Unknown Analyst

Okay. So we’re delighted to have Jamie Dimon with us this morning. Jamie is now in his 12th year as CEO and Chairman of JPMorgan. Since the merger with Bank One, JPMorgan has outperformed the market by almost 100% and has distributed about $150 billion to shareholders. I think the first time, Jamie, that you spoke at this conference was back in December 2000, when you were CEO of Bank One, and we really do appreciate you coming back to talk to us over the years.

好的，我们非常高兴今天上午请到Jamie Dimon。Jamie目前已担任JPMorgan董事长兼CEO第12个年头。自与Bank One合并以来，JPMorgan的市场表现几乎超越大盘100%，并已向股东分红约1500亿美元。我记得Jamie第一次在本会议上发言是在2000年12月，当时你还是Bank One的CEO，我们非常感激你这些年来多次回来与我们交流。

Unknown Analyst

So I thought we could start off with just a broad question around your outlook for 2019. Obviously, a lot of conflicting signals from financial markets, lots of concerns around where we are in the cycle. When you look across the business, what are the trends that you see? How do you think 2019 is going to unfold? And how do you think it will differ to what we’ve seen this year?

我想我们可以先从一个宏观问题开始：你对2019年的展望如何？显然，金融市场传递出很多相互矛盾的信号，大家也都在担忧当前所处的经济周期阶段。从你对整体业务的观察来看，你看到的趋势是什么？你认为2019年的经济走势将如何？又会和今年有何不同？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

You’re welcome. I’m happy to be here again. So I’ll answer the question, but it’s very important you understand, we don’t run the company guessing about what 2019 is going to be. We build bankers, systems, people, ops and stuff like that. If you look at the immediate economy, it’s actually doing fine, and so is the global economy. So the IMF warned about slowing growth, but they still project 3.5% for the global economy, which is actually rather good. And Europe is doing a bit better; China is 6%; Japan, 1%; and America looks like something like 2.5%. The financial companies are in great shape. Households are in good shape. Debt service ratios are low. Confidence is high. I know that Tim Sloan said he had business confidence. Consumer confidence, not at all-time highs but they’re close to them. So it looks like we’re doing fine. Obviously, there will – something will disrupt it and something will one day change that. It may very well not be 2019. So I think people should get it in their heads that it may not – it could not – it may not be 2020. And as you said, but fear is out there. Tariffs is one. And it’s not a huge fear. It’s just that you see the uncertainty it causes. It’s a funny thing when indirect effects of the tariffs – it’s not the direct effects, the indirect in confidence, reinvestment, people trying to figure out what the fat tail of a trade war means. So that’s why the market is swinging around. Another one is the rise in the rates, how much inflation will there be, the reversal of quantitative easing. We don’t completely understand what quantitative easing did, therefore, we can’t completely understand what the reversal of quantitative easing will do. And with the different monetary transmissions, different regulatory policies, it may not be quite as smooth as we think.

很高兴再次来到这里。我来回答这个问题，不过我想强调一点，我们并不是靠猜测2019年会如何来经营这家公司。我们在打造的是银行家、系统、人才、运营等基础能力。如果你看眼前的经济状况，实际上表现得还不错，全球经济也是如此。虽然IMF警告说增长可能放缓，但他们仍预计全球经济增长率为3.5%，其实这个水平是相当不错的。欧洲表现略有改善，中国为6%，日本为1%，美国大约为2.5%。金融公司状况良好，家庭财务状况也不错，债务偿付比率较低，信心很强。我知道Tim Sloan提到他对企业信心充足，消费者信心虽然不是历史新高，但也接近高位。所以从整体来看，我们目前运行良好。当然，总会有某个因素打破现状，改变趋势，但这可能不会在2019年发生。我认为大家要有心理准备，也许2020年也不会发生转变。就像你说的，市场上确实存在一些担忧，其中之一就是关税问题。这种担忧并不是非常巨大，而是它所带来的不确定性让人警惕。令人头疼的是关税的间接影响——不是直接效应，而是信心、再投资受到影响，人们在试图理解贸易战的“肥尾风险”到底意味着什么，这正是导致市场波动的原因之一。另一个问题是利率上升、通胀走向以及量化宽松政策的逆转。我们并不完全理解量化宽松的真正作用，因此也就无法完全预测其逆转会带来什么影响。加上各国货币传导机制、监管政策的差异，整个过程可能不会像我们想象的那样顺利。

Unknown Analyst

Okay. And perhaps outside the U.S., there’s obviously, again, a lot going on with Brexit, a lot of developments in Italy, questions in Germany. And then perhaps, you can touch on the impact of trade and tariffs in China, where I think the impact of that has obviously been a lot bigger.

明白。那么在美国之外，也有许多重要的事件正在发生，比如英国脱欧、意大利的局势、德国面临的一些问题。你是否也可以谈谈中国方面贸易与关税的影响？我想那里的影响显然要更大一些。

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Right. So let me do a quick thing in Europe. So Brexit is not good for Britain. But what we think is going to happen, again, we don’t really know, is that something will be voted as kind of an agreement in principle. But think of that as that’s fine. Parliament may vote it down and vote it down 2 or 3 times before it gets voted on. The chance of a hard Brexit is rather small because it would be disastrous for Europe, too. They’ll just delay something like that past March. But the real thing is what gets negotiated in the 21 months after the transition, and there’s a 2-year transition. That’s going to be very tough on the Brits. Yes, that could be a simple thing. That’s almost industry by industry. Italy, it’s all about the banks, Italian bonds, the relationship of the Italian government with the European government. Now they’re kind of sticking their finger in the eye of the European government in deficits and stuff like that. You see it in their bond prices. The issue with that is, does it cause a run on the European – on Italian banks? It’s not good. But having said that, I would stick more – and you have a little downturn in Germany, which is unexpected; a little downturn in Japan. People react to short-term stimuli. It looks like Europe will still be growing at 1.5% to 2%. That’s what most people forecast for Europe next year. And China, it looks like they’re going to be growing like 6%. It’s absolutely clear, the tariffs and the trades, those hurt them. The reliance on exports, it’s something like half of what it was 15 years ago. They reacted in kind to America raising tariffs. They got kind of a 90-day hiatus. My guess is that after 90 days, I’m hoping they’ll announce that they made progress enough to continue negotiating, because there’s no way you can finish the complexity of these trade negotiations in 90 days, all right? And then, we don’t have a trade war, then we have a negotiated agreement with China that resolves some of these very, very serious issues that we and the rest of the world have with China around trade. And I’m hoping it gets there.

好的，那我来简要谈谈欧洲。英国脱欧对英国而言不是好事。但我们认为接下来可能发生的情况是——当然我们也不能确定——议会将以某种原则性协议进行表决。但你要明白，那其实只是一个开端。议会可能会否决这个协议一到两次，甚至三次，才最终通过。出现“硬脱欧”的可能性相当小，因为那对整个欧洲也会是灾难性的。到时候他们可能会把这个问题推迟到三月以后再说。但真正棘手的是过渡期之后的21个月里要达成的协议，整个过渡期是两年，那段时间对英国来说将非常艰难。那可能会变成一个几乎是按行业逐项谈判的过程。

意大利的问题则是银行、国债，以及意大利政府与欧盟之间的关系。目前他们在财政赤字等方面几乎是在公然挑战欧盟。这些都体现在他们的国债收益率上。最大的问题是，这会不会引发一场针对意大利银行体系的挤兑？这是不好的信号。尽管如此，我还是比较关注其他方面——比如德国出现了小幅的意外下滑，日本也有一点下行。人们总是会对短期刺激反应过度。但总体来看，欧洲明年预计仍将保持1.5%到2%的增长，这是大多数人的预测。

至于中国，预计仍将保持大约6%的增长率。毫无疑问，关税和贸易摩擦对他们造成了冲击。不过，中国对出口的依赖相比15年前大约已减少了一半。他们也对美国加征关税进行了反击，目前有一个90天的缓冲期。我猜在这90天之后，我们有望看到他们宣布谈判取得了足够进展，从而继续进行后续协商。因为显然，像这样复杂的贸易谈判在90天内根本不可能完成，对吧？那样的话我们就不会陷入贸易战，而是与中国达成一项谈判协议，以解决我们和全球其他国家在贸易上与中国存在的一些非常、非常严重的问题。我希望事情能往这个方向发展。

Unknown Analyst

Okay. So let’s turn to the outlook for your businesses. And I was an outsider looking in over the last 3 years. You’ve gained market share in most of the businesses that you’re in. Where do you see the best opportunity now for redeploying capital? Where do you see the best opportunity for you to grow the franchise? And where do you see the biggest gaps relative to some of your peers?

