 7 1/2 percent of every slip.

而且，现在请记住，被保险人仍然有权选择他们的保险公司，因此我们并不是自动从每个单据中获得 7.5%的佣金。

But we had had an arrangement for a couple of years with Marsh on a marine book and perhaps some other areas, but not across the board.

但我们与Marsh在海洋保险及其他一些领域有过安排，但并不是全方位的。

And we think that — we think that the profit possibilities are reasonable for that business, or we wouldn’t have entered into it.

我们认为——我们认为这个业务的利润可能是合理的，否则我们就不会进入这个领域。

It will give us more of a cross-section of business than we’ve been used to having, but it doesn’t mean that we give up our present business at all, either.

这将为我们提供比以往更多的业务横截面，但这并不意味着我们会放弃目前的业务。

The second item you mentioned is just in the last week or thereabouts. It was announced that four pretty well-known insurance people that had been with AIG had joined us to write, primarily, commercial insurance, initially domestically, perhaps, but around the world.

您提到的第二项是在上周或左右宣布的。四位在 AIG 工作过的知名保险人士加入了我们，主要负责撰写商业保险，最初可能是在国内，但也会在全球范围内。

And these are people that reached out to Berkshire. In the case of at least one of them, even reached out a number of times in the past.

这些人主动联系了伯克希尔。至少有一位曾在过去多次联系过我们。

But we were ready to enter this field with these people who were very able people. We’ve had a number of people reach out since the announcement was made only a week or so ago.

但我们已经准备好与这些非常有能力的人一起进入这个领域。自从大约一周前宣布以来，我们已经有很多人联系了我们。

So I think you will see Berkshire, in addition to all of the other insurance businesses that has had over the years, I think you’ll see us become a very significant factor, worldwide, in the commercial insurance business.

所以我认为，除了多年来拥有的其他保险业务外，您将看到伯克希尔在全球商业保险业务中成为一个非常重要的因素。

I mean, it could be business that reaches into the billions. In fact, I would hope that it would — it could be — you know, a fair number of billions over time.

这可能是一个涉及数十亿美元的业务。事实上，我希望它将会——随着时间的推移，可能会达到数十亿美元。

And we’ve got the right people. We’ve got capital like nobody else has. We have the ability to sign on to coverages that other people have to spread out among others.

我们有合适的人才。我们的资本无人能比。我们有能力签署其他人必须分散给他人的保险。

So, I think we’re ideally situated to go into this business, and I’m looking forward to it.

所以，我认为我们非常适合进入这个行业，我对此充满期待。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, generally speaking, I don’t think the reinsurance business is a very good business for most people.

查理·芒格：嗯，总的来说，我认为再保险业务对大多数人来说并不是一个很好的生意。

And I think it’s a very desirable part of Berkshire’s business, the way it’s run, but it’s different from something like the other businesses, which would work pretty well if somebody else owned them.

我认为这是伯克希尔业务中非常理想的一部分，它的运作方式很好，但与其他一些业务不同，如果其他人拥有它们，它们也能运作得相当不错。

I think our reinsurance business under Ajit is very peculiar, and other people who think it’s easy are going to find out that it isn’t.

我认为在 Ajit 领导下我们的再保险业务非常独特，其他认为这很简单的人会发现其实并不是。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And I should point out, this commercial insurance business also, I mean, it will be primary insurance. The Aon arrangement is a reinsurance arrangement, but we will be in the primary business.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我还要指出，这项商业保险业务也将是初级保险。Aon的安排是再保险安排，但我们将参与初级业务。

So, it will be large commercial risks, but there’s a lot of premium buy-in there, and there’s a lot of chances to make mistakes.

所以，这将是巨大的商业风险，但这里有很多保费投入，也有很多犯错的机会。

But I’d rather have the group we have overseeing that business than any other group I can think of.

但我宁愿让我们现在的团队来监督这项业务，而不是我能想到的其他任何团队。

14. GEICO vs Progressive’s Snapshot

GEICO 与 Progressive 的 Snapshot

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 2?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Mike Sorenski (PH) from New York.

观众成员：嗨。我是来自纽约的迈克·索伦斯基（音）。

In regards to GEICO, Warren, last year you said the firm had no plans to adopt usage-based driving technology, similar to what competitor Progressive —

关于 GEICO，沃伦，去年你说该公司没有计划采用基于使用的驾驶技术，类似于竞争对手 Progressive 的做法——

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — called Snapshot.

观众成员：——称为Snapshot。

Is that still the case, and if so, why wouldn’t that technology give GEICO better data to potentially give discounts to customers?

这仍然是这样吗？如果是的话，为什么那项技术不会为 GEICO 提供更好的数据，以便可能给客户提供折扣呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That still is the case, and Snapshot has attracted a fair amount of attention and there are other companies doing that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。情况仍然如此，Snapshot 吸引了相当多的关注，还有其他公司也在做这件事。

It’s an arrangement, essentially, to tie — well, the term “Snapshot,” perhaps, says it — to get a picture of how people really do drive.

这基本上是一种安排，确切地说，就是“ Snapshot”这个词，旨在获取人们实际驾驶的情况。

Insurance underwriting, you know, is an attempt to figure out the likely propensity, based on a number of variables, of a person having an accident.

保险承保，您知道，是试图根据多个变量来判断一个人发生事故的可能性。

Now, you know, in life insurance, it’s very obvious that somebody 100 is — if you don’t know anything else about them — is more likely to die in the next year than somebody that’s 20.

在寿险中，很明显，如果你对某人 100 岁没有其他了解，那么他在下一年去世的可能性比 20 岁的人要高得多。

When you get into auto insurance, figuring out who’s likely to have an accident involves assessing a number of variables, and different companies go at it different ways.

当你进入汽车保险领域时，确定谁可能发生事故涉及评估多个变量，不同的公司有不同的方法。

Clearly, on statistics, if you’re a 16-year-old male, you’re more likely to have an accident than I am.

显然，从统计数据来看，如果你是一个 16 岁的男性，你发生事故的可能性比我更高。

Now, that isn’t because I’m a better driver. It’s because the 16-year-old is probably driving about ten times as much, and he’s trying to impress the girl sitting next to him.

现在，这并不是因为我开车技术更好。那是因为这个 16 岁的年轻人可能开车的次数是我的十倍，而且他正在努力给坐在他旁边的女孩留下深刻印象。

巴菲特认为影响风险的因素不需要太多的细分。

And that doesn’t work with me anymore, so I’ve given it up. (Laughter)

这对我来说已经不管用了，所以我放弃了。（笑声）

But the — we ask a number of questions, and our attempt, as much as possible, is to figure out the propensity of any given applicant, or the possibility, that they will have accidents.

但是我们会问很多问题，我们的尝试尽可能地是要弄清楚任何给定申请人的倾向，或者他们发生事故的可能性。

And there are a number of variables that are quite useful in predicting. And Progressive is focusing on this Snapshot arrangement, and we’ll see how they do.

并且有许多变量在预测中非常有用。Progressive 正在专注于这个 Snapshot 方案，我们将看看他们的表现。

I would say that our ability to sell insurance at a price that’s considerably lower than most of our competitors, evidenced by the fact that when people call us, they shift to us, and, at the same time, earn a significant underwriting profit, indicates that our selection process is working quite well.

我认为，我们以远低于大多数竞争对手的价格销售保险的能力，体现在人们拨打我们的电话时转向我们，同时获得显著的承保利润，这表明我们的选择过程运作得相当顺利。

I mean, if your selection process is wrong, if you treat a 16-year-old male and give him the same rate that you’d give a 40-year-old that’s driving their car 3 or 4,000 miles a year, you know, you’re going to get terrible underwriting results.

我的意思是，如果你的选择过程是错误的，如果你对一个 16 岁的男性的处理方式和对一个每年开车 3 或 4,000 英里的 40 岁的人一样，你知道，你会得到糟糕的承保结果。

So our systems, our underwriting criteria, have been developed, you know, over many decades. We have a huge number of policyholders, so that it becomes very credible, these different underwriting cells.

所以我们的系统，我们的承保标准，经过了几十年的发展。我们拥有大量的保单持有人，因此这些不同的承保单元变得非常可信。

And everybody in the business is trying to figure out ways to predict with greater accuracy the possibilities that a given individual will have an accident.

在这个行业中，每个人都在努力寻找更准确地预测某个个体发生事故的可能性的方法。

And Progressive is focusing on this Snapshot approach, and we watch it with interest, but we’re quite happy with the present situation.

Progressive专注于这种Snapshot方法，我们对此保持关注，但我们对目前的情况感到相当满意。

OK. Andrew Ross Sorkin? 好的。安德鲁·罗斯·索金？

Oh, Charlie, I’ve got to give you a chance to comment.

哦，查理，我必须给你一个评论的机会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

15. Business Wire and new rule allowing internet disclosures

15. 商业通讯和允许互联网披露的新规则

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. Warren, we got a couple questions related to this.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，沃伦，我们有几个与此相关的问题。

Warren, now that you’re on Twitter and the SEC is allowing companies to make material announcements over social media, what are the implications for Business Wire, a unit of Berkshire?

沃伦，现在你在推特上，而美国证券交易委员会允许公司通过社交媒体发布重要公告，这对伯克希尔旗下的商业通讯有什么影响？

Do you agree with the SEC’s new position on the distribution of material information, and would you consider selling Business Wire given the new rules?

你是否同意美国证券交易委员会关于重要信息分发的新立场？考虑到新规则，你会考虑出售 Business Wire 吗？

If not, how do you think Business Wire will have to transform itself? And, by the way, what are you doing on Twitter? (Laughter)

如果不是这样，你认为 Business Wire 将如何转型？顺便问一下，你在 Twitter 上做什么？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I haven’t figured that last one out yet.

沃伦·巴菲特：我还没有弄明白最后一个。

The — no, I think it is a mistake. Some companies have announced — made important announcements — on webpages, and some, in certain cases, they’ve messed it up and caused a fair amount of trouble.

这——不，我认为这是一个错误。一些公司在网页上发布了重要公告，而有些情况下，他们搞砸了，造成了相当大的麻烦。

But the key to disclosure is accuracy and simultaneity. I mean, if we own stocks, or are thinking about owning stocks, we want to be very sure that we get accurate information and we get it exactly at the same time as all other people.

但披露的关键在于准确性和同时性。我的意思是，如果我们拥有股票，或者正在考虑拥有股票，我们希望确保获得准确的信息，并且与其他所有人同时获得。

And Business Wire does a magnificent job of that.

Business Wire在这方面做得非常出色。

And I do not want, if I’m buying Wells Fargo, or selling it, or whatever it may be, I do not want to have to keep hitting up to their webpage, or something, and hoping that I’m not 10 seconds behind someone else if there’s some important announcement.

我不想在购买或出售富国银行时，必须不断刷新他们的网页，或者其他什么东西，希望我不会比其他人晚 10 秒钟，如果有重要公告的话。

So, Business Wire has got a traffic record of accuracy and of getting the information to every part of the globe in a simultaneous manner, and that is the key to disclosure.

因此，Business Wire 在准确性和将信息同时传递到全球各个地方方面有着良好的记录，这就是披露的关键。

And I think — I don’t think that — I don’t think anything has come close to doing that as well as Business Wire.

我认为——我不认为——我认为没有任何东西能像商业通讯社那样做得如此好。

So I think we will do very well. We’ve got a sensational manager in Cathy Baron Tamraz.

所以我认为我们会做得很好。我们有一位出色的经理凯西·巴伦·塔姆拉兹。

I couldn’t be happier with the business, so we will not be selling it. And if I could clone Cathy, I would do it.

我对这项业务感到非常满意，所以我们不会出售它。如果我能克隆凯西，我会这么做。

I will not — Berkshire, when it puts out its information — and we like to put it out, actually, after the market closes because we think there’s so much to digest that it’s a terrible mistake to have people try and figure it all out in reading a one- or two-page announcement.

我不会——伯克希尔在发布信息时——我们实际上喜欢在市场关闭后发布，因为我们认为有太多信息需要消化，让人们试图在阅读一到两页的公告时搞清楚所有内容是个严重的错误。

But anything important from Berkshire, or any of our companies, is going to come out on Business Wire so that people get accurate information at exactly at the same time.

但来自伯克希尔或我们任何公司的重要信息将通过Business Wire发布，这样人们就能在同一时间获得准确的信息。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s very hard for me to know anything about Twitter when I’m avoiding it like the plague.

查理·芒格：嗯，当我像避瘟疫一样避开推特时，我很难了解关于推特的任何事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: He sent me out to venture in it, and he’s going to see if anything bad happens to me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他让我去冒险，他要看看我会不会遇到什么坏事。（笑声）

16. As Berkshire grows, it’s paying more for bigger acquisitions

随着伯克希尔的发展，它在更大收购上的支出越来越多。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We now have a short seller in a first, I believe, at any meeting, Doug Kass.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们现在有一位做空者，我相信这是第一次在会议上，道格·卡斯。

DOUG KASS: Thank you, Warren and Charlie. Thanks for this unusual invitation. I’m honored, and I look forward to playing the role of Daniel in the lion’s den in front of 45,000 of your closest friends and greatest admirers.

道格·卡斯：谢谢你，沃伦和查理。感谢你们这个不同寻常的邀请。我感到荣幸，并期待在你们四万五千个亲密朋友和最伟大崇拜者面前扮演丹尼尔在狮子洞中的角色。

WARREN BUFFETT: You can bring your own crowd next year. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：明年你可以带上你自己的观众。（笑声）

DOUG KASS: I would note, you have me asking the last question in the group, though.

道格·卡斯：我想指出，你让我在小组中问最后一个问题。

My first question is a follow-up to Carol Loomis’s first question. Warren, it’s said that size matters.

我的第一个问题是对卡罗尔·卢米斯第一个问题的跟进。沃伦，人们说规模很重要。

WARREN BUFFETT: It does. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：确实如此。（笑声）

DOUG KASS: In the past, Berkshire has purchased cheap or wholesale. For example, GEICO, MidAmerican, your initial purchase of Coca-Cola.

道格·卡斯：在过去，伯克希尔购买的是便宜或批发的。例如，GEICO、米德美洲，以及你最初购买的可口可乐。

And, arguably, your company has shifted to becoming a buyer of pricier and more mature businesses, for example, IBM, Burlington Northern, Heinz, and Lubrizol. These were all done at prices, sales, earnings, book value multiples, well above your prior acquisitions and after the stock prices rose.

而且，可以说贵公司已经转变为购买更昂贵和更成熟的企业，例如 IBM、伯灵顿北方铁路、亨氏和 Lubrizol。这些交易的价格、销售、收益和账面价值倍数都远高于您之前的收购，并且是在股价上涨之后进行的。

Many of the recent buys might be great additions to Berkshire’s portfolio of companies; however, the relatively high prices paid for these investments could potentially result in a lower return on invested capital.

许多最近的收购可能是伯克希尔公司投资组合的优秀补充；然而，为这些投资支付的相对高价可能会导致投资资本的回报率降低。

You used to hunt gazelles. Now you’re hunting elephants. As Berkshire gets bigger, it’s harder to move the needle.

你曾经猎捕瞪羚。现在你在猎捕大象。随着伯克希尔的壮大，推动变化变得更加困难。

To me, the recent buys look like preparation for your legacy, creating a more mature, slower-growing enterprise.

对我来说，最近的收购看起来像是在为你的遗产做准备，创建一个更加成熟、增长较慢的企业。

Is Berkshire morphing into a stock that has become to resemble an index fund and that, perhaps, is more appropriate for widows and orphans, rather than past investors who sought out differentiated and superior compounded growth?

伯克希尔是否正在转变为一种越来越像指数基金的股票，或许更适合寡妇和孤儿，而不是那些寻求差异化和优越复合增长的过去投资者？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There’s no question that we cannot do as well as we did in the past, and size is a factor.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。毫无疑问，我们无法像过去那样表现出色，规模是一个因素。

Actually, the — it depends on the nature of markets, too. We might — there will be times when we’ll run into bad markets, and sometimes there our size can even be an advantage. It may well have been in 2008.

实际上，这也取决于市场的性质。我们可能会遇到糟糕的市场，有时我们的规模甚至可以成为一种优势。这在 2008 年可能确实是这样。

But there — I would take exception to the fact that we paid fancier prices in some cases than, say — in GEICO, I think we paid 20 times earnings and a fairly-sized — good-sized — multiple of book value.

但是，我要对我们在某些情况下支付的价格表示异议，比如在 GEICO，我认为我们支付了 20 倍的收益和相当大的账面价值倍数。

So we have paid up — partly at Charlie’s urging — we’ve paid up for good businesses more than we would have 30 or 40 years ago.

所以我们已经支付了——部分是因为查理的催促——我们为好的企业支付的金额比 30 或 40 年前要多。

But it’s tougher as we get bigger, I we’ve always known that would be the case.

但随着我们变得更大，这变得更加困难，我们一直知道情况会是这样的。

But even with some diminution from returns of the past, they still can be satisfactory and we are willing — there’s companies we should of bought 30 or 40 years ago that looked higher priced then, but we now realize that paying up for an extraordinary business is not a mistake.

但即使考虑到过去收益的减少，它们仍然可以令人满意，我们愿意——有些公司我们应该在 30 或 40 年前就买下，那时看起来价格较高，但我们现在意识到，为一家卓越的企业支付高价并不是错误。

Charlie, what would you say?

查理，你会怎么说？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’ve said over and over again to this group that we can’t do as well in percentage terms per annum in the future as we did in our early days.

查理·芒格：好吧，我们已经对这个团体反复说过，未来我们每年的百分比增长无法像早期那样表现得那么好。

But I think I can make the short seller’s argument even better than he did, and I’ll try and do that.

但我认为我可以比短线卖空者的论点说得更好，我会尽力做到这一点。

If you look at the oil companies that got really big in the past history of the world, the record is not all that good.

如果你看看历史上那些真正变得庞大的石油公司，记录并不是很好。

If you stop to think about it, Rockefeller’s Standard Oil is practically the only one, after it got monstrous, continued to do monstrously well.

如果你停下来想一想，洛克菲勒的标准石油几乎是唯一一家在变得庞大后仍然表现出色的公司。

So, when we think we’re going to do pretty well in spite of getting very big, we’re telling you we think we’ll do a little better than the giants of the past. We think we’ve got a better system.

所以，当我们认为尽管变得非常庞大，我们仍然会做得很好时，我们告诉你，我们认为我们会比过去的巨头做得稍微好一些。我们认为我们有一个更好的系统。

We don’t have a better system than riding up oil, you know, but we have a better system than most other people.

我们并没有比追逐油价的系统更好，但我们比大多数其他人有更好的系统。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. In terms of the acquisitions we’ve made in the last five years, I think we feel pretty good about those and — overall — and, obviously, including the Heinz.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。就我们在过去五年中所做的收购而言，我认为我们对此感到相当满意——总体而言——显然，包括亨氏。

We are buying some very good businesses.

我们正在购买一些非常好的企业。

We actually, as we pointed out, we own eight different businesses that would each be on the Fortune 500 list if it was a separate company, and then in a few months, we’ll own half of another one, so we’ll have eight-and-a-half, in effect.

实际上，正如我们所指出的，我们拥有八个不同的企业，如果它们是独立公司，每个企业都将上《财富》500 强榜单，然后在几个月内，我们将拥有另一个企业的一半，因此实际上我们将拥有八个半。

Well, you haven’t convinced me yet to sell the stock, Doug, but keep working. (Laughter)

好吧，道格，你还没有说服我卖掉股票，但继续努力吧。（笑声）

17. Will U.S. dollar lose reserve currency status?

美元会失去储备货币地位吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Section 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三部分。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Jonathan Schiff, visiting from Macau, China.

观众成员：谢谢。乔纳森·希夫，来自中国澳门的访客。

You briefly touched upon this. But on our side of the world, there’s a lot of discussion about the U.S. dollar’s status at the world’s reserve currency.

你简要提到了这一点。但在我们这边，关于美元作为世界储备货币的地位有很多讨论。

I’m sorry, there’s some feedback. It’s kind of weird.

对不起，有一些反馈。这有点奇怪。

What would be the effect upon the U.S. and the world economy if the dollar loses that status as a world reserve currency?

如果美元失去作为世界储备货币的地位，对美国和世界经济会产生什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know the answer to that, but fortunately, I don’t think it’s going to be relevant.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不知道答案，但幸运的是，我认为这不会相关。

I think the dollar bill will be the world’s reserve currency for some decades to come. I think China and the United States will be the two supereconomic powers, but I don’t see any — I think it’s extremely unlikely — that any currency supplants the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency for many decades, if ever.

我认为美元将在未来几十年内继续作为世界储备货币。我认为中国和美国将成为两个超级经济大国，但我认为任何货币取代美元作为世界储备货币的可能性极小，甚至可能永远不会发生。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there are advantages to a country that has the reserve currency, and if you lose that, you lose some advantage.

查理·芒格：嗯，拥有储备货币的国家有其优势，如果失去这一点，就会失去一些优势。

England had a better hand when it had the reserve currency of the world than it had later when the United States had the reserve currency of the world.

英格兰在拥有世界储备货币时的处境比后来美国拥有世界储备货币时要好。

If that eventually happened to the United States, it would not be, I think, all that significant.

如果最终发生在美国，我认为这并不会太重要。

It’s in the nature of things that sooner or later every great leader is no longer the leader.

事物的本质是，迟早每位伟大的领导者都不再是领导者。

Over the long run, as Keynes said, we’re all dead, and over the long run —

从长远来看，正如凯恩斯所说，我们都死了，而在长远来看——

WARREN BUFFETT: This is the cheery part of the section. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是这一部分的愉快部分。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you stop and think about it, every great leading civilization of the past passed the baton.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你停下来想一想，过去每一个伟大的领先文明都传递了接力棒。

WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think the probabilities are that the U.S. dollar will not be the reserve currency 20 years from now?

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为 20 年后美元不再是储备货币的概率有多大？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think it’ll still be the reserve currency of the world 20 years from now. That doesn’t mean that it’s forever.

查理·芒格：哦，我认为 20 年后它仍然会是世界的储备货币。这并不意味着它会永远如此。

18. “Extraordinary” corporate profits despite tax complaints

尽管有税务投诉，但“非凡”的企业利润

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from John Custabal (PH) of the Philadelphia area.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自费城地区的约翰·库斯塔巴尔（PH）。

Mr. Buffett, you have said in the past, specifically in a 1999 speech that was printed in Fortune, quote, “You —”

巴菲特先生，您在过去曾说过，特别是在 1999 年发表的一次演讲中，该演讲被《财富》杂志刊登，引用：“您——”

WARREN BUFFETT: You would bring that up, wouldn’t you?

沃伦·巴菲特：你会提到这个，是吗？

CAROL LOOMIS: I would bring that up, right. I’m so glad he sent this question.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：我会提到这一点，对吧。我很高兴他提出了这个问题。

“You have to be” — you have said, “You have to be wildly optimistic to believe that corporate profits, as a percent of GDP can, for any sustained period, hold much above 6 percent.”

“你必须”——你曾说过，“你必须非常乐观，才能相信企业利润占 GDP 的百分比在任何持续的时期内都能保持在 6%以上。”

Corporate profits are now greater than 10 percent of GDP. How should we think about that?

企业利润现在超过了国内生产总值的 10%。我们应该如何看待这一点？

WARREN BUFFETT: What we should think is pretty unusual, and particularly considering the economic backdrop.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们应该考虑的事情是相当不寻常的，特别是考虑到经济背景。

Corporate profits are extraordinary, as a percentage of GDP, at least looking back on the history of the United States.

企业利润在国内生产总值中的比例非常惊人，至少从美国历史来看。

And what’s interesting about it, of course, is that American business, to a great extent, is complaining enormously — or frequently, anyway — about the level of the corporate income tax.

有趣的是，美国企业在很大程度上经常抱怨企业所得税的税率。

Now, the corporate income tax is about half what it was 40 years ago, as a percentage of GDP. But yet, as you point out, corporate profits are at an all-time record, as a percentage of GDP.

现在，企业所得税占 GDP 的比例大约是 40 年前的一半。然而，正如你所指出的，企业利润占 GDP 的比例达到了历史最高水平。

So I would have you take with a grain of salt the complaint that American business is noncompetitive because of our corporate income tax rate, which gets so widely complained about.

所以我希望你对关于美国企业因公司所得税率而缺乏竞争力的抱怨持保留态度，因为这个问题被广泛抱怨。

American business has done extraordinarily well at a time when inequality, actually, is — has widened considerably — both measured by net worth and measured by income, if you take the top versus the people down below.

在不平等加剧的时期，企业却表现得非常出色——如果你将富人和底层人民的净资产和收入进行比较。

很有倾向性的观察。

And — (loud noise) —

和——（大声噪音）——

Well, we heard from one of the people here. (Laughter)

好吧，我们听到了这里一个人的话。（笑声）

And, it will be interesting to see whether these levels can be maintained.

而且，看看这些水平是否能够维持将会很有趣。

Corporate — business has come back very, very strong, in terms of profits, from the precipice that we were on in the fall of 2008, the panic.

企业——在利润方面，商业已经非常强劲地回升，摆脱了我们在 2008 年秋季所处的恐慌边缘。

Employment has not come back, the same way. And that’s going to be, I would say, a subject of a lot of public discourse. And you’re seeing — you’re reading more about that, currently.

就业并没有以同样的方式恢复。这将成为我认为公众讨论的一个重要话题。你现在看到——你正在阅读更多关于这个的内容。

If I had to bet on whether corporate profits would be 10 percent of GDP — and, of course, we’re talking about profits that are earned outside the United States, I believe, in that — in the figures you quote — I would say they’re likely to trend downward.

如果我必须下注企业利润是否会占 GDP 的 10%——当然，我们谈论的是在美国以外赚取的利润，我相信，在你引用的数字中——我会说它们可能会呈下降趋势。

But I think that, of course, GDP will be growing, so that does not mean any terrible things will be happening to profits.

但我认为，当然，GDP 会增长，所以这并不意味着利润会发生任何可怕的事情。

Charlie, what do you think about the —?

查理，你对——有什么看法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I wouldn’t be too surprised if that 6 percent figure turned out to be on the low side, in the estimate.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不会太惊讶如果那个 6%的数字最终被证明是低估的。

Just because Warren thought something 20 years ago, doesn’t mean it’s a law of nature. (Laughter)

仅仅因为沃伦 20 年前认为某件事，并不意味着这就是自然法则。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll talk this over at lunchtime. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们午餐时再谈这个。（笑声）

How do you feel about 10 percent?

你对 10%有什么感觉？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m a natural conservative on such items.

查理·芒格：嗯，我在这些问题上是个天生的保守派。

But you’ve got to recognize that the stocks themselves are owned by a lot of endowments and pension funds and so on. So it — that figure doesn’t mean that the world’s becoming grossly more unequal.

但你必须认识到，这些股票本身是由许多捐赠基金、养老金等拥有的。因此，这个数字并不意味着世界变得极其不平等。

There’s no automatic correlation between those two figures.

这两个数字之间没有自动的关联。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you feel the corporate tax rate is too high?

沃伦·巴菲特：你觉得企业税率太高了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think when the rest of the world is — keeps bringing the rates down, —there’s some disadvantage to us if we’re much higher. So I — (Applause)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为当世界其他地方不断降低利率时，如果我们的利率高得多，这对我们来说是有一些不利的。所以我——（掌声）

I rather like Warren’s idea that people like us should pay more, but the corporate tax rate, I’m glad to have lower.

我很喜欢沃伦的想法，认为像我们这样的人应该多交税，但我很高兴企业税率能降低。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. He’s the Republican; I’m the Democrat.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。他是共和党人；我是民主党人。

19. Too many subsidiaries for Buffett’s successor to manage?

巴菲特的继任者管理的子公司太多了吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？（笑声）

JONATHAN BRANDT: Thanks, Warren.

乔纳森·布兰特：谢谢，沃伦。

You probably have a couple of dozen direct reports from the multitude of noninsurance businesses that Berkshire owns, and this arrangement seems to work wonderfully for you.

你可能有几十个直接下属，来自伯克希尔拥有的众多非保险业务，这种安排似乎对你来说非常有效。

But I wonder if this could potentially pose a challenge to your successors.

但我想知道这是否可能对你的继任者构成挑战。

Adding smaller units like Oriental Trading and the newspaper group, even if they are economically sound transactions individually, could arguably add to the unwieldiness of the organization.

增加像Oriental Trading和报纸集团这样的小单位，即使它们在经济上是合理的交易，也可以说会增加组织的笨重性。

How do you weigh the benefits of adding earnings with the risk of leaving a less-focused and harder-to-manage company for even highly capable successors?

您如何权衡增加收益的好处与将一个不够专注且更难管理的公司留给即使是非常有能力的继任者的风险？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think my successor will probably organize things a little differently on that, Jonathan, but not dramatically so.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为我的继任者可能会在这方面稍微以不同的方式组织事情，乔纳森，但不会有太大的变化。

And we’ll certainly never leave the principle of our CEOs running their businesses in virtually all important ways except, perhaps — except for capital allocation.

我们当然不会放弃首席执行官在几乎所有重要方面管理其业务的原则，除了——资本配置除外。

But, I actually have delegated a few units to an assistant of mine, and my guess is that my successor will modestly organize things in a somewhat different way.

但是，我实际上已经将几个单位委托给我的一位助手，我猜我的继任者会以一种稍微不同的方式谦虚地组织事务。

I’ve grown up with these companies and with the people and everything, and so it’s a lot easier for me to communicate with dozens of managers, sometimes very infrequently, because they don’t need it. It just — sometimes it’s their own preference to some degree.

我和这些公司以及这些人一起成长，因此与几十位经理沟通对我来说要容易得多，有时虽然不常沟通，但他们并不需要。这只是——在某种程度上，有时是他们自己的偏好。

And somebody coming in fresh would want, obviously, to be — to understand very well — and that person will understand, in fact, understands now — very well, the major units.

而一个新来的人显然会希望非常了解这些情况——那个人实际上现在就非常了解——主要单位。

But you’re right, when you get down to units that we have, you know, some businesses that make, you know, only 5 or $10 million a year or something like that.

但你说得对，当你考虑到我们拥有的单位时，你知道，有些企业每年只赚 500 万或 1000 万美元之类的。

And my guess is that it gets rearranged a little bit, but that won’t really make any difference.

我的猜测是它会稍微重新排列一下，但这并不会有什么实质性的区别。

I mean, the real money is made by the big businesses. It will continue to be made by the big businesses, and the insurance business, and a little change in reporting arrangements, maybe one more person at headquarters if they go crazy, will really take care of things.

我的意思是，真正的利润是由大企业创造的。它将继续由大企业、保险行业创造，或许在报告安排上稍作调整，如果他们疯狂的话，增加一个总部的人，实际上就能解决问题。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think, of course, it would be unwieldy to have so many businesses, a lot of them small, if we were trying to run them through an imperial headquarters that dominated all the details.

查理·芒格：我认为，当然，如果我们试图通过一个主导所有细节的中央总部来管理这么多企业，其中很多都是小企业，那将是非常笨拙的。

But our system is totally different. If your system is decentralization, almost to the point of abdication, what difference does it make how many subsidiaries you have?

但我们的系统完全不同。如果你的系统是去中心化，几乎到了放弃的地步，那么你拥有多少子公司又有什么区别呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s working pretty well now.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。现在运作得很好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’ll work pretty well afterwards, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：之后也会运作得很好。

But my successor is not going to do things identically. It’d be a mistake.

但我的继任者不会完全照搬我的做法。这将是一个错误。

But the culture will remain unchanged. And the preeminence of the managers of the operating units will remain unchanged, and then every now and then something comes along and a change needs to be made. Sometimes it’s through death or disability, or sometimes a mistake is made.

但文化将保持不变。运营单位管理者的优越地位也将保持不变，然后时不时会出现一些事情，需要进行改变。有时是由于死亡或残疾，或者有时是因为犯了错误。

But, in the end, we’re now trying to acquire companies that are at least at the $75 million pretax level.

但最终，我们现在正在尝试收购至少在 7500 万美元税前水平的公司。

Incidentally, the best acquisitions — to some extent, the best acquisitions — certainly from my standpoint makes it easier — is the one — is these bolt-ons that I talked about in the annual report, in which we did, I think, 2-and-a-half billion worth of last year, because they fall under the purview of managers that we’ve got terrific confidence in and they add really nothing to what happens at headquarters.

顺便提一下，最好的收购——在某种程度上，最好的收购——从我的角度来看，确实更容易——就是我在年报中提到的这些附加收购，去年我们进行了大约 25 亿美元的收购，因为它们属于我们非常有信心的管理者的管辖范围，并且对总部的运作几乎没有影响。

And, of course, the best bolt-ons out of all are when we do buy a — buy out — a minority interest.

当然，所有附加收购中最好的就是我们收购了——收购一个少数股权。

When we buy $2 billion worth more of ISCAR, or a billion-and-a-half more of Marmon, with another billion-and-a-half to come in the next year, you know, that’s adding earning power without it, you know, posing any more work.

当我们购买价值 20 亿美元的 ISCAR，或者再购买 15 亿美元的 Marmon，并且在明年还会再增加 15 亿美元时，你知道，这是在增加盈利能力，而不需要额外的工作。

Those are the ultimate in bolt-on acquisitions, getting more of a good thing.

这些是附加收购的终极，获得更多的好东西。

Charlie, any more on that, or—?

查理，还有其他的事情吗，或者——？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you stop to think about it, if it were all that difficult, what we’re doing now would be impossible, and it isn’t.

查理·芒格：嗯，如果你仔细想想，如果这真是那么困难，我们现在正在做的事情就不可能实现，但事实并非如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll have to think about that a little. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我得考虑一下这个。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, think if 50 years — 20 years ago — they said to you, can you make something this size with a staff of ten or something in a little office in Omaha? People would’ve thought that’s ridiculous. But it’s happened, and it works.

查理·芒格：好吧，想想如果 50 年前——20 年前——他们问你，能否在奥马哈的一间小办公室里用十个人的团队做出这么大的东西？人们会觉得这太荒谬了。但这发生了，而且它有效。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll let it go at that.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，就这样吧。

20. Dangers when Fed reverses economic stimulus

当美联储逆转经济刺激时的危险

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 4? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第四站？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Scott Moore (PH), Overland Park, Kansas.

观众成员：谢谢你。斯科特·摩尔（PH），堪萨斯州奥弗兰帕克。

With the Fed buying 85 billion per month of mortgage securities and Treasurys, what do you think are the long-run risks to this process, and how does the Fed stop this without negative implications? Thank you.

随着美联储每月购买 850 亿美元的抵押贷款证券和国债，您认为这一过程在长期内存在哪些风险？美联储如何在不产生负面影响的情况下停止这一过程？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you answered that yesterday in an interview, so I’ll let you lead off.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你昨天在一次采访中回答了这个问题，所以我让你先说。

CHARLIE MUNGER: My basic answer is I don’t know.

查理·芒格：我的基本回答是我不知道。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

I might say I have nothing to add. (Laughter and applause)

我可以说我没有什么好补充的。（笑声和掌声）

But Scott, you came from Overland, so we’ll do our best.

但是斯科特，你来自 Overland，所以我们会尽力而为。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’re— the questioner — is right to suspect that it’s going to be difficult.

查理·芒格：我认为提问者是对的，怀疑这将会很困难。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s going to be — yeah, it is really uncharted territory.

沃伦·巴菲特：这将是——是的，这确实是未知领域。

And as many people have found out, whether it was the Hunt Brothers buying silver or whatever it might be, it’s a lot easier to buy things, sometimes, than it is to sell them.

正如许多人发现的那样，无论是亨特兄弟购买白银还是其他什么，有时候买东西比卖东西要容易得多。

And the Fed’s balance sheet is up around 3.4 trillion now, and that’s a lot — those are a lot of securities.

美联储的资产负债表现在大约达到 3.4 万亿美元，这是一笔巨款——这些都是大量的证券。

And the bank reserve positions are incredible. I mean, Wells Fargo is sitting with $175 billion at the Fed earning a quarter of a percent, and really earning nothing, after attendant expenses.

银行的储备状况令人难以置信。我的意思是，富国银行在美联储的存款达到 1750 亿美元，赚取四分之一的利率，实际上在扣除相关费用后几乎没有收益。

So, there’s all this liquidity that’s been created. It hasn’t really hit the market because the banks have let it sit there.

所以，已经创造了这么多流动性。它实际上并没有进入市场，因为银行让它停在那里。

You know, in classical economics, you know, that’s how you juice the economy, and you pushed it out by having the Fed buy securities and create reserves for the banks and all of those things.

你知道，在古典经济学中，这就是如何刺激经济的，你通过让美联储购买证券并为银行创造储备来推动这一切。

But, believe me, the banks want loans. I mean, they are not happy — Wells is not happy — having 175 billion at the Fed, and they’re looking every place they can to get it out, with the proviso that they hope to get it back from whoever they get it out to, which can slow down a bank at times.

但是，相信我，银行是想要贷款的。我的意思是，他们并不高兴——富国银行并不高兴——在美联储有 1750 亿美元，他们正在寻找所有可能的地方将其取出，前提是他们希望能从借出对象那里收回，这有时会拖慢银行的速度。

But it— we really are in uncharted territory. I’ve got a lot of faith in Bernanke. I mean, he — if he’s running a risk, he’s running a risk he knows and understands.

但我们确实处于未知领域。我对伯南克有很大的信心。我的意思是，如果他在冒险，他是在冒他知道和理解的风险。

I don’t know whether he’s affected by the fact that his term expires pretty soon, so he just hands the baton off to the next guy and said, “Here. Here’s this wonderful balance sheet. And all you have to do is bring it down a few trillion dollars,” you know. (Laughs)

我不知道他是否受到任期即将结束的影响，所以他只是把接力棒交给下一个人，说：“给你。这是这份出色的资产负债表。你所要做的就是把它减少几万亿美元，”你知道的。（笑）

And I gave a few lectures at George Washington University last year, if you care to read them, and maybe it’ll help you.

我去年在乔治·华盛顿大学讲了几次课，如果你愿意阅读，也许会对你有所帮助。

The — this is something we haven’t seen. It certainly has the potential for being very inflationary. It hasn’t been so far. In fact, my guess is that the Fed wishes it had been a little more inflationary.

这是我们未曾见过的情况。这无疑有成为非常通货膨胀的潜力。到目前为止，它并没有如此。实际上，我的猜测是，美联储希望它能更具通货膨胀性。

If you’re running up a lot of debt, it gets measured in relation to nominal GDP, and the best way to run up — easiest way to run up, not the best way — the easiest way to run up nominal GDP is to inflate, and my guess is that they never would admit it but that the — that at least some Fed members — are probably disappointed that they haven’t seen more inflation.

如果你正在积累大量债务，它是相对于名义 GDP 来衡量的，而增加名义 GDP 的最简单方法——不是最好的方法——是通货膨胀，我猜他们可能永远不会承认，但至少一些美联储成员可能对没有看到更多通货膨胀感到失望。

It won’t be when they start selling. It’ll be — when the market gets a — any kind of a signal — that maybe just the buying ends, maybe that selling will take place, you know, it’s likely to be the shot heard around the world.

当他们开始出售时，就不会是这个时候。市场一旦收到——任何形式的信号——说购买可能结束，可能会发生出售，这可能就是全球市场的“枪声”。

Now, that doesn’t mean the world will come to an end, but it will certainly mean that everybody that owns securities and who’s felt that they’ve been driven into them by extremely low rates or that the assets have to go up in price because interest rates are so low, will start re-evaluating their hand, and people re-evaluate very fast in markets.

现在，这并不意味着世界会结束，但这肯定意味着所有拥有证券的人，尤其是那些觉得自己是因为极低的利率而被迫投资，或者认为由于利率如此之低，资产必须升值的人，将开始重新评估他们的投资，而人们在市场中重新评估的速度非常快。

So, while I’ve been talking, Charlie, have you got any new insights?

所以，查理，在我说话的过程中，你有没有新的见解？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, generally speaking, I think that what’s happened in the realm of macroeconomics has surprised all the people who thought they knew the answers, namely the economists.

查理·芒格：嗯，总的来说，我认为宏观经济领域发生的事情让所有认为自己知道答案的人感到惊讶，也就是经济学家们。

Who would have guessed that interest rates could go so low and stay so low for so long? Or that Japan, a mighty, powerful nation, could have 20 years of stasis after using all the tricks in the economist’s bag?

谁能想到利率会降得如此之低，并且能保持如此之低的水平这么长时间？或者说，日本这个强大而有力的国家，在使用了经济学家所有的手段后，竟然会经历 20 年的停滞？

So I think given this history, the economists ought to be a little more cautious in believing they know exactly how to stay out of trouble when they print money in massive amounts.

所以我认为鉴于这个历史，经济学家在相信他们确切知道如何在大量印钞时避免麻烦时应该更加谨慎。

WARREN BUFFETT: It is a huge experiment.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个巨大的实验。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Applause)

查理·芒格：是的。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think the probabilities are that within ten years you see inflation at a rate of 5 percent or higher a year?

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为在十年内，通货膨胀率达到每年 5％或更高的概率有多大？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I worry about even more than inflation.

查理·芒格：嗯，我担心的甚至比通货膨胀还要多。

If we could get through the next century with the same results we had in the last century, which involved a lot of inflation over that long period, I think we’d all be quite satisfied.

如果我们能在下一个世纪中取得与上一个世纪相同的结果，其中涉及大量通货膨胀，我想我们都会感到非常满意。

I suspect it’s going to be harder, not easier, in this next century. And it wouldn’t surprise me — I’m not going to be here to see it — but I would predict that we may have more trouble than we think — than we now think.

我怀疑在下一个世纪，这将比上一个世纪更难，而我不会感到惊讶——我不会在这里看到这一切，但我预测我们可能会遇到比我们现在想象的更多麻烦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie says he won’t be here to see it, but I reject such defeatism. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理说他不会在这里看到这一切，但我拒绝这种失败主义。（笑声）

21. Effects of low interest rates

低利率的影响

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This is actually a follow-up to the shareholder from Overland Park, the question that was just asked.

