2018-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Buffett opens a box of peanut brittle for Munger

巴菲特为芒格打开了一盒花生糖。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。

VOICE: Warren and Charlie, we love you! (Applause)

声音：沃伦和查理，我们爱你们！(掌声)

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m Warren. He’s Charlie. Charlie does most things better than I do, but — (laughter) — you know, this one’s a little tough. Charlie, maybe you can chew on that a while. OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我是沃伦。他是查理。查理做大多数事情都比我好，但——（笑声）——你知道，这个有点难。查理，也许你可以考虑一下。好的。（笑声）

At the formal meeting that will begin at 3:45, we will elect 14 directors. Charlie and I are two of them, and I would like to introduce the other 12. I’ll do it in alphabetical order.

在下午 3:45 开始的正式会议上，我们将选举 14 名董事。查理和我是其中两名，我想介绍其他 12 名。我将按字母顺序进行介绍。

If they will stand as I announce their name. Withhold your applause. May be hard to do, but give it your best. And when we get all through, then you can let loose, but —

如果他们在我宣布他们的名字时站起来。请不要鼓掌。可能很难做到，但请尽力而为。当我们全部结束时，你们可以尽情欢呼，但——

We’ll do this alphabetically beginning with Greg Abel, if you’ll stand and stay standing. Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Sue Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer. (Applause)

我们将按字母顺序进行，从格雷格·阿贝尔开始，请您站起来并保持站立。霍华德·巴菲特，史蒂夫·伯克，苏·德克，比尔·盖茨，桑迪·戈特斯曼，夏洛特·古伊曼，阿吉特·贾因，汤姆·墨菲，罗恩·奥尔森，沃尔特·斯科特，梅里尔·维特默。（掌声）

2. Accounting-rule net loss “not representative” of the business

会计规则下的净亏损“不能代表”业务

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see. This morning, we posted both our earnings and our 10-Q. And if we can put up slide one, you can take a look at what was reported.

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们看看。今天早上，我们发布了我们的收益和 10-Q 报告。如果我们可以展示第一张幻灯片，您可以查看报告的内容。

And as I warned you in the annual report, a new accounting rule was introduced at the beginning of this year. And it provides that our equity securities, whether we sell them or not, are marked to market every day.

正如我在年度报告中警告过你的，今年年初引入了一项新的会计规则。该规则规定，无论我们是否出售我们的证券，它们每天都要按市场价格计价。

So we can have a gain or loss of a couple billion dollars in our equity securities portfolio, and that day, according to the accounting principles now in effect, which are a change, will be recorded as making a couple billion dollars that day or losing a couple billion.

因此，我们的证券投资组合可能会有几十亿美元的盈亏，而根据目前生效的会计原则（这些原则有所变化），那一天将被记录为赚了几十亿美元或亏了几十亿美元。

And I told you that would produce some very unusual effects from quarter to quarter. And it further explains why I like to release our earnings early Saturday morning and — as well as the 10-Q — to give people a chance to read through the explanation.

我告诉过你，这将导致每个季度产生一些非常不寻常的效果。这也进一步解释了我为什么喜欢在周六早上提前发布我们的财报，以及 10-Q，以便给人们一个机会来阅读解释。

Because if you just were handed this with a TV monitor, you know, at 3:30 in the afternoon or whatever it might be, you would report the net earnings figure, understandably, very quickly. And it really is not representative of what’s going on in the business at all.

因为如果你只是拿到这个报告，看到的是下午3:30的电视显示屏上的净收益数字，你们会很快报告这个数字，这种做法是可以理解的。但这真的无法代表我们业务的实际情况。

So, if you look at the figure of operating earnings, which is what we look at, we actually earned a record amount for any quarter we’ve ever had.

所以，如果你看一下运营收益这个数字——这是我们关注的重点——我们实际上创下了我们历史上任何一个季度的记录收益。

And that includes no realized gains or losses on securities, or on the few remaining derivatives we have.

这包括证券上没有实现的收益或损失，也没有我们少量的衍生品的盈亏。

You might leave that slide up there just a little longer. Maybe it is up —

你可以把那张幻灯片再留上一会儿。也许它还在上面——

The insurance underwriting — GEICO had a quite a good-sized turnaround in profitability and a good gain, although not as big a gain as last year, which was a record in terms of policies in force and, really, throughout most of our businesses.

保险承保 — GEICO 的盈利能力有了相当大的好转，虽然收益没有去年那么大，去年在保单有效数量上创下了记录，实际上，在我们大多数业务中也是如此。

And the details are in the 10-Q, which is up on our website now.

细节在 10-Q 报告中，现已在我们的网站上发布。

And as you can see, the railroad was up significantly, and we had — most of our businesses tended to be up.

正如您所看到的，铁路业务显著增长，我们的大多数业务也趋于增长。

Now we were aided in that, in a material way, by the reduction in the federal income tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent. Our businesses were up significantly on a pretax basis, but the gain was further enhanced by the change in the income tax rate.

现在，我们在这方面得到了实质性的帮助，联邦所得税税率从 35%降至 21%。我们的业务在税前基础上显著增长，但由于所得税税率的变化，收益进一步增强。

So that pretty well sums up the first quarter. We’ll probably get some — may well get some questions on it when we get into the question and answer section.

这基本上总结了第一季度。我们可能会在问答环节中收到一些问题。

3. Master class: How to think about investments

大师班：如何思考投资

WARREN BUFFETT: The questions we’ll be getting, we’ve got the press over here, and then we have the analysts on my left. And of course, we have our partners out in front of me. And we will rotate among you.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们将要回答的问题，媒体在这里，然后我的左边是分析师。当然，我面前还有我们的合作伙伴。我们会在你们之间轮流提问。

And the questions we get, as we go through the next six hours or so, will understandably relate to a lot of current events. You know, you will —

在接下来的六个小时左右，我们会收到的问题自然会与许多时事相关。你知道，你会——

We may get asked, and we don’t know the questions, but we may get asked, you know, about Fed policy, or whether we’re seeing any inflation, or whether business is speeding up or down, or the threats we may face competitively in our businesses as we go along.

我们可能会被问到一些问题，虽然我们不知道具体的问题，但我们可能会被问到，比如美联储的政策，或者我们是否看到通货膨胀，或者商业是否在加速或放缓，或者在我们发展的过程中，我们可能面临的竞争威胁。

And you — anything goes on the questions, except we won’t tell you what we’re buying or selling. But it really can be a question sometimes of confusing the forest with the trees.

而你——关于问题，任何事情都可以，除了我们不会告诉你我们在买什么或卖什么。但有时确实可能是一个将森林与树木混淆的问题。

And I would like to just spend just a couple of minutes giving you a little perspective on how you might think about investments, as opposed to the tendency to focus on what’s happening today, or even this minute, as you go through.

我想花几分钟给你一些关于如何看待投资的观点，而不是倾向于关注今天发生的事情，甚至是这一分钟的事情。

And to help me in doing that, I’d like to go back through a little personal history.

为了帮助我做到这一点，我想回顾一下我的个人历史。

And we will start — I have here a New York Times of March 12th, 1942. I’m a little behind on my reading. (Laughter)

我们将开始——我这里有一份 1942 年 3 月 12 日的《纽约时报》。我在阅读上有点落后。（笑声）

And if you go back to that time, that — it was about, what? Just about three months since we got involved in a war which we were losing at that point.

如果你回到那个时候，那——大约是什么时候？大约是我们卷入一场当时我们正在失利的战争的三个月。

The newspaper headlines were filled with bad news from the Pacific. And I’ve taken just a couple of the headlines from the days preceding March 11th, which I’ll explain was kind of a momentous day for me.

报纸头条充满了来自太平洋的坏消息。我挑选了几条 3 月 11 日之前的头条，这一天对我来说是一个重要的日子。

And so you can see these headlines. We’ve got slide two up there, I believe. And we were in trouble, big trouble, in the Pacific. It was only going to be a couple months later that the Philippines fell, but we were getting bad news.

所以你可以看到这些标题。我们已经把第二张幻灯片放上来了，我相信。我们在太平洋遇到了麻烦，严重的麻烦。仅仅几个月后，菲律宾就沦陷了，但我们收到了坏消息。

We might go to slide three for March 9th. Hope you can read the headlines, anyway. The price of the paper’s three cents, incidentally.

我们可能会在 3 月 9 日查看第三张幻灯片。希望你能读懂标题，顺便提一下，这份报纸的价格是三分钱。

The — and let’s see, we’ve got March 10th up there, as slide — I — when I get to where there’s advanced technology of slides, I want to make sure I’m showing you the same thing that I’m seeing in front of me.

我们来看一下3月10日的幻灯片。请等一下，确保我展示的幻灯片与你们看到的一样。

So anyway, on March 10th, when again, the news was bad: “Foe Clearing Path to Australia.” And it was like it — the stock market had been reflecting this.

所以无论如何，在 3 月 10 日，当时的消息又不好：“敌人正在清理通往澳大利亚的道路。” 股票市场一直在反映这一点。

And I’d been watching a stock called Cities Service preferred stock, which had sold at $84 the previous year. It had sold at $55 the year — early in January, two months earlier — and now it was down to $40 on March 10th.

我一直在关注一只名为城市服务优先股的股票，去年卖到了 84 美元。今年早些时候——1 月初——它卖到了 55 美元，而到 3 月 10 日时已经跌到了 40 美元。

So that night, despite these headlines, I said to my dad — I said, “I think I’d like to pull the trigger, and I’d like you to buy me three shares of Cities Service preferred” the next day.

所以那天晚上，尽管有这些头条新闻，我对我爸爸说——我说：“我想要下单，我希望你明天帮我买三股城市服务优先股。”

And that was all I had. I mean, that was my capital accumulated over the previous five years or thereabouts. And so my dad, the next morning, bought three shares.

这就是我所有的。我是说，那是我在过去五年左右积累的资本。因此，我爸爸第二天早上买了三股。

Well, let’s take a look at what happened the next day. Let’s go to the next slide, please. And it was not a good day. The stock market, the Dow Jones Industrials, broke 100 on the downside.

好吧，让我们看看第二天发生了什么。请切换到下一张幻灯片。这一天并不好。股市，道琼斯工业平均指数，跌破了 100 点。

Now they were down 2.28 percent as you see, but that was the equivalent of about a 500-point drop now. So I’m in school wondering what is going on, of course.

现在他们下跌了 2.28%，正如你所看到的，但这相当于大约 500 点的下跌。所以我在学校里想知道发生了什么。

Incidentally, you’ll see on the left side of the chart, the New York Times put the Dow Jones Industrial Average below all the averages they calculated. They — they had their own averages, which have since disappeared, but the Dow Jones has continued.

顺便提一下，您会看到图表左侧，《纽约时报》将道琼斯工业平均指数放在他们计算的所有平均值之下。他们有自己的平均值，但这些平均值后来消失了，而道琼斯指数则继续存在。

So the next day — we can go to the next slide — and you will see what happened. The stock that was at 39 — my dad bought my stock right away in the morning because I’d asked him to, my three shares. And so I paid the high for the day.

所以下一天——我们可以进入下一张幻灯片——你将看到发生了什么。那只股票在 39，我爸爸一大早就买了我的股票，因为我请他买了我的三股。所以我以当天的最高价买入。

That 38 1/4 was my tick, which was the high for the day. And by the end of the day, it was down to 37, which was really kind of characteristic of my timing in stocks that was going to appear in future years. (Laughs)

那 38 1/4 是我的高点，今天的最高价。到一天结束时，它降到了 37，这实际上很符合我在未来几年股票交易中的时机特点。（笑）

But it was on the — what was then called the New York Curb Exchange, then became the American Stock Exchange.

但那是在当时被称为纽约场外交易所的地方，后来变成了美国证券交易所。

But things, even though the war, until the Battle of Midway, looked very bad and — and if you’ll turn to the next slide, please — you’ll see that the stock did rather well. I mean, you can see where I bought at 38 1/4.

但是事情，即使在战争期间，直到中途岛战役，看起来非常糟糕——如果您能翻到下一张幻灯片——您会看到股票表现得相当不错。我的意思是，您可以看到我在 38 1/4 时买入。

And then the stock went on, actually, to eventually be called by the Cities Service Company for over $200 a share. But this is not a happy story because, if you go to the next page, you will see that I — (Laughter)

然后这只股票实际上最终被城市服务公司以每股超过 200 美元的价格收购。但这并不是一个快乐的故事，因为如果你翻到下一页，你会看到我——（笑声）

Well, as they always say, “It seemed like a good idea at the time,” you know. (Laughter)

好吧，正如他们常说的，“当时看起来是个好主意”，你知道的。（笑声）

So I sold — I made $5 on it. It was, again, typical — (laughs) — of my behavior. But when you watch it go down to 27, you know, it looked pretty good to get that profit.

所以我卖了——我赚了 5 美元。这又是我行为的典型表现——（笑）——但是当你看到它跌到 27 时，你知道，获得那个利润看起来不错。

Well, what’s the point of all this? Well, we can leave behind the Cities Service story, and I would like you to, again, imagine yourself back on March 11th of 1942.

那么，这一切的意义是什么呢？好吧，我们可以抛开城市服务的故事，我希望你再次想象自己回到 1942 年 3 月 11 日。

And as I say, things were looking bad in the European theater as well as what was going on in the Pacific. But everybody in this country knew America was going to win the war. I mean, it was, you know, we’d gotten blindsided, but we were going to win the war. And we knew that the American system had been working well since 1776.

正如我所说，欧洲战场的形势以及太平洋的局势都很糟糕。但这个国家的每个人都知道美国会赢得战争。我的意思是，我们确实遭遇了意外，但我们会赢得战争。我们知道，自 1776 年以来，美国的制度一直运作良好。

So, if you’ll turn to the next slide, I’d like you to imagine that at that time you had invested $10,000. And you put that money in an index fund — we didn’t have index funds then — but you, in effect, bought the S&P 500.

所以，如果你翻到下一张幻灯片，我希望你想象一下，当时你投资了 10,000 美元。你把这笔钱放在一个指数基金里——那时我们还没有指数基金——但实际上，你购买了标准普尔 500 指数。

Now I would like you to think a while, and don’t — do not change the slide here for a minute.

现在我希望你思考一会儿，不要——在这一分钟内不要更换幻灯片。

I’d like you to think about how much that $10,000 would now be worth, if you just had one basic premise, just like in buying a farm you buy it to hold throughout your lifetime and depend — and you look to the output of the farm to determine whether you made a wise investment.

我希望你考虑一下，如果你只有一个基本前提，比如在购买农场时，你是为了在一生中持有它并依赖它——你会看农场的产出以判断你是否做出了明智的投资，那么那 1 万美元现在值多少钱。

You look to the output of the apartment house to decide whether you made a wise investment if you buy an apartment — small apartment house — to hold for your life.

你查看公寓楼的收益，以决定如果你购买一个公寓——小型公寓楼——作为终身持有的投资是否明智。

And let’s say, instead, you decided to put the $10,000 in and hold a piece of American business, and never look another stock quote, never listen to another person give you advice or anything of this sort.

假设你决定将 10,000 美元投入并持有一部分美国企业的股份，从此不再查看任何股票报价，不再听任何人给你建议或类似的事情。

I want you to think how much money you might have now. And now that you’ve got a number in your head, let’s go to the next slide, and we’ll get the answer.

我希望你想想你现在可能有多少钱。现在你心里有了一个数字，让我们看下一张幻灯片，我们就能得到答案。

You’d have $51 million. And you wouldn’t have had to do anything. You wouldn’t have to understand accounting. You wouldn’t have to look at your quotations every day like I did that first day — (laughs) — when I’d already lost $3.75 by the time I came home from school.

你将拥有 5100 万美元。而你什么都不需要做。你不需要理解会计。你不需要像我第一天那样每天查看你的报价——（笑）——当我放学回家时，我已经损失了 3.75 美元。

All you had to do was figure that America was going to do well over time, that we would overcome the current difficulties, and that if America did well, American business would do well.

你所要做的就是想明白，美国会随着时间的推移而表现良好，我们会克服当前的困难，如果美国表现良好，美国的商业也会表现良好。

You didn’t have to pick out winning stocks. You didn’t have to pick out a winning time or anything of the sort. You basically just had to make one investment decision in your life.

你不需要挑选获胜的股票。你不需要选择一个成功的时机或类似的事情。你基本上只需要在你的一生中做出一个投资决策。

And that wasn’t the only time to do it. I mean, I can go back and pick other times that would work out to even greater gains.

而这并不是唯一一次。我是说，我可以回去选择其他时间，这样会获得更大的收益。

But as you listen to the questions and answers we give today, just remember that the overriding question is, “How is American business going to do over your investing lifetime?”

但当你听我们今天给出的问答时，请记住，最重要的问题是：“在你的投资生涯中，美国商业将会如何发展？”

I would like to make one other comment because it’s a little bit interesting. Let’s say you’d taken that $10,000 and you’d listened to the prophets of doom and gloom around you, and you’ll get that constantly throughout your life. And instead, you’d used the $10,000 to buy gold.

我想再做一个评论，因为这有点有趣。假设你拿着那 1 万美元，听信了周围的悲观预言者，而你在生活中会不断遇到这样的声音。相反，你用这 1 万美元去买黄金。

Now for your $10,000 you would have been able to buy about 300 ounces of gold. And while the businesses were reinvesting in more plants, and new inventions came along, you would go down every year in your — look in your safe deposit box — and you’d have your 300 ounces of gold.

现在，用你的$10,000，你大约可以购买 300 盎司黄金。虽然企业在重新投资于更多的工厂，新的发明不断涌现，但你每年都会去你的保险箱里查看，你会发现你的 300 盎司黄金。

And you could look at it, and you could fondle it, and you could — I mean, whatever you wanted to do with it. (Laughter)

你可以看它，可以抚摸它，可以——我的意思是，你想怎么做就怎么做。（笑声）

But it didn’t produce anything. It was never going to produce anything.

但它没有产生任何东西。它永远不会产生任何东西。

And what would you have today? You would have 300 ounces of gold just like you had in March of 1942, and it would be worth approximately $400,000.

今天你会拥有什么？你会拥有 300 盎司黄金，就像 1942 年 3 月一样，价值大约 40 万美元。

So if you decided to go with a nonproductive asset — gold — instead of a productive asset, which actually was earning more money and reinvesting and paying dividends and maybe purchasing stock — whatever it might be — you would now have over 100 times the value of what you would have had with a nonproductive asset.

所以如果你决定选择一个非生产性资产——黄金——而不是一个生产性资产，后者实际上赚了更多的钱并进行再投资、支付股息，甚至可能购买股票——无论是什么——你现在的价值将是非生产性资产的 100 倍以上。

In other words, for every dollar you had made in American business, you’d have less than a penny by — of gain — by buying in this store of value, which people tell you to run to every time you get scared by the headlines or something of the sort.

换句话说，每赚取一美元的美国商业收益，你通过投资这种被称为“价值储存”的资产，最终只会获得不到一分钱的收益。这种资产是人们在被头条新闻吓到时推荐的避风港。

It’s just remarkable to me that we have operated in this country with the greatest tailwind at our back that you can imagine. It’s an investor’s haven — I mean, you can’t really fail at it unless you buy the wrong stock or just get excited at the wrong time.

对我来说，令人惊讶的是，我们在这个国家的运营得到了你能想象的最大的顺风。这是一个投资者的天堂——我的意思是，除非你买错股票或者在错误的时间过于兴奋，否则你真的无法失败。

But if you’d — if you owned a cross-section of America and you put your money in consistently over the years, there’s just — there’s no comparison against owning something that’s going to produce nothing.

但是如果你拥有美国的一个横截面，并且多年来持续投资，那么与拥有一些不会产生任何收益的东西相比，简直无法相比。

And there — frankly — there’s no comparison with trying to jump in and out of stocks and pay investment advisors.

而且——坦率地说——与尝试频繁进出股票并支付投资顾问的费用相比，根本没有可比性。

If you’d followed my advice, incidentally — or this retrospective advice — which is always so easy to give — (Laughs)

如果你听从了我的建议，顺便说一下——或者说这个回顾性的建议——这总是很容易给出的——（笑）

If you’d follow that, of course you — there’s one problem. Your friendly stock broker would have starved to death.

如果你遵循那个，当然你——有一个问题。你友好的股票经纪人会饿死。

I mean, you know, and you could have gone to the funeral to atone for their fate. But the truth is, you would have been better off doing this than a very, very, very high percentage of investment professionals have done, or people have done that are active that — it’s very hard to move around successfully and beat, really, what can be done with a very relaxed philosophy.

我的意思是，你本来可以去参加他们的葬礼以为他们的命运赎罪。但事实是，你这样做会比绝大多数投资专业人士的表现要好得多。对于那些积极操作的人来说，真正要成功地超越，实际上非常困难，而采用一种非常放松的投资哲学能做得更好。

And you do not have to be — you do not have to know as much about accounting or stock market terminology or whatever else it may be, or what the Fed is going to do next time and whether it’s going to raise three times or four times or two times.

你不必了解太多会计、股票市场术语或其他任何相关内容，也不必知道美联储下次会做什么，以及它会加息三次、四次还是两次。

None of that counts at all, really, in a lifetime of investing. What counts is having a philosophy that you’ve — that you stick with, that you understand why you’re in it, and then you forget about doing things that you don’t know how to do.

在投资的漫长一生中，这些都不算什么。重要的是要有一种哲学——一种你坚持的哲学，明白你为什么要这样做，然后忘记那些你不知道如何去做的事情。

4. Nothing’s changed - Buffett’s still “semi-retired”

没有什么改变 - 巴菲特仍然是“半退休”状态

WARREN BUFFETT: So with all those happy words, we will move on and start the questioning, and we’ll start with Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么在这些愉快的话语之后，我们将继续并开始提问，我们将从卡罗尔开始。

CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. In choosing a first question to ask each year, I look for a question that is definitely Berkshire-related and is timely. And this question seemed to fill the bill. The question came from William Anderson (PH) of Salem, Oregon.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：早上好。在每年选择第一个问题时，我寻找一个与伯克希尔相关且及时的问题。这个问题似乎符合这个要求。这个问题来自俄勒冈州塞勒姆的威廉·安德森（PH）。

And he said, “Mr. Buffett, you have previously said that there are two parts to your job, overseeing the managers and capital allocation. Mr. [Greg] Abel and Mr. [Ajit] Jain now oversee the managers, which leaves you with capital allocation.

他说：“巴菲特先生，您之前提到您的工作有两个部分，监督经理和资本配置。现在[格雷格]阿贝尔先生和[阿吉特]贾因先生负责监督经理，这就只剩下您负责资本配置。”

“However, you share capital allocation with Ted Weschler and Todd Combs. Question. Does all that mean you are semi-retired? Or if not, please explain.” (Laughter)

“不过，您与泰德·韦施勒和托德·科姆斯共同分配资本。问题是，这是否意味着您半退休了？如果不是，请解释一下。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been semi-retired for decades. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我已经半退休几十年了。（笑声）

The answer is that I was probably — well, it’s hard to break down the percentage of the time that I was involved in but now — the jobs that are now done by Ajit and Greg, and in the case of investing, the sub part of the job that is done by Ted and Todd.

答案是我可能——嗯，很难具体说明我参与的时间百分比，但现在——现在由 Ajit 和 Greg 完成的工作，以及在投资方面，由 Ted 和 Todd 完成的工作的一部分。

Ted and Todd each manage 12- or $13 billion, so in total, that’s 25 billion. And we have in equities 170-some billion, probably now, and 20 billion in longer-term bonds, and another hundred billion in cash and short-term.

泰德和托德各自管理 120 亿或 130 亿美元，所以总共是 250 亿美元。我们在股票方面大约有 1700 多亿，现在可能是这样，还有 200 亿在长期债券中，以及另外 1000 亿现金和短期投资。

So they’re managing 20 - 25 and doing a very good job. And I still have the responsibility, basically, for the other 300 billion. So — (Laughter and applause)

所以他们管理着 200 亿到 250 亿，并且做得非常好。而我基本上仍然负责其他 3000 亿。所以——（笑声和掌声）

I think Charlie will tell you — in fact, I’d like him to comment — nothing’s really changed that much. We’ve got — clearly we’ve got two people in Ajit and Greg that are smarter, more energetic, just bring more to the job every day.

我认为查理会告诉你——实际上，我希望他能评论——没有什么真正改变太多。我们有——显然，我们有两个比阿吉特和格雷格更聪明、更有活力的人，他们每天都为工作带来更多。

But they don’t bring too much, because the culture is that our managers are running their business. But there’s a lot — there’s a good bit to oversee. So they do a superb job.

但他们不会带来太多，因为文化是我们的经理们在管理他们的业务。但有很多——有很多需要监督的事情。所以他们做得非常出色。

And Ted and Todd not only do a great job with the 12 or 13 billion each — they started with a couple billion each — not that it’s all been the growth of the 2 billion — but they also do — have done a number of things for Berkshire that they do it cheerfully, but more important, very skillfully.

泰德和托德不仅在每人管理的 120 亿或 130 亿美元上做得很好——他们最初各自只有几十亿美元——虽然这并不全是从 20 亿美元的增长中来的——但他们还为伯克希尔做了很多事情，他们做得很愉快，更重要的是，非常熟练。

So there’s just — there’s one thing after another that I will have them looking into or working on. And sometimes I steal their ideas and —

所以，一件接一件的事情，我会让他们去调查或处理。有时我还会偷他们的主意——

But I think, actually, semi-retired is probably — catches me at my most active point. I think if —(laughter) — your questioner’s got a good point.

但我认为，实际上，半退休可能是——在我最活跃的时候。我觉得如果——（笑声）——提问者说得对。

OK, Charlie? 好的，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve watched Warren for a long time, and he sits around reading most of the time and thinking. And every once in a while he talks on the phone or talks to somebody. I can’t see any great difference. A lot of people — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我观察沃伦很久了，他大部分时间都在阅读和思考。偶尔他会打电话或和某人交谈。我看不出有什么大的区别。很多人——（笑声）

Part of the Berkshire secret is that when there’s nothing to do, Warren is very good at doing nothing. (Laughter)

伯克希尔的一个秘密是，当没有事情做的时候，沃伦非常擅长什么也不做。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m still looking forward to being a mattress tester. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我仍然期待成为一名床垫测试员。（笑声）

5. Precision Castparts is “a very good business”

精密铸件公司是“一家非常好的企业”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jonathan Brandt.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森·布兰特。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Hi Warren. Hi Charlie. Given the growth in airplane build rates, it seems surprising that Precision Castparts isn’t doing better on the top or bottom line.

乔纳森·布兰特：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。考虑到飞机生产率的增长，精密铸件公司在收入和利润方面表现得如此不佳，似乎令人惊讶。

I understand the issue with a bumpy transition from old to new programs, but I’ve also heard from industry sources that Precision’s market position is not as strong as it used to be amid intensifying competition and some technological disruption.

我理解从旧程序到新程序过渡不平稳的问题，但我也听说来自行业的消息，Precision 的市场地位在激烈竞争和一些技术颠覆中不再像以前那样强劲。

What does Precision need to do to solidify and strengthen its preeminent position with its aerospace customers so that it can deliver the growth you expected when Berkshire acquired it?

Precision需要做些什么来巩固和加强其在航空航天客户中的卓越地位，以便能够实现伯克希尔收购时您所期望的增长？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah — 沃伦·巴菲特：是的——

JONATHAN BRANDT: More generally, two years after the acquisition, what is your outlook for that business?

乔纳森·布兰特：更一般地说，在收购两年后，您对该业务的前景如何？

WARREN BUFFETT: Give me the last part again. The outlook.

沃伦·巴菲特：再给我最后一部分。前景。

JONATHAN BRANDT: More generally, two years after the acquisition, what is your updated outlook for that business longer term?

乔纳森·布兰特：更一般地说，在收购两年后，您对该业务的长期前景有什么更新的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, longer term, I think — and in the reasonably shorter term — it’s a very good business. I mean, you were —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，从长远来看，我认为——在相对较短的时间内——这是一项非常好的生意。我的意思是，你曾经——

You mentioned aircraft, but we get into other industries. But certainly aircraft’s the most important. You have manufacturers that are very dependent on both the quality of the parts and the promptness of delivery.

你提到了飞机，但我们也涉及其他行业。不过，飞机无疑是最重要的。你有一些制造商非常依赖零件的质量和交货的及时性。

You do not want to have an aircraft with 75- or 100- or maybe $200 million and be waiting for a part or something of the sort. So it’s —

你不想拥有一架价值 7500 万、1 亿美元或甚至 2 亿美元的飞机，却在等待某个零件或类似的东西。所以——

Reliability is, both in terms of quality and delivery times and all of that sort of thing, is enormously important. And we get contracts that extend out many years. And sometimes we — I mean, we will get them well before the plane even starts in production. So there’s very long lead times.

可靠性在质量、交货时间以及所有相关方面都是极其重要的。我们获得的合同通常会延续多年。有时我们会在飞机甚至开始生产之前就获得这些合同。因此，交付周期非常长。

跟Tiktok的电视属性一样，再是不一样也是一个帮别人代工的业务。

And we have found in the last year — found it earlier, but I know of some specific cases in the last year — where other suppliers have failed in their deliveries and then the manufacturers come to us and say, “We would like you to help us out.”

在过去的一年里，我们发现——其实早些时候就发现了，但我知道在过去一年里有一些具体的案例——其他供应商在交货方面出现了问题，然后制造商来找我们，说：“我们希望你们能帮我们。”

And we say, “Well, we’d be glad to help you out, but we’d like about a five-year contract, if we’re going to do it because we’re just not going to make up for these other guys’ shortfalls periodically.” But that sort of thing has a very long lead time.

我们说：“好吧，我们很乐意帮助你，但如果我们要做的话，我们希望有一个五年的合同，因为我们不可能定期弥补其他人的不足。”但这种事情需要很长的准备时间。

The business is a very good business. One thing you will see their earnings charged with is about $400 million — little over $400 million a year — of intangible — nondeductible in that case — amortization of goodwill, which is really — is not an economic cost in my view.

这项业务非常好。你会看到他们的收益中有大约 4 亿美元——每年略超过 4 亿美元——的无形资产——在这种情况下不可扣除——商誉摊销，这在我看来实际上并不是经济成本。

We have a significant amount of that through Berkshire, but by far, the largest amount is related to the Precision acquisition. So whatever you see, you can add about 400 million that in my view is not an economic expense, but the accountants would argue otherwise. But it’s our money, so we’ll take my view. The — (Laughter)

我们通过伯克希尔有相当大的一笔，但到目前为止，最大的一笔与Precision收购有关。因此，无论你看到什么，你可以再加上大约 4 亿，我认为这不是经济支出，但会计师会有不同的看法。但这是我们的钱，所以我们会坚持我的观点。——（笑声）

Mark Donegan, who runs that operation, is incredible, and he has been not only — he’s a fabulous manager. I wouldn’t have bought it without him in charge. He also has been very helpful to us in other areas, and he loves to do it. So you can’t beat him, both as a manager in his own operation, but with his devotion to really doing everything that will help Berkshire.

马克·多尼根负责该业务，他非常出色，不仅是一位出色的经理。如果没有他掌管，我是不会购买的。他在其他领域也对我们非常有帮助，而且他热爱这份工作。因此，无论是作为他自己业务的经理，还是他对真正帮助伯克希尔的奉献精神，你都无法超越他。

It was — it’s a very good acquisition with very long tails to the products that are being developed.

这是一项非常好的收购，所开发的产品具有非常长的生命周期。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, I think we’d buy another one just like it tomorrow if we had the chance.

查理·芒格：嗯，是的，我认为如果有机会，我们明天会再买一个一样的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s the answer. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这就是答案。（笑声）

Man of few words, but he gets the point. (Laughter)

言简意赅，但他抓住了要点。（笑声）

6. Trade benefits are huge, so U.S. and China won’t do something “foolish”

贸易利益巨大，因此美国和中国不会做出“愚蠢”的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now we will go to the shareholder in Station 1. I believe that’s probably up here to my right.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，现在我们将去 1 号站的股东。我相信那可能在我右边。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. This is Chao (PH) from Wuxi, China, (Inaudible) Capital. I’ve been to the meeting for 12 years. Wish you and Charlie good health, so we could see you both from meeting for 12 more years.

观众成员：你好。我是来自中国无锡的 Chao（音）。我参加这个会议已经 12 年了。祝你和 Charlie 身体健康，希望我们能在会议上再见到你们 12 年。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Quick question. We know both you and China delegations — U.S. and China delegations — are in China for intense discussion, also called a trade war.

观众成员：快速提问。我们知道你们和中国代表团——美国和中国代表团——正在中国进行激烈的讨论，也称为贸易战。

Let’s go one step beyond the trade war. Do you think there’s a win-win situation for both countries or the world is just too small for both to win and we have to revisit your 1942 chart again? Thank you.

让我们超越贸易战一步。你认为两国之间有双赢的局面吗，还是世界太小，无法让双方都获胜，我们必须重新审视你 1942 年的图表？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. I’d like to just mention one thing. In August, I’m going to be 88, and that will be the eighth month of the year, and it’s a year that ends with an eight.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。我想提到一件事。在八月份，我将满 88 岁，那将是今年的第八个月，而这一年以 8 结尾。

And as you and I both know, eight is a very lucky number in China. So if you find anything over there for me, this is the time we should be acquiring something. All those eights.

而你我都知道，八在中国是一个非常幸运的数字。所以如果你在那边为我找到什么，现在正是我们应该获取一些东西的时候。所有的八。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Will do. (Buffett laughs)

观众成员：好的。（巴菲特笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: The United States and China are going to be the two superpowers of the world, economically and in other ways, for a long, long, long time.

沃伦·巴菲特：美国和中国将在经济和其他方面长期成为世界上的两个超级大国。

We have a lot of common interests, and like any two big economic entities, there are times when there’ll be tensions.

我们有很多共同的兴趣，像任何两个大型经济实体一样，有时会出现紧张局势。

But it is a win-win situation when the world trades, basically. And China and the U.S. are the two big factors in that, but there’s plenty of other citizens of the world that are involved in how this comes out. And there is no question —

但在全球贸易中，这基本上是一个双赢的局面。中国和美国是其中两个重要因素，但还有很多其他国家的公民参与到这一过程中。毫无疑问——

The nice thing about in this country I think is that both Democrats and Republicans basically, on balance, believe in the benefits of free trade.

我认为这个国家的好处在于，民主党和共和党基本上都相信自由贸易的好处。

And we will have disagreements with each other. We’ll have disagreements with other countries on trade.

我们之间会有分歧。我们与其他国家在贸易上也会有分歧。

But it’s just too big and too obvious for — that the benefits are huge, and the world’s dependent on it in a major way for its progress, that two intelligent countries will do something extremely foolish.

但这实在太大、太明显了——好处巨大，世界在很大程度上依赖它的进步，两个聪明的国家不会做出极其愚蠢的事情。

We both may do things that are mildly foolish from time to time, and there is some give and take, obviously, involved.

我们有时可能会做一些轻微愚蠢的事情，显然，这其中有一些相互妥协。

But U.S. exports in 1970 and U.S. imports in 1970 were both about 5 percent of GDP. I mean, here we we were, selling 5 percent of our GDP and buying up 5 percent of our GDP, basically.

但 1970 年美国的出口和 1970 年美国的进口都约占 GDP 的 5%。我的意思是，我们在这里，出售了 5%的 GDP，同时购买了大约 5%的 GDP。

Now people think we don’t export a lot of things. Our exports are 11 and a fraction percent of GDP. They’ve more than doubled as a share of this rising GDP. But the imports are about 14 1/2 percent, so there’s a gap of three percent or thereabouts.

现在人们认为我们并没有出口很多东西。我们的出口占 GDP 的 11%多一点。随着 GDP 的增长，出口所占的比例已经翻了一番多。但进口大约占 14.5%，因此存在大约 3%的差距。

And I would not like that gap to get too wide. But when you think about it, it’s really not the worst thing in the world to have somebody send you a lot of goods that you want and hand them little pieces of paper.

我不希望这个差距变得太大。但仔细想想，让别人给你发送很多你想要的商品，并给他们一些小纸条，其实并不是世界上最糟糕的事情。

I mean, because the balancing item is, if you have a surplus or deficit in your trade, you’re going to have a surplus in investment.

我的意思是，因为平衡项目是，如果你在贸易中有盈余或赤字，你将会在投资中有盈余。

And so the world is getting more claim checks on the United States, and they — to some extent they buy our government securities, they can buy businesses.

因此，世界对美国的索赔支票越来越多，他们在某种程度上购买我们的政府证券，他们可以购买企业。

And over time, you don’t want the gap to get to be too wide because the amount of claim checks you are giving out to the rest of the world could get a little unpleasant under some circumstances.

随着时间的推移，你不希望差距变得太大，因为在某些情况下，你向外界发放的索赔支票数量可能会变得有些不愉快。

But we’ve done remarkably well with trade. China’s done remarkably well with trade. The countries of the world have done remarkably well with trade. So it is a win-win situation.

但我们在贸易方面做得非常好。中国在贸易方面做得非常好。世界各国在贸易方面做得非常好。因此，这是一个双赢的局面。

And the only problem gets to be when one side or the other may want to win a little bit too much, and then you have a certain amount of tension.

唯一的问题在于，当一方或另一方可能想赢得太多时，就会产生一定程度的紧张。

But we will not sacrifice — the world, I mean — will not sacrifice world prosperity based on differences that arise in trade.

但我们不会牺牲——我指的是世界——不会因为贸易中出现的差异而牺牲世界繁荣。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well I think that both countries have been advancing. And of course China is advancing faster economically, because it started from a lower base and they’ve had a little more virtue than practically anybody else in the world in having a high savings rate.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为这两个国家都在进步。当然，中国的经济发展速度更快，因为它起步较低，而且在世界上几乎没有其他国家能像他们一样拥有较高的储蓄率。

And of course, a country that was mired in poverty for a long, long time, and that assimilates the advanced technology of the world, and has a big savings rate, is going to advance faster than some very mature company like Britain or the United States. And that’s what’s happened.

当然，一个长期陷入贫困的国家，吸收了世界先进技术，并且拥有较高的储蓄率，发展速度会比一些非常成熟的国家如英国或美国更快。这就是发生的事情。

But I think we’re getting along fine, and I’m very optimistic that both nations will be smart enough to realize that the last thing they should do is have any ill will for the other.

但我认为我们相处得很好，我非常乐观地认为两个国家都足够聪明，意识到他们最不应该做的事情就是对对方怀有任何恶意。

7. Deals don’t depend on Buffett: “The reputation belongs to Berkshire now”

交易不依赖于巴菲特：“声誉现在属于伯克希尔”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky Quick. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基·奎克。（掌声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Kirk Thompson.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自柯克·汤普森。

He says, “Warren, in this year’s annual letter to shareholders, you referenced both cheap debt and a willingness by other companies to leverage themselves as competitive examples as to why it’s hard to get more acquisition deals done.

他说：“沃伦，在今年给股东的年度信中，你提到了廉价债务和其他公司愿意利用自身杠杆作为竞争例子的原因，这使得达成更多收购交易变得困难。”

“It seems like the trust in — and prestige of doing a deal with Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger allow Berkshire to get a hometown discount and beat out other firms that might pay a little more to a prospective seller.

似乎与沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格达成交易的信任和声望使得伯克希尔能够获得折扣，并击败其他可能向潜在卖家支付更多的公司。

“Have you given thought to having other Berkshire managers have more public exposure, so future generations of successful business owners continue to bring deal opportunities to Berkshire like they have in prior decades?”

“你是否考虑过让其他伯克希尔经理们拥有更多的公众曝光，以便未来几代成功的企业主继续向伯克希尔提供交易机会，就像过去几十年一样？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that sort of reminds me of — who was it? Tony O’Reilly remarked one time about the responsibility of a CEO.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这让我想起了——是谁来着？托尼·奥赖利曾经提到过首席执行官的责任。

That the very first job of the CEO was to search through his organization and find that person who had the initiative and the brains, the determination, all of the qualities to be his logical successor, and then fire the guy. (Laughter)

他说首席执行官的第一项工作是，在组织中寻找那个拥有主动性、智慧、决心和所有品质的合适继任者，然后解雇他。（笑声）

The — there’s no question. I think the reputation of Berkshire as being a very good home for companies — particularly private companies — but a good home for companies, I don’t think that reputation is dependent on me or Charlie.

毫无疑问。我认为伯克希尔作为公司——特别是私营公司——的良好归宿的声誉，我认为这个声誉并不依赖于我或查理。

It may take a little, you know, there’ll be a little testing period for whoever takes over, in that respect. But, you know, basically we’ve got the money to do the deals. We’ll have the money to do the deals subsequently. People can see how our subsidiaries operate in the future.

可能需要一点时间，你知道，接手的人会有一个小的测试期。在这方面。但，基本上我们有资金来进行交易。我们之后也会有资金来进行交易。人们可以看到我们的子公司未来是如何运作的。

And the truth is that, I think some of the other executives are going — are getting better known. But there will be a — you know, I’ll tell you this, if things get bad enough, you don’t have to worry. They’ll be calling us no matter what. (Laughs)

事实是，我认为其他一些高管正在变得更加知名。但会有一个——你知道，我告诉你，如果情况变得足够糟糕，你就不用担心。他们无论如何都会打电话给我们。（笑）

So I do not worry about the so-called “deal flow,” which is a term I hate. But I don’t think there’s — I think that’s dependent on Berkshire and not dependent on me.

所以我不担心所谓的“交易流”，这是我讨厌的一个术语。但我认为这取决于伯克希尔，而不是我。

And, you know, as I’ve mentioned, my phone isn’t ringing off the hook with good deals. So apparently this big winning personality or something is not delivering for you. (Laughter)

而且，你知道，正如我提到的，我的电话并没有因为好交易而响个不停。所以显然这个大赢家的个性或其他什么并没有为你带来好处。（笑声）

So it may be the next person will be even more — get even more calls.

所以下一个人可能会接到更多的电话。

Berkshire — the reputation belongs to Berkshire now. And we are, for somebody that cares about a business that they and their parents and maybe their grandparents lovingly built over decades — if they care about where that business ends up being after, for one reason or another, they don’t want to keep it or can’t keep it in the family, we absolutely are the first call.

伯克希尔——这个声誉现在属于伯克希尔。对于那些关心自己和父母，甚至祖父母几十年来辛勤建立的企业的人来说——如果他们关心在某种原因下，企业最终会去往何处，因为他们不想保留或无法将其留在家族中，我们绝对是他们的首选。

And we will continue to be the first call, whether Charlie or I answer the phone or somebody else does.

我们将继续是第一通电话，无论是查理还是我接电话，或者其他人接。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a lot of the subsidiaries have for a long time already been making all kinds of acquisitions with people they know and we don’t. So it’s already happening. And, in fact, it’s happening more there than it is at headquarters, so —

查理·芒格：嗯，许多子公司已经很长时间以来就在和他们认识的人进行各种收购。所以这已经在发生。实际上，这在那儿发生得比在总部还要多，所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: Don’t tell them, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：别告诉他们，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re getting your wish. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你如愿以偿了。（笑声）

And it is weird that about 99 percent of the public companies that change hands, in terms of control, change hands in a sort of auction presided over by an investment banker.

奇怪的是，约 99%的公众公司在控制权方面的易手，都是通过投资银行家主持的某种拍卖进行的。

And the people that buy are usually just leverage it to the gills, and when it starts doing a little better, they re-leverage it.

而购买的人通常只是将其杠杆化到极限，当它开始稍微好转时，他们会重新杠杆化。

And that money is coming out of the charitable endowments and pension plans who are making these highly-leveraged investments in all these companies changing hands at very high prices. Sooner or later, this is not going to work perfectly.

而这些钱来自于慈善捐赠和养老金计划，这些机构对所有这些公司进行高度杠杆化的投资，价格非常高。迟早，这种做法不会完美运行。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And it’s going to have an unpleasant episode. And I think we’ll be around and in good shape at that time.

查理·芒格：这将会有一个不愉快的事件。我认为到那时我们会在场并且状况良好。

WARREN BUFFETT: There was one fellow who came to me many years ago. And he had a wonderful business. And he had been worried because he had seen a friend of his die.

沃伦·巴菲特：很多年前，有一个人来找我。他有一个很棒的生意。他一直很担心，因为他看到一个朋友去世了。

And the problems that arose later when the managers, to some extent, tried to take advantage of the widow. And it became a disaster.

后来出现的问题是，管理者在某种程度上试图利用这位寡妇，结果变成了一场灾难。

So he said he thought about it a lot the previous year. And he decided he didn’t want to sell the business to a competitor, who would be a logical buyer, because they would fire all of his people. And the CFO that would remain, and, you know, all up and down the line, they’d all be the acquirer’s people. He didn’t want to do that to his people.

所以他说他去年考虑了很多。他决定不想把生意卖给一个竞争对手，虽然那是一个合乎逻辑的买家，因为他们会解雇他所有的员工。而留下来的首席财务官，以及所有上下游的人员，都会是收购方的人。他不想这样对待他的员工。

And then he thought, and he didn’t want to sell it to a private equity firm, because he thought they’d leverage it up. He never liked to leverage that much, and then they’d just resell it later on to somebody, so it would be totally out of control of what he wanted to do.

然后他想了想，他不想把它卖给一家私募股权公司，因为他认为他们会加杠杆。他从来不喜欢那么高的杠杆，然后他们会把它转手卖给别人，这样就完全不受他想做的事情的控制。

And he wanted to keep running it himself. So he said, “Warren,” he said, “It isn’t that you’re such a great guy,” he says, “It’s you’re the only one left.” So — (Laughter) —

他想自己继续经营。所以他说：“沃伦，”他说，“并不是因为你是个好人，”他说，“而是因为你是唯一剩下的人。”所以——（笑声）——

Berkshire will continue to be the only one left in many cases.

伯克希尔在许多情况下将继续是唯一剩下的。

8. “We don’t know what we’re doing” in cyber insurance

在网络保险中，“我们不知道自己在做什么”

WARREN BUFFETT: Gary Ransom.

沃伦·巴菲特：加里·兰索姆。

GARY RANSOM: Good morning. Warren, in your annual letter, you wrote about a potential for a $400 billion natural catastrophe event, something out in the tail of the loss distribution. I can think of another risk that could have a similar order of magnitude, and that would be cyberrisk.

加里·兰索姆：早上好。沃伦，在你的年度信中，你提到了一个可能导致 4000 亿美元损失的自然灾害事件，这在损失分布的尾部。我能想到另一个可能具有类似数量级的风险，那就是网络风险。

I’m sure all your managers have taken steps against that potential, but in — out in the tail of the cyberrisk distribution, it could hit a lot of industries, a lot of your companies. So how do you think about and prepare for the big one in cyber?

我相信你们所有的管理者都已经采取了措施来应对这种潜在风险，但在网络风险分布的尾部，它可能会影响许多行业，许多你们的公司。那么你们是如何考虑和准备应对网络中的重大风险的呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I include, incidentally, in my — that part I wrote in the annual report where I said that roughly — nobody knows the answer on this. I mean, I could stick down two, and somebody else much smarter in insurance would stick down a different figure.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。顺便说一下，我在年报中写的那部分，我提到大约——没有人知道这个答案。我是说，我可以写下两个，而其他在保险方面更聪明的人可能会写下一个不同的数字。

But I think it’s about a 2 percent risk of what I call a 400 billion super-cat of all time. And —

但我认为这大约有 2%的风险，我称之为历史上 4000 亿美元的超级灾难。并且——

But cyber is in that equation. I mean, that’s not just earthquakes and that sort of thing. And frankly, I don’t think we, or anybody else, really knows what they’re doing when writing cyber. I mean, we — it is just very, very, very early in the game.

但网络风险也在这个方程式中。这不仅仅是地震和类似的事情。坦率地说，我认为我们，或者说其他任何人，实际上在处理网络保险时真的不知道自己在做什么。我们——这只是非常非常早期的阶段。

And we don’t know what the interpretations of the policies, necessarily, will be. We don’t know the degree to which they’ll be what — there’ll be correlated incidents, which we don’t really think are correlated now or haven’t had the imagination to come up with.