好的，那我们现在来谈谈你们的业务展望。作为一名旁观者，在过去三年里我看到你们在大多数业务领域都获得了市场份额。那么你现在认为最好的资本再配置机会在哪些方面？你们在哪些领域最有机会扩大业务版图？你们和一些同行相比在哪些方面还存在明显差距？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

So one of the things – maybe you all saw when Daniel Pinto, who runs the global corporate investment bank, this chart that showed where we were in the 17 major areas of cash management, equity, derivatives, equity cash, equity derivatives, fixed income, all the trading areas, ECM, DCM, et cetera. And we’ve obviously moved up to #1, 2 or 3 in almost all of them at this point. The second chart is actually much more telling about what management should be doing, which is you split it apart by region, by product, by – et cetera, all of a sudden, we’re #5. So our market share in the United States investment banking is 10%; in Asia, it’s 5%. And you go product by product, you’ll see the same thing. And certain investment banking areas are – in the United States, we have a 15% share; in other investment areas, we have a 5% share. So that’s how we do it, piece by piece. What’s our G10 trading in this country? What’s our G10 trading in that country? What’s our credit – the trading market share in that country? And to do that, you’re basically building systems, people, capabilities, research, et cetera, around the world to deliver it. Same with when you look at the United States, fundamentally you’re consolidating the market, and you have less banks, not more banks, probably be mergers. And you probably pay more attention to that as we can acquire. But we want to add products and services that make it great for a customer. So now we have You Invest. You can do stock and bond trading for free if you’re a Sapphire Banking customer. And we’re going to add robo investment. We haven’t decided how to price that yet. So I think over time, we can gain share in investments, maybe gain share in deposits. Now we’re opening up – we’re not in all the markets. So we’re adding – we’ve already done Philadelphia, Boston, D.C., et cetera, and we hope to gain share there. And so over time, we want to be a Pan-Europe – a Pan-American retail bank, which includes credit cards, investing capabilities, private banking, et cetera. And so we kind of look at each area and have plans to attack it. And even when we do budgeting and stuff like that, we even look at like – I don’t look at a recession as a bad thing. I mean, it’s bad for America. It’s bad for people to be unemployed. It’s usually an opportunity for JPMorgan. And so I don’t sit there and say, “Oh, my God. This is terrible. Earnings will be down.” I say, “Okay, what are we going to do to do even more that we want to do?” And so I think there will be opportunities in the downturn, too, which hopefully we’ll be prepared for.

我们其中一个做法——也许你们都看到过Daniel Pinto（我们的全球企业投资银行主管）做的那张图，展示了我们在现金管理、股票、衍生品、股票现货、股票衍生品、固定收益、所有交易业务、股票资本市场（ECM）、债务资本市场（DCM）等17个主要领域中的市场排名。我们现在在几乎所有这些领域都排在第1、第2或第3名。但其实第二张图更能说明管理层该做什么，那张图是按照地区、产品等维度拆分的，然后你会发现我们在某些细分维度上只排第5。比如我们在美国的投行业务市占率是10%；在亚洲是5%。再看具体产品，在美国某些投行业务我们占有15%的市场份额，而在其他领域可能只有5%。所以我们就是这样一点一点来分析的——我们在这个国家的G10货币交易如何？在另一个国家的情况怎样？我们在那个国家的信用交易市场份额是多少？为了做到这些，我们必须全球布局系统、人才、能力、研究等方面的建设。

在美国市场也是一样，实际上行业正在集中化，银行越来越少，可能还会出现合并。如果有收购机会，我们也会更加关注。但我们想要的是为客户提供卓越的产品和服务。比如我们现在推出了“You Invest”平台，如果你是Sapphire Banking客户，你可以免费交易股票和债券。我们还将推出智能投顾服务（robo investment），定价方式还未确定。所以我认为未来我们可能在投资和存款方面继续扩大份额。目前我们还没有覆盖所有市场，但我们已经在费城、波士顿、华盛顿等地展开业务，希望在那里扩大市占率。

我们希望最终成为泛美洲（Pan-American）零售银行，服务涵盖信用卡、投资、私人银行等。我们会一一审视每个领域，并制定对应的策略。甚至在做预算的时候我们也会考虑这些。我并不把经济衰退视为坏事。是的，它对美国整体是坏事，对失业的人来说是坏事，但对JPMorgan来说通常是机会。所以我不会惊呼“哦天哪，这太糟了，盈利要下滑了”，而是会说：“好吧，我们接下来怎么做才能实现更多目标？”我相信在经济下行期也会有机会出现，而我们希望届时能够把握住。

Unknown Analyst

Let me ask a follow-up question on that. I mean, given the amount of capital and the amount of liquidity in the banking system today, do you think the opportunity for JPMorgan in a downturn will be equivalent to what we’ve seen in some of the prior downturns?

让我就这个问题再追问一下。我的意思是，考虑到目前银行体系中大量的资本和流动性，您是否认为摩根大通在下一轮经济下行期中会有与以往类似的机会？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Not quite like that because I don’t think you’re going to see people acquiring a lot of troubled banks in a downturn because of the complexity of that, the lawsuits afterwards, the litigation. So I think you’re not going to do like Bear Stearns again or something like that. I do think – and we can’t buy insured deposits anymore. So we can’t play that game even if we have another WaMu. I think someone else will. I mean, if you were a bunch of the banks, I won’t give you names, I would absolutely have my mind on the target to acquire someone when it makes sense, as long as it’s clean. I wouldn’t want to get involved in mortgages and something like that again and have to pay the consequences of that after the fact.

情况不会完全一样，因为我认为这次下行期你不会再看到那么多人去收购陷入困境的银行了，那会很复杂，还会引发诉讼、法律纠纷。所以，我认为不会再出现像贝尔斯登那样的交易了。我们现在也不能再收购受保存款了，就算再出现一个WaMu（华盛顿互惠银行），我们也不能参与那种操作了，我想会有别的人会去做。如果你是一家银行集团，我不点名的话，我当然会盯着一些目标，只要这些目标“干净”，收购是有意义的。我不会想再涉足抵押贷款那一类的东西，因为那会带来事后沉重的代价。

Unknown Analyst

Okay. So you’ve generated 4 years of operating leverage. So your efficiency ratio, I think, has fallen 300 basis points. You’re very, very close to your 55% target. As you continue to gain share, as the business continues to digitize, what do you think the medium-term outlook for that is?

好的。你们已经实现了连续4年的经营杠杆，我记得你们的效率比下降了300个基点。你们已经非常接近55%的目标了。随着你们不断扩大市场份额，业务持续数字化，你如何看待中期前景？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Yes. Well, you have to put this in perspective. First of all, we’re overearning in certain categories. I think it’s very important the management knows that. So if we look at credit, we’re overearning. Credit losses are literally almost at all-time lows, and they’ve been that way for quite a while. So when we talk about the 55%, you’ve got to normalize for certain things that you’re benefiting from, certain things you’re hurting from. So we’re very close to where we should be. The other thing I’d look at it is that – and we’ve always known this, but you don’t know exactly how it’s going to play out. The competition will force a return to more normal type of pricing and things like that, so you can do better than your competition. But you can’t like endlessly grow your efficiency ratio. It’s just not possible because eventually capitalism is going to force you to do a better job for the client, which is a good thing. And so I’m very cautious about saying you can keep on growing and reducing your efficiency ratio because as you do that, your clients are going to want more people to compete. And we’ve seen – because of tax reform and other things, we’ve seen a part being competed away. So there are certain things like in the trading areas, where it repriced right away. In mortgages, it repriced right away. It wasn’t like you’ve got these benefits. And now, of course, mortgage is sucking wind a little bit. And so we hope to do better, but we’re not aiming to have dramatic improvements in efficiency. We also want to – we will build whatever we need to build to build the right stuff for the future. So all businesses do that. What do you build in terms of technology to serve people better, faster, quicker, cheaper, straight-through processing? And we don’t look at that as a discretionary item. I look at that as you have to do that. And whatever that is, we may come up here one day and say, “No, we spent another $2 billion or something because we think it’s valuable.” It’s like building these branches, and that’s a lot of expense before you have a benefit. But it’s great for shareholders. Those branches, we hope, will be enormously profitable 5 years from now.

