2020-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning Session - 2020 Meeting
早晨会议 - 2020 年会议
1. “Doesn’t feel like an annual meeting”
“感觉不像是年度会议”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s 3:45 in Omaha and this is the annual meeting of Berkshire Hathaway.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，现在是奥马哈时间 3:45，这是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的年度会议。
It doesn’t look like an annual meeting. It doesn’t feel exactly like an annual meeting.
这看起来不像是年度会议。感觉也不完全像年度会议。
It particularly doesn’t feel like an annual meeting because my partner of 60 years, Charlie Munger, is not sitting up here. And I think most of the people that come to our meeting really come to listen to Charlie.
这特别不像一次年度会议，因为我 60 年的搭档查理·芒格并不在这里。我认为大多数来参加我们会议的人真的都是来听查理的。
But I want to assure you, Charlie at 96 is in fine shape. His mind is as good as ever, his voice is as strong as ever, but it just didn’t seem like a good idea to have him make the trip to Omaha for this meeting.
但我想向你保证，96 岁的查理状态很好。他的思维依然清晰，声音依然洪亮，但让他为了这次会议前往奥马哈似乎不是个好主意。
Charlie — Charlie is really taking to this new life.
查理——查理真的很适应这种新生活。
He’s added Zoom to his repertoire. So, he has meetings every day with various people. And he’s just skipped right by me technologically, but that really isn’t such a huge achievement. It’s more like, you know, kind of like stepping over a peanut or something.
他把 Zoom 加入了他的技能库。所以，他每天都和不同的人开会。而他在技术上已经完全超过了我，但这其实并不是一个很大的成就。更像是，你知道，就像跨过一个花生之类的。
But nevertheless, I want to assure you, Charlie is in fine shape. And he’ll be back next year. And we’ll — we’ll try to have everything in the show that we normally have next year.
但我想向你保证，查理状态很好。他明年会回来。我们会尽量在明年的节目中包含我们通常有的一切。
Ajit Jain, also, who is the vice chairman in charge of insurance, is safely in New York. And again, it just did not seem worthwhile for him to travel to Omaha for this meeting.
阿吉特·贾因（Ajit Jain）也是负责保险的副董事长，他安全地在纽约。而且，他似乎也没有必要为了这次会议而前往奥马哈。
But on my left, we do have Greg Abel. And Greg is the vice chairman in charge of all operations, except insurance. Greg manages a business that has more than 150 billion in revenues and crosses across dozens of industries, and has more than 300,000 employees.
但在我左边，我们有格雷格·阿贝尔。格雷格是负责除保险外所有运营的副董事长。格雷格管理着一个收入超过 1500 亿美元、跨越数十个行业的业务，并拥有超过 30 万名员工。
And he’s been at that job a couple of years. And frankly, I don’t know what I’d be doing today if I didn’t have Ajit and Greg handling the duties that I was doing only about a quarter as well, a couple of years ago.
他在那份工作上已经几年了。坦白说，如果没有 Ajit 和 Greg 来处理我几年前只做得四分之一好的工作，我今天不知道会在做什么。
So, I owe a whole lot of thanks to Greg and you’ll get exposed to him more as this meeting goes along.
所以，我非常感谢格雷格，随着会议的进行，你会更多地接触到他。
2. Meeting will be in four parts
会议将分为四个部分
WARREN BUFFETT: The meeting will be divided into four parts. And in a moment or two, I will talk — sort of a monologue with slides.
沃伦·巴菲特：会议将分为四个部分。稍后我会进行一段带幻灯片的独白。
I’ve never really used slides before. I’ve taught college classes intermittently, but pretty steadily, from age 21 to age 88. And I never recalled using a single slide.
我以前从来没有真正使用过幻灯片。我从 21 岁到 88 岁间断性地教授大学课程，但相对稳定。我不记得使用过一张幻灯片。
You know, who says can’t teach an old dog a new trick. So — (Laughs)
你知道，谁说不能教老狗新把戏呢。所以——（笑）
We’ll see whether you can or not.
我们看看你能不能。
And I’ve got a number of slides and I would like to take you through those in the first section, which will start in just a minute.
我有一些幻灯片，想在第一部分中带您浏览这些内容，马上就要开始。
And then we’ll move on to the — a brief recap of Berkshire’s first quarter results.
然后我们将继续回顾一下伯克希尔第一季度的业绩。
Now, we put those up in the 10-Q, which was posted on the internet, on berkshirehathaway.com, this morning. And there’s lots and lots of detail in there. So, I’m not going to go through. I’ll just have a point on one or two things that may be of interest to you. And actually, I’ll talk a little bit about what we did in April, which is something that is new to Berkshire, to be that current. But —
现在，我们将这些内容放在了今天早上发布在互联网的 10-Q 报告中，网址是 berkshirehathaway.com。里面有很多详细信息。所以，我不打算逐一讲解。我只会提到一两件可能对你们感兴趣的事情。实际上，我会稍微谈谈我们在四月份所做的事情，这对伯克希尔来说是一个新的进展。可是——
I’ll give you that. Then we’ll have the — the formal meeting, which will take maybe 15 or 20 minutes. And from there we’ll go to Becky Quick, who, for a couple of hours, will grill me and Greg on questions she’s selected from a huge batch that I’m told she’s received that went to Carol Loomis and Andrew Ross Sorkin, as well as to Becky. But to simplify things, we consolidated all those questions that Becky will ask.
我同意你的观点。然后我们将进行正式会议，可能需要 15 到 20 分钟。之后我们将去见贝基·奎克，她会用几个小时的时间对我和格雷格进行提问，这些问题是她从一大批问题中挑选出来的，我听说这些问题也发给了卡罗尔·卢米斯和安德鲁·罗斯·索金，以及贝基自己。为了简化事情，我们将贝基要问的所有问题进行了整合。
And like I say, we’ll go for a couple of hours. And there’s no specified cut-off time at present. We’ll just see how things develop.
就像我说的，我们会进行几个小时。目前没有具体的截止时间。我们只会看看事情如何发展。
3. COVID-19 health uncertainty
COVID-19 健康不确定性
WARREN BUFFETT: Now what’s, of course, on everybody’s mind the last two months or so, is, you know, what — what’s going to be the situation in terms of health in the United States and what’s going to be the situation in terms of the economy in the United States in the months, and perhaps, the years to come.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，过去两个月大家心里最关心的当然是，美国的健康状况将会如何，以及未来几个月，甚至几年，美国的经济状况将会如何。
And I don’t really have anything to add to your knowledge on health. I — in school I did okay in accounting, but I was a disaster in biology.
我对健康方面的知识没有什么可以补充的。我在学校的会计课上表现还不错，但生物课上我却是一团糟。
I — I’m learning about these various matters the same way you are. And I think, personally, I feel extraordinarily good about being able to listen to Dr. (Anthony) Fauci, who I’d never heard of a year ago. But I think we’re very, very fortunate as a country to have somebody at 79 years of age who appears to be able to work 24 hours a day, and keep a good humor about him, and communicate in a very, very straightforward manner about fairly complex subjects and tell you when he knows something and when he doesn’t know something.
我——我和你一样在学习这些不同的事情。我个人觉得能够听到（安东尼）福奇博士的讲话非常好，而我在一年前从未听说过他。但我认为，作为一个国家，我们非常幸运，有一位 79 岁的人能够每天工作 24 小时，保持良好的幽默感，并以非常直接的方式沟通相当复杂的主题，告诉你他什么时候知道某件事，什么时候不知道某件事。
So, I — I’m not going to talk about any political figures at all or politics generally this afternoon, but I do feel that I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. Fauci for educating and informing me — actually along with my friend Bill Gates — as to what’s going on. And I know I get — I get it from a straight shooter when I get that from either one of those. So, thank you, Dr. Fauci.
所以，我——我今天下午不会谈论任何政治人物或政治问题，但我确实觉得我对福奇博士怀有巨大的感激之情，因为他让我了解和知晓发生了什么——实际上还有我的朋友比尔·盖茨。因为我知道，当我从他们任何一位那里得到信息时，我得到的是直截了当的真相。所以，谢谢你，福奇博士。
The — when this hit us — and as I sit here in this auditorium with 17 or 18-thousand empty seats — the last time I was here, it was absolutely packed. Creighton was playing Villanova. And there were 17- or 18-thousand, whatever it holds, it was full. And there wasn’t one person in that crowd — this was in January — there wasn’t one person in that crowd that didn’t think that March Madness wasn’t going to occur.
当这一切发生时——我现在坐在这个拥有17或18千个空座位的礼堂里——上一次我在这里时，座无虚席。克瑞顿大学对阵维拉诺瓦大学，礼堂坐满了大约17或18千人。而当时，这还是在1月，没有一个人认为三月疯狂（NCAA篮球锦标赛）不会发生。
It’s been a flip of a switch in a huge way, in terms of national behavior, the national psyche. It’s dramatic.
在国家行为和国家心理方面，这就像是一个巨大的开关翻转。变化非常戏剧化。
And when we started on this journey, which we didn’t ask for, it seemed to me that it was an extraordinary wide variety of possibilities on both the health side and on the economic side.
当我们开始这段我们并未请求的旅程时，我觉得在健康和经济两方面都有着极其广泛的可能性。
I mean, it was — in other words — DEFCON 5 on one side and DEFCON 1 on the other side. And nobody really knows, of course, all the possibilities that there are, and they don’t know what probability factor to stick on them.
我的意思是，换句话说，一边是 DEFCON 5，另一边是 DEFCON 1。当然，没人真正知道所有的可能性，他们也不知道该给这些可能性贴上什么概率因素。
But in this particular situation, it did seem to me that there was an extraordinary range of things that could happen on the health side. And there was an extraordinary range in terms of the economy. And of course, they intersect and affect each other. So, they’re bouncing off each other as you go along.
但在这种特定情况下，我确实觉得在健康方面可能发生的事情范围非常广泛。在经济方面也是如此。当然，它们相互交叉并相互影响。因此，随着时间的推移，它们相互作用。
And I would say again, I don’t — I don’t know anything you don’t know about health matters. But I do think the range of possibilities has narrowed down, somewhat, in that respect. We know we’re not getting a best case and we know we’re not getting the worst case.
我想再次强调，在健康问题上，我并不比你知道得更多。但是，我确实认为在这方面可能性的范围有所缩小。我们知道，我们不会遇到最好的情况，也不会遇到最坏的情况。
The — the possibility, initially, of the virus was hard to evaluate and it’s still hard to evaluate. There’s a lot of things we’ve learned about it, and other things we know we don’t know. But at least we know what we don’t know. And some very smart people are working on it and we’re learning as we go along.
最初，病毒的可能性很难评估，现在仍然很难评估。我们已经学到了很多关于它的知识，还有一些我们知道自己不知道的事情。但至少我们知道我们不知道什么。一些非常聪明的人正在研究这个问题，我们在不断学习。
But the virus, obviously, has been very transmissible and it’s — but on the good side — it’s not — not that good — but it is not as lethal as it might have been.
但这个病毒显然传播性很强，但好的一面是——虽然不是很好——但它并没有那么致命。
We had a — we had a Spanish flu in 1918. And my dad and four siblings and his parents went through it. And they had a terrific story in the March 15th edition of the Omaha World-Herald, that you can go to omaha.com and look up. It’s also on the first page, I believe, of Google if you put in “Spanish flu Omaha.”
我们在 1918 年经历了一场西班牙流感。我的父亲、四个兄弟姐妹和他的父母都经历了这场流感。在《奥马哈世界先驱报》3 月 15 日的版面上有一个精彩的故事，你可以去 omaha.com 查找。我相信如果你在谷歌上输入“西班牙流感 奥马哈”，它也会出现在首页。
And during that particular time, in maybe four months or so, Omaha had 974, I believe, deaths. And that was a half of one percent of the population. And that figure wasn’t greatly different around the country.
在那段时间，大约四个月左右，奥马哈的死亡人数是 974，我相信。这占人口的0.5%。而这个数字在全国范围内并没有太大差异。
So, if you think about half of 1 percent of the population now, you’re talking a million-7, or thereabouts, people who, unfortunately, in terms of the worst case, which does not appear to have impacted — I think you can almost rule it out it’s being as lethal as the Spanish flu was — but it’s very, very transmissible.
所以，如果你考虑到现在大约千分之一的人口，你谈论的是大约170万不幸的人。在最坏的情况下，虽然看起来这种情况没有像西班牙流感那样致命——我认为你几乎可以排除这一点——但它的传播性非常强。
And of course, we have the problem we don’t know the denominator, in terms of exactly how many (inaudible) it is because we don’t know how many people have had it and didn’t know they had it.
当然，我们面临的问题是我们不知道分母，确切来说有多少（听不清）因为我们不知道有多少人得过这种病却不知道自己得过。
But in any event, the range of probabilities on health have narrowed down somewhat.
但无论如何，健康的概率范围已经有所缩小。
4. COVID-19 economic uncertainty
COVID-19 经济不确定性
WARREN BUFFETT: I would say the range of probabilities — or possibilities — on the economic side are still extraordinarily wide.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为经济方面的概率或可能性范围仍然非常广泛。
We do not know exactly what happens when you voluntarily shut down a substantial portion of your society.
我们并不确切知道当你自愿关闭社会的很大一部分时会发生什么。
In 2008 and ’09, our economic train went off the tracks. And there were some reasons why the roadbed was weak, in terms of the banks and all of that sort of thing, but —
在 2008 年和 2009 年，我们的经济列车脱轨了。造成路基薄弱的原因有一些，比如银行等方面，但——
This time we just pulled the train off the tracks and put it on a siding. And I don’t really know of any parallel of a — in terms of a very, very — well, the most important country in the world — the most productive — huge population — in effect, sidelining its economy and its workforce.
这次我们只是把火车从轨道上拉开，放到了一条侧线。我真的不知道有什么可以与之相比的——就一个非常非常——好吧，世界上最重要的国家——最具生产力——人口庞大——实际上，搁置了它的经济和劳动力。
And obviously, and unavoidably, creating a huge amount of anxiety and changing people’s psyche, and causing them to somewhat lose their bearings — in many cases understandably.
显然，不可避免地，这造成了巨大的焦虑，改变了人们的心理，使他们在某种程度上失去了方向——在许多情况下，这是可以理解的。
This is quite an experiment. And we may know the answer to most of the questions reasonably soon, but we may not know the answers to some very important questions for many years.
这是一项相当大的实验。我们可能很快就能合理地知道大多数问题的答案，但对于一些非常重要的问题，我们可能需要很多年才能知道答案。
So, it still has this enormous range of possibilities.
所以，它仍然具有这种巨大的可能性范围。
5. “Nothing can basically stop America”
“没有什么可以基本上阻止美国”
WARREN BUFFETT: But even facing that, I would like to talk to you about the economic future of the country.
沃伦·巴菲特：但即使面临这一点，我仍然想和你谈谈国家的经济未来。
Because I remain convinced, as I have — I was convinced of this in World War II, I was convinced of it during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 9/11, the financial crisis — that nothing can basically stop America.
因为我始终相信，正如我在第二次世界大战中相信的那样，我在古巴导弹危机、911 事件和金融危机期间也相信这一点——没有什么能够根本上阻止美国。
We faced great problems in the past. We haven’t faced this exact problem. In fact, we haven’t really faced anything that quite resembles this problem.
我们过去面临过很大的问题。我们没有遇到过这个确切的问题。事实上，我们并没有真正面对过任何与这个问题相似的情况。
But we faced tougher problems and the American miracle — the American magic — has always prevailed and it will do so again.
但我们面临着更严峻的问题，而美国奇迹——美国魔力——始终战胜一切，它将再次如此。
6. America is an “extraordinarily young country”
美国是一个“极其年轻的国家”
WARREN BUFFETT: And I would — I would like to take you through a little history to essentially make my case that if you were to pick one time to be born and one place to be born, and you didn’t know what your sex was going to be, you didn’t know what your intelligence would be, you didn’t know what your special talents or special deficiencies would be, that — if you do that one time, you would not pick 1720, you would not pick 1820, you would not pick 1920, you’d pick to — you’d pick today. And you would pick America.
沃伦·巴菲特：我想带你回顾一下历史，以此来证明我的观点：如果你要选择一个出生的时间和一个出生的地点，而你不知道自己的性别、智力、特殊才能或特殊缺陷，那么——如果你选择那个时间，你不会选择 1720 年，你不会选择 1820 年，你不会选择 1920 年，你会选择——你会选择今天。你会选择美国。
And of course, the interesting thing about it is that ever since America was organized in 1789 when George Washington took the oath of office, people have wanted to come here. Can you imagine that?
当然，有趣的是，自从 1789 年乔治·华盛顿宣誓就职以来，美国成立以来，人们就一直想来这里。你能想象吗？
For 231 years, there’s always been people that have wanted to come here. Now — my friend, I think, has jumped the gun just a shade — I’m putting up slide one — but I’m going to call for some slides as we go along.
在 231 年里，总是有人想来这里。现在——我的朋友，我认为，他有点急于求成——我正在展示第一张幻灯片——但我会在接下来的过程中要求一些幻灯片。
But the interesting thing about this country is what is on slide one. Let’s put it up.
但这个国家有趣的地方在于第一张幻灯片上。我们把它放上来。
This is an extraordinarily young country. Now I’m comparing it to a couple of guys that are pretty old. But when you think about the fact that my age, Charlie’s age, or our life experience — and then we’ll throw in this young guy over here, Greg Abel — and if our life experiences combined, exceed the life of the United States, we are a very, very young country.
这是一个非常年轻的国家。现在我把它和几个年纪很大的人进行比较。但是当你考虑到我的年龄、查理的年龄，或者我们的生活经历——然后我们再加上这个年轻人，格雷格·阿贝尔——如果我们的生活经历加起来超过美国的历史，那我们就是一个非常非常年轻的国家。
But what we’ve accomplished is miraculous. Now just think of this — this little spot in history. And if we’ll go to slide two, I’ve tried to estimate —
但我们所取得的成就是奇迹般的。现在想想这一点——历史上的这一小点。如果我们翻到第二张幻灯片，我试着估计——
Well, let’s go back. Stay with slide two, but the population in 1790, you know, we had 3.9 million people here.
好吧，让我们回到之前。停留在第二张幻灯片，但 1790 年的人口，你知道，我们这里有 390 万人。
Incidentally, when you look up census figures, you find out that the — they had a big fire in the Department of Commerce building in 1921, so they lost a lot of the census records. So, these are not quite as — there’s some things where there’s a few gaps, but there were 3.9 million people in the United States.
顺便提一下，当你查找人口普查数据时，你会发现——他们在 1921 年商务部大楼发生了一场大火，因此丢失了很多人口普查记录。所以，这些数据并不是完全的——有些地方有一些空白，但美国有 390 万人。
And actually — I’ve got point-six million — it’s closer to point-seven million — there were 700,000 of those people who were slaves at the time.
实际上，我有六十万，实际上更接近七十万，当时有七十万人是奴隶。
But those 3.9 million people were one half of 1 percent of the population of the planet. And if you’d asked any of those 3.9 million people — any of them — to imagine what life would be like 231 years later, even the most optimistic person — and they could have been drinking heavily and even had a little pot — and they still could not in their wildest dreams have thought that in three lifetimes — Charlie’s, mine, and Greg’s — that in that period, you would be looking at a country with 280 million vehicles shuffling around its roads, airplanes — maybe not today so much but they’ll be back again — flying people at 40,000 feet, coast to coast in five hours, that great universities would exist in one state after another, great hospital systems, and entertainment would be delivered to people in a way nobody could have dreamt of in 1790.
但这 390 万人仅占全球人口的 0.5%。如果你问这 390 万中的任何一个人——任何一个——想象 231 年后的生活会是什么样子，即使是最乐观的人——他们可能喝得酩酊大醉，甚至吸了一点大麻——他们也无法在最疯狂的梦中想到，在三个生命的时间里——查理的、我的和格雷格的——在这段时间里，你会看到一个拥有 2.8 亿辆汽车在道路上穿梭的国家，飞机——也许今天不太多，但它们会再次回归——在 4 万英尺的高空飞行，跨越整个国家只需五小时，伟大的大学会在一个又一个州中存在，伟大的医院系统，以及娱乐将以 1790 年没人能想象的方式送到人们手中。
This — this country, in 231 years, has exceeded anybody’s dreams.
这个国家，在 231 年里，超出了任何人的梦想。
7. America’s wealth has grown 5000-for-1
美国的财富增长了 5000 倍。
WARREN BUFFETT: I went to the internet in trying to prepare for this, and I tried — if you’ll move to the next slide — I tried to find out what was the wealth of the country in 1790 — 1789 — our starting point. And I punched in “United States wealth.” I tried 1789. I tried 1790. I thought it might be a little easier in terms of a round year, and I think 4 million or so references came up. And I didn’t look at all 4 million.
沃伦·巴菲特：我上网试图为此做准备，我尝试——如果你能翻到下一张幻灯片——我试图找出 1790 年——1789 年——我们起始点的国家财富。我输入了“美国财富”。我试了 1789 年。我试了 1790 年。我想以一个整年为参考可能会简单一点，结果出现了大约 400 万条相关信息。我没有查看所有 400 万条。
But I can tell you the data collection in those early days on many, many fronts was not — and even not today — you really can’t — you can’t find what I would consider reliable figures. You can find out how many mules there were in the country, and a few things like that and add — try to add them up.
但我可以告诉你，在早期的许多方面，数据收集并不——甚至到今天——你真的无法找到我认为可靠的数字。你可以找到全国有多少骡子，以及一些类似的事情，然后试着把它们加起来。
But in real estate, you know, when you find — when you’re looking at houses or apartment houses or office buildings, that, you know, they’re each slightly different than each other. But they look to comparable sales, so it’s hard to find a lot of countries that have been sold where the wealth has been estimated.
但是在房地产领域，你会发现，当你查看房屋、公寓或办公楼时，它们彼此都有些许不同。然而，它们都会参考类似的销售情况。因此，很难找到很多国家曾被出售并且财富已被估算的情况。
But it was interesting to go back and think about the fact that in 1803, we purchased for $15 million — we made the Louisiana Purchase. Now that’s a little later than 1789, but — but that’s the — that’s the best comp, as they say in real estate — that’s the best copy we could find for land mass anyway, and —
但回过头来思考一下，1803 年我们以 1500 万美元购买了路易斯安那州，这很有趣。虽然这比 1789 年晚了一些，但——这就是——正如房地产行业所说的——这是我们能找到的最好的比较，至少在土地面积上是这样，——
When we purchased — made that purchase — that was equal, incidentally, to about a quarter —800,000-plus square miles — but it was about a quarter of what the lower 48 states now contain.
当我们进行那次购买时——顺便说一下，那相当于大约四分之一，超过80万平方英里——但这大约是现在美国本土48个州面积的四分之一。
So, we bought about a quarter of the lower 48 for those $15 million back in 1803.
所以，我们在1803年用1500万美元买下了美国本土48个州大约四分之一的土地。
And if you live in Texas, and your grandfather is close to dying, and he calls — he calls the grandchildren, children around him, and in his final words, he always says, “Don’t sell the mineral rights.”
如果你住在德克萨斯州，你的祖父快要去世了，他打电话——他叫来孙子孙女和孩子们，在他临终的话中，他总是说：“不要卖掉矿权。”
Well, the French sold us the mineral rights on that $15 million deal as well. So, we — we got that whole strip there — we got all of Kansas, and essentially all of Oklahoma. They’ve produced 21 billion barrels of oil for us and a lot of natural gas since the purchase.
好吧，法国人还把那笔 1500 万美元交易的矿产权卖给了我们。所以，我们——我们得到了那整条地带——我们得到了整个堪萨斯州，基本上还有整个俄克拉荷马州。自从购买以来，他们为我们生产了 210 亿桶石油和大量天然气。
One of the sidelights is that we paid our 15 million for the Louisiana Purchase — we paid 3 million of it —20 percent of it — we paid with a — with 200,000 ounces of gold, valued at 15 bucks an ounce. And that 3 million to the French took — and we got South Dakota as part of the Louisiana Purchase, and the Homestake mine up there, before it closed, produced, well over 40 million ounces of gold. And 40 million ounces of gold comes to about $60 billion worth. And like I say we 20 — 200,000 ounces took care of 20 — 20 percent of our purchase price.
其中一个旁注是，我们为路易斯安那购地支付了 1500 万美元——我们支付了其中的 300 万美元——占 20%——我们用 20 万盎司黄金支付，黄金的价值是每盎司 15 美元。而这 300 万美元给法国人支付——我们得到了南达科他州作为路易斯安那购地的一部分，而那里的霍姆斯特克矿在关闭之前，生产了超过 4000 万盎司黄金。4000 万盎司黄金的价值大约为 600 亿美元。正如我所说，我们用 20 万盎司黄金支付了我们购地价格的 20%。
So, the Louisiana Purchase was a bargain, but it’s what the going price was for 800,000 square miles, I guess, at the time and — three cents an acre.
所以，路易斯安那购地是个划算的交易，但我想在当时 800,000 平方英里的市场价格就是这样——每英亩三美分。
And so, I decided, by playing around with various numbers such as that, that it as a — as a reasonable estimate of the worth of the country, in 1789, a billion was not a crazy figure.
因此，我决定通过玩弄各种数字，认为在 1789 年，十亿是对这个国家价值的一个合理估计，并不是一个疯狂的数字。
Now if I’d been an academician or something, I would have put $1,107,400,000 or something like that — or it’s a —I would have made it look respectable — but it’s a wild guess. But it’s not — it’s not a crazy figure.
现在如果我是一位学者或其他什么人，我会写上 11,074,000,000 美元之类的数字——或者说——我会让它看起来更体面——但这只是一个粗略的估计。但这并不是——这不是一个疯狂的数字。
So, what has happened — let’s move on to the next slide — to the wealth of that country since then? And here we have some figures that come out pretty regularly — well, they do come out regularly — where the Federal Reserve estimates the net household worth of people in the United States — all the households in the United States.
那么，自那时以来，那个国家的财富发生了什么变化呢？接下来我们来看下一张幻灯片。这里有一些定期发布的数据——实际上，它们确实是定期发布的——联邦储备委员会估计美国所有家庭的净家庭财富。
And you can look these up and you’ll — you’ll see that, you know, there’s 30 trillion of stocks. And I think maybe single-family homes — what are there — there’s 82 million or so owner-occupied single families and maybe 45 million rental apartments and so on. So, you start adding all these up.
你可以查一下，你会看到大约有 30 万亿的股票。我认为单户住宅大约有 8200 万套自住的单户家庭，可能还有 4500 万套出租公寓等等。所以，你开始把这些加起来。
And the Federal Reserve tells us — and I invite you to look at the — the data — it’s kind of interesting — that we now in the United States, 231 years later, we have 100 trillion— we have more than 100 trillion — of household wealth, even though the stock market’s gone down somewhat since the last quarterly report.
美联储告诉我们——我邀请你查看——这些数据——这很有趣——现在在美国，231 年后，我们的家庭财富超过 100 万亿——尽管自上个季度报告以来，股市有所下跌。
So, you say, well, you know, we’ve had a lot of inflation, everything. We actually, in the United States, for the first half of our existence roughly, we didn’t really have that much inflation. We had inflationary periods and deflationary periods, but the general price level did not change that dramatically.
所以，你说，好吧，你知道，我们经历了很多通货膨胀，所有的一切。实际上，在美国，我们存在的前半段时间里，通货膨胀并没有那么严重。我们经历了通货膨胀期和通货紧缩期，但总体价格水平并没有发生那么大的变化。
But I will assume again for this calculation that — that there’s been 20-for-1 inflation that’s — it’s way less than that in many commodities, but — and it’s very hard to measure and to talk about equivalent benefits from different kinds of products and so on — and cost — but I think it’s reasonable to say that the United States, in real terms, has increased in wealth at something in the area of 5000-for-1.
但我在这个计算中假设——美国的财富增长为5000倍——假设有20倍的通货膨胀，尽管在许多商品中远低于这个水平，衡量和比较不同产品的实际利益和成本非常困难。但我认为可以合理地说，美国的实际财富增加了大约5000倍。
Which is really — its mind blowing — 5000-for-1 — in real terms — in a country that had a half a percent of the — and a bunch of raw land — but a vision that — to accomplish that in 231 years. There’s just no denying that — that’s beyond what anybody could have dreamt earlier.
这确实是令人难以置信的——按实际价值计算，相当于5000倍回报——在一个当时只有0.5%人口的国家，一片原始土地，但有着远见卓识，在231年内实现了这样的成就。毫无疑问，这超出了任何人早期的想象。
8. America’s bumps in the road: The Civil War
美国的坎坷：内战
WARREN BUFFETT: But it was not done — and this is important — because we’ve now hit a bump in the road — it was not done without some very, very serious bumps in the road. It was not 231 years of steady progress. And matter of fact, we had been in the — in this birth of this country — we had been, what, into it 72 years — and if we go to the next slide —
沃伦·巴菲特：但要强调的是，这并不是一帆风顺的——因为我们现在遇到了一些挫折——它并不是在没有非常严重的坎坷的情况下完成的。这231年并不是持续的进步。事实上，在这个国家诞生72年后——如果我们看下一张幻灯片——
In 1861, we now had about 31 million people — the 1960 [1860] census showed around 31 million people or thereabouts — in the country, and 4 million of them were slaves and we had never really resolved the very much unfinished business of what was involved in compromises in 1789, and we’ll have more to say about that later.
到1861年，美国大约有3100万人——1860年的人口普查显示大约有3100万人左右——其中有400万是奴隶。我们从未真正解决1789年妥协所遗留下来的未竟之事，关于这一点我们稍后还会进一步讨论。
But we had something that not too many countries experienced — and if you’d told people in 1789, that in 17 — in 72 years, you were going to have a division that caused the president of the United States, at Gettysburg, to say that “testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and dedicated can long endure.”
但我们拥有一些并不是太多国家经历过的东西——如果你在 1789 年告诉人们，在 72 年后，你将会有一个分裂，导致美国总统在盖茨堡说“检验那个国家，或任何如此构思和奉献的国家是否能够长久存在。”
Imagine the president of the United States wondering aloud whether the country that he was presiding over could long endure only 72 years — or 74 years at Gettysburg — had taken place.
想象一下，美国总统在思考，他所领导的国家是否能够长久地维持下去，仅仅 72 年——或者在盖茨堡时的 74 年——是否已经发生。
So, while this marvelous dream was being played out, roughly a third of the way through it, we face this — this really moment of decision.
所以，当这个奇妙的梦想正在展开时，大约在其中的三分之一处，我们面临着这个——这个真正的决策时刻。
And we entered into a contest that — if we’ll go to the next slide — I made an estimate — that literally killed roughly 6 percent of the males in the country who were between 18 and 60 —I’m assuming that there were more than 600,000 deaths in the war.
我们参加了一个比赛——如果我们继续下一张幻灯片——我做了一个估计——这场战争大约导致了该国 18 到 60 岁男性中大约 6%的死亡——我假设战争中死亡人数超过了 600,000。
I think it’s a reasonable estimate that — that — that 18 to 60 group of males were, by far, the great proportion.
我认为 18 到 60 岁男性这一群体的比例是相当大的。
So, imagine 6 percent of your working prime-age males in a country are wiped out in four years.
所以，想象一下，一个国家中 6%的适龄男性在四年内消失。
So, when we look at the progress of this country, and we think of our own problems — and now I just ask you to ponder — we’ll move to the next slide — that would be equivalent today to having 4 billion males in that same age group similarly wiped out.
所以，当我们审视这个国家的进步时，想到我们自己的问题——现在我请你们思考一下——我们将进入下一张幻灯片——这在今天相当于同样年龄段的 400万男性被消灭。
So that was one incredible interruption, which this country nevertheless worked through, while compiling this American dream that is one of the wonders of the world, perhaps the wonder of the world in many senses.
所以这是一次令人难以置信的干扰，但这个国家仍然克服了这一切，编织出这个美国梦，这个梦是世界的奇迹之一，或许在许多方面都是世界的奇迹。
9. America’s bumps in the road: The Great Depression
美国的坎坷：大萧条
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s move on to the — another crisis of a different sort that hit the country. And this, of course, is the 1929 crash which led to the Great Depression.
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们继续讨论另一个不同类型的危机，这当然是 1929 年的崩盘，导致了大萧条。
And here, the Dow Jones average, which we’ll use for this — at that time that’s the one everybody paid attention to — actually the second most important average at that time, if you look at the papers, was the New York Times average which has disappeared. And of course, the Standard and Poor’s has probably, regardless, is a superior yardstick, but the Dow Jones is a perfectly adequate yardstick.
在这里，道琼斯平均指数是我们将要使用的——那时这是大家关注的指数——实际上，当时第二重要的平均指数是《纽约时报》平均指数，但它已经消失了。当然，标准普尔指数可能是一个更优越的衡量标准，但道琼斯指数也是一个完全足够的衡量标准。
And on September 3rd, 1929, the Dow Jones average closed at 381.17, and people were very happy buying stocks on margin. It worked wonderfully. And the roaring ’20s had a good feeling to it with the auto coming of age, and the day of air travel coming along, and all kinds of new appliances, and the telephone getting wider use. Believe it or not, that hadn’t really caught on that much prior thereto. But the movies were coming on. It was a happy place.
1929 年 9 月 3 日，道琼斯指数收于 381.17，人们非常高兴地进行保证金买股。这运作得非常好。咆哮的 20 年代给人一种美好的感觉，汽车逐渐成熟，航空旅行的时代到来，各种新电器层出不穷，电话的使用也越来越广泛。信不信由你，在此之前，这些并没有真正流行起来。但电影正在兴起。那是一个快乐的地方。
And then, of course, if we’ll move to the next slide, we’ll look at what happened in the couple of months after September 3rd. And the Dow Jones average almost got cut in half. And that was pretty impressive until we had this recent situation where in a shorter period of time, we lost about a third.
然后，当然，如果我们转到下一张幻灯片，我们将看看 9 月 3 日之后的几个月发生了什么。道琼斯指数几乎减半。这非常令人印象深刻，直到我们最近的情况，在更短的时间内，我们损失了大约三分之一。
But the — the — the crash — and there’s a great book about it called “The Great Crash” by John Kenneth Galbraith.
但是——那个——崩溃——有一本很棒的书，叫做《大崩溃》，作者是约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思。
I may interject one little plug here. There’s a small business in Omaha — and I hate what this —what truncating this meeting or changing it so dramatically has done to many of the businesses in Omaha because I think small business is beneficial — were the beneficiaries of — of a really — they got a lot of business with the Berkshire meeting and they’re going to get it in the future but — but they suffer during a period like this, and they just had a story about the Bookworm.
我在这里插一句话。有一家位于奥马哈的小企业——我讨厌这种——这种缩短会议或如此剧烈改变会议对奥马哈许多企业造成的影响，因为我认为小企业是有益的——他们是伯克希尔会议的受益者——他们从中获得了很多生意，未来也会继续获得，但——在这样的时期他们会受到影响，他们刚刚讲了关于书虫的故事。
Well, the Bookworm — if you buy any books that come out of anything I recommend, think about just put in, “Bookworm” — “Bookworm in Omaha.” And “The Great Crash” is a wonderful book, and John Kenneth Galbraith describes it.
好吧，书虫——如果你购买任何我推荐的书，考虑一下就写上“书虫”——“奥马哈的书虫”。《大崩溃》是一本精彩的书，约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯对此进行了描述。
And I would like to get into a bit of a personal note which will have some relevance. Not too much, but some relevance, to the story of the Great Depression, because in 1929 my dad, who was 26 years of age then, was employed as a security salesman by a local, small bank.
我想讲一点个人的故事，虽然与接下来的大萧条的故事并没有太大的关联，但还是有些许关联。1929年，我父亲当时26岁，在一家本地的小银行担任证券销售员。
And he sold stocks and bonds, but he mostly sold stocks. And when stocks fall 48 percent and you were selling them to people a few months ago, you really don’t feel like going out and facing those same people.
他卖股票和债券，但他主要卖股票。当股票下跌 48%而你几个月前还在把它们卖给人们时，你真的不想出去面对那些人。
So, I think my dad probably elected to, as they say now, shelter-in-place, which means stay at home. And there really wasn’t that much in our house. We just had a small yard. It was wintertime anyway. My dad wouldn’t have been puttering around the yard anyway. And there really wasn’t — you know, television wasn’t there. And he and my mother got along very well.
所以，我想我爸爸可能选择了现在所说的“居家避难”，这意味着待在家里。我们家里其实没有太多东西。我们只有一个小院子。反正那是冬天。我的爸爸也不会在院子里忙活。而且实际上没有——你知道，电视也没有。他和我妈妈相处得很好。
So, under those conditions, if you’ll turn to the next slide, I was born about nine months later, so —
所以，在这些条件下，如果你翻到下一张幻灯片，我大约在九个月后出生，所以——
But at that time — I was actually born on August 30th, but the stock market was closed that day, and so I’m using the previous day’s figures — but the — it wasn’t — I didn’t notice at the time that the market was closed — but the stock market had actually recovered over 20 percent during that 9 1/2 month period or thereabouts.
但在那时——我实际上是在 8 月 30 日出生的，但那天股市关闭，所以我使用的是前一天的数字——但是——当时我并没有注意到市场关闭——但实际上在那 9 个半月的时间里，股市已经恢复了超过 20%。
People did not think in the fall of 1930 — they did not think they were in the great — a great depression. They thought it was a recession very much like had occurred at least a dozen times, although not always when stock markets were important. But we’d have many recessions in the — in the United States over the time, and this did not look like it was something dramatically out of the ordinary.
人们在 1930 年秋天并没有意识到他们正处于一场伟大的——一场大萧条中。他们认为这只是一次衰退，和过去至少发生过十几次的衰退非常相似，尽管并不总是在股市重要的时候发生。但在美国，历史上我们经历过许多次衰退，而这看起来并不像是有什么戏剧性的不寻常之处。
But — and for a while — actually for about ten days after my birth — that (inaudible), and the stock market actually managed to go up all of 1 or 2 percent there in those 10 days.
但是——而且持续了一段时间——实际上是在我出生后的大约十天——那（听不清），股市在这十天内实际上上涨了 1%或 2%。
But that’s the last day — well, from that point — if you’ll turn to the next slide — the stock market went from a level of 240 to 41, which was a noticeable decline, because if somebody had given me a thousand dollars on the day I was born and I’d bought stock with it, and bought the Dow average, my thousand dollars would have become $170 in less than two years.
但那是最后一天——好吧，从那时起——如果你翻到下一张幻灯片——股市从 240 点下降到 41 点，这是一种明显的下降，因为如果有人在我出生那天给我一千美元，我用它买了股票，买了道琼斯平均指数，我的一千美元在不到两年的时间里就变成了 170 美元。
And that is something that none of us here have ever experienced that — we may have had it with one stock occasionally — but — but in terms of having a broad range of America marked down 83 percent in two years, and marked down 89 percent of the peak that was September 3rd, 1929, was extraordinary.
这对我们在座的每一个人来说都是从未经历过的——我们可能偶尔在某只股票上经历过——但是——就整个美国在两年内下跌了 83%以及从 1929 年 9 月 3 日的峰值下跌了 89%而言，这实在是非同寻常。
And in that intervening period less than one year after I was born — the slightly less than one year — my dad went to the bank where he worked and had his account. And of course, the bank had a sign on it, “Closed,” and so he had no job. And he had two kids at that point.
在我出生后的不到一年间——稍微少于一年——我爸爸去了他工作的银行，那里有他的账户。当然，银行门口挂着“关闭”的标志，所以他失去了工作。那时他有两个孩子。
And his father had a grocery store but — Charlie and I both worked for my grandfather — Charlie worked there in 1940, I worked there in 1941, so we didn’t know each other — but — but my grandfather said to my father that don’t worry about your groceries, and Howard, he says I’ll just let your bill run. (Laughs)
他的父亲（也就是我的祖父）开了一家杂货店——查理和我都曾为我祖父工作——查理在1940年工作过，我则在1941年工作过，那时候我们还不认识——但我祖父对我父亲说：“不用担心你的食品账单，霍华德，我会让你的账单挂着。”（笑）
That was — my grandfather was not exactly — he was — he cared about his family, but he wasn’t going to go crazy. And —
我的祖父不是那种特别慷慨的人——他关心家人，但也不会做出疯狂的举动。而且——
10. FDIC: “A very, very, very good thing”
FDIC：“非常非常非常好的事情”
WARREN BUFFETT: One of the things, as I look back on that period is — and I don’t think economists, generally, like to give it that much of a point of importance, but — but if we’d had the FDIC 10 years earlier, we’d — the FDIC started on January 1st, 1934 — it was part of the sweeping legislation that took place when (President Franklin) Roosevelt came in — but if we’d had the FDIC, we would have had a much, much different experience, I believe, in the — in the Great Depression.
