2017-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2017-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2016 was \$27.5 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.7%. Over the last 52 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from \$19 to \$172,108, a rate of 19% compounded annually.\*

2016年，Berkshire的净资产增长了275亿美元，使我们A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增长了10.7%。在过去的52年里（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到172,108美元，年复合增长率为19%。*

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

本报告中所有的每股数据均适用于Berkshire的A类股票。B类股票的对应数值为A类股票的1/1500。

During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”

在那些年份的前半段，Berkshire的净资产大致等于真正重要的指标：公司的内在价值。这两个数字当时之所以接近，是因为我们的大部分资源都投资于可供出售的证券，而这些证券会定期按照其市场报价进行重估（扣除若出售将产生的税费）。用华尔街的术语来说，我们的资产负债表在当时在很大程度上是“按市价计价”的。

By the early 1990s, however, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that materially diminished the relevance of balance sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules (commonly referred to as “GAAP”) that apply to companies we control differ in important ways from those used to value marketable securities. Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that the carrying value of “losers” be written down when their failures become apparent. “Winners,” conversely, are never revalued upwards.

然而到了1990年代初，我们的重点转向了对企业的完全所有权，这种转变大大削弱了资产负债表数字的相关性。这种脱节的原因在于，对我们控制的公司适用的会计规则（通常称为“GAAP”）与用于估值可供出售证券的规则在若干重要方面有所不同。具体来说，对我们所拥有的企业的会计处理要求，一旦企业失败显现，就必须减记其账面价值；而相反，“赢家”则从不会上调其账面价值。

We’ve experienced both outcomes: As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often deliver surprises after the “I do’s.” I’ve made some dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill of companies we acquired. That later led to goodwill write-offs and to consequent reductions in Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners among the businesses we’ve purchased – a few of the winners very big – but have not written those up by a penny.

我们经历了这两种结果：正如婚姻中常见的那样，企业并购在说“我愿意”之后常常也会带来意外。我曾做过一些愚蠢的收购，花了太多的钱去购买我们所收购公司的经济商誉。后来这导致了商誉减记，并进而减少了Berkshire的账面价值。我们也买到过一些“赢家”企业——其中有几个是非常大的赢家——但我们一分钱都没有将它们的账面价值向上调整。

We have no quarrel with the asymmetrical accounting that applies here. But, over time, it necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for Berkshire’s shares that far exceeds their book value. The overage is truly huge in our property/casualty insurance business and significant also in many other operations.

我们并不反对适用于此处的这种非对称会计处理。但随着时间的推移，它必然会扩大Berkshire内在价值与账面价值之间的差距。如今，我们那些赢家企业中尚未计入账面的巨大且持续增长的收益，使得Berkshire股票的内在价值远远超过其账面价值。这一差额在我们的财产/意外险业务中尤为巨大，在许多其他业务中也相当可观。

Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic value. That’s what has happened at Berkshire, a fact explaining why the company’s 52-year market-price gain – shown on the facing page – materially exceeds its book-value gain.

随着时间的推移，股票价格会趋近于其内在价值。Berkshire的情况正是如此，这也解释了为什么公司52年来的市场价格涨幅——见对页所示——大大超过了账面价值的增长。

What We Hope to Accomplish

我们的目标

Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power per share to increase every year. Actual earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of periodic weakness in the U.S. economy. In addition, insurance mega-catastrophes or other industry-specific events may occasionally reduce earnings at Berkshire, even when most American businesses are doing well.

Berkshire的副董事长、我的合伙人Charlie Munger和我都期望Berkshire每年的常态化每股盈利能力能够持续增长。当然，受美国经济周期性疲弱的影响，实际收益有时也会出现下降。此外，即便大多数美国企业表现良好，保险行业的大型灾害或其他特定行业事件有时也可能使Berkshire的收益下滑。

It’s our job, though, to over time deliver significant growth, bumpy or not. After all, as stewards of your capital, Berkshire directors have opted to retain all earnings. Indeed, in both 2015 and 2016 Berkshire ranked first among American businesses in the dollar volume of earnings retained, in each year reinvesting many billions of dollars more than did the runner-up. Those reinvested dollars must earn their keep.

不过，我们的职责就是要在长期内实现可观增长，无论过程是否颠簸。毕竟，作为你们资本的管理人，Berkshire董事会选择将所有利润保留在公司。实际上，在2015年和2016年，Berkshire在美国所有企业中都位列保留收益总额的第一名，每年再投资的资金比第二名多出数十亿美元。这些再投资的资金必须带来回报。

Some years, the gains in underlying earning power we achieve will be minor; very occasionally, the cash register will ring loud. Charlie and I have no magic plan to add earnings except to dream big and to be prepared mentally and financially to act fast when opportunities present themselves. Every decade or so, dark clouds will fill the economic skies, and they will briefly rain gold. When downpours of that sort occur, it’s imperative that we rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons. And that we will do.

有些年份，我们在基础盈利能力方面取得的进展可能微不足道；但偶尔，收益的“收银机”会响得震天响。Charlie和我并没有什么神奇的增收计划，我们所能做的就是怀有宏大愿景，并在心理和财务上做好准备，一旦机会来临就迅速出手。大约每十年一次，经济的天空会乌云密布，并短暂地降下黄金雨。遇到那样的倾盆大雨，我们必须端着大盆冲出去，而不是拿着小勺——我们一定会这么做。

I earlier described our gradual shift from a company obtaining most of its gains from investment activities to one that grows in value by owning businesses. Launching that transition, we took baby steps – making small acquisitions whose impact on Berkshire’s profits was dwarfed by our gains from marketable securities. Despite that cautious approach, I made one particularly egregious error, acquiring Dexter Shoe for \$434 million in 1993. Dexter’s value promptly went to zero. The story gets worse: I used stock for the purchase, giving the sellers 25,203 shares of Berkshire that at yearend 2016 were worth more than \$6 billion.

我之前曾描述过，我们逐步从一家主要依靠投资活动获取收益的公司，转变为一家通过持有企业而增长价值的公司。在启动这项转变时，我们采取的是小步前进的策略——进行了一些小规模的收购，对Berkshire利润的影响远远不如可供出售证券的投资收益。尽管采取了如此谨慎的方式，我还是犯下了一笔极其严重的错误——1993年以4.34亿美元收购了Dexter Shoe，而Dexter很快就一文不值。更糟糕的是：我用股票来支付这笔交易，给卖方的25,203股Berkshire股票在2016年底的市值超过60亿美元。

That wreck was followed by three key happenings – two positive, one negative – that set us firmly on our present course. At the beginning of 1996, we acquired the half of GEICO we didn’t already own, a cash transaction that changed our holding from a portfolio investment into a wholly-owned operating business. GEICO, with its almost unlimited potential, quickly became the centerpiece around which we built what I believe is now the world’s premier property/casualty business.

那场灾难之后，发生了三件关键的事——两件是积极的，一件是负面的——它们坚定地推动我们走上了如今的道路。1996年初，我们收购了GEICO中我们尚未持有的一半股份，这是一笔现金交易，使我们对GEICO的持股从投资组合中的一项，变成了全资运营业务。GEICO拥有几乎无限的潜力，很快就成为我们构建我认为是当今全球最优秀财产/意外险业务的核心。

Unfortunately, I followed the GEICO purchase by foolishly using Berkshire stock – a boatload of stock – to buy General Reinsurance in late 1998. After some early problems, General Re has become a fine insurance operation that we prize. It was, nevertheless, a terrible mistake on my part to issue 272,200 shares of Berkshire in buying General Re, an act that increased our outstanding shares by a whopping 21.8%. My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that – despite the Biblical endorsement – is far from blessed when you are buying businesses).

可惜的是，在收购GEICO之后，我愚蠢地在1998年底用Berkshire的股票——大量股票——去收购了General Reinsurance。虽然General Re在最初经历了一些问题，但如今已成为我们非常重视的一家优质保险公司。然而，我为收购General Re而发行272,200股Berkshire股票，是一个严重的错误，这一举动使得我们的流通股数激增了21.8%。这一错误导致Berkshire股东付出的远远超过他们所得到的（尽管《圣经》鼓励“施比受更有福”，但在收购企业时，这种做法却远非“有福”）。

Early in 2000, I atoned for that folly by buying 76% (since grown to 90%) of MidAmerican Energy, a brilliantly-managed utility business that has delivered us many large opportunities to make profitable and socially-useful investments. The MidAmerican cash purchase – I was learning – firmly launched us on our present course of (1) continuing to build our insurance operation; (2) energetically acquiring large and diversified non-insurance businesses and (3) largely making our deals from internally-generated cash. (Today, I would rather prep for a colonoscopy than issue Berkshire shares.)

2000年初，我通过收购MidAmerican Energy 76%的股份（此后增持至90%）来弥补此前的愚蠢。这是一家管理出色的公用事业公司，给我们带来了许多盈利丰厚且具有社会价值的投资机会。通过现金收购MidAmerican的经历让我意识到，我们已坚定地走上了目前的路线，即：（1）持续建设我们的保险业务；（2）积极收购大型且多元化的非保险企业；（3）主要通过内部产生的现金来完成交易。（如今，我宁愿去做肠镜检查，也不愿再发行Berkshire的股票。）

Our portfolio of bonds and stocks, de-emphasized though it is, has continued in the post-1998 period to grow and to deliver us hefty capital gains, interest, and dividends. Those portfolio earnings have provided us major help in financing the purchase of businesses. Though unconventional, Berkshire’s two-pronged approach to capital allocation gives us a real edge.

尽管我们不再强调，但自1998年以来，我们持有的债券和股票投资组合仍在不断增长，并为我们带来了可观的资本利得、利息和股息收入。这些投资组合的收益为我们收购企业提供了重要的资金支持。虽然这种方式不太传统，但Berkshire这种双轨制的资本配置策略确实赋予了我们独特的优势。

Here’s our financial record since 1999, when the redirection of our business began in earnest. During the 18-year period covered, Berkshire’s outstanding shares grew by only 8.3%, with most of the increase occurring when we purchased BNSF. That, I’m happy to say, was one issuance of stock that made good sense.

下面是自1999年以来我们的财务记录，那是我们正式转型的起点。在这18年间，Berkshire的流通股总数仅增长了8.3%，其中大部分增长是在我们收购BNSF时发生的。值得欣慰的是，那次发行股票的决策是明智的。

(1) Including interest and dividends from investments, but excluding capital gains or losses.

包括投资带来的利息和股息收入，但不包括资本利得或损失。

(2) In very large part, this tabulation includes only realized capital gains or losses. Unrealized gains and losses are also included, however, when GAAP requires that treatment.

在很大程度上，这些数据仅包括已实现的资本利得或损失。但在GAAP要求的情况下，也包括未实现的收益或亏损。

Our expectation is that investment gains will continue to be substantial – though totally random as to timing – and that these will supply significant funds for business purchases. Concurrently, Berkshire’s superb corps of operating CEOs will focus on increasing earnings at the individual businesses they manage, sometimes helping them to grow by making bolt-on acquisitions. By our avoiding the issuance of Berkshire stock, any improvement in earnings will translate into equivalent per-share gains.

我们预期，投资收益将继续保持可观——尽管其发生的时间完全不可预测——而这些收益将为我们收购企业提供重要资金。同时，Berkshire杰出的运营型CEO团队将专注于提升他们所管理企业的盈利能力，有时也会通过追加收购来助力企业成长。由于我们避免发行Berkshire股票，任何盈利的提升都将转化为相应的每股收益增长。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our efforts to materially increase the normalized earnings of Berkshire will be aided – as they have been throughout our managerial tenure – by America’s economic dynamism. One word sums up our country’s achievements: miraculous. From a standing start 240 years ago – a span of time less than triple my days on earth – Americans have combined human ingenuity, a market system, a tide of talented and ambitious immigrants, and the rule of law to deliver abundance beyond any dreams of our forefathers.

我们努力大幅提升Berkshire常态化盈利能力的过程中，将一如我们管理任期以来那样，继续受益于美国经济的活力。用一个词来概括我们国家的成就：奇迹。从240年前一穷二白的起点出发——这个时间长度还不到我在世天数的三倍——美国人融合了人类的智慧、市场制度、大批有才干且充满抱负的移民浪潮以及法治精神，创造出超出我们先辈梦想的繁荣富足。

You need not be an economist to understand how well our system has worked. Just look around you. See the 75 million owner-occupied homes, the bountiful farmland, the 260 million vehicles, the hyper-productive factories, the great medical centers, the talent-filled universities, you name it – they all represent a net gain for Americans from the barren lands, primitive structures and meager output of 1776. Starting from scratch, America has amassed wealth totaling \$90 trillion.

你不必是经济学家，也能明白我们的制度运转得有多成功。看看你身边的一切：7,500万套自住房、肥沃的农田、2.6亿辆汽车、高效的工厂、一流的医疗中心、人才济济的大学等等——所有这些，都是从1776年那片贫瘠土地、原始建筑和微薄产出基础上净增而来。美国从零起步，已积累起总额达90万亿美元的财富。

It’s true, of course, that American owners of homes, autos and other assets have often borrowed heavily to finance their purchases. If an owner defaults, however, his or her asset does not disappear or lose its usefulness. Rather, ownership customarily passes to an American lending institution that then disposes of it to an American buyer. Our nation’s wealth remains intact. As Gertrude Stein put it, “Money is always there, but the pockets change.”

当然，美国人在购买房屋、汽车和其他资产时，往往会大量借贷。但即使借款人违约，他或她的资产并不会消失或失去价值。相反，资产的所有权通常会转移至一家美国金融机构，然后由它转售给另一位美国买家。我们的国家财富依然完好无损。正如Gertrude Stein所说：“钱始终都在，只是口袋换了人。”

Above all, it’s our market system – an economic traffic cop ably directing capital, brains and labor – that has created America’s abundance. This system has also been the primary factor in allocating rewards. Governmental redirection, through federal, state and local taxation, has in addition determined the distribution of a significant portion of the bounty.

最关键的是，我们的市场体系——这个有效调度资本、才智和劳动力的经济“交警”——造就了美国的繁荣富足。这个体系也是主要的收益分配机制。而通过联邦、州和地方税收，政府也对这份财富中的相当一部分进行了再分配。

America has, for example, decided that those citizens in their productive years should help both the old and the young. Such forms of aid – sometimes enshrined as “entitlements” – are generally thought of as applying to the aged. But don’t forget that four million American babies are born each year with an entitlement to a public education. That societal commitment, largely financed at the local level, costs about \$150,000 per baby. The annual cost totals more than \$600 billion, which is about 3½% of GDP.

比如，美国决定让处于生产年纪的公民帮助老年人和儿童。这类援助形式——有时被正式确认为“应享权利”——通常被认为是面向老年人。但别忘了，美国每年出生的400万个婴儿，也自出生起就享有接受公共教育的权利。这个社会承诺，主要由地方财政承担，平均每个孩子的成本约为15万美元，总体年支出超过6,000亿美元，约占GDP的3.5%。

However our wealth may be divided, the mind-boggling amounts you see around you belong almost exclusively to Americans. Foreigners, of course, own or have claims on a modest portion of our wealth. Those holdings, however, are of little importance to our national balance sheet: Our citizens own assets abroad that are roughly comparable in value.

不论我们的财富如何分配，如你所见，那些令人咋舌的巨大财富几乎全部归美国人所有。当然，外国人确实拥有或持有部分美国财富的权益。但这些资产的占比很小，对我们国家的资产负债表几乎无影响：我们的公民在海外拥有的资产价值与之大致相当。

Early Americans, we should emphasize, were neither smarter nor more hard working than those people who toiled century after century before them. But those venturesome pioneers crafted a system that unleashed human potential, and their successors built upon it.