是的，这得放到整体背景中来看。首先，我们在某些领域实际上是赚得过多了，我认为管理层必须清楚这一点。比如说信贷业务，我们现在的利润水平是偏高的，信用损失几乎处于历史最低水平，并且已经持续了一段时间了。所以当我们谈到55%的效率比目标时，必须要对我们当前受益和受损的因素进行正常化调整。我们现在其实已经非常接近应有的水平了。另一个角度是——我们一直都知道，但你永远不知道会具体如何发生——竞争会迫使回归到更正常的定价环境，所以你可以比竞争对手做得更好，但你不能无限制地提升你的效率比，这在资本主义体系下是不可能的。最终你必须为客户提供更好的服务——这是件好事。因此我对于“可以不断提升效率比”这种说法是非常谨慎的，因为当你这么做时，客户就会希望市场上有更多人来竞争。我们已经看到——比如由于税改等原因——有些领域已经出现了这种竞争，比如交易业务领域，价格很快就重新定价了；抵押贷款业务也是一样，立即重新定价。不是说你一开始就获得了额外好处。现在，抵押贷款的日子也不好过。所以我们希望做得更好，但我们并不指望效率比会有戏剧性的改善。我们还会继续投资于未来所需的建设。所有的业务都是如此：你该如何通过技术构建系统来服务客户，做到更好、更快、更便宜，实现自动化流程？我们不把这类投资看作是可有可无的支出，而是必须要做的事。无论金额是多少，有一天我们可能会站出来说，“我们又花了20亿美元，因为我们认为这是值得的。”这就像我们建设的那些分支机构，一开始是一大笔成本，但从长远来看对股东是有利的。我们希望这些网点在五年后能带来巨大的利润。

Unknown Attendee  

I have a question. When will JPMorgan stop financing private prison and detention companies? They're locking up immigrants, including children and tearing our families apart. These are our loved ones, black folks, immigrants, trans folks. And yet you have so much power to do something. Why won't you?

我有一个问题。JPMorgan什么时候会停止资助私营监狱和拘留公司？他们在关押移民，包括儿童，并拆散我们的家庭。这些人是我们的亲人、黑人、移民、跨性别者。然而你们有这么大的权力去做些什么。为什么你们不作为？

Unknown Analyst  

All right. Could we get someone?

好了。能请人来处理一下吗？

Unknown Attendee  

Why won't you -- you answered his questions, why won't you answer mine? You're the biggest bondholder. [ Obviously, you have a recourse in it ]. Why won't you stop investing? You say you care about immigrants. You just told a Make the Road member, Maria Rubio, earlier this year at your shareholder meeting that you would stop. So you said you would look into it, but to-date you've said nothing.

为什么你们不作为——你回答了他的问题，为什么不回答我的？你们是最大的债券持有人。[ 显然，你们对此是有办法的 ]。为什么你们不停止投资？你们说关心移民。今年早些时候，在你们的股东大会上，你亲口告诉Make the Road的成员Maria Rubio，说你们会停止。你说了会调查此事，但至今什么也没说。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay. So I'm not sure how I'm going to follow that question. So perhaps we can talk a little bit, if there's anything -- do you want to say anything? Okay.

好的。我不确定该如何接续那个问题。或许我们可以谈谈，如果有什么——您想说点什么吗？好的。

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

All right. So I should say, because this is important, the BRT, which I'm the Chairman of, and JPMorgan support real immigration reform. DACA stays, [ granting ] citizenship for undocumented but taxpaying, law-abiding, undocumented, more merit-based stuff. And so we're truly supportive of some of the underlying things that properly treat immigrants in the United States of America.

好吧。我应该说明一下，因为这很重要，我担任主席的BRT和JPMorgan都支持真正的移民改革。保留DACA，为纳税、守法的无证移民[ 授予 ]公民身份，以及更多基于贡献的政策。所以我们真心支持那些在美国能妥善对待移民的根本性措施。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay. So one of the areas that you have obviously increased your investment in considerably is technology. The tech budget is up $2 billion this year. You're now spending $11 billion. And I think...

好的。很明显，你们大幅增加投资的一个领域是技术。今年的技术预算增加了20亿美元。你们现在的花费是110亿美元。而且我认为……

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

It's not up $2 billion. I mean, it's up $2 billion, but it's not over 1 year.

不是增加了20亿美元。我的意思是，是增加了20亿美元，但不是在一年内增加的。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay, yes. But you're now spending close -- well over 10% of revenues on technology. On my calculations, I think it's doubled over the last 5 or 6 years. What do you see the trajectory for that being? And what's your ability to fund increases in tech spending by rationalizing the other parts of the business over the next few years?

好的，是的。但你们现在技术上的花费接近——远超收入的10%。根据我的计算，我认为在过去5到6年里翻了一番。您认为未来的发展轨迹会是怎样？未来几年，你们有多大能力通过优化业务的其他部分来为技术支出的增长提供资金？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Yes. So the way you should look at tech -- we look at it a couple of ways. One is run the bank and then innovation. So maybe 30% of that number is more innovative stuff, and it's stuff you need. It's automating things, it's straight-through processing, it's You Invest, it's Chase Pay, it's better products. And so you have to do that. So it isn't -- like I said, you can cut that stuff, but I think it'd be -- not well served to do it. On the run the bank part, you can actually drive down those costs all the time. There are better computers, agile manufacturing, there's cloud, internal cloud, public cloud, private cloud.

是的。你应该这样看待技术——我们从几个方面来看。一是维持银行运营，然后是创新。所以这个数字中大概有30%是更具创新性的东西，而且是你需要的东西。它包括自动化、直通式处理、You Invest、Chase Pay、更好的产品。所以你必须做这些。所以这不像——我说过，你可以削减那些东西，但我认为这样做是不明智的。在维持银行运营方面，你其实可以一直降低这些成本。有更好的计算机、敏捷开发，还有云，包括内部云、公共云、私有云。

Unknown Attendee  

[indiscernible]

[听不清楚]

Unknown Analyst  

Not another one. Come on. Please, take her out.

又来一个。拜托。请把她带出去。

Unknown Attendee  

You are making a profit off of locking up children in cages. When will you stop being [ about the ] hate? When are you going to stop [indiscernible] and locking up children and putting them in cages?

你们通过把孩子关在笼子里来牟利。你们什么时候才能停止[关于]仇恨？你们什么时候才能停止[听不清楚]、把孩子关起来、把他们关进笼子里？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Okay. Anyone left here, come on out. Please get it out now. You should know that they do have legitimate issues. Those prisons they talk about are run by -- sanctioned by government agencies, audited by government agencies. And a lot of people say they do a much better job than private -- than the public prisons. So I'm not an expert in that kind of thing.

好的。这里还有谁想说的，都出来吧。请现在就说出来。你们应该知道，他们确实提出了合理的问题。他们谈论的那些监狱是由政府机构批准、由政府机构审计的。而且很多人说，他们比私营——比公立监狱做得好得多。所以我不是这方面的专家。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay. So perhaps on the technology side. Again, if you can talk a little bit about...

好的。那么或许谈谈技术方面。再次，如果您能稍微谈谈……

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Okay. So the running the bank part, you're always getting -- you're not getting those costs down all the time. Straight-through processing, cloud, public cloud, more efficiencies, stuff like that. So it's both, but those both are standards. That's been going on my whole life. You're reducing some costs, you're increasing other costs. And I hate it when people look at these, they just look at the one. I mean, you remember, we all spent a lot of money on Y2K. Everyone had to disclose how much they spent on Y2K. Billions of dollars on Y2K. Well, it didn't go away, did it? So it's kind of artificial when you do that. So we do look at these things. You spend the money to develop it, then you have the ongoing cost, which obviously comes down a little bit and sunsetting applications, forcing consolidation of various systems. But the way I'd look at it, you should expect the tech budget to kind of go up over time, hopefully, less than revenues, but go up over time.

好的。在维持银行运营方面，你总是在——你不是总能降低这些成本。直通式处理、云、公共云、更高的效率，诸如此类。所以两者都有，但这两者都是标准。我这辈子一直都是这样。你在降低一些成本，同时也在增加另一些成本。我讨厌人们看这些问题时，只看其中一面。我的意思是，你还记得，我们都在Y2K上花了很多钱。每个人都必须披露他们在Y2K上花了多少钱。在Y2K上花了数十亿美元。嗯，这笔开销并没有消失，不是吗？所以当你这样做的时候，有点人为化。所以我们确实会看这些事情。你花钱去开发，然后就有持续的成本，这个成本显然会下降一点，还有淘汰应用程序，强制整合各种系统。但我看待它的方式是，你应该预料到技术预算会随着时间的推移而增长，希望增速低于收入增速，但会随着时间增长。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay. So let's just talk about the retail side of the industry. And if we look across other industries...

好的。那我们来谈谈这个行业的零售方面。如果我们看看其他行业……

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

No, it's a discipline, by the way. When we sit down as a management team, we go through -- we ask people, "Are you building all the things you need?" We don't tell them, "Your budget is $1 billion and no more." We say, "Are you building things you need to compete and win in the future?" And of course, we analyze everybody else, too. And every now and then, there are people doing a better job than us in certain areas, and that makes us jealous when they do a better a job. So we want to build those things, too. And we think some of the things are table stakes. So when we all spent a lot of money building Zelle, P2P, that was table stakes. We didn't spend a lot of time doing NPVs on it. We said, "We should have done this years ago as a banking -- the whole banking industry should have done it." And so there are other things which you've got to do. You've got to digitize certain stuff and don't spend a lot of time thinking about what the payback is because if you don't do it, you will lose a lot of business over time.

