2017-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Welcome and introductions

欢迎和介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, and good morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，早上好。

That’s Charlie. I’m Warren. (Laughter)

那是查理。我是沃伦。（笑声）

You can tell us apart because he can hear and I can see. That’s why we — (laughter) — work together so well. We each have our specialty.

你可以分辨出我们，因为他能听见，而我能看见。这就是为什么我们——（笑声）——合作得如此默契。我们各有所长。

I’d like to welcome you to — we’ve got a lot of out-of-towners here, and I’d like to welcome you to Omaha. It’s a terrific — (Applause)

我想欢迎你们——我们这里有很多外地人，我想欢迎你们来到奥马哈。这是一个很棒的——（掌声）

Thank you. 谢谢。

It’s a terrific city. And Charlie’s lived in California now for about 70 years, but he’s still got a lot of Omaha in him.

这是一个很棒的城市。查理在加利福尼亚住了大约 70 年，但他身上仍然有很多奥马哈的气息。

Both of us were born within two miles of this building that you’re in. And Charlie — as he mentioned [in the pre-meeting movie] in his description of his amorous triumphs in high school — Charlie graduated from Central High, which is about one mile from here. It’s a public school.

我们俩都出生在离你所在的这栋建筑不到两英里的地方。查理——正如他在会议前的影片中提到的，描述他在高中时期的爱情胜利——查理毕业于中央高中，离这里大约一英里。那是一所公立学校。

And my dad, my first wife, my three children and two of my grandchildren have all graduated from the same school.

我爸爸、我的第一任妻子、我的三个孩子和我的两个孙子都毕业于同一所学校。

In fact, my grandchildren say they’ve had the same teachers that my dad — (Laughter)

实际上，我的孙子们说他们上过的老师和我父亲的老师一样。（笑声）

The — but it’s a great city. I hope you get to see a lot of it while you’re here.

但这是一个很棒的城市。我希望你们在这里时能多看看这个城市。

And in just a minute we will start a question period — hopefully a question and answer period that will last till about noon, and then we’ll take a break for an hour or so. We’ll reconvene at one. And then we’ll go — continue with the question and answer period till 3:30.

我们将在一分钟内开始提问环节——希望这个问答环节能持续到中午，然后我们会休息一个小时左右。我们将在一点钟重新开始。然后我们将继续问答环节，直到三点半。

And then we’ll break for 15 minutes or so. And then we’ll convene the annual meeting of Berkshire, which I — we have three propositions that people wish to speak on, so that could last perhaps as long as an hour.

然后我们将休息大约 15 分钟。之后我们将召开伯克希尔的年度会议，我——我们有三个提案有人希望发言，因此这可能会持续大约一个小时。

Before we start, I’d like to make a couple of introductions, the first being Carrie Sova, who’s been with us about seven years. And can we have a light on Carrie? I think she — Carrie, are you there? (Applause)

在我们开始之前，我想做几个介绍，第一个是凯莉·索瓦，她和我们在一起大约七年了。我们能给凯莉打个灯吗？我想她——凯莉，你在吗？（掌声）

Carrie. Stand up, Carrie, come on. (Laughter and applause)

凯莉。站起来，凯莉，快点。（笑声和掌声）

Carrie puts on this whole program. She came to us about seven years ago and a few years ago I said, “Why don’t you just put on the annual meeting for me?” And she handles it all. And she has two young children.

凯莉负责整个项目。大约七年前她来到我们这里，几年前我说：“你为什么不为我举办年度会议呢？”她全权负责。而且她还有两个年幼的孩子。

And she has dozens and dozens and dozens of exhibitors that she works with and, as you can imagine, with all of what we put on and all of the numbers of you that come, the hotels and the airlines and the rental cars and everything, she does it as if, you know, she could do that and be juggling three balls at the same time.

她与数十个展商合作，正如你所想象的，考虑到我们所举办的一切以及前来的人数，酒店、航空公司、租车等等，她就像能同时操控三个球一样，轻松应对这一切。

She’s amazing, and I want to thank her for putting on this program for us. And — (Applause)

她真了不起，我想感谢她为我们举办这个节目。——（掌声）

I also would like to welcome and have you welcome our directors.

我也想欢迎你们欢迎我们的董事。

They will be voted on later, so I’ll do this alphabetically. They’re here in the front row. And if we could just have the spotlight drop on them as they’re introduced.

他们稍后会被投票，所以我将按字母顺序进行介绍。他们在前排。如果在介绍他们时能让聚光灯照在他们身上就好了。

And alphabetically, is Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Sue Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, we have Charlie Munger next to me, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer. Yeah. (Applause)

按字母顺序，霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、苏·德克、比尔·盖茨、桑迪·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼，查理·芒格在我旁边，汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默。是的。（掌声）

One more introduction I’m going to make, but I’ll save that for just a minute.

我还要做一个介绍，但我会等一会儿再说。

2. First quarter earnings

第一季度收益

WARREN BUFFETT: And our earnings report was put out yesterday.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们的财报昨天发布了。

The — as we regularly explain, the realized investment gains or losses in any period really mean nothing. I mean, they —

——正如我们经常解释的，任何时期内实现的投资收益或损失实际上并没有什么意义。我的意思是，他们——

We could take a lot of gains if we wanted to. We could take a lot of losses if we wanted to. But we don’t really think about the timing of what we do at all, except in relation to the intrinsic value of what we’re buying or selling. We are not —

我们如果愿意，可以获得很多收益。如果我们愿意，也可以承受很多损失。但我们实际上并不考虑我们所做的事情的时机，除非是与我们所买或所卖的内在价值相关。我们不是——

We do not make earnings forecasts. And we have — on March 31st, we have over $90 billion of net unrealized gains. So if we wanted to report almost any number you can think of and count capital gains as part of the earnings, we could do it.

我们不做收益预测。到3月31日，我们有超过900亿美元的未实现收益。所以，如果我们想报告几乎任何你能想到的数字，并把资本收益算作收益的一部分，我们都可以做到。

So in the first quarter — and I would say that we have a very, very, very slight preference this year, if everything else were equal — well, it’s true in any year, but it’s a little more so this year — we would rather take losses than gains, because of the tax effect if two securities were equally valued.

所以在第一季度——我会说，今年我们有一个非常非常微小的偏好——如果一切其他条件相等——这在任何一年都是如此，但今年更明显——我们宁愿承受损失而不是获得收益，因为这样可以利用税收效应，如果两项证券的价值相等的话。

And there’s probably just one touch more of emphasis on that this year, because we are taxed on gains at 35 percent, which means we also get the benefit — the tax benefit — at 35 percent of any losses we take.

今年可能更加强调这一点，因为我们对收益的税率是35%，这意味着我们也可以获得35%的任何损失的税收优惠。

And I would say that there’s some chance of that rate being lower, meaning that losses would have less tax value to us after this year than they would have this — after this year than this year.

我会说，这种税率可能会更低，这意味着在今年之后，损失的税收价值对我们来说可能会减少。

That is not a big deal, but it would be a very slight preference. And it may get to be more of a factor in deferring any gains, and perhaps accelerating any losses, as the year gets closer to December 31st, assuming — and I’m making no predictions about it — but assuming that there were to be a tax act that had the effect of reducing the earnings.

这不是大问题，但这会是一个非常轻微的偏好。随着年份接近 12 月 31 日，这可能会在推迟任何收益和加速任何损失方面变得更加重要，假设——我并没有对此做出任何预测——假设有一项税法的实施会导致收益减少。

So in the first quarter, insurance underwriting was the swing factor. And the — there’s a lot more about this in our 10-Q, which you can look up on the internet.

因此，在第一季度，保险承保是关键因素。关于这一点在我们的 10-Q 报告中还有更多内容，您可以在互联网上查找。

And you really, if you’re seriously interested in evaluating our earnings or our businesses, you should go to the 10-Q, because the summary report, as we point out every quarter, does not really get to a number of the main points of valuation.

如果您真的对评估我们的收益或业务感兴趣，您应该查看 10-Q，因为我们每个季度都指出的摘要报告并没有真正涵盖一些主要的估值要点。

I would just mention two factors in connection with the insurance situation, which I love.

我想提到与我所喜爱的保险情况相关的两个因素。

In the first four months — not the first three months — but the first four months, GEICO’s had a net gain of 700,000 policy holders, and that’s the highest number I can remember.

在前四个月——不是前三个月——而是前四个月，GEICO 的净增保单持有者达到了 70 万，这是我记得的最高数字。

There may have been a figure larger than that somewhere in the past. I did not go back and look at them all. But last year I believe that figure was like 300,000.

过去可能有一个比这个更大的数字。我没有回去查看所有的数字。但我相信去年这个数字大约是 300,000。

And this has been a wonderful period for us at GEICO, because several of our major competitors have decided — and they publicly stated this — in fact one of them just reiterated it the other day — although they’ve now changed their policy — but they intentionally cut back on new business because new business carries with it a significant loss in the first year. There’s just costs of acquiring new business.

这对我们 GEICO 来说是一个美好的时期，因为我们的一些主要竞争对手已经决定——他们公开表示了这一点——实际上其中一个竞争对手就在前几天重申了这一点——尽管他们现在已经改变了政策——但他们故意减少了新业务，因为新业务在第一年会带来显著的损失。这只是获取新业务的成本。

Plus the loss ratio, strangely enough, on first-year business tends to run almost 10 points higher than on renewal business. And so not only do you have acquisition costs, but you actually have a higher loss ratio.

此外，奇怪的是，第一年业务的损失率往往比续保业务高出近 10 个百分点。因此，不仅有获取成本，实际上损失率还更高。

So when you write a lot of new business, you’re going to lose money on that portion of the business that year.

所以当你写很多新业务时，你会在那部分业务上亏损。

And we wrote a lot of new business, and at least two of our competitors announced that they were lightening up for a while on new business, because they did not want to pay the penalty of the first-year loss.

我们签署了很多新业务，至少有两家竞争对手宣布他们将暂时减少新业务，因为他们不想承担第一年亏损的惩罚。

And, of course, that’s made to order for us, so we just put our foot to the floor and tried to write as much business — good business — as we can. And there are costs to that.

当然，这正是为我们量身定制的，所以我们全力以赴，尽量写下尽可能多的业务——好的业务。这样做是有成本的。

A second factor — well, it was not a factor in the P&L — but an important event in the first quarter is that we increased our float.

第二个因素——好吧，这在损益表中并不是一个因素——但在第一季度是一个重要事件，那就是我们增加了我们的浮存金。

And on the slide, I believe it shows that year-over-year, 16 billion. Fourteen billion of that came in the first quarter of this year, so we had a $14 billion increase in float.

在幻灯片上，我相信它显示出同比增长为 160 亿。其中 140 亿是在今年第一季度实现的，因此我们的浮存金增加了 140 亿。

And for some years I’ve been telling you it’s going to be hard to increase the float at all, and I still will tell you the same thing.

多年来，我一直告诉你们，增加浮存金将会非常困难，我仍然会这么说。

But it’s nice to have $14 billion or more, which is one reason, if you look at our 10-Q, you will see that our cash and cash equivalents, including Treasury bills, now has come to well over 90 billion.

但拥有 140 亿美元或更多是件好事，这也是一个原因。如果你查看我们的 10-Q，你会看到我们的现金及现金等价物，包括国库券，现在已经超过 900 亿美元。

So I think I feel very good about the first quarter, even though our operating earnings were down a little bit.

所以我认为我对第一季度感到非常满意，尽管我们的运营收益略有下降。

One quarter means nothing. I mean, over time, what really counts is whether we’re building the value of the businesses that we own.

一个季度毫无意义。我的意思是，随着时间的推移，真正重要的是我们是否在提升我们所拥有的业务的价值。

And I’m always interested in the current figures, but I’m always dreaming about the future figures.

我总是对当前的数据感兴趣，但我总是在梦想未来的数据。

3. Tribute to Vanguard’s Jack Bogle

对先锋集团的杰克·博格尔致敬

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s one more person I would like to introduce to you today, and I’m quite sure he’s here. I haven’t seen him, but I understood he was coming. There’s a — I believe that he’s made it today. And that is Jack Bogle, who I talked about in the annual report.

沃伦·巴菲特：今天我还想向大家介绍一个人，我很确定他在这里。我还没见到他，但我知道他会来。我相信他今天来了。那就是我在年报中提到的杰克·博格尔。

Jack Bogle has probably done more for the American investor than any man in the country. (Applause)

杰克·博格尔可能为美国投资者做的贡献超过了这个国家的任何人。（掌声）

And Jack, would you stand up? There he is. (Applause)

杰克，你能站起来吗？他来了。（掌声）

Jack Bogle, many years ago, he wasn’t the only one that was talking about an index fund, but he — it wouldn’t have happened without him.

杰克·博格尔很多年前，他并不是唯一一个谈论指数基金的人，但没有他，这一切都不会发生。

I mean, Paul Samuelson talked about it. Ben Graham even talked about it.

我指的是，保罗·萨缪尔森谈过这个。本·格雷厄姆甚至也谈过这个。

But the truth is, it was not in the interest of invest — of the investment industry of Wall Street. It was not in their interest, actually, to have the development of an index fund — the index fund — because it brought down fees dramatically.

但事实是，这并不符合华尔街投资行业的利益。实际上，他们并不希望指数基金的发展，因为这大幅降低了费用。

And, as we’ve talked about some in the reports, and other people have commented, index funds, overall, have delivered for shareholders a result that has been better than Wall Street professionals as a whole.

正如我们在报告中讨论过的，以及其他人所评论的，整体而言，指数基金为股东带来的回报优于华尔街专业人士的整体表现。

And part of the reason for that is that they’ve brought down the costs very significantly.

其中一个原因是他们大幅降低了成本。

So when Jack started, very few people — certainly Wall Street did not applaud him, and he was the subject of some derision and a lot of attacks.

所以当杰克开始时，很少有人——当然华尔街并没有为他喝彩，他成为了一些嘲笑和大量攻击的对象。

And now we’re talking trillions when we get into index funds, and we’re talking a few basis points when we talk about investment fees, in the case of index funds, but still hundreds of basis points when we talk about fees elsewhere.

现在当我们谈到指数基金时，我们谈论的是数万亿，而当我们谈到投资费用时，指数基金的费用只有几个基点，但在其他地方谈到的费用仍然是数百个基点。

And I estimate that Jack, at a minimum, has saved — left in the pockets of investors, without hurting them overall in terms of performance at all — gross performance — he’s put tens and tens and tens of billions into their pockets. And those numbers are going to be hundreds and hundreds of billions over time.

我估计，杰克至少为投资者节省了——在不影响他们整体表现的情况下——总表现上，他已经为他们带来了数十亿的收益。这些数字随着时间的推移将达到数百亿。

So, it’s Jack’s 88th birthday on Monday, so I just say happy birthday, Jack, and thank you on behalf of American investors. (Applause)

所以，杰克的 88 岁生日在星期一，所以我只想说生日快乐，杰克，并代表美国投资者感谢你。（掌声）

And Jack, I’ve got great news for you.

杰克，我有好消息要告诉你。

You’re going to be 88 on Monday, and in only two years you’ll be eligible for an executive position at Berkshire. (Laughter)

你周一将满 88 岁，只有两年后你就有资格担任伯克希尔的高管职位。（笑声）

Hang in there, buddy. (Laughter)

坚持住，伙计。（笑声）

4. Q&A begins

问答环节开始

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ve got a panel of expert journalists on this side, and expert analysts on that side, and expert shareholders in the middle. And we’re going to rotate, starting with the analysts. And some who are here I have a — here we go. And we will — we’ll do this through the afternoon.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们这边有一组专业记者，那边是专业分析师，中间是专业股东。我们将开始轮流提问，从分析师开始。这里有一些人，我有——开始吧。我们将持续到下午。

After we — if we get through 54 questions, which would be six for each journalist, six for each analyst, and 18 more for the audience, then we will go strictly to the audience.

在我们——如果我们完成 54 个问题，每位记者 6 个，每位分析师 6 个，观众再 18 个问题，那么我们将严格转向观众。

I don’t think I’ve got any information as to what the situation is on overflow rooms. But we’ll go to at least one of them.

我不知道分会场的情况如何。但我们至少会去其中一间。

But let’s start off with Carol Loomis of Fortune Magazine, the longest serving employee in the history of Time Inc., I believe, with 60 years. And Carol, go to it. (Applause)

但让我们先来听听《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯，我相信她是时代公司历史上任职时间最长的员工，达到了 60 年。卡罗尔，请开始吧。（掌声）

5. Loomis asks for Berkshire-related questions

卢米斯询问与伯克希尔相关的问题

CAROL LOOMIS: Thank you. Thanks from all of us journalists up here.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：谢谢你。代表我们所有在这里的记者感谢你。

I know that there are many, many people out there who have sent us questions that aren’t going to get answered. And I just want to say that it’s very hard to get a question answered.

我知道有很多人向我们提出了问题，但这些问题不会得到回答。我只想说，得到一个问题的回答是非常困难的。

The one thing I could suggest is that you follow Warren’s thought in the annual report, that he wants everybody to go away from this meeting more educated about Berkshire than they were when they came.

我唯一可以建议的是，您遵循沃伦在年报中的想法，他希望每个人在离开这次会议时对伯克希尔的了解比来时更多。

And one way you can do that is keep your questions quite directly Berkshire-related or relating to the annual letter. Even then it will be hard to get your question answered.

一种方法是让你的问题直接与伯克希尔相关或与年度信函相关。即便如此，得到你的问题的回答也会很困难。

The three of us only have 18 questions in total, but I encourage you to think in the Berkshire-related direction when you’re submitting a question next year.

我们三个人总共有 18 个问题，但我鼓励你在明年提交问题时朝着与伯克希尔相关的方向思考。

6. Wells Fargo didn’t act quickly enough to stop bad behavior

富国银行没有迅速采取行动制止不当行为

CAROL LOOMIS: Now, my first question. It’s about Wells Fargo, which is Berkshire’s largest equity holding — 28 billion at the end of the year. And this question comes from a shareholder who did not wish to be identified.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：现在，我的第一个问题。关于富国银行，这是伯克希尔最大的股权投资——年末时为 280 亿美元。这个问题来自一位不愿透露姓名的股东。

“In the wake of the sales practices scandal that last year engulfed Wells Fargo, the company’s independent directors commissioned an investigation and hired a large law firm to assist in carrying it out.

在去年卷入的富国银行销售行为丑闻之后，该公司的独立董事委托进行调查，并聘请了一家大型律师事务所协助进行调查。

“The findings of the investigation, which were harsh, have been released in what is called the Wells Fargo Sales Practices Reports.” You can find it on the internet.

调查结果非常严厉，已在所谓的富国银行销售实践报告中发布。您可以在互联网上找到它。

“It concludes that a major part of the company’s problem was that, and I quote, ‘Wells Fargo’s decentralized corporate structure gave too much autonomy to the community banks’ senior leadership,′ end of quote.

“结论是，公司问题的一个主要部分在于，我引用，‘富国银行的分散企业结构给予了社区银行高级领导过多的自主权，’引文结束。”

“Mr. Buffett, how do you satisfy yourself that Berkshire isn’t subject to the same risk, with its highly decentralized structure and the very substantial autonomy given to senior leadership of the operating companies?”

“巴菲特先生，您如何确保伯克希尔不会面临相同的风险，考虑到其高度分散的结构以及给予运营公司高级领导的相当大的自主权？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s true that we at Berkshire probably operate on as — we certainly operate on a more decentralized plan than any company of remotely our size.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，确实我们在伯克希尔的运作方式比任何规模相近的公司都更加分散。

And we count very heavily on principles of behavior rather than loads of rules.

我们非常依赖行为原则，而不是大量的规则。

It’s one reason at every annual meeting you see that Salomon description. And it’s why I write very few communiqués to our managers, but I send them one once every two years and it basically says that we’ve got all the money we need. We’d like to have more, but we’re — it’s not a necessity.

这就是为什么在每年的会议上你会看到那个Salomon的陈述。这也是我很少给我们的经理写公报的原因，但我每两年会给他们发一次，内容基本上是我们有足够的钱。我们希望能有更多，但这并不是必要的。

But we don’t have one ounce of reputation more than we need, and that our reputation at Berkshire is in their hands.

但我们没有一盎司的声誉超过我们的需要，我们在伯克希尔的声誉掌握在他们手中。

And Charlie and I believe that if you establish the right sort of culture, and that culture, to some extent, self-selects who you obtain as directors and as managers, that you will get better results that way in terms of behavior than if you have a thousand-page guidebook.

查理和我相信，如果你建立了正确的文化，而这种文化在某种程度上会自我选择你获得的董事和经理，那么在行为方面，你将获得比拥有一本千页的指南更好的结果。

You’re going to have problems regardless. We have 367,000, I believe, employees. Now, if you have a town with 367,000 households, which is about what the Omaha metropolitan area is, people are doing something wrong as we talk here today. There’s no question about it.

无论如何你都会遇到问题。我相信我们有 367,000 名员工。如果你有一个有 367,000 个家庭的城镇，这大约就是奥马哈大都市区的情况，那么人们在我们今天谈话时做错了什么。这毫无疑问。

And the real question is whether the managers at — [audio drops out] — are in a better — are worrying and thinking about finding and correcting any bad behavior, and whether, if they fail in that, whether the message gets to Omaha, and whether we do something about it.

真正的问题是——[音频中断]——的管理者是否在更好地关注和思考寻找并纠正任何不当行为，以及如果他们未能做到这一点，信息是否会传达到奥马哈，以及我们是否会对此采取行动。

At Wells Fargo, you know, there were three very significant mistakes, but there was one that dwarfs all of the others.

在富国银行，你知道，有三个非常重大的错误，但有一个错误远远超过其他所有错误。

You’re going to have incentive systems at any business — almost any business. There’s nothing wrong with incentive systems, but you’ve got to be very careful what you incentivize. And you can’t incentivize bad behavior. And if so, you better have a system for recognizing it.

在任何企业中，几乎都会有激励系统。激励系统本身没有问题，但你必须非常小心你所激励的内容。你不能激励不良行为。如果这样的话，你最好有一个识别它的系统。

Clearly, at Wells Fargo, there was an incentive system built around the idea of cross-selling and number of services per customer. And the company, in every quarterly investor presentation, highlighted how many services per customer. So, it was the focus of the organization — a major focus.

显然，在富国银行，有一个围绕交叉销售和每位客户服务数量的激励系统。公司在每次季度投资者演示中都强调每位客户的服务数量。因此，这成为了组织的重点——一个主要的重点。

And undoubtedly, people got paid and graded and promoted based on that number — at least partly based on that number.

毫无疑问，人们的薪酬、评级和晋升部分是基于这个数字的。

Well, it turned out that that was incentivizing the wrong kind of behavior.

好吧，结果证明那是在激励错误的行为。

We’ve made similar mistakes. I mean any company’s going to make some mistakes in designing a system.

我们也犯过类似的错误。我的意思是，任何公司在设计系统时都会犯一些错误。

But it’s a mistake. And you’re going to find out about it at some point. And I’ll get to how we find out about it.

但这是一个错误。你总会在某个时候发现它。我会告诉你我们是如何发现这个错误的。

But the biggest mistake was that — and I don’t know — obviously don’t know all the facts as to how the information got passed up the line at Wells Fargo.

但最大的错误是——我不知道——显然不知道所有关于信息是如何在富国银行上传递的事实。

But at some point, if there’s a major problem, the CEO will get wind of it. And that is — at that moment, that’s the key to everything, because the CEO has to act.

但在某个时刻，如果出现重大问题，首席执行官会察觉到。这一刻就是一切的关键，因为首席执行官必须采取行动。

That Salomon situation that you saw happened because of — on April, I think, 28th, the CEO of Salomon, the president of Salomon, the general counsel of Salomon, sat in a room and they had described to them, by a fellow named John Meriwether, some bad practice, terrible practice, that was being conducted by a fellow named Paul Mozer, who worked for them.

那个你看到的 Salomon 事件发生是因为——在四月，我想是 28 号，Salomon 的首席执行官、Salomon 的总裁和 Salomon 的总法律顾问坐在一个房间里，他们被一个名叫 John Meriwether 的人描述了一些不良行为，糟糕的行为，这些行为是由一个名叫 Paul Mozer 的人进行的，他为他们工作。

And Paul Mozer was flimflamming the United States Treasury, which is a very dumb thing to do. And he was doing it partly out of spite, because he didn’t like the Treasury and they didn’t like him. So he put in phony bids for U.S. Treasurys and all of that.

保罗·莫泽在欺骗美国财政部，这是一件非常愚蠢的事情。他这样做部分是出于怨恨，因为他不喜欢财政部，而财政部也不喜欢他。因此，他提交了虚假的美国国债投标，诸如此类。

So on April 28th, roughly, the CEO and all these people knew that they had something that had gone very wrong, and they had to report it to the Federal Reserve Board in New York — the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

所以在 4 月 28 日左右，首席执行官和所有这些人都知道他们遇到了非常严重的问题，他们必须向纽约联邦储备委员会报告——纽约联邦储备银行。

And the CEO, John Gutfreund, said he would do it, and then he didn’t do it. And he undoubtedly put it off just because it was an unpleasant thing to do.

首席执行官约翰·古特弗伦德说他会做到，然后他没有做到。他无疑是因为这是一件不愉快的事情而推迟了。

And then on May 15th, another Treasury auction was held, and Paul Mozer put in a bunch of phony bids again.

然后在 5 月 15 日，举行了另一场财政拍卖，保罗·莫泽再次提交了一堆虚假的竞标。

And at this point, it’s all over, because the top management had known ahead of time, and now a guy that was a pyromaniac had gone out and lit another fire. And he lit it after they’d been warned that he was a pyromaniac, essentially.

到此为止，一切都结束了，因为高层管理人员事先就知道了，而现在一个纵火狂又出去点燃了另一场火。他在被警告他是纵火狂之后点燃了这场火。

And it all went downhill from there. It had to stop when the CEO learns about it.

一切从那里开始变得不可收拾。当 CEO 了解到这一切时，事情必须停止。

And then they made a third mistake, actually, but again, it pales in comparison to the second mistake.

然后他们实际上犯了第三个错误，但与第二个错误相比，这个错误显得微不足道。

They made a third mistake when they totally underestimated the impact of what they had done once it became uncovered, because they — there was a penalty of 185 million. And in the banking business, people get fined billions and billions of dollars for mortgage practices and all kinds of things.

他们在完全低估了事情被揭露后所造成的影响时犯了第三个错误，因为他们——有一个 1.85 亿美元的罚款。在银行业务中，人们因抵押贷款行为和各种其他事情被罚款数十亿美元。

The total fines against the big banks, I don’t know whether the total’s 30 or 40 or a billion or whatever the number may be.

对大银行的总罚款，我不知道总数是 30 还是 40，还是十亿，或者其他任何数字。

So, they measured the seriousness of the problem by the dimensions of the fine. And they thought $185 million fine signaled a less offensive practice than something involved 2 billion, and they were totally wrong on that.

因此，他们通过罚款的金额来衡量问题的严重性。他们认为 1.85 亿美元的罚款表明这种行为比涉及 20 亿美元的行为更不严重，但他们对此完全错误。

But the main problem was they didn’t act when they learned about it. It was bad enough having a bad system, but they didn’t act.

但主要问题是他们在得知此事后没有采取行动。拥有一个糟糕的系统已经够糟糕了，但他们没有采取行动。

At Berkshire, we have — the main source of information for me about anything that’s being done wrong at a subsidiary is the hotline. Now, we got 4,000 or so hotline reports — or that come — we get communications on the hotline — perhaps 4,000 times a year.

在伯克希尔，我主要的信息来源是热线，关于任何子公司做错的事情。现在，我们每年大约收到 4000 个热线报告——或者说——我们在热线上的沟通大约有 4000 次。

And most of them are frivolous. You know, the guy next to me has bad breath or something like that. I mean it’s — (laughter) — but there are a few serious ones, and the head of our internal audit, Becki Amick, looks at all those. People — a lot of them come in anonymous, probably most of them.

而且大多数都是无关紧要的。你知道，坐在我旁边的家伙口臭或者类似的事情。我是说——（笑声）——但也有一些严肃的，负责我们内部审计的贝基·阿米克会查看所有这些。人们——很多人都是匿名的，可能大多数都是。

And some of them, she refers back to the companies, probably most of them. And — but anything that looks serious, you know, I will hear about, and that has led to action — well, put it, more than once.

她提到其中一些公司，可能大多数都是。还有——但任何看起来严重的事情，你知道，我会听说的，这导致了行动——好吧，超过一次。

And we’ve spent real money investigating some of those. We put special investigators, sometimes, on them. And, like I say, it has uncovered certain practices that we would not at all condone at the parent company.

我们确实花了真金白银来调查其中一些问题。有时我们会派专门的调查员去处理这些事情。正如我所说，这揭露了一些我们在母公司绝对不容忍的做法。

I think it’s a good system. I don’t think it’s perfect. I don’t know what — I’m sure they’ve got an internal audit at Wells Fargo, and I’m sure they’ve got a hotline.

我认为这是一个好的系统。我不认为它是完美的。我不知道——我相信富国银行有内部审计，我相信他们有热线。

And I don’t know the facts, but I would just have to bet that a lot of communications came in on that, and I don’t know what their system was for getting them to the right person. And I don’t know who did what at any given time.

我不知道具体情况，但我只能猜测有很多沟通在这方面发生，我不知道他们的系统是如何将这些信息传递给正确的人的。我也不知道在任何特定时间是谁做了什么。

But that was — it was a huge, huge, huge error if they were getting — and I’m sure they were — getting some communications and they ignored them, or they just sent them back down to somebody down below.

但那是——如果他们收到了——我相信他们收到了——一些通讯并且忽视了它们，或者只是把它们发回给下面的某个人，那就是一个巨大的、巨大的、巨大的错误。

Charlie? You’ve followed it. What are your thoughts on it?

查理？你已经关注它了。你对此有什么想法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, put me down as skeptical when some law firm thinks they know how to fix something like this.

查理·芒格：好吧，当某个律师事务所认为他们知道如何解决这样的事情时，把我算作持怀疑态度。

If you’re in a business where you have a whole a lot of people under incentives very likely to cause a lot of misbehavior, of course you need a big compliance department.

如果你在一个有很多人受到激励的行业，这很可能会导致很多不当行为，当然你需要一个庞大的合规部门。

Every big wirehouse stock brokerage firm has a huge compliance department. And if we had one, we would have a big compliance department too, wouldn’t we, Warren?

每家大型证券经纪公司都有一个庞大的合规部门。如果我们有一个，我们也会有一个大合规部门，对吧，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely.

沃伦·巴菲特：绝对是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely, but doesn’t mean that everybody should try and solve their problems with more and more compliance.

查理·芒格：当然，但这并不意味着每个人都应该通过更多的合规来解决他们的问题。

I think we’ve had less trouble over the years by being more careful in whom we pick to have power and having a culture of trust. I think we have less trouble, not more.

我认为多年来我们通过更加谨慎地选择掌权者和建立信任文化，减少了麻烦。我认为我们遇到的麻烦更少，而不是更多。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we will have trouble from time to time.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们会时不时遇到麻烦。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, of course. We’ll be blindsided someday.

查理·芒格：是的，当然。我们总有一天会被蒙在鼓里。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie says an ounce of prevention — he said when Ben Franklin, who he worships, said, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” he understated it. An ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理说预防胜于治疗——他说当他崇拜的本·富兰克林说“预防胜于治疗”时，他低估了这一点。预防的价值远超过治疗。

And I would say a pound of cure, promptly applied, is worth a ton of cure that’s delayed. It — problems don’t go away.

我会说，及时采取一磅的治疗，胜过延迟的吨位治疗。问题不会自行消失。

John Gutfreund said that problem, originally, was — he called it a traffic ticket. He told the troops there at Salomon it was a traffic ticket. You know, and it almost brought down a business.

约翰·古特弗伦德说，问题最初是——他称之为交通罚单。他告诉在所罗门的团队，这是一张交通罚单。你知道，这几乎让一个企业垮掉。

Some other CEO, that they described the problem that he’d encountered as a foot fault. You know, and it resulted in incredible damage to the institution.

还有其他CEO，他们描述他们遇到的问题是一个“脚步错误”，结果对公司造成了不可估量的损害。

And so you’ve got to act promptly. And frankly, I don’t know any better system than hotlines and anonymous letters to me. I get anonymous letters. And I’ve gotten three or four of them probably in the last six or seven years that have resulted in major changes.

所以你必须迅速行动。坦率地说，我不知道还有什么比热线和匿名信更好的系统了。我收到过匿名信。在过去六七年里，我大概收到了三四封，这些信导致了重大变化。

And very, very occasionally they’re signed. Almost always they’re anonymous, but it wouldn’t make any difference, because there were — will be no retribution against anybody, obviously, if they call our attention to something that’s going wrong.

而且非常非常偶尔它们会被签名。几乎总是匿名的，但这并没有什么区别，因为如果他们提醒我们注意到某些错误的事情，显然不会对任何人进行报复。

But I will tell you, as we sit here, somebody is doing — quite a few people — are probably doing something wrong at Berkshire, and usually, it’s very limited. I mean maybe stealing small amounts of money or something like that.

但我告诉你，当我们坐在这里时，有人——相当多人——可能在伯克希尔做错了事，通常这很有限。我是说，也许是偷了一小笔钱或类似的事情。

But when it gets to some sales practice like was taking place at Wells Fargo, you can see the kind of damage it would do.

但是当涉及到像在富国银行发生的某些销售行为时，你可以看到它会造成的损害。

7. Driverless vehicles would hurt BNSF and GEICO

无人驾驶车辆将对 BNSF 和 GEICO 造成伤害

WARREN BUFFETT: We will now shift over to the analysts and Jonny Brandt.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们现在将转到分析师和乔尼·布兰特。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. Thanks for having me.

乔纳森·布兰特：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。谢谢你们邀请我。

You’ve addressed the risk of driverless cars to GEICO’s business. But it strikes me that driverless trucks could narrow the cost advantage of railroads, even if the number of crew members in a locomotive eventually declines from two to zero.

您已经提到了无人驾驶汽车对 GEICO 业务的风险。但我认为，无人驾驶卡车可能会缩小铁路的成本优势，即使机车上的乘员数量最终从两个减少到零。

Is autonomous technology more of an opportunity or more of a threat for the Burlington Northern?

自主技术对伯灵顿北方来说是更多的机会还是更多的威胁？

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I would say that driverless trucks are a lot more of a threat than an opportunity — (laughs) — to the Burlington Northern.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我会说无司机卡车对伯灵顿北方铁路来说更多的是一种威胁而不是机会——（笑）——。

And I would say that if driverless cars became pervasive, it would only be because they were safer. And that would mean that the overall economic cost of auto-related losses had gone down, and that would drive down the premium income of GEICO.

我想说，如果无人驾驶汽车变得普遍，那只是因为它们更安全。这意味着与汽车相关的损失的整体经济成本已经下降，这将导致 GEICO 的保费收入减少。

So, I would say both of those — and autonomous vehicles — widespread — would hurt us if they went — if they spread to trucks, and they would hurt our auto insurance business.

所以，我想说这两者——以及自动驾驶汽车——如果普及到卡车，会对我们造成伤害，并且会对我们的汽车保险业务造成影响。

I think my personal view is that they will certainly come. I think they may be a long way off, but that will depend. It’ll probably, frankly, depend on experience in the first early months of the introduction in other than test situations.

我个人认为他们肯定会来。我认为他们可能还需要很长时间，但这要看情况。坦率地说，这可能主要取决于在非测试环境中引入的最初几个月的经验。

And if they make the world safer, it’s going to be a very good thing, but it won’t be a good thing for auto insurers.

如果他们让世界变得更安全，那将是一件非常好的事情，但这对汽车保险公司来说却不是好事。

And similarly, if they learn how to move trucks more safely, there’s a — tends to be driver shortages in the truck business now — it obviously improves their position vis-à-vis the railroads.

同样，如果他们学会如何更安全地驾驶卡车，卡车行业现在普遍存在司机短缺——这显然改善了他们与铁路公司的竞争地位。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s perfectly clear. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这非常清楚。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Finally, approval. All these years. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：终于，获得了批准。这些年来。（笑）

8. Buying See’s Candies from someone who preferred “girls and grapes”

从一个喜欢“女孩和葡萄酒”的人那里购买 See's 糖果

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1. The shareholder.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第一站。股东。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. My name is Bryan Martin and I’m from Springfield, Illinois.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我叫布莱恩·马丁，来自伊利诺伊州斯普林菲尔德。

In the HBO documentary, “Becoming Warren Buffett,” you had a great analogy comparing investing to hitting a baseball and knowing your sweet spot.

在 HBO 纪录片《成为沃伦·巴菲特》中，你用一个很好的类比将投资比作击打棒球，并了解你的最佳击球点。

Ted Williams knew his sweet spot was a pitch right down the middle. When both of you look at potential investments, what attributes make a company a pitch in your sweet spot that you’ll take a swing at and invest in?

泰德·威廉姆斯知道他的最佳击球点是正中间的投球。当你们两个人看待潜在投资时，哪些特征使一家公司成为你们愿意出手投资的最佳选择？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m not sure I can define it in exactly the terms you would like, but the — we sort of know it when we see it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不确定我能否用你想要的确切术语来定义它，但我们在看到它时大致知道。

And it would tend to be a business that, for one reason or another, we can look out five, or 10, or 20 years and decide that the competitive advantage that it had at the present would last over that period.

这将倾向于成为一个业务，出于某种原因，我们可以展望五年、十年或二十年，并决定它目前所拥有的竞争优势将在这一时期内持续。

And it would have a trusted manager that would not only fit into the Berkshire culture, but that was eager to join the Berkshire culture. And then it would be a matter of price.

它将有一个值得信赖的经理，不仅能够融入伯克希尔的文化，而且渴望加入伯克希尔的文化。然后这就只是一个价格的问题。

But the main — you know, when we buy a business, essentially, we’re laying out a lot of money now based on what we think that business will deliver over time. And the higher the certainty with which we make that prediction, the better off — the better we feel about it.

但主要是——你知道，当我们收购一家公司时，实际上，我们现在投入了很多资金，基于我们对这家公司未来表现的预期。而我们对这个预测的确定性越高，我们就越感到满意。

You can go back to the first — it wasn’t the first outstanding business we bought, but it was kind of a watershed event — which was a relatively small company, See’s Candy.

你可以回到第一个——这并不是我们购买的第一个杰出企业，但它算是一个分水岭事件——那是一家相对较小的公司，See’s Candy。

And the question when we looked at See’s Candy in 1972 was, would people still want to be both eating and giving away that candy in preference to other candies?

当我们在 1972 年审视 See's Candy 时，问题是人们是否仍然愿意吃和赠送这种糖果，而不是选择其他糖果？

定性分析。

And it wouldn’t be a question of people buying candy for the low bid. And we had a manager we liked very much. And we bought a business that was — paid $25 million for it, net of cash, and it was earning about 4 million pretax then. And we must be getting close to $2 billion or something like that, pretax, that was taken out of it.

这不仅仅是人们是否愿意以最低价格购买糖果。我们当时有一个我们非常喜欢的经理。我们为它支付了2500万美元（扣除现金），当时它赚了大约400万美元税前利润。现在我们可能已经从中获得了接近20亿美元的税前利润。

But it was only because we felt that people would not be buying, necessarily, a lower-price candy.

但这只是因为我们觉得人们不会仅仅因为价格低而购买糖果。

I mean it does not work very well if you go to your wife or your girlfriend on Valentine’s Day — I hope they’re the same person — (laughter) — and say, you know, “Here’s a box of candy, honey. I took the low bid.” You know, it doesn’t — it loses a little as you go through that speech.

我意思是，如果你在情人节去找你的妻子或女朋友——我希望她们是同一个人——（笑）——然后说：“亲爱的，这是一盒糖果。我选择了最低的报价。”这并不好——在你说完这番话后，它的分量就减轻了一些。

And we made a judgment about See’s Candy that it would be special and — probably not in the year 2017 — but we certainly thought it would be special in 1982 and 1992. And fortunately, we were right on it. And we’re looking for more See’s Candies, only a lot bigger.

我们对 See's Candy 做出了判断，它会是特别的——可能不是在 2017 年——但我们确实认为在 1982 年和 1992 年它会是特别的。幸运的是，我们的判断是正确的。我们正在寻找更多的 See's Candy，只是规模更大。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, but it’s also true that we were young and ignorant then. And —

查理·芒格：是的，不过那时我们也年轻无知。而且——

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re old and ignorant. Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们老了，愚蠢了。是的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And yes, that’s true, too.

查理·芒格：是的，这也是真的。

And the truth of the matter is that it would have been very wise to buy See’s Candy at a slightly higher price. You know if they’d asked it, we wouldn’t have done it, so we’ve gotten a lot of credit for being smarter than we were.

事实上，如果我们当时以稍高的价格购买See’s Candies，那会非常明智。如果他们开价更高，我们也许不会买。所以我们得到很多赞誉，实际上并没有那么聪明。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and to be more accurate, if it had been 5 million more, I wouldn’t have bought it. Charlie would have been willing to buy it, so, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，更准确地说，如果多了 500 万，我就不会买了。查理会愿意买，所以，是的。

Fortunately, that we didn’t get to the point where we had to make that decision that way. But he would’ve pushed forward when I probably would’ve faded.

幸运的是，我们没有到必须以那种方式做出决定的地步。但他会继续前进，而我可能会退缩。

It’s a good thing that a guy came around — actually the seller was the — well, he’s the grandson of Mrs. See, wasn’t he, Charlie? He was Larry See’s son. Am I correct? Or Larry See’s brother.

有一个人来找我们——实际上卖方是——嗯，他是Mrs. See的孙子，不是吗，查理？他是Larry See的儿子。没错？或者是Larry See的兄弟。

But he was not interested in the business. And he was interested in — more interested in girls and grapes, actually. And he almost changed his mind. Well, he did change his mind about selling.

但他对这个生意不感兴趣。他对——更多地对女孩和葡萄酒感兴趣。他几乎改变了主意，嗯，他确实改变了关于出售的主意。

And I wasn’t there, but Rick Guerin told me that Charlie went in and gave a — an hour talk on the merits of girls and grapes over having a candy company. (Laughter)

我不在场，但里克·盖林告诉我，查理进去进行了一个小时的演讲，讲述了女孩和葡萄酒的优点，胜过拥有一家糖果公司。（笑声）

This is true, folks. And the fellow sold to us, so that — (laughter) — I pull Charlie out in emergencies like that. He’s — (Laughter)

这是真的，伙计们。那家伙卖给我们，所以——（笑声）——我在这种紧急情况下把查理拉出来。他——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We were very lucky that, early, the habit of buying horrible businesses because they were really cheap. It gave us a lot of experience trying to fix unfixable businesses as they headed downward toward doom.

查理·芒格：我们早期购买那些非常便宜的糟糕业务的习惯给了我们很多修复无可救药的业务的经验，它们正向毁灭之路前进。

And that early experience was so horrible, fixing the unfixable, that we were very good at avoiding it, thereafter. So, I would argue that our early stupidity helped us.

而那段早期的经历是如此可怕，修复那些无法修复的事情，以至于我们此后非常擅长避免它。因此，我认为我们的早期愚蠢帮助了我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. We learned we could not make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。我们学到我们无法把猪耳朵变成丝绸钱包。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we learned —

查理·芒格：不，我们学到了——

WARREN BUFFETT: So, we went out looking for silk after that.

沃伦·巴菲特：所以，我们之后开始寻找丝绸。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But you have to try it for a long time and fail and have rub — have your nose rubbed in it to really understand it.

查理·芒格：但你必须长时间尝试并失败，经历挫折，才能真正理解它。

9. “There are going to be marauders” at the moat

“护城河上会有掠夺者。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky? Becky Quick.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？贝基·奎克。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a shareholder named Mark Blakley in Tulsa, Oklahoma, who says, “There has been more news than usual in some of Berkshire’s core stock holdings.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的一位股东马克·布莱克利，他说：“在伯克希尔的一些核心股票持有中，新闻比平常多。”

“Wells Fargo in the incentive and new account scandal, American Express losing the Costco relationship and playing catch-up in the premium card space, United Airlines and customer service issues, Coca-Cola and slowing soda consumption.

“富国银行在激励和新账户丑闻中，美国运通失去与好市多的关系并在高端信用卡领域追赶，联合航空和客户服务问题，可口可乐和碳酸饮料消费放缓。”

“How much time is spent reviewing Berkshire’s stock holdings? And is it safe to assume, if Berkshire continues to hold these stocks, that the thesis remains intact?”

“伯克希尔对其股票持有的审查花费了多少时间？如果伯克希尔继续持有这些股票，是否可以安全地假设其投资论点仍然有效？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we spend a lot of time think — those are very large holdings. If you add up American Express, Coca-Cola, and Wells Fargo, I mean, you’re getting up, you know, well into the high tens of billions of dollars. And those are businesses we like very much. There’re different characteristics.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们花了很多时间思考——这些都是非常大的持股。如果你把美国运通、可口可乐和富国银行加起来，我的意思是，你会发现，金额已经达到数百亿美元。而这些都是我们非常喜欢的业务。它们有不同的特点。

In the case of — you mentioned United Airlines, we actually are the largest holder of all four of the — we’re the largest holder of the four largest airlines. And that is much more of an industry thought.

在您提到的美国联合航空的情况下，我们实际上是四大航空公司中最大的持有者。我们是四大航空公司的最大持有者。这更多的是一个行业的看法。

But all businesses have problems. And some of them have some very big plusses.

但所有企业都有问题。而其中一些企业有一些非常大的优势。

I personally — you mentioned American Express. If you read American Express’s first quarter report and talk about their Platinum Card, the Platinum Card is doing very well.

我个人——你提到了美国运通。如果你阅读美国运通的第一季度报告并谈论他们的白金卡，白金卡的表现非常好。

The gains around the world. You know, I think there were 17 percent or something like that in billings in the U.K. and 15 percent is original currency — or the local currency — Japan, Mexico, and very good in the United States.

全球的收益。你知道，我认为英国的账单增长了 17%左右，而日本、墨西哥的本币增长了 15%，美国的表现也非常好。

There’s competition in all these businesses. If we thought — we did not buy American Express or Wells Fargo or United Airlines, Coca-Cola, with the idea that they would never have problems or never have competition.

所有这些行业都有竞争。如果我们认为——我们购买美国运通、富国银行、联合航空、可口可乐，并不是因为我们认为它们永远不会有问题或永远不会有竞争。

What we did buy — why we did buy them — is we thought they had very, very strong hands. And we liked the financial policies in the cases of many of them. We liked their position.

我们所购买的——我们为什么购买它们——是因为我们认为它们的实力非常强大。而且我们喜欢它们中的许多公司的财务政策。我们喜欢它们的地位。

We’ve bought a lot of businesses. And we do look to see where we think they have durable competitive advantage.

我们购买了很多企业。我们确实会关注它们是否具有持久的竞争优势。

And we recognize that if you’ve got a very good business, you’re going to have plenty of competitors that are going to try and take it away from you. And then you make a judgment as to the ability of your particular company and product and management to ward off competitors.

我们认识到，如果你有一个非常好的生意，你将会有很多竞争对手试图从你手中夺走它。然后你会判断你所在公司、产品和管理层抵御竞争对手的能力。

They won’t go away, but the — we think — I’m not going to get into specific names on it — but those companies generally are very well-positioned.

他们不会消失，但我们认为——我不打算具体提到名字——但那些公司通常处于非常有利的位置。

I’ve likened essentially — if you’ve got a wonderful business, even if it was a small one like See’s Candy, you basically have an economic castle. And in capitalism, people are going to try and take away that castle from you.

我基本上把它比作——如果你有一个很棒的生意，即使它像 See's Candy 那样小，你基本上就拥有了一座经济城堡。在资本主义中，人们会试图从你那里夺走这座城堡。

So, you want a moat around it, protecting it in various ways that can protect it. And then you want a knight in the castle that’s pretty darn good at warding off marauders. But there are going to be marauders. And they’ll never go away.

所以，你想要在周围挖一条护城河，以各种方式保护它。然后你希望城堡里有一个非常擅长抵御掠夺者的骑士。但掠夺者会出现，而且他们永远不会消失。

And if you look at — I think Coca-Cola was 1886. American Express was 18 — I don’t know — ’51 or ’52 — starting out with an express business.

如果你看看——我认为可口可乐是 1886 年。美国运通是 18——我不知道——'51 或'52——以快递业务起步。

Wells Fargo was — I don’t know what year they were started. Incidentally, I — American Express was started by [Henry] Wells and [William] Fargo as well.

富国银行成立于——我不知道他们是什么时候成立的。顺便提一下，我——美国运通也是由[亨利]韦尔斯和[威廉]法戈创办的。

So these companies had lots of challenges. And they’ll have more challenges. And the companies we own have had challenges.

所以这些公司面临了很多挑战。它们将面临更多挑战。我们拥有的公司也经历了挑战。

Our insurance business has had challenges. But, you know, we started with National Indemnity’s $8 million purchase in 1968. And fortunately, we’ve had people like Tony Nicely at GEICO. And we’ve had Ajit Jain, who’s added tens of billions of value.

我们的保险业务面临了一些挑战。但是，你知道，我们从 1968 年国家赔偿公司 800 万美元的收购开始。幸运的是，我们有像托尼·尼克利这样的 GEICO 员工。还有阿吉特·贾因，他为我们增加了数百亿美元的价值。

And we’ve got some smaller companies that you probably don’t even know about, but really have done a terrific job for us.

我们还有一些你可能甚至不知道的小公司，但他们为我们做得非常出色。

So there’ll always be competition in insurance, but there’ll always be things to do that a really intelligent management with a decent distribution system, various things going for him, can do to ward off the marauders.

所以保险行业总会有竞争，但总会有一些事情可以做，一个真正聪明的管理者配合良好的分销系统，以及其他各种有利条件，可以采取措施来抵御掠夺者。

So I — there was a specific question, “How much time is spent reviewing the holdings?” I would say that I do it every day. I’m sure Charlie does it every day.

所以我——有一个具体的问题，“花多少时间来审查持有的资产？”我会说我每天都这样做。我相信查理也每天都这样做。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think I had anything to add to that, either. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我觉得我也没有什么可以补充的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll cut his salary if he doesn’t participate here. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果他不参与这里，我们就会削减他的薪水。（笑声）

10. “We think we’ll do well” with AIG reinsurance deal

“我们认为与 AIG 的再保险交易会做得很好”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jay Gelb.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，杰伊·盖尔布。

JAY GELB: This question is on Berkshire’s retroactive reinsurance deal with AIG, which was the largest ever of its kind.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于伯克希尔与美国国际集团（AIG）之间的追溯再保险交易，这是有史以来最大的一笔。

Based on AIG’s track record of reserve deficiencies and the opportunity for Berkshire to invest the float, what is your level of confidence that this contract covering up to $20 billion of AIG’s reserves in return for $10 billion of premiums will ultimately be profitable for Berkshire?

基于 AIG 在准备金不足方面的记录以及伯克希尔投资浮存金的机会，您对这份合同的信心有多大？该合同涵盖高达 200 亿美元的 AIG 准备金，换取 100 亿美元的保费，最终对伯克希尔来说会盈利吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, at the time we do every deal, I think it’s smart. And then sometimes — (laughs) — I find out otherwise as we go along.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，在我们做每一笔交易的时候，我认为这是明智的。有时候——（笑）——随着时间的推移，我发现情况并非如此。

The deal, that Jay knows, but might be unfamiliar to many people, is that AIG transferred to us the liability for 80 percent of 25 billion — excess — of 25 billion.

这笔交易，Jay知道，但对许多人来说可能不熟悉，是 AIG 将 250 亿中 80%的责任转移给我们——超出 250 亿的部分。

In other words, they had to pay the first 25 billion. And then on the next 25 billion, we had to pay 80 percent of what they paid up to a limit of 20 billion, 80 percent of 25. And we got paid $10.2 billion for that.

换句话说，他们必须支付前 250 亿美元。然后在接下来的 250 亿美元中，我们必须支付他们支付金额的 80%，上限为 200 亿美元，即 250 亿美元的 80%。我们因此获得了 102 亿美元的支付。

And we had — and this applies to their losses in many classes of business written — or earned — before December 31st, 2015.

我们有——这适用于他们在 2015 年 12 月 31 日之前所承保或赚取的许多业务类别的损失。

So Ajit Jain, who has made a lot more money for Berkshire than I — for you — than I have, but he evaluates that sort of transaction.

所以阿吉特·贾因为伯克希尔赚了比我多得多的钱——为你们——比我赚得多，但他会评估那种交易。

We talk about it a fair amount ourselves. I just find it interesting. I particularly find the 10.2 billion that they’re going to give us interesting.

我们自己也谈论了很多。我觉得这很有趣。我特别觉得他们要给我们的 102 亿很有趣。

And the — we come to the conclusion that we think we’ll do well by getting 10.2 billion today with a maximum payout of 20 billion over some — I mean, between now and judgment day — on this large piece of business.

我们得出结论，认为今天获得 102 亿是明智的，最大支付额为 200 亿，时间跨度是从现在到审判日——在这笔大生意上。

AIG had very good reasons for doing this, because their reserves had been under criticism. And this essentially — probably — and should have, I think — put to bed the question of whether they were underreserved on that business. And we get the 10.2 billion.

AIG 这样做是有充分理由的，因为他们的储备一直受到批评。这基本上——可能——应该，我认为——解决了他们在该业务上是否储备不足的问题。我们得到了 102 亿美元。

And the question is how fast we pay out the money and how much money we pay out. And Ajit does 99 percent of the thinking on that. And I do one percent. And we project out what we think will happen.

问题是我们支付资金的速度有多快，以及我们支付多少资金。Ajit 在这方面思考了 99%。而我只占 1%。我们预测我们认为会发生的事情。

And we know whatever our projection is, that it will be wrong, but we try to be conservative.

我们知道无论我们的预测是什么，它都会是错误的，但我们尽量保持谨慎。

And we’ve done a fair amount of these deals. This is the largest. The second largest was a creature that was formed out of Lloyd’s of London some years ago.

我们已经完成了相当多的这些交易。这是最大的。第二大的是几年前由伦敦Lloyd’s形成的一个实体。

And we’ve been wrong on one transaction that involved something over a billion of premium. I mean clearly wrong.

我们在一笔涉及超过十亿保费的交易上犯了错误。我是说，显然是错误的。

And there are a couple of others that may or may not work out depending on what you assume we have earned on the funds. But they’re OK.

还有其他几个可能会有效，也可能不会有效，这取决于你假设我们在资金上赚了多少。但它们还不错。

But they probably didn’t come out as well as we thought they would, though. But overall, we’ve done OK on this.

但他们可能没有我们想象的那么好。不过总体来说，我们在这方面做得还不错。

It’s less OK when we’re sitting around with 90-plus billion of cash. So the incremental 10.2 billion we took in in the first quarter is earning us peanuts at the moment. And peanuts is not what fits into the formula for making this an attractive deal.

当我们手头有超过 900 亿现金时，这就不太好了。因此，我们在第一季度获得的额外 102 亿目前为我们带来的收益微不足道。而微不足道的收益并不符合让这笔交易变得有吸引力的公式。

So we have — we do have to assume we’ll find uses of the money, but the money will be with us quite a while. And I think our calculations are on the conservative side. They are not the identical calculations that AIG makes. I mean, we come up with our own estimate of payouts and all of that.

所以我们必须假设我们会找到资金的用途，但这笔钱会陪伴我们相当长一段时间。我认为我们的计算是比较保守的。它们并不是 AIG 所做的相同计算。我的意思是，我们会得出自己对赔付等的估计。

And I think it — actually, I think it was quite a good transaction from AIG’s standpoint. Because they did take 20 billion of potential losses off for 10.2 billion.