沃伦·巴菲特：回顾那段时期，我认为经济学家通常不太愿意强调这一点，但如果我们在十年前就有联邦存款保险公司（FDIC），我们——FDIC 于 1934 年 1 月 1 日成立——这是罗斯福总统上任时进行的一系列广泛立法的一部分——但如果我们有 FDIC，我相信我们在大萧条期间的经历会截然不同。
People blame it on smooth — Smoot-Hawley. I mean, they — there’s all kinds of things — and the margin requirements in ’29 — and all of those things entered into creating a recession.
人们把它归咎于斯穆特-霍利。我是说，他们——有各种各样的因素——还有 1929 年的保证金要求——所有这些因素都导致了经济衰退。
But if you have over 4000 banks fail, that’s 4000 local experiences where people save and save and save, put their money away and then someday, they reach for it and it’s gone.
但是如果有超过 4000 家银行倒闭，那就是 4000 个地方的经历，人们不断存钱，把钱存起来，然后有一天，他们想取钱，却发现钱不见了。
And that happens, you know, in all 48 states. And it happens to your neighbors and it happens to your relatives. It — it has to have an effect on the psyche that’s incredible.
这在所有 48 个州都发生。它发生在你的邻居身上，也发生在你的亲戚身上。这——这必然对心理产生难以置信的影响。
So, one very, very, very good thing that came out of the depression, in my view, is the FDIC. And it would have been a somewhat different world, I’m sure, if the bank failures hadn’t just rolled across this country and — and with people that thought that they were savers find out that they had nothing when they went there and there was a sign that said “Closed.”
所以，在我看来，经济大萧条带来的一个非常非常好的结果就是联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）。我相信，如果银行倒闭没有在这个国家蔓延，世界会有所不同——那些认为自己是储户的人发现，当他们去银行时，看到的却是“关闭”的标志，结果一无所有。
Incidentally, the FDIC — I think very few people know this — but — or at least they don’t appreciate it — but the FDIC does not cost the American taxpayer a dime. I mean, its expenses have been paid, its losses have been paid, all through assessments on banks. It’s been a mutual insurance company of the banks, backed by the federal government, and associated with the federal government.
顺便提一下，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）——我想很少有人知道这一点，或者至少他们没有意识到这一点——但FDIC没有花费美国纳税人一分钱。它的开支和损失都是通过对银行的评估支付的。这实际上是一个由银行组成的互助保险公司，由联邦政府支持并与其相关联。
跟最早的火灾保险一样。
But now it holds a hundred billion dollars and that consists of premiums that were paid in, and investment income on the premiums, less the expenses and paying of all the losses. And think of the incredible amount of peace of mind that’s given to people that were not similarly situated in — when the Great Depression hit.
但现在它拥有一千亿美元，这包括已支付的保费和保费的投资收入，减去费用和所有损失的支付。想想在大萧条时期，那些处境不佳的人们所获得的巨大安心感。
11. Depression’s long-term effect on stock prices
抑郁症对股票价格的长期影响
WARREN BUFFETT: So, the Great Depression went on. And it lasted a very long time, but it lasted a lot longer in the minds of people than it did actually in its effects.
沃伦·巴菲特：所以，大萧条持续了很长时间，但在人的心中，它持续的时间远远超过了它实际造成的影响。
World War II came along. And on sort of an involuntary manner, we adopted Keynesianism, we started running fiscal deficits, of course, that were absolutely huge and took our debt up to a percentage of GDP which we’d never reached — had never reached before — and have never reached since.
第二次世界大战来临了。在一种非自愿的方式下，我们采纳了凯恩斯主义，开始运行巨额的财政赤字，当然，这些赤字是绝对巨大的，使我们的债务占 GDP 的比例达到了我们从未达到过的水平——之前从未达到过，之后也从未达到过。
So, we had an enormous economic recovery. But the minds of people had been so scarred — the memories. Parents told their children. Nineteen-twenty-nine became a symbol in people’s minds. I mean, if you said 1929, it was like saying 1776 or 1492. I mean, everybody knew exactly what you were talking about.
所以，我们经历了巨大的经济复苏。但人们的心灵却受到严重创伤——那些记忆。父母告诉他们的孩子。1929 年在大家心中成为了一个象征。我的意思是，如果你提到 1929 年，就像提到 1776 年或 1492 年一样。每个人都确切知道你在说什么。
And it affected stock prices in a rather remarkable way to the point — if you’ll change to the next slide — it was January 4th of 1951 — that the kid who was born on August 30th in 1930 had finished college — before the stock market got back to where it was at that earlier time.
这对股票价格产生了相当显著的影响——如果你换到下一张幻灯片——那是 1951 年 1 月 4 日——在 1930 年 8 月 30 日出生的孩子在股市回到之前的水平之前已经完成了大学学业。
So, take the years from 1920 — 1930 — or 1929 (inaudible) — to 1951 — or take the year from my birth — 20 years — and bear in mind that, you know, the country was only 140 years old when this started at.
所以，从 1920 年到 1930 年——或者 1929 年（听不清）——到 1951 年——或者从我出生的那一年——20 年——请记住，当这一切开始时，这个国家只有 140 年的历史。
That’s 20 years out of this amazing 231-year lifetime of our country that was flat out, you know, a time of — for a long time — of no economic growth and no feeling by people, in terms about the wealth of the country, about what American economy was worth, but all these corporations that were doing far, far, far better than they were (inaudible).
这就是我们国家 231 年辉煌历史中 20 年的时间，这段时间完全是——长时间没有经济增长，人们对国家财富的感觉也没有，关于美国经济的价值没有任何感觉，但所有这些公司却做得远远好于他们（听不清）。
But it took all of that time to restore in the market a price level that was equal to what it was when I was born 20 years earlier.
但花费了所有这些时间，市场才恢复到我出生时 20 年前的价格水平。
So, if you think about the fact that we’re enduring a few months, and we’ll endure some many more months, but — and we don’t know how it comes out — and people in the ’30s didn’t know how it was going to come out — but they endured, persevered, prospered, and the American miracle continued.
所以，如果你考虑到我们正在经历几个月的时间，而我们还将经历更多的几个月，但——我们不知道结果会如何——而 30 年代的人们也不知道结果会如何——但他们坚持了，忍耐了，繁荣了，美国的奇迹继续。
But it’s interesting in that — I actually don’t have a slide for the next one because last night, I was thinking after all the slides have been prepared, I was actually thinking about this a little late, a little bit, and I remembered that in 19 — at the start of 1954, the stock market was — the Dow was only at about 280. And I remember 1954 because it was the best year I’ve ever had in the stock market.
但有趣的是——我实际上没有下一张幻灯片，因为昨晚在所有幻灯片准备好之后，我开始思考这个问题，稍微晚了一点，我记得在 1954 年初，股市——道琼斯指数仅在 280 左右。我记得 1954 年，因为那是我在股市中度过的最好的一年。
And the Dow went from, essentially, what — 2 — 280 or thereabouts at the start of the year to a little over 400 at the end of the year.
道琼斯指数从年初的约 280 点，基本上上涨到年末的 400 多点。
And when it went to 400, as soon as it went across 381, that famous figure from 1929, when it went to 400 — and this will be hard for some of you to believe — but everybody wondered, is this 1929 all over again?
当它涨到 400 时，一旦超过 381，那是 1929 年的著名数字，当它涨到 400 时——这对你们中的一些人来说可能很难相信——但每个人都在想，这是不是 1929 年重演？
And that seems a little farfetched, because it was a different country in 1954. But that was the common question. And it actually achieved — it was, you know — it achieved such a level of worry about whether we were about to jump off another cliff, just because the 381 of 1929 have been succeeded — exceeded — that they held — Senator Fulbright — Bill Fulbright of Arkansas, who became very famous later, in terms of the Foreign Relations Committee — but he headed the Senate Banking Committee, and he called a special — for a special investigation and he called it the — what did he call it? — the stock market study, but it really is — if you read through it — he really was questioning whether we had built another house of cards again.
这似乎有点牵强，因为 1954 年是一个不同的国家。但这确实是一个普遍的问题。实际上，它达到了一个担忧的程度，担心我们是否即将再次跳下悬崖，仅仅因为 1929 年的 381 已经被超越——他们召开了——阿肯色州的富尔布赖特参议员，后来在外交关系委员会中变得非常著名——但他担任参议院银行委员会的主席，他召开了一次特别——进行特别调查，他称之为——他称它为？——股市研究，但如果你仔细阅读——他实际上是在质疑我们是否又建造了一个纸牌屋。
And on this committee — it’s interesting to see the Senate Finance Committee — one of the members was Prescott Bush, the father of George H.W. Bush, the grandfather of George W. Bush — and had some illustrious names.
在这个委员会上——有趣的是参议院财政委员会——其中一位成员是普雷斯科特·布什，乔治·H·W·布什的父亲，乔治·W·布什的祖父——还有一些显赫的名字。
And his committee, in March of 1955, with the Dow at 405, assembled 20 of the best minds in the United States, to testify as to whether we were going crazy again, because the market was at 400 — the Dow was at 400, and we’d gotten in this incredible trouble before. But that was the mindset of the country. (Inaudible) incredible.
他的委员会在 1955 年 3 月，当道琼斯指数为 405 时，召集了美国 20 位最优秀的头脑，来证明我们是否又要发疯了，因为市场在 400——道琼斯指数在 400，而我们之前曾陷入过这种难以置信的麻烦。但这就是当时国家的心态。（听不清）难以置信。
We didn’t really believe America was what it was. And my boss — the reason I’m familiar with this thousand-page book that I have here — I found it last night in the library — I’d never — was that I was working in New York for one of the 20 people that was called down to testify before Senator Fulbright.
我们当时并不真正相信美国就是它现在的样子。而我之所以熟悉我手上这本千页书的原因是——昨晚我在图书馆找到了它——我从未读过它——因为我在纽约为一个曾被召去参议员富布赖特面前作证的20个人之一工作。
And he testified right before Bill Martin, who was running the Federal Reserve, testified and right after General (Robert) Wood, who was running Sears, testified. Sears was very, very important then.
他在比尔·马丁面前作证，马丁当时负责联邦储备系统，紧接着罗伯特·伍德将军作证，他当时负责西尔斯。西尔斯在那时非常重要。
And Bill Martin, of course, is the fellow that — the longest running chairman in the history of the Fed, and he’s the one that gave the famous quote about the function of the Fed was to take away the punchbowl just when the party started to get really warmed up.
比尔·马丁当然是那位——美联储历史上任期最长的主席，他就是那位说过著名名言的人，关于美联储的功能就是在派对开始真正热起来的时候把酒水拿走。
But Ben Graham, my boss, sent me over to the public library in New York and — to gather some information for him — something you could do in five minutes with the computer now — and I dug out something, and he went to testify — and on page 545 of this book — I knew where to look, I didn’t have to go through it all — but he had the quote, which I remember.
但是我的老板本·格雷厄姆让我去纽约的公共图书馆——为他收集一些信息——现在用电脑五分钟就能完成的事情——我找到了些资料，他去作证——在这本书的第 545 页——我知道该去哪里找，不用全部翻阅——但他有那句引用，我记得。
And I remember because Ben Graham was the — one of the three — smartest people I’ve met in my life, and he was the dean of people in the securities business. He wrote the classic “Security Analysis” book in 1934. He wrote the book that changed my life, “The Intelligent Investor,” in 1949. He was unbelievably smart.
我记得本·格雷厄姆是我一生中遇到的三位最聪明的人之一，他是证券行业的领军人物。他在 1934 年写了经典著作《证券分析》。他在 1949 年写了改变我一生的书《聪明的投资者》。他聪明得令人难以置信。
And when he testified, with the Dow at 404, he had one line in there right toward the start in his written testimony, and he said the stock market is high — looks high — it is high, but it’s not as high as it looks. But he said it is high.
当他作证时，道琼斯指数为 404，他在书面证词的开头有一句话，他说股市很高——看起来很高——确实很高，但并没有看起来那么高。但他说确实很高。
12. “Nothing can stop America”
“没有什么可以阻止美国”
WARREN BUFFETT: And since that time — if we’ll turn to the next slide — of course, we felt the American tailwind at full force.
沃伦·巴菲特：自那时以来——如果我们翻到下一张幻灯片——当然，我们感受到了美国的顺风。
And the Dow — now let’s see the — yeah, the Dow was down Friday, but when we made the slide it was about 24,000.
道琼斯指数——现在让我们看看——是的，周五道琼斯指数下跌，但当我们制作幻灯片时，它大约是 24,000。
So, you’re looking at a market today that has produced a hundred dollars for every dollar.
所以，您今天看到的市场每投入一美元就产生了一百美元。
All you did was have the belief in America — just buy a cross section of America. You didn’t — you didn’t have to read The Wall Street Journal, you didn’t have to look up the price of your stock. You didn’t have to pay a lot of money and fees to anybody. You just had to believe that the American miracle was intact.
你所做的就是相信美国——只需购买美国的一个横截面。你不需要——你不需要阅读《华尔街日报》，你不需要查找你股票的价格。你不需要支付很多钱和费用给任何人。你只需要相信美国的奇迹依然存在。
But you’d had this testing period between 1929 and — and well, really — certainly 1954, as indicated by what happened when it got back up to 380 — you had this testing period. And people really had lost faith to some degree. They just didn’t see the potential of what America could do.
但是在 1929 年到 1954 年之间，你们经历了这个测试期，正如在回升到 380 时所发生的事情所表明的那样——你们经历了这个测试期。人们在某种程度上确实失去了信心。他们只是没有看到美国能够做的潜力。
And we’ve found that — that nothing can stop America when you get right down to it, and —
我们发现——当你深入思考时，没有什么能阻止美国，和——
It’s been true all along. It may have been interrupted, with the scariest of scenarios, when you had a war with one group of states fighting another group of states. And it may have been tested again in the Great Depression, and it may be tested now to some degree. But in the end, the answer is, never bet against America.
这一直都是事实。它可能在你与一组州与另一组州作战时被打断，出现了最可怕的情景。它可能在大萧条时期再次受到考验，现在在某种程度上也可能受到考验。但最终，答案是，永远不要对美国下赌注。
And that, in my view, is as true today as it was in 1789. And even was true at the — during the Civil War and in the depths of the Depression. Now —
在我看来，这在今天和 1789 年一样真实。甚至在内战期间和大萧条的深渊中也是真实的。现在——
13. America is a better country than it was in 1789
美国比 1789 年时更好。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m now about to say something but that — don’t change the slide yet.
沃伦·巴菲特：我现在要说一些事情，但请不要更换幻灯片。
Now I’m about to say something that some of you will be tempted to argue with me about, but I would make the case that we are imperfect in a great, great, great many ways.
现在我即将说一些你们中的一些人可能会想要与我争论的事情，但我认为我们在许多方面都是不完美的。
But I would say — and if you’ll put up the next slide — that we are now a better country, as well as an incredibly more wealthy country, than we were in 1789.
但我想说——如果你能放出下一张幻灯片——我们现在是一个更好的国家，同时也是一个比 1789 年时富裕得多的国家。
We’re far, far, far from what we should be — will be — but we have gone dramatically in the right direction.
我们离我们应该成为的样子——将会成为的样子——还远得很，但我们已经朝着正确的方向大幅前进。
It’s interesting, we said in 1776, we said, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, endowed by their — are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and pursuit of Happiness.”
有趣的是，我们在 1776 年说过：“我们认为这些真理是不言而喻的，所有人生而平等，赋予他们的——由他们的创造者赋予某些不可剥夺的权利，其中包括生命、自由和追求幸福。”
And yet, 14 years later, a year after we — we really officially began the country in 1789, adopted a constitution — we found that more than 15 percent of the people in the country were slaves. And we wrestled with that.
然而，14 年后，也就是在我们真正于 1789 年正式建立国家、通过宪法的一年后，我们发现全国超过 15%的人口是奴隶。我们对此感到困惑。
But when you say the word “self-evident,” that sort of sounds like you’re saying any damn fool can recognize that, and you certainly say — you can argue maybe a little bit about “life” and “pursuit of happiness,” but I don’t see how in the world anybody can reconcile “liberty” with the idea that — that 15 percent of the population was enslaved. And it took us a long time to, at least partially, correct that.
但是当你说“不言而喻”这个词时，这听起来就像是在说任何傻瓜都能认识到这一点，而你当然可以争论一下“生活”和“追求幸福”，但我实在看不出任何人如何能将“自由”与 15%的人口被奴役的想法调和在一起。我们花了很长时间，至少部分地纠正了这一点。
(Inaudible) took a Civil War. It took losing 6 percent of those people that — males that were between 18 and 60 years of age.
（听不清）经历了一场内战。失去了 6%的那些人——年龄在 18 到 60 岁之间的男性。
But we’ve moved in the right direction. We’ve got a long ways to go, but we’ve moved in the right direction.
但我们朝着正确的方向前进了。我们还有很长的路要走，但我们朝着正确的方向前进了。
Now — in addition, going back again to that 1776 statement, that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator, etc. — I think it was self-evident to the 50 percent of the population that they were getting a fair deal for over half the lifetime of the country.
现在，回到1776年的声明，所有人生而平等，并被他们的造物主赋予某些权利等——我认为，对于占人口50%的人来说，这在他们看来是显而易见的，在国家一半以上的历史中，他们得到了公平的待遇。
It took 131 years of our country’s 231 years — it took 131 years until women were guaranteed the right to vote for our country’s leaders.
在我们国家 231 年的历史中，花费了 131 年才确保女性有权投票选举国家领导人。
And then what’s even more remarkable is that after we adopted the 19th Amendment in 1920, it took 61 more years until a woman was allowed to join those eight males on the Supreme Court.
更令人瞩目的是，在我们于 1920 年通过第十九修正案后，整整 61 年后才有一位女性被允许与那八位男性一起担任最高法院法官。
I grew up thinking that the Supreme Court, you know, it must have said it had to be nine men. But it, at 61 years, so, it took 192 years before Sandra Day O’Connor was appointed to the court.
我从小一直以为最高法院必须由九位男性组成，但实际上，经过了61年，花了192年，才在1981年由桑德拉·戴·奥康纳被任命为最高法院大法官。
And now you can say that — that there was a pipeline problem. Half the population may have been women in 1920 but they weren’t half the lawyers, or they weren’t 10 percent of the lawyers, probably.
你可以说当时存在“人才管道问题”。1920年，虽然人口的一半可能是女性，但她们并不是律师队伍中的一半，甚至可能连10%都不到。
So, you can understand some delay, but 61 years is a long time to go and to pick 33 males in between — if that was entirely by chance, the odds against that, if we were flipping coins, is about eight billion to one. Now like I said that was a pipeline problem. But it took us a long, long time. And it’s not done yet.
所以，你可以理解一些延迟，但 61 年是很长的时间，而在这期间选择 33 个男性——如果这完全是偶然的话，几率大约是八十亿分之一。正如我所说，那是一个管道问题。但这花了我们很长很长的时间。而且还没有完成。
But I think it does give meaning to the fact that we are a better society with a lot of room to go.
但我认为这确实赋予了我们是一个更好的社会这一事实意义，还有很大的进步空间。
We are a better society than existed in 1789. When you go to Colonial Williamsburg, you know, you have that — I’ve been there a couple of times — a matter of fact, I watched the debate between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford there, that’s in 1976.
我们现在的社会比1789年时更为进步。当你去殖民地威廉斯堡时，你会感受到那种氛围——事实上，我去过那里几次。我还在那里观看了1976年吉米·卡特和杰拉尔德·福特之间的辩论。
And, you know, it was not a great time to be black. It was not a great time to be a woman. And both of those categories still have certainly got potential for significant improvement in terms of fulfilling that pledge made in 1776 about how we believe that it’s “self-evident all men are created equal.”
而且，你知道，那时候做黑人并不好。做女人也不好。这两个群体在实现 1776 年关于“人人生而平等”的承诺方面，仍然有显著改善的潜力。
But we have made progress. We are a better society. And we will, as the years go by — if you’ll move to the next slide — and I believe that, and I think — let’s see if I can get these slides in the proper order.
但我们已经取得了进展。我们是一个更好的社会。随着岁月的流逝——如果你能翻到下一张幻灯片——我相信这一点，我想——让我们看看我能否把这些幻灯片按正确的顺序排列。
I believe that when you get through evaluating all of the qualitative facts, what we have done toward meeting the aspirations of what we wrote in 1776 — what we wrote in 1776 wasn’t a fact — but it was an aspirational document. And we have worked toward those aspirations. And we have a long way to go.
我相信，当你评估所有定性事实时，我们在实现 1776 年所写的愿望方面所做的努力——我们在 1776 年所写的并不是一个事实——而是一个愿景文件。我们一直在朝着这些愿望努力。我们还有很长的路要走。
聪明的假设-》正确的事实。
But I’ll repeat — if you move to the next slide — that never, never bet against America.
但我再重复一遍——如果你换到下一张幻灯片——永远不要与美国对赌。
14. Bet on America, but “be careful how you bet”
投资美国，但“要小心你的投资方式”
WARREN BUFFETT: Now — let’s move on now to a broad, much broader, subject: what I don’t know.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在——让我们转向一个更广泛的主题：我不知道的事情。
And I don’t know — and perhaps with a bias, I don’t believe anybody knows — what the market is going to do tomorrow, next week, next month, next year.
我不知道——也许带着偏见，我不相信任何人知道——市场明天、下周、下个月、明年会怎么走。
I know America is going to move forward over time. But I don’t know for sure — and we learned this on September 10th, 2001 — and we learned it a few months ago, in terms of the virus — anything can happen in terms of markets.
我知道美国会随着时间的推移而向前发展。但我不确定——我们在 2001 年 9 月 10 日学到了这一点——几个月前我们也学到了这一点，关于病毒——在市场方面，任何事情都可能发生。
And if you — you can bet on America, but you got to have to be careful about how you bet, because — simply because markets can do anything.
如果你——你可以押注于美国，但你必须小心你的押注方式，因为——仅仅因为市场可以做任何事情。
On October, whatever it was, in 1987 — October 11th, I believe — Monday — markets went down 22 percent in one day.
在 1987 年 10 月，无论是什么日子——我相信是 10 月 11 日——星期一——市场在一天内下跌了 22%。
In 1914, they closed the stock market for about four months. After 9/11 closed the market for four days, we hustled to get it going again. But nobody knows what’s going to happen tomorrow.
在 1914 年，他们关闭了股市大约四个月。在 911 事件后，市场关闭了四天，我们努力让它重新运转。但没有人知道明天会发生什么。
So, when you — when you bet — when I tell you to bet on America, and I tell you that that’s what’s really gotten me through ever since I was — I bought my first stock when I was 11 — I mean this —
所以，当你——当你下注——当我告诉你下注美国的时候，我告诉你，这就是自从我 11 岁买了第一只股票以来一直让我坚持下来的原因——我的意思是这个——
I caught a huge, huge, huge tailwind in America. But it didn’t — wasn’t going to blow in my direction every single day and you don’t know what’s going to happen tomorrow.
我在美国遇到了巨大的顺风。但它并不是每天都朝我这个方向吹，你不知道明天会发生什么。
15. Sam Nunn’s pandemic warning
山姆·南恩的疫情警告
WARREN BUFFETT: I would like to, in the context of the present news, point out something you may find kind of interesting.
沃伦·巴菲特：在当前新闻的背景下，我想指出一些你可能会觉得有趣的事情。
If you go to You Tube, you’ll find on June 17th of 2015— four-plus years ago — you’ll find Sam Nunn, who is one of the people I admire the most in the United States — in the world — enormous patriot, tremendous senator.
如果你去 YouTube，你会发现 2015 年 6 月 17 日——四年多前——你会看到山姆·南恩，他是我在美国——在世界上——最钦佩的人之一——伟大的爱国者，杰出的参议员。
And he’s carried on thankless work since leaving the Senate of the United States and heading something called the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which most of you haven’t heard of, but I’ve been slightly involved in it. Sam Nunn founded that.
他自离开美国参议院以来，一直在从事无私的工作，领导一个叫做核威胁倡议的组织，大家可能都没听说过，但我对此稍有参与。这个组织是由山姆·南恩创立的。
And the Nuclear Threat Initiative is simply organizations devoted to trying to reduce the chances of something of a nuclear, chemical, biological, and now cyber, nature from either malevolent or accidental or whatever it may be, from causing deaths to millions of Americans.
核威胁倡议组织致力于减少核、化学、生物以及现在的网络等性质的事件，无论是恶意的、意外的或其他原因，导致数百万美国人死亡的可能性。
Among the things in — Sam co-founded it, and — but he’s been the heart and soul of the organization subsequently — and he’s talked about — worried about — pandemics among — along with the nuclear threat — for decades. And he’s participated in wargames where they play out various scenarios, including malevolent pandemics that could be started by the same kind of nut that sent the anthrax letters around 9/11 and a little after.
在其中——萨姆共同创办了它，而——但他此后一直是这个组织的核心和灵魂——他谈到了——担心——大流行病——以及核威胁——已经几十年了。他参与了战争游戏，在这些游戏中，他们演绎各种情景，包括可能由同样的疯子引发的恶性大流行病，这个疯子在 911 事件及其后不久发送了炭疽信。
And Sam appeared on this You Tube presentation — and I’m sure he’s been on many others, I just happened to look this one up — and talked about the dangers of a pandemic. And anybody should listen to Sam Nunn anytime he talks.
萨姆出现在这个 YouTube 演示中——我相信他还参加过许多其他演示，我只是恰好查到了这个——并谈到了疫情的危险。任何时候萨姆·南恩讲话，大家都应该听。
So, I — he said at that time, “Germs don’t have borders,” which we certainly learned in the last couple of months.
所以，我——他当时说，“细菌没有国界，”这在过去几个月我们确实学到了。
And I — when I clicked on YouTube — if you’ll go to the next — I found out that recently it had 831 views and this was only two days ago I looked it up — and maybe — I don’t know whether most of those views have just been the last few days because of — the last few months I should say — because of the interest in pandemics.
我——当我点击 YouTube 时——如果你去下一页——我发现最近它有 831 次观看，而这仅仅是我两天前查到的——也许——我不知道这些观看大多数是在过去几天内增加的，因为——我应该说是过去几个月——因为对疫情的关注。
But it is hard to think about things that haven’t happened yet. So, we can experience when something like the current pandemic happens — it’s just — it’s hard to factor that in.
但很难去思考尚未发生的事情。因此，当像当前的疫情发生时，我们可以体验到——这就是——很难将其考虑在内。
And that’s why you never want to use borrowed money, at least in my view, buy on margin to buy into investments.
这就是为什么在我看来，你永远不想使用借来的钱，至少不要通过保证金购买投资。
And we run Berkshire that way. We’ve run it so that we literally try to think of the worst case of not only just one thing going wrong, but other things going wrong at the same time, maybe partly caused by the first, but maybe independent even of the first.
我们就是这样管理伯克希尔的。我们管理它的方式是，字面上考虑最坏的情况，不仅仅是某一件事情出错，而是同时发生其他事情出错，可能部分是由第一件事情引起的，但也可能与第一件事情无关。
And you know, you learned in — I don’t know what grade now — probably earlier than when I went to school — in fifth or sixth grade that anything — you can have any series of numbers times zero, and just need one zero in there, and the answer is zero.
你知道的，你在——我不知道现在是什么年级——可能比我上学时早——在五年级或六年级学过，任何数字系列乘以零，只要有一个零在里面，答案就是零。
There’s no reason to use borrowed money to participate in the American tailwind, but there’s every other reason to participate.
没有理由借钱参与美国的顺风，但参与的理由却有很多。
Now, I can’t resist pointing out that in October of 2019, a large 300-page — I got it right here — book was brought out, and Johns Hopkins, one of the most respected institutions in the country, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI, and the intelligence group at The Economist — collaborated to evaluate the problems of the worldwide preparedness for pandemics, essentially.
现在，我忍不住要指出，在 2019 年 10 月，出版了一本 300 页的大书——我就在这里——约翰霍普金斯大学、美国最受尊敬的机构之一，核威胁倡议（NTI）以及《经济学人》杂志的情报小组合作评估了全球应对大流行病的准备问题。
And I think in November, Sam came out to see me with Ernie Moniz, former secretary of energy, who now is the CEO of the — of NTI. He and Sam are co-chairman. And Beth Cameron, who did a lot of work on this report — came out to see me. And they gave me — in November, I believe, of last year — they gave me this appraisal.
我想在去年十一月，萨姆和前能源部长厄尼·莫尼兹一起来见我，他现在是 NTI 的首席执行官。他和萨姆是共同主席。贝丝·卡梅伦也来见我，她在这份报告上做了很多工作。他们在去年十一月给了我这个评估。
And the opening line — if you’ll turn the page — this is the opening line of this 300-page tome. “Biological threats — natural, intentional or accidental — in any country can pose risks to global health, international security, and the worldwide economy.”
生物威胁——无论是自然的、故意的还是意外的——在任何国家都可能对全球健康、国际安全和世界经济构成风险。
And this book was prepared in order to evaluate the preparedness of the various countries and rank them. We ranked pretty well, but all of us got a failing — all of the countries — got a failing grade, basically.
这本书的编写是为了评估各国的准备情况并对其进行排名。我们的排名相当不错，但所有国家都得了不及格的分数，基本上都是不及格。
Now, you would think that the prestige of Johns Hopkins and The Economist, along with people like Sam and Ernie, etc., that this would have gotten some attention.
现在，你可能会认为约翰霍普金斯大学和《经济学人》的声望，加上像山姆和厄尼这样的人，这应该引起一些关注。
And again, Sam — turn to the next page — to Sam and the others went on YouTube on October 24th, 2019, and they have racked up, as of a couple days ago, 1498 views.
再一次，萨姆——翻到下一页——萨姆和其他人于 2019 年 10 月 24 日上了 YouTube，截至几天前，他们已经获得了 1498 次观看。
Now my friend Bill Gates was delivering the same warning at a TED talk some years back, and he’s gotten a lot more views, but it just says something about the fact that you’re going to get bolts from the blue, and you can read papers about them, and you can talk about what will happen if some, as they used — the fellows at Salomon used to tell me some 25 sigma event comes along and they’d say this — that that’ll happen once in the life of the universe, you know, and at happens to them a couple of times in a month and they go broke.
现在我的朋友比尔·盖茨几年前在 TED 演讲中发出了同样的警告，他获得了更多的关注，但这只是说明了一个事实：你会遭遇意外事件，你可以阅读相关论文，也可以讨论如果发生某种事件——就像萨洛蒙的那些家伙曾告诉我的 25 个西格玛事件那样——他们会说，这种事件在宇宙的生命周期中只会发生一次，你知道的，而他们每个月却会遇到几次，结果破产了。
You just don’t know what’s going to happen. You know, at least in my view, you know, that America’s tailwind is not exhausted. You’re going to get a fine result if you own equities over a long period of time.
你根本不知道会发生什么。你知道，至少在我看来，美国的顺风并没有耗尽。如果你长期持有股票，你会得到一个不错的结果。
16. Stocks do better than bonds
股票表现优于债券
WARREN BUFFETT: And the idea that equities will not produce better results than the 30-year Treasury bond, which yields 1 1/4 percent now — it’s taxable income. It’s the aim of the Federal Reserve to have 2 percent a year inflation.
沃伦·巴菲特：认为股票的回报不会优于30年期国债的观点是错误的，目前30年期国债的收益率是1.25%，而且这是应税收入。联邦储备的目标是每年2%的通货膨胀率。
Equities are going to outperform that bond. They’re going to outperform Treasury bills. They’re out — they’re going to outperform that money you’ve stuck under your mattress. I mean, there’s — they are a enormously sound investment, as long as they’re an investment, and they’re not a gambling device or something that you think you can safely, you know, buy on margin or whatever it may be.
股票将会超过那种债券的表现。它们将会超过国库券的表现。它们将会超过你放在床垫下的钱。我是说，只要它们是投资，而不是赌博工具或你认为可以安全地、以保证金购买的东西，它们就是一种极其稳健的投资。
It’s interesting that stocks offer which — and stocks are a —we always look at stocks as just being a part of a business — I mean, stocks are a small part of a business.
有趣的是，股票提供了——而股票是——我们总是把股票视为商业的一部分——我的意思是，股票是商业的一小部分。
If in 1789, you’d saved a small amount of money — and it wasn’t easy to save — you might have bought with those savings — you might have bought a tiny, tiny plot of property. Maybe you bought a house that could be rented to somebody.
如果在 1789 年，你存了一小笔钱——而且存钱并不容易——你可能用这些储蓄买了一小块土地。也许你买了一栋可以租给别人的房子。
You didn’t really have the chance to buy in with ten different people who were developing businesses and who were putting — presumably putting — their own money in and that would have the American tailwind behind. And — and of the ten, a reasonably high percentage would succeed in a way and earn decent returns. But what — those are the choices you might have had to do with savings.
你真的没有机会与十个正在开发业务、并投入自己资金的人一起投资，而这些人背后还有美国经济的顺风支持。并且，在这十个人中，相当大比例的人可能会成功，并获得不错的回报。但这些就是你可能用储蓄做出的选择。
And they started offering bonds originally — and there again you’ve got a limited return — but the return may have been in those days, may have been 5 or 6 percent, or something of the sort. But you can’t buy risk-free bonds.
他们最初开始提供债券——在这里你又有了有限的回报——但在那些日子里，回报可能是 5%或 6%之类的。但你无法购买无风险债券。
I mean, the yardstick for me is always the U.S. Treasury. And when somebody offers you quite a bit more than the U.S. Treasury, there’s usually a reason — there’s much more risk.
我的标准始终是美国国债。当有人给你提供比美国国债高得多的收益时，通常是有原因的——风险更大。
17. Why buying a stock should be like buying a farm
为什么购买股票应该像购买农场一样
WARREN BUFFETT: But going back to stocks, people bring the attitude to them too often that because they are liquid and quoted minute-by-minute, that it’s important that you develop an opinion on them, minute-by-minute.
沃伦·巴菲特：但回到股票上，人们往往带着这样的态度，因为股票是流动的，并且每分钟都有报价，所以你必须每分钟对它们形成看法。
Now that’s really foolish when you think about it. And that’s something Benjamin Graham taught me in 1949. I mean, that single thought, that stocks were parts of businesses and not just little things that moved around on charts or — charts were very popular in those days — whatever it may be.
现在仔细想想，这真是愚蠢。而这是本杰明·格雷厄姆在 1949 年教我的。我是说，这个单一的想法，即股票是企业的一部分，而不仅仅是图表上移动的小东西——在那个时代，图表非常流行——无论它是什么。
Imagine for a moment that you decided to invest money now. And you bought a farm, and the farmland around here — let’s say you bought 160 acres and you bought it at x per share — or per acre. And the farmer next to you had 160 identical acres, same contour, same quality — soil quality. So, it was — it was identical.
想象一下，如果你决定现在投资一些钱。你买了一块农场，周围的农田——假设你买了 160 英亩，并且以每股或每英亩 x 的价格购买。而你旁边的农民也有 160 英亩相同的土地，地形相同，土壤质量相同。所以，它是——它是完全相同的。
And that farmer next door to you was a very peculiar character. Because every day that farmer with the identical farm said, “I’ll sell you my farm” — or “I’ll buy your farm” — at a certain price which he would name. Now, that’s a very obliging neighbor. I mean, that’s got to be a plus to have a fellow like that with the next farm.
而你隔壁的农民是个非常奇特的人。因为每天那个拥有相同农场的农民都会说：“我会以某个价格卖给你我的农场”——或者“我会以某个价格买你的农场”。现在，这真是个很乐于助人的邻居。我是说，拥有这样一个邻居肯定是个好处。
You don’t get that with farms. You get it with stocks. You want a hundred shares of General Motors. On Monday morning, somebody will buy your hundred shares or sell you another hundred shares at exactly the same price, and that goes on five days a week.
你在农场得不到这一点。你在股票中得到它。你想要一百股通用汽车。周一早上，有人会以完全相同的价格买下你的那一百股，或者再卖给你一百股，这样一周五天都在进行。
But just imagine if you had a farmer doing that. When you bought the farm, you looked to what the farm would produce. That was what went through your mind. You’re saying to yourself, I’m paying x dollars per acre, I think I’ll get so many bushels of corn or soybeans on average, some years good, some years bad, some years the price will be good, some years the price will be bad, etc.
但想象一下如果你有一个农民这样做。当你购买农场时，你考虑的是农场将会生产什么。这就是你脑海中想到的。你在心里说，我每英亩支付 x 美元，我认为我平均会得到这么多蒲式耳的玉米或大豆，有些年份好，有些年份差，有些年份价格好，有些年份价格差，等等。
But you think about the potential of the farm. And now you get this idiot that buys a farm next to you and — and on top of that he’s sort of a manic depressive and drinks, maybe smokes a little pot, so his numbers just go all over the place.
但是你考虑到农场的潜力。现在你遇到这个傻瓜，他在你旁边买了一个农场——而且他有点躁郁症，还喝酒，可能还抽一点大麻，所以他的数字完全不稳定。
Now, the only thing you have to do is to remember that this guy next door is there to serve you and not to instruct you. You bought the farm because you thought the farm was — had the potential. You don’t really need a quote on it.
现在，您唯一需要做的就是记住，隔壁的这个家伙是来为您服务的，而不是来指导您的。您购买这块农场是因为您认为这块农场有潜力。您实际上并不需要对此进行报价。
You know, if you bought in with John D. Rockefeller, or Andrew Carnegie, there were never any quotes — well, there were quotes later on, but — but basically, you bought into the business, and that’s what you’re doing when you buy stocks.
你知道，如果你和约翰·D·洛克菲勒或安德鲁·卡内基一起投资，根本没有任何报价——好吧，后来有了报价，但——基本上，你是投资于这个业务，而这就是你购买股票时所做的。
But you get this added advantage that you do have this neighbor, who you’re not obliged to listen to at all, who is going to give you a price every day. And he’s going to have his ups and downs. And maybe he’ll name a silly price that he’ll buy at, in which case you sell, if you want to. Or maybe he’ll name a very low price and you’ll buy his farm from him. But you don’t have to. And you don’t want to put yourself in a position where you have to sell.
但你会得到一个额外的好处，那就是你有这个邻居，你完全不必听他的，他每天都会给你一个价格。他会有起有落。也许他会报一个愚蠢的买入价格，这样的话，如果你愿意，你可以卖给他。或者也许他会报一个非常低的价格，你可以从他那里买下他的农场。但你并不一定要这样做。你也不想让自己处于必须出售的境地。
Stocks have this enormous inherent advantage of people yelling out prices all the time to you. And many people turn that into a disadvantage. And of course, many people can profit in one way or another from telling — telling you that they can tell you what this farmer is going to yell out tomorrow or next — your neighboring farmer — is going to yell out tomorrow or next week or next month. There’s huge money in it.
股票有一个巨大的内在优势，那就是人们不断向你喊出价格。然而，许多人把这个优势变成了劣势。当然，许多人通过告诉你，他们可以预测明天或下周甚至下个月你的邻居农民会喊出什么价格，从中获利。这其中有巨大的利润空间。
So, people tell you that it’s important and they know and that you should pay a lot of attention to their thoughts about what price changes should be, or you tell yourself that there should be this great difference.
于是，人们告诉你，这些价格变化很重要，他们知道这些，并且你应该非常关注他们对价格变化的看法，或者你自己认为这些价格变化应该有很大的差异。
But the truth is, if you owned the businesses you liked prior to the virus arriving — it changes prices and it changes — but nobody’s forcing you to sell. And if you really like the business, and you like the management you’re in with, and the business hasn’t fundamentally changed — and I’ll get to that a little when I report on Berkshire, which I will soon, I promise.
但事实是，如果你在病毒到来之前拥有你喜欢的企业——价格会变化，情况也会变化——但没有人强迫你出售。如果你真的喜欢这个企业，喜欢你所参与的管理，而且企业没有从根本上改变——我稍后会在报告伯克希尔时提到这一点，我会很快做到，我保证。
Stocks have an enormous advantage. And you still can bet on America. But you can’t bet unless you’re willing, and have an outlook, to independently decide that you want to own a cross section of America, because I don’t think most people are in a position to pick single stocks. A few may be, but — but on balance, I think people are much better off buying a cross section of America and just forgetting about it.
