2014-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session 早晨会议

1. Buffett’s “second career” with singer Paul Anka

巴菲特与歌手保罗·安卡的“第二职业”

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

Good morning. Before we start, there are two very special guests that I’d like to introduce, have stand up.

早上好。在我们开始之前，我想介绍两位非常特别的嘉宾，请他们站起来。

The first, even though he was on tour, he took a quick detour to Omaha to be here today. And will my friend [singer-songwriter] Paul Anka please stand up. Paul? (Applause)

第一位，尽管他正在巡演，但他还是迅速绕道奥马哈来到这里。我的朋友[歌手兼词曲创作人]保罗·安卡能否请站起来。保罗？（掌声）

With all the talk that had been around about my succession, I thought it was probably a good idea to try and hook up with someone famous that might give me a shot at a second career here. (Laughter)

关于我继任的各种讨论，我觉得与某个名人建立联系可能是个好主意，这样我或许能在这里获得第二次职业机会。（笑声）

So we’re available for weddings and funerals and bar mitzvahs. (Laughter)

所以我们可以参加婚礼、葬礼和成人礼。（笑声）

We actually had one offer the other day. I thought it was kind of insulting. They offered $1,000. And, I mean, for me and Paul, that really seemed a little ridiculous.

我们实际上前几天收到一个报价。我觉得这有点侮辱。他们报价 1000 美元。对我和保罗来说，这真的有点荒谬。

I told the people that and they said, “OK. We’ll make it $10,000 if just Paul comes.” (Laughter)

我告诉大家这个，他们说：“好吧。如果只有保罗来，我们就定价 10,000 美元。”（笑声）

2. Berkshire’s Carrie Sova introduced

伯克希尔的凯莉·索瓦介绍了

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we have one other very special guest.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们有另一位非常特别的嘉宾。

This affair does not just happen by itself.

这件事并不是自然而然发生的。

And there’s a young woman who had a baby, a young boy named Brady, in September. And she has marshaled together 400-plus of the people from our various companies and put on the show you’re witnessing today.

还有一位年轻女性在九月份生下了一个男婴，名叫布雷迪。她召集了我们各个公司的 400 多人，举办了你今天所见的这个活动。

And I just want to say a special thanks to the woman we all love, and especially me, Carrie Sova. Carrie? (Applause)

我想特别感谢我们大家都爱的女人，尤其是我，凯莉·索瓦。凯莉？（掌声）

Please stand up. There she is. (Applause)

请站起来。她来了。（掌声）

3. Berkshire directors introduced

伯克希尔董事介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now we get down to the minor players and we’ll introduce the board of directors. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在我们来谈谈小角色，我们将介绍董事会。（笑）

We’re going to have the — we’ll have the board meeting — the shareholders meeting, I should say — after the Q&A, which will end at 3:30. And then we’ll recess for 15 minutes. And at 3:45, reinstitute the — or begin — the shareholders meeting.

我们将在问答环节结束后召开董事会会议——我应该说是股东大会——问答环节将在 3:30 结束。然后我们将休息 15 分钟。3:45 时，我们将重新开始——或者说开始——股东大会。

But for those of you who won’t be around at 3:45, I’d like you to have a chance to meet the directors now.

但对于那些在 3:45 不会在场的人，我希望你们现在有机会见见董事。

So, I will introduce them one at a time and ask them to stand. Hard as it may be, withhold your applause until they’re all finished standing, and then you can go crazy.

所以，我将一个一个地介绍他们，并请他们站起来。尽管这可能很难，但请在他们都站好之前不要鼓掌，然后你们可以尽情欢呼。

So, doing it alphabetically, and if you’ll stand as I give your name.

所以，按字母顺序进行，如果你能在我报你的名字时站起来。

Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Sue Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, my partner Charlie Munger, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer.

霍华德·巴菲特，史蒂夫·伯克，苏·德克，比尔·盖茨，桑迪·戈特斯曼，夏洛特·古伊曼，唐·基欧，我的合作伙伴查理·芒格，汤姆·墨菲，罗恩·奥尔森，沃尔特·斯科特，梅瑞尔·维特默。

And that is the board of directors at Berkshire. (Applause)

这就是伯克希尔的董事会。（掌声）

4. Berkshire’s Q1 earnings summary

伯克希尔第一季度收益摘要

WARREN BUFFETT: We have just a couple of slides and then we’ll move right into the questioning, which will go on until roughly at noon.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们只有几张幻灯片，然后我们将直接进入提问环节，直到大约中午。

We’ll take a break at noon and come back about 1:00, and then we’ll continue till 3:30, at which point we’ll adjourn and then have the annual meeting at 3:45.

我们中午休息，1:00 左右回来，然后继续到 3:30，届时我们将休会，然后在 3:45 召开年度会议。

But, there are just a couple slides. We released our earnings yesterday.

但是，只有几张幻灯片。我们昨天发布了我们的财报。

And I’ve always emphasized — we try to release our earnings always after the market’s closed, and, preferably, after the market’s closed on a Friday, so that people will have a full weekend to digest the information, because there’s a lot of information about Berkshire every quarter. And it’s contained, primarily, in a 10-Q that we make available for you to read over the full weekend.

我一直强调——我们尽量在市场关闭后发布我们的财报，最好是在周五市场关闭后，这样人们就可以有一个完整的周末来消化这些信息，因为每个季度关于伯克希尔的信息很多。这些信息主要包含在我们提供给你阅读的 10-Q 报告中，供你在整个周末阅读。

So we always urge you not to just look at the summary figures, but take a look at the 10-Q. It’s great reading. And absorb all that by Monday morning.

所以我们总是敦促您不要仅仅查看摘要数据，而是要查看 10-Q 报告。这是很好的阅读材料。请在周一早上之前吸收所有内容。

But here we have the summary for the first quarter.

但这里是第一季度的总结。

And as you can see, our operating earnings were down a bit. And that was more than accounted for in insurance underwriting. And you should understand that insurance underwriting from quarter to quarter really doesn’t mean that much.

正如您所看到的，我们的营业收入略有下降。这主要是由于保险承保造成的。您应该明白，保险承保在不同季度之间实际上并没有太大意义。

For one thing, it can be quite affected by changes in foreign exchange, which really don’t have anything to do with our insurance business. But — or at least in the reality of interim results.

首先，它可能会受到外汇变动的影响，而这些变动与我们的保险业务并没有任何关系。但是——或者至少在临时结果的现实中。

Our insurance business now has a float of $77 billion. And that $77 billion is ours to invest. And whether it costs us anything or not is determined by whether we have an underwriting profit.

我们的保险业务现在有 770 亿美元的浮存金。这 770 亿美元是我们可以投资的。它是否会给我们带来成本取决于我们是否有承保利润。

So even though our underwriting profit in the first quarter was quite satisfactory, but nevertheless down from the first quarter of last year, the insurance business is marvelous for us.

尽管我们第一季度的承保利润相当令人满意，但仍然低于去年第一季度，保险业务对我们来说非常出色。

And if we even break even, that $77 billion, which is subtracted from net worth, I mean, it’s a liability on the balance sheet, but if it’s cost free, it really does us about as much good as net worth itself does. So it’s a very remarkable business.

如果我们甚至能够持平，那 770 亿美元就会从净资产中扣除，我的意思是，这在资产负债表上是一项负债，但如果没有成本，它对我们来说的好处实际上和净资产本身差不多。所以这是一项非常了不起的业务。

And frankly, if we average an underwriting profit over the years, I’ll be very happy and you should be very happy with what our insurance business does for us.

坦率地说，如果我们多年平均获得承保利润，我会非常高兴，而你也应该对我们的保险业务为我们所做的感到非常满意。

But it was down in the first quarter. And, like I said, that more than accounted for the decline in earnings.

但在第一季度下降了。正如我所说，这在很大程度上解释了收益的下降。

We always advise you to pay little — pay no attention, really — to quarterly or even annual realized gains or losses in securities because we make no attempt to time the sales of securities to produce earnings in any given quarter.

我们始终建议您对证券的季度或年度实现的收益或损失少加关注——实际上根本不需要关注——因为我们并不试图在任何特定季度通过出售证券来产生收益。

We just try to manage the money as well as we can. And we let the chips fall where they may, in terms of whether those actions produce gains or losses in the short term.

我们尽力管理好资金。至于这些行动在短期内是否会产生收益或损失，我们就让事情自然发展。

We hope that they produce a lot of gains over the longer term, and they have.

我们希望他们在长期内获得很多收益，而他们确实做到了。

But they should be ignored in attempting to interpret our shorter-term earnings.

但在试图解读我们短期收益时，应该忽略它们。

5. Buffett praises shareholders for rejecting dividend proposal

巴菲特赞扬股东拒绝分红提案

WARREN BUFFETT: With that, I would like to give you a little preview of a vote that has taken place and which we will talk more about when we get the shareholders meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：在此，我想给大家预告一下已经进行的投票，我们将在股东大会上进一步讨论。

But it’s so remarkable, that I wanted to put it up for all of you to look at now.

但这实在太了不起了，我想现在把它展示给你们所有人看。

As you know, we had a shareholder resolution. Yeah, it’s up there.

如你所知，我们有一项股东提案。是的，它在那儿。

We had a shareholder resolution, rather elegantly stated, that suggested that we pay a dividend. And with the sort of subliminal suggestion that we weren’t paying it because I was so rich that I could live in this grand style to which I’ve become accustomed, without a dividend, but that the shareholders were out there essentially bereft of the necessities of life because we were holding all the money here in Omaha. (Laughter)

我们有一项股东提案，措辞相当优雅，建议我们支付股息。并带有一种潜意识的暗示，认为我们之所以不支付股息，是因为我太富有了，能够过上我习惯的这种奢华生活，而不需要股息，但股东们实际上因为我们把所有的钱都留在奥马哈而缺乏生活必需品。（笑声）

So this gentleman put this on the ballot. And if we’ll go to the next slide, you’ll see some remarkable figures.

所以这位先生将这个放在了投票中。如果我们看下一张幻灯片，你会看到一些显著的数据。

Bear in mind that, you know, you people get these proxies at your home or at your office. And you can mark anything you want.

请记住，你们可以在家里或办公室获得这些代理。你们可以标记任何你们想要的东西。

We hire no proxy solicitation firms. So we are making no calls. We make no attempt to influence how anybody votes. We just count them as they come in.

我们不雇佣任何代理招募公司。因此我们不进行任何电话联系。我们不试图影响任何人的投票方式。我们只是按收到的票数进行统计。

And as you’ll see at the top, among the Class A shares, the vote was roughly 90-plus-to-one, against the dividend. But you might suspect that I stuffed the ballot box, which I did. (Laughter)

正如你在顶部看到的，在 A 类股票中，投票结果大约是 90 比 1 反对分红。但你可能会怀疑我操纵了选票，实际上我确实这么做了。（笑声）

And so I took my vote out. And you’ll see down below, the vote was a little less than 40-to-one among the untainted shareholders of A against receiving a dividend.

所以我投出了我的票。你会看到下面，A类股票的未受污染的股东中，反对分红的投票结果大约是 40 比 1。

And then you may say to yourself, “Well, you know, those are Warren and his rich friends, all the plutocrats. And easy for them to say.”

然后你可能会对自己说：“好吧，你知道，那些是沃伦和他富有的朋友们，都是那些富豪。对他们来说，这很容易说。”

So let’s go onto the next slide. And you will see there that among the B shareholders — and we believe we may have as many as a million B shareholders. We don’t know the exact number. We don’t even know an approximate number very well. But it’s not a bad guess that we have a million or so shareholders.

那么我们继续看下一张幻灯片。您会看到，在 B 类股东中——我们相信可能有多达一百万个 B 类股东。我们不知道确切的数字。我们甚至对大致的数字也不太清楚。但猜测我们有大约一百万个股东并不是一个坏的猜测。

And remarkably, by a vote of 45-to-one — these are people — we’re not making any phone calls to get their vote or anything — by 45-to-one, our shareholders said, “Don’t pay us a dividend.”

令人惊讶的是，以45比1的投票比例——这些都是人们——我们没有打电话去获得他们的投票——以45比1的比例，我们的股东说，“不要给我们支付股息。”

I’m not sure that there’s any company in the world that would get quite that vote.

我不确定世界上是否有任何公司会得到那样的投票。

And now you go to one more slide and that’ll be the end.

现在你再看一张幻灯片，这就结束了。

But this is the rather disturbing part of that vote. If you go to the next page, you’ll see again, among the B shareholders, that — I’ve got that same vote up there — and if you look down below, you will notice that almost the same number of people voted against, or withheld their vote for me, as voted for having a dividend.

但这是投票的一个相当令人不安的部分。如果你们看下一页，你们会再次看到，在B类股东中——我在那儿有相同的投票——如果你们看下方，你们会注意到，几乎相同数量的人投票反对，或保留对我的投票，就像支持支付股息的数量一样。

So from that you can only deduce that if the shareholders are ever forced with the choice — or I should say, if the directors are ever forced with the choice — of paying a dividend or getting rid of me, it’s a close vote. (Laughter)

所以从中你只能推断，如果股东们面临选择——或者我应该说，如果董事们面临选择——支付股息或是摆脱我，这将是一个接近的投票结果。（笑声）

So you can see why I’m rather reluctant to bring up the dividend question with the directors.

所以你可以理解我为什么对向董事们提起股息问题有些犹豫。

The vote, actually, up until two days earlier, before these final figures, the vote was actually just virtually a dead heat.

投票实际上在这最后的数字之前，直到两天前，投票几乎是平局。

The number of people that wanted to have a dividend and the number of people that wanted me to get out of the place were running neck in neck. So it — again, it’s a rather unusual voting arrangement.

想要分红的人数和想让我离开这个地方的人数不相上下。因此，这又是一种相当不寻常的投票安排。

6. Q&A begins

问答开始

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with that we’re going to do the questioning, as we always do.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，接下来我们将进行提问，和往常一样。

We have journalists on this side. We have financial analysts on this side. And we’ve got a wonderful group of shareholders in the audience.

我们这边有记者。我们这边有金融分析师。观众中还有一群优秀的股东。

So we’re going to alternate among these groups. And we will keep doing that until noon. And then we’ll pick up where we left off at 1 o’clock, then continue doing it.

所以我们将轮流在这些小组之间进行。我们会一直这样做直到中午。然后我们将在一点钟从我们停下的地方继续。

And we will start off with Carol Loomis of Fortune Magazine.

我们将从《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯开始。

CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. I’ll make my two or three sentence introductory remarks.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：早上好。我将做两三句的开场白。

First, Becky and Andrew and I get hundreds, if not thousands, of questions, and we can only ask a few. So, if we didn’t get to your question, please excuse us.

首先，贝基、安德鲁和我收到了成百上千个问题，甚至可能是数千个，但我们只能问几个。所以，如果我们没有回答你的问题，请见谅。

Secondly, Warren and Charlie got no hint of what we were going to ask.

其次，沃伦和查理没有任何关于我们将要问什么的暗示。

Though they read the news like we do, and that may explain that they would sometimes get a thought about what they were going to get asked. And that will explain my first question.

尽管他们像我们一样阅读新闻，这可能解释了他们有时会想到自己将被问到的问题。这也解释了我的第一个问题。

7. Buffett defends abstaining on “excessive” Coca-Cola compensation

巴菲特为对“过高”可口可乐薪酬的弃权辩护

CAROL LOOMIS: The question is from Will Elridge (PH) of New York City.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自纽约市的威尔·埃尔德里奇（PH）。

And he says, “Mr. Buffett, this is a question about Berkshire’s holdings in Coca-Cola.

他说：“巴菲特先生，这是一个关于伯克希尔在可口可乐持股的问题。”

“This spring, Coke asked shareholders to approve a magnanimous stock option program for its executives.

“今年春天，可口可乐要求股东批准一项慷慨的高管股票期权计划。”

“Asked about it by the press after the vote, you said the program was excessive. Yet, you did not tell the world prior to the Coke shareholders meeting that you believed the program to be excessive, a disclosure that, had it been made earlier, might’ve made shareholders vote against it.

在投票后被媒体问及此事时，你表示该计划过于庞大。然而，在可口可乐股东大会之前，你并没有告诉世界你认为该计划过于庞大，如果提前披露，可能会导致股东投票反对该计划。

“And in fact, you did not vote Berkshire’s shares against the plan. You only abstained in the voting.

“实际上，您也没有对该计划投反对票，只是选择了弃权。”

“I guess you had your reasons. I must say, I don’t expect to agree with them. And I cannot see how they can stand up under examination.

“我想知道您选择弃权的理由是什么，我必须说，我不认为这些理由能经受住审查。”

“But I still would like to know why you engaged in this very strange, un-Buffett-like behavior.

“但我仍然想知道你为什么会表现出这种非常奇怪、不像巴菲特的行为。”

“So why did you abstain rather than voting no against a corporate action that deserved to be shouted down?”

“那么，为什么你选择弃权，而不是投反对票来反对一个应该被大声反对的公司行动？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, some people, incidentally, think that strange and un-Buffett-like are really not quite right. Strange is frequently Buffett-like. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，有些人觉得奇怪和不像巴菲特的说法可能并不准确。奇怪的行为往往也是巴菲特的行为。（笑声）

The proposal was made by a shareholder who’d owned shares for a long time and was opposed to the option program.

这个提案是由一位长期持有可口可乐股票的股东提出的，他反对这个期权计划。

His calculations — and I probably should explain this in a minute — but his calculations of the dilution were wildly off. And we did not care to get into a discussion of that or anything else.

他对稀释的计算——我可能应该稍后解释——非常不准确。我们不想讨论这个问题或其他任何问题。

But we did talk — or I did talk — to Muhtar Kent. And I informed him that we were going to abstain.

但我们确实进行了交谈——或者说是我与穆赫塔尔·肯特交谈了。我告诉他我们将会弃权。

I told him that we admired, enormously, the Coca-Cola Company. We admire the management.

我告诉他，我们非常钦佩可口可乐公司。我们钦佩其管理层。

And we thought the compensation plan, although it was very similar to a great many plans, was excessive.

我们认为补偿计划虽然与许多计划非常相似，但还是过于丰厚。

And Muhtar and I had a very good discussion right here in Omaha, as a matter of fact, as well as a couple of telephone discussions. And then immediately after the vote, I announced that we had abstained, and gave the reasons that we thought the plan was excessive.

穆赫塔尔和我在奥马哈进行了非常好的讨论，实际上还进行了几次电话讨论。然后在投票后，我宣布我们选择了弃权，并给出了我们认为该计划过于激进的理由。

And I think that in terms of having an effect on the Coca-Cola compensation practices, as well as maybe having an effect on some other compensation practices, that that is the most effective — was the most effective — way of behaving for Berkshire.

我认为，这种行为对于影响可口可乐的薪酬实践，以及可能影响其他一些薪酬实践来说，是最有效的。

We made a very clear statement about the excessiveness of the plan. And at the same time, we, in no way, went to war with Coca-Cola. We have no desire to go to war with Coca-Cola.

我们对计划的过度性做出了非常明确的声明。同时，我们也没有与可口可乐开战。我们没有意图与可口可乐开战。

And we did not endorse some calculations that were wildly inaccurate, and joined forces with someone that I had really no contact with him. I received several letters in the mail after they’d first been given to the press.

我们没有支持一些极其不准确的计算，并与一个我几乎没有接触的人联手。在他们首次将这些信息提供给媒体后，我收到了几封信。

So, I think you have to be — I don’t think going to war is a very good idea in most situations. And I think if you’re going to join forces in going to war with somebody, you’d better be very sure about what that alliance might mean.

所以，我认为你必须要——我认为在大多数情况下，战争并不是一个很好的主意。我认为如果你要与某人结盟去打仗，你最好非常确定这个联盟可能意味着什么。

So, I think the best result for the Coca-Cola Company was achieved by our abstention. And we will see what happens in terms of compensation between now and the next meeting with Coke.

所以，我认为通过我们的弃权行为取得了对可口可乐公司最好的结果。我们将看看在下一次股东大会之前，薪酬问题会有什么进展。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you handled the whole situation very well. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为你处理整个情况非常好。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie remains vice chairman. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理仍然是副董事长。（笑声）

Charlie, incidentally, was the — Charlie was the only one with whom I talked over the vote before — or the abstention — before I did it.

查理，顺便说一下，是唯一一个在我投票之前——或者说弃权之前——和我谈过的人。

I called Charlie. And told him about the plan. And we agreed on the course of action.

我给查理打了电话，告诉他这个计划。我们就行动方案达成了一致。

I should point out one thing. And in fairness to David Winters who may — who led the war — he took figures from the Coca-Cola proxy statement. So it’s hard to fault him for that.

我应该指出一点。公平地说，David Winters可能——他领导了这场战斗——他从可口可乐的代理声明中提取了数据。所以很难指责他。

But for those of you who would really — would like to know how to think about calculating dilution, Coca-Cola has regularly repurchased the shares that are issued through options.

但对于那些真的想了解如何计算稀释的人来说，可口可乐定期回购通过期权发行的股票。

And the share count has, thereby, come down just a small bit at Coca-Cola. Not anywhere near as much as if they hadn’t issued as many shares, though, in repurchased shares.

可口可乐的股份数量因此略有减少。但如果他们没有回购那么多股份，减少的幅度就不会如此之小。

But Coca-Cola has a plan that involves 500 million shares. And they say in the annual report that they expect to issue these over approximately four years. And then they have a further calculation between performance shares and option shares, but I’ll leave that out. Make this a little simpler.

但是可口可乐有一个涉及 5 亿股的计划。他们在年度报告中表示，预计将在大约四年内发行这些股票。然后，他们还对业绩股票和期权股票进行了进一步的计算，但我就不提这个了。让我们简单一点。

And that’s a lot of shares.

这可是一大堆股份。

Let’s assume for the moment that Coca-Cola’s selling around $40 a share now, which it is. And that when — and that all the options are issued at $40. And that the — when they’re exercised, we’ll say the stock is $60.

假设目前可口可乐的股价大约为每股 40 美元，实际上确实如此。所有期权都是以 40 美元的价格发行的。当这些期权被行使时，我们假设股票价格为 60 美元。

Now, at that point, there has been a $10 billion transfer of value. Twenty dollars a share times 500 million shares, a $10 billion transfer of value.

现在，此时已经发生了 100 亿美元的价值转移。每股 20 美元乘以 5 亿股，价值转移为 100 亿美元。

Now, the company, when that is done, gets a tax deduction — and at the — for 10 billion — and at the present tax rates, that would result in 3 1/2 billion less tax.

现在，公司在完成后可以获得税收减免——对于 100 亿——按照目前的税率，这将导致减少 35 亿的税款。

So if you take 20 billion of proceeds from exercise of the options, and you add 3 1/2 billion of tax savings, the Coca-Cola Company receives 23 1/2 billion.

所以，如果你把20亿美元的期权行使收益和35亿美元的税收节省加起来，可口可乐公司将获得235亿美元。

And if they should buy in the stock at $60 a share, which it would be selling for then, they would be able to buy 391,666,666 shares.

如果他们以每股 60 美元的价格购买该股票（那时的售价），他们将能够购买 391,666,666 股。

So, in effect, the Coca-Cola Company, net, would be out a little over eight — 108 million shares. And that’s on a base of four-billion-four.

因此，实际上，可口可乐公司净损失将超过1.08亿股，这是在44的基础上。

So the dilution — assuming all the proceeds from the option exercise and the tax refund were used to buy shares — the dilution would be 108 million shares on 4.4 billion, or about 2 1/2 percent.

因此，稀释——假设所有来自期权行使的收益和税款退款都用于购买股票——稀释将是 1.08 亿股，占 44 亿股的约 2.5%。

And I don’t like dilution and I don’t like 2 1/2 percent dilution. But it’s a far cry from the numbers that were getting tossed around.

我不喜欢稀释，也不喜欢 2.5%的稀释。但这与那些被提及的数字相去甚远。

It’s a long explanation, but I’ve never seen the math written about. I mean, I’ve seen people throwing out claims and all of that.

这是一段很长的解释，但我从未见过相关的数学公式。我是说，我见过人们提出各种说法和所有这些。

And you can change my supposition from 55 — 60 to 55 — or 65. It doesn’t change things very much.

你可以把我的假设从 55-60 改为 55-或 65。这并不会改变太多事情。

8. Berkshire likely to team with 3G again despite different styles

尽管风格不同，伯克希尔可能会再次与 3G 合作

WARREN BUFFETT: Jon Brandt

沃伦·巴菲特：乔恩·布兰特

JONATHAN BRANDT: Hi, Warren. Thanks again for having me back.

乔纳森·布兰特：嗨，沃伦。再次感谢你让我回来。

My first question is as follows: Berkshire has a track record of buying successful companies and leaving them alone.

我第一个问题如下：伯克希尔有购买成功公司的记录，并让它们保持独立。

3G has a more hands-on strategy with its acquisition. Its zero-base budgeting would seem to offer the potential to improve margins at any non-insurance business.

3G 在收购方面采取了更为务实的策略。其零基预算似乎有潜力改善任何非保险业务的利润率。

Is there a way for Berkshire to use 3G’s methods to boost profits without violating promises made to selling shareholders or breaking faith with Berkshire’s decentralized culture?

伯克希尔有没有办法利用 3G 的方法来提高利润，而不违反对出售股东的承诺或破坏伯克希尔的分散文化？

Would it be consistent with Berkshire’s culture to hire a 3G alumnus to run a Berkshire subsidiary after an existing manager retired? Or alternatively, how hard would it be for a non-3G alumnus to learn and implement their management process? Thank you.

在现有经理退休后，雇佣一位 3G 校友来管理伯克希尔的子公司是否符合伯克希尔的文化？或者，非 3G 校友学习和实施他们的管理流程会有多困难？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think the two blend very well.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为这两者结合得不好。

But I do think that we — I think 3G does a magnificent job of running businesses. And I’ve watched them in the past from afar and I’ve watched them more recently up close.

但我确实认为我们——我认为 3G 在经营企业方面做得非常出色。我过去从远处观察过他们，最近也更近距离地观察了他们。

And there’s no question that it’s a different style than Berkshire. And I don’t think it would pay to try and blend the two.

毫无疑问，这与伯克希尔的风格不同。我认为尝试将两者融合在一起是没有意义的。

But I certainly think that we will see more opportunities to partner with 3G. And we’re very likely to jump at those opportunities, because I think they’re as able as anybody I’ve seen in the management of businesses.

但我确实认为我们会看到更多与 3G 合作的机会。我们很可能会抓住这些机会，因为我认为他们在企业管理方面的能力与我见过的任何人都不相上下。

And to get a chance to join with them — and in addition to that, they’re marvelous partners. They’re more than fair in everything they do with us.

并有机会与他们合作——此外，他们是出色的合作伙伴。他们在与我们合作的每件事上都非常公平。

So we will, as I’ve put in the past, I think we’re very likely to partner with them, perhaps in things that are very large.

所以，正如我之前所说的，我认为我们很可能会与他们合作，也许是在一些非常大的项目上。

But I do not think a blending of the two would work very well. We’ve got a system, works very well for us.

但我认为将两者结合在一起并不太可行。我们有一个系统，对我们来说运作得很好。

And managers, when they join Berkshire, are joining into a large business that’s unlike virtually any large business that’s around. They really can’t find a home exactly like Berkshire.

而当经理们加入伯克希尔时，他们加入的是一个与几乎所有大型企业都不同的大型企业。他们实际上找不到一个完全像伯克希尔的家。

And that’s a huge corporate asset. It’s one that’s grown over time. It’ll continue to grow. And we want to maintain that with a very clear message that it goes well beyond my lifetime.

这是一项巨大的企业资产。它随着时间的推移而增长。它将继续增长。我们希望以非常明确的信息来维护这一点，这超出了我的一生。

But we welcome the chance to join with 3G.

但我们欢迎与 3G 合作的机会。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think we’ve ever had a policy that loved overstaffing. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为我们从来没有过一个喜欢人手过剩的政策。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would only slightly disagree with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对此只会稍微不同意。

We certainly never had a policy that allows for overstaffing at the home office.

我们当然从来没有过允许总部人员过剩的政策。

We only feel happy when people are sitting in other people’s laps. I mean, you have to understand this.

我们只有在别人坐在彼此膝盖上的时候才会感到高兴。我是说，你必须理解这一点。

But the — but we have not enforced, or attempted to enforce, nor would wish to enforce, a strong discipline on every subsidiary as to whether they have a few too many people or not.

但是我们并没有对每个子公司强制执行或试图执行严格的纪律，也不希望对他们是否有太多员工进行强制执行。

A great many don’t. In fact, I mean, most of them are — overwhelmingly — they’re managed on a lean basis.

很多人并不是这样。实际上，我的意思是，他们大多数——压倒性地——是以精益的方式进行管理的。

But that’s not true of everyone we’ve been involved in over the years. And it probably won’t be true of everyone in the future.

但这并不适用于我们多年来接触的每一个人。未来也可能不会适用于每一个人。

We encourage — I mean, we encourage, just by example. But we do not encourage it by edicts, particularly.

我们鼓励——我的意思是，我们通过示范来鼓励。但我们并不特别通过法令来鼓励它。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think a lot of great businesses spill a little just because they don’t want to be fanatic.

查理·芒格：我认为许多伟大的公司稍微溢出一点，因为他们不想变得太过极端。

And that’s all right. I don’t think you have to have the last nickel out of the staffing cost.

这没关系。我认为你不必从人员成本中榨取最后一分钱。

9. Corporate taxes aren’t holding back businesses

企业税并没有阻碍企业发展

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to the shareholder in station 1, up on my far right.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去第一号股东，位于我右侧的最远处。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, hello. My name is Doug Merrill (PH). I’m from Denver, Colorado, the home of Peyton Manning.

观众成员：你好，我叫道格·梅里尔。我来自科罗拉多州的丹佛，佩顿·曼宁的故乡。

WARREN BUFFETT: Omaha, Omaha. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：奥马哈，奥马哈。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Awesome.

观众成员：太棒了。

The president’s approval rating is at 40 percent. Steve Wynn said, “Obama is the biggest wet blanket to the economy.” Other countries are lowering taxes and reducing debt.

总统的支持率为 40%。史蒂夫·温说：“奥巴马是对经济最大的泼冷水者。”其他国家正在降低税收和减少债务。

You have Obama’s ear. The train’s going in the wrong direction. Can you conduct Obama to change the train’s direction? (Applause)

你得到了奥巴马的关注。火车走错了方向。你能引导奥巴马改变火车的方向吗？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Doug, I think I’ll let you communicate with him directly. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：道格，我想我会让你直接和他沟通。（笑声）

I don’t agree with a number of things you’ve said there. American business is doing extraordinarily well. (Applause)

我不同意你所说的许多事情。美国的商业表现非常好。（掌声）

The — many of the American people are not. And, you know, and I think Obamacare is more about doing something for them than many other people would.

许多美国人并不是这样。我认为奥巴马医改更多是为了他们，而不是为了其他许多人。

But we’re going to have a difference of opinion on politics. And I’m not going to convince you, and you’re not going to convince me.

但我们在政治上会有不同的看法。我不会说服你，你也不会说服我。

But I will say that anybody that thinks American business is doing — is not doing well — should just look at corporate profits.

但是我想说，任何认为美国企业表现不佳的人，只需看看企业利润。

Anybody that thinks our corporate taxes are too high should look at a chart of corporate taxes as a percentage of GDP since World War II, and it’s come down from 4 percent of GDP to 2 percent of GDP, while many other forms of taxes have, obviously, increased.

任何认为我们公司税过高的人都应该查看自第二次世界大战以来公司税占 GDP 百分比的图表，这一比例已经从占 GDP 的 4%降至 2%，而其他许多税种显然是增加的。

And American business earnings on net tangible assets, which is the way to measure profitability overall, you know, it’s basically the envy of the world. I mean, we have extraordinary returns on tangible assets — net tangible assets — in this country.

而美国企业在净有形资产上的收益——这是衡量总体盈利能力的方式——基本上是世界羡慕的对象。我们的净有形资产回报在这个国家是非常惊人的。

And our tax rates now for corporations are far lower than when Charlie and I were operating. And American business actually was doing pretty good then.

我们现在对企业的税率远低于查理和我经营时的税率。而那时美国的商业实际上表现得相当不错。

But for much of our life, taxes were at — corporate taxes — were at either 52 percent or 48 percent.

但在我们生活的很大一部分时间里，企业税的税率要么是 52％，要么是 48％。

But I don’t want to try and convince you because I don’t want you to try and convince me. So we’ll call a truce on that and I’ll let Charlie comment. (Laughter)

但我不想试图说服你，因为我也不想让你试图说服我。所以我们就对此达成停战，我让查理来评论。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m going to avoid this one. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我会避免这个。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And people complain about me abstaining. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：人们抱怨我不参与。（笑声）

10. Berkshire underperforms when stock market is strong

当股市强劲时，伯克希尔表现不佳

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky Quick.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基·奎克。

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Manolo Salseda (PH).

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自马诺洛·萨尔塞达（菲律宾）。

And I’ll preface it by saying he says that he is “a true admirer of Buffett and what he stands for, so please don’t confuse my bluntness and straightforwardness with a lack of admiration or empathy with this amazing person and his master creation.” With that disclaimer —

我先说一下，他表示自己是“巴菲特及其所代表的事物的真正崇拜者，所以请不要将我的直言不讳和坦率与对这个了不起的人及其杰作的缺乏钦佩或同情混淆。”有了这个免责声明——

WARREN BUFFETT: “But.” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：“但是。”（笑声）

BECKY QUICK: But. His question is, “You’ve stated several times in the past that if management, you, wasn’t capable of delivering a better return than the index, than management wasn’t doing the job.

贝基·奎克：但是。他的问题是，“你过去曾多次表示，如果管理层，你，无法提供比指数更好的回报，那么管理层就没有尽到职责。”

“Then you said that the yardstick should be any five-year period. You’ve just missed your five-year period comparison.

“然后你说标准应该是任何五年期。你刚刚错过了你的五年期比较。”

“How come you didn’t tackle the issue in your annual shareholder letter? Are you changing the yardstick, and what’s next?”

“你为什么在年度股东信中没有解决这个问题？你是在改变标准吗，接下来会怎样？”

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we’re not changing the yardstick.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们不会改变标准。

But I would point out that we said, actually, in the 2012 report — and it’s in the upper half of the first page — we pointed out how we do worse in very strong years and better in poor years.

但我想指出，我们在 2012 年的报告中实际上提到过——这在第一页的上半部分——我们指出在非常强劲的年份表现较差，而在较差的年份表现较好。

And I said then, “If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.”

我当时说：“如果市场在 2013 年继续上涨，我们五年的连胜纪录将会结束。”

I didn’t say it might end, or could end, or anything. It was obvious that if you have five strong years in a row, we will not beat the S&P. And that will be true in the future, for sure.

我没有说过它可能会结束，或者可能会结束，或者其他什么。很明显，如果你连续五年表现强劲，我们将无法超越标准普尔指数。将来这肯定也会是事实。

And of course, last year was — I think there were two years in the last 40 or so that the market was up more than it was last year. So, despite the things mentioned about President Obama, the stock market seems to have done quite well.

当然，去年——我认为在过去 40 年中，市场上涨超过去年的年份只有两年。因此，尽管提到了关于奥巴马总统的事情，但股市似乎表现得相当不错。

We will underperform in very strong up years. We’ll probably, more or less, match in moderate up years. We’ll do better than average in even years or down years.

在非常强劲的上涨年份，我们的表现会低于预期。在适度上涨的年份，我们的表现大致相当。在偶数年或下跌年份，我们的表现会好于平均水平。

And I have said, and I’ll continue to say, and it’s been true that over any cycle, we will — I think we will overperform. But there’s no guarantee on that.

我已经说过，我会继续说，而且这一直是真实的，在任何周期内，我们——我认为我们会表现得超过预期。但对此没有保证。

But it was clearly said — like I say, on the first page of the 2012 report — that if the market went up, we would have a five-year streak of underperformance. And that’s exactly what happened.

但很明确地说——就像我在 2012 年报告的第一页上所说的——如果市场上涨，我们将会有五年的表现不佳。而这正是发生的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we should remember that Warren’s standard talks about net worth of Berkshire increasing, after full corporate taxes, at roughly 35 percent. And the indexes aren’t paying any taxes.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们应该记住，沃伦的标准是伯克希尔的净资产在35%的全额公司税后大幅增长，而这些指数并没有缴纳任何税。

这个说法后面也有提及，指数里的公司同样有企业所得税。

And so, Warren has set a ridiculously tough standard and has so far met it over a long period of time.

因此，沃伦设定了一个极其严格的标准，并且到目前为止在很长一段时间内都达到了这个标准。

In the last couple of years, the net worth of Berkshire, after full corporation income taxes, went up, what, 60?

在过去的几年里，伯克希尔的净资产在全额公司所得税后增长了，大约 60？

WARREN BUFFETT: Something like that, yeah —

沃伦·巴菲特：差不多是这样，嗯——

CHARLIE MUNGER: $60 billion —

查理·芒格：600 亿美元 —

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Pre-tax, probably 90 billion in —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。税前，大约 900 亿。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And so, if this is failure, I want more of it. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的。如果这就是失败，我想要更多。（笑声和掌声）

11. “Eager” to buy back shares at 120% of book value

“渴望”以账面价值的 120%回购股票

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay Gelb.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。杰伊·盖尔布。

JAY GELB: Warren, this question is on Berkshire’s intrinsic value.

杰伊·盖尔布：沃伦，这个问题是关于伯克希尔的内在价值。

In the annual letter, you appear to strongly signal that Berkshire’s shares are undervalued, especially relative to intrinsic value.

在年度信中，您似乎强烈暗示伯克希尔的股票被低估，特别是相对于内在价值。

Aside from share buybacks, what actions can Berkshire take to narrow the discount between the current share price and intrinsic value? For example, would you ever consider an IPO of Berkshire’s individual operating units?

除了股票回购，伯克希尔还可以采取哪些措施来缩小当前股价与内在价值之间的折扣？例如，您是否会考虑伯克希尔的个别运营单位进行首次公开募股？

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to the last part is no.

沃伦·巴菲特：最后一部分的答案是否定的。

But the — I think we try to explain —my guess is I’ve never seen an annual report that uses the term, “intrinsic value,” or even talks about the intrinsic value of its units or business, as much as Berkshire does.

但我想我们试图解释——我猜我从未见过一份年报使用“内在价值”这个术语，或者甚至谈论其单位或业务的内在价值，像伯克希尔那样多。

So, Charlie and I really devote considerable effort to explaining which of our businesses — where there’s really a significant discrepancy between what carrying value is, or book value — call it carrying value — and the true value, or the intrinsic value, of the business.

所以，查理和我确实花了相当大的精力来解释我们的哪些业务——在这些业务中，账面价值或称为账面价值与业务的真实价值或内在价值之间存在显著差异。

And I got very specific in the case of GEICO in the past year, for example.

在过去一年中，我在 GEICO 的案例中变得非常具体。

And I said that GEICO, which is carried at about 1 billion over tangible assets, may be worth as much as 20 billion over tangible assets. And I wouldn’t be surprised if five years or ten years from now that that figure itself will be a lot larger.

我说过，GEICO 的有形资产大约超过 100亿美元，可能实际的内在价值高达 200 亿美元。如果五年或十年后这个数字变得更大，我也不会感到惊讶。

So we’ve talked about it. We said we are willing to buy — not only willing, but eager to buy — stock at 120 percent of book value.

所以我们已经谈过这个问题。我们说我们愿意购买——不仅愿意，而且渴望以账面价值的 120%购买股票。

Well, with book value being close to 230 billion now, that obviously means we think that at $45 billion, roughly, over that figure, we are getting a bargain, in relation to intrinsic value.

好吧，考虑到账面价值现在接近 2300 亿，这显然意味着我们认为在大约 450 亿的价格上，相对于内在价值，我们得到了一个便宜的交易。

But we’re never going to try and put out an exact number because we don’t know an exact number.

但我们永远不会尝试给出一个确切的数字，因为我们不知道确切的数字。

And it’s — A, it changes from day to day. And — although not a lot day to day, but certainly changes, you know, over the quarters and over the years.

而且——这会随着每天的变化而变化。虽然每天的变化不大，但在季度和年份之间肯定会有所变化。

And the second reason is, if you ask Charlie and me to write down a figure as we sit here as to the intrinsic value of Berkshire, we’d probably be within 5 percent of each other.

第二个原因是，如果你让查理和我在这里写下伯克希尔的内在价值，我们可能会相差不超过 5%。

But we might very — we probably would not be within 1 percent of each other.

但我们可能非常——我们可能不会相差 1%。

And so we will continue to try to give shareholders information about the important units.

因此，我们将继续努力向股东提供有关重要单位的信息。

It isn’t — the small ones are not unimportant to us, but they are — they do not have a big impact on the overall intrinsic value.

这些小业务对我们来说并非不重要，但它们对整体内在价值的影响不大。

We’ve got a few businesses. I mean, we have some businesses that may be carried at a few hundred million that might be worth a billion or maybe 2 billion, even.

我们有一些业务。我是说，我们有些业务的账面价值可能是几亿美元，但实际价值可能是10亿美元甚至20亿美元。

But that isn’t where the big, undisclosed by the balance sheet, values are.

但这并不是资产负债表上未披露的大价值所在。

You know, they’re in the railroad, they’re in the insurance business, they’re in our utility business.

你知道，他们在铁路行业，他们在保险业务，他们在我们的公用事业。

And we — they add up to some pretty big numbers. We try to tell you exactly the numbers and, really, and use the words that we use when we’re thinking about those businesses ourselves, in terms of estimating their value. But we don’t want to go further than that.

而我们——它们加起来是相当大的数字。我们尽量准确地告诉你这些数字，实际上，使用我们在考虑这些业务时所用的词汇，以估算它们的价值。但我们不想再进一步。

The 120 percent, obviously, is a loud shoutout as to a figure that we think is very significantly below intrinsic value, or we wouldn’t use it to repurchase shares.

显然，120%是一个明确的信号，表明我们认为这是一个明显低于内在价值的数字，否则我们不会用这个价格来回购股票。

We only believe in repurchasing shares when we can do so at a significant discount from intrinsic value.

我们只相信在我们能够以显著低于内在价值的价格回购股票时才进行回购。

Some companies talk about — Coca-Cola does — they talk about buying in shares to cover options. That actually isn’t the best reason to buy in shares.

一些公司谈论——可口可乐就这样做——他们谈论回购股票以覆盖期权。这实际上不是回购股票的最佳理由。

I mean, the stock could be overpriced, and even though you issued on options, you shouldn’t be buying it in.

我意思是，这只股票可能被高估了，即使你发行了期权，你也不应该买入。

But that’s become sort of a mantra throughout corporate America, that if you buy shares to cover the option exercises that you’ve negated the dilution to shareholders.

但这在整个美国企业中已经成为一种口头禅，即如果你购买股票来覆盖你所放弃的期权行使，那么你就消除了对股东的稀释。

But again, if you buy shares — if you buy a dollar bill for 90 cents, you’re doing your shareholders a favor. And if you buy it for $1.10, you are doing them no favor at all.

但是，再说一次，如果你购买股票——如果你以 90 美分的价格购买一美元的钞票，你是在为你的股东谋福利。如果你以 1.10 美元的价格购买，那你就完全没有在为他们谋福利。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t believe we’ve ever wanted to get the stock way over intrinsic value so that we can issue it to other people and get an advantage for ourselves and a disadvantage for them.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不认为我们曾经想要将股票的价值远远抬高，以便将其发行给其他人，从中为自己谋取利益，而让他们处于不利地位。

And, I think the people that want the stock up very close to intrinsic value, or higher, really want egg in their beer. It’s okay if it’s a little below.

我认为那些希望股票接近内在价值或更高的人，实际上是在自找麻烦。如果稍微低一点也没关系。

And we’re not in the game of ballooning our stock up as high as we can get it so we can issue it more at a profit to ourselves.

我们不在于把股票价格抬得尽可能高，以便可以更多地发行给自己从中获利。

I think over the long term, our system will work pretty well. And I think the stock will eventually go above intrinsic value, whether we like it or not.

我认为从长远来看，我们的系统会运作得很好。我认为股票最终会超过内在价值，无论我们喜欢与否。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But we have — we really watched a lot over the years of certain managers attempting to get their stock to sell for way more than it was worth, so they could use it to trade for other companies. I mean, that was all the rage in the late ’60s.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但是多年来，我们确实观察到一些经理试图让他们的股票卖出远高于其实际价值的情况，以便用它来交易其他公司。我是说，这在 60 年代末是非常流行的。

One of the reasons that I wound up my partnership was that that activity was going on so much and it affected all other values.

我结束合作关系的原因之一是那项活动进行得太频繁，影响了其他所有价值。

And it was really a game. And it was a game that some people played sort of halfway honestly, and other people really cheated like crazy, because if you’re trying to get your stock to be overpriced, you’re very likely to cheat on your earnings and cheat on projections. Cheat on everything.

这确实是一场游戏。有些人玩得算是半诚实，而其他人则疯狂作弊，因为如果你试图让你的股票被高估，你很可能会在收益和预测上作弊，甚至在所有方面都作弊。

And it works, incidentally. It doesn’t work indefinitely, but it works.

而且顺便说一下，它是有效的。它并不是无限期有效，但它是有效的。

Some companies, whose names you know, were, to some extent, built on that principle.

一些你知道名字的公司在某种程度上是建立在这个原则上的。

That’s a game that we not only don’t want to play, we really found it very distasteful, because we saw a lot of these people in action.

这不仅是我们不想参与的游戏，而且我们真的觉得非常令人反感，因为我们见识过很多这些人的行为。

And it comes in waves. And we just — we don’t want to come close to playing it.

它有时会以波浪的形式出现。我们只是——我们不想接近这种游戏。

Unless I’m careful, Charlie will name names, so we’d better move on to shareholders. (Laughter)

除非我小心，查理会点名的，所以我们最好继续讨论股东的问题。（笑声）

12. Why sellers trust Berkshire with the companies they’ve built

为什么卖家信任伯克希尔与他们所建立的公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s go to station number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们去第二个站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett—

观众：嗨，巴菲特先生——

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — and Mr. Munger.

观众成员：——还有芒格先生。

My name is Masato Luso (PH) and I’m from Los Angeles, California.

我的名字是马里奥·卢索（PH），我来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。

Berkshire is known to buy into whole companies for many, many years. But earlier in your careers, that was not known.

伯克希尔以收购整个公司而闻名，已经很多年了。但在你们的职业生涯早期，这并不为人所知。

And typically, acquisitions of other companies is very disruptive. Employees fear losing their jobs as a redundancy. And managers really have to think twice and be diligent about it.

通常，收购其他公司会造成很大的干扰。员工担心失去工作而被裁员。管理者确实需要三思而后行，并对此保持谨慎。

So my question is, what do you do to gain the trust of founders or owners of the companies you have bought out in the past?

我想问的是，你们过去是如何赢得被收购公司的创始人或所有者的信任的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve kept our word to them.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们对他们守信了。

And now we have to be very careful about what we promise, because we can’t promise, for example, never to have a layoff in a business we buy, because who knows what the world holds.

现在我们必须非常小心我们所承诺的，因为我们不能承诺，例如，在我们购买的业务中绝对不裁员，因为谁知道未来会发生什么。

But we can promise that we won’t sell their business, for example, if it turns out to be disappointing, as long as it doesn’t run into the prospect of continuing losses or having significant labor problems.

但我们可以保证，如果业务结果令人失望，我们不会出售他们的业务，只要它没有面临持续亏损或重大劳工问题的前景。

But we keep — we are keeping — certain businesses that you would not get a passing grade at business school on if you wrote down our reasons for keeping them.

但我们仍然保留——我们正在保留——某些业务，如果你把我们保留它们的理由写下来，你在商学院是无法及格的。

But the reason is, we made a promise.

但原因是，我们做出了一个承诺。

And we put that — we not only make the promise, we put it in the back of the annual report now — we’ve done it for 30 years or so — where we list the economic principles.

我们不仅做出承诺，还将其放在年度报告的后面——我们已经这样做了大约 30 年——在报告中列出经济原则。

And we put it there because we believe it. But we put it there, also, so that the managers who sell us their— the owners who sell us their business — know they can count on it.

我们把它放在那里，因为我们相信它。但我们也把它放在那里，以便那些向我们出售他们业务的管理者——业主——知道他们可以依赖它。

And if we behave differently, you know, the word would get around. And it should get around.

如果我们表现得不同，你知道，消息会传开的。而且应该传开。

So, we can make promises. We can’t make promises we’ll never change employment. We can’t even make a promise that we’ll keep a business forever.

所以，我们可以做出承诺。我们不能承诺我们永远不会改变就业。我们甚至不能承诺我们会永远保留一个业务。

But we can promise what we do promise, which is that if it turns out to be somewhat disappointing on earnings, but does not promise, sort of, unending losses, or if we have labor problems, we can keep that promise.

但我们可以承诺我们所承诺的，即如果收益结果有些令人失望，但并不意味着会有无尽的亏损，或者如果我们遇到劳动力问题，我们可以保持这个承诺。

And we have kept that promise. We’ve only had to get rid of a few businesses, including our original textile business.

我们遵守了那个承诺。我们只不得不剥离了一些业务，包括我们最初的纺织业务。

We promise the managers, you know, that they are going to continue to run their businesses.

我们向经理们承诺，他们将继续经营他们的业务。

And believe me, if we didn’t do it, the word would get around on that very quickly. But we’ve been doing it now for 49 years.

相信我，如果我们不这样做，消息很快就会传开。但我们已经这样做了 49 年。

And we’ve put ourselves in a class that is hard for other people to compete with, if that’s important to the seller of a business.

我们把自己放在一个其他人很难竞争的类别中，如果这对商业卖家来说很重要的话。

A private equity firm is going to be totally unimpressed by what’s in the back of our annual report. They don’t care. And that’s — there’s nothing wrong with that. That’s their business.

一家私募股权公司对我们年度报告背后的内容完全不会感兴趣。他们不在乎。这没什么错。这是他们的业务。

But for somebody that’s built up their company over 20 or 30 or 40 years — and maybe their father or grandfather built it up even before that — some of those people care about where their businesses go.

但是对于那些花费 20 年、30 年或 40 年建立起自己公司的人的来说——也许他们的父亲或祖父甚至在更早之前就建立了公司——其中一些人关心他们的企业未来走向。

They’re very rich, they’ve accomplished all kinds of things in life. And they don’t want to build up something which somebody else tears apart very quickly believe they handing it over to a few MBAs who want to show their stuff.

他们非常富有，已经在生活中取得了各种成就。他们不想建立一些很快就被别人拆毁的东西，认为自己把它交给几个想要展示自己能力的 MBA。

So, we do have a unique — close to a unique — asset at Berkshire. And as long as we behave properly, we will maintain that asset. And really, no one else will have much luck in competing with us.