我们不知道这些政策的解释会是什么。我们不知道它们在多大程度上会是什么——会有相关事件，而我们现在并不认为这些事件是相关的，或者没有想象力去提出这些事件。

We know that every year when I go and hear these people from the CIA or wherever it may be, they tell me that the offense is ahead of the defense, and will continue that way.

我们知道，每年当我去听这些来自中央情报局或其他地方的人时，他们告诉我，进攻领先于防守，并将继续保持这种状态。

And I can dream of a lot of cyber incidents, which I’m not going to spell out here, because people that have twisted minds may be — they’ve probably got more — way more — ideas than I’ve got, but I don’t believe in feeding them any.

我可以想象很多网络事件，我在这里不打算详细说明，因为那些思想扭曲的人可能有——他们可能有更多——比我想的更多的想法，但我不相信要给他们任何灵感。

But it’s a business where we don’t — we have a pretty good idea of the probabilities of a quake in California, or the probabilities of a three or a four hurricane hitting Florida, or whatever it may be.

这是一个我们并不完全了解的业务。我们对加州地震的概率，或者飓风3级或4级袭击佛罗里达州的概率有一个比较好的了解。

We don’t know what we’re doing in cyber, and we try to keep — we don’t want to be a pioneer on this. We do some business in that arena in Berkshire Hathaway Specialty.

我们在网络风险方面不知道自己在做什么，我们尽量保持——我们不想成为这个领域的先锋。我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦专业保险公司做了一些业务。

But if you’re doing something for competitive reasons — which I’m OK with — but when I’m doing something where I — that people tell me is a competitive necessity, we are going to try not to have — we don’t want to be number one or number two or number three in exposures on it. And I don’t — and I am sure we are not in cyber. But I don’t —

但如果你出于竞争原因在做某事——我对此没问题——但当我在做一些人告诉我这是竞争必要的事情时，我们会尽量不去追求——我们不想在曝光率上成为第一、第二或第三。我不——而且我确信我们在网络安全方面并不是这样。但我不——

I think anybody that tells you now that they think they know in some actuarial way, either what general experience is likely to be in the future, or what the worst case would be, I think, is kidding themselves.

我认为现在告诉你他们以某种精算方式知道未来一般经验可能是什么，或者最坏的情况会是什么的人，我认为是在自欺欺人。

And that’s one of the reasons that I say that a $400 billion event has a — I think has roughly a 2 percent probability per year of happening.

这就是我说一个 4000 亿美元的事件每年发生的概率大约是 2%的原因之一。

Cyber’s uncharted territory, and it’s going to get worse, not better. And then the question is whether, if we have a whole bunch of $25 billion commercial limits out there, whether there’s some aggregation that we didn’t foresee or that the courts interpret those policies differently, then you know — they are generally going to give the benefit of the doubt to the insured.

网络风险是未知领域，它将会变得更糟，而不是更好。然后问题是，如果我们有一堆250亿美元的商业限额，是否有一些我们没有预见到的聚合，或者法院对这些政策的解释不同，那么你知道——他们通常会对被保险人有利。

So you’re right in pointing that out as a very material risk, which didn’t exist 10 or 15 years ago and that — and will be much more intense as the years go along.

所以你指出这是一个非常重要的风险是正确的，这在 10 或 15 年前并不存在，并且随着时间的推移，这种风险将会更加严重。

And all I can tell you, Gary, is that, that’s part of my 400 billion and my 2 percent. But if you’ve got a different guess, it’s just as likely that yours is right than mine on that.

我能告诉你，盖瑞，这就是我 4000 亿和我的 2%的部分。但如果你有不同的猜测，你的猜测和我的一样有可能是对的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, something that’s very much like cyberrisk is, you’ve got computers programmed to do your security trading and your computer goes a little wild from some error.

查理·芒格：是的，类似于网络风险的事情是，你有计算机被编程来进行安全交易，但由于某些错误，你的计算机有点失控。

And that’s already happened at least once where somebody just was fine one morning and by the afternoon they were broke because some computer went crazy. We don’t have any computers we allot — we allow to do big, automatically trading securities.

这已经至少发生过一次，有人早上还好好的，到了下午就破产了，因为某台计算机出现了故障。我们没有任何计算机被允许进行大规模的自动交易证券。

I think, generally, Berkshire is less likely than most other places to be careless in some really stupid way.

我认为，通常来说，伯克希尔比大多数其他地方更不容易以某种非常愚蠢的方式粗心大意。

WARREN BUFFETT: I do think if there’s a mega-cat from cyber, and let’s say it hits 400 billion, I do not think we’ll have more than a 3 percent —

沃伦·巴菲特：我确实认为，如果有一个网络大灾难，假设它达到了4000亿美元，我不认为我们的暴露会超过3%。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no —

查理·芒格：不，不——

WARREN BUFFETT: — exposure.

沃伦·巴菲特：—— 曝露。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, we’ll get our share.

查理·芒格：不，不，我们会得到我们的份额。

WARREN BUFFETT: And but it, you know, it will destroy — what will destroy a lot of companies — that we will actually, if we had a $12 billion loss, I would think, except for the new accounting rule, but I believe from what I call operating earnings, we would probably still have a reasonable profit that year.

沃伦·巴菲特：这将摧毁很多公司——如果我们有 120 亿美元的损失，我认为，除了新的会计规则，但我相信从我所称的运营收益来看，那一年我们可能仍然会有合理的利润。

I mean, we are in a different position than any insurance company I know of in the world, in our ability to handle the really — really super, super-cat.

我的意思是，我们的处境与我所知道的世界上任何保险公司都不同，我们有能力处理真正的——真正的超级超级灾难。

OK, shareholder from station 2.

好的，来自站点 2 的股东。

CHARLIE MUNGER: May I point out that the main shareholder to my right here has almost all his net worth in one security. That’s likely to be more carefully managed than some public place with people just passing through.

查理·芒格：我想指出，坐在我右边的主要股东几乎将他的全部净资产投入到一项证券中。这很可能比一些人来人往的公众公司管理得更为谨慎。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you don’t want a guy that’s 64 and is going to retire at 65. And a lot of decisions you really don’t want him or her to be making. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你不想要一个 64 岁的人，他将在 65 岁退休。而且很多决定你真的不希望他或她来做。（笑声）

9. Capital allocation in the public sector

公共部门的资本配置

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 2?

沃伦·巴菲特：第二站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wally Obermeyer, Obermeyer Wood Investment Counsel, Aspen, Colorado.

观众成员：沃利·奥伯迈尔，奥伯迈尔木材投资顾问，科罗拉多州阿斯彭。

Warren and Charlie, you two have demonstrated great talent in private sector capital allocation and shown the world the power of excellence in this area.

沃伦和查理，你们两位在私营部门资本配置方面展现了巨大的才华，并向世界展示了这一领域卓越的力量。

Do you think there is a similar opportunity for outstanding capital allocation in the public sector, at both the state and federal levels? And if so, what approach and/or changes would you suggest for society to achieve these benefits?

你认为在公共部门，无论是州级还是联邦级，是否存在类似的优秀资本配置机会？如果有的话，你会建议社会采取什么方法和/或改变来实现这些利益？

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s too tough. Why don’t we go on to a new question? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这太难了。我们为什么不换个问题呢？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m afraid I have nothing to add. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：恐怕我没有什么可以补充的。（笑声和掌声）

I don’t mean to be unfair to somebody asking a question, but it — you know, it is unfortunately an entirely different game. And the electorate — the motivations are different, the terms, the reward system is different.

我并不是想对提问的人不公平，但这——你知道，这不幸的是完全不同的游戏。选民——动机不同，条件不同，奖励系统也不同。

I mean, everything is different. And if we knew how to solve that, we wouldn’t — we can’t add anything to what you had in your view. I’m sorry on that.

我的意思是，一切都不同。如果我们知道如何解决这个问题，我们就不会——我们无法在你所看到的基础上添加任何东西。对此我感到抱歉。

10. Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”

富国银行将在其“重大失误”后变得更强大

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Hi Warren. This question comes from Paul Spieker (PH) of Chicago, Illinois. I believe he may be here today.

安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金：嗨，沃伦。这个问题来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的保罗·斯皮克（PH）。我相信他今天可能在这里。

He writes, “One of your more famous and perhaps most insightful quotes goes as follows:

他写道：“你们更著名的、也许是最具洞察力的名言之一如下：

″‘Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.’

“如果你发现自己在一只长期漏水的船上，投入精力去换船可能比投入精力去修补漏水更有效。”

“In light of the unauthorized accounting scandal at Wells Fargo, of its admission that it charged customers for duplicate auto insurance, of its admissions that it wrongly fined mortgage holders in relation to missing deadlines caused by delays that were its own fault, of its admission that it charged some customers improper fees to lock in mortgage interest rates, of the sanction placed upon it by the Federal Reserve prohibiting it from growing its balance sheet, and of the more than recent $1 billion penalty leveled by federal regulators for the aforementioned misbehavior, if Wells Fargo company is a chronically leaking boat, at what magnitude of leakage would Berkshire consider changing vessels?”

考虑到威尔斯·法戈的未经授权的会计丑闻、它承认对客户重复收费汽车保险、对因延误造成的按揭持有人错误罚款、承认对客户收取不正当的按揭利率锁定费、以及联邦储备委员会对它施加的限制不允许其扩张资产负债表，再加上最近联邦监管机构对上述行为处以超过10亿美元的罚款，如果威尔斯·法戈是一只长期漏水的船，那么在什么程度的漏水下，伯克希尔会考虑更换船只？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Wells Fargo (Applause) —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，富国银行（掌声）——

Wells Fargo is a company that proved the efficacy of incentives, and it’s just that they had the wrong incentives. And that was bad.

富国银行是一家证明了激励措施有效性的公司，只是他们的激励措施是错误的。这是个坏事。

But then they committed a much greater error — and I don’t know exactly how or who did it or when, but — ignoring the fact that they had a faulty incentive system which was incenting people to do things that were kind of crazy, like opening nonexistent accounts, et cetera.

但他们犯了一个更大的错误——我不知道具体是怎么回事，谁做的，或者是什么时候，但——忽视了他们有一个有缺陷的激励系统，这个系统促使人们做一些疯狂的事情，比如开设不存在的账户等等。

直接伪造虚假的现实。

And, you know, that is a cardinal sin at Berkshire. We know people are doing something wrong, right as we sit here, at Berkshire.

而且，你知道，这在伯克希尔是一个大忌。我们知道人们在做错事，就在我们坐在这里的时候，在伯克希尔。

You can’t have 377,000 employees and expect that everyone is behaving like Ben Franklin or something out there. They — we — I don’t know whether there are ten things being done wrong as we speak, or 20, or 50.

你不能有 377,000 名员工，并期望每个人都像本·富兰克林那样表现。他们——我们——我不知道现在有多少事情在做错，可能是十件、二十件或五十件。

The important thing is, we don’t want to incent any of that if we can avoid it, and if we find — when we find it’s going on, we have to do something about it. And that is absolutely the key to it.

重要的是，如果我们能避免的话，我们不想激励任何这些事情，如果我们发现——当我们发现这些事情发生时，我们必须采取措施。这绝对是关键所在。

And Wells Fargo didn’t do it, but Salomon didn’t do it. And the truth is, we’ve made a couple of our greatest investments where people have made similar errors.

而富国银行没有这样做，但所罗门也没有。事实是，我们在一些人犯类似错误的地方进行了我们最大的几项投资。

We bought our American Express stock — that was the best investment I ever made in my partnership years — we bought our American Express stock in 1964 because somebody was incented to do the wrong thing in something called the American Express Field Warehousing Company. We bought —

我们购买了美国运通的股票——这是我在合伙期间做过的最好的投资——我们在 1964 年购买了美国运通的股票，因为有人被激励在一个叫做美国运通现场仓储公司的事情上做错事。我们买了——

A very substantial amount of GEICO we bought that became half the — half of GEICO, for $40 million because somebody was incented to meet Wall Street estimates of earnings and growth. And they didn’t focus on having the proper reserves.

我们购买了大量的 GEICO，花费了 4000 万美元，这部分 GEICO 变成了一半，因为有人受到激励以满足华尔街对收益和增长的预期。他们没有专注于保持适当的储备。

And that caused a lot of pain at American Express in 1964. It caused a lot of pain at GEICO in 1976. It caused a layoff of a significant portion of the workforce, all kinds of things. But they cleaned it up.

这在 1964 年给美国运通带来了很大的痛苦。在 1976 年给 GEICO 造成了很多痛苦。这导致了大规模裁员，涉及到大量员工，各种各样的事情。但他们解决了这个问题。

They cleaned it up, and look where American Express has moved since that time. Look at where GEICO has moved since that time.

他们进行了清理，看看自那时以来美国运通的变化。看看自那时以来 GEICO 的变化。

So the fact that you are going to have problems at some very large institution is not unique. In fact, almost every bank has — all the big banks have had troubles of one sort or another.

所以你在某个非常大的机构遇到问题并不是独特的事实。实际上，几乎每家银行——所有的大银行都曾遇到过某种问题。

And I see no reason why Wells Fargo as a company, from both an investment standpoint and a moral standpoint going forward, is in any way inferior to the other big banks with which it competes on —

我看不出为什么富国银行作为一家公司，从投资和道德的角度来看，未来在任何方面都不比它所竞争的其他大银行差

如果银行作为一个商业模式将继续存在，富国银行就不会差到哪里去。

It — they made a big mistake. It cost — I mean, we still got — I mean we have a large, unrealized gain in it, but that doesn’t have anything to do with our decision-making. But the —

他们犯了一个大错误。这花费——我的意思是，我们仍然有——我的意思是我们在这方面有一个巨大的、未实现的收益，但这与我们的决策没有任何关系。但是——

I like it as an investment. I like Tim Sloan as a manager, you know. He is correcting mistakes made by other people.

我喜欢它作为一种投资。我喜欢蒂姆·斯隆作为经理，你知道的。他正在纠正其他人犯的错误。

I tried to correct mistakes at Salomon, and I had terrific help from Deryck Maughan as well as a number of the people at Munger, Tolles. And I mean, that is going to happen. You try to minimize it.

我试图纠正 Salomon 的错误，并得到了 Deryck Maughan 以及 Munger, Tolles 的许多人的大力帮助。我是说，这种情况会发生。你尽量去减少它。

Charlie says that, “An ounce of prevention isn’t worth a pound of cure, it’s worth about a ton of cure.” And we ought to jump on everything. He’s pushed me all my life to make sure that I attack unpleasant problems that surface. And that’s sometimes not easy to do when everything else is going fine.

查理说：“预防的价值不是一磅治疗，而是大约一吨治疗。”我们应该对所有事情都采取行动。他一生都在推动我，确保我去解决出现的不愉快问题。当其他一切都顺利时，这有时并不容易。

And at Wells, they clearly — and I don’t know exactly what — but they did what people at every organization have sometimes done, but it got accentuated to an extreme point.

在富国银行，他们显然——我不太清楚具体是什么——但他们做了每个组织有时会做的事情，只是这种情况被极端放大了。

But I see no reason to think that Wells Fargo, going forward, is other than a very, very large, well-run bank that had an episode in its history it wished it didn’t have.

但我看不出有任何理由认为，未来的富国银行会是其他什么，它只是一个非常非常大的、管理良好的银行，历史上有过一个希望自己没有经历过的事件。

But GEICO came out stronger, American Express came out stronger. The question is what you do when you find the problems.

但是 GEICO 变得更强大，American Express 也变得更强大。问题是当你发现问题时你该怎么做。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with that. I think Wells Fargo is going to be better going forward than it would have been if these leaks had never been discovered.

查理·芒格：我同意这一点。我认为富国银行未来会比如果这些泄露从未被发现时要好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Or happened.

沃伦·巴菲特：或者发生了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, so I think it’s — it — but I think Harvey Weinstein has done a lot for improving behavior, too. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我认为这——但是我认为哈维·温斯坦在改善行为方面也做了很多。（笑声）

It was clearly an error, and they’re acutely aware of it and acutely embarrassed, and they don’t want to have it happen again.

这显然是一个错误，他们对此非常清楚并感到非常尴尬，他们不想再发生这样的事情。

You know, if I had to say which bank is more likely to behave the best in the future, it might be Wells Fargo, of all of them.

你知道，如果让我说哪家银行在未来更有可能表现良好，那可能是所有银行中富国银行。

WARREN BUFFETT: This New York Times that I have here from March 12th, 1942, if you go toward the back of it, in the classified section, you have one big section that says, “Help Wanted Male,” and another one that says, “Help Wanted Female.”

沃伦·巴菲特：我这里有一份 1942 年 3 月 12 日的《纽约时报》，如果你翻到后面，在分类广告部分，你会看到一个大栏目写着“招聘男性”，另一个写着“招聘女性”。

You know, was the New York Times doing the right thing in those days? You know, I think the New York Times is a terrific paper. But people make mistakes.

你知道，《纽约时报》在那些日子里做得对吗？我认为《纽约时报》是一个很棒的报纸。但人们会犯错。

And you know, the idea of classifying between — taking ads and saying, “Well, we’ll take them and divide them up between men and women, what jobs we think are appropriate,” or that the advertiser thinks is appropriate.

你知道，分类的想法——接受广告并说：“好吧，我们会把它们分成男性和女性，哪些工作我们认为合适，”或者广告商认为合适的工作。

We do a lot of dumb things in this world. And GEICO, as I say, in the early 1970s, they just ignored — and you can do it in the setting of proper reserves, which mean they charged the wrong price to new customers because they thought their losses were less than they were.

我们在这个世界上做了很多愚蠢的事情。正如我所说，GEICO 在 1970 年代初期，他们只是忽视了——而且你可以在适当的准备金设置中做到这一点，这意味着他们对新客户收取了错误的价格，因为他们认为自己的损失比实际少。

And I’m sure some of that may have been a desire to please Wall Street or just because they didn’t want to face how things were going. But it came out incredibly stronger. You know, and now it’s got 13 percent of the households in the United States insured.

我相信其中一些可能是出于取悦华尔街的愿望，或者只是因为他们不想面对现实。但结果是它变得非常强大。现在，它有13%的美国家庭投保。

And it came out with an attention to reserves and that sort of thing that was heightened by the difficulties that they’d found themselves in where they almost went bankrupt. Forty-two —

并且它关注储备和类似的事情，这种关注因他们几乎破产而面临的困难而加剧。四十二——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a lot more stupid than Wells Fargo. It was really stupid what they did way back, right?

查理·芒格：他们的做法比富国银行愚蠢得多。早期他们所做的事情真的很愚蠢，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They had the world by the tail, and then they quit looking at the reserve development. But — and American Express was just picking up a few dollars by having the field warehousing company in 1963. And, you know, they were worried whether it was going to sink the company.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们曾经掌控一切，但随后他们停止了对储备发展的关注。。不过——美国运通在 1963 年通过拥有现场仓储公司赚了一些钱。他们担心这会不会让公司陷入困境。

And when some guy named Tino De Angelis in, I think it was Bayonne, New Jersey —

当一个名叫蒂诺·德·安杰利斯的家伙在，我想是在新泽西州的Bayonne——

In fact, I went to the annual meeting in 1964 of American Express after the scandal developed, and somebody asked if the auditor would step forward.

事实上，我在丑闻发生后参加了 1964 年美国运通的年会，有人问审计师是否会站出来。

And the auditor from one of the big firms, which I won’t mention, came up to the microphone, and somebody said, “How much did we pay you last year?”

来自一家大公司的审计师，我不想提及其名称，走到麦克风前，有人问：“我们去年付了你多少钱？”

And the auditor gave his answer, and then the questioner said, “Well, how much extra would you have charged us to go over to Bayonne, which was ten miles away, and check whether there’s any oil in the tanks?” (Laughs)

审计师回答了，然后提问者说：“好吧，如果你去Bayonne检查一下是否有油，那额外的费用会是多少？”（笑声）

So it — you know, here was something — a tiny little operation — some guy was calling him from a bar in Bayonne and telling him this phony stuff was going on, and they didn’t want to hear it. They shut their ears to it.

所以这是——你知道，这里发生了一些事情——一个小小的操作——有个家伙在Bayonne的一家酒吧打电话给他，告诉他这些虚假的事情正在发生，而他们不想听。他们对这些事充耳不闻。

And then what emerged was one great company after this kind of, what they thought was a near-death experience. So it’s — we’re going to make mistakes.

然后出现了一家伟大的公司，经历了他们认为的濒死体验。所以——我们会犯错误。

I will guarantee you that we will get some unpleasant news at Berkshire. I don’t know what it’ll be, you know — the most important thing is we do something about it.

我可以保证我们会在伯克希尔得到一些不愉快的消息。我不知道会是什么，你知道——最重要的是我们要对此采取行动。

And there have been times when I procrastinated, and Charlie has been the one that jabs me into action. And so he’s performed a lot of services you don’t know about. (Laughter)

有时候我会拖延，而查理就是那个推动我采取行动的人。因此，他做了很多你不知道的事情。（笑声）

11. “I like to think I’ll be missed a little bit, but you won’t notice it”

“我喜欢认为我会被稍微想念，但你不会注意到。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg, Gregg Warren.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格，格雷格·沃伦。

GREGG WARREN: Good morning, Warren. I have a little bit of a follow-up on Becky’s question.

格雷格·沃伦：早上好，沃伦。我想对贝基的问题做一点跟进。

At the 2014 annual meeting, as well as this morning, you noted that the power of Berkshire brand and its reputation, as well as the strength of Berkshire’s balance sheet, would allow the company’s next managers to replicate many of the advantages that have come with your being the face of the organization, one of which has been an ability to extract high rents from firms in exchange for a capital infusion and the Buffett seal of approval during times of financial distress.

在2014年的年会上，以及今天早上，你提到过伯克希尔品牌和其声誉的力量，以及伯克希尔资产负债表的强劲，都会让公司下一任管理者复制许多你作为公司面孔所带来的优势，其中之一就是在金融困境时期从公司那里获取高回报，以换取资本注入和巴菲特的认可印章。

I buy the argument about the strength of the balance sheet and believe that deals will continue to be done with sellers still lining up to become part of the Berkshire family, especially if the company’s next managers are allowed to keep a ton of cash on hand.

我相信资产负债表的实力会让交易继续进行，尤其是如果公司的下一任管理者能够保持大量现金在手的话，卖家仍然会排队成为伯克希尔的一部分。

But I’m not entirely convinced that they’ll be able to garner the same 8, 9, 10 percent coupons, as well as other add-ons, that you’ve been able to extract from firms like Goldman Sachs and Bank of America in times of distress.

但我不完全相信他们能从像高盛和美国银行这样的公司那里获得相同的8%、9%、10%的票息，以及其他附加条件。

I’d expect those rents to be at least a few percentage points lower once you’re no longer running the show. That is, until those managers build up a reputation to warrant higher returns. Am I right to think about it that way?

我预计在你不再掌舵后，这些租金可能会低几个百分点。也就是说，直到那些管理者建立起值得更高回报的声誉为止。我这样考虑对吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure. The — when we, in two — you mentioned Goldman Sachs, and we also did with General Electric, in September or early October of 2008. We probably could actually have extracted better terms.

沃伦·巴菲特：我不太确定。——当我们在 2008 年 9 月或 10 月初与高盛和通用电气合作时，我们可能实际上可以获得更好的条款。

You know, I think it might have been counterproductive in the end, but I was — we would have done better, incidentally, financially, if we’d really waited until the panic developed further — because I didn’t know how far it would develop — but we could have made a lot better purchases three or four or five months later than we did at that time.

你知道，我觉得最终这可能是适得其反的，但我——顺便说一下，如果我们真的等到恐慌进一步发展，我们在财务上会做得更好——因为我不知道它会发展到什么程度——但我们本可以在三、四或五个月后做出比当时更好的购买。

And we also did not want to do something that looked to be so high as to in — make the transaction disadvantageous to Goldman or to GE.

我们也不想做一些看起来过于高昂的事情，以至于使交易对高盛或通用电气不利。

They were going to take the terms we offered, but we actually didn’t push it to the limit, because there really wasn’t anybody else around.

他们本来打算接受我们提供的条件，但我们实际上并没有把它推到极限，因为周围真的没有其他人。

I think — and we’re working on something right now that probably won’t happen. It’s not huge.

我认为——我们正在进行一些可能不会发生的事情。它并不重大。

But actually, in this case, both Todd [Combs] and Ted [Weschler] have brought deals to me. One of them brought something to me, and, you know, he was thinking in the same terms that I got — was thinking about — and he’s the one that returned the call that he had received about a transaction.

但实际上，在这种情况下，托德和泰德都向我提出了交易。其中一笔交易是托德提出的，他考虑的条件和我想的差不多——他是回电了一个他收到的交易提案。

And I do not think the party on the other side is going to care about the fact that they had him on the phone rather than me on the phone. I —

我认为对方不会在意他们和他通话而不是和我通话的事实。我——

You know, there may — there could be just a little bit at certain times in history. But, you know, we will continue to have our standards of what we think money is worth at any given time. And Ted and Todd think just as well about that as I do.

你知道，在历史的某些时刻，可能会有一点点变化。但是，你知道，我们会继续坚持我们对任何特定时间金钱价值的标准。泰德和托德对此的看法和我一样。

And there will be times, very occasionally, when our phone will ring a lot. And I don’t think they’ll hang up because I don’t answer it, if they need the money.

有时，偶尔我们的电话会响很多次。我认为如果他们需要钱，他们不会因为我不接电话而挂断。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well. The times he’s referring to, a lot of them, were like the worst in 50 years. So that’s a really rare kind of an occurrence. And we didn’t make all that many deals. So I think he’s right that it’ll be harder for us to make similar deals in the future.

查理·芒格：嗯。他所提到的那些时期，很多都是过去 50 年中最糟糕的。所以这是一种非常罕见的情况。我们也没有做太多交易。因此，我认为他是对的，未来我们要达成类似的交易会更困难。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the problem is the sums involved now, more than the problem of deciding what the proper terms should be. And sometimes we can get what we think is appropriate and sometimes we — most of the time, today, we can’t.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，问题在于现在涉及的金额，而不是确定适当条款的问题。有时候我们可以得到我们认为合适的条件，有时候我们——大多数时候，现在我们不能。

But you may see a transaction or two that — not in terms of buying business but in terms of securities — that strike you as perfectly decent ways to invest Berkshire’s money.

但你可能会看到一两笔交易——不是指收购业务，而是证券投资——这可能是伯克希尔投资资金的非常合理方式。

And they may well have come through Todd or Ted instead of directly to me.

他们可能是通过托德或泰德而不是直接找到我的。

I like to think I’ll be missed a little bit, but I — you won’t notice it. (Laughter)

我喜欢认为我会被稍微想念，但我——你不会注意到的。（笑声）

12. Buffett talks to Ajit Jain about insurance pricing because it’s fun

巴菲特与阿吉特·贾因谈论保险定价，因为这很有趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，3 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Todd Lichter (PH) from Boulder, Colorado.

观众成员：我是来自科罗拉多州博尔德的托德·利赫特（PH）。

Mr. Buffett, are you still involved in pricing decisions at See’s Candies and The Buffalo News? And with what other Berkshire subsidiaries do you take more than a hands-off approach?

巴菲特先生，您还参与 See's Candies 和 The Buffalo News 的定价决策吗？您还与哪些其他伯克希尔子公司保持更积极的参与？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you’re correct that at one time I, and for some — for quite a while — both Charlie and I took part in the pricing decisions at See’s Candy.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你说得对，曾经我和查理在很长一段时间内都参与了 See's Candy 的定价决策。

And certainly, for some years, particularly with the question of the survival of The Buffalo News was really in question, I definitely took part in those decisions.

当然，在过去的几年里，特别是《The Buffalo News 》的生存问题确实受到质疑，我肯定参与了那些决策。

In both cases, we had good managers, but still we wanted to — we thought those decisions were important. But it’s been a long, long time — very long time — since we’ve participated in anything like that.

在这两种情况下，我们都有优秀的经理，但我们仍然想要——我们认为那些决定很重要。但自从我们参与过类似的事情已经很久很久了——真的很久。

I can’t tell you what the per pound price is for See’s Candy, which is because people, and you’re invited to join this group, send me free candy from time to time. (Laughter)

我不能告诉你See’s Candies每磅的价格，因为有些人——你也被邀请加入这个群体——时不时会送我免费的糖果。（笑声）

And I can’t — I really, I can’t tell you the prices at The Buffalo News. All I know is it’s very, very, very hard to move up prices on advertising, generally. So no, we —

我不能——我真的，我不能告诉你《布法罗新闻》的价格。我只知道，通常提高广告价格是非常非常困难的。所以不，我们——

The only thing is, Ajit [Jain] and I talk frequently. And if there’s some very big risk, if somebody wants a $5 billion cover on a chemical plant some way excessive loss of over 3 billion or something — we have a certain amount of fun with him deciding on the price in his head. And I decide in my head, and then we compare notes.

唯一的是，阿吉特（Ajit Jain）和我经常讨论。如果有一些非常大的风险，比如有人想要5亿美元的化工厂保险，超过30亿的损失——我们在心里决定价格，然后比较一下。

It’s the kind of risk that you really can’t look up in a book and see, actuarially, what it’s fairly — the parameters — are fairly likely to be.

这是一种风险，你真的无法在书中查到，精算上它的参数是什么，可能性有多大。

I enjoy thinking through the pricing of that, and I particularly enjoy comparing it with Ajit. So the —

我喜欢思考这个的定价，特别喜欢与 Ajit 进行比较。所以——

These are just oddball situations, but we do that sort of thing, and we’ve done it for three decades. And it’s part of the fun of my job.

这些只是奇怪的情况，但我们就是这样做的，我们已经做了三十年。这也是我工作乐趣的一部分。

The candy prices, if you got to complain about those, you have to go to Charlie. (Laughter)

糖果的价格，如果你想抱怨这些，你得去找查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the answer is, Warren is still doing it and talking to Ajit, and — but that’s because Ajit likes it that way.

查理·芒格：嗯，答案是，沃伦仍在这样做并与阿吉特交谈，但这因为阿吉特喜欢这样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have a very peculiar place where the — where Warren’s contact with the various people elsewhere in the organization largely depends on what they want, not what he wants.

查理·芒格：我们有一个非常特殊的地方——沃伦与组织中其他人接触在很大程度上取决于他们想要什么，而不是他想要什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: The CEO of one of our —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们的一家公司的首席执行官——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s very unusual, and it’s worked beautifully.

查理·芒格：这非常不寻常，但效果很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: The CEO of one of our most successful subsidiaries, I may have talked to — unless I saw him here and just said hello — I probably talked to him three times in the last ten years.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们最成功的子公司之一的首席执行官，我可能和他交谈过——除非我在这里见到他并打了个招呼——在过去十年里，我可能只和他谈过三次。

And he does remarkably well. (Laughs)

他做得非常好。（笑）

He might have done even better if I hadn’t talked to him those three times. (Laughter)

如果我没有和他谈过那三次，他可能会做得更好。（笑声）

And on the other hand, Ajit and I talk very, very frequently. And he’s got the kind of business, A, I do know — I know more about the insurance business than I know about a good many of the other businesses.

另一方面，Ajit 和我非常频繁地交谈。他的生意类型，我确实知道——我对保险行业的了解比对许多其他行业的了解要多。

And it’s interesting. And we are evaluating things that you don’t look up in a book, you know. I mean, actuarial talent is not what’s important in the things that Ajit talks to me about. It’s plenty important throughout our insurance operation.

这很有趣。我们正在评估一些你在书本上找不到的东西。我的意思是，精算人才并不是阿吉特和我谈论的事情中重要的部分。它在我们的保险业务中非常重要。

But in these particular cases, you know, we’re making judgments, and his judgment’s better than mine. But I like to — I just like to hear about them. They’re interesting propositions.

但在这些特定情况下，你知道，我们在做判断，而他的判断比我的更好。但我喜欢——我只是喜欢听听这些事情。它们是有趣的提议。

13. Putting business values in income account is “enormously deceptive”

将市场价值放入收入账户是“极具误导性的”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: … shareholder named Jack Ciesielski . He’s a well-known accounting expert, who for many years has written “The Accounting Observer.”

卡罗尔·卢米斯：……一位名叫杰克·切谢尔斯基的股东。他是一位知名的会计专家，多年来一直在撰写《会计观察者》。

“Mr. Buffett, in this year’s shareholder letter you have harsh words for the new accounting rule that requires companies to use market value accounting for their investment holdings.

“巴菲特先生，在今年的股东信中，您对要求公司对其投资持有使用市场价值会计的新会计规则发表了严厉的批评。”

″‘For analytical purposes,’ you said, ‘Berkshire’s bottom-line will be useless.’

“‘为了分析目的，’你说，‘伯克希尔的底线将毫无用处。’”

“I’d like to argue with you about that. Shouldn’t a company’s earnings report cite everything that happened to, and within, a company during an accounting period?

“我想和你争论一下这个。公司的财报难道不应该列出在一个会计期间内发生在公司及其内部的所有事情吗？”

“Shouldn’t the income statement be like an objectively written newspaper informing shareholders of what happened under the management for that period, showing what management did to increase shareholder value and how outside forces may have affected the firm?

“收入报表不应该像一份客观撰写的报纸，向股东通报在该期间管理层发生了什么，展示管理层为增加股东价值所做的努力，以及外部因素如何影响公司吗？”

“If securities increased in value, surely the company and the shareholders are better off. And surely they’re worse off if securities decreased in value.

“如果证券增值，公司的情况和股东的情况肯定会更好。如果证券贬值，他们的情况肯定会更糟。”

“Those changes are most certainly real. In my opinion, ignoring changes in the way that some companies ignore restructuring costs, is censoring the shareholders’ newspaper.

“这些变化无疑是真实的。在我看来，忽视变化就像一些公司忽视重组成本一样，是在审查股东的报纸。”

“So my question is, how would you answer what I say?” (Laughter)

“所以我的问题是，你会如何回答我所说的话？”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my answer to the question that asks what my answer would be to what he said — the — I would ask Jack, if we’ve got $170 billion of partly-owned companies, which we intend to own for decades, and which we expect to become worth more money over time, and where we reflect the market value in our balance sheet, does it make sense to, every quarter, mark those up and down through the income account, when at the same time we own businesses that have become worth far more money, in most cases, and become, you know, since we bought — you name the company — take GEICO, an extreme case — we bought half the company for $50 million, roughly — do we want to be marking that up every quarter to the value — and having it run through the income account?

沃伦·巴菲特：我对这个问题的回答是，如果我们有 1700 亿美元的部分拥有的公司，我们打算拥有几十年，并且预计这些公司的价值会随着时间的推移而增加，而我们在资产负债表中反映市场价值，那么每个季度通过收益账户对这些公司进行上下调整是否有意义？与此同时，我们拥有的企业在大多数情况下已经变得更有价值，自从我们购买——你可以说是任何公司——以 GEICO 为极端案例——我们大约以 5000 万美元购买了该公司的半数股份——我们是否希望每个季度都将其价值上调，并通过收益账户进行处理？

That becomes an appraisal process. There’s nothing wrong with doing that, in terms of evaluation. But in terms of — and you can call it gain in net asset value or loss in net asset value — that’s what a closed-end investment fund, or an open-investment fund would do.

这就变成了一个评估过程。在评估方面，这没有什么问题。但在——你可以称之为净资产价值的增加或减少——这就是封闭式投资基金或开放式投资基金所做的。

But to run that through an income account — if I looked at our 60 or 70 businesses, or whatever number there might be, and every quarter we marked those to market, we would have, obviously, a great many, in certain cases, where over time we’d have them at 10 times what we paid, but how quarter-by-quarter we should mark those up and run it through the income account, where 99 percent of investors probably look at net income as being meaningful, in terms of what has been produced from operations during the year, I think would be — well, I can say it would be enormously deceptive.

但是如果通过收入账户来处理这一点——如果我查看我们的 60 或 70 个业务，或者可能有的任何数量，每个季度我们将这些业务按市场价值进行标记，显然，在某些情况下，我们会发现有很多业务的价值是我们支付的 10 倍，但我们应该如何逐季度地将这些业务的价值上调并计入收入账户，而 99%的投资者可能认为净收入在一定程度上是有意义的，反映了年度运营所产生的结果，我认为这将是——好吧，我可以说这将是极其具有误导性的。

I mean, in the first quarter of this year — you saw the figures earlier — where we had the best what I would call operating earnings in our history, and our securities went — were down six billion, or whatever it was, to keep running that through the income account every day you would say that we might have made on Friday, we probably made 2 1/2 billion dollars. Well, if you have investors and commentators and analysts and everybody else working off those net income numbers and trying to project earnings for quarters, and earnings for future years, to the penny, I think you’re doing a great disservice by running those through the income account.

我的意思是，在今年第一季度——你们之前看到了这些数据——我们取得了历史上最好的运营收益，而我们的证券下跌了六十亿，或者说是其他的数字，每天将这些数字计入收入账户，你会说我们可能在周五赚了大约二十五亿美元。如果你有投资者、评论员、分析师和其他所有人都在根据这些净收入数字进行工作，并试图精确预测季度收益和未来几年的收益，我认为通过将这些数字计入收入账户，你是在做一件很大的不公正的事情。

I think it’s fine to have marketable securities on the balance sheet — the information available as to their market value — but we have businesses there — if we — we never would do it — but if we were to sell half, we’ll say, of the BNSF railroad, we would receive more than we carried — carried for them — we would turn — we could turn it into a marketable security and it would look like we made a ton of money overnight. Or if we were to appraise it, you know, appraise it every three months and write it up and down, A, it could lead to all kinds of manipulation, but B, and it would just lead to the average — to any investor— being totally confused.

我认为将市场证券放在资产负债表上——可获得它们的市场价值信息——是可以的，但我们有些业务——如果我们——我们绝对不会这样做——但如果我们出售BNSF铁路的一半，我们将收到比我们在账面上记录的金额更多的钱，我们可以将其转变为市场证券，这看起来就像我们一夜之间赚了很多钱。或者如果我们每三个月进行一次评估，并进行涨跌，这不仅可能导致各种操控，还会使任何投资者完全困惑。

I don’t want to receive data in that manner and therefore I don’t want to send it out in that manner.

我不想以那种方式接收数据，因此我也不想以那种方式发送数据。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, to me it’s obvious that the change in valuation should be noted, and it is and always has been — it goes right into the net worth figures.

查理·芒格：对我来说，显然应该注意到估值的变化，它确实是，并且一直都是——这直接反映在净资产数字中。

So the questioner doesn’t understand his own profession. (Laughter and applause)

所以提问者不理解自己的职业。(笑声和掌声)

I’m not supposed to talk that way but it slips out once in a while. (Laughter)

我不应该那样说，但偶尔会不小心说出来。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Sometimes he even gives it a push. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：有时候他甚至会推一把。（笑声）

14. McLane profits hurt by severe competitive pressure

McLane的利润受到严重竞争压力的影响

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: McLane’s core operating margins have dropped about 50 percent from where they’ve generally been since acquisition [from Walmart].

乔纳森·布兰特：麦克莱恩的核心运营利润率从收购以来（来自沃尔玛）通常的水平下降了约 50%。

Could you elaborate on the competitive pressures in the grocery and convenience store distribution business that have caused the deterioration in profits? And do you expect the margin structure of that business to eventually get back to where it was, or is this the new normal?

您能详细说明一下在杂货和便利店分销业务中导致利润恶化的竞争压力吗？您是否预计该业务的利润结构最终会恢复到以前的水平，还是说这就是新的常态？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know the answer to the second part about the future, but there’s no question that the margins have been squeezed. They were very, very narrow, as you know, they were about one cent on the dollar pretax, and they have been squeezed from that. Payment terms get squeezed.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不知道关于未来的第二部分答案，但毫无疑问，利润率已经被压缩。正如你所知道的，它们非常非常窄，税前大约是每美元一美分，并且已经从那个水平被压缩。付款条款也被压缩。

In some cases we have fairly long-term contracts on that, so it will go on for five years (inaudible).

在某些情况下，我们有相当长期的合同，因此这将持续五年（听不清）。

It’s a very, very tight margin business. And the situation is even worse than you portray because within McLane we have a liquor distribution business in a few states and that business has actually increased its earnings moderately, and we’ve added to that business, so within McLane’s figures there are about 70 million or so pretax from the liquor part that have nothing to do with the massive parts you’re talking about, in terms of food distribution.

这是一项利润非常微薄的业务。情况比你所描述的还要糟糕，因为在McLane内，我们有一个在几个州运营的酒类配送业务，那部分业务的收益实际上有所增加，我们也在扩展这一业务。因此，McLane的数据显示，酒类业务税前收益大约为7000万美元，这与您提到的大规模食品配送业务无关。

So it’s even — the decline is even greater in what you’re referring to than you’ve (inaudible).

所以实际上，您提到的下降幅度比您认为的还要大。

That’s just become very much more competitive. We have to decide — if you’ll look at our competitors, they’re not making much money either. And that’s capitalism.

这变得更加竞争激烈。我们必须决定——如果你看看我们的竞争对手，他们也赚不了多少钱。这就是资本主义。

I think, you know, there comes a point where the customer says, you know, “I’ll only pay X,” and you have to walk away.

我认为，你知道，客户会有一个时刻说，“我只愿意支付 X”，然后你就必须离开。

And there’s a great temptation when you’re employing — particularly employing thousands of people —and you’ve built distribution facilities, and all of that sort of thing — take care of them — to meet what you’d like to term as “irrational competition,” but that is capitalism.

当你雇佣——特别是雇佣成千上万的人——并且你建立了分销设施，以及所有这些事情时，照顾他们——以应对你所称之为“非理性竞争”的情况，这就是资本主义。

And — you’re right. We took — the earnings went up quite a bit from the time we bought it. And we’re still earning more than then. And we’ve earned a lot of money over time.

你说得对。我们购买它之后，收益确实上升了很多。我们现在赚的钱比那时还要多。我们长期以来赚了很多钱。

But, as I say, a fair amount of that is actually coming from liquor distribution, activities in about four states that we purchased — very well-run.

但正如我所说，实际上有相当一部分收入来自于我们在四个州购买的酒类配送业务——非常运营良好。

And — we will do our best to get the margins up. But I would not — I could not tell you — give you a really — your guess is almost as good as mine, or better than mine, maybe, as to what margins will be in that distribution business five years from now.

我们会尽力提高利润率。但我不能告诉你，五年后那个分销业务的利润率会是什么，你的猜测可能和我一样好，甚至比我更好。

It’s a very essential service. We do $40-some billion. And we move more of the product of all kinds of companies that names are known to you, than anybody else. But — when you get — when you get — Kraft Heinz for that matter, or Philip Morris, or whomever it may be, on one side of the deal, and you get Walmart and some other — 7/11 — on the other side of the deal, sometimes they don’t leave you very much room in between.

这是一个非常重要的服务。我们每年处理超过400亿美元的产品，移动的产品来自所有你所知道的公司。但是——当你在交易的一方得到——面对像Kraft Heinz或者Philip Morris这样的公司，或者其他任何公司为例，而在交易的另一方得到沃尔玛和7-11这样的公司时，有时他们之间留给你的空间并不多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’ve described it very well. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：我认为你描述得很好。（巴菲特笑）

15. Health care costs partnership with Amazon and JPMorgan

与亚马逊和摩根大通的医疗保健成本合作

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter) Station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Charlie and Warren. I know that seems a little bit out of order, but I’m a huge fan of yours, Charlie, mostly for your 25 Cognitive Biases.

观众成员：早上好，查理和沃伦。我知道这似乎有点不合时宜，但我非常喜欢你，查理，主要是因为你的 25 种认知偏差。

I’m from Seattle, Washington. I run a one-person digital marketing firm that specializes in Facebook ads and email marketing. I use these a lot. I — your breakdown of Coca-Cola was really, really solid.

我来自华盛顿州的西雅图。我经营一家专注于 Facebook 广告和电子邮件营销的一人数字营销公司。我经常使用这些。我——你对可口可乐的分析真的非常出色。

And I use that as reference when looking to how to understand the mechanics of my clients’ products and how to promote them. So I’m fairly certain that your cognitive biases work for internet-related companies.

我将其作为参考，以了解我客户产品的机制以及如何推广它们。因此，我相当确定你的认知偏见适用于互联网相关公司。

Now that you’re partnering with Amazon [and JPMorgan] on health care, I’m curious, have you started to understand how to apply these biases to internet-related companies? Or is there another set of tools you use to decide if you understand a business? Because you guys talk a lot about not investing in businesses that you don’t understand.

既然你们与亚马逊[和摩根大通]在医疗保健方面合作，我很好奇，你们是否已经开始理解如何将这些偏见应用于互联网相关公司？还是说你们有另一套工具来判断自己是否理解一个业务？因为你们经常谈论不投资于自己不理解的业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, health care is a — we don’t plan to start health care companies or, necessarily, insurers or anything. We simply have three organizations with leaders that I admire and trust. And we — mutually goes around all three.

沃伦·巴菲特：医疗保健是——我们不打算开始医疗保健公司或保险公司。我们只是与三个我钦佩和信任的组织合作。我们三方互相合作。

And we hope to do something which Charlie correctly would probably say is almost impossible to change in some way a system which is — was taking 5 percent of GDP in 1960, and now is taking close to 18 percent.

我们希望做一些查理正确地说几乎不可能的事情，以某种方式改变一个系统——这个系统在 1960 年占据了 5%的 GDP，现在接近 18%。

And we have a hugely noncompetitive medical cost in American business, relating to any country in the world. The countries that — there were some countries that were around our 5 percent when we were at 5 percent. But we’ve managed to get to 18 without them going beyond 11 or so.

在美国商业中，我们的医疗成本极其不具竞争力，与世界上任何国家相比。当我们处于 5%时，有一些国家的医疗成本也在 5%左右。但我们已经设法将其提高到 18，而他们的成本没有超过 11 左右。

Literally, in 1960, we were spending $170 per capita on medical costs in the United States. And now we’re spending over 10,000.

字面上说，1960 年我们在美国的人均医疗费用为 170 美元。而现在我们花费超过 10,000 美元。

And, you know, every dollar only has a hundred cents. So there is a cost problem. It is a tapeworm, in terms of American business and its competitiveness.

而且，你知道，每美元只有一百美分。所以存在成本问题。在美国商业及其竞争力方面，这就像是一条寄生虫。

We don’t — we have fewer doctors per capita. We have fewer hospital beds per capita, fewer nurses per capita, than some of the other countries that are well below us.

我们没有——我们的人均医生数量更少。我们的人均医院床位更少，护士的人均数量也比一些低于我们的国家少。

And you’ve got a system that is delivering $3.3 trillion — that’s almost as much as the federal government raises — it’s delivering 3.3 trillion, or some number like that, to millions and millions and millions of people who are involved in the system. And every dollar has a constituency. It’s just like politics.

你有一个系统，每年提供 3.3 万亿美元——这几乎与联邦政府的收入相当——它向数百万、数百万、数百万参与该系统的人提供 3.3 万亿美元，或者类似的数字。每一美元都有其支持者。这就像政治一样。

And whether we can find the chief executive, which we’re working on now, and which I would expect we would — we would be able to announce before too long — that — but that’s a key part of it.

我们是否能找到首席执行官，这是我们现在正在努力的方向，我预计我们会在不久的将来宣布这一点——这是其中一个关键部分。

And whether that person will have the imagination and support of people that will enable us to make any kinds of significant improvements in a system which everybody agrees is sort of out of control on cost, but what — but — but they all think it’s the other guy’s fault, generally — we’ll find out. It won’t be — it won’t be easy.

是否那个人会有想象力和支持，使我们能够在一个大家都同意在成本方面有点失控的系统中做出任何显著改进，而大家普遍认为是其他人的错，我们会看到。这不会容易。

But it is not a — the motivations are not primarily profit-making. They’re — we want to deliver — we want our employees to get better medical service at a lower cost. We’re not going to — we’re certainly not going to come up with something where we think the service that they receive is inferior to what they’re getting now.

但这并不是一个——动机主要不是为了盈利。我们——我们希望提供——我们希望我们的员工能够以更低的成本获得更好的医疗服务。我们绝对不会——我们肯定不会想出一些我们认为他们所获得的服务低于他们现在所得到的服务的东西。

But we do think that there may be ways to make a real — significant changes — that could have an effect. And we know that the resistance will be unbelievable.