我们应当强调，早期的美国人并不比前几百年辛勤劳作的人们更聪明或更勤奋。但这些勇于探索的先驱们建立了一套释放人类潜能的制度，而他们的后代则在这一基础上不断拓展。

This economic creation will deliver increasing wealth to our progeny far into the future. Yes, the build-up of wealth will be interrupted for short periods from time to time. It will not, however, be stopped. I’ll repeat what I’ve both said in the past and expect to say in future years: Babies born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

这个经济体系将在未来源源不断地为我们的后代创造财富。是的，财富的积累有时会短暂中断，但不会停止。我重申自己过去说过、也会在未来继续说的话：今天出生在美国的婴儿，是历史上最幸运的一代。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

America’s economic achievements have led to staggering profits for stockholders. During the 20th century the Dow-Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497, a 17,320% capital gain that was materially boosted by steadily increasing dividends. The trend continues: By yearend 2016, the index had advanced a further 72%, to 19,763.

美国的经济成就为股东带来了惊人的收益。20世纪，道琼斯工业指数从66点上涨到11,497点，实现了17,320%的资本增值，而且这还是在持续增长的股息大幅推动下取得的。这个趋势仍在延续：截至2016年底，该指数又上涨了72%，达到19,763点。

American business – and consequently a basket of stocks – is virtually certain to be worth far more in the years ahead. Innovation, productivity gains, entrepreneurial spirit and an abundance of capital will see to that. Ever-present naysayers may prosper by marketing their gloomy forecasts. But heaven help them if they act on the nonsense they peddle.

美国企业——也因此包括一篮子股票——未来几年的价值几乎肯定会远远高于当前水平。创新、生产力提升、企业家精神和资本的充裕将保障这一前景。那些常年唱衰的人，也许靠兜售悲观预测能赚些钱，但如果他们真按自己兜售的胡说八道去行动，那就只有上帝才能帮得了他们了。

Many companies, of course, will fall behind, and some will fail. Winnowing of that sort is a product of market dynamism. Moreover, the years ahead will occasionally deliver major market declines – even panics – that will affect virtually all stocks. No one can tell you when these traumas will occur – not me, not Charlie, not economists, not the media. Meg McConnell of the New York Fed aptly described the reality of panics: “We spend a lot of time looking for systemic risk; in truth, however, it tends to find us.”

当然，会有许多公司逐渐落后，甚至倒闭。这种筛选过程正是市场活力的体现。此外，未来几年也会偶尔出现重大市场下跌，甚至是恐慌，这将影响几乎所有股票。没有人能准确告诉你这些动荡什么时候会发生——我不能，Charlie也不能，经济学家和媒体同样不能。纽约联储的Meg McConnell精准地描述了恐慌的本质：“我们花大量时间寻找系统性风险；但实际上，它总是自己找上门来。”

During such scary periods, you should never forget two things: First, widespread fear is your friend as an investor, because it serves up bargain purchases. Second, personal fear is your enemy. It will also be unwarranted. Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and simply sit for an extended period with a collection of large, conservatively-financed American businesses will almost certainly do well.

在这些令人胆寒的时期，你应牢记两件事：第一，普遍的恐惧是投资者的朋友，因为它带来了廉价的买入机会；第二，个人的恐惧是你的敌人，而这种恐惧往往是多余的。那些避免高昂且不必要成本的投资者，只要长期持有一组大型、财务稳健的美国企业，几乎肯定会获得不错的回报。

As for Berkshire, our size precludes a brilliant result: Prospective returns fall as assets increase. Nonetheless, Berkshire’s collection of good businesses, along with the company’s impregnable financial strength and owner-oriented culture, should deliver decent results. We won’t be satisfied with less.

至于Berkshire，我们的规模已经不可能再取得惊艳的回报：资产越多，预期收益率越低。不过，Berkshire拥有一组优秀企业，再加上坚不可摧的财务实力和以股东为本的文化，仍应能带来相当不错的业绩。而我们不会满足于低于这个标准的结果。

Share Repurchases

股份回购

In the investment world, discussions about share repurchases often become heated. But I’d suggest that participants in this debate take a deep breath: Assessing the desirability of repurchases isn’t that complicated.

在投资界，关于股份回购的讨论常常十分激烈。但我建议参与这类辩论的人先深呼吸一下：评估回购是否合适其实并不复杂。

From the standpoint of exiting shareholders, repurchases are always a plus. Though the day-to-day impact of these purchases is usually minuscule, it’s always better for a seller to have an additional buyer in the market.

从退出股东的角度看，回购永远是有利的。尽管这些买入对每日交易的影响通常微乎其微，但市场上多一个买家，对于卖家总归是好事。

For continuing shareholders, however, repurchases only make sense if the shares are bought at a price below intrinsic value. When that rule is followed, the remaining shares experience an immediate gain in intrinsic value. Consider a simple analogy: If there are three equal partners in a business worth \$3,000 and one is bought out by the partnership for \$900, each of the remaining partners realizes an immediate gain of \$50. If the exiting partner is paid \$1,100, however, the continuing partners each suffer a loss of \$50. The same math applies with corporations and their shareholders. Ergo, the question of whether a repurchase action is value-enhancing or value-destroying for continuing shareholders is entirely purchase-price dependent.

然而，对于继续持有股份的股东来说，只有当回购价格低于公司内在价值时，回购才是有意义的。如果遵循这个原则，剩余股份的内在价值会立刻提升。想象一个简单的类比：如果一家企业价值3,000美元，有三位平等合伙人，其中一位被合伙企业以900美元买出，那么剩下的两位合伙人每人立即获得50美元的价值增益。但如果退出的合伙人被支付1,100美元，剩下的每位合伙人就各自亏损50美元。同样的数学逻辑也适用于公司和其股东。因此，股份回购是否能为留存股东创造价值，完全取决于购买价格。

It is puzzling, therefore, that corporate repurchase announcements almost never refer to a price above which repurchases will be eschewed. That certainly wouldn’t be the case if a management was buying an outside business. There, price would always factor into a buy-or-pass decision.

因此令人困惑的是，企业在发布回购声明时几乎从不提及一个价格上限，超过这个价格就不再回购。如果是收购一家外部企业，管理层当然不会忽略价格，价格始终是决定买还是不买的关键因素。

When CEOs or boards are buying a small part of their own company, though, they all too often seem oblivious to price. Would they behave similarly if they were managing a private company with just a few owners and were evaluating the wisdom of buying out one of them? Of course not.

但当CEO或董事会在回购自己公司的少量股份时，他们常常表现得对价格毫不在意。如果他们经营的是一家只有少数股东的私人公司，并要评估是否收购其中一位股东的股份，他们会这样做吗？当然不会。

It is important to remember that there are two occasions in which repurchases should not take place, even if the company’s shares are underpriced. One is when a business both needs all its available money to protect or expand its own operations and is also uncomfortable adding further debt. Here, the internal need for funds should take priority. This exception assumes, of course, that the business has a decent future awaiting it after the needed expenditures are made.

必须牢记，即使公司股价被低估，在以下两种情况下也不应进行回购。第一种情况是，公司需要用所有可用资金来保护或扩展自身业务，同时又不愿意进一步举债。这时，内部的资金需求应优先考虑。当然，这一例外前提是，在完成所需支出后，公司依然拥有良好的前景。

The second exception, less common, materializes when a business acquisition (or some other investment opportunity) offers far greater value than do the undervalued shares of the potential repurchaser. Long ago, Berkshire itself often had to choose between these alternatives. At our present size, the issue is far less likely to arise.

第二种较少见的例外是，当一次企业收购（或其他投资机会）所能带来的价值远高于公司自己被低估的股票时。很久以前，Berkshire常常需要在这两者之间做出选择。而在我们目前的体量下，这种情况已经很少出现。

My suggestion: Before even discussing repurchases, a CEO and his or her Board should stand, join hands and in unison declare, “What is smart at one price is stupid at another.”

我的建议是：在讨论回购之前，CEO和董事会成员应该起立，握手，并齐声宣告：“在一个价格上是聪明之举的事情，在另一个价格上就是愚蠢行为。”

* * * * * * * * * * * *

To recap Berkshire’s own repurchase policy: I am authorized to buy large amounts of Berkshire shares at 120% or less of book value because our Board has concluded that purchases at that level clearly bring an instant and material benefit to continuing shareholders. By our estimate, a 120%-of-book price is a significant discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a spread that is appropriate because calculations of intrinsic value can’t be precise.

总结一下Berkshire自身的回购政策：我被授权在股价不超过账面价值120%的水平上大量回购Berkshire的股票，因为董事会认定，在这一价格水平进行回购显然能为持续持股的股东带来直接且实质性的收益。根据我们的估算，账面价值的120%远低于Berkshire的内在价值，这种价差是合理的，因为内在价值的计算本就不可能精确。

The authorization given me does not mean that we will “prop” our stock’s price at the 120% ratio. If that level is reached, we will instead attempt to blend a desire to make meaningful purchases at a value-creating price with a related goal of not over-influencing the market.

我所获得的授权并不意味着我们会将Berkshire的股价“托”在账面价值的120%水平。一旦达到这一水平，我们将努力在以创造价值的价格进行有意义的回购与不过度影响市场之间取得平衡。

To date, repurchasing our shares has proved hard to do. That may well be because we have been clear in describing our repurchase policy and thereby have signaled our view that Berkshire’s intrinsic value is significantly higher than 120% of book value. If so, that’s fine. Charlie and I prefer to see Berkshire shares sell in a fairly narrow range around intrinsic value, neither wishing them to sell at an unwarranted high price – it’s no fun having owners who are disappointed with their purchases – nor one too low. Furthermore, our buying out “partners” at a discount is not a particularly gratifying way of making money. Still, market circumstances could create a situation in which repurchases would benefit both continuing and exiting shareholders. If so, we will be ready to act.

迄今为止，回购我们自己的股票一直很难执行。这很可能是因为我们清晰地阐明了回购政策，并因此传递了这样一种信息：Berkshire的内在价值远高于账面价值的120%。如果事实如此，那也很好。Charlie和我更希望Berkshire的股价在内在价值附近的小范围内波动，我们既不希望股价被高估——让股东对买入感到失望毫无乐趣——也不希望股价过低。此外，以折扣价“买断”我们的“合伙人”，也不是我们认为令人愉快的赚钱方式。不过，市场情况可能会出现一种局面，在那种情况下，回购会同时使持续持股和退出的股东受益。如果出现这种情况，我们将准备好采取行动。

One final observation for this section: As the subject of repurchases has come to a boil, some people have come close to calling them un-American – characterizing them as corporate misdeeds that divert funds needed for productive endeavors. That simply isn’t the case: Both American corporations and private investors are today awash in funds looking to be sensibly deployed. I’m not aware of any enticing project that in recent years has died for lack of capital. (Call us if you have a candidate.)

对本节还有一项最后的评论：随着股份回购话题愈发热烈，有些人几乎将其称作“不符合美国精神”——把它描绘成企业误用资金、阻碍生产性投入的行为。但事实并非如此：如今，无论是美国企业还是私人投资者，手中都充裕着寻求合理配置的资金。我并不知道近年来有哪个有吸引力的项目因为缺乏资金而胎死腹中。（如果你知道有这样的项目，欢迎联系我们。）

Insurance

保险业务

Let’s now look at Berkshire’s various businesses, starting with our most important sector, insurance. The property/casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for \$8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

现在让我们来看一下Berkshire旗下的各项业务，首先是我们最重要的板块——保险业务。这个行业中财产/意外险（简称P/C）这一分支，自1967年以来就一直是推动我们成长的引擎。当年我们以860万美元收购了National Indemnity及其姊妹公司National Fire & Marine。如今，按净资产计算，National Indemnity已成为全球最大的财产/意外险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

我们之所以对P/C业务感兴趣，其中一个原因在于其财务特性：P/C保险公司在一开始就收取保费，而赔付通常要等到之后进行。在某些极端情况下，如石棉相关的索赔，赔付甚至可能持续几十年。这种“先收款、后付款”的模式使P/C公司得以持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”（float）——这些钱最终会支付给他人。而在此期间，保险公司可以将浮存金用于自身投资。尽管个别保单和索赔会不断变动，但浮存金的总量通常会相对稳定，与保费规模大致保持同步。因此，随着我们的业务增长，浮存金也随之增长。而它的增长幅度如下表所示：

We recently wrote a huge policy that increased float to more than \$100 billion. Beyond that one-time boost, float at GEICO and several of our specialized operations is almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of large run-off contracts whose float is certain to drift downward.

我们最近承保了一份巨额保单，使得浮存金突破了1,000亿美元。在这一一次性增长之外，GEICO以及我们若干专项运营单位的浮存金几乎可以肯定会以良好的速度继续增长。然而，National Indemnity的再保险部门涉及多份大型的“终止合同”（run-off contracts），其浮存金注定将逐步减少。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. It will never be compromised.

我们的浮存金未来或许会出现下滑。但如果真是如此，下降也会非常缓慢——每年最多不超过3%。我们保险合同的结构性质决定了，我们绝不会面临需要立刻或短期内支付大量资金的情况。这种结构是经过精心设计的，也是我们保险公司无可匹敌的财务实力的核心组成部分，绝不会被破坏。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费收入超过总支出和最终赔付，我们的保险业务就会录得承保利润，这将叠加在浮存金所带来的投资收益之上。当我们获得这样的利润时，就相当于不仅能免费使用这笔资金，而且还能因为持有它而获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望获得这一令人愉快的结果，这种共同愿望催生了极为激烈的竞争，激烈到有时会导致整个P/C行业陷入严重的承保亏损。实际上，这种亏损就是行业为持有浮存金所付出的代价。由于竞争格局所致，几乎可以肯定，尽管所有公司都能从浮存金中获益，保险业整体在有形净资产回报率方面仍会继续呈现低于其他美国行业的惨淡表现。

This outcome is made more certain by the dramatically lower interest rates that now exist throughout the world. The investment portfolios of almost all P/C companies – though not those of Berkshire – are heavily concentrated in bonds. As these high-yielding legacy investments mature and are replaced by bonds yielding a pittance, earnings from float will steadily fall. For that reason, and others as well, it’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly in the case of companies that specialize in reinsurance.

全球利率水平的大幅下降，更加确认了这一趋势。几乎所有P/C公司（但不包括Berkshire）的投资组合都高度集中在债券上。随着这些高收益的旧债陆续到期，并被低收益新债取代，浮存金所带来的收益将持续下降。基于这一原因以及其他因素，可以合理预期，未来十年整个行业的业绩将不及过去十年，尤其是那些专注于再保险的公司。

Nevertheless, I very much like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage; occasionally, they offer us major opportunities. When others are constrained, our choices expand.

尽管如此，我对我们自身的前景非常乐观。Berkshire无与伦比的财务实力，使我们在投资方面拥有远超其他P/C公司的灵活性。我们手中的众多选择始终是一项优势；有时，这些选择甚至会带来重大的机遇。当其他人受限时，我们的机会反而增多。

Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 14 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled \$28 billion. That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

此外，我们的P/C公司有着出色的承保记录。Berkshire已连续14年实现承保盈利，这一期间的税前利润总计达280亿美元。这一成绩并非偶然：严谨的风险评估是我们所有保险管理人员的日常核心工作。他们深知，虽然浮存金非常宝贵，但其带来的益处可能会被糟糕的承保结果所吞噬。所有保险公司都口头上强调这一点，但在Berkshire，这是信仰，还是《旧约》式的信仰。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as a typical liability is a major mistake. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge \$27 billion to more than six million claimants in 2016 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.

