2019-02-23 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Berkshire earned \$4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are \$24.8 billion in operating earnings, a \$3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), \$2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a \$20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.
伯克希尔在2018年按照公认会计准则（通常称为“GAAP”）实现了40亿美元的收益。该数字的构成包括248亿美元的经营收益、30亿美元的无现金无形资产减值损失（几乎全部来自我们在 Kraft Heinz 的股权）、28亿美元的投资证券出售已实现资本收益，以及206亿美元的投资持仓未实现资本收益减少所造成的损失。
A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as “wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.”
新的 GAAP 规则要求我们将最后一项计入收益。正如我在2017年年度报告中所强调的，伯克希尔的副董事长 Charlie Munger 和我都认为这项规定不够明智。我们一致认为，这一按市值计量的变动将导致我所描述的“我们净利润的剧烈且随意的波动”。
The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of \$1.1 billion and \$25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of \$12 billion and \$18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of \$17.6 billion by 41%.
这一预测的准确性可从我们2018年的季度业绩看出。在第一季度和第四季度，我们分别报告了11亿美元和254亿美元的 GAAP 亏损；在第二季度和第三季度，我们则报告了120亿美元和185亿美元的利润。与这些巨大波动形成鲜明对比的是，伯克希尔旗下众多业务在各季度都实现了持续且令人满意的经营收益。全年经营收益较2016年的高点176亿美元增长了41%。
Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly \$173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of \$2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a “profit” or “loss” of more than \$4 billion.
我们的季度 GAAP 盈利将不可避免地继续出现大幅波动。这是因为我们庞大的股票投资组合——在2018年底价值接近1730亿美元——往往会出现单日20亿美元或以上的价格波动，而新的规则要求将这些波动立即计入净利润。事实上，在第四季度这个股价高度波动的时期，我们曾多次出现单日“盈利”或“亏损”超过40亿美元的情况。
Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.
我们的建议？关注经营收益，对任何形式的收益或损失都不要过度在意。我这样说绝不意味着投资对伯克希尔不重要。随着时间推移，Charlie 和我预计这些投资将带来可观的收益，尽管收益的实现时间会高度不规律。
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Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.
长期阅读我们年度报告的读者会注意到我以不同的方式开篇这封信。在近三十年的时间里，首段一直以 Berkshire 每股账面价值的百分比变化为特色。现在是时候放弃这一做法了。
账面价值开始失真但经营利润还是实实在在的数据。
The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.
事实是，Berkshire 账面价值的年度变化——它在第2页上作最后亮相——这一指标已失去了昔日的相关性。造成这一情况有三个原因。首先，Berkshire 已逐渐从一家资产集中于可交易股票的公司，转变为其主要价值体现在经营性业务的公司。Charlie 和我预计这种重塑将以不规则的方式持续。第二，虽然我们的股票持仓按市价计值，会计规则却要求我们将经营性公司的集合以远低于其当前价值的金额计入账面价值，这种错估近年来不断扩大。第三，可以预见，随着时间推移，Berkshire 将大量回购自家股份，这些交易将在高于账面价值但低于我们对内在价值估计的价格进行。这类回购的数学结果很简单：每次交易都会提高每股内在价值，而降低每股账面价值。这种组合使得账面价值的计分卡与经济现实日益脱节。
In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.
在未来对财务业绩的汇总中，我们预计将关注 Berkshire 的市场价格。市场可能极为反复无常：只需看看第2页所列的54年历史。然而，从长远来看，Berkshire 的股价将提供衡量经营业绩的最佳标准。
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Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.
在继续之前，我想告诉大家一些好消息——真正的好消息——这些内容并未体现在我们的财务报表中。这涉及到我们在2018年初所做的管理层调整，当时 Ajit Jain 被任命负责所有保险业务，而 Greg Abel 则被授权管理所有其他运营。这些举措早就应该进行了。如今的 Berkshire 比当年由我一人监管时管理得好得多。Ajit 和 Greg 具备罕见的才华，伯克希尔的血液在他们体内奔流。
Now let’s take a look at what you own.
现在让我们看看你所拥有的资产。
Focus on the Forest – Forget the Trees
关注整片森林——忘掉那些树木
Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic “trees,” so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.
评估 Berkshire 的投资者有时会过分关注我们众多且多元业务的细节——亦即我们的经济“树木”。鉴于我们拥有从细枝嫩芽到参天红杉的庞大品类，这样的分析可能让人头昏脑胀。我们的某些树已患病，十年后也许就不复存在；但还有许多树注定会不断成长，日臻庞大而美丽。
Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five “groves” of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.
幸运的是，要粗略估算 Berkshire 的内在商业价值，并不需要逐一评估每棵树。原因在于，我们的森林包含五大片至关重要的“林区”，每一片都可以整体地、相当准确地进行估值。其中四片林区由易于理解的不同业务集群和金融资产构成。第五片——规模庞大且多元化的保险业务——则以一种不那么显而易见的方式为 Berkshire 提供巨大价值，我将在信中稍后解释。
Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.
在仔细审视前四片林区之前，让我提醒各位，我们在配置你们资本时的首要目标是：整体或部分收购那些管理出色、且具备有利且持久经济特性的企业。同时，我们必须以合理的价格完成这些收购。
Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.
有时我们可以取得符合标准公司的控股权，但更多情况下，我们在上市公司中发现我们所寻求的特质，并通常买入其5%至10%的股份。我们这种双管齐下的大规模资本配置方式在美国企业界颇为罕见，并在某些时刻为我们带来了重要优势。
In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about \$43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only \$19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.
近年来，我们应当采取的明智之举十分明确：许多股票为我们的资金带来的收益远胜于我们整体收购企业所能获得的回报。正因为这种差异，我们去年买入了约430亿美元的可交易股票，仅出售了190亿美元。Charlie 和我相信，我们投资的公司价值卓越，远超并购交易所能提供的价值。
Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire’s forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned \$16.8 billion last year. When we say “earned,” moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.