但我们确实认为，可能有办法进行真正的——显著的改变——可能会产生影响。我们知道阻力将是难以置信的。

And if we fail, we’ve at least tried. And — but they — the idea is not that I will be able to contribute anything to, you know, in some breakthrough moment, by reading a few medical journals or something — (laughs) — changing something that is as embedded as the medical system.

如果我们失败了，至少我们尝试过。可是——他们——这个想法并不是我能通过阅读几本医学期刊或其他什么来为某个突破时刻做出贡献——（笑）——改变像医疗系统这样根深蒂固的东西。

But the idea is that maybe the three organizations, which employ over a million people and which, after we announced it, we had a flood of calls from people that wanted to join in, but there isn’t anything to join into now. But they will if we have — come up with any ideas that are useful.

但这个想法是，也许这三个组织雇佣了超过一百万人，在我们宣布之后，我们收到了大量希望加入的电话，但现在没有任何可以加入的东西。如果我们想出任何有用的想法，他们会加入。

Whether we can — bring the resources, bring the person. And the CEO is terribly important. And then bring the person, support that person. And somehow, figure out a better way for people to continue to receive better medical care in the United States without that 8 percent — 18 percent — going to 20 or 22 percent, you know, in the lifetime of, you know, our children or something of the sort — because there are only a hundred cents in the dollar.

是否我们能带来资源，带来合适的人选。CEO非常重要。然后支持那个人。以某种方式找到一个更好的方法，让人们继续在美国获得更好的医疗服务，而不是将那个18%提高到20%或22%，你知道，可能在我们的孩子一代人生命中，因为每一美元只有一百美分。

And we will see what happens. It’s — you know — if you were Ajit [Jain], actuarially figuring, it would not — you would not bet on us. But — I think there is some chance we will do something.

我们将看看会发生什么。这是——你知道——如果你是 Ajit [Jain]，从精算的角度来看，你不会押注我们。但是——我认为我们有一些机会会做点什么。

There’s a chance — nobody can quantify it — that we can do something significant. And we are positioned better than most people to try. And we’ve certainly got the right partners. So, we will give it a shot and see what happens.

有一个机会——没人能量化——我们可以做一些重要的事情。而我们比大多数人更有优势去尝试。而且我们肯定有合适的合作伙伴。所以，我们会试一试，看看会发生什么。

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: There is some precedent for success in this public service activity. If you go back many decades, John B. Rockefeller I, using his own money, made an enormous improvement in American medical care. Perfectly enormous. In fact, there’s never been any similar improvement done by any one man since that rivals it.

查理·芒格：在这项公共服务活动中，有一些成功的先例。如果你追溯到几十年前，约翰·D·洛克菲勒一世用自己的钱对美国医疗保健进行了巨大的改善。实在是巨大的。事实上，自那以来，没有任何一个人能做到与之相媲美的改善。

So Warren, having imitated Rockefeller in one way, is just trying another. And maybe it’ll work.

所以沃伦在某种程度上模仿了洛克菲勒，现在只是尝试另一种方式。也许这会奏效。

WARREN BUFFETT: Rockefeller, incidentally, lived a very long time. So I actually am trying to imitate him three ways there. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，洛克菲勒活得很长。所以我实际上在这三方面试图模仿他。（笑声）

We’ll see what happens. But we are — we’re making a lot of progress. And I think we’ll probably have a CEO within a couple of months. But if we don’t have one, then we’re not going to pick somebody just because we want to meet any deadline or anything like that. We’ve got these wonderful partners.

我们看看会发生什么。但我们正在取得很大进展。我认为我们可能在几个月内会有一位首席执行官。如果没有，我们也不会因为想要赶上任何截止日期而随便选择一个人。我们有这些优秀的合作伙伴。

We don’t have a partnership agreement among us. Somebody started drawing up one in a legal department and the CEO just put a stop to it.

我们之间没有合作协议。有人在法律部门起草了一份协议，但首席执行官直接停止了这一进程。

They — you do have places that have a lot of resources. And while we all have our share of bureaucracy, we can cut through it if we’ve got something that we really think makes sense.

他们——你确实有很多资源丰富的地方。虽然我们都有各自的官僚主义，但如果我们有一些真正认为有意义的东西，我们可以突破这些障碍。

And we will get the support — we’ll get — we’ll get a lot of resistance, too. But we will get the support of a lot of American business, if we come up with something that makes sense.

我们会得到支持——我们会得到——我们也会遇到很多阻力。但如果我们提出一些合理的东西，我们将获得许多美国企业的支持。

But if it was easy, it would’ve already been done. There’s no question about that.

但如果这很简单，那早就完成了。对此毫无疑问。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not easy.

查理·芒格：这并不容易。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. (Laughs) But it should be tried.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。（笑）但应该尝试。

16. Weschler and Combs “slightly ahead” of S&P

Weschler 和 Combs “略微领先”于标准普尔

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from David Rolfe, who is with Wedgewood Partners, and has been — the company — has been shareholders in Berkshire since 1989. The stock is currently the largest holding in their stocks — 18 stocks.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自大卫·罗尔夫，他在Wedgewood Partners，自 1989 年以来，该公司一直是伯克希尔的股东。该股票目前是他们 18 只股票中最大的持股。

He asks this question: “Over the past two years, you have listed the individual fund-of-funds performance from Protégé Partners. When will you start showing the annual performance on 25 billion that Ted [Weschler] and Todd [Combs] manage? Can you state if either Ted or Todd has beaten the S&P 500 index over the last five years?

他问这个问题：“在过去两年中，你列出了 Protégé Partners 的各个基金的表现。你们什么时候会开始展示 Ted [Weschler]和 Todd [Combs]管理的 250 亿美元的年度表现？你能否说明 Ted 或 Todd 在过去五年中是否超过了标准普尔 500 指数？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Both — A, we’ll probably never report their individual performance.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。两者——A，我们可能永远不会报告它们的个别表现。

But you can be sure that I have an enormous interest in — as does Charlie — in how much we think they contribute to Berkshire. And they have — they’ve been terrific. They’ve — they not only have the intellect, and the record, but they are exceptional human beings. And they —

但你可以放心，我对他们对伯克希尔的贡献有着极大的兴趣——查理也是如此。他们——他们非常出色。他们不仅有智慧和业绩，而且是杰出的人。还有他们——

Todd has done a tremendous amount of work, for example, on the medical project.

托德在医疗项目上做了大量的工作。

And — Ted is — I’ve given him several things, and he’s done them better than I could do them.

而且——泰德是——我给了他几件事，他做得比我更好。

So the record, since inception — and I’m measuring it — Ted came later than Todd, a year or so later — but the record, since inception, is almost identical — both for the two managers — from their different inception and matching the S&P.

所以记录，从开始到现在——我在测量——Ted 来的比 Todd 晚，大约晚了一年——但从开始到现在的记录几乎是相同的——对于这两位经理来说——从他们不同的开始到与标准普尔的匹配。

And they’ve received some incentive compensation, which they only get if they beat the S&P. And as I say, they’re just slightly ahead. That really hasn’t —

他们获得了一些激励性补偿，只有在他们超过标准普尔指数时才能获得。正如我所说，他们只是稍微领先。这实际上并没有——

It’s been better than I’ve done, so naturally, I can’t criticize it. (Laughs)

这比我做得好，所以自然我不能批评它。（笑）

They — they were the — they were two very, very, very good choices.

他们——他们是——他们是两个非常非常非常好的选择。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You did report it in a previous year. You just didn’t do it this year. And — but now you have your report. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你在之前的年份报告过这些。只是今年没有报告。不过现在你有报告了。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would — the problem that all of us has is size. It’s actually — it’s harder to run even 12 or $13 billion, frankly, than it is to run a billion. And if you’re running a million dollars or something of the sort, it’s a whole different game. You’d agree with that, wouldn’t you, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为——我们所有人面临的问题是规模。实际上，管理 120 亿或 130 亿美元比管理 10 亿美元要困难得多。如果你管理的是 100 万美元或类似的金额，那就是完全不同的游戏。你会同意这一点，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course.

查理·芒格：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，好的。（笑声）

Just like any good lawyer, you never ask him a question unless you think you know the answer they’re going to give. (Laughter)

就像任何优秀的律师一样，你永远不会问他一个问题，除非你认为你知道他们会给出的答案。（笑声）

17. GEICO is on a good growth and profit track

GEICO 正在良好的增长和盈利轨道上。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。加里？

GARY RANSOM: My question’s on GEICO. Last year, you promised growth and delivered. But along the way, the combined ratio was moving up, and it was the first time it was over a hundred in about 15 years.

加里·兰索姆：我的问题是关于 GEICO 的。去年，你们承诺增长并实现了。但在此过程中，综合比率在上升，这是大约 15 年来第一次超过 100。

Granted, some of that was catastrophes. But even excluding catastrophes, there was something going on in the loss trends that caused you to slow down that growth, at least at the — as we got to the latter part of the year.

诚然，其中一些是灾难。但即使排除灾难，损失趋势中仍然发生了一些事情，导致你在增长方面放缓，至少在我们进入年末时是这样的。

And I wondered if you could tell us what was going on. And I did look this morning, too, so it looked like the first quarter has settled down a little bit, but I’d still like to know about the fourth quarter.

我想知道你能否告诉我们发生了什么。我今天早上也查看了一下，似乎第一季度已经稍微平稳了一些，但我仍然想了解第四季度的情况。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, sure. It — the only thing I differ with the question on slightly — when you say it caused us to slow down — we didn’t want to slow down the growth. I mean, you’re looking at a guy here that has never wanted to slow down the growth of GEICO. The growth did slow down, but it wasn’t because we wanted it to.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当然。唯一我稍微不同意的问题是——当你说这导致我们放慢了速度——我们并不想放慢增长。我是说，你看到的是一个从未想过要放慢 GEICO 增长的人。增长确实放慢了，但这并不是因为我们想这样。

Our prices that led to the underwriting loss — we actually — we’d have been slightly in the black without the catastrophes.

我们的价格导致了承保损失——实际上——如果没有灾难，我们的财务状况会稍微好一些。

But, you know, if we hadn’t have paid our light bills, we might have been in the black, too. I mean, this “except for” stuff doesn’t mean much in insurance as far as I’m concerned.

但是，你知道，如果我们没有支付电费，我们也可能会有盈余。我的意思是，这种“除了”之类的东西在保险方面对我来说并没有太大意义。

The — if you’ll look at the first quarter — our margins were around 7 percent, which is actually a little more than we aimed for. And I received the unaudited — I mean, the preliminary — figures for April, and they’re similar.

如果你看看第一季度，我们的利润率大约是 7%，实际上比我们预期的稍高。我收到了未经审计的——我的意思是，初步——四月份的数据，它们是相似的。

So, the underwriting gain is — or margins — are perfectly satisfactory now. And we’d love to get all the growth we can. And we will gain market share this year. And we gained market share — Tony — when Tony [Nicely] took over the place, it was — in 1993 — it was two and a very small fraction percent. And it’ll be 13 percent of the — you know — 13 percent of the households in the country now. And we will keep gaining share. We will keep writing profitably — most of the time.

所以，承保利润或利润率现在完全令人满意。我们非常愿意获取所有可以获得的增长。今年我们会继续获取市场份额。Tony [Nicely]接管时（1993年），市场份额是2%多一点，而现在是13%。我们会继续增加市场份额。我们将大多数时间继续盈利写保单。

And every now and then, our rates will be slightly — modestly inaccurate — inadequate, I should say. And/or we’ll have, maybe, some big losses on hurricanes or something of the sort, or we’ll have a [Hurricane] Sandy in New York.

而且时不时地，我们的费率会稍微——适度地不准确——不足，我应该这么说。并且/或者我们可能会在飓风或类似事件上遭受一些重大损失，或者我们会在纽约遇到[飓风]桑迪。

The — but GEICO is a jewel. And it’s — you know, it’s really a — we’ve got some others we feel awfully close to similarly about, but it’s an incredible company. It has a culture all of its own. It’s saving its customers probably 4 or $5 billion a year against which they would — against what they would otherwise be paying, based on the average in auto insurance. And it will be profitable on underwriting a very high percentage of the year. It contributed another $2 billion to float last year.

——但 GEICO 是一颗明珠。而且——你知道，它真的是——我们还有一些其他公司，我们对它们的感觉也非常接近，但它是一家令人难以置信的公司。它有自己独特的文化。它每年为客户节省大约 40 亿到 50 亿美元，相比于他们在汽车保险中本应支付的平均费用。而且它在承保方面的盈利能力在很大程度上是可观的。去年它又贡献了 20 亿美元的浮存金。

It is a terrific company. And like I say, the first four months are dramatically better.

这是一家很棒的公司。正如我所说，前四个月的表现大大改善。

Now, there’s some seasonal in auto insurance. So, the first quarter is usually the best of the four quarters. But it’s not a dramatic seasonal. So, I think when you read the 10-Q — and you can take my word for April — I think GEICO is on a good profit track as well as a good growth track. And the more it grows, the better I like it.

现在，汽车保险有一些季节性因素。因此，第一季度通常是四个季度中最好的。但是这并不是一个显著的季节性因素。所以，我认为当你阅读 10-Q 时——你可以相信我在四月的说法——我认为 GEICO 在盈利和增长方面都走在良好的轨道上。它的增长越快，我就越喜欢。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you’ve said it perfectly.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为你说得非常好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Huh. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was never very bad, and it’s better now. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：情况从来没有很糟，现在更好了。（巴菲特笑）

18. Munger on steel tariffs: “Even Donald Trump can be right”

芒格谈钢铁关税：“连特朗普有时也能是对的”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station five.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第五站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. My name is Ethan Mupposa (PH), and I am from Omaha, Nebraska.

观众成员：早上好，沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格。我叫伊桑·穆波萨（PH），来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。

My question is, how will Donald Trump’s tariffs affect the manufacturing business of Berkshire Hathaway?

我的问题是，唐纳德·特朗普的关税将如何影响伯克希尔·哈撒韦的制造业务？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to date — (applause) — steel costs — we’ve seen steel costs increase somewhat. But as I said earlier, I don’t think the United States or China — there’ll be some jockeying back and forth, and there will be something that leaves some people unhappy and — but I don’t think — I don’t think either country will dig themselves into something that precipitates and continues any kind of real trade war in this country.

沃伦·巴菲特：到目前为止——（掌声）——钢铁成本——我们看到钢铁成本有所增加。但正如我之前所说，我认为美国或中国——会有一些来回的博弈，会有一些事情让一些人感到不满——但我不认为——我不认为任何一个国家会让自己陷入某种引发并持续真正贸易战的局面。

We — we’ve had that in the past a few times. And I think we’ve learned a general lesson on it.

我们——我们过去有过几次这样的情况。我认为我们对此学到了一个普遍的教训。

But there will — there will be some things about our trade policies that irritate others. And there will be some from others that irritate us. And there will be some back and forth. But in the end, I don’t think we’ll come out with a terrible answer on it.

但我们的贸易政策中会有一些让其他国家感到不快的地方。而其他国家也会有一些让我们感到不快的地方。会有一些来来回回的争论。但最终，我认为我们不会得到一个糟糕的结果。

Charlie, I’ll let you —

查理，我会让你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, steel has — it reached — the conditions in steel were almost unbelievably adverse to the American steel industry.

查理·芒格：嗯，钢铁的情况——钢铁的条件对美国钢铁工业几乎是不可思议的恶劣。

You know, even Donald Trump can be right on some of this stuff. (Laughter and applause)

你知道，甚至唐纳德·特朗普在某些事情上也可能是对的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: The — the thing about trade — you know, I’ve always said that the president, whether it’s president — any president — needs to be an educator-in-chief, which [Franklin] Roosevelt was in the Depression. That’s why he had those Fireside Chats, and it was very important that he communicated to the people what needed to be done and what was happening around them, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：关于贸易——你知道，我一直说总统，无论是哪个总统——都需要成为首席教育者，正如[富兰克林]罗斯福在大萧条时期所做的那样。这就是为什么他有那些炉边谈话，向人民传达需要做什么以及周围发生了什么是非常重要的，——

Trade is particularly difficult, because the benefits of trade are basically not visible, you know. You don’t know what you would be paying for the clothes you’re wearing today if we’d had a rule they all had to be manufactured in the United States, or what you’d be paying for your television set, or whatever it may be.

贸易特别困难，因为贸易的好处基本上是看不见的，你知道的。如果我们有一条规定，所有衣服都必须在美国制造，你今天穿的衣服你会支付多少，或者你的电视机，或者其他任何东西，你都不知道。

No one thinks about the benefits day-by-day as they walk around buying things and carrying on their own business.

没有人会在日常走动、购买东西和处理自己事务时考虑到这些好处。

The negatives, and there are negatives, are very apparent and very painful. And if you’re laid off — like happened in our shoe business [Dexter Shoes] in Maine — and you know you are — been a very, very, very good worker, and you were proud of what you did, and maybe your parents did it before you, and all of a sudden you find out that American shoes — shoes manufactured in America — are not competitive with shoes made outside the United States.

负面影响是显而易见且非常痛苦的。如果你被解雇了——就像我们在缅因州的鞋业 [Dexter Shoes] 所发生的那样——而你知道自己一直是一个非常非常优秀的员工，并且为自己所做的感到自豪，也许你的父母在你之前就做过这个工作，突然间你发现美国制造的鞋子——在美国生产的鞋子——与在美国以外生产的鞋子没有竞争力。

You know, you can talk all you want about Adam Smith or David Ricardo or something and explain the benefits of free trade and comparative advantage and all that sort of thing, and that doesn’t make any difference.

你知道，你可以尽情谈论亚当·斯密或大卫·李嘉图之类的事情，解释自由贸易和比较优势的好处等等，但这并没有什么区别。

And if you’re 55 or 60 years old, to talk about retraining or something like that, you know, so what?

如果你 55 或 60 岁，谈论再培训或类似的事情，那又怎么样呢？

So, I — it is tough in politics where you have a hidden benefit and a very visible cost to a certain percentage of a — of your constituency.

在政治中，拥有隐形的好处和非常明显的成本给某些选民带来痛苦，这是很艰难的。

And you need to do two things under those circumstances, if you have that situation. You know what’s good for the country. So, you have to be very good at explaining how it does really hurt, in a real way, somebody that works in a textile mill, like we had in New Bedford, where you only spoke Portuguese — half our workers only spoke Portuguese. And suddenly, they have no job. And they’ve been doing their job well for years.

在这种情况下，如果你遇到这样的情况，你需要做两件事。你知道什么对国家有利。因此，你必须非常擅长解释这对在纺织厂工作的人造成了怎样的真实伤害，就像我们在新贝德福德所经历的那样，那里的工人只说葡萄牙语——我们的一半工人只说葡萄牙语。突然间，他们失去了工作。而且他们多年来一直在做好自己的工作。

You’ve got to do two things. You can — you’ll have to — you have to understand that that’s the price individuals pay for what’s good for the collective good.

你必须做两件事。你可以——你必须——你必须理解，这是个人为集体利益所付出的代价。

And secondly, you’ve got to take care of the people that are — that — where retraining is a joke because of their age, or whatever it may be. And you’ve got to take care of the people that become the roadkill in something that is collectively good for us as a country. And —

其次，你必须照顾那些因为年龄或其他原因而无法重新培训的人。你还必须照顾那些在对我们国家整体有益的事情中成为牺牲品的人。

That takes society acting through its representatives to develop the policies that will get us the right collective result, and not kill too many people economically in the process. And you know, we’ve done that in various arenas over the years.

这需要社会通过其代表来制定政策，以获得正确的集体结果，并在此过程中不会经济上杀死太多人。你知道，多年来我们在各个领域都做到了这一点。

The people in their productive years do help take care of the people that are too old, and too young. I mean, every time a baby is born in the United States, you know, we take on an obligation of educating them for 12 years. It’ll cost $150,000 now, you know? It —

在他们的工作年龄段的人确实帮助照顾那些年纪太大和太小的人。我的意思是，每当在美国出生一个婴儿时，我们就承担了教育他们 12 年的义务。现在这将花费 15 万美元，你知道吗？这——

We have a system that has a bond between the people in their productive years and the ones in the young and old. And it gets better over time. It’s far from perfect now. But it has gotten better over time.

我们有一个系统，它在工作年限的人与年轻人和老年人之间建立了联系。随着时间的推移，这种联系变得更好。现在远非完美，但随着时间的推移，它确实有所改善。

And I believe that trade, properly explained, and with policies that take care of the people that are roadkill, is good for our country and can be explained.

我相信，适当解释的贸易以及照顾那些成为“牺牲品”的政策对我们的国家是有好处的，并且可以解释清楚。

But I think it’s a tough — it’s been a tough, tough sell to a guy that made shoes in Dexter, Maine or worked on a loom in New Bedford, Mass, or works in the steel mill in Youngstown, Ohio. (Applause)

但我认为这很困难——对一个在缅因州德克斯特做鞋子的人，或者在马萨诸塞州新贝德福德织布的人，或者在俄亥俄州扬斯敦的钢铁厂工作的人来说，这一直是一个艰难的推销。（掌声）

19. Buffett won’t impose his political opinions on Berkshire

巴菲特不会将他的政治观点强加于伯克希尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, Warren. This question comes from a Berkshire shareholder who says they’ve been a shareholder for ten years. I should say this may be one of the most pointed questions I’ve ever received for you. So —

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，沃伦。这个问题来自一位持有伯克希尔股票十年的股东。我应该说，这可能是我收到的对你来说最尖锐的问题之一。所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: But you elected to give it, though.

沃伦·巴菲特：但你选择给了它。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: But I did. (Laughter)

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：但我确实做了。（笑声）

The shareholder writes, “I have watched the movie every year at this meeting, when you testify in front of Congress on behalf of Salomon, as the symbol of what it means to have a moral compass. Investors are increasingly looking to invest in companies that are socially and morally responsible.

股东写道：“我每年在这个会议上观看这部电影，当你代表所罗门在国会作证时，作为拥有道德指南针的象征。投资者越来越倾向于投资那些在社会和道德上负责任的公司。”

“So I was disturbed when you were asked on CNBC about the role that business could play in sensible policies around the sales of guns.

所以当你在CNBC上被问及企业在合理的枪支销售政策中可以扮演的角色时，我感到非常困扰。

“You said you didn’t think business should have a role at all, and you wouldn’t impose your values on others. I was even more surprised when you said you’d be OK with Berkshire owning shares in gun manufacturers.

你说你认为企业不应该扮演任何角色，你也不会将你的价值观强加于他人。我更加惊讶的是，你说你对伯克希尔拥有枪支制造商的股份是可以接受的。

“At this meeting years ago, you said you wouldn’t buy a tobacco company because of the social issues. The idea that Berkshire would associate with any company as long as it isn’t illegal seems at odds with everything I think you stand for. Please tell us you misspoke.”

“在多年前的这次会议上，您说过您不会购买烟草公司，因为社会问题。伯克希尔只要不是非法的公司就会与之关联的想法似乎与我认为您所代表的一切相悖。请告诉我们您说错了。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — (applause) — let’s explore that a little. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——（掌声）——让我们稍微探讨一下这个。（笑声）

Should it be just my view, or should it be the view of the owners of the company? So, if I decide to poll the owners of the company on a variety of political issues, and one of them being whether, you know, Berkshire Hathaway should support the NRA, I don’t — if a majority of the shareholders voted to do it, or if a majority of the board of directors voted to do it, I would — I wouldn’t — I would accept that.

这应该只是我的观点，还是应该是公司的所有者的观点？所以，如果我决定就各种政治问题对公司的所有者进行民意调查，其中一个问题是伯克希尔·哈撒韦是否应该支持全国步枪协会（NRA），我不会——如果大多数股东投票支持这样做，或者大多数董事会成员投票支持，我会接受这个决定。

I don’t think that the — my political views — I don’t think I put them in a blind trust at all when I take the job. And I — in the elections of 2016, I raised a lot of money. In my case, I raised it for Hillary [Clinton]. And I spoke out in various ways that were quite frank, but — (applause) — I don’t think that I speak —

我不认为我的政治观点——我不认为我在担任这个职位时把它们放在盲目信托。我——在2016年的选举中，我筹集了很多钱。对我来说，我筹集了钱给希拉里·克林顿。我也以各种方式直言不讳，但——（掌声）——我不认为我是在代表伯克希尔发言。

When I do that, I don’t think I’m speaking for Berkshire. I’m speaking as a private citizen. And I don’t think I have any business speaking for Berkshire. We have never — at the parent company level — we have never made a political contribution, you know —

当我这样做时，我并不认为我在代表伯克希尔。我是在作为一个私人公民发言。我也不认为我有资格代表伯克希尔发言。我们从未——在母公司层面——我们从未进行过政治捐款，你知道的——

And I don’t go to our suppliers. I don’t do anything of that sort where I raise money either for the school I went to, or for a political candidate I went to, or anything else.

我不去找我们的供应商。我不做任何那种事情，无论是为我上过的学校筹款，还是为我支持的政治候选人筹款，或者其他任何事情。

And I don’t think that we should have a question on the GEICO policyholder form, “Are you an NRA member?” you know, and if you are, you just aren’t good enough for us, or something. That — I think —

我认为我们不应该在 GEICO 投保人表格上问“您是 NRA 会员吗？”如果您是，那您就不够好，或者类似的事情。我认为——

I do not believe in imposing my political opinions on the activities of our businesses.

我不相信将我的政治观点强加于我们企业的活动。

And if you get to what companies are pure and which ones aren’t pure — (applause) — I think it is very difficult to make that call. Thank you.

如果你要判断哪些公司是纯粹的，哪些公司不是纯粹的——（掌声）——我认为很难做出这样的判断。谢谢。

I think with that response, I’m almost afraid to call on Charlie. But go ahead, Charlie. (Laughter)

我想听了这个回答，我几乎不敢叫查理。但请继续，查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, obviously, you do draw a limit, Warren —

查理·芒格：显然，你确实设定了一个界限，沃伦——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we did.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们做到了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — in all kinds of thing —

查理·芒格：—— 在各种事情中 ——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — which are beneath us, even though they’re legal. But we don’t necessarily draw it perfectly because we’ve got some sort of supreme knowledge. We just do the best we can.

查理·芒格：——即使它们是合法的，但我们不会完全依靠某种至高无上的知识来设定这些限制。我们只是尽力而为。

And certainly, we’re not going to ban all guns, surrounded by wild turkeys in Omaha. (Laughter)

当然，我们不会在奥马哈被野火鸡包围的情况下禁止所有枪支。（笑声）

20. “Very unlikely” Berkshire would pay a special dividend

“非常不可能”，伯克希尔会支付特别股息

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。（笑声）

GREGG WARREN: Warren, this question’s also based on something you said more recently, so I can’t guarantee it’s going to be any easier. (Buffett laughs)

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，这个问题也是基于你最近说的某些事情，所以我不能保证它会更简单。（巴菲特笑）

You recently noted that you prefer share repurchases over dividends as a means for returning capital to shareholders should Berkshire’s cash balances continue to rise and hit the $150 billion threshold you noted as being difficult to defend to shareholders at last year’s annual meeting.

您最近提到，如果伯克希尔的现金余额继续上升并达到您在去年年度会议上提到的难以向股东辩护的 1500 亿美元门槛，您更倾向于通过股票回购而非分红来向股东返还资本。

While I understand the rationale for not establishing a regular dividend, a one-time special dividend could be a useful option for returning a larger chunk of Berkshire’s excess capital to shareholders without the implied promise to keep paying a regular dividend forever.

虽然我理解不设定常规股息的理由，但一次性特别股息可能是将伯克希尔多余资本的大部分返还给股东的一个有用选项，而不需要隐含承诺永远支付常规股息。

The drawback with the special dividend, though, is that it would lead to an immediate decline in book value and book value per share. Whereas a larger share repurchase effort, while depressing book value, would reduce Berkshire’s share count, limiting the impact on book value per share.

特殊股息的缺点在于，它会导致账面价值和每股账面价值的立即下降。而较大规模的股票回购虽然会压低账面价值，但会减少伯克希尔的股份数量，从而限制对每股账面价值的影响。

If we do happen to get a few years out and Berkshire does hit that $150 billion threshold, because valuations continue to be too high, both for acquisitions and for the repurchase of company stock, would you consider a one-time special dividend as a means for returning capital to shareholders?

如果我们真的能等到几年后，伯克希尔达到 1500 亿美元的门槛，因为估值仍然过高，无论是收购还是回购公司股票，您会考虑一次性特别股息作为向股东返还资本的方式吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we thought we couldn’t use capital effectively, we would figure — we would try to figure out the most effective way of returning capital to shareholders. And — you could — I would have probably — I think it’d be unlikely we’d do it by a special dividend.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果我们认为无法有效利用资本，我们会想办法找出向股东返还资本的最有效方式。而——你可以——我可能会——我认为我们不太可能通过特别股息来做到这一点。

I think it’d be more likely we’d do it by a repurchase, if the repurchase didn’t result in us paying a price above intrinsic value per share. We’re never going to do anything that we think is harmful to continuing shareholders.

我认为如果回购不会导致我们支付超过每股内在价值的价格，我们更有可能通过回购来实现。我们绝不会做任何我们认为对留下来的股东有害的事情。

So if we think the stock is intrinsically worth X, and we would have to pay some modest multiple even above that to repurchase shares, we wouldn’t do it because we would be hurting continuing shareholders to the benefit of the people who are getting out.

所以如果我们认为这只股票的内在价值是 X，而我们即使在此基础上还需要支付一些适度的倍数来回购股票，我们就不会这样做，因为这会损害持续持股的股东，而使得那些退出的人受益。

But we will try and do whatever makes the most sense, but not with the idea that we have to do something every day because we simply can’t find something that day.

但我们会尽力做最合理的事情，而不是抱着每天都必须做点什么的想法，因为我们那天根本找不到合适的事情。

We had a vote as you know — I don’t know, a few years back — on whether people wanted a dividend. And — the B shares — so I’m not talking my shares or Charlie’s or anything — but the B shares voted 47 to one against it.

我们进行了投票，正如你所知道的——我不知道，几年前——关于人们是否想要分红。而——B 股——所以我不是在谈论我的股份或查理的股份或其他任何东西——但 B 股以 47 票对 1 票反对。

So I think through self-selection of who become shareholders — I don’t think shareholders world — or countrywide — on all stocks would vote 47 to one at all.

所以我认为通过自我选择成为股东的人——我认为股东在全球或全国范围内对所有股票的投票不会是 47 比 1。

But we get self-selection in terms of who joins us. And I think they expect us to do whatever we think makes sense for all shareholders. And obviously, if we really thought we never could use the money effectively in the business, we should get it out, one way or another. And —

但我们通过自我选择来决定谁加入我们。我认为他们希望我们做出对所有股东有意义的事情。当然，如果我们真的认为我们永远无法有效利用这些资金，我们应该以某种方式将其返还。

You’ve got a bunch of directors who own significant — very significant — amounts of stock themselves. And you can expect them to think like owners. It’s the reason they’re on the board.

你有一群董事，他们自己拥有大量——非常大量——的股票。你可以期待他们像拥有者一样思考。这就是他们在董事会的原因。

And you can expect the management to think like owners and — owners will return money to all of the owners if they think it makes more sense than continuing to look for things to do.

你可以期待管理层像业主一样思考——如果业主认为退还资金给所有业主比继续寻找其他事情做更有意义，他们会这样做。

But we invested in the first quarter, maybe — have to look it up on the — well, certainly through April — probably close to 15 billion or something like that, net, so —

但我们在第一季度投资了，可能——你需要查看——好吧，肯定是到四月为止——大约150亿美元左右的净额，所以——

And we won’t always be in a world of very low interest rates — or high private market prices.

我们不会总是在低利率或高私募市场价格的世界里。

So we will do what makes the most sense. But I can’t see us ever making a special — almost — it’s very unlikely we would just pay out a big, special dividend. I think that if we put that to the vote of the shareholders, and Charlie and I did not vote, I think we would get a big negative vote. And I’d be willing to — be willing to make a bet on that one.

所以我们会做最有意义的事情。但我看不到我们会做特别——几乎——我们非常不可能单纯支付一个大额的特别分红。我认为如果我们将这个问题提交给股东投票，查理和我没有投票，我认为我们会得到一个大反对票。我愿意——愿意对这个赌注下个注。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as long as the existing system continues to work as well as it has, why would we change it? We’ve got a whole lot of people that are accustomed to it, have done well under it. And if conditions change, why, we’re capable of changing our minds, if the facts change.

查理·芒格：嗯，只要现有系统继续像现在这样有效，为什么我们要改变它呢？我们有很多人已经习惯于这个系统，并且在其中表现良好。如果条件发生变化，我们能够改变我们的想法，如果事实发生变化的话。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and we’ve done that several times.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们已经这样做过好几次了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Although, I must say, it’s a little hard. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不过，我必须说，这有点难。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He always brings me back to earth.

沃伦·巴菲特：他总是让我回到现实。

21. Munger is more interested than Buffett in Chinese stocks

芒格对中国股票的兴趣超过了巴菲特。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 6?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 6 站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Stephie Yu from Horizon Insights, a China-focused research firm based in Shanghai. So I have a lot of mutual fund clients in China, who are very young — relatively younger — and they manage a smaller portion of funds.

观众成员：您好，早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫于思妤，来自位于上海的专注于中国市场的研究公司 Horizon Insights。我在中国有很多共同基金客户，他们都很年轻——相对较年轻——并且管理的资金规模较小。

So my question is, if you only have $1 billion in your portfolio today, how would you change your investments? Would you consider more investment opportunities in emerging markets such as China? Thank you.

所以我的问题是，如果你今天的投资组合只有 10 亿美元，你会如何改变你的投资？你会考虑在中国等新兴市场增加更多投资机会吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say, if I were working with a billion, I would probably find — within a $30 trillion market in the United States, where I understood things better, generally, than I do around the world — I’d probably find opportunities there that would be better, incidentally, by some margin, than what we can find for hundreds of billions.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说，如果我在处理十亿美元，我可能会在美国这个 30 万亿美元的市场中找到机会，在那里我对事情的理解通常比对世界其他地方要好——顺便说一下，我可能会发现的机会会比我们为数百亿美元找到的机会要好得多。

But I wouldn’t — there’s no way I’d rule out emerging markets. There was a time, 15 years ago or so, when just because it was kind of interesting and it took me back to my youth, I — on the weekend, I went through a directory of Korean stocks. And I bought — and these were small stocks — well, they weren’t small by standards of either Korean or American business. They were big, big companies.

但我不会——我绝对不会排除新兴市场。大约 15 年前，有一段时间，仅仅因为这很有趣，并让我想起我的青春，我在周末翻阅了一份韩国股票目录。我买了一些——这些都是小股票——不过按韩国或美国商业的标准来看，它们并不算小。它们是大公司。

But I found 15 or 20 in — that were statistically cheap and bought some of each one myself.

但我发现有 15 或 20 个——在统计上便宜，我自己买了一些。

And there are opportunities with smaller amounts of money to do things that we just can’t do. And — but I — my first inclination always would be to comb through things in the United States. And —

而且有一些小额资金的机会可以做一些我们无法做到的事情。但是我总是首先倾向于在美国仔细研究这些事情。

But I’ve combed through — in other countries. I probably wouldn’t get into very, very small markets because there can be a lot of difficulties even in market execution and taxation, (inaudible).

但我已经在其他国家仔细研究过。我可能不会进入非常非常小的市场，因为即使在市场执行和税收方面也可能会遇到很多困难，（听不清）。

You can find — if you can’t find it, you know, in America and China and Britain and a few other places — (laughs) — you probably aren’t going to find it someplace else. You may think you’ve found it. But that may be — it may be a different game than you know. Our problem is size, not geography.

如果你在美国、中国、英国和其他几个地方找不到机会，可能你也不会在其他地方找到。你可能认为你找到了，但那可能是一个你不太了解的游戏。我们的问题是规模，而不是地理位置。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I already have more stocks in China than you do, as a percentage, so I’m with the young lady. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我在中国的股票比例已经比你多了，所以我支持这位年轻女士。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Well, you can — you want to name names? Do these stocks have names? Or — (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。那么，你想点名吗？这些股票有名字吗？或者——（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I don’t. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：不，我不这样认为。（巴菲特笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is —

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题是——

WARREN BUFFETT: I should just add one thing. You will find plenty of opportunities in China. Charlie would say you’ve got a better hunting ground than even a person with similar capital in the United States. Would you agree with —?

沃伦·巴菲特：我还要补充一点。你会发现中国有很多机会。查理会说，你在中国的猎场可能比在美国类似规模的投资者更好。你同意吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I do.

查理·芒格：是的，我是。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. So — and in the sense they’re — it’s logical that should be the case because it’s a younger market, but still a large market. So that —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。所以——从某种意义上说，这种情况是合乎逻辑的，因为这是一个年轻的市场，但仍然是一个庞大的市场。所以——

Markets probably work toward efficiency as they age. Japan had this very strange situation with warrants being priced out of line and all of that 30 years ago. And people notice after a while and it disappears. But there can be — some very strange things happen in markets as they develop. I think you’d agree with that, Charlie, wouldn’t you?

市场随着时间的推移可能会朝着效率发展。30 年前，日本出现了非常奇怪的情况，权证的定价失去了合理性。人们过了一段时间后会注意到这一点，然后这种情况就消失了。但在市场发展过程中，确实会发生一些非常奇怪的事情。我想你会同意这一点，查理，是吧？

日本和中国的情况非常接近。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely.

查理·芒格：绝对如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

22. Munger: Keep the faith and don’t sell your stock when we’re gone

芒格：保持信念，不要在我们离开时卖掉你的股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Hello — 乔纳森·布兰特：你好 —

CAROL LOOMIS: You skipped me.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：你跳过我了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Did I skip —? I skipped Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：我跳过——？我跳过卡罗尔了吗？

CAROL LOOMIS: Yup. 卡罗尔·卢米斯：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. I’m sorry.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦。我很抱歉。

CAROL LOOMIS: OK. 卡罗尔·卢米斯：好的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question, and I would concede it is not a small one, comes from Gideon Pollack of Montreal.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题，我承认这不是一个小问题，来自蒙特利尔的基甸·波拉克。

He says, “The world knows generally how the looks of Berkshire Hathaway have changed since you began to run the company in 1965. Berkshire was then a tiny northeastern, textile company. And now it is the number-four company on the Fortune 500.

他说：“世界普遍知道自从你在 1965 年开始管理公司以来，伯克希尔哈撒韦的面貌发生了怎样的变化。伯克希尔当时是一家位于东北部的小型纺织公司，而现在它是《财富》500 强中的第四大公司。”

“What about the next 50 years? Could you give us your view of what Berkshire looks like in 2068?”

“接下来的 50 年呢？您能给我们讲讲 2068 年的伯克希尔是什么样子的吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: I think it’ll look a long way away. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我觉得这看起来还很遥远。（笑声）

No, the answer is I don’t know. And I didn’t know, 50 years ago, what it would like now, I mean —

不，我的答案是我不知道。而且 50 年前我也不知道现在会是什么样子，我的意思是——

It will be based on certain principles. But where that leads, you know, we will find out and we’ll have people that are thinking about different things than I am. And we’ll have a world that’s different. But —

这将基于某些原则。但这将导致什么，你知道，我们会发现，我们会有一些人思考的事情与我不同。我们将拥有一个不同的世界。但是——

We will be — I very much hope and believe that we will be — that we’ll be as shareholder-oriented as any large company in the world. We will look at our shareholders as partners and we will be trying to do with their money exactly what we’d do with our own, not seeking to get an edge on them. And who knows what else will be happening then?

我们将会——我非常希望并相信我们会——像世界上任何大型公司一样以股东为导向。我们会把股东视为合作伙伴，努力用他们的钱做我们自己会做的事情，而不是试图在他们身上占便宜。谁知道那时还会发生什么呢？

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I want to talk to the younger shareholders in the group. Those of you who, after we are gone, sell your Berkshire stock and do something else with it, helped by your many friends, I think are going to do worse. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我想对年轻的股东们说一说。那些在我们离开后卖掉伯克希尔股票并做其他事情的人，我认为，他们会做得更糟。（笑）

So I would advise you to keep the faith. (Applause)

所以我建议你要保持信念。（掌声）

By the way, some of that has already happened in many families.

顺便说一下，这在许多家庭中已经发生过一些。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll give his answer next time now that I see it get all of that applause. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我下次会给出他的答案，现在我看到它得到了所有的掌声。（笑声）

23. “should be earning more money than it is now”

“ Duracell应该赚更多的钱。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: Duracell’s $82 million of pretax profits in 2017 were still well below what it earned as a subsidiary of P&G. Can you clarify or quantify to what extent transition costs or purchase price accounting impacts at the segment level were still temporarily burdened last year? Or is it possible that the gap in earnings contribution simply reflects a commoditization of the category given the entry of Amazon into the battery market?

乔纳森·布兰特：2017年，Duracell的税前利润为8200万美元，仍然远低于它作为宝洁子公司的盈利水平。您能否澄清或量化过渡成本或购买价格会计在细分层面上对盈利的暂时负担的程度？或者，这种收益差距是否可能反映了由于亚马逊进入电池市场导致的类别商品化？

I did see that Duracell’s earnings were up in the first quarter. Is that a sign of a more meaningful contribution in 2018 and beyond, as you finish right-sizing the manufacturing footprint and acquisition-related charges fall away?

我确实看到Duracell在第一季度的收益有所上升。这是否意味着在 2018 年及以后，随着你们完成制造规模的调整和收购相关费用的减少，将会有更有意义的贡献？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Duracell should be earning more money than it is now, and will be. And as you mentioned, it’s well on its way there. But it is not earning an appropriate amount now, based on the history of the company.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，Duracell应该赚更多的钱，并且会赚更多。正如你提到的，它确实在朝着这个方向发展。但是，按公司的历史来看，它现在的盈利水平并不合适。

I was around when — I was on the board of Gillette when Gillette bought Duracell. And I’ve seen what it does when it is managed to its full extent. And I saw what Jim Kilts did with it at Gillette when he ran it. And there were a lot more transition problems in the purchase. For one thing, there’s a lot of rules connected with our swap of our stock in P&G for Duracell. There are a lot of things which you cannot do that made sense to do in that period of transition from P&G’s management to ours. But Duracell — the brand is strong. Very strong.

我曾在吉列董事会时看到吉列收购Duracell的情况。我也看到了吉列时任总裁吉姆·基尔茨（Jim Kilts）是如何管理Duracell的。当时有很多过渡期的问题。例如，我们与宝洁的股票交换Duracell时，存在许多规则。在从宝洁管理层过渡到我们的管理层期间，有许多事情是不能做的，但在这个过渡期内是合适的。Duracell的品牌非常强大。

The product line is very strong. And we are making more money. And we should, and I believe we will earn, really, what the property is capable of earning. We should be earning that relatively soon.

产品线非常强大。我们正在赚更多的钱。我相信我们应该，也会真正赚到这项资产所能赚到的。我们应该很快就能赚到这些。

But you’re absolutely right that it is — from a profit standpoint — is underperforming.

但你绝对是对的，从利润的角度来看，它的表现不佳。

We’re making a lot of changes. And some of those are involved in jurisdictions — countries — where it is really expensive to change in terms of employment — payments that have to be made if a plant is changed or something of the sort.

我们正在进行很多改变。其中一些涉及到管辖区——国家——在这些地方，改变的成本非常高，尤其是在就业方面——如果工厂发生变化或类似情况，需要支付的费用。

But I like the Duracell deal absolutely as well as when we made it.

但我依然非常喜欢Duracell这笔交易，就像我们当初做出这笔交易时一样。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I like it better than you do. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我比你更喜欢它。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Duracell is a very, very — is our kind of business.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，Duracell是一个非常非常——是我们喜欢的业务。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It is. 查理·芒格：是的。

24. Long-term bonds are “almost ridiculous” at current rates

在当前利率下，长期债券“几乎是荒谬的”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. And I have a question related to the bond market — U.S. Treasury bond market. And my name is Ola Larsson (PH). I live in the San Francisco bay area.

观众成员：早上好。我有一个与债券市场相关的问题——美国国债市场。我的名字是奥拉·拉尔森（音）。我住在旧金山湾区。

And I never worked in the financial industry. I started out buying penny mining stocks on the Vancouver Stock Exchange. And then decades later, I got married. And my wife convinced me to buy Berkshire shares. That was probably a good decision. (Laughter)

我从未在金融行业工作过。我最开始是在温哥华证券交易所购买便士矿业股票。几十年后，我结婚了。我的妻子说服我购买了伯克希尔的股票。那可能是个好的决定。（笑声）

So my question is, I read the newspapers about the Federal Reserve and the inflation numbers. And there must be an increase supply of Treasury bonds that must go to auction. And my question is how would — what do you expect that to impact yield or interest rate?

所以我的问题是，我看到报纸上关于美联储和通货膨胀的数据。应该会有更多的国债供拍卖。我想知道这会如何影响收益率或利率？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The answer is, I don’t know. And the good news is, nobody else knows, including members of the Federal Reserve and everyone —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。答案是，我不知道。好消息是，其他人也不知道，包括联邦储备委员会的成员和所有人——

There are a lot of variables in the picture. And the one thing we know is we think that long-term bonds are a terrible investment, and we — at current rates or anything close to current rates.

图中有很多变量。我们知道的一件事是，我们认为长期债券是一项糟糕的投资，尤其是在当前利率或接近当前利率的情况下。

So basically all of our money that is waiting to be placed is in Treasury bills that, I think, have an average maturity of four months, or something like that, at most.

基本上，我们所有等待投资的资金都在国库券中，我认为这些国库券的平均到期时间大约是四个月，最多也就这样。

The rates on those have gone up lately, so that in 2018, my guess is we’ll have at least $500 million more of pretax income than we would’ve had in the bills last year.

这些的利率最近上涨了，所以我猜在 2018 年，我们的税前收入至少会比去年账单多出 5 亿美元。

But they still — it’s not because we want to hold them. We’re waiting to do something else.

但他们仍然——这并不是因为我们想要留住他们。我们在等待做其他事情。

But long-term bonds — they’re basically, at these rates — it’s almost ridiculous when you think about it. Because here the Federal Reserve Board is telling you we want 2 percent a year inflation. And the very long bond is not much more than 3 percent. And of course, if you’re an individual, then you pay tax on it. You’re going to have some income taxes to pay.

但长期债券——在这些利率下——想想这几乎是荒谬的。因为美联储告诉你我们希望每年有 2%的通货膨胀。而非常长期的债券利率不过 3%左右。当然，如果你是个人，你还要缴税。你将需要支付一些所得税。

And let’s say it brings your after-tax return down to 2 1/2 percent. So the Federal Reserve is telling you that they’re going to do whatever’s in their power to make sure that you don’t get more than a half a percent a year of inflation-adjusted income.

假设这使你的税后回报降到 2.5%。所以美联储告诉你，他们将尽一切可能确保你每年获得的通胀调整后收入不超过 0.5%。

And that seems to me, a very — I wouldn’t go back to penny stocks — but I think I would stick with productive businesses, or productive — certain other productive assets — by far.

在我看来，这非常——我不会回到便士股票——但我认为我会坚持投资于生产性企业，或者其他某些生产性资产——远远优于其他选择。

But what the bond market does in the next year, you know — you’ve got trillions of dollars in the hands of people that are trying to guess which maturity would be the best to own and all that sort of thing. And we do not bring anything to that game that would allow us to think that we’ve got an edge.

至于债券市场在未来一年会发生什么，你知道——你有数万亿美元在手的人正在试图猜测哪个到期时间的债券最好，我们在这方面没有任何优势。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it really wasn’t fair for our monetary authorities to reduce the savings rates, paid mostly to our old people with savings accounts, as much as they did. But they probably had to do it to fight the Great Recession, appropriately.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们的货币当局大幅降低储蓄利率，主要是对我们有储蓄账户的老年人来说，这真的不公平。但他们可能不得不这样做，以适当地应对大萧条。

But it clearly wasn’t fair. And the conditions were weird. In my whole lifetime, it’s only happened once that interest rates went down so low and stayed low for a long time.