我认为这实际上是 AIG 的一个相当不错的交易。因为他们以 102 亿美元的价格消除了 200 亿美元的潜在损失。

And I think they satisfied the investing community that they were quite unlikely to have adverse development in the period prior to 2015 that was not accounted for by this transaction.

我认为他们向投资界证明了，他们在2015年之前的这段时间内不太可能有未被这笔交易考虑到的不利发展。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s intrinsically a dangerous kind of activity. And — but that’s one of its attractions. I don’t think there are any two people in the world that are better at this kind of transaction than Ajit and Warren.

查理·芒格：我认为这本质上是一种危险的活动。不过，这也是它的吸引力之一。我认为世界上没有两个人比阿吉特和沃伦更擅长这种交易。

And nobody else has had the experience we’ve had. Just get me in a lot more of those businesses and I’ll accept a little extra worry.

而且没有其他人有过我们这样的经历。只要让我参与更多这样的业务，我就愿意接受一点额外的担忧。

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s one thing I should mention, too, that we actually were the only insurance operation in the world that would write that sort of a contract and that — where it would be satisfactory to the other party.

沃伦·巴菲特：我还应该提到一件事，我们实际上是世界上唯一一家愿意签订那种合同的保险公司，并且这对另一方是令人满意的。

I mean, when somebody hands you $10.2 billion and says, “I’m counting on you to pay 20 billion back, even if it’s 50 years from now, on the last dollar,” there are very few people that they’d want to hand 10.2 billion to. And there —

就是说，当有人给你102亿美元，并说：“我希望你支付200亿美元，即使是50年后，也要支付最后一美元”，没有多少人会愿意把102亿美元交给他们。

So it’s a — there’s limited people on the other side. I mean, there’s not that many people remotely that have that kind of size deal. But —

所以，另一方的选择非常有限。也就是说，很少有人有这种规模的交易。

CHARLIE MUNGER: “Very few” is a good expression. He means “one.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：“非常少”是一个很好的表达。他的意思是“一个”。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

11. “A life properly lived is just learn, learn, learn”

“一个过得恰当的生活就是不断学习、学习、再学习。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name’s Grant Gibson (PH). I’m from Denver, Colorado, and this is my fifth consecutive year here. So thank you for having us.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫格兰特·吉布森（音）。我来自科罗拉多州的丹佛，这是我连续第五年在这里。感谢您接待我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks for coming.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们的到来。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Appreciate it. With all due respect, Mr. Buffett, this question is for Mr. Munger. (Laughter)

观众成员：谢谢您。恕我直言，巴菲特先生，这个问题是问芒格先生的。（笑声）

In your career of thousands of negotiations and business dealings, could you describe for the crowd which one sticks out in your mind as your favorite or is otherwise noteworthy?

在你数千次谈判和商业交易的职业生涯中，能否为大家描述一下哪一次让你印象深刻，或者是其他值得一提的？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think I’ve got a favorite. But the one that probably did us the most good as a learning experience was See’s Candy.

查理·芒格：嗯，我想我没有最喜欢的。不过，可能对我们作为学习经验帮助最大的是See’s Candy。

It’s just the power of the brand, the unending flow of ever-increasing money with no work. (Laughter)

这只是品牌的力量，源源不断的、不断增加的现金流而无需工作。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sounds nice. (Laughter)

观众成员：听起来不错。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was. And I’m not sure we would have bought the Coca-Cola if we hadn’t bought the See’s.

查理·芒格：确实如此。如果我们没有购买 See's，我们可能不会买可口可乐。

I think that a life properly lived is just learn, learn, learn all the time. And I think Berkshire’s gained enormously from these investment decisions by learning through a long, long period.

我认为，过好生活就是不断学习、学习、再学习。我认为，伯克希尔通过长期的学习，从这些投资决策中获得了巨大的收益。

Every time you appoint a new person that’s never had big capital allocation experience, it’s like rolling the dice. And I think we’re way better off having done it so long. And —

每次你任命一个没有大规模资本配置经验的新人的时候，就像是在掷骰子。我认为我们已经做了这么久，情况要好得多。还有——

But the decisions blend, and the one feature that comes through is the continuous learning. If we had not kept learning, you wouldn’t even be here.

但这些决策是相互交融的，唯一显而易见的特点就是持续学习。如果我们没有不断学习，你甚至不会在这里。

You’d be alive probably, but not here. (Laughter)

你可能还活着，但不在这里。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s nothing like the pain of being in a lousy business — (laughs) — to make you appreciate a good one.

沃伦·巴菲特：没有什么比在一个糟糕的生意中所经历的痛苦更能让你欣赏一个好的生意了——（笑）——。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s nothing like getting into a really good one that’s a very pleasant experience and it’s a learning experience.

查理·芒格：嗯，没有什么比进入一个真正好的项目更让人愉快的体验了，这也是一个学习的经历。

I have a friend who says, “The first rule of fishing is to fish where the fish are. And the second rule of fishing is to never forget the first rule.” (Laughter)

我有一个朋友说：“钓鱼的第一条规则是要在鱼的地方钓鱼。第二条规则是永远不要忘记第一条规则。”（笑声）

And we’ve gotten good at fishing where the fish are.

我们已经学会了在鱼聚集的地方钓鱼。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s only metaphorically.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这只是比喻。

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’re too many other —

查理·芒格：还有太多其他——

WARREN BUFFETT: I went to fish with Charlie one time. He didn’t get —

沃伦·巴菲特：我有一次和查理去钓鱼。他没有钓到——

CHARLIE MUNGER: There are too many other boats in the damn water. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：水里有太多其他船了。（笑声）

But the fish are still there.

但鱼仍然在那里。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we bought a department store in Baltimore in 1966. And there’s really nothing like being in an experience of trying to decide whether you’re going to put a new store in a area that hasn’t really developed yet enough to support it, but your competitor may move there first.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在 1966 年在巴尔的摩买了一家百货商店。实际上，没有什么比经历决定是否在一个尚未发展到足以支持新商店的地区开设新店更让人感到兴奋的了，但你的竞争对手可能会先在那里开店。

And then you have the decision of whether to jump in. And if you jump in, that kind of spoils it. Now you’ve got two stores where even one store isn’t quite justified.

然后你就要决定是否要跳进去。如果你跳进去，那就有点破坏了它。现在你有两个商店，而即使一个商店也不太合理。

How to play those games — those business games — is — you learn a lot by trying. And what you really learn is which ones to avoid.

如何玩那些游戏——那些商业游戏——就是——你通过尝试学到很多。而你真正学到的是哪些游戏要避免。

I mean, it — you just stay out of a bunch of terrible businesses, you’re off to a very great start, as far as — because we’ve tried them all.

我的意思是，你只要远离一堆糟糕的生意，你就已经有了一个很好的开端，因为我们都试过这些。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But you can really learn, because the experience is a lot like eating cuttle (PH) burgers. And it really gets your attention. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：但你真的可以学习，因为这个经验很像吃墨斗鱼汉堡。它真的会引起你的注意。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we won’t expand on that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们就不再详细讨论这个了。（笑声）

12. Making mistakes with IBM, Google, and Amazon

在 IBM、谷歌和亚马逊犯错误

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew Ross Sorkin.

沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Good morning, Warren.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：早上好，沃伦。

This question comes from a long-time shareholder who I should tell you accosted me last night in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel with this question.

这个问题来自一位长期股东，我应该告诉你，昨晚他在希尔顿酒店的大厅里用这个问题拦住了我。

“Warren, for years, you stayed away from technology companies, saying they were too hard to predict and didn’t have moats. Then you seemed to change your view about technology when you invested in IBM, and again when you recently invested in Apple.

“沃伦，多年来，你一直远离科技公司，认为它们太难预测，且没有护城河。然后当你投资 IBM 时，你似乎改变了对科技的看法，最近投资苹果时又一次改变了。”

“But then on Friday you said IBM had not met your expectations and sold a third of our stake.

“但在周五你说 IBM 没有达到你的期望，并出售了我们三分之一的股票。”

“Do you view IBM and Apple differently? And what have you learned about investing in technology companies?”

“你对 IBM 和苹果的看法不同吗？你在投资科技公司方面学到了什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I do view them differently. But, you know, obviously, when I bought the IBM — started buying it six years ago — I thought it would do better in the six years that have elapsed than it has.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我确实是以不同的方式看待它们。但是，你知道，显然，当我六年前开始购买 IBM 时，我认为在过去的六年里它的表现会比实际要好。

And Apple — I regard them as being in quite different businesses. I think Apple is much more of a consumer products business, in terms of the — in terms of sort of analyzing moats around it, and consumer behavior, and all that sort of thing.

我认为苹果和它们的业务截然不同。我认为苹果更像是一家消费品公司，从分析其护城河、消费者行为以及所有这些方面来看。

It’s obviously a product with all kinds of tech built into it. But in terms of laying out what their prospective customers will do in the future, as opposed to, say, IBM’s customers, it’s a different sort of analysis.

显然，这是一款内置各种技术的产品。但在阐述他们潜在客户未来的行为时，与 IBM 的客户相比，这是一种不同的分析。

That doesn’t mean it’s correct. And we’ll find out over time. But they are two different types of decisions.

这并不意味着它是正确的。我们会随着时间的推移找到答案。但这两种决策是不同的。

And I was wrong on the first one, and we’ll find out whether I’m right or wrong on the second. But I do not regard them as apples and apples, and I don’t quite regard them as apples and oranges, but they’re — it’s somewhat in between on that.

我在第一个问题上是错的，我们将看看我在第二个问题上是对还是错。但我不认为它们是同类事物，我也不完全认为它们是截然不同的事物，而是有点介于两者之间。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we avoided the tech stocks, because we felt we had no advantage there and other people did. And I think that’s a good idea not to play where the other people are better.

查理·芒格：我们避免了科技股，因为我们觉得在这方面没有优势，而其他人有。我认为不在其他人更强的地方竞争是个好主意。

But, you know, if you ask me, in retrospect, what was our worst mistake in the tech field, I think we were smart enough to figure out Google. Those ads worked so much better in the early days than anything else.

但是，你知道，如果你问我，回想起来，我们在科技领域最大的错误是什么，我认为我们足够聪明去弄明白谷歌。那些广告在早期的效果远远好于其他任何东西。

So I would say that we failed you there. And we were smart enough to do it and didn’t do it. We do that all the time, too.

所以我想说我们在这方面辜负了你。我们本可以做到，但却没有做到。我们也经常这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We were their customer very early on with GEICO, for example. And we saw — I don’t — these figures are way out of date, but I — as I remember, you know, we were paying them 10 or 11 dollars a click or something like that.

沃伦·巴菲特：对，我们在早期就是谷歌的客户。例如，GEICO曾经花费10到11美元每次点击。

And any time you’re paying somebody 10 or 11 bucks every time somebody just punches a little thing where you’ve got no cost at all, you know, that’s a good business, unless somebody’s going to take it away from you.

每当你支付某人 10 或 11 美元，只是因为有人轻轻按了一下一个你根本没有成本的小东西时，你知道，这是一门好生意，除非有人要把它从你手中夺走。

And so we were close up, seeing the impact of that.

所以我们近距离地看到了那种影响。

And incidentally, if any of you don’t have anything to do in your hotel rooms tonight, just keep punching Progressive or something. And — (Laughter)

顺便说一下，如果你们今晚在酒店房间里没有什么事情可做，就继续打电话给 Progressive 或者其他什么的。然后——（笑声）

Don’t really do that. (Laughter)

别真的那样做。（笑）

The thought just happened to cross my mind. The — (Laughter)

这个念头刚好在我脑海中闪过。——（笑声）

But, you know, that is — and you’ve never seen a business — almost never seen a business — like it, where —

但是，你知道，那是——你几乎从未见过这样的生意——几乎从未见过这样的生意——在哪里——

And I think for LASIK surgery and things like that, I think the figures were, you know, 60 or 70 bucks a click with no incremental — no cost.

我认为对于激光矫视手术之类的事情，费用大约是每次 60 或 70 美元，没有额外的成本。

So — and I knew the guys. I mean, they actually designed their prospectus. They came to see me. And they — a little bit after the original one, when they went public, a little bit after Berkshire even. And so I had plenty of ways to ask questions or anything of the sort, educate myself. But I blew it — (laughs) — and —

我认识这些人，他们实际上设计了他们的招股说明书。他们在公开募股后不久来找过我。相比伯克希尔，他们稍晚一些。这样我有很多机会提问或了解情况。但我错过了——（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We blew Walmart, too. When it was a total cinch, we were smart enough to figure that out and we didn’t.

查理·芒格：我们还错过了沃尔玛。当它显得完全稳妥时，我们本可以发现它的价值，但我们没有做到。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, figuring out — execution is what counts. So — (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，弄清楚——执行才是关键。所以——（笑）

Anyway, we’ll — and I could be making two mistakes on IBM. I mean, the — you know, they’re — they —

无论如何，我们会——我可能在 IBM 上犯了两个错误。我的意思是，他们——你知道，他们——他们——

It’s harder to predict, in my view, the winners in various items, or how much price competition will enter in to something like cloud services and all of that.

在我看来，预测各项的赢家或价格竞争在云服务等领域将进入多少是更困难的。

I will — I made a statement the other day, which it’s really remarkable, and I was — I asked Charlie whether he could think of a situation like it — where one person has built an extraordinary economic machine in two really pretty different industries, you know, almost simultaneously, as has happened —

我最近做了一个声明，真的很了不起，我问查理是否能想到类似的情况——一个人在几乎同时从零起步，在两个截然不同的行业中建立了一个非凡的经济机器，这就是发生在——

CHARLIE MUNGER: From a standing start at zero.

查理·芒格：从零开始。

WARREN BUFFETT: From a standing start at zero, with other — with competitors with lots of capital and everything else.

沃伦·巴菲特：从零开始，面对其他拥有大量资本和其他一切的竞争对手。

To do it in retailing and to do it with the cloud, like Jeff Bezos has done, I mean, I —

在零售业中做到这一点，并像杰夫·贝索斯那样利用云技术，我的意思是，我——

People like the Mellons invested in a lot of different industries and all of that. But he has been, in effect, the CEO, simultaneously, of two businesses starting from scratch that if — you know, Andy Grove used to use — at Intel — used to say, you know, “Think about if you had a silver bullet and you could shoot it at — and get rid of one of your competitors, who would it be?”

梅隆家族等人投资了许多不同的行业。但他实际上同时担任了两家从零开始的公司的首席执行官。如果——你知道，安迪·格罗夫在英特尔时常说——“想象一下，如果你有一颗银色子弹，可以射向并消灭一个竞争对手，那会是谁？”

Well, I think that both in the cloud and in retail, there are a lot of people that would aim that silver bullet at Jeff.

好吧，我认为无论是在云计算还是零售领域，都有很多人会把那颗灵丹妙药瞄准杰夫。

And he’s done — it’s a different sort of game — but he’s, you know, at The Washington Post, he’s played that hand as well as anybody I think possibly could.

他做了--这是一种不同的游戏--但他，你知道，在《华盛顿邮报》，他把这一手玩得出神入化，我想这是任何人都做不到的。

So it’s a remarkable business achievement, where he’s been involved, actually, in the execution, not just bankrolling it, of two businesses that are probably as feared by their competitors, almost, as any you can find.

这是一项显著的商业成就，他实际上参与了两个企业的执行，而不仅仅是为其提供资金，这两个企业几乎是竞争对手最为忌惮的企业之一。

It’s — Charlie, you got further thoughts?

查理，你还有其他想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’re sort of like the Mellons, old-fashioned people who done all right. And Jeff Bezos is a different species. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我们有点像梅隆家族，老派的人，过得还不错。而杰夫·贝索斯则是另一种物种。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And we missed it entirely, incidentally. We never owned a share of Amazon. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，我们完全错过了这件事。我们从来没有拥有过亚马逊的股票。（笑）

13. Buffett defends investing in competitive airline industry

巴菲特为投资竞争激烈的航空业辩护

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg Warren.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格·沃伦。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, my question relates to some recent stock purchases as well.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，我的问题也与最近的一些股票购买有关。

Unlike the railroads, which benefit from colossal barriers to entry due to their established, practically impossible to replicate, networks of rail and rights of way, the airline industry seems to have few, if any advantages.

与铁路行业不同，铁路行业因其已建立的、几乎无法复制的铁路和通行权网络而受益于巨大的进入壁垒，而航空业似乎几乎没有任何优势。

Even with the consolidation we’ve seen during the past 15 years, the barriers to entry are few and the exit barriers are high.

即使在过去 15 年中我们看到的整合，进入壁垒很少，而退出壁垒很高。

The industry also suffers from low switching cost and intense pricing competition, and is heavily exposed to fuel costs, with rising fuel prices being difficult to pass on, and declining fuel prices leading to more price competition.

该行业还面临低转换成本和激烈的价格竞争，并且对燃料成本高度敏感，燃料价格上涨难以转嫁，而燃料价格下降则导致更多的价格竞争。

Compare this with rail customers who have few choices and thus wield limiting buying power, and where fuel charges allow the industry to mitigate fuel price fluctuations.

与此相比，铁路客户的选择很少，因此购买力受到限制，而燃油费使该行业能够减轻燃油价格波动。

While you’ve noted several times since the airline stock purchases were announced that the two industries are quite different and that comparisons should not be made to Berkshire’s move into railroads a decade ago, could you walk us through what convinced you that the airlines were different enough this time around for Berkshire to invest close to $10 billion in the four major airlines?

尽管您多次提到自航空公司股票购买宣布以来，这两个行业截然不同，且不应与十年前伯克希尔进入铁路行业的举动进行比较，但您能否向我们解释一下是什么让您相信这次航空公司足够不同，以至于伯克希尔愿意在四大航空公司投资近 100 亿美元？

Because it would seem to me that UPS, which you have a small stake in, and FedEx, both of which have wider economic moats built on more identifiable and durable competitive advantages, would be a better option for long-term investors.

因为在我看来，您持有少量股份的 UPS 和 FedEx 都拥有更广泛的经济护城河，建立在更明显和持久的竞争优势上，因此对于长期投资者来说，它们会是更好的选择。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the decision in respect to airlines had no connection with our being involved in the railroad business.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，关于航空公司的决定与我们参与铁路业务没有任何关系。

I mean, you can classify them, you know, maybe in — as transportation businesses or something. But it had no connection, had no more connection than the fact we own GEICO or, you know, any other business.

我的意思是，你可以把它们归类为运输业务之类的。但这与我们拥有 GEICO 或其他任何业务的事实没有更多的联系。

You couldn’t pick a tougher industry, you know, ever since Orville [Wright] went up and I said, you know, that if anybody’d really been thinking about investors, they should have had Wilbur [Wright] shoot him down and save everybody a lot of money for a hundred years.

你无法选择一个更艰难的行业，你知道，自从奥维尔·莱特飞上天以来，我就说过，如果有人真的在考虑投资者，他们应该让威尔伯·莱特把他击落，这样可以为大家节省一百年的钱。

You can go to the internet and type in “airlines” and “bankrupt,” and you’ll see that something like a hundred airlines — in that general range, you know, gone bankrupt in the last few decades.

你可以上网搜索“航空公司”和“破产”，你会看到大约有一百家航空公司在过去几十年里破产。

And actually, Charlie and I were directors for some time of USAir. And people write about how we had a terrible experience in USAir. It was the — one of the dumbest things I’d ever done. And there’s a lot of —

实际上，查理和我曾在 USAir 担任董事一段时间。人们写到我们在 USAir 的经历有多糟糕。这是我做过的最愚蠢的事情之一。而且还有很多——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You made a fair amount of money out of it, too.

查理·芒格：你也从中赚了不少钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and we made a lot of money out of it. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们从中赚了很多钱。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was undeserved.

查理·芒格：这是不应得的。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we made a lot of money out of it, because there was one little brief period when people got all enthused about USAir. And after we left as directors and after we sold our position, USAir managed to go bankrupt twice in the subsequent period.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们从中赚了很多钱，因为有一段短暂的时间，人们对美国航空充满了热情。在我们辞去董事职务并出售我们的股份后，美国航空在随后的时间里竟然破产了两次。

I mean, you’ve named all of the — not all of them — but you’ve named a number of factors that just make for terrible economics.

我意思是，你列举了所有的——不是所有的——但你列举了一些因素，这些因素使得经济状况非常糟糕。

And I will tell you that if capacity — you know, it’s a fiercely competitive industry. The question is whether it’s a suicidally competitive industry, which it used to be.

我会告诉你，如果产能——你知道，这个行业竞争非常激烈。问题是它是否是一个自杀式竞争的行业，过去确实是。

乘客少了飞机还在。

I mean, when you get virtually every one of the major carriers, and dozens and dozens and dozens of minor carriers going bankrupt, you know, it ought to come upon you, finally, that maybe you’re in the wrong industry.

我意思是，当几乎所有主要航空公司以及数十家小型航空公司都破产时，你应该意识到，也许你在错误的行业。

It has been operating for some time now at 80 percent or better of capacity — being available seat miles — and you can see what deliveries are going to be and that sort of thing.

它已经以 80%或更高的产能运行了一段时间——即可用座位英里——你可以看到交付情况以及类似的事情。

So if you make — I think it’s fair to say that they will operate at higher degrees of capacity over the next five or 10 years than the historical rates, which caused all of them to go broke.

所以，如果你——我认为可以公平地说，它们在接下来的五到十年内将以比历史上更高的产能进行运营，这将导致所有航空公司破产。

Now the question is whether, even when they’re doing it in the 80s, they will do suicidal things in terms of pricing, remains to be seen.

现在的问题是，即使它们在80%产能下运营，它们是否会在定价上做出自杀式的行为，这还需要观察。

They actually, at present, are earning quite high returns on invested capital. I think higher than either FedEx or UPS, if you actually check that out.

目前，它们实际上在投资资本回报率方面赚得相当高。我认为这比FedEx或UPS还要高，如果你实际查一下。

But that doesn’t mean — tomorrow morning, you know, if you’re running one of those airlines and the other guy cuts his prices, you cut your prices, and as you say, there’s more flexibility when fuel goes down to bring down prices than there is to raise prices when prices go up.

但这并不意味着——明天早上，你知道，如果你经营其中一家航空公司，而另一家降价了，你也降价，正如你所说，当燃料价格下降时，降低价格的灵活性比当价格上涨时提高价格的灵活性要大。

So the industry, you know — it is no cinch that the industry will have some more pricing sensibility in the next 10 years than they had in the last hundred years. But the conditions have improved for that.

所以这个行业，你知道——在未来十年里，行业在定价敏感性方面比过去一百年有所改善并不是一件容易的事。但条件已经有所改善。

They’ve got more labor stability than they had before, because they’re basically all going to — they’ve been through bankruptcy.

他们的劳动稳定性比以前更强，因为他们基本上都经历过破产。

And they’re all going to sort of have an industry pattern bargaining, it looks to me like. They’re going to have a shortage of pilots to some degree. But it’s not like buying See’s Candy.

他们似乎都将进行一种行业模式的谈判。我认为他们在某种程度上会面临飞行员短缺。但这并不像购买 See's 糖果那样简单。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but the investment world has gotten tougher with more competition, more affluence, and more absolute obsession with finance throughout the whole country. And we picked up a lot of low-hanging fruit in the old days, where it was very, very easy. And we had huge margins of safety.

查理·芒格：不，但投资世界变得更加艰难，竞争加剧，富裕程度提高，以及全国范围内对金融的绝对痴迷。我们在过去的日子里收获了很多低垂的果实，那时非常简单。我们有巨大的安全边际。

Now we operate with a less advantageous general climate. And maybe we have small statistical advantages, where in the old days it was like shooting fish in a barrel.

现在我们在一个不太有利的总体环境中运作。也许我们有一些小的统计优势，而在过去，那就像在桶里打鱼一样简单。

But that’s all right. It’s OK if it gets a little harder after you get filthy rich. (Laughter)

但这没关系。如果在你变得非常富有之后事情变得有点困难，那也没关系。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie’s more philosophical than I am on that point. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理在这一点上比我更具哲学性。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I can’t bring back the low-hanging fruit, Warren. You’re just going to have to keep reaching for the higher branches.

查理·芒格：好吧，我无法再把低垂的果实拿回来，沃伦。你只能继续去摘更高的果实。

WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg, the — I don’t — I think the odds are very high that there are more revenue passenger miles five years from now or 10 years from now.

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格，我认为五年后或十年后，客运里程的收入会有很高的可能性会增加。

If the airlines — if the airline companies are only worth, five or 10 years from now, what they’re worth now, in terms of equity, we’ll get a pretty reasonable rate of return, because they’re going to buy in a lot of stock at fairly low multiples.

如果航空公司在五年或十年后仅值目前的股本价值，我们会得到相当合理的回报，因为它们将以相对低的倍数回购大量股票。

So if the company’s worth the same amount at the end of the year and there’s fewer shares of stock outstanding, over time we make decent money. And all four of the major airlines are buying in stock at a —

所以如果公司在年底的价值相同，而流通的股票数量减少，随着时间的推移，我们会赚到不错的钱。而且四大主要航空公司正在以——的价格回购股票。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’ve got to remember that the railroads were a terrible business for decades and decades and decades and then they got good.

查理·芒格：你必须记住，铁路行业在几十年里都是一个糟糕的生意，然后才变得好起来。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it — we like — I like the position. Obviously, by buying all four, it means that it’s very hard to distinguish who will do the — at least in my mind — it’s hard to distinguish who will do the best.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们喜欢——我喜欢这个位置。显然，通过购买所有四个，这意味着很难区分谁会做得最好——至少在我看来——很难区分谁会做得最好。

I do think the odds are quite high that, if you take revenue passenger miles flown five or 10 years from now, it will be a higher number. And that will be —

我确实认为，如果你考虑未来五年或十年的营收乘客英里，概率相当高，它会是一个更高的数字。而这将是——

There’ll be low-cost people who come in. And, you know, the Spirits of the world and JetBlues, whatever it may be. But the — my guess is that all four of the companies we have will have higher revenues. The question is what their operating ratio is.

会有低成本的公司进入市场。你知道，像Spirit和JetBlue之类的。但——我猜所有四家公司会有更高的收入。问题是它们的运营比率是什么。

They will have fewer shares outstanding by a significant margin. So even if they’re worth just what they’re worth today, we could make a fair amount of money. But it is no cinch, by a long shot.

他们的流通股将大幅减少。因此，即使他们的价值仅与今天相同，我们也可以赚取相当可观的利润。但这绝不是轻而易举的事情。

14. Coca-Cola and Buffett get “Black Planet Award”

可口可乐和巴菲特获得“黑色星球奖”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，3 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, everybody. My name is Savilla Aliance (PH). I’m from Germany. And I’m member of board of Ethecon Foundation Ethics and Economy.

观众成员：大家早上好。我叫萨维拉·阿利安斯（音）。我来自德国。我是 Ethecon 基金会伦理与经济委员会的成员。

I’m very happy that I can put my question here. And maybe you are not as happy as I am to listen to it.

我很高兴我可以在这里提问。也许你听到这个问题并没有我那么高兴。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, we’ll try to stay happy. Thank you for coming. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）好吧，我们会努力保持快乐。谢谢你们的到来。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Mr. Buffett, a few years ago, I saw a movie in which you proclaimed that the print on the dollar bill — “In God We Trust” — does not really express your philosophy. In your opinion, only cash counts. And your credo is, “in the dollar I trust.” You obviously thought —

观众成员：谢谢你。巴菲特先生，几年前，我看了一部电影，你在其中宣称美元上的印刷字句——“我们信仰上帝”——并不真正表达你的哲学。在你看来，只有现金才算数。你的信条是：“我信任美元。”你显然认为——

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think I’ve ever said that actually. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我从来没有这样说过。可是——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I can show you the movie. (Laughs) That will prove.

观众成员：好吧，我可以给你放电影。（笑）这会证明。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, well, I — send me a clip. I —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好吧，我——给我发个片段。我——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, maybe it was just joking. But always behind a joke there is also a truth. So — well, you laughed heartily at that moment.

观众成员：嗯，也许这只是开玩笑。但在玩笑背后总是有一个真相。所以——好吧，你当时笑得很开心。

You, as one of the most richest men in — of all times on this Earth, are you not a good-humored, friendly, elderly gentleman?

您作为地球上有史以来最富有的人之一，难道不是一位和蔼可亲、友好的老绅士吗？

Whatever motivated those who designed the dollar notes, they certainly wanted to say that there is something higher than the value of this printed paper.

无论是什么激励了设计美元钞票的人，他们肯定想要表达的是，这种印刷纸张的价值之上还有更高的东西。

Regrettably, you have shown many times in your life that you see this differently. You have accumulated billions of dollars — (applause) — showed extraordinary cleverness and skill, and you knew — you knew better to pick up than many others who, like you, used the rules which are inherent to capitalism for their own intentions.

遗憾的是，你在生活中多次表现出你对此有不同的看法。你积累了数十亿美元——（掌声）——展现了非凡的聪明才智和技能，而你知道——你比许多其他人更清楚，像你一样，利用资本主义固有的规则来实现自己的意图。

But have you ever given a thought to what troubles and sacrifices, slavery and destruction of Mother Earth, and even diseases and deaths stick to the dollar bills which you gather so eagerly? (Booing)

但你有没有想过，你如此渴望收集的钞票上，附着着多少麻烦和牺牲、奴役和对地球母亲的破坏，甚至还有疾病和死亡？（嘘声）

Let’s take Coca-Cola. (Booing)

让我们来谈谈可口可乐。（嘘声）

Ethecon Foundation Ethics and Economy from Germany has awarded the Black Planet Award to the members of the board of directors as well as to the large shareholders, Warren Buffett and Allen — and Herbert Allen —because you are co-responsible for all of what makes these group make so much money, isn’t it?

Ethecon 基金会来自德国的伦理与经济奖将黑色星球奖授予董事会成员以及大股东沃伦·巴菲特和艾伦·赫伯特·艾伦，因为你们共同对这个集团赚取如此巨额利润负有责任，不是吗？

Among other things, Coca-Cola deprives people —

可口可乐剥夺了人们——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — of their drinking water —

观众成员：—— 他们的饮用水 ——

WARREN BUFFETT: — at some point, yeah, I —

沃伦·巴菲特：——在某个时刻，是的，我——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — in drought-prone areas of the world.

观众成员：——在干旱易发的地区。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, are you asking a question?

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，你是在问一个问题吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And many (inaudible) contaminate the groundwater in these areas.

观众成员：而且许多（听不清）污染了这些地区的地下水。

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t want to interrupt you, but are you — (applause) — making a speech or asking a question?

沃伦·巴菲特：我不想打断你，但你是在——（掌声）——发表演讲还是在问问题？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I put my question right now.

观众：好吧，我现在就提问。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, good.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Will you give up your Coca-Cola shares if the destruction of the environment, the monopolization of the right to healthy drinking water, and the shameless exploitation of the workers continue?

观众成员：如果环境破坏、健康饮用水的垄断以及对工人的无耻剥削继续下去，你会放弃你的可口可乐股份吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s more of a speech than a question.

查理·芒格：嗯，那更像是一段演讲而不是一个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）

I don’t think that quote you had earlier — I have — I’ve said once or twice that it should say “In the Federal Reserve We Trust” because they print the money. And if they print too much of it, it could decline in value.

我认为你之前提到的那句话——我曾经说过一两次，它应该说“我们信任联邦储备”，因为他们印钞。如果他们印得太多，货币的价值可能会下降。

But I’ve never — to my knowledge, I’ve never said anything like you originally said.

但我从来没有——据我所知，我从来没有说过你最初说的那样的话。

And I would say this. I think I’ve been eating things I like to eat all my life. And Coca-Cola — this Coca-Cola’s 12 ounces, I drink about five a day. (Laughter) It has about 1.2 ounces of sugar in it.

我想说的是，我觉得我一辈子都在吃我喜欢的东西。而可口可乐——这瓶可口可乐是 12 盎司，我每天喝大约五瓶。（笑声）里面大约有 1.2 盎司的糖。

And if you look at what people — different people — get their sugar and calories from, they get them from all kinds of things. I happen to believe that I like to get 1.2 ounces with this. And it’s enjoyable.

如果你看看不同的人从哪里获取糖分和卡路里，他们会从各种各样的东西中获取。我个人认为我喜欢从这个中获取 1.2 盎司。而且这很愉快。

Since 1886, people have found it pleasant. And I would say that if you pick every meal in terms of what somebody in some recent publication has told you is the very best for you, I offer you that. I say, “Go to it.”

自 1886 年以来，人们发现这很愉快。我想说，如果你根据某个最近出版物中告诉你的对你最好的食物来选择每一餐，我就提供给你。我说：“去吧。”

But if you told me that I would live one year longer. And I don’t even think that — that I would live one year longer if I’d eaten nothing but broccoli and asparagus and everything my Aunt Alice wanted me to eat all my life or I could eat everything I enjoyed eating, including chocolate sundaes, and Coca-Cola, and steak, and hash browns, you know, I would rather eat what — in a way I enjoy for my whole life than — and — than, you know eat some other way and live another year. (Applause)

但是如果你告诉我我会多活一年。我甚至不认为——如果我一辈子只吃西兰花、芦笋和我阿姨爱丽丝想让我吃的所有东西，我会多活一年；或者我可以吃我喜欢的所有食物，包括巧克力圣代、可乐、牛排和土豆饼，你知道，我宁愿吃我喜欢的方式度过我的一生，而不是——然后——你知道，换一种方式活多一年。（掌声）

And I do think that choice should be mine, you know? If somebody decides sugar is harmful, you know, there — maybe you’d encourage the government to ban sugar. But sugar in Coca-Cola is not different than eating sugar, you know, put on my Grape-Nuts in the morning or whatever else I’m having.

我确实认为这个选择应该是我的，你知道吗？如果有人认为糖是有害的，你知道，也许你会鼓励政府禁止糖。但是可口可乐中的糖和早上在我的葡萄坚果上获取的糖没有什么不同，或者我吃的其他东西。

So I think Coca-Cola’s been a very, very positive factor in America for — and the world — for a long, long time. And you can look at a list of achievements of the company. (Applause)

所以我认为可口可乐在美国以及世界上已经是一个非常积极的因素，持续了很长很长时间。你可以查看这家公司的成就列表。（掌声）

And I really don’t want anybody telling me I can’t drink it.

我真的不想有人告诉我我不能喝它。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve solved my Coca-Cola problem by drinking Diet Coke. And I swill the stuff like other people swill I don’t know what. And I’ve been doing it for just as long as you’ve been taking all those Coca-Colas that — I’ve had breakfast with Warren when he has Coca-Colas and nuts. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我通过喝健怡可乐解决了我的可口可乐问题。我像其他人喝不知道什么一样痛痛快快地喝它。我喝健怡可乐的时间和你喝那些可口可乐的时间一样长——我和沃伦一起吃早餐时，他喝可口可乐和坚果。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And pretty damn good too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：而且也非常不错。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you keep doing that, Warren, you may not make a hundred.

查理·芒格：如果你继续这样做，沃伦，你可能活不到一百岁。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — (laughter) — I think there’s something in longevity to feeling happy about your life, too. It’s not —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯——（笑）——我认为长寿与对生活感到快乐之间也有某种联系。这并不是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely. (Applause)

查理·芒格：当然。（掌声）

15. Intrinsic value projections depend on interest rates

内在价值预测依赖于利率

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Franz Tramberger (PH) of Austria. And it concerns intrinsic value, which is neither — Warren may rather — he may amend this, my definition here, but — which is neither a company’s accounting value nor its stock market value, but is rather its estimated real value.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自奥地利的弗朗茨·特兰贝格（PH）。它涉及内在价值，这既不是公司的会计价值，也不是其股票市场价值，而是其估计的真实价值。

So the question is, “At what rate has Berkshire compounded intrinsic value over the last 10 years? And at what rate, including your explanation for it please, do you think intrinsic value can be compounded over the next 10 years?”

所以问题是：“在过去 10 年中，伯克希尔的内在价值以什么速度复合增长？在接下来的 10 年中，您认为内在价值可以以什么速度复合增长，请包括您的解释。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Intrinsic value, you know, can only be calculated — or gains — you know, in retrospect.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。内在价值，你知道，只能在事后计算——或者收益——你知道。

But the intrinsic value pure definition would be the cash to be generated between now and Judgment Day, discounted at an interest rate that seems appropriate at the time. And that’s varied enormously over a 30 or 40-year period.

但内在价值的纯定义是从现在到审判日之间产生的现金，按当时看起来合适的利率折现。而在 30 或 40 年的时间里，这个利率变化巨大。

If you pick out 10 years, and you’re back to May of 2007, you know, we had some unpleasant things coming up. But we’ve — I would say that we’ve probably compounded it at about 10 percent.

如果你选择 10 年，回到 2007 年 5 月，你知道，我们面临了一些不愉快的事情。但是我们——我会说我们可能以大约 10%的速度复合增长。

And I think that’s going to be tough to achieve, in fact almost impossible to achieve, if we continued in this interest rate environment.

我认为在这种利率环境下，要实现这一目标将会非常困难，实际上几乎是不可能实现的。

That’s the number one — if you asked me to give the answer to the question, if I could only pick one statistic to ask you about the future before I gave the answer, I would not ask you about GDP growth. I would not ask you about who was going to be president.

这就是第一点——如果你让我回答这个问题，如果我只能选择一个统计数据来询问你关于未来的事情，在我给出答案之前，我不会问你关于 GDP 增长的问题。我也不会问你谁将成为总统。

I would — a million things — I would ask you what the interest rate is going to be over the next 20 years on average, the 10-year or whatever you wanted to do.

我会——一百万件事——我会问你未来 20 年平均利率会是多少，10 年期的或者你想做的任何东西。

And if you assume our present interest rate structure is likely to be the average over 10 or 20 years, then I would say it’d be very difficult to get to 10 percent.

如果你认为我们目前的利率结构在未来 10 年或 20 年内可能是平均水平，那么我会说达到 10%将非常困难。

On the other hand, if I were to pick with a whole range of probabilities on interest rates, I would say that that rate might be — it might be somewhat aspirational. And it might well — it might be doable.

另一方面，如果我需要在利率的各种可能性中进行选择，我会说那个利率可能是——它可能有些理想化。而且它可能——它可能是可行的。

And if you would say, “Well, we can’t continue these interest rates for a long time,” I would ask you to look at Japan, you know, where 25 years ago, we couldn’t see how their interest rates could be sustained. And we’re still looking at the same thing.

如果你说：“好吧，我们不能长期维持这些利率，”我会请你看看日本，你知道，25 年前，我们无法想象他们的利率会如何持续。而我们现在仍在关注同样的问题。

So I do not think it’s easy to predict the course of interest rates at all. And unfortunately, predicting that is embedded in giving a good answer to you.

所以我认为预测利率的走势并不容易。不幸的是，预测这一点与给你一个好的答案是密切相关的。

I would say the chances of getting a terrible result in Berkshire are probably as low as about anything you can find. Chance of getting a sensational result are also about as low as anything you can find. So if I — I would — I —

我会说，在伯克希尔获得糟糕结果的机会可能是你能找到的最低的机会之一。获得轰动结果的机会也大约是你能找到的最低的机会之一。所以如果我——我会——我——

My best guess would be in the 10 percent range, but that assumes somewhat higher interest rates — not dramatically higher — but somewhat higher interest rates in the next 10 or 20 years than we’ve experienced in the last seven years.

我最好的猜测是在 10%的范围内，但这假设未来 10 到 20 年内的利率会比过去七年经历的利率略高——并不是大幅提高——而是略高。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s no question about the fact that the future, with our present size is, in terms of percentages of rates of return, is going to be less glorious than our past. And we keep saying that. And now we’re proving it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：毫无疑问，考虑到我们目前的规模，未来的回报率百分比将比我们的过去逊色。我们一直在说这个，现在我们正在证明这一点。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you want to end on that note, Charlie? Or would you care to — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想以这个话题结束吗？还是你想——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think Warren’s right about one thing. I think we have a collection of businesses that on average has better investment values than, say, the S&P average. So I don’t think you shareholders have a terrible problem.

查理·芒格：我确实认为沃伦在一件事上是对的。我认为我们拥有的这些企业平均来说比标准普尔的平均水平具有更好的投资价值。所以我认为你们这些股东并没有什么严重的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I would say we probably — well, I’m certain — we have — we do have more of a shareholder orientation than the S&P 500 as a whole. I mean, for — you know, the —

沃伦·巴菲特：我可以说，我们可能——好吧，我可以肯定——我们有——我们确实比标准普尔 500 指数整体更注重股东利益。我的意思是，对于——你知道的——

This company has a culture where decisions are made for — as an owner, as a private owner would make them. And frankly, that’s a luxury we have that many companies don’t have. I mean, they’re under pressures today, sometimes, to do things.

这家公司有一种文化，决策是以所有者的方式做出的，像私人所有者一样。坦率地说，这是我们拥有的奢侈，而许多公司却没有。我是说，他们今天有时面临压力，必须做某些事情。

One of the questions I ask the CEO of every public company that I meet is, “What would you be doing differently if you owned it all yourself?” And the answer, you know, is usually this, that, and a couple of other things.

我问每位我见过的上市公司首席执行官的问题之一是：“如果你自己完全拥有这家公司，你会有什么不同的做法？”而答案通常是这样那样，还有其他几件事。

If you would ask us, the answer is, you know, we’re doing exactly what we would do if we owned them all — all the stock ourselves. And I think that’s a small plus over time.

如果你问我们，答案是，你知道，我们正在做的正是如果我们自己拥有所有股票时会做的事情。我认为这随着时间的推移是一个小的优势。

Anything further, Charlie? (Applause)

还有其他要补充的吗，查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we have one other advantage. A lot of other people are trying to be brilliant. And we’re just trying to stay rational. And — (laughter and applause) — it’s a big advantage. Trying to be brilliant is dangerous, particularly when you’re gambling.

查理·芒格：我认为我们还有一个优势。很多其他人都在试图表现得聪明。而我们只是想保持理性。——（笑声和掌声）——这是一大优势。试图表现得聪明是危险的，特别是在赌博时。

16. Who benefits from corporate tax cut varies by industry

企业减税的受益者因行业而异

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: If corporate tax rates are reduced meaningfully, Berkshire will enjoy a one-time boost to book value because of its sizable deferred tax liability, and its go-forward earnings should be higher, too, at least in theory.

乔纳森·布兰特：如果企业税率大幅降低，伯克希尔将因其巨额的递延税负而享受一次性的账面价值提升，并且其未来的收益理论上也应该更高。

How much of the reduced tax rate will be passed along to Berkshire’s customers through, for instance, lower electricity rates or lower railroad shipping rates? And how much will go to Berkshire shareholders?

降低的税率将通过例如更低的电价或更低的铁路运输费传递给伯克希尔的客户多少？又有多少将归伯克希尔的股东所有？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the question is, in the case of our utility businesses, all benefit of lower tax rates goes to customers. And it should be, because we are allowed a return on equity — in general — I mean, I’m simplifying a little bit. But the —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，问题是，在我们的公用事业业务中，所有降低税率的好处都归客户所有。这是应该的，因为我们被允许获得股本回报——一般来说——我的意思是，我在简化一点。但——

We’re allowed a return on equity that’s computed on an after-tax basis. And the utility commissions would, if taxes were raised, would presumably give us higher rates to compensate for that.

我们被允许计算税后收益的股本回报率。如果税收增加，公用事业委员会可能会给我们更高的费率以补偿。

And if taxes are lowered, they would say, “You’re not entitled to make more money just because tax rates — on equity — because tax rates have been lowered.” So forget about the utility portion of the deferred taxes.

如果税收降低，他们会说：“你没有权利因为税率——在股权上——降低而赚更多的钱。”所以忘记递延税款的效用部分吧。

The deferred taxes that are applicable to our unrealized gains in securities, we would get all the benefit of. Because I mentioned we had 90 billion-plus of unrealized gains. And if the rates were changed on those in either direction, our owners, dollar for dollar, will participate in that.

适用于我们证券未实现收益的递延税款，我们将获得所有的好处。因为我提到我们有超过 900 亿美元的未实现收益。如果这些收益的税率发生变化，无论是上升还是下降，我们的股东将按比例参与其中。

And then you get into the other businesses. You mentioned the railroad, but it can be all of our other businesses.

然后你就进入其他业务。你提到了铁路，但这可以是我们所有其他的业务。

To some extent, if tax rates are lowered, to different degrees in different industries, depending on the number of players, the competitive conditions, some of it may — some if it almost certainly gets competed away. And some of it would likely not be competed away.

在某种程度上，如果税率降低，不同行业的降低幅度不同，取决于参与者的数量和竞争条件，其中一部分可能会——有些几乎肯定会被竞争消耗掉。而有些则可能不会被竞争消耗掉。

And that’s — you know, economists can argue about that a lot. But I’ve seen it in action in a lot of cases.

而这——你知道，经济学家对此可以争论很多。但我在很多案例中看到了它的实际运作。

You got a big decline in rates, for example, in the U.K. And we’ve had them over my lifetime. We had 52 percent corporate rates. You know, we’ve had a lot of different numbers.

你在税率上有了大幅下降，例如在英国。在我的一生中，我们经历过这样的情况。我们曾有 52%的企业税率。你知道，我们经历过很多不同的数字。

So I have seen how behavior — economic behavior — works. And I would say that it’s certain that some of any lower rate would be competed away. And it’s virtually certain that some would enure to the benefit of the shareholders. And it’s very industry and company specific in how that plays out.

所以我已经看到了行为——经济行为——是如何运作的。我可以说，任何较低税率的一部分肯定会被竞争消耗掉。而且几乎可以肯定的是，部分税率将惠及股东。这在行业和公司层面上是非常具体的，结果会有所不同。

Charlie? 查理？

Well, we — dollar for dollar, I mean, there’s 90 or 95 billion, if the rate were to drop 10 percent, that 9 1/2 billion is — by 10 percentage points — that 9 1/2 billion’s real.

好吧，我们——逐美元计算，我的意思是，如果税率下降 10%，那 90 或 95 亿中的 9.5 亿就是——下降 10 个百分点——那 9.5 亿是真实的。

On the other hand, if it goes up as it did — went up from 28 to 35 percent, they can take it away from us, too.

另一方面，如果它像之前那样上涨——从 28%上涨到 35%，他们也可以把它从我们这里拿走。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s true that we’re peculiar in one way. If things go to hell in a handbasket and then get better later, we’re likely to do better than most others.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我们在某种程度上确实很特别。如果事情一团糟然后后来变好，我们可能会比大多数人做得更好。

And we don’t wish for that. And we don’t want our company to have to suffer through it. And we fear what might happen if the country went through the ringer like that.

我们不希望那样。我们也不想让我们的公司经历这样的痛苦。我们担心如果国家经历这样的磨难会发生什么。

But if that real adversity comes, we’re likely to do better in the end. We’re good at navigating through that kind of stuff.

但如果真正的逆境来临，我们最终可能会做得更好。我们擅长应对这种情况。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and occasionally, there will be —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，偶尔会有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot — in fact, we’re quite good at it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：很多——实际上，我们对此相当擅长。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There will be occasional hiccups in the American economy. Doesn’t have much to do with who’s president or anything like that. Those people may get blamed or given credit for different things.

沃伦·巴菲特：美国经济偶尔会出现一些波动。这与谁是总统或其他事情关系不大。这些人可能会因不同的事情受到指责或获得赞誉。

But it’s just — it is the nature of market systems to occasionally go haywire in one direction or another. And it’s been ever thus, you know, and it’ll be ever thus.

但市场系统的本质就是偶尔会朝一个方向或另一个方向失控。这一直都是这样，你知道，将来也会一直如此。

It’s not — it does not have a — there’s not a — it’s not a — on a regular sine wave-type picture or anything of the sort. But it’s certain to happen from time to time.

这不是——它没有——没有——这不是——在常规的正弦波类型的图像或任何类似的东西上。但它肯定会时不时发生。

And we will probably have a fair amount of money and credit at that time. And we certainly —

我们到时候可能会有相当多的钱和信用。我们当然——

We’re not affected. When the rest of the world is fearful, we know America’s going to come out fine. And we will not have a trouble — any trouble — psychologically, acting at all.

我们不受影响。当世界其他地方感到恐惧时，我们知道美国会没事的。我们不会有任何心理上的麻烦，完全不会有任何问题。

And then the question is how much do we have in the way of resources? We’ll also never put the company in any kind of risk just because we see a lot of opportunities. We’ll grab all the ones we can that we can handle. And not lose a day of sleep.

然后问题是我们有多少资源？我们绝不会因为看到很多机会而让公司处于任何风险之中。我们会抓住所有我们能处理的机会。并且不会失去一夜的安眠。

(Someone shouts in the audience)

（观众中有人喊）

I didn’t quite get that. But —

我没太明白。不过——

17. Why Buffett sold his used Cadillac for a profit

为什么巴菲特以盈利出售他的二手凯迪拉克

WARREN BUFFETT: In any event, we will now go to station 4. And if the person yelling — are we up there in station — are you on station 4?

沃伦·巴菲特：无论如何，我们现在将前往第 4 站。如果在大喊的人——我们在第 4 站吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Dr. Bruce Hertz from Glenview, Illinois. I wanted to thank you for allowing me to attend. I feel both honored and blessed.

观众成员：是的，我是来自伊利诺伊州格伦维尤的布鲁斯·赫茨博士。我想感谢您让我参加。我感到既荣幸又幸福。

My question for Mr. Buffett is, you’ve always advised us to purchase equities that appreciate in value. Yet a few years ago you sold your used Cadillac at a tremendous profit. (Laughter)

我对巴菲特先生的问题是，您一直建议我们购买增值的股票。然而几年前，您以巨大的利润出售了您的二手凯迪拉克。（笑声）

How can you justify selling a depreciating asset for a significant profit? Thank you.

你如何能为以显著利润出售贬值资产辩护？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well — (laughter) — actually I gave it to Girls Inc. And they sold it. And it was kind of an interesting — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯——（笑声）——实际上我把它捐给了Girls Inc.。他们把它卖掉了。这是一个有趣的——（掌声）

A very nice guy bought it for a hundred and some thousand dollars. And I did not — and Girls Inc. got the money. And he got in the — he came later, actually, with his family.

一个非常好的人花了十几万美元买下了它。我没有——而 Girls Inc.得到了这笔钱。他后来实际上和他的家人一起来了。

And he drove it away without any plates. He was driving back to New York. And he got picked up by the police — (laughter) — in Illinois. And he said, “Well” — he started giving this explanation about how he’d given this money to Girls Inc. and was driving the car back. And he had this nice looking family with him.

他开着没有车牌的车离开了。他正开车回纽约。然后在伊利诺伊州被警察拦下了——（笑声）——他说：“好吧”——他开始解释他是如何把钱捐给 Girls Inc.并开车回来的。他身边还有一个看起来很不错的家庭。

And the cops were quite skeptical. But fortunately, I’d signed the dashboard for him as part of the deal when he — and so they looked at that. And then they just said, “Well, did he give you any stock tips?” And they let him go. (Laughter)

警察对此相当怀疑。但幸运的是，我在交易时为他签了仪表盘——所以他们看了那个。然后他们就问：“他给你任何股票建议了吗？”然后他们就放了他。（笑声）

I can’t recall ever selling a used car at a profit. But we — I don’t think I’ve sold any personal possession. Well, I’ve got a house for sale.

我不记得自己曾经以盈利的方式出售过二手车。但我们——我想我没有出售过任何个人财物。好吧，我有一套房子在出售。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You don’t have any personal possessions. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你没有任何个人财物。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No, I — anything you see with a figure attached like that —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。没有，我——你看到的任何带有这样的数字的东西——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re a fatter version of Mahatmas Gandhi — (laughter) — Mahatma Gandhi.

查理·芒格：你是一个比甘地更胖的版本。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: The guy was a very nice guy that bought it. And, you know, his check cleared. So we were fine. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：那个人是个非常好的人，他买下了它。而且，你知道，他的支票兑现了。所以我们没问题。（笑声）

18. Why Buffett wants his wife to own an index fund after he dies

为什么巴菲特希望他的妻子在他去世后拥有一个指数基金

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: I’d like to ask a question that can serve as a follow-up to the question that Carol had asked. And Charlie, in that response, said that he thinks that Berkshire’s businesses on the whole will do better than the S&P 500.

贝基·奎克：我想问一个问题，可以作为对卡罗尔提问的后续。查理在回应中表示，他认为伯克希尔的整体业务将会表现得比标准普尔 500 指数更好。

Clark Cameron (PH) from Birmingham, Alabama, who owns 281 shares of Berkshire B, writes in and asks, “Why have you advised your wife to invest in index funds after your death rather than Berkshire Hathaway? I believe Munger has counseled his offspring to quote, ‘Not be so dumb as to sell.’”

克拉克·卡梅伦（PH）来自阿拉巴马州的伯明翰，他拥有 281 股伯克希尔 B 类股票，他写信问道：“为什么在你去世后建议你的妻子投资于指数基金而不是伯克希尔哈撒韦？我相信芒格曾建议他的后代‘不要傻到去卖’。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

She won’t be selling any Berkshire to buy the index funds. All of my Berkshire, every single share, will go to philanthropy.

她不会卖掉任何伯克希尔来购买指数基金。我的所有伯克希尔，每一股，都会用于慈善事业。

So the — I don’t even regard myself as owning Berkshire, you know, basically — (applause) — it’s committed.

所以我——我甚至不认为自己拥有伯克希尔，你知道的，基本上——（掌声）——它是承诺的。

And so far, about 40 percent has already been distributed.

到目前为止，已经分发了大约 40%。

So the question is, somebody who is not an investment professional will be, I hope, reasonably elderly by the time that the estate gets settled.

所以问题是，继承人可能在处理遗产时已经年纪很大。

And what is the best investment, meaning one that there would be less worry of any kind connected with and less people coming around and saying, “Why don’t you sell this and do something else?” and all those things. She’s going to have more money than she needs.

什么是最好的投资，意味着与之相关的担忧更少，周围的人也更少来问：“你为什么不卖掉这个去做别的？”等等。她将拥有比她需要的更多的钱。

最难质疑的决策，非常聪明的做法。

And the big thing, then, you want is money not to be a problem. And there will be no way that if she holds the S&P — or virtually no way, absent something happening with weapons of mass destruction — but virtually no way that she won’t — she’ll have all the money that she possibly can use.

巴菲特说：“最重要的是，钱不应该成为问题。只要她持有S&P 500指数基金——除非发生大规模毁灭性武器这样的极端事件——几乎不可能会面临资金短缺的问题。她将拥有她可能需要的所有资金。”

She’ll have a little liquid money so that if stocks are down tremendously at some point, there’s — they close the stock exchange for a while, anything like that — she’ll still feel that she’s got plenty of money.

她会有一些流动资金，这样如果某个时候股票大幅下跌，或者股票交易所暂时关闭之类的情况，她仍然会觉得自己有足够的钱。

And the object is not to maximize. It doesn’t make any difference whether the amount she gets doubles or triples or anything of the sort. The important thing is that she never worries about money the rest of her life.

目标不是最大化。她得到的金额是翻倍、三倍还是其他任何形式都没有关系。重要的是，她在余生中永远不再为钱而担忧。

And I had an Aunt Katie here in Omaha, who Charlie knew well, and worked for her husband, as did I. And she worked very hard all her life. And had lived in a house she’d paid, I think, I don’t know, $8,000 for at 45th and Hickory all her life.