尽管我们近期增持了可交易股票，但在 Berkshire 的森林中，最具价值的林区仍是伯克希尔控制的数十家非保险业务（通常持股100%，从未低于80%）。这些子公司去年赚取了168亿美元。值得强调的是，当我们说“赚取”时，指的是扣除所有所得税、利息支出、管理层薪酬（无论是现金还是股票形式）、重组费用、折旧、摊销以及总部开支之后所剩余的利润。
That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature “adjusted EBITDA,” a measure that redefines “earnings” to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.
这种类型的盈利与华尔街银行家和企业 CEO 经常吹捧的盈利大相径庭。他们的演示中常常出现“adjusted EBITDA”，一种将“earnings”重新定义为排除各种实实在在成本的指标。
For example, managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year’s exact rearrangement won’t recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.
例如，管理层有时声称公司的股票薪酬不应计入费用。（否则还能是什么——股东赠送的礼物吗？）至于重组费用？也许去年的那次精确调整不会重演。但各种形式的重组在商业中很常见——Berkshire 就走过这条路数十次，而我们的股东一直承担着相关成本。
Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: “If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?” and then answered his own query: “Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.” Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.
Abraham Lincoln 曾提出一个问题：“如果你把狗的尾巴称作腿，它有几条腿？”然后他自己回答：“四条，因为称尾巴为腿并不会让它变成腿。”如果在华尔街，Abe 可能会感到孤独。
Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of \$1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization “costs” to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.
Charlie 和我确实主张，我们与收购相关的 14 亿美元摊销费用（详见第 K-84 页）并不是真正的经济成本。在评估私人企业和可交易股票时，我们会将这些摊销“成本”加回 GAAP 盈利中。
In contrast, Berkshire’s \$8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those “maintenance” capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record \$14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.
相比之下，Berkshire 的 84 亿美元折旧费用低估了我们的真实经济成本。事实上，我们每年需要花费超过这一金额，仅仅是为了在众多业务中保持竞争力。除了这些“维护性”资本支出之外，我们还会投入巨资追求增长。总体而言，Berkshire 去年在厂房、设备和其他固定资产上投入了创纪录的 145 亿美元，其中 89% 花在美国。
Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly \$173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about \$14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.
Berkshire 价值位列第二的林区是其股票投资组合，通常在一家大型公司中持有 5% 至 10% 的股权。如前所述，我们的股票投资在年末价值近 1730 亿美元，远高于成本。如果该投资组合以年末估值出售，增值需缴纳约 147 亿美元的联邦所得税。极有可能，我们会长期持有这些股票。然而，最终收益仍将在出售时按当时适用的税率缴税。
Our investees paid us dividends of \$3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as an indicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.
我们投资的公司去年向我们支付了 38 亿美元股息，这一数字将在 2019 年增加。不过，比股息更重要的是这些公司每年保留的巨额盈利。仅作一个指标，请考虑仅涵盖我们五大持股的以下数字。
(1) Based on current annual rate.
按当前年度比率计算。
(2) Based on 2018 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.
基于2018年收益减去已支付的普通股和优先股股息。
GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.
GAAP——它决定了我们报告的收益——不允许我们在财务报表中计入被投资公司的保留收益。但这些收益对我们极为重要：多年来，我们的被投资公司（视作一个整体）保留的收益最终为 Berkshire 带来了超过一美元的资本利得，也就是说，这些公司为我们再投资的每一美元，最终都为 Berkshire 创造了超过一美元的资本增值。
All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee’s stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire’s ownership percentage.
我们所有的主要持股都具备出色的经济特性，并且大多数公司会利用部分保留收益回购自家股票。对此我们非常乐见：如果 Charlie 和我认为被投资公司的股票被低估，当管理层用部分收益来提高 Berkshire 的持股比例时，我们会感到欣喜。
Here’s one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire’s holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire’s portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well.
以下例子取自上表：过去八年里，Berkshire 对 American Express 的持股数量保持不变，但由于公司回购股票，我们的持股比例已从12.6%提高到17.9%。去年，American Express 赚取了69亿美元，其中 Berkshire 的份额为12亿美元，约占我们当初投入13亿美元成本的96%。当利润增长而流通股减少时，所有者往往会随着时间推移获得良好回报。
A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.
Berkshire 的第三类业务所有权是一组我们与其他方共同控制的四家公司。2018年，这些业务的税后经营利润中属于我们的份额——Kraft Heinz 的26.7%，Berkadia 和 Electric Transmission Texas 的50%，以及 Pilot Flying J 的38.6%——合计约为13亿美元。
In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.
在我们的第四片林区，Berkshire 于年末持有1120亿美元的美国国库券及其他现金等价物，以及另外200亿美元的各类固定收益工具。其中一部分资金被视为不可动用的储备，因为我们承诺始终持有至少200亿美元的现金等价物，以防范外部灾难；我们也承诺避免任何可能危及这一缓冲的活动。
Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.
Berkshire 将永远是一座金融堡垒。在经营过程中，我会犯代价高昂的作为性错误，也会错失许多机会，其中一些本应对我而言显而易见。有时，当投资者逃离股票时，我们的股价会大幅下跌，但我绝不会冒险陷入现金短缺。
In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.
未来几年，我们希望将大量过剩流动性投入到 Berkshire 将永久持有的企业中。然而，短期前景并不乐观：具备良好长期前景的企业价格高得惊人。
That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)
这一令人失望的现实意味着2019年我们很可能会再次扩大可交易股票的持仓。但我们仍然希望能遇到一笔“巨象级”收购。即便在我们分别88岁和95岁的年纪——我是那个年轻的——这种可能性仍能让我的心脏和 Charlie 的心脏怦怦加速。（仅仅写到可能进行一笔巨额收购就已让我的脉搏飙升。）
My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.