所以，我们在伯克希尔确实拥有一个独特的——接近独特的——资产。只要我们行为得当，我们就会保持这个资产。实际上，其他人很难与我们竞争。

But it doesn’t solve all problems, but — and it — and frankly, it’s the way we want to operate anyway.

但这并不能解决所有问题，但——老实说，这正是我们想要的运作方式。

So it’s — we’re comfortable with it. The sellers that do come to us that care about their businesses are comfortable with it. And I think it’ll continue to work well.

所以我们对此很满意。那些关心自己生意的卖家也对此感到满意。我认为这将继续运作良好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, obviously, we behave the way we do because we like doing it. And number two, it’s worked pretty well and we’re unlikely to stop.

查理·芒格：显然，我们之所以这样做，是因为我们喜欢这样做。其次，这种方式效果很好，我们不太可能停止。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

You can tell that he doesn’t get paid by the word. (Laughter)

你可以看出他不是按字数收费的。（笑声）

13. “Social dynamics” weaken oversight by corporate boards

“社会动态”削弱了公司董事会的监督能力

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren. This is a tough corporate governance question. I probably received about a dozen of them this week, some polite and some less polite. This —

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦。这是一个棘手的公司治理问题。我这周大概收到了十几个这样的提问，有些礼貌，有些则不太礼貌。这——

WARREN BUFFETT: Use one of the polite ones.

沃伦·巴菲特：使用其中一个礼貌的。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This is probably one of the more polite ones.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这可能是比较礼貌的一种。

“Your son Howard serves on the board of Coke and voted to support its CEO pay package proposal, which you have said was excessive and you were against.

“你的儿子霍华德在可口可乐的董事会任职，并投票支持其首席执行官薪酬方案，而你曾表示这一方案过于奢侈，你对此表示反对。”

“You have said Howard will become non-executive chairman of Berkshire after you step down, as its, quote, ‘protector of culture,’ to uphold the morals that you and we all hold so dear.

“你说霍华德将在你辞职后成为伯克希尔的非执行主席，作为其所谓的‘文化保护者’，以维护你和我们都非常珍视的道德。”

Given his role in the Coke vote, how can we count on Howard to defend the culture of Berkshire and ensure that the future management of Berkshire does not benefit at the expense of its shareholders?”

鉴于他在可口可乐投票中的角色，我们如何能指望霍华德捍卫伯克希尔的文化，并确保伯克希尔未来的管理不会以股东的利益为代价？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I think, as I mentioned in at least one interview, I voted for not — I’m not referring to Coke here necessarily — but as a director of various companies, I not only voted for comp plans that were far from what I would’ve come up myself, but I voted for acquisitions that I didn’t think make much sense.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想，正如我在至少一次采访中提到的，我投票反对——我并不是特别指可口可乐——但作为多家公司的董事，我不仅投票支持那些与我自己想法相去甚远的薪酬计划，还投票支持我认为没有太大意义的收购。

I voted against a few. And they attracted a lot of attention. But they were big ones, where I really think — where I thought — it really made a difference.

我投票反对了一些。它们引起了很多关注。但它们是大问题，我真的认为——我认为——这确实产生了影响。

But the nature — and this is something worth exploring, generally, because the nature of boards is such that they’re part business organizations and part social organizations. And people behave in some ways with their business brain and they behave to some extent with their social brain.

但本质——这是一个值得探讨的内容，因为董事会的本质是它们既是商业组织，又是社交组织。人们在某些方面用商业思维行事，在某种程度上又用社交思维行事。

And I would say — and I said this — that in 55 years of being on corporate boards, and 19 companies aside from Berkshire, I don’t think I’ve ever seen a comp committee report come in and get a dissenting vote.

我想说——我也这样说过——在我 55 年的公司董事会经历中，以及在除了伯克希尔之外的 19 家公司中，我认为我从未见过薪酬委员会的报告出现异议投票。

And the social reason for that is that the board organizes itself in a way whereby certain activities are delegated to a smaller portion of the board, one being a compensation committee.

社会原因在于，董事会以一种方式组织自己，使得某些活动被委托给董事会的较小部分，其中之一是薪酬委员会。

And that committee presumably meets for a few hours the day before the meeting, or maybe the morning of the meeting. And then they go into a board meeting. And the comp committee reports on its activities. And you’ve delegated that activity, as a board member, to that group.

该委员会大概在会议前一天或会议当天早上开会几个小时。然后他们进入董事会会议。薪酬委员会报告其活动。作为董事会成员，您已将该活动委托给该小组。

It’s almost unheard of to question that. I’m not saying that maybe it shouldn’t be questioned, but I’m just saying that that is the way it works.

几乎没有人会质疑这一点。我不是说这可能不应该被质疑，而是我只是想说，这就是事情运作的方式。

Now bear in mind that the so-called independent directors on such a board are probably receiving maybe $200,000 a year, maybe $300,000 a year. Believe me, they are not independent.

请记住，这种董事会上的所谓独立董事可能每年获得大约 20 万美元，甚至 30 万美元。相信我，他们并不独立。

They’re independent as measured by some standards, perhaps, at the SEC, but they — you know, how would you feel about having a job that required you to go to work four or six times a year, pleasant company, you know, certain amount of prestige attached with it, and on top of it, you get paid maybe $300,000 a year and you kind of hope to get another job like that? That is not independence.

他们在某些标准下可能被认为是独立的，比如在证券交易委员会，但你知道吗，想想如果你有一份工作，每年只需要去工作四到六次，工作环境愉快，附带一定的声望，而且你每年能赚到大约 30 万美元，你还希望能找到另一份这样的工作？这并不是独立。

So, you get a group coming in like that from the comp committee. And in those 19 boards, I was put on the comp committee exactly once. Charlie might be able to tell you exactly what the result was that time. They do not look for Dobermans. (Laughter)

所以，你会看到一个这样的团队从薪酬委员会进来。在那 19 个董事会中，我只被安排在薪酬委员会一次。查理可能能告诉你那次的结果是什么。他们并不寻找杜宾犬。（笑声）

They look for cocker spaniels. And then they make sure that the tails are wagging. (Laughter)

他们寻找可卡犬。然后他们确保尾巴在摇摆。（笑声）

But that is — don’t condemn it too much because you and I are doing similar things in other parts of our lives.

但这并不是——不要过于谴责它，因为你我在生活的其他方面也在做类似的事情。

You know, the social dynamics are important in board actions. My son Howard — in fact, my other two children as well, if they were involved — you know, they would have a dedication, and do have a dedication, to the culture of Berkshire, which is clearly defined. It’s one of the reasons I want it clearly defined. And it’s reinforced by the behavior and it’s reinforced by results.

你知道，社交动态在董事会行动中很重要。我的儿子霍华德——实际上，如果我的其他两个孩子也参与的话——你知道，他们会对伯克希尔的文化有一种奉献精神，并且确实有这种奉献精神，这种文化是明确的。这也是我希望它被明确界定的原因之一。而且这种文化通过行为得到了强化，通过结果得到了强化。

And, incidentally, their job would not be to set the compensation. I mean, the non-executive board chairman is not there to select the compensation of the CEO or others. He’s not there to select the CEO.

顺便提一下，他们的工作并不是设定薪酬。我的意思是，非执行董事会主席并不是来选择首席执行官或其他人的薪酬。他并不是来选择首席执行官的。

He is there to facilitate a change if the board of directors decides a change is needed. And that can be important. Very, very, very unlikely to be important in the case of Berkshire.

他在那里以便在董事会决定需要变更时促进变更。这可能很重要。在伯克希尔的情况下，这种重要性非常非常非常不可能。

But it’s a nice, little, extra safety valve. And Howie’s the perfect guy to carry that out.

但这是一个不错的小的额外安全阀。而霍华德是执行这一点的完美人选。

And like I say, I voted for comp plans at various places, including way back, you know, at Coke that were far from what I would’ve designed myself. And the ones I designed myself would have worked.

就像我说的，我在不同的地方投票支持过薪酬计划，包括很久以前在可口可乐的那些计划，远不是我自己设计的。而我自己设计的那些计划会有效。

But that is the way boards work.

但这就是董事会的运作方式。

I was made chairman of one comp committee, and Charlie can tell you a little about that.

我被任命为一个委员会的主席，查理可以告诉你一些关于这件事的情况。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

Warren was totally voted down at Salomon Inc. In fact, people acted like, what in the hell is he doing? How could he be disapproving compensation on Wall Street?

沃伦在所罗门公司完全被否决。事实上，人们的反应就像，究竟他在干什么？他怎么能在华尔街对薪酬表示反对？

And I think the general idea that a person should just shout disapproval all day long of everything he disapproves of is very suspect. In the world in which we inhabit, people accomplish more if they pick their spots for public disapproval.

我认为，一个人整天对他不赞同的事情大声表达不满的想法是非常可疑的。在我们所生活的世界中，人们如果选择性地公开表达不满，往往能取得更多成就。

And knowing both Howie and Warren Buffett, I don’t think you have to worry that they’re going to go crazy or be soft and foolish just because they don’t shout all the time about everything they disapprove of. If we all did that, we wouldn’t be able to hear each other.

而且了解霍华德和沃伦·巴菲特，我认为你不必担心他们因为不对所有自己不赞同的事情大喊大叫就会变得疯狂、软弱或愚蠢。如果我们都这样做，那我们就听不到彼此说话了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）

If you — if you’re in any social organization and you keep belching at the dinner table, you’ll be eating in the kitchen before very long. (Laughter)

如果你——如果你在任何社交组织中，而你在餐桌上不停打嗝，不久之后你就会在厨房里吃饭了。（笑声）

And people won’t pay any attention to you.

人们不会注意你。

I mean, you really have to — you not only have to pick your spots, you have to pick how you do it.

我意思是，你真的必须——你不仅要选择场合，还要选择方式。

I mean, you — that could even be — I mean, sure, Charlie gives the marital advice around here, as you noticed, in the movie, but it’s not even a bad thought to keep in mind in marriage, I mean, in terms of — of attempting to change the behavior of others, which is — you’ll have a very limited ability to do, in any event. It’s not helped by shouting a lot.

我的意思是，你——这甚至可能是——我的意思是，当然，查理在这里提供婚姻建议，正如你在电影中注意到的，但在婚姻中保持这个想法并不是一个坏主意，我的意思是——在试图改变他人行为方面，你的能力是非常有限的，无论如何。大声喊叫并没有帮助。

对自己不能改变的事大喊大叫，对自己能做的事视而不见。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I offend more people than you do. And I’m quite satisfied with your level of disapproval. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我冒犯的人比你多。我对你们的不满程度感到相当满意。（笑声）

14. Everyone else is wrong on cost of capital

其他人对资本成本的看法都是错误的

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Gregg, welcome.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。晨星的格雷格·沃伦。格雷格，欢迎。

GREGG WARREN: Thank you. Warren and Charlie, on behalf of Morningstar, I want to thank you for having us on the panel this year.

格雷格·沃伦：谢谢你。沃伦和查理，代表晨星，我想感谢你们让我们今年参加小组讨论。

I may not be an accredited bear, but hopefully, I ask probing questions that add value for shareholders.

我可能不是一个认证的投资者，但我希望我提出的问题能够为股东带来价值。

My first question relates to the measurement of management performance.

我第一个问题与管理绩效的测量有关。

For Morningstar, the ultimate measure of success is not just whether or not a firm can earn more than its cost of capital, but whether or not it can do so for an extended period of time.

对于晨星来说，成功的最终衡量标准不仅仅是一个公司是否能够赚取超过其资本成本的收益，而是它是否能够在较长时间内做到这一点。

Berkshire has historically done a good job of generating outsized returns. But as you’ve noted in the past, the sheer size of the firm’s operations, which continue to grow, will ultimately limit the returns that Berkshire could generate.

伯克希尔历史上在创造超额回报方面表现良好。但正如你过去所提到的，公司的运营规模不断扩大，最终将限制伯克希尔能够产生的回报。

With that in mind, what do you believe Berkshire’s cost of capital is? How much do you think that this hurdle rate is increased as you’ve acquired more capital intensive, debt-heavy firms?

考虑到这一点，您认为伯克希尔的资本成本是多少？您认为随着您收购更多资本密集型、债务沉重的公司，这个障碍率增加了多少？

And how much confidence do you have that future capital allocators at Berkshire will be able to generate returns in excess of the firm’s cost of capital, acknowledging, of course, the fact that Berkshire’s days of outsized returns are most likely behind it?

你对未来在伯克希尔的资本配置者能够产生超过公司资本成本的回报有多大信心，当然要承认，伯克希尔的超额回报时代很可能已经过去？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there’s no question that size is an anchor to performance. And we intend to prove that up to the point where it starts really biting.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。毫无疑问，规模是业绩的一个桎梏。我们打算证明这一点，直到它开始真正产生影响。

But it — we cannot earn the returns on capital with well over 200 — well, with a market cap of 300-plus billion. It just isn’t doable.

但我们无法在市值超过 3000 亿美元的情况下赚取资本回报。这根本不可行。

Archimedes, he said he could move the world if he had a long enough lever, didn’t he, or something like that, Charlie?

阿基米德，他说如果有足够长的杠杆就能移动世界，不是吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, he did.

查理·芒格：是的，他确实做了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish I had his lever because we don’t have that lever at Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望我有他的杠杆，因为我们在伯克希尔没有那个杠杆。

So we — well, we’ll answer two questions there.

所以我们——好吧，我们将在那里回答两个问题。

In terms of cost of capital, Charlie and I always figure that our cost of capital is the — is what could be produced by our second best idea. And then our best idea has to exceed that.

在资本成本方面，查理和我总是认为我们的资本成本是——是我们第二好的想法所能产生的收益。然后，我们最好的想法必须超过这个收益。

We think — I have listened to so many nonsensical cost of capital discussions, that —

我们认为——我听过太多无意义的资本成本讨论，以至于——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve never heard an intelligent one.

查理·芒格：我从未听过一个聪明的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。（笑声）

It’s really true. I mean, and there’s — that’s another thing. I’ve been on boards and the CFO comes in and explains why we’re doing this and it always gets down to, you know, it exceeds our cost of capital.

这是真的。我是说，还有另一件事。我曾在董事会中，首席财务官进来解释我们为什么要这样做，最终总是归结为，你知道，这超出了我们的资本成本。

And he doesn’t know what the hell his cost of capital is, and I don’t know. And — but I don’t embarrass him, you know?

他不知道他的资本成本到底是多少，我也不知道。不过，我不会让他感到尴尬，你知道吗？

So I just sit there and listen to this stuff and apply my own thing, and then still end up voting for it, probably, if I don’t like it, although there have been a few exceptions to that.

所以我就坐在那里听这些东西，应用我自己的想法，然后如果我不喜欢，可能还是会投票支持它，尽管有一些例外。

The real test, you know, over time, is whether the capital we retain produces more than a dollar of market value as we go along.

真正的考验，你知道，随着时间的推移，是我们保留的资本是否能产生超过一美元的市场价值。

And if we keep putting billions in and those billions, in effect, are worth, in terms of present value terms, in terms of what they add to the value of the business, more than what we’re putting in, you know, we’ll keep doing it.

如果我们继续投入数十亿，那些数十亿在现值方面，增加业务价值的程度超出我们投入的金额，你知道，我们会继续这样做。

We bought a company day before yesterday, I guess it was. And we are spending close to $3 billion U.S. It’s a Canadian company.

我们前天收购了一家公司，我想是这样。我们花费了近 30 亿美元。这是一家加拿大公司。

And we think we will be better off financially because we did that and we thought it was the best thing that we could do with the $3 billion on that day. And those are the yardsticks that we have.

我们认为这样做会让我们的财务状况更好，因为我们认为这是那天我们可以用 30 亿美元做的最好的事情。这些就是我们所依据的标准。

And what I do know is that I’ve never seen a CEO who wanted to do a deal where the CFO didn’t come in and say it exceeded the cost of capital.

我知道的是，我从未见过一个首席执行官想做一笔交易，而首席财务官却说这笔交易超过了资本成本。

It’s just — it’s a game, as far as we’re concerned.

这只是——对我们来说，这是一场游戏。

And we think we can evaluate businesses. And we know the capital we have available. And we have things that we can sell to buy. Not businesses, but marketable securities that we can sell to buy businesses if we like.

我们认为我们可以评估企业，我们了解我们可用的资金。我们有可以卖出的东西来买。不是企业，而是可出售的有价证券，如果我们愿意，可以用这些证券来买入企业。

And we are constantly measuring that opportunity cost that Charlie talked about in the movie. It’s an important subject. And one that I think has had more nonsense written about it than about anything.

我们不断在衡量查理在电影中提到的机会成本。这是一个重要的话题。我认为关于它的胡说八道比任何其他事情都要多。

But I’ll turn it over to Charlie to go over —

但我会把它交给查理来讲解——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a phrase like “cost of capital,” which means different things to different people, and often means silly things to people who teach in business schools, we just don’t use it.

查理·芒格：嗯，“资本成本”这样的短语对不同的人意味着不同的东西，通常对商学院的老师来说意味着愚蠢的东西，我们就是不使用它。

Warren’s definition of behaving in a corporation, so that every dollar retained tends to create more than a dollar of market value for the shareholders, is probably the best way of describing cost of capital. That is not what they mean in business schools.

沃伦对在公司中行为的定义是，每保留一美元就倾向于为股东创造超过一美元的市场价值，这可能是描述资本成本的最佳方式。这并不是商学院所指的。

The answer’s perfectly simple. We’re right and they’re wrong. (Laughter)

答案非常简单。我们是对的，他们是错的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I look good compared to him, don’t I? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我看起来比他好，对吧？（笑声）

15. Buying Nebraska Furniture Mart from the Blumkins

从布鲁姆金斯手中购买内布拉斯加家具市场。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Jonathan Fye (PH) and I’m from Denton, Texas, just up the road from the new Nebraska Furniture Mart that’s going to be located in The Colony.

观众成员：早上好。我叫乔纳森·法伊，我来自德克萨斯州的登顿，就在即将在科罗尼开设的新内布拉斯加家具市场的附近。

My question relates to your original acquisition of that business from the Blumkin family in 1983.

我的问题与您在 1983 年从布伦金家族收购该业务的最初情况有关。

Based on the data you provided in this year’s annual report, it appears you were able to purchase this business for roughly 85 percent of book value, or roughly two times earnings.

根据您在今年年度报告中提供的数据，您似乎能够以大约 85%的账面价值，或大约两倍的收益购买这项业务。

Can you comment on the factors or the environment in Omaha that enabled you to purchase this wonderful business for such a wonderful price?

你能评论一下在奥马哈使你能够以如此优越的价格购买这家优秀企业的因素或环境吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wish we had bought it that cheap, Jonathan, but no — we paid at the time, as I remember, probably 11 or 12 times after-tax earnings. It was not a discount from book value.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我希望我们当时能以那么便宜的价格买到，乔纳森，但不——我记得我们当时支付的价格大约是税后收益的 11 或 12 倍。这并不是从账面价值的折扣。

I’m not sure where those numbers come. Well, we bought 80 percent of the company. It was bought on the basis, as I remember, of 100 —of $60 million of purchase price.

我不确定那些数字来自哪里。好吧，我们购买了公司 80%的股份。根据我记得的，购买价格是 6000 万美元。

So we —actually there was a second transaction involved in it. But 60 million was 100 percent value. We ended up with 80 percent.

所以我们——实际上涉及到第二笔交易。但 6000 万是 100%的价值。我们最终得到了 80%。

The 60 million would’ve been more than book at the time. Not way more, but more than book.

6000 万当时会比账面价值高。虽然不是高很多，但确实高于账面。

And it would’ve been a multiple of 11 or 12 times earnings, as I remember. The sales were about 100 million. Pre-tax margins were in the 7 percent range.

这将是 11 或 12 倍的收益，我记得。销售额大约为 1 亿。税前利润率在 7%左右。

So, it was about 7 million pre-tax. And, you know, 4 ½, probably, after-tax. That’s ballpark.

所以，大约是 700 万税前。你知道，税后大约是 450 万。这是个大致的估算。

So, it was not a bargain purchase. It was a great business. It was a wonderful opportunity to join as fine a family as I’ve ever met.

所以，这并不是一次便宜的购买。它是一家出色的公司。能够与我遇到过的最优秀的家庭之一合作，是一个绝妙的机会。

But it was — and incidentally, there was another company, I believe, from Germany, that was trying to buy it at the time.

但当时确实有另一家公司，我相信是来自德国的，试图收购它。

And believe it or not, Erskine Bowles, of Simpson-Bowles, was representing them, my friend Erskine — I didn’t know this at the time.

相信与否，埃尔斯金·鲍尔斯（Erskine Bowles），来自辛普森-鲍尔斯（Simpson-Bowles），当时正在代表他们，我的朋友埃尔斯金——我当时并不知道这一点。

And then I went out on my birthday, August 30th, 1983. And had that contract, which is in the annual report.

然后我在 1983 年 8 月 30 日我的生日那天出去了。并且有了那份合同，合同在年度报告中。

And I gave it to Mrs. B. And — and she didn’t read, but Louie, her son, told her what was in it.

我把它给了 B 太太。她没有读，但她的儿子路易告诉她里面有什么。

And I never asked her for an audit. I just asked her if she owed any money. And I asked her if she owned the building. And she said yes. And we made the deal. But it was not a bargain purchase.

我从来没有要求她进行审计。我只是问她是否欠了钱。我还问她是否拥有那栋建筑。她说是的。然后我们达成了交易。但这并不是一次便宜的购买。

Now, if you want to talk about bargain purchases, we should talk about going out to the Nebraska Furniture Mart. (Laughter)

现在，如果你想谈论划算的购物，我们应该谈谈去内布拉斯加家具市场。(笑声)

So far, in the three — we —in the days of this annual meeting, our sales, which were a record 40 million for the week last year, are up about — I think they’re up about 7 percent now. And last year, of course, it was a record.

到目前为止，在这次年度会议的三天里，我们的销售额——去年这一周创下了 4000 万的记录——现在大约上涨了 7%。当然，去年也是一个记录。

And on Tuesday, which was the first day, we did 7.8 million.

在星期二，也就是第一天，我们做了 780 万。

And Berkshire owns the largest home furnishing store in Sacramento, California. We own the largest one in Boise, Idaho. We own the largest one in Salt Lake City. We own the largest one in Las Vegas. Largest one in Reno.

伯克希尔拥有加利福尼亚州萨克拉门托最大的家居用品商店。我们拥有爱达荷州博伊西最大的商店。我们拥有盐湖城最大的商店。我们拥有拉斯维加斯最大的商店。我们拥有雷诺最大的商店。

Our sales at the Furniture Mart on Tuesday were larger than the monthly sales of any one of those stores I’ve just named, being the largest ones in places like Sacramento. So it is a remarkable organization. (Applause)

我们在星期二的家具市场的销售额超过了我刚才提到的任何一家商店的月销售额，这些商店都是像萨克拉门托这样的地方中最大的商店。所以这是一个了不起的组织。（掌声）

And the good news is there’s still time for you to avail yourself of those prices. (Laughter)

好消息是你还有时间享受这些价格。(笑声)

I would like to put in a plug for the Dallas store, where — I was down there a week ago. And it’s a plot of land like you wouldn’t believe. It’s a store like you wouldn’t believe. It is 1,800,000 square feet under one roof. Over 40 acres.

我想为达拉斯的商店宣传一下——我一周前去过那里。那是一块你无法想象的土地。那是一家你无法想象的商店。它的面积在一个屋檐下达到 180 万平方英尺。超过 40 英亩。

It will do more volume, I predict, than any other home furnishing store in the world. And I wouldn’t be surprised if I could add to that by a factor of at least two.

我预测它的销售量将超过世界上任何其他家居用品商店。我不会感到惊讶，如果我能将这个数字至少增加一倍。

It’s a remarkable store. And I toured around it. And we’re, you know, we’re putting in streets. We’re — site preparation, utilities, racking, all these things. This wonderful woman, Michelle, who showed me around.

这是一家了不起的商店。我在里面参观了一圈。我们正在铺设街道。我们正在进行场地准备、公共设施、货架等所有这些工作。这位出色的女士米歇尔带我参观了。

And the Blumkins later told me that she had started — worked for Nebraska Furniture Mart as a cashier, and she is in charge of this, you know, many hundreds of millions of dollar project. It’s really — it’s the good thing about America.

布伦金斯后来告诉我，她曾作为收银员在内布拉斯加家具市场工作，现在她负责这个数亿项目。这真的是——这是美国的好事。

And at the end of the tour, she’d had this number two person working — walking around with us, who — she was explaining some things to us, too. And I learned at the end of the tour that number two was Michelle’s husband. (Laughter)

在游览结束时，她有一个二号人物和我们一起走，她也在给我们解释一些事情。我在游览结束时得知这个二号人物是米歇尔的丈夫。（笑声）

Interesting pillow talk, you know? “How many cubic yards did you move today, honey,” you know? (Laughter)

有趣的枕边话，你知道吗？“亲爱的，你今天搬了多少立方码？”你知道吗？（笑声）

16. Why Buffett recommends an index fund for his wife’s inheritance

为什么巴菲特建议为他妻子的遗产投资指数基金

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Jason Rothman (PH) of Oklahoma City, who was the first shareholder to ask a question that subsequently was framed by a number of other shareholders as well.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自俄克拉荷马城的杰森·罗斯曼（PH），他是第一个提出问题的股东，随后许多其他股东也提出了类似的问题。

In my mailbox, this was the most popular question asked.

在我的邮箱中，这是最常被问到的问题。

“Mr. Buffett, you state in your annual letter to shareholders that in your will you have given instructions to the trustee who will be acting for your wife’s benefit to put 10 percent of the cash given her in short-term government bonds and 90 percent in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund.

“巴菲特先生，您在给股东的年度信中提到，您在遗嘱中指示受托人为了您妻子的利益，将给予她的现金的 10%投资于短期政府债券，90%投资于一个非常低成本的标准普尔 500 指数基金。”

“My question is why are you advising the trustee to put 90 percent of the cash into an S&P 500 index fund instead of into Berkshire shares?”

“我的问题是，为什么你建议受托人将 90%的现金投入标准普尔 500 指数基金，而不是投入伯克希尔的股票？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——

CAROL LOOMIS: “This might imply that you expect the index fund to outperform Berkshire in the future when the company is run by a new CEO and chairman. Please clarify.”

卡罗尔·卢米斯：“这可能意味着你期望在新首席执行官和董事长领导下，指数基金在未来的表现超过伯克希尔。请澄清。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ll be glad to clarify. That letter didn’t come from Vanguard, by any chance, did — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我很高兴能澄清一下。那封信不是来自先锋集团吧——（笑声）

When I die, incidentally, then all the Berkshire shares I have at that point will go to five different foundations. Every single share. I mean, there are no shares that have not been designated, mentally, to charity. A good many of them have been designated specifically to — in numbers and all that.

当我去世时，我所持有的所有伯克希尔股票将会捐赠给五个不同的基金会。每一股股票。我是说，没有一股股票没有被心理上指定给慈善事业。很多股票已经被具体指定了——包括数量等等。

But — and they will be distributed over the ten years after my estate is closed. So figure over 12 years.

但是——它们将在我的遗产结算后的十年内分配。所以算上大约 12 年。

And I tell my — I tell the trustees that will be holding these shares, you know, “Don’t sell any Berkshire shares until they have to be sold.”

我告诉我的——我告诉将持有这些股票的受托人，“在必须出售之前，不要出售任何伯克希尔的股票。”

So my views, on Berkshire at least through 12 years after my death are as bullish as anybody could possibly come up with.

所以我对伯克希尔的看法，至少在我去世后的 12 年内，和任何人可能提出的看法一样乐观。

And incidentally, without those kind of instructions, anybody would say, “You know, you’re crazy to keep many, many billions of dollars all in one stock.” I can’t think of anything better to do it over those 12 years.

顺便说一下，如果没有那些指示，任何人都会说：“你知道，把数十亿的资金全部投入一只股票是疯狂的。”在这 12 年里，我想不出更好的做法。

In terms of my wife’s situation, you know, that is not a question of maximizing capital. It’s just a question of total, 100 percent peace of mind on something that cannot get a bad result.

就我妻子的情况而言，你知道，这不是一个最大化资本的问题。这只是一个关于完全、百分之百安心的问题，涉及到不会产生不良结果的事情。

And, like I said, there’s way more money for her than she’ll ever use. As a matter of fact, those of you who know her, you know, may feel that I’ve added about three zeros too many.

而且，就像我说的，对她来说，钱多得她根本用不完。事实上，认识她的人可能会觉得我多加了大约三个零。

But it is not designed for her to get even larger amounts of capital. And there’ll be capital, loads of capital left over on that part of it.

但它并不是为了让她获得更多的资本。而且在那部分会有大量的资本剩余。

On the part that I care about maximizing, I have instructed the three trustees to not sell a single share until it has to be sold. So, that’s good for 12 years after I die, as to my best advice as to what I want them to hold.

对于我关心的最大化资本的部分，我已经指示三位受托人，在必须出售之前不要出售任何股票。所以，对于他们应该持有的东西，我的最佳建议是这12年内不出售。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren is a little peculiar in the way he distributes money in the family. And I think he’s entitled to do what he damn pleases. (Applause)

查理·芒格：嗯，沃伦在家庭中分配钱的方式有点特别。我认为他有权利做他想做的事。（掌声）

Speaking — 说话 —

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I — do I hear my — children applauding? Do I hear my children applauding? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到我的——孩子们在鼓掌吗？我听到我的孩子们在鼓掌吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I’ve never had this feeling I had to starve the family down to a few trifles.

查理·芒格：我从未有过这种感觉，即我必须让家庭陷入几乎无法维持生计的境地。

And Warren really — and Susie, when she was alive, was the same way.

沃伦真的——而苏西在世时也是这样。

He really is a meritocrat. He’s really quite extreme in wanting to let most of his money go back to the civilization in which it was earned.

他真的是一个精英主义者。他非常极端地希望将大部分钱回馈给他所赚取财富的文明。

I like being associated with it. (Applause)

我喜欢与它相关联。（掌声）

17. BNSF service problems are hurting earnings

BNSF 的服务问题正在影响收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: The BNSF has done very well since Berkshire acquired it in 2010.

乔纳森·布兰特：自从伯克希尔在 2010 年收购 BNSF 以来，BNSF 表现非常出色。

But its western competition of Union Pacific has actually grown its earnings more. And at the moment, the UP seems to be operating more smoothly for its customers.

但其西部竞争对手联合太平洋的收益实际上增长得更多。目前，联合太平洋似乎为其客户提供了更顺畅的服务。

Could you shed some light on the service challenges Burlington has experienced recently and perhaps discuss any differences between the two railroads in end markets, geography, and strategy that may have led to the divergent result?

您能否阐明伯灵顿最近遇到的服务挑战，并讨论一下两条铁路在最终市场、地理和战略方面的差异，这些差异可能导致了不同的结果？

Would it be fair to say that, in trying to aggressively sign up new business volume last year, that the railroad did not allow for a sufficient margin of safety in terms of what its capacity could handle, should there be a harsher than normal winter or other adverse circumstances?

可以公平地说，在去年积极争取新业务量时，铁路没有考虑到在可能出现比正常冬季更严酷的天气或其他不利情况时，其运力能够承受的安全余地吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It — we’ve handled more volume, actually, than in the past. I mean, in 2006, we had a peak of 219,000 carloads. That was in the late fall.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。实际上，我们处理的货运量比过去更多。我是说，在 2006 年，我们的车载量达到了 219,000 个，这是在深秋时节。

But no question that we’ve had a lot of service problems, particularly on our northern route.

但毫无疑问，我们在北部航线遇到了很多服务问题。

We have been spending more money than Union Pacific, and they spend a lot, in terms of attempting to anticipate the kind of problems that can occur when you get a big increase in volume, on that one route particularly, from the boom in the — particularly the Bakken shale oil.

我们在支出上超过了联合太平洋，而他们的支出也很大，尤其是在试图预见当某一条路线的运输量大幅增加时可能出现的问题，特别是由于巴肯页岩油的繁荣。

We’ve got a lot of unit trains that are running over those lines that weren’t running five years ago.

我们有很多货运列车在这些线路上运行，而五年前这些列车并没有运行。

I think I’ve got Matt Rose here — right — I think somewhere in the front. And he might address some of the problems of cold weather. I mean, want to get — there were a lot of days where it was 15 below or worse.

我想我这里有马特·罗斯——没错——我想在前面某个地方。他可能会谈到一些寒冷天气的问题。我的意思是，想要解决——有很多天的气温低于零下 15 度或更糟。

And in terms of sending people out to work on problems, under those circumstances, it can be really — it can be life threatening.

在这种情况下，派人出去解决问题可能真的会——可能会危及生命。

But Matt, do you have — oh, there he is. OK. Could you shine a light down on him, please, too? So he’s right here in the front. In the front.

但是马特，你有——哦，他在那儿。好的。你能把光照在他身上吗？他就在前面。就在前面。

MATT ROSE: Warren. So last year, the industry grew at about 820,000 units. BNSF handled 53 percent of all those units.

马特·罗斯：沃伦。去年，行业增长了大约 82 万个单位。BNSF 处理了所有这些单位的 53%。

And it’s not what we wanted to take or what we didn’t want to take. Quite frankly, it’s the geographic nature of our franchise. And the oil came a lot faster than we were expecting and we’ve been spending money at a rapid clip to try and build into it.

这并不是我们想要的或者不想要的。坦率地说，这是我们特许经营的地理性质。石油的到来比我们预期的要快得多，我们一直在快速花钱试图融入其中。

The second issue was, you know, I had previously, prior to this past year, been in the CEO role for 13 years, and I have never seen a weather — a winter weather — like that.

第二个问题是，你知道，在过去的一年之前，我担任首席执行官的角色已经有 13 年了，我从未见过这样的冬季天气。

We had 83 inches of snow in Chicago. We had multiple days, over 30 days, where it didn’t get to zero in the Minnesota area.

我们在芝加哥下了 83 英寸的雪。在明尼苏达地区，我们有超过 30 天的时间气温没有降到零度。

So, you know, we know this is an outdoor sport. We get it, on the weather. But quite frankly, when we get to about 0 to 10 degrees below, things just don’t work.

所以，你知道，我们知道这是一项户外工作。我们明白天气的影响。但坦率地说，当气温降到零度到零下十度时，一切就是不太好。

The weather’s getting better. Last week, we handled 206,000 units. No other railroad has ever handled 205,000 units.

天气变好了。上周，我们处理了 206,000 个单位。没有其他铁路曾处理过 205,000 个单位。

So the railroad’s coming back. And we’re making the significant investments to be able to handle all the business that’s out there.

铁路正在回归。我们正在进行重要投资，以便能够处理所有的业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks, Matt. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢，马特。（掌声）

We will spend $5 billion on the railroad this year. No railroad’s ever spent that kind of money, or even very close to it.

我们今年将在铁路上花费 50 亿美元。没有任何铁路曾花过这么多钱，甚至接近这个数。

But I got a call — or I got a letter — from a fellow in North Dakota. And they were having a problem getting fertilizer. And I called and talked to him. And they sent it down to Matt.

但我接到了一个电话——或者我收到了一个来自北达科他州的人的信。他们在获取肥料方面遇到了问题。我打电话和他谈了谈。他们把肥料送到了马特那里。

But we’ve now put on — I think we’re going to have 52 unit trains of fertilizer. And they will get there in time for the planting. And that’s important. I mean, we take it seriously.

但我们现在已经安排了——我认为我们将有 52 列肥料专列。它们会及时到达，以便进行种植。这很重要。我的意思是，我们对此非常重视。

But cold in winter or floods in the summer, I mean, we’re now really functioning a lot better and our earnings will be, in my view, are very likely to be a lot better.

但是冬天寒冷或夏天洪水，我的意思是，我们现在的运作确实好多了，我认为我们的收益很可能会好得多。

But the thing that could disrupt that is, if for some reason, you had incredible floods. You’re dealing with 22,000 miles of track. And if you get weak links, one of which, always, for all four big railroads, is Chicago, because that’s where things get interchanged and that’s where a lot of bottlenecks have been this year, and that’s where weather was tough as well.

但可能会打乱这一切的是，如果出于某种原因，发生了巨大的洪水。你要处理 22,000 英里的轨道。如果出现薄弱环节，其中一个始终是四大铁路公司中的芝加哥，因为那里是货物交换的地方，也是今年许多瓶颈的所在，天气也很恶劣。

But you’re right, Jon, in the comparative financials in recent months. And believe me, Matt’s paying a lot of attention to them and Carl’s paying a lot of attention to them, and I even pay a little attention to them.

但你说得对，乔恩，最近几个月的财务比较情况。相信我，马特对此非常关注，卡尔也非常关注，我甚至也稍微关注了一下。

So I have a feeling that they will be getting better over the remainder of the year.

所以我感觉他们在今年剩下的时间里会变得更好。

18. Generating electricity with natural gas

使用天然气发电

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，4 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Rosal Kerkhove (PH). I’m from Omaha, Nebraska. My question relates to our company’s use of natural gas to generate electricity.

观众成员：罗莎尔·克尔霍夫（PH）。我来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。我的问题与我们公司使用天然气发电有关。

This past winter, natural gas in storage has declined substantially.

今年冬天，天然气储存量大幅下降。

In the future, how do our companies assure that they have an adequate supply of natural gas to generate electricity?

在未来，我们的公司如何确保有足够的天然气供应来发电？

And if the price of natural gas increases in multiples, how do our companies assure that they can sell the electricity at a satisfactory return on investment? Thank you.

如果天然气价格大幅上涨，我们的公司如何确保能够以令人满意的投资回报率销售电力？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have — I’m going to ask Greg Abel to be more specific on this.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们——我会请格雷格·阿贝尔对此更具体一些。

But we are the largest alternative generator of — using alternative sources — I think, in the country. And I think by the end of 2015, we will be capable of producing 40 percent of our needs in Iowa through wind, which will be unlike any other company you can find in the country. (Applause)

但我们是全国最大的替代能源发电商——使用替代能源——我认为，到 2015 年底，我们将能够通过风能满足爱荷华州 40%的需求，这在全国是独一无二的公司。（掌声）

But I think I’ll have Greg answer the specifics of any natural gas-dependent generating units we have.

但我想让我格雷格回答我们拥有的任何依赖天然气的发电机组的具体问题。

I’m not worried about that thing, but I — about what you raised —but Greg would know a lot more about the mix on natural gas and the opportunity to shift to coal. And exactly the profile of the generating capacity.

我对那件事不担心，但我——关于你提到的——不过格雷格会对天然气的混合情况和转向煤炭的机会了解得更多。还有发电能力的具体情况。

Greg? Now, let’s get a light down on him, if you can. He —

格雷格？现在，如果可以的话，让我们把光线照在他身上。他——

GREG ABEL: I think it’s — okay, there it is.

格雷格·阿贝尔：我想这就是——好吧，就在那里。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there we go —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，来吧——

GREG ABEL: Yup. Sorry. So like Matt touched on, obviously, we had a very cold winter in the Midwest.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。抱歉。正如马特提到的，显然，我们在中西部经历了一个非常寒冷的冬天。

So our systems, for the first time, were challenged in a significant way. But very proud of how the resources were managed.

所以我们的系统第一次在重大方面受到挑战。但我对资源的管理感到非常自豪。

So if you look at the question around natural gas, and specifically the gas availability, there was substantial gas available to be utilized both to heat homes and produce the energy, because ultimately, we’re worried about both, the — keeping the furnaces on and, equally, keeping the lights on.

所以如果你看看关于天然气的问题，特别是气体的可用性，实际上有大量的气体可以用来加热家庭和生产能源，因为最终，我们担心的是这两点——保持炉子运转，以及同样，保持灯光亮起。

So when you looked at the balance of supply, there was gas there.

所以当你查看供应的平衡时，那里有天然气。

But clearly, we have to continue to look at the unique situation as we continue to move towards using more gas in the United States.

但显然，我们必须继续关注独特的情况，因为我们在美国继续朝着使用更多天然气的方向发展。

Warren touched on an important point. This past year, as he highlighted — he highlighted 2015 — but if you look at just what we produced on the renewable side in Iowa, that was 39 percent renewable, i.e. wind. And that’ll only get larger.

沃伦提到了一个重要的观点。正如他所强调的——他强调了 2015 年——但如果你看看我们在爱荷华州可再生能源方面的产出，那是 39%的可再生能源，即风能。而这个比例只会越来越大。

So as we continue to manage these multiple resources, there’s clearly a way to meet the needs of our customers. And we’re meeting it in an extremely cost-effective fashion.

因此，在我们继续管理这些多种资源时，显然有一种方法可以满足客户的需求。而我们以极具成本效益的方式满足了这些需求。

I’d also highlight that when you think through the cost recovery side of it, we’ve got very unique mechanisms within our utilities.

我还想强调的是，当你考虑到成本回收的方面时，我们的公用事业中有非常独特的机制。

When the underlying cost of gas goes up, where we have to purchase more than we had anticipated, we’ve got clear pass-throughs back to our customers. And we’ve negotiated those across each of our states.

当天然气的基础成本上升时，如果我们需要购买的数量超过了预期，我们会明确将这些成本转嫁给我们的客户。我们已经在各个州进行了谈判。

So we’re well positioned to service our customers long term, and equally protect the fundamental financials of the underlying businesses.

因此，我们在长期服务客户方面处于良好位置，同时也能保护基础业务的基本财务状况。

WARREN BUFFETT: The — 沃伦·巴菲特：这 —

GREG ABEL: Thank you. 格雷格·阿贝尔：谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: The company that Greg runs has many subsidiaries. And our gas pipeline subsidiaries move about 8 percent of the gas in the United States.

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格所管理的公司有许多子公司。我们的天然气管道子公司运输美国约 8%的天然气。

And I think you said you were from Omaha. And the gas that comes into this area comes through a pipeline that we own. And we just renamed the company to Berkshire Hathaway Energy, from MidAmerican Energy. We changed it to Berkshire Hathaway Energy.

我想你说过你来自奥马哈。进入这个地区的天然气是通过我们拥有的管道输送的。我们刚刚将公司名称从MidAmerican更改为伯克希尔哈撒韦能源。我们将其更改为伯克希尔哈撒韦能源。

But, it’s a point of some pride to us that that company, Northern Natural Gas, which originally came from Omaha, when we bought that from Enron a decade or so ago — actually, Dynegy had it in between — but its origin then was Enron.

但是，我们感到自豪的是，那个公司，北方天然气，最初来自奥马哈，当我们大约十年前从Enron手中收购它时——实际上，中间是由 Dynegy 拥有的——但它的起源确实是Enron。

You know, they’d skimped on maintenance, done all kinds of things. And it was ranked number 42 out of the 42 ranked pipelines in the United States at that time. And last year it was ranked number one.

你知道，他们在维护方面偷工减料，做了各种事情。当时它在美国42条排名管道中排名第42。去年它排名第一。

So it went from last to first under Greg’s management. And I tip my hat to him. (Applause)

在格雷格的管理下，它从最后变成了第一。我向他致敬。（掌声）

And number two was our other pipeline — current pipeline. So we’re running one, two at the moment.

第二名是我们的另一条管道——当前的管道。所以我们目前在运行第一和第二名的管道。

19. Two heads running Berkshire are better than one

两位领导伯克希尔的头脑比一个更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Fred Ireman (PH) in Richmond, Virginia, and it’s addressed to you, Warren.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自弗雷德·艾尔曼（PH），他在弗吉尼亚州的里士满，问题是问你的，沃伦。

He says that, “During the past several years, much has been written and many have speculated about your successor. I shall not even go down that path, as it would cause you to repeat yourself.

他说：“在过去的几年里，关于你的继任者已经写了很多，许多人也进行了猜测。我甚至不想走这条路，因为这会让你重复自己。”

“However, has there been any discussion at your board meetings about a replacement for your partner, longtime friend, and co-chairman, Charlie Munger?

“然而，你们的董事会会议上是否讨论过替代你的合作伙伴、长期朋友和联合主席查理·芒格的事宜？

“Has it been determined Berkshire will continue to be led by a similar dynamic duo? Two magnificent investor minds, each providing a unique point of view, have been a major reason the business has performed magnificently over the decades and has delighted the shareholders.”

“是否已经确定伯克希尔将继续由类似的动态二人组领导？两位杰出的投资者，各自提供独特的观点，是公司几十年来表现出色并让股东满意的主要原因。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie is my — he’s my canary in the coal mine. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理是我的——他是我的“矿井中的金丝雀”。（笑声）

Charlie turned 90. And I find it very encouraging how well he’s handling middle age. (Laughter)

查理已经90岁了。我发现他处理中年生活的方式非常令人鼓舞。（笑声）

So I hope to be able to do the same thing myself.

所以我希望能够自己做到同样的事情。

No — you raised a point, which is — I hadn’t thought about, but I’m a little sensitive now that you raised it.

不——你提出了一个观点——我之前没有考虑过，但现在你提到这个我有点敏感。

They always talk about replacing me, but they never talking about replacing Charlie.

他们总是谈论要替换我，但他们从不谈论要替换查理。

I do think — I think it’s very likely, incidentally, that whoever replaces me as CEO probably has, over the years certainly, developed — they’ll never be able to develop another Charlie — but they’ll develop somebody that they work with very closely. It’s a great way to operate.

我确实认为——顺便说一下，我认为接替我担任首席执行官的人很可能在这些年里肯定已经培养出——他们永远无法培养出另一个查理——但他们会培养出一个与他们非常紧密合作的人。这是一种很好的运作方式。

Berkshire is better off because the two of us have worked together than if either one of us had been working individually, there’s no question about that. (Applause)

伯克希尔的情况因为我们两个人的合作而更好，这毫无疑问，如果我们其中任何一个人单独工作，情况就不会如此。（掌声）

And —but I do think, you know, we saw it with Roberto Goizueta and Don Keough at Coke, we saw it with Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities. I mean, these were magnificent companies.

而——但我确实认为，你知道，我们在可口可乐看到了罗伯托·戈伊祖埃塔和唐·基欧，我们在城市资本看到了汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克。我的意思是，这些都是伟大的公司。

And I think that in both cases that I just named, I think that they accomplished far more because they had two incredible people running them who admired and worked well with the other. And they were complimentary, in terms of the talents they brought.

我认为在我刚才提到的这两种情况下，他们取得了更大的成就，因为有两位杰出的人在管理他们，他们彼此欣赏并合作得很好。他们在所带来的才能方面是互补的。

In many ways, it’s a great way to operate. You can’t will it to somebody.

在许多方面，这是一种很好的运作方式。你不能把它强加给别人。

But I would be very surprised if, a few years after my successor takes over, or maybe sooner, that there isn’t some relationship, a partnership, that enhances the CEO’s not only — not only achievements — but the fun they have.

但我会非常惊讶，如果在我的继任者接任几年的时间里，或者更早的时候，没有某种关系，某种合作伙伴关系，能够增强CEO的成就和他们的乐趣。

And — but so far, nobody’s brought up, in the meeting, any successor to Charlie.

而且——但到目前为止，会议上没有人提到查理的继任者。

And frankly, I have a lot of trouble thinking of anybody that could be a successor to Charlie. (Laughs)

坦率地说，我很难想到任何可以接替查理的人。（笑）

Charlie, you want to comment? I’ve got to give you a chance. (Laughter)

查理，你想评论一下吗？我得给你一个机会。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think the world has much to worry about. Most 90-year-old men are gone soon enough. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为世界没有太多需要担心的。大多数 90 岁的男人很快就会离开。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the canary has spoken. OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，金丝雀已经唱了。好的。（笑声）

20. Subsidiary shuffles aren’t related to Berkshire succession plans

子公司的人事调整与伯克希尔的继任计划无关

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？

JAY GELB: I have a question on succession planning, as well.

杰伊·盖尔布：我也有一个关于继任计划的问题。

Matt Rose recently shifted his role from CEO of the Burlington Northern unit, to executive chairman of Burlington. Does this change affect who will be the next CEO of Berkshire? And what is the succession plan for Ajit Jain at Berkshire’s reinsurance unit?

马特·罗斯最近将他的角色从伯灵顿北方公司的首席执行官转变为伯灵顿的执行董事长。这一变化会影响下一个伯克希尔的首席执行官人选吗？阿吉特·贾因在伯克希尔再保险部门的接班计划是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: The only succession for Ajit would be reincarnation. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：阿吉特唯一的继任方式就是转世。（笑声）

We will not get another Ajit. But fortunately, we won’t have to for a very, very long time.

我们不会再有另一个 Ajit。但幸运的是，我们很长一段时间内都不需要。

The situation with Matt, which was at Matt’s suggestion, was designed to fit specifically the succession situation at BNSF and the wishes of certain people. It doesn’t have any implications for Berkshire.

关于马特的情况，这是在马特的建议下提出的，旨在特别适应 BNSF 的继任情况以及某些人的愿望。这对伯克希尔没有任何影响。

I have letters from every one of our managers telling me what I should — I keep — these are private, I don’t share these with the board, even — telling me what I should do if something happens to them tonight.

我收到了我们每位经理的信，告诉我应该怎么做——我保留——这些是私密的，我不与董事会分享，甚至——告诉我如果今晚他们发生什么事我应该怎么做。

So I have their ideas. In some cases, they talk about more than one person. In some cases, they tell me the strengths and weaknesses of the people.

所以我有他们的想法。在某些情况下，他们谈论不止一个人。在某些情况下，他们告诉我这些人的优点和缺点。

But the — I would not try to make any judgments about the succession plans at the parent company from what is done in terms of succession planning at any of the subsidiaries.

但我不会根据任何子公司的继任计划来对母公司的继任计划做出任何判断。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I always say, I’m not the least bit worried about it. If I — I wish my main problem in life was the fear about succession problems at Berkshire. I think we’re in very good shape.

查理·芒格：我总是说，我一点也不担心。如果我——我希望我生活中最大的烦恼是对伯克希尔继任问题的担忧。我认为我们状况很好。

21. “Great” question, but no answer

“伟大的”问题，但没有答案

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Bill Melby from Northfield, Minnesota.

观众成员：我来自明尼苏达州北场的比尔·梅尔比。

At the 2009 annual meeting, Mr. Buffett, you said that if you were required to invest your total net worth in one company, that that company would be Wells Fargo.

在 2009 年年会上，巴菲特先生，您说如果您被要求将您的全部净资产投资于一家公司，那家公司将是富国银行。

So in 2014, I ask the same company — or the same question. If you were required to invest your total net worth in one company, what would that be?

所以在 2014 年，我问同一家公司——或者说同样的问题。如果你被要求将你的全部净资产投资于一家公司，那会是哪家公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: When the question was asked in 2009, did you exclude Berkshire? Because I think I would’ve answered Berkshire. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：当在 2009 年被问到这个问题时，你是否排除了伯克希尔？因为我想我会回答伯克希尔。（笑）

But I wouldn’t quarrel with Wells Fargo as a marketable security outside of Berkshire at that time.

