2016-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Charlie Munger always “gets the girl”

查理·芒格总是“赢得女孩”。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren Buffett. This is Charlie Munger. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。我是沃伦·巴菲特。这是查理·芒格。（掌声）

I’m the young one. (Laughter)

我是年轻的那个。(笑声)

You may notice in the movie, incidentally, that Charlie is always the one that gets the girl, and he has one explanation for that. But I think mine is more accurate.

你可能会在电影中注意到，查理总是那个得到女孩的人，而他对此有一个解释。但我认为我的解释更准确。

As you know, every mother in this country tells her daughter at an early age, if you’re choosing between two very old and very rich guys, pick the one that’s older. (Laughter)

正如你所知，这个国家的每位母亲在女儿年幼时都会告诉她，如果你在两个非常富有且年纪很大的男人之间选择，选择那个年纪更大的。(笑声)

2. Welcome webcast viewers

欢迎网络直播观众

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d especially — we’re webcasting this for the first time, so I’d especially like to welcome our visitors from all over the world.

沃伦·巴菲特：我特别想欢迎来自世界各地的访客，因为这是我们第一次进行网络直播。

We’re having this meeting simultaneously translated into Mandarin. And that poses certain problems for me and Charlie, because I’m not sure how sensible all our comments will come out once translated into Mandarin.

我们正在进行这次会议的普通话同声翻译。这给我和查理带来了一些问题，因为我不确定我们的所有评论翻译成普通话后会变得多么合理。

In fact, I’m not so sure how sensible they come out initially sometimes. (Laughter)

事实上，我有时并不太确定它们最初的结果有多合理。（笑声）

But we’re delighted to have people around the world joining us.

但我们很高兴有来自世界各地的人加入我们。

3. Meeting agenda

会议议程

WARREN BUFFETT: Now the drill of the day is that I’ll make a couple of introductions, and we’ll show a couple of slides, and then we’ll go on to questions from both our two panels and from the audience, we’ll rotate them. And we’ll do that until about noon.

沃伦·巴菲特：今天的流程是我会做几次介绍，然后我们会展示几张幻灯片，接着我们会进行来自两个小组和观众的问题，我们会轮流进行。我们会一直这样进行到中午左右。

Actually, about a quarter of twelve, I’ll give you a rundown on a bet that was made that we report on every year.

实际上，大约在十二点一刻，我会给你讲述一个我们每年报道的赌注。

But then I’ll also, in connection with that, explain, and it ties in with it, what I really think is probably the most important investment lesson in the world. So we’ll have that about a quarter of twelve and I hope that keeps you around.

但接下来我也会与此相关地解释，我认为这可能是世界上最重要的投资课程。所以我们将在大约十二点一刻讨论这个，我希望这能让你留下来。

And then we’ll break at noon for an hour for lunch. We’ll reconvene at one o’clock.

然后我们将在中午休息一个小时吃午餐。我们将在一点钟重新集合。

We’ll proceed until 3:30 with questions. We’ll then adjourn for fifteen minutes and at 3:45 convene the formal meeting.

我们将进行到 3:30 进行提问。然后我们将休会十五分钟，并在 3:45 召开正式会议。

4. Introductions

介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to just make a couple of introductions.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想做几个介绍。

I hope Carrie Sova is here. Do we have a spotlight? Carrie puts this whole meeting together. There she is.

我希望凯莉·索瓦在这里。我们有聚光灯吗？凯莉组织了整个会议。她来了。

Wonder Woman. (Applause) 神奇女侠。（掌声）

Carrie joined us, Carrie joined us as a receptionist about six years ago, and I just kept throwing more and more problems at her.

凯莉加入了我们，凯莉大约六年前作为接待员加入了我们，我不断给她更多的问题。

And she’d put together the 50th anniversary book, which we’ve actually expanded further this year. We have a revised edition.

她编写了 50 周年纪念册，我们今年实际上进一步扩展了它。我们有一个修订版。

Charlie and I autographed a hundred of them. We interspersed them among the group being sold.

查理和我签名了一百个。我们把它们分散在正在出售的组中。

And Carrie, while doing that, she also had a young baby girl, her second baby, late in January. But then she’s gone ahead to put on this whole annual meeting.

凯莉在这样做的同时，她在一月下旬还生下了一个小女孩，这是她的第二个孩子。但她还是继续举办了整个年度会议。

It’s a remarkable achievement and I really want to thank her, it’s been terrific. (Applause)

这是一个了不起的成就，我真的想感谢她，太棒了。（掌声）

Actually, we have one surprise guest. I think my youngest great-grandchild, who will be about seven months old, is also here today and if he happens to break out crying a lot, and don’t let it bother you. It’s just his mother is explaining to him my views on it inherited wealth and… (Laughter)

实际上，我们有一位惊喜嘉宾。我想我最小的曾孙，今天大约七个月大，也在这里。如果他突然哭得很厉害，请不要介意。这只是他的母亲在向他解释我对继承财富的看法……（笑声）

We also have our directors with us. And they’re here in the front row.

我们还有我们的董事在这里。他们在前排。

I’ll introduce them. If they’ll stand when introduced, withhold your applause, no matter how extreme the urge to applaud them individually. And when we’re finished, then you can go wild.

我会介绍他们。如果他们在介绍时站起来，请不要鼓掌，无论你有多么强烈的鼓掌冲动。等我们结束后，你们就可以尽情欢呼。

First of all, Howard Buffett. Steve Burke. Sue Decker. Bill Gates. Sandy Gottesman. Charlotte Guyman. Tom Murphy. Ron Olson. Walter Scott. And Meryl Witmer. And that’s our wonderful group. (Applause)

首先，霍华德·巴菲特。史蒂夫·伯克。苏·德克。比尔·盖茨。桑迪·戈特斯曼。夏洛特·古伊曼。汤姆·墨菲。罗恩·奥尔森。沃尔特·斯科特。还有梅瑞尔·维特默。这就是我们精彩的团队。（掌声）

5. Q1 earnings

第一季度收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we just have two slides to show you now.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们只需要给你们展示两张幻灯片。

The first one is a preliminary… summary figures — for the first quarter.

第一个是初步的……第一季度的汇总数据。

And you’ll notice that insurance underwriting — these are after-tax figures by category — are down somewhat.

您会注意到，保险承保——这些是按类别计算的税后数字——有所下降。

The basic underwriting at GEICO is actually improving, but we had some important hailstorms in Texas toward the end of the quarter. We’ve actually had some since the end of the quarter, too, so there were more cat losses in the first quarter than last year.

在 GEICO，基本承保实际上在改善，但我们在季度末时德克萨斯州发生了一些重要的冰雹风暴。自季度末以来我们也经历了一些，因此第一季度的灾难性损失比去年更多。

Railroad earnings are down significantly, and railroad car loadings throughout the industry, all of the major railroads, were down significantly in the first quarter, and probably will continue to be down, almost certainly will continue to be down, the balance of the year.

铁路收入大幅下降，整个行业的铁路装载量，包括所有主要铁路公司，在第一季度显著下降，预计在接下来的时间里几乎肯定会继续下降，全年都将保持下降趋势。

We have two companies which we added to the manufacturing, service, and retailing field: Precision Castparts and Duracell, but they were added during the quarter, so their full earnings aren’t shown in the figures.

我们有两家公司被加入到制造、服务和零售领域：Precision Castparts和Duracell，但它们是在本季度内加入的，因此它们的全部收益未在数据中显示。

In the other category, we have, and I don’t like to get too technical here, and you should read the 10-K — 10-Q — when it comes out next weekend.

在其他类别中，我们有，我不想在这里过于技术性，你应该在下个周末发布时阅读 10-K 和 10-Q。

But, when we borrow money in other currencies, and the only currency we’ve done that with is the euro, but we have a fair amount of money that we borrowed in euros, and the nature of accounting is that the change in value of the foreign exchange — change in value each quarter — is actually shown in interest expense.

但是，当我们以其他货币借款时，而我们唯一以欧元借款的情况是我们借了相当数量的欧元，根据会计规定，外汇价值的变化会反映在利息支出中。

So if the euro goes up, we have a lot of extra interest expense, they’re shown that way. It’s not a realized factor, but it moves from quarter to quarter. And if the euro goes down, it offsets interest expense.

所以如果欧元上涨，我们会有很多额外的利息支出，它们是以这种方式显示的。这不是一个实现的因素，但它会在每个季度之间波动。如果欧元下跌，它会抵消利息支出。

It’s a technicality, to some extent, because we have lots of assets in Europe and they are expressed in euros when they go up. It does not go through the income account. It goes directly to other comprehensive income. So I just, that figure which looks a little unusual, that’s the reason for it.

这在某种程度上是一个技术性问题，因为我们在欧洲有很多资产，当它们增值时以欧元表示。这并不通过收入账户，而是直接进入其他综合收益。所以我只是想说，这个看起来有点不寻常的数字，就是这个原因。

And we always urge you to pay no attention to the figures below operating earnings. They will bounce around from quarter to quarter, and we make no attempt to manage earnings in any way, to have them be smoother. We could do that very easily, but it’d be ridiculous.

我们始终建议您不要关注运营收益以下的数字。它们会在每个季度之间波动，我们并不试图以任何方式管理收益，使其更加平滑。我们可以很容易做到这一点，但那样做是荒谬的。

We make investment decisions solely on the basis of what we think the best investment decision is, not on the basis of how it will affect earnings in any quarter or in any year.

我们做出投资决策完全基于我们认为的最佳投资决策，而不是基于它将如何影响任何季度或任何年的收益。

And in the first quarter we exchanged - we completed a transaction that was begun over a year ago — whereby we exchanged our Procter and Gamble stock for cash and for Duracell, and that accounts for the large — largely accounts — for the large capital gain in the quarter.

在第一季度，我们完成了一项交易，这项交易已进行了一年多，我们用宝洁公司的股票交换了现金和Duracell，这项交易大部分解释了本季度的大额资本收益。

So, those are the figures for the first quarter.

所以，这些是第一季度的数字。

6. Share count and earnings

股份数量和收益

WARREN BUFFETT: And then, to illustrate what we’re sort of all about here, I put up a second slide.

沃伦·巴菲特：然后，为了说明我们在这里的主题，我展示了第二张幻灯片。

And I started this slide in 1999. The reason being that at the end of 1998, we affected a large merger with Gen Re, and at that point we sort of entered a different era.

我在 1999 年开始了这个幻灯片。原因是，在 1998 年底，我们与 Gen Re 进行了大规模的合并，从那时起，我们进入了一个不同的时代。

After 1998 merger with Gen Re, we had a little over a 1,500,000-some A-equivalent shares out. And our shares — up to that point, we’d increase the outstanding shares by more than 50 percent over the 30-some years preceding that point.

在 1998 年与 Gen Re 合并后，我们的 A 类等值股份略超过 1,500,000 股。在此之前的 30 多年里，我们的流通股增加了超过 50%。

Since that time, as I note here, we’ve only increased the number of shares, over the next 17 years, we’ve only increased the shares outstanding by 8.2 percent.

自那时起，正如我在这里提到的，在接下来的 17 年里，我们仅将流通股数量增加了 8.2%。

So these figures represent a fairly unchanged share count since that point, whereas the share count had changed quite a bit before.

因此，这些数字代表自那时以来股数几乎没有变化，而在此之前股数变化很大。

And, as you’ll note, in terms of operations, I’ve told you that our goal at Berkshire is to increase the normalized earnings, operating earnings, every year.

而且，正如你所注意到的，在运营方面，我告诉过你，我们在伯克希尔的目标是每年增加正常化的收益，经营收益。

And I’ve said sometimes it will — we hope it will only be — it’ll turn out to be only a little bit — and sometimes we can get some fairly decent jumps. But that’s the goal.

我曾说过，有时它会——我们希望它只会——结果只会是一点点——有时我们可以获得一些相当不错的跳跃。但这就是目标。

Now, earnings will not increase every year, because there’s such a thing as a business cycle, and in times of recession we’re going to earn less money, obviously, than in times when things are much better overall.

现在，收益不会每年都增加，因为存在商业周期，在经济衰退时期，我们显然会赚到比整体情况更好的时候少得多的钱。

And on top of that, we’re heavily in an insurance business, and earnings there can be quite volatile because of catastrophes.

而且，我们的保险业务也很重要，那里的收益可能因为灾难而波动很大。

And this chart shows you what’s happened to the operating earnings since that time. Again, pointing out that shares outstanding have gone up very little during that period.

这张图表显示了自那时以来运营收益的变化。再次指出，在此期间，流通股本几乎没有增加。

You’ll notice in 2001, when we suffered significant insurance losses due to 9/11, we actually were in the red, in terms of operating earnings.

你会注意到在 2001 年，当我们因 911 事件遭受重大保险损失时，我们实际上在运营收益方面是亏损的。

And you’ll notice the figures are very irregular, but over time, by adding new subsidiaries, by further developing the businesses we have by bolt-on acquisitions, by the reinvestment of retained earnings, the earnings have moved up, in a very irregular fashion, quite substantially.

你会注意到这些数字非常不规则，但随着时间的推移，通过增加新的子公司，通过进一步发展我们现有的业务，通过附加收购，通过留存收益的再投资，收益以非常不规则的方式大幅上升。

I’ve put in, also, the capital gains we’ve achieved through investments in derivatives, and they total some $32 billion after-tax, close to fifty billion pretax.

我还计算了我们通过衍生品投资获得的资本收益，税后总额约为 320 亿美元，税前接近 500 亿美元。

Those are not important in any given year. Those numbers can go all over the place.

这些在任何一年都不重要。这些数字可能会变化很大。

The main advantage, from my standpoint, in that $32 billion, is it gives us money to buy other businesses.

从我的角度来看，这 320 亿美元的主要优势在于它为我们提供了收购其他企业的资金。

What we really want to focus on, what we hope, is that the bigger under operations, five, or ten, or twenty, years from now, grow substantially, partly because retained earnings from operations, partly because our operations improve in their own profitability, partly because they make bolt-on acquisitions, partly because we have gains from securities, which enable us to buy even more businesses.

我们真正想要关注的是，我们希望在未来五年、十年或二十年内，业务规模能够显著增长，这部分是因为运营中的留存收益，部分是因为我们业务自身的盈利能力提高，部分是通过附加收购，另外还有因为证券收益，这些收益使我们能够购买更多的企业。

But we don’t manage, as you know, we don’t manage to try to get any given number from quarter to quarter. We never make a forecast on earnings. We don’t give out earnings guidance. We think it’s silly.

但正如你所知道的，我们并不努力从一个季度到另一个季度获取任何特定的数字。我们从不对收益做预测。我们不提供收益指引。我们认为这很愚蠢。

We do not have budgets at the parent company level. Most of our subsidiaries have budgets, but they don’t submit them, or they’re not required to submit them, to headquarters.

我们在母公司层面没有预算。我们的大多数子公司有预算，但它们不提交，或者不需要提交给总部。

We just focus, day after day, year after year, decade after decade, on trying to add earning power, sustainable and growing earning power, to Berkshire.

我们只是日复一日、年复一年、十年复十年地专注于努力为伯克希尔增加盈利能力，增加可持续和不断增长的盈利能力。

So that’s a quick summary. Now we’ll move on to the questions.

所以这就是一个简要总结。现在我们将进入提问环节。

I just ask, with the audience, that you limit your question to one question. The multiple questions have a way of sneaking in, occasionally, but — so let’s keep them to a single question.

我只是请求大家将问题限制为一个问题。多个问题有时会不经意间出现，但——所以我们就保持一个问题。

7. “One of the problems of prosperity”

“繁荣的一个问题”

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll start off with the journalist group on my right, and we’ll start off with Carol Loomis.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们将从我右边的记者小组开始，首先请卡罗尔·卢米斯发言。

CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. I’ll make my very short little speech about the fact that the journalists and the analysts, too, have given Charlie and Warren no hint of what they’re going to ask, so they will be learning for the first time what that’s going to be, also.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：早上好。我将简短地谈一下，记者和分析师们也没有给查理和沃伦任何他们将要提问的提示，因此他们也将第一次了解到这些问题。

This question comes from Eli Moises.

这个问题来自埃利·莫伊塞斯。

“In your 1987 letter to shareholders, you commented on the kind of companies Berkshire likes to buy, those that required only small amounts of capital. You said, quote, ‘Because so little capital is required to run these businesses, they can grow, while concurrently making almost all of their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities.’

在您 1987 年给股东的信中，您评论了伯克希尔喜欢购买的公司类型，即只需要少量资本的公司。您说，引用：“因为经营这些业务所需的资本很少，它们可以增长，同时几乎将所有的收益都用于新的机会。”

“Today the company has changed its strategy. It now invests in companies that need tons of capital expenditures, are overregulated, and earn lower returns on equity capital. Why did this happen?”

“今天公司已经改变了战略。它现在投资于需要大量资本支出的公司，这些公司受到过度监管，并且股本回报率较低。为什么会发生这种情况？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it’s one of the problems of prosperity.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是繁荣的一大问题。

The ideal business is one that takes no capital, but yet grows, and there are a few businesses like that, and we own some.

理想的生意是不需要资本，但仍然能够增长的生意，像这样的生意不多，而我们拥有一些。

But we are not able — we’d love to find one that we could buy for $10 or $20 or $30 billion that was not capital intensive and we may, but it’s harder.

但我们无法做到——我们希望能找到一个可以以 100 亿、200 亿或 300 亿美元购买的项目，而不是资本密集型的，我们可能会找到，但这更难。

And that does — that does hurt us, in terms of compounding earnings growth, because, obviously, if you have a business that grows and gives you a lot of money every year and doesn’t take it — it isn’t required in its growth — you know, you get a double-barreled effect from the earnings growth that occurs internally without the use of capital, and then you get the capital it produces to go and buy other businesses. And See’s Candy was a good example of that. I’ve used that.

这确实会对我们的复合收益增长造成伤害，因为显然，如果你有一个每年都在增长并给你带来大量资金的业务，而这些资金在其增长中并不需要使用——你知道，内部发生的收益增长会产生双重效应，而不需要使用资本，然后你可以利用它产生的资本去收购其他业务。See's Candy 就是一个很好的例子。我用过这个。

Back when the newspaper business was good, our Buffalo newspaper was, for example, was a good example of that. The Buffalo newspaper was making, at one time, $40 million a year and had no capital requirement, so we could take that whole $40 million and go and do — go buy something else with it.

在报纸生意好的时候，我们的布法罗报纸就是一个很好的例子。布法罗报纸曾经一年赚 4000 万美元，并且没有资本要求，因此我们可以把这 4000 万美元全部拿去做其他投资。

But capital — increasing capital — acts as an anchor on returns in many ways. And one of the ways is that it drives us into — just in terms of availability — it drives us into businesses that are much more capital intensive.

但资本——增加资本——在许多方面对回报起着制约作用。其中一种方式是，它使我们在可用性方面进入了更为资本密集型的业务。

You just saw a slide, for example, on Berkshire Hathaway Energy, where we just announced, just in the last couple of weeks, we announced a $3.6 billion investment coming up in wind generation. And we pledged overall to have $30 billion in renewables.

您刚刚看到了一张幻灯片，例如关于伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的幻灯片，我们在过去几周刚刚宣布了一项 36 亿美元的风能发电投资。我们承诺总体上将在可再生能源方面投资 300 亿美元。

Anything that Berkshire Hathaway Energy does, anything that BNSF does, takes lots of money. We get decent returns on capital, but we don’t get the extraordinary returns on capital that we’ve been able to get in some of the businesses we acquire that are not capital intensive.

无论是伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司还是 BNSF 所做的任何事情，都需要大量资金。我们的资本回报率不错，但我们并没有在一些非资本密集型的收购业务中获得的那种非凡资本回报。

As I mentioned in the annual report, we have a few businesses that actually earn 100 percent a year on true invested capital. And clearly, that’s a different sort of operation than something like Berkshire Hathaway Energy, which may earn 11 or 12 percent on capital — and that’s a very decent return — but it’s a different sort of animal than the business that’s very low capital intensive — intensity.

正如我在年度报告中提到的，我们有一些业务实际上每年在真实投资资本上赚取 100%。显然，这与像伯克希尔哈撒韦能源这样的业务不同，后者可能在资本上赚取 11%或 12%——这也是一个相当不错的回报——但这与资本密集度非常低的业务是不同的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, when our circumstances changed, we changed our minds.

查理·芒格：好吧，当我们的情况发生变化时，我们也改变了主意。

事实改变，想法改变。

WARREN BUFFETT: Slowly and reluctantly. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：慢慢地，勉强地。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: In the early days, quite a few times we bought a business that was soon producing 100 percent per annum on what we paid for it and didn’t require much reinvestment.

查理·芒格：在早期，我们多次购买了一家企业，随后它每年产生的收益达到了我们支付金额的 100%，而且不需要太多的再投资。

If we’d been able to continue doing that, we would have loved to do it, but when we couldn’t, we got to plan B. And plan B is working pretty well. In many ways, I’ve gotten so I sort of prefer it. How about you, Warren?

如果我们能够继续这样做，我们会很乐意这样做，但当我们不能这样做时，我们就转向了计划 B。而计划 B 运作得相当不错。在很多方面，我已经有点更喜欢它了。你呢，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s true. When something’s forced on you, you might as well prefer it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是真的。当某件事被强加给你时，你不妨喜欢它。（笑声）

But, I mean, we knew that was going to happen. And the question is, does it lead you from what looks like a sensational result to a satisfactory result.

但是，我的意思是，我们知道这会发生。问题是，这是否会让你从看起来像是轰动的结果转向一个令人满意的结果。

And we don’t — we’re quite happy with a satisfactory result. The alternative would be to go back to working with very tiny sums of money, and that really hasn’t gotten a lot of serious discussion between Charlie and me. (Laughs)

我们并不——我们对一个令人满意的结果感到很满意。另一种选择是回到处理非常小的金额，这实际上在查理和我之间并没有进行很多认真的讨论。（笑）

8. Precisions Castparts acquisition

精密铸件收购

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. From the analyst group, Jonathan Brandt.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。来自分析师团队，乔纳森·布兰特。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Hi Warren. Thanks for having me again.

乔纳森·布兰特：嗨，沃伦。谢谢你再次邀请我。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks for coming.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们的到来。

JONATHAN BRANDT: My first question is about Precision Castparts.

乔纳森·布兰特：我的第一个问题是关于精密铸件公司的。

Besides your confidence in its talented CEO Mark Donegan, what in particular do you like about their business that gave you the confidence to pay historically high multiple?

除了你对其才华横溢的首席执行官马克·多尼根的信心之外，你特别喜欢他们的业务什么，让你有信心支付历史上最高的倍数？

Are there ways Precision can be even more successful as, essentially, a private company?

Precision作为一家私人公司，是否有更成功的方法？

For instance, are there long-term investments to support client programs or acquisitions that Precision can make now that they couldn’t realistically have done as a publicly traded entity?

例如，Precision 现在是否可以进行一些长期投资，以支持客户项目或收购，而作为一家上市公司时他们实际上无法做到这些？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we completed the acquisition of Precision Castparts at the end of January this year. We agreed — we made the deal last August.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在今年一月底完成了对精密铸件公司的收购。我们在去年八月达成了协议。

And you covered the most important asset in your question. Mark Donegan, who runs Precision Castparts, is an extraordinary manager. I mean we’ve seen very — and Charlie and I’ve seen a lot of managers over the years — and I would almost rank Mark as one of a kind.

你在问题中提到了最重要的资产。管理精密铸件公司的马克·唐尼根是一位非凡的经理。我是说，我们见过很多经理——查理和我多年来见过很多——我几乎可以把马克排为独一无二。

I mean he is doing extremely important work, in terms of making — primarily making — aircraft parts.

我指的是他正在做非常重要的工作，主要是制造飞机零件。

I would say that there’s certainly no disadvantages to him to be working as a — and for that company to be a subsidiary of Berkshire and not be a public company.

我认为他在那家公司作为子公司工作，并且不是上市公司，肯定没有任何缺点。

And I think he would say, and I think Charlie and I would agree with him, that over time, there could be some significant advantages.

我认为他会说，我认为查理和我会同意他的观点，随着时间的推移，可能会有一些显著的优势。

For one thing, he can spend 100 percent of his time now on figuring out better things to do with aircraft engines. And it was always his first love to be thinking about that, and he did spend most of his time, but he also had to spend some time, you know, explaining quarterly earnings to analysts and perhaps negotiating bank lines and that sort of thing.

首先，他现在可以将 100%的时间花在研究更好的飞机发动机使用方法上。这一直是他的第一爱好，他确实花了大部分时间在这上面，但他也不得不花一些时间，向分析师解释季度收益，或者谈判银行贷款之类的事情。

So his time, like all of our managers, can be spent exactly on what makes the most sense to them and their business. Mark does not have to come, ever, to Omaha to put on some show for me, in terms of justifying a billion dollar acquisition or plant investment.

所以他的时间，和我们所有的经理一样，可以完全花在对他们和他们的业务最有意义的事情上。马克不必来奥马哈，为我做一些表演，以证明十亿美元的收购或工厂投资是合理的。

He wastes — doesn’t have to waste his time on anything that isn’t productive. And running a public company, you do waste your time on quite a bit of stuff that isn’t productive.

他浪费——不必在任何不具生产力的事情上浪费时间。而经营一家上市公司，你确实会在很多不具生产力的事情上浪费时间。

So I would say we’ve taken the main asset of Precision Cast and made it — made him in this case — even more valuable to the company.

所以我想说我们已经将 Precision Cast 的主要资产进行了提升——在这种情况下是他——使其对公司更有价值。

In terms of acquisitions, Precision’s always made a number of them. But, as being part of Berkshire, there’s really no limitations on what can be done. And so, there again, his canvas has been broadened, in large, with the acquisition by Berkshire.

在收购方面，Precision 一直进行了多项收购。但是，作为伯克希尔的一部分，实际上没有任何限制可以做什么。因此，在这方面，由于伯克希尔的收购，他的画布在很大程度上得到了拓宽。

I see no downside whatsoever. If he needs capital, I’ve got an 800 number.

我看不出任何缺点。如果他需要资金，我有一个 800 号码。

And, you know, he wasn’t paying much of a dividend before, but he doesn’t have to pay any dividend now.

而且，你知道，他之前并没有支付多少红利，但现在他不需要支付任何红利。

Precision Cast will do better under Berkshire than it would have independently, although it would have done very, very well independently.

精密铸造在伯克希尔的管理下会表现得更好，尽管如果独立运作也会非常非常成功。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in the early days, we used to make wiseass remarks. And Warren would say we buy a business an idiot can manage, because sooner or later, an idiot will.

查理·芒格：嗯，在早期，我们常常开玩笑。沃伦会说我们买一个傻瓜也能管理的生意，因为迟早会有傻瓜来管理它。

And we did buy some businesses like that in the early days, and they were widely available.

我们确实在早期购买了一些这样的企业，并且它们广泛可用。

Of course we’d prefer to do that, but the world has gotten harder, and we had to learn new and more powerful ways of operating.

当然我们更愿意这样做，但世界变得更加艰难，我们不得不学习新的、更强大的运作方式。

A business like Precision Castparts requires a very superior management that’s going to stay superior for a long time.

像Precision Castparts这样的企业需要一个非常优秀的管理团队，并且这个团队将长期保持优秀。

向高科技方向移动的很有限，只是一个很需要可靠性的业务。

And we gradually have done more and more and more of that, and it’s simply amazing how well it works.

我们逐渐做得越来越多，这真的令人惊讶它的效果有多好。

I think, to some extent, we’ve gotten almost as good at picking the superior managers as we were in the old days at picking the no-brainer businesses.

我认为，在某种程度上，我们在挑选优秀管理者方面几乎和过去挑选毫无疑问的商业一样出色。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we would love to find — we won’t be able to find them because they’re very rare birds — but we would love to find another three or four of a similar type to Precision Castparts, where they, forever, are going to be producing something that — where quality is enormously important, where the customers depend very heavily on them, when there’s contracts that extend over many years, and where people don’t simply just take the low bid in order to get this gadget of one sort or another.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们希望能找到——我们可能找不到，因为它们非常稀有——但我们希望能找到另外三到四个类似于精密铸件的公司，在这些公司中，他们将永远生产一些质量极其重要的产品，客户非常依赖他们，合同持续多年，人们不会仅仅为了获得某种小玩意而选择最低报价。

It’s very important that you have somebody there that has enormous skill running the business, and their reputation, among aircraft manufacturers, engine manufacturers, you know, is absolutely unparalleled.

重要的是你必须有一个在业务运营方面具有巨大技能的人，他们在飞机制造商、发动机制造商中的声誉是无与伦比的。

9. “Can’t imagine anybody any happier”

“无法想象还有谁会比这更快乐”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now we go to the audience, and we go up to section 1. And if you’ll give your name and where you’re from, I’d appreciate it.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，现在我们去听众那里，我们去第一部分。如果您能告诉我您的名字和来自哪里，我将不胜感激。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, good morning. My name is Gaspar. I’m Spanish and I come from London.

观众成员：嗨，早上好。我叫加斯帕。我是西班牙人，来自伦敦。

I admire you both in many ways, but I would like to know that, when looking backwards, what would you have done differently in life in your search for happiness?

我在许多方面都很欣赏你们，但我想知道，当回首往事时，你们在追求幸福的过程中会有什么不同的选择？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m 85 and I can’t imagine anybody any happier than I am.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我 85 岁了，我无法想象还有谁比我更快乐。

So — by accident or whatever, I still — I mean, you know, I’m sitting here eating exactly what I like to eat, doing in life exactly what I love to do, with people I love. So it really doesn’t get any better than that and I — (applause)

所以——无论是偶然还是其他原因，我仍然——我的意思是，你知道，我坐在这里吃着我喜欢的食物，过着我热爱的生活，和我爱的人在一起。所以这真的没有比这更好的了，我——（掌声）

I did decide, fairly early in life, that my favorite employer was myself. (Laughter)

我确实在生活的早期就决定，我最喜欢的雇主是我自己。（笑声）

And, that — I think that presented — I’ve managed to avoid, really, aggravation of almost any sort.

而且，我认为这让我成功地避免了几乎所有形式的烦恼。

Really, you know, if you, or those around you that you love, have health problems or something, I mean, that is a real tragedy, and there’s not much you can do about it but accept it.

真的，你知道，如果你或者你爱的人有健康问题或者其他什么，我是说，那真的是一个悲剧，而你能做的也不多，只能接受它。

But Charlie and I have, every day, been blessed. I mean, here Charlie is, 92, and he’s doing, every day, something that he finds fascinating.

但是查理和我每天都感到很幸运。我的意思是，查理已经 92 岁了，他每天都在做一些他觉得很有趣的事情。

You know he — I think he probably finds what he is doing at 92 as interesting, as fascinating, and as rewarding, as socially productive, you know, as any period you can pick in his life.

你知道他——我认为他在 92 岁时所做的事情，可能和他生命中任何一个时期一样有趣、迷人、充实和对社会有益。

And so we’ve been extraordinarily lucky. We’ve been, you know, we’re lucky it’s a partnership. It’s more fun doing things as a partnership.

所以我们非常幸运。我们知道，我们很幸运能够合作。作为一个合作伙伴一起做事情更有趣。

So, I’ve got no complaints. It would be very churlish of me to have any kind of complaint. I would say, if you’re talking about business life, I don’t think I would have started with a textile company. (Laughter)

所以，我没有任何抱怨。如果我有任何抱怨，那就太无礼了。我想说，如果你谈论的是商业生活，我觉得我不会选择从一家纺织公司开始。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, looking back, I don’t regret that I didn’t make more money, or become better known, or any of those things. I do regret that I didn’t wise up as fast as I could have and —

查理·芒格：回首往事，我并不后悔没有赚更多的钱，或者没有变得更有名，或者其他那些事情。我确实后悔没有尽快变得聪明起来——

But there’s a blessing in that, too. Now that I’m 92, I still have a lot of ignorance left to work on. (Laughter and applause)

但这也是一种祝福。现在我 92 岁了，我还有很多无知需要改进。（笑声和掌声）

10. Reinsurance outlook a factor in Munich Re and Swiss Re sales

再保险前景是慕尼黑再保险公司和瑞士再保险公司销售的一个因素

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky Quick.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基·奎克。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Solomon Ackerman, who’s in Frankfurt, Germany.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自德国法兰克福的所罗门·阿克曼。

He wants to know why Berkshire has significantly sold down their holdings in Munich Re, which is the world’s biggest reinsurance company, based in Germany, while sticking with the reinsurance operations within Berkshire, like Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance and General Re.

他想知道为什么伯克希尔大幅减持在慕尼黑再保险公司（全球最大的再保险公司，总部位于德国）的持股，同时仍然坚持伯克希尔内部的再保险业务，如伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险和通用再保险。

Would you reduce exposure to Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance and General Re if they were listed companies? And he’s hoping that this can bring out some of your insights as to what’s happening in the reinsurance business right now.

如果伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险和通用再保险是上市公司，你会减少对它们的投资吗？他希望这能引发你对当前再保险业务状况的一些见解。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — I said in the annual report that I thought it was very likely that the reinsurance business would not be as good in the next ten years as it has been in the last ten years.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我在年报中说过，我认为再保险业务在未来十年内的表现很可能不如过去十年。

I may be wrong on that, but that’s just a judgment based on seeing the competitive dynamics of the reinsurance business now versus 10 or 20 years ago.

我可能在这方面错了，但这只是基于观察现在与 10 或 20 年前再保险业务的竞争动态所做的判断。

Both Munich — we sold our entire holdings, which were substantial — of Munich Re and Swiss Re. We owned about 3 percent of Swiss Re, and we own more than 10 percent of Munich Re, and last year we sold those two holdings.

我们出售了我们在慕尼黑再保险公司和瑞士再保险公司所有的全部股份，这些股份相当可观。我们拥有瑞士再保险公司约 3%的股份，而我们拥有慕尼黑再保险公司超过 10%的股份，去年我们出售了这两项投资。

They’re fine companies. They’re well-managed companies. I like the people that run them.

它们是优秀的公司。它们管理得很好。我喜欢管理这些公司的人员。

I think their business — the business of the reinsurance companies generally — is less attractive for the next 10 years than it has been for the last 10 years.

我认为他们的业务——再保险公司的业务总体上——在未来 10 年内比过去 10 年吸引力要小。

In part, that’s because what’s happened to interest rates. A significant portion of what you earn in insurance comes from investment of the float. And both of those companies, and for that matter almost all of the reinsurance industry, is somewhat more restricted in what they can do with their float, because they don’t have this huge capital cushion that Berkshire has, and also because they don’t have this great amount of unrelated earning power that Berkshire has.

部分原因是利率的变化。保险业务中，收益的一部分来自于浮动资金的投资。而这两家公司，几乎所有的再保险行业，也受到一定限制，因为他们没有像伯克希尔那样庞大的资本缓冲区，也没有像伯克希尔那样来自其他领域的大量盈利能力。

Berkshire has more leeway in what it can do simply because it does have capital that’s many times what its competitors have, and it also has earning power coming from a whole variety of unrelated areas — unrelated to insurance.

伯克希尔在行动上有更多的自由度，因为它拥有的资本是竞争对手的多倍，而且它的盈利能力来自于许多与保险无关的领域。

So it was not a negative judgment, in any way, on those two companies. It was not a negative judgment on their managements. But it was a — at least — a mildly negative judgment on the reinsurance business.

所以这并不是对那两家公司的任何负面评价，也不是对它们管理层的负面评价。但这至少是对再保险业务的轻微负面评价。

Now, we have the ability at Berkshire to actually rearrange, to a degree — we are certainly affected by industry factors — but we have more flexibility in modifying business models, and we’ve operated that way, over the years, in insurance generally, and particularly in reinsurance.

现在，我们在伯克希尔有能力在一定程度上进行重新安排——我们当然受到行业因素的影响——但我们在修改商业模式方面有更多的灵活性，多年来我们在保险行业，特别是在再保险方面一直是这样运作的。

So, a Munich, a Swiss, all the major reinsurance companies, except for us, is pretty well tied to a given type of business model.

所以，慕尼黑、瑞士，除了我们之外，所有主要的再保险公司都与特定类型的商业模式紧密相关。

They don’t really have as many options, in terms of where capital gets deployed. They have to continue down the present path.

他们在资本部署方面实际上没有太多选择。他们必须继续沿着目前的道路前进。

And I think they’ll do fine. But I don’t think they will do as fine in the next 10 years as they have in the last 10.

我认为他们会做得很好。但我认为在接下来的 10 年里，他们的表现不会像过去 10 年那样出色。

And I don’t think if we played the same game as we were playing the last 10, we would do as well, but we do have considerably more flexibility — in terms of how we conduct all of our insurance operations, but particularly in reinsurance — we have an extra string to our bow that the rest of the industry doesn’t have.

我认为如果我们继续以过去 10 年一样的方式进行游戏，我们不会做得那么好，但我们在进行所有保险业务方面，特别是在再保险方面，确实有了更大的灵活性——我们有一个其他行业没有的额外优势。

The amount of capital that’s come in to the reinsurance business — you know, it is no fun running a traditional reinsurance company and having money come in — particularly if you’re in Europe — and have money come in, and look around you for investment choices and find out that a great many of the things that you were buying a few years ago now have negative yields.

进入再保险业务的资本量——你知道，经营一家传统的再保险公司并且有资金流入并不是一件有趣的事情——尤其是如果你在欧洲——资金流入后，环顾四周寻找投资选择，却发现你几年前购买的许多东西现在的收益率是负的。

The whole idea of float is it’s supposed to be invested at a positive rate — a fairly substantial — positive rate.

浮存金的整个概念是它应该以一个正的利率进行投资——一个相当可观的——正利率。

And that game has been over for a while, and it looks like it will be, at least, unattractive, if not terrible, for a considerable period in the future.

那场比赛已经结束一段时间了，看起来在未来相当长的一段时间内，它至少会显得不吸引人，甚至可能是糟糕的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But, you know, there’s a lot of new capacity in reinsurance and there’s a lot of very heavy competition.

查理·芒格：是的。但是，你知道，再保险领域有很多新的产能，而且竞争非常激烈。

A lot of people from finance have come over into reinsurance, and all the old competitors remained, too. That’s different from Precision Castparts, where most of the customers would be totally crazy to hire some other supplier, because Precision Castparts is so much more reliable and so much better.

很多金融界的人进入了再保险领域，而所有的老竞争对手也依然存在。这与精密铸件不同，精密铸件的客户几乎不会去聘用其他供应商，因为精密铸件的可靠性和质量都远远优于其他公司。

Of course, we like the place with more competitive advantage. We’re learning.

当然，我们喜欢具有更多竞争优势的地方。我们正在学习。

WARREN BUFFETT: The — to put it in terms of Economics 101 — basically, in reinsurance, supply has gone up and demand has not gone up.

沃伦·巴菲特：用经济学 101 的术语来说，基本上，在再保险领域，供应增加了，而需求没有增加。

And some of the supply is driven by investment managers who would like to establish something offshore where they don’t have to pay taxes, and reinsurance is sort of the easiest beard — what you might call beard — behind which to actually engage in money management in a friendly tax jurisdiction.

一些供应是由投资经理推动的，他们希望在海外建立一些不需要缴税的业务，而再保险在某种程度上是最简单的掩护——可以称之为掩护——在友好的税收管辖区内实际进行资金管理。

And you can set up a reinsurance operation with very few people, by taking large chunks of what brokers may offer. It’s not the greatest reinsurance in the world, and a couple of the operations that have done that have proven that statement to be right.

您可以通过接受经纪人可能提供的大量业务，设立一个只需很少人员的再保险业务。这并不是世界上最好的再保险，而一些这样做的公司已经证明了这一说法是正确的。

But nevertheless, it is a very, very easy way to have a disguised investment operation in a friendly tax jurisdiction. But that becomes supply in the reinsurance field, and supply has gone up relative to demand, and it looks to me like that will continue to be the case. And couple that with the poor returns on float, and it’s not as good a business as it was.

但尽管如此，这仍然是一种在友好的税收管辖区进行隐蔽投资操作的非常简单的方法。但这在再保险领域变成了供应，而供应相对于需求有所增加，在我看来，这种情况将继续存在。再加上浮存金的回报不佳，这项业务的前景不如以前。

11. Rise in auto death rate hurt GEICO

汽车死亡率上升对 GEICO 造成了伤害

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’ll talk to an insurance man about it, Cliff Gallant.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们将与一位保险专家克里夫·加兰特谈谈这个问题。

CLIFF GALLANT: Thank you.

克利夫·加朗特：谢谢你。

In terms of growth in profitability, GEICO really got whupped by Progressive Direct over the last year. In 2015, Progressive Direct’s auto business group grew its policy count by 9.1 percent. GEICO, only 5.4. And in terms of profitability, the combined ratio at Progressive was a 95.1 and GEICO’s was a 98.0.

在盈利增长方面，GEICO 在过去一年中被 Progressive Direct 狠狠击败。2015 年，Progressive Direct 的汽车业务组保单数量增长了 9.1%。而 GEICO 仅增长了 5.4%。在盈利能力方面，Progressive 的综合比率为 95.1，而 GEICO 的为 98.0。

Is this evidence that Progressive’s investments in technology, like Snapshot, investments that GEICO has spurned, is it making a difference in a time of difficult loss trends? Why is GEICO suddenly losing to Progressive Direct?

这是否证明了 Progressive 在技术上的投资，比如 Snapshot，而 GEICO 却拒绝了这些投资，在当前困难的损失趋势中有所不同？为什么 GEICO 突然在与 Progressive Direct 的竞争中落后？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I would say this. Over the — over the last — well, I forget what year it was we passed Progressive and what year it was we passed Allstate, but GEICO’s growth rate in the first quarter was not as high as in the past couple first quarters, but it was it was quite satisfactory.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想我可以这么说。在过去——我忘了我们是哪一年超过了 Progressive，哪一年超过了 Allstate，但 GEICO 在第一季度的增长率没有过去几个第一季度那么高，但还是相当令人满意的。

Now the first quarter is, by far, the best quarter for growth. But last year, both frequency — how often people had accidents — and severity — which is the cost per accident; in other words, just how much those accidents cost you — both of those went up quite suddenly and substantially. And Progressive’s figures show that they were hit by that less than Allstate and GEICO and some others.

现在第一季度无疑是增长的最佳季度。但去年，无论是事故发生的频率——人们发生事故的频率——还是严重性——每次事故的成本；换句话说，这些事故给你带来的费用——这两者都突然且大幅上升。而 Progressive 的数据显示，他们受到的影响比 Allstate、GEICO 和其他一些公司要小。

But I don’t think you’ll see, necessarily, those same trends this year.

但我认为你不一定会在今年看到那些相同的趋势。

It’s an interesting thing. Last year, for the first time in I don’t know how many years, the number of deaths in auto accidents, per 100 million miles, went up.

这是一件有趣的事情。去年，经过不知道多少年的第一次，每亿英里汽车事故的死亡人数上升了。

Now, if you go back to the mid-1930s, there were almost 15 people killed per 100 million miles driven. It got down to just slightly over one — from 15 — to one.

现在，如果你回到 20 世纪 30 年代中期，每行驶 1 亿英里几乎有 15 人遇难。这个数字降到了略高于 1 — 从 15 降到 1。

You had almost as many — you had roughly as many — people killed in auto accidents in the mid-1930s, about 30, 32,000 a year, as we had last year — or the year before — when people drove almost 15 times as many miles.

在 1930 年代中期，汽车事故中死亡的人数几乎和我们去年或前年一样，约有 30,000 到 32,000 人，而那时人们的驾驶里程几乎是现在的 15 倍。

Cars have gotten far, far, far, far safer.

汽车变得安全得多。

And it’s a good thing, because if we’d had the same rate of deaths from auto accidents as we had in the ’30s, relative to miles driven, we would have had over a half a million people die last year from auto accidents, instead of a figure closer to 40,000.

这是一件好事，因为如果我们在行驶里程上与 30 年代的汽车事故死亡率相同的话，去年将会有超过 50 万人因汽车事故而死亡，而实际数字接近 40,000。

But last year, for the first time, there was more driving, and I think there was more distracted driving. So you really had this uptick in frequency, and more important, in severity.

但去年，第一次出现了更多的驾驶，我认为分心驾驶也增加了。因此，确实出现了频率的上升，更重要的是，严重性也增加了。

GEICO has adjusted its rates. As I mentioned, my own prediction would be that the underwriting margins at GEICO will be better this year than last year, although you never know when catastrophes are coming along. March and April have had a lot of cat activity.

GEICO已经调整了其费率。正如我提到的，我自己预测GEICO的承保利润率今年会比去年更好，尽管你永远不知道何时会发生灾难。3月和4月有很多自然灾难。

I made a bet a long time ago on — a mental one — on the GEICO model versus the Progressive model. And, as I say, they were significantly ahead of us in volume a few years back. Then we passed them and we passed Allstate and, as I put in the annual report, I hope on my 100th birthday that the GEICO people announce to me that they passed State Farm.

我很久以前打了一个赌——一个心理上的赌——关于 GEICO 模式和 Progressive 模式。正如我所说，他们几年前在销量上远远领先于我们。然后我们超过了他们，也超过了 Allstate，正如我在年报中所写的，我希望在我 100 岁生日那天，GEICO 的人能告诉我他们超过了 State Farm。

But I have to do my share on that, too, by getting to 100. So we’ll see what happens on that particular one. (Laughs)

但我也得为此做出贡献，活到100岁。所以我们看看那个结果会如何。（笑）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think it’s a tragedy that some competitor got a little better ratio from one period. GEICO’s quadrupled its market share since we bought all of it.

查理·芒格：我认为某个竞争对手在某个时期获得了稍微更好的比例并不是悲剧。自从我们收购了它，GEICO 的市场份额已经翻了四倍。

WARREN BUFFETT: Quintupled.

沃伦·巴菲特：五倍增长。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, quintupled, all right. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，确实是五倍。（笑声）

I don’t think we should worry about the fact that somebody else had a good quarter.

我认为我们不应该担心其他人有一个好的季度。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）

I think it’s far more sure that GEICO will pass State Farm someday than that I’ll make it to 100, I’ll put it that way. (Laughs)

我认为，GEICO 有一天超过 State Farm 的可能性远比我活到 100 岁的可能性要大，我就这么说吧。（笑）

12. Amazon has “disrupted plenty of people”

亚马逊“打乱了很多人的生活”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to the shareholder from station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们将去 2 号站的股东。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Greetings to all of you from the Midwest of Europe. I’m Norman Rentrop from Bonn, Germany, a shareholder since 1992.

观众成员：来自欧洲中部的问候。我是来自德国波恩的诺曼·伦特罗普，自 1992 年以来一直是股东。

My question is about the future of salesmanship in our companies.

我想问的是我们公司销售工作的未来。

Warren, you have always demonstrated a heart for direct selling. When we met you in the midst of a tornado warning, in the barbershop, you immediately offered to write insurance for us. (Laughter)

沃伦，你一直展现出对直销的热情。当我们在龙卷风警报期间在理发店遇见你时，你立刻主动提出为我们写保险。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s true. They were all huddled down there in the barbershop. There wasn’t going to be any tornadoes, so I told them they give me a dollar, I’d — they can go upstairs and if anything happened to them I’d pay them — I forget — a million dollars, or something of the sort. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。他们都挤在理发店里。不会有龙卷风，所以我告诉他们给我一美元，我会——他们可以上楼，如果发生什么事，我会给他们——我忘了——一百万美元，或者类似的东西。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Now we see with the rise of Amazon.com and others a shift from push marketing to pull marketing. From millions of catalogs having been sent out in the past, to now consumers searching on what they are looking for.

观众成员：现在，我们看到亚马逊和其他公司兴起，从推销营销转向拉动营销。从过去发送的数百万份目录，现在消费者自己搜索他们所需要的东西。

What is your take on how this shift from push to pull marketing will affect our companies?

你怎么看待这种从推销到拉动营销的转变会对我们的公司产生什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Norman, the development you refer to is huge. I mean, really huge.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，诺曼，你提到的发展是巨大的。我是说，真的很巨大。

And it isn’t just Amazon, but Amazon is a huge part of it and what they’ve accomplished, in a fairly short period of time, and continue to accomplish, is remarkable. The number of satisfied customers they’ve developed and —

不仅仅是亚马逊，亚马逊在其中占据了重要部分，他们在相对较短的时间内所取得的成就，以及持续取得的成就，都是令人瞩目的。他们所培养的满意客户数量以及——

We don’t make any decision involving even the manufacturing of goods, the retailing, whatever it is, without thinking long and hard about what the world will look like in five or 10 or 20 years with that powerful trend — really hugely powerful trend — that you just described.

我们在做任何涉及商品制造、零售等决策时，都不会不经过深思熟虑，考虑到在你刚才描述的这种强大趋势下，未来五年、十年或二十年世界会是什么样子。

So, we’re not — we don’t look at that as something where we’re going to try and beat them at their own game, you know. They’re better than we are at that. And so, Charlie and I are not going to out-Bezos Bezos, by a long shot.

所以，我们并不把这看作是我们要在他们擅长的领域击败他们的事情。你知道，他们在这方面比我们强。因此，查理和我绝对不会在这方面超越贝索斯。

But we are going to think about that.

但我们会考虑这个。

It does not worry us, obviously, with Precision Cast — it doesn’t worry us, in terms of the overwhelming majority of our businesses.

显然，这对我们来说并不担心，精密铸造——在我们绝大多数业务方面，这并不让我们担心。

But it is a huge economic trend that, 20 years ago, was not on anybody’s radar screen, and lately, has been on everybody’s radar screen. And many of them have not — and including us, in a few areas — have not figured the way to either participate in it or to counter it.