我对增持股票的预期并非基于对市场走势的判断。Charlie 和我对下周或明年股票的表现毫无头绪，这类预测从来都不是我们的活动内容。我们的思考聚焦于计算一家公司中一部分股权的价值是否高于其市场价格。
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I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.
我认为，伯克希尔的内在价值可通过将我们资产丰厚的四大片林区的价值相加，再减去最终在出售可交易证券时需支付的适当税费来近似估算。
You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.
你也许会问，我们是否还应为伯克希尔若出售某些全资子公司而产生的重大税费留出准备。打消这个念头吧：即便出售不需缴税，出售我们任何一家出色的公司都是愚蠢之举。真正优秀的企业极为难得。若你有幸拥有它们，出售毫无意义。
The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire’s fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds “float,” a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.
在计算伯克希尔非保险业务的收益时，我们已将所有债务的利息成本作为费用扣除。除此之外，我们对前四片林区的大部分持有，是以伯克希尔第五片林区——一系列卓越保险公司——产生的资金来融资的。我们称这些资金为“浮存金”（float），长期来看，我们预计这种融资成本为零，甚至可能更佳。稍后在本信中，我们将解释浮存金的特性。
Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.
最后一点同样关键且持久：伯克希尔通过将五大片林区组合进一个单一实体，最大化了自身价值。这种架构使我们能够无缝且客观地配置大量资本，消除企业风险，避免孤立，以极低成本为资产融资，偶尔利用税收效率，并将管理开支最小化。
At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.
在伯克希尔，整体大于——且远大于——各部分之和。
Repurchases and Reporting
回购与报告
Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.
前文我提到，Berkshire 将不时回购自家股票。假设我们以低于 Berkshire 内在价值的价格进行回购——这无疑是我们的意图——那么回购既会惠及退出的股东，也会惠及留下的股东。
True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.
确实，对于那些离开的股东而言，回购带来的上行空间非常有限。这是因为我们谨慎的买入会最大程度减小对 Berkshire 股价的影响。然而，市场上多一个买家仍然会对卖方带来些许好处。
For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90¢ on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value-destructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.
对继续持有的股东而言，优势显而易见：如果市场将一位退出合伙人的权益定价为每美元 90 美分，公司每一次回购都会使每股内在价值提高。显然，回购应当对价格敏感：盲目买入被高估的股票会毁损价值，然而许多善于宣传或永远乐观的 CEO 却忽视了这一事实。
When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.
当一家公司表示考虑回购时，至关重要的是向所有股东伙伴提供他们所需的信息，以便做出明智的价值评估。向大家提供这些信息正是 Charlie 和我在本报告中努力做到的。我们不希望有合伙人因为被误导或信息不足而把股份卖回给公司。
Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.
然而，一些卖方可能不同意我们的估值，而另一些卖方则找到比 Berkshire 股票更具吸引力的投资。第二类中的部分卖方会是正确的：毫无疑问，有许多股票的回报将远超我们的。
In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.
此外，某些股东只是决定是时候让他们自己或家庭成为净消费者，而不再继续积累资本。Charlie 和我目前无意加入这一行列。也许在晚年，我们会成为大手笔的消费人。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.
在过去的54年里，伯克希尔的管理决策始终从留下的股东而非离开的股东的角度出发。因此，Charlie和我从未关注当季业绩。
Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.
事实上，伯克希尔或许是财富500强中唯一不编制月度收益报告或资产负债表的公司。当然，我会定期查看大多数子公司的月度财务报告，但Charlie和我只在季度末才了解伯克希尔的整体盈利和财务状况。
Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly “number” to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.
此外，伯克希尔没有统一的公司预算（尽管我们的许多子公司认为预算有用）。缺乏这种工具意味着母公司从未设定季度“目标数字”。回避这个“假想敌”向众多经理人传递了重要信息，并强化了我们所珍视的企业文化。
Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.
多年来，Charlie和我见过各种因管理层渴望满足华尔街预期而导致的糟糕会计和运营行为。为了不让“华尔街”失望，一次“无伤大雅”的数字粉饰——例如季度末压货、对不断攀升的保险赔付视而不见，或动用“饼干罐”储备——都可能演变为彻头彻尾的欺诈。“就这一次”动手脚也许是CEO的初衷，但结果往往不止于此。如果老板稍微作弊都可以，部下也很容易为类似行为找到借口。
At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.
在伯克希尔，我们的受众既不是分析师也不是评论员：Charlie和我为我们的股东伙伴工作。传递到我们手上的数字，也将原封不动地呈递给你们。
Non-Insurance Operations – From Lollipops to Locomotives
非保险业务——从棒棒糖到火车头
Let’s now look further at Berkshire’s most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses – keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51.
现在，让我们进一步审视 Berkshire 最具价值的林区——我们的非保险业务组合——同时牢记，我们不想无谓地向竞争对手透露可能对他们有用的信息。有关各项业务的更多细节可参见第 K-5 至 K-22 页以及第 K-40 至 K-51 页。
Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of \$20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.
整体来看，这些业务在 2018 年实现税前利润 208 亿美元，比 2017 年增长 24%。我们在 2018 年的收购仅贡献了极少部分增幅。
I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic.
在接下来的讨论中，我将坚持使用税前数据。但由于年初生效的公司税率下调，我们从这些业务中获得的 2018 年税后收益增幅更大——达到 47%。让我们看看为何影响如此显著。
Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government “owns” an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large “dividends” (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s “stock,” which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.