那么，我们的浮存金如何影响内在价值？在计算Berkshire的账面价值时，我们的全部浮存金会作为负债被扣除，就好像我们明天就必须支付这笔钱且无法补充一样。但把浮存金当作普通负债是一个重大误判。它应被视为一个循环基金。每天我们都在支付旧的索赔和相关费用——2016年这部分支出高达270亿美元，涉及600多万名索赔人——这会减少浮存金。同时，我们每天也在承保新业务，这些业务很快就会带来新的索赔，从而补充浮存金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing \$1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing \$1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.

如果我们的循环浮存金既无成本又能长期存在——我相信确实如此——那么这种“负债”的真实价值将远低于账面上的会计负债。一个实际上永远不会离开公司的“1美元负债”（因为新业务几乎肯定会补上）与一个明天就必须支出的、且无法补充的1美元负债，二者有天壤之别。然而，根据GAAP，这两种负债在会计上却被一视同仁。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a \$15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that is included in our book-value figure. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这一被高估负债的部分抵消，是我们账面价值中包含的155亿美元“商誉”资产，这是我们在收购保险公司时形成的。这部分商誉在很大程度上代表的是我们为获得保险业务浮存金能力所支付的对价。但商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。举例来说，如果某家保险公司长期承保亏损，那么其账面上的任何商誉，无论最初成本多少，都应被视为没有价值。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire \$15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000 when float was \$28 billion. Yet we have subsequently increased our float by \$64 billion, a gain that in no way is reflected in our book value. This unrecorded asset is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value far exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，这种情况并不适用于Berkshire。Charlie和我认为，我们保险业务商誉的真实经济价值——也就是如果我们今天要收购一家拥有同等质量浮存金的保险公司，我们愿意支付的价格——远远高于其历史账面价值。事实上，我们账面上155亿美元的保险商誉几乎全部是在2000年就已形成，当时的浮存金仅为280亿美元。而此后我们又增加了640亿美元的浮存金，这一增长完全没有反映在账面价值中。这个未被记录的资产，是我们认为Berkshire内在业务价值远高于账面价值的原因之一——而且是一个极其重要的原因。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that in most cases possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

Berkshire之所以拥有出色的保险经济模式，全靠我们拥有一批杰出的管理者在运营这些纪律严明的业务，这些业务在多数情况下具有难以复制的商业模式。下面我来介绍几家主要的业务单位。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

浮存金规模最大的，是由Ajit Jain管理的Berkshire Hathaway再保险集团。Ajit承保那些其他人既不愿意也没有资本承担的风险。他的业务具备独特的组合：承保能力、反应速度、决策果断，以及最重要的——卓越的头脑，在整个保险行业中都堪称独树一帜。但他从不让Berkshire暴露于超出我们资源承受能力的风险之中。

Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a \$250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a large profit for the year. Our many streams of non-insurance earnings would see to that. Additionally, we would remain awash in cash and be eager to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.

事实上，Berkshire在规避风险方面，比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。比如说，如果整个保险行业因某场超级灾难而遭受2,500亿美元的损失——这个数字大约是历史上最大损失的三倍——Berkshire整体可能仍会在该年实现大额利润。我们来自非保险业务的多元化收入将支撑这一点。同时，我们仍将拥有充裕的现金储备，并乐于在一个可能陷入混乱的保险市场中承保新业务。与此同时，其他大型保险和再保险公司可能会深陷亏损，甚至面临资不抵债的风险。

聪明的假设，也是差异化的点。

When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our small and struggling reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders. If there were ever to be another Ajit and you could swap me for him, don’t hesitate. Make the trade!

1986年一个周六，Ajit第一次走进Berkshire办公室时，他在保险行业连一天的经验都没有。尽管如此，彼时担任我们保险业务主管的Mike Goldberg还是把我们那家小而挣扎的再保险业务的钥匙交给了他。正因这一决定，Mike几乎堪称“封圣”——从那时起，Ajit已为Berkshire股东创造了数百亿美元的价值。如果哪天再出现一个Ajit，并且你有机会用我来交换他，不要犹豫，立刻交易！

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed until recently by Tad Montross. After 39 years at General Re, Tad retired in 2016. Tad was a class act in every way and we owe him a ton of thanks. Kara Raiguel, who has worked with Ajit for 16 years, is now CEO of General Re.

我们在再保险领域还有另一家重量级公司——General Re，直到最近一直由Tad Montross管理。Tad在General Re工作了39年，并于2016年退休。他在各方面都是典范，我们欠他无数感谢。接替他担任General Re首席执行官的是Kara Raiguel，她与Ajit共事已有16年。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

归根结底，一家稳健的保险公司必须遵守四项基本原则：（1）充分理解可能导致保单赔付的所有风险暴露；（2）对这些风险暴露实际导致损失的可能性以及潜在损失规模作出保守评估；（3）设定一个保费，使其在覆盖预期赔付和运营成本之后，仍能带来平均利润；（4）如果得不到合适的保费，就必须果断放弃这笔业务。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Tad never listened to that nonsensical excuse for sloppy underwriting, and neither will Kara.

许多保险公司可以通过前面三项测试，但在第四项上却不及格。他们无法拒绝那些竞争对手争相承保的业务。那句老话：“别人都在做，所以我们也得做”，在任何行业都意味着麻烦，而在保险行业更是如此。Tad从未理会这种为粗放承保开脱的荒唐理由，Kara也同样不会。

停不下来是离生存压力太近（安全边际），这种压力是财务上的也是心理上的。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, there is GEICO, the company that set my heart afire 66 years ago (and for which the flame still burns). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 55 years of service in 2016.

最后要提的是GEICO，这家公司在66年前点燃了我心中的火焰（而这团火至今仍在燃烧）。GEICO由Tony Nicely管理，他18岁加入公司，并于2016年完成了55年的服务。

Tony became CEO of GEICO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony, who brings his combination of brilliance, dedication and soundness to the job. (The latter quality is essential to sustained success. As Charlie says, it’s great to have a manager with a 160 IQ – unless he thinks it’s 180.) Like Ajit, Tony has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire.

Tony于1993年成为GEICO的首席执行官，从那时起公司一飞冲天。没有比Tony更出色的管理者了，他将才智、敬业和稳健完美结合地投入到工作中。（最后一项品质对持续成功至关重要。正如Charlie所说，拥有一个智商160的管理者当然很好——除非他以为自己的智商是180。）和Ajit一样，Tony为Berkshire创造了数百亿美元的价值。

稳定的天才的定义。

On my initial visit to GEICO in 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed over the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. The company’s annual sales were then \$8 million; In 2016, GEICO did that much business every three hours of the year.

我1951年第一次拜访GEICO时，就被公司相较行业巨头所拥有的巨大成本优势震撼到了。我当时就明白GEICO一定会成功，因为它理应成功。那时公司年销售额为800万美元；到了2016年，GEICO每三小时的业务量就达到这个数字。

Auto insurance is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver those. In fact, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-847-7536.

汽车保险是大多数家庭的重要开支。省钱对他们来说意义重大——而只有低成本的运营才能实现这一点。事实上，至少40%的读者通过GEICO投保可以省下一笔钱。所以别读了——现在就停下！——访问 geico.com 或拨打 800-847-7536。

GEICO’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. As a result, the company gobbles up market share year after year, ending 2016 with about 12% of industry volume. That’s up from 2.5% in 1995, the year Berkshire acquired control of GEICO. Employment, meanwhile, grew from 8,575 to 36,085.

GEICO的低成本构筑了一道护城河——而且是持久的护城河——竞争对手无法跨越。因此，公司每年都在吞食市场份额，到2016年底，行业占比达到了约12%。而1995年Berkshire收购GEICO控股权时，这一数字还只有2.5%。同期员工人数也从8,575人增长到36,085人。

GEICO’s growth accelerated dramatically during the second half of 2016. Loss costs throughout the auto-insurance industry had been increasing at an unexpected pace and some competitors lost their enthusiasm for taking on new customers. GEICO’s reaction to the profit squeeze, however, was to accelerate its new-business efforts. We like to make hay while the sun sets, knowing that it will surely rise again.

2016年下半年，GEICO的增长速度显著加快。整个汽车保险行业的赔付成本以超出预期的速度上升，一些竞争对手因此失去了扩展新客户的热情。然而，GEICO对利润压缩的反应却是加快拓展新业务。我们喜欢“落日时分收割干草”，因为我们知道太阳一定会再次升起。

GEICO continues on a roll as I send you this letter. When insurance prices increase, people shop more. And when they shop, GEICO wins.

当我写这封信的时候，GEICO仍在高速发展。当保险价格上涨时，人们会更加比较各家产品。而一旦他们开始比较，GEICO就会胜出。

Have you called yet? (800-847-7536 or go to geico.com)

你打电话了吗？（800-847-7536 或访问 geico.com）

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a collection of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually one much superior to that reported by their competitors. Over the past 14 years, this group has earned \$4.7 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume – while increasing its float from \$943 million to \$11.6 billion.

除了我们的三大保险业务，我们还拥有一批以承保商业保险为主的小型公司。总体而言，这些公司构成了一项规模庞大、不断增长且极具价值的业务，持续实现承保盈利，而且通常远优于同行。过去14年中，该集团通过承保赚取了47亿美元的利润——约占保费收入的13%——同时其浮存金从9.43亿美元增长至116亿美元。

Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which is included in this grouping. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge, a move that proved to be a home run: We expected significant losses in the early years while Peter built the personnel and infrastructure needed for a world-wide operation. Instead, he and his crew delivered significant underwriting profits throughout the start-up period. BHSI’s volume increased 40% in 2016, reaching \$1.3 billion. It’s clear to me that the company is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.

不到三年前，我们成立了Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance（“BHSI”），它也包含在上述业务集团中。我们最初的决定是任命Peter Eastwood为负责人，这一决定被证明是全垒打：我们原本预期公司在早期阶段会出现较大亏损，因为Peter需要搭建一家全球化运营所需的人才与基础设施。但相反，他和他的团队在创业阶段就实现了可观的承保利润。BHSI在2016年的业务量增长了40%，达到13亿美元。我确信，这家公司注定会成为全球领先的财产及责任保险公司之一。

Here’s a recap of pre-tax underwriting earnings and float by division:

以下是按部门划分的税前承保利润与浮存金概况：

Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a range of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that time will only make more valuable.

Berkshire 拥有出色的管理者、一流的财务实力，以及一系列由宽广护城河保护的商业模式，这些构成了保险行业中的独特优势。这些优势的集合对Berkshire的股东而言是巨大的资产，时间只会让它愈发珍贵。

浮存金最多的不是Geico。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管的资本密集型业务

Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), our 90%-owned utility business, share important characteristics that distinguish them from Berkshire’s other activities. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings last year.

我们的BNSF铁路公司和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”），即我们持股90%的公用事业公司，具有与Berkshire其他业务显著不同的重要特征。因此，我们在这封信中特别设立了一个章节讨论它们，并在我们的GAAP资产负债表和利润表中分别列示这两家公司合并的财务数据。这两家重要子公司在去年占据了Berkshire税后经营利润的33%。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们在使用寿命极长、受监管的资产上投入巨资，并通过大量长期债务进行部分融资，这些债务并不由Berkshire担保。事实上，这些公司的信用状况无需依赖我们，因为即便在极其糟糕的经济环境下，它们的盈利能力也远超其利息支出。例如，在铁路行业表现不佳的去年，BNSF的利息保障倍数仍超过6倍。（我们对利息保障倍数的定义是“息税前利润除以利息费用”，而不是市面常用的“EBITDA除以利息”，我们认为后者是一个存在严重缺陷的指标。）

At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service for which demand is remarkably steady. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: an ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both us and our customers.

而对于BHE来说，有两个因素确保其在任何情况下都具备偿债能力。第一点是所有公用事业公司所共有的：抗衰退的盈利能力，因为这些公司提供的是需求极为稳定的基本服务。第二点则是其他公用事业公司少有的：收益来源日益多元化，使得BHE不会因某一个监管机构的政策而遭受重大损害。这些多元的利润来源，再加上BHE拥有一个实力雄厚的母公司这一固有优势，使得BHE及其旗下的公用事业子公司能够显著降低其债务成本。这一经济事实不仅对我们有利，也惠及我们的客户。

All told, BHE and BNSF invested \$8.9 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to their segments of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

总体而言，BHE和BNSF去年在厂房和设备上投资了89亿美元，这是对美国基础设施领域的一项巨大投入。只要这些投资能带来合理回报，我们就乐于进行这类支出——在这方面，我们对未来的监管体系抱有高度信任。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们的信心来自过去的经验，也来自一个事实：社会永远需要对交通和能源领域进行巨额投资。对政府而言，以确保关键项目能持续获得资金支持的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同样地，以赢得监管机构及其所代表公众认可的方式运营企业，也符合我们的自身利益。

Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 7.1¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.9¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.5¢, Illinois 9.2¢, Minnesota 10.0¢. The national average is 10.3¢. We have promised Iowans that our base rates will not increase until 2029 at the earliest. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.

低价是一种强有力的方式来赢得相关利益方的满意。在爱荷华州，BHE的平均零售电价为每千瓦时7.1美分。该州另一家主要电力公司Alliant的平均电价为9.9美分。邻近州的行业平均电价如下：内布拉斯加9.0美分，密苏里9.5美分，伊利诺伊9.2美分，明尼苏达10.0美分，全国平均为10.3美分。我们已向爱荷华州居民承诺，最早到2029年之前都不会上调基础电价。对工资拮据的客户来说，我们的超低价格可实实在在地节省一大笔开支。

At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance the load is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads ranged from 4¢ to 5¢.

在BNSF，与其他主要铁路公司进行价格比较要困难得多，因为货物种类和运输距离差异显著。然而，作为一个粗略的衡量标准，我们去年的每吨英里收入为3美分，而美国其他四大铁路公司的客户运输成本在每吨英里4美分到5美分之间。

Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to rivaling Iowa, where last year the megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 55% of all megawatt-hours sold to our Iowa retail customers. New wind projects that are underway will take that figure to 89% by 2020.

BHE和BNSF在推动环保技术方面都处于领先地位。在风力发电方面，没有哪个州能与爱荷华州相提并论，去年我们在该州通过风力发电产生的兆瓦时数占向零售客户售出总电量的55%。正在进行的新风能项目将在2020年将这一比例提高至89%。

Bargain-basement electric rates carry second-order benefits with them. Iowa has attracted large hightech installations, both because of its low prices for electricity (which data centers use in huge quantities) and because most tech CEOs are enthusiastic about using renewable energy. When it comes to wind energy, Iowa is the Saudi Arabia of America.

极低的电价还带来了间接的好处。爱荷华州吸引了大量高科技企业的入驻，这既得益于其低廉的电价（数据中心对电力需求巨大），也因为多数科技公司CEO热衷于使用可再生能源。就风能而言，爱荷华州堪称“美国的沙特阿拉伯”。

BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. Those economics make railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.

BNSF与其他一级铁路公司一样，只需消耗一加仑柴油就能将一吨货物运输近500英里。这种效率使铁路的燃油利用率是卡车的四倍！此外，铁路在缓解公路拥堵方面也起到了巨大作用，从而大大减少了由此带来的纳税人资助的道路维护支出。

All told, BHE and BNSF own assets that are of major importance to our country as well as to shareholders of Berkshire. Here are the key financial figures for both:

总的来说，BHE和BNSF拥有的资产不仅对我国意义重大，也对Berkshire的股东至关重要。以下是两家公司的关键财务数据：

HomeServices may appear out of place in the above table. But it came with our purchase of MidAmerican (now BHE) in 1999 – and we are lucky that it did.

HomeServices在上表中看起来可能有些格格不入。但它是我们1999年收购MidAmerican（现为BHE）时一同购入的资产——我们很幸运拥有它。

HomeServices owns 38 realty companies with more than 29,000 agents who operate in 28 states. Last year it purchased four realtors, including Houlihan Lawrence, the leader in New York’s Westchester County (in a transaction that closed shortly after yearend).