股票有巨大的优势，你仍然可以押注美国的未来。但除非你有意愿，并且有独立的视野去决定你想拥有美国的一个横截面，否则你无法进行这样的押注。因为我认为大多数人并不具备挑选单只股票的能力。少数人可能可以，但总体来看，我认为人们最好是购买一部分美国的整体股票，然后忘记它，不去过多关注。
If you’d done that — if I’d done that when I got out of college, it’s all I had to do to make 100-for-1 and collect dividends on top of it, which increased — would increase substantially over time.
如果你那样做了——如果我在大学毕业时就那样做，那是我唯一需要做的事情，就可以赚到100倍的回报，并且还能领取股息，而这些股息会随着时间大幅增加。
The American tailwind is marvelous. American business represents — and it’s going to have interruptions and you’re not going to foresee the interruptions, and you do not want to get yourself in a position where those interruptions can — can affect you, either because you’re leveraged or because you’re psychologically unable to handle looking at a bunch of numbers.
美国的顺风势头非常强劲。美国的商业代表了这一点——虽然会有中断，你无法预见这些中断，但你不希望让自己处于被这些中断影响的境地，可能是因为你用了杠杆，或者你在心理上无法应对看到一堆数字的压力。
If you really had a farm, and you had this neighbor and one day he offered you $2,000 an acre, and the next day he offers you $1200 an acre, and maybe the day after that he offers you $800 an acre, are you really going to feel that at $2,000 an acre, when you had evaluated what the farm would produce, are you going to let this guy drive you into thinking I better sell because this number keeps coming in lower all the time?
如果你真的有一个农场，而你有一个邻居，有一天他给你每英亩 2000 美元的报价，第二天他给你每英亩 1200 美元的报价，也许在那之后的某一天他给你每英亩 800 美元的报价，你真的会觉得在每英亩 2000 美元的情况下，当你评估过农场的产出时，你会让这个家伙让你觉得我最好卖掉，因为这个数字一直在下降吗？
It’s a very, very, very important matter to bring the right psychological approach to owning common stocks.
将正确的心理方法应用于拥有普通股是一个非常非常重要的事情。
But I will tell you if you bet on America and sustain that position for decades, you’re going to do better than — than — in my view — far better than owning Treasury securities. Or far better than following people who tell you what the farmer is going to yell out next.
但我会告诉你，如果你押注于美国并在几十年内坚持这个立场，你会比——在我看来——远远好于拥有国债。或者远远好于听那些告诉你农民接下来会喊什么的人。
There’s huge amounts of money that people pay for advice they really don’t need and for advice where the person giving it can be very well meaning and believe their own line. But the truth is that — that you can’t have — you can’t deliver superior results to everybody by just having them trade around a business.
人们为他们实际上并不需要的建议支付了巨额费用，而提供这些建议的人可能出于好意并相信自己的观点。但事实是，你无法通过让所有人频繁交易股票来为每个人提供优异的结果。
A business is going to deliver what the business produces. And the idea that you can outsmart the person next to you, or that the person advising you can outsmart the next — the person sitting next to you — is — well, it’s really the wrong approach.
一家公司将会交付它所能生产的成果。认为你可以比身边的人更聪明，或者你的顾问可以比坐在你旁边的人更聪明，这种想法——其实是错误的方法。
So, find businesses — get a cross section. In my view, for most people, the best thing to do is to own the S&P 500 index fund. People will try and sell you other things because there’s more money in it for them if they do. And I’m not saying that that’s a conscious act on their part. Most — most good salespeople believe their own baloney. I mean, that’s part of being a good salesperson. And I’m sure I’ve done plenty of that in my life, too. But it’s very human.
所以，寻找企业——获取一个横截面。在我看来，对于大多数人来说，拥有标准普尔 500 指数基金是最好的选择。人们会试图向你推销其他东西，因为这样对他们来说能赚更多的钱。我并不是说这是他们有意识的行为。大多数——大多数优秀的销售人员相信他们自己的胡说八道。我是说，这也是成为一名优秀销售人员的一部分。我相信我在生活中也做过很多这样的事情。但这非常人性化。
If you keep repeating something — often that’s why lawyers get — have the witnesses keep saying things over and over again that by the time they get on the witness stand, they’ll — they’ll believe it whether it was true in the first place or not. The—
如果你不断重复某件事——这通常就是律师让证人不断重复说同样的话的原因——以至于当他们上证人席时，他们会相信这是真的，无论最初是否真实。
18. “I hope I’ve convinced you to bet on America”
“我希望我已经说服你们投资美国。”
WARREN BUFFETT: You are dealing with something fundamentally advantageous, in my view, in owning common stocks. I will bet on America the rest of my life. And I hope my successors at Berkshire do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：在我看来，拥有普通股是一种根本上有利的事情。我会在余生中押注美国。我希望我的继任者们在伯克希尔也能这样做。
Now we do it in two different ways. We do it by buying entire businesses, and we buy parts of businesses. And I would like to emphasize that — well, I’d like to give you a few figures that will tie in from our activities in the first quarter. And also, what we’ve done in April.
现在我们有两种不同的方式来做这件事。我们通过购买整个企业来实现，也通过购买企业的部分来实现。我想强调的是——好吧，我想给你一些数据，这些数据将与我们第一季度的活动相关联。还有，我们在四月份所做的事情。
We are not right about — we do try to pick the businesses that we think we understand. We don’t buy the S&P 500. And we like to buy the entire businesses when we buy them. But we don’t get a chance to do that very often. Most of the best businesses are not available for sale in their entirety.
我们并不总是正确——我们确实尝试选择我们认为理解的企业。我们不购买标准普尔 500 指数。我们喜欢在购买时买下整个企业。但我们并不常有机会这样做。大多数优秀企业并不完全对外出售。
But we don’t mind in the least buying partial interests in businesses, and we would rather own 6 or 7 or 8 percent of a wonderful company and regard it as a partnership interest, essentially, in that company.
但我们一点也不介意购买企业的部分股份，我们宁愿拥有一家优秀公司的 6%、7%或 8%的股份，并将其视为对该公司的合伙权益。
And we get an opportunity to do that through marketable securities and sometimes we get more opportunities than others. And with that, I hope I’ve convinced you to — to bet on America.
我们通过可交易证券获得这样的机会，有时我们获得的机会比其他时候更多。希望我已经说服你们——相信美国。
I’m not saying that this is the right time to buy stocks, if you mean by “right,” that they’re going to go up instead of down. I don’t know where they’re going to go in the next day or week or month or year.
我并不是说现在是买股票的合适时机，如果你所说的“合适”是指它们会涨而不是跌。我不知道它们在接下来的一天、一周、一个月或一年内会怎么走。
But I hope I know enough to know — well, I think I can buy a cross section and do fine over 20 or 30 years. And I think that’s kind of, for a guy of 89, taking an optimistic viewpoint.
但我希望我知道足够多——好吧，我想我可以购买一个横截面，并在 20 或 30 年内做得很好。我认为这对于一个 89 岁的人来说，是一种乐观的观点。
But I hope that, really, everybody would buy stocks with the idea that they’re buying partnerships in businesses and they wouldn’t look at them as chips to move around, up or down.
但我希望，实际上，每个人在购买股票时都能把它们视为对企业的合伙投资，而不是将其视为可以上下移动的筹码。
19. Virus will affect Berkshire’s operating earnings
病毒将影响伯克希尔的运营收益
WARREN BUFFETT: We will just now take a quick look — and I see we’ve got the — Becky’s email address — so if you have questions on what I’ve said or other things, you can email these questions and she is back there, probably, sort of a madhouse trying to handle questions coming in and pick out the ones she’s going to prioritize. But feel free to — anything I’ve talked about so far — to send along to her. And we’ll keep her address up when I later hold the formal part of the meeting, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们现在快速看一下——我看到我们有贝基的电子邮件地址——所以如果你对我所说的内容或其他事情有疑问，可以把这些问题发邮件给她，她可能在后面忙得不可开交，试图处理涌入的问题并挑选出她要优先处理的。不过请随意——对我到目前为止谈到的任何内容——发给她。等我稍后进行会议的正式部分时，我们也会保持她的地址。
Very briefly, in terms of Berkshire in the first quarter. If you’ll put up — we have the slides on that? There we are.
非常简要地说，关于伯克希尔在第一季度的情况。如果你能把幻灯片放上来——我们有这些幻灯片吗？我们来了。
We — our operating earnings were — and there’s much more about this in the 10-Q, and it’s really not worth spending any real time on — but the operating earnings for the first quarter have no meaning whatsoever in terms of forecasting what’s going to happen the next year.
我们——我们的营业收益是——关于这一点在 10-Q 中有更多内容，实际上不值得花太多时间讨论——但第一季度的营业收益在预测明年将会发生什么方面毫无意义。
And I don’t know the consequences of shutting down the American economy. I know eventually it will work, whatever we do.
我不知道关闭美国经济的后果。我知道无论我们做什么，最终它都会奏效。
We may make mistakes — we will make mistakes — and I’m not — during this talk and later on — I’m not going to be second guessing people on this because nobody knows for sure what any alternative action would produce or anything of the sort.
我们可能会犯错误——我们会犯错误——在这次谈话中以及之后——我不会对人们进行事后诸葛亮，因为没有人能确切知道任何替代行动会产生什么结果或类似的事情。
But what we do know is that for some period, certainly during the balance of the year, but it could go on a considerable period of time, who knows. But our operating earnings will be less — considerably less — than if the virus hadn’t come along. I mean, that’s just — it — it hurts some of our businesses a lot.
但我们所知道的是，在某个时期，肯定是在今年剩下的时间里，但可能会持续相当长的时间，谁知道呢。但我们的运营收益将会减少——大幅减少——如果没有这个病毒的话。我是说，这对我们的一些业务影响很大。
I mean, you shut down — some of our businesses effectively have been shut down. It affects others much less.
我意思是，你关闭了——我们的一些业务实际上已经关闭。这对其他业务的影响要小得多。
Our three major businesses of insurance and the BNSF railroad — railroad and our energy business, those are our three largest by some margin — they’re in a reasonably decent position. They will — they’ll spend more than their depreciation.
我们的三大主要业务是保险和 BNSF 铁路——铁路和我们的能源业务，这三者在某种程度上是我们最大的业务——它们的状况相对不错。它们的支出将超过折旧。
So, some of the earnings will go — along with depreciation — will go toward increasing fixed assets — but basically these businesses will produce cash even though their earnings decline somewhat and —
因此，一部分收益将与折旧一起用于增加固定资产——但基本上这些企业将产生现金，即使它们的收益略有下降——
20. Why Berkshire will always have “plenty of cash”
为什么伯克希尔将永远拥有“充足的现金”
WARREN BUFFETT: And if we’ll go to part two — we at Berkshire, we keep ourselves in an extraordinarily strong position. We’ll always do that. That’s just — that’s fundamental.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们进入第二部分——我们在伯克希尔，我们始终保持在一个极其强大的位置。我们将永远这样做。这就是——这很基本。
We insure people — we’re a specialist to some extent, and the leader — it’s not our main business — but we sell structured settlements. That means somebody gets in a terrible accident, usually an auto accident, and they’re going to require care for 10, 30, 50 years.
我们为人们提供保险——在某种程度上，我们是这一领域的专家和领导者，虽然这不是我们的主要业务——但我们销售结构性赔偿。这意味着有人遭遇了严重事故，通常是车祸，并且他们可能需要护理10年、30年甚至50年。
And their family or their lawyer is wise enough, in our view, that rather than take some big cash settlement, to essentially arrange to have money paid over the lifetime of the individual to take care of their medical wills — bills — or whatever it may be.
在我们看来，他们的家人或律师足够明智，与其接受一大笔现金赔偿，不如安排在这个人一生中分期支付资金，以支付他们的医疗账单或其他费用。
And we’re — we’re a large — we’ve got many, many, many people that, in effect, have staked their wellbeing on the promises of Berkshire to take care of them for, like I say, 50 years or longer into the future.
我们是一个庞大的组织——我们有很多很多人，实际上，他们的福祉寄托在伯克希尔的承诺上，伯克希尔承诺在未来 50 年或更长时间内照顾他们。
Now, I would be — I would never take real chances with money under — of other people’s money — under any circumstances. Both Charlie and I come from a background where we ran partnerships. I started mine in 1956 for, really, seven, either actual family members or the equivalent. And Charlie did the same thing six years later.
现在，我绝对不会在任何情况下冒险使用他人的钱。查理和我都来自于经营合伙企业的背景。我在 1956 年开始了我的合伙企业，实际上是为七个家庭成员或相当于家庭成员的人服务。查理在六年后也做了同样的事情。
And we never — neither one of us, I think — I know I didn’t — I’m virtually certainly the same is true of Charlie — neither one of us ever had a single institution investment with us. I mean, every single bit of money we managed for other people was from individuals, people with faces attached to them — or entities — or money with faces attached to them.
我认为我们俩——我确定我是这样，我几乎肯定查理也是——从来没有管理过任何机构的投资。我是说，我们为别人管理的每一分钱，都是来自个人，有具体的人和面孔与这些钱联系在一起——或实体——但都是和具体的人联系在一起的资金。
And so, we’ve always felt that our job is basically that of a trustee and, hopefully a reasonably smart trustee, in terms of what we’re trying to accomplish. But the trustee aspect has been very important. It’s true for the people with the structured settlements. It’s true for — up and down the line. But it’s true for the owners very much, too. So we always operate from a position of strength.
因此，我们一直觉得我们的工作基本上是一个受托人的角色，并且希望自己是一个相对聪明的受托人，努力去实现我们的目标。而受托人的这一方面非常重要。对于有结构性赔偿的人来说，这一点很重要，对上下线的客户来说也很重要。而对于我们的股东，这同样非常重要。所以我们总是从一个有力的立场出发去运作。
Now, I show on — on the slide that’s up, I show our — well, let’s go back one. Yeah. I show our net — our cash and Treasury bill position on March 31st. And you might look at that and say, well, you’ve got 125 billion or so in cash — in Treasury bills. And you’ve got, at least at that point, we had about 180 billion or so in equities.
现在，我展示的幻灯片上显示了我们——好吧，让我们回到前一张幻灯片。是的，我展示了我们截至3月31日的净现金和国库券头寸。你可能会看到，我们有大约1250亿美元的现金和国库券。同时，在那个时候，我们大约有1800亿美元的股票。
And you can say, well, that’s a huge position, having Treasury bills versus just 180 billion in equities.
你可能会说，这是一笔巨大的头寸，持有大量国库券，而股票只有1800亿美元。
But we really have far more than that in equities because we own a lot of businesses. We own a hundred percent of the stock of a great many businesses, which to us are very similar to the marketable stocks we own. We just own them all. They don’t have a quote on them.
但我们在股票方面实际上拥有的远不止这些，因为我们拥有很多企业。我们拥有许多企业的百分之百股份，这些企业对我们来说与我们拥有的可交易股票非常相似。我们只是全部拥有它们。它们没有报价。
But we have hundreds of billions of wholly-owned businesses, and so they are — 124 billion, that’s not a — not some, you know, 40 percent or so. The cash position is far less than that. And we will always keep plenty of cash on hand and for any circumstances.
但我们还拥有数千亿美元的全资业务，因此那1240亿美元并不是大约40%的比例。我们的现金头寸远低于那个比例。我们始终会在手头保留充足的现金，以应对任何情况。
If a 9/11 comes along, if the stock market is closed as it was in World War I —it’s not going to be, but you know, I didn’t think we were going to be having a pandemic when I watched that Creighton-Villanova game in January either, so —
如果像 911 事件那样发生，如果股市像第一次世界大战时那样关闭——虽然不会发生，但你知道，我在一月份观看克雷顿与维拉诺瓦的比赛时也没想到我们会经历一场大流行，所以——
We want to be in a position at Berkshire where — well you remember Blanche DuBois in “A Streetcar Named Desire” — that’s goes back before many of you — but she said she didn’t want to — she, in Blanche’s case, she said that she depended on the kindness of strangers. And we don’t want to be dependent on the kindness of friends, even, because there are times when money almost stops.
我们希望在伯克希尔处于一种状态——你们还记得《欲望号街车》中的布兰奇·杜波依斯吗——这在你们很多人之前就已经存在了——但她说她不想——在布兰奇的情况下，她说她依赖陌生人的善意。我们甚至不想依赖朋友的善意，因为有时钱几乎会停止流动。
21. Fed’s Jerome Powell praised for unfreezing credit
美联储的杰罗姆·鲍威尔因解冻信贷而受到赞扬
WARREN BUFFETT: But we — money was — investment grade companies were essentially going to be frozen out of the market. CFOs all over the country have been taught to sort of maximize returns on equity capital. So, they finance themselves to some extent through commercial paper because that was very cheap. And it was backed up by bank lines and all of that. And they — and they — they let the debt create — creep up quite a bit at many companies.
沃伦·巴菲特：当时，投资级公司基本上被排除在市场之外。全国各地的首席财务官们都被教导要尽可能提高股本回报率。因此，他们通过商业票据进行部分融资，因为这非常便宜，而且有银行贷款支持。许多公司因此让债务逐渐增加了不少。
And then of course, they had the hell scared out of them by what was happening in markets, particularly the equity markets, and so they rushed to draw down lines of credit. That surprised the people who had extended those lines of credit, and they got very nervous.
然后，当然，他们被市场上发生的事情，特别是股市，吓得不轻，因此他们急忙提取信用额度。这让那些提供信用额度的人感到惊讶，他们变得非常紧张。
And the capacity of Wall Street to absorb a rush to liquidity that was taking place in mid-March was strained to the limit, to the point where the Federal Reserve, observing these markets, decided they had to move in a very big way.
华尔街吸收3月中旬流动性激增的能力被推到了极限，以至于美联储在观察这些市场后，决定必须大规模介入。
We got to the point where the U.S. Treasury market, the deepest of all markets, got somewhat disorganized. And when that happens, believe me, every bank and CFO in the country knows it, and they react with fear, and fear is the most contagious disease you can imagine. It makes the virus look like a piker. And we came very close to having a total freeze of credit to the largest companies in the world who were depending on it.
我们甚至到了美国国债市场——所有市场中最深的市场——变得有些混乱的地步。当这种情况发生时，相信我，全国的每家银行和每位首席财务官都知道，他们会因恐惧做出反应。而恐惧是你能想象到的最具传染性的疾病，它让病毒看起来微不足道。我们当时非常接近全球最大公司完全失去信贷支持的局面，而这些公司严重依赖信贷。
And to the great credit of (Federal Reserve Chair) Jay Powell — I’ve always had (former Fed chair) Paul Volcker up on a special place — a special pedestal — in terms of Federal Reserve chairmen over the years — we’ve had a lot of very good Fed chairmen, but Paul Volcker, I had him at the top of the list. And I’ll recommend another book.
而且值得高度赞扬的是（美联储主席）杰伊·鲍威尔——我一直把（前美联储主席）保罗·沃尔克放在一个特殊的位置——一个特殊的高度——在多年来的美联储主席中——我们有很多非常优秀的美联储主席，但保罗·沃尔克，我把他放在了名单的最上面。我还会推荐另一本书。
Paul Volcker died about — here — I don’t know, less than maybe a year ago or a little less. But not much before he died, he wrote a book called “Keeping At It.” If you call my friends at the Bookworm, I think you’ll enjoy reading that book. Paul Volcker was a giant in many ways. He was a big guy, too.
保罗·沃尔克大约在这里——我不知道，可能不到一年前或者稍微少一点的时候去世了。但他去世前不久，写了一本书，叫《Keeping At It.》。如果你联系我的朋友们在Bookworm书店，我想你会喜欢读这本书的。保罗·沃尔克在许多方面都是个巨人，他也是个身材高大的家伙。
He and Jay Powell couldn’t see more in temperament or anything. But Jay Powell, in my view, and the Fed board, belong up there on that pedestal, because — with him — because they acted in the middle of March — probably somewhat instructed by what they’d seen in 2008 and ’09 — they reacted in a huge way and essentially allowed what’s happened since that time to play out the way it has.
他和杰伊·鲍威尔在性格上或其他方面都大不相同。但在我看来，杰伊·鲍威尔和美联储董事会应当和他一起被放在那个崇高的地位上，因为他们在3月中旬采取了行动——可能部分是受2008年和2009年所见的影响——他们做出了巨大的反应，并基本上使得自那时以来的事态发展得以顺利进行。
March, when the market had essentially frozen — could— a little after mid-month — ended up — because the Fed took these actions on March 23rd — it ended up being the largest month for corporate debt issuance, I believe, in history.
三月，当市场基本上冻结时——在月中稍晚——最终——因为美联储在 3 月 23 日采取了这些行动——我相信，这最终成为了历史上企业债务发行规模最大的一个月。
And then April followed through and was even — was even — with even a larger month, and you saw all kinds of companies grabbing everything coming to market and spreads actually narrowed and — and every one of those people that issued bonds in late March and April ought to send a thank you letter to the Fed, because it would not have happened if they hadn’t operated with really unprecedented speed and determination.
然后四月继续推进，甚至——甚至——是一个更大的月份，你看到各种公司争相抓住市场上出现的一切，利差实际上缩小了——而且在三月底和四月发行债券的每一个人都应该给美联储写一封感谢信，因为如果他们没有以真正前所未有的速度和决心行动，这一切都不会发生。
And we’ll know the consequences of swelling the Fed’s balance sheet — you can look at the Fed’s balance sheet, they put it out every Thursday — it’s kind of interesting reading if you sort of a nut like me — but it’s up there on the internet every Thursday, and you’ll see some extraordinary changes there in the last six or seven weeks.
我们将知道扩大美联储资产负债表的后果——你可以查看美联储的资产负债表，他们每周四都会发布——如果你像我一样有点疯狂，这其实挺有趣的阅读——但每周四它都会在互联网上发布，你会看到在过去六七周里有一些非凡的变化。
And like I say, we don’t know the consequences of that. And nobody does, exactly. And we don’t know the consequences of what, undoubtedly, we’ll have to do.
就像我说的，我们不知道那样做的后果。实际上，没有人知道。而且我们也不知道我们无疑将不得不做的事情的后果。
But we do know the consequences of doing nothing. And that’s — would have been the tendency of the Fed in many years past — not doing nothing — but doing something inadequate. But (former European Central Bank President) Mario Draghi, you know, brought the “whatever it takes” to Europe. And the Fed, in mid-March sort of did whatever it takes squared. And we owe them a huge thank you.
但我们确实知道不作为的后果。而这——在许多年前，美联储的倾向——不是不作为——而是采取了一些不够的措施。但是（前欧洲中央银行行长）马里奥·德拉吉，你知道，他把“无论如何都要做到”带到了欧洲。而美联储在三月中旬则采取了更为强有力的措施。我们对此要表示衷心的感谢。
But we’re prepared at Berkshire. We always prepare on the add — on the basis that maybe the Fed will not have a chairman that acts like that. And we really want to be prepared for anything. So that explains some of the 124 billion in cash and bills. We don’t need it all. But we do never want to be dependent on, not only the kindness of strangers, but the kindness of friends.
但我们在伯克希尔已经做好准备。我们总是以可能美联储不会有那样的主席为基础进行准备。我们真的希望为任何情况做好准备。这也解释了我们手中 1240 亿美元现金和票据的部分原因。我们并不需要全部资金。但我们绝不想依赖于陌生人的善意，更不想依赖于朋友的善意。
22. Berkshire did “very, very little” on stocks in Q1
伯克希尔在第一季度对股票的操作“非常非常少”。
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, in the next slide we have the — what we did in — in equities. And these numbers are tiny when you get right down to it. I mean, for having 500 billion or so in net worth — I mean, not net worth — but in market value at the start of the year, or something close to that.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，在下一张幻灯片中，我们展示了我们在股票方面的表现。说到底，这些数字是微不足道的。我的意思是，年初时的市场价值大约为 5000 亿美元，或者接近这个数字。
You know, our — we bought in 1.7 billion of stock and our purchases were a couple of billion more than our sales of equities.
你知道，我们——我们购买了 17 亿美元的股票，我们的购买额比我们的股票出售多出几亿美元。
But as you saw in the previous slide, we had operating earnings of 5, almost 6 billion. And so, we did very, very little in the first quarter.
但是正如您在前一张幻灯片中看到的，我们的营业利润为 50 亿，接近 60 亿。因此，我们在第一季度几乎没有做什么。
23. Buffett: Buying airline stocks was a mistake
巴菲特：购买航空公司股票是个错误
WARREN BUFFETT: And then I’ve added another figure, which I wouldn’t normally present to you. But I want to be sure that if I’m talking to you about investments and stocks — more than I usually have — I want you to know what Berkshire is actually doing now.
沃伦·巴菲特：然后我添加了另一个数字，我通常不会向你们展示。但我想确保，如果我和你们谈论投资和股票——比我通常谈得更多——我希望你们知道伯克希尔现在实际上在做什么。
You’ll see in the month of April that we net sold 6 billion or so of securities. And that’s basically — that isn’t because we thought the stock market was going to go down or anything of the sort, or because some — somebody changes their target price, or they change this year’s earnings forecast.
你会看到在四月份我们净售出了大约 60 亿的证券。这基本上不是因为我们认为股市会下跌或类似的原因，也不是因为某个人改变了他们的目标价格，或者他们改变了今年的盈利预测。
I just decided that I’d made a mistake in evaluating — it was an understandable mistake. It was a probability-weighted decision when we bought that we were getting an attractive amount for our money when investing across the airlines business.
我刚刚决定我在评估时犯了一个错误——这是一个可以理解的错误。当我们购买时，这是一个概率加权的决定，我们认为在航空业投资时得到了一个有吸引力的回报。
So, we bought roughly 10 percent of the four largest airlines. And we probably — this doesn’t — is not a hundred percent of what we did in April — but we probably paid 7 or 8 billion — somewhere between 7 and 8 billion — to own 10 percent of the four large companies in the airline business.
所以，我们大约购买了四大航空公司 10%的股份。我们可能——这并不是我们四月份所做的全部——但我们可能支付了 70 亿到 80 亿之间的金额，来拥有这四家大型航空公司的 10%股份。
And we felt for that, we were getting a billion dollars, roughly, of earnings. Now, it wasn’t — we weren’t getting a billion dollars of dividends. But we felt our share of the underlying earnings was a billion dollars and we felt that that number was more likely to go up than down over a period of time, that it would be cyclical, obviously.
我们认为，由此我们大约获得了十亿美元的收益。当然，这并不是说我们收到了十亿美元的股息，但我们认为我们所占的潜在收益份额是十亿美元，而且我们觉得这个数字在一段时间内更有可能上升而不是下降，尽管它显然会有周期性波动。
12%的收益率。
But — but it was — it was as if we’d bought the whole company, but we bought it through the New York Stock Exchange and we can only effectively buy 10 percent, roughly, of the four. And we didn’t — we treat it mentally exactly as if we were buying a business.
但是——但是这就像我们买下了整个公司，但我们是通过纽约证券交易所购买的，我们只能有效地购买大约四分之一的 10%。而且我们——我们在心理上完全把它当作是在购买一项业务。
And — and it turned out I was wrong about that business because of something that was not in any way the fault of four excellent CEOs.
而且——结果我对那件事的看法是错误的，因为这完全不是四位优秀首席执行官的错。
I mean, believe me, no joy being a CEO of a airline, but the companies we bought are well managed. They did a lot of things right. It’s a very, very, very difficult business because you’re dealing with millions of people every day and if something goes wrong, for 1 percent of them, they are very unhappy.
相信我，担任航空公司CEO并不是什么愉快的事，但我们投资的这些公司管理得很好，他们做了很多正确的事情。这是一个非常非常非常艰难的行业，因为你每天要处理数百万的客户，如果其中1%的人遇到了问题，他们会非常不满。
So, I don’t envy anybody the job of being CEO of an airline, but I particularly don’t enjoy him — being in a period like this where essentially nobody in — people have been told, basically, not to fly.
所以，我并不羡慕任何人担任航空公司的首席执行官，但我特别不喜欢他——在这样一个基本上没有人——人们基本上被告知不要飞行的时期。
I’ve been told not to fly for a while. I’m looking forward to flying. I may not fly commercial, but that’s another question.
我被告知暂时不要飞行。我期待着飞行。我可能不会乘坐商业航班，但那是另一个问题。
But the — but the airline business — and I may be wrong, and I hope I’m wrong — but I think it changed in a very major way. And it’s obviously changed in the fact that there are four companies — are each going to borrow perhaps an average of at least 10 or 12 billion each.
但是——但是航空公司业务——我可能错了，我希望我错了——但我认为它发生了非常重大的变化。显然，它的变化在于有四家公司——每家公司可能平均借款至少 10 亿或 12 亿。
Well, you have to pay that back out of earnings over some period of time. I mean, you’re 10 or $12 billion worse off if that happens, and of course, in some cases are having to sell stock or sell the right to buy a stock at these prices. And that takes away from the upside on —
好吧，你必须在一段时间内用收益来偿还这笔钱。我的意思是，如果发生这种情况，你的损失将达到 100 亿或 120 亿美元，当然，在某些情况下，还不得不以这些价格出售股票或出售购买股票的权利。这会削弱潜在的收益——
And I don’t know, whether it’s two or three years from now, that as many people will fly as many passenger miles as they did last year. They may and they may not. But the future is much less clear to me about how the business will turn out through absolutely no fault of the airlines themselves.
我不知道，未来两年或三年内，会有多少人飞行，乘客里程是否会像去年一样多。他们可能会，也可能不会。但对我来说，未来关于航空公司业务的发展变得更加不明确，这完全不是航空公司的错。
It’s something that was a low-probability event. It happened and it happened to hurt particularly — you know, whether it’s the travel business, the hotel business, cruise business, theme park business — but the airline business in particular and of course, the airline business has the problem that if the business comes back 70 percent or 80 percent, the aircraft don’t disappear. So, you’ve got — you’ve got too many planes.
这是一件低概率事件。它发生了，并且特别令人痛苦——无论是旅游业、酒店业、邮轮业、主题公园业——但航空业尤其如此，当然，航空业面临的问题是，如果业务恢复到 70%或 80%，飞机并不会消失。因此，你有——你有太多的飞机。
事后看这些判断很准确。
But it didn’t look that way when the orders were placed a few months ago and when the arrangements were made.
但几个月前下订单和安排时并不是这样的。
But the world changed for airlines. And I wish them well, but it’s one of the businesses we have — we have businesses we own directly that are going to be hurt significantly.
但航空公司面临的世界发生了变化。我祝他们好运，但这是我们拥有的业务之一——我们直接拥有的业务将受到重大影响。
The virus will cost Berkshire money. It doesn’t cost money because our stock, and various other businesses, moves around. I mean, if XYZ, which is — say it’s one of our holdings, and we own it as a business, and we like the business — if the stock goes down 20 or 30 or 40 percent, we don’t feel we’re poor in that situation.
病毒将使伯克希尔损失金钱。这并不是因为我们的股票和其他各种业务波动。我是说，如果 XYZ——假设它是我们的一个投资，我们将其视为一项业务，并且我们喜欢这项业务——如果股票下跌 20%、30%或 40%，我们并不会觉得在这种情况下我们很穷。
We felt we were poor, in terms of what had actually happened to those airline businesses, just as if we owned a hundred percent of them.
我们感觉自己处于不利地位，就像我们拥有这些航空公司100%的股份一样，因为那些航空公司业务的实际情况并不理想。
So that explains those sales, which are relatively minor. But I want to make sure that nobody thinks that that involves a market prediction.
这就解释了那些相对较小的出售。但我想确保没有人认为这涉及市场预测。
And that pretty well wraps it up for Berkshire.
这基本上就结束了关于伯克希尔的内容。
24. Formal corporate meeting begins
正式公司会议开始
WARREN BUFFETT: So now we move into the formal part of the meeting, which will be followed by a fairly extended question and answer period, if there are a lot of questions with Becky. And while we’re doing this formal part of the meeting — it’s not too exciting — so feel free to leave your — whatever you’re viewing this through. And if you want to send questions to Becky, we’ll keep her contact information up on the screen.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们进入会议的正式部分，接下来将有一个相当长的问答环节，如果有很多问题的话，可以问贝基。在我们进行会议的正式部分时——这并不是太激动人心——所以请随意离开你正在观看的设备。如果你想向贝基发送问题，我们会在屏幕上保持她的联系信息。
Or if you want to fix yourself a sandwich or do anything else, we will now move — or you can pay attention to the formal part of the meeting. But we will do this and it won’t take too long, and then we will move on to the question and answer meeting.
或者如果你想给自己做个三明治或做其他任何事情，我们现在可以开始——或者你可以关注会议的正式部分。但我们会这样做，这不会花太长时间，然后我们将进入问答环节。
So, with that, I will call the meeting to order.
那么，我现在宣布会议开始。
And this follows the script, if you can’t tell by what I’m saying.
这符合剧本，如果你听不出来我在说什么的话。
I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company and I welcome you to this 2020 annual meeting of shareholders.
我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席，欢迎您参加 2020 年股东年会。
Marc Hamburg is secretary of Berkshire Hathaway and he will make a written record of the proceedings.
马克·汉堡是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的秘书，他将对会议进行书面记录。
Dan Jaksich has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. He will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motions to be voted upon at this meeting.
丹·贾克西奇已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。他将对董事选举中投票的计数以及本次会议上待投票的提案进行认证。
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.
本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股份数量、投票权和出席会议的报告？
MARC HAMBURG: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied this note — the notice of this meeting — that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 4th, 2020, the record date for this meeting, there were 699,123 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,382,352,370 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/10,000 of one vote, on motions considered at the meeting.
马尔克·汉堡：是的，我有。如本通知所附的代理声明所示——本次会议的通知——于 2020 年 3 月 4 日发送给所有登记股东，该会议的登记日期为 2020 年 3 月 4 日，伯克希尔哈撒韦 A 类普通股共有 699,123 股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权，而伯克希尔哈撒韦 B 类普通股共有 1,382,352,370 股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有 1/10,000 票的投票权。
Of that number, 472,037 Class A shares and 834,802,274 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 30th.
在这个数字中，472,037 股 A 类股份和 834,802,274 股 B 类股份通过截至 4 月 30 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。
First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Miss Debbie Bosanek, who will place a motion before the meeting.
会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请德比·博萨内克小姐提出一项动议。
DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.
德比·博萨内克：我提议省略上次股东会议记录的阅读，并批准会议记录。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I second the motion.
未识别的声音：我支持这个提议。
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion is carried.
沃伦·巴菲特：动议通过。
25. Berkshire directors elected
伯克希尔董事选举
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors. I recognize Miss Debbie Bosanek to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。我请德比·博萨内克小姐在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。
DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Gregory Abel, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Kenneth Chenault, Susan Decker, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.
德比·博萨内克：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷戈里·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、肯尼斯·陈诺特、苏珊·德克、戴维·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I second the motion.
未识别的声音：我支持这个提议。
WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Greg Abel, Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Ken Chenault, Susan Decker, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：提议并得到支持，选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷格·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、肯·陈诺特、苏珊·德克、戴维·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。
The nominations are ready to be acted upon. Mr. Jaksich, when you’re ready, you may give your report.
提名已准备好进行处理。贾克西奇先生，当您准备好时，可以进行报告。
DAN JAKSICH: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 543,203 votes for each nominee. That number exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
丹·贾克西奇：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票，针对截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 543,203 票。这个数字超过了所有流通的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，并与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Jaksich.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，贾克西奇先生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Greg Abel, Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Ken Chenault, Susan Decker, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷格·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、肯·陈诺特、苏珊·德克、戴维·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默已被选为董事。
And Ken, if you’re watching, or listening — Ken Chenault, our new director, actually got the highest vote of all the directors. Well ahead of me, I might add. So, congratulations, Ken.
肯，如果你在看或者听——肯·陈诺特，我们的新董事，实际上获得了所有董事中最高的票数。比我领先得多，我可以补充一下。所以，恭喜你，肯。
26. Advisory compensation votes
顾问薪酬投票
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers. I recognize Miss Debbie Bosanek to place a motion before the meeting on this item.
沃伦·巴菲特：议程上的下一个项目是对伯克希尔·哈撒韦高管薪酬的咨询投票。我请德比·博萨内克女士在会议上就此项目提出动议。
DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the compensation discussion and analysis, the accompanying compensation tables, and the related narrative discussion, in the company’s 2020 annual meeting proxy statement.
德比·博萨内克：我提议公司股东以咨询方式批准根据 S-K 规则第 402 条披露的公司指定高管的薪酬，包括薪酬讨论与分析、附带的薪酬表以及相关的叙述讨论，这些内容均在公司 2020 年年度股东大会的委托书中披露。
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I second the motion.
未识别的声音：我支持这个提议。
WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.
沃伦·巴菲特：已提议并获得第二次支持，公司的股东以咨询的方式批准支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。
Mr. Jaksich, when you are ready, you may give your report.
贾克西奇先生，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。
DAN JAKSICH: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 519,750 votes to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation to the company’s named executive officers — the compensation paid to the companies named executive officers. That number exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
丹·贾克西奇：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票，针对截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票，投出了不少于 519,750 票，以顾问的方式批准对公司指定高管的薪酬——支付给公司指定高管的薪酬。这个数字超过了所有流通的 A 类和 B 类股份总投票数的多数。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Mr. Jaksich.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，贾克西奇先生。
The motion to approve, on an advisory basis, the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers has passed.
对公司指定高管所支付的薪酬进行咨询性批准的动议已通过。
The next item on the agenda is an advisory vote on the frequency of a shareholder advisory vote on compensation of Berkshire Hathaway’s executive officers.
议程上的下一个项目是对伯克希尔哈撒韦公司高管薪酬的股东咨询投票频率进行咨询投票。
I recognize Miss Debbie Bosanek to place a motion before the meeting on this item.
我请德比·博萨内克小姐在会议上就此事项提出动议。
DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that the shareholders of the company determine, on an advisory basis, the frequency — whether annual, biannual, or triennial — with which they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers, as set forth in the company’s 2020 annual meeting proxy statement.
德比·博萨内克：我提议公司股东以咨询方式决定他们对公司 2020 年年度会议代理声明中所列的公司指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率——无论是年度、半年一次还是三年一次。
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I second the motion.
未识别的声音：我支持这个提议。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that the shareholders of the company determine the frequency with which they have — they shall have an advisory vote on compensation of named executive officers with the option being every one, two, or three years.
沃伦·巴菲特：提议并得到第二次支持，公司的股东决定他们对指定高管薪酬进行咨询投票的频率，选项为每年、每两年或每三年一次。
Mr. Jaksich, when you are ready, you may give your report.
贾克西奇先生，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。
DAN JAKSICH: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 131,443 votes for a frequency of every year, 2228 votes for a frequency of every two years, and 419,984 votes for a frequency of every three years of an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers.
丹·贾克西奇：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票，针对截至上周四晚上收到的代理，投出了 131,443 票支持每年一次的频率，2,228 票支持每两年一次的频率，以及 419,984 票支持每三年一次的频率，关于对公司指定高管薪酬的咨询投票。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Jackson. The shareholders of the company have determined on an advisory basis that they shall have an advisory vote on the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers every three years.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，杰克逊先生。公司的股东已决定以咨询的方式，每三年对公司指定高管的薪酬进行咨询投票。
27. Proposal for board and management diversity
董事会和管理层多样性提案
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re through with sort of the boilerplate resolutions, and this next item is of more importance.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们已经完成了那些标准的决议，接下来的事项更为重要。
And we have put up on the berkshirehathaway.com site, some material relating to this motion, which I hope shareholders and others read, because it’s important and it’s — well, I’ll describe it as to —
我们在 berkshirehathaway.com 网站上发布了一些与此提案相关的材料，我希望股东和其他人能阅读，因为这很重要——我会这样描述它——
The script says, the next item of business is a motion put forth by the boards of trustees of the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, the New York City Teachers’ Retirement System, the New York City Police Pension Fund, the New York City Fire Pension Fund, funds collectively called “the Systems.”
脚本中提到，下一项议程是由纽约市员工退休系统、纽约市教师退休系统、纽约市警察养老金基金和纽约市消防养老金基金的受托人提出的动议，这些基金统称为“系统”。
The motion is set forth in the proxy statement.