我在奥马哈有一个凯蒂阿姨，查理对她很熟悉，我也为她的丈夫工作。她一生都非常努力工作。她一生都住在一栋她花了大约 8000 美元买的房子里，位于第 45 街和山核桃街。

And because she was in Berkshire, she ended up — she lived to 97 — she ended up with, you know, a few hundred million. (Laughter)

因为她在Berkshire，她活到了 97 岁，最后她拥有了几亿。（笑声）

And she would write me a letter every four or five months. And she said, “Dear Warren, you know, I hate to bother you. But am I going to run out of money?”

她每四五个月就给我写一封信。她说：“亲爱的沃伦，我不想打扰你。但是我会用完钱吗？”

And — (laughter) — I would write her back. And I’d say, “Dear Katie, it’s a good question because, if you live 986 years, you’re going to run out of money.” And — (laughter) — then about four or five months later, she’d write me the same letter again.

她每隔四五个月就会写信给我，问我“亲爱的沃伦，我会用完钱吗？”我会回复她，“亲爱的Katie，如果你活到986岁，你会用完钱的。”然后四五个月后，她又会写我同样的信。

And I have seen there’s no way in the world, if you’ve got plenty of money, that it should become a minus in your life. And there will be people, if you’ve got a lot of money, that come around with various suggestions for you, sometimes well-meaning, sometimes not so well-meaning.

我看到，如果你有很多钱，世界上没有任何理由让它在你的生活中变成负担。如果你有很多钱，会有人围绕着你，提出各种建议，有时是出于好意，有时则不那么好意。

So if you’ve got something as certain to deliver — you know, it was all in Berkshire, they’d say, “Well, if Warren was alive today, you know, he would be telling you to do this.” I just don’t want anybody to go through that.

所以如果你有一些确定能交付的东西——你知道，这一切都在伯克希尔，他们会说：“好吧，如果沃伦今天还活着，你知道，他会告诉你这样做。”我只是不想让任何人经历那种事情。

And the S&P will be a — I think actually what I’m suggesting is what — a very high percentage of people should do something like that. And I don’t think they will have as — I think there’s a chance they won’t have as much peace of mind if they own one stock.

标准普尔指数将是——我认为实际上我所建议的是——非常高比例的人应该这样做。我认为如果他们只拥有一只股票，他们可能不会有那么多的安心。

And they’ve got neighbors and friends and relatives that are trying to do some — like I say, sometimes well-intentioned, sometimes otherwise, to do something else. And so I think it’s a policy that’ll get a good result and is likely to stick.

他们有邻居、朋友和亲戚在尝试做一些事情——就像我说的，有时是出于好意，有时则不是，想要做其他事情。因此，我认为这是一个会产生良好结果并且可能会持续的政策。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as Becky said, the Mungers are different. I want them to hold the Berkshire.

查理·芒格：正如贝基所说，芒格家族与众不同。我希望他们能持有伯克希尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I want to hold the Berkshire, too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我也想持有伯克希尔。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but I mean I don’t like the — I recognize the logic of the fact that that S&P algorithm is very hard to beat. You know, diversified portfolio of big companies. It’s all but impossible for most people. But, you know, it’s — I’m just more comfortable with the Berkshire.

查理·芒格：不，我是说我不喜欢——我承认标准普尔算法确实很难超越。你知道，分散投资于大公司的组合。对大多数人来说几乎是不可能的。但是，你知道，我对伯克希尔更感到舒适。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s the family business.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是家族企业。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But it — I’ve just — I’ve seen too many people as they get older, particularly, being susceptible and just having to listen to the arguments of people coming along.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但是我——我见过太多人随着年龄的增长，特别是变得容易受影响，只能听从那些前来争论的人的观点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you’re going to protect your heirs from the stupidity of others, you may have some good system. But I’m not much interested in that subject.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你想保护你的继承人免受他人愚蠢行为的影响，你可能有一些好的系统。但我对这个话题不太感兴趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

19. Berkshire probably would have put $15B into failed Unilever deal

伯克希尔可能会在失败的联合利华交易中投入 150 亿美元

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。杰伊？

JAY GELB: Berkshire reportedly partnered with 3G and Kraft Heinz’s attempt to acquire Unilever for $143 billion.

杰伊·盖尔布：据报道，伯克希尔与3G合作参与了卡夫亨氏收购联合利华的尝试，总金额为1430亿美元。

How much was Berkshire willing to invest in this deal? And does this mean Berkshire’s next large acquisition is likely to be in partnership with 3G?

伯克希尔愿意在这笔交易中投资多少？这是否意味着伯克希尔的下一个大型收购很可能与 3G 合作？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Kraft, I — you’d have to distinguish between two situations. Kraft Heinz was a widely-owned company in which we and 3G act as a control group and have a little over 50 percent of the stock.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，卡夫，我——你需要区分两种情况。卡夫亨氏是一家广泛持有的公司，我们和 3G 作为控股集团，拥有略超过 50%的股份。

But as originally contemplated — no certainty that this exactly is what would have happened — we would have invested an additional 15 billion and 3G would have invested an additional 15 billion if a friendly agreement could have been reached.

但如最初设想的那样——没有确定性这正是会发生的事情——我们将额外投资 150 亿，而 3G 也将额外投资 150 亿，如果能够达成友好的协议。

So if the deal had been made, if the independent directors of Kraft Heinz had approved the transaction, the likely — well, then the likelihood is that we would have invested 15 billion. But it would’ve required the approval of the independent directors as well.

所以如果交易达成，如果卡夫亨氏的独立董事批准了这笔交易，那么我们很可能会投资 150 亿美元。但这也需要独立董事的批准。

Now Kraft Heinz, in going forward with making that offer, wanted to be sure that there would be enough equity capital, in addition to the debt that would be incurred, to make the deal. And so, informally, we had basically committed the 15 billion.

现在，卡夫亨氏在推进这一提议时，希望确保除了将要承担的债务外，还有足够的股本来完成交易。因此，我们非正式地基本上承诺了 150 亿美元。

It only was approved on the basis that it be a friendly deal with Unilever. And initially, we thought they would be at least possibly interested in such a deal.

这项交易的批准仅基于与联合利华达成友好协议的前提。起初，我们认为他们至少可能对这样的交易感兴趣。

And when we found out otherwise, we withdrew the offer. So it would have been 15 billion of additional money, in all probability.

当我们发现情况并非如此时，我们撤回了报价。因此，最终可能会有 150 亿美元的额外资金。

20. Speculation is inevitable in China and the U.S.

在中国和美国，投机是不可避免的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Honorable Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, I’m Tian Du Hua (PH) from China. My company (Inaudible) Holdings is spreading value investing philosophy in Asia.

观众成员：尊敬的巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我是来自中国的田独华（PH）。我的公司（听不清）控股正在亚洲传播价值投资理念。

My business partner Ken Chi (PH), Cho Quy Ying (PH), and I are committed to awake 100 million Chinese people to return to rational way of investing.

我的商业伙伴 Ken Chi（菲律宾）、Cho Quy Ying（菲律宾）和我致力于唤醒 1 亿中国人回归理性的投资方式。

The hardest thing in this world is to change people’s values or belief system. And we should like to awake investors to change from speculate in the market to investing in the market. It’s not changing the speculator’s values or belief system.

这个世界上最难的事情就是改变人们的价值观或信仰体系。我们希望唤醒投资者，从在市场上投机转向在市场上投资。这并不是改变投机者的价值观或信仰体系。

May I ask you, Mr. Buffett, can you kindly advise us what we should do to spread your value investing philosophy? Or is there any word of encouragement? Thank you.

请问您，巴菲特先生，您能否告诉我们应该如何传播您的价值投资理念？或者您有什么鼓励的话吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — when — in any system — Keynes wrote about this in 1936 — I think it was, in “The General Theory,” or ’35. I think it’s Chapter 12. It’s — great chapter on investing.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当——在任何系统中——凯恩斯在 1936 年写过这个——我想是在《通论》中，或者是 1935 年。我认为是第 12 章。这是——关于投资的伟大章节。

And he talked about investment and speculation and the propensity of people to speculate and the dangers of it.

他谈到了投资和投机，以及人们投机的倾向和其带来的危险。

And worded eloquently, there’s always the possibility of, I mean, there’s always some speculation, obviously, and there’s always some value investors and all that sort of thing in the market. But there’s —

而且措辞优雅，总是有可能，我是说，显然总会有一些猜测，还有一些价值投资者以及市场上的所有这些东西。但总是有——

When speculation gets rampant, and when you’re getting what I guess Charlie would call “social proof” — that it’s worked recently — people can get very excited about speculating in markets. And we will have it from time to time in this market.

当投机变得猖獗时，当你获得我想查理会称之为“社会证明”的东西——即它最近有效——人们会对市场投机感到非常兴奋。在这个市场上，我们会不时遇到这种情况。

There’s nothing more agonizing than to see your neighbor who you think has an IQ about 30 points below you getting richer than you are by buying stocks. And whether it’s internet stocks or whatever. And it — and people succumb to it. And they’ll succumb in this economy just as elsewhere.

看到你认为智商比你低 30 分的邻居通过买股票变得比你更富有，真是没有比这更痛苦的了。不管是互联网股票还是其他的。人们会屈服于此。在这个经济环境中，他们也会像其他地方一样屈服。

There’s also a point which gets to your question. I would say that early on in the development of markets — there is probably a — there’s some tendency for them, I think, to be more speculative than markets that have been around for a couple hundred years because the — it has a — invest —

还有一个点可以回答你的问题。我想说，在市场发展的早期阶段——可能有一种——我认为它们的投机性比那些已经存在了几百年的市场更强，因为——它有一个——投资——

Markets have a casino characteristic that has a lot of appeal to people, particularly when they see, like I say, people getting rich around them. And those that haven’t been through cycles before are probably a little more prone to speculate than people who have experienced the outcome of wild speculation.

市场具有赌场的特性，这对人们有很大的吸引力，特别是当他们看到周围的人变得富有时。那些没有经历过周期的人可能比经历过疯狂投机结果的人更容易投机。

So I — you know, basically in this country, Ben Graham was, in the book I read in 1949, was preaching investment. And that book continues to sell very well.

所以我——你知道，基本上在这个国家，本·格雷厄姆在我 1949 年读的那本书中，宣扬投资。而那本书至今仍然畅销。

But if the market gets hot, new issues are doing well and people on leverage are doing well, a lot of people will be attracted to, not only speculation, but what I would call gambling. And I’m afraid that that will be true in the United States.

但如果市场变热，新发行的股票表现良好，杠杆投资者也表现良好，很多人将被吸引，不仅是投机，还有我所称之为赌博。我担心这在美国也会是真的。

And I think that China, being a newer market, essentially, in which there’s widespread participation, is likely to have some pretty extreme experiences in that respect. We will have some in this country, too.

我认为，中国作为一个相对较新的市场，参与者广泛，因此在这方面可能会有一些相当极端的经历。我们在这个国家也会有一些。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我当然同意这一点。（笑声）

The Chinese will have more trouble. They’re very bright people. They have a lot of action and, sure they’re going to be more speculative.

中国人将面临更多麻烦。他们是非常聪明的人。他们行动很多，当然他们会更加投机。

And it’s a dumb idea. And to the extent you’re working on it, why, you’re on the side of the angels. But lots of luck. (Laughter)

这真是个愚蠢的主意。至于你在做这件事，嗯，你是在天使的一边。但祝你好运。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it will offer the investor more opportunities actually — (laughs) — if they can keep their wits about them — if you have wild speculation. I mean, we —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这实际上会为投资者提供更多机会——（笑）——如果他们能保持冷静——如果你有疯狂的投机。我是说，我们——

Charlie just mentioned earlier, you know, that if we get into periods that are very tough, Berkshire certainly will do reasonably well because it won’t — we won’t be — we won’t get fearful. And fear spreads like you cannot believe until you’ve seen a few examples of it.

查理刚才提到，如果我们进入非常艰难的时期，伯克希尔肯定会表现得相当不错，因为我们不会感到恐惧。恐惧的传播是难以置信的，直到你看到一些例子。

At the start of September 2008, you had 35 million people with their money in money market funds with $3 1/2 trillion in them. And none of them were afraid that that dollar wasn’t going to be a dollar when they went to cash in their money market fund.

在 2008 年 9 月初，有 3500 万人将他们的钱投入货币市场基金，基金总额为 3.5 万亿美元。没有人担心当他们兑现货币市场基金时，那美元不会是美元。

And three weeks later, they were all terrified, and 175 billion flowed out in three days. And so the way the public can react is really extreme in markets. And that actually offers opportunities for investors.

三周后，他们都感到恐惧，1750 亿美元在三天内流出。因此，公众在市场上的反应确实非常极端。这实际上为投资者提供了机会。

You’ll never — people like action and they like to gamble. And if they think there’s easy money to be made, a lot of them, you’ll get a rush to it. And for a while it will be self-fulfilling and create new converts until the day of reckoning comes. They’ll —

人们总是喜欢行动，他们喜欢赌博。如果他们认为可以轻松赚钱，很多人会涌向这种情况。一段时间内，这会自我实现并创造新的信徒，直到最后的审判日到来。他们会——

Just keep preaching investing, and if the market swings around a lot, you’ll keep adding a few people here and there to a group that recognizes that markets are there to be taken advantage of, rather than to instruct you as to what is going on. OK. Andrew?

继续宣传投资理念，如果市场波动很大，你会不断吸引一些人加入到认识到市场是用来利用的，而不是指导你了解市场状况的群体中。好的，安德鲁？

Anything more on that, Charlie?

查理，还有其他的事情吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve done a lot of preaching, Warren, without much effect.

查理·芒格：沃伦，我们做了很多说教，但效果不大。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. And that’s probably good, from our standpoint.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。从我们的角度来看，这可能是好的。

21. We don’t do anything differently due to tax law changes

我们不会因为税法变化而做出任何不同的做法。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. This question comes from Ryan Prince (PH).

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。这个问题来自瑞安·普林斯（PH）。

“President Donald Trump and his advisors have talked about proposing a substantial investment tax credit to provide incentives for long-term corporate fixed capital investment.

“唐纳德-特朗普总统和他的顾问们曾谈到，建议推出一项实质性的投资税收抵免，为企业的长期固定资本投资提供激励。”

“In BNSF, Berkshire owns a sprawling infrastructure portfolio requiring regular routine maintenance investment of substantial scale.

在 BNSF，伯克希尔拥有一个庞大的基础设施投资组合，需要定期进行大规模的常规维护投资。

“What impact would an investment tax credit have on BNSF’s capital investment decision-making, from a return on investment capital perspective, as well as in terms of timing?

投资税收抵免对 BNSF 的资本投资决策会产生什么影响，从投资资本回报的角度以及时间安排上来看？

“And just as importantly, given the current economy and employment picture, would such a tax credit amount to a subsidization of otherwise mandatory maintenance capital investment or a proper incentive to stimulate investment?”

“同样重要的是，考虑到当前的经济和就业形势，这样的税收抵免是否会成为对本应进行的维护资本投资的补贴，或者是刺激投资的适当激励？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it would all depend on how it was worded — you know, because — we’ve had investment tax credits in this country, and we’ve had bonus depreciation. It’s another form of it. We — and we do get extra first-year depreciation. That does not enter into our calculation very much.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这完全取决于措辞——你知道，因为——我们在这个国家有投资税收抵免，还有额外折旧。这是另一种形式。我们——而且我们确实获得了额外的第1年折旧。这对我们的计算影响不大。

You know, in fact — certainly at the Berkshire level, I’ve never instructed anybody to do anything different because of investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation. There may be some calculations done down at the operating company level.

你知道，实际上——当然在伯克希尔层面，我从来没有指示任何人因为投资税收抵免或加速折旧而做出不同的事情。可能在运营公司层面会进行一些计算。

It’s certainly true in something like wind projects and solar projects. They are dependent on the tax law, currently. There may come a time when they aren’t, but they wouldn’t have been done without some subsidization through the tax law.

在风能项目和太阳能项目中，这确实是事实。它们目前依赖于税法。未来可能会有不依赖税法的时候，但如果没有通过税法的某些补贴，这些项目是无法完成的。

But I would say, if you change the depreciation schedules and, you know, double depreciation — triple depreciation, for — that — we’re going to do what we need to do at the railroad to make it safer and more efficient if we just had ordinary depreciation.

但我想说，如果你改变折旧计划，比如双倍折旧、三倍折旧——那么——如果我们只是有普通的折旧，我们将在铁路上做我们需要做的事情，以使其更安全、更高效。

And I doubt if there’d be any dramatic differences. Obviously, if you were going to, say, buy a bunch of planes and the law was going to change on December 31st, and the math made it better to wait till January 1st or do it this December 31st, you make that kind of calculation.

我怀疑会有任何戏剧性的差异。显然，如果你打算，比如说，买一堆飞机，而法律将在 12 月 31 日改变，数学上更好在 1 月 1 日再买或者在这个 12 月 31 日买，你会做这样的计算。

But I can’t recall, in all the years, that I’ve ever sent out anything to our managers saying, “Let’s do this because the tax law is being changed or might be changed,” or something of the sort.

但我无法回忆起，在所有这些年里，我曾向我们的经理发送过任何信息，说“让我们这样做，因为税法正在改变或可能会改变”之类的话。

As I mentioned earlier, it changes just a little bit if you think there’s going to be a change in capital gains rates at a given time. Obviously if it’s going to — the rate’s going to be lowered, you would take losses ahead of time and defer gains, maybe, a little.

正如我之前提到的，如果你认为在某个时间资本利得税率会发生变化，那么情况就会稍微有所不同。显然，如果税率会降低，你可能会提前亏损并推迟一些收益。

And that’s why it’s useful, actually, if the tax committees in the Senate and the House are working on something, it might be useful if the chairmans would say that, “If we do make any changes, we’re likely to use this effective date,” or something of the sort. And I think they’ve done that a few times in the past.

这就是为什么实际上很有用，如果参议院和众议院的税务委员会正在处理某些事情，主席们可能会说：“如果我们确实做出任何更改，我们可能会使用这个生效日期，”或者类似的话。我认为他们在过去做过几次。

We are not, the big tax-driven item — is — in wind and solar. And that is a specific policy, because the government has decided they want to move people — or society has decided — they want to move people toward those forms of electric generation. And the market system wouldn’t do it.

我们不是，主要的税收驱动项目——是——在风能和太阳能方面。这是一个具体的政策，因为政府已经决定他们想要推动人们——或者说社会已经决定——他们想要推动人们朝着这些电力生产形式发展。而市场系统不会做到这一点。

And there may come a time when the market system will do it all by itself.

可能会有一天，市场系统会自行完成所有事情。

We won’t make big changes. And it’s so speculative anyway, in terms of even what the law would be.

我们不会进行重大改变。而且无论如何，这都是非常不确定的，甚至在法律会是什么方面。

But beyond that, if it becomes less speculative as the law and it really looks like something is going through, it doesn’t change us big time at all.

但除此之外，如果它变得不那么投机，法律看起来真的有进展，实际上也不会对我们产生重大影响。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. We’re not going to change anything at the Berkshire — at the railroad — for some little tax jiggle.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。我们不会因为一些小的税务调整而改变伯克希尔——铁路——的任何事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if we need a bridge repaired, we’re going to repair the bridge, you know. And if need — we need a lot of track maintenance all the time and that sort of thing. And it just, I don’t think [BNSF’s] Matt [Rose] and I have ever had a talk about it since we’ve owned the railroad, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果我们需要修理桥梁，我们就会修理桥梁，你知道的。而且我们需要经常进行大量的轨道维护之类的事情。我想，自从我们拥有这条铁路以来，马特和我从来没有谈过这个，但——

22. Coal shipment revenues will drop for BNSF

BNSF 的煤炭运输收入将下降

WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg? 沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren, my question also relates to Burlington Northern.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，我的问题也与北方伯灵顿有关。

Despite the current administration’s belief that they can bring the coal industry back, market forces continue to lead to the industry’s demise.

尽管当前政府相信他们可以使煤炭行业复苏，但市场力量仍在导致该行业的衰退。

While 90 percent of U.S. coal consumption is driven by electricity generation, natural gas has been both cheaper and cleaner burning, and renewable electricity generation has remade parts of the market as wind and solar have gained scale and become cheaper alternatives.

在美国，90%的煤炭消费是由电力生产驱动的，而天然气则更便宜且更清洁，随着风能和太阳能的规模扩大并成为更便宜的替代品，可再生电力生产重新塑造了市场的部分。

This has created problems for Burlington Northern, with coal shipments accounting for just 18 percent of volume and revenue for the railroad last year, down from an average of 24 percent for both measures the previous 10 years.

这给伯灵顿北方铁路带来了问题，去年煤炭运输仅占该铁路运输量和收入的 18%，而在过去 10 年中，这两个指标的平均值为 24%。

While some of this was due to large buildup of coal supplies the past couple of winters, which finally seem to be working their way out, what are your expectations for the contribution coal can make to BNSF longer term?

尽管这在一定程度上是由于过去几个冬季煤炭供应的大量积累，这些积累似乎终于开始消耗了，但您对煤炭在 BNSF 长期贡献的期望是什么？

And I know that the railroad currently handles some export shipments going through Canada’s Pacific Coast ports, but will there be enough growth there to offset domestic demand? Or will BNSF need to rely more heavily on segments like intermodal to offset lost coal volumes?

我知道铁路目前处理一些通过加拿大太平洋沿岸港口的出口货物，但那里的增长是否足以抵消国内需求？还是 BNSF 需要更多依赖像多式联运这样的业务来弥补失去的煤炭运输量？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the answer is coal’s — coal is going to go down over time. I don’t think there’s much question about that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，答案是煤炭——煤炭将会随着时间的推移而下降。我认为对此没有太多疑问。

The specifics of any given year relate very importantly to the price of natural gas. I mean, right now there are — there —

任何特定年份的细节与天然气价格密切相关。我的意思是，现在有——有——

Demand is somewhat up — fair amount up — from last year because natural gas is at 3.15 or 3.20, and the utilities can produce electricity, in many cases, quite a bit cheaper with coal than with natural gas. Whereas, with a $2, it would all be — it would be natural gas.

需求有所上升——比去年上升了相当多——因为天然气价格在 3.15 或 3.20，而公用事业公司在许多情况下用煤炭发电的成本比用天然气便宜得多。而如果天然气价格是 2 美元，所有的发电都会使用天然气。

But over time, coal is — in my mind — is essentially certain to decline as a percentage of the revenue of the railroad.

但随着时间的推移，煤炭在我看来，作为铁路收入的百分比基本上是必然会下降的。

The speed at which it does, you know, it — you don’t build — create generation plants overnight. And so it —

它的速度，你知道，建造发电厂不是一夜之间就能完成的。所以它——

You can’t predict the rate. And if natural gas is cheap enough, it’s going to be a — you’ll see a big conversion back to natural gas.

你无法预测价格。如果天然气足够便宜，天然气的使用将会大幅回升。

So coal is a — coal is going to go down, as a percentage of revenues, significantly.

所以煤炭的收入比例将会显著下降。

You know, certainly over 10 years it’ll be quite significant, and who knows exactly, year by year. We are looking for other sources of growth than coal. If you’re tied to coal, you got problems.

你知道，十多年后这将是相当重要的，谁知道具体情况，逐年而异。我们正在寻找除了煤炭以外的其他增长来源。如果你依赖煤炭，你就会有问题。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — you go out over the extremely long term, I think that all hydrocarbons will be used, including all the coal.

查理·芒格：嗯——从极长远的角度来看，我认为所有的碳氢化合物都会被使用，包括所有的煤。

So I think that, in the end, these hydrocarbons are a huge resource for humanity, and I don’t think we’ve got any good substitute.

所以我认为，最终这些碳氢化合物是人类的巨大资源，我认为我们没有任何好的替代品。

And I’ve never minded saving them for the next generation. I don’t like using them up very fast. So, I’m often on a road on my own on this one.

我从来不介意为下一代保存它们。我不喜欢很快就用完它们。因此，在这方面我常常是独自一人。

And people think that all this hydrocarbons are going to be stranded and the whole world’s going to change. I think we’re going to use every drop of the hydrocarbon sooner or later. We’ll use them as chemical feed stocks. It’s —

人们认为所有这些碳氢化合物将会被闲置，整个世界将会改变。我认为我们迟早会用完每一滴碳氢化合物。我们会将它们用作化学原料。这是——

I regard all these things as very hard to predict. And I’m not at all sure that — I would eventually expect natural gas to be pretty short in supply.

我认为所有这些事情都很难预测。而且我并不确定——我最终会预期天然气的供应会相当短缺。

WARREN BUFFETT: A change in storage would make a big difference.

沃伦·巴菲特：存储的变化将会带来很大的不同。

We will produce, within a few years, as much electricity in Iowa — or virtually as much — electricity in Iowa from wind as our customers use. But the wind only blows about 35 percent of the time or something like that. And sometimes it blows too hard.

在几年内，我们将在爱荷华州生产与我们的客户使用的电量几乎相等的风能电力。但风力发电只有约35%的时间在发电，有时风速也会过大。

But the storage, you know, having it 24 hours a day, seven days a week, is a real problem, even if we’ve got the capability of producing, like I say, a self-sufficient amount, essentially, in Iowa before very long.

但是，全天候的存储是一个真正的问题，即使我们在不久的将来在爱荷华州能实现基本自给自足。

Coal — our shipments of coal are up fairly substantially this year on the BNSF. But they were very low last year, and as you said, stockpiles grew and have come down somewhat. They’re still on the high side.

我们今年BNSF的煤炭运输量增加了相当多，但去年非常低，正如你所说，库存增加了一些，现在有所减少，但仍然偏高。

But in my mind — Charlie’s got a longer-term outlook on this — in my mind, we’re going to be shipping a whole lot less coal 10 or 20 years from now than we are now.

但在我看来——查理对此有更长远的看法——在我看来，10 年或 20 年后，我们将运送的煤炭量会比现在少得多。

On the other hand, I think there’s some decent prospects in other long hauls.

另一方面，我认为在其他长途运输中有一些不错的前景。

I mean, it’s a pretty cheap way to move bulk commodities long distance. Rail is. And I think it’s a good business, but the coal aspect of it’s going to diminish.

我的意思是，这是一种相对便宜的长途运输大宗商品的方式。铁路运输是。我认为这是一项不错的生意，但煤炭方面的需求将会减少。

23. Big change: You don’t need money to run America’s biggest companies

大变化：你不需要钱就能运营美国最大的公司

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. It’s Marcus Burns from Sydney, Australia.

观众成员：早上好。我是来自澳大利亚悉尼的马库斯·伯恩斯。

My question, Mr. Buffett, is, you used to buy capital-light, cash-generative businesses, but now buy lower-growth, capital-consumptive businesses.

我的问题是，巴菲特先生，您过去喜欢购买轻资产、现金产生型的企业，但现在却购买低增长、高资本消耗的企业。

I realize Berkshire generates a lot of cash flow, but would shareholders have been better off if you had continued to invest in capital-light companies?

我意识到伯克希尔产生了大量现金流，但如果你继续投资于轻资产公司，股东们会不会更好？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’d love to find them. I mean, there’s no question that buying a high-return-on-assets, very light-capital-intensive business that’s going to grow beats the hell out of buying something that requires a lot of capital to grow.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们当然希望能找到这样的公司。毫无疑问，购买一个高资产回报率、资本需求很少且将会增长的企业，远胜于购买一个需要大量资本才能增长的企业。

And this varies from day to day, but I believe — and I don’t think it’s sufficiently appreciated. I believe that probably the five largest American companies by market cap — and some days we’re in that group and some days we aren’t — let’s assume we’re not in that group on a given day — they have a market value of over $2 1/2 trillion, and that 2 1/2 trillion is a big number.

这每天都在变化，但我相信——我认为这并没有得到足够的重视。我相信，按市值计算，可能有五家最大的美国公司——有些日子我们在这个组里，有些日子我们不在——假设在某一天我们不在这个组里——它们的市场价值超过 2.5 万亿美元，而这 2.5 万亿美元是一个很大的数字。

I don’t know whether the aggregate market cap of the U.S. market is, but that’s probably getting up close to 10 percent of the whole market cap of the United States. And if you take those five companies, essentially, you could run them with no equity capital at all. None.

我不知道美国市场的总市值是多少，但这可能接近美国整体市值的 10%。如果你考虑这五家公司，基本上，你可以完全不需要任何股本来运营它们。没有。

That is a very different world than when Andrew Carnegie was building a steel mill and then using the earnings to build another steel mill and getting very rich in the process, or Rockefeller was building refineries and buying tank cars and everything.

那是一个与安德鲁·卡内基建造钢铁厂并利用收益再建造钢铁厂、在这个过程中变得非常富有的时代截然不同的世界，或者是洛克菲勒建造炼油厂、购买油罐车及其他一切的时代。

Generally speaking, over — for a very long time in our capitalism, growing and earning large amounts of money required considerable reinvestment of capital and large amounts of equity capital, the railroads being a good example.

一般来说，在我们的资本主义中，长期以来，增长和赚取大量资金需要相当可观的资本再投资和大量的股本，铁路就是一个很好的例子。

That world has really changed, and I don’t think people quite appreciate the difference.

那个世界真的变了，我认为人们并没有完全意识到这种差异。

You literally don’t need any money to run the five companies that are worth collectively more than $2 1/2 trillion, and who have outpaced any number of those names that were familiar, if you looked at the Fortune 500 list 30 or 40 years ago, you know, whether it was Exxon or General Motors or you name it.

你实际上不需要任何资金来运营这五家公司，它们的总价值超过 2.5 万亿美元，并且超越了那些在 30 或 40 年前的《财富》500 强名单上熟悉的名字，无论是埃克森美孚、通用汽车还是其他任何公司。

So we would love — I mean, there’s no question that a business that doesn’t take any capital and grows and has, you know, almost infinite returns on required equity capital, is the ideal business.

所以我们非常希望——我的意思是，毫无疑问，一个不需要任何资本而成长并且在所需股本上几乎可以获得无限回报的企业，是理想的企业。

And we own a couple of businesses — a few businesses — that earn extraordinary returns on capital, but they don’t grow.

我们拥有几家企业——几家企业——它们在资本上获得了非凡的回报，但它们并不增长。

We still love them, but if they had — if they were in fields that would grow, believe me, we wouldn’t — you know, they would be number one on our list.

我们仍然爱他们，但如果他们在能够发展的领域，相信我，我们不会——你知道，他们会是我们名单上的第一位。

We aren’t seeing those that we can buy and that we understand well.

我们没有看到那些我们可以购买并且理解得很好的东西。

But you are absolutely right that that’s a far, far, far better way of laying out money than what we’re able to do when buying capital-intensive businesses.

但你绝对是对的，这比我们在购买资本密集型企业时所能做到的要好得多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The chemical companies of America, at one time, were wonderful investments.

查理·芒格：是的。美国的化学公司曾经是很好的投资。

Dow and DuPont sold at 20-some times earnings, and they kept building more and more complicated plants and hiring more Ph.D. chemists, and it looked like they owned the world.

陶氏和杜邦的市盈率在 20 倍左右，他们不断建造越来越复杂的工厂，雇佣更多的博士化学家，看起来他们拥有整个世界。

Now, most chemical products are sort of commoditized and it’s a tough business being a big chemical producer. And in comes all these other people like Apple and Google and they’re just on top of the world.

现在，大多数化学产品都已经商品化，成为大型化学生产商的生意非常艰难。而苹果和谷歌等其他公司则如日中天。

I think the questioner’s basically right that the world has changed a lot, and that the people who have made the right decisions in getting into these new businesses that are so different from the old ones have done very well.

我认为提问者基本上是对的，世界已经发生了很大变化，那些在进入这些与旧行业截然不同的新业务中做出正确决策的人表现得非常好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Andrew Mellon would be absolutely baffled by looking at the high-cap companies now. I mean, the idea that you could create hundreds of billions of value essentially without assets — without tangible assets —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，安德鲁·梅隆看到现在的高市值公司一定会感到困惑。我的意思是，居然可以在几乎没有资产——没有有形资产的情况下创造数千亿的价值——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Fast. 查理·芒格：快。

WARREN BUFFETT: Fast, yeah. But that is the world. I mean, there is —

沃伦·巴菲特：快，是的。但这就是世界。我的意思是，那里有——

When Google can sell you something that — where GEICO was paying 11 bucks or something every time somebody clicked something — that is a lot different than spending years finding the right site and developing, you know, iron mines to supply the steel plants and, you know, railroads to haul the iron to where the steel is produced and distribution points, and all that sort of thing.

当谷歌可以以每次点击11美元的价格向你推销东西——这与花费多年寻找合适的地点、开发铁矿以供应钢铁厂、修建铁路运输铁矿到钢铁生产地以及所有的分销点完全不同。

Our world was built — you know, when we first looked at it, our U.S. — our capitalist system, basically, was built on tangible assets, and reinvestment, and all that sort of thing, and a lot of innovation and invention to go with it.

我们的世界是建立起来的——你知道，当我们第一次看到它时，我们的美国——我们的资本主义系统，基本上是建立在有形资产、再投资以及所有这些东西之上的，还有很多与之相关的创新和发明。

But this is so much better, if you happen to be good at it, to essentially be able to build hundreds of billions of market value without really needing any capital.

但如果你擅长这一点，这样做要好得多，基本上可以在不需要任何资本的情况下创造数千亿的市场价值。

That is a different world than existed in the past. And I think, listen, I think it’s a world that is likely to continue. I mean, the trend is, I don’t think the trend in that direction is over by a long shot.

那是一个与过去不同的世界。我认为，听着，我认为这是一个可能会持续的世界。我的意思是，这个趋势，我认为这个方向的趋势远未结束。

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot of the people who are chasing that sort of thing very hard now in the venture capital field are losing a lot of money. It’s a wonderful field, but not everybody’s going to win big in it. A few are going to win big in it.

查理·芒格：现在在风险投资领域，很多人非常努力地追逐那种事情，但他们正在亏损很多钱。这是一个很棒的领域，但并不是每个人都能在其中获得巨大的成功。只有少数人会在其中获得巨大的成功。

24. Benefits of Berkshire’s “management by abdication”

伯克希尔“放权管理”的好处

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from a shareholder in California, in the Silicon Valley area, who didn’t want his name mentioned because he said he wasn’t looking for publicity, but whose picture makes him appear to be a millennial.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自加利福尼亚州硅谷地区的一位股东，他不想透露姓名，因为他说他并不想寻求公众关注，但他的照片让人觉得他是千禧一代。

“Every Berkshire shareholder knows about the stock market value of Berkshire, but my question is about the value of Berkshire to the world.

“每个伯克希尔的股东都知道伯克希尔的股票市场价值，但我想问的是伯克希尔对世界的价值。”

“For instance, the value of Apple to the world has been iPhones. The value of GEICO is cost-effective auto insurance. The value of 3G,” and I will tell you that there are some shareholders who would be arguing about it here, but “the value of 3G is improved operations.”

例如，苹果对世界的价值在于 iPhone。GEICO 的价值在于经济实惠的汽车保险。3G 的价值，”我会告诉你，这里有一些股东会对此争论，但“3G 的价值在于改善运营。”

“But about Berkshire, I just don’t know. In managing Berkshire’s subsidiaries, as Mr. Munger once famously said, you practice ‘delegation just short of abdication.’ So, hands-on management can’t be the answer.

“但关于伯克希尔，我真的不知道。在管理伯克希尔的子公司时，正如芒格先生曾经著名地说过的，你要实践‘委托权力但不放弃权力’。所以，亲力亲为的管理不可能是答案。”

“That means the majority of Berkshire’s subsidiaries would do just as well if they were to stay independent companies. So that’s my question. What is the value of Berkshire to the world?”

“这意味着伯克希尔的大多数子公司如果保持独立公司也会表现得很好。那么我的问题是，伯克希尔对世界的价值是什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, the — I would say the question about — I’m with him to the point where he says that our — which he accurately describes as “delegation to the point of abdication.”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会说关于——我同意他的观点，他准确地描述了我们的——“委托到放弃的地步”。

But I would argue that that abdication, actually, in many cases, will enable those businesses to be run better than they would if they were part of the S&P 500 and the target, perhaps, of activists or somebody that wants to get some kind of a jiggle in the short term.

但我认为，这种放弃实际上在许多情况下会使这些企业的运营比它们如果是标准普尔 500 指数的一部分，并且成为激进投资者或想要在短期内获得某种波动的人的目标时更好。

So I think that our abdication actually has some very positive value on the companies. But that, you know, you’d have to look at it company by company.

所以我认为我们的让位实际上对公司有一些非常积极的价值。但你知道，这需要逐个公司来考虑。

We’ve got probably 50 managers in attendance here. And naturally, they’re not going to say anything, probably, on television or anything where they knock a certain thing.

我们这里大概有 50 位经理在场。自然，他们可能不会在电视上或其他地方说什么，去抨击某个事情。

But get them off in a private corner and just ask them whether they think their business can be run better with a “management by abdication” from Berkshire, but with also all the capital strengths of Berkshire, that when any project that makes sense can be funded in a moment without worrying whether the banks are still lending, like in 2008, you know, or whether Wall Street will applaud it or something of that sort.

可能会在私下里被问到他们是否认为自己的业务在伯克希尔的“放权管理”下能否更好地运营，同时享受伯克希尔的资本实力，任何有意义的项目都可以迅速获得资金，而无需担心银行是否还在贷款，像2008年那样，或者华尔街是否会称赞这种做法。

So I think our very — our hands-off style, actually, I think can add significant value in many companies, but we do have managers here you could ask about that.

所以我认为，我们非常“放权”的风格实际上能在许多公司中带来显著的价值，但我们确实有经理在这里，你可以问他们。

We certainly don’t add to value by calling them up and saying that we’ve developed a better system, you know, for turning out additives at Lubrizol, or running GEICO better than Tony Nicely can run it or anything of the sort.

我们肯定不会通过给他们打电话，告诉他们我们已经开发出更好的润滑剂添加剂系统，或比Tony Nicely更好地运营GEICO来增加价值。

But we do take a — we have a very objective view about capital allocation.

但我们对资本配置持有非常客观的看法。

We can free managers up. I would say that we might very well free up at least 20 percent of the time of a CEO in the normal public — who would have — otherwise have a public company — just in terms of meeting with analysts, and the calls, and dealing with banks, and all kinds of things that, essentially, we relieve them of so that they can spend all of their time figuring out the best way to run their business.

我们能让经理们更自由。我会说，我们可能让公共公司CEO的时间至少能腾出20%，原本他们要花时间与分析师会面、接听电话、处理银行事务等等，而这些都是我们替他们做了的，以便他们可以花更多时间去思考如何最好地运营他们的业务。

So I think we bring something to the party, even if it — even if we’re just sitting there with our feet up on the desk.

所以我认为我们为聚集带来了些什么，即使我们只是坐在那里，把脚放在桌子上。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We’re trying to be a good example for the world. I don’t think we’d be having these big shareholders meetings if there weren’t a little bit of teaching ethos in Berkshire.

查理·芒格：是的。我们正在努力为世界树立一个好榜样。如果没有一点教学精神在伯克希尔，我想我们不会召开这么大的股东会议。

And I’ve watched it closely for a long time. I’d argue that that’s what we’re trying to do, is set a proper example. Stay sane. Be honest. Yeah. (Applause)

我已经密切关注了很长时间。我认为我们正在努力做的就是树立一个正确的榜样。保持理智。诚实。是的。（掌声）

So I’m proud of Berkshire, and I don’t worry too much if we sell Coca-Cola. (Laughter)

所以我为伯克希尔感到自豪，如果我们卖掉可口可乐，我也不太担心。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We — I would say, you know, GEICO is an extraordinarily well-run company and it would be extraordinarily well-run if it were public.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想说，GEICO 是一家管理非常出色的公司，如果它是上市公司，管理也会非常出色。

But it has gone from 2-and-a-fraction percent of the auto insurance market to 12 percent.

但它已经从汽车保险市场的 2%多一点上升到 12%。

And part of the reason, a small part — the real key is GEICO and Tony Nicely — but part of the reason is that when other — at least two of our competitors — and big competitors — said that they would not meet their profit objectives if they didn’t lighten up their interest in new business, eight or 10 months ago, I think our business decision to step on the gas is a better business decision.

部分原因，虽然只是小部分——真正的关键在于 GEICO 和 Tony Nicely——但部分原因是，当其他至少两个我们的竞争对手——而且是大型竞争对手——在八到十个月前表示如果不减少对新业务的兴趣，他们将无法实现利润目标时，我认为我们决定加大力度是一个更好的商业决策。

整个行业处于比较困难的时候，GEICO会有一些优势。

But I think that GEICO, as a public company, would have more trouble making that decision than they do when they’re part of GEICO [Berkshire].

但我认为，作为一家上市公司，GEICO 在做出这个决定时会比作为 GEICO [伯克希尔]的一部分时更困难。

Because we are thinking about nothing but where GEICO’s going to be in five or 10 years, and if that requires having new— we want new business cost to penalize our earnings in the short-term.

而我们只关注GEICO未来五年或十年的发展，如果这需要新的业务成本在短期内影响我们的收益，那是我们愿意接受的。

And other people have different pressures. I’m not arguing about how the —how they behave, because they have a different constituency than GEICO has with Berkshire and what Berkshire has with its shareholders, in turn.

其他人面临着不同的压力。我并不是在争论他们的行为，因为他们的股东与 GEICO 与伯克希尔的关系，以及伯克希尔与其股东之间的关系是不同的。

And I think in that case, our system’s superior. But it’s not because we work harder. Charlie and I don’t do hardly anything. (Laughter)

我认为在这种情况下，我们的系统更优秀。但这并不是因为我们工作更努力。查理和我几乎什么都不做。（笑声）

25. Structured settlements interest rate

结构性结算的利率

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Could you please talk about your periodic payment annuity business? The weighted average interest rate on these contracts is 4.1 percent, which doesn’t sound particularly attractive given the current interest rate environment.

乔纳森·布兰特：您能谈谈您的定期支付年金业务吗？这些合同的加权平均利率为 4.1%，考虑到当前的利率环境，这听起来并不是特别有吸引力。

Is the duration of these liabilities long enough to make that an attractive cost of funds? Or were these contracts executed primarily when rates were higher?

这些负债的期限是否足够长，以使其成为一个有吸引力的资金成本？还是这些合同主要是在利率较高时签订的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, those contracts — these are what are called structured settlements, primarily.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，这些合同——主要是所谓的结构性结算。

And when somebody young has a terrible auto accident or whatever it may be — perhaps urged by the court, urged by family members who really do have the interest of the injured party at heart, or — they may convert what could be a large sum settlement, probably against the insurance company — you know, maybe a million dollars, maybe $2 million — into periodic payments for the rest of the life of the injured party.

当有人年轻时发生严重的车祸或其他事故——可能在法庭的推动下，或是受到真正关心受害者的家庭成员的建议——他们可能会将可能的一笔大额赔偿金，可能是100万美元，也可能是200万美元，转换为受害者余生的定期支付。

And we issue those for other insurance companies.

我们为其他保险公司发行这些合同。

In fact, sometimes the court directs that Berkshire — or hints strongly — that Berkshire should be the one to issue those, because you’re talking about somebody’s life 30 or 40 or 50 years from now.

事实上，有时法院会要求，或者强烈暗示，伯克希尔应该是发行这些合同的公司，因为你是在谈论某人的生命长达30年、40年或50年。

And the court, or the lawyer, or the family, they want to be very, very sure that whoever makes that promise is going to be around to keep it. And Berkshire has a preferred position in that.

法院、律师或家庭，他们希望非常非常确定，无论是谁做出那个承诺，都能在场履行它。而伯克希尔在这方面处于优先地位。

We look — to get to your question, Jonny — we look for taking the longer maturity situations. We always have.

我们寻找的是更长期的投资机会，乔尼，我们一直都是这样。

And we have to make assumptions about mortality, and we have to make — and then we have to decide at what interest rate we’ll do it.

我们必须对寿命做出假设，然后决定我们会以什么利率来做这些合同。

The 4.1 is a mix of a lot of contracts over a lot of years, obviously. We write maybe 30 million of these, 20 to 30 million a week, looking for the long maturities.

4.1%是许多合同在多年来的一个混合结果。我们每周大约写入2000万到3000万美元的合同，主要是长期合同。

And so, if you take an average of 15 years, or something of the sort, that’s how we come up with that sort of a figure. We adjust them to interest rates at all times.

因此，如果你取一个平均值，大约 15 年，或者类似的东西，这就是我们得出这种数字的方式。我们始终根据利率进行调整。

And when doing that, we’re making an assumption that we’re going to earn more money that — than is inherent in the cost of these structured settlements. It’s a business we’ve — I think we’ve got six or seven billion up now. And we’ll keep doing them.

在这样做时，我们假设我们能赚到比这些结构性结算所固有成本更多的回报。这是一个我们认为可以长期做的业务——目前我们大约有60亿到70亿美元在运作中，我们会继续做这个业务。

And incidentally, probably a significant percentage of the six or seven billion, we’re not yet paying anything on. Somebody else may have the earlier payments. And they’re certainly weighted far out. So it’s a business that we’ll be in 10 or 20 years from now.

顺便提一下，可能有相当大比例的六十或七十亿，我们还没有支付任何费用。可能是其他人已经支付了早期的费用。而且这些费用肯定是远期的。因此，这是一个我们将在 10 年或 20 年后仍然参与的业务。

We’ve got some natural advantage, because people trust us more than any other company to make those payments. And the test is whether we earn, over time, a return above that which we’re paying to the injured party.

我们有一些自然优势，因为人们比信任其他任何公司更信任我们来进行这些支付。考验在于，随着时间的推移，我们是否能获得超过我们支付给受害方的回报。

And that’s a bet we’re willing to make. But if interest rates continued at present levels for a long time — we would, assuming we kept the money in fixed-income instruments — we would — we’d have some loss in that.

这就是我们愿意下注的赌注。但是如果利率在当前水平上持续很长时间——假设我们将资金保持在固定收益工具中——我们会——我们会有一些损失。

We’ve got an allowance in there for the expenses, incidentally, because we do make monthly payments to these people, eventually.

顺便说一下，我们在这里设立了费用的准备金，因为我们确实会每月向这些人支付款项。

And we have to keep track of whether they’re still alive or not. Because you cannot count on the relatives of somebody that’s deceased when a check is coming in every month to notify you promptly that the person has become deceased. But it’s — it’ll —

并且我们需要跟踪他们是否还在世。因为你不能指望一个死者的亲属在每个月有支票进账时及时通知你该人已去世。但这——

That number will go up over time. If interest rates stay where they are, that 4.1 will come down a little bit as we add new business.

这个数字会随着时间的推移而增加。如果利率保持在现在的水平，那4.1%会随着我们新增业务的增加而略微下降。

26. USG investment not “great,” but not a “disaster”

USG的投资不是“伟大”，但也不是“灾难”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, for all you’ve done and the opportunity to learn even more from your approach to investing and life.

观众：谢谢您，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢您们所做的一切，以及让我有机会进一步学习您们的投资和生活方式。

My name’s Harry Hong, and I’m a respirologist from Vancouver, British Columbia.

我叫哈里·洪，是来自不列颠哥伦比亚省温哥华的呼吸科医生。

The question involves, back in 2001, you made an initial investment in USG, shortly before the company declared bankruptcy due to the mounting asbestos liability.

这个问题涉及到，2001 年你对 USG 进行了初始投资，恰好在公司因不断增加的石棉责任而宣布破产之前。

You held those shares through the bankruptcy process, even though standard wisdom says that the equity in Chapter 11 is usually worthless. Can you explain why USG’s equity was a safe investment?

您在破产过程中持有这些股份，尽管标准观点认为第 11 章的股权通常是毫无价值的。您能解释为什么 USG 的股权是一项安全的投资吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t really remember all the details then.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不太记得当时的所有细节了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was very cheap. (Laughter) Very cheap. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这非常便宜。（笑声）非常便宜。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but I would say this. USG, we own — I’m not sure what percent, but it’s very significant percentage. I don’t know what —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但我想说的是。我们拥有 USG——我不确定具体百分比，但这是一个非常重要的百分比。我不知道——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Twenty percent, or something.

查理·芒格：二十个百分点，或者其他什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably 30 percent or something like that. But USG, overall, has just been disappointing because the gypsum business has been disappointing.

沃伦·巴菲特：可能是 30%左右。但整体来看，USG 一直令人失望，因为石膏业务一直令人失望。

And I think — I may be wrong — I think they went bankrupt twice, first from asbestos going back and then, subsequently, because they just had too much debt. So it has not been a brilliant investment.

我认为——我可能错了——我认为他们破产了两次，第一次是因为石棉问题，随后是因为他们的债务太多。因此，这并不是一个成功的投资。

Now if gypsum prices were at levels that they were in some years in the past, it would have worked out a lot better.

现在，如果石膏价格达到过去某些年份的水平，情况会好得多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it hasn’t been terrible.

查理·芒格：但这并没有那么糟糕。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it hasn’t been terrible, but it — gypsum took — has taken a real dive several times, and there has been too much gypsum capacity.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，这并没有糟糕，但石膏确实经历了几次大幅下跌，而且石膏的产能过剩。

And then when it comes back, the managements have been — not necessarily at USG, but including USG perhaps — they’ve gotten more optimistic about future demand than they should have. And it —

然后当它回来的时候，管理层——不一定是在 USG，但可能包括 USG——对未来需求的乐观程度超过了他们应该有的。然后它——

And they like — going back historically a way — they like to build new plants. And it’s a business where the supply has been significantly — potential supply — has been significantly greater than demand in a lot of years. I mean, it —

他们喜欢——从历史上看——他们喜欢建造新工厂。这是一个在很多年里，潜在供应显著大于需求的行业。我是说，这——

You’ve seen housing starts in — since 2008 and 2009 — not come back anywhere near as much as people anticipated. So gypsum prices have moved up but not dramatically.

自 2008 年和 2009 年以来，您看到的住房开工率并没有像人们预期的那样恢复。因此，石膏价格有所上涨，但并不显著。

So just put that one down as not one of our great ideas. Not one of my great ideas. Charlie wasn’t involved in that. It’s no disaster, though.

所以就把那个当作不是我们伟大想法之一吧。不是我伟大想法之一。查理没有参与这个。不过这并不算灾难。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No it isn’t. It’s —

查理·芒格：不是的。它是——

27. “Terrific” insurance operations are even better with Ajit Jain

“绝佳”的保险业务在阿吉特·贾因的带领下更上一层楼

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK (off microphone): This question — this question —

贝基·奎克（未开麦克风）：这个问题——这个问题——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦。

BECKY QUICK: Hello? Oh, there we go.

贝基·奎克：你好？哦，来了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Axel Meyersiek in Germany who writes, “If Ajit Jain were to retire, God forbid, be promoted, what would be the impact on the insurance operations, both with regards to underwriting profit as well as the development of float?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自德国的阿克塞尔·梅耶里克，他写道：“如果阿吉特·贾因退休，天哪，或者被提升，这将对保险业务产生什么影响，无论是承保利润还是浮存金的发展？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, nobody will — could possibly replace Ajit. I mean, it just — you can’t come close.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，没人能——可能替代阿吉特。我是说，这简直——你无法接近。

But we have a terrific operation in insurance. We really do, outside of Ajit, and it’s terrific-squared with Ajit.

但我们的保险业务非常出色。我们确实如此，除了 Ajit 之外，与 Ajit 一起更是出色。

There are things only he can do. But there are a lot of things that are institutionalized, a lot of things in our insurance business, where we’ve got extraordinarily able management, too.

只有他能做的事情。但有很多事情是制度化的，在我们的保险业务中，有很多事情，我们也有非常优秀的管理团队。

So Ajit, for example, bought a company that nobody here has heard of, probably, called Guard Insurance a few years ago, based in worker’s comp, primarily. It’s based in — improbably — in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

所以，阿吉特举例来说，几年前购买了一家可能在这里没有人听说过的公司，叫做 Guard Insurance，主要以工人赔偿为基础。它位于——不可思议的是——宾夕法尼亚州的威尔克斯-巴里。

And it’s expanding like crazy in Wilkes-Barre. And it — it’s been a gem. And Ajit oversees it, but we’ve got a terrific person running it.

而且它在威尔克斯-巴里疯狂扩张。它——它一直是个宝石。Ajit 负责它，但我们有一个出色的人在管理它。

And we bought Medical Protective some years ago. Tim Kenesey runs that. Ajit oversees it, but Tim Kenesey can run a terrific insurance company, with or without Ajit. But he’s smart enough to realize that, if you got somebody like Ajit that’s willing to oversee it to a degree, that’s great.

我们几年前购买了医疗保险公司。蒂姆·肯尼西负责该公司。阿吉特监督它，但蒂姆·肯尼西可以独立运营一家出色的保险公司，无论有无阿吉特。但他足够聪明，意识到如果有像阿吉特这样愿意在一定程度上监督的人，那就太好了。

But Tim is a great insurance manager all by himself, and Medical Protective has been a wonderful business for us. Most people don’t know we own it. The company goes back into the 19th century, actually.

但蒂姆自己就是一个出色的保险经理，而医疗保险公司对我们来说一直是一个很好的生意。大多数人不知道我们拥有它。实际上，这家公司可以追溯到 19 世纪。

We’ve got a lot of good operations. If you look at that section of the annual report called “Other” — insurance company, I mean that is — in aggregate, that is a wonderful insurance company. There’s very few like it. GEICO is a terrific company.

我们有很多好的业务。如果你看看年报中叫做“其他”的部分——保险公司，我的意思是——总体来说，那是一家很棒的保险公司。这样的公司非常少。GEICO 是一家出色的公司。

So, Ajit has made more money for Berkshire than I have, probably. But we’ve still got what I would consider the world’s best property-casualty insurance operation, even without him. And with him, you know, it — nobody, I don’t think anybody comes close.

所以，阿吉特为伯克希尔赚的钱可能比我多。但即使没有他，我认为我们仍然拥有世界上最好的财产和意外保险业务。而有了他，我认为没有人能接近。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a few years ago, California made a little change in its workmen’s compensation law, and Ajit saw instantly that it would cause the underwriting results to change drastically.

查理·芒格：几年前，加利福尼亚对工人赔偿法做了一些小改动，阿吉特立刻意识到这会导致承保结果发生剧烈变化。

And he went from a tiny percent of the market, (inaudible) 10 percent of the market, which is big, and he just grasped a couple billion dollars, at least, out of the air, like it was snapping his fingers. And when it got tough, he pulled back.

他从市场的微小百分比（听不清）增长到市场的 10%，这已经很大了，他就像打个响指一样轻松地获得了至少几十亿美元。当情况变得困难时，他选择了撤回。

We don’t have a lot of people like Ajit. It’s hard to just snap your fingers and grab a couple billion dollars out of the air. (Laughter)

我们没有很多像 Ajit 这样的人。想要轻松地打个响指就从空中抓到几十亿美元是很难的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve — actually, the California Workers’ Comp (inaudible), Guard has moved into that. I — we have got a lot of terrific insurance managers. I mean, I don’t know of a better collection any place. And Ajit has found some of those.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，加州工伤补偿法的变化，Guard已经进入了那个市场。我——我们有很多优秀的保险经理。我不知道哪里还有更好的集合。Ajit发现了一些这样的经理。

I’ve gotten lucky a few times. I mean, Tom Nerney at U.S. Liability, that goes back, what, 15, 16 years. He has a terrific operation. It’s not huge, but it is so well-managed.

我也有过几次幸运的机会。比如，Tom Nerney在U.S. Liability，已经过去了15、16年。他运营得非常好。虽然它不是很大，但管理得非常出色。

And people don’t even know we own these things. But if you look at that last line — and now we’ve added Peter Eastwood with Berkshire Hathaway Specialty. And these are really good businesses, I got to tell you. (Laughs)

人们甚至不知道我们拥有这些公司。但如果你看最后一行——我们现在还增加了Peter Eastwood和Berkshire Hathaway Specialty。我们有非常好的业务，我得告诉你们。（笑）

When you can produce underwriting prowess, and on top of that just hand more float — we don’t have many businesses like that. Those are great businesses.