贝基·奎克：这实际上是对来自奥弗兰公园的股东的跟进，刚才问的问题。

This comes from Anthony Starace (PH) who is in Lincoln, Nebraska, and he says, “How has the Fed’s zero-interest policy affected Berkshire Hathaway’s various business segments? For example, has it helped or hurt their operations and profitability?”

这来自安东尼·斯塔拉斯（PH），他在内布拉斯加州的林肯，他说：“美联储的零利率政策对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的各个业务部门产生了什么影响？例如，它是帮助还是伤害了他们的运营和盈利能力？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s helped. You know it— interest rates are to asset prices, you know, sort of like gravity is to the apple.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这有帮助。你知道，利率对资产价格就像重力对苹果一样。

And when there are very low interest rates, there’s a very small gravitational pull on asset prices.

当利率非常低时，资产价格的引力非常小。

And we have seen that getting played out. I mean, people make different decisions when they can borrow money for practically nothing than they made back in 1981 and ’2 when Volcker was trying to stem inflation and use — and the government bond rates got up to 15 percent.

我们已经看到这一点的发生。我是说，当人们几乎可以以零成本借钱时，他们做出的决定与 1981 年和 1982 年沃尔克试图遏制通货膨胀时的决定是不同的，那时政府债券利率达到了 15%。

So, interest rates power everything in the economic universe, and they have some effect on the decisions we make.

利率在经济宇宙中主导一切，并对我们所做的决策产生一定影响。

We borrowed the money on the Heinz purchase a lot cheaper than we could’ve borrowed it 10 or 15 years ago, so that does affect what people are willing to pay.

我们在亨氏收购上借的钱比我们 10 或 15 年前能借到的便宜得多，因此这确实影响了人们愿意支付的价格。

So it’s a — it’s a huge factor and, of course, it will — presumably — it will change at some point, although, as Charlie was pointing out in Japan, it hasn’t changed for decades.

所以这是一个——这是一个巨大的因素，当然，它——可以推测——它在某个时刻会改变，尽管正如查理在日本指出的那样，它已经几十年没有改变了。

So, if you wanted to inflate asset prices, you know, bringing down interest rates and keeping them down — at first, nobody believed they’d stay down there very long, so it reflects the permanence that people feel will be attached to the lower rates.

所以，如果你想要抬高资产价格，你知道，降低利率并保持在低位——起初，没有人相信它们会保持在那么低的水平很久，因此这反映了人们对低利率将会持续的感觉。

But when you get the 30-year bond down to 2.8 percent, you know, you are — you’re able to have transactions take place.

但是当你把 30 年期债券的利率降到 2.8%时，你知道，你就能够进行交易。

It makes houses more attractive.

它使房屋更具吸引力。

I mean, it’s been a very smart policy, but the unwind of it, you know, has got to be more difficult, by far, than buying.

我的意思是，这是一项非常聪明的政策，但其解除过程显然要比购买困难得多。

I mean, it is very easy if you’re the Fed to buy 85 billion a month and — I don’t know what would happen if they started trying to sell 85 billion.

我的意思是，如果你是美联储，每个月购买 850 亿美元是非常简单的——我不知道如果他们开始尝试出售 850 亿美元会发生什么。

Now, when you’ve got the banks with loads of reserves there, it might — it’d certainly — be a lot easier than if those reserves had already been deployed out into the real economy. Then you would really be tightening things up.

现在，当你拥有大量准备金的银行时，这可能会——当然——比那些准备金已经被投入到实际经济中时要容易得多。那时你真的会收紧经济。

But I have — you know, this is like watching a good movie, as far as I’m concerned, because I do not know the end, and that’s what makes for a good movie.

但对我来说，这就像在看一部好电影，因为我不知道结局，这正是好电影的魅力所在。

So, we will be back here next year and I will — or maybe in two or three years — and I will tell you I told you so and hope you have a bad memory.

所以，我们明年会再回来这里，或者也许在两三年后，我会告诉你我早就说过，希望你有个坏记性。

Charlie? (Laughter) 查理？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I strongly suspect that interest rates aren’t going to stay this low for hugely extended periods. But as I pointed out, practically everybody has been very surprised by what’s happened, because what’s happened would’ve seemed impossible to practically all intelligent people not very long ago.

查理·芒格：我强烈怀疑利率会在很长一段时间内保持如此低的水平。但正如我所指出的，几乎所有人都对发生的事情感到非常惊讶，因为发生的事情在不久前几乎对所有聪明人来说都似乎是不可能的。

At Berkshire, of course, we’ve got this enormous float in the insurance business, and our incremental float, when we’re carrying huge amounts of cash, is worth less than it was in the old days.

在伯克希尔，我们在保险业务中拥有巨额的浮动资金，而当我们持有大量现金时，我们的增量浮存金的价值比以前要低。

And that, I suppose, should give some cheer to you people because if that changes, we may get an advantage.

我想这应该给你们带来一些鼓舞，因为如果情况改变，我们可能会获得优势。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have 40 — at the end of the first quarter, we had, whatever it was, 48 or maybe 9 billion or something like that — in short-term securities.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有 40——在第一季度末，我们有大约 480 亿或 490 亿之类的短期证券。

We’re earning basically nothing on that. We do not — we never stretch for yield in terms of commercial paper that brings ten basis points more than Treasury.

我们基本上在这方面没有收益。我们从不——我们从不为了获得比国债多十个基点的收益而去追求商业票据。

可以更长远的看待机会。

Our money— we don’t count on anybody else, so we keep it in Treasurys, basically, and so we’re earning nothing on that.

我们的资金——我们不依赖其他人，所以我们基本上把它存放在国债中，因此我们在这方面没有赚到任何钱。

So if we get back to an environment where short-term rates are 5 percent, and we would still have the same amount, then that would be a couple billion dollars of annual earnings, pretax, that we don’t have now.

所以如果我们回到一个短期利率为 5%的环境，而我们仍然拥有相同的金额，那么这将是每年几亿美元的税前收益，而我们现在没有。

But of course, it would have lots of other effects in our business.

但当然，这在我们的业务中会产生许多其他影响。

We have benefited significantly, and the country has benefited significantly, by what the Fed has done in the last few years.

我们和国家在过去几年美联储所做的事情中受益匪浅。

And if they can successfully pull off a reversal of this without getting a lot of surprises, you know, we will all have been a lot better off.

如果他们能够成功地逆转这一局面而不遇到太多意外，我们大家都会过得更好。

22. Building, not buying, commercial insurance growth

自建，而不是通过购买获取商业保险的增长

WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff? 沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫？

CLIFF GALLANT: Thank you.

克利夫·加朗特：谢谢你。

WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff, incidentally, you ran a 2:40 last year, didn’t you, in the marathon at Lincoln?

沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫，顺便问一下，你去年在林肯的马拉松中跑了 2 小时 40 分钟，对吧？

CLIFF GALLANT: I ran the Lincoln marathon after the shareholder meeting.

克利夫·加朗特：在股东会议后，我参加了林肯马拉松。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ve got incredible talent on this thing. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们在这件事上有着令人难以置信的人才。（笑声）

CLIFF GALLANT: I wanted to ask you more about the commercial insurance business and Berkshire’s interest.

克利夫·加兰特：我想问你更多关于商业保险业务和伯克希尔的兴趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

CLIFF GALLANT: If the business is attractive, why not make an acquisition? Do you think that public company valuations are too high today?

克利夫·加朗特：如果这个业务有吸引力，为什么不进行收购呢？你认为今天上市公司的估值太高了吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There aren’t too many commercial operations that we would want to acquire, big ones.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们想收购的大型商业保险并不多。

It wouldn’t do much — I mean, we’re acquired — when we acquired GUARD Insurance, it’s workers’ compensation, but it’s just — it’s a small acquisition. It’s a good acquisition, but that is a commercial, in effect, underwriter that we acquired late last year.

这不会有什么太大意义——我的意思是，当我们收购GUARD保险时，它是工伤赔偿保险，但这只是一个小规模的收购。这是一个好的收购，但这实际上是我们去年年底收购的一个商业承保单位。

But, if you look at the big ones, some of them we wouldn’t want. There’s a couple that we would. But the prices would be probably far higher than what we think we might be able to develop a comparable operation for.

但是，如果你看看那些大公司，有些我们并不想要。有几个我们会想要。但价格可能远高于我们认为能够开发出类似业务的成本。

I mean, we — in effect — I think we’re going to build a very large commercial operation, and essentially we’ve built it at book value. And we pick up no bad habits of other companies, at least we hope we don’t.

我的意思是，我们——实际上——我认为我们将建立一个非常大的商业保险，基本上我们是以账面价值建立的。而且我们没有吸取其他公司的坏习惯，至少我们希望没有。

And so, it’s really better to build than buy, if you can find the right people with the right mind-set, and everything, in the business.

因此，如果你能找到合适的人和正确的心态，建立比购买更好。

And you know, we’ve got a terrific manager, obviously, in Ajit, and these other people have sought him out, so I think — if there were certain commercial operations, and we could’ve bought them at the right price, we’d have done it.

你知道，我们有一个出色的经理，显然是 Ajit，而其他人也在寻找他，所以我认为——如果有某些商业保险，我们能够以合适的价格购买，我们就会这样做。

But we have not been able to do that so we will build our own. And I predict that we will have a good and significant commercial insurance operation in a relatively short time.

但我们还没有能够做到这一点，所以我们将自己建立。我预测我们将在相对较短的时间内拥有一个良好且重要的商业保险业务。

23. Munger: bitcoin won’t be “big universal currency”

芒格：比特币不会成为“全球通用货币”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第五站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Benjamin. I’m from Appleton, Wisconsin, and I had a question for you regarding unregulated digital currency, such as bitcoin.

观众成员：早上好。我叫本杰明。我来自威斯康星州的阿普尔顿，我有一个关于无监管数字货币（如比特币）的问题想问您。

I was wondering what you think the significance of something like that showing up in the last few years is, and what you think that might mean for the future? Thank you.

我在想你认为最近几年出现这样的事情有什么意义，以及你认为这对未来可能意味着什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I hope you know something about this subject because I don’t know a thing. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我希望你对这个话题有所了解，因为我一无所知。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I know what he’s talking about.

查理·芒格：我知道他在说什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: I know what he’s talking about, but I just don’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：我知道他在说什么，但我就是不——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have no confidence whatsoever in bitcoin being any kind of a big universal currency.

查理·芒格：我对比特币成为任何一种大型通用货币完全没有信心。

WARREN BUFFETT: That would certainly be my gut reaction, but I don’t — I haven’t really looked into it.

沃伦·巴菲特：这当然是我的直觉反应，但我没有——我并没有真正研究过这个。

But I— I’ll put it this way: of our 49 billion, we haven’t moved any to bitcoin. (Laughter)

但是我——我这样说吧：在我们的 490 亿中，我们没有转移任何到比特币上。（笑声）

My— well, the truth is I don’t know anything about it. That doesn’t always stop me from talking about things, but it will in this case.

我——嗯，事实是我对这件事一无所知。这并不总是阻止我谈论事情，但在这种情况下会。

24. Pampered Chef isn’t a pyramid scheme

Pampered Chef 不是一个金字塔骗局

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？（笑声）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. 安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的。

Bill Ackman, the activist investor, who’s also a Berkshire investor as well, has raised questions in recent months about the legality of the multilevel marketing company Herbalife. He called it a pyramid scheme.

比尔·阿克曼，这位激进投资者，同时也是伯克希尔的投资者，最近几个月对多层次营销公司赫尔巴莱法的合法性提出了质疑。他称其为金字塔骗局。

Berkshire owns a multilevel marketing company, too: the Pampered Chef.

伯克希尔还拥有一家多层次营销公司：Pampered Chef。

Will Ackman’s attack on Herbalife have any impact on the Pampered Chef or Berkshire, and do you believe Ackman’s concerns are legitimate?

威尔·阿克曼对赫尔巴莱夫的攻击会对 Pampered Chef 或伯克希尔产生影响吗？你认为阿克曼的担忧是合理的吗？

How do you think about the debate over multilevel marketing companies and decipher which ones are legitimate and which ones are not?

你如何看待关于多层次营销公司的辩论，并判断哪些是合法的，哪些不是？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t know anything— I’ve never actually even looked at a 10-K of Herbalife, so I do not know about their operation.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不知道任何事情——我实际上从未看过 Herbalife 的 10-K 报告，所以我对他们的运营一无所知。

But, I think the key, obviously, is whether a direct marketing operation is really based on selling product to would-be distributors of one sort, and loading them up, instead of sell— in effect — selling it to end users.

但我认为关键显然在于，一个直接营销的操作是否真的基于向潜在分销商销售产品，而不是把他们装上货，而是——实际上——向最终用户销售。

And Pampered Chef is a million miles away from anything where the money is made, in any way, by selling to level A, and then those people selling to level B, and all that sort of thing.

而Pampered Chef与通过销售给A层，然后那些人再销售给B层等形式赚钱的任何东西相去甚远。

It is true that certain people — lots of people — get paid on the results — the selling results — of other people that they recruit.

确实，某些人——很多人——根据他们招募的其他人的销售结果获得报酬。

But this business of loading up people with a couple-hundred dollar package of something that they never sell, and that being sort of the main business — and I don’t know anything about Herbalife on this, I do know about Pampered Chef — and that is not Pampered Chef’s business.

但是这种让人们购买几百美元的产品包，而这些产品根本卖不出去的做法，居然成为主要业务——我对 Herbalife 不太了解，但我对 Pampered Chef 很了解——这并不是 Pampered Chef 的业务。

Pampered Chef’s business is based on selling to the end user.

Pampered Chef 的业务是基于直接向最终用户销售。

And we have thousands and thousands and thousands of parties every week where people who are actually going to use the product buy it from somebody, and we are not making it — we’re not making the money — by loading up people and then having them leave the sales force and our profit coming from that.

我们每周都有成千上万的聚会，真正会使用产品的人从某个地方购买，而我们并不是通过让人们加入销售队伍然后离开来赚钱的。

Charlie? 查理？

I think that should be the distinguishing characteristic. If I were regulating the industry, I would look very hard at operations where thousands of people got their hopes as to earning a living by selling the product, invested their savings, and buying a whole bunch of product that they didn’t need themselves, and then sort of being — abandoning the hope and being left with the product.

我认为这应该是区分的特征。如果我是监管机构，我会非常仔细地审视那些让成千上万的人通过销售产品来谋生的操作，他们投入了自己的积蓄，购买了一堆他们自己不需要的产品，结果却放弃了希望，留下了这些产品。

And the parent company just— or the main company — just going out and selling millions and millions of people on a dream that was not fulfilled.

而母公司——或主要公司——只是向数以百万计的人推销一个未能实现的梦想。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s likely to be more flimflam in selling magic potions than pots and pans. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，销售魔法药水的花招可能比卖锅碗瓢盆要多。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: At our age, we’re in the market, though, for any magic potions, if any of you have them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们这个年纪，如果你们有任何神奇的药水，我们是很感兴趣的。（笑声）

That’s the extent of your comment, I assume, Charlie?

我想这就是你评论的全部，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

25. “Lender of last resort” after Buffett?

“巴菲特之后的最后贷款人”？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

Doug? 道格？

DOUG KASS: Warren — 道格·卡斯：沃伦 —

WARREN BUFFETT: Doug. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：道格。（笑）

DOUG KASS: Warren. (Laughter)

道格·卡斯：沃伦。（笑声）

Much of Berkshire’s returns over the last decade have been based on your reputation and your ability to extract remarkable deals from companies in duress, as compared to the past, when you conducted yourself more as a value investor digging and conducting extensive analysis.

在过去十年中，伯克希尔的回报很大程度上基于你的声誉和你从困境中的公司中提取出卓越交易的能力，而不是像过去那样，作为一名价值投资者进行深入挖掘和广泛分析。

What gives you confidence that your successor’s imprimatur will be as valuable to Berkshire as yours has been?

你对你的继任者的印记会像你一样对伯克希尔同样有价值，这种信心从何而来？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the successor will probably have even more capital to work with, and they will have capital, presumably, from time to time, when markets are in distress.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，接任者可能会有更多的资本可供运用，他们将会在市场困境时，适时拥有资本。

And at those times, very few people — few people have the capital, and a lot fewer people have the willingness, to commit.

而在那些时候，只有很少的人——很少有人有资本，更少的人愿意去投入。

But I have no question that my successor will have unusual capital at times when — at turbulent times when — the ability to say “yes” very quickly with very large sums sets you apart from virtually anybody in the investing universe.

但我毫无疑问，我的继任者将在动荡时期拥有非凡的资本，能够迅速以大量资金说“是”，这使他们在投资领域中脱颖而出。

And I would not worry about that successor being willing to deploy capital under those circumstances, and being called upon.

我不担心继任者在这种情况下是否愿意动用资本，也不担心他们会被召唤。

I mean, Berkshire is the 800 number when there’s really, sort of, panic in markets, and for one reason or another, people need significant capital.

我意思是，伯克希尔是当市场真的有点恐慌时的 800 电话，因为某种原因，人们需要大量资金。

Now, that’s not our main business. You know, it happened a couple times in 2008. It happened once in 2011. But that’s not been our main business, but it’s fine. And it will happen again.

现在，这不是我们的主要业务。你知道，这在 2008 年发生过几次。在 2011 年发生过一次。但这不是我们的主要业务，不过没关系。这会再次发生。

And I would think if you come to a day when the Dow has fallen 1,000 points a day for a few days, and the tide had gone out and we’re finding out who’s been swimming naked, that those naked swimmers may call Berkshire — they will call Berkshire — if they need lots of money.

我想如果有一天，道琼斯指数连续几天下跌 1000 点，潮水退去，我们发现谁在裸泳，那些裸泳者可能会打电话给伯克希尔——如果他们需要大量资金，他们会打电话给伯克希尔。

I mean— and Berkshire’s reputation will become even more solidified, in terms of being willing to provide capital for sound deals at times when most people are frozen.

我的意思是——在大多数人都处于僵持状态的时候，伯克希尔的声誉将更加巩固，因为它愿意为合理的交易提供资金。

And when that happens when I’m not around, it becomes even more the Berkshire brand and not anything attached to a single individual.

当这种情况发生在我不在的时候，它更成为伯克希尔的品牌，而不是与任何单一个体相关的东西。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that in the early days, Warren had huge success as a value investor in little-owned companies because his competition was so small.

查理·芒格：我认为，在早期，沃伦在小型公司作为价值投资者取得了巨大的成功，因为他的竞争对手非常少。

If he stayed in that field, he would have to be in bigger companies, and his competition would be way more intense.

如果他留在那个领域，他就必须进入更大的公司，而他的竞争将会更加激烈。

He’s gotten into a field, being a good home for a big companies that don’t want to be controlled in meticulous detail by headquarters, where there isn’t much competition.

他进入了一个领域，为那些不想被总部细致控制的大公司提供了良好的家园，而这个领域竞争不大。

So I would argue that he’s done exactly the right thing, and it’s ridiculous to think that the past is the thing he should have stayed in.

所以我认为他做得完全正确，认为过去是他应该停留的地方是荒谬的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we will send— I think he’s probably referring to something like the Bank of America transaction or Goldman Sachs and GE — and there will come a time, in markets, where large sums — I’ve gotten calls on other things, too, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们将会——我想他可能指的是类似美洲银行的交易，或者高盛和通用电气的交易——未来某个时候，市场上会有大额资金——我也接到过其他一些交易的电话，但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but other people are not getting the calls.

查理·芒格：是的，但其他人没有接到电话。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they don’t have the money and they don’t have the willingness to act immediately.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，他们没有钱，也没有立即采取行动的意愿。

And Berkshire will — those qualities will remain with Berkshire after I’m gone.

而伯克希尔将会——这些品质在我离开后仍将与伯克希尔同在。

In fact, in a sense, the area we occupy becomes more and more our own as we get even bigger, I would say, Charlie.

事实上，从某种意义上说，随着我们变得越来越大，我会说，我们所占据的区域变得越来越属于我们，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s what I like about it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这就是我喜欢它的原因。（笑声）

26. We only buy from willing sellers

我们只从愿意出售的卖家那里购买。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Andre from Beverly Hills, California.

观众成员：嗨，我叫安德烈，来自加利福尼亚州比佛利山庄。

During very key events, like the Sanborn incident, when you were buying See’s, or when you were buying Berkshire stocks, you persuaded people to sell you their shares when they really didn’t want to.

在非常关键的事件中，比如桑博恩事件、你购买 See's 的时候，或者你购买伯克希尔股票的时候，你说服人们在他们其实并不想卖的时候把股票卖给你。

What were your three keys to influencing people in those specific situations?

在那些特定情况下，影响他人的三个关键是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think — you brought up Sanborn and you brought up See’s and— I don’t think —the See’s family, there had been a death in the See’s family— it was Larry See, wasn’t it, that died?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不认为——你提到了桑伯恩和See’s——我不认为—— See’s家族中有一个人去世了——是Larry See去世了，对吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And he had been the instrumental, I guess, grandson of Mary See, and the operator, and there was a— the rest of the family really didn’t want to run the business.

沃伦·巴菲特：他是Mary See的孙子，起到了关键作用，并且是经营者，而其他家人实际上并不想经营这家公司。

So it was put up for sale, and I didn’t even hear about it until they’d had one other party— I don’t know even know who it was— but that they negotiated a deal with and that it didn’t go through.

所以它被挂牌出售，我甚至在他们与另一个买家谈判之前都没有听说过——我甚至不知道那是谁——但他们与之谈判了一笔交易，但没有成功。

Charlie probably remembers this better than I do. We certainly — the See family— and Charlie persuaded me to buy it. We didn’t persuade them to sell it. Charlie?

查理可能比我更记得这件事。我们—— See——确实是查理说服我买下它的。我们并没有说服他们卖掉它。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We didn’t buy anything from any unwilling sellers.

查理·芒格：是的。我们没有从任何不愿意出售的人那里购买任何东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. And Berkshire, we started buying that in 1962 in the open market. It had quite a few shareholders. It was a — it traded fairly actively, and we bought a lot of stock, and we did buy a couple of key pieces.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。我们在 1962 年开始在公开市场上购买伯克希尔。它有相当多的股东。它的交易相当活跃，我们买了很多股票，也买了几块关键的股份。

We bought one from Otis Stanton, who was Seabury Stanton’s brother, but Otis wanted to sell.

我们从奥蒂斯·斯坦顿那里买了一个，他是西布里·斯坦顿的兄弟，但奥蒂斯想要出售。

It wasn’t the most attractive business in the world. I mean, here was a textile company that lost money in most of the previous years, and over a ten-year period, that had significant losses. And it was a northern textile company.

这并不是世界上最有吸引力的生意。我的意思是，这是一家在过去大多数年份都亏损的纺织公司，在十年期间，亏损相当严重。而且这是一家北方的纺织公司。

So, we bought stock in the market, a lot of stock in the market. We had two big blocks from Otis Stanton and from some relatives of Malcolm Chace, but they were happy to sell.

所以，我们在市场上买了很多股票。我们从奥蒂斯·斯坦顿和马尔科姆·查斯的一些亲戚那里获得了两大块股票，但他们很乐意出售。

I never met — at the time I bought the stock from Otis Stanton — I had never met him, and so I delivered no personal sales talk to him.

我从奥蒂斯·斯坦顿那里买股票时，从未见过他，因此我没有对他进行任何个人推销。

And the same thing is true of the Chase family, not Malcolm himself, but some relatives, they sold us a block of 100,000 shares. But we were not out convincing anybody to sell their stock.

同样的事情也适用于Chase家族，不是马尔科姆本人，而是一些亲戚，他们卖给我们一块 100,000 股的股票。但我们并没有去说服任何人出售他们的股票。

So there’s been very little that I can remember where — we talked to Betty Peters about avoiding a transaction we thought was dumb, when Wesco was considering merging with Financial Corp of Santa Barbara.

所以我能记得的很少——我们和贝蒂·彼得斯谈过避免一笔我们认为愚蠢的交易，当时 Wesco 正在考虑与圣巴巴拉金融公司合并。

I flew out to see her in San Francisco. But she stayed with us. She did not sell her stock and remains a shareholder to this day, 30-plus years, almost 40 years later.

我飞到旧金山去看她。但她和我们在一起。她没有卖掉她的股票，至今仍然是股东，已经超过 30 年，快 40 年了。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve got nothing to add to that at all.

查理·芒格：嗯，我对此没有任何补充。

27. Berkshire’s edge for acquisitions

伯克希尔在收购方面的优势

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Then we’ll go to Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。那我们去卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Mark Trautman of Crested Butte, Colorado.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自科罗拉多州克雷斯特布特的马克·特劳特曼。

And you’ve touched on this, Warren and Charlie, on little fringes today, but this is a direct question.

你们今天在一些小细节上提到了这一点，沃伦和查理，但这是一个直接的问题。

“Warren, both you and Charlie have described over the years how you have built Berkshire Hathaway to be sustainable for the long term.

“沃伦，您和查理多年来都描述了如何将伯克希尔哈撒韦建设为可持续的长期公司。”

“I am having difficulty explaining to my 13-year-old daughter, and frankly, to many adults, also, in easy to understand terms, Berkshire’s business model and long-term sustainable, competitive advantage.

“我很难用简单易懂的术语向我 13 岁的女儿，坦白说，也向许多成年人解释伯克希尔的商业模式和长期可持续的竞争优势。”

“Can you give all of us, and particularly my daughter, Katie, who is here today, the Peter Lynch two-minute monologue explaining the business of Berkshire Hathaway and its merits as a long-time investment for future decades?”

“你能给我们所有人，特别是今天在场的我的女儿凯蒂，讲一下彼得·林奇的两分钟独白，解释一下伯克希尔·哈撒韦的业务及其作为长期投资在未来几十年的优点吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Charlie, you talk to Katie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，查理，你去和凯蒂谈谈。（笑声）

I’m going to have some fudge. (Laughter)

我要吃一些软糖。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGER: All right. I’ll try that.

查理·芒格：好的。我会试试的。

We’ve always tried to stay sane, and other people, a lot of them, like to go crazy. That’s a competitive advantage. (Laughter and applause)

我们一直努力保持理智，而其他人，很多人，喜欢疯狂。这是一种竞争优势。（笑声和掌声）

Number two: as we’ve gotten bigger, we’ve used this sort of golden rule that we want to treat the subsidiaries the way we would want to be treated if we were in the subsidiaries.

第二点：随着我们的壮大，我们遵循了一条黄金法则，那就是我们希望以我们希望在子公司时被对待的方式来对待子公司。

And that, again, is a very rare attitude in corporate America, and it causes people to come to us who don’t want to come to anybody else. That is a long-term competitive advantage.

这在美国企业中是一种非常罕见的态度，这使得那些不想去其他地方的人愿意来找我们。这是一个长期的竞争优势。

We’ve tried to be a good partner to people who come to us and need a partner with more money. That is a competitive advantage.

我们努力成为那些来找我们并需要更多资金的好的合作伙伴。这是一个竞争优势。

And so, we are leaving behind a field that’s very competitive and getting into a place where we’re more unusual.

因此，我们正在离开一个竞争非常激烈的领域，进入一个我们更为独特的地方。

This was a very good idea. I wish we had done it on purpose. (Laughter)

这是个很好的主意。我希望我们是故意这么做的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: A few years ago, a person who’s in this audience, I believe, came to me and he was in his 60s, and he said that for about a year, he’d been thinking about selling his business.

沃伦·巴菲特：几年前，我相信在座的某位人士来找我，他当时六十多岁，他说他考虑出售自己的生意已经有一年了。

And the reason he had been thinking about it was not because he wanted to retire. We’re not — we very seldom buy businesses from people who want to retire. He didn’t want to retire at all. He loved what he was doing.

他之所以考虑这个问题，并不是因为他想退休。我们很少从想退休的人那里购买业务。他根本不想退休。他热爱自己所做的事情。

But he’d had an experience in buying a business a few years earlier from a family where he had known the fellow that built it, the fellow had died, and then just everything bad started happening in the family and the business and the employees, everything else.

但他几年前从一个家庭购买生意时有过一次经历，他认识那个创建它的人，那个人去世后，家庭、企业和员工等一切坏事接踵而至。

So he really wanted to put to bed the question of what happened with his business.

所以他真的想要解决关于他生意发生了什么的问题。

It wasn’t that he really cared a lot about monetizing it or having the money. He just wanted — he wanted to put his mind at ease, that what he had spent lovingly building up over 30 or 40 years was not going to get destroyed — or that his family would get destroyed — if he — if he made a — if he died.

他并不是特别在乎将其货币化或拥有金钱。他只是想——他想让自己安心，自己花了 30 或 40 年心血建立起来的东西不会被毁掉——或者他的家庭不会被毁掉——如果他——如果他去世的话。

So he said he thought about it a year. And he thought about it and he thought, “Well, if I sell it to one of my competitors” — and they would be a logical buyer, they usually are. That’s why we have antitrust laws.

所以他说他考虑了一年。他想了又想，“好吧，如果我把它卖给我的一个竞争对手”——他们通常是一个合乎逻辑的买家。这就是我们有反垄断法的原因。

If he sold it to a competitor, they would come in and basically they would put their people in charge.

如果他把它卖给竞争对手，他们就会进来，基本上会让他们的人负责。

They would have all these ideas about synergy, and synergy would mean that the people that had helped him build the business over 30 years would all get sacked and that the acquiring company would come in like Attila the Hun and be the conquering people, and he just didn’t want to do that to the people that helped him over the years.

他们会有关于协同效应的各种想法，而协同效应意味着那些在过去 30 年里帮助他建立业务的人都会被解雇，收购公司就像匈奴王阿提拉一样进来，成为征服者，他就是不想这样对待那些多年来帮助过他的人。

And then he thought he could — he might — sell it to some private equity firm. And he figured that if he sold it to them, they’d load it up with debt, which he didn’t like, and then they’d resell it later on. And so he would, again, have lost control and they might do the same thing that he didn’t want to have happen in the first place, in terms of selling it to a competitor, or whatever it might be.

然后他想他可以——他可能——把它卖给某个私募股权公司。他认为如果他把它卖给他们，他们会把债务加到上面，这让他不喜欢，然后他们会在之后转售它。因此，他又会失去控制权，他们可能会做他一开始不想发生的事情，比如把它卖给竞争对手，或者其他什么。

So when he came to me, he said — he described this — and he said, “It really isn’t because you’re so attractive.”

所以当他来到我面前时，他说——他描述了这一点——他说：“这真的不是因为你太有吸引力了。”

But he said, “You’re the only guy left standing. You know, I mean, you’re not a competitor, you’re not a private equity firm, and I know I will get a permanent home with Berkshire and that the people that have stayed with me over the years will continue to get opportunities and they will continue to work for me. I’ll keep to get doing what I love doing, and I won’t have to worry about what will happen if something happens to me tonight.”

但他说：“你是唯一剩下的人。你知道，我的意思是，你不是竞争对手，你也不是私募股权公司，我知道我会在伯克希尔找到一个永久的家，而那些多年来一直陪伴我的人将继续获得机会，他们将继续为我工作。我会继续做我喜欢做的事情，我不必担心如果今晚发生什么事会怎样。”

Well, that company has turned out to be a wonderful acquisition for Berkshire, and our competitive advantage is we had no competitors. And I think — well, we will see more of that. We’ve seen a lot of that over the years. We’ll see more of it.

好吧，那家公司对伯克希尔来说是一项很棒的收购，而我们的竞争优势在于我们没有竞争对手。我认为——好吧，我们会看到更多这样的情况。多年来我们已经看到了很多这样的情况。我们会看到更多。

Charlie, anything? 查理，有什么消息吗？

And I don’t think you mentioned the fact that developing a shareholder base, too, that’s different than —we do look at shareholders as partners, and, you know, it’s not something a public relations firm wrote for us, or anything of the sort. We want you to get the same result we get, and we try to demonstrate that in every way we can.

我认为你没有提到建立股东基础这一事实，这与——我们确实将股东视为合作伙伴不同，而这并不是公关公司为我们写的东西，或类似的东西。我们希望你能获得与我们相同的结果，我们尽力以各种方式来证明这一点。

28. BNSF outlook for carrying coal and oil

BNSF 对运输煤炭和石油的展望

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: I have a — (Applause)

乔纳森·布兰特：我有一个——（掌声）

I have a couple questions about Burlington Northern’s two energy franchises, coal and crude.

我对伯灵顿北方的两个能源特许经营权，煤炭和原油，有几个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Uh-huh. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Given that coal-fired generation is in gradual structural decline, can you discuss whether the tracks, locomotives, and other assets used to deliver coal can be redeployed, equally profitable, serving other customers? Are those assets fungible?

乔纳森·布兰特：鉴于燃煤发电正逐渐结构性衰退，您能否讨论一下用于运输煤炭的轨道、机车和其他资产是否可以重新部署，是否同样盈利，服务于其他客户？这些资产是否可互换？

Can you also discuss whether crude by rail can continue to grow even as pipelines are built to serve the Bakken, and as the currently large geographic spreads in crude prices potentially narrow?

随着为巴肯地区服务的管道建设，以及当前原油价格的大幅地理差异可能缩小，你们能否也讨论一下，通过铁路运输原油是否还能继续增长？

You’ve talked about the flexibility of crude by rail on TV. Can you elaborate on that, please?

您在电视上谈到了原油铁路运输的灵活性。您能详细说明一下吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If there was no coal moving, we would not find a lot of use for some of the tracks we have, there’s no question about that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果没有煤炭运输，我们就不会发现我们的一些轨道有很多用途，这毫无疑问。

So, the — I think what you’re talking about would be very gradual over time. But, I mean, the outlook for coal is not the same as the outlook for oil.

所以，我认为你所说的将会是一个非常渐进的过程。但是，我的意思是，煤炭的前景与石油的前景并不相同。

A lot of the coal, in terms of the year-by-year fluctuations, may depend on the price of natural gas because some of the generating capacity can go in either direction.

许多煤炭的年度波动可能取决于天然气的价格，因为一些发电能力可以朝两个方向发展。

In terms of oil, I think the view a few years ago was that there might just be a little blip in terms of rail transportation. But I’ve talked to some oil producers, the largest up there in the Bakken, and I think there will be a lot of rail usage for a long time, in fact, increased rail usage.

在石油方面，我认为几年前的观点是，铁路运输可能只会出现一点小波动。但我与一些油气生产商进行了交谈，尤其是巴肯地区最大的生产商，我认为铁路使用将会持续很长时间，实际上，铁路使用会增加。

Oil moves a whole lot faster, incidentally, by rail than it does by pipeline. Most people have sort of a visual conception that the oil is flowing at terrific speeds through pipelines and that the railcars are sitting on the sidelines someplace.

顺便提一下，石油通过铁路的流动速度远远快于通过管道的速度。大多数人对石油在管道中以惊人的速度流动有一种直观的印象，而铁路货车则似乎在一旁静静地等待。

But it’s just the opposite. You can move oil a lot faster.

但情况正好相反。你可以更快地运输石油。

And with change — with different market prices and different refinery situations and all that — there’s a lot of flexibility in the oil transportation by rail.

随着变化——不同的市场价格和不同的炼油厂情况等等——铁路石油运输具有很大的灵活性。

Matt Rose is right up front here, and if somebody would give him a microphone, I think he can probably tell you a lot more about moving coal and oil than I can. Matt?

马特·罗斯就在这里，如果有人给他一个麦克风，我想他可能能告诉你们更多关于运输煤炭和石油的事情，比我能说的还要多。马特？

We got a spotlight someplace that can focus right on here?

我们有一个聚光灯可以正好照在这里吗？

MATT ROSE: Yes. So, Warren, the two franchises are really different. That’s just the way the geographic is laid out.

马特·罗斯：是的。所以，沃伦，这两个特许经营实际上是非常不同的。这就是地理布局的方式。

We expect the coal franchise to basically stay about where it is today, depending on natural gas prices as well as what happens with the EPA.

我们预计煤炭特许经营基本上会保持在今天的水平，这取决于天然气价格以及环保局的动向。

Our crude by rail, right now we have about 10 loading stations in the Bakken with about 30 destination stations. We’re currently in negotiation, looking at about another 30 destination stations.

我们通过铁路运输原油，目前在巴肯地区有大约 10 个装载站和大约 30 个目的地站。我们目前正在谈判，正在考虑大约另外 30 个目的地站。

So it’s really an exciting time right now. We’re handling about 650,000 barrels of crude a day. We think we’ll be at 750 by the end of this year, and we see a pathway to a million-two to a million-four.

现在真是一个激动人心的时刻。我们每天处理大约 65 万桶原油。我们认为到今年年底我们会达到 75 万桶，并且我们看到了通往 120 万到 140 万桶的道路。

WARREN BUFFETT: When you think of the whole country producing 5 million barrels a day not long ago, that is a lot of oil.

沃伦·巴菲特：当你想到整个国家不久前每天生产 500 万桶石油，那是很多石油。

And of course, it isn’t just the Bakken. You know, the shale developments, they can open up a lot of things over time.

当然，这不仅仅是巴肯地区。你知道，页岩开发随着时间的推移可以开启很多机会。

29. Sorry to see Harley-Davidson notes expire

抱歉看到哈雷-戴维森的债券到期。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 7 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Charlie. My name is Bill Hennessy (PH) and I’m from Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

观众成员：早上好，沃伦和查理。我叫比尔·亨尼西（PH），来自威斯康星州密尔沃基。

I have a similar question. Back in 2009, you made a substantial investment in Harley-Davidson with the five-year term at 15 percent. I noticed that note comes due in 2014.

我有一个类似的问题。2009 年，你对哈雷-戴维森进行了大额投资，期限为五年，利率为 15%。我注意到那张票据将在 2014 年到期。

What are your plans or thoughts once that investment comes due?

一旦那笔投资到期，你有什么计划或想法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what we’d like to do is not answer the mail, and just let him keep paying his 15 percent, but that won’t happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想做的是不回复邮件，让他继续支付 15%的税，但这不会发生。

The — no, those were — we had a few private transactions during a period when the corporate bond market was basically frozen and received unusual terms, although the best terms those companies obviously could obtain at that time. And those deals are coming due, and I wish the five-year deals had been ten-year deals.

不，这些都是——在企业债券市场几乎冻结的时期，我们进行了几笔私下交易，获得了不寻常的条款，尽管这些公司在当时显然只能获得最好的条款，这些交易即将到期，我希望五年的交易能是十年的交易。

But, now those — that was a special time. And in effect, that’s a depleting asset that we have that’s left over from five years ago.

但现在这些——那是一个特殊的时期。实际上，那是我们五年前留下的一个递减资产。

We won’t see anything like that for a while, but we’ll see similar things at some point in the future.

我们不会在一段时间内看到类似的事情，但在未来的某个时刻我们会看到类似的事情。

I mean, the world is given to excesses, and they have consequences, and we are always willing to act.

我意思是，世界倾向于过度，而这些过度会带来后果，我们总是愿意采取行动。

I mean, we did not think Harley-Davidson was going to go broke. I mean, it was that simple.

我意思是，我们并不认为哈雷-戴维森会破产。我是说，就是这么简单。

You know, any kind of company that gets its customers to tattoo ads on their chest can’t be all bad, you know, I mean— (Laughter)

你知道，任何一种让顾客在胸前纹广告的公司都不可能完全是坏的，你知道，我的意思是——（笑声）

But it will be a sad day when the Harley-Davidson notes mature.

但当哈雷-戴维森的债券到期时，将是一个悲伤的日子。

30. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler’s stock-picking independence

Todd Combs 和 Ted Weschler 的选股独立性

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Andishi Tuzush (PH) who asks, “If Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, if they purchase stock in a company that you have reviewed before and did not believe to be a good investment, would you share your thoughts with them?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自安迪希·图祖什（菲律宾），他问：“如果托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒购买了你之前评估过但不认为是好投资的公司的股票，你会与他们分享你的想法吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: I would probably not know they were even buying it until, maybe, a month after they started.

沃伦·巴菲特：我可能在他们开始购买后大约一个月才会知道他们甚至在买它。

I do not — they do not check with me before they buy something.

我不——他们在买东西之前不会和我确认。

I gave them each another billion dollars on March 31st, and I do not know whether they’ve spent the billion or whether — which stocks they bought or—

我在 3 月 31 日又给了他们每人十亿美元，我不知道他们是否已经花掉了这笔钱，或者——他们买了哪些股票，或者——

Now, I will see it on portfolio sheets. I get them monthly, but they’re in charge of their investments.

现在，我将在投资组合表上查看它。我每月收到这些表格，但他们负责自己的投资。

They’ve got one or two things that they’re restricted on, in terms of— things that — for example, if we own a chunk of American Express, and under the Bank Holding Company law we would not be able to buy another share.

他们在某些方面受到了一些限制，例如，如果我们拥有美国运通的一部分股份，根据银行控股公司法，我们将无法再购买另一股。

So there’s a couple things like that — restrictions they have. But otherwise, they have no restrictions on what they buy.

所以他们有一些这样的限制。但除此之外，他们在购买方面没有任何限制。

They’ve bought things I wouldn’t buy. You know, I buy things they wouldn’t buy. That part of the investment process.

他们买了我不会买的东西。你知道，我买了他们不会买的东西。这是投资过程的一部分。

I do not tell them how much to diversify. They can put it all in one stock if they want to. They can put it in 50 stocks, although that’s not my style.

我不告诉他们应该多大程度上进行多样化。他们可以选择把所有资金投入一只股票，如果他们愿意的话。他们也可以投资于 50 只股票，尽管这不是我的风格。

They are managing money. And when I managed money, you know, I wanted to be a free agent.

他们在管理资金。当我管理资金时，你知道，我想要成为一个自由代理人。

If he wanted to give me — they could make the decision on whether they wanted to give me the money, but once they gave me the money, and I had the responsibility for managing it, I wanted free reign to do what I wanted. And I did not want to be held responsible for things with my hands tied.