该动议在委托书中提出。
The motion requests that the company adopt a policy for improving board and top management diversity.
该提案要求公司制定一项政策，以改善董事会和高层管理人员的多样性。
The directors have recommended the shareholders vote against the proposal.
董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。
I’d like to interrupt the script here just a second to point out that we — when we saw that it would be impossible to have shareholders attend this meeting and traveling to Omaha, and gathering in gatherings, which really neither the governor, the mayor, or the public safety people, thought would be advisable.
我想在这里暂停一下剧本，指出我们——当我们看到股东无法参加这次会议，无法前往奥马哈并聚集在一起时，实际上州长、市长和公共安全人员都认为这样做并不明智。
We were hoping to have somebody from the comptroller’s office come and present the motion and then have a good discussion at the meeting of the pros and cons, because it’s a very — it’s a serious, important subject and —
我们希望有来自审计长办公室的人来介绍这个提案，然后在会议上进行关于利弊的良好讨论，因为这是一个非常严肃且重要的主题——
I can tell you on a personal basis, I think I’m in sync with the comptroller, in terms of how he wants the world to evolve.
我可以从个人的角度告诉你，我认为我与审计长的想法是一致的，关于他希望世界如何发展的。
But I’m not — I disagree on the specifics of this motion as applied to — more generally and to Berkshire’s board in particular.
但我不同意——我对这一动议的具体内容持不同意见，尤其是对伯克希尔的董事会。
And we’ve been very outspoken over the years. We’ve probably written more on qualifications for directors, than probably, any public company I can think of. And we’ve been consistent over the years and we’ve explained the reasons for our position. And we know a great many people disagree with that position.
多年来，我们一直非常直言不讳。我们可能在董事资格方面写的比任何我能想到的上市公司都要多。我们多年来一直保持一致，并解释了我们立场的原因。我们知道很多人不同意这个立场。
So, I was — I welcome the idea of really presenting to our meeting and having our shareholders hear what they had to say, and evaluate what we had — what our thoughts were.
所以，我欢迎在我们的会议上真正展示，并让我们的股东听听他们的意见，评估我们的想法。
And when we had to, essentially, not allow shareholders at the meeting, we immediately got in touch with the comptroller’s office. And we said we’d make an exception, if anybody from the comptroller’s office wanted to come out and present the proposition — or the proposal — and engage in our discussion of pros and cons.
当我们不得不在会议上基本上不允许股东参加时，我们立刻与审计办公室取得了联系。我们表示，如果审计办公室的任何人想要出来介绍这个提案——或者说提议——并参与我们关于利弊的讨论，我们愿意破例。
And as you might expect, they were not in a position to send somebody. And we — so we offered — we may have made it even in the first place — we’d be glad to have somebody introduce the motion on their behalf.
正如你所预料的，他们没有能力派人来。因此我们——所以我们提出——我们可能一开始就提出过——我们很乐意代表他们介绍这个动议。
And that we would also, if they would send along a supporting statement, we would be glad to have the person that was their proxy, in effect, present the motion — we’d be happy to have them read the supporting statement. And we said we’d appreciate it if they keep it to five minutes or less.
如果他们能提供一份支持声明，我们也很乐意让他们的代理人提出动议——我们很高兴让他们朗读支持声明。我们表示，如果他们能控制在五分钟以内，我们将不胜感激。
And they wrote back immediately and — or emailed back immediately — and said that they’d be delighted to do it that way. And they’d even try and keep it down to three minutes.
他们立即回复了 — 或者说是立即发了电子邮件 — 说他们很高兴以这种方式进行。他们甚至会尽量把时间控制在三分钟内。
So, they’ve — they have sent a supporting statement, which is going to be read to you in a minute, and I’m glad they did it. I do hope shareholders will, or have already, and others, will read — will listen to what the supporting statement says. And we’ll also read the original arguments that they made in the proxy for their proposal. And then we’ll read our reasons for voting against the — suggest voting against, because it’s an important topic. And I really hope that next year that if somebody from the comptroller’s office wishes to come out, we’d be glad to have even a more fulsome discussion of the subject.
他们已经发送了一份支持声明，稍后会读给你听，我很高兴他们这样做。我确实希望股东们会，或者已经，其他人也会听听这份支持声明所说的内容。我们还会阅读他们在提案代理中提出的原始论点。然后我们会说明我们反对投票的理由，因为这是一个重要的话题。我真的希望明年如果有人来自审计长办公室愿意出来，我们将很高兴能对此主题进行更全面的讨论。
So, with that, I will now recognize Mr. Hamburg to read a statement prepared by the comptroller of the City of New York in support of the motion.
因此，我现在将请汉堡先生朗读由纽约市审计长准备的支持该动议的声明。
MARC HAMBURG: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the board, fellow shareholders.
马尔克·汉堡：谢谢您。主席先生，董事会成员，各位股东。
I’m Marc Hamburg from Berkshire Hathaway and I’m here to present Proposal Four, on behalf of the New York City comptroller, Scott Stringer, and the New York City pension funds.
我是来自伯克希尔·哈撒韦的马克·汉堡，我在这里代表纽约市审计长斯科特·斯特林格和纽约市养老金基金介绍提案四。
The funds have approximately $211 billion in assets as of February and are substantial long-term Berkshire Hathaway shareowners with 2.5 million shares.
截至 2 月份，这些基金的资产约为 2110 亿美元，并且是持有 250 万股的长期伯克希尔·哈撒韦的主要股东。
Our proposal requests that Berkshire Hathaway’s board adopt a diversity search policy requiring that the initial candidates from which new director nominees and external CEOs are chosen include qualified female, and racially or ethnically diverse, candidates.
我们的提案要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事会采用一项多元化搜寻政策，规定新董事提名人选和外部首席执行官的初步候选名单中必须包括合格的女性，以及种族或族裔多元化的候选人。
First of all, we would like to commend the directors for the addition of Mr. Kenneth Chenault, and the fact that 21 percent of the board is made up of women.
首先，我们要赞扬董事会增加了肯尼斯·陈诺特先生，并且董事会中有 21%的成员是女性。
We would also like to recognize that the executive pipeline includes diverse candidates, including Mr. Ajit Jain, another board member.
我们还想强调，管理层人才库中包括多元化的候选人，包括董事会成员阿吉特·贾因先生。
Secondly, we applaud Mr. Buffett’s recognition that women in the boardroom have historically been rare. And even more importantly, that although women won the right to have their voices heard in a voting booth a century ago, attaining similar status in a board room, remains a work in progress.
其次，我们赞赏巴菲特先生认识到女性在董事会中历来稀少。更重要的是，尽管女性在一个世纪前赢得了在投票箱中发声的权利，但在董事会中获得类似的地位仍然是一个正在进行的工作。
With our shareowner proposal, what we are seeking is to nudge this particular process forward.
通过我们的股东提案，我们希望推动这个特定的过程向前发展。
Thirdly, one of the things that Mr. Buffett mentions is that he only buys businesses that have three criteria, the second of which is able and honest managers, and that the most important duty for a board is to find and retain a talented CEO.
第三，巴菲特先生提到的其中一件事是，他只购买符合三个标准的企业，其中第二个标准是能够且诚实的管理者，而董事会最重要的职责是寻找和留住一位有才华的首席执行官。
We would note that in reviewing Berkshire Hathaway’s largest stock market holdings of businesses, all 10 of these companies have boards that meet our board diversity requirement.
我们注意到，在审查伯克希尔·哈撒韦最大的股票市场持股时，这 10 家公司都有符合我们董事会多样性要求的董事会。
In essence, the companies that Berkshire Hathaway has found fit to invest in are those that have more diverse boards.
本质上，伯克希尔·哈撒韦所选择投资的公司是那些拥有更具多样化董事会的公司。
Fourthly, we would like to clarify that through this shareholder proposal, we are not asking for the Berkshire Hathaway board, our guardians, to have a quantifiable end result in terms of its composition, but that an initial pool of candidates for a board seat include a woman and another individual who is racially or ethnically diverse.
第四，我们想澄清，通过这项股东提案，我们并不是要求伯克希尔哈撒韦的董事会，我们的守护者，在其组成方面有一个可量化的最终结果，而是希望董事会席位的初始候选人中包括一位女性和另一位种族或民族多样化的个人。
We believe these candidates, if qualified, would also have very high integrity, business savvy, shareholder orientation, and a genuine interest in the company.
我们相信这些候选人如果合格，也会具有很高的诚信、商业头脑、以股东为导向，以及对公司的真正兴趣。
According to a 2016 Harvard Business Review study, including more than one woman, or a member of a racial minority, in a finalist pool helps combat the unconscious biases amongst interviewers and increases the likelihood of a diverse hire.
根据 2016 年哈佛商业评论的一项研究，在决赛候选人中包括一位以上的女性或一位种族少数群体成员，有助于对抗面试官的无意识偏见，并增加多样化招聘的可能性。
What we are requesting is a small step in that direction, to include diverse candidates at the beginning of the search.
我们所请求的是朝着这个方向迈出小小的一步，在搜索开始时就包括多样化的候选人。
Finally, we would like to applaud Berkshire Hathaway’s robust internal CEO succession plans. Our proposal states that a CEO diversity policy should only apply in the case of an external search. The New York City comptroller’s office is disappointed that we never had the opportunity to discuss our proposal with directors or management but remain open to constructive engagement.
最后，我们想赞扬伯克希尔·哈撒韦强有力的内部首席执行官继任计划。我们的提案指出，首席执行官多样性政策仅应适用于外部招聘的情况。纽约市审计长办公室对我们从未有机会与董事或管理层讨论我们的提案感到失望，但仍然愿意进行建设性的交流。
In the interim, we strongly urge Berkshire Hathaway shareholders to support Proposal Four. Thank you.
在此期间，我们强烈敦促伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东支持提案四。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thanks, Marc. And thank you to the comptroller for the — for presenting that supporting statement.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。谢谢你，马克。也感谢审计长提供的支持声明。
The motion is now ready to be acted upon. Mr. Jaksich, when you are ready, you may give your report.
动议现在可以进行表决。贾克西奇先生，当您准备好时，可以进行报告。
DAN JAKSICH: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 65,925 votes for the motion, and 485,824 votes against the motion.
丹·贾克西奇：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票，针对截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票，支持该提案的票数为 65,925 票，反对该提案的票数为 485,824 票。
As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares properly cast on the matter, as well as all votes outstanding, the motion has failed.
由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类股份在此事项上有效投票的票数的多数，以及所有未投票的票数，因此该提案已被否决。
The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be put — will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的准确投票计数的认证将交给秘书，与本次会议的会议记录一起存放。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Jaksich.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，贾克西奇先生。
The proposal fails. 提案失败。
DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that this meeting be adjourned.
德比·博萨内克：我提议休会。
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I second the motion to adjourn.
未确认的声音：我支持休会的提议。
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. The meeting is adjourned. So, thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。会议休会。谢谢大家。
28. Q&A begins
问答开始
WARREN BUFFETT: So now we’re ready to have questions which Becky Quick has selected from those that’s been forwarded to her directly and from Carol Loomis and Andrew Ross Sorkin, and Greg and I are available to be — we’ll be answering them for some time.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们准备回答问题，贝基·奎克从直接转发给她的，以及卡罗尔·卢米斯和安德鲁·罗斯·索金的问题中进行了选择，格雷格和我将会回答这些问题一段时间。
So, Becky, you’re on and I hope all the tech — I hope everything works. (Laughs)
所以，贝基，你准备好了，我希望所有的技术——我希望一切都能顺利进行。（笑）
BECKY QUICK: Yeah, Warren, I should tell you that since you put that address up on the screen, I’ve gotten more than 2500 emails that have been coming in. So, there is a lot of demand from shareholders wanting to get in and ask questions. And I’ll ask some that we’ve compiled before and some that are coming in right now.
贝基·奎克：是的，沃伦，我应该告诉你，自从你把那个地址放在屏幕上以来，我收到了超过 2500 封邮件。所以，股东们想要参与并提问的需求很大。我会问一些我们之前整理的问题，还有一些现在正在进来的问题。
29. Buffett confirms all airline shares were sold
巴菲特确认所有航空公司股票已售出
BECKY QUICK: The first question, though, comes from one that just came in based on the comments that you were actually saying. This is a question that comes from William Lewis. He said, “Please, did I understand correctly Mr. Buffett to say that Berkshire Hathaway sold its interest in four different airlines, and if so, can you name them? Can the names of those airlines be identified?”
贝基·奎克：不过，第一个问题来自于刚刚根据您所说的评论提出的问题。这是来自威廉·刘易斯的问题。他说：“请问，我是否正确理解巴菲特先生所说的伯克希尔哈撒韦出售了对四家不同航空公司的股份，如果是的话，您能说出它们的名字吗？这些航空公司的名字能被确认吗？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I wouldn’t normally talk about it. But I think it requires an explanation. And it requires an explanation that means we were not disappointed at all in the businesses as they were being run, and the management, but we did come to a different opinion on it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我通常不会谈论这个。但我认为这需要解释。而这需要的解释是，我们对这些企业的运营和管理并没有感到失望，但我们对它有了不同的看法。
The four large — there’re the four largest U.S. airlines. It’s American Airlines and Delta Air Lines and Southwest Airlines and United Continental. And I think collectively they probably are at least 80 percent of the revenue passenger miles in the — that is flown in the United States. And they have significant international flying, too, excluding Southwest.
这四家大型航空公司是美国最大的四家航空公司。它们是美国航空、达美航空、西南航空和联合大陆航空。我认为它们的总收入客运里程在美国的航空运输中至少占 80%。它们也有相当可观的国际航班，西南航空除外。
So, we like those airlines. We like them, but we do not like — the world was changed for the airlines. And I don’t know how it’s changed, and I hope it corrects itself in a reasonably prompt way.
所以，我们喜欢那些航空公司。我们喜欢它们，但我们不喜欢——世界对航空公司发生了变化。我不知道这种变化是什么，我希望它能在合理的时间内自行纠正。
I don’t know whether Americans will have now changed their habits, or will change their habits, because of an extended period, if it happens, that we’re semi-shut down in the economy.
我不知道美国人是否会因为经济半封闭的延长时期而改变他们的习惯，或者是否会改变他们的习惯。
I don’t know whether the trends toward, you know, what people have been doing by phone.
我不知道人们通过电话所做的趋势如何。
I mean I’ve been — it’s been seven weeks since I’ve had a haircut. It’s been seven weeks since— more than seven weeks — since I put on a tie or anything. It’s just a question of which sweatsuit I wear.
我意思是，我已经有七周没剪头发了。已经超过七周没穿领带或其他任何东西了。现在只是选择我穿哪套运动服的问题。
So, who knows how we come out of this, but I think that there are certain industries — and unfortunately, I think that the airline industry, among others — that are really hurt by a forced, in effect shutdown by events that are far beyond our control.
所以，谁知道我们将如何走出这个困境，但我认为有一些行业——不幸的是，我认为航空业等行业——确实受到了一种强制性、实际上是由于我们无法控制的事件而导致的停摆的严重影响。
Greg, would you like to add anything to that?
格雷格，你想对此补充些什么吗？
GREG ABEL: Really nothing to add, Warren.
格雷格·阿贝尔：真的没什么好补充的，沃伦。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑）
We’ve got another Charlie here. (Laughs)
我们这里还有一个查理。（笑）
GREG ABEL: I didn’t — I didn’t intend to use that as a line. But you know, you’ve covered it well.
格雷格·阿贝尔：我本来没打算把那句话当作论点使用。不过你知道，你已经很好地概括了。
WARREN BUFFETT: We would have bought other airlines too, incidentally. But those were the four big ones. And those were the ones we could put some money into.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，我们本来还会购买其他航空公司。但这四家是最大的。而且这些是我们可以投资的公司。
And we put, whatever it was, 7 or 8 billion into it, and we did not take out anything like 7 or 8 billion.
我们投入了大约 70 亿或 80 亿，但并没有取出像 70 亿或 80 亿那样的金额。
And that was my mistake. But it was — it’s always a problem if —
那是我的错误。但这总是一个问题，如果——
There are things on the lower levels of probabilities that happen sometimes. And it happened to the airlines. And I’m the one who made the decision.
有些事情在概率较低的情况下有时会发生。这发生在航空公司身上。而我就是做出这个决定的人。
BECKY QUICK: But Warren, just to clarify on his question, he asked, did you sell your whole stake in all four of those?
贝基·奎克：但是沃伦，为了澄清他的问题，他问，你是否卖掉了你在那四个中的全部股份？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the answer is yes.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，答案是肯定的。
Yeah, when we — when we sell something — when we sell something, very often it’s going to be our entire stake. I mean, we don’t trim positions or — that just not the way we approach it, any more than if we buy a hundred percent of a business, we’re going to sell it down to 90 percent or 80 percent.
是的，当我们——当我们出售某样东西时——当我们出售某样东西时，通常会是我们全部的股份。我的意思是，我们不会削减持仓——这不是我们的做法，就像如果我们购买了一家公司的百分之百，我们不会将其出售到百分之九十或百分之八十。
I mean, if we like a business, we’re going to buy as much of it as we can and keep it as long as we can.
我的意思是，如果我们喜欢一项业务，我们会尽可能多地购买它，并尽可能长时间地持有它。
But when we change our mind —
但当我们改变主意时——
BECKY QUICK: All right. The next question —
贝基·奎克：好的。下一个问题——
WARREN BUFFETT: Go ahead, I’m sorry.
沃伦·巴菲特：继续，我很抱歉。
BECKY QUICK: No, go ahead. When you change your mind?
贝基·奎克：不，继续。你什么时候改变主意的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, when we change our mind, we don’t take half measure or anything of the sort.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，当我们改变主意时，我们不会采取半途而废的措施或类似的做法。
So, I was amazed at how, frankly — now we were selling them at far lower prices than we paid — but I was amazed at the volume.
所以，我对我们以远低于我们支付的价格出售它们的数量感到惊讶。
The airlines always trade in large volume, relatively. But we have sold the entire positions.
航空公司通常以相对较大的交易量进行交易。但我们已经卖出了所有头寸。
BECKY QUICK: OK, thank you.
贝基·奎克：好的，谢谢。
30. You need the right psychology to buy stocks
你需要正确的心理状态来购买股票
BECKY QUICK: The next question comes from Robert Tomas, from Toronto, Canada, and he says, “Warren, why are you recommending listeners to buy now, yet you’re not comfortable buying now, as evidenced by your huge cash position?”
贝基·奎克：下一个问题来自加拿大多伦多的罗伯特·托马斯，他说：“沃伦，为什么你建议听众现在购买，而你自己却不愿意现在购买，这从你巨额的现金头寸中可以看出？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, A, as I’ve explained, the position isn’t that huge when I look at worst-case possibilities.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，正如我所解释的，当我考虑最坏的情况时，这个头寸并不是那么大。
I would say that there are things that I think are quite impossible — improbable — and I hope they don’t happen, but that doesn’t mean they won’t happen.
我会说，有些事情我认为是相当不可能的——不太可能的——我希望它们不会发生，但这并不意味着它们就不会发生。
I mean, for example, in our insurance business, we can have the world’s — or the country’s — number one hurricane that it’s ever had, but that doesn’t preclude the fact we could have the biggest earthquake a month later.
我的意思是，比如在我们的保险业务中，可能会遇到全球或全国范围内有史以来最大的飓风，但这并不排除一个月后我们还可能遇到最大的地震。
So, we — we are not — we don’t prepare ourselves for a single problem, we prepare ourselves for problems that sometimes create their own momentum.
所以，我们并不是只为单一问题做准备，而是为那些有时会产生自身连锁反应的问题做好准备。
等着把整个剧情看完再做决定，连锁反应是个很重要的事项。
I mean, in 2008 and ’09, you didn’t see all the problems the first day when really — what really kicked it off was when the Freddie and Fannie, the GSEs, went into conservatorship in early September.
我指的是，在 2008 年和 2009 年，你并没有在第一天看到所有的问题，实际上——真正引发这一切的是在九月初，房利美和房地美，这些政府支持企业，进入了接管状态。
And then when money market funds broke the buck, I mean — there are things that trip other things.
然后，当货币市场基金跌破面值时，我的意思是——有些事情会引发其他事情。
And we take a very much — a worst-case scenario into mind that probably is a considerably worse case than most people do.
我们考虑了一个非常糟糕的情况，这可能比大多数人想象的情况要糟糕得多。
So, I don’t look at it as huge. And I’m not — I’m not recommending that people buy stocks today or tomorrow or next week or next month. I think it all depends on your circumstances.
所以，我并不认为这很重要。而且我并不是——我并不建议人们今天、明天、下周或下个月买股票。我认为这完全取决于你的情况。
But you shouldn’t buy stocks unless you expect, in my view, you expect to hold them for a very extended period and you are prepared financially and psychologically to hold them the same way you would hold a farm, and never look at a quote, and never pay — you don’t need to pay attention to them.
但除非你预计会长期持有股票，并且在财务和心理上都准备好像持有农场一样持有它们，否则你不应该买股票，永远不看报价，也不需要关注它们。
I mean, the main thing to do — and you’re not going to pick the bottom and you’re not going — nobody else can pick it for you, or anything of the sort.
我的意思是，关键是要行动起来——你不会准确找到市场的最低点，也没有人能为你选到，或者类似的事情。
You’ve got to be prepared, when you buy a stock, to have it go down 50 percent — or more — and be comfortable with it, as long as you’re comfortable with the holding.
你在购买股票时必须做好准备，股票可能会下跌 50%甚至更多，并且要对此感到舒适，只要你对持有它感到满意。
And I pointed out — I think a year, maybe two years ago in the annual report — almost just the one before this most recent one — I pointed out that there have been three times in Berkshire’s history when the price of Berkshire stock went down 50 percent — three different times.
我指出过——我想是在一年前，也许是两年前的年度报告中——几乎就是在这最近一次之前的那一份——我指出在伯克希尔的历史上，有三次伯克希尔股票的价格下跌了 50%——三次不同的时间。
Now, if you hold it on borrowed money, you know, you could have been cleaned out. There wasn’t anything wrong with Berkshire when those three times occurred.
现在，如果你是用借来的钱来持有它，你知道，你可能会被清空。在那三次发生时，伯克希尔并没有任何问题。
But if you’re going to — if you’re going to look at the price of the stock, and think that you have to act because it’s doing this or that, or somebody else tells you a line, I mean, “How can you stay with that,” when something else is going up or anything.
但如果你只看股票的价格，并认为你必须采取行动，因为它在涨或跌，或者别人告诉你某种观点，我的意思是，“当其他股票在上涨时，你怎么还能持有这只股票？”
Really, you’ve got to be in the right psychological position.
真的，你必须处于正确的心理状态。
And frankly, some people are not really careful. Some people are more subject to fear than others. It’s like the virus — it strikes some people with much greater ferocity than others.
坦率地说，有些人并不太小心。有些人比其他人更容易感到恐惧。这就像病毒——它对某些人的攻击远比对其他人更为猛烈。
非常好的类比。
And fear is — fear is something I’ve really never felt financially, but — I don’t think Charlie’s felt it, either.
恐惧——我在财务上从来没有感受过恐惧，但——我认为查理也没有过这种感觉。
Some people can handle it psychologically. If you can’t handle it psychologically, then you really shouldn’t own stocks, because you’re going to buy and sell them at the wrong time.
有些人能够在心理上应对。如果你无法在心理上应对，那么你真的不应该拥有股票，因为你会在错误的时间买入和卖出。
And you should not count on somebody else telling you this. You should you should do something you understand yourself.
你不应该指望别人告诉你这些。你应该做一些你自己理解的事情。
If you don’t understand it yourself, you’re going to be affected by the next person you talk to. And so, you should — you should be in a position to hold.
如果你自己都不理解，你将会受到下一个与你交谈的人的影响。因此，你应该——你应该处于一个能够坚持的状态。
And I don’t know whether today is a great day to buy stocks. I know it will work out over 20 or 30 years. I don’t know whether it will work out over two years at all. I have no idea whether you’ll be ahead or behind on a stock you buy on Monday morning — or the market.
我不知道今天是否是买股票的好日子。我知道在 20 或 30 年后会有结果。我不知道在两年内是否会有结果。我完全不知道你在周一早上买的股票——或者市场——是否会盈利。
31. April’s $426M in stock buys was meaningless
四月份的 4.26 亿美元股票购买毫无意义
BECKY QUICK: Warren, the next question comes from Scott Kelly. And he writes in based on the numbers you just put up. He said, “What did you spend the $426 million on equities in April? Was that adding to existing positions? Or was that initiating new positions?”
贝基·奎克：沃伦，下一个问题来自斯科特·凯利。他根据你刚刚提供的数字写道：“你在四月份花费的 4.26 亿美元用于股票是什么？是增加现有头寸吗？还是建立新头寸？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t remember, to tell you the truth. But one thing you have to allow for — well, these are the figures for Berkshire Hathaway, and they include both Todd and — Todd Combs and Ted Weschler manage significant sums of money.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，老实说，我不记得了。但你必须考虑一件事——这些是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的数字，包括托德和——托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒管理着大量资金。
So, it could well be something they bought. It could be something I bought. But I — 462 million is not much money — (laughs) — at Berkshire. It’s more to Todd and Ted than it is to me, in terms of our positions. But I literally have no memory of —
所以，这可能是他们买的东西，也可能是我买的东西。但是我——4.62 亿并不是很多钱——（笑）——在伯克希尔。这对托德和泰德来说比对我更重要，就我们的仓位而言。但我真的没有任何记忆——
We’re not doing anything big, obviously. We’re willing to do something very big. I mean, you could come to me on Monday morning with something that involved 30 or 40 billion or $50 billion. And if we really liked what we were seeing, we would do it. And that will happen someday.
我们显然没有做什么大事。我们愿意做一些非常大的事情。我的意思是，你可以在周一早上带着涉及 300 亿、400 亿或 500 亿美元的事情来找我。如果我们真的喜欢我们看到的东西，我们就会去做。总有一天这会发生。
If it happens in the market, we can’t put it all in in one day or one week or one month.
如果它发生在市场上，我们不能在一天、一周或一个月内全部解决。
It took us months to build up our airline position — many months. We were able to sell them faster than we bought them, but we were selling them at lower prices.
我们花了几个月的时间来建立我们的航空公司地位——很多个月。我们能够以比购买更快的速度出售它们，但我们出售的价格却更低。
So, the 462 is essentially meaningless, and it may not have even — probably was not mine.
所以，4.62亿基本上是没有意义的，它可能甚至不是——很可能不是我的。
32. We haven’t seen any attractive deals to provide capital
我们还没有看到任何有吸引力的交易来提供资金。
BECKY QUICK: All right, this next question comes from Lee Yan Dar, and his question is, “In the last financial crisis, Berkshire acted as a lender of support for eight different deals. Despite the injection of expensive capital through preferred stocks and securing warrants, these companies were, in fact, paying for the sign of confidence from Berkshire in the midst of a crisis. And that was invaluable.
贝基·奎克：好的，下一个问题来自李彦达，他的问题是：“在上一次金融危机中，伯克希尔作为八个不同交易的支持贷方。尽管通过优先股注入了昂贵的资本并获得了认股权证，但这些公司实际上是在为伯克希尔在危机中表现出的信心付费。这是无价的。”
“Today we have QE infinity, low interest rates, and hungry hedge funds, even though the economy has deteriorated rapidly over the last few months. Why have we not acted as a lender of support?”
“今天我们有无限量宽松、低利率和饥渴的对冲基金，尽管经济在过去几个月迅速恶化。我们为什么没有作为支持的贷款人采取行动？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we haven’t seen anything attractive.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们没有看到任何有吸引力的东西。
And, frankly — it wasn’t predicated on this — but the Federal Reserve did the right thing. And they did it very promptly, which they should have. And I salute them for it.
坦率地说——这并不是基于这个——但美联储做了正确的事情。他们非常迅速地采取了行动，这是他们应该做的。我为此向他们致敬。
But that means that a lot of companies that needed money, and probably should have done their financing a little earlier — but they’re perfectly decent companies — got the chance to finance in huge ways in the last five weeks or there abouts.
但这意味着许多需要资金的公司，可能应该稍早进行融资——但它们都是相当不错的公司——在过去五周左右的时间里获得了以巨额方式融资的机会。
I mean, it’s set records. Some companies have come back twice — a number — very big companies that didn’t bother to extend out their borrowings — came a couple times.
我的意思是，它创造了纪录。一些公司已经两次回来——有好几家非常大的公司，没有及时延长他们的借款期限——结果回来借了几次。
Berkshire actually raised some more money. We don’t need it. But we’ll — I think it’s still a good idea over time.
伯克希尔实际上筹集了一些更多的资金。我们并不需要它。但我认为从长远来看，这仍然是个好主意。
And then there are some pretty marginal companies that have also had access to money.
然后还有一些相当边缘的公司也获得了资金。
So, there is no shortage of funds at rates which we would not invest at.
所以，资金并不短缺，只是这些利率水平让我们不会去投资。
So, we have not — we have not done anything because we don’t see anything that attractive to do.
所以，我们没有——我们没有做任何事情，因为我们看不到任何吸引人的事情可做。
Now, that could change, you know, very quickly or it may not change.
现在，这可能会很快改变，也可能不会改变。
But in 2008 and ’09, the truth is, we weren’t — we weren’t buying those things to make a statement to the world. They may have made a statement to the world to some extent, and I’m glad that they did, if they did.
但在 2008 年和 2009 年，事实是，我们并不是——我们并不是为了向世界发出声明而购买那些东西。它们可能在某种程度上向世界发出了声明，如果它们确实如此，我很高兴。
But we made them because they seemed intelligent things to do. And markets were such that we didn’t really have much competition.
但我们这样做是因为这似乎是明智的选择。而市场的情况是，我们实际上没有太多竞争。
Now it turned out that we would have been a lot better off if we’d waited four or five months to do similar things. So, my timing was actually terrible in 2008 or ’09, but the — what was available was so attractive that even though my timing was terrible, we still — we still came out OK, or a little bit better than OK.
现在看来，如果我们等四五个月再做类似的事情，我们会好得多。所以，我在 2008 年或 2009 年的时机实际上很糟糕，但当时可用的东西是如此吸引人，以至于即使我的时机很糟糕，我们仍然——我们仍然过得不错，或者说比不错稍好一些。
But it was not — it was not designed — what we did was not designed to make a statement. It was designed to take advantage of what we thought were very attractive terms. But they were terms that nobody else was willing to offer at that time because the market was in a state of panic.
但这并不是——这并不是为了表达什么——我们所做的并不是为了发表声明。我们是为了利用我们认为非常有吸引力的条款而设计的。但在那个时候，没有其他人愿意提供这些条款，因为市场处于恐慌状态。
And the market in equities was in a state of panic for a short period of time when the virus broke out — or spread to the United States — and it became apparent — and the debt market was frozen — or in the process of freezing. And that changed dramatically when the Fed acted.
当病毒爆发——或传播到美国——时，股票市场在短时间内陷入恐慌状态，债务市场被冻结——或正在冻结中。这一切在美联储采取行动时发生了戏剧性的变化。
But who knows what happens next week or next month or next year? The Fed doesn’t know. I don’t know. And nobody knows.
但谁知道下周、下个月或明年会发生什么呢？美联储不知道。我也不知道。没有人知道。
There’s various — there’s a lot of different scenarios that can play out. And under some scenarios, we’ll spend a lot of money. In other scenarios we won’t.
有很多不同的情况可能会发生。在某些情况下，我们会花很多钱。在其他情况下，我们则不会。
Greg, you’ve been watching what’s been happening around Berkshire.
格雷格，你一直在关注伯克希尔周围发生的事情。
GREG ABEL: Yeah. Yeah. Well, I think your comment on the Fed, Warren — because as you know, interestingly, when it was first occurring, there were calls coming in — not the size of transactions we’re interested in nor companies we were inclined to act upon.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。是的。我认为你对美联储的评论，沃伦——因为你知道，有趣的是，当这件事最初发生时，有一些电话打进来——但不是我们感兴趣的交易规模，也不是我们倾向于采取行动的公司。
But there were — there was that general interest out there as people were in a difficult point in time, i.e., looking at their balance sheet and deciding what they were going to do.
但人们在这个困难时期普遍感兴趣，即审视他们的资产负债表并决定他们将要做什么。
But the reality is those companies were not — not of interest. And post — basically, effectively — March 23rd, the companies have been able to act.
但现实是，那些公司对我们并没有吸引力。而在基本上从3月23日之后，这些公司已经能够采取行动了。
And Warren touched on it. At Berkshire Hathaway Energy, post the Fed action, we actually issued $4 billion of securities that was associated with debts or obligations we had maturing — some short-term obligations we wanted to clearly lengthen out.
沃伦提到了这一点。在伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司，在美联储采取行动后，我们实际上发行了 40 亿美元的证券，这与我们到期的债务或义务有关——其中一些是我们想要明确延长期限的短期义务。
And we pre-funded one of our capital programs at PacifiCorp, with the thought this was the time to get the funds in place such that we could proceed with what is really an excellent opportunity both for PacifiCorp, our customers, and ultimately for the Berkshire shareholders. So, we’ve taken action within Berkshire, as Warren noted.
我们提前为 PacifiCorp 的一个资本项目筹集了资金，认为这是确保资金到位的最佳时机，这样我们就能推进这一对 PacifiCorp、我们的客户，最终也对伯克希尔股东都非常有利的机会。因此，正如沃伦提到的，我们在伯克希尔内部已经采取了行动。
WARREN BUFFETT: This is a very good time to borrow money, which means it may not be such a great time to lend money.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在是借钱的好时机，这意味着可能不是放贷的好时机。
But the — it’s good for the country that it’s a good — it’s a good time to borrow money.
但这对国家来说是好事——现在是借钱的好时机。
Not good for Berkshire, particularly, although we borrowed some money so we — we’ve put our money where our mouth is.
对伯克希尔来说并不好，尤其是，尽管我们借了一些钱，所以我们——我们把钱投入到我们所说的事情上。
33. We won’t subsidize our companies with shareholder money
我们不会用股东的钱来补贴我们的公司。
BECKY QUICK: That gets kind of to another question that came in from Mark McNicholas in Chicago, Illinois.
贝基·奎克：这引出了另一个问题，来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的马克·麦克尼科拉斯。
He says Berkshire itself has a Fort Knox-like balance sheet, but some of its operating companies may be tight on cash during the pandemic. Would Berkshire consider sending cash to its operating companies to, one, ensure that they can get through the pandemic and, two, allow them to increase market share while their competitors struggle?
他说，伯克希尔本身拥有像福特诺克斯一样的资产负债表，但在疫情期间，一些运营公司可能会面临现金紧张。伯克希尔会考虑向其运营公司提供现金，以确保他们能够度过疫情，并在竞争对手挣扎时让他们增加市场份额吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve sent money to a few and — we’re in a position to do that. We’re not going to send money indefinitely to anything where it looks like their future is not — it’s just changed dramatically from what it was a year ago or so, or even six months ago.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们给了一些钱——我们有能力这样做。我们不会无限期地给任何看起来未来不妙的事情送钱——它的未来与一年前或六个月前相比发生了巨大的变化。
You know, we made that decision in terms of the airline business. We took money out of the business, basically, even at a substantial loss.
你知道，我们在航空业务方面做出了那个决定。我们基本上是从业务中抽出了资金，即使是以相当大的损失。
And we will not fund a company that — where we think that it’s going to chew up money in the future. We started out with a company like that in our textile business at Berkshire Hathaway in 1965. And we went for 20 years, trying to think we could solve something that wasn’t that solvable.
我们不会资助一个我们认为未来会消耗资金的公司。1965 年，我们在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的纺织业务中开始了一家这样的公司。我们尝试了 20 年，试图解决一个并不那么容易解决的问题。
So, we are not in the business of subsidizing any companies with shareholders’ money. If people want to do that with their own money — but we’re not going to do it on their behalf.
所以，我们不打算用股东的钱来补贴任何公司。如果人们想用自己的钱这样做——但我们不会代表他们这样做。
But we have advanced money — we are perfectly ready to advance money.
但我们已经预付了款项——我们完全准备好预付款项。
Gaining market share and all that. That may happen but the companies that need money, probably, market share is not their number one problem. I’ll put it that way.
获得市场份额等等。这可能会发生，但需要资金的公司，市场份额可能不是他们的首要问题。我就这么说吧。
Greg, would you —? 格雷格，你能——吗？
GREG ABEL: Yeah, well, yeah. It’s interesting when we look at our different companies as we went into the pandemic, where we’re addressing the COVID-19 crisis. Obviously, the first focus by our management team — and appropriately — was our employees, and effectively making sure they’re safe in that the business environment we’re in that, that they could continue to operate.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，嗯，是的。当我们回顾不同公司在疫情期间的表现时，确实很有趣，我们在应对 COVID-19 危机。显然，我们管理团队的首要关注点——这是合适的——是我们的员工，确保他们在我们所处的商业环境中安全，并能够继续运营。
Then we quickly moved to looking at where our customers were in the cycle, i.e., what was the underlying demand within the business. And to great credit to our managers, they very much have adjusted their businesses consistent with the underlying needs and demands of customers.
然后我们迅速转向查看我们的客户在周期中的位置，即业务中潜在的需求是什么。值得称赞的是，我们的管理者们非常好地调整了他们的业务，以符合客户的潜在需求和要求。
So effectively, they’re moving with the customer, meaning very few of our businesses have actually required funds. Some have, and as Warren said, we’ve advanced the funds to them. But the businesses have really reacted in a way where they’re managing consistent with the — with where the market’s at, i.e., their — the demand for their products.
实际上，他们是随着客户的需求在行动，这意味着我们的业务中很少有真正需要资金的公司。有一些确实需要，正如沃伦所说，我们已经为他们提供了资金支持。但整体而言，这些公司都在根据市场状况进行调整，也就是根据他们产品的需求来管理业务。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Berkshire is almost certain to generate cash. I mean nothing’s 100 percent certain but — and we’re, as Greg mentioned, at Berkshire Hathaway Energy we had some short-term financing.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。伯克希尔几乎可以肯定会产生现金。我的意思是没有什么是百分之百确定的，但——正如格雷格提到的，我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司有一些短期融资。
We don’t have short-term financing to any degree. We’ll never get ourselves in a position where we have a lot of money that can come due tomorrow.
我们几乎没有短期融资。我们绝不会让自己处于那种大量资金明天就到期的境地。
And people that were financing heavily with commercial paper and then found their business stopped — well, you’ve seen what’s happened to the airlines. I mean, they need money. Cruise lines need money.
那些大量依赖商业票据融资的人，后来发现他们的业务停滞不前——你已经看到了航空公司的情况。我是说，他们需要资金。邮轮公司也需要资金。
There’s some businesses that, you know, it’s just the nature of what they’re in.
有些行业的业务就是这样，您知道，这就是他们所处的行业的性质。
Berkshire will never get in a position where it makes money.
伯克希尔永远不会处于缺钱的状态。
And we factor in — like I say — we factor in some things that are not ridiculously unlikely. And I’m not going to spell out scenarios because I, to some extent, you start — spreading — spelling out scenarios, you may increase the chance of them happening. So, it’s not something that we really want to talk about a lot, but —
正如我所说，我们也会考虑一些并非完全不可能的情况。我不会详细描述这些情景，因为在某种程度上，当你开始传播或描述这些情景时，可能会增加它们发生的几率。所以这不是我们特别想多谈的事情，但是——
Our position will be to be — to stay a Fort Knox.
我们的立场是保持像福特诺克一样的安全。
But we don’t need — we don’t need a hundred and — it’s a little higher now than it was at quarter end — we don’t need 130 or 35 billion, but we need a lot of money that’s always available.
但是我们不需要——我们不需要一千三百亿或一千三百五十亿，虽然现在比季度末时略高一些——但我们需要大量随时可以动用的资金。
And that means we own nothing but Treasury bills. I mean, we do not — we’ve never owned — we never buy commercial paper — we don’t buy — we don’t count on bank lines.
这意味着我们只拥有国库券。我的意思是，我们从未拥有过——我们从未购买过商业票据——我们不购买——我们不依赖银行信贷。
One or two of our subsidiaries — a few of our subsidiaries have them but the — we’ve — we basically want to be in a position to get through anything.