HomeServices拥有38家房地产公司，拥有超过29,000名代理人，业务遍及28个州。去年它又收购了四家房地产经纪公司，其中包括纽约Westchester County领先的Houlihan Lawrence（该交易在年末之后不久完成交割）。

In real estate parlance, representing either a buyer or a seller is called a “side,” with the representation of both counting as two sides. Last year, our owned realtors participated in 244,000 sides, totaling \$86 billion in volume.

在房地产术语中，代表买方或卖方的行为被称为一个“side”，若同时代表买卖双方，则算作两个“sides”。去年，我们旗下的房地产经纪公司共完成了244,000个“side”，总交易额达860亿美元。

HomeServices also franchises many operations throughout the country that use our name. We like both aspects of the real estate business and expect to acquire many realtors and franchisees during the next decade.

HomeServices还在全国范围内以我们的品牌授权经营多家业务机构。我们喜欢房地产业务的这两个方面，并预计在未来十年内将收购更多房地产经纪公司及被授权经营者。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务与零售业务

Our manufacturing, service and retailing operations sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们的制造、服务与零售业务所销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机应有尽有。下面让我们来看看该集团整体的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Included in this financial summary are 44 businesses that report directly to headquarters. But some of these companies, in turn, have many individual operations under their umbrella. For example, Marmon has 175 separate business units, serving widely disparate markets, and Berkshire Hathaway Automotive owns 83 dealerships, operating in nine states.

本财务摘要中包括了44家直接向总部汇报的公司。但其中一些公司本身又拥有大量子业务单位。例如，Marmon集团下设有175个独立业务单元，服务于截然不同的市场；Berkshire Hathaway Automotive拥有83家汽车经销商，分布在九个州。

This collection of businesses is truly a motley crew. Some operations, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific returns that, in a couple of instances, exceed 100%. Most are solid businesses generating good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.

这批业务构成了一支真正的“杂牌军”。其中一些业务以未加杠杆的有形净资产收益率衡量，表现出极其出色的回报率，在个别情况下甚至超过了100%。大多数业务是稳健的企业，回报率良好，大致在12%到20%之间。

A few, however – these are serious blunders I made in my job of capital allocation – produce very poor returns. In most cases, I was wrong when I originally sized up the economic characteristics of these companies or the industries in which they operate, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. In a couple of instances, I stumbled in assessing either the fidelity or ability of incumbent managers or ones I later put in place. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. Fortunately, Charlie – never bashful – is around to say “no” to my worst ideas.

但也有少数业务——这些是我在资本配置工作中犯下的严重错误——其回报非常糟糕。在多数情况下，是我最初判断这些公司或其所在行业的经济特性时出现了错误，如今我们正在为这些误判付出代价。在个别案例中，我也曾错误地评估了现任管理者，或是我后来任命的管理者的诚信或能力。我将来还会犯错——这点你们可以肯定。幸运的是，Charlie（从不羞于直言）总能对我最糟糕的想法说“不”。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in the manufacturing, service and retailing group are an excellent business. They employed an average of \$24 billion of net tangible assets during 2016 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and carrying very little debt, earned 24% after-tax on that capital.

作为一个整体来看，这个制造、服务与零售业务群体是一项极好的业务。2016年，这些公司平均动用的有形净资产为240亿美元，尽管它们持有大量多余现金且几乎没有债务，税后净资产回报率仍达24%。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show on our balance sheet for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Absent a recession, earnings from the group will likely grow in 2017, in part because Duracell and Precision Castparts (both bought in 2016) will for the first time contribute a full year’s earnings to this group. Additionally, Duracell incurred significant transitional costs in 2016 that will not recur.

当然，即使一项业务本身经济特性优异，如果买入价格太高，也可能成为一项糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务支付了相当高的有形净资产溢价，这一成本体现在我们资产负债表中显示的大量商誉和其他无形资产上。不过，整体来看，我们在该板块投入的资本正获得相当可观的回报。只要不出现经济衰退，这一集团的收益很可能在2017年继续增长，部分原因是Duracell和Precision Castparts（两者均于2016年收购）将在今年首次贡献完整年度的利润。此外，Duracell在2016年还发生了大量过渡性成本，而这些成本不会重复出现。

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses, we might be disadvantaged if outsiders knew our numbers. Therefore, in certain of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 90 - 94. Be aware, though, that it’s the growth of the Berkshire forest that counts. It would be foolish to focus over-intently on any single tree.

我们在这个业务板块中的公司太多，无法逐一评论。此外，这些公司的现有和潜在竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在某些业务中，如果外部人士知道我们的详细数据，可能会使我们处于不利地位。因此，对于那些对评估Berkshire整体影响不大的公司，我们仅披露必要信息。不过，在报告第90至94页，你仍可以找到许多业务的详细资料。但请记住，关键在于“Berkshire这片森林”的成长，若对某棵“树”过于执着，将是愚蠢的做法。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For several years I have told you that the income and expense data shown in this section does not conform to GAAP. I have explained that this divergence occurs primarily because of GAAP-ordered rules regarding purchase-accounting adjustments that require the full amortization of certain intangibles over periods averaging about 19 years. In our opinion, most of those amortization “expenses” are not truly an economic cost. Our goal in diverging from GAAP in this section is to present the figures to you in a manner reflecting the way in which Charlie and I view and analyze them.

多年来我一直告诉你们，本节中展示的收入和支出数据并不符合GAAP。我解释过，这种差异主要源于GAAP关于购买会计调整的规定，该规则要求在平均约19年的期间内对某些无形资产进行完全摊销。而在我们看来，这些摊销“费用”大多数并不是真正的经济成本。我们在本节中背离GAAP的目标，是希望以Charlie和我分析企业的方式向你们呈现这些数据。

On page 54 we itemize \$15.4 billion of intangibles that are yet to be amortized by annual charges to earnings. (More intangibles to be amortized will be created as we make new acquisitions.) On that page, we show that the 2016 amortization charge to GAAP earnings was \$1.5 billion, up \$384 million from 2015. My judgment is that about 20% of the 2016 charge is a “real” cost.

在第54页，我们逐项列出了尚未通过年度费用摊销计入损益的154亿美元无形资产。（随着我们进行新收购，还会产生更多需摊销的无形资产。）在该页中，我们还展示了2016年计入GAAP利润的摊销费用为15亿美元，比2015年增加了3.84亿美元。依我判断，这一摊销费用中，大约只有20%是真正的“实际”成本。

Eventually amortization charges fully write off the related asset. When that happens – most often at the 15-year mark – the GAAP earnings we report will increase without any true improvement in the underlying economics of Berkshire’s business. (My gift to my successor.)

最终，摊销费用会将相关资产全部冲销。届时——通常在第15年左右——我们报告的GAAP利润将会增长，而Berkshire业务的基本经济状况却没有任何实际改善。（这是我留给接班人的“礼物”。）

Now that I’ve described a GAAP expense that I believe to be overstated, let me move on to a less pleasant distortion produced by accounting rules. The subject this time is GAAP-prescribed depreciation charges, which are necessarily based on historical cost. Yet in certain cases, those charges materially understate true economic costs. Countless words were written about this phenomenon in the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation was rampant. As inflation subsided – thanks to heroic actions by Paul Volcker – the inadequacy of depreciation charges became less of an issue. But the problem still prevails, big time, in the railroad industry, where current costs for many depreciable items far outstrip historical costs. The inevitable result is that reported earnings throughout the railroad industry are considerably higher than true economic earnings.

说完了我认为被高估的GAAP费用，现在我来讲一个更不愉快的会计失真。这一次的主题是GAAP规定的折旧费用，这些费用必须以历史成本为基础。然而，在某些情况下，这些费用严重低估了真正的经济成本。在上世纪70年代至80年代初期通胀猖獗之时，关于这一现象的评论可谓汗牛充栋。随着保罗·沃尔克采取英勇行动使通胀得以缓解，折旧不足的问题逐渐不再引人注目。但在铁路行业，这一问题至今仍然非常严重，因为当前许多可折旧资产的重置成本远远高于历史成本。其不可避免的结果是，整个铁路行业的报告利润都显著高于其实际经济利润。

At BNSF, to get down to particulars, our GAAP depreciation charge last year was \$2.1 billion. But were we to spend that sum and no more annually, our railroad would soon deteriorate and become less competitive. The reality is that – simply to hold our own – we need to spend far more than the cost we show for depreciation. Moreover, a wide disparity will prevail for decades.

以BNSF为例，去年我们在GAAP下计提的折旧费用为21亿美元。但如果我们每年只花这笔钱而不多支出，我们的铁路系统很快就会退化、竞争力下降。现实是，哪怕只是维持现状，我们也必须花费远高于账面折旧金额的资金。而且，这种差距在未来几十年内仍将长期存在。

All that said, Charlie and I love our railroad, which was one of our better purchases.

尽管如此，Charlie和我仍然非常喜爱我们的铁路业务，这是我们做得比较出色的一笔收购。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Too many managements – and the number seems to grow every year – are looking for any means to report, and indeed feature, “adjusted earnings” that are higher than their company’s GAAP earnings. There are many ways for practitioners to perform this legerdemain. Two of their favorites are the omission of “restructuring costs” and “stock-based compensation” as expenses.

太多管理层——而且这个数字似乎每年都在增长——在想尽办法披露并强调“调整后利润”，以显示其公司业绩高于GAAP（通用会计准则）下的利润。业内人士有很多种手法来进行这种“魔术”，其中最常用的两个做法是：把“重组成本”和“基于股票的薪酬”排除在费用之外。

Charlie and I want managements, in their commentary, to describe unusual items – good or bad – that affect the GAAP numbers. After all, the reason we look at these numbers of the past is to make estimates of the future. But a management that regularly attempts to wave away very real costs by highlighting “adjusted per-share earnings” makes us nervous. That’s because bad behavior is contagious: CEOs who overtly look for ways to report high numbers tend to foster a culture in which subordinates strive to be “helpful” as well. Goals like that can lead, for example, to insurers underestimating their loss reserves, a practice that has destroyed many industry participants.

Charlie和我希望管理层在评论中说明影响GAAP数据的非常规项目——不管是正面还是负面。毕竟，我们之所以查看这些历史数字，是为了对未来进行预估。但如果一个管理层经常试图通过突出“调整后每股收益”来掩盖真实费用，我们就会感到不安。因为不良行为是具有传染性的：那些公然追求高利润报表的CEO往往会培养一种文化，使下属也倾向于“配合”他们。这种导向可能导致，比如，保险公司低估赔付准备金，而这种行为已经摧毁了许多行业参与者。

Charlie and I cringe when we hear analysts talk admiringly about managements who always “make the numbers.” In truth, business is too unpredictable for the numbers always to be met. Inevitably, surprises occur. When they do, a CEO whose focus is centered on Wall Street will be tempted to make up the numbers.

当我们听到分析师赞美那些“总能达成指标”的管理层时，Charlie和我都不禁皱眉。事实上，商业本质上太不可预测，不可能总是恰好达到目标。意外总是会发生。而当这种情况发生时，那些将注意力集中在华尔街的CEO往往会忍不住“编出”一个漂亮的数字。

Let’s get back to the two favorites of “don’t-count-this” managers, starting with “restructuring.” Berkshire, I would say, has been restructuring from the first day we took over in 1965. Owning only a northern textile business then gave us no other choice. And today a fair amount of restructuring occurs every year at Berkshire. That’s because there are always things that need to change in our hundreds of businesses. Last year, as I mentioned earlier, we spent significant sums getting Duracell in shape for the decades ahead.

让我们回到“别算这个”派管理者最常用的两个手法，先说“重组”。Berkshire可以说从我们1965年接手的第一天起就在进行重组。那时候我们只拥有一家北方的纺织企业，别无选择。而如今，Berkshire每年也都在进行相当数量的重组工作，因为我们旗下有数百家企业，总会有需要调整的地方。去年，正如我之前提到的，我们为Duracell未来数十年的发展投入了大量资金进行重组和整合。

We have never, however, singled out restructuring charges and told you to ignore them in estimating our normal earning power. If there were to be some truly major expenses in a single year, I would, of course, mention it in my commentary. Indeed, when there is a total rebasing of a business, such as occurred when Kraft and Heinz merged, it is imperative that for several years the huge one-time costs of rationalizing the combined operations be explained clearly to owners. That’s precisely what the CEO of Kraft Heinz has done, in a manner approved by the company’s directors (who include me). But, to tell owners year after year, “Don’t count this,” when management is simply making business adjustments that are necessary, is misleading. And too many analysts and journalists fall for this baloney.

不过，我们从未将重组费用单列出来并告诉你们在评估我们正常盈利能力时可以忽略它们。如果某一年真的发生了特别重大的支出，我当然会在评论中予以说明。确实，在业务完全重组的情况下，比如Kraft与Heinz合并时，将多年来整合带来的巨额一次性成本清楚地解释给股东是十分必要的。Kraft Heinz的CEO就做了这样的说明，并获得公司董事会（包括我在内）的批准。但是，如果管理层年复一年地告诉股东“这笔费用别算”，而实际上只是进行一些本就必要的业务调整，那就是在误导大家。而令人遗憾的是，太多的分析师和财经记者居然对这种说法信以为真。

To say “stock-based compensation” is not an expense is even more cavalier. CEOs who go down that road are, in effect, saying to shareholders, “If you pay me a bundle in options or restricted stock, don’t worry about its effect on earnings. I’ll ‘adjust’ it away.”

说“基于股票的薪酬不是费用”更加轻率。那些采取这种说法的CEO，实际上就是在对股东说：“如果你用大量股票期权或受限股票来支付我，别担心对利润的影响，我会在报表里‘调整掉’。”

To explore this maneuver further, join me for a moment in a visit to a make-believe accounting laboratory whose sole mission is to juice Berkshire’s reported earnings. Imaginative technicians await us, eager to show their stuff.

为了进一步探讨这种手法，让我们暂时走进一个虚构的“会计实验室”，这个实验室的唯一使命就是“提升Berkshire的账面利润”。一群富有想象力的技术人员已经在等待，跃跃欲试地想要展示他们的“本领”。

Listen carefully while I tell these enablers that stock-based compensation usually comprises at least 20% of total compensation for the top three or four executives at most large companies. Pay attention, too, as I explain that Berkshire has several hundred such executives at its subsidiaries and pays them similar amounts, but uses only cash to do so. I further confess that, lacking imagination, I have counted all of these payments to Berkshire’s executives as an expense.

请你仔细听我向这些“能人”说明：在大多数大公司，前三四名高管的总薪酬中，至少有20%是基于股票的。而我进一步解释说，Berkshire旗下的子公司拥有数百位这类高管，他们的薪酬水平相当，但我们**全部使用现金支付**。我还承认，缺乏想象力的我，把这些现金支付**全部如实计入了费用**。

My accounting minions suppress a giggle and immediately point out that 20% of what is paid these Berkshire managers is tantamount to “cash paid in lieu of stock-based compensation” and is therefore not a “true” expense. So – presto! – Berkshire, too, can have “adjusted” earnings.

我的会计“小助手”们忍着笑意，立即指出：这些对Berkshire管理者支付的现金中有20%等同于“用现金代替股票支付”，因此不应视为“真实费用”。于是——唰的一下！——Berkshire也可以拥有“调整后利润”了。

Back to reality: If CEOs want to leave out stock-based compensation in reporting earnings, they should be required to affirm to their owners one of two propositions: why items of value used to pay employees are not a cost or why a payroll cost should be excluded when calculating earnings.