但这显然不公平。而且情况很奇怪。在我一生中，利率降到如此低并且保持低位的情况只发生过一次。

And it was quite unfair to a lot of people. And it benefited the people in this room enormously because it drove asset prices up, including the price of Berkshire Hathaway stock. So we’re all a bunch of undeserving people — (laughter) — and I hope that we continue to be so. (Laughter)

这对很多人来说非常不公平。它极大地惠及了在座的各位，因为它推高了资产价格，包括Berkshire Hathaway的股价。所以我们都是一群不配得到这些的人——（笑）——希望我们继续如此。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: At the time this newspaper came out in 1942, it was — the government was appealing to the patriotism of everybody. As kids, we went to school and we bought Savings Stamps to put in — well, they first called them U.S. War Bonds, then they called them U.S. Defense Bonds, then they called them U.S. Savings Bonds. (Laughs) But they were called war bonds then.

沃伦·巴菲特：在1942年这份报纸出来时，政府在呼吁大家的爱国心。当时我们上学的时候会买储蓄债券——一开始叫做美国战债，然后叫做美国国防债券，再后来叫做美国储蓄债券。（笑）但当时叫做战争债券。

And you put up $18.75 and you got back $25 in ten years. And that’s when I learned that that $4 for three — in ten years — was 2.9 percent compounded. They had to put it in small print then.

你投入了 18.75 美元，十年后得到了 25 美元。那时我明白了，三年 4 美元的利息——在十年内——是复利 2.9%。他们当时必须把它写在小字上。

And even an 11-year-old could understand that 2.9 percent compounded for ten years was not a good investment. But we all bought them. It was — you know, it was part of the war effort, basically.

甚至一个 11 岁的孩子也能理解，2.9%的复利投资十年并不是一个好的选择。但我们都买了它们。这基本上是——你知道的，这是战争努力的一部分。

And the government knew — I mean, you knew that significant inflation was coming from what was taking place in finance, in World War II.

政府知道——我的意思是，你们知道，重大的通货膨胀是由于金融领域和第二次世界大战中发生的事情而来。

We actually were on a massive Keynesian-type behavior, not because we elected to follow Keynes, but because war forced us to have this huge deficit in our finances, which took our debt up to 120 percent of GDP. And it was the great Keynesian experiment of all time, and we backed into it, and it sent us on a wave of prosperity like we’ve never seen. So you get some accidental benefits sometimes.

我们实际上处于一种大规模的凯恩斯主义行为中，这并不是因为我们选择遵循凯恩斯，而是因为战争迫使我们在财政上出现巨大的赤字，使我们的债务达到了 GDP 的 120%。这是一场有史以来最伟大的凯恩斯实验，我们是被迫进入的，这让我们经历了一波前所未有的繁荣。因此，有时你会意外地获得一些好处。

But the United States government (inaudible) every citizen to put their money into a fixed-dollar investment at 2.9 percent compounded for ten years. And I think Treasury bonds have been unattractive ever since — (laughs) — with the exception of the early ’80s. That was something at that time.

但是美国政府（听不清）要求每个公民将他们的钱投入一个固定美元投资，年利率为 2.9%，复利十年。我认为自那时以来，国债一直不具吸引力——（笑）——除了 80 年代初期。那时的情况是这样的。

I mean, you really had a chance to buy — you had a chance to invest your money by buying zero-coupon Treasury bonds, and in effect, guarantee yourself that for 30 years you would get a compounded return, you know, something like 14 percent for 30 years of your lifetime.

我的意思是，你真的有机会购买--你有机会通过购买零息国债来投资你的钱，实际上，你可以保证自己在 30 年里获得复利回报，你知道，在你一生中的 30 年里，你可以获得类似 14%的回报。

So every now and then, something really strange happens in markets and the trick is to not only be prepared but to take action when it happens.

所以时不时地，市场上会发生一些非常奇怪的事情，关键不仅是要做好准备，还要在发生时采取行动。

Charlie, did you ever buy any war bonds?

查理，你曾经买过战争债券吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. No. I never bought war bonds.

查理·芒格：不，不。我从来没有购买过战争债券。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Used to be like take me —

沃伦·巴菲特：不。以前是让我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t have any money when I was in the war. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我在战争期间没有钱。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a good reason not to buy. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是不买的好理由。（笑）

25. “A bureaucracy is sort of like a cancer”

“官僚机构有点像癌症”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Angus Hanton (PH), who — he and his wife are based in London, and he says they’ve been shareholders in Berkshire Hathaway for over 30 years.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自安格斯·汉顿（PH），他和他的妻子住在伦敦，他说他们已经是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东超过 30 年了。

He says, “We have all read about the zero-based budgeting that has been so effective with Kraft Heinz and other investments that you’ve done with 3G Partners. Can we expect these cost-reduction techniques to be used by your managers in other parts of the Berkshire Hathaway enterprise?”

他说：“我们都读过关于零基预算的内容，这在卡夫亨氏和你与 3G 合伙人进行的其他投资中非常有效。我们可以期待你们的管理者在伯克希尔哈撒韦的其他部分使用这些成本削减技术吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in general, we do not expect the managers, generally, to get in the position where there would be a lot of change in terms of zero-based budgeting. In other words, why in the world aren’t you thinking that way all of the time?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，通常情况下，我们不期望经理们会在零基预算方面做出很多改变。换句话说，为什么你们不总是这样思考？

零基预算已经证明管理上的失败。

The 3G people have gone into certain situations where there were — probably primarily in personnel, but in other expenses as well — a lot of expenses that were not delivering a dollar of value per dollar expended.

3G的人进入了某些情况，主要是在人员配置方面，但在其他费用方面也有很多支出，并没有每花费一美元就能带来一美元的价值。

And so, they made changes very fast that — to a situation that probably shouldn’t have existed in the first place.

因此，他们迅速做出了改变——针对一个可能根本不应该存在的情况。

Whereas, we hope that our managers — take a GEICO. GEICO’s gone from, I think, 8,000 to 39,000 people since we bought control. But they’re all very productive. I mean, you would not find a way for a 3G operation to take thousands of people out of there.

然而，我们希望我们的管理者——以 GEICO 为例。自从我们控制了 GEICO 以来，它的员工人数从 8000 人增加到 39000 人。但他们都非常高效。我是说，你不会发现 3G 的运营方式能让那里的人数减少到几千人。

On the other hand, I can think of some organizations where you could take a whole lot of people out, where it isn’t being done because the businesses are very profitable to start with.

另一方面，我可以想到一些组织，你可以从中减少大量人员，但因为业务本身非常盈利，所以这些工作并没有做。

That’s what happened with the tobacco companies, actually. They were so profitable that they had all kinds of people around that didn’t — weren’t really needed. But they — the money just flowed in.

这就是烟草公司发生的事情。它们利润丰厚，以至于周围有各种各样的人，实际上并不需要。但钱源源不断地涌入。

So I — our managers have different techniques of keeping track of — or of — trying to maximize customer satisfaction at the same time that they don’t incur other than necessary costs.

所以我——我们的经理有不同的技巧来跟踪——或者说——在不产生其他不必要成本的同时，尽量提高客户满意度。

And I think, probably, some of our managers may well use something that’s either zero-based budgeting or something akin to it. They do not submit budgets — never have — to me. I mean, they’ve never been required to. We’ve never had a budget at Berkshire.

我认为，可能我们的一些经理确实会使用零基预算或类似的东西。他们从来没有向我提交过预算——从来没有——我的意思是，他们从来没有被要求过。我们在伯克希尔从来没有过预算。

We don’t consolidate our figures monthly. I mean, I get individual reports on every company. But there’s no reason to have some extra time spent, for example, by having consolidated figures at the end of April, or consolidated figures at the end of May.

我们不会每月合并我们的数据。我的意思是，我会收到每个公司的单独报告。但没有必要花额外的时间，比如在四月底或五月底合并数据。

We know where we stand. And — you know, I’m sure we’re the only company that — probably in the whole Fortune 500 — that doesn’t do it. But we don’t do unnecessary things around Berkshire. And a lot of stuff that’s done at big companies is unnecessary. And that’s why a 3G finds opportunities from time to time.

我们知道我们所处的位置。而且——你知道，我敢肯定我们是唯一一家——可能在整个财富 500 强中——不这样做的公司。但我们在伯克希尔不做不必要的事情。大公司做的很多事情都是不必要的。这就是为什么 3G 不时会发现机会。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you’ve got 30 people at headquarters and half of those are internal auditors, that is not the normal way of running a big company in America.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你在总部有 30 个人，而其中一半是内部审计员，这不是在美国经营大公司的正常方式。

And what’s interesting about it is, obviously, we lose some advantages from big size. But we also lose certain disadvantages from having a big bureaucracy with endless meeting after meeting after meeting around headquarters.

有趣的是，显然，我们失去了一些大规模带来的优势。但我们也失去了一些由于拥有庞大官僚机构而产生的劣势，比如在总部无休止的会议。

And net, I think we’ve been way ahead with our low overhead, diversified method. And also, it makes our company attractive to very able, honorable people who have companies.

而且，我认为我们在低开销、多元化的方法上一直走在前面。此外，这也使我们的公司对那些有能力、值得尊敬的企业家具有吸引力。

So generally speaking, the existing system has worked wonderfully for us. I don’t think we have the employment that could be cut effectively that a lot of other places have. And I think our methods have worked so well that we’d be very unlikely to change them.

总体而言，现有系统对我们来说运作得非常好。我认为我们没有像许多其他地方那样可以有效削减的就业岗位。而且我认为我们的方法运作得如此出色，以至于我们不太可能改变它们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think if some — at headquarters, you could say we have kind of subzero-based budgeting. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为在总部，如果你想说我们有一种接近于零的预算方式。（笑声）

And we hope that the example of headquarters is, to a great extent, emulated by our —

我们希望总部的榜样在很大程度上被我们的——效仿

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it isn’t just the cost reduction. I think the decisions get made better if you eliminate the bureaucracy.

查理·芒格：但这不仅仅是成本降低。我认为，如果消除官僚主义，决策会做得更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think a bureaucracy is sort of like a cancer. And it functions sort of like a cancer. (Applause)

查理·芒格：我认为官僚机构有点像癌症。它的运作方式也有点像癌症。（掌声）

And so, we’re very anti-bureaucracy. And I think it’s done us a lot of good. In that case, we’re quite different from, say, Anheuser-Busch at its peak.

因此，我们非常反对官僚主义。我认为这对我们有很大的好处。在这种情况下，我们与Anheuser-Busch在其巅峰时期有很大的不同。

26. We’re experimenting with lower-cost commercial insurance

我们正在尝试更低成本的商业保险。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，盖瑞。

GARY RANSOM: My question is on small commercial, and specifically, direct small commercial.

加里·兰索姆：我的问题是关于小型商业，特别是直接小型商业。

You seem to have some websites that enable buyers to purchase small commercial insurance directly; biBERK is one of them.

您似乎有一些网站可以让买家直接购买小型商业保险；biBERK 就是其中之一。

It’s a very competitive, fragmented market. But what is your strategy for that market? And then, can you ultimately GEICO-ize the small commercial market?

这是一个竞争激烈、碎片化的市场。但你对这个市场的策略是什么？然后，你能最终将小型商业市场“GEICO 化”吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll find out. I mean, it’s a very good question because that’s exactly the question we ask ourselves.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们会找到答案。我是说，这是一个非常好的问题，因为这正是我们问自己的问题。

And we have this incredible company at GEICO, which has gone direct in the personal auto field, and was, you know, first started it in 1936.

我们在 GEICO 有这家令人难以置信的公司，它在个人汽车领域直接开展业务，并且你知道，它是在 1936 年首次开始的。

And there’s no question in my mind that over a lot of years — and maybe not so many years — something like small commercial — anything that takes cost out of the system, you know, makes it easier for the customer, is going to work over time, if you’ve got a system that was based on something that had more layers of agency costs and that sort of thing.

我毫不怀疑，经过很多年——也许不是那么多年——像小型商业这样的东西——任何能降低系统成本、让客户更方便的东西，随着时间的推移都会奏效，前提是你有一个基于更多代理成本和类似因素的系统。

So we are experimenting, and we’ll continue to experiment, on something like small commercial, workers’ comp, whatever it may be. We’ll try and figure out ways to take cost out of the system, offer the customer an equivalent product or better at lesser price, and we’ll find out what can be done and what can’t be done.

所以我们正在进行实验，并将继续在一些小型商业、工人赔偿等方面进行实验。我们会尝试找出降低系统成本的方法，以更低的价格为客户提供等同或更好的产品，并找出可以做什么和不能做什么。

And we’re not the only ones doing it, as you know. But we are not going — we’ve got some managers that are going to be quite, I’m sure, enterprising on that. And we back them. And we expect some to fail and some — and if a few succeed — we’ll have some very good businesses. And the world is going in that direction. So — you could expect us to try and go with it.

我们并不是唯一在这样做的人，正如你所知道的。但我们不会停下——我们有一些经理，我相信他们会非常有进取心。我们支持他们。我们预期会有一些失败，但如果有几个成功，我们将会有一些非常好的业务。世界正朝这个方向发展。所以——你可以期待我们尝试跟随这个趋势。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if it were easy, I think it would’ve happened more fast —

查理·芒格：嗯，如果这很简单，我想它会发生得更快——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah — 沃伦·巴菲特：是的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — than it has.

查理·芒格：——比它更有。

WARREN BUFFETT: It will happen as we go along. I mean, it wasn’t easy in auto, I mean, when you think about it.

沃伦·巴菲特：随着时间的推移，这会发生。我是说，在汽车行业并不容易，想想看。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it wasn’t.

查理·芒格：不，不是。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. I mean, it was a system with all kinds of extra costs that go back to the turn of the 19th century into the 20th. I mean, it was built on fire insurance and strong general agencies. And that slopped over into auto when the auto came along in 1903 from Ford or whenever. And — so it grew within a system that really wasn’t very efficient compared to what was available.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。我是说，这是一个有各种额外成本的系统，可以追溯到 19 世纪末到 20 世纪初。我是说，它是建立在火灾保险和强大的综合代理机构之上的。当汽车在 1903 年从福特或其他地方出现时，这种模式也延伸到了汽车行业。因此，它在一个与可用资源相比并不是很高效的系统中发展起来。

But it took State Farm initially to go to a direct, or a captive agency system. And then it took USAA, and then later, GEICO, and then later, Progressive, to go to direct systems that are even more efficient and consumer-friendly.

但最初是State Farm采用了直接或专属代理系统。然后是 USAA，后来是 GEICO，接着是 Progressive，采用了更高效、更符合消费者需求的直接系统。

And the same thing is going to happen, to some degree, in all kinds of industries, and certainly small commercial — somebody will —

在所有行业中，某种程度上都会发生同样的事情，尤其是小型商业——总会有人——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It could happen, but it will be slow.

查理·芒格：这可能会发生，但会很慢。

WARREN BUFFETT: It takes an amazingly long time. I mean, it — but you know, the battle doesn’t always go to the strong and the race to the swift. But that’s the way to bet, you know, as they say. So — (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这需要惊人的时间。我是说，战斗并不总是胜利于强者，比赛也不总是跑得快的赢。但这是你可以押的赌注，你知道的，正如他们所说。（笑）

27. Health care partnership is attacking a huge “industry moat”

医疗保健合作伙伴正在攻克一个巨大的“行业护城河”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 8?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，8 号站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Austin Merriam, from Jacksonville, Florida.

观众成员：奥斯丁·梅里亚姆，来自佛罗里达州杰克逊维尔。

Mr. Buffett, with the recent news of the partnership between you, Mr. [Jeff] Bezos, and Mr. [Jamie] Dimon, to challenge the health care industry and the self-admitted difficulties you are running across, this would lead me to believe the industry has higher barriers to entry than may have originally been hypothesized; a larger moat, if you will.

巴菲特先生，关于您与[杰夫]贝索斯先生和[杰米]戴蒙先生最近合作挑战医疗行业的消息，以及您所承认的所面临的困难，这让我相信该行业的进入壁垒比最初假设的要高；可以说是一个更大的护城河。

Would that justify a higher earnings multiple for established players in the industries, such as PBMs, for example?

这是否意味着像PBM这样的行业中的既有玩家的盈利倍数可能会更高呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, just — though the system may have a moat against intruders, it doesn’t mean that everybody operating within the system has individual moats, for one thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，虽然这个系统可能对入侵者有护城河，但这并不意味着在系统内运作的每个人都有各自的护城河。

Now, I — we are — if this new triumvirate succeeds at all, we are attacking an industry moat. And I’m defining industry very broadly; health care, not just, you know, health care insurers or this or that.

现在，我——我们——如果这个新的三人组成功的话，我们正在攻击一个行业护城河。我将行业的定义非常广泛；医疗保健，不仅仅是医疗保险公司或其他什么。

We’re trying to figure out a better way of doing it and making sure that we’re not sacrificing care. And the goal is to improve care.

我们正在努力寻找更好的方法来做到这一点，并确保我们不会牺牲护理。我们的目标是改善护理。

And like I say, that is a — that’s a lot bigger than a single company’s moat. It’s bigger than a component of the industry’s moat. The moat held by the whole system, since it interacts in so many ways, is actually — that’s the moat that essentially has to be attacked, and that’s a huge moat.

而且，就像我说的，这比单一公司的护城河大得多。它比行业的某个组成部分的护城河还要大。整个系统的护城河，因为它以各种方式相互作用，实际上就是我们必须攻克的护城河，这是一道巨大的护城河。

And like I say, we’ll do our best. But — I hope if we fail, I hope somebody else succeeds.

就像我说的，我们会尽力而为。但是——我希望如果我们失败了，希望其他人能成功。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I suspect that eventually when the Democrats control both houses of Congress and the White House, we will get single-payer medicine. And I don’t think it’s going to be very friendly to many of the current PBMs. (Applause)

查理·芒格：嗯，我怀疑，当民主党最终控制了国会两院和白宫时，我们将会得到单一付款人制度。我认为这对许多现有的PBM公司来说不会很友好。（掌声）

And I won’t miss them. (Laughter)

我不会想念他们的。（笑声）

28. Buffett vs Elon Musk on whether competitive moats are “lame”

巴菲特与埃隆·马斯克关于竞争护城河是否“无聊”的争论

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Kiwi (PH) and actually is directly about the issue of moats.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自基维（PH），实际上是直接关于护城河的问题。

He notes that — “Elon Musk, this week, on his Tesla earnings call, said the following, quote, ‘I think moats are lame. They are, like, nice in a sort of quaint, vestigial way. And if your only defense against invading armies is a moat, you will not last long. What matters is the pace of innovation. That is the fundamental determinant of competitiveness,’ unquote.

他提到——“埃隆·马斯克在本周的特斯拉财报电话会议上表示，‘我认为护城河很无聊。它们在某种古雅的、遗迹般的方式上还不错。如果你对抗入侵的唯一防御就是护城河，你将无法持久。重要的是创新的速度。这是竞争力的基本决定因素。’”

“So, Warren, it seems the world has changed. Business is getting more competitive. Pace of innovation. Technology is impacting everything. Is Elon right?”

“所以，沃伦，似乎世界已经改变。商业竞争越来越激烈。创新的步伐加快。科技正在影响一切。埃隆说得对吗？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me answer that one, Warren.

查理·芒格：让我来回答这个，沃伦。

Elon says a conventional moat is quaint. And that’s true of a puddle of water. And he says that the best moat would be to have a big competitive position. And that is also right. You know, it’s ridiculous. (Laughter)

埃隆说传统的护城河是过时的。这对一滩水来说是正确的。他说最好的护城河是拥有强大的竞争地位。这也是对的。你知道，这很荒谬。（笑声）

Warren does not intend to build an actual moat. (Laughter)

沃伦并不打算建造一个真正的护城河。（笑声）

Even though they’re quaint.

尽管它们很古雅。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

There’s certainly a great number of businesses — this has always been true, but it does seem like it — the pace has accelerated and so on, in recent years. There’s been more moats that have been — become susceptible to invasion — than seemed to be the case, earlier. But there’s always been the attempt to do it.

确实有很多企业——这一直都是事实，但似乎——近年来，速度加快了等等。比以前看起来更容易受到侵袭的护城河增多了。但一直以来都有这样的尝试。

And there — here and there, there are probably places where the moat is as strong as ever. But certainly — you could work at — certainly should be working at improving your own moat and defending your own moat all of the time. And Elon may turn things upside down in some areas.

而在这里和那里，可能有一些地方护城河依然坚固。但可以肯定的是——你应该一直在努力改善自己的护城河并保护自己的护城河。而埃隆可能会在某些领域颠覆一切。

I don’t think he’d want to take us on in candy. But — (Laughter)

我不认为他会想在糖果上和我们竞争。但是——（笑声）

And we’ve got some other businesses that wouldn’t be so easy to —

我们还有一些其他的业务，那就不那么容易了——

You can look at something like Garanimals out there in the other room. And — it won’t be technology that takes away the business in — (laughs) — Garanimals. Maybe something else that catches the young kid’s fantasy or something.

你可以看看在其他房间的Garanimals——技术不会带走——（笑声）——Garanimals的业务。也许是其他东西吸引了年轻孩子的幻想。

But — there are some pretty good moats around. Being the low-cost producer, for example, is a terribly important moat. And something like GEICO — technology has really not brought down the cost that much. I think our position as — there is a couple of companies that have costs as low as ours. But among big companies, we are a low-cost producer, and that is not bad when you’re selling an essential item.

但是——周围有一些相当不错的护城河。例如，成为低成本生产者是一个非常重要的护城河。而像 GEICO 这样的公司——技术并没有大幅降低成本。我认为我们的地位是——有几家公司成本和我们一样低。但在大公司中，我们是低成本生产者，这在销售必需品时并不坏。

29. Not surprised “if we find good uses” for Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s capital

如果我们找到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的资本的良好用途，我并不感到惊讶。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren, Berkshire Energy has benefited greatly from operating under the Berkshire umbrella. By not having to pay out 60 to 70 percent of earnings annually as a dividend, the company was able to amass 9 billion in capital the past five years, and closer to 12 billion in the past ten, money that can be allocated to acquisitions and capital spending, especially on renewables.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，伯克希尔能源在伯克希尔的庇护下受益匪浅。由于不必每年支付 60%到 70%的收益作为股息，公司在过去五年中积累了 90 亿美元的资本，在过去十年中接近 120 亿美元，这些资金可以用于收购和资本支出，特别是在可再生能源方面。

While tax credits for solar energy don’t run out until next year, we’ve already seen a dramatic reduction in Berkshire Energy’s capital commitment to solar projects. And even though spending on wind generation capacity is projected to be elevated this year and next, it does wind down in 2020 as the wind production tax credits are phased out.

虽然太阳能的税收抵免要到明年才会到期，但我们已经看到伯克希尔能源对太阳能项目的资本承诺大幅减少。尽管预计今年和明年风能发电能力的支出将保持在高位，但随着风能生产税收抵免的逐步取消，这一支出将在 2020 年减少。

Absent a major commitment to additional capital projects, it looks like Berkshire Energy’s expenditures in 2021 will be its lowest since 2012, leaving the firm with more cash on hand than it has had in some time.

在没有重大资本项目的承诺下，伯克希尔能源在 2021 年的支出看起来将是自 2012 年以来的最低水平，这使得该公司手头的现金比一段时间以来都要多。

Do you think it is likely at that point that Berkshire Energy starts funneling some of that cash up to the parent company? Or will it be earmarked for debt reduction, or just be left on the balance sheet as dry powder for acquisitions?

你认为在那时伯克希尔能源会开始将一些现金转移到母公司吗？还是会用于减少债务，或者仅仅留在资产负债表上作为收购的备用资金？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — you’re right about when tax credits phase out and all of that. Although, as you know, they’ve extended that legislation in the past. Who knows exactly what the government’s position will be on incentivizing various forms of alternative energy?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你说得对，关于税收抵免何时逐步取消等等。尽管你知道，他们过去曾延长过那项立法。谁知道政府在激励各种形式的替代能源方面的立场究竟会是什么呢？

But my guess is — I mean, if you take the logical expenditures that may be required in all aspects of the public — like regeneration and the utility business generally — I think there’ll be a lot of money spent.

但我猜——我的意思是，如果你考虑到公共领域可能需要的合理支出——比如再生和公用事业业务一般——我认为会花费很多钱。

And the question is whether we can spend it and get a reasonable return on it. There again, we’ll do what’s logical.

问题是我们是否可以花费它并获得合理的回报。在这里，我们将做出合乎逻辑的决定。

There are three shareholders, basically, of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Berkshire Hathaway itself owns 90 percent of it. And Greg Abel and his family, perhaps, and Walter Scott and, again, family members — own the other 10 percent. And we all have an interest in employing as much capital as we can at good rates.

伯克希尔能源的三个主要股东基本上是：伯克希尔本身拥有90%的股份。格雷格·阿贝尔及其家族，可能还有沃尔特·斯科特及其家族，拥有另外10%的股份。我们都希望尽可能地以良好的回报使用资本。

And we’ll know when it can be done and when it can’t be done. And we’ll do — there’s no tax consequences to Berkshire at all. So — but the three partners will figure out which makes the most sense.

我们会知道什么时候可以做到，什么时候做不到。我们会做出最合适的选择。对伯克希尔没有税收后果。因此——但三个合伙人将决定哪种方式最有意义。

But when you think of what might be done to improve the grid in the U.S. and the fact that we do have the capital, I wouldn’t be surprised if we find good uses for capital in Berkshire Hathaway Energy for a long time in the future.

但是当你考虑到可以采取什么措施来改善美国的电网，以及我们确实拥有资本这一事实时，我不会感到惊讶，如果我们在未来很长一段时间内在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源找到资本的良好用途。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I think there’ll be huge opportunities in Berkshire Energy as far ahead as you can see to deploy capital very intelligently. So I think the chances of a big dividend is approximately zero.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为，在伯克希尔能源方面，将会有巨大的机会来非常聪明地部署资本。所以我认为大幅分红的可能性接近于零。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve not only got the money to an extent that virtually no utility company does — we’ve also got the talent, too. I mean, we’ve got a very, very talented organization there.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不仅拥有几乎没有公用事业公司能比拟的资金，我们还有人才。我是说，我们那里有一个非常非常有才华的团队。

So it’s a big field and we’ve got shareholders that are capitalists. And we’ve got managers that are terrific. And you would think we’d find something intelligent to do over time in the field.

所以这是一个大领域，我们有资本家的股东。我们有出色的管理者。你会认为我们会随着时间的推移在这个领域找到一些聪明的事情去做。

So far, we have. I mean, we’ve owned it now for close to 20 years. And we’ve deployed a lot of capital and so far, so good. I mean, it’s —

到目前为止，我们已经拥有它将近 20 年了。我们投入了大量资金，到目前为止，一切都很好。我的意思是——

If you look at the improvements that can be made in our utility system in the United States, you’re talking hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions. So — you know, where else but Berkshire would you look for that kind of money? (Laughs)

如果你看看我们在美国的公用事业系统可以做出的改进，你在谈论数百亿，甚至数万亿的美元。因此——你知道，还能去哪里寻找那样的资金呢？（笑声）

30. “We do expect that normalized earning power to increase over time”

“我们确实预计正常化的盈利能力会随着时间的推移而增加。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，9 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Richard Sercer (PH) from Tucson, Arizona.

观众成员：我来自亚利桑那州图森的理查德·塞尔瑟（PH）。

“At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power.” That was in your last letter. What is our normalized per-share earning power, as you estimate it?

“在伯克希尔，最重要的是我们每股正常盈利能力的增长。”这是你在上封信中提到的。你估计我们的每股正常盈利能力是多少？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that what you saw in the first quarter, under these tax rates, would probably be a reasonable guess. You know, obviously, it depends on the economy in any given year. I would say that would — is a reasonable estimate.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说，在这些税率下，你在第一季度看到的情况可能是一个合理的猜测。显然，这取决于任何给定年份的经济状况。我会说这是一个合理的估计。

But we have firepower we haven’t used. And we’ll have more firepower as we go along. So we do expect that normalized earning power to increase over time. And if it doesn’t, you know, one way or another, we’re failing you because we’re retaining those earnings.

但我们还有未使用的火力。随着时间的推移，我们将拥有更多的火力。因此，我们确实预计正常的盈利能力会随着时间的推移而增加。如果没有，你知道，无论如何，我们都在辜负你，因为我们在保留这些收益。

So — I don’t see anything abnormal in our earnings, figured now at a 21 percent federal rate. But as I look at the 5 1/4 billion in the first quarter — seasonally, insurance is better in the first quarter — but seasonally, most of our businesses, the first quarter is not the strongest quarter for us. I don’t see anything abnormal with it.

所以——我在我们的收益中没有看到任何异常，目前的联邦税率为 21%。但是当我看到第一季度的 52.5 亿美元时——季节性地，第一季度的保险表现更好——但从季节性来看，我们大多数业务的第一季度并不是最强的季度。我没有看到任何异常。

And then I think you can expect, you should expect, we expect, substantial capital gains over time in addition to what comes from the operating businesses.

然后我认为你可以期待，你应该期待，我们期待，随着时间的推移，除了来自运营业务的收益外，还会有可观的资本收益。

So how much you figure in for that — I would say that the retained earnings beyond dividends of our 770 billion of equities — in other words, how much they’re keeping from us, but that our share of the earnings, which can be used by them, whether it’s Apple or American Express or Coca-Cola or Wells Fargo or whatever, our share, you know, is in many billions of dollars annually. And one way or another, we think that those dollars will benefit us as much as if they had been paid out.

那么你考虑到的金额是多少——我会说，我们7700亿美元的股票的保留收益——换句话说，他们从我们这里保留的金额，但我们的份额，诸如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐或富国银行等，我们的份额，每年都在数十亿美元。无论如何，我们认为这些美元将使我们受益，就像它们被支付出来一样。

Now, in certain cases, they won’t. But in certain cases, they’ll excel the amount, in terms of market value created.

现在，在某些情况下，它们不会。但在某些情况下，它们在创造的市场价值方面会超出这个金额。

So there’s many billions of dollars we are not showing in our earnings that is being retained by our investees. And one way or another, I think we’ll get value received out of those.

因此，有许多数十亿美元我们没有在我们的收益中反映出来，而这些是我们的投资公司保留的。无论如何，我认为我们会从中获得价值。

So you can take 20 or 21 billion under present tax rates, present economic conditions, and then we should get something from that and we should get more when we get 100 billion of cash invested. And we should get more as we retain the earnings. So we hope it adds up to a bigger number as we go along.

所以在目前的税率和经济条件下，你可以获得 200 亿或 210 亿美元，然后我们应该从中获得一些收益，当我们投资 1000 亿美元现金时，我们应该获得更多。随着我们保留收益，我们应该获得更多。因此，我们希望随着时间的推移，这些数字能够累加成一个更大的数字。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think our shareholders are going to see another increase in net worth of $65 billion in a single year. They may have to wait a while for another. But I don’t think that — I think eventually there — another will come, and then another. Just be patient. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我们的股东在一年内不会再看到 650 亿美元的净资产增长。他们可能需要等一段时间才能再看到一次。但我认为——我认为最终会有另一次增长，然后再来一次。耐心点。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t regard the present situation as, you know, as disadvantageous, except we’d like to get more money out. But we like the businesses we have. We like the businesses that we own part of. We are not reflecting — in the way we look at earnings — the dividends we get from those partially-owned companies falls far short of what they’re going to contribute, in our view, to Berkshire’s overall earnings over time. We wouldn’t own those stocks otherwise. So —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们并不认为目前的情况是，不利的，除了我们希望能提取更多资金。但我们喜欢我们拥有的企业。我们喜欢我们拥有部分股份的企业。我们并没有反映--在我们看待收益的方式上--我们从这些部分持有的公司获得的股息远远低于它们对伯克希尔整体收益的贡献，在我们看来，随着时间的推移。否则，我们不会持有这些股票。所以

CHARLIE MUNGER: And you also like the Apple and airline stocks you’ve recently purchased better than the cash you parted with.

查理·芒格：你最近购买的苹果和航空公司股票比你放弃的现金更让你喜欢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely. Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And that’s quite a lot.

查理·芒格：这可真不少。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah, yeah. OK. We won’t pursue that further. Carol? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的，是的。好的。我们不再追究这个了。卡罗尔？（笑声）

31. No “unusual profits involved in being a real estate agent”

作为房地产经纪人没有“异常利润”

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Daniel Kane (PH) of Atlanta.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自亚特兰大的丹尼尔·凯恩（PH）。

“Your annual letter this year pointed out that Berkshire has become a leader in real estate brokerage in the United States. Congratulations. That is a significant feat in less than 20 years.

“您今年的年度信函指出，伯克希尔已成为美国房地产经纪行业的领导者。恭喜。这在不到 20 年的时间里是一个重要的成就。”

“But let me mention a sticky point. If fees charged by stock market active managers are a drag on investor performance, I would argue that real estate commissions are no different, and perhaps more detrimental, especially when one considers the lifetime effects of large, forgone, upfront cash flows and the power of compounding interest. I would be pleased to hear your rejoinder on the points I’ve raised.”

“但让我提到一个棘手的问题。如果股票市场的主动管理者收取的费用对投资者的表现造成拖累，那么我认为房地产佣金也没有不同，甚至可能更具破坏性，尤其是考虑到大量被放弃的前期现金流和复利的终生效应。我很乐意听听你对我提出的观点的回应。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the purchase of a home is the largest financial transaction, for a significant percentage of the population, that they make. And — people — a lot of people need a lot of attention. And you can show a lot of houses before you sell one.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，购买房屋是大多数人进行的最大金融交易。而且——人们——很多人需要很多关注。在你卖出一套房子之前，你可能会展示很多房子。

I would say this. If you look at our close to 50,000 agents now, I think they make a good living — or a decent living. But I would say that that people who manage money make a whole lot more money with perhaps less contribution to the welfare of the person that they are dealing with.

我会说，如果你看看我们现在接近50,000名经纪人，我认为他们赚得很好——或者说赚得体面。但我会说，管理资金的人赚的钱多得多，也许对他们所接触的人的福利贡献更少。

So I don’t think that there are unusual profits involved in being a real estate agent. I don’t think there are unusual profits involved in the ownership. We like it because it’s fundamentally a good business.

所以，我不认为做房地产经纪人有异常的利润。我不认为拥有房地产会有异常的利润。我们喜欢它，因为它从根本上是一个好生意。

But here we are, doing 3 percent of all the real estate transactions in the United States, and we’re making, maybe, $200 million a year — which — well, we won’t get into what the comparative efforts are in Wall Street to earn $200 million. But —

但我们在这里，完成美国所有房地产交易的 3%，每年赚大约 2 亿美元——这——好吧，我们就不讨论华尔街为了赚取 2 亿美元所付出的相对努力了。不过——

I think I have to tell them about Roy Tolles a little bit on this. Roy Tolles, for example — Charlie’s partner — many, many, many years ago, decided he was going to want to buy a house in San Marino. He’s going to have a number of kids.

我认为我必须稍微谈谈罗伊·托尔斯（Roy Tolles）这个例子。比如说，查理的合伙人——很多年前，决定他要在圣马力诺买一套房子。他将有几个孩子。

So he sent his wonderful wife, Martha, out. And for six months, he had her look at houses in San Marino. And this was many years ago. And if they were priced at 150,000, she would offer (inaudible), or offer 75,000. And of course, the real estate agents were going crazy because they’re never going to get something listed at 150 sold at 75.

所以他让他那位了不起的妻子玛莎出去。六个月内，她看了很多房子。如果房子的标价是15万美元，她会出（不清楚的数字），或者出7.5万美元。当然，房地产经纪人们都疯了，因为他们永远不会把150000美元的房子以75000美元的价格卖掉。

And then finally, when she found one that they both really liked, he had her offer something like 120 and the real estate was so happy to get a bid that was in the general area — (laughs) — of the offering price that he would work very hard on the seller to take that bid. Because he knew what — (laughs) — he did not want six more months of Roy bidding at the lower prices. So you don’t sell them on the first trip.

然后最后，当她找到他们都真的喜欢的房子时，他让她出120000美元的价格，房地产经纪人非常高兴能够收到一个接近要价的报价——（笑声）——他们会非常努力地说服卖家接受这个报价。因为他知道——（笑声）——他不想再经历六个月的低价竞标。因此，你不能在第一次出价时就卖掉它。

Incidentally, I had Roy buy a house for me, sight unseen, because this was a guy that — (laughs) — knew human nature.

顺便说一下，我让罗伊为我买了一栋房子，没看过，因为这个家伙——（笑）——懂人性。

You don’t get rich — real estate agency — you know, the people earn their money, and they earn it in a perfectly respectable and honorable manner in terms of what they get paid. And as in every single industry there is, you know, there can be excesses or mistakes or that sort of thing.

你不会通过房地产中介致富，你知道，人们赚他们的钱，他们以一种完全体面和光荣的方式获得报酬。就像每个行业一样，可能会有过度或错误之类的事情。

But we will continue to buy more brokers. In fact, we’ll probably have another couple to announce before long.

但我们将继续收购更多的经纪人。实际上，我们可能很快会再宣布几家。

And we will feel that if we get to where we’re doing 10 percent of the real estate brokerage business in the country and we’re making 6- or $700 million a year, pretax, we will not think that’s a crazy amount of money to make for enabling 10 percent of 5 million people to change their homes every year in the United States.

我们会觉得，如果我们做到美国房地产经纪业务的10%，每年赚取6亿到7亿美元的税前利润，我们不会认为这是一个疯狂的金额，来帮助10%的人每年更换他们的房子。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the commissions in real estate may get unreasonable if you’re talking about $20 million houses. It seems a little ridiculous to pay a 5 percent commission on a $20 million transaction.

查理·芒格：嗯，如果你谈论的是 2000 万美元的房子，房地产的佣金可能会变得不合理。在 2000 万美元的交易中支付 5%的佣金似乎有点荒谬。

But do any of us really care if the kind of people who pay $20 million for a house have a slightly higher commission? (Laughter)

但我们当中有谁真的在乎那些花 2000 万美元买房的人是否有稍高的佣金呢？（笑声）

The ordinary commission is pretty well-earned.

普通的佣金是相当合理的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have a number of brokerage firms. So the highest has their average transaction — in one section of the country — would be close to $600,000 a unit. But the — in terms of the sales price of the house. But the — in most of our real estate operations — the average price is more like $250,000 or something in that area. And you can show a lot of houses to make one $250,000 sale.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们有一些经纪公司。所以，最高的平均交易——在某个地区——会接近60万美元。但在我们大多数房地产操作中——房子的平均价格更像是25万美元左右。你可以展示很多房子才能成交一套25万美元的房子。

And of course, you split — the listing company and the selling company are usually two different companies. So it’s — it does not strike me as excessive.

当然，上市公司和销售公司通常是两个不同的公司。所以——这在我看来并不算过分。

And incidentally, it doesn’t strike the people in the industry that way either. It has not been particularly susceptible to online-type substitution or something of the sort. The real estate agent earns their commission in most cases.

顺便提一下，行业内的人们也并不这样认为。它并没有特别容易受到在线替代或类似事物的影响。在大多数情况下，房地产经纪人会赚取他们的佣金。

But Charlie’s had more experience with $20 million houses. So he will comment on that area. (Laughter)

但查理在 2000 万美元的房子方面有更多的经验。所以他会对此领域发表评论。（笑声）

32. Some Kraft Heinz products “enjoy fairly healthy” growth

一些卡夫亨氏产品“享有相当健康”的增长

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll have one more question before we break. Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们在休息前再来一个问题。乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Given the changes in consumer tastes in the food business, and Kraft Heinz’s already high margin structure, do you think the brands they own today, plus new product introductions, can together maintain or increase the current level of profits over the next ten years without the benefit of acquisitions? Is there anything in their portfolio besides ketchup that is enjoying growing demand?

乔纳森·布兰特：鉴于食品行业消费者口味的变化，以及卡夫亨氏已经很高的利润结构，你认为他们今天拥有的品牌，加上新产品的推出，能否在未来十年内维持或增加目前的利润水平，而不依赖于收购？在他们的产品组合中，除了番茄酱之外，还有哪些产品正在享受增长的需求？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in effect, you’re asking me whether Kraft Heinz is a good buy. And we don’t — (laughs) — we don’t want to give information on marketable securities in that manner.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，你是在问我卡夫亨氏是否值得购买。我们不——（笑）——我们不想以那种方式提供关于可交易证券的信息。

But — yeah, there are a number of items besides ketchup that enjoy growing demand. And some vary quite a bit by geography. There’s enormous differences in the penetration of various products in the portfolio.

但是——是的，除了番茄酱，还有许多其他产品的需求正在增长。而且这些产品在不同地区的需求差异很大。产品组合中各种产品的渗透率差异巨大。

Consumer packaged goods are still a terrific business in terms of return on invested assets. And you know — but the population, worldwide, grows fairly smally and at — a fairly minor rate. And — people are going to eat about the same amount. And there is some more willingness to experiment, you know, or go for organic products of the sort.

消费品在投资资产回报方面仍然是一个很好的行业。你知道，全球人口增长相对缓慢，增长率也相当低。而且，人们的饮食量大致保持不变。人们对尝试新事物的意愿有所增加，比如选择有机产品。

It’s a very good business. And there are new products coming out constantly. It’s not one where you’re going to get terrific organic growth, but it never has been. And — you know, I like the business and we own 26 or so percent of it.

这是一项非常好的业务。而且不断有新产品推出。这不是一个会获得巨大有机增长的业务，但它从来就不是。我喜欢这项业务，我们拥有大约 26%的股份。

But there are a number of items within Kraft Heinz that enjoy pretty — fairly — healthy growth. And I think you’d find that at most food companies. And I think you’d find very good returns on invested — on tangible net assets — at those businesses.

但在卡夫亨氏内部，有许多产品享有相当健康的增长。我认为你会发现这在大多数食品公司中都是如此。而且我认为你会发现这些业务在投资——在有形净资产上的回报非常好。

33. Thanks to meeting organizer Melissa Shapiro

感谢会议组织者梅丽莎·夏皮罗。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Last year, for several years, we had a wonderful woman who carried this meeting off without a hitch, Carrie Sova. And she just had her third child here about a few weeks ago, and decided that — she decided right after the last meeting that that was going to be her full-time occupation.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。去年，几年来，我们有一位出色的女士，凯莉·索瓦，她顺利地主持了这次会议。她大约在几周前刚刚生下了第三个孩子，并决定——她在上次会议后就决定，这将是她的全职工作。

And this year, again, we’ve had everything carried off without me having to do anything, without a hitch.

而今年，我们又一次在我没有做任何事情的情况下，一切都顺利进行。

And I would just like to have Melissa Shapiro stand up. And we’ll get a spotlight on her. (Applause)

我想请梅丽莎·夏皮罗站起来。我们会给她一个聚光灯。（掌声）

I can’t believe it, how she does it. It’s just been — it’s remarkable. I mean, we — I just tell her the date and then that’s all the help I am — (laughs) — and it goes on from there. So, Melissa, thank you.

我真不敢相信，她是怎么做到的。这真是——太了不起了。我的意思是，我们——我只是告诉她日期，然后我就帮不上什么忙了——（笑）——然后事情就从那里开始了。所以，梅丽莎，谢谢你。

OK, I think we next go to station ten, and we will continue until 3:30. Then we’ll take a 15-minute break, and at 3:45 we’ll convene the actual annual meeting.

好的，我想我们接下来去第十站，我们将继续到 3:30。然后我们会休息 15 分钟，3:45 时我们将召开实际的年度会议。

34. Why Berkshire won’t be buying Microsoft stock

为什么伯克希尔不会购买微软股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 10?

沃伦·巴菲特：10 号站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Theresa Lukasinski (PH). I’m from Omaha, Nebraska. And I have a question about Microsoft.

观众成员：嗨，我是特蕾莎·卢卡辛斯基（音）。我来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。我有一个关于微软的问题。

You have gotten into the tech world with buying Apple. You have Mr. [Bill] Gates there. I’m just wondering why you’ve never bought Microsoft.

你已经通过购买苹果进入了科技界。你那里有比尔·盖茨。我只是想知道你为什么从来没有购买过微软。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — (laughter) — in the earlier years, it’s very clear it’s — the answer’s stupidity. But the — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——（笑声）——在早期，很明显——答案是愚蠢。但是——（笑声）

Since Bill has — particularly since Bill has joined the board, but even earlier than that because of our friendship, it would be — it just would be a mistake for Berkshire to buy Microsoft.

但自从比尔——特别是比尔加入董事会以来，即使在那之前，由于我们的友谊，伯克希尔购买微软股票就会是一个错误。

Because if something happened a week later, a month later, in terms of them having better earnings than expected, or making an acquisition — anything — both Bill and I would — incorrectly, but — would be a target of suggestions and accusations, perhaps even, that somehow he had told me something or vice versa.

因为如果一周后、一个月后，他们的收益比预期更好，或者进行了一项收购——任何事情——比尔和我都会——虽然不正确——但会成为建议和指责的目标，甚至可能会有人说他告诉了我什么，或者反之亦然。

I stay away from — I try to stay away from a few things just totally because the inference would be drawn that we might have talked — that I might have talked to somebody about something.

我尽量远离一些事情，因为人们可能会推断出我们可能谈过——我可能和某人谈过某事。

So I’ve told the fellows, Ted [Weschler] and Todd [Combs] for example, that there are just a few things that are off the list because there would be a lot of people who wouldn’t believe us if something good immediately happened after we bought it.

所以我告诉了那些家伙，比如 Ted [Weschler] 和 Todd [Combs]，有一些事情是排除在外的，因为如果我们买下它后立即发生了好事，会有很多人不相信我们。

And of course, we — to buy a lot of stock, it can take six months to buy it or something of the sort. We just don’t need it.

当然，我们——购买大量股票可能需要六个月或类似的时间。我们根本不需要它。

But both that and my stupidity have cost us a lot of money. (Laughs)

但这件事和我的愚蠢让我们花了很多钱。（笑）

It’s a very — it’s a good question, and I think the answer makes sense.

这是一个很好的问题，我认为答案是合理的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s part of theology that a late conversion is better than never — (laughter) — and you’ve greatly improved yourself. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，迟来的转变总比没有好——（笑）——而且你已经大大改进了自己。（笑）

35. “Through it all … America really, really moves ahead”

“经历这一切……美国真的、真的向前迈进”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。（笑）

BECKY QUICK: All right, this question comes from Dave Shane (PH). He says, “Warren, you are a big believer in the U.S. political system, the financial system, and in every American.

贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自戴夫·香农（PH）。他说：“沃伦，你非常相信美国的政治体系、金融体系以及每一个美国人。”

“You’ve said that regardless of who is president, the economy and the U.S. consumer will continue to prosper over the long run. All that said, do you believe that people in this country are more divided today than 50 years ago?

“你曾说过，无论谁是总统，经济和美国消费者在长期内都会继续繁荣。话虽如此，你认为这个国家的人们今天比 50 年前更加分裂吗？”

“Or is it just social media, and media in general, that blows this divide out of proportion? And if you do believe the divide has grown, what words of wisdom do you have to possibly help remedy it?”

“还是说只是社交媒体，以及媒体整体上，把这个分歧夸大了？如果你确实相信这个分歧在加大，你有什么智慧之言可以帮助缓解它？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say this. Multiple times in my life, people have felt the country was more divided than ever.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想说的是。在我一生中，多次有人觉得这个国家比以往任何时候都更加分裂。

And I’ve gone through periods where people I knew and admired thought that, because the other party was in power, that there never would be another election. That the Constitution would —

我经历过一些时期，那时我认识和钦佩的人认为，由于另一方掌权，永远不会再有选举。宪法将会——

I’ve heard everything. Now, the interesting thing is this paper from 1942. Since then, there have been 14 American presidents, just since my young venture into the stock market at 11, I’ve lived under 14 of the 44 presidents the United States has had.

我听到了所有的事情。现在，有趣的是这篇 1942 年的论文。从那时起，美国经历了 14 位总统，自从我 11 岁开始涉足股市以来，我生活在美国 44 位总统中的 14 位之下。

Now, they call Trump 45, but they count Grover Cleveland twice, so there’s really only been 44 presidents of the United States. And 14 of the 44 have been during this period when that $10,000 became 51 million.