当你能够展现承保能力，并且再加上提供更多的浮存金——我们没有很多这样的业务。这些都是很好的业务。

We’ve got a hundred — you know, whatever it is — a hundred billion-plus of money that we get to earn on, while at the same time, overall, you know, on balance, we’re likely to make some additional money for holding it.

我们有一百亿——你知道，不管是什么——一百亿以上的钱可以赚，同时，总体上，你知道，综合来看，我们很可能因为持有这些钱而赚到一些额外的收益。

And if you can get somebody to hand you $104 billion and pay you to hold it while you get to invest and get the proceeds, it’s a good business.

如果你能让某人给你 1040 亿美元，并支付你持有这笔钱的费用，同时你可以投资并获得收益，那就是一笔好生意。

Now, most people don’t do well at it. And, you know, the problem is that what I just described tempts lots of people to get into it.

现在，大多数人对此并不擅长。而且，你知道，问题在于我刚才描述的内容诱使很多人参与其中。

And recently, people have gotten into it, really, just for the investment management. It’s a way to earn money offshore. And we don’t do that, but it can be done for small companies with investment managers.

最近，人们真的开始关注这方面，主要是为了投资管理。这是一种在海外赚钱的方式。我们不这样做，但小公司可以通过投资经理来实现。

So there’s a lot of competition in it. But we have some fundamental advantages, plus we have — in certain areas — plus we have absolutely terrific managers to maximize those advantages. And we’re going to make the most of it.

所以竞争非常激烈。但我们有一些基本的优势，再加上在某些领域，我们有绝对出色的管理者来最大化这些优势。我们会充分利用这些优势。

28. Promo for Kraft Heinz Philadelphia Cream Cheese product

卡夫亨氏费城奶油奶酪产品的促销

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve just been handed something Kraft Heinz came out with. They just came out with it commercially a couple days — a few days ago, maybe a few weeks ago. At the directors’ meeting they had this. I had three of these.

沃伦·巴菲特：我刚刚拿到了一些卡夫亨氏推出的东西。他们几天前——也许几周前刚刚开始商业化。在董事会议上他们展示了这个。我尝了三个。

I’m sure that there’s a member or two of the audience that may not approve of it, but they — (laughter) — I got to tell you folks, it’s good.

我相信观众中可能有一两位不赞成，但他们——（笑声）——我得告诉你们，真的很好。

It’s a cheesecake arrangement with topping and Philadelphia Cream Cheese (Inaudible), so you create your own cheesecake.

这是一个奶酪蛋糕的组合，上面有配料和费城奶油奶酪（听不清），所以你可以自己制作奶酪蛋糕。

And I thought that I can eat it while Charlie’s talking. And — (laughter) — you’ll be able to get it at the halftime. It’s selling very well.

我还以为我可以在查理讲话的时候吃它。然后——（笑声）——你可以在中场休息时买到。它卖得很好。

And I think, just so you don’t feel too guilty, I think it’s 170 calories for this cherry one. Like I say, I had three of these here. I don’t mind having five- or 600 calories for dessert, you know. (Laughter)

我认为，为了让你不要感到太内疚，我觉得这个樱桃口味的有 170 卡路里。就像我说的，我这里有三个。我不介意吃五六百卡路里的甜点，你知道的。（笑声）

I’ll let somebody else eat the broccoli and I’ll have the dessert. (Laughter)

我会让别人吃西兰花，我自己吃甜点。（笑声）

So we’ll be eating this, but you, too, at halftime — I think they brought 8- or 9,000 of these. I’ll be disappointed if we don’t run out. Actually, I’ll be disappointed in you, not them. (Laughter)

所以我们会在中场休息时吃这个，但你们也会吃——我想他们带来了 8,000 或 9,000 个。如果我们没有吃完，我会感到失望。实际上，我会对你们感到失望，而不是对他们。（笑声）

29. Subsidiary managers aren’t competing for Buffett’s job

子公司经理并不在竞争巴菲特的职位

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。杰伊？

JAY GELB: This question is on the topic of succession planning.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于继任计划的。

Warren, there seem to be fewer mentions, by name, of top-performing Berkshire managers in this year’s annual letter. Does this mean you’re changing your message regarding the succession plan for Berkshire’s next CEO?

沃伦，今年的年度信中提到表现优秀的伯克希尔经理的名字似乎减少了。这是否意味着你正在改变关于伯克希尔下任首席执行官继任计划的信息？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that’s no. And I didn’t realize there were fewer mentions by name.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是否定的。我没有意识到提到名字的次数减少了。

I write that thing out and send it to Carol [Loomis], and she tells me, “Go back to work.” (Laughs)

我把那件事写出来，发给卡罗尔（卢米斯），她告诉我：“回去工作。”（笑）

I don’t actually think that much about how many personally get named.

我实际上并不太考虑有多少人被提到。

I would say this. And this is absolutely true. We have never had more good managers — now, it’s because we’ve got more good companies — but we have never had more good managers than we have now, so I — but it has nothing to do with succession.

我想说的是。这绝对是真的。我们从未拥有过更多优秀的管理者——现在，这是因为我们有更多优秀的公司——但我们现在拥有的优秀管理者比以往任何时候都要多，所以我——但这与接班人没有任何关系。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that. We don’t seem to have a whole lot of 20-year-olds. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我当然同意这一点。我们似乎没有很多 20 岁的人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Certainly not at the front table. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：当然不在前排桌子上。（笑声）

No, we’ve got an extraordinary group of good managers, which is why we can manage by abdication.

不，我们有一群出色的好经理，这就是为什么我们可以通过放权来管理。

It wouldn’t work if we had a whole bunch of people who were — had come with the idea of getting my job. I mean, if we had 50 people out there, all of who wanted to be running Berkshire Hathaway, it would not work very well. And —

如果我们有一大堆人来这里是为了争夺我的工作，那就行不通。我是说，如果外面有 50 个人都想管理伯克希尔·哈撒韦，那就不会很好。还有——

But they have the jobs they want in life. Tony Nicely loves running GEICO. You know, it — then you go down the line. They have jobs they love.

但他们拥有自己想要的工作。托尼·尼克利喜欢经营 GEICO。你知道，然后你继续往下看。他们都有自己热爱的工作。

And that’s a lot better, in my view, than having a whole bunch of them out there that are kind of doing their job there kind of hoping the guys competing with them will fail so that, when I’m not around, that they’ll get the nod.

在我看来，这比有一大堆人希望他们的竞争对手失败，以便在我不在时能得到提拔要好得多。

It’s a much different system than exists at most American corporations.

这与大多数美国公司的系统截然不同。

Charlie, got anything? 查理，有什么吗？

30. Berkshire’s buying advantage: “There just isn’t anyone else”

伯克希尔的购买优势：“没有其他人可以比”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll go to Station 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们去第 8 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. My name’s Vicky Wei. I’m an M.B.A. student from the Wharton School of Business.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我叫维基·韦。我是沃顿商学院的 MBA 学生。

This is my first time to be in the first — in the annual meeting. I’m really excited about it. Thanks for having us here. My —

这是我第一次参加年度会议。我对此感到非常兴奋。感谢你们让我们在这里。我的——

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks for coming.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们的到来。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is, where do you want to go fishing for the next three to five years? Which sectors are you most bullish on, and which sectors are you most bearish on? Thank you.

观众成员：我的问题是，您希望在接下来的三到五年里去哪里钓鱼？您对哪些行业最看好，哪些行业最看衰？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie and I do not really discuss sectors much. Nor do we let the macro environment or thoughts about it enter into our decisions.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理和我并不太讨论行业。我们也不让宏观环境或对它的想法影响我们的决策。

We’re really opportunistic. And we — we, obviously, are looking at all kinds of businesses all the time. I mean, it’s a hobby with us, almost — probably more with me than Charlie.

我们真的很机会主义。显然，我们一直在关注各种业务。我是说，这对我们来说几乎是一种爱好——可能对我来说比查理更强烈。

But we’re hoping we get a call, and we’ve got a bunch of filters.

但我们希望能接到电话，我们有一堆过滤器。

And I would say this is true of both of us. We probably know in the first five minutes or less whether something is likely to — or has a reasonable chance of happening.

我想这对我们俩都是如此。我们可能在头五分钟内就知道某件事情是否可能发生——或者发生的可能性有多大。

And it’s just going to go through there, and it’s going to — first question is, “Can we really ever know enough about this to come to a decision?” You know, and that knocks out a whole bunch of things.

这将会经过那里，首先的问题是：“我们真的能知道足够的信息来做出决定吗？”你知道，这就排除了很多事情。

And there’s a few. And then if it makes it through there, there’s a pretty good — reasonable chance we’re going to — we may do something. But it’s not sector specific. It —

还有一些。如果它能通过那里，那么我们有相当不错的机会 — 我们可能会采取一些行动。但这并不是特定于某个行业的。它 —

We do love the companies, obviously, with the moats around the product long — where consumer behavior can be, perhaps, predicted further out. But I would say it’s getting harder to — for us, anyway — to anticipate consumer behavior than we might’ve thought 20 or 30 years ago. I think that it’s just a tougher game now.

我们确实喜欢那些产品周围有护城河的公司——在这些公司中，消费者行为可能会被更长远地预测。但我想说，对于我们来说，预测消费者行为变得比 20 或 30 年前想象的要困难得多。我认为现在的游戏就是更艰难了。

But we’ll measure it and we’ll look at it in terms of returns on present capital, returns on prospective capital. We may have — we can —

但我们会对其进行测量，并从现有资本的回报和未来资本的回报来考虑。我们可能会——我们可以——

A lot of people give you some signals as to what kind of people they are, even in talking in the first five minutes, and whether you’re likely to actually have a satisfactory arrangement with them over time. So a lot of things go on fast, but it —

很多人在前五分钟的交谈中就会给你一些信号，告诉你他们是什么样的人，以及你们是否有可能在一段时间内达成令人满意的安排。因此，很多事情发展得很快，但它——

We know the kind of sectors we kind of like to — or the type of business we’d kind of like to end up in. But we don’t really say, “We’re going to go after companies in this field, or that field, or another field.”

我们知道我们喜欢的行业类型——或者说我们希望最终进入的业务类型。但我们并不真的说：“我们要去追求这个领域、那个领域或其他领域的公司。”

Charlie, you want to? 查理，你想要吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Some of our subsidiaries do little bolt-on acquisitions that make sense, and that’s going on all the time. And, of course we like it when —

查理·芒格：是的。我们的一些子公司进行一些小的附加收购，这些收购是有意义的，这种情况一直在发生。当然，我们喜欢这样的情况——

But I would say the general field of buying whole companies, it’s gotten very competitive. There’s a huge industry of doing these leveraged buyouts. That’s what I still call them.

但我想说，整体收购公司的领域变得非常竞争激烈。进行这些杠杆收购的行业非常庞大。我仍然称它们为杠杆收购。

The people who do them think that’s a — kind of a bad marker, so they say they do private equity. You know, it’s like (inaudible) a janitor call himself the chief of engineering or something. (Laughter) And —

进行这些操作的人认为这个术语不好，所以他们称之为私募股权。就像清洁工称自己为首席工程师一样。（笑）

But at any rate, the people who do the leveraged buyouts, they can finance practically anything in about a week or so through shadow banking. And they can pay very high prices and get very good terms and so on.

但无论如何，进行杠杆收购的人可以通过影子银行在大约一周内融资几乎任何东西。他们可以支付非常高的价格并获得非常好的条款等等。

So, it’s very, very hard to buy businesses. And we’ve done well, because there’s a certain small group of people that don’t want to sell to private equity. And they love the business so much that they don’t want it just dressed up for resale.

所以，收购企业是非常非常困难的。我们做得很好，因为有一小部分人不想把企业卖给私募股权投资公司。他们非常热爱自己的业务，不希望它只是为了转售而被包装。

WARREN BUFFETT: We had a guy some years ago, came to see me, and he was 61 at the time. And he said, “Look, I’ve got a fine business. I got all the money I can possibly need.” But he said, “There’s only one thing that worries me when I drive to work.”

沃伦·巴菲特：几年前，有一个人来见我，当时他 61 岁。他说：“听着，我有一门很好的生意。我有我可能需要的所有钱。”但他说：“当我开车去上班时，只有一件事让我担心。”

Actually, there’s more than one guy’s told me that that’s used the same term.

实际上，有不止一个人告诉我，他们使用了同样的术语。

He said, “There’s only one thing that bothers me when I go to work. You know, if something happens to me today, my wife’s left.

他说，“有一件事让我去上班时感到不安。如果今天发生什么事，我的妻子会留下来。

“You know, I’ve seen these cases where executives in the company try to buy them out cheap or they sell to a competitor and all the people —”

“我见过这些情况，公司的高管试图以低价买下它，或者他们卖给竞争对手，然后所有的人——”

He says, “I don’t want to leave her with the business. I want to decide where it goes, but I want to keep running it, and I love it.”

他说：“我不想把生意留给她。我想决定它的发展方向，但我想继续经营它，我热爱这个。”

有可能实现长期利益最大化。

And he said, “I thought about selling it to a competitor, but if I sell it to a competitor, you know, their CFO’s going to become the CFO of the new company, and there, you know, on down the line.

他说，“我考虑过卖给一个竞争对手，但如果我卖给竞争对手，你知道，他们的 CFO 会成为新公司的 CFO，其他人也是如此。”

“And all these people who helped me build the business, you know, they’re — a lot of them are going to get dumped. And I’ll walk away with a ton of money, and some of them will lose their job.” He said, “I don’t want to do that.”

“所有这些帮助我建立业务的人，你知道，他们——很多人会被抛弃。我会带着一大笔钱离开，而他们中的一些人会失去工作。”他说，“我不想那样做。”

And he says, “I can sell it to a leveraged buyout firm, who would prefer to call themselves private equity, but they’re going to leverage it to the hilt and they’re going to resell it. And they’re going to dress it up some, but in the end, it’s not going to be in the same place. I don’t know where it’s going to go.”

他说：“我可以把它卖给一家杠杆收购公司，他们更喜欢称自己为私募股权，但他们会将其杠杆化到极限，然后再转售。他们会稍微包装一下，但最终，它不会在同一个地方。我不知道它会去哪里。”

He said, “I don’t want to do that.” So he said, “It isn’t because you’re so special.” He says, “There just isn’t anyone else.” (Laughter)

他说：“我不想那样做。”于是他说：“这不是因为你特别。”他说：“只是没有其他人。”（笑声）

And if you’re ever proposing to a potential spouse, don’t use that line, you know. (Laughter)

如果你有一天向潜在的配偶求婚，别用那句话，你知道的。（笑声）

But that’s what he told me. I took it well, and we made a deal.

但这就是他告诉我的。我接受得很好，我们达成了协议。

So, logically, unless somebody had that attitude, we should lose in this market. I mean, you can borrow so much money so cheap. And we’re looking at the money as pretty much all equity capital.

所以，从逻辑上讲，除非有人持这种态度，否则我们在这个市场上应该会失利。我的意思是，你可以以如此低廉的价格借到这么多钱。而我们将这笔钱视为几乎全部的股本。

And we are not competitive with somebody that’s going to have a very significant portion of the purchase price carried in debt, maybe averaging, you know, 4 percent or something.

我们无法与那些用大量债务融资的购买者竞争，可能平均利率为4%或更高

CHARLIE MUNGER: And he won’t take the losses if it goes down. He gets part of the profit if it goes up.

查理·芒格：如果股价下跌，他不会承担损失。如果股价上涨，他会获得部分利润。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, his calculus is just so different than ours. And he’s got the money to make the deal.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他的计算方式与我们完全不同。而且他有足够的资金来达成交易。

So, if all you care about is getting the highest price for your business, you know, we are not a good call.

所以，如果你唯一关心的是为你的生意获得最高价格，那么我们就不是一个好的选择。

And we will get some calls in any event. And we can offer something that — wouldn’t call it unique, but it’s unusual.

无论如何，我们会接到一些电话。我们可以提供一些——虽然不能称之为独特，但确实是不同寻常的东西。

The person that sold us that business and a couple of others that have — actually it’s almost, word for word, the same thing they say. They are all happy with the sale they made, very happy.

卖给我们那项业务的人以及其他几个人——实际上，他们说的几乎是逐字相同的内容。他们对自己所做的交易都很满意，非常满意。

And, you know, they are — they have lots and lots and lots of money, and they’re doing what they love doing, which is still running the business. And they know that they made a decision that will leave their family and the people who work with them all their lives in the best possible position.

而且，你知道，他们有很多很多很多的钱，他们在做他们热爱的事情，也就是继续经营业务。他们知道，他们做出了一个决定，这个决定将使他们的家人和与他们一起工作的人在一生中处于最佳状态。

And that’s — in their equation, they have done what’s best. But that is not the equation of many people, and it certainly isn’t the equation of somebody who buys and borrows every dime they can with the idea of reselling it after they, you know, maybe dress up the accounting and do some other things.

而这就是——在他们的方程式中，他们做了最好的选择。但这并不是许多人的方程式，当然也不是那些用尽所有资金进行购买和借贷，想着在稍后可能美化账目并做其他事情再转售的人。

And — but there — when the disparity gets so wide between what a heavily debt-financed purchase will bring as against an equity-type purchase, it gets to be tougher. There’s just no question about it. And it’ll stay that way.

当杠杆融资的购买与股本型购买之间的差距如此之大时，情况变得更难。这一点毫无疑问。而且这种情况会持续下去。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s been tough for a long time, and we’ve bought some good businesses.

查理·芒格：但这已经很艰难很长时间了，我们还是买到了一些很好的公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。

31. “If the board hires a compensation consultant after I go, I will come back”

“如果董事会在我离开后聘请了薪酬顾问，我会回来。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren. This comes from a shareholder who I think is here, who asked to remain anonymous.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦。这来自一位我认为在场的股东，他要求匿名。

Writes: “Three years ago, you were asked at the meeting about how you thought we should compensate your successor. You said it was a good question, and you would address it in the next annual letter. We’ve been patiently waiting. (Laughter)

三年前，在会议上有人问你应该如何补偿你的继任者。你说这是个好问题，你会在下一封年度信中提到这个问题。我们一直在耐心等待。（笑声）

“Can you tell us now, at least philosophically, how you’ve been thinking about the way the company should compensate your successor, so we don’t have to worry when the pay consultants arrive on the scene?”

“你能告诉我们现在，至少从哲学上讲，你是如何考虑公司应该如何补偿你的继任者的，这样我们就不必担心薪酬顾问到场时的情况？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that — unfortunately, at my age I don’t have to worry about things I say — said three years ago, but this guy, obviously much younger, remembers. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，这——不幸的是，到了我这个年纪，我不必担心我三年前说过的话——但这个家伙，显然年轻得多，记得。（笑声）

I’m not — well, I’ll accept his word that I said that. But the — there’s a couple possibilities, actually.

我不是——好吧，我会接受他的话，承认我说过那句话。但是——实际上有几种可能性。

I don’t want to get into details on them, but you may have — and I, actually, would hope that we would have somebody, A) who’s already very rich — which they should be if they’ve been working a long time and have got that kind of ability — that’s very rich, and really is not motivated by whether they have 10 times as much money that they and the families can need or a hundred times as much.

我不想详细讨论这些，但你可能有——而我实际上希望我们能有一个，A）已经非常富有的人——如果他们工作了很长时间并具备那种能力，他们应该是非常富有的——这个人非常富有，实际上并不受他们和家庭需要的金钱是十倍还是一百倍的动机所驱动。

And they might even wish to perhaps set an example by engaging for something far lower than actually what you could say their true market value is. And that could or could not happen, but I think it’d be terrific if it did. But I can’t blame anybody for wanting their market value.

他们甚至可能希望通过以远低于他们真正市场价值的价格参与来树立一个榜样。这可能会发生，也可能不会发生，但我认为如果发生的话会很棒。但我不能责怪任何人想要他们的市场价值。

And then — if they didn’t elect to go in that direction, I would say that you — would probably pay them a very modest amount and then have an option which increased in value by — or increased in striking price — annually.

然后——如果他们不选择朝那个方向走，我会说你——可能会支付他们一个非常适中的金额，然后拥有一个每年增加价值或增加行使价格的选择权。

Nobody does this, hardly. The Washington — Graham Holdings has done it, The Washington Post Company did a little bit — but would increase because it’s assuming that there were substantial retained earnings every year.

几乎没有人这样做。华盛顿——Graham Holdings 做过一点——华盛顿邮报公司做过一点——但会因为假设每年有实质性的保留收益而增加。

Because why should somebody retain a bunch of earnings and then claim they’ve actually improved the value, simply because they withheld the money from shareholders?

因为为什么有人要保留一大笔收益，然后声称他们实际上提高了价值，仅仅因为他们将钱从股东那里扣留了？

So it’s very easy to design that, and in private companies people do design it in that way. They just don’t want to do it in public companies, because they get more money the other way.

这很容易设计，在私营公司中，人们确实以这种方式设计它。他们只是不愿意在上市公司中这样做，因为他们可以得到更多的钱。

But they might have a very substantial one that could be exercised, but where the shareholder’s — the shares had to be held for a couple years after retirement, so that they really got the result over time that the majority of the stockholders would be able to get, and not be able to pick their spots, as to when they exercised and sold a lot of stock.

但他们可能会有一个非常重要的期权，可以在退休后持有几年的股票，以便他们真正得到大多数股东能够得到的结果，而不是能够挑选他们的时间，何时行使和出售大量股票。

It’s — it would — it’s not hard to design. And it really depends who you’re dealing with, in terms of actually how much they care about money and having money beyond what they can possibly use.

这并不难设计。实际上，这真的取决于你所接触的人，他们对金钱的看重程度以及他们拥有的金钱是否超出了他们的实际需求。

And most people do have an interest in that, and I don’t blame them.

大多数人确实对此感兴趣，我不怪他们。

But I don’t know. What do you think, Charlie?

但我不知道。你觉得怎么样，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — one thing I think is that I have avoided, all my life, the compensation consultants. To me it’s a — I hardly can find the words to express my contempt. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我一生中一直避免薪酬顾问。对我来说，这是一种——我几乎找不到词来表达我的蔑视。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: I will say this. If the board hires a compensation consultant after I go, I will come back. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我会这么说。如果董事会在我离开后聘请了一位薪酬顾问，我会回来。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Mad. Mad.

查理·芒格：疯狂。疯狂。

So I think there’s a lot of mumbo jumbo in this field, and I don’t see it going away.

所以我认为这个领域有很多胡言乱语，我看不出它会消失。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, it isn’t going to go away. No, it’s going to get worse. It — I mean, the — if you look at, I mean, the way compensation gets handled, I mean, it — you know, everybody looks at everybody else’s proxy statement and says, “We can’t possibly hire a guy that hasn’t been — ”

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，这不会消失。不，这只会变得更糟。我的意思是，如果你看看，补偿是如何处理的，我的意思是，大家都在看其他人的代理声明，然后说：“我们绝对不能雇佣一个没有——”

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s ridiculous.

查理·芒格：这太荒谬了。

WARREN BUFFETT: —so on. And the human relations department, you know, who work for the CEO, come in and suggest a consultant.

沃伦·巴菲特：——等等。人力资源部门，你知道，负责 CEO 的，进来建议一个顾问。

What consultant is ever going to get another assignment if he says, “You should pay your CEO below the — down in the fourth quartile because you’re getting a fourth quartile result?” It —

什么顾问会在说“你们应该把 CEO 的薪水定在第四分位以下，因为你们的结果也在第四分位”之后再得到另一个任务呢？这——

I mean, it just, you know — it isn’t that the people are evil or anything. It’s just the nature of the situation just — it produces a result that is not consistent with how representatives of the owners should behave.

我的意思是，这只是，人们并不是邪恶的或其他什么。只是情况的性质就——它产生了一个与业主代表的行为不一致的结果。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s even worse than that. Capitalism is the golden goose that we all live on. And if people generally get so they have contempt for it because they don’t like the pay arrangements in the system, your capitalism may not last as well. And that’s like killing the golden goose.

查理·芒格：情况甚至更糟。资本主义是我们所有人赖以生存的金蛋。如果人们普遍对它产生蔑视，因为他们不喜欢系统中的薪酬安排，你的资本主义可能也不会长久。这就像是在杀死金蛋。

So I think the existing system has a lot wrong with it.

我认为现有的系统有很多问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think there is something coming in pretty soon — I may be wrong about this — where companies are going to have to put in their proxy statement the CEO’s pay to the average pay, or something like that. That isn’t going to change anything. I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为很快会有一些事情发生——我可能错了——公司将不得不在其代理声明中披露首席执行官的薪酬与平均薪酬的比例，或者类似的内容。这不会改变任何事情。我的意思是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It won’t change a thing.

查理·芒格：这不会改变任何事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: It won’t change a thing. And, you know, it’ll cost us virtually —

沃伦·巴菲特：这不会改变任何事情。而且，你知道，这几乎不会给我们带来任何成本——

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, it won’t get any headlines, either. It’ll be tucked away.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，这不会引起任何头条新闻。它会被藏起来。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’ll cost us a lot of money, with 367,000 people employed around the world. And, I mean, we’ll hope to get something that makes it somewhat simpler so we can use estimates or something of the sort.

沃伦·巴菲特：这将花费我们很多钱，我们在全球有 367,000 名员工。我意思是，我们希望得到一些使其更简单的东西，以便我们可以使用估算值或类似的东西。

But to get the median income or mean income or whatever, however the rules may read, you know, and —

但是要获得中位数收入或平均收入，或者无论规则如何规定，你知道的，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s what consultants are for, Warren. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这就是顾问的作用，沃伦。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It — it’s, you know, it is human nature that produces this. And, you know, the most —I write in this letter to the managers every two years, I said, “The only excuse I won’t take on something is that everybody else is doing it.”

沃伦·巴菲特：这——这就是人性所导致的。你知道，我每两年给经理们写这封信，我说：“我唯一不会接受某件事的理由就是大家都在做。”

But of course, “everybody else is doing it,” is exactly the rationale for why people did not want to count the costs of stock options as a cost — I mean, it was ridiculous.

但当然，“其他人都在这样做”正是人们不想将股票期权的成本算作成本的理由——我的意思是，这太荒谬了。

All these CEOs went to Washington and they got the Senate, I think, to vote 88 to 9 to say that stock options aren’t a cost. And then a few years later, you know, it became so obvious that they finally put it in so it was a cost. You know, it reminded me of Galileo or something, I mean, all these guys.

所有这些首席执行官都去了华盛顿，我认为他们让参议院以 88 票对 9 票投票，认为股票期权不是成本。然后几年后，你知道，这变得如此明显，以至于他们最终将其列为成本。你知道，这让我想起了伽利略之类的事情，我的意思是，所有这些人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Worse. It was way worse. The pope behaved better to Galileo in the —and he was —

查理·芒格：更糟。糟糕得多。教皇对伽利略的态度要好得多——而他是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, anyway, it’s — it — I would hope, you know, like I say, somebody — well — and it doesn’t even have to be, I’m not talking about the current successor or anybody else.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，无论如何，我希望，你知道，就像我说的，某个人——好吧——而且这甚至不必是，我不是在谈论当前的继任者或其他任何人。

I mean, successors down the line are probably going to have gotten very wealthy by the time they’re running Berkshire. And the incremental value of wealth gets very close to zero at some point. And there is a chance to use it as a different sort of model.

我意思是，将来会有接班人，他们在管理伯克希尔时可能会非常富有。财富的增量价值在某些时候会非常接近零。而且有机会使用不同的模型。

But I don’t have any problem, if it’s — a system is devised that recognizes retained earnings. Nobody wanted — I’ve never heard anybody talk about it, you know, in the 20 boards I’ve been on.

但我没有任何问题，如果有一个系统能够识别留存收益。没有人想过——我从未听到过有人谈论这个，在我参与的 20 个董事会中。

You know, if you and I were partners in a business, you know, and we kept retaining earnings in the business and I kept having the value to buy a portion of you out at a constant price, you’d say, “This is idiocy.”

你知道，如果你和我是合伙人，你知道，我们继续在公司中保留收益，而我不断以固定价格购买你的一部分，你会说，“这简直是愚蠢。”

But of course that’s the way all option systems are designed, and it’s better to be — for the CEO and for the consultants. And of course, usually if there’s — there’s some correlation between what CEOs are paid and what boards are paid.

但当然，这就是所有期权系统的设计方式，对首席执行官和顾问来说更好。当然，通常首席执行官的薪酬与董事会的薪酬之间是有一定关联的。

If CEOs were getting paid at the rate that they got paid 50 years ago, adapted to present dollars, director pay would be lower. So it’s — you know, it’s got all these built-in things that, to some extent, sort of kindle the —

如果首席执行官的薪酬按照 50 年前的水平支付，经过调整后以现在的美元计算，董事的薪酬会更低。因此，这里面有很多内在因素，在某种程度上激发了——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No Berkshire director is in it for the money.

查理·芒格：没有哪个伯克希尔董事是为了钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they are if they own a lot of stock. And they bought it in the market just like the —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果他们拥有很多股票的话，那就是这样。他们在市场上购买的就像——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s —

查理·芒格：是的，这就是——

WARREN BUFFETT: — shareholder did.

沃伦·巴菲特：——股东做了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a very old-fashioned system.

查理·芒格：这是一种非常老式的系统。

WARREN BUFFETT: I looked at one company the other day, and seven of the directors had never bought a share of stock with their own money. Now they’d been given stock, but not one of them — I mean, I shouldn’t say not one — seven of the directors had never actually bought a share of stock.

沃伦·巴菲特：我前几天看了一家公司，七位董事从未用自己的钱购买过一股股票。他们确实得到了股票，但没有一位——我不应该说没有一位——七位董事实际上从未购买过一股股票。

And there they are, you know, making decisions on who should be CEO and how they should be paid and all that sort of thing. But, you know, they never felt like shelling out a dollar themselves. Now they’d been given a lot of stock.

他们在那里，你知道，决定谁应该成为首席执行官，应该如何支付他们的薪酬，以及所有这些事情。但是，你知道，他们从来没有觉得自己应该掏出一美元。现在他们获得了很多股票。

And it’s, you know, we’re dealing with human nature here, folks. (Laughs) And that — what you want is to have a system that works well in spite of how human nature’s going to drive it.

而且，你知道，我们在这里处理的是人性，朋友们。（笑）而你想要的是一个能够良好运作的系统，尽管人性会影响它。

And we’ve done awfully well in this country in that respect. I mean, American business has — overall has done very well for the Americans generally. But not every aspect of it is exactly what you want to teach your kids.

在这方面，我们在这个国家做得非常好。我的意思是，美国的商业总体上对美国人来说做得很好。但并不是每个方面都是你想教给孩子的。

32. BNSF is a “good” business, but probably won’t grow much

BNSF 是一家“好”的企业，但可能不会有太大增长。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren. 格雷格·沃伦：沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

GREGG WARREN: Between 2010 and 2015, intermodal rail traffic enjoyed double-digit rates of revenue growth as shorter-haul freight converted from truck to rail.

格雷格·沃伦：在 2010 年至 2015 年间，联运铁路货运的收入增长率达到了两位数，因为短途货运从卡车转向铁路。

During the past year or so, though, cheaper diesel prices and more readily available truckload capacity have made trucking more competitive, leading to a decline in intermodal rail traffic.

在过去一年左右，较低的柴油价格和更容易获得的整车运输能力使得卡车运输变得更具竞争力，导致了多式联运铁路交通的下降。

While carload growth is expected to be solid longer term, helping to offset weakness in other segments like coal, what impact do you expect the widening of the Panama Canal, which was completed last year, to have on the West Coast port shipments that BNSF has traditionally carried through to exchange points for the Eastern U.S. railroads, as shippers elect to have goods unloaded at ports in the Gulf of Mexico or up the Eastern seaboard?

虽然预计长远来看车载货物增长将保持稳定，有助于弥补像煤炭这样的其他领域的疲软，但你预计完成的巴拿马运河扩建对BNSF传统上通过西海岸港口运输到东部铁路交换点的货物会有什么影响？由于托运人选择在墨西哥湾或东海岸的港口卸货，这可能导致一些流量的丧失。

And while loss of volumes is never a good thing, could there be a small trade-off here as the bottleneck in Chicago, where most East-West cargo is handed off, eases a bit over time, if some of the current traffic gets rerouted?

虽然货运量的减少从来不是一件好事，但如果当前的一些交通被重新引导，随着时间的推移，芝加哥的瓶颈（大多数东西向货物在此交接）稍微缓解，这里是否会有一些小的权衡？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you know — I — Chicago has got lots of problems, and it’s going to continue for a while. I mean, that requires a good solution.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你知道——我——芝加哥有很多问题，而且这些问题还会持续一段时间。我的意思是，这需要一个好的解决方案。

When you think of how the railroads developed, I mean, they — Chicago was the center and, you know, they laid the rails — and there were a whole bunch of different railroads — you know, a hundred years ago. And the city grows up around them and everything. So Chicago is a — can be a huge problem.

当你想到铁路是如何发展的，我的意思是，芝加哥是中心，你知道，他们铺设了铁轨——而且有很多不同的铁路——你知道，一百年前。城市围绕着它们发展起来等等。所以芝加哥是一个——可能是一个巨大的问题。

But getting to intermodal, I think intermodal will do very well. But you are correct that car loadings actually hit a peak in 2006, so here we are 11 years later.

但谈到多式联运，我认为多式联运会表现得很好。但你说得对，货车装载量实际上在 2006 年达到了峰值，所以现在已经过去 11 年了。

And the investment of the five big Class I railroads — four of the biggest — if you look at their investment beyond depreciation, it’s tens and tens of billions of dollars, and we’re carrying less freight before, in aggregate, than we were in 2006. And coal will continue to decrease.

五大一级铁路公司的投资——其中四家是最大的——如果你看看他们在折旧之外的投资，那是数百亿甚至数千亿美元，而我们目前的货运总量比 2006 年时还要少。而煤炭的运输量将继续减少。

It’s a good business, and it has big advantages over truck in many respects. Truck gets much more of a free ride in terms of the fact that their right of way, which is the highway system, is subsidized to a much greater degree beyond the gas tax — you know, we — than the railroad industry.

这是一项不错的生意，在许多方面相较于卡车有很大的优势。卡车在某种程度上享受了更多的“免费通行”，因为它们的通行权，即高速公路系统，得到了比铁路行业更大程度的补贴，超出了燃油税的范围。

But it has not been a growth business, in physical volume, to any great degree. I think it’s unlikely to be. I think it’s likely to be a good business. I think we’ve got a great territory.

但在实际规模上，它并没有大幅增长。我认为这不太可能。我认为这可能是一个好生意。我认为我们拥有一个很好的市场。

I like the West better than the East, and as you mention, you know, there will be some intermodal traffic that gets diverted to Eastern ports perhaps or so on.

我喜欢西部胜过东部，正如你提到的，可能会有一些集装箱运输流量转向东部港口等等。

Overall, I —we’ve got a terrific system in that respect. And we will do well.

总体而言，我——我们在这方面有一个很棒的系统。我们会做得很好。

It would be more fun if we had something where you could expect aggregate car loadings to increase two or three or four percent a year, but I don’t think that’s going to happen.

如果我们有一些可以预期每年集装箱装载量增加两、三或四个百分点的东西，那会更有趣，但我认为这不会发生。

I do think our fundamental position is terrific, however. I think we’ll earn decent returns on capital. But that’s — I think that’s the limit of it.

我确实认为我们的基本立场非常好。不过，我认为我们会获得合理的资本回报。但这就是——我认为这就是它的极限。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

33. Berkshire’s next CEO needs a “money mind”

伯克希尔的下一任首席执行官需要具备“金钱思维”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m from — Shankar Anant from Gurnee, Illinois. Thank you for doing everything you do for us. I have a question.

观众成员：我来自伊利诺伊州的格尼，香卡尔·阿南特。感谢您为我们所做的一切。我有一个问题。

The two of you have largely avoided capital allocation mistakes by bouncing ideas off of one another.

你们两人通过相互交流想法在很大程度上避免了资本配置错误。

Will this continue long into Berkshire’s future? And I’d like to — I’m interested in both at headquarters and at subsidiaries.

这会在伯克希尔的未来持续很久吗？我对总部和子公司都很感兴趣。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It can’t continue very long.

查理·芒格：这不能持续太久。

WARREN BUFFETT: I — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我——（笑声）

Don’t get defeatist, Charlie. (Laughter)

不要消极，查理。（笑声）

Any successor that’s put in at Berkshire, capital allocation abilities, and proven capital allocation abilities, are certain to be uppermost in board’s minds or in, in the current case — in terms of my recommendation, Charlie’s recommendation, for what happens after we’re not around.

任何在伯克希尔任职的继任者，其资本配置能力和经过验证的资本配置能力，必定是董事会最关心的，或者在当前的情况下——就我和查理的推荐而言——在我们不在之后会发生什么。

Capital allocation is incredibly important at Berkshire. Right now we have 280 or -90 billion, whatever it may be, of shareholders’ equity. If you take the next decade alone, you know, nobody can make accurate predictions on this.

资本配置在伯克希尔非常重要。目前我们有 2800 亿或-900 亿，无论是什么，股东权益。如果仅考虑下一个十年，您知道，没有人能对此做出准确的预测。

But in the next 10 years, if you just take — and depreciation right now is another seven billion a year, something on that order.

但在接下来的 10 年里，如果你只考虑——而目前的折旧每年大约是七十亿，差不多是这个数。

The next manager in the decade is going to have to allocate, maybe, 400 billion or something like that, maybe more. And it’s more than already has been put in.

下一个十年的经理可能需要分配大约 4000 亿或更多的资金。这比已经投入的还要多。

So 10 years from now, Berkshire will be an aggregation of businesses where more money has been put in in that decade than everything that took place ahead of time. So you need a very sensible capital allocator in the job of being CEO of Berkshire. And we will have one.

所以在未来 10 年，伯克希尔将是一个商业的集合，在这十年中投入的资金将超过之前所有的投入。因此，作为伯克希尔的首席执行官，需要一个非常理智的资本配置者。我们会有这样的人。

It would be a terrible mistake to have someone in this job where, really, capital allocation might be — might even be their main talent. It probably should be very close to their main talent.

如果某人担任这个职位，但资本配置可能是他们的主要才华，这将是一个巨大的错误。它可能应该非常接近于他们的主要才华。

And of course, we have an advantage at Berkshire, in that we do know how important that is and there is that focus on it.

当然，我们在伯克希尔有一个优势，那就是我们知道这有多重要，并且我们对此很专注。

And in a great many companies, people get to the top through ability, and sales sometimes, if they come from the legal side, something like that — all different sides — and they then have the capital allocation, sort of, in their hands.

在很多公司中，人们往往通过能力、销售等方面的表现，或者他们来自法律背景等不同领域，逐步上升到高层，然后掌握资本配置。

Now, they may not establish strategic thinking divisions. And they may listen to investment bankers and everything, but they better be able to do it themselves.

现在，他们可能没有建立战略思维部门。他们可能会听取投资银行家的意见等等，但他们最好能够自己做出决定。

And if they’ve come from a different background or haven’t done it, it’s a little bit, as I put in one of my letters, I think — it’s like getting to Carnegie Hall playing the violin, and then you walk out on the stage and they hand you a piano.

如果他们来自不同的背景或没有经历过，这就有点像我在一封信中提到的——就像拉小提琴的到达卡内基音乐厅，然后你走上舞台，他们却给你一架钢琴。

I mean, it is something that — Berkshire would not do well if somebody was put in who had a lot of skills in other areas but really did not have an ability to capital allocation.

这是一件——如果某人有很多其他技能，但真的没有资本配置能力的话，伯克希尔不会做得很好。

I’ve talked about it as being something I call a “money mind.” I mean, people can have 120 IQs or 140 IQs or whatever it may be, very similar scoring abilities in terms of intelligence tests. And some of them have minds that are good at one kind of thing and some of them another.

我谈到过这被我称为“金钱思维”的东西。我的意思是，人们可以有 120 的智商或 140 的智商，或者其他什么，智力测试的得分能力非常相似。而他们中的一些人擅长某一种事情，而另一些人则擅长另一种。

I’ve known very bright people that do not have money minds, and they can make very unintelligent decisions. They can do all kinds of other things that most mortals can’t do. But it just doesn’t, it isn’t the way their wiring works.

我认识一些非常聪明的人，但他们没有理财的头脑，可能会做出非常不明智的决定。他们可以做许多普通人无法做到的事情。但这并不是他们思维的运作方式。

And I’ve known other people that really would not do that brilliantly. They do fine, but on an SAT test or something like that. But they’ve never made a dumb money decision in their life. And Charlie, I’m sure, has seen the same thing.

我也认识其他一些人，他们在这方面表现得并不出色。他们的表现还不错，但在 SAT 考试或类似的测试中却不太理想。但他们一生中从未做过愚蠢的金钱决策。我相信查理也见过同样的情况。

So we do want somebody — and hopefully they’ve got a lot of talents — but we certainly do not want somebody that — if they lack a money mind.

所以我们确实希望有人——希望他们有很多才能——但我们绝对不希望有人——如果他们缺乏金钱思维的话。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s also the option of buying in stock, which — so, it isn’t like it’s some hopeless problem. One way or another, something intelligent will be done.

查理·芒格：嗯，还有购买股票的选择，所以这并不是一个无望的问题。无论如何，总会有一些明智的做法。

WARREN BUFFETT: And a money mind will recognize when it makes sense to buy in stock and doesn’t. You know, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：一个有金钱头脑的人会识别出何时买入股票是有意义的，何时不是。你知道，和——

In fact, it’s a pretty good test for some people, in terms of managements, how they think about something like buying in stock, because it’s not a very complicated equation if you sort of think straight about that sort of a subject.

事实上，对于某些人来说，这实际上是一个相当不错的测试，尤其是在管理方面，他们如何看待像购买股票这样的事情，因为如果你对这个主题有清晰的思考，这并不是一个非常复杂的方程。

But some people think that way and some don’t, and they’re probably miles better at something else. But they say some very silly things when you get to something that seems so clear as whether, say, buying in stock makes sense.

但有些人是这样想的，有些人则不是，他们在其他方面可能更出色。但是当你谈到一些看起来非常明确的事情，比如说，购买股票是否合理时，他们会说一些非常愚蠢的话。

Anything further, Charlie?

还有其他问题吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

34. Most financial advisors don’t deserve their fees

大多数财务顾问不值得他们的费用

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Steve Haverstroll (PH) of Connecticut.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自康涅狄格州的史蒂夫·哈弗斯特罗尔（PH）。

“Warren, you have made it very clear in your annual letter that you think the hedge fund compensation scheme of ‘2 and 20’ generally does not work well for the fund’s investors.

“沃伦，你在年度信中明确表示，你认为对冲基金的‘2 和 20’薪酬方案通常对基金的投资者并不奏效。”

“And in the past, you have questioned whether investors should pay, quote, ‘financial helpers,’ unquote, as much as they can. But financial helpers can create tremendous value for those they help.

“在过去，你曾质疑投资者是否应该尽可能多地支付所谓的‘财务顾问’。但财务顾问可以为他们所帮助的人创造巨大的价值。”

“Take Charlie Munger, for instance. In nearly every annual letter and on the movie this morning, you describe how valuable Charlie’s advice and counsel has been to you and, in turn, to the incredible rise in Berkshire’s value over time.

以查理·芒格为例。在几乎每一封年度信件中，以及今天早上的电影中，你都描述了查理的建议和指导对你有多么重要，反过来又对伯克希尔的价值随着时间的推移而显著上升产生了多大的影响。

“Given that, would you be willing to pay the industry standard, quote ‘financial helper’ fee of one percent on assets to Charlie? Or would you perhaps even consider ‘2 and 20’ for him? What is your judgment about this matter?”

鉴于此，您是否愿意支付行业标准的“财务顾问”费用，即资产的百分之一给查理？或者您是否甚至考虑给他“2 和 20”？您对此事的判断是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

Well, I’ve said in the annual report that I’ve known maybe a dozen people in my life — and I said there are undoubtedly hundreds or maybe thousands out there.

好吧，我在年度报告中说过，我一生中可能认识十来个人——我说过，外面无疑还有数百或数千人。

But I’ve said that I’ve known, personally, a dozen where I would have predicted or did predict — in a fair number of those 12 cases — I did predict that the person involved would do better than average in investing over a long period of time.

但我曾说过，我个人认识十几个案例，在这些案例中，我曾预测或确实预测——在这 12 个案例中相当一部分——我预测相关的人在长期投资中会表现得比平均水平更好。

And obviously, Charlie is one of those people. So would I pay him? Sure. But would I take financial advisors as a group and pay them one percent with the idea that they would deliver results to me that were better than the S&P 500 by one percent, and thereby leave me breaking even against what I could have done on my own? You know, there’s very few.

显然，查理就是这样的人之一。那么我会付给他吗？当然。但是我会把财务顾问作为一个整体，支付他们百分之一，期望他们能给我带来比标准普尔 500 指数高出百分之一的回报，从而让我在自己能做到的基础上持平吗？你知道，这种情况非常少见。

So it’s just not a good question to ask whether, you know, I’d pay Charlie one percent. That’s like asking, you know, whether I’d have paid Babe Ruth, you know, 100,000 or whatever it was to come over from the Red Sox to the Yankees. I mean, sure I would have, but there weren’t very many people I would have paid 100,000 to in 1919, or whatever it was, to come over to the Yankees.

所以问我是否会给查理支付百分之一并不是一个好问题。这就像问我是否会给贝比·鲁斯支付 10 万美元，或者其他什么金额，让他从红袜队转到洋基队。我当然会，但在 1919 年，或者其他什么年份，我愿意给 100,000 美元的人并不多，让他们来洋基队。

And so, the — it’s a fascinating situation, because the problem isn’t that the advisors are going to do so terrible. It’s just that you have an option available that doesn’t cost you anything that is going to do better than they are, in aggregate.

所以，这是一种引人入胜的情况，因为问题并不是顾问会做得多糟糕。只是你有一个可用的选项，它不会花费你任何成本，并且整体上会做得比他们更好。

And it — it’s an interesting question. I mean, if you hire an obstetrician, assuming you need one, they’re going to do a better job of delivering the baby than, you know, if the spouse comes in to do it, or if they just pick somebody up off the street.

这确实是个有趣的问题。我的意思是，如果你雇佣了一位产科医生，假设你需要一个，他们在接生方面会比配偶来做或者随便找个路人来做得更好。

And if you go to a dentist, if you hire a plumber, in all of the professions, there is value added by the professionals as a group, compared to doing it yourself or just randomly picking laymen.

如果你去看牙医，或者雇一个水管工，在所有职业中，专业人士作为一个群体所增加的价值，与自己动手或随便选择外行人相比，都是有区别的。

In the investment world, it isn’t true. I mean, they, the active group, the people that are professionals, in aggregate, are not, cannot do better than the aggregate of the people who just sit tight.

在投资界，这并不是真的。我的意思是，他们，活跃的群体，那些专业人士，总体上，做得并不比那些只是静静持有的人更好。

And if you say, “Well, in the active group there’s some person that’s terrific,” I will agree with you. But the passive people can’t all pick that person. And they wouldn’t — they don’t know how to identify them. So I —

如果你说，“在主动投资领域，有些人确实很棒，”我同意。但被动投资者无法识别这些人，他们不知道如何识别。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s even worse than that. The (inaudible) — the expert who’s really good, when he gets more and more money in, he suffers just terrible performance problems.

查理·芒格：情况甚至比那更糟。那个（听不清）——真正优秀的专家，当他获得越来越多的钱时，他会遭遇非常糟糕的业绩问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And so you’ll find the person who has a long career at “2 and 20,” and if you analyze it, net, all the people who’ve lost money because some of the early people have had a good record but more money coming in later and they lose it.

查理·芒格：所以你会发现那些在“2和20”下有长时间职业生涯的人，如果你分析一下，净损失的资金比早期表现良好的人要多，因为他们在资金增加后表现差了。

So, the investing world is just, it’s a morass of wrong incentives, crazy reporting, and I’d say a fair amount of delusion.

所以，投资界简直就是一个充满错误激励、疯狂报道和相当程度幻觉的泥潭。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if you asked me whether I — those 12 people I picked would do better than the S&P working with a hundred billion dollars, I would answer that probably none of them would. I mean, they — that would not be their prospective performance.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果你问我那 12 个人是否会在管理一千亿美元的情况下表现得比标准普尔更好，我会回答可能没有一个人会。我是说，他们的表现不会达到那个水平。

They’re not, but when I was talking of them, I — you know, or referencing them — and when they actually worked in practice, they dealt, generally, with pretty moderate sums. And as the sums grew, their relative advantage diminished.

他们不是，但当我谈论他们时，我——你知道，或者提到他们——而当他们实际上在实践中工作时，他们通常处理的是相对适中的金额。随着金额的增加，他们的相对优势减小。

It — I mean, it’s so obvious from history. The example I used in the report — I mean, the guy who made the bet with me, and incidentally all kinds of people didn’t make the bet with me because they knew better than to make the bet with me.

从历史上看，这是显而易见的。我在报告中举的例子——与我打赌的人，顺便提一句，很多人没和我打赌，因为他们知道和我打赌的后果。

You know, there were hundreds, at least a couple hundred underlying hedge funds. These guys were incented to do well. The fund of fund manager was incented to pick the best ones he could pick. The guy who made the bet with me was incented to pick the best fund of funds.

你知道，至少有几百个底层对冲基金。这些人有激励去做得更好。基金中的基金经理有激励去挑选他能挑选的最好的基金。与我打赌的人有激励去挑选最好的基金中的基金。

You know, and tons of money, and just in with those five funds, a lot of money went to pay managers for what was subnormal performance over a long period of time. And it can’t be anything but that.

你知道，还有大量资金，不仅仅是这五个基金，很多钱用来支付经理的报酬，而他们的表现长期以来都是低于正常水平。这只能是这样。

And it’s an interesting — you know, it’s an interesting profession when you have tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of people, who are compensated based on selling something that, in aggregate, can’t be true: superior performance. So —

这是一份有趣的职业，当你有成千上万，甚至数十万人，他们的报酬是基于销售一些在整体上无法成立的东西：卓越的表现。所以——

But it’ll continue, and the best salespeople will tend to attract the most money. And because it’s such a big game, people will make huge sums of money, you know, far beyond what they’re going to make in medicine or you name it. I mean, you know, repairing the country’s infrastructure, I think.

但这将继续下去，最优秀的销售人员往往会吸引最多的资金。因为这是一个如此庞大的游戏，人们会赚取巨额财富，远远超过他们在医学或其他领域所能赚到的。我是说，修复国家的基础设施，我认为。

I mean, the big money — huge money — is in selling people the idea that you can do something magical for them.

我指的是，大笔的钱——巨额的钱——在于向人们销售一个想法：你可以为他们做一些神奇的事情。

And if you have — if you even have a billion-dollar fund, you know, and get two percent of it — for terrible performance, you make — that’s $20 million.

如果你有一个十亿美元的基金，收取 2% 的费用——即使表现糟糕，你也赚到——这就是 2000 万美元。

In any other field, you know, it would just blow your mind. But people get so used to it, you know, in the Wall — in the field of investment that it just sort of passes along. And $10 billion, I mean, $200 million fees?

在其他任何领域，这都令人震惊。但人们在投资领域对这种情况已经习以为常。这就像是 100 亿美元，收费 2 亿美元？

We’ve got two guys in the office, you know, that are managing $11 billion. Well, no they’re not. I’m sorry. Yeah, they’re managing 20 billion, you know, between the two of them, 21 billion maybe.

我们办公室有两个家伙，你知道，他们管理着 110 亿美元。其实不是，我很抱歉。对，他们管理着 200 亿美元，你知道，他们两个加起来可能是 210 亿美元。

And, you know, we pay them a million dollars a year, plus the amount by which they beat the S&P. They have to actually do something to get contingent compensation, which is much more reasonable than the 20 percent.

你知道，我们给他们每年支付 100 万美元，再加上他们超过标普500的部分。要获得附加报酬，他们必须实际做出一些成绩，这比 20% 的收费合理得多。

But how many hedge fund managers in the last 40 years have said, “I only want to get paid if I do something for you?” You know, “Unless I actually deliver something beyond what you can get yourself, you know, I don’t want to get paid.” It just doesn’t happen.

但在过去 40 年里，有多少对冲基金经理说，“我只想在为你做出贡献时才获得报酬？”你知道，“除非我真的提供超出你自己可以获得的东西，否则我不想获得报酬。”这种情况几乎不存在。

And, you know, it get back — it’s get back — it gets back to that line that I’ve used, but when I asked a guy, you know, “How can you, in good conscience, charge ‘2 and 20?’” And he said, “Because I can’t get 3 and 30.” You know — (Laughter)

而且，你知道，这又回到了我用过的那句话，当我问一个人，“你怎么能良心不安地收取‘2 和 20’？”他回答说，“因为我不能收 3 和 30。”你知道——（笑声）

Any more, Charlie? Or have we used up our —

还有吗，查理？还是我们已经用完了我们的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’ve beaten up on them enough.

查理·芒格：我认为你们对他们的批评已经够多了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯。（笑声）

35. “I love the fact we bought Precision Castparts”

“我喜欢我们购买了精密铸件公司。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Precision Castparts represents the second largest acquisition Berkshire has ever made. There wasn’t much qualitative or quantitative information about it in the 2016 annual.

乔纳森·布兰特：精密铸件是伯克希尔迄今为止第二大收购。在 2016 年年报中对此没有太多定性或定量的信息。

Would you be willing to update us here with how it is doing currently, what excites you about its prospects, and what worries you most about it?

您愿意在这里更新一下它目前的情况吗？您对它的前景感到兴奋的是什么？您最担心的是什么？

I’m also curious if there were any meaningful purchase price adjustments beyond intangible amortization that negatively impacted Precision’s earnings in 2016, as was the case with Van Tuyl in 2015?

我也很想知道是否有任何有意义的购买价格调整，除了无形资产的摊销之外，是否对 Precision 的盈利产生了负面影响，就像 Van Tuyl 在2015年一样？？

And finally, are there any opportunities in sight for bolt-on acquisitions?

最后，是否有任何额外收购的机会？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve actually made acquisitions, and we will make more that fit there, because we’ve got an extraordinary manager. And we’ve got a terrific position in the aircraft field.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们实际上已经进行了收购，并且我们会进行更多适合的收购，因为我们有一位杰出的经理。而且我们在航空领域拥有一个绝佳的地位。

So there will be sensible — there will be the chance for sensible acquisitions. And we’ve already made two, anyway. And we will make more over time. The — it’s —

所以会有明智的收购机会。无论如何，我们已经进行了两次收购。随着时间的推移，我们还会进行更多。这个——它是——

The amortization of intangibles is the only big purchase price adjustment. That’s something over $400 million a year, nondeductible. In my mind, that’s 400-and-some million of earnings.

无形资产的摊销是唯一的大额购买价格调整。这是一年超过4亿美元的摊销，不可抵扣。在我看来，这相当于4亿多美元的收益。

I do not regard the economic goodwill of Precision Castparts being diminished at that rate annually. That is a — and, you know, I’ve explained that in some degree. The —

我并不认为 Precision Castparts 的经济性商誉每年以这种速度贬值。这是一个——你知道，我在某种程度上已经解释过了。——

As a very long-term business, you can worry about 3-D printing. I don’t think you have to worry about aircrafts being manufactured. But aircraft deliveries can be substantially altered in relation to any given backlog in most cases.