回到现实：如果CEO在报表中想剔除基于股票的薪酬，他们就应该向股东明确陈述以下两者之一：**为什么用于支付员工的有价资产不是成本？或者，为什么在计算利润时，某一部分工资成本可以被排除在外？**

During the accounting nonsense that flourished during the 1960s, the story was told of a CEO who, as his company revved up to go public, asked prospective auditors, “What is two plus two?” The answer that won the assignment, of course, was, “What number do you have in mind?”

在1960年代盛行的会计荒谬潮中，流传着这样一个故事：某公司准备上市时，CEO问拟聘的审计师：“二加二等于几？”最终赢得审计合同的回答当然是：“你心里想要哪个数字？”

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品业务

Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). Each is the leader in its field.

我们的三项租赁业务分别由 CORT（家具租赁）、XTRA（半挂车租赁）和 Marmon（主要是罐车，同时还有货车、罐式集装箱和起重机）运营。这三家公司在各自领域均处于行业领先地位。

We also include Clayton Homes in this section. This company receives most of its revenue from the sale of manufactured homes, but derives the bulk of its earnings from its large mortgage portfolio. Last year, Clayton became America’s largest home builder, delivering 42,075 units that accounted for 5% of all new American homes. (In fairness, other large builders do far more dollar volume than Clayton because they sell site-built homes that command much higher prices.)

Clayton Homes 也被归入这一部分。该公司大部分收入来自于预制房屋的销售，但其利润主要来源于庞大的抵押贷款组合。去年，Clayton 成为全美最大的住宅建造商，共交付了42,075套住房，占美国新建住宅总量的5%。（需要说明的是，其他大型房企的销售总金额远高于Clayton，因为他们销售的是价格更高的现场建造房屋。）

In 2015, Clayton branched out, purchasing its first site-builder. Two similar acquisitions followed in 2016, and more will come. Site-built houses are expected to amount to 3% or so of Clayton’s unit sales in 2017 and will likely deliver about 14% of its dollar volume.

Clayton 于2015年开始扩展业务，首次收购了一家现场建造房屋的公司。2016年又完成了两项类似的收购，未来还会有更多此类收购。预计到2017年，现场建造的房屋将在Clayton的销售单位中占比约3%，但其销售额预计将占到Clayton总销售金额的约14%。

Even so, Clayton’s focus will always be manufactured homes, which account for about 70% of new American homes costing less than \$150,000. Clayton manufactures close to one-half of the total. That is a far cry from Clayton’s position in 2003 when Berkshire purchased the company. It then ranked third in the industry in units sold and employed 6,731 people. Now, when its new acquisitions are included, the employee count is 14,677. And that number will increase in the future.

尽管如此，Clayton 的重心仍将始终放在预制房屋上。预制房屋占美国售价低于15万美元的新建住房的约70%，而Clayton生产的数量接近其中的一半。这与2003年Berkshire收购Clayton时的地位有天壤之别。当时Clayton在行业销量中排名第三，员工人数为6,731人。而现在，若包括新收购的公司在内，员工总数已达14,677人，未来还将继续增长。

Clayton’s earnings in recent years have materially benefited from extraordinarily low interest rates. The company’s mortgage loans to home-buyers are at fixed-rates and for long terms (averaging 25 years at inception). But Clayton’s own borrowings are short-term credits that re-price frequently. When rates plunge, Clayton’s earnings from its portfolio greatly increase. We normally would shun that kind of lend-long, borrow-short approach, which can cause major problems for financial institutions. As a whole, however, Berkshire is always asset-sensitive, meaning that higher short-term rates will benefit our consolidated earnings, even as they hurt at Clayton.

近年来，Clayton 的盈利在很大程度上受益于极低的利率。该公司为购房者提供的是长期、固定利率的抵押贷款（起始平均期限为25年），而其自身的融资则主要是短期贷款，并且利率经常重定价。当市场利率下降时，Clayton 从其贷款组合中获得的收益会大幅增长。通常我们会避免这种“长贷短借”的模式，因为它可能会对金融机构造成重大风险。但从整体来看，Berkshire 是一个“资产敏感型”公司，意味着短期利率上升会提高我们合并后的收益，即便它对Clayton不利。

Last year Clayton had to foreclose on 8,304 manufactured-housing mortgages, about 2.5% of its total portfolio. Customer demographics help explain that percentage. Clayton’s customers are usually lower-income families with mediocre credit scores; many are supported by jobs that will be at risk in any recession; many, similarly, have financial profiles that will be damaged by divorce or death to an extent that would not be typical for a high-income family. Those risks that our customers face are partly mitigated because almost all have a strong desire to own a home and because they enjoy reasonable monthly payments that average only \$587, including the cost of insurance and property taxes.

去年，Clayton 被迫止赎了 8,304 笔工厂制造住房的抵押贷款，占其整个贷款组合的大约 2.5%。客户的基本人口特征可以解释这个比例。Clayton 的客户通常是信用评分平平的低收入家庭；他们中有许多依赖于在经济衰退中容易受到冲击的工作；还有不少人因离婚或家庭成员去世而面临财务状况受损的风险，这种情况在高收入家庭中较为少见。这些风险在一定程度上被缓解了，因为几乎所有客户都非常渴望拥有住房，并且他们所承担的月供较为合理，平均仅为 587 美元（其中包括保险费和房地产税）。

Clayton also has long had programs that help borrowers through difficulties. The two most popular are loan extensions and payment forgiveness. Last year about 11,000 borrowers received extensions, and 3,800 had \$3.4 million of scheduled payments permanently canceled by Clayton. The company does not earn interest or fees when these loss-mitigation moves are made. Our experience is that 93% of borrowers helped through these programs in the last two years now remain in their homes. Since we lose significant sums on foreclosures – losses last year totaled \$150 million – our assistance programs end up helping Clayton as well as its borrowers.

Clayton 长期以来都有一系列帮助借款人渡过难关的项目。其中最受欢迎的两项是贷款延期和豁免还款。去年，大约有 11,000 名借款人获得了延期还款资格，另有 3,800 名借款人共计 340 万美元的预定还款金额被 Clayton 永久免除。公司在这些损失缓解措施中不会收取任何利息或费用。我们的经验表明，过去两年通过这些项目获得帮助的借款人中有 93% 仍然住在自己的家中。由于止赎造成的损失巨大（去年达到了 1.5 亿美元），我们的援助计划最终也对 Clayton 自身带来了帮助。

Clayton and Berkshire have been a wonderful partnership. Kevin Clayton came to us with a best-in-class management group and culture. Berkshire, in turn, provided unmatched staying power when the manufacturedhome industry fell apart during the Great Recession. (As other lenders to the industry vanished, Clayton supplied credit not only to its own dealers but also to dealers who sold the products of its competitors.) At Berkshire, we never count on synergies when we acquire companies. Truly important ones, however, surfaced after our purchase of Clayton.

Clayton 和 Berkshire 之间一直是一段极好的合作关系。Kevin Clayton 带着一支行业顶尖的管理团队和企业文化加入了我们。而当工厂制造住房行业在次贷危机中崩溃时，Berkshire 则为其提供了无与伦比的稳定支持。（在行业内其他贷款机构纷纷撤离之际，Clayton 不仅为自己的经销商提供信贷支持，也向销售竞争对手产品的经销商提供融资。）在 Berkshire，我们从不在并购中依赖“协同效应”，但在收购 Clayton 之后，一些真正重要的协同效应确实显现了出来。

芒格说的为什么是Berkshire？

Marmon’s railcar business experienced a major slowdown in demand last year, which will cause earnings to decline in 2017. Fleet utilization was 91% in December, down from 97% a year earlier, with the drop particularly severe at the large fleet we purchased from General Electric in 2015. Marmon’s crane and container rentals have weakened as well.

Marmon 的铁路货车业务去年经历了需求的显著放缓，这将导致其 2017 年的收益下降。到去年 12 月，车队的利用率为 91%，低于一年前的 97%，其中降幅最显著的是我们在 2015 年从 General Electric 收购的大型车队。此外，Marmon 的起重机和集装箱租赁业务也出现了疲软。

Big swings in railcar demand have occurred in the past and they will continue. Nevertheless, we very much like this business and expect decent returns on equity capital over the years. Tank cars are Marmon’s specialty. People often associate tank cars with the transportation of crude oil; in fact, they are essential to a great variety of shippers.

铁路货车需求的剧烈波动在过去时有发生，未来也将持续存在。尽管如此，我们仍然非常喜欢这项业务，并预计在未来多年内能够获得不错的股本回报。罐式货车是 Marmon 的专长。人们常常把罐车与运输原油联系在一起，但实际上，它们对于众多类型的托运人来说都是不可或缺的。

Over time, we expect to expand our railcar operation. Meanwhile, Marmon is making a number of bolt-on acquisitions whose results are included in the Manufacturing, Service and Retailing section.

随着时间推移，我们预计将扩大铁路货车业务的规模。与此同时，Marmon 正在进行一系列小型并购，这些收购的经营成果被计入“制造、服务与零售”业务板块中。

Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for our finance-related companies:

以下是我们金融相关公司税前利润的简要回顾：

* Excludes capital gains or losses

不包括资本收益或损失

Investments

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. The 325,442,152 shares Berkshire owns of Kraft Heinz are carried on our balance sheet at a GAAP figure of \$15.3 billion and had a yearend market value of \$28.4 billion. Our cost basis for the shares is \$9.8 billion.

下方列出了我们截至年末市值最高的十五项普通股投资。我们未将 Kraft Heinz 的持股计入其中，因为 Berkshire 属于其控股集团的一部分，因此必须按“权益法”核算这项投资。Berkshire 持有 Kraft Heinz 的 325,442,152 股股份，这部分在我们资产负债表上的 GAAP 账面价值为 153 亿美元，而年末市值为 284 亿美元。我们对该股份的成本基础为 98 亿美元。

* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.

不包括由 Berkshire 子公司养老金基金持有的股份。

** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.

这是我们的实际购买价格，也作为我们的税务成本基础；GAAP 所定义的“成本”在少数情况下因按照 GAAP 规则进行减值处理而有所不同。

Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently, manages more than $10 billion; I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at monthly trade sheets. Included in the $21 billion that the two manage is about $7.6 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.

表中部分股票由 Todd Combs 或 Ted Weschler 负责管理，他们与我共同管理 Berkshire 的投资。每人独立管理的资产都超过 100 亿美元；我通常是通过查看每月的交易清单来了解他们所做的投资决策。在两人合计管理的 210 亿美元中，约有 76 亿美元是 Berkshire 部分子公司的养老金信托资产。如前所述，养老金投资未包含在前述的 Berkshire 持股表中。

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Excluded from the table – but important – is our ownership of \$5 billion of preferred stock issued by Bank of America. This stock, which pays us \$300 million per year, also carries with it a valuable warrant allowing Berkshire to purchase 700 million common shares of Bank of America for \$5 billion at any time before September 2, 2021. At yearend, that privilege would have delivered us a profit of \$10.5 billion. If it wishes, Berkshire can use its preferred shares to satisfy the \$5 billion cost of exercising the warrant.

未列入表格、但非常重要的一项，是我们持有的由美国银行发行的 50 亿美元优先股。这批优先股每年为我们带来 3 亿美元的收益，同时附带一项极具价值的认股权证，允许 Berkshire 在 2021 年 9 月 2 日前的任何时间以 50 亿美元的价格购买 7 亿股美国银行的普通股。到年末时，这项权利本可以为我们带来 105 亿美元的利润。如果愿意，Berkshire 可以使用这批优先股来支付行使认股权证所需的 50 亿美元。

If the dividend rate on Bank of America common stock – now 30 cents annually – should rise above 44 cents before 2021, we would anticipate making a cashless exchange of our preferred into common. If the common dividend remains below 44 cents, it is highly probable that we will exercise the warrant immediately before it expires.

如果美国银行普通股的股息率（目前为每年 30 美分）在 2021 年之前升至 44 美分以上，我们预计将以非现金方式将优先股转换为普通股。如果普通股股息仍然低于 44 美分，我们很可能会在认股权证到期前立即行使。

Many of our investees, including Bank of America, have been repurchasing shares, some quite aggressively. We very much like this behavior because we believe the repurchased shares have in most cases been underpriced. (Undervaluation, after all, is why we own these positions.) When a company grows and outstanding shares shrink, good things happen for shareholders.

我们所投资的许多公司（包括美国银行）都在回购股票，有些公司甚至非常积极。我们非常支持这种做法，因为我们相信，大多数回购的股票都被低估了。（毕竟，我们之所以投资这些公司，正是因为它们被低估。）当一家公司的业务增长、流通股数量减少时，对股东而言通常是好事。

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It’s important for you to understand that 95% of the \$86 billion of “cash and equivalents” (which in my mind includes U.S. Treasury Bills) shown on our balance sheet are held by entities in the United States and, consequently, is not subject to any repatriation tax. Moreover, repatriation of the remaining funds would trigger only minor taxes because much of that money has been earned in countries that themselves impose meaningful corporate taxes. Those payments become an offset to U.S. tax when money is brought home.

你需要了解的一点是，在我们资产负债表上列示的 860 亿美元“现金及现金等价物”（在我看来，包括美国国债）中，有 95% 是由美国境内的子公司持有的，因此不需要缴纳任何资金汇回税。此外，即便其余资金被汇回，美国所征收的税负也很小，因为其中大部分是在对企业征收实质性所得税的国家中赚取的。这些已缴税款可以在资金汇回美国时抵扣相应的美国税负。

These explanations are important because many cash-rich American companies hold a large portion of their funds in jurisdictions imposing very low taxes. Such companies hope – and may well be proved right – that the tax levied for bringing these funds to America will soon be materially reduced. In the meantime, these companies are limited as to how they can use that cash. In other words, off-shore cash is simply not worth as much as cash held at home.

这些解释很重要，因为许多现金充裕的美国公司将大量资金存放在税率极低的司法管辖区。这些公司寄希望于（而且很可能会被证明是正确的）未来将资金汇回美国时所需缴纳的税将大幅降低。在此之前，它们对这些资金的使用存在诸多限制。换句话说，海外现金的价值**低于**本土现金。

Berkshire has a partial offset to the favorable geographical location of its cash, which is that much of it is held in our insurance subsidiaries. Though we have many alternatives for investing this cash, we do not have the unlimited choices that we would enjoy if the cash were held by the parent company, Berkshire. We do have an ability annually to distribute large amounts of cash from our insurers to the parent – though here, too, there are limits. Overall, cash held at our insurers is a very valuable asset, but one slightly less valuable to us than is cash held at the parent level.

Berkshire 的现金地理分布虽然有利，但也存在一定的“抵消因素”：其中很大一部分是由我们旗下的保险子公司持有的。尽管我们拥有多种投资这些资金的选择，但其灵活度不如现金直接由母公司 Berkshire 持有时那样无限制。当然，我们每年有能力将大量现金从保险公司上划至母公司——不过这一点也存在限制。总体而言，保险公司所持现金是一项非常有价值的资产，但对我们来说，其价值略低于由母公司直接持有的现金。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Sometimes the comments of shareholders or media imply that we will own certain stocks “forever.” It is true that we own some stocks that I have no intention of selling for as far as the eye can see (and we’re talking 20/20 vision). But we have made no commitment that Berkshire will hold any of its marketable securities forever.

有时，股东或媒体的评论会暗示我们会“永远”持有某些股票。的确，我们确实持有一些我在可预见的未来内完全没有打算出售的股票（而且我们说的是视力 20/20 的那种“可见”）。但我们从未承诺 Berkshire 会永远持有任何可流通证券。

Confusion about this point may have resulted from a too-casual reading of Economic Principle 11 on pages 110 - 111, which has been included in our annual reports since 1983. That principle covers controlled businesses, not marketable securities. This year I’ve added a final sentence to #11 to ensure that our owners understand that we regard any marketable security as available for sale, however unlikely such a sale now seems.