不，顺便说一句，这是一种纪律。当我们作为管理团队坐下来时，我们会审视——我们会问大家：“你们在构建所有需要的东西吗？”我们不会告诉他们：“你的预算是10亿美元，不能再多了。”我们会说：“你在构建未来竞争和取胜所需要的东西吗？”当然，我们也会分析其他所有人。时不时地，会有人在某些领域比我们做得更好，当他们做得更好时，我们会感到嫉妒。所以我们也想构建那些东西。而且我们认为有些东西是入场券。所以当我们都花了很多钱来构建Zelle、P2P时，那就是入场券。我们没有花很多时间去做净现值分析。我们说：“我们几年前就该这么做了，作为银行业——整个银行业都该这么做。”所以还有其他你必须做的事情。你必须将某些东西数字化，不要花太多时间去想回报是什么，因为如果你不这样做，随着时间的推移，你会失去很多业务。

Unknown Analyst  

So let's talk about the medium- to long-term outlook for the retail industry. So if -- we look at across other industries that have digitized, have consolidated and have globalized at the same time. Can you talk a bit about both? And I'm particularly interested in if you think you can export some of the expertise that you have on the retail side to other markets.

那我们来谈谈零售行业的中长期前景。如果我们看看其他同时实现了数字化、整合和全球化的行业。您能谈谈这两方面吗？我特别感兴趣的是，您是否认为可以将你们在零售方面的专业知识输出到其他市场。

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Yes. So I think you will -- obviously, there's huge economies of scale in our business, and that does drive consolidation. It doesn't mean small players can't compete. It's just that they have to come up with different strategies and different ways of competing in local markets, et cetera. And there's always going to be a role for different types of banks in different areas. And in Global Investment Banking, there is also huge economies of scale, like for every trading area, every function, every country. And there's also, what I call, network effects. If you bank in Brazil, you're banking in multinationals going to Brazil. Your bank income is in Brazil, and you bank in Brazilian companies going around the world. So JPMorgan serves those Brazilian companies all around the world, and we have a kind of a tri-party kind of a way to grow revenue, grow our business. So even if Brazil is not doing well, it doesn't mean we can't be banking more and more companies doing business going into Brazil. And so there's a network effect. On the retail side, we've always said we're not going to go retail overseas because we have -- when we build these 400 branches, we're adding what we call the 4-wall costs, 8 or 9 people and rent. But we don't have to add risk, legal or credit compliance, audit, marketing, sales, services, languages, call centers. That pretty much is almost at a very small variable cost. If I go and open retail footprints overseas, I have to add both costs, the local cost, and then since we don't have the languages and I hook up all the systems, you have risk, legal, credit compliance, like a lot of overhead. And then, if I have to open those branches in a different country or a different city somewhere, there's no reason for you to go to Chase. And so you'll be losing money pretty much the rest of your life. Is it possible -- and so if you're going to do something, would you do a big acquisition? It is possible. It probably won't take place in my tenure, but it's possible. But does the new digital world change your ability to do something differently? That's also possible, too. And you obviously know what Marcus is doing. People are looking at ways that they can grow overseas without the physical plant. And so we look at that. We think about it. And if you look at it, it hasn't been like an enormous, successful thing. And each market is a little bit different, so you have to compete differently in Brazil than you do in the U.K., than you do in France, than you do in -- you have different local competitors. But I do think it's a possibility. You have seen kind of some companies doing a good job of cutting across. And if we ever think that's the right thing for us to do, we'd be happy to do it.

是的。我认为你会看到——很明显，我们的业务存在巨大的规模经济，这确实推动了整合。这并不意味着小公司无法竞争。只是他们必须想出不同的策略和不同的方式在本地市场竞争等等。在不同地区，总会有不同类型的银行扮演不同的角色。在全球投资银行业务中，也存在巨大的规模经济，比如每个交易领域、每个职能、每个国家。还有我所说的网络效应。如果你在巴西有银行业务，你就在为进入巴西的跨国公司提供银行服务。你的银行收入来自巴西，你也为走向世界的巴西公司提供银行服务。所以JPMorgan为全球各地的巴西公司提供服务，我们有一种三方合作的方式来增加收入、发展我们的业务。所以即使巴西经济不景气，也不意味着我们不能为更多进入巴西开展业务的公司提供银行服务。所以存在网络效应。在零售方面，我们一直说我们不会去海外发展零售业务，因为我们——当我们建立这400家分行时，我们增加的是我们所说的“四面墙”成本，即8到9名员工和租金。但我们不必增加风险、法律或信贷合规、审计、营销、销售、服务、语言、呼叫中心。这些几乎是以非常小的可变成本存在的。如果我去海外开设零售网点，我必须增加两种成本，即本地成本，然后由于我们没有相应的语言，并且我要连接所有的系统，你就会有风险、法律、信贷合规等很多管理费用。然后，如果我必须在另一个国家或某个不同的城市开设那些分行，你没有理由去Chase。所以你基本上会在余生中一直亏钱。有没有可能——所以如果你要做点什么，你会进行一次大的收购吗？这是有可能的。这可能不会在我的任期内发生，但这是可能的。但是，新的数字世界是否改变了你以不同方式做事的能力？那也是可能的。你显然知道Marcus在做什么。人们正在寻找在没有实体设施的情况下在海外发展的方法。所以我们关注这一点。我们思考它。如果你看看，这并不是一个非常成功的案例。而且每个市场都有些不同，所以你在巴西的竞争方式与在英国、在法国、在——你面对的本地竞争对手都不同。但我确实认为这是一种可能性。你已经看到一些公司在跨领域方面做得很好。如果我们认为这是我们应该做的正确事情，我们会很乐意去做。

Unknown Analyst  

Would you consider joint ventures on the retail side so that you could get some of the local expertise and then use some of the experience that you have in the U.S.?

您会考虑在零售方面建立合资企业，以便获得一些本地专业知识，然后利用你们在美国的经验吗？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

We would, but joint ventures are always completely full of problems. They have different agendas, different growth, different ability to invest, different ways you want to take risk because you can't take risk when you're a bank. So we have huge restrictions on what we can and can't do, regulations, et cetera, compliance requirements. So it's hard for me to imagine that, that will work successfully, but we're completely open-minded. Every now and then, if someone has called me up and said, "We think we can do this together," I'd be willing to look at that.

我们会考虑，但合资企业总是充满了问题。他们有不同的议程、不同的增长、不同的投资能力、不同的风险承担方式，因为作为一家银行，你不能随便承担风险。所以我们在能做什么和不能做什么方面有巨大的限制，比如法规、合规要求等等。所以我很难想象这会成功，但我们持完全开放的态度。时不时地，如果有人打电话给我说：“我们认为我们可以一起做这件事”，我会愿意考虑。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay. So let's talk a bit about regulation. And I appreciate nothing has been finalized, but Governor Quarles has put out a number of NPRs, and they touch a lot of different aspects of how you run the business, from capital to the Volcker Rule, to changes in risk-weighted asset calculations. I mean, again, I appreciate the rules are not final, so things can change, but when you look at the direction that Governor Quarles is headed in, does it have an impact to how you think about running JPMorgan?