如果他们想给我——他们可以决定是否想给我这笔钱，但一旦他们给了我这笔钱，并且我负责管理它，我就想要自由去做我想做的事情。我不想在受到限制的情况下被追究责任。

And that’s exactly the position we have with Todd and Ted now.

我们现在与托德和泰德的关系正是如此。

It takes a lot of — it’s an unusual person that we will give that kind of responsibility to. That’s not something that Charlie and I would do lightly at all.

这需要很大的——我们会把这种责任交给一个不寻常的人。这绝不是查理和我会轻易做的事情。

But we thought they deserved the trust when we hired them, and we believe that more than ever after watching them in action for a time.

但我们在雇用他们时认为他们值得信任，在观察他们一段时间后，我们更加相信这一点。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: What can I say in addition to that?

查理·芒格：我还能说些什么呢？

31. Why GEICO isn’t copying Progressive’s Snapshot

为什么 GEICO 不复制 Progressive 的 Snapshot

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Cliff?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。克利夫？

CLIFF GALLANT: Thank you. I wanted to ask a follow-up question about Snapshot at Progressive.

克利夫·加兰特：谢谢你。我想问一个关于 Progressive 的 Snapshot 的后续问题。

Now, I realize that GEICO’s first quarter numbers are very good, things are going very well at the company.

现在，我意识到 GEICO 第一季度的数字非常好，公司一切进展顺利。

But Progressive is claiming that the data is profound, that they’re getting from Snapshot. That they can give their best drivers 30 percent rate cuts, and those customers are still their most profitable customers.

但 Progressive 声称他们从 Snapshot 获得的数据是深刻的。他们可以给最优秀的司机提供 30%的费率折扣，而这些客户仍然是他们最盈利的客户。

We have a lot of GEICO policyholders here today. I’m sure they’re very good drivers.

今天我们这里有很多 GEICO 的保单持有者。我相信他们都是非常优秀的司机。

Why shouldn’t they go try Snapshot and try to save 30 percent or more? Why isn’t GEICO investing in what I think appears to be a credible underwriting tool and potential threat?

他们为什么不去尝试 Snapshot，看看能否节省 30%或更多？为什么 GEICO 不投资我认为看起来是一个可信的承保工具和潜在威胁的东西？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They — I don’t think — but obviously Progressive disagrees with us — but I don’t think their selection method is better than ours. And I would say that I might even feel that ours is a little bit better than theirs.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们——我不认为——显然Progressive不同意我们的看法——但我认为他们的选择方法并不比我们的好。

But every company has a different approach to it.

但每家公司对此都有不同的处理方式。

Peter Lewis, who runs Progressive, when he started the company— he told me this story himself. I mean, it was a tiny, tiny little company. It came out of a mutual company, as you know.

彼得·刘易斯，管理Progressive的人，当他创办公司的时候——他自己告诉我这个故事。我是说，那是一家非常小的公司。如你所知，它来自一家互助公司。

And he went in the motorcycle business. And the first guy that he insured— or the first loss, I think, that was reported— came from some guy that was redheaded, and he just decided not to insure any redheads for a while. (Laughter)

他进入了摩托车行业。他承保的第一个人——或者说我认为报告的第一个损失——是一个红头发的家伙，他决定暂时不承保任何红头发的人。（笑声）

That — you know—when you don’t have very much money, you can’t afford to experiment too long.

那——你知道——当你没有太多钱时，你不能花太长时间去实验。

Well, Peter learned that that was not a criteria, and he knew that, but he had fun telling the story.

好吧，彼得意识到这不是一个标准，他知道这一点，但他很乐于讲这个故事。

But all we’re trying to do— if I’m looking at all these people here and I’m going to issue them insurance policies for the next year, I’m going to charge different rates to different people.

但我们所要做的就是——如果我看着这里的所有人，并且我要为他们发放明年的保险单，我会对不同的人收取不同的费率。

And, if I’m going to sell them life insurance, I’m going to charge different rates to them. If I’m going to sell them health insurance, I’m going to charge different rates.

如果我要给他们卖人寿保险，我会收取不同的费率。如果我要给他们卖健康保险，我也会收取不同的费率。

There’s a different — there’s a different probability attached to each individual, based on a whole lot of variables.

每个人都有不同的概率，这取决于许多变量。

And Progressive — before Snapshot, they had a different selection approach than GEICO.

和 Progressive——在 Snapshot 之前，他们的选择方法与 GEICO 不同。

And like I say, ours has worked very well and we think it will continue to work well.

正如我所说，我们的系统运作得非常好，我们认为它将继续良好运作。

And we are obtaining, under our selection system, we are obtaining a hugely disproportionate number of new policyholders compared to the growth in the market, so our rates are attractive and our underwriting results are attractive.

在我们的选择系统下，我们获得的新保单持有人数量与市场增长相比极不成比例，所以我们的费率和承保结果都很有吸引力。

And we continue, always, to look for further ways, obviously, to refine the selection technique.

我们始终继续寻找进一步改进选择技术的方法。

But we don’t do any of it lightly because what we’re doing now is working very well.

但我们并不是轻率地做这些，因为我们现在所做的非常有效。

And I just invite you to compare the Progressive results with the GEICO results in the next two or three years, and I will — if we’re wrong — I will be here to freely admit that we were wrong, but I don’t think we will be.

我邀请你在接下来的两三年中将 Progressive 的结果与 GEICO 的结果进行比较，如果我们错了，我会在这里坦诚承认我们错了，但我认为我们不会错。

OK, station 8? 好的，8 号站？

Oh, Charlie, you want to add something?

哦，查理，你想补充些什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well now, obviously, we’re not going to immediately copy the oddball thing that every single competitor does in the world, particularly when we’ve got an operation that’s working so well.

查理·芒格：那么，显然，我们不会立即模仿世界上每一个竞争对手所做的奇怪事情，特别是当我们的业务运作得如此顺利时。

WARREN BUFFETT: If I were starting in the direct auto insurance business, I think I would attempt to copy GEICO.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我在直接汽车保险业务中起步，我想我会试图模仿 GEICO。

It wouldn’t work, but it would offer you the best chance, I think. It’s a remarkable system.

这可能不会成功，但我认为这会给你提供最佳机会。这是一个了不起的系统。

And Tony Nicely, you can’t give him enough credit. I mean — you know, we will — I hope we will — gain a million policies this year.

而托尼·尼克利，你无法给予他足够的赞誉。我的意思是——你知道，我们会——我希望我们会——在今年获得一百万份保单。

The entire industry, I don’t think, will gain more than a million-and-a-half. So we will probably get two-thirds — in my view — we’ll get two-thirds of all the growth and we’ll do it profitably, and we’ll save people a lot of money. So I think that’s quite a company.

整个行业，我认为不会超过一百五十万。因此，在我看来，我们可能会获得三分之二的增长，我们会以盈利的方式做到这一点，并为人们节省很多钱。所以我认为这是一家相当不错的公司。

相当明显的优势。

32. We rely on sugar and caffeine, not to-do lists

我们依赖糖和咖啡因，而不是待办事项清单。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。8 号站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Alex [Banayan], and I’m from Los Angeles.

观众成员：嗨，我的名字是亚历克斯（Banayan），我来自洛杉矶。

Mr. Buffett, I’ve heard that one of your ways of focusing your energy is that you write down the 25 things you want to achieve, choose the top 5, and then avoid the bottom 20.

巴菲特先生，我听说您集中精力的一种方法是写下您想要实现的 25 件事，选择前 5 件，然后避免关注后面的 20 件。

I’m really curious how you came up with this, and what other methods you have to prioritizing your desires?

我真的很好奇你是怎么想到这个的，还有你有什么其他方法来优先考虑你的愿望？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m actually more curious about how you came up with it, because — (laughter) — it really isn’t the case.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我其实更好奇你是怎么想到这个的，因为——（笑声）——这确实不是事实。

It sounds like a very good method of operating, but it’s much more disciplined than I actually am. (Laughter)

这听起来是一种非常好的操作方法，但实际上比我更有纪律。（笑声）

If they stick fudge down in front of me, I eat it, you know, I’m not thinking about 25 other choices. (Applause)

如果他们在我面前放下巧克力糖，我就会吃，您知道，我不会考虑其他 25 个选择。（掌声）

So I don’t mean to —you know, Charlie and I live very simple lives. We know what we do enjoy, and we now have the option of doing it, pretty much.

所以我并不想——你知道，查理和我过着非常简单的生活。我们知道自己喜欢什么，而且现在几乎都有机会去做。

Charlie likes to design buildings. I mean, he’s not—he’s no longer a frustrated architect — he’s a full-fledged architect now. And, you know — and we both like to read a lot.

查理喜欢设计建筑。我是说，他不再是一个沮丧的建筑师——他现在是一个完全合格的建筑师。而且，你知道——我们俩都喜欢读很多书。

But we — I’ve never made lists. I can’t recall making a list in my life, but maybe I’ll start.

但我们——我从来没有列过清单。我想不起来我一生中做过清单，但也许我会开始。

You’ve given me an idea. Thank you.

你给了我一个主意。谢谢你。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s really interesting on the subject of Warren’s operating methods, you can see happening here.

查理·芒格：嗯，关于沃伦的运营方法，实际上这里发生的事情非常有趣。

We didn’t know, when we started out, this modern psychological evidence to the effect that you shouldn’t make a lot of important decisions when you’re tired and that making a lot of difficult decisions is tiring.

我们在开始时并不知道现代心理学的证据表明，当你疲惫时不应该做很多重要决定，而做很多困难决定是令人疲惫的。

And we didn’t also know, as well as we now do, how helpful it is to be consuming caffeine and sugar when you’re making important decisions. (Laughter)

我们也不知道，像现在这样，摄入咖啡因和糖分在做重要决策时是多么有帮助。（笑声）

And what happens, of course, is that both Warren and I live entirely on autopilot, in terms of the ordinary decisions in life, which is totally habitual, so we don’t work — waste — any decision making industry — I mean energy — on that stuff, and we’re ingesting caffeine and sugar.

当然，发生的事情是沃伦和我在生活中的普通决策上完全处于自动驾驶状态，这完全是习惯性的，因此我们不在这些事情上浪费任何决策能量，我们正在摄入咖啡因和糖。

And, it turns out, under the modern evidence, this is an ideal way to sit where Warren sits. And he didn’t know that, he just stumbled into it. (Laughter)

而且，事实证明，根据现代证据，这是一种理想的坐姿，就像沃伦坐的那样。他并不知道这一点，他只是偶然发现的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: When we write our book on nutrition, it promises to be a huge seller. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：当我们写关于营养的书时，它肯定会成为畅销书。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I cannot remember an important decision that Warren has made when he was tired.

查理·芒格：我无法记起沃伦在疲惫时做出的任何重要决定。

He’s never tired. (Laughter)

他从来不累。（笑声）

He sleeps soundly, and he doesn’t waste time thinking about what he’s going to eat. As you say, he just eats what he’s always eaten.

他睡得很香，也不浪费时间考虑要吃什么。正如你所说，他只是吃他一直吃的东西。

You know, his style turns out to be absolutely ideal for human cognition. (Laughter)

你知道，他的风格对于人类认知来说是绝对理想的。（笑声）

It looks peculiar, but he stumbled into something very good.

看起来很奇怪，但他偶然发现了一些非常好的东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: You can write the forward to my next book. OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你可以为我的下一本书写序言。好的。（笑声）

33. Buffett defends buying newspaper companies

巴菲特为购买报纸公司辩护

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This following question comes from a shareholder who asked to remain anonymous.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：以下问题来自一位要求匿名的股东。

They write, “I’m from Omaha, and I’m thrilled you bought our newspaper as a local citizen, but not so much as an investor in Berkshire.

他们写道：“我来自奥马哈，作为一名当地公民，我很高兴你购买了我们的报纸，但作为伯克希尔的投资者就没那么高兴了。”

“I read your reasons for acquiring newspapers, but it still doesn’t make sense to me, economically, given the downward trends in the industry.

“我读了你关于收购报纸的理由，但从经济角度来看，考虑到行业的下行趋势，这仍然让我感到困惑。”

“Don’t you think there are other businesses with higher rates of return that you could buy?

“你不觉得还有其他回报率更高的生意可以投资吗？”

“Why would you buy such a small business, since you always say you want to buy elephants?

“你为什么要买这么小的生意，既然你总是说你想买大象？”

“Please quantify exactly what rate of return you expect from the newspapers.” (Scattered applause)

“请准确量化您期望从报纸中获得的回报率。”（零星掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that we will get a decent rate of return.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说我们会获得一个不错的回报率。

Whether it’s — most of them, incidentally, have been bought, and they were either S corporations or partnerships of some sort.

无论是——顺便提一下，大多数已经被收购，它们要么是 S 公司，要么是某种形式的合伙企业。

So they — compared to buying a Heinz, for example, or a BNSF or something of the sort — they actually have a certain structural advantage in terms of the eventual return after tax, because we get to write off the intangibles we’re purchasing.

所以他们——与购买亨氏、比如说，或者 BNSF 之类的相比——在税后最终回报方面实际上具有一定的结构优势，因为我们可以抵扣我们所购买的无形资产。

That affects the after-tax return, compared to the pretax return that would come from this.

这会影响税后收益，与此所带来的税前收益相比。

But I would say that our after-tax return, with declining earnings, which I expect, would be at least 10 percent after tax, but I think — and it could well be somewhat higher.

但我想说，考虑到我预期的收益下降，我们的税后回报至少会在 10％以上，但我认为——实际上可能会更高一些。

I think it’s very unlikely that it would be significantly lower.

我认为它显著降低的可能性非常小。

And everything we have seen to date, and it hasn’t been that long, but we have a number of papers now, would indicate that we will meet or beat the 10 percent.

到目前为止我们所看到的一切，虽然时间不长，但我们现在有很多论文，这表明我们将达到或超过 10%。

It doesn’t have — it’s not going to move the needle at Berkshire.

这不会对伯克希尔产生影响。

You know, the papers we have bought now, we’re probably getting close to maybe having 100 million of pretax earnings, a good bit of which is — fair amount of which — we get a favorable tax treatment on, because they were bought from S corporations.

你知道，我们现在购买的股票，可能接近有 1 亿的税前收益，其中相当一部分是因为我们从 S 公司购买的，所以我们享有有利的税收待遇。

You know, and 100 million is real money, but it doesn’t move the needle at Berkshire.

你知道，1 亿是真正的钱，但在伯克希尔并没有太大影响。

But it will end up being a very — I think it will be a perfectly decent return in relation to capital employed.

但我认为这将是一个非常——我认为这将是与投入资本相比，完全体面的回报。

Now, we wouldn’t have done it in any other business. I mean, there’s no question — the questioner is right about that.

现在，我们在其他任何行业都不会这样做。我的意思是，毫无疑问——提问者对此是正确的。

But, it doesn’t — you know — doesn’t require an extra ounce of effort by me or Charlie or people at headquarters. We will get a decent return and we like newspapers and —

但是，这并不——你知道——不需要我、查理或总部的人额外付出一点努力。我们会获得不错的回报，我们喜欢报纸——

Although, the one thing I’ll promise to do with you is I will be glad to give you figures, annually, as to how we are doing relative to investment.

尽管如此，我向你保证的一件事是，我很乐意每年向你提供我们在投资方面的表现数据。

We are buying the papers at very, very low prices compared to current earnings, and we must do that because the earnings will go down.

我们以非常非常低的价格购买这些股票，相比于当前的收益，我们必须这样做，因为收益会下降。

Now, the interesting thing is, of course, is that we see books from investment bankers on all kinds of businesses, and always the projected earnings go up in the book.

现在有趣的是，我们看到投资银行家关于各种业务的书籍，而书中总是预测收益会上升。

A lot of times they don’t — you know, in reality — they don’t go up. The difference is that we expect them to go down in the newspapers, and whatever the investment salesmen expect, they certainly don’t project that any business they sell will have declining earnings.

很多时候，它们并没有——你知道，实际上——并没有增长。而不同之处在于，我们预计报纸的收益会下降，而无论投资销售人员期望什么，他们肯定不会预测他们所销售的任何业务会有下降的收益。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think what you’re saying is that it’s an exception and you like doing it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为你所说的是这是一种例外，而你喜欢这样做。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I wish I hadn’t asked. (Laughter) OK.

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望我没有问。（笑声）好的。

34. Follow Teledyne CEO Henry Singleton’s lead

跟随Teledyne首席执行官亨利·辛格尔顿的领导

WARREN BUFFETT: Doug? Sort of a lead-in to you, Doug. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：道格？这算是给你铺垫，道格。（笑声）

DOUG KASS: Warren, in a previous answer to a question, you suggested, I think for the first time, that when you’re gone — and everyone here hopes that’s not for a very long time —

道格·卡斯：沃伦，在之前对一个问题的回答中，你第一次提到，当你离开时——这里的每个人都希望那不是很久之后——

WARREN BUFFETT: No one more than I. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：没有人比我更想要了。（笑声）

DOUG KASS: I thought you would say that —

道格·卡斯：我以为你会这么说——

You’re going to move — Berkshire will likely move — to a more centralized style, or approach, to management.

你们将要转变——伯克希尔可能会转向一种更集中化的管理风格或方法。

My question is, in the past you’ve demonstrated a great deal of respect for Dr. Henry Singleton, the founder and longtime CEO of the diversified conglomerate Teledyne.

我的问题是，过去你对亨利·辛格尔顿博士表现出了极大的尊重，他是多元化企业Teledyne的创始人和长期首席执行官。

You have written about Singleton, quote, “Henry is a manager that all investors, CEOs, would-be CEOs, and MBA students should study.

你写过关于Singleton的内容，引用：“亨利是所有投资者、首席执行官、准首席执行官和 MBA 学生应该研究的经理。”

“In the end, he was 100 percent rational, and there are very few CEOs about whom I can make that statement,” close quotes.

“最后，他是百分之百理性，我能这样说的首席执行官非常少。”

Prior to his death, he broke up Teledyne into three companies. Dr. Singleton told our mutual friend, Lee Cooperman, that he did it for several reasons.

在去世之前，他将 Teledyne 拆分为三家公司。辛格尔顿博士告诉我们的共同朋友李·库珀曼，他这样做是出于几个原因。

There was one reason in particular that Lee mentioned to me that I want to ask you about. According to Singleton, Teledyne was getting very hard to manage for one CEO.

李提到的一个特别原因我想问你。根据辛格尔顿的说法，Teledyne对于一个首席执行官来说变得非常难以管理。

What would you say about the Berkshire situation, given your company’s greater complexity, size, and the management issues that you faced in the last three years?

您会如何看待伯克希尔的情况，考虑到您公司的复杂性、规模以及您在过去三年中面临的管理问题？

And what is the advisability of restructuring Berkshire into separately-traded companies along business lines?

将伯克希尔重组为按业务线分开交易的公司，这样做的可行性如何？

WARREN BUFFETT: Berkshire, to me, seems about the easiest company to manage imaginable.

沃伦·巴菲特：对我来说，伯克希尔似乎是最容易管理的公司。

And if you took an earlier answer — and I understand why you did, that implied greater centralization after my death, there will be a tiny bit more, just in terms of the small companies. But I do not anticipate any change of any real significance.

如果你采纳了之前的回答——我理解你为什么这么做，那意味着在我去世后会有更大的集中化，尤其是在小公司方面会有一点点增加。但我不预期会有任何真正重要的变化。

Now, Charlie knew Henry Singleton, and I think it might be interesting for Charlie to give you his views on what Singleton did right and, eventually, wrong.

现在，查理认识亨利·辛格尔顿，我想让查理给你谈谈他对辛格尔顿做对和做错的事情的看法，可能会很有趣。

And, I’ll answer the last part of your question, though.

而且，我会回答你问题的最后一部分。

Breaking it up into several companies, I’m convinced, would produce a poorer result. Certainly now, and I believe in the future.

将其拆分成几家公司，我相信会产生更差的结果。现在如此，我相信未来也是如此。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Henry Singleton was a genius who could play chess blindfolded just below the grandmaster level and never got less than an 800 on any complicated math or physics exam.

查理·芒格：亨利·辛格尔顿是一位天才，他可以在盲棋状态下下棋，水平接近国际象棋大师，并且在任何复杂的数学或物理考试中从未得分低于 800。

And, I knew him. He lived in my community.

我认识他。他住在我的社区里。

But he started as a conglomerate where he was very interested in reporting higher earnings all the time so he could keep the daisy chain going. And when he managed it on the way down, he bought in the stock relentlessly and very logically, like a great chess player should.

但他最初是一家大型企业，他非常关注不断报告更高的收益，以便能够维持这个连锁反应。当他在下滑过程中管理时，他毫不留情且非常理性地回购股票，就像一位伟大的棋手应该做的那样。

And — but he managed those companies on a way more centralized basis than Berkshire has ever operated.

而且——但他以比伯克希尔以往任何时候都更集中化的方式管理那些公司。

And in the end, the great bulk of the enterprises, he wanted to sell to us. And by that time, he was ill and he really wanted to sell to us. And of course, he wanted Berkshire stock.

最后，他想把大部分企业卖给我们。到那时，他生病了，他真的想把它们卖给我们。当然，他还想要伯克希尔的股票。

And we basically said to him, “Henry, we love you and we’d love to buy your businesses, but we don’t want to issue Berkshire stock.”

我们基本上对他说：“亨利，我们爱你，我们很想收购你的公司，但我们不想发行伯克希尔的股票。”

So, I don’t think you should get the idea that just because he was a genius he did it better than we did.

所以，我认为你不应该认为仅仅因为他是个天才，他就比我们做得更好。

He did, in some ways, because he understood these very high-tech businesses, but —

他在某种程度上确实如此，因为他理解这些非常高科技的企业，但——

WARREN BUFFETT: He played the public markets way better. I mean, it—

沃伦·巴菲特：他在公共市场上表现得更好。我是说，这—

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re not interested in doing that, actually.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，我们对这样做不感兴趣。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we’re not.

查理·芒格：不，我们不是。

WARREN BUFFETT: And he was incredible in that, and he made a fortune for shareholders that stayed with him.

沃伦·巴菲特：他在这方面非常出色，为与他同行的股东赚取了巨额财富。

But he was — to some extent, he looked at the shareholder group as somebody to be taken advantage of, and he issued stock like crazy. I’ll bet he did at least 50 acquisitions where—

但在某种程度上，他把股东群体视为可以利用的对象，疯狂地发行股票。我敢打赌他至少进行了 50 次收购，其中——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: He wanted to use a very fancy price stock. He was playing the game of the ’60s, and we actually have never wanted to get in that game.

沃伦·巴菲特：他想用非常昂贵的股票。他在玩 60 年代的游戏，而我们实际上从来不想参与那个游戏。

I mean, he promoted the stock. And, you know, he had the Litton Industries background on it, and it was a game that worked wonderfully if you didn’t care about how it ended up.

我的意思是，他推销股票。你知道，他有利顿工业的背景，这是一场如果你不在乎结局如何，就能运作得非常好的游戏。

And so we have not played that game. He was — in terms of wanting to get Berkshire stock — you know, he essentially was going into the third stage—(laughs) — of first issuing shares at overprice, then buying it back very underpriced, and then he was going to —

所以我们没有玩那个游戏。他在想要获得伯克希尔股票方面，基本上进入了第三阶段——（笑）——首先以高价发行股票，然后以非常低价回购，然后他打算——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — sell it to us for more than it was worth.

查理·芒格：——以超过它价值的价格卖给我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, exactly.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was the wrong stock. But he was an enormously talented man and that cool rationality was to be admired.

查理·芒格：这是一只错误的股票。但他是一个极具才华的人，那种冷静的理性值得钦佩。

I like our system better. We’re more avuncular than Teledyne was.

我更喜欢我们的系统。我们比Teledyne更加亲切。

WARREN BUFFETT: Not the toughest test. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这不是最艰难的考验。（笑）

35. High health costs are hurting competitiveness

高昂的医疗成本正在损害竞争力

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。9 号站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Kelly Morrell (PH) from New York, and I have a question.

观众成员：嗨，我叫凯莉·莫雷尔（PH），来自纽约，我有一个问题。

You’ve been both very outspoken on corporate and personal tax rates, as well as the trade deficit.

您对企业和个人税率以及贸易赤字都非常直言不讳。

And I’m wondering if you can elaborate on what the top two or three things you think both business leaders and policy makers should be focused on to preserve U.S. competitiveness?

我想知道您能否详细说明一下您认为商业领袖和政策制定者应该关注的两到三件事，以保持美国的竞争力？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say health care costs would be a big item.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说医疗保健成本将是一个大项。

We’re spending — we’re a country that’s spending, we’ll say — you get different figures — but call it 17 1/2 percent or so of GDP. And most of our rivals in the world are paying anywhere from, probably, 9 1/2 to, maybe, 11 1/2, or thereabouts.

我们花费——我们是一个国家，花费，我们可以说——你会看到不同的数字——但大约是GDP的17.5%。而我们世界上的大多数竞争对手支付的费用大约在 9.5%到 11.5%之间。

So, you know, there are only 100 cents in the dollar, and if you give up 6 or 7 or 8 points of that dollar, I mean, it’s just like having a raw material that costs you more, or something of the sort.

所以，你知道，1 美元只有 100 美分，如果你放弃了 6、7 或 8 美分，我的意思是，这就像拥有一种成本更高的原材料，或者类似的东西。

So, that will be a major problem in American competitiveness. It is right now, and it will — all signs point to the fact that it will become more so.

所以，这将是美国竞争力的一个主要问题。现在就是这样，所有迹象都表明，这种情况将会更加严重。

And it doesn’t relate to the Medicare problem, which is a huge problem, obviously, but the real problem is health care costs, whether it’s in the private system or whatever payer system you have.

这与医疗保险问题无关，显然这是一个巨大的问题，但真正的问题是医疗费用，无论是在私营系统中还是在任何支付系统中。

We have a big, big disadvantage in cost versus the rest of the world.

我们在成本方面与世界其他地方相比有一个很大的劣势。

People used to talk about how General Motors had $1500 a car in health care costs that Toyota didn’t have. Well, if they had $1500 a car disadvantage in steel costs, I mean, you know, the management would be focused on that.

人们曾经谈论通用汽车每辆车在医疗成本上有 1500 美元的劣势，而丰田没有。好吧，如果他们在钢铁成本上有每辆车 1500 美元的劣势，我是说，管理层肯定会关注这个问题。

If they had $150 — if they had $15 — difference in steel costs, but health care costs, which are sort of beyond the control of any one company, promise to be a huge competitive disadvantage.

如果他们有 150 美元——如果他们有 15 美元——钢铁成本的差异，但医疗保健成本在某种程度上超出了任何一家公司控制的范围，这将成为巨大的竞争劣势。

Overall, though, incidentally, I mean, the United States — since the crisis of 2008 — we have done very well, compared to most countries, and our system works.

总体而言，顺便说一下，我是说，自 2008 年危机以来，美国的表现相较于大多数国家非常好，我们的系统运作良好。

But if you asked me the number one problem for American business, I would say it’s that health care cost disadvantage.

但如果你问我美国商业面临的头号问题是什么，我会说是医疗成本劣势。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would add that I don’t think it does our competitiveness any good to have this grossly swollen securities and derivative market — markets. (Scattered applause)

查理·芒格：我想补充一点，我认为拥有这个严重膨胀的证券和衍生品市场对我们的竞争力没有任何好处。（零星的掌声）

And the young men from Caltech and MIT going into high finance and derivative trading, and so on, I think this is a perfectly crazy outcome in terms of its effect on the country.

来自加州理工学院和麻省理工学院的年轻人进入金融和衍生品交易等领域，我认为这对国家的影响是一个完全疯狂的结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: Anything further? (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：还有其他问题吗？（零星的掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you about the health care, but I find the other more revolting.

查理·芒格：我同意你关于医疗保健的看法，但我觉得其他的更令人厌恶。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s very Old Testament. And he’s right.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理非常像旧约。他是对的。

36. Obamacare’s effect on Berkshire?

奥巴马医保对伯克希尔的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question picks up, indeed, from where you were on the previous answer. It’s from John Sealme (PH).

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题确实是从你之前的回答中延续下来的。它来自约翰·西尔梅（PH）。

“I have never heard or read whether all of Berkshire’s nearly 300,000 employees are currently receiving health benefits.

我从未听说或阅读过伯克希尔近 30 万名员工是否目前都在享受健康福利。

“If all employees today are not receiving benefits, has Berkshire quantified the cost of complying with the Affordable Care Act? And if so, what will be the costs be?

“如果今天所有员工都没有享受福利，伯克希尔是否量化了遵守《平价医疗法案》的成本？如果是的话，成本将是多少？”

“In other words, how is the Affordable Care Act going to affect Berkshire?”

换句话说，平价医疗法案将如何影响伯克希尔？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t know the answer to that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不知道这个问题的答案。

The— I’m virtually certain that — you know, we’ve got 70-plus subsidiaries, some of which — one of which — has over 100 itself.

我几乎可以肯定，你知道我们有 70 多家子公司，其中有一家子公司本身就有超过 100 家。

So, very hard to speak totally categorically. But to my knowledge, I don’t know of any units that don’t have health care benefits.

所以，很难完全明确地说。但据我所知，我不知道有任何单位没有医疗福利。

But like I say, I mean, we just bought 27 or 28 daily newspapers, some of them are very small, so I can’t really speak to every single unit.

但是就像我说的，我们刚买了 27 或 28 份日报，其中一些非常小，所以我不能真的对每一个单位都发表意见。

But health care costs are a huge cost for us. We’re actually going to do — we do very few things with, as you know, on a centralized basis — but that is something where all of our companies will try to learn what’s in store for them and try to figure out some answers.

但是医疗保健成本对我们来说是一个巨大的开支。正如你所知道的，我们实际上很少以集中方式做事情——但这是我们所有公司都会努力了解未来的情况并试图找到一些答案的领域。

But we have not yet — we have not assessed in any way — put together — the kind of figures that that question calls for.

但我们还没有——我们没有以任何方式评估——整理出——那个问题所需要的那种数据。

We spent a lot of money, obviously, I mean, to get up to the kind of numbers that are coming through on health care costs.

我们花了很多钱，显然，我是说，为了达到医疗费用上出现的那种数字。

I see them at some of our — a few of our — individual units, as I look at their monthly reports. I will see costs rising 10 or 12 percent.

我在我们的一些——少数几个——个别单位的月度报告中看到他们。我会看到成本上升 10%或 12%。

And what happens in 2014, I don’t know.

2014 年会发生什么，我不知道。

But the same thing will be happening to our competitors, and we will try to figure out what makes the most sense at that time.

但我们的竞争对手也会面临同样的情况，我们会尽力找出在那时最合理的做法。

And our individual managers are already working, particularly the larger units, are spending a lot of time on that.

我们的各个经理已经在努力工作，特别是较大的单位，花费了很多时间在这方面。

But it’s not something we try to control out of headquarters.

但这不是我们试图从总部控制的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s a — we really don’t want to try and control it out of headquarters. We like that kind of decision being made near the firing line.

查理·芒格：是的，我们真的不想从总部来控制它。我们喜欢这种决策在前线附近做出。

37. Future of rooftop solar power

未来的屋顶太阳能发电

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Here’s a question for Charlie on a subject which I consider him an expert on, and I hope I don’t prove my ignorance by asking the question.

乔纳森·布兰特：我有一个问题想问查理，关于我认为他是专家的一个话题，我希望我问这个问题不会暴露我的无知。

The question is about capital spending plans at your regulated utilities and a potential long-term risk to realizing returns on current and future capacity.

问题是关于您监管的公用事业的资本支出计划，以及实现当前和未来产能回报的潜在长期风险。

With the ongoing reduction in the cost of solar panels causing more utility customers to, at least, consider generating electricity from their own rooftops, some worry about a vicious circle of customers reducing their dependence on the grid, forcing utilities to raise rates, to maintain returns on the remaining customers who, in turn, are then incentivized to reduce their dependence on the grid, or even exit it.

随着太阳能电池板成本的持续降低，越来越多的公用事业客户开始考虑从自家屋顶发电，一些人担心客户减少对电网的依赖会形成恶性循环，迫使公用事业公司提高费率，以维持对剩余客户的回报，而这些客户又会因此受到激励，进一步减少对电网的依赖，甚至退出电网。

I understand the risks are greatest to regulated utilities in sunny places like Arizona and California, but given how much solar power is generated in cloudy places like Germany, are regulated utilities in Iowa, the Pacific Northwest, the Rocky Mountains, and the UK really immune?

我理解在亚利桑那州和加利福尼亚州等阳光充足的地方，受监管的公用事业面临的风险最大，但考虑到德国等多云地区产生的太阳能如此之多，爱荷华州、太平洋西北地区、落基山脉和英国的受监管公用事业真的免疫吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my answer would be I don’t think anybody really knows exactly how this is going to play out.

查理·芒格：嗯，我的回答是，我认为没有人真正知道这将如何发展。

I confidently predict there will be more solar generation in deserts than there is going to be on rooftops in cloudy places — (laughter) — and there’s a good reason for that.

我自信地预测，沙漠中的太阳能发电将会比多云地区的屋顶发电更多——（笑声）——这有很好的理由。

And Berkshire’s big operations, as you — in solar — are in what amounts to desert.

而伯克希尔的大型业务，正如您在太阳能领域所看到的，实际上是在沙漠中。

And we get very favorable terms and incentives, and I think Berkshire’s going to do fine in solar.

我们获得了非常有利的条款和激励，我认为伯克希尔在太阳能方面会表现良好。

I am skeptical, myself, about trying to run the utilities of the world from a bunch of little, tiny rooftops. I suspect there’s some twaddle in that — and some fancy salesmanship in that arena.

我对试图从一堆小小的屋顶上运营世界的公用事业持怀疑态度。我怀疑其中有一些废话——以及在这个领域中的一些花哨的推销手法。

And of course, the people that did it early were foolish because the price came down rapidly thereafter. So put me down as not totally charmed by rooftops in cloudy areas.

当然，早期这样做的人是愚蠢的，因为之后价格迅速下跌。所以请把我算作对多云地区的屋顶并不完全着迷。

WARREN BUFFETT: We have Greg Abel here from MidAmerican Energy. If we can direct a spotlight down there, Greg can probably speak to this with a lot more intelligence than Charlie and I. I noticed that —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们这里有来自中美能源的格雷格·阿贝尔。如果我们能把聚光灯照向那边，格雷格可能比查理和我更有智慧地谈论这个。我注意到——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: I noticed that—I noticed that Jonathan left me out of the thing entirely when he wanted to get an intelligent answer, but I’m not taking any offense at that. Greg?

沃伦·巴菲特：我注意到——我注意到乔纳森在想要得到一个聪明的答案时完全把我排除在外，但我对此并不感到冒犯。格雷格？

GREG ABEL: Sure. Happy to touch on it.

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然。很高兴谈谈这个。

Jonathan, I would touch on the fact you’re absolutely right. We’re seeing, when it comes to rooftop solar, a decline in the total cost of installing them.

乔纳森，我想提到你说得完全正确。我们看到，关于屋顶太阳能，安装它们的总成本正在下降。

At the same time, when you compare it to a regional tariff, or a specific tariff in most of those states, the utility is extremely still competitive.

与此同时，当你将其与大多数州的区域电价或特定电价进行比较时，公用事业仍然极具竞争力。

And I would highlight that as you see more rooftops coming on, you’ll see a restructuring of the tariffs, but at the same time, there’s a lot of protection for the utilities.

我想强调的是，随着更多屋顶的出现，你会看到电价的重组，但同时也有很多保护措施为公用事业提供保障。

So in the regions we’re supplying power, we will see some introduction of solar, but we’re absolutely comfortable our systems for the long-term are valuable both to our customers and to our shareholders — Berkshire shareholders — for the long term. Thanks.

所以在我们供电的地区，我们会看到一些太阳能的引入，但我们绝对相信我们的系统在长期内对我们的客户和我们的股东——伯克希尔的股东——都是有价值的。谢谢。

38. Luck, timing, and success

运气、时机与成功

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Marc Marzotto, Toronto, Canada.

观众成员：谢谢。马克·马尔佐托，加拿大多伦多。

Bill Gross made recent comments that his generation of investors, yourselves included, owed a deal of their success to timing.

比尔·格罗斯最近评论说，他这一代投资者，包括你们在内，成功在很大程度上归功于时机。

Do you agree with Bill’s comment, and do you think a similar opportunity will provide itself to today’s investors? Thank you.

你同意比尔的评论吗？你认为今天的投资者会有类似的机会吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s no question that being born in the United States was a huge, huge, huge advantage to me, and as I’ve pointed out in a recent article, being born male was a big advantage.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，毫无疑问，出生在美国对我来说是一个巨大的、巨大的、巨大的优势，正如我在最近的一篇文章中指出的，出生为男性也是一个很大的优势。

I would not have had the same opportunities in the investment, or in the business world, remotely, that I’ve had if I’d been a female born in 1930.

如果我在 1930 年出生为女性，我在投资或商业世界中根本不会有同样的机会。

And the timing could have been a little better. Actually, my dad was a security salesman and, you know, I was conceived in November, 1929. And if you remember, the stocks had gone down dramatically at that time.

时机本可以稍微好一些。实际上，我父亲是一名证券销售员，你知道，我是在1929年11月怀上的。如果你记得，当时股市大幅下跌。

There really wasn’t anybody to call on, for my dad, and there wasn’t any television at home or anything. So here I am, you know. (Laughter)

我父亲真的没有人可以找，也没有电视或其他什么。所以，我就这样来了。（笑声）

So I feel myself very lucky that the crash of 1929 came along.

所以我觉得自己非常幸运，1929 年的崩溃发生了。

And that also provided a decade, more than a decade, of people who were very turned off. Well, it was a decade of terrible business for quite a while, and then a decade of — more of people that were turned off on stocks, just as we sort of had a decade like that in the past decade going up to 2010 or so, people that — a lot of people — that had gotten turned off by stocks.

这也导致了十年，超过十年的时间，人们非常失望。嗯，这段时间的商业状况非常糟糕，接着又是一个让更多人对股票失去兴趣的十年，就像我们在过去十年中经历的那样，一直到 2010 年左右，很多人对股票感到失望。

So that was a favorable environment. But the United States itself was an incredibly favorable environment. If I’d been born five years earlier, I probably would have made more money. But if I’d been born 10 or 15 years later, I would’ve made, probably, less money.

所以那是一个有利的环境。但美国本身就是一个极其有利的环境。如果我早出生五年，我可能会赚更多的钱。但如果我晚出生 10 年或 15 年，我可能会赚得更少。

But, it— I envy the baby that’s being born today in the United States. I mean, I think, on a probability basis, that’s the luckiest individual that’s ever been born.

但是，我——我羡慕今天在美国出生的婴儿。我的意思是，从概率的角度来看，那是有史以来最幸运的个体。

And I think that they will do very well in life in all kinds of ways, on a probability basis, better than existed when I was born.

我认为他们在生活中会以各种方式做得很好，从概率上看，比我出生时的情况要好。

And I think they’ll have opportunities to do very well in the investment field.

我认为他们在投资领域会有很好的机会。

It may not be as good a field as it was for me starting in 19-, say, ’50, ’51 or thereabouts, but it will be a very good field to operate in.

这可能不像我在 19-，比如说 50、51 年左右开始时那样好，但这将是一个非常好的领域。

The person that has a passion for investing, born today, coming of age 20 years from now, is likely, in my view, to do very well, and to live far better than we live today, just as we live far better than John D. Rockefeller lived many years ago.

对投资充满热情的人，今天出生，20 年后成年，在我看来，很可能会做得很好，生活得比我们今天好得多，就像我们生活得比许多年前的约翰·D·洛克菲勒好得多一样。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the competition was very weak in your early days, and I don’t think the competition is as weak now.

查理·芒格：嗯，早期的竞争非常弱，我认为现在的竞争没有那么弱。

So I think, sure, we got advantages from timing. And I don’t think that means there’s nothing to be done ahead.

所以我认为，当然，我们从时机中获得了优势。但我并不认为这意味着前面就没有可以做的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: But Charlie, in 2008 and ’9, there were all kinds of high IQ —

沃伦·巴菲特：但是查理，在 2008 年和 2009 年，有各种各样的高智商——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — highly experienced, investment professionals, I mean, thousands and thousands and thousands of them.

沃伦·巴菲特：——经验丰富的投资专业人士，我的意思是，成千上万的他们。

And you invested at the Daily Journal Company in some equities at X that are worth, what, three X or four X now, or something like that?

而你在《每日新闻报》投资了一些股票，X现在值什么，三倍或四倍，还是其他什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s right.

查理·芒格：没错。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I call that opportunity, but it may be routine to him. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我称之为机会，但对他来说这可能是常规的事。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But I sat for a lot of years before I did it.

查理·芒格：但我坐了很多年才做到这一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: But it still became available.

沃伦·巴菲特：但机会还是出现了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, yes. But you were drowning in opportunities when I first knew you. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：哦，是的。但我第一次认识你时，你正沉浸在机会中。（笑声）

You were waiting for —

你在等待——

WARREN BUFFETT: I wasn’t drowning in money, unfortunately. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不幸的是，我并没有沉浸在金钱中。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, what you lacked was money.

查理·芒格：不，你缺少的是钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, now we’ve got money and no ideas.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。现在我们有钱但没有想法。

39. You have to like what you’re doing

你必须喜欢你正在做的事情

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station—(Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站——（笑声）

Station 10? Station 10? Do we have a Station 10? Let’s take a look. It should be right over there.

站点 10？站点 10？我们有站点 10 吗？让我们看看。它应该就在那边。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. 观众：你好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dexter Ang (PH). I’m from Stafford, Virginia.

观众成员：我的名字是德克斯特·昂（PH）。我来自弗吉尼亚州的斯塔福德。

I’m 30 years old, and I’m wondering what my life will be like in a few years, let alone 50 years from now.

我 30 岁了，我在想几年后我的生活会是什么样子，更不用说 50 年后的生活了。

My question for both Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger is: how do you think you’ve changed over the last 50 years?