关于这一点的误解，可能源自对我们年报中第 110 至 111 页“经济原则第 11 条”的过于随意的解读。该原则自 1983 年起便列入年报，其适用于我们控制的企业，而非可流通证券。今年我在第 11 条的末尾添加了一句话，以确保我们的股东明白：**我们将任何可流通证券都视为可出售的资产**，即便目前看来出售的可能性极小。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Before we leave this investment section, a few educational words about dividends and taxes: Berkshire, like most corporations, nets considerably more from a dollar of dividends than it reaps from a dollar of capital gains. That will probably surprise those of our shareholders who are accustomed to thinking of capital gains as the route to tax-favored returns.

在结束这一投资部分之前，我们想讲几句有关股息与税收的“教育性”内容：与大多数公司一样，Berkshire 从每一美元的股息中获得的净收益要远高于从每一美元的资本利得中获得的收益。这一点可能会让一些习惯于将资本利得视为享受税收优惠路径的股东感到意外。

But here’s the corporate math. Every \$1 of capital gains that a corporation realizes carries with it 35 cents of federal income tax (and often state income tax as well). The tax on dividends received from domestic corporations, however, is consistently lower, though rates vary depending on the status of the recipient.

但这就是公司所得税的“数学”：每获得 1 美元的资本利得，公司需要缴纳 35 美分的联邦所得税（往往还包括州所得税）。而从美国本土公司获得的股息，其适用的税率始终较低，尽管税率因收款方身份的不同而有所差异。

For a non-insurance company – which describes Berkshire Hathaway, the parent – the federal tax rate is effectively 10½ cents per \$1 of dividends received. Furthermore, a non-insurance company that owns more than 20% of an investee owes taxes of only 7 cents per \$1 of dividends. That rate applies, for example, to the substantial dividends we receive from our 27% ownership of Kraft Heinz, all of it held by the parent company. (The rationale for the low corporate taxes on dividends is that the dividend-paying investee has already paid its own corporate tax on the earnings being distributed.)

对非保险公司（如母公司 Berkshire Hathaway）而言，从其他美国公司收到每 1 美元的股息所适用的联邦税率为 10.5 美分。如果非保险公司对被投资企业的持股超过 20%，则每 1 美元的股息仅需缴税 7 美分。例如，我们母公司持有 Kraft Heinz 27% 的股份，从中收到的大量股息就适用此税率。（对股息征收较低公司税的合理性在于，分红企业已就所分配的利润缴纳了公司所得税。）

Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries pay a tax rate on dividends that is somewhat higher than that applying to non-insurance companies, though the rate is still well below the 35% hitting capital gains. Property/casualty companies owe about 14% in taxes on most dividends they receive. Their tax rate falls, though, to about 11% if they own more than 20% of a U.S.-based investee.

Berkshire 的保险子公司在股息上适用的税率略高于非保险公司，但仍远低于 35% 的资本利得税率。财产/意外险公司收到的大多数股息适用大约 14% 的税率。如果它们持有一家美国本土被投资企业超过 20% 的股份，该税率则降至大约 11%。

And that’s our tax lesson for today.

以上就是我们今天的“税务课”。

“The Bet” (or how your money finds its way to Wall Street)

“赌局”（或者说，你的钱是如何流向华尔街的）

In this section, you will encounter, early on, the story of an investment bet I made nine years ago and, next, some strong opinions I have about investing. As a starter, though, I want to briefly describe Long Bets, a unique establishment that played a role in the bet.

在本节中，你首先会读到我在九年前参与的一场投资赌局的故事，随后会看到我对投资的一些强烈观点。但首先，我想简单介绍一下 Long Bets，这是一家在这场赌局中发挥了作用的独特机构。

Long Bets was seeded by Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and operates as a non-profit organization that administers just what you’d guess: long-term bets. To participate, “proposers” post a proposition at Longbets.org that will be proved right or wrong at a distant date. They then wait for a contrary-minded party to take the other side of the bet. When a “doubter” steps forward, each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if its side wins; parks its wager with Long Bets; and posts a short essay defending its position on the Long Bets website. When the bet is concluded, Long Bets pays off the winning charity.

Long Bets 由 Amazon 的 Jeff Bezos 创立，是一家非营利性组织，正如你所猜，它管理的是“长期赌局”。参与者（即“提议人”）可在 Longbets.org 上发布一个将在遥远未来被验证真伪的命题，然后等待一个持相反观点的人站出来参与这场赌局。一旦“怀疑者”应战，双方就各自指定一个慈善机构作为潜在受益人，将赌注托管给 Long Bets，并在其网站上发表一篇简短文章阐述各自的立场。当赌局到期后，Long Bets 将赌注支付给胜出一方所指定的慈善机构。

Here are examples of what you will find on Long Bets’ very interesting site:

以下是 Long Bets 网站上一些非常有趣的案例：

In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Kapor asserted that “By 2029 no computer – or ‘machine intelligence’ – will have passed the Turing Test,” which deals with whether a computer can successfully impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with \$10,000. I don’t know who will win this bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever replicate Charlie.

2002 年，企业家 Mitch Kapor 断言：“到 2029 年，任何计算机或‘机器智能’都不可能通过图灵测试”（该测试用于判断计算机能否成功模仿人类）。发明家 Ray Kurzweil 则持相反观点。两人各自以 1 万美元为赌注支持自己的立场。我不知道谁将赢得这场赌局，但我可以自信地打赌，没有任何计算机会复制 Charlie（芒格）。

That same year, Craig Mundie of Microsoft asserted that pilotless planes would routinely fly passengers by 2030, while Eric Schmidt of Google argued otherwise. The stakes were \$1,000 each. To ease any heartburn Eric might be experiencing from his outsized exposure, I recently offered to take a piece of his action. He promptly laid off \$500 with me. (I like his assumption that I’ll be around in 2030 to contribute my payment, should we lose.)

同年，微软的 Craig Mundie 预测到 2030 年无人驾驶飞机将常规运送乘客，而 Google 的 Eric Schmidt 则持相反意见。他们各自下注 1,000 美元。为了减轻 Eric 对自己巨大风险敞口的担忧，我最近提出愿意分担一部分赌注。他随即将 500 美元的赌注转给我。（我很喜欢他默认我在 2030 年还健在、可以为我们的失败支付赌注的假设。）

Now, to my bet and its history. In Berkshire’s 2005 annual report, I argued that active investment management by professionals – in aggregate – would over a period of years underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who simply sat still. I explained that the massive fees levied by a variety of “helpers” would leave their clients – again in aggregate – worse off than if the amateurs simply invested in an unmanaged low-cost index fund. (See pages 114 - 115 for a reprint of the argument as I originally stated it in the 2005 report.)

现在回到我自己的赌局及其背景。在 Berkshire 2005 年的年报中，我提出一个观点：专业人士的主动投资管理——从整体来看——在多年时间里将跑输那些只是静静坐着不动的普通投资者。我解释说，各种“帮手”收取的大量费用，会使其客户的最终结果（同样从整体来看）比不上那些只是在低成本、无人管理的指数基金中投资的业余投资者。（详见第 114 至 115 页，收录了我在 2005 年年报中最初发表的这段论述。）

Subsequently, I publicly offered to wager \$500,000 that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds – wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles – that would over an extended period match the performance of an unmanaged S\&P-500 index fund charging only token fees. I suggested a ten-year bet and named a low-cost Vanguard S\&P fund as my contender. I then sat back and waited expectantly for a parade of fund managers – who could include their own fund as one of the five – to come forth and defend their occupation. After all, these managers urged others to bet billions on their abilities. Why should they fear putting a little of their own money on the line?

随后，我公开提出下注 50 万美元，赌没有任何投资专业人士能够选出至少五只对冲基金（这种投资工具非常流行，收费却极高），在一个较长周期内的表现能够匹敌一只无需管理、费用极低的标普500指数基金。我建议为期十年的赌局，并提名了一只低成本的 Vanguard 标普指数基金作为我的代表。然后我坐等众多基金经理出面迎战——他们甚至可以将自己管理的基金列为五选之一。毕竟，他们一直鼓励他人将数十亿美元托付给他们，为什么不敢用一小部分自己的钱证明自己？

设计的很好，同时选出5只不是鸡的基金的概率极低。

What followed was the sound of silence. Though there are thousands of professional investment managers who have amassed staggering fortunes by touting their stock-selecting prowess, only one man – Ted Seides – stepped up to my challenge. Ted was a co-manager of Protégé Partners, an asset manager that had raised money from limited partners to form a fund-of-funds – in other words, a fund that invests in multiple hedge funds.

接下来是一片沉寂。尽管有成千上万的专业投资经理通过推销自己的选股能力积累了巨额财富，但最终只有一人——Ted Seides——接受了我的挑战。Ted 是 Protégé Partners 的联合经理，这是一家资产管理公司，从有限合伙人那里募资设立了基金中的基金——也就是说，它投资于多个对冲基金。

I hadn’t known Ted before our wager, but I like him and admire his willingness to put his money where his mouth was. He has been both straight-forward with me and meticulous in supplying all the data that both he and I have needed to monitor the bet.

在我们打赌之前我并不认识 Ted，但我很喜欢他，并钦佩他“言出必行”的勇气。他在整个过程中都非常坦率，并且认真细致地提供了我们双方用于跟踪赌局所需的全部数据。

For Protégé Partners’ side of our ten-year bet, Ted picked five funds-of-funds whose results were to be averaged and compared against my Vanguard S\&P index fund. The five he selected had invested their money in more than 100 hedge funds, which meant that the overall performance of the funds-of-funds would not be distorted by the good or poor results of a single manager.

在这场为期十年的赌局中，代表 Protégé Partners 的 Ted 选择了五只基金中的基金，其收益将取平均值，与我所选择的 Vanguard 标普指数基金进行比较。他所挑选的这五只基金合计投资于超过 100 只对冲基金，这意味着整体表现不会因为某一位经理的好或坏而产生过度偏差。

Each fund-of-funds, of course, operated with a layer of fees that sat above the fees charged by the hedge funds in which it had invested. In this doubling-up arrangement, the larger fees were levied by the underlying hedge funds; each of the fund-of-funds imposed an additional fee for its presumed skills in selecting hedge-fund managers.

当然，这些基金中的基金在其所投资的对冲基金费用之外，还附加了一层自身的管理费。在这种“叠加收费”的结构中，主要费用由底层对冲基金收取，而每只基金中的基金还会因其“挑选对冲基金经理的能力”而收取额外费用。

Here are the results for the first nine years of the bet – figures leaving no doubt that Girls Inc. of Omaha, the charitable beneficiary I designated to get any bet winnings I earned, will be the organization eagerly opening the mail next January.

以下是这场赌局前九年的成绩——这些数字毫无疑问地表明，我指定的慈善受益方——奥马哈的 Girls Inc.——将在明年一月满怀期待地打开邮件。

Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, see their annual audits.

注：根据我与 Protégé Partners 的协议，这些基金中的基金的名称从未对外公布。不过，我本人可以查看它们的年度审计报告。

The compounded annual increase to date for the index fund is 7.1%, which is a return that could easily prove typical for the stock market over time. That’s an important fact: A particularly weak nine years for the market over the lifetime of this bet would have probably helped the relative performance of the hedge funds, because many hold large “short” positions. Conversely, nine years of exceptionally high returns from stocks would have provided a tailwind for index funds.

截至目前，指数基金的年复合增长率为 7.1%，这是一个很容易被证明是长期股市回报“典型值”的数字。这一点很重要：如果这场赌局所涵盖的九年期间，市场表现极为疲弱，那么对冲基金的相对表现可能会更好一些，因为它们普遍持有大量的“空头”头寸。相反，如果这九年间股票表现极佳，指数基金就会拥有顺风之势。

Instead we operated in what I would call a “neutral” environment. In it, the five funds-of-funds delivered, through 2016, an average of only 2.2%, compounded annually. That means \$1 million invested in those funds would have gained \$220,000. The index fund would meanwhile have gained \$854,000.

实际上，我们是在一个我称之为“中性”的环境下进行的赌局。在这样的环境中，截止 2016 年，这五只基金中的基金平均年复合回报率仅为 2.2%。也就是说，投资 100 万美元在这些基金中，只能获得 22 万美元的收益。而同期指数基金的收益则为 85.4 万美元。

Bear in mind that every one of the 100-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds had a huge financial incentive to do his or her best. Moreover, the five funds-of-funds managers that Ted selected were similarly incentivized to select the best hedge-fund managers possible because the five were entitled to performance fees based on the results of the underlying funds.

请记住，参与这场赌局的 100 多位底层对冲基金经理都有巨大的经济激励去尽其所能地做好投资。此外，Ted 所挑选的五只基金中的基金的经理也同样有动力去筛选表现最佳的对冲基金经理，因为他们的收益提成是基于这些底层基金的业绩。

I’m certain that in almost all cases the managers at both levels were honest and intelligent people. But the results for their investors were dismal – really dismal. And, alas, the huge fixed fees charged by all of the funds and funds-of-funds involved – fees that were totally unwarranted by performance – were such that their managers were showered with compensation over the nine years that have passed. As Gordon Gekko might have put it: “Fees never sleep.”

我确信，在绝大多数情况下，这两个层级的经理都是诚实且聪明的人。但他们为投资者带来的回报却令人沮丧——真的是非常沮丧。而且，可惜的是，这些对冲基金及基金中的基金收取的巨额固定费用——与其业绩完全不相称——导致其管理人即使在这九年中表现不佳，依然获得了巨额酬劳。用戈登·盖柯的话说就是：“费用永不眠。”

The underlying hedge-fund managers in our bet received payments from their limited partners that likely averaged a bit under the prevailing hedge-fund standard of “2 and 20,” meaning a 2% annual fixed fee, payable even when losses are huge, and 20% of profits with no clawback (if good years were followed by bad ones). Under this lopsided arrangement, a hedge fund operator’s ability to simply pile up assets under management has made many of these managers extraordinarily rich, even as their investments have performed poorly.

参与赌局的这些底层对冲基金经理，从他们的有限合伙人那里获得的报酬，大致接近但略低于业内通行的“2 与 20”收费标准：即每年收取 2% 的固定管理费（即使出现巨额亏损也照收），以及 20% 的利润提成（没有回拨条款，即使好年份之后迎来坏年份也无需返还）。在这种极不对称的安排下，只要能不断吸引资金、增加资产管理规模，很多对冲基金经理就能变得极为富有，即便他们的投资表现非常糟糕。

Still, we’re not through with fees. Remember, there were the fund-of-funds managers to be fed as well. These managers received an additional fixed amount that was usually set at 1% of assets. Then, despite the terrible overall record of the five funds-of-funds, some experienced a few good years and collected “performance” fees. Consequently, I estimate that over the nine-year period roughly 60% – gulp! – of all gains achieved by the five funds-of-funds were diverted to the two levels of managers. That was their misbegotten reward for accomplishing something far short of what their many hundreds of limited partners could have effortlessly – and with virtually no cost – achieved on their own.

不过，说到费用，我们还没讲完。请记住，还有基金中的基金的管理人要“养活”。这些管理人通常会收取额外的固定费用，约为资产的 1%。此外，尽管这五只基金整体表现糟糕，但其中一些年份表现尚可，因此还收取了“业绩提成”。因此，我估计，在这九年期间，这五只基金所获得的全部收益中，大约有 60% ——呃！—— 被分配给了两层管理人。这些收益，是他们完成的远远低于数百名有限合伙人可以轻松、几乎无成本完成的“成果”所获得的报酬。

In my opinion, the disappointing results for hedge-fund investors that this bet exposed are almost certain to recur in the future. I laid out my reasons for that belief in a statement that was posted on the Long Bets website when the bet commenced (and that is still posted there). Here is what I asserted:

在我看来，这场赌局所揭示的对冲基金投资者令人失望的结果，在未来几乎必然会重复出现。我在赌局开始时曾在 Long Bets 网站上发表了一份声明，阐述了我对这一观点的理由（该声明至今仍在网站上发布）。以下是我的原话：

Over a ten-year period commencing on January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2017, the S\&P 500 will outperform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds, when performance is measured on a basis net of fees, costs and expenses.

