2021-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning Session - 2021 Meeting

早晨会议 - 2021 年会议

1. Good morning from Los Angeles

洛杉矶早上好

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. It’s 11:30 — or 10:30 here in Los Angeles, and we’re going to hold our second virtual annual meeting of Berkshire Hathaway. We did it in Omaha last year on short notice. We had more warning this time. And so, we came to Los Angeles.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。现在是 11:30——或者说洛杉矶这里是 10:30，我们将举行伯克希尔·哈撒韦的第二届虚拟年度会议。去年我们在奥马哈召开时通知很短。这次我们有了更多的准备时间。因此，我们来到了洛杉矶。

And the reason we’re doing it from here is because of the man on my left. Not because he asked for it, but because all of us wanted to do it with Charlie in — here in Los Angeles.

我们之所以在这里做这件事，是因为我左边的那个人。不是因为他要求，而是因为我们所有人都想和查理一起在洛杉矶做这件事。

So, I’ll introduce the three vice chairmen of Berkshire in a minute.

那么，我马上就会介绍伯克希尔的三位副主席。

I’ll show you the first quarter earnings. We won’t take much time on that.

我会给你看第一季度的收益。我们不会花太多时间在这上面。

I’ll have one or two very short lessons for, perhaps, the new investors, who are — not necessarily in Berkshire Hathaway — but people who have entered the stock market in the last year. And there’s — I think there have been a record number that have entered the stock market. I’ll have a couple of little examples for them.

我会为新投资者准备一两节非常简短的课程，这些投资者不一定是在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司，但他们是在过去一年进入股市的人。我认为进入股市的人数创下了纪录。我会给他们提供几个小例子。

And then we’ll swing into a Q&A led by Becky Quick, who’s looked at thousands of questions that have been submitted to her. But more can be submitted during this meeting. And we will put up on camera, from time to time, the way you can communicate directly with her if you want to send questions in during the meeting.

然后我们将进入由贝基·奎克主持的问答环节，她已经查看了成千上万提交给她的问题。但在会议期间还可以提交更多问题。我们会不时在镜头上展示您如何直接与她沟通，如果您想在会议期间发送问题。

She got flooded with them last time. And she miraculously keeps sorting them out. And so, feel free to send in a question. And we will have a question period for about three and a half hours.

她上次收到了很多问题。她奇迹般地一直在整理这些问题。所以，请随意提问。我们将有大约三个半小时的提问时间。

And then we will finally have the annual meeting, which won’t take long, at the end.

最后我们将举行年度会议，这不会花太长时间。

2. Charlie Munger introduction: He’s lived in the same house for 62 years

查理·芒格介绍：他在同一所房子里住了 62 年。

WARREN BUFFETT: So, with that, I would like to first introduce the three vice chairmen of Berkshire Hathaway. I’ll tell you just a little bit about them. And then I’ll have a mild surprise for you at the end, perhaps.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，接下来我想首先介绍一下伯克希尔·哈撒韦的三位副主席。我会简单告诉你们一些关于他们的事情。然后，或许在最后我会给你们一个小惊喜。

On my left is Charlie Munger. And I met Charlie 62 years ago. He was practicing law in Los Angeles.

我左边是查理·芒格。我 62 年前认识查理。他当时在洛杉矶执业。

He was building a house at that time a few miles from here. And 62 years later, he’s still living in the same house.

他当时在离这里几英里远的地方建房子。62 年后，他仍然住在同一所房子里。

Now that’s kind of interesting, because I was buying a house just a few months before, 62 years ago. And I’m still living in the same house. So, you’ve got a couple of fairly peculiar guys, just to start with, in terms of their love affair with their homes.

这有点有趣，因为我在 62 年前的几个月前买了一栋房子。而我仍然住在同一栋房子里。所以，首先你有两个相当奇特的人，他们与自己的家有着特殊的情感。

And Charlie and I hit it off immediately. And I would say he’s probably the vice chairman in charge of culture, among other things.

查理和我立刻就合得来。我会说他可能是负责文化的副主席，还有其他职责。

But, if I ever want to get questions about where true north is, I talk to Charlie. And he has been an enormous help. He’s done it with a lot fewer hours and a lot less talking and everything than I have. But he’s contributed in an incredible way to Berkshire.

但是，如果我想问真正的北方在哪里，我会找查理。他给了我巨大的帮助。他所花的时间和说的话都比我少得多。但他对伯克希尔的贡献是不可思议的。

So, Charlie’s been out here in Los Angeles for 60-plus years.