我对巴菲特先生和芒格先生的问题是：你们认为在过去的 50 年里自己发生了怎样的变化？

And if you could communicate to yourself 50 years ago, what would you tell them, one piece of advice, business or personal, and how would you do it in a way where your former self would actually heed it? (Laughter)

如果你能和 50 年前的自己沟通，你会给他们什么建议，无论是商业上的还是个人的，你会如何做到让过去的自己真正听进去？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I’ll let you answer that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我让你来回答这个。（笑声）

Incidentally, I’ll trade you places, so don’t worry about your future.

顺便说一下，我会和你交换位置，所以不用担心你的未来。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we’re basically so old-fashioned that we’re boringly trite.

查理·芒格：是的，我们基本上是如此老派，以至于显得无聊而陈腐。

We think you ought to keep plugging along and stay rational and stay energetic and just all the old virtues still work, and—

我们认为你应该继续努力，保持理智，保持精力充沛，所有的老美德依然有效，——

WARREN BUFFETT: But find what turns you on.

沃伦·巴菲特：但要找到让你兴奋的事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’ve got to work where you’re turned on.

查理·芒格：你必须在让你感到兴奋的地方工作。

I don’t know about Warren, but I have never succeeded to any great extent in something I didn’t like doing.

我不知道沃伦怎么样，但我从来没有在我不喜欢做的事情上取得过什么大的成功。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I both started in the same grocery store, and neither one of us are in the grocery business. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我都是从同一家杂货店开始的，但我们俩都不在杂货行业。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We were not going to be promoted, either, and even though you had the family name.

查理·芒格：我们也不会被提拔，即使你有这个家族的名字。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

My grandfather was right, too. (Laughs)

我祖父也是对的。（笑）

It’s really — I mean, if you’re lucky, and Charlie and I were lucky in this respect. We — well, we were lucky to be in this country to start with — but we found things we like to do very early in life, and then we, you know, we pushed very hard in doing those things, but we were enjoying it while we did it.

这真的——我的意思是，如果你幸运的话，查理和我在这方面是幸运的。我们——好吧，我们一开始就很幸运能在这个国家——但我们很早就找到了喜欢做的事情，然后我们，你知道，我们在做这些事情时非常努力，但我们在做的时候也很享受。

We have had so much fun running Berkshire, I mean, it’s almost sinful.

我们在经营伯克希尔时玩得非常开心，我的意思是，这简直有些罪恶。

But, we were lucky to — you know, my dad happened to be in a business that he didn’t find very interesting but I found very interesting.

但是，我们很幸运——你知道，我爸爸恰好从事一项他觉得不太有趣的生意，但我觉得非常有趣。

And so when I would go down on Saturday, there were a lot of books to read, and, you know, it just flowed from a very early age. And Charlie found — he found —

所以当我在星期六下去的时候，有很多书可以读，你知道，这从很小的时候就自然而然地流淌出来。查理发现——他发现——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We found a way to atone by your — for your — sins in having so much fun. You’re giving all the money back.

查理·芒格：我们找到了一种方式来弥补你们在享受乐趣时所犯的罪过。你们要把所有的钱都还回去。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but you give it all back whether you want to or not, in the end.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但无论你想不想，最终你都会把所有的一切都还回去。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s true, too. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这也是真的。（笑声）

40. Rational insurance pricing

理性的保险定价

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Laurence Endersen in Dublin, Ireland.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自爱尔兰都柏林的劳伦斯·恩德森。

And he asks, “What factors have enabled Berkshire’s insurance pricing policy to stay so rational while also being a very sizable market participant?”

他问：“是什么因素使得伯克希尔的保险定价政策在作为一个非常大的市场参与者的同时，仍然保持如此理性？”

WARREN BUFFETT: In insurance, was that the —

沃伦·巴菲特：在保险方面，那是——

BECKY QUICK: In insurance, yeah.

贝基·奎克：在保险方面，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I would say this: I really do think that Berkshire is an unusually rational place.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想说的是：我真的认为伯克希尔是一个异常理性的地方。

I mean, we know what we want to accomplish. We’ve had the benefit of a very, very long run, and we’ve had the benefit of a — you can argue whether it was a benefit or not — but of controlling shareholders, so we did not have outside influences that pushed us in directions that we didn’t want to go.

我的意思是，我们知道我们想要实现什么。我们享受了非常非常长的时间的好处，我们也享受了一个——你可以争论这是否是好处——但我们有控股股东的好处，因此我们没有外部影响迫使我们朝着我们不想走的方向前进。

So, you know, insurance should be conducted as a rational activity. And one of the problems that some insurers have had is that they would have a pressure for increasing premium volume every year, brought upon by Wall Street, you know— very few—

所以，你知道，保险应该作为一种理性活动进行。一些保险公司面临的问题之一是，他们每年都受到华尔街的压力，要求增加保费收入，你知道——很少有——

We actually contracted the business written by National Indemnity, formerly our main business, its traditional business, I think we contracted it, probably, by 80 percent or something of the sort when the business became less attractive.

我们实际上承接了国家赔偿公司所承保的业务，这曾是我们的主要业务，传统业务。我认为当这项业务变得不那么有吸引力时，我们大约承接了 80%左右的业务。

I’m not sure any manager of a public company that was answering to quarterly earnings calls and that sort of thing, I’m not sure whether they could’ve really stood up to the kind of pressure that they would receive if they followed a similar policy.

我不确定任何一家上市公司的经理在回答季度收益电话会议等问题时，是否能够真正承受如果他们采取类似政策所面临的压力。

We have no — if we do something stupid, it’s because we did something stupid. It’s not — no external factors are pressing on us. And that’s a great way to operate, and it’ll continue to be the way we operate.

我们没有——如果我们做了愚蠢的事情，那是因为我们做了愚蠢的事情。没有——没有外部因素在施压我们。这是一种很好的运作方式，并且将继续是我们运作的方式。

Most people, if you own a half of 1 percent of the company or less, you know, and other people are doing things that Wall Street is applauding and you’re not doing them, it could be very hard to resist.

大多数人，如果你拥有公司 0.5%或更少的股份，你知道，其他人正在做一些华尔街赞赏的事情，而你没有做，那可能很难抵抗。

And you know, you respond to media criticism and all kinds of things that—

你知道，你会对媒体批评和各种事情作出回应——

We don’t have — we don’t have to do it. And there’s no reason for us to do anything stupid in insurance.

我们不必这样做。我们没有理由在保险方面做任何愚蠢的事情。

You get offered a lot of opportunities to do things that are stupid. We were major writers of catastrophe — natural catastrophe — insurance in the United States some years ago when the prices were right.

你会得到很多做愚蠢事情的机会。几年前，当价格合适时，我们是美国自然灾害保险的主要撰写者。

We don’t think the prices are right now, so we don’t write it. We haven’t left the market, the market left us, and — but we are not about to do something where we get paid 90 cents for running the — running a probabilistic loss of a dollar.

我们认为现在的价格不合适，所以我们不写。我们没有离开市场，是市场抛弃了我们——但我们不会做一些让我们以 90 美分的价格来承担1美元的损失概率的事情。

It just doesn’t make any sense and we won’t do it. And we don’t put any pressure on anybody to do it, and their incomes are not dependent on doing it. So it’s not hard to be rational at Berkshire.

这完全没有意义，我们不会这样做。我们也不会对任何人施加压力去做这件事，他们的收入也不依赖于此。因此，在伯克希尔保持理性并不困难。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There are pressures on other people that we don’t want and therefore don’t have.

查理·芒格：是的。其他人面临的压力是我们不想要的，因此我们也没有。

It is very hard to shrink an insurance operation by 80 percent when the people who come in every day don’t have enough to do, and it’s just — it’s a counter-intuitive thing to do.

在每天进来的人没有足够的事情可做时，很难将一个保险业务收缩80%。这真的是——这是一个违反直觉的做法。

But it’s absolutely required that you do it in a place where people go as crazy as they do in insurance.

但在保险这样疯狂的地方，绝对有必要这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s like buying Internet stocks, you know, in the late 1990s. I mean, the — all around you, you have these people that have high IQs and they’re doing it and they’re being successful in it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这就像在 1990 年代末购买互联网股票。我的意思是，周围有很多高智商的人，他们在做这件事，并且取得了成功。

So, you know, everybody from your, you know, your spouse to your employer to the press says, you know, “How come all these other — how come you think you’re so smart, you know, avoiding this when everybody else is doing it and they’re making a lot of money?”

所以，你知道，从你的配偶到你的雇主再到媒体，大家都在问：“为什么你觉得自己这么聪明，能够避免这个，而其他人都在做这个，并且赚了很多钱？”

And, of course, it creates this social proof where it works for a while.

当然，这会产生一种社会证明，最初是有效的。

That’s the great danger period in all of these bubbles, is that what starts out with skepticism ends up with your neighbor getting richer than you are because he went along and you didn’t.

这就是所有这些泡沫中的巨大危险期，最开始的怀疑最终会导致你的邻居比你更富有，因为他顺应潮流而你却没有。

And that sort of thing — the bandwagon effect and everything — those things are very hard to resist.

这种事情——从众效应等等——这些东西是非常难以抵抗的。

But we don’t have any pressures to do that sort of thing. I mean, we just don’t give a damn, you know, and if —

但我们没有任何压力去做那种事情。我的意思是，我们根本不在乎，你知道，如果——

We don’t necessarily think we’re smarter than the other person on that. We just think we don’t understand what it’s all about.

我们并不一定认为自己在这方面比其他人聪明。我们只是觉得我们不理解这到底是怎么回事。

And if they can make a lot of money, you know, day trading or whatever it may be, you know, good luck to them. But we’re not envious of them, but we certainly are not going to do it just because they’re doing it.

如果他们能通过日间交易或其他方式赚很多钱，那就祝他们好运。但我们并不羡慕他们，我们当然不会因为他们在做这件事就去做。

Charlie, any more on that?

查理，还有更多关于那个的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I always say there’s a reason why all that stuff is in the Bible. You can’t covet your neighbor’s ass or — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：哦，我总是说，这些东西在《圣经》中有其原因。你不能贪恋邻居的东西——（笑声）

I mean, they were having trouble with envy a long time ago. And it’s a perfectly terrible thing to do, and how much fun can you have being envious?

我意思是，他们很久以前就对嫉妒感到困扰。这是一件非常糟糕的事情，嫉妒能带来多少乐趣呢？

We always say it’s the one sin there’s no fun in.

我们总是说这是一个没有乐趣的罪。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

Gluttony is a lot of fun. (Laughs)

暴食是非常有趣的。（笑）

Lust has its place, too, but we won’t get into that.

欲望也有其存在的意义，但我们不打算深入讨论这个。

41. “Dumb” competition from hedge funds in reinsurance

对冲基金在再保险领域的“愚蠢”竞争

WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫？（笑声）

CLIFF GALLANT: We can follow that up. (Laughter)

克利夫·加朗特：我们可以继续这个话题。（笑声）

Reinsurance pricing is expected to be down at midyear renewals this year, despite the fact that we’ve had a lot catastrophes in recent years.

再保险定价预计在今年的年中续保时会下降，尽管近年来我们经历了许多灾难。

The finger is being pointed towards alternative capital entering the market, new capacity entering the market.

人们指责是替代资本进入市场，新的产能进入市场。

How concerned are you about this new capacity, and, you know, what is the likelihood that cheap reinsurance pricing soon leads to cheaper primary commercial pricing?

对于这种新产能，你有多担忧？你认为便宜的再保险定价很快会导致更便宜的主要商业定价的可能性有多大？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We hate dumb competition, and hedge fund — managed money, but particularly hedge funds — have entered the insurance, and more particularly, probably, the reinsurance business, quite aggressively in the last few years.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们讨厌愚蠢的竞争，尤其是对冲基金——管理资金，但特别是对冲基金——在过去几年中相当积极地进入了保险，尤其是再保险业务。

For one thing, it gives them a chance to have a beard, in effect, to operate in Bermuda or someplace where the tax rates are low and where they defer their own income from U.S. income taxes for a long time, and it’s a perfectly respectable beard.

首先，这给他们一个留胡子的机会，实际上是在百慕大或其他税率较低的地方运营，并且可以将他们自己的收入从美国所得税中延迟很长时间，这是一种完全可以接受的掩饰。

And it can be sold to investors. And people talk about it, you know, being an uncorrelated type of operation and all of that. Anything Wall Street can sell, it will sell. I mean, you can count on that. And —

它可以被出售给投资者。人们谈论它，你知道，这是一种不相关的操作等等。华尔街能卖的东西，它都会卖。我是说，你可以相信这一点。还有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: They like big words, too.

查理·芒格：他们也喜欢大词。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And it’s very salable now, and the money will flow in and the money will — may — bring down prices, it may do stupid things in reinsurance, but that’s happened before.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。现在它非常畅销，资金将会流入，资金可能会——可能——压低价格，可能会在再保险方面做出愚蠢的事情，但这以前也发生过。

And in the end, you know, we know what we’re willing to do, we know what we think the prices should be, and we will do insurance business where we think that the odds favor us earning an underwriting profit. And if we can’t do it, we’ll watch for a while.

最后，你知道，我们知道我们愿意做什么，我们知道我们认为价格应该是多少，我们会在我们认为有利于我们获得承保利润的地方做保险业务。如果我们做不到，我们会观察一段时间。

You can’t afford, you know, to go along with the crowd in investment, insurance, or a whole lot of other things.

你知道，在投资、保险或其他很多事情上，你不能随波逐流。

And it can be irritating to have a dumb competitor. I mean, if you’ve got a service station on the corner and you’ve got a guy across the street that is willing to sell gas below cost, you know, you’ve got a terrible problem. That’s why I got out of the gas station business a long time ago.

这可能会让人感到恼火，尤其是有一个愚蠢的竞争对手。我的意思是，如果你在街角有一个加油站，而对面有一个愿意以低于成本的价格卖油的人，你知道，这会是个大问题。这就是我很久以前退出加油站生意的原因。

But insurance, it’s — nice thing about it is— the standby costs are not huge, so it’s not like idling steel plants or something.

但保险的好处是，待机成本并不高，所以并不像闲置的钢铁厂那样。

还有航空公司。

So we were perfectly willing in the 1980s to have our expense ratio go up significantly because our volume went down so dramatically.

因此，在1980年代，我们完全愿意让我们的费用比例显著上升，因为我们的业务量急剧下降。

And, you know, it was a standby cost that was real, but it wasn’t back breaking, and we just waited for better days, and they came along.

而且，你知道，这是一种真实的待命成本，但并不是压垮我们的，我们只是等待更好的日子，而这些日子终于来了。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: With our cranky, wait-it-out methods, we probably have ended up with the best large-scale causality insurance operation in the world.

查理·芒格：凭借我们古怪的、耐心等待的方法，我们可能已经拥有了世界上最好的大规模因果保险业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think that’s true, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为这是真的，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: So why would we change?

查理·芒格：那我们为什么要改变呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: We never really anticipated it would happen, though, when we started in.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，当我们开始时，我们从未真正预料到会发生这种情况。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s true.

查理·芒格：那是真的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It just sort of evolved.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这就是逐渐演变而来的。

But the principles were useful, and then we were very lucky in getting some sensational people.

但这些原则是有用的，然后我们很幸运地找到了几个引人注目的人。

You know, we’ve got Tad Montross at Gen Re, we’ve got Ajit Jain, we’ve got Don Wurster, we’ve got Tony Nicely at GEICO.

你知道，我们在 Gen Re 有 Tad Montross，我们有 Ajit Jain，我们有 Don Wurster，我们在 GEICO 有 Tony Nicely。

I mean, we have just hit the jackpot, in terms of the people. And they like the environment of Berkshire in which to operate, because they do not get pressures to do dumb things, which they would get at many other places.

我意思是，我们刚刚在人才方面中大奖了。他们喜欢在伯克希尔的环境中工作，因为在这里他们不会受到做愚蠢事情的压力，而在许多其他地方则会受到这种压力。

42. Buffett calls for more women in corporate leadership roles

巴菲特呼吁在企业领导岗位上增加女性。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 11。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Susan Tilson, and I’m from New York City. I am a long-term shareholder, but this is my first time to Omaha. This is quite the little gathering you’ve got going on here.

观众成员：嗨，我叫苏珊·蒂尔森，我来自纽约市。我是长期股东，但这是我第一次来奥马哈。你们在这里举办的聚会真是不错。

You, just a few minutes ago, Mr. Buffett, mentioned that you enjoyed a lot of advantages as a male.

您刚才提到，巴菲特先生，作为男性您享有很多优势。

I have three daughters, and I would like them to be able to go as far as their aspirations and hard work take them.

我有三个女儿，我希望她们能够根据自己的抱负和努力走得更远。

I’ve noticed and applaud the fact that you’ve added women to Berkshire’s board, but both the board and senior management at Berkshire still reflect the reality that in 2013, there are very few women holding the top jobs in corporate America.

我注意到并赞赏你们将女性加入伯克希尔董事会的事实，但伯克希尔的董事会和高级管理层仍然反映出在 2013 年，企业美国中担任高管职位的女性非常少。

Do you see this as a problem? And if so, what should be done about it?

你认为这是一个问题吗？如果是的话，应该怎么解决？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I do see it as a problem, and I — (Scattered applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我确实把它视为一个问题，我——（零星的掌声）

I’ve written an article in Fortune Magazine, which if you go to Fortune.com, I guess it’s in front of the paywall. You can click on it. It’s only 1150 words or so. And you’ll see my views on that.

我在《财富》杂志上写了一篇文章，如果你去 Fortune.com，我想它在付费墙前面。你可以点击它。文章大约只有 1150 个字。你会看到我对此的看法。

But there’s no question that women throughout my lifetime and, you know, for a millennia before that, have not had the same shot at many things in the world that males have.

但毫无疑问，在我一生中，以及在此之前的千年里，女性在许多事情上没有与男性相同的机会。

I mean, I have two sisters, as I pointed out in this article — both here today, I believe — and, you know, a couple years on each side of me, and absolutely as smart as I am. They’re more personable than I am. They got along with people much better than I did when we were young. Got — their grades were the same, but they did not have the same opportunities at all.

我有两个姐妹，正如我在这篇文章中提到的——我相信她们今天都在这里——她们比我大几岁，绝对和我一样聪明。她们比我更善于交际。我们年轻时，她们与人相处得比我好。她们的成绩相同，但她们根本没有相同的机会。

I mean, nobody really wanted to limit them. Certainly the— you know, my parents love them the same way as they felt about me, and they never would’ve dreamt of saying to them that, you know, Warren gets all these opportunities and you don’t. But it just existed.

我的意思是，没人真的想限制他们。当然，我的父母对他们的爱和对我的爱是一样的，他们从来不会想说，沃伦得到了所有这些机会，而你们没有。但这就是存在的事实。

And, you know, all my teachers in grade school, every one of them was a female. And the reason they were females is because they only had a few occupations open to them.

而且，你知道，我小学时的所有老师，每一个都是女性。她们之所以是女性，是因为她们只有少数职业可以选择。

So, as a result, I had way better teachers than I sort of deserved for the pay level that existed in it because all this talent was being compressed into a few areas.

因此，结果是我拥有的老师远比我在这个薪资水平上应得的要好，因为所有这些人才都被压缩到少数几个领域。

Well, a lot of improvement has been made, but there’s still a ways to go.

好吧，已经取得了很大的进步，但仍然有很长的路要走。

And there is a pipeline effect, so I mean, you couldn’t change it all in one day if you wanted to. But on the other hand, that should not be an excuse for not changing at all.

而且有一个管道效应，所以我的意思是，如果你想的话，不能一天之内全部改变。但另一方面，这不应该成为完全不改变的借口。

And then I also wrote about the fact that there’s — that when people are placed in that position, they start believing it about themselves, so they do not set their own objectives as high as their potential would indicate.

然后我还写到，当人们被置于那种境地时，他们开始相信自己是这样的，因此他们设定的目标没有达到他们的潜力所指示的高度。

And that’s — I use the example of Katharine Graham, who I knew quite well, and she was, you know, she was very, very intelligent. She was very high-grade. She had all kinds of good qualities.

而这——我以凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆为例，我对她很了解，她非常聪明。她非常优秀，拥有各种良好的品质。

But she had been told by a mother, and she had been told by a husband, and she had been told by society that women couldn’t run businesses as well as men.

但她被母亲告知，被丈夫告知，被社会告知，女性无法像男性一样经营企业。

And she knew it wasn’t true, but she couldn’t get rid of it. And she saw herself in this funhouse mirror, and it — no matter how hard you tried, you couldn’t really get rid of the funhouse mirror. It had just been there too long.

她知道这不是真的，但她无法摆脱它。她在这个鬼屋镜子中看到了自己，无论你多么努力，你都无法真正摆脱这个鬼屋镜子。它在那里已经太久了。

And I kept saying, you know, “Look at yourself in a regular mirror, and you’ll see somebody who’s very smart and very high-grade and just as good as any male you’ll find.”

我一直在说，你知道，“看看你自己在普通镜子里的样子，你会看到一个非常聪明、非常优秀的人，和你能找到的任何男性一样好。”

Her stock went up 40-for-1 when she was CEO. She wrote a Pulitzer Prize-winning autobiography. And to her dying day, you know, she — at one level she knew she was the equal of the males around her, and at another level, she couldn’t get rid of that little voice inside of her that came from her mother and came from all of society that said, you know, “You should take care of the garden and let the males do all the important work.”

她在担任首席执行官时，股票上涨了 40 比 1。她写了一本获得普利策奖的自传。直到去世的那一天，你知道，她在某种程度上知道自己与周围的男性平起平坐，但在另一个层面上，她无法摆脱内心那个来自母亲和整个社会的小声音，它说：“你应该照顾花园，让男性去做所有重要的工作。”

So, both the exterior obstacles— they’re crumbling to a very significant degree and they should. I mean, it only took thousands of years.

所以，外部障碍——它们在很大程度上正在崩溃，应该如此。我的意思是，这只花了几千年。

I mean, as I point out in the article, we said in the Declaration of Independence, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,” but they weren’t so self-evident when they got around to writing the Constitution and they used a bunch of male pronouns in describing the presidency in Article II, or when they didn’t get around to putting a Supreme Court—a female Supreme Court — justice on until 1981.

我的意思是，正如我在文章中指出的，我们在《独立宣言》中说：“我们认为这些真理是不言而喻的，所有人生而平等”，但当他们开始撰写《宪法》时，这些真理并不是那么显而易见，他们在第二条中用了一堆男性代词来描述总统职位，或者直到 1981 年才设立女性最高法院法官。

So, the country has come a long way on it. It continues to move. It’s moving in the right direction.

所以，这个国家在这方面已经走了很长一段路。它继续前进。它朝着正确的方向发展。

But you know, I hope it keeps moving and moving faster, and I hope that the females that are laboring under these beliefs that were told to them about themselves that aren’t true, get rid of the funhouse mirrors and get regular mirrors. And I say all this in this article if you want to read it in Fortune.com. Thank you. (Applause)

但你知道，我希望它能继续发展，并且发展得更快。我希望那些在这些关于她们自己的不真实信念下辛苦挣扎的女性，能够摆脱那些变形镜，使用普通的镜子。如果你想在 Fortune.com 上阅读这篇文章，我在其中说了这些。谢谢。（掌声）

43. Berkshire is not “too big to fail”

伯克希尔并不是“太大而不能倒闭”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: You’ll know why I’m asking this question in a second, and why I picked it.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：你马上就会知道我为什么问这个问题，以及我为什么选择它。

This question is the following: “Is Berkshire too big to fail? On the same topic — ”

这个问题是：“伯克希尔会太大而无法倒闭吗？关于同一主题——”

WARREN BUFFETT: I think I heard of a book by that name. Who wrote it? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我听说过一本叫这个名字的书。谁写的？（笑）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: “On the same topic, how do you feel about Dodd-Frank? And now that it’s being implemented, how is it impacting Berkshire’s insurance businesses and our investments in banks like Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs?”

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：“关于同一个话题，你对多德-弗兰克法案有什么看法？现在它正在实施，这对伯克希尔的保险业务以及我们在富国银行和高盛等银行的投资有什么影响？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think it’s affecting Berkshire’s insurance businesses, to my knowledge. I mean — we’re — we’ve had — to my knowledge, you know, we’ve never had anything that impinges on our activity arising from a too-big-to-fail doctrine.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为这并没有影响到伯克希尔的保险业务，至少在我所知的范围内。我的意思是——我们——我们有——在我所知的范围内，你知道，我们从来没有遇到过任何因“太大而不能倒”原则而影响我们活动的事情。

The capital ratios for large banks are being established at somewhat higher levels than smaller banks, and that obviously affects return on equity.

大型银行的资本比率设定在比小型银行稍高的水平，这显然影响了股本回报率。

The ratios, as I understand it, for Wells are not as high as they would be for Citi or J.P. Morgan, but they’re higher than they would be for a local bank in Omaha.

根据我的理解，富国银行的比例并不像花旗或摩根大通那样高，但比奥马哈的地方银行要高。

And the higher the capital ratio, the lower the return on equity will be.

资本比率越高，股本回报率就越低。

I consider the banking system in the United States to be stronger than, certainly, any time in the last 25 years.

我认为美国的银行系统比过去 25 年中的任何时候都要强大。

Capital is dramatically higher. A lot of the — well, a very significant part — of the loans that were troublesome are gone. The loans that have been put on the last four or five years are far better.

资本显著增加。许多——实际上是非常重要的一部分——麻烦贷款已经消失。过去四五年内发放的贷款要好得多。

It’s a — I think we’ve got — the Canadian banking system is very strong, but compared to Europe, I think our banks — or compared to our banks of 20 years ago — I think they’re dramatically stronger than they were then.

我认为，加拿大的银行系统非常强大，但与欧洲相比，我认为我们的银行——或者与 20 年前的我们的银行相比——我认为它们比那时强大得多。

I do not worry about the banking system being the cause of the next bubble. I mean, it will be something else.

我不担心银行系统会成为下一个泡沫的原因。我的意思是，这将是其他原因。

I mean, we will have bubbles in capitalism. Capitalism goes to excess, and it’s because of the humans that operate it.

我的意思是，我们在资本主义中会出现泡沫。资本主义会走向过度，而这都是因为操控它的人。

And we will have that again, but usually you don’t get it the same way as you got it before. I don’t think it will be a housing boom next time.

我们会再次经历那种情况，但通常你不会以之前的方式再次获得。我认为下次不会出现住房繁荣。

But, I am — you know, I feel very good about our investment in Wells Fargo. I feel very good about our investment in U.S. Bank. I feel very good about our investment in M&T.

但是，我——你知道，我对我们在富国银行的投资感到非常满意。我对我们在美国银行的投资感到非常满意。我对我们在 M&T 的投资感到非常满意。

All of those are very strong banks pursuing, in my view, sound practices, and they should result — they should be decent investments, over time.

所有这些都是非常强大的银行，在我看来，追求稳健的做法，随着时间的推移，它们应该会带来合理的投资回报。

They won’t earn as high a return on tangible equity, nearly as high a return as they would have seven or eight years ago, because the rules have been changed. And they have been changed to provide thicker equities, and that pulls down return on equity.

他们在有形股本上的回报不会像七八年前那样高，因为规则已经改变。这些规则的改变是为了提供更厚的股本，这导致了股本回报率的下降。

Charlie has been known to express himself on this subject, and I’ll give him the floor.

查理在这个话题上一直很有表达能力，我将把发言权交给他。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m a little less optimistic about the banking system, long-term, than you are.

查理·芒格：嗯，我对银行系统的长期前景比你乐观一些。

I would like to see something more extreme, in terms of limiting bank activities. I do not see why massive derivative books should be mixed up with insured — deposits that are insured — by the country.

我希望看到在限制银行活动方面更极端的措施。我不明白为什么庞大的衍生品账簿应该与由国家保险的存款混在一起。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m with Charlie on that. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我同意查理的看法。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: The more bankers want to be like investment bankers instead of bankers, the worse I like it. (Applause)

查理·芒格：银行家越想像投资银行家一样，而不是像银行家，我就越不喜欢。（掌声）

I don’t want to say more.

我不想多说。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I get in enough trouble on the subject already.

查理·芒格：我在这个话题上已经惹了不少麻烦。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) I can—I can see the journalists just licking their chops over there waiting for Charlie to throw a thunderbolt, but he’s unusually restrained.

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）我可以——我可以看到记者们在那边摩拳擦掌，等着查理抛出雷霆一击，但他异常克制。

44. Buffett updates his bet against hedge funds

巴菲特更新了他对对冲基金的看法

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re now very close to noon.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们现在离中午非常近。

I promised — five years ago — I wrote about five or six years ago about the inordinate costs that investors bear in — many investors bear in—getting sold various types of products.

我承诺过——五年前——我写过关于投资者在购买各种产品时所承担的过高成本的文章，大约是五六年前。

And I talked about hedge funds and private equity and all kinds — and a whole variety of things.

我谈到了对冲基金、私募股权以及各种各样的事情。

The investment world has been very good at extracting a very significant percentage of the returns that investors get for themselves.

投资界在从投资者获得的回报中提取了非常可观的一部分。

So I offered to bet anyone that wanted to step up to the plate that a group of hedge funds would not beat an unmanaged no-load index over a ten-year period.

所以我提出要和任何想要挑战的人打赌，一组对冲基金在十年内不会超过一个不管理的免佣金指数。

And I promised — and then I got a taker, a very nice group of people. I like them. Ted Seides is in the group.

我承诺过——然后我找到了一个愿意接受的人，一个非常不错的团队。我喜欢他们。泰德·赛德斯在这个团队中。

So they took me up on this. So we each put about $350,000 or so into something where in ten years — well, we put it in zero-coupon Treasurys, which would mature and be worth a million dollars in ten years.

所以他们接受了这个提议。于是我们每人投入了大约 35 万美元，投资于一种十年后到期的零息国债，十年后将价值一百万美元。

And I promised to report on the bet every year.

我承诺每年报告一次赌注。

And what we did this year, interest rates fell so far that our original 700,000 or so investment got to be worth like 950,000 just because the five-year Treasury got so low. So there was very little appreciation left into it between now and five years from now when it matures.

我们今年所做的事情是，利率下降到如此低的水平，以至于我们原本约 70 万美元的投资现在价值大约 95 万美元，仅仅是因为五年期国债利率降得太低。因此，从现在到五年后到期之间几乎没有什么增值空间。

So, we sold the zero-coupon Treasurys and we bought Berkshire with the proceeds, and I guaranteed that it would be worth a million dollars. Currently it’s worth about a million-two, so that the charities are benefiting to some extent.

所以，我们卖掉了零息国债，用所得款项购买了伯克希尔，我保证它的价值会达到一百万美元。目前它的价值大约是一百二十万美元，因此慈善机构在某种程度上受益。

Now, Ted has one charity, which is a very worthwhile charity. I have Girls Inc. of Omaha, which is a charity I selected.

现在，泰德有一个慈善机构，是一个非常有价值的慈善机构。我选择了奥马哈的女孩公司（Girls Inc. of Omaha）。

And we’ll put the — we can put the figures up on the — there as to where we stand at the moment.

我们可以把数字放在那儿，显示我们目前的状况。

The hedge funds got off to a fast start, and were 13 points ahead of the index fund at the end of the first year.

对冲基金开局迅速，在第一年结束时领先指数基金 13 点。

But the last four years — and these are funds of funds, so they really represent probably 2 or 300, maybe, hedge funds underneath.

但过去四年——这些是基金中的基金，因此它们实际上可能代表着 200 到 300 个对冲基金。

But there’s two levels of fees involved. There’s the standard fees of the hedge funds, which probably many times are “2 and 20,” but can be other things, and then there’s the fee of the fund of funds on top of it.

但涉及到两个层次的费用。对冲基金的标准费用通常是“2 和 20”，但也可能是其他形式，然后在此基础上还有基金中的基金的费用。

So, we now are at the halfway point, and I’ll keep reporting to you every year how we do. And if Berkshire does well, we’ll have well over a million dollars to distribute to one of two charities.

所以，我们现在已经到达了中途，我会每年向你报告我们的进展。如果伯克希尔表现良好，我们将有超过一百万美元可以分配给两个慈善机构中的一个。

You might enjoy going to a website called longbets.org. That’s where — they’re the people that hold the money.

你可能会喜欢访问一个叫 longbets.org 的网站。那里的人是持有资金的。

And you will see that there are a number of propositions that people have wagered on, and the proponents and the opponent of every proposition give a short little description. Ted gave a description of why he thought he’d win. I gave a description of why I thought I’d win.

你会看到有很多人下注的提议，每个提议的支持者和反对者都给出了简短的描述。泰德给出了他认为自己会赢的原因。我也给出了我认为自己会赢的原因。

But some of these are — I just can’t resist a couple of — pointing out a couple of them. You can see these on the web.

但其中有一些——我就是忍不住要指出其中的几个。你可以在网上看到这些。

But one of it is that a large collider will destroy the Earth in 10 years. Now there’s a $1,000 bet on that, but I’m not sure who will collect. (Laughter)

但其中一个说法是，一个大型对撞机将在 10 年内摧毁地球。现在对此有一个 1000 美元的赌注，但我不确定谁会赢得这个赌注。（笑声）

I thought that was an interesting one. And there was one other, and then we’ll go to lunch. But there are a number of these that are quite interesting.

我觉得那是一个有趣的内容。还有一个，然后我们就去吃午饭。但有很多这样的内容都很有趣。

At least one human alive in the year 2000 will still be alive in 2150. Now, that’s 148 years from when the bet was entered, there’s a $2,000 bet on that.

在 2000 年时至少有一个人会在 2150 年仍然活着。现在，这距离下注时已经过去了 148 年，这个赌注是 2000 美元。

And I hope Charlie is in contention for the — being the winner of that one.

我希望查理有机会赢得那个比赛。

45. Buffett’s hot dog lunch

巴菲特的热狗午餐

WARREN BUFFETT: I had a hot dog with a lot of ketchup for lunch. I hope you did the same.

沃伦·巴菲特：我午餐吃了一个加了很多番茄酱的热狗。希望你也一样。

46. Buffett: I haven’t lost any intensity

巴菲特：我没有失去任何热情

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll go to Doug.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们去找道格。

DOUG KASS: Thank you, Warren.

道格·卡斯：谢谢你，沃伦。

Mae West once said, “The score never interested me, only the game.”

梅·韦斯特曾说过：“分数从来没有让我感兴趣，只有比赛。”

Are you at the point now where the game interests you more than the score? But before you answer the question, let me explain to you why I asked it.

你现在是否到了对游戏的兴趣超过分数的地步？但在你回答这个问题之前，让我先解释一下我为什么会问这个问题。

In the past, your research has been all-encompassing, whether measured in time devoted to selecting investments and acquisitions, or the intensity of analysis, your interest in the old days of knowing the slightest minutia about a company.

过去，你的研究非常全面，无论是投入在选择投资和收购上的时间，还是分析的强度，你对公司微小细节的了解都让人印象深刻。

You once said, in characterizing Ben Rosner, quote, “Intensity is the price of excellence,” closed quotes.

你曾经说过，在描述本·罗斯纳时，引用：“强度是卓越的代价。”结束引用。

Your research style has seemed to morph over time from a sleuth-like analysis — American Express comes into mind when you hired Jonathan’s dad, Henry Brandt. You and he conducted weeks of analysis and sight visits and channel checks.

你的研究风格似乎随着时间的推移而发生了变化，从一种侦探般的分析转变而来——当你雇佣乔纳森的父亲亨利·布兰特时，我想到了美国运通。你和他进行了数周的分析、实地考察和渠道检查。

Not so much in the later investments. As an example, you famously thought of making the Bank of America investment in your bathtub.

在后来的投资中并不是这样。举个例子，你曾在浴缸里想到投资美国银行。

There is an investment message of this transformation from being intense to less intense.

这种转变从强烈到不那么强烈的投资信息。

Would you please explain the degree it has to do with the market, Berkshire’s size, or some other factors?

您能否解释一下这与市场、伯克希尔的规模或其他因素的关系程度？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think, actually, you have to love something to do well at it. There may be exceptions on that, but it is an enormous, enormous advantage if you absolutely love what you’re doing, every minute of it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为，实际上，你必须热爱某样东西才能做得好。可能会有例外，但如果你绝对热爱你所做的每一分钟，那将是一个巨大的、巨大的优势。

And the nature of it is that that intensity adds to your productivity.

这种强度会提高你的生产力。

And I have every bit of the intensity — not manifested exactly the same way — but it’s there every minute. I mean, I love thinking about Berkshire. I love thinking about its investments. I love thinking about its businesses. I love thinking about its managers. It’s part of me.

我每时每刻都充满了这种强度——虽然表现方式不完全相同——但它始终存在。我是说，我喜欢思考伯克希尔。我喜欢思考它的投资。我喜欢思考它的业务。我喜欢思考它的管理者。这是我生活的一部分。

And it is true, you can’t separate the game from the scorecard. I mean, you — so your score card is part of playing the game and loving the game.

而且这是真的，你无法将比赛与记分卡分开。我的意思是，你的记分卡是玩游戏和热爱游戏的一部分。

The proceeds are — you know, to me — are unimportant, but the proceeds are part of the score card, so they come with a score card.

收益对我来说并不重要，但收益是评分的一部分，所以它们会附带一个评分表。

But it’s much more important — I mean, I would — no question about it, I wouldn’t be — feel — the same way about Berkshire at this point if I didn’t own a share of it, if I didn’t get paid. I mean, it’s what I like doing in life, and that’s why I do it.

但这更重要——我的意思是，如果我没有持有伯克希尔的一股股票，如果我没有得到报酬，我对此的感觉绝对不会是这样的。我是说，这就是我喜欢做的事情，这就是我为什么去做它的原因。

So, I don’t think you’ll — I don’t think it’s actually a correct observation — and Charlie can comment on this — to say that because we’re doing things in a somewhat different way, that any of the intensity or the passion has been lost.

所以，我认为你不会——我认为这实际上不是一个正确的观察——查理可以对此发表评论——说因为我们以一种稍微不同的方式做事情，所以任何的强度或热情都已经丧失。

There’s nothing more fun for me than finding something new to add to Berkshire, and that was true 40 years ago. It’s true now. And it’ll be true 10 years from now, I hope.

对我来说，没有什么比发现新的东西来增加伯克希尔更有趣，这在 40 年前是这样，现在也是如此。我希望 10 年后也是如此。

Charlie, how would you answer that?

查理，你会怎么回答这个问题？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think when you bought American Express for the first time, you didn’t know that much about it, so, naturally, you were digging in rather deeply.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为当你第一次购买美国运通时，你对它并不是很了解，所以，自然地，你在深入研究。

The second time you bought it, I remember you got on the golf course with Olson —

第二次你买的时候，我记得你和奥尔森一起上了高尔夫球场——

WARREN BUFFETT: Frank Olson, yep.

沃伦·巴菲特：弗兰克·奥尔森，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and you just saw how he couldn’t get rid of American Express if he wanted to, and then you bought it the second time.

查理·芒格：——你看到如果他想的话也无法摆脱美国运通，然后你第二次购买了。

The research is still — the first one was hard, and the second was easy.

研究仍在进行中——第一次很难，第二次就容易了。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s all cumulative.

沃伦·巴菲特：这一切都是累积的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s cumulative, eventually.

查理·芒格：是的，最终这是累积的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And, you know, what I learned sitting with Lorimer Davidson on a Saturday at GEICO in January of 1951 is still — is useful to me, and I don’t have to learn it a second time. I can build on it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你知道，我在 1951 年 1 月的一个星期六与洛里默·戴维森坐在 GEICO 时学到的东西至今仍对我有用，我不需要再学一次。我可以在此基础上继续发展。

But that’s one of the great things about investing. I mean, the universe, there’s enough in it so that you can finds lots of opportunities, but there — it’s not like it’s changing dramatically all the time.

但这就是投资的伟大之处。我是说，宇宙中有足够的东西让你找到很多机会，但它并不是一直在剧烈变化。

There’s some things that may change, and we just don’t play in that part of the game if we don’t understand them.

有些事情可能会改变，如果我们不理解它们，我们就不会在游戏的那个部分参与。

But what Charlie says is true. I didn’t know a thing about American Express when the Salad Oil Scandal hit in November of 1963. But I thought I saw an opportunity, so I learned a lot about it.

但查理说的是真的。1963 年 11 月色拉油丑闻爆发时，我对美国运通一无所知。但我觉得看到了一个机会，于是我学到了很多关于它的知识。

I went around to restaurants and talked to people about travel and entertainment cards, as they were called then. I learned about traveler’s checks. I talked to banks. And I was absorbing some knowledge.

我去了一些餐馆，和人们谈论旅行和娱乐卡，那时它们就是这样称呼的。我了解了旅行支票。我和银行进行了交谈。我在吸收一些知识。

And then, as Charlie said, when we were up at Prouts Neck playing golf with Frank Olson, and he was running the Hertz Corp., and he was telling me that there was no way in the world that he could get rid of American Express, or even get them to cut their fees. That was my kind of business.

然后，正如查理所说，当我们在普劳特斯角与弗兰克·奥尔森打高尔夫时，他当时在经营Hertz公司，他告诉我，根本不可能摆脱美国运通，甚至让他们降低费用。这正是我喜欢的生意。

And I knew enough to proceed to buy a fair amount of stock, and now we own whatever it is, probably 13 percent of the company or thereabouts. And they keep buying in their stock. We can’t buy anymore stock ourselves.

我知道足够的信息去购买相当数量的股票，现在我们拥有大约 13%的公司股份。他们还在继续回购股票。我们自己不能再购买股票了。

I got asked that question in March of 2009 by Joe Kernen, “Why aren’t you buying the stock of American Express?” Well, it was a bank holding company, and we couldn’t add a share.

我在 2009 年 3 月被乔·科尔南问到这个问题：“你为什么不买美国运通的股票？”好吧，它是一家银行控股公司，我们无法增加一股。

But they are doing it for us, and I love it.

但他们为我们在做这件事，我对此非常喜欢。

At Coca-Cola, at Wells Fargo, to a lesser degree, at IBM, at most of our companies, our interest in the company goes up every year because the companies are repurchasing shares and they probably earn more money so we got a double play going for us.