他们称特朗普为第45任总统，但他们计算了两次的格罗弗·克利夫兰，所以实际上美国只经历了44位总统。而在这个时期，10,000美元变成了5100万。

Seven have been Republicans, seven have been Democrats. One has been assassinated, one has resigned under pressure.

七位曾是共和党人，七位曾是民主党人。一位被刺杀，一位在压力下辞职。

It works, you know. It — if you’d told me at the start, you know, that you’d have a Cuban Missile Crisis, and you’ve have nuclear weapons, and you’d have a panic in 200[8] — a financial panic — and you’d have many recessions, and you’d have war in the streets in the late ’60s from a divided country, you’d say, “Why the hell are you buying stocks?”

它是有效的，你知道。如果你在一开始就告诉我，你会经历古巴导弹危机，你会拥有核武器，你会在 2008 年经历金融恐慌，你会经历多次衰退，你会在 60 年代末因为一个分裂的国家而在街头发生战争，你会说：“你为什么要买股票？”

And through it all, you know, America — in fits and starts — but America really, really moves ahead.

而在这一切中，你知道，美国——时起时落——但美国真的、真的在向前发展。

And we are always — we survived the Civil War. I mean, it — I hate to think of having to do it that way. But this country, in only less than three of my lifetimes —

我们总是——我们经历了内战。我是说，我不想这样想。但这个国家，在我生命的不到三倍的时间里——

If you go back three of my lifetimes, you go back 263 years, I guess, and Thomas Jefferson is 12 years old. And that’s just three — and there was nothing here.

如果你回到我三生三世之前，你大约要回到 263 年前，那时托马斯·杰斐逊 12 岁。而这仅仅是三世——这里什么都没有。

You know, you’ve flown in from all over to Omaha today, and you flew over a country with more than 75 million owner-occupied homes, and 260 million vehicles, and great universities, and medical systems, and everything. And it’s all a net gain in less than three of my lifetimes.

你知道，今天你们从各地飞到奥马哈，飞越了一个拥有超过 7500 万套自有住房、2.6 亿辆汽车、优秀大学和医疗系统的国家，所有这一切在我三生三世的时间里都是净收益。

So — and we’ve had these events since I started buying my first stock. This country really, really works. And it always will have lots of disagreements, and after every election you’ll have people feeling the world is coming to an end and, you know, “How could this happen?”

所以——自从我开始购买我的第一只股票以来，我们经历了这些事件。这个国家真的、真的运作得很好。它总是会有很多分歧，每次选举后，人们都会觉得世界快要结束了，您知道的，“怎么会发生这种事？”

And I remember my future father-in-law in 1952, he wanted to have a talk with me before his daughter and I got married. So kind of reluctantly I sat down with him, and he said, “Warren,” he said, “there’s just one thing I want to tell you.” He said, “You’re going to fail.”

我记得1952年我未来的岳父，他想和我谈一谈，然后和他的女儿结婚。于是，我有点不情愿地坐下来，他说：“沃伦，”他说，“我只想告诉你一件事。”他说，“你会失败。”

He said — (laughter) — you know, “The Democrats are going to get in,” you know, “they’re going to take over the country. And you’re going to fail, but don’t feel responsible for it because it’s not your fault.”

他说——（笑）——你知道，“民主党会掌权，”你知道，“他们会接管这个国家。你会失败，但不要为此感到责任，因为这不是你的错。”

And he wanted to absolve me from this feeling that, while his daughter was starving to death, it was my fault. And — (laughter) — I kept buying stocks and doing a little bit better all the time. And, but —

他想让我摆脱这种感觉：在他的女儿饿死的时候，这是我的错。而——（笑声）——我一直在买股票，情况也在逐渐好转。但是——

And if the Republicans were in, it was OK, and it was because of them that I was doing well. And if they were out, forget it, it was all going to disappear and stuff.

如果共和党在位，那就没问题，正是因为他们我才过得不错。如果他们下台，那就算了，一切都要消失之类的。

I mean, I’ve seen a lot of American public opinion over the years. I’ve seen a lot of media commentary. I’ve seen the headlines. And when you get all through with it, this country has six times the per capita GDP growth — the GDP per capita — that it had when I was born.

我的意思是，多年来我见过很多美国公众舆论。我见过很多媒体评论。我见过那些头条新闻。总的来说，这个国家的人均 GDP 增长是我出生时的六倍。

One person’s lifetime, six-for-one change. Everybody in this room, essentially, is living better in multiple ways, than John D. Rockefeller Sr. was, who was the richest person, you know, in the world at that — during my early years. And we’re all living better than he could live.

一个人的一生，六倍的变化。你们房间里的每个人基本上都比约翰·D·洛克菲勒（Sr.）过得更好，他是我早年时世界上最富有的人。而我们都过得比他更好。

So this is a remarkable, remarkable country, and we found something — (applause) — very special.

所以这是一个非凡的、非凡的国家，我们发现了一些——（掌声）——非常特别的东西。

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible)

查理·芒格：（听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would love to be a baby being born in the United States today. Charlie. OK, Charlie, you give the other side of this.

沃伦·巴菲特：我很想成为今天在美国出生的婴儿。查理。好的，查理，你来讲讲另一面。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — (laughter) — there’s a tendency to think that our present politicians are much worse than any we had in the past. But we tend to forget how awful our politicians were in the past. I can — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧——（笑）——人们倾向于认为我们现在的政治家比过去的任何一个都要糟糕。但我们往往忘记了过去的政治家是多么糟糕。我可以——（笑）

I can remember a prominent senator [Roman Hruska] arguing with an absolute earnestness that mediocre people ought to have more representation on the United States Supreme Court.

我记得一位杰出的参议员[罗曼·赫鲁斯卡]非常认真地辩称，平庸的人应该在美国最高法院上有更多的代表权。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He came from Nebraska, incidentally.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他顺便说一下，来自内布拉斯加州。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He did. He came from Nebraska. (Laughter) So we’re not quite as bad as that yet.

查理·芒格：他是的。他来自内布拉斯加州。（笑声）所以我们还没有那么糟糕。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He succeeded my dad in the House of Representatives.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他接替我父亲在众议院的职位。

36. “We’ll have a somewhat larger operation at Gen Re”

“我们将在 Gen Re 进行一个稍大的操作。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gary.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，盖瑞。

GARY RANSOM: Yes, on reinsurance. I know we’ve talked in the past about reinsurance not really being as attractive an industry in, say, the next ten years as the last ten. But I don’t think we’ve talked specifically about General Re.

加里·兰索姆：是的，关于再保险。我知道我们过去谈过再保险在未来十年可能没有过去十年那么有吸引力的行业。但我认为我们还没有具体谈到通用再保险。

And I looked this morning at the 10-Q and I see General Re has grown nicely. I know there’s been some changes in the management.

今天早上我查看了 10-Q，发现 General Re 发展得很好。我知道管理层有一些变动。

And I wondered if you could just give us a sense of what’s going on at the company to bring about some of that growth and what looks like improvement.

我想知道您能否给我们一些关于公司正在进行的事情的感觉，以促进这种增长和看起来的改善。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the reinsurance business — I don’t think I’d say that it’s tougher than it was ten years ago. But you go to 40 or 50 years ago, it was not brutally competitive, I’ll put it that way.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，再保险业务——我不认为它比十年前更艰难。但如果你回到四五十年前，那时候竞争并没有那么激烈，我可以这么说。

And at Gen Re — Tad Montross, who did a fantastic job for us at Gen Re, retired. And we have under Ajit [Jain] — and then Kara [Raiguel] in addition — but under Ajit, the focus of the place has changed somewhat.

在 Gen Re，Tad Montross 为我们做了出色的工作，现在退休了。在 Ajit [Jain]的领导下——还有 Kara [Raiguel]的支持——但在 Ajit 的领导下，这里的重点有所变化。

And it probably is more growth oriented than before. But I can assure you that anything associated with Ajit is — also has underwriting discipline attached to it.

而且它可能比以前更注重增长。但我可以向你保证，任何与 Ajit 相关的事情——也都附带有承保纪律。

But, I — there has, as you’ve correctly noticed, there’s been some pick-up. And I think you actually will see the property-casualty reinsurance business grow a fair amount.

但是，我——正如你正确注意到的，确实有一些好转。我认为你实际上会看到财产意外再保险业务增长相当可观。

And the life business — reinsurance business — and this is really the only place we do much in life — but that has grown very substantially ever since we took it over, particularly internationally. And so that part, I like.

生命业务——再保险业务——这是我们唯一做得比较多的生命业务——自从我们接手以来，尤其是在国际市场上，这部分增长非常显著。因此，我喜欢这一点。

And we will have a somewhat — I think we’ll have a somewhat larger operation at Gen Re.

我们在 Gen Re 的业务规模会稍微大一些。

But we have various methods, as you know, of being in reinsurance. We do these huge bulk deals. That’s why our net revenues are down this year. We did that $10 billion deal with AIG, which was the biggest deal in history, last year. And we don’t have a repeat of it this year.

但正如你所知，我们有多种再保险的方法。我们进行这些巨额的批量交易。这就是我们今年净收入下降的原因。去年我们与 AIG 达成了 100 亿美元的交易，这是历史上最大的交易。今年我们没有重复这样的交易。

We will be in the reinsurance business five years from now, 10 years from now, 20 years from now, and 50 years from now, in my view. And we will have some unusual advantages that stem both from our capital position, our attitude toward the business, and the talent that we have.

在我看来，五年后、十年后、二十年后和五十年后，我们将进入再保险业务。我们将拥有一些独特的优势，这些优势源于我们的资本状况、对业务的态度以及我们拥有的人才。

We have an — we have a way better than average insurance business, generally. We have some real gems that nobody really knows much about.

我们有一个——我们有一个比平均水平好得多的保险业务，通常来说。我们有一些真正的宝藏，没人真正了解。

And we have a very, very good reinsurance business that will be subject to more ups and downs than something like GEICO will be, which just moves ahead every year. But it will be an important part of Berkshire.

我们有一个非常好的再保险业务，它会比像GEICO这样的业务经历更多的起伏，GEICO每年都会稳步发展。但这将是Berkshire的重要组成部分。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I would argue the part that any idiot financier can easily get into has gotten way tougher. And why wouldn’t it?

查理·芒格：是的。我会争辩说，任何傻瓜金融家都能轻松进入的那部分已经变得更加困难了。为什么不呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is my substitute for my father-in-law that was — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理是我岳父的替代品——（笑声）

37. “I can’t reduce that to a formula for you”

“我无法为你把这个简化成一个公式。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，11 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey, Warren. Charlie. Thank you again for having us and having me. I just can’t thank you guys enough and appreciate you guys enough for the body of work that you guys have delivered to us and the exemplar example that you guys have set with your principles. Thank you. (Applause)

观众成员：嘿，沃伦。查理。再次感谢你们接待我们和我。我真的无法表达对你们的感激之情，感谢你们为我们所提供的工作成果，以及你们以原则树立的榜样。谢谢。（掌声）

Charlie, you’ve mentioned that, if given the chance — or the same chance with a smaller capital base — you would still look for mispriced stock opportunities.

查理，你提到过，如果有机会——或者在较小的资本基础上有同样的机会——你仍然会寻找被错误定价的股票机会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course.

查理·芒格：当然。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And that would be determined through, obviously, what we’ve called the intrinsic value of the organization — or the company in question — an aggregate of the discounted future cash flows.

观众成员：这显然将通过我们所称的组织的内在价值——或相关公司的内在价值——即未来现金流的折现总和来确定。

Would you work the arithmetic using a fictional data set to illustrate the mathematical principia to determine an intrinsic value?

你会使用虚构的数据集进行算术运算，以数学公式来确定内在价值吗？

And I hope you include the comprehensive mental model of the key metrics considered, and quantitative assessments of the management, and any assumptions of its industry to determine the durability of its earning power.

希望你能包括关键指标的全面思维模型，以及管理层的定量评估，和行业假设来确定其盈利能力的持久性。

And, Warren, same to that effect. Would you also demonstrate or illustrate an arithmetic problem set using, with a significant capital base, and provide the object lessons on how those have changed from a small to a large capital base?

Warren，你也是如此。你会使用显著的资本基础来演示或说明一个算术问题集，并提供关于这些问题如何从小资本基础转变为大资本基础的实例吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I can’t give you a formulaic approach because I don’t use one. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我不能给你一个公式化的方法，因为我不使用这种方法。（笑声）

And I just mix all — (laughter) — I just mix all the factors and if the gap between value and price is not attractive, I go on to something else.

我只是把所有因素混合在一起——（笑）——如果价值和价格之间的差距不具吸引力，我就会去做其他事情。

And sometimes it’s just quantitative. For instance, when Costco was selling at about 12 or 13 times earnings, I thought that was a ridiculously low value, just because the competitive strength of the business was so great and it was so likely to keep doing better and better.

有时候这只是定量的。例如，当好市多的市盈率在 12 或 13 倍左右时，我认为这个价值实在是低得离谱，因为这家公司的竞争力非常强，继续做得越来越好是非常可能的。

Well, I can’t reduce that to a formula for you. I liked the cheap real estate. I liked the competitive position. I liked the way the personnel system worked. I liked everything about it.

好吧，我无法将其简化为一个公式。我喜欢便宜的房地产。我喜欢竞争地位。我喜欢人事系统的运作方式。我喜欢它的一切。

And I thought, even though it’s three times book, or whatever it was then, that it’s worth more. But that’s not a formula that anybody —

我想，即使那时是三倍的账面价值，或者其他什么，那也更有价值。但这不是任何人都能用的公式——

If you want a formula, you should go back to graduate school. (Laughter)

如果你想要一个公式，你应该回到研究生院。(笑声)

They’ll give you lots of formulas that won’t work. (Applause)

他们会给你很多不管用的公式。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: This is the longest we’ve ever gone in a Berkshire meeting without Charlie saying that — getting to the point where he prefers Costco to Berkshire. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是我们在Berkshire会议上最长的一次没有Charlie提到——到现在为止，他更喜欢Costco而不是Berkshire。（笑声）

38. Why Apple and thoughts on Apple’s buybacks

为什么选择苹果以及对苹果回购的看法

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: We got a handful of questions relating to Apple. This is a bit of a mash-up of a couple of them.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我们收到了几条与苹果相关的问题。这是其中几个问题的汇总。

Warren, you have bought in and sold out of IBM. You have praised [Amazon CEO] Jeff Bezos but never bought Amazon. And you have doubled down on Apple. Can you tell us what it is about Apple?

沃伦，你曾经买入并卖出过 IBM。你赞扬过[亚马逊首席执行官]杰夫·贝索斯，但从未购买过亚马逊。你对苹果加倍下注。你能告诉我们苹果有什么特别之处吗？

And given your sometimes critical views on buybacks, do you think Apple would do better spending a hundred billion dollars on buybacks, or buying other productive businesses the way you have generally preferred? A hundred billion dollars is a lot of money.

另外，考虑到你对回购的有时批评的观点，你认为苹果花费一千亿美元进行回购，还是像你通常偏好的那样收购其他生产型企业更好？一千亿美元是很多钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: I used to think so. (Laughter) The —

沃伦·巴菲特：我曾经是这么想的。（笑声）这——

Apple has a incredible consumer product which you understand a lot better than I do. Whether they should buy in their shares — they shouldn’t buy in their shares at all, unless they think that they’re selling for less than they’re worth.

苹果有一款令人难以置信的消费产品，你对它的理解远胜于我。至于他们是否应该购买自己的股票——他们根本不应该购买自己的股票，除非他们认为这些股票的售价低于其实际价值。

And if they are selling for less then they’re worth, and they have the money, and they don’t see an acquisition that’s even more attractive, they should buy in their shares. And I think that that’s very —

如果他们的股票价格低于其价值，并且他们有资金，并且没有看到更具吸引力的收购机会，他们应该回购自己的股票。我认为这非常——

Because I think it’s extremely hard to find acquisitions that would be accretive to Apple that would be in the 50 or 100 billion, or $200 billion range. They do a lot of small acquisitions.

因为我认为找到对苹果有增值作用的收购是非常困难的，这些收购的金额在 500 亿、1000 亿或 2000 亿美元的范围内。他们进行很多小规模的收购。

And, you know, I’m delighted to see them repurchasing shares. We own — let’s say we own 250 million or so shares. They have, I think, 4 billion, 923 million or something like that. And mentally, you can say we own 5 percent of it.

而且，你知道，我很高兴看到他们回购股票。我们拥有——假设我们拥有大约 2.5 亿股。他们有，我想是 40 亿 9,230 万股或类似的数字。从心理上讲，你可以说我们拥有 5%的股份。

But I figure with, you know, with the passage of a little time we may own 6 or 7 percent simply because they repurchase shares. And it —

但我想，随着时间的推移，我们可能会拥有 6%或 7%的股份，仅仅是因为他们回购股票。而这——

I find that if you’ve got an extraordinary product, and ecosystem, and there’s lots to be done, I love the idea of having our 5 percent, or whatever it may be, grow to 6 or 7 percent without us laying out a dime. I mean, it’s worked for us in many other situations.

我发现，如果你有一个非凡的产品和生态系统，还有很多事情要做，我喜欢我们的 5%或其他任何比例在不花一分钱的情况下增长到 6%或 7%的想法。我的意思是，这在我们许多其他情况下都有效。

But you have to have some very, very, very special product, and — which has an enormous wide — enormously widespread ecosystem, and the product’s extremely sticky, and all of that sort of thing.

但你必须拥有一些非常非常非常特别的产品，并且——它拥有一个极其广泛的生态系统，而且产品的粘性极强，还有所有这些东西。

And they’re not going to find 50 or a hundred billion dollar acquisitions that they can make at remotely a sensible price that really become additive to that.

他们不会找到可以以合理价格进行的 500 亿或 1000 亿美元的收购，这些收购真正能够对其产生增值。

And they may find it, who knows? But there certainly, as I look around the horizon, I don’t see anything that would make a lot of sense for them in terms of what they’d have to pay and what they would get.

他们可能会找到，谁知道呢？但当我环顾四周的地平线时，我确实看不到任何对他们来说在支付和获得方面有很大意义的东西。

Whereas I do see a business that they know everything about, and where they may or may not be able to buy it at an attractive price when they repurchase their shares. That remains to be seen.

我确实看到他们对一项业务了如指掌，并且在他们回购股票时，可能能够以有吸引力的价格购买该业务，也可能无法做到。这还有待观察。

Incidentally, that’s one thing that I always enjoy. People say, “Well, you’re talking your book,” or something if you talk —

顺便说一下，这正是我一直喜欢的一件事。人们会说：“好吧，你在为自己辩护，”或者如果你谈论——

From our standpoint, we would love to see Apple go down in price. They’re going to — well, just put it this way. If Andrew and Charlie and I were partners in a business that was worth $3 million so each of us had a million dollar interest in it, if Andrew offered to sell out his one-third interest at 800,000 and we had the money around, we’d jump at the chance to buy him out. I mean, it’s so simple.

从我们的角度来看，我们希望苹果的价格下降。换句话说，如果安德鲁、查理和我在一个价值 300 万美元的生意中是合伙人，每个人都有 100 万美元的股份，如果安德鲁提出以 80 万美元出售他三分之一的股份，而我们有钱的话，我们会立刻抓住机会买下他的股份。我的意思是，这太简单了。

But people get all lost — and if he’d wanted a million-two for it, we wouldn’t pay it to him. (Laughs)

但是人们都迷失了——如果他想要一百二十万，我们也不会给他。（笑）

It’s very simple math, but it gets lost in all these discussions. And of course, like I say, [Apple CEO] Tim Cook could do simple math. And he could probably do very complicated math, too. So, we very much approve of them repurchasing shares.

这非常简单的数学，但在所有这些讨论中却被忽视了。当然，正如我所说，[苹果首席执行官]蒂姆·库克可以做简单的数学。他也可能能做非常复杂的数学。因此，我们非常支持他们回购股票。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think, generally speaking in America, when companies go out hell-bent to buy other companies, they do — they’re worth less after the transaction is made than they were before.

查理·芒格：我认为，通常在美国，当公司拼命去收购其他公司时，交易完成后它们的价值往往低于交易前的价值。

So I don’t think you have a general way to wealth for American corporations to go out and buy other corporations. Averaged out, it’s a way down, not up.

所以我认为你没有一个普遍的方法让美国公司去收购其他公司。平均来看，这是一种下降，而不是上升。

And I think that a great many places have nothing better to do than to buy in their own stock, and nothing as advantageous to do as they can — as buying in their own stock.

我认为很多地方没有比回购自己的股票更好的事情可做，也没有比回购自己的股票更有利的事情可做。

So, I think we know pretty damn well what’s going to happen to Apple. They’d be very lucky to — if there was something available at a low price that they could buy. It’s —

所以，我想我们非常清楚苹果将会发生什么。如果有一些低价的东西可以购买，他们会非常幸运。就是这样——

I don’t think the world’s that easy. I think that the reason these companies are buying their stock is that they’re smart enough to know that it’s better for them than anything else.

我认为这个世界并不那么简单。我认为这些公司购买自己股票的原因是，他们足够聪明，知道这对他们来说比其他任何事情都要好。

WARREN BUFFETT: And that does not mean we approve of every buyback, at all, though. I mean, we’ve seen —

沃伦·巴菲特：这并不意味着我们完全赞成每一次回购。我是说，我们已经看到——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, no. I think some people just buy it to keep the stock up. And that, of course, is insane. And immoral. But apart from that, it’s fine. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不，不，不。我认为有些人只是为了维持股价而购买它。当然，这种做法是疯狂的，也是不道德的。但除此之外，这没问题。（笑声）

39. “I like very much our holdings of American Express”

“我非常喜欢我们持有的美国运通股份。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren, if we look at the performance of your equity investment portfolio the last three to five years, some of the strongest performances come from Visa and Mastercard, which put up returns that are three to four times greater than American Express.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，如果我们看看你在过去三到五年中的股票投资组合表现，表现最强劲的来自于维萨和万事达卡，它们的回报是美国运通的三到四倍。

Unfortunately, your holdings of the two names, which we assume were held by Todd [Combs] or Ted [Wechsler], have accounted for less than one percent of stock holdings on a combined basis the past five years, while American Express has tended to be a top-five holding, accounting for 10 percent of the portfolio, on average, and closer to 8 percent of late.

不幸的是，您持有的这两个股票的份额，我们假设是由托德（Todd Combs）或特德（Ted Wechsler）持有，在过去五年中合计占股票持有量的不到百分之一，而美国运通则一直是前五大持股之一，平均占投资组合的 10%，最近接近 8%。

Given that all three firms benefit from powerful network effects along with valuable brands, were there any particular reasons Berkshire did not ramp up its stakes in Visa and Mastercard to more meaningful levels, especially during those years when American Express was struggling?

考虑到这三家公司都受益于强大的网络效应和有价值的品牌，是否有什么特别的原因导致伯克希尔没有增加对Visa和Mastercard的持股，尤其是在美国运通表现不佳的那些年？

After all, you’ve shown a willingness to own several stocks from the same industry, holding shares in several competing banks, and buying stakes in all four domestic airlines in fairly equal amounts when you picked them up in late 2016.

毕竟，你已经表现出愿意持有来自同一行业的多只股票，持有几家竞争银行的股份，并在 2016 年底以相对相等的金额购买了四家国内航空公司的股份。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. When Ted and Todd, or either one of them — I won’t get into which specifically — which one of them specifically — bought, or for that matter they could both have bought — Visa and Master Charge (Mastercard) — they were significant portions of their portfolio.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当泰德和托德，或者其中任何一个——我不想具体说是哪个——买入，或者说他们可能都买入了——维萨和万事达（Mastercard）——它们在他们的投资组合中占据了重要部分。

And there was no embargo or anything on them owning those stocks because we had a big investment in American Express. And I could have bought them as well. And, looking back, I should have.

并且，持有这些股票并不因为我们在美国运通的重大投资而受到任何限制。我也可以购买它们。回头看，我应该购买。

On the other hand, I think American Express has done a fabulous job, and now we own 17 and a large fraction percent of a company that not that long ago we may have owned 12 percent. We’ve done it without spending a dime and without — you know, it’s a company that has really done a fantastic job in a very competitive field where lots of people would love to take their customers away from them. But they have more customers than ever, and they’re spending more money than ever. The customers are.

另一方面，我认为美国运通做得非常出色，我们现在拥有17%多一点的公司股份，而不久前我们可能只有12%。我们在不花一分钱的情况下实现了这一点。它是在一个非常竞争的领域中表现出色的公司，许多人都希望从他们那里抢走客户，但他们的客户数量不断增加，客户花的钱也越来越多。

And the international growth has accelerated. The small business penetration is terrific. It’s really quite a business. And, you know, we love the fact we own it.

国际业务增长加速。小企业渗透率也很棒。真的是一家非常了不起的公司。我们喜欢我们拥有的股份。

Like I say, it didn’t preclude me from, in any way, from buying Master Charge (Mastercard) or Visa. And if I had been as smart as Ted or Todd, I would have. (Laughs)

就像我说的，这并没有阻止我以任何方式购买万事达卡（Mastercard）或 Visa。如果我像泰德或托德那样聪明，我就会这样做。（笑）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we would have been a little — a lot better with all of our stock picking if we could do it in retrospect.

查理·芒格：好吧，我们如果可以从后视镜看过去的股票选择，会做得好很多。

But — (laughter) — at the time, we have a big position in American Express, and there is one tiny cloud on the horizon of the payments processors and that is the system of WeChat in China.

但——（笑声）——当时我们在美国运通的持股很大，并且支付处理系统的一个小隐忧就是中国的微信支付系统。

And so it isn’t as though there isn’t a little cloud somewhere off in the — and I don’t have the faintest idea how important that cloud is, and I don’t think Warren does either.

所以，不是说没有什么隐忧存在——我不知道这个隐忧有多重要，我认为Warren也不太清楚。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. No. Payments are a huge deal worldwide. And you’ve got all kinds of smart people working at various ways to change the payment arrangements. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。支付在全球范围内是一个大业务。你有各种聪明的人在努力改变支付安排。还有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: To destroy what we have now.

查理·芒格：摧毁我们现在所拥有的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure, sure. And you’ve got some very smart people that, you know, I am — the — but there — building a company.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，当然。你有一些非常聪明的人在——但是，建立一家公司。

And American Express made a decision a few years ago not to bid as low as somebody else did to retain the Costco business. And I think — Charlie and I disagree on this — but I think it was a smart decision. He doesn’t think it was a smart decision. But one of us will be right. And — (laughter) — and one of us will remind you that they were right. (Laughter)

美国运通几年前做了一个决定，就是不去出价那么低以保留Costco的业务。我认为——Charlie和我对此有分歧——但我认为这是一个明智的决定。他认为这不是明智的决定。但其中一个人会是对的。——（笑声）——而且其中一个人会提醒你他们是对的。（笑声）

The — but if you look at American Express, it is — it’s a remarkable company. I mean, you know, they came after them with Sapphire last year. People want that business. And payments are changing.

但如果你看看美国运通，它真的是一家了不起的公司。去年他们被Sapphire攻击，人们想要这块业务。支付方式正在发生变化。

And you can see in different countries different ways things are going on in that. And there are a lot of people that will play the game of gaming the system, and switch from one to another based on the rewards on this card or that, and all of that sort of thing.

你可以看到在不同国家，事情的发展方式各不相同。有很多人会玩弄系统，根据这张卡或那张卡的奖励在不同的选项之间切换，类似这样的事情。

But there also is a — I think there’s a very substantial group for which American Express does something very special, and they keep capitalizing on that premier position with that group.

但也有一个——我认为有一个非常大的群体，认为美国运通做得非常特别，他们不断利用这种首屈一指的地位。

And they’re doing it successfully around the country. And you’ll see in the first quarter — you’ve seen in the first quarter — you know, where in Britain, in Mexico, in Japan, you’re seeing gains of 15 percent or better in local currencies.

他们在全国范围内成功地做到这一点。你可以看到在第一季度——你已经看到在第一季度——在英国、墨西哥和日本，你看到的增长超过了15%，以当地货币计算。

And the base is not tiny, but it’s not huge, so there’s a lot of room left to go in that. And the small business penetration is good. The loan portfolio has behaved sensationally compared to, really, just about anybody.

基础虽然不小，但也不大，所以还有很大的增长空间。小企业渗透率也很好。贷款组合的表现非常出色，比其他大多数公司都要好。

So, I like very much our holdings of American Express.

所以，我非常喜欢我们持有的美国运通股份。

The first half, because of the accounting changes, they had to suspend their repurchase program for six months. But I — they’ve announced that they expect to renew it.

上半年，由于会计变更，他们不得不暂停了六个月的回购计划。但我——他们已经宣布他们打算恢复回购计划。

And someday we’ll even, you know, we’ll own a greater percentage of American Express and it will be a bigger company, in my opinion. And I think we’ll do very well.

有一天，我们甚至会拥有更大比例的美国运通，我认为这将是一家更大的公司。我认为我们会做得很好。

But as Charlie says, nobody knows how payments is — for sure — comes out. And nobody knows how autos for sure come out. And there — that is true of a great many businesses we’re in, and we’ve faced it before.

但正如查理所说，没有人确切知道支付是如何进行的。也没有人确切知道汽车是如何出来的。而这——对于我们所处的许多行业来说都是如此，我们以前也遇到过这种情况。

We used to buy things that were certain failures, like textiles and second-rate department stores and trading stamps in California. Now we just face things that face real difficulty. So we’re actually moving up the ladder. (Laughter)

我们曾经购买一些注定失败的东西，比如加利福尼亚的纺织品、二流百货商店和交易印花。现在我们只面对真正的困难。因此，我们实际上是在向上攀登。（笑声）

40. Capital-intensive businesses are “good enough”

资本密集型企业“足够好”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第一站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Daphne Collier Starr (PH). I’m eight years old and live in New York City. I’ve been a shareholder for two years and this is my second annual shareholders meeting.

观众成员：巴菲特先生，我叫达芙妮·科利尔·斯塔尔（PH）。我八岁，住在纽约市。我已经是股东两年了，这是我第二次参加年度股东大会。

Berkshire Hathaway’s best investments on which the company built its reputation have been in very capital-efficient businesses — (laughter) — such as Coke, See’s Candy, American Express, and GEICO.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦建立声誉的最佳投资是在资本非常高效的企业上——（笑声）——例如可口可乐、See’s、美国运通和 GEICO。

But recently, Berkshire has made really big investments in a few businesses that require huge capital investments to maintain and that offer only a regulated low rate of return such as — (laughter) — Burlington Northern Railroad.

但最近，伯克希尔在一些需要巨额资本投资以维持的业务中进行了非常大的投资，这些业务仅提供受监管的低回报率，例如——（笑声）——伯灵顿北方铁路。

My question to you, Mr. Buffett, is could you please explain why Berkshire’s largest recent investments have been departed from your old capital-efficient philosophy?

我想问您，巴菲特先生，您能否解释一下为什么伯克希尔最近最大的投资偏离了您以往的资本效率哲学？

And why specifically have you invested Burlington Northern instead of buying a capital-efficient company like American Express? (Applause)

您为什么选择投资伯灵顿北方铁路，而不是购买像美国运通这样资本效率高的公司？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re killing me, Daphne. (Laughter) Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：你真是让我难住了，Daphne。（笑声）是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m certainly glad she’s not nine years old.

查理·芒格：我当然很高兴她不是九岁。

WARREN BUFEFTT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

I’m just sitting here thinking which of the six panelists we’re going to bump next year and put you in. (Laughter)

我在想，明年我们要把哪个六人小组的成员挤出去，把你放进去。（笑声）

Well, I thought I was doing well when I bought that City Service at 11. (Laughs)

我以为我在 11 的时候买了那只城市服务股票做得很好。（笑）

The answer is that we have — we’d love — we always prefer the businesses that earn terrific returns on capital, like a See’s Candy when we bought it or a good many of the businesses.

答案是我们有——我们很喜欢——我们总是更喜欢那些能获得优异资本回报的企业，比如我们购买的 See's Candy 或许多其他企业。

And, we’ve — and, you know, American Express, you know, earns a terrific return on equity, and has for a very long time.

而且，我们——你知道，美国运通的股本回报率非常高，而且已经持续了很长时间。

The fact that we buy a Burlington — BNSF, Burlington Northern — means that, essentially, we can’t get more money deployed in capital-light businesses at prices that make sense to us. And so we have gone into more capital-intensive businesses that are good businesses.

我们买下伯灵顿北方铁路——BNSF的原因是，我们无法以合理的价格将更多的钱投入到轻资本业务中。因此，我们进入了更多的资本密集型业务，这些业务虽然需要大量资本，但仍然是好的业务。

But wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could run the railroad without trains, and track, and tunnels, and bridges, and a few things?

但如果我们可以在没有火车、轨道、隧道、桥梁和一些其他东西的情况下运营铁路，那不是很美好吗？

We get a decent return on the capital-intensive businesses. We bought most of them at very decent prices, and they’ve been run very well since we bought them.

我们在资本密集型业务上获得了不错的回报。我们以相当不错的价格购买了大部分业务，自从我们购买以来，它们的运营一直非常良好。

We still love a business that takes very little capital and earns high returns, and continues to grow, and requires very little incremental capital.

我们仍然热爱一种需要很少资本、获得高回报、持续增长并且几乎不需要增量资本的业务。

We can’t deploy as much money as we have in doing that. And so as the second-best choice, still a good choice, the answer is yes. It’s not as good as the best choice.

但我们无法像以前那样在这类业务上投入那么多钱。因此，作为第二选择，尽管不是最佳选择，但仍然是好的选择，答案是肯定的。这比最佳选择要差一些。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I like the aspiration of that young lady. She basically wants her royalty on the other fellow’s sales. And of course that’s a very good model, and if everybody could do that, why, nobody would do anything else.

查理·芒格：是的，我喜欢那位年轻女士的抱负。她基本上想要从其他人的销售中获得版税。当然，这是一种非常好的模式，如果每个人都能做到这一点，那就没有人会做其他事情了。

The reason we’re satisfied with our utility returns and our railroad returns is they’re quite satisfactory. And we — and the — quite satisfactory. I wish we had two more just like them. Don’t you, Warren?

我们对我们的公用事业回报和铁路回报感到满意的原因是它们相当令人满意。我们——而且——相当令人满意。我希望我们能再有两个这样的。你不觉得吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So — 查理·芒格：那么——

WARREN BUFFETT: Definitely.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So the answer is they’re good enough, and you’re asking us to get perfection if you would want us to have all our money in Coke at, say five percent of what it’s now selling for.

查理·芒格：所以答案是它们足够好，而你希望我们追求完美，如果你希望我们把所有的钱都投入可口可乐，比如说以现在售价的五个百分点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And a business like Apple really doesn’t take much capital.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。像苹果这样的企业实际上并不需要太多资本。

But — so, you’ve got to spend a lot of money to buy businesses like that. Very few are for sale.

但是——所以，你必须花很多钱去购买这样的企业。很少有出售。

And the answer is we have not foregone any opportunity to buy businesses that earn high returns — very high returns — on equity capital, when we could buy them at a sensible price, to buy these other businesses.

而答案是，我们没有放弃任何机会去购买那些在股本上获得高回报——非常高的回报——的企业，当我们能够以合理的价格购买它们时，去购买这些其他企业。

So they haven’t shoved anything else off the table. But you are — you definitely have a job in our capital allocation department. (Laughter)

所以这些其他业务没有将任何机会排除在外。但你确实在我们的资本配置部门有一份工作。（笑声）

41. Buffett “surprised” rate of decline for newspapers hasn’t moderated

巴菲特对报纸下降速度“感到惊讶”，并没有减缓

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Max Taylor (PH) of Chicago, and it concerns the newspapers that Berkshire owns.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自芝加哥的马克斯·泰勒（PH），涉及伯克希尔拥有的报纸。

“In your 2012 letter to shareholders, Mr. Buffett, you had a section devoted to Berkshire’s buying 28 newspapers during the year just past. Since then, you have not come back to the newspaper subject.

在您 2012 年致股东的信中，巴菲特先生，您有一部分专门讨论了伯克希尔在过去一年中收购的 28 家报纸。从那时起，您没有再提及报纸的话题。

“But this year, at the end of the annual report, you published a list of the newspapers Berkshire owns today, along with their circulation. I compared that list with the one you published five years ago at the end of 2012.

“但是今年，在年度报告的末尾，你发布了伯克希尔目前拥有的报纸名单及其发行量。我将这个名单与五年前 2012 年底你发布的名单进行了比较。”

“As you no doubt know better than anyone, the circulation of the 26 newspapers that Berkshire still owns, of the 28 originally bought, fell sharply. In many cases, by big amounts like 30 percent to almost 50 percent.

“正如你比任何人都更清楚的，伯克希尔仍然拥有的 26 份报纸的发行量，从最初购买的 28 份中，急剧下降。在许多情况下，下降幅度很大，达到 30%到近 50%。

“I know that five years ago, you acknowledged the risk in owning newspapers, but you still said, ‘Charlie and I believe that papers delivering comprehensive and reliable information to tightly-bound communities, and having a sensible internet strategy, will remain viable for a long time.’

“我知道五年前你承认拥有报纸的风险，但你仍然说，‘查理和我相信，向紧密联系的社区提供全面和可靠信息的报纸，以及拥有合理的互联网战略，将在很长一段时间内保持可行性。’”

“Skip to today, and imagine that you are writing about Berkshire’s experience with newspapers. What would you be saying?”

“跳到今天，想象一下你正在写关于伯克希尔与报纸的经历。你会说些什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that — I forget the modifying word on internet strategy — but I think I said “sensible.”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说——我忘记了关于互联网战略的修饰词——但我想我说过“明智”。

The problem has been — about 1,300 daily newspapers in the United States — there were 1,700 not that long ago — is that no one except The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and now probably The Washington Post has come up with a digital product that, really in any really significant way, will replace the revenue that is being lost as print newspapers lose both circulation and advertising.

问题是——大约1300家美国日报——不久前还有1700家——除了《华尔街日报》、《纽约时报》和现在可能的《华盛顿邮报》之外，没有人能够提出一种数字产品，真正以任何重要的方式替代由于印刷报纸发行量和广告收入减少而失去的收入。

And if you look at the communities in which we operate, or the communities in which, you name it — other newspapers operate, the community could be prospering. We’re in a prosperous economy presently. And all are losing daily circulation, they’re losing Sunday circulation, they’re losing street — all street sales, they’re losing home-delivered.

如果你看看我们运营的社区，或者其他报纸运营的社区，这些社区可能正在繁荣。我们目前处于一个繁荣的经济中。然而，所有报纸的日常发行量都在下降，他们的周日发行量也在下降，街头销售也在下降，家庭送报服务也在下降。

And it is — I’ve been surprised that the rate of decline has not moderated in the last five years.

我感到惊讶的是，在过去五年中，下降的速度并没有减缓。

We bought all the papers at reasonable prices, so it is not of great economic consequence to Berkshire. But I would like to see daily newspapers, actually, you know, be economically viable, because of the importance to society.

我们以合理的价格购买了所有的报纸，因此对伯克希尔来说并没有太大的经济影响。但我希望日报实际上能够在经济上可行，因为这对社会的重要性。

But I would say that the trends which — I put those circulation figures in there because I think the shareholder’s entitled to look, year-to-year, at what is happening. And it’s not only —

但我想说的是，这些趋势——我把这些发行数字放在这里，因为我认为股东有权查看每年的情况。这不仅仅是——

It’s happening to 1,300 newspapers throughout the United States. And it happens in small towns, where you would think that the alternative sources of information would not be that good. It happens every place.

这正在发生在美国的 1300 家报纸上。它发生在小镇上，你可能会认为那里的替代信息来源不会那么好。它在每个地方都发生。

And The Journal, The Times, and probably The Post, have a viable economic model in the digital world, and probably will continue to shrink — I’m almost certain will continue to shrink — in the print world.

《华尔街日报》、《泰晤士报》，以及可能的《邮报》，在数字世界中有一个可行的经济模式，并且可能会继续缩小——我几乎可以肯定在印刷世界中会继续缩小。

But the digital world will be big enough that — and they’ll be successful enough — so that they have, in my view, a sustainable business model.

但数字世界将足够大——而且他们会足够成功——以至于在我看来，他们拥有一个可持续的商业模式。

But it is very difficult to see, with the lack of success, in terms of important dollars arising from digital, it’s difficult to see how the print product survives over time. And that’s — I’m afraid that’s true of 1,300 papers in this country.

但由于缺乏成功，尤其是在数字化带来的重要收入方面，很难看出印刷产品如何在时间中生存下去。我担心这对这个国家的 1300 份报纸来说都是如此。

And we’ll keep looking to see if there is a way to do it. But you’d have to look at our experience, and look at the experience of everyone else’s.

我们会继续寻找是否有办法做到这一点。但你需要看看我们的经验，以及其他所有人的经验。

McClatchy newspapers came out the other day, you know, and I think that newspaper — which is very good — fine cities that they operate in — and advertising revenue is down something like 17 or 18 percent, and circulation. But it isn’t just them, it’s everybody in the business. And I wish I had a better answer for you, but I don’t.

麦克拉奇报纸前几天发布了消息，你知道，我认为那份报纸——非常好——他们运营的城市也很好——广告收入下降了大约 17%或 18%，而发行量也在下降。但这不仅仅是他们，整个行业都是如此。我希望我能给你一个更好的答案，但我没有。

I would say that the economic significance to Berkshire is almost negligible, but the significance to society, I think, actually is enormous.

我认为对伯克希尔来说，经济意义几乎可以忽略不计，但对社会的意义，我认为实际上是巨大的。

And, you know, I hope that we find something. I hope others find something because we’ll copy it. But so far, we have not succeeded in that.

而且，你知道，我希望我们能找到一些东西。我希望其他人也能找到一些东西，因为我们会复制它。但到目前为止，我们还没有成功。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the decline was faster than we thought it was going to be. So it was not our finest bit of economic prediction. And I think it’s even worse.

查理·芒格：嗯，下降的速度比我们想象的要快。所以这不是我们最好的经济预测。我认为情况甚至更糟。

I think, to the extent we miscalculated, we may have done it because we both love newspapers and are — and have considered them so important in our country.

我认为，若我们有误判，那可能是因为我们都热爱报纸，并且一直认为它们在我们国家中是如此重要。

These little local newspaper monopolies tended to be owned by people who behaved well and tended to control the politicians. And we’re going to miss these newspapers if they disappear. We’re going to miss them terribly. And —

这些地方小报的垄断往往由行为良好的人拥有，他们往往控制着政治家。如果这些报纸消失了，我们会非常想念它们。我们会非常想念它们。而——

WARREN BUFFETT: I think you may continue —

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为你可以继续——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — I hope to God it doesn’t happen, but the figures are not good, Warren.

查理·芒格：——我希望上帝保佑这不会发生，但数据并不好，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. No, they aren’t. And it isn’t just — you know, it isn’t some town that has a particular problem with unemployment or anything of the sort. And it isn’t due to general economic conditions.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不是的。并不仅仅是——你知道，这不是某个特定的城镇有失业问题或类似的事情。这也不是由于一般经济状况。

It’s due to the fact that a newspaper, if you wanted to know the baseball results from the present day, and the box scores, and everything else, they told you the following morning and it was still news to you.

这归因于这样一个事实：如果你想知道当天的棒球比赛结果、统计数据以及其他一切，报纸会在第二天告诉你，而这对你来说仍然是新闻。

And the financial material that I read from there, and in terms of looking at the stock prices and everything, they were news to you the following morning. And the —

我从那里阅读的财务资料，以及查看股票价格等方面，第二天早上对你来说都是新闻。还有——

What was developing in the Pacific in terms of the war was news to you when you read about it in the morning in The New York Times. And it’s — news is what you don’t know that you want to know. And the —

在太平洋上发生的战争进展，当你早上在《纽约时报》上读到时，对你来说是个新消息。而新闻就是你不知道但想知道的事情。

And those Help Wanted ads, you know, segregated as they may have been, still were the place to go to look to find a job. And you can go up and down the line and one element after another where the daily print newspaper was primary, they’re no longer primary.

那些招聘广告，尽管可能存在隔离，但仍然是寻找工作的地方。你可以逐一查看，过去以日报为主的各个元素，现在已经不再是主要的了。

And the business has changed in a very material way, and we haven’t been able to figure out any solutions to that, and we’ll keep trying.

业务发生了非常实质性的变化，我们还没有找到任何解决方案，但我们会继续努力。

Like I say, it’s not of economic consequence, but I think it is societal consequence. And we haven’t been able to solve it.

就像我说的，这在经济上并没有影响，但我认为它在社会上有影响。我们还没有能够解决这个问题。

42. TTI has “improved dramatically in the past year”

TTI 在过去一年中“有了显著改善”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: TTI has been a nice growth story since Berkshire acquired it 11 years ago, more than doubling its pre-tax earnings to about $400 million due to fine organic growth and at least two successful bolt-on acquisitions. Business momentum appeared to accelerate in the first quarter.

乔纳森·布兰特：自从伯克希尔在 11 年前收购 TTI 以来，它一直是一个不错的增长故事，税前收益翻了一番多，达到了约 4 亿美元，这得益于良好的有机增长和至少两次成功的附加收购。第一季度的业务势头似乎有所加速。

Can you please talk about the competitive landscape in the electronic components distribution industry and what TTI’s advantages are? Is it just a great industry to be in or is TTI’s business model and/or management team special?

您能谈谈电子元件分销行业的竞争格局以及 TTI 的优势吗？这只是一个很好的行业，还是 TTI 的商业模式和/或管理团队特别？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——

JONATHAN BRANDT: Do you expect it to continue to be one of Berkshire’s faster growing non-insurance subsidiaries?

乔纳森·布兰特：你是否预计它将继续成为伯克希尔增长较快的非保险子公司之一？

WARREN BUFFETT: TTI is run by a fellow named Paul Andrews who’s done an absolutely sensational job with us. He’s a wonderful man. He’s a wonderful manager.

沃伦·巴菲特：TTI 由一个名叫保罗·安德鲁斯的人管理，他在我们这里做得非常出色。他是一个了不起的人。他是一个出色的经理。

And in the last — he’s quadrupled the business, basically, but in the last year and accelerating right to this point.

而在最后——他基本上将业务扩大了四倍，但在过去一年中加速发展，直到现在。

They distribute little electronic components. They actually — their average — they’re a many-billion dollar business — and their average item is less than a nickel that they sell. So it’s kind of like being in the jellybean business or something like that. Except these things go into all kinds of fancy machines that I don’t understand.

他们分销小型电子元件。实际上——他们的平均——他们是一个数十亿美元的企业——他们销售的平均商品价格不到五美分。所以这有点像是在做果冻生意或类似的事情。只是这些东西被用在我不理解的各种复杂机器中。

And we have a worldwide operation based in the Dallas, Fort Worth area. And built by one man who left a division of General Dynamics 45 or 50 years ago. And step-by-step built up this business — like we just bought within the last two months, we bought an operation in South Korea that will be another substantial addition. We do business worldwide. And electronic components that have absolutely taken off in the last year.

我们在达拉斯-沃斯堡地区有一个全球运营。这个业务是由一个人创立的，他在 45 或 50 年前离开了通用动力公司。一步一步地建立了这个业务——就在过去两个月内，我们在韩国收购了一家运营，这将是另一个重要的补充。我们在全球范围内开展业务。电子元件在过去一年中绝对取得了飞速发展。

And they use something called, you know, well, it’s essentially a measure of backlog. And book-to-build is the ratio they call it. But it’s just kind of a special term.

他们使用某种称为“账单与交付比率”的东西，但这只是一个特殊术语。

The — but, it’s grown — I mean, it’s just improved dramatically in the last year. And it continues month after month. So something is going on out there because nobody buys these things to store them in their basement or anything of the sort. I mean, these get used, these electronic components.

但，它在过去一年中显著改善，并且每个月都在继续增长。所以发生了某些事情，因为没有人会购买这些东西来存放在地下室或其他地方。这些电子元件确实被使用。

Some of them are on allocation. We have a great relationship with suppliers. We have a very good relationship with our customers because we carry more inventory than most of our competitors. So particularly when the business is tight we can deliver and do a very first-class job doing it.