但这是一个巨大的经济趋势，20 年前没有人关注，而最近却引起了所有人的注意。许多人，包括我们在某些领域，仍然没有找到参与或对抗它的方法。

GEICO’s a good example of a company in an industry that had to adjust to change, and some people made the change better than others.

GEICO 是一个很好的例子，说明了一个行业中的公司如何适应变化，有些人比其他人更好地应对了这种变化。

We were slow on the internet. The phone had worked so well for us, you know, this traditional advertising, and the phone had worked so well, you know, there’s always a resistance to think about new possibilities.

我们在互联网方面进展缓慢。电话对我们来说一直运作得很好，你知道，这种传统广告，电话一直运作得很好，你知道，总是有一种抵触情绪去考虑新的可能性。

When we saw what was happening on the internet, we jumped in with both feet and you know, with mobile and whatever. But — but there are — capital — the nature of capitalism is somebody’s always trying to figure — if you’ve got some good business — they’re always trying to figure out how to take it away from you and improve on it.

当我们看到互联网发生的事情时，我们全力以赴地参与其中，你知道的，移动互联网等等。但是——但是有——资本——资本主义的本质就是总有人试图弄清楚——如果你有一个好的生意——他们总是试图想办法把它从你手中夺走并加以改进。

And the effect — I would say just of Amazon, but others that are playing the same game — the effect on industry — the full effect — is far from having been seen.

而且效果——我想不仅仅是亚马逊，还有其他在玩同样游戏的公司——对行业的影响——全面的影响——远未显现。

I mean, it is a big, big force and it will — it already — has disrupted plenty of people and it will disrupt more.

我的意思是，这是一股巨大的力量，它已经扰乱了很多人，并且还会扰乱更多人。

I think Berkshire is quite well situated. For one thing, one big advantage we have is we didn’t ever see ourselves as starting out in one industry. I mean, we didn’t go into — we went into department stores — but we didn’t think of ourselves as department store guys, or we didn’t think of ourselves as steel guys, or tire guys, or anything of that sort.

我认为伯克希尔的地位相当不错。首先，我们有一个很大的优势，那就是我们从来没有把自己视为从一个行业起步。我是说，我们进入了百货商店——但我们并不认为自己是百货商店的人，或者我们并不认为自己是钢铁行业的人，或者轮胎行业的人，或者任何类似的角色。

So we’ve thought of ourselves as having capital to allocate. If you start with a given industry focus and you spend your whole time working on a way to make a better tire, or whatever it may be, I think it’s hard to have the flexibility of mind that you have, if you just think you have a large — hopefully large — and growing pile of capital, and trying to figure out what is the best — next — best next move that you can make with that capital. And I think we do have a real advantage that way.

所以我们一直认为自己拥有可以分配的资本。如果你从一个特定的行业焦点开始，并且花费所有时间在寻找更好的轮胎或其他任何事情上，我认为很难保持那种灵活的思维方式。如果你只是认为自己拥有一大笔——希望是越来越多的——资本，并试图弄清楚用这笔资本可以做出的最佳——下一个——最佳的下一步是什么。我认为我们在这方面确实有一个真正的优势。

But I think — I think the fellow that — I think Amazon’s got a real advantage, too, in this intense focus on having, you know, hundreds of millions of, generally, very happy customers getting very quick delivery of something that they want to get promptly, and they want to shop the way they shop.

但我认为——我认为亚马逊在这种密切关注顾客的方式上也有真正的优势，他们有数亿的、通常非常满意的客户，快速送达他们想要的东西，并按照他们喜欢的方式购物。

And if I owned a bunch of shopping malls, or something like that, that would be — I’d be thinking plenty hard about what they might look like 10 or 20 years from now.

如果我拥有一堆购物中心，或者类似的东西，我会认真思考它们在 10 年或 20 年后可能会是什么样子。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would say that we failed so thoroughly in retailing when we were young that we pretty well avoided the worst troubles when we were old.

查理·芒格：我想说，我们年轻时在零售业的失败如此彻底，以至于我们在年老时几乎避免了最糟糕的麻烦。

I think, net, Berkshire has been helped by the internet. The help at GEICO has been enormous. And it’s contributed greatly to the huge increase in market share.

总的来说，互联网对伯克希尔有帮助。对GEICO的帮助非常大，它极大地贡献了市场份额的巨大增长。

And our biggest retailers are so strong that they’re — they’ll be among the last people to have troubles from Amazon.

我们最大的零售商如此强大，以至于他们将是最后一批受到亚马逊影响的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t get that dollar from you, Norman, actually that — after I gave you that wonderful advice.

沃伦·巴菲特：诺曼，其实我没有从你那里拿到那一美元，虽然我给了你那个很好的建议。

13. Defending Coca-Cola from sugar health worries

为可口可乐辩护，回应糖分健康担忧

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. Great to see you today.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。今天见到你真好。

Got a lot of questions on this particular topic, and this question is a particularly pointed one.

在这个特定的话题上有很多问题，而这个问题尤其尖锐。

“Warren, for the last several years at this meeting, you’ve been asked about the negative health effects of Coca-Cola products, and you’ve done a masterful job dodging the question, by telling us how much Coke you drink personally. (Laughter)

“沃伦，在过去几年的会议上，大家一直在问你关于可口可乐产品的负面健康影响，而你巧妙地回避了这个问题，告诉我们你个人喝了多少可乐。（笑声）”

“Statistically, you may be the exception. According to a peer-reviewed study by Tufts University, soda and sugary drinks may lead to 184,000 deaths among adults every year.

“从统计上看，你可能是个例外。根据塔夫茨大学的一项同行评审研究，汽水和含糖饮料每年可能导致 184,000 名成年人死亡。”

“The study found that sugar-sweetened beverages contributed to 133,000 deaths from diabetes, 45,000 deaths from cardiovascular disease, 6,450 deaths from cancer.”

研究发现，含糖饮料导致了 133,000 例糖尿病死亡，45,000 例心血管疾病死亡，6,450 例癌症死亡。

Another shareholder wrote in about Coke, noted that you declined to invest in the cigarette business on ethical grounds, despite once saying, quote, “It was a perfect business because it cost a penny to make, sell it for a dollar, it’s addictive, and there’s fantastic brand loyalty.”

另一位股东写信提到可口可乐，指出您出于道德原因拒绝投资烟草业务，尽管曾经说过，“这是一项完美的生意，因为成本是一分钱，售价是一美元，它是上瘾的，并且有着极好的品牌忠诚度。”

“Again, removing your own beverage consumption from the equation, please explain directly why we Berkshire Hathaway shareholders should be proud to own Coke.”

“再说一次，抛开你自己饮料消费的因素，请直接解释一下为什么我们伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东应该为拥有可口可乐感到自豪。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think people confuse — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为人们混淆了——（掌声）

— you know, the amount of calories consumed.

— 你知道，消耗的卡路里数量。

I mean, I happen to elect to consume about 700 calories a day from Coca-Cola. So I’m about one-quarter Coca-Cola, roughly. (Laughter)

我意思是，我恰好选择每天从可口可乐中摄入大约 700 卡路里。所以我大约有四分之一是可口可乐，差不多。（笑声）

Not sure which quarter, and I’m not sure we want to pursue the question.

不确定是哪一季度，而且我不确定我们是否想要追究这个问题。

I think if you decide that sugar, generally, is something that the human race shouldn’t have — I think the average person consumes something like 150 pounds of dry weight sugar here and 125 pounds — I mean, you know, it —

我认为如果你决定糖通常是人类不应有的东西——我认为普通人每年摄入大约150磅的干糖，125磅——我就是说——

What’s in Coca-Cola, largely, are more of the calories come from is sugar.

可口可乐中的热量主要来自糖。

I elect to get my 26 or 2700 calories a day from things that make me feel good when I eat them. And that’s been my sole test. That wasn’t a test that my mother necessarily thought was great, or my grandfather.

我选择每天从让我吃了感觉良好的食物中摄取 2600 或 2700 卡路里。这一直是我唯一的标准。这并不是我母亲或我祖父认为很好的标准。

But there are over 1.9 billion 8-ounce servings of some Coca-Cola drink. Now they have an enormous range of products, you know. I mean, you have a few that are called Coke, Diet Coke, Coke Zero and that sort of thing, but they have literally thousands of products.

但每年有超过19亿份8盎司的可口可乐饮料。现在他们有各种各样的产品。你有一些叫做可口可乐、健怡可乐、零度可口可乐等，但他们实际上有几千种产品。

One-point-nine billion. That’s — what is that — 693,500,000,000 8-ounce servings a year, except it’s a leap year. (Laughter)

十九亿。这是——那是什么——每年 693,500,000,000 个 8 盎司的份量，除了这是一个闰年。（笑声）

That’s almost 100 8-ounce servings per capita for 7 billion people in the world every year. And that’s been going on since 1886.

这是每人每年几乎100份8盎司的饮料，适用于70亿人。这种情况自1886年以来就一直存在。

And I would find quite spurious the fact that somebody says, if you’re eating 3500 or so calories a day, and you’re consuming 27-or-8 hundred, and some of the 3500 is Coca-Cola, to lay it — any particular obesity-related illnesses — on the Coca-Cola you drink.

我会觉得非常可疑的是，有人会说，如果你每天摄入3500卡路里，而其中2800卡路里来自可口可乐，将任何与肥胖相关的疾病归咎于你喝的可口可乐。

You have the choice of consuming more than you use, I mean. And I make a choice to eat — or get — 700 calories from this, and I like fudge a lot, peanut brittle.

你可以选择摄入的卡路里比你消耗的要多。我的选择是从这些食物中获取700卡路里，我喜欢吃糖果、花生脆糖。

And I am a very, very, very happy guy and I don’t know — I think — and I’m serious about this — I think if you are happy every day, you know, it may be hard to measure, but I think you’re going to live longer as well. So there may be a compensating factor. (Applause)

我非常非常非常快乐，我不知道——我认为——我对此是认真的——我认为如果你每天都快乐，你知道，这可能很难衡量，但我认为你也会活得更久。所以可能会有一个补偿因素。（掌声）

And I really wish I’d had a twin, and that twin had eaten broccoli his entire life, and we both consume the same number of calories. I know I would have been happier. And I think the odds are fairly good I would have loved longer.

我真的希望我有一个双胞胎，而那个双胞胎一辈子都吃西兰花，我们俩摄入的卡路里相同。我知道我会更快乐。我认为我活得更久的几率也相当高。

I think Coca-Cola is a marvelous product, you know. I mean, if you consume 3500 or 4000 calories a day, and live a normal life, in terms of your metabolism, you know, something’s going to go wrong with your body at some point.

我认为可口可乐是一种奇妙的产品，你知道的。我的意思是，如果你每天摄入 3500 或 4000 卡路里，并过着正常的生活，从你的新陈代谢来看，你知道，总有一天你的身体会出现问题。

But if you keep — I think if you balance out the calories so that you don’t become obese, I do — I have not seen evidence that convinces me that, you know, I’ll make it — it will be more likely I reach 100 if I suddenly switch to water and broccoli.

但如果你保持——我认为如果你平衡卡路里，以免变得肥胖，我确实——我没有看到让我信服的证据，证明如果我突然改为只喝水和吃西兰花，我更有可能活到 100 岁。

Incidentally, a friend of mine, Arjay Miller, a remarkable man — born about 100 miles from here, west — eighth child — near Shelby, Nebraska.

顺便提一下，我的一位朋友阿尔杰·米勒，一个了不起的人——出生在离这里约 100 英里以西的地方——是家中的第八个孩子——在内布拉斯加州的谢尔比附近。

He said Shelby’s population was 596 and it never changed because every time some girl had a baby a guy had to leave town, it was a very stable. (Laughter)

他说谢尔比的人口是 596，而且从未改变，因为每次有女孩生孩子时，总会有一个男孩离开这个小镇，这里非常稳定。（笑声）

But Arjay went on to be president of Ford Motor Company, from this farm near Shelby, and he had his 100th birthday on March 4th of this year. So I went out to see Arjay for his birthday on March 4th, and Arjay told me that there were 10,000 men in the United States that had lived to be 100 or greater, and there were 45,000 women that were 100 or greater.

但是阿尔杰后来成为了福特汽车公司的总裁，他在这个靠近谢尔比的农场长大，今年 3 月 4 日迎来了他的 100 岁生日。因此，我在 3 月 4 日去看阿尔杰庆祝他的生日，阿尔杰告诉我，美国有 10,000 名男性活到了 100 岁或更大，女性则有 45,000 名。

So I came back and I checked that on the internet — I went to the census figures — and sure enough, that is the ratio. There’s 10,000 men over 100, roughly, and 45,000 women.

所以我回来了，我在网上查了一下——我查看了人口普查数据——果然，比例就是这样。大约有 10,000 名男性和 45,000 名女性。

So if you really want to improve your longevity prospects, I mean a guy in my position, you have a sex change. (Laughter)

所以如果你真的想改善你的长寿前景，我是说像我这样的家伙，你就去做变性手术。（笑声）

I mean as a — you’re 4 1/2 times more likely to get to be 100.

我的意思是——你有 4.5 倍的机会活到 100 岁。

That sounds like one of those studies that people put out. It’s just a matter of facts, folks.

这听起来像是人们发布的那些研究。这只是一个事实问题，各位。

I think I’ll have Charlie go first, though, on that one. (Laughter)

我想我会让查理先来，关于那个。（笑声）

Charlie, do you have any comments?

查理，你有什么意见吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — 查理·芒格：好吧——

WARREN BUFFETT: Have some fudge.

沃伦·巴菲特：吃点软糖。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I like the peanut brittle better than the Coke. I drink a lot of Diet Coke and — I think the people who ask questions like that one always make one ghastly error that’s really inexcusable. They measure the detriment without considering the advantage.

查理·芒格：我更喜欢花生糖而不是可乐。我喝很多健怡可乐——我认为那些问这样问题的人总是犯了一个可怕的错误，这个错误真是不可原谅。他们在衡量损害时没有考虑到好处。

Well, that’s really stupid. That’s like saying we should give up air travel through airlines because 100 people die a year in air crashes or something. That would be crazy. The benefit is worth the risk.

好吧，这真是愚蠢。这就像说我们应该放弃航空旅行，因为每年有 100 人在空难中丧生。这太疯狂了。收益是值得冒这个风险的。

And if every person has to have about 8 or 10 glasses of water every day to stay alive, and it’s pretty cheap and sensible, and it improves life to have a little extra flavor to your water, and a little stimulation, and a little calories, if you want to eat that way, there are huge benefits to humanity in that, and it’s worth having some disadvantage.

如果每个人每天需要大约 8 到 10 杯水才能活下去，而水又相对便宜且合理，给水增加一点额外的味道、一些刺激和少量卡路里，如果你想这样饮食，这对人类有巨大的好处，值得承受一些缺点。

We ought to have, almost, a law in the editorial — I’m sounding like Donald Trump — (laughter) — where these people shouldn’t be allowed to cite the defects without citing the offsetting advantage. It’s immature and stupid. (Applause)

我们几乎应该在社论中有一条法律——我听起来像唐纳德·特朗普——（笑声）——这些人不应该只提缺点而不提相应的优点。这是幼稚和愚蠢的。（掌声）

14. Renewable energy investments

可再生能源投资

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg Warren.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格·沃伦。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, with both coal fired and natural gas plants continuing to generate around two-thirds of the nation’s electricity, and renewables accounting for less than 10 percent, there remains plenty of room for growth.

格雷格·沃伦：随着煤炭和天然气发电厂继续产生全国约三分之二的电力，而可再生能源占不到 10%，仍然有很大的增长空间。

At this point, Berkshire Energy, which has invested heavily in the segment, is one of the nation’s largest producers of both wind and solar power, and yet still only generates around one-third of its overall capacity from renewables.

在这一点上，伯克希尔能源在该领域进行了大量投资，是全国最大的风能和太阳能生产商之一，但仍然仅从可再生能源中产生大约三分之一的整体产能。

As you noted earlier, MidAmerican recently committed another $3.6 billion to wind production, which should lift the amount of electricity it generates from wind to 85 percent by 2020.

正如您之前提到的，MidAmerican 最近又承诺投入 36 亿美元用于风能生产，这应该会使其到 2020 年从风能产生的电力比例提升至 85%。

You’ve also had the company, overall, pledging to have around 30 billion in renewables longer term.

你们公司总体上也承诺在长期内投资约 300 亿美元于可再生能源。

The recent renewal of both the wind and solar energy tax credits has made this kind of investment more economically viable and should clear the path for future investments.

最近风能和太阳能税收抵免的续期使这种投资在经济上更具可行性，并应为未来的投资铺平道路。

Eliminating coal-fired plants looks to be the main priority, but natural gas-fired plants are also fossil fuel driven and are exposed to the vagaries of energy prices.

消除煤炭发电厂似乎是主要优先事项，但天然气发电厂也是化石燃料驱动，且受到能源价格波动的影响。

Is the endgame here for Berkshire Energy to get 100 percent of its generation capacity converted over to renewables, and what are the risks and rewards associated with that effort?

伯克希尔能源的最终目标是将其 100%的发电能力转为可再生能源吗？与这一努力相关的风险和回报是什么？

After all, the company operates in a highly-regulated industry, where rates are driven by an effort to keep customer costs low, while still providing adequate returns for the utilities.

毕竟，该公司在一个高度监管的行业中运营，在这个行业中，费率的制定旨在保持客户成本低，同时仍能为公用事业提供足够的回报。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I think implicit in what you say is that we do — any decision we make — including the one that we just showed on the — during the movie to — on any decision about new generation, changes in generation — has to go through what’s usually called the Public Utility Commission, they may have different names in a few states.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为你所说的隐含着我们所做的任何决定——包括我们在电影中展示的那个决定——关于新一代、代际变化的任何决定，都必须经过通常称为公共事业委员会的机构，在一些州可能有不同的名称。

But the utility industry is overwhelmingly regulated at the state level, and we cannot make changes that are not approved by the Public Utility Commission.

但公用事业行业在很大程度上受到州级监管，我们无法进行未经公共事业委员会批准的更改。

We’ve had more problems, for example, in bringing in renewables in our western utility, Pacific Corp, because it’s, in effect, regulated by six states — I believe it’s six states — and they don’t necessarily agree on how the cost and benefits should be divided if we put in a bunch of renewables, and we have to follow their instructions.

我们在引入可再生能源方面遇到了更多问题，例如，在我们西部的公用事业公司太平洋电力公司，因为它实际上受到六个州的监管——我相信是六个州——而这些州在如果我们引入大量可再生能源时，成本和收益应该如何分配上并不一定达成一致，我们必须遵循他们的指示。

Iowa was just been marvelous about encouraging — I mean at every level — I mean the consumer groups, the governor, you name it — they have seen the benefits.

爱荷华州在鼓励方面真是太棒了——我指的是各个层面——消费者团体、州长，你说的都对——他们看到了好处。

And in Iowa it’s literally true that we have one major competitor, called Alliant, and they have not — either been able to — I don’t know the reasons — but they have not pursued renewables the way we have, so our rates are considerably lower than theirs.

在爱荷华州，我们确实有一个主要竞争对手，叫做 Alliant，他们没有——我不知道原因——但他们没有像我们一样追求可再生能源，因此我们的费率远低于他们的。

And, if you look at their budget projections — although they’re substantially higher rates than we have now — they may well need a rate increase within a year or so.

如果你查看他们的预算预测——尽管他们的电价远高于我们现在的水平——他们可能会在一年左右需要涨价。

And with our latest expansion, we have said that we will not need a rate increase till 2029 at the earliest. That’s thirteen years off.

随着我们最新的扩展，我们表示在最早到 2029 年之前不需要提高费率。这还要十三年。

So there’ve been great benefits if you have a regulation that works with you on that, but it is a determination that is made at the state level.

因此，如果您有一项与您合作的法规，那么将会有很大的好处，但这是在州级别做出的决定。

Now, the federal government has encouraged, in a major way, the development of renewables by this production tax credit, which currently amounts to about 2.3 cents per kilowatt hour.

现在，联邦政府通过这项生产税收抵免在很大程度上鼓励可再生能源的发展，目前该抵免额约为每千瓦时 2.3 美分。

We would not have the renewable generation that we have if it hadn’t been for the fact that that building of those projects is subsidized by the federal government, because the benefits of reducing solar emissions are — or carbon emissions — are worldwide, and therefore it’s deemed proper that the citizenry as a whole should participate in subsidizing the cost of reducing those emissions.

如果没有联邦政府对这些项目建设的补贴，我们不会拥有现在的可再生能源发电，因为减少太阳能排放——或碳排放——的好处是全球性的，因此认为整个公民群体应该参与补贴减少这些排放的成本。

And that has encouraged — in fact, it’s allowed — things like have happened in Iowa as well.

这也鼓励了——实际上，它允许了——在爱荷华州发生的事情。

But the degree to which the renewables replace, primarily coal — although there’s plenty of emissions connected with natural gas if you trace it all the way through — will depend on governmental policy.

但可再生能源替代煤炭的程度——尽管如果追溯到头，天然气也有很多排放——将取决于政府政策。

And I think, so far, I think it’s been quite sensible in encouraging — having the cost borne by society as a whole, in terms of reduced tax revenues, and having the benefits, which is less CO₂, into the atmosphere.

我认为，到目前为止，政府在鼓励方面表现得相当明智，让社会整体承担成本，通过减少税收收入来享受减少CO₂排放的好处。

They also, broadly — you know, they’re not just limited to the people of Iowa when we build that. That’s a benefit that accrues to the world.

他们还广泛地——你知道，他们不仅限于我们在爱荷华州建设的地方。这是对世界的好处。

I think you’ll see continued change. It will vary by jurisdiction.

我认为你会看到持续的变化。这将因管辖区而异。

And we would hope — we’ve got the capital, we’ve got lots of taxes, federal taxes, paid in our consolidated returns — so we’re in a particularly advantageous position to take advantage of massive investments that companies with limited tax appetites couldn’t handle.

我们希望——我们有资本，我们在合并报表中缴纳了大量的联邦税收——所以我们在利用那些有限税务需求的公司无法处理的大规模投资方面处于特别有利的位置。

政策套利。

I think you’ll see us be a very big player. But governmental policy is going to be, you know, the major driver.

我认为你会看到我们成为一个非常重要的参与者。但政府政策将是主要推动力。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think we’re doing way more than our share of shifting to renewable energy, and we’re charging way lower energy prices to our utility customers than other people.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为我们在向可再生能源转型方面做得远远超过我们的份额，并且我们向公用事业客户收取的能源价格远低于其他人。

If the whole rest of the world were behaving the way we are, it would be a much better world.

如果全世界都像我们这样行事，那将是一个更美好的世界。

I will say this about the subject, though, and that is that I think that the people who worry about climate change as the major trouble of Earth don’t have my view.

我想说的是，我认为那些把气候变化视为地球主要问题的人并不认同我的观点。

I think that we — I like all this shifting to renewables, but I have a different reason. I want to conserve the hydrocarbons, because eventually, I think, we’re going to use every drop, humanity, for chemical feedstocks. And so I’m in their camp, but I’ve got a different reason.

我认为我们——我喜欢所有这些转向可再生能源的做法，但我有一个不同的理由。我想要保护碳氢化合物，因为最终，我认为人类会用尽每一滴，作为化学原料。因此，我支持他们，但我有一个不同的理由。

WARREN BUFFETT: One thing you’ll find — might find — kind of interesting: Nebraska has not done much with wind power. And maybe three miles from — two miles — from where we’re sitting, right across the river, people are buying their electricity cheaper, in Council Bluffs right across the river, than they are in Omaha.

沃伦·巴菲特：你会发现一件可能有趣的事情：内布拉斯加州在风能方面做得不多。而我们坐的地方大约三英里，或者两英里，正对着河对岸，人们在河对岸的考克斯布拉夫以比奥马哈更便宜的价格购买电力。

And yet Omaha — Nebraska is entirely a public power state, so there’s no stockholders who have to have any earnings, the bonds are issued on a tax-exempt basis, and yet electricity is considerably cheaper right across the river.

而且奥马哈——内布拉斯加州完全是公共电力州，所以没有股东需要盈利，债券以免税的方式发行，尽管如此，电力在河对岸却便宜得多。

And, you know, the wind blowing doesn’t just start at the Missouri River. I mean, it comes across Nebraska and that wind could be captured. And, so far, it really hasn’t.

而且，你知道，风的吹动并不仅仅是从密苏里河开始的。我的意思是，它是从内布拉斯加州吹过来的，而那股风是可以被捕捉的。到目前为止，它实际上还没有。

And the real irony is that because our electricity is so much cheaper in Iowa, you have these massive server farms of people like Google. It’s become a tech haven for these operations that just gobble up electricity. And Iowa has gotten plant after plant after plant and job after job after job, and increased property tax — I mean gotten more property tax revenues — and that’s being done — the Google server is probably seven or eight miles from here — and it’s located in Iowa because we have cheap wind-generated electricity. And it’s creating jobs. It’s fascinating.

真正的讽刺在于，由于爱荷华州的电力成本非常低，像谷歌这样的大型服务器农场应运而生。这里已经成为这些大量消耗电力的运营的科技天堂。爱荷华州不断获得一个又一个工厂和工作岗位，财产税也在增加——我指的是获得了更多的财产税收入——而这一切都是因为谷歌的服务器距离这里大约七八英里，它位于爱荷华州，因为我们有廉价的风能发电。这正在创造就业机会。这真是令人着迷。

Nebraska has prided itself on public power. It was originated back, I believe, in the ’30s when George Norris was a very powerful senator here and it’s been a source of pride. But lately, it’s been a source of cost, too.

内布拉斯加州一直以公共电力为荣。我相信它起源于上世纪 30 年代，当时乔治·诺里斯是一位非常有影响力的参议员，这一直是我们的骄傲来源。但最近，它也成为了成本的来源。

15. Derivatives still a “danger to the system”

衍生品仍然是“系统的危险”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, shareholders section 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，股东部分 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Adam Bergman. I’m with Sterling Capital in Virginia Beach.

观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫亚当·伯格曼。我在弗吉尼亚海滩的斯特林资本工作。

In your 2008 shareholder letter, you said, “Derivatives are dangerous… They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks.”

在您 2008 年的股东信中，您说：“衍生品是危险的……它们使得投资者几乎无法理解和分析我们最大的商业银行和投资银行。”

So my question for you is: how do you analyze and value companies like Bank of America Merrill Lynch and other commercial banks that Berkshire has investments in, relative to their significant derivative exposures? Thanks.

所以我想问你的是：你如何分析和评估像美国银行美林证券以及其他伯克希尔投资的商业银行，相对于它们显著的衍生品风险？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, derivatives do complicate the problem very dramatically.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，衍生品确实大大复杂化了问题。

Now, they are moving away to being collateralized, which helps.

现在，他们正逐渐远离抵押化，这有助于改善情况。

But there’s no question that if you asked me to describe the derivative position of the B of A, for example, I would know that they have done a conscientious job and worked hard at properly evaluating.

但毫无疑问，如果你让我描述美国银行的衍生品头寸，我会知道他们做得很认真，并努力进行适当的评估。

But the great danger in derivatives is if there’s a discontinuity. If there’s not discontinuities, you probably don’t have much of a problem, assuming they get marked to market, and collateralized, and so on.

但衍生品的巨大危险在于出现不连续性。如果没有不连续性，你可能不会有太多问题，前提是它们按市场价值标记，并且有担保等。

这个想法跟保险有关，也跟投资相关。

But if the system stopped for a while — the system stopped after 9/11 for three or four days. It stopped at the time of World War One. They closed the New York Stock Exchange for many months.

但是如果系统停了一段时间——在 911 事件后，系统停了三到四天。在第一次世界大战期间也停过。他们关闭了纽约证券交易所好几个月。

They debated closing the stock exchange, very seriously, the day after October 19, 1987. And it was — there were a lot of people that wanted to close it. And on that Tuesday morning, it looked like it was about to stop, but it continued.

他们在 1987 年 10 月 19 日之后的第二天非常认真地讨论是否关闭证券交易所。很多人想要关闭它。在那个星期二的早晨，看起来交易所快要停止了，但它继续运作。

But if you had a — if you have a major cyber, nuclear, chemical, biological, attack on the country — which will certainly happen at some point — if you have a major discontinuity, then you’ll have a lot of problems, a lot of problems.

但是如果你有一个——如果你对国家进行一次重大的网络、核、化学、生物攻击——这在某个时候肯定会发生——如果你有一个重大的不连续性，那么你会面临很多问题，很多问题。

But you will also — when things reopen — you will find there can be enormous gaps in things that you thought were fully protected by collateral, and that sort of thing, or netting arrangements, and that type of thing.

但当事情重新开启时，你会发现可能会有巨大的缺口，之前认为被担保、或者通过净额结算等方式完全保护的东西，实际上可能会出现问题。

So I regard very large derivative positions as dangerous.

所以我认为非常大的衍生品头寸是危险的。

We inherited a modest- sized position at Gen Re and, in a benign market, we lost about $400 million, just in trying to unwind it, with no pressure on us whatsoever.

我们在 Gen Re 继承了一个适度规模的头寸，在一个温和的市场中，我们仅仅在试图解除它时就损失了大约 4 亿美元，完全没有任何压力。

So I do think it continues to be a danger to the system.

所以我确实认为这对系统仍然构成威胁。

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, the accountants blessed that big derivative position as being worth a lot of money. They were only off, what, many hundreds of millions.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，会计师们认为那个巨大的衍生品头寸价值很高。他们的估计只错了几亿。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. Charlie found one position when he was on the audit committee at Salomon. I think it was mismarked by $20 million.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理在Salomon的审计委员会时发现过一个位置，估值偏差了2000万美元。

I actually, by happenstance, happen — I do know of one incredibly mismarked position — doesn’t affect any of our operations — but it almost staggers the mind to know the way that position is marked. And you can only come to the conclusion that some trader got somehow — influenced whoever did mark it, or marked it himself, heaven forbid, and probably just influenced someone.

实际上，我偶然知道一个位置标记得极其不准确——这不影响我们的操作——但你会感到难以置信。你只能得出这样的结论：某个交易员在某种程度上影响了标记它的人，或者他自己标记了它，天哪，可能只是影响了某人。

Or they didn’t know enough. Some of these things get so complicated, they are very hard to evaluate. That’s the kind that have the most profit in them, usually, so they were quite enthusiastic about those when we were at Solomon.

或者他们可能不知道足够的信息。有些东西变得如此复杂，以至于很难评估。这通常是最有利润的那些，所以他们在我们在Solomon时对这些很热衷。

They can be extraordinary hard to mark. And, like I say, I know one that’s so mismarked it would blow your mind.

它们可能非常难以标记。而且，就像我说的，我知道一个标记得如此错误，以至于会让你大吃一惊。

And, you know, the auditors, I don’t think, are necessarily capable of holding that behavior in check.

而且，你知道，我认为审计员不一定能够抑制这种行为。

It’s very interesting, because now there’s really four big auditing firms, and obviously, they’re auditing companies where there’s a derivative position, and they’re auditing company A that’s on one side of the transaction, and they’re auditing company B that’s on the other side of the transaction. In some cases, it’s the same auditor.

这非常有趣，因为现在确实有四家大型审计公司，显然，他们正在审计有衍生品头寸的公司，他们正在审计交易一方的公司 A，也在审计交易另一方的公司 B。在某些情况下，审计师是同一个。

And I will guarantee you that there’s plenty of times when the marks on what they’re attesting to are significantly different, which would be an interesting exercise to pursue, in terms of checking those numbers out.

我可以保证，他们所证明的标记在很多时候是显著不同的，这将是一个有趣的练习，可以检查这些数字。

Derivatives are still dangerous, in large quantities, and we have — we would not do them, on a collateralized basis, because if there was a discontinuity, I don’t know exactly where we would end up, and I’m never going to get us in a position where we could have money demanded of us and not be able to fulfill it with ease, and with me sleeping well.

衍生品仍然是危险的，尤其是在大量情况下，我们不会以抵押的方式进行交易，因为如果出现不连续性，我不知道我们最终会处于什么位置，我绝不会让我们处于一种可能被要求支付而无法轻松满足的境地，这样我也无法安然入睡。

So we won’t engage in it. We’ve got some in runoff, but so far we’ve made money and had the use of money for a decade or more, and it’s been very attractive for us. But that does not entice me, at all, into doing any derivative transactions that would involve collateral, when collateral is not required.

所以我们不会参与其中。我们有一些衍生品在逐步清算中，但到目前为止我们已经赚钱，并且使用资金已经超过十年，这对我们来说非常有吸引力。但这完全没有诱使我去进行任何需要担保的衍生品交易，当担保不是强制要求的时候。

It’s still a potential time bomb in the system.

这仍然是系统中的一个潜在定时炸弹。

Anything where discontinuities — and basically that means closing up and stopping trading markets from functioning — anything where discontinuities can exist, can be real poison in markets.

任何存在不连续性的情况——基本上这意味着关闭和阻止市场运作——任何可能存在不连续性的情况，都可能对市场造成真正的毒害。

Kuwait, some years ago, went to a very delayed system on settlement of stock purchases, so they didn’t have to settle up for six months or thereabouts. And it caused all kinds of problems, because, you know, you’ve got an IOU from somebody for six months and if you got zillions of those, a lot of trouble can ensue.

科威特几年前采用了一种非常延迟的股票结算系统，因此他们不需要在六个月左右的时间内进行结算。这导致了各种问题，因为你知道，如果你手里有某人的欠条，且这种欠条有成千上万张，就会引发很多麻烦。

So I agree with your general caution. I’m not in the least troubled by our Bank of America investment, nor our Wells Fargo — we added to Wells Fargo — and our Bank of America position, right now, is a preferred stock, but we’re very likely to exercise the warrants on that.

所以我同意你的总体谨慎。我对我们在美国银行的投资以及我们在富国银行的投资一点也不感到困扰——我们增加了对富国银行的投资——而我们在美国银行的持仓目前是优先股，但我们很可能会行使相关的认股权证。

On the other hand, there are a great number of banks in the world. If you take the 50 largest banks in the world, we wouldn’t even think about probably 45 of them. Wouldn’t you say that, Charlie?

另一方面，世界上有大量的银行。如果你拿出全球前50大银行，我们可能不会考虑其中的45家。你觉得呢，查理？

银行股的假设。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’re in the awkward position where I think we’ll probably make about $20 billion out of derivatives, and just those few contracts that you and Ajit [Jain] did years ago.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们处于一个尴尬的境地，我认为我们可能会从衍生品中赚取大约 200 亿美元，仅仅是你和阿吉特[贾因]几年前签订的那些合同。

All that said, we’re different from the banks. We would really prefer it if those derivatives had been illegal for us to buy. It would have been better for our country.

所有这些话说完，我们与银行不同。我们真的希望这些衍生品对我们来说是非法的。这样对我们的国家会更好。

16. Float still “useful” despite low interest rates

尽管利率低，浮存金仍然“有用”

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This questions relates to something that Warren briefly said earlier today. The question comes from Lynn Palmer, who is just finishing her freshman year at a Houston, Texas high school.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题涉及到沃伦今天早些时候简要提到的一点。问题来自于正在完成她在德克萨斯州休斯顿高中一年级的林恩·帕尔默。

“My question,” she says, “concerns the float generated by Berkshire’s insurance companies. In Mr. Buffett’s 2015 annual letter, he said that the large amount of float that Berkshire possesses allows the company to significantly increase its investment income.

“我的问题，”她说，“涉及伯克希尔保险公司产生的浮存金。在巴菲特先生 2015 年的年度信中，他提到伯克希尔拥有的大量浮存金使公司能够显著增加其投资收入。”

“But what happens when interest rates decline? If the U.S. were to implement negative interest rates in the same way that the eurozone and Japan have done, how would Berkshire be affected?”

“但是当利率下降时会发生什么？如果美国以与欧元区和日本相同的方式实施负利率，伯克希尔会受到怎样的影响？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well some of our float actually exists in Europe, where we have the problem of negative interest rates on very high-grade and short-term and medium — even medium-term bonds — and obviously anything that reduces the value of having money is going to affect Berkshire, because we’re always going to have a lot of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们的一部分浮存金实际上存在于欧洲，在那里我们面临负利率的问题，尤其是高等级的短期和中期债券——显然，任何降低持有资金价值的因素都会影响伯克希尔，因为我们总是会有很多资金。

We — because we have so much capital, and so many sources of earning power, we have the ability, quite properly, to use our float in — to a certain degree — in ways that most insurance companies can’t think about.

我们——因为我们拥有如此多的资本和如此多的盈利来源，我们有能力，恰当地，利用我们的浮存金——在某种程度上——以大多数保险公司无法想到的方式。

So we can find things to do, but sometimes we get, you know we — we’ve got fifty-odd billion of short-term government securities now, and we’re going to get another $8.3 billion, in all likelihood, early in June when our Kraft Heinz preferred is called, so we’ll be back over 60 billion again very soon.

所以我们可以找到事情做，但有时我们会，你知道，我们现在有大约五十多亿的短期政府证券，我们很可能在六月初当我们的卡夫亨氏优先股被赎回时再获得 83 亿美元，所以我们很快就会再次超过 600 亿美元。

So we’ve got 60 billion out, that’s out at, say, a quarter of 1 percent. Well, the difference between a quarter of 1 percent and minus a quarter of 1 percent, you know, is not that great. I mean, it’s almost as painful to have 60 million out at a quarter of a percent, as to have it out at a negative rate.

我们有 600 亿的资金，这个利率大约是 0.25%。那么，0.25%和-0.25%之间的差别并不大。我的意思是，60 亿以 0.25%的利率借出，和以负利率借出，几乎是一样痛苦的。

Float is not worth as much to insurance companies now as it was 10 years ago or 15 years ago. And that’s true at Berkshire. I think it’s worth considerably more to us than it is to the typical insurance company, because I think we have a broader range of options as to what to do with it.

浮存金对保险公司现在的价值不如 10 年前或 15 年前那么高。这在伯克希尔也是如此。我认为对我们来说，它的价值远高于典型保险公司，因为我们在处理这些资金方面有更广泛的选择。

But there’s no question about it, that having a lot of money around now is not just a problem for insurance companies. It’s a problem for retirees. It’s a problem for anybody that’s stuck with fixed-dollar investments and finds that their income now is a pittance or, you know, in Europe, perhaps a negative rate. And that was not something in their calculation at all 15 years ago.

但毫无疑问，现在有很多钱不仅仅是保险公司的问题。这是退休人员的问题。这是任何被固定收益投资困住的人面临的问题，他们发现现在的收入微不足道，或者在欧洲，可能是负利率。这在 15 年前的计算中根本没有考虑到。

We love the idea, however, of increasing our float. I mean that money has been very useful to us over time.

我们非常喜欢增加我们浮存金的想法。我的意思是，这笔钱在我们身上一直非常有用。

It’s useful to us today, even under present conditions, and it’s likely to be very useful to us in the future. It’s shown as a liability, but it’s actually a huge asset.

它今天对我们很有用，即使在当前的条件下，未来对我们也可能非常有用。它被视为负债，但实际上它是一个巨大的资产。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s now in full swing. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他现在全力以赴了。（笑声）

17. We still love BNSF despite falling coal shipments

我们仍然爱 BNSF，尽管煤炭运输量下降。

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We can’t hear you.

查理·芒格：我们听不见你。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Testing. The railroad industry seems, right now, to be suffering from exposure to some of the weakest parts of the economy, with volume declines of varying magnitudes in coal, oil, sand, and metals. Even intermodal, usually a steady source of growth, has been relatively weak of late.

乔纳森·布兰特：测试。铁路行业目前似乎正受到经济一些最薄弱部分的影响，煤炭、石油、沙子和金属的运输量都有不同程度的下降。即使是通常稳定的增长来源——多式联运，最近也相对疲软。

How much of the weakness is cyclical, how much is secular?

这种弱点有多少是周期性的，有多少是长期性的？

In the last 15 months, the other western railroad’s market capitalization is down by 30 — 35 percent — as projections of future growth have come down.

在过去的 15 个月里，另一家西方铁路公司的市值下降了 30%至 35%，因为对未来增长的预期降低了。

Is your estimate of BNSF’s intrinsic value down by a material amount during the same period, or is your view of the value of BNSF’s irreplaceable network unaffected by these short-term wiggles?

您对 BNSF 内在价值的估计在同一时期内是否大幅下降，还是您对 BNSF 不可替代网络价值的看法未受这些短期波动的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would — certainly the decline in coal — which is a very important commodity — it’s about 20 percent of revenues — that’s secular.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为——煤炭的下降——这是一种非常重要的商品——它大约占收入的 20%——这是长期趋势。

Now, there’s other factors that may cause the line of decline to jiggle around. We had a very mild winter, and we went into the winter with utilities carrying unusual amounts of coal.

现在，还有其他因素可能导致下降趋势线的波动。我们经历了一个非常温和的冬天，并且在冬季开始时，公用事业公司储存了异常数量的煤炭。

And ironically, part of the reason for that was that our service the year before had been bad and they’d gotten low on coal, so then they compensated by bringing in more than they needed, just to catch up. And because the weather was mild, electricity use was poor in the winter time. And so they continue, at this point, to have considerably more coal on hand than they would like.

讽刺的是，部分原因是前一年我们的服务很差，他们的煤炭储备不足，因此他们通过引入超过所需的煤炭来弥补，只是为了赶上。而且由于天气温和，冬季的电力使用情况不佳。因此，他们目前手头的煤炭数量远远超过他们的需求。

So they are not only — they’re trying to under order what they will be using, and that has a little effect. But the decline in coal, for sure, is secular. And at 20 percent of revenues, that’s a significant factor.

所以他们不仅仅是在尝试减少他们将使用的订单，这确实有一些影响。但煤炭的下降无疑是长期的。而且占收入的 20%，这是一个重要因素。

But — and it’s true that the market, generally, got very enthused about railroad stocks a year or two ago, so they sold up a lot. And now that people have seen that car loadings are down and earnings are down, in some places, that equity valuations have come down.

但是——确实，市场普遍在一两年前对铁路股票非常热衷，因此他们卖出了很多股票。现在人们看到货运量下降，收益在某些地方也下降，股票估值也随之下跌。

We don’t — we love the fact we own BNSF. We think we bought it at an attractive price. We’d love to be able to buy a second thing exactly like it at that price. We’d do it in a second. We’d even pay a little bit more, probably.

我们不这样认为——我们喜欢拥有 BNSF 的事实。我们认为我们以一个有吸引力的价格买下了它。我们希望能够以那个价格再买一个完全一样的东西。我们会立刻这样做。我们甚至可能会多花一点钱。

But we don’t mark up, and down, our wholly-owned businesses, based on stock market valuations.

但我们不会根据股市估值对我们的全资企业进行加价或降价。

Obviously, stock market valuations are some factor in our thinking, but we are not marking our wholly-owned businesses to market because we know we’re going to hold them forever. And we regard BNSF as a very good business to hold forever.

显然，股市估值在我们的思考中是一个因素，但我们并没有将我们全资拥有的业务按市场价值计量，因为我们知道我们会永远持有它们。我们认为 BNSF 是一项非常适合永远持有的好业务。

But it will it will lose coal volume and, you know, it may lose in other areas, but it will gain in other areas. It’s a terrific and valuable asset, and it will learn a lot of money this year, but it won’t earn as much money as it earned last year.

但它会失去煤炭运输量，可能在其他领域也会有所下降，但在其他领域也会有所增长。它是一个很棒且有价值的资产，今年会赚很多钱，但不会像去年那样赚那么多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

18. Don’t envy people making money from risky behavior

不要羡慕那些通过冒险行为赚钱的人

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Warren and Charlie. Great to see you. This is Cora and Dan Chen from Taulguard Investments of Los Angeles.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，沃伦和查理。很高兴见到你们。这是来自洛杉矶塔尔戈德投资的科拉和丹·陈。

This annual meeting reminds me of the magical world of Hogwarts, of Harry Potter. This arena is our Hogwarts. Warren, you are our Headmaster and Professor Dumbledore. (Laughter)

这个年度会议让我想起了霍格沃茨的魔法世界，想起了哈利·波特。这个舞台就是我们的霍格沃茨。沃伦，你是我们的校长和邓布利多教授。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I haven’t read Harry Potter, but I’ll take it as a compliment. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我没读过《哈利·波特》，但我会把这当作一种赞美。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Charlie is our Headmaster Snape, direct, and full of integrity.

观众成员：查理是我们的斯内普校长，直率且充满诚信。

The magic of long-term, concentrated, value investing is real, yet similar to Harry Potter, the rest of the world doesn’t believe we exist.

长期集中价值投资的魔力是真实的，但就像哈利·波特一样，世界其他地方的人并不相信我们存在。

Your letter to me has changed my life. Your “Secret Millionaire’s Club” has changed my children’s life. They go to class chatting about investing.

你的信改变了我的生活。你的“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”改变了我孩子的生活。他们上课时聊着投资。

My question is for my children watching at home today and the children in the audience.

我想问的问题是给今天在家观看的孩子们和在观众席上的孩子们。

How should they look at stocks, when every day in the media they see companies that have never made a dime in their life go IPO?

我想问一下，面对每天媒体上那些从未盈利的公司进行IPO的情况，他们应该如何看待股票？

They’re dilutive and they see a lot of very short-term spin. The cycle is getting shorter and shorter.

这些IPO很具稀释性，他们看到很多非常短期的宣传。周期变得越来越短。

How should they view stocks, and what’s your message for them?

他们应该如何看待股票？你对他们有什么建议？

Finally, Cora and I would love to thank you in person and shake your hand personally today. I’ll repeat what I said last year: thank you for putting — setting — the seeds for my generation to sit in the shade, and for my children’s generation to sit in the shade with the “Secret Millionaire’s Club.”

最后，科拉和我今天非常想亲自感谢您，并与您握手。我会重申我去年说过的话：感谢您为我的一代人播下种子，让他们能够在阴凉处休息，也感谢您为我孩子的一代人播下种子，让他们能够与“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”一起在阴凉处休息。

I truly walk amongst giants. Thank you.

我真的和巨人同行。谢谢你们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Would you mind repeating the whole thing? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你介意再说一遍吗？（笑声）

“The Secret Millionaire’s Club,” we want to give great credit to Andy Heyward on that. I think it has helped — I know it’s helped — thousands and thousands of children and Andy — it was Andy’s idea — and it grows in strength.

《秘密百万富翁俱乐部》，我们要对安迪·海沃德给予高度赞扬。我认为它帮助了——我知道它帮助了——成千上万的孩子，而安迪——这是安迪的主意——它在不断壮大。

And having young children learn good lessons, in terms of handling money, and making friendships, and just generally behaving as better citizens is a great objective, and Andy makes it easy for them to do. So, on his behalf, I accept your comments.

让年轻孩子们学习如何处理金钱、建立友谊，以及一般来说如何更好地作为公民行为是一个伟大的目标，而安迪让他们更容易做到这一点。因此，我代表他接受你的意见。

You don’t really have to worry about, you know, what’s going on in IPOs, or people making money.

你不必太担心，知道吗，IPO 发生了什么，或者人们赚钱的事。

People win lotteries every day, but there’s no reason to have that effect you at all. You shouldn’t be jealous about it.

人们每天都在中彩票，但这没有理由影响到你。你不应该对此感到嫉妒。

I mean, you know, if they want to do mathematically unsound things, and one of them occasionally gets lucky, and they put the one person on television, and the million that contributed to the winnings, with the big slice taken out for the state, you know, don’t get on — it’s nothing to worry about.

我的意思是，你知道，如果他们想做一些数学上不合理的事情，而其中一个偶尔运气好，他们把那个人放上电视，而贡献奖金的那百万个人，扣掉给国家的大部分，你知道，没什么好担心的。

Just, all you have to do is figure out what makes sense. And you don’t — you look at buying — when you — when you buy a stock, you get yourself in the mental frame of mind that you’re buying a business, and if you don’t look at a quote on it for five years, that’s fine.

只需弄清楚什么是合理的。你不需要——你在考虑购买——当你——当你买入一只股票时，你要把自己置于一种心理状态中，认为你是在购买一家公司，如果你五年内不看它的报价，那也没关系。

You don’t get a quote on your farm every day or every week or every month. You don’t get it on your apartment house, if you own one. If you own a McDonald’s franchise, you don’t get a quote every day.

你不会每天、每周或每月在你的农场上获得报价。如果你拥有一栋公寓楼，你也不会得到报价。如果你拥有一个麦当劳特许经营权，你也不会每天获得报价。

You know, you want to look at your stocks as businesses, and think about their performance as businesses. Think about what you pay for them, as you would think about buying a business.

你知道，你应该把你的股票看作是企业，并考虑它们作为企业的表现。考虑你为它们支付的价格，就像你考虑购买一家企业一样。

And let the rest of the world go its own way. You don’t want to get into a stupid game just because it’s available.

让世界其他人走他们自己的路。你不想因为有愚蠢的游戏就参与其中。

And I’m going to say a little more about that close to the break. But with that, I’ll turn it over to Charlie.

我会在休息前再多说一点。但在此，我把时间交给查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, I think that your children are right to look for people they can trust in dealing with stocks and bonds.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为你的孩子们确实应该寻找他们可以信任的人来处理股票和债券。

Unfortunately, more than half the time, they will fail, in a conventional answer. So you — they really have to — they have a hard problem. If you just listen to your elders, they’ll lie to you and make — spread — a lot of folly.

不幸的是，大多数时候，他们会失败，给出一个常规的答案。所以他们确实面临着一个艰难的问题。如果你只是听你长辈的话，他们会对你撒谎，并传播很多愚蠢的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: But they really have an easy problem, in the sense that American business, as a whole, is going to do fine over time. So the only way they can —

沃伦·巴菲特：但他们实际上面临一个简单的问题，因为整体而言，美国企业随着时间的推移会表现良好。所以他们唯一能做的就是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But not the average client of a stock broker.