好的。那我们来谈谈监管。我知道目前还没有最终定论，但夸尔斯理事已经发布了多项拟议规则通知（NPR），这些通知触及了你们经营业务的许多不同方面，从资本到《沃尔克规则》，再到风险加权资产计算的变化。我的意思是，再次强调，我知道这些规则尚未最终确定，所以情况可能会变，但当您审视夸尔斯理事所前进的方向时，这是否对您如何思考运营摩根大通产生影响？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Not really, because the first way we run JPMorgan is we have clients to serve. The middle-market clients, investment banking clients, retail clients, mortgage clients, credit card, and we serve them. That's the #1 thing we do. Obviously, we have to calibrate all these other rules. And as you know, there's like 19 capital requirements now and 19 different ways of doing something. We try to optimize across that, but that's subjugated to doing a good job for clients. And now certain things are pure balance sheet decisions, like I call it a portfolio decision, where you put a mortgage on or off the balance sheet. That's 100% based upon regulations because we don't have to do that. So we've got to do the best execution or something like that. But you can't just go in and out of client businesses. And let's just be very clear, no one is asking that Dodd-Frank be thrown out. I would love to see some reporters write a story about Lehman redux. So Lehman redux, if Lehman was existing today and you had a similar crisis, they would have, we estimate, something like 2.5x more equity capital. They would have been able to survive the crisis, okay? They would have had 2x the liquidity, and they would have had, I think, 2 or 3x in bail-in-able debt. So even if they didn't survive the crisis, they would have -- the government has the right to take them over, because they didn't last time. That bail-in-able debt, at the moment of failure, they'd have more equity than any other financial institution in the world. They'd be massively over-equitized. So they fixed the main problem. Can you handle failures of major financial companies in a way that doesn't have this huge, disruptive effect? Remember, Lehman was a disorderly unwind around the world, and it caused a lot of confusion and panic and stuff like that. So that's kind of been fixed. Some of the other stuff, it's perfectly reasonable when you look at international standards to calibrate, coordinate, be a little more consistent. Some of these things worked at counter-purposes and some of the things to reduce mortgage lending a little bit, they reduce small business lending a little bit. So look at it. Remember, a healthier financial system, they're changing some of these rules to make the financial system healthy and not less healthy. Diversification is a good thing, not a bad thing. And some of these measures is treated like it's a bad thing. So I just think that regulators, when they look at it, and they -- between what the Fed has laid out, Randy Quarles in his speeches and these -- I think there were 4 or 5 Treasury reports, they [ allowed ] a bunch of areas that should be looked at. How should we calibrate? How can we fix mortgage securitization? How should you calculate liquidity so it actually functions better for the marketplace in a crisis? If you're going to have global standards around G-SIFI, what should be the same? What should be different? So you might have different national standards, but they shouldn't be so different that you're putting one country at a disadvantage to other countries for a 20-year period. And so I hope they go around and look at it. We haven't seen much relief yet, but hopefully, there'll be some coming down the road. I think it's important to do a better job for America. So it's not about doing a better job for JPMorgan. I can give you very specific examples where the mortgage market has been highly constrained by some of these rules, including the fact we still don't have securitization rules. And that the Volcker Rule -- I'm not against the concept of the Volcker Rule, but that the market liquidity is so tight. And it's not -- we're not in a tough market. Wait until things get really tough and people get scared. And then, you have the confluence of factors. Liquidity ratios stop banks from intermediating. Volcker will stop people from wanting to take additional risk. And we don't know what the full effect of that stuff is, and I think regulators should be looking at that, thinking about if they did all the right things. It's not binary, and it's not like anything you do that might be positive for a bank is a bad thing to do for the country. That's just not true.

不完全是，因为我们运营摩根大通的首要方式是服务客户。中端市场客户、投资银行客户、零售客户、抵押贷款客户、信用卡客户，我们为他们服务。这是我们做的第一要务。显然，我们必须校准所有这些其他规则。如你所知，现在大约有19项资本要求和19种不同的做事方式。我们试图在其中进行优化，但这要服从于为客户做好服务。现在某些事情是纯粹的资产负债表决策，我称之为投资组合决策，比如你将一笔抵押贷款放入或移出资产负债表。这100%是基于监管的，因为我们不必这么做。所以我们必须做到最佳执行之类的事情。但你不能随意进入或退出客户业务。我们必须非常清楚，没有人要求废除《多德-弗兰克法案》。我很希望看到一些记者写一篇关于雷曼重演的报道。所以，雷曼重演，如果雷曼今天还存在，并且你遇到了类似的危机，我们估计，他们的股本资本会多出大约2.5倍。他们本可以度过危机，好吗？他们的流动性会是原来的2倍，而且我认为，他们的可用于自救的债务会是原来的2到3倍。所以即使他们没能度过危机，他们也会——政府有权接管他们，因为上次他们没有这个权力。那些可用于自救的债务，在倒闭的那一刻，他们拥有的股本将比世界上任何其他金融机构都多。他们的股本将极为充足。所以他们解决了主要问题。你能否以一种不会产生巨大破坏性影响的方式来处理大型金融公司的倒闭？记住，雷曼在全球范围内是一次无序的清算，造成了大量的混乱和恐慌。所以这个问题基本上已经解决了。至于其他一些东西，当你参照国际标准进行校准、协调、使其更具一致性时，这是完全合理的。其中一些事情起到了反作用，一些减少抵押贷款的事情，也稍微减少了小企业贷款。所以要审视它。记住，一个更健康的金融体系，他们正在改变其中一些规则，是为了让金融体系更健康，而不是更不健康。多元化是好事，不是坏事。而其中一些措施却把它当作坏事来对待。所以我只是认为，监管机构在审视它时，他们——在美联储已经阐明的、兰迪·夸尔斯在他的演讲中提到的以及这些——我认为有4到5份财政部报告，他们[允许]审视一系列领域。我们应该如何校准？我们如何修复抵押贷款证券化？你应该如何计算流动性，以便在危机中它能更好地为市场服务？如果你要围绕全球系统重要性金融机构（G-SIFI）制定全球标准，哪些应该相同？哪些应该不同？所以你可能会有不同的国家标准，但它们不应该如此不同，以至于让一个国家在20年内相对于其他国家处于不利地位。所以我希望他们能全面审视。我们还没有看到太多放松，但希望未来会有一些。我认为为美国做得更好很重要。所以这不只是为了摩根大通做得更好。我可以给你非常具体的例子，说明抵押贷款市场受到了这些规则的严重制约，包括我们仍然没有证券化规则这一事实。还有《沃尔克规则》——我不是反对《沃尔克规则》的概念，而是市场流动性如此紧张。而且这还不是——我们还没处在艰难的市场中。等到情况变得非常艰难，人们开始害怕的时候再说。然后，你就会看到各种因素的汇合。流动性比率阻止银行进行中介活动。《沃尔克规则》会阻止人们愿意承担额外风险。我们不知道这些东西的全部影响是什么，我认为监管机构应该审视这一点，思考他们是否做了所有正确的事情。这不是非黑即白的问题，也不是说任何可能对银行有利的事情就对国家有害。这根本不是事实。

Unknown Analyst  

So capital returns is obviously an important part of the investment thesis in JPMorgan. How are you thinking about the distribution between buybacks and dividends? And if the soft cap gets completely removed, I mean, what type of dividend payout ratio do you think JPMorgan could get to over the next 2 to 3 years?

因此，资本回报显然是投资摩根大通的重要论点之一。您如何看待回购和股息之间的分配？如果软上限被完全取消，我的意思是，您认为摩根大通在未来2到3年内可以达到什么样的股息支付率？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

So again, this is really a board-level decision. So what I'm about to say is kind of what I feel. If I had my druthers, okay, dividends would be about 30% to 35% of normalized earnings. So I think one of the complaints regulators have is banks went to 80% of peak earnings at one point and made it very hard for them to cut when things went down because people don't like to cut their dividend. So you make the dividend kind of permanent. You can count on it, hopefully, annual increases. So I say this not really as a joke. Every 7 years, don't increase it. I've seen company after company get crippled over this every year, the record, every year, 35 years. And you don't want to be the CEO who doesn't do it in the 36th year. So I really think -- [ I don't mean ] -- just simply don't do it. Tell your shareholders they'll be completely fine, so you don't put a burden on the future. But regular dividend. Then the other 65%, if it were up to me, I'd reinvest it. The highest and best use of our capital is reinvesting it, and we're starting to do that now in branches that use capital; in You Invest, which uses capital; in building technology, which uses capital. Every time we go into branches, we also do small business, more mortgage lending, more LMI lending. So to me, that is the highest and best use. That is why we're in business. Stock buyback, in my opinion, is a very good thing to do when your stock is cheap. This notion that you should buy back stock at 3x tangible book value as a return of capital to shareholders is crazy. I just don't understand it. If our stock was trading at 3x tangible book, I would just retain it. And I tell people, you're not losing it. It's earnings in store. So if you can use it down the road at a good return, just retain it for now. If you can't use it all for the foreseeable future, then I would increase dividends and then return it back to shareholders through a dividend thing where you then can decide what to do with this as opposed to me overpaying for my stock. So I do think there'd be more opportunities. Remember, CCAR and all those rules require banks to retain all this capital. Now they've got to where they are, they still retain the capital and they use it to buy back stock. But I think, more and more, it would have been used -- you [ can't ] have counterfactuals. It would have been used to grow and expand. And the fact that it wasn't used to grow and expand did hurt the economy a little bit. And so I think it's good for banks to return back with their recirculating deposits and loans. And obviously, intelligently, bad loans are bad, but more competition is almost always good.