但在当时，作为伯克希尔以外的可交易证券，我不反对Wells Fargo。

Well, I guess he’s checking his notes on — the — well —

好吧，我想他正在查看他的笔记——那个——好吧——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The question is other than Berkshire —

观众成员：问题是除了伯克希尔以外——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, other than Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，除了伯克希尔。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: —what would you invest in today?

观众成员：——你今天会投资什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it’s a great question, but it’s not going to get an answer. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是个好问题，但不会得到答案。（笑声）

Charlie, do you want to answer?

查理，你想回答吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, I think you’ve given exactly the right answer. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不，不，我认为你给出了完全正确的答案。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I’m sorry to disappoint you, but we’ve disappointed others when they’ve asked that question.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我很抱歉让你失望，但当其他人问这个问题时，我们也让他们失望过。

22. Shareholders aren’t helped by rule requiring CEO pay disclosure

股东并未从要求披露首席执行官薪酬的规则中受益。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. This question comes from Dave Hitchy (PH) from Auburn.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。这个问题来自奥本的戴夫·希奇（PH）。

It’s a long question. He says, “As a shareholder for about a dozen corporations in addition to Berkshire, I always see a number of proxy statements each year. In all, except Berkshire, the summary compensation table has the compensation listed for at least five or more of the highest paid executives. Berkshire lists three, Warren, Charlie and Mark.

这是个长问题。他说：“作为除伯克希尔之外的约十二家公司的股东，我每年都会看到许多代理声明。除了伯克希尔外，所有公司在摘要薪酬表中列出了至少五名或更多的高管薪酬。伯克希尔只列出了三名，即沃伦、查理和马克。

“I assume that since Berkshire is a holding company structure, that’s the way it is. I think it would be instructive to include at least two of the highest paid executives from the wholly-owned subsidiaries in the summary table, Ajit, Tony, or Greg, or Matt, to give the shareholders, your partners, a sense of how Berkshire compensates its strongest and highest-paid leaders, as other companies do.

“我猜测这是因为伯克希尔是一个控股公司结构。这种做法我理解。我认为，如果在摘要表中至少包括两名来自全资子公司的高管，比如Ajit、Tony、Greg或Matt，这将对股东有启发性，帮助股东了解伯克希尔如何像其他公司一样补偿其最强大和薪水最高的领导者。

“This would be particularly valuable since two-thirds of the current listees, Warren and Charlie, only receive nominal salaries of $100,000 per year, a figure that is vastly below the value they bring to the company.

这将特别有价值，因为目前的两位上市公司高管，沃伦和查理，每年的名义薪水仅为 10 万美元，这一数字远低于他们为公司带来的价值。

“Would you, in the spirit of transparency, be willing to add at least two of the highest-paid subsidiary officers in the table in future years? And how much do you think the next CEO of Berkshire should be paid?”

“您是否愿意出于透明度的考虑，在未来的年份中在表格中添加至少两名薪酬最高的子公司高管？您认为下任伯克希尔首席执行官应该获得多少薪酬？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to the last is he certainly will be entitled to pay — get paid a lot. But their decision as to how much they accept is another question.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于最后一个问题，下一任CEO的薪水肯定会很高。但他们接受多少薪水是另一个问题。

But I’m going to write about that very end question next year in the annual report because it has a lot of interesting ramifications.

但我打算在明年的年度报告中写关于那个最终问题，因为它有很多有趣的影响。

We, obviously, are following the SEC rules, which I can’t recite, in terms of the officers required to be in the proxy statement as to their pay.

我们显然遵守SEC的规定，我无法详细叙述这些规定，关于必须在代理声明中列出哪些高管的薪酬。

But, you know, Andrew, in my sporting mood, I would say that Comcast probably has some people in the employ that make a lot more money — not at CNBC, we’re not —but — that would exceed the salaries of the people that they list in the proxy statement, as well.

但你知道，安德鲁，在我轻松的心情下，我会说Comcast可能雇佣了一些薪水比他们在代理声明中列出的高得多的人——在CNBC我们不是——但——这也会超出他们列出的薪水。

And there’s a real question as to whether it’s in the interests of the shareholders of the company to start listing, you know, how much the person who’s the anchor of the nightly news or whomever it might be, gets paid because it might have a very negative effect, in terms of negotiating salaries with other people within the organization.

确实存在一个问题，即列出薪水是否对公司股东有利，比如，夜间新闻主持人或其他某些人的薪水，因为这可能对与组织内其他人的薪水谈判产生非常负面的影响。

I would say that the — I would say the shareholders of Comcast would be hurt, actually, if you published the five highest salaries paid at the subsidiaries or at Comcast itself.

我认为，如果你公布子公司或Comcast本身支付的五个最高薪水，Comcast的股东实际上会受到伤害。

And certainly, if you carried it to every subsidiary there was. I mean, if you were to publish the five highest salaries at CNBC, I don’t think the salaries overall would go down the following year.

当然，如果你把它带到每一个子公司。我是说，如果你公布 CNBC 的五个最高薪水，我认为整体薪水在下一年不会下降。

So, I think that is a — I think that’s a good reason for not — for us not publishing the salaries of, you know, say, our top ten managers of the company.

所以，我认为这就是我们不公布，比如，我们公司的前十名经理薪水的一个很好的理由。

At Salomon — we mentioned that a little earlier — everybody — virtually everybody — was dissatisfied with what they were getting paid. And they were getting paid enormous amounts of money.

在Salomon——我们之前提到过——几乎每个人都对他们的薪水感到不满。而他们的薪水是巨额的。

But they were disappointed, not because of the absolute amount. They were disappointed because they looked at somebody else in the place and it drove them crazy.

但他们感到失望，并不是因为绝对的数量。他们感到失望是因为他们看到了其他人，这让他们感到疯狂。

And as a matter of fact, the first big crisis we had in compensation was when the management made a — what was regarded as a secret deal, with the arb group, as I remember — whereby, John Meriwether and his crew got paid a lot of money, which I would argue they earned. I mean, I think they deserved it.

事实上，我们在薪酬方面遇到的第一个重大危机是管理层与arb集团达成了一项被视为秘密的交易，约翰·梅里韦瑟和他的团队因此获得了大量报酬，我认为他们是应得的。我是说，我认为他们值得。

But as soon as that happened, it made compensation, which had always been a terrible problem, an even greater problem because of the jealousy that broke out among the people that weren’t in John Meriwether’s group.

但一旦发生这种情况，赔偿问题，这一直是个可怕的问题，变得更加严重，因为在不属于约翰·梅里韦瑟团队的人之间爆发了嫉妒。

I think it’s been — I think it’s very seldom that publishing compensation accomplishes much for the shareholders.

我认为，公布薪酬很少对股东有实际效果。

In fact, you can argue that much of what’s going on in corporate America — well, I would put it this way: corporate CEOs, as a group, would be being paid a lot less money if proxy statements hadn’t revealed how much other people were getting paid.

事实上，你可以说美国企业中发生的许多事情——我会这样说：作为一个群体，企业首席执行官的薪酬要少得多，如果代理声明没有揭示其他人获得的薪酬。

It is only human to look at a whole bunch of proxy statements and say, “Well, I’m worth more than that guy,” and negotiate that way. And a comp committee is going to respond to that.

人们看着一堆代理声明并说：“好吧，我比那家伙值钱，”并以此进行谈判，这很正常。薪酬委员会会对此作出回应。

So, American shareholders are paying a significant price for the fact that they get to look at that proxy statement every year and see how much those top five officers are earning.

因此，美国股东为每年查看该代理声明并了解前五名高管的收入而付出了相当大的代价。

Charlie? (Scattered applause)

查理？（零星的掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: In the spirit of transparency, you’re asking for something that wouldn’t be good for the shareholders. And it’s not going to happen unless the SEC makes it happen.

查理·芒格：出于透明的精神，你要求的事情对股东来说并不好。除非证券交易委员会促成，否则这不会发生。

We’re way better off without adding to the culture of envy in America.

我们在不增加美国嫉妒文化的情况下要好得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s no one that looks at —there’s no CEO that looks at other proxy statements and comes away thinking, “I should get paid less.” I mean, that — you know? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没有哪个 CEO 会看其他的代理声明后觉得“我应该拿得更少”。我的意思是，你知道吗？（笑声）

We haven’t seen — have we ever seen them?

我们没有见过——我们见过他们吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I —

查理·芒格：不，我——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re not old enough.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们还不够老。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say that envy is doing the country a lot of harm. And our practices are envy dampeners.

查理·芒格：我认为嫉妒对国家造成了很大的伤害。而我们的做法是抑制嫉妒的。

23. Why Berkshire maintains $20B cash cushion

为什么伯克希尔保持 200 亿美元的现金缓冲

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Greg. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。（掌声）

GREGG WARREN: Thank you. As you know, Berkshire’s cash balances are an issue for some investors. Especially with excess cash being in the 25 to $30 billion range the last couple of years, and Berkshire having a more difficult time than it’s had historically reinvesting capital as quickly as it comes in.

格雷格·沃伦：谢谢你。正如你所知，伯克希尔的现金余额对一些投资者来说是个问题。尤其是在过去几年，超额现金在 250 亿到 300 亿美元之间，而伯克希尔在将资本再投资方面比历史上更困难，速度跟不上现金流入的速度。

Although Berkshire did provide $3.5 billion of the $3.6 billion of cash that was used to acquire NV Energy last year, with MidAmerican funding the remainder with debt, was there something that kept Berkshire from providing all of the capital for the acquisition, perhaps via inter-company debt?

尽管伯克希尔确实提供了 36 亿美元中用于收购 NV 能源的 35 亿美元现金，而中美能源则通过债务融资了其余部分，但是否有什么原因使伯克希尔无法提供收购所需的全部资本，或许是通过公司间债务？

And on a separate note, can you provide with us some insight into the decision to allow MidAmerican to retain all of its earnings, while Burlington Northern, which spent $3 billion on capital expenditures last year and is on pace to spend $5 billion this year, continues to pay a distribution to Berkshire, all while it takes on additional debt to help fund capital spending?

另外，您能否向我们提供一些关于允许 MidAmerican 保留所有收益的决定的见解，而 Burlington Northern 去年在资本支出上花费了 30 亿美元，并且今年预计将花费 50 亿美元，却仍然向 Berkshire 支付分配，同时还承担额外债务以帮助资助资本支出？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. MidAmerican, now renamed Berkshire Hathaway Energy — we’ll call it BH Energy — will have multiple opportunities, I hope, and we’ve seen two of them in the last 12 months, to buy other businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。中美能源，现在更名为伯克希尔哈撒韦能源——我们称之为 BH 能源——我希望它会有多个机会，我们在过去 12 个月中已经看到了其中两个，来收购其他企业。

And, as you noted, we spent a substantial amount of money on NV Energy and two days ago we agreed to buy transmission lines in Alberta.

而且，正如您所提到的，我们在 NV Energy 上花费了大量资金，前两天我们同意购买阿尔伯塔的输电线路。

So, we will — we hope we will — and so far we’ve been able to — come up with really large businesses to buy at BH Energy.

所以，我们希望能够——到目前为止，我们已经能够——在 BH Energy 找到真正大型的收购目标。

That will not — at BNSF, we will spend a lot of money to have the best railroad possible. But we’re not going to be buying other businesses.

这不会发生——在 BNSF，我们将花费大量资金来拥有最好的铁路。但我们不会收购其他企业。

So, we distribute substantial money out of BNSF and we will continue to do so because it’ll earn substantial money. And it can easily handle the debt that it has and will incur.

因此，我们将从 BNSF 分配大量资金，并将继续这样做，因为这将赚取可观的利润。而且它可以轻松应对现有和将要产生的债务。

Whereas, at Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we have pretty much the appropriate level of debt at both the subsidiary and the parent company level. So as we buy things, we need not only the retained earnings that we have, but occasionally we need some money from the shareholders.

鉴于在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司，我们在子公司和母公司层面都有相当适当的债务水平。因此，在我们购买东西时，我们不仅需要我们拥有的留存收益，有时还需要一些来自股东的资金。

And there are three shareholders of BH Energy. Berkshire owns 90 percent and then Greg and Walter Scott have the balance.

BH Energy 有三个股东。伯克希尔拥有 90%的股份，格雷格和沃尔特·斯科特拥有剩余的股份。

And so, if we make a large acquisition and we need a little more equity, we will have a pro rata subscription, which the other two shareholders are welcome to participate in. But if they don’t — if they decided not to, it wouldn’t hurt them. They’d still have an improvement in the value of their shares.

因此，如果我们进行大规模收购并需要更多的股本，我们将进行按比例认购，其他两个股东可以参与。但如果他们不参与——如果他们决定不参与，这对他们没有坏处。他们的股份价值仍然会有所提升。

So those two companies are quite different that way.

所以这两家公司在这方面是非常不同的。

I hope that more possible deals for Berkshire Hathaway Energy come along. And I think they will.

我希望伯克希尔哈撒韦能源能有更多可能的交易出现。我认为它们会出现。

So we may invest many, many, many billions there. We will invest billions at the railroad, but it’ll all be to improve the railroad. It won’t be to buy additional businesses.

所以我们可能会在那里投资很多很多亿。我们将在铁路上投资数十亿，但这都是为了改善铁路。并不是为了收购其他企业。

So far this year, if you think about it, counting yesterday — now, two of these deals started last year — but we’ve spent 5 billion on acquisitions, roughly.

到目前为止，如果你仔细想想，包括昨天——现在，这其中有两个交易是去年开始的——但我们大约花了 50 亿用于收购。

And, of course, in the first quarter, we spent another 2.8 billion on property, plant, and equipment.

当然，在第一季度，我们又花费了 28 亿用于物业、厂房和设备。

But we are finding — we are finding things to do that tend to sop up the cash.

但我们发现——我们发现一些事情可以消耗现金。

We always will have $20 billion around Berkshire. We will never be dependent on the kindness of strangers. It didn’t work that well for Blanche DuBois, either.

我们始终会在伯克希尔周围拥有 200 亿美元。我们永远不会依赖陌生人的善意。这对布兰奇·杜波依斯来说也没有那么奏效。

But in any event, the — we don’t count on bank lines. You know, we don’t count on — we don’t count on anything.

但无论如何，我们不依赖银行贷款。你知道，我们不依赖——我们不依赖任何东西。

There will be some time in the next 100 years, and it may be tomorrow and it may be 100 years from now, and nobody knows, you know, where we cannot depend on anybody else to keep our own strength and to maintain our operations.

在接下来的 100 年里，可能会有某个时刻，可能是明天，也可能是 100 年后，没人知道，你知道的，我们不能依赖其他人来保持我们的力量和维持我们的运作。

And we spent too long building Berkshire to have that one moment destroy us.

我们花了太长时间来建立伯克希尔，不会让那一刻摧毁我们。

I mean, we lent money, as you probably know, to Harley-Davidson at 15 percent. And we lent it at a time when short-term rates were probably a half a percent.

我想说的是，正如你可能知道的，我们以 15%的利率向哈雷-戴维森贷款。而我们是在短期利率大约为 0.5%的时候贷款的。

Well, Harley-Davidson is a fine company — but it, like Goldman Sachs and General Electric and a bunch of other companies —we lent money to Tiffany’s — they — you know, they needed — when you need cash, you know, it’s the thing — it’s the only thing — you need. And it’s because other people aren’t coming up with it.

好吧，哈雷-戴维森是一家不错的公司——但它和高盛、通用电气以及其他一些公司一样——我们借钱给蒂芙尼——他们——你知道，他们需要——当你需要现金时，你知道，这就是事情——这是唯一的事情——你需要的。而且这是因为其他人没有提供现金。

I’ve always said that, you know, cash is — available cash or credit — is a lot like oxygen: that you don’t notice it — the lack of it — 99.9 percent of the time.

我一直说，现金——可用现金或信用——很像氧气：99.9%的时间你都不会注意到它的缺乏。

But if it’s absent, it’s the only thing you notice. And we don’t want to be in that position.

但如果它缺失了，那就是你唯一注意到的事情。我们不想处于那种境地。

So we will keep 20 billion. We will never go to sleep at night worrying about any event that’s taken place that could hurt our ability to keep playing our game.

所以我们将保留 200 亿。我们永远不会在晚上担心任何可能影响我们继续玩游戏的事件。

And above 20 billion, we’ll try to find ways to invest it intelligently. And so far, we’ve generally done it. I mean, right — you know, we always had something above that.

超过 200 亿，我们会努力寻找明智投资的方式。到目前为止，我们通常做到了。我是说，对吧——你知道，我们总是有超过那个的东西。

But, you know, we’ve spent a fair amount of money so far this year. We’ll probably spend more later in the year.

但是，你知道，我们今年到目前为止已经花了相当多的钱。我们可能在今年晚些时候会花更多。

So, so far, I feel we could get the cash out at reasonable returns. We never feel a compulsion to use it though, just because it’s there.

所以，到目前为止，我觉得我们可以以合理的回报提取现金。不过，我们从来没有感到必须使用它，仅仅因为它在那里。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we’re very lucky to have these businesses that can employ a lot of new capital at very respectable rates.

查理·芒格：我们非常幸运拥有这些能够以非常可观的回报使用大量新资本的业务。

And if — earlier in the history of Berkshire, we didn’t have such automatic opportunities. And now that we’re so affluent, we really are way better off having these opportunities.

而在伯克希尔早期历史中，我们没有这样的自动机会。现在我们非常富裕，我们真的拥有这些机会，远比之前要好得多。

It’s a blessing. I mean, who would want to get rid of MidAmerican and the Burlington Northern Railroad? Nobody in his right mind.

这是个祝福。谁会想要摆脱MidAmerican和Burlington Northern铁路？没有一个正常人会这样做。

I mean, we love the opportunity to invest more capital intelligently in a world where short-term interest rates are half a percent, or lower.

我意思是，我们喜欢在短期利率为0.5%或更低的世界中，有机会明智地投资更多的资本。

进入基础建设是应对低利率的方案。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we love the opportunity to go in with 3G at Heinz and —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们很喜欢与 3G 一起进入亨氏的机会——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: —employ significant capital. We’ll get the chances to use capital.

沃伦·巴菲特：——投入大量资本。我们将有机会使用资本。

Eventually, you know, compound interest will catch up with us. And it’s certainly dampened things.

最终，你知道，复利会追上我们。这当然抑制了一些东西。

But it hasn’t delivered its final blow yet.

但它还没有发出最后一击。

24. Buffett and Munger disagree, but never argue

巴菲特和芒格意见不合，但从不争吵

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren, Charlie. John Norwood from West Des Moines, Iowa. Thank you so much for the annual meetings. And please don’t move it to Dallas or some other place. I’ve got my system worked out here.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦，查理。我是来自爱荷华州西德莫因的约翰·诺伍德。非常感谢你们的年度会议。请不要把它移到达拉斯或其他地方。我在这里已经安排好了我的系统。

WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Hey, two quick questions.

观众成员：谢谢。嘿，有两个简单的问题。

One is allocation of capital and how you wrestle with the operating companies and how much cash comes up to the operating companies — or comes up to the mother ship — versus the operating companies.

一个是关于资本分配的，如何处理运营公司和母公司之间的现金流动——或是母公司对运营公司现金流动的情况。

And you and Charlie, do you ever fight or argue? And any lessons over the years for how you manage your partnership of two? Thank you.

你和查理会打架或争吵吗？多年来你们在如何管理两人合作关系方面有什么经验教训吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie and I have never had an argument. We met in 19 — when I was 29. He was 35. We’re a little older now.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理和我从来没有争吵过。我们在 19——我 29 岁时认识。他 35 岁。我们现在稍微老了一些。

And in those years, 55 years, we’ve disagreed on a lot of things. And it’s just never led, and never will, lead to an argument.

在这 55 年里，我们在很多事情上意见不合。但这从来没有导致，也永远不会导致争吵。

We argue with other people. (Laughs)

我们和其他人争论。（笑）

But it just — it hasn’t occurred.

但这就是——它还没有发生。

I called Charlie on the Coca-Cola vote, you know, and then said what the proxy statement said and everything. Said, “What do you think?” And we thought alike, you know?

我给查理打了电话，关于可口可乐的投票，你知道，然后说了代理声明的内容和一切。我问：“你怎么看？”我们想法一致，你知道吗？

Sometimes we don’t think alike. And we never go away in the least bit mad if we don’t, or —

有时候我们的想法不一样。如果我们不一样，我们一点也不会生气，或者——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Most of the time, we think alike. That’s one of the problems. If one of us misses it, the other is likely to, too. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：大多数时候，我们的想法是相似的。这就是其中一个问题。如果我们其中一个人错过了，另一个人也很可能会错过。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that — well, there’s no question. If you look at the really bad mistakes we’ve made, I’ve made them.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说——毫无疑问。如果你看看我们犯的那些真正糟糕的错误，那些错误是我犯的。

I’m probably a little more inclined toward action than Charlie. Would you say that’s fair, Charlie? Or —

我可能比查理更倾向于行动。你觉得这样说公平吗，查理？还是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you once called me the abominable ‘no’ man. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，你曾经叫我“可怕的‘不’先生”。（笑）

25. Berkshire’s cash cushion is partially held by subsidiaries

伯克希尔的现金缓冲部分由子公司持有

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’ve missed — what’s the — what was the first part of the question? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们错过了——问题的第一部分是什么？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Capital allocation. How do you decide how much cash comes up from the operating companies —

观众成员：资本分配。你们如何决定从运营公司中提取多少现金——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，那是——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — to the mother ship?

观众成员：——到母公司去？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s pretty simple, in that we don’t really care too much where that 20 billion minimum is.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这很简单，因为我们并不太在乎那 200 亿美元的最低限额在哪里。

We wouldn’t — but we don’t count the money in a regulated — well, in the energy business or the railroad.

我们不会——但我们不算那些在受监管行业（例如能源业务或铁路）的钱。

So we really count the money that we could make a phone call and get.

所以我们真正计算的是我们能通过打个电话就能拿到的钱。

With interest rates at these levels, we sit around sometimes with — every one of our companies, I would say, probably has more cash in it than if some other large conglomerate was running the place.

在这样的利率水平下，我们有时会坐在一起——我想我们每一家公司可能都有比其他大型企业管理更多的现金。

They would probably have sweep accounts and all of that. And we may get around to that at some point, but it just doesn’t make that much difference, because if we had it at the parent company, we’d have it out at five basis points. And if it’s at the — if it’s down at the subsidiary, it’s probably getting five basis points.

他们可能会有清算账户等等。我们可能会在某个时候谈到这个，但这并没有太大区别，因为如果我们在母公司有这个，我们的利率会是五个基点。如果是在子公司，那可能也是五个基点。

So we’re not — it’s not something we think about on a day to day or week to week or month to month basis.

所以我们并不是——这不是我们每天、每周或每月都会考虑的事情。

I know where the cash is. And I know when we’re going to need cash and I know what I’m thinking about doing, or may possibly do in the next few months, that maybe something’s a 50/50 probability of happening.

我知道现金在哪里。我知道我们什么时候需要现金，我知道我在考虑做什么，或者在接下来的几个月里可能会做什么，也许有 50%的可能性会发生。

And anything I am committing to do, I know where the cash is coming from.

我知道我承诺要做的事情的资金来源。

But it doesn’t mean that we try to get it all in the parent company, day by day or week by week like many companies do. We could change that procedure someday. Maybe a sweep account would make sense at some point. Probably would.

但这并不意味着我们像许多公司那样，逐日或逐周地试图将所有事务集中在母公司。我们可能会在某一天改变这个程序。也许在某个时候，设立一个汇总账户会有意义。可能会有。

But we’re not big disciplinarians of our subsidiaries day by day. We don’t want them to feel that way.

但我们并不是每天都对我们的子公司进行严格管理。我们不希望他们有这样的感觉。

And there’s one company I’m thinking of, where I’ve never been there. Probably only talked to the fellow who runs it three or four times in ten years. You know, and there’s a lot of cash around. And every now and then, he sends me some.

我在想的一家公司，我从未去过那里。十年里只和那位负责的人谈过三四次话。你知道的，那里有很多现金。偶尔，他会给我寄一些。

And if I really need it, I mean, I know where it is. And he’ll give it to me. But there’s — it doesn’t really make much difference, you know, whether it’s sitting there, whether it’s sitting at Berkshire.

如果我真的需要它，我是说，我知道它在哪里。他会把它给我的。但这并没有太大区别，你知道的，无论它是在那儿，还是在伯克希尔。

I don’t want to encourage to our managers of our other subsidiaries who are listening to this a new way of behaving. But, I sort of adapt to the companies, except when we really need the money, and then I grab it. (Laughter)

我不想鼓励我们其他子公司的经理们听到这段话后采取新的行为方式。但是，我有点适应这些公司，除非我们真的需要钱，然后我就会抓住机会。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s just fine.

查理·芒格：这很好。

26. Buffett admits he’s “slow to make personnel changes”

巴菲特承认他“在人员变动上反应迟缓”

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from an astute fellow named Richard Sercer of Tucson, who spotted an opening and is going for it.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自一位聪明的朋友，名叫理查德·塞尔瑟，他来自图森，发现了一个机会并正在抓住它。

And it actually reminds me of a question that you, Warren, or Charlie, could’ve thought up yourself.

这实际上让我想起了一个你们，沃伦或查理，自己可能会想到的问题。

“In an interview on April 23rd, 2014 about the Q&A session, Warren said, quote, ‘I hope we will get questions that probe at our weak points.’ My question is, what is our weak points and what can be done to address them?” (Laughter)

“在 2014 年 4 月 23 日的采访中，关于问答环节，沃伦说，‘我希望我们能收到能探讨我们弱点的问题。’我的问题是，我们的弱点是什么，以及可以采取什么措施来解决这些问题？”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that would spoil all the fun for the journalists. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，那样会破坏记者们的乐趣。（笑）

They’re the ones that are supposed to look for the weak points.

他们是应该寻找弱点的人。

We have a lot of weak — we point them out. You know, I’ve just pointed out one.

我们有很多弱点——我们指出它们。你知道，我刚刚指出了一个。

Probably, I would say if you’d — if we’d — executed a sweep account for all our subsidiaries some years ago, you know, we would have a few more dollars than we have now.

可能的话，如果我们几年前就执行了一个清算账户系统，我们现在可能会有更多的钱。

You know, it — who knows what they’re doing with some of those balances in terms of — we wouldn’t — it wouldn’t be because we do riskier things. But we — you know — we are very disciplined in some ways. And by ordinary business standards, we’re sloppy in other ways.

你知道，这——谁知道他们在处理那些余额时在想什么——我们不会——这不是因为我们做了更冒险的事情。但我们——你知道——在某些方面我们非常有纪律。而按照普通商业标准，我们在其他方面则显得很马虎。

And, oh, well, a clear weak point of mine would be I’m slow to make personnel changes. I mean, I like the managers we have.

而且，哦，我的一个明显弱点就是我在进行人事变动时反应较慢。我的意思是，我喜欢我们现有的管理者。

And Charlie and I had a wonderful friend who couldn’t have been a greater guy. And, you know, we were slow to make a change there. We loved the guy. And it wasn’t killing us in our business.

查理和我有一个很棒的朋友，他真是个好人。你知道，我们在那方面改变得很慢。我们很喜欢这个家伙。而且这并没有对我们的生意造成太大影响。

And how long would you say we went beyond where somebody else would’ve acted in that case, Charlie?

你认为我们在这种情况下超出了其他人会采取行动的时间有多长，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know exactly.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不太确定。

But that, turning to the sweep account system, reminds me of a friend I had when I was in the Air Corps and he was a very skinny man. And he decided to give blood. And they put the needle into his arm and the blood stopped flowing.

但这让我想起了我在空军时的一个朋友，他是个非常瘦的人。他决定献血。结果他们把针头插入他的手臂，血液却停止了流动。

And the nurse just started stripping his arm as though it were the udder of a cow. And he got the impression that he was going to — they were going to get that blood whether it took all he had. And he fainted.

护士开始像挤奶牛一样脱掉他的手臂上的衣物。他感觉到他们一定会——不管他付出多少代价，他们都会抽取他的血。他晕倒了。

It was a very unpleasant occurrence. And I don’t think a sweep account is all that pleasant to sit there and just — every little dollar comes in, somebody sweeps it away.

这是一件非常不愉快的事情。我认为一个清算账户并不那么令人愉快，坐在那里只是——每一分钱进来，就被人划走。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, our —

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我们的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I like the tone of our business.

查理·芒格：我喜欢我们业务的基调。

WARREN BUFFETT: Our managers are listening here. I mean, don’t give them that illustration to use when I ask for money. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们的经理们在这里听着。我的意思是，当我要求资金时，不要给他们那个例子来使用。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But, you know, I’ve seen people subject to — Teledyne and Litton, those people, swept every dime every day, basically.

查理·芒格：不过，我见过那些像Teledyne和Litton那样的人，他们基本上每天清算每一分钱。

And it was a little more economic, but it created a tone in the company that — which I think is less desirable than ours.

这在经济上稍微更划算，但在公司中产生了一种氛围——我认为这比我们的氛围更不理想。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve waited too long on managers, though, sometimes, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，有时候，我们在经理身上等得太久了，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sure. You and I participated in taking one man directly from an executive chair into a Alzheimer’s home. There was no — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。你我曾参与过把一位直接从执行职位上送到阿尔茨海默病院的人。没有——（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re hitting a sensitive subject here, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你触及了一个敏感的话题。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’d arranged that he could do no harm, and we loved him well enough so that we just made it easy for him.

查理·芒格：我们已经安排了他不会造成任何伤害，我们也非常喜欢他，所以我们只是让他顺利过渡了。

I’ve never regretted it, have you?

我从未后悔过，你呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Not —

沃伦·巴菲特：不。不是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: Not at all. Not at all. It —

沃伦·巴菲特：一点也不。一点也不。它——

CHARLIE MUNGER: On the other hand, I want to be pretty careful.

查理·芒格：另一方面，我想要非常小心。

WARREN BUFFETT: It — we will be slow. And we — there will be times when what you might call our lack of supervision over subsidiaries, you know, we’ll miss something.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会很慢。有时你可能会说我们对子公司的监督不足，我们会错过一些事情。

Now, we think that giving our managers the degree of freedom that they enjoy will also accomplish a lot.

现在，我们认为给予我们的管理者他们所享有的自由度也会取得很大的成就。

So someone will come along someday and say, “If you’d had many more checks and oversight and all of that sort of thing,” you know, something — well, something will happen at Berkshire and they’ll say, “That wouldn’t have happened if you’d followed the procedure that some other company followed.” And they’ll be right.

总有一天会有人说：“如果你们有更多的检查和监督之类的东西，”你知道，某些事情——好吧，伯克希尔会发生某些事情，他们会说：“如果你们遵循了其他公司遵循的程序，这种事情就不会发生。”他们会是对的。

But what they won’t be able to measure is how much on the positive side we have achieved with dozens and dozens of people because we gave them that same sort of leeway.

但他们无法衡量的是，我们与数十人取得的积极成果，因为我们给予了他们同样的自由度。

I mean, we operate differently in terms of the level of control and supervision. You know, we don’t have a general counsel’s office at Berkshire. We don’t have a human relations department at Berkshire.

我的意思是，我们在控制和监督的层面上运作不同。你知道，我们在伯克希尔没有总法律顾问办公室。我们在伯克希尔没有人力资源部门。

And that would be almost unthinkable to other companies. And we’re not saying that’s a 100 percent benefit in all ways. We think — but we think on balance, it’s a benefit.

这对其他公司来说几乎是不可想象的。我们并不是说这在所有方面都是百分之百的好处。我们认为——但我们认为总体上这是一个好处。

But when the down side of such a procedure shows up, people will say, “Well, you should of done it differently and you should’ve been spending lots of money over the years and restricting the activities more of your subsidiary managers,” and so on.

但是当这种程序的缺点显现出来时，人们会说：“好吧，你应该以不同的方式进行，你应该多花钱并限制你的子公司经理的活动，”等等。

And our reaction will be that they are wrong. But we will look bad in that individual case.

我们的反应将是他们错了。但在那个个案中，我们看起来会很糟糕。

Wouldn’t you say that’s true, Charlie?

你不觉得这是真的，查理吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The — by the standards of the rest of the world, we over trust. And so far, our results have been way better because we carefully selected people because they were going to be over trusted. And it’s worked very well for us.

查理·芒格：是的。按照世界其他地方的标准，我们过于信任。而到目前为止，我们的结果要好得多，因为我们仔细挑选了人选，因为他们会被过度信任。这对我们来说效果很好。

And, I think a lot of places work better when they create a culture of deserved trust. And that’s been our system. And some people regard that as a weakness.

我认为很多地方在建立应得信任的文化时运作得更好。这就是我们的系统。有些人将其视为一种弱点。

And this modern accounting treatment, when everybody’s measured on internal controls, I think it’s going to do more harm than good. (Applause)

这种现代的会计处理，当每个人都被内部控制来衡量时，我认为它会造成更多的伤害，而不是好处。（掌声）

27. Trying, and failing, to expand See’s Candies’ geographic market

尝试并未成功地扩展 See's Candies 的地理市场

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: See’s Candy is obviously small in the context of Berkshire’s currently expansive operations, but has long been one of your favorite businesses.

乔纳森·布兰特：在伯克希尔目前庞大的运营背景下，See's Candy 显然规模较小，但它一直是你最喜欢的业务之一。

And no wonder, given that its pre-tax profits grew consistently from less than $5 million in 1972 when Berkshire acquired it, to $74 million in 1999.

难怪，考虑到其税前利润从 1972 年伯克希尔收购时的不到 500 万美元，持续增长到 1999 年的 7400 万美元。

However, since 1999, profit growth appears to have stalled.

然而，自 1999 年以来，利润增长似乎已经停滞。

Can you explain why See’s was able to grow its profits through the ’70s, ‘80s and ’90s, but not, so far, in this millennium?

你能解释一下为什么 See's 在 70 年代、80 年代和 90 年代能够增长利润，但到目前为止在这个千年却没有吗？

Did something change about the business, for instance, the growth and demand for boxed chocolates or its market position?

关于业务是否发生了变化，例如，盒装巧克力的增长和需求或其市场地位？

Could you or Brad Kinstler discuss whether the relatively recent geographic expansion could help reignite See’s growth? Thank you.

您或布拉德·金斯特勒能否讨论一下最近的地理扩张是否有助于重新点燃 See 的增长？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the boxed chocolate business is, basically, not growing.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，盒装巧克力业务基本上没有增长。

I mean, if you go back 100 years, the — each city of any size was characterized by lots of candy shops. Chicago was a big leader. New York was a big leader.

我的意思是，如果你回到 100 年前，每个有一定规模的城市都有很多糖果店。芝加哥是一个重要的领导者。纽约也是一个重要的领导者。

Believe it or not, the predecessor company to Pepsi Cola was the — a company with the most — it was a company called Loft’s — that had the most candy shops in New York City.

信不信由你，百事可乐的前身公司是——一家拥有最多——它是一家名为洛夫特的公司——在纽约市拥有最多糖果店。

It was a candy shop company, originally, that a fellow that — what was his name?

这是一家糖果店公司，最初，一个叫——他叫什么名字的家伙？

CHARLIE MUNGER: [Charles] Guth.

查理·芒格：[查尔斯] 古斯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. What was it?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。那是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Guth. 查理·芒格：古斯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He acquired Pepsi for a few thousand bucks, stuck it in Loft’s.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他花了几千美元收购了百事可乐，把它放在洛夫特的。

And the corporate — the corporate name, if you go all the way back on Pepsi, is Loft’s.

而公司的——公司的名称，如果追溯到百事可乐，便是洛夫特的。

So there were loads of candy shops around everyplace. And including in Omaha.

所以到处都有很多糖果店，包括在奥马哈。

Boxed chocolates have lost position dramatically. Primarily, I would guess, to salted snacks of one sort or another. Various things.

盒装巧克力的市场地位急剧下降。主要原因，我猜，是因为某种咸味零食的竞争。各种各样的东西。

See’s has done remarkably well, far better than any chocolate company in the country.

See's 表现得非常出色，远远超过了国内任何一家巧克力公司。

Russell Stover did very well for a while. Very well, with a different business model. But, you know, they ran into their problems as well.

拉塞尔·斯托弗一度表现得非常好。非常好，采用了不同的商业模式。但是，你知道，他们也遇到了问题。

So, we can’t do much about increasing the size of the market. And we’ve tried a lot of ways. And we’ve tried moving out of our strong geography, multiple times.

所以，我们对扩大市场规模无能为力。我们尝试了很多方法，也多次尝试走出我们的强势地区。

I mean, Charlie and I looked at what we were earning in California in the ’70s and said to ourselves, “If we could do this in 50 states instead of one, you know, we’ll get very rich.”

我意思是，查理和我看着我们在 70 年代加利福尼亚的收入，心里想着：“如果我们能在 50 个州而不是一个州做到这一点，你知道的，我们会变得非常富有。”

So we tried it and we didn’t get very rich. It doesn’t travel that well.

所以我们尝试了，但并没有变得很富有。它的流通性不太好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn’t. And you figure out whether it’s going to work by trying it.

查理·芒格：有时候有效，有时候无效。你可以通过尝试来判断它是否会奏效。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve tried it many times.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们已经尝试过很多次。

But so far — it’s interesting. Two-thirds — people in the East prefer dark chocolate, two-thirds to one-third. In the West, they prefer milk chocolate, two-thirds to one-third.

但到目前为止——这很有趣。东部地区的人们更喜欢黑巧克力，比例为三分之二对三分之一。在西部，他们更喜欢牛奶巧克力，比例也是三分之二对三分之一。

They like miniatures in the East. They won’t eat miniatures in the West. There’s a lot of different things.

他们在东部喜欢小巧克力，在西部则不吃小巧克力。有很多不同的因素。

But in the end, there isn’t a lot of boxed chocolates volume.

但最终，盒装巧克力的市场份额并不大。

And we’ve done very, very, very well in See’s. And it not only has provided us with earnings that we’ve used to buy other businesses, so we’ve added lots of earnings power through See’s, beyond the earning power we’ve added at See’s.

我们在 See’s 方面做得非常好。它不仅为我们提供了收益，我们用这些收益购买了其他业务，从而增加了很多盈利能力。

But it opened my eyes to the power of brands and probably you could say that we made a lot of money in Coca-Cola partly because we bought See’s, or at least in my case, bought See’s, because I’d understood brands to some degree, but there’s nothing like owning one, and sort of seeing the possibilities with it as well as the limitations, to educate yourself about things you might do in the future.

但这让我意识到了品牌的力量，或许可以说，我们在可口可乐上赚了很多钱，部分原因是我们收购了 See's，或者至少在我看来，收购了 See's，因为我在某种程度上理解了品牌，但没有什么比拥有一个品牌更能让人看到它的可能性和局限性，这能让你对未来可能做的事情有更深的了解。

品牌是一种纵向的能力。

And in 1972, we bought See’s. And in 1988 we bought Coca-Cola.

1972 年，我们收购了 See's。1988 年，我们收购了可口可乐。

And I wouldn’t be at all surprised, if we had not owned See’s, whether we would’ve owned Coca-Cola later on.

我一点也不惊讶，如果我们没有拥有 See's，后来是否会拥有可口可乐。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There’s no question about the fact that its main contribution to Berkshire was ignorance removal. And it’s not the only big contributor to ignorance removal.

查理·芒格：是的。毫无疑问，它对伯克希尔的主要贡献是消除无知。而且这并不是唯一一个对消除无知有重大贡献的因素。

If it weren’t for the fact we were so good at removing our ignorance, step by step, Berkshire would be practically nothing today.

如果不是因为我们在逐步消除无知方面做得如此出色，伯克希尔今天几乎一无所有。

What we knew originally wasn’t enough. We were pretty damn stupid when we bought See’s. We were just barely smart enough to buy it.

我们最初知道的还不够。当我们购买 See's 时，我们真是太愚蠢了。我们只是勉强聪明到足以买下它。

And if there’s any secret to Berkshire, it’s the fact that we’re pretty good at ignorance removal. And the nice thing about that is we have a lot of ignorance left to remove. (Laughter)

如果说伯克希尔有什么秘密，那就是我们在消除无知方面相当出色。而这件事的好处在于，我们还有很多无知需要去消除。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s what happens when I call on him. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，这就是我叫他时发生的事情。（笑声）

28. Buffett explains deal to change Bank of America investment

巴菲特解释了改变美国银行投资的交易

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ben Ottenhoff and I’m from Washington, D.C.

观众成员：我叫本·奥滕霍夫，来自华盛顿特区。

I was wondering if you could talk — I’ve read recently that the Bank of America investment, you changed it so they can now treat it as tier one capital.

我在想你是否可以谈谈——我最近读到美国银行的投资，你们已经改变了它，使他们现在可以将其视为一级资本。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you explain a little bit why you did that and what benefit, if any, there is to Berkshire’s shareholders?

观众成员：你能解释一下你为什么这样做，以及这对伯克希尔的股东有什么好处吗？

And also, does it give you any pause that they can’t calculate their tier one capital requirements properly?

而且，他们无法正确计算一级资本要求，这是否让你感到担忧？

WARREN BUFFETT: The — it came about some — really, a good many months ago, that Brian Moynihan called me and asked me whether we would be willing to change our preferred stock, five billion of it, from a cumulative preferred, to a noncumulative preferred.

沃伦·巴菲特：这件事发生在几个月前，布莱恩·莫伊尼汉给我打电话，问我们是否愿意将我们五十亿的优先股从累积优先股改为非累积优先股。

Now, a non-cumulative preferred has certain defects, obviously, compared to a cumulative preferred. As, for example, the shareholder — the preferred shareholders — of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are finding out.

非累积优先股显然相比累积优先股有一定的缺陷。例如，弗雷迪·麦克（Freddie Mac）和房利美（Fannie Mae）的优先股股东就发现了这些缺陷。

Noncumulative preferreds — Ben Graham wrote about them in the 1934 edition of “Security Analysis” — they’re a terribly weak form of security.

非累积优先股——本·格雷厄姆在 1934 年版的《证券分析》中提到过——它们是一种非常弱的证券形式。

But, partly because they are that weak form of security, they count different in capital with banks.

但正因为它是一种脆弱的证券形式，它在银行资本计算中有不同的计入方式。

So Brian asked me to do that and then he said, “If you will do that” — and this requires approval by their shareholders and everything — but he said, “If you’ll do that, we would be willing to make your preferred noncallable for five years.”

所以布赖恩让我这样做，然后他说：“如果你愿意这样做”——这需要他们股东的批准等等——但他说：“如果你愿意这样做，我们愿意将你的优先股设定为五年内不可赎回。”

Now, in a world of five-basis money — five-basis-point money — you know, practically nothing — no returns — I was very willing to make that trade-off.

现在，在一个五个基点的货币世界里——几乎没有回报——我非常愿意做出这样的权衡。

It was — they felt it was good for them and I felt it was good for Berkshire.

他们觉得这对他们有好处，我觉得这对伯克希尔有好处。

So, I get five years at Berkshire of non-call of a 6 percent preferred, which I can always use as payment for the warrants we have.

所以，我获得了五年内无法赎回的6%的优先股，这笔钱我可以用来支付我们持有的认股权证。

So, I don’t have a problem of being locked into it forever, into a noncumulative committed preferred, and the BofA gets the benefit of using it in their calculation of capital.

所以，我并不担心被永远锁定在一个非累积的优先股中，而美银则可以在其资本计算中受益于此。

That was all done before this recent — I mean, a long time ago — before the recent, you know, week ago or so when they had the miscalculation involving some structured notes of Merrill Lynch.

这一切都是在最近之前完成的——我的意思是，很久以前——在最近，也就是大约一周前，他们在涉及美林证券的一些结构性票据时发生了误算。

That error they made does not bother me. I mean, it — you know, we work on our figures, you know, we’ve got that 20,000 page-plus tax return. We have 10-Ks, 10-Qs, going in and out. You do the best you can.

他们犯的那个错误并不让我烦恼。我的意思是，我们在处理我们的数据，你知道，我们有超过 20,000 页的税务申报表。我们有 10-K、10-Q，进进出出。你尽力而为。

But I — that error did not affect their GAAP reported numbers or anything of the sort. And they wished they hadn’t made it. And they’ll pay a penalty, in the sense of their capital plan, because they did make it.

但我——那个错误并没有影响他们的 GAAP 报告数字或类似的东西。他们希望自己没有犯这个错误。他们将会在资本计划上付出代价，因为他们确实犯了这个错误。

But it doesn’t change my feeling about the Bank of America or its management one iota.

但这并没有改变我对美国银行或其管理层的任何看法。

And I do think that this — they were going to pay the dividend anyway. You know, I mean, the probabilities that going to non-cumulative hurts us are very, very low. And the probability that making it noncallable for five years is a real plus to us.

我确实认为他们无论如何都会支付股息。你知道，我的意思是，变为非累积的对我们造成伤害的概率非常非常低。而将其设定为五年不可赎回对我们来说是一个真正的好处。

So, it was an exchange I was happy to make. And I think that it was good for us and good for them.

所以，这是我乐意进行的交换。我认为这对我们和他们都是有益的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you.

查理·芒格：我同意你的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

29. NetJets is “satisfactory,” but don’t expect big growth

NetJets“令人满意”，但不要指望大幅增长

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Frank Robinson in Madison.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自麦迪逊的弗兰克·罗宾逊。

And he asks, “Ten years ago, NetJets was mentioned at the annual meeting each year as an exciting growth opportunity for Berkshire. Five years ago, there were some problems which seem to have been addressed since they’re no longer mentioned.

他问：“十年前，NetJets 每年在年度会议上都被提及，作为伯克希尔一个令人兴奋的增长机会。五年前，出现了一些问题，但似乎已经得到解决，因为现在不再提及了。”

“What are the current prospects for NetJets? Is it a substantial contributor to growth and revenue and earnings?”

“NetJets 目前的前景如何？它对增长、收入和盈利有实质性的贡献吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s not a big grow — it’s a very — it’s a perfectly decent business.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这不是一个大增长——这是一家非常——这是一家完全体面的企业。

The number — it peaked in new unit volume more or less coincident with what happened in the stock market in 2007 and ’08.

这个数字——它在新单位销量上达到了顶峰，或多或少与 2007 年和 2008 年股市发生的事情相吻合。

I mean, there were a fair number of people whose income was dependent on stock market behavior, particularly hedge fund managers. But other — a lot of others.

我指的是，有相当多的人收入依赖于股市的表现，特别是对冲基金经理。但还有很多其他人。

And they gave us quite a boom in sales. And not only did their demand fall off, but when their contracts ran out — and they tended to run out in, like, 2011 and ’12 — a lot of them did not renew.

他们给我们的销售带来了相当大的增长。不仅他们的需求下降，而且当他们的合同到期时——通常是在 2011 年和 2012 年——很多人并没有续约。

Until the last — won’t be totally accurate on this — but until the last six or eight months, net ownership in the U.S. was declining just slightly. And that’s turned around now. Net ownership is growing month by month.

直到最后——对此不会完全准确——但直到最近六到八个月，美国的净拥有量略有下降。而现在这一趋势已经扭转。净拥有量正逐月增长。

But it is not a huge growth business at all. I mean — it’s a very large-size business. I mean, we are, you know, probably 60-some percent of the industry and there’s nobody remotely close as a second. I mean, we are the premier product.

但这根本不是一个巨大的增长业务。我的意思是——这是一个非常大的业务。我是说，我们大约占行业的 60%左右，几乎没有任何竞争对手接近第二名。我是说，我们是首屈一指的产品。

But I don’t see the market being double or triple the present size.

但我不认为市场会是目前规模的两倍或三倍。

We are going to China very soon. But that’s a very, very long-range play. We are in Europe and that is not — that still is declining a little bit in unit volume.

我们很快就要去中国。但这是一项非常长期的计划。我们在欧洲，而那里的单位销量仍然在略微下降。

Now, the flight hours have picked up a fair amount. So the owners are using the planes more in the last six months to a year, and that fell off a lot in the 2007- 8 period.

现在，飞行小时数增加了很多。因此，过去六个月到一年，飞机的使用频率提高了，而在 2007-2008 年期间，这一使用频率大幅下降。

So I would not characterize NetJets as a big growth opportunity. But I would — but I’m glad we own it. And I think it’s very — it’s a very satisfactory business.

所以我不会将 NetJets 视为一个大的增长机会。但我很高兴我们拥有它。我认为这是一项非常令人满意的业务。

But it is not one I would expect to see a whole lot of growth out of.

但我不认为会看到它有很大的增长。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I demonstrated my optimism by buying 25 more hours. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我通过购买 25 个小时来展示我的乐观。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He was a tough sell, too, I got to tell you that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我得告诉你，他也很难推销。（笑声）

I can think of a few more comments, but I won’t make them.

我可以想到更多的评论，但我不会说出来。

30. Unlikely to use major stock holdings to pay for acquisitions

不太可能使用主要持有的股票来支付收购。

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay. 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊。

JAY GELB: This question is on acquisitions.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于收购的。

How large of an acquisition is Berkshire comfortable targeting currently?

伯克希尔目前对多大规模的收购感到舒适？

And to what extent are Berkshire’s major equity investments in Wells Fargo, Coke, American Express, and IBM realistically a potential source of funds for deals?

伯克希尔在富国银行、可口可乐、美国运通和 IBM 的主要股权投资在多大程度上实际上是交易资金的潜在来源？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they could be a source of funds. But it’s very unlikely they will be.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，它们可能是资金来源。但它们不太可能成为资金来源。

But — the — our goal is to buy really good businesses, and big businesses, and businesses where we like the management, and businesses that we think we can grow over time.

但是——我们的目标是购买真正优秀的企业，规模较大的企业，以及我们喜欢管理层的企业，还有我们认为可以随着时间增长的企业。

I mean, Berkshire is about building earning power. When we buy, as we did a day or two ago, agreed to buy that transmission line in Alberta, I mean, I’m looking at trying to add earning power to Berkshire.

我想，伯克希尔是关于建立盈利能力的。当我们购买，比如说一两天前同意购买阿尔伯塔的那条输电线时，我的意思是，我在努力为伯克希尔增加盈利能力。

And we try to do that every day or every week or every month. And we don’t get opportunities that often.

我们努力每天、每周或每月都这样做。但我们并不常有这样的机会。

But if the opportunities were large enough and we needed to raise some money, you know, we can dip into a huge reservoir of securities and still have, you know, huge investments thereafter.

但如果机会足够大，我们需要筹集一些资金，你知道，我们可以动用大量的证券储备，之后仍然可以进行巨额投资。

It hasn’t come to that. You know, when we’ve got 40-some billion of capital — or cash — and I’m willing to take it down to 20, it — you know, we’ve got a fair cushion there.