在可口可乐、在富国银行、在 IBM（程度较小），在我们大多数公司中，我们对公司的兴趣每年都在上升，因为这些公司正在回购股票，而且它们可能赚更多的钱，所以我们有双重收益。

But the passion is not gone, I promise you.

但热情并没有消失，我向你保证。

47. We don’t buy anything just “by the numbers”

我们不会仅仅“按数字”购买任何东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：站点 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. My name is Vincent Wong (PH) from Seattle.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我叫文森特·黄（PH），来自西雅图。

When people analyze a stock, a lot of them look at quantitative metrics, such as P/E ratio, return on equity, debts-to-asset ratio, et cetera.

当人们分析股票时，很多人会关注定量指标，例如市盈率、股本回报率、债务资产比率等。

So, Mr. Buffett, when you analyze a stock for purchase, what’s your top five quantitative metrics that you looked at, and what’s your preferred number for each metric? Thank you.

巴菲特先生，当您分析一只股票以进行购买时，您关注的五个主要定量指标是什么？每个指标的首选数字是多少？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re looking at quantitative and quality — we aren’t looking at the aspects of the stock, we’re looking at the aspects of a business.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们关注的是定量和质量——我们不是在看股票的方面，而是在看一个企业的方面。

It’s very important to have that mindset, that we are buying businesses, whether we’re buying 100 shares of something or whether we’re buying the entire company. We always think of them as businesses.

拥有这样的心态非常重要，我们是在购买企业，无论我们是购买某个股票的 100 股，还是购买整个公司。我们始终将它们视为企业。

So when Charlie and I leaf through Value Line or look at annual reports that come across our desk or read the paper, whatever it may be, that, for one thing, we have a — we do have this cumulative knowledge of a good many industries and a good many companies, not all by a long shot.

所以当查理和我翻阅《价值线》或查看我们桌面上出现的年度报告，或者阅读报纸时，无论是什么，我们都有——我们确实对许多行业和许多公司有这种累积的知识，尽管并不是全部。

And different numbers are of different importance — or various numbers are of different importance — depending on the kind of business.

不同的数字具有不同的重要性——或者说各种数字的重要性各不相同——这取决于业务的类型。

I mean, if you were a basketball coach, you know, you would — if you were walking down the street and some guy comes up that’s 5′4″ and says, you know, “You ought to sign me up because you ought to see me handle the ball,” you would probably have a certain prejudice against it. But there might be some — one player out there it made sense on.

我意思是，如果你是一名篮球教练，你知道，如果你在街上走着，某个身高 5 英尺 4 英寸的人走过来说：“你应该签我，因为你应该看看我控球的样子，”你可能会对此有一定的偏见。但可能有某个球员在这方面是有道理的。

But on balance, we would say, “Well, good luck, son, but, you know, we’re looking for 7-footers.” And then if we find 7-footers, we have to worry about whether we can get them halfway coordinated and keep them in school, a few things like that.

但总体来说，我们会说：“好吧，祝你好运，儿子，但你知道，我们在寻找 7 尺高的球员。”然后如果我们找到了 7 尺高的球员，我们就得担心能否让他们协调起来，并且让他们保持在学校，诸如此类的事情。

But we see certain things that shout out to us, look further or think further.

但我们看到某些事物在向我们呼喊，要求我们更深入地观察或思考。

And over the years, we’ve accumulated this background of knowledge on various kinds of businesses, and we also have come up with the conclusion that we can’t make an intelligent analysis out of — about all kinds of businesses.

多年来，我们积累了关于各种类型企业的知识背景，并得出结论，我们无法对所有类型的企业进行明智的分析。

And then, usually, some little fact slips into view that causes us to rethink something. It was mentioned how I got the idea about buying the Bank of America — or making an offer to Bank of America on a preferred stock — when I was in the bathtub, which is true.

然后，通常会有一些小事实浮现出来，让我们重新思考某些事情。提到我在浴缸里想到购买美国银行——或者向美国银行提出优先股的报价——这是真的。

But the bathtub really was not the key factor. (Laughter)

但浴缸真的不是关键因素。（笑声）

The truth is, I read a book more than 50 years ago called “Biography of a Bank.” It was a great book, about A.P. Giannini and the history of the bank.

事实上，我在 50 多年前读过一本书，名为《一家银行的传记》。这是一本很棒的书，讲述了 A.P. Giannini 和这家银行的历史。

And I have followed the Bank of America, and I’ve followed other banks, you know, for 50 years.

我关注了美国银行，也关注了其他银行，已经有 50 年了。

Charlie and I have bought banks. We used to trudge around Chicago trying to buy more banks in the late ’60s.

查理和我买了银行。我们曾在 60 年代末拖着脚步在芝加哥四处寻找更多的银行。

And so, we have certain things we think about, in terms of a bank, that are different than we think about when we’re buying ISCAR. And so there is not one-size-fits-all.

因此，我们在考虑银行时，有一些事情与我们购买 ISCAR 时的想法不同。因此，并没有一种适合所有人的解决方案。

We have certain things we think about when we’re buying an insurance company, certain things we think about when we’re buying a company dependent upon — that depended upon — brands. Some brands travel very well, Coca-Cola being a terrific example, and some brands don’t travel.

我们在购买保险公司时会考虑某些因素，在购买依赖于品牌的公司时也会考虑某些因素。有些品牌传播得很好，像可口可乐就是一个很好的例子，而有些品牌则传播得不好。

And, you know, we just keep learning about things like that, and then every now and then we find some opportunity.

而且，你知道，我们一直在学习这样的事情，然后偶尔我们会发现一些机会。

The Bank of America — whenever it was — in 2011 — was subject to a lot of rumors, terrible — I mean, lots — big short interest, morale was terrible, and everything else. It just struck me that an investment by Berkshire might be helpful to the bank and might make sense for us.

美国银行——无论何时——在 2011 年——受到很多谣言的困扰，情况糟糕——我的意思是，很多——做空兴趣很大，士气低落，还有其他一切。我觉得伯克希尔的投资可能对银行有帮助，也可能对我们有意义。

And I’d never met Brian Moynihan at that point — maybe I’d met him at some function, some party of something, but I had no memory of it — and I didn’t have his phone number but I gave him a call. And things like that happen.

在那时我从未见过布赖恩·莫伊尼汉——也许我在某个活动、某个聚会上见过他，但我没有任何记忆——我没有他的电话号码，但我还是给他打了电话。这样的事情就发生了。

And it’s not because I calculate some price — precise — P/E ratio or price-book value ratio or whatever it might be.

这并不是因为我计算某个价格——精确的——市盈率或市净率或其他什么。

It is because I have some idea of what the company might look like in five or ten years, and I have a reasonable amount of confidence in that judgment, and there’s a disparity in price and value, and it’s big.

这是因为我对公司在五年或十年后的样子有一些想法，并且对这个判断有合理的信心，而且价格和价值之间存在很大的差距。

Charlie, would you like to elaborate?

查理，你能详细说明一下吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t know how to buy stocks just by looking at financial figures and making judgments based on the ratios.

查理·芒格：我们不知道仅仅通过查看财务数据和根据比率做出判断来购买股票。

We may be influenced a little by some of that data, but we need to know more about how the company actually functions. And anything a computer could be functioned to do, in terms of screening — I know I never do it. Do you use a computer to screen anything?

我们可能会受到一些数据的影响，但我们需要更多了解公司实际运作的方式。至于计算机可以执行的任何筛选功能——我知道我从来不这样做。你会用计算机筛选任何东西吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. I don’t know how to. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我不知道怎么做。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Bill’s still trying to explain it to me.

查理·芒格：不，比尔还在试图向我解释。

WARREN BUFFETT: I — we — you can — it’s a little hard to be precise on, because we don’t really use screens — (inaudible) were screening everything. But it’s not like we sit there and say, you know, we want to look at things that are below the price of book value, or low P/Es, or something of the sort.

沃伦·巴菲特：我——我们——你可以——这有点难以精确，因为我们并不真的使用屏幕——（听不清）在筛选所有东西。但并不是说我们坐在那里说，你知道，我们想看一些低于账面价值的东西，或者低市盈率的东西，或者类似的东西。

We are looking at businesses exactly like we’d look at them if somebody came in and offered us the entire business, and then we try to think, what is this place going to look like in five or ten years, and how sure are we of it.

我们正在以与有人进来并向我们提供整个业务时完全相同的方式看待这些企业，然后我们试图思考，这个地方在五年或十年后会是什么样子，我们对此有多确定。

And most — a lot of companies, you know, we just don’t know the answer to it. We do not know which auto company is going to, you know, be knocking the ball out of the park ten years from now or which one is going to be hanging on by its fingernails.

而大多数公司，我们其实不知道答案。我们不知道哪家汽车公司在十年后会表现出色，或者哪家会勉强维持生存。

You know, we watched the auto business for 50 years, a very interesting business, but we don’t know how to — we don’t know how to foresee the future well enough on something like that.

你知道，我们观察汽车行业已经 50 年了，这是一个非常有趣的行业，但我们不知道如何——我们不知道如何对这样的事情做出足够好的未来预测。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We think that the Burlington Northern will have a computer — a competitive —advantage 15 years from now, with a high degree of confidence. We would never have that degree of confidence about Apple, no matter what their financial statement showed.

查理·芒格：我们认为，伯灵顿北方铁路在15年后将具备竞争优势，我们对此非常有信心。无论苹果的财务报表显示什么，我们对此绝对不会有这样的信心。

两年后开始买入苹果，apperceptive masses。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s just — it’s too hard.

查理·芒格：这太难了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We don’t know about an oil company ten years from now, you know, in terms of what the product will be selling for or anything.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不知道十年后的石油公司，您知道的，关于产品的售价或其他任何事情。

I would say we’re — you know, we’re virtually 100 percent confident about a Burlington Northern, or a GEICO, or some other companies that I won’t name.

我可以说我们几乎对伯灵顿北方铁路、GEICO 或其他一些我不想提及的公司有百分之百的信心。

CHARLIE MUNGER: People with very high IQs who are good at math naturally look for a system where they can just look at the math and know what security to buy. It’s not that easy.

查理·芒格：智商很高且擅长数学的人自然会寻找一个系统，他们可以仅通过数学来判断该买什么证券。但这并不那么简单。

You really have to understand the company and its competitive position, and the reasons why its competitive position is what it is, and that is often not disclosed by the math.

你真的必须了解公司及其竞争地位，以及其竞争地位为何如此，这通常在数学上并没有披露。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s not what I learned from Ben Graham, although the fundamentals of looking at stocks as businesses, and the attitude toward the market and all that, is absolutely still part of the catechism.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这并不是我从本·格雷厄姆那里学到的，尽管将股票视为企业的基本原则，以及对市场的态度等等，绝对仍然是教义的一部分。

But I wouldn’t — I don’t know exactly how I would manage money if I was just trying to do it by the numbers that —

但我不知道如果我只是想通过数据来管理资金，我会怎么做——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’d do it poorly. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你会做得很糟糕。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That takes care of that. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这就解决了这个问题。（笑声）

48. Disagreement on whether the “new normal” will bring lower returns

对于“新常态”是否会带来更低的回报存在分歧

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Benjamin Knoll of Greater Twin Cities United Way.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自大双城联合之路的本杰明·诺尔。

“Every time Bill Gross writes a new essay on the, quote, ‘new normal,’ unquote, I get more depressed about the prospects for my retirement.

“每次比尔·格罗斯写一篇关于‘新常态’的新文章时，我对我的退休前景就更加感到沮丧。”

“Do you share his view that market returns in the next few decades will be much lower than in the past few? And should we expect Berkshire’s future market returns to be greatly constrained, not only by its size, but also by much lower equity returns overall?

“你是否同意他的观点，即未来几十年的市场回报将远低于过去几十年？我们是否应该预期伯克希尔未来的市场回报不仅会受到其规模的极大限制，还会受到整体股本回报大幅降低的影响？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I don’t pay any attention to macro forecasts.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我对宏观预测不太关注。

We have worked together now for 54 years, and I can’t think of a time when we made a decision on a stock, or on a company, where a macro discussion — where we’ve talked about macro.

我们已经一起工作了 54 年，我想不出我们在做出关于股票或公司的决策时，有过一次宏观讨论——我们谈论过宏观。

We don’t know what things are going to look like, in any precise way. And, incidentally, naturally, we think if we don’t know it, nobody else knows. That’s the conceit that we have. (Laughs)

我们不知道事情会是什么样子，具体来说也没有确切的答案。而且，顺便说一下，自然地，我们认为如果我们不知道，那就没有其他人知道。这就是我们的自负。（笑）

And — so we — you know, why talk — why spend time talking about something you really don’t know anything about? I mean it — people do it all the time, but it not very productive. So we talk about the businesses.

而且——所以我们——你知道，为什么要谈——为什么要花时间谈论一些你真的不知道的事情？我的意思是——人们总是这样做，但这并不是很有成效。所以我们谈论的是商业。

I like Bill Gross. Sounds like Lloyd Bentsen, you know, back in the — he’s a friend of mine.

我喜欢比尔·格罗斯。听起来像洛伊德·本森，你知道的，早些时候——他是我的朋友。

But I don’t — it doesn’t make any difference to me what he thinks about the future, doesn’t make any difference to me, you know, what any economist thinks about it.

但我不在乎——他对未来的看法对我来说没有任何区别，我知道，任何经济学家对它的看法对我来说也没有任何区别。

I have a general feeling that America will continue to work well. And I don’t — you know — there’s — throughout my adult lifetime, and before that, there’s always been all kinds of opinions that, you know, about what’s going to happen this year or the next year or anything like that. And nobody knows.

我总的感觉是美国会继续运转良好。而我不——你知道——在我成年后的生活中，以及之前，总是有各种各样的观点，关于今年或明年会发生什么之类的事情。没有人知道。

What you do know, with a very high degree of certainty, in my view, is that BNSF will be carrying more carloads 10 years from now, 20 years from now; that there will be no substitute for the service that they provide; that there will be two important railroads in the west and two important railroads in the east; and that they will have an asset that has incredible replacement value, nobody could turn out something like it, and that they’ll get paid fairly for what they do. It’s not very complicated.

你非常确定地知道，在我看来，BNSF 在未来 10 年、20 年将会运输更多的货物；他们提供的服务将没有替代品；西部将有两条重要的铁路，东部也将有两条重要的铁路；他们将拥有一种具有不可思议替代价值的资产，没人能生产出类似的东西，他们将为所做的工作获得公平的报酬。这并不复杂。

And to ignore what you know because of predictions about what you don’t know, or what nobody else knows, in our view, it’s just plain silly.

忽视你所知道的，因为对你不知道的事情或其他人也不知道的事情的预测，在我们看来，这简直是愚蠢。

So we don’t have anything against somebody talking about a new normal or an old normal or an in-between normal, but it doesn’t mean anything to us.

所以我们对有人谈论新常态、旧常态或介于两者之间的常态没有任何意见，但这对我们来说没有任何意义。

My own guess is that people will do very well owning good businesses, if they don’t pay too much for them, you know, whether they hold them for 10 years or 20 years or 30 years.

我自己的猜测是，如果人们没有为好的企业支付过多，他们会非常成功地拥有这些企业，无论是持有 10 年、20 年还是 30 年。

And if they try and time their purchases in some way by listening to forecasts about what’s going to happen in business and try and buy and sell them, they’re going to do very well for their broker and not so well for themselves.

如果他们试图通过听取关于商业将要发生的预测来安排他们的购买，并试图买卖这些，他们将为他们的经纪人做得很好，但对自己却不太好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But, of course, Warren, we have a lot of money. We have to do something with it. So we’re going to do our thing no matter what the external climate is.

查理·芒格：是的。不过，沃伦，我们有很多钱。我们必须对它做点什么。所以无论外部环境如何，我们都会做我们的事情。

If you’re a busy surgeon and trying to decide whether to work two more years before you retire, then you may be more interested, and rationally so, in the new normal.

如果你是一名忙碌的外科医生，正在考虑在退休前再工作两年，那么你可能会更关注新的常态，这也是合乎理性的。

And I would personally advise the guy to work an extra couple of years. (Laughter)

我个人会建议那个人再多工作几年。（笑声）

In other words, I kind of agree with Bill Gross.

换句话说，我有点同意比尔·格罗斯的观点。

WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think the normal is?

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为正常是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, less than we’ve enjoyed in our lifetimes, the new normal.

查理·芒格：嗯，新的常态比我们一生中享受的要少。

WARREN BUFFETT: What have we enjoyed in the last 10 years? I mean, you know —

沃伦·巴菲特：在过去的 10 年里，我们享受了什么？我的意思是，你知道——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It hasn’t been so bad.

查理·芒格：情况并没有那么糟。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. And it hasn’t been —

沃伦·巴菲特：不。并且这并没有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not nearly as good as it was in the first 30.

查理·芒格：这远不如前 30 年那么好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And do you think it would be worse than the average of the last 10 years?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你认为这会比过去10年的平均水平更差吗？

未来大概率比过去更好，芒格始终不明白。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think that’s quite a conceivable outcome.

查理·芒格：我认为这是一个相当可以想象的结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: So take your pick. OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：那就随你选择吧。好的。（笑声）

49. Fruit of the Loom’s vs. Gildan Activewear

Fruit of the Loom 与 Gildan Activewear对比

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Warren, I’m sorry. My last question about solar was directed at Charlie, but my next question is about underwear, so I think you can probably field this one.

乔纳森·布兰特：沃伦，对不起。我最后一个关于太阳能的问题是问查理的，但我下一个问题是关于内衣的，所以我想你可能可以回答这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Boxers or briefs? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：内裤还是三角裤？（笑）

JONATHAN BRANDT: I’m not talking.

乔纳森·布兰特：我不想说。

Over time, Fruit of the Loom and others have lost nearly all of the T-shirt-focused wholesale screen print market to Gildan, a relatively new player with very low cost structure.

随着时间的推移，Fruit of the Loom 等公司几乎失去了所有以 T 恤为主的丝网印花批发市场，而 Gildan 则是一家相对较新的公司，其成本结构非常低。

Gildan is now going after the underwear-focused retail market and is having some success with certain large customers. Branding is obviously more important in the retail market, but is there any reason to think Fruit of the Loom won’t lose significant amounts of share here over time, just as they did in the wholesale screen print market?

Gildan 现在正在进军以内衣为重点的零售市场，并在某些大型客户中取得了一些成功。品牌在零售市场显然更为重要，但是否有理由认为 Fruit of the Loom 不会像在批发丝网印刷市场那样，随着时间的推移失去大量市场份额？

What can they do to protect what remains of their franchise?

他们可以做些什么来保护他们特许经营的剩余部分？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You keep — you keep your costs down and you constantly work at brand building, and you try very hard to make sure that your main customers, in turn, have their customers happy with the product, and are happy with the price points that you can deliver it at.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你要保持成本低，并不断致力于品牌建设，努力确保你的主要客户也让他们的客户对产品满意，并对你能提供的价格感到满意。

And you’re correct that Gildan, in terms of certain aspects, the non-branded aspects, basically, of some parts of the business, has hurt Fruit in the last — well, last 10 years, certainly.

你说得对，Gildan 在某些方面，特别是一些非品牌的业务部分，确实在过去的十年里对 Fruit 造成了伤害。

But we turn out first-quality, low-priced underwear with a strong brand recognition. And I think it will be very tough to either build a brand against it or to beat our costs significantly.

但我们生产出一流的、价格低廉的内衣，并且拥有强大的品牌认知度。我认为，要建立一个与之竞争的品牌或显著降低我们的成本将会非常困难。

Now Gildan pays very little in the way of income taxes, you know, because they route stuff through the Cayman Islands, and that’s a modest factor.

现在 Gildan 在所得税方面支付的非常少，你知道，因为他们通过开曼群岛进行资金转移，这也是一个小因素。

But I think you’ll find five years from now, or 10 years from now, that our market share in men’s and boys’, particularly underwear, will hold up.

但我认为你会发现五年后，或者十年后，我们在男士和男孩，特别是内衣方面的市场份额将会保持稳定。

But you’re right. They’re a competitive threat. Hanes is a competitive threat. And it’s not a business that you can coast on. It’s not Coca-Cola, but it’s not an unbranded product, either.

但你说得对。他们是一个竞争威胁。Hanes 是一个竞争威胁。而且这不是一个可以轻松应对的生意。这不是可口可乐，但也不是一个无品牌的产品。

And I think Fruit will do reasonably well, but it will not get anything like, you know, the kind of profit margins that you can get in certain branded products.

我认为Fruit的表现会相当不错，但它不会像某些品牌产品那样获得可观的利润率。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And then, too, as many products as we have, we may average out pretty well, in terms of market shares, but we’re not going to win every skirmish or every battle.

查理·芒格：是的，尽管我们有很多产品，我们在市场份额方面的平均表现可能不错，但我们不会在每一场小争斗或每一场战斗中获胜。

50. Influential books and early investments

影响力书籍和早期投资

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. I’m Fritz Hauser (PH) from Offenburg, Germany.

观众成员：是的。嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我是来自德国奥芬堡的弗里茨·豪瑟。

I’d like to know what 10 books influenced you the most and that weren’t written by Graham and Fisher, and I’d also like to tell you that I think it would be great if you would publish the portfolio statements of the Buffett Partnership years.

我想知道哪 10 本书对你影响最大，并且不是由格雷厄姆和费舍尔所写的。我还想告诉你，如果你能出版巴菲特合伙公司时期的投资记录，那将是非常棒的。

I think there are a lot of small investors that would get a kick out of knowing, you know, what you invested and how you went ahead and analyzed the companies. Thank you.

我认为有很多小投资者会很高兴知道你投资了什么，以及你是如何分析这些公司的。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Charlie ran something called Wheeler,Munger and his portfolio was even more interesting, so we’ll start with you, Charlie. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理经营着一个叫做惠勒-芒格的公司，他的投资组合更有趣，所以我们先从你开始，查理。（笑）

He ran a more concentrated portfolio than I did in those days.

他在那些日子里管理的投资组合比我更集中。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t think people would be greatly helped. You wouldn’t recognize the names, most of them, clearly, by the partnership.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为这对人们帮助不大。大多数人可能都不认识那些合伙企业中的名字。

You’d recognize American Express. Rattle off some of the names.

你一定会认出美国运通。说出一些名字。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we can start with Mosaic Tile and —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们可以从马赛克瓷砖开始——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The map company.

查理·芒格：地图公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: — Meadow River Coal & Land. There’s hundreds of them. Flagg-Utica, Philadelphia Reading Coal & Iron, you name it.

沃伦·巴菲特：— 梅adow River煤炭与土地。还有成百上千的名字。Flagg-Utica，费城阅读煤与铁，等等。

I’ve literally owned — I bet I’ve owned 4- or 500 names at one time or another, but most of the money’s been made in about 10 of them.

我实际上拥有过——我敢打赌我曾经拥有过四五百个名字，但大部分的钱都是在其中大约 10 个名字上赚到的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I couldn’t name 10 books either that have — that I regard as that much better than the next 10. My mind is a blend of so many books I can’t even sort it out anymore. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我也无法列出 10 本书，它们比接下来的 10 本书要好得多。我的思维融合了太多书籍，我甚至无法再理清楚了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. “The Intelligent Investor” changed my life, in terms of — I literally had read every book in the Omaha Public Library by the time I was 11 on the subject of investing, and there were a lot of books.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。《聪明的投资者》改变了我的生活，实际上在我 11 岁时，我已经读完了奥马哈公共图书馆关于投资的所有书籍，而且书籍数量很多。

And there were a lot — there were technical books, Edwards & Magee, I mean, that was a classic in those days, and a whole bunch of them, Garfield Drew. But — and I love — I enjoyed reading them a lot. Some of them I read more than once.

而且有很多——有技术书籍，爱德华兹和马吉，我是说，那在当时是经典，还有一大堆，加菲尔德·德鲁。但是——我喜欢——我非常享受阅读它们。其中一些我读了不止一次。

But I never developed a philosophy about it. I enjoyed it. I charted stocks. I did all that sort of thing.

但我从未对此形成一种哲学。我享受其中。我研究股票。我做了所有这些事情。

Graham’s book gave me a philosophy, a bedrock philosophy, on investing that made sense. I mean, he taught me how to think about a stock, he taught me how to think about the stock market, and he taught me that the market was there not to instruct me but to serve me.

格雷厄姆的书给了我一种哲学，一种坚实的投资哲学，这让我觉得很有道理。我的意思是，他教会了我如何看待股票，教会了我如何看待股市，并且教会了我市场的存在不是为了指导我，而是为了服务我。

And he used that famous “Mr. Market” example. He taught me to think about stocks as pieces of businesses, rather than ticker symbols or things that, you know, you could chart, or something of the sort.

他用了那个著名的“市场先生”例子。他教我把股票看作是企业的一部分，而不是股票代码或可以图表化的东西，或者类似的东西。

And so it was that philosophy — and in some way, further influenced by Phil Fisher’s book — and Phil Fisher was just telling me the same thing that Charlie was telling me, which was that it’s very important to get into a business with fundamentally good economics, and one that you could ride with for decades, rather than one where you had to go from flower to flower every day.

因此，哲学——在某种程度上受到菲尔·费舍尔书籍的进一步影响——菲尔·费舍尔告诉我的和查理告诉我的一样，那就是进入一个基本经济良好的企业非常重要，而不是每天都要从一个花朵跳到另一个花朵的企业，这样的企业你可以与之共度数十年。

And those — that philosophy has carried me along. Now, I’ve learned different ways of applying it over the years, but it’s the way I think about businesses now.

而这些——这种哲学一直伴随着我。现在，随着岁月的推移，我学会了不同的应用方式，但这就是我现在对待商业的思维方式。

I have not found any aspect of that bedrock philosophy that has flaws in it. You have to learn how to apply it in different ways.

我没有发现那种基础哲学的任何方面存在缺陷。你必须学会以不同的方式应用它。

So those are the books that influenced me.

所以那些是影响我的书。

And, of course, in other arenas, Charlie’s probably read more biography than anybody that I know of. And I like to read a lot of it.

当然，在其他领域，查理可能读过的传记比我认识的任何人都要多。我也喜欢读很多传记。

We’re just about through reading the Joe Kennedy biography. You’ve read that, haven’t you, now, Charlie?

我们快要读完乔·肯尼迪的传记了。你读过那本书，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, I’m not sure you want to emulate everything he did, but it’s still interesting reading. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，我不确定你想要模仿他所做的一切，但这仍然是有趣的阅读。（笑）

We read for the enjoyment of it. I mean, it’s been enormously beneficial to us, but the reason we read is that it’s fun. And, you know, it’s still fun.

我们阅读是为了享受。我是说，这对我们非常有益，但我们阅读的原因是因为这很有趣。而且，你知道，这仍然很有趣。

And on top of it, we have gotten very substantial benefits from it. My life would have been different if Ben Graham hadn’t gone to the trouble of writing a book, which he had no financial need to do at all. You know, I would have a very different life.

而且，我们从中获得了非常可观的收益。如果本·格雷厄姆没有费心写一本书，我的生活将会截然不同，他根本没有经济上的需要去做这件事。你知道，我的生活会非常不同。

51. Buffett remains bearish on airlines

巴菲特对航空公司依然持悲观态度

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Bill Miller of Legg Mason.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自雷格·梅森的比尔·米勒。

He writes, “The U.S. airline industry has been plagued with terrible economics for over 100 years. With the pending merger of USAir and American, the industry will have consolidated to the point where the top four carriers will control almost 90 percent of the traffic.

他写道：“美国航空业在过去 100 多年里一直受到糟糕经济状况的困扰。随着 USAir 和美国航空的合并即将进行，行业将会整合到一个地步，前四大航空公司将控制几乎 90%的客运量。”

资本主义为求取生存的策略。

“As a result, the industry has been consistently profitable this past several years, with many of the airlines now earning double-digit returns on invested capital and generating substantial free cash flow.

因此，过去几年该行业一直保持盈利，许多航空公司现在的投资资本回报率达到了两位数，并产生了可观的自由现金流。

Do you think the industry’s much improved economics are likely to persist? And would there be any economic benefits if Berkshire were to own a domestic airline and pair it with NetJets?”

你认为行业大幅改善的经济状况会持续吗？如果伯克希尔拥有一家国内航空公司并与 NetJets 配对，会有什么经济利益吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the answer to the second is no.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。第二个问题的答案是否定的。

But the question about the industry is really interesting, because it is true that it has consolidated very significantly.

但关于这个行业的问题确实很有趣，因为它确实已经显著整合。

And in some businesses, you can have only two competitors and they’re still terrible businesses, they beat each other’s brains out. And sometimes they end up competing to do very stupid things. You can argue that that’s what happened with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. I mean, enormous companies that had a huge advantage over everybody else, but they still, in their battle to both report higher earnings every quarter and to beat the other guy out, you know, drove prices for insuring loans down to the improper levels, and did a lot of other stupid things, too.

在某些行业中，你可能只有两个竞争对手，但它们仍然是糟糕的企业，它们互相争斗。有时它们甚至会竞争做一些非常愚蠢的事情。你可以说，这就是弗雷迪·麦克和房利美的情况。我的意思是，这些巨大的公司在其他公司面前有巨大的优势，但在它们争相每个季度报告更高的收益和击败对手的过程中，导致贷款保险的价格降到不当水平，并做了许多其他愚蠢的事情。

So you see — you do see certain industries where once they get down to very — a very few companies, do extremely well. And you see other industries where, even when they get to be two of them, they don’t do that that well.

所以你看——你确实看到某些行业，一旦只剩下很少几家公司，就会表现得非常好。而你也看到其他行业，即使只有两家公司，它们的表现也并不好。

I mean, you can take Coke and Pepsi in the United States.

我意思是，你可以在美国喝可口可乐和百事可乐。

I mean, they’re the only two colas that people can name, and 50 percent or so of the soft drinks are colas. But if you go into a supermarket on the weekend, you will see them pricing their product at ridiculously low prices and competing very vigorously.

我意思是，它们是人们能说出的唯一两个可乐，而大约 50%的软饮料是可乐。但是如果你在周末去超市，你会看到他们以极低的价格定价自己的产品，并且竞争非常激烈。

So it’s very industry specific. The airline industry, you know, has this situation where they have very, very, very low incremental costs per seat, you know, with enormous fixed costs, and the temptation to sell that last seat at a very low price is very high and it’s very — and sometimes it can be very difficult to distinguish between the last seat and other seats.

所以这非常具有行业特性。航空业有这样的情况，他们每个座位的增量成本非常非常低，但固定成本却非常高，出售最后一个座位的诱惑非常大，而且有时很难区分最后一个座位和其他座位。

So it’s a labor-intensive, capital-intensive, largely commodity-type business, and it’s been — as Bill Miller points out in that question, it’s been, you know, a death trap for investors ever since Orville [Wright] took off.

所以这是一项劳动密集型、资本密集型，主要是商品类型的业务，正如比尔·米勒在那个问题中指出的，自从奥维尔·怀特起飞以来，这对投资者来说一直是一个死亡陷阱。

I mean, as I’ve said, if there had been a capitalist at Kitty Hawk he should have shot down Orville and done us all a favor. (Laughter)

我的意思是，正如我所说的，如果在基蒂霍克有一个资本家，他应该把奥维尔打下来，给我们大家一个好处。（笑声）

But the — but having neglected to do that, investors have poured money into airline companies, and aircraft manufacturing companies, now for 100 years-plus, with terrible results.

但是——但是由于忽视了这一点，投资者已经向航空公司和飞机制造公司投入了超过 100 年的资金，结果却非常糟糕。

And if it ever gets down to where there’s one airline and there’s no regulation, it will be a wonderful business. And then the question is whether, having gotten down, now, through a lot of bankruptcies, to a relatively few that are doing a high percentage of the seat miles, whether it’s a good business yet. I don’t know the answer, but I’m skeptical.

接下来的问题是，经过大量破产，现在是否仅存的几家航空公司能够做到很高的座位利用率，这是否算是好生意。我不知道答案，但我持怀疑态度。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the last time we were presented with a similar opportunity was when the railroads did exactly what Bill Miller suggests. The railroads got down and consolidated and got better control of their labor costs and it turned into a wonderful business. And what did we do? We missed it. We stumbled in very late to the party, right?

查理·芒格：好吧，上一次我们遇到类似机会时，铁路公司正是按照比尔·米勒的建议行事。铁路公司进行了整合，更好地控制了劳动力成本，结果变成了一项很好的生意。我们做了什么？我们错过了这个机会。我们很晚才加入这个派对，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So we’ve proven ourselves to be slow learners in this field, and it’s conceivable, isn’t it, that Bill Miller is right in what he suggests?

查理·芒格：那么我们做了什么呢？我们错过了这个机会。我们非常晚才加入这个行列，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Which way do you bet?

沃伦·巴菲特：你会押哪一边？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It goes into my too hard pile. (Scattered laughter)

查理·芒格：这进入了我的“太难”堆里。（散发笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Mine, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：我也是。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But he could be right.

查理·芒格：但他可能是对的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, sure he could. And it will be fun to watch.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他当然可以。而且看起来会很有趣。

But we like things we have stronger feelings about.

但我们更喜欢那些我们有更强烈感觉的事物。

We do not think that things will change dramatically in — well, with See’s Candy, you know, it’s — we’ve got — even there, you know, the real profitability is limited to the West Coast, but we do not see some competitor coming along and taking away business.

我们认为情况不会发生剧烈变化——好吧，关于 See’s Candy，你知道的——我们有——即使在那里，真正的盈利能力也仅限于西海岸，但我们并没有看到有什么竞争对手会出现并夺走业务。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You really couldn’t create another railroad and —

查理·芒格：你真的无法再创建另一条铁路——

WARREN BUFFETT: I hope not.

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望如此。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and you — and you can create another airline.

查理·芒格：——而你——你可以创建另一家航空公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Very easily, and you have people that like to do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：非常简单，而且你有喜欢这样做的人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s what we don’t like about it.

查理·芒格：这就是我们不喜欢它的原因。

WARREN BUFFETT: And people love doing it. It’s exciting to people.

沃伦·巴菲特：人们喜欢这样做。这让人感到兴奋。

And you can sell the idea. I’ve had, probably, a dozen proposals over the last 25 or 30 years from people that want to get into the airline business one way or the — and a number of them have. It’s sexy, for some reason.

你可以把这个想法卖出去。在过去的 25 或 30 年里，我大概收到了十几个想要进入航空业的提案，其中一些人确实进入了这个行业。出于某种原因，这个行业很吸引人。

I mean, it — you know, if you go to the office of some Mr. Big CEO and say, “I want to talk to you about this new airplane,” you get in the door. You know, I mean, if you want to talk to him about hauling coal or something, it’s a little different.

我的意思是，如果你去某位大公司的首席执行官办公室，说“我想和你谈谈这架新飞机”，你就能进门。你知道，如果你想和他谈谈运输煤炭之类的事情，那就有点不同了。

So it is a business that attracts people. And you can go out and raise money for a new airline, and the record is — it’s really been something. I don’t know how many bankruptcies there have been in the airline field, but it’s an enormous number.

这是一项吸引人们的生意。你可以出去为一家新航空公司筹集资金，记录是——这真是了不起。我不知道航空领域有多少次破产，但这个数字非常庞大。

And, of course, some have done it more than once. We bought USAir. I bought that. I was at Gorat’s with [CEO] Ed Colodny, and he explained to me how wonderful the airline was — he’s a good guy, incidentally — and I wrote a check.

当然，有些人做过不止一次。我们收购了美国航空。我买下了它。我和[首席执行官]埃德·科洛德尼在 Gorat's 餐厅，他向我解释了这家航空公司是多么出色——顺便说一句，他是个好人——然后我写了一张支票。

And by the time the check was cashed, they were having troubles. I mean, it did not take long.

当支票兑现时，他们就遇到了麻烦。我的意思是，这并没有花太长时间。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: And then they went bankrupt twice. We were very lucky on — we actually made quite a bit of money on it, as it turned out, because there was a little blip at one point. But I think it went bankrupt twice after we bought it.

沃伦·巴菲特：然后他们破产了两次。我们非常幸运——实际上，我们从中赚了不少钱，因为在某个时刻出现了一个小波动。但我认为在我们购买后，它破产了两次。

And Charlie and I were on the board, and we would look at these projections, you know, and they were just ridiculous. I mean, they never came true, did they, Charlie?

查理和我在董事会，我们会看这些预测，你知道，它们简直荒谬。我是说，它们从来没有实现过，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, no. It was —

查理·芒格：不，不，不。是——

WARREN BUFFETT: We were very popular because we actually pointed that out a few times. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们非常受欢迎，因为我们实际上指出了这一点几次。（笑声）

52. Mixed feelings on Berkshire stock buybacks

对伯克希尔股票回购的复杂感受

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Cliff.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，克利夫。

CLIFF GALLANT: I want to ask you about share repurchases. How hard a floor should shareholders think about the 1.2 times book value buyback multiple?

克利夫·加朗特：我想问你关于股票回购的问题。股东们应该把1.2倍账面价值的回购倍数看作是一个坚实的底线吗？

Are there circumstances under which you would not be buying back at 1.2?

在什么情况下您不会以 1.2 的价格回购？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, generally speaking, book value has got nothing to do with the price at which you should purchase your shares; intrinsic business value does. And the correlation between intrinsic business value and book value throughout the investment universe is — you know, there’s virtually no correlation.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。一般来说，账面价值与您应该购买股票的价格没有关系；内在商业价值才有关系。在整个投资领域，内在商业价值与账面价值之间几乎没有相关性。

So book value is unimportant to most companies. It actually has — it has a reasonable tracking utility at Berkshire.

因此，账面价值对大多数公司来说并不重要。实际上，在伯克希尔，它具有合理的跟踪效用。

Our intrinsic business value is very considerably above book value, and we have signaled that — we’ll say it right here, we’ve said it before — but in addition, we’ve signaled that by saying that we would repurchase our shares as long as we had a substantial cash balance, met all the needs of our operating companies, at 120 percent of book value, and if we got the opportunity to buy it there, we would probably buy a whole lot of it.

我们的内在商业价值远高于账面价值，我们已经发出了信号——我们在这里就说，我们之前也说过——此外，我们还通过表示只要我们有充足的现金余额，满足所有运营公司的需求，我们就会以账面价值的 120%回购我们的股票，如果有机会以这个价格购买，我们可能会大量购买。

The calculus is very much what I put in the report. You know, you take care of your business with money first, and if you can buy additional businesses at something where you add to the per-share value of the business, you do that.

这个计算过程与我在报告中提到的非常相似。你知道，首先用钱来照顾你的业务，如果你能以某种方式购买额外的业务，从而增加每股的业务价值，你就这样做。

If you can repurchase your shares at a significant discount from intrinsic value, it like buying dollar bills at 90 cents or 80 cents or whatever it may be, and it’s a very sure way of improving per-share value.

如果你能以显著低于内在价值的价格回购你的股票，就像以 90 美分或 80 美分或其他价格购买美元钞票，这是一种非常可靠的提高每股价值的方法。

It’s been very difficult for us to do it because every time we announce it, people say, “Well, if it’s — if he thinks it’s worth more than 120 percent of book,” you know —

这对我们来说非常困难，因为每次我们宣布时，人们都会说：“好吧，如果他认为这超过账面价值的 120%。”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Those cheapskates are willing to pay that.

查理·芒格：是的。这些小气鬼愿意为此付钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, right. Well, if at least one cheapskate is willing to pay that, the —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。如果至少有一个小气鬼愿意支付这个，——

And, you know, they’re right. And we don’t really — we’ve got mixed emotions on it.

而且，你知道，他们是对的。我们对此其实有些复杂的情感。

We don’t really like the idea of running a company where it makes most of its money by buying its partners out at a discount, but if partners want to sell out at a discount, we also like the idea of buying and making, you know, sure money that way.

我们并不喜欢这样的公司：它的大部分收入来源于以折扣买入合作伙伴的股份，但如果合作伙伴想要以折扣出售，我们也喜欢通过这种方式进行有把握的赚钱。

We haven’t done much of it. Most of the time our stock has sold in a reasonable range in relation to intrinsic business value. We would think that probably a fairly significant percentage of the time in recent years it sold at at least some discount. There were a few years when we thought it sold for more than intrinsic business value.

我们没有做太多。大多数时候，我们的股票在与内在商业价值相关的合理范围内出售。我们认为，近年来大约相当大比例的时间里，它至少以某种折扣出售。有几年我们认为它的售价超过了内在商业价值。

But if it, in our opinion, the directors’ opinion, the stock is selling at a significant discount and we’ve got the money around and we’ve got the stock offered to us in a reasonable quantity, we will buy it, and then — and there could be circumstances — it’s unlikely — but there could be circumstances where we’d buy a whole lot at a price that would be attractive for the stockholders who stayed in.

但如果在我们和董事们的意见中，股票以显著折扣出售，而我们有资金并且有合理数量的股票可供我们购买，我们会买入，然后——虽然不太可能——但也可能会有一些情况，我们会以对留存股东有吸引力的价格大量购买。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

53. Munger won’t be moving to Omaha

芒格不会搬到奥马哈

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi there. Sean Cawley. I’m a real estate agent in Los Angeles, California.

观众成员：你好。我是肖恩·考利。我是加利福尼亚州洛杉矶的一名房地产经纪人。

Question for Charlie. It’s kind of a real estate question, and it’s also a company culture question. Have you ever considered moving to Omaha to be closer to corporate headquarters?

查理的问题。这有点像房地产问题，也涉及公司文化问题。你有没有考虑过搬到奥马哈，以便离公司总部更近？

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Laughs) Oh, I think the answer to that is no. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：（笑）哦，我认为答案是否定的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m sure the answer to that is no.

沃伦·巴菲特：我敢肯定答案是否定的。

Our partnership works extremely well. And even though we’re somewhat technophobic, we have gotten to the point where we can handle using the phone — (laughter) — don’t push us beyond that.