其中一些是分配的。我们与供应商关系良好。我们与客户的关系也非常好，因为我们的库存比大多数竞争对手多。因此，特别是在业务紧张时，我们能够交付并做到一流的服务。

So I give credit to Paul. He increased his physical facility, started on that a few years ago. And it’s a godsend that he did it because with the business going through there now we wouldn’t have been able to handle it.

所以我把功劳归于Paul。他几年前开始增加物理设施。幸运的是他这么做了，因为现在通过这些设施的业务如果没有它们我们将无法处理。

But it’s a competitive business. I mean, if you look at Arrow Electronics, you know, on the New York Stock Exchange — we’ve got competitors. I think Paul is doing a better job, by a considerable margin, than they are. And I’m delighted as a part of the Berkshire family.

但这是一个竞争激烈的行业。如果你看一下在纽约证券交易所上市的Arrow Electronics，我们有竞争对手。我认为Paul的表现比他们好得多。我很高兴他成为伯克希尔的一部分。

There will be times when that business slows down because their customers, you know, will have their own cycles. And what it does will go down. But over time that business is going to grow.

有时候，生意会放缓，因为他们的客户会有自己的周期。这会导致生意下滑。但随着时间的推移，这个生意会增长。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s a wonderful business because it’s so difficult to do that competitors don’t want try it. When I lived in Omaha there was a man who lived in great prosperity and almost no work. And his business was gathering up and rendering dead horses. And he never had any competitors. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，这是一项很棒的生意，因为它太难做了，以至于竞争对手不想尝试。当我住在奥马哈时，有一个人过着富裕的生活，几乎不需要工作。他的生意是收集和处理死马。他从来没有竞争对手。（笑声）

He used to come up to the Omaha Club and start drinking about 11 in the morning. It was not a difficult business. But nobody ever crowded him with new competition.

他曾经在早上11点左右到奥马哈俱乐部开始喝酒。这不是一个困难的生意。但没有人来拥挤他的市场。

And very few people want to distribute zillions of electronic parts that are worth a nickel each. It’s very complicated.

很少有人愿意分销无数的电子零件，每个零件的价值仅为五分钱。这非常复杂。

And of course that business is terribly good at it. And it keeps getting more and more of the same. So you’re right. It’s a huge growth business which is sort of the electronic equivalent of gathering up and rendering dead horses. (Laughter)

而且这家企业在这方面做得非常出色，并且不断增加。因此，你说得对。这是一个巨大的增长业务，有点像电子版本的处理死马。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Imagine keeping track of close to a million different items, you know, with very small values attached to them and getting them out to your customer fast because they want them fast, all over the world. You know, and those things are not easy to manage. I mean, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：想象一下，要跟踪近一百万个不同的物品，知道它们的价值都很小，并且要快速将它们送到客户手中，因为他们希望尽快收到，遍布全球。这些东西并不好管理。我是说，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And staying in stock on so many items. It’s very complicated. And that business is very good at it.

查理·芒格：在这么多商品上保持库存是非常复杂的。而这项业务做得很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re luck —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们很幸运——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And of course it’ll grow. The horses went away but these parts aren’t going to go away. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：当然它会增长。马匹消失了，但这些零件不会消失。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie made a profession of studying businesses where the owners could sit around and drink all day and have — (laughter) — he thought that was where we ought to be competing but — or buying.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理把研究那些老板可以整天坐着喝酒的生意当作职业——（笑声）——他认为我们应该在那儿竞争——或者购买。

CHARLIE MUNGER: My theory, Warren, is if it can’t stand a little mismanagement, it’s no business. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我的理论是，沃伦，如果它经不起一点点管理不善，那就不是生意。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah and we’re testing that sometimes. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有时会测试这个。（笑声）

43. Phillips 66 and staying below 10 percent ownership

Phillips 66 及其保持在 10%以下的持股比例

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Ben Sherber (PH), Topeka, Kansas. Just want to say, Warren and Charlie, thank you again for hosting us all. This is a great event.

观众成员：嗨，Ben Sherber（音），堪萨斯州托皮卡。想说，沃伦和查理，再次感谢你们的热情款待。这是一个很棒的活动。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is about the recent decision to sell shares back of Phillips 66. Not to put you on the hot seat. But right after that, share prices jumped up about $22 a share.

观众成员：我的问题是关于最近决定回购Phillips 66 的股票。不是想让你感到为难。但就在那之后，股价上涨了大约每股 22 美元。

You mentioned at the time that there’s some regulatory requirements if you own over 10 percent of a company. Could you talk about the factors that go into how you decide whether to retain more than that or get under that threshold? And then what are your thoughts long-term on Phillips 66, like, their business mid-stream refining?

你提到过，如果你持有一家公司的股份超过10%，就会有一些监管要求。你能谈谈在决定是否保留超过这个阈值或者低于这个阈值时考虑的因素吗？然后，你对菲利普斯66的长期看法是什么？比如他们在中游炼油业务方面的表现。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it was the City Service preferred of last year. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，这是去年的城市服务优先股。（笑声）

We sold the stock at around 93 or ’4. And it’s probably 115 now. But we own just under 10 percent of the company. And the more Ted [Weschler] and Todd [Combs] and I think about various problems connected with regulatory problems and trading problems and so on, overwhelmingly we will stick below 10 percent on marketable security holdings.

我们在大约 93 或 94 时卖出了股票。现在可能是 115。但我们拥有公司不到 10%的股份。随着 Ted [Weschler]、Todd [Combs]和我对与监管问题和交易问题等相关的各种问题的思考，我们绝大多数时间会将可交易证券的持有量保持在 10%以下。

We’ve done it with the airlines. Now that does not mean we’re going to reduce our holdings in American Express or anything of the sort.

我们已经在航空公司做到了。这并不意味着我们会减少在美国运通的持股或类似的事情。

But — and Greg Garland has done a great job at Phillips 66. We’ve had very good relations with the company. They’re very — he’s a very, very, very experienced and sensible manager.

但是——格雷格·加兰在菲利普斯 66 做得很好。我们与这家公司关系非常好。他是一个非常、非常、非常有经验和明智的经理。

But I did decide that I wanted to be below 10 percent in that holding. And we, like I say, we’ll stay just slightly under 10 percent of Wells Fargo.

但我确实决定我想在那项投资中保持低于 10%。正如我所说，我们将保持在富国银行略低于 10%的比例。

We’ve actually sold a few shares just to stay below 10 percent in the case, I think, of both American Airlines and United Continental.

我们实际上已经出售了一些股份，以便在美国航空和联合大陆的情况下保持在 10%以下。

Unless there’s something unusual we’re going to stay under ten. But we have nine and a significant fraction percent of Phillips. And I think they’ve been good at operations. I think they’ve been good at capital allocation.

除非有特别的情况，我们将继续保持在10%以下。但我们在菲利普斯66的持股大约是9%加上一些小数。我认为他们在运营方面做得很好，在资本配置方面也很出色。

We traded them a business — we traded them stock for a business some years ago, which has been a very nice business that we’ve retained in operation.

我们与他们进行了交易——几年前我们用股票换了一项业务，这项业务一直运作良好。

So we’ve got a lot of money still in Phillips. And I wish I’d made the deal at a higher price. But we made money on what we sold and we accomplished an objective.

所以我们在菲利普斯还有很多钱。我希望我能以更高的价格达成交易。但我们在出售中赚了钱，并达成了一个目标。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we like the subsidiary [Phillips Specialty Products] we traded the stock for. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我们喜欢我们用股票换取的那个子公司。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: I missed that —

沃伦·巴菲特：我错过了那个——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We traded the stock for a subsidiary.

查理·芒格：我们用这只股票换了一家子公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We like the subsidiary.

查理·芒格：我们喜欢这个子公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah. Well, it improved —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。嗯，它改善了——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It isn’t like the stock went away for nothing.

查理·芒格：这并不是说股票白白消失了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, actually we’ve done pretty well with Phillips.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。实际上，我们在菲利普斯的投资表现不错。

44. Cryptocurrency craze will “come to a bad ending”

加密货币热潮将“以悲惨的结局告终”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Vlad Koptev (PH) in Ukraine. He says, “Capitalization of cryptocurrency has approached that of Berkshire and Apple last year. And clearly the idea behind crypto will affect conventional banking groups where Berkshire is a shareholder. You always say you didn’t go into too much detail to obtain an understanding on cryptocurrencies. So what factors caused you to say that it’s a bubble?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自乌克兰的弗拉德·科普捷夫（PH）。他说：“加密货币的市值已经接近去年伯克希尔和苹果的市值。显然，加密货币背后的理念将影响伯克希尔作为股东的传统银行集团。你总是说你没有深入了解加密货币。那么，是什么因素让你说这是一个泡沫？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, generally non-productive assets remain not only — if you’d bought gold at the time of Christ and you figured the compound rate on it, you know, it may be a couple tenths of 1 percent.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，通常非生产性资产不仅保持不变——如果你在基督时代购买了黄金，并计算其复合利率，你知道，它可能只有千分之几。

It essentially is not going to deliver anything other than supposed scarcity, you know, because they’ll only — you can only mine so many. But so what? I mean, what does it produce itself?

它本质上不会提供任何其他东西，除了所谓的稀缺性，你知道，因为他们只能——你只能挖掘这么多。但那又怎么样？我的意思是，它自己能产生什么？

You know, the check is a wonderful idea. Just imagine how the world would be without being able to write checks or have wire transfer of funds. But it doesn’t make the check intrinsically itself worth a lot of money.

你知道，支票是个很好的主意。想象一下，如果没有支票或资金电汇，世界会是什么样子。但这并不意味着支票本身就值很多钱。

And if you said you can’t use something called “check” with a little piece of paper you’d do something else to transfer money.

如果你说你不能用一种叫“支票”的东西和一小张纸，你会做其他事情来转账。

I think that anytime you buy a nonproductive asset you are counting on somebody else later on to buy a nonproductive asset because they think they can sell it to somebody for more money.

我认为每当你购买一个非生产性资产时，你都是在指望其他人以后也购买一个非生产性资产，因为他们认为可以以更高的价格将其卖给别人。

And it’s been tried with tulips and it’s been tried. It’s been tried with various things over time. And it does come to a bad ending.

并且已经尝试过郁金香，也尝试过其他各种事物。最终结果都不好。

I mean, having — you have a hard time. You can think of raw land. I mean, the Louisiana Purchase was, say, $15 million for 800,000 or so square miles of land. In fact, you’re sitting on land that came with the Louisiana Purchase.

比如说，你可以考虑原始土地。路易斯安那购地花了1500万美元，得到了约80万平方英里的土地。实际上，你坐在的土地就是路易斯安那购地的一部分。

And so what’d we pay? We paid 20 bucks a square mile. And, you know, 640 acres in a square mile. And you’re down to three cents or something. So that was a pretty good purchase of what was then a nonproductive property. But it’d depend — but it’s very hard. You can buy stamps. Bill Gross got, you know, collected a wonderful stamp collection. It sold for more money in the end.

所以我们付了多少钱？我们每平方英里付了 20 美元。你知道，1 平方英里有 640 英亩。这样算下来，每英亩大约三美分。所以那是一个相当不错的购买，当时那是一块非生产性财产。但这要看情况——但这很难。你可以买邮票。比尔·格罗斯收集了一个很棒的邮票收藏，最后卖了更多的钱。

But it’s dependent on somebody else wanting to buy, hoping they will sell it for more money and so on.

但这依赖于其他人想要购买，希望他们能以更高的价格出售等等。

And in the end you make your money on productive assets. If you buy a farm, you try to estimate what the crops, what amount per acre of soybeans or corn or whatever may be raised, and how much you have to pay the farmer that farms it for you, and what your taxes will be, and various things. And you make a conclusion based on what the asset itself will produce over time. And that’s an investment.

最终，您通过生产性资产赚钱。如果您购买一块农田，您会尝试估算作物的产量，每英亩大豆、玉米或其他作物的产量，以及您需要支付给为您耕作的农民的费用，还有您的税费以及其他各种因素。您会根据资产本身随时间产生的收益得出结论。这就是投资。

When you buy something because you’re hoping tomorrow morning you’re going to wake up, you know, and the price will be higher, the only reason, you know, you need more people coming into it than are leaving.

当你购买某样东西是因为你希望明天早上醒来时，价格会更高，唯一的原因就是，你需要更多的人进入这个市场，而不是离开。

And you can get that. And it will feed on itself for a while, and sometimes for a long while, and sometimes to extraordinary numbers. But in the end — but they come to bad endings. And cryptocurrencies will come to bad endings.

你可以得到这种情况。它会自我繁衍一段时间，有时是很长的时间，有时是到极端的数字。但最终——但它们会有糟糕的结局。加密货币将会以糟糕的结局收场。

And along with the fact that there’s nothing being produced in the way of value from the asset that you also have the problem that it draws in a lot of charlatans and that sort of thing who are trying to create various sorts of exchanges or whatever it may be.

并且，由于该资产没有产生任何价值，您还面临着吸引大量骗子等问题，他们试图创建各种交易所或其他形式的东西。

You know, it’s something where people who are of less than stellar character see an opportunity to clip people who are trying to get rich because their neighbor’s getting rich buying this stuff that neither one of them understands. It will come to a bad ending.

你知道，这是一种情况，那些品德不佳的人看到机会，想要利用那些试图致富的人，因为他们的邻居通过购买这些他们都不理解的东西而变得富有。这将以不好的结局告终。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I like cryptocurrencies a lot less than you do. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我对加密货币的喜爱远不如你。（笑声）

And so to me it’s just dementia. And I think the people who are professional traders that go into trading cryptocurrencies, it’s just disgusting. It’s like somebody else is trading turds and you decide, “I can’t be left out.” (Laughter and applause)

对我来说，这就是痴呆症。我认为那些专业交易员进入加密货币交易的人，真是令人厌恶。就像其他人在交易粪便，而你决定：“我不能被落下。”（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: To the extent that this — we are being webcast around the world, I hope some of our stuff doesn’t translate very well, actually. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：在一定程度上，由于我们正在全球直播，我希望我们的一些内容实际上翻译得不太好。（笑声）

45. Shareholders will get a lot of the corporate tax cut benefit

股东将获得企业大量减税的好处。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gary.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，盖瑞。

GARY RANSOM: Yes, I had a question on the corporate tax rate. And we have a debate in my investment world about where the benefits of that cut fall. And I’d say the consensus is going to the consumer as it gets competed away over time. But perhaps some of it sticks to shareholders.

加里·兰索姆：是的，我对企业税率有一个问题。在我的投资领域，我们对这项减税的好处归属有争论。我认为共识是，随着时间的推移，这些好处会被竞争消耗，最终流向消费者。但也许其中一部分会留给股东。

And my question is, do you think, over the long run, some of the benefits sticks to shareholders? And maybe it’s even beyond auto insurance? Maybe it’s other businesses you have as well.

我的问题是，您认为从长远来看，一些好处会留给股东吗？也许这甚至超出了汽车保险？也许还有您拥有的其他业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what people do generally with that is they take what they want to be the answer for them and then they hire — or they just attach themselves to some economist that gives them a more complicated way of saying it’s all going to be wonderful because it’s happened.

沃伦·巴菲特：人们通常会这样做，他们会选择他们想要的答案，然后他们雇佣——或者他们只是依附于某个经济学家，给他们一个更复杂的说法，声称一切都会很好，因为这已经发生了。

But the answer is that in the case of our regulated public utilities, the benefits are all supposed to go, and will go, to the utility customer, because we’re entitled to a return on equity if we perform well. And we’re not entitled to get excess returns because our tax rates changed. And similarly, if tax rates would go back up, we would expect to get compensated for that. So in that area — and that was 5 or $6 billion for us.

但答案是，在我们受监管的公共事业的情况下，所有的利益都应该归于并将归于公用事业客户，因为如果我们表现良好，我们有权获得股本回报。而我们无权因为税率的变化而获得超额回报。同样，如果税率上升，我们也希望得到相应的补偿。因此在这一领域——对我们来说是 50 亿或 60 亿美元。

But in that area, absolutely, it goes to the user, the consumer. And it should.

但在那个领域，绝对是归用户和消费者的。这是应该的。

Then the question is, with the remainder, does it get competed away or not? And the answer is sometimes it does, sometimes it gets competed very quickly and substantially. Sometimes it may be slow. And other times it probably won’t.

那么问题是，剩余部分是被竞争掉了还是没有？答案是，有时会，有时会很快而且显著地被竞争掉。有时可能会很慢。而其他时候可能不会。

The one thing to know is that the change in the corporate tax law was good for shareholders, generally, and Berkshire shareholders. I mean — and that’s what Congress passed. And the intent had to be that if you were going to cut taxes that shareholders would get a particularly large portion this time. And some of you will agree with that politically and some of you won’t agree with it politically. But you’ll all benefit equally. (Laughs)

要知道的一件事是，企业税法的变化总体上对股东，尤其是伯克希尔的股东是有利的。我的意思是——这就是国会通过的法案。其意图必须是，如果要减税，股东这次将获得特别大的一部分。有些人可能在政治上同意这一点，有些人则不同意。但你们都会平等受益。（笑）

And I think it’s human nature if you’re getting a break to say it’s going to work wonderfully for everybody else. And we’ll find out whether it will or not.

我认为这是人性，如果你得到了一个机会，就会说这对其他人会非常有效。我们将看看它是否真的有效。

It’s very, very, very difficult in economics to measure the impact of single variables. You cannot just do one thing in economics. People kind of learn that in physics and talk about butterflies in China and all that sort of thing. But the — every question you get in economics the next, any statement, you should say “and then what?”

在经济学中，衡量单一变量的影响是非常非常困难的。你不能在经济学中只做一件事。人们在物理学中学到这一点，并谈论中国的蝴蝶和所有这些事情。但是，在经济学中，你得到的每一个问题，接下来的任何陈述，你都应该问“然后呢？”

And when you get into the “and then whats” you get start favoring people who give an answer to that in political life that happens to usually help you in some way or another, including your pocketbook. And we’ve see that with this. And it’s helped the shareholders at Berkshire Hathaway.

当你进入“然后呢”时，你开始偏向于给出一个答案的政治生活，这个答案通常会在某种方式上对你有利，包括你的钱包。我们在这方面也看到了。这对伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东有好处。

I would say that some will be competed away. Some, by law, will go to the utilities and some will benefit Berkshire shareholders. Charlie?

我会说，有些将被竞争淘汰。有些将根据法律归公用事业公司所有，还有一些将使伯克希尔的股东受益。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

46. Utilizing multicultural backgrounds to improve international economies, and the benefits of multiculturality

利用多元文化背景改善国际经济及多元文化的好处

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Kevin and I’m from Shenzhen, China, currently studying finance and philosophy at Boston College.

观众成员：嗨，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫凯文，来自中国深圳，目前在波士顿学院学习金融和哲学。

I have a rather broad question. In this more and more globalized world, what do you think our younger generation can do to best leverage our background and experience of both China and U.S. to create values and for the benefit two countries’ economy and relationship? And what do you see valuable in a person with a multicultural background? Thank you.

我有一个相当广泛的问题。在这个日益全球化的世界中，您认为我们的年轻一代可以如何最好地利用我们在中国和美国的背景和经验来创造价值，并为两国的经济和关系带来好处？您认为拥有多元文化背景的人有什么价值？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think in answer to the last question, I think it’s terrific to have a multicultural background. And I never was any good at languages. But if I were in college today, in either country, I’d be learning the language of the other country, because I think it would be a great advantage over time.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为对于最后一个问题的回答，我认为拥有多元文化背景是非常棒的。我从来不擅长语言。但如果我今天在任何一个国家上大学，我会学习另一个国家的语言，因为我认为这在长远来看会是一个很大的优势。

The first part of the question, I’d like to have that stated again to me. I want to make sure I’m answering your specific aspect there on the — I think it’s going to be good for your future. But can we have the microphone on up there again?

问题的第一部分，我希望能再说一遍。我想确保我在回答你提到的具体方面——我认为这对你的未来会有好处。但我们能把上面的麦克风再打开吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So the first part of the question is, like, what do you think our younger generation can do to best leverage our background and experience of both China and U.S.?

观众成员：那么问题的第一部分是，你认为我们年轻一代可以如何最好地利用我们在中国和美国的背景和经验？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d start with being multilingual, I mean, certainly, in terms of, you know, I mean, obviously you want to be able to express yourself in both. And the better you can understand, obviously, the culture of another society, obviously, that’s a benefit.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会从掌握多种语言开始，我的意思是，当然，在表达自己方面，你知道，我的意思是，显然你希望能够用两种语言表达自己。而且，你越能理解另一个社会的文化，显然，这就是一种好处。

But I think the market system, modified as it may be, both in China and in the United States, in a way, it really does — there will be an invisible hand, to some extent, that does work to improve the lot of future generations by the fact that both China and the United States, and the rest of the world, is improving. I mean, it is much better, in my view, particularly in a nuclear world. But it’s much better to have people prospering throughout the world, partly through their own efforts but partly through their interactions with the rest of the world.

但我认为，无论在中国还是美国，市场体系虽然有所调整，但在某种程度上，它确实存在一只看不见的手，通过中国、美国以及世界其他地方的进步，改善未来几代人的生活。我认为，特别是在核武器的世界中，这种情况要好得多。让世界各地的人们繁荣发展，部分是通过他们自己的努力，部分是通过与世界其他地区的互动，这要好得多。

And we’ve made a lot of progress in that respect particularly since World War II. I mean, it was a terrific idea to have the Marshall Plan, you know, instead of behaving like we did after World War I and getting the result that we got. I think we behaved much more intelligently after World War II.

我们在这方面取得了很大进展，特别是自第二次世界大战以来。我的意思是，马歇尔计划是个很棒的主意，你知道的，和我们在第一次世界大战后那样的行为相比，得到了我们所得到的结果。我认为我们在第二次世界大战后表现得更加聪明。

So I’m bullish on the future of United States. But I’m bullish on the future of China, and to a significant extent, you know, the rest of the world.

所以我对美国的未来持乐观态度。但我对中国的未来也持乐观态度，并且在很大程度上，我对世界其他地方的未来也持乐观态度。

People are going to be living better 10, 20, 50 years from now. And I don’t think that’s something that can be stopped even. Charlie? Absent weapons of mass destruction.

人们在未来 10 年、20 年、50 年将会生活得更好。我认为这甚至是无法阻止的。查理？在没有大规模杀伤性武器的情况下。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, the multicultural stuff, it wouldn’t do you much good to be fluent in both English and Chinese if you were, say, a proctologist in China or a proctologist in Nebraska. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，多元文化的东西，如果你在中国或内布拉斯加州是个肛肠科医生，流利掌握英语和中文也没什么太大用处。（笑声）

So if you’re going to use your multicultural background, you’ve got to work at some interface between the United States and China.

所以如果你打算利用你的多元文化背景，你必须在美国和中国之间找到某种接口。

And you can raise money in the United States and invest it in China like Li Lu does or you can be some kind of an importer or a trade specialist. But you’ve got to get near that interface to benefit from being bilingual and so on.

你可以在美国筹集资金并像李录一样投资于中国，或者你可以成为某种进口商或贸易专家。但你必须接近那个接口，才能从双语能力等中受益。

WARREN BUFFETT: But you would bet that the interface will be substantially greater.

沃伦·巴菲特：但你可以预见到这个接口会大大增加。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Huge. 查理·芒格：巨大。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Huge. 查理·芒格：巨大。

WARREN BUFFETT: And that’s what you want to prepare for.

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是你想要准备的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. And I think that, generally speaking, that we get multicultural you can also be multidisciplinary. But generally I think people make more money if they’re very narrowly specialized, like the proctologist. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我认为，通常来说，我们可以是多元文化的，同时也可以是多学科的。但一般来说，我认为如果人们非常专门化，比如肛肠科医生，他们赚的钱会更多。（笑声）

And it’s much harder to make a lot of money for most people if you try to imitate Warren and me.

如果你试图模仿沃伦和我，大多数人赚钱就会困难得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m glad I didn’t meet him earlier. I mean — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我很高兴我没有更早遇到他。我的意思是——（笑声）

47. Subsidiaries encouraged to offer low-cost 401(k) options

鼓励子公司提供低成本的 401(k)选项

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, this question comes from someone who says, “I am a Berkshire employee and shareholder.”

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，这个问题来自一位说：“我是伯克希尔的员工和股东。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Uh huh. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: “I read an investigative article from ProPublica and The Washington Post that many of Berkshire’s various units only offer 401(k) plans with high fees that are actively managed rather than the low-cost indexes you have advocated as the best path for savings for retirement.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这位员工说：“我读到了一篇来自ProPublica和《华盛顿邮报》的调查文章，文章指出伯克希尔旗下的许多单位只提供高费用的401(k)计划，而不是您一直倡导的低成本指数基金。

“The article’s author said he contacted the company and nobody would comment.

“文章的作者说他联系了公司，但没有人愿意评论。”

“Will you do something to improve our 401(k) offerings to match your investment philosophy? And from an operational perspective, how did this happen, given your strong views on the topic?”

“你会采取措施改善我们的 401(k)产品，以符合你的投资理念吗？从运营的角度来看，考虑到你对这个话题的强烈看法，这种情况是如何发生的？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ve absolutely said what — many, many times through annual reports — and our managers know what I think about the attractiveness of having an index fund option. But they all have different plans, different histories. And they run their businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我确实在年报中多次提到过——而且我们的管理者知道我对有指数基金选项的吸引力的看法。但他们都有不同的计划、不同的历史。他们运营自己的业务。

And who knows, you know, which particular — if you go back to the older businesses, they have defined benefit pension plans, generally. Nobody puts them in anymore. And then the question is, you know, do you transition to something else.

而谁知道呢，你知道，具体是哪一种——如果你回到老旧的企业，他们通常有确定收益的养老金计划。现在没有人再设立这种计划了。然后问题是，你知道，你是否要过渡到其他东西。

In the end, we overwhelmingly thought our managers make those kind of decisions and others. And my guess is that a very high significant percentage of people who have — who work at a company that has a 401(k) plan will have an index fund option, but they may not, in some cases.

最后，我们普遍认为我们的经理会做出那种决策以及其他决策。我的猜测是，拥有 401(k)计划的公司的员工中，有很高的比例会有指数基金选项，但在某些情况下，他们可能没有。

The only thing we — I think we have asked the companies to have a limit on the percentage, I think, that they might put in Berkshire’s stock through the 401(k). We don’t want people to lose jobs who are tied to Berkshire.

我们唯一要求公司的是对他们通过 401(k)投资伯克希尔股票的比例设定一个限制。我认为我们不希望与伯克希尔相关联的人失去工作。

We certainly don’t want to be in the position of encouraging to put 100 percent or something of their savings in Berkshire itself. I don’t want to be in that position.

我们当然不想鼓励人们将他们的 100%或某些储蓄投入到伯克希尔本身。我不想处于那种境地。

But I don’t think even there we’ve insisted on any company doing that. I think we’ve probably made that, when we’ve been asked about it once or twice, I think we’ve given that suggestion.

但我认为即使在那儿，我们也没有坚持让任何公司这样做。我想当我们被问到这件事一两次时，我们可能给出了这个建议。

But the managers will run the companies. The employees, if they feel — and some of our companies have human relations departments — if they feel that they’d like different options or something like that, you know, they should make those views known to the managers. And in some cases the managers, I think, will pay attention to them and in others they probably won’t.

但经理们会管理公司。如果员工觉得——我们的一些公司有人力资源部门——如果他们觉得想要不同的选择或类似的东西，他们应该向经理表达这些观点。在某些情况下，我认为经理们会关注他们，而在其他情况下，他们可能不会。

We’ve got a wide variety of managers that run our businesses. And we’re not going to start trying to run them from Omaha.

我们有多种多样的经理来管理我们的业务。我们不会从奥马哈开始尝试管理它们。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’re right. That has happened. That business of the high-fee choices, because we’ve delegated the whole subject to the managers of the subsidiaries. And so no attention at all is being given to the employee choices at headquarters.

查理·芒格：你说得对。这确实发生了。高费用选择的业务，因为我们将整个问题委托给了子公司的管理者。因此，总部对员工选择根本没有给予任何关注。

And what you’re pointing out is that a lot of the employees in the subsidiaries would do better if they indexed instead of choosing what they did choose. My guess is you’re absolutely right about that. You know.

你指出的是，很多子公司的员工如果选择指数基金，可能会表现得更好。我的猜测是你完全正确。你知道。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And if there are any people, managers, in the business today, I hope we’ll do a little better at encouraging better choices.

查理·芒格：如果今天有任何人、管理者在这个行业，我希望我们能在鼓励更好的选择方面做得更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, although we don’t want them to interfere too much in —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，尽管我们不希望他们过多干预——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: — directing what they, you know, we can take over human relations.

沃伦·巴菲特：——指导他们。我们可以接管人力资源。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it’s up to the managers. But we wouldn’t object to a little different viewpoint.

查理·芒格：不，这是管理者的责任。但我们不反对不同的观点。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we have made it very clear what we think. I mean, some of them don’t listen to us. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们已经非常明确地表达了我们的看法。我的意思是，有些人不听我们的意见。（笑声）

48. Berkshire’s culture will continue because “it works”

伯克希尔的文化将继续存在，因为“它有效”。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Warren, you’ve noted time and again that there is a strong common culture shared across Berkshire subsidiaries built on a commitment to honesty and integrity, a focus on the long-term, and an emphasis on customer care. And it’s also critical to find cultures that mesh well with Berkshire’s when acquiring operating companies.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，你多次提到，伯克希尔子公司之间有着强烈的共同文化，这种文化建立在对诚实和正直的承诺、对长期发展的关注以及对客户关怀的重视之上。在收购运营公司时，找到与伯克希尔文化相契合的文化也是至关重要的。

In most cases, the managers that are currently running these subsidiaries are the same individuals who are members of the families that originally sold their firms to Berkshire, leaving them with a vested interest in the businesses they are running and a strong connection to the culture they tend to share in common with Berkshire.

在大多数情况下，目前管理这些子公司的经理与最初将其公司出售给伯克希尔的家庭成员是同一批人，这使他们对所管理的业务有着既得利益，并与伯克希尔共享的文化有着强烈的联系。

It seems to me that the greater challenge is in ensuring that the large publicly-traded firms that have been acquired and account for a meaningful and growing amount of Berkshire’s overall value, stay the course. Could you comment on whether or not this is the case and what the greatest challenge is for you and Charlie when it comes to not only maintaining Berkshire’s culture but in finding firms that would fit in well with what you’ve built?

在我看来，更大的挑战在于确保那些被收购的大型上市公司能够保持稳定，这些公司占据了伯克希尔整体价值的相当大且不断增长的部分。您能否评论一下这是否属实，以及在维护伯克希尔的文化方面，您和查理面临的最大挑战是什么，同时还要找到与您所建立的企业文化相契合的公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think the culture is very, very strong. And I think it gets reinforced — frankly, I think it gets reinforced by the shareholders we have. I mean, we have a different body of shareholders and we look at those shareholders, I think, in a somewhat different way than a good many other companies do.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为文化非常强大。我认为这得到了加强——坦率地说，我认为这得到了我们股东的加强。我的意思是，我们有一群不同的股东，我们以一种与许多其他公司不同的方式看待这些股东。

I mean, I think there are a fair number of public companies that wish they didn’t have, you know, public shareholders. We’re happy to have public shareholders. And we like having individual shareholders. And we don’t favor institutions. And we’re not going to, you know, give guidance and talk especially to them on investor calls and all that sort of thing. We want our — we want it to be directly with — we want shareholders who are partners, basically.

我的意思是，我认为有相当多的上市公司希望他们没有公众股东。我们很高兴有公众股东。我们喜欢有个人股东。我们不偏向机构股东。我们不会在投资者电话会议上特别给他们提供指导和交流。我们希望我们的股东基本上是合作伙伴。

And it begins with that. It goes to the directors. We have directors who are not — well, I’ve been on 19 boards, and I’ve never seen another board like ours. And I think it’s terrific that we’ve got the people who represent, in many cases, lots of shares themselves. They didn’t gets special deals. It’s a group of owner-oriented, Berkshire-conscious, business-savvy owners.

这就开始了。它传递给董事们。我们有一些董事——我已经在 19 个董事会任职，我从未见过像我们这样的董事会。我认为我们有很多情况下代表大量股份的人，这真是太棒了。他们没有获得特殊待遇。这是一群以所有者为导向、关注伯克希尔、精明的业主。

And we don’t have anybody on the board because they’re a leading, you know, educator or whatever it may be. We want people who, basically, think about how to run a business well for themselves and for their partners. And we’ve got managers who fit into that culture, who have chosen that culture in coming with us.

我们董事会没有人是因为他们是领先的教育者或其他什么。我希望有那些基本上会考虑如何为自己和他们的合作伙伴良好运营企业的人。我们有适合这种文化的管理者，他们在加入我们时选择了这种文化。

And sometimes we have the second or the third or fourth generation, say at the Nebraska Furniture Mart, that share that. Is it perfect? No, it’s far from perfect. I mean, you don’t get everybody thinking the same way. We have people — we have people that are very independently minded running a lot of businesses. And some of them have different political beliefs, they have different — they see through different lenses than we do, to some degree.

有时候，我们在内布拉斯加家具市场会看到第二代、第三代或第四代的人分享这些观点。它完美吗？不，远非完美。我的意思是，大家的想法并不完全一致。我们有一些人——我们有一些非常独立思考的人在经营许多企业。其中一些人有不同的政治信仰，他们在某种程度上以不同的视角看待事物。

But in terms of having a common, strong, positive culture, I don’t think there’s any big public company that has it any better than Berkshire. And I think that will continue because people opt into it to a great deal. Cultures get passed along. You do things that are consistent with the culture, so you do — what you talk about is what you do.

但在拥有一种共同、强大、积极的文化方面，我认为没有任何大型上市公司比伯克希尔做得更好。我认为这种情况会继续下去，因为人们在很大程度上选择加入这种文化。文化是相互传递的。你做的事情与文化是一致的，所以你所谈论的就是你所做的。

And you don’t find people saying, you know, “We’re a wonderful partnership,” and then voting themselves, you know, huge options. And then a whole bunch of other people will say options beneath them because they can’t look like they’re taking it all for themselves, and arranging — I read about some deal where it could pay off with many, many, many billions of dollars, the other day. We won’t name names.

你不会发现有人说，“我们是一个了不起的合伙关系，”然后给自己发巨额期权。然后其他人会得到比他们低的期权，因为他们不能看起来像是自己独占所有，然后安排——我最近读到一个交易，可能会带来很多很多亿美元，我们不提名字。

But we’ve got as good a culture as you can get. And I would say, net, it grows stronger. We have a few people all of the time that really don’t buy into it entirely. I mean, it is not 100 percent. But it’s as close to it.

但我们的文化已经非常优秀。我会说，总体上，它在不断增强。我们总有一些人并不完全认同。我是说，这并不是百分之百。但它已经接近了。

And I think it gets closer all the time as we go along. And we will keep — we will try to keep behaving in a way that reinforces it and doesn’t dilute it. And I think that will not only work for Charlie and me but it will work for our successors very well. It won’t be perfect.

我认为随着时间的推移，这种关系会越来越紧密。我们会努力保持一种强化这种关系的行为，而不是削弱它。我认为这不仅对查理和我有用，对我们的继任者也会非常有效。虽然不会完美。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Every time I come to one of these meetings and sit in the manager’s luncheon, I feel more strongly at the end of the luncheon that the culture and values of Berkshire Hathaway will go on and on for a long time after the present management is gone.

查理·芒格：每次我参加这样的会议，坐在经理的午餐会上，我越发坚信，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的文化和价值观将在现任管理层离开后继续存在很长时间。

In fact, I think it’ll go on after all of the present managers are gone. I think we’ve started something here that will work well enough that it will last. And one of the reasons it will last is it’s not that damned easy to duplicate.

事实上，我认为在所有现任经理离开后，这一切仍会继续。我认为我们在这里开始了一些足够有效的事情，它会持续下去。而它能够持续的原因之一是，这并不是那么容易复制的。

So the one that is present is likely to just keep going and going. Think of how little direct copying of the Berkshire system there’s been.

因此，现有的文化可能会不断延续。想想伯克希尔系统的直接复制有多么少。

WARREN BUFFETT: But it won’t produce the returns it’s produced in the past even.

沃伦·巴菲特：但它不会产生过去那样的回报。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think it’s going to last a long time for a very simple reason. It’s going to —

查理·芒格：不，我认为这将持续很长时间，原因很简单。它将会——

WARREN BUFFETT: It works.

沃伦·巴菲特：它有效。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — deserve to last a long time.

查理·芒格：——值得长久存在。

WARREN BUFFETT: It works.

沃伦·巴菲特：它有效。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And it’s going to work.

查理·芒格：这将会成功。

49. Cash needed to support Berkshire insurance operations

支持伯克希尔保险业务所需的现金

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Christian Marx. I’m a proud shareholder from Cologne, Germany. It is my pleasure to be here.

观众成员：我的名字是克里斯蒂安·马克斯。我是来自德国科隆的自豪股东。很高兴能在这里。

My question relates to the Berkshire insurance operations. When I look at the quarterly balance sheets of the last two decades, I noticed a pattern that I kindly ask you to discuss.

我的问题与伯克希尔的保险业务有关。当我查看过去二十年的季度资产负债表时，我注意到一个模式，我恳请您讨论一下。

The sum of cash plus fixed income always hovers around 100 percent of the amount of insurance float. Therefore, my question is, is it fair to say that from the 128 billion of consolidated cash plus fixed income as of March, 116 billion are actually needed to support the insurance operations?

现金加固定收益的总和始终徘徊在保险浮存金的 100%左右。因此，我的问题是，是否可以公平地说，截至三月的 1280 亿美元的合并现金加固定收益中，实际上有 1160 亿美元是需要用来支持保险业务的？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I appreciate —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我很感激——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The answer is no. Yes.

查理·芒格：答案是否定的。是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer is no. But he deserves an explanation of how this — maybe I haven’t looked at it the way he’s looked at it.

沃伦·巴菲特：答案是否定的。但他值得一个解释，说明这是怎么回事——也许我没有像他那样看待它。

We would much rather have a number closer to 20 than to have 116. And we do not correlate or, in effect, measure the float and then decide how much to put or leave in cash, in fixed income.

我们更希望有一个接近20而不是116的数字。我们不会将现金和固定收益的资金与浮存金进行关联或衡量。

The fact —our float keeps growing. And lately our — which is by design and has been terrific for us — and our cash and cash equivalents have has grown because the competition for acquisitions has become much stronger as — both as money has piled up with the buyers of businesses and because debt has been so cheap and a variety of factors.

事实上——我们的浮存金持续增长。最近，我们的——这是有意为之，对我们来说非常好——我们的现金和现金等价物也随之增长，因为收购的竞争变得更加强烈——无论是由于买家资金的积累，还是由于债务便宜以及各种因素。

But I don’t think those are necessarily permanent. In fact, it would be reasonably true they aren’t permanent. It’s just a question of when they change.

但我认为这些不一定是永久的。事实上，合理地说，它们并不是永久的。这只是一个它们何时改变的问题。

发生灾难性下跌只是时间的问题。

We are not tying, as Charlie said, we’re not tying the cash and cash equivalents at all to float. The float is (inaudible).

我们并没有像查理所说的那样，将现金和现金等价物与浮存金完全挂钩。浮存金是（听不清）。

The float went up $2 billion in the first quarter. And there is no way that that that float can shrink a lot in any short period. It just structurally has been set up in such a way that it will not — it cannot shrink. And actually, I think it’ll grow a little bit for a while.

浮存金在第一季度上升了 20 亿美元。而且在任何短时间内，这个浮存金不可能大幅缩小。它的结构设置就是这样，不会——也不能缩小。实际上，我认为它会在一段时间内稍微增长。

I mean, I’ve always been amazed by how much it has grown. We’ve got so much more float than any property-causality company in the world. And it’s pretty amazing that it all came from that little building that Jack Ringwalt built and picked the location because it was near the tennis courts. (Laughs)

我一直对它的增长感到惊讶。我们拥有的浮动资金比世界上任何财产保险公司都要多。这真是令人惊讶，都是来自那个小建筑，Jack Ringwalt 建造的，他选择了那个位置，因为它靠近网球场。（笑）

OK, Carol. 好的，卡罗尔。

Oh, and Charlie. 哦，还有查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: There are encouraging recent developments. Some of the cash has gone out recently for securities we vastly prefer over the cash. And we have a lot of cash that could be — remaining — that could be deployed in securities we might like a lot better than Treasury notes. So stay tuned.

查理·芒格：最近有一些令人鼓舞的发展。一些现金最近用于我们远远更喜欢的证券。我们还有很多现金可以——剩下的——用于我们可能更喜欢的证券，而不是国债。所以请继续关注。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, to make it very simple, in the first quarter we earned five and — from operations we earned a little over $5 billion. Now, we only spent about our depreciation. Normally we would spend somewhat more than that. But that’s 5-and-a-fraction billion. Two billion came, in net, from float. So that’s $7 billion that — basically in the first quarter — that would have been added to our cash if we hadn’t done something with it. And instead our cash and equivalents went down, because we, net, invested more in equities by some margin than the seven that came in.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，简单来说，在第一季度我们从运营中赚了超过 50 亿美元。现在，我们只花费了大约我们的折旧。通常我们会花费稍微多一些。但那是 50 亿加一点。净浮存金收入为 20 亿。所以在第一季度，基本上有 70 亿美元本来会增加到我们的现金中，如果我们没有对其进行处理。相反，我们的现金及现金等价物减少了，因为我们净投资于股票的金额比进来的 70 亿多了一些。

But we do have this position where, even absent a change in float, about 400 million comes into Berkshire every week, which is very comfortable. (Laughs)

但我们确实有这样的情况，即使没有浮存金的变化，每周大约有 4 亿进入伯克希尔，这让人感到非常舒适。（笑）

And we will — we want to get it so that more than 400 million is going out into productive assets. And we succeeded in doing that in the first quarter. And, net, net we improved our position in the first quarter.

我们希望将超过 4 亿投入到生产性资产中。在第一季度，我们成功实现了这一目标。总体而言，我们在第一季度改善了我们的状况。

50. “Amazing” earnings in the new “asset-light economy”

在新的“轻资产经济”中，“惊人的”收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: In your 1999 article in Fortune magazine, you stated your belief that after-tax corporate profits were unlikely to hold much above 6 percent for any sustained period, due not only to competition but also to public policy.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：在您 1999 年发表于《财富》杂志的文章中，您表示相信，税后企业利润不太可能在任何持续时期内保持在 6%以上，这不仅是由于竞争，还与公共政策有关。

You stated in the article, “If corporate investors, in aggregate, are going to eat an ever-growing portion of the economic pie, some other group will have to settle for a smaller portion. That would justifiably raise political problems.”

您在文章中提到：“如果企业投资者总体上将占据越来越大的一部分经济蛋糕，那么其他某个群体就必须满足于更小的一部分。这无疑会引发政治问题。”

Since 2008, after-tax corporate profits have been 8 to 10 percent of GDP. Do you believe that is a permanent shift in the U.S. economy? And of course, we have to think about the latest tax bill. Or will corporate profits revert back to the 4 percent to 6 percent of GDP range that was normal in the 20th century?

自 2008 年以来，税后企业利润占 GDP 的 8%到 10%。你认为这是美国经济的永久性转变吗？当然，我们还必须考虑最新的税法。或者企业利润会否回到 20 世纪正常的 4%到 6%的 GDP 范围？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s been an interesting development during that period. It goes back a little bit before that period. But you now have the four largest companies, by market value, in the United States — a $30 trillion market — you have four companies that essentially don’t need any net tangible assets.

沃伦·巴菲特：这段时间确实是个有趣的发展。这个现象其实早于这个时期。你现在在美国市值最大的四家公司——一个30万亿美元的市场——中，有四家公司基本上不需要任何净有形资产。

And if you go back many years, I mean, if you looked to the largest companies — Carol used to put out the Fortune 500 list. And you know, it would be AT&T and General Motors, and it was companies that — Exxon Mobil — it was companies that just required lots of capital in order to produce earnings.

如果你回顾很多年前，我的意思是，如果你看看最大的公司——卡罗尔曾经发布《财富 500 强》名单。你知道，那时是 AT&T 和通用汽车，还有埃克森美孚——这些公司都需要大量资本才能产生收益。

So American industry has gotten incredibly more profitable, in aggregate, in the last 20 or 30 years. You look at the return on the S&P 500, the earnings as a percent of net tangible assets, and the rest is just, you know, if you buy a company that has a million dollars’ worth of net worth and you pay a billion for it, it still only had the million dollars’ of net worth. I mean you just paid more for it. So the basic profitability of the company is huge, even though your investment may be at a significantly higher price.

所以美国工业在过去 20 或 30 年中整体上变得极其盈利。你看看标准普尔 500 指数的回报率，收益占净有形资产的百分比，其余的就是，如果你购买一家净资产价值一百万美元的公司，而你为此支付十亿，那么它仍然只有一百万美元的净资产。我的意思是，你只是为它支付了更多。因此，公司的基本盈利能力是巨大的，即使你的投资可能以显著更高的价格进行。

So that what has happened is that, I think if you look at the earnings on tangible net worth of the S&P 500 and compare it to 20 years ago, it is amazing. And that is really due to the fact that this has become somewhat, you could call it an asset-light economy.

所以发生的事情是，我认为如果你查看标准普尔 500 指数的有形净资产收益，并将其与 20 年前进行比较，这真是令人惊讶。这实际上是因为这已经变成了一种可以称之为轻资产经济的状态。

And you know, those four companies that earn 10 percent of the — they comprise close to 10 percent of the market value of the entire publicly-traded corporate America, they don’t — and they don’t take any money, basically. And that is a changing world. And they will earn even more money with the tax rate going down.

你知道，那四家公司占据了整个美国上市公司市场价值的近 10%，他们基本上不拿任何钱。这是一个变化的世界。随着税率的降低，他们将赚更多的钱。

And I don’t think people have quite processed all that information in terms of what has gone on in the market.

我认为人们还没有完全消化市场上发生的所有信息。

You don’t — you know, [Andrew] Carnegie built a steel mill, and then he paid it off. Or he borrowed a little money, and then he built another steel mill, and all of that sort of thing. But it was enormously capital-intensive.

你不会——你知道，[安德鲁] 卡内基建了一座钢铁厂，然后他还清了债务。或者他借了一点钱，然后又建了一座钢铁厂，诸如此类。但这非常需要资本。

And one industry after another. AT&T was enormously capital-intensive. And now the money is in the asset-light — I mean, huge money is in the — not only asset-light business — but the negative asset.

一个行业接着一个行业，AT&T也极其需要资本。而现在，钱在轻资产——我指的是不仅是轻资产业务中的巨额资金——甚至是负资产的业务中。

You know, IBM even, you know, had — it has no tangible — it has a net — minus tangible net worth. There’s nothing wrong with that. It’s terrific. But it is not the world we lived in 30 years ago.

你知道，IBM 甚至——它没有任何有形资产——它的有形净资产是负的。这样并没有什么错。这很棒。但这不是我们 30 年前生活的世界。

And in that sense, I didn’t see that coming in 1999 when I wrote whatever I wrote there. It hasn’t changed the profitability of the asset-heavy companies particularly. I mean, it isn’t like oil.

在这个意义上，我在 1999 年写下我所写的内容时并没有预见到这一点。资产重的公司的盈利能力并没有特别改变。我的意思是，这并不像石油。

If you take the five most capital-intensive industries in the ’90s, I don’t think you’ll find that their earnings on tangible asset have increased a lot. But you will find that this group has moved in that really doesn’t — they don’t need any net tangible assets at all, or they need very minor amounts.

如果你看看 90 年代五个资本密集型行业，我认为你不会发现它们在有形资产上的收益增加了很多。但你会发现这一组行业实际上并没有——它们根本不需要任何净有形资产，或者只需要非常少量的资产。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s also a lot of financial engineering that’s raised leverage, even in the capital-intense businesses. And you know, while Warren may have predicted a little wrong when he wrote that very scholarly article, he didn’t invest wrong. And so it just shows that it’s hard to make these economic predictions.