还没有到那一步。你知道，当我们有大约 400 多亿的资本——或者现金——而我愿意把它降到 200 亿时，这——你知道，我们有一个相当的缓冲。

But if I needed to, we would do something, if it was attractive enough, and big enough, that it required us to.

但如果我需要的话，我们会做一些事情，如果它足够吸引人，足够大，以至于我们必须这样做。

So, that could happen. Could happen this year, could happen ten years from now. You never know.

所以，这可能会发生。可能在今年发生，也可能在十年后发生。你永远不知道。

Charlie, have you got any thoughts on that?

查理，你对此有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, no, I think the — our acquisitions have been irregular in the past. They’ll be irregular in the future.

查理·芒格：嗯，不，我认为我们的收购在过去是不规律的。未来也会是不规律的。

I do think we’ll get more, sort of, automatic, intelligent redeployment of capital from our railroad and our utility subsidiary than we have in the past. And I think that’s good, good for the shareholders.

我确实认为，我们将比过去获得更多的自动化、明智化的资本重新配置，来自我们的铁路和公用事业子公司。我认为这对股东来说是好事。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think people may think that what we get turned on is by finding some stock we’d like to buy. That’s fine.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为人们可能会认为我们感兴趣的是找到一些我们想买的股票。这很好。

But what really — there’s no comparison — what really turns us on is finding a business that we want to buy, and that fits well for Berkshire, and that’ll be earning money for Berkshire 10 and 20 and 50 years from now.

但真正让我们兴奋的——没有可比性——是找到一个我们想要购买的业务，这个业务适合伯克希尔，并且在未来 10 年、20 年和 50 年内为伯克希尔赚取利润。

That’s what we’re — that’s what we’ve been trying to build for 49 years.

这就是我们——这就是我们 49 年来一直在努力建立的。

And marketable securities have played a big part in that, because the profits that we’ve made from them have helped do that, and it’s a great place to deploy capital on an — you know, it’s easy to do there.

可交易证券在其中发挥了重要作用，因为我们从中获得的利润帮助实现了这一点，而且这是一个很好的资本部署的场所——你知道，在那里很容易做到。

But if you — what we’re really thinking about, at least Charlie and I — we’ve got Todd and Ted thinking about marketable securities — what we’re really thinking about is buying businesses. And that’s what it’ll continue to be.

但如果你——我们真正考虑的，至少查理和我——我们让托德和泰德考虑可交易证券——我们真正考虑的是收购企业。这将继续是我们的目标。

We’re in no hurry to sell any of those stocks you mentioned. (Laughs)

我们并不急于出售你提到的那些股票。（笑）

They — there probably would be other stocks — if we were going to go out to raise five or 10 billion from stocks, they would not be the names you mentioned.

他们——可能会有其他股票——如果我们要去筹集 50 亿或 100 亿美元的股票，它们不会是你提到的那些名字。

31. Still reluctant to borrow despite cheap money

尽管资金便宜，仍然不愿意借款

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 8 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello Warren, Charlie. My name is Stefano Grasso (PH) and I come from Genova, Italy, all the way from there. It’s a pleasure to be here today with you.

观众成员：你好，沃伦，查理。我叫斯特法诺·格拉索（PH），来自意大利热那亚，特地从那里过来。今天能和你们在一起真是太高兴了。

I have a question about increasing leverage for Berkshire in this day. This question is really to trigger a discussion and to hear your thoughts on that.

我有一个关于在今天为伯克希尔增加杠杆的问题。这个问题实际上是为了引发讨论，听听你对此的看法。

And also, this question was triggered by the fact that following the acquisition of BNSF, few years ago, which was partially financed by Berkshire stock, shortly after, there was plenty of cash around.

而且，这个问题的产生是因为在几年前收购 BNSF 之后，部分由伯克希尔股票融资，市场上现金很充裕。

There could be different advantages for Berkshire to wisely increase leverage these days. Some generally true for all the companies. Some Berkshire specific.

如今，伯克希尔明智地增加杠杆可能会有不同的优势。有些是对所有公司普遍适用的，有些则是伯克希尔特有的。

And the Berkshire specific, most important one for me as a shareholder, is that the investment decision made to invest the funds would be made by the present team, you and the other managers.

而对于伯克希尔来说，对我作为股东而言最重要的一点是，投资资金的决策将由现在的团队，包括你和其他经理来做出。

Question is then, why not go out and ask for several billions in bonds with a long maturity, and maybe even with some earlier endorsement or callable options embedded at Berkshire discretion, and good — and make a good use of it? Thank you.

问题是，为什么不出去申请几百亿的长期债券，甚至可能在伯克希尔的自由裁量下嵌入一些提前担保或可赎回的选项，并好好利用它呢？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what you say makes great sense.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你说的很有道理。

And it’s the kind of thing Charlie and I used — I think if you’d asked Charlie and me 40 years ago, that if we were looking at the present set of interest rates and we had some wonderful businesses that were making a lot of money, whether we would have gone out and borrowed a whole lot of money for the long term. We would’ve said yes, right, Charlie?

这正是查理和我曾经使用的方式——我想如果你在 40 年前问查理和我，如果我们看到现在的利率水平，并且我们有一些盈利丰厚的优秀企业，我们是否会出去借一大笔长期贷款，我们会说是的，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Wouldn’t have been a hard decision.

查理·芒格：这不会是一个困难的决定。

WARREN BUFFETT: But, we’ve got several reasons. We — A, we do have a good way of generating funds other than through equity: through float. And we’ve done that to the tune of 77 billion.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是，我们有几个理由。我们——首先，我们确实有一种通过浮存金而非股权生成资金的好方法。我们已经做到这一点，金额达到 770 亿。

And we don’t like the idea of operating a very conservatively-leveraged company, and then changing courses so that the people who bought bonds that were rated double-A, sort of find themselves with much lower rated bonds of the sort.

我们不喜欢以非常保守的杠杆运营公司，然后改变方向，让那些购买了双 A 评级债券的人发现自己手中持有的债券评级大幅下降。

We don’t have any problem leveraging up the utility or the railroad. They deserve to have even a lot more debt than they do, but we keep it sort of in line with what the rating agencies think should be conventional ratios.

我们在利用公用事业或铁路方面没有任何问题。他们应该承担比现在更多的债务，但我们仍然保持与评级机构认为的常规比率相符。

But they’re — if you look — if you analytically look at them — both of them could withstand a fair amount more debt.

但如果你仔细观察——如果你分析地看它们——它们两个都可以承受更多的债务。

At the parent level, we — you know, looking back on the BNSF deal, we borrowed some money that time and we used some equity.

在母公司层面，我们——你知道，回顾 BNSF 交易，我们那时借了一些钱，并使用了一些股权。

I think using equity helped us make the deal. But it was, you know, it was not a smart thing to do, basically.

我认为使用股权帮助我们达成了交易。但你知道，这基本上不是一个明智的做法。

I should — and I could’ve always gone to the market and repurchased a bunch of stocks subsequently, and that’s probably what I should’ve done on that.

我应该——而且我本可以去市场重新购买一堆股票，这可能是我当时应该做的。

So I understand your point. I completely — you know, another 30 or 40 billion of debt at Berkshire would be nothing and it would cost very little.

所以我理解你的观点。我完全同意——在伯克希尔再增加 300 亿或 400 亿的债务也没什么，成本也很低。

We don’t actually have great places to put it now, as evidenced by the fact that we’ve got 25 billion or so of excess cash.

我们现在实际上没有很好的地方来放置这些资金，这从我们大约有 250 亿美元的多余现金这一事实可以看出。

We’d be — we are reluctant to leverage it up a lot at the parent now, since we have these other sources of money that are really pretty attractive.

我们现在不太愿意在母公司大幅度杠杆化，因为我们还有其他来源的资金，这些资金实际上非常有吸引力。

We are selling what we call structured settlements, for example, that have a very long duration. And they actually have an interest cost to us of less than if we were to sell bonds.

例如，我们正在出售一些结构化的产品，这些产品的持续时间非常长。它们的利息成本实际上低于我们发行债券的成本。

So we are doing certain things that are along the lines you urge, but not nearly as aggressively as you urge.

所以我们正在做一些符合您所提议的方向的事情，但远没有您所要求的那么积极。

And you probably are right. And you’re certainly right if we saw a $50 billion deal and we passed on it for some reason because we were unwilling to take on some debt.

你可能是对的。如果我们看到一个 500 亿美元的交易，而因为不愿承担一些债务而放弃了它，那么你肯定是对的。

If we see a really good $50 billion deal, we’ll figure out a way to do it.

如果我们看到一个真正好的 500 亿美元的交易，我们会想办法去做。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we’d welcome it. We’re — even though what you suggest is intelligent, we’re probably not going to do it in advance.

查理·芒格：我认为我们会欢迎它。尽管你所建议的很聪明，但我们可能不会提前这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: You caught the last two words there.

沃伦·巴菲特：你听到了最后两个词。

32. Climate change threat doesn’t affect investment decisions

气候变化威胁不会影响投资决策

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew. 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Question comes from Rory Holscher in Galena, Illinois. This question is about Berkshire’s investments in climate change.

安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金：问题来自伊利诺伊州加利纳的罗瑞·霍尔舍尔。这个问题是关于伯克希尔在气候变化方面的投资。

“On one hand, Berkshire’s utilities have large commitments to wind and solar power. Berkshire also has an investment in BYD, an innovative transportation company that may be comparable in some ways to Tesla.

“在一方面，伯克希尔的公用事业对风能和太阳能有很大的承诺。伯克希尔还投资了比亚迪，这是一家创新的交通公司，在某些方面可能与特斯拉相当。”

“On the other hand, Burlington Northern hauls a lot of coal. You point out in the 2013 annual report that its profits could shrink if coal burning was curtailed.

另一方面，伯灵顿北方运输公司运输了大量煤炭。您在 2013 年年报中指出，如果减少煤炭燃烧，其利润可能会缩水。

And then there’s the reinsurance business.

然后就是再保险业务。

How do these and other Berkshire investments align with your understanding of the risks and opportunities posed by climate change? How should we think about this as investors?”

这些以及其他伯克希尔的投资如何与您对气候变化带来的风险和机遇的理解相一致？作为投资者，我们应该如何看待这一点？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that you’ve stated the facts on a whole bunch of businesses. And, I mean, if you own a railroad that’s carrying a lot of coal, it’ll carry a lot of coal for a long period. A very long period. But it’ll probably carry less at some point. I don’t think —I think that’s very likely, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为你已经陈述了很多企业的事实。我的意思是，如果你拥有一条运输大量煤炭的铁路，它会在很长一段时间内运输大量煤炭。非常长的一段时间。但在某个时刻，它可能会运输更少的煤炭。我认为——我认为这也是非常可能的。

But, I get all these questions from people who tell me they want me to fill out lots of forms and everything about how it’ll affect our insurance business. It doesn’t — it just doesn’t operate in that — in that time period.

但是，我收到很多来自人们的问题，他们告诉我想让我填写很多表格，以及这将如何影响我们的保险业务。其实并没有——它根本不在那个时间段内运作。

I mean, we are not making — when Ajit and I talk about what we’ll charge for catastrophe insurance, you know, whether it’s hurricanes in Florida, or whether it’s earthquakes in New Zealand, or whatever it may be, the year-to-year change in probabilities on that are, at least in our view, extremely low.

我的意思是，当阿吉特和我谈论我们将为灾难保险收取多少费用时，无论是佛罗里达的飓风，还是新西兰的地震，或者其他任何情况，我们认为每年的概率变化至少是非常低的。

I mean, it doesn’t come close to being anything that affects your prices in any material way in any given year.

我的意思是，这在任何一年都不会以任何实质性的方式影响你的价格。

And, you know, we will continue to develop alternative sources of energy. We’ll continue to use coal in our coal generation plants until the utility commissions under which we operate tell us that we should do something different. We have no choice about that.

我们将继续开发替代能源。我们会继续在我们的煤电厂使用煤炭，直到我们运营的公用事业委员会告诉我们应该做些不同的事情。我们对此没有选择。

We, incidentally, have no — I mean, we’re happy to carry the coal, but beyond that, we are a common carrier. I mean, we might love to turn away chlorine or ammonia or something like that because of the dangers in carrying it. And we can’t get compensated adequately for that.

我们顺便提一下，我们没有——我的意思是，我们乐意运输煤炭，但除此之外，我们是一个普通承运人。我的意思是，我们可能会因为运输氯或氨等物质的危险而拒绝运输。而且我们无法获得足够的补偿。

But we are a common carrier. So, we — by law, we’re required to carry the freight that is offered to us.

但我们是一个公共承运人。因此，按照法律，我们有义务运输提供给我们的货物。

So I — I don’t think in making an investment decision on Berkshire Hathaway, or most companies, virtually all of the companies I can think of, that climate change should be a factor in the decision- making process. Charlie?

所以我——我认为在做出对伯克希尔·哈撒韦或大多数公司，几乎所有我能想到的公司的投资决策时，气候变化不应该是决策过程中的一个因素。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think a lot of the people who think they know how climate change is going to change weather patterns and hurricanes are overclaiming. (Applause)

查理·芒格：是的，我认为很多认为自己知道气候变化将如何改变天气模式和飓风的人都在夸大其词。（掌声）

人工智能有可能部分影响飓风的预测。

We’re sort of agnostic. It isn’t that there isn’t some global warming, because there plainly is.

我们有点无神论。并不是说没有全球变暖，因为显然是有的。

But the people who think they know exactly what’s going to happen and how many people are going to die from tropical diseases and so forth are mostly talking through their hats.

但是那些认为自己确切知道将会发生什么以及有多少人会死于热带疾病等的人，大多数都是在胡说八道。

I think there’s a class of people who like the idea they’ve got a calamity to worry about. And —

我觉得有些人喜欢有一个灾难来担忧。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, but — and when you say it, I mean, just in terms of being an economic variable in making a decision, this —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，但——当你这么说时，我的意思是，就作为一个经济变量在做决策时，这——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. We’re not saying, “How can we structure our whole investment program to take into account what we think we know about climate change?”

查理·芒格：不。我们并不是在说，“我们如何构建整个投资计划，以考虑我们对气候变化的理解？”

But I think we’re very well located long term, no matter what happens.

但我认为我们长期来看处于非常有利的位置，无论发生什么情况。

I think that transmission lines and more or — we’re going to have to produce a lot more electricity directly from the sun or indirectly through things like wind. And, we’re beautifully positioned.

我认为，电力传输线路和类似的东西，我们将不得不更多地直接从太阳或风能中生产电力。我们在这方面处于一个很好的位置。

It’s just like GEICO made a lot of money when the internet came along, that they didn’t really plan on, I think we’ll make a lot of money as more and more electricity is produced more directly from the sun.

就像 GEICO 在互联网出现时赚了很多钱一样，他们并没有真正计划到这一点，我认为随着越来越多的电力直接来自太阳，我们也会赚很多钱。

So I think we’re in a very good shape. But I don’t think we deserve any great credit for it. We just stumbled into it.

所以我认为我们处于一个非常好的状态。但我不认为我们应该为此获得任何伟大的赞誉。我们只是偶然得到了它。

33. Praise for portfolio managers Todd Combs and Ted Weschler

对投资组合经理托德·科姆斯和特德·韦施勒的赞扬

WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg? 沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Since Berkshire started to transfer some of the responsibility for the company’s investment portfolio over to Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, the two men have gone from managing around $3 billion each in early 2012, to managing more than $7 billion each earlier this year.

格雷格·沃伦：自从伯克希尔开始将公司投资组合的一部分责任转移给托德·科姆斯和特德·韦施勒以来，这两人从 2012 年初各自管理约 30 亿美元，增长到今年早些时候各自管理超过 70 亿美元。

That said, this still represents less than 10 percent of the equity portion of your investment portfolio, with big legacy positions in Wells Fargo, Coca-Cola, American Express, IBM and Proctor & Gamble, overshadowing the rest of the holdings.

这仍然代表您投资组合中股权部分的不到 10%，而在富国银行、可口可乐、美国运通、IBM 和宝洁等大额传统持仓的影响下，其他持仓显得微不足道。

Can you give us an update on how much money each of your lieutenants is now running and how much you see that growing into over the next five years?

你能给我们更新一下你每个副手现在管理了多少钱，以及你预计在未来五年内会增长到多少吗？

And given that both men have seemingly been involved in things beyond their roles as portfolio managers the last couple of years, how much do you expect their roles to expand over time?

考虑到这两位男性在过去几年中似乎参与了超出他们作为投资组合经理角色的事务，您预计他们的角色会随着时间的推移扩展多少？

And on a completely separate note, at what point can we expect to see Todd and Ted join you and Charlie up there on stage to talk about their efforts managing Berkshire’s investment portfolio?

另外，您能告诉我们，Todd 和 Ted 何时会和您以及 Charlie 一起上台，谈论他们管理伯克希尔投资组合的努力吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I got through college answering fewer questions than that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我上大学时回答的问题还没有那么多呢。（笑声）

They are managing about —it’s a little over 7 billion now. We will change that periodically and it will always be upward. But we don’t change it month by month.

他们管理的金额大约是——现在稍微超过 70 亿。我们会定期更改这个数字，并且它总是向上调整。但我们不会每个月都更改。

I mean, their portfolios may change in value month by month. But they will be handling more money in the future than they are now.

我的意思是，他们的投资组合可能会每月变化。但他们将来处理的钱会比现在多。

I think, to some extent, they, as well as I — you know, I’ve had the unpleasant experience of handling more and more money as the years go by — they are seeing that it does get a little more difficult as the sums get larger.

我认为，在某种程度上，他们和我一样，处理越来越多的钱会变得更困难。

But it’s still far better to keep moving money over to them and away from me as time passes. And that’ll continue to be the case.

但随着时间的推移，把钱转移到他们那里而不是留在我这里仍然是更好的选择。这种情况将继续存在。

They’re both terrific additions to Berkshire, beyond their investment skills in that they know — they each know — a whole lot about business. They know a whole lot about management.

他们都是伯克希尔的绝佳补充，除了他们的投资技能外，他们还知道——他们各自都知道——很多关于商业的知识。他们对管理也了解很多。

And there are a lot of things that come across the desk at Berkshire that I get an idea on, but I just don’t feel like carrying out myself, because they might involve a lot of time, particularly if they get involved in negotiating small points and that sort of thing.

在伯克希尔，有很多事情摆在我的桌子上，我会有一些想法，但我就是不想自己去执行，因为这些事情可能会涉及很多时间，特别是如果需要谈判一些小细节之类的。

So Ted and Todd have both, as I mentioned in the report, been very helpful in doing things beyond their investment management duties that have added a significant value to Berkshire. And I think it’s a cinch that that will continue.

所以，正如我在报告中提到的，泰德和托德在投资管理职责之外做了很多事情，这对伯克希尔增添了显著的价值。我认为这将继续下去是毫无疑问的。

They want to do it. They enjoy doing it. They don’t ask for extra compensation, at all, because they do it.

他们想这样做。他们喜欢这样做。他们根本不要求额外的报酬，因为他们愿意这样做。

They’re 100 percent attuned to Berkshire. They know how I think. And if I tell them, you know, “Here’s a deal that I think makes sense if you can get it done,” they’ll know why it makes sense, and they’ll know how to get it done, and they’ll spend the time to do it.

他们百分之百地与伯克希尔保持一致。他们知道我的想法。如果我告诉他们，“这是一个我认为有意义的交易，如果你们能完成的话”，他们会知道为什么这有意义，他们也知道如何去完成，并且会花时间去做。

So it’s been a big, big plus for Berkshire to bring them onboard. And they’ll be more important factors as the years go by. OK.

所以，伯克希尔能够将他们纳入团队是一个很大的好处。随着时间的推移，他们将变得更加重要。好的。

Charlie? I’m sorry, I’m —

查理？对不起，我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: How’s that?

查理·芒格：怎么样？

34. Praise for Federal Reserve and Chairman Ben Bernanke

对美联储和主席本·伯南克的赞扬

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Charlie. My name is Jason. I’m from Toronto and my question relates to the general financial markets.

观众成员：早上好，沃伦和查理。我叫杰森，来自多伦多，我的问题与一般金融市场有关。

We’ve been in an environment of virtually zero interest rates now for many years. In recent times, prolonged periods of low rates have led to asset bubbles, such as the housing bubble and, potentially, now a bond bubble.

我们已经处于几乎零利率的环境中很多年了。最近，长期的低利率导致了资产泡沫，例如房地产泡沫，以及现在可能出现的债券泡沫。

If you were running the Fed, what would be your policy with respect to interest rates? Do you see a need for a hike? And what would be your time horizon for such a change? Thank you.

如果你在美联储任职，你对利率的政策会是什么？你认为有必要加息吗？你对这种变化的时间预期是什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, since it’s — you’re right about the — who would’ve guessed five years ago that you’d have had rates this low for this long?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，既然如此——你说得对——谁能想到五年前你会有这么低的利率持续这么久呢？

You’re — I would say that I’m surprised at, really, how well things are going.

我真的很惊讶事情进展得如此顺利。

I don’t think I would be doing much differently. And I particularly say that because it’s worked so well so far. So I would like to say that I would’ve done exactly the same thing and take credit for it.

我认为我不会做太多不同的事情。我特别这样说是因为到目前为止效果很好。所以我想说我会做完全相同的事情，并为此感到自豪。

I’ve been surprised at how well this worked. But as I said last year, this is really an interesting movie because we haven’t seen it before. And what makes it interesting is also we don’t know how it ends. But, I think Ben Bernanke was a hero, both at the time of the crash — or the panic — and subsequently.

我对这个效果感到惊讶。但正如我去年所说，这部电影真的很有趣，因为我们以前没有见过。而使它有趣的是我们不知道它的结局。不过，我认为本·伯南克在崩溃——或恐慌——以及随后的时期都是一个英雄。

I think he’s a very smart man. I think he handled things very well.

我认为他是一个非常聪明的人。我认为他处理事情非常好。

What was interesting to me was when the minutes of the Fed from the period in 2007 and 2008 came out, it was interesting to me how a number of the members of the Fed were not getting it, as to what was happening.

让我感兴趣的是，当 2007 年和 2008 年期间美联储的会议纪要公布时，我发现美联储的一些成员并没有理解当时发生的事情。

That was really fascinating. It wasn’t — there were a lot of them that didn’t really understand, it seems that way, or some of them that didn’t understand just how serious things were.

这真的很吸引人。似乎有很多人并不真正理解，或者有些人并不知道事情有多严重。

And so I give particular credit to Bernanke, considering the fact that he was really not getting a cons — certainly not a unanimous view from those surrounding him, that the kind of actions he knew were necessary, were really necessary.

因此，我特别要赞扬伯南克，考虑到他周围的人并没有给出一致的看法，他所知道的必要行动实际上是非常必要的。

And yet, he went ahead with them. And in my opinion, did a masterful job. And from everything I’ve seen of Janet Yellen, I feel the same way about her.

然而，他还是和他们一起进行了。在我看来，他做得非常出色。从我所见到的珍妮特·耶伦的一切，我对她也有同样的感觉。

We will see how this movie plays out. You know, I do not know the answer as to what happens if you keep rates close to zero for a very, very long time. And keep absorbing more and more of the debt issuance of the country because so far, we’ve tapered, but we’re still buying.

我们将看看这部电影的发展。你知道，我不知道如果你将利率保持在接近零的水平很长时间会发生什么。而且继续吸收国家越来越多的债务发行，因为到目前为止，我们已经缩减了，但我们仍在购买。

I’d be interested to hear Charlie’s thoughts on it.

我很想听听查理对此的看法。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, nobody, for instance, in Japan would ever have anticipated that interest rates would go way down and stay down for 20 years.

查理·芒格：嗯，比如说，在日本，没有人会预料到利率会大幅下降并保持 20 年不变。

And nobody would’ve expected common stocks to decline by huge amounts and stay down for 20 years.

而且没有人会预料到普通股票会大幅下跌并持续 20 年。

So strange things have happened. And they’re very confusing to the economics profession.

奇怪的事情发生了。这让经济学界感到非常困惑。

In fact, if you’re not confused, you really probably don’t understand it very well.

事实上，如果你不感到困惑，你可能真的不太理解它。

And at Berkshire, what I noticed is there aren’t many long-term bonds being bought.

在伯克希尔，我注意到并没有购买很多长期债券。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We — well, you know, in 2008, I wrote an article saying, you know, that — everybody was saying cash is king. Well, cash may have been king if you used it, but cash was the dumbest damn thing you could possibly own, you know, if you weren’t going to use it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们——你知道，在 2008 年，我写了一篇文章说，大家都在说现金为王。好吧，如果你使用现金，它可能是王，但如果你不打算使用现金，那现金就是你能拥有的最愚蠢的东西。

And people cling to cash at — usually at the wrong times.

人们通常在错误的时机紧紧抓住现金。

But it is — a zero interest rate policy has had a huge effect, both in rejuvenating the economy and — and in terms of asset prices.

但确实如此——零利率政策对经济复苏和资产价格都产生了巨大影响。

It has not, in my view, produced a bubble. That doesn’t mean it can’t produce one. But this is not — this is not a bubble situation, at all, that we’re living in. But it’s an unusual situation that we’re living in.

在我看来，这并没有产生泡沫。这并不意味着它不能产生泡沫。但我们所处的情况根本不是泡沫情况。我们所处的情况是一个不寻常的情况。

Any further thoughts, Charlie?

查理，还有其他想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’m as confused as you are.

查理·芒格：不，我和你一样困惑。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh good. Good. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好。好。（笑声）

That’s why we get along so well.

这就是我们相处得如此融洽的原因。

35. How Berkshire benefits from being a conglomerate

伯克希尔如何从多元化经营中受益

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question concerns another uncertainty. It’s from Chris Gotcho (PH) of Gotcho Capital Management in New York City.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题涉及另一个不确定性。来自纽约市的戈乔资本管理公司的克里斯·戈乔（PH）。

“You’ve been looking for a credentialed bear to ask questions at this meeting. I’m not it. In fact, selling short on Berkshire would be quite silly.

“你一直在寻找一个有资质的专家在这次会议上提问。我不是那个人。事实上，做空伯克希尔是相当愚蠢的。”

“However, in the long term, Berkshire has a business model of owning over 70 non- financial, unrelated businesses — bricks and chocolate, for example — which is a model that has almost universally not worked well in the past 100 years of American business.

然而，从长远来看，伯克希尔拥有超过 70 家非金融、无关的企业——例如砖块和巧克力——这是一种在过去 100 年美国商业中几乎普遍不成功的商业模式。

“The model has worked well for you two, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, who are uniquely talented.

“这个模型对你们两位，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，运作得很好，你们都是独特的天才。”

“But the question is, the probabilities do not seem likely to be favorable that their successors will be able to have it continue to work nearly as well.”

“但问题是，似乎不太可能他们的继任者能够让它继续像现在这样有效。”

So that is my question.

所以这就是我的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Actually, the — it’s interesting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。实际上，这很有趣。

The model has worked well for America. I mean, if you look at all these disparate businesses in America, they’ve done extraordinarily well over time.

这个模型在美国运作良好。我的意思是，如果你看看美国所有这些不同的企业，它们随着时间的推移表现得非常出色。

So if you want to look at the Dow Jones average as one entity — now, it was a changing group of companies over a 100-year period — but, you know, any business unit that goes from 67 — or 66 — to 11,497 while paying you out a fair amount of money every year, actually is a model that’s worked pretty well. But it hasn’t been, of course, under one management.

所以如果你想把道琼斯平均指数看作一个整体——当然，在 100 年的时间里，它是一个不断变化的公司群体——但是，你知道，任何一个从 67（或 66）增长到 11,497 的商业单位，同时每年给你支付相当可观的收益，实际上都是一个运作得相当不错的模型。但当然，这并不是在一个管理层下进行的。

But owning a group of good businesses is not a terrible business plan. A good many of the conglomerates were put together to perform financial magic of one sort or another.

但拥有一组优秀的企业并不是一个糟糕的商业计划。许多企业集团的成立是为了实现某种金融魔法。

They were based upon — you know, if you go back to the Litton Industries and the Gulf and Westerns and just — you could name them by the hundreds. They were really put together — Ling-Temp — LTV, and — on the idea of serial issuance of stock, where you issued stock that was selling at 20 times earnings to buy businesses that were at ten times earnings.

它们的基础是——你知道，如果你回顾一下利顿工业公司和墨西哥湾与西方公司，实际上——你可以列举出数百个。它们实际上是组合在一起的——Ling-Temp——LTV，以及——基于连续发行股票的理念，即发行以 20 倍收益出售的股票来购买以 10 倍收益出售的企业。

And it was the idea that somehow you could fool people into continuously riding along on this chain letter scheme, without the primary thought being given to what you were actually building in the management.

而这个想法是，你可以以某种方式欺骗别人不断参与这个连锁信的计划，而不去考虑你实际上在管理中建立了什么。

I think our business plan makes nothing but great sense, to own a great group, a group of great businesses, diversified, outstanding managers, conservatively capitalized.

我认为我们的商业计划非常合理，拥有一个优秀的团队，一个多元化的优秀企业群体，出色的管理者，保守的资本结构。

And with one enormous advantage, which people don’t really understand. I mean, capitalism is about, in an important way, it’s about the allocation of capital. And we have a system at Berkshire where we can allocate capital without tax consequences.

而且有一个巨大的优势，人们并不真正理解。我的意思是，资本主义在一个重要的方面是关于资本的配置。我们在伯克希尔有一个系统，可以在没有税收后果的情况下配置资本。

So we can move businesses from See’s Candy, to generate surplus capital, to other areas. It doesn’t hurt See’s in the process, and we can move it, as the textbooks say, to places where capital can be usefully employed, like wind farms or whatever it may be.

所以我们可以将 See's Candy 的业务转移，以产生盈余资本，转向其他领域。这在过程中不会对 See's 造成伤害，我们可以将其转移，正如教科书所说，转移到资本可以有效利用的地方，比如风电场或其他地方。

So we are — you know — there’s nobody else really better situated to do that than Berkshire Hathaway, and it makes perfectly good sense.

所以我们——你知道——没有其他人比伯克希尔·哈撒韦更适合这样做，这完全是合情合理的。

But it has to be applied with business-like principles, rather than with stock promotion principles. And I would say a great many of the conglomerates have been — have had, as their underlying premise, stock promotion.

但它必须以商业原则而不是股票推广原则来应用。我想说，许多企业集团的基本前提是股票推广。

You know, you saw what happened with Tyco or — the serial acquirers were usually interested in issuing a lot of stock.

你知道，你看到了Tyco发生的事情，或者说，连续收购者通常对发行大量股票感兴趣。

I think if you had to look at one of the primary indicators of what sort of species you’re viewing, you would see whether somebody’s issuing — if they’re issuing stock continuously, one way or another, they’ve probably got a chain letter game going on. And that does come to a bad end.

我认为如果你必须查看一个主要指标来判断你正在观察的物种类型，你会看到某人是否在不断发行股票，无论以何种方式，他们可能正在进行一个连锁信游戏。这最终会以不好的结局告终。

I think our method of acquiring for cash, and acquiring good businesses, and building many, many sources of growing earning power, I think, is a terrific model.

我认为我们通过现金收购、收购优秀企业以及建立许多增长的盈利能力的方法是一个很棒的模式。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there’re a couple of differences between us and the people who are generally thought to have failed at a conglomerate model.

查理·芒格：我认为我们与那些通常被认为在综合企业模式中失败的人之间有几个区别。

One is we have an alternative when there’s nothing to buy in the way of companies. We’ve got more securities to buy in the insurance company portfolios. And that’s an option which most of the other conglomerates didn’t have.

一个是当没有公司可购买时，我们有一个替代方案。我们可以在保险公司的投资组合中购买更多证券。这是大多数其他综合企业没有的选择。

Number two, they were hell bent to buy something or other quite regularly. And we don’t feel any compulsion to buy. We’re willing to just sit until something makes sense.

第二，他们非常想定期购买某些东西。而我们并不感到购买的压力。我们愿意静静等待，直到有些事情变得合理。

We’re quite different. We’re a lot more like the Mellon brothers than we are like Gulf and Western. And the Mellon brothers did very, very well for what, 50, 60, 70 years.

我们非常不同。我们更像梅隆兄弟，而不是像海湾和西方。梅隆兄弟在过去的 50、60、70 年里做得非常好。

And they were willing to own minority interest, they were willing to grow companies, they were a lot like us.

他们愿意拥有少数股权，他们愿意发展公司，他们和我们很像。

And so I don’t think we’re a standard conglomerate. And I think we’re likely to continue to do very well, sort of like if the Mellon brothers had just kept young forever.

所以我认为我们不是一个标准的企业集团。我认为我们可能会继续表现得很好，就像梅隆兄弟永远保持年轻一样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Now you’re talking.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在你说得对。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

36. Praise for Forest River’s Pete Liegl

对Forest River的Pete Liegl的赞扬

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Forest River is one of Berkshire’s better performing acquisitions. Since Berkshire purchased it in 2005, its sales have grown considerably faster than those of its principle competitor, Thor. And I believe it has taken the number one spot at retail for recreational vehicles.

乔纳森·布兰特：森林河是伯克希尔表现较好的收购之一。自从伯克希尔在 2005 年收购它以来，它的销售增长速度远远超过了主要竞争对手索尔。我相信它已经在休闲车辆的零售市场上占据了第一的位置。

Can you explain what Forest River is doing differently from Thor? And tell us whether Forest River is accepting lower operating margins than Thor’s 7 percent to gain the share.

您能否解释一下Forest River与Thor在运营上有什么不同？Forest River是否接受了低于Thor 7% 的运营利润率来获得市场份额？

Does Forest River have any sustainable, structural advantages over Thor that will help it maintain its number one position?

森林河是否在可持续性和结构上有任何优势，可以帮助它保持第一的位置？

Also, with three companies now accounting for about 80 percent of the share in the RV market, are there greater barriers to entry than in the past, or can a feisty upstart like Forest River, in its day, still come out of nowhere and gain a lot of share?

此外，考虑到现在有三家公司占据了RV市场约80%的份额，这是否意味着进入市场的障碍比以前更大，还是说像Forest River这样充满干劲的新兴公司，仍然可以凭借自己的力量获得大量市场份额？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We bought a company called Forest River, run by a fellow named Pete Liegl, I’d say about ten years ago or so.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们大约十年前收购了一家公司，名为Forest River，由一位叫Pete Liegl的家伙经营。

And it’s interesting. Pete, who is not an MBA type at all, he’s a terrific guy, he built up a — (Laughter)

有趣的是，Pete并不是那种典型的MBA类型，他是一个非常出色的人，他把一个——（笑声）

That was not a statement, that was an observation. (Laughter)

那不是评价，那是观察。（笑声）

Pete built up a very successful, but much smaller, RV business. And he sold it to a private equity firm in the mid-1990s. And they promptly started telling him how to run it. And he, very shortly thereafter, told them to go to hell.

皮特建立了一个非常成功但规模较小的房车业务。他在 1990 年代中期将其出售给了一家私募股权公司。然后他们立即开始告诉他如何经营它。没过多久，他就告诉他们去死。

And, not very long after that, it went broke, which is not an unusual — I would’ve predicted that.

而且，不久之后，它破产了，这并不奇怪——我本来就会预测到这一点。

So Pete then bought it out of bankruptcy, and rebuilt it, and then came to see me about ten years ago.

所以皮特随后从破产中买下了它，并重建了它，然后大约十年前来找我。

And in one afternoon — we went to dinner that night. He brought his wife and his daughter. And we bought the business.

在一个下午——那天晚上我们去吃了晚餐。他带着他的妻子和女儿。我们买下了这家公司。

And he made me a couple of promises then. He’s very limited in his promises. I told him what I’d do. And we’ve lived happily ever after.

他当时给了我几个承诺。他的承诺非常有限。我告诉他我会怎么做。我们从此过上了幸福的生活。

I’ve never been to Forest River. It’s based in Elkhart, Indiana. I hope it’s there. I mean, maybe they’re just making up these figures — you know?

我从未去过森林河。它位于印第安纳州的埃尔克哈特。我希望它在那里。我的意思是，也许他们只是在编造这些数字——你知道吗？

I could see that. Some guy saying, “What figures shall we send Warren this month, you know, ha, ha, ha.” (Laughter)

我能看出来。有个家伙说：“这个月我们要给沃伦发送什么数字，你知道的，哈哈哈。”（笑声）

Pete does a terrific job of running the company. We made a deal at the time he came, on incentive comp and base comp. He’s never suggested a change, I’ve never suggested a change.

皮特在管理公司方面做得非常出色。我们在他来时达成了关于激励薪酬和基本薪酬的协议。他从未建议过改变，我也从未建议过改变。

He’s built the company to where it’ll do over — I think it’ll do over $4 billion of business this year.

他已经把公司发展到今年的业务额将超过——我认为将超过 40 亿美元。

I’ve probably had three or four phone calls with him in the whole time.

我和他在这段时间里可能通了三四次电话。

It’s his company. And he does a sensational job.

这是他的公司。他做得非常出色。

I don’t know about the Thor-Forest River situation in terms of how tough it is to go in to compete with him. I think it’d be tough to compete with Pete under any circumstances.

我不知道关于索尔-森林河的情况，去和他竞争有多困难。我认为在任何情况下与皮特竞争都很困难。

His IT department, for a $4 billion business, consists of six people. He just knows what’s going on in the place.

他的 IT 部门对于一个价值 40 亿美元的企业来说，仅由六个人组成。他只是知道这里发生了什么。

And the important thing is that it’s his company. I couldn’t run an RV company, and we don’t have anybody at headquarters that could run one.

重要的是这是他的公司。我无法经营一家房车公司，我们在总部也没有人能够经营。

It’s a tough business. And you do work on narrow margins, to get to your point on that, Jonny. The —it’s a business that runs with maybe 11 or 12 percent gross margins, and probably 5 to 6 percent of SG&A. So, you know, your margins are in that 6-or-so percent range.

这是一项艰难的生意。正如你所说，Jonny，你的利润空间很小。这个行业的毛利率大约在 11%或 12%左右，销售和管理费用大约占 5%到 6%。所以，你的利润大约在 6%左右。

We have a very good — both from his standpoint and from our standpoint — we worked out an incentive comp. Like I say, we worked it out that afternoon in Omaha when he came by.

我们有一个非常好的——从他的角度和我们的角度来看——我们制定了一个激励薪酬。就像我说的，我们在他来时的那个下午在奥马哈制定了这个方案。

And it’s worked for him. It’s worked for us. You know, it couldn’t be a better arrangement. I wish we had 20 like it.

这对他有效，对我们也有效。你知道，这真是一个完美的安排。我希望我们有 20 个这样的。

And probably, most of our shareholders don’t even know we own Forest River. But that is a company that will do 4 billion of business this year, and I’ll bet will do more business over time. It’s the leader in its industry. The industry’s not going to go away.

而且可能我们大多数股东甚至不知道我们拥有 Forest River。但这是一家今年将实现 40 亿美元业务的公司，我敢打赌随着时间的推移它的业务会更多。它是其行业的领导者。这个行业不会消失。

And, you know, maybe we can even sell a little insurance on RVs. So that’s the story on Forest River.

而且，你知道，也许我们甚至可以在房车上卖一点保险。这就是关于森林河的故事。

37. Modest impact of Bakken oil shale on Berkshire

Bakken页岩油对伯克希尔的影响有限

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 10 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren, Charlie. My name is Vishal Patel (PH). I’m visiting from Toronto, Canada, and my question is about the oil sands.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦，查理。我叫维沙尔·帕特尔（PH）。我来自加拿大多伦多，我的问题是关于页岩油的。

Can you please share with the audience your view on the oil sands industry and their impact on Berkshire Hathaway?

您能否与观众分享您对页岩油行业及其对伯克希尔哈撒韦影响的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in terms of —are you thinking of the oil sands or are you thinking of shale production?

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，您是在考虑页岩油还是在考虑页岩油生产？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m thinking oil sands, Alberta.

观众成员：我在想Alberta的页岩油。

WARREN BUFFETT: Alberta, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：Alberta，是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Keystone XL.

观众成员：基石 XL。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not a huge impact. We have a crane business at Marmon that does a lot of business in oil development, generally. But, certainly, is active in the oil sands.

沃伦·巴菲特：这并没有太大影响。我们在Marmon有一家起重机业务，通常在石油开发方面做了很多生意。但当然，在页岩油方面也很活跃。

We will soon have a transmission operation that will cover 85 percent of Alberta. Alberta’s a big place. It’ll have 8,000 miles, or something like that, of transmission lines, for example.

我们很快将有一个覆盖阿尔伯塔省 85%的输电系统。阿尔伯塔省很大。例如，它将有大约 8000 英里的输电线路。

But the oil sands business is — I mean, you know, oil sands are huge. And we own some Exxon Mobil, when they’ve got an operation in the oil sands, obviously.

但页岩油业务是——我的意思是，你知道，页岩油是巨大的。我们拥有一些埃克森美孚的股票，他们在页岩油领域有业务，显然。

One thing you might find kind of interesting, you know, we are moving 700,000 barrels a day of crude oil on our railroad. We’ve got — probably got — maybe, nine unit trains — now [BNSF Executive Chairman] Matt [Rose] can correct me on that — you know, that carry 100 cars or so.

有一件你可能会觉得有趣的事情，我们的铁路每天运输 70 万桶原油。我们大概有九列单元列车——现在[BNSF 执行董事长]马特可以纠正我——你知道，运载大约 100 节车厢。

And each one has 650 barrels, or so, of oil so that — oil, you may find interesting, not only is there a significant advantage in terms of the flexibility of where you take it, so that spreads are different in different places, and you can move it to refineries that you might otherwise have trouble moving it to. Rail’s flexible that way.

每节车厢大约装有650桶油。所以，油，你可能会发现有趣的是，铁路在移动油方面不仅在灵活性上有显著优势，这样可以把油运送到不同的炼油厂，即使平时难以到达的地方，铁路的灵活性很大。

But rail, actually, you know — mentally, you think of oil gushing through pipelines. But rail is probably, I would say, close to twice as fast in moving oil as is — as are pipelines.

但实际上，铁路运输，你知道——在心理上，你会想到石油在管道中涌动。但我认为铁路运输石油的速度可能接近管道的两倍。

But we recently bought a company from Phillips 66. We got it in an exchange for our Phillips stock. We bought a specialty chemicals company.

但我们最近从Phillips 66 收购了一家公司。我们用我们的菲利普斯股票进行了交换。我们购买了一家特种化学公司。

And its main product is a chemical additive that causes oil to move through pipelines about 10 percent faster than it would otherwise. So it may take a day off of a trip.

其主要产品是一种化学添加剂，可以使石油在管道中流动的速度比正常情况下快约 10%。因此，它可能会缩短一天的运输时间。

So we’re actually in the pipeline business in a small way — the crude pipeline business — in a small way, through that.

所以我们实际上在小规模上涉足管道业务——原油管道业务——通过这种方式。

I don’t think — I think the oil sands are an important asset for mankind, obviously. There’s a huge amount of oil there. They’re an important asset for mankind, you know, in — over the centuries to come.

我认为——我认为页岩油对人类来说是一个重要的资产，显然。那里有大量的石油。它们是人类的重要资产，你知道，在未来的几个世纪里。

But I don’t think there’s — I don’t think it will dramatically change anything at Berkshire.

但我认为这不会——我认为这不会对伯克希尔产生重大变化。

Matt might have a different view on that. I’ll ask Charlie to talk. And then if Matt would like to say anything, I’d be glad to hear from him, too.

马特可能对此有不同的看法。我会让查理来谈谈。如果马特想说些什么，我也很乐意听听他的意见。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but, a lot of the oil sand production uses natural gas to produce the heavy oil.

查理·芒格：好吧，但很多页岩油生产使用天然气来生产重油。

So it’s a very peculiar thing. It’s economic only if oil stays at a very high price, and it’s delightfully economic only if natural gas is too cheap.

这是一件非常奇特的事情。只有当石油价格保持在非常高的水平时，它才具有经济性；而只有当天然气价格过低时，它才令人愉悦地具有经济性。

So it’s a very peculiar business. And it is good for mankind. But whether it’s a great investment or not, I haven’t the faintest idea.

这是一项非常特殊的业务。它对人类是有益的。但我对它是否是一个伟大的投资毫无头绪。

WARREN BUFFETT: Matt, would you — do you have anything to add on the crude situation there?

沃伦·巴菲特：马特，你有什么想补充的关于那里的原油情况吗？

38. Update on Buffett’s hedge fund bet

关于巴菲特对对冲基金的押注更新

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’re at noon.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们在中午。

I promised a group — some people — six years ago I made a bet for charity on how a index — Standard and Poor’s 500 index fund — would compare in performance to a group of hedge funds. And a firm in New York took me up on the bet.

我六年前向一群人承诺，我打了一个关于慈善的赌，赌的是标准普尔 500 指数基金的表现与一组对冲基金的比较。纽约的一家公司接受了我的赌注。

And I promised that every year I would give the up-to-date results on how we’re doing. And it’s getting to be more fun to give these results every year. (Laughter)

我承诺每年都会提供我们进展的最新结果。每年分享这些结果变得越来越有趣了。（笑声）

We’re now six years into the bet. And it’s interesting, because the people who selected these funds are very decent people and smart people. And, obviously, the fund of funds gets paid based on the per — they get paid a fee, naturally.

我们现在已经进入了赌注的第六年。这很有意思，因为选择这些基金的人都是非常正派且聪明的人。显然，这些基金中的基金经理按表现收取额外的费用。

But they also get paid an additional performance fee based on how the hedge funds they select do. So they have every economic incentive to come up with a wonderful group of hedge funds.

但他们还会根据所选对冲基金的表现获得额外的业绩费用。因此，他们有充分的经济动力来挑选出一组优秀的对冲基金。

And underneath these fund — five funds of funds that are involved in the bet — there are probably, at least, 200 hedge funds that the fund of fund managers have carefully picked in order to enhance their own income. They got the ultimate motivation going for them.

在这些基金之下——涉及这一赌注的五个基金——可能至少有 200 个对冲基金，这些基金的基金经理经过精心挑选，以增强他们自己的收入。他们有着最终的动力。

So we are now five years — six years — into the bet. And the first year, the fund of fund groups, in a down market, did considerably better than the S&P.

所以我们现在已经进入这个赌注五年——六年——了。在第一年，基金中的基金组在下行市场中表现明显优于标准普尔指数。

But as you can see in the five years subsequently, the S&P has been running away, to some degree.

但正如你所看到的，在接下来的五年里，标准普尔在某种程度上一直在飙升。

Interestingly enough, we bought — we each put in 350, or something, thousand dollars, and we bought zero-coupon bonds so there would be a million dollars in ten years.

有趣的是，我们每人投入了大约 35 万美元，购买了零息债券，这样十年后就会有一百万美元。

We bought ten-year Treasurys, zero coupon. And we bought a million dollars principal. We each put up 350.

我们买了十年期的国债，零息。我们买了一百万美元的本金。我们每人投入了35万美元。

Well, the way interest rates changed after a few years to practically zero rates, it meant the bonds, even though they had no coupons attached to them, practically went to par.

好吧，几年来利率几乎降到零的变化意味着这些债券，即使没有附带息票，几乎都回到了面值。

So, a year or two ago, we sold the bonds at about 95 or 6, we got almost the full million dollars. We put that all in Berkshire stock. I guaranteed them that they would have a million dollars at the end of ten years, no matter what happened.

所以，一两年前，我们以大约 95 或 96 的价格出售了债券，几乎得到了全部的百万美元。我们把这些钱全部投入了伯克希尔的股票。我向他们保证，无论发生什么，他们在十年后都会有一百万美元。

And so the prize looks like it’s going to be quite a bit more than a million dollars when the ten years comes around, so. So, so far, everyone’s happy.

因此，奖金额在十年到来时看起来会超过一百万美元。所以，到目前为止，大家都很高兴。

Afternoon session 下午会议

39. Record attendance

记录出勤

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s get ready to proceed.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，准备开始吧。

We never get any precise figures, because people come and go from the meeting. But I did know that we sent out about 11,000 more tickets this year than in any other year, and we had all the overflow rooms filled. We’re using space in a room over at the Hilton and everything, so clearly this year we have substantial more attendance than any year in the past, and I hope the spending patterns reflect that. (Laughter)

我们从来没有得到任何确切的数字，因为人们进进出出会议。但我知道，今年我们发出的票比往年多了大约 11,000 张，而且所有的分会场都满了。我们还在希尔顿的一个房间里使用空间，所以显然今年的出席人数比以往任何一年都要多，我希望消费模式能反映这一点。（笑声）

40. Risk of change to businesses

业务变革的风险

WARREN BUFFETT: So with that, we’ll go to Becky. Assuming she’s here.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，接下来我们请贝基。假设她在这里。

BECKY QUICK: I am, I’m here.

贝基·奎克：我在，我在这里。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

BECKY QUICK: Let’s see, this is a question that comes, and I hope I pronounce your name correctly, Michael.

贝基·奎克：让我看看，这是一个问题，我希望我能正确地发音你的名字，迈克尔。

It’s Michael — Michael Locheck (PH) and he says, “Energy Future Holdings’ likely bankruptcy is a consequence of unexpected and dramatic decline in prices of natural gas prices caused by a revolution in drilling technology. To what extent do you believe other assets held in Berkshire’s portfolio, debt, equity, et cetera, may be subject to disruptive technological or other changes that erode business models and barriers to entry?”

“Michael Locheck（PH）说，‘能源未来控股公司（Energy Future Holdings）即将破产是由于意想不到的天然气价格剧烈下跌，而这种下跌是由钻探技术的革命引起的。您认为其他在伯克希尔投资组合中的资产（债务、股票等）在多大程度上可能受到颠覆性技术或其他变化的影响，从而侵蚀商业模式和进入壁垒？

“For example, changes in consumer behavior and regulation could affect Coca-Cola. Revolution in payment systems could affect American Express, ever-increasing rate of change in technology and competitive landscape could affect IBM, wireless delivery of media content and urbanization could be disruptive to DirecTV.

例如，消费者行为和监管的变化可能会影响可口可乐。支付系统的革命可能会影响美国运通，技术和竞争环境的不断变化可能会影响 IBM，无线媒体内容的传输和城市化可能会对 DirecTV 造成干扰。

“Could you also comment on whether participation of some sponsors of Energy Future Holdings, which include the very best of private equity, contributed to your decision to invest? Was it the degree of crowd mentality at play, and what lessons are to be learned from the experience?”

您能否评论一下，参与Energy Future Holdings的某些投资者，包括一些顶尖的私募股权公司，是否对您决定投资该公司有所贡献？在这其中是否存在某种从众心理？从这次经历中可以学到哪些教训？’

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. I would be unwilling to share the credit for my decision to invest in Energy Future Holdings with anybody else. I would think that’s very unfair of anyone to insinuate that they had anything to do with that decision.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我不愿意将我对能源未来控股公司的投资决定归属于任何其他人。我认为这样暗示别人对这个决定有影响是不公平的。

That was just a mistake on my part. It was a big — it was a significant mistake, and we will make mistakes in the future.