在从 2008 年 1 月 1 日至 2017 年 12 月 31 日这十年期间，若以扣除所有费用、成本和开支后的净收益来衡量，标普500指数将优于一组对冲基金中的基金的投资组合。

A lot of very smart people set out to do better than average in securities markets. Call them active investors.

有许多非常聪明的人试图在证券市场中跑赢平均水平。我们称他们为主动投资者。

Their opposites, passive investors, will by definition do about average. In aggregate their positions will more or less approximate those of an index fund. Therefore, the balance of the universe—the active investors—must do about average as well. However, these investors will incur far greater costs. So, on balance, their aggregate results after these costs will be worse than those of the passive investors.

与之相对的是被动投资者，从定义上讲，他们的收益大致等于市场平均水平。从整体来看，他们的持仓基本上与某个指数基金接近。因此，市场的另一部分——主动投资者——总体上也必须获得类似的平均收益。然而，他们所承担的成本远高得多。因此，扣除这些成本之后，主动投资者的总体结果将不如被动投资者。

Costs skyrocket when large annual fees, large performance fees, and active trading costs are all added to the active investor’s equation. Funds of hedge funds accentuate this cost problem because their fees are superimposed on the large fees charged by the hedge funds in which the funds of funds are invested.

当把高额的年费、业绩提成和频繁交易成本都加进主动投资者的投资方程式时，总成本会飙升。而基金中的基金则进一步放大了这个成本问题，因为它们的费用是叠加在底层对冲基金本身已经很高的费用之上的。

A number of smart people are involved in running hedge funds. But to a great extent their efforts are self-neutralizing, and their IQ will not overcome the costs they impose on investors. Investors, on average and over time, will do better with a low-cost index fund than with a group of funds of funds.

确实有很多聪明人参与管理对冲基金。但在很大程度上，他们的努力是彼此抵消的，而他们的智商也无法弥补他们给投资者带来的高成本。从平均水平来看，在长期内，投资者通过低成本指数基金所获得的回报将优于投资于一组基金中的基金。

So that was my argument – and now let me put it into a simple equation. If Group A (active investors) and Group B (do-nothing investors) comprise the total investing universe, and B is destined to achieve average results before costs, so, too, must A. Whichever group has the lower costs will win. (The academic in me requires me to mention that there is a very minor point – not worth detailing – that slightly modifies this formulation.) And if Group A has exorbitant costs, its shortfall will be substantial.

这就是我的论点——现在让我用一个简单的等式来表达它：如果 A 组（主动投资者）和 B 组（什么都不做的投资者）构成整个投资世界的全部，而 B 在扣除成本前注定只能获得平均回报，那么 A 也同样如此。哪一组的成本更低，哪一组就会胜出。（出于学术背景的严谨，我必须提一句：确实存在一个非常细微的技术性修正点——不值得在此赘述。）而如果 A 组的成本高得离谱，那它的劣势将会非常显著。

There are, of course, some skilled individuals who are highly likely to out-perform the S&P over long stretches. In my lifetime, though, I’ve identified – early on – only ten or so professionals that I expected would accomplish this feat.

当然，确实有一些极具能力的人，在长期内有很大可能跑赢标普指数。但在我的一生中，我一开始就能识别出来、且有信心认为他们能够做到这一点的专业人士，不超过十位。

There are no doubt many hundreds of people – perhaps thousands – whom I have never met and whose abilities would equal those of the people I’ve identified. The job, after all, is not impossible. The problem simply is that the great majority of managers who attempt to over-perform will fail. The probability is also very high that the person soliciting your funds will not be the exception who does well. Bill Ruane – a truly wonderful human being and a man whom I identified 60 years ago as almost certain to deliver superior investment returns over the long haul – said it well: “In investment management, the progression is from the innovators to the imitators to the swarming incompetents.”

毫无疑问，还有数百人，甚至上千人，我从未遇见过，他们的能力可能与我识别出的那几位相当。毕竟，这项工作并非不可能完成。问题在于，绝大多数试图跑赢市场的经理最终都会失败。而你所接触到的募资者，极有可能并不是那少数表现优异的例外之一。Bill Ruane——一位真正优秀的人，也是在 60 年前我就确定他几乎注定能实现长期超额回报的人——说得好：“在投资管理行业中，发展的顺序是：创新者、模仿者，以及成群结队的无能者。”

Further complicating the search for the rare high-fee manager who is worth his or her pay is the fact that some investment professionals, just as some amateurs, will be lucky over short periods. If 1,000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of a year, it’s very likely that the calls of at least one will be correct for nine consecutive years. Of course, 1,000 monkeys would be just as likely to produce a seemingly all-wise prophet. But there would remain a difference: The lucky monkey would not find people standing in line to invest with him.

进一步使寻找“值得高收费”的少数基金经理变得复杂的因素，是一些投资专业人士就像一些业余投资者一样，在短期内可能会碰巧走运。如果有 1,000 个经理在年初做出市场预测，那么其中至少有一个在接下来的九年中连续预测正确是很可能发生的。当然，1,000 只猴子也同样有可能“制造出”一个看似全知全能的预言家。但区别在于：那只幸运的猴子并不会引来一群人排队把钱交给它投资。

Finally, there are three connected realities that cause investing success to breed failure. First, a good record quickly attracts a torrent of money. Second, huge sums invariably act as an anchor on investment performance: What is easy with millions, struggles with billions (sob!). Third, most managers will nevertheless seek new money because of their personal equation – namely, the more funds they have under management, the more their fees.

最后，还有三个相互关联的现实，导致投资成功往往孕育出失败：第一，良好的过往业绩会迅速吸引大量资金涌入；第二，巨额资金几乎必然会拖累投资业绩：用几百万美元投资很轻松，但用几十亿美元则步履维艰（唉！）；第三，大多数经理仍会追求更多的资金，因为他们的个人激励机制决定了：管理的资产越多，收取的费用就越多。

These three points are hardly new ground for me: In January 1966, when I was managing $44 million, I wrote my limited partners: “I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results. Therefore, . . . I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL. I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.”

这三点对我来说并不是什么新鲜事：1966 年 1 月，当我管理着 4,400 万美元时，我写信给我的有限合伙人说：“我认为，规模的显著扩大更可能损害未来业绩，而非带来帮助。对我个人的投资结果而言，也许未必如此，但对你们的回报而言，很可能就是事实。因此……我打算不再接受任何新合伙人加入 BPL。我已经通知了 Susie，如果我们将来还有孩子，那就由她负责帮他们另找合伙企业。”

The bottom line: When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not the clients. Both large and small investors should stick with low-cost index funds.

结论是：当数万亿美元交由华尔街那些收取高额费用的人管理时，最终获利丰厚的通常是这些管理人，而不是客户。无论是大投资者还是小投资者，都应该坚持投资于低成本的指数基金。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for American investors, the handsdown choice should be Jack Bogle. For decades, Jack has urged investors to invest in ultra-low-cost index funds. In his crusade, he amassed only a tiny percentage of the wealth that has typically flowed to managers who have promised their investors large rewards while delivering them nothing – or, as in our bet, less than nothing – of added value.

如果未来要立一座雕像，以纪念对美国投资者贡献最大的人，毫无疑问应当是 Jack Bogle。几十年来，Jack 一直倡导投资者将资金投向极低成本的指数基金。在这场事业中，他自己只获得了极少的财富回报——相比之下，许多承诺高额回报却未兑现（甚至像我们这场赌局一样，创造负价值）的基金经理，却获取了巨额财富。

In his early years, Jack was frequently mocked by the investment-management industry. Today, however, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he helped millions of investors realize far better returns on their savings than they otherwise would have earned. He is a hero to them and to me.

在 Jack 的早期岁月里，他常常被投资管理行业讥笑。但如今，他可以欣慰地知道，自己帮助了数百万投资者，从储蓄中获得了远超他们原本可能实现的回报。他是他们的英雄，也是我的英雄。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Over the years, I’ve often been asked for investment advice, and in the process of answering I’ve learned a good deal about human behavior. My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S\&P 500 index fund. To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have usually followed my suggestion.

多年来，我常被人问到投资建议，而在回答这些问题的过程中，我也学到了许多关于人类行为的知识。我一贯的建议是投资于一只低成本的标普500指数基金。值得肯定的是，那些财力有限的朋友们通常都会听从我的建议。

I believe, however, that none of the mega-rich individuals, institutions or pension funds has followed that same advice when I’ve given it to them. Instead, these investors politely thank me for my thoughts and depart to listen to the siren song of a high-fee manager or, in the case of many institutions, to seek out another breed of hyper-helper called a consultant.

但我相信，我向那些超级富豪、机构或养老金基金提出同样建议时，没有一个人真的照做。相反，这些投资者会礼貌地感谢我的建议，然后转身去听那些高收费经理的“海妖之歌”，或者像很多机构那样，另寻一类被称作“顾问”的超级帮手。

That professional, however, faces a problem. Can you imagine an investment consultant telling clients, year after year, to keep adding to an index fund replicating the S\&P 500? That would be career suicide. Large fees flow to these hyper-helpers, however, if they recommend small managerial shifts every year or so. That advice is often delivered in esoteric gibberish that explains why fashionable investment “styles” or current economic trends make the shift appropriate.

但这些专业人士也面临一个问题。你能想象一位投资顾问年复一年地对客户说：“继续加码一只复制标普500的指数基金”吗？那无异于职业自杀。而只要他们每年建议进行一些小幅度的管理人调整，这些超级帮手就能赚取高额费用。这类建议通常披着一层晦涩难懂的行话外衣，解释为什么某种时尚的投资“风格”或当前的经济趋势使得这些变动显得合理。

The wealthy are accustomed to feeling that it is their lot in life to get the best food, schooling, entertainment, housing, plastic surgery, sports ticket, you name it. Their money, they feel, should buy them something superior compared to what the masses receive.

富人习惯于认为，他们理应在生活中享受到最好的食物、教育、娱乐、住房、整形手术、体育赛事门票……等等。他们觉得，自己的财富理应为自己带来比大众更高级的待遇。

In many aspects of life, indeed, wealth does command top-grade products or services. For that reason, the financial “elites” – wealthy individuals, pension funds, college endowments and the like – have great trouble meekly signing up for a financial product or service that is available as well to people investing only a few thousand dollars. This reluctance of the rich normally prevails even though the product at issue is – on an expectancy basis – clearly the best choice. My calculation, admittedly very rough, is that the search by the elite for superior investment advice has caused it, in aggregate, to waste more than \$100 billion over the past decade. Figure it out: Even a 1% fee on a few trillion dollars adds up. Of course, not every investor who put money in hedge funds ten years ago lagged S\&P returns. But I believe my calculation of the aggregate shortfall is conservative.

确实，在生活的很多方面，财富确实能够带来顶级的产品和服务。正因如此，那些金融“精英”——富有的个人、养老金基金、大学捐赠基金等等——很难甘心地选择一个连仅投入几千美元的普通人都能使用的金融产品或服务。即便这种产品从期望收益的角度来看，明显是最优选择，富人对其的抗拒仍然普遍存在。我承认，这个估算很粗略，但我认为，那些“精英”群体对更优投资建议的追求，已在过去十年中使他们整体上浪费了超过 1,000 亿美元。你算算就知道：哪怕只收 1% 的费用，放在几万亿美元的资产上，也是天文数字。当然，并不是每一位十年前投资对冲基金的人都跑输了标普指数。但我相信，我对总体劣势的估计已经是保守的了。

Much of the financial damage befell pension funds for public employees. Many of these funds are woefully underfunded, in part because they have suffered a double whammy: poor investment performance accompanied by huge fees. The resulting shortfalls in their assets will for decades have to be made up by local taxpayers.

许多财政损失落在了公共雇员的养老金基金上。许多这类基金严重资金不足，部分原因是它们遭遇了“双重打击”：投资表现不佳，同时还支付了高额费用。这些资产缺口将在未来几十年内由当地纳税人承担。

Human behavior won’t change. Wealthy individuals, pension funds, endowments and the like will continue to feel they deserve something “extra” in investment advice. Those advisors who cleverly play to this expectation will get very rich. This year the magic potion may be hedge funds, next year something else. The likely result from this parade of promises is predicted in an adage: “When a person with money meets a person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the money and the one with money leaves with experience.”

人的行为不会改变。富人、养老金基金、捐赠基金等仍会认为他们在投资建议上理应得到某种“额外待遇”。那些巧妙迎合这种心理的顾问将会赚得盆满钵满。今年的“魔法药水”也许是对冲基金，明年可能又换成别的。对这种承诺接力赛的最终结果，一句谚语早已预言得明明白白：“当有钱人遇到有经验的人，最后有经验的人拿走了钱，而有钱的人则带走了经验。”

Long ago, a brother-in-law of mine, Homer Rogers, was a commission agent working in the Omaha stockyards. I asked him how he induced a farmer or rancher to hire him to handle the sale of their hogs or cattle to the buyers from the big four packers (Swift, Cudahy, Wilson and Armour). After all, hogs were hogs and the buyers were experts who knew to the penny how much any animal was worth. How then, I asked Homer, could any sales agent get a better result than any other?

很久以前，我的一位姐夫 Homer Rogers 是奥马哈牲畜交易市场的一名佣金代理人。我问他，他是如何说服农场主或牧场主雇他来将他们的猪或牛卖给四大肉品公司买家的（Swift、Cudahy、Wilson 和 Armour）。毕竟，猪就是猪，买家又都是行家，知道每头牲畜值多少钱——我问 Homer，说，在这种情况下，任何销售代理人又如何能比别人做得更好呢？

Homer gave me a pitying look and said: “Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.” What worked in the stockyards continues to work in Wall Street.

Homer 用一种怜悯的眼神看着我，说：“Warren，关键不在于你怎么卖，而在于你怎么讲。”这种在牲畜市场行得通的道理，在华尔街依然屡试不爽。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And, finally, let me offer an olive branch to Wall Streeters, many of them good friends of mine. Berkshire loves to pay fees – even outrageous fees – to investment bankers who bring us acquisitions. Moreover, we have paid substantial sums for over-performance to our two in-house investment managers – and we hope to make even larger payments to them in the future.

最后，我想向华尔街人士——其中许多是我多年的好友——递上一枝橄榄枝。Berkshire 非常乐意向为我们带来并购机会的投资银行支付费用——即便是高得离谱的费用。此外，对于我们内部两位投资经理在表现出色时，我们也支付了大量奖金——未来我们希望支付得更多。

To get biblical (Ephesians 3:18), I know the height and the depth and the length and the breadth of the energy flowing from that simple four-letter word – fees – when it is spoken to Wall Street. And when that energy delivers value to Berkshire, I will cheerfully write a big check.

用一句圣经（以弗所书 3:18）来讲，我了解那四个字母构成的简单单词——fees（费用）——在华尔街引发的“高度、深度、长度和广度”的能量。而当这种能量为 Berkshire 带来价值时，我会欣然签下一张大额支票。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Last year we partnered with Yahoo to air the first-ever webcast of our annual meeting. Thanks to Andy Serwer and his Yahoo crew, the production was a success in all respects, registering 1.1 million unique visits in real-time viewing and 11.5 million more in replays (many of those, to be sure, called up by viewers interested in only certain segments of the webcast).