所以，这实际上是一个董事会层面的决定。所以我接下来要说的是我个人的一些感受。如果让我自己选择，好的，股息将占正常化收益的30%到35%左右。所以我认为监管机构的一个抱怨是，银行在某个时候的派息率达到了峰值收益的80%，这使得他们在情况变糟时很难削减股息，因为人们不喜欢削减股息。所以你让股息变得有点像永久性的。你可以指望它，希望每年都有增长。所以我说这个不完全是开玩笑。每7年，就不要增加它。我看到一家又一家公司因为这个每年都要创纪录而陷入困境，每年，连续35年。你也不想成为第36年不这么做的那个CEO。所以我真的认为——[我不是说]——就干脆别这么做。告诉你的股东他们会完全没事的，这样你就不会给未来增加负担。但是要有定期的股息。然后剩下的65%，如果由我决定，我会把它再投资。我们资本的最高和最佳用途是再投资，我们现在正开始这么做，投资于需要资本的分行；投资于需要资本的You Invest；投资于需要资本的技术建设。每次我们开设分行，我们也会做小企业业务、更多的抵押贷款、更多的低中等收入（LMI）贷款。所以对我来说，那是最高和最佳的用途。这就是我们经营业务的原因。股票回购，在我看来，当你的股票便宜时，是一件非常好的事情。那种认为你应该以3倍有形账面价值回购股票作为向股东返还资本的观念是疯狂的。我就是不理解。如果我们的股票以3倍有形账面价值交易，我就会保留这些资本。我告诉人们，你没有失去它。这是储存起来的收益。所以如果你将来能以好的回报率使用它，现在就先保留它。如果你在可预见的未来无法全部使用它，那么我会增加股息，然后通过股息的方式将其返还给股东，这样你们就可以决定如何处理这些钱，而不是让我为我的股票支付过高的价格。所以我确实认为会有更多的机会。记住，CCAR和所有那些规则都要求银行保留所有这些资本。现在他们达到了现在的水平，他们仍然保留资本并用它来回购股票。但我认为，越来越多地，它本可以被用来——你[不能]做反事实假设。它本可以被用来增长和扩张。而它没有被用来增长和扩张的事实，确实对经济造成了一点伤害。所以我认为，银行通过其循环的存款和贷款来回报是件好事。而且显然，要明智地做，坏账就是坏账，但更多的竞争几乎总是好的。

Unknown Analyst  

And what do you think the opportunity is going to be for you to redeploy capital into loan growth next year? It's obviously been weaker. We've seen some signs that it's picking up. Do you think it's just seasonal? Or do you think we're finally starting to see corporate loan demand pick up? And I guess, the second question is like a number of regulators have talked about systemic risks increasing as a result of nonbank competition in corporate lending. How do you see that risk?

那么您认为明年将资本重新部署到贷款增长中的机会是什么？显然，贷款增长一直比较疲软。我们看到了一些回升的迹象。您认为这只是季节性的吗？还是您认为我们终于开始看到企业贷款需求回升了？我想，第二个问题是，一些监管机构已经谈到，由于非银行机构在企业贷款领域的竞争，系统性风险正在增加。您如何看待这种风险？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

So you have to look at the businesses differently. So corporate, the large company, the stuff that's in the balance sheet, the CIB, loan, revolvers, corporate bonds that could circulate, that kind of has its own life, its own logic. And I look at middle market. It's the one that you traditionally look at and say when there's growth in the economy, their receivables go up, their payables go up, they need more capital to do fixed capital investment or something like that. And that, we have not really seen. Hard to figure out why. Remember, tax reform gave them more cash. Growth has been anemic. So when your growth is anemic, you don't need to -- you can just -- you retain earnings. You can do a lot of debt, investing, et cetera. And so now you're kind of starting to see a little bit more growth, and I kind of expect to see more usage of revolvers in middle-market lending. We haven't really, but I kind of still expect it to happen at this part of the cycle. And then things -- certain things are portfolio-effect decisions. So you're not going to -- you don't want to aggressively make loans if you think you might be going into a recession in certain types of your commercial real estate or subprime mortgages or subprime auto or stuff like that. And that is where we turn the spigot -- we will -- we want to turn the spigots on is new business. If you're an existing client, I'm going to be there servicing you. But -- so it's a whole different issue. I'm not going to kick you out because I'm afraid of exposure. No, we think that through. We want to bank our existing clients through the next recession, knowing full well there's going to be a cost to that. But that's how we kind of run the business. And the other one is I -- we don't have excessive risk built up in the financial system. I have seen CEOs talk about it somehow like '07. No. In '07, okay, there was over $450 billion of underwritten debt on the balance sheet of investment banks that haven't been syndicated yet. And today's number is like $80 billion. And so it's dramatically different. CLOs are properly formed today. They're more conservatively structured. You go through them, the stuff that's going through them are more conservative. There are no SIBs. Okay, there are a lot less off-balance sheet vehicles of banks, et cetera, and I can go through a whole bunch of them. Almost all of the mortgage credit -- remember, mortgage credit is like $10 trillion. It's been pristine since '09, other than some of the stuff the government has, the FHA stuff, but that's not an exposure to the system. Student lending is bad. But it's all owned by the government, and it's $1.3 trillion, and it's getting worse every single day. We see it having a little bit of an underlying effect on credit for the ability of people to do loans to get mortgage and stuff like that, so it's hurting household formation a little bit. And large corporate, the leverage lending market, if I remember correctly, there's $800 billion Term A, mostly like 85% owned by the banks. Pretty good stuff, okay? There's $900 billion of Term B, mostly owned by institutional holders, hedge funds, insurance companies, some of these special vehicles, et cetera. And it's not systemic. It's there and some of it will get lost. And of course, the regulators look at how often we're financing that $900 billion of Term B. And our exposures are pretty light on that. I'm not worried about that at all. I'll make you a bet. Something -- somebody's doing something in a stupid way. I mean, but that always happens. But you kind of want that because it kind of -- it teaches you what not to do. So I don't think that it's systemic in the financial system. Something will cause the recession. It could be the something is that rate, there's inflation, and rates are going to go up and they can't go up in a benign way that we all feel good about. They go up in a way you don't feel good about, and that's kind of a traditional recession. You have too much inflation. Wages going up. Our economists expect unemployment will be 3.3% at the end of the year. That's after more people entering the workforce. So it's a very healthy thing, but it also might be the tail end, that the Fed is doing things that we're not used to. It hasn't happened in so long. But it doesn't mean it's going to happen in 2020 or 2021 or something like that.

所以你必须区别看待这些业务。企业业务，即大公司业务，那些在资产负债表上的东西，企业与投资银行部的贷款、循环贷款、可以流通的公司债券，这些都有其自身的生命周期和逻辑。而我关注的是中端市场。这是你传统上会关注的领域，当经济增长时，他们的应收账款增加，应付账款增加，他们需要更多资本来进行固定资本投资之类的事情。而这一点，我们并没有真正看到。很难说清楚为什么。记住，税收改革给了他们更多现金。而经济增长一直很乏力。所以当增长乏力时，你就不需要（额外贷款）——你可以直接保留收益，并有能力处理大量的债务、投资等事宜。所以现在你开始看到多一点的增长，我有点期望在中端市场贷款中看到更多的循环贷款使用。我们还没有真正看到，但我仍然期望在这个周期的这个阶段会发生。然后有些事情——某些事情是投资组合效应的决策。所以你不会——如果你认为经济可能要进入衰退，你不会想在某些类型的商业房地产、次级抵押贷款或次级汽车贷款之类的事情上积极放贷。而对于新业务，这就是我们进行调控的地方。如果你是现有客户，我会继续为你服务。但——所以这是个完全不同的问题。我不会因为害怕风险敞口就把你赶走。不，我们把这个问题想得很透彻。我们希望在下一次衰退中继续为我们现有的客户提供银行服务，并且完全清楚这会带来成本。但我们就是这样经营业务的。另一点是，我——我们认为金融体系中没有积累过度的风险。我看到有些CEO把它说得好像是07年一样。不。在07年，好的，投资银行的资产负债表上有超过4500亿美元尚未完成银团分销的已承销债务。而今天的数字大概是800亿美元。所以这有天壤之别。如今的贷款抵押债券（CLO）结构合理。它们的结构更加保守。你仔细看，通过它们打包的资产也更保守。没有结构化投资工具（SIB）了。好的，银行的资产负债表外工具等等也少了很多，我可以给你举一大堆例子。几乎所有的抵押贷款信贷——记住，抵押贷款信贷市场大约有10万亿美元。自09年以来一直非常纯净，除了一些政府持有的东西，比如联邦住房管理局（FHA）的东西，但那对整个系统来说不是风险敞口。学生贷款很糟糕。但它全部由政府持有，规模达1.3万亿美元，而且情况每天都在恶化。我们看到它对人们获得抵押贷款等贷款的能力产生了一些潜在的信贷影响，所以它在一定程度上损害了家庭的组建。而大型企业，杠杆贷款市场，如果我没记错的话，有8000亿美元的A类定期贷款（Term A），其中大约85%由银行持有。质量相当不错，好吗？还有9000亿美元的B类定期贷款（Term B），主要由机构投资者、对冲基金、保险公司、一些特殊目的载体等持有。这不是系统性的。它就在那里，其中一部分会产生损失。当然，监管机构会关注我们为那9000亿美元的B类定期贷款提供融资的频率。而我们在这方面的风险敞口非常小。我对此一点也不担心。我跟你打个赌。有些事——总有人在用愚蠢的方式做事。我的意思是，但这种事总会发生。但你在某种程度上希望有这种事，因为它——它会教你什么不该做。所以我不认为这在金融体系中是系统性的。总会有什么东西引发衰退。可能就是利率，通货膨胀来了，利率将要上升，而且它们不会以我们都感觉良好的良性方式上升。它们会以一种让你感觉不舒服的方式上升，而这是一种传统的衰退。你有太多的通货膨胀。工资上涨。我们的经济学家预计年底失业率将达到3.3%。这是在更多人进入劳动力市场之后。所以这是一件非常健康的事情，但它也可能是周期的末尾，美联储正在做一些我们不习惯的事情。这种情况已经很久没有发生了。但这并不意味着它会在2020年或2021年之类的年份发生。