我们的一两个子公司——我们的一些子公司有这些，但——我们——我们基本上希望能够应对任何情况。
And we hope that doesn’t happen, but you can’t rule out the possibility any more than in 1929 you could rule out the possibility that, you know, you would be waiting until 1955 — or the end of 1954 — to get even.
我们希望这种情况不会发生，但你不能排除这种可能性，就像在 1929 年你不能排除你可能要等到 1955 年——或者 1954 年末——才能得到补偿一样。
Anything can happen, and we want to be prepared for anything, but we also want to do big things.
任何事情都可能发生，我们希望为任何情况做好准备，但我们也想做一些大事。
If the prices are attractive — as Greg said — there was a period right before the Fed acted — we were starting to get calls. They weren’t attractive calls. But we were getting calls. And the companies we were getting calls from — after the Fed acted — a number of them were able to get money in the public market, frankly, at terms we wouldn’t have given it to them.
如果价格有吸引力——正如格雷格所说——在美联储采取行动之前的那段时间——我们开始接到电话。那些电话并不吸引人。但我们确实接到了电话。而我们接到电话的公司——在美联储采取行动之后——其中一些能够在公开市场上获得资金，坦率地说，条件是我们不会给他们的。
34. Berkshire may have short-term layoffs but expects long-term job gains
伯克希尔可能会有短期裁员，但预计长期会增加就业机会。
BECKY QUICK: All right, this next question is one that Greg, you actually touched on the answer to this to some extent, but maybe the two of you could expand on it.
贝基·奎克：好的，下一个问题是，格雷格，你实际上在某种程度上提到了这个问题的答案，但也许你们两位可以对此进行更深入的探讨。
It comes from Richard Sercer from Tucson, Arizona. He says, “Berkshire’s annual report indicated that Berkshire had 391,539 employees at the end of 2019. Which areas of our operations have already been hardest hit, or will be, by the coronavirus pandemic? And what are the implications for the continued employment of those people?
这来自亚利桑那州图森的理查德·塞尔瑟。他说：“伯克希尔的年度报告显示，伯克希尔在 2019 年底有 391,539 名员工。我们的哪些业务领域已经受到新冠疫情的严重影响，或者将会受到影响？这对这些人的持续就业有什么影响？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Those people are employed in dozens and dozens of different industries. And there’s — there are a few industries that there’s a fair likelihood that our employment could be reduced but they’re not large.
沃伦·巴菲特：那些人被雇佣在数十个不同的行业中。有一些行业我们的就业可能会减少，但它们并不大。
I’m just thinking as I’m talking. I mean, it’s not like — it’s not like we’re — you know — in the — some of the businesses that are — you know — we’re not in the hotel business, or various aspects of travel and entertainment and all of that that could really be changed in a very major way. So, I don’t see our employment —
我只是边说边想。我的意思是，这并不是说——我们并不是——你知道——在——一些可能会以非常重大方式改变的行业中。我们并不在酒店业，或者旅行和娱乐的各个方面。因此，我不认为我们的就业——
I’ll put it this way. Five years from now, I think Berkshire will be employing considerably more people. And I don’t — I don’t see where we’ll have large dips. But the virus could take off in certain ways that in some of our manufacturing businesses, for example, the demand could be dramatically reduced. And in those cases, we would have — we would have layoffs at some point. Greg?
我这样说吧。五年后，我认为伯克希尔将雇佣更多的人。我不——我不认为我们会有大幅度的下滑。但病毒可能会以某种方式爆发，例如在我们的一些制造业务中，需求可能会大幅减少。在这些情况下，我们可能会在某个时候裁员。格雷格？
GREG ABEL: What I would add, Warren, is that as we are in the, you know, sort of crux of the pandemic, we’re still dealing with it, so our businesses have adjusted. Some have had to adjust more. We have — if you look at Berkshire Hathaway Energy, for example, you can see U.S. electricity consumption’s down 4 percent. That, realistically, doesn’t impact that business in a significant way, and longer term we’ll continue to grow that business. So even in — even during the crisis, a relatively small impact to the business.
格雷格·阿贝尔：沃伦，我想补充的是，尽管我们正处于疫情的关键时刻，我们仍在应对它，因此我们的业务已经进行了调整。有些业务调整得更多。例如，如果你看看伯克希尔哈撒韦能源，你会发现美国的电力消费下降了 4%。从现实来看，这对该业务的影响并不显著，长期来看我们将继续发展该业务。因此，即使在危机期间，对业务的影响相对较小。
But, as Warren knows, we do have retailers that — their doors are shut right now. Be it our See’s Candy, the — some of our jewelers. And at that point in time, we do adjust and adapt to the environment, i.e., we adjust our workforce.
但是，正如沃伦所知，我们确实有一些零售商——他们的门现在是关着的。比如我们的 See’s Candy，还有一些珠宝商。在那个时候，我们会根据环境进行调整和适应，也就是说，我们会调整我们的劳动力。
But equally, we do see, for example, See’s — at a point, our stores will reopen. And at that point, we reemploy the folks. And overall, for Berkshire as a whole, as Warren said, five years from now, we see our employment numbers being far, far, far greater than they we are today, in that we see great prospects within the operating businesses as a whole.
但同样，我们确实看到，例如，See’s——在某个时刻，我们的商店将重新开放。在那个时候，我们会重新雇用员工。总体而言，对于整个伯克希尔，正如沃伦所说，五年后，我们预计我们的就业人数将远远大于今天，因为我们看到整体运营业务有很大的前景。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. See’s — See’s is an interesting example, because we’ve owned that since 1972. That’s a long time. And we love it. And we continue to love it. And I have a box here of our peanut brittle, and I’ve got another box of fudge right here, and I’ll probably take them all home and not share with Greg. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。See’s——See’s 是一个有趣的例子，因为我们从 1972 年就拥有它。这已经很久了。我们喜欢它。我们仍然喜欢它。我这里有一盒我们的花生脆糖，还有一盒软糖，我可能会把它们都带回家，不和格雷格分享。（笑）
But, we were in the midst of our Easter season. And Easter is a big sales period for See’s. And I don’t know whether we were halfway through, but we weren’t halfway through in terms of the volume that was going to be delivered, because it comes toward the end.
但是，我们正处于复活节季节中。复活节是 See’s 的一个重要销售时期。我不知道我们是否已经过了一半，但就即将交付的数量而言，我们并没有过一半，因为它是在最后阶段到来的。
And essentially, we were shut down and we remain shut down. The malls that — we’ve got 220 or so retail stores and we’ve got a lot of — you know, (Nebraska) Furniture Mart sells our candy, but the Furniture Mart’s closed down.
基本上，我们被关闭了，现在仍然处于关闭状态。我们有大约 220 家零售店，很多地方——你知道，(内布拉斯加州)家具市场卖我们的糖果，但家具市场已经关闭。
And so — 于是——
GREG ABEL: Yep. 格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — See’s business stopped. And it’s a very seasonal business to start with. So, we have a lot of seasonal workers, too, that come in, particularly for the Christmas season.
沃伦·巴菲特：——See’s的生意停了。而且这本身就是一个非常季节性的生意。所以，我们也有很多季节工，特别是在圣诞季节来工作。
But we have — we have a lot of Easter candy — (laughs) — and Easter candy is kind of specialized, too, so we won’t sell it, and we produced a good bit of it. We couldn’t ship it — we couldn’t— we couldn’t put it in stores and — and there’s — some of that’s going on.
但是我们有——我们有很多复活节糖果——（笑）——而复活节糖果也有点特殊，所以我们不会出售它，我们生产了不少。我们无法发货——我们无法——我们无法把它放进商店——而且——有些事情正在发生。
And, of course, I — Greg does all the work on those sort of situations — and our managers are terrific, of course, and dealing with it — but this is a very, very unusual period.
当然，我——格雷格在这种情况下做了所有的工作——我们的经理们也很出色，当然，他们在处理这些事情时——但这是一个非常非常不寻常的时期。
And like I say, a few years from now, I think Berkshire will be employing more people than 395,000.
就像我说的，几年后，我认为伯克希尔将雇佣超过 395,000 人。
Over the years, we’ve — we started with 2000 at a textile business, and we still got the same playbook — is —
多年来，我们从 2000 年开始做纺织生意，我们仍然使用同样的策略——就是——
35. Only very small Berkshire subsidiaries may not reopen
只有非常小的伯克希尔子公司可能不会重新开放
BECKY QUICK: This next question comes from Drew Johnson, who says that he’s a longtime shareholder who has attended a couple of meetings. He says in an interview on April 17th, Charlie mentioned that some small businesses owned by Berkshire would not reopen after the pandemic eases. Can you elaborate on which businesses might be impacted?
贝基·奎克：下一个问题来自德鲁·约翰逊，他说他是一位长期股东，参加过几次会议。他在 4 月 17 日的采访中提到，查理提到一些伯克希尔拥有的小企业在疫情缓解后将不会重新开业。你能详细说明哪些企业可能会受到影响吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, even — we have businesses within businesses. At Marmon, don’t we have 97 different businesses, for example?
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，实际上——我们有业务中的业务。在Marmon，我们有 97 个不同的业务，例如？
GREG ABEL: Exactly. Yeah.
格雷格·阿贝尔：没错。是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And there are some that weren’t doing that well before — and I’m not talking about Marmon specifically — but they got a couple of them and there’s a couple of — and — and it may be that in effect, the — you know, what’s happened in the last couple months has accelerated the decline in — of those businesses, or their customers are developing different habits.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。有些公司之前的表现并不好——我并不是特别指Marmon——但他们有几个这样的公司，可能在过去几个月发生的事情加速了这些业务的衰退，或者他们的客户正在养成不同的习惯。
I mean, people are developing different habits in retail. There’s no question about that. Now, that doesn’t mean we haven’t got a bunch of good retail businesses.
我意思是，人们在零售方面正在养成不同的习惯。这毫无疑问。现在，这并不意味着我们没有一堆好的零售业务。
But there are businesses that were — that were having problems before, and that have even greater problems.
但有些企业在之前就遇到了问题，现在面临更大的问题。
Now, we don’t own our newspapers anymore, but we’re financing the enterprise which does have them. We’ve actually increased our investment in the newspaper business by selling the papers to Lee and then refinancing their debt.
现在我们不再拥有我们的报纸了，但我们正在为拥有这些报纸的企业提供融资。实际上，我们通过将报纸出售给李录并为他们的债务进行再融资，增加了我们在报纸业务中的投资。
And the newspaper business was having plenty of problems with both circulation and advertising before the virus came along. But advertising declines everyplace have accelerated, fairly dramatically.
在病毒出现之前，报纸行业在发行和广告方面就面临着许多问题。但各地广告的下降加速了，幅度相当明显。
You know, when the automobile industry stops, the auto dealers don’t advertise as much.
你知道，当汽车行业停滞时，汽车经销商的广告也会减少。
It’s — it’s made certain businesses that were tough before, even tougher now.
这使得一些之前就很困难的企业现在变得更加艰难。
And there will be management of at least one of the subsidiaries that you suggested to us. And so, there’ll be — but there’ll be — there’ll be some changes in a few businesses, but they’re very small businesses.
至少会有一家子公司的管理层是你们向我们指出的。因此，会有一些变化，但这些变化只会出现在几家业务规模较小的公司上。
Our major businesses, and our businesses of intermediate size, I can’t think of anything that’s of significance that won’t reopen.
我们的主要业务和中型业务，我想不出有什么重要的业务不会重新开放。
But it won’t be any fun with the businesses where the world has really changed. You’re seeing a lot of change.
但在那些世界真正发生变化的行业中，这将不会有任何乐趣。你会看到很多变化。
If you own a shopping center, you’ve got a bunch of tenants who don’t want to pay you right now — we don’t — and, you know, the supply and demand for retail space may change fairly significantly.
如果你拥有一个购物中心，你会发现有一群租户现在不想支付租金——我们不想——而且，零售空间的供需关系可能会发生相当大的变化。
The supply and demand for office space may change significantly. A lot of people learned that they can work at home or that there’s other methods of conducting their business, and they might have thought that — from what they were doing a couple of years ago. When — when change happens in the world, you adjust to it.
办公室空间的供需可能会发生显著变化。很多人意识到他们可以在家工作，或者有其他方式来开展业务，他们可能会认为——与几年前他们所做的事情相比。当——当世界发生变化时，你就会适应它。
GREG ABEL: Yeah, I think the — go ahead.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，我认为——请继续。
BECKY QUICK: The next question is —
贝基·奎克：下一个问题是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky, I think that Greg —
沃伦·巴菲特：贝基，我认为格雷格——
GREG ABEL: Well, I was just going to add on the Marmon example, there are 97 companies there.
格雷格·阿贝尔：嗯，我只是想补充一下关于Marmon的例子，那儿有 97 家公司。
For example, we have a food service group, which sells equipment to a variety of the restaurants. We have a few businesses that realistically were challenged when the industry was performing really well.
例如，我们有一个食品服务集团，向各种餐厅销售设备。我们有一些企业在行业表现良好时实际上面临挑战。
And as we come out of the, you know, crisis, their economic prospects aren’t going to be better. And in fairness to the teams and the employees in there, they understand that, and they’re working through it, and there’ll be other opportunities, potentially within the company, within Marmon, and things like that.
当我们走出这场危机时，他们的经济前景不会变得更好。公平地说，那些团队和员工也明白这一点，他们正在应对这个局面，并且在公司内部、Marmon 内部等地方可能会有其他机会。
But you know, there’s a very specific answer — or example — relative to the question.
但是你知道，关于这个问题，有一个非常具体的答案——或者说例子。
36. Selling or closing underperforming subsidiaries is not a new policy for Berkshire
出售或关闭表现不佳的子公司并不是伯克希尔的新政策。
BECKY QUICK: This next question is a follow up on that. It comes from Chris Fried of Philadelphia. And he says, “It’s been a long-term policy at Berkshire to not sell or close any ongoing subsidiaries as long as their business prospects weren’t a money hole.
贝基·奎克：下一个问题是对此的跟进。来自费城的克里斯·弗里德提问：“在伯克希尔，长期以来的政策是，只要其业务前景不是一个资金黑洞，就不出售或关闭任何正在进行的子公司。”
“Over the last year,” he points out, “The sale of Berkshire Hathaway Media, and then Charlie’s comments from that interview, saying that several small Berkshire subsidiaries will not be opening when the coronavirus lockdown is lifted.
“在过去的一年里，”他指出，“伯克希尔哈撒韦媒体的出售，以及查理在那次采访中的评论，表示几个小的伯克希尔子公司在冠状病毒封锁解除后将不会开业。”
“So, should shareholders assume that Berkshire has now changed its long-term policy in regards to keeping underperforming subsidiaries?”
“那么，股东们是否应该认为伯克希尔现在已经改变了其关于保留表现不佳子公司的长期政策？”
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I think that policy was spelled out for, maybe, 30 years or so in an addendum to the annual report, that we have said that if a company — or if an operation — we think its prospects are that it will continually lose money in the future, that we will certainly — we’ll try to sell it to somebody else — but one way or another, we will not continue to hold it.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我认为这个政策在附录中已经阐明了大约 30 年，我们曾说过，如果一家公司——或者说一个业务——我们认为它的前景是将来会持续亏损，我们肯定会——我们会尝试把它卖给其他人——但无论如何，我们不会继续持有它。
That is not a new policy and it’s not been changed.
这不是一项新政策，也没有被更改。
You can say, in effect, we did that with the airline industry, to some extent. If we owned all of an airline now, it would be a tough decision to decide whether to sustain billions of dollars in operating losses, when you know, A, you don’t know how long it’s going to happen — or occur — and secondly, you know that it’s very likely that there’ll be too many planes around, and we know what happens in airline pricing when load factors go down, and there’s an oversupply of airline seats.
可以说，在某种程度上，我们在航空业做到了这一点。如果我们现在拥有一家航空公司，决定是否维持数十亿美元的运营亏损将是一个艰难的决定，因为你知道，首先，你不知道这种情况会持续多久；其次，你知道很可能会有过多的飞机，而我们知道当载客率下降且航空座位过剩时，航空定价会发生什么。
So, you know, we didn’t have to make that decision in terms of our own operation on it. But we did make a decision that — that’s a very tough management decision to make.
所以，你知道，我们在自己的运营方面不需要做那个决定。但我们确实做出了一个决定——这是一个非常艰难的管理决策。
And the government, of course, is willing that the first wave of financing for the airlines, but to the airlines’ credit, they have very aggressively raised money. I mean, it’s amazing to me how — what a good job they’ve done of that.
当然，政府愿意为航空公司提供第一轮融资，但值得称赞的是，航空公司非常积极地筹集资金。对我来说，他们在这方面做得真是令人惊讶。
And, in the case of — I think, in the case of three of them — no, two of them — but there may be more coming — that they’ve raised equity money, too. I mean, they are saying to the debt holders and investors, you know, you got to put more money into this business if we’re going to be able to continue.
在其中的三个案例中——不，两例——但可能会有更多案例出现——他们也筹集了股权资金。我的意思是，他们在告诉债权人和投资者，如果我们要继续下去，你们得往这个业务里投入更多资金。
And the government’s done it, and private sources have done it, and it’s going to — it’s exactly the right thing for the managements to be doing.
政府已经做到了，私人机构也做到了，这正是管理层应该做的正确事情。
But, you know, whether it’s — whether it makes sense, we’ll find out, for the investors.
但是，你知道，无论这是否有意义，我们会为投资者找到答案。
37. Precision Castpart’s future is tied to uncertainty for Boeing
精密铸件公司的未来与波音的不确定性息息相关
BECKY QUICK: This next question comes from Eric LeFante, and it’s directed to Greg.
贝基·奎克：下一个问题来自埃里克·勒方特，问的是格雷格。
He asks, “How is Precision Castparts handling the severe slowdown in the aerospace industry?”
他问：“精密铸件公司如何应对航空航天行业的严重放缓？”
GREG ABEL: So, very consistent with everything we’ve just discussed, which is, obviously, a large part of their businesses, is the aerospace industry.
格雷格·阿贝尔：所以，这与我们刚刚讨论的内容非常一致，显然，他们业务的很大一部分是航空航天行业。
And it can really be broken into three areas as we do in our (10-)Q, but two are being impacted.
它实际上可以分为三个领域，就像我们在我们的（10-）Q 中所做的那样，但有两个领域受到影响。
The defense contract business remains very sound and strong within Precision Castparts. But if you look at the large-body aircraft, the aircraft that they use within the regional jets, that business will move directly with the demand there, and the jets that are ordered longer term.
在精密铸件公司（Precision Castparts）内，国防合同业务依然非常稳健和强劲。但如果你看大型飞机，特别是区域喷气式飞机的使用情况，这个业务将直接跟随那里的需求波动，以及长期订购的飞机订单。
So, Precision Castparts is, literally as we speak, continuing to adjust their business relative to the demand that would come out of Boeing. They would be having weekly calls with Boeing, recognizing what are their production orders there and adjusting the business accordingly.
因此，精密铸件公司正在根据波音的需求，持续调整他们的业务。他们每周与波音进行电话会议，了解他们的生产订单，并相应地调整业务。
WARREN BUFFETT: Boeing raised 25 billion just a day or two ago, and they raised 14 billion before that. And a year ago, they felt they were in a fine cash position, and I understand how all that happened.
沃伦·巴菲特：波音公司就在一两天前筹集了 250 亿美元，而在此之前他们筹集了 140 亿美元。一年前，他们觉得自己的现金状况很好，我理解这一切是如何发生的。
Airbus has had the same situation. They’ve made some comments recently, within the last week, you know, the fact that they — they really don’t know what their future is. And I don’t know what their future is.
空客也面临同样的情况。他们最近在过去一周内发表了一些评论，表示他们真的不知道自己的未来是什么。我也不知道他们的未来是什么。
We’re going to — we’re going to have aircraft in this country. We’re going to be flying. But the real question is, whether you need a lot of new planes or not, and when you’ll — when you’re likely to need them.
我们将会在这个国家拥有飞机。我们将会飞行。但真正的问题是，你是否需要很多新飞机，以及你何时可能需要它们。
And it affects a lot of people. And it certainly affects Precision Castparts. It affects General Electric. It, obviously, affects Boeing.
这影响了很多人。它当然影响了精密铸件公司。它影响了通用电气。显然，它也影响了波音。
And it’s — it is a blow to, essentially, have your demand dry up. And it goes up in the chain. And, you know, the aircraft manufacturers didn’t — they didn’t bring it on themselves. The airlines didn’t bring it on themselves. Precision Castparts didn’t bring it on itself. General Electric didn’t —
事实上，需求的枯竭无疑是一个打击。这影响一路传导上去，航空制造商并不是自找的，航空公司也不是，精密铸件公司不是，通用电气也不是。
链条复杂的业务很难搞。
It’s, basically, that we shut off air travel in this country. And what that does to people’s habits, how they behave in the future, it’s just hard to evaluate. I don’t know the answer.
基本上，就是我们在这个国家停止了航空旅行。这对人们的习惯、他们未来的行为会产生什么影响，真的很难评估。我不知道答案。
But we do know that it will have an effect on Precision Castparts. And how severe it will be depends on the same sort of variables that are hitting Boeing.
但我们确实知道这将对精密铸件产生影响。而影响的严重程度取决于与波音面临的相同类型的变量。
You name the company in aircrafts — and aircraft’s a big business. And this country’s good at it, incidentally, too.
你提到的公司是飞机制造业——而飞机是一个大生意。顺便说一下，这个国家在这方面也很擅长。
I mean, if you think about Boeing, you know, it is one hell of a company and it’s important. It’s a huge exporter and it affects a lot of jobs. And some of them are with us.
我意思是，如果你考虑波音，你知道，它真的是一家了不起的公司，而且它很重要。它是一个巨大的出口商，影响了很多工作岗位。其中一些岗位与我们有关。
And, you know, we hope for the best and we wish everybody the best. Obviously, we wish ourselves the best in it.
我们希望一切顺利，也祝愿大家一切顺利。显然，我们也希望自己能顺利。
But part of it is out of our — certainly out of our control.
但其中一部分超出了我们的控制范围——当然是超出了我们的控制。
38. COVID-19′s effect on GEICO
COVID-19 对 GEICO 的影响
BECKY QUICK: This next question is for Warren. “Do you think GEICO will experience unusually high profitability in 2020 due to the reduced amount of driving, even after giving customers a 15 percent credit?”
贝基·奎克：下一个问题是问沃伦的。“您认为，即使给客户提供了 15% 的信用返还，GEICO 在 2020 年是否仍会因为驾驶量的减少而获得异常高的盈利？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have promised to give our customers — at GEICO, we’re the second-largest auto insurance company and — and different auto insurers are handling a sharing of the better experience with their policyholders in different ways.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们承诺为我们的客户提供——在 GEICO，我们是第二大汽车保险公司——不同的汽车保险公司以不同的方式与他们的保单持有人分享更好的体验。
We — our plan — we’ll deliver back 2 1/2 billion, roughly or so, in recognizing the reduced frequency of accidents during this period.
我们——我们的计划——我们将在此期间大约返还 25 亿，主要是因为事故发生频率的降低。
What we don’t know is how long this will continue. I mean, people want to drive their cars still. But conditions have reduced that driving dramatically, obviously.
我们不知道这种情况会持续多久。我的意思是，人们仍然想开车。但显然，条件大大减少了驾驶。
Now, we have instituted a program that runs — saving people money — for six months. And so far, other people have largely been two months, but some of them have given a little more for those two months than we give per month.
现在，我们已经实施了一个为期六个月的项目——为人们省钱。到目前为止，其他人通常是两个月，但他们中的一些人在这两个月里给出的金额比我们每月给出的要多一些。
Our total is the greatest at 2 1/2 billion, and —
我们的总数是 25 亿，是最大的，和——
In addition to that, we and all the others in the industry — it’s not just GEICO — we’ve also — and insurance commissioners, in many cases, I believe have required it — but we have — we give people more time to pay, if they aren’t paying. And if they cancel their policy, or if they don’t end up paying us, we’ve, in effect, given them free insurance during that period.
除此之外，我们和业内的其他公司——不仅仅是 GEICO——我们还为客户提供了更多的宽限期，许多情况下，我相信这是保险监管机构要求的。如果他们没有按时支付保费，或者取消了他们的保单，或者最终没有付款，实际上我们在那段时间内是免费为他们提供了保险。
And the delay in payments is, obviously — increased delay of payments — if you’ve got a shopping center getting rent, it — delay in payments is what happens during a period like this. And that will be a significant cost to us. We don’t know how significant it will be.
支付延迟显然是——支付延迟增加——如果你有一个购物中心在收租，支付延迟就是在这样的时期发生的事情。这对我们来说将是一个显著的成本。我们不知道它会有多显著。
There will be more uninsured motorists driving, and they cause a disproportionate amount of accidents, and that — so there’s a lot of variables.
将会有更多没有保险的司机上路，他们造成的事故比例过高，因此有很多变量。
We made our best guess as to what we’re going to do to reflect the current reduced accidents in our — in our premiums that we receive, really, over the next year. It applies for six months on renewals, but that — we’ll be renewing policies in October that will extend it into next April.
我们尽最大努力预测了我们将如何在未来一年内的保费中反映当前事故减少的情况。虽然这项措施适用于续保的六个月，但我们将在十月续保的保单将把这项政策延续到明年四月。
And so, we’ve made a guess on it , and we’ll see how it works out.
所以，我们对此做了一个预测，我们将看看结果如何。
39. Berkshire insurance subsidiaries don’t have big COVID-19 risk
伯克希尔保险子公司没有大规模的 COVID-19 风险
BECKY QUICK: This next question comes from Stephen Tedder. He’s a shareholder in Atlanta, Georgia, and he says, “Would you please help us understand the effects of COVID-19 on our insurance businesses. Other insurance companies have reported losses from boosting reserves for future insurance claims that they expect to be paying as a result of coronavirus.
贝基·奎克：下一个问题来自斯蒂芬·泰德。 他是乔治亚州亚特兰大的股东，他说：“您能否帮助我们了解 COVID-19 对我们保险业务的影响。其他保险公司报告了因增加未来保险索赔准备金而造成的损失，他们预计这些索赔是由于冠状病毒引起的。”
“Yet in Berkshire’s 10-Q released this morning, we do not appear to have reported much of these future expected losses. Can you tell us why this is the case? What kind of risks Berkshire is underwriting that allows us not to be affected by the pandemic? Or conversely, what we are writing that might be?”
然而，在今天早上发布的伯克希尔的 10-Q 报告中，我们似乎并没有报告这些未来预期的损失。你能告诉我们为什么会这样吗？伯克希尔正在承保什么样的风险，使我们不受疫情的影响？或者相反，我们正在承保什么可能会受到影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the amount of litigation that is going to be generated out of what’s already happened, let alone what may happen, is going to be huge.
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，已经发生的事情所产生的诉讼数量，更不用说可能发生的事情，将会是巨大的。
You know, just the cost of defending litigation is a huge, enormous expense, depending on how much there.
你知道，诉讼的辩护费用是一个巨大的开支，这取决于具体的情况。
Now, in the auto insurance field, which is our number one field in terms of premium volume, by some margin, that’s more definable. But who knows what comes out of it in terms of litigation?
现在，在汽车保险领域，这是我们在保费收入方面的第一大领域，差距相当明显，这个领域的情况相对更容易定义。但谁能预料诉讼会带来什么结果呢？
But in what they call “commercial multiple peril,” which involves property losses, and where some people elect to buy business interruption coverage, many policies, quite clearly in the contract language, would not have a claim for business interruption under a commercial multiple peril policy, where you’ve elected that.
但在所谓的“商业综合险”中，涉及财产损失，并且一些人选择购买营业中断险，许多保单在合同条款中明确规定，根据商业综合险保单，选择了这种保险的人并不会有营业中断的索赔权利。
But other policies do. I know of — I think I know of one company — I don’t know the details — that’s written a fair amount where they cover — or they — certainly there’s a good argument perhaps that they cover — business interruption that might arise from a pandemic.
但也有一些保单确实包含这种情况。我知道——我认为我知道有一家公司——我不清楚具体细节——他们签订了相当多的保单，可能涵盖了——或者说，有充分的理由认为他们可能涵盖了——因疫情引发的营业中断险。
Well, they’re in a very different position than the standard language, which says that you recover for business interruption only if there’s — involves physical damage to the property. And you can buy all kinds of different policies.
好吧，他们的情况与标准条款非常不同，标准条款规定只有在涉及对财产的物理损害时，才能因业务中断而获得赔偿。而且你可以购买各种不同的保险政策。
We are not big in the commercial multiple peril business. So, I mean, this is not like our auto business or anything of the sort.
我们在商业综合险业务方面并不大。所以，我的意思是，这与我们的汽车业务或其他类似业务并不相同。
But we will have — we will have claims. We’ll have litigation costs. But proportionally, it’s not the same with us as with some other companies, which have been much heavier in writing business interruption as part of a commercial multiple peril.
但我们会有——我们会有索赔。我们会有诉讼费用。但从比例上看，这与一些其他公司并不相同，那些公司在商业综合险中写入的业务中断要重得多。
But you don’t automatically get coverage if you have business interruption. I mean, for example, I think it would be unusual if, say, General Motors had a strike, which they did, and that they have business interruption that covers a strike.
但如果发生业务中断，您并不会自动获得保障。我的意思是，例如，我认为如果通用汽车发生罢工（他们确实发生了），并且他们的业务中断保险涵盖了罢工，这将是非常不寻常的。
Now, we actually wrote about — probably the only annual report in the United States — we wrote about business interruption insurance — (laughs) — because we had it over in France, when one of our properties was adjacent to a property that’s — much smaller property — that had a fire, and then it spread to our plant, and it caused a lot of physical damage. And we had bought — we have business interruption that ties in with that.
实际上，我们大概是美国唯一一家在年报中提到营业中断保险的公司（笑），因为我们在法国有这样一份保单。我们的一处财产邻近一处规模较小的物业，发生了火灾，火势蔓延到我们的工厂，造成了大量的物理损坏。我们购买了与此相关的营业中断保险。
But, if we had some company we were selling auto parts to, and they had a strike, our business would be interrupted, but it’s not covered by that. I mean, that is not part of the coverage, unless you specifically really buy it.
但是，如果我们有一些客户在购买汽车零件，而他们发生罢工，我们的业务就会受到影响，但这并不在保障范围内。我的意思是，这不属于保障内容，除非你特别购买了它。
So, there’s some claims that are going to be very valid related to this, the present situation. There’ll be an awful lot that there’ll be litigation on that won’t be valid. There’s no question that some insurance companies — I know one in particular — that will pay a lot of money, relative to their size, in terms of policies that they’ve written.
因此，在当前的情况下，会有一些非常合理的索赔。但也会有大量无效的索赔引发诉讼。毫无疑问，一些保险公司——我尤其知道一家——相对于它们的规模来说，将会因为它们签订的保单而支付大量的赔偿金。
And I think we have reserved — and our history shows we generally have reserved — on the conservative side, adequately, at least. And that’s certainly our intent.
我认为我们已经进行了储备——我们的历史显示我们通常都会保守地进行充分储备，至少是这样。而这当然也是我们的意图。
And we tell no managers of any of our insurance operations what numbers we expect from them, or do any of that.
我们不会告诉我们任何保险业务的经理我们对他们的期望数字，也不会做任何类似的事情。
They evaluate their losses. And they build in something for social inflation. They build in things for — all kinds of things.
他们评估他们的损失。他们为社会通胀考虑了一些因素。他们考虑了各种各样的事情。
And generally speaking, Berkshire has been pretty accurate in its reserving, and I have no reason to think that we’re otherwise than that currently.
一般来说，伯克希尔在其准备金方面相当准确，我没有理由认为我们目前的情况会有所不同。
40. We would sell pandemic insurance “at the right price”
我们会以“合适的价格”出售疫情保险。
BECKY QUICK: Steven Stoller from Atlanta, who says he’s a 10-year Berkshire shareholder, writes in and he says, “Do you see Berkshire offering pandemic coverage in future insurance policies?”
贝基·奎克：来自亚特兰大的史蒂文·斯托勒，他说自己是伯克希尔的十年股东，写信问道：“你认为伯克希尔会在未来的保险政策中提供疫情保障吗？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is, we insure a lot of things. Sure. I don’t —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是，我们承保很多东西。当然。我不——
We had somebody come to us the other day wanting insurance involving a $10 billion protection on something very unusual. We’re not going to make that deal, in all probability — in fact, I would say it’s dead — but we would have written — we would have written pandemic insurance if people had come to us and offered us what we thought was the right price.
前几天，有人找我们寻求一种非常特殊的保险，涉及 100 亿美元的保障。我们很可能不会达成这笔交易——实际上，我会说这笔交易已经没戏了——但如果有人来找我们，给出我们认为合理的价格，我们是愿意承保疫情保险的。
We would have been wrong — (laughs) — probably, in doing it.
我们可能会错 — （笑） — 这样做。
But we — we have no reluctance to quote on very unusual things and very big limits. We’re famous for it.
但我们——我们对非常不寻常的事情和非常大的限制没有任何顾虑。我们以此而闻名。
We haven’t done that much of it in certain periods because the prices aren’t right.
我们在某些时期没有做太多，因为价格不合适。
But if you want to come and insure almost anything — and we don’t want you to insure against fire if you happen to be a known arsonist or something — but if you come to us with any unusual coverages, either in the size or in the nature of what’s covered, Berkshire is a very good place to stop.
但是如果你想来为几乎任何东西投保——我们不希望你投保火灾险，如果你恰好是一个已知的纵火犯之类的——但如果你带着任何不寻常的保险需求，无论是保险金额还是保险内容，伯克希尔都是一个非常好的选择。
And so, if somebody wants to buy — they can dream up the coverage, and they can tell us the price they’ll pay, and — we will — we’ll consider writing it.
因此，如果有人想购买——他们可以设想保险范围，并告诉我们他们愿意支付的价格，然后——我们会——我们会考虑承保。
We wrote a lot of business after 9/11, for example, when there were really only a couple companies in the world that were willing to write the business. And Berkshire and AIG wrote a lot of business, and we thought we knew what we were doing. But we could have been surprised.
在 911 事件后，我们写了很多业务，例如，当时世界上真的只有几家公司愿意承接这些业务。而伯克希尔和 AIG 写了很多业务，我们认为我们知道自己在做什么。但我们可能会感到惊讶。
I mean, there could have been some follow-on incidents from 9/11 that we wouldn’t have known about, and, you know, you don’t know for sure the answer. That’s why people are buying insurance.
我意思是，可能在 911 事件之后发生了一些我们不知道的后续事件，而且，你知道，你不确定答案。这就是人们购买保险的原因。
But we would — we would be willing to write pandemic coverage at the right price.
但我们愿意以合适的价格提供疫情保险。
41. Berkshire will still do great deals after Buffett and Munger
巴菲特和芒格之后，伯克希尔仍将进行伟大的交易
BECKY QUICK: This next question is for Greg and it comes from a shareholder named Todd Flaska.
贝基·奎克：下一个问题是问格雷格的，来自一位名叫托德·弗拉斯卡的股东。
He says, “I don’t expect Berkshire to outperform the S&P 500 during good times. However, I remain a long-term investor because of the huge war chest that can be deployed during the downturns in the market like we’re seeing right now.
他说：“我不指望伯克希尔在经济好的时候超过标准普尔 500 指数。然而，我仍然是一个长期投资者，因为在市场下跌时，比如我们现在看到的那样，可以动用巨额的资金。”
“Warren has been brilliant at negotiating mutually favorable deals with companies that have somewhat urgent capital needs during these downtimes. These opportunities may only come about once a decade. There’s a small window of time for these deals. They all come at once, and you don’t really know if you’re at the bottom of the market when the deals start coming.
“沃伦在与那些在经济低迷时期急需资金的公司谈判互利的交易方面表现得非常出色。这些机会可能十年才有一次。这类交易的机会窗口很短，它们往往会同时出现，而当这些交易开始涌现时，你并不真正知道是否已经到了市场的底部。”
“Will Berkshire be able to continue this approach when Warren and Charlie are no longer at the helm?”
“当沃伦和查理不再掌舵时，伯克希尔能否继续这种做法？”
GREG ABEL: I fundamentally, without Warren and Charlie at the helm, I don’t see the culture of Berkshire changing. I don’t see our billet, which a large part of that is having the business acumen to understand the transaction, the economic prospects, and then the ability — the ability to act quickly. I really don’t see that changing.
格雷格·阿贝尔：我从根本上认为，没有沃伦和查理的领导，我看不到伯克希尔的文化会发生变化。我看不到我们的能力，其中很大一部分是具备理解交易、经济前景的商业头脑，以及快速行动。我真的看不到这一点会改变。
As we’ve all listened, you know, there’s no one better than Warren and Charlie, but equally, we’ve got a talented team in Berkshire, both at the Berkshire level and within our managers, that can, obviously, look at opportunities, too, very quickly.
我们都听过，没有人比沃伦和查理更优秀，但同样，我们在伯克希尔有一支才华横溢的团队，无论是在伯克希尔层面还是在我们的管理者中，他们显然也能非常迅速地审视机会。
But you know, the reality is, it’s a huge advantage we have right now, and we would clearly want to be in a position to maintain that — that position of strength. Warren?
但你知道，现实是，我们现在拥有巨大的优势，我们显然希望能够保持这种——这种强势地位。沃伦？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will maintain it. And we not only have it with the managers of the — in some cases — not all cases by a longshot — but in some cases, we have managers that will occasionally come up with something that can be quite attractive.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们会保持这种状态。我们不仅与一些经理保持这种关系——并不是所有情况下都是这样——但在某些情况下，我们有些经理偶尔会提出一些相当有吸引力的东西。
But between Greg and Todd (Combs), and Ted (Weschler), we’ve got three extraordinarily good (inaudible), in terms of allocating capital.
但在格雷格和托德（科姆斯）以及泰德（韦施勒）之间，我们有三位在资本配置方面非常出色的人。
And — you know, I — Charlie may get — we may get an occasional call, because of someone we knew 20 years ago or something — but they know a lot more people, they’ve got a lot more energy. And their minds work the same way as ours have in the past.
而且——你知道，我——查理可能会接到——我们可能会偶尔接到一个电话，因为我们 20 年前认识的某个人或者其他什么——但他们认识的人更多，他们精力更充沛。他们的思维方式和我们过去的思维方式是一样的。
So, I think it could very well be a significant improvement when the three of them are thinking about capital allocation than when Charlie and I are now — particularly now that he’s found Zoom. (Laughter)
所以，我认为当他们三个人在考虑资本配置时，可能会比现在查理和我在一起时有显著的改善——尤其是现在他找到了 Zoom。（笑声）
42. No Berkshire businesses have received government “bailout” money
没有伯克希尔的企业获得政府的“救助”资金。
BECKY QUICK: All right, this next question comes from Max Rudolph in Omaha, Nebraska. And he asks if Berkshire or any of its fully-owned businesses have participated in any of the bailouts from the Fed or the Treasury?
贝基·奎克：好的，下一个问题来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈的马克斯·鲁道夫。他问伯克希尔或其任何全资拥有的企业是否参与了美联储或财政部的任何救助计划？
WARREN BUFFETT: I certainly don’t know of any. I guess you could say while we owned the airlines — well, you know, the question is about fully-owned businesses. And there’s no way that I wouldn’t know about anybody that did any of that. Greg?
沃伦·巴菲特：我当然不知道有任何。 我想你可以说在我们拥有航空公司期间——好吧，你知道，问题是关于全资拥有的企业。 我不可能不知道有任何人做过这些。 格雷格？
GREG ABEL: No. In fact, we’ve been very clear with the businesses. But we — our businesses understood our — how Berkshire operates. And equally, we’re very clear that we would not be participating in any of those programs or quote, “bailouts.”
格雷格·阿贝尔：不会。事实上，我们已经非常明确地向各个业务说明了这一点。我们的业务也理解伯克希尔的运营方式。同样，我们非常明确地表示，我们不会参与任何这些计划或所谓的“救助”。
43. With COVID-19, the future is a “huge unknown”
随着 COVID-19 的影响，未来是一个“巨大的未知”
BECKY QUICK: This is a similarly related question. It comes From Seth Freiden, who says, “As a long-term shareholder of Berkshire B shares, I’d like to know Warren’s viewpoint around smaller holdings, specifically Oriental Trading Company and Nebraska Furniture Mart, that are based in your hometown of Omaha.”