那是我个人的错误。这个错误是相当重大的，未来我们还会犯错误。

All businesses should constantly be thinking about what can mess up their business model. And with Energy Future Holdings it was a fairly simple assumption that was made that just turned out to be wrong.

所有企业都应该不断思考什么可能会破坏他们的商业模式。而在 Energy Future Holdings，做出的一个相当简单的假设结果证明是错误的。

I mean, the assumption there was that gas prices would stay roughly as high as they were or go higher, and instead they went a whole lot lower.

我的意思是，假设是油价会保持在大致相同的高位或更高，而实际上它们却大幅下降。

And at that point the whole place toppled. They had a lot of reserve holdings and they had some futures positions which kept them alive for a while. But that was a basic error.

在这一点上，整个公司都崩溃了。他们拥有大量的储备和一些期货头寸，暂时维持了生存，但这是一个基本错误。

We look at all of our businesses as subject to change. A classic case would be GEICO. I mean, GEICO set out in 1936 to operate at low costs and pass on those low costs to the customer through lower prices for something that was a necessity, auto insurance.

我们对所有业务都要保持对变化的关注。GEICO就是一个经典案例。GEICO成立于1936年，旨在以低成本运营，并通过降低价格向客户传递这些低成本，提供一种必需品，即汽车保险。

And they originally did it by mail offerings, U.S. Postal Service, two people who were government employees. That’s where the name comes from, GEICO, Government Employees Insurance Company.

最初他们主要通过邮寄方式向政府雇员提供服务。GEICO这个名字正是来源于此。

And they had to adapt over the years, and they adapted first to widening classifications. But they went from the U.S. mail, primarily, to the telephone, and later went to the internet, and onto social media.

他们多年来不得不适应，首先适应了不断扩大的分类。但他们主要从美国邮政转向电话，后来又转向互联网，最终进入社交媒体。

But in there they stumbled one time, too, as they went to adapt, and they — when they left the government employees classification, at one point they became too aggressive about expanding and they almost — they really did go broke.

但在那里面，他们也曾经跌倒过一次，当他们去适应时，他们——当他们离开政府雇员分类时，有一段时间他们变得过于激进地扩张，差点——他们真的破产了。

So there’s — change is going on all the time, and it’s going on with all of our businesses. And we want managers that are thinking about change, and what can — what’s going to be needed for their business model in the future. And we know they’re not going look the same five or ten years from now.

所以变化一直在发生，并且在我们所有的业务中都在进行。我们希望管理者能够考虑变化，以及未来他们的商业模式需要什么。我们知道，五年或十年后，它们不会看起来一样。

I mean, BNSF, something as basic as railroads, is looking big at LNG for its locomotives. Everything is going to change.

例如，BNSF，作为一家基础的铁路公司，正在积极考虑在机车上使用液化天然气（LNG）。所有这一切都会改变。

Our businesses generally deal from strength and they’re generally not subject to rapid change. But they’re all subject to change, and of course, slow change can be much harder to perceive, and can lull you to sleep easier, sometimes than when rapid change is clearly in sight.

我们的业务通常以实力为基础，通常不容易发生快速变化。但它们都可能发生变化，当然，缓慢的变化往往更难察觉，有时比快速变化更容易让你放松警惕。

So I would say, in answer to that question, A) I will make mistakes in the future. I mean, when you — that’s guaranteed.

所以我会说，作为对那个问题的回答，A) 我将来会犯错误。我的意思是，当你——这是可以保证的。

We do not make anything like “bet the company” decisions that will ever cause us real anguish. That just doesn’t happen at Berkshire. But you’re not going to make a lot of decisions without making some significant mistakes.

我们不会做出任何类似“孤注一掷”的决策，这会让我们感到真正的痛苦。这在伯克希尔是不会发生的。但你不可能在做出许多决策的同时不犯一些重大错误。

And occasionally they work out very well. Charlie and I, and Sandy Gottesman, in 1966, bought a department store in Baltimore. Now, there’s probably nothing dumber than buying a department store in the mid-1960s. There were four department stores on the corner of Howard and Lexington Street in Baltimore in 1966, and none of them are there. And the number one store, Hutzler’s, went broke a little later than our store went broke.

有时它们的结果非常好。1966 年，查理、我和桑迪·戈特斯曼在巴尔的摩买了一家百货商店。现在，可能没有比在 1960 年代中期买百货商店更愚蠢的事情了。1966 年，巴尔的摩霍华德街和列克星敦街的拐角处有四家百货商店，而现在它们都不在了。而第一家店，哈茨勒百货，破产的时间比我们的店稍晚一些。

But fortunately Sandy did a great job of selling it, so the $6 million invested in that department store became worth about $45 billion in Berkshire Hathaway stock as we did other things with the money as we went along.

但幸运的是，桑迪在销售方面做得非常出色，因此投资于那家百货公司的 600 万美元变成了大约 450 亿美元的伯克希尔哈撒韦股票，因为我们在过程中对这笔钱进行了其他投资。

So you do have to be very alert to what is going on in your businesses, and we want our managers to do that. But actually, it’s something that Charlie and I, and our directors, are going to think about, as well as our managers. Charlie?

所以你确实需要对你们的业务中发生的事情保持高度警觉，我们希望我们的经理能够做到这一点。但实际上，这也是查理和我以及我们的董事们要考虑的事情，当然还有我们的经理。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I spoke earlier about the desirability of removing your ignorance piece by piece, and there’s another trick, which is scrambling out of your mistakes. And we’ve been quite good at both, and it’s enormously useful.

查理·芒格：是的，我之前谈到了逐步消除无知的必要性，还有另一个技巧，就是从错误中逃脱。我们在这两方面都做得很好，这非常有用。

Imagine Berkshire, a textile mill sure to go broke because power costs in New England were about twice as high as they were in TVA country, a sure-to-fail department store, and a trading stamp sure to be forced out of business by change in mode. Out of that comes Berkshire Hathaway. Talk about scrambling out of mistakes, I think of what we might have done if we’d had a better start. (Laughter)

想象一下伯克希尔，一家纺织厂肯定会破产，因为新英格兰的电力成本大约是田纳西谷地区的两倍，一家注定要失败的百货商店，以及一家肯定会因模式变化而被迫停业的交易印花。由此诞生了伯克希尔哈撒韦。谈到从错误中奋起，我想到了如果我们有一个更好的开端，我们可能会做些什么。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The point was driven home to me — my great-grandfather started a grocery store here in Omaha in 1869. And my grandfather was running it in 1929, and he wrote my uncle who was going to be running it with him.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这个观点让我深刻体会到——我的曾祖父在 1869 年在奥马哈开了一家杂货店。我的祖父在 1929 年经营这家店，他给我的叔叔写信，告诉他将和他一起经营这家店。

And the letter started out, this is in 1929, “The day of the chain store is over.” And that is why we ended up with one grocery store, which went out of business in 1969.

信的开头是这样的，这是在 1929 年，“连锁店的时代已经结束。”这就是为什么我们最后只剩下一个杂货店，它在 1969 年倒闭了。

It — you really have to face facts around you, and the wish being father to the thought was, unfortunately, what overcame my grandfather.

你真的必须面对周围的事实，而愿望是思想之父，这不幸地战胜了我的祖父。

41. Heinz earning power

Heinz的盈利能力

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：好的，杰伊？

JAY GELB: This question is on the Heinz transaction.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于Heinz交易的。

Berkshire’s 50 percent ownership in Heinz is included in Berkshire’s results, which can be meaningful to its earnings over time.

伯克希尔对Heinz的 50%股权被纳入伯克希尔的业绩中，这可能对其长期收益产生重要影响。

What is Heinz’s current normalized earning power, after the substantial restructuring of the business, and what do you anticipate Heinz could earn within a few years?

Heinz目前的正常化盈利能力是多少，在业务进行大规模重组之后，您预计Heinz在几年内能赚多少钱？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Heinz will be filing its own 10-Qs. In fact, I guess its first quarter would be — they went to a calendar year now — first quarter would be about due now. So you’ll get to see Heinz’s figures.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，Heinz将会提交自己的 10-Q 报告。实际上，我想它的第一季度——他们现在采用日历年——第一季度大约该到了。所以你将看到Heinz的数字。

And I will say this, that Heinz was actually a very reasonably run food company with about 15 percent pre-tax margins for many years, and that’s not an unusual operating margin in the food business.

我想说的是，Heinz实际上是一家运营相当合理的食品公司，多年来的税前利润率约为 15%，这在食品行业并不算异常的运营利润率。

And I would just invite you to look quarter by quarter and maybe next year, too, I think the margins of Heinz will be significantly improved from those historical figures. What Bernardo Hees and his associates have done there is — they’ve just restructured the business model.

我邀请你逐季度地观察，也许明年也是如此，我认为Heinz的利润率将显著改善，远超历史数据。贝尔纳多·希斯和他的团队所做的就是——他们重新构建了商业模式。

And I think that the brands, which are all-important, are as strong as ever. And I think the cost structure is going to be significantly improved without cutting into marketing expenditures.

我认为品牌是至关重要的，依然强大如昔。我认为成本结构将会显著改善，而不会削减市场营销支出。

So I think you’ll see a significant improvement, but I don’t want to name a number on that. You’ll find it out soon enough.

所以我认为你会看到显著的改善，但我不想给出一个具体的数字。你很快就会发现。

42. Buy companies or stock?

买公司还是股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 11。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Dev Contessaria (PH) and I’m a fund manager from Philadelphia.

观众成员：嗨，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫德夫·孔特萨里亚（PH），我是来自费城的基金经理。

You’ve touched on some of this already today, but I wanted to ask, if you could expand on how you think about comparing investment opportunity.

您今天已经触及了一些内容，但我想请您进一步阐述一下您如何比较投资机会。

In the past, you haven’t been afraid to make a single position a large portion of your portfolio, such as Coca-Cola.

在过去，你并不害怕将单一头寸占据你投资组合的很大一部分，比如可口可乐。

So when there is a chance to buy more of your favorite names, as in 2008 and early 2009, how did the case of buying more of companies like Coca-Cola or even a Moody’s, which had dropped from 75 to 15, as examples, compare with other things that you actually did?

过去，您并不害怕将单一头寸占据您投资组合的很大部分，比如可口可乐。所以，当有机会购买您最喜欢的股票时，比如在2008年和2009年初，您是如何将购买可口可乐或甚至穆迪（股价从75跌到15）的案例与其他实际采取的行动进行比较的？

Could Berkshire have achieved its historical returns with a more simple, concentrated portfolio of your favorite names with positive characteristics such as durable competitive advantage, pricing power, strong organic growth, et cetera, versus the larger, more complex collection of businesses which exist today? Thank you.

伯克希尔是否可以通过一个更简单、集中在您最喜欢的具备积极特征（如持久的竞争优势、定价权、强劲的有机增长等）的投资组合，实现其历史上的回报，而不是现在这样更大、更复杂的业务组合？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, depends which favorite name we might have hit harder back in the 2008 and 2009 period.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这要看我们在 2008 年和 2009 年期间可能更重视哪个最喜欢的名字。

In the first instance, I spent a considerable part of our cash reserves too early, looking back, too early in the 2009 panic. The bottom of that was reached early in March in 2009, and that bottom was quite a bit lower than September and October of 2008 when we spent 16 or so billion.

首先，回顾过去，我在2009年恐慌期间，实际上花费了相当一部分现金储备，回想起来，这是太早了。2009年3月初是底部，当时的底部价格远低于2008年9月和10月我们花费约160亿美元的时候。

Now, we were committed to finance Mars for 6.6 billion, and that commitment had been made many months earlier, so we didn’t really have much choice in terms of the timing of that.

当时我们确实承诺以66亿美元融资Mars，这项承诺几个月前就已经做出，所以在时间上我们并没有太多选择。

But we did fine on the expenditures we made during that period, but obviously we didn’t do as well, remotely as well, as if we’d kept all of the powder dry and then just spent it all at once at the bottom.

但我们在那段时间的支出上表现得很好，但显然我们没有做到那么好，远不如如果我们把所有的资金都保持干燥，然后在最低点一次性花掉。

But we’ve never really figured out how to do that, and we won’t figure out how to do that.

但我们从来没有真正弄明白如何做到这一点，而且我们也不会弄明白如何做到这一点。

So, the timing could have been improved dramatically. On the other hand, as late as the late fall of October of 2009, when the economy was still in the dumps, really in the dumps, you know, we were able to buy BNSF, which will be an enormous part of our future.

所以，时机本可以大大改善。另一方面，直到 2009 年 10 月的深秋，当经济仍然处于低谷时，我们能够收购 BNSF，这将是我们未来的重要组成部分。

So, overall we did reasonably well going through that period. But looking back, the most money would have been made just by buying a bundle of stocks.

总体来说，我们在那段时间表现得相当不错。但回头看，最赚钱的方式就是购买一揽子股票。

When we were buying Harley Davidson bonds at 15, looking back we should have been buying the stock. But that’ll always be the case.

当我们以 15%的价格购买哈雷·戴维森债券时，回想起来我们应该购买股票。但这总是如此。

买入债券和买入美国的说法有些不一致。

Overall, we would love the idea — what really we want to do at our present size and scope, and with the objectives we’ve got for our shareholders, is we want to buy big businesses with good management at reasonable prices and then try to build them over time.

总体而言，我们非常喜欢这个想法——我们目前的规模和范围，以及我们为股东设定的目标，实际上是希望以合理的价格收购管理良大的企业，然后努力在时间的推移中发展它们。

I mean, when we start 2014, we’ve got a really good group of businesses, some of them very big. Those businesses will earn more over time, and then the — what we’re trying to do is add onto them and make sure we don’t issue any shares in the process. So it’s not a complicated process.

我的意思是，当我们开始 2014 年时，我们有一组非常好的企业，其中一些非常大。这些企业会随着时间的推移赚更多的钱，然后我们要做的是在此基础上增加，并确保在这个过程中不发行任何股票。所以这不是一个复杂的过程。

And looking back we’ll always be able to do it better than we’ve done it. That’s just the nature of things. But I don’t — I feel the game is still a very viable one, and will be for some time. It won’t be forever, it can’t be forever. But it’s still got some juice left in it. Charlie?

回顾过去，我们总能做得比以前更好。这就是事物的本质。但我不——我觉得这个游戏仍然是一个非常可行的选择，并且在一段时间内会继续如此。它不会永远如此，也不可能永远如此。但它仍然有一些潜力。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s happened, of course, is the private businesses that we control have gotten to be a bigger and bigger percentage of the thing. For a great many of the early years we had more in common stocks than the total value of the company. And so we were — it was like a big portfolio of common stocks and a lot of businesses thrown in as extras.

查理·芒格：当然，发生的事情是我们控制的私人企业在其中所占的比例越来越大。在很多早期的年份，我们在普通股上的投资超过了公司的总价值。因此，我们就像是一个大型的普通股投资组合，里面还额外包含了很多企业。

And now, of course, the private companies are worth way more than the stocks. And, I would guess that that will continue, wouldn’t you Warren?

现在，当然，私营公司的价值远远超过股票。我想，这种情况会继续下去，你不觉得吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure, it’ll continue. And the difference is when we’re right about stocks, it shows up in market value and in net worth.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，这将继续下去。区别在于，当我们对股票做出正确的判断时，它会在市值和净资产中体现出来。

When we’re right about businesses, it shows up in future earning power, which you can see, but it doesn’t jump out at you the same way changes in stock values do. So it’s a different sort of buildup of value, and one is somewhat easier to see than the other.

当我们对企业的判断正确时，这会体现在未来的盈利能力上，你可以看到这一点，但它并不像股票价值的变化那样显而易见。因此，这是一种不同的价值积累方式，其中一种比另一种更容易被察觉。

But the other is more enduring and does not require going from flower to flower. And they’re both fine, but we’ve moved into phase two. Say that’s fair, Charlie?

但另一个更持久，不需要从花到花。它们都是好的，但我们已经进入第二阶段。这样说公平吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, if you’re just investing moderate amounts of capital in the middle of some panic, you take the bottom tick, it’s a very attractive price. But no significant volume of the shares could have been purchased at that price.

查理·芒格：是的，如果你在某种恐慌中只是投资适量的资本，你会在最低点买入，那是一个非常有吸引力的价格。但在那个价格上并没有大量的股票可以购买。

And so when we buy these businesses, we can get huge chunks of money into things. And now if we’d wanted to go much heavier into Moody’s, we couldn’t have bought that much anyway.

所以当我们购买这些企业时，我们可以将大量资金投入其中。如果我们想要更大规模地投资穆迪，我们也无法购买那么多。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. 沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, so, we are sort of forced by our own past success, more into these bigger positions represented by the private companies.

查理·芒格：是的，所以，我们在某种程度上被自己过去的成功所迫，更加倾向于这些由私营公司代表的大型投资。

But really, that’s in the advantage of all of us, I think.

但我认为，这实际上对我们所有人都有好处。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I love it when we buy transmission lines in Alberta. I don’t think anything horrible is going happen to Alberta. And nor do I think transmissions —

查理·芒格：我喜欢我们在阿尔伯塔购买输电线路。我不认为阿尔伯塔会发生什么可怕的事情。我也不认为输电——

WARREN BUFFETT: If it does, we won’t know it.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果这样，我们就不知道了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right, right. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，对，对。（笑声）

And — no, I think we’ve adapted pretty well to changes in our circumstances.

而且——不，我认为我们已经很好地适应了环境的变化。

And that, again, is part of life. I mean, since change is inevitable, how well you adapt to it is terribly important. And I would say the changes that many of you have watched in Berkshire over the years have been very much in our interest, and then there may be future changes that are just as desirable.

这再次是生活的一部分。我的意思是，既然变化是不可避免的，你适应变化的能力是非常重要的。我想说，许多人在伯克希尔多年来所看到的变化对我们来说非常有利，未来可能还有同样令人向往的变化。

WARREN BUFFETT: We bought a fair amount of Wells Fargo, for example, really over the last few years. And because the economy came back, really, the most money, if you were buying at the bottom, came from buying the banks of lesser quality because they — their weaknesses drove them down even further in price, and they needed a good economy to come back.

沃伦·巴菲特：例如，我们在过去几年购买了相当多的富国银行。由于经济复苏，实际上，如果你在低点买入，获得的最多收益来自于购买质量较差的银行，因为它们的弱点使得价格进一步下跌，而它们需要良好的经济才能复苏。

But they were kind of like a marginal copper producer or something, that you make more money if copper goes up, not if you buy the best copper company but, usually, if you buy the worst one, because it — they have the highest marginal cost, but that gives it the biggest kick on profits.

但他们有点像一个边际铜生产商，如果铜价上涨，你会赚更多的钱，而不是买最好的铜公司，而通常是买最差的那一个，因为它们的边际成本最高，但这会给利润带来最大的提升。

To some extent that’s been true, for example, the banks. But we felt 100 percent comfortable buying Wells Fargo, and we might have felt 50 percent comfortable buying some others and so we went where we were comfortable.

在某种程度上，这确实是这样，例如银行。但我们对购买富国银行感到百分之百的放心，而对购买其他一些银行可能只感到百分之五十的放心，因此我们选择了让我们感到舒适的地方。

Looking back, you can say we should have just bought them all. And in fact, bought the ones that had had the worst record going into 2008 or ’09, because they had the greatest recovery possible, simply because they’d fallen so far. Andrew?

回头看，您可以说我们应该买下所有银行。事实上，购买那些在2008或2009年表现最差的银行，因为它们具有最大的复苏潜力，正是因为它们跌得最深。Andrew？

43. Technology and GEICO’s future

技术与 GEICO 的未来

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: — And it has to do with the future as well, and it relates to GEICO.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：——这也与未来有关，并且与 GEICO 有关。

And the questioner asked, “Could you, and perhaps Tony Nicely, please explain how you think about usage-based pricing, tracking drivers electronically and charging premiums accordingly, and how that will affect the auto insurance industry in the U.S. in the next decade, and how these changes impact the moat at GEICO?

提问者问："您，或许还有Tony Nicely，能否解释一下您是如何看待基于使用情况的定价、通过电子方式跟踪驾驶员并据此收取保费的，以及这在未来十年将如何影响美国的汽车保险业，这些变化又将如何影响 GEICO 的护城河？

I’m also sure you’ve studied the potential impact of self-driving cars on GEICO. Google says it’s now five years away. What does this mean to the future of the profit machine that is GEICO, and if the analysis showed a challenging future, would you ever sell?”

我也相信你已经研究过自动驾驶汽车对 GEICO 的潜在影响。谷歌表示这项技术现在距离实现还有五年。这对 GEICO 这个盈利机器的未来意味着什么，如果分析显示未来充满挑战，你会考虑出售吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the answer to the very last question is no.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。最后一个问题的答案是否定的。

The usage-based pricing is something that’s popular with some companies that have done a lot of work on it. Probably the one most identified with it is Progressive doing something called “Snapshot.”

基于使用的定价在一些已经对此进行了大量工作的公司中很受欢迎。可能最与之相关的是 Progressive 推出的一个叫“Snapshot”的产品。

And there’s no question that knowing how customers drive, or policy holders drive, and how they use their cars is a valuable input to assessing the proper premium to people.

毫无疑问，了解客户或投保人的驾驶方式，以及他们如何使用自己的汽车，对于评估适当的保费是非常有价值的。

And insurance is all about comparing the propensity of loss to achieve — or evaluating the propensity of loss to establish the proper premium.

而保险的目的就是比较损失的可能性，或评估损失的可能性，以确定适当的保费。

And it’s very easy to understand in life insurance. I mean, if somebody is 90, they’re more likely to die than 20, despite Charlie — situation. (Laughter)

这在人寿保险中很容易理解。我的意思是，如果一个人 90 岁了，他比 20 岁的人更容易死，尽管查理的情况是个例外。（笑声）

Even at 83 they’re more likely to die than somebody at 20.

即使在 83 岁，他们的死亡几率也比 20 岁的人更高。

The — so you know, that’s obvious. Females live longer. That’s not quite as obvious but it’s been established.

这一点显而易见。女性寿命更长。这一点虽然不是很明显，但已经得到证实。

So there are various variables in insurance, and you try to assess those variables and set the proper price for the policy holder. If you lived in a state, for example, where the population of the state was one instead of, you know, 100 million, there’d be a whole lot less chance of an accident, you know, than — because of the lack of density of driving and so on. There’s all kinds of variables.

在保险中，有各种各样的变量，你尝试评估这些变量并为保单持有人设定合适的价格。例如，如果你住在只有1个人而不是你知道的1亿人的州，那么发生事故的可能性就会小得多，因为驾驶密度的缺乏等等。有各种各样的变量。

And through studying usage, by various methods, Progressive being probably the best known on it, they’re attempting to look at some variables and hope they get better information about the propensity of that particular driver to — or the likelihood of that particular driver — to be in an accident.

他们试图通过各种方法研究使用情况，其中最著名的可能是 "Progressive"，他们试图研究一些变量，并希望获得有关特定驾驶员发生事故的倾向性或可能性的更好信息。

And we look at lots of variables, they look at lots of variables. We think we’ve got a pretty good system, and so far I think that’s been proven correct. But we’ll continue to look at many variables.

我们考虑了很多变量，他们也考虑了很多变量。我们认为我们有一个相当不错的系统，到目前为止，我认为这已经被证明是正确的。但我们会继续关注许多变量。

I feel very, very, very good about GEICO, GEICO’s management, and its ability to evaluate risk. And I think there are plenty of other people that are good at it, but I don’t think there’s — in my view, there’s nobody better at it, in terms of auto insurance, than the GEICO people.

我对GEICO、GEICO的管理层及其评估风险的能力非常有信心。我认为还有很多人也在做得很好，但在我看来，汽车保险领域没有人比GEICO做得更好。

So — but we ought to keep asking ourselves, “Can we do it better?” And we do ask ourselves that.

所以——但我们应该不断问自己：“我们能做得更好吗？”而我们确实在问自己这个问题。

Now, when you get to the self-driving car, that is a real threat to the auto insurance industry. I mean, if that proves successful and reduces accidents dramatically, it will be very good for society and it will be very bad for auto insurers.

现在，当你谈到自动驾驶汽车时，这对汽车保险行业构成了真正的威胁。我的意思是，如果这证明是成功的并且显著减少了事故，这对社会来说是非常好的，但对汽车保险公司来说则非常糟糕。

So you know, that can happen. I don’t know how to evaluate over how long a period that might take or what percentage of cars might be affected with that. But it certainly could happen and it would not cause us to be thinking for one second about selling GEICO. Charlie?

所以你知道，这种情况是可能发生的。我不知道评估这可能需要多长时间，或者有多少百分比的汽车可能会受到影响。但这确实可能发生，并且这不会让我们考虑出售 GEICO，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, some of these things happen a lot more slowly than you might think. I went to a program at Harvard, oh, at least 30 years ago, describing how color movies were going come to the house on demand, and they were just around the corner.

查理·芒格：是的，有些事情的发展速度远比你想的要慢。我大约30年前参加过哈佛的一场讲座，讲的是彩色电影将如何在家中按需播放，好像是触手可及的事情。

Well, they’ve come, but it was 30 years later. I have a feeling that self-driving cars having a huge impact on the market may take quite a while. And so I’m not —

好吧，他们来了，但这是 30 年后。我感觉自动驾驶汽车对市场产生巨大影响可能还需要很长时间。所以我并不——

WARREN BUFFETT: That would be my guess, but we could be wrong, you know.

沃伦·巴菲特：那是我的猜测，但我们可能是错的，你知道的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it could be wrong.

查理·芒格：是的，这可能是错的。

WARREN BUFFETT: But — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但是——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But — 查理·芒格：但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: But if we are wrong, we’ll be wrong together. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：但如果我们错了，我们就一起错。（笑）

It is hard to figure out how it could have a major impact in 10 years, but it may not work at all, who knows?

很难想象它在 10 年内会产生重大影响，但它可能根本不起作用，谁知道呢？

But GEICO will be doing more business, a lot more business, in my view, five years from now than now, and ten years from now.

但在我看来，五年后，GEICO 的业务将比现在多得多，十年后也会如此。

You know, 30 years from now, you’re young enough to find out, and I will go away peacefully without knowing.

你知道，30 年后，你还年轻，可以去发现，而我将安然离去，毫不知情。

OK. (Laughter) 好的。（笑声）

44. More international acquisitions?

更多国际收购？

WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg. 沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Thank you, Warren.

格雷格·沃伦：谢谢你，沃伦。

You’ve been pretty explicit about your acquisition criteria over the years, and some years ago, perhaps around the time of the ISCAR deal, you mentioned at one of the annual meetings that a concerted effort was being made to make non-U.S. companies more aware of Berkshire’s positive attributes as a preferred acquirer.

几年前，也许是在ISCAR交易前后，您在一次年会上提到，我们正在共同努力，让非美国公司更多地了解伯克希尔作为首选收购方的优势。

Yet, despite the higher proportion of large family-owned businesses in places like Europe and the fact that over half of the world’s listed market cap currently comes from outside of the U.S., Berkshire has deployed very little capital outside of the U.S. with just ISCAR, and more recently AltaLink, coming to mind.

然而，尽管在欧洲等地大型家族企业的比例较高，并且目前全球超过一半的上市市值来自美国以外，伯克希尔在美国以外的地区投入的资本却非常有限，仅有ISCAR和最近的AltaLink可供参考。

Is the U.S. truly that much more attractive a destination for capital, or is there some other reason why the firm has not deployed serious capital outside of the region?

美国真的比其他地方更具吸引力，成为资本的目的地，还是说公司没有在该地区以外投入大量资本还有其他原因？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no, we’ve never turned down a chance to make a significant acquisition outside the United States because of any feeling we’d much rather be doing something in the United States. We just — you know, you mentioned the Alberta deal.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们从来没有因为更愿意在美国做某事而拒绝在美国以外进行重大收购的机会。我们只是——你提到了阿尔伯塔的交易。

But we have not had as much luck getting on the radar screen of owners around the world as we have in the United States.

但我们在全球范围内引起业主关注的运气不如在美国那么好。

Our best bet, by far, in buying a business is to buy it from the family of a founder or the founder himself or herself. So we’ve, you know, that’s our strong suit, and in the United States I think almost anybody that fits in that category with a business of size thinks of us. And a fair number would prefer us.

我们购买企业的最佳选择，毫无疑问，是从创始人的家族或创始人本人那里购买。因此，我们的强项就是这一点，在美国，我认为几乎所有符合这一类别的中型企业都会想到我们。相当一部分人会更倾向于选择我们。

I don’t think that same — I think there’s some recognition outside the U.S. Certainly when we heard from ISCAR, that was in 2006, Eitan Wertheimer said, he wrote me a letter, I’d never heard of him before, I’d never heard of the company. And he said the family had thought about it, and we were the only company to which they wanted to sell, and if they didn’t sell it to us, they weren’t going to sell it.

我不认为在美国之外有同样的认知。当然，当我们与ISCAR接触时，那是在2006年，Eitan Wertheimer说，他给我写了一封信，我之前从未听说过他，也从未听说过这家公司。他说，家族已经考虑过了，我们是他们唯一想要出售的公司，如果他们不卖给我们，就不会卖给其他人。

So, there’s some awareness. But I’ve been a little disappointed in that we haven’t had better luck outside the country. And we’ll keep working at it and see what happens.

所以，确实有一定的认知。但我有点失望，我们在国外的运气没有那么好。我们会继续努力，看看会发生什么。

Incidentally, I just talked to Jacob Harpaz, who does an incredible job of running ISCAR. I talked to him yesterday when I was touring the exhibition hall.

顺便说一下，我刚刚和雅各布·哈帕兹谈过，他在管理 ISCAR 方面做得非常出色。我昨天在参观展览厅时和他交谈过。

They set a new record in April. Now, that won’t be the last new record they set. But that may have some slight meaning, in terms of how world business is doing, because they sell, you know, these tiny little cutting tools, and so on, that go into basic industry all over the world.

他们在四月份创下了新纪录。现在，这不会是他们设定的最后一个新纪录。但这可能在一定程度上反映了全球商业的状况，因为他们销售这些微小的切削工具等，进入全球各地的基础工业。

And people don’t buy those because they — you know, they’re going look pretty in their offices or anything else, they buy them because they’re using them up. And, it was a record in April. March had been extremely good, too. So they are seeing strength in the business that certainly would make it hard to believe there’s weakness going on throughout the industrial world.

人们购买这些东西并不是因为它们在办公室里看起来好看，而是因为他们在使用它们。四月份的销量创下了纪录。三月份的表现也非常好。因此，他们在业务中看到了强劲的表现，这无疑让人很难相信整个工业界存在疲软的情况。

ISCAR’s been a wonderful company for us. The people have been sensational. The business is extraordinary. It just is — it fits us so well that I just wish I could find a few more like it out there.

ISCAR 对我们来说是一家很棒的公司。员工们非常出色。业务也很非凡。就是这样——它与我们非常契合，我真希望能在外面找到更多这样的公司。

But this year, aside from the one we announced yesterday, we have not been contacted by any significant ones that made sense. We have heard from people over the last five years, I mean, we’ve — fair number. But nothing that really makes sense. But we’ll keep trying.

但今年，除了我们昨天宣布的那个，我们没有收到任何有意义的重大联系。在过去五年里，我们听到了很多人的声音，我是说，我们——相当多。但没有什么真正有意义的。但我们会继续努力。

45. Knowing your “circle of competence”

了解你的“能力圈”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 1. We’re back at — here we are.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第一站。我们回来了——我们在这里。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, and hello, Mr. Munger. Thank you for being extremely generous with sharing your wisdom. My name is Chander Chawla, and I am visiting from San Francisco.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生，您好，芒格先生。感谢您们慷慨分享智慧。我的名字是钱德尔·查瓦拉，我来自旧金山。

In the past, you have said that people should operate within their circle of competence. My question is, how does one figure out what one’s circle of competence is? (Laughter)

在过去，你曾说过人们应该在自己的能力范围内行动。我的问题是，如何才能弄清楚自己的能力范围是什么？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Good question. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好问题。（笑）

Some of the people in the audience are identifying with it, I can hear them.

观众中的一些人正在与之产生共鸣，我能听到他们。

The — it’s — you know, it is a question of being self-realistic, and that applies outside of business as well.

你知道，这是一个自我现实的问题，这也适用于商业以外的领域。

And, I think Charlie and I have been reasonably good at identifying what I would call the perimeter of that circle of competence, but obviously we’ve gone out of it.

我认为查理和我在识别我所称之为能力圈的边界方面做得相当不错，但显然我们已经超出了这个范围。

I would say that in my own case, I’ve gone out of it more often in retail than in any other arena. I think it’s easy to sort of think you understand retail, and then subsequently find out you don’t, as we did with the department store in Baltimore.

我想说，就我个人而言，我在零售行业的经历比其他任何领域都要多。我认为很容易以为自己理解零售，但随后发现自己并不理解，就像我们在巴尔的摩的百货商店所经历的那样。

You could say I was outside of my circle of competence when I bought Berkshire Hathaway, although I bought it, really, to resell as a stock, originally.

你可以说我在购买伯克希尔·哈撒韦时超出了我的能力范围，尽管我买它的初衷其实是为了转售作为股票。

I probably was out of my circle of competence when I decided that I should go in and buy control of the company. That was a dumb decision — which worked out.

我可能在决定应该进去收购公司的控制权时超出了我的能力范围。那是一个愚蠢的决定——但结果却很好。

The — being realistic in appraising your own talents and shortcomings, I think — I don’t know whether that’s innate, but some people seem a whole lot better at it than the others. And I certainly know of a number of CEOs that I feel have no idea of where their circle of competence begins and ends.

—— 在评估自己的才能和缺点时要现实，我认为——我不知道这是否是与生俱来的，但有些人似乎在这方面远远优于其他人。我确实知道一些首席执行官，我觉得他们完全不知道自己的能力范围从哪里开始到哪里结束。

But, we’ve got a number of managers who I think are just terrific at it. I mean, they really know when they’re playing in the game they’re going win in, and they don’t go outside of that game.

但是，我们有一些经理，我认为他们在这方面非常出色。我的意思是，他们真的知道自己在参与的游戏中会赢，并且不会超出那个游戏。

The ultimate was Mrs. B, at the Furniture Mart. She told me that she did not want stock, in terms of the Berkshire Hathaway deal. Now, that may sound like it was a bad decision. It was a splendid decision.

伯克希尔哈撒韦交易中，最棒的人是家具城的女老板 B 夫人。她告诉我，她不想买股票。现在，这听起来可能是一个糟糕的决定。但这绝对是一个明智的决定。

She did not know anything about stock, but she knew a lot about what to do with cash. She knew real estate, she knew retailing, and she knew exactly what she knew and what she didn’t know, and that took her a long, long, long, long way in business life.

她对股票一无所知，但她对现金的处理却非常了解。她懂房地产，懂零售，并且清楚自己知道什么和不知道什么，这在商业生活中帮助了她走了很长很长的一段路。

And that — that ability to know when you’re playing the game in which you’re going to win, and playing outside of that game, is a huge asset.

并且——能够知道何时在必胜的游戏中玩，何时在游戏之外玩，这是一项巨大的优势。

I can’t tell you the best way to develop a great sense of that about yourself. You might get some of your friends that know you well to offer contributions. Charlie’s given me a few contributions occasionally, saying, “What the hell do you know about that?” That’s one way of putting it, of course. (Laughs)

我无法告诉你培养这种自我意识的最佳方法。你可以让一些熟悉你的朋友为你出谋划策。查理偶尔也会给我一些建议他说："你到底知道些什么？"当然，这也是一种说法。（笑）

But Charlie, do — can you help him out?

但是查理，你能帮他一下吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think it’s as difficult to figure out competence as it may appear to you. If you’re five-foot-two, you don’t have much of a future in the National Basketball League. And if you’re 95 years of age, you probably shouldn’t try and act the romantic lead part in Hollywood. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为判断能力并不像你想的那么困难。如果你身高五英尺两寸，你在国家篮球联赛中没有太多前途。如果你 95 岁了，你可能不应该尝试在好莱坞扮演浪漫主角。（笑声）

And if you weigh 350 pounds, you probably shouldn’t try and dance the lead part in the Bolshoi Ballet. And if you can hardly count cards at all, you probably shouldn’t try and win chess tournaments playing blindfolded, and so on and so on.

如果你体重 350 磅，你可能不应该尝试在莫斯科大剧院跳主角。如果你几乎无法数牌，你可能也不应该尝试在盲棋比赛中获胜，等等。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re ruling out everything I want to do. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你在排除我想做的一切。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But competency is a relative concept. And what a lot of us need, including the one speaking, is — what I needed to get ahead was to compete against idiots, and luckily there’s a large supply. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：但能力是一个相对的概念。我们很多人，包括我自己，需要的就是——我想要取得进步所需要的，是与愚蠢的人竞争，而幸运的是，这种人有很多。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔。（笑声）

46. Comparing Berkshire’s book value to stock index

将伯克希尔的账面价值与股票指数进行比较

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes back a little to a question asked earlier about your annual performance standard that you comparison.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题有点回到之前问过的关于你年度绩效标准的比较的问题。

“Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, I think of you as running a rational company. But when I look at your annual comparison of Berkshire’s book value per share versus the S&P average, I don’t see any rationality in that at all.”

“巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我认为你们是理性的公司。但是，当我查阅您对伯克希尔哈撒韦公司每股账面价值与标准普尔指数的年度对比时，我发现其中没有任何合理性。”

“What is the logic of comparing a stock market index against the rise in an operating company’s book value? And an operating company is predominantly what Berkshire is these days, so why do you annually make this irrational comparison?”

“将股票市场指数与一家经营公司的账面价值增长进行比较的逻辑是什么？而且一家经营公司是伯克希尔现在主要的形态，那么你为什么要每年进行这种不合理的比较？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me answer that one.

查理·芒格：让我来回答这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer is you’re totally right, and we do that because Warren wants to make it eccentrically difficult for himself. So if you don’t understand people who like to wear hair shirts, you’ll never figure out why anybody would do such a thing.

查理·芒格：答案是你完全正确，我们这样做是因为沃伦想让自己变得古怪而困难。所以如果你不理解那些喜欢穿毛衣的人，你永远也无法弄明白为什么有人会做这样的事情。

It’s a ridiculous way to make a comparison, but it makes it hard for Warren to look good. And he likes to climb mountains that are difficult. But it’s insane, you’re right. (Laughter and applause)

这是一种荒谬的比较方式，但这让沃伦看起来很糟糕。他喜欢攀登困难的山峰。但你说得对，这太疯狂了。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。

Normally when he goes all wishy washy like that, I like to clarify. But I don’t think I’ll try. (Laughter)

一般来说，当他说得这么含糊不清时，我都会想办法澄清。但我想我不会尝试。（笑声）

47. ISCAR and Marmon deal valuations

ISCAR 和 Marmon 交易估值

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: The multiple of pre-tax profit that Berkshire paid for minority interests in Marmon and ISCAR in 2013 were considerably higher than the multiples Berkshire paid for earlier purchases of majority stakes in those two firms.

乔纳森·布兰特：2013 年，伯克希尔为马门和 ISCAR 的少数股权支付的税前利润倍数远高于伯克希尔之前收购这两家公司多数股权时支付的倍数。

Can you please explain why the valuation formulas changed, why the multiples weren’t fixed for future increases in Berkshire’s stake, which at least in Marmon’s case were always contemplated, and why Berkshire was willing to accept meaningfully lower returns on the more recent purchases, not so many years after the first purchases?

您可以解释一下估值方法为何发生变化？为什么在伯克希尔持股增加的情况下，估值倍数没有被固定？至少在 Marmon 的案例中，这种增加一直是预期中的。伯克希尔为何愿意接受最近几笔收购中明显较低的回报？这距离最初的收购已经没有多少年了

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, the multiple with ISCAR was actually determined precisely on the basis of which the original purchase was made. In other words when we made the deal in 2006, we took multiples of earnings and allowed for cash and a few things.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，ISCAR 的倍数实际上是基于最初购买时的基础精确确定的。换句话说，当我们在 2006 年达成交易时，我们考虑了收益的倍数，并考虑了现金和一些其他因素。

But — and then we took that formula and we stuck that in as both a put and call option for the family or Berkshire. They had the put, we had the call. And we stuck that in to govern things for, you know, between now and judgment day, and so that there’s no variation from the original formula.

但是——然后我们把那个公式作为伯克希尔家族的看跌和看涨期权。它们有看跌期权，我们有看涨期权。我们把它放进去，以便在现在和审判日之间进行管理，这样就不会偏离原始公式。

We would never — shouldn’t say never, but we had — our style would not be ever to call that from the family, even though we had the right to do it.

我们永远不会--不应该说永远不会，但我们有--我们的风格是永远不会从家里打电话，即使我们有权这么做。

The put and call were at the same price, or at the same — following the same formula. But the family elected to put it to us, but they put it to us exactly on the same basis as what was involved in the original purchase of the 80 percent.

看涨期权和看跌期权的价格相同，或者说，价格相同——遵循相同的公式。但是，该家族选择将其交给我们，但他们将其交给我们完全基于与最初购买 80% 股份所涉及的相同基础上。

The Marmon deal is entirely different. The Marmon deal was an installment sale, and, in effect, to make the deal and buy the originals turned out to be 64 percent, we intended it to be 60 but gave them the option to do more.

马门交易完全不同。马门交易是一种分期付款销售，实际上，达成交易并购买原件的成本为 64%，我们原本打算是 60%，但给了他们更多的选择。

That was simply an installment sale, and we looked at the consequences of the formulas being applied in the future. The family would not have sold us the 64 percent, which they did on the original piece, unless they had the formula applying to the second and third piece that was embodied in the contract.

那只是一笔分期付款，我们研究了公式在未来应用的后果。除非合同中包含适用于第二和第三部分的公式，否则该家族不会将最初部分的 64% 卖给我们。

And we looked at that as a single transaction, knowing that if the business improved we would be paying more money, and as the cash position improved, we’d be paying more money later on. But it was all built into the original deal, so one was one — was at exactly the same price, and one was part of a three-step deal, in effect. Charlie?

我们将其视为一笔单一交易，知道如果业务改善，我们将支付更多的钱，随着现金状况的改善，我们会在后期支付更多的钱。但这一切都包含在最初的交易中，所以一是一个——正好是同样的价格，而一个实际上是三步交易的一部分。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: But the price went up because the value went up.

查理·芒格：但价格上涨是因为价值上涨。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but it was — and because it was built into —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但这是——因为它是内置的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and we’d agreed to — that that would be — we’d pay value.

查理·芒格：是的，我们已经达成一致——我们会支付价值。

WARREN BUFFETT: In both cases, I should say too, both with the Pritzker family at Marmon and with the Wertheimer family at ISCAR, it couldn’t have been — they couldn’t have behaved better — or the feelings are entirely good, everybody felt good about the transaction. The initial transaction and the subsequent transaction. So it pays to have to have deals in which people feel good when they —

沃伦·巴菲特：在这两种情况下，我也应该说，无论是与普利茨克家族在马门，还是与维尔特海默家族在 ISCAR，他们的表现都非常出色——大家的感觉都很好，所有人对交易的感觉都很好。最初的交易和随后的交易。因此，进行让人感觉良好的交易是值得的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing that happened there is that — we got just an enormous respect for the intelligence of those two families. The more we looked at those businesses, the smarter and better those families looked. It was just amazing what each family had done, wouldn’t you say, Warren?

查理·芒格：发生的事情并不是——我们对那两个家庭的智慧有着巨大的尊重。我们越是研究那些企业，那两个家庭看起来就越聪明、越优秀。每个家庭所做的事情真是令人惊叹，你说是不是，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Right, right.

沃伦·巴菲特：对，对。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely amazing.

查理·芒格：绝对惊人。

WARREN BUFFETT: And those were two important acquisitions. I mean, they — you know, they add up to lots of intrinsic value. And there, partly because of some accounting peculiarities, but the carrying value of the businesses is well below what the intrinsic business value is now.

沃伦·巴菲特：这两项收购非常重要。我的意思是，它们——你知道，它们加起来具有很大的内在价值。而且，部分原因是一些会计上的特殊情况，但这些业务的账面价值远低于现在的内在价值。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And by the way, that Union Tank Car that’s within Marmon is John D. Rockefeller’s old business. The first John D. Rockefeller. It’s amazing how some of these good businesses have lasted.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，马门公司内的联合油罐车是约翰·D·洛克菲勒的老业务。第一代约翰·D·洛克菲勒。令人惊讶的是，这些优秀的企业竟然能够持续这么久。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, actually the corporate form it — the original corporation that is Marmon, I’m quite sure, is Rockwood and Company, which I did a cocoa arbitrage with back in 1955 or something, and that’s where I met Jay Pritzker. So it — these things wind their way along.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，实际上，它的公司形式 - 最初的公司 Marmon，我敢肯定，是 Rockwood and Company，我在 1955 年左右与他们做了一笔可可套利交易，我就是在那里遇到了杰伊·普利茨克。所以说，这些事情都是有来龙去脉的。

It — one thing you learn in life, but also learn particularly in business, is that you’re going to meet a lot of people and entities and experiences — in the future that — you may have thought were one shot —one stop shops originally in your life.

在生活中，尤其是在商业中，你会学到一件事，那就是你将会遇到很多人、实体和经历——在未来，你可能曾经认为这些只是你生活中的一次性、一站式的选择。

48. How to find what you love and do it

如何找到你所爱的并去做它

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Bung — this — Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Nicholas Erdenberger. I hail from the beautiful Garden State of New Jersey. And I guess the — (laughs) — I guess the question —

观众成员：邦先生——这——巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我的名字是尼古拉斯·埃尔登伯格。我来自美丽的新泽西州。然后我想——（笑）——我想问的问题是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Withhold your applause, applause. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：请不要鼓掌，鼓掌。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I guess this is a follow up question to the question before.

观众成员：所以我想这是对之前问题的一个后续提问。

I really connect with the idea of not investing in industries you can’t fully understand. Being a young guy who has limited ability to code and who can’t build robots, tech is certainly not an industry I fully understand.

我非常认同不投资于自己无法完全理解的行业的这个想法。作为一个年轻人，我的编程能力有限，无法制造机器人，因此科技行业显然不是我完全理解的领域。

And yet these days, the concept of entrepreneurship is nearly synonymous with tech amongst people my age. So my question to you, Mr. Buffett, is if you were 23-years-old with entrepreneurial tendencies, what non-tech industry would you start a business in and why?

然而，如今在我这个年龄段的人中，创业的概念几乎与科技同义。所以我想问您，巴菲特先生，如果您 23 岁并有创业倾向，您会选择哪个非科技行业创业，为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d probably do just what I did when I was 23. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我可能会做我 23 岁时做的事情。（笑）

The — you know, I would go in the investment business. And I would look at lots of companies and I would go and talk to lots of people, and I would try to learn from them what I could about different industries.

我知道，我会进入投资行业。我会查看很多公司，去和很多人交谈，尽量从他们那里了解不同产业的知识。

One thing I did when I was 23, if I got interested in the coal business, I would go out and see the CEOs of eight or ten coal companies. And the interesting thing was I never made appointments usually or anything, I just dropped in. But they —they felt a fellow from Omaha who looked like me couldn’t be too harmful.

我在 23 岁时做的一件事是，如果我对煤炭行业感兴趣，我会去见八到十家煤炭公司的首席执行官。有趣的是，我通常不预约或什么的，我只是随便去。但他们——他们觉得一个看起来像我来自奥马哈的人应该不会太有害。

So they’d always see me. And I would — I’d ask them a lot of questions, but one question I’d always ask them, two questions at the end, I would ask them if they had to put all of their money into any coal company except their own and go away for ten years and couldn’t change it, which one would it be and why?

他们总是能看到我。我——我会问他们很多问题，但最后我会问他们两个问题，第一个问题是，如果他们必须把所有的钱投资到一家除了他们自己以外的煤炭公司，然后消失十年，并且不能改变主意，他们会选择哪一家，为什么？

And then I would say, after I got an answer to that, I would say, and if as part of that deal they had to sell short in the equivalent amount of money — in one coal company — which would it be and why?

然后我会说，在我得到答案之后，我会问，如果作为交易的一部分，他们必须在一家煤炭公司以等值金额进行卖空，那会是哪家公司，为什么？

And if I went around and talked to everybody in the coal business about that, I would know more about the coal companies from an economic standpoint than any one of those managers probably would.

如果我去问所有从事煤炭行业的人这个问题，那么我从经济的角度对煤炭公司的了解可能比任何一位经理都要多。

So, I think there’s lots of ways to learn about business. You’re not going learn how to start another Facebook or Google that way, but you can — you can learn a lot about the economic characteristics of companies by reading, personal contact.

所以，我认为有很多方法可以了解商业。你不会通过这种方式学会如何创办另一个 Facebook 或 Google，但你可以——通过阅读和个人接触，你可以学到很多关于公司的经济特征。

You do have to have — you have to have a real curiosity about it. I mean, you — I don’t think you can do it because your mother’s telling you to do it, or something of the sort. (Laughs)

你确实需要——你必须对它有真正的好奇心。我的意思是，你——我认为你不能因为你母亲让你去做这件事，或者类似的原因而去做。（笑）

I think you — it really has to turn you on. And I mean, what could turn you on more than running around asking questions about coal companies? (Laughter)

我认为你——这真的得让你兴奋。我是说，还有什么能比到处问煤炭公司问题更让你兴奋呢？（笑声）

You have to maybe be a little odd, too.

你也许还得有点古怪。

But that’s what I would do. And I might, in the process of doing that, find some industry that particularly interested me, in my case the insurance industry did, and you might become very well equipped, even perhaps, to start your own insurance company, but perhaps to pick the most logical one to go to work for.

但这就是我会做的。在这个过程中，我可能会发现某个特别让我感兴趣的行业，在我看来，保险行业就是这样，您可能会变得非常有能力，甚至可能开始自己的保险公司，或者选择一个最合适的公司去工作。

If you just keep learning things, something will come along that you’ll find extremely useful to do. I mean, it — but you’ve got to be open to it. Charlie?

如果你不断学习一些东西，总会有一些你会发现非常有用的事情出现。我是说，这——但你必须对它保持开放的态度。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you might try a version of the trick that Larry Bird used. When he wanted an agent to negotiate his new contract, he asked every agent why he should be selected. And if he was not going be selected, whom the agent would recommend. And since everybody recommended the same number two choice, Larry Bird just hired him and negotiated the best contract in history. There’s —

查理·芒格：嗯，你可以试试拉里·伯德使用的一个技巧。当他想让一个经纪人来谈判他的新合同时，他问每个经纪人为什么应该选择他。如果他不会被选择，那个经纪人会推荐谁。由于每个人都推荐了同一个第二选择，拉里·伯德就雇了他，并谈成了历史上最好的合同。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — there are a lot of tricks that people use.