作为一个非常长期的业务，你可能会担心3D打印。我认为你不必担心飞机的制造。但飞机交付在大多数情况下可以根据任何给定的积压情况大幅度变化。

So the deliveries can be fairly volatile, but I don’t think the long-term demand is anything I worry about.

所以交付可能相当波动，但我认为长期需求并不是我担心的事情。

And the question is, whether anybody can do it better or cheaper, or like I say, whether 3-D printing at least takes away part of the field in some respects.

问题是，是否有人能做得更好或更便宜，或者像我说的，是否3D打印在某些方面至少会削减一部分市场。

But overall, I would tell you I feel very good about Precision Castparts. It is a very long-term business. I mean, we have contracts that run for a very long time, and like I say, the initiation of a new plane may be delayed or something of the sort.

但总体来说，我可以告诉你，我对精密铸件公司感到非常满意。这是一个非常长期的业务。我的意思是，我们有合同持续很长时间，正如我所说，新飞机的启动可能会被延迟或类似的情况。

But if you take a look at the engine that’s in the other adjoining room here and in our exhibition hall, you would, if you were putting that engine together for the 20 or 25-year life or whatever it may have, carrying hundreds of people, you would care very much about your supplier.

但如果你看看我们展览大厅里那台发动机，你会发现，如果你要组装那台发动机，计划使用20或25年，承载数百人，你会非常在意你的供应商。

关键性的视角-》聪明的假设。

And you’d care not only in the quality, you know — which would be, absolutely you’d care — of the work being done. But you also, if you were an engine manufacturer or an aircraft manufacturer further down the line, you would care very much about the reliability of delivery on something.

而且你不仅会关心工作的质量，你知道——这绝对是你会关心的——但如果你是一个发动机制造商或飞机制造商，你会非常关心某项交付的可靠性。

Because you do not want a plane that — or an engine — that’s 99 percent complete while somebody’s dealing with a problem of faulty parts or anything else that would delay delivery.

因为你不想要一架飞机——或者一台引擎——在 99%完成的情况下，还有人正在处理故障零件或其他任何会延迟交付的问题。

So, the reliability is incredibly important. And I don’t think anybody has a reputation better than Mark Donegan for — and the company — for delivery.

因此，可靠性非常重要。我认为没有人比马克·多尼根和他的公司在交付方面的声誉更好。

So I love the fact we bought Precision Castparts.

所以我很喜欢我们购买了精密铸件公司。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, what’s interesting about them, too, is that it’s a very good business purchased at a fair price under — but this is no screaming bargain like the old days.

查理·芒格：是的，有趣的是，这是一项以合理价格购买的非常好的生意——但这并不是像过去那样的超值交易。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: For quality businesses, you pay up now a lot more than we used to.

查理·芒格：对于优质企业，你现在支付的价格比我们以前高得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s absolutely true, and we — you don’t get a bargain price.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这绝对是真的，我们——你不会以便宜的价格买到。

The 400-plus million incidentally, you know, goes on for quite a while, too.

顺便提一下，那超过4亿美元的摊销，也会持续很长时间。

And we’ll explain it in the report just like — just as we’ll explain that the depreciation charge at a railroad would not be adequate. I mean, it’s the way accounting works.

我们会像解释铁路的折旧费用一样，在报告中解释这一点。这是会计工作的方式。

36. A “really stupid” accounting rule change

一项“真的愚蠢”的会计规则变更

WARREN BUFFETT: And starting — I don’t even want to tell you about this one — but starting the first of next year, accounting is going to become sort of a nightmare in terms of Berkshire and other companies because they’re going to have us mark our equities to market just like we were a Wall Street trading firm or something.

沃伦·巴菲特：而且从明年开始——我甚至不想告诉你这个——但从明年开始，会计将变得有点像噩梦，对于伯克希尔和其他公司来说，因为他们会让我们像华尔街的交易公司一样对我们的股票进行市值计量。

And those changes in the value of Coca-Cola, or American Express, or everything, are going to run through the income account every quarter. In fact, they run through it every day in this theory, so that it really will get confusing.

可口可乐、美国运通或其他一切的价值变化将每个季度反映在收入账户中。实际上，在这个理论中，它们每天都会反映出来，因此这确实会变得令人困惑。

Now, it’s our job to explain things so that you aren’t confused when we report GAAP earnings, but GAAP earnings, as reported, will become even more meaningless, if looking only at the bottom line, than they are now, and —

现在，我们的工作是解释事情，以便在我们报告 GAAP 收益时您不会感到困惑，但如果仅仅看底线，报告的 GAAP 收益将变得比现在更没有意义，并且——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That was not necessarily a good idea.

查理·芒格：这不一定是个好主意。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I think it’s a terrible idea, but we’ll deal with it. And we’ll — and, I mean, it’s my job to explain to what extent GAAP accounting is useful to you in evaluating Berkshire, and the times when it actually distorts things.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我认为这是个糟糕的主意，但我们会处理它。我的工作是向你解释公认会计原则（GAAP）在评估伯克希尔时有多大用处，以及它实际上扭曲事物的时刻。

Accounting isn’t supposed to — it’s not supposed to describe value.

会计不应该——它不应该描述价值。

On the other hand, it’s a terribly useful tool, if understood, in order to estimate value if you’re analyzing businesses. And so, you know, certainly, you can’t blame the auditing profession for doing what they think is their job, which is not to present value. Although, by using these market values —

另一方面，如果理解得当，它是一个非常有用的工具，可以用来估算价值，特别是在分析企业时。因此，你知道，当然，你不能责怪审计行业做他们认为是自己工作的事情，那就是不呈现价值。尽管通过使用这些市场价值——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But you can blame the audit —

查理·芒格：但你可以责怪审计——

WARREN BUFFETT: What’s that?

沃伦·巴菲特：那是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You can blame the audit profession for that one.

查理·芒格：你可以把那个归咎于审计行业。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，嗯。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That was really stupid. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那真是太愚蠢了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I agree with that actually. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我实际上同意这一点。（笑声）

But we will do our best to give you — we’re always going to give you the audited figures.

但我们会尽力给您——我们始终会给您经过审计的数字。

And then we’re going to explain their shortcomings in either direction and how they — how what you should use and what you probably should ignore in looking at those numbers and using them to come to a judgment as to the value of your holdings.

然后我们会解释它们在各个方面的缺陷，以及你应该如何使用这些数字，并且你可能应该忽略哪些内容，以来判断你持有的资产的价值。

And I’ll explain it to you the same way I would explain it to my sisters or anybody else that — you know, we want you to understand what you own. And we try to cover the details that are really important in that respect.

我会像向我的姐妹或其他任何人解释一样来向你解释——你知道，我们希望你理解你所拥有的东西。我们尽量涵盖在这方面真正重要的细节。

I mean, there’s a million things you can talk about that are just of minor importance when you’re talking about a $400 billion market value.

我意思是，当你谈论一个 4000 亿美元的市场价值时，有一百万件事情可以谈论，但它们都只是微不足道的重要性。

But they’re the things that, if Charlie and I were talking about the company, that they’d be the figures or the interpretations or anything that we would regard as important in sort of coming to an estimate of the value of the business. But it’s going to be —

但这些是，如果查理和我在谈论公司时，它们是我们认为在估算业务价值时重要的数字或解释。但这将是——

You can’t knock the media. I mean, they’ve only got a few paragraphs to describe the earnings at Berkshire every quarter. But if they simply look at bottom line numbers, what can be silly this year will become absolutely ludicrous next year because of the new rule that comes into effect for 2018.

你不能批评媒体。我的意思是，他们每个季度只有几段文字来描述伯克希尔的收益。但是如果他们只是看底线数字，今年看起来愚蠢的事情明年可能会变得绝对荒谬，因为 2018 年将生效的新规则。

37. Munger: China’s stock market is cheaper than U.S.

芒格：中国的股市比美国便宜。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello Warren. This is a question from China.

观众成员：你好，沃伦。这是来自中国的问题。

VOICE: (Inaudible) 声音：（听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me?

沃伦·巴菲特：请问？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Jeff Chan (PH), a pension fund manager from China, Shanghai. My question is quite simple.

观众成员：我是杰夫·陈（PH），来自中国上海的养老金基金经理。我的问题很简单。

What is the probability of duplicating your great investment track record in China’s stock market the next decades or two in terms of a (inaudible)? That’s all.

在未来几十年中，在中国股市复制您出色投资业绩的概率是多少（听不清）？就这些。

And I thank my friends from (FOREIGN LANGUAGE) Fund Management House for guiding me in writing this question. Thank you.

我感谢（外语）基金管理公司我的朋友们指导我写这个问题。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you’re the expert on China. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你是中国专家。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s like determining the order of precedency between a louse and a flea. Yeah.

查理·芒格：这就像确定虱子和跳蚤之间的优先顺序。是的。

I do think that the Chinese stock market is cheaper than the American market. And I do think China has a bright future. And I also think that there’ll be growing pains, of course. And —

我确实认为中国股市比美国市场便宜。我也认为中国有光明的未来。当然，我也认为会有成长的烦恼。还有——

But — 但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have this opportunistic way of going through life. We don’t have any particular rules about which market we’re in or anything like that.

查理·芒格：我们有一种机会主义的生活方式。我们没有关于我们所处市场的任何特定规则或其他类似的东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie’s delivered a headline anyway, now: “Munger Predicts China Market Will Outperform U.S.” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，查理总算给了个标题：“芒格预测中国市场将超越美国。”（笑声）

38. Berkshire and 3G’s different approaches to job cuts

伯克希尔和 3G 在裁员方面的不同做法

WARREN BUFFETT: Panel all here? OK. We’re back for action. And we’ll go right to Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：大家都在吗？好的。我们回来了。接下来我们直接请贝基发言。

BECKY QUICK: All right. This question comes from Anne Newman (PH). She says that she’s a shareholder of the Class B stock.

贝基·奎克：好的。这个问题来自安妮·纽曼（PH）。她说她是 B 类股票的股东。

And her question is, “The primary investment strategy of 3G Capital is extreme cost-cutting after the purchase of a company. This typically includes the elimination of thousands of jobs.

她的问题是：“3G 资本的主要投资策略是在收购公司后进行极端的成本削减。这通常包括裁减数千个职位。”

“With the current U.S. president focusing on retention of U.S. jobs, will Berkshire Hathaway still consider future investments with 3G Capital if those investments result in the purchase of U.S. companies and the elimination of more U.S. jobs?”

“在当前美国总统专注于保留美国就业的情况下，伯克希尔·哈撒韦是否仍会考虑与 3G 资本进行未来投资，如果这些投资导致收购美国公司并消除更多美国就业？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, the, essentially, 3G management — and I’ve watched them up very close at Kraft Heinz — is — basically, they don’t — they believe in having a company as productive as possible.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，基本上，3G 管理层——我在卡夫亨氏非常近距离地观察过他们——基本上，他们不——他们相信让公司尽可能高效。

And, of course, the gains in this world, for the people in this room, and people in Omaha, and people throughout America, have come through gains in productivity.

当然，这个世界的收益，对于在座的各位、奥马哈的人们以及全美人民，都是通过生产力的提升而获得的。

If there had been no change in productivity, we would be living the same life as people lived in 1776.

如果生产力没有变化，我们将过着与 1776 年人们相同的生活。

Now, the people — the 3G people — do it very fast. And they’re very good at making a business productive with fewer people than operated before.

现在，3G 人做事非常快。他们非常擅长用比以前更少的人来提高业务的生产力。

But that — they’ve been, you know, we’ve been doing that in every industry, whether it’s steel, or cars, or you name it. And that’s why we live as well as we do.

但这一点——他们一直在这样做，你知道，我们在每个行业都在这样做，无论是钢铁、汽车，还是其他任何行业。这就是我们生活得如此美好的原因。

We prefer at Berkshire — I wrote about this a year ago — we prefer to buy companies that are already run efficiently because, frankly, we don’t enjoy the process at all of getting more productive. I mean, it’s not pleasant.

我们在伯克希尔更喜欢——我一年前写过——我们更喜欢购买那些已经高效运营的公司，因为坦率地说，我们一点也不喜欢提高生产力的过程。我的意思是，这并不愉快。

But it is what has enabled the country to progress. And nobody has figured out a way to double people’s consumption per capita without, in some way, improving productivity per capita.

但这正是使国家得以进步的原因。而且没有人找到一种方法可以在不以某种方式提高人均生产力的情况下，使人均消费翻倍。

It’s a good question in the — whether it’s smart overall if you think you’re going to suffer politically because political consequences do hit businesses. So I don’t know that I can answer the question categorically.

这是一个好问题——如果你认为在政治上会遭受影响，那么整体上是否明智，因为政治后果确实会影响企业。所以我不确定我能否明确回答这个问题。

But I can tell you that they not only focus on productivity and do it in a very intelligent way, but they also focus, to a terrific degree, on product improvement, innovation, and all of the other things that you want a management to focus on.

但我可以告诉你，他们不仅专注于生产力，并且以非常明智的方式做到这一点，他们还在产品改进、创新以及你希望管理层关注的所有其他方面，投入了极大的精力。

And I hope that, at the lunchtime, if you had the Kraft Heinz cheesecake, you’ll agree with me that product improvement and innovation there is a — is just as much a part of the 3G playbook as productivity. I don’t —

我希望在午餐时间，如果你尝过卡夫亨氏的芝士蛋糕，你会同意我说，产品改进和创新与生产力一样，是 3G 操作手册的一部分。我不——

Personally, we have been through the process of buying into a textile business that employed a couple thousand people and went out of business over a period of time, or a department store, a business that was headed for oblivion.

我们个人经历过购买一家雇佣了几千人的纺织企业的过程，该企业在一段时间内倒闭，或者是一家即将消失的百货商店。

And it is just not as much fun to be in a business that cuts jobs rather than one that adds jobs.

所以，在一个削减就业岗位的业务中工作，并不如在一个增加就业岗位的业务中工作那样有趣。

So, Charlie and I would probably forego, personally, having Berkshire directly buy businesses where the main benefits were come — would come from increasing productivity by actually having fewer workers.

所以，查理和我可能会选择避免伯克希尔直接收购那些主要通过减少员工来提高生产力的公司。

But I think it’s pro-social to think in terms of improving productivity. And I think that people at 3G do a very good job at that.

但我认为从提高生产力的角度思考是有利于社会的。我认为 3G 的员工在这方面做得非常好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree. I don’t see anything wrong with increasing productivity. On the other hand, there’s a lot of counterproductive publicity to doing it. Just because you’re right doesn’t mean you should always do it.

查理·芒格：我同意。我认为提高生产力没有什么错。另一方面，做这件事有很多适得其反的宣传。仅仅因为你是对的，并不意味着你总是应该这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’d agree with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我同意这一点。

39. Pressure to deploy Berkshire’s cash grows as it nears $100B

随着伯克希尔的现金接近 1000 亿美元，部署现金的压力不断增加。

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？

JAY GELB: Berkshire’s cash and Treasury bill holdings are approaching $100 billion.

杰伊·盖尔布：伯克希尔的现金和国库券持有量接近 1000 亿美元。

Warren, a year ago, you said Berkshire might increase its minimum valuation for share buybacks above 1.2 times book value if this occurred. What are your latest thoughts on raising the share repurchase threshold?

沃伦，一年前，你说如果发生这种情况，伯克希尔可能会将其股票回购的最低估值提高到超过账面价值的 1.2 倍。你对提高股票回购门槛的最新看法是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — when the time comes — and it could come reasonably soon, even while I’m around — but [if] we really don’t think we can get the money out in a reasonable period of time into things we like, we have to reexamine then what we do with those funds that we don’t think can be deployed well.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当时机来临时——而且这可能会很快到来，甚至在我还在的时候——但是如果我们真的认为无法在合理的时间内将资金投入我们喜欢的项目，我们就必须重新审视那些我们认为无法很好部署的资金该如何处理。

And at that time, we’d make a decision. And it might include both, but it could be repurchases. It could be dividends.

到那时，我们会做出决定。可能会包括两者，但也可能是回购。也可能是分红。

There are different inferences that people draw from a dividend policy than from a repurchase policy that, in terms of expectations that you won’t cut a dividend and that sort of thing. So you have to factor that all in.

人们从分红政策和回购政策中得出的推论是不同的，尤其是在对不会削减分红等期望方面。因此，您必须将所有这些因素考虑在内。

But if we really — if we felt that we had cash that was unlikely to be used — excess cash — in a reasonable period of time, and we thought repurchases at a price that was still attractive to continuing shareholders was feasible in a substantial sum, that could make a lot of sense.

但如果我们真的——如果我们觉得我们有不太可能在合理时间内使用的现金——多余的现金——而且我们认为以对持续股东仍然有吸引力的价格进行大规模回购是可行的，那就非常有意义。

At the moment, we’re still optimistic enough about deploying the capital that we wouldn’t be inclined to move to a price much closer where there’s only a narrow spread between an intrinsic value and the repurchase price. But at a point, the burden of proof is definitely on us.

目前，我们对资本的部署仍然足够乐观，以至于我们不倾向于将回购价格提高到一个与内在价值之间只有狭窄差距的水平。但有一点，证明责任绝对在我们这边。

I mean, that — I — the last thing we like to do is own something at a hundred times earnings where the earnings can’t grow.

我的意思是，我们最不想做的就是拥有那些市盈率高达一百倍但收益无法增长的东西。

I mean, we’re — as you point out, we’ve got almost a hundred billion — it’s $90-plus billion invested in a business, we’ll call it a business, where we’re paying almost a hundred times earnings. And it’s kind of a lousy business.

我的意思是，正如你所指出的，我们已经投资了近一千亿美元——超过九百亿美元，投入到一个我们称之为商业的领域，而我们支付的价格几乎是盈利的百倍。而这实际上是一个糟糕的生意。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s more after after-tax earnings.

查理·芒格：这是在税后收益之后的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. So, it — you know, we don’t like that. And we shouldn’t use your money that way for a long period of time. And, then, the question is, you know, are we going to be able to deploy it?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。所以，我们不喜欢那样。而且，我们不应该长时间以那种方式使用你的钱。然后，问题是，我们能否将其投入使用？

And I would say that history is on our side, but it’d be more fun if the phone would ring instead of just relying on history books.

我会说历史对我们有利，但如果电话能响起，而不是仅仅依赖历史书，那会更有趣。

And, you know, I am sure that sometime in the next 10 years — and it could be next week or it could be nine years from now — there will be markets in which we can do intelligent things on a big scale.

而且，你知道，我相信在接下来的 10 年里——可能是下周，也可能是九年后——会有市场让我们能够大规模地做一些明智的事情。

But it would be no fun if that happens to be nine years off. And I don’t think it will be, but just based on how humans behave and how governments behave and how the world behaves.

但如果这发生在9年后，那将没有趣味。我不认为会这样，但仅仅基于人类行为、政府行为和世界行为。

每10年有重大的机会，后面几年的看法改为每20年有重大机会。

But like I say, at a point, the burden of proof really shifts to us, big-time. And there’s no way I can come back here three years from now and tell you that we hold 150 billion or so in cash or more, and we think we’re doing something brilliant by doing it.

但正如我所说，有一点，证明责任确实完全转移到我们这边。三年后我不能再回来告诉你，我们持有1500亿美元或更多现金，并且我们认为这样做非常聪明。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you. The answer is maybe. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我同意你的看法。答案可能是。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He does have a tendency to elaborate. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他确实有详细阐述的倾向。（笑声）

40. CTB and animal rights

CTB 和动物权利

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I am Anil Daron (PH) from Short Hills, New Jersey and New Delhi, India.

观众成员：谢谢您，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自新泽西州短山和印度新德里的阿尼尔·达龙。

This is my 18th time to this wonderful event, and profoundly thank you for your extraordinary wisdom, generosity, and time.

这是我第 18 次参加这个精彩的活动，衷心感谢您非凡的智慧、慷慨和时间。

As I’m involved with sustainable investments that also do not directly harm animals, I would appreciate your perspective, if any, on the practices of your CTB subsidiary, which is somewhat involved in pig, poultry, and egg production.

由于我参与可持续投资，并且这些投资不会直接伤害动物，我希望能听听您对贵公司 CTB 子公司在猪、家禽和蛋类生产方面的做法的看法（如果有的话）。

Somewhat indirectly related, as you share your concern on nuclear war extensively at the last annual meeting, I would love to pick your brain on Albert Schweitzer’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, shortly after the first nuclear bombs were detonated, that compassion can attain its full breadth and depth if it is not limited to humans only. Thank you.

此外，您在上次年度会议上广泛讨论了对核战争的担忧，我也希望了解您对阿尔贝特·施韦itzer诺贝尔和平奖接受演讲的看法，他在首次核弹爆炸后不久提到，如果同情心不局限于人类，它可以达到其全部的广度和深度。谢谢

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a pretty broad question. I would say on your first point, we have a subsidiary, CTB, run by Vic Mancinelli. And I sit down with him once a year. And he’s a terrific manager. He’s one of our very best. You don’t hear much about him.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个相当广泛的问题。我想在你提到的第一点上，我们有一个子公司，CTB，由维克·曼辛内利管理。我每年和他坐下来谈一次。他是一位出色的经理，是我们最优秀的经理之一。你很少听到关于他的消息。

And they do make the equipment for poultry growers. And I would — I can’t answer your question specifically, but I would be glad to have you get in contact with Vic directly because I know that what — question you raised is a — it’s a major factor in what they do.

他们确实为禽类养殖者制造设备。我不能具体回答你的问题，但我很高兴你能直接联系 Vic，因为我知道你提到的问题是他们工作中的一个主要因素。

I mean, they do care about how the equipment is used, in terms of poultry and egg production. And, as you know, a number of the largest purchasers and the largest producers are also in the same camp. But I can’t tell you enough about it directly that I can give you a specific answer.

我的意思是，他们确实关心设备的使用，特别是在家禽和蛋类生产方面。正如你所知道的，一些最大的采购商和生产商也在同一阵营。但我无法直接告诉你足够的信息，以便给你一个具体的答案。

But I can certainly put you in touch with Vic. And I think you would find him extremely well-informed and doing some very good things in the area that you’re talking about.

但我可以肯定地把你介绍给 Vic。我认为你会发现他非常了解情况，并且在你所谈论的领域做了一些非常好的事情。

In terms of the nuclear weapon question, I’m very pessimistic on weapons of mass destruction, generally. Although, I don’t think that nuclear, probably, is quite as likely as either biological — primarily, biological — and maybe cyber. I don’t know that much about cyber.

在核武器问题上，我对大规模杀伤性武器总体上非常悲观。尽管我认为核武器的可能性可能不如生物武器——主要是生物武器——以及网络攻击那么高。我对网络了解得不多。

But I do think that’s the number one problem with mankind. But I don’t think I can say anything particularly constructive on it now.

但我确实认为这是人类面临的头号问题。但我现在觉得我无法对此说出任何特别建设性的意见。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think we mind killing chickens. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我觉得我们并不介意杀鸡。（笑声）

And I do think we’re against nuclear war, so — (Laughter)

我确实认为我们反对核战争，所以——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）

We are not actually a poultry producer, but we do — they use our equipment. And that equipment has been changed substantially in the last 10 or 15 years.

我们实际上并不是家禽生产商，但他们确实使用我们的设备。在过去的 10 到 15 年里，这些设备发生了重大变化。

But, again, I’m not that good on the specifics that I can give them to you. But I can certainly you put you in touch with Vic.

但是，我对具体细节不是很了解，无法提供给你。不过，我可以把你介绍给 Vic。

41. Giving Weschler and Combs more to manage wouldn’t help them

给韦施勒和科姆斯更多的管理任务并不会对他们有帮助。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew ? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren. Since Todd [Combs] and Ted [Weschler] joined Berkshire, the market cap of the company has doubled, and cash on hand is now nearly a hundred billion dollars.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦。自从托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒加入伯克希尔以来，公司的市值已经翻了一番，手头现金现在接近一千亿美元。

It doesn’t look like Todd and Ted have been allocated new capital on the same relative basis. Why?

看起来托德和泰德并没有在相同的相对基础上获得新的资本。为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually, I would say they have been.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，实际上，我想说他们一直是。

I think we started out with two billion. That could be wrong, but my memory was two billion with Todd when he came with us. And so, there have been substantial additions.

我认为我们一开始有二十亿。这可能不对，但我记得当托德和我们在一起时是二十亿。因此，后来有了大量的增加。

And, of course, their own capital has grown just because — say, in a sense, they retain their own earnings.

当然，他们的资本增长只是因为——可以说，从某种意义上讲，他们保留了自己的收益。

So yeah, they are managing a proportion of Berkshire’s capital — also measured by marketable securities — I think they’re managing a proportion that’s pretty similar, maybe even a little higher than when each one of them entered. And Ted entered a year or two after Todd.

所以是的，他们正在管理伯克希尔资本的一部分——同样以可交易证券来衡量——我认为他们管理的比例相当相似，甚至可能比他们每个人进入时稍高一些。而泰德是在托德之后一两年进入的。

You know, they — I think they would agree that it’s tougher to run 10 billion than it is to run one or two billion. I mean, your expectable returns go down as you get into larger sums.

你知道，他们——我想他们会同意，管理 100 亿比管理一两亿要困难得多。我的意思是，随着金额的增加，你的预期回报会下降。

But the decision to bring them on has been terrific. I mean, they have — they’ve done a good job of managing marketable securities. They made more money than I would’ve made with that same, what is now 20 billion, but originally was two billion.

但决定引入他们是非常成功的。我的意思是，他们在管理可交易证券方面做得很好。他们赚的钱比我用那同样的、现在是 200 亿但最初是 20 亿的资金赚得还多。

And they’ve been a terrific help in a variety of ways beyond just money management. So that decision, I’ll — you know — that’s been a very, very good decision.

他们在多方面提供了极大的帮助，不仅仅是资金管理。因此，这个决定，我会——你知道——这是一个非常非常好的决定。

And they are — they’re smart. They have money minds. They are good, specifically, at investment management. But they’re absolutely first-class human beings. And they really fit at Berkshire. So, that was —

他们很聪明。他们有商业头脑。他们在投资管理方面特别出色。但他们绝对是第一流的人。并且他们非常适合伯克希尔。所以，这就是——

Charlie gets credit for Todd. He met Charlie first. And I’ll claim credit for Ted. And I think we both feel very good about the decisions.

查理得到了托德的功劳。他先见到了查理。我会为泰德争取功劳。我想我们都对这些决定感到非常满意。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the shareholders are very lucky to have them because they both think like shareholders.

查理·芒格：我认为股东们很幸运能拥有他们，因为他们都像股东一样思考。

WARREN BUFFETT: Totally. 沃伦·巴菲特：完全正确。

CHARLIE MUNGER: After all, it came up that way. And that is not the normal way headquarters employees think. It’s a pretense that everybody takes on, but the reality is different.

查理·芒格：毕竟，他们就是这样思考的。这不是总部员工的正常思维方式。大家通常装作如此，但现实情况不同。

And these people really, deeply think like shareholders. And they’re young, and smart, and constructive. So we’re all very lucky to have them around.

这些人真的非常像股东一样思考。他们年轻、聪明且具有建设性。因此，我们都很幸运能有他们在身边。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Their mindset is a hundred percent, “What can I do for Berkshire,” not, “What can Berkshire do for me?” And, believe me, you can spot that over time with people.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们的心态完全是“我能为Berkshire做些什么”，而不是“Berkshire能为我做些什么”。相信我，你可以从时间中发现这一点。

And on top of that, you know, they’re very talented.

而且，他们非常有才华。

But, you know, it’s hard to find people young, ambitious, very smart, that don’t put themselves first. And I would — every experience we’ve had, they did not put themselves first. They put Berkshire first.

但是，你知道，找到年轻、有抱负、非常聪明且不把自己放在第一位的人是很难的。而我会说——我们经历的每一件事，他们都没有把自己放在第一位。他们把伯克希尔放在第一位。

And believe me, I can spot it when people are extreme in one direction or another. Maybe I’m not so good around the middle, but you’ve got —

相信我，当人们在某个方向上极端时，我能察觉到。也许我在中间的表现不太好，但你有——

You couldn’t have two better people in those positions.

你不可能找到更合适的人担任这些职位。

But — and you say, “Well, why don’t you give them another 30 billion each or something?” I don’t think that would improve their lives or their performance.

但是——你会说，“那么，为什么不再给他们每人 30 亿或者其他什么呢？”我认为这不会改善他们的生活或表现。

They may be handling more as they go along, but the truth is, I’ve got more assigned to me than I can handle at the present time, as proven by the fact that we’ve got this 90 billion-plus around.

他们可能会随着时间的推移处理更多的事情，但事实是，我目前被分配的工作超过了我能处理的能力，这一点从我们有超过 900 亿的事实可以证明。

I think there are reasonable prospects for using it. But if you told me I had to put it to work today, I would not like the prospect.

我认为使用它是有合理前景的。但是如果你告诉我今天必须开始使用它，我就不太喜欢这个前景。

Charlie, anything? 查理，有什么补充？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that. It’s a lot harder now than it was at times in the past.

查理·芒格：我当然同意这一点。现在比过去的某些时候要困难得多。

42. Private transactions not needed now for Class A shares

目前不需要进行私人交易以购买 A 类股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Gregg? 沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren, plans for your ownership stake, which is heavily concentrated in Class A shares, are fairly well known, with the bulk of the stock going to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and four different family charities over time.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，关于您持有的股份计划，主要集中在 A 类股票上，这些计划相当知名，绝大部分股票将随着时间的推移转给比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会以及四个不同的家庭慈善机构。

Your annual pledges to these different charities involve the conversion of Class A shares, which hold significantly greater voting rights than the Class B shares.

您对这些不同慈善机构的年度承诺涉及 A 类股份的转换，A 类股份的投票权显著高于 B 类股份。

As such, the voting control held by your estate will diminish over time, with a whole layer of super-voting shares being eliminated in the process.

因此，您遗产所持有的投票控制权将随着时间的推移而减少，整个超级投票股份的层次将在此过程中被消除。

While the voting influence of Class B shareholders are expected to increase over time, it will not be large enough to have a big influence on Berkshire’s affairs.

虽然 B 类股东的投票影响力预计会随着时间的推移而增加，但这并不足以对伯克希尔的事务产生重大影响。

With that in mind, and recognizing the great importance on having Berkshire buy back and retire Class A shares in the long run, I was just wondering if the firm has compiled a pipeline of potential future sellers from the ranks of the company’s existing shareholders.

考虑到这一点，并认识到长期内让伯克希尔回购并注销 A 类股票的重要性，我只是想知道公司是否已经从现有股东中汇总了一批潜在的未来卖家。

Given the limited amount of liquidity for the shares, privately negotiated transactions with these sellers, like the one you negotiated in December of 2012, would end up being in the best interest of both parties.

鉴于股票流动性有限，与这些卖方进行私下协商的交易，比如您在 2012 年 12 月谈判的交易，将对双方都最有利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, again, it would depend on the price of Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这又要看伯克希尔的价格。

So, in terms of what I give away annually, you know, it’s — the last two years, it’s been about 2.8 billion per year. That can be — you know that’s one day’s trading in Apple.

所以，就我每年捐赠的金额而言，过去两年大约是每年 28 亿。这可以说是——你知道，这相当于苹果公司一天的交易额。

I mean, the amount I’m giving away is, in terms of Berkshire’s market cap, I mean, you know, you’re down to seven-tenths of one percent of the market cap. So, it’s not a big market factor, and it really wouldn’t be that illiquid.

我捐赠的金额在Berkshire市值中，只有不到0.7%。所以，这并不是一个大的市场因素，实际上不会有太大的流动。

So, I know a few big holders that, you know, might have 8- or 10,000 shares of A. But the market can handle it now.

所以，我知道一些大的持股者，可能有8000到10000股A类股票。但市场现在可以处理它。

When we bought that block of — I think it was 12,000 shares of A, I mean, we bought it because we thought it increased the intrinsic business value of Berkshire by a significant amount. And we paid the seller what the market was at the time.

当我们购买那一块——我想是 12,000 股 A 时，我的意思是，我们之所以购买是因为我们认为这大大增加了伯克希尔的内在商业价值。我们支付给卖家的价格是当时市场的价格。

And, you know, we’re open to that up to 120 percent. And who knows? If it came along at a time and it was 124 percent or something, it was a very large block and the directors decided that that was OK, it still was a significant discount, we might very well buy it.

我们对此持开放态度，最高可达 120%。谁知道呢？如果在某个时候出现了 124%或更高的情况，且是一个非常大的块，董事们决定这没问题，尽管仍然是一个显著的折扣，我们很可能会购买它。

But in terms of the orderly flow of the market or anything like that, there will be no problems just as there haven’t been, you know, when I’ve given away — I do it every July — when I’ve given away the last two years.

但就市场的有序流动或类似的事情而言，不会有任何问题，就像过去两年，我每年七月赠送时一样，没有出现过问题。

Some of the foundations may keep it for a while. But they have to spend what I give them. And they may build up a position in B for, you know, a fairly significant dollar amount. But they’re going to sell it.

一些基金可能会暂时保留它。但他们必须花掉我给他们的钱。他们可能会在 B 上建立一个相当可观的头寸。但他们会卖掉它。

And it is true that for a period after I die, there’ll be a lot of votes still in the estate and later in a trust.

而且确实，在我去世后的一个时期内，遗产中仍会有很多投票，后来在信托中也会有。

But, you know, that will get reduced over time. I see no problem with our capitalization over time.

但是，这将随着时间的推移而减少。我不认为我们在资本结构上会有任何问题。

You know, I like the idea of a fair number of votes being concentrated with people that believe in the culture strongly and, you know, would be thinking about whether they’d get a 20 percent jump in the stock if somebody came along with some particular plan.

我喜欢有相当多的投票权集中在那些强烈相信公司文化的人手中，并且考虑是否有人会带来某个具体计划，可能会让股票上涨20%。

But, eventually, that’s going to get diminished. It continues to get diminished. And I think, in terms of — you know, there’s a very good market in Berkshire shares.

但最终，这种情况会逐渐减弱。它持续在减弱。我认为，就——你知道，伯克希尔股票的市场非常好。

And if we can buy them at a discount from intrinsic business value and somebody offers some sum — a big piece — and it may be at a hundred — stock may be selling at 122 percent, 124 percent, you know, I would pick up the phone and call the directors and see if they didn’t want to make a change.

如果我们可以以折扣价从内在商业价值中回购它，而某人提出了一个大块的价格——可能是在股票售价的122%到124%之间，我会打电话给董事们，看看他们是否想做出改变。

And we did it once before. And if it made sense, I’m sure they’d say yes. And if it didn’t make sense, I’m sure they’d say no. So, I don’t think we have any problem in terms of blocks of stock or anything.

我们之前做过一次。如果这有意义，我相信他们会同意。如果没有意义，我相信他们会拒绝。因此，我不认为我们在股票的处理上会有任何问题。

I don’t think people that own it have a problem selling it. And I don’t think we have a problem in terms of evaluating the desirability of repurchasing it.

我不认为拥有股票的人在出售时会有问题。我也不认为我们在评估回购的可行性时会遇到问题。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

43. Deciding whether to exercise Bank of America warrant

决定是否行使美国银行的认股权证

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Erin Byer. And I was born and raised in Pasadena, California, and I currently live in New York City.

观众成员：你好。我叫艾琳·拜尔。我在加利福尼亚州的帕萨迪纳出生和长大，目前住在纽约市。

It’s been a dream of mine to come here today. I’ve been a proud BH shareholder for almost 20 years.

今天能来到这里是我一直以来的梦想。我已经是 BH 的骄傲股东快 20 年了。

I asked my dad for stock for Christmas when I was 15. And I kept thinking at the opportunity to ask you a question today that I should make it one that would change my life.

我在 15 岁时向我爸爸要了股票作为圣诞礼物。我一直在想今天问你一个问题的机会，我应该让这个问题改变我的生活。

Well, that question is, do you know any eligible bachelors living in the New York City area? (Laughter and applause)

那么，问题是，你知道在纽约市地区有哪个合适的单身汉吗？（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you certainly have the approach toward life that Charlie and I would. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：您对生活的态度真是让查理和我感到很欣慰。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But the question that might make my Monday, back in the office: back in 2011, you purchased Bank of America preferred stock with a warrant. You had the opportunity, at a later date, to exercise and convert those into common shares.

观众成员：但可能会让我在办公室的周一变得更好的问题是：在 2011 年，你购买了美国银行的优先股和认股权证。你有机会在稍后的日期行使并将其转换为普通股。

When you’re looking at evaluating that decision to exercise that position, which would increase all of our Berkshire holdings — or the value of the Berkshire holdings — what are you going to consider when you’re looking at that?

当你在评估行使该仓位的决定时，这将增加我们所有的伯克希尔持股——或伯克希尔持股的价值——你在考虑这一点时会考虑什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s almost — well, if the price of the stock is above seven dollars a share, which seems quite likely, whether we were going to keep it or not, it would still make sense for us to exercise the warrant shortly before it expired, because it would be a valuable warrant, but it’s only a valuable warrant if it’s converted — or if exercised — and exchanged into common. And that warrant does expire.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，差不多——如果股票价格高于每股七美元，这似乎很可能，无论我们是否打算持有它，在到期前不久行使认股权证仍然是有意义的，因为这将是一个有价值的认股权证，但只有在转换——或者说行使——并兑换成普通股时，它才是有价值的。而且这个认股权证确实会到期。

So, as I put in the annual report, our income from the investment would increase if the Bank of America ever got to where it was paying 11 cents quarterly.

因此，正如我在年度报告中所提到的，如果美国银行的季度分红达到了 11 美分，我们的投资收入将会增加。

We get 300 million off the — a year — off the preferred. And for us to use the preferred as payment in the exercise of the warrant, we would need to — we would want to feel we were getting more than 300 million a year by — and that would take 11 cents quarterly.

我们每年从优先股中获得 3 亿的收益。为了在行使认股权证时使用优先股作为支付，我们需要感觉到每年得到的收益超过3亿美元——这需要达到每季度11美分。

They may or may not get to where they pay that amount before the warrant expires in 1921 — or 2021.

他们可能会在 1921 年或 2021 年之前支付该金额，也可能不会。

If we — if it does get to there, we’ll exercise the warrant. And then, instead of owning the five billion of preferred and the warrant, we’ll have 700-plus million shares of common.

如果我们——如果真的到了那一步，我们将行使认股权证。然后，我们将拥有超过 7 亿的普通股，而不是拥有 50 亿的优先股和认股权证。

Then that becomes a separate decision. Do we want to keep the 700 million shares of common?

那么这就成为一个单独的决定。我们想保留这 7 亿股普通股吗？

I — if it were to happen today, I would definitely want to keep the stock. Now, who knows what other alternatives may be available in 2021 or —

我——如果今天发生这种情况，我肯定想保留这只股票。现在，谁知道 2021 年可能还有什么其他选择呢——

But as of today, if our warrant were expiring tomorrow, we would use the preferred to buy 700 million-plus shares of common. And we would keep the common.

但截至今天，如果我们的认股权证明天到期，我们将使用优先股购买超过 7 亿股普通股。我们会保留这些普通股。

If they get to 11 cents quarterly dividend, we’ll convert it. And we’ll very likely keep the common.

如果他们的季度股息达到 11 美分，我们就会转换它。而且我们很可能会保留普通股。

And if we get to 2021, if the common’s above seven dollars, which I would certainly anticipate, we will exercise.

如果到2021年，普通股价格在7美元以上，我肯定会预测，我们会行使权证。

So that’s all I can tell you on that. But I certainly wish you success on your other objective. (Laughter)

所以我能告诉你的就这些。但我确实祝你在其他目标上取得成功。（笑声）

And I think, probably, the fellow will be using very good judgment, too.

我认为，这家伙可能也会运用非常好的判断力。

OK. Charlie? 好的。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s a very wise thing for a woman that owns Berkshire stock and is a good looking woman to put her picture up like that. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：我认为，一位拥有Berkshire股票并且相貌出众的女性，像这样展示她的照片是非常明智的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It does give me a thought, though. We might actually start selling ads in the annual report. And — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，这确实让我想到。我们可能真的会在年报中开始卖广告。然后——（笑声）

OK. That — incidentally, that BofA purchase, it literally was true that I was sitting in the bathtub when I got the idea of checking with the BofA, whether they’d be interested in that preferred.

顺便提一下，那次购买美洲银行的优先股，确实是当我在浴缸里时想到的，检查一下美国银行是否对那个优先股感兴趣。

But I’ve spent a lot of time in the bathtub since, and nothing’s come to me. So — (Laughter)

但自那以后我在浴缸里待了很多时间，也没再想到什么新点子。所以——（笑声）

Clearly, I either need a new bathtub or we got to get in a different kind of market.

显然，我要么需要一个新的浴缸，要么我们得进入一个不同的市场。

44. Defending 3G’s job cuts

为 3G 裁员辩护

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This is a question from George Benaroya. And it adds a layer to the discussion about 3G a little bit ago.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这是乔治·贝纳罗亚的问题。这为不久前关于 3G 的讨论增添了一层内容。

He says, “I am a very happy, long-term shareholder. But this is a concern I have regarding Berkshire Hathaway’s Kraft Heinz investment.

他说：“我是一位非常快乐的长期股东。但这是我对伯克希尔哈撒韦的卡夫亨氏投资的担忧。”

“This investment has done well in economic terms. The carrying value is 15 billion, and the market value was 28 billion in 2016.

这项投资在经济上表现良好。账面价值为 150 亿，2016 年的市场价值为 280 亿。

“But the DNA of 3G is quite different from ours. We do not make money by buying companies and firing people. 3G fired 2,500 employees at Kraft Heinz. That is what private equity firms do, but we are not a private equity firm.

“但 3G 的 DNA 与我们截然不同。我们不是通过收购公司和解雇员工来赚钱的。3G 在卡夫亨氏解雇了 2500 名员工。这是私募股权公司所做的，但我们不是私募股权公司。”

“Our values have worked for us for over four — 50 years. There is a risk that as 3G continues to deviate from our principles, they will, eventually, harm both our value and our values. How do we prevent that from happening?”

“我们的价值观在过去的五十多年里一直对我们有利。随着 3G 不断偏离我们的原则，存在风险，最终会损害我们的价值和价值观。我们如何防止这种情况发生？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s interesting. I mentioned earlier that it was very gradual. But it would’ve been, probably, a better decision. We fired 2,000 people over time — and some retired and left and all of that — but at the textile operation [Berkshire Hathaway]. You know, it didn’t work.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个有趣的问题。我之前提到过这过程非常渐进。其实我们应该做得更好。我们在纺织业务中裁掉了2000人——还有一些人退休了——但这个业务没能成功。

And at Hochschild Kohn, the successor — we fortunately sold it to somebody else — but eventually, they closed up the department stores because department stores, at least that particular one and a good many, actually, including our competitors in Baltimore, could not make it work.

在Hochschild Kohn，继任者——我们幸运地把它卖给了别人——但最终他们关闭了百货公司，因为百货公司，至少是那个特定的百货公司，还有许多其他的，包括我们在巴尔的摩的竞争对手，都无法维持运营。

Walmart came along with something — and, now, Amazon’s coming along with something — that changed the way people thought they knew. You —

沃尔玛带来了某种东西——现在，亚马逊也带来了某种东西——这改变了人们的认知。你——

We mentioned our poultry with CTB, which is a lot of different farm equipment.

我们提到了我们的家禽与 CTB，这是一种多种不同的农场设备。

The farm equipment, often, that CTB develops, the idea is that it’s more productive than what already is out there, which means fewer people are employed on farms.

CTB 开发的农场设备通常比现有设备更具生产力，这意味着农场上雇佣的人会更少。

We had 80 percent of the American public — population, working population — working on farms a couple of hundred years ago.

几百年前，80%的美国公众——包括劳动人口——在农场工作。

And if nobody had come up with things to make it more productive — farming — we’d have 80 percent of people working on farms now to feed our populace. And it means that we’d be living in a far, far more primitive way.

如果没有人想出让农业更高效的办法，我们现在将有 80%的人在农场工作来养活我们的民众。这意味着我们将生活得更加原始。

So there — you know — if you look at the auto industry, it gets more productive. If you look at any industry, they’re trying to get more productive. Walmart was more productive than department stores, and —

所以，你知道，如果你看看汽车行业，它变得更高效。如果你看看任何行业，他们都在努力提高生产力。沃尔玛比百货商店更高效，——

That will continue in America. And it better continue or we won’t live in — or our kids won’t live any better than we do.

这将在美国继续下去。最好继续下去，否则我们将无法生活——或者我们的孩子生活得不会比我们好。

Our kids will live better than we do, because America does get more productive as it goes along. And people do come up with better ways of doing things. The —

我们的孩子将过得比我们更好，因为美国在不断提高生产力。人们确实会想出更好的做事方法。

When Kraft Heinz finds that they can do whatever amount of business — $27 billion worth of business or something — and they can do it with fewer people, they’re doing what American business has done for a couple hundred years and why we live so well. But they do it very fast.

当卡夫亨氏发现他们可以进行任何数量的业务——价值 270 亿美元的业务或其他——并且可以用更少的人来完成时，他们正在做美国商业几百年来一直在做的事情，这也是我们生活得如此美好的原因。但他们的速度非常快。

They’re more than fair, in terms of severance pay and all of that sort of thing. But they don’t want to have two people doing the job that one can do.

他们在遣散费和其他相关方面非常公平。但他们不想让两个人做一个人能做的工作。

And I, frankly, don’t like going through that, having faced that.

老实说，我不喜欢经历那样的事情，面对那样的事情。

I faced that down at Dempster in Beatrice, Nebraska. And it really needed change. But the change is painful for a lot of people. And I just would rather spend my days not doing that sort of thing, having had one or two experiences.

我在内布拉斯加州比阿特里斯的登普斯特街面对过这个问题。它确实需要改变。但对很多人来说，改变是痛苦的。我宁愿花我的日子不去做那种事情，经历过一两次之后。

But I think that it’s absolutely essential to America that we become more productive because that is the only way we have more consumption per capita, is to have more productivity per capita.

但我认为，提高生产力对美国来说绝对至关重要，因为这是我们人均消费增加的唯一途径，即提高人均生产力。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — you’re absolutely right. We don’t want to go back to subsistence farming. I had a week of that when I was young on a western Nebraska farm. And I hated it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我——你说得完全正确。我们不想回到自给自足的农业。我年轻时在内布拉斯加州西部的一个农场经历了一周这样的生活。我讨厌它。（笑声）

And I don’t miss the elevator operators who used to sit there all day in the elevator, run the little crank, you know.

我不想念那些整天坐在电梯里，转动小曲柄的电梯操作员。

So, on the other hand, it — as you say it’s terribly unpleasant for the people that have to go through it and why would we want to get into a — the business of doing that over and over ourselves?

所以，另一方面，正如你所说，这对那些必须经历这一切的人来说是非常不愉快的，我们为什么要自己一遍又一遍地去做这样的事情呢？

We did it in the past when we had to, when the businesses were dying.

我们在过去不得不这样做，当时生意正在衰退。

I don’t see any moral fault in 3G at all, but I do see that there’s some political reaction that doesn’t do anybody any good.

我完全看不到 3G 的道德缺陷，但我确实看到有一些政治反应对任何人都没有好处。

WARREN BUFFETT: Milton Friedman, I think it was, used to talk about the time — probably apocryphal — he would talk about the huge construction project in some communist country. And they had thousands and thousands and thousands of workers out there with shovels digging away on this major project.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想是米尔顿·弗里德曼曾谈到过一个时间——可能是虚构的——他会谈到某个共产主义国家的大型建设项目。那里有成千上万的工人拿着铲子在这个重大项目上挖掘。

And, then, they had a few of these big, earth-moving machines behind — which were idle — and which could’ve done the work in one-twentieth of the time of the workers.

然后，他们后面有几台大型的土方机械——这些机器闲置着——本可以在工人用二十分之一的时间内完成工作。

So the economists suggested to the local party worker or whoever it was that, you know, why in the world didn’t they use these machines to get the job done in one-tenth or one-twentieth the time instead of having all these workers out there with shovels?

所以经济学家建议当地的党务工作者或其他人，为什么不使用这些机器在十分之一或二十分之一的时间内完成工作，而不是让所有这些工人拿着铲子在外面工作？

And the guy replied, “Well, yeah. But that would put the workers out of work.” And Friedman said, “Well, then, why don’t you give them spoons to do it instead,” you know? (Laughter)

那个人回答说：“嗯，是的。但那样会让工人失业。”弗里德曼说：“那么，为什么不让他们用勺子来做呢？”你知道吗？（笑声）

45. Berkshire’s $20B cash cushion is an “absolute minimum”

伯克希尔的 200 亿美元现金缓冲是“绝对最低限度”

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: I understand that Berkshire is much more liquid than is ideal right now with a 113 billion of consolidated cash and bonds versus policyholder float of 1-0 — 105 billion. But I have trouble calculating how much incremental buying power Berkshire has at any point in time.

乔纳森·布兰特：我理解伯克希尔的流动性远高于理想状态，目前有 1130 亿美元的现金和债券，而保单持有人的浮动资金为 1050 亿美元。但我很难计算伯克希尔在任何时刻的增量购买力有多少。

You’ve talked about having a minimum of 20 billion in cash on a consolidated basis.

你提到过在合并基础上至少要有 200 亿美元的现金。

But for regulatory, risk control, or liquidity purposes, is there some minimum amount of float beyond the 20 billion that has to be in cash bonds or, say, preferred stocks?

但出于监管、风险控制或流动性目的，是否有超过 200 亿的最低浮存金必须以现金债券或优先股的形式存在？

Or can all but 20 billion be put into either common stocks or invested into wholly-owned businesses if you found attractive opportunities?

或者，如果你发现有吸引力的机会，是否可以将除了 200 亿以外的所有资金投入到普通股票或全资企业中？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

JONATHAN BRANDT: What does the balance sheet look like if you were fully invested? And where does additional debt fit into the equation, if at all?

乔纳森·布兰特：如果你完全投资，资产负债表看起来怎么样？额外的债务在这个方程中适合什么，或者根本没有？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — I wouldn’t conflate the cash and the bonds. I mean, when we talk about 20 billion in cash, we can own no bond beyond that. Twenty billion would be the absolute minimum. As a practical matter, I never —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我不会将现金和债券混为一谈。我的意思是，当我们谈论 200 亿美元的现金时，我们不能拥有超过这个数额的债券。200 亿美元将是绝对的最低限度。实际上，我从来没有——

Since I’ve set 20 billion as a minimum, I’m not going to operate with 21 billion any more than I’m going to see a highway, a truck sign that says maximum load 30,000 pounds or something and, then, drive 29,800 across it. So, we won’t come that close.

由于我将 200亿设定为最低限额，我不会以 210亿进行操作，就像我不会看到一条高速公路上有一个标志写着最大载重 30,000 磅，然后再开着 29,800 磅的货物经过它。因此，我们不会接近这个数字。

But the answer is that, A, we could use — we’re not inclined to use debt. Obviously, if we found something that really lit the — lit our fire — we might use some more debt, although that’d be a — it’s unlikely under today’s circumstances. But we can —

但答案是，A，我们可以使用——我们不倾向于使用债务。显然，如果我们发现了真正点燃我们激情的东西——我们可能会使用更多的债务，尽管在今天的情况下这不太可能。但我们可以——

Twenty billion’s an absolutely minimum. You can say that because I say 20 billion’s an absolute minimum, it probably wouldn’t be below 24 or 25.

200亿是绝对的最低限度。你可以说，因为我说200亿是绝对的最低限度，它可能不会低于240或250。

And we could do a very large deal if we thought it was sufficiently attractive. I mean, we have not put our foot to the floor on anything for really a very long time. But if we saw something really attractive —

如果我们认为某个交易足够有吸引力，我们可以做一个非常大的交易。我的意思是，我们已经很长时间没有全力以赴去做任何事情了。但如果我们看到一些真正有吸引力的东西——

We spent 16 billion back when we were much smaller in a period of two or three weeks — probably three weeks maybe — in the fall of 2008. And we never got to a point where it was any problem for me sleeping at night. And now, we, obviously, have a lot more money to put out.

我们在 2008 年秋季的时候，花了 160 亿，当时我们还很小，花费是在两到三周内——可能是三周。我们从来没有到过让我晚上睡不着觉的地步。而现在，显然我们有更多的钱可以投入。

So, if a good — Charlie, at what point, if I called you, would you say, “I think that’s a little bit big for us today?”

所以，如果一个好的——查理，如果我打电话给你，你会在什么情况下说：“我觉得今天这个对我们来说有点大？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say about $150 billion.

查理·芒格：我会说大约 1500 亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in that case, I’ll call you. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，在这种情况下，我会给你打电话。（笑声）

Don’t — I’m a little more conservative on that than, actually, Charlie. But we both would do a very, very big deal if we —

别这样——在这方面我比查理更保守一些。但如果我们——我们都会做一件非常非常大的事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t have to agree perfectly.

查理·芒格：我们不必完全一致。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’d have to be —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这必须是——

But, if we find a really big deal that makes compelling sense —

但是，如果我们发现一个真正重大的交易，具有令人信服的意义——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, you’re talking.

查理·芒格：现在，你说得对。

WARREN BUFFETT: — we’re going to do it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：——我们会做到的。（笑声）

46. Very unlikely Jorge Paulo Lemann would succeed Buffett as CEO

乔治·保罗·莱曼接替巴菲特担任首席执行官的可能性非常小

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger.

观众：您好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。

My name is Felipe Kioni (PH). I’m 19 years old from Brazil.

我的名字是费利佩·基奥尼（PH）。我 19 岁，来自巴西。

And your partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann and his associates at 3G has been very successful, taking into account great outcome of transactions such as the Kraft Heinz merger.

与豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼及其在 3G 的合作伙伴的合作非常成功，考虑到像卡夫亨氏合并这样的交易取得了很好的结果。

Even though you and Jorge Paulo have different investment methods, would you and Charlie consider him to be your — a member of your board, or even your successor?

尽管你和霍尔赫·保罗有不同的投资方法，你和查理会考虑他成为你们的董事会成员，甚至是你们的继任者吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think that will happen, but I — but then, I think it would complicate things, in terms of the board membership.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为那不会发生，但我——不过，我认为这会使事情变得复杂，尤其是在董事会成员方面。

But we love the idea of being their partner. And I don’t think — I think there’s a good chance that we will do more, and perhaps even bigger, things together.

但我们喜欢成为他们的合作伙伴这个想法。我认为我们有很大的机会一起做更多，甚至更大的事情。

But the — we’re probably unlikely to be doing much change in the board, certainly in the next few years.

但我们在董事会的变动可能在未来几年内不会太大。

And there will be a successor, and the successor could very well be while I’m alive.

将会有一个继任者，而这个继任者很可能在我活着的时候就会出现。

But that will be — there’s a very high probability that will be from somebody that’s been in our company for some time. I mean, the world could change in very strange ways, you know. But that’s a very, very high probability.

但这很可能是来自于我们公司工作了一段时间的人。我是说，世界可能会以非常奇怪的方式变化，你知道的。但这确实是一个非常非常高的概率。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: All I can say is that my back hurts when I come to these functions because I want to indicate to the — my fellow shareholders — that they probably got seven more good years to get out of Warren. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：我只能说，当我参加这些活动时，我的背部很痛，因为我想向我的股东们表示，他们可能还有七年时间可以从沃伦那里获得收益。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s inspiring me. I got to tell you that.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理激励了我。我得告诉你这一点。

But we’ve been very, very lucky in life. And so far, our luck seems to be holding.