去年，我们与 Yahoo 合作，首次进行了年度股东大会的网络直播。感谢 Andy Serwer 和他带领的 Yahoo 团队，这场制作在各方面都堪称成功：实时观看中录得了 110 万个独立访问数，回放累计观看量达到 1,150 万（当然，其中许多是观众只选择了自己感兴趣的片段）。

Berkshire’s thank-you mail for initiating the webcast included many notes from three constituencies: the elderly who find travel difficult; the thrifty who find it expensive to travel to Omaha; and those who cannot attend a Saturday meeting for religious reasons.

Berkshire 收到许多感谢我们启动网络直播的来信，主要来自三个群体：一是行动不便的老年人，二是觉得前往奥马哈开销太高的节俭型股东，三是因宗教原因无法在周六参会的人士。

The webcast cut attendance at last year’s meeting to about 37,000 people (we can’t get a precise count), which was down about 10%. Nevertheless, both Berkshire’s subsidiaries and Omaha hotels and restaurants racked up huge sales. Nebraska Furniture Mart’s sales broke their 2015 record volume by 3%, with the Omaha store recording one-week volume of \$45.5 million.

去年由于网络直播的安排，现场出席股东大会的人数降至约 37,000 人（我们无法得出确切人数），比前一年减少了约 10%。尽管如此，Berkshire 的子公司、以及奥马哈的酒店和餐厅仍实现了惊人的销售额。Nebraska Furniture Mart 的销售额突破了其 2015 年的历史纪录，增长了 3%，其中奥马哈门店单周销售额达到了 4,550 万美元。

Our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink were open from noon until 5 p.m. on Friday and drew a crowd of 12,000 bargain-hunting shareholders. We will repeat those Friday shopping hours this year on May 5th. Bring money.

我们的 Berkshire 展商在 CenturyLink 中心于周五中午至下午 5 点开放，吸引了 12,000 名寻找优惠的股东。今年我们将在 5 月 5 日继续安排同样的周五购物时段。记得带钱来。

The annual meeting falls on May 6th and will again be webcast by Yahoo, whose web address is [https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream](https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream). The webcast will go live at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both those interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.

年度股东大会将在 5 月 6 日举行，届时将再次由 Yahoo 进行网络直播，网址为 [https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。直播将于中部夏令时间上午](https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。直播将于中部夏令时间上午) 9 点开始。Yahoo 将在大会开始前和午餐休息期间采访董事、管理层、股东及名人。会议及采访都将同步提供普通话翻译。

For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:30 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting. It will run an hour or so. That is somewhat longer than usual because three proxy items are to be presented by their proponents, who will be given a reasonable amount of time to state their case.

对于亲自参会的股东，CenturyLink 中心将于周六上午 7 点开放，方便大家在 8:30 股东电影播放前进行购物。问答环节将于 9:30 开始，持续至下午 3:30，中午设有一小时午休。最后，我们将在 3:45 举行正式的股东会议，预计持续约一小时。这个时长比往常略长，因为今年将有三项股东提案由提案人亲自陈述，届时他们将获合理的发言时间。

On Saturday morning, we will have our sixth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be the porch of a Clayton Home, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). The competition will begin about 7:45, and I’ll take on ten or so competitors selected a few minutes earlier by my assistant, Deb Bosanek.

周六早上，我们将举办第六届“国际报纸投掷挑战赛”。目标仍然是位于投掷线正前方 35 英尺处的一座 Clayton Home 的门廊。当我还是个青少年的时候——在我短暂的“正经劳动”生涯中——曾投递过大约 50 万份报纸。所以我觉得我这方面还挺在行。来挑战我！羞辱我！打击我！比赛用的报纸有 36 至 42 页，你必须自己折叠（不允许使用橡皮筋）。比赛大约在 7:45 开始，我将迎战大约十位竞争者，他们将在比赛前几分钟由我的助理 Deb Bosanek 现场选出。

Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.

购物场地是与会场相连的一座 194,300 平方英尺的展厅，届时我们几十家子公司的产品都将在此销售。别忘了跟在各展位“坐镇”的 Berkshire 管理人员打声招呼。另外一定要看看精彩的 BNSF 铁路模型展，它向我们旗下所有公司致敬。你的小孩（还有你自己！）一定会对此着迷。

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle we eat throughout the Saturday meeting takes its toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.

我们的跑鞋子公司 Brooks 将再次在大会上推出一款纪念款跑鞋。买上一双，然后在周日早上 8 点穿着它参加我们的第四届 “Berkshire 5K” 长跑活动，起点设在 CenturyLink。完整的参赛信息将随会议证件和来宾指南一并寄出。参赛者将会与 Berkshire 的许多经理、董事和员工一起奔跑。（不过我和 Charlie 会睡懒觉；我们在周六大会期间吃太多软糖和花生糖了，总要付出些代价。）5K 长跑的参与人数年年增加，来帮我们再创一次纪录吧。

A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 21% from 2015. I predict we will be up again this year.

GEICO 将在购物区设立展位，并由来自全国各地的多位顶级顾问现场提供服务。去年的股东大会上，我们的保单销售创下纪录，比 2015 年增长了 21%。我预测今年我们还会继续增长。

So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.

所以请顺路来获取一份报价。在多数情况下，GEICO 可以为你提供股东折扣（通常为 8%）。这项特别优惠在我们开展业务的 51 个司法辖区中，有 44 个是允许的。（补充一点：如果你已经符合其他折扣资格，例如某些团体的优惠政策，该股东折扣无法叠加。）带上你现有保单的详细信息，来比比价格。我们可以为许多人节省实实在在的钱——然后你可以用省下来的钱购买其他 Berkshire 产品。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. The best book I read last year was *Shoe Dog*, by Nike’s Phil Knight. Phil is a very wise, intelligent and competitive fellow who is also a gifted storyteller. The Bookworm will have piles of *Shoe Dog* as well as several investment classics by Jack Bogle.

记得要去逛一逛 Bookworm。这家位于奥马哈的零售商将带来大约 35 本图书和 DVD，其中包含几本新作。我去年读过的最佳图书是 Nike 创始人 Phil Knight 的《Shoe Dog》。Phil 是一位睿智、聪明且极富竞争力的人，也是一位出色的讲故事者。Bookworm 将备有大量《Shoe Dog》，以及 Jack Bogle 的几本经典投资著作。

The Bookworm will once again offer our history of the highlights (and lowlights) of Berkshire’s first 50 years. Non-attendees of the meeting can find the book on eBay. Just type in: *Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Celebrating 50 years of a Profitable Partnership (2nd Edition).*

Bookworm 还将再次销售我们公司前 50 年历史中的高光时刻（和低谷）的纪念图书。未能亲自参会的朋友可在 eBay 搜索购买，只需输入书名：*Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Celebrating 50 years of a Profitable Partnership (2nd Edition)*。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend – though I must admit I have developed some tolerance, bordering on enthusiasm, for that practice now that Berkshire has made large investments in America’s four major carriers. Nevertheless, if you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to \$1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.

本报告随附的授权委托资料附件中，解释了你如何获得用于入场的会议及活动凭证。请注意，部分航空公司有时会在 Berkshire 年度大会周末调高票价——尽管我必须承认，考虑到 Berkshire 已对美国四大航空公司进行了大量投资，我对这种做法已逐渐从“容忍”转向“欣赏”。不过，如果你是远道而来，不妨比较一下飞往堪萨斯城与飞往奥马哈的费用。这两地之间车程约 2.5 小时，而堪萨斯城的机票可能会帮你省下一大笔钱。对于一对夫妇来说，节省金额可能高达 1,000 美元或更多。请把这笔钱花在我们 Berkshire 的产品上吧。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 2nd and Monday, May 8th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.

位于 72 街 Dodge 与 Pacific 之间，占地 77 英亩的 Nebraska Furniture Mart 将再次推出“Berkshire 周末”专属折扣价格。要享受 NFM 的 Berkshire 折扣，你必须在 5 月 2 日星期二至 5 月 8 日星期一之间购物，并出示你的大会凭证。即使是几家通常绝不打折的知名制造商品牌，在股东周末的精神感召下，也将为你破例提供优惠价格，我们对此表示感谢。在“Berkshire 周末”期间，NFM 的营业时间为：周一至周五上午 10 点至晚上 9 点，周六上午 10 点至晚上 9:30，周日上午 10 点至晚上 8 点。周六下午 5:30 至 8 点，NFM 将举办一次烧烤野餐，欢迎大家参加。

This year we have good news for shareholders in the Kansas City and Dallas metro markets who can’t attend the meeting or perhaps prefer the webcast. From May 2nd through May 8th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to their local NFM store will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store.

今年我们也有一条好消息要带给无法出席大会、或更愿意观看直播的堪萨斯城和达拉斯大都会地区的股东。从 5 月 2 日至 5 月 8 日期间，凡在当地 NFM 门店出示大会凭证或其他能证明持有 Berkshire 股票的文件（如券商对账单）的股东，将享有与亲临奥马哈门店相同的折扣待遇。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 5th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 7th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store).

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场专为股东举办的活动。第一场是 5 月 5 日（星期五）下午 6 点至 9 点的鸡尾酒招待会；第二场为主场庆典，将于 5 月 7 日（星期日）上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六我们将营业至下午 6 点。记住，你买得越多，省得越多（至少我女儿每次带我去这家店的时候是这么说的）。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, May 1st through Saturday, May 13th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.

整个周末，Borsheims 都将迎来大量顾客。为了你的便利，股东优惠价将从 5 月 1 日星期一延续至 5 月 13 日星期六。在此期间，请通过出示大会凭证或显示你持有 Berkshire 股票的券商对账单，来证明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician and motivational speaker from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. I will join them at some point and hope Ajit, Charlie and Bill Gates will do so also.

星期天，在 Borsheims 商场外部，将有来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师兼励志演讲者 Norman Beck，为观众带来令人称奇的表演。在楼上，我们还邀请到世界顶尖桥牌专家 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg，周日下午将与你们这些股东同桌切磋。如果他们提出下注，建议你赶紧换个话题。我也会在某个时间点加入，希望 Ajit、Charlie 和 Bill Gates 也会加入我们。

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. Now, she’s a senior at Princeton (after interning last summer at JPMorgan Chase). If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.)

我的朋友 Ariel Hsing 也将在星期天出现在商场，与挑战者们进行乒乓球比赛。我第一次见到 Ariel 是她九岁那年，那时我连一分都拿不到。Ariel 曾代表美国参加 2012 年奥运会。现在她是普林斯顿大学的应届毕业生（去年夏天曾在摩根大通实习）。如果你不介意被“吊打”，可以从下午 1 点开始挑战她。Bill Gates 去年与 Ariel 打得还不错，也许今年他会再次出战。（我的建议是：押 Ariel 胜。）

Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7th, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 3rd (but not before). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.

Gorat’s 餐厅将在 5 月 7 日（星期日）专门为 Berkshire 股东开放，营业时间为下午 1 点至晚上 10 点。如需预订，请在 4 月 3 日致电 402-551-3733（不要提前致电）。想显得你是“行家”，请点 T 骨牛排配土豆饼。

We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at [loomisbrk@gmail.com]; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at [BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com]; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at [arsorkin@nytimes.com].

大会问答环节仍将由三位同样的财经记者主持，他们将代表股东通过电子邮件提交的问题向我和 Charlie 发问。这三位记者及其电邮地址为：当代最杰出的财经记者之一 Carol Loomis（邮箱：[loomisbrk@gmail.com]）；CNBC 的 Becky Quick（邮箱：[BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com]）；以及《纽约时报》的 Andrew Ross Sorkin（邮箱：[arsorkin@nytimes.com]）。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)

在收到的问题中，每位记者将挑选六个他们认为最有趣、对股东最重要的问题。记者们告诉我，你的问题如果简明扼要、不是最后一刻才提交、与 Berkshire 有关、并且每封邮件中不超过两个问题，那么被选中的可能性会最大。（如果你希望提问时提到你的名字，请在邮件中注明。）

An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.

与之配套，另有三个长期关注 Berkshire 的分析师将现场提问。今年负责保险类问题的是巴克莱的 Jay Gelb；关于非保险业务的问题，将由 Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的 Jonathan Brandt 以及晨星的 Gregg Warren 提出。毕竟这是一场股东大会，我们希望分析师和记者们能提出有助于股东理解自身投资的相关问题。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha.

我和 Charlie 事先不会获得任何问题的提示。有些问题肯定会很棘手，而我们就喜欢这样。我们不允许多重问题出现；我们希望尽可能多的提问者能有机会向我们发问。我们的目标是：让你在离开大会时比来之前对 Berkshire 有更深的了解，并且在奥马哈度过一段愉快的时光。

All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.

总体而言，我们预计将有至少 54 个问题被提问，其中每位分析师和记者各提 6 个，现场观众将有 18 个提问机会。观众提问者将通过抽签方式选出，抽签将在年会当天上午 8:15 进行。会场和主溢出会场共设置了 11 个麦克风，每个麦克风“主持”一次抽签。

While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems).

既然谈到让股东获取信息，我想提醒大家，Charlie 和我始终认为，**所有股东都应同时获得 Berkshire 发布的新信息**，并且在任何交易发生之前，如有可能，也应有足够的时间进行消化与分析。正因如此，我们会选择在周五晚或周六早上发布财务数据，我们的年度股东大会也总是在星期六举行（这一天也有助于缓解交通和停车问题）。

We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day – and as I write this letter – that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.

我们不采纳那些与大型机构投资者或分析师一对一沟通的常见做法，相反，我们将其视为与所有其他股东平等对待。对我们而言，没有人比这样一位股东更重要：他或她也许并不富裕，却信任我们，把自己相当一部分积蓄托付给了我们。在我日常经营公司时——也包括写这封信时——我脑海中浮现的正是这样的股东。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

我经常称赞我们各业务子公司的经营管理者，这并非毫无道理。他们确实是一群“全明星”，经营业务的态度就像这家公司是他们整个家族唯一的资产。我也认为，在所有大型上市公司中，我们的管理者的思维方式是最具股东导向的。多数管理者并不需要为生计工作，而在他们看来，打出业务上的“本垒打”所带来的成就感和他们的薪酬同样重要。

Equally important, however, are the men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,450-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,580 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.

但同样重要的，是与我在公司总部共事的男女员工。这支团队高效地处理着无数来自 SEC 和其他监管机构的要求，申报长达 30,450 页的联邦所得税表，监督 3,580 份州税申报，回应大量股东和媒体的问询，编制年报，筹备全美规模最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会各项事务，校对这封信的内容——等等等等。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q\&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help Carrie Sova – our talented ringmaster at the annual meeting – deliver an interesting and entertaining weekend for our shareholders. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.

他们以愉快的态度和令人难以置信的效率完成所有这些事务，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力早已超出与 Berkshire 直接相关的事务范围：例如，去年他们负责协调 40 所大学（从 200 个申请者中选出）派学生来奥马哈与我进行问答交流。他们还负责处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的行程，甚至为我买来汉堡和薯条（当然是配 Heinz 番茄酱）。此外，他们也积极参与协助我们年度大会的“总指挥”Carrie Sova，为股东带来一个充实有趣的周末。他们为能在 Berkshire 工作感到骄傲，而我也为他们感到自豪。

I’m a lucky guy, very fortunate in being surrounded by this excellent staff, a team of highly-talented operating managers and a boardroom of very wise and experienced directors. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 6th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to seeing you.

我是一个幸运的人，身边有这样一支优秀的员工团队、一批极具才能的业务经营者，以及一群睿智而经验丰富的董事，我深感荣幸。5 月 6 日，欢迎你来到奥马哈——这个“资本主义的摇篮”——与 Berkshire 的大家庭见面。我们所有人都期待着见到你。

February 25, 2017

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2017-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2017-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

What We Hope to Accomplish

Share Repurchases

Insurance

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

Finance and Financial Products

Investments

“The Bet” (or how your money finds its way to Wall Street)

The Annual Meeting

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