查理·芒格：但不是股票经纪人的普通客户。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll get to that later. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们稍后再谈这个。（笑）

The stockbroker will do fine. The — (laughter)

股票经纪人会做得很好。——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, that’s true.

查理·芒格：是的，确实如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: But, they don’t have to do that and we can talk — I’d rather address that just a little later.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是，他们不必这样做，我们可以谈谈——我更愿意稍后再讨论这个。

But — just — you don’t want to worry — you don’t want to be — a lot of problems are, as Charlie would say, are caused by envy. You don’t want to get envious of somebody who’s won the lottery, or bought an IPO that went up. You have to figure out what makes sense and follow your own course.

但是——就是——你不想担心——你不想成为——很多问题，正如查理所说，都是由嫉妒引起的。你不想对那些中彩票或买了上涨的 IPO 的人感到嫉妒。你必须弄清楚什么是合理的，并遵循自己的道路。

19. Nevada utility customers shouldn’t have to subsidize solar power

内华达州的公用事业客户不应为太阳能提供补贴

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a shareholder named Lisa Kang Le (PH) in Singapore. And this has to do with NV Energy’s issue with solar energy in Nevada.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自新加坡的一位股东，名叫丽莎·康·乐（PH）。这个问题与 NV Energy 在内华达州的太阳能问题有关。

“Can the chairman help his environmentally conscious shareholders understand why NV Energy has lobbied for new rules in Nevada that make it prohibitive for households to use solar energy? Is there a good reason that we haven’t yet heard about?

“主席能否帮助那些环保意识强的股东理解为什么NV Energy游说推行新规，使家庭使用太阳能变得不切实际？是否有我们尚未听到的合理原因？”

“And can the chairman or vice chairman share their views on whether there’s a need to implement an environmental, social, and governance policy, on Berkshire investments going forward?

“主席或副主席能否分享他们对未来伯克希尔投资是否需要实施环境、社会和治理政策的看法？”

“I understand that Berkshire Hathaway typically lets the underlying operating companies and CEOs manage their own policies autonomously, but should Berkshire’s board influence better environmental protection policies going forward?”

“我理解伯克希尔·哈撒韦通常让其下属运营公司和首席执行官自主管理自己的政策，但伯克希尔的董事会是否应该在未来影响更好的环境保护政策？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the public utility and the pricing policies and everything in Nevada, as well as other places, but they’re determined by a public utility commission. So, there are, I believe, three commissioners that decide what’s proper.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，内华达州以及其他地方的公共事业和定价政策都是由公共事业委员会决定的。因此，我相信有三位委员决定什么是合适的。

The situation in Nevada is that, in terms of rooftop power, was that for the last few years, if you had a solar project on your roof, you could sell back excess power you generated to the grid at a price that was far, far, far above what we, as a utility, could buy it for elsewhere.

内华达州的情况是，在屋顶发电方面，过去几年，如果你在屋顶上有一个太阳能项目，你可以将你产生的多余电力以一个远远高于我们作为公用事业公司在其他地方购买的价格卖回电网。

So, you could sell it back, we’ll say, at roughly 10 cents a kilowatt hour. And about 17,000 — maybe a few more now — about 17,000 people had rooftop installations.

所以，你可以以大约每千瓦时10美分的价格卖回电力。大约有17000人——现在可能更多——拥有屋顶安装。

Now they get — there were federal credits involved, but those usually got sold to other people, in terms of tax credits.

现在他们获得了——涉及联邦税收抵免，但这些通常会被出售给其他人，作为税收抵免。

So they were being subsidized by the federal government, and that encouraged solar generation, as it’s encouraged us to do solar generation and wind generation, as well.

因此，他们得到了联邦政府的补贴，这促进了太阳能发电，也鼓励我们进行太阳能发电和风能发电。

But the people who had these 17,000 rooftop installations were selling back to the grid at 10 cents, roughly, a kilowatt hour, energy we could purchase or produce — either — but purchase elsewhere, too — for 3 1/2 cents, or thereabouts.

但这些拥有17000个屋顶安装的人，以每千瓦时10美分的价格将电力卖回电网，而我们可以在其他地方购买或生产——大约是3.5美分。

So, 99 percent of our consumers were being asked to subsidize the 1 percent that had solar units, by paying them a significantly — triple the market price, basically — of what we could otherwise buy electricity to sell to the 99 percent.

所以，我们99%的消费者被要求补贴1%拥有太阳能设备的人，支付的价格基本上是市场价格的三倍——这是我们可以购买电力的价格。

So then it’s just a question of whether you wish to have the 99 percent subsidize the 1 percent.

所以这只是一个问题，您是否希望 99%的人来补贴 1%的人。

And the public utility commission in Nevada, they had originally let this small amount of rooftop solar generation be allowed as an experiment with this 10 cent, roughly 10 cent, rebate.

内华达州的公共事业委员会最初允许这小部分屋顶太阳能发电作为实验，提供大约 10 美分的补贴。

And they decided that they did not believe that the 99 percent should be subsidizing the 1 percent.

他们决定，他们不认为99%的人应该补贴1%。

There may — there’s no question — that for solar to be competitive, just like wind, it needs subsidization. Costs are not yet at a level where it becomes competitive with natural gas, for example.

毫无疑问，太阳能要具备竞争力，就像风能一样，需要补贴。目前的成本还没有达到与天然气竞争的水平。

And who pays the subsidy gets to be a real question, if you want to encourage people to use renewables.

谁来支付补贴就成了一个真正的问题，如果你想鼓励人们使用可再生能源。

And, in general, the federal government has done it through tax subsidies, which means taxpayers, generally, throughout the country subsidize it.

而且，总的来说，联邦政府是通过税收补贴来实现的，这意味着全国的纳税人普遍在补贴它。

And the public utility commission in Nevada decided that after seeing this experiment, they decided that it was not right for a million — well over a million — customers to be buying electricity at a price that subsidized the 17,000 people, and therefore increase the prices of electricity for the million.

内华达州公共事业委员会在看到这个实验后决定，超过一百万的客户以补贴 17,000 人的价格购买电力是不合理的，因此提高了超过一百万客户的电价。

And that question of who subsidizes renewables, and how much, is, you know, going to be a political question for a long time to come.

关于谁补贴可再生能源以及补贴多少，这个问题将会在很长一段时间内成为一个政治问题。

And I personally think that if society is the one that’s benefiting from the lack of — reduction of — greenhouse gases, that society should pick up the tab.

我个人认为，如果社会是从减少温室气体中受益的，那么社会应该承担这笔费用。

And I don’t think that somebody sitting in a house in someplace in Nevada, we’ll call it Las Vegas, but it could be other cities because we serve most of Nevada, should be picking up the subsidy for their neighbor, and the public utility commission agrees with that.

我不认为某个坐在内华达州某地的人——我们可以说是拉斯维加斯，但也可以是其他城市，因为我们服务于大部分内华达州——应该为他们的邻居提供补贴，而公共事业委员会也同意这一点。

I think we have Greg Abel here who — NV Energy is a subsidiary of Mid-American — of Berkshire Hathaway Energy.

我想我们这里有格雷格·阿贝尔，他是 NV Energy 的负责人，NV Energy 是中美能源公司——伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的子公司。

Greg, was there anything you want to add? Can we get a spotlight down here? Maybe?

格雷格，你有什么想补充的吗？我们能在这里打个聚光灯吗？也许？

It’s not live. 它不是现场直播。

GREG ABEL: I think it’s on now.

格雷格·阿贝尔：我想现在可以开始了。

So, as usual Warren, you summarized it extremely well. When we think of Nevada, it’s exactly as you described. I would just add a few things.

所以，像往常一样，沃伦，你总结得非常好。当我们想到内华达州时，正如你所描述的那样。我只想补充几点。

One: as you’ve touched on earlier, we absolutely support renewables. So we start with the fundamental concept that we are for solar. But, as you highlighted, we want to purchase renewable energy at the market rate, not at a heavily subsidized rate that 1 percent of the customers will benefit from and harm the other 99 percent.

第一：正如你之前提到的，我们绝对支持可再生能源。所以我们从支持太阳能的基本概念开始。但正如你所指出的，我们希望以市场价格而不是1%客户受益并损害其他99%客户的价格来购买可再生能源。

And it goes back to being as fundamental as this: if you take, as you touched on, a working family in Nevada who can’t afford the roof top unit and you ask him, “Do you want to subsidize your neighbor, that 1 percent?” the answer is clearly no.

这回到最基本的问题：如果你考虑一个在内华达州工作的家庭，他们买不起屋顶设备，你问他们，“你想要补贴你邻居的1%吗？”答案显然是否定的。

At the same time, we’re absolutely committed to Nevada utilizing renewable resources, and absolutely proud of what our team’s doing. By 2019, we will have eliminated or retired 76 percent of our coal units and be replacing it with solar energy. So we’re on a great path there. Thank you. (Applause)

与此同时，我们绝对致力于内华达州利用可再生资源，并为我们团队所做的感到非常自豪。到 2019 年，我们将消除或退役 76%的煤电机组，并用太阳能替代它。因此，我们在这方面走在了正确的道路上。谢谢。（掌声）

And we’re just going to encourage our team. And with the work of the commission, and obviously led by the state, we’ll head down a great path. Thank you.

我们将继续鼓励我们的团队。在委员会的工作下，显然是在州的领导下，我们将走上一条伟大的道路。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if the projectionist would put up slide 7, it will give you a view of what the situation is.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果放映员能放出第七张幻灯片，它会让你看到情况是什么样的。

This counts all of our all our Berkshire Hathaway Energy operations, and you can see, in a 20-year period we’ll have a 57 percent reduction.

这包括我们所有的伯克希尔哈撒韦能源运营，您可以看到，在 20 年的时间里，我们将减少 57%。

You wouldn’t want a 100 percent reduction tomorrow. Believe me, the lights would be off all over the country. But it’s moving at a fast pace.

你不会想要明天完全停电。相信我，全国的灯都会熄灭。但这正在快速推进。

But, you do — you want to be sure that you treat fairly the people involved in this, because somebody pays the cost of electric generation.

但是，你确实想要确保公平对待参与其中的人，因为有人要承担电力生产的成本。

And I do think that if you’re doing something that’s to benefit the planet — and it’s important that it be done — but that you have the cost be assessed for that, not on a specific person who’s having trouble, perhaps, making ends meet in their job.

我确实认为，如果你正在做一些有利于地球的事情——而且这件事很重要——那么应该对其成本进行评估，而不是让一个可能在工作中难以维持生计的人来承担。

And obviously, if you’ve got over a million customers in Nevada, a lot of them are struggling. A lot of them are going fine, too. But they are not the ones, in my view, to subsidize the person who could afford to put the solar unit in.

显然，如果你在内华达州有超过一百万客户，其中很多人正在挣扎。也有很多人过得不错。但在我看来，他们不是应该补贴那些能够负担得起安装太阳能设备的人。

20. We don’t buy or sell based on commodity price predictions

我们不根据商品价格预测进行买卖。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Cliff?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。克利夫？

CLIFF GALLANT: Over the past year we’ve learned — perhaps I’ve learned — that Berkshire’s results are more influenced by oil markets than I previously appreciated. Revenues at the railway company and some of Berkshire’s manufacturing businesses were negatively impacted. And arguably, low gas prices hurt GEICO’s loss ratio.

克利夫·加兰特：在过去的一年里，我们了解到——也许是我了解到——伯克希尔的业绩受到石油市场的影响比我之前意识到的要大。铁路公司和伯克希尔的一些制造业务的收入受到负面影响。可以说，低油价对 GEICO 的损失比率造成了伤害。

Yet during this year, Berkshire invested in Phillips 66, Kinder Morgan, and even PCP has revenues associated with the oil and gas industries.

然而在这一年，伯克希尔投资了Phillips66、Kinder Morgan，甚至 PCP 的收入也与石油和天然气行业相关。

I know Berkshire wouldn’t make a bet on a commodity like oil, but is Berkshire making a statement about the long-term outlook for oil?

我知道伯克希尔不会对像石油这样的商品下注，但伯克希尔是否在对石油的长期前景发表声明？

WARREN BUFFETT: Making a statement about what?

沃伦·巴菲特：在说什么？

CLIFF GALLANT: Oil. 克利夫·加朗特：石油。

WARREN BUFFETT: The price? The price of oil?

沃伦·巴菲特：价格？石油的价格？

CLIFF GALLANT: Yes. 克利夫·加兰特：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. We haven’t the faintest idea what the long-term price of oil was and there’s always a better system available.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们对长期石油价格没有丝毫头绪，总是有更好的系统可用。

You can buy oil, as you know, for delivery a year from now, or two years from now, or three years from now. We actually did that once, Charlie, didn’t we? Some years back.

你可以购买石油，正如你所知道的，可以选择一年后、两年后或三年后的交货。查理，我们实际上曾经这样做过，不是吗？几年前。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Cashed it in too soon, too.

查理·芒格：也太早兑现了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We made money but we could have made a lot more money.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们赚钱了，但我们本可以赚更多的钱。

We don’t think we can predict commodity prices. We don’t hedge cocoa or sugar (inaudible). We do some forward buying of chocolate coatings or something of the sort.

我们认为我们无法预测商品价格。我们不对可可或糖进行对冲（听不清）。我们会进行一些巧克力涂层或类似产品的远期采购。

But basically, we are not two fellows who think we can predict the price of soybeans or corn or oil or anything else.

但基本上，我们不是两个认为自己可以预测大豆、玉米、石油或其他任何东西价格的人。

So, anything you have seen in our investment transactions — some of those securities you mentioned there were bought by Todd or Ted, and one was bought by me — but neither they nor I bought those, or if we sell them, sell them, based on commodity price predictions.

所以，你在我们的投资交易中看到的任何情况——你提到的一些证券是托德或泰德买的，还有一部分是我买的——但无论是他们还是我，都不是根据商品价格预测来购买或出售这些证券的。

We don’t know how to do it. And we’re thinking about other things when we make those decisions.

我们不知道怎么做这些。我们在做这些决定时考虑的是其他方面的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m even more ignorant than you are.

查理·芒格：我比你更无知。

WARREN BUFFETT: That would be hard to beat. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这可不容易超越。（笑）

OK. I think that’s the first time I’ve heard him say that. It has a nice ring to it. (Laughter)

好的。我想这是我第一次听他说这个。听起来不错。（笑声）

21. Don’t expect efficiency in higher education

不要指望高等教育的效率

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren. Hi Charlie.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Ken Martin. I’m an MBA student from the Tuck School at Dartmouth.

观众成员：我叫肯·马丁。我是达特茅斯大学塔克商学院的 MBA 学生。

My question is about college tuition and the problem of rising student debt balances.

我的问题是关于大学学费和学生债务余额上升的问题。

In the past, prominent philanthropists have founded institutions that are now prominent research universities in our country. Why is this not a bigger part of today’s philanthropic debate, the founding of new colleges? Would not new supply in higher education be at least part of the solution to this problem?

过去，一些著名的慈善家创办了现在我们国家一些著名的研究型大学。为什么这在今天的慈善辩论中没有更大的关注？创办新的大学是否至少是解决这个问题的部分方案？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to tackle that one? You’re more of an expert than I am.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想回答这个问题吗？你在这方面比我更有经验。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think that if you expect a lot of efficiency — financial efficiency — in American higher education, you’re howling at the wind. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的。我认为如果你期望美国高等教育有很高的效率——财务效率——那你就是在对着风嚎叫。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well. I think he’s also talking about just more philanthropy to deliver there. Am I right?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯。我认为他也在谈论更多的慈善捐赠来解决这个问题。我说得对吗？

Want to give him the light back on there?

想把灯再打开给他吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, that’s right.

观众成员：是的，没错。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What’s the question again?

查理·芒格：问题是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about is — maybe — whether more philanthropy ought to be devoted to that relatively because of the cost. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：关于这个问题——也许——是否应该相对更多地将慈善事业投入到这个领域，因为成本的原因。但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do a lot more than Warren does in this field — (laughs) — and I am frequently disappointed but — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我在这个领域做的比沃伦多得多——（笑）——我经常感到失望，但——（笑声）

Monopoly has kind of — and bureaucracy — have kind of pernicious effects everywhere, and the universities aren’t exempted from it.

垄断和官僚主义在各个地方都有害的影响，大学也未能幸免。

But of course, they are the glory of civilization, and if people want to give more to it, why, I’m all for it.

但当然，他们是文明的荣耀，如果人们想要为此付出更多，那我完全支持。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it — you know, you’ve got the option of very good state schools and — we spend a lot of money on education in this country.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你知道，你有很好的公立学校的选择——我们在这个国家的教育上花了很多钱。

You know, if you just take — you take kindergarten through twelve, it’s interesting. People talk about entitlements in this country. They say it’s terrible we have all these entitlements for Social Security and everything.

你知道，如果你只考虑从幼儿园到十二年级，这很有趣。人们在这个国家谈论权利。他们说我们有这么多社会保障等权利，这太可怕了。

We have entitlements for the young. We spend $600 billion a year educating 50 million kids in the public schools between kindergarten and twelfth grade, and just think what that is as an entitlement.

我们对年轻人的福利也很大。我们每年花费6000亿美元来教育5000万公立学校的孩子，想想这是一种多么巨大的福利。

Nobody ever seems to bring that up. But it’s a huge — and I believe in it, obviously, but — you know, the people in their working ages, generally speaking, I think have an — in a rich society — have an obligation to both the young and the old.

似乎没有人提到这一点。但这是一个巨大的——我显然相信这一点——你知道，处于工作年龄的人，通常来说，我认为在一个富裕的社会中，他们有责任对年轻人和老年人负责。

And based on the amount we spend, if we have problems with our school system it’s not because we’re cheap. No, there are other problems that contribute to it. In terms of the money we put out, we’re right up there. (Applause)

根据我们的支出情况，如果我们的学校系统出现问题，那并不是因为我们吝啬。不，还有其他问题导致了这一点。在我们投入的资金方面，我们的水平是相当高的。（掌声）

But I was the trustee of a college that saw the endowment go from $8 million to over a billion. And I didn’t see the tuition come down. And I didn’t see the number of students go up.

但我曾是一个大学的受托人，该大学的捐赠基金从 800 万美元增长到超过 10 亿美元。但我没有看到学费下降，也没有看到学生人数增加。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing went up, except the professors’ salaries.

查理·芒格：除了教授的薪水，其他什么都没有上涨。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. From 8 million to a billion. I mean — and very, very decent people running the place.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。从 800 万到 10 亿。我是说——这里有非常非常体面的人在管理。

But when you read the figures on endowment of the big schools, you know, and some of them have really got up in the big numbers, the main objective of the people running the endowment is to have the endowment grow larger. And that will be ever thus. That is the way humans operate.

但是当你看到大学校的捐赠数字时，你会知道，有些学校的捐赠确实达到了很高的数字，管理捐赠的人主要目标是让捐赠不断增长。这将永远如此。这就是人类的运作方式。

You have any more comments on that, Charlie? You’ve seen a lot.

你对此还有什么评论吗，查理？你见过很多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve made all the enemies I can afford at the moment.

查理·芒格：我已经得罪了我能承受的所有人。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter.)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声。）

That’s never slowed him down in the past. (Laughter)

这从未阻止过他。（笑声）

22. Berkshire will “do fine” if Trump or Clinton wins

如果特朗普或克林顿获胜，伯克希尔将“表现良好”

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew. 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. This from a shareholder who asked to remain anonymous.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。这是来自一位要求匿名的股东。

“If Donald Trump becomes the president of the United States, and recognizing your public criticism of him and your public support for Hillary Clinton, what specific risks, regulatory, policy, or otherwise, do you foresee for Berkshire Hathaway’s portfolio of businesses?

“如果唐纳德·特朗普成为美国总统，考虑到您对他的公开批评以及您对希拉里·克林顿的公开支持，您预见到伯克希尔·哈撒韦的业务组合会面临哪些具体的风险，包括监管、政策或其他方面？”

WARREN BUFFETT: That won’t be the main problem. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：这不会是主要问题。（笑声和掌声）

Well. Government, you know, is a very big factor in our business and in all businesses. I mean, there’s the very broad policies that affect practically everybody, and sometimes there can be some pretty specific policies.

好吧。政府，你知道，在我们的业务和所有业务中是一个非常重要的因素。我的意思是，有一些非常广泛的政策几乎影响到每个人，有时也会有一些相当具体的政策。

But, I will predict that if Don — either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton becomes president — and one of them is likely to be — very likely to be — I think Berkshire will continue to do fine.

但是，我预测如果唐纳德·特朗普或希拉里·克林顿中的任何一位成为总统——其中一位很可能会成为——我认为伯克希尔将继续表现良好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m afraid to get into this area. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我害怕进入这个领域。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve operated under all — I mean, we’ve operated under price controls. I mean, there —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在所有情况下都运作过——我的意思是，我们在价格管制下运作过。我是说，那里——

We’ve had 52 percent federal taxes applied to our earnings for many years. Even high — I mean, they were higher at other times — but there — you know, we’ve had regulations come along and, in the end, business in this country has done extraordinarily well for a couple of hundred years, and it was adapted to the society and the society has adapted to business.

我们曾经多年受到52%的联邦税收征税。即使其他时候更高——但你知道，我们经历过监管的变动，最后，这个国家的商业在过去的几百年里表现得极为出色，并且它适应了社会，而社会也适应了商业。

This is a remarkably attractive place in which to conduct a business. Imagine, in a world of practically zero interest rates, you know, American business earning terrific returns on tangible cap — equity. I mean, those are the assets that were actually employed in the business. The numbers are staggering.

这是一个非常有吸引力的经营环境。想象一下，在几乎零利率的世界中，美国商业在有形资本——股本上获得了惊人的回报。那些是实际投入到业务中的资产。这些数字令人震惊。

And, you know, people who have had their money in savings accounts or something like that get destroyed.

而且，你知道，把钱存入储蓄账户或类似地方的人会受到严重损失。

But owners of business, if you look at returns on tangible equity, just check them out some time, and they have not suffered even as people who own fixed-interest — fixed-income — instruments have suffered enormously.

但商业所有者，如果你查看有形股本上的回报，随时检查一下，他们并没有遭受像持有固定收益工具的人那样的巨大损失。

And, you know, farm prices are down now. Farmer income has fallen off a lot in the last couple of years.

而且，你知道，现在农场价格下降了。农民的收入在过去几年中大幅下降。

But business has managed to take care of itself. And for a good reason, because it contributes to, and has been the engine of, our market economy that’s delivered output that is staggering by the imagination of anyone that might have existed 100 years ago.

但商业已经设法自我维持。这有一个很好的原因，因为它对市场经济做出了贡献，并且一直是推动我们市场经济的引擎，这种经济产生了令人难以想象的输出。

In my lifetime, the GDP per capita, in real terms, of the United States, has gone up six-for-one. Can you imagine a society where in one person’s lifetime, overall, people have six times the real output that they had at the beginning.

在我的一生中，美国的人均 GDP 在实际意义上增长了六倍。你能想象一个社会，在一个人的一生中，整体上人们的实际产出是他们最初的六倍吗？

It’s — you know, the system works very well in terms of aggregate output. In terms of distribution of that output, sometimes it can fall very short, in my view. But, it’ll keep working. You don’t have to worry about that.

这——你知道，系统在整体产出方面运作得很好。在产出的分配方面，有时在我看来可能会大打折扣。但它会继续运作。你不必担心这个。

Twenty years from now, they’ll be far more output per capita in the United States, in real terms, than there is now. In 50 years, it will be far more. It’ll — and the quality will get better.

二十年后，美国的人均产出将在实际意义上远高于现在。五十年后，产出将会更高。质量也会有所提升。

And no presidential candidate or president is going to end that. They can shape it in ways that are good or bad, but they can’t end it.

没有任何总统候选人或总统能够结束这一点。他们可以以好的或坏的方式来塑造它，但他们无法结束它。

Now Charlie, give something pessimistic here to balance me out.

现在查理，给我一些悲观的东西来平衡一下。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I want to say something optimistic.

查理·芒格：不，我想说一些乐观的话。

I think that the GDP figures greatly understate the real advantage that our system has given our citizens. It underweighs a lot of huge achievements because they don’t translate right into money in a certain way that the economists can easily handle.

我认为 GDP 数据大大低估了我们的制度给公民带来的真正优势。它没有充分反映许多巨大的成就，因为这些成就并不以经济学家容易处理的方式直接转化为金钱。

But the real achievements over the last century, say, are way higher than are indicated by the GDP figures, and the GDP figures are good.

但过去一个世纪的真正成就，比如说，远远高于 GDP 数字所显示的，而 GDP 数字本身也不错。

I don’t think the future is necessarily going to be quite as a good as the past. But it doesn’t have to be.

我认为未来不一定会像过去一样好。但它不必如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s no one you’ll run into, at least in my experience, that says, “With my same talents, I wish I’d lived 50 years ago instead.” Born 50 years earlier.

沃伦·巴菲特：至少根据我的经验，没有人会说：“凭借我的才能，我希望我能在50年前出生。”早出生50年。

But a majority of the American public thinks that it’s a bad time to be born today compared to when they were born. They think their children will not — they’re wrong. I mean, it’s — the pace of innovation — just think how different you’re living compared to 20 years ago, in terms of what you do with your time.

但大多数美国公众认为今天出生是个糟糕的时机，相比他们出生时的情况，他们认为他们的孩子不会——他们错了。我的意思是——创新的步伐——只需想想你现在的生活与20年前有多么不同，在你如何支配时间方面。

Now, a lot of people may condemn it, or something of the sort, but you’re making free choices that were not available to you 20 years ago and you’re making them in a different direction than —

现在，很多人可能会谴责这一点，或其他类似的说法，但你在做出以前20年没有的自由选择，并且你做出了与——

I’m still staying with the landline, but you people are way ahead of me. (Laughs).

我仍然在使用固定电话，但你们已经走在我前面了。（笑）

23. BNSF CEO doesn’t see rail mergers in near future

BNSF 首席执行官不认为近期会有铁路合并

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren. Late last year we saw Canadian Pacific make a hostile bid for Norfolk Southern, a combination that would have linked Canada’s second largest carrier with one of the two largest railroads in the eastern U.S.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦。去年底，我们看到加拿大太平洋对诺福克南方公司发起了一项敌意收购，这一组合将把加拿大第二大承运人与美国东部两大铁路之一连接起来。

This move led to a largely negative reaction from not only Norfolk Southern, but from federal and state lawmakers, shippers, and other railroad operators, even though a formal evaluation process hadn’t even begun with the U.S. Surface Transportation Board. Canadian Pacific eventually backed down.

这一举动引发了诺福克南方铁路公司、联邦和州立法者、货运商以及其他铁路运营商的广泛负面反应，尽管美国地面运输委员会的正式评估程序尚未开始。加拿大太平洋铁路最终退让了。

Looking back to 1999, when the Transportation Board blocked a proposed merger between BNSF and Canadian National, the attitude was that any additional mergers amongst railroads would have to be accretive to competition.

回顾 1999 年，当运输委员会阻止了 BNSF 与加拿大国家铁路的合并提案时，态度是任何额外的铁路合并都必须对竞争有促进作用。

What do you think they meant by this? And if one believes that the hookup of one of the two major western railroads with one of the two eastern railroads would not alter the current landscape, where most shippers have just two choices amongst the large railroads operating in the region, and could actually generate efficiencies and cost savings that could be passed along to customers, how does a combination of someone like BNSF with Norfolk Southern or CSX not satisfy their goal?

你认为他们所说的“对竞争有利”是什么意思？如果有人认为将两大西部铁路公司之一与两大东部铁路公司之一合并不会改变当前的格局——目前大多数货运商在该地区只有两家大型铁路公司可供选择——而且实际上可能会产生效率和成本节省，进而转嫁给客户，那么BNSF与诺福克南方或CSX的合并为什么不符合他们的目标？

WARREN BUFFETT: I — I think now there’s — and is Matt Rose, is he here? He can probably answer that — some of that — better than I can — certainly. He can answer all of it better than I can.

沃伦·巴菲特：我——我认为现在有——Matt Rose在这里吗？他可能比我更好地回答这些问题——当然。他可以比我更好地回答所有问题。

Yeah. There’s Matt. Yeah.

是的。那是马特。是的。

MATT ROSE: Yeah. So, the statement is actually right.

马特·罗斯：是的。所以，这个说法实际上是正确的。

Back in 1999, we had a failed merger with Canadian National. New rules were put in place by our regulator, a little group called the STB, and what they said was that the public litmus test for the next merger would have to be different.

回到1999年，我们曾与加拿大国家铁路尝试合并但失败了。我们的监管机构STB（表面运输委员会）设定了新的规则，他们表示，下一个合并的公众考验必须有所不同。

And, at that point in time we didn’t really think that a large merger was possible. And so, when Canadian Pacific announced their merger of the Norfolk Southern, when we think about our four constituencies, and those four are our customers, the labor groups, the communities in which we serve, and shareholders, which, our shareholder, of course, is BRK, we didn’t see any interest in the final round of these mergers occurring outside of the shareholder community.

当时我们并没有真正认为大型合并是可能的。因此，当加拿大太平洋宣布与诺福克南方合并时，我们考虑到我们的四个利益相关方，这四个利益相关方是我们的客户、劳工团体、我们服务的社区以及股东，我们没有看到在这些合并的最后阶段，除了股东社区外，其他方有兴趣。

And so our position was simply to say, if the rest of the shipping community believes that we ought to see this final round, that’s fine, we’ll participate, but we don’t see it occurring right now.

所以我们的立场很简单，如果其他运输社区认为我们应该看到这个最终阶段的合并，那很好，我们会参与，但我们现在不认为它会发生。

We do believe that when that final round occurs, there will be great efficiencies made for shippers and communities, but right now we don’t see the dynamics in place.

我们确实相信，当那个最终阶段发生时，会为货运商和社区带来极大的效率，但现在我们不看到那些动态。

So, what are those dynamics? It will be as the country continues to grow in population from where we are today, 315 million people, to, say, 320, 330, 350, transportation becomes more scarce and the railroads will need to do more. And that’s really when we think the next round will occur.

那么这些动态是什么呢？随着国家人口从现在的3.15亿人增长到3.20亿、3.30亿、3.50亿，交通变得更加紧张，铁路公司将需要做更多的事情。这就是我们认为下一个阶段将发生的时间。

24. Berkshire indifferent to Wells Fargo’s investment banking

伯克希尔对富国银行的投资银行业务漠不关心

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Michael Mozia. I’m from Brooklyn, New York and I’ll be starting at Wharton Business School in the fall.

观众成员：嗨，我叫迈克尔·莫齐亚。我来自纽约布鲁克林，秋季将开始在沃顿商学院学习。

In an interview with Bloomberg Markets recently, Jamie Dimon defended the role banks play in financial markets, saying, “Banks aren’t markets. The market is amoral… You’re a trade to the market… A bank is a relationship.”

在最近接受彭博市场采访时，杰米·戴蒙辩护银行在金融市场中的角色，他说：“银行不是市场。市场是无道德的……你在市场中是一笔交易……银行是一个关系。”

But banks, namely investment banks, have struggled as regulators have favored market-based solutions, and many of those relationships investment banks have worked so hard for have proven to be less lucrative, especially compared to the growing fixed costs of supporting them.

但银行，特别是投资银行，面临困境，因为监管机构更倾向于市场导向的解决方案，而投资银行辛苦建立的许多关系证明收益较低，尤其是与日益增长的支持这些关系的固定成本相比。

As it relates to our marketable securities portfolio, how do you feel about the investment banking component, particularly as Wells moves into that space? Would you feel differently if the cost basis was higher?

关于我们的可交易证券投资组合，您对投资银行业务的看法如何，特别是当富国银行进入这一领域时？如果成本基础更高，您的感受会有所不同吗？

And Warren, Charlie, thank you so much for doing this every year.

沃伦，查理，非常感谢你们每年都做这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Charlie, I didn’t totally get that, but does he feel the investment banking firms are being disadvantaged?

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。查理，我没有完全理解，但他觉得投资银行公司处于不利地位吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he’s basically, how do we feel about — Jamie says —

查理·芒格：嗯，他基本上是，我们对——杰米说——的感觉如何

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How do you feel about —?

观众成员：你对——有什么感觉？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You can’t make as much money as you used to out of relationships, and it’s getting tougher and so forth?

查理·芒格：你不能像以前那样从关系中赚到很多钱，而且变得越来越困难等等？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the public policy since 2008-9 has been to, very much, toughen up capital requirements in a variety of ways for banks, but it is specifically been designed to make large banks- very large banks — less profitable relative to smaller banks.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。自2008-2009年以来，公共政策非常严厉地提高了银行的资本要求，并且特别设计以使大银行——尤其是大银行——相较于小银行的盈利能力下降。

And you do that by increasing capital requirements. You can change the math of banking, and the attractiveness of banking, totally, by capital requirements. Obviously, if you said every bank had to be 100 percent equity, it would be a terrible business. You couldn’t possibly earn any money that was significant on capital.

你可以通过提高资本要求来实现这一点。你可以完全改变银行的数学和吸引力，方法就是资本要求。显然，如果你说每家银行必须是 100%的股本，那将是一个糟糕的生意。你根本无法在资本上赚到任何显著的利润。

《Big Banks Could Face 20% Boost to Capital Requirements》，这篇报道要求提升大银行的资本金。

And if you let people operate with 1 percent capital ratios, they can make a lot of money and they will cause the system all kinds of trouble.

如果你让人们以 1%的资本比率运作，他们可以赚很多钱，并且会给系统带来各种麻烦。

So, since 2009, the rules have been tilted against the larger banks by — primarily — through capital requirements. And that just means returns on equity go down, but returns on equity were awfully high prior to that. So it doesn’t — it hasn’t turned it into a bad business, it’s turned it into a less attractive business than earlier.

自 2009 年以来，规则主要通过资本要求对大银行产生了不利影响。这意味着股本回报率下降，但在此之前股本回报率非常高。因此，这并没有使其变成一个糟糕的业务，而是使其变得比以前不那么有吸引力。

And that — some of the investment banks operate as bank holdings companies, still, and they’ve been affected by those capital requirements, too.

一些投资银行仍然作为银行控股公司运作，他们也受到了这些资本要求的影响。

I’m not sure I’m getting 100 percent to your question, so I invite you to give me a follow-up, if you like, on that.

我不确定我是否完全理解了你的问题，所以如果你愿意，可以给我一个后续的问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: In the marketable securities portfolio, do you feel good about the going-forward prospects of the investment — of the investment banking companies — especially as Wells Fargo moves into that business?

观众成员：在可交易证券投资组合中，您对投资银行公司的未来前景感到乐观吗，特别是当富国银行进入该业务时？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Wells Fargo has an investment banking aspect to it that primarily came in through Wachovia. And it’s not insignificant.

沃伦·巴菲特：好，富国银行有一个投资银行业务方面，主要是通过收购Wachovia进入的。这不是微不足道的。

But our ownership of Wells Fargo, which is very large — it’s our largest single marketable security — I’m not counting Kraft Heinz, which is about the same size, because in that situation we’re in a control position — it’s the largest non-control situation that we have, at Wells Fargo.

但我们对富国银行的持股——它是我们最大的单一可投资证券——我不算 Kraft Heinz，因为在那种情况下我们处于控制地位——它是我们最大的非控股投资

And that’s by intent. I like it extremely well compared to other securities. Not because it has the most upside, but I feel that, weighted for upside and downside, that it’s —

这也是有意为之。我觉得它比其他证券要好得多。不是因为它有最大的上升潜力，而是因为考虑到上升和下降的权重，我们认为它是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not the investment banking that charms you in Wells Fargo. It’s the general banking that —

查理·芒格：吸引你的是富国银行的普通银行业务，而不是投资银行业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No. We’re not — it isn’t that big a deal, and that’s not what attracts us.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不是的。我们并不觉得这是什么大事，这也不是吸引我们的原因。

We think Wells Fargo is a very well run bank. But, we didn’t make any decision to buy a single share based on the fact they were going to be more in the investment banking business because of the Wachovia acquisition.

我们认为富国银行是一家管理非常出色的银行。但是，我们并没有因为他们因收购华盛顿互惠银行而将更多精力投入投资银行业务而决定购买一股股票。

They’ve got a lot of sources of income. They’ve got a huge base of very cheap money, but unfortunately, they’ve got it out at very cheap rates on the other side now. But, spreads will probably work in their advantage eventually. And we think it’s a very well run bank.

他们有很多收入来源。他们有一个庞大的低成本资金基础，但不幸的是，他们现在以非常低的利率借出这些资金。不过，利差最终可能会对他们有利。我们认为这是一家管理非常好的银行。

Investment banking business — Charlie and I are probably a little affected by the experience we had in running one for a short period of time — it’s not been something that we invested in significantly.

投资银行业务——查理和我可能受到我们短期经营这一业务的经历的影响——这并不是我们大力投资的领域。

We, obviously, made a major investment in Goldman Sachs, and we continue to hold shares that came out of the warrants that we received when we made the investment in 2008.

我们显然对高盛进行了重大投资，并且我们继续持有在 2008 年投资时获得的认股权证所产生的股份。

But I think I can’t recall us making an investment banking purchase — a marketable security involving an investment bank — for a long time. Can you, Charlie?

但我想我无法回忆起我们很久以来进行过投资银行购买——涉及投资银行的可交易证券。你能记得吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think, generally, we fear the genre more than we love it.

查理·芒格：不，我认为一般来说，我们对这个类型的恐惧超过了我们的热爱。

25. “Very, very unlikely” activists could break up Berkshire

激进投资者拆分伯克希尔的可能性“非常非常小”

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: In the conclusion of the book “Dear Chairman,” which you recommend in this year’s annual letter — a new book you recommend- the author argues that, quote, “The life’s work of great investors is inevitably reabsorbed into the industrial complex with little acknowledgement of their accomplishments.”

卡罗尔·卢米斯：在您在今年的年度信中推荐的书《亲爱的主席》的结尾，作者认为，引用，“伟大投资者的毕生工作不可避免地被工业综合体重新吸收，而对他们的成就几乎没有承认。”

He then argues that Berkshire Hathaway will eventually be targeted by activist investors if it trades at too sharp a discount to intrinsic value.

他接着辩称，如果伯克希尔哈撒韦的交易价格与内在价值之间的折扣过大，最终将会受到激进投资者的关注。

Do you agree with this assessment and have you considered installing corporate defenses that might prevent future generations of activists from trying to break up Berkshire Hathaway?

你是否同意这种评估，并且你是否考虑过安装企业防御措施，以防止未来的激进投资者试图拆分伯克希尔·哈撒韦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I used to worry more about that than I do now.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我以前对此的担忧比现在多。

Partly, size is one factor. I think the more important factor would be that Berkshire will always be in a position to repurchase very significant amounts of stock, and as long as it’s willing to buy that stock at some price — and it should be — close to intrinsic value, there should not be a large margin, in terms of anybody that might come along and think there’d be a lot money to be made by breaking up.

部分原因是规模。更重要的因素是，伯克希尔始终有能力回购非常大量的股票，只要我们愿意以接近内在价值的某个价格购买这些股票，就不应该有很大的差距来吸引那些可能来拆分它的人。

There would be money lost by breaking it up, in terms of we’d lose — there’d be certain advantages lost.

拆分它会导致资金损失，因为我们会失去——会失去某些优势。

MidAmerican Energy could not have done what it has done in renewables without Berkshire being the parent. I mean, if it had been split off, it would have been worth — the parts would have been worth — less than the whole. And there are other instance — I could give you significant instances of that in other cases.

拆分伯克希尔将导致一些优势的丧失。例如，MidAmerican Energy如果没有伯克希尔作为母公司，就无法在可再生能源领域取得如此成就。拆分后，各部分的价值将低于整体的价值。我可以在其他情况下举出很多类似的例子。

So, I don’t think there will be a spread that will be enticing to anyone. And beyond that, I think the numbers involved would be staggering, and I think we have a shareholder base that recognizes the advantages of both the Berkshire businesses and its culture and — so I think it’s very, very unlikely.

所以，我认为不会有任何人会觉得有吸引力的差价。而且，我认为涉及的数字将是惊人的，我认为我们的股东基础认识到伯克希尔的业务和文化的优势——所以我认为这非常非常不可能。

But there have been periods in business history where stocks sold at — where practically all stocks — sold at dramatic discounts from what you might call intrinsic value. And it’s interesting that very little activity occurred there.

但在商业历史上曾经有过一些时期，股票的售价——几乎所有股票——都以大幅折扣出售，低于你可以称之为内在价值的水平。而有趣的是，在那里几乎没有什么活动发生。

In the 1974 period, 1973 and ’74, you know, there were company — really good companies — one of which was Cap Cities, for example, that Tom Murphy ran, that was selling at a huge discount to what it was worth. But people did not come along. And so, to some extent, when the discounts are huge, money is hard to get.

在 1974 年期间，1973 年和 1974 年，你知道，有一些公司——非常好的公司——其中之一是由汤姆·墨菲经营的 Cap Cities，它的售价远低于其实际价值。但人们并没有来投资。因此，在某种程度上，当折扣很大时，资金很难筹集。

It’s not a huge worry with me. Actually, in my own case, because of the way my stock will get distributed to philanthropies after I die, it’s very likely that my estate, for some years, will be, by far, the largest shareholder of Berkshire, in terms of votes, even with this distribution policy that occurs.

这对我来说并不是一个大问题。实际上，就我个人而言，由于我去世后我的股票将如何分配给慈善机构，我的遗产在未来几年内很可能会成为伯克希尔最大的股东，按投票权计算，即使在这种分配政策下也是如此。

So I — it’s not something I worry about now. I used to worry about it some, but it’s not a factor now.

所以我——现在我不再担心这个了。我以前有点担心，但现在这不是一个因素。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I — I think we have almost no worries at all on this subject, and that most other people have a lot of thoroughly justifiable worry, and I think that helps us. So, I look forward on this subject with optimism.

查理·芒格：嗯，我——我认为我们在这个问题上几乎没有任何担忧，而其他大多数人则有很多完全合理的担忧，我认为这对我们有帮助。因此，我对这个问题持乐观态度。

WARREN BUFFETT: You want to explain how it helps us, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：你想解释一下这对我们有什么帮助吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you’re being attacked by people you regard as evil and destructive and so on, and you want a strong ally, how many people would you pick in preference to Berkshire?

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你受到你认为是邪恶和具有破坏性的人攻击，并且你想要一个强大的盟友，你会选择多少人来替代伯克希尔？

WARREN BUFFETT: My name is Warren Buffett and I approve of that message. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我的名字是沃伦·巴菲特，我支持这个信息。（笑声）

26. No interest in “pure” leasing businesses

对“纯”租赁业务没有兴趣

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Leasing has quietly become an important contributor to Berkshire’s earnings with its several leasing units logging about $1 billion in combined annual pre-tax income.

乔纳森·布兰特：租赁悄然成为伯克希尔收益的重要贡献者，其多个租赁单位的年税前收入合计约为 10 亿美元。

Could you talk about Berkshire’s competitive advantages in its varying leasing businesses including containers, cranes, furniture, tank cars, and rail cars?

你能谈谈伯克希尔在其不同租赁业务中的竞争优势吗，包括集装箱、起重机、家具、罐车和铁路货车？

Are there other leasing businesses you’d be interested in entering, for instance, airplanes or commercial auto fleets? Plane leasing companies, in particular, seem to sell for reasonable prices and are often available.

您是否对进入其他租赁业务感兴趣，例如飞机或商业汽车车队？特别是飞机租赁公司，似乎以合理的价格出售，并且通常可用。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we’ve got a very good truck leasing business in XTRA, and we’ve got a good, primarily tank car leasing, business at Union Tank Car and Procor. And we expanded by a billion dollars when we bought the GE fleet recently.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在 XTRA 有一个非常好的卡车租赁业务，在 Union Tank Car 和 Procor 有一个主要以罐车租赁为主的良好业务。最近我们收购了 GE 的车队，扩展了十亿美元。

Leasing, generally, isn’t something that will — we have to bring something to the party.

租赁通常不是一件我们可以单靠自己完成的事情——我们必须为这个过程带来一些东西。

At XTRA , that’s much more than just handing people a trailer and taking a check every month. There’s important service advantages brought to that.

在 XTRA，这不仅仅是把拖车交给人们并每月收取支票。这带来了重要的服务优势。

But pure leasing — leasing of new cars, which is a huge business — the math is not that attractive for us.

但是纯粹的租赁业务——比如新车租赁，这是一个庞大的业务——对我们来说，数学上并不是那么有吸引力。

The banks have an advantage over us because their cost of funds is so low now. It’s not quite as low as it looks, but I think Wells Fargo, I think the last figure was, you know, down around 10 basis points.

银行在这方面有优势，因为它们的资金成本现在非常低。虽然这看起来不完全如此，但我认为Wells Fargo最近的成本大约是10个基点。

And when somebody has, you know, maybe a trillion dollars or so, and they’re paying 10 basis points for it, I don’t feel very competitive at Berkshire in that situation.

当某人拥有大约一万亿美元，并且为此支付 10 个基点时，我在伯克希尔的竞争力就显得不太强。

So, pure money-type leasing is not an attractive business for us when we’ve got other people with a lower cost of funds. I mean, they’ve got the edge.

所以，纯粹的货币型租赁对我们来说并不是一个有吸引力的业务，因为我们有其他资金成本更低的人。我是说，他们有优势。

And we have got — railcar leasing involves a lot more than just a financial transaction. I mean, we repair — we’ve got huge activity in the repair field, and those cars require servicing, and the same way in our trailer business.

我们在铁路货车租赁中涉及的不仅仅是金融交易。我们有大量的维修活动，这些车需要维护，同样我们的拖车业务也是如此。

But you will not see us get in — aircraft leasing doesn’t interest me in the least. We’ve looked at that a lot of times, at various aircraft leasing companies offered to us. And that’s a scary business. And some people have done well in it by, in recent years, by using short-term money to finance longer-term assets which have big residual risks, and that just isn’t for us.

但你不会看到我们进入这个领域——飞机租赁对我一点兴趣都没有。我们已经多次考虑过，许多飞机租赁公司向我们提供过相关服务。这是一个令人害怕的行业。近年来，有些人通过使用短期资金来融资长期资产，从中获得了不错的收益，而这些资产有很大的残值风险，但这并不适合我们。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’ve said it pretty well. We’re well located now but we — I don’t agree that we have huge opportunities.

查理·芒格：我认为你说得很好。我们现在位置不错，但我不同意我们有巨大的机会。

27. “We’re not targeting competitors for destruction”

“我们不是在针对竞争对手进行毁灭性打击”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Warren and Charlie. I am Vandemere Se from the Philippines. Warren, my wife and I sent original paintings to your office two days ago, we hope you like them.

观众成员：早上好，Warren 和 Charlie。我是来自菲律宾的 Vandemere Se。Warren，我和妻子两天前把原始画作寄到了您的办公室，希望您喜欢它们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Today — sorry — today Berkshire’s size ensures that it faces competition from numerous businesses. If you had a silver bullet, which competitor would you take out and why? I’m sorry — and you can’t say Donald Trump. (Laughter)

观众成员：今天——抱歉——今天伯克希尔的规模确保它面临来自众多企业的竞争。如果你有一个灵丹妙药，你会消灭哪个竞争对手，为什么？抱歉——而且你不能说唐纳德·特朗普。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Which competitor in which businesses? I mean, you’re asking about which —

沃伦·巴菲特：哪个竞争对手在什么业务中？我的意思是，你在问哪个——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Which — which competitor would you kill if you could? I don’t think — I don’t think we have to answer this one.

查理·芒格：如果可以的话，你会杀掉哪个竞争对手？我认为——我认为我们不必回答这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Charlie’s a lawyer. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）查理是个律师。（笑声）

But I’ve thought about the question. (Laughter)

但我考虑过这个问题。（笑声）

We have lots of tough competitors. And in many areas, we’re a pretty tough competitor ourselves.

我们有很多强大的竞争对手。在许多领域，我们自己也是一个相当强大的竞争者。

And — and the real — what we want our managers to be doing, you know, is thinking every day about how to achieve a stronger competitive position. We call it “widening the moat.”

而且——真正的——我们希望我们的管理者每天都在思考如何实现更强的竞争地位。我们称之为“拓宽护城河”。

But, we want to turn out better products, we want to keep our costs down to a minimum, you know, we want to be thinking about what our customer’s likely to be wanting from us, you know, a month, a year, 10 years from now.

但是，我们想要生产更好的产品，我们想要将成本降到最低，你知道，我们想要考虑客户在一个月、一年、十年后可能会想要什么。

And, generally, if you take care of your customer, the customer takes care of you. But there are cases where there is some force coming along that really is — you may not have the answer for it. And then, you know, you get out of that business.

一般来说，如果你照顾好你的客户，客户也会照顾好你。但有些情况下，会有一些力量出现，你可能对此没有答案。然后，你知道，你就会退出那个行业。

We had that department store in Baltimore in 1966, and if we’d kept it, we would have gone out of business.

我们在 1966 年在巴尔的摩有那家百货商店，如果我们继续经营下去，我们就会倒闭。

So, recognizing reality is also important. I mean, you do not want to try and fix something that’s unfixable.

所以，认识现实也很重要。我的意思是，你不想试图修复一些无法修复的东西。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re not targeting competitors for destruction. We’re just trying to do the best we can everywhere.