查理·芒格：还有很多金融工程提高了杠杆，即使在资本密集型企业中。你知道，虽然沃伦在写那篇非常学术的文章时可能预测得有些错误，但他的投资并没有错。因此，这表明做出这些经济预测是很困难的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jon —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔恩——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We weren’t very right on that one, Warren.

查理·芒格：在那件事上我们并没有很正确，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, actually, the performance of the stock market since then has been pretty accurate. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上，自那时以来股市的表现相当准确。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. That’s true.

查理·芒格：是的。那是真的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Being right for the wrong reason or something. (Laughs) Or wrong for the right reasons.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。因为错误的理由而正确，或者因为正确的理由而错误。（笑）

51. “We still feel OK” about AIG’s $10.2 retroactive premium

“我们对 AIG 的 102 亿美元再保险费仍然感到满意”

WARREN BUFFETT: Anyway, Jonathan? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：无论如何，乔纳森？（笑）

JONATHAN BRANDT: Berkshire received a 10.2 billion retroactive premium from AIG early last year. If the upwardly revised estimate of 18.2 billion of ultimate claims proves to be correct, will the cost of float, adjusted for favorable tax attributes, likely be lower or higher than what Berkshire would have paid to borrow 10 billion for a similar duration?

乔纳森·布兰特：伯克希尔去年初从美国国际集团收到了 102 亿美元的再保险费。如果最终索赔的上调估计为 182 亿美元是正确的，那么考虑到有利的税收属性，浮存金成本是否可能低于或高于伯克希尔为借入相似期限的 100 亿美元所支付的费用？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we certainly go in with the idea that it will be — the cost will be lower. And it’s an interesting situation.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们当然是以成本更低的预期进行的。这是一个有趣的情况。

We — essentially, AIG, which is one of the largest property-casualty, particularly commercial property-casualty companies in the world, said, “We want to give you all of the losses that we incurred in a very big percentage of our domestic business before December 31st of 2015, and we will pay the first 25 billion. And then after we pay 25 billion and AIG pays $25 billion, then you pay 80 percent of the next 25 billion.” And they gave us $10 billion for doing that. And that’s —

基本上，AIG——这是全球最大的财产保险公司之一，特别是商业财产保险公司——说：“我们想把在2015年12月31日之前我们在很大程度上承担的损失都转给你们，我们会支付前250亿美元，然后在我们支付250亿美元后，AIG再支付250亿美元的80%，之后你们再支付80%。” 他们为了这样做给了我们100亿美元。

If we are correct about our estimates of how much money will be paid and when it will be paid, we should come out being better off than if we had borrowed a similar amount.

如果我们对支付金额和支付时间的估计是正确的，那么我们应该比借入相似金额时更好。

We have a history of doing 10 or so — maybe 12 — big deals like that. We hold the record. We did it for Lloyd’s of London 10 or more years ago, and we did it now with AIG.

我们有做过大约 10 个——也许 12 个——这样的重大交易的历史。我们保持着这个记录。我们在 10 多年前为伦敦Lloyd’s做过这样的交易，现在又为美国国际集团（AIG）做了。

And sometimes we’ve been on the low side in our estimate, and sometimes we’ve been on the high side so far.

有时我们的估计偏低，有时又偏高。

AIG just said that they — I think they paid 15-and-a-fraction billion on these pre-12/31/2015 losses. They paid 15-and-a-fraction billion. But the payments tend to trickle down over years as you get further away from when the losses occurred.

AIG 刚刚表示，他们——我认为他们在这些 2015 年 12 月 31 日之前的损失上支付了 150 亿多。他们支付了 150 亿多。但随着时间的推移，支付往往会逐渐减少，因为你离损失发生的时间越来越远。

So I would say that we still feel OK about it, and we’ll be wrong one way or the other. Everybody is when you estimate losses that may not get settled for 20 or 30 years. But so far, on the group as a whole of these deals we’ve done, we’ve been OK. And I think on the AIG thing, we think we’ll be OK. And I think AIG thinks we’ll be OK. I mean, they entered into it for good reasons of their own. So it looks OK.

所以我想说我们对此仍然感到不错，我们会以某种方式出错。每个人在估计可能需要 20 或 30 年才能解决的损失时都是如此。但到目前为止，就我们所做的这些交易整体而言，我们还不错。我认为在 AIG 的事情上，我们认为会没问题。我认为 AIG 也认为会没问题。我的意思是，他们出于自己的良好理由参与其中。所以看起来还不错。

Sorry to get into this technical stuff, but Jonathan always asks me questions like that, so I have to be ready to — I want to answer them.

抱歉谈到这些技术问题，但乔纳森总是问我这样的问题，所以我必须准备好——我想回答他们。

52. “We really want products where people feel like kissing you”

“我们真的想要让人们有想要亲吻你的感觉的产品。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 5 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name’s Adam Bergman with Sterling Capital in Virginia Beach, Virginia. I’m here with my daughter Michelle from Cape Henry Collegiate in Virginia Beach.

观众成员：下午好。我叫亚当·伯格曼，来自弗吉尼亚州弗吉尼亚海滩的斯特林资本。我和我的女儿米歇尔一起来自弗吉尼亚海滩的凯普亨利学院。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren, hi Charlie.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦，嗨，查理。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Our question for you is how you go about attempting to forecast the degree of future success of one specific product in a good business versus another, such that you invest in American Express and Coca-Cola rather than Diners Club or RC Cola, for example. Thanks.

观众成员：我们的问题是，您如何预测某一特定产品在良好商业环境中的未来成功程度，以便您选择投资美国运通和可口可乐，而不是 Diners Club 或 RC Cola，例如。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with American Express — (laughs) — it was an interesting situation, because Diners Club got there first. I think American Express, in a certain sense — I mean, they did it for a lot of reasons — but they went into the credit card business because they were worried about what was going to happen to traveler’s checks. And — although traveler’s checks are — still exist in a significant way.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，关于美国运通——（笑）——这是一个有趣的情况，因为Diners Club先到。我认为美国运通在某种意义上——我的意思是，他们出于很多原因这样做——但他们进入信用卡业务是因为他们担心旅行支票会发生什么。而——尽管旅行支票——仍然在很大程度上存在。

But the interesting thing when American Express went into competition with Diners Club, and with Carte Blanche, as I remember that — which also existed at the time — was that instead of charging less than Diners Club and going in figuring they were going against the established guy and they’d come in at a lower price, they went in it at a higher price, as I remember.

但有趣的是，当美国运通与Diners Club和 Carte Blanche 竞争时，我记得当时也存在 Carte Blanche——他们并没有选择比Diners Club收取更低的费用，想着要与这个已建立的品牌竞争并以更低的价格进入市场，而是以更高的价格进入市场，正如我所记得的那样。

And the American Express centurion was on that card. I’ve got one that I got in 1964, but they were in it before that. It had more value in time. I mean, it got better representation. And frankly, if you were a salesperson out with somebody, and you could pull out that American Express card with that centurion, you looked you were JP Morgan. And if you pulled out the Diners Club, it had a whole bunch of flashy symbols, you looked like a guy that was kiting his checks from one month to the next, and — (Laughter)

那张卡上有美国运通的百夫长。我有一张 1964 年得到的卡，但他们在那之前就已经有了。那时候它的价值更高。我是说，它的代表性更强。坦率地说，如果你是一个销售人员，和某人在外面，你能掏出那张带有百夫长的美国运通卡，你看起来就像是 JP 摩根。如果你掏出的是 Diners Club 卡，上面有一堆花哨的符号，你看起来就像是一个从这个月到下一个月透支支票的人，——（笑声）

A fellow named Ralph Schneider — Ralph Schneider and Al Bloomingdale developed the Diners Club. And they were very smart about getting there first, but they weren’t smart about how they merchandised it subsequently.

一个名叫拉尔夫·施奈德的人——拉尔夫·施奈德和阿尔·布鲁明戴尔共同开发了Diners Club。他们在首次推出时非常聪明，但在后续的营销上却不够聪明。

RC Cola, you know, it did — there are all kinds of colas that came after Coke. I mean, you know, you go back to 1886 and come up with something at Jacobs’ Pharmacy that’s incredibly successful, you know, fairly soon you’re going to get lots of imitators. But Coke really is the real thing. And you know, you offer me RC Cola and say, “I’ll give it to you at half the price of Coca-Cola,” in terms of drinking it,

RC 可乐，你知道，它确实如此——在可口可乐之后出现了各种各样的可乐。我是说，你知道，追溯到 1886 年，在雅各布药房推出了一种非常成功的饮料，你知道，很快就会有很多模仿者。但可口可乐确实是真正的东西。你知道，你给我 RC 可乐，并说：“我以可口可乐一半的价格给你”，在饮料方面，

I mean, just, this is a product that’s 6 1/2 ounces, sold for a nickel in 1900, you know. And now if you buy it on the weekend and buy it in large quantities and everything, you’re not paying that much more. This newspaper was three cents in 1942, you know. I mean, the amount of enjoyment per real — in terms of the real — of what you pay for this, has gone dramatically down in inflation-adjusted money. So it is a bargain product.

我的意思是，这是一种 6.5 盎司的产品，1900 年售价五分。现在如果你在周末大量购买，你花的钱并没有多多少。这份报纸在 1942 年售价三分。我是说，按实际支付的金额来看，你所获得的享受程度在经过通货膨胀调整后大幅下降。所以这是一种划算的产品。

You know, you have to look at — See’s Candy, you know, if you live in California and you were a teenage boy, and you went to your girlfriend’s house and you gave the box of candy to her or to her mother or father and she kissed you, you know, you lose price sensitivity at that point. (Laughter)

你知道，你得看看—— See’s，你知道，如果你住在加利福尼亚，作为一个青少年，你去你女朋友家，给她或她的父母送了一盒糖果，然后她亲了你，你知道，那时你就不再在乎价格了。（笑声）

So we really want products where people feel like kissing you, you know — (laughs) — rather than slapping you.

所以我们真的想要让人们感觉想要亲吻你的产品，你知道的——（笑）——而不是想要打你的。

It’s an interesting thing. I mean, you know, in effect we’re betting on the ecosystem of Apple products, but — led by the iPhone. And I see characteristics in that that make me think that it’s extraordinary. But I may be wrong.

这是一件有趣的事情。我的意思是，实际上我们是在押注于苹果产品的生态系统，但——以 iPhone 为主导。我看到其中的一些特征让我觉得它是非凡的。但我可能是错的。

And you know, so far we’ve been — I would say we’ve been right on American Express and Coca-Cola.

到目前为止，我可以说我们对美国运通和可口可乐的判断是正确的。

American Express had this huge salad oil scandal in 1960 happen — in ’63, November, right around the time [President John] Kennedy was shot. And there was really worry about whether the company would survive.

美国运通在 1960 年发生了这个巨大的色拉油丑闻——在 1963 年 11 月，正好是在[总统约翰]肯尼迪被刺杀的那段时间。人们真的很担心公司是否能生存下去。

But nobody quit using the card. Nobody quit using the traveler’s checks. And they charged a premium price for their traveler’s checks. So there are things you can see around consumer products that sometimes can give you a pretty good insight into the future. And then sometimes we make mistakes.

但没有人停止使用这张卡。没有人停止使用旅行支票。他们对旅行支票收取高价。所以你可以看到消费产品的一些事情，有时可以给你对未来有相当好的洞察力。然后有时我们会犯错。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add, except that if we’d been offered a chance to go into Coca-Cola right after it was invented, we probably would have said no.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的，除了如果我们在可口可乐发明后不久就有机会投资，我们可能会说不。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’d have turned it down. Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会拒绝的。是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It would’ve looked kind of silly to us.

查理·芒格：这在我们看来会显得有点傻。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, unless we drank it, now, Charlie, listen. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，除非我们喝了它，查理，听着。（笑）

No, he’s right. I mean, we don’t foresee things that we haven’t got a lot of evidence in on. And —

不，他是对的。我的意思是，我们无法预见没有大量证据的事情。而且——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: We want to see a lot of — if we’re talking about a consumer product — we want to see how a consumer product behaves under a lot of different circumstances, and then we want to use something — actually, there was a book by Phil Fisher written around 1960 called “Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits.” It’s one of the great books on investing.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想看到很多——如果我们在谈论消费品——我们想看看消费品在许多不同情况下的表现，然后我们想使用一些东西——实际上，菲尔·费舍尔在 1960 年左右写了一本书，叫做《普通股与非凡利润》。这是一本关于投资的伟大书籍之一。

And it talks about the “scuttlebutt method” of investing, which was quite a ways from what Ben Graham taught me in terms of figures. But it’s a very, very good book. And you can learn a lot, you know, just by going out and using some shoe leather.

它谈到了一种投资方法，叫做“耳语法”，这与本·格雷厄姆教我的数字方法相距甚远。但这是一本非常好的书。你可以通过一些实地考察来学到很多东西。

Now they call them channel checks now or something like that. But it’s — you can get a feel for some products, and then there are others you can’t. And then sometimes you’re wrong. But it is a good technique. It’s an important investing technique, I would say that. And Ted [Weschler] and Todd [Combs] do a lot of that. And they have people — some people that help them out on doing it, too.

现在他们称之为渠道检查之类的东西。但你可以对某些产品有一定的了解，而对其他产品则无法了解。有时你也会犯错。但这是一种很好的技巧。我会说这是一种重要的投资技巧。Ted [Weschler] 和 Todd [Combs] 做了很多这方面的工作。他们还有一些人帮助他们进行这项工作。

Charlie’s done it with Costco. I mean, he’s — (Laughs)

查理和好市多一起做到了。我是说，他——（笑）

I mean, all the time he is finding new virtues in Costco, you know, and then it — and he’s right, incidentally. I mean, Costco has an enormous appeal to its constituency. They delight — they surprise and delight their customers. And there is nothing like that in business. You have delighted customers, you’re a long way home.

我意思是，他一直在发现好市多的新优点，你知道，然后——顺便说一下，他是对的。我是说，好市多对其顾客群有巨大的吸引力。他们让顾客惊喜和愉悦。在商业中没有什么能比得上这一点。如果你有让顾客满意的服务，你就离成功不远了。

53. Hostile bids aren’t “evil” but Berkshire doesn’t do them

敌意收购并不是“邪恶”的，但伯克希尔不参与此类收购。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This comes from John Hegarty (PH) at Brightstar Capital Partners, who writes, “Warren, you’re stepping down from the Kraft Heinz board at a time when the company’s looking to do a large acquisition: Unilever, for example. Do you fundamentally disagree with the combative nature of hostile bids, activist investing, and competitive proxy contests?”

贝基·奎克：这来自布莱特星资本合伙人约翰·赫加提（PH），他写道：“沃伦，你在卡夫亨氏董事会辞职的时机正值公司寻求进行大规模收购：例如联合利华。你是否根本上不同意敌意收购、激进投资和竞争性代理投票的对抗性本质？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we will not make hostile tenders ourselves. I do not believe that there’s anything fundamentally wrong with the idea. I mean, if you take the Fortune 500 companies, I’m sure that all 500 are not managed by the best, or in some cases even the friendliest to investor managements in the world.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们不会自己进行敌意收购。我认为这个想法从根本上没有什么问题。我的意思是，如果你看看财富 500 强公司，我敢肯定这 500 家公司中并不是所有的都由世界上最优秀的，或者在某些情况下甚至是对投资者最友好的管理层来管理。

So I don’t think it’s evil or anything to conduct a hostile offer for a company. It’s just we won’t do it, and we don’t want to get into that. We like being liked by the managements that we join, because we’re counting on them to run the company, and we’re not bringing in a whole bunch of people that know how to change businesses.

所以我认为对一家公司进行敌意收购并不是邪恶的事情。只是我们不会这样做，我们也不想参与其中。我们喜欢被我们加入的管理层所喜欢，因为我们依赖他们来管理公司，而我们并不会带来一大堆懂得如何改变业务的人。

We seldom take a position opposite the management — very seldom — on anything involving a proxy, but — contest of sorts. But we don’t rule it out. We don’t think every management is entitled to be — you know, they don’t have a lifetime hold on their business. But it’s not our style at all to — well, we won’t do it in terms of initiating it ourselves, and we’d be very, very, very unlikely to support a contest.

我们很少在涉及代理的任何事情上与管理层对立——非常少——但——某种程度上的竞争。但我们并不排除这种可能性。我们不认为每个管理层都有权利——你知道，他们并没有对自己的业务拥有终身控制权。但这绝对不是我们的风格——好吧，我们不会主动发起这样的事情，而且我们非常非常非常不可能支持一场竞争。

But we have voted against a couple of propositions over 50 years that managements have had — made — in relation to stocks options. We withheld a vote at Coca-Cola a few years ago to express our opinion.

但在过去 50 年中，我们对管理层提出的几项与股票期权相关的提案投了反对票。几年前，我们在可口可乐的投票中弃权，以表达我们的意见。

But we don’t think it’s evil for the shareholders, in some cases, to have different opinions about who should run the company, or whether compensation’s appropriate, or matters of that sort. The stockholders still own the company.

但我们认为，股东在某些情况下对谁应该管理公司、薪酬是否合适或类似问题持有不同意见并不是邪恶的。股东仍然拥有公司。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that. I don’t envy these people that are in these unfriendly uproars all the time. Imagine doing that after you’re already rich. It’s insane. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。我不羡慕那些经常参与敌意争夺的人。想象一下，在你已经富有之后再去做这些事，真是疯狂。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, we are definitely not looking for it. We don’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的，我们绝对不在寻找它。我们不——

There are certainly companies that deserve challenge. And they propose things that deserve challenge occasionally. But again, it’s not our main activity.

确实有一些公司值得挑战。它们偶尔提出一些值得挑战的事情。但再说一次，这不是我们的主要活动。

And incidentally, this has — the question was asked in reference to Kraft Heinz.

顺便提一下，这个问题是关于卡夫亨氏的。

The people at 3G are great, great managers. They’ve been wonderful partners. I had made a determination, before we got involved there, I was going to be on no more public boards. I’d been on 19 of them, and it takes a lot of time. And they asked me if I’d go on for a while, and I did.

3G的人是很棒的经理。他们是出色的合作伙伴。在我们参与之前，我已经决定不再参加更多的公开董事会。我已经在19个董事会任职，这需要很多时间。他们问我是否愿意继续待一段时间，我答应了。

But it really is, like, seven-and-a-half days or something. And if you’re on a bank board, it may be quite a bit more than that. I mean, there just —

但实际上，这大约是七天半左右。如果你在银行董事会，可能会多得多。我是说，确实有很多事情——

Being on a public board usually means quarterly meetings plus maybe an extra one. And, you know, at 87, I think I’ve now learned what happens, and it’s fine, but I don’t want to spend seven-and-a-half days a year when I — maybe I can call up people that I trust and admire who are on the board in five minutes, you know, and find out what’s going on or whatever it may be, any questions that come up.

在公共董事会任职通常意味着每季度开会加上可能的额外会议。而且，你知道，87 岁时，我想我已经学会了会发生什么，这没问题，但我不想每年花七个半天的时间，因为我——也许我可以在五分钟内打电话给我信任和钦佩的董事会成员，了解情况或其他任何问题。

And so we are their partners, and delighted to be their partners. And now we have two people on the board of Kraft Heinz, and they can do the traveling and I can stay home.

因此，我们是他们的合作伙伴，并且很高兴成为他们的合作伙伴。现在我们在卡夫亨氏的董事会中有两个人，他们可以出差，而我可以留在家里。

Charlie, how many public — you’re on Costco, of course, over the — your lifetime, how many public boards?

查理，你在 Costco 上，当然，在你的一生中，有多少个公开董事会？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I — Costco — except for something —

查理·芒格：哦，我——好市多——除了某些事情——

WARREN BUFFETT: Kansas City Power.

沃伦·巴菲特：堪萨斯城电力。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — like The Daily Journal where I own part of it, Costco’s the only public board —

查理·芒格：——就像我拥有部分股份的《The Daily Journal》，好市多是唯一的上市公司——

WARREN BUFFETT: You were on Kansas City Power.

沃伦·巴菲特：你在堪萨斯城电力公司工作过。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — if it wasn’t Berkshire or something I owned personally.

查理·芒格：——如果不是伯克希尔或我个人拥有的东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I was on Kansas City Power and Light. Boy, that goes way back. But basically it hasn’t happened. I don’t envy people who float around to a lot of different board meetings.

查理·芒格：我曾在堪萨斯城电力公司工作。哇，那是很久以前的事了。但基本上这并没有发生。我不羡慕那些在很多不同董事会会议上游荡的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, generally speaking you have very little influence and spend a lot of time. And the trouble is, if you’re going to a board meeting, particularly if you get to the international, and sometimes they feel they have to have one that’s international, you know, they feel they have to take up a fair amount of your time or it wouldn’t have been worth coming, you know, thousands of miles for.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，总的来说，你的影响力非常有限，而且花费了很多时间。问题是，如果你要参加董事会会议，特别是如果你要参加国际会议，有时他们觉得必须有一个国际会议，你知道，他们觉得必须占用你相当多的时间，否则你千里迢迢来一趟就不值得了。

So you get a lot of the show and tell stuff and — that — I find my mind drifting. OK. (Laughter)

所以你会看到很多展示和讲解的内容——我发现我的思绪开始漂移。好的。（笑声）

54. Berkshire still not on radar screen of international business sellers

伯克希尔仍未进入国际商业卖家的雷达屏幕

WARREN BUFFETT: Gary. 沃伦·巴菲特：加里。

GARY RANSOM: Yes, you’ve said that you are looking for non-insurance large acquisitions to put that cash to work. And when you’ve said that, I’ve usually thought of the United States, because you’re a big fan of the U.S. business.

加里·兰索姆：是的，你说过你正在寻找非保险的大型收购来利用这些现金。当你这么说的时候，我通常会想到美国，因为你是美国商业的忠实粉丝。

And I just was wondering whether you’re seeing more opportunities as the rest of the world opens up, grows, whether there’s opportunities for some of those mega-transactions in other parts of the world, say Asia or Europe.

我只是想知道，随着世界其他地方的开放和增长，您是否看到更多的机会，是否在其他地区，比如亚洲或欧洲，有一些大型交易的机会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Gary, I would say that I’ve been disappointed in that, because we do see some outside the United States, and thank heavens we saw the one we saw in Israel some years ago [ISCAR] when Eitan [Wertheimer] wrote me a letter. But — and you know, we bought a business which is a very important part of Berkshire now.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，加里，我会说我对此感到失望，因为我们确实在美国以外看到了一些，感谢上天，我们几年前在以色列看到的那个[ISCAR]，当时艾坦[维尔特海默]给我写了一封信。但是——你知道，我们买了一家现在是伯克希尔非常重要的业务。

But we are still not — they’re certainly aware of Berkshire Hathaway outside the United States. But they don’t sort of pick up the phone automatically.

但我们仍然不是——他们当然在美国以外知道伯克希尔·哈撒韦。但他们并不会自动拨打电话。

In the United States, I think any large — particularly private — company that thinks — is thinking about doing something, they at least think about Berkshire. But that — in Europe or Asia, that — we are not embedded in the minds the same way.

在美国，我认为任何大型——特别是私营——公司如果在考虑做某件事，他们至少会想到伯克希尔。但在欧洲或亚洲，我们并没有以同样的方式深入人心。

They know about us, they know we’ve got a lot of money and they know we like to buy things. But we really, we’re on the radar screen big-time in the United States, and we’re not as — we don’t — the immediate desire to be sure that they’ve thought about the Berkshire option does not occur the same way outside the United States. And we’ve tried to encourage it a few ways. But I would say that the results have not been great at all.

他们知道我们，他们知道我们有很多钱，他们知道我们喜欢买东西。但实际上，我们在美国的关注度非常高，而我们并没有——我们并不——在美国以外的地方，确保他们考虑过伯克希尔选项的迫切愿望并不存在。我们尝试了几种方式来鼓励这一点。但我会说，结果并不好。

But I hope tomorrow, you know, I get a call from Germany or Britain or Italy or you name it, and Australia, wherever it may be. And I hope I get a call and we get an opportunity to do it.

但我希望明天，你知道，我能接到来自德国、英国、意大利，或者你说的任何地方的电话，还有澳大利亚，无论在哪里。我希望我能接到电话，我们能有机会去做这件事。

There’s a good many countries we’d be quite happy to put substantial money into it. And like I say, our experience in Israel has been just terrific.

有很多国家我们非常乐意投入大量资金。而且正如我所说，我们在以色列的经验非常好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but the corporate acquisition game now is so driven by the leveraged buyout and the so-called, whatever they call them, strategic, yes, strategic. I usually translate that into barnyard language. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：是的，但现在企业收购游戏受到杠杆收购和所谓的战略收购的驱动，我通常将这些翻译成农场语言。（笑声）

And we’re so — there’s so much craziness in price from our viewpoint. Of course, it’s very hard for us to do it.

我们对此的价格波动感到非常疯狂。当然，这对我们来说是非常困难的。

The people in the leveraged buyout game, who love massive leverage and don’t mind high prices, even they are getting nosebleeds. It’s hard. And it’s not an environment that means that — that allows Berkshire just to go out and buy a whole lot of companies.

在杠杆收购游戏中的人们，喜欢巨额杠杆并且不介意高价格，即使他们也感到头痛。这很困难。而且这并不是一个让伯克希尔可以随便去收购很多公司的环境。

WARREN BUFFETT: Have you ever made a strategic deal that you —

沃伦·巴菲特：你有没有做过一个战略交易，你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have to wait.

查理·芒格：我们必须等待。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve made a strategic deal that you can remember?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们达成了一项你能记住的战略协议吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Hmm? 查理·芒格：嗯？

WARREN BUFFETT: Have we ever made a deal that we would have regarded as strategic?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有没有达成过我们认为是战略性的交易？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve never had a strategic plan unless you’ve hidden it from me. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们从来没有过战略计划，除非你把它藏起来了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. That answers that.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。那就解决了。

55. Investing “doesn’t require advanced learning”

投资“并不需要高级学习”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Brady Ritchie (PH) from St. Louis, Missouri. Shareholder since 1996.

观众成员：嗨，我是来自密苏里州圣路易斯的布雷迪·里奇（音）。自 1996 年以来的股东。

WARREN BUFFETT: Terrific.

沃伦·巴菲特：太棒了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren, you and Charlie have been critical of business schools in the past and what they teach. With respect to value investing, in “Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville,” you featured the returns of many great investors with different backgrounds’ work in education, with the lesson being, “Following the philosophy is the key.”

观众成员：沃伦，你和查理过去对商学院及其教授的内容提出了批评。关于价值投资，在《格雷厄姆与多德斯维尔的超级投资者》中，你展示了许多成功投资者的回报，他们的背景和教育经历各不相同，教训是“遵循哲学是关键”。

To be successful today, does it still just fall back to chapter eight of “The Intelligent Investor?” And what do you think of programs and designations such as CFA, CFP, et cetera, which purport high standards yet root it heavily into academia? And I’d like to challenge you to a round of bridge tomorrow. (Laughter)

要在今天取得成功，是否仍然只依赖《聪明的投资者》第八章？你对像 CFA、CFP 等声称高标准但又深深扎根于学术界的项目和资格认证有什么看法？我想挑战你明天打一局桥牌。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And what was the last part?

沃伦·巴菲特：最后一部分是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he was talk — what do we think about —

查理·芒格：好吧，他在谈论——我们对此怎么看——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, business schools and all that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，商学院和那些。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — business schools and all that.

查理·芒格：—— 商学院和那些。

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t catch the last —

沃伦·巴菲特：我没听到最后——

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re better —

查理·芒格：他们更好——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, he’s challenged me to a round of bridge. OK. The — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，他向我挑战了一局桥牌。好的。（笑声）

I went to three business schools, and at each I found a teacher or two. I went to one specifically to get a given teacher. But at each one of them I found a teacher or two that I really got a lot out of. The — so we’re not anti-business school here at all.

我上过三所商学院，在每所学校我都找到了一个或两个老师。我特意去了一所学校就是为了找某位老师。但在每所学校我都找到了一个或两个让我受益匪浅的老师。所以，我们并不是反对商学院。

We do think that the priesthood, say, 30 years ago, for example, in terms of — or 40 years ago — in terms of efficient market theory and everything. They strayed pretty far, in our view, from the reality of investing. And I would rather have a person — if I could hire somebody among the top five graduates of number one, two or three of the business schools, and my choice was somebody that had — was bright — but had chapter eight of “The Intelligent Investor” absolutely — it just was natural to them — they had it in their bones, basically — I’d take the person from chapter eight.

我们确实认为，30 年前，比如说，或者 40 年前，关于有效市场理论等方面的神职人员，偏离了我们认为的投资现实。我宁愿雇佣一个人——如果我可以在排名第一、第二或第三的商学院中选择五名优秀毕业生中的一位，而我的选择是一个聪明的人——但他对《聪明的投资者》第八章的理解非常自然——这对他们来说就像是与生俱来的——我会选择那个对第八章了如指掌的人。

This is not — what we do is not a complicated business. It’s got to be a disciplined business, but it is — it does not require a super IQ or anything of the sort. And there are a few fundamentals that are incredibly important, and you do have to understand accounting. And it helps to get out and talk to consumers and start thinking like a consumer in many ways in certain — and all of that.

这不是——我们所做的并不是一项复杂的业务。它必须是一个有纪律的业务，但它——并不需要超级智商或类似的东西。有一些基本原则是非常重要的，你确实需要理解会计。而且，走出去与消费者交谈，并在许多方面开始像消费者一样思考，这也是有帮助的——所有这些。

But it just doesn’t require advanced learning. And — I — I certainly — you know, I didn’t want to go to college, so I don’t know whether I would have done better or worse if I’d just quit after high school, you know, and read the books I read and all of that.

但这并不需要高级学习。而且——我——我当然——你知道，我不想上大学，所以我不知道如果我在高中毕业后就退学，是否会做得更好或更差，你知道的，读我读的书，等等。

I think that if you run into a few great teachers, and they really change the way you see the world to some degree, you know, you’re lucky. And you can find them in — you can find them in academia and you can find them in ordinary life.

我认为，如果你遇到几个伟大的老师，他们在某种程度上真的改变了你看待世界的方式，你知道，你是幸运的。你可以在学术界找到他们，也可以在普通生活中找到他们。

And I’ve been extraordinarily lucky in having great teachers, including Charlie. I mean, Charlie’s been a wonderful teacher. And, you know —

我非常幸运，有优秀的老师，包括查理。我是说，查理是一位很棒的老师。而且，你知道——

Anyplace you can find somebody that gives you insights into things you didn’t understand before, maybe makes you a better person than you would have been before, you know, you get — that’s very lucky, and you want to make the most of it. If you can find it in academia, make the most of it. And if you can find it in the rest of your life, make the most of it.

任何地方你都可以找到能够让你了解以前不明白的事情的人，也许会让你成为一个比以前更好的人，你知道，这很幸运，你想要充分利用它。如果你能在学术界找到它，就好好利用。如果你能在生活的其他方面找到它，就好好利用。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, when you found Ben Graham he was unconventional, and he was very smart. And of course, that was very attractive to you. And then when you found out it worked and you could make a lot of money while you’re sitting on your ass — (laughter) — of course you were an instant convert. And so —

查理·芒格：好吧，当你发现本·格雷厄姆时，他是个不拘一格的人，而且非常聪明。当然，这对你来说非常有吸引力。然后当你发现这行得通，并且你可以在悠闲中赚很多钱时——（笑声）——当然你立刻就信服了。所以——

WARREN BUFFETT: It still appeals to me, actually. I mean — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，这仍然吸引我。我的意思是——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: But the world changed. Before he died, Bill Graham — I mean, Ben Graham — recognized that the exact way he sought undervalued companies wouldn’t necessarily work for all times under all conditions. And that’s certainly the way it worked for us.

查理·芒格：但世界变了。在他去世之前，比尔·格雷厄姆——我的意思是本·格雷厄姆——意识到他寻找被低估公司的确切方式并不一定适用于所有时间和所有条件。这对我们来说肯定是这样。

We gradually morphed into trying to buy the better companies when they were underpriced, instead of the lousy companies when they were underpriced. And of course, that worked pretty well for us.

我们逐渐转变为在优秀公司被低估时购买它们，而不是在劣质公司被低估时购买它们。当然，这对我们来说效果很好。

And Ben Graham, he outlived the game that he played personally most of the time. He lived to see most of it fade away. I mean, just to find some company that’s selling for one third of its working capital, and figure out it could easily be liquidated and distribute $3 for every dollar of market price. Lots of luck if you can find those in the present market. And if you can find them, they’re so small that Berkshire wouldn’t find them of any use anyway.

本·格雷厄姆活过了他大部分时间所参与的游戏。他活着目睹了大部分的消逝。我的意思是，找到一些以其营运资本三分之一的价格出售的公司，并发现它们可以轻易清算并分配每美元市场价格 3 美元的现金。如果你能在当前市场中找到这些，那真是运气好。而且如果你能找到它们，它们又小得伯克希尔根本不会觉得有任何用处。

So we’ve had to learn a different game. And that’s a lesson for all the young people in the room. If you’re going to live a long time, you have to keep learning.

所以我们不得不学习一种不同的游戏。这是给在场所有年轻人的教训。如果你想活得长久，就必须不断学习。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What you formerly knew is never enough. So if you don’t learn to constantly revise your earlier conclusions and get better (inaudible), you are — I always use the same metaphor. You’re like a one-legged man in an ass-kicking contest. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你以前知道的永远不够。所以如果你不学会不断修正你早期的结论并变得更好（听不清），你就——我总是用同样的比喻。你就像一个在踢屁股比赛中的独腿人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If anybody has suggestions for another metaphor, send them to me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果有人有其他隐喻的建议，请发给我。（笑声）

Graham, incidentally, one point, important point. Graham was not scalable. I mean, you could not do with really big money. And when I worked for Graham-Newman Corp, here he was, the dean of all analysts. And you know, he was an intellect above all others around that time.

格雷厄姆，顺便提一下，有一点，重要的一点。格雷厄姆是不可扩展的。我的意思是，你无法用真正的大资金来操作。当我为格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作时，他是所有分析师中的权威。你知道，他在那个时候的智力超越了其他所有人。

But our — the investment fund was $6 million, and the partnership that worked in tandem with the investment company also had about $6 million in it. So we had 12 million bucks we were working with. Now, you can make adjustments for inflation and everything. But it was just a tiny amount. It wasn’t really scalable.

但是我们的投资基金是 600 万美元，与投资公司合作的合伙企业也有大约 600 万美元。所以我们总共有 1200 万美元可以使用。现在，你可以考虑通货膨胀和其他因素。但这只是一个微不足道的数额。它实际上并不可扩展。

And the truth is that Graham didn’t care, because he really wasn’t interested in making a lot of money for himself. So he had no reason to want to find something that could go on and on, become larger and larger.

事实上，格雷厄姆并不在乎，因为他真的对为自己赚很多钱没有兴趣。因此，他没有理由想要找到一些可以不断扩展、变得越来越大的东西。

And so the utility of chapter eight, in terms of looking at stocks as a business, is of enormous value. The utility of chapter 20 about a margin of safety is of enormous value. But that’s not complicated stuff.

因此，第八章在将股票视为一种商业的角度上，其实用性是巨大的。第二十章关于安全边际的实用性也非常重要。但这些并不复杂。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I finally figured out why the teachers of corporate finance often teach a lot of stuff that’s wrong. When I had some eye troubles very early in life, I consulted a very famous eye doctor. And I realized that his place of business was doing a totally obsolete cataract operation. They were still cutting with a knife after better procedures had been invented.

查理·芒格：我终于明白了为什么企业金融的老师们常常教很多错误的东西。当我在很小的时候有一些眼睛问题时，我咨询了一位非常著名的眼科医生。我意识到他的诊所正在进行一种完全过时的白内障手术。在更好的手术方法发明之后，他们仍然在用刀切割。

I said, “Why are you in a great medical school performing absolute obsolete operations?” And he said, “Charlie, it’s such a wonderful operation to teach.” (Laughter)

我说：“你为什么在一所优秀的医学院进行绝对过时的手术？”他回答：“查理，这是一项非常好的教学手术。”（笑声）

Well, that’s what happens in corporate finance. They get these formulas, and it’s a fine teaching experience. (Laughter)

好吧，这就是企业金融中发生的事情。他们得到这些公式，这是一段很好的教学经历。（笑声）

You give them a formula, you present the problem, they use the formula. You get a real feeling of worthwhile activity. (Laughter)

你给他们一个公式，提出问题，他们就用这个公式。你会感受到一种有价值的活动的真实感。（笑声）

There’s only one there. It’s all balderdash.

那里只有一个。全都是胡说八道。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, whenever you hear a theory described as elegant, watch out, you know. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，每当你听到一个理论被描述为优雅时，要小心，你知道的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. 查理·芒格：对。

56. Buffett “bullish on human race” as women enter the workforce

巴菲特对人类“持乐观态度”，因为女性进入劳动力市场

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question — we got a couple like this one — comes from Lauren Taylor Wolfe. She’s a managing partner at Impactive Capital.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题——我们收到了几个类似的问题——来自劳伦·泰勒·沃尔夫。她是影响资本的管理合伙人。

“Warren, you’ve recently said that one of the things that makes you optimistic about America is women entering the workforce and the quote ‘doubling of the talent that’s effectively employed in that workforce.’ When it comes to positions of leadership, however, women make up less than 21 percent of boards of S&P 500 companies, and an even smaller 5 percent of the CEOs.

“沃伦，你最近提到让你对美国感到乐观的因素之一是女性进入劳动力市场，以及‘有效就业的劳动力中人才的翻倍’这句话。然而，在领导职位上，女性在标准普尔 500 公司董事会中的比例不到 21%，而首席执行官的比例更小，仅为 5%。”

“What can Berkshire do, and what is Berkshire specifically doing, as a major investor in many of these large companies, to advance gender equality, both at the board level and among senior leadership?”

“伯克希尔作为许多大型公司的主要投资者，可以做些什么，以及具体在做些什么，以推动性别平等，无论是在董事会层面还是在高级领导层中？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, again — (applause) — you know, as I’ve pointed out in the past, one of my sisters is here. And I have two sisters that are absolutely as smart as I am. And they have better personalities, as anybody that knows both of us — or all of us — can attest. And they didn’t remotely have the same opportunities I had.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧，再次——（掌声）——你知道，正如我过去所指出的，我有一个姐妹在这里。我有两个姐妹，她们的聪明才智绝对和我一样。她们的个性更好，任何了解我们三个人的人都可以证明这一点。而且她们根本没有我所拥有的机会。

And you have this 1942, or — New York Times — and you know, women could be nurses or teachers or retail clerks or stenographers. And that actually worked enormously to my advantage when I was a kid in Omaha in the ’30s, because I had way better teachers, because they were — that was a job open to women, I didn’t have a single male teacher in grammar school, and Charlie didn’t when he went to Dundee, I don’t think, either.

而你有这份 1942 年的《纽约时报》，你知道，女性可以是护士、教师、零售店员或速记员。这实际上在我 30 年代在奥马哈当孩子时对我大有裨益，因为我有更好的老师，因为那是一个对女性开放的工作，我在小学时没有一位男性老师，查理在邓迪上学时我想也没有。

And we had this huge talent pool that was being funneled into very few opportunities, and therefore we got better than we deserved in terms of a market system producing it. The —

我们有一个庞大的人才库，但却被引导到很少的机会中，因此在市场体系的产出方面，我们得到了超出应得的结果。

Again, our managers run their companies. But I’ve probably named — before we made this management change — I probably named only six or seven CEOs in the last five or six years. We don’t change that much. But I would say that half of them that I’ve named have been women, which is about what you would — what should turn out to be the case in terms of ability.

再说一次，我们的经理管理他们的公司。但在我们进行这次管理变更之前，我可能在过去五六年里只提名过六七位首席执行官。我们并没有太多变化。但我可以说，我提名的首席执行官中有一半是女性，这大约是根据能力应该出现的情况。

Now, there is a certain pipeline problem, but that gets cured with time, and you can’t use that forever as an excuse.

现在，确实存在某种管道问题，但随着时间的推移，这个问题会得到解决，你不能永远把这个当作借口。

And you know, I feel very good about the decisions we made for CEOs. I prefer all our CEOs to live forever. And one woman almost did that, that we hired. Mrs. B. [Nebraska Furniture Mart founder Rose Blumkin] lived to be 104. She retired at 103. And that’s a lesson to our other managers, that if you retire prematurely, you know — (laughter) — no telling what’ll happen.

你知道，我对我们为首席执行官所做的决定感到非常满意。我希望我们所有的首席执行官都能长生不老。有一位我们聘用的女性几乎做到了这一点，布伦金夫人（内布拉斯加家具市场创始人罗斯·布伦金）活到了 104 岁。她在 103 岁时退休。这对我们其他的管理者是一个教训，如果你过早退休，你知道——（笑声）——谁也不知道会发生什么。

But it is absolutely true. It does make me bullish. It makes me bullish on the human race. But it’s certainly on our country. Because if you look at what happened, you know, before the 19th Amendment, and then after the 19th Amendment for a long time, and continuing to this day, but it’s — that — there’s been significant improvement.

但这绝对是真的。这让我对人类充满信心。让我对我们的国家充满信心。因为如果你看看在第十九修正案之前发生的事情，然后在第十九修正案之后很长一段时间，以及持续到今天，但——那——有了显著的改善。

And I do feel more optimistic about the future, because I think there will be more selection by merit, rather than, you know, by gender or by race or by inheritance.

我对未来感到更加乐观，因为我认为将会有更多基于能力的选择，而不是基于性别、种族或继承。

I think that if you had a system where all businesses got passed on to the eldest son or something, I think it — I think that society would make a lot less progress than one that’s merit-based.

我认为如果有一个系统，所有企业都传给长子之类的，我认为这——我认为这样的社会进步会比基于能力的社会少得多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we did live in a different age. There’s an old saying that the past is a very strange country. People behave quite differently there. And it was just totally different. And it was ridiculous that — I cannot remember — I had one or two male teachers in my high school. But almost none. And the world has really changed.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们确实生活在一个不同的时代。有句老话说，过去是一个非常奇怪的国度。人们在那里的行为截然不同。那时的情况完全不同。而且真是荒谬——我记不得了——我在高中时只有一两位男老师。但几乎没有。世界真的变了。

And within Berkshire, I’ve never seen any overt discrimination anywhere on the grounds of gender.

在Berkshire，我从未见过任何基于性别的明显歧视。

WARREN BUFFETT: There probably has been some, though. I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：可能确实有一些，不过。我是说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, I’m sure that we have our —

查理·芒格：不，不，我确信我们有我们的——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, there has —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，那里有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: —share of all the peculiarities of human nature.

查理·芒格：——人性所有特性的份额。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s generally, it’s — everything has always improved, wouldn’t you agree with that?

查理·芒格：但一般来说，一切总是有所改善，你不觉得吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I think it’ll keep improving.

查理·芒格：我认为它会不断改善。

57. Berkshire buybacks not limited by state insurance rules

伯克希尔的回购不受州保险规则的限制

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren, in this year’s annual report it was noted, much as it is every year, that payments of dividends by the company’s insurance subsidiaries are restricted by insurance statutes and other regulations, with Berkshire’s insurance operations currently allowed to declare up to 16 billion as ordinary dividends during 2018.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦，今年的年报中提到，公司的保险子公司支付股息受到保险法规和其他规定的限制，目前伯克希尔的保险业务在2018年允许宣布高达160亿的普通股息。

My question here is, should we view this annual regulatory threshold for dividends as a benchmark for allowable share repurchases as well? And in the event that Berkshire wanted to buy back more stock than that, or pay out even more as dividends, would there be an issue with you using capital from operations that aren’t held by the insurance operations to return additional capital?

我的问题是，我们是否应该将这个年度监管股息门槛视为回购股票的基准？如果伯克希尔想回购更多股票，或者支付更多股息，您是否会使用不在保险业务下的运营资本来返还额外的资本？

With the side question here being, would the annual cash distribution from BNSF, which is held on National Indemnity’s books, be excluded?

另外一个问题是，来自BNSF的年度现金分配，如果在National Indemnity的账上，这是否会被排除在外？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — we will obviously follow the rules of the states in which we’re domiciled, and all the rules, of course. But basically it’s the state of domestication in the insurance companies, and they do restrict the amount of dividends in any given year. Although you could, if you wanted to, request some additional amount. But we don’t ever consider that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们显然会遵循我们注册地州的规则，以及所有的规则。当然，基本上这是保险公司的注册州，它们确实限制了任何给定年份的股息金额。尽管如果你想的话，可以请求一些额外的金额。但我们从来没有考虑过这一点。

But repurchases — if repurchases were really attractive, we would do it in a very big way. And, you know, I wouldn’t rule — there’s all kinds of ways that we could arrange things to do either a very large acquisition, which is what I would prefer, or a very large repurchase, would I don’t think is probably in the cards just because the way our stock trades, not because we wouldn’t like it at a large discount.

但回购——如果回购真的很有吸引力，我们会以非常大的方式进行。你知道，我不会排除——我们可以通过各种方式安排事情，进行一次非常大的收购，这是我更倾向的，或者进行一次非常大的回购，我认为这可能不太可能，因为我们的股票交易方式，并不是因为我们不喜欢以大折扣进行回购。

So Charlie and I, we’ve got the appetite. And we would have — we’ve got a lot of cash — but we could have a lot more cash. We can make any deal of — even one of a very large size. We can make anything that came along — we could work out how to get it done.

所以查理和我，我们有这个胃口。而且我们有很多现金——但我们可以有更多现金。我们可以达成任何交易——甚至是非常大规模的交易。我们可以处理任何出现的事情——我们可以想办法完成它。

We would — we would have — we’re not going to be doing this, but we would have partners who would come in and give us a preferential part of a partnership. That’s not going to happen, in all probability. But there’s a lot of things that we could do. So don’t rule out anything based on statutory limitations of distributions from insurance companies —

我们可以——我们不会这么做，但我们会有合作伙伴来给我们一个优先的合作份额。这可能不会发生，但有很多事情我们可以做。所以，不要基于保险公司分配的法定限制排除任何可能性——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And that — we could get special permissions to —

查理·芒格：而这——我们可以获得特别许可来——

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, we can get —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我们可以得到——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — declare bigger dividends. We are not — you should not assume that we’re constrained by the laws of nature to the amount that we can take out under the statutes now.

查理·芒格：——宣布更高的分红。我们并不是——你不应该假设我们受到自然法则的限制，无法根据现行法规提取更多。

58. Munger: “I don’t think the world is going to be changed that much by machine intelligence”

芒格：“我认为机器智能不会对世界产生太大的改变。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，7 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. Thank you for everything. I’m David (inaudible), an investment manager in Shanghai. I’ve been here for eight years.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。谢谢你们的一切。我是大卫（听不清），在上海的一名投资经理。我在这里已经八年了。

If investment is a sport in the Olympics, you are our champion team. So my question is, facing the fast-growing machine challenges, how do you see the new competition impact the capital allocation productivity in the future?

如果投资是一项奥林匹克运动，那么你就是我们的冠军团队。那么我的问题是，面对快速增长的机器挑战，你如何看待新竞争对未来资本配置生产力的影响？

For Charlie, what is the first principle of capital allocation from a general economic interest point of view? Thank you.

对于查理来说，从一般经济利益的角度来看，资本配置的第一原则是什么？谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, two questions. Machine intelligence. I’m afraid the only intelligence I have is — is being provided by something that’s not a machine. And I don’t think I’m going to learn machine intelligence. Yeah. If you ask me how to beat the game of Go with my own intelligence, I couldn’t do it. And I think it’s too old for me to learn computer science.

查理·芒格：嗯，有两个问题。机器智能。我担心我所拥有的唯一智能是——由某些非机器的东西提供的。我认为我不会学习机器智能。是的。如果你问我如何用我自己的智能来赢得围棋，我做不到。我觉得我已经太老了，无法学习计算机科学。

Generally I’m — I think that the machine intelligence has worked. After all, a machine now can beat the best human player of Go. But I think there’s more hype in that field than there is probable achievement.