先从一个经济现实说起：无论喜欢与否，美国政府按国会设定的比例“持有” Berkshire 收益的一部分。实际上，财政部持有一种我们股票的特殊类别——姑且称之为 AA 股——并从 Berkshire 获得大量“分红”（即税款）。2017 年及之前多年，公司税率为 35%，这意味着财政部凭借其 AA 股获益颇丰。事实上，自 1965 年我们接手时毫无收益的“股票”，已演变为每年为联邦政府贡献数十亿美元的持股。
Last year, however, 40% of the government’s “ownership” (14/35ths) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our “A” and “B” shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares.
然而，去年公司税率降至 21% 时，政府“持股”的 40%（即 14/35）被无偿归还给 Berkshire。因此，我们的“A”股和“B”股股东所享有的收益大幅提升。
This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.
这一变化实质性地提高了你我所持 Berkshire 股票的内在价值。同样的机制也提升了 Berkshire 持有的几乎所有股票的内在价值。
Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.
以上是主要内容。但还有一些抵消我们收益的因素值得考虑。例如，我们大型公用事业业务获得的税收优惠会让利于其客户。同时，我们从国内公司获得的大额股息适用的税率基本不变，约为 13%。（这一较低税率由来已久且合乎逻辑，因为我们的被投资公司已对其分配给我们的收益缴过税。）尽管如此，新税法总体上仍显著提升了我们的业务和所持股票的价值。
Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned \$9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45.
这让我们回到非保险业务的业绩。此林区的两棵参天红杉是 BNSF 和 Berkshire Hathaway Energy（持股 90.9%）。它们去年合计实现税前利润 93 亿美元，比 2017 年增长 6%。关于这些业务的更多信息，可参见第 K-5 至 K-10 页和第 K-40 至 K-45 页。
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of \$6.4 billion, up from the \$5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.
按盈利排名（此处按字母顺序列出）的下一个五家非保险子公司——Clayton Homes、International Metalworking、Lubrizol、Marmon 和 Precision Castparts——在 2018 年共实现税前利润 64 亿美元，高于 2017 年的 55 亿美元。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned \$2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from \$2.1 billion in 2017.
接下来的五家（同样按盈利排名并按字母顺序列出）——Forest River、Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw 和 TTI——去年税前利润为 24 亿美元，高于 2017 年的 21 亿美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of \$3.6 billion in 2018 vs. \$3.3 billion in 2017.
Berkshire 其余的非保险业务——数量众多——在 2018 年实现税前利润 36 亿美元，而 2017 年为 33 亿美元。
Insurance, “Float,” and the Funding of Berkshire
保险、“浮存金”与伯克希尔的资金来源
Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business – our fifth grove – has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for \$8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.
我们的财产/意外险（“P/C”）业务——我们的第五片林区——自1967年以860万美元收购 National Indemnity 及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine 以来，一直是推动伯克希尔增长的引擎。按净值计算，如今 National Indemnity 已成为全球最大的财产/意外险公司。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.
我们之所以被 P/C 业务吸引，其中一个原因是该行业的商业模式： P/C 保险公司先收取保费，后支付赔款。在极端情况下，如因石棉暴露或严重工伤事故导致的索赔，赔付可持续数十年。
This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:
这种“先收后付”的模式使 P/C 公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将支付给他人。与此同时，保险公司可以将浮存金用于自身投资。尽管单项保单和理赔此起彼伏，保险公司持有的浮存金规模通常相对于保费总额保持相当稳定。因此，随着我们业务的扩张，浮存金也随之增长。下表展示了其增长情况：
* Includes float arising from life, annuity and health insurance businesses.
包含源自寿险、年金及健康保险业务的浮存金。
We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.
我们或许终将经历浮存金的下降。如若如此，降幅也将十分缓慢——极端情况下每年的降幅不会超过 3%。我们的保险合同性质决定了，我们绝不会面临对现金资源造成重大影响的即时或短期支付要求。这一结构经过刻意设计，是我们保险公司无与伦比财务实力的关键组成部分。这种实力绝不会被削弱。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我们的保费收入超过费用与最终赔付总和，我们的保险业务便会实现承保盈利，该盈利又会叠加在浮存金产生的投资收益之上。一旦实现这样的盈利，我们便能使用免费的资金——更妙的是，还能因为持有这笔资金而获得报酬。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.
不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望获得这一可喜结果，这种愿望导致了激烈的竞争，竞争之激烈有时甚至使整个财产/意外险行业出现显著的承保亏损。实际上，这种亏损就是行业为持有浮存金所支付的代价。竞争态势几乎保证了保险业——尽管所有公司都享有浮存金收入——相较于其他美国企业，仍将继续在有形净资产收益率上表现低迷。
Nevertheless, I like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our float than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage and occasionally offer major opportunities. When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand.
尽管如此，我仍然看好我们的前景。伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使我们在投资浮存金方面拥有远超一般财产/意外险公司的灵活性。我们可供选择的众多方案始终是一种优势，并且偶尔会带来重大机遇。当其他保险公司受限时，我们的选择空间反而会扩大。
Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was $3.2 billion. For the entire 16-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27 billion, of which $2 billion was recorded in 2018.
此外，我们的财产/意外险公司拥有出色的承保纪录。在过去的 16 年里，伯克希尔有 15 年实现了承保盈利；唯一的例外是 2017 年，当年税前亏损为 32 亿美元。整个 16 年期间，我们的税前利润累计达到 270 亿美元，其中 20 亿美元是在 2018 年实现的。
That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
这一纪录并非偶然：严格的风险评估是我们保险经理人的日常核心工作，他们深知浮存金的益处可能被糟糕的承保结果所吞噬。所有保险公司都会口头强调这一点，而在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰，旧约式的信仰。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources – debt and equity. At Berkshire, we have two additional arrows in the quiver to talk about, but let’s first address the conventional components.
在大多数情况下，一家企业的资金来源有两种——债务和股权。在 Berkshire，我们还有另外两支箭可供讨论，但让我们先谈传统的组成部分。
We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant debt juices the returns for equity owners. And these more venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time.