查理·芒格：我们并不是在针对竞争对手进行毁灭。我们只是尽力在各个方面做到最好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Spoken like an anti-trust lawyer. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：听起来像个反垄断律师。（笑声）

OK. We really hope to be the ones that the other guys want to use the silver bullet on.

好的。我们真的希望成为其他人想要用银弹来解决问题的对象。

28. Sequoia Fund was “overly entranced” by Valeant

红杉基金对Valeant“过于着迷”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Rom and Raji Terracod from Sugarland, Texas.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自德克萨斯州糖城的罗姆和拉吉·特拉科德。

He writes, “My wife and I have the vast majority of our net worth invested in Berkshire and in shares of the Sequoia Fund. Mr. Buffett, you have endorsed the Sequoia Fund on more than a few occasions.

他写道：“我和我的妻子将我们绝大多数的净资产投资于伯克希尔和红杉基金的股票。巴菲特先生，您在不止一次的场合上支持过红杉基金。”

“Recently, the Sequoia Fund has been in the news because of its large position in Valeant Pharmaceuticals. Mr. Munger has termed Valeant’s business model ‘highly immoral.’

最近，红杉基金因其在Valeant Pharmaceuticals的大额投资而成为新闻焦点。芒格先生称Valeant的商业模式为“高度不道德”。

“Mr. Buffett, do you agree with Mr. Munger’s assessment? Have your views about Sequoia Fund changed? Also, as you know, Sequoia is an admirer and large holder of Berkshire stock. ”

“巴菲特先生，您同意芒格先生的评估吗？您对红杉基金的看法有改变吗？此外，正如您所知，红杉基金是伯克希尔股票的崇拜者和大股东。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in a sense, I’m the father of Sequoia Fund, in that when I was closing up my partnership at the end of 1969, I was giving back a lot of money to partners, and these people had trusted me, and they wanted to know what they should do with their money.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，从某种意义上说，我是红杉基金的创始人，因为在 1969 年底我结束我的合伙关系时，我把很多钱返还给合伙人，这些人信任我，他们想知道应该如何处理他们的钱。

And we helped out those who wanted to put it in municipal bonds for a few months, Bill Scott and I stayed around and helped those people come up with those. But most of them were equity oriented-type investors.

我们帮助了那些想要将资金投入市政债券几个月的人，比尔·斯科特和我留了下来，帮助这些人完成这些。但大多数人都是以股票为导向的投资者。

And we said there were two people that we admired enormously in the investment business, not simply because they were terrific investors, but they were terrific people. And they would be the kind of people that you’d make trustee of your will.

我们说在投资行业中有两个人我们非常钦佩，不仅因为他们是出色的投资者，更因为他们是出色的人。他们是那种你会愿意让他们成为你遗嘱的受托人的人。

So those two, one of whom is in the room — Sandy Gottesman, our director — and one was Sandy and one was Bill Ruane. They were friends themselves.

所以这两个人，其中一个在房间里——我们的董事桑迪·戈特斯曼——另一个是比尔·鲁安。他们彼此是朋友。

So, Sandy took on a number of our clients — a number of our partners — and they became clients, and very happy clients, of his, and I’ll bet some of them are still clients, or their children or their grandchildren are, to this day.

所以，桑迪接手了我们的一些客户——我们的一些合作伙伴——他们成为了他的客户，而且非常满意，我敢打赌他们中的一些人至今仍然是客户，或者他们的孩子或孙子至今仍然是。

Others went with Bill — a lot of them went with both of them, actually — in fact, I would be surprised if the majority who had a lot of money gave some to Sandy and gave some to Bill.

其他人跟着比尔——实际上，他们中的很多人都跟着他们两个——事实上，如果大多数有很多钱的人给桑迪一些，又给比尔一些，我会感到惊讶。

But Bill — we had a lot of people whose total funds were really not of a size that made them economic individual clients. And so, Bill, who would not have otherwise set up a fund, Bill said, “I’ll set up a fund.”

但Bill——我们有很多客户的资金总量实际上并不足以让他们成为经济上的个人客户。因此，Bill，虽然他本来不会设立一个基金，但他决定说，‘我会设立一个基金。’

And they actually had an office in Omaha. John Harding, who used to work for me, became the employer here.

他们实际上在奥马哈有一个办公室。曾经为我工作的约翰·哈丁在这里成为了雇主。

And a number of our ex-partners — my ex-partners — joined Sequoia Fund as a way to find an outstanding investment manager, like I say, both for ability and for integrity, and could deploy small sums with him.

一些我们的前合伙人——我的前合伙人——加入了红杉基金，以寻找一位杰出的投资经理，正如我所说，既看重能力也看重诚信，并且可以与他一起投入小额资金。

And Bill ran Sequoia until, I think, roughly 2005, when he died, and did a fantastic job.

比尔一直管理着红杉，直到我认为大约在 2005 年他去世时，他做得非常出色。

And even now, if you take the record from inception to now, with the troubles they’ve had recently, I don’t know of a mutual fund in the United States that has a better record. There probably is one, maybe, or two, But it’s — it’s far better than the S&P, and you won’t find many records that go for 30 or 40 years that are better than the S&P.

即使到现在，如果你看从创立到现在的记录，尽管他们最近遇到了一些麻烦，我也不知道在美国有哪个共同基金的记录比它更好。可能有一个或两个，但它的表现远远好于标准普尔指数，而且你很难找到有30年或40年历史的记录比标准普尔指数表现更好的基金。

So Bill did a great job for people. And Bill died in 2005, and the record continued to be good until a year or so ago.

比尔为人们做了很好的工作。比尔于 2005 年去世，直到一年前左右，记录仍然保持良好。

And at that time, they — the management company — the manager, I should say — took an unusually large position in Valeant and, despite the objection of some people on the board, not only maintained that position but actually increased it, after a fair amount of doubt had been expressed by the board about the advisability of doing that.

在那个时候，他们——管理公司——我应该说是经理——在 Valeant 中采取了一个异常大的头寸，尽管董事会的一些人对此表示反对，但不仅维持了这个头寸，实际上还在董事会对这样做的可行性表达了相当多的怀疑后增加了这个头寸。

The record, like I say, to date, still, from when it started, is significantly better than average.

截至目前为止，这个记录仍然比平均水平好得多。

My understanding is that the manager who made the decision on Valeant is no longer running the operation, and that other people have (inaudible) for doing so, and I have every reason to believe that they’re — I know that they’re very smart, decent people, who are good, probably way better than average analysts, in terms of Wall Street.

我理解的是，做出关于 Valeant 决策的经理已经不再负责运营，其他人已经（听不清）来做这件事，我有充分的理由相信他们——我知道他们是非常聪明、正直的人，在华尔街的分析师中，他们的能力可能远超平均水平。

So, I think it was a very unfortunate period when the manager got overly entranced with a business model, which, if you — I watched the Senate hearings a couple of days ago when Senator Collins and Senator McCaskill interrogated three people from Valeant, and it was not a pretty picture.

所以，我认为这是一个非常不幸的时期，当时经理过于迷恋一种商业模式。如果你——我几天前观看了参议院听证会，科林斯参议员和麦卡斯基尔参议员质询了来自 Valeant 的三个人，结果并不美好。

In my view, the business model of Valeant was enormously flawed. It had been touted to us. We had several people who urged us, strongly, to buy Valeant, and wanted us to meet Pearson, and all that sort of thing.

在我看来，Valeant的商业模式极其有缺陷。它曾经被推荐给我们。我们有几个人强烈建议我们买Valeant，想让我们见见Pearson，诸如此类的事情。

But it illustrated a principle that Pete Kiewit, I think, said many, many years ago. He said if you’re looking for a manager, find somebody that’s intelligent, energetic, and has integrity. And he said that if they don’t have the last, be sure they don’t have the first two. If you’ve got somebody that lacks integrity, you want them to be dumb and lazy.

但它说明了一个原则，我认为Pete Kiewit多年前说过。他说，如果你在寻找一个经理，找一个聪明、充满活力，并且有诚信的人。他说如果他们没有最后一点，一定要确保他们没有前两点。如果你有一个缺乏诚信的人，你会希望他们是愚蠢和懒惰的。

You know — and if you get an intelligent, energetic guy, or woman, who is pursuing a course of action which, if put on the front page, you know, would make you very unhappy, you can get in a lot of trouble.

你知道——如果你得到一个聪明、充满活力的人，或女人，他们追求的行动路线，如果公开在报纸上，会让你非常不高兴，那么你可能会陷入很多麻烦。

It may take a while. But Charlie and I have seen, and we’re not remotely perfect at this, I don’t mean that, but we’ve seen patterns. You get — pattern recognition gets very important in evaluating humans and businesses. And, the pattern recognition isn’t 100 percent, and none of the patterns exactly repeat themselves, but there’re certain things in business and securities markets that we’ve seen over and over, and that frequently come to a bad end, but frequently look extremely good in the short run.

这可能需要一些时间。但Charlie和我都看过，虽然我们也远非完美，但我们已经看到了模式。模式识别在评估人和业务中变得非常重要。模式识别不是百分之百准确，没有模式会完全重复，但在商业和证券市场中，我们已经看到了很多次，通常会带来坏结果，但通常在短期内看起来极其良好。

One, which I talked about last year — I’m not referring to Valeant in this regard — is the chain letter scheme, the disguised chain letter. You’re going to see chain letters the rest of your life.

一个，我去年提到过的——在这方面我并不是指 Valeant——是连锁信的计划，伪装的连锁信。你将在余生中看到连锁信。

Nobody calls them chain letters because that has a connotation that will scare you off. But they’re disguised chain letters. And many of the schemes in Wall Street that are designed to fool people have that particular aspect to it.

没有人称它们为连锁信，因为这个词有让人害怕的含义。但它们是伪装的连锁信。华尔街许多旨在欺骗人的计划都有这一特定特征。

And there were patterns at Valeant that I think — certainly if you go and watch those Senate hearings, I think, you’ll decide that there were patterns there that really should have been picked up on, and it’s been very painful to the people of Sequoia.

在 Valeant 有一些模式，我认为——当然如果你去观看那些参议院听证会，我想你会发现那里确实存在一些应该被注意到的模式，这对红杉的人们来说是非常痛苦的。

And I personally think that the people running Sequoia now are able people, and I’ll get into in a second the difficulty in managing money, but first, I’ll give Charlie a chance to comment on this.

我个人认为，现在管理红杉资本的人是有能力的，我稍后会谈到管理资金的困难，但首先，我会给查理一个机会对此进行评论。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I totally agree with you that Sequoia, as reconstituted, is a reputable investment fund and that the manager, as reconstituted, is a reputable investment adviser.

查理·芒格：我完全同意你的观点，重组后的红杉资本是一个有声望的投资基金，而重组后的管理者也是一个有声望的投资顾问。

I’ve got quite a few friends and clients that use Ruane, Cunniff, and I’ve advised them to stay with the place as reconstituted. I believe you’ve done the same thing, haven’t you?

我有很多朋友和客户使用 Ruane, Cunniff，我建议他们继续使用这个重组后的公司。我相信你也这样做了，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So we trust — we think the whole thing is fixed.

查理·芒格：所以我们相信——我们认为整个情况已经得到解决。

Valeant, of course, was a sewer, and those who created it deserve all the opprobrium that they got. (Applause)

Valeant，当然，是个污水坑，那些创建它的人值得受到他们所得到的所有谴责。（掌声）

29. Buffett leads in wager against hedge funds

巴菲特在与对冲基金的赌注中领先

WARREN BUFFETT: In a few minutes we’ll break, but I think it almost ties in with this last question.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们将在几分钟后休息，但我认为这几乎与最后一个问题相关。

If we could put slide 3 up.

如果我们能把第 3 张幻灯片放上来。

I promised — some years ago I made a wager — and I promised to report, before the lunch, how the wager was coming out.

我承诺过——几年前我打了一个赌——我承诺在午餐前报告这个赌的结果。

And I’ve been doing that regularly, but it probably seems appropriate, since it’s developed this far, to point out a rather obvious lesson, which is what I hoped to drive home, to some degree, by offering to make the wager originally.

我一直在定期这样做，但这可能显得合适，因为事情发展到这个地步，指出一个相当明显的教训是必要的，这也是我希望通过最初提出这个赌注在某种程度上强调的。

Incidentally, when I offered to make the wager, namely that somebody could pick out five hedge funds and I would take the unmanaged S&P index used by Vanguard Fund, and I would bet that over a ten-year period that the unmanaged index would beat these five funds that were all being managed, presumably — they could pick any five funds — that were managed by people who were charging incredible sums to people because of their supposed expertise.

顺便提一下，当我提出打赌时，也就是说，有人可以挑选出五个对冲基金，而我将选择由先锋基金使用的未管理标准普尔指数，我打赌在十年期间，未管理的指数将超过这五个基金，这些基金都是由人管理的，显然——他们可以选择任何五个基金——这些基金的管理者因为他们所谓的专业知识而向人们收取惊人的费用。

And, fortunately, there’s an organization called, or at least you go — if you go to the Internet, if you put in longbets.org — it’s a terribly interesting website.

而且，幸运的是，有一个组织叫做，或者至少你可以去——如果你上网，输入 longbets.org——这是一个非常有趣的网站。

You can have a lot of fun with it because people take the opposite side of various propositions that have a long tail to them and make bets as to the outcome, and then they both give their — each side gives their reasons.

你可以和它玩得很开心，因为人们会对各种有长尾的命题采取相反的立场，并就结果进行下注，然后双方各自给出他们的理由。

And you can go to that website and you can find bets about, you know, whether — what population will be doing 15 years from now or — all kinds of things.

你可以去那个网站，找到关于未来 15 年某个人口将会做什么的投注，或者其他各种事情。

And our bet became quite famous on there. They — and a fellow I like, who I didn’t know before this, Ted Seides, bet that he could pick out five hedge funds — these were funds of funds.

我们的赌注在那儿变得相当有名。他们——还有一个我喜欢的家伙，之前我并不认识他，泰德·赛德斯，打赌他能挑出五个对冲基金——这些是基金中的基金。

In other words, there was one hedge fund at the top and then that manager picked out who he thought were the best managers underneath, and then bought into these other funds in turn, so that the five funds of funds represent, maybe, 100 or 200 hedge funds underneath.

换句话说，顶层有一个对冲基金，然后那个经理挑选他认为最优秀的下层经理，接着投资于这些其他基金，因此这五个基金中的基金可能代表着 100 或 200 个下层对冲基金。

Now bear in mind that the hedge fund — the fellow making the bet — was picking out funds where the manager on top was getting paid, perhaps, 1/2 percent a year, plus a cut of the profits, for merely picking out who he thought were the best managers underneath, who in turn were getting paid, maybe, 1 1/2 or 2 percent, plus a cut of the funds’ profits.

请记住，对冲基金——进行下注的那位——正在挑选那些顶层经理每年可能只获得 0.5%的报酬，加上利润分成，仅仅是挑选他认为最优秀的底层经理，而这些底层经理可能获得 1.5%或 2%的报酬，加上基金利润的分成。

But certainly the guy at the top was incentivized to try and pick out great funds, and at the next level, those people were presumably incentivized, too.

但可以肯定的是，顶层的人有动力去挑选优秀的基金，而在下一级，那些人也可以推测有动力。

So the result is, after eight years, and several hundred hedge fund managers being involved, is that now the totally unmanaged fund by Vanguard with very, very minimal costs, is now 40-some points ahead of the group of hedge funds.

所以结果是，经过八年，以及数百名对冲基金经理的参与，现在由先锋集团管理的完全不受管理的基金，以非常非常低的成本，已经领先于对冲基金组 40 多个点。

Now that may sound like a terrible result for the hedge funds, but it’s not a terrible result for the hedge fund managers. (Laughs)

现在这听起来可能对对冲基金来说是个糟糕的结果，但对对冲基金经理来说并不是一个糟糕的结果。（笑）

These managers — A), you’ve got this top-level manager that’s charging probably 1/2 percent, I don’t know that for sure, and down below you’ve got managers that are probably charging 1 1/2 to 2 percent.

这些经理——A)，你有这个顶级经理，收费可能是 0.5%，我不确定，下面你有一些经理，收费可能是 1.5%到 2%。

So if you have a couple of percentage points sliced off every year, that is a lot of money.

所以如果每年削减几个百分点，那就是很多钱。

We have two managers at Berkshire that each manage $9 billion for us. They both ran hedge funds before.

我们在伯克希尔有两位经理，他们各自为我们管理 90 亿美元。他们之前都经营过对冲基金。

If they had a 2-and-20 arrangement with Berkshire, which is not uncommon in the hedge fund world, they would be getting $180 million each, you know, merely for breathing, annually. (Laughter)

如果他们与伯克希尔有一个 2 和 20 的安排，这在对冲基金界并不罕见，他们每年仅仅因为呼吸就能获得 1.8 亿美元。（笑声）

That — I mean that — it’s a compensation scheme that is unbelievable to me, and that’s one reason I made this bet.

那——我的意思是——这是一个让我难以置信的补偿计划，这也是我下这个赌注的原因之一。

But what I’d like you to do is for a moment imagine that in this room we have the entire — you people own all of America, all the stocks in America are owned by this group. You are the Berkshire 18,000, or whatever it is, that has someone managed to accumulate all the wealth in the country.

但我希望你们暂时想象一下，在这个房间里，我们拥有整个——你们这些人拥有整个美国，所有的美国股票都由这个团体拥有。你们是伯克希尔的 18,000 人，或者不管是什么，已经成功积累了全国所有财富的人。

And let’s assume we just divide it down the middle, and on this side we put half the people — half of all the investment capital in the world — and that capital is what a certain presidential candidate might call “low energy.”

假设我们将其平均分成两半，这一边放置一半的人——全球一半的投资资本——而这些资本是某位总统候选人可能称之为“低能量”的。

In fact, they have no energy at all. They buy half of everything that exists in the investment world, 50 percent, everyone on this side. And so now half of it is owned by these — by these no-energy people.

事实上，他们根本没有精力。他们购买投资世界中存在的一切的 50%，这一边的每个人都是如此。因此，现在一半的资产被这些——这些没有精力的人所拥有。

They don’t look at stock prices. They don’t turn on business channels. They don’t read The Wall Street Journal. They don’t do anything. They just — they are a slovenly group that just sits for year after year after year owning half of the country — half of America’s business.

他们不看股票价格。他们不打开商业频道。他们不读《华尔街日报》。他们什么都不做。他们只是——他们是一群邋遢的人，年复一年地坐着，拥有国家的一半——美国商业的一半。

Now what’s their result going to be? Their result is going to be exactly average, as how America business does, because they own half of all of it. They have no expenses, no nothing.

现在他们的结果会是什么呢？他们的结果将会完全是平均水平，就像美国的商业运作一样，因为他们拥有一半的所有权。他们没有开支，什么都没有。

Now what’s going to happen with the other half? The other half are what we call the “hyperactives.”

现在另一半会发生什么？另一半是我们所称的“过度活跃者”。

And the hyperactives, their gross result is also going to be half, right? They can’t — the whole has to be the sum of the parts here, and this group, by definition, can’t change from its half of the ultimate investment results.

而那些过度活跃的人，他们的总结果也将是一半，对吧？他们不能——整体必须是各部分之和，而这个群体，按定义，不能改变其最终投资结果的一半。

This half is going to have the same gross results — you’re going to have the same results as the low-energy — no-energy people, and they’re also going to have terrific expenses, because they’re all going to be moving around, hiring hedge funds, hiring consultants, paying lots of commissions and everything.

这一部分将会有相同的粗略结果——你将会得到与低能量、无能量的人相同的结果，他们也会有巨大的开支，因为他们都将四处活动，雇佣对冲基金，雇佣顾问，支付大量佣金等等。

And that half, as a group, has to do worse than this half. The people who don’t do anything have to do better than the people that are trying to do better. It’s that simple.

而那一半，作为一个群体，必须表现得比这一半更差。那些什么都不做的人必须比那些试图做得更好的人表现得更好。就是这么简单。

And I hoped through making this bet to actually create a little example of that, but that offer was open to anybody. And I would make, incidentally, the same offer now except, you know, being around in 10 years to collect gets a little more problematic as we go through life. (Laughs)

我希望通过下这个赌注来实际创造一个小例子，但这个提议对任何人都是开放的。顺便说一下，我现在也会提出同样的提议，只是，随着我们生活的进行，十年后再来收集就变得有点问题了。（笑）

But it seems so elementary. But I will guarantee you that no endowment fund, no public pension fund, no extremely rich person, wants to sit in that part of the auditorium.

但这看起来如此简单。但我可以保证，没有任何捐赠基金，没有任何公共养老金基金，没有任何极其富有的人，愿意坐在礼堂的那一部分。

They just can’t believe that because they have billions of dollars to invest that they can’t go out and hire somebody who will do better than average. I hear from them all the time.

他们就是不敢相信，因为他们有数十亿美元可以投资，所以他们不能出去雇一个能做得比平均水平更好的人。我一直在听他们这么说。

So this group over here, supposedly sophisticated people, generally richer people, hire consultants, and no consultant in the world is going to tell you, just buy an S&P index fund and sit for the next 50 years.

因此，那些所谓的精明的人，通常是富人，雇佣顾问，而世界上没有顾问会告诉你，只需购买一个标准普尔指数基金并持有50年。

You don’t get to be a consultant that way. And you certainly don’t get an annual fee that way.

你不能那样成为顾问。你当然也不能那样获得年费。

So the consultant’s got every motivation in the world to tell you, this year I think we should concentrate more on international stocks, or this year this manager is particularly good on the short side.

所以顾问有充分的动机告诉你，今年我认为我们应该更多地关注国际股票，或者今年这个经理在做空方面特别出色。

And so they come in and they talk for hours, and you pay them a large fee, and they always suggest something other than just sitting on your rear end and participating in American business without cost.

他们进来后谈了几个小时，你支付给他们一笔高额费用，他们总是建议一些其他的事情，而不仅仅是坐在那儿参与美国商业而不花钱。

And then those consultants, after they get their fees, they, in turn, recommend to you other people who charge fees which, as you can see over a period of time, cumulatively eat up capital like crazy.

然后那些顾问在收取费用后，反过来向你推荐其他收费的人，随着时间的推移，你会发现这些费用会像疯狂一样逐渐侵蚀资本。

So, I would suggest that what I felt sure — I didn’t feel sure because nothing — you can’t tell for sure about any 10-year period — but it certainly felt very probable or I wouldn’t have stuck my neck out.

所以，我想建议的是，我感到很确定——我并不是很确定，因为没有什么——你无法确切判断任何 10 年的时间段——但这确实感觉非常可能，否则我不会冒这个险。

It just demonstrates so dramatically — I’ve talked to huge pension funds, and I’ve taken them through the math, and when I leave, they go out and hire a bunch of consultants and pay them a lot of money. And — it — just unbelievable. And the consultants always change the recommendations a little bit from year to year. They can’t change them 100 percent, because then it didn’t look like they knew what they were doing the year before, so they tweak them from year to year.

这真是太戏剧化了——我和大型养老基金谈过，我给他们讲解了数学原理，当我离开时，他们就出去雇了一堆顾问，并支付给他们很多钱。而——这——真是不可思议。顾问们每年总会稍微改变一下建议。他们不能完全改变，因为那样就显得他们去年不知道自己在做什么，所以他们每年都会稍微调整一下。

And they come in and they have lots of charts and PowerPoint presentations, and they recommend people who, in turn, are going to charge them a lot of money. And they say, well, you can only get the best talent by paying 2-and-20, or something of the sort.

他们进来时带着很多图表和 PowerPoint 演示文稿，并推荐一些人，而这些人又会向他们收取大量费用。他们说，只有支付 2 和 20，或者类似的费用，才能获得最优秀的人才。

And the flow of money from the hyperactive to what I call the helpers is dramatic, while this group over here sits here and absolutely gets the record of American industry.

从过度活跃的群体到我所称的帮助者之间的资金流动是戏剧性的，而这边的群体则坐在这里，完全记录了美国工业的情况。

So I hope you realize that for most — for the population as a whole — American business has done wonderfully, and the net result of hiring professional management, you know, is a huge minus.

所以我希望你意识到，对于大多数人——对于整个社会——美国企业表现得非常出色，而雇佣专业管理的净结果，实际上是一个巨大的负面影响。

And at the bookstore we have a little book called “Where Are the Customer’s Yachts?” written by Fred Schwed. I read it when I was about 10-years-old. Been updated a few — well it hasn’t been updated, but new editions have been put out a few times — but the basic lessons are there.

在书店里，我们有一本小书，名为《顾客的游艇在哪里？》，作者是弗雷德·施韦德。我大约在 10 岁时读过这本书。虽然它没有更新，但几次推出了新版本，基本的教训依然存在。

That lesson is told in that book from 1940. It’s so obvious, and yet all the commercial push is behind telling you that you ought to think about doing something today that’s different than you did yesterday.

那本书的教训从1940年就开始讲述。尽管如此，所有的商业推动力仍在告诉你，你应该考虑今天做些不同于昨天的事情。

You don’t have to do that. You just have to sit back and let American industry do its job for you.

你不必那样做。你只需坐下来，让美国工业为你做它的工作。

Charlie, do you have anything to add to my sermon? (Applause)

查理，你有什么想补充我讲道的吗？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’re talking to a bunch of people who have solved their problem by buying Berkshire Hathaway. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，你们正在对一群通过购买伯克希尔哈撒韦解决了他们的问题的人说话（笑）。

That worked even better. And there have been a few of these managers, the managers —

这比对冲基金的表现更好。而且确实有一些经理——

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — who’ve actually succeeded. They are a few in the universities who are really good.

查理·芒格：——那些真正成功的人。在大学里，确实有少数人非常优秀。

But it’s a tiny group of people. It’s like looking for a needle in a haystack.

但这只是一个小群体。就像在大海捞针。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And when I was given the job of naming two in 1969, I knew — I knew two — I knew a couple of others. Charlie wasn’t interested in managing more money then, and my friend Walter Schloss would not scale up well, although he had a fabulous record over 45 years, or thereabouts.

沃伦·巴菲特：当我在1969年被要求列出两个时，我知道——我知道两个——我知道几个其他的。Charlie那时对管理更多的资金不感兴趣，而我的朋友Walter Schloss虽然有一个出色的记录，但他不适合扩大规模，大约45年左右的记录。

But, you know, that was all I could come up with at that time. And fortunately, you know, I did have a couple. And the people who went with Sequoia Fund have been well-served, if they stayed for the whole period.

但是，你知道，那时候我能想到的就只有这些。幸运的是，我确实有几个。而与红杉基金一起投资的人，如果他们一直持有，受益良多。

But the — the people — there’s been far, far, far more money made by Wall — by people in Wall Street — through salesmanship abilities than through investment abilities.

但是——人们——在华尔街的人们通过销售能力赚的钱远远超过了通过投资能力赚的钱。

There are a few people out there who are going to have an outstanding investment record. But there are very few of them, and the people you pay to have identify them don’t know how to identify them. And — and they do know how to sell you. That’s my message.

有一些人会有出色的投资记录。但这样的人非常少，而你支付给他们去识别这些人的人并不知道如何识别他们。而且——他们确实知道如何向你推销。这就是我的信息。

30. Sell commercial insurance on the internet?

在互联网上销售商业保险？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If you’ll take your seats, we’ll get underway.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。如果大家就座，我们就开始吧。

CLIFF GALLANT: Thank you.

克利夫·加朗特：谢谢你。

Berkshire has an online portal for commercial insurance business. I believe it’s CoverYourBusiness.com. Is there an opportunity in commercial lines to go direct akin to what we’ve seen GEICO do in personal auto insurance?

伯克希尔有一个商业保险业务的在线门户。我相信是 CoverYourBusiness.com。在商业保险领域是否有机会像我们看到的 GEICO 在个人汽车保险中那样直接销售？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the answer to that is we’ll find out. We have actually two online arrangements. I’m not sure whether they’re both up yet.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，答案是我们会找到的。我们实际上有两个在线安排。我不确定它们是否都已经上线。

One is called — I believe it’s called Big. I think we got that domain name, B-I-G, and that will be run by the Applied Underwriters, which is a subsidiary of ours that writes workers comp.

一个叫——我相信它叫做 Big。我想我们得到了那个域名，B-I-G，这将由应用承保公司运营，这是我们的一家子公司，负责工人赔偿。

And the other is run by Ajit [Jain]. And then, actually, we do commercial auto, some commercial auto, through GEICO as well, so we will learn soon —

另一个由 Ajit [Jain]管理。实际上，我们也通过 GEICO 进行一些商业汽车保险，所以我们很快就会了解——

I guess my message about inherited wealth is getting delivered here. (Laughter)

我想我关于继承财富的信息在这里得到了传达。（笑声）

The kid probably wants to put himself up for adoption now. (Laughter)

这个孩子可能现在想要自愿被收养。（笑声）

The — so we will be — we have been a little bit, and we will be experimenting more with various insurance lines.

我们将会——我们已经有一点了，我们将会在各种保险产品上进行更多的实验。

When you look at what has happened, you know, just take Amazon, you have to — you want to try a lot of things, and it amazed me how fast the inquiries on personal auto migrated from phone to the internet, and, you know, I would’ve thought that the younger people would do it, but the people like myself would be very slow to do it.

当你看到发生的事情时，你知道，就拿亚马逊来说，你必须——你想尝试很多事情，我惊讶于个人汽车的咨询从电话转移到互联网的速度是多么快，我本以为年轻人会这样做，但像我这样的人会非常慢。

But the adaptation by the American public of internet response has really been pretty incredible and shows no sign of slowing down.

但是美国公众对互联网反应的适应真是令人难以置信，并且没有放缓的迹象。

So the answer is, we’ll try various things and we’ll make some mistakes, and my guess is that 10 and 20 and 30 years from now, it’ll be a lot different.

所以答案是，我们会尝试各种事情，并且会犯一些错误，我猜 10 年、20 年和 30 年后，情况会大不相同。

31. Our culture will endure for “many, many decades”

我们的文化将持续“许多许多个十年”。

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 8 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Matt Clayborn from Columbus, Ohio. And thank you for putting this on for all of us.

观众成员：你好。我叫马特·克莱博恩，来自俄亥俄州的哥伦布。感谢你为我们大家举办这个活动。

My question is: you have said before that your role will be divided into parts for your succession, one of which will be the responsibility of maintaining culture by having [son] Howard [Buffett] as non-executive chairman.

我的问题是：你之前说过你的角色将被分成几个部分以便于继任，其中之一是通过让[儿子]霍华德·巴菲特担任非执行主席来维护文化的责任。

What is the plan for how Berkshire will maintain its culture when Howard no longer fills the role, and what should shareholders watch for to make sure that the culture is being properly maintained decades from now when I am your age?

伯克希尔在霍华德不再担任这一角色时将如何维持其文化的计划是什么？股东应该关注什么，以确保在几十年后，当我和你们同龄时，文化能够得到妥善维护？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that’s a question we’ve obviously given a lot of thought to, and although I hope that Howard is made chairman just for the reason that if a mistake is made in selecting a successor, it’s easier to correct it if you have a non-executive chairman. But that’s a very, very — I mean, that’s a 1-in-100 or 1-maybe-in-500 probability, but there’s no sense ignoring it totally.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，这是一个我们显然考虑了很多的问题，尽管我希望霍华德能被任命为董事长，原因在于如果在选择继任者时犯了错误，拥有一个非执行董事长会更容易纠正。但这确实是一个非常非常——我意思是，这大约是 1/100 或 1/500 的概率，但完全忽视它是没有意义的。

It’s not a key factor. The main — by far, the main factor in keeping Berkshire’s culture is that you have a board and you’ll have successor board members. You have managers and you’ll have successor managers. And you have shareholders that clearly recognize the special nature of the culture, that have embraced the culture. When they sold their businesses to us, they wanted to join that culture.

这不是一个关键因素。保持伯克希尔文化的主要因素——远远是主要因素——是你有一个董事会，并且你会有继任的董事会成员。你有管理者，并且你会有继任的管理者。还有股东，他们清楚地认识到这种文化的特殊性质，并且接受了这种文化。当他们将自己的企业出售给我们时，他们希望加入这种文化。

It’s a — it thrusts out people that really aren’t in tune with it, and there are very few of them. And it embraces those who enjoy and appreciate it, and I think, to some extent, we don’t have a lot of competition on it. So it becomes very identifiable, and it works.

这是一种——它排斥那些与之不和谐的人，而这样的人的确很少。它包容那些享受和欣赏它的人，我认为在某种程度上，我们在这方面没有太多竞争。因此，它变得非常具有识别性，并且运作良好。

So I think the chances of us going off the rails in terms of culture are really very, very, very slight, regardless of whether there’s a non-executive chairman or not. But that’s just a small added protection.

所以我认为我们在文化方面偏离轨道的可能性非常非常小，无论是否有非执行主席。这只是一个小的额外保护。

So it’s — I think that the main problem that Berkshire will have will be size, and I’ve always — I thought that when I was managing money, when I first started managing money. Size is the enemy of performance to a significant degree.

所以我认为，伯克希尔面临的主要问题将是规模，我一直认为——我在管理资金时，刚开始管理资金时就这样认为。规模在很大程度上是业绩的敌人。

But I do think that the culture of Berkshire adds significantly to the value of the individual components viewed individually. And I don’t see any evidence that there’d be any board member, any managers, or anything that would — could in any way really move away from what we have now for many, many decades. Charlie?

但我确实认为，伯克希尔的文化显著增加了单独看待的各个组成部分的价值。我没有看到任何证据表明会有任何董事会成员、任何管理人员，或者任何事情会在许多、许多个十年内以任何方式真正偏离我们现在所拥有的。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m even more optimistic than you are.

查理·芒格：我比你更乐观。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve never noticed it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我从来没有注意到过。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I really think the culture is going to surprise everybody — how well it lasts — and how well they do. They’re going to wonder why they ever made any fuss over us in the first place. It’s going to work very well.

查理·芒格：我真的认为文化会让大家感到惊讶——它会持续得多么好——他们的表现会多么出色。他们会想知道当初为什么要对我们大惊小怪。这一切都会运作得非常好。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve got so many good ingredients in place just in terms of the businesses and people already here, you know, that — at the companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：就公司而言，我们已经有很多优秀的要素在这里，包括业务和人才。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s what I’m saying.

查理·芒格：我就是这个意思。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s just so much power in place.

查理·芒格：这里的权力实在太大了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Another thing that’s interesting is how little turnover we get in it, too. So that — the number of managers that have been needed, that we’ve had to replace in the last ten years, are very few.

沃伦·巴菲特：另一个有趣的事情是我们在这方面的人员流动率非常低。因此，在过去十年中，我们需要更换的经理人数非常少。

You know, without a retirement age, and I tend to bring that up at every meeting to reinforce the idea, the — but without a retirement age and with people working because they love their jobs — and they like the money as well — but their primary motive is that they really like accomplishing what they do in their jobs. And that means that we get long tenure out of our managers.

你知道，没有退休年龄，我倾向于在每次会议上提到这一点以强化这个想法——但是没有退休年龄，人们因为热爱他们的工作而工作——他们也喜欢钱——但他们的主要动机是他们真的喜欢在工作中完成他们所做的事情。这意味着我们的管理者可以长期任职。

So the turnover is low, the directors are not here for the money, and so we have great tenure among the directors, and I would argue that’s a huge plus. It’s going to go on a very long time.

因此，人员流动率低，董事们并不是为了钱而在这里，所以我们在董事中有很长的任期，我认为这是一个巨大的优势。这将持续很长时间。

32. Diversity isn’t a factor in choosing Berkshire directors

多样性不是选择伯克希尔董事的因素。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew. 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. The following question comes from Ariz Galdos (PH), and several other shareholders asked similar questions that are a part of this as well. It’s a bit of a multipart question.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。接下来的问题来自阿里兹·加尔多斯（PH），还有几位股东也提出了类似的问题，这些问题也是这个问题的一部分。这是一个多部分的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Uh-uh. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: “About two dozen men and women work with you, Warren, at our corporate office. I see from last year the quality of the picture has been improved in the annual report, so congratulations on that.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：“沃伦，约有二十名男女在我们的公司办公室与您一起工作。我看到去年的年报中图片质量有所提高，祝贺您。”

“However, looking at it, there is something that comes to anyone’s attention and is the lack of diversity among the staff. A 2015 analysis by Calvert Investments found that Coca-Cola was one of the best companies for workplace diversity while Berkshire Hathaway was one of the worst.

然而，仔细观察会发现，员工缺乏多样性引起了人们的注意。2015 年，Calvert Investments 的分析发现，可口可乐是工作场所多样性最好的公司之一，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦则是最差的公司之一。

“You’ve explicitly stated that you do not consider diversity when hiring for leadership roles and board members. Does that need to change? Are we missing any investment opportunities as a result?

“您明确表示在招聘领导职位和董事会成员时不考虑多样性。这需要改变吗？因此我们是否错过了任何投资机会？”

“And do you consider diversity, however defined, of company leadership and staff when analyzing the value of a company that you may want to purchase?

“在分析您可能想要购买的公司的价值时，您是否考虑公司领导层和员工的多样性（无论如何定义）？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s a multiple part question. The answer to the last one is no.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是一个多部分的问题。最后一个问题的答案是否定的。

What was the one before it? (Laughter)

之前的是哪个？（笑声）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: “You’ve explicitly stated you do not consider diversity when hiring for leadership roles and board members. Does that need to change, and are we missing any investment opportunities as a result?”

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：“你明确表示在招聘领导职位和董事会成员时不考虑多样性。这需要改变吗？我们因此错过了哪些投资机会？”

WARREN BUFFETT: No. We will select board members, and we lay it out. And we’ve done so for years, and I think we’ve been much more explicit than most companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。我们会选择董事会成员，并且我们已经明确说明了这一点。多年来我们一直这样做，我认为我们比大多数公司更明确。

We are looking for people who are business savvy, shareholder oriented, and have a special interest in Berkshire. And we found people like that. And as a result, I think we’ve got the best board that we could have. They’re not in it — they’re clearly not in it for the money.

我们正在寻找那些具有商业头脑、以股东为导向并对伯克希尔有特别兴趣的人。我们找到了这样的人。因此，我认为我们拥有的董事会是最好的。他们显然不是为了钱而参与其中。

I get called by consulting firms who have been told to get candidates for directors for other companies, and by the questions they ask, it’s clear they’ve got something other than the three questions we ask, in terms of directors, in mind.

我接到咨询公司的电话，他们被告知要为其他公司寻找董事候选人，从他们提出的问题来看，很明显他们心中考虑的与我们在董事方面提出的三个问题不同。

They really want somebody whose name will reflect credit on the institution, which means a big name. You know, and one organization recently, the one that did the blood samples with small pricks, got — they got some very big names on their board. Theranos, I think, or — is that the way you pronounce it, Charlie? Theranos?

他们真的想要一个名字能为机构带来声誉的人，这意味着要有一个大名。你知道，最近有一个组织，做了用小针刺取血样的那个，他们的董事会里有一些非常大牌的名字。我想是 Theranos，查理，这个发音对吗？Theranos？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I mean the names are great, but we’re not interested in people that want to be on the board because they want to make 2- or $300,000 a year, you know, for 10 percent of their time. And we’re not interested in the ones who — for whom it’s a prestige item and who want to go and check boxes or that sort of thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我的意思是这些名字很好，但我们对那些想要进入董事会只是为了每年赚 20 万或 30 万美元的人不感兴趣，你知道的，花费他们 10%的时间。而且我们也不对那些把这当作一种声望的人感兴趣，他们想去打勾或那种事情。

So I think we’ve got — we will continue to apply that test: business savvy, shareholder oriented, and with a strong personal interest in Berkshire.

所以我认为我们会继续应用这个标准：商业头脑、以股东为导向，并对伯克希尔有强烈的个人兴趣。

And every share of Berkshire that our shareholders own, they bought just like everybody else in this room. They haven’t gotten them on an option or they haven’t — I’ve been on boards where they’ve given me stock, you know, and they — I get it for breathing, basically. Half a dozen places that are — maybe three or four that I was on the board of.

每一股我们股东拥有的伯克希尔股票，他们都是像在座的每一个人一样购买的。他们并不是通过期权获得的，也不是——我曾在一些董事会任职，他们给我股票，你知道的，我基本上是白得的。我曾在几个地方任职——也许有三四个。

We want our shareholders to walk in the shoes — I mean, our directors to walk in the shoes of shareholders. We want them to care a lot about the business, and we want them to be smart enough so that they know enough about business that they know what they should get involved in and what they shouldn’t get involved in.

我们希望我们的董事能够站在股东的立场上。我们希望他们非常关心业务，并且希望他们足够聪明，了解业务，以便知道自己应该参与什么，不应该参与什么。

The people in the office — I’m hoping that when we take the Christmas picture again this year, they’re exactly the same 25 that were there last year, even though we might have added 30,000 employees elsewhere and maybe 10 billion of sales or something like that.

办公室里的员工——我希望今年再拍圣诞照片时，他们正好是去年那 25 个，尽管我们可能在其他地方增加了 30,000 名员工，销售额也许增加了 100 亿之类的。

It’s a remarkable group of people, and they — I mean, just take this meeting. Virtually every one of the 25, our CFO, my assistant, whoever, they’ve been doing job after job connected with making this meeting a success and a pleasant outing for our shareholders. It’s a cooperative effort.

这是一群了不起的人，他们——我的意思是，看看这次会议。几乎所有的 25 个人，我们的首席财务官，我的助理，任何人，他们都在不断地为这次会议的成功和为我们的股东提供愉快的体验而努力。这是一次合作的努力。

The idea that you would have some department called Annual Meeting Department and, you know, you’d have a person in charge of it and she’d — or he — would have an assistant and then they would go to various conferences about holding annual meetings and build up — and then they’d hire consultants to come in and help them on the meeting. We just don’t operate that way. It’s a place where everybody helps each other, but — (Applause)

你会有一个叫做年度会议部的部门，知道吗？你会有一个负责人，她——或者他——会有一个助手，然后他们会去各种关于举办年度会议的会议，积累经验——然后他们会雇佣顾问来帮助他们举办会议。我们并不是那样运作的。这里是一个大家互相帮助的地方，但——（掌声）

Part of the — what makes — part of what makes my — well, my job is extraordinarily easy, but the people around me really make it easy. And part of the reason it’s easy is because we don’t have any committees. Maybe we have some committee I don’t know about, but I’ve never been invited to any committees, I’ll put it that way, at Berkshire.

我工作的部分原因——让我工作变得非常简单的部分——是周围的人真的让我轻松。而这之所以简单的部分原因是因为我们没有任何委员会。也许我们有我不知道的委员会，但我从来没有被邀请参加任何委员会，我就这么说吧，在伯克希尔。

And we don’t — we may have a PowerPoint someplace, I haven’t seen it, and I wouldn’t know how to use it anyway.

我们没有——我们可能有一个 PowerPoint 文件，但我没见过，而且我也不知道怎么用。

The — we just don’t do — we don’t have make-work activities. And we might go a to a baseball game together or something like that, but it — I’ve seen the other kind of operation and I like ours better, I’ll put it that way. Charlie?

我们——我们不做——我们没有无意义的工作活动。我们可能会一起去看一场棒球比赛或类似的活动，但——我见过另一种运作方式，我更喜欢我们这种，我就这么说吧。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, years ago I did some work for the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, and my senior partner pompously said, you know, you don’t need to hire us to do this. There’s plenty of good Catholic tax lawyers. And the archbishop looked at him like he was an idiot and said, “Mr. Peeler,” he says,” last year I had some very serious surgery, and I did not look around for the leading Catholic surgeon.” That’s the way I feel about board members. (Applause)

查理·芒格：多年前，我为洛杉矶的罗马天主教大主教做了一些工作，我的高级合伙人自以为是地说，你知道，你不需要雇我们来做这个。有很多优秀的天主教税务律师。大主教看着他，像是在看一个傻瓜，说：“皮勒先生，”他说，“去年我做了一些非常严重的手术，我并没有去寻找顶尖的天主教外科医生。”我对董事会成员的感觉就是这样。（掌声）

33. Buffett’s “mixed emotions” on Berkshire buybacks

巴菲特对伯克希尔回购的“复杂情感”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, while —

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，虽然——

WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg. (Laughter.)

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格。（笑声。）

GREGG WARREN: While Berkshire has authorized a share repurchase program, originally aimed at buying back shares at prices no higher than 10 percent premium to the firm’s most recent book value per share, a figure that was subsequently increased to repurchase shares at prices no higher than 20 percent premium to book value, there’s been relatively little share repurchase activity during the last four-and-a-half years.

格雷格·沃伦：虽然伯克希尔已授权一项股票回购计划，最初旨在以不高于公司最近每股账面价值 10%溢价的价格回购股票，但这一数字随后增加至以不高于每股账面价值 20%溢价的价格回购股票，但在过去四年半的时间里，股票回购活动相对较少。

Even as the shares dipped down below the 1.2 times book value threshold during both January and February of this year, if you base it on a buyback price calculated on Berkshire’s book value per share at the end of 2015, a number that had not yet been published when the stock did dip that low.

即使在今年一月和二月，股票价格跌至低于 1.2 倍账面价值的阈值，如果以 2015 年底伯克希尔每股账面价值计算的回购价格为基础，当时股票跌至如此低的水平时，这个数字尚未公布。

Given your belief that Berkshire’s intrinsic value continues to exceed its book value, with the difference continuing to widen over time, are we at a point where it makes sense to consider buying back stock at a higher break point than Berkshire currently has in place, and would you ever consider stepping in and buying back shares if they dip down blow 1.2 times book value per share even if that prior year’s figure had not yet been released?

鉴于您认为伯克希尔的内在价值仍然超过其账面价值，并且这种差距随着时间的推移而继续扩大，我们是否到了一个考虑以高于伯克希尔目前设定的回购价位回购股票的时机？如果股票价格跌至每股账面价值的 1.2 倍以下，即使前一年的数据尚未发布，您是否会考虑介入回购股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Gregg, you mentioned that it sold below 1.2, and I don’t think that’s correct. I keep a pretty close eye on that, and it’s come fairly close to 1.2. But I could almost guarantee you that it has not hit 1.2, or we would’ve done it. And I’d be happy to send you figures on any day that you might feel that it did hit the 1.2.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。格雷格，你提到它的售价低于 1.2，我认为这不正确。我对此保持密切关注，它已经非常接近 1.2。但我几乎可以保证它没有达到 1.2，否则我们就会这样做。如果你觉得它确实达到了 1.2，我很乐意在任何一天给你发送相关数据。

Clearly in my view, Charlie’s view, the board’s, the stock is worth significantly more than 1.2, but it should be worth significantly more, or we wouldn’t have it at that level.

显然在我、查理和董事会的观点中，这只股票的价值远超过 1.2，但它应该值得更多，否则我们不会将其定在这个水平。

On the other hand, we did move it up from 1.1 to 1.2 because we had acquired more businesses over time that were — where the differential between our carrying value and the book value — and the intrinsic value really had widened from when we set the 1.1.

另一方面，我们确实将其从 1.1 上调至 1.2，因为随着时间的推移，我们收购了更多的业务——我们的账面价值与实际价值之间的差异——以及内在价值确实比我们设定 1.1 时扩大了。

I have mixed emotions on the whole thing, in that from strictly a financial standpoint, and from the standpoint of the continuing shareholders, I love the idea of buying it at 1.2, which means I probably would love the idea of buying it a little higher than 1.2.

我对整个事情有复杂的情感，从严格的财务角度来看，以及从持续股东的角度来看，我喜欢以 1.2 的价格购买它的想法，这意味着我可能会更喜欢以略高于 1.2 的价格购买它的想法。

On the other hand, I don’t take — and it’s the surest way of making money per share there is. I mean, if you can buy dollar bills for anything less than a dollar, you know, there’s no more certain way of making money.

另一方面，我不这样做——这也是每股赚钱的最可靠方式。我的意思是，如果你能以低于一美元的价格购买美元钞票，你知道，没有比这更确定的赚钱方式了。

On the other hand, I don’t particularly like — enjoy the actual act of buying out people who are my partners at a price that is below — well below what I think the stock is worth.

另一方面，我并不特别喜欢——享受以低于我认为股票价值的价格收购我的合作伙伴。

So — but we will buy stock, almost certainly. We don’t make it a 100 percent pledge because there’d be a lot of ramifications to that, but the odds are extremely high that we would buy a lot of stock at 1.2 times or less. But we would do it in a manner where we were not propping the stock at any given level. And if it happens, it will be very good for the stockholders who continue.

所以——但我们几乎肯定会购买股票。我们并不做出 100%的承诺，因为这样会有很多后果，但我们在 1.2 倍或更低的价格购买大量股票的可能性非常高。但我们会以一种不在任何特定水平上支撑股票的方式进行。如果发生这种情况，对继续持有股票的股东来说将是非常好的。

It is kind of an interesting situation, though, because if it’s true that we will, and are eager even, from a financial standpoint, to buy it at that price, it’s really like having a savings account where if you take your money out as a dividend, or as an interest payment on a savings account, you know, you get a dollar.

这确实是一个有趣的情况，因为如果我们真的会，并且从财务角度来看，我们甚至渴望以那个价格购买它，这就像拥有一个储蓄账户，如果你把钱作为红利或储蓄账户的利息取出来，你知道，你就能得到一美元。

But if you leave it in, you’re almost guaranteed that we’ll pay you $1.20. I mean, why would anybody want to take money out of a savings account if they could cash it in, what they left, at 120 percent?

但如果你把它留在里面，你几乎可以保证我们会支付你 1.20 美元。我的意思是，如果他们可以以 120%的利率兑现他们留下的存款，为什么还会有人想从储蓄账户中取钱呢？

So it’s a — it acts as a backstop for ensuring that a no-dividend policy results in greater returns than it would be if we paid out a dollar and people got a dollar. If they leave a dollar in, they’re going to get at least $1.20 in my view, at least — it’s not a total guarantee, but it’s a pretty strong probability.