一般来说，我认为机器智能是有效的。毕竟，现在的机器可以击败最优秀的人类围棋选手。但我认为这个领域的炒作超过了实际成就。

So I don’t think the world is going to be changed that much by machine intelligence. Some, but not hugely.

所以我认为机器智能不会对世界产生太大的改变。会有一些变化，但不会很大。

And what was the other question?

还有另一个问题是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——

CHARLIE MUNGER: One of them was machine intelligence.

查理·芒格：其中之一是机器智能。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think he was getting at capital allocation —

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为他是在谈论资本配置——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah. That’s such a general question. Generally speaking, we’re always trying to get the best — to get something that’s worth buying.

查理·芒格：哦，是的。这是一个非常笼统的问题。一般来说，我们总是试图获得最好的——得到一些值得购买的东西。

And the human mind rejects that if you’re in academia, because you could come in and make one declaratory sentence at the opening of the semester and you wouldn’t have anything to do for the rest of the — of your time. So people want to find some formula. It’s what I call “physics envy.” These people want the world to be like physics.

人类的思维在学术界会拒绝这种想法，因为你可以在学期开始时说一句声明性的话，然后在接下来的时间里就没有任何事情可做。因此，人们想要找到某种公式。这就是我所说的“物理嫉妒”。这些人希望世界像物理学一样。

But the world isn’t like physics, outside of physics. And that false precision just does nothing but get you in trouble.

但世界并不像物理学那样，超越物理学。而这种虚假的精确只会让你陷入麻烦。

So I would say you’ve got to master the general ideas, and you’ve got to work to improve your judgment slowly, the way all the rest of us had. And I don’t think most individuals have much hope of individual gain from machine intelligence.

所以我想说，你必须掌握一般概念，并且你必须慢慢提高你的判断力，就像我们其他人一样。我认为大多数人对从机器智能中获得个人收益的希望不大。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I don’t — I don’t think that — I’m impressed when machines beat Go or something of the sort, or even win at chess or whatever it may be.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我不这样认为——当机器在围棋或类似的游戏中获胜，甚至在国际象棋中获胜时，我感到印象深刻。

I don’t really think they bring much to the table in terms of capital allocation or investing. And then I may be missing something entirely, you know, maybe I’m just blind to what’s out there.

我并不认为他们在资本配置或投资方面能带来太多价值。也许我完全错过了什么，你知道，也许我只是对外面的情况视而不见。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re missing a lot of very remunerative, fee-earning twaddle. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你错过了很多非常有利可图、赚取费用的废话。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. Well, that takes care of that. So we’ll go on to station 8. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯。那么，这件事就解决了。我们接着去第 8 站。（笑声）

59. Munger: “American investors are missing China”

芒格：“美国投资者错过了中国”

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you very much for hosting the meeting. It’s truly been remarkable. Thank you.

观众成员：亲爱的巴菲特先生和芒格先生，非常感谢您们主持这次会议。这真是令人难以置信。谢谢您们。

My name is Yen (PH), and I’m a partner at Tiger Brokers, a leading electronic brokerage firm from China.

我叫 Yen（PH），我是来自中国的一家领先电子经纪公司 Tiger Brokers 的合伙人。

Let me rephrase that. So, I and my colleagues flew half a way from the globe with (inaudible) to be here, and it is honor, just like everyone else in the stadium, we’re honored to be here.

让我换个说法。我和我的同事们飞了半个地球来到这里，能够在这里感到荣幸，就像体育场里的每一个人一样，我们都感到荣幸。

My question is, you mentioned earlier that investors don’t really have to be struggling in picking the right stocks. They would do well in picking, probably, the right market and the right country.

我的问题是，您之前提到投资者实际上不必在选择正确的股票上苦苦挣扎。他们可能在选择正确的市场和正确的国家时会表现得很好。

China is the second-largest economy, and probably has the biggest growth potential. Just by passively weighting a portfolio — by passively valuating a portfolio — U.S. investors are significantly underweighting China. So in your opinion, what are stopping the investors from investing in China? Thank you.

中国是第二大经济体，可能拥有最大的增长潜力。仅仅通过被动配置投资组合——通过被动评估投资组合——美国投资者显著低配了中国。那么在您看来，是什么阻止投资者投资中国？谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the answer is that you’re absolutely right. That we are — American investors are missing China. And they’re missing it because it’s a long way away, it looks different, they’re not used to it, it’s complicated, the headlines confuse them.

查理·芒格：我认为答案是你说得完全正确。美国投资者确实忽视了中国。他们忽视中国是因为距离遥远，外观不同，他们不习惯，情况复杂，头条新闻让他们感到困惑。

In other words, it just looks too hard, sitting in Omaha, to outsmart the Chinese market. But I think you’re absolutely right. It’s where they should be looking.

换句话说，坐在奥马哈，想要智胜中国市场看起来太难了。但我认为你说得完全正确。这正是他们应该关注的地方。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

We’ve actually had a couple investments in China. We’ve done pretty well. But there were — well, if you go back a number of years, (inaudible).

我们实际上在中国进行了几项投资。我们做得相当不错。但是，如果你回顾几年前，（听不清）。

In terms of getting a lot of money into something, you know, many billions, and we have to get billions into things in — to move any kind of a needle, that can be tougher in markets that you’ve got — you’re unfamiliar working in. And it’s difficult under any circumstances.

在投入大量资金方面，你知道，数十亿，我们必须在某些事情上投入数十亿——以推动任何变化，在你不熟悉的市场中，这可能会更困难。在任何情况下，这都是困难的。

But accumulating a 6 or 8 or $10 billion position in investments outside the United States can be very difficult. For example, in U.K. and much of Europe we have to report when we own 3 percent of a company. In fact, we can be asked to report if we even have less than 3 percent. That really gets very tough when we get a bunch of followers and a lot of publicity that probably isn’t deserved in terms of what we’re doing in the markets and everything.

但在美国以外的地方积累 60 亿、80 亿或 100 亿美元的投资头寸可能非常困难。例如，在英国和大部分欧洲，我们必须在拥有一家公司的 3%股份时进行报告。实际上，如果我们拥有不到 3%的股份，也可能会被要求报告。当我们有一大批追随者和很多可能不应得的公众关注时，这真的变得非常棘手。

Some of the problems are, just by the nature of our size. It would be lot — it’d be a lot easier if we were running a smaller fund.

一些问题正是由于我们的规模所致。如果我们管理一个较小的基金，那将会容易得多。

PetroChina, we managed to get a very big position. But the government owned 90 percent of it. So we bought 14 percent of what the government didn’t own, but it was still only 1.4 percent of the company.

中国石油，我们成功获得了一个非常大的股份。但政府拥有 90%的股份。因此我们购买了政府未持有的 14%的股份，但这仍然仅占公司 1.4%。

But Charlie, Charlie actually keeps pushing me to do more in China. And we’ve tried a couple of times, actually. And there was one operation that we got involved in —

但是查理，查理实际上一直在推动我在中国做更多的事情。我们实际上尝试过几次。还有一次我们参与的行动——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you did so poorly the first time, you put in 200,000 and got about 2 billion, so.

查理·芒格：嗯，你第一次表现得很糟糕，你投入了 20 万美元，得到了大约 20 亿，所以。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Well.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。好吧。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Wasn’t encouraging enough. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：不够鼓舞人心。（笑声）

60. “What Jeff Bezos has done is something close to a miracle”

“杰夫·贝索斯所做的事情几乎可以说是一个奇迹。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 9 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dr. Sherman Silber. I’m an infertility doctor from St. Louis. And I’ve been a shareholder and coming to this meeting for 23 years, and I want to thank you very much for making my grandchildren very rich. (Laughter and applause)

观众成员：我叫谢尔曼·西尔伯博士。我是来自圣路易斯的不孕不育医生。我已经是股东，并参加这个会议 23 年了，非常感谢你们让我的孙子孙女们变得非常富有。（笑声和掌声）

And they sometimes compare me in the medical world — infertility world — as the Berkshire Hathaway of infertility, because I’m so old and I come from a relatively small community.

他们有时在医学界——不孕不育界——把我比作不孕不育的伯克希尔·哈撒韦，因为我年纪大，而且我来自一个相对较小的社区。

But I’m wondering about your interests in not just Apple, but all of the tech stocks, like Amazon and Google. Because you’ve avoided them, you’ve stated in the past, because they’re complicated, you should stick with something you understand.

但我想知道你对不仅仅是苹果，还有所有科技股的兴趣，比如亚马逊和谷歌。因为你过去曾表示你避免投资这些股票，因为它们很复杂，你应该坚持投资你理解的东西。

On the other hand, Amazon and Google have what you call a very durable competitive advantage. They really hardly have any competitor. And that’s true in China, too, of Alibaba and Tencent.

另一方面，亚马逊和谷歌拥有你所说的非常持久的竞争优势。他们几乎没有任何竞争对手。在中国，阿里巴巴和腾讯也是如此。

So it seems like it’s a conflict, and I’m wondering if you’re going to be turning the corner and going into these tech companies that seem to have no serious competition.

所以看起来这是一场冲突，我在想你是否会转变方向，进入这些似乎没有严重竞争的科技公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we certainly looked at them. And we don’t think of whether we should be in tech companies or not, or that sort of thing. We are looking for things when we do get into the durability of the competitive advantage, and whether we think that our opinion might be better than other people’s opinion in assessing the probability of the durability, so to speak.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们当然考虑过这些。我们并不考虑是否应该投资科技公司，或者类似的事情。我们在寻找一些东西，当我们进入时，会关注竞争优势的持久性，以及我们是否认为我们的观点在评估持久性概率方面可能优于其他人的观点。

But the truth is that I’ve watched Amazon from the start, and I think what Jeff Bezos has done is something close to a miracle. And the problem is, if I think something will be a miracle, I tend not to bet on it. (Laughs)

但事实是，我从一开始就关注亚马逊，我认为杰夫·贝索斯所做的事情接近于奇迹。问题是，如果我认为某件事会是奇迹，我往往不愿意押注于此。（笑）

It would have been better — far better, obviously — if we — if I had some insights into certain businesses.

如果我对某些业务有一些见解，那将会更好——显然会好得多。

But you know, in fact, Bill told me early on — Bill Gates told me early on — you know, that I think I was on AltaVista and he suggested I turn to Google.

但你知道，实际上，比尔早期就告诉我——比尔·盖茨早期就告诉我——你知道，我当时在 AltaVista 上，他建议我转向谷歌。

But the trouble is I saw that Google was skipping past AltaVista, and then I wondered if anybody could skip past Google. And I saw at GEICO that we were paying a lot of money for something that cost them nothing incrementally.

但问题是，我看到谷歌已经超越了AltaVista，然后我在想，是否有人能超越谷歌。在GEICO，我们支付了很多钱给谷歌，而这些对他们来说没有额外的成本。

We’ve looked at it, and you know, I made a mistake in not being able to come to a conclusion where I really felt that at the present prices that the prospects were far better than the prices indicated.

我们已经考虑过这个问题，你知道，我犯了一个错误，没有得出一个结论，我真的觉得在目前的价格下，前景远比价格所显示的要好。

And I didn’t go into Apple because it was a tech stock in the least. I mean, I went into Apple because I made certain — came to certain conclusions about both the intelligence with which the capital would be employed, but more important, about the value of an ecosystem and how permanent that ecosystem could be, and what the threats were to it, and a whole bunch of things.

我之所以投资苹果并不是因为它是一只科技股。我的意思是，我投资苹果是因为我得出了一些结论，既包括资本运用的智慧，也更重要的是关于生态系统的价值，以及这个生态系统的持久性，威胁是什么，还有很多其他因素。

And that didn’t — I don’t think that required me to, you know, take apart an iPhone or something and figure out what all the components were or anything. It’s much more the nature of consumer behavior. And some things strike me as having a lot more permanence than others.

这并不——我认为这并不需要我去拆解一个 iPhone 之类的东西，弄清楚所有组件是什么。更重要的是消费者行为的本质。有些事情给我的感觉比其他事情更具持久性。

But the answer is, we’ll miss a lot of things that — or I’ll miss a lot of things — that I don’t feel I understand well enough.

但答案是，我们会错过很多事情——或者我会错过很多事情——我觉得我还不够理解。

And there is no penalty in investing if you don’t swing at a ball that’s in the strike zone, as long as you swing at something at some point, then you know, eventually that you find the pitches you like. And that’s the way we’ll continue to do it. We’ll try to stay within our circle of competence.

投资没有惩罚，如果你没有对一个在好球区的球挥棒，只要你在某个时点挥棒，就能找到你喜欢的球。这就是我们将继续做的事情。我们将尽力保持在自己的能力圈内。

And Charlie and I generally agree on sort of where that circle ends, and what kind of situations where we might have some kind of an edge in our reasoning or our experience or something that — where we might evaluate something differently than other people.

查理和我通常在那个圈子结束的地方以及我们可能在推理、经验或其他方面有优势的情况上达成一致——在这些情况下，我们可能会与其他人对某些事物的评估有所不同。

But the answer is, we’re going to miss a lot of things.

但答案是，我们会错过很多东西。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we have a wonderful system. If one of us is stupid in some area, so is the other. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我们有一个很棒的系统。如果我们中的一个人在某个领域愚蠢，另一个也是。（笑声）

And of course, we were not ideally located to be high-tech wizards. How many people of our age quickly mastered Google? I’ve been to Google headquarters. They look to me like they’re — it looks like a kindergarten. (Laughter)

当然，我们并不理想地位于高科技精英的中心。我们这个年龄有多少人迅速掌握了谷歌？我去过谷歌总部。对我来说，他们看起来就像——就像一个幼儿园。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: A very rich kindergarten.

沃伦·巴菲特：一个非常富有的幼儿园。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it’s extraordinarily impressive, what they’ve done. And like I say, at GEICO we were paying them a lot of money at the time they went public. And all three of the main characters — Eric [Schmidt] and Larry [Page] and Sergey [Brin] — they actually came and saw me. But they were more interested in talking about going public and the mechanics of it and various things along that line.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，他们所做的非常令人印象深刻。正如我所说，在他们上市时，GEICO 给了他们很多钱。而三位主要人物——埃里克·施密特、拉里·佩奇和谢尔盖·布林——实际上都来见过我。但他们更感兴趣的是谈论上市及其机制以及相关的各种事情。

But it wasn’t like what they were doing was a mystery to me. The mystery was how much competition would come along, and how effective they would be, and whether it would be a game where four or five people were slugging it out without making as much money as they could if one company dominated.

但他们所做的并不是我无法理解的谜团。谜团在于会有多少竞争者出现，他们的效果如何，以及这是否会是一场四五个人拼搏的比赛，而不是一个公司主导时能赚到更多的钱。

Those are tough decisions to make. You can have industries where there’s only two people in it, and they still don’t (inaudible) very good because they beat each other’s brains out. And that’s one of the questions in the airline business. It’s a better business now than it used to be, but it used to be suicide, so — (Laughs)

这些都是困难的决策。某些行业中即使只有两家公司，他们之间的竞争也可能很激烈，导致他们无法赚到很多钱。这就是航空业的一个问题。现在它的生意比以前要好，但过去它几乎是自杀性的， (笑声)

And you know that the competitive factors are extraordinary in airlines, and how much better business is it with four people operating at 85 percent capacity than it was at — with seven or eight operating in the mid-70s, and with more planes run. Those are tough decisions.

竞争因素在航空公司中非常复杂，比起有四家公司在85%产能下运营的情况，它比七八家公司在中等70%的产能下运营要好。那些都是困难的决策。

But I made the wrong decision on Google. And Amazon, I just — I really consider that a miracle, that you could be doing Amazon web services and changing retail at the same time, with — you know, without enormous amounts of capital, and with the speed and effectiveness of what Amazon has done.

我对谷歌的决定是错的。亚马逊，我真的认为那是一个奇迹，你可以同时在亚马逊网络服务和零售业务中进行创新，且不需要大量资本，并且以亚马逊所做的速度和效率进行。

I just — I underestimated — I had a very, very, very high opinion of Jeff’s ability when I first met him. And I underestimated him. (Laughs)

我只是——我低估了——我第一次见到杰夫时对他的能力有着非常非常高的评价。结果我低估了他。（笑）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my comment would be that the shareholders have one thing to be thankful for.

查理·芒格：嗯，我的评论是，股东们有一件事可以感恩。

Some of the age-related stupidity at headquarters has been ameliorated by Ted [Weschler] and Todd [Combs] joining us. We are looking at the world with the aid of some younger eyes now. And they’ve had a contribution —

总部的一些与年龄相关的愚蠢问题在泰德（Weschler）和托德（Combs）加入我们后得到了改善。我们现在在一些年轻的视角的帮助下看待世界。他们做出了贡献——

WARREN BUFFETT: Significant.

沃伦·巴菲特：重要。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — beyond their own investments. And so you’re very lucky to have them be shareholders. Because there’s a lot of ignorance in the older generation that needs removal. (Applause)

查理·芒格：——超越他们自己的投资。因此，你们非常幸运能有他们作为股东。因为老一代中有很多无知需要被消除。（掌声）

61. “We already have a family office. It’s sitting right here”

“我们已经有一个家族办公室。它就在这里。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，10 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, good afternoon. Good afternoon, Warren. Good afternoon, Charlie. And my name is Yujin. I come from China, and I work for Hen Tian Tsai Fu family office. And we are serving high-worth individual clients in China. And you two would be my dream customer.

观众成员：你好，下午好。下午好，沃伦。下午好，查理。我叫于金，来自中国，供职于亨天财富家族办公室。我们为中国的高净值个人客户提供服务。你们两位将是我梦想中的客户。

I know your shareholder Bill Gates has a family office, which, helping his wealth. So my question is, do you have a family office, and what — can we know what they do, some — anything for you? And if not, are you planning to have a family office in the future?

我知道你的股东比尔·盖茨有一个家族办公室，这对他的财富有帮助。所以我的问题是，你有家族办公室吗？我们能知道他们为你做些什么吗？如果没有，你计划在未来设立一个家族办公室吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We already have a family office. It’s sitting right here. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们已经有一个家族办公室。它就在这里。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we would be the last guys in the world to have a family office, actually. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们实际上是世界上最后一批会拥有家族办公室的人。（笑声）

There are a lot of them around, and — but it’s not something that fits the Munger family or the Buffett family. (Laughs)

周围有很多这样的东西，但这并不适合芒格家族或巴菲特家族。（笑）

Charlie, you have anything?

查理，你有什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

62. No “precise formulas” on Berkshire’s incentive plans

伯克希尔的激励计划没有“精确公式”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s — we’ll do one more. Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们再来一个。第 11 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren, Charlie. My name is Adam Mead, Mead Capital Management from Derry, New Hampshire.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦，查理。我叫亚当·米德，来自新罕布什尔州德里，米德资本管理公司。

In the past you have touched on certain compensation arrangements with key executives. Could you please provide some specific examples of compensation arrangements within Berkshire that speak to incentivizing good behavior while not penalizing the manager for size or the relative ease or difficulty of the business or industry? Thank you.

在过去，您提到过与关键高管的某些薪酬安排。您能否提供一些伯克希尔内部薪酬安排的具体例子，这些例子能够激励良好行为，同时不因业务或行业的规模或相对的容易或困难而惩罚管理者？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that is a very, very good question, and a very, very tough question. Because some of our —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是一个非常非常好的问题，也是一个非常非常困难的问题。因为我们的一些——

CHARLIE MUNGER: He really doesn’t want to answer.

查理·芒格：他真的不想回答。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, some of our managers — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们的一些经理——（笑声）

No, some of our managers are in businesses that are just much easier. I mean, we bought into a variety of businesses. People are obviously influenced by what pay arrangements are elsewhere. They wouldn’t be human if they weren’t.

不，我们的一些经理所在的行业确实简单得多。我的意思是，我们投资了多种业务。显然，人们会受到其他地方薪酬安排的影响。如果他们不受影响，那就不是人类了。

And trying to come to the right answer when you have different degrees of capital intensity, different degree — very different degrees — of basic profitability, and how much you scale up based on size, because there is an incentive to grow businesses. Usually if businesses get much larger, everybody from the CEO down expects to earn more money for something that — where they really bring the same amount of intensity and work and (inaudible) to it.

在面对不同程度的资本密集度、非常不同的基本盈利能力，以及根据规模的增长程度时，努力找到正确的答案，因为企业有增长的激励。通常，如果企业变得更大，从首席执行官到其他所有人都期望在同样的投入和工作量下赚取更多的钱。

It is really a tough question. I think that if you engage compensation consultants at public companies, which they all do, they’re going to recommend things that cause them to have CEOs recommend them to other companies. (Laughs)

这真是个棘手的问题。我认为，如果你在上市公司聘请薪酬顾问，而他们都这样做，他们会推荐一些让首席执行官向其他公司推荐他们的事情。（笑）

It’s just, you’re working against human nature when you have an arrangement like that.

这只是因为，当你有那样的安排时，你是在与人性作对。

I would say that we have obviously kept a very, very, very high percentage of the managers that we hoped to have stay with us. In fact, just about a hundred percent. It’s —

我可以说，我们显然保留了我们希望留住的经理中非常非常非常高的比例。实际上，几乎是百分之百。它是——

And I think people do like — they do like to make their own decisions. They do like recognition. You know, they — most people respond — they like doing a good job, and they like the fact that we understand it. And compensation’s part of that. But it’s not the whole thing.

我认为人们确实喜欢做出自己的决定。他们确实喜欢被认可。你知道，大多数人会回应——他们喜欢做好工作，他们喜欢我们理解这一点。而薪酬是其中的一部分，但并不是全部。

And I wish I could give you some precise formulas, but there aren’t any —

我希望我能给你一些精确的公式，但实际上并没有

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, you really don’t, Warren.

查理·芒格：不，你真的不需要，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: What? 沃伦·巴菲特：什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s an advantage at Berkshire to keep our individual deals private. There would be no advantage to just publishing them all.

查理·芒格：在伯克希尔，保持我们各个交易的私密性是一种优势。公开所有交易并没有任何好处。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we’re not going to do that.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们不会那样做。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, of course not. So what we’re saying, he makes all those decisions personally. He’s got every formula in the book. And he keeps them all private. That’s our system. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不，当然不是。所以我们所说的是，他亲自做所有的决定。他掌握了书中的每一个公式。而且他把这些都保密。这就是我们的系统。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we do — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们确实——（笑声）

We publish what the directors are paid.

我们公布董事的薪酬。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We publish what we have to, yes.

查理·芒格：我们会发布我们必须发布的内容，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. It’s 3:30 now. We’re going to reconvene at 3:45.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在是 3:30。我们将在 3:45 重新开始。

Charlie and I, we love the fact that our partners basically turn out for this. So we thank you for coming. I hope you’ve had a good time, both at the meeting and in Omaha. And we look forward to seeing you again next year. Thanks. (Applause)

查理和我，我们很高兴我们的合作伙伴基本上都能出席这个活动。感谢你们的到来。希望你们在会议和奥马哈的时间过得愉快。我们期待明年再见到你们。谢谢。（掌声）

63. Formal business meeting

正式商务会议

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going to move it right along — do a little gun-jumping here.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们将继续前进——在这里稍微跳一下。

If you’ll please take your seat, thank you.

请您就坐，谢谢。

This is the formal meeting, so the meeting will now come to order.

这是正式会议，现在会议开始。

I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company, and I welcome you to this 2018 annual meeting of shareholders.

我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席，欢迎您参加 2018 年股东年会。

This morning, I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present and also with today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors.

今天早上，我介绍了在场的伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事，并且今天还有我们的审计师德勤会计师事务所的合伙人。

Jennifer Tselentis is the assistant secretary of Berkshire Hathaway. She will make a written record of the proceedings.

詹妮弗·特塞伦蒂斯是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的助理秘书。她将对会议进行书面记录。

Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting, and she will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motions to be voted upon at the meeting.

贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将对董事选举中投票的计数以及会议上待投票动议进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg. Does the assistant secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。助理秘书是否有关于有权投票并在会议上代表的伯克希尔股份总数的报告？

VOICE: This is the important part.

声音：这是重要的部分。

VOICE: You sit there. 你坐在那里。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re building the suspense here. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在这里制造悬念。（笑）

JENNIFER TSELENTIS: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 7th, 2018, the record date for this meeting, there were 748,347 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,344,969,701 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to 1/10,000th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

詹妮弗·特塞伦蒂斯：是的，我有。如 2018 年 3 月 7 日发送给所有登记股东的会议通知所附的委托书声明所示，本次会议的记录日期为 2018 年 3 月 7 日，届时共有 748,347 股 A 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对提案有一票投票权；同时还有 1,344,969,701 股 B 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对提案有 1/10,000 的投票权。

Of that number, 537,524 Class A shares and 823,145,874 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening May 3rd.

在这个数字中，537,524 股 A 类股份和 823,145,874 股 B 类股份通过截至 5 月 3 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum. And we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数。因此，我们将直接开始会议。

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place a motion before the meeting.

会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生提出一项动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion has been moved and seconded. We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say aye.

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并得到支持。我们将通过口头表决对该动议进行投票。所有赞成者请说“是”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed. The motion is carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：反对。动议通过。

The next item of business is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who did not send in a proxy or wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in, you may vote in person on the election of directors and other matters to be considered at this meeting. Please identify yourself to one of the meeting officials in the aisles so that you can receive a ballot.

下一个议程是选举董事。如果有股东在场但未提交委托书或希望撤回之前提交的委托书，您可以亲自投票选举董事及本次会议将讨论的其他事项。请向走道上的会议工作人员自我介绍，以便您能领取选票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to the election of directors.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Greg Abel, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷格·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Gregory Abel, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors. Are there any other nominations or any discussion?

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并得到支持，沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷戈里·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默被选为董事。还有其他提名或讨论吗？

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and deliver their ballots to one of the meeting officials in the aisles. Miss Amick, when you are ready you may give your report.

提名已准备好进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 605,906 votes for each nominee. That number exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票在上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 605,906 票。这个数字超过了所有流通的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。根据特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证将交给秘书，放入本次会议的会议记录中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Gregory Abel, Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷戈里·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默已被选为董事。

32. Shareholder motion on methane emissions

32. 股东提案关于甲烷排放

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by Freeda Cathcart on behalf of shareholder Marcia Sage. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement. The motion requests that the company provide a report revealing the company’s policies, actions, plans, and reduction targets related to methane emissions from all operations.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由弗里达·卡斯卡特代表股东玛西亚·塞奇提出的动议。该动议在委托书中列出。动议要求公司提供一份报告，揭示公司在所有运营中与甲烷排放相关的政策、行动、计划和减排目标。

The directors have recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize Miss Cathcart to present the motion. To allow all interested shareholders their views, I ask that the representative of the Baldwin Brothers limit the presentation of the motion to five minutes.

我现在请凯瑟卡特小姐提出动议。为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我要求鲍德温兄弟的代表将动议的陈述时间限制为五分钟。

FREEDA CATHCART: Good morning Chairman Buffett, Mr. Munger, members of the board and fellow shareholders. I am presenting this proposal on behalf of Baldwin Brothers on the issue of methane asset risk. This is the second year for this methane-focused proposal. Last year 10 percent of shareholders approved of it.

弗里达·凯思卡特：早上好，巴菲特主席，芒格先生，董事会成员和各位股东。我代表鲍德温兄弟公司就甲烷资产风险问题提出这个提案。这是第二年提出这个以甲烷为重点的提案。去年有 10%的股东对此表示支持。

Methane asset risk is a serious financial safety and environmental issue across the entire natural gas supply chain. The failure of a gas injection well at Southern California Gas Aliso Canyon Storage facility in Los Angeles revealed major vulnerabilities in the maintenance and safety of natural gas facilities.

甲烷资产风险是整个天然气供应链中一个严重的财务安全和环境问题。位于洛杉矶的南加州天然气阿利索峡谷储存设施的气体注入井的故障暴露了天然气设施维护和安全方面的重大漏洞。

In that situation, cleanup and containment costs have soared to close to $1 billion. Governor Jerry Brown of California has threatened to shut down the facility.

在这种情况下，清理和控制成本已飙升至接近 10 亿美元。加利福尼亚州州长杰瑞·布朗威胁要关闭该设施。

Berkshire Hathaway owns the largest interstate natural gas pipeline system in the United States. It has natural gas storage distribution and transportation facilities that may face similar safety risks through the Northern Natural Gas Company, Kern River Gas, and MidAmerican Energy Corporations.

伯克希尔哈撒韦拥有美国最大的州际天然气管道系统。它通过北方天然气公司、科恩河天然气公司和中美能源公司拥有天然气储存、分配和运输设施，这些设施可能面临类似的安全风险。

On an environmental front, research indicates methane leaks could erase the climate benefits of reducing coal use to meet internationally agreed upon climate change targets. Methane emissions have an impact on global temperature of roughly 84 times that of CO2 over a 20-year period.

在环境方面，研究表明，甲烷泄漏可能会抵消减少煤炭使用以满足国际气候变化目标所带来的气候效益。甲烷排放在 20 年内对全球温度的影响大约是二氧化碳的 84 倍。

Berkshire is a voluntary member of the EPA’s Methane Challenge and ONE Future Emissions Intensity Commitment Framework and should be applauded for reducing its leakage rates to below the 1 percent target along its value chain.

伯克希尔自愿成为美国环保署的甲烷挑战和 ONE Future 排放强度承诺框架的成员，值得赞扬的是，它已将其价值链上的泄漏率降低到 1%以下的目标。

Since this framework is a cost-effective versus prescriptive approach, shareholders would like to understand if this cost-effective approach employed at Berkshire is sufficient — maintenance and enhanced disclosure should help mitigate the potential for these financial and regulatory risks.

由于该框架是一种成本效益高的相对于规定性的方法，股东希望了解伯克希尔采用的这种成本效益高的方法是否足够——维护和增强披露应有助于减轻这些财务和监管风险的潜在性。

In closing, we think it prudent that Berkshire Hathaway issue a report revealing and disclosing the company’s specific best practices, policies, and safety standards for methane assets and required upgrade costs to facilities to mitigate potential business risks.

最后，我们认为伯克希尔哈撒韦发布一份报告，揭示和披露公司在甲烷资产方面的具体最佳实践、政策和安全标准，以及为减轻潜在商业风险而需要对设施进行的升级成本，是明智之举。

The report would make it easier for investors, customers, and regulators to understand Berkshire’s overall approach to managing methane emissions and risks. Thank you for your consideration.

该报告将使投资者、客户和监管机构更容易理解伯克希尔在管理甲烷排放和风险方面的整体方法。感谢您的考虑。

WARREN BUFFETT: Miss Cathcart, could you help me out? Are there some other people that are there to speak? I can’t quite see from here.

沃伦·巴菲特：凯瑟卡特小姐，您能帮我一下吗？那里还有其他人要发言吗？我从这里看不太清楚。

VOICE: No, there are no other shareholders who wish to speak on this issue.

声音：不，没有其他股东希望就此问题发言。

FREEDA CATHCART: There’s nobody behind me to speak.

弗里达·凯思卡特：我身后没有人可以发言。

WARREN BUFFETT: Did you get that, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：你听到了吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg — could we put up slide one and then if somebody will give Greg a microphone, that’d be helpful. He could elaborate some on this chart and knows what we’re doing.

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格——我们能不能先放上第一张幻灯片，如果有人能给格雷格一个麦克风，那就太好了。他可以对此图表做一些详细说明，并且知道我们在做什么。

GREG ABEL: OK. Thanks, Warren and appreciate the comments there. What we’ve prepared here is in response to the proposal. It demonstrates the ONE Future Initiative goal as it was highlighted. They’d like to see our pipelines operating by 2025 at a 1 percent throughput — or a loss of throughput at 1 percent.

格雷格·阿贝尔：好的。谢谢你，沃伦，感谢你的评论。我们在这里准备的内容是针对提案的。它展示了 ONE Future 倡议的目标，如所强调的那样。他们希望看到我们的管道在 2025 年以 1%的吞吐量运行——或者吞吐量损失为 1%。

I’m happy to report, as this slide shows, that in 2017 our throughput loss was 0.046 percent, 20 times better than the request in 2025. (Applause)

我很高兴地报告，正如这张幻灯片所示，2017 年我们的吞吐量损失为 0.046%，比 2025 年的要求好 20 倍。（掌声）

Thank you. It’s a great compliment to our operating team, obviously. They take the issue that has been highlighted very seriously. I would also add, as it was noted, we’re part of the EPA program where we report on a voluntary basis. Our practices are disclosed and reviewed by the EPA and additionally added on our website.

谢谢。这显然是对我们运营团队的极大赞赏。他们非常认真地对待所强调的问题。我还想补充一点，正如所提到的，我们是环保局（EPA）项目的一部分，我们是自愿报告的。我们的做法会被环保局披露和审查，并且还会在我们的网站上发布。

Accordingly, I strongly feel we’re getting the results and disclosing the appropriate information. Thank you.

因此，我强烈感到我们正在取得成果并披露适当的信息。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and thanks Greg. And Miss Cathcart, we are on the same side you are on this basically. We just are not looking for ways to conduct more studies and prepare reports that may cost us money and generate more reports and all that. But I can tell you two things.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，谢谢你，格雷格。凯瑟卡特小姐，我们在这一点上和您是同一阵线。我们只是不想寻找更多的方式来进行研究和准备可能会花费我们金钱的报告，以及产生更多的报告等等。但我可以告诉你两件事。

This is something that is reported to the board of directors of Berkshire Hathaway Energy quarterly. And I’m on that board. And we believe in achieving the same things and we think Berkshire Hathaway Energy is both sensitive and effective — sensitive to and effective — in reducing methane emissions.

这是每季度向伯克希尔哈撒韦能源董事会报告的内容。我是该董事会的成员。我们相信实现相同的目标，我们认为伯克希尔哈撒韦能源在减少甲烷排放方面既敏感又有效。

So if — I think we’re now ready. The motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the motion and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles. Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

所以，如果——我认为我们现在准备好了。动议现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员。阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以进行您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 48,040 votes for the motion and 558,640 votes against the motion.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票在上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，支持该提案的票数为 48,040 票，反对该提案的票数为 558,640 票。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares properly cast on the matter, as well as all votes outstanding, the motion has failed. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有有效投票的 A 类和 B 类股份的多数票，以及所有未投票的票数，该提案已被否决。根据特拉华州法律要求的精确投票计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起保存。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。提案失败。

64. Shareholder proposal on sustainability reports

股东关于可持续性报告的提案

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by shareholder Freeda Cathcart. The motion is set forth in the proxy statement. The motion requests that Berkshire adopt a policy to encourage more Berkshire subsidiary companies to issue annual sustainability reports.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是股东弗里达·卡斯哈特提出的动议。该动议在委托书中列出。动议请求伯克希尔采取政策，鼓励更多的伯克希尔子公司发布年度可持续发展报告。

I will now recognize Freeda Cathcart to present the motion, and to all interested shareholders to present their views I ask her to limit her remarks to five minutes. You have the floor, Miss Cathcart.

我现在将时间交给 Freeda Cathcart 来提出动议，并请所有感兴趣的股东发表意见，我要求她将发言时间限制在五分钟内。您有发言权，Cathcart 小姐。

FREEDA CATHCART: Thank you so much. It is a privilege to be here and a privilege I can give thanks to my grandfather James Cathcart, who started out in the mailroom of Gen Re and worked himself up through the company to become the chair of Gen Re. During that time he accumulated a lot of Gen Re stock, which he bestowed generously upon his family.

弗里达·凯瑟卡特：非常感谢。能在这里是一种荣幸，我要感谢我的祖父詹姆斯·凯瑟卡特，他从 Gen Re 的邮件室开始，逐步晋升，最终成为 Gen Re 的董事长。在此期间，他积累了大量的 Gen Re 股票，并慷慨地将其赠予家人。

And when he did so, he encouraged the members of his family to do good and to pay it forward, to do something that would make a difference in the world and in our communities. For my father, he did so by being philanthropic with educational institutions with the theory that if you give a person a fish you feed them for a day, but if you teach them to fish, you feed them for a lifetime.

当他这样做时，他鼓励家人做好事并回馈社会，做一些能改变世界和我们社区的事情。对我父亲来说，他通过对教育机构的慈善捐助来实现这一点，认为如果你给一个人一条鱼，你只是在喂养他们一天，但如果你教他们钓鱼，你就是在喂养他们一辈子。

My focus has been on the environment with the thought that when people fish, it would be nice if they were able to eat the fish.

我的关注点一直在环境上，想着人们钓鱼时，如果能吃到鱼那就太好了。

I want to take this opportunity to clarify my proposal about the sustainability reports and put the emphasis on the word encourage. It is evident that Berkshire Hathaway’s management of allowing the subsidiaries to work without getting guidance — well, mandates from you is being very successful.

我想借此机会澄清我关于可持续性报告的提议，并强调“鼓励”这个词。显然，伯克希尔·哈撒韦允许子公司在没有来自你们的指导——好吧，命令的情况下运作是非常成功的。

And I wouldn’t recommend changing it. You’re doing a great job. Please keep it up.

我不建议改变它。你做得很好。请继续保持。

But I do think that there’s something to be said to encourage them and support them, and in many ways you already are.

但我确实认为，有必要鼓励和支持他们，在许多方面你已经在这样做了。

There is a high level of interest from investors and the public in corporate social responsibility. One-fifth of investments are based on socially responsible investment strategies. And back in 2012, I found an article by Planet Earth Herald where they wrote, “When Warren Buffett talks, people listen. He is now talking about the environment. He believes that companies need to have a triple bottom line. And respecting the environment is absolutely critical to a company’s economic performance.”

投资者和公众对企业社会责任的关注度很高。五分之一的投资基于社会责任投资策略。早在 2012 年，我发现了一篇来自《地球星球报》的文章，其中写道：“当沃伦·巴菲特发言时，人们会倾听。他现在在谈论环境问题。他认为公司需要有三重底线。尊重环境对公司的经济表现至关重要。”

In times — and this is a direct quote from you, Mr. Buffett, “In times such as these a company must invest in the key ingredients of profitability: its people, communities, and the environment.”

在这样的时代——这是您直接引用的话，巴菲特先生，“在这样的时代，一家公司必须投资于盈利的关键要素：它的员工、社区和环境。”

One-third of Berkshire Hathaway’s subsidiaries already have a sustainability presence on the web. And one of them is Berkshire Energy that has the acronym respect, R-E-S-P-E-C-T, which stands for Responsibility, Efficiency, Stewardship, Performance, Communication, and Training.

伯克希尔哈撒韦的三分之一子公司已经在网上有了可持续发展的存在。其中之一是伯克希尔能源，其缩写为 R-E-S-P-E-C-T，代表责任、效率、管理、绩效、沟通和培训。

And Berkshire Hathaway provides an annual sustainability summit to help bring the subsidiaries together so they can learn how to be more sustainable, how to share tips, and how to be profitable. And that’s excellent.

伯克希尔哈撒韦每年举办可持续发展峰会，以帮助子公司聚集在一起，学习如何更可持续发展，如何分享经验，以及如何盈利。这非常出色。

But when I try to find a web presence about the sustainability summit, I wasn’t able to find it. And that’s where I think that we can do a better job in Berkshire Hathaway when it comes to communication with our shareholders and with the outside world about the good work that we’re doing.

但是当我试图找到关于可持续发展峰会的网络信息时，我没有找到。这就是我认为我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦在与股东和外界沟通我们所做的好工作方面可以做得更好的地方。

A simple solution to that would just be to create a link on the Berkshire Hathaway website to sustainability that people could click on and go and find out about initiatives like the sustainability summit. And from there, perhaps, they could click on to go to the subsidiaries that have a web presence about sustainability to see what they’re doing.

一个简单的解决方案就是在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的网站上创建一个可点击的可持续发展链接，让人们可以了解可持续发展峰会等倡议。从那里，他们也许可以点击进入那些在可持续发展方面有网络存在的子公司，看看他们在做什么。

In doing so, we give a window to the world where they can see what we’re doing to make a difference that might inspire other corporations to follow the example. Or perhaps a college student working on a paper would read about it and think that that is a good business model, that that’s something that he wants to bring forward when he goes into his career.

通过这样做，我们为世界提供了一个窗口，让他们看到我们正在做些什么来带来改变，这可能会激励其他公司效仿。或者，也许一位正在写论文的大学生会读到这些，并认为这是一个好的商业模式，这是他在进入职业生涯时想要推广的东西。

There is a Facebook page called “Berkshire Hathaway’s Sustainability” that will be available for shareholders and the outside world to look at to see research and to encourage each other to learn how we can support sustainability practices. And that is available now.

有一个名为“伯克希尔哈撒韦可持续发展”的 Facebook 页面，供股东和外界查看研究，并相互鼓励学习如何支持可持续发展实践。这个页面现在可以访问。

I greatly appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today and to clarify what my proposal is. And I do greatly applaud and appreciate all the work that you’re doing on behalf of our corporation and the world. Thank you so much.

我非常感谢今天有机会与您交谈，并澄清我的提议是什么。我也非常赞赏和感激您为我们的公司和世界所做的所有工作。非常感谢您。

WARREN BUFFETT: And thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们。（掌声）

Many of the managers — a great many of the managers — of Berkshire are here and are listening to you. And I suspect that a very high percentage of them agree with what you’re saying. Whether they — what they do in terms of web pages and so on, in our view, is basically up to them.

许多伯克希尔的经理——非常多的经理——在这里并在听你讲话。我怀疑他们中有很高的比例同意你所说的。至于他们在网页等方面的做法，在我们看来，基本上取决于他们自己。

But I can tell you that one leading proponent, as you mentioned, was Greg Abel, who until recently was running Berkshire Hathaway Energy and now is vice chairman. And Greg may want to say a few words on this, too. But I can assure you that the managers are listening to you.

但我可以告诉你，正如你提到的，一位主要支持者是格雷格·阿贝尔，他直到最近还在负责伯克希尔哈撒韦能源，现在是副董事长。格雷格也可能想对此说几句话。但我可以向你保证，管理层在倾听你们的声音。

GREG ABEL: Thanks, Warren. Yeah, we do everything that was touched on. I’ll just maybe add a few points for our shareholders. Obviously, sustainability is a priority for Berkshire and each of our operating subsidiaries. It was highlighted that a number of them have sustainability reports. But I would go beyond that. If you go to our various companies’ websites, you’ll see specific actions they’re taking relative to sustainability. So it may not be summarized in a specific report, but that type of information is available.

格雷格·阿贝尔：谢谢，沃伦。是的，我们做了所有提到的事情。我可能会为我们的股东补充几点。显然，可持续性是伯克希尔及我们每个运营子公司的优先事项。已经强调了其中一些公司有可持续性报告。但我想更进一步。如果你访问我们各个公司的官方网站，你会看到他们在可持续性方面采取的具体行动。因此，这些信息可能没有在特定报告中总结，但这类信息是可以获得的。

I can also add that when you think of the Berkshire Hathaway Energy Corporation, we’re trying to lead by example with support from Warren, Charlie, Walter Scott. I’m happy to report, if you look at where our energy production is right now at the end of 2017, 50 percent of our energy that is produced and consumed by our customers comes from renewable energy.

我还可以补充一点，当你想到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司时，我们正试图在沃伦、查理和沃尔特·斯科特的支持下以身作则。我很高兴地报告，如果你看看我们在 2017 年底的能源生产情况，50%的能源是由我们的客户生产和消费的，来自可再生能源。

That’s something we’re strongly communicating across the U.S. and globally as an example of what can be done in our industry. And I’m happy to report by the end of 2021, 100 percent of the energy utilized by our customers can be met through renewable energy in Iowa.

这就是我们在美国和全球范围内强烈传达的一个例子，展示了我们行业中可以做到的事情。我很高兴地报告，到 2021 年底，我们客户所使用的 100%的能源可以通过爱荷华州的可再生能源来满足。

So I understand the concept of sustainability. We’re working across our organizations to share best practices. But as Warren highlighted, it really resides in each of our companies. But it will be encouraged and you’ll continue to see great results. Thank you.

所以我理解可持续发展的概念。我们正在各个组织之间分享最佳实践。但正如沃伦所强调的，这实际上存在于我们每个公司中。但这将受到鼓励，您将继续看到良好的成果。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

The motion is now ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person they should now mark their ballot on the motion and deliver their ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

动议现在可以进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Miss Amick, when you’re ready you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，您准备好了可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 67,282 votes for the motion and 544,256 votes against the motion.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票结果是，截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，有 67,282 票支持该提案，544,256 票反对该提案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. And I would say Miss Cathcart, our managers heard you. I mean, you have had an impact and I appreciate what you have done.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。我想说，凯瑟卡特小姐，我们的经理们听到了你的声音。我的意思是，你产生了影响，我很感激你所做的一切。

Walter, I guess we’re now ready for a motion?

沃尔特，我想我们现在准备好提议了吗？

WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

2018-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2018-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Buffett opens a box of peanut brittle for Munger

2. Accounting-rule net loss “not representative” of the business

3. Master class: How to think about investments

4. Nothing’s changed - Buffett’s still “semi-retired”

5. Precision Castparts is “a very good business”

6. Trade benefits are huge, so U.S. and China won’t do something “foolish”

7. Deals don’t depend on Buffett: “The reputation belongs to Berkshire now”

8. “We don’t know what we’re doing” in cyber insurance

9. Capital allocation in the public sector

10. Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”

11. “I like to think I’ll be missed a little bit, but you won’t notice it”

12. Buffett talks to Ajit Jain about insurance pricing because it’s fun

13. Putting business values in income account is “enormously deceptive”

14. McLane profits hurt by severe competitive pressure

15. Health care costs partnership with Amazon and JPMorgan

16. Weschler and Combs “slightly ahead” of S&P

17. GEICO is on a good growth and profit track

18. Munger on steel tariffs: “Even Donald Trump can be right”

19. Buffett won’t impose his political opinions on Berkshire

20. “Very unlikely” Berkshire would pay a special dividend

21. Munger is more interested than Buffett in Chinese stocks

22. Munger: Keep the faith and don’t sell your stock when we’re gone

23. “should be earning more money than it is now”

24. Long-term bonds are “almost ridiculous” at current rates

25. “A bureaucracy is sort of like a cancer”

26. We’re experimenting with lower-cost commercial insurance

27. Health care partnership is attacking a huge “industry moat”

28. Buffett vs Elon Musk on whether competitive moats are “lame”

29. Not surprised “if we find good uses” for Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s capital

30. “We do expect that normalized earning power to increase over time”

31. No “unusual profits involved in being a real estate agent”

32. Some Kraft Heinz products “enjoy fairly healthy” growth

33. Thanks to meeting organizer Melissa Shapiro

34. Why Berkshire won’t be buying Microsoft stock

35. “Through it all … America really, really moves ahead”

36. “We’ll have a somewhat larger operation at Gen Re”

37. “I can’t reduce that to a formula for you”

38. Why Apple and thoughts on Apple’s buybacks

39. “I like very much our holdings of American Express”

40. Capital-intensive businesses are “good enough”

41. Buffett “surprised” rate of decline for newspapers hasn’t moderated

42. TTI has “improved dramatically in the past year”

43. Phillips 66 and staying below 10 percent ownership

44. Cryptocurrency craze will “come to a bad ending”

45. Shareholders will get a lot of the corporate tax cut benefit

46. Utilizing multicultural backgrounds to improve international economies, and the benefits of multiculturality

47. Subsidiaries encouraged to offer low-cost 401(k) options

48. Berkshire’s culture will continue because “it works”

49. Cash needed to support Berkshire insurance operations

50. “Amazing” earnings in the new “asset-light economy”

51. “We still feel OK” about AIG’s $10.2 retroactive premium

52. “We really want products where people feel like kissing you”

53. Hostile bids aren’t “evil” but Berkshire doesn’t do them

54. Berkshire still not on radar screen of international business sellers

55. Investing “doesn’t require advanced learning”

56. Buffett “bullish on human race” as women enter the workforce

57. Berkshire buybacks not limited by state insurance rules

58. Munger: “I don’t think the world is going to be changed that much by machine intelligence”

59. Munger: “American investors are missing China”

60. “What Jeff Bezos has done is something close to a miracle”

61. “We already have a family office. It’s sitting right here”

62. No “precise formulas” on Berkshire’s incentive plans

63. Formal business meeting

64. Shareholder proposal on sustainability reports

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