查理·芒格：——人们使用了很多技巧。

WARREN BUFFETT: We did the same thing with Solomon, actually. It was a Saturday morning —

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，我们对Solomon也做了同样的事情。那是一个星期六的早晨——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — when I call —and you were there, Charlie, weren’t you? -

沃伦·巴菲特：——当我打电话时——你在那儿，查理，是吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes — 查理·芒格：是的——

WARREN BUFFETT: — I wasn’t sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：——我不确定。

I called in, I don’t know whether it was eight or ten of the manager — I had just gotten in there on Friday afternoon, and now it’s Saturday morning and we had to open for business Sunday night in Tokyo, and I had to have somebody to run the place.

我打电话给经理，不知道是八个还是十个——我刚在星期五下午到那里，现在是星期六早上，我们必须在星期天晚上在东京开业，我需要有人来管理这个地方。

So I called in eight people and I said, you know, “Who besides you would be the ideal person to run this, and why?”

所以我叫了八个人，我问你们，“除了你们自己，谁是最理想的人来负责这个，为什么？”

One guy told me that there was nobody compared to him. (Laughter)

一个家伙告诉我，没人能比得上他。 (大笑)

He was gone from the firm within a few months. (Laughter)

他在公司待了几个月就离开了。（笑声）

But — the — it’s not a bad system to use.

但——这——并不是一个坏的系统。

You can really learn a lot just by asking. I mean, it’s starting to sound a little bit like a Yogi Berra quote or something, but it is — it is literally true that you — if you talk to enough people about something they know something about, and people like to talk. You know, and — here we are talking ourselves. (Laughs)

你真的可以通过提问学到很多东西。我是说，这听起来有点像尤吉·贝拉的名言，但这确实是事实——如果你和足够多了解某件事的人交谈，他们会乐于分享。你知道，我们现在就是在聊天。（笑）

And you just have to be open to it. And you will find your spot. You may not find it the first day, or the week, or month, but you’ll find what fascinates you.

你只需要对它保持开放的态度。你会找到属于你的位置。你可能在第一天、第一周或第一月找不到，但你会找到让你着迷的东西。

I was very lucky because I found what fascinated me when I was seven or eight years of age. But — you know, some people find chess or music, you know, fascinates them when they’re four or five.

我很幸运，因为我在七八岁的时候找到了让我着迷的东西。但是——你知道，有些人在四五岁的时候就发现国际象棋或音乐让他们着迷。

If you’re lucky you find it early, and sometimes it takes you longer, but you’ll find it.

如果你幸运的话，你会早早找到它，有时候需要更长的时间，但你一定会找到它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: If it’s a very competitive business, and it plainly requires the qualities that you lack, it should probably be avoided.

查理·芒格：如果这是一个竞争非常激烈的行业，并且显然需要你所缺乏的素质，那么最好避免。

I could — when I was at Caltech I took thermodynamics, and Homer Joe Stewart, who was a genius, taught the course. And it was fairly apparent to me that no amount of time or effort would turn me into a Homer Joe Stewart. He was utterly, impossibly more talented than I could be.

我可以——当我在加州理工学院时，我学习了热力学，霍默·乔·斯图尔特是一位天才，他教授这门课程。对我来说，很明显，无论花费多少时间或努力都无法让我变成霍默·乔·斯图尔特。他的才华完全超出了我所能达到的水平。

Gave up. I immediately said I wasn’t going try and be a professor of thermodynamics at Caltech. And I’ve done that with field after field, and pretty soon there was only one or two left. (Laughter)

放弃了。我立刻说我不会尝试成为加州理工学院的热力学教授。我在一个又一个领域都这样做，很快只剩下了一两个领域了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I had a similar experience in athletics. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我在体育方面也有过类似的经历。（笑声）

49. Hotel room economics during Berkshire meeting

伯克希尔会议期间的酒店房间经济学

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Darren Bordemier (PH). He says, “Warren, you’ve commented in the press that you are concerned about the hotel price gauging in the Omaha area during the Berkshire meeting weekend.” (Applause)

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自达伦·博尔德迈尔（PH）。他说：“沃伦，你在媒体上提到你对伯克希尔会议周末奥马哈地区酒店价格过高感到担忧。”（掌声）

Hold your applause, you haven’t heard the rest. “Please elaborate further on that position, as it seems to contradict free market capitalism. Shouldn’t the law of supply and demand apply in this case?”

请稍等你的掌声，你还没有听到后面的内容。“请进一步阐述这个观点，因为它似乎与自由市场资本主义相矛盾。在这种情况下，供求法则不应该适用吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely. And so therefore, since we want to increase the demand, the proper thing to do is increase the supply, right? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。所以，既然我们想要增加需求，正确的做法就是增加供应，对吧？（笑）

And that’s why we have encouraged, for example, Airbnb, to come in and — they supplied some rooms this year.

这就是为什么我们鼓励，例如，Airbnb 进来——他们今年提供了一些房间。

But it’s very logical. If you think about most cities, the big events that come to their convention centers and use their hotels, they size themselves in deciding where to go. If you have a relatively small industry, they can pick a moderate-sized city and they can have their convention there, and they don’t outstrip the supply of rooms.

但这非常合乎逻辑。如果你考虑大多数城市，来到他们会议中心的大型活动以及使用他们酒店的活动，他们在决定去哪里时会考虑规模。如果你有一个相对较小的行业，他们可以选择一个中等规模的城市，在那里举办会议，并且不会超出房间的供应。

If you have a very big industry and you’re having a convention, you know, you have to go to some place like Vegas or some place that has a lot of rooms because otherwise you do throw the supply-demand out of whack.

如果你有一个非常大的行业，并且要举办一个会议，你知道，你必须去一些像拉斯维加斯这样的地方，或者其他有很多房间的地方，因为否则你会打乱供需关系。

So, if you have an event, which isn’t sized by the people that are scheduling it, can’t be sized by the people that are scheduling it, then you can totally outstrip rational supply of rooms.

所以，如果你有一个活动，无法由安排它的人来确定规模，那么你完全可以超出合理的房间供应。

I mean, you know, the great case would be something like the Masters tournament. I mean, Augusta can’t size its hotel industry to Augusta, to the Masters, and the Masters isn’t going move any place. Well, there — are certain events like that, but there aren’t very many.

我想，你知道，最好的例子就是像大师赛这样的比赛。我是说，奥古斯塔无法根据奥古斯塔和大师赛的需求来调整其酒店业，而大师赛也不会搬到其他地方。嗯，确实有一些这样的活动，但并不多。

And Omaha cannot size its hotel supply to the Berkshire meeting. It sizes it to the kind of conventions it normally gets and all of that, but the Berkshire meeting has grown beyond what we anticipated.

奥马哈无法根据伯克希尔会议的需求来调整其酒店供应。它是根据通常接待的会议类型来调整的，但伯克希尔会议的规模超出了我们的预期。

So fortunately, there’s developed — and for that reason people started putting in — what really bothered me were the three-day minimums. I mean, it — you know, I think there’s something particularly irritating about somebody’s coming in for a one-day event to have to buy — have a three-day minimum. And the prices were getting high.

所以幸运的是，已经发展起来了——因此人们开始投入——让我真正困扰的是三天的最低要求。我的意思是，你知道，我觉得对于某人来说，来参加一天的活动却必须购买三天的最低要求，这特别令人恼火。而且价格也越来越高。

Incidentally, the Omaha Hilton right across the street, they — they’ve been magnificent throughout this, as have many others. But there were a few that were really pushing things, and we didn’t want to cut down on the demand. We didn’t want to move to Dallas, even though we’re opening a store there next year, it would be kind of fun for that.

顺便提一下，街对面的奥马哈希尔顿酒店在整个过程中表现得非常出色，还有许多其他酒店也是如此。但有一些酒店确实在施加压力，我们不想减少需求。我们不想搬到达拉斯，尽管我们明年在那里开一家新店，这样也会有点乐趣。

But we’re not going move to Dal — I mean, we want — Omaha people love this event, it’s an economic boon for Omaha, but — and people get a good impression of Omaha when they come here, generally.

但我们不会搬到达尔——我的意思是，我们想——奥马哈的人们热爱这个活动，这对奥马哈是一个经济上的好处，但——人们来这里时，通常对奥马哈有一个良好的印象。

So it’s — there’s a lot of good things about having the meeting in Omaha, and we can’t expect anybody to build new hotels to take care of three days a year. So, fortunately, something like Airbnb is sort of a flex supply arrangement that seems to me to make a lot of sense for it.

所以在奥马哈召开会议有很多好处，我们不能指望任何人为了每年三天的活动而建造新的酒店。因此，幸运的是，像 Airbnb 这样的灵活供应安排在我看来是非常合理的。

And I think that it will be more developed by next year, and I think that the hotels will do extremely well next year. But I don’t think they can push it to the ultimate extreme of a total scarcity product. And we want them to do well, and that’s why we’ve gone where we have. Charlie?

我认为到明年它会更加发展，我认为明年的酒店会非常好。但我不认为他们能将其推向完全稀缺产品的极限。我们希望他们做得好，这就是我们选择走到今天这一步的原因。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

50. Will GEICO eventually overtake State Farm?

GEICO 最终会超越 State Farm 吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？

JAY GELB: This question is on GEICO. GEICO continues to gain the most market share of the large auto insurers while delivering attractive margins. It also has the largest advertising budget of the auto insurers while maintaining the advantage of being a low-cost operator.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于 GEICO 的。GEICO 在大型汽车保险公司中继续获得最大的市场份额，同时提供有吸引力的利润率。它还拥有汽车保险公司中最大的广告预算，同时保持低成本运营的优势。

一项长期缓慢发展的业务很适合广告。

My question is, will GEICO, with 10 percent market share currently in auto insurance, eventually overtake State Farm, which currently has 19 percent market share in auto insurance, keeping in mind that State Farm is also a major writer of homeowners insurance coverage?

我的问题是，拥有 10%市场份额的 GEICO 是否最终会超过目前在汽车保险中拥有 19%市场份额的 State Farm，考虑到 State Farm 也是主要的房主保险承保商？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. Well, that’s a good question. Nobody knows the answer to that for sure. But I will tell you this, we passed Allstate this year.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是个好问题。没有人能确切知道答案。但我可以告诉你，今年我们超过了Allstate。

And State Farm is a terrific company, I mean, it’s one of the great histories — has one of the great company histories in America. It was started by a farmer who had no insurance experience to speak of when he was, I think, in his early 40s. There’s a book called “The Farmer from Merna,” I think it is, over in Illinois, and you know, he built this incredible business based on a better business model. And that was done around 1920 or so, I believe.

State Farm是一家了不起的公司，我的意思是，它在美国有着辉煌的历史——拥有伟大的公司历史。它是由一位在四十多岁时几乎没有保险经验的农民创办的。我想有一本书叫《来自梅尔纳的农民》，在伊利诺伊州，他基于更好的商业模式建立了这个令人难以置信的企业。我相信这大约是在 1920 年左右完成的。

And then, of course, GEICO came out with an even better model, but State Farm was huge by that time. Allstate was very, very large. And it’s taken us since 1936 to become number two.

然后，当然，GEICO 推出了一个更好的模型，但到那时 State Farm 已经非常庞大。Allstate 也非常非常大。自 1936 年以来，我们花了很长时间才成为第二。

Now, I have some projections that if I live to be 100, that we should be number one. And I tell GEICO, I’m going do my part. So the rest is up to them. (Laughter)

现在，我有一些预测，如果我活到 100 岁，我们应该是第一名。我告诉 GEICO，我会尽我的努力。所以剩下的就靠他们了。（笑声）

We will gain share, in my view. We will gain share month after month, year after year, as long as we never forget that our job is to take extremely good care of the customer, and as long as we can properly rate risks.

在我看来，我们将会获得市场份额。只要我们永远不忘记我们的工作是极好地照顾客户，并且能够正确评估风险，我们将会月复一月、年复一年地获得市场份额。

We’ve got some basic advantages that will enable us to do that as long as we take care of those two matters. And Tony Nicely has done a job that belongs in, you know, world’s hall of fame, in terms of achieving that objective.

我们有一些基本优势，只要我们处理好这两件事，就能实现这个目标。而托尼·尼克利所做的工作在实现这一目标方面，堪称世界名人堂的成就。

The 15 years prior to Tony coming — taking over — roughly 15 years, maybe 14 years — the market share had hovered around 2 percent. And you know, maybe two-one or two-two. And you know, since he took over in 1993, it’s gone to ten-plus and it will keep going.

在托尼接手之前的 15 年——大约 15 年，也许 14 年——市场份额一直徘徊在 2%左右。你知道，也许是 2.1%或 2.2%。自从他在 1993 年接手以来，市场份额已经上升到 10%以上，并且还会继续增长。

But State Farm has got a net worth of probably 70 billion now or there abouts, 60 to 70 billion, and they’ve got a strong presence in homeowners and they’ve got a strong agency force. They’ve got a lot of satisfied customers. So it won’t come fast, but I do think it will come. Charlie?

但State Farm的净资产现在可能在 700 亿左右，60 到 70 亿，他们在房主市场上有强大的存在，并且拥有强大的代理团队。他们有很多满意的客户。所以这不会来得很快，但我确实认为它会到来。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, GEICO to me is very much like Costco. And one of the reasons it’s succeeded is that they really feel a holy duty to have a wonderful product at a very low price.

查理·芒格：对我来说，GEICO 很像 Costco。它成功的原因之一是他们确实感到有一种神圣的责任，以非常低的价格提供优质的产品。

A lot of people talk that game, but very few have it just right down under the body and soul of the company. But GEICO does, and companies like that do tend to grind ahead over time.

很多人谈论这个游戏，但很少有人真正理解公司的核心和灵魂。但 GEICO 做到了，像这样的公司往往会随着时间的推移不断前进。

WARREN BUFFETT: One thing you’ll find about it, I think this is true about Costco, too, it’s certainly true about GEICO, is that people don’t come and go from there as they — I mean, we have practically no one from the rest of the insurance industry that’s come over to GEICO, and they don’t leave us.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为你会发现这一点，我认为这对好市多也是如此，对 GEICO 来说更是如此，人们不会像其他地方那样进进出出——我的意思是，几乎没有来自其他保险行业的人来到 GEICO，他们也不会离开我们。

I mean, they really have their own idea about how it should be done, what should be done right. And it becomes very, very reinforced. And, of course, it becomes reinforced by success. Is that true at Costco, Charlie?

当然，他们真的有自己的一套想法，关于事情应该如何完成，以及哪些事情应该做得正确。而且这种想法会变得非常、非常根深蒂固。当然，它也会因成功而得到强化。查理，在好市多也是这样吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, Costco’s unbelievable. And it reminds me very much of GEICO, and I’m not surprised that both companies keep taking share.

查理·芒格：哦，Costco 真是不可思议。这让我想起了 GEICO，我并不惊讶这两家公司不断扩大市场份额。

It’s easy to talk the game, but living the game is something else. I mean, it’s against the human nature of many entrepreneurial people to try and get the price down and the service quality up all the time. I mean, it’s like wearing the ultimate hair shirt and yet it works.

说起来容易做起来难。我的意思是，许多创业者的人性都是尽量压低价格，提高服务质量。我的意思是，这就像穿着终极苦行服，但它却有效。

51. Has Buffett’s frugality hurt Berkshire?

巴菲特的节俭是否伤害了伯克希尔？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，3 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Neil Patel from Chicago. I greatly admire the way you have lived a frugal personal life even with your considerable wealth.

观众成员：巴菲特先生，我叫尼尔·帕特尔，来自芝加哥。我非常钦佩您在拥有可观财富的情况下，仍然过着节俭的个人生活。

How do you think your frugality has helped Berkshire shareholders over the years? And Charlie, are there any instances where you think that Warren’s frugality has hurt Berkshire and shareholders?

你认为你的节俭在这些年里如何帮助了伯克希尔的股东？查理，你认为沃伦的节俭有没有伤害到伯克希尔和股东的情况？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, first of all, let’s ask who is the more frugal between us. Charlie, who do you think — (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：首先，让我们问一下谁更节俭。查理，你觉得谁更节俭——（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in personal consumption, Warren is more frugal. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，在个人消费方面，沃伦更节俭。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Would you care to give an example? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：你能举个例子吗？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren lives in the same house he bought for a very modest price, what, in 1950-something?

查理·芒格：沃伦住在他在 1950 年左右以非常低的价格买的同一所房子里

WARREN BUFFETT: I bought in 1958, and you moved into yours about 1960, didn’t you?

沃伦·巴菲特：我在 1958 年买的，你大约在 1960 年搬进你的房子，是吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and I paid more. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我付得更多。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But he designed his own —

沃伦·巴菲特：但他设计了自己的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely, I could get —

查理·芒格：当然，我可以得到——

WARREN BUFFETT: — he designed his own house.

沃伦·巴菲特：——他设计了自己的房子。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — he’s more frugal.

查理·芒格：——他更节俭。

WARREN BUFFETT: He did not pay an architect, right?

沃伦·巴菲特：他没有支付给建筑师，对吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I did, I paid an architect $1,900. It was as much as 30 percent of the normal price.

查理·芒格：我付给了一位建筑师 1,900 美元。这是正常价格的 30%。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Notice how he remembers the details. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。注意他是如何记住细节的。（笑声）

No, I would — I have everything in life I want. It’s a very simple thing. If there’s anything that money can buy — there are things money can’t buy, but if there’s anything money could buy that I wanted, I’d do it this afternoon. I wouldn’t have any problem with that at all.

不，我会——我拥有生活中想要的一切。这是一件非常简单的事情。如果有任何金钱能买到的东西——有些东西是金钱买不到的，但如果有我想要的金钱能买到的东西，我今天下午就会去做。我对此完全没有问题。

I do not think that standard of living equates with cost of living beyond a certain point. I mean, up to a certain point there’s no question that it does in — in terms of having good housing, good health, good health service, good food, everything. But — good transportation.

我认为生活水平与生活成本在某个点之后并不等同。我的意思是，在某个点之前，毫无疑问它们是相等的——在拥有良好的住房、良好的健康、良好的医疗服务、良好的食物等方面。但——良好的交通。

But there’s a point I think, if anything, you start getting inverse correlation. My life would not be happier, and it’d be worse, if I had six or eight houses or, you know, a whole bunch of different things I could have. It just doesn’t correlate.

但我认为有一点，如果有什么的话，你开始得到反向相关。我的生活不会更快乐，如果我拥有六或八栋房子，或者你知道的，我可以拥有一大堆不同的东西，那会更糟。它根本没有相关性。

And so I — having everything I have, I mean, you can’t have more than that. And that doesn’t really make any — it makes a difference up to a point. I mean, you could start thinking a lot differently when you got to X, but when you get to ten-X, or a 100-X, or 1,000-X, it just doesn’t make any possible difference. Charlie, can you —?

所以我——拥有我所拥有的一切，我的意思是，你不能拥有更多。那实际上并没有什么——在某种程度上是有区别的。我的意思是，当你达到 X 时，你可能会开始有很大的不同，但当你达到十倍、百倍或千倍时，这就没有任何可能的区别了。查理，你能——？

CHARLIE MUNGER: The frugality, basically, has helped Berkshire. And I look out at this audience and I see a bunch of understated, frugal people, too. We collect you people. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：节俭，从本质上讲，帮助伯克希尔获得了成功。当我环顾四周，我看到很多朴实节俭的人。我们就是喜欢你们这样的人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But forget about it this weekend. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：但这个周末就别想这些了。（笑声和掌声）

The more you buy the more you save at these prices, folks. (Laughter)

在这种价格下，买得越多，省得越多，伙计们。（笑声）

52. Berkshire doesn’t “begrudge” paying taxes

伯克希尔并不“吝啬”支付税款

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Azhar Quader who’s in the audience, Queens Court Capital, wants you to know that he’s a Columbia B School grad just like you, Warren.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自观众中的阿扎尔·夸德，他是皇后法院资本的，想让你知道他和你一样，沃伦，是哥伦比亚商学院的毕业生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good. 沃伦·巴菲特：好。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: The question is the following, “Berkshire paid $8.9 billion in taxes in 2013. Pfizer is currently contemplating an acquisition that would allow it to move its technical holding company overseas and thereby save income tax expense and create shareholder value. Is this something you and Charlie would ever consider if it would create value for Berkshire shareholders?”

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：问题是，“伯克希尔在 2013 年支付了 89 亿美元的税款。辉瑞目前正在考虑一项收购，这将使其能够将技术控股公司迁往海外，从而节省所得税费用并为股东创造价值。如果这能为伯克希尔的股东创造价值，你和查理会考虑这种做法吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the answer to that is no. What do you say, Charlie? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为答案是否定的。查理，你怎么看？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it would be — I think it would be crazy to be as prosperous as Berkshire and get our tax to zero while we remain this prosperous. That would not be a legitimate ideal. (Applause)

查理·芒格：我认为这将是——我认为如果像伯克希尔这样繁荣，却把我们的税收降到零，同时我们仍然如此繁荣，这将是疯狂的。这将不是一个合法的理想。（鼓掌）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We could not have done Berkshire in any other country except the United States, either. You know, and just look at what we’ve acquired and everything.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在其他国家无法做到伯克希尔。你知道，看看我们所收购的一切。

America has, in a very, very, very big way helped Charlie and I become very, very, very rich. (Laughs). Charlie?

美国以非常非常非常大的方式帮助查理和我变得非常非常非常富有。（笑）查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got no complaints. And I look around at this group, I see you at breakfast, it’s a very happy group of people. I don’t think a lot of people are gnashing their teeth that somebody else has a little more.

查理·芒格：我没有任何抱怨。我环顾这个小组，看到你们在早餐时，大家都是一群非常快乐的人。我不认为很多人会因为别人多一点而咬牙切齿。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we don’t pay — I don’t want to make it holier than thou, this stuff. We don’t pay anything beyond that — when we get all through figuring out tax on our 20,000 page-plus return, we just don’t — we don’t add a tip of 20 percent or 15 percent or anything. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们不支付——我不想让这件事显得高人一等。我们不支付超过这个的费用——当我们完成对超过 20,000 页的报税表的计算时，我们就是不——我们不会再加上 20%或 15%的小费或其他任何东西。（笑声）

And we do certain transactions which are tax driven. We’re in low-income housing tax credits, which actually George Bush 41 congratulated me for. So it’s bipartisan.

我们进行某些以税收为驱动的交易。我们参与低收入住房税收抵免，实际上乔治·布什 41号总统为此向我表示祝贺。所以这是两党合作的。

We — the wind energy deals we do, the solar deals we do, they are tax driven to — I mean, they won’t make economic sense otherwise.

我们——我们所做的风能交易、太阳能交易，都是受税收驱动的——我的意思是，否则它们在经济上是没有意义的。

So we follow the rules. But we don’t begrudge the taxes we pay. We’ve earned a lot of money while paying U.S. taxes. (Applause)

所以我们遵守规则。但我们并不怨恨我们所缴纳的税款。在缴纳美国税的同时，我们赚了很多钱。（掌声）

53. Try for Mexico’s rail freight market?

尝试进入墨西哥的铁路货运市场？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, Burlington Northern’s main competitor in the west, Union Pacific, generates around 10 percent of its revenue from freight moving to and from Mexico. It also owns a 20 percent stake in the large Mexican railroad, Ferromex.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，伯灵顿北方铁路在西部的主要竞争对手，联合太平洋铁路，约有 10%的收入来自于往返于墨西哥的货运。它还拥有大型墨西哥铁路 Ferromex 的 20%股份。

Given the expectation for strong auto production growth in Mexico with 30 percent more capacity coming online in the next two years, and the potential for additional near-sourcing manufacturing in Mexico, how attractive do you find the Mexican freight market?

考虑到预计墨西哥汽车生产将强劲增长，未来两年将新增 30%的产能，以及在墨西哥进行更多近源制造的潜力，您认为墨西哥货运市场的吸引力如何？

And assuming that the answer to that question is positive, would it not be a greater benefit to Burlington Northern to own the smallest Class-I railroad at Kansas City Southern, which generates about half its revenue from its Mexican concession, whether than just receiving cargo from the firm?

假设这个问题的答案是肯定的，那么对于伯灵顿北方公司来说，拥有在堪萨斯城南方的最小一级铁路（该铁路约一半的收入来自其墨西哥特许经营权）是否比仅仅从该公司接收货物更有利呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Union Pacific has a big edge in terms of Mexico. I mean, their route structure is such, I think they cross the border at six different places. Their route structure is far better than ours in relation to Mexico.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，联合太平洋在墨西哥方面有很大的优势。我的意思是，他们的路线结构是这样的，我认为他们在六个不同的地方越过边界。他们的路线结构在与墨西哥的关系上远远优于我们的。

And Kansas — it’s true as you say, that Kansas City Southern has a very significant presence in Mexico.

堪萨斯——你说得对，堪萨斯城南方铁路在墨西哥有着非常重要的存在。

But, in terms of what we can do with our money and what we see as the prospects — there are good prospects there, but there are good prospects elsewhere for traffic, too.

但是，就我们可以用钱做什么以及我们看到的前景而言——那里有良好的前景，但其他地方也有良好的交通前景。

So it doesn’t make sense for us. But, you know, maybe someday something will, but — the math does not work for Mexico. But we’re continuously thinking about Mexico, but we’re thinking about lots of other markets, too.

所以这对我们来说没有意义。但是，你知道，也许有一天会有合适的机会，但——这个数学对墨西哥来说不成立。不过我们一直在考虑墨西哥，但我们也在考虑很多其他市场。

There are lots of possibilities for moving more freight on the BNSF over the years. And we won’t forget about Mexico, but we won’t do anything silly, either. Charlie?

多年来，BNSF 有很多增加货运的可能性。我们不会忘记墨西哥，但也不会做任何愚蠢的事情。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t have anything to say.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好说的。

You know, it’s awfully easy to imagine combinations that just make you rich with sleight of hand. And, of course, the easiest transaction is buying a competitor. But most of that stuff, when you get to a certain size, you can’t do. So why spend time even thinking about it? I’m afraid Burlington Northern is going have to get ahead on its own from here on.

你知道，想象一些只需巧妙手法就能让你致富的组合是非常容易的。当然，最简单的交易就是收购竞争对手。但当你达到一定规模时，大多数这些事情是无法做到的。那么，为什么还要花时间去思考这些呢？我担心伯灵顿北方铁路从现在开始必须独立发展。

WARREN BUFFETT: Wouldn’t worry about that.

沃伦·巴菲特：对此不必担心。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m not worried about it.

查理·芒格：我对此不担心。

54. Intrinsic value and the Berkshire model

内在价值与伯克希尔模型

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. Dan Hua from Los Angeles. My wife, Cora, and I are thrilled to be here.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我是来自洛杉矶的丹·华。我和我的妻子科拉很高兴能在这里。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re delighted to have you.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们很高兴能有你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. You earlier today discussed intrinsic value, and I’m a big fan of Graham and Fisher, especially “Security Analysis.” What differences do you have, if any, for calculating intrinsic value, versus what was said in “Security Analysis?”

观众成员：谢谢你。你今天早些时候讨论了内在价值，我非常喜欢格雷厄姆和费舍尔，尤其是《证券分析》。在计算内在价值方面，你有什么不同之处吗？与《证券分析》中所说的相比？

And for examples, how does management factor into that? You recently mentioned evaluating management is like dating, and recently you said, also, management does matter.

管理在其中扮演什么角色？你最近提到评估管理层就像约会，最近你也说过，管理层确实很重要。

My second part is, which company do you fear the most? Why is it that no one else has done what you have done? I mean, Coca-Cola has their Pepsi. Thank you.

我的第二个问题是，你最害怕哪家公司？为什么没有其他公司做过你所做的事情？我的意思是，可口可乐有百事可乐。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — actually Graham didn’t get too specific about intrinsic value in terms of precise calculations. But intrinsic value has come to be equated with, and I think quite properly, with what you might call private business value.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上格雷厄姆并没有对内在价值进行太具体的精确计算。但内在价值已被等同于，我认为是非常恰当的，你可以称之为私人企业价值。

Now, I’m not sure who was the first one that came up with it, but — well, the first one that came up with it was Aesop, actually. But the intrinsic value of any business, if you could foresee the future perfectly, is the present value of all cash that will be ever distributed for that business between now and judgment day.

现在，我不确定是谁最先提出这个观点，但——实际上，最先提出这个观点的是伊索。不过，任何企业的内在价值，如果你能够完美地预见未来，就是从现在到审判日之间，所有将要分配给该企业的现金的现值。

And we’re not perfect at estimating that, obviously. (Laughs)

我们显然在估计这方面并不完美。（笑）

But that’s what an investment or a business is all about. You put money in and you take money out.

但这就是投资或商业的本质。你投入资金，然后再取出资金。

Aesop said, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” Now, he said that around 600 B.C. or something like that, but that hasn’t been improved on very much by the business professors now.

伊索说：“手中的鸟胜过林中的两只。”他大约在公元前 600 年左右说过这句话，但现在的商学院教授对此并没有太多改进。

Now the question is, you know, how sure are you that there are two in the bush, you know? How far away is the bush? There are all kinds of things. What are interest rates? But I mean, Aesop wanted to leave us something to play with over the next couple thousand years, so he didn’t spell the whole thing out. But that’s what intrinsic value essentially is.

现在的问题是，你知道，你有多确定灌木丛里有两只吗？灌木丛有多远？还有各种各样的事情。利率是多少？但我的意思是，伊索想留给我们一些东西，让我们在接下来的几千年里玩弄，所以他没有把整个事情说清楚。但这就是内在价值的本质。

And, we don’t — Graham would say that, Phil Fisher would say that. Phil Fisher would say that in calculating that, he would want to look a lot harder at the qualitative factors of the business in making that estimate of how many birds were in the bush.

而且，我们并不——格雷厄姆会这么说，菲尔·费舍尔也会这么说。菲尔·费舍尔会说，在进行这种计算时，他会更仔细地考虑业务的定性因素，以估算灌木丛中有多少只鸟。

Graham would say he would want to see the bush — you know, $2 worth of cash in the bush, you know, and to pay a dollar for it now.

格雷厄姆会说他想看看灌木丛——你知道，灌木丛里有 2 美元的现金，你知道，现在只花 1 美元就能买到。

One emphasized quantitative factors and one emphasized qualitative factors, but neither one would have disagreed with the math.

一个强调定量因素，一个强调定性因素，但两者都不会对数学有异议。

And I started out very influenced by Graham, so I emphasized quantitative factors. Charlie came along and said I was all wrong, and that he’d learned more in law than I’d learned in financial studies and everything, and that I should think more about qualitative factors, and he was right. And Phil Fisher said the same thing.

我一开始受到格雷厄姆的很大影响，因此我强调定量因素。查理过来告诉我我完全错了，他在法律方面学到的比我在金融研究中学到的多，他认为我应该更多地考虑定性因素，他是对的。菲尔·费舍尔也说了同样的话。

But that’s what intrinsic value is about, you know. if you buy a McDonald’s franchise, if you buy General Motors, whatever it may be, the real question is, A) are you going to have to put more cash into after you buy it? But it’s really cash in, cash out? When? What discount rate? All the standard stuff.

但是，这就是内在价值的意义所在，你知道吗？如果你买了一家麦当劳的加盟店，如果你买了一家通用汽车公司，无论它是什么，真正的问题是，A）你在买下它之后是否还要投入更多资金？但真正重要的是现金流入和流出？什么时候？什么折扣率？所有这些标准的东西。

In terms of — if I had a silver bullet, what company would I shoot as being a threat to us? I don’t really — I don’t see any competitor to Berkshire. I see private equity buying lots of businesses and having an advantage in that they’ll leverage up when we won’t, and also that presently they can borrow money very cheap and all of that.

在我看来——如果我有一个银弹，我会把哪个公司视为对我们的威胁？我真的——我看不到任何对伯克希尔构成竞争的公司。我看到私募股权收购了很多企业，并且他们有一个优势，那就是在我们不愿意的时候，他们会加杠杆，而且目前他们可以以非常低的成本借钱，所有这些。

So I mean, there are always going to be people competing with us to buy businesses. But — which is our main business — main occupation for me and Charlie.

所以我的意思是，总会有人和我们竞争购买企业。但——这就是我们的主要业务——对我和查理来说是主要职业。

But I don’t see anybody that’s got a model, or trying to build a model, that will essentially go after what we’re trying to achieve, which is to buy wonderful businesses from people that care about where their business goes, and who generally want to keep on running them. Charlie?

但我没有看到任何人有一个模型，或者试图建立一个模型，基本上是为了追求我们想要实现的目标，那就是从关心自己企业未来的人那里购买优秀的企业，并且他们通常希望继续经营这些企业。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as I’ve said earlier, I think the Berkshire model as now constructed will have — as said in show business, with legs. It will go a long time, and I think it will be quite creditable. And I think it has enough advantage that it will just keep going a long time. And I think most big businesses don’t.

查理·芒格：嗯，正如我之前所说，我认为现在构建的伯克希尔模式将会——就像娱乐圈所说的，有“生命力”。它会持续很长时间，我认为它会相当值得信赖。我认为它有足够的优势，可以持续很长时间。而我认为大多数大型企业则做不到这一点。

If you stop to think about it, all the great big businesses of yesteryear, how few of them have really gotten big and stayed big.

如果你停下来想一想，过去那些伟大的大企业，有多少真正做大并且保持大的呢？

Of the really old businesses, only one stayed big and that was Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. And so we’re getting up into a territory where very few people keep going well.

在真正古老的企业中，只有一家保持了规模，那就是洛克菲勒的标准石油。因此，我们正进入一个很少有人能够持续发展的领域。

But I think what we’ll be more like Standard Oil, than we’ll be like ordinary businesses, because I think we will just keep going. We will keep doing what we’re already doing, and we’ll keep learning from our mistakes.

但我认为我们更像标准石油，而不是普通企业，因为我认为我们会继续前进。我们会继续做我们已经在做的事情，并且会继续从我们的错误中学习。

And the people up here are no longer all that important. The momentum’s in place, the ethos is in place. It’s going to keep going. And to you young people in the audience, I always say, “Don’t be too quick to sell the stock.”

这里的人们不再那么重要。势头已经形成，精神也已经建立。它将继续下去。对在场的年轻人，我总是说：“不要太快卖掉股票。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Why don’t we get more copycats?

沃伦·巴菲特：为什么我们没有更多的模仿者？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It reminds me of our mutual friend, Ed Davis. He figured out how to do an operation that was so difficult that he operated the bottom of a dark hole with instruments of his own creation. He gave his own shots by Novocain, 87 of them, while he was operating. And it was a better operation. His death rate was 2 percent and everybody else was 20.

查理·芒格：这让我想起我们的共同朋友埃德·戴维斯。他想出一个办法做一项极其困难的手术，他自己设计了工具，在伸手不见五指的黑洞里进行操作。他在手术过程中给自己注射了 87 针诺瓦卡因。手术效果却更好，他的死亡率只有 2%，而其他人则高达 20%。

And the other surgeons came to copy him, and they watched him. And they just said, “Well, I don’t think I’ll try and copy that.” (Laughs)

其他外科医生来模仿他，他们观察着他。他们只是说：“嗯，我想我不会尝试去模仿那个。”（笑）

I think it looks just too hard to do. There’s — nothing in the American business school teaches people to be like Berkshire.

我觉得这看起来太难了。美国商学院没有任何课程教人们像伯克希尔那样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Eddie Davis is the guy that, in effect, introduced the two of us. He was a famous urologist here in Omaha, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：埃迪·戴维斯实际上是把我们两个人介绍在一起的人。他是奥马哈著名的泌尿科医生，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But people didn’t try and learn his operation. And it doesn’t look all that easy. It’s very different.

查理·芒格：但人们并没有尝试去了解他的运作。而且看起来并不那么简单。这是非常不同的。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s slow, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：这也很慢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And it’s slow, it’s — yeah, very slow.

查理·芒格：而且这很慢，确实，非常慢。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the slowness deters more people than anything else.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为缓慢比其他任何因素都更能阻止人们。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And the difficulty with being slow is you’re dead before it’s finished. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：慢的困难在于你在完成之前就已经死了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s kind of cheerful. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这听起来有点愉快。（笑声）

Carol, let’s come up with something a little — (Laughs)

卡罗尔，我们想出一些稍微——（笑）

CAROL LOOMIS: Well, for a more cheerful subject, mine is inflation. In it — (Laughter)

卡罗尔·卢米斯：好吧，谈一个更愉快的话题，我的话题是通货膨胀。在其中——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Only compared to Charlie can inflation be cheerful. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：只有与查理相比，通货膨胀才能显得愉快。（笑声）

55. Positive and negative effects of inflation

通货膨胀的正面和负面影响

CAROL LOOMIS: This comes from Larry Pitkowsky and Keith Trauner at the GoodHaven Fund.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这来自于 GoodHaven 基金的拉里·皮特科夫斯基和基思·特劳纳。

“In your 1981 shareholder letter, you discuss returns on equity, interest rates and inflation, and how difficult it was for many companies to function under inflationary conditions. Indeed that Berkshire itself was not immune and would be negatively — could be negatively affected.

在您 1981 年的股东信中，您讨论了股本回报、利率和通货膨胀，以及许多公司在通货膨胀条件下运作的困难。实际上，伯克希尔本身也未能幸免，可能会受到负面影响。

“Today it seems like every central banker in the world is desperate to create inflation, something that is generally great for debtors, not so great for creditors, and difficult for owners and managers.

“今天，似乎世界上每位中央银行家都渴望创造通货膨胀，这对债务人来说通常是件好事，对债权人则不太好，对所有者和管理者来说则很困难。”

Should investors and business owners be thinking more about inflation and higher interest rates after 30 years of declines in both? How would Berkshire behave differently if it became apparent that the future was turning inflationary?”

投资者和企业主是否应该在经历了 30 年的通货膨胀和利率下降后，更加关注通货膨胀和更高的利率？如果未来显现出通货膨胀的趋势，伯克希尔会有什么不同的表现？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, inflation would hurt us, but it would hurt most businesses. It doesn’t — there’s certain assets that if highly leveraged, obviously, would benefit from inflation. But, well, it’s just —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，通货膨胀会对我们造成伤害，但它会伤害大多数企业。某些资产如果高度杠杆化，显然会从通货膨胀中受益。但，嗯，这只是——

We’ll set up an inflationary condition. Let’s just assume tonight that drones are sent up over all of the United States and they happen to drop a million dollars in every household.

我们将设置一个通货膨胀的条件。今晚我们假设无人机在整个美国上空飞行，并且恰好在每个家庭中投放一百万美元。

Now, the question is would the country be better off? Every individual would now have — or every family would now have a million dollars that they didn’t have the day before.

现在，问题是这个国家会更好吗？每个人现在都有——或者每个家庭现在都有一百万美元，而他们在前一天并没有。

The one thing I can guarantee you is that Berkshire would be worse off at that point, obviously. And obviously, what I’ve described would be wildly inflationary.

我可以保证的一件事是，伯克希尔在那个时候显然会更糟。而且显然，我所描述的将会导致极度通货膨胀。

The trick in that circumstance is to find out that you’ve got a million dollars before anybody else finds out that they have, and you’ll do very well if you’re first.

在这种情况下的诀窍是要在其他人发现他们有一百万美元之前，先发现自己拥有一百万美元，如果你是第一个发现的，你会做得很好。

But essentially, you don’t create wealth by inflation or by having — you can move it around, but you don’t create it by inflation, and you don’t — a firm like Berkshire, you know, our earnings per share would go up. The intrinsic value of our business, measured in dollars, would go up. But under lots of inflation, unless we had leveraged those businesses, the value of your investment, in real terms, would go down. Charlie?

但本质上，你并不是通过通货膨胀来创造财富，或者通过拥有——你可以转移它，但你并不是通过通货膨胀来创造财富，像伯克希尔这样的公司，你知道，我们的每股收益会增加。我们业务的内在价值，以美元计量，会增加。但在大量通货膨胀的情况下，除非我们对这些业务进行了杠杆化，否则你投资的实际价值会下降。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we had a test of hyperinflation in Weimar Germany, and the people who owned stocks in places like Berkshire got through. And they didn’t prosper joyously, but they got through. And everybody else, practically, life insurance policies, bank deposits, you name it, got wiped out.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们在魏玛德国经历了超级通货膨胀的考验，拥有像伯克希尔这样的股票的人熬过来了。他们并没有欣欣向荣，但他们熬过来了。几乎所有其他人，寿险、银行存款，您说的都没了。

And, of course, if you create so much misery that you get a Hitler, and a World War, and a Holocaust and so forth, it’s not a good thing to let things go that far.

当然，如果你制造了如此多的痛苦，以至于出现了希特勒、世界大战和大屠杀等等，那让事情发展到这种地步就不是一件好事。

And so I’m — I don’t like this huge confidence that all you have to do is just keep printing money and spending it. I think there’s some limit to when that will work, and I am never going forget Weimar Germany. And I don’t think any of the rest of us should either.

所以我——我不喜欢这种巨大的信心，认为只要不断印钞和消费就可以。我认为这种做法是有一定限度的，我永远不会忘记魏玛德国。我也不认为我们其他人应该忘记。

We can handle a little bit of subpar growth for some stretch or other. But it would be quite dangerous to let the whole damn thing blow up because a bunch of crazy politicians were printing money. (Applause)

我们可以忍受一段时间的低于预期的增长。但如果因为一群疯狂的政治家在印钞票而让整个事情崩溃，那将是非常危险的。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If you own a home, though, with a very large mortgage, and you have incredible inflation that wipes out the mortgage, then you’ve still got the home. I mean, it’s just —

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，如果你拥有一套房子，但有一笔非常大的抵押贷款，并且你经历了巨大的通货膨胀，抵消了抵押贷款，那么你仍然拥有这套房子。我的意思是，这只是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: In Weimar, Germany, they gave you the mortgage back at the end. It was very interesting. That’s the one thing they did right. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：在德国魏玛，他们在最后把抵押贷款还给你。这非常有趣。这是他们做对的唯一一件事。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s way ahead of me, folks. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：他远远领先于我，伙计们。（笑）

56. Why companies make “dumb” deals

为什么公司会做“愚蠢”的交易

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: In evaluating the after-tax returns Berkshire earns on its acquisitions of non-insurance businesses, whether it be the utilities, the railroad, or the manufacturing service and retailing business, in terms of choosing a benchmark, what would be your best estimate of the returns on acquisitions earned by an aggregate of all American industry, adjusted, of course, to exclude the impact of accounting write-offs and equalizing for leverage?

乔纳森·布兰特：在评估伯克希尔对其非保险业务收购（包括公用事业、铁路、制造服务和零售业务）的税后回报时，在选择基准方面，您对美国所有行业的收购回报的最佳估计是多少，当然，经调整后不包括会计冲销的影响并进行杠杆均衡？

WARREN BUFFETT: That sounds too tough for me, but go ahead, Charlie. I’ll be thinking. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这对我来说听起来太难了，但你继续，查理。我会思考的。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, let me summarize. I think the sum total of all acquisitions done by American industry will be lousy. It’s in the nature of corporations that are prosperous to be talked into dumb deals, and bureaucracy tends to feed on itself and create unnecessary costs.

查理·芒格：好吧，让我总结一下。我认为美国工业所做的所有收购的总和将是糟糕的。繁荣的公司往往会被说服做愚蠢的交易，而官僚机构往往会自我滋生，造成不必要的成本。

So I think the history of acquisitions is that it’s not an enormous way to wealth. Now, it has been for us, but we’re very peculiar, and luckily a lot of people don’t want to be peculiar in our way.

所以我认为收购的历史表明，这并不是通往财富的巨大途径。现在，对我们来说确实如此，但我们非常特殊，幸运的是很多人并不想以我们的方式变得特殊。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would — it’s really hard to, you know, come up with a useful answer on that. But I certainly —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会——这真的很难，你知道，给出一个有用的答案。但我肯定——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But you don’t have a great deal of optimism, do you?

查理·芒格：但你并没有太多的乐观，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: When we read that a company we don’t control is going to make an acquisition, I’m much more inclined to cry than to smile.

沃伦·巴菲特：当我们得知一家我们不控制的公司要进行收购时，我更倾向于哭泣而不是微笑。

But on the other hand, we love making acquisitions ourselves, so it’s a little hard to get too harsh just because we don’t like the other guy’s acquisitions.

但另一方面，我们自己也喜欢进行收购，所以仅仅因为我们不喜欢对方的收购而过于苛刻是有点困难的。

I have been — I have sat in on, probably, hundreds of acquisition discussions conducted by people I didn’t control, as a director. And most of them have been bad ideas, but there have been some —

我曾经——作为一名董事，我可能参加了数百场由我无法控制的人进行的收购讨论。大多数都是糟糕的主意，但也有一些——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Some are mediocre. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：有些人很平庸。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: A great case is GEICO. I mean, it’s really a great case study because GEICO had this wonderful business prior to going off the tracks in the early 1970s, but it’d been an incredible business and everybody — it was well known in the financial world.

沃伦·巴菲特：一个很好的例子是 GEICO。我的意思是，这确实是一个很好的案例研究，因为 GEICO 在 20 世纪 70 年代初走下坡路之前有一项很棒的业务，但它一直是一项令人难以置信的业务，每个人——它在金融界是众所周知的。

And then it went off the tracks in its own business, got back on the tracks. And then in the next — after it got back on the tracks, it made a couple of acquisitions. And they weren’t disasters, but they certainly weren’t successes, and they tended to take people’s — I think they took their eyes off the ball in terms of the potential of GEICO itself.

然后它在自己的业务上偏离了轨道，后来又回到了轨道上。在接下来的时间里——在它回到轨道之后，它进行了几次收购。这些收购并不是灾难，但也绝对不是成功，并且它们往往让人们——我认为它们让人们忽视了 GEICO 本身的潜力。

So the accounting costs of those — there were two acquisitions in particular — the accounting costs of those two acquisitions was not — it was poor, but it wasn’t disastrous.

因此，这两项并购的具体财务成本——尤其是这两项并购的财务处理成本——算不上是——处理不佳，但也谈不上灾难性。

But if you look to secondary effects, it was huge. I mean, there were a dozen years there or so where all kinds of gains could have been made that weren’t. And you don’t get those years back.

但如果你考虑到次要影响，那就非常巨大。我是说，有十多年时间，各种收益本可以获得，但却没有得到。而这些年是无法再回来的。

Now, that was probably a net plus for Berkshire, you know, in the end, because we’d bought half of the company then we got to buy the other half later on. If they’d done wonderfully, we probably would have never bought the second half. Now, maybe the first half would have been worth that much more.

现在，这对伯克希尔来说可能是一个净收益，因为我们当时买了公司的半数股份，后来又得以购买另一半。如果他们表现得非常出色，我们可能就不会再买第二半了。现在，也许第一半的价值会高出那么多。

But it’s human nature, to some degree, to, you know, keep wanting — I mean, normally the people who get to be CEOs are not shrinking violets, you know.

但就人的本性而言，在某种程度上总是想要——我的意思是，通常能够当上 CEO 的人都不甘平庸。

And they have animal spirits, as Keynes talked about, and they like to do things. And the supporting staff certainly senses that they like to do things. I mean, they often have people in charge of strategy or acquisitions, or all of those things.

他们拥有凯恩斯所说的动物精神，他们喜欢做事。支持人员当然也感觉到他们喜欢做事。我的意思是，他们通常负责战略或收购之类的事情。

What do you think those people are going to do? Sit around and suck their thumbs? No, they’re going keep coming up with deals. And the investment bankers will be, you know, calling on them daily.

你认为那些人会做什么？坐在那里吮吸拇指吗？不，他们会继续想出交易。而投资银行家每天都会给他们打电话。

So there are all these forces that push toward deals, and if you try to push toward deals, you’re going to get a lot of dumb deals.

所以有很多力量推动达成交易，如果你试图推动达成交易，你会得到很多愚蠢的交易。

We try very hard, Charlie and I, not to get eager to do a deal. We’re just eager to do a deal that makes sense.

我们努力不让自己急于达成交易。我们只是渴望达成一个合理的交易。

And that would be a lot harder if we had directors, strategy departments, whatever it might be, all pushing us toward, you know, what have you done in the last three months, or something of the sort.

这将会更加困难，如果我们有董事、战略部门，或者其他什么人，所有人都在催促我们，问你在过去三个月做了什么，或者类似的问题。

So the setting in which you operate really can be very important. Charlie, anything further?

所以你所处的环境确实非常重要。查理，还有其他要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but it’s — you know how much more tactful he is.

查理·芒格：不，但你知道他有多么圆滑。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well the comparison isn’t tough. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，比较起来并不难。（笑声）

57. Prosecute individuals or corporations?

起诉个人或公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：第五站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Russell Narig (PH) from Neenah, Wisconsin. The — not another Packer fan.

观众成员：我是来自威斯康星州尼纳的拉塞尔-纳里格（Russell Narig）。我不是包装工队的球迷。

The people in this hall tonight are here because of the invest into your money, in anticipation and hope that you and Charlie would make that investment grow.

今晚在这个大厅里的人们之所以在这里，是因为对你们的投资抱有期待和希望，希望你和查理能够让这笔投资增值。

We recognize that things go wrong and that we might lose money. But never, ever, has it ever crossed our minds that we’d be cheated out of their money.

我们认识到事情会出错，我们可能会亏钱。但我们从未想过会被欺骗，失去他们的钱。

Unfortunately, that — that’s not — that’s new — I’m sorry, having problems with this microphone. Unfortunately, particularly in the investment banking business, confidence, my confidence, and I’m sure the confidence of many people in this room, are falling.

不幸的是，这--这不是--这是新的--对不起，麦克风出了问题。不幸的是，特别是在投资银行业务方面，信心，我的信心，我相信在座许多人的信心，都在下降。

Particularly distressing are reports in the “New York Times” in the last week or so about private meetings in the Justice Department, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Fed, and others, about the need or desire, the requirement, perhaps, to bring criminal charges against some of the largest banks dealing business, for, among other things, knowingly laundering billions of Iranian dollars through our U.S. banks, knowingly laundering billions of drug cartel money through U.S. banks, soliciting on U.S. soil deals which would include tax evasion by moving assets offshore, and even fixing the LIBOR.