贝基·奎克：这是一个相关的问题。来自塞斯·弗里登，他说：“作为伯克希尔 B 股的长期股东，我想知道沃伦对较小持股的看法，特别是位于你家乡奥马哈的Oriental Trading Company和内布拉斯加家具市场。”
He imagines that those smaller business units have been adversely impacted by COVID shelter-in-place mandates. So he would like to know if Oriental Trading, or other small business units, applied for PPP (Small Business Administration Paycheck Protection Program) loans or participated in those acts?
他想象那些较小的商业单位受到 COVID 居家令的负面影响。因此，他想知道Oriental Trading Company或其他小型商业单位是否申请了 PPP（小企业管理局薪资保护计划）贷款或参与了这些行动？
And if they didn’t qualify for a loan or didn’t participate, then how will Berkshire support those smaller businesses to make sure that they can continue to employ their employees?
如果他们没有资格获得贷款或没有参与，那么伯克希尔将如何支持那些小企业，以确保他们能够继续雇佣员工？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to my knowledge, none of them have gone in for government money and —
沃伦·巴菲特：据我所知，他们没有一个申请政府资金——
The two that are mentioned — I don’t like to get into specific companies — but I can assure you that the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Oriental Trading, in my view, have a fine future.
提到的这两家公司——我不想具体谈论某些公司——但我可以向你保证，在我看来，内布拉斯加家具市场和Oriental Trading Company有着美好的未来。
But I — I don’t want to talk about — go down the list, obviously, of every single company, because some of them I don’t know the answer to.
但是我——我不想谈论——逐一列出每一家公司，因为有些我不知道答案。
You know, we actually decided some time ago that our newspapers would have a much better chance of surviving if they were run as part of Lee, than if we ran them independently. And, as I said earlier, we actually put considerably more money — we probably put more money in the newspaper business than virtually anybody in the country in the last six months, because we took over a loan that would have been a problem in the year — whatever it might have been, maybe, a year and a half — and we enable them to just deal with one lender rather than a group. And they are doing a better job with the newspapers then we would do.
你知道，我们实际上在一段时间前就决定，如果我们的报纸作为李录的一部分运营，它们生存的机会会更大，而不是独立运营。正如我之前所说的，我们实际上投入了更多的资金——在过去六个月里，我们可能在报纸业务上的投入比全国几乎任何人都要多，因为我们接管了一笔贷款，这在一年内会成为一个问题——无论那是什么，可能是一年半——我们让他们只需与一个贷方打交道，而不是一群人。他们在报纸方面的表现比我们自己做得更好。
And that’s always our preference. If we’ve got a business that’s — that does not have — looks like it is not going to sustain itself over time in our hands, if we can find somebody else that we think will do a better job, we’d love to have them run it.
这始终是我们的首选。如果我们有一个业务——看起来在我们手中无法持续下去，如果我们能找到其他人，我们认为他们会做得更好，我们很乐意让他们来管理。
So, if we have a problem business, we would prefer to find somebody that thinks they can do a better job, and probably can do a better job, of running it than we can.
所以，如果我们有一个问题业务，我们更愿意找到一个认为自己能做得更好的人，而且可能真的能比我们更好地管理它。
But some businesses just disappear.
但有些企业就是消失了。
We — we started with a textile business. We started a company called Diversified Retailing, which merged into Berkshire — became part of Berkshire — and it started with a department store in Baltimore. And department stores looked good in 1966, but the world has gone against them.
我们——我们开始时做的是纺织生意。我们成立了一家公司，叫做多元化零售，后来并入了伯克希尔——成为伯克希尔的一部分——它始于巴尔的摩的一家百货商店。1966 年，百货商店看起来不错，但世界已经对它们不利了。
And we had a trading stamp business at one time, and we stayed longer than anybody else, but the world left trading stamps behind.
我们曾经有一个交易印花的生意，我们比其他人待得更久，但世界已经抛弃了交易印花。
And that’s going to happen with some businesses. That’s capitalism. And it will happen to some Berkshire businesses over the next 10 years, in the next 50 years.
这将在一些企业中发生。这就是资本主义。在接下来的 10 年和 50 年里，这也会发生在一些伯克希尔的企业上。
We think we’ll find more of them that will grow and, net, that Berkshire will grow, but we do not think if you own a great many businesses, that everyone is destined for success.
我们认为我们会找到更多能够成长的公司，整体上，伯克希尔会增长，但我们并不认为如果你拥有很多企业，所有企业都注定会成功。
That’s why I suggest to people they buy an index fund. I do not — with the exception of Berkshire — I would not want to put all my money in any one company, although there’s a few I wouldn’t mind being very close to that. But —
这就是为什么我建议人们购买指数基金。除了伯克希尔之外，我不愿意把所有的钱都投入到任何一家公司，尽管有几家公司我倒是不介意非常接近这样做。但——
I don’t think — you know — you get surprises in this world. And there will be businesses that we think are very good that turn out not to be so good. And there will be other businesses that turn out better than we think. And It’s up to the world to judge our batting average over time. Greg?
我认为——你知道——这个世界上没有惊喜。我们认为非常好的企业，最终可能并不好。而其他一些企业可能会比我们想象的更好。最终由世界来评判我们的成功率。格雷格？
GREG ABEL: Well, I would just add, and echo again, that when it comes to the PPP loans, we’re not aware of any of our businesses taking them. And, you know, as I said, we encouraged them, if they were ever thinking that there is going to be a dialog, and we’re not aware of any businesses pursuing them.
格雷格·阿贝尔：我只想补充并再次强调，对于PPP贷款，我们不知道有任何一家我们的业务在申请这些贷款。正如我所说，如果他们曾考虑过进行讨论，我们会鼓励他们这么做，但我们并不知道有任何业务在追求这些贷款。
I would also just add that when you look at our businesses as we went into the crisis, they responded very well.
我还想补充一点，当你看到我们在危机中进入的业务时，它们反应得非常好。
So, as we look at our businesses — and Warren touched on this — our large businesses, our mid-sized businesses, and even as you go down from there, they’re in very sound shape as we go through the pandemic, and are really preparing to emerge now.
所以，当我们审视我们的业务时——沃伦提到过这一点——我们的大型企业、中型企业，甚至更小的企业，在疫情期间都处于非常良好的状态，现在真的在准备迎接复苏。
So, they’re evaluating, they listen. They’re going to have a different customer. There’s going to be different consumer behaviors — how our employees work, i.e., a lot of them work at home now — does that make sense?
所以，他们在评估和倾听。他们会面对不同的客户。消费者行为也会有所不同——比如我们的员工工作方式，很多人现在在家工作——这是否合理？
And the communities we’re operating in have all changed. But we’re literally moving from the point of — OK, we’re making it through the crisis, and really planning to reemerge now. And I would say our businesses are in an extremely sound place.
我们所运营的社区都发生了变化。但我们实际上正从“好吧，我们正在度过危机”这一点出发，真正开始规划重新崛起。我可以说我们的业务处于一个非常稳健的状态。
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t know when the —
沃伦·巴菲特：我们不知道何时——
思维方式的差异，注意力集中在当下，对未来的期望较低。
BECKY QUICK: This next question —
贝基·奎克：下一个问题——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I just — what we don’t know — we don’t — we don’t know how long this period lasts. And nobody knows.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我只是——我们不知道——我们不知道这个时期会持续多久。没有人知道。
You know, we don’t know whether the — most people think — and they know more about it than I do — that the virus will, you know, to some extent, decline in its spread during summer months.
你知道，我们不知道——大多数人认为——而且他们对这方面的了解比我多——病毒在夏季的传播会在某种程度上减少。
And I would say — but many think that it will come back at some later date. And how the American public reacts, if they get their hopes up through some reopening — some through — through some summer diminution — and how they would react to a second attack, in effect, by the virus — it’s like Dr. Fauci — you know, the virus is going to determine our behavior. You know, we — and we’re doing a lot of smart things, and we’ve got a lot of very smart people, but there are unknowns. And the unknowns that apply to the health aspect create unknowns in the economy.
我会说——但许多人认为它会在某个稍后的日期回来。美国公众的反应如何，如果他们通过某些重新开放——通过某些夏季减弱而感到希望——他们对病毒的第二次攻击会如何反应，实际上就像福奇博士所说的——你知道，病毒将决定我们的行为。你知道，我们——我们正在做很多聪明的事情，我们有很多非常聪明的人，但仍然有未知数。而适用于健康方面的未知数在经济上也会产生未知数。
And we will — we’ll have to keep evaluating things as we go along.
我们将不得不在前进的过程中不断评估情况。
I hope, like crazy, obviously, that — that once suppressed, it doesn’t come back and that we readjust. But things don’t always work perfectly.
我当然非常希望，一旦疫情得到遏制，它不会卷土重来，并且我们能够重新调整。但事情并不总是按理想的方式发展。
That doesn’t mean there was a better course of action that would not — I would not go around criticizing people at all for what they’ve done, or anything of the sort.
这并不意味着有更好的行动方案，我绝不会去批评人们所做的事情或类似的事情。
I just think you’re dealing with a huge unknown. And I think that the degree to which it’s disturbed the world, and changed habits, and endangered businesses, in the last couple of months, indicates that you’d better be — not be too sure of yourself about what will — what it’ll do in the next six months or year or whatever.
我只是觉得你正在面对一个巨大的未知。我认为，在过去几个月里，它对世界的干扰程度、改变的习惯以及对企业的威胁，表明你最好不要对接下来六个月、一年或其他时间会发生什么过于自信。
44. Index funds are still better than paying big fees to Wall Street
指数基金仍然比支付高额费用给华尔街要好。
BECKY QUICK: Warren, a moment ago, you mentioned that you still are recommending that people invest in an S&P 500 index fund. Let me ask this question that came in from Kevin. He says, “The last few weeks, we’ve been hearing from active money managers that the day of passing — passive investing is over, the historical safety of investing in an index fund long-term is gone.
贝基·奎克：沃伦，刚才你提到你仍然建议人们投资于标准普尔 500 指数基金。让我问一个来自凯文的问题。他说：“在过去几周，我们听到一些主动投资经理说，被动投资的时代已经结束，长期投资于指数基金的历史安全性已经消失。”
“Would you please provide your thoughts on this topic? Particularly in regards to an investment time span of 10 years?”
“您能否分享一下您对这个话题的看法？特别是关于 10 年的投资时间跨度？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can tell you, I haven’t changed by will. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我可以告诉你，我的想法没有改变。（笑）
It directs that my widow would have 90 percent of the funds in index funds. And it’s — I think it’s better advice than people are generally getting from people that are getting paid a lot to give other advice. You don’t make a lot of money advising an S&P 500 index fund, I mean and —
我的遗嘱指示我的遗孀将90%的资金投资于指数基金。我认为这是比大多数人从那些收费很高的顾问那里获得的建议要好的建议。建议投资于标准普尔500指数基金并不会赚很多钱，我的意思是——
How you can say the day of index funds is over? I mean, you’re — if you say the day of investing in America is over, I would disagree quite violently. And then, is there something special about index funds being a terrible way to invest?
你怎么能说指数基金的时代已经结束了呢？我的意思是，如果你说投资美国的时代结束了，我会非常强烈地反对。而且，难道指数基金作为一种投资方式有什么特别糟糕的地方吗？
I just don’t think — it really — it’s very hard to have evidence of that. I mean, the index funds reflect the market.
我只是觉得——这真的——很难有证据证明这一点。我的意思是，指数基金反映了市场。
And one side has high fees, that — they think they can pick out stocks. And the other side has low fees. I know which side is going to win over time, and —
一方的费用很高，他们认为自己可以挑选股票。另一方的费用很低。我知道哪一方最终会获胜，——
It’s — you have to recognize that it’s in a great many people’s interest to convince you that they can do something that they may well even believe they can. And a certain percentage of them will do it from luck, and a few people will do it from skill. And that’s what makes it so enticing, that you can find the Jim Simons, or somebody, that is going to produce extraordinary returns.
你必须认识到，许多人都有兴趣说服你，他们能够做到一些事情，尽管他们可能自己也相信这一点。其中一部分人可能是靠运气做到的，而少数人则是凭借技能。这正是它如此诱人的原因，你可能会找到吉姆·西蒙斯或其他人，他们将会产生非凡的回报。
And Jim and his group (Renaissance Technologies) have done it by brainpower, but it’s very unusual. And incidentally, they are going to charge you a lot of money, and they’re going to actually maybe close up their fund, if they do it, because they can’t do it with really huge amounts of money compared to what they’ve — how the record’s been established in the past, so —
吉姆和他的团队（文艺复兴科技）是凭借智力做到这一点的，但这非常不寻常。顺便提一下，他们会向你收取很多钱，如果他们这样做，可能会关闭他们的基金，因为与他们过去建立的记录相比，他们无法处理真正巨额的资金，所以——
It’s — you just have to recognize you’re dealing with an industry where it pays to be a great salesperson. And it pays even better if you’re a great salesperson, and you can actually produce something.
你必须认识到，你正在处理的行业中，成为一名出色的销售人员是非常有利的。如果你不仅是一个优秀的销售人员，而且还能实际创造出一些东西，那就更加有利了。
But the money is in selling. There’s a lot more money in selling than in managing, actually, if you look to the essence of investment management.
但真正赚钱的是销售。实际上，如果你看投资管理的本质，销售比管理赚得更多。
45. Berkshire won’t always beat the S&P, but it’s a strong company
伯克希尔并不总是能战胜标准普尔，但它是一家强大的公司。
BECKY QUICK: I got a number of variations on this next question, some more polite than others. This one’s right down the middle.
贝基·奎克：我收到了许多关于下一个问题的不同版本，有些更礼貌，有些则不然。这一个正好是中间的。
This is from Mark Blakely, who writes in from Tulsa, Oklahoma. And he says, “Like many, I’m a proud Berkshire Hathaway shareholder. However, in comparing the performance of Berkshire with the S&P 500 over the last five, 10, or 15 years, I’ve been disappointed in Berkshire’s underperformance.
这来自于马克·布莱克利，他来自俄克拉荷马州的塔尔萨。他说：“和许多人一样，我是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的自豪股东。然而，在比较伯克希尔与标准普尔 500 指数在过去五年、十年或十五年的表现时，我对伯克希尔的表现不佳感到失望。”
“Even year-to-date, Berkshire is trailing the S&P 500 by 8 percent. To what would you attribute Berkshire’s underperformance? While I can’t imagine ever selling my Berkshire stock, at some point, money is money.”
“即使是截至目前，伯克希尔的表现也落后于标准普尔 500 指数 8%。你会将伯克希尔的表现不佳归因于什么？虽然我无法想象会出售我的伯克希尔股票，但在某种程度上，钱就是钱。”
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I agree with everything that — I forget his name, but — just said. I mean the truth is that — that’s — I recommend the S&P 500 to people. And I happen to believe that Berkshire is about a sound as any single investment can be in, in terms of earning reasonable returns over time. But I would not want to bet my life on whether we beat the S&P 500 over the next 10 years.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我同意刚才那位——我忘了他的名字——所说的一切。我的意思是，事实是——我向人们推荐标准普尔 500 指数。我相信伯克希尔在长期内作为单一投资能够获得合理回报方面是相当稳健的。但我不想拿我的生命去赌我们在未来 10 年是否能超过标准普尔 500 指数。
I think there’s, you know, I obviously think there’s a reasonable chance of doing it, but — and we’ve had periods — I don’t know how many out of the 50-55 years that we’ve been doing it or — I don’t know how many we’ve beaten or not.
我认为，有合理的机会做到这一点，但——我们经历过一些时期——我不知道在我们进行这项工作 50 到 55 年的时间里，有多少次我们成功了，或者有多少次没有成功。
I mentioned earlier that 1954 was my best year, but I was working with — absolutely with peanuts, unfortunately. And, I think if you work with small sums of money, I think there is some chances — some chance — of a few people that really do bring something to the game.
我之前提到过 1954 年是我最好的一年，但不幸的是，我的工作收入微薄。我认为如果你用小额资金进行投资，确实有一些机会——有一些人真的能为这个游戏带来一些东西。
But I think it’s very, very hard for anybody to identify them. And I think that when they work with large funds, it gets tougher. And it’s certainly gotten tougher with — for us with larger funds. And I would make no promise to anybody that we will do better than the S&P 500.
但我认为任何人都很难识别它们。而且我认为当他们与大型基金合作时，这变得更加困难。对于我们来说，随着大型基金的增加，这确实变得更加困难。我不会向任何人承诺我们会比标准普尔 500 指数表现得更好。
But I will promise them is that I’ve got 99 percent of my money in Berkshire, and most members of my family are — may not be quite that extreme, but they’re close to it.
但我向他们保证的是，我有 99%的资金在伯克希尔，而我家大多数成员可能没有那么极端，但也差不多。
And I do care about what happens to Berkshire over the long period about as much as anybody could care about it.
我确实关心伯克希尔在长期内发生的事情，关心的程度和任何人一样。
But, you know, caring doesn’t guarantee results. It does guarantee attention. Greg?
但是，你知道，关心并不保证结果。它确实保证了关注。格雷格？
GREG ABEL: Well, I would agree, Warren, that there’s never guarantees, but when I look at the assets we have in place, and the teams that are in place, i.e., you’re committed to Berkshire, but we have dedicated teams that equally are dedicated to Berkshire, and they’re sure going to give it their best effort every day.
格雷格·阿贝尔：沃伦，我同意，世上没有什么是有保证的。但当我看到我们现有的资产和团队时，换句话说，你对伯克希尔的承诺是坚定的，而我们也有同样致力于伯克希尔的团队，他们每天都会尽全力做到最好。
And I — when I look at the assets and the people, I think we have, as you said, you can’t guarantee it, but we have a great chance of sure giving it a good effort to outperform it.
而我——当我看到资产和人时，我认为我们有，正如你所说的，虽然不能保证，但我们有很大的机会去努力超越它。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s hard to imagine getting a terrible result with Berkshire, but, you know, anything can happen. And what I do know is it would be easier to be running 5 million than — our book net worth at Berkshire at the quarter-end, I think, was 370-some billion, which is down, but it’s still greater than the book net worth of any corporation in the United States. That’s right, I mean, maybe there’s some federal corporation that has more, but in terms of — and it may be the greatest in the world. I’m not sure.
沃伦·巴菲特：很难想象伯克希尔会有糟糕的结果，但你知道，任何事情都有可能发生。我所知道的是，管理 500 万资产要比管理伯克希尔的资产轻松得多。伯克希尔在季度末的账面净值大约是 3700 多亿美元，虽然有所下降，但仍然高于美国任何一家公司。这是对的，或许有一些联邦企业的账面净值更高，但在公司层面上，它可能是全球最大的。我不太确定。
GREG ABEL: Warren, I would —
格雷格·阿贝尔：沃伦，我想——
WARREN BUFFETT: That makes that makes life difficult in some ways, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：这在某些方面也让生活变得困难。（笑）
GREG ABEL: Right, and the potential of our operating businesses are substantial. When you think — we’ve talked about energy, you touched on it — that infrastructure is continuing to (inaudible), and we’re ready for a hundred billion dollars of investment opportunities there.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，我们运营业务的潜力非常大。你想想——我们谈到了能源，你也提到过——基础设施建设正在持续推进，而我们已经为一千亿美元的投资机会做好了准备。
If we just look at the business over the next 10 years and the infrastructure that’s required and how it’s changing — substantial, substantial investments there — that just tell me we have very good prospects, and we’re well positioned to pursue them.
如果我们仅仅看未来 10 年的业务以及所需的基础设施和其变化——在这方面需要大量的投资——这告诉我我们有非常好的前景，并且我们在追求这些前景方面处于良好位置。
Which again, to me — when you look at our core businesses — you touched on them — Burlington, the insurance, and energy — our downside is very nicely protected. We have three really core great businesses.
这再次让我想到——当你看看我们的核心业务——你提到了它们——伯灵顿、保险和能源——我们的下行风险得到了很好的保护。我们有三项真正核心的优秀业务。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’re better positioned than anybody in the energy business, just because we don’t have dividend requirements. We’ve retained 28 billion of earnings over 20 years that — you can’t do it if you run a normal public company. And we’ve got a huge appetite and the country needs it. The world needs it.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在能源行业的定位比任何人都要好，因为我们没有股息要求。在过去 20 年里，我们保留了 280 亿美元的收益——如果你经营一家正常的上市公司，这是做不到的。我们有巨大的需求，而国家也需要它。世界也需要它。
And we are a very, very logical, well structured, well managed —I would say because it doesn’t involve me — company to participate in just huge requirements around the world. Now, you know, they’re slow and they involve governments and, I mean, you know, state governments. And there’s a lot of — it’s not anything that happens dramatically. It will happen and Berkshire should participate in a huge way.
我们是一家非常非常理性、结构良好、管理出色的公司——我可以这么说，因为这不涉及我——可以参与全球范围内的大规模需求。你知道，这个过程很缓慢，还涉及政府，尤其是州政府。并没有什么事情会迅速发生，但它终将发生，伯克希尔应该会在其中扮演重要角色。
We can do things in insurance nobody else can do. That doesn’t mean much, many times, but occasionally, it may be important.
我们在保险领域能够做别人做不到的事情。这并不意味着很多，很多时候，但偶尔，这可能很重要。
So, there are — there are some advantages to size and strength, but there are disadvantages to size, too. If we find some great opportunity that — for a billion dollars — to double our money, that’s a billion pre-tax, and that’s 790 million after tax, and on a market value of 450 billion or whatever it may be, it doesn’t amount to much, unfortunately. We’ll still try and do it if we can. (Laughs)
所以，规模和实力确实有一些优势，但也有劣势。如果我们发现一个十亿美元的好机会，可以让我们翻倍获利，那就是十亿美元的税前收益，税后大概是7.9亿美元。而对于一个市值4500亿美元的公司来说，这点收益就显得微不足道了，不幸的是如此。当然，如果我们能找到这样的机会，我们还是会去尝试的。（笑）
GREG ABEL: Yeah. (Laughter)
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。（笑声）
46. Ajit Jain is great at insurance, but doesn’t do capital allocation
阿吉特·贾因在保险方面很出色，但不进行资本配置。
BECKY QUICK: I want to ask this question that came in, because I think some people may have had a misinterpretation about something you said a few minutes ago. This is the benefit of being able to get these questions real-time.
贝基·奎克：我想问一个刚刚收到的问题，因为我认为有些人可能对你几分钟前说的某些话产生了误解。这就是能够实时获取这些问题的好处。
But a few moments ago, you were talking about the people at the company who will be allocating capital after you and Charlie are no longer doing it. And you mentioned that you’ve got Todd (Combs), Ted (Weschler), and Greg all doing that.
但就在几分钟前，你提到公司里那些在你和查理不再负责后将分配资本的人。你提到你有托德（科姆斯）、泰德（韦施勒）和格雷格都在做这件事。
But I’ve gotten a few questions that read similar to this. This one’s from Edward Popoola in New York City, who says, “Dear Warren, I noticed you didn’t mention Ajit Jain when you reeled off your list of future management. Is he out of the picture?”
但我收到了一些类似的问题。这条来自纽约市的爱德华·波普拉，他说：“亲爱的沃伦，我注意到你在列出未来管理层时没有提到阿吉特·贾因。他是不是不在考虑之中？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Ajit is not in the capital allocation business. He is the best — well, he’s got one of the best minds in the world.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，阿吉特并不从事资本配置业务。他是最优秀的——他拥有世界上最优秀的头脑之一。
I mean, I wrote his father after he worked for us for a few years — I wrote him again the other day — but 20 years ago, I wrote him and I said, “If you’ve got another son like this, send him — send him over from India, because we’ll own the world.”
我意思是，我在他为我们工作了几年后给他的父亲写了信——前几天我又给他写了一封——但 20 年前，我写信给他，我说：“如果你还有一个像他这样的儿子，就送过来——从印度送过来，因为我们将征服世界。”
No, Ajit is one of a kind. Anybody will tell you, that’s had any contact with him, and particularly anybody in the insurance business where they know him well, he is absolutely one of a kind.
不，Ajit 是独一无二的。任何与他有过接触的人，特别是在保险行业中与他非常熟悉的人，都会告诉你，他绝对是独一无二的。
But his job is not capital allocation. It’s evaluating insurance risk. And that is a rare — he possesses a rare talent and he has a huge capital backing to do it. So, he’s an incredible asset.
但他的工作不是资本配置，而是评估保险风险。这是一种罕见的才能，他拥有巨大的资本支持来完成这项工作。因此，他是一个不可思议的资产。
But Greg, and Todd, and Ted have been in the asset allocation business in a big way, for a long time. That’s their game, and Ajit’s game is insurance. So that’s why I mentioned those three.
但是格雷格、托德和泰德在资产配置行业已经做了很长时间。这是他们的游戏，而阿吉特的游戏是保险。所以我提到那三个人。
And incidentally, while Charlie and I are around, we kind of like capital allocation ourselves. (Laughs)
顺便提一下，当查理和我在的时候，我们自己也挺喜欢资本配置的。（笑）
We’re not going anyplace voluntarily, but we probably will go someplace involuntarily before that long. (Laughter)
我们不会自愿去任何地方，但在不久的将来，我们可能会不情愿地去某个地方。（笑声）
Charlie is in good health, incidentally. I’m in good health. (Laughs)
查理的健康状况很好，顺便提一下。我也很健康。（笑）
47. Depreciation of assets at Berkshire Hathaway Energy
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的资产折旧
BECKY QUICK: Greg, let me ask you one of these capital allocation questions. This one comes from Matt Libel, and he says, “Berkshire directed 46 percent of capital expenditure in 2019 to Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Can you walk us through, with round numbers, how you think differences in capex spending versus economic depreciation versus GAAP depreciation, and help explain the timeframe over which we should recognize the contract — the contractive return on equity from these large investments, as we are shareholders in — as we, as shareholders, are making in Berkshire Hathaway Energy.”
贝基·奎克：格雷格，让我问你一个关于资本配置的问题。这个问题来自马特·莱贝尔，他说：“伯克希尔在2019年将46%的资本支出用于伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司。你能不能用大概的数字解释一下，你是如何看待资本支出与经济折旧和GAAP折旧之间的差异，并帮助解释我们作为伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源股东，在这些大规模投资中应如何认识股本回报的时间框架？”
GREG ABEL: So, when we look at Berkshire Hathaway Energy and their capital programs, we try to really look at — look at it as it was highlighted, really, in a couple different packages.
格雷格·阿贝尔：所以，当我们查看伯克希尔哈撒韦能源及其资本项目时，我们确实尝试从几个不同的角度来审视它，正如在几个不同的方案中所强调的那样。
One, what does it actually require to maintain the existing assets for the next 10-20-30 years? I.e., it’s not incremental, it’s effectively maintaining the asset, the reflection of depreciation. And our goal is always to clearly understand, across our businesses, do we have businesses that require more than our depreciation, or equal, or less.
首先，要维持现有资产在未来 10-20-30 年的运行，实际需要做些什么？也就是说，这不是增量投资，而是为了维持资产的有效运转，反映折旧的情况。我们的目标始终是清楚地了解，在我们的各个业务中，是否有需要超过折旧额的支出，还是相等或更少的支出。
And, happy to say, with the assets we have in place and how we’ve maintained the energy assets, we generally look at our depreciation as being more than adequate, if we deploy it back into capital to maintain the asset.
而且，很高兴地说，凭借我们现有的资产以及我们对能源资产的维护，我们通常认为我们的折旧是相当充足的，如果我们将其重新投入资本以维护资产。
Now, the unique thing in the lion’s share of our energy businesses that are regulated — and that exceeds 85 percent of them — 83 percent of them — we still earn on that capital we deploy back into that business. So, it’s not a traditional model where you’re putting it in, but you’re effectively putting it in to maintain your existing earnings stream. So, it’s not drastically different, but we do earn on that capital.
现在，在我们能源业务的大部分中，超过 85% 的业务是受到监管的——准确地说是 83%——我们对投入到这些业务中的资本仍然能够获得收益。所以这不是一个传统的模式，虽然你投入资金是为了维持现有的盈利流，但它并没有太大的不同，因为我们依然能够从这些资本中获得收益。
But what we do spend a lot of time, and that’s what, when Warren and I think about the substantial amounts of opportunities, that’s incremental capital that is truly needed within new opportunities.
但我们确实花了很多时间，而当沃伦和我考虑到大量的机会时，那是新机会中真正需要的增量资本。
So, it’s built — it’s to build incremental wind, incremental transmission, that services the wind or other types of renewable solar. That’s all incremental to the business and drives incremental growth in the business. It does require capital, but it does drive growth within the energy business.
所以，它是为了建设增量风能、增量传输，服务于风能或其他类型的可再生太阳能。这一切都是对业务的增量，推动了业务的增量增长。它确实需要资本，但它确实推动了能源业务的增长。
So, there’s really the two buckets. I think we would use a number a little bit lower than the depreciation we’re comfortable the business can be maintained at that level. And as we deploy amounts above that, we really do view that as, quote, incremental or growth capex.
所以，实际上有两类支出。我认为我们会使用一个稍低于折旧的数字，这个数字足以让我们感到安心，业务可以维持在该水平。而当我们投入超过这个水平的资金时，我们确实将其视为所谓的增量或增长型资本支出。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have what — what — 40 billion or something of — what do we have in, sort of, kind of, in the works?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有大约 400 亿的资金，或者说我们在进行中的项目大概有多少？
GREG ABEL: Oh, yeah. So, we have basically, as Warren’s highlighting, 40 billion in the works of capital, that’s over the next, effectively, nine years, 10-year period. A little — approximately half of that, we would view as maintaining our assets. More — a little more than half of it is truly incremental, but — and that are known — those are known projects we’re going to move forward with.
格雷格·阿贝尔：哦，是的。所以，正如沃伦所强调的，我们基本上有 400 亿美元的资本在筹备中，这将在接下来的九年、十年期间内进行。大约一半的资金，我们认为是用于维护我们的资产。超过一半的资金是真正的增量，但——这些都是我们将要推进的已知项目。
And I would be happy to report, we probably have another 30 million — 30 billion — that aren’t far off of becoming real opportunities in that business.
我很高兴地报告，我们可能还有另外 3000 万——300 亿——即将成为该业务中真正的机会。
Now, as Warren said, that takes a lot of time. It’s a lot of work. The transmission projects, for example, we’re finishing in 2020 were initiated in 2008 when we bought PacifiCorp. I remember working on that transmission plan, putting it together, thinking six to eight years from now, we’ll have them in operation.
现在，正如沃伦所说，这需要很多时间。这是一项艰巨的工作。例如，我们在 2020 年完成的输电项目是在 2008 年收购 PacifiCorp 时启动的。我记得当时在制定那个输电计划，想着六到八年后，我们就能投入运营。
Twelve years later, and over that period of time, we earned on that capital we have invested, and then when it comes into service, we earn on the whole amount.
十二年后，在这段时间内，我们从所投资的资本中获得了收益，而当这些投资开始投入使用时，我们将从整个投资额中继续获得收益。
So, we’re very pleased with the opportunity, but it — we plant a lot of seeds, put it that way.
所以，我们对这个机会感到非常高兴，但我们——可以这么说，我们种下了很多种子。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And these are not — it’s not like they’re super-high return thing. But they’re decent returns over time. And we’re almost uniquely situated to deploy the capital, as opposed — I mean, you could have government entities do it too —but in terms of a private enterprise — and they take a long time. They earn decent returns.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这些投资并不是——并不是说它们的回报率非常高。但随着时间的推移，它们的回报是不错的。我们几乎独特地处于能够部署资本的地位，虽然政府机构也可以这样做——但就私营企业而言——这需要很长时间。它们能获得不错的回报。
I’ve always said about the energy business, it’s not a way to get real rich, but it’s a way to stay real rich, and —
我一直说，能源行业并不是一个让人迅速致富的途径，但它确实是保持财富的好方法，而且——
We will deploy a lot — a lot of money at decent returns — not super returns, you shouldn’t earn super returns on that sort of thing, I mean — it does — you are getting rights to do certain things that governmental authorities are authorizing. And they should protect consumers and — but they also should protect people that put up the capital. And —
我们将投入大量资金——获得合理的回报——而不是超额回报，你不应该在这种事情上获得超额回报，我的意思是——这确实——你获得了政府当局授权的某些事情的权利。他们应该保护消费者——但他们也应该保护出资的人。并且——
You know, it’s worked now for 20 years, and it’s got a long runway ahead.
你知道，这已经运作了 20 年，并且前方还有很长的道路。
48. Occidental deal hurt by unexpected oil price plunge
西方交易因意外的油价暴跌而受损
BECKY QUICK: All right, this next question comes from Jason (Plawner) in New Jersey. “As both a Berkshire and Occidental shareholder I was encouraged to see your investment in the company, but with passing weeks, it became evident that your investment facilitated Occidental management’s ability to avoid a shareholder vote on the Anadarko acquisition, a very shareholder unfriendly outcome.
贝基·奎克：好的，下一个问题来自新泽西的杰森（Plawner）。“作为伯克希尔和西方石油公司的股东，我很高兴看到你们对西方石油的投资，但随着时间的推移，显而易见的是，你们的投资使西方石油管理层能够避免股东对收购Anadarko的投票，这是一个对股东非常不友好的结果。”
“This deal proved to be irresponsible and expensive from an OXY perspective, and ultimately, very value destructive for OXY shareholders. In my view, it also permanently hurt Berkshire’s reputation in the marketplace.
“从 OXY 的角度来看，这笔交易被证明是不负责任且昂贵的，最终对 OXY 的股东造成了很大的价值损失。在我看来，这也永久性地损害了伯克希尔在市场上的声誉。”
“Please comment on this unfortunate outcome and tell me why OXY shareholders and other market observers shouldn’t feel this way.”
“请对这个不幸的结果发表评论，并告诉我为什么 OXY 的股东和其他市场观察者不应该有这种感觉。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, yeah. We said right from the beginning — although we didn’t certainly expect the degree of what’s happened — we said, essentially, when you buy into an oil — a huge oil production company — you know, how it works out is going to depend on the price of oil to a great extent.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，是的。我们从一开始就说过——虽然我们确实没有预料到发生的程度——我们基本上说，当你投资一家大型石油生产公司时，结果在很大程度上将取决于石油价格。
It’s not going to be your geological home runs or super mistakes or anything like that. It is a — it is a investment that depends on the price of oil. And, you know, I — when oil goes to minus $37 — (laughs) — it happened the other day for, I guess, it was the May contract. You know, that’s off the chart, and —
这不是依赖于你的地质大发现或超级失误之类的事情。这是一个依赖于石油价格的投资。当油价跌到负 37 美元时——（笑）——那是前几天发生的事情，我猜是 5 月的合约。这种情况完全超出预期，简直是离谱的——
埋在地下的未开采储量不影响市值，最大的影响因素是当前的油价。
If you own oil, you should only own oil, if you expect these prices to go up significantly. I don’t know whether they’ll go up significantly or not. We’re in the transaction.
如果你拥有石油，你应该只拥有石油，如果你预计这些价格会大幅上涨。我不知道它们是否会大幅上涨。我们正在进行交易。
Our commitment was made on a Sunday when the management of Anadarko favored Chevron. And Chevron had a breakup fee of a billion dollars and the Occidental people had been working on it for several years.
我们的承诺是在一个星期天做出的，当时阿纳达科的管理层倾向于雪佛龙。而雪佛龙有一个 10 亿美元的分手费，而西方石油的人已经为此努力了好几年。
And it was attractive at oil prices that then prevailed. And it doesn’t work, obviously — it doesn’t work at $20 a barrel — it certainly doesn’t work at minus $37 a barrel — but it doesn’t work at $20 a barrel.
当时的油价使这个交易具有吸引力。但显然，这在每桶 20 美元的油价下行不通——当然，在每桶负 37 美元时更行不通——但在每桶 20 美元时也无法奏效。
And everything the oil companies have been doing, whether it’s Exxon or Occidental or anybody else, it doesn’t work at these oil prices.
石油公司所做的一切，无论是埃克森美孚、 Occidental 还是其他公司，在这些油价下都行不通。
That’s why oil production is going to go down a lot in the next few years, because it does not pay to drill now.
这就是为什么未来几年石油生产会大幅下降，因为现在钻探是没有利润的。
That’s happened at other times in the past. But the situation is, you know, you don’t know where you’re going to store the incremental barrel of oil, and oil demand is down dramatically, and for a while the Russians and the Saudis were trying to outdo each other in how much oil they could produce. And when you’ve got too much in storage, it doesn’t work its way off that very fast.
这种情况在过去也曾发生过。问题在于，你不知道该把多余的一桶油存放在哪里，石油需求急剧下降，而一段时间里，俄罗斯和沙特在竞相增加石油产量。当库存过剩时，这些油不会很快被消耗掉。
Now, you will have production of oil go down in the United States significantly. It does not pay to drill in all kinds of formations that paid before, and it doesn’t pay — it doesn’t pay to have paid the price that oil was trading at in the ground a year or two ago.
现在，美国的石油产量将大幅下降。过去在各种地层进行钻探是有利可图的，但现在这种情况不再成立。此外，一两年前为地下石油支付的价格，现在也不再划算。
And to that extent, if you’re an OXY shareholder, you know you’ve — or any shareholder in any oil producing company — you’ll join me in having made a mistake, so far, in terms of where oil prices went. And who knows where they go in the future.
因此，如果你是 OXY 的股东，或者是任何石油生产公司的股东，你会和我一样意识到，在油价走势方面，我们迄今为止都犯了一个错误。未来油价会走向何方，谁也无法预测。
49. Low prices pose a risk to oil equity investments
低价格对石油股权投资构成风险
BECKY QUICK: Let me follow up with this one, and this one comes in from Mohnish Bahl, who says, “Is there a risk of permanent loss of capital in the oil equity investments?”
贝基·奎克：让我跟进这个问题，这个问题来自莫尼什·巴尔，他说：“在石油股票投资中是否存在永久性资本损失的风险？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there certainly is, you know — there’s no question if — if oil stays at these prices, there’s going to be a lot of money — a whole lot of money — in middle extended bank loans, and it’ll affect the banking industry, to some degree, not — it doesn’t destroy them or anything, but there’s a lot of money that’s been invested that was not invested based on a $17 or $20 or $25 price for WTI, West Texas Intermediate oil, and —
沃伦·巴菲特：毫无疑问，如果油价保持在当前水平，会有大量资金——非常多的资金——陷在中长期银行贷款中。这在某种程度上会影响银行业，但不会毁灭它们之类的。不过，有大量资金的投资并不是基于每桶 17 美元、20 美元或 25 美元的西得克萨斯中质油（WTI）价格。
But you can do the same thing in copper. You can do the same thing in some of the things we manufacture — I mean it — but with commodities, it’s particularly dramatic.
但你可以在铜上做同样的事情。你可以在我们制造的一些东西上做同样的事情——我是说真的——但在商品方面，这尤其引人注目。
And, you know, farmers have been getting lousy prices, but to some extent, the government subsidized them. I’m all for it, actually.
而且，你知道，农民一直得到糟糕的价格，但在某种程度上，政府对他们进行了补贴。其实我对此是完全支持的。
But if you’re an oil producer, you take your chances on future prices, unless you want to sell a lot of futures forward. OXY, actually, did sell 300,000 barrels a day of puts, in effect, that — or they bought puts — and sold calls, in effect, to match it. And they were protected on $10 — for a layer of $10 a barrel on 300,000 barrels a day.
但如果你是一名石油生产商，你要面对未来价格的风险，除非你愿意卖出大量远期合约。实际上，西方石油公司（OXY）每天卖出30万桶的看跌期权，或者说，他们买了看跌期权，并卖出了相应的看涨期权。他们在每天30万桶的油价上获得了每桶10美元的保护。
But you’re really buying — when you buy oil, you’re betting on oil prices over time, and over a long time. And oil prices — there’s risk. And the risk is being realized by oil producers as we speak.
但你真正购买的是——当你购买石油时，你是在押注石油价格的长期走势。而石油价格——存在风险。而这种风险正在被石油生产商实时感受到。
There will be— if these prices prevail — there will be a lot of bad loans in energy loans and or— bad debts in energy loans. And if there are bad debts in energy loans, you can imagine what happens to the equity holders. So yes, there’s a risk.