我们谨慎使用债务。需要指出的是，许多管理者会不同意这一政策，他们认为大量负债能够提升股权持有人的回报。而这些更具冒险精神的 CEO 在多数时候也确实是正确的。
At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal. A Russian-roulette equation – usually win, occasionally die – may make financial sense for someone who gets a piece of a company’s upside but does not share in its downside. But that strategy would be madness for Berkshire. Rational people don’t risk what they have and need for what they don’t have and don’t need.
然而，在罕见且无法预测的时刻，信贷会消失，债务变成致命的财务负担。轮盘赌型的选择——大多数时候获胜，偶尔毙命——对那些只分享公司收益、却不承担下行风险的人来说或许有其金融逻辑。但对 Berkshire 而言，这种策略无异于疯狂。理性的人不会拿自己拥有且需要的东西去冒险，换取自己没有且不需要的东西。
Most of the debt you see on our consolidated balance sheet – see page K-65 – resides at our railroad and energy subsidiaries, both of them asset-heavy companies. During recessions, the cash generation of these businesses remains bountiful. The debt they use is both appropriate for their operations and not guaranteed by Berkshire.
在我们的合并资产负债表上——见第 K-65 页——所列举的大部分债务都来自铁路和能源子公司，这两家都是重资产企业。在经济衰退期间，它们的现金创造能力依旧充沛。它们所使用的债务既适合其运营，也未由 Berkshire 提供担保。
Our level of equity capital is a different story: Berkshire’s \$349 billion is unmatched in corporate America. By retaining all earnings for a very long time, and allowing compound interest to work its magic, we have amassed funds that have enabled us to purchase and develop the valuable groves earlier described. Had we instead followed a 100% payout policy, we would still be working with the \$22 million with which we began fiscal 1965.
我们的股本水平则是另一回事：Berkshire 的 3,490 亿美元在美国企业中无出其右。长期以来，我们保留全部收益并让复利发挥神奇功效，从而积累了资金，使我们得以购买并发展前文所述的宝贵林区。若我们采纳 100% 的分红政策，如今我们仍只能运作 1965 财年起步的 2,200 万美元。
Beyond using debt and equity, Berkshire has benefitted in a major way from two less-common sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have described. So far, those funds, though they are recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity. That’s because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting earnings. In effect, we have been paid in most years for holding and using other people’s money.
除了债务和股权，Berkshire 还大幅受益于两种较为少见的企业资金来源。规模更大的一种就是我所描述的浮存金。迄今为止，这些资金虽然在资产负债表上记作巨额净负债，但对我们的作用超过同等规模的股本。这是因为它们通常伴随着承保盈利。实际上，多数年份里，我们在持有并使用他人资金的同时还能获得报酬。
As I have often done before, I will emphasize that this happy outcome is far from a sure thing: Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years to surface. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as a hurricane or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a megacatastrophe strikes, we will get our share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, we will be looking to add business the next day.
正如我过去多次强调的，这种令人欣慰的结果绝非板上钉钉：评估保险风险的错误可能巨大，并且需要多年才会显现。（想想石棉案例。）一场规模远超卡特里娜和迈克尔飓风的重大灾难必将发生——也许在明天，也许在几十年后。“特大事件”可能源自传统灾害，如飓风或地震，也可能是完全出乎意料的事件，比如造成超出保险业想象的灾难性后果的网络攻击。当这种巨灾发生时，我们也将承担相应损失，而且损失会非常巨大。然而，与许多其他保险公司不同，我们将在第二天寻求增加业务。
The final funding source – which again Berkshire possesses to an unusual degree – is deferred income taxes. These are liabilities that we will eventually pay but that are meanwhile interest-free.
最后一种资金来源——伯克希尔同样拥有异常规模的来源——是递延所得税。这些是我们最终必须支付的负债，但在此期间不需支付利息。
As I indicated earlier, about \$14.7 billion of our \$50.5 billion of deferred taxes arises from the unrealized gains in our equity holdings. These liabilities are accrued in our financial statements at the current 21% corporate tax rate but will be paid at the rates prevailing when our investments are sold. Between now and then, we in effect have an interest-free “loan” that allows us to have more money working for us in equities than would otherwise be the case.
如前所述，我们505亿美元递延税款中约147亿美元源自股票持仓的未实现收益。这些负债在财务报表中按现行21%的公司税率计提，但将在出售投资时按届时适用的税率支付。在此期间，我们实际上享有一笔无息“贷款”，使我们能在股票投资中运用比原本更多的资金。
A further \$28.3 billion of deferred tax results from our being able to accelerate the depreciation of assets such as plant and equipment in calculating the tax we must currently pay. The front-ended savings in taxes that we record gradually reverse in future years. We regularly purchase additional assets, however. As long as the present tax law prevails, this source of funding should trend upward.
还有283亿美元递延税款，则源于我们在计算当前应缴税款时可对厂房及设备等资产加速折旧。我们记录的前期税收节省会在未来逐年递回。然而，我们会定期购置新的资产。只要现行税法保持不变，这一资金来源应会呈上升趋势。
Over time, Berkshire’s funding base – that’s the right-hand side of our balance sheet – should grow, primarily through the earnings we retain. Our job is to put the money retained to good use on the left-hand side, by adding attractive assets.
从长远来看，伯克希尔的资金基础——即资产负债表右侧——应主要通过我们留存的盈利而增长。我们的任务是在左侧善用这些留存资金，增添有吸引力的资产。
GEICO and Tony Nicely
That title says it all: The company and the man are inseparable.
标题已说明一切：这家公司与这个人密不可分。
Tony joined GEICO in 1961 at the age of 18; I met him in the mid-1970s.