尤其令人不安的是，《纽约时报》在过去一周左右的时间里报道了司法部、证券交易委员会、美联储和其他机构私下召开会议，讨论是否有必要或有愿望，或许有必要对一些最大的商业银行提出刑事指控，因为这些银行在知情的情况下通过我们的美国银行清洗了数十亿美元的伊朗资金，在知情的情况下通过美国银行清洗了数十亿美元的贩毒集团资金。美国银行，故意通过美国银行清洗数十亿美元的贩毒集团资金，在美国领土上招揽交易，其中包括通过将资产转移到海外来逃税，甚至操纵伦敦银行同业拆借利率。

The problem the Justice Department is having is that they are being told that if they bring criminal charges against those banks, and we can list those banks, they’ve been in the “New York Times,” that those banks would be sorely hurt, may be required to go out of business, and require — and evolve into a new financial crisis of some sort. (Applause)

司法部面临的问题是，他们被告知如果对那些银行提起刑事指控（我们可以列出这些银行，它们已经在《纽约时报》上出现过），这些银行将受到严重打击，可能需要停业，并可能演变成某种新的金融危机。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, we can’t —

查理·芒格：现在，我们不能——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question — my question, though, to you is do you believe a financial crisis will be — come about as a result of bringing justice to criminal activity on a large scale? Or have we reached a new point where criminal activity in Wall Street is being institutionalized, sort of allowed to happen because they’re too big to fail, too big to go to jail, and too big to be regulated, to follow the law?

观众成员：我的问题是，您是否认为由于大规模追究犯罪活动的正义，会导致金融危机的出现？还是我们已经达到一个新的阶段，华尔街的犯罪活动正在被制度化，某种程度上被允许发生，因为他们太大而无法倒闭，太大而无法入狱，太大而无法受到监管，无法遵循法律？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you’re the lawyer, you take it up. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你是律师，你来处理吧。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think behavior on Wall Street has enormously improved as a result of the trauma we’ve just been through. And so I think the worst of it is behind us.

查理·芒格：我认为，华尔街的行为因我们刚经历的创伤而有了巨大的改善。因此，我认为最糟糕的已经过去了。

But you’re never going to have perfect behavior when a bunch of human beings live in a miasma of easy money. It’s just this is always going happen to some extent, and —

但当一群人生活在轻松赚钱的环境中时，你永远不可能有完美的行为。这种情况总会在某种程度上发生，——

WARREN BUFFETT: How do you feel about the prosecution of individuals versus the prosecution of corporations?

沃伦·巴菲特：您对个人起诉与公司起诉有什么看法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there’s hardly anything that changes behavior more than prosecuting individuals.

查理·芒格：我认为，没有什么比起诉个人更能改变行为了。

When they took Boy Scout leaders out of Pittsburgh or wherever it was and put them in the federal penitentiary for fixing steel prices, it really changed behavior of American businessmen. So I do think that a few criminal prosecutions do change behavior a lot. And it looks to me like we’ll get a few.

当他们把皮特斯堡或其他地方的童子军领袖送进联邦监狱，因为他们操纵钢铁价格，这确实改变了美国商人的行为。所以我确实认为，几起刑事起诉会大大改变行为。看起来我们会得到一些这样的案件。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I may be biased a little bit by the experience at Salomon, but — I lean way more toward prosecution of individuals than corporations.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我可能因为在所罗门的经历而有些偏见，但——我更倾向于起诉个人而不是公司。

You know, I literally saw, you know, a bad act, or maybe multiple bad acts, by just a couple of people and negligence in reporting by a couple more, you know, come close — certainly upsetting, hurting, and maybe destroying, you know, possibly thousands and thousands of other people’s lives, forgetting about the financial investment.

你知道，我确实看到了一些坏行为，或者可能是几起坏行为，仅仅是由几个人造成的，还有几个人在报告时的疏忽，接近——当然令人不安，伤害，甚至可能摧毁，可能是成千上万其他人的生活，忘记了财务投资。

And it is — it did seem to me, and that’s — had that experience a couple of other times in what I’ve seen, that — that it really — it may be easy — it’s way easier to prosecute the corporation. The corporation’s going write a check, and you know, I mean, it’s somebody else’s money.

而且我觉得——我确实有过几次这样的经历——这真的——起诉公司可能更容易。公司会开支票，你知道，我的意思是，这是别人的钱。

And the prosecutor knows he’s going get a win, basically, if he goes against the company, whereas he’s got a way tougher job going against individuals. The company’s going to cave, it’s just their calculus is such that it just doesn’t make sense to fight if they can write a check, whereas the individual is fighting to stay out of jail.

检察官知道，如果他对抗公司，基本上会赢，而对抗个人则要困难得多。公司会妥协，他们的计算方式是，如果可以写支票，就没有必要去争斗，而个人则是在为避免入狱而斗争。

So the prosecutor’s got an easy case, or relatively easy case, and probably a headline-grabbing case, if he goes against the corporation. And he has a grinded-out type of thing, which he can very well lose and which really takes a lot of work, against individuals. So — but I still lean very much — toward going against individuals. And —

所以检察官的案件相对简单，或者说相对容易，如果他对抗公司，可能还会成为头条新闻。而他还有一个耗时费力的案件，针对个人，他很可能会输。因此——但我仍然非常倾向于对抗个人。并且——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I do, too. That’s what I meant when I said when antitrust violations were regarded as forgivable offenses, menial sins, we had a lot of them, and we still have some now that we prosecute people criminally. But we have really changed behavior on price fixing by the individual prosecutions, and we haven’t had many of those prosecutions in finance yet. And we probably need some more. Don’t you agree with that?

查理·芒格：我也是。我所说的就是，当反垄断违规被视为可原谅的罪行、微不足道的罪过时，我们有很多这样的案例，现在我们仍然有一些人被刑事起诉。但通过对价格操纵的个别起诉，我们的行为确实发生了变化，而在金融领域，我们还没有很多这样的起诉。我们可能还需要更多。你同意吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s — absolutely, absolutely.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，绝对是，绝对是。

And I will tell you this: we have 300,000-plus people working at Berkshire. Somebody is doing something wrong now, I mean, that — you know, you cannot have a city of 300,000 people and not have somebody behaving badly.

我告诉你这一点：我们在伯克希尔有超过 30 万人在工作。现在肯定有人在做错事，我是说，你知道，你不可能有一个 30 万人口的城市而没有人行为不当。

And that’s the thing — that is the one thing that — I don’t worry about us making money, we’ll figure out a way to do that. And it may be better or worse than we hope for. But it won’t be a disaster, ever.

这就是问题所在——这就是我不担心我们赚钱的唯一原因，我们会找到办法做到这一点。结果可能会比我们希望的好，也可能会更糟。但这永远不会是个灾难。

The disaster is if somebody is doing something wrong that, you know, that actually reflects badly on the whole organization.

灾难在于如果有人做错了事情，这实际上会对整个组织产生负面影响。

And I know that’s, to a degree, out of my hands. I can tell the managers, and they can tell the people that work for them that reputation is more important than anything else. And that’s going to have an effect, and I think it’s going to have more of an effect than having them — giving them some 200-page manual.

我知道在某种程度上这超出了我的控制。我可以告诉经理们，他们可以告诉为他们工作的人，声誉比其他任何事情都重要。这会产生影响，我认为这会比给他们一本 200 页的手册更有效。

But it’s not going cure everything. And what we hope is when there is something wrong that we find it out early, and then it’s up to us to do something about it.

但这并不能治愈所有问题。我们希望的是，当出现问题时，我们能够尽早发现，然后由我们来采取措施。

But we will have a problem of some sort, at some time, because it just — you know, 300,000 people are not going to all behave properly every day. It just doesn’t happen.

但我们总会在某个时候遇到某种问题，因为你知道，30 万人不可能每天都表现得得体。这是不可能的。

But the individual prosecution, and I’ve written about that a little bit in the annual report in terms of — the way to change behavior is to have the fear, at least among people who may be doing the wrong things, is to have the fear that somehow it’s going to come home to them and hit them hard.

但个人起诉，我在年度报告中对此稍作了些许讨论——改变行为的方式是让那些可能做错事的人感到恐惧，至少要让他们害怕这件事最终会回到他们身上，并对他们造成严重影响。

And if the only fear is that the company’s going have to write a big check, you’re going to get way less change in behavior than if it’ll hit home to the individual. Becky? (Applause)

如果你唯一担心的是公司要开一张大支票，那么你的行为改变就会远远小于对个人的影响。贝基？

58. Effect of major railroad accident on BNSF and Berkshire

重大铁路事故对 BNSF 和伯克希尔的影响

BECKY QUICK: This comes from Mark Blakley from Tulsa, Oklahoma.

贝基·奎克：这来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的马克·布莱克利。

He says there’s been a number of railroad accidents in the past year. In January, the Wall Street Journal published an article highlighting the lack of insurance to cover a worst-case accident scenario.

他说过去一年发生了多起铁路事故。1 月份，《华尔街日报》发表了一篇文章，强调缺乏保险来覆盖最坏情况的事故场景。

“Mr. [Matt] Rose of BNSF was mentioned as wanting to set up an insurance fund funded by the railroads to protect the industry in case of an accident, similar to a fund currently set up by nuclear power companies, but that idea has gained no traction.

“BNSF 的[马特]罗斯先生提到希望设立一个由铁路公司资助的保险基金，以保护行业免受事故影响，类似于目前由核电公司设立的基金，但这个想法没有得到支持。”

“How would a worst-case accident scenario impact BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway? And if the industry is lacking insurance for such an event, how can the company protect itself, and what exposure does Berkshire have should a major accident occur?”

“最坏情况下的事故场景将如何影响 BNSF 和伯克希尔哈撒韦？如果行业缺乏针对此类事件的保险，公司如何保护自己？如果发生重大事故，伯克希尔将面临什么风险？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well we’re on both sides of that because Ajit [Jain] has offered the rail industry some very high limits to all the major railroads. But they don’t like his price, presumably. And I would say this, the four major railroads really have the financial capacity to pay a huge award if something really terrible happened.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在这方面是两面派，因为阿吉特（贾因）向所有主要铁路公司提供了一些非常高的限额。但他们显然不喜欢他的价格。我想说的是，四大主要铁路公司确实有财力支付巨额赔偿，如果发生了非常糟糕的事情。

The most — you know, I don’t know which is the most dangerous — they have what they call hazmat, hazardous materials, and rails have to carry them. You’re a common carrier, you’re forced to carry them. And the railroads would really prefer they didn’t carry them, but they do, they have to. And they probably can’t get enough, ever get enough, in the way of payments per carload to really compensate them for the risk involved.

最危险的，我不知道哪一种是最危险的——他们有一种叫做危险材料的东西，铁路必须运输这些材料。作为一个公共承运人，你被迫运输它们。铁路公司其实更希望不运输这些材料，但他们必须运输。而且，他们可能永远无法通过每车装的运费来真正补偿他们所面临的风险。

But the four major railroads, certainly have the — it might be a very, very significant financial hit to them, but I think they have the capability of, if something really drastic happened, I think they do have the financial capability to handle that size — kind of an award.

但是这四大铁路公司肯定会——这可能对他们来说是一个非常非常重大的财务打击，但我认为他们有能力，如果发生了真正严重的事情，我认为他们确实有财务能力来应对那种规模的——某种赔偿。

And if they feel that they don’t, they can buy insurance from Ajit, but so far we haven’t sold any.

如果他们觉得不需要，他们可以从 Ajit 那里购买保险，但到目前为止我们还没有卖出任何保险。

The companies have insurance, but they don’t like — they’re not going talk about the amounts that they have or anything of the sort because that becomes a honey pot sometimes, and it’s not advisable to discuss your insurance limits publicly.

这些公司有保险，但他们不喜欢——他们不会谈论他们拥有的金额或类似的事情，因为这有时会成为一个蜜罐，而且公开讨论你的保险限额并不明智。

But I would — it is true, as the writer mentions, that the nuclear risk — the government decided was too big, as they have with terrorism — decided it was too big to be borne by private industry.

但我会——正如作者提到的，核风险——政府决定这个风险太大，就像他们对待恐怖主义一样——决定这个风险太大，无法由私营行业承担。

I don’t think the consequences of any conceivable accident — you could probably dream up one — but of any conceivable accident on rails would go beyond the capability of the major railroads to pay. But it could be very, very large, relative to their net worth and relative to their current earnings. Charlie?

我认为任何可以想象的事故——你可能能想出一个——但在铁路上发生的任何可以想象的事故，其后果不会超出主要铁路公司的赔付能力。但相对于它们的净资产和当前收益，这可能会非常非常大。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the big surprise for everyone, of course, was British Petroleum.

查理·芒格：是的，当然，大家最大的惊讶是英国石油公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nobody in their wildest dreams believed that a major oil company, from an accident in one well, would have a loss in so many tens of billions of dollars. And, of course, that’s gotten a lot of attention.

查理·芒格：没有人会在他们最疯狂的梦想中相信，一家大型石油公司会因为一口井的事故而损失数百亿美元。当然，这引起了很多关注。

I don’t know about Warren, but after that happened, I would have less enthusiasm for drilling in the Gulf. It was just such a big loss compared to anything.

我不知道沃伦是怎么想的，但在那件事发生后，我对在海湾地区钻井的热情会大打折扣。与任何事情相比，这都是一个巨大的损失。

WARREN BUFFETT: And a gain, possible gain.

沃伦·巴菲特：还有一个可能的收益。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And gain — possible gain. And that was a big oil field they tapped into, but it wouldn’t remotely pay for this accident. And so — but I — Matt will know, the biggest rail accident in the history of the rails, has it cost $200 million? Is Matt there?

查理·芒格：还有可能的收益。这是他们开发的一个大油田，但这根本无法弥补这次事故的损失。所以——但是我——马特会知道，历史上最大的铁路事故，花费了 2 亿美元吗？马特在吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think — I don’t think Norfolk Southern has ever announced what that accident cost.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为——我认为诺福克南方铁路从未公布过那次事故的费用。

But we are not getting paid enough, I can tell you this, for carrying chlorine or ammonia or something like that. I mean, it — just — you know, to buy appropriate insurance just to cover those kind of products, compared to the revenue, I don’t think it ever would make sense.

但我们得到的报酬不够，我可以告诉你，运送氯或氨或类似的东西。我的意思是，单单是为了购买适当的保险来覆盖这些产品，与收入相比，我认为这永远都没有意义。

But we’re required — they’re going move from one place to another one way or another, either by truck or in some manner. And we are a common carrier.

但我们是被要求的——他们无论如何都会从一个地方移动到另一个地方，要么通过卡车，要么以其他方式。我们是一个公共承运人。

But it is not — that’s not one that keeps me awake nights from a financial standpoint. The big risk is some form of very effective terrorism or action by a rogue state in terms of nuclear, chemical, biological, or cyber.

但这并不是——从财务角度来看，这并不是让我夜不能寐的事情。最大的风险是某种形式的非常有效的恐怖主义或流氓国家在核、化学、生物或网络方面的行动。

And, you know, war acts are excluded in insurance policies. But you could have some kind of a terrorist act that would create damages, whether they’re liable under insurance contracts is another matter, but could create damages like we have never seen. And there’s a, you know, there’s obviously a reasonable probability of that happening sometime in the next 50 years, and what that probability is I don’t know. But it’s not insignificant. Charlie?

而且，你知道，保险政策中排除了战争行为。但你可能会遇到某种恐怖行为，这会造成损害，不管它们在保险合同下是否承担责任，这都是另一个问题，但可能会造成我们前所未见的损害。而且，显然在接下来的 50 年里，这种情况发生的合理概率是存在的，我不知道这个概率是多少。但这并不是微不足道的。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we saw what one pilot could do recently in this Malaysian airplane.

查理·芒格：好吧，我们最近看到一名飞行员在这架马来西亚飞机上能做什么。

I think we live in a world where there are always going be big events, and I think we’re lucky, to some extent, that we have some big corporations that can have elaborate safety programs and that can handle the losses when they occur. I don’t think we’d be better off if we had a bunch of little Flivvers going around the airplanes.

我认为我们生活在一个总会发生重大事件的世界里，我认为在某种程度上我们很幸运，因为我们有一些大型企业能够拥有复杂的安全计划，并且能够在损失发生时处理这些损失。我认为如果我们有一堆小型飞机在空中飞行，我们的处境不会更好。

59. Is commercial property-casualty insurance expansion too late?

商业财产意外保险的扩展是否为时已晚？

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？

JAY GELB: — question is on Berkshire’s primary commercial property-casualty insurance business.

杰伊·盖尔布：——问题是关于伯克希尔的主要商业财产-意外保险业务。

Berkshire plans to substantially expand the Berkshire Hathaway specialty insurance unit and has also become a major insurer of Lloyd’s business through an Aon-brokered facility.

伯克希尔公司计划大幅扩展伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的特种保险部门，并通过 Aon-brokered 机构成为劳合社业务的主要承保人。

Why is Berkshire increasing its presence in commercial property-casualty insurance when pricing has peaked?

伯克希尔为什么要在商业财产意外伤害保险领域增加其业务，而价格已经见顶？

WARREN BUFFETT: We — it’s the first one that’s more important.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们--第一个问题更重要。

We entered the commercial insurance field the middle of last year, and we had some wonderful talent that wanted to join us. And we have a great amount of capital, a very, very good reputation, and we think we have the ability to both underwrite more intelligently than most, to keep larger limits than anybody, and to operate at costs significantly below average.

去年年中，我们进入了商业保险领域，一些优秀的人才希望加入我们。我们拥有雄厚的资金和良好的声誉，我们认为我们有能力比大多数人更明智地承保，比任何人都能保持更大的限额，并以大大低于平均水平的成本运营。

So if you put those elements together, and you throw in Ajit Jain overseeing the operation, I think it’s a terrific opportunity.

所以如果把这些元素结合在一起，再加上 Ajit Jain 负责运营，我认为这是一个绝佳的机会。

And I think you will — and it wouldn’t make any difference when we entered it. I mean, we entered it because we had the availability of some terrific people. That was the reason for the timing of it.

我认为你会这样想——我们进入这个领域的时间并没有什么区别。我的意思是，我们之所以进入这个领域，是因为我们有一些优秀人才的可用性。这就是时机的原因。

And we’ll have — we’ve added to that group significantly. Peter Eastwood runs it, and I think we will build a very, very significant commercial insurance operation over time. And I believe that that operation will operate with better underwriting results than the great majority of our competitors.

我们已经大幅增加了这个团队。彼得·伊斯特伍德负责这个团队，我认为我们将随着时间的推移建立一个非常重要的商业保险业务。我相信这个业务的承保结果将优于绝大多数竞争对手。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s a very logical thing for us to do. And, of course, when something is logical we don’t hold back because we think the business cycle might possibly be a little better. It’s a long-term play.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这是我们非常合乎逻辑的做法。当然，当某件事合乎逻辑时，我们不会因为认为商业周期可能会稍微好一些而有所保留。这是一个长期的投资。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re not going away based on the little short-term troubles.

查理·芒格：我们不会因为一些短期的小麻烦而离开。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it’s a forever play. And — when we see a chance to enter a business we like, basically, with outstanding people and with some very fundamental competitive advantages, we’re going to play the game and we’re going to play the game hard.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，这是一个永恒的游戏。当我们看到有机会进入我们喜欢的业务时，基本上是与杰出的人才和一些非常基本的竞争优势，我们就会参与其中，并且会全力以赴。

60. Buy a sports team or sports equipment company?

购买一支体育队或体育设备公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 6?

沃伦·巴菲特：第 6 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Ed Boyle (PH) and I’m from Chicago. My question’s for Warren and Charlie.

观众成员：我叫埃德·博伊尔（PH），来自芝加哥。我的问题是问沃伦和查理。

Do you ever have any plans, or would you be interested, in buying a professional sport team —(laughter) — or sports equipment manufacturing company, being that we’re — sports is in a global world today? Or is this out of the Berkshire game?

你有没有计划，或者你是否有兴趣购买一支职业体育队——（笑）——或者一家体育设备制造公司，因为我们——体育在今天是一个全球化的世界？还是这超出了伯克希尔的游戏？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren’s already done it.

查理·芒格：沃伦已经做到了。

WARREN BUFFETT: I owned a quarter of a major — a minor-league team, but it’s not responsible for my position on the Forbes 400. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我拥有一支小型职业棒球队的四分之一，但这并不是我在福布斯 400 强中的地位的原因。（笑声）

The answer to your question about buying a sports team is no. In fact, if — Charlie and I — if you read that either one of us is buying a sports team, it may be time to talk about successors. (Laughter)

关于你购买一支运动队的提问，答案是否定的。事实上，如果——我和查理——如果你读到我们任何一人要购买一支运动队，那么可能就是讨论接班人的时候了。(笑)

We are — we do — sports equipment has generally not been a very good business, although, you know, obviously Nike’s done incredibly well in its overall operation.

我们——我们做——运动器材总体上一直不是一个很好的生意，尽管，你知道，耐克在其整体运营中做得非常好。

But — we own Spalding. We own Russell. And you know, Spalding has been around a long, long time. A.G. Spalding, I forget when the hell he was — I think he was trying to take baseball to the rest of the world back in the, I don’t know, the 1880s or something like that.

但是——我们拥有斯波尔丁。我们拥有拉塞尔。你知道，斯波尔丁已经存在很久很久了。A.G. 斯波尔丁，我忘了他到底是什么时候——我想他是在 1880 年代左右试图将棒球推广到世界其他地方。

But it’s — generally speaking, if you look at the people that have made golf equipment, footballs, helmets particularly, baseball gloves, baseballs, it’s not been a particularly profitable business.

但一般来说，如果你看看那些制造高尔夫设备、足球、特别是头盔、棒球手套和棒球的人，这并不是一个特别有利可图的行业。

And certain aspects of it, like helmets, you know — the last thing Berkshire should do is own a helmet company. A helmet company should be owned by some guy that owes about a million dollars and doesn’t have a dime to his name, because, you know, he is not going to be a target. And we would be the ultimate target.

某些方面，比如头盔，你知道——伯克希尔最不应该做的就是拥有一家头盔公司。头盔公司应该由一个欠了大约一百万美元、身无分文的人拥有，因为，你知道，他不会成为目标。而我们将是最终的目标。

That’s the reason — we used to be involved in Pinkerton, but we’d had no interest in — and we got offered the chance to buy the whole place, and the idea of owning a business that provided guards at airports, you know, when anything went wrong, you know, you’re going to say that it was the guard’s fault. And here’s this super-rich corporation around there that is a perfect target.

这就是原因——我们曾经参与过 Pinkerton，但我们对此不感兴趣——我们收到了收购整个地方的机会，以及拥有一个在机场提供警卫的公司这样的想法，你知道，当任何事情出错时，你会说这是警卫的错。而这个超级富有的公司就在那里，这是一个完美的目标。

I mean, a guard company at airports, again, should be owned by somebody whose net worth does not get out to two figures. (Laughter)

我意思是，机场的保安公司应该由那些净资产不超过两位数的人拥有。（笑声）

So, you won’t see much of us in the sports arena.

所以，你不会在体育场上看到我们太多。

But Charlie here, are you looking at the Clippers or —? (Laughter)

但是查理，你是在看快船还是——？（笑声）

Now I’m worried that he is. No — (Laughter)

现在我担心他是。不是——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Whatever Warren thinks about sports teams ownership, I like it less. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：无论沃伦对体育团队拥有权的看法如何，我都更不喜欢。（笑声）

61. Secrecy, Bill Ackman, and activist investors

保密、比尔·阿克曼和激进投资者

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, Warren. You have long advocated for transparency and disapproved of greenmailers. Bill Ackman compared his amassing his stake in Allergan in stealth ahead of Valeant’s bid to your purchase of Coca-Cola in the 1980s.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：OK, Warren.长期以来，您一直倡导透明度，不赞成绿色讹诈。比尔-阿克曼（Bill Ackman）将他在 Valeant 竞购之前秘密积累的 Allergan 股份与你在 20 世纪 80 年代收购可口可乐公司相提并论。

Is that right? What do you make of the covert tactic Ackman is using from a policy perspective for the markets?

那是对的吗？从政策角度来看，你怎么看 Ackman 正在使用的这种隐秘策略对市场的影响？

And just as important, what do you make of the larger trend of activism in corporate America?

同样重要的是，您如何看待美国企业中更广泛的激进主义趋势？

WARREN BUFFETT: I hadn’t heard that about Coca-Cola. I’m really not sure how that would come about. I mean, we bought stock in the open market, we never used a derivative transaction or any sort in buying it, or anything. I mean, and we certainly haven’t taken it over yet. The — so I — I’m not sure — can you elaborate, Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：我没听说过可口可乐的事。我真的不确定这会是怎么发生的。我的意思是，我们是在公开市场上购买的股票，我们从来没有使用过衍生品交易或任何形式的交易来购买它，或者其他任何东西。我的意思是，我们当然还没有接管它。所以我——我不太确定——你能详细说明一下吗，安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I don’t have more from the —

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我没有更多的信息来自于——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: — the question. I believe Bill Ackman went on television at one point, had commented that using his stake, or buying the stake, rather, he did it covertly, and I think he was perhaps suggesting that, I don’t know, maybe I will adjust the question.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：——这个问题。我相信比尔·阿克曼曾在某个时刻上电视评论过，使用他的股份，或者说购买股份，他是秘密进行的，我想他可能在暗示，我不知道，也许我会调整一下问题。

There have been times in the past when you have bought stakes in other companies and used specific rules through the SEC to do so with — to give you some room without disclosing. Maybe, will that adjust the question?

过去曾有过一些时候，你曾通过美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 的特定规则购买了其他公司的股份，这样做是为了给你一些不披露的空间。也许，这会调整这个问题吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: It — 沃伦·巴菲特：它——

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Or you could just go to the activism question.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：或者你可以直接问关于激进投资者的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and tell me the activism question again, because we have never used derivatives or anything that would get us around the rules of reporting, I mean, it’s that simple.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，告诉我关于激进投资者的问题，因为我们从未使用衍生品或任何可以规避报告规则的东西，我的意思是，这就是简单。

But what’s the second part?

但第二部分是什么？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I think that the second part is what do you make of the larger trend of activism in corporate America, given that it’s in the news so much today?

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我认为第二部分是，考虑到今天企业美国的激进投资者在新闻中如此频繁，你怎么看待这一更大趋势？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think it’ll go away, and I think it scares the hell out of a lot of managers. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为它不会消失，我认为它让很多管理者感到非常害怕。（笑）

The — there are cases — certainly cases where corporate management should be changed. I mean, you can’t have thousands of corporations without that being the case.

——确实有一些情况——确实有一些情况，企业管理层应该被更换。我的意思是，你不能有成千上万的公司而不出现这种情况。

I think, generally speaking, that the — you know, the activists, if they get the price of the stock up one way or another, you know, that’s going to end their interest in the business, so I don’t think they’re looking for — often they’re not looking for permanent changes for the better in the business. But they’re looking for a specific event that will result in a big price change, and —

我认为，通常来说，激进投资者如果以某种方式将股票价格抬高，这将结束他们对业务的兴趣，所以我认为他们并不寻求——通常他们并不寻求业务的永久性改善。但他们在寻找一个特定事件，这个事件将导致价格的大幅变化，且——

They’re certainly attracting more and more money. In other words, the funds flowing to activist hedge funds and so on is — multiply them, sure, by a significant factor, and that means they can play the game on a bigger scale.

他们肯定吸引了越来越多的资金。换句话说，流向激进对冲基金等的资金——当然，可以将其乘以一个显著的因素，这意味着他们可以在更大规模上参与游戏。

And anything in Wall Street that looks like it’s successful will generate a funds flow that will, you know, go on until it’s no longer successful. Charlie?

在华尔街，任何看起来成功的事物都会产生资金流动，这种流动会持续下去，直到它不再成功。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’re right that the activism is causing more of a stir in corporate management than anything has in years. Practically nobody feels immune.

查理·芒格：嗯，你说得对，这项行动比以往任何时候都更能引起企业管理层的关注。实际上，几乎没有人能置身事外。

When an activist comes into a company, 20 or 30 percent of the stock can change hands rather rapidly, and management that seemed entrenched is — suddenly is threatened. And, of course, that sort of thing causes a lot of anguish.

当一位激进投资者进入一家公司时，20%或 30%的股票可能会迅速易手，而看似根深蒂固的管理层突然受到威胁。当然，这种情况会引发很多痛苦。

And on the other side, the activists, by and large, are making a fair amount of money. And, of course, in the culture we live in, most people don’t care how the money is earned, they just care whether they get it or not.

另一方面，激进投资者总体上赚了不少钱。当然，在我们生活的文化中，大多数人并不关心钱是怎么赚来的，他们只关心自己是否能得到。

And so that — that just grows like some — I don’t know, the beanstalk of Jack. And so I think we have a very significant effect.

所以这就像某种——我不知道，杰克的豆茎一样不断生长。因此，我认为我们有一个非常显著的影响。

And some of the stuff — you’ll find an activist who is not what you’d want to marry into the family, going after a company you would never buy into. And when that happens, it reminds me of Oscar Wilde’s definition of fox hunting. He said, “The pursuit of the uneatable by the unspeakable.” (Laughter)

有些事情--你会发现一个你不愿意娶进家门的激进投资者，正在追逐一家你永远不会买进的公司。这种情况让我想起奥斯卡-王尔德对猎狐的定义。他说："用不可言喻的方式去追求不可吃的东西。"（笑声）

And I think we’re seeing some of that. It’s — I don’t think it’s good for America, what’s happening —

我认为我们正在看到一些这样的情况。这——我认为这对美国来说并不好，正在发生的事情——

WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think —

沃伦·巴菲特：你怎么看——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — averaged out.

查理·芒格：——平均而言。

WARREN BUFFETT: What do you think it’ll be three years from now?

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为三年后会是什么样子？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Bigger. 查理·芒格：更大。

WARREN BUFFETT: Wow. 沃伦·巴菲特：哇。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s stopping it?

查理·芒格：那么，是什么阻止了它？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If it’s bigger three years from now, it’ll be a lot bigger. I mean, just the compounding of numbers.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果三年后它更大，那就会大得多。我的意思是，仅仅是数字的复利效应。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s really serious.

查理·芒格：这真的很严重。

62. Buy smaller companies instead of waiting for an “elephant?”

购买小公司，而不是等待“巨象”？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。（笑声）

GREGG WARREN: If Berkshire’s size is expected to be an ongoing constraint for growth, does it make more sense for the firm to target a larger collection of smaller companies that are growing faster and can do so for a longer period of time, rather than looking to bag a big elephant that is in all likelihood already reached maturity, leaves the firm to sit on larger-than-normal cash balances for a longer period of time, even if it means paying a higher price for the growth?

格雷格·沃伦：如果伯克希尔的规模预计将持续制约其增长，那么公司是否更应该瞄准一组更大数量的较小公司，这些公司增长更快并且能够持续更长时间，而不是试图收购一只很可能已经达到成熟期的大象，这样会导致公司在更长时间内坐拥高于正常水平的现金余额，即使这意味着为增长支付更高的价格？

And if the answer is no, then what is the opportunity cost to Berkshire shareholders for keeping a lot of excess cash on hand until the right deal comes along?

如果答案是否定的，那么对于伯克希尔的股东来说，保持大量闲置现金直到合适的交易出现的机会成本是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to the first is one doesn’t preclude the other. You know, we’d be delighted to buy some company for 2 or 3 billion that we thought would do very well over time.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，第一个问题的答案是，一个并不排除另一个。你知道，我们很高兴能以 20 亿或 30 亿的价格收购一些我们认为会随着时间的推移表现良好的公司。

But that applies to one for 20 or 30 billion. Now, if you get down to buying one for a couple hundred million, that may fit one of our subsidiaries to do that that knows the business.

但这适用于价值 200 亿或 300 亿的公司。现在，如果你考虑购买一家价值几亿的公司，这可能适合我们的一家子公司来做，因为他们了解这个行业。

多个层次的资产配置。

But — we’re not passing up anything of any size that can have any real impact on Berkshire. And like I say, our subsidiaries made 25 tuck-ins last year, and they’ll keep making more. They’ll see things that fit them.

但是——我们不会放过任何可能对伯克希尔产生实际影响的任何规模的机会。正如我所说，我们的子公司去年进行了 25 次小规模收购，他们会继续进行更多收购。他们会看到适合他们的机会。

But one, you know, one $30 billion deal is ten $3 billion deals, and a hundred $300 million deals. So, in terms of the reality of how we build a lot more earning power into Berkshire, which is what we’re trying to do, our main emphasis should be on bigger deals. Charlie?

但是你知道，一个 300 亿美元的交易相当于十个 30 亿美元的交易，或者一百个 3 亿美元的交易。因此，在我们如何为伯克希尔增加更多盈利能力的现实中，这正是我们所努力的，我们的主要重点应该放在更大的交易上。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with that. The idea of buying hundreds and hundreds of small businesses —

查理·芒格：我同意这一点。购买数百家小企业的想法——

WARREN BUFFETT: Not worth a damn.

沃伦·巴菲特：一点都不值。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — not as bolt-ons for what we already have, it would be anathema.

查理·芒格：—— 不是作为我们已有的附加部分，这将是不可接受的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s lots of competition for the small deals. I mean, private equity is going after all kinds of small deals. In fact they just keep selling them to each other to some degree.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，小交易的竞争非常激烈。我的意思是，私募股权正在追逐各种小交易。事实上，他们在某种程度上只是不断地相互出售这些交易。

We don’t feel envious when we look at what they’re doing, in the least. But that doesn’t mean we can’t find an occasional small business that fits in and that will do well.

我们在看他们的所作所为时一点也不感到嫉妒。但这并不意味着我们不能找到偶尔适合并且会做得不错的小企业。

It’s not going be the future of Berkshire, though. But I want to emphasize one does not preclude the other.

这并不是伯克希尔的未来。不过，我想强调的是，一个并不排除另一个。

63. The most intelligent question you’ve been asked?

你被问过的最聪明的问题是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Willy Larsen (PH) from San Francisco.

观众成员：来自旧金山的威利·拉尔森（PH）。

You both mingle with the smartest investors in the country, something that I don’t have the opportunity to do. So to my question, what is the most intelligent question you have been asked recently on investing, and what was your answer to that question? (Laughter)

你们都与国内最聪明的投资者交往，而我没有这样的机会。那么我想问，最近有人问过你们的投资中最聪明的问题是什么，你们的回答是什么？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you can go first on that while I think.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你可以先说说这个，我想想。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve already done that when I answered the young gentleman who said he couldn’t understand why Warren compared his — or Berkshire’s book value increase to stock market index performance.

查理·芒格：好吧，我已经回答过这个问题了，当时我回答了一位年轻绅士，他说他无法理解为什么沃伦将他的——或者伯克希尔的账面价值增长与股市指数表现进行比较。

In other words there are a lot of interesting questions that don’t get much attention where there’s a lot of irrationality.

换句话说，有很多有趣的问题没有得到太多关注，而这些问题中存在很多非理性。

WARREN BUFFETT: The question you asked, I get that frequently from the college students that come out. They say, “What’s the most intelligent question that you’ve gotten in the past.” And I never come up with a good answer, and I’m not coming up with one today —

沃伦·巴菲特：你问的问题，我经常从刚毕业的大学生那里听到。他们会问：“你过去收到过的最聪明的问题是什么？”我从来没有想到一个好的答案，今天也想不出来——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t like the question, do you?

查理·芒格：我不喜欢这个问题，你喜欢吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不。（笑声）

That’s why we changed —

这就是我们改变的原因——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s quite fair.

查理·芒格：我认为这不太公平。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why I let you go first. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是我让你先说的原因。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

64. MidAmerican energy return on assets

MidAmerican资产回报率

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now we’ve hit 54 questions. So now we start going around to the stations in order. All of the journalists of each had six apiece, so we’ll go to station 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，现在我们已经收到了 54 个问题。现在我们开始按顺序去各个站点。每位记者都有六个问题，所以我们将去第 8 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Philip Case, Manchester, New Hampshire.

观众成员：菲利普·凯斯，新罕布什尔州曼彻斯特。

My question pertains to the MidAmerican Energy segment. On page 64 of our annual report, you provide us with segment data for each business.

我的问题涉及 MidAmerican Energy 部门。在我们年度报告的第 64 页，您为我们提供了每个业务的部门数据。

For the MidAmerican Energy segment, when I take earnings before interest and taxes and add back depreciation expense and subtract capex, the result is negative operating cash flow.

对于中美能源部门，当我将息税前利润加上折旧费用并减去资本支出时，结果是负的经营现金流。

When I repeat that exercise for each of the past five years, in its best year the segment generates $308 million of operating cash flow. When I divide that by tangible assets, the result is a return on tangible assets of 0.86 percent.

当我在过去五年中每年重复进行该项练习时，在最好的一年，该部门产生了 3.08 亿美元的经营现金流。当我将其除以有形资产时，结果是有形资产的回报率为 0.86%。

Why are we allocating capital to a business that in its best year generates a return on tangible assets of less than 1 percent?

我们为什么要将资本分配给一个在最佳年份产生的有形资产回报率低于 1%的业务？

WARREN BUFFETT: You were doing great until you got to return on tangible assets. The — we love the math that you just described, as long as we are going to get returns on the added capital investment. And we are in businesses, whether it’s wind energy in Iowa or whether with PacifiCorp after we bought it, there were lots of opportunities for capital investment. And the energy which we bought, we’re looking forward to putting more capital in because as long as we get treated fairly by the regulators in the states that we operate, we will get appropriate returns on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：你做得很好，直到你提到有形资产的回报。我们喜欢你刚才描述的数学，只要我们能从新增的资本投资中获得回报。我们所处的行业，无论是在爱荷华州的风能，还是在收购太平洋电力公司后，我们都有很多资本投资的机会。我们购买的能源，我们期待投入更多的资本，因为只要我们在运营的州得到监管机构的公平对待，我们就会获得适当的回报。

And the return is not measured by the cash minus the increased capital investment we’re making. It’s measured by the operating earnings after depreciation. And there will be times in our businesses where no net investment may be required. But we actually prefer the ones where net — in the utility business — where net investment is required because we like the idea of getting more capital out at reasonable returns.

回报并不是通过现金减去我们所做的资本投资增加来衡量的。它是通过折旧后的营业收益来衡量的。在我们的业务中，有时可能不需要净投资。但我们实际上更喜欢那些需要净投资的公用事业业务，因为我们喜欢以合理的回报获得更多资本的想法。

Now, the bet we are making is that regulatory authorities will treat us fairly in the future. And we’ve got every reason to believe that’s true in the jurisdictions in which we operate. And one of the reasons we believe it’s true is because we’ve done so much better than, really, the great majority of utilities in delivering electricity at lower rates than are charged by most utilities.

现在，我们所做的赌注是监管机构将来会公平对待我们。我们有充分的理由相信在我们运营的辖区内这是真的。我们相信这是真的原因之一是，我们在以低于大多数公用事业公司收取的电价提供电力方面，表现得远远好于绝大多数公用事业公司。

We have a situation in Iowa, for example, where there is one stockholder-owned competitive utility, and some other municipal-owned ones, and if you look at our rates, they are significantly below those of our competitors.

我们在爱荷华州有一种情况，例如，那里有一家股东拥有的竞争性公用事业公司，还有一些其他市政拥有的公司，如果你看看我们的费率，它们明显低于我们的竞争对手。

And in fact, one of our directors has a farm where he buys from two different sources, one being us. And his rate from us is dramatically lower than the one from the cooperative arrangement that exists.

事实上，我们的一位董事有一个农场，他从两个不同的来源购买，其中一个就是我们。他从我们这里的价格明显低于现有的合作安排的价格。

So, we have a deserved good reputation with the regulators that we’re dealing with. We’ve improved the operations, including safety, incidentally, dramatically from the conditions that existed before we purchased the utilities. That’s why they welcome us when we come to new states.

因此，我们在与之打交道的监管机构中享有良好的声誉。我们改善了运营，包括安全，顺便提一下，从我们购买公用事业之前的条件来看，改善幅度非常大。这就是为什么当我们来到新的州时，他们会欢迎我们。

And so if we can put more money into useful projects in those states, we’ve got every reason to believe we will get returns that are appropriate.

因此，如果我们能在那些州投入更多资金用于有益的项目，我们有充分的理由相信我们会获得适当的回报。

But if you compute net cash generated from those, you will see nominal or negative figures for a considerable period as we add to our investment and we make those utilities even more useful for people in those jurisdictions. I think we’ll get a fair return.

但是如果你计算从这些中产生的净现金，你会看到在相当长的一段时间内名义上或负数的数字，因为我们增加了投资，并使这些公用事业对那些地区的人们更加有用。我认为我们会获得合理的回报。

We have somewhat similar situation at the railroad, too. But we’re very happy about both of those businesses. Charlie?

我们在铁路方面也有类似的情况。但我们对这两项业务都非常满意。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, if the numbers you recited came from a declining department store, we would just hate it. But when it comes from a growing utility, we like it because we have such confidence that the reinvested money is going to do exceptionally well. It’s just that simple.

查理·芒格：是的，如果你提到的数字来自一家衰退的百货商店，我们会非常讨厌。但如果来自一家增长的公用事业公司，我们就会喜欢，因为我们对再投资的资金会表现得非常好充满信心。就是这么简单。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

Greg — 格雷格 —

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re two different kinds of businesses.

查理·芒格：它们是两种不同类型的业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg? Is Greg here? You want to — you might be able to give him a few figures that I don’t remember off the top of my head in terms of comparative — how our prices compare, and give him a little more of a flavor on how the utility commissions do regard us and how they treat us fairly.

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？格雷格在吗？你想要——你可能能给他一些我记不起来的数字，关于我们的价格比较，以及让他更了解公用事业委员会如何看待我们，以及他们如何公平对待我们。

GREG ABEL: Sure. When you look at our rates across each of the regions, effectively we’re generally the low-cost provider, or in the low quartile.

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然。当你查看我们各个地区的费率时，实际上我们通常是低成本提供者，或者处于低四分位。

Your example, Warren, in Iowa was a great example. The last time we had a rate increase there was 1998. We’ve just currently had one this past year, so it’s the first one in the past 16 years. And we don’t see another one in the foreseeable future. And when you create that type of model with our regulators, obviously they’re very supportive of the various projects we’ve introduced.

你的例子，沃伦，在爱荷华州是一个很好的例子。我们上一次涨价是在 1998 年。我们刚刚在去年进行了涨价，所以这是过去 16 年来的第一次。而且我们在可预见的未来不会再有涨价。当你与我们的监管机构建立这种模型时，他们显然非常支持我们推出的各种项目。

So this past year we introduced a project in Iowa, it’s a 1,000 megawatt project, $1.9 billion being incurred. And if you go to the gentleman’s comment, yes, we’re going put the — we’ll deploy that $1.9 billion over the coming two years, but we’ll earn 11-and-a-half percent — 11.6 percent return on it.

所以在过去的一年里，我们在爱荷华州推出了一个项目，这是一个 1000 兆瓦的项目，投资 19 亿美元。如果你听到那位先生的评论，是的，我们将在未来两年内投入这 19 亿美元，但我们将获得 11.5% — 11.6%的回报。

Generally when we look at our utilities, we do pay attention to our capital, we try to keep it very close to our depreciation. That’s what we put back into the business. We’ll even earn on that capital, but the reality is the lion’s share of our capital right now is growth capital. And we earn a very nice return on that.

通常，当我们查看我们的公用事业时，我们确实会关注我们的资本，我们尽量将其保持在与折旧非常接近的水平。这就是我们投入到业务中的部分。我们甚至会在这些资本上获得收益，但现实是我们目前资本的绝大部分是增长资本。我们在这方面获得了非常可观的回报。

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg, you might comment, just a minute, I think they’d find it interesting, on what’s happening in Iowa with the tech companies, simply because of what we’re doing in the electric field. Or not simply, but in part because of what we’re doing in the field of electricity.

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格，你可以评论一下，我想他们会觉得有趣，关于爱荷华州的科技公司发生的事情，这主要是因为我们在电力领域所做的工作。或者说，不仅仅是因为，还部分是因为我们在电力领域所做的工作。

GREG ABEL: Right. So when you look at the tech companies and the data centers that exist, if you just go across the river, we service Google in Council Bluffs.

格雷格·阿贝尔：没错。所以当你看看现有的科技公司和数据中心时，如果你只需过河，我们在考恩斯布拉夫斯为谷歌提供服务。

They’ve got a site that was initially a relatively small data center. They’re looking at taking it to 40 to 50 megawatts, which is a small size of a power plant. But the reality is they’re talking about ultimately building that to 1,000 megawatts. And we’re seeing that replicated time after time in the state.

他们有一个最初相对较小的数据中心。他们计划将其扩展到 40 到 50 兆瓦，这相当于一个小型发电厂。但实际上，他们谈论的是最终将其建设到 1000 兆瓦。我们在该州一次又一次地看到这种情况的复制。

And it’s really due to two things. One, we’ve got these exceptionally low rates. And then the fact that a significant portion of our energy, as Warren highlighted earlier and I touched on, comes from renewable energy. They want those credits, they want to be associated with a utility that’s producing green power.

这主要归因于两个因素。一是我们有这些异常低的费率。二是我们能源的相当一部分，如沃伦之前强调的，我也提到过，来自可再生能源。他们想要这些信用，他们希望与生产绿色电力的公用事业公司相关联。

65. Education market’s future in U.S. and China

美国和中国教育市场的未来

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9, please. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。9 号站，请。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Gao Ling Yun and I came from Shanghai, China. I focus on the education investment.

观众：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫高凌云，来自中国上海。我专注于教育投资。

Today, my co-worker, Yi Nuo Education Company and I have a question. What do you think about the education market in America and China in future? Thank you.

今天，我的同事和我在易诺教育公司有一个问题。你对未来美国和中国的教育市场怎么看？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? 沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I didn’t catch those last two words. In what?

查理·芒格：嗯，我没听清最后两个词。什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: He wanted to know what we thought of the education market in U.S. and China, but he didn’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：他想知道我们对美国和中国教育市场的看法，但他没有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But in what? He said in some — is it health care?

查理·芒格：但是什么呢？他说在某些——是医疗保健吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: In future.

观众成员：在未来。

CHARLIE MUNGER: In the future, I see.

查理·芒格：在未来，我看到了。

Well, we certainly are getting the easy questions late in the day. (Laughter)

好吧，我们确实在一天的最后时刻得到了简单的问题。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think America —

查理·芒格：我认为美国——

WARREN BUFFETT: Whatever he says, I agree with. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：无论他说什么，我都同意。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think America made a huge mistake when they allowed the public schools, and many particularly big school systems, to just go to hell. (Applause)

查理·芒格：我认为美国犯了一个巨大的错误，当他们允许公立学校，尤其是许多大型学校系统，任其堕落。（掌声）

And I think the Asian cultures are less likely to do that. So to the extent that Asian cultures are avoiding some of our mistakes, why, I just wish we were more like them.

我认为亚洲文化不太可能这样做。因此，在亚洲文化避免我们的一些错误的程度上，我真希望我们能更像他们。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

66. Buffett’s joke about Munger’s hearing

巴菲特关于芒格听力的笑话

WARREN BUFFETT: I probably shouldn’t tell you this. When Charlie was having a little trouble there on those last two words — I get a little worried about Charlie, don’t know whether I should talk about this, but — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我可能不应该告诉你这个。当查理在最后两个词上有点困难时——我有点担心查理，不知道我是否应该谈论这个，但——（笑声）

I thought maybe he was losing his hearing and I didn’t want to confront him with it. I mean, we’ve been pals for a long time, so I went to the doctor and I said, “Doc, I’ve got this wonderful partner, but I think maybe his hearing is going on him.

我想也许他在失去听力，我不想和他面对面谈这个。我是说，我们已经是很长时间的朋友了，所以我去看医生，我说：“医生，我有一个很棒的搭档，但我觉得他可能听力有问题。”

“And I want to talk to him about it. I mean, how do you say that to somebody you’ve known that long? And what should I do?” He says, “Well, you stand across the room, talk to him in normal course of — tone of voice, and let me know what happens.”

“我想和他谈谈这件事。我的意思是，你怎么能对一个认识这么久的人说这些话？我该怎么办？”他说：“好吧，你站在房间的另一边，用正常的语气和他说话，然后告诉我发生了什么。”

So the next time I was with Charlie, I stood across the room and I said, “Charlie, I think we ought to buy General Motors at 35, do you agree?” Not a flicker.

所以下次我和查理在一起时，我站在房间的另一边说：“查理，我觉得我们应该在 35 的时候买入通用汽车，你同意吗？”他没有丝毫反应。

I go halfway across the room. I say, “Charlie, I think we ought to buy General Motors at 35, do you agree?” Nothing.

我走到房间的中间。我说：“查理，我觉得我们应该在 35 的时候买入通用汽车，你同意吗？”没有回应。

Get right next to him, in his ear, “Charlie, I think we ought to buy General Motors at 35, do you agree?”

靠近他，靠在他耳边说：“查理，我认为我们应该在 35 的时候买入通用汽车，你同意吗？”

He said, “For the third time, yes.” (Laughter and applause)

他说：“是的，这是第三次。” （笑声和掌声）

So speak up, speak up. (Laughs)

所以大声说出来，大声说出来。（笑）

67. Is housing lending reform needed?

住房贷款改革是否必要？

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 10 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, this is — Glen Green (PH) from Chicago.

观众成员：是的，我是来自芝加哥的格伦·格林（音）。

First of all, I want to thank you for allocating capital so well all these years, very much appreciated.

首先，我想感谢您这些年来如此出色地分配资本，非常感谢。

The question has to do with housing and housing reform more specifically, and there’s clearly legislation in Washington, D.C. right now talking about reforming the GSEs, specifically Fannie and Freddie. Do you think we need housing reform? What would be a reasonable approach to do it, and if private participants were involved, would that make sense for Berkshire given Ajit’s actuarial skills and your ability to allocate capital?

这个问题与住房和住房改革更具体地说有关，目前华盛顿特区显然有立法在讨论改革政府支持企业，特别是房利美和房地美。你认为我们需要住房改革吗？什么样的合理方法可以实现这一点，如果私人参与者参与，这对伯克希尔来说是否有意义，考虑到阿吉特的精算技能和你们的资本配置能力？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that — and Charlie may disagree with me on it, I think that the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage is a terrific boon to home owners.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为——查理可能会不同意我的看法，我认为 30 年期固定利率抵押贷款对房主来说是一个极大的好处。

It’s not necessarily such a great instrument to own as an investor, but I think it’s done a lot for home ownership. May have been abused in some cases, but overall it’s done a terrific job for home ownership in the country. Let people get into homes earlier than they might have been able to otherwise, kept costs down to quite a degree.

作为一项投资工具，它对投资者来说不一定那么好，但我认为它对住房所有权很有帮助。在某些情况下可能被滥用，但总的来说，它对该国的住房所有权起到了巨大的作用。让人们比以往更早地拥有住房，并将成本控制在相当低的水平。

And so I would hope that — and the government guarantee part of it does keep the cost down. Nobody — no private organizations can do it. I mean, home mortgages are an 11 trillion-or-so dollar market, and there’s not the insurance capacity, or remotely the insurance capacity, for private industry to do the job, and the rates would be much higher.