我们的合作非常顺利。尽管我们有些害怕技术，但我们已经能够使用电话了——（笑声）——不要逼我们超出这个范围。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we’ve never learned anything beyond the phone.

查理·芒格：不，我们从未学到过超出电话的东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we — I mean, as a practical matter, we each know exactly how the other guy thinks, so that we don’t really even need the phone, exactly. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们——我的意思是，从实际的角度来看，我们彼此都非常清楚对方的想法，所以我们实际上甚至不需要电话。（笑声）

We used to do a lot of phoning back when it cost a lot of money to phone. Now it doesn’t cost anything to phone, and we don’t talk to each other, hardly. (Laughter)

我们以前打很多电话，那时候打电话很贵。现在打电话不花钱，我们几乎不再交流了。（笑声）

Charlie — but Charlie has a lot of fond thoughts about Omaha, incidentally, as do I.

查理——顺便说一下，查理对奥马哈有很多美好的回忆，我也是。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Although, I — as I said earlier on this weekend, they’re rebuilding it so rapidly now that I felt like Rip Van Winkle. They’ve torn down so many of the buildings I remember. It’s amazing how much Omaha has changed the last five years.

查理·芒格：是的。虽然，正如我在这个周末早些时候所说，他们现在重建得如此迅速，我感觉就像是沉睡的瑞普·范·温克尔。他们拆除了我记得的许多建筑。奥马哈在过去五年中变化真是惊人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you have to remember that a third of the lifetime of the country has passed during our lifetime, so you have to expect a little change occasionally, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你得记住，在我们的生命中，国家的三分之一的历史已经过去，所以你得偶尔期待一些变化，查理。（笑声）

54. Climate change isn’t a factor for short-term insurance rates

气候变化不是短期保险费的因素。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, Warren. We got a couple of questions related, this year, to climate change and its impact on the company.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，沃伦。今年我们有几个与气候变化及其对公司的影响相关的问题。

So let me ask this question from Clem Dinsmore, who asks: “If asked, what would the underwriting experts at your casualty insurance and reinsurance companies advise you and your fellow board members are the emerging risks to Berkshire’s many enterprises from the changes in extreme weather associated with climate change?”

让我问这个问题，来自 Clem Dinsmore，他问：“如果被问到，你们的财产保险和再保险公司的承保专家会建议你和你的董事会成员，气候变化相关的极端天气变化对伯克希尔的众多企业带来的新兴风险是什么？”

And I would add that Jed McDonald asked a separate question, but related, saying, “What are your thoughts on the price on carbon debate?”

我还想补充一点，杰德·麦克唐纳提出了一个相关但不同的问题，他说：“你对碳定价的辩论有什么看法？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, as you’ve noticed if you’ve been here the last few years, the climate really is getting a lot warmer. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，如果你在过去几年里一直在这里，你会注意到气候确实变得越来越暖和了。（笑声）

Obviously — well, Charlie knows far more about science than I do, which is not saying a whole lot, but the — my general feeling is that there is a — certainly a reasonable chance — that people that are worried about warming and the effect of CO2, et cetera, are right.

显然——好吧，查理对科学的了解远远超过我，这并不是说我懂得很多，但——我一般的感觉是，确实有一个合理的机会——那些担心全球变暖和二氧化碳等影响的人是正确的。

But I don’t know enough so that I can say that, you know, that I can speak as any kind of an expert on it.

但我对这方面了解不够，所以我不能说我可以作为任何专家来谈论它。

I don’t know the answer on it, but I certainly am willing to assume that — there are a lot of very smart people who think that, and I think that it’s a reasonable assumption.

我不知道这个问题的答案，但我当然愿意假设——有很多非常聪明的人这样认为，我认为这是一个合理的假设。

I don’t think that it makes any real difference in assessing insurance rates from year to year.

我认为在评估保险费率时，逐年之间并没有什么实质性的差别。

We have a general tendency to be pessimistic in our assumptions about the likelihood of natural catastrophes, but we would have that general bias, which I think is useful, regardless, if there were no carbon emissions of any kind going on.

我们通常倾向于对自然灾害的可能性持悲观态度，但我认为这种普遍的偏见是有用的，无论是否存在任何形式的碳排放。

We would still assume that whatever the past history had been of natural disasters, we would assume that they were going to be somewhat worse.

我们仍然会假设，无论过去自然灾害的历史如何，我们都认为它们会变得更加严重。

And the global warming, in terms of resetting prices of insurance from year to year, is not a real factor.

全球变暖在每年重置保险价格方面并不是一个真正的因素。

Our general pessimistic bias is something of a factor.

我们普遍的悲观偏见在某种程度上是一个因素。

The second part about pricing of carbon emissions, do you want to repeat that again?

关于碳排放定价的第二部分，你想再重复一遍吗？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: The full question — and I abbreviated it — was, “What are your thoughts on the carbon — the price of carbon — debate?

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：完整的问题——我简化了——是：“你对碳的价格辩论有什么看法？”

“Do you think it’s a feasible way, for example, to incentivize efficiency improvements and capture the externalities of carbon’s damaging effects, or is it a lofty, idealized concept too tricky to figure out in practice?”

“你认为这是一种可行的方法吗，例如，激励效率提升并捕捉碳的有害影响的外部性，还是一个过于理想化、在实践中难以实现的高尚概念？”

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say that the question calls for having Charlie give the answer. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想这个问题应该让查理来回答。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve got to realize that I’m a Caltech-trained meteorologist, but that was before they’d invented most of modern meteorology. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，你得意识到我是一名加州理工学院训练的气象学家，但那是在他们发明大部分现代气象学之前。（笑声）

I think that I think that carbon trading is pretty impractical, a whole bunch of nations with different ideas, and so on.

我认为碳交易相当不切实际，各国有着不同的想法等等。

And I think if you’re going to change habits, the correct answer is carbon taxes.

我认为如果你要改变习惯，正确的答案是碳税。

I think Europe, because they’re socialists and wanted to tax the thing the people needed the most, they put these big high taxes on motor fuel. So they did it by accident, and not because it was a good idea, vis-a-vis global warming and a lot of other issues, but because they really needed the money.

我认为欧洲是因为他们是社会主义者，想要对人们最需要的东西征税，所以对机动车燃料征收了高额税款。他们是出于意外这样做的，并不是因为这是一个好主意，关于全球变暖和其他许多问题，而是因为他们真的需要钱。

But I think they stumbled into the right policy. I think the United States should have way higher taxes on motor fuel, and that’s efficient. (Applause)

但我认为他们偶然找到了正确的政策。我认为美国应该对机动车燃料征收更高的税，这样是有效的。（掌声）

Some group of shareholders, though. They like clapping for high taxes. (Laughter)

一些股东团体，他们喜欢为高税收鼓掌。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: They weren’t all clapping. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：他们并不是都在鼓掌。（笑声和掌声）

55. Doug Kass’s short-selling challenge

道格·卡斯的卖空挑战

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Doug.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，道格。

DOUG KASS: Warren, my next question is both a question and an unusual challenge.

道格·卡斯：沃伦，我下一个问题既是一个问题，也是一个不寻常的挑战。

I’m asking this next question because in the past, you’ve been open to inviting your audience to apply for jobs.

我问下一个问题是因为在过去，你一直乐于邀请你的观众申请工作。

In 2002, you suggested that shareholders who thought they were eligible to send in their qualifications if they were interested in seeking a seat on your board of directors.

在 2002 年，您建议那些认为自己有资格的股东如果有兴趣寻求董事会席位，可以提交他们的资格。

And, again, in your 2006 letter, when you advertised for a successor to Lou Simpson at GEICO, you said at the time “Send me your resume.”

在您 2006 年的信中，当您为 GEICO 寻找 Lou Simpson 的继任者时，您当时说“把您的简历发给我。”

In the past, you have discussed your views on short selling. You have cited that stocks tend to rise over time, and you’ve talked about the asymmetry between reward and risk.

在过去，你曾讨论过你对卖空的看法。你提到股票往往会随着时间上涨，并且谈到了收益与风险之间的不对称性。

By contrast, the last 15 years has demonstrated that short selling can be a value additive tool to total return when done by professionals. In fact, I believe Todd Combs had success as a short seller when you hired him.

相比之下，过去 15 年证明了短线卖空在专业人士操作时可以成为总回报的增值工具。事实上，我相信当你雇佣 Todd Combs 时，他作为短线卖空者取得了成功。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He had so much success he stopped doing it. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：他成功得太多，以至于停止了这件事。（笑声和掌声）

DOUG KASS: Yes, Charlie, but he got the job from that success. My question is —

道格·卡斯：是的，查理，但他是通过那个成功获得这份工作的。我的问题是——

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no, he didn’t. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不，他没有。（笑）

Can’t slide that one in there, Doug. (Laughter)

不能把那个放进去，道格。（笑声）

DOUG KASS: My question is: would you ever consider committing capital to a short-selling strategy? Would you or Berkshire consider being my Homer Dodge, who invested in your partnership after the original seven investors?

道格·卡斯：我的问题是：您是否会考虑将资金投入做空策略？您或伯克希尔是否会考虑成为我的霍默·道奇，他在最初的七位投资者之后投资于您的合伙企业？

Would you or Berkshire Hathaway be willing to give my firm at least $100 million in a managed account?

您或伯克希尔·哈撒韦愿意给我的公司至少 1 亿美元的管理账户吗？

If Seabreeze failed to outperform the increase, during the two-year period, of the book value increase in Berkshire, all the earned fees earned would be contributed half to the Sherwood Foundation, and half to two charities of my choice, including the Jewish Federation of Palm Beach County?

如果 Seabreeze 在两年期间未能超过伯克希尔账面价值的增长，那么所赚取的所有费用将一半捐给 Sherwood 基金会，另一半捐给我选择的两个慈善机构，包括棕榈滩县犹太联合会

And even if Seabreeze outperformed Berkshire’s change in book value, 25 percent of the earned fees would be contributed to the charities.

即使 Seabreeze 的表现超过了伯克希尔的账面价值变化，获得费用的 25%也将捐赠给慈善机构。

And I want to add something else. You talked about being technophobic.

我还想补充一点。你提到了对技术的恐惧。

Technology may be very hard for Berkshire to invest in, but it is also disruptive to many industries whose business models are scathed by it, and this produces very fertile ground for short-selling opportunities.

科技对伯克希尔来说可能很难投资，但它也对许多受到其影响的行业的商业模式造成了破坏，这为做空机会提供了非常肥沃的土壤。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we got to —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们得——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me add to that.

查理·芒格：让我补充一下。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK — 1:55 without an ad, but — (laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的——1:55 没有广告，但——（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer to your question is no. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：你问题的答案是否定的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I are no strangers to short selling. I mean, we both —

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我对卖空并不陌生。我的意思是，我们都——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Failed at it.

查理·芒格：在这方面失败了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

So we’ll — just think about how lucky you are. You don’t have the competition from all kinds of people that listen to us or — ourselves.

所以我们——只需想想你有多幸运。你没有来自所有听我们讲的人或我们自己的竞争。

No, we — I may even propose a little wager at some point, but we’ll let that ride for the time being.

不，我们——我可能会在某个时候提议一个小赌注，但我们暂时先不提这个。

I’ve known — well, if you go back far enough, you know, we did a reasonable amount of short selling, and I’ve certainly identified lots of companies that I thought were far overpriced, and I’ve identified a fair number of companies that I not only thought, but was virtually certain, were frauds. And so, Charlie — we’ve been seeing them ever since we got in the business.

我知道——好吧，如果你追溯得够远，你知道，我们确实进行了相当数量的卖空，我也确实识别了很多我认为价格过高的公司，还有相当多的公司我不仅认为，而且几乎可以肯定是欺诈的。所以，查理——自从我们进入这个行业以来，我们一直在看到这些。

But making a lot of money short selling, still, is not a game that appeals to us over a long period of time. It’s one of those things that —

但长期来看，做空赚很多钱仍然不是我们所感兴趣的游戏。这就是其中之一——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t like trading agony for money. (Applause)

查理·芒格：我们不喜欢用痛苦换取金钱。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we wish you well. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们祝你好运。（笑声）

56. Reluctantly paying more for a great business

不情愿地为一个伟大的生意支付更多费用

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ben Sauer (PH) from Shreveport, Louisiana.

观众成员：来自路易斯安那州什里夫波特的本·索尔（PH）。

Could you be more specific about what factors you considered when determining what a fair price was for an acquisition such as Heinz?

您能否更具体地说明在确定像亨氏这样的收购的公平价格时考虑了哪些因素？

And also, what sources do you use to make judgments about major changes that will affect an industry?

而且，您使用哪些来源来判断将影响一个行业的重大变化？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we usually — we usually feel we’re paying too much. Isn’t that right, Charlie? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们通常——我们通常觉得我们付得太多了。是吧，查理？（笑）

But we find the business so compelling, the management, our associates, so compelling, that we gag and we get there on the price.

但我们发现这个业务非常吸引人，管理层和我们的合作伙伴也非常吸引人，以至于我们忍不住接受这个价格。

But we — there is no mathematical — perfect mathematical — formula.

但是我们——没有完美的数学——公式。

Looking back, when we’ve bought wonderful businesses that turned out to continue to be wonderful, we could’ve paid significantly more money, and they still would have been great business decisions. But you never know 100 percent for sure.

回顾过去，当我们购买了那些结果证明依然出色的优秀企业时，我们本可以支付更多的钱，它们仍然会是伟大的商业决策。但你永远无法百分之百确定。

And so it isn’t as precise as you might think. Generally speaking, if you get a chance to buy a wonderful business — and by that, I would mean one that has economic characteristics that lead you to believe, with a high degree of certainty, that they will be earning unusual returns on capital over time — unusually high — and, better yet, if they get the chance to employ more capital at — again, at high rates of return — that’s the best of all businesses. And you probably should stretch a little.

因此，它并不像你想的那么精确。一般来说，如果你有机会购买一个优秀的企业——我指的是那些具有经济特征，让你有很高的把握相信它们会随着时间的推移获得异常的资本回报——异常高——而且更好的是，如果它们有机会以同样高的回报率投入更多的资本——那就是所有企业中最好的。你可能应该稍微放宽一些。

Charlie and I have had several conversations where we were looking at a building — a business — which we liked, and were sort of gagging at the price, and Charlie or I will say, you know, “Let’s do it,” even though it kind of kills us to pay that last 5 percent.

查理和我有过几次谈话，我们看中了一项业务——我们喜欢的业务——虽然价格让我们有点不适，但查理或我会说：“我们来做吧，”即使付那最后的5%让我们有些心痛。

We did that with See’s Candy. Charlie was the one that said, “For God’s sakes, Warren, write the check.” I was the one that was suffering.

我们在See’s Candy的交易中也这样做了。查理是那个人，他说：“天哪，沃伦，快写支票。”而我则是那个感到痛苦的人。

But it’s happened quite a few times, hasn’t it, Charlie?

但这已经发生过好几次了，不是吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It almost always happens. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这几乎总是发生。（笑声）

Modern prices are not cheap.

现代价格并不便宜。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. And great businesses, you know, you’re not going to find lots of them, and you’re not going to get the opportunity to buy them and — although you do in the market.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。伟大的企业，你知道，你不会找到很多这样的企业，你也不会有机会去购买它们——尽管你在市场上确实会遇到。

The stock market will offer you opportunities for profit, percentage-wise, that you’ll never see, in terms of negotiated purchase of business.

股市将为您提供利润机会，从百分比上看，这是您在商业谈判购买中永远无法看到的。

In negotiated purchase of a business, you’re almost always dealing with someone that has the option of either selling or not selling, and can sort of pick the time when they decide to sell, and all of that sort of thing.

在谈判购买一项业务时，您几乎总是与有选择权的人打交道，他们可以选择出售或不出售，并且可以在决定出售时选择时间，以及所有这些事情。

In stock markets, it’s an auction market. Crazy things can happen.

在股票市场中，这是一个拍卖市场。疯狂的事情可能会发生。

You can have, you know, some technological blip that will cause a flash crash or something. And the world really hasn’t changed at all, but all kinds of selling mechanisms are tripped off, and that sort of thing.

你可能会遇到一些技术故障，导致闪电崩盘之类的情况。世界实际上并没有发生任何变化，但各种卖出机制被触发，类似的事情就会发生。

So you will see opportunities in the stock market that you’ll never really get in the business market.

所以你会在股市中看到一些机会，而在商业市场中你永远无法真正获得这些机会。

But what we really like, we really like buying businesses to hold and keep. We like buying cheap marketable securities, too. But particularly when you’ve got lots of cash coming in and you’re going to continue to have lots of cash coming in, you really want to deploy it in great businesses that you can own forever.

但我们真正喜欢的是购买企业来持有和保留。我们也喜欢购买便宜的可交易证券。但特别是当你有大量现金流入，并且将继续有大量现金流入时，你真的想把它投入到你可以永远拥有的优秀企业中。

Charlie, anything? 查理，有什么消息吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. It — we’re sort of in a different mode now, and that has a great lesson, in that if we’d kept our earlier modes, if we’d never learned, we wouldn’t have done very well.

查理·芒格：不。我们现在有点处于不同的状态，这有一个很大的教训，如果我们保持早期的状态，如果我们从未学习过，我们就不会做得很好。

The game of life is a game of everlasting learning. At least it is if you want to win.

生活的游戏是一个永恒学习的游戏。至少如果你想赢的话。

WARREN BUFFETT: We want to win.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想要胜利。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

57. George W. Bush’s 10 words of economic wisdom

乔治·W·布什的 10 句经济智慧

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol. 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Logan Reed (PH) of Pawling, New York, and has both a question and a postscript, and I’m going to do the postscript first. It’s friendly.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自纽约波林的洛根·里德（PH），包含一个问题和一个附言，我将先处理附言。它很友好。

“I’m an 86-year-old World War II vet, which puts me about halfway between you and Mr. Munger. I would respectfully and urgently request that you quit eating so many hamburgers. (Laughter)

“我是一名 86 岁的二战老兵，这让我大约处于你和芒格先生之间的中间位置。我恳请您紧急停止吃这么多汉堡包。（笑声）”

“Those things plug up your arteries, and I want to keep you around for a while, in spite of the fact” — the unfriendliness comes in here — “that you voted for President Obama.” (Laughter)

“那些东西会堵塞你的动脉，我想让你多活一段时间，尽管事实是”——这里出现了不友好的语气——“你投票支持了奥巴马总统。”（笑声）

Now, here is the question.

现在，问题来了。

WARREN BUFFETT: This guy is trying to kill me, and he’s doing it — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这个家伙想要杀了我，他正在这么做——（笑声）

CAROL LOOMIS: “Over the years, you’ve frequently alluded to your legendary reputation for thriftiness, and you’ve extolled the virtues of the managers of Berkshire companies who have invariably been extremely cost conscious.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：“多年来，你经常提到你传奇般的节俭声誉，并赞扬了伯克希尔公司经理们的美德，他们始终非常注重成本。”

“If these are hallmarks of the philosophy which has enabled you to achieve your astounding success, how can you possibly support an administration which has plunged our country into $16 trillion worth of debt, and has not indicated the slightest concern — (applause) — over the efficiency — inefficiency — over the inefficiency of big government?”

“如果这些是使您取得惊人成功的哲学特征，您如何能支持一个让我们的国家陷入16万亿美元债务的政府，并且对大政府的低效完全没有表示担忧——（掌声）——”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the 16 trillion, we’ll have to give Bush a certain amount of credit for that, too. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，16万亿，我们也得给布什一定的功劳。（掌声）

They certainly didn’t — certainly wasn’t — the Obama administration that, at least, allowed policy that created the greatest financial crisis and required an appropriate stimulus on the part of the government. (Applause)

他们当然——至少不是——奥巴马政府，至少不是让政策造成了我们一生中最大的金融危机并需要政府采取适当刺激措施的。

But, in the end, I find it totally unproductive — and that fellow at 86 probably is — should have found it out by now — to discuss politics with people. I mean, you’re to have roughly half agree with you and half disagree.

但归根结底，我发现讨论政治完全没有生产力——那个86岁的人可能——到现在应该明白这一点——与人们讨论政治。我的意思是，你会有大约一半的人同意你，另一半的人不同意你。

So if you — if you look at this — the trouble is, Charlie and I, even though he’s a Republican, I’m a Democrat, we really don’t disagree as much as you might think based on that.

所以如果你——如果你看看这个——问题是，查理和我，尽管他是共和党人，我是民主党人，但我们实际上并没有你想象的那么不同。

Otherwise, I could say you could just take your pick here and vote for one of us and ignore the other one, and we would offer a little something for everyone.

否则，我可以说你可以在这里随意选择，投票支持我们其中一个，忽略另一个，我们会为每个人提供一点东西。

The amount of deficit spending in the last four years, the amount of stimulus provided — fiscal stimulus provided — I think, has been quite appropriate in relation to the threat to the economy that was posed by the greatest panic in my lifetime.

在过去四年中，赤字支出的金额，以及提供的刺激措施——财政刺激措施——我认为，这与我一生中所经历的最大恐慌所带来的经济威胁相比，是相当适当的。

I mean, you literally had a situation where Berkshire Hathaway was getting a phone call because General Electric needed money, and we were the last stop.

我指的是，你们实际上遇到了一个情况，伯克希尔·哈撒韦接到了电话，因为通用电气需要资金，而我们是最后的选择。

That is quite a situation. It’s quite a situation when Freddie and Fannie go into conservatorship and WaMu and Wachovia fail, and where money market funds have 5 percent drained out of them in three days, and with a panic underway.

这是一个相当大的情况。（笑声）当房利美和房地美进入管制，华盛顿互助银行和华盛顿互助银行倒闭，以及货币市场基金在三天内被抽走5%的资金，危机正在发生。

So I — we needed fiscal stimulus in this country.

所以我——我们在这个国家需要财政刺激。

Now, the real question is: how do you get off of that? And that is a problem, but it’s a lesser problem than we would’ve had if we’d decided to follow some austerity program, in my view, at least, starting in 2008.

现在，真正的问题是：你如何摆脱这一点？这确实是一个问题，但我认为它是一个比如果我们在2008年决定采取某种紧缩计划会面临的问题小得多。

How do you feel about that, Charlie?

你对此感觉如何，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I agree with you completely. (Applause)

查理·芒格：我完全同意你的观点。（掌声）

And, by the way, so did George W. Bush.

顺便说一下，乔治·W·布什也是如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That was bipartisan. We were in so much trouble, that on both sides of the aisle, we finally got together and supported these extreme interventions.

查理·芒格：这是两党合作。我们陷入了如此大的麻烦，以至于在两边的议员中，我们最终团结在一起，支持这些极端的干预措施。

WARREN BUFFETT: George Bush issued, probably, the ten greatest words of economic thought in history. Most people don’t give him credit for that.

沃伦·巴菲特：乔治·布什可能发表了历史上十个最伟大的经济思想词汇。大多数人并没有给予他应有的认可。

They think of Adam Smith and comparative advantage and Keynes and animal spirits and all those guys.

他们想到了亚当·斯密和比较优势、凯恩斯和动物精神，以及所有那些人。

But George Bush went out there in September of 2008 and said, “If money doesn’t loosen up, this sucker could go down.” (Laughter)

但是乔治·布什在2008年9月站出来说：“如果资金不松动，这个家伙可能会倒下。” （笑声）

I mean, that is a man that knew how to get to the point. (Laughter)

我意思是，那是一个知道如何直截了当的人。（笑声）

And I give him great credit for it, enormous credit.

我对此给予他很高的评价，极大的赞赏。

And plenty of members of his party did not agree with what he was doing, but we owe him a lot, in that respect.

他的党内有很多成员不同意他的做法，但在这方面我们欠他很多。

And, you know, we — our leaders, generally speaking, in both parties, once they were in the terrible trouble, I think they behaved, or came up with policies that, in general, were very useful in avoiding something far worse than what we experienced.

而且，你知道，一般来说，我们的领导人，无论属于哪个党，一旦遇到可怕的麻烦，我认为他们的行为，或者提出的政策，总体上是非常有用的，以避免比我们经历的事情更糟糕的事情。

And they weren’t easy to do. I mean, it took some guts.

而且这些并不容易做到。我的意思是，这需要一些勇气。

So, I am disturbed by a national debt that grows in respect to GDP. In fact, I wrote an article in The New York Times, an op-ed piece, in — I think maybe 2009 or 2010 — talking about this very problem.

所以，我对国家债务相对于 GDP 的增长感到不安。事实上，我在《纽约时报》上写了一篇文章，一篇评论文章，可能是在 2009 年或 2010 年，讨论的正是这个问题。

But, you know, we came out of World War II with a debt higher — a gross or net debt — higher in relation to GDP than we have now, and people were predicting terrible things at that time because of that situation, and the country has done sensationally.

但是，你知道，我们在第二次世界大战后，债务与 GDP 的比率比现在要高，无论是总债务还是净债务，当时人们因为这种情况预测了可怕的事情，但国家表现得非常出色。

The real danger is that it just continues to grow, and it gets easier to print money than exercise some discipline.

真正的危险在于它只会继续增长，印钞变得比施加一些纪律更容易。

But we’ve encountered far worse problems than we face now. I mean, this is not our country’s toughest hour, by a huge margin.

但我们遇到过比现在更糟糕的问题。我的意思是，这绝不是我们国家最艰难的时刻，差距非常大。

And I think we will do fine, but with a lot of bickering, and kind of nonsense that will bother you when you read about it day to day. But when you look at it from a viewpoint of history 10 or 20 years from now, you will not be that disturbed.

我认为我们会做得很好，但会有很多争吵和一些琐事，这些在你每天阅读时会让你感到烦恼。但当你从 10 年或 20 年后的历史角度来看待它时，你就不会那么困扰。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you about George W. Bush, and I like these nonpartisan episodes when we get together and do things right.

查理·芒格：嗯，我同意你关于乔治·W·布什的看法，我喜欢这些非党派的时刻，当我们聚在一起做正确的事情。

And I also think that our current problems are quite confusing. In fact, if you aren’t confused, I don’t think you understand it very well. (Laughter)

我也认为我们目前的问题相当复杂。事实上，如果你不感到困惑，我觉得你并没有很好地理解它。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That sort of immunizes you from everything. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这就让你免疫于一切。（笑）

How bothered are you by the level of debt in relation to GDP?

你对债务与 GDP 的比例感到多烦恼？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think there’s any one fixed ratio that is written in the stars.

查理·芒格：我认为没有任何一个固定的比例是注定的。

As a matter of fact, most of the debt, as I conceive it, is not even counted in what you call “debt.” The off-the-books debt of the United States is bigger than the on-the-books debt, all the present value of future promises that are unfunded.

事实上，我认为大部分债务甚至不算在你们所称的“债务”中。美国的隐性债务比账面上的债务还要大，所有未资助的未来承诺的现值。

WARREN BUFFETT: That can be changed, however.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，这可以改变。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. But, if they can be changed, but are we really going to take Social Security away from somebody who’s worked a lifetime?

查理·芒格：是的。但是，如果它们可以被改变，我们真的要把社会保障从一个工作了一辈子的人身上拿走吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we shouldn’t.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们不应该。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s very likely.

查理·芒格：我认为这不太可能。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. But Social Security is not a killer, actually, in terms — if you have a GDP that rises a couple percent in real terms —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。但是社会保障实际上并不是一个杀手，实际上——如果你的 GDP 在实际意义上增长几个百分点——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course — that’s the great problem. All of our problems are trivial, if GDP will just rise at 2 percent per annum, per capita.

查理·芒格：当然——那就是最大的难题。如果GDP每年以2%的速度上升，那我们所有的问题都是微不足道的

All these problems that the Republicans are screaming about fade into insignificance if we can do that.

如果我们能做到这一点，所有这些共和党人所大喊大叫的问题都将显得微不足道。

But you’ve got to have policies that enable you to do it, and I’m not sure we always do that very well. (Applause)

但你必须有能够让你做到这一点的政策，而我不确定我们总是做得很好。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Stay tuned.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。请继续关注。

58. Benjamin Moore won’t go downmarket

Benjamin Moore不会走低端市场。

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: I have a question about the competitive landscape in the paint business.

乔纳森·布兰特：我对涂料行业的竞争格局有一个问题。

I personally always use Benjamin Moore, but some say that Benjamin Moore is disadvantaged because it doesn’t control its own distribution, as does Sherwin-Williams, and they note that it has lost market share to Behr, which is sold in the home centers at lower prices.

我个人总是使用Benjamin Moore，但有人说Benjamin Moore处于劣势，因为它不像舍温·威廉姆斯那样控制自己的分销，他们指出它已经失去了市场份额给贝尔，而贝尔在家居中心以更低的价格出售。

You recently replaced management there. What changes in strategy and/or pricing, if any, are being undertaken at that unit, and what is the outlook for that franchise?

您最近更换了那里的管理层。该单位正在进行哪些战略和/或定价方面的变化（如果有的话），以及该特许经营的前景如何？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Benjamin Moore, it’s a relatively small percentage of the total paint industry, but it — at the high end, it is the best regarded paint, and we have not lost position in that respect.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。Benjamin Moore在整个涂料行业中占比较小，但在高端市场，它是最受推崇的涂料，我们在这方面没有失去地位。

But the — when we purchased Benjamin Moore, I made a promise. I even made a video. It had a dealer system, and people that invested their savings and passed on from generation to generation dealerships from Benjamin Moore, and counted on the company adhering to a dealer system, even though you could always get a huge jump in volume, particularly in the first year, if you went with the big boxes.

但是，当我们收购Benjamin Moore时，我做出了一个承诺。我甚至拍了一段视频。它有一个经销商系统，那些投资了他们的积蓄并将Benjamin Moore的经销权代代相传的人们，依赖于公司遵循经销商系统，尽管如果你选择大型商超，特别是在第一年，你总是可以获得巨大的销量提升。

So we were always approached by the big boxes, and they said, you know, “Let us take Benjamin Moore into our stores,” whether it be Home Depot or whomever. And we would’ve gotten a big jump in volume when that happened and they would’ve loved us — to have us — as a brand with that kind of identity in their stores, but it would’ve represented a total change in the distribution arrangement.

所以我们总是受到大型商家的接触，他们说：“让我们把Benjamin Moore带入我们的商店，”无论是家得宝还是其他商家。当那发生时，我们会获得一个巨大的销量增长，他们会非常喜欢我们——作为一个在他们商店中拥有那种身份的品牌，但这将意味着分销安排的彻底改变。

I don’t think it would’ve worked out as well over time, and I know it would have been essentially — particularly after my pledge, which the other — which the management pledged too, they would’ve been double-crossing a network of dealers that trusted us, and trusted us when we bought it to continue with the policy.

我认为这随着时间的推移不会那么好，我知道这本质上会——特别是在我承诺之后，其他管理层也做出了承诺，他们会背叛一个信任我们的经销商网络，而他们在我们购买时信任我们继续这一政策。

A dealer policy will work with a first-class brand like Benjamin Moore. It will never get the kind of market share as will take a Behr, which is distributed through Home Depot.

经销商政策将与像本杰明·摩尔这样的顶级品牌合作。它永远无法获得像通过家得宝分销的贝尔那样的市场份额。

We were actually offered Behr at one time. Charlie, do you remember that one?

我们曾经被推荐过贝尔。查理，你还记得那件事吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I do.

查理·芒格：是的，我是。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. But the company was actually investigating, and went on its way to implementing, some moves that would’ve, in effect, gutted, or we felt would drastically hurt the dealers and violate the pledge that I’d made to them back when we bought it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。但该公司实际上正在调查，并准备实施一些措施，这在事实上会削弱，或者我们认为会严重伤害经销商并违反我在购买时向他们做出的承诺。

So we did have a change there. And we will — we will not follow the Sherwin-Williams path, which is a very — I mean, it’s a very effective business strategy. I’m not knocking that at all, but that is not our strategy. Our strategy will be a dealer strategy, focused on the high end of the market.

所以我们确实在这里进行了改变。而且我们——我们不会遵循谢尔温-威廉姆斯的路径，那是一种非常有效的商业策略。我一点也不贬低这一点，但这不是我们的策略。我们的策略将是经销商策略，专注于市场的高端。

专注于细分领域的策略跟乔布斯的观点很接近，参考：《2003-12-03 Steve Jobs.The Rolling Stone Interview》。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Besides, it’s worked very well.

查理·芒格：此外，这运作得非常好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah, it’s worked well, and it’ll continue to work well.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的，这运作得很好，并且将继续运作得很好。

It doesn’t mean that Sherwin-Williams won’t do extremely well. I think they will. It doesn’t mean that Behr won’t do well. I think they will.

这并不意味着舍温-威廉姆斯不会表现得非常好。我认为他们会表现得很好。这并不意味着贝尔不会表现得好。我认为他们会表现得很好。

But we are in a different segment and it’s up to us to protect and really foster the dealer distribution network, and I think we can have something, and do have something, very special with those dealers and with the position that Benjamin Moore has.

但我们处于一个不同的领域，保护并真正培养经销商分销网络是我们的责任，我认为我们可以与这些经销商以及本杰明·摩尔所处的位置拥有一些非常特别的东西。

But it will not lead to far higher market shares or anything. I think it will lead — and it has — to very decent profitability. Benjamin Moore is a good business, and I think it will continue to be a good business.

但这不会导致更高的市场份额或其他任何东西。我认为这会导致——而且确实如此——相当可观的盈利能力。本杰明·摩尔是一家好公司，我认为它将继续是一家好公司。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree totally. I always wish we could buy five more like it tomorrow.

查理·芒格：我完全同意。我总是希望我们明天能再买五个这样的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, exactly.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。

59. Stock strategy

股票策略

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Derek Foster, Ottawa, Canada.

观众成员：德里克·福斯特，加拿大渥太华。

First of all, thank you, Warren, for sharing all your information. You’ve changed my life. I took finance in university, couldn’t understand Greek formulas, but now I can invest reasonably well.

首先，感谢你，沃伦，分享你所有的信息。你改变了我的生活。我在大学学过金融，但无法理解希腊公式，但现在我可以合理地投资了。

My question to you is, in the past you’ve said for an investor, you should simply — for 99 percent of investors — you should simply stick money in an index fund and let it go and don’t worry about it. Those 1 percent of investors, choose your best five stocks and put a substantial amount of money in it.

我问你的问题是，过去你曾说过，对于投资者来说，99%的投资者应该简单地把钱放在指数基金中，让它去，不用担心。那 1%的投资者，选择你最好的五只股票，并投入一笔可观的资金。

I’m just wondering, how about a strategy of, perhaps, buying 20 of the best stocks in America, you know, Procter & Gamble, Coca-Cola, Johnson & Johnson, whatever, the companies that have been around for centuries — or a century or decades or whatever — and just leaving it at that.

我只是想知道，是否可以考虑一种策略，比如购买美国 20 只最好的股票，比如宝洁、可口可乐、强生等等，这些公司已经存在了几个世纪——或者一个世纪，或者几十年——然后就这样放着不管。

Do you think that that would outperform an index fund over the long term? And I want Charlie’s opinion as well.

你认为这在长期内会超过指数基金吗？我也想听听查理的意见。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know whether you’re saying the 20 largest companies or the 20 best. You might get different thoughts from different people on what they are.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不知道你是说 20 家最大的公司还是 20 家最好的公司。不同的人可能会对它们有不同的看法。

But I think you would — probably the 20 you would pick would virtually match the results of an index fund. Who knows exactly which ones would be the best?

但我认为您选择的20家公司可能会与指数基金的结果几乎相同。谁能确切知道哪些会是最好的呢？

But the real distinction — and Graham made this in his book, basically — is between the person who is going to spend an appreciable amount of time becoming something of an expert on businesses, because that’s what stocks are, or the person who is going to be busy with another profession, wants to own equities, and actually will actually do very well in equities. But the real problem they have is that they may tend to get excited about stocks at the wrong time.

但真正的区别——基本上，格雷厄姆在他的书中提到——是在于那些花费相当多时间成为商业专家的人，因为这就是股票的本质，或者是那些忙于其他职业、希望拥有股票、并且实际上在股票市场表现良好的人。但他们真正面临的问题是，他们可能会在错误的时机对股票感到兴奋。

You know, they, really, the idea of buying an index fund over time is not to buy stocks at the right time or the right stocks. It’s to avoid buying them at the wrong time, the wrong stocks.

你知道，他们，实际上，购买指数基金的想法并不是在正确的时间或购买正确的股票。目的是避免在错误的时间购买错误的股票。

So equities will do well over time, and you just have to avoid getting — you know, getting excited when other people are excited, or getting excited about certain industries when other people are, trying to behave like a professional when you aren’t spending the time and bringing what’s needed to the game to be a professional.

所以，股票市场随着时间的推移会表现良好，您只需避免在别人兴奋时也兴奋，或在某些行业里受到他人影响而兴奋，试图表现得像个专业人士，而实际上您并没有花时间和投入所需的专业知识。

And if you’re an amateur investor, there’s nothing wrong with being an amateur investor, and you just simply — you’ve got a very logical, profitable course of action available to you, and that is simply to buy into American business in a broadly diversified way and put your money in over time.

如果你是一个业余投资者，成为业余投资者并没有什么错，你只需简单地——你有一个非常合理、盈利的行动方案，那就是以广泛多样化的方式投资美国企业，并随着时间的推移逐步投入你的资金。

So I would say your group of 20 will probably match an index fund, and you’ll probably do well in that, and you will do well in an index fund.

所以我会说，您的20家公司可能会与指数基金相匹配，您可能会在其中表现良好，您在指数基金中也会表现良好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have nothing to add. I do think it’s — that knowing the edge of your own competency is very important. If you think you know a lot more than you do, well, you’re really asking for a lot of trouble.

查理·芒格：嗯，我没有什么好补充的。我确实认为，了解自己能力的边界是非常重要的。如果你认为自己知道的比实际多得多，那你真的是在自找麻烦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And that’s true outside of investments, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这在投资之外也是如此。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Works particularly well in matrimony. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。在婚姻中尤其有效。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you want to give any other advice on that subject?

沃伦·巴菲特：你想在这个话题上给出其他建议吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: He gave it in the movie. I saw people taking notes.

沃伦·巴菲特：他在电影中讲了这个。我看到有人在做笔记。

60. Are Buffett’s stock donations hurting Berkshire’s price?

巴菲特的股票捐赠是否在影响伯克希尔的股价？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from James Brodbelt Harris of Columbus, Ohio.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自俄亥俄州哥伦布市的詹姆斯·布罗德贝尔特·哈里斯。

He says that your enormously generous multibillion charitable gifts of Berkshire Hathaway stock over the past decade have, and will continue to be, sources of salable assets for the charities linked to the Buffett, Gates, and Munger families.

他说，您在过去十年中对伯克希尔哈撒韦股票的巨大慷慨捐赠，已经并将继续成为与巴菲特、盖茨和芒格家族相关的慈善机构可出售资产的来源。

Could annual sales of billions of dollars’ worth of donated stock by these charitable foundations be a reason why shares have traded under 120 percent of book value, and will announced share repurchase plans fully address this selling by the charitable funds in the coming decade?

这些慈善基金每年捐赠的股票销售额达到数十亿美元，这是否是导致股票交易价格低于账面价值 120%的原因？宣布的股票回购计划是否能在未来十年内完全解决这些慈善基金的抛售问题？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I give away 4 3/4 percent of my stock, we’ll say, every year, and let’s say that’s $2 billion worth of stock, roughly. That’s 1 percent — a little less than 1 percent — of the market value of Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我每年捐赠大约4.75%的股票，假设这大约值20亿美元。这是伯克希尔市场价值的1%——稍微少于1%。

Many companies in the New York Stock Exchange trade over 100 percent a year. A 1 percent sale annually of the outstanding capitalization is absolutely peanuts, and you can even argue, in some cases, that it can aid, in terms of market price, because the availability of stocks sometimes determines whether people get interested in buying.

许多在纽约证券交易所的公司每年的交易量超过 100%。每年 1%的流通市值销售绝对微不足道，甚至可以在某些情况下争辩说，这在市场价格方面是有帮助的，因为股票的可获得性有时决定了人们是否对购买感兴趣。

But a supply of 1 percent annually is not going to change the level at which a stock trades. I mean, it just it’s insignificant compared to the volume.

但每年 1%的供应量不会改变股票的交易水平。我的意思是，这与交易量相比是微不足道的。

Berkshire — I think Berkshire’s volume, A and B combined, is — probably averages, what, 4 or $500 million a day, so 2 billion spent over a year is not going to affect things.

伯克希尔——我认为伯克希尔的交易量，A 类和 B 类合计，可能平均每天大约是 4 亿或 5 亿美元，所以一年花费 20 亿美元不会影响情况。

And you can argue that, you know, everybody else has a right to sell their stock or give it to a charity. I don’t think I should be totally tied up, in terms of being able to give the stock away.

你可以争辩说，其他人都有权出售他们的股票或将其捐赠给慈善机构。我认为我不应该完全被束缚，无法将股票赠送出去。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s nothing so insignificant as an extra $2 billion to an old man. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，对于一个老人来说，额外的20亿美元是微不足道的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve never given away a penny that in any way changed my life. Have you, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：我从来没有因为捐钱在任何方面改变了我的生活。你呢，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, of course not.

查理·芒格：不，当然没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: We never even thought of it. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们从来没有想过这件事。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It would be unthinkable.

查理·芒格：这简直不可想象。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s — it has a lot more utility in the hands of other people than it does in my safe deposit box.

沃伦·巴菲特：它在其他人手中比在我的保险箱里更有用。

61. Most of our opportunities will be in the U.S.

我们的大部分机会将在美国。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Cliff? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。克利夫？（掌声）

CLIFF GALLANT: Looking over your first quarter results in the 10-Q, I was wondering — and this might apply more to the noninsurance businesses — what are you seeing in terms of reading the tea leaves for the U.S. economy right now?

克利夫·加兰特：在查看你们的 10-Q 文件中的第一季度业绩时，我在想——这可能更多地适用于非保险业务——你们目前对美国经济的前景有什么看法？

Are you starting to see lift? And I’m curious if you have any — if you feel any — need to start to expand Berkshire internationally outside of the U.S.?