Tony 于 1961 年 18 岁时加入 GEICO；我在 1970 年代中期认识了他。
At that time, GEICO, after a four-decade record of both rapid growth and outstanding underwriting results, suddenly found itself near bankruptcy. A recently-installed management had grossly underestimated GEICO’s loss costs and consequently underpriced its product. It would take many months until those loss-generating policies on GEICO’s books – there were no less than 2.3 million of them – would expire and could then be repriced. The company’s net worth in the meantime was rapidly approaching zero.
当时，GEICO 在经历了四十年的快速增长和优异承保业绩后，突然濒临破产。新上任的管理层严重低估了 GEICO 的赔付成本，因而将产品定价过低。要等到账面上那 230 万份以上的亏损保单逐步到期并得以重新定价，需要数月时间。与此同时，公司的净值正迅速逼近零。
In 1976, Jack Byrne was brought in as CEO to rescue GEICO. Soon after his arrival, I met him, concluded that he was the perfect man for the job, and began to aggressively buy GEICO shares. Within a few months, Berkshire bought about 1⁄3 of the company, a portion that later grew to roughly 1⁄2 without our spending a dime. That stunning accretion occurred because GEICO, after recovering its health, consistently repurchased its shares. All told, this half-interest in GEICO cost Berkshire \$47 million, about what you might pay today for a trophy apartment in New York.
1976 年，Jack Byrne 受聘担任 CEO 挽救 GEICO。不久之后，我与他见面，确信他是救火的最佳人选，便开始大举买入 GEICO 股票。数月内，Berkshire 购买了约三分之一的股份，此后在未再投入一分钱的情况下，这一持股份额增至约二分之一。惊人的增持归因于 GEICO 康复后持续回购股票。总的来说，Berkshire 取得这 50% 的股权仅花费 4,700 万美元，大约相当于如今在纽约购买一套豪华公寓的价格。
Let’s now fast-forward 17 years to 1993, when Tony Nicely was promoted to CEO. At that point, GEICO’s reputation and profitability had been restored – but not its growth. Indeed, at year-end 1992 the company had only 1.9 million auto policies on its books, far less than its pre-crisis high. In sales volume among U.S. auto insurers, GEICO then ranked an undistinguished seventh.
让我们快进 17 年至 1993 年，那时 Tony Nicely 升任 CEO。当时，GEICO 的声誉和盈利能力已恢复，但增长并未恢复。事实上，截至 1992 年底，公司仅有 190 万份汽车保单，远低于危机前的峰值。在美国汽车保险公司中，GEICO 的保费规模仅排名第七，乏善可陈。
Late in 1995, after Tony had re-energized GEICO, Berkshire made an offer to buy the remaining 50% of the company for \$2.3 billion, about 50 times what we had paid for the first half (and people say I never pay up!). Our offer was successful and brought Berkshire a wonderful, but underdeveloped, company and an equally wonderful CEO, who would move GEICO forward beyond my dreams.
1995 年末，在 Tony 让 GEICO 重焕生机后，Berkshire 出价 23 亿美元收购公司剩余 50% 的股份，约为我们购买前一半股权成本的 50 倍（有人还说我从不出高价！）。这一报价成功，使 Berkshire 获得了一家优秀但尚未充分发展的公司，以及一位同样出色的 CEO，他让 GEICO 的发展超出了我的想象。
GEICO is now America’s Number Two auto insurer, with sales 1,200% greater than it recorded in 1995. Underwriting profits have totaled \$15.5 billion (pre-tax) since our purchase, and float available for investment has grown from \$2.5 billion to \$22.1 billion.
如今，GEICO 已成为美国第二大汽车保险公司，销售额较 1995 年增长了 1,200%。自我们完成收购以来，承保利润累计达 155 亿美元（税前），可供投资的浮存金由 25 亿美元增至 221 亿美元。
By my estimate, Tony’s management of GEICO has increased Berkshire’s intrinsic value by more than \$50 billion. On top of that, he is a model for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000 associates to identify and polish abilities they didn’t realize they possessed.
据我估算，Tony 对 GEICO 的管理使 Berkshire 的内在价值提升了逾 500 亿美元。此外，他堪称管理者的典范，帮助其 4 万名同事发现并打磨他们未曾意识到的能力。
Last year, Tony decided to retire as CEO, and on June 30th he turned that position over to Bill Roberts, his long-time partner. I’ve known and watched Bill operate for several decades, and once again Tony made the right move. Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest of his life. He’s incapable of doing less.
去年，Tony 决定卸任 CEO，并于 6 月 30 日将这一职务交给其长期搭档 Bill Roberts。我认识并观察 Bill 的工作已有数十年，再一次证明 Tony 的决定是正确的。Tony 仍担任董事长，并将在余生继续为 GEICO 贡献力量；他做不到袖手旁观。
All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks. I head the list.
所有 Berkshire 股东都应感谢 Tony，我首当其冲。
Investments
投资
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of \$13.8 billion, an amount reduced by our share of the large write-off of intangible assets taken by Kraft Heinz in 2018. At yearend, our Kraft Heinz holding had a market value of \$14 billion and a cost basis of \$9.8 billion.
下面我们列出了在年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资。我们不包括对 Kraft Heinz 的持股——325,442,152 股——因为 Berkshire 属于一个控制集团，因此必须按“权益”法核算这项投资。在资产负债表中，Berkshire 按 GAAP 将其 Kraft Heinz 持股计入 138 亿美元，这一数额已因我们分摊 Kraft Heinz 于 2018 年对无形资产的大额减记而减少。到年末，我们的 Kraft Heinz 持股市值为 140 亿美元，成本为 98 亿美元。
* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
不包括伯克希尔子公司养老基金持有的股份。
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
这是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的税务成本基础。
Charlie and I do not view the $172.8 billion detailed above as a collection of ticker symbols – a financial dalliance to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.
Charlie 和我并不把上述 1,728 亿美元视作一堆股票代码——不会因为“华尔街”的评级下调、预期中的美联储行动、可能的政治动态、经济学家的预测或任何其他时髦话题而随意终止这项财务“调情”。
What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.