这也是无股息政策比支付股息能带来更高回报的保证。如果他们不取走1美元，留在账户里，他们将至少得到1.2美元的回报，虽然这不是完全的保证，但这是非常有可能的。

So would we increase that number? Perhaps. If we run out of ideas, and I don’t mean, you know, day by day, but if it really becomes apparent that we can’t use capital effectively within the company, in the quantities with which it’s being generated, then at some point the threshold might be moved up a little because it could still be attractive to buy it.

那么我们会增加这个数字吗？也许会。如果我们没有想法，我不是说每天，而是如果真的明显我们无法有效地利用公司内部产生的资本，那么在某个时候，门槛可能会稍微提高，因为购买它仍然可能具有吸引力。

And you don’t — you know, you don’t want — you don’t want to keep accumulating so much money that it burns a hole in your pocket. And it’s been said, actually, that — you know, that a full wallet is a little like a full bladder, that you may get an urge fairly quickly to pee it away, and we don’t want that to happen.

而你不想——你知道，你不想——你不想积累那么多钱，以至于它在你口袋里烧出一个洞。实际上，有人说过，满的钱包有点像满的膀胱，你可能会很快有冲动想要把它花掉，我们不希望那种情况发生。

But so far that hasn’t happened, and we will — if it ever gets to where we have 100 billion or 120 billion or something like that around, we might have to increase the price.

但到目前为止还没有发生，如果真的达到 1000 亿或 1200 亿之类的数量，我们可能需要提高价格。

Anytime you can buy stock in for less than it’s worth, it’s advantageous to the continuing shareholders, and — but it should be by a demonstrable margin. You can’t — intrinsic value can’t be that finely calculated that you can figure it out to four decimal places or anything of the sort. Charlie?

任何时候你能以低于其价值的价格购买股票，这对持续的股东是有利的——但这应该是一个明显的差距。你不能——内在价值不能被计算得如此精确，以至于你能算到小数点后四位或类似的东西。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ll notice that elsewhere in corporate America, these buyback plans get a life of their own, and it’s gotten quite common to buy back stock at very high prices that really don’t do the shareholders any good at all. I don’t know why people exactly are doing it. I think it gets to be fashionable.

查理·芒格：你会注意到，在美国其他地方，这些回购计划开始独立运作，回购股票在非常高的价格下变得相当普遍，这对股东根本没有任何好处。我不知道人们到底为什么要这样做。我认为这变得时尚起来了。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s fashionable and they get sold on it by advisors.

沃伦·巴菲特：这很时髦，顾问们会向他们推销。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s true, too.

查理·芒格：这也是真的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Can you imagine somebody going out and saying, we’re going to buy a business and we don’t care what the price is? You know, we’re going to spend $5 billion this year buying a business, we don’t care what the price is.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你能想象有人出去说，我们要买一家公司，我们不在乎价格吗？你知道，我们今年要花 50 亿美元买一家公司，我们不在乎价格。

But that’s what companies do when they don’t attach some kind of a metric to what they’re doing on their buybacks. To say we’re going to buy back 5 billion of stock, maybe they don’t want to publicize the metric, but certainly they should say, we’re going to buy back 5 billion of stock if it’s advantageous to buy it back.

但这就是公司在进行股票回购时不附加任何指标所做的事情。说我们将回购 50 亿美元的股票，也许他们不想公开这个指标，但他们当然应该说，如果回购是有利的，我们将回购 50 亿美元的股票。

But they don’t — you know, if they say we’re going buy the XYZ Company, they say, we’ll buy it at this price, but we won’t buy it at 120 percent of that price. But I have very rarely seen — Jamie Dimon is very explicit about saying he’s going to buy back the stock when he’s buying it below what he considers intrinsic value to be.

但他们并不会——你知道，如果他们说我们要收购 XYZ 公司，他们会说，我们会以这个价格收购，但我们不会以这个价格的 120%收购。但我很少见到——杰米·戴蒙非常明确地表示，当他以他认为的内在价值以下的价格回购股票时，他会回购股票。

But I have seen hundreds of buyback notices, and I’ve sat on boards of directors one after another where they have voted buybacks and basically — and they said they were doing it to prevent dilution or something like that. It’s got nothing to do with preventing dilution. I mean, if you’re — dilution by itself is a negative and buying back your stock at too high a price is another negative.

但我见过数百份回购通知，我也曾在一个又一个董事会中任职，他们投票决定回购股票，并基本上——他们说这样做是为了防止稀释或类似的理由。这与防止稀释没有任何关系。我的意思是，稀释本身就是一个负面因素，而以过高的价格回购股票也是另一个负面因素。

So it has to be related to valuation. And as I say, you will not find a lot of press releases about buybacks that say a word about valuation.

所以这必须与估值有关。正如我所说，你不会发现很多关于回购的新闻稿提到估值这个词。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The occasion — we’re always behaving a lot like what some might call the Episcopal prayer. We prayerfully thank the Lord that we’re not like these other religions who are inferior. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：这个场合——我们总是表现得很像某些人所称的主教祷告。我们虔诚地感谢上帝，我们不像那些劣等的其他宗教。（笑）

I’m afraid there’s probably too much of that in Berkshire, but we can’t help it. (Laughter.)

我担心在伯克希尔可能有太多这样的事情，但我们无能为力。（笑声。）

34. New Nebraska Furniture Mart store in Dallas doing big business

新的内布拉斯加家具市场在达拉斯生意兴隆

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett.

观众：下午好，巴菲特先生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Shawn Montgomery (PH) from Fort Worth, Texas. The Nebraska Furniture Mart has been open for about a year in Dallas.

观众成员：我叫肖恩·蒙哥马利（PH），来自德克萨斯州沃斯堡。内布拉斯加家具市场在达拉斯开业已经大约一年了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦·巴菲特：对。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was just curious how sales have been, how they compare to your other stores, and what you think they’ll be in the future. Thank you.

观众成员：我只是好奇销售情况如何，和你们其他店铺相比怎么样，以及你认为未来会怎样。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s our largest store in volume. But we had a problem there that we had in Kansas City, and we’ll probably have every time we open a store, in that we generate so much initial volume that we had a delivery problem. Like I say, it was worse in Kansas City — that was the first one we opened.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是我们销量最大的商店。但我们在那儿遇到了一个问题，就像我们在堪萨斯城遇到的那样，每次开店时我们可能都会遇到这个问题，因为我们产生了如此大的初始销量，以至于出现了配送问题。就像我说的，在堪萨斯城的情况更糟——那是我们开设的第一家店。

So we really had to take our foot off the gas pedal because the last thing in the world we want to do, you know, is make first impressions with delivery problems — accompanied by delivery problems.

所以我们真的不得不放慢脚步，因为我们最不想做的事情就是给人留下有交付问题的第一印象。

So, it’s our largest store in volume. The deliveries have gotten far better. They actually are meeting our company standards that we have in Omaha.

所以，这是我们体量最大的商店。送货服务已经大大改善。实际上，他们达到了我们在奥马哈设定的公司标准。

But that wasn’t the case for some months. And it’s hard to go open up — we opened up the largest home furnishing store in the United States, and we did it in an area where we naturally thought we trained the drivers as well as we could and everything.

但几个月来情况并非如此。而且很难去开放——我们在美国开设了最大的家居用品商店，我们是在一个我们自然认为已经尽可能训练好司机的地区开设的。

But delivery with 100-plus units out there in a new operation, you know, taking in carpet and people getting lost and routing being bad and all kind — there was plenty of work to be done. And it’s been done.

但是在一个新的运营中，交付超过 100 个单位，你知道，处理地毯，人们迷路，路线不佳等等——还有很多工作要做。而且这些工作已经完成了。

So I expect that store, which already is the largest store we have, but I think it’ll be a billion-dollar annual store before very long. We’re getting ready to step on the gas. It’s a terrific area.

所以我预计那家店，已经是我们最大的店，但我认为它很快就会成为一家年收入十亿美元的商店。我们正在准备全力以赴。这是一个很棒的地区。

We have 20-plus auto dealerships there in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. We probably have three or four of them in the area where our Furniture Mart is. They can’t build fast enough down there. Toyota’s moving there. Lexus.

我们在达拉斯/沃斯堡地区有超过 20 家汽车经销商。我们在家具市场所在的地区可能有三四家。他们在那里的建设速度赶不上需求。丰田正在搬到那里。雷克萨斯。

It’s going — it already is a great store, but it’s going to be something even far beyond that.

它正在发展——它已经是一家很棒的商店，但它将会变得更加出色。

We’ve opened up about — I think there are about four food places so far. We’ve got four or five more in the works. And they’re doing terrific volumes.

我们已经公开了——我想目前大约有四个餐饮场所。我们还有四到五个正在筹备中。它们的营业额非常可观。

I’m starting to sound like Donald Trump here, you know, tremendous, terrific, you know, fantastic, I’ve never seen anything like it. (Laughter)

我开始听起来像唐纳德·特朗普了，你知道的，巨大的，了不起的，你知道，奇妙的，我从未见过这样的事情。（笑声）

Just wait until next year. I’ll come back, I’ll really be in shape then.

等到明年吧。我会回来，到时候我真的会保持好状态。

It’s doing well. We couldn’t have picked a better area. We have 400 and — have over 400 acres that we were very fortunate in corralling a whole bunch of land, and we’re bringing prices and variety like they — nobody’s seen. And now we’ve just got to bring in delivery like nobody’s ever seen.

它发展得很好。我们无法选择一个更好的地区。我们有 400 多英亩的土地，我们非常幸运地聚集了大量土地，我们带来的价格和品种是前所未见的。现在我们只需提供前所未有的配送服务。

35. Buffett’s concerns about weapons of mass destruction

巴菲特对大规模杀伤性武器的担忧

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Chris Gottscho (PH) of New York.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自纽约的克里斯·戈特肖（PH）。

Mr. Buffett, you have expressed concern about cyber, biological, nuclear, and chemical attacks, but preventing catastrophe is not getting enough attention.

巴菲特先生，您对网络、生物、核和化学攻击表示担忧，但防止灾难并没有得到足够的关注。

For example, a bill passed the house unanimously to harden the electric grid against the high-altitude nuclear explosion. Not too many bills pass unanimously these days, but then the bill got bottled up in the Senate.

例如，一项法案在众议院一致通过，以加强电网抵御高空核爆炸的能力。如今，能够一致通过的法案并不多，但该法案随后在参议院被搁置。

Have you considered funding — wouldn’t it be a good idea for you to consider funding a lobbying and educational campaign to promote the public good in this area and counteract industry lobbyists who are often more interested in short-term profits?

您是否考虑过资金问题——为促进该领域的公共利益并对抗那些通常更关注短期利润的行业游说者，考虑资助一项游说和教育活动不是一个好主意吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, in my view, there is no problem remotely like the problem of what I call C-N-B-C, cyber, nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks, that either by rogue organizations, even possibly individuals, rogue states, I mean, you know, if you think about — you can think about a lot of things. It will happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在我看来，没有任何问题能与我所称之为 C-N-B-C 的网络、核、化学和生物攻击相提并论，这些攻击可能来自流氓组织，甚至可能是个人，流氓国家。我是说，如果你考虑一下——你可以想到很多事情。这将会发生。

I think we’ve been both lucky and, frankly, the people have done a very good job in government, because government is the real protection on this, in not having anything since 1945.

我认为我们既幸运，坦率地说，政府中的人们做得非常好，因为政府在这方面是真正的保护，自 1945 年以来没有发生任何事情。

We came very, very close during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And I don’t know what the odds were, but I do think that if there had been — I can think of many people that if they’d been in place of either [U.S. President John] Kennedy or [USSR Premier Nikita] Khrushchev, we would’ve had a very different result.

在古巴导弹危机期间，我们非常接近。我不知道几率是多少，但我确实认为，如果有很多人代替[美国总统约翰]肯尼迪或[苏联总理尼基塔]赫鲁晓夫，我们的结果会非常不同。

And it’s the ultimate problem. As I put in the annual report, it’s the only real threat to Berkshire’s economic — external threat to Berkshire’s economic well-being over time. And I just hope when — it’ll happen — I hope when it happens that it’s minimized.

这就是最终的问题。正如我在年度报告中所说，这是对伯克希尔经济的唯一真正威胁——对伯克希尔经济福祉的外部威胁。我只希望当它发生时——这肯定会发生——我希望它的影响能够降到最低。

But the desire of psychotics and megalomaniacs and religious fanatics and whatever to do harm on others is a lot more when you have 7 billion people on earth than when you had 3 billion or so, which was the case when I was born — less than 3 billion.

但是，当地球上有 70 亿人时，精神病患者、自恋狂、宗教狂热分子以及其他人对他人造成伤害的欲望要比当时只有 30 亿人时要强烈得多，而我出生时的情况是——不到 30 亿。

And unfortunately, there are means of doing it. You know, if you were a psychotic back far enough, you threw a stone at the guy in the next cave, and you would sort of limit — relationship of damage to psychosis.

不幸的是，有办法做到这一点。你知道，如果你在很久以前是个精神病患者，你会向隔壁洞穴的家伙扔石头，这样你就会在某种程度上限制——精神病造成的伤害关系。

But the — and that went along, you know, through bows and arrows and spears and cannons and various things. And in 1945, we unleashed something like the world had never seen, and that is a pop gun compared to what can be done now.

但是——这一路走来，你知道，通过弓箭、长矛、大炮和各种东西。1945 年，我们释放了人类从未见过的东西，而这与现在能做到的相比简直是小儿科。

So there are plenty of people that would like to cause us huge damage. And I came to that view when I was in my 20s. And in terms of my philanthropic efforts, I decided that that was one of two issues that I thought should be the main issue, and I got involved with all kinds of things like the Concerned — Union of —

所以有很多人想要对我们造成巨大的伤害。我在 20 多岁时就形成了这样的看法。在我的慈善努力方面，我决定这是我认为应该成为主要问题的两个问题之一，因此我参与了各种事情，比如关心——工会的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You supported the Pugwash Conference year after year and were exactly all by yourself.

查理·芒格：你年复一年地支持Pugwash会议，完全是独自一人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Union of Concerned Scientists, and I have given some money to the Nuclear Threat Initiative that was going to create a — sort of a Federal Reserve system to bank uranium that will take away some of the excuse for countries to develop their own highly-enriched uranium.

沃伦·巴菲特：我和关心科学联盟一起向核威胁倡议捐了一些钱，该倡议将创建一种类似于联邦储备系统的机制，用于储存铀，这将减少一些国家发展自己高浓缩铀的借口。

So — but it’s overwhelmingly a governmental problem on what you’re dealing, and it should be, and I think it actually has been the top priority for president after president. It’s not the thing they can go out and talk about it every day, and they don’t want to scare the hell out of everybody, and they also don’t want to tip people’s hands as to what they’re doing.

所以——但这主要是一个政府问题，您所处理的事情应该是这样的，我认为这实际上一直是每位总统的首要任务。这不是他们每天都可以出去谈论的事情，他们不想吓坏每个人，也不想让人们知道他们在做什么。

But being in the insurance business — you don’t have to even be in the insurance business — you can — you know that someday somebody will pull off something on a very, very, very big scale that will be harmful.

但身处保险行业——你甚至不必在保险行业——你知道，总有一天会有人在非常非常非常大的规模上做出一些有害的事情。

Maybe it will — the United States is probably the most likely place it happens, but it can happen a lot of other places, and that’s the one huge disadvantage to innovation. I mean, people —

也许会发生——美国可能是最有可能发生的地方，但它也可以在很多其他地方发生，这就是创新的一个巨大缺点。我的意思是，人们——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, I think he also asked, why don’t we, Berkshire, spend a lot more time telling the government what it should be doing and thinking?

查理·芒格：沃伦，我想他还问，为什么我们，伯克希尔，不花更多时间告诉政府应该做什么和思考什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ve tried telling people. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我试着告诉人们。（笑）

Nobody disagrees with you on it. They just — it seems sort of hopeless to — I mean, they don’t know what to do beyond what they’re doing.

没有人不同意你的看法。他们只是——这似乎有点无望——我的意思是，他们不知道除了现在所做的事情之外该怎么办。

And incidentally, they’ve done a lot of things. I mean, not all gets publicized, but — and I think Kennedy and Khrushchev — I mean, Khrushchev shouldn’t have been sending it over to Cuba, but at least he had enough sense when he knew Kennedy meant business to turn the ships around.

顺便说一下，他们做了很多事情。我的意思是，并不是所有的事情都被公开，但——我认为肯尼迪和赫鲁晓夫——我的意思是，赫鲁晓夫不应该把它送到古巴，但至少当他知道肯尼迪是认真的时，他有足够的头脑让船只掉头。

But it’s — you can’t count on there being Kennedys and Khrushchevs all the time in charge of things.

但你不能指望总有肯尼迪和赫鲁晓夫这样的人掌控一切。

And the mistakes that are — I see the mistakes that are made in business or human behavior where people act so contrary to their own long-range self-interest that — humans are very — you know, they’ve got a lot of frailties.

我看到在商业或人类行为中所犯的错误，人们的行为与他们自己的长远利益背道而驰——人类非常——你知道，他们有很多脆弱之处。

You can argue that if Hitler hadn’t been so anti-Semitic, you know, he could’ve kept a lot of scientists that might have gotten him to the atomic bomb before we did, but he was — he drove out the best of the scientific minds and fortunate —

你可以说，如果希特勒没有那么反犹太主义，他本可以留住很多科学家，这些科学家可能会让他在我们之前获得原子弹，但他却驱逐了最优秀的科学头脑，真是可惜

CHARLIE MUNGER: Imagine a guy stupid enough to think the way to improve science is to kick out all the Jews. (Laughter.)

查理·芒格：想象一下，有一个人愚蠢到认为改善科学的方法是把所有犹太人赶出去。（笑声。）

WARREN BUFFETT: It was — the hero of the 20th century may have been Leo Szilard. I mean, Leo Szilard is the guy that got [Albert] Einstein to cosign a letter to [President Franklin] Roosevelt and say, you know, one side or the other is going to get this, and we better get it first, basically. He said it much more eloquently than that. You can go to the internet and look up the letter, but — you know, we’ve both been good and we’ve been lucky.

沃伦·巴菲特：20 世纪的英雄可能是利奥·西拉德。我是说，利奥·西拉德是那个让[阿尔伯特]爱因斯坦共同签署一封信给[总统富兰克林]罗斯福的人，信中说，你知道，一方或另一方会得到这个，我们最好先得到它，基本上。他说得比这更有文采。你可以上网查找那封信，但——你知道，我们都很优秀，也很幸运。

But, if you remember post-9/11, people started getting a few envelopes with anthrax, and they went to, like, the National Enquirer and Tom Brokaw and Tom Daschle — I can’t remember.

但是，如果你还记得 911 事件后，人们开始收到几封含有炭疽菌的信件，像是寄给《国家询问者》和汤姆·布罗考以及汤姆·达施尔——我记不清了。

I mean, who knows what — when you’re — when you’ve got a mind that’s going to send anthrax to people, you know, how that decision making is made is just totally beyond comprehension. And that person did not end up doing a lot of damage, but the capability for damage is absolutely incredible.

我意思是，谁知道——当你——当你有一个会向人们发送炭疽的思想时，你知道，那种决策是如何做出的，完全超出了理解范围。那个人最终没有造成太多伤害，但造成伤害的能力绝对令人难以置信。

I don’t know how Berkshire does anything about — I don’t know how to do it philanthropically. If I knew how to do — reduce the probabilities of the C-N-B-C-type mass attack, if I knew how to reduce the probability by 5 percent, all my money would go to that, no question about that, maybe 1 percent.

我不知道伯克希尔如何处理这些事情——我不知道如何以慈善的方式去做。如果我知道如何减少 C-N-B-C 类型大规模攻击的概率，如果我知道如何将概率降低 5%，我所有的钱都会投入到这个上面，毫无疑问，可能只会 1%。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But hasn’t it been true we haven’t been very good at getting the government to follow any of our advice?

查理·芒格：但我们不是一直很难让政府听从我们的建议吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But this one’s important. (Laughter.)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但这个很重要。（笑声。）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well —

查理·芒格：是的，嗯——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Nobody argues with you about it. They just sort of throw up their hands. And some people work for a while on it and just get discouraged and quit.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。没有人会和你争论这个。他们只是有点无奈。有些人会努力一段时间，但最终感到沮丧而放弃。

I was involved — I forget the exact name of it, but their idea was — a bunch of nuclear scientists — this is long ago, but their idea was to affect elections in small states, the theory being that government was the main instrument and you would have the maximum impact. And just one after another, you know, people took it up and got discouraged.

我参与过——我忘记了确切的名称，但他们的想法是——一群核科学家——这是很久以前的事，但他们的想法是影响小州的选举，理论是政府是主要工具，你会有最大的影响。接二连三地，人们接手了这个想法，但都感到沮丧。

I don’t — I don’t think it’s because we — we’ve had the wrong leaders. I think our leaders have been good on this.

我不——我不认为这是因为我们——我们有错误的领导者。我认为我们的领导者在这方面表现得很好。

I think that any candidate — well, I do not worry about the fact that either [Hillary] Clinton or [Donald] Trump would regard that as the paramount problem of their presidency.

我认为任何候选人——好吧，我并不担心[希拉里]克林顿或[唐纳德]特朗普会将此视为他们总统任期内的首要问题。

But I just don’t know — the offense can be ahead of the defense, and that’s — you can win the game 99.99 percent of the time, but eventually anything that has any probability of happening, you know, will happen.

但我就是不知道——进攻可以领先于防守，而这——你可以 99.99%的时间赢得比赛，但最终任何有可能发生的事情，你知道，都会发生。

I wish I could give you a better answer. Charlie, have you got any —

我希望我能给你一个更好的答案。查理，你有什么——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have no hope of giving a better answer.

查理·芒格：我没有希望给出更好的答案。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s what they all say to me. Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们都这么对我说。是的。

36. Lubrizol’s lubricant additives business

Lubrizol的润滑剂添加剂业务

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: The Lubrizol lubricant additives business is one of your six largest noninsurance units, but there’s been relatively little disclosure about its performance since it was acquired nearly five years ago.

乔纳森·布兰特：Lubrizol 的润滑剂添加剂业务是你们六个最大的非保险单位之一，但自从近五年前被收购以来，关于其业绩的披露相对较少。

Can you please update us on how the core business has done and how the competitive landscape and end markets have evolved since it was acquired?

请您更新一下核心业务的表现，以及自从被收购以来竞争格局和最终市场的变化情况

I know the core business is not a growth business, but has the increase in miles driven helped their top line at all?

我知道核心业务不是一个增长型业务，但行驶里程的增加对他们的收入有帮助吗？

Could you also talk about the performance of one or two of their more important bolt-on acquisitions, whether it be Chemtool, the pipeline flow-improver company, Warwick, Weatherford, or Lipotec?

你能否谈谈他们一两个重要的附加收购的表现，无论是 Chemtool、管道流量改善公司、Warwick、Weatherford 还是 Lipotec？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The additive business — there’s four companies in it, basically — and it’s a no-growth, but very good, business, and we’re the leader.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。添加剂业务——基本上有四家公司——这是一个没有增长但非常好的业务，而我们是领导者。

So it has performed almost exactly as you would anticipate since purchase. And other specialty companies have — some of which have — have growth possibilities, but they’re small.

所以它的表现几乎完全符合你购买时的预期。其他一些专业公司也有增长的可能性，但它们的规模较小。

So Lubrizol overall, on an operational basis, has been very much as we anticipated, or you would’ve anticipated, if you looked at the prospectus at the time we bought it.

总体而言，Lubrizol 的运营情况与我们预期的非常一致，或者说，如果你在我们购买时查看了招股说明书，你也会有这样的预期。

They made one large acquisition which is — was a big mistake, and that was in the oil field specialty chemical area, and was made just about the time that — or even a little after — that oil took a nosedive.

他们进行了一个大型收购，这个收购是一个大错误，涉及的是石油领域的特种化学品，并且是在石油价格大幅下跌的时候，或者甚至稍晚一些时候进行的。

So we’ve had a — we’ve had some decent acquisitions there, but the biggest acquisition should not have been made.

我们在该领域进行了一些不错的收购，但最大的一次收购是个错误。

It is — we still got the fundamental earning power of the additives business and everything. That has not disappointed us in any way. It’s a very well-run operation that way, but it’s not a growth operation.

这就是——我们仍然拥有添加剂业务的基本盈利能力和一切。这在任何方面都没有让我们失望。这是一项运作非常良好的业务，但它不是一个增长型业务。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

37. “We like to look at micro factors”

“我们喜欢关注微观因素”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you so much for your insights, teaching, and being great role models. My name is Eric Silberger, a violinist based in New York City.

观众成员：你好。你好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，非常感谢你们的见解、教导，以及作为伟大的榜样。我的名字是埃里克·西尔伯格，是一名驻纽约市的小提琴家。

My question for both of you is related to psychological biases. Through Berkshire Hathaway’s operations, you get a very good read on macroeconomic factors. Yet, Berkshire does not make investment decisions based upon macroeconomic factors.

我对你们两个的问题与心理偏见有关。通过伯克希尔·哈撒韦的运营，你可以很好地了解宏观经济因素。然而，伯克希尔并不根据宏观经济因素做出投资决策。

How do you control the effect of information, such as knowing macroeconomic factors, or the anchoring effect of knowing stock prices, because after a while it’s hard not to once you’ve analyzed them before?

你如何控制信息的影响，比如了解宏观经济因素，或者知道股票价格的锚定效应，因为一旦你分析过这些信息，过一段时间后就很难不去考虑它们？

And how does that influence your rational decision making, whether you should ignore it, or whether you should try to use it in a positive way?

这如何影响你的理性决策，是否应该忽视它，或者是否应该尝试以积极的方式利用它？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I are certainly — we read a lot, so we — and we’re interested in economic matters, and political matters, for that matter. And so we — we know a lot, or are familiar a lot, I should say, with almost all the macroeconomic factors.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我当然——我们读了很多书，所以我们——我们对经济问题和政治问题都很感兴趣。因此，我们——我们对几乎所有的宏观经济因素都了解很多，或者说很熟悉。

That doesn’t mean we know where they’re going to lead. We don’t know where zero interest rates are going to lead. But we do know what’s going on, if we don’t know what — what is likely to —

这并不意味着我们知道它们将引向何处。我们不知道零利率将引向何处。但我们确实知道正在发生什么，即使我们不知道——可能会发生什么——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, there’s a confusion here.

查理·芒格：沃伦，这里有些混淆。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It says microeconomic factors.

查理·芒格：它说微观经济因素。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, micro.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，微观。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We pay a lot of attention to those.

查理·芒格：我们非常关注这些。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah. I’m sorry.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。我很抱歉。

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you talk about macro, we don’t know any more than anybody else.

查理·芒格：如果你谈论宏观经济，我们知道的和其他人一样多。

WARREN BUFFETT: He summed it up.

沃伦·巴菲特：他总结了这一点。

In terms of the businesses we buy, and we — when we buy stocks, we look at it as buying businesses, so they’re very similar decisions — we try to know all, or as many as we can know, of the microeconomic factors.

在我们购买的企业方面，当我们购买股票时，我们将其视为购买企业，因此这些决策非常相似——我们尽量了解所有或尽可能多的微观经济因素。

We — I like looking at the details of a business whether we buy it or not. I mean, I just find it interesting to study the species, and — and that’s the way you do study it. So I — I don’t think there’s any lack of interest in those factors or denying the importance of them. So am I getting his question or not, Charlie?

我们——我喜欢关注一个企业的细节，无论我们是否购买。我是说，我发现研究这些细节很有趣——这就是你研究它的方式。所以我——我认为对这些因素没有缺乏兴趣，也不否认它们的重要性。那么，查理，我是否理解了他的问题？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there hardly could be anything more important than the microeconomics. That is business. Business and microeconomics is sort of the same term.

查理·芒格：微观经济学几乎没有比这更重要的了。这就是商业。商业和微观经济学在某种程度上是同一个概念。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I guess —

观众成员：我想——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Microeconomics is what we do, and macroeconomics is what we put up with.

查理·芒格：微观经济学是我们所做的，宏观经济学是我们所忍受的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The anchoring effect, I mean, how do you deal with that as well?

观众成员：锚定效应，我是说，你们是如何应对这个的？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’re not anchored to what we’re ignoring.

查理·芒格：好吧，我们并不依赖于我们所忽视的事物。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I see. (Laughter)

观众成员：我明白了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we — Charlie and I are the kind that literally find it interesting in every business — we like to look at micro factors.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是我们——查理和我就是那种在每个行业中都能找到有趣之处的人——我们喜欢关注微观因素。

If we buy — when we buy a See’s Candy in 1972, you know, there may have been 140 shops or something. We’ll look at the — we’ll look at numbers on each one, and we’ll watch them over time, and we’ll see how third-year shops behave in the second year — we really like understanding businesses.

如果我们在 1972 年购买 See's Candy，你知道，当时可能有 140 家商店左右。我们会查看每家商店的数据，并随着时间的推移观察它们，看看第三年开业的商店在第二年的表现——我们真的很喜欢了解商业。

非常深入的了解。

It’s just — it’s interesting to us. And some of the information is very useful, and some of it may look like it’s not helpful, but who knows when some little fact stored in the back of your mind pops up and really does make a difference.

这对我们来说很有趣。有些信息非常有用，有些看起来可能没什么帮助，但谁知道你脑海中存储的某个小事实什么时候会冒出来，真的会产生影响呢。

So, we’re fortunate in that we’re doing what we love doing. I mean, we love doing this like other people like watching baseball games, and which I like to do, too.

所以，我们很幸运，因为我们在做我们热爱的事情。我的意思是，我们喜欢这样做，就像其他人喜欢看棒球比赛一样，而我也喜欢这样做。

But they — just the very act, every pitch is interesting, and every movement, you know, and whether the guy’s — you know, a double steal is interesting, or whatever it may be, and so that’s what our activity is really devoted to, and we talk about that sort of thing.

每个投球都很有趣，每个动作，无论是双偷垒还是其他，你都会觉得有趣。所以，这就是我们所致力的活动。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We try and avoid the worst anchoring effect, which is always your previous conclusion. We really try and destroy our previous ideas.

查理·芒格：我们尽量避免最糟糕的锚定效应，那就是你之前的结论。我们真的努力摧毁我们之前的想法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie says that if you disagree with somebody, you want to be able to state their case better than they can.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理说，如果你不同意某人，你应该能够比他们更好地陈述他们的观点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely.

查理·芒格：绝对如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: And at that point, you’ve earned the right to disagree with them.

沃伦·巴菲特：到那时，你就有权与他们意见不合。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Otherwise, you should just keep quiet. It would do wonders for our politics if everybody followed my system. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：否则，你应该保持沉默。如果每个人都遵循我的系统，我们的政治将会大有改善。（笑声和掌声）

38. I’d “much rather make money for Berkshire than for myself”

我“宁愿为伯克希尔赚钱，而不是为自己赚钱”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: Warren, just a quick request. Would you please stop using C-N-B-C as an acronym for mass destruction? (Laughter.)

贝基·奎克：沃伦，我有个小请求。你能不能不要把 C-N-B-C 当作大规模毁灭的缩写？（笑声。）

WARREN BUFFETT: But if I use N-B-C-C, then I’ve got a problem with [NBCUniversal CEO] Steve [Burke].

沃伦·巴菲特：但如果我使用 N-B-C-C，那么我就会和[NBC 环球首席执行官]史蒂夫·伯克有问题。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Matt Bandy in Dallas, Texas.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自德克萨斯州达拉斯的马特·班迪。

He’s asking about Seritage Growth Properties. He says, “In December, 2015, you filed a personal 13-G evidencing a roughly 8 percent ownership position in the real estate investment trust Seritage Growth Properties, which to my knowledge is not paralleled as a Berkshire investment.

他在询问 Seritage Growth Properties。他说：“在 2015 年 12 月，你提交了一份个人 13-G，证明你在房地产投资信托 Seritage Growth Properties 中拥有大约 8%的股份，据我所知，这在伯克希尔的投资中是没有类似的。”

“Alternatively, in September, 2015, Warren filed a personal 13-G evidencing ownership in Phillips 66, which is paralleled as a Berkshire investment.

“或者，在 2015 年 9 月，沃伦提交了一份个人 13-G，证明他拥有Phillips 66 的股份，这与伯克希尔的投资相对应。”

“My question is, how do you decide when making a personal investment for your own account versus an investment for Berkshire? I understand market cap and ownership sizing are the likely factors, but does it still not behoove him to invest for the shareholder’s benefit in a company like Seritage that might have significant upside, and where are you putting your personal money to work?”

“我的问题是，您如何决定在为自己投资和为伯克希尔投资时的选择？我理解市值和持股规模可能是重要因素，但在像 Seritage 这样可能有显著上行空间的公司中，为股东利益投资是否仍然是明智的？您个人的资金又是如何运作的？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. I do not own a share, or never have owned, a share of Phillips 66, so I’m not sure where that person — what he’s referring to.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。我没有拥有，也从未拥有过Phillips 66 的股票，所以我不确定那个人在指的是什么。

It may be that there’s some way when the form is filled out that — that because I’m CEO of Berkshire that on some line it imputes ownership to me or something. The answer is I’ve never owned a share of Phillips.

可能在填写表格时，有某种方式——因为我是伯克希尔的首席执行官，所以在某一行上将所有权归于我或其他什么。答案是我从未拥有过Phillips的任何股份。

And Seritage is a real estate investment trust that had a total market value of under $2 billion when I bought it. And my situation is that I have about 1 percent of my net worth outside of Berkshire and 99 percent in it, and I can’t be doing things that Berkshire does.

Seritage 是一家房地产投资信托，当我购买时其总市值不到 20 亿美元。我的情况是，我的净资产中大约有 1%在伯克希尔之外，99%在伯克希尔内部，而我不能做伯克希尔所做的事情。

So a Seritage, with a $2 billion market cap, is not really something that is of a Berkshire size. Plus we’ve never owned a real estate investment trust to my knowledge, or my memory, in Berkshire at all. I mean, it’s just not a — so, I could buy that and not have any worry about a conflict with Berkshire.

所以，市值 20 亿美元的 Seritage 并不算是伯克希尔的规模。此外，据我所知，伯克希尔从来没有拥有过房地产投资信托。我是说，这根本不是一个——所以，我可以购买它，而不必担心与伯克希尔的利益冲突。

As a practical matter, you know, my best ideas are — I hope they’re my best ideas —are off-limits for me because they go to Berkshire, if they’re sizable enough to have a significance to Berkshire.

实际上，你知道，我最好的想法——我希望它们是我最好的想法——对我来说是禁区，因为如果它们足够重要，就会归入伯克希尔。

We will not be making investments — unless it’s something very odd — we will not be making investments in companies with a total market cap of a couple billion while we’re our present size.

我们不会进行投资——除非是非常奇特的情况——在我们目前的规模下，我们不会对市值只有几亿的公司进行投资。

But — so, every now and then I see something that’s subsize for Berkshire that I’ll put my — that 1 percent of my net worth in, and the rest of the stuff is off-limits, basically, unless Berkshire’s all done buying something or — I mean, I own some wells that I bought a long, long time ago, and Berkshire was not in — was not interested. I mean, we bought enough or something at the time, or maybe we didn’t have money for investment.

所以，偶尔我会看到一些对伯克希尔来说规模较小的机会，我会用那1%的净资产进行投资，其余的基本上是禁止的，除非伯克希尔已经完成了某项收购，或者——我的意思是，我拥有一些很久以前买的油井，而伯克希尔对此并不感兴趣。我的意思是，当时我们已经买了足够的东西，或者也许我们没有投资的资金。

But I try to stay away from anything that could conflict with Berkshire.

但我尽量避免与伯克希尔发生任何冲突。

And if I’d been buying Phillips, when Berkshire was buying Phillips, or immediately — or prior — or subsequently, there could be a case where it’d be OK when — we might have hit some limit.

如果我在伯克希尔购买菲利普斯时也在购买菲利普斯，或者在此之前、之后，甚至是立即购买，可能会出现一种情况，那时我们可能会达到某个限制。

But the answer is I didn’t buy any, and I’ve never owned any. Charlie?

但答案是我没有买过任何东西，我也从来没有拥有过。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, part of being in a position like that we occupy, is you really don’t want conflict of interest or even the appearance of it. And it’s been 50 or 60 years, when have we embarrassed Berkshire by some of our side-gunning?

查理·芒格：嗯，身处我们这样的职位，确实不想有利益冲突或甚至是这种冲突的表象。已经过去了五六十年，我们什么时候因为一些旁敲侧击而让伯克希尔感到尴尬？

Both of us have practically nothing of significance, in the total picture, outside of Berkshire. I’ve got some Costco stock, because I’m director of Costco. Berkshire’s got some Costco stock.

我们俩在整体上几乎没有什么重要的东西，除了伯克希尔。我有一些好市多的股票，因为我是好市多的董事。伯克希尔也有一些好市多的股票。

There are two or three little overlaps like that, but basically Berkshire shareholders have more to worry about than some conflict that Warren and I are going to give it. We’re not going to do it.

这类的小重叠有两三个，但基本上伯克希尔的股东不用担心我们会带来什么利益冲突。我们不会这么做的。

WARREN BUFFETT: It may sound a little crazy, and it’s only because I can afford to say this, but I would much rather make money for Berkshire than for myself.

沃伦·巴菲特：这听起来可能有点疯狂，这只是因为我有能力这样说，但我更愿意为伯克希尔赚钱，而不是为自己赚钱。

I mean, it isn’t going to make any difference to me anyway. I’ve got all the money I could possibly need, and way more, and on balance, my personality — everything’s more wound up in how Berkshire does than I am myself, because I’m going to give it all away.

对我来说，这没有什么区别。我已经拥有了我需要的一切，甚至远超我需要的。而且，整体上来说，我的性格更多地与伯克希尔的表现挂钩，而不是我自己，因为我最终会把所有钱都捐出去。

So, I know my end result is zero, and I don’t want Berkshire’s end result to be zero. So I’m on Berkshire’s side. (Laughs)

所以，我知道我的最终结果是零，我不想让伯克希尔的最终结果是零。所以我站在伯克希尔这一边。（笑）

39. Berkshire’s cash flow outlook

伯克希尔的现金流展望

WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff. (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫。（掌声。）

CLIFF GALLANT: One of the great financial characteristics of Berkshire today is its awesome cash flow.

克里夫·加兰特：今天伯克希尔的一个伟大财务特征是其惊人的现金流。

While its simple earnings-less-capex formula yields an annual free cash flow calculation of, I figure, of around 10 to 12 billion, in reality it seems to be much higher, closer to 20 billion, and I think, in part, due to changes in the deferred tax asset year-to-year.

虽然其简单的收益减去资本支出公式得出的年度自由现金流计算大约在 100 亿到 120 亿之间，但实际上似乎要高得多，接近 200 亿，我认为这在一定程度上是由于递延税资产年复一年的变化。

What is the outlook for free cash flow, and can investors continue to expect similar dynamics going forward?

自由现金流的前景如何，投资者是否可以继续期待未来类似的动态？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There’s a lot of deferred tax that’s attributable to unrealized appreciation in securities. I don’t have the figure, but let’s just assume that’s 60 billion of unrealized appreciation in securities. Well, then there would be 21 billion of deferred tax.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。很多递延税款是由于证券的未实现增值。我没有具体数字，但我们假设证券的未实现价值是 600 亿美元。那么，递延税款将是 210 亿美元。

That isn’t really cash that’s available. It’s just an absence of cash that’s going to be paid out until we sell the securities.

这实际上并不是可用的现金。只是直到我们出售证券之前，将要支付的现金缺失。

Some arises through bonus depreciation. The railroad will have depreciation for tax purposes that’s a fair amount higher than for book purposes.

一些是通过超额折旧产生的。铁路在税务上的折旧将比账面上的折旧高出相当多。

But overall, I think of, primarily, the cash flow of Berkshire as a practical matter relating to our net income plus our increase in float, assuming we have an increase.

但总体而言，我主要将伯克希尔的现金流视为与我们的净收入加上我们的浮存金增加相关的实际问题，假设我们有增加。

And over the years, float has added $80-billion-plus to make available for investment beyond what our earnings have allowed for, and that’s the huge element.

多年来，浮存金已经为我们提供了超过800亿美元的额外投资资金，远超我们的收益总和，这就是浮存金的巨大作用。

We’re going to spend more than our depreciation in our businesses, primarily, number one, because of the — well, the railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy are two entities that will spend quite a bit more than depreciation, in all likelihood, for a long, long, long, long time.

我们将在我们的业务中花费超过我们的折旧，主要是因为——铁路和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源这两个实体在很长一段时间内很可能会花费远远超过折旧。

And the other businesses, unless we get into inflationary conditions, it won’t be a huge swing one way or the other.

其他业务，除非我们进入通货膨胀的情况，否则不会有很大的波动。

So, our earnings, the 17 — not counting investment, not counting capital gains — but our earnings, which were — whatever they were, you know, around 17 billion — plus our change in float is the net new available cash. But, of course, we can always sell securities and create additional cash. We can borrow money and create additional cash.

所以，我们的收益，不包括投资，不包括资本收益——但我们的收益，无论是多少，你知道，大约是 170 亿美元——加上我们的浮存金变化就是净新增可用现金。当然，我们总是可以出售证券来创造额外的现金。我们可以借钱来创造额外的现金。

But it’s not a very complicated economic equation at Berkshire. People didn’t — for a long time, they didn’t appreciate the value of float. We kept explaining it to them, and I think they probably do now.

但在伯克希尔，这并不是一个非常复杂的经济方程。人们——很长一段时间，他们没有意识到浮存金的价值。我们不断向他们解释，我想他们现在可能明白了。

The big thing, the goal, what Charlie and I think about, we want to add, every year, something to the normalized — you know, the normalized earning power per share of the company.

大事，目标，查理和我所考虑的，我们希望每年为公司的每股正常化收益能力增加一些东西。

And we think we can do it because we should be able to do it. We have retained earnings to work with every year to get that job done.

我们认为我们可以做到，因为我们应该能够做到。我们每年都有留存收益可以用来完成这项工作。

资金流向新的生产力。

Sometimes it doesn’t look like we’ve accomplished much, and we haven’t accomplished much.

有时候看起来我们并没有取得太多成就，实际上我们也没有取得太多成就。

And other years, we — something big happens, and we don’t know ahead of time which year is going to be which. Charlie?

还有其他年份，我们——发生了一些大事，而我们事先不知道哪一年会是哪个。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there are very few companies that have ever been similarly advantaged.

查理·芒格：嗯，很少有公司曾经拥有过类似的优势。

In the whole history of Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve lived in a torrent of money, and we were constantly deploying it, and disbursed assets, and we were wising up as we went along. That’s a pretty good system.

在伯克希尔哈撒韦的整个历史中，我们生活在一股资金的洪流中，我们不断地投入资金和分配资产，同时我们也在不断地变得聪明。这是一个相当不错的系统。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a —

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一场——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re not going to change it.

查理·芒格：我们不会改变它。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. And it’s allowed for a lot of mistakes. I mean, that’s the interesting thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。这允许了很多错误。我是说，这就是有趣的地方。

American business has been good enough that you don’t have to be — you don’t have to really be smart to get a decent result. And if you can bring a little bit of intellect, you know, then you should get a pretty good result.

美国的商业环境一直很好，以至于你不必聪明才智出众就能取得不错的结果。如果你能带来一点智慧，那么你应该能获得相当不错的结果。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What you’ve got to do is be aversive to the standard stupidities. You just keep those out. You don’t have to be smart.

查理·芒格：你需要做的是避免那些标准的愚蠢行为。你只需把它们排除在外。你不必聪明。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank God.

沃伦·巴菲特：感谢上帝。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank God, right.

查理·芒格：谢天谢地，对吧。

40. We’ve “avoided the self-destructive behavior”

我们“避免了自我毁灭的行为”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Section 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 11 节。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey, Warren and Charlie. Thank you so much for your generosity and sharing your life’s accumulation of knowledge and financial capital to the progress of humanity. Thank you for that.

观众成员：嘿，沃伦和查理。非常感谢你们的慷慨，分享你们一生积累的知识和金融资本，为人类的进步做出贡献。谢谢你们。

And Berkshire managers, thank you for building important companies and stewarding our financial futures. Thank you, guys.

并且感谢伯克希尔的管理者们，感谢你们建立重要的公司并管理我们的财务未来。谢谢你们。

This is Bruce Wang from MICROJIG, traveling west from Orlando, Florida.

这是来自 MICROJIG 的布鲁斯·王，正在从佛罗里达州奥兰多向西旅行。

Last year, you kindly shared with me the importance of getting the best reputation you can and behaving well. This year I’d like to ask and preface with, Bill Gates wrote, “Warren’s gift is being able to think ahead of the crowd. It requires more than taking his aphorisms to the heart to accomplish that, although Warren is full of aphorisms well worth taking to heart.”

去年，您善意地与我分享了获得最佳声誉和良好行为的重要性。今年我想请教，并以比尔·盖茨的话作为开场：“沃伦的天赋在于能够超越人群思考。这不仅仅需要将他的格言铭记于心，尽管沃伦的格言确实值得铭记。”

And he also added that, “I’ve never met anyone who thought in business in such a clear way.”

他还补充说：“我从未见过在商业上思考如此清晰的人。”

Warren, what elusive, yet obvious to you, truth has allowed you to think ahead of the crowd and build a clear mental framework to produce a historically significant institution powerhouse brand?

沃伦，是什么难以捉摸但对你来说显而易见的真理，让你能够超越人群，构建清晰的思维框架，从而打造出一个具有历史意义的企业巨头品牌？

And, Charlie, same to you, what obvious truth presents itself so clearly to you, but many would fervently disagree with you upon?

而且，查理，对你来说，什么明显的真理如此清晰地展现在你面前，但许多人会热切地不同意你呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think I got the question, and I — you know, I owe a great deal to Ben Graham in terms of learning about investing.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我明白这个问题，我——你知道，我在投资方面非常感谢本·格雷厄姆。

And I learned a — I owe a great deal to Charlie, in terms of learning a lot about business.

我从查理那里学到了很多，我在商业方面欠他很多。

And then I’ve also been around — I mean, I spent a lifetime, you know, looking at businesses and why some work and why some don’t work.

然后我也经历了很多——我的一生都在观察商业，思考为什么有些成功而有些失败。

You know, as Yogi Berra said, you can see a lot just by observing. And that’s pretty much what Charlie and I have been doing for a long time.

你知道，正如尤吉·贝拉所说的，你通过观察可以看到很多。这基本上就是查理和我很长一段时间以来一直在做的事情。

And you do — I mentioned pattern recognition earlier — you know, there’s — you — and I would say it’s important to recognize what you can’t do. So we have — we may have tried the department store business and a few things, but we’ve — we’ve generally tried to only swing at things in the strike zone, and our particular strike zone. And it really hasn’t been much more complicated than that.

你确实如此——我之前提到过模式识别——你知道，有——你——我会说，认识到你不能做的事情是很重要的。所以我们——我们可能尝试过百货商店业务和一些其他事情，但我们——我们通常只尝试在我们的击球区内的事情，而我们的特定击球区。实际上，这并没有比这更复杂。

You do not need — you don’t need the IQ in the investment business that you need in certain activities in life. But you do have — you do have to have emotional control.

你在投资行业不需要像生活中某些活动那样的智商。但你确实需要——你确实需要有情绪控制。

I mean, we see very smart people do very stupid things, and it’s fascinating how humans do that. Just take the people that get very rich and then leverage themselves up in some way that they lose everything.

我意思是，我们看到非常聪明的人做出非常愚蠢的事情，这让人着迷的是人类是如何做到这一点的。就拿那些变得非常富有的人来说，他们以某种方式杠杆化自己，结果失去了一切。

I mean, they are risking something that’s important to them for something that isn’t important to them.

我的意思是，他们为了不重要的事情而冒着失去对他们重要的东西的风险。

Well, you can say, you could figure that one out in first grade, but people do it time after time.

好吧，你可以说，这个在一年级就能想明白，但人们一次又一次地这样做。

And you see that constantly, self-destructive behavior of one way or another. I think we’ve probably — and it doesn’t take a genius to do it, but I think we’ve sort of avoided the self-destructive behavior.

你会不断看到以某种方式表现出的自我毁灭行为。我认为我们可能——这并不需要天才才能做到，但我认为我们在某种程度上避免了自我毁灭的行为。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s just a few simple tricks that work — work well, and particularly if you’ve got a temperament that has a combination of patience and opportunism in it.

查理·芒格：嗯，有一些简单的技巧有效——效果很好，特别是如果你有耐心和机会主义相结合的性格。

And I think that’s largely inherited, although I suppose it can be learned to some extent.

我认为这在很大程度上是遗传的，尽管我想在某种程度上是可以学习的。

Then I think there’s another factor that accounts for the fact that Berkshire has done as well as it has, is that we’re really trying to behave well.

然后我认为还有一个因素解释了伯克希尔表现如此出色，那就是我们真的在努力表现得很好。

And I had a great-grandfather. When he died, the preacher gave the talk, and he said none envied this man’s success, so fairly won and wisely used. That’s a very simple idea, but it’s exactly what Berkshire’s trying to do.

我有一个曾祖父。当他去世时，牧师发表了讲话，他说没有人嫉妒这个人的成功，因为他的成功是公正获得并明智使用的。这是一个非常简单的想法，但这正是伯克希尔所试图做到的。

There are a lot of people who make a lot of money and everybody hates them, and they don’t admire the way they earned the money.