你开始看到增长了吗？我很好奇你是否有任何——如果你有感觉的话——需要开始将伯克希尔扩展到美国以外的国际市场？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re willing to go, you know, anyplace where we think we understand what things are — in a reasonable way— what things are going to look like in five or 10 years, and where we get our money’s worth, and good management, and all of the things that we emphasize.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们愿意去任何地方，只要我们认为我们合理地理解事情会是什么样子——五年或十年后会是什么样子，且我们能物有所值，拥有良好的管理，以及所有我们强调的要素。

But — so we don’t — we’ve never foreclosed anything, but we’re going to find most of our opportunities in the United States. It’s just the nature of things that this is a huge, huge market for businesses, and we’re better known here.

但是——所以我们没有——我们从未关闭过任何机会，但我们将在美国找到大多数机会。这就是事物的本质，这是一个巨大的、巨大的商业市场，而我们在这里更为人知。

But, you know, most of our deals will take place here, but we find things outside the United States, particularly in terms of bolt-on acquisitions.

但是，您知道，我们的大多数交易将在这里进行，但我们也会在美国以外找到机会，特别是在增值收购方面。

In terms of current business, ever since the fall of 2009, coming on four years, we’ve seen a gradual improvement. And sometimes people have gotten encouraged to think it was speeding up quite a bit, and then they get feeling that — they start talking about a double-dip, which I’ve never believed in and hasn’t happened.

在当前的商业方面，自 2009 年秋季以来，已经快四年了，我们看到逐渐改善。有时人们会受到鼓舞，认为情况在加速好转，然后他们开始谈论“双底”，我从来不相信这种说法，而且也没有发生。

What we see overall is just a slow progress in the American economy. You saw those figures on carloadings for the first 17 weeks. And, you know, we were up 3-and-a-fraction percent, but the other railroads were up 4/10 of a percent, so the industry as a whole might be up 1 percent or thereabouts, a little over 1 percent.

我们总体看到的只是美国经济的缓慢进展。你看到了前 17 周的货车装载数据。我们增长了 3 个多百分点，但其他铁路公司增长了 0.4 个百分点，因此整个行业可能增长了 1 个百分点左右，略高于 1 个百分点。

This economy is not — for the last four years — it’s not come roaring back in any way, shape, or form.

经济在过去四年里并没有以任何方式、形状或形式强劲反弹。

It’s never faltered, and I wouldn’t be surprised if it keeps going this way.

它从未动摇过，我不会感到惊讶如果它继续这样下去。

Now, finally, the overhang in housing ended — it ended about a year ago — but — so we’re starting to get — we’re seeing some recovery in home prices, which has a big psychological effect, and we’re seeing some improvement in construction.

现在，住房的滞后终于结束了——大约在一年前结束——但是——我们开始看到——房价有所回升，这对心理有很大影响，我们也看到建筑方面有所改善。

But we don’t want to start overbuilding again. We really want to have housing starts that more or less equal household formation. And I think we’re seeing that.

但我们不想再次过度建设。我们真的希望住房开工数量大致等于家庭形成数量。我认为我们正在看到这一点。

So if you ask me where we’re going to be when we meet here next year, you know, I think we will have moved forward.

所以，如果你问我明年我们在这里再次会面时会是什么情况，您知道，我认为我们将会有所进展。

But I don’t think it will be in any surge of any sort, but I don’t think we’ll stall, either.

但我认为不会出现任何形式的激增，但我也不认为我们会停滞不前。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s not a field where —

查理·芒格：嗯，这不是一个……

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — I’ve been good.

查理·芒格：——我很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: We do know what’s going on now, though. I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：不过我们现在确实知道发生了什么。我是说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we know what’s going on now.

查理·芒格：是的，我们现在知道发生了什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I guess that ends it? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想这就结束了？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Can’t make a lot of money knowing what’s going on now. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：了解现在发生的事情也不能赚很多钱。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And you can’t make a lot of money thinking you know what’s going to go on tomorrow if you don’t, either.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你不知道，认为自己知道明天会发生什么也无法赚很多钱。

We will — we’ll just keep — we keep playing the game. I mean —

我们会——我们会继续——我们会继续玩这个游戏。我是说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we keep playing the game.

查理·芒格：是的，我们继续玩这个游戏。

WARREN BUFFETT: And if we hear about something tomorrow that we can spend 15 or $20 billion on and we feel we like the business, United States or otherwise, we’ll move in an instant, and if we don’t, we won’t do anything.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们明天听到有什么可以花 150 亿或 200 亿美元的项目，并且我们觉得这个业务不错，无论是在美国还是其他地方，我们会立刻行动，如果我们不觉得合适，就什么都不做。

And we just never know when opportunity is going to come along, but it does come along from time to time. And sometimes in financial markets, it comes in a huge way. I mean, that will happen from time to time.

我们永远不知道机会何时会出现，但它确实会时不时地出现。有时在金融市场上，它会以巨大的方式出现。我是说，这种情况会时不时发生。

We may not see very many more, but most of the people in this room will see four or five times in their — during their lifetimes — they will see incredible opportunities offered in — probably in equity markets — but maybe in bond markets as well.

我们可能不会再看到很多，但在这个房间里的大多数人一生中会看到四到五次——他们将看到在股市中提供的令人难以置信的机会——但也可能在债券市场中。

People — things will happen, and then, you know, you have to be able to act, and then you have — and that means both in terms of having the ability and also having the mental fortitude to jump in when most people are jumping out. OK. Station 6. Charlie, you want to —

人们——事情会发生，然后，你知道，你必须能够采取行动，然后你必须——这意味着既要有能力，也要有心理韧性，在大多数人选择退出时你能够跳进去。好的。第六站。查理，你想要——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

62. How should a young money manager attract investors?

年轻的资金经理应该如何吸引投资者？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Brandon from Los Angeles.

观众：嗨，我是来自洛杉矶的布兰登。

I’m in my 20s and I’m starting a partnership. What advice do you have about getting people to put in money before I have a track record as a solo investor? (Laughter)

我在20多岁，正在建立一个合伙企业。您有什么建议可以帮助我在没有个人投资记录之前吸引投资者？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you haven’t sold me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，你还没说服我。（笑声）

No, I think people should be quite cautious about investing money with other people, even when they have a track record, incidentally. There are a lot of track records that don’t mean much.

不，我认为人们在把钱投资给其他人时应该非常谨慎，即使他们有记录。有很多记录其实并没有什么意义。

But overall, I would advise any young person that wants to manage money, and wants to attract money later on, to start developing an audited track record as early as they can.

但总体来说，我建议任何想要管理资金的年轻人，以及想要以后吸引资金的人，尽早开始建立经过审计的投资记录。

I mean, it was far from the sole reason, far from the sole reason, that we hired Todd and Ted, but we certainly looked at their record, and we looked at a record that we both believed and could understand, because we see a lot of records that we don’t really think mean much.

我的意思是，这并不是我们聘用托德和泰德的唯一原因，但我们确实看了他们的记录，我们看了一个我们都相信并且可以理解的记录，因为我们看到很多记录实际上并没有太大意义。

I mean, if you get — you know, if you have a coin flipping contest, as I wrote, you know, some years ago, and you get 310 million orangutans out there and they all flip coins and they flip them 10 times, you know, you will — instead of having 300 million left, you’ll have 300,000, roughly, left that’ll flip ten times in a row successfully.

我的意思是，如果你举行一个抛硬币比赛，正如我几年前所写的，如果有3.1亿只猩猩在那儿抛硬币，并且它们每人抛10次，你会发现，最终留下的不是3亿，而是大约30万只能够连续成功抛十次的。

And those orangutans will probably go around trying to attract a lot of money to back them in future coin flipping contests.

那些猩猩可能会四处招揽大量资金，以支持它们未来的抛硬币比赛。

So it’s our job when we hire somebody to manage money to figure out whether they’ve been lucky coin flippers or whether they really know what they’re —

所以当我们雇佣某人来管理资金时，我们的工作就是弄清楚他们是运气好的抛硬币者，还是他们真的知道自己在做什么

CHARLIE MUNGER: When you had his problem, didn’t you scrape together about $100,000 from a loving family?

查理·芒格：当你遇到他的问题时，难道你没有从一个充满爱的家庭里凑到大约 10 万美元吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I hope they kept loving me after they gave me the money. That was —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我希望在他们给我钱之后，他们仍然爱我。那是——

Well, it was very slow, and it should have been very slow. As Charlie has pointed out, some people thought I was running a Ponzi scheme, probably, there.

嗯，这个过程非常缓慢，而且应该是非常缓慢的。正如查理所指出的，有些人认为我在进行庞氏骗局，可能是这样。

And other people may not have thought it, but it was to their advantage to sort of scare people because they were selling investments in Omaha.

而其他人可能并不这样想，但因为他们在奥马哈出售投资，所以吓唬人对他们是有利的。

But you — to attract money, you should deserve money, and you should develop a record over time that — and then you should be able to explain to people why that record is a product of sound thinking rather than simply being in tune with a trend or simply just being lucky.

但是你——要吸引财富，你应该值得拥有财富，并且你应该随着时间的推移建立一个记录——然后你应该能够向人们解释为什么这个记录是理性思考的产物，而不仅仅是跟随潮流或仅仅是运气好。

Charlie? You’re starting today and you’re 25 years old. How do you attract money?

查理？你今天开始工作，25 岁。你如何吸引财富？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think most people start with friends and family, or people whose trust they’ve already earned in some other way. So it’s hard to do when you’re young, and that’s why people start so small.

查理·芒格：我认为大多数人从朋友和家人开始，或者从他们以其他方式已经赢得信任的人开始。所以当你年轻的时候，这很难，这就是为什么人们起步时都很小。

WARREN BUFFETT: And a relatively few will be successful.

沃伦·巴菲特：而且相对较少的人会成功。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s right, too.

查理·芒格：没错，也是这样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Some of them — a great many will be successful and make — I mean, you know, we have the hedge fund record here. And during that time, the hedge fund managers have probably made a very considerable amount of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：其中一些人——很多人会成功并赚钱——我的意思是，你知道，我们这里有对冲基金的记录。在此期间，对冲基金经理可能赚了相当可观的金额。

As I pointed out, Todd and Ted, working under a 2 and 20 arrangement, if they put the money in a hole in the ground, would make $120 million each this year.

正如我所指出的，托德和泰德在2和20的安排下，如果他们把钱放进一个坑里，今年将各赚1.2亿美元。

So it’s not exactly an arrangement that you don’t want to think about a little bit before you engage in it.

所以这并不是一个你在参与之前不想稍微考虑一下的安排。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The arithmetic attracts many of the wrong sort of people.

查理·芒格：这样的算术吸引了许多不对的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Naturally, we thought we were exceptions.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，我们认为我们是例外。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

63. Is Ajit Jain going to run Berkshire after Buffett?

阿吉特·贾因会在巴菲特之后接管伯克希尔吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. At Berkshire, there is a unique dynamic that exists between your recognition of Ajit’s special skills and Ajit’s special skills.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的。在伯克希尔，你对阿吉特特殊技能的认可和阿吉特自身的特殊技能之间存在一种独特的动态。

You comment often about how unique Ajit’s skills are. So just tell us, is Ajit your successor? (Buffett laughs)

你经常评论阿吉特的技能有多独特。那么请告诉我们，阿吉特是你的接班人吗？（巴菲特笑）

And if not, what happens to Ajit’s businesses without Ajit?

如果没有 Ajit，Ajit 的生意会怎样？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they won’t be without Ajit for a long time. And he — what — he’s remarkable in many ways, but one of the ways he’s particularly remarkable is that when people start copying something he’s doing and turning what was maybe quite profitable into something that becomes something every Tom, Dick, and Harry is doing, he figures out new ways to do business.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，在很长一段时间内，他们都离不开阿吉特。他在很多方面都很了不起，但他特别了不起的一点是，当人们开始模仿他做的事情，把原本可能很赚钱的事情变成每个汤姆、迪克和哈里都在做的事情时，他就会找出新的方法来做生意。

And I notice you started with the ‘A’s when you started on a possible successor with Ajit, and you won’t have any more luck when you get to the ’B’s. (Laughs)

我注意到，当你和阿吉特开始研究可能的继任者时，你是从 "A "开始的，当你研究到 "B "时，你不会再有更多的运气了（笑）。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the basic answer is that if Ajit ever is not with us —

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为基本的答案是，如果阿吉特有一天不在我们身边——

WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t look as good.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们看起来不会那么好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we won’t look as good, right.

查理·芒格：是的，我们看起来不会那么好，对吧。

WARREN BUFFETT: And that’s true of a number of other managers, too. We have an extraordinary group of people, in most cases, who do not need the money that they earn working for us. They may make substantial money. And they are doing a job for you shareholders and for me and Charlie that you can almost say we don’t deserve.

沃伦·巴菲特：对于其他许多经理来说也是如此。我们拥有一支非凡的团队，在大多数情况下，他们并不需要在我们这里工作的收入。他们可能会赚到很多钱。他们为您和我的股东以及我和查理做了一份工作，您几乎可以说我们不配得这份工作。

But they are having — I think they’re having — a good time running their businesses. The one thing we do is try and create an atmosphere where they can enjoy running the businesses rather than spend all their time running back and forth to headquarters and doing show-and-tell operations and that sort of thing.

但我认为他们在经营自己的业务时过得很好。我们所做的就是努力创造一种氛围，让他们享受经营业务，而不是花费所有时间往返于总部，进行展示和说明等活动。

And it’s taken a long time, though, too. I mean, we operated Berkshire for 20 years without Ajit. If he’d come in the office in 1965 instead of 1985, we’d probably own the world. (Laughter)

而且这也花了很长时间。我是说，我们在没有阿吉特的情况下运营伯克希尔达 20 年。如果他在 1965 年而不是 1985 年进办公室，我们可能会拥有整个世界。（笑声）

Kind of fun to think about, isn’t it?

想想还挺有趣的，不是吗？

Charlie? 查理？

64. Howard Buffett’s role after his father isn’t running Berkshire

霍华德·巴菲特在他父亲之后的角色不是经营伯克希尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Doug? 沃伦·巴菲特：道格？

DOUG KASS: Howard, like you, I have two sons that I love. Like you, I have a son in the audience today. This question is not meant to be disrespectful —

道格·卡斯：霍华德，和你一样，我有两个我爱的儿子。和你一样，我今天在观众中有一个儿子。这个问题并不是想要不尊重——

WARREN BUFFETT: Sounds like it’s going to be, but go ahead. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：听起来是这样，但请继续。（笑声）

DOUG KASS: — but it’s a question I have to ask.

道格·卡斯：——但这是我必须问的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

DOUG KASS: Someday your son, Howard, will become Berkshire’s nonexecutive chairman. Berkshire is a very complex business, growing more complex as the years pass. Howard has never run a diversified business, nor is he an expert on enterprise risk management.

道格·卡斯：总有一天，你的儿子霍华德将成为伯克希尔的非执行主席。伯克希尔是一家非常复杂的企业，随着时间的推移变得越来越复杂。霍华德从未经营过多元化的企业，也不是企业风险管理的专家。

Best as we know, he hasn’t made material stock investments, nor has he ever been engaged in taking over a large company.

据我们所知，他没有进行过实质性的股票投资，也从未参与过收购大型公司。

Away from the accident of birth, how is Howard the most qualified person to take on this role?

远离出身的偶然性，霍华德是胜任这个角色的最合适人选，理由何在？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he’s not taking on the role that you described. He is taking on the role of being nonexecutive chairman in case a mistake is made in terms of who is picked as a CEO.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，他并没有承担你所描述的角色。他担任的是非执行主席的角色，以防在选择首席执行官时出现错误。

I don’t — I think the probabilities of a mistake being made are less than 1 in 100, but they’re not 0 in 100. And I’ve seen that mistake made in other businesses.

我认为出错的概率不到 1/100，但也不是 0/100。我在其他企业中见过这种错误。

So it is not his job to run the business, to allocate capital, do anything else. If a mistake is made in picking a CEO, having a nonexecutive chairman who cares enormously about preserving the culture and taking care of the shareholders of Berkshire, not running the business at all, it will be far easier to then make another change.

因此，他的工作不是经营业务、分配资本或做其他任何事情。如果在挑选首席执行官时犯了错，有一个非常关心维护伯克希尔文化和照顾伯克希尔股东的非执行董事长，而不是经营业务，那么再做改变就会容易得多。

And that — he is there as a protector of the culture, and he has got an enormous sense of responsibility about that, and he has no illusions about — at all — about running the business.

他作为文化的保护者在那里，对此有着巨大的责任感，并且对经营业务没有任何幻想。

He would have no interest in running the business. He won’t get paid for running the business. He won’t have to think about running the business.

他对经营这家公司没有兴趣。他不会因为经营这家公司而获得报酬。他不需要考虑经营这家公司。

He’ll only have to think about whether the board and himself — but as a member of the board — but whether the board may need to change the CEO.

他只需要考虑董事会和他自己——作为董事会的一员——是否需要更换首席执行官。

And I have seen many times, really many times, over 60-plus years or — well, probably 55 years as a director — times when a mediocre CEO, likable, you know, not dishonest, but not the person who should run it, needs to be changed.

我在60多年作为董事的时间里，见过很多次，当一位平庸的CEO（虽然人很可爱，不诚实）需要被更换，而这个人实际上并不适合担任这个职位。

And it’s very, very hard to do when that person is in the chairman’s position. It’s not as — it’s a bit easier now that you have this procedure where the board meets at least once a year without the chairman present.

而当那个人担任主席时，这非常非常困难。现在有了这个程序，董事会至少每年召开一次没有主席在场的会议，这就容易一些。

That’s a very big improvement, in my view, in corporate America. Because it — a board is a social institution, and it is not easy for people to come in, we’ll say, to Chicago or New York or Los Angeles once every three months, have a few committee meetings, and maybe have some doubts about whether they’ve really got the right person running it.

从我的角度来看，这对美国企业来说是一个非常大的改进。因为 - 董事会是一个社会机构，如果人们每三个月就来一次芝加哥、纽约或洛杉矶，开几次委员会会议，然后可能对是否真的有合适的人来管理它产生怀疑，那可不是件容易的事。

They may have a very nice person running it, but they could do better. But who’s going to make a change?

他们也许有很好的人在管理，但他们可以做得更好。但谁会改变呢？

And that’s the position that the nonexecutive chairman, in this case, Howard, will be in. And I know of nobody that will feel that responsibility more in terms of doing that job as it should be done than my son, Howard, you know.

在这种情况下，非执行董事长霍华德将担任这一职务。我知道，没有人比我的儿子霍华德更能感受到他的责任，他必须尽职尽责地完成这项工作。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the Mungers are much safer — (applause) with Howard there.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为有霍华德在，芒格家族会安全得多——（掌声）

You’ve got to remember, the board owns a lot of stock, you know. We’re thinking about the shareholders. We’re not trying to gum it up for the shareholders.

你要记住，董事会拥有很多股票，我们在考虑股东的利益。我们并不是想让股东受损。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. After my death, whatever it may be in terms of value then, but it would be $50 billion worth of stock, will, over a period of time, go to help people around the world and it makes an enormous difference, you know, whether the company behind that stock is doing well or not.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在我去世后，无论那时的价值是多少，500 亿美元的股票将在一段时间内帮助世界各地的人们，这会产生巨大的影响，无论那只股票背后的公司表现如何。

And both Charlie and I have seen — we’ve seen some — more than one example — of where a CEO who might be a six on a scale of 10, and is perfectly likable and has, perhaps, helped select some of the directors that sit there, and continues to run the business year after year when somebody else could do it a whole lot better.

查理和我都见过——我们见过一些——不止一个例子——一个首席执行官在 10 分制中可能只有 6 分，虽然他非常讨人喜欢，并且或许帮助挑选了一些在那里的董事，但年复一年地继续经营这个业务，而其他人可能能做得更好。

And it can be hard to make that — very hard — to make that change if that person controls the agenda and, you know, keeps everybody busy when they come into town for a little while.

而如果那个人控制着议程，并且在他们来城里待一段时间时让每个人忙碌起来，那么要进行这样的改变就会非常困难。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You can have a CEO that’s nine out of 10 on everything but with deep flaws, too.

查理·芒格：你的 CEO 可能在所有方面都是 9 分（满分 10 分），但却有严重的缺陷。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It helps to have some objective person with a real incentive sitting in the position Howard will be in.

查理·芒格：让一个客观、有真正动机的人担任霍华德将担任的职位是有帮助的。

WARREN BUFFETT: The example I’ve used in the past, I mean, that — you know, that blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth, but after they inherit the earth, will they stay meek?

沃伦·巴菲特：我过去用的例子是，“温柔的人有福了，因为他们将承受大地”，但在他们承受大地之后，他们还会保持温柔吗？

Well, that could be the problem, you know, if somebody got named CEO of Berkshire. It could be a position where people might want to throw their weight around in various ways.

好吧，这可能就是问题所在，你知道，如果有人被任命为伯克希尔的首席执行官。这可能是一个人们可能想以各种方式施加影响的职位。

You may have noticed that in the annual report, in terms of our newspapers, I said, you know, I am not going to be telling them who to endorse for president. Ten of them endorsed Romney and two endorsed Obama. I voted for Obama, but I’m not going to change that.

你可能注意到，在年报中，我提到过，我不会告诉他们支持谁竞选总统。十个支持了罗姆尼，两个支持了奥巴马。我投了奥巴马的票，但我不会改变这一点。

But when I write that sort of thing, I’m trying to box in my successor, to some degree, too, and we do not want somebody using Berkshire Hathaway as a power base in the future. We want them to be thinking about the shareholders. It’s that simple.

但当我写那种东西时，我在某种程度上也是在给我的继任者设限，我们不希望未来有人将伯克希尔·哈撒韦作为权力基础。我们希望他们关注股东。就是这么简单。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sometimes somebody becomes CEO who has the characteristic of a once-famous California CEO, and they used to say about him he’s the only man who could strut sitting down. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：有时候，某人会成为CEO，他们身上有曾经有名的加州CEO的特征，曾有人这样评价他：“他是唯一一个能坐着走路的人。”（笑声）

65. Near-zero rates “brutal” for bonds

接近零的利率对债券“残酷”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Brad Johnston from Minneapolis, Minnesota.

观众成员：嗨。我是来自明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达州的布拉德·约翰斯顿。

And my question is within the context of a very low interest rate environment that may be sustained for some time and the challenge that insurance companies are facing in that environment with respect to managing their capital, as well as managing their risk and uncertainty when they have future liabilities and potentially the need for liquidity.

我的问题是在一个可能会持续一段时间的非常低利率环境下，保险公司在这个环境中面临的挑战，包括管理其资本，以及在未来有负债和可能需要流动性的情况下管理其风险和不确定性。

And maybe you could transcend that down to the individual, as well, who is dealing with a low interest rate environment, trying to manage uncertainty and yet still get some cash return from investments.

也许你可以将这一点延伸到个人身上，他们正处于低利率环境中，努力应对不确定性，同时仍希望从投资中获得一些现金回报。

I appreciate your concept of selling, you know, some of your shares periodically and being better off to do that rather than take dividends, but many people are dealing with the challenges of cash flow.

我很欣赏你们定期出售一些股票而不是收取红利的理念，但很多人都在面对现金流的挑战。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And then — and just one final tag-on. If you could at the end, could you explain what Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke believes he has as a tool in his toolbox called the “term credit facility”?

观众成员：最后一个附加问题，如果可以的话，您能解释一下美联储主席本·伯南克认为他工具箱中的“定期信贷便利”是什么吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. The answer is I can’t. Can you, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：不。答案是我做不到。你能吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: The problem faced by people who have stayed in cash, or cash equivalents, or short-term Treasurys, or whatever, I mean, it is brutal.

沃伦·巴菲特：那些一直持有现金、现金等价物、短期国债或其他资产的人面临的问题是非常严峻的。

The loss — if they live off their income, you know — the loss of purchasing power, it’s just staggering when you get into these low interest rates. They are huge victims of a low-interest policy and a dramatically low-interest policy, you know.

损失——如果他们依靠收入生活，你知道——购买力的损失，当你进入这些低利率时，真是令人震惊。他们是低利率政策和极低利率政策的巨大受害者，你知道。

Basically, you know, I’ve written — I wrote back in 2008 to own equities. I mean, it was — equities were cheap.

基本上，你知道，我在 2008 年写过——我写过要拥有股票。我的意思是，股票当时很便宜。

And you were almost certain to get killed, you know, in terms of — for at least a while — we had a promise that the Fed was going to hold rates very low, so it was a great time to own equities.

而且，你几乎可以肯定会受损，尤其是——至少在一段时间内——我们承诺美联储会保持低利率，所以那是持有股票的好时机。

And I feel sorry for people that have clung to fixed-dollar investments, particularly short-term ones, during a period like this, and I don’t know what I would do if I were in that position.

我为那些在这样一个时期坚持固定收益投资的人感到遗憾，尤其是短期的，我不知道如果我在那种情况下该怎么办。

Imagine having, you know, some sum that seemed like a very large amount of money in the past but, you know, a quarter of a percent on a million dollars is $2,500 a year, and that is not what people anticipated when they were saving over the years.

想象一下，曾经觉得是一笔很大钱的资金，现在却只带来千分之四的利息，一百万美元一年就是2500美元，这显然不是人们多年来所期待的。

So I — well, anybody I’ve advised, I’ve always felt that owning businesses certainly made sense — more sense — than fixed dollars, under most circumstances.

所以我——好吧，我建议过的任何人，拥有企业在大多数情况下比固定收益更有意义。

Not every time in my life, but probably 90 percent of the time in my life, it’s made more sense than owning fixed-dollar investments. And it’s certainly made dramatic sense a few years ago when equities were marked down to where they were, you know, terrific buys, and where you could see the prospect that fixed-dollar investments were going to pay very little for a considerable period of time.

虽然并非我一生中的每个时刻，但可能在我生活中的90%的时间里，拥有企业比持有固定收益投资更有意义。而在几年前，股票的价格被打折到绝佳购买价时，这种选择显得特别有道理，尤其是可以预见到固定收益投资在相当长一段时间内会几乎没有回报。

And I didn’t anticipate that we would see the kind of rates for the extended period that we have already, and I don’t know how long it will go on.

我没有预料到我们会看到如此长时间的低利率，我也不知道这种情况会持续多久。

But it’s a real dilemma for people. I get letters — I get a lot of letters — from people that say, you know, “I’ve got $300,000,” and they say, “What should I do?”

但这对人们来说是一个真正的困境。我收到很多信件，很多人说：“我有 30 万美元，”他们问：“我该怎么办？”

So it’s — the fallout from low interest rates has hit millions of people in a very harsh way. And you don’t read much about it and they don’t have much of a voice, but it’s been a good argument for owning productive assets rather than dollars during a period like this.

因此，低利率带来的后果已经在非常严峻的方式上影响了数百万人。你不常听到这些声音，他们没有太多发言权，但这为在这样一个时期拥有生产性资产而非现金提供了有力的论据。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, they had to hurt somebody, and the savers were convenient.

查理·芒格：好吧，他们必须伤害某些人，而储蓄者是个方便的目标。

WARREN BUFFETT: What would you do about it?

沃伦·巴菲特：你会怎么做？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would’ve done about what they did.

查理·芒格：我会做他们所做的事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, so would I.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我也是。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would’ve felt bad about it, but I would have — that’s what I would have done.

查理·芒格：我会对此感到难过，但我会——这就是我会做的。

66. IBM’s competitive moat

IBM 的护城河

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8. We’re now going to the shareholder base. We’ve gone through the panels, and we’ve got about 45 minutes left and so we’re going to give the shareholders a chance to ask — answer — to ask all the questions — maybe answer them — ask all the questions from this point.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 8 站。我们现在要进入股东环节。我们已经完成了各个小组的讨论，剩下大约 45 分钟，所以我们将给股东们一个机会来提问——回答——从这一点开始提问。

Station 8. 站 8。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Chris Hu (PH) from Tokyo, Japan.

观众成员：你好。我是来自日本东京的 Chris Hu（音）。

Can you talk a little bit more about the IBM investment? Where do you see the moat for that business? And just in the spirit of full disclosure, I work for Microsoft.

你能多谈谈 IBM 的投资吗？你认为这个业务的护城河在哪里？为了完全透明，我在微软工作。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Was your — what was your — the moat about which business?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你的——你说的护城河是关于哪个业务的？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: IBM. 观众成员：IBM。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, IBM. Well, I would say that I do not understand the moat around an IBM as well as I understand the mode around a Coca-Cola. I think I have some understanding of it, but I feel I would have more conviction about the moat around a Coca-Cola, or a Wrigley or a Heinz, for that matter, than an IBM.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，IBM。嗯，我想我对 IBM 的护城河的理解不如对可口可乐的护城河理解得那么透彻。我认为我对它有一些理解，但我觉得我对可口可乐、威利糖果或亨氏的护城河会更有信心，而不是 IBM。

But I feel good enough about IBM that we’ve put a considerable amount of money in it. And there’s nothing that precludes both Microsoft, which you mentioned, and IBM being successful. In fact, I hope they both are.

但我对 IBM 的感觉很好，因此我们在其中投入了相当多的资金。而且没有什么能阻止你提到的微软和 IBM 都取得成功。事实上，我希望他们都能成功。

We — I’ve got enough conviction about IBM’s position that we took a very large position.

我们——我对 IBM 的立场有足够的信心，因此我们采取了一个非常大的投资。

I like their financial policies. I think the odds are good that their position is maintained in a strong way over time, but I don’t feel the same degree of conviction about that as I do about the BNSF railroad. I mean, you know, it’s very hard for me to think of anything that could go wrong with BNSF. I could think of some things that could go wrong with IBM.

我喜欢他们的财务政策。我认为他们的地位在长期内保持强劲的可能性很大，但我对这一点的信心没有我对 BNSF 铁路的信心那么强。我是说，你知道，我很难想到 BNSF 会出现什么问题。而我可以想到一些 IBM 可能会出现的问题。

They, incidentally, have a very large pension obligation. Now, they have a large pension fund, too, but you’re talking 75 or $80 billion of assets and liabilities that, you know, is a big — it is a big annuity company on the side.

顺便说一句，他们有非常大的养老金义务。现在，他们也有一个很大的养老金基金，但你谈论的是750亿到800亿美元的资产和负债，这在某种程度上相当于一家大型年金公司。

And you can have — balls can take funny bounces in the annuity field. I would rather they didn’t have that, but that is a fact that I take into consideration when I buy. They show the assets and liabilities of being roughly equal, but the liabilities are a lot more certain than the assets over time.

在年金领域，风险是不可预测的。我希望他们没有那种义务，但这是我在购买时考虑的一个事实。他们显示的资产和负债大致相等，但随着时间的推移，负债的确定性远高于资产。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, at least the IBM pension plan has the resources of IBM. Suppose you’re a big life insurance company now. All over the world, the life insurance companies have started to suffer the tortures of hell.

查理·芒格：是的。至少IBM的养老金计划拥有IBM的资源。假设你是一个大型人寿保险公司。现在，全球范围内的人寿保险公司都开始遭受极大的痛苦。

In Japan, they agreed to pay 3 percent interest, and, of course, there was no way to earn 3 percent interest once the Japanese policies had been in place a long time.

在日本，他们同意支付 3%的利息，当然，一旦日本政策实施很长时间，就没有办法赚取 3%的利息。

A whole lot of once revered, secure places look unsecure now.

曾经被尊敬和认为安全的许多地方现在看起来不安全了。

And around Berkshire, you’ll notice the life operations are — where we have our own policies as distinguished from reinsurance — are pretty small, right?

在伯克希尔，你会注意到我们的人寿业务——我们拥有自己的保单，而不是再保险——相对较小，对吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We do not like giving options in this world, and people tend to — well, particularly they’ve got a sales force pushing them on, as you have in the life insurance industry. They have tended to give people options that have, in certain cases, cost them huge amounts of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不喜欢在这个世界上提供期权，而人们往往——尤其是在有销售队伍推动的情况下——在寿险行业，他们倾向于给人们提供某些选择，这在某些情况下使他们付出了巨大的代价。

买人寿险，或者靠养老金账户养活的无论什么样的产品都不会有好的表现。

It’s — you know, you always want to accept an option; you never want to give an option. But the life business is in just the reverse side of that.

你知道，你总是希望接受一个期权；你绝对不想提供一个期权。但人寿业务正好相反。

Actually, the mortgage business — I mean, you know, Charlie and I were in the savings and loan business. The idea of giving somebody a 30-year mortgage where they can — if it’s a good deal for you — they can call it off tomorrow, and if it’s a good deal for them, they keep it for 30 years.

实际上，抵押贷款业务——我和查理曾在储蓄贷款业务中工作。给某人提供一笔30年抵押贷款的想法是，如果这对你来说是一个好交易，他们可以明天取消，而如果对他们来说是个好交易，他们可以保留30年。

Those are terrible instruments. They’re good for you if you’re buying a house, and I recommend that you — I recommend everybody in this room get a 30-year mortgage immediately on a house for all they can.

那些是糟糕的工具。如果你要买房子，它们对你有好处，我建议你——我建议在座的每个人立即为他们能买得起的房子申请 30 年期抵押贷款。

If it’s a bad deal and rates go to 1 percent, you can refund it. If rates go to 6 or 7 percent, maybe you can buy it back for 70 cents on the dollar or something of the sort.

如果这是个坏交易，利率降到1%，你可以再融资。如果利率升到6%或7%，也许你可以以70美分买回1美元。

So the life companies have engaged in that big time — big, big time — in the last few decades, and a lot of them are paying the price, and some of them haven’t even realized exactly quite what the problems are.

因此，寿险公司在过去几十年中进行了大量这样的业务，而很多公司正在付出代价，有些甚至还没有完全意识到问题究竟是什么。

They’re kind of like the fellow in the switchblade fight, you know, where the other guy takes a big swipe at him with a switchblade and the fellow says, “You didn’t touch me,” and the other guy says, “Well, just wait until you try and shake your head.” Well, that’s a little bit like where some of the life companies are right now.

他们有点像在弹簧刀战斗中的那个人，你知道，另一个人用弹簧刀猛击他，那个人说“你没有碰我”，另一个人说，“等你试着摇头你就知道了。”嗯，这有点像一些保险公司目前的处境。

Charlie? Anything further, Charlie?

查理？还有其他的事吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, that’s gloomy enough.

查理·芒格：没有，那已经够悲观了。

67. Investing with much smaller amounts of money

用更少的钱进行投资

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 站。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Masato Muso. I’m from Los Angeles, California, and an MBA student at Boston University.

观众成员：你好。我叫武藏正人。我来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶，是波士顿大学的 MBA 学生。

You have mentioned that you are 85 percent Benjamin Graham and 15 percent Phil Fisher, and you have also said that if you only had $1 million today, you could generate 50 percent returns.

你提到过你是 85%的本杰明·格雷厄姆和 15%的菲尔·费舍尔，你还说如果今天只有 100 万美元，你可以获得 50%的回报。

Since I’m a young investor, this is my question for the both of you: how was your investment strategy different when you were still accumulating money as opposed to managing billions?

因为我是一名年轻的投资者，我想问你们俩：在积累资金的阶段，您的投资策略与管理数十亿美元时有什么不同？

Did you focus on specific industries, small cap, large cap, et cetera? Thank you.

您是否专注于特定行业、小型股、大型股等？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, managing a million dollars is an entirely different game than running Berkshire Hathaway, or running some 20 or $50 billion fund of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：管理一百万美元与管理伯克希尔·哈撒韦或管理一些 200 亿或 500 亿美元的基金完全是两回事。

And if Charlie and I were running a million dollars now or 100,000 or — we would be looking in some — we’d be looking at some — probably some very small things. We would be looking for small discrepancies in certain situations.

如果查理和我现在有一百万美元或者十万美元——我们会关注一些——我们会关注一些——可能是非常小的事情。我们会寻找某些情况下的小差异。

And the opportunities are out there, and periodically, they’re extraordinary.

机会是存在的，而且不时地，它们是非凡的。

But that’s something we really don’t think about anymore because our problem is handling 12 or 14 billion, or whatever it might be, coming in every year, and that means we have to be looking for very big deals and forget about what we used to do when we were very young.

但这已经是我们不再考虑的事情，因为我们面临的问题是每年处理 120 亿或 140 亿，或者其他任何数字，这意味着我们必须寻找非常大的交易，忘记我们年轻时所做的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I’m glad I’m through with that particular problem. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我很高兴我已经解决了那个特定的问题。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He worked pretty hard at it when —

沃伦·巴菲特：他在这方面非常努力地工作——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We both did.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们都做了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Did we ever.

查理·芒格：我们确实做过。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. We looked under a lot of rocks, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。我们查看了很多地方，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I used to make big returns on my float on my own income taxes. Between the time I got the money and I paid it to the government, I frequently made enough money to pay the tax. It was working for small amounts of money and doing it on most things.

查理·芒格：我过去在自己收入的缴税上也能做出可观的回报。在我把钱交给政府之前，通常我能赚到足够的利息来支付税款。这就是用小额资金进行投资的好处。

WARREN BUFFETT: He didn’t tell me how to do it, though. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不过他没有告诉我怎么做。（笑）

68. Don’t invest in countries or categories

不要投资于国家或类别

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. This is Andy Ling (PH) from Shanghai, China.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我是来自中国上海的安迪·凌（PH）。

Thank you very much for what you have said and what you have done. People around the globe have benefited a lot from your philosophies, so you have fans — even a lot of fans — even in China.

非常感谢您所说的和所做的。全球的人们从您的哲学中受益匪浅，因此您有粉丝——甚至有很多粉丝——即使在中国也是如此。

My question is: how did you see investments in emerging markets where Berkshire is spend its investments in places like China? If yes, what kind of industries and companies you are interested in? Thank you.

我的问题是：您如何看待伯克希尔在中国等新兴市场的投资？如果是的话，您对哪些行业和公司感兴趣？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We don’t really start out looking to either emerging markets or specific countries or anything of the sort.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们并不真的一开始就关注新兴市场或特定国家或类似的东西。

We may find things, you know, as we go around, but it isn’t like Charlie and I talk in the morning and we say, you know, it’s a particularly good idea to invest in Brazil or India or China or whatever it may be. We’ve never had a conversation like that, have we, Charlie?

我们可能会发现一些事情，你知道的，随着我们四处走动，但并不是说查理和我早上会谈论，我们会说，你知道，投资巴西、印度或中国或其他什么地方是个特别好的主意。我们从来没有过这样的对话，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: It just won’t happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：这根本不会发生。

We don’t think that’s where our strength is. We know that our strength is not there. And we think, probably, most people’s strength isn’t there either. I mean, it sounds good, but I don’t really think it’s the best way to look at investments.

我们认为那不是我们的优势所在。我们知道我们的优势不在那里。我们认为，可能大多数人的优势也不在那里。我的意思是，这听起来不错，但我真的不认为这是看待投资的最佳方式。

If you told me that we can only invest —

如果你告诉我我们只能投资——

We’re perfectly willing to do it. We owned a lot of PetroChina at one time. We own some BYD now. We’ve owned securities outside the United States and will continue to.

我们完全愿意这样做。我们曾经拥有很多中国石油的股票。我们现在拥有一些比亚迪的股票。我们曾经拥有美国以外的证券，并将继续拥有。

But if you told us that we could only invest in the United States the rest of our lives, we would not regard that as a huge hardship, would we, Charlie?

但如果你告诉我们余生只能在美国投资，我们不会认为这是一种巨大的困难，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s a great way to sell investment advice, to have a whole lot of different categories, lots of commissions, lots of advice, lots of action.

查理·芒格：是的。这是一种很好的销售投资建议的方法，拥有许多不同的类别，很多佣金，很多建议，很多行动。

And a lot of things we just — we don’t feel we’ve got enough of an edge so that we want to play.

而很多事情我们只是——我们觉得自己没有足够的优势，所以我们不想参与。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. When we hear somebody talking concepts, of any sort, including country-by-country concepts or whatever it might be, we tend to think that they’re probably going to do better at selling than at investing.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当我们听到有人谈论概念时，无论是国家间的概念还是其他什么，我们往往会认为他们在销售方面可能会比投资方面做得更好。

It’s just such an easy way — I mean, it’s what people expect to hear when — you know, when somebody comes calling that, you know, today we think you ought to be looking at this or that around the world.

这真是一个简单的方法——我的意思是，当有人来找你时，人们期望听到的就是——你知道，今天我们认为你应该关注世界上的这个或那个。

The thing to do is just find a good business at an attractive price and buy it.

要做的就是找到一个有吸引力价格的好生意并购买它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Our experts really like Bolivia. And you say, “Well, last year you liked Sri Lanka.” It’s just — we’re not comfortable with that.

查理·芒格：我们的专家真的很喜欢玻利维亚。你会说，“好吧，去年你们喜欢斯里兰卡。”这就是——我们对此并不感到舒服。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we usually think it’s a lot of baloney, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们通常认为这都是胡说八道，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s why we’re not comfortable.

查理·芒格：这就是我们感到不安的原因。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

69. Washington not solely to blame for housing bubble

华盛顿并不完全应为房地产泡沫负责

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 11。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, and Mr. Munger. My name is Brandt Hooker from Los Angeles.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是来自洛杉矶的布兰特·胡克。

I want to thank you both, first of all, for all the years of advice and your financial philanthropy, as well as your education and/or knowledge philanthropy you’ve given to so many investors around the world.

我首先要感谢你们两位，感谢你们多年来的建议和财务慈善，以及你们给予全球众多投资者的教育和/或知识慈善。

And my question is: the U.S. government was seemingly complicit in enticing the American public to buy a home, and, therefore, a mortgage, at any cost. Do you think our legislators are doing the same thing now, and are we creating a bubble?

我的问题是：美国政府似乎在诱使美国公众不惜一切代价购买房屋，因此也购买抵押贷款。你认为我们的立法者现在也在做同样的事情吗？我们是否正在制造一个泡沫？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. I don’t think we’re remotely near a bubble, in terms of housing, now.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我认为我们现在在住房方面远未接近泡沫。

And I certainly think that your statement is accurate but not complete, in terms of what went on before.