如果这些价格持续下去，能源贷款中将会有很多不良贷款，或者说——能源贷款中的坏账。如果能源贷款中出现坏账，您可以想象股东会发生什么。因此，是的，存在风险。
处理资产有可能影响股东权益。
50. No “surprise” liabilities in Berkshire’s stock derivatives contracts
伯克希尔的股票衍生品合同中没有“意外”负债
BECKY QUICK: All right, this question comes from Bob (Coleman). He says, “Warren, could you bring us up to date with the status of your equity put contracts? Sourcing the 2019 — ”
贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自鲍勃（科尔曼）。他说：“沃伦，你能告诉我们你股票认沽合约的最新情况吗？关于 2019 年的——”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
BECKY QUICK: ” — annual report, found on page 60, it appears at 2019 year-end, the fair value liability was just under a billion dollars. And if the indexes decline 30 percent, the liability obligations balloon to $2.7 billion.
贝基·奎克：“——年报，在第 60 页上可以找到，2019 年年末，公允价值负债刚好不到十亿美元。如果指数下降 30%，负债义务将膨胀到 27 亿美元。”
“So, if the indexes are down 60 percent, would Berkshire’s obligation be close to 5 1/2 billion dollars? Does that math seem reasonable? And are there any loose ends or open exposures associated with — ”
“所以，如果指数下跌了 60%，那么伯克希尔的义务会接近 55 亿美元吗？这个计算看起来合理吗？是否还有与此相关的任何未解决的问题或开放的风险——”
WARREN BUFFETT: No, they — we — between 2004, I think, and 2006, I think we wrote 48 — maybe 50 contracts — something like that.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们——在 2004 年到 2006 年之间，我想我们签了 48 份——也许是 50 份合同——大概是这样的。
The shortest was 15 years. The longest was 20 years. And we received, as I remember, roughly $4.8 billion, which we were free to do with what we wanted. And we agreed to pay based on where one or more of four indices were selling for, at the time of expiration. They were so-called European style puts, where they’re only payable based on one date. And we did not have — with a small exception — we did not have to put up collateral, which was part of the deal.
最短期限是15年，最长是20年。记得当时我们收到了大约48亿美元的资金，可以自由支配。我们同意在到期时，按照四个指数中的一个或多个的表现支付。他们是所谓的欧洲式看跌期权，只需在到期日根据一个日期支付。而且，除了一个小例外，我们不需要提供担保，这是协议的一部分。
And we’ve had that $4.8 billion — we probably had an original nominal value of something over 30 billion, maybe 35 billion — that’s if everything went to zero. I mean, if the Dow Jones went to zero, the FTSE went to zero, and the Nikkei and so on.
我们有那 48 亿美元——我们最初的名义价值可能超过 300 亿美元，也许是 350 亿美元——那是如果一切都归零的情况下。我是说，如果道琼斯归零，富时 100 归零，日经指数等等。
A number of those have run off. So, we now have about 14 billion, nominal. We have something less than half left. We haven’t paid out anything significant. We bought back a few of them.
其中一些已经到期了。所以，现在我们还有大约140亿美元的名义金额，剩下的不到一半。我们还没有支付任何显著的费用，只是回购了其中的一部分。
If everything went to zero, we would owe 14 billion. If everything were to sell at the same price it was selling for on March 31st, I think the number is some — I think it’s somewhat less than we carry as a liability on the balance sheet, which is two-and-a-fraction billion.
如果一切都归零，我们将欠下140亿美元。如果所有资产都按3月31日的价格出售，我认为金额会比我们在资产负债表上列为负债的数额稍微少一些，大约是20多亿美元。
So far, so good. I mean, we’ve, had the use of a lot of money, and the outstanding potential of them is, if the market went up a lot, we wouldn’t have to pay anything, and if it goes down some more, we have to pay more than a couple of billion, but we’ve had the liability set up for that.
到目前为止，一切还不错。我的意思是，我们使用了大量资金，而这些期权的潜在风险是，如果市场大幅上涨，我们不需要支付任何费用；如果市场继续下跌，我们可能需要支付超过几亿美元，但我们已经为此预留了负债。
But so far, so good, on that. And it is not anything that causes us any problem. They come due — the final one — I think comes due sometime in 2023. I think there’s — I think maybe 20 or 25 percent of them come due late this year.
到目前为止，这方面一切顺利，这并没有给我们带来任何问题。最后一笔期权，我记得应该在2023年到期。我想大约有20%或25%的期权会在今年晚些时候到期。
And so, it’s — there’s nothing — the questioner doesn’t really understand about them, I can tell by the question — and there’s no surprises there. There’s — there’s no way that some liability could double up on us, except based on — except relating to where those indices close at the expiration of a group of different puts, which, like I said, have been more than cut in half. And we’ve done very well on it.
所以，没什么可担心的——从提问来看，提问者并没有真正理解这些期权的运作——并且这里也没有任何意外。唯一可能增加我们负债的方式是，这些指数在一组不同的看跌期权到期时的收盘价表现。不过，正如我所说，相关负债已经减少了一半以上，我们在这方面表现得非常好。
Key to that — 关键在于——
BECKY QUICK: Warren, you mentioned a few minutes ago that you —
贝基·奎克：沃伦，你几分钟前提到你——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I was just going to say, key to that was — with just a couple of tiny exceptions — we did not — we did not agree to put up collateral. We never would have gotten ourselves in that position, and — That was — when we made the deals, we would just would not get ourselves in that position. And we never, never, will, where on a given date, we could have some tremendous obligation that would come due that we weren’t counting on getting — having come due.
沃伦·巴菲特：我正要说，关键在于——除了极少数的例外——我们没有同意提供担保。我们绝不会让自己陷入那种境地。当我们达成这些交易时，我们明确不愿意让自己处于那种境地。而且我们永远都不会这样做，绝不会让自己在某个特定日期面临巨额到期义务，而这种义务是我们没有预料到的。
I’m done, then, Becky, yeah.
我完成了，那么，贝基，是的。
51. Berkshire will stay intact after Buffett
伯克希尔在巴菲特之后将保持完整
BECKY QUICK: OK, thanks. And you mentioned a few minutes ago that you’re very concerned about Berkshire’s long-term health, too. This question came in from Drew Estes in Atlanta, Georgia, who says, “There’s already speculation of a post-Buffett breakup of Berkshire, and given the sway carried by modern activists, the speculation should be taken seriously.
贝基·奎克：好的，谢谢。您刚才提到，您非常关心伯克希尔的长期健康。这是来自乔治亚州亚特兰大的德鲁·埃斯特斯的问题，他说：“已经有人在猜测巴菲特时代之后伯克希尔可能会被拆分，考虑到现代激进投资者的影响力，这种猜测应该被认真对待。”
“Many long-term owners see the folly in this view. A $25 billion auxiliary earnings stream provides a lot of flexibility when investing insurance float. “On our, and your estate’s, behalf, could you more forcefully make the case of maintaining Berkshire’s current architecture? If you don’t, that responsibility will fall on an unknown set of shoulders with far less credibility>′
“许多长期股东认为这种观点是愚蠢的。每年250亿美元的辅助收益为投资保险浮存金提供了极大的灵活性。‘为了我们和您遗产的利益，您能否更有力地阐述保持伯克希尔当前架构的理由？如果您不这样做，这个责任将落到一个缺乏您这种可信度的未知人选身上。’”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you were to — if you were to sell Berkshire’s various subsidiaries, you would incur a very significant amount of tax at the corporate level before anything was distributed to the shareholders.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果你要出售伯克希尔的各个子公司，你将在公司层面产生相当可观的税收，然后才能将任何东西分配给股东。
You can spin off a given one, or something of the sort. But the ability to break up a diverse company without tax implications — there was there was something called the General Utilities Doctrine that prevailed in various ways up until 1986. And a lot of people seem to comment based on the fact that that didn’t happen in 1986. (Laughs)
你可以剥离某个业务或类似的操作。但在没有税务影响的情况下拆分一家多元化公司，这种能力已经不存在了。曾经有一种叫做“通用公用事业法则”的规定，以各种方式适用到1986年。然而，许多人似乎对1986年这一情况没有发生发表了评论。（笑）
And there’s imaginative ways where people try to avoid taxes, and can do it in some cases, on certain types of transactions. If you were to break up Berkshire, that would be one factor. But the interaction of being able to move capital around, in terms of being able to do things in insurance that we couldn’t do unless there were the backup earnings, and capital employed in the other entities — there’s enormous advantages in capital deployment within the place, so I —
有一些有创意的方式让人们试图避税，并且在某些交易中确实可以做到。如果你要拆分伯克希尔，那将是一个需要考虑的因素。但在资本的调动上，特别是在保险业务中，如果没有其他实体的盈利支持和资本支撑，我们无法完成许多事情。公司内部的资本部署有巨大的优势，所以我——
There is not a big discount to breakup value embodied in Berkshire’s price. And the situation actually is that although all my Berkshire shares — every share — will be given to charities pursuant to a plan I developed back 14 years ago and followed ever since, and will continue following this July — I’ll be giving away 3 billion or so worth of the stock and — but it’s all — it still involves a big voting percentage that — including other people’s that still remain in the picture, aside even from the Buffett family — it isn’t going to happen.
伯克希尔的股价并没有包含大的拆分价值折扣。实际上，尽管我所有的伯克希尔股份——每一股——都会根据我14年前制定并一直遵循的计划捐给慈善机构，并将在今年7月继续执行，我会捐出大约30亿美元的股票，但这些股票仍然包含很大的投票权比例，尤其是包括其他人的投票权，除了巴菲特家族之外的也仍然存在。所以，拆分不会发生。
Now, I will tell you everybody in the world will come around and propose something, and say it’s wonderful for shareholders, and by the way, it involves huge fees. I mean— (laughs) — you do not — you do not get impartial advice from Wall Street — (laughs) — when there’s (an) enormous amount of fees possible from one action, and no fees applicable from another action.
现在，我要告诉你，世界上的每个人都会过来提议一些事情，并说这对股东来说是很棒的，顺便提一下，这涉及巨额费用。我的意思是——（笑）——你不会——你不会从华尔街得到公正的建议——（笑）——当某个行动可能产生巨额费用，而另一个行动没有任何费用时。
But you can be sure I’ve thought about it. And I would say that you can you can count on Berkshire’s present posture being continued for a long time.
但你可以放心，我已经考虑过这个问题。我可以说，你可以相信伯克希尔目前的立场会持续很长时间。
I can’t tell you what’s going to happen a hundred years from now. And I can’t tell you exactly what would happen, for example, if certain ideas, in terms of wealth taxes, changed, or taxes on foundations change. I mean, they could —
我无法告诉你一百年后会发生什么。我也无法确切告诉你，例如，如果某些关于财富税的想法发生变化，或者对基金会的税收发生变化，会发生什么。我是说，它们可能会——
But my plan has been thought out and in place for a long time. And it not only ensures that the money that’s been made off Berkshire — all of it ends up going to various philanthropies staggered over time — but it also — it will keep the wolves away.
但我的计划早已考虑周全并且落实了很长时间。这不仅确保了从伯克希尔赚到的钱——所有的钱都会分批捐给各种慈善机构——而且它还会让那些狼远离。
Greg, do you have any thoughts on that? (Laughs)
格雷格，你对此有什么想法吗？（笑）
GREG ABEL: Well, I think the comment on the capital allocation is critical, that we have the ability to move the capital amongst the — be it the operating businesses or up to the insurance or down — with really no consequences to our shareholders. That’s the value driver, the unique structure of Berkshire, and it creates immense value, so — That’s all I would add, or second, I guess.
格雷格·阿贝尔：我认为关于资本配置的评论非常关键，我们能够在运营业务之间，或从运营业务调动到保险，或从保险调动回运营，且对我们的股东没有任何负面影响。这正是伯克希尔独特结构的价值驱动因素，它创造了巨大的价值——这是我想补充或再次强调的观点。
52. Big question: Can U.S. keep issuing money without consequences?
大问题：美国能否在没有后果的情况下继续发行货币？
BECKY QUICK: All right, this question comes from Robb Grandish in Washington, D.C. He says, “Interest rates are negative in much of Europe, also in Japan. Warren has written many times that the value of Berkshire’s insurance companies is derived from the fact that policyholders pay up front creating insurance float, on which Berkshire gets to earn interest.
贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自华盛顿特区的罗布·格兰迪什。他说：“在欧洲的许多地方，利率是负的，日本也是。沃伦多次提到，伯克希尔保险公司的价值源于投保人提前支付保费，从而产生保险浮存金，伯克希尔可以在此基础上赚取利息。”
“If interest rates are negative, then collecting money up front will be costly rather than profitable. If interest rates are negative, then the insurance float is no longer a benefit but a liability.
“如果利率为负，提前收取资金将变得成本高昂，而不是盈利。如果利率为负，保险浮存金将不再是一个优势，而是一个负担。”
“Can you please discuss how Berkshire’s insurance companies would respond if interest rates became negative in the United States?”
“请您讨论一下如果美国的利率变为负值，伯克希尔的保险公司将如何应对？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if they were going to be negative for a long time, you better — you better own equities. Or you better own something other than — than debt.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果他们会长期保持负利率，你最好——你最好拥有股票。或者你最好拥有其他资产，而不是债务。
I mean, it’s remarkable what’s happened in the last 10 years. I’ve been wrong in thinking that you could really have the developments you’ve had without inflation taking hold.
我的意思是，过去十年里发生的事情真的很惊人。我之前认为，经历了这些发展而不会出现通货膨胀是错误的。
But we have 120-odd billion — well, we have some — almost — very high percentage in Treasury bills — some in other — and some just in cash, but we — but those Treasury bills are paying us virtually nothing.
但我们有大约 1200 亿——好吧，我们有一些——几乎——非常高比例的国库券——一些在其他方面——还有一些只是现金，但我们——但那些国库券几乎没有给我们带来任何收益。
Now, they’re a terrible investment over time. But they are the one thing that when opportunity arises — it will arise at a time — and maybe the only thing you can look to pay for those opportunities is the Treasury bills you have. I mean, the rest of the world may have stopped.
现在，从长远来看，它们是一个糟糕的投资。但它们是唯一在机会出现时——机会会在某个时刻出现——也许是你唯一可以用来支付这些机会的东西，就是你拥有的国库券。我的意思是，其他地方可能已经停滞不前。
And we also need them to protect— be sure that we can pay the liabilities we have, in terms of policyholders over time, and we take that very seriously.
我们还需要他们保护——确保我们能够支付我们在保单持有人方面的责任，并且我们对此非常重视。
So, if the world turns into a world where you can issue more and more money and have negative interest rates over time, I’d have to see it to believe it, but I’ve seen a little bit of it. I’ve been surprised. So, I’ve been wrong so far.
所以，如果世界变成一个可以不断发行更多货币并且长期存在负利率的世界，我得亲眼看到才能相信，但我已经看到了一些。我感到惊讶。因此，到目前为止我一直是错的。
I do not think that— I don’t see how you can create — I would say this, if you can have negative interest rates, and pour out money and incur more and more debt, relative to productive capacity, you think the world would have discovered it in the first couple thousand years rather than just coming on it now, but we will see.
我不认为——我不明白你怎么能做到这一点——我想说的是，如果你能够维持负利率，持续注入资金并增加越来越多的债务，而不考虑生产能力的相对比重，你会认为世界应该在过去几千年里就发现这种方式，而不是现在才发现，但我们拭目以待。
It’s one of the most — it’s probably the most interesting question I’ve ever seen in economics — is can you keep doing what we’re doing now, and —
这是我在经济学中见过的最有趣的问题之一——也许是最有趣的问题——就是我们能否继续现在的做法，和——
We’ve been able to do it — or the world’s been able to do it — for now, a dozen years or so and —
我们已经能够做到这一点——或者说世界已经能够做到这一点——大约有十年左右了，——
But we’re — we may be facing a — we may be facing a period where we’re testing that hypothesis that you can continue it with a lot more force than we’ve tested it before.
但我们可能正面临一个时期，在这个时期，我们会以比以往更大的力度来验证这个假设，即你是否可以持续这种做法。
Greg, do you have any thoughts on that. I wish I knew the answer. Maybe, you do? (Laughter)
格雷格，你对此有什么想法吗？我希望我知道答案。也许，你知道？（笑声）
GREG ABEL: No, I think, as you articulated — I think it was in the annual report, too — I mean, we don’t know the answer.
格雷格·阿贝尔：不，我认为，正如你所阐述的——我想这也在年报中提到过——我的意思是，我们不知道答案。
But, as you said, some of the fundamentals right now are very interesting relative to having a negative interest rate. But I know — I hate to say it, but I don’t have anything to add. (Laughter)
但是，正如你所说，目前的一些基本面相对于负利率来说非常有趣。但我知道——我不想这么说，但我没有什么可以补充的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’d love to be secretary of the Treasury, if I knew I could just keep raising money at negative interest rates, that makes life pretty simple.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果我知道可以在负利率下不断筹集资金，我会很乐意担任财政部长，这样生活就简单多了。
We’re doing things that we really don’t know the ultimate outcome. I think — and I think, in general, they are the right things, but I don’t think they’re without consequences. And I think they could be, kind of, extreme consequences if pushed far enough.
我们正在做一些我们并不真正知道最终结果的事情。我认为，总的来说，这些措施是正确的，但我不认为它们没有后果。如果推到极限，我认为这些后果可能会非常严重。
But there would be, kind of, extreme consequences if we didn’t do it as well. So, somebody has to — you know, balance those — those questions.
但是，如果我们不这样做，可能会有极端的后果。所以，必须有人来平衡这些问题。
53. Businesses that don’t need a lot of capital are better
不需要大量资本的企业更好。
BECKY QUICK: All right, this question comes from Adam Schwartz in Miami, Florida. And he says Berkshire is the largest holding in his partnership, which also houses most of their net worth.
贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自佛罗里达州迈阿密的亚当·施瓦茨。他说伯克希尔是他合伙企业中最大的持股，这里也包含了他们大部分的净资产。
He says, “Berkshire’s invested in many capital-intensive businesses through the years, railroads as an example. How do you think about the inflationary, or even deflationary, risks for all of the capital-intensive businesses? And could this prove to be an existential problem for businesses?”
他说：“伯克希尔多年来投资了许多资本密集型企业，例如铁路。你如何看待所有资本密集型企业的通货膨胀或甚至通货紧缩风险？这会对企业构成生存问题吗？”
“I’m kind of referencing what you were just talking about, that eventually the bill for the debts being issued comes due. Will it eventually come from all businesses through some combination of higher tax rates on corporations, increased wages for the lower-middle classes?”
“我指的是你刚才谈到的，债务最终会到期，需要偿还。是否最终会通过提高公司税率、增加中下阶层工资等方式，从所有企业中来弥补这些债务呢？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I certainly think that increased corporate taxes are a much higher probability than having lower corporate taxes.
沃伦·巴菲特：我确实认为，提高企业税的可能性远高于降低企业税的可能性。
So, I — I think that we got handed, as a corporation, a big chunk of what used to be the government’s profits from our business a couple of years ago. And it would depend on, to some extent, which party is elected and — and whether they have control of both houses as well as the presidency, and who knows what else.
我认为，几年前我们公司获得了一大部分以前属于政府从我们业务中获取的利润。这在某种程度上取决于哪个政党当选，是否同时掌控国会两院以及总统职位，其他因素也难以预料。
But we could very easily have higher corporate income taxes, and perhaps much higher corporate income taxes, at some point. And in terms of capital-intensive businesses, they’re just not as good, if you can find an equally good business — I mean, in terms of operations — that doesn’t require capital.
但我们很可能在某个时候面临更高的公司所得税，甚至是大幅增加的公司所得税。对于资本密集型的业务来说，如果能找到同样好的业务——我指的是运营方面——而且不需要大量资本投入，那么资本密集型业务就不那么有吸引力了。
I mean — they’re — you know, the — See’s never — See’s (Candies) never really required. It didn’t grow, but it’s — it just doesn’t — it didn’t take money to expand it and it’s delivered enormous sums to us. And because we own it within Berkshire, to redeploy it elsewhere didn’t require a lot of tax expense either at the corporate level or at the personal level.
我的意思是，像See's（糖果公司）这样的业务，它从未真正需要大量资本投入。虽然它的增长并不快，但也不需要大量资金来扩展，且为我们带来了巨额利润。而且因为我们是在伯克希尔内部拥有它的，将其利润重新部署到其他地方时，不需要在公司或个人层面支付大量的税款。
So, you really want a business — and everybody wants a business — that doesn’t take any capital to speak off — and keeps growing — that doesn’t take more capital as it grows.
所以，你真的想要一个生意——每个人都想要一个生意——这个生意不需要任何资本来启动——并且持续增长——在增长的过程中不需要更多的资本。
Now, our utility business (inaudible) the energy business requires more capital as it grows. Our railroad business, to some extent, requires more capital if it doesn’t grow, even.
现在，我们的公用事业业务（听不清）能源业务在增长时需要更多的资本。我们的铁路业务在某种程度上，即使不增长，也需要更多的资本。
So capital-intensive businesses, by their nature, you know, are not as good as something where people pay in advance and you don’t need the capital.
因此，资本密集型企业本质上不如那些人们提前付款且不需要资本的业务。
I mean, if you look at — if you look at where the top market value is in a $30 trillion market, you know — if you take the top four or five companies that account for, you know, maybe 3 — 4 trillion or so of that 30 trillion, basically, they don’t take much capital.
我的意思是，如果你看看——如果你看看在一个 30 万亿美元的市场中，最高的市场价值在哪里，你知道——如果你拿出前四或五家公司，它们大约占据了那 30 万亿美元中的 3 万亿到 4 万亿，基本上，它们所需的资本并不多。
And that’s why they’re worth a lot of money, because they make a lot of money and they don’t require the money, to any great extent, in the business. We own some businesses like that.
这就是为什么它们值很多钱，因为它们赚很多钱，而且在业务中并不需要太多资金。我们拥有一些这样的企业。
But it’s certainly not the railroad. And it’s not — it’s not the energy business. They’re good businesses. We love them. But if they didn’t take any capital, they’d be unbelievable.
但这肯定不是铁路。而且它也不是——它不是能源行业。它们都是好行业。我们喜欢它们。但如果它们不需要任何资本，那就太不可思议了。
But that’s just — that’s what we’ve learned from 50 or 60 years of operating businesses, that if you can find a great business that doesn’t require capital when it grows, you’ve really got something.
但这就是——这是我们从 50 或 60 年的经营经验中学到的，如果你能找到一个在成长时不需要资本的优秀企业，那你真的找到了宝贵的东西。
And to a certain extent, because insurance uses the kind of assets we would like to own anyway, our insurance business doesn’t really take capital. It requires having capital available. But, we’re able to invest that money, largely, in things we’d like to own anyway.
在某种程度上，由于保险业务使用的资产正是我们本来就想拥有的类型，因此我们的保险业务实际上不需要大量资本投入。它需要的是可用的资本。但我们能够将这些资金主要投资于我们本来就想持有的资产。
So, we’re particularly well suited for the insurance business. And it’s really been the most important factor in our growth over the years, although a lot of other things contribute.
所以，我们特别适合保险行业。这确实是我们多年来增长的最重要因素，尽管还有很多其他因素也在起作用。
Greg, you’re in a capital — you were in a capital-intensive business. (Laughs)
格雷格，你在一个资本密集型的行业——你曾经在一个资本密集型的业务中。（笑）
Tell us about it. (Laughter)
告诉我们吧。（笑声）
GREG ABEL: Well, I think there’s no question, obviously, we’d prefer to be in a less capital-intensive business, but there are unique opportunities there.
格雷格·阿贝尔：嗯，我认为毫无疑问，我们更希望处于一个资本密集度较低的行业，但那里有独特的机会。
The one I would touch on when I think of inflation — or even potentially, as we go through this crisis, and maybe a prolonged one — or depending on how long it takes to recover — I mean, we are in a unique — when we’re looking at energy or rail — we do have a certain amount of pricing power. And it’s through our regulatory formulas or how our arrangements are with our customers.
当我想到通货膨胀时，我会提到的一个方面——或者甚至在我们经历这场危机时，可能会是一个长期的危机——或者取决于恢复需要多长时间——我的意思是，我们处于一个独特的情况——当我们关注能源或铁路时——我们确实拥有一定的定价权。这是通过我们的监管公式或我们与客户的安排实现的。
So, if we then were to move into a deflationary period, it’s not perfect protection, but those businesses, generally, can recover a significant portion of their costs, even in an inflationary environment, and still earn a reasonable return.
所以，如果我们进入一个通货紧缩的时期，这并不是完美的保护，但这些企业通常可以在通货膨胀环境中收回相当一部分成本，并仍然获得合理的回报。
They’re not going to be great returns, as you highlight, Warren. But they’re still going to earn a —
他们的回报不会很高，正如你所强调的，沃伦。但他们仍然会赚取一个——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。
GREG ABEL: — reasonable return on their capital, even in an inflationary period. There may be some lag and some things like that, but they’re still going to be very sound investments.
格雷格·阿贝尔：——即使在通货膨胀时期，他们的资本仍然会有合理的回报。可能会有一些滞后和其他因素，但它们仍然会是非常稳健的投资。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah. If there was 10- for-1 inflation — make it extreme — yeah, we’d be happy we own the railroad — very happy.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。如果有 10 倍的通货膨胀——极端一点——是的，我们会很高兴拥有铁路——非常高兴。
Well, we’d be investing a lot of capital in it, but that businesses, in my view, is a very, very solid business for many, many, many, many decades to come. I said originally, we bought it with a hundred-year time horizon, and I’ve extended that, so —
好吧，我们会在这方面投资大量资金，但在我看来，这个业务在未来许多、许多、许多、许多年里都是一个非常非常稳固的业务。我最初说过，我们以一百年的时间视角来购买它，而我已经将这个时间延长了，所以——
It will earn more dollars if there’s a lot of inflation. In real terms, who knows? But it would earn a lot more dollars. And a lot of the energy projects would in the —
如果通货膨胀很高，它将赚更多的美元。在实际意义上，谁知道呢？但它会赚到更多的美元。许多能源项目将在——
But it’s better if we don’t have inflation. And it’s better if we don’t have capital — (laughs) — if we can find the same sort of businesses that aren’t as capital intensive.
但如果我们没有通货膨胀，那会更好。如果我们能找到同样类型的业务，而不是那么资本密集的，那就更好了——（笑）——而且如果我们没有资本，那也更好。
We — we’ve got capital. I mean, we — we’re ideally positioned for capital-intensive businesses that other people have trouble raising capital for, but they’ve still got to promise decent returns.
我们——我们有资本。我的意思是，我们——我们在资本密集型企业方面处于理想位置，而其他人却很难筹集到资本，但他们仍然必须承诺合理的回报。
54. U.S. can’t default on its debt, but inflation is a risk
美国不能违约其债务，但通货膨胀是一个风险
BECKY QUICK: All right, this question comes from Charlie Wang. He’s a shareholder in San Francisco. He says, “Given the unprecedented time of the economy and the debt level, could there be any risks and consequences of the U.S. government defaulting on its bonds?”
贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自查理·王。他是旧金山的一位股东。他说：“考虑到经济的前所未有的时期和债务水平，美国政府违约其债券是否会存在任何风险和后果？”
WARREN BUFFETT: No. The — if you — if you print bonds in your own currency, what happens to the currency is — it can be a question, but you don’t default.
沃伦·巴菲特：不。如果你用自己的货币发行债券，货币会发生什么——这可能是个问题，但你不会违约。
The United States has been smart enough, and people have trusted us enough, to issue its debt in its own currency.
美国足够聪明，人们也足够信任我们，以自己的货币发行债务。
And Argentina is now having a problem because the debt isn’t in their own currency. And lots of countries have had that problem, and lots of countries will have that problem in the future. It is very painful to owe money in somebody else’s currency.
阿根廷现在面临一个问题，因为债务不是以他们自己的货币计价。许多国家曾经遇到过这个问题，未来也会有很多国家面临这个问题。以他国货币欠债是非常痛苦的。
But if you — listen, if I could issue a currency — Buffett Bucks — and I had a printing press, you know, I could borrow money — and I could borrow money on that — I would never default. (Laughs)
但是如果你——听着，如果我能发行一种货币——巴菲特币——而我有一台印刷机，你知道，我可以借钱——而我可以在此基础上借钱——我绝对不会违约。（笑）
So, what you end up getting, in terms of purchasing power, can be in doubt. But in terms of the U.S. government — when Standard and Poor’s downgraded the United States government — I think it was Standard and Poor’s, some years back — that, to me, did not make sense.
所以，从购买力的角度来看，最终得到的结果可能会令人怀疑。但就美国政府而言——当标准普尔下调了美国政府的评级——我认为是标准普尔，几年前——对我来说，这没有意义。
I mean, in the end, how you can regard any corporation as stronger than a person who can print the money to pay you, I just don’t understand.
我意思是，最终，你怎么能认为任何公司比一个可以印钱来支付你的人更强大，我实在无法理解。
So, don’t worry about the government defaulting.
所以，不用担心政府违约。
I think it’s kind of crazy, incidentally — this should be said — to have these limits on the debt and all of that sort of thing, and then stopped government arguing about whether it’s going to increase the limits. We’re going to increase the limits on the debt.
顺便说一下，我认为设定这些债务上限，以及围绕这些上限进行争论，是有些荒谬的。政府一直在争论是否要提高债务上限，而实际上我们肯定会提高债务上限的。
The debt isn’t going to be paid, it’s going to be refunded. And anybody that thinks they’re going to bring down the national debt, I mean — that — you know — there’s been brief periods — I think in the late ’90s or thereabouts — when the debt has come down a little bit.
债务是不会被偿还的，它会被重新融资。任何认为国家债务会减少的人，我的意思是——你知道——曾经有过短暂的时期——我想是在90年代末或左右——当时债务确实稍微减少了一点。
The country is going to print more — incidentally, the country is going to grow, in terms of its debt paying capacity. And — but the trick is to keep borrowing in your own currency.
这个国家将会印更多的钱——顺便提一下，这个国家在偿债能力方面将会增长。但是——关键是要继续以自己的货币借款。
55. Stock buybacks aren’t immoral, but they can be stupid
股票回购并非不道德，但它们可能是愚蠢的。
BECKY QUICK: Emphasis on trick.
贝基·奎克：强调技巧。
This question comes from David Kass. He is a clinical professor of finance at the University of Maryland. And he says, “Berkshire has invested in many companies with stock buyback programs. Recently there’s been a backlash against buybacks. What are your views on this subject?”
这个问题来自大卫·卡斯。他是马里兰大学的金融教授。他说：“伯克希尔投资了许多有股票回购计划的公司。最近，针对回购的反对声越来越大。你对此有什么看法？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s very politically correct to be against buybacks now, you know, and they’re going to incorporate it in the loan program.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在反对股票回购是非常政治正确的行为，你知道，他们甚至计划将这一观点纳入贷款计划中。
The — there’s a lot of crazy things said on buybacks. Buybacks are so simple. I mean, it’s a way of distributing cash to shareholders.
回购上有很多疯狂的说法。回购是非常简单的。我是说，这是一种向股东分配现金的方式。
And let’s just say that you and I and Greg — the three of us — decide to buy an auto dealership, or a McDonald’s franchise, or something. We each put a million dollars in, you know, or whatever the number may be.
假设你、我和格雷格——我们三个人——决定购买一家汽车经销商，或者一家麦当劳特许经营店，或者其他什么。我们每个人投入一百万美元，或者其他任何数字。
And we get along with each other and the business grows and all of that. And one of us really wants to spend our share of the earnings. And the other two want to leave the money in the business to grow.
我们彼此相处得很好，生意也在发展。然后我们中的一个人真的想花掉我们分到的收益，而另外两个则想把钱留在公司里继续发展。
Now if the three of us did that, and we’re the only shareholders, we would not establish a 100 percent dividend payout for everybody. And we wouldn’t freeze the one that wanted to get out, either.
如果我们三个人这样做了，而且我们是唯一的股东，我们不会为所有人设定100%的股息支付比例。同时，我们也不会阻止那个想要退出的人。
The logical thing to do is to buy a portion — whatever that person wants to spend annually from the earnings — buy a portion of their stock, and the other two find their interest in the company goes up. And the third person still has a little more of an interest by what they leave in, but they also can take some money out of the business.
逻辑上最合理的做法是，从这个人的手中购买部分股票，这样其他两个人在公司的持股比例就会增加。而第三个人仍然保留一部分股份，同时也可以从业务中取出一些资金。
You’re taking money out of the business in either case. And one you call dividends and you send it to everybody whether they want it or not. And with buybacks, you give it to the ones who want the money.
无论哪种情况，你都在从业务中取出资金。一种方式叫做分红，你把钱发给所有人，无论他们是否需要。而通过回购，你只把钱给那些想要资金的人。
And I have been following a policy of giving away stock, now, since 2006. And I’ll give away a lot of stock. But the people — the philanthropies — that that receive it — the gifts — have to spend the money very promptly, within, you know — on a current basis, more or less.
自2006年以来，我一直遵循着捐赠股票的政策。我会捐出大量股票。但那些接收这些捐赠的慈善机构必须非常迅速地花掉这些资金，基本上是在当前的时间框架内。
So, they are getting $3 billion worth of stock, or whatever it may be. And I’m, in effect, reducing my interest in Berkshire. But I’m still — Berkshire is still retaining more capital than I’m giving away, so I have more dollars invested, but my interest goes down, and the people that need the cash to carry out the philanthropic efforts, they cash out the stock.
所以，他们收到的是价值 30 亿美元的股票，或者类似的金额。而实际上，我在减少自己在伯克希尔的持股比例。但伯克希尔仍然保留了比我捐赠的更多的资本，所以我的投资金额增加了，但持股比例下降了。而那些需要现金来执行慈善活动的人会套现这些股票。
And I don’t force — I don’t force my sister, or whoever it may be, to take a bunch of money she doesn’t want. She wants it reinvested — all of it — reinvested in the business. And people that don’t want to, can sell some of their stock.
我不强迫——我不强迫我的姐姐，或者其他任何人，去接受她不想要的一大笔钱。她想把所有的钱再投资——全部再投资到业务中。而那些不想要的人，可以出售他们的一部分股票。
And the company ends up in the same position. We’ve distributed some of the capital that we don’t need for growth.
公司最终处于相同的位置。我们已经分配了一些我们不需要用于增长的资本。
Now, whether the company should buy it depends on a couple of things. One is they ought to retain the money they need for intelligent growth prospects, that’s fine.
现在，公司是否应该购买它取决于几个因素。一是他们应该保留实现明智增长前景所需的资金，这很好。
And secondly — and this is a point that’s never mentioned — they should be buying it back below what they think it’s worth. Now, they’ll make mistakes in that, but you make mistakes in a lot of businesses. But over — that should be the guiding principle.
其次——这是一个从未提及的观点——他们应该以低于他们认为的价值的价格回购。现在，他们在这方面会犯错误，但在很多业务中你都会犯错误。但总体来说——这应该是指导原则。
And to my knowledge — JPMorgan — (CEO) Jamie Dimon said it once, and we’ve said it various times, you know — we retained — we will repurchase shares when it’s to the advantage of the continuing shareholder to have us do so.
据我所知，摩根大通的首席执行官杰米·戴蒙曾说过一次，我们也多次提到过，你知道——我们保留——当回购股票对留下来的股东有利时，我们会进行回购。
But you read about all these buyback problems that we’re going to spend 5 billion buying it back, or 10 billion. Well, that’s like saying, I’m going to go out and buy some business this year for 5 billion without knowing what you’re going to get for the money.
但你会看到关于回购的问题，比如我们要花 50 亿或 100 亿进行回购。这就像说：“我要花 50 亿美元去买些业务”，但却不知道你会用这些钱买到什么。这种做法是不明智的。
It should be price sensitive, obviously. It should be needs sensitive, obviously. But when the conditions are right, it should also be obvious to repurchase shares, and there shouldn’t be the slightest taint to it any more than there is to dividends.
显然，它应该对价格敏感。显然，它应该对需求敏感。但在条件合适时，回购股票也应该显而易见，且这与股息一样，绝不应该有丝毫污点。
And people that have now, sort of, taken up the cries about how terrible it was that companies bought back stock — I will say it was terrible for them to pay dividends, too — (laughs) — and they’d have more money now, but they were doing what was intelligent at the time, and I hope they continue to do what’s intelligent as they go forth.
那些现在开始批评公司回购股票有多糟糕的人，我想说，支付股息也是一样糟糕的（笑）。如果他们当时不支付股息，现在会有更多资金。但他们当时做的事情是明智的，我希望他们今后也能继续做出明智的决策。
Greg? 格雷格？
GREG ABEL: No, I — the only thing I know you’ve commented on in the past, Warren, is that — I think the one thing we are seeing, and obviously, we’re supportive of buybacks — but there are companies that used — probably their financial engineering was just a little —
格雷格·阿贝尔：不，我唯一知道的是，沃伦，你过去评论过的一件事是——我认为我们现在看到的情况是，显然我们支持回购，但有些公司可能在使用财务工程时稍微过头了一点——
WARREN BUFFETT: Extreme. 沃伦·巴菲特：极端。
GREG ABEL: — extreme and too cute, that effectively you’re using every ounce of your balance sheet to buy back stock at a time where you’re really creating no cushion for your business for any type of event or bump in the road, and I — you know, we’re going to see that, and I think that’s a very unfortunate outcome of them, and hence you get some of the backlash.
格雷格·阿贝尔：——极端且过于可爱，实际上你在用你资产负债表的每一分来回购股票，而此时你实际上并没有为你的业务创造任何缓冲，以应对任何事件或突发情况，我——你知道，我们将会看到这一点，我认为这是他们非常不幸的结果，因此你会看到一些反弹。
But there’s still companies, as you highlighted, many that do it right.
但仍然有很多公司，如你所强调的，做得很好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No, if they’re buying it back because it’s fashionable, because they really do like the idea that —there’s nothing wrong with doing — taking an action that increases the value of the remaining shares, but if they’re doing it very — and incidentally, I’ve been witness to some programs, where it really is stupid.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果他们回购是因为这很时髦，因为他们真的喜欢这个想法——采取一种增加剩余股份价值的行动没有错，但如果他们这样做是非常——顺便说一下，我见过一些项目，确实是愚蠢的。
But I don’t think it’s immoral. I just think it’s stupid — (laughs) — you know, basically.
但我认为这并非不道德。我只是觉得这很愚蠢——（笑）——你知道的，基本上。
And — on the other hand, I — we favor companies that take care of all their requirements for growth and, as Greg says, maintain sound balance sheets and all of that, leave a margin of error for things that you can get surprised with, and if they find their stock selling below the — what the business is intrinsically worth, I think that they’re making a big mistake if they don’t buy in their stock, and —
另一方面，我认为我们支持那些在满足所有增长需求的同时，如格雷格所说，保持稳健的资产负债表，并为可能出现的意外情况留有余地的公司。如果他们发现自己的股票价格低于业务的内在价值，而不回购股票，我认为这是一个大错误。
It’s going to be a political football, and like I say, that when it becomes politically correct to do something in this country — if you’re a politician, the best thing to do is get on board. But Berkshire is going to do what it thinks makes sense for shareholders.
这将成为一个政治问题，正如我所说，当在这个国家做某事变得政治正确时——如果你是一个政治家，最好的做法就是支持它。但伯克希尔将做它认为对股东有意义的事情。
And we — and we like investing in companies that think that way, too. And not all companies, obviously, do.
我们——我们也喜欢投资于那些以这种方式思考的公司。显然，并不是所有公司都是这样。
56. Convert A shares to B shares if you want a smaller tax liability when cashing out
如果您希望在兑现时减少税负，请将 A 股转换为 B 股。
BECKY QUICK: All right, here’s a question from Lou — Lou Bogart in Boca Raton, Florida.
贝基·奎克：好的，这是来自卢的问题——来自佛罗里达州博卡拉顿的卢·博加特。
He says, “I’m a longtime shareholder with a concern as I head into retirement. I understand the theory that splitting shares does nothing for the value of shares. However, with the extremely high price on A shares, when I wish to draw down some money on my portfolio in retirement, I’m facing a large tax hit.
他说：“我是一名长期股东，随着退休的临近，我有一些担忧。我理解拆分股票对股票价值没有影响的理论。然而，由于 A 股的价格极高，当我希望在退休时提取一些投资组合中的资金时，我面临着巨额的税收负担。”
“Say the average price has been about $300,000 this year, and I’m sitting on a $200,000 capital gains liability for each share. If I need $60,000 in additional cash during my retirement, I need to sell a full share and get hit with $200,000 tax liability.