有很多人赚了很多钱，但大家都讨厌他们，并且不欣赏他们赚取这些钱的方式。

And I’m not particularly admirable of making money running gambling casinos. And, you know, we don’t own any. And we’ve turned down businesses, including a big tobacco business.

我并不特别钦佩通过经营赌博赌场来赚钱。而且，你知道，我们并不拥有任何赌场。我们拒绝了包括一家大型烟草企业在内的业务。

So, I don’t think Berkshire would work as well if we were just terribly shrewd, but didn’t have a little bit of what the preacher said about my grandfather, Ingham.

所以，我认为如果我们只是非常精明，但没有一点牧师所说的关于我祖父英厄姆的东西，伯克希尔就不会运作得那么好。

We want to have people think of us as having won fairly and used wisely.

我们希望人们认为我们是公平获胜并明智使用的。

It works. (Applause.) 它有效。（掌声。）

WARREN BUFFETT: And we were very, very lucky to be born when we were and where we were. And I mean, we — you could’ve dropped us at some other place in time or some other part of the world, and things would’ve turned out —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们非常非常幸运，出生在我们所处的时间和地点。我是说，如果把我们放在其他时间或世界的某个地方，事情可能会变得完全不同——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And think of how lucky you were to have your Uncle Fred. Warren had an uncle who was one of the finest men I ever knew. I used to work for him, too. You know, a lot of people have terrible relatives. (Laughter.)

查理·芒格：想想你有弗雷德叔叔是多么幸运。沃伦有一个叔叔，他是我见过的最优秀的人之一。我也曾为他工作过。你知道，很多人都有可怕的亲戚。（笑声。）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s not an unimportant point. Just yesterday, we had a meeting of all my cousins and a whole bunch that we just get together at the annual meeting time. There are probably 40 of us or 50 of us there.

沃伦·巴菲特：这并不是一个不重要的观点。就在昨天，我们召开了所有表亲的会议，还有一大堆人，我们在年度会议期间聚在一起。那里大约有 40 到 50 个人。

And they were pulling out some old pictures, and four — I had four aunts, they are all in these pictures — and every one of them — you know, I mean, you were so lucky to have one like that, and I had four. I mean, they just were — in every way they reinforced a lot of things that needed some reinforcement in my case.

他们在翻出一些旧照片，我有四个姑姑，她们都在这些照片里——每一个——你知道，我是多么幸运能有一个这样的姑姑，而我有四个。我的意思是，她们在各个方面都加强了我需要一些支持的很多事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I wish you’d had a couple more. (Laughter.)

查理·芒格：我希望你能再有几个。（笑声。）

WARREN BUFFETT: But — 沃伦·巴菲特：但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’d be doing even better.

查理·芒格：我们会做得更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: But, he mentioned my Uncle Fred, but my Aunt Katie worked in the store, too. My Aunt Alice worked in the store, and they just — you just couldn’t have been around better people. I think Charlie would agree with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是，他提到了我的弗雷德叔叔，我的凯蒂阿姨也在商店工作。我的爱丽丝阿姨也在商店工作，他们真的是——你无法遇到更好的人。我想查理会同意这一点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, we were very lucky.

查理·芒格：是的。我们非常幸运。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. My grandfather was a little tough, however. Tell them what my grandfather used to do when he paid you on Saturday, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我的祖父有点严厉。不过，查理，告诉他们我祖父在周六给你发工资时会做什么。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that was very interesting. Warren’s a Democrat, but he came from different antecedents. I worked for his grandfather, Ernest, and he was earnest. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：嗯，这非常有趣。沃伦是个民主党人，但他来自不同的背景。我曾为他的祖父欧内斯特工作过，他是个真诚的人。（笑）

And when they passed Social Security, which he disapproved of because he thought it reduced self-reliance — and he paid me $2 for 10 hours work, there was no minimum wage in those days — on Saturday, and it was a hard ten hours.

当他们通过社会保障法时，他对此表示不满，因为他认为这降低了自力更生——而且他给我支付了 2 美元，换取 10 小时的工作，那时候没有最低工资——在星期六，那是十个艰难的小时。

At the end of the ten hours, I came in and he made me give him two pennies, which was my contribution to Social Security. (Laughter)

在十小时结束时，我进来了，他让我给他两个便士，这是我对社会保障的贡献。（笑声）

And he gave me two $1 bills and a long lecture about the evils of Democrats, and the welfare state, and a lack of self-reliance, and it went on and on and on and on.

他给了我两张一美元的钞票，还对我进行了长时间的讲座，讲述民主党的罪恶、福利国家的弊端以及缺乏自力更生，讲了个没完没了。

So, I had the right antecedents, too. I had Ernest Buffett telling me what to do.

所以，我也有正确的背景。我有厄尼斯特·巴菲特告诉我该怎么做。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Enough family history.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。家族历史说够了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I haven’t overstated that, have I?

查理·芒格：我没有夸大这一点，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, you haven’t overstated it at all. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，你一点也没有夸大。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: You can’t believe what people — and he thought he was doing his duty by the world to do that.

查理·芒格：你无法想象他当时的想法——他真的认为这样做是在履行对世界的责任。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we were lucky then. The people we were around when we were young, we were very lucky.

沃伦·巴菲特：但那时我们很幸运。我们年轻时身边的人，我们非常幸运。

41. Due diligence doesn’t find the real risks of buying a company

尽职调查无法发现收购公司的真实风险

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew. 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: “Warren and Charlie, you’re famous for making a deal over a day or two with nothing more than a handshake. You pride yourself on the small overhead of doing the diligence mostly yourself.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：“沃伦和查理，你们以仅凭握手在一两天内达成交易而闻名。你们以自己大部分亲自进行尽职调查的低开销而感到自豪。”

Other successful acquisitive companies use teams of internal people, outside bankers, consultants, and lawyers to due diligence, often over many months to assess deals.

其他成功的收购公司会利用内部团队、外部银行家、顾问和律师进行尽职调查，通常需要数月时间来评估交易。

Speed may be a competitive advantage. You’ve done some amazing deals. But does your diligence process also put us at greater risk? And if you’re ever gone, how would you recommend Berkshire change how we approach dealmaking?

速度可能是竞争优势。你们做了一些惊人的交易。但你们的尽职调查过程是否也让我们面临更大的风险？如果你不在了，你会建议伯克希尔如何改变我们处理交易的方式？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I get that question fairly often, sometimes — often from lawyers.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我经常收到这个问题，有时——经常是来自律师。

In fact, our own — we talked to Munger Tolles, the law firm, and that was one of the questions I got, why we didn’t do more due diligence, which we would have paid them by the hour for.

事实上，我们自己——我们与法律事务所 Munger Tolles 进行了交谈，这是我得到的一个问题，为什么我们没有进行更多的尽职调查，而我们本可以按小时支付他们费用。

The — (Laughter) —（笑声）

It’s interesting. We’ve made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions. Plenty. And we made mistakes in not making acquisitions, but the mistakes are always about making an improper assessment of the economic conditions in the future of the industry of the company.

这很有趣。我们在收购中犯了很多错误。很多。而我们在没有进行收购时也犯了错误，但这些错误总是关于对公司行业未来经济状况的错误评估。

They’re not a bad lease. They’re not a specific labor contract. They’re not a questionable patent. They’re not the things that are on the checklist, you know, for every acquisition by every major corporation in America. Those are not the things that count.

它们不是一个糟糕的租约。它们不是一个特定的劳动合同。它们不是一个有争议的专利。它们不是每个美国大型企业收购时清单上的那些东西。那些不是重要的东西。

What counts is whether you’re wrong about — whether you’ve really got a fix on the basic economics and how the industry’s likely to develop, or whether Amazon’s likely to kill them, you know, in a few years, or that sort of thing.

重要的是你是否对基本经济学有正确的理解，以及行业可能如何发展，或者亚马逊是否可能在几年内将他们击垮，类似这样的事情。

We have not found a due diligence list that gets at what we think are the real risks when we buy a business. And like I say, we’ve made — we’ve certainly made at least — oh, at least a half a dozen mistakes and probably a lot more if you get into mistakes of omission.

我们没有找到一份尽职调查清单，能够涵盖我们认为在收购企业时真正的风险。正如我所说，我们确实犯过至少六个错误，如果算上遗漏的错误，可能还有更多。

But none of those would have been cured by a lot more due diligence. They might have been cured by us being a little smarter.

但这些问题都无法通过更多的尽职调查来解决。它们可能会通过我们变得更聪明一些而得到解决。

It isn’t — it just isn’t the things that are on the checklist that really count. Assessing whether a manager, who I’m going to hand a billion dollars to, for his business, and he is going to hand me a stock certificate, assessing whether he’s going to behave differently in the future in running that business than he has in the past when he owned it, that’s incredibly important, but there’s no checklist in the world that’s going to answer that.

这并不是一份检查清单上列出的事情。评估我将交给他十亿美元而他将交给我一张股票证书的经理人是否会在未来表现得和他过去拥有公司时一样，这非常重要，但没有世界上任何一份清单可以回答这个问题。

So, if we thought there were items of due diligence — and incidentally, there are a few that get covered. I mean, you want to make sure that they don’t have twice as many shares out as you’re buying or something of the sort.

因此，如果我们认为有尽职调查事项——顺便说一下，确实有一些被覆盖的事项。我的意思是，你需要确保他们没有发行两倍于你购买的股票数量，或者类似的事情。

But they’re — if we thought there were things that we were missing that were of importance in assessing the future economic prospects of the business, you know, we would, by all means, drill down on those.

但是如果我们认为在评估未来商业经济前景时有重要的事情被我们忽视了，我们当然会深入研究这些问题。

But the question of — you know, when we bought See’s, it probably had 150 leases. You know, when we — when we buy Precision Castparts, they have 170 plants, you know, there’s going to be pollution problems at some place.

但是问题是——你知道，当我们购买 See's 时，它大概有 150 个租约。你知道，当我们购买 Precision Castparts 时，他们有 170 个工厂，你知道，某些地方会有污染问题。

Those are — that is not what determines whether a $32 billion acquisition is going to look good five years from now, or ten years from now.

但这些并不是决定320亿美元收购在五年或十年后看起来如何的关键因素。

We try to focus on those things. And I do think it probably facilitates things with, at least, certain people that our method of operation does cut down —

我们尽量专注于这些事情。我确实认为，这可能会在某种程度上促进与某些人的交流，因为我们的运作方式确实减少了——

You get into squabbles on small things. I’ve seen deals fall apart because people start arguing about some unimportant point, and their egos get involved, and, you know, they draw lines in the sand and all of that.

你在小事上争吵。我见过因为人们开始争论一些无关紧要的点而导致交易破裂，他们的自尊心介入，你知道，他们划定界限，诸如此类。

I think we gain a lot. When we start to make a deal, it usually gets done. Charlie.

我认为我们获得了很多。当我们开始达成交易时，通常会成功。查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you stop to think about it, business quality usually counts on something more than whether you cross the T in some old lease or something.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你仔细想想，商业质量通常不仅仅取决于你是否在某个旧租约上划了个 T。

And the human quality of the management who are going to stay are very important. And how are you going to check that as — by due diligence, you know?

管理层的人性素质非常重要，他们将会留下来。你打算如何通过尽职调查来检查这一点呢？

And I think — I don’t know anybody who’s had a generally better record than Berkshire in judging business quality and the human quality of the people.

我认为——我不知道还有谁在评估商业质量和人们的人品方面的记录比伯克希尔更好。

We’re going to lead the business after it’s acquired, and I don’t think it would’ve improved at all by using some different method. So I think the answer is that for us, at least, we’re doing it the way we should.

我们将在收购后领导这项业务，我认为使用其他方法并不会有所改善。因此，我认为答案是，至少对我们来说，我们正在以正确的方式进行。

WARREN BUFFETT: Negotiations that drag out have a tendency — they’re more likely to blow up for some reason. I mean, people — they can get obstinate about very small points, and it’s silly to be obstinate, but people get silly sometimes.

沃伦·巴菲特：拖延的谈判往往更容易因为某种原因而破裂。我的意思是，人们可能会对非常小的细节变得固执，这很愚蠢，但人们有时会变得愚蠢。

I like to keep things moving. I like to show a certain amount of trust in the other person, because usually trust comes back to you.

我喜欢让事情保持进展。我喜欢对对方表现出一定的信任，因为通常信任会回到你身上。

But the — you know, the truth is there’s some bad apples out there, and spotting them is not going to come from looking at documents.

但你知道，事实是外面有一些坏苹果，而识别它们并不是通过查看文件来实现的。

You really have to size up whether that person who’s getting a lot of cash from you is going — how they’re going to behave in the future, because we’re counting on them.

你真的要评估一下那个从你这里获得很多现金的人将来会如何表现，因为我们依赖他们。

And that assessment is as important as anything involved — you know, we know all the figures and everything going in, and we know what we’ll pay, and so we don’t want things to get gummed up in negotiations.

这种评估和所有相关事项一样重要——你知道，我们知道所有的数字和相关信息，我们知道我们会支付的费用，因此我们不希望在谈判中出现障碍。

And I’m perfectly willing to lose small points here and then on a deal. If I have the deal on the right terms, I don’t believe in — in making a — and Tom Murphy taught me this — I mean, you know, you just don’t try and win every point. It’s a terrible mistake.

我完全愿意在交易中失去一些小的细节。如果我拿到了合适的交易条款，我不认为——我不相信一定要每个点都赢。汤姆·墨菲教过我这个道理——我的意思是，你知道的，你不应该试图在每个方面都获胜。这是一个严重的错误。

You make a decent deal, and if you find something that bends a little different someway, that’s OK.

你做了一个不错的交易，如果你发现某种方式稍微有点不同的东西，那也没关系。

If you think it’s bad faith and gives an indication of the character of the person you’re dealing with, then you got another problem, and you’re lucky if you find that out early. Charlie, any more?

如果你认为这是恶意行为，并且表明了你所面对的人的性格，那么你就有另一个问题，如果你能早早发现这一点，那你算是幸运的。查理，还有其他的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: How many people who, in this room, are happily married, carefully checked their spouse’s birth certificate and so on? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：在座的各位，有多少人幸福地结婚了，仔细检查过配偶的出生证明等等？（笑声）

My guess is that our methods are not so uncommon as they appear.

我的猜测是，我们的方法并不像看起来那么不常见。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’ll think about that. (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会考虑这个的。（掌声。）

42. “We don’t pay any attention to titles”

“我们不关注头衔”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, the announcement earlier this month, that Ajit Jain would be taking over responsibility for all of Berkshire’s reinsurance efforts once Tad Montross retires from General Re, has raised some questions about not only the change in leadership structure but succession planning.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，本月早些时候宣布，阿吉特·贾因将在塔德·蒙特罗斯从通用再保险退休后接管伯克希尔所有再保险工作的责任，这引发了一些关于领导结构变化和继任计划的问题。

Given the state of the reinsurance market, it makes sense to have Ajit overseeing both businesses, especially if the pricing environment expected to be difficult for another ten years, and there are duplicative efforts that can be streamlined.

考虑到再保险市场的状况，让 Ajit 同时监督这两项业务是有意义的，特别是如果预计未来十年定价环境将会困难，并且有可以精简的重复性工作。

Given this move and the change in responsibilities we’ve seen at several of Berkshire’s subsidiaries the last few years, I was just wondering if you could just give us some color on how succession planning is handled at the subsidiary level, and any insight you could give us into what led you to finally decide to have Ajit oversee both of Berkshire’s reinsurance arms, and whether or not it will change the amount of work you’ll be doing on the specialty side of the business, would be greatly appreciated.

鉴于这一举动以及我们在伯克希尔的几个子公司看到的责任变化，我想知道您能否给我们一些关于子公司层面如何处理继任计划的情况，以及您能否分享一下是什么促使您最终决定让 Ajit 监督伯克希尔的两个再保险部门，以及这是否会改变您在专业业务方面的工作量，我们将非常感激。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Tad Montross, after 39 years, has done an absolutely sensational job for Berkshire. You know, originally — (applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。塔德·蒙特罗斯在伯克希尔工作了 39 年，做得非常出色。你知道，最初——（掌声）

Gen Re was a problem child for a while, as you know. Some brought on by itself and some external. But the — and Tad is — I mean, he’s sensational, and I tried several times, maybe successfully in terms of months but not in terms of years, to get him to stay on longer.

Gen Re 曾经是个问题公司，正如你所知道的。有些是自己造成的，有些是外部因素。但——而 Tad 是——我的意思是，他太出色了，我尝试过几次，也许在几个月的时间里成功了，但在几年上却没有成功，让他留得更久。

As you say, it makes sense to have the reinsurance operation under Ajit. Ajit’s ability to handle more and more things in insurance — he oversees a company called GUARD, which most of you have never heard it, and we bought it a few years ago, and it’s doing terrifically. It’s based in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

正如你所说，将再保险业务归于 Ajit 是有道理的。Ajit 处理保险事务的能力越来越强——他负责一家名为 GUARD 的公司，你们大多数人可能从未听说过，我们几年前收购了它，现在发展得非常好。它位于宾夕法尼亚州的威尔克斯-巴里。

It’s doing a great job with small business policies, primarily workers’ comp, around the country. And it’s flourished, you know, being put under Ajit.

它在全国范围内的小型企业保单方面做得很好，主要是工人赔偿保险。而且在 Ajit 的领导下，它蓬勃发展。

He started the specialty operation a couple years ago, and under Peter [Eastwood], that is going gangbusters.

几年前他开始了特种保险业务，在Peter Eastwood的领导下，这项业务发展得非常好。

And I have found — and this is interesting, but it’s true — I have found with really able people, they can handle so much.

我发现——这很有趣，但这是真的——我发现真正有能力的人，他们能应对很多事情。

I mean, they almost — well, just take Carrie Sova, that put this meeting together.

我意思是，他们几乎——好吧，就拿组织这次会议的凯莉·索瓦来说。

You know, if you have some preconceived notion that an annual meeting that’s going to have 40,000 people therefore needs, you know, to spend millions of dollars with all kinds of organizational planning and meetings and meetings and meetings, but really able people — my assistant, Debbie Bosanek, she can do anything.

你知道，如果你有一种先入为主的观念，认为一个有 40,000 人的年会因此需要花费数百万美元进行各种组织规划和会议，但实际上能干的人——我的助理，黛比·博萨内克，她什么都能做。

So there’s just no limit to what talented people can accomplish. And if I had something else in insurance tomorrow that needed doing, I’d probably call Ajit on that, too.

所以有才华的人能完成的事情是没有限制的。如果明天我在保险方面还有其他事情需要处理，我可能也会打电话给 Ajit。

So it has no — you know, in terms of my succession, that’s something — we’ll have a board meeting on Monday, but we’ll talk about it as we always do at every meeting and — you know, when — we haven’t — our thoughts are as one on that, and everybody knows why it makes the most sense.

关于我的继任问题，我们将在周一召开董事会会议，像往常一样讨论这个问题，我们的想法完全一致，每个人都知道为什么这样做最合适。

But five years from now, something different could make sense. That’s one reason for not announcing any names. I mean, who knows what happens in terms of the time when it happens or what happens to the person involved? Maybe their situation changes.

不过五年后，也许情况会有所不同，这就是为什么我们不会提前宣布任何名字。谁知道在那时会发生什么，或是那个人的情况是否会改变？

So it’s not a — there are no tea leaves to read in the fact that Ajit is supervising Gen Re from this point forward. Charlie?

所以，从现在开始，Ajit 监督 Gen Re 这一事实并没有什么值得解读的。Charlie？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, and there’s an obverse side of that. Not only can the able people usually do a lot more, but the unable people by and large you can’t fix. So —

查理·芒格：嗯，这还有一个反面。有能力的人通常能做的更多，而无能的人大体上是无法修复的。所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: That is for sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：这点是肯定的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’re forced to use our system if you have your wits about you.

查理·芒格：我认为如果你保持清醒，你就不得不使用我们的系统。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we don’t feel the need to follow any kind of organizational common view as to, you know, you do this and you have — only so many people can report to you or any of this sort of thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们并不觉得有必要遵循任何形式的组织共识，比如说，你必须这样做，只有这么多人可以向你汇报，或者类似的事情。

Berkshire — every decision that comes up, you know, we just try and figure out the most logical thing to do at that time. But we don’t have some grand design in mind of, you know, like an army organizational chart or something of the sort, and we never will.

伯克希尔——每一个出现的决策，我们只是尽量找出当时最合逻辑的做法。但我们并没有心中设想一个宏伟的设计，比如军队的组织结构图之类的东西，我们也永远不会有。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren and I once reached a decision we wouldn’t pay more than X dollars for something, and the man who was subordinate to both of us who was working on it just said, you guys are out of your minds. This is really stupid. This is a quality operation, you ought to pay up for it. We just looked at one another, and did it his way.

查理·芒格：沃伦和我曾经达成一个决定，我们不会为某样东西支付超过 X 美元，而我们下属的一个人正在处理这件事，他只是说，你们真是疯了。这真的很愚蠢。这是一个优质的操作，你们应该为此支付更多。我们只是互相看了一眼，然后按照他的方式做了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t pay any attention to titles or —

查理·芒格：我们不关注头衔或——

WARREN BUFFETT: He was right, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：他也是对的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He was right, yeah, of course. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：他是对的，是的，当然。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I’m sorry. Have you got —?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。对不起。你有——吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: If a charwoman gave us a good idea, we’d accept it cheerfully.

查理·芒格：如果一个女清洁工给了我们一个好主意，我们会欣然接受。

WARREN BUFFETT: Actually, one time the woman that does clean my office came in, and I think she’d been kind of wondering what I did, you know, based on — and I’d see her frequently, and her name was Ruby.

沃伦·巴菲特：其实，有一次来我办公室打扫的女士进来了，我想她一直在想我在做什么，你知道的，基于——我经常见到她，她的名字叫露比。

And finally one day she decided to really get to the heart of the matter, and she said, “Mr. Buffett, do you ever get any good horses?” Apparently thought this is where I was really making my money, was at the track, but — (Laughter)

最后有一天，她决定真正深入问题的核心，她说：“巴菲特先生，您有没有得到过好马？”显然，她认为我真正赚钱的地方是在赛马场，但——（笑声）

43. “The rating agencies are wrong” on Berkshire

“评级机构对伯克希尔的评价是错误的”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett —

观众：你好，巴菲特先生——

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Mr. Munger. Nirav Patel. Haverhill, Massachusetts. Thank you for taking my question.

观众成员：——芒格先生。我是尼拉夫·帕特尔，来自马萨诸塞州哈弗希尔。感谢您回答我的问题。

With Berkshire Hathaway being so well managed, why doesn’t it have a highest credit bond rating?

伯克希尔哈撒韦管理得如此出色，为什么它没有最高的信用债券评级？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me take that one.

查理·芒格：让我来处理这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The rating agencies are wrong — (laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：评级机构是错的——（笑声和掌声）

— and set in their ways.

— 并且固执己见。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we don’t fit their model very well.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们并不太符合他们的模式。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I mean, we don’t look like anything, exactly, they see otherwise. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我的意思是，我们看起来并不是什么特别的，他们看到的却是其他的东西。但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But that’s the answer.

查理·芒格：但这就是答案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们——（笑声）

I’ll say this, though. What I do, when they come in the door, I always say, “Let’s talk quadruple-A.” I believe in starting the negotiation from that standpoint. I never get any place.

我会这么说。当他们进门时，我总是说：“我们来谈谈四 A 级。”我相信从这个立场开始谈判。我从来没有取得任何进展。

44. 3G’s cost cutting hasn’t hurt Kraft Heinz

3G 的成本削减并没有伤害到卡夫亨氏

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: Questions continuing to come in about the financing and working relationship that Berkshire formed with 3G a couple of years ago, and this is one of those questions:

卡罗尔·卢米斯：关于伯克希尔与 3G 几年前形成的融资和合作关系的问题仍在不断涌入，这是其中一个问题：

“While 3G has been very successful in cutting costs and increasing margins at Kraft Heinz, the company has seen volumes and revenues decline.

虽然 3G 在降低成本和提高 Kraft Heinz 的利润方面非常成功，但公司却看到销量和收入下降。

As a long-term investor, how do you judge when a management is cutting muscle as well as fat? Can a business increase revenues while cutting costs?”

作为长期投资者，您如何判断管理层是在削减肌肉还是脂肪？企业在削减成本的同时能否增加收入？

And I forgot to say, this came from Rick Smith at New York City.

我忘了说，这来自纽约市的瑞克·史密斯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is, yes, that sometimes you can cut costs that are a mistake to cut, and you can — and sometimes you can keep costs that are a mistake to keep.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是，是的，有时你可以削减一些不该削减的成本，有时你也可以保留一些不该保留的成本。

Tom Murphy had the best approach. I mean, he never hired a person that he didn’t need, and therefore, they never had layoffs.

汤姆·墨菲有最好的方法。我的意思是，他从不雇用不需要的人，因此，他们从未裁员。

And you might say that at headquarters at Berkshire, we follow a similar approach. You would never — we just don’t — we don’t take on anybody.

你可以说，伯克希尔总部也遵循了类似的方法。我们基本不雇佣任何人。

Now, I think it is totally crazy when companies are in — now, if you’re in a cyclical business, you may have to cut a workforce because there aren’t as many carloads of freight moving, or something like that, so you cut back on crane crews and all that — but the idea that you give up your staff, whatever it may be, economists or something like that, because business has slowed down — if you didn’t need them — if you don’t need them now, you didn’t need them in the first place, you know.

我认为，在某些周期性行业中，当运输货物减少时，你可能不得不裁减一部分员工，例如减少起重机操作人员等。但当业务放缓时，你因为业务减少而削减某个部门的员工，这种做法是疯狂的。如果你现在不需要这些人，那么你一开始就不应该雇佣他们。

I mean, the people that are there just because somebody started a department, and they hired more people, and so on, I would argue that — since we’ve forgotten to insult this group so far — I would suggest that happens in investor relations departments, perhaps, or something of the sort.

我想说，那些仅仅因为某人开设了一个部门而被雇佣的人，我认为——既然我们到目前为止还没有侮辱这个群体——我建议这可能发生在投资者关系部门，或者类似的地方。

You know, you get people — you get a department going and they’re always going to want to expand.

你知道，部门一旦成立，人们总是想要扩展。

The ideal method is not to do it in the first place. But there are all kinds of American companies that are loaded with people that aren’t really doing anything or are doing the wrong thing. And if you cut that out, it should not really have any significant effect on volume.

理想的方法是根本不去做。但有各种各样的美国公司，里面充满了那些实际上并没有做任何事情或做错事情的人。如果你把这些人去掉，应该不会对业务量产生任何重大影响。

On the other hand, if you cut out the wrong things, you could have a big effect. I mean, it can be done in a dumb way or a smart way.

另一方面，如果你切掉错误的东西，可能会产生很大的影响。我的意思是，这可以以愚蠢的方式或聪明的方式来完成。

My impression, with everything I’ve seen, and I’ve seen a fair amount so far, is that 3G, in terms of the cost cuts that they have made, have been extremely intelligent about it, and have not done things that will cut volume.

我的印象是，基于我所见的一切，至今我已经看到了相当多的东西，3G 在他们所做的成本削减方面非常聪明，并没有采取会减少销量的措施。

It is true that in the packaged goods industry, volume trends for everybody — whether they’re fat or lean in their operation — volume trends are not good. And the test will be over time — you know, three, five years — are the operations which have had their costs cut, do they do poor, in terms of volume, than the ones, that in my judgment, look very fat? So far I see no evidence of that whatsoever.

确实，在包装商品行业中，不管是运行效率高的公司还是低的公司，销量趋势对每个人都不是很有利。关键在于未来三到五年间，那些削减了成本的公司在销量上的表现是否会比那些我认为成本过高的公司差。我目前没有看到任何这样的证据。

I do think at Kraft Heinz, for example, we’ve got certain lines that will decline in volume. I think we’ve got certain lines that will increase. But I think overall, the packaged goods industry is not going to go anyplace in terms of physical volume, and it may decline just a bit.

我确实认为，例如在卡夫亨氏，我们有一些产品线的销量会下降。我认为我们有一些产品线的销量会增加。但我认为总体而言，包装食品行业在实际销量方面不会有太大变化，可能会略微下降。

I can’t — I’ve never — I’ve never seen anybody run anything more sensibly than 3G has, in terms of taking over operations where costs were unnecessarily high, and getting those costs under control in a hurry.

我不能——我从来没有——我从来没有见过任何人比 3G 更明智地管理任何事情，特别是在接管那些不必要高昂成本的运营，并迅速控制这些成本方面。

And the volume question, we’ll look at as we go along. But believe me, I look at those figures every month, and I look at everybody else’s figures every month, and I try to — I’m always looking for any signs of underperformance because of any decisions made, and I’ve seen none. Charlie?

关于销量的问题，我们会在过程中逐步讨论。但相信我，我每个月都会查看这些数据，也会查看其他所有人的数据，我总是在寻找由于任何决策导致的业绩不佳的迹象，但我没有发现任何。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And sometimes when you reduce volume, it’s very intelligent, because you’re losing money on the volume you’re discarding.

查理·芒格：是的。有时候，当你减少产量时，这是非常聪明的，因为你在丢弃的产量上亏损。

It’s quite common for a business, not only to have more employees than it needs, but sometimes it has two or three customers that it would be better off without. And so it’s hard to judge from outside whether things are good or bad just because volume is going up or down a little.

企业不仅常常拥有超过所需的员工，有时还会有两个或三个客户，如果没有这些客户，企业的状况可能会更好。因此，仅仅因为业务量有所上升或下降，从外部很难判断情况是好是坏。

Generally speaking, I think the leanly-staffed companies do better at everything than the ones that are overstaffed. I think overstaffing is like getting to weigh 400 pounds when you’re a normal person. It’s not a plus.

一般来说，我认为人员精简的公司在各方面表现都比人员过剩的公司要好。我认为人员过剩就像一个正常人体重达到 400 磅。这并不是一个优势。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Sloppy thinking in one area probably indicates there may well be sloppy thinking elsewhere.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在一个领域的粗心思考可能表明其他地方也可能存在粗心思考。

And I have been a director of 19 public corporations, and I’ve seen some very sloppy operations, and I’ve seen a few really outstanding business operators. And there’s a huge, huge difference.

我曾担任 19 家上市公司的董事，我见过一些非常马虎的运营，也见过一些真正出色的商业运营者。两者之间有着巨大的差异。

If you have a wonderful business, you can get away with being sloppy. We could be wasting a billion dollars a year at Berkshire, you know, 650 million after tax, that’d be 4 percent of earnings, and maybe you wouldn’t notice it. But —

如果你有一个出色的生意，你可以不拘小节。你知道，我们在伯克希尔每年可能浪费十亿美元，税后 6.5 亿，那将是盈利的 4%，也许你不会注意到。但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would. 查理·芒格：我会。

WARREN BUFFETT: — it grows. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：——它在增长。（笑声）

Charlie would notice it, so I —

查理会注意到这一点，所以我——

But it’s the really prosperous companies that — you know, some — well, the classic case I think were the tobacco companies many years ago. I mean, they, you know, they went off into this thing and that thing and — and it was practically play money because it was so easy to make, and it didn’t require, you know — it didn’t require good management, and they took advantage of that fact. You can read about some of that in “Barbarians at the Gate.”

但真正繁荣的公司——你知道，有些——我认为经典案例是多年前的烟草公司。我的意思是，他们，你知道，他们进入了这个事情和那个事情——几乎是玩钱，因为赚钱太容易了，而且不需要，你知道——不需要良好的管理，他们利用了这一事实。你可以在《门口的野蛮人》中读到一些相关内容。

45. We paid less for Van Tuyl than it appears

我们为Van Tuyl支付的费用比看起来的要少。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Berkshire paid 4.1 billion for Van Tuyl’s auto retailing business and consolidated its earnings for nearly ten months last year.

乔纳森·布兰特：伯克希尔以 41 亿美元收购了Van Tuyl的汽车零售业务，并在去年几乎十个月内合并了其收益。

Given prevailing acquisition multiples in the industry, and margins, and the record level of retail auto sales, it seems that the acquisition should have contributed more to Berkshire’s bottom line in 2015 than it seemed to, although it’s hard to tell for sure since its results were lumped in with those of the German motorcycle apparel acquisition, which was only owned for a part of the year, also.

根据行业中的普遍收购倍数、利润率以及创纪录的汽车零售销售水平，似乎这次收购对伯克希尔2015年业绩的贡献应该比实际体现的要多，尽管很难确定，因为它的业绩与仅拥有部分年份的德国摩托车服装收购案的结果合并在一起。

I understand the deductive — tax-deductible intangibles reduce the effective purchase price of Van Tuyl, but I still wonder whether there were any one-time charges or whether profits from insurance and finance operations could have been reported somewhere other than in the retail segment?

我明白可抵扣的无形资产降低了Van Tuyl的实际购买价格，但我仍然好奇是否有任何一次性费用，或者保险和金融业务的利润是否可能在零售部门之外的其他地方报告？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

JONATHAN BRANDT: I imagine Berkshire is earning a better return on the acquisition than is so far apparent, but I wonder if you could explain the difference between the likely economics of the deal and what I infer from the annual report figures.

乔纳森·布兰特：我想伯克希尔在这笔收购上获得的回报比目前所显现的要好，但我想知道您能否解释一下这笔交易的经济情况与我从年报数据中推断出的差异。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, you’re right about it. It is better than it looks.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你说得对。它比看起来要好。

For one thing, we got a billion dollars of securities, roughly, with the 4.1, and those securities we’re basically carrying at a quarter of a percent. But that billion is available to us, and that came with the deal.

首先，我们用41亿美元收购时获得了大约10亿美元的证券，而这些证券基本上按0.25%的利率计入，但这10亿美元是可以供我们使用的，这也是交易的一部分。。

There’s some very significant acquisition accounting charges that will continue for a couple of years, and that I’m happy to have taken that way.

还有一些非常重要的收购会计费用，这些费用将持续几年，我很高兴这些费用以这种方式计算。

The economics of Van Tuyl, I would say, have worked out almost exactly as — if you had me, a year ago, lay out a projection — I don’t do it — but if I had, it would look very much like things have turned out.

Van Tuyl的经济效益，我会说，几乎完全符合预期。如果你让我在一年前做出一个预测——我通常不这么做——但如果我做了，结果与现在的情况非常接近。

And Jeff Rachor, who runs that operation, really fits the Berkshire mold. I mean, we’ve got a first-class CEO there.

杰夫·拉乔尔负责的这个业务，真的很符合伯克希尔的标准。我的意思是，我们那里有一位一流的首席执行官。

But take a billion off the purchase price just for openers, and then there are some amortization charges of items that are allowable that make you correctly see a fairly low figure against what it appears the acquisition price was. So far, it’s exactly on schedule, and the schedule was perfectly satisfactory.

不过你可以先从购买价格中减去10亿，然后还有一些项目的摊销费用，这些项目是允许摊销的，这使得你正确地看到了一些相对较低的数字，与看似的收购价格相比。因此，到目前为止，一切都按计划进行，而这个计划是完全令人满意的

OK. Station 2. 好的。站 2。

We haven’t — incidentally — we haven’t had much luck, so far, in acquiring other auto dealerships based on the same metrics that we bought Van Tuyl. And I think to a small degree, that’s because people think we paid more for Van Tuyl than we did.

我们到目前为止——顺便提一下——在根据我们收购 Van Tuyl 时使用的相同标准收购其他汽车经销商方面运气不太好。我认为在某种程度上，这是因为人们认为我们为 Van Tuyl 支付的价格比实际更高。

They’re not seeing certain factors in it, so they think we paid X, and therefore they’re entitled to X, and we didn’t pay X, so we haven’t made — we’ve bought very little so far. I hope that changes in the future.

他们没有看到其中的某些因素，所以他们认为我们支付了 X，因此他们有权获得 X，而我们并没有支付 X，所以到目前为止我们几乎没有购买。我希望未来会有所改变。

But we’re not going to change — we’re not going to change our metrics, in terms of how we value auto dealerships.

但我们不会改变——我们不会改变我们的指标，关于我们如何评估汽车经销商。

类似于房地产中介，需要面对面交流的业务。

46. “Very cheap money makes me pay a little more”

“非常便宜的钱让我多花一点”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m John Gorry from Iowa City, Iowa.

观众：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自爱荷华州爱荷华市的约翰·戈里。

When interest rates go from zero to negative in a country, how does that change the way that you value a company or a stock?

当一个国家的利率从零降到负值时，这如何改变你对公司或股票的估值方式？

Do you choose a high valuation because the discount rate is low, or on the other hand, do you choose a low valuation because the cash flow is likely to be poor?

你是因为折现率低而选择高估值，还是因为现金流可能较差而选择低估值？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, going from — which we haven’t done in this country, yet — but going from zero to minus-a-half is really no different than going from 4 to 3 and a half.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，从——我们在这个国家还没有做到——但从零到负半其实和从 4 到 3.5 没有什么不同。

It has a different feel to it, obviously, if you have to pay a half a point to somebody. But if you have your yield — or your base rate — reduced by a half a point, it’s of some significance, but it isn’t dramatic.

显然，如果你必须支付给某人半个点，它的感觉会有所不同。但是如果你的收益——或基准利率——减少了半个点，这有一定的意义，但并不戏剧性。

What’s dramatic is interest rates being where they are, generally. I mean, whether they’re zero, plus a quarter, minus a quarter, plus a half, minus a half, we are dealing with a situation of, essentially, very close to zero interest rates, and we have been for a long time and longer than I would’ve anticipated.

戏剧性的是，利率普遍处于这样的水平。我是说，无论是零、加四分之一、减四分之一、加半、减半，我们实际上都在处理一个非常接近零利率的情况，而且这种情况已经持续了很长时间，超过了我的预期。

The nature of it is that you’ll pay more for a business when interest rates are zero than if they were, like, 15 percent when [former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul] Volcker was around, and you can take that up and down the line.

其本质在于，当利率为零时，你为一项业务支付的价格会比在[前联邦储备主席保罗]沃尔克在任时利率为 15%时支付的价格要高，这一点可以在各个方面体现。

I mean, we don’t get too exact about it, because it isn’t that exact a science, but very cheap money makes me pay a little more for businesses than when money was at what we previously thought was normal rates. And very tight money would cause me to pay somewhat less.

我的意思是，我们并不太精确，因为这并不是一门非常精确的科学，但非常便宜的资金让我为企业支付的价格比我们之前认为的正常利率时要高一些。而非常紧缩的资金则会让我支付的价格稍微低一些。

I mean, you know, the — we had a rule for 2600 years that — Aesop lived around 600 BC, but he didn’t happen to know it was BC, but, you know, you can’t know everything — and it was that a bird in a hand is worth two in the bush. But a bird in the hand now is worth about nine-tenths of a bird in the bush in Europe, you know, because it depends on how far out the bush, but it keeps getting a little less as you go on. So these are very unusual times that way.

我意思是，你知道，我们有一个 2600 年的规则——伊索大约生活在公元前 600 年，但他并不知道这是公元前，你知道，人不可能知道一切——这个规则是手中的鸟胜过灌木丛中的两只鸟。但在欧洲，手中的鸟现在大约值灌木丛中鸟的十分之九，你知道，因为这取决于灌木丛有多远，但随着时间的推移，这个价值会逐渐减少。所以在这方面，这些确实是非常不寻常的时期。

And if you ask me whether I paid a little more for Precision Castparts because interest rates were around zero, than if they’d been 6 percent, the answer is yes.

如果你问我是否因为利率接近于零而为Precision Castparts支付了更多的钱，而不是在利率为6%的情况下，我的答案是肯定的。

I try not to pay too much more, but it has an effect. And if interest rates continue at this rate for a long time, if people ever really start thinking something close to this is normal, that will have an enormous effect on asset values.

我尽量不多花钱，但这会产生影响。如果利率在这个水平上持续很长时间，如果人们真的开始认为这种情况是正常的，那将对资产价值产生巨大的影响。

It already has some effect. Charlie?

它已经有一些效果了。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but I don’t think anybody really knows much about negative interest rates. We never had them before.

查理·芒格：是的，但我认为没有人真正了解负利率。我们以前从未经历过。

And we’ve never had periods of stasis like — except for the Great Depression — we didn’t have things like happened in Japan: great modern nation playing all the monetary tricks, Keynesian tricks, stimulus tricks, and mired in stasis for 25 years.

而我们从未经历过像这样的停滞期——除了大萧条——我们没有像日本那样的情况：一个伟大的现代国家玩弄各种货币手段、凯恩斯主义手段、刺激手段，却在停滞中陷入了 25 年。

And none of the great economists who have studied this stuff, and taught it to our children, understand it, either. So we just do the best we can.

那些研究经济学并教授给我们孩子的伟大经济学家们也不明白这一点。所以我们只能尽力而为。

WARREN BUFFETT: And they still don’t understand it.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们仍然不理解这一点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Our advantage is that we know we don’t understand it.

查理·芒格：不。我们的优势在于我们知道我们不理解它。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s interesting, though. I mean, we are — you know, it’s — it makes for an interesting movie.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过这确实有趣。我是说，这让事情变得很有趣。

And it does modestly affect what we pay for businesses. Whether — I don’t think anybody expected it to last this long, do you Charlie, personally?

这对我们支付的价格有些影响。你个人认为这种情况会持续这么久吗，Charlie？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think — if you’re not confused, you haven’t thought about it correctly.

查理·芒格：我认为——如果你没有感到困惑，那你就没有正确地思考过这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I thought about it correctly, then. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我当时想得很对。（笑）

47. No comment on GEICO-IBM cooperation

对 GEICO 与 IBM 的合作没有评论

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky. 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。

BECKY QUICK: Warren, in the past you’ve talked about GEICO working with IBM’s Watson.

贝基·奎克：沃伦，过去你曾谈到过 GEICO 与 IBM 的沃森合作。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

BECKY QUICK: And this shareholder, Guillermo Bermudez, writes in and wants to know, “Would IBM be able to offer insurance industry competitors of GEICO the solutions developed with GEICO help and expense?

贝基·奎克：这位股东，吉列尔莫·贝尔穆德斯，写信询问：“IBM 是否能够向 GEICO 的保险行业竞争对手提供与 GEICO 合作开发的解决方案？”

“I would think that there would be confidentiality provisions to protect GEICO, because in as much as GEICO educates IBM as to insurance issues, GEICO could be at jeopardy of competitors gaining or equaling its advantage if they purchase solutions jointly developed by GEICO and IBM.”

“我认为会有保密条款来保护GEICO，因为如果GEICO向IBM传授了保险问题，GEICO可能会面临竞争对手通过购买GEICO与IBM共同开发的解决方案而获得或赶上其优势的风险。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say the answer to that is that both parties have thought about that matter, very intensively and extensively, and neither would be in a position to talk about it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我的回答是，双方都已经对这个问题进行了非常深入和广泛的思考，双方都不处于可以谈论这个问题的立场。

I don’t like to not answer any questions, but there’s some things that it doesn’t pay to answer. Am I right, Charlie?

我不喜欢不回答任何问题，但有些问题回答了也无益。对吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, of course you’re right. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，你当然是对的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I like that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我喜欢这个回答。

48. American Express faces tough competition

美国运通面临激烈竞争

WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff. 沃伦·巴菲特：悬崖。

CLIFF GALLANT: You’ve long stressed the importance of taking a long-term view when investing. Over the decades, your substantial returns in American Express seem to support your point.

克利夫·加兰特：您一直强调在投资时采取长期视角的重要性。几十年来，您在美国运通的可观回报似乎支持了您的观点。

Now, you’ve talked in the past about the ability of American Express to reinvent itself over time, but today it seems to be a company that doesn’t have alternative businesses and its brand doesn’t seem to have the same cachet as it once did.

您过去曾谈到过美国运通有能力随着时间推移进行自我重塑，但今天它似乎是一家没有其他替代业务的公司，并且其品牌似乎不再像以前那样具有吸引力。

Shouldn’t a prudent investor — shouldn’t Berkshire — periodically reassess its reasons for owning an investment?

一个谨慎的投资者——伯克希尔——难道不应该定期重新评估持有某项投资的理由吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we reassess our reasons for owning all investments on almost a continuous basis.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们几乎持续不断地重新评估我们持有所有投资的理由。

And both Charlie and I do that, and we’re usually in a general range of agreement, but sometimes we are a fair distance apart, perhaps.

查理和我都这样做，我们通常在一个大致的共识范围内，但有时我们可能相距较远。

There’s no question that payments are an area of intense interest to a lot of very smart people, who have got a lot of resources, and —

毫无疑问，支付领域引起了许多聪明人极大的兴趣，他们拥有丰富的资源，且——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And rapid change.

查理·芒格：以及快速变化。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And rapid change, and it will change.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。快速变化，它会改变。

And I personally feel OK about American Express. We — and I’m happy to own it. I think — but their position — and it has been under attack for decades, more intensively later — lately — and it will continue to be under attack.

我个人对美国运通感到满意。我们——我很高兴拥有它。我认为——但他们的地位——几十年来一直受到攻击，最近更加激烈——而且这种攻击还会继续。

I mean, it’s too big a business, and it’s too interesting a business, and it could be too attractive a business, for people to ignore it.

我意思是，这个生意太大了，太有趣了，而且可能太有吸引力了，无法让人们忽视它。

And it plays to the talents of some very smart people. I mean, it’s a natural, that a great many organizations that are really quite able, think about it. And it’s big. So —

这发挥了许多非常聪明的人的才能。我的意思是，这很自然，许多真正有能力的组织会考虑这个。而且它很大。所以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot of great businesses aren’t quite so great as they used to be.

查理·芒格：许多伟大的企业并不像以前那样伟大了。

The packaged good business, the Procter & Gambles and so forth of the world — General Mills — they’re all weaker than they used to be at their peak and —

包装商品行业，像宝洁（Procter & Gamble）和通用磨坊（General Mills）这样的公司——它们都比巅峰时期弱了。

WARREN BUFFETT: And the auto companies. I mean when Charlie and I were —

沃伦·巴菲特：还有汽车公司。我是说，当查理和我在——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, my God. When I think of the power of General Motors when I was young, and what happened — they wiped out all the shareholders — I would no more have predicted that.

查理·芒格：哦，天哪。当我想到年轻时通用汽车的力量，以及后来发生的事情——他们让所有股东的权益化为乌有——我从未预料到会发生这种事。

When I was young, General Motors loomed over the economy like a colossus. It looked totally invincible. Torrents of cash. Torrents of everything.

当我年轻时，通用汽车在经济中如同一座巨人般屹立。它看起来完全不可战胜。现金如潮水般涌来。一切都如潮水般涌来。

WARREN BUFFETT: Trying to hold down market share.

沃伦·巴菲特：努力保持市场份额。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, because they — yeah, they were afraid they’d be too monopolistic.

查理·芒格：是的，因为他们——是的，他们担心自己会过于垄断。

And so the world changes, and we can’t change — make a portfolio change — every time something is a little less advantaged than it used to be.

因此，世界在变化，而我们不能每次当某些事物的优势稍微减弱时就进行投资组合的调整。

WARREN BUFFETT: But you have to be —

沃伦·巴菲特：但你必须要——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Alert. 查理·芒格：警惕。

WARREN BUFFETT: — you have to be thinking all the time and alert to whether there’s been something that really changes the game in a big way. And that’s not only true for American Express, that’s true for other things we own, including things we own 100 percent of.

沃伦·巴菲特：——你必须时刻保持思考，警惕是否有一些事情在重大方面真正改变了游戏。这不仅适用于美国运通，也适用于我们拥有的其他事物，包括我们 100%拥有的东西。

And we’ll be wrong sometimes. We’ll be late sometimes, we’ll be wrong sometimes. But we’ll be right sometimes, too. But it’s not that we’re not cognizant of threats.

我们有时会犯错。有时我们会迟到，有时我们会错。但我们也会对。有时候我们是对的。但并不是说我们没有意识到威胁。

Assessing the probabilities of those threats being a minor problem, or a major problem, or a life-threatening problem, you know, it’s a tough game, but that’s what makes our job interesting.

评估这些威胁是小问题、重大问题还是致命威胁的概率，你知道，这是一场艰难的游戏，但这正是我们工作的有趣之处。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think anybody in payments, probably has — with an established long-time player with an old method — has more danger than used to exist. It’s just — there’s more fluidity in it.

查理·芒格：我认为，任何在支付领域的老牌企业，尤其是那些长期存在的传统业务，面临的风险比以往更大。这个领域的流动性更强了。

开始担心的业务。

49. We like steak but aren’t interested in owning cattle

我们喜欢牛排，但对养牛不感兴趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett.

观众：嗨，巴菲特先生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Munger. I’m from Flagstaff, Arizona. My name is Nick Kelly. My family runs some cattle ranches down in Arizona, and that’s kind of what my question pertains to.

观众成员：嗨，芒格先生。我来自亚利桑那州的弗拉格斯塔夫。我叫尼克·凯利。我的家族在亚利桑那州经营一些牧场，这也是我问题的相关内容。

I’m curious on your thoughts as it relates to the expanding global population and investing in cattle and if you think it’s wise. Thank you.

我对全球人口增长和投资养牛的看法感到好奇，您认为这是明智的吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? 沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s one of the worst businesses I can imagine for somebody like us. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为这对我们这样的人来说是最糟糕的生意之一。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s nothing personal about this.

沃伦·巴菲特：这并不是对你个人的攻击。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Not only is it a bad business, but we have no aptitude for it.

查理·芒格：是的。这不仅是一个糟糕的生意，而且我们对此没有任何天赋。

WARREN BUFFETT: Some people have done well in it, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：有些人在这方面做得很好，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — yeah. They have one good year every 20 years or something.