因此，我希望——政府担保的部分确实能降低成本。没有任何私人组织能够做到这一点。我的意思是，住房抵押贷款是一个大约 11 万亿美元的市场，而私人企业没有保险能力，甚至远远不够，来完成这项工作，利率会高得多。

So I think you keep the government in the picture. Now, the question is how you keep the government in the picture without keeping politics in the picture? And we’ve found some of the problems with that, in terms of not only Fannie and Freddie being — doing a lot of dumb things on their own, but being prodded into doing some of those things by politicians.

所以我认为你要让政府了解情况。现在的问题是，如何让政府了解情况而不让政治介入？我们发现了一些相关的问题，不仅是房利美和房地美自己做了很多愚蠢的事情，还受到政治家的推动去做其中的一些事情。

And I think there could be a way — I wrote an article 20, or 30 or — probably 30 years ago, an op-ed piece that appeared, I think, in the “Washington Post,” when the F-D-I — well, when FSLIC, the savings and loan guarantee operation was essentially falling apart, and suggesting for the FDIC some way to get the private sector into pricing and evaluating the risk, in that case, of banks, but essentially the government being the main insurer.

我认为可能有一种方法——我大约在 20、30 年前写了一篇文章，可能是 30 年前，发表在《华盛顿邮报》上的一篇评论文章，当时 F-D-I——好吧，当 FSLIC，即储蓄和贷款担保机构基本上崩溃时，我建议 FDIC 寻找某种方式让私营部门参与定价和评估风险，在这种情况下是银行，但基本上政府是主要的保险人。

There could be — there could well be a way that that model, and it’s being explored now, that model works in terms of home mortgage insurance.

可能会有一种方式，这种模型——现在正在探索——在住房抵押贷款保险方面是有效的。

I don’t think we would likely be a player, because I think that other people would be more optimistic than we would be in setting rates.

我认为我们不太可能成为参与者，因为我认为其他人对设定利率的看法会比我们更乐观。

In the end, the government would have to be the main insurer. You might have a situation where private industry priced 5 percent of it and the government took the other 95 percent and, in turn, even guaranteed the 5 percent by the private industry once the private investors went broke.

最后，政府必须成为主要的保险人。你可能会遇到这样的情况：私营企业定价 5%，政府承担另外 95%，一旦私人投资者破产，政府甚至反过来为私营企业的 5%提供担保。

But I do think it’s very important to get housing, the mortgages for homes — to get that a correct national policy. I know it’s being worked on. And I think, you know, I think it’s very unlikely that Berkshire Hathaway would play any part in it.

但我确实认为，获得住房、房屋抵押贷款——制定正确的国家政策是非常重要的。我知道这正在进行中。我认为，伯克希尔·哈撒韦参与其中的可能性非常小。

Charlie, what are your thoughts?

查理，你有什么想法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, when private industry was allowed to take over pretty much the whole field, we got the biggest bunch of thieves and idiots that you can imagine screwing up the whole system and threatening all of us. So I’m not very trustful of private industry in this field.

查理·芒格：好吧，当私营企业被允许几乎完全接管这个领域时，我们得到了你能想象的最大一群小偷和傻瓜，他们搞砸了整个系统，威胁着我们所有人。所以我对这个领域的私营企业不是很信任。

And so, as much as I hate what politicians frequently do, I think the existing system is probably pretty sound.

所以，尽管我非常厌恶政治家们经常做的事情，但我认为现有的系统可能相当稳健。

At the moment, Fannie and Freddie are being pretty conservative and they’re making almost all the home loans. I think that’s OK, and I’m not anxious to go back to where the investment banks were in a big race to the bottom, in terms of creating phony securities.

目前，房利美和房地美相当保守，他们几乎在发放所有的住房贷款。我认为这没问题，我并不急于回到投资银行在创造虚假证券方面的激烈竞争中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and I think — one question is whether you let Fannie and Freddie just run off as is, and I don’t know —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为——一个问题是你是否让房利美和房地美就这样运行下去，我不知道——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Instead of keep doing just what they’re doing.

查理·芒格：与其继续做他们正在做的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: But I think — I think you may — I think certainly one of the things that led Fannie and Freddie astray was the desire to serve two masters and increase earnings at double-digit ranges. And to do that, they started doing big portfolio activities.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我想——我想你可能——我认为导致房利美和房地美误入歧途的一个因素可能是，它们希望同时服务于两个主人，并将收益提高到两位数。为了实现这一点，它们开始进行大量的投资组合活动。

I think if Freddie and Fannie had stuck to insuring mortgages and not become the biggest hedge funds in the country, because they did have this capability of borrowing very cheap, very long, and therefore could get a reasonable — what looked like a reasonable spread on a huge portfolio action. I think that was a big contributing factor to —

我认为如果房利美和房地美坚持只为抵押贷款提供保险，而不是成为全国最大的对冲基金，因为他们确实有以非常低的成本和非常长的期限借款的能力，因此可以在庞大的投资组合操作中获得看似合理的收益差。我认为这对——是一个重要的促成因素。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, they became, in effect, private corporations. But they’re not anymore, Warren. They’re —

查理·芒格：嗯，它们实际上变成了私人公司。但现在它们不再是了，沃伦。它们——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and they are at the moment being fairly conservative.

查理·芒格：——他们目前相对保守。

WARREN BUFFETT: There are people who want them to return to being private corporations, though.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，有些人希望他们重新成为私人公司。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but I think that’s a mistake because when they really got lousy, it’s because the private companies were taking over the whole mortgage market as bad lending drove out good. And Fannie May and Freddie Mac, to hold up their volumes, joined in the rush to laxity and fraud and folly. And so —

查理·芒格：是的，但我认为这是一个错误，因为当情况真的变糟时，是因为私营公司接管了整个抵押贷款市场，糟糕的贷款驱逐了好的贷款。为了维持他们的业务量，房利美和房地美也加入了放松监管、欺诈和愚蠢的潮流。因此——

WARREN BUFFETT: Would you let them have portfolio activities at all?

沃伦·巴菲特：你会让他们进行投资组合活动吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t see any need for it.

查理·芒格：我看不出有必要。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t either. And I think that did get them into quite a bit of trouble. And I think those were done in order to keep the earnings per share game going.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我也不这样认为。我认为这确实让他们陷入了相当大的麻烦。我认为这些做法是为了维持每股收益的游戏。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think that particular experiment in privatization was a total failure. (Applause)

查理·芒格：不，我认为那个特定的私有化实验完全失败了。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 11 站，和——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we made a billion dollars out of it, if you remember.

查理·芒格：我们从这笔交易中赚了 10 亿美元，如果你还记得的话。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wasn’t going mention that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我本不打算提到这个。（笑声）

68. “Fortunate” to partner with 3G and Jorge Paulo Lemann

“幸运”与 3G 和乔治·保罗·莱曼合作

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Whitney Tilson, shareholder from New York City.

观众成员：下午好。惠特尼·蒂尔森，来自纽约市的股东。

I’ve just started reading “Dream Big,” the book recently released about your new Brazilian partners and I’m really enjoying it. Their track records are unbelievable, and as a long-time Berkshire shareholder I’m delighted that you’ve partnered with them, and hope that Heinz is the first of many elephants that you bag together.

我刚开始阅读《Dream Big》，这是一本最近发布的关于你们新的巴西合作伙伴的书，我非常喜欢。它们的业绩记录令人难以置信，作为一名长期的伯克希尔股东，我很高兴你们与他们合作，并希望亨氏是你们一起捕获的众多“大象”中的第一个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Can I interrupt you just for one second, Whitney? I appreciate that sentiment, and that book is available in — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我可以打断你一下吗，惠特尼？我很欣赏这个观点，那本书可以在——（笑声）

I should have mentioned it earlier. The book was written in Portuguese and it was a best seller in Brazil for the last year. But it just got translated very, very, very recently and it is available at the Bookworm. So — Whitney, you can go on from there, but I did want to mention it’s available.

我应该早点提到这件事。这本书是用葡萄牙语写的，去年在巴西畅销。但它最近才被翻译，现已在书虫书店有售。所以——惠特尼，你可以从这里继续，但我想提一下它是可用的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Why would you assume that all of our shareholders don’t read Portuguese? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你为什么会认为我们所有的股东都不懂葡萄牙语？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ll also mention that it is only available on Amazon via Kindle. The only hard copies in the world in English that I’m aware of are available downstairs, so that will create quite a run on the book, I think.

观众成员：我还要提到，这本书仅在亚马逊的 Kindle 上提供。我所知道的世界上唯一的英文纸质书在楼下有售，所以我认为这会引发对这本书的抢购。

WARREN BUFFETT: We will raise the price. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会提高价格。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I have two questions related to this. First, I know you’ve known these gentlemen probably for a couple decades, and I’d love to hear your observations on what’s their secret sauce? It’s got to be more than zero-based budgeting, which we all hear about. What are the key things they do that produces such extraordinary returns?

观众成员：我有两个与此相关的问题。首先，我知道您可能认识这些绅士已经有几十年了，我很想听听您对他们的观察，他们的秘诀是什么？这肯定不仅仅是我们听说的零基预算。他们做了哪些关键事情，才能产生如此非凡的回报？

And secondly, when I look at some of the biggest, best deals that you’ve done in recent years, important factors seem to be your longtime personal relationships, for example, with Jorge Paulo Lemann in the Heinz deal, or your brand name.

其次，当我看到你们近年来做的一些最大、最好的交易时，重要因素似乎是你们长期的个人关系，例如在亨氏交易中与乔治·保罗·莱曼的关系，或者你们的品牌名称。

The Warren Buffett stamp of approval mattered a lot to some of the deals you did with, for example, Goldman or GE during the financial crisis. And I just wonder what your thoughts are on whether your successors will have the same opportunities to do wonderful deals like this?

沃伦·巴菲特的认可对你在金融危机期间与高盛或通用电气等公司达成的一些交易非常重要。我想知道你对你的继任者是否会有同样机会达成这样的精彩交易有什么看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: It will become the Berkshire brand. I mean, the first year or so people will wonder about it, but the person that follows me will bring the same qualities, including the ability to write a very big check. But other things besides that, and it will be a Berkshire brand that may have started with me, but that will continue.

沃伦·巴菲特：它将成为伯克希尔品牌。我是说，头一年左右人们会对此感到疑惑，但接替我的人将具备相同的品质，包括能够开出一张非常大的支票。但除此之外，还有其他方面，这将是一个可能起源于我的伯克希尔品牌，但它会继续存在。

Going on to our Brazilian friends, they’re very smart, they’re very focused, they’re very hardworking and determined. They’re never satisfied.

继续谈谈我们的巴西朋友，他们非常聪明，非常专注，非常勤奋和坚定。他们从不满足。

And as I said earlier, when you make a deal with them you’ve made a deal with them. They don’t overreach, they don’t overpromise. They’ve got a lot of good qualities. And if you read the book, I think you’ll probably learn a lot more about the qualities that made them what they are.

正如我之前所说，当你与他们达成协议时，你就与他们达成了协议。他们不会过度扩张，也不会过度承诺。他们有很多优良品质。如果你读这本书，我想你会了解到更多使他们成为他们的品质。

But we are very fortunate to be associated with them, and we’re very fortunate to be associated with a number of the managers that have joined us, too.

但我们很幸运能与他们合作，也很幸运能与一些加入我们的经理合作。

We want to be a good partner ourselves because it attracts good partners. And that is a reputation that Berkshire deserves. I mean, Charlie and I do our part toward keeping that reputation intact, but that takes a lot of other people also behaving in a way that causes people to want to join them, causes people to want to trust them. And that will be part of a Berkshire brand. Charlie?

我们希望自己成为一个好的合作伙伴，因为这会吸引好的合作伙伴。这是伯克希尔应得的声誉。我的意思是，查理和我在维护这一声誉方面尽了自己的努力，但这也需要很多其他人以一种让人们想要加入他们、让人们想要信任他们的方式行事。这将成为伯克希尔品牌的一部分。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I always say the way to get a good spouse is to deserve one. And the way to get a good part —

查理·芒格：是的，我总是说，获得一个好配偶的方法是值得拥有一个。而获得一个好部分的方法——

WARREN BUFFETT: What’s your second way? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你的第二种方法是什么？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and the other — well, but to get a good partner you deserve a good partner. It’s an old-fashioned way of getting ahead. And the interesting about it is it still works in these modern times. Nothing changes, if you just behave yourself correctly, it’s amazing how well it works. (Applause)

查理·芒格：——还有另一个——好吧，但要找到一个好的合作伙伴，你值得拥有一个好的合作伙伴。这是一种老派的成功方式。有趣的是，这种方式在现代仍然有效。如果你只是正确地表现自己，真是令人惊讶，它是多么有效。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You have any further thoughts on the Brazilians?

沃伦·巴菲特：你对巴西人还有其他想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: On what? 查理·芒格：关于什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: On the success of Jorge Paulo and his associates, beyond what I laid out?

沃伦·巴菲特：关于豪尔赫·保罗及其合伙人的成功，超出了我所阐述的内容吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there — you can’t skirt the fact that they’re very good at removing unnecessary costs.

查理·芒格：好吧，你不能回避这样一个事实，他们在消除不必要的成本方面非常出色。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I do not consider that in any way immoral or wrong or something.

查理·芒格：我并不认为这在任何方面是不道德的、错误的或其他什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: Not in the least.

沃伦·巴菲特：一点也不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think removing unnecessary costs is a service to civilization. And I think it should be done with some — what do they call it? Mercy, really.

查理·芒格：我认为去除不必要的成本是对文明的一种服务。我认为这应该以某种——他们称之为？怜悯，真的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sensitivity.

沃伦·巴菲特：敏感性。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, sensitivity. But I don’t think it’s good for our system to have a lot of make-work and what have you. So —

查理·芒格：是的，敏感性。但我认为让我们的系统有很多无用的工作并不好。所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: If it was, we’d love government, right?

沃伦·巴菲特：如果是这样，我们就会喜欢政府，对吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and so, generally speaking, I think they’re an interesting example to all of us.

查理·芒格：是的，总的来说，我认为他们是我们所有人的一个有趣例子。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re learning from them.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们正在向他们学习。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Everybody is.

查理·芒格：每个人都是。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK — 沃伦·巴菲特：好的 —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Some reluctantly.

查理·芒格：有些人不情愿。

69. We’ll decide what to do with “too much” cash when we get there

当我们到达那里时，我们会决定如何处理“过多”的现金。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name is Walter Chang (PH) and I came from Taiwan for this meeting.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我叫 Walter Chang（音），我来自台湾，参加这个会议。

Seven years ago, I named my first-born son after you, Warren, so the second one hasn’t come yet —

七年前，我以你的名字为我的第一个儿子命名，沃伦，所以第二个还没有出生——

WARREN BUFFETT: How’s he — how’s he —

沃伦·巴菲特：他怎么样——他怎么样——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — so sorry —

观众成员：——非常抱歉——

WARREN BUFFETT: — how’s he — how’s he doing?

沃伦·巴菲特：——他怎么样——他过得怎么样？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: He’s doing great.

观众成员：他表现得很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So he says hi. He always says, “Warren Buffalo,” so, sorry — (Laugher) — sorry about that.

观众成员：所以他说你好。他总是说：“沃伦·巴法罗”，所以，抱歉——（笑声）——对此感到抱歉。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been called — I’ve been called worse. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我被称呼过——我被称呼过更糟的。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is for both of you. We wish you continued good health, and when both of you break Mrs. B’s record of working to 103 years old, that will be 20 years from now.

观众：我的问题是问你们两位。我们祝愿你们身体健康，当你们两位都打破 B 女士 103 岁工作的记录时，那将是 20 年后的事。

If Warren — or sorry, if Berkshire breaks that record and basically doubles over the next ten years and doubles again, you’ll have a market cap of $1.2 trillion.

如果沃伦——或者说，如果伯克希尔打破那个记录，并在接下来的十年里基本上翻一番，再翻一番，你将拥有 1.2 万亿美元的市值。

What do you think Berkshire will look like at that time and can you get there sooner? (Laughter)

你认为伯克希尔那时会是什么样子，你能更早到达那里吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We may have to. Your original hypothesis may not hold up.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们可能不得不这样做。你最初的假设可能不成立。

I do plan on writing about that next year, but there’s no question that at some point we will have more cash than we can intelligently deploy. And then — in the business — and then the question is what do we do with the excess? And that will depend on circumstances at the time.

我确实计划明年写关于这个，但毫无疑问，在某个时刻我们会有比我们能合理使用的更多现金。那么——在商业上——问题是我们该如何处理这些多余的现金？这将取决于当时的情况。

I mean, if the stock can be bought in at a price that makes sense for continuing shareholders, in other words that their value is enhanced by the repurchase, you know, if I were around at that time I would probably be very aggressive about repurchasing shares. But who knows what the circumstances will be. Who knows what the tax law will be then, you know.

我的意思是，如果股票的购买价格对继续持股的股东来说是合理的，换句话说，他们的价值因回购而提升，你知道，如果我那时在场，我可能会非常积极地回购股票。但谁知道那时的情况会怎样呢。谁知道那时的税法会是什么样的，你知道。

What I do know is that we will have more cash than we can intelligently invest at some point in the future. That’s built into what we’re doing, and I hope that isn’t real soon, and I don’t think it probably will be.

我所知道的是，在未来的某个时刻，我们将拥有比我们能够明智投资的更多现金。这是我们所做事情的一部分，我希望这不会很快发生，我也认为可能不会。

But it’s not on a distant horizon. I mean, the numbers are getting up to where we will not be able to deploy intelligently everything that’s coming in.

但这并不是在遥远的地平线上。我的意思是，数字正在上升到我们将无法明智地部署所有即将到来的东西的程度。

But then we can deploy — it may be that we can deploy very intelligently and repurchase the shares. Who knows what the circumstances will be?

但我们可以部署——也许我们可以非常明智地部署并回购股票。谁知道情况会如何呢？

All I can tell you is that whatever is done will be done in the interest of the shareholder. That, you know, that is what every decision starts from, from that principle. Charlie?

我能告诉你的是，无论做什么，都是为了股东的利益。你知道，每个决定都是从这个原则出发的。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not a tragedy to succeed so much that future returns go down. That’s success, that’s winning.

查理·芒格：成功到未来回报下降并不是悲剧。这就是成功，这就是胜利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he’ll name his next child after you. (Laughter) OK.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，他会以你的名字给下一个孩子命名。（笑声）好的。

70. Uber, Airbnb, and the “disruptive” sharing economy

优步、爱彼迎和“颠覆性”的共享经济

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Afternoon. My name’s Michael Sontag (PH) and I’m from Washington, D.C.

观众成员：下午好。我叫迈克尔·索恩塔格，我来自华盛顿特区。

My question’s about the sharing economy. What larger implications do you expect companies like Uber and Airbnb to have on their sectors, and do you think this business model is here to stay?

我想问的是关于共享经济的问题。您预计像 Uber 和 Airbnb 这样的公司对其行业会产生什么更大的影响，您认为这种商业模式会持续下去吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they are obviously trying to disrupt some other businesses, and those businesses will fight back in competitive ways, and they may try to fight back through legislation.

沃伦·巴菲特：显然，他们正在试图干扰其他一些企业，而这些企业将以竞争的方式反击，他们可能会通过立法来反击。

You know, when anybody’s threatened, or any business is threatened, it tries to fight back.

你知道，当任何人受到威胁，或者任何企业受到威胁时，它都会试图反击。

If you go back to when State Farm came on the scene in 1921, that the — or ’20, or whenever it was, the agency system was sacrosanct, in terms of insurance. It’d been around forever and the big companies were in Hartford or New York and they fought over having the number one agency in town.

如果你回到 1921 年tate Farm出现的时候，或者说是 1920 年，或者其他时候，代理制度在保险行业是神圣不可侵犯的。它已经存在了很久，大公司都在哈特福德或纽约，他们争夺镇上第一家代理机构。

So if you came to Omaha and you were at Travelers or Aetna, or whomever it might be, your objective was to get the agent. And the policy holder really wasn’t being thought about.

所以如果你来到奥马哈，和Travelers或Aetna，或者其他任何公司在一起，你的目标就是找到代理人。而保单持有者实际上并没有被考虑在内。

And then State Farm came along and they had a better mouse trap, and then GEICO came along with a better mouse trap yet.

然后 State Farm 出现了，他们有了更好的捕鼠器，然后 GEICO 又出现了一个更好的捕鼠器。

And so, every — the industries originally — the insurance companies fought back in a lot of ways. But one of the ways they tried to do it was to insist, you know, on various state laws involving what agents could do and what could not be done in insurance without agents and all that.

因此，各个行业——保险公司以多种方式进行了反击。但他们尝试的一种方式是坚持各种州法律，涉及代理人可以做什么以及在没有代理人的情况下保险可以做什么和不能做什么。

It’s — that’s standard. And you’ll see that, and in the end the better mouse trap usually wins. But the people with the second or third-best mouse trap will try to keep that from happening.

这就是标准。你会看到，最终更好的捕鼠器通常会获胜。但第二或第三好的捕鼠器的人会试图阻止这种情况发生。

The ones you name, I don’t know anything about. I mean, I know what they do, but I don’t their specific prospects, which is why we kind of stay away from that sort of thing because we don’t — we know there’ll be change, and we don’t know who the winners will be. And we try to stick with businesses where we know the winners.

你提到的那些，我一无所知。我的意思是，我知道他们在做什么，但我不知道他们的具体前景，这就是为什么我们有点避开那种事情，因为我们知道会有变化，但我们不知道谁会是赢家。我们尽量专注于我们知道赢家的业务。

We know — and there are energy companies that — a railroad. A lot of our businesses are very, very, very likely to be winners, and that doesn’t mean they don’t have some change involved with them, but they’re going to be winners.

我们知道——还有一些能源公司——一条铁路。我们很多的业务非常非常有可能会成功，这并不意味着它们没有一些变化，但它们会成功。

And then there’s other fields where we can’t pick the winners, and so we just sit and watch. We find them interesting but we don’t get tempted. Charlie?

然后还有其他领域，我们无法选择赢家，所以我们只能坐着观看。我们觉得它们很有趣，但我们不受诱惑。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the new technology is going to be quite disruptive to a lot of people. I think retailing, in particular, is facing some very significant threats.

查理·芒格：我认为新技术将对很多人产生相当大的冲击。我认为零售业尤其面临一些非常重大的威胁。

And you heard Greg Abel talk about a power plant in Iowa that was huge to serve one Google server farm. When you get computer capacity all over the world on this scale, it is changing the world. I mean, you’re talking about —

你听到格雷格·阿贝尔谈到一个位于爱荷华州的电厂，它的规模巨大，足以为一个谷歌服务器农场提供服务。当你在全球范围内拥有如此规模的计算能力时，这正在改变世界。我的意思是，你在谈论——

WARREN BUFFETT: Fast, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：快，太快了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, fast. So — and I think it’s going to hurt a lot of people just as all the past technology investments hurt a lot of people. I think Berkshire, by and large, is in pretty good shape.

查理·芒格：是的，很快。所以——我认为这会伤害很多人，就像过去的所有技术投资伤害了很多人一样。我认为伯克希尔总体上状况不错。

WARREN BUFFETT: Where do you think we’re most vulnerable?

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为我们最脆弱的地方在哪里？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think I want to name them.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不想提他们的名字。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑）

Now you’ve got them all wondering, Charlie. (Laughs)

现在你让他们都在想，查理。（笑）

71. Teach financial literacy to children in school?

在学校教孩子们金融知识吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Section 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三部分。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Diane Wilen, and I’m from Hollywood, Florida.

观众成员：下午好。我叫黛安·威伦，来自佛罗里达州好莱坞。

I’ve worked in public education for over 35 years. My concern is that I think that we need to do more to proactively prepare our children and youth to be financially literate, especially in light of the serious financial stresses many adults in our society face on a daily basis.

我在公共教育领域工作了超过 35 年。我的担忧是，我认为我们需要更加主动地为我们的儿童和青少年做好财务知识的准备，特别是考虑到我们社会中许多成年人每天面临的严重财务压力。

My question is, do you think that financial literacy should be a standard part of the curriculum in our nation’s schools and, if so, how early do you think it should begin and what do you think some of the most important learning goals would be?

我的问题是，您认为金融素养应该成为我们国家学校课程的标准部分吗？如果是的话，您认为应该从多早开始，您认为一些最重要的学习目标是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, certainly the earlier the better. I mean, habits are such a powerful force in everyone’s life, and certainly good financial habits.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，越早越好。习惯在每个人的生活中都是一种强大的力量，尤其是良好的财务习惯。

You know, I see it all the time. I get letters every day from people that have committed some kind of financial lunacy or another, but they didn’t know it was lunacy and, you know, they didn’t get taught that. Their parents didn’t teach it to them.

你知道，我经常看到这种情况。我每天都会收到来自那些犯下某种金融疯狂行为的人们的信件，但他们并不知道这是什么疯狂行为，你知道，他们没有被教导过。他们的父母没有教他们。

And digging yourself out of the holes that financial illiteracy can cause, you know, you can spend the rest of your lifetime doing it. So I’m very sympathetic to what you’re talking about.

而要摆脱金融无知所造成的困境，你知道，这可能需要你花费一生的时间去做。所以我对你所说的非常同情。

We’ve done a little bit. I don’t know whether you saw our “Secret Millionaire’s Club” exhibit in the exhibition hall.

我们做了一些工作。我不知道你是否看到了我们在展览厅的“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”展览。

And you want to talk to people at a very young age. Charlie and I were lucky. I mean, we got it in our families so that, you know, we were learning it at the dinner table when we were — before we knew what we were learning. And that happens in a lot of families, and in a lot of families it doesn’t happen.

你想在很小的时候就与人交谈。查理和我很幸运。我是说，我们在家庭中就接触到了这些，所以你知道，我们在餐桌上学习这些知识时——在我们还不知道自己在学习什么的时候。这在很多家庭中都发生过，而在很多家庭中则没有发生。

And, of course, you mention about childhood financial literacy. Then there’s a big problem with adulthood, adult financial illiteracy. And it’s harder to be smarter or have better habits than your parents unless the schools intercede or —probably, you know, the schools are your best bet, but it can be done — a lot can be done on television or through the internet.

当然，你提到了儿童时期的金融素养。那么，成年后就出现了一个大问题，成年人的金融无知。除非学校介入，否则要比父母更聪明或养成更好的习惯是很困难的——学校可能是你最好的选择，但这也是可以做到的——很多事情可以通过电视或互联网来实现。

But it is really important to have good financial habits, and I think anything you can do very early through the school system, you know, would certainly have my vote. Charlie?

但养成良好的财务习惯真的很重要，我认为在学校系统中尽早采取的任何措施，肯定会得到我的支持。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m not sure if the schools are at fault. I would place most of the fault with the parents. I think the most powerful example (applause) is the behavior of the parent, and so if you’re —

查理·芒格：嗯，我不确定学校是否有错。我认为大部分责任在于父母。我认为最有力的例子（掌声）是父母的行为，所以如果你——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I agree with — the most important thing is the parents, but not everybody gets the right parents.

沃伦·巴菲特：我同意——最重要的是父母，但并不是每个人都能拥有合适的父母。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, it’s very hard to fix people who have the wrong parents. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。嗯，修正那些有错误父母的人是非常困难的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s just say you have the job of fixing people that have the wrong parents. What would you do about it?

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，假设你有这个工作，去修复那些有错误父母的人。你会怎么做？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what’s the — if you had the job of living forever, what would you do about it? It gets to be so impractical. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那么，如果你有永生的工作，你会怎么做？这变得太不切实际了。（笑声）

Who would ever believe that I would have any ability to fix all the people that have the wrong parents?

谁会相信我有能力修复所有有错误父母的人呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: How about a few? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：那几个怎么样？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think I’m good at that, either. The only thing I’ve ever been slightly good at in my life is raising the top higher. It’s just — they left the talent out of me.

查理·芒格：我不认为我擅长那个。我一生中唯一稍微擅长的事情就是提高标准。只是——他们把我身上的才华遗漏了。

I don’t scorn it. I think it’s a noble work. I just — I’m no good at it.

我不鄙视它。我认为这是一个高尚的工作。我只是——我不擅长它。

I don’t think you’re so hot, either. (Laughter)

我也不觉得你那么厉害。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If he hadn’t been in public, it would have been stronger. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果他没有出现在公众面前，它会更强大。（笑）

Stop by our “Secret Millionaire’s Club,” though. You may get some ideas.

顺便来我们“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”看看。你可能会得到一些灵感。

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, the main troubles with education in this field are probably not in the grade schools. They’re probably in the colleges.

查理·芒格：顺便说一句，这个领域教育的主要问题可能不在于小学。可能在于大学。

There’s a lot of asininity taught in the finance courses at the major universities, and even the departments of economics have much wrong with them. So, if you really want to start fixing the world, you shouldn’t assume that when it gets highfalutin, it’s a lot better.

在主要大学的金融课程中教授了很多愚蠢的东西，甚至经济学系也存在许多问题。因此，如果你真的想开始改善世界，就不应该认为当事情变得高深时，它就会好得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——（掌声）

There was certainly a period of at least 20 years, I would say, when I think the net utility of knowledge given to finance majors was negative in major universities. I think maybe it’s getting better now, but it is a —

我认为至少有 20 年的时间，在主要大学中，给予金融专业学生的知识的净效用是负面的。我觉得现在可能有所改善，但这仍然是一个——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Imagine it. Net utility was negative. It was (unintelligible) asinine.

查理·芒格：想象一下。净效用是负的。这是（听不清）愚蠢的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I wish you’d use normal English. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我希望你能用正常的英语。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m worried about what English you’re going to use. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我担心你会用什么英语。（笑声）

I don’t want to egg him on.

我不想煽动他。

The — it was — frankly, it was fascinating to me because here was something I understood.

这——坦率地说——对我来说非常吸引人，因为这是我能理解的东西。

And to watch — I mean extraordinary universities that, essentially, were teaching people some very, very dumb things. And where even to obtain the positions in the departments of those schools, you had to subscribe to this orthodoxy, which made no sense at all.

而且观察——我的意思是那些非凡的大学，基本上在教人一些非常非常愚蠢的东西。而且即使是要在那些学校的系里获得职位，你也必须遵循这种完全没有意义的正统观念。

And it got stronger and stronger, and then — now it’s changing to quite a degree. But it may have soured my feeling on higher education to an unwarranted degree because that — you know, it may have been particularly bad in the area that I was familiar with, but it was bad.

而且它变得越来越强，然后——现在它正在发生相当大的变化。但这可能在不合理的程度上影响了我对高等教育的看法，因为——你知道，这可能在我熟悉的领域特别糟糕，但确实很糟糕。

Have I got — is my language okay, Charlie?

我说得怎么样，查理？我的语言还可以吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You would have liked academics better if you’d have taken physics instead of finance. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：如果你学的是物理而不是金融，你会更喜欢学术界。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I’m glad I didn’t. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我很高兴我没有这样做。（笑）

72. “There’s no advantage to breaking Berkshire into pieces”

“将伯克希尔拆分成几部分没有任何好处”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 4。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. First of all, great party last night. I stood there for half an hour and still couldn’t get a drink, so great crowd. Oh, by the way this is Zhang Xiaozhu (PH) from Ottawa, Ontario.

观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生。首先，昨晚的聚会非常棒。我站在那里半个小时，还是没能喝到酒，真是人山人海。哦，顺便说一下，我是来自安大略省渥太华的张小柱（音）。

My question relates to the age-old question about dividends and also valuation. I think you guys are penalized by the great success of your enormously successful company. It’s huge, so no one knows how to properly valuate it, and also because of your yardstick you picked, which is not quite fair.

我的问题与关于股息和估值的古老问题有关。我认为你们因为自己极其成功的公司而受到惩罚。它太庞大了，以至于没有人知道如何正确地对其进行估值，还有因为你们选择的标准，这并不公平。

Every year I see some of the old shareholders, and they are waiting to get a dividend, using some of the monies to supplement their retirements.

每年我都会见到一些老股东，他们在等待分红，用一些资金来补充他们的退休生活。

I do not feel it’s essentially fair for them to sell their shares. I remember the case study you had in last year’s letter to the shareholders. You did a case study comparing issuing dividends or having the shareholders selling their shares directly.

我觉得他们出售股份并不公平。我记得你在去年的股东信中提到的案例研究。你做了一个案例研究，比较了发放股息和让股东直接出售股份。

Because of the shares are so depressed, I do not feel it’s very fair. So I’m wanting to ask, is there a practical way for you to break up the company into four logical groups, as you report in every year’s AGM, and unlock some of the values and still allow you to allocate the capital freely, please?

由于股票价格如此低迷，我觉得这并不公平。因此，我想问一下，是否有实际的方法将公司分成四个逻辑组，如您在每年的股东大会上所报告的那样，并解锁一些价值，同时仍然允许您自由分配资本？

WARREN BUFFETT: We would lose — we would not unlock value. We would lose significant value if we were to break it into four companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会失去——我们不会释放价值。如果我们将其拆分为四家公司，我们将失去显著的价值。

There are large advantages in both capital allocation, occasionally in the tax situation. There’s — Berkshire is worth more as presently constituted than in any other form that I can conceive of unless we engaged in something to de-tax the whole place, which we’re not going to do and which would probably be impossible anyway, but even if it was possible, we wouldn’t be doing it.

在资本配置方面有很大的优势，有时在税务状况上也是如此。伯克希尔目前的构成比我能想到的任何其他形式都更有价值，除非我们参与某种方式来减税，这我们是不会做的，而且这可能也不可能，但即使可能，我们也不会去做。

But the — we did have this vote, and it’s now time to adjourn and then we’ll come back in a few minutes for the annual meeting. But we did have a vote, and unfortunately we — there’s not a way to deliver a dividend to a few shareholders and not to others, although — whereas there is a way to — for shareholders to maintain an even and greater dollar investment in Berkshire, in terms of the underlying assets, and still cash out annually some portion of their investment, just like they would with a partnership, and incur fairly little tax in the matter. And I wrote about that last year and you’ve read that.

但是 - 我们已经进行了表决，现在是休会的时候了，然后我们会在几分钟后回来参加年度会议。但是我们确实进行了一次表决，不幸的是我们 - 并没有一种方法可以向少数股东发放股息而不向其他股东发放，尽管 - 虽然股东有一种方法可以让伯克希尔的资产持续增长，并以每年出售一定数量的股票的方式套现，就像他们对合伙企业所做的那样，并且在这过程中缴纳很少的税。我去年写过这方面的内容，你已经读过了。

But there’s no advantage to breaking Berkshire into pieces. It would be a terrible mistake. Charlie?

但将伯克希尔拆分成几部分没有任何好处。这将是一个可怕的错误。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, generally I think that you’re not being deprived when the stock goes from 100 to 200, and you didn’t get a dividend that year.

查理·芒格：嗯，通常我认为当股票从 100 涨到 200 时，即使你那年没有得到分红，你也并没有被剥夺。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it isn’t going to go up every year, though. I mean, it’s going to —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不过，它不会每年都上涨。我是说，它会——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Or two years or whatever it was.

查理·芒格：或者两年，或者其他什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We had, by a 45-to-1 vote, we had people — which actually surprised me. We had people say that they prefer the present policy to a change in that policy, so it would be a big mistake to change.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们以 45 票对 1 票的结果，有人——这实际上让我感到惊讶。我们有些人表示他们更喜欢现行政策，而不是改变该政策，因此改变政策将是一个大错误。

And with that we will end the Q-and-A session. We’ll be back in about ten or so minutes, and we’ll have an annual meeting. Thank you. (Applause)

那么我们将结束问答环节。我们将在大约十分钟后回来，进行年度会议。谢谢大家。（掌声）

73. Berkshire’s formal annual meeting

伯克希尔的正式年度会议

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If you’ll take your seats, we’ll get on to the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。如果大家就座，我们就开始会议。

OK. I have a script here that I’ll read from and make sure everything’s proper.

好的。我这里有一个剧本，我会根据它来读，并确保一切都正确。

The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company, and I welcome you to the 2014 annual meeting of shareholders.

会议现在开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席，欢迎您参加 2014 年股东年会。

This morning, I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present. Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天早上，我介绍了在场的伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事。此外，今天还有我们的审计师德勤会计师事务所的合伙人。他们可以回答您可能对他们公司对伯克希尔账目的审计有的相关问题。

Sharon Heck is secretary of Berkshire Hathaway. She will make a written record of the proceedings.

莎伦·赫克是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的秘书。她将对会议进行书面记录。

Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify that the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motion to be voted upon at the meeting.

贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。她将确认在董事选举和会议上投票的提案中投票的计数。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

WARREN BUFFETT: Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?

沃伦·巴菲特：秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股数量、享有投票权的股份以及出席会议的报告？

SHARON HECK: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 5, 2014, there were 857,848 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at this meeting and 1,179,267,338 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one ten-thousandth of one vote on motions considered at this meeting. Of that number, 601,494 Class A shares and 682,365,717 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, May 1.

莎伦·赫克：是的，我有。如 2014 年 3 月 5 日发送给所有登记股东的会议通知所附的委托书中所示，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的 A 类普通股共有 857,848 股，每股在本次会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权；B 类普通股共有 1,179,267,338 股，每股在本次会议上对所考虑的动议有万分之一票的投票权。在这些股份中，601,494 股 A 类股和 682,365,717 股 B 类股通过截至 5 月 1 日星期四晚间的委托代理人出席本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will, therefore, directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。

74. Approval of last year’s minutes

去年会议记录的批准

WARREN BUFFETT: First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place the motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：首要事务是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并获得支持。有没有任何评论或问题？

We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say, “Aye.” Opposed? The motion is carried.

我们将通过口头表决对这个提案进行投票。赞成的请说“赞成”。反对的？提案通过。

75. Election of Berkshire directors

伯克希尔董事的选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who did not send in a proxy or wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in, you may vote in person on the election of directors and other matters to be considered at this meeting. Please identify yourself to one of the meeting officials in the aisle so that you can receive a ballot.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。如果有股东在场但未提交代理投票或希望撤回之前提交的代理投票，您可以亲自投票选举董事以及本次会议将要考虑的其他事项。请向走道上的会议工作人员自我介绍，以便您可以领取选票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并得到支持，选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅里尔·维特默为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? The nominations are ready to be acted upon.

还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？提名已经准备好进行表决。

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the election of directors and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道中的一位会议官员。

Ms. Amick, when you are ready you may give your report.

阿米克女士，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 660,619 votes for each nominee.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票针对截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 660,619 票。

That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

该数字远远超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份总投票数的多数。根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克女士。

Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅里尔·维特默已被选为董事。

76. Advisory vote on executive compensation

关于高管薪酬的咨询投票

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting on this item.

沃伦·巴菲特：议程上的下一个项目是对伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬的咨询投票。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上就此项目提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of the regulation S-K, including the compensation discussion and the analysis and the accompanying compensation tables and the related narrative discussion in the company’s 2014 annual meeting proxy statement.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议公司股东以咨询的方式批准根据 S-K 法规第 402 条披露的公司指定高管的薪酬，包括薪酬讨论和分析，以及公司 2014 年年度会议委托书中的相关薪酬表和叙述讨论。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.

沃伦·巴菲特：已提议并获得第二次支持，公司的股东以咨询的方式批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。

Is there any discussion? I believe there may be on this. Do we have anyone?

有讨论吗？我相信可能会有。我们有谁吗？

OK. Ms. Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

好的，阿米克女士，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: The report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 666,751 votes to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.

贝基·阿米克：报告已准备好。代理持有人的选票在对上周四晚上收到的代理投票的回应中，投出了不少于 666,751 票以顾问的方式批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克女士。

The motion to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers is passed.

对公司指定高管所支付的薪酬进行咨询性批准的动议已通过。

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the frequency of a shareholder advisory vote on compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting on this item.

沃伦·巴菲特：议程上的下一个项目是关于对伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬的股东咨询投票频率的咨询投票。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上就此项目提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company determine, on an advisory basis, the frequency, whether by annual, biannual, or triannual, with which they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers as set forth in the company’s 2014 annual meeting proxy statement.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议公司股东以咨询方式决定他们对公司 2014 年年度会议代理声明中所列的公司指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率，频率可以是年度、半年或每三年一次。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that shareholders of the company determine the frequency with which they have an advisory vote on compensation of named executive officers with the options being every one, two or three years. Is there any discussion? I believe on this one there is a — somebody wishes to speak? Yes.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提议并得到支持，由公司的股东决定他们对指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率，选项为每年、每两年或每三年一次。有没有讨论？我相信在这个问题上——有人想发言吗？是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Boston, Massachusetts. I suggest a vote of one year in order to change the policy of named executives.

观众成员：——马萨诸塞州波士顿。我建议投票决定一年，以便改变指定高管的政策。

In addition to Warren, Charlie, and Marc, the company should report Ajit Jain’s salary. He is irreplaceable, and Warren works integrally with him in setting insurance rates.

除了沃伦、查理和马克，公司还应该报告阿吉特·贾因的薪水。他是不可替代的，沃伦在设定保险费率时与他密切合作。

Since —five — there should be five members of management, either another insurance manager or someone from the capital-related industries group, from BNSF or MidAmerican, should also be added.

由于——五——应该有五名管理成员，另外还应该增加一名保险经理或来自资本相关行业集团的人员，来自 BNSF 或 MidAmerican。

You are so lean at corporate, the group managers should be named. Two should be named, but at least Ajit should be added.

你在公司里太精简了，应该给小组经理命名。应该命名两个，但至少应该加上 Ajit。

The CEOs of former Fortune 500s used to disclose what is their compensation now. There is no retirement age at Berkshire, which is fine, but there should be more depth of disclosure, and this should be done next year, not three years from now.

前财富 500 强公司的首席执行官们曾经披露他们现在的薪酬。伯克希尔没有退休年龄，这很好，但应该有更深入的披露，这应该在明年进行，而不是三年后。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there anyone else that — doesn’t appear to be.

沃伦·巴菲特：还有其他人吗——似乎没有。

I personally actually agree with a one-year frequency on this, normally, but it does seem in the case of Berkshire that considering what’s required and considering what the numbers are and everything, that it probably doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. But I generally feel one year is not a bad idea.

我个人实际上同意这一点的频率为一年，通常情况下，但在伯克希尔的情况下，考虑到所需的内容以及数字和一切，似乎并没有太多意义。但我一般认为一年并不是一个坏主意。

I do not think it’s a good idea to start selecting people among the managers to give compensation for the reasons discussed earlier.

我认为在经理中选择人员以给予补偿并不是一个好主意，原因如前所述。

OK. Ms. Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

好的，阿米克女士，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 113,530 votes for a frequency of every year, 2,412 votes for a frequency of every two years, and 552,309 votes for a frequency of every three years of an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票回应了截至上周四晚上收到的代理，投出了 113,530 票支持每年一次的频率，2,412 票支持每两年一次的频率，以及 552,309 票支持每三年一次的频率，关于对公司指定高管薪酬的咨询投票。根据特拉华州法律要求的精确投票计数的认证将交给秘书，放入本次会议的会议记录中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克女士。

Shareholders of the company determined, on an advisory basis, that they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers every three years.

公司的股东决定，以咨询的方式，每三年对公司指定高管的薪酬进行一次咨询投票。

77. Proposal to set greenhouse gas reduction goals

提议设定温室气体减排目标

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by Meyer Family Enterprises, LLC, a Berkshire shareholder represented by Brady Anderson and Linda Nkosi.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由梅耶家庭企业有限责任公司提出的动议，该公司是伯克希尔的股东，由布雷迪·安德森和琳达·恩科西代表。

The motion is set forth in the proxy statement. The motion directs Berkshire Hathaway to establish quantitative goals for reduction of greenhouse gases and other air emissions at its energy generating holdings and publish a report to shareholders on how it will achieve those goals.

该提案在委托书中提出。该提案要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司为其能源发电资产设定减少温室气体和其他空气排放的量化目标，并向股东发布一份报告，说明如何实现这些目标。

The directors have recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize Brady Anderson and Linda Nkosi to present the motion. To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I ask them to limit their remarks to five minutes.

我现在将请布雷迪·安德森和琳达·恩科西提出动议。为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我请他们将发言时间限制在五分钟内。

LINDA NKOSI: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Linda Nkosi from Swaziland, and this is Brady Anderson from Iowa.

琳达·恩科西：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生，女士们，先生们。我叫琳达·恩科西，来自斯威士兰，这是来自爱荷华州的布雷迪·安德森。

We are students of economics and finance at Wartburg College in Iowa and are here representing a delegation of students who manage a $1.2 million portfolio that includes shares of Berkshire Hathaway. We very much appreciate the opportunity to take part in this celebrated event.

我们是爱荷华州瓦特堡学院的经济与金融专业学生，代表一个管理着 120 万美元投资组合的学生代表团，投资组合中包括伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票。我们非常感谢能够参加这个备受瞩目的活动。

We stand to represent Investor Voice SPC of Seattle on behalf of the Meyer Family Enterprises to move Item 4 on page 12 of the proxy, a proposal that Berkshire establish goals for greenhouse gas reduction at its energy holdings.

我们代表西雅图的投资者声音特别目的公司，代表迈耶家族企业提出在代理文件第 12 页的第 4 项提案，建议伯克希尔为其能源资产设定温室气体减排目标。

We applaud Berkshire Hathaway Energy for having the largest renewable energy portfolio in the country.

我们赞扬伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司拥有全国最大的可再生能源投资组合。

That said, it is also true that BH Energy generates close to half its power by burning coal, which makes BH Energy a huge emitter of greenhouse gas. Given these facts, it would benefit BH Energy to have a carbon reduction plan.

尽管如此，BH Energy 确实通过燃烧煤炭产生近一半的电力，这使得 BH Energy 成为温室气体的巨大排放者。鉴于这些事实，BH Energy 制定碳减排计划将是有益的。

Sixty-six percent of U.S. electric utilities have greenhouse gas reduction goals. Berkshire Hathaway Energy is not among them, despite stating on its website, “We will set challenging goals and assess our ability to continually improve our environmental performance.”

美国 66%的电力公司设定了温室气体减排目标。尽管伯克希尔哈撒韦能源在其网站上声明：“我们将设定具有挑战性的目标，并评估我们持续改善环境绩效的能力”，但它并不在其中。

As shareholders are aware, climate disruption creates profound financial risk for the global economy as well as for Berkshire. The Investor Network on Climate Risk, whose members manage more than $11 trillion, and the Carbon Disclosure Project, representing more than $80 trillion in assets globally, have called on companies to disclose risks related to climate change, as well as to take steps to reduce that risk.

正如股东所知，气候变化给全球经济以及伯克希尔带来了深远的财务风险。气候风险投资者网络的成员管理着超过 11 万亿美元的资产，而碳信息披露项目则代表着全球超过 80 万亿美元的资产，呼吁公司披露与气候变化相关的风险，并采取措施降低这些风险。

BRADY ANDERSON: The SEC has stated that climate risks are financially material and that they must be disclosed. This is because a high-carbon approach creates risk, whereas a low-carbon approach avoids risk, both now and into the future.

布雷迪·安德森：证券交易委员会已表示，气候风险在财务上是重要的，必须披露。这是因为高碳方法会带来风险，而低碳方法则可以避免风险，无论是现在还是未来。

Without planning and a set of forward-looking goals, neither management nor investors can truly know where they stand.

没有规划和一套前瞻性的目标，管理层和投资者都无法真正了解他们所处的位置。

In addition, Berkshire’s core businesses are vulnerable to climate disruption. Why? Because many of the most negative financial impacts of climate disruption are borne by insurance companies.

此外，伯克希尔的核心业务容易受到气候干扰的影响。为什么？因为气候干扰的许多负面财务影响由保险公司承担。

Berkshire’s GEICO took its single largest loss in history from Superstorm Sandy, a $490 million loss due to claims on more than 46,000 flooded vehicles.

伯克希尔的 GEICO 因超级风暴桑迪遭遇历史上最大的单笔损失，损失金额为 4.9 亿美元，因超过 46,000 辆被淹车辆的索赔。

Berkshire’s reinsurance business is likely to bear significantly more risk from the trends towards increasingly extreme weather.

伯克希尔的再保险业务可能会因日益极端天气的趋势而承担显著更多的风险。

For a time, some portion of these costs may be pushed onto customers in the form of higher premiums, but it is a prudent — it is (not) a prudent or sustainable long-term strategy to impose on customers the cost of not planning for the greenhouse gas reductions that climate scientists agree are urgently needed.

在一段时间内，这些成本的一部分可能会以更高的保费形式转嫁给客户，但将不计划减少气候科学家一致认为迫切需要的温室气体排放的成本强加给客户并不是一种明智或可持续的长期策略。

In summary, hundreds of the world’s largest institutional investors, representing trillions of dollars of invested assets, call on companies to set greenhouse gas reduction goals. Such goals are key tools for reducing the profound business risk that climate change creates.

总之，数百家全球最大的机构投资者，代表着数万亿美元的投资资产，呼吁公司设定温室气体减排目标。这些目标是减少气候变化带来的深刻商业风险的关键工具。

More than two-thirds of United States utilities already have such goals, and institutional proxy advisory firms repeatedly recommend voting for goal setting and disclosure of this sort.

超过三分之二的美国公用事业公司已经设定了这样的目标，机构代理咨询公司也反复建议投票支持此类目标设定和信息披露。

Therefore, please join us in voting for this common sense proposal, which not only benefits the planet, it will preserve, if not boost, Berkshire profits by avoiding risk.

因此，请与我们一起投票支持这一常识性提案，它不仅有利于地球，还将通过避免风险来保护，甚至提升，伯克希尔的利润。

Thank you for this truly amazing opportunity to share our concerns.

感谢您给予我们这个真正令人惊叹的机会来分享我们的担忧。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, and thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢大家。（掌声）

I assume that the fact the lights went off, there’s nobody additionally that would like to speak on the motion for or against?

我假设灯熄灭的事实是，没有其他人想要就此动议发表支持或反对的意见？

Hearing nothing, I’ll say that the motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the motion and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

听不到任何声音，我将说该提案现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在提案上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Ms. Amick, when you’re ready, you can give your report.

阿米克女士，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 49,553 votes for the motion and 561,642 votes against the motion.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，有 49,553 票支持该提案，561,642 票反对该提案。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份的多数票，该提案已失败。根据特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick. The proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克女士。提案失败。

78. Shareholder proposal to pay a dividend

股东提案支付股息

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forward by David Witt. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement. The motion requested the board of directors consider payment of a dividend. The directors have recommended the shareholders vote against the proposal.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是大卫·威特提出的动议。该动议在委托书中列出。动议请求董事会考虑支付股息。董事们建议股东投票反对该提案。

Mr. Witt available? 威特先生在吗？

As neither Mr. Witt nor his representative is present to present their proposal for action, the motion fails.

由于威特先生及其代表均未出席提出行动提案，动议未通过。

79. Meeting adjourned

会议结束

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。会议结束前，还有人要提出其他事务吗？如果没有，我请斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion to adjourn.

声音：我支持休会的提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。