但我们在生活中非常非常幸运。到目前为止，我们的运气似乎还在持续。

47. Online competition hasn’t yet affected Berkshire retailers

在线竞争尚未影响伯克希尔的零售商

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Drew Estes in Atlanta, Georgia.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自乔治亚州亚特兰大的德鲁·埃斯特斯。

And he asks, “Is Fruit of the Loom experiencing difficulties related to the distribution channel shift towards online and the troubles in the brick and mortar retail world? If so, do you believe the difficulties are short term in nature?”

他问：“Fruit of the Loom 是否在经历与向在线分销渠道转变以及实体零售世界的困扰相关的困难？如果是这样，您认为这些困难是短期性质的吗？”

And, then, Drew goes on to add, “I’m hoping millennials haven’t bucked the underwear trend, too.” (Laughter)

德鲁还补充道：“我希望千禧一代还没有改变他们的内裤趋势。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, he may know more about that than I do. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他可能比我更了解这件事。（笑声）

The answer is essentially no, so far. But anybody that doesn’t think that online isn’t changing retail in a big way, and that anybody who thinks they’re totally insulated from it is correct —

答案基本上是到目前为止没有。但是，任何认为在线购物没有在大幅改变零售的人，以及认为自己完全不受影响的人，都是错误的——

I mean, the world is changing big time. And like I say, at Fruit of the Loom, I don’t — it really hasn’t changed. And at our furniture operation, which is setting a record so far again this year for the shareholder’s weekend. You know, I mentioned it in the report, but I think we did $45 million in one week.

我的意思是，世界正在发生巨大的变化。就像我说的，在 Fruit of the Loom，我觉得——它真的没有改变。而在我们的家具业务方面，今年的股东周末又创下了记录。你知道，我在报告中提到过，但我认为我们在一周内做到了 4500 万美元。

And our furniture operations — it’s hard to see any effect from online, outside of our own online operations. It had really good same-store gains.

我们的家具业务——很难看到在线业务的任何影响，除了我们自己的在线业务。它的同店销售增长非常好。

You can take, you know, whether it’s the Nebraska Furniture Mart, but RC Willey, whether it’s in Sacramento, or Reno, or Boise, or Salt Lake City, or Jordan’s, which, in Boston, has done very well on a same-store basis.

你可以考虑，比如内布拉斯加家具市场，或者 RC Willey，无论是在萨克拉门托、里诺、博伊西、盐湖城，还是在波士顿的 Jordan's，都是在同店销售方面表现非常好。

So, we don’t really see it, but there were a lot of things we didn’t see 10 years ago that then materialized.

所以，我们并没有真正看到，但十年前有很多我们没有看到的事情后来都显现出来了。

One thing you may find interesting is that the Furniture Mart here in Omaha, which is an extraordinary operation — the online has grown very substantially.

您可能会发现有趣的一件事是，位于奥马哈的家具市场是一项非凡的业务——在线销售增长非常显著。

And I may be wrong on this, but I think it’s getting up to — I’d like to check this with the Blumkins before I say it, but I think it’s getting pretty close to 10 percent or so of volume. But it’s a very significant percentage of those people still go and pick the product up at the Furniture Mart.

我可能在这方面错了，但我认为这接近——我想在说之前先和布伦金斯确认一下，但我认为这接近于大约 10%的销量。不过，这个比例非常显著，那些人仍然会去家具市场亲自取货。

So apparently, they — it’s the time spent entering the store or maybe at check-out lines or whatever it may be. I’m surprised that it gets to be that percentage.

显然，他们——这是进入商店或许是在结账队伍中花费的时间。我很惊讶这个比例竟然会这么高。

But the one thing about it is we keep looking at the figures and trying to figure out what they’re telling us.

但关于这一点，我们不断查看数据，试图弄清它们在告诉我们什么。

So far, I would not say that it’s affected Fruit of the Loom in a significant manner. I would not say it’s affected the furniture operation in a significant manner. But I have no illusions that 10 years is going to look — from now — is going to look anything like today.

到目前为止，我不会说这对 Fruit of the Loom 产生了显著影响。我也不会说这对家具业务产生了显著影响。但我没有幻想，十年后的情况——从现在来看——将与今天有任何相似之处。

If you think about it, you know, if you go back a hundred years to the great department stores, what did they offer? They offered incredible selection.

如果你想想，回到一百年前的大百货商店，他们提供了什么？他们提供了令人难以置信的选择。

You know, if you had a big department store in Omaha, you had the thousand bridal dresses. And if you lived in a small town around, the local guy had two or something of the sort.

你知道，如果你在奥马哈有一家大型百货商店，你就会有一千件婚纱。而如果你住在附近的小镇上，当地的人可能只有两件或者类似的东西。

So the department store was the big, exciting experience of variety and decent prices and convenient transportation, because people took the street cars to get there.

百货商店是一个令人兴奋的大型体验，提供多样化的商品、合理的价格和便利的交通，因为人们乘坐电车前往那里。

And, then, along came the shopping center. And they took what was vertical before. And they made it horizontal. And they changed it into multiple ownerships.

然后，购物中心来了。他们把之前的垂直结构变成了水平结构，并将其转变为多重所有权。

But they still kept incredible variety, and assortments, and convenience of going to one place, and accessible transportation because, now, the car was the method. And now you go to — and, you know, and then, we went for the discount stores and all of that.

但他们仍然保持了令人难以置信的多样性、品种和便利性，因为现在汽车是主要的出行方式。现在你可以去——你知道，然后，我们去了折扣店等等。

But now you’ve got the internet. And you’ve got the ultimate, in terms of assortments. And you’ve got people that are coming in at low prices. And the transportation is taken care of entirely, so the evolution that has taken place —

但现在你有了互联网。你拥有了终极的商品种类。而且你有以低价进入的消费者。运输完全得到保障，因此发生的演变——

The department store is online now, basically, except much expanded in assortment, much more convenient, and lower prices.

百货商店现在基本上在线了，除了品种大大增加，更加方便，价格也更低。

So the world has evolved, and it’s going to keep evolving. But the speed has increased dramatically.

所以世界已经发展了，并且将继续发展。但速度已经大幅提高。

And what’ll happen with — the brands are going to be tested in a variety of ways that — and they have to make decisions as to whether they try to do an online themselves, or work through an Amazon, or whether they try to hang onto the old methods of distribution while embracing new ones.

品牌将以多种方式进行测试，他们必须决定是自己尝试在线销售，还是通过亚马逊进行销售，或者是试图坚持旧的分销方式，同时接受新的分销方式。

There’s a lot of questions in retail and in branding that are very interesting to watch. And you’ll get some surprises in the next 10 years, I can promise you that.

在零售和品牌方面有很多有趣的问题值得关注。在接下来的 10 年里，你会看到一些惊喜，我可以向你保证。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s — it would be certainly — be unpleasant if we were in the department store business. Just think of what we avoided, Warren.

查理·芒格：如果我们在百货商店行业，那肯定会很不愉快。想想我们避免了什么，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we got very lucky, actually, because we were in the department store business, and our business was so lousy that we recognized it. If it had been a little bit better, we would’ve hung on.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们实际上非常幸运，因为我们在百货商店行业，我们的生意糟糕得让我们意识到了这一点。如果生意稍微好一点，我们就会坚持下去。

And we owe a tremendous gratitude to Sandy Gottesman, our director who’s here in the front row, because he got us out of the business when Charlie and I, and Sandy, were partners in that.

我们非常感谢桑迪·戈特斯曼，我们的董事，他在前排，因为他在查理、我和桑迪作为合作伙伴时把我们从这个行业中解救了出来。

And something we paid six dollars a share for, I think it’s worth about $100,000 a share now, because we got out of the business.

我们以每股六美元的价格购买的东西，我认为现在每股价值大约 100,000 美元，因为我们退出了这个行业。

And if it had been a somewhat better business, you know, it might be worth 10 or $12 a share now. So, sometimes you get lucky.

如果这生意稍微好一点，你知道，现在可能值 10 或 12 美元一股。所以，有时候你会走运。

We don’t miss it either, do we, Charlie? Hochschild Kohn.

我们也不想念它，对吧，查理？霍赫希尔德·科恩。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. We don’t miss it.

查理·芒格：不，我们不想念它。

48. Book value a “whole lot less” relevant to Berkshire

账面价值对伯克希尔的相关性“少得多”

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay. 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊。

JAY GELB: This question is on Berkshire’s intrinsic value. A substantial portion of the company’s value is driven by operating businesses rather than the performance of the securities portfolio.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题涉及伯克希尔的内在价值。公司价值的很大一部分是由运营业务驱动的，而不是证券投资组合的表现。

Also, the values of previously acquired businesses are not marked up to their economic value, including GEICO, MidAmerican, and Burlington Northern.

此外，之前收购的企业的价值并未按其经济价值进行标记，包括 GEICO、MidAmerican 和 Burlington Northern。

Based on these factors, is book value per share still a relevant metric for valuing Berkshire?

基于这些因素，每股账面价值仍然是评估伯克希尔的相关指标吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s got some relevance, but it’s got a whole lot less relevance than it used to. And that’s why — I don’t want to drop the book value per share factor, but the market value tends to have more significance as the decades roll along.

沃伦·巴菲特：账面价值有一定的相关性，但相较于过去，它的相关性下降了很多。这就是为什么我不想完全放弃账面价值每股这一指标，但随着时间的推移，市场价值往往更具意义。

It’s a starting point. And clearly, our securities aren’t worth more than we’re carrying for — carrying them for — at that time. And, on the other hand, we’ve got the kind of businesses you’ve mentioned.

账面价值是一个起点。显然，我们的证券价值不会超过我们账面上记录的价值。然而，另一方面，我们有一些你提到的业务。

But we’ve got some small businesses that are worth 10 times or so, you know, what would — could carry it for. We’ve also got some clunkers, too.

我们还有一些小型业务，其实际价值可能是账面价值的10倍左右。当然，我们也有一些表现不佳的业务。

But I think the best method, of course, is just to calculate intrinsic business value. But it can’t be precise.

但我认为最好的方法当然是计算内在商业价值。但这无法做到精确。

We know — we think the probability’s exceptionally high that 120 percent understates it. Although, if it was all in securities, you know, 120 percent would be too high.

我们知道——我们认为有极高的概率120%的估计会低估实际价值。虽然如果全部是证券，120%可能会过高。

But as the businesses have evolved, as we built in unrecognized value at the operating businesses — unrecognized for accounting purposes — I think it still has some use as being kind of the base figure we use.

但随着业务的发展，我们在运营业务中积累的未确认价值——尽管在会计上没有确认——我认为账面价值作为基础数据仍然有一定用途。

If it were a private company and 10 of us here owned it, instead we’d just sit down annually and calculate the businesses one by one and use that as a base value.

如果这是一个私人公司，而我们这里的 10 个人拥有它，那么我们每年只需坐下来逐一计算业务，并以此作为基础价值。

But that gets pretty subjective when you’ve got as many as we do. And so, I think the easiest thing is to use the standards we’re using now, recognizing the limitations in them.

但当我们有这么多时，这就变得相当主观。因此，我认为最简单的办法是使用我们现在正在使用的标准，同时认识到它们的局限性。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the equities in the insurance company offsetting shareholders equity in the company are really not worth the full market value because they’re locked away in a high-tax system.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为保险公司中的股权并没有完全的市场价值，因为这些股权被锁定在高税负的体系中。

And so I, basically, like it when our marketable securities go down and our own businesses go up.

所以我基本上喜欢我们的可交易证券下跌而我们自己的业务上涨。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re working to that end. We’ve been working that way for 30 years now or something like that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们正在朝这个方向努力。我们已经这样工作了大约 30 年。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve done a pretty good job, too.

查理·芒格：我们也做得相当不错。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have a lot of — we’ve replaced a lot of marketable securities with unmarketable securities that are worth a lot more.

查理·芒格：我们有很多——我们用价值更高的非流动证券替代了很多可流通证券。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And it’s actually a more enjoyable way to operate, too, beyond that, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。实际上，这也是一种更愉快的操作方式，除此之外，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We know a lot of people we wouldn’t otherwise —

查理·芒格：是的。我们认识很多人，否则我们不会——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — be with. Good people.

查理·芒格：——与好人相处。

49. I don’t know tech, but I know consumer behavior

我不懂技术，但我了解消费者行为

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. 观众：你好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Michael Monahan (PH). And I’m from Long Island, New York.

观众成员：我的名字是迈克尔·莫纳汉（PH）。我来自纽约的长岛。

I don’t know if this question qualifies as investment advice. So I have a short, different question if you don’t want answer this one. (Laughter)

我不知道这个问题是否算作投资建议。如果你不想回答这个问题，我有一个简短而不同的问题。（笑声）

Unlike the last shareholder from zone 3, this will not be a stump speech, nor a protest.

与来自第三区的最后一位股东不同，这将不是一场政治演说，也不是一次抗议。

One of your most well-known pieces of investment advice is to buy what you know. Additionally, you said earlier, one of the main criteria for buying is if you could ever understand the business.

你最著名的投资建议之一是购买你了解的东西。此外，你之前提到，购买的主要标准之一是你是否能够理解这项业务。

Ever since I came to my first meeting in 2011, you were not known for being a tech guy. You have said smart phones are too smart for you, you don’t have a computer at your desk, and you’ve only tweeted nine times in the last four years. (Laughter)

自从我在 2011 年参加第一次会议以来，你就不以技术专家而闻名。你曾说智能手机对你来说太智能了，你的桌子上没有电脑，而且在过去四年里你只发过九条推文。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It was either that or going to a monastery. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：要么这样，要么去修道院。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Despite this, you’ve recently been investing, looking, and talking more about tech companies.

观众成员：尽管如此，您最近一直在投资、关注和谈论科技公司。

My question to you and also to Charlie to comment is, what you turned you from the Oracle of Omaha to the Tech Maven of Omaha?

我想问你和查理的是，是什么让你从奥马哈的神谕者变成了奥马哈的科技大师？

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, I don’t think I would — I don’t think I’ve talked that much about tech companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）好吧，我想我不会——我想我没有谈过那么多关于科技公司的事情。

But the truth is, we made a large investment in IB — I made a large investment in IBM, and — which has not turned out that well. We haven’t lost money. But in terms of the bull market we’ve been in, it’s been a significant laggard.

但事实是，我们在 IBM 上进行了大量投资——我在 IBM 上进行了大量投资——结果并不太理想。我们没有亏损。但就我们所处的牛市而言，它的表现明显滞后。

And, then, fairly recently, we took a large position in Apple, which I do regard as more a consumer goods company, in terms of certain economic characteristics. Although, that —

然后，最近我们在苹果公司采取了一个大规模的投资，我确实认为它在某些经济特征上更像是一家消费品公司。尽管，那个——

You know, it has a huge tech component in terms of what that product can do, or what other people might come along to do, to leapfrog it in some way.

你知道，这个产品在技术方面有很大的组成部分，无论是它能做什么，还是其他人可能会以某种方式超越它。

But I’ve — I think I’ll end up being — no guarantees — but I think I’ll end up being 1- for-2 instead of 0- for-2. But we’ll find out.

但我觉得我最终会是 1 中 2，而不是 0 中 2，虽然没有保证。但我们会知道的。

Charlie? 查理？

I make no pretense whatsoever of being on the intellectual level of some 15-year-old that’s got an interest in tech. I think I may know — have some insights into consumer behavior.

我完全不假装自己在技术方面的智力水平能和一个15岁的小孩相比。我认为我可能对消费者行为有一些洞察。

I, certainly, can get a lot of information on consumer behavior and, then try to draw inferences about what that means about what consumer behavior is likely to be in the future. But we will find with —

我当然可以获得很多关于消费者行为的信息，然后尝试推断这对未来消费者行为可能意味着什么。但我们会发现——

The one — the other thing I’ll guarantee is I’ll make some mistakes on marketable securities, and I’ve made them in other areas than tech. So it — you’ll not bat a thousand, you know, no matter what industries you stick — you try to stick by.

我可以保证的另一件事是，我在可交易证券方面会犯一些错误，而我在其他领域也犯过错误，不仅仅是科技领域。所以，无论你坚持哪个行业，你都不可能做到百分之百的成功。

I know insurance pretty well. But I think we probably lost money on an insurance stock, perhaps, you know, once or twice over the years. So it — you don’t bat a thousand.

我对保险了解得很清楚。但我认为我们可能在一两次的保险股票上亏过钱，所以这——你不可能每次都成功。

But I have gained no real knowledge about tech in the last — well, since I was born, actually. (Laughter)

但我在过去——实际上，自我出生以来——没有获得任何关于技术的真正知识。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s a very good sign that you bought the Apple. It shows either one of two things. Either it is you’ve gone crazy or you’re learning. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为你买苹果股票是个很好的迹象。这表明了两种情况之一。要么你疯了，要么你在学习。（笑声）

I prefer the learning explanation.

我更喜欢学习的解释。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, so do I, actually. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：其实我也是。（笑声）

50. Artificial intelligence impact is hard to predict

人工智能的影响难以预测

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Hi, Warren. This one’s a fun one. Thomas Kimay (PH) is here. He’s a 27-year-old shareholder from Kentfield, California.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：嗨，沃伦。这是一个有趣的话题。托马斯·基梅（音）在这里。他是来自加利福尼亚肯特菲尔德的 27 岁股东。

And I should preface this question by saying that he was here 17 years ago at 10 years old, asked you a question from the audience asking you if the internet might hurt some of Berkshire’s investments.

我应该在这个问题前提到，他在 17 年前 10 岁时曾在这里，向你提问，问你互联网是否可能会对伯克希尔的一些投资造成伤害。

At the time, you said you wanted to see how things would play out. He’s now updated the question. (Buffett laughs)

当时，你说你想看看事情会如何发展。他现在更新了这个问题。（巴菲特笑）

“What do you think about the implications of artificial intelligence on Berkshire’s businesses, beyond autonomous driving and GEICO, which you’ve talked about already? In your conversations with Bill Gates, have you thought through which other businesses will be most impacted?

“你对人工智能对伯克希尔业务的影响有什么看法，除了你已经谈到的自动驾驶和 GEICO？在你与比尔·盖茨的对话中，你有没有考虑过哪些其他业务会受到最大的影响？”

“And do you think Berkshire’s current businesses will have a significantly — will have significantly more or less employees a decade from now as a function of artificial intelligence?”

“你认为伯克希尔目前的业务在十年后会因为人工智能而有显著更多或更少的员工吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我——

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I mixed a couple questions together.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我把几个问题混在一起了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I certainly have no special insights on artificial intelligence, but I will bet a lot of things happen in that field in the next couple of decades, and probably a shorter timeframe.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我对人工智能没有特别的见解，但我敢打赌在接下来的几十年里，这个领域会发生很多事情，可能在更短的时间内。

They should lead, I would certainly think — but again, I don’t bring much to this party. But I would certainly think they would result in significantly less employment in certain areas. But that’s good for society.

他们应该领导，我当然这么认为——但我在这个聚会上并没有带来太多东西。但我确实认为这会导致某些领域的就业显著减少。但这对社会是有好处的。

And it may not be good for a given business, but let’s take it to the extreme. Let’s assume one person could push a button and, essentially, through various machines and robotics, all kinds of things, turn out all of the output we have in this country.

这对某个特定的企业可能并不好，但我们来极端假设一下。假设一个人可以按下一个按钮，通过各种机器和机器人，生产出我们国家所有的产出。

So, everybody’s — there’s just as much output as we have. It’s all being done by, you know, instead of 150-some million people being employed, one person.

所以，每个人的产出都是一样的。所有的工作都是由一个人完成的，而不是一亿五千万个被雇佣的人。

You know, is the world better off or not? Well, certainly we’d work a lot less hours a week — of work per week and so on.

你知道，世界是变得更好还是更糟？嗯，当然我们每周的工作时间会少很多。

I mean, it would be a good thing, but it would require enormous transformation in how people relate to each other, what they expect of government, you know, all kinds of things. And, of course, as a practical matter, more than one person would keep working.

我的意思是，这将是一件好事，但这需要人们在彼此关系、对政府的期望以及其他各种方面进行巨大的转变。当然，从实际的角度来看，不止一个人会继续工作。

But pushing the idea that way is one of the — you’d certainly think that’s one of the consequences of making great progress in artificial intelligence.

但以那种方式推动这个想法无疑是——你肯定会认为这是在人工智能取得重大进展后的一种后果。

And that’s enormously prosocial, eventually. It’s enormously disruptive in other ways. And it can have huge problems, in terms of a democracy and how it reacts to that.

这在最终是极具社会性的。这在其他方面是极具破坏性的。在民主及其对这些反应方面，它可能会带来巨大的问题。

It’s similar to the problem we have in trade where trade is beneficial to society, but the people that see the benefits day by day of a — of trade — don’t see a price at Walmart on socks or whatever they’re importing, that says, you know, “you’re buying — you’re paying X, but you would pay X-plus-so-many-cents if you bought this domestically.”

这类似于我们在贸易中遇到的问题，贸易对社会是有益的，但那些每天看到贸易好处的人并没有看到沃尔玛袜子或他们进口的其他商品的价格，上面写着“你支付的是 X，但如果你在国内购买，你将支付 X 加上那么多美分。”

So they’re getting these small benefits and invisible benefits. And the guy that gets hurt by it, who’s the roadkill of free trade, feels it very specifically. And that translates into politics.

所以他们获得了这些小的好处和隐形的好处。而受到伤害的人，作为自由贸易的牺牲品，感受得非常具体。这转化为政治。

And so, you can — it gets very uncertain as to how the world would adjust, in my view, to great increases in productivity.

因此，在我看来，世界如何适应生产力的大幅提高变得非常不确定。

And without knowing a thing about it, I would think that artificial intelligence would have that hugely beneficial social effect, but a very unpredictable political effect if it came in fast, which I think it could.

而在对其一无所知的情况下，我认为人工智能会产生巨大的社会效益，但如果快速出现，则会带来非常不可预测的政治影响，我认为这是可能的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’re painting a very funny world where everybody’s engaged in trade. And the trade is, I give you golf lessons and you dye my hair. And that would be a world kind of like the royal family of Kuwait or something.

查理·芒格：好吧，你描绘了一个非常有趣的世界，大家都在进行交易。交易是，我给你高尔夫课程，而你给我染发。那将是一个有点像科威特王室的世界。

And I don’t think it would be good for America to have everything produced by one person and the rest of us just engaged in leisure.

我认为让所有东西都由一个人生产，而我们其他人只是从事休闲活动，对美国来说并不好。

WARREN BUFFETT: How about if we just got twice as productive?

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们能提高两倍的生产力怎么样？

CHARLIE MUNGER: What? 查理·芒格：什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: How about if we got twice as productive in a short period of time, so that 75 million people could do what 150 million people are doing now?

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们在短时间内提高两倍的生产力，让 7500 万人能够做现在 1.5 亿人正在做的事情，怎么样？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’d be amazed how quickly people would react to that.

查理·芒格：我认为你会惊讶于人们对此反应有多快。

WARREN BUFFETT: In what way?

沃伦·巴菲特：以什么方式？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Favorably.

查理·芒格：赞同。

WARREN BUFFETT: I — 沃伦·巴菲特：我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s what happened during the period when there — I’m sure everybody remembers with such affection — back in the Eisenhower years, five percent a year or something — people loved it.

查理·芒格：那就是在那个时期发生的事情——我相信每个人都怀念那个时候——在艾森豪威尔年代，每年五个百分点左右——人们都喜欢那样。

Nobody complained that they were getting air conditioning and they didn’t have it before. Nobody wanted to go back to stinking, sweating nights in the South and —

没有人抱怨他们得到了空调，而之前没有。没有人想回到南方那种臭气熏天、满身是汗的夜晚——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you cut everybody’s hours in half, it’s one thing. But if you fire half the people and the other people keep working, I just think it gets very unpredictable. I mean, I think we saw some of that in this election because I think that —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果你把每个人的工作时间减半，那是一回事。但如果你解雇一半的人，而其他人继续工作，我认为这就变得非常不可预测。我是说，我认为我们在这次选举中看到了一些这种情况，因为我认为——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’ve adjusted to an enormous amount of it. It just came along a few percent per year.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们已经适应了大量的变化。它每年只增加了几个百分点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, and the question, then, is —

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，问题是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Don’t think you have to worry — I don’t think you have to worry about coming out at 25 percent a year. You know, I think you have to worry about it — you’re going to get less than two percent a year. That’s what’s worrisome.

查理·芒格：别担心——我认为你不必担心每年 25%的回报。你知道，我认为你应该担心的是——你每年会得到不到 2%的回报。这才是令人担忧的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll move on. But it will be, you know, it’s an absolutely fascinating subject to see what happens with this. But it’s very, very hard to predict.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们继续。但这绝对是一个迷人的话题，看看会发生什么。但这非常非常难以预测。

If — in some way, you know, we’ve got 36,000 people, say, employed at GEICO, you know.

如果——以某种方式，你知道，我们在 GEICO 有 36,000 人就业，你知道。

And if you could do the same — perform all the same functions, virtually all the same functions even, and do it with five- or 10,000 people, and it came on quickly, and the same thing was happening in a great many other areas, you know, I don’t think we’ve ever experienced anything quite like that.

如果你也能做到这一点——执行所有相同的功能，甚至几乎所有相同的功能，并且能在五千或一万人中迅速实现，而在许多其他领域也发生了同样的事情，我认为我们从未经历过这样的事情。

And maybe we won’t experience anything like it in the future. I don’t know that much about AI, but —

也许我们将来不会再经历类似的事情。我对人工智能了解不多，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think you have to worry about that.

查理·芒格：我认为你不必担心这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s because I’m 86. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，那是因为我 86 岁了。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not going to come that quickly.

查理·芒格：这不会那么快到来。

51. We have a “huge appetite” for both wind and solar projects

我们对风能和太阳能项目有“巨大的需求”。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, during the past five years, Berkshire Energy’s investments in solar and wind generation have been about equal, with around 4.7 billion dedicated to capital projects in each segment.

格雷格·沃伦：在过去五年中，伯克希尔能源在太阳能和风能发电方面的投资大致相等，每个领域大约投入了 47 亿美元用于资本项目。

Based on the company’s end-of-year capital spending forecast for 2017 through 2019, investments in wind generation were expected to be more than seven times greater than investments in solar generation the next three years, with just over $4.5 billion going into wind generation.

根据公司对 2017 年至 2019 年年末资本支出预测，未来三年对风能发电的投资预计将超过对太阳能发电投资的七倍，风能发电的投资将超过 45 亿美元。

Just wondering how much of that future spending is tied to PacifiCorp’s recently announced $3.5 billion expansion plan, which is heavily weighted towards improving and expanding the subsidiary’s existing wind fleet, and whether the economics for wind are that much better than solar given that MidAmerican has also been spending heavily on wind investments?

我只是想知道未来的支出中有多少与 PacifiCorp 最近宣布的 35 亿美元扩张计划有关，该计划主要集中在改善和扩展子公司的现有风电机组上，以及考虑到 MidAmerican 也在大力投资风能，风能的经济性是否比太阳能好得多？

Or is this disparity between the two segments being driven more by genuine capacity needs, which would imply that you have much more solar capacity than you need?

或者这种两个细分市场之间的差异更多是由真正的容量需求驱动的，这意味着你拥有的太阳能容量远超过你所需的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It is — we don’t look at it as having more solar capacity than we need or anything like —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们并不认为拥有的太阳能容量超过我们的需求或其他任何事情——

It’s really a question of what comes along. I mean, and these — the projects, they’re internally generated, they’re externally offered to us, and we’ve got a big appetite for wind or solar. We have seen — you know — just based on those figures, we’ve seen more wind lately.

这实际上是一个关于什么会出现的问题。我的意思是，这些项目是内部生成的，也有外部提供给我们的，我们对风能或太阳能有很大的需求。根据这些数据，我们最近看到更多的风能。

But we have no bias toward either one. I mean, if we saw five billion of attractive solar projects we could do and didn’t happen to see any wind during that period, it wouldn’t slow us down from doing the five billion or vice versa.

但我们对两者没有偏见。就是说，如果我们看到有五十亿美元的吸引人的太阳能项目，而在那段时间没有看到任何风能项目，这不会阻止我们去做这五十亿美元的项目，反之亦然。

So we are — we have an appetite, a huge appetite, for projects in either area. We’re particularly well situated, as I think I’ve explained or talked about in the past, because we pay lots of taxes.

所以我们——我们对这两个领域的项目有着巨大的渴望。正如我过去所解释或谈到的，我们的情况特别好，因为我们缴纳了大量税款。

And therefore, solar and wind projects all involve a tax aspect to them. And we can handle those much better than many other — certainly, electric utilities.

因此，太阳能和风能项目都涉及税务方面的问题。我们可以比许多其他公司——尤其是电力公司——更好地处理这些问题。

Most electric utilities really, A, don’t have that much money left over after dividends and these — frequently, the taxes aren’t that significant.

大多数电力公司实际上，A，分红后剩下的钱并不多，而且这些——通常，税收并不是那么重要。

At Berkshire, we pay lots of taxes, and we’ve got lots of money. So it’s really just a question of doing the math on the deals as they come along.

在Berkshire，我们缴纳大量税款，我们也有大量资金。所以，实际上就是在处理这些项目时的数学问题。

We’ve been very fortunate in Iowa, in finding lots of projects that made sense. And as a result, we’ve had a — we’ve got a much lower price for electricity than our main competitor in the state. We’ve got a lower price than in any states that touch us.

我们在爱荷华州非常幸运，找到了许多合理的项目。因此，我们的电价比州内的主要竞争对手低得多。我们的电价也低于任何与我们接壤的州。

We’ve told the people of Iowa we won’t — they won’t have a price increase for many, many, many years — guaranteed that. So this worked out extremely well.

我们告诉爱荷华州的人们，我们不会——他们在很多很多年内不会有价格上涨——对此做出了保证。所以这非常成功。

But if somebody walks in with a solar project tomorrow and it takes a billion dollars or it takes three billion dollars, we’re ready to do it. There’s no specific —

但是如果有人明天带着一个太阳能项目进来，需要十亿美元或者三十亿美元，我们已经准备好了。没有具体的——

And the more, the better. There’s no specific preference between the two. Obviously, it depends where you are in the country.

越多越好。两者之间没有具体的偏好。显然，这取决于你在全国的哪个地方。

I mean, Iowa’s terrific for wind. And, obviously, California’s terrific for sun. And there are geographical advantages to one or the other. But from our standpoint, we can do them anyplace. And we will do them anyplace.

我意思是，爱荷华州非常适合风能。而显然，加利福尼亚州非常适合太阳能。两者各有地理优势。但从我们的角度来看，我们可以在任何地方进行这些项目。我们将在任何地方进行这些项目。

52. I “underestimated the brilliance” of Jeff Bezos at Amazon

我“低估了”杰夫·贝索斯在亚马逊的才华

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Joey (PH). And I’m an MBA candidate at Wharton. Thank you for having us.

观众成员：你好。我叫乔伊（PH）。我是一名沃顿商学院的 MBA 候选人。谢谢你们的邀请。

Amazon has been hugely disruptive, due to the brilliance of Jeff Bezos, whom Charlie earlier called the business mind of our generation.

亚马逊因杰夫·贝索斯的才华而产生了巨大的颠覆，查理之前称他为我们这一代的商业头脑。

What is your current outlook and — on Amazon? And why hasn’t Berkshire bought in?

你目前对亚马逊的前景怎么看？为什么伯克希尔还没有投资？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, because I was too dumb to realize what was going to happen — (laughs) — even though I admired Jeff. I’ve admired him for a long, long time and watched what he was doing.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，因为我太傻了，没意识到会发生什么——（笑）——尽管我很欣赏杰夫。我一直很欣赏他，看着他所做的事情。

But I did not think that he could succeed on the scale he has. And I certainly didn’t — I didn’t even think about the possibility of doing anything with Amazon Web Services or the cloud.

但我没有想到他能取得如此大的成功。我当然没有——我甚至没有考虑过与亚马逊网络服务或云计算做任何事情的可能性。

So if you’d asked me the chances that, while he was building up the retail operation, that he would also be doing something that was disrupting the tech industry, you know, that would’ve been a very, very long shot for me. And I’ve underestimated — I’ve really underestimated the brilliance of the execution.

所以如果你问我，在他建立零售业务的同时，他是否会做一些颠覆科技行业的事情，我会觉得这几乎是不可能的。我真的低估了执行的卓越。

I mean, it’s one thing to dream about doing this stuff online, but it takes a lot of ability. And, you know, you can read his 1997 annual report. And he laid out a roadmap. And he’s done it, and done it in spades.

我想，梦想在网上做这些事情是一回事，但这需要很大的能力。而且，你知道，你可以阅读他 1997 年的年报。他制定了一条路线图。他做到了，而且做得非常出色。

And if you haven’t seen his interview on Charlie Rose three or four months ago — CharlieRose.com — go to it and listen to it because you’ll learn a lot. At least, I did. So, I just plain —

如果你还没有看到他三四个月前在查理·罗斯节目上的采访——查理罗斯.com——去看看并听听，因为你会学到很多东西。至少，我是这样。所以，我就直接——

It always looked expensive. And I really never thought that he would be where he is today. I thought he would do — I thought he was really brilliant. But I did not think he would be where he is today when I looked at it three, five, eight, 12 years ago — whenever it may have been.

它总是看起来很昂贵。我真的从来没有想过他会达到今天的成就。我认为他会做得很好——我认为他真的很聪明。但当我在三年前、五年前、八年前、十二年前——无论是什么时候——看待这一切时，我并没有想到他会达到今天的成就。

Charlie, how did you miss it? (Laughter)

查理，你怎么会错过这个？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was easy. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：这很简单。（巴菲特笑）

What was done there was very difficult, and it was not at all obvious that it was all going to work as well as it did.

在那里所做的事情非常困难，根本没有明显的迹象表明一切会像现在这样顺利。

I don’t feel any regret about missing out on the achievements of Amazon. But other things were easier. And I think we screwed up a little.

我对错过亚马逊的成就没有任何遗憾。但其他事情更简单。我觉得我们有点搞砸了。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. We won’t pursue that line. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们不会追求那条路。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I meant Google.

查理·芒格：嗯，我是指谷歌。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we missed a lot of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们错过了很多事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We missed a lot of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们错过了很多事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we’ll keep doing it.

查理·芒格：我们会继续这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter) And we’ll have a two —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）我们将有一个二——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Luckily, we don’t miss everything, Warren. That’s our secret. We don’t miss them all. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：幸运的是，沃伦，我们并不是所有的事情都错过了。这就是我们的秘密。我们并不是全部都错过了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We better move on, I think. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我想我们最好继续前进。（掌声）

He may start getting specific.

他可能会开始变得具体。

53. “If I died tonight, I think the stock would go up tomorrow.”

“如果我今晚死了，我觉得明天股票会涨。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: The creator of this question, Jim Keifer (PH) of Atlanta, has even higher expectations for Warren’s longevity than Charlie does.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：提出这个问题的吉姆·凯弗（PH）来自亚特兰大，他对沃伦的长寿的期望甚至比查理更高。

“Mr. Buffett, we all hope you win the record as mankind’s oldest living person. But at some point, you and/or Charlie will go, and Berkshire stock may then come under selling pressure.

“巴菲特先生，我们都希望您能成为人类最长寿的活人。但在某个时刻，您和/或查理将会离开，伯克希尔的股票可能会面临卖压。”

“My question is, if Berkshire stock falls to a price where share repurchase is attractive, can we count on the board and top management to repurchase shares?

我的问题是，如果伯克希尔的股票跌到一个吸引人的回购价格，我们能否指望董事会和高层管理人员回购股票？

“I ask this question both because of past comments you have made about not wanting to take advantage of shareholders and because some of the passages in the owner’s manual lead me to believe this might be an instance when the board does not choose to repurchase shares.

“我问这个问题既是因为你过去提到过不想利用股东的评论，也因为业主手册中的一些段落让我相信这可能是董事会不选择回购股份的情况。”

“Can you clarify what course of action we might expect about repurchases in the circumstances I have outlined?”

“您能否澄清一下在我所描述的情况下，我们可能会期待什么样的回购行动？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, as far as I’m concerned, they’re not taking advantage of shareholders if they buy the stock when it’s undervalued. That’s the only way they should buy it. And they should —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。就我而言，如果他们在股票被低估时购买股票，那就不是在利用股东。这是他们应该购买的唯一方式。他们应该——

But in doing so — there were a few cases back when Charlie and I were much younger — where there were very aggressive repurchases — or the equivalent of repurchases — by people. And the repurchases, incidentally, made a lot more sense than they do now.

但在这样做的时候——在查理和我年轻得多的时候，有几个案例——人们进行了非常激进的回购——或者说回购的等价物。而且，顺便提一下，这些回购比现在更有意义。

But they were done by people who either — for various techniques — tried to depress the shares. And if you’re trying to encourage your partners to sell out at a depressed price by various techniques, including misinformation — but there’s other techniques — you know, I think that’s reprehensible. But our board wouldn’t be doing that.

但这些回购是由一些尝试通过各种手段压低股票价格的人做的。如果你试图通过各种手段，包括误导信息，来鼓励你的合作伙伴在一个被压低的价格上卖出，这就是可耻的。但我们的董事会不会这样做。

I’ll take exception to the first part of it, but I’ll still answer the second. I think the stock is more likely to go up. If I died tonight, I think the stock would go up tomorrow. And there’d be speculation about break ups and all that sort of thing.

我会对第一部分提出异议，但我还是会回答第二部分。我认为，如果我今晚去世，股票更可能会涨明天。会有关于拆分等的投机。

So, it would be a good Wall Street story that, you know, this guy that’s obstructed breaking up something that — where some of the parts might sell for more than the whole.

所以，这将是一个好的华尔街故事，你知道，这个家伙阻止了拆分某个东西——其中一些部分可能比整体卖得更高。

They wouldn’t necessarily be — probably be worth less than the whole — but might sell for — temporarily — for more than the whole. And it would happen. So I would bet in that direction.

它们不一定会——可能会比整体价值更低——但可能会暂时以超过整体的价格出售。这样的事情会发生。所以我会朝那个方向下注。

But if, for some reason, it went down to a level that’s attractive, I don’t think the board is doing anything in the least that’s reprehensible by buying in the stock at that point. No false information, no nothing. It should —

但如果出于某种原因，股价下跌到一个有吸引力的水平，我认为董事会在那个时候购买股票并没有做任何可指责的事情。没有虚假信息，什么都没有。应该——

And their buying means that the seller would get a somewhat better price — if there are a lot of sellers — they’d get a mildly better price than if they weren’t buying. And the continuing stockholders would benefit.

他们的购买意味着卖方会获得一个稍微更好的价格——如果卖方很多——他们会获得一个比不回购时稍微更好的价格。留下来的股东也会受益。

So I think that — I think it’s obvious what they would do. And I would think it’s obvious that it’s pro-shareholder to do it. And I think they would engage in pro-shareholder acts as far as the eye can see. I mean, we’ve got that sort of board.

所以我认为——我认为他们会怎么做是显而易见的。我认为这样做显然是有利于股东的。我认为他们会进行有利于股东的行为，直到眼睛所能看到的地方。我是说，我们有那样的董事会。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you or I might suddenly get very stupid very quickly, but I don’t think our board is going to have that problem. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为你或我可能会突然变得非常愚蠢，但我不认为我们的董事会会有这个问题。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I want to think about that one. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想想这个。(笑声)

54. We try to explain material accounting issues to shareholders

我们努力向股东解释重要的会计问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Warren, in the past, you’ve enjoyed discussing accounting for options grants.

乔纳森·布兰特：沃伦，过去你喜欢讨论期权授予的会计问题。

So I’m curious, what’s your view of the new accounting standard which mandates that companies report lower tax provisions, based on so-called excess tax benefits enjoyed when share-based compensation ends up being more profitable for the grantees than when it’s initially modeled?

所以我很好奇，你对新的会计准则有什么看法，该准则要求公司报告较低的税务准备金，基于所谓的额外税收利益，这些利益是由于股权激励的实际收益超过了最初的预期。

These so-called benefits — excess benefits — used to go through the shareholder’s equity line on the balance sheet. Which accounting method makes more sense to you, the old method or the new?

这些所谓的“额外利益”曾经在资产负债表的股东权益线上体现。你觉得哪种会计方法更合理，旧方法还是新方法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonny, I think you know a lot more about it than I do. So, if I were asked to answer that question, I’d probably call you up and say, “What should I say?” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：乔尼，我想你对这件事了解得比我多。所以，如果有人问我这个问题，我可能会打电话给你说：“我该怎么说？”（笑声）

It’s not a factor that will enter into Berkshire, so I really have not — I mean, I’ve heard just a little bit about that accounting standard. But I really don’t know anything about it.

这不是伯克希尔会考虑的因素，所以我真的没有——我的意思是，我只听说过一点关于那个会计准则的事情。但我真的对它一无所知。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not a big deal, Warren.

查理·芒格：这没什么大不了的，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I know that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我知道这一点。（笑声）

Yeah. We — there are few things in accounting we really disagree with and whether they might be material to somebody trying to evaluate Berkshire. And, you know, that primarily gets into amortization of intangibles.

是的。我们——在会计方面有一些我们确实不同意的事情，以及这些事情是否对试图评估伯克希尔的人来说是重要的。你知道，这主要涉及无形资产的摊销。

It will certainly — it certainly gets into realized capital gains and that sort of thing. And we will go to great lengths to try to tell our partners, basically, not all of whom, you know, are accounting experts or anything.

这肯定会——它确实涉及到实现的资本收益和类似的事情。我们会尽力告诉我们的合作伙伴，基本上，并不是所有人都是会计专家或其他什么的。

And we will try to make clear to them, at least, what our view is. You know, the same way as if I had a family business and I was talking to my sisters or something about it.

我们会尽量向他们明确我们的观点。你知道，就像我有一个家族企业，我在和我的姐妹们谈论这件事一样。

But unless it’s material, we’ll probably stay away from trying to opine on any new accounting standards. If it’s material to Berkshire, we’ll go to great lengths to, at least, give our view.

但除非它是重要的，否则我们可能会避免对任何新的会计准则发表意见。如果对伯克希尔来说是重要的，我们会不遗余力地至少表达我们的看法。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with that.

查理·芒格：我当然同意这一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK — 沃伦·巴菲特：好的 —

CHARLIE MUNGER: That is, that what he’s talking about is not very material to Berkshire.

查理·芒格：也就是说，他所谈论的内容对伯克希尔并不是很重要。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. It isn’t. And it really won’t be. You know, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不是的。实际上也不会是。你知道的，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: Some of these others are, though, and we will bring those up as they come up. The — yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过其中一些是的，我们会在它们出现时提到这些。是的。

We are reporting 400-and-some million dollars less in our earnings than if Precision Castparts had remained a public company.

我们报告的收益比如果 Precision Castparts 仍然是一家上市公司时少了四亿多美元。

Well, is Precision Castparts — I mean, are the earnings less real? Is the cash less real? Is anything — because it’s moved, the ownership? I don’t think so.

那么，精密铸件公司——我的意思是，收益不那么真实吗？现金不那么真实吗？有什么——因为它的所有权发生了变化？我不这么认为。

And I want to convey that belief to shareholders. And they can debate whether it’s right or wrong. But I think it’s a mistake not to comment if — and just assume that the owners understand that because it, you know, it’s a fairly arcane point. And so, we point it out. But we also point out if we think depreciation is inadequate.

我想把这个信念传达给股东。他们可以辩论这是否正确。但我认为如果不评论就假设所有者理解这一点是个错误，因为这确实是一个相当深奥的观点。因此，我们指出这一点。但如果我们认为折旧不足，我们也会指出。

As for valuation purposes, the depreciation is inadequate at a very capital-intensive business like BNSF, which we, I must say, still love anyway.

就估值而言，折旧在像 BNSF 这样资本密集型的企业中是不够的，尽管我必须说，我们仍然非常喜欢它。

Charlie, any more? 查理，还有其他的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

55. “Valuation … is not reducible to any formula”

“估值……无法简化为任何公式”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Section 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第五节。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, and good afternoon. I’m Adam Bergman with Sterling Capital in Virginia Beach, Virginia.

观众成员：谢谢，下午好。我是亚当·伯格曼，来自弗吉尼亚州弗吉尼亚海滩的斯特林资本。

Earlier today, Mr. Munger commented on the valuation of China versus the U.S. market.

今天早些时候，芒格先生对中国市场与美国市场的估值进行了评论。

My question for you is, are market cap to GDP and cyclically adjusted P/E still valid ways to consider market valuation? And how do those influence Berkshire’s investment decisions? Thank you.

我想问你的是，市值与 GDP 的比率和周期调整后的市盈率仍然是考虑市场估值的有效方法吗？这些因素如何影响伯克希尔的投资决策？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I think — well, I expect that I guess Charlie’s overall valued in China.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我认为——好吧，我期待查理对中国的总体估值。

I would say that both of the standards you mention are not paramount at all in our valuation of securities. It’s harder —

我想说，您提到的这两个标准在我们对证券的估值中根本不是最重要的。更难的是——

People are always looking for a formula. And there is an ultimate formula, but the trouble is you don’t know what to stick in for the variables. But the —

人们总是在寻找一个公式。确实有一个终极公式，但问题是你不知道该用什么来替代变量。可是——

And, you know, that’s the value of anything, being the present value of all the cash it’s ever going to distribute. But the P/E ratios — I mean, every number has some degree of meaning, means more sometimes than others.

而且，你知道，这就是任何事物的价值，成为它将来分配的所有现金的现值。但市盈率——我的意思是，每个数字都有一定的意义，有时比其他时候更有意义。

Valuation of a business is — it’s not reducible to any formula where you can actually put in the variables perfectly.

企业估值并不能简化为任何可以完美代入变量的公式。

And both of the things that you mentioned get — themselves, get bandied around a lot.

你提到的这两件事经常被提起。

It’s not that they’re unimportant. But sometimes they’re — they can be very important. Sometimes they can be almost totally unimportant. It’s just not quite as simple as having one or two formulas and, then, saying the market is undervalued or overvalued or a company is undervalued or overvalued.

这并不是说它们不重要。但有时它们——它们可以非常重要。有时它们几乎可以完全不重要。这并不像仅仅有一两个公式，然后说市场被低估或高估，或者一家公司被低估或高估那么简单。

The most important thing is future interest rates. And, you know, and people frequently plug in the current interest rate saying that’s the best they can do. After all, it does reflect a market’s judgment.

最重要的是未来的利率。你知道，人们经常使用当前的利率，认为那是他们能做到的最好。毕竟，这确实反映了市场的判断。

And, you know, the 30-year bond should tell you what people who are willing to put out money for 30 years and have no risk of dollar gain or dollar loss at the end of the 30-year period.

而且，你知道，30年期债券应该告诉你那些愿意投资30年的人对30年期结束时没有美元增益或损失的风险的看法。

But what better figure can you come up with? I’m not sure I can come up with a better figure. But that doesn’t mean I want use the current figure, either. So, I would say that —

但你能想出什么更好的数字呢？我不确定我能想出更好的数字。但这并不意味着我想使用当前的数字。所以，我会说——

I think Charlie’s answer will be that he does not come up with China versus the U.S. market based on what you’ve mentioned as yardsticks. But, no, Charlie, you tell them.

我认为查理的回答是，他不会根据你提到的标准来比较中国和美国市场。但是，不，查理，你告诉他们。

CHARLIE MUNGER: All I meant was that — I said before that the first rule of fishing is to fish where the fish are — is that a good fisherman can find more fish in China if your — if fish is the stock market. That’s all I meant.

查理·芒格：我所说的只是——我之前说过，钓鱼的第一条规则是要在有鱼的地方钓鱼——一个好的钓鱼者如果你的——如果鱼是股票市场的话，可以在中国找到更多的鱼。这就是我所说的全部。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. One — I’m going to go back to one —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想回到一个——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a happier hunting ground.

查理·芒格：这是一个更快乐的狩猎场。

56. Lessons from running a “lousy business”

经营“糟糕生意”的经验教训

WARREN BUFFETT: This doesn’t really directly relate. Just going — I want to go back to one question that was mentioned earlier.

沃伦·巴菲特：这并不直接相关。我想回到之前提到的一个问题。

I really think if you want to be a good evaluator of businesses — an investor — you really ought to figure out a way, without too much personal damage, to run a lousy business for a while.

我真的认为，如果你想成为一个好的商业评估者——一个投资者——你真的应该想办法，在不造成太多个人损失的情况下，经营一段时间糟糕的生意。

I think you learn a whole lot more about business by actually struggling with a terrible business for a couple of years than you run by — than you learn by getting into a very good one where the business itself is so good that you can’t mess it up.

我认为，通过与一个糟糕的生意挣扎几年，你能学到的商业知识要比你进入一个非常好的生意时学到的多，因为那个生意本身太好，以至于你无法搞砸它。

I don’t know what — I don’t know whether Charlie has a view on that or not. But it’s certainly — it’s — it was a big part of our learning experience. And I think a bigger part, in a sense, than running — being involved — with good businesses was actually being involved in some bad businesses and just seeing —

我不知道——我不知道查理对此是否有看法。但这肯定——这是——我们学习经历中的一个重要部分。我认为，从某种意义上说，参与一些糟糕的生意比参与好的生意更重要，实际上就是看到——

CHARLIE MUNGER: How awful it was.

查理·芒格：这真是太糟糕了。

WARREN BUFFETT: — how awful it is, and how little you can do about it, and how IQ does not solve the problem, and a whole bunch of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：——这有多糟糕，你能做的又有多少，智商并不能解决问题，还有一大堆其他事情。

It’s a useful experience. But I wouldn’t advise too much of it. Would you think so, Charlie? Or —

这是一个有用的经历。但我不建议过多地去做。你觉得呢，查理？还是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was very useful to us. There’s nothing like personal, painful experience if you want to learn. And we certainly had our share of it.

查理·芒格：这对我们非常有用。如果你想学习，没有什么比个人的痛苦经历更有效了。而我们当然也经历了不少。

57. Weapons of mass destruction pose biggest risk to Berkshire

大规模杀伤性武器对伯克希尔构成最大风险

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Tom Spanfelner (PH). And he’d like to be called Tom Span from Pennsylvania.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自汤姆·斯潘费尔纳（PH）。他希望被称为来自宾夕法尼亚的汤姆·斯潘。

He says, “In life, business, and investing, strategies often work until they don’t work. Other than a massive insurance loss, any thoughts on what could cause the Berkshire enterprise to not work?”

他说：“在生活、商业和投资中，策略往往有效，直到它们失效。除了巨额的保险损失之外，还有什么可能导致伯克希尔企业失效的想法吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the only —

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为唯一的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Good question.

查理·芒格：好问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, if there were some change, if we got some infection — outside agent of some sort that changed the culture in some major way, an invasion of different thought.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果发生了一些变化，如果我们遭遇了一些感染——某种外部因素以某种重大方式改变了文化，带来了不同的思想入侵。

But as a practical matter, I don’t think anything — you know, and it’s the things you can’t think of — but I can’t think of anything that can harm Berkshire in a material, permanent way except weapons of mass destruction. But I don’t regard that as a low probability.

但从实际角度来看，我认为没有任何事情——你知道的，还有那些你想不到的事情——但我想不出任何能以实质性、永久性方式伤害伯克希尔的东西，除了大规模杀伤性武器。但我不认为那是一个低概率事件。

It would take a recession, a depression, a panic, you know, hurricanes, earthquakes. They all would have some effect. And in some cases, it might even be that we would do better because of them.

这需要经济衰退、经济萧条、恐慌，你知道的，飓风、地震。它们都会产生一些影响。在某些情况下，甚至可能因为这些事件我们会做得更好。

But if there were a successful — as measured by the aggressor — nuclear, chemical, biological, or cyber-attack on the United States — and there are plenty of people that would like to pull that off or organizations and maybe even a few countries — it could disrupt society to such an extent that it would harm us.

但如果发生了一次成功的——以侵略者的标准衡量——针对美国的核、化学、生物或网络攻击——有很多人、组织，甚至可能还有一些国家希望实现这一点——这可能会对社会造成如此大的干扰，以至于对我们造成伤害。

But I think — with the variety of earning streams, with the asset positions, with the general philosophy at play — the culture — I think that we would be close to the last one affected.

但我认为——考虑到收入来源的多样性、资产状况以及整体的理念——文化——我认为我们将是最后一个受到影响的。

But if somebody figures out how to kill millions of Americans and totally disrupt society, then, you know, then all bets are off.

但是如果有人想出办法杀死数百万美国人并彻底破坏社会，那么，所有的赌注都不再有效。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree. It would take something really extreme.

查理·芒格：我同意。这需要一些非常极端的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And just take the question like — British Petroleum took a huge loss with one oil well blowing.

查理·芒格：就像——英国石油公司因一口油井爆炸而遭受巨额损失。

And Berkshire has all these independent subsidiaries. And they really are independent. And the parent company is not (inaudible) if there’s one horrible accident somewhere.

而伯克希尔拥有所有这些独立的子公司。它们确实是独立的。母公司并不会因为某个地方发生一起可怕的事故而受到影响。

We would tend to pay, of course, maybe more than our legal liability, but we are not — one accident in one subsidiary that caused a big lot of damage, we’re better protected than most companies.

我们当然倾向于支付，可能超过我们的法律责任，但我们并不是——一家子公司发生的一起事故造成了大量损失，我们的保护比大多数公司要好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: In every way, Berkshire is structured to handle stresses.

查理·芒格：在各个方面，伯克希尔的结构能够应对压力。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s the kind of thing we think about all the time. We’ve thought about it ever since we started. But I really don’t know any company that can take more general adversity or even some specific adversities.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是我们一直在思考的事情。自从我们开始以来，我们就一直在考虑这个问题。但我真的不知道有什么公司能够承受更普遍的逆境，甚至一些特定的逆境。

But if you get into the “what could happen with weapons of mass destruction?” that is something we can’t predict about. But if that ever happens, there’ll be more to worry about than the price of Berkshire.

但如果你考虑“大规模杀伤性武器可能会发生什么？”这是我们无法预测的。但如果那真的发生了，那么要担心的事情就不仅仅是伯克希尔的价格了。

58. Buffett confident about growth for property-casualty business

巴菲特对财产险业务的增长充满信心

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？

JAY GELB: Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance generated $1.3 billion of premium volume in 2016. This business is on the smaller end of commercial property-casualty insurers in terms of scale, although its volume did grow 40 percent last year.

杰伊·盖尔布：伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险在 2016 年产生了 13 亿美元的保费收入。尽管该业务在规模上属于商业财产意外险保险公司中的小型企业，但其保费收入在去年增长了 40%。

In a highly competitive commercial P&C environment, what gives you confidence that Berkshire Hathaway Specialty is destined to become one of the world’s leading commercial P&C insurers, as you said in this year’s annual letter?

在竞争激烈的商业财产与意外保险环境中，是什么让你相信伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险注定会成为世界领先的商业财产与意外保险公司之一，正如你在今年的年信中所说的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think it will be. And I think how fast it grows depends very — it does depend very much on the market.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为会的。我认为它的增长速度在很大程度上取决于市场。

I mean, we’re, you know, we are not interested in trying to be a price-cutter in a market where the prices already aren’t that attractive.

我的意思是，我们并不想在一个价格已经不太有吸引力的市场中试图削价。

But we have built the scale, worldwide. And a lot of this has just been added in, you know, recent months and just over the past year. We have —

但我们已经在全球范围内建立了规模。很多这些都是在最近几个月和过去一年中新增的。我们有——

We will grow a lot. But if the market should turn hard for any reason, we would grow a lot faster. But we are destined, at Berkshire Hathaway Specialty, to be one of the leading PC firms in the world, just as we were destined to have — when Ajit [Jain] came in, even though we had nothing — we were destined to become a very important reinsurer throughout the world and, in certain ways, almost the only reinsurer for certain types of risks in the world.