Unknown Analyst  

So volatility has picked up significantly across pretty much all products, all markets in the fourth quarter. You've always said the end of QE is going to coincide with a pickup in volatility. Do you think that's what we're seeing? And how has it impacted your business?

所以，第四季度几乎所有产品、所有市场的波动性都显著上升。您一直说量化宽松（QE）的结束将伴随着波动性的增加。您认为我们现在看到的就是这种情况吗？它对您的业务有何影响？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Yes. Well, it's -- I think you have more spotty -- some people say we needed more volatility on trading. Sometimes volatility is good. Sometimes volatility is bad. And I can't go through all the different reasons. But I don't think -- I think a little bit of it is QE. So the Chinese have been selling some treasuries that caused a little bit of volatility as opposed to buying treasuries. You have obviously trade, the reverse of QE, probably a heightened sense of issues around Brexit and Italy and issues like that. So yes, that's caused more volatility. In the meantime, it may have settled out a little bit because it may be that now the world's adjusted. We've adjusted to these new fears, P/Es have come down a little bit, and growth is going to continue. And I think there's some pretty good chance that's what you're going to see.

是的。嗯，我认为——我认为情况更加零散——有些人说我们在交易中需要更多的波动性。有时波动性是好事，有时是坏事。我无法一一列举所有不同的原因。但我不认为——我认为有一部分是量化宽松的原因。比如中国一直在抛售一些国债，这造成了一些波动，而不是像以前那样购买国债。你显然有贸易问题，量化宽松的逆转，可能还有对英国脱欧和意大利等问题的担忧加剧。所以，是的，这造成了更多的波动。与此同时，情况可能已经有所稳定，因为世界可能已经适应了。我们已经适应了这些新的恐惧，市盈率已经有所下降，而增长将继续。我认为很有可能你会看到这种情况。

Unknown Analyst  

And in terms of the performance of your business in the fourth quarter?

那么就第四季度您业务的表现而言呢？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Are you talking about trade?

你是指贸易业务吗？

Unknown Analyst  

Trading.

交易业务。

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Roughly equivalent to last year with almost a month ago.

大约与去年同期相当，这是差不多一个月前的情况。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay. All right. So we got a few minutes left. Let me see if there's any questions from the audience. Yes. We have one here. Bring the mic around. Okay. Speak up. I can repeat it.

好的。好的。我们还剩下几分钟。让我看看观众有没有问题。是的。这里有一个。把麦克风递过来。好的。大声说。我可以重复。

Unknown Analyst  

Just curious. The lack of liquidity across your business, how that plays out [indiscernible] asset classes [indiscernible]?

只是好奇。您业务中缺乏流动性的问题，如果[听不清]资产类别[听不清]，会如何发展？

Unknown Analyst  

Okay. So the question is about a lack of liquidity in the financial markets and how that could play out if there is a downturn, I think, in the economic environment.

好的。所以问题是关于金融市场缺乏流动性，以及如果经济环境出现下滑，这种情况会如何发展。

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Yes. So I do -- so we have $450 billion of HQLA or something like that. And we are required to hold that under all these new rules and stuff like that. So we have tons of liquidity. It cannot be used in a market crisis under existing rules. Maybe this time they will change those rules. And so there's a lot of liquidity locked up in the banking systems. So all those excess reserves are not excess. They cannot be used as they might have been used in the past to intermediate with repos and to buying portfolios and taking a little more trading risk and stuff like that. And kind of what's happening a little bit is you, the investor, are accumulating more liquidity instead. And because of kind of Volcker and that rule, market-making is less. If you run a big credit fund, you say, "It's really hard." So you really build into your mindset to hold more cash, and you can -- it takes a long time to ease into positions and a long time to ease out. As opposed to someone making a bid for $200 million of these bonds, they're going to make a bid for $20 million. And they might work during the day. So liquidity has kind of moved in a different place. The other thing about liquidity is as the Fed reduces balance sheet, it does reduce liquidity. It's hard to figure out exactly how and why. Like I said, the transmission policy is different because of LCR and capital requirements and things like that. So I do expect the likely outcome of that liquidity will get worse, not better. As the markets get more volatile, that will make it even worse. Like all -- a lot of these people put up more collateral when that happens. And so to me, you should expect a little bit of squeezing in liquidity as this takes place. But hopefully, it's not like a panic squeeze. It's just like a squeeze. And that a lot of money managers learn to deal with it, and you do have some nonbanks. I think some of the nonbanks, when things get bad, will not lend, okay? So therefore, that will also remove a little bit of the lending capability to that sector. So I think it's a little bit of a risk because if they're not going to be lending, it is an important thing that banks do. Banks, if you go to '09, banks rolled over all their middle-market loans at prevailing prices. They didn't call up the middle-market clients or even large corporate clients and say, "We're not rolling over to LIBOR plus 175 because I can go buy your bonds in the marketplace at LIBOR plus 800." But other market participants will not buy at LIBOR plus 175 when their choice is they go buy in the marketplace at 800. So think of hedge funds, some of these specs, some of these lenders. It's just -- it won't happen. Therefore, those folks have to go back to a banking system that may not be able to lend them as much as they did in the past. So we'll see. It'll sort out. JPMorgan, we'll try to think through to be prepared to help those clients if and when the time comes.

是的。我确实认为——我们持有大约4500亿美元的高质量流动性资产（HQLA）或类似的资产。根据所有这些新规定，我们被要求持有这些资产。所以我们有大量的流动性。但在现有规则下，这些流动性不能在市场危机中使用。也许这次他们会修改这些规则。因此，有大量的流动性被锁定在银行体系中。所以所有那些超额准备金都不是多余的。它们不能像过去那样，被用来通过回购进行中介、购买投资组合、承担更多交易风险等等。现在发生的情况有点像是，你，作为投资者，反而在积累更多的流动性。而且由于沃尔克规则之类的规定，做市活动减少了。如果你管理一个大型信贷基金，你会说：“这真的很难。”所以你真的会在心态上倾向于持有更多现金，而且你需要很长时间才能缓慢建仓，也很长时间才能缓慢平仓。不同于有人会为2亿美元的这些债券出价，他们现在可能只会为2000万美元出价。而且他们可能会在当天完成交易。所以流动性已经转移到了一个不同的地方。关于流动性的另一点是，随着美联储缩减资产负债表，它确实会减少流动性。很难确切地弄清楚这是如何以及为什么发生的。就像我说的，由于流动性覆盖率（LCR）和资本要求等因素，传导政策变得不同了。所以我确实预计，流动性的可能结果是会变得更糟，而不是更好。随着市场变得更加动荡，情况会变得更糟。就像所有——很多这些人在那种情况下会提供更多的抵押品。所以对我来说，你应该预料到随着这种情况的发生，流动性会出现一些紧缩。但希望，这不会是恐慌性的挤兑，而只是普通的紧缩。许多基金经理学会了应对这种情况，而且你还有一些非银行机构。我认为一些非银行机构，当情况变糟时，是不会放贷的，好吗？因此，那也将减少该领域的一些放贷能力。所以我认为这有一点风险，因为如果他们不放贷，而这正是银行所做的一件重要事情。银行，如果你回到09年，银行以当时的价格续作了所有中端市场贷款。他们没有打电话给中端市场客户甚至大型企业客户说：“我们不以LIBOR加175个基点的利率续贷了，因为我可以在市场上以LIBOR加800个基点的价格买到你的债券。”但其他市场参与者，当他们可以在市场上以800个基点的价差购买时，是不会以175个基点的价差购买的。所以想想对冲基金，一些投机者，一些这类贷款机构。这根本——不会发生。因此，那些人必须回到银行体系，而银行体系可能无法像以前那样借给他们那么多钱。所以我们拭目以待。情况会自行解决。在摩根大通，我们会努力思考周全，以便在时机到来时为这些客户提供帮助。

Unknown Analyst  

Can we have another question at the front?