查理·芒格：嗯，我——是的。他们每 20 年才有一个好年头。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I know you guys like steak.

观众成员：我知道你们喜欢牛排。

WARREN BUFFETT: Very much.

沃伦·巴菲特：非常喜欢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But not owning cattle. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：但我们不喜欢养牛。(笑)

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, it — actually, I know a few people that have done reasonably well in cattle, but they usually own banks on the side or something, so — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，其实，我认识一些在养牛方面做得相当不错的人，但他们通常还拥有一些银行之类的东西，所以——（笑声）

But I wish you the best at it. (Laughter)

但我祝你一切顺利。（笑声）

And I’m in Kiewit Plaza, if want to send anything along. (Laughs)

我在基维特广场，如果你想寄点东西过来。(笑)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Somebody has to occupy the tough niches in the economy.

查理·芒格：总得有人去占据经济中艰难的细分市场。

We need you. (Laughter) 我们需要你。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.

观众：谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Applause)

查理·芒格：是的。（掌声）

50. Don’t reward profits in compensation plans

不要在薪酬计划中奖励利润

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew. 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren and Charlie — well, the first part is for Charlie; second part is for Warren.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦和查理——第一部分是给查理的；第二部分是给沃伦的。

“Charlie, you clearly understand the power of incentives. How do you apply this at Berkshire when designing compensation formula?

“查理，你显然理解激励的力量。你是如何在伯克希尔设计薪酬公式时应用这一点的？”

“Without naming names or dollar amounts, please illustrate for us with examples — of a couple of examples — of how Berkshire’s operating managers get paid for performance in different industries.”

“请举几个例子，说明伯克希尔的运营经理在不同产业中如何根据业绩获得报酬，而不提及具体的名字或金额。”

The second part is for Warren, which is, “You once said you’d write about how we should compensate the next Berkshire CEO. Can you describe exactly how we should do it now?”

第二部分是给沃伦的，内容是：“你曾说过你会写关于我们应该如何补偿下一个伯克希尔首席执行官的事。你能详细描述一下我们现在应该怎么做吗？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ll let Warren worry about the next CEO.

查理·芒格：我让巴菲特去考虑下一任CEO的问题。

But the — when it comes to assess — our incentive systems are different and what they try and adapt to is the reality of each situation.

但我们在激励系统上所做的事情因情况而异，我们试图适应每个情况的现实。

And the basic rule on incentives is you get what you reward for. So, if you have a dumb incentive system, you get dumb outcomes.

激励机制的基本规则是：你奖励什么，就会得到什么结果。所以，如果你有一个愚蠢的激励系统，你会得到愚蠢的结果。

And one of our really interesting incentive systems is at GEICO, and I’ll let Warren explain it to you, because we don’t have a normal profits-type incentive for the people at GEICO.

我们的GEICO的激励系统非常有趣，我会让巴菲特来解释一下，因为我们在GEICO并没有采用普通的利润类型的激励。

Warren, tell them, because it’s really interesting.

沃伦，告诉他们，因为这真的很有趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well at GEICO, we have two variables, and they apply to well over 20,000 people. I think you have to be there a year, but beyond that point, anybody that’s been there a year or more — and I could be wrong on the exact period — is subject — and knows — understands — that these two variables will determine bonus compensation. And as you go up the ladder, it has a multiplier effect.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在 GEICO，我们有两个变量，这适用于超过 20,000 人。我认为你必须在那里工作一年，但在那之后，任何在那工作一年或更长时间的人——我可能对确切的时间有误——都知道并理解这两个变量将决定奖金补偿。随着你在公司中的晋升，这会产生倍增效应。

It’s still the same two variables, but it gets to be larger and larger, in terms of bonus compensation as a percentage of your base, but it’s always significant. It’s always significant.

仍然是这两个变量，但随着基础工资的百分比，奖金补偿会越来越大，但它始终是重要的。它始终是重要的。

And those two variables are very simple. I care about growing the business, and I care about growing it with a profitable business. So we have a grid, which consists of growth and policies in force on one axis — not gross in dollars, because that’s reflected by average premiums, which are outside their control — but growth in policies in force.

这两个变量非常简单。我关心业务的增长，也关心业务的盈利能力。因此，我们有一个网格系统，一条轴线上是保单数量的增长——而不是总收入，因为总收入反映的是平均保费，这是他们无法控制的——但保单数量的增长。

And then on the other grid, we have the profitability of seasoned business. It costs a lot of money to put business on the books. I mean, we spend a lot of money on advertising and all of that.

然后在另一条轴线上，我们关注的是成熟业务的盈利能力。将业务登记入账需要花费很多钱。我的意思是，我们在广告等方面花费了大量资金。

So the first year, any business we put on the books is going to reduce profits significantly. And I don’t want people to be worried about the profit if it’s going — that comes — that might be impaired by growing the business fast.

所以第一年，我们记录的任何业务都会显著减少利润。我不希望人们担心利润，因为这可能会因为快速发展业务而受到影响。

So, profit of seasoned business, growth of policies in force. Very simple. We’ve used it since 1995. We put a tiny little tweak or two in for new businesses or something, but it’s overwhelmingly a simple system.

所以，成熟业务的利润，现行保单的增长。非常简单。我们自 1995 年以来一直在使用它。我们为新业务或其他情况做了一些微小的调整，但总体上这是一个简单的系统。

Everybody understands it. In February, or so, it’s a big day when the two variables are announced and people figure out how they come out on it.

每个人都理解这一点。在二月份左右，当两个变量被公布时，这是一个重要的日子，人们会弄清楚他们的结果。

And it totally aligns the goals of the organization, in terms of compensation, with the goals of the owner.

这完全将组织的目标（在薪酬方面）与所有者的目标对齐。

And that’s a simple one. The interesting thing about —

这很简单。有趣的是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s simple, but other people might reward something like just profits, and so the people don’t take on new business, they should take it on, because it hurts profits.

查理·芒格：这很简单，但如果你只是奖励利润，人们可能不会接受新业务，因为这会影响利润。

So you’ve got to think these things through, and, of course, Warren’s good at that, and so is [GEICO CEO] Tony Nicely.

所以你必须仔细考虑这些事情，当然，沃伦擅长这一点，[GEICO 首席执行官]托尼·尼克利也是。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And just thinking about — you know, I mean, very — somebody comes in and says, well, if you reward profits — you don’t want to award profits, alone. It’d be the dumbest thing you could do.

沃伦·巴菲特：对，如果有人进来就说，我们要奖励利润——你绝对不应该仅仅奖励利润。这是你能做的最愚蠢的事情。

You just quit advertising, and, you know, start shrinking the business a little. That’s a — and like I said, that — people there know that the very top person is getting paid based on those same two variables. So that they — they don’t think that the guys at the top have got a cushy deal compared to them, and all of that. It’s just a very logical system.

你只会停止广告投放，稍微缩小业务规模。这是一个——而且正如我所说，那些在这里工作的人知道最高层的人员也基于这两个变量来获得报酬。他们不会觉得顶层的人相比他们有额外的优待，这一切都很合逻辑。

The interesting thing — and I’ll get to your second thing in a — second question — in a minute, but the interesting thing is that if we brought in a compensation consultant, they would start coming up with plans that would be designed for all of Berkshire, and get us all pulling together, you know —

有趣的是——我马上会回答你的第二个问题——但有趣的是，如果我们请来一个薪酬顾问，他们会开始提出一些针对整个伯克希尔的计划，试图让我们所有人都朝着同一个方向努力，你知道的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Maybe an undertaking parlor.

查理·芒格：这简直是个殡仪馆的计划。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: God knows where they’d get the plan.

查理·芒格：上帝知道他们会从哪里得到这个计划。

WARREN BUFFETT: The — you know, the idea of having a — sort of — a coordinated arrangement for incentive compensation across 70 or 80 businesses, or whatever, is just totally nuts.

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，想要为70或80个业务设计一个统一的激励安排是完全疯狂的。

And yet, I would almost guarantee you that if we brought in somebody, they would be thinking in terms of some master plan, and little subplans, and all this kind of thing, and explain it with all kinds of objectives.

然而，我几乎可以保证，如果我们请来咨询公司，他们会考虑制定一个总体计划，再加上各种子计划，解释各种目标。

We try to figure out what makes sense in each business we’re in. There’s some businesses where the top person is enormously important, or some businesses where the business itself dominates the nature — the result.

我们尝试为每个业务设计合适的方案。有些业务中顶层人员至关重要，而有些业务则由业务本身主导结果。

We try to design plans that make sense. In certain cases — I asked one fellow that came to work for us — or that was selling me his business — the day I met him he came to the office, and he had a business he wanted to sell, but he also wanted to keep running it. And I made a deal with him on it.

我们努力设计合理的计划。在某些情况下——我问过一个来我们公司工作的人——或者说是卖给我的生意——我第一次见到他那天，他来办公室，他有一个想要出售的生意，但他也想继续经营它。我和他达成了协议。

And then I said, you know, tell me what the compensation plan should be. And he said, well, he said, I thought you told me that. (Laughs)

然后我问他，你觉得薪酬计划应该是什么样的。他说，他以为是我告诉他的。（笑）

I said no. I said, I don’t want a guy working for me that has a plan that he thinks doesn’t make sense, or that he’s unhappy with, or chewing at him, or he’s complaining to his wife about it, whatever it may be.

我说不是。我说，我不想要一个他觉得不合适、让他不满意、或埋怨的计划，或者他在和妻子抱怨的计划。

You tell me what makes sense. And he told me what made sense, and it made sense, and we’ve been using it ever since. Never changed a word.

你告诉我什么是有道理的。他告诉我什么是有道理的，这确实有道理，从那时起我们一直在使用它。一个字都没改。

We have so many different kinds of businesses. Some of them are very tough businesses. Some of them are very easy businesses. Some of them are capital intensive. Some of them don’t take capital.

我们有很多不同类型的企业。其中一些企业非常艰难，另一些则很简单。有些企业需要大量资金，而有些企业则不需要资金。

I mean, you just go up and down the line, and to think that you’ll have a simple formula that can be sort of stamped out for the whole place, and then with some overall stuff for corporate results on top of it, you’d be wasting a lot of money, and you’d be misdirecting incentives.

我的意思是，你只需沿着这条线上下走动，想要一个可以在整个地方简单复制的公式，然后再加上一些整体的公司业绩数据，你会浪费很多钱，并且会误导激励措施。

So we think it through one at a time, and it seems to work out pretty well.

所以我们逐个考虑，似乎效果很好。

In terms of the person that succeeds me, it’s true, I have sent a memo to the — in fact, I sent two memos to the board — with some thoughts on that. Maybe I’ll send a third one.

关于接替我的人，确实，我已经向董事会发送了一份备忘录——实际上，我发送了两份备忘录——里面有一些想法。也许我会再发送一份。

But I don’t think it would be wise to disclose exactly what’s in those letters. But it’s the same principle as I’ve just gotten through describing.

但我认为透露那些信件的具体内容并不明智。但这与我刚刚描述的原则是一样的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And he wanted more bad examples.

查理·芒格：他还想要更多糟糕的例子。

A lot of the bad examples of incentives come from banking and investment banking. And if you reward somebody with some share of the profits, and the profits are being reported using accounting practices that cause the profit to exist on paper that are not really happening in terms of underlying economics, then people are doing the wrong thing, and it’s endangering the bank and hurting the country and everything else.

很多糟糕的激励例子来自银行和投资银行。如果你以利润的一部分作为奖励，而这些利润是通过会计手法使利润存在于纸面上，但实际上并不存在于经济基础中，那么人们就会做错误的事情，这不仅危害银行，还会对国家造成伤害。

And that was a major part of the cause of the great financial crisis: it’s that the banks were reporting a lot of income they weren’t making, and the investment banks were, too.

这也是导致大金融危机的主要原因之一：银行报告了很多并不存在的收入，投资银行也是如此。

The accounting allowed, for a long time, a lender to use his bad — as his bad debt provision — his previous historical loss rate. So an idiot could make a lot of money by just making way-gamier loans at high interest, and accruing a lot of interest, and saying, “I’m not going to lose any more money on these, because I didn’t lose money on different loans in the past.”

会计允许，长时间内，贷款人使用他们的坏账准备——基于过去的历史损失率。一个傻瓜可以通过只做更高风险的贷款来赚很多钱，并在其中累积大量的利息，然后说，“我不会再在这些贷款上损失钱了，因为我在过去的不同贷款上没有损失过钱。”

That was insane for the accountants to allow that. And — literally insane. That’s not too strong a word.

那对于会计师来说，允许那样的事情真是疯狂。而且——字面上说是疯狂。这并不是一个过于强烈的词。

And yet nobody’s ashamed of it. I’ve never met an accountant that’s ashamed of it.

然而，没有人对此感到羞愧。我从未遇到过对这件事感到羞愧的会计师。

WARREN BUFFETT: The other — another thing that — possibility is when you get the very greedy chief executive who wants an enormous payoff for himself, and to justify it, designs a pyramid, so that a whole bunch of other people down the line get overpaid in some relation — or get paid — in relation to something they have no control over, just so it doesn’t look like he’s all by himself, in terms of that fantastic payoff he’s arranged for himself.

沃伦·巴菲特：另一个可能性是，当一个非常贪婪的首席执行官想要为自己安排巨额薪酬时，为了证明这一点，他设计了一个金字塔，使得很多其他人也会按比例得到过高的薪酬——与他们无法控制的东西有关，只是为了让它看起来不像他自己在为自己安排那种令人惊讶的薪酬。

There’s a lot of misbehavior.

有很多不当行为。

And, you know, we saw it — you saw it in pricing of stock options. I mean, people that — you know, I literally would hear conversations in a board room where they hoped they were issuing the options, you know, at a terribly low price.

而且，你知道，我们看到了——你在股票期权的定价中看到了。我是说，人们——你知道，我真的会在董事会的会议上听到这样的对话，他们希望以非常低的价格发行期权。

Well, if you’ve got people interested in having options issued at a terribly low price, they may occasionally do something that might cause that. And it certainly — what could be dumber than a company looking for a way to issue shares at the lowest price?

好吧，如果你让人们希望以非常低的价格发行期权，他们可能会做一些事情来实现这一点。这确实——什么比公司寻找以最低价格发行股份的方法更愚蠢？

Compensation isn’t as complicated as the world would like to make it, but that’s — if you were a consultant, you would want to make people think it’s very complicated, and that only you could solve this terrible problem for them that they couldn’t solve.

补偿并不像世界想象的那么复杂，但如果你是一名顾问，你会希望让人们觉得这非常复杂，只有你能为他们解决这个他们无法解决的可怕问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We want it simple and right, and we don’t want it to reward what we don’t want.

查理·芒格：我们希望它简单而正确，我们不希望它奖励我们不想要的东西。

If you have — those of you with children — just imagine how your household would work if you constantly rewarded every child for bad behavior.

如果你有孩子，想象一下如果你不断因为坏行为而奖励每个孩子，你的家庭会如何运作。

The house would be ungovernable in short order.

这座房子很快就会失去控制。

51. BNSF’s capital expenditures

BNSF 的资本支出

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: During the past several years, Burlington Northern has spent more than just about every railroad on capital expenditures.

格雷格·沃伦：在过去的几年里，伯灵顿北方铁路在资本支出方面的花费超过了几乎所有其他铁路。

While the company reduced its capex budget from $5.7 billion during 2015, to $4.3 billion this year, it stills represents around 20 percent of annual revenue, which we believe is at least a bare minimum for most railroads to continue to invest indefinitely.

虽然公司将资本支出预算从2015年的57亿美元减少到今年的43亿美元，但这仍然占到年收入的约20%，我们认为这至少是大多数铁路公司为了能够持续投资所需的最低水平。

Other than maintenance capex, which is likely to account for around 60 percent of that total, what do you believe are the most likely additional investment opportunities for BNSF, realizing that the secular decline in coal, which has accelerated of late, and the complicated nature of crude oil shipments, where BNSF has already invested heavily the past few years, are likely to push it more towards other parts of the business?

除了维护性资本支出外，这部分可能占到总额的60%左右，您认为BNSF最可能的额外投资机会是什么？考虑到煤炭的长期下降趋势，最近加速的煤炭下降以及原油运输的复杂性（BNSF在过去几年已经在这方面投入了大量资金），这可能使其更多地转向业务的其他部分？

WARREN BUFFETT: As I mentioned in the annual report, in the case of all railroads, merely spending their depreciation expense will not keep them in the same place.

沃伦·巴菲特：正如我在年报中提到的，对于所有铁路公司，仅仅花费它们的折旧费用是无法让它们保持在原地的。

So depreciation is an inadequate measure of the actual steady state of capital expenditure needs of a railroad, even in these fairly noninflationary ways.

所以，即使在这些相对非通胀的情况下，折旧也不足以衡量铁路公司实际的资本支出需求。

And that’s an important consideration in buying the business. We knew that going in, and it’s been reinforced since.

这在购买业务时是一个重要的考虑因素。我们在进入时就知道这一点，之后也得到了进一步的确认。

We spent a lot of money in 2015 because we had a lot of problems to correct. That was when we spent the 5.7 billion.

我们在 2015 年花了很多钱，因为我们有很多问题需要解决。那时我们花了 57 亿。

I would say that the true maintenance capex, if you’re looking at 4.3 billion, is higher than 60 percent of that number, when you really evaluate keeping the railroad in competitive shape to do just the same volume as it would be doing the year before.

我会说，如果你考虑到 43 亿美元，真正的维护资本支出超过这个数字的 60%，当你真正评估保持铁路在竞争状态以完成与前一年相同的运输量时。

There is an additional expense at BNSF that is not reflected in the figures. There — we also have a lot of intangible expenses at some other businesses that aren’t real expenses. I mean, overall, I think that Berkshire’s figures actually are on the conservative side, in relation to real economic earnings. But that’s not true at any railroad.

BNSF还有一些未反映在数字中的额外支出。我们在其他一些业务中也有很多无形的支出，这些并不是真正的费用。总体来说，我认为伯克希尔的财务数字实际上在真实经济收益方面是保守的。但铁路公司并非如此。

We’ve also had something called “positive train control,” which amounts to a lot of money for the industry. I think we may be a little further along than most of them in paying for that, but that’s 2 or $300 million a year and maybe — I don’t know whether it’d be close to 2 billion, or something like that, in aggregate.

我们还花费了所谓的“积极列车控制”系统，这对整个行业来说是一笔不小的开支。我认为我们在这方面的投入可能比大多数公司要多，但这每年大概需要2到3亿美元，总额可能接近20亿美元或更多。

So it is a very capital-intensive business. We run — at the BNSF — we run far more gross, in revenue ton miles, than any other railroad in North America. And that has obviously some — is a factor on capital expenditures.

所以这是一个非常资本密集型的业务。在BNSF，我们的总收入吨英里远远超过北美的任何其他铁路公司。这显然是资本支出的一种因素。

But I would say that it’s very likely that we will spend more than depreciation — unfortunately, quite a bit more than depreciation — to stay in the same place for a long, long time, as will other railroads.

但我会说，为了保持现状，我们将不得不花费比折旧多得多的资金，长期保持在同一水平，这对其他铁路公司也是如此。

And that is — that’s a negative in the picture. We will always be looking for ways to use capital expenditure money to develop additional business, and we get that opportunity regularly. It’s just a question of the size of it.

这是一种负面因素。我们会一直寻找使用资本支出资金来开发更多业务的机会，我们定期获得这样的机会。这只是一个规模的问题。

And, you know, we did a lot of that in the Bakken, and we got benefits from it. We’re not getting benefits as much as we thought we would at this point when the price of oil was falling off. But that was a very sensible capital expenditure. And I hope we get the opportunity to do more.

你知道，我们在巴肯地区做了很多这方面的工作，并且从中受益。由于油价下跌，我们目前没有预期的收益那么多。但这是一项非常合理的资本支出。我们希望能有更多这样的机会。

What’s happening in coal, with the decline, I mean, that doesn’t really have anything to do with our overall capital expenditure budget except we won’t be spending a whole lot of money to expand in that arena.

在煤炭方面发生的事情，随着其衰退，我的意思是，这实际上与我们的整体资本支出预算没有太大关系，只是我们不会在这个领域花很多钱进行扩张。

Does that answer your question OK?

那样回答你的问题可以吗？

GREGG WARREN: I was just thinking maybe with intermodal as well, if that’s, you know, a longer-term opportunity to invest more heavily there.

格雷格·沃伦：我在想，也许在多式联运方面，如果那是一个长期的投资机会呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re always open to it. But we would want — you know, you have to see a fair amount of revenue coming from —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们总是对此持开放态度。但我们希望——你知道，你必须看到相当可观的收入来自——

We had a proposition, very recently, which we worked on for many, many years, in terms of making the port at Long Beach considerably more efficient. And we spent a lot of money on that, and spent a lot of time, and we would’ve spent a lot more money — a whole lot more money — if it’d been approved.

我们最近有一个提议，我们为此工作了很多年，目的是让洛杉矶港的效率大大提高。我们在这方面花了很多钱，也花了很多时间，如果这个提议获得批准，我们还会花更多的钱——会花很多很多的钱。

Recently a court came out with a decision that was negative on it, and whether that kills the chance to do that or we look someplace else, you know, we’ll have to look at the situation.

最近，一家法院作出了对其不利的裁决，这是否会扼杀实现这一目标的机会，或者我们是否会寻找其他地方，我们需要根据情况进行评估。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Our competitors there pretend to be environmentalists. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：我们的竞争对手在那里假装是环保主义者。（笑）

It’s a common practice now.

这现在是一种常见的做法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. In any event, we wouldn’t — we thought we had something that made a lot of sense, for both the area and for the transportation system of the country, and — but there are —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。无论如何，我们不会——我们认为我们有一些对该地区和国家的交通系统都很有意义的东西，但——但是有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We are trying to do the right thing, and so far we’ve lost.

查理·芒格：我们正在努力做正确的事情，到目前为止我们已经失败了。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we’re still willing to spend a lot of money —

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们仍然愿意花很多钱——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — if we can find things that make the railroad more efficient, or make it larger, I mean, either way.

沃伦·巴菲特：——如果我们能找到让铁路更高效或更大的方法，我是说，无论哪种方式。

52. U.S. benefits overall from low oil prices

美国整体受益于低油价

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Section 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第4部分。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Marcus Douglas. I’m an investment advisor from Houston, Texas.

听众：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫马库斯·道格拉斯，是来自德克萨斯州休斯顿的投资顾问。

Where I’m from, there are a lot of people losing their jobs, mostly due to the sharp decline of crude oil prices. My question pertains to the overall state of the union, more so than my dear city.

在我所在的地方，由于原油价格的急剧下跌，很多人正在失业。我的问题涉及整体经济状况，而不仅仅是我亲爱的城市。

Keeping in mind that crude oil is primarily bought and sold in American dollars, do either of you believe the major fluctuations in the supply of crude oil influence the future monetary policy decisions?

考虑到原油主要是用美元买卖的，你们认为原油供应的重大波动会影响未来的货币政策决策吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s yours, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：这个问题交给你，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my answer would be, not much.

查理·芒格：我的回答是，影响不大。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s an important industry, obviously. And the decline in the price of oil has had a lot of effects, very good for the consumer, millions and — well, hundreds and millions of consumers — and very bad for certain of the businesses, like the one we bought in Lubrizol, and some others, to a degree.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这显然是一个重要的行业。石油价格的下降有很多影响，对消费者非常有利，数以百万计的消费者——实际上是几亿消费者——而对某些企业来说非常糟糕，比如我们在Lubrizol买的那个，还有其他一些企业。

You know — net, it should be good for the United States, overall, to have low prices for oil. We’re a net oil importer. I mean, just like it’s good for the United States to have low prices for bananas. We’re a banana importer.

你知道，总体来说，低油价对美国应该是有利的。我们是一个净进口石油的国家。就像对美国来说，香蕉价格低也是有好处的。我们是香蕉的进口国。

Anything we net buy is a plus when prices fall, but oil is big enough, and extends into so many areas, that it also hurts, plenty, when the price of oil falls, and it particularly hurts capital values.

任何我们净买入的东西，价格下跌时都是有利的，但石油的规模足够大，并且涉及很多领域，因此油价下跌也会带来很大的伤害，特别是对资本价值的伤害。

So the value — the consumer gets the benefit when he or she goes to the filling station, you know, every two or three weeks, or something like that, and it comes in relatively small increments.

所以，消费者会在每两三周去加油站时得到好处，这种好处是以相对较小的增量体现的。

The capital value contraction, which is huge, if you project out lower-price oil for a while, you know, hits immediately. I mean, an oil field that was worth X may be worth half X, or a third of X, or no X, overnight.

资本价值的收缩是巨大的，如果你预测油价会持续一段时间下跌，它会立即发生。我是说，一个原本值X的油田可能一夜之间变成X的一半、三分之一，甚至没有价值。

And so, there’s certain big factors — well, in terms of our chemical operation, people just stop ordering.

因此，有一些重大因素——在我们的化学业务方面，人们只是停止了订单。

So you have this big impact on capital values immediately, and you have the benefits move in over time. But net, the United States is better off, and Saudi Arabia is worse off, when prices of oil are lower.

因此，资本价值会立即受到重大影响，而好处会随着时间的推移逐渐显现。但总体来看，当油价较低时，美国的情况会更好，而沙特阿拉伯的情况则更糟。

Oil is a big part of the economy, but our economy has continued to make progress, overall, during the oil price decline.

石油在经济中占据重要地位，但我们的经济在油价下跌期间整体上仍继续进步。

But obviously, different regions suffer disproportionately, just like they boomed — you know, they got a real boom in — during the period when it was at $100, and when trucking came in big time. Charlie?

但显然，不同地区会受到不成比例的影响，就像在油价达到100美元时那样，他们经历了真正的繁荣，当时货运业务也大幅增长。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that that will do it for this subject.

查理·芒格：好吧，我想这就对这个话题足够了。

53. No need to sweep cash from subsidiaries

无需从子公司抽取现金

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: The question is from Larry Levowitz (PH) of Boston.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自波士顿的拉里·列维茨。

“The year-end balance sheet for our manufacturing, service, and retailing operations shows total current assets of 28.6 billion, of which cash and equivalents are 6.8 billion.

“我们制造、服务和零售业务的年终资产负债表显示，总流动资产为286亿美元，其中现金及现金等价物为68亿美元。

“Meanwhile, total current liabilities are 12.7 billion, implying net working capital of 15.9 billion.

“与此同时，总流动负债为127亿美元，这意味着净营运资本为159亿美元。

“It has become increasingly common for companies like Apple and Dell to finance their business via their suppliers, in some cases with negative working capital.

“像苹果和戴尔这样的公司越来越常见地通过供应商融资，在某些情况下还会出现负营运资本的情况。

“Why is it necessary for these Berkshire businesses to have so much working capital, particularly so much cash?

“为什么这些伯克希尔的业务需要这么多的营运资本，特别是这么多现金？

“More generally, how do you think about efficiently managing the working capital of a business segment so large, sprawling, and decentralized as this one?”

“更一般地说，你们如何看待有效管理这样一个如此庞大、分散且复杂的业务部门的营运资本？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we have excess cash every place at Berkshire, so we don’t — at present, it really doesn’t make any difference whether we have it at certain subsidiaries or other subsidiaries.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在伯克希尔的各个地方都有多余的现金，所以目前，这些现金放在某些子公司还是其他子公司并没有太大区别。

So we do not — we have excess cash. As I pointed out in the past, we’ll never go below 20 billion in cash, and we’ll actually stay comfortably above it, but — allowing for the preferred that’s going to — of Kraft Heinz — we’ll be, again, over 60 billion of consolidated cash.

所以我们并没有——我们有多余的现金。正如我以前提到的，我们的现金绝不会低于200亿美元，而且我们实际上会保持在这个数字之上，但——考虑到Kraft Heinz的优先股——我们将再次拥有超过600亿美元的合并现金。

We don’t really worry much about what pocket it’s in. It’s not making anything, anyway, at these levels.

我们不太关心这些现金放在哪个口袋里。无论如何，这些现金在目前的水平上并不会产生任何收益。

Now, if rates move higher, we’ve actually got the mechanics in process to do sweep accounts and that sort of thing, which — so I would pay no attention to the particular cash that’s being held in that category there.

现在，如果利率上升，我们实际上已经有了处理自动转账账户之类的机制，所以我不会关注这些现金的具体存放情况。

The cash in Berkshire Hathaway Energy, the cash in the railroad, we have independent levels, that we don’t guarantee their debt, and they run with ample cash, and we would not look at sweeping that down to a minimum.

在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司和铁路公司的现金，我们有独立的管理水平，我们不担保它们的债务，它们运营时有充足的现金，我们不会考虑将这些现金降到最低。

But if you talk about 40 or 50 of our miscellaneous subsidiaries, we will go to a sweep account when rates gets where it really makes any difference to do it.

但如果你谈论的是我们40或50个杂项子公司，当利率达到真的有意义的水平时，我们会使用自动转账账户。

But right now, when you’re getting zero, it doesn’t make much difference where you get zero. So I think the fellow’s overanalyzed it a little bit, but I understand why he did it.

但现在，当你得到零收益时，无论在哪里得到零收益都没什么区别。所以我认为那个人分析得有点过度，但我理解他这么做的原因。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, one of these ideas is, why don’t we imitate some of these other people, and pay our suppliers a lot more slowly, so we have more working capital?

查理·芒格：沃伦，其中一个想法是，为什么我们不模仿这些其他公司，向供应商支付得更慢一些，这样我们就能有更多的营运资本？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that’s a big thing in business now. And last year, Walmart, for example, went to almost all of their suppliers, as I understand it, and certainly the companies that we supply, and they basically had a list of half a dozen things that they wanted present suppliers to agree to, and one of those things was more-extended terms.**

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这在商业中现在是一个大问题。例如，去年沃尔玛几乎向所有供应商提出了这样的要求，当然包括我们供应的公司，他们基本上列出了一些供应商需要同意的事项，其中之一就是更长的付款期限。

And each of our companies made their own decisions, but my guess is they got more extended terms from most of their suppliers, maybe a very high percentage of their suppliers, and they may have gone from — I don’t remember the exact request, whether they went from 30 to 60 days, or what it was — but they got a meaningful extension.

我们每个公司都做出了自己的决定，但我猜他们从大多数供应商那里获得了更长的付款期限，也许是很高比例的供应商，他们可能从——我不记得具体要求了，是从30天变成60天，还是其他什么——但他们获得了实质性的延期。

So, you will — you know, in a couple years or a year, takes time to implement, you’ll see higher payables, relative to sales, at Walmart than you saw a year or two ago.

所以，你会看到，在几年或一年内，需要时间来实施，你会看到沃尔玛的应付账款相对于销售额比一两年前要高。

And, you know, they are under a lot of pressure competing with Amazon and others, and that’s one of the ways they expressed it.

你知道，他们在与亚马逊和其他公司竞争时承受了很大的压力，这就是他们表达这种压力的一种方式。

And I’ve seen it done other places, and it’s conceivable that one of our subsidiaries might deem it wise to do it, but I don’t think they will. I mean, I think that the pressure for cash at Berkshire is not that high, and I think that the pressure for — or the desire for — great relations with suppliers is — would probably overcome, in most of our managers’ minds, any desire to start extending terms.

我也在其他地方见过这种做法，可能我们的一个子公司会觉得这样做是明智的，但我不认为他们会这样做。我的意思是，我认为伯克希尔对现金的压力并不大，而对与供应商保持良好关系的需求——在我们大多数经理的心目中，可能会超越任何开始延长付款期限的愿望。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think it’s hard to do that, brutally, when you’re rich and your supplier isn’t, and think that your supplier is going to love you.**

查理·芒格：是的，我认为当你富有而供应商不富裕时，强行这样做很难，还指望你的供应商会喜欢你。

And so I think there’s something to be said for leaning over backward to have a win-win relationship with both suppliers and customers, always. (Applause)

所以，我认为竭尽全力与供应商和客户建立双赢的关系是有意义的。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s never been pushed at Berkshire, that’s for sure.**

沃伦·巴菲特：这在伯克希尔从未被强迫过，这是肯定的。

You can argue we got a pretty good thing going in float anyway, so — (Laughs)

你可以说我们在“浮存金”方面做得相当好，所以——（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and we don’t need it. Let somebody else set the record on that one.**

查理·芒格：是的，我们也不需要这样。让其他人来创下那个记录吧。

54. “We don’t need to inflate the figures”

“我们不需要夸大数字”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonny?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔尼？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Most American corporations separate out supposedly one-time restructuring costs, whereas Berkshire doesn’t. Berkshire’s reported operating earnings are, therefore, in my opinion, of higher quality.

乔纳森·布兰特：大多数美国公司将所谓的一次性重组成本分开，而伯克希尔则不这样做。因此，我认为伯克希尔报告的运营收益质量更高。

**Have you ever calculated how much higher operating earnings, on average, would be if Berkshire separated out plant closing costs, product line exits, severance pay, and similar items?

你们是否计算过，如果伯克希尔将工厂关闭成本、产品线退出、遣散费以及类似项目分开计算，平均运营收益会高出多少？

Is it a material number? Or does Berkshire not incur much in the way of these types of costs typically because most of your acquisitions are stand-alones?

这是一个重要的数字吗？还是伯克希尔通常不会产生这些类型的成本，因为你们的大多数收购都是独立的？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me take that one.

查理·芒格：让我来回答这个问题。

That’s a question like asking, why don’t you kill your mother to get the insurance money? (Laughter)

这就像问你，为什么不杀了你的母亲以获得保险金？（笑声）

We don’t do it. We’re not interested in manipulating those numbers, and we haven’t had a restructuring charge ever, and I don’t think we’re about to start. (Applause)

我们不这样做。我们不感兴趣操控这些数字，我们从未有过重组费用，我认为我们也不会开始这样做。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say this, too, Johnny.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我也这么说，乔尼。

We don’t do that. The numbers would not be huge. You know, there could be a year, I suppose, when they might be, for some reason, but they are more conservatively stated than most companies, and I think they’re of higher quality.

我们不这样做。这些数字不会很大。我想，也许有一年由于某些原因它们可能会很大，但总体来说它们的陈述比大多数公司更为保守，我认为它们的质量更高。

But I’ve pointed out, also, that I think that our depreciation expense at the railroad, which is standard and which all of the other railroads use, is inadequate as a measure of true operating earnings, but that’s —

但我也指出，我认为我们的铁路折旧费用——这是标准的，所有其他铁路公司也使用——作为真实运营收益的度量是不足够的，但这——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And you’re talking about — we like to advertise our defects.**

查理·芒格：而且你说的是——我们喜欢展示我们的缺陷。

WARREN BUFFETT: Not all of them. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不是所有的缺陷。（笑声）

There’s no question that we — I think we will have more amortization of certain intangibles in our — which reduce earnings and reported earnings, but which, in reality, are not expenses — we’ll have more of that than some companies.

毫无疑问，我们——我认为我们会有更多的某些无形资产摊销——这会减少收益和报告的收益，但实际上这些并不是费用——我们会比一些公司有更多这样的情况。

And I’ve pointed that out. I haven’t — I never want to report one of these things where I have the whole adjusted earnings set out and say, this is what you’re supposed to pay attention to, because every one of those I’ve seen virtually results in some inflation of figures.

我已经指出了这一点。我从未——我从不想报告这些事物中的一个，其中我列出了整个调整后的收益，并说这是你们应该关注的，因为我看到的每一个这样的情况几乎都会导致一些数据的夸大。

Things are good enough at Berkshire. We don’t need to inflate the figures.

伯克希尔的情况已经足够好，我们不需要夸大数据。

55. Berkshire Hathaway’s credit default swaps

伯克希尔哈撒韦的信用违约掉期

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is Martin, calling from Germany. I’m a fixed-income manager.

观众成员：我是马丁，来自德国。我是一名固定收益经理。

We launched, with (inaudible), a fund and —

我们启动了一个基金，和（听不清）——

WARREN BUFFETT: You have my — you have my sympathy.

沃伦·巴菲特：你有我的同情。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, yeah. The volume is about 600, 650 million. We are 4.1 percent ahead this year.

观众：是的，是的。这个数字大约是 6 亿到 6.5 亿。我们今年领先 4.1%。

Obviously my question is about fixed income. If I look in your annual report, it’s about the volume of 25 billion. And if I add, let’s say, the CDS, you were selling the CDS, it is by the volume of 7 or 8 billion.

显然，我的问题是关于固定收益的。如果我查看你的年报，提到的金额是 250 亿。如果我再加上，比如说，信用违约掉期（CDS），你们出售的 CDS，金额大约是 70 亿或 80 亿。

So my concrete question is, the premium on your CDS is about 31 percent — 31 basis points — at the end of the year, so mark-to-market, it is probably at the high teens or 20s.

所以我具体的问题是，你们的信用违约掉期（CDS）溢价大约是 31 个基点——在年底时，所以按市值计算，可能在高十几或 20 左右。

So would you consider to unwind this position? Are you allowed to do it and the (inaudible) say no? But probably you can make exactly the contrary trade on it. That means you are buying protection.

那么你会考虑解除这个头寸吗？你被允许这样做吗，还是（听不清）说不？但你可能可以在此基础上进行完全相反的交易。这意味着你在购买保护。

Is that a philosophy which you stand behind? Could you do that from the (inaudible) point of view, when the premiums are extremely low, which is at the case that the spreads are, as I said, between 15 and 20 basis points? Can you give —?

这是你支持的哲学吗？在（听不清）观点下，当溢价极低时，你能这样做吗？正如我所说，利差在 15 到 20 个基点之间。你能给出——？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, that sounds like it was designed for you. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，这听起来像是为你设计的。（笑）

I think he was referring to — we have one position left over from six or seven years ago, or thereabouts, that involves us selling protection on zero coupon municipal bonds with a nominal value — maturity value, which is — since there’s zero coupons, is far off, and not present value, at all. I think 7.7 billion or something like that.

我认为他指的是——我们还有一个仓位，来自六七年前，或者差不多的时间，涉及我们出售零息市政债券的保护，名义价值——到期价值，由于没有零息票，所以是很久以后的，不是现值，完全不是。我想是 77 亿美元或类似的数字。

And we’re just sitting with that position because we like the position. And the gentleman mentions that our CDS — our CDS is — that’s an insurance premium against our debt that people buy.

我们保留这个头寸，因为我们喜欢这个头寸。这位绅士提到我们的信用违约掉期——我们的信用违约掉期是——这是人们购买的针对我们债务的保险费。

A, there’s a fair amount of activity in it from time to time, and I think that’s partially caused by the fact that we neither collateralize that municipal contract that he refers to, but we don’t collateralize, with minor exceptions, the equity puts that are still out there.

A，时不时会有相当多的活动，我认为这部分是由于我们既没有对他提到的市政合同进行担保，也没有对仍然存在的股权认沽期权进行担保，只有少数例外。

So the counterparties have to buy — I believe this is the case — I think the counterparties have to buy protection on Berkshire’s credit through CDSs.

因此，对手方必须购买——我相信情况是这样的——我认为对手方必须通过信用违约掉期（CDS）购买伯克希尔的信用保护。

Now, the people they buy it from, their credit probably isn’t as good as Berkshire’s, so I mean I think they’re — but it’s probably an internal rule at some of these firms that are on the other side of the contract, and so — but that really doesn’t make any difference to us.

现在，他们购买的对象的信用可能不如伯克希尔的好，所以我认为他们——但这可能是一些合同另一方公司的内部规则，因此——但这对我们来说真的没有任何区别。

Back in 2008 and ’9, our CDS prices went up to a crazy level, and I even commented here at the annual meeting that I would love to be selling them myself, except I wasn’t allowed to.

在 2008 年和 2009 年，我们的 CDS 价格达到了疯狂的水平，我甚至在年度会议上评论过，我很想自己出售这些产品，只是我不被允许。

But what goes on in a CDS market really isn’t of any particular interest to us, and it’s too bad for the other guys. They didn’t get collateral from us and we wouldn’t have given it to them. And so they have to buy these things that, like I say, from our standpoint, they’re wasting their money, but they probably have internal rules that make them.

但 CDS 市场发生的事情对我们来说并没有特别的兴趣，其他人真是太可怜了。他们没有从我们这里获得担保品，而我们也不会给他们。因此，他们不得不购买这些东西，从我们的角度来看，他们是在浪费钱，但他们可能有内部规则让他们这样做。

I think I’ve addressed your question, but — Charlie, do you think I’ve addressed his question?

我想我已经回答了你的问题，但——查理，你认为我回答了他的问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the truth of the matter is that we don’t pay much attention to trying to get an extra two basis points by being gamey on our short-term things. And that credit default position is a weird, historical accident, and we don’t pay much attention to it, either. It’ll go away in due course.

查理·芒格：实际上，我们并不太关注通过短期操作来获取额外的两个基点。而那个信用违约头寸是一个奇怪的历史意外，我们也不太关注它。它会在适当的时候消失。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. All of our contracts are just going to expire. We’re not — now, we do a few operational contracts in our energy company. I’ve mentioned a couple places where they — for their own reasons and sometimes because the utility commissions want them to — they do certain things, but it’s peanuts.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们所有的合同都会到期。我们并没有——现在，我们在能源公司做了一些运营合同。我提到过几个地方，他们出于自己的原因，有时是因为公用事业委员会希望他们这样做——他们会做某些事情，但这微不足道。

And the positions that I instituted six or seven years ago are basically all in a runoff position, and the first big runoffs will be in 2018, in a couple years.

而我在六七年前设立的头寸基本上都处于清算状态，第一次大规模的清算将在2018年，即几年后进行。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re basically not in — we don’t fool around with our own credit defaults.

查理·芒格：我们基本上不——我们不玩弄自己的信用违约。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no, never, no. But I would’ve liked to have sold them in 2008. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不，绝对不会。但我很想在2008年出售它们。（笑声）

They actually got up — people were paying —

实际上它们的价格上涨了——人们在支付——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I know, it was crazy.

查理·芒格：我知道，这太疯狂了。

WARREN BUFFETT: — 500 basis points, 5 percent, in terms of betting that Berkshire would go broke, which was totally crazy, but I couldn’t take advantage of it. I wanted to, though.

沃伦·巴菲特：——500个基点，5%，押注伯克希尔破产，这完全是疯狂的，但我无法利用这个机会。我确实想这么做。

56. A fantastic manager makes a huge difference

一个出色的经理能带来巨大的变化

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky. 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Tom Hinsley, a long-time shareholder from Houston, Texas, who says, “Over the years, you’ve been effusive in your praise of Ajit Jain and his contributions to Berkshire.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自德克萨斯州休斯顿的长期股东汤姆·欣斯利，他说：“多年来，你对阿吉特·贾因及其对伯克希尔的贡献赞不绝口。”

“In the 2009 chairman’s letter you wrote, ‘If Charlie, Ajit, and I are ever sinking in a boat, and you can only save one of us, swim to Ajit.’

“在 2009 年的董事长信中你写道，‘如果查理、阿吉特和我在一艘船上沉没，而你只能救我们中的一个，游去救阿吉特。’”

My question is, what if we don’t get to Ajit in time? Please comment on the impact on National Indemnity and Berkshire, and whether or not there’s another Ajit in the house.”

“我的问题是，如果我们来不及救阿吉特会怎么样？请评论一下对国家赔偿公司和伯克希尔的影响，以及是否还有其他类似阿吉特的人在公司里。”

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s not another Ajit in the house.

沃伦·巴菲特：公司里没有另一个阿吉特。

I didn’t hear the part immediately before it when you were — but there is not another Ajit on the house.

我没有听到你刚才提到的那部分——但是公司里没有另一个阿吉特。

BECKY QUICK: The impact on National Indemnity — I guess the impact on the insurance companies, as a result —

贝基·奎克：对国家赔偿公司的影响——我想问一下对保险公司会有什么影响——

WARREN BUFFETT: If we lost him?

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们失去他的话？

BECKY QUICK: Yeah. 贝基·奎克：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: It would be very significant. And that would be true of some other managers of some other subsidiaries.

沃伦·巴菲特：这将非常重要。这对其他一些子公司的其他管理者也是如此。

But it’s quite dramatic with Ajit’s operation, because, literally, there were a few years when we had, like, 25 or so — or 30 — people where that operation — it was an unusual period to be in — but where it’s earning potential, under Ajit, was fantastic. That probably won’t happen to that degree again. I wish it would.

但阿吉特的操作是相当戏剧性的，因为，实际上，有几年我们有大约25人或者30人，那段时期——那是一个不寻常的时期——但在阿吉特的领导下，它的盈利潜力是非常巨大的。这种程度的情况可能不会再出现。我希望能再出现。

But he’s done a tremendous amount for Berkshire. But I can, you know, you can start with [GEICO CEO] Tony [Nicely] — you go to all — there have been a lot of managers that have created billions and billions of dollars of value for Berkshire. I mean, and maybe you can get into the tens of billions, you know.

但他为伯克希尔做了大量的贡献。不过，我可以，你知道，你可以从[GEICO 首席执行官]托尼[尼克利]开始——你去看看——有很多管理者为伯克希尔创造了数十亿、数十亿的价值。我是说，也许你可以达到数百亿，你知道的。

It’s — having a fantastic manager that has a large business — potential business — available to them, and who makes the most of it, you know, it’s huge over time. You don’t see it necessarily in a week or a month or anything of the sort.

拥有一位出色的经理，他们有巨大的商业潜力可供利用，并且充分利用这一点，随着时间的推移，这是非常重要的。你不会在一周、一个月或类似的时间内看到这一点。

But when you’re building capital value, I mean, think of the value of [CEO] Jeff Bezos to Amazon. It wouldn’t have happened without him, you know, and you’re looking at huge values.

但是当你在建立资本价值时，想想[首席执行官]杰夫·贝索斯对亚马逊的价值。没有他，这一切都不会发生，你知道的，而你正在看到巨大的价值。

And I could name other situations. You know, the value of Tom Murphy and Dan Burke was the difference between zero and what they ended up with. I mean, they built that thing from a bankrupt UHF station in Albany.

我还可以列举其他情况。你知道，汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克的价值是从零到他们最终得到的价值之间的差异。我的意思是，他们从一个破产的UHF电台在奥尔巴尼建立了那个事业。

It wasn’t that they were — they didn’t invent television or anything of the sort, they just managed it so well.

他们并不是发明了电视或其他类似的东西，只是管理得非常好。

So, really outstanding managers, they’re invaluable, and we want to —

所以，真正出色的经理是无价的，我们希望——

Charlie and I can’t do it ourselves, but we want to align ourselves with them and then, you know, have them feel about Berkshire the way we feel about it.

查理和我自己做不到，但我们想与他们保持一致，然后让他们对伯克希尔的感觉和我们对它的感觉一样。

And if we do that, we have an enormous asset, and we do have, in Ajit and a number of the other managers. Charlie?

如果我们这样做，我们就拥有了一个巨大的资产，而在阿吉特和其他一些经理身上，我们确实拥有这个。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, and Ajit has a longer shelf life than we do. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，阿吉特的保质期比我们长。（笑声）

He’d be particularly missed.

他会被特别怀念。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, let’s not give up here, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，查理，我们不要放弃。（笑声）

I reject such defeatism. (Laughs)

我拒绝这种悲观主义。（笑声）

57. Paying a little money now to have a lot of money later

现在花一点钱，以后获得很多钱

WARREN BUFFETT: Cliff. 沃伦·巴菲特：克利夫。

CLIFF GALLANT: Thank you.

克利夫·加朗特：谢谢你。

Low-to-negative interest rates is something that’s been discussed a few times today, and you’ve mentioned its implications for a return on float.

低至负利率是今天讨论过几次的一个话题，您提到了它对浮存金收益的影响。

I was wondering, how should shareholders value the 25 percent of the float that’s been created by retrocessional reinsurance, where the business is booked at an underwriting loss, and at times, has adversely developed?

我在想，股东应该如何评估由再保险创造的 25%的浮存金，这部分业务以承保亏损的方式入账，并且有时会出现不利的发展？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Cliff brings up, some of our business, in the insurance business, we take with either the probability of some underwriting loss, in order to get to use the money for a very long period of time. And it would look, under today’s interest rates, like we can’t do much with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。克利夫提到，我们的一些业务，在保险行业中，我们会承担一定的承保损失的概率，以便能够长期使用这笔资金。在今天的利率下，这看起来我们对此无能为力。

There’s two answers to that. We don’t think it will — for the duration of the kind of contracts we have — we don’t expect these rates, but we could be wrong.

对此有两个答案。我们认为，考虑到我们所拥有的合同期限——我们不期望这些利率会持续，但我们可能错了。

But the second one, also, is that we do think that occasionally we will get chances, even in periods of low interest rates, to do things that are — will produce quite a bit — very reasonable returns.

但第二点是，我们确实认为，即使在低利率时期，我们偶尔也会有机会做一些能够产生相当可观回报的事情。

And so we do not — we are not measuring it against, you know, double-A corporates, or anything of the sort. We’re measuring it in the potential utility, to us with our really pretty unusual flexibility, in respect to the deployment of funds, and this long period when we’ll have an opportunity, perhaps, to come up with one or two things that — where we can deploy money at a rate that may be quite a bit higher than other people. Assume now the money can be deployed. Charlie?

因此，我们并没有将其与双 A 级企业或类似的东西进行比较。我们是在衡量其潜在效用，考虑到我们在资金部署方面非常独特的灵活性，以及在这段较长的时间内，我们可能有机会提出一两个方案——在这些方案中，我们可以以比其他人高得多的速度部署资金。假设现在资金可以被部署。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we’re willing to pay a little money now to have just a certainty of having a lot of money available in case something really attractive comes up in a difficult time.