我们将会有很大的增长。但如果市场因任何原因变得困难，我们的增长速度会更快。但我们注定在伯克希尔哈撒韦专业公司成为全球领先的财产险公司之一，就像当阿吉特（Ajit Jain）加入时，尽管我们一无所有，我们注定会成为全球非常重要的再保险公司，并在某些方面几乎是全球某些类型风险的唯一再保险公司。

And we’ve got the people. We’ve got the capital. We’ve got the reputation. There is no stronger company in the insurance world — and there won’t be — than the Berkshire Hathaway insurers. We’ve got the talent there.

我们拥有人才。我们拥有资本。我们拥有声誉。在保险界，没有比伯克希尔哈撒韦保险公司更强大的公司了——也不会有。我们拥有那里的才华。

So it will grow. It may grow slowly some years. It may have big jumps just like the reinsurance operation did many years ago. But it’s a very important addition to Berkshire that brought that on. I wish — just wish we could’ve started a little earlier.

所以它会增长。它可能在某些年份增长缓慢。它可能会像多年前的再保险业务那样有大幅度的跳跃。但这是对伯克希尔非常重要的补充。我希望——只是希望我们能早点开始。

But we had to have to right people. And they came to us. And, as you say, we wrote whatever it was, a billion-three or a billion-four last year, and we’ll write more this year. But we won’t write as much as if we were in a hard market.

但我们必须找到合适的人选。他们来找我们。正如你所说，我们去年写了大约十三亿或十四亿，今年会写更多。但如果我们处于一个困难的市场，我们写的就不会这么多。

59. “My God, we’re still learning”

“我的天啊，我们还在学习。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 6?

沃伦·巴菲特：第 6 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name Sally Burns. I’m from Australia. But I currently reside in Austin, Texas.

观众成员：下午好。我叫萨莉·伯恩斯。我来自澳大利亚，但我目前住在德克萨斯州的奥斯丁。

My question, Mr. Buffett, I have heard that Mr. Munger says your greatest talent is that you’re a learning machine, that you never stop updating your views.

我的问题是，巴菲特先生，我听说芒格先生说您最大的才能是您是一台学习机器，您从不停止更新自己的观点。

What are the most interesting things you’ve learned over the last few years?

你在过去几年中学到的最有趣的事情是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it is fun to learn. I would say Charlie is much more of a learning machine than I am. I’m a specialized one, and he’s a much — he does as well as I do in my specialty. And, then, he’s got a much more general absorption rate than I have about what’s going on in the world.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，学习是很有趣的。我会说查理比我更像一个学习机器。我是一个专业型的，而他在我的专业领域表现得和我一样好。此外，他对世界发生的事情的吸收能力比我强得多。

But, you know, it’s a world that gets more fascinating all the time. And a lot of fun can occur when you learn you were wrong on something. It — you know, that’s when you really learn that the old ideas really weren’t so correct. And you have to adapt to new ones. And that, of course, is difficult.

但是，你知道，这个世界总是变得越来越迷人。当你发现自己在某件事情上错了时，会发生很多有趣的事情。你知道，那时你真的意识到旧的观念并不是那么正确。你必须适应新的观念。当然，这很困难。

I don’t know that I would pick out — well, I think, actually, what’s going on, you know, in America is terribly, terribly interesting, you know, and politically, all kinds of things. But just the way the world’s unfolding, it’s moving fast.

我不知道我会选择什么——好吧，我认为，实际上，美国发生的事情是非常非常有趣的，你知道的，政治上，各种各样的事情。但就世界的发展方式而言，它正在快速变化。

I do enjoy trying, you know, to figure out not only what’s going to happen, but what’s even happening now. But I don’t think I’ve got any special insights that would be useful to you. But maybe Charlie does.

我确实喜欢尝试，知道吗，不仅要弄清楚将要发生什么，还要弄清楚现在发生了什么。但我认为我没有任何对你有用的特别见解。不过，也许查理有。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think buying the Apple stock is a good sign in Warren. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为购买苹果股票是沃伦的一个好迹象。（笑声）

And he did run around Omaha and ask if he could take his grandchildren’s tablets away. (Buffett laughs)

他确实在奥马哈四处打听，问是否可以拿走他孙子们的平板电脑。（巴菲特笑）

And he did market research.

他进行了市场调研。

And I do think we keep learning. And more important, we keep — we don’t unlearn the old tricks. And that is really important.

我确实认为我们不断学习。更重要的是，我们保持——我们不会忘记旧的技巧。这一点非常重要。

You look at the people who try and solve their problems by printing money and lying and so forth.

你看看那些试图通过印钞和撒谎等方式来解决问题的人。

Take Puerto Rico. Who would’ve guessed that a territory of the United States would be in bankruptcy? Well, I would’ve predicted it because they behave like idiots. (Laughter) And so —

以波多黎各为例。谁能想到美国的一个领土会破产呢？好吧，我会预测到这一点，因为他们的行为就像傻瓜一样。（笑声）所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: And we did not buy any Puerto Rico bonds. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们没有购买任何波多黎各的债券。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. And if you go to Europe — you go to Europe, you should look at the government bond portfolios we’re required to hold in Europe. There’s not only no Greek bonds, they’re the bonds of nobody but Germany.

查理·芒格：不。如果你去欧洲——你去欧洲，你应该看看我们在欧洲被要求持有的政府债券投资组合。那里不仅没有希腊债券，只有德国的债券。

Everywhere you look in Berkshire, somebody is being sensible. And that is a great pleasure. And if you combine that with being very opportunistic so that when something comes along like a panic, why, it’s a nice — it’s like playing with two hands instead of one on a game that requires two hands.

在Berkshire，无论你往哪里看，总有人在明智地行事。这是一种很大的乐趣。如果你再加上非常善于抓住机会，当像恐慌这样的事情发生时，那就更好了——这就像在需要双手的游戏中用两只手玩，而不是用一只手。

It helps to have a fair-sized repertoire.

拥有丰富的经验非常重要。

And, Warren, we’ve learned so damn much. There are all kinds of things we’ve done over the last 10 years we would not have done 20 years ago.

而，沃伦，我们学到了太多东西。在过去的 10 年里，我们做了许多 20 年前不会做的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s true, although if you take — it’s interesting. I’ve mentioned this before. But one of the best books on investment was written, I think, in 1958. I think I read it around 1960, by Phil Fisher, called Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits. And he told —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是真的，尽管如果你考虑一下——这很有趣。我之前提到过这一点。但我认为，关于投资的最佳书籍之一是由菲尔·费舍尔于 1958 年写的。我想我在 1960 年左右读过，书名是《普通股与非凡利润》。他告诉——

CHARLIE MUNGER: All the countries went — companies went to hell eventually.

查理·芒格：所有国家——公司最终都走向了毁灭。

WARREN BUFFETT: But it talked about the importance, I mean, or the usefulness of, what do you call, the “scuttlebutt method.” And, you know, that was something I didn’t learn from [Benjamin] Graham.

沃伦·巴菲特：这本书谈到了“口碑法”的重要性。这是我从Benjamin Graham那里没学到的。

But every now and then, it’s turned out to be very useful. Now, it doesn’t solve everything. And, I mean, there’s a whole lot of more —

但时不时地，它确实非常有用。现在，它并不能解决所有问题。而且，我的意思是，还有很多其他的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I saw you do it with American Express in the Salad Oil scandal.

查理·芒格：我看到你在色拉油丑闻中与美国运通合作。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re still doing at Apple, you know, decades later.

查理·芒格：你在苹果公司仍然在做，知道吗，几十年后。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It — in certain cases, you actually can learn a lot just by asking a lot of questions. And I give Phil Fisher credit. That book goes back a lot of years.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在某些情况下，你实际上可以通过问很多问题来学到很多东西。我要感谢菲尔·费舍尔。那本书已经有很多年了。

But as Charlie said, some of the companies he picked as winners forever did sort of peter out on him.

正如查理所说，一些他曾经看好的‘永远的赢家’公司最终也逐渐消失了。

But the basic idea, that you can learn a lot of things just by asking in some cases — I mean, I used to —

但基本的想法是，在某些情况下，你可以通过询问学习很多东西——我的意思是，我曾经——

I mean, if I got interested in the coal industry — just say to pick one out of the air — you know, when I was much younger, more energetic, if I went and talked to the heads of 10 coal companies and I asked each one of them — way later into the conversation, after they got feeling very — they felt like talking.

我意思是，如果我对煤炭行业感兴趣——就随便举个例子——你知道，当我年轻的时候，更有活力，如果我去和 10 家煤炭公司的负责人交谈，我问他们每一个人——在谈话进行得很深入之后，他们感觉很——他们愿意谈。

And I would just, you know, I’d just say, “If you had to go away for 10 years on a desert island and you had to put all of your family’s money into one of your competitors, which one would it be and why?”

如果你必须在一个荒岛上待 10 年，并且必须把你家所有的钱投入到你的一个竞争对手那里，你会选择哪个，为什么？

And then, you know, and then I’d ask them if they had to sell short one of their competitors for 10 years, all their family money, why?

然后，你知道，我会问他们，如果他们必须在 10 年内做空他们的一个竞争对手，动用所有的家庭资金，为什么？

And they — everybody loves talking about their competitors. And if you do that with 10 different companies, you’ll probably have a better fix on the economics of the coal industry than any one of those individuals has.

他们——每个人都喜欢谈论他们的竞争对手。如果你和 10 家不同的公司这样做，你可能对煤炭行业的经济状况有比任何一个人更清晰的了解。

I mean, the — it — there’s ways of getting at things. And sometimes they’re useful. Sometimes, they’re not. But sometimes, they can be very useful.

我的意思是，有办法接触到事情。有时候它们是有用的，有时候则不是。但有时候，它们可以非常有用。

And, you know, the idea of just learning more all the time about —

而且，你知道，随时学习更多关于——的想法

I’m more specialized in that by far than Charlie. I mean, he wants to learn about everything. And I just want to learn about something that’ll help Berkshire.

我在这方面比查理更专业得多。我的意思是，他想了解所有的事情。而我只想学习一些能帮助伯克希尔的东西。

But — (laughs) — it’s a very, you know, it’s a very useful attitude toward — have toward — the world.

但是——（笑）——这是一种非常有用的态度，面对——对——这个世界。

And, of course, I don’t know who said it. But somebody said the problem is not in getting the new ideas but shedding the old ones. And there’s a lot of truth to that.

当然，我不知道是谁说的。但有人说问题不在于获得新想法，而在于摆脱旧想法。这句话有很多道理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We would never have bought ISCAR if it had come along 10 years earlier. We would never have bought Precision Castparts if it had come along 10 years earlier. We are learning. And, my God, we’re still learning.

查理·芒格：如果 ISCAR 在 10 年前出现，我们绝对不会买它。如果 Precision Castparts 在 10 年前出现，我们绝对不会买它。我们在学习。天哪，我们仍在学习。

60. “We’re getting too much medicine”

“我们吃的药太多了”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Hi. Warren, this is my final question.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：嗨，沃伦，这是我的最后一个问题。

In 2012, you were quoted as saying, “I think the health care problem in — is the number one problem of America and of American business. We have not dealt with that yet.”

在 2012 年，您曾被引用说：“我认为——的医疗保健问题是美国和美国商业的头号问题。我们还没有解决这个问题。”

Do you believe that the current administration’s plan to repeal and replace ACA will ultimately benefit the economy and Berkshire or not?

你相信当前政府计划废除和替换《平价医疗法案》最终会对经济和伯克希尔产生好处吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I’ll answer — I’ll give you two answers here, the first one being that if you go back to 1960 or thereabouts, corporate taxes were about four percent of GDP. I mean, they bounced around some.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，我会给你两个答案，第一个是如果你回到 1960 年左右，企业税大约占 GDP 的四个百分点。我的意思是，它们有些波动。

And, now, they’re about two percent of GDP. And at that time, health care was five percent of GDP. And now, it’s about 17 percent of GDP.

现在，它们大约占 GDP 的 2%。而那时，医疗保健占 GDP 的 5%。现在，它大约占 GDP 的 17%。

So when American business talks about taxes strangling our competitiveness or that sort of thing, they’re talking about something that, as a percentage of GDP, has gone down from four to two while medical costs, which are borne to a great extent by business, have gone from five to 17 percent.

所以当美国商界谈论税收扼杀我们的竞争力或类似的事情时，他们谈论的是作为 GDP 百分比的税收，从四降到二，而医疗成本在很大程度上由企业承担，从五上升到 17%。

So medical costs are the tapeworm of economic — American economic competitiveness, I mean, if you’re really talking about it.

所以医疗成本是经济的寄生虫——我指的是美国的经济竞争力，如果你真的在谈论这个的话。

And that — and business knows that. They don’t feel they can do much about it, but it is not —

而这一点——商业界知道这一点。他们觉得自己对此无能为力，但这并不是——

The tax system is not crippling Berkshire competitiveness around the world or anything of the sort. Our health costs have gone up incredibly and will go up a lot more. And if you look at the rest of the world, there were a half a dozen countries that were around our five percent if you go back to the early years.

税收制度并没有削弱伯克希尔在全球的竞争力。我们的医疗成本已经大幅上升，并且还会继续大幅上升。如果你看看世界其他地方，回到早期，有大约六个国家的费率也在我们五个百分点左右。

And while we’re at 17, now, they’re at 10 or 11. So they have gained a five or six point advantage — the world — even in these countries with fairly high medical costs.

而现在我们在 17，他们在 10 或 11。所以他们获得了五到六点的优势——在这些医疗成本相对较高的国家中，世界也是如此。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And that’s with socialized medicine.

查理·芒格：这就是社会化医疗。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. So it’s a huge — whatever I said then goes and is accentuated now. And that isn’t a problem —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。所以这很重要——我当时说的任何话现在都被强调了。这不是问题——

I mean, that is a problem this society is having trouble with and is going to have more trouble with, and — regardless of which party’s in power or anything of the sort. It almost transcends that.

我意思是，这是一个这个社会正在面临的问题，并且将会面临更多的问题，无论哪个政党掌权或其他类似的事情。这几乎超越了这些。

In terms of the new act that was passed a couple days ago versus the Obama administration act, it’s a very interesting thing.

关于几天前通过的新法案与奥巴马政府的法案，这是一件非常有趣的事情。

All I can tell you is the net effect of that act on one person is that my taxes — my federal income taxes — would’ve gone down 17 percent last year, if the act — if what was proposed went into effect.

我能告诉你的是，这项法案对一个人的净影响是，如果该法案——如果提议的内容生效，我的联邦所得税去年将减少 17%。

So, it is a huge tax cut for guys like me. And you’ll have to figure out the effects of the rest of the act.

所以，这对像我这样的人来说是一个巨大的减税。你需要弄清楚该法案其余部分的影响。

But the one thing I can tell you is if it goes through the White House — put in, I mean, it — anybody with $250,000 a year of adjusted gross income and a lot of investment income is going to have a huge tax cut. And when there’s a tax cut, either the deficit goes up or they get the taxes from somebody else.

但我可以告诉你的一件事是，如果它通过白宫——我指的是它——任何年调整后总收入为 25 万美元并且有大量投资收入的人都会获得巨大的减税。而当减税发生时，要么赤字增加，要么他们从其他人那里获得税收。

So, as it stands now, it is — that is the one predictable effect, if it should pass, as it — and it — the Senate will do something different and hold a conference. And who knows what happens? But that is in the law that was passed a couple days ago.

所以，目前的情况是——这是一个可预测的结果，如果它通过的话——而且——参议院会采取不同的行动并召开会议。谁知道会发生什么？但这在几天前通过的法律中有规定。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with you about the medical care. What I don’t like about the medical care is that a lot of — we’re getting too much medicine.

查理·芒格：我当然同意你关于医疗保健的看法。我不喜欢医疗保健的地方在于，我们接受了太多的医疗。

There’s too much chemotherapy on people that are all but dead, and all kinds of crazy things go on in Medicare and in other parts of the health system.

对那些几乎已经死亡的人进行过多的化疗，而在医疗保险和健康系统的其他部分则发生各种疯狂的事情。

And every — there are so many vested interests that it’s very hard to change.

而且每一个——有这么多既得利益，改变起来非常困难。

But I don’t think any rational person looking objectively from the outside of the American system of medical care — we all love all the new life-saving stuff, and the new chemotherapies, and the new drugs, and all that.

但我认为，任何一个理性的人从美国医疗系统的外部客观地看，都不会认为——我们都喜欢所有这些新的救命技术、新的化疗、新的药物，以及所有这些。

But, my God, the system is crazy. And the cost is just going wild. And it does put our manufacturers at a big disadvantage with other people where the government is paying the medical bills. And so, I agree with Warren totally.

但，天啊，这个系统真是疯狂。成本也在不断飙升。这确实使我们的制造商在与其他政府支付医疗费用的国家进行竞争时处于巨大的劣势。所以，我完全同意沃伦的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you had to bet, 10 years from now, we’ll be higher or lower than 17 percent of GDP?

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你要打赌，10年后，我们的医疗支出占GDP的比例会比17%更高还是更低？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if present trends continue, it’ll get more and more. There are huge vested interests in having this thing continue the way it is. And they’re very vocal and active. And the rest of us are indifferent. So, naturally, we get a terrible result.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果目前的趋势继续下去，这种情况会越来越严重。维持现状有巨大的既得利益者，他们非常积极和 vocal。而我们其余的人则漠不关心。因此，自然会导致糟糕的结果。

And I would say that on this issue, both parties hate each other so much that neither one of them can think rationally. And I don’t think that helps, either.

我想说，在这个问题上，双方互相仇恨得如此严重，以至于他们都无法理性思考。我认为这也没有帮助。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：这——（掌声）

It is kind of interesting that, you know, with — the federal government spends — or raises, we’ll say — 3 1/2 trillion or something like that — I mean, the degree of concern everybody has about that — although that’s stayed fairly steady in the 18 percent or so of GDP plus or minus a couple points — but three trillion-plus is spent on health care.

有趣的是，联邦政府花费或筹集大约 3.5 万亿，大家对此的关注程度虽然保持在国内生产总值的 18%左右上下波动，但超过三万亿的支出用于医疗保健。

And everybody wants the best. And it’s perfectly understandable. But it’s a very, very — it’s a big number compared to the whole federal budget. I mean, there’s some overlap and all of that. But it’s —

每个人都想要最好的。这是完全可以理解的。但这确实是一个非常非常大的数字，相对于整个联邦预算来说。我是说，确实有一些重叠等等。但这就是——

If you talk about world competitiveness of American industry, it’s the biggest single variable where we keep getting more and more out of whack with the rest of the world.

如果谈论美国工业的世界竞争力，这是一个最大的单一变量，我们与世界其他地方的差距越来越大。

And it’s very tough for political parties to attack it. Yet, it’s, you know, it — basically, it’s a political subject.

这对政党来说很难攻击。然而，你知道，这基本上是一个政治话题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot of it is deeply immoral. If you have a group of hospital people and doctors that are feasting like a bunch of jackals on the carcass of some dying person, it’s not a pretty sight.

查理·芒格：很多事情都是极其不道德的。如果你有一群医院人员和医生像一群豺狼一样在一个垂死者的尸体上大快朵颐，那真是个不堪入目的场景。

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them about that group out — (applause) — in California that —

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们关于那个在加利福尼亚的团体——（掌声）——的事

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yes. 查理·芒格：哦，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Perfect — this is —

沃伦·巴菲特：完美——这就是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: This is Redding. This is one of my favorite stories. There are a bunch of very ambitious cardiologist and heart surgeons in Redding.

查理·芒格：这是雷丁。这是我最喜欢的故事之一。雷丁有一群非常有雄心的心脏病学家和心脏外科医生。

And they got the thought that, really, what a heart was was a “widowmaker.” So everybody — every patient that came in, they said, “You’ve got a widowmaker in your chest. And we know how to fix it.” And so they recommended heart surgery for everybody.

他们认为，心脏实际上就是一个“寡妇制造者”。所以每一个进来的病人，他们都说：“你胸口有一个寡妇制造者。我们知道怎么修复它。”于是他们为每个人都推荐了心脏手术。

And, of course, they developed a huge volume of heart surgery. And they got very wonderful results because nobody comes through heart surgery better than the man who doesn’t need it at all. (Laughter)

当然，他们开展了大量的心脏手术。他们取得了非常好的结果，因为没有人能比根本不需要心脏手术的人恢复得更好。（笑声）

And they made so much money that the hospital chain, which was Tenet, brought all its other hospitals — why can’t you be more like Redding? And this is a true story. And it went on and on and on.

他们赚了很多钱，以至于医院连锁公司 Tenet 收购了所有其他医院——为什么你们不能更像雷丁？这是真实的故事。事情就这样不断地发展下去。

And finally, there was some beloved Catholic priest. And they said, “You’ve got a widowmaker in your chest.” And he didn’t believe them. And he blew the whistle.

最后，有一位受人爱戴的天主教神父。他们说：“你胸口有个致命的病。”他不相信他们。然后他吹响了哨子。

WARREN BUFFETT: He was a priest. You could see why he didn’t believe them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他是个牧师。你可以理解他为什么不相信他们。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: At any rate — well, when you get a routine, you just keep using it, you know. A heart is a widowmaker. It’s a widowmaker.

查理·芒格：无论如何——好吧，当你形成一个常规时，你就会一直使用它，你知道。心脏是个寡妇制造者。它是个寡妇制造者。

Later, I met one of the doctors who threw these people out of the medical profession. And I said to him, “In the end, did they think they were doing anything wrong?”

后来，我遇到了一个把这些人驱逐出医疗行业的医生。我对他说：“最后，他们认为自己做错了什么吗？”

He said, “No, Charlie. They thought that what they were doing was good for people.” That is why it’s so hard to fix these things. The self — the delusion that comes into people as they make money and get more successful by doing God-awful things should never be underestimated. And it’s — there’s a lot — (Applause)

他说：“不，查理。他们认为他们所做的对人们是有好处的。”这就是为什么修复这些事情如此困难。自我——当人们通过做一些可怕的事情赚钱并变得更加成功时产生的错觉，绝不能被低估。而且——这有很多——（掌声）

A lot of that goes on. And you’re (inaudible) such gross craziness. And you thought little Wells Fargo looks like innocence. He only has a little trouble with his incentive system.

很多事情都是这样的。你会觉得这种疯狂真是太离谱了。你以为小威尔斯·法戈看起来很无辜，他只是对他的激励系统有一点小麻烦。

But the heart surgery rate was 20 times normal or something. You’d think you’d notice if you’re running a hospital. And — but they did notice. They wanted the other hospitals to be more like it.

但心脏手术的比例是正常水平的 20 倍左右。你会认为如果你在经营一家医院，你会注意到这一点。然而——他们确实注意到了。他们希望其他医院也能更像这样。

WARREN BUFFETT: They had a terrific success ratio.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们的成功率非常高。

61. Buffett expects Berkshire will own more utilities

巴菲特预计伯克希尔将拥有更多的公用事业公司

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？（笑）

GREGG WARREN: Thank you, Warren.

格雷格·沃伦：谢谢你，沃伦。

As you look forward, in taking into consideration some of the headwinds faced in the U.S.-based utilities, including weaker electricity demand growth as increasing energy efficiency impacts demand, distributed generation, which hits vertically integrated utilities doubly hard as they face both declining energy sales revenue and increased network cost to support reliable delivery and, third, higher interest rates, which would increase borrowing costs, what are the key attributes that Berkshire Energy would be looking for in future acquisition candidates? In —

展望未来，考虑到美国公用事业面临的一些阻力，包括由于能源效率提高而导致的电力需求增长疲软、分布式发电对垂直整合的公用事业造成双重打击，因为它们面临着电力销售收入下降和支持可靠交付的网络成本增加，以及更高的利率导致的借贷成本增加，伯克希尔能源在未来收购候选资产时会关注哪些关键属性？特别是，是否有相对于发电资产，像输电资产这样的优势或劣势，使得你们更倾向于选择某一类资产？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Oh, excuse me. I’m sorry.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。哦，抱歉。我很抱歉。

GREGG WARREN: I’m sorry. In particular, are there advantages or disadvantages attached to, say, transmission assets relative to generation assets that would make you favor one over the other?

格雷格·沃伦：对不起。特别是，相对于发电资产，输电资产是否有优势或劣势，使您更倾向于其中一个？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, generation assets, you can say, have inherently more risk because that — some of them are going to —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。发电资产本身有更多的风险，因为一些可能会—

CHARLIE MUNGER: Be stranded.

查理·芒格：被闲置。

WARREN BUFFETT: — stranded, yeah, and obsoleted. Now the question is how they treat stranded and all of that sort of thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：对，被闲置，过时。现在问题是他们如何处理这些闲置资产等等。

We — on the other hand, more of the capital investment is in the generating assets. So that tends to be where a good bit of the capital base is.

另一方面，发电资产的资本投资更多。所以这通常是资本基础的一个主要部分。

We like the utility business OK. I mean — electric — electricity demand is not increasing like it was, as you point out. They’re going to be stranded assets. They —

我们对公用事业业务还不错。电力需求确实不像以前那样增长，正如你所指出的那样，它们会面临闲置资产的问题。它们——

If they’re stranded because of rank foolishness, you know, they will probably be less inclined — or the utility commissions — will be less inclined to let you figure that in your rate base as you go forward as opposed to things that are — where societal demands are just changing.

如果这些闲置是由于极端愚蠢的决策造成的，公用事业委员会可能不愿意让你在未来的电费基础上考虑这些问题，而相对于社会需求的变化则会有所不同。

But we still think the utility business is a very decent asset. The prices are very high, but that’s what happens in a low interest rate environment. I would be —

但我们仍然认为公用事业业务是一个非常不错的资产。价格很高，但这正是低利率环境下的情况。

I’d be surprised if 10 years from now, we don’t have significantly more money in not only wind and solar, but probably — we’ll probably own more utility systems than we own now.

我会感到惊讶，如果10年后，我们没有在风能和太阳能领域投入更多的钱，而且我们可能会拥有比现在更多的公用事业系统。

We’re a buyer of choice with many utility commissions. In fact, if we can put up the slide, there’s a slide which shows something about our pricing compared to other utilities.

我们是许多公用事业委员会的首选买家。事实上，如果我们能展示幻灯片，有一张幻灯片显示了我们与其他公用事业的定价比较。

And Greg Abel and his group have done an extraordinary job. They’ve done it in safety. They’ve done it in reliability. They’ve done it in price. They’ve done it in renewables. It’s hard to imagine a better run operation than exists at MidAmerican Energy.

格雷格·阿贝尔和他的团队做得非常出色。他们在安全、可靠性、价格和可再生能源方面都表现卓越。很难想象比MidAmerican Energy更好的运营。

And people want us — with that record — people want us to come to their state in many cases.

人们希望我们——凭借这样的记录——在许多情况下希望我们到他们的州去。

But when prices get to the level they have, I mean, some utilities have sold at extraordinary prices. And we can’t pay them and have it make sense for Berkshire shareholders.

但是当价格达到现在的水平时，我的意思是，一些公用事业以非常高的价格出售。我们无法支付这些费用，这对伯克希尔的股东来说没有意义。

But just because we can’t do it this year doesn’t mean it won’t happen next year or the year after. So I think we’ll get a chance.

但仅仅因为我们今年做不到，并不意味着明年或后年就不会发生。所以我认为我们会有机会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And our utilities are not normal. The way Greg has run those things, they’re so much better run in every way than normal utilities. They’re better regarded by the paying customers. They’re better regarded by the regulators. They have better safety records. They charge —

查理·芒格：我们的公用事业并不正常。格雷格管理这些东西的方式，使它们在各个方面都比普通公用事业运行得更好。付费客户对它们的评价更高。监管机构对它们的评价更高。它们的安全记录更好。它们的收费——

It’s just everything about it is way the hell better. And it’s a pleasure to be associated with people like that and to have assets of that quality.

这件事的一切都好得多。与这样的人合作并拥有如此高质量的资产是一种乐趣。

And it’s a lot safer. If somebody asked Berkshire to build a $50 billion nuclear plant, we wouldn’t do it.

而且这要安全得多。如果有人要求伯克希尔建造一个 500 亿美元的核电站，我们是不会做的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we have public power here in Nebraska. I mean, it’s been sort of the pride of Nebraska for many decades. It’s all — there are no privately-held utility systems, and totally public power. And, you know, those utilities have no requirements for earnings on equity. They have —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在内布拉斯加州有公共电力。我是说，这已经是内布拉斯加州多年来的骄傲。这里没有私营公用事业系统，完全是公共电力。而且，你知道，这些公用事业没有对股本收益的要求。它们有——

They can borrow at tax-exempt rates. We have to borrow at taxable rates. And Nebraska — you know, the wind — it’s not that much different than Iowa. And we’re selling electricity across the river, a few miles from here, you know, at lower prices than exist in Nebraska. So it’s an extraordinary utility.

他们可以以免税利率借款。我们必须以应税利率借款。而内布拉斯加州——你知道，风——与爱荷华州并没有太大区别。我们在河对岸，离这里几英里远的地方，以比内布拉斯加州更低的价格出售电力。所以这是一个非凡的公用事业。

And it was lucky when we got involved in it. I thank Walter Scott, our director, for introducing me to it almost 17 or 18 years ago or so. And —

而我们参与其中时真是幸运。我感谢我们的董事沃尔特·斯科特，差不多在 17 或 18 年前把我引入这个领域。还有——

But I don’t think the utility business, as such — I mean, if I were putting together a portfolio of stocks, I don’t think there would be any utilities in that group now. But I love the fact we own Berkshire Hathaway Energy.

但我认为公用事业业务本身——我的意思是，如果我在组建一个股票投资组合，我认为现在这个组合中不会有任何公用事业公司。但我喜欢我们拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司的事实。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s different —

查理·芒格：但这有所不同——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — radically different —

查理·芒格：—— 截然不同 ——

WARREN BUFFETT: A lot —

沃伦·巴菲特：很多——

WARREN BUFFETT: — and better.

沃伦·巴菲特：——更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: A lot better, actually.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上好多了。

62. McLane: lots of revenue, but very thin profit margin

麦克莱恩：收入很多，但利润率很薄

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. 观众：你好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Grant Misterly from beautiful, historic Saint Augustine, Florida.

观众成员：我叫格兰特·米斯特利，来自美丽而历史悠久的佛罗里达州圣奥古斯丁。

I’ve been a fan of yours and of Berkshire since I was a kid, looking through the stock pages and seeing one crazy stock that traded for $10,000 a share.

我从小就是你的粉丝，也是伯克希尔的粉丝，翻看股票页面时看到一只疯狂的股票，交易价格为每股 10,000 美元。

Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to convince my parents to buy it at that point. But now I’m a shareholder as an adult. And I’m here with my daughters, Mabel, who’s seven and Willa, who’s one year old, my wife.

不幸的是，我当时没能说服我的父母买下它。但现在我作为成年人是一个股东。我和我的妻子以及我的女儿们在这里，梅布尔七岁，威拉一岁。

I voraciously read the letter every year. And I love the stories of — from the different companies, GEICO and See’s, BNSF, that kind of teach investing lessons.

我每年都贪婪地阅读这封信。我喜欢来自不同公司的故事，比如 GEICO 和 See’s，BNSF，这些故事教会了我投资的课程。

And this year, when I was looking through the accounting information in the back, I noticed that one company, McLane, contributes a lot of revenue, a large portion of Berkshire’s revenue and, to a lesser extent, earnings. But I don’t ever see much about it in the annual report.

今年，当我查看后面的会计信息时，我注意到一家名为麦克莱恩的公司贡献了大量收入，是伯克希尔收入的重要部分，盈利也在一定程度上有所贡献。但我在年报中几乎没有看到关于它的内容。

So I’m curious why we don’t hear more about that company? And are there any investing lessons like we get from See’s and GEICO that you can share about that company?

我很好奇为什么我们对那家公司听得不多？关于那家公司，你能分享一些像我们从 See's 和 GEICO 那里学到的投资经验吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, McLane — the reason you see their figures separately is because the SEC has certain requirements that are based on sales. And McLane is a company that has an extraordinary amount of sales in relation to intrinsic value or to net income.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，麦克莱恩——你看到他们的数字分开显示的原因是因为证券交易委员会有一些基于销售的要求。麦克莱恩是一家在内在价值或净收入方面与销售额相比有着非凡销售额的公司。

It, basically, is a distributor of — well, it’s a huge customer, for example, of the food companies, the candy companies, the cigarette companies, it — go up and down the line of anything that goes into convenience stores.

它基本上是一个分销商——例如，它是食品公司、糖果公司、香烟公司的一个巨大客户，它——涵盖了进入便利店的任何商品。

But we bought it from Walmart. And Walmart is our biggest customer. I can’t tell you the precise volume, but — well, if you get Walmart’s and Sam’s together, you know, you’re getting up to 20 percent-plus.

但我们是从沃尔玛买的。而沃尔玛是我们最大的客户。我不能告诉你确切的数量，但——好吧，如果你把沃尔玛和山姆的销量加在一起，你知道的，差不多能达到 20%以上。

But it’s nationwide. But in the end, it operates on about six percent gross margins and five percent operating expenses, so it has a one percent pre-tax margin.

但这是全国性的。但最终，它的毛利率约为六个百分点，运营费用为五个百分点，因此它的税前利润率为一个百分点。

And, obviously, a one percent pre-tax margin only works in terms of return on capital if you turn your equity extraordinarily fast. And that’s what McLane does. Being a wholesaler, it’s moving things in, moving things out very fast, very efficiently. And it does this —

显然，只有在你极快地周转资本的情况下，1%的税前利润率才能在资本回报方面发挥作用。而这正是麦克莱恩所做的。作为一个批发商，它以非常快和高效的方式进货和出货。它就是这样做的——

It also has a few liquor distribution subsidiaries that have wider margins. But the basic McLane business is, you know, 45 billion-plus, makes one percent pre-tax on sales.

它还有一些酒类分销子公司，利润率更高。但基本的麦克莱恩业务是，你知道的，超过 450 亿美元，所以它的税前利润率是1%。

But the return on capital is very decent. But it sort of has an outsized appearance simply because of this huge volume of sales that go through it.

但资本回报率非常可观。只是由于其庞大的销售量，它看起来有些过于突出。

Grady Rosier, who runs it, is exceptional. He was there when we bought it from Walmart, whenever it was, a dozen years ago.

格雷迪·罗西尔负责这个项目，他非常出色。我们从沃尔玛购买它时，他就在那儿，大约是十多年前的事。

And I’ve been there once. We’ve got thousands and thousands of trucks, big distribution centers all over the country. It is a major factor in moving goods at wholesale.

我去过那里一次。我们在全国各地有成千上万的卡车和大型配送中心。这是批发货物运输的一个主要因素。

I mean, if you’re a Mars Candy or something of the sort, I mean, we — we’re — we’ll be the biggest customer.

我的意思是，如果你是火星糖果或类似的东西，我的意思是，我们——我们——将是最大的客户。

But that pretty well describes the business. You know, it’s a business that earns good returns in relation to invested capital and in relation to our purchase price.

但这基本上描述了这个业务。你知道，这是一项相对于投资资本和我们的购买价格来说能获得良好回报的业务。

But, you know, every tenth of a cent is important in the business. In collect — moving your receivables exceptionally fast, and consequently you have — you know, you have payables moving big time.

但是，你知道，在商业中，每一分每一厘都是重要的。在收款方面——快速地处理你的应收账款，因此你知道，你的应付账款也在大幅度地流动。

So the sales are 30 times receivables and 30 times payables, you’ve got — and maybe, yeah, 35 or so times inventory. I mean, this is a business that’s moving a lot of goods. But, in terms of its —

所以销售额是应收账款的 30 倍和应付账款的 30 倍，库存大约是 35 倍左右。我是说，这是一家流通大量商品的企业。但是，就其——

It’s an important subsidiary but not remotely as important as would be indicated by the sales. It’s still very important making the kind of money that shows up in the 10-K.

这是一个重要的子公司，但远没有销售所显示的那么重要。它仍然非常重要，因为它赚的钱在 10-K 报告中体现出来。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You said it all. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：你说得对。（巴菲特笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: That was an interesting thing. Walmart wanted to sell it. They came to see us, and we made a deal. And the CFO came. We talked for a while. He went into the other room and called the CEO and came back and said, “You have a deal.”

沃伦·巴菲特：那是件有趣的事情。沃尔玛想要出售它。他们来找我们，我们达成了协议。首席财务官来了。我们聊了一会儿。他走进另一个房间，给首席执行官打了电话，然后回来告诉我：“你们达成了协议。”

And Walmart has told me subsequently that they never had a deal that closed as fast as the one with Berkshire. I mean, they — you know, we said what we would pay. It was cash. And we got it done very promptly. And they were terrific on their side.

沃尔玛随后告诉我，他们从未有过像与伯克希尔那样迅速达成的交易。我的意思是，他们——你知道，我们说了我们会支付的金额。是现金。我们很快就完成了交易。他们在这方面表现得非常出色。

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, that reputation for being quick and simple, and doing what we promised and so on, has helped at Berkshire time after time.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，这种快速、简单、信守承诺的声誉在伯克希尔一次又一次地帮助了我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, we wouldn’t have made that deal without, essentially, having that reputation. But they knew —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的，如果没有这种声誉，我们是不会达成那笔交易的。但他们知道——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you bought the Northern Natural Gas Company in one weekend. And they wanted the Monday — that money on Monday.

查理·芒格：好吧，你在一个周末买下了北方天然气公司。他们想要周一——那笔钱在周一。

WARREN BUFFETT: They needed the money on Monday.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们周一需要钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Before the lawyers could complete the legal papers, we managed to do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：在律师完成法律文件之前，我们就成功做到了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, not only that, but I think it took some clearance by — in Washington. And, essentially, I think I wrote a letter and said that if they didn’t — if they decided after looking at it they didn’t want to clear it, we’d undo the deal.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，不仅如此，我认为这还需要华盛顿的某些批准。基本上，我想我写了一封信，表示如果他们在审查后决定不批准，我们将撤销这笔交易。

But these guys needed the money so bad, we were going to give them the money, essentially, based on the deal clearing. And there wasn’t any reason why it wouldn’t clear, but that was just a procedural problem.

但这些人需要钱如此迫切，我们几乎是基于交易清算的前提下给他们钱的。虽然没有理由认为它不会清算，但这只是一个程序性的问题。

But most companies can’t do that. I mean, we can. We’ve got a flexibility that, really, in most large companies just plain doesn’t exist. There’s too many people have to sign off on it or something of the sort.

但大多数公司做不到这一点。我的意思是，我们可以。我们拥有一种灵活性，这在大多数大型公司中根本不存在。太多人需要对此进行签字或类似的事情。

So the Northern Natural deal would not have been made if we’d had to follow the normal timetable. It —

因此，如果我们必须遵循正常的时间表，北方天然气的交易就不会达成。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And it’s a lovely business to own.

查理·芒格：这是一项很好的生意。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Absolutely.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。绝对如此。

63. Buffett wants to be remembered as a (very old) teacher

巴菲特希望被记住为一位（非常老的）老师

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’re moving from one station to another between now and 3:30, so we now go to station 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们将在现在到 3:30 之间从一个站点移动到另一个站点，所以我们现在去第 8 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning or good afternoon, Warren and Charlie, John —

观众成员：早上好或下午好，沃伦和查理，约翰——

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Norwood from West Des Moines, Iowa. You guys have iron bladders. (Laughter)

观众成员：——诺伍德，来自爱荷华州的西得梅因。你们的膀胱真铁。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t tell you the secret to that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会告诉你这个秘密。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fine — (Laughter)

观众成员：好吧——（笑声）

I was wondering about a contraption under the —

我在想一个装置在——

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — table there.

观众成员：——那张桌子。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. You can come down and inspect.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。你可以下来检查。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right. (Laughter)

观众成员：好的。（笑声）

Hey, I had a question for each. Warren, I was fortunate to ask you a question, I think, in 2011 about legacy and what you wanted to be known for a hundred years from now. And I’m kind of curious to hear what Charlie would like to be known for.

嘿，我有一个问题想问每个人。沃伦，我很幸运在 2011 年问过你一个关于遗产的问题，以及你希望在一百年后被人们记住的事情。我有点好奇查理希望被人们记住的是什么。

Warren, I’m 52. So I guess you started this — doing this — when I was born. And I’m kind of interested in a memory from your first annual meeting.

沃伦，我 52 岁。所以我想你是在我出生的时候开始做这个的。我对你第一次年会的一个记忆有点感兴趣。

CHARLIE MUNGER: My first memory when Warren got on this subject and they asked him what he wanted said at his funeral.

查理·芒格：我第一次记得沃伦谈到这个话题时，他们问他希望在他的葬礼上说些什么。

He said, “I want them to all be saying ‘that’s the oldest looking corpse I ever saw.’” (Laughter) And —

他说：“我希望他们都在说‘那是我见过的最老的尸体。’” （笑声）然后——

WARREN BUFFETT: That may be the smartest thing I ever said. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：那可能是我说过的最聪明的话。（笑声）

Oh, it — well — with me, it —very simple. It — I really like teaching.

哦，对我来说，这很简单。我真的很喜欢教学。

So, basically, I’ve been doing it formally and, you could say, somewhat informally, all my life. And I certainly had the greatest teachers you can imagine. So, if somebody thought that I did a decent job at teaching, I’d feel very good about that. (Applause)

所以，基本上，我一生中一直在正式和非正式地做这件事。我当然有过你能想象的最伟大的老师。所以，如果有人认为我在教学方面做得不错，我会对此感到非常高兴。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. To make the teaching endurable it has to have a bit of wise-assery in it. And that we’ve both been able to supply. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。为了让教学变得耐人寻味，它必须带有一点调侃的成分。而我们两个人都能够做到这一点。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And for those of you who are old-time basketball fans, have I mentioned that on Wilt Chamberlain’s tomb it was reputed that it was going to say, “At last, I sleep alone?” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：对于那些老派篮球迷，我有没有提到在威尔特·张伯伦的墓碑上据说会写着“终于，我独自安息？”（笑声）

64. “Don’t wait till you’re 93”

“不要等到你 93 岁”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett.

观众：下午好，芒格先生和巴菲特先生。

My name is Ji Wen Yue (PH). I come from China. It’s my first time to come to this meeting. And I think I’m very lucky to have a chance to ask question.

我叫季文月（PH）。我来自中国。这是我第一次参加这个会议。我觉得我很幸运有机会提问。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad to have you.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们很高兴见到你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Everyone has personal dreams. And at a different age, maybe dreams will come different to you. And what’s your dream now?

观众成员：谢谢。每个人都有个人的梦想。在不同的年龄，梦想可能会以不同的方式呈现给你。你现在的梦想是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, we’ll let you go first.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我们让你先说。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t quite hear that.

查理·芒格：我没听清楚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I — what’s your dream now? She says —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我——你现在的梦想是什么？她说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: My dream. Well — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我的梦想。好吧——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s skip the first one. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们跳过第一个吧。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sometime when I’m especially wishful, I think, oh, to be 90 again. (Applause)

查理·芒格：有时候，当我特别怀念的时候，我会想，哦，能再活到 90 岁该多好。（掌声）

And I got some advice for the young. If you got anything you really want to do, don’t wait till you’re 93.

我给年轻人一些建议。如果你有想做的事情，不要等到 93 岁再去做。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, do it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，去做吧。（笑声）

No, that’s the same thing I would tell students is, you can’t always find it the first time or the second time. But when you go out in the world, look for the job that you would take if you didn’t need a job.

我也会告诉学生们，你不能总是在第一次或第二次就找到它。但当你走向世界时，寻找那个即使你不需要工作也会愿意做的工作。

I mean, don’t postpone that sort of thing. Somebody — I think it was Kierkegaard, said that, you know, life must be evaluated backwards but it must be lived forwards.

我意思是，不要推迟那种事情。有人——我想是基尔凯郭尔说过，生活必须向后评估，但必须向前生活。

And you want to sort of — Charlie says all he wants to know is where he’ll die so he’ll never go there, you know. And so you — (Laughter)

你想要 sort of — 查理说他只想知道他会在哪里死，这样他就永远不会去那里，你知道的。所以你 — （笑声）

You do want to do a certain amount of reverse engineering in life. I mean, that’s not — that doesn’t mean you can do everything that way.

你确实想在生活中进行一定程度的逆向工程。我的意思是，这并不意味着你可以用这种方式做所有事情。

But you really want to think about what will make you feel good, when you get older, about your life.

但你真的要考虑一下，当你变老时，什么会让你对自己的生活感到满意。

And you, at least generally, want to keep going in that direction. And, you know, you need some luck in life. And you got to accept some bad things that are going to happen as you go along.

而你，至少一般来说，想要朝那个方向继续前进。而且，你知道，生活中需要一些运气。而且你必须接受在前进过程中会发生的一些坏事。

But life has been awfully good to me and Charlie, so we have no complaints.

但生活对我和查理非常好，所以我们没有任何抱怨。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What you don’t want to be is like the man, when they held his funeral, and the minister said, “Now, it’s the time for somebody to say something nice about the deceased.” And nobody came forward. And nobody came forward.

查理·芒格：你不想成为那种人，当他们为他举行葬礼时，牧师说：“现在是时候让某人说些关于已故者的好话了。”但没有人站出来。没有人站出来。

He said, “Surely, somebody can say somebody — something nice — about the deceased.” And nobody came forward.

他说：“肯定有人可以说一些关于已故者的好话。”但没有人站出来。

And finally, one man came up. And he said, “Well,” he said, “His brother was worse.”

最后，一个人走了过来。他说：“好吧，”他说，“他的兄弟更糟。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

65. Buffett’s regret: “I wish I’d met Charlie earlier”

巴菲特的遗憾：“我希望我能更早遇到查理”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll move to station 10 and see if we can improve on it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们将前往第 10 站，看看我们能否改进它。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Andy Lijun Lin from Loyal Valley Innovation Capital from Shanghai.

观众成员：你好。我是来自上海忠诚谷创新资本的林立军。

This is my sixth year from Shanghai to here. I have say — I have to say to you two, Warren and Charlie, you are highly respected and deeply loved by millions and millions, or even billions, globally.

这是我从上海到这里的第六年。我必须对你们两位，沃伦和查理说，你们在全球数以百万计，甚至数十亿的人中备受尊敬和深受喜爱。

I have two questions today. First question, in your letters to shareholders you said you believe EBITDA is not a good parameter to value a business. Why it’s not? Can you elaborate on that?

我今天有两个问题。第一个问题，在你给股东的信中你提到你认为 EBITDA 不是评估企业价值的好参数。为什么不是？你能详细说明一下吗？

Second question, you both have very successful and happy lives with great respect. My question is to each of you. In retrospect, from a personal standpoint, do you have regrets in life?

第二个问题，你们两位都有非常成功和幸福的生活，受人尊敬。我的问题是针对你们每个人的。从个人的角度回顾，你们对生活有遗憾吗？

If there is one thing you could have done differently in your life, family, personal, or business, what is it? Thank you very much.

如果你可以在生活、家庭、个人或事业中做出一个不同的选择，那会是什么？非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think you should expect us to answer that on personal.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为你不应该期待我们在个人问题上回答这个。

But in business, I would say I wish I’d met Charlie earlier. (Laughs)

但在商业上，我想我希望我能更早遇到查理。（笑）

We’ve had a lot of fun ever since I was 29 and he was 35. But it would’ve been even more fun if we’d started many, many years earlier. We had a chance to. We worked in the same grocery store but not at the same time.

自从我 29 岁，他 35 岁以来，我们一直玩得很开心。但如果我们早很多年就开始，那会更有趣。我们曾有机会。我们在同一家杂货店工作，但不是在同一时间。

66. Teaching the “delusion” of EBITDA is “horror squared”

教导 EBITDA 的“错觉”是“恐怖的平方”

WARREN BUFFETT: In respect to EBITDA, depreciation is an expense. And it’s the worst kind of an expense. You know, we love to talk about float. And float is where we get the money first and we have the expense later.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于 EBITDA，折旧是一种费用。而且这是一种最糟糕的费用。你知道，我们喜欢谈论浮存金。浮存金是我们先获得资金，然后再产生费用的地方。

Depreciation is where you spend the money first, you know, and, then, record the expense later. And it’s reverse float. And it’s not a good thing.

折旧是指你先花钱，然后再记录费用。这是反向浮动。这不是一件好事。

And to have that enter into a multiple — it’s much better to buy a business that has, everything else being equal — has no depreciation because it has, essentially, no investment and fixed assets that makes X, than it is to buy a company where there’s a lot of depreciation in getting to X.

而将其纳入倍数计算——最好还是购买那种没有折旧的公司，因为它本质上没有固定资产投资能够产生X，而不是购买那些在达到X的过程中需要大量折旧的公司。

And I — actually, I may write a little bit more on that next year, just because it’s such a mass delusion. And, of course, it’s in the interests of Wall Street, enormously, to focus on something called EBITDA because it results in higher borrowing power, higher valuations, and all of that sort of thing.

而我——实际上，我明年可能会对此多写一点，因为这实在是一种集体错觉。当然，华尔街非常有兴趣关注所谓的 EBITDA，因为这会导致更高的借贷能力、更高的估值，以及所有这些事情。

So it’s become very popular in the last 20 years, but I — it’s a very misleading statistic that can be used in very pernicious ways.

在过去 20 年里，它变得非常流行，但我认为这是一个非常具有误导性的统计数据，可以以非常有害的方式使用。

Charlie, on either one of those subjects?

查理，关于这两个话题中的任何一个？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’ve understated the horrors of the subject and the disgusting nature of the people that brought that term into the valuation of business. It was just —

查理·芒格：我认为你低估了这个话题的恐怖性以及那些将这个术语引入商业估值的人的令人厌恶的本质。这只是——

It would be like a leasing broker of real estate who’s got a thousand square-foot new suite to be leased, and he says it’s got 2,000 feet in it. That’s not honorable behavior. And that’s the way that term got into common usage.

这就像一个房地产租赁经纪人说他有一套1000平方英尺的新套房要出租，而他却说它有2000平方英尺。这是不诚实的行为。这就是这个术语被广泛使用的方式。

Nobody in his right mind would think that depreciation is not an expense.

没有理智的人会认为折旧不是一种费用。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It — but it’s very much in the interest of Wall Street.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这对华尔街非常有利。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. That’s why —

查理·芒格：是的。这就是为什么——

WARREN BUFFETT: You — 沃伦·巴菲特：你 —

CHARLIE MUNGER: — they did it.

查理·芒格：——他们做到了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It made the multiple seem lower.

查理·芒格：这让倍数看起来更低。

WARREN BUFFETT: And what’s amazing is the way it’s accepted, actually.

沃伦·巴菲特：令人惊讶的是，它被接受的方式。

But anyway, it just illustrates how people use language, you know, and sell concepts that work to their own use.

但无论如何，这只是说明了人们如何使用语言，你知道的，推销对他们有利的概念。

And “2 and 20” has the same sort of thing. I mean, the number of people — the amount of money that’s overperformed after paying 2 and 20, compared to the expenses that have been incurred, I will assure you, makes for a terrible indictment of that particular arrangement.

“2 和 20”也有类似的情况。我的意思是，支付了 2 和 20 之后，表现超出预期的人数——与所产生的费用相比，我可以向你保证，这对这种特定安排来说是一个可怕的指控。

But as long as it can get sold, it will get sold. And —

但只要能卖出去，就会卖出去。并且——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And, now, they use it in the business schools. Now, that is horror squared.

查理·芒格：现在，他们在商学院使用它。现在，这简直是可怕的平方。

I mean — (laughter) — it’s bad enough that a bunch of thieves start using a term. But when it gets so common that the business schools copy it, that is not a — that’s not a good result.

我意思是——（笑）——一群小偷开始使用一个术语，这已经够糟糕了。但当这个术语变得如此普遍，以至于商学院也开始模仿，那就不是——这不是一个好的结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

67. “Nobody should be roadkill in this sort of society”

“在这种社会中，没有人应该成为路边的牺牲品。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. I’m Whitney Tilson, a shareholder from New York.

观众成员：下午好。我是来自纽约的股东惠特尼·蒂尔森。

My question is related to the ones asked earlier about job cuts. Perhaps, the only thing that makes American workers angrier than layoffs is to shut down an operation entirely and move the jobs overseas.

我的问题与之前关于裁员的问题有关。也许，让美国工人比裁员更生气的唯一事情就是完全关闭一个业务并将工作转移到海外。

Ask anyone in Ohio or Michigan, and they’ll tell you stories about companies that have been operating in those states for decades, benefitting from the educational system, infrastructure and so forth, things that were paid for by local taxpayers.

问问俄亥俄州或密歇根州的任何人，他们会告诉你关于那些在这些州经营了几十年的公司的故事，这些公司受益于教育系统、基础设施等，这些都是由当地纳税人支付的。

But, then, some high-paid consultants came along and showed the company how it could reduce its costs by relocating production to Mexico or China. And poof, the good U.S. jobs disappeared.

但是，随后一些高薪顾问出现，向公司展示了如何通过将生产迁移到墨西哥或中国来降低成本。结果，美国的好工作就这样消失了。

My observation is that most investors and those in corporate America today worship at the altar of maximizing shareholder value, which is code for doing whatever is necessary to boost the share price as high as possible.

我观察到，今天大多数投资者和美国企业界的人都崇拜于最大化股东价值的祭坛，这实际上是为了不惜一切代价将股价提升到尽可能高的水平。

But in doing so, companies are taking actions that make millions of workers feel, at best, fearful and left behind and, at worst, deeply harmed by corporate America.

但这样做的公司正在采取行动，使数百万工人感到，充其量是害怕和被抛在后面，最糟糕的是，深受美国企业的伤害。

It makes so many people so angry that I think it’s testing the post-World War II economic order, which is rooted in free trade, and even the strength of our democracy. I’d argue that it was decisive in our last election.

这让很多人非常愤怒，我认为这正在考验战后经济秩序，这一秩序根植于自由贸易，甚至考验我们的民主制度的强度。我认为这在我们上次选举中起到了决定性作用。

So my question to you is, do you think that businesses should consider factors outside of pure economics when making these types of decisions? What obligations, if any, do they have to their employees and communities in which they operate?

所以我想问你的是，你认为企业在做这些决策时应该考虑纯经济之外的因素吗？他们对员工和运营所在的社区有什么义务吗？

And lastly, if a Berkshire CEO came to you and asked for your approval to close a U.S. operation and relocate it overseas to save money, what questions would you ask beyond the economics of this decision? Thank you.

最后，如果一位伯克希尔的首席执行官找你寻求批准关闭美国的一项业务并将其迁往海外以节省成本，你会问哪些问题，除了这个决定的经济因素？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the truth is that — (applause) — in certain cases, production that would otherwise — that had formerly been in the United States has definitely been supplanted by production that comes from other parts of the world.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。实际上——（掌声）——在某些情况下，原本在美国的生产确实被来自世界其他地方的生产所取代。

Originally — I was there when Fruit of the Loom was called Union Underwear and bought by Graham-Newman Corp in 1955, I believe. And it was probably all domestic then. And the truth is if it was all domestic now, it wouldn’t exist.

最初——我在 Fruit of the Loom 被称为 Union Underwear 并于 1955 年被 Graham-Newman Corp 收购时就在那儿。我相信那时它可能完全是国内的。事实上，如果现在完全是国内的，它就不会存在。

We had the same thing happen with Dexter Shoe. And it was a wonderful company and skilled workers. And in the end, if we sold the shoes at a price that yielded what they cost us, they were not competitive with shoes from around the world.

我们在德克斯特鞋业也遇到了同样的情况。那是一家优秀的公司，工人们技艺高超。最终，如果我们以能覆盖成本的价格出售鞋子，它们在全球范围内并不具竞争力。

Trade, I would argue — both ways, export, import — massive trade should be — and is, actually — enormously beneficial both to the United States and the world. I mean, it will — it — greater productivity will benefit the world in a general way.