我们看到的是一组我们部分拥有的公司，这些公司按加权计算，对其经营所需的净有形股本赚取约 20% 的回报。而且，这些公司在不依赖过度负债的情况下实现盈利。
Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared against the return that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 3% or less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.
在任何情况下，大型、成熟且易于理解的企业实现如此水平的回报都是非同寻常的。与许多投资者在过去十年愿意接受的债券收益率相比——例如 30 年期美国国债 3% 或更低——这样的回报令人震撼。
On occasion, a ridiculously-high purchase price for a given stock will cause a splendid business to become a poor investment – if not permanently, at least for a painfully long period. Over time, however, investment performance converges with business performance. And, as I will next spell out, the record of American business has been extraordinary.
有时，对某只股票支付荒唐高价会让一家出色的企业变成糟糕的投资——即便不是永久如此，也会持续相当漫长且痛苦的时期。然而，从长期来看，投资表现会与企业经营表现趋于一致。正如我接下来将阐述的，美国企业的历史记录极其卓越。
The American Tailwind
美国顺风
On March 11th, it will be 77 years since I first invested in an American business. The year was 1942, I was 11, and I went all in, investing \$114.75 I had begun accumulating at age six. What I bought was three shares of Cities Service preferred stock. I had become a capitalist, and it felt good.
3月11日，将是我首次投资美国企业满77周年。当时是1942年，我只有11岁，我把自己6岁开始积攒的114.75美元全部投了进去，买下了3股Cities Service的优先股。我由此成为一名资本家，这感觉真不错。
Let’s now travel back through the two 77-year periods that preceded my purchase. That leaves us starting in 1788, a year prior to George Washington’s installation as our first president. Could anyone then have imagined what their new country would accomplish in only three 77-year lifetimes?
现在，让我们回溯至这次购买之前的两个77年时期。也就是说回到1788年，那是乔治·华盛顿就任首任总统的前一年。那时的人们能否想象，在仅仅三个77年的人生跨度里，他们的新国家会取得怎样的成就？
During the two 77-year periods prior to 1942, the United States had grown from four million people – about 1⁄2 of 1% of the world’s population – into the most powerful country on earth. In that spring of 1942, though, it faced a crisis: The U.S. and its allies were suffering heavy losses in a war that we had entered only three months earlier. Bad news arrived daily.
在1942年之前的两个77年里，美国人口从400万——约占世界人口的0.5%——增长为地球上最强大的国家。然而在1942年春天，美国面临危机：美国及其盟友在三个月前才参战的战争中损失惨重，每天都有坏消息传来。
Despite the alarming headlines, almost all Americans believed on that March 11th that the war would be won. Nor was their optimism limited to that victory. Leaving aside congenital pessimists, Americans believed that their children and generations beyond would live far better lives than they themselves had led.
尽管头条新闻令人震惊，几乎所有美国人在3月11日那天仍相信这场战争终将取胜。他们的乐观并不限于战争胜利。除了天生悲观者外，美国人相信，他们的子孙后代的生活将远胜于他们自己。
The nation’s citizens understood, of course, that the road ahead would not be a smooth ride. It never had been. Early in its history our country was tested by a Civil War that killed 4% of all American males and led President Lincoln to openly ponder whether “a nation so conceived and so dedicated could long endure.” In the 1930s, America suffered through the Great Depression, a punishing period of massive unemployment.
当然，国民也明白，前方道路不会一帆风顺，历史上也从未如此。早期，美国经历了一场导致全国男性4%阵亡的内战，令林肯总统公开思考“一个如此建立并致力于此的国家能否长久存在”。1930年代，美国又遭受了大萧条，陷入大规模失业的严酷时期。
Nevertheless, in 1942, when I made my purchase, the nation expected post-war growth, a belief that proved to be well-founded. In fact, the nation’s achievements can best be described as breathtaking.
尽管如此，在1942年我进行投资时，全国仍对战后增长抱有期待，而事实证明这种信念十分有据。实际上，这个国家的成就堪称令人叹为观止。
Let’s put numbers to that claim: If my \$114.75 had been invested in a no-fee S\&P 500 index fund, and all dividends had been reinvested, my stake would have grown to be worth (pre-taxes) \$606,811 on January 31, 2019 (the latest data available before the printing of this letter). That is a gain of 5,288 for 1. Meanwhile, a \$1 million investment by a tax-free institution of that time – say, a pension fund or college endowment – would have grown to about \$5.3 billion.
让我们用数字来证明这一说法：如果我当年的114.75美元投入一只零费用的标普500指数基金，并且把所有分红再投资，那么到2019年1月31日（本信印刷前的最新数据），这笔钱（税前）将增至606,811美元，增长比例为5,288比1。与此同时，当年若有免税机构——例如养老金或大学基金会——投资100万美元，其市值将增至约53亿美元。
Let me add one additional calculation that I believe will shock you: If that hypothetical institution had paid only 1% of assets annually to various “helpers,” such as investment managers and consultants, its gain would have been cut in half, to \$2.65 billion. That’s what happens over 77 years when the 11.8% annual return actually achieved by the S\&P 500 is recalculated at a 10.8% rate.
让我再补充一个相信会令你震惊的计算：如果上述假设中的机构每年向各种“帮手”——如投资经理和顾问——支付仅1%的资产费用，其收益将被削减一半，仅剩26.5亿美元。这就是在77年时间里，把标普500实际取得的11.8%年回报率，按10.8%重新计算后的结果。
Those who regularly preach doom because of government budget deficits (as I regularly did myself for many years) might note that our country’s national debt has increased roughly 400-fold during the last of my 77-year periods. That’s 40,000%! Suppose you had foreseen this increase and panicked at the prospect of runaway deficits and a worthless currency. To “protect” yourself, you might have eschewed stocks and opted instead to buy 3¼ ounces of gold with your \$114.75.