查理·芒格：是的，我们愿意现在花一点钱，以确保在困难时期有很多钱可用，以便在出现真正有吸引力的机会时能够抓住。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s an option cost.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是一种期权成本。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s an option cost, right.

查理·芒格：这是一种期权成本，对吧。

WARREN BUFFETT: And that option came in handy in 2008 and ’9, for example.

沃伦·巴菲特：例如，这个选择在 2008 年和 2009 年派上了用场。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Did it ever.

查理·芒格：确实如此。

58. No nationwide bubble in residential real estate now

目前住宅房地产没有全国性泡沫

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie and Warren. My name is Mindy Jensen, and I’m from Longmont, Colorado. I work for the largest real estate investing social network online, called BiggerPockets.com.

观众成员：嗨，查理和沃伦。我叫明迪·詹森，来自科罗拉多州的朗蒙特。我在最大的房地产投资社交网络网站 BiggerPockets.com 工作。

We’re seeing investors starting to get concerned that the real estate market is a bit frothy, similar to the run-up of 2005, ‘6, and ’7, that led to the crash in 2008.

我们看到投资者开始担心房地产市场有些过热，类似于 2005、2006 和 2007 年的上涨，这导致了 2008 年的崩盘。

Warren, in 2012, you told Becky Quick that if you had a way to easily manage them, you’d buy 100,000 houses and rent them out. How do you feel about the real estate market today?

沃伦，2012 年你告诉贝基·奎克，如果你有办法轻松管理这些房产，你会买 10 万套房子并出租。你对今天的房地产市场有什么看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not as attractive as it was in 2012. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：现在看起来没有 2012 年那么吸引人了。（笑）

The — you know, we’re not particularly better at predicting real estate markets than we are stock markets, or interest rate markets, but there’s certainly — and it’s driven to some extent by these low interest rates — but there’s certainly properties that are being sold at very, very low cap rates that strike me as having more potential for loss than gain.

你知道，我们在预测房地产市场方面并不比股票市场或利率市场更擅长，但确实——在某种程度上是受到这些低利率的驱动——但确实有些物业以非常低的资本化率出售，这让我觉得它们更有可能带来损失而不是收益。

But again, if you can borrow money for very, very little, and you think you’re getting into some very safe asset, 100 basis points or 150 basis points higher, there’s a great temptation to do it.

但再次说，如果你能以非常低的成本借到钱，并且你认为你进入的是一些非常安全的资产，利率高100个基点或150个基点，这确实有很大的诱惑。

I think it’s a mistake to do that, but, you know, I could be wrong.

我认为这样做是个错误，但你知道，我可能是错的。

I don’t see a nationwide bubble in residential real estate now, at all. I think, you know, I think in a place like Omaha or, you know — most of the country — you are not paying bubble prices for residential real estate.

我现在完全看不到全国范围内的住宅房地产泡沫。我认为，在像奥马哈这样的地方，或者说这个国家的大部分区域，你并没有为住宅房地产支付泡沫价格。

But it’s quite different than it was in 2012. And I don’t think the next time around the problem is going to be a real estate bubble. I think that it certainly was the cause, in a very large part, of what happened in 2008 and ’9, but I don’t — I don’t think it’ll be a replica of that. Charlie?

但这与2012年时大相径庭。我认为下一次问题不会是房地产泡沫。我认为房地产泡沫确实是2008年和2009年发生的事件的主要原因，但我不认为它会重演那种情况。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

59. Praise for portfolio managers Ted Weschler and Todd Combs

对投资组合经理泰德·韦施勒和托德·科姆斯的赞扬

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren, Todd and Ted now have been at Berkshire for several years.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦、托德和泰德现在在伯克希尔已经待了好几年。

What have been their biggest hits, and failures, specifically?

他们最大的成功和失败具体是什么？

And what have they learned from Charlie and Warren, and what are the biggest differences between you and them?

他们从查理和沃伦那里学到了什么？你和他们之间最大的区别是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll answer the last part, the easiest.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我会先回答最后一部分，这是最简单的。

I am trying to think of very big deals that we can do something in, in investments, or in business, preferably just in operating businesses.

我正在考虑我们可以在投资或商业中进行的一些非常大的交易，最好是在运营业务方面。

I mean, they still are — their primary job is working on — each has a $9 billion portfolio, and one of them has, I don’t know, perhaps seven or eight positions, and the other one has maybe thirteen or fourteen, but they have a very similar approach to investing.

我的意思是，他们仍然是——他们的主要工作是——每个人都有一个 90 亿美元的投资组合，其中一个大约有七八个头寸，另一个可能有十三四个，但他们的投资方法非常相似。

They’ve both been enormously helpful in doing several things, including important things, that — for which they don’t get paid a dime, and which they’re just as happy working on as — working on the things — as they are when they’re working on things that do pay off for them financially.

他们在做几件事情上都非常有帮助，包括一些重要的事情——这些事情他们没有得到一分钱的报酬，但他们在这些事情上的工作和在那些能给他们带来经济回报的事情上工作时一样开心。

They’ve got — they’re perfect cultural fits for Berkshire. They’re smart at what they do. And, you know, they’re a big addition to Berkshire. Charlie?

他们是——他们与伯克希尔完美契合。他们在自己的领域非常聪明。而且，你知道，他们是伯克希尔的重要补充。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Again, I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Did I cover the whole thing, Andrew, or was there one —a part I missed there?

沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁，我把整个事情都讲完了吗，还是有我漏掉的部分？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Biggest hits and failures. I think they specifically wanted to know, in terms of investments, and trying to understand the way you think perhaps — I think the question was more — I think — the implication was, the way they think and the way you think, are there differences?

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：最大的成功与失败。我认为他们特别想知道，在投资方面，以及试图理解你的思维方式，也许——我认为问题更多的是——我认为——暗示是，他们的思维方式和你的思维方式之间是否存在差异？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They’re — I would say they’re — they have a bigger universe to work with, because they can look at ideas in which they can put 500 million, and I’m looking — I’m trying to think of ways to put, you know, sums into billions.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们——我会说他们——他们有更大的投资范围，因为他们可以考虑投入 5个亿的想法，而我则在思考如何将资金投入到数十亿。

But — and they probably — well, they certainly — have more extensive knowledge of certain industries and activities in business that have developed in the last ten or fifteen years. They’d be smarter on that than I am.

但是——他们可能——好吧，他们肯定——对过去十年或十五年中发展起来的某些行业和商业活动有更广泛的知识。他们在这方面比我聪明。

But their approach to investing, I mean, they’re looking for businesses that they understand and that are going to — and through the stocks of those businesses — that they can buy at a sensible price and that they think will be earning significantly more money five or ten years from now.

但他们的投资方法是，他们寻找的是他们理解的企业，并且通过这些企业的股票，他们可以以合理的价格购买，并且他们认为这些企业在五年或十年后将赚取更多的钱。

So it’s very similar to what I’m thinking about, except I’d probably add another zero to it.

所以这和我想的非常相似，只是我可能会再加一个零。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we don’t want to talk about specific hits and failures.

查理·芒格：我们不想谈论具体的成功和失败。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

OK. Gregg. 好的。格雷格。

Yeah, we will never get into disclosing — I mean, we file reports every 90 days that show what Berkshire does in marketable securities, but we don’t identify — I may identify whether it’s mine or theirs, but we don’t get into identifying what they do individually.

是的，我们永远不会透露——我的意思是，我们每 90 天提交一次报告，显示伯克希尔在可交易证券方面的操作，但我们不具体说明——我可能会指出这是我的还是他们的，但我们不会具体说明他们各自的操作。

60. We moved money to pay for Precision Castparts

我们转移了资金以支付精密铸件。

GREGG WARREN: Looking at Berkshire’s finance and financial products segment, there was a fairly significant increase in the amount of cash carried on the group’s books last year.

格雷格·沃伦：查看伯克希尔的金融和金融产品部门，去年集团账面上的现金金额有了相当显著的增加。

After holding steady between 2 and 2-and-a-half billion dollars during 2012 to 2014, the amount of cash held at the segments spiked up to 5.4 billion at the end of the third quarter of last year, and $7.1 billion at the end of 2015.

在 2012 年至 2014 年期间，现金持有量稳定在 20 亿到 25 亿美元之间，而在去年第三季度末，该金额激增至 54 亿美元，并在 2015 年底达到 71 亿美元。

This incidentally coincided with your acquisition of GE’s railcar leasing unit, as well as the acquisition of several railcar repair maintenance facilities.

这恰好与您收购通用电气的铁路车辆租赁部门以及收购几家铁路车辆维修保养设施的事件相吻合。

Sales and profitability were fairly solid last year, but don’t really seem to account for the magnitude of the change in cash. And investments, debt, and other liabilities do not look to have changed significantly enough to count for the difference, perhaps accounting for about $1 billion of the increase.

去年的销售和盈利能力相当稳健，但似乎并没有真正反映现金变化的幅度。而投资、债务和其他负债似乎也没有显著变化，可能只占到增加额的约 10 亿美元。

Just wondering where the additional $3.5 billion in cash came from, and whether or not the elevated level of cash at the end of last year is excess to the business, or a new required level of cash for the operation?

我只是想知道额外的 35 亿美元现金来自哪里，以及去年年底的现金水平是否对业务来说是多余的，还是运营所需的新现金水平？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I can — I can’t tell where it came from — you think I would, 3-and-a-half billion — but I can tell you why we were funneling money into the parent company and the finance company.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不能确定这笔钱来自哪里——你会认为我会知道，35 亿美元——但我可以告诉你我们为什么要向母公司和金融公司注入资金。

That money was basically dedicated to making the 22 billion portion of the Precision Castparts purchase that was accounted for by cash. We borrowed — we actually borrowed 12 billion — but 10 billion was what was — of the borrowing — was there.

这笔钱主要是为了支付精密铸件收购中22亿美元的现金部分。我们借了——实际上我们借了 120 亿美元——但其中 100 亿美元是借款的部分。

And we pushed money from various sources, depending on who owned what and that sort of thing, we pushed money into those two entities, and eventually into the parent company, to take care of the 22 billion that was coming due, turned out to be at the end of January, when the Precision Castparts closed. There’s really no significance to it other than that.

我们从各种来源注入资金，具体取决于谁拥有什么之类的情况，我们将资金注入这两个实体，最终注入母公司，以应对到期的 220 亿美元，结果是在精密铸件关闭时的1月底。除此之外，这并没有什么特别的意义。

61. IBM is “coping with a considerable change”

IBM 正在“应对重大变化”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Jeffrey Ustep (PH) from Cranford, New Jersey.

观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫杰弗里·尤斯特（音），来自新泽西州克兰福德。

I just have a simple question for you. How would you explain IBM’s moat?

我只是有一个简单的问题要问你。你会如何解释 IBM 的护城河？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure that’s a simple question. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我不确定这是不是一个简单的问题。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I don’t either.

查理·芒格：不，我也不这样认为。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it has certain strengths and certain weaknesses. And I don’t think we want to get into giving an investment analysis of any of the portfolio companies that we own.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，它有一定的优势和劣势。我认为我们不想对我们拥有的任何投资组合公司进行投资分析。

I would — I think I probably better leave it there. Charlie?

我想我最好就到此为止。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s obviously coping with a considerable change in the computing world, and it’s attempting something that’s big and interesting, and God knows whether it’s going to work modestly or very well.

查理·芒格：是的。显然，它正在应对计算世界的重大变化，并且正在尝试一些既大又有趣的事情，天知道它会以适度的方式还是非常成功地运作。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think Warren knows either.

查理·芒格：我认为沃伦也不知道。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. We’ll find out whether the strengths are strengths. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：不。我们会发现这些优势是否真的存在。但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s a field that a lot of intelligent people are trying to get big in.

查理·芒格：但这是一个许多聪明人都在努力拓展的领域。

62. Where Buffett and Munger get their sense of humor

巴菲特和芒格的幽默感来自哪里

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’re going to go to Section 8, and then we will adjourn for 15 minutes, prior to the formal meeting of the company.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们将进入第八节，然后在公司正式会议之前休息 15 分钟。

Station 8. 站 8。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, everybody. Good afternoon. My name is Cristian Campos. I’m from New York City. I’m a senior accounting major at Baruch College, part of the City University of New York.

观众成员：大家好。下午好。我叫克里斯蒂安·坎波斯。我来自纽约市。我是巴鲁克学院的会计专业大四学生，属于纽约市立大学的一部分。

And, Mr. Buffett, in your annual shareholder letters, and during interviews, and even today, your sense of humor always shines through. Where does your sense of humor come from? Please tell us. Thank you. (Laughter)

巴菲特先生，在您的年度股东信中，在采访中，甚至在今天，您的幽默感总是闪耀着光芒。您的幽默感来自哪里？请告诉我们。谢谢。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s just the way I see the world. It’s a very interesting and, at times, very humorous place. And actually, I think Charlie has a better sense of humor than I have, so I’ll let him answer where he got his. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是我看待世界的方式。这个地方非常有趣，有时也非常幽默。实际上，我认为查理的幽默感比我更好，所以我让他来回答他是从哪里得到的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think if you see the world accurately, it’s bound to be humorous, because it’s ridiculous. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：我认为如果你准确地看待世界，它必然是幽默的，因为它是荒谬的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that’s a good note to close on.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为这是一个很好的结束语。

63. Shareholder Q&A concludes

股东问答结束

WARREN BUFFETT: We will reconvene in 15 minutes for the formal part of the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们将在 15 分钟后重新召开会议的正式部分。

We have one proxy item to act on, and — so I hope that those of you who are interested in learning more about, actually, the insurance aspects of climate change, will stick around, and we’ll have a discussion on that. And I’ll see you at 3:45. Thank you.

我们有一个代理项目需要处理，所以我希望那些对气候变化的保险方面感兴趣的人能留下来，我们将对此进行讨论。我会在 3:45 见到你们。谢谢。

64. Berkshire’s formal annual meeting begins

伯克希尔的正式年度会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If everybody will please settle down, we’ll proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。如果大家请安静下来，我们将开始会议。

The meeting will now come to order.

会议现在开始。

I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company. I welcome you to this 2016 annual meeting of shareholders.

我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席。欢迎您参加 2016 年股东年会。

This morning, I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present.

今天早上，我介绍了在场的伯克希尔哈撒韦董事。

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天还与我们在一起的有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，他们会回答有关其审计伯克希尔账户的问题。

Sharon Heck is secretary of Berkshire Hathaway, and she will make a written record of the proceedings.

莎伦·赫克是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的秘书，她将对会议进行书面记录。

Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify the count of votes cast in the election for directors, and the motion to be voted upon at this meeting.

贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数进行认证，以及对本次会议上将进行投票的提案。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding — turned off the lights on me — entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股数量的报告——把灯关了——有投票权并在会议上代表的？

SHARON HECK: Yes, I do.

是的，我愿意。

As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 2nd, 2016, the record date for this meeting, there were 807,242 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,254,393,030 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one ten-thousandth of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

根据附带会议通知的委托书说明，该通知已于2016年3月2日发送给所有股东，该会议的记录日期是2016年3月2日。共有807,242股A类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股，每股享有对会议上动议的一个投票权；以及1,254,393,030股B类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股，每股享有对会议上动议的万分之一投票权。

Of that number, 575,608 Class A shares and 772,724,950 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 28th.

在这个数字中，575,608 股 A 类股份和 772,724,950 股 B 类股份通过截至 4 月 28 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。

The first order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place a motion before the meeting.

会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生提出一项动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

MARC HAMBURG: I second the motion.

马尔克·汉堡：我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. We will vote on the motion by voice vote. All those in favor say, “Aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并得到支持。我们将通过口头表决对动议进行投票。所有赞成者请说“赞成”。

Opposed? The motion is carried.

反对？提案通过。

65. Election of Berkshire directors

伯克希尔董事的选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。

If a shareholder is present who did not send in a proxy or wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in, you may vote in person on the election of directors and other matters to be considered at this meeting. Please identify yourself to one of the meeting officials in the aisle so that you can receive a ballot.

如果有股东在场但未提交代理投票或希望撤回之前提交的代理投票，您可以亲自投票选举董事及本次会议将要考虑的其他事项。请向走道上的会议工作人员自我介绍，以便您能领取选票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

MARC HAMBURG: I second the motion.

马尔克·汉堡：我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并得到支持，选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅里尔·维特默为董事。

Are there any other nominations or any discussion?

还有其他提名或讨论吗？

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the election of directors and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

提名已准备好进行投票。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道中的一位会议官员。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。

The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 643,789 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

代理持有人的投票，针对上周四晚上收到的代理投票，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 643,789 票。这个数字远远超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默已被选为董事。

66. Shareholder proposal on climate change risks

股东提案关于气候变化风险

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by the Nebraska Peace Foundation.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由内布拉斯加和平基金会提出的动议。

The motion is set forth in the proxy statement, and will the projectionist please put up number 9? Here we are.

该动议在委托书中列出，请放映员放映第 9 号？我们开始了。

The motion requested our insurance business issue a report describing their response to the risks posed by climate change, including specific initiatives and goals relating to each risk issue identified.

该动议要求我们的保险业务发布一份报告，描述他们对气候变化带来的风险的应对措施，包括与每个识别出的风险问题相关的具体举措和目标。

The directors have recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize — and I think it’ll be up in area one — I will now recognize Dr. James Hansen to present the motion.

我现在将承认——我认为它将在第一区域——我现在将承认詹姆斯·汉森博士来提出动议。

But I believe, maybe, the gentleman from the Nebraska Peace Foundation may be introducing it, and then he may introduce Dr. Hansen.

但我相信，也许来自内布拉斯加和平基金会的绅士会介绍它，然后他可能会介绍汉森博士。

To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I ask the initial speaker to limit his remarks to five minutes, and then those — the microphone in zone one is available for those wishing to speak for or against the motion, subsequently — zone one is the only microphone station in operation.

为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我请初始发言者将发言时间限制在五分钟，然后在第一区域的麦克风将提供给希望支持或反对该提案的人，随后——第一区域是唯一一个正在运作的麦克风站。

For the benefit of those present, I ask that each speaker for or against the motion limit themselves, with the exception of the initial speaker, to two minutes, and confine your remarks solely to the motion. And the motion should be left up on the — let’s see, is that up there or not? Yeah, OK, the motion shall be left up there.

为了在场人员的利益，我要求每位支持或反对该动议的发言者（初始发言者除外）将发言时间限制在两分钟内，并将发言内容仅限于该动议。动议应保持在上面——我们看看，是否在那里？是的，好的，动议将保持在那里。

In a sense, incidentally, it asks us to present a report about the risk to the insurance division by climate change, and I did address this subject in the annual report. That would be a report, and it was a report that was concurred in by Ajit Jain, who is our number one expert on insurance risks. So that does represent the view of our insurance division, and myself, as the chief risk officer.

在某种意义上，顺便提一下，它要求我们就气候变化对保险部门的风险提交一份报告，我在年度报告中确实讨论了这个主题。这将是一份报告，并且得到了我们在保险风险方面的首席专家 Ajit Jain 的认可。因此，这确实代表了我们保险部门的观点，以及我作为首席风险官的观点。

But the subject now is open and we welcome the initial speaker’s comments.

但现在主题是开放的，我们欢迎初始发言者的评论。

And if you’re just going to introduce Dr. Hansen — I can’t see who’s who up there — then I presume that he will have the five minutes and then subsequent speakers will have two minutes. So go to it, you’re on.

如果你只是要介绍汉森博士——我看不清那边是谁——那么我想他会有五分钟的时间，接下来的发言者将有两分钟。所以开始吧，你可以上了。

MARK VASINA: Thank you. My name is Mark Vasina. I’m the treasurer of the Nebraska Peace Foundation, the owner of one A share of Berkshire Hathaway.

马克·瓦西纳：谢谢。我的名字是马克·瓦西纳。我是内布拉斯加和平基金会的财务主管，拥有一股伯克希尔·哈撒韦的 A 类股票。

We are the sponsor of the shareholder resolution which Mr. Buffett has described. In so doing, making the recommendation to develop a risk analysis and report on it, we’re following the lead of the Bank of England, which last September published a comprehensive report on climate change risks facing the insurance industry, and recommended that its regulated companies conduct reviews of the risks and make this available.

我们是巴菲特先生所描述的股东提案的发起人。在此过程中，建议进行风险分析并报告，我们正在效仿英格兰银行，后者在去年九月发布了一份关于保险行业面临的气候变化风险的综合报告，并建议其监管的公司进行风险评估并公开这些信息。

The Bank of England regulates the UK insurance industry, which is the third-largest global insurance market. I’ll turn the rest of my time over to world-renowned climate scientist Dr. James Hansen.

英格兰银行监管英国保险行业，该行业是全球第三大保险市场。我将把剩下的时间交给世界著名气候科学家詹姆斯·汉森博士。

DR JAMES HANSEN: Thank you for this opportunity.

詹姆斯·汉森博士：感谢您给予这个机会。

I want to make a suggestion that I hope you will ponder.

我想提出一个建议，希望你能考虑一下。

Some aspects of climate have become clear. Humans are changing the atmosphere, and we can measure how this is changing earth’s energy balance. More energy is coming in than going out.

气候的某些方面已经变得清晰。人类正在改变大气，我们可以测量这种变化如何影响地球的能量平衡。进入的能量比流出的能量更多。

So the ocean is warming, ice sheets are melting, and sea level is beginning to rise.

所以海洋在变暖，冰盖在融化，海平面开始上升。

We are now close to a point of handing young people a situation that will be out of control, with ice sheet disintegration and multimeter sea level rise during the lifetime of today’s young people, which would mean loss of coastal cities and economic devastation.

我们现在接近一个将年轻人置于失控局面的时刻，冰盖解体和海平面在今天年轻人一生中上升多米，这将意味着沿海城市的消失和经济的毁灭。

Sea level rise would be irreversible on any time scale of interest to humanity. The other irreversible effect of rapid climate change would be extinction of a substantial fraction of the species on Earth.

海平面上升将在任何人类关注的时间尺度上是不可逆的。快速气候变化的另一个不可逆影响将是地球上大量物种的灭绝。

The bottom line is that we cannot burn all fossil fuels, and the economic law of gravity is that as long as fossil fuels appear to be the cheapest energy, we will keep burning them.

底线是我们不能燃烧所有化石燃料，而经济学的重力法则是，只要化石燃料看起来是最便宜的能源，我们就会继续燃烧它们。

So my request, given the respect and the trust the public has in you, is that you reflect upon the possibility of a public statement in favor of a revenue-neutral, gradually-rising carbon fee.

因此，我的请求是，鉴于公众对您的尊重和信任，请您考虑发表一份支持收入中立、逐步上升的碳费用的公开声明。

A carbon fee is needed to make the price of fossil fuels honest, to include the costs to humanity of their air pollution, water pollution, and climate change.

需要征收碳费，以使化石燃料的价格真实反映其对人类造成的空气污染、水污染和气候变化的成本。

A rising carbon fee is needed to spur effective investments by the private sector in clean energies and energy efficiency.

需要提高碳费用，以刺激私营部门在清洁能源和能源效率方面的有效投资。

Most important, it will steadily phase down fossil fuel use. I’m not asking you to endorse a carbon fee on the spot, but I hope that you will reflect upon it and perhaps provide a clear statement in your next report.

最重要的是，它将逐步减少化石燃料的使用。我并不是要求你立即支持碳费用，但我希望你能对此进行反思，并在下一个报告中提供明确的声明。

It could be your greatest legacy. It could affect everything, even the course of our future climate. T

这可能是你最大的遗产。它可能影响一切，甚至我们未来气候的走向。

Thanks. 谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Dr. Hansen.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，汉森博士。

I might say that we — (Applause)

我可以说我们——（掌声）

— although we may differ on some specifics, and I don’t know — I am no expert on this subject whatsoever — I don’t think you and I have any difference in the fact that it’s important that climate change — you know, since it’s something where there is a point of no return — if we are on the course that you think is certain and I think is probable, that it’s a terribly important subject.

— 尽管我们在一些细节上可能存在分歧，而我也不知道——我对这个主题完全不是专家——我认为你我在气候变化这一点上没有任何分歧——你知道，因为这是一个有不可逆转的临界点——如果我们走在你认为是确定的道路上，而我认为是可能的道路上，那么这是一个非常重要的话题。

But the motion that was put forth was relating to the insurance aspects of it, and we have discussed — believe me, we have thought and discussed insurance aspects, and I’ve, in effect, given a report in the — which was asked for by this — within the annual report.

但提出的动议与保险方面有关，我们已经讨论过——相信我，我们已经考虑并讨论了保险方面的问题，我实际上在年度报告中提供了一个报告，这是由此要求的。

So it is really not — the issue before the shareholders is not how I feel about whether climate change is real, or whether a carbon tax is appropriate, it’s whether it poses a risk to our insurance business.

所以，实际上——股东面前的问题不是我对气候变化是否真实，或者碳税是否合适的看法，而是它是否对我们的保险业务构成风险。

And I recognize the Bank of England — read that report — but we respectfully disagree with them in terms of — not in terms of the importance of climate change — but in terms of the risk to our insurance business.

我承认英国银行的报告——不过我们在某些方面尊重他们，但在风险方面我们有不同看法——并不是在气候变化的重要性方面，而是在对我们保险业务的风险方面。

We don’t — we are not forced — we don’t write policies for a long period of time. We’re not forced to write a policy on anything, so we are — our judgment is made as propositions are presented to us, usually as to whether, for one year, we are willing to accept a given risk for a given price.

我们不这样做——我们没有被迫——我们不会长时间制定政策。我们没有被迫就任何事情制定政策，因此我们的判断是根据提出给我们的命题来做的，通常是关于在一年内，我们是否愿意以给定的价格接受特定的风险。

And that — obviously, climate is enormously important in our activities, hurricanes being the most important, probably, although we also get involved in earthquakes — but that is what the proposal is about, and that — and we’ve given a response to that, and it does not mean that we differ on the importance of climate change to the human race.

而且——显然，气候在我们的活动中极为重要，飓风可能是最重要的，尽管我们也参与地震的相关工作——但这就是提案的内容，我们对此做出了回应，这并不意味着我们在气候变化对人类的重要性上存在分歧。

So with that, I would be delighted to hear from the various seconders.

因此，我很高兴听到各位支持者的意见。

JIM JONES: Hello. My name is Jim Jones. I’m the executive director of the Katie School of Insurance at Illinois State University.

吉姆·琼斯：你好。我叫吉姆·琼斯。我是伊利诺伊州立大学凯蒂保险学院的执行主任。

I would like to express my concerns, based on three hidden risks associated with climate change.

我想表达我的担忧，这基于与气候变化相关的三个隐性风险。

The first relates to stranded assets of insurers investing in fossil fuels. The second is a more insidious risk related to climate change. This risk is associated with the long-term liabilities associated with property, life, and health lines of business.

第一个问题涉及到投资于化石燃料的保险公司面临的滞留资产。第二个问题是与气候变化相关的更隐蔽的风险。这种风险与房地产、生命和健康保险业务相关的长期负债有关。

And I realize that a number of intelligent people and experts don’t see a long-term liability, but they’re missing one important part, is that primary insurers are not able to withdraw or reprice books — entire books of business.

我意识到许多聪明的人和专家并没有看到长期负债，但他们忽视了一个重要部分，那就是主要保险公司无法撤回或重新定价整个业务账簿。

Following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, new hurricane models were developed in Florida, and they attempted to get the recommended rate approvals for that. They were not allowed to, and so many insurers began to withdraw from that market.

在卡特里娜、丽塔和威尔玛飓风之后，佛罗里达州开发了新的飓风模型，并试图获得推荐的费率批准。但他们未被允许，因此许多保险公司开始退出该市场。

Ten years later, that — about 40 percent of the underperforming business is still on the books of those insurers, and this could play out in several other states that are exposed to climate risk.

十年后，约 40%的表现不佳的业务仍在那些保险公司的账上，这可能在其他面临气候风险的州也会出现。

For a reinsurer, the value of reinsurance with their customers is a long-term business.

对于再保险公司来说，与客户的再保险价值是一项长期业务。

The reason why this is so important is because, according to my count, 156 of your reinsurance customers have filed climate change disclosures, and these customers are looking for long-term interest being protected by their reinsurer.

这之所以如此重要，是因为根据我的统计，您有 156 个再保险客户提交了气候变化披露，这些客户希望他们的再保险公司能够保护他们的长期利益。

几乎所有错误都错在开头的部分，一开始的前提或者假设就是错的。

And if not, there’s a potential for a relationship default risk that could occur if they perceived your reinsurance as just being one-year contracts that can be repriced or withdrawn.

如果不是这样，那么就存在一种关系违约风险的可能性，如果他们认为你的再保险只是可以重新定价或撤回的一年期合同。

And you enter into that world of the expanding market competition of alternative reinsurance, which just last year was $72 billion, and earlier this quarter, we set a record of $2.2 billion in cap bonds.

你进入了替代再保险市场竞争不断扩大的世界，去年市场规模为 720 亿美元，而在本季度早些时候，我们创下了 22 亿美元的资本债券记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. The — I would point out that we have not been asked, ever, to my knowledge, to write long-term contracts. Our primary insurers know that we look at it one year at a time, and we will not write business that we think has a major negative probability. They don’t expect us to.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。我想指出的是，据我所知，我们从未被要求签订长期合同。我们的主要保险公司知道我们是逐年考虑的，我们不会承接我们认为有重大负面概率的业务。他们也不期望我们这样做。

It’s way less a relational business than in the past. It’s much more a transactional business.

这比过去的关系型业务少得多。现在更像是一种交易型业务。

But it — we will not write — if we lose a customer because they want us to do something stupid, we lose the customer, and there is not a — in our business — I’m not speaking for other reinsurers, but in our business, and I believe with most other reinsurers, they are not going to do something that they think is terribly disadvantageous to them just to maintain a relationship. That’s not really a relationship. It’d be a subsidy.

但我们不会这样做——如果我们失去一个客户，因为他们想让我们做一些愚蠢的事情，我们就失去这个客户，在我们的业务中——我不是在为其他再保险公司发言，但在我们的业务中，我相信大多数其他再保险公司也不会做一些他们认为对自己极为不利的事情，仅仅是为了维持关系。这并不是真正的关系。这只是一种补贴。

So I do — that does not strike me, frankly, as a factor at all of any negative consequence at Berkshire.

所以我这样做——坦率地说，这在我看来根本不是伯克希尔任何负面后果的因素。

We — in terms of what happened after Katrina — rates went up, and actually it — the hurricane experience in Florida has been better than any period since before 1850 that we have any records on.

我们——就卡特里娜之后发生的事情而言——费率上涨，实际上——佛罗里达的飓风经历比我们有记录以来 1850 年之前的任何时期都要好。

That’s been a surprise to us, incidentally. But we have not written business — catastrophe business — in Florida during that period, because we didn’t think the rates were adequate. They were adequate, we just were wrong about it.

这对我们来说是个意外。不过，在那段时间里，我们没有在佛罗里达州承保商业——灾难业务，因为我们认为费率不够合理。实际上费率是合理的，只是我们错了。

So the — and incidentally, that does not — the fact that we walked away from cat business in Florida that we thought was mispriced — does not hurt us in the business.

所以——顺便提一下，这并不——我们在佛罗里达放弃了我们认为定价错误的自然灾难业务——并没有对我们的业务造成伤害。

It’s really a — it’s much more of a transactional business in the — there may have been a time when relationships were very big in reinsurance, but with so many entrants in it, it is very much a transactional business. And no one expects you to do something that’s very stupid.

这实际上是一个——在再保险行业中，它更像是一个交易型业务——可能曾经有一段时间，关系在再保险中非常重要，但随着许多新进入者的加入，它现在非常依赖交易。而且没有人会期望你做一些非常愚蠢的事情。

You know, if they do, it’s the wrong kind of a relationship. But glad to hear the next speaker.

你知道，如果他们这样做，那就是错误的关系。但很高兴听到下一位演讲者。

JANE KLEEB: Hello, Mr. Buffett. My name is Jane Kleeb. I run a group called Bold Nebraska, which was part of an unlikely alliance who beat Keystone XL, to protect the aquifer in our state as well as property rights.

简·克利布：你好，巴菲特先生。我叫简·克利布。我经营一个叫做“大胆内布拉斯加”的组织，我们是一个不太可能的联盟的一部分，成功击败了基石 XL，以保护我们州的含水层以及财产权。

And I met you several years at Senator Nelson’s home, and I had pulled you aside and asked how could we get health care reform passed?

我几年前在尼尔森参议员的家里遇见了你，我把你拉到一边，问我们如何才能通过医疗改革？

And you told me two things: You said, the polling numbers matter, and that we have to keep on applying public pressure.

你告诉我两件事：你说，民调数字很重要，我们必须继续施加公众压力。

And we feel the same way about climate change and climate action. The most recent Yale study said that even 47 percent of conservatives believe in climate change and want to start seeing corporate and government action.

我们对气候变化和气候行动也有同样的看法。最近的耶鲁大学研究显示，甚至有 47%的保守派人士相信气候变化，并希望看到企业和政府采取行动。

And your response to this resolution struck me, because one of the sentences said that if you live in a low-lying area, you should probably move.

你的回应让我印象深刻，因为其中一句话说，如果你住在低洼地区，你可能应该搬走。

Well, we work with Native brothers and sisters who live in coastal communities, and one of those tribes is now the first United States climate refugees.

我们与生活在沿海社区的土著兄弟姐妹合作，其中一个部落现在成为了美国首批气候难民。

They didn’t have the option to move. They were forced to move.

他们没有选择移动的机会。他们被迫移动。

And so we’re turning to you and we’re turning to ourselves to continue to apply public pressure and hope that both you and Charlie stand with us.

因此，我们向您和我们自己寻求支持，以继续施加公众压力，并希望您和查理能与我们站在一起。

And maybe it’s not this year, and maybe it’s not the year after, but we really look forward to you doing full climate risk analysis, as well as divesting from all the fossil fuels that you own.

也许不是今年，也许不是明年，但我们真的期待您进行全面的气候风险分析，并且剥离您所拥有的所有化石燃料。

And lastly, it takes both small and mighty, as well as big and powerful, to solve this problem of climate change. So you blocking small solar in Nevada is the wrong road to go down. Thank you. (Scattered applause)

最后，解决气候变化这个问题需要小的和强大的，以及大的和有力的。因此，你在内华达州阻止小型太阳能的发展是错误的方向。谢谢。（零星的掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think you’ll have a reasonable time to move, but I would say, if you’re making a 50-year investment in low-lying properties, it’s probably a mistake.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为你会有合理的时间来行动，但我想说，如果你在低洼地区进行 50 年的投资，那可能是个错误。

I actually said you may — as a homeowner in a low-lying area — you may wish to consider moving.

我实际上说过，作为一个位于低洼地区的房主，您可能希望考虑搬家。

And I would say that if you expect to be there for ten years or so, I don’t think I would consider moving. But if I thought I was making a 100-year investment, I don’t think I would make it.

我会说，如果你期望在那里待十年左右，我认为我不会考虑搬家。但如果我认为我是在进行一项 100 年的投资，我觉得我不会这样做。

I think it gets to the question — we have a shareholder proposal that says, what are the risks to the insurance division from climate change?

我认为这涉及到一个问题——我们有一个股东提案，问气候变化对保险部门的风险是什么？

We’re not denying climate change is an incredibly important subject. We’re not denying its existence.

我们并不否认气候变化是一个极其重要的话题。我们并不否认它的存在。

But it will not hurt our insurance business, and it’s immaterial compared to other things that could affect our insurance business. And, you know, that is the issue before the meeting. But I’ll be glad to hear from the next speaker.

但这不会对我们的保险业务造成伤害，与其他可能影响我们保险业务的事情相比，这无关紧要。你知道，这就是会议前的问题。不过我很高兴能听到下一位发言者的意见。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett. My name is Kay Harn (PH). I’ve been a shareholder for more than a decade, basically my investing life.

观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生。我叫凯·哈恩（音）。我已经是股东超过十年了，基本上是我投资生涯的一部分。

Today someone said that you think ahead of the crowd. With regards to this resolution, you’re saying that the Berkshire insurance business will just raise rates the next time the policy is renewed, and that makes sense. But you agree that climate change poses a major problem for our planet.

今天有人说你总是走在前面。关于这个决定，你说伯克希尔的保险业务在下次续保时只会提高费率，这很有道理。但你同意气候变化对我们的星球构成了重大问题。

I would say that climate change poses a major problem for the stability of our global financial markets, if the political action continues at its current pace with regards to this issue.

我认为气候变化对我们全球金融市场的稳定构成了重大问题，如果在这个问题上政治行动继续以目前的速度进行。

I personally agree with Dr. Hansen, that a carbon fee is the solution to address this issue. I’m wondering if you can tell us what you think the solution to address this issue is, and whether you think the Berkshire businesses, more broadly than just insurance, will be impacted by this issue in the next decade or two.

我个人同意汉森博士的观点，碳费是解决这个问题的方案。我想知道您认为解决这个问题的方案是什么，以及您是否认为伯克希尔的企业（不仅仅是保险）在未来十年或二十年内会受到这个问题的影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would doubt if it’s affected in the next decade or two.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我怀疑在接下来的十年或二十年里会受到影响。

But I won’t argue with you at all that it’s likely, not certain, that — unless various techniques are designed for reducing — well, for sequestration, different things of that sort — that plenty of people will be working on — or unless the emissions greenhouse — gas emissions — are reduced significantly — that it’s a terribly important problem for civilization.

但我完全不想和你争论，这很可能，而不是确定，除非设计出各种技术来减少——好吧，进行封存，类似的事情——很多人会在这方面工作——或者除非温室气体排放——显著减少——这对文明来说是一个非常重要的问题。

And there have been other — I mean, there’s certainly going to be some very smart people working on ways to change the balance in some way, either through less being released in the atmosphere or by various techniques that might diminish the impact, but no one here will deny that it’s important.

而且还有其他——我的意思是，肯定会有一些非常聪明的人在研究以某种方式改变平衡的方法，要么通过减少释放到大气中的物质，要么通过各种可能减轻影响的技术，但这里没有人会否认这很重要。

I don’t think it will impact — I don’t think it will impact, in a serious way, the climate — or insurance, for that matter — in the next decade or two.

我认为这不会产生影响——我认为在接下来的十年或二十年里，这不会对气候产生严重影响——保险方面也是如此。

But, as I pointed out in the report, if you’re dealing with something where there’s a point of — where you pass a point of no return, the time to do something isn’t when we get ten minutes away from the point of no return.

但是，正如我在报告中指出的，如果你正在处理某个事情，已经过了不可逆转的临界点，那么采取行动的时机不是在距离不可逆转的临界点还有十分钟的时候。

So there are policies, which we’ve subscribed to very strongly, in terms of renewables and that sort of thing, but I think there’s also possibilities that within the scientific community, there will be solutions that are beyond my limited knowledge of physics to conjure up myself, but there are a whole lot of people out there that are a lot smarter.

所以我们非常坚定地支持可再生能源等政策，但我认为在科学界也有可能会出现一些超出我有限物理知识的解决方案，但外面有很多人比我聪明得多。

And I think that a basic problem on the reduction — if those things don’t come to pass — is the fact that it’s a planetary problem, and it requires cooperation by very important countries, and I think President Obama has made a good start in working with leaders of other countries. But it can’t be solved by the United States alone, as you know better than I.

我认为，减少问题的一个基本问题——如果这些事情没有发生——是它是一个全球性问题，需要重要国家的合作。我认为奥巴马总统在与其他国家领导人合作方面已经迈出了良好的第一步。但正如你比我更清楚的那样，这个问题不能仅靠美国来解决。

I’d be glad to hear from the next speaker.

我很高兴听到下一位发言者的意见。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Nancy Meyer (PH), and I’ve been a shareholder for 15 years with my husband.

观众成员：你好。我叫南希·迈耶（音），我和我的丈夫已经做了 15 年的股东。

We have great faith in Berkshire Hathaway. That’s why we invested. So I’m just here to say that, as a shareholder, I’d like to ask my fellow shareholders to consider the economic costs of climate change and urge Berkshire Hathaway to adopt this resolution to show leadership in the insurance industry. Thank you.

我们对伯克希尔哈撒韦充满信心。这就是我们投资的原因。因此，我在这里想说，作为一名股东，我希望我的其他股东考虑气候变化的经济成本，并敦促伯克希尔哈撒韦采纳这一决议，以在保险行业中展现领导力。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. I appreciate the fact you’ve been a shareholder, but I do think for reasons that — I don’t really think that the resolution — I think the resolution is, in a sense, inapplicable to our insurance business.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。我很感激你一直是我们的股东，但我确实认为，出于某些原因——我并不认为这个提案——我认为这个提案在某种意义上与我们的保险业务不适用。

I mean, insurance — global climate is not a risk to our insurance business. It may be a risk to the planet over time, but that’s a different thing.

我的意思是，保险——全球气候对我们的保险业务不是风险。随着时间的推移，这可能对地球构成风险，但那是另一回事。

I mean, you can — we can adopt all kinds of resolutions about saying that, obviously, nuclear proliferation is a threat to the planet, and you can say, well then, it’s a threat to Berkshire.

我的意思是，我们可以——我们可以通过各种决议来表明，显然，核扩散对地球构成威胁，而你可以说，那么，这对伯克希尔也是一种威胁。

But in terms of being Berkshire-specific, you know, you can read the resolution and, like I say, our answer, with Ajit Jain, probably the smartest person I know in insurance, and I have 99 percent of my net worth in Berkshire that’s all destined to go to philanthropic institutions, and I’m not eager to see that disappear, and I do regard myself as the chief risk officer of Berkshire, and I worry about things that can hurt Berkshire, and I do not see it in our insurance division, in relation to climate change. But, thank you.

但就伯克希尔而言，你可以阅读这个决议，正如我所说的，我们的回答是，与阿吉特·贾因一起，他可能是我所认识的保险领域中最聪明的人，我的 99%的净资产都在伯克希尔，这些资产都注定要用于慈善机构，我不希望看到这些消失，我确实把自己视为伯克希尔的首席风险官，我担心可能会伤害伯克希尔的事情，而我在我们的保险部门并没有看到与气候变化相关的问题。谢谢。

RICHARD MILLER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett. I am Richard Miller, in the Creighton Theology Department, here in Omaha. And I study and teach climate change and its social effects.

理查德·米勒：下午好，巴菲特先生。我是理查德·米勒，来自克雷顿神学院，在奥马哈。我研究和教授气候变化及其社会影响。

I just wanted to make you aware that Berkshire is operating within a larger economy, and that the most important climate analysis — economic analysis — from Nicholas Stern, indicates that on our current path, by the end of this century, 30 percent loss in global GDP is possible.

我只是想让你知道，伯克希尔正在一个更大的经济体中运作，而尼古拉斯·斯特恩的最重要气候分析——经济分析——表明，如果我们继续当前的路径，到本世纪末，全球 GDP 可能会损失 30%。

The other issue is, when we talk about doing something about climate change, doing something means to avoid major sea level rise, we need to reduce emissions globally, starting today, 7 percent per year.

另一个问题是，当我们谈论应对气候变化时，采取行动意味着要避免海平面大幅上升，我们需要从今天开始，全球每年减少 7%的排放。

The only time we’ve ever reduced emissions, over a ten-year period, in a growing economy, was in the 1990s in England, and we reduced them 1 percent per year.

我们在一个增长的经济中，唯一一次在十年内减少排放是在 1990 年代的英格兰，我们每年减少了 1%。

So we’re talking about a completely different thing than President Obama’s gradual move.

所以我们谈论的是与奥巴马总统的渐进式变革完全不同的事情。

And we need to do something — no, we need to do massive transformation — immediately. And with your large global holdings, you are a world significant figure on this, not just about this particular shareholder resolution. Thank you for your time.

我们需要立即采取行动——不，我们需要进行大规模的转型。凭借您庞大的全球资产，您在这方面是一个世界重要人物，这不仅仅是关于这项特定的股东提案。谢谢您的时间。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

Is that the — complete the speakers?

那是——完整的发言者吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Say that again?

观众成员：再说一遍？

WARREN BUFFETT: Are you the final speaker?

沃伦·巴菲特：你是最后一位发言者吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, I think those are all the speakers.

观众成员：是的，我认为那就是所有的发言人。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Well, thank you. Charlie, do you have anything you want to say?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。谢谢你。查理，你有什么想说的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes.

查理·芒格：嗯，是的。

We’re in Omaha, which is considerably above sea level. We have no big economic interest in this subject in our insurance companies. We don’t write much of that catastrophic insurance we used to write many years ago.

我们在奥马哈，海拔相当高。我们在保险公司对此主题没有大的经济利益。我们不再写很多年前曾经写过的那种灾难性保险。

So we’re asked, as a corporation, to take a public stance on very complicated issues. We’ve got crime in the cities. We’ve got 100 — we’ve got 1,000 — complicated issues that are very material to our civilization.

所以我们被要求作为一个公司，对非常复杂的问题采取公开立场。我们在城市中面临犯罪问题。我们有 100 个——我们有 1,000 个——对我们的文明非常重要的复杂问题。

And if we spend our time in the meeting taking public stands on all of them, I think it would be quite counterproductive.

如果我们在会议上花时间对所有这些问题发表公开立场，我认为这将是相当适得其反的。

And I don’t like the fact that the people that constantly present this issue never discuss any solution, except reducing consumption of fossil fuels.

我不喜欢那些不断提出这个问题的人，他们除了减少化石燃料的消费外，从不讨论任何解决方案。

So there are geo-engineering possibilities that nobody’s willing to talk about, and I think that’s asinine, so put me down as not welcoming. (Applause)

所以有一些没人愿意谈论的地球工程可能性，我认为这很愚蠢，所以请把我算作不欢迎。(掌声)

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t want to have a political rally.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不想举行政治集会。

The motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the motion and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

动议现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Ms. Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克女士，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告准备好了。

The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 69,114 votes for the motion and 531,724 votes against the motion.

代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，69,114 票支持该提案，531,724 票反对该提案。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares properly cast on the matter, as well as all votes outstanding, the motion has failed.

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类股份在此事项上有效投票的票数的多数，以及所有未投票的票数，因此该提案已被否决。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Ms. Amick. The proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克女士。提案失败。

67. Adjournment 38. 休会

WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any questions for our audit firm before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，有人对我们的审计公司有任何问题吗？如果没有，我请斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Mr. Olson?

沃伦·巴菲特：奥尔森先生？

RON OLSON: And I second it.

RON OLSON：我支持这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say, “Aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成者请说“赞成”。

All opposed say, “No.” 所有反对者请说：“不。”

2016-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2016-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Charlie Munger always “gets the girl”

2. Welcome webcast viewers

3. Meeting agenda

4. Introductions

5. Q1 earnings

6. Share count and earnings

7. “One of the problems of prosperity”

8. Precisions Castparts acquisition

9. “Can’t imagine anybody any happier”

10. Reinsurance outlook a factor in Munich Re and Swiss Re sales

11. Rise in auto death rate hurt GEICO

12. Amazon has “disrupted plenty of people”

13. Defending Coca-Cola from sugar health worries

14. Renewable energy investments

15. Derivatives still a “danger to the system”

16. Float still “useful” despite low interest rates

17. We still love BNSF despite falling coal shipments

18. Don’t envy people making money from risky behavior

19. Nevada utility customers shouldn’t have to subsidize solar power

20. We don’t buy or sell based on commodity price predictions

21. Don’t expect efficiency in higher education

22. Berkshire will “do fine” if Trump or Clinton wins

23. BNSF CEO doesn’t see rail mergers in near future

24. Berkshire indifferent to Wells Fargo’s investment banking

25. “Very, very unlikely” activists could break up Berkshire

26. No interest in “pure” leasing businesses

27. “We’re not targeting competitors for destruction”

28. Sequoia Fund was “overly entranced” by Valeant

29. Buffett leads in wager against hedge funds

30. Sell commercial insurance on the internet?

31. Our culture will endure for “many, many decades”

32. Diversity isn’t a factor in choosing Berkshire directors

33. Buffett’s “mixed emotions” on Berkshire buybacks

34. New Nebraska Furniture Mart store in Dallas doing big business

35. Buffett’s concerns about weapons of mass destruction

36. Lubrizol’s lubricant additives business

37. “We like to look at micro factors”

38. I’d “much rather make money for Berkshire than for myself”

39. Berkshire’s cash flow outlook

40. We’ve “avoided the self-destructive behavior”

41. Due diligence doesn’t find the real risks of buying a company

42. “We don’t pay any attention to titles”

43. “The rating agencies are wrong” on Berkshire

44. 3G’s cost cutting hasn’t hurt Kraft Heinz

45. We paid less for Van Tuyl than it appears

46. “Very cheap money makes me pay a little more”

47. No comment on GEICO-IBM cooperation

48. American Express faces tough competition

49. We like steak but aren’t interested in owning cattle

50. Don’t reward profits in compensation plans

51. BNSF’s capital expenditures

52. U.S. benefits overall from low oil prices

53. No need to sweep cash from subsidiaries

54. “We don’t need to inflate the figures”

55. Berkshire Hathaway’s credit default swaps

56. A fantastic manager makes a huge difference

57. Paying a little money now to have a lot of money later

58. No nationwide bubble in residential real estate now

59. Praise for portfolio managers Ted Weschler and Todd Combs

60. We moved money to pay for Precision Castparts

61. IBM is “coping with a considerable change”

62. Where Buffett and Munger get their sense of humor

63. Shareholder Q&A concludes

64. Berkshire’s formal annual meeting begins

65. Election of Berkshire directors

66. Shareholder proposal on climate change risks

67. Adjournment 38. 休会

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