前排可以再提一个问题吗？

Unknown Analyst  

I wanted to ask you about [ one and DB ]. In the context of questions you raised about with all the Fed oversight of G-SIBs, how could something like that happen? What's your sense of that? Is that a fair criticism? Or is that -- or not?

我想问您关于[一马公司]的问题。在您提出的关于美联储对全球系统重要性银行（G-SIB）进行全面监管的背景下，怎么会发生那样的事情？您对此有何看法？这是一种公平的批评吗？还是——不是？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

I'm not going to get into the specifics. And no, I mean, so most -- I mean, in general, most investment banks have reputation committees, risk committees, extensive rules and requirements they go through. And I honestly don't know what happened there. And Goldman are friends of mine. I worked at Goldman Sachs for some [ in '81 ], which most people don't know. And so I don't know. I mean, that will come out, hopefully. Sometimes it is -- and again, I'm being more generic here. Sometimes it's an isolated thing. You're not going to get rid of the errant bump who is willing to destroy your company so they can commit a [ forgery actually ] or make more money. And so you have rules in place, but you should be careful to say extrapolate everyone.

我不想谈论具体细节。不，我的意思是，大多数——总的来说，大多数投资银行都有声誉委员会、风险委员会，以及它们需要遵守的广泛规则和要求。我真的不知道那里发生了什么。而且高盛的人是我的朋友。我曾在81年为高盛工作过一段时间，这大多数人都不知道。所以我不知道。我的意思是，希望真相会水落石出。有时候——我再次强调，我这里说得比较笼统。有时候这是一件孤立的事情。你无法杜绝那些为了进行[欺诈]或赚更多钱而愿意毁掉你公司的害群之马。所以你有规则来约束，但你应该小心，不要以偏概全地推断到每个人身上。

Unknown Analyst  

Are you saying that it's not really a fair criticism?

您是说这并不是一个公平的批评吗？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

I don't know. I don't -- let them finish all the work, yes.

我不知道。我——让他们完成所有的工作再说，是的。

Unknown Analyst  

We've got a question on the back.

后面有一个问题。

Unknown Analyst  

You spoke fairly positively earlier about the regulatory health of the banking system. If you could tinker with only one rule, what would it be?

您之前对银行体系的监管健康状况评价相当正面。如果您只能修改一项规则，那会是哪一项？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

I think G-SIFI is the -- it's completely ill-conceived, unfair and then we gold-plated it. So there are things in G-SIFI like, there's like 12 categories. It's 1,000 things. But things like cash in the balance sheet and very secure repo is double counted in multiple measures. Obviously, cash in the balance sheet isn't quite the same thing. There is a thing called substitutability. So they make it -- it's a bad thing if things are not substitutable. That would be risky, except you know what they included in substitutability? Market-making, equity underwriting and debt underwriting. So when Lehman went down, did anyone have a problem replacing that stuff? No, they did not. So it's a false number. And so I think the G-SIFI should be modified. Gold-plating should probably go away. I'm not saying you shouldn't -- G-SIFIs shouldn't hold more capital. Just if you're going to do the numbers, do them right just like at my company. We don't BS ourselves on the numbers. We do the numbers right. And then, I think there are certain things about LCR, which I already mentioned, that caused a little bit of issues. I think the regulators know that, and they can always modify that. By the way, I think it was totally within their control. And they're already talking about making some changes to CCAR to make it easier for -- I mean, CCAR, you all should be complaining about CCAR. It makes it harder for you to manage, to know that the capital is being deployed in a responsible, consistent way the way CCAR is running. I think they're going to change some of that. There's other stuff that should be modified.

我认为是全球系统重要性金融机构（G-SIFI）的规定——它完全是构思不周、不公平的，然后我们还对其进行了“镀金”（即额外加码）。G-SIFI里面有些东西，比如有12个类别，上千个项目。但像资产负债表中的现金和非常安全的回购协议在多个指标中被重复计算。显然，资产负债表中的现金并不是完全一样的东西。还有一个叫做“可替代性”的东西。所以他们把它——如果某些东西不可替代，就被视为坏事。那会很危险，但你知道他们在可替代性里包含了什么吗？做市、股票承销和债券承销。那么当雷曼兄弟倒闭时，有人在替代这些业务上遇到问题吗？不，没有。所以这是一个虚假的数字。因此，我认为G-SIFI应该被修改。“镀金”的部分可能应该取消。我不是说G-SIFI不应该持有更多资本。只是如果你要计算数字，就要把它们算对，就像在我的公司一样。我们不会在数字上自欺欺人。我们把数字算对。然后，我认为关于流动性覆盖率（LCR），我之前已经提到过，它也造成了一些问题。我认为监管机构知道这一点，他们随时可以修改。顺便说一句，我认为这完全在他们的控制范围之内。而且他们已经在讨论对综合资本分析与审查（CCAR）进行一些修改，以使其更容易——我的意思是，CCAR，你们都应该抱怨CCAR。以CCAR的运作方式，它让你们更难管理，更难知道资本是否以负责任、一致的方式进行部署。我认为他们会改变其中一些内容。还有其他一些东西也应该被修改。

Unknown Analyst  

Can we have time for one more question? I think just in the middle here.

我们还有时间再提一个问题吗？我想就在中间这里。

Unknown Analyst  

I have a health care question [indiscernible]. I'm wondering how you think your health care initiative could impact your long-term vision or if it even should?

我有一个关于医疗保健的问题[听不清]。我想知道您认为您的医疗保健计划将如何影响您的长期愿景，或者它是否应该产生影响？

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

It's got nothing to do with that. So we spend $1 billion on health care. Our expense is $62 billion. What I'm worried about with health care -- and so this is more of an effort with Berkshire, Amazon and JPMorgan about that we have a serious health care issue in America. It's almost 20% of GDP. It's $10,000 a person more -- or more. And Warren calls it the tapeworm of business in America. And the reason is it's going to break our budget, the federal budget many years from now, and there are problems with wellness programs, obesity, misuse of drugs. High deductibles didn't work, end-of-life isn't properly constructed. The laws need to be changed. And you all -- I'm much sure a lot of you got blood tests or MRIs recently. You have no idea what they cost because you don't pay. But the differential in cost of an MRI can go anywhere from $1,000, in New York City, I think the number's right, $1,000 to $7,000. And there's no qualitative thing about that as opposed to radiology. This is just an MRI. And so if we don't fix this, it's really bad for America. And so you can help. Send me an e-mail. I'll hook you up with the people. We've hired real teams of people who are trying to look at how we're going to attack the problem, using big data, brains, legal, testing things with a long-term view. And hopefully, we'll have some good ideas that we'll share with the world. It's not profit-seeking. It's trying to look at a huge problem and see where we can help fix that problem.

这与那无关。我们每年在医疗保健上花费10亿美元。我们的总开支是620亿美元。我所担心的医疗保健问题——所以这更多是伯克希尔、亚马逊和摩根大通共同努力的结果，因为我们在美国面临一个严重的医疗保健问题。它几乎占到GDP的20%。人均花费超过1万美元——甚至更多。沃伦称之为美国商业的“绦虫”。原因是它将在很多年后拖垮我们的预算，即联邦预算，而且在健康计划、肥胖问题、药物滥用方面都存在问题。高免赔额制度没有奏效，临终关怀的构建也不合理。法律需要修改。而你们各位——我很确定你们中很多人最近都做过血液检查或核磁共振。你们根本不知道它们花了多少钱，因为不是你们付钱。但在纽约市，一次核磁共振的费用差异可以从1000美元到7000美元不等，我想这个数字是正确的。而且这与放射科不同，并没有质量上的差异。这只是一次核磁共振。所以如果我们不解决这个问题，对美国来说真的非常糟糕。所以你们可以帮忙。给我发封电子邮件。我会帮你们联系相关人员。我们已经聘请了真正的专业团队，他们正试图研究如何解决这个问题，利用大数据、智慧、法律手段，并以长远的眼光来测试各种方案。希望我们能有一些好的想法与全世界分享。这不是为了盈利。这是为了审视一个巨大的问题，并看看我们能在哪里帮助解决它。

Unknown Analyst  

Okay, with that, we're out of time. Jamie, thank you so much.

好的，就到这里，我们的时间到了。杰米，非常感谢您。

James Dimon   Chairman & CEO

Okay. Great, folks. Thank you very much. [ Richard ], thank you.

好的。太好了，各位。非常感谢。[理查德]，谢谢你。