长期以来经常因政府预算赤字而唱衰（我自己多年来也常如此）的人，也许会注意到，在我的最后一个 77 年期间，美国的国债大约增长了 400 倍——也就是 40,000%！假设你预见到这种增幅，并因担心赤字失控、货币贬值而陷入恐慌。为了“保护”自己，你可能会回避股票，转而用那 114.75 美元购买 3 又 1/4 盎司黄金。
And what would that supposed protection have delivered? You would now have an asset worth about \$4,200, less than 1% of what would have been realized from a simple unmanaged investment in American business. The magical metal was no match for the American mettle.
那么这种所谓的保护能带来什么？如今你将拥有一项价值约 4,200 美元的资产，还不到简单、被动投资美国企业所能获得收益的 1%。魔力金属终究不敌美国人的坚毅。
Our country’s almost unbelievable prosperity has been gained in a bipartisan manner. Since 1942, we have had seven Republican presidents and seven Democrats. In the years they served, the country contended at various times with a long period of viral inflation, a 21% prime rate, several controversial and costly wars, the resignation of a president, a pervasive collapse in home values, a paralyzing financial panic and a host of other problems. All engendered scary headlines; all are now history.
我国几乎难以置信的繁荣是以两党合作的方式取得的。自 1942 年以来，美国历经七位共和党总统和七位民主党总统。在他们的任期内，国家不时要应对长期的恶性通胀、21% 的最优惠利率、几场有争议且代价高昂的战争、一位总统的辞职、房地产价值的全面崩溃、一次令金融体系瘫痪的恐慌以及其他诸多问题。这些都曾占据骇人的头条；如今皆成历史。
Christopher Wren, architect of St. Paul’s Cathedral, lies buried within that London church. Near his tomb are posted these words of description (translated from Latin): “If you would seek my monument, look around you.” Those skeptical of America’s economic playbook should heed his message.
圣保罗大教堂的建筑师克里斯托弗·雷恩安葬于该伦敦教堂内。他墓旁的碑文（译自拉丁文）写道：“若寻我纪念碑，环顾你四周。” 对美国经济蓝图持怀疑态度的人应当聆听这一信息。
In 1788 – to go back to our starting point – there really wasn’t much here except for a small band of ambitious people and an embryonic governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into reality. Today, the Federal Reserve estimates our household wealth at \$108 trillion, an amount almost impossible to comprehend.
回到我们的起点——1788 年——当时这里几乎一无所有，只有一小群胸怀抱负的人和一套旨在将他们梦想变为现实的初生治理框架。如今，美联储估计美国家庭财富已达 108 万亿美元，这几乎是难以想象的数字。
Remember, earlier in this letter, how I described retained earnings as having been the key to Berkshire’s prosperity? So it has been with America. In the nation’s accounting, the comparable item is labeled “savings.” And save we have. If our forefathers had instead consumed all they produced, there would have been no investment, no productivity gains and no leap in living standards.
还记得在本信前文，我如何描述留存收益是伯克希尔繁荣的关键吗？美国亦是如此。在国家的账本里，对应项目被称为“储蓄”。而我们确实储蓄了。如果我们的先辈把他们创造的一切都消费掉，就不会有投资、不会有生产率的提升，也不会有生活水平的飞跃。
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Charlie and I happily acknowledge that much of Berkshire’s success has simply been a product of what I think should be called The American Tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for American businesses or individuals to boast that they have “done it alone.” The tidy rows of simple white crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims.
Charlie 和我欣然承认，伯克希尔的成功在很大程度上只是得益于我称之为“美国顺风”的力量。若有美国企业或个人自夸“独自完成”，那已不仅是傲慢；在诺曼底整齐排布的简洁白色十字墓碑应让此类言论感到羞愧。
There are also many other countries around the world that have bright futures. About that, we should rejoice: Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all nations thrive. At Berkshire, we hope to invest significant sums across borders.
世界上还有许多国家拥有光明的前景。对此我们应当感到欣喜：若各国共同繁荣，美国人将更加富裕且更为安全。在伯克希尔，我们希望能跨越国界投入可观资金。
Over the next 77 years, however, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be provided by The American Tailwind. We are lucky – gloriously lucky – to have that force at our back.
然而，在未来 77 年里，我们收益的主要来源几乎必将是“美国顺风”。我们非常幸运——无比幸运——有这股力量在背后助推。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Berkshire’s 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May 4th. If you are thinking about attending – and Charlie and I hope you come – check out the details on pages A-2 – A-3. They describe the same schedule we’ve followed for some years.
伯克希尔 2019 年度股东大会将于 5 月 4 日（星期六）举行。如果你计划出席——Charlie 和我都希望你能来——请查看 A-2 至 A-3 页的详细信息。那里列出了我们多年来沿用的同一日程。
If you can’t join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo’s webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world’s knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.
如果你无法抵达奥马哈，可通过 Yahoo 的网络直播参会。Andy Serwer 及其 Yahoo 团队在全程报道大会并采访众多伯克希尔管理者、名人、金融专家及国内外股东方面表现出色。自 Yahoo 加入以来，世界对每年五月第一个周六在奥马哈发生的一切的了解显著提升。直播将于中部夏令时间上午 8:45 开始，并提供普通话翻译。
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For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable.
54年来，查理和我一直热爱我们的工作。每天我们都在做自己感兴趣的事情，与我们喜欢并信任的人一起工作。而现在，全新的管理架构让我们的生活更加惬意。
With the whole ensemble – that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture – your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.
整体而言——也就是由阿吉特和格雷格负责运营、多样化的优质业务、源源不断的现金流、大批才华横溢的管理者以及稳固的企业文化——贵公司已具备良好状态，应对未来的一切挑战。
February 23, 2019
Warren E. Buffett
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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