贸易，我认为——无论是出口还是进口——大规模贸易应该是——实际上也是——对美国和世界都极为有利。我是说，它将——它——更高的生产力将以一种普遍的方式使世界受益。

But to be roadkill, to be the textile worker in New Bedford that was put out of a job eventually, to be the shoe worker in Dexter — at Dexter to be — was put out of work, you know, is —

但成为路边死尸，成为新贝德福德的纺织工人，最终失业，成为德克斯特的制鞋工人——在德克斯特被解雇，失去工作，你知道，这就是——

I mean, it would be no fun to go through life and say, “I’m doing this for the greater good and so that shoes or underwear will sell for five percent less,” or something, “and the American public will actually never know.”

我的意思是，生活中如果说“我这样做是为了更大的利益，或者为了让鞋子或内衣便宜五个百分点”，或者类似的话，“而美国公众实际上永远不会知道”，那就没有乐趣了。

So what you need is two things, in my view. You’ve got an enormously prosperous country. You’ve got almost $60,000 of GDP per capita. It’s unbelievable — six times what it was when I was born, in real terms.

在我看来，你需要两件事。你拥有一个极其繁荣的国家。人均 GDP 几乎达到 60,000 美元。这是不可思议的——是我出生时的六倍，按实际价值计算。

So we’ve got the prosperity. And that prosperity is enhanced by trade. We were only exporting five percent of our GDP back in 1970, and that’s — I think it’s around 12 percent or something like that now.

所以我们拥有繁荣。而这种繁荣是通过贸易增强的。1970 年我们仅出口了 5%的 GDP，而现在我认为这个数字大约是 12%左右。

We’re doing what we do best. But we need an educator-in-chief, logically the president — I don’t mean this specific president. I mean any president who’s been around for decades — has to be able to explain to the American public the overall benefits of, essentially, free trade.

我们正在做我们最擅长的事情。但我们需要一位首席教育官，逻辑上来说就是总统——我并不是指这个特定的总统。我是指任何在位数十年的总统——必须能够向美国公众解释自由贸易的整体好处。

And then, beyond that, we have to have policies that take care of the people that become the roadkill in the process.

然后，在此之外，我们必须制定政策来照顾在这个过程中成为牺牲品的人。

Because it doesn’t make any difference to me if — as far as I’m concerned, if my life is miserable because I’ve been put out of business by something that’s good for 320-some million people in some infinitesimal way, and it’s messed up my life when I’ve tried to live it in a proper way.

因为对我来说没有任何区别——就我而言，如果我的生活因为某些对三亿多人有微小好处的事情而变得痛苦，而这件事破坏了我努力以正确方式生活的生活。

So we have got the resources to take care of those people. The investors, I don’t worry about. I wrote about this a few years ago.

所以我们有资源来照顾那些人。投资者，我不担心。我几年前写过这个。

The investors can diversify their investments in such a way that, overall, trade probably benefits them and they don’t get killed by a specific industry condition.

投资者可以以这样的方式分散他们的投资，从而总体上，贸易可能使他们受益，而不会因特定行业的状况而受到重创。

But the worker, in many cases, can’t do that. You’re not going to retrain some 55-year-old worker in New Bedford who may not even speak English in our textile mill or something. I mean, they —

但在许多情况下，工人无法做到这一点。你不会让一个可能连英语都不会说的 55 岁工人在我们的新贝德福德纺织厂重新培训。我是说，他们——

If they get destroyed by something that’s good for society, they get destroyed, unless government puts in some policies that takes care of people like that. And we’ve got a rich society that can do that. And we got a society that will benefit by free trade.

如果他们被对社会有益的东西摧毁，他们就会被摧毁，除非政府制定一些政策来照顾这样的人。而我们有一个富裕的社会可以做到这一点。我们有一个通过自由贸易受益的社会。

And I think we ought to try to hit both objectives of making sure that there is not roadkill and that, at the same time, we get — 320 million people — get the benefits of free trade. (Applause)

我认为我们应该努力实现两个目标：确保没有路边死尸，同时让 3.2 亿人享受到自由贸易的好处。（掌声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t quarrel with that. And we have unemployment insurance for that exact reason.

查理·芒格：嗯，我对此没有异议。我们有失业保险正是出于这个原因。

But I’m afraid that a capitalist system is always going to hurt some people as it modifies and improves. There’s no way to avoid it.

但我担心，资本主义制度在不断调整和改善的过程中，总是会伤害到一些人。无法避免这一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, capitalism is brutal to capital if you’re in the wrong businesses. And, like I say, you can diversify those results.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，如果你在错误的行业，资本主义对资本是残酷的。而且，正如我所说，你可以多元化这些结果。

Capitalism is brutal to people that have the bad luck to be skilled or develop their skills for decades.

资本主义对那些不幸拥有技能或经过数十年发展技能的人是残酷的。

But a rich — a very rich society can actually — if it’s beneficial to society overall, it can take care of those people. I mean, it just — you know, the new tax —

但一个富裕的——非常富裕的社会实际上可以——如果对整个社会有利，它可以照顾那些人。我的意思是，它只是——你知道，新的税收——

The bill that was passed a couple days ago reduces my taxes, you know, by 17 percent. You know, and is that needed by the government or anything of the sort?

几天前通过的法案减少了我的税收，你知道，减少了 17%。你知道，这对政府来说是必要的吗，或者类似的事情？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I wouldn’t start spending the money.

查理·芒格：我不会开始花这笔钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. And — (laughter) — but that was the will, I mean, of the —

沃伦·巴菲特：不。——（笑声）——但那是——的意愿，意思是——

No, I agree. I don’t think — who knows what happens with the bill? But I’m just — to have that happen, and I don’t think —

不，我同意。我不认为——谁知道法案会发生什么？但我只是——发生这样的事情，我不认为——

I think if you polled a thousand people in Omaha that were walking to a shopping center as to whether my tax bill had been cut by some very large sum because of what passed, I don’t think many people would have the faintest idea what happened, in terms of the coverage of it and all of that that took place.

我认为如果你在奥马哈对一千个正在走向购物中心的人进行调查，问他们我的税单是否因为通过的法案而减少了很大一笔金额，我认为很少有人会对发生的事情有丝毫了解，包括相关的报道和所有发生的事情。

So I — we’ve got — we do have — it’s probably more like 57- or $58,000 of GDP per capita — family of four, $230,000. But nobody should be roadkill in this sort of society —

所以我——我们有——我们确实有——人均 GDP 大约是 57,000 或 58,000 美元——四口之家，230,000 美元。但在这种社会中，没人应该成为牺牲品——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, remember what Bismarck said: There are two things that nobody should have to watch. One is the making of the sausage. And the other is the making of legislation. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，记住比斯马克说过的话：有两件事情是没人应该观看的。一是香肠的制作，另一是立法的过程。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I would say that somebody ought to watch. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说应该有人关注一下。（笑声）

Anyway, we’ve hit the magic hour of 3:30. We’ll reconvene at 3:45 to do — have a formal shareholders meeting.

无论如何，我们已经到了神奇的 3:30。我们将在 3:45 重新集合，举行正式的股东会议。

And that may take a while. So, you’re welcome to stay and watch that. Or you’re welcome to shop. And I might even have a small preference of that. But go — do whatever you wish. OK. (Applause)

这可能需要一些时间。所以，欢迎你留下来观看。或者你也可以去购物。我可能更倾向于后者。但去吧——做你想做的事。好的。（掌声）

68. Formal business meeting begins

正式商务会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let’s regroup.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们重新聚集一下。

If you’ll all take your seats, we’ll begin the formal meeting. And I’ll work from a script in this.

如果大家就坐，我们将开始正式会议。我会按照这个脚本进行。

The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of the directors of the company. I welcome you to this 2017 annual meeting of shareholders.

会议现在开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席。欢迎您参加 2017 年股东年会。

This morning, I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present. Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors.

今天早上，我介绍了在场的伯克希尔哈撒韦董事。此外，今天还有我们的审计师德勤会计师事务所的合伙人。

Sharon Heck is secretary of Berkshire Hathaway, and she will make a written record of the proceedings.

莎伦·赫克是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的秘书，她将对会议进行书面记录。

Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting, and she will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motions to be voted upon at this meeting.

贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将对董事选举中投票的计数以及本次会议上将要投票的动议进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding —?

秘书有没有关于伯克希尔流通股数量的报告？

VOICES: (Inaudible) 声音：（听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: if you don’t mind, keep the lights on a little more so I can read this — outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你不介意的话，请再开灯一会儿，这样我可以读一下——杰出的，有投票权，并且在会议上有代表吗？

SHARON HECK: Yes. I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 8th, 2017, the record date for this meeting, there were 770,994 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,310,304,247 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/10,000th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

莎伦·赫克：是的，我有。正如 2017 年 3 月 8 日发送给所有记录在案的股东的会议通知中附带的委托书声明所示，本次会议的记录日期为 2017 年 3 月 8 日，届时有 770,994 股 A 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权；同时有 1,310,304,247 股 B 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有 1/10,000 的投票权。

Of that number, 538,915 Class A shares and 734,450,954 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Friday afternoon, May 5th.

在这个数字中，538,915 股 A 类股份和 734,450,954 股 B 类股份通过截至 5 月 5 日星期五下午返回的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Sharon. That number represents a quorum and will therefore — we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，莎伦。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。

The first item of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.

会议的第一项议程将是阅读上次股东会议的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生，他将向会议提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. We will vote on the motion by voice vote. All those in favor say, “Aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并得到支持。我们将通过口头表决对动议进行投票。所有赞成者请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t hear very many. But opposed? The motion is carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：我没听到很多。但反对？动议通过。

69. Election of Berkshire directors

伯克希尔董事的选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who did not send in a proxy or who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in, you may vote in person on the election of directors and other matters to be considered at this meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。如果有股东在场但没有提交委托书，或者希望撤回之前提交的委托书，您可以亲自投票选举董事以及本次会议上要考虑的其他事项。

Please identify yourselves to one of the meeting officials in the aisle so that you can receive a ballot.

请向走道上的会议官员自我介绍，以便您可以领取选票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并第二次支持选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅里尔·维特默为董事。

Are there any other nominations or any discussion?

还有其他提名或讨论吗？

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark the ballots on the election of directors and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

提名已准备好进行投票。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举的选票上做记号，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Friday afternoon cast not less than 601,375 votes for each nominee.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票针对上周五下午收到的代理投票，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 601,375 票。

That number exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

该数字超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份总投票数的多数。根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起保存。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默已被选为董事。

70. Advisory vote on Berkshire’s executive compensation

关于伯克希尔高管薪酬的咨询投票

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting at this time.

沃伦·巴菲特：议程上的下一个项目是对伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬的咨询投票。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生在此时向会议提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive directors as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the compensation discussion and analysis, and the accompanying compensation tables, and the related narrative discussion, in the company’s 2017 annual meeting proxy statement.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议公司股东以咨询的方式批准根据 S-K 规则第 402 项披露的公司指定执行董事的薪酬，包括薪酬讨论与分析、附带的薪酬表格以及相关的叙述讨论，这些内容均在公司 2017 年年度股东大会的委托书中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.

沃伦·巴菲特：已提议并获得第二次支持，公司的股东以咨询的方式批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。

Miss Amick, when you are ready you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Friday afternoon cast not less than 608,765 votes to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票回应了截至上周五下午收到的代理，投票不低于 608,765 票，建议批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The motion to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers has passed.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。关于以咨询方式批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬的提案已通过。

71. Advisory vote on frequency of advisory compensation votes

关于顾问薪酬投票频率的咨询投票

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the frequency of a shareholder advisory vote on compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting on this item.

沃伦·巴菲特：议程上的下一个项目是关于对伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬的股东咨询投票频率的咨询投票。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上就此项目提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the shareholders of the company determine, on an advisory basis, the frequency, whether annual, biannual, or triannual, with which they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executives as set forth in the company’s 2017 annual meeting proxy statement.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议公司股东以咨询的方式决定他们对公司 2017 年年度会议代理声明中所列的公司指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率，是否为年度、半年或季度。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: Second the motion.

RON OLSON: 支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company determine the frequency with which they shall have an advisory vote on compensation of named executive officers with the option being every one, two, or three years.

沃伦·巴菲特：已提议并得到支持，由公司的股东决定他们对指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率，选项为每年、每两年或每三年一次。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Friday afternoon cast 131,268 votes for a frequency of every year, 1,954 votes for a frequency of every two years, and 476,661 votes for a frequency of every three years of an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票回应了截至上周五下午收到的代理，投出了 131,268 票支持每年一次的频率，1,954 票支持每两年一次的频率，以及 476,661 票支持每三年一次的频率，关于对公司指定高管薪酬的咨询投票。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The shareholders of the company have determined, on an advisory basis, that they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers every three years.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。公司的股东已决定，作为咨询性措施，他们将每三年对公司指定高管的薪酬进行咨询性投票。

72. Shareholder motion to disclose political contributions

股东提案披露政治捐款

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is the motion put forth by Clean Yield Asset Management on behalf of shareholders, Tom Beers and Mary Durfee. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由清洁收益资产管理公司代表股东汤姆·比尔斯和玛丽·杜菲提出的动议。该动议在委托书声明中列出。

The motion requests that the company provide a report on its political contributions. The directors recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

该提案要求公司提供其政治捐款的报告。董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize Eileen Durry (PH) — I hope I’m pronouncing that right — to present the motion.

我现在要请艾琳·达里（PH）——我希望我发音正确——来提出动议。

To allow all interested shareholders present their views, I ask to limit the — I ask to limit her remarks to five minutes.

为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我请求将她的发言时间限制为五分钟。

And the microzone — the microphone at zone 1 is available for those wishing to speak for or against the motion. Zone 1 is the only microphone station in operation.

微区——第一区的麦克风可供希望支持或反对提案的人使用。第一区是唯一正在使用的麦克风站。

For the benefit of those present, I ask that each speaker for or against the motion, with the exception of the original proposer, limit themselves to two minutes and confine your remarks solely to the motion.

为了在场人员的利益，我要求每位支持或反对该动议的发言者（原提案人除外）将发言时间限制在两分钟内，并将您的发言仅限于该动议。

And do we have, at station 1, the representative of Clean Yield Management? Or, wait. Sorry. Clean Yield Asset Management.

在 1 号站，我们有清洁收益资产管理的代表吗？或者，等一下。抱歉。清洁收益资产管理。

EILEEN DURRY: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, board of directors, and my fellow shareholders.

艾琳·杜里：下午好，主席、董事会成员，以及我的股东们。

My name is Eileen Durry. And I have been asked to read the following statement by the filers of this proposal, Tom Beers and Mary Durfee.

我的名字是艾琳·达里。我被要求朗读提案提交者汤姆·比尔斯和玛丽·达菲的以下声明。

Our proposal, number four on the proxy ballot, calls on Berkshire Hathaway to fully disclose the extent of its political spending.

我们的提案，代理投票中的第四项，要求伯克希尔哈撒韦全面披露其政治支出的程度。

Why do we ask for this? Corporate political spending is a controversial activity that must be carefully managed and overseen at the most senior levels of management.

我们为什么要这样做？企业政治支出是一项有争议的活动，必须在最高管理层进行仔细管理和监督。

Mismanagement or misjudgment around political contributions can bring reputation damage, political risks, and legal consequences.

对政治捐款的管理不善或判断失误可能导致声誉损害、政治风险和法律后果。

In recent years, at the urging of shareholders and other stakeholders, scores of companies have adopted stronger disclosure and better oversight of political contributions.

近年来，在股东和其他利益相关者的推动下，许多公司采取了更强的披露和更好的政治捐款监督。

Best practices in this area include full disclosure of direct and indirect political contributions, descriptions of policies and procedures to ensure full legal compliance, and a commitment to board oversight.

在这一领域的最佳实践包括全面披露直接和间接的政治捐款，描述确保完全合法合规的政策和程序，以及对董事会监督的承诺。

But our company’s policies in this area are so nonexistent or hidden that they have earned it a score of zero for six years running on the leading rating system for corporate political disclosure and accountability, the CPA-Zicklin Index.

但我们公司的政策在这一领域几乎不存在或隐藏不显，以至于在企业政治透明度和问责制的领先评级系统 CPA-Zicklin 指数上连续六年得分为零。

In contrast, 56 percent of the S&P make public a detailed policy governing political expenditures from corporate funds. Peers such as GE, Travelers, Unum, CSX, and Norfolk Southern disclose political spending.

相比之下，56%的标准普尔公司公开了一项详细的政策，规定了来自企业资金的政治支出。通用电气、旅行者、优能、CSX 和诺福克南方等同行披露了政治支出。

In contrast, all we know about Berkshire’s political spending is contained in the two paragraph response to our proposal in this year’s proxy statement, which seeks to reassure us that Berkshire’s political spending is small, relative to its size.

相比之下，我们对伯克希尔政治支出的所有了解都包含在今年代理声明中对我们提案的两段回应中，这旨在向我们保证，伯克希尔的政治支出相对于其规模而言是微小的。

But management’s statement raises more questions than it answers. It says nothing, for example, about whether Berkshire gives to third party, like trade associations and 501(c)(4)s, which are leading sources of dark money contributions that are nearly impossible to trace.

但管理层的声明引发的问题比它所回答的问题更多。例如，它没有提到伯克希尔是否向第三方捐款，比如贸易协会和 501(c)(4)组织，这些组织是几乎无法追踪的黑金捐款的主要来源。

Since 2012, over $670 million in dark money was spent in the U.S. elections with no disclosure of who the underlying donors were.

自 2012 年以来，美国选举中花费了超过 6.7 亿美元的黑金，且没有披露背后捐赠者的身份。

Fellow shareholders, as you know, our company is a large and complicated enterprise. Berkshire Hathaway ranks number four in the Fortune 500.

各位股东，正如您所知，我们公司是一家大型且复杂的企业。伯克希尔·哈撒韦在《财富》500 强中排名第四。

At a time when the trend among large companies is to be more open about their political spending and their policies regarding dark money vehicles, it doesn’t behoove or benefit Berkshire Hathaway to be so secretive if it has nothing to hide. If you agree, please vote in favor of proposal number four.

在大型公司越来越倾向于公开其政治支出及其关于黑金工具的政策之际，伯克希尔·哈撒韦如果没有什么可隐瞒的，就没有必要如此保密。如果您同意，请投票支持第四号提案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Are there other people that wish to speak on the motion?

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。还有其他人想就此动议发言吗？

EILEEN DURRY: Not that I know of.

艾琳·杜里：我不知道。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。谢谢。

And I will tell you that, to my knowledge, in 52 years, Berkshire Hathaway, at the parent company level, has not made a political contribution. I don’t — I, personally, disagree strongly with the Citizens United decision, which was a five-to-four vote.

我可以告诉你，按照我的了解，在过去的 52 年里，伯克希尔·哈撒韦在母公司层面没有进行过政治捐款。我个人强烈反对公民联合案的裁决，那是一个五比四的投票结果。

And I think that having unlimited contributions by wealthy individuals through super PACs and — or wealthy corporations — I do not think it’s a plus at all. And I think it’s a minus in our democracy. And I think that big money does — can often distort the political process.

我认为，富有个人通过超级政治行动委员会或富有公司进行无限制的捐款，我认为这一点都不是好事。我认为这对我们的民主是一个负面影响。我认为大额资金往往会扭曲政治过程。

It’s a reality that any of our subsidiaries in heavily regulated industries are probably going to have to make some political contributions. Their competitors do it.

我们任何在高度监管行业的子公司都可能需要进行一些政治捐款，这是一个现实。他们的竞争对手也这样做。

And I tell our managers, basically, if they — I don’t want them making contributions on their own personal preferences in elections to be made from corporate funds. And I would regard that as a breach of trust with Berkshire.

我告诉我们的经理们，基本上，如果他们——我不希望他们根据个人偏好用公司资金在选举中做出贡献。我会将此视为对伯克希尔的信任破坏。

But I do recognize that if they’re in the railroad industry, or the electric utility industry, or whatever it may be, that there is a necessity, essentially, to make political contributions. And I’m sure they give money to people that I wouldn’t vote for.

但我确实认识到，如果他们在铁路行业、电力公用事业行业或其他任何行业，基本上有必要进行政治捐款。我相信他们会给一些我不会投票支持的人捐钱。

But that is a reality of doing business in certain businesses which have a significant political aspect to their activities.

但这是某些业务中进行商业活动的现实，这些业务在其活动中具有显著的政治方面。

So, I (inaudible) and my heart is with you to some extent, in terms of I wish Citizens United had gone the other way. I don’t like the idea of great sums being spent.

所以，我（听不清）我的心在某种程度上与你同在，因为我希望《公民联合案》有不同的结果。我不喜欢花费巨额资金的想法。

But I do not think we — I think it — personally, I think that it could be disadvantageous to actually list all of the political organizations to which people contribute when competitors don’t. And I think there’s expense involved in all three of the proposals that are coming up on this one.

但我认为我们——我个人认为，实际上列出人们捐款的所有政治组织，而竞争对手却没有，这可能会带来不利影响。而且我认为这三个提案都涉及费用。

So I, personally, voted against the proposition. But I do hope, like you, that money plays a lesser part in politics — big money — in the future — and undisclosed money — than it does now. And I don’t think the odds are good that the Supreme Court is going to reverse Citizens United.

所以我个人投票反对这个提案。但我确实希望，像你一样，未来金钱在政治中扮演的角色——大额资金——以及未披露的资金——会比现在少。我认为最高法院推翻《公民联合案》的可能性不大。

So with that, I would say the motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the motion and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

因此，我认为动议现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Friday afternoon cast 64,449 votes for the motion and 542,399 votes against the motion.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周五下午收到的代理投票中，有 64,449 票支持该提案，542,399 票反对该提案。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares properly cast on the matter, as well as all votes outstanding, the motion has failed.

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类股份在此事项上有效投票的票数的多数，以及所有未投票的票数，因此该提案已被否决。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。提案失败。

73. Shareholder motion on methane emissions

股东提案关于甲烷排放

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is put forth by Baldwin Brothers Inc. on behalf of shareholder Marcia Sage. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程项目是由鲍德温兄弟公司代表股东玛西亚·塞奇提出的。该动议在委托书中列出。

The motion requests that the company provide a report reviewing the company’s policies, actions, plans and reduction targets related to methane emissions from all operations. The directors have recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

该提案要求公司提供一份报告，审查公司在所有运营中与甲烷排放相关的政策、行动、计划和减排目标。董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize Eileen Durry to present the motion. To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I ask her to limit her remarks to five minutes.

我现在请艾琳·达里提出动议。为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我请她将发言时间限制在五分钟内。

The microphone at zone 1 is available for those wishing to speak for or against the motion. Zone 1 is the only microphone station in operation.

区域 1 的麦克风可供希望支持或反对该提案的人使用。区域 1 是唯一正在运行的麦克风站。

For the benefit of those present, I ask that each speaker for and against — or against the motion — limit themselves to two minutes — although, Miss Durry, that’s five minutes in your case — and to confine your remarks solely to the motion.

为了在场人员的利益，我要求每位支持和反对发言者——或者反对动议的发言者——将发言时间限制在两分钟内——不过，达里小姐，您可以有五分钟——并且仅限于动议本身进行发言。

EILEEN DURRY: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the board, and fellow shareholders.

艾琳·杜里：下午好，主席，董事会成员，以及各位股东。

My name is Eileen Durry. I am here to move Arjuna Capital and Baldwin Brothers’ proposal on behalf of Marcia Sage, a long-term investor in our company.

我的名字是艾琳·达里。我在这里代表我们的长期投资者玛尔西亚·萨奇提出阿尔朱纳资本和鲍德温兄弟的提案。

Proposal five seeks to protect shareholder value by ensuring the transparent disclosure for information regarding methane emissions.

提案五旨在通过确保对甲烷排放信息的透明披露来保护股东价值。

The reason for this proposal are clearly in the interest of protecting long-term shareholder value. Leaked gas has a direct economic impact on our company as it is no longer available for sale, establishing a clear business case for reduction targets and control processes.

此提案的原因显然是为了保护长期股东价值。泄漏的气体对我们公司产生直接的经济影响，因为它不再可供销售，这为减少目标和控制流程建立了明确的商业案例。

In fact, leaked methane represented $30 billion of lost revenue in 2012, equivalent to three percent of gas produced globally.

事实上，泄漏的甲烷在 2012 年造成了 300 亿美元的收入损失，相当于全球天然气生产的 3%。

The National Resources Defense Council estimates that capturing currently wasted gas for sale could reduce methane pollution by roughly 80 percent.

国家资源保护委员会估计，捕获目前被浪费的气体进行销售可以减少大约 80%的甲烷污染。

And while the climate benefit of replacing coal with natural gas has been widely publicized, that benefit is negated when leakage rates exceed 2.7 percent, as methane carries 84 times the global warming impact of CO2 over a 20-year period.

虽然用天然气替代煤炭的气候效益被广泛宣传，但当泄漏率超过 2.7%时，这一效益就会被抵消，因为在 20 年内，甲烷的全球变暖影响是二氧化碳的 84 倍。

Recent academic studies are particularly troubling as they have identified methane leakage far north of current EPA estimates. Additionally, gas storage presents outsized risks.

最近的学术研究尤其令人担忧，因为它们发现甲烷泄漏远远超出了当前环保署的估计。此外，天然气储存带来了巨大的风险。

The 2015 failure of a gas injection well at Southern California Gas Company’s Aliso Canyon storage field in Los Angeles revealed major vulnerabilities in the maintenance and safety of natural gas storage facilities. The incident exposed both a lack of oversight and contingency planning in the face of a well blowout.

2015 年，南加州燃气公司位于洛杉矶的阿利索峡谷储气场发生的气体注入井故障暴露了天然气储存设施在维护和安全方面的重大漏洞。该事件揭示了在井喷情况下缺乏监督和应急计划。

Berkshire Hathaway has storage facilities that face similar risks as it is estimated to hold the 11th highest volume in natural gas in the country.

伯克希尔哈撒韦拥有的储存设施面临类似的风险，因为预计其在全国天然气储量中排名第 11。

There are over 400 gas storage facilities around the country, many of which were drilled decades ago. Numerous independent researchers have concluded that if natural gas is to lead to a more sustainable energy future, then missing emissions must be addressed.

全国有超过 400 个天然气储存设施，其中许多是在几十年前钻探的。许多独立研究人员得出结论，如果天然气要引领更可持续的能源未来，那么必须解决缺失的排放问题。

Ongoing concerns have spurred public debate and led to regulatory action at the state and federal level. A strong program of target-setting measurement, mitigation, and disclosure would indicate a reduction in regulatory risk as well as efficient operations maximizing gas for sale and shareholder value.

持续的担忧引发了公众辩论，并导致州和联邦层面的监管行动。强有力的目标设定、测量、减缓和披露计划将表明监管风险的降低，以及最大化销售天然气和股东价值的高效运营。

Given this, we believe our company has a tremendous opportunity to move forward by providing shareholders with this important information.

鉴于此，我们相信我们的公司有巨大的机会通过向股东提供这些重要信息来向前发展。

ISS, the leading provider of proxy voting advice, agrees and has a recommended a vote in favor, noting such disclosures would allow shareholders to better understand the company’s management of its methane emissions and any related risks. Thank you for your consideration.

ISS，领先的代理投票建议提供商，同意并推荐投票支持，指出此类披露将使股东更好地了解公司对甲烷排放及相关风险的管理。感谢您的考虑。

WARREN BUFFETT: Are there other people who wish to speak on this motion?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有其他人希望就此提案发言吗？

EILEEN DURRY: I don’t believe so.

艾琳·杜里：我不这么认为。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. The motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the motion and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles. Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。动议现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员。阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以进行您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Friday afternoon cast 57,600 votes for the motion and 542,870 votes against the motion.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周五下午收到的代理投票中，有 57,600 票支持该提案，542,870 票反对该提案。

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类股份在此事项上有效投票的票数的多数，以及所有未投票的票数，因此该提案已被否决。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg, incidentally — is there a live microphone? You’re — yeah, there we — you might talk a little bit about the methane situation.

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格，顺便问一下——有麦克风吗？你——是的，我们——你可以谈谈甲烷的情况。

GREGORY ABEL: Sure, Warren. So thank you for your comments.

格雷戈里·阿贝尔：当然，沃伦。感谢你的评论。

And when you think about methane emissions, it is a serious issue, relative to carbon. It was highlighted 84 times worse than a carbon emission. But I’d be very pleased to report on our situation at Berkshire Hathaway.

当你考虑到甲烷排放时，这相对于碳来说是一个严重的问题。它的影响被强调为比碳排放严重 84 倍。但我很高兴能报告我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦的情况。

So, three different issues were raised in the comment. One was overall emissions from oil and gas production. So, the first thing I would just highlight is that we do not own any oil and gas producing assets. So we don’t have any wells and, effectively, don’t have that risk.

所以，评论中提出了三个不同的问题。一个是石油和天然气生产的整体排放。因此，我首先要强调的是，我们不拥有任何石油和天然气生产资产。所以我们没有任何油井，实际上也就没有这种风险。

The second thing that was highlighted was the significant loss of gas at Aliso Canyon. It was a injection well that failed. Took many months to fix the well.

第二个被强调的事情是阿利索峡谷的天然气大量损失。这是一个发生故障的注入井。修复这个井花了很多个月。

And if you fundamentally look at the problem there — and we do own other storage facilities, but we do not use their technology or that type of well. All of our wells are cased to the top which creates a very different risk and, literally, can be mitigated within hours.

如果从根本上看这个问题——我们确实拥有其他储存设施，但我们不使用他们的技术或那种井。我们所有的井都是封闭到顶部，这就产生了非常不同的风险，并且实际上可以在几个小时内减轻。

And, then, the third issue which was raised was leakage rates. And it was highlighted, at least in a second response to the proposal, that the leading companies in the industry have a leakage rate of one percent, or they’ve put together programs to achieve a leakage rate of one percent.

然后，提出的第三个问题是泄漏率。至少在对提案的第二次回应中强调，行业内的领先公司泄漏率为百分之一，或者他们已经制定了实现百分之一泄漏率的计划。

And I’m happy to report, when we look at our leakage rate from our pipelines, we’re at 0.53 of one percent. So, basically, half of the leading companies in the industry. So that, obviously, support the recommendation of the shareholders. Thank you.

我很高兴地报告，当我们查看管道的泄漏率时，我们的泄漏率为 0.53%。所以，基本上是行业内领先公司的一半。因此，这显然支持了股东的建议。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks, Greg. You’ve heard the vote. And the proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢，格雷格。你们听到了投票结果。提案未通过。

74. Shareholder motion to divest fossil fuel holdings

股东提案剥离化石燃料资产

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by a shareholder, the Nebraska Peace Foundation. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement. The motion requests that the company divest of its holdings in companies involved in the extracting, processing, or burning of fossil fuels.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由股东内布拉斯加和平基金会提出的动议。该动议在委托书中列出。动议请求公司剥离其在涉及提取、加工或燃烧化石燃料的公司的持股。

The directors have recommended the shareholders vote against the proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize Mark Vasina to present the motion. And, again, to allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I asked him to limit his remarks to five minutes.

我现在将请马克·瓦西纳提出动议。为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我要求他将发言时间限制在五分钟内。

And the microzone at zone 1 is available for those wishing to speak for or against the motion. Zone 1 is the only microphone station in operation.

在第一区的微区可供希望支持或反对该提案的人发言。第一区是唯一一个正在运行的麦克风站。

And for the benefit of those present, subsequent speakers should — I ask that they limit themselves to two minutes and confine your remarks solely to the motion. With that, if you’ll proceed.

为了在场人员的利益，后续发言者应——我请求他们将发言时间限制在两分钟内，并仅限于与动议相关的内容。这样，如果您可以继续。

MARK VASINA: Thank you. My name’s Mark Vasina. I represent the Nebraska Peace Foundation. We’re here to present our proposal asking Berkshire Hathaway to divest of its carbon-based assets over a period of 12 years, a period of time we believe is a very modest proposal indeed.

马克·瓦西纳：谢谢。我的名字是马克·瓦西纳。我代表内布拉斯加和平基金会。我们在这里提出我们的提案，要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦在 12 年内剥离其碳基资产，我们认为这个时间段是一个非常温和的提案。

Last year, we were here with a proposal that Berkshire Hathaway evaluate and report on the impact of climate change on their insurance companies.

去年，我们在这里提出了一项建议，要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦评估并报告气候变化对其保险公司的影响。

After our — after the meeting, we were approached by a number of shareholders who suggested we were pulling our punches. And they suggested the real question is divestiture. So we thought about it. We came back to ask for divestiture of the carbon-based assets.

在会议结束后，我们接到了多位股东的反馈，他们认为我们没有尽全力。他们提出真正的问题是剥离资产。因此我们考虑了一下，决定请求剥离碳基资产。

We recognize that for a public company that’s involved in investing in other companies, divestiture represents different kinds of challenges from those of university endowments, pension plans, public foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation — organizations which have divested or have implemented divestiture plans.

我们认识到，对于一家涉及投资其他公司的上市公司而言，剥离所面临的挑战与大学捐赠基金、养老金计划、公共基金会（如比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会）所面临的挑战是不同的——这些组织已经进行了剥离或实施了剥离计划。

However, we believe that the necessity for divestiture involves more than just a social, ethical, or even moral question, but also involves financial risk.

然而，我们认为，剥离的必要性不仅涉及社会、伦理或甚至道德问题，还涉及财务风险。

As the Bank of England, in their recommendation to the insurance companies that they regulated, that they investigate and report on the climate change risk to these companies, they pointed out that financial risk of holding these carbon-based assets was real — unpredictable.

英格兰银行在向其监管的保险公司提出建议时，要求他们调查并报告这些公司面临的气候变化风险，指出持有这些碳基资产的金融风险是真实的——不可预测的。

Things like regulatory risk, political risk, technology changes, investment — investor sentiment changes — these things pose risks towards the financial value of assets in this type of investment.

诸如监管风险、政治风险、技术变革、投资——投资者情绪变化——这些因素对此类投资中资产的金融价值构成风险。

So we are proposing, as I said, divestiture of all carbon-based assets over 12 years.

因此，正如我所说，我们提议在 12 年内剥离所有基于碳的资产。

I’m going to be followed by three prominent American climate scientists, Frank LaMere of the Winnebago tribe of Nebraska, and Richard Miller, Creighton University theologian. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to make our case for this proposal.

我将由三位杰出的美国气候科学家跟随，内布拉斯加州温尼巴戈部落的弗兰克·拉梅尔和克雷顿大学的神学家理查德·米勒。感谢您给我们机会为这个提案辩护。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. And we’ll proceed to the next speaker, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。接下来请进行下一位发言者。

MICHAEL MANN: Chairman Buffett, board members and shareholders, my name is Michael Mann. I’m a professor at Penn State University and a climate scientist.

迈克尔·曼：巴菲特主席、董事会成员和股东们，我叫迈克尔·曼。我是宾州州立大学的教授，也是气候科学家。

And as a scientist who spends much of my time communicating the reality and threat of climate change, it’s an honor to have this opportunity to speak to you today.

作为一名花费大量时间传播气候变化现实和威胁的科学家，今天有机会在这里与您讲话，我感到非常荣幸。

Warren Buffett, known as the Wizard of Omaha, is an inspiration to many, a symbol of the value of work ethic, self-made success, and the great reward that comes with foresight.

沃伦·巴菲特，被称为奥马哈的巫师，是许多人的灵感来源，象征着勤奋工作的价值、自我成就的成功，以及凭借远见而获得的巨大回报。

Now, foresight means recognizing both opportunity and risk. And when it comes to risk, there is no better example than climate change. I recently co-authored an article in the journal, “Scientific Reports,” for example, demonstrating that climate change played a key role in the onslaught of unprecedented, devastating droughts, floods, and heat waves in recent years.

现在，前瞻性意味着识别机会和风险。而在风险方面，没有比气候变化更好的例子了。例如，我最近在《科学报告》期刊上共同撰写了一篇文章，证明气候变化在近年来前所未有的、毁灭性的干旱、洪水和热浪的袭击中发挥了关键作用。

And the impacts we’re seeing now are just the veritable tip of the iceberg. Carbon emissions must be brought down dramatically within the next few years if we are to avert the worst impacts of climate change.

我们现在看到的影响只是冰山一角。如果我们想要避免气候变化的最严重影响，碳排放必须在未来几年内大幅减少。

Mr. Buffett coined the term “Noah’s Law” in his 2015 shareholder letter to describe the risk posed by climate change, stating, “If there is only a one percent chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy.”

巴菲特先生在 2015 年的股东信中创造了“诺亚法则”这个术语，以描述气候变化带来的风险，他表示：“如果地球面临真正重大灾难的可能性只有 1%，而延误意味着越过不可逆转的临界点，那么现在的无所作为是愚蠢的。”

Well, I couldn’t agree more. And the science tells us that we are heading toward disaster in the absence of substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

我完全同意。而科学告诉我们，如果不大幅减少温室气体排放，我们将走向灾难。

Board member Bill Gates demonstrated bold leadership a year ago when the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation announced it was divesting of fossil fuel holdings.

董事会成员比尔·盖茨在一年前展示了大胆的领导力，当时比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会宣布将剥离化石燃料资产。

Were Mr. Buffett to follow suit, it would send a profound message to the rest of the global business community, a message that we can both mitigate risk and seize opportunity in the form of massive growth in clean energy technology by tackling this problem now head-on before it’s too late. Thank you.

如果巴菲特先生效仿，这将向全球商业界传递一个深刻的信息：我们可以通过现在直接应对这个问题，既降低风险，又抓住清洁能源技术巨大发展的机会，避免为时已晚。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. And I believe there’s another speaker or maybe two. If you’ll identify yourself, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。我相信还有另一位发言人，或者可能有两位。如果你能自我介绍一下，请。

RICHARD SOMERVILLE: My name is Richard Somerville. I’m a climate scientist and a professor at the University of California San Diego.

理查德·索默维尔：我的名字是理查德·索默维尔。我是一名气候科学家，也是加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校的教授。

Chairman Buffett, board and shareholders, the world is warming. It is due to human activities. It is getting worse. The observational evidence is overwhelming.

巴菲特主席、董事会和股东们，世界正在变暖。这是由于人类活动造成的。情况正在恶化。观察证据不容忽视。

All the warmest years, globally, are recent years. We see the weather changing. We see more severe floods and droughts. Sea level rise is accelerating. Ice sheets and glaciers are shrinking worldwide.

所有最温暖的年份都是最近的年份。我们看到天气在变化。我们看到更严重的洪水和干旱。海平面上升正在加速。全球的冰盖和 glaciers 正在缩小。

Climate change will become more and more serious unless emissions of heat-trapping gases and particles are quickly and drastically reduced.

气候变化将变得越来越严重，除非迅速和大幅减少温室气体和颗粒物的排放。

The biggest unknown about future climate is human behavior. Everything depends on what humanity does now. We have our hands on the thermostat that controls the climate of our children and grandchildren.

未来气候最大的未知因素是人类行为。一切都取决于人类现在的作为。我们掌握着控制我们子孙后代气候的温控器。

In 2015, the nations of the world agreed in Paris on how much warming can safely be allowed. The Paris target was informed by science. And the science shows that to meet the target, emissions need to be reduced drastically and quickly.

在 2015 年，世界各国在巴黎达成了一致，确定了可以安全允许的升温幅度。巴黎目标是基于科学的。科学表明，为了实现这一目标，排放需要迅速且大幅度减少。

We cannot just muddle through. Dithering and procrastinating lead to catastrophe. Alleviating the disruption of climate change is cheap compared to coping with the damage that unmitigated climate change will cause.

我们不能只是混日子。犹豫和拖延会导致灾难。缓解气候变化带来的干扰相比于应对不加以缓解的气候变化所造成的损害要便宜得多。

Want an example? Doing nothing about climate change means that sea level will become so high that coastal cities must eventually be abandoned.

想要一个例子吗？对气候变化无动于衷意味着海平面将变得如此之高，以至于沿海城市最终必须被放弃。

We caused this problem. We can solve it. And polls show that most Americans want strong actions to limit climate change.

我们造成了这个问题。我们可以解决它。民调显示大多数美国人希望采取强有力的行动来限制气候变化。

The forces driving clean energy are powerful. The market is turning against fossil fuels. The prices of solar and wind energy are dropping. They can already compete without subsidies. Vehicle electrification is happening fast.

推动清洁能源的力量是强大的。市场正在反对化石燃料。太阳能和风能的价格正在下降。它们已经可以在没有补贴的情况下竞争。车辆电气化正在迅速进行。

Clean energy provides jobs and economic growth. Progress and prosperity do not require emitting heat-trapping gasses.

清洁能源提供就业和经济增长。进步和繁荣不需要排放温室气体。

Berkshire Hathaway and Warren Buffett are rightly admired and respected worldwide. Helping the world confront climate change should be an important part of their legacy. We owe it to our children and grandchildren. Thank you.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦和沃伦·巴菲特在全球范围内受到应有的钦佩和尊重。帮助世界应对气候变化应该是他们遗产的重要组成部分。我们对我们的孩子和孙子有这个责任。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. I believe there’s one more speaker. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。我相信还有一位演讲者。(掌声)

DAVID TITLEY: Thank you, sir. I am David Titley, retired rear admiral, former oceanographer of the Navy and now a professor of practice at Penn State.

大卫·泰特利：谢谢您，先生。我是大卫·泰特利，退休的海军少将，前海洋学家，现在是宾州州立大学的实践教授。

I’ve been a shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway since December of 2000. Thank you, sir, for your leadership of this enterprise.

我自 2000 年 12 月起成为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东。谢谢您，先生，感谢您对这个企业的领导。

When I was stationed at the Pentagon, I had the privilege of working directly for the Pentagon’s foremost strategic planner, Mr. Andrew Marshall.

当我驻扎在五角大楼时，我有幸直接为五角大楼首席战略规划师安德鲁·马歇尔先生工作。

He taught me how to think about risk, and especially risks that may seem distant or low probability, but one with very high impact, such as weapons of mass destruction. Climate change is a fat tail, emerging risk.

他教我如何思考风险，特别是那些看似遥远或低概率但影响极大的风险，比如大规模杀伤性武器。气候变化是一种肥尾、正在出现的风险。

It’s really a risk to people, to us. And when this risk is not managed, we have a security problem.

这对人们，对我们来说真的很危险。当这种风险没有得到管理时，我们就会面临安全问题。

One example would be Syria. Climate is one of the links in a long chain of events that led to the tragic outcome. Non-climate events, such as over a million refugees pouring into Syrian cities from the Iraq War, stress Syrian governance.

一个例子是叙利亚。气候是导致悲惨结果的一系列事件中的一个环节。非气候事件，例如由于伊拉克战争涌入叙利亚城市的超过一百万难民，给叙利亚的治理带来了压力。

Then, about a decade ago, an exceptionally intense drought and heat spell, linked with high confidence to a changing climate, devastated Syrian agriculture. Now, you have millions of desperate people with nothing and a breeding ground for extremists.

大约十年前，一场与气候变化高度相关的极端干旱和热浪摧毁了叙利亚的农业。现在，你有数百万绝望的人一无所有，成为极端主义者的温床。

Syria is an example of why, in the security community, we say that climate change accelerates the risks of instability. It can make bad places worse, a lot worse.

叙利亚就是一个例子，说明为什么在安全领域我们说气候变化加剧了不稳定的风险。它可以使糟糕的地方变得更糟，变得更加糟糕。

Senior military officers know you must address risks and take precautions while you can, before it’s too late. The U.S. Defense Department understands the risks of climate change. And it’s been working quietly to adapt to the changing climate for years.

高级军事官员知道，必须在为时已晚之前，及时应对风险并采取预防措施。美国国防部了解气候变化的风险，并且多年来一直在默默努力适应不断变化的气候。

Winston Churchill is alleged to have said, “Americans can always be counted upon to do the right thing after exhausting every other possibility.” But we will prevail. And you, sir, can help.

温斯顿·丘吉尔被认为曾说过：“美国人总是可以指望在耗尽其他所有可能性后做出正确的选择。”但我们会胜利。而您，先生，可以提供帮助。

Here’s my ask. What are government and business leaders doing to stabilize the climate? We should reduce rather than accept the risks of unchecked climate change because the ice doesn’t care which party controls the White House or the Congress. It just melts. Thank you. (Applause)

这是我的请求。政府和商业领袖正在做些什么来稳定气候？我们应该减少而不是接受不受控制的气候变化带来的风险，因为冰并不关心哪个政党控制白宫或国会。它只是融化。谢谢。（掌声）

FRANK LAMERE: I am Frank LaMere, of the Bear Clan of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska.

弗兰克·拉梅尔：我是弗兰克·拉梅尔，来自内布拉斯加州威尼巴戈部落的熊氏族。

It was the indigenous people of this continent who first consecrated the ground on which we live and grow, who offered up prayers and petitions asking that we be allowed to live and to provide a way for the generations to come.

是这个大陆的土著人民首先祝圣了我们生活和成长的土地，他们祈祷和请求，希望我们能够生存，并为后代提供一条道路。

In exchange for the blessings given by the creator, our forbearers agreed to be good stewards of the land. The stewardship of our Mother Earth, who provides for us, has now changed. But the covenant remains the same. Let there be no mistake about that.

为了回报创造者给予的祝福，我们的祖先同意成为土地的良好管理者。我们母亲大地的管理，现在已经改变。但契约依然不变。对此请不要有任何误解。

If we continue to disrespect our earth mother, those things given us, bountiful harvest, protection from the elements and good, clean water will surely be taken from us. Our elders speak of this. It has been foretold.

如果我们继续不尊重我们的地球母亲，赐予我们的丰收、保护我们免受自然灾害的恩惠和干净的水源必将被夺走。我们的长辈们对此有言在先。这是早已预言的。

On Christmas Eve, my son came from Standing Rock to visit us for one hour. His mother and I worried about him. “How is it there? Why did you go?” I asked. He said, “It is dangerous, dad. But someone has to protect our water.”

在圣诞前夕，我的儿子从斯坦丁岩来探望我们一个小时。他的母亲和我都很担心他。“那边怎么样？你为什么去？”我问。他说：“那里很危险，爸爸。但总得有人保护我们的水。”

I nodded and said, “Ahoo! That is good.” He is a water protector. I stand on his shoulders. Mni wiconi. The protectors proclaim water is life.

我点头说：“啊哈！那很好。”他是水的保护者。我站在他的肩膀上。水是生命。保护者宣告水就是生命。

Bearing that in mind, I am told that this waterway flowing south from Standing Rock and passing just a short walk from here would be fouled by any kind of breach in the Dakota Access Pipeline.

考虑到这一点，我被告知，从斯坦丁岩向南流动并且距离这里仅有短暂步行的这条水道将会因达科他接入管道的任何破裂而受到污染。

My sense and my years tells me that this will happen. Millions would be poisoned.

我的直觉和我的经历告诉我，这将会发生。数百万人将会中毒。

I’m further told that this collective body holds a 15 percent interest in the — an oil company that is a 25 percent shareholder in the Dakota Access Pipeline.

我进一步得知，这个集体机构持有该公司的 15%股份——这是一家在达科他接入管道中拥有 25%股份的石油公司。

I would ask that you walk away from that investment, stand with Mother Earth today.

我请求你放弃那项投资，今天与大地母亲站在一起。

I’m a Winnebago Indian. The Missouri River brought us here when we had no place to go.

我是温尼巴戈印第安人。密苏里河把我们带到了这里，当时我们无处可去。

We stand with our Mother Earth now as she stood with us. Think about that. Mni wiconi. Water is life. Pinagigi. Thank you.

我们现在与我们的母亲地球站在一起，就像她曾经与我们站在一起。想想这个。水是生命。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

RICHARD MILLER: Dear Chairman Buffett, board members and shareholders.

理查德·米勒：亲爱的巴菲特主席、董事会成员和股东们。

I am Richard Miller. I am an associate professor of philosophical theology and sustainability studies at Creighton University. I write and teach on ethical issues raised by the climate crisis.

我是理查德·米勒。我是克雷顿大学的哲学神学和可持续发展研究的副教授。我撰写和教授气候危机所引发的伦理问题。

As a rationale for voting no on the divestment resolution, the board maintained that Berkshire should not limit its universe of potential investments based upon complex social and moral issues, and that following state and federal laws was sufficient to meet your obligations.

作为对撤资决议投反对票的理由，董事会认为伯克希尔不应基于复杂的社会和道德问题限制其潜在投资的范围，并且遵循州和联邦法律足以满足其义务。

There is not only an overwhelming consensus in the scientific community about the reality and dangers of climate change, but there is also an overwhelming consensus among all major ethical theories that is one not morally justified to use increased profit as a rationale for doing harm to others.

科学界不仅对气候变化的现实和危险达成了压倒性的共识，而且所有主要伦理理论之间也达成了压倒性的共识，即以增加利润作为对他人造成伤害的理由在道德上是不正当的。

By continuing to invest in, and thus promote, the extracting, processing, and burning of fossil fuels, Berkshire is doing harm to people around the world and creating conditions that will threaten future generations.

通过继续投资并促进化石燃料的开采、加工和燃烧，伯克希尔正在对全球人民造成伤害，并创造将威胁未来几代人的条件。

While one is not morally justified to use increased profits as a rationale for doing harm to others, one cannot also opt out of ethical considerations by appealing to moral complexity. When you’re doing harm to others, especially at that — this scale, there is no neutral space.

虽然一个人没有道德上的理由以增加利润作为伤害他人的理由，但也不能通过诉诸道德复杂性来逃避伦理考虑。当你在伤害他人，尤其是在这种规模上时，是没有中立空间的。

Nor can you simply appeal to the fact that Berkshire is following state and federal laws when those laws are, themselves, unethical in that they allow the United States to violate the human rights of people around the world and set in motion catastrophic future for young people.

你也不能仅仅以伯克希尔遵循州和联邦法律为理由，因为这些法律本身是不道德的，因为它们允许美国侵犯世界各地人们的基本人权，并为年轻人设定了灾难性的未来。

The consensus among ethical theories will, in due time, become self-evident to the average person, analogous to the way slavery, as an evil, is self-evident today.

伦理理论之间的共识，迟早会对普通人变得不言而喻，类似于奴隶制作为一种邪恶，今天是显而易见的。

Indeed, the recognition of the immorality of investing in fossil fuels is rapidly gaining ground as more and more institutions divest their fossil fuel holdings.

确实，投资化石燃料的不道德性正在迅速获得认可，越来越多的机构正在撤回其化石燃料投资。

Mr. Buffett, you’re standing on an ethical house of cards. It is only a matter of time before it comes tumbling down.

巴菲特先生，您正站在一个道德的纸牌屋上。它崩溃只是时间问题。

Like the thousands gathered here and the millions on live stream, I admire your considerable achievements. But I am afraid that if you do not change course very soon, history will not judge you kindly. Thank you for your time.

像在这里聚集的数千人和在直播中观看的数百万观众一样，我钦佩你们的巨大成就。但我担心，如果你们不尽快改变方向，历史将不会对你们宽容。谢谢你们的时间。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。谢谢。（掌声）

The motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the motion and deliver their ballots to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

动议现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Friday afternoon cast 7,784 votes for the motion and 594,044 votes against the motion.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周五下午收到的代理投票中，有 7,784 票支持该提案，594,044 票反对该提案。

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类股份在此事项上有效投票的票数的多数，以及所有未投票的票数，因此该提案已被否决。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The proposal fails. And Mr. Scott, do you have a motion?

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。提案失败。斯科特先生，你有动议吗？

WALTER SCOTT: I move the meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议会议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion to adjourn has now been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Any discussion, if not, all in favor say, “Aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：现在已经提出并得到支持休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。是否有讨论，如果没有，赞成者请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

2017-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2017-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Welcome and introductions

2. First quarter earnings

3. Tribute to Vanguard’s Jack Bogle

4. Q&A begins

5. Loomis asks for Berkshire-related questions

6. Wells Fargo didn’t act quickly enough to stop bad behavior

7. Driverless vehicles would hurt BNSF and GEICO

8. Buying See’s Candies from someone who preferred “girls and grapes”

9. “There are going to be marauders” at the moat

10. “We think we’ll do well” with AIG reinsurance deal

11. “A life properly lived is just learn, learn, learn”

12. Making mistakes with IBM, Google, and Amazon

13. Buffett defends investing in competitive airline industry

14. Coca-Cola and Buffett get “Black Planet Award”

15. Intrinsic value projections depend on interest rates

16. Who benefits from corporate tax cut varies by industry

17. Why Buffett sold his used Cadillac for a profit

18. Why Buffett wants his wife to own an index fund after he dies

19. Berkshire probably would have put $15B into failed Unilever deal

20. Speculation is inevitable in China and the U.S.

21. We don’t do anything differently due to tax law changes

22. Coal shipment revenues will drop for BNSF

23. Big change: You don’t need money to run America’s biggest companies

24. Benefits of Berkshire’s “management by abdication”

25. Structured settlements interest rate

26. USG investment not “great,” but not a “disaster”

27. “Terrific” insurance operations are even better with Ajit Jain

28. Promo for Kraft Heinz Philadelphia Cream Cheese product

29. Subsidiary managers aren’t competing for Buffett’s job

30. Berkshire’s buying advantage: “There just isn’t anyone else”

31. “If the board hires a compensation consultant after I go, I will come back”

32. BNSF is a “good” business, but probably won’t grow much

33. Berkshire’s next CEO needs a “money mind”

34. Most financial advisors don’t deserve their fees

35. “I love the fact we bought Precision Castparts”

36. A “really stupid” accounting rule change

37. Munger: China’s stock market is cheaper than U.S.

38. Berkshire and 3G’s different approaches to job cuts

39. Pressure to deploy Berkshire’s cash grows as it nears $100B

40. CTB and animal rights

41. Giving Weschler and Combs more to manage wouldn’t help them

42. Private transactions not needed now for Class A shares

43. Deciding whether to exercise Bank of America warrant

44. Defending 3G’s job cuts

45. Berkshire’s $20B cash cushion is an “absolute minimum”

46. Very unlikely Jorge Paulo Lemann would succeed Buffett as CEO

47. Online competition hasn’t yet affected Berkshire retailers

48. Book value a “whole lot less” relevant to Berkshire

49. I don’t know tech, but I know consumer behavior

50. Artificial intelligence impact is hard to predict

51. We have a “huge appetite” for both wind and solar projects

52. I “underestimated the brilliance” of Jeff Bezos at Amazon

53. “If I died tonight, I think the stock would go up tomorrow.”

54. We try to explain material accounting issues to shareholders

55. “Valuation … is not reducible to any formula”

56. Lessons from running a “lousy business”

57. Weapons of mass destruction pose biggest risk to Berkshire

58. Buffett confident about growth for property-casualty business

59. “My God, we’re still learning”

60. “We’re getting too much medicine”

61. Buffett expects Berkshire will own more utilities

62. McLane: lots of revenue, but very thin profit margin

63. Buffett wants to be remembered as a (very old) teacher

64. “Don’t wait till you’re 93”

65. Buffett’s regret: “I wish I’d met Charlie earlier”

66. Teaching the “delusion” of EBITDA is “horror squared”

67. “Nobody should be roadkill in this sort of society”

68. Formal business meeting begins

69. Election of Berkshire directors

70. Advisory vote on Berkshire’s executive compensation

71. Advisory vote on frequency of advisory compensation votes

72. Shareholder motion to disclose political contributions

73. Shareholder motion on methane emissions

74. Shareholder motion to divest fossil fuel holdings

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