我确实认为你的陈述是准确的，但在之前发生的事情方面并不完整。

I mean, the whole country, almost, every — really kind of went crazy in terms of housing. And the government was a very big part of it because they’re a very big part of the financing of it. And it’s certainly true that plenty of legislators were encouraging Freddie and Fannie to be doing things that they shouldn’t have been doing, not just in retrospect. I mean, if you looked at it at the time, you could come to that conclusion.

我意思是，几乎整个国家在住房方面都疯狂了。政府在其中扮演了一个非常大的角色，因为他们在融资中占了很大份额。确实，有很多立法者在鼓励房利美和房地美做一些他们不应该做的事情，而不仅仅是在事后看。你如果当时看，就能得出这样的结论。

But there were an awful lot of people doing the same thing. I mean, it was coming from all sources. And it had that aspect to it, which bubbles do, where year after year for three or four or five years, whatever it might be, that the skeptics looked like idiots and that the people who jumped on the bandwagon were the ones that were refinancing their houses at ever higher prices and people who were speculating on other houses.

但是有很多人都在做同样的事情。我的意思是，这种情况来自各个方面。它有那种泡沫的特征，年复一年，三年、四年或五年，无论是什么，怀疑者看起来像傻瓜，而那些跟风的人则是以越来越高的价格再融资他们的房子，以及那些在其他房子上投机的人。

So it just looked all so wonderful. And people are really susceptible to that sort of bandwagon effect where they see their neighbors making easy money, everybody’s making easy money but them, and they finally succumb.

所以这一切看起来都如此美好。人们真的很容易受到那种从众效应的影响，他们看到邻居们轻松赚钱，大家都在轻松赚钱，只有他们没有，最终他们也屈服了。

It’s just — it’s the nature of things. And it doesn’t mean the people at Freddie or Fannie were necessarily evil — a few of them were — or that legislators, necessarily, were evil, although, again, a few of them probably were. But overwhelmingly, I think most people just get caught up in a grand illusion.

这就是事物的本性。这并不意味着房利美或房地美的人一定是邪恶的——其中确实有少数是——立法者也不一定都是邪恶的，尽管可能其中也有少数是。但总的来说，我认为大多数人只是被一种巨大的幻觉所迷惑。

And, you know, it’s happened many times in history, it’ll happen again, and you can use that very much to your profit.

而且，你知道，这在历史上发生过很多次，它会再次发生，你可以利用这一点来获得很大的利益。

We’re not in that kind of a period now on housing. You’ve got very, very low interest rates, which support, in many cases, the purchase of houses, because it brings down the payments, obviously.

我们现在并不是处于那种住房市场。你会发现利率非常非常低，这在很多情况下支持购房，因为这显然降低了还款额。

But I personally, about a year ago, I mean, I recommended to people that they buy houses, and I certainly recommend to people that they finance them now.

但我个人，大约一年前，我推荐人们买房子，我当然建议人们现在融资。

And most places I would recommend if you find a — if you’re going to live in the community for some time and you find a house that fits your needs, I think it’s probably a very good time to buy it, in part because the financing is so unbelievably attractive.

如果你打算在社区生活一段时间，并且找到一套符合你需求的房子，我认为现在可能是一个非常好的购房时机，部分原因是融资条件非常有吸引力。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the main problem was that as things got crazier and crazier, the government could’ve intervened by pulling away the punch bowl before everybody was totally drunk, and instead, the government increased the proof.

查理·芒格：嗯，主要问题是，随着事情变得越来越疯狂，政府本可以在每个人都喝得酩酊大醉之前撤走酒杯，而政府却选择提高酒精浓度。

And this was not a good idea. But you — it’s hard to get governments in a democracy to be pulling away the punch bowl from voters who want to get drunk.

这不是个好主意。但是你——在民主国家，很难让政府从想要喝醉的选民手中收回酒杯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s almost impossible.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这几乎是不可能的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I mean, it isn’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我的意思是，这并不是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: So you’re complaining a little bit about what’s sort of inevitable in life. Not too good an idea.

查理·芒格：所以你有点抱怨生活中一些不可避免的事情。这不是个好主意。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You’ll see it again, not necessarily in housing, but you will see it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你会再次看到它，不一定是在住房方面，但你会看到它。

And humans will continue to make the same mistakes that they have made in the past.

人类将继续犯他们过去犯过的同样错误。

I mean, they get fearful when other people are fearful. I mean, that’s — you saw it in those money market funds when 175 billion, you know, flowed out in three days. I mean, everybody gets — when people get scared, you know, they — it’s very, very pervasive.

我意思是，当其他人感到恐惧时，他们也会感到恐惧。我是说，你在那些货币市场基金中看到了这一点，当 1750 亿美元在三天内流出时。我是说，当人们感到害怕时，大家都会感到害怕，这种情绪非常普遍。

I’ve often thought that, you know, if I owned a bank in a two-bank town, you know, I’d — if I were inclined to — I might hire a whole bunch of Hollywood extras to form a line in front of the other guy’s bank. (Laughter)

我常常想，如果我在一个有两家银行的城镇里拥有一家银行，我可能会——如果我有这个倾向——雇一大堆好莱坞临时演员在另一家银行前排成一队。(笑声)

The hell of it is that they — you know, as soon as they got through forming a line there, they’d start forming a line at my bank because they — people really get — they get fearful en masse.

可怕的是，他们——你知道，刚一排好队，他们就会开始在我的银行排队，因为——人们真的会——他们会集体感到恐惧。

Confidence comes back sort of one at a time, but when they get greedy, they get greedy en masse, too.

信心的恢复是逐渐的，但当他们变得贪婪时，他们也会集体变得贪婪。

I mean, it just — it’s just the way the humans are constructed. That’s where Charlie and I have an edge. We don’t have an edge, particularly, in many other ways.

我的意思是，这就是人类的构造方式。这就是查理和我有优势的地方。我们在其他许多方面并没有特别的优势。

But we are able, I think, perhaps better than most, to not really get caught up with what other people are doing. And, you know, I don’t know whether we learned that over time or what.

但我认为我们能够比大多数人更好地不被他人所做的事情所影响。你知道，我不知道我们是随着时间的推移学会了这一点，还是其他什么原因。

But when we see falling prices, you know, we think it’s an opportunity to buy, and it doesn’t bother us.

但是当我们看到价格下跌时，我们认为这是一个购买的机会，这并不会让我们感到困扰。

Now, we don’t own things on margin or, you know, we don’t get ourselves in a position where somebody else can pull the rug out from under us. That’s enormously important in life. You never want to, you know, get out on a limb.

当然，我们不使用保证金持有资产，也不会让自己处于别人可以把我们“踢开”的位置。这在生活中非常重要。你永远不想——你知道，不要冒险。

And, of course, leverage gets very tempting when things are going up. And leverage was what was introduced into housing in a huge, huge way. I mean, people just felt that you were an idiot if you didn’t keep borrowing more on your house, and using that to buy more houses, or using it to live on, or whatever, and then finally the roof fell in.

当然，当事情向上发展时，杠杆就变得非常诱人。而杠杆在住房市场中以巨大的方式被引入。我是说，如果你不继续在房子上借更多的钱，去买更多的房子，或者用来生活，或者其他什么的，人们就会觉得你是个傻瓜，最后结果就是屋顶塌了。

Charlie? 查理？

70. Ready to invest in Europe despite its debt problems

尽管欧洲面临债务问题，仍准备投资。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name is George Islets (PH) from Cologne.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我叫乔治·艾斯利特（音），来自科隆。

Do you see investment opportunities in the eurozone? For example, extending your stake in Munich Re?

你在欧元区看到投资机会吗？例如，增加你在慕尼黑再保险公司的股份？

Do you trust in the policy of the ECB to bring the things together? Thank you.

你相信欧洲中央银行的政策能将事情整合在一起吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we’re perfectly willing to look at business opportunity in the eurozone, and we bought a couple of bolt-on acquisitions, one for a couple hundred million in the farm equipment area. And we’ll be happy if we find a business in any one of the 17 countries tied to the euro.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们非常愿意在欧元区寻找商业机会，我们已经在农用设备领域进行了几笔几亿的附加收购。如果我们在与欧元相关的 17 个国家中的任何一个找到合适的业务，我们会很高兴。

There might be a few of them we may be a little less inclined than others. (Laughs)

当然，有些国家我们可能不太愿意去投资。（笑声）

But — you know, it may create opportunities for us to buy businesses. We’d be happy to. Europe is not going to go away. But the European monetary union was — you know, had a major flaw, and they’re grappling with a way to correct that flaw.

但——你知道，这可能为我们购买企业创造机会。我们会很乐意。欧洲不会消失。但欧洲货币联盟有一个重大缺陷，他们正在努力纠正这个缺陷。

And with 17 political bodies and a lot of diverse cultures, it’s really tough for them to do so.

在17个政治实体和多元文化之间，确实很难做到这一点。

They’ll do it in time, in my view. But essentially they synchronized a currency without synchronizing much else.

在我看来，他们会及时做到。但本质上，他们同步了一种货币，却没有同步其他很多东西。

And nature finds the fatal flaw always, and so does economics, and they found it fairly quickly, in terms of the euro. And the structure that was put in place will not work, and they’ll have to find something that does work.

而自然总会发现致命的缺陷，经济学也如此，他们很快就发现了欧元的问题。建立的结构是行不通的，他们必须找到有效的解决方案。

And they will, eventually, but they may go through a fair amount of pain in the process.

他们最终会这样做，但在这个过程中可能会经历相当多的痛苦。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Structured as Europe was structured, letting in Greece into the European Union was a lot like using rat poison as whipping cream. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。欧洲的结构就像是让希腊加入欧盟，这就像用老鼠药当奶油一样。（笑声）

It just — it was an exceptionally stupid idea. (Laughter)

这真是个极其愚蠢的主意。（笑声）

It’s not a responsible capitalistic country, a place where people don’t pay taxes and so on and so — it just — and —

这不是一个负责任的资本主义国家，那里的人们不交税等等——它只是——和——

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve tried for years to get him to use ‘Country A’ and ‘Country B,’ but he — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我多年来一直试图让他使用“国家 A”和“国家 B”，但他——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and committed fairly extreme fraud in the course of getting into the union. They lied about their debt.

查理·芒格：——在进入欧盟的过程中还犯了相当严重的欺诈。他们对自己的债务撒了谎。

And so Europe made terrible mistakes. They have politicians, too. (Laughter and applause)

因此，欧洲犯了可怕的错误。他们也有政客。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You think it’ll be behind them in ten years?

沃伦·巴菲特：你觉得十年后他们会克服这些问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think Europe will muddle through.

查理·芒格：我认为欧洲会混过去。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Think what Europe has already muddled through.

查理·芒格：想想欧洲已经经历了多少混乱。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we would be delighted, even with that dire forecast, not overly — we would be delighted, tomorrow, to buy a big business in Europe that we liked, and we’d pay cash for it.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，即便在这种悲观的预测下，我们也会很高兴，明天能在欧洲买到一个我们喜欢的大企业，并且会全额支付。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I hope you’ll call me if it’s in Greece. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：如果是在希腊，记得叫我。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I make these small suggestions, but you can see it doesn’t help much. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我提出这些小建议，但你可以看到这并没有太大帮助。（笑）

71. Social media will help some Berkshire businesses

社交媒体将帮助一些伯克希尔的企业

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m David Yarus (PH) from Miami Beach, Florida.

观众成员：嗨。我是来自佛罗里达州迈阿密海滩的大卫·雅鲁斯。

On behalf of the internet, welcome to Twitter.

代表互联网，欢迎来到推特。

And my question is: how has social media impacted your business and any Berkshire companies, and what impact do you see it having on the world in the short and long term?

我的问题是：社交媒体对您的业务和任何伯克希尔公司产生了什么影响，您认为它在短期和长期内对世界会产生什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably half the people or more in this audience could answer that question better than I can.

沃伦·巴菲特：这个听众中可能有一半以上的人能比我更好地回答这个问题。

It has — certainly in a place like GEICO, you know, we are — it makes a difference, and over time will make a huge difference in marketing, just as the internet made a change.

社交媒体——特别是在像GEICO这样的地方——确实有影响，并且随着时间的推移，将在市场营销中产生巨大差异，就像互联网一样。

I mean, GEICO was founded in 1936 and it had a great business idea of going direct, but it did it entirely by mail, initially, and it worked very well.

我意思是，GEICO 成立于 1936 年，它有一个很好的商业想法，就是直接销售，但最初完全通过邮件进行，这非常成功。

And then it progressed to — as the world changed, it, you know, went to TV advertising and phone numbers and that sort of thing, and then it went to the internet, and now it goes on to social media.

然后它发展到——随着世界的变化，它，您知道，转向了电视广告和电话号码之类的东西，然后转向了互联网，现在转向了社交媒体。

So, you know, we have to listen to our customers in all our businesses. Some of them it’s much more dramatic than others.

所以，在我们所有的业务中，我们必须倾听客户。有些业务的变化更加显著。

And I’ve been amazed, you know, at how fast the world has changed. I thought the internet, for example, in terms of GEICO, would affect younger people very quickly, in terms of their buying habits.

我一直对世界变化的速度感到惊讶。比如，我认为互联网在 GEICO 方面会很快影响年轻人的购买习惯。

很准确的判断。

But the truth that it spread across the entire age range very, very quickly, a huge change. And you have to respond to that. And I am not the best person, by miles, to do that, but we have people that are very good at it at our businesses, and they’re thinking about it plenty, and they’ll continue to think about it.

但事实是，这种变化在整个年龄段迅速传播，带来了巨大的变化。你必须对此做出回应。而我并不是最合适的人选，但我们公司里有很多擅长这方面的人，他们对此进行了充分的思考，并将继续思考。

But it would be a terrible mistake to put me in charge of social media at Berkshire Hathaway. (Laughter)

但把我放在伯克希尔哈撒韦的社交媒体负责人位置上将是一个可怕的错误。（笑声）

And Charlie would not be a particularly good choice, either. (Laughter)

而查理也不是一个特别好的选择。（笑声）

Charlie, do you want to defend yourself, or —

查理，你想为自己辩护，还是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t understand it very well. For very good reason, I avoid it like the plague.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不太理解它。出于很好的理由，我像避瘟疫一样避开它。

And I hate the idea of the teenagers in my own family immortalizing for all time the three dumbest things they said when they were 13. (Laughter)

我讨厌我家里的青少年将他们13岁时说的三件最愚蠢的事情永远铭刻在网上的想法。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We would have been in big trouble, Charlie. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，如果是这样的话，我们可就麻烦大了。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We would have been in big trouble, both of us, if that were the system.

查理·芒格：如果是这个系统，我们两人都会遇到大麻烦。

And so I think there’s a time when your ignorance and folly ought to be hidden. (Laughter and applause)

所以我认为有时候你的无知和愚蠢应该被隐藏起来。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I also think that when you multitask like crazy, like the young people do, none of the tasks is likely to be done well. (Applause)

查理·芒格：我也认为，当你像年轻人那样疯狂地同时处理多项任务时，任何一项任务都不太可能做得好。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there anyone we’ve forgotten to offend? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：还有谁是我们忘记冒犯的？（笑声）

72. Frauds, crooks, and accounting

诈骗、骗子和会计

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Stuart Kaye (PH) and I work in Stamford, Connecticut.

观众成员：你好。我叫斯图尔特·凯（PH），我在康涅狄格州斯坦福工作。

Earlier in the meeting, you said when reading over financial statements, you identified companies you were virtually certain were frauds.

在会议早些时候，您提到在审阅财务报表时，您识别出几乎可以确定是欺诈的公司。

What was it in those financial statements that you saw that made you be so certain they were frauds?

在那些财务报表中，你看到了什么让你如此确信它们是欺诈行为？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it varies just enormously over the years, but there are — we can’t identify 100 percent of the frauds, or 90 percent, or 80 percent, but there are certain ones that jump out to you, just — people give themselves away a lot, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这些年来变化非常大，但我们无法识别出 100%的欺诈，或者 90%，或者 80%，但有些欺诈是非常明显的，人们也常常自己暴露出来。

I mean, in poker they talk about tells. And Charlie and I have bought a lot of businesses, and it’s very important when we buy those businesses that we assess the individuals that we’re buying from with some degree of accuracy.

我想，在扑克中他们会谈论“信号”。查理和我购买了很多企业，当我们购买这些企业时，评估我们购买对象的个人特征是非常重要的，必须有一定的准确性。

缩小范围、提高标准可以减少触及烂人的机会。

Because, you know, they hand us the stock certificate and we hand them a lot of money, and then we count on them to run the business with as much enthusiasm after they have the money as they did before.

因为，你知道，他们把股票证书交给我们，我们则给他们很多钱，然后我们指望他们在拿到钱后能像之前一样热情地经营业务。

And so we are assessing people. And we don’t think we can assess everyone accurately. We just have to be right about the ones where we make an affirmative decision.

因此，我们正在评估人。我们认为我们无法准确评估每个人。我们只需要对我们做出肯定决定的那些人做出正确判断。

And those decisions have not always been perfect, but they’ve been pretty good. And I would say they’ve probably gotten a little bit better, even, as the years have passed.

这些决定并不总是完美的，但它们相当不错。我会说，随着时间的推移，它们可能变得更好了一些。

Similarly, in looking at financial statements — for example, in the insurance field, we’ve seen some frauds, and they’re — you can see things being done with loss reserves occasionally. We saw it back in — I won’t name any names. Unlike Charlie, I don’t — we’ll call them Company As and Bs instead of naming names.

同样，在查看财务报表时——例如，在保险领域，我们看到了一些欺诈行为，有时可以看到损失准备金的处理方式。我们在过去也见过——我不会提任何名字。与查理不同，我不——我们称它们为公司 A 和 B，而不是直接命名。

But you would see companies that, when they were offering stock to the public, you know, the year or two before that, the reserves would be down very suspiciously, and — you know, then — or even when they were selling them to other insurance companies, if they were buying in stock they might be building the reserves.

但你会看到一些公司，在他们向公众发行股票的前一年或两年，储备会非常可疑地下降，然后——或者即使他们在向其他保险公司出售股票时，如果他们在购买股票，他们可能会在增加储备。

But there’s a million different ways. And I don’t claim I know all the ways, obviously, but I have seen enough situations over the years, and I’ve seen how promoters act. And you can spot certain people who you know are, one way or another, playing games with the numbers. They give themselves away.

但有无数种不同的方法。我并不声称我知道所有的方法，显然，但多年来我见过足够多的情况，也看到了推销员的行为。你可以识别出某些人，你知道他们以某种方式在玩数字游戏。他们会暴露自己。

But I can’t give you a checklist of 40 items or something of the sort that you look for in the balance sheet or the income account or the footnotes.

但我不能给你一份包含 40 项或类似内容的清单，让你在资产负债表、损益表或附注中查找。

Charlie, can you help? 查理，你能帮忙吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sometimes it’s pretty obvious. I once was introduced by Warren, of all people, by accident, to a man who wanted to sell us a fire insurance company. One of the first things he said, with a thick accent, from Eastern Europe, I think —

查理·芒格：有时候这很明显。我曾经被沃伦介绍给一个人，他想卖给我们一家火灾保险公司，这真是个意外。他说的第一件事，带着浓重的口音，我想他是来自东欧——

WARREN BUFFETT: Don’t name countries. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不要提国家。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t remember the country.

查理·芒格：我不记得那个国家。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：很好。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But what he told me was — he says, “It’s like taking candy from babies,” he said.

查理·芒格：但他告诉我的是——他说，“这就像从婴儿手中抢糖果，”他说。

“We only write fire insurance on concrete structures that are underwater.” And I figured out instantly that it was probably fraudulent.

“我们只对水下的混凝土结构投保火灾险。”我立刻意识到这可能是欺诈行为。

WARREN BUFFETT: The guy’s a crook.

沃伦·巴菲特：这个家伙是个骗子。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m a very acute man.

查理·芒格：我是一个非常敏锐的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the guy’s a crook.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这家伙是个骗子。

Well, you actually — you had some experience — you know, he was a lawyer in the movie industry. (Laughs)

好吧，你实际上——你有一些经验——你知道，他在电影行业当过律师。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, my God.

查理·芒格：哦，我的天。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — when you get into accounting for — well, movies are a good thing, in terms of how fast you write off properties, and anything where you’ve got construction in progress or progress payment-type things — there’s so many ways you can cheat in accounting.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。涉及会计时——电影是个很好的例子，因为你可以快速摊销资产，以及任何建设中的项目或进度付款类型的事务——在会计中有很多方法可以作弊。

And financial institutions are particularly, probably, prone to it. And there’s been plenty of it in insurance.

金融机构尤其可能容易受到影响。在保险行业中，这种情况已经相当普遍。

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot of it, they’re not being deliberately fraudulent, because they’re deluded. In other words, they believe what they’re saying.

查理·芒格：很多情况下，他们并不是故意欺诈，而是因为他们被误导。换句话说，他们相信自己所说的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. People like to hire them as salesmen. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。人们喜欢把他们当作销售员雇用。（笑声）

If you’ve got doubts, forget it. There’s probably some reason you —

如果你有怀疑，就忘了吧。可能有某种原因——

It’s interesting. The accounting — they worked harder and harder and harder at coming up with disclosures in accounting. And I’m not sure I find present financial statements more useful or, in some cases, as useful as I found them 30 or 40 years ago. (Scattered applause)

有趣的是，会计方面——他们在努力制定披露政策。我并不确定我现在找到的财务报表是否比30或40年前的报表更有用，甚至在某些情况下，我认为没有。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the financial statements of big banks are way harder to understand now than they used to be. They just do so many different things, and they’ve got so many footnotes, and there’s so much gobbledygook, that it doesn’t — they’re not my grandfather’s banks.

查理·芒格：我认为大银行的财务报表现在比以前难以理解得多。它们做的事情太多了，附注也很多，还有很多难以理解的术语，这些银行已经不是我祖父时代的银行了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we couldn’t understand them when we owned them.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在拥有这些银行时也无法理解。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: I mean, we bought a company that — Gen Re — where they had 23,000 derivative contracts. And Charlie and I could’ve spent 24 hours a day, and had the help of 10 or 20 math Ph.Ds. and we still wouldn’t have known what was going on.

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是，我们收购了一家公司——Gen Re——他们有 23000 个衍生合同。查理和我可以每天花 24 小时，甚至请 10 或 20 个数学博士的帮助，但我们仍然不知道发生了什么。

It cost us about $400 million to find out, but — and that was in a benign market. But nobody can.

这让我们损失了约4亿美元，但那是在一个比较宽松的市场中。但是没有人能理解。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And the accountants had certified the balance sheet.

查理·芒格：会计师已经认证了资产负债表。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a new kind of asset I invented a name for. I said, “Good until reached for.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这是我发明的一种新资产，我给它起了个名字。我说：“在被取用之前有效。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, and you would — you would actually — the same auditing firm would be auditing two different companies that are on the opposite side of a derivative transaction and attesting to different values to the same contract.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。那么，你实际上会——同一家审计公司会对两家处于衍生品交易对立面的不同公司进行审计，并对同一合同的不同价值进行认证。

And Charlie found one mistake at Salomon on a derivative contract. What was it, 20 million?

查理在Salomon发现了一份衍生合同中的一个错误。是什么，2000 万吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. It was a big contract, and both sides reported a large profit, blessed by their accountants, on the same contract —

查理·芒格：不。这是一份大合同，双方在同一合同上都报告了可观的利润，得到了他们的会计师的认可——

WARREN BUFFETT: Kind of like us and Swiss Re.

沃伦·巴菲特：有点像我们和瑞士再保险。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — just for breaking it.

查理·芒格：——仅仅因为解除合同。

Once people get in a competitive frenzy, things just go out of control.

一旦人们陷入竞争的狂热，事情就会失去控制。

WARREN BUFFETT: I became the interim chairman of — interim CEO — of Salomon in 1991, and, fortunately, I testified to both the House and Senate committee before I found this out.

沃伦·巴菲特：我在 1991 年成为了所罗门的临时董事长和临时首席执行官，幸运的是，在我发现这一点之前，我向众议院和参议院委员会作了证。

And, generally speaking, incidentally, Salomon wanted to have conservative accounting. I think that would be a fair statement. And in many cases did.

一般来说，顺便提一下，Salomon想要采取保守的会计方法。我认为这是一种公正的说法。在许多情况下确实如此。

But they did come in to me one day and they said, “Warren, you probably should know that we have this item” — and I think it was around 180 million or something like that — with a capital base of 4 billion, maybe — but 180 million.

但他们有一天来找我，说：“沃伦，你可能应该知道我们有这个项目”——我想大约是 1.8 亿之类的——资本基础大约是 40 亿，也许——但就是 1.8 亿。

And they said, this is a plug number, and we’ve been plugging it ever since Phibro merged with Salomon in 19 — I guess, ’81.

他们说，这是一个插头数字，自从 Phibro 在 1981 年与 Salomon 合并以来，我们一直在使用它。

For ten years, this number moved around every day. And as I remember, Phibro or some — one of them was on a trade date system, and that was on a settlement date system.

十年来，这个数字每天都在变动。根据我的记忆，Phibro或其中之一是按交易日系统，而这个是按结算日系统。

And in ten years, with Arthur Andersen as their accountant, paying a lot of money in auditing fees, they just never figured out how the hell to get the thing to balance, so they just stuck a number in every day.

在十年里，阿瑟·安德森作为他们的会计师，支付了大量的审计费用，他们就是无法弄清楚如何让账目平衡，所以每天都随便填一个数字。

And they literally plugged it for ten years, and I couldn’t figure out how to unplug it myself. I mean, it was — you almost had to start over. Didn’t they do that one time out there?

他们实际上填补了十年，而我自己也不知道怎么把它拔掉。我的意思是，你几乎得从头开始。那一次，他们不是也这样做了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We did that, Warren.

查理·芒格：我们做到了，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：对。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We had a discrepancy when we changed accounting systems in our savings and loan, and none of the accountants could fix it. So we just let it run out.

查理·芒格：当我们在储蓄和贷款公司更改会计系统时出现了差异，所有会计师都无法解决。因此我们就让它继续运行。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we let the account —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们让账户——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We just let the account run out, and then —

查理·芒格：我们就让账户耗尽，然后——

WARREN BUFFETT: Figured we’d start over again.

沃伦·巴菲特：想我们可以重新开始。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We started over, right.

查理·芒格：我们重新开始了，对吧。

WARREN BUFFETT: Accounting is not quite the science that people might want you to —

沃伦·巴菲特：会计并不是人们想象中的那种科学——

CHARLIE MUNGER: In accounting, you can do things like they do in Italy when they have trouble with the mail. You know, it piles up and irritates the postal employees. They just throw away a few carloads — (laughter) — everything flows smoothly thereafter.

查理·芒格：在会计中，你可以像意大利人那样处理邮件问题。你知道，邮件堆积起来会让邮政员工感到烦恼。他们就会扔掉几车邮件——（笑声）——之后一切就顺畅了。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re naming names again, folks. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：你们又在点名了，伙计们。（笑）

That happened in some unnamed international country. (Laughter)

那发生在某个无名的国际国家。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, Italy. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，意大利。（笑声）

73. Would Berkshire invest in sub-Saharan Africa?

伯克希尔会投资于撒哈拉以南非洲吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Section 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第四节。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Jerry Lucas (PH) from Newark, Delaware.

观众成员：下午好。我叫杰瑞·卢卡斯（音）来自特拉华州纽瓦克。

You answered the question earlier about emerging markets. I just have a similar question.

你之前回答了关于新兴市场的问题。我有一个类似的问题。

If you found the business that attracted you in sub-Saharan Africa, outside of South Africa, are the conditions right today to make that investment?

如果你在南撒哈拉非洲（南非以外）找到了吸引你的商业机会，今天的条件是否适合进行投资？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I might not know enough to do it myself, but I think — and I wouldn’t rule — if it was attractive enough and I thought I understood the nature of the business, I would probably get some advice from some other people. And I might not end up doing it, but I wouldn’t totally preclude it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我可能自己做不到，但我认为——我不会排除——如果它足够有吸引力，而且我认为我理解这个业务的性质，我可能会向其他人寻求一些建议。我可能最终不会去做，但我不会完全排除这个可能性。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I saw that done. The University of Michigan hired an investment manager in London who specialized in sub-Saharan Africa. And I thought, “My God, how are they doing this?”

查理·芒格：我看到过这样的事情。密歇根大学聘请了一位专门研究撒哈拉以南非洲的伦敦投资经理。我想，“天哪，他们是怎么做到的？”

What they did is the little banks would trade in the pink sheets in Africa, and the first thing people would want was not to have the money under their pillow, and they just bought all the little banks in Africa, and they made a lot of money.

他们所做的是小银行在非洲的粉单上进行交易，人们首先想要的不是把钱放在枕头下，他们只是收购了非洲所有的小银行，并赚了很多钱。

So it is possible, if you know what you’re doing, to go into very unlikely places. I would say we’re not very good at it.

所以如果你知道自己在做什么，就有可能进入非常不可能的地方。我会说我们对此并不太擅长。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, that isn’t our specialty, but it can be done. And if we were poor enough, we might even be thinking about doing it, right, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：不，这不是我们的专长，但这是可以做到的。如果我们够穷，我们甚至可能会考虑这样做，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think so.

查理·芒格：我不这么认为。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

Next year we’ll prepare for this. (Laughter)

明年我们会为此做好准备。（笑声）

74. Read over your will with your adult children

和你的成年子女一起阅读你的遗嘱

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Marvin Blum from Fort Worth, Texas, the home to four of your companies.

观众成员：你好。我是来自德克萨斯州沃斯堡的马文·布卢姆，这里是你们四家公司的总部。

WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely. We love Fort Worth.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。我们喜欢沃斯堡。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. We love you, too, and your presence in our community.

观众成员：谢谢你。我们也爱你，以及你在我们社区中的存在。

I’m an estate planning lawyer, and it’s interesting as we wrap up today to ponder that the Baby Boomer generation is about to pass along the greatest transfer of wealth in history.

我是一名遗产规划律师，今天结束时思考一下，婴儿潮一代即将进行历史上最大的财富转移，这很有趣。

I can design plans that eliminate estate tax and pass down great amounts of wealth to the next generation, but many of my clients come to me and say they want a plan like Warren Buffett’s, leaving their kids enough so they can do anything, but not so much that they can do nothing.

我可以设计消除遗产税的计划，并将大量财富传给下一代，但我的许多客户来找我时说，他们想要像沃伦·巴菲特那样的计划，给孩子们留足够的财富，让他们可以做任何事情，但又不至于多到让他们无所事事。

Now they ask me, and I’m asking you, how much is that, and how do you keep from ruining your kids?

现在他们问我，我也在问你，这要多少钱，你是如何不让你的孩子受到影响的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯。

(Applause) （掌声）

I think more kids are ruined by the behavior of their parents than by the amount of the inheritance. (Applause)

我认为更多的孩子是因为父母的行为而受到影响，而不是因为遗产的多少。（掌声）

Your children are learning about the world through you, and more through your actions than through your words, you know, from the moment they’re born. You’re their natural teacher, and, you know, it’s a very important and serious job.

你的孩子们通过你了解世界，更多是通过你的行动而不是你的言语，从他们出生的那一刻起。你是他们的自然老师，而这是一份非常重要和严肃的工作。

And I don’t think — I don’t actually think — that the amount of money that a rich person leaves to their children is the determining factor, at all, in terms of how those children turn out. But I think that the atmosphere, and what they see about them, and how their parents behave, is enormously important.

我并不认为——我实际上并不认为——富人留给孩子的财富在孩子成长过程中是决定性因素。但我认为，家庭氛围、他们所看到的事物以及父母的行为是极其重要的。

I would say this: I’ve loosened up a little bit as I go along.

我想说的是：随着时间的推移，我放松了一些。

Every time I rewrite my will, my kids are happy because they know I’m not reducing the amount, anyway. (Laughter)

每次我重写遗嘱时，我的孩子们都很高兴，因为他们知道我不会减少遗产的数额，反正。(笑声)

And I do something else that — I find that — which I think is an obvious thing, but it’s amazing to me how many don’t do it.

我还做另一件事——我发现——我认为这是显而易见的，但让我惊讶的是，有这么多人不这样做。

I think that your children are going to read the will someday — that’s assuming you’re a wealthy person — your children are going the read the will someday.

我认为你的孩子们有一天会阅读遗嘱——假设你是一个富有的人——你的孩子们有一天会阅读遗嘱。

It’s crazy to have them read it after you’re dead, for the first time. I mean, you’re not in a position to answer questions then unless the Ouija board really works or something of the sort.

在你死后让他们第一次阅读这篇文章真是疯狂。我的意思是，那时你无法回答问题，除非灵魂板真的有效或者类似的东西。

So if they’re going to have questions about how to carry out your wishes, or why you did this or that, you know, why leave them endlessly wondering after you die?

所以如果他们对如何实现你的愿望，或者你为什么做这个或那个有疑问，你知道，为什么在你去世后让他们无休止地猜测呢？

So in my own case, I always have my children — I rewrite a will every five or six years or something like that — and I have them read it.

所以在我自己的情况下，我总是让我的孩子们——我每五六年就重写一次遗嘱——并让他们阅读它。

They’re the executors under it. They should understand how to carry out their obligations that are embodied in the will, and they should — also, if they feel there’s anything unfair about it, they should express themselves before I sign that will, and we should talk it over, and we should figure out whether they’re right or I’m right, or someplace in between.

他们是遗嘱的执行人。他们应该理解如何履行遗嘱中所体现的义务，如果他们觉得其中有任何不公平的地方，他们应该在我签署遗嘱之前表达出来，我们应该讨论一下，弄清楚他们是否正确，或者我是否正确，或者在两者之间的某个地方。

So I do think it’s very important in wealthy families, once the kids are of a certain age. I mean, I don’t advise doing this with your 14-year-old or something, but when they get — you know, certainly by the time they’re in the mid-30s or thereabouts — I think they should be participants in the will.

所以我确实认为在富裕家庭中，这一点非常重要，一旦孩子们到了某个年龄。我是说，我不建议在你 14 岁的孩子身上这样做，但当他们到了——你知道，肯定是在他们三十多岁的时候——我认为他们应该参与遗嘱的制定。

And I do think that if you get to be very wealthy that the idea of trying to pass on, create a dynasty of sorts, it just sort of runs against the grain, as far as I’m concerned.

我确实认为，如果你变得非常富有，试图传承、创造某种王朝的想法在我看来是有些违背本性的。

And the money has far more utility — you know, the last hundreds of millions or billions have far more utility to society than they would have to make — create a situation — where your kids don’t have to do anything in life except call a trust officer once a year and tell them how much money they want.

而且，这些钱对社会的效用要远远大于创造一种情况——让你的孩子只需每年打个电话给信托官，告诉他们想要多少钱。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think I want to go into this one.

查理·芒格：我觉得我不想谈这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I’m absolutely sure you don’t want to discuss your will with your children if you’re going to treat them unequally.

查理·芒格：我绝对相信，如果你打算对待孩子们不平等，你就不想和他们讨论你的遗嘱。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That is poison.

查理·芒格：那是毒药。

WARREN BUFFETT: But there — one of the problems you have — I mean, and what you want to discuss just for that very situation is there may be circumstances where one child will have much more of an interest in one type of asset than others, or something of the sort.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是，有一个问题——我的意思是，您想讨论的正是这种情况，可能会出现某个孩子对某种资产的兴趣远远超过其他资产的情况，或者类似的情况。

And you want to make sure that your definition of equality, in terms of handling different kinds of assets, meshes, or at least is understood, by the children so that they don’t think the fact that you may gave one a farm and another a house or something of the sort resulted in inequality when you thought it was equality.

你要确保你对平等的定义，在处理不同种类的资产时，能够被孩子们理解，这样他们就不会认为你给了一个人一个农场，而给了另一个人一栋房子或类似的东西，导致了不平等，而你认为这是平等。

Charlie, you got anything?

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I’m —

查理·芒格：没有。我——

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s staying away from this one.

沃伦·巴菲特：他在回避这个问题。

75. No question from station 6 — Buffett’s happy

站点 6 没有问题——巴菲特很高兴

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No question.

观众成员：没有问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: No questions. I like station six. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：没有问题。我喜欢六号站。（笑声）

76. Don’t hold your breath until …

不要屏住呼吸直到…….

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, thanks for everything that you do for us, including advice that you give us, and also for — as an individual investor — for the things that you’ve done for me.

观众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，感谢你们为我们所做的一切，包括你们给我们的建议，以及作为个人投资者，你们为我所做的事情。

I have a question. You’ve long been against stock splits, but as you think about the Berkshire A share and one day can — if you don’t split it — it can get to a million dollars, is the board thinking about how to deal with that, in terms of getting new stock owners, the ownership structure, and so on?

我有一个问题。你一直反对股票拆分，但当你考虑到伯克希尔 A 股，并且有一天如果不拆分它可能会达到一百万美元，董事会是否在考虑如何应对这个问题，包括吸引新的股东、所有权结构等等？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — we actually — I think we’ve got a pretty good arrangement now.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我——我们实际上——我认为我们现在有一个相当不错的安排。

It evolved, originally, through some people that were going to try and make a lot of money off of our shareholders by creating their own split shares, so we created the B shares.

它最初是通过一些人演变而来的，这些人打算通过创建自己的拆分股票来从我们的股东那里赚取大量利润，因此我们创建了 B 股。

And then when the BNSF acquisition came along, we wanted to be sure that people that wanted to have a stock-free exchange, or that wanted to get shares, would not prohibit it simply because they had a small amount of BNSF, and, therefore, our B shares were too expensive.

然后，当 BNSF 被收购时，我们希望确保那些希望进行无股票交易或希望获得股票的人，不会仅仅因为他们拥有少量 BNSF 股份而禁止交易，因此，我们的 B 股就太贵了。

So I think now with one stock, you know, in the $100 range, people can split the — people that own the A stock can split their stock anytime they wish.

所以我认为现在有一只股票，价格在 100 美元左右，拥有 A 股票的人可以随时分割他们的股票。

And we’ve always pledged that there won’t ever be this situation, but if there was some corporate transaction or anything like that, we will — the A and B will get treated identically.

我们一直承诺不会出现这种情况，但如果发生任何企业交易，我们会确保A股和B股的待遇完全相同。

And so I really see no reason to change the present situation.

所以我真的看不出改变目前状况的理由。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would not hold your breath until we change. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我建议你别指望我们会改变。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That may apply to almost anything in our lives.

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能适用于我们生活中的几乎所有事物。

2013-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2013-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Welcome

2. Q1 earnings

3. Directors introduced

4. Table tennis champ Ariel Hsing

5. Buffalo News publisher Stan Lipsey retires

6. Berkshire buys remaining ISCAR stake

7. Q&A begins

8. Berkshire lagging the S&P 500

9. Jonathan Brandt introduced

10. ISCAR vs Sandvik

11. Preserving Berkshire’s culture after Buffett

12. Partnering with 3G Capital for $23B Heinz deal

13. Moving into commercial insurance

14. GEICO vs Progressive’s Snapshot

15. Business Wire and new rule allowing internet disclosures

16. As Berkshire grows, it’s paying more for bigger acquisitions

17. Will U.S. dollar lose reserve currency status?

18. “Extraordinary” corporate profits despite tax complaints

19. Too many subsidiaries for Buffett’s successor to manage?

20. Dangers when Fed reverses economic stimulus

21. Effects of low interest rates

22. Building, not buying, commercial insurance growth

23. Munger: bitcoin won’t be “big universal currency”

24. Pampered Chef isn’t a pyramid scheme

25. “Lender of last resort” after Buffett?

26. We only buy from willing sellers

27. Berkshire’s edge for acquisitions

28. BNSF outlook for carrying coal and oil

29. Sorry to see Harley-Davidson notes expire

30. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler’s stock-picking independence

31. Why GEICO isn’t copying Progressive’s Snapshot

32. We rely on sugar and caffeine, not to-do lists

33. Buffett defends buying newspaper companies

34. Follow Teledyne CEO Henry Singleton’s lead

35. High health costs are hurting competitiveness

36. Obamacare’s effect on Berkshire?

37. Future of rooftop solar power

38. Luck, timing, and success

39. You have to like what you’re doing

40. Rational insurance pricing

41. “Dumb” competition from hedge funds in reinsurance

42. Buffett calls for more women in corporate leadership roles

43. Berkshire is not “too big to fail”

44. Buffett updates his bet against hedge funds

45. Buffett’s hot dog lunch

46. Buffett: I haven’t lost any intensity

47. We don’t buy anything just “by the numbers”

48. Disagreement on whether the “new normal” will bring lower returns

49. Fruit of the Loom’s vs. Gildan Activewear

50. Influential books and early investments

51. Buffett remains bearish on airlines

52. Mixed feelings on Berkshire stock buybacks

53. Munger won’t be moving to Omaha

54. Climate change isn’t a factor for short-term insurance rates

55. Doug Kass’s short-selling challenge

56. Reluctantly paying more for a great business

57. George W. Bush’s 10 words of economic wisdom

58. Benjamin Moore won’t go downmarket

59. Stock strategy

60. Are Buffett’s stock donations hurting Berkshire’s price?

61. Most of our opportunities will be in the U.S.

62. How should a young money manager attract investors?

63. Is Ajit Jain going to run Berkshire after Buffett?

64. Howard Buffett’s role after his father isn’t running Berkshire

65. Near-zero rates “brutal” for bonds

66. IBM’s competitive moat

67. Investing with much smaller amounts of money

68. Don’t invest in countries or categories

69. Washington not solely to blame for housing bubble

70. Ready to invest in Europe despite its debt problems

71. Social media will help some Berkshire businesses

72. Frauds, crooks, and accounting

73. Would Berkshire invest in sub-Saharan Africa?

74. Read over your will with your adult children

75. No question from station 6 — Buffett’s happy

76. Don’t hold your breath until …

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