“假设今年的平均价格大约为 30 万美元，而我每股面临 20 万美元的资本利得税负。如果我在退休期间需要 6 万美元的额外现金，我就需要出售一整股，并承担 20 万美元的税负。”
“If you would split the stock 10-for-1, I could sell two $30,000 shares and keep my tax liability at a more manageable 40,000. I could also maintain more of my investment in Berkshire.”
“如果你将股票进行 10 比 1 的拆分，我可以出售两份 30,000 美元的股票，并将我的税务负担保持在更可控的 40,000 美元。我还可以在伯克希尔保持更多的投资。”
He said, “Have you thought about this? In retrospect, I should have bought B shares but didn’t think about it the time.”
他说：“你考虑过这个吗？回想起来，我应该买 B 股，但当时没有想到。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you can convert A to B shares, which is exactly what takes place when I give away the money in July to the five foundations. I actually convert it immediately before the gift, I mean, and so they get B shares.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，你可以将 A 股转换为 B 股，这正是我在七月将钱赠送给五个基金会时发生的事情。我实际上是在赠与之前立即进行转换，也就是说，他们获得的是 B 股。
And the truth is, the B shares are very useful to people that want to, either, give away a small portion of what they have, or spend it, or whatever it may be.
事实上，B 股对那些想要捐出一小部分他们所拥有的东西，或者花费它，或者其他任何用途的人来说，非常有用。
So, you can convert the A to B shares, which is exactly what I’ve been doing now for 14 years as I give it away, and — and solve that problem, and we —
所以，你可以将 A 股转换为 B 股，这正是我在过去 14 年中一直在做的事情，因为我在赠送它，并且——解决这个问题，我们——
We split the B shares, as I remember it, from one point, you know, just to make it even more manageable, so that people could deal with smaller denominations.
我们将 B 股拆分，我记得是从某个时点开始的，你知道，为了让它更易于管理，以便人们可以处理更小的面额。
The B shares — the A shares have a different voting power — but, we passed some resolution some time ago, I think — and it certainly would be the case — in any event, we’re never going to give the A shares an advantage over the B.
B 股——A 股的投票权不同——但是，我们在一段时间前通过了一些决议，我认为——无论如何，我们绝对不会让 A 股在 B 股面前占优势。
They used to have an advantage in a shareholder-designated contribution program that we had, and we put that in there when we started but that’s in — that goes way back in time, and that doesn’t exist anymore, so that the B and the A are going to get treated exactly the same over time.
他们曾经在我们设立的股东指定捐赠计划中享有一些优势。我们在开始时设置了这个计划，但那已经是很久以前的事情了，现在这个计划已经不存在了。所以，B股和A股未来将完全被同等对待。
It’s true the A have more votes, but — and they sell — they sell very close to parity all the time.
确实，A股有更多的投票权，但它们的交易价格几乎一直与B股保持接近的平价。
So, I would say that if you want to do anything, in terms of raising cash, and you’ve got a lot of A shares, you know, you take one or two shares of A — and plenty of people I know have done this — and just cash in, and turn it into B, and give yourself whatever amount of cash you want to get.
所以，我会说，如果你想筹集现金，而且你持有很多A股股票，你可以卖掉一两股A股——我认识的很多人都这么做过——然后将其换成B股，提取你需要的现金。
57. No “special problems in the banking industry now”
目前银行业没有“特殊问题”
BECKY QUICK: This is one that comes from Thomas Lin in Taiwan. He says, “Warren once said that banking is a good business if you don’t do dumb things on the asset side. Given that the pandemic might put a lot of pressure on the loans, dumb things that got done in the past few years are likely to explode.
贝基·奎克：这是来自台湾的托马斯·林的提问。他说：“沃伦曾经说过，如果你在资产方面不做愚蠢的事情，银行业是一个好生意。考虑到疫情可能会对贷款施加很大压力，过去几年做的愚蠢事情可能会爆发。”
“Through reading annual reports, 10-Qs, and other public information, what clues are you looking for to decide whether a bank is run by a true banker who avoids doing dumb things?”
“通过阅读年报、10-Q 报告和其他公开信息，您在寻找哪些线索来判断一家银行是否由真正的银行家管理，避免做愚蠢的事情？”
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a very good question. But I would say that the one thing that made (Federal Reserve) Chairman (Jerome) Powell’s job a little easier this time than it was in 2008 and ’09, is that the banks are in far better shape, so —
沃伦·巴菲特：这是个很好的问题。但我想说，这次让（美联储）主席（杰罗姆）鲍威尔的工作比 2008 年和 2009 年轻松一些的原因是，银行的状况要好得多，所以——
In terms of thinking about what was good for the economy, he wasn’t at the same time worrying about what he was going to do with bank A or bank B, to merge them with somebody else, or put strain — added strains on the system or anything.
在考虑对经济有利的事情时，他并没有同时担心自己要如何处理银行 A 或银行 B，是否要将它们与其他银行合并，或者给系统增加压力之类的事情。
The banks — the banks were very involved with the problem in 2008 and ’09. They had — they had done some things they shouldn’t have done in —some of them.
银行在2008年和2009年的问题中扮演了重要角色。部分银行做了一些不该做的事情。
And they were certainly in far different financial condition than now, so that — the banking system is not the problem in this particular shutdown. The government — we decided, as a people, to shut down part of the economy in a big way.
当时的银行财务状况与现在截然不同，因此在这次经济停摆中，银行体系并不是问题。作为一个国家，我们决定大规模关闭部分经济。
And it was not the fault of anyone that it happened. Things do happen in this world. Earthquakes happen, you know. Huge hurricanes happen. This was something different, but —
这并不是任何人的错，它发生了。这个世界上确实会发生事情。地震会发生，你知道的。巨大的飓风会发生。这是不同的事情，但——
The banks — banks need regulation. I mean, you know, they benefit from the FDIC, but part of having the government standing behind your deposits is to behave well, and I think that the banks have behaved very well, and I think they’re in very good shape.
银行确实需要监管。你知道，它们受益于联邦存款保险公司（FDIC），但让政府为你的存款提供保障的前提是要表现良好。我认为银行在这方面表现得非常好，而且它们的状况也非常稳健。
I mean, that’s why the FDIC has built up a hundred billion dollars that I’ve talked about. I mean, they’ve assessed the banks, in recent years, at accelerated amounts in certain periods, and they even differentiated against the big banks.
这就是为什么联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）已经积累了我提到的1000亿美元资金的原因。近年来，他们在某些时期加速向银行征收保险费，甚至对大银行进行了区分对待。
So, they built up great reserves there. And they built their own balance sheets, and they are not, presently, part of Chairman Powell’s problem, whereas they were very much a part of Chairman Bernanke’s problem back in 2008 and ’09.
所以，他们在那里建立了巨大的储备。他们建立了自己的资产负债表，而他们目前并不是鲍威尔主席的问题的一部分，而在 2008 年和 2009 年，他们确实是伯南克主席问题的一部分。
How you spot the people that are doing the dumb things is not easy because — well, sometimes it’s easy. But — (laughs) — I don’t see a lot that bothers me.
识别那些做傻事的人并不容易，因为——好吧，有时候很简单。但是——（笑）——我没有看到很多让我烦恼的事情。
But banks are, in the end, institutions that operate with significant amounts of other people’s money, and if problems become severe enough in an economy, even strong banks can be under a lot of stress, and we’ll be very glad we’ve got the Federal Reserve System standing behind them.
但银行最终是运用大量他人资金的机构，如果经济问题严重到一定程度，即使是强大的银行也可能面临很大压力，我们会非常高兴有联邦储备系统在背后支持他们。
I don’t see special problems in the banking industry now.
我现在在银行业没有看到特别的问题。
I could think of possibilities. And (CEO) Jamie Dimon referred to this a little bit in the Morgan — JPMorgan report. You can dream of scenarios that puts a lot of strain on banks, and they’re not totally impossible. And that’s why we have a (inaudible).
我可以想到一些可能性。（摩根大通的首席执行官）杰米·戴蒙在摩根大通的报告中也稍微提到了这一点。你可以设想一些可能会给银行带来巨大压力的情景，而这些并非完全不可能发生。这也是为什么我们需要（保险或缓冲机制）。
And I think that — I think overall, the banking system is not going to be the problem. But I’m not — I wouldn’t say that with a hundred percent certainty because there are certain possibilities that exist in this world where banks can have problems.
我认为——总体来说，银行系统不会成为问题。但我不会百分之百确定，因为这个世界上确实存在一些可能性，银行可能会出现问题。
They’re going to have problems with energy loans. They’re going to have problems some — you know, they’re going to have extra problems with consumer credit. They’re going to have — you know, they’re in — but they know it. And they’re well reserved. Well, they’re well capitalized for it. They were reserve building in the first quarter, and they may need to build more reserves.
他们将面临能源贷款的问题。他们将面临一些问题——你知道，他们在消费信贷方面会有额外的问题。他们会有——你知道，他们在——但他们知道这一点。而且他们的准备金充足。好吧，他们的资本充足。他们在第一季度进行了储备建设，可能还需要增加更多的储备。
But they are not a primary worry of mine at all. We own a lot of banks. We own a lot of bank stocks.
但这并不是我主要担心的事情。我们拥有很多银行。我们拥有很多银行股票。
Greg, do you have any thoughts on it?
格雷格，你对此有什么想法吗？
GREG ABEL: No, I really — you touched on it earlier, too, just in general, which is we don’t know how long this pandemic will go, we don’t know if there’s going to be a second event, which are just risks that are really unknown at this time, and the banks will have to continue to manage through that, as businesses do. But you’ve already highlighted that, obviously.
格雷格·阿贝尔：不，我真的——你之前也提到过这一点，总的来说，我们不知道这场疫情会持续多久，我们也不知道是否会有第二次事件，这些都是目前真的未知的风险，银行将不得不继续应对这些风险，就像企业一样。但你显然已经强调了这一点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
58. Despite its drop, Berkshire’s stock price hasn’t made buybacks compelling
尽管下跌，伯克希尔的股价仍然没有使回购变得有吸引力。
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？
BECKY QUICK: All right. So, this question — I was looking for one of these, because I got several questions that came in similar to this — I was looking for one of these a moment ago. This one’s from Andrew Wenke.
贝基·奎克：好的。那么，这个问题——我在寻找其中一个，因为我收到了几个类似的问题——我刚才在寻找其中一个。这是来自安德鲁·温克的问题。
He says, “Can you ask Warren why he didn’t purchase — repurchase — Berkshire shares in March when they dropped to a price that was 30 percent lower than the price that he had repurchased shares for in January and February?”
他说：“你能问问沃伦为什么在三月份股价下跌到比他在一月和二月回购的价格低 30%的时候没有购买——重新购买——伯克希尔的股票吗？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It was very, very, very short period where they were 30 percent less, but —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。那段时间非常非常短，他们的价格低了 30%，但是——
We — I don’t think Berkshire shares, relative to present value, are at a significantly different discount than they were when we were paying somewhat higher prices.
我认为伯克希尔的股票相对于当前的实际价值，并没有比我们以前支付稍高价格时有显著不同的折扣。
You know, it’s like (economist John Maynard) Keynes said, or whoever it was, “If the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”
你知道，就像经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯说的，或者不管是谁说的：“如果事实改变了，我就会改变主意。请问您怎么做呢，先生？”
So — it’s — we always think about it. But I don’t feel that it’s more — far more compelling to buy Berkshire shares now than I would have felt three months, or six months, or nine months ago.
所以——我们总是考虑这个。但我并不觉得现在购买伯克希尔的股票比三个月、六个月或九个月前更具吸引力。
It’s always — it’s always a possibility. And we’ll see what happens.
这总是——这总是一个可能性。我们拭目以待。
Greg, you’ve — you think about repurchasing shares. (Laughs)
格雷格，你在考虑回购股票。 （笑）
GREG ABEL: No, I — I think our approach, Warren, is the right approach. I mean, you’re always — I can’t really add anything other than the approach is the right approach.
格雷格·阿贝尔：不，我——我认为我们的方式，沃伦，是正确的。我意思是，你总是——我真的没有什么可以补充的，除了说这种方式是正确的。
We approach it when we see it’s the right thing for our shareholders to be repurchasing. And that doesn’t mean we’re repurchasing all the time, or the view doesn’t change.
我们在看到回购对我们的股东是正确的事情时就会采取行动。这并不意味着我们一直在回购，或者我们的观点没有变化。
WARREN BUFFETT: There could be a price, relative to value at the time, not relative to what it was worth a year ago, I mean.
沃伦·巴菲特：可能会有一个价格，相对于当时的价值，而不是相对于它一年前的价值，我是这个意思。
The value of certain things have decreased. Our airline position was a mistake. Berkshire is worth less today because I took that position than if I hadn’t.
某些事物的价值已经下降。我们的航空公司投资是一个错误。由于我采取了这个立场，伯克希尔今天的价值比如果我没有这样做要低。
And there are other decisions like that. And they’re not, you know — it is not more compelling to buy the shares now than it was when we were buying them. It’s not less compelling. I mean, it’s a wash. But we didn’t do any — we —
还有其他类似的决定。而且它们并不是，你知道——现在购买这些股票并没有比我们当时购买时更具吸引力，也没有更不具吸引力。我的意思是，这是一种平衡。但我们没有做任何——我们——
等着危机的连锁反应产生更低的价格。
It’s not gotten — the price has not gotten to a level — or not been at a level — where it really feels way better to us than other things, including the option value of money, to step up in a big, big way.
价格还没有达到一个水平——或者说没有处于一个水平——让我们感觉到比其他东西更好，包括货币的选择价值，因此我们还没有大幅度地增加投入。
59. Don’t owe money on your credit card
不要在信用卡上欠钱
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from three investors in Israel, Lidor Zloof, Yossi Zloof, and Dan Gorfung.
贝基·奎克：这个问题来自以色列的三位投资者，利多尔·兹卢夫、约西·兹卢夫和丹·戈尔丰。
They want to know about the credit card industry. It says, “How do you explain the rise in the average credit card interest rate in recent years compared to the federal funds rate? What are the forces that you think might keep it at or around current levels, and what are the forces that might drive it lower in the future?”
他们想了解信用卡行业。它说：“你如何解释近年来平均信用卡利率相对于联邦基金利率的上升？你认为有哪些因素可能会使其保持在当前水平或附近，以及哪些因素可能会在未来将其压低？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that is not a subject that I’m — you know — obviously, it affects American Express to some degree, it affects the banks we own.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这不是我——你知道——显然，这在某种程度上影响了美国运通，也影响了我们拥有的银行。
But interest rates on credit cards respond to competition, obviously, to loss potential, which, obviously, has gone up significantly in the last few months — although it’s gone down, perhaps from some other periods you can pick in the past — but I don’t really have much I can bring to the party on that question.
但信用卡的利率显然会受到竞争的影响，也会受到潜在损失的影响，而潜在损失在过去几个月中显著上升——尽管在过去的某些时期可能有所下降——但我对此问题并没有太多可以提供的。
We are not in the — well, that isn’t true. Our furniture companies, a couple of them, have their own credit card, although they do a lot of business on other people’s credit cards.
其实，我们的情况并不是完全如此。我们的几家家具公司确实有自己的信用卡，尽管它们的大部分业务仍然是通过其他人的信用卡完成的。
My general advice to people — I mean, you know — we have an interest in credit cards, but people — I don’t — I think people should avoid using credit cards as a piggy bank to be raided.
我对人们的一般建议是——尽管我们也有信用卡业务的利益相关，但我认为，人们不应该把信用卡当作随时可以动用的储蓄罐来使用。
I had a woman come to see me here not long ago, and she’d (inaudible) some money — and not very much, but it was a lot to her — she’s a friend of mine — and she said, “What should I do with it?” And I said, “Well, what do you owe on your credit card?” And she’s, “Well, I owe X.” And I said, “Well, what you should do” — I don’t know what interest rate she was paying, but I think, you know — maybe — I think I asked her, and she knew, and something like 18 percent or something.
不久前，有一位女士来找我，她有一些钱——虽然不多，但对她来说是笔大数目——她是我的朋友。她问我，“我应该怎么处理这笔钱？” 我就问她，“你信用卡上欠了多少钱？” 她回答说，“我欠了X。” 我说，“你应该做的是——” 我不知道她的利率是多少，但我想可能是——也许我当时问了她，她知道，大概是18%左右。
I said, “I don’t know how to make 18 percent.” You know, I mean — if I owed any money at 18 percent, the first thing I’d do with any money I had, would be to pay it off. It’s going to be way better than any investment idea I’ve got. And that wasn’t what you wanted to hear.
我说：“我不知道怎么赚 18%。”你知道，我的意思是——如果我欠了 18%的钱，我会用我所有的钱首先来还清。这比我任何投资想法都要好得多。而这不是你想听的。
And then later on in the conversation, she talked about her daughter, and her daughter had a thousand dollars or two thousand dollars, or something. And she said, “Well, what should I do with …” — and she named the girls — ”… money?”
后来在谈话中，她提到了她的女儿。她女儿有一千或两千美元左右，她问我：“我应该怎么处理我女儿的钱？”
And I said, “Have her lend it to you.” (Laughs)
我说：“让她借给你。”（笑）
“I mean, if you’re willing to pay 18 percent —(laughter) — or whatever, I mean, she’s not going to find a better deal. I’ll lend you money.”
“我的意思是，如果你愿意支付 18%的利息——（笑声）——或者其他什么，我是说，她不会找到更好的交易。我可以借钱给你。”
It just doesn’t — it doesn’t make sense. You can’t go through life, you know, borrowing money at those rates and be better off (inaudible).
这根本不合理。你不能在生活中以那样的利率借钱而过得更好（听不清）。
So, I encourage everybody — it’s contrary to my own — or Berkshire’s interests in certain cases — but the world is in love with credit cards — but I would suggest to anybody that the first thing they do in life is not owe — I don’t think — you can get to something else later on — but don’t be paying — don’t be paying, even 12 percent, to anybody. I mean it’s —
所以，我鼓励每个人——虽然在某些情况下这与我个人或伯克希尔的利益相悖——但现在的世界很喜欢信用卡。不过，我建议任何人，生活中首先要做的就是不要欠债——你可以在以后做其他事情——但千万不要付给任何人12%的利息。我是这么认为的。
Pay that off and then — and if they’re really a good credit and they don’t want to do it, come and see me personally, I’ll lend you the money — (laughs) — at that rate.
还清那个，然后——如果他们真的信用很好又不想这样做，亲自来找我，我会借给你钱——（笑）——按那个利率。
Greg, what do you tell your children? (Laughs)
格雷格，你对你的孩子们说什么？（笑）
GREG ABEL: The same advice — excellent advice. (Laughs)
格雷格·阿贝尔：同样的建议——非常好的建议。（笑）
No, I have three that carefully use their credit card, and more I would say for — not the — but, obviously, people use it a lot more as they go into the digital world and e-commerce world, but then the goal has to be to repay it.
不，我有三个都非常谨慎地使用他们的信用卡的人，而且更多是为了方便而不是过度使用。当然，随着人们进入数字化和电子商务的世界，信用卡的使用会越来越频繁，但关键是必须按时还款。
It doesn’t mean you — because you have to use it for those type of transactions, you run up the balance, but there’s an incremental risk there now.
这并不意味着因为你需要使用信用卡进行那些类型的交易，你就可以让余额不断增加。现在这种做法确实带来了额外的风险。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a matter of convenience for some people.
沃伦·巴菲特：对某些人来说，这是一种便利。
GREG ABEL: Yeah, yeah. 格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: But — I would have trouble — if I were paying 12 percent for money, or whatever it might be, it would not be a good thing. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：但是——如果我为资金支付 12%的利息，或者其他什么，那就不是一件好事。（笑）
You won’t see Berkshire paying that. (Laughter)
你不会看到伯克希尔支付那个。(笑声)
60. “I’m 100% for taking care of people” hurt economically by COVID-19 shutdowns
“我百分之百支持照顾因 COVID-19 封锁而受到经济伤害的人。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Beck. 沃伦·巴菲特：贝克。
BECKY QUICK: Warren, this question is from Lindsay Schumacher.
贝基·奎克：沃伦，这个问题来自林赛·舒马赫。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——
BECKY QUICK: Did you have something you were saying?
贝基·奎克：你有什么想说的吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: We probably ought to wind this up, maybe, in 15 minutes. Can you select the best ones? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们可能应该在 15 分钟内结束这个，您能选出最好的几个吗？（笑）
BECKY QUICK: OK. Absolutely. Yeah. Well, I’ve got a couple more questions for you.
贝基·奎克：好的，当然。是的。我还有几个问题要问你。
This one’s from Lindsay Schumacher. She says, “Warren, what’s your opinion regarding the (COVID-19) Payroll Protection plan?”
这条来自林赛·舒马赫。她说：“沃伦，你对（COVID-19）薪资保护计划有什么看法？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t want to get into politics generally. But I think that’s a very good idea to take care of the people who are having terrible trouble taking care of themselves in a period like this.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不想一般性地谈论政治。但我认为在这样的时期，照顾那些在照顾自己方面遇到严重困难的人是一个非常好的主意。
I mean, if the government — and surrounding conditions and whatever it may be — if you’re telling a lot of businesses, essentially, you know, quit doing business for a long time — and it’s one thing to tell me, but to tell somebody that is living from paycheck to paycheck that way — you know — I’m — I’m all for it.
我的意思是，如果政府——以及周围的环境，无论是什么——基本上是在告诉很多企业，停止长时间的经营，这对某些人来说可能无所谓，但对那些靠薪水过日子的人来说却完全不同。我完全支持这种考虑。
It must be hell to administer. I mean it — you know — any huge program. I don’t want to — I’ll never get into criticizing on how people do this or that, because I’ve had problems myself in running a few big things.
管理这样的事情肯定非常艰难。我是说——你知道——任何庞大的项目都会面临挑战。我不想去批评别人是如何做这件事或那件事的，因为我自己在管理一些大项目时也遇到过不少问题。
It just isn’t that easy to inaugurate incredibly large problems (programs). There’s going to be a certain amount of fraud. There’s going to be — you know, everything doesn’t go perfectly.
启动非常庞大的问题（项目）并不是那么简单。会有一定程度的欺诈。你知道，一切都不会完美进行。
But I am a hundred percent for taking care of the people that really get hurt by something that they’ve got nothing to do with, and where it’s — you know — who knows how long it lasts.
但我百分之百支持照顾那些因与自己无关的事情而受到伤害的人，而这种情况——你知道——谁知道会持续多久。
You’ve got millions and millions of people that are worrying about something that they weren’t worried about a few months ago. And they didn’t do anything. They showed up for work on time, and they pleased the people they dealt with, and whatever it may have been. And now they don’t have a job, or they’ve been furloughed, or whatever.
你有数以百万计的人在担心几个月前他们并不担心的事情。他们什么也没做。他们按时上班，取悦他们接触的人，无论是什么。现在他们失业了，或者被暂时解雇了，或者其他情况。
So, I — I’m totally for the basic idea. And I think it’s very difficult.
所以，我——我完全支持这个基本想法。我认为这非常困难。
We can’t carry it out perfectly. You do your best and you do it promptly. And I give — I give real credit to both Congress for acting promptly on what the problem is. They’ve sort of caught on from what they learned in 2008 and ’09, I think. And I give credit to trying to do what I think is very much the right thing, and I don’t sit around and think about how I could do it better. Greg?
我们无法做到完美。你尽力而为，及时完成。我对国会迅速采取行动解决问题给予真正的赞赏。我认为他们从 2008 年和 2009 年学到的经验中有所领悟。我赞赏他们努力做我认为非常正确的事情，而我不会坐在那里想我能做得更好。格雷格？
GREG ABEL: I agree with the comments.
格雷格·阿贝尔：我同意这些评论。
61. As a prosperous nation, we need to take better care of people fighting COVID-19
作为一个繁荣的国家，我们需要更好地照顾那些与 COVID-19 作斗争的人。
BECKY QUICK: Warren, this question comes from Bill Murray, the actor, who’s also a shareholder in Berkshire. He says, “This pandemic will graduate a new class of war veterans, health care, food supply, deliveries, community services. So many owe so much to these few. How might this great country take our turn and care for all of them?”
贝基·奎克：沃伦，这个问题来自演员比尔·默里，他也是伯克希尔的股东。他说：“这场疫情将培养出一批新的战争老兵，医疗、食品供应、快递、社区服务。许多人都欠这些人太多。这个伟大的国家将如何轮到我们来照顾他们所有人？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we won’t be able to pay, actually — you know, it’s like people that landed in Normandy or something. I mean, the poor, the disadvantaged, they suffer. There’s an unimaginable suffering, and at the same time, they’re doing all these things that — you know, they’re working 24-hour days, and we don’t even know their names. So, we ought to a —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们实际上无法支付——你知道，这就像那些登陆诺曼底的人。我是说，穷人和弱势群体，他们在受苦。那是一种无法想象的痛苦，同时，他们还在做这些事情——你知道，他们每天工作 24 小时，而我们甚至不知道他们的名字。所以，我们应该——
If we go overboard on something, we ought to do things that can help those people.
如果我们在某件事情上过于激进，我们应该做一些可以帮助那些人的事情。
And this country — I’ve said it a lot of times before — but the history of it, I mean — we are a rich, rich, rich country. And the people that are doing the kind of work that Bill talks about, you know, they are they’re contributing a whole lot more than some of the people that came out of the right womb, you know, or got lucky and thinks they’re — know how to arbitrage bonds, or whatever it may be. And I’m, you know, in large part, I’m one of those guys.
我以前说过很多次了，这个国家有着丰富的历史——我们是一个非常富裕的国家。那些做着比尔所提到的那类工作的人，实际上对社会的贡献远远超过了那些出身优越、运气好的人，这些人可能自认为懂得如何套利债券或其他类似的事情。而我很大程度上也属于那些靠运气的人之一。
So, you really try to create a society that under normal conditions, with more than $60,000 of GDP per capita, that anybody that worked 40 hours a week can have a decent life without a second job, and with a couple of kids, and have, you know —
所以，你真的试图创造一个在正常情况下，人均 GDP 超过 60,000 美元的社会，让任何每周工作 40 小时的人都能过上体面的生活，而不需要第二份工作，并且有几个孩子，拥有，您知道的——
They can’t live like kings. I don’t mean that. But that — nobody should be left behind. It’s like a rich family. You know, you find rich families, and if they have five heirs, or six heirs, they know they try and pick, maybe, the most able one to run the business.
他们不能像国王一样生活。我不是这个意思。但那——没有人应该被落下。这就像一个富裕的家庭。你知道，你会发现富裕的家庭，如果他们有五个继承人，或者六个继承人，他们会试着挑选，也许是最有能力的一个来管理生意。
But they don’t forget about — you know — the kid that actually may be a better citizen in some ways even than the one that does the best at business, but he just doesn’t happen to have that market value — skill.
但他们不会忘记那些孩子——你知道——有些孩子可能在某些方面是更好的公民，甚至比那些在商业上最成功的人更好，只是他们恰好没有那种市场价值的技能。
So, I do not think that a very rich company ought to totally abide by — totally abide by what the market dishes out, you know, in 18th century style or something of the sort.
所以，我认为一家非常富有的公司不应该完全遵循——完全遵循市场所提供的东西，你知道的，像 18 世纪那样或类似的东西。
So, I welcome ideas that go in that direction I — we’ve gone in that direction — you know, we did come up with Social Security in the ’30s.
所以，我欢迎朝这个方向发展的想法——我们已经朝这个方向前进了——你知道，我们在 30 年代确实提出了社会保障。
We — we’ve made some progress, but we ought to. We have become very, very, very rich as a country. And we’ve been — things have improved for the bottom 20 percent. I mean, you can see various statistics on that. But I’d rather be in the — I’d rather be in the bottom 20 percent now than be in the bottom 20 percent a hundred years ago, or 50 years ago.
我们——我们取得了一些进展，但我们应该这样做。作为一个国家，我们变得非常非常富有。而且——底层 20%的人生活状况有所改善。我是说，你可以看到各种统计数据。但我宁愿现在处于底层 20%，也不愿意在一百年前或五十年前处于底层 20%。
But it’s — what’s really improved — (laughs) — is the top 1 percent. And I hope we, as a country, move in a direction where the people Bill’s talking about get treated better. And it isn’t going to hurt — it isn’t going to hurt the country’s growth, and —It’s overdue, but a lot of things are overdue.
真正得到改善的主要是顶层的1%（笑）。我希望我们国家能够朝着一个方向前进，让比尔提到的那些人得到更好的待遇。这不会伤害国家的增长——实际上，这种改变早该发生，虽然很多事情都早该发生。
We are — I will still say we’re a better society than we were a hundred years ago. But you would think with our prosperity, we could — we would — hold ourselves to even higher standards of taking care of our fellow man, particularly when you see a situation like you’ve got today, where it’s the people that — whose names you don’t know, that are watching the people come in and watching the bodies go out.
我还是会说，我们比一百年前是一个更好的社会。但你会认为，随着我们的繁荣，我们应该——我们本可以——为照顾他人设定更高的标准，特别是在今天这样的情形下，那些默默无闻的人在前线坚守，那些你不知道名字的人正在看着人们进来，看到尸体出去。
Greg? 格雷格？
GREG ABEL: Yeah, I — the only other group that I would highlight, and I think it’s — it’ll be very interesting how it plays out — is with the number of homeschooling and the children that are home — I think there’s a — we’ve always had so much respect for teachers, but we all talk about how we don’t take care of them.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，我还想特别提到的另一个群体是，随着大量孩子在家接受教育和居家学习的现象，我认为这将会很有意思，看看如何发展。我们一直非常尊敬教师，但我们总是谈论如何没有好好照顾他们。
And, you know, it is remarkable to hear how many people comment that, clearly, we don’t recognize or — you know, I have a little 8-year-old — Beckett — at home and, you know, plenty of challenges for Mom. But all of a sudden, you respect the institution, the school, the teachers, and everything around it.
而且，你知道，听到这么多人评论，显然，我们没有意识到——你知道，我家里有一个 8 岁的孩子——贝克特——对妈妈来说有很多挑战。但突然间，你开始尊重这个机构、学校、老师以及周围的一切。
So, there’s — and then when I think of our companies and the delivery employees we have, it’s absolutely amazing what they’re doing, and they’re truly on the front line. You know, that’s where we have our challenges around keeping them health and safety.
所以，当我想到我们的公司和我们拥有的配送员工时，他们所做的事情真是令人惊叹，他们确实处于第一线。你知道，我们在保持他们的健康和安全方面面临着挑战。
And then you go all the way to the rail. The best videos you see out of our companies are when we have folks that are actively engaged in moving supplies, food, medical products, and they’re so proud of it, and they recognize they’re making a difference.
然后你一直走到铁路。我们公司最好的视频是当我们有员工积极参与运输物资、食品、医疗产品时，他们对此感到非常自豪，并意识到自己正在产生影响。
So, a lot of it is, we just owe them a great thanks. And, Warren, you touched on it. We can — some way — maybe, hopefully, longer term compensate them, but there’s a great deal of thanks, and I probably just think an immense amount — new appreciation for a variety of folks.
所以，我们非常感谢他们。沃伦，你提到了这一点。我们可以——以某种方式——也许，希望在长期内补偿他们，但我们非常感谢他们，我可能对各种各样的人有了更深的感激之情。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going the right direction (inaudible) the country, but it’s been awfully slow.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们在朝着正确的方向前进（听不清），但进展非常缓慢。
GREG ABEL: Yeah. 格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。
62. Capitalism needs government to make sure everyone participates in prosperity
资本主义需要政府确保每个人都能参与繁荣。
BECKY QUICK: Gentlemen, I’ll make this the last question. It comes from Phil King. He says, “Many people in the press and politics are questioning the validity of capitalism. What can you say to them that might prompt them to take a look at capitalism more favorably?”
贝基·奎克：先生们，我将把这个问题作为最后一个问题。这个问题来自菲尔·金。他说：“许多媒体和政治界的人在质疑资本主义的有效性。你能对他们说些什么，可能会促使他们更积极地看待资本主义？”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the market system works wonders. And it’s also brutal, if left entirely to itself.
沃伦·巴菲特：市场系统的确奇妙。但如果完全放任自流，它也会非常残酷。
And we wouldn’t be the country we are, if the market system hadn’t been allowed to function. And to some extent, you can say that other countries around the world that have improved their way of life dramatically, to some extent, have copied us.
如果市场系统没有被允许运作，我们就不会成为现在的国家。在某种程度上，可以说世界上其他一些显著改善生活方式的国家，在某种程度上是模仿了我们。
So, the market system is marvelous in many respects, but it needs government and it — you know — it is creative destruction, but for the ones who are destroyed It can be a very brutal game, and for the people who work in the industries and all of that sort of thing, so I —
所以，市场系统在许多方面都是奇妙的，但它需要政府的介入——你知道——它是创造性毁灭，但对于那些被毁灭的人来说，这可能是一个非常残酷的游戏，对于在这些行业工作的人来说也是如此，所以我——
I do not want to come up with anything different than capitalism, but I certainly do not want unfettered capitalism. And it’s — I don’t think we’ll move away from it, but I think we capitalists — and I’m one of them — you know, I think there’s a lot of thought that should be given to what would happen if we all drew straws — again — for particular market-based skills. You know, it’s —
我并不想提出任何与资本主义不同的东西，但我也不希望看到不受限制的资本主义。我不认为我们会远离资本主义，但作为一名资本家——我是其中一员——我认为我们应该认真思考，如果我们都重新抽签来决定具体的市场技能会发生什么。你知道，这是——
Somewhere way back, somebody invented television. I don’t know who it was. And then they invented cable. Then they invented pay systems and all of that. And so, the fellow that could bat .406 in 1941 was worth $20,000 a year, and now a marginal big leaguer, you know, will make vastly greater sums because, in effect, the stadium size was increased from 30 or 40 or 50,000 people to the country, and the market system — capitalism — took over.
在很久以前，有人发明了电视。我不知道那是谁。然后他们发明了有线电视。接着他们发明了付费系统等等。因此，1941 年能打出 0.406 的球员年薪是 20,000 美元，而现在一个边缘大联盟球员的收入要高得多，因为实际上，体育场的容量从 3 万、4 万或 5 万人增加到了全国范围，而市场系统——资本主义——接管了这一切。
And it’s very uneven. And incidentally, I think that Ted Williams — (laughs) — was worth a whole lot more money than I ever should make.
而且这非常不均衡。顺便说一下，我认为泰德·威廉姆斯——（笑）——值的钱远远超过我应该赚的。
But the market system can work toward a winner takes all-type situation, and we don’t want to discourage people from working hard and thinking hard, but that alone doesn’t do it. There’s a lot of randomness in the capitalist system — including inherited wealth — and I think we can — I think we can keep the best parts of a market system and capitalism, and we can do a better job of making sure that everybody participates in the prosperity that that produces. Greg?
但市场系统可能会导致赢家通吃的局面，我们不想打击人们努力工作和认真思考的积极性，但仅靠这些是不够的。资本主义系统中有很多随机性——包括继承财富——我认为我们可以保留市场系统和资本主义的最佳部分，并且可以更好地确保每个人都能参与到由此产生的繁荣中。格雷格？
GREG ABEL: Yeah. No, I think it’s always keeping the best parts of it. And I even think if we look at the current environment we’re in, i.e., in the pandemic, and we have to do it only when we can do it properly and reemerge, but in some ways the best opportunity for people is when we’re back working, clearly, and that the systems function again, but that — that’s the obvious and then there’s, as Warren, you’ve highlighted, there’s, you know, there’s a lot of imperfections but it’s still — it’s definitely the best model out there, that just needs some fine tuning.
格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。我认为始终保留其中最好的部分。我甚至认为，如果我们看看我们所处的当前环境，即疫情期间，我们必须在能够妥善处理时才去做，并重新出现，但在某种程度上，人们最好的机会是当我们重新开始工作时，显然，系统再次运作，但——这是显而易见的，然后正如沃伦所强调的，还有很多不完美之处，但这仍然是——这绝对是现有的最佳模型，只需要一些微调。
63. “Smartness does not necessarily equate to wisdom”
“聪明并不一定等同于智慧”
WARREN BUFFETT: And Becky, at the end, I would just —
沃伦·巴菲特：贝基，最后我只想说——
BECKY QUICK: Hey Warren —
贝基·奎克：嘿，沃伦——
WARREN BUFFETT: I would just say that, you know — oh sure, go ahead.
沃伦·巴菲特：我只想说，你知道——哦，当然，继续。
BECKY QUICK: Can I? Can I just —
贝基·奎克：我可以吗？我可以直接——
WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。
BECKY QUICK: — look at one more quick question. I forgot this one. Someone sent it in earlier. Thanks.
贝基·奎克：——再看一个快速问题。我忘了这个。有人早些时候发过来。谢谢。
Anderson Haxton wrote in. He said, “Warren mentioned that Ben Graham is one of the three smartest he’s ever met.” (Buffett laughs)
安德森·哈克斯顿写道。他说：“沃伦提到本·格雷厄姆是他见过的三位最聪明的人之一。”（巴菲特笑了）
“I’d like to ask him the names of the other two.”
“我想问他另外两个的名字。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I may not be one of the smartest, but I’m smart enough not to name the other two. I’d make two people happy. But — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我可能不是最聪明的，但我足够聪明，不去提其他两个人。我会让两个人开心。但是——（笑声）
But I would — it isn’t a — Ben Graham is one of the three smartest people, and I’ve known some really smart people. Smartness is not necessarily — does not necessarily equate to wisdom, either.
但我会——这不是——本·格雷厄姆是三位最聪明的人之一，我认识一些非常聪明的人。聪明并不一定——也不一定等同于智慧。
And Ben Graham, one of the things he said he liked to do, every day, was he wanted to do something creative, something generous, and something foolish.
本·格雷厄姆说他每天都想做的事情之一，就是做一些创造性的事情、一些慷慨的事情和一些愚蠢的事情。
And he said he was pretty good at the latter. (Laughs)
他说他在后者方面相当不错。（笑）
But he was pretty good — he was amazing, actually, creating. But it’s interesting that IQ does not always translate into rationality and behavioral success or wisdom, and so —
但他相当不错——实际上，他非常出色，创造力十足。但有趣的是，智商并不总是能转化为理性、行为成功或智慧，因此——
I know some people that are extraordinarily wise that would not be in the top three on an IQ test. But if I wanted their judgment on some matter, even if I want to put them in a position of responsibility someplace, I might prefer them to — we’ll say one of the three. That’ll leave the other two feeling fine — (laughs) — of the three. (Laughs)
我认识一些非常聪明的人，虽然他们在智商测试中可能不会排在前三名。但如果我需要他们对某些事情做出判断，甚至想让他们担任某个有责任的职位，我可能会更倾向于选择他们，而不是三名高智商者中的其中一位。（笑）这让另外两位感觉还不错。（笑）
Greg, you have any thoughts on that? (Laughter)
格雷格，你对此有什么想法吗？（笑声）
GREG ABEL: Nope. I agree with the person you named.
格雷格·阿贝尔：不，我同意你提到的那个人。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
64. Conclusion: Never bet against America
结论：永远不要与美国对赌
WARREN BUFFETT: And Becky, I would just — I would just say, again, that we may have — I hope we don’t — but we may get some unpleasant surprises, you know. We’re dealing with a virus that — that spreads its wings in a certain way, you know, in very unpredictable ways, and how the — how all Americans react to it, you know, there’s all kinds of possibilities.
沃伦·巴菲特：贝基，我只想再说一次，我们可能会——我希望不会——但我们可能会遇到一些不愉快的惊喜。你知道，我们正在处理一种以某种方式传播的病毒，以非常不可预测的方式传播，而所有美国人对此的反应，你知道，有各种可能性。
But I definitely come to the conclusion, after weighing all that sort of stuff, never bet against America. So, thanks.
但我绝对得出结论，在权衡所有这些因素后，永远不要对美国下赌注。所以，谢谢。
BECKY QUICK: Thank you. 贝基·奎克：谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
BECKY QUICK: I appreciate your time tonight.
贝基·奎克：感谢你今晚的时间。
WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll see you next year. We’ll have — we’ll fill this place. OK. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：明年见。我们会——我们会把这个地方填满。好的。（笑）
BECKY QUICK: OK, good night, everybody.
贝基·奎克：好的，大家晚安。
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