查理在洛杉矶待了超过 60 年。

3. Greg Abel introduction: He plays hockey

格雷格·阿贝尔介绍：他打冰球

WARREN BUFFETT: On my right, your left, I have the vice chairman in charge of everything except insurance and investments, Greg Abel.

沃伦·巴菲特：在我右边，你左边，是负责除保险和投资以外所有事务的副董事长格雷格·阿贝尔。

Greg was born and raised in Edmonton, Alberta. He’s Canadian. Plays hockey. His eight-year-old plays hockey.

格雷格出生并在阿尔伯塔省的埃德蒙顿长大。他是加拿大人。打冰球。他的八岁儿子也打冰球。

And he came to the United States sometime after he graduated from college in Canada. And he is in charge of a business which has well over 150 billion in sales and employs 200 — more than 250,000 — probably 275,000 people. And does a much better job at doing that than I was doing previously.

他在加拿大大学毕业后不久来到美国。他负责的企业销售额超过 1500 亿美元，雇佣了超过 25 万人，可能达到 27.5 万人。他在这方面的表现远胜于我之前的工作。

4. Ajit Jain introduction: He’s learned a lot about insurance

Ajit Jain 介绍：他对保险了解颇多

WARREN BUFFETT: And on my far left, your right, we have Ajit Jain. And Ajit was born and raised in India, and graduated from college there.

沃伦·巴菲特：在我最左边，你们的右边，我们有阿吉特·贾因。阿吉特出生并在印度长大，并在那里大学毕业。

And I met Ajit on a Saturday in 1986. And I’d been in the insurance business — Berkshire had been in the insurance business — for quite a while. And I was kind of stumbling around in various ways. And Ajit came to the office. And Saturday, I was opening the mail.

我在 1986 年的一个星期六遇到了 Ajit。我已经在保险行业工作了一段时间——伯克希尔也一直在保险行业。我有点迷茫。Ajit 来到了办公室。星期六，我在打开邮件。

And I said, “How much do you know about insurance?” And he said, “Nothing.” And I said, “Well, nobody’s perfect. And let’s (laughs) talk about it some.”

我说：“你对保险了解多少？”他回答：“一点都不知道。”我说：“好吧，没人是完美的。我们来（哈哈）聊聊这个吧。”

And by the end of the morning, I knew I had somebody that was going to build a great insurance business. And starting from that point, this improbable little company in Omaha became the largest property-casualty company in the world, in terms of net worth.

到早晨结束时，我知道我有一个人会建立一个伟大的保险业务。从那时起，这家位于奥马哈的小公司变成了世界上最大的财产意外保险公司，按净资产计算。

It writes risks — it writes risks, occasionally, in a 24-hour period that other companies simply couldn’t take on themselves. They’d have to assemble other people. It would take them a long time to come to a decision. That was very important at various times in the past. It’s not so important now.

它承担风险——它承担风险，有时在 24 小时内，其他公司根本无法独自承担。他们必须召集其他人。做出决定需要很长时间。在过去的某些时候，这非常重要。现在则不那么重要。

But he’s built an incredible — the world’s leading property-casualty insurance company.

但他建立了一家令人难以置信的——全球领先的财产意外保险公司。

5. We all lived in Omaha at one point

我们曾经都住在奥马哈。

WARREN BUFFETT: So, here we have Charlie from LA, 60-some years. We’ve got Greg from Canada. We’ve got Ajit from India.

沃伦·巴菲特：所以，我们这里有来自洛杉矶的查理，六十多年。我们有来自加拿大的格雷格。我们有来自印度的阿吉特。

And the one thing in common that these three fellows have, aside from working for Berkshire and doing a sensational job, the one thing in common is that at one time or another, for some extended period, they lived within a mile of me in Omaha, Nebraska.

这三位朋友的共同点是，除了为伯克希尔工作并表现出色之外，他们在某个时期内都曾在内布拉斯加州的奥马哈距离我不到一英里处居住。

And Charlie, in 1934, moved about a hundred yards away from where I now live. And went through high school and eventually went in the service. And knows the neighborhood as well as I do. Went to the same grade school my kids went to and so on.

查理在 1934 年搬到了离我现在住的地方大约一百码的地方。上了高中，最终参军。他对这个社区的了解和我一样。上了我孩子们上过的同一所小学，等等。

Greg spent significant time in — living in Omaha. Lived about five or six blocks from me. And now lives in Des Moines. And Ajit was in Omaha about a mile away for a couple years.

格雷格在奥马哈生活了很长时间，离我大约五六个街区。现在他住在德莫因。阿吉特在奥马哈住了大约一年，离我大约一英里。

So, we started in very different places, and sort of came together, and now go our separate ways, but it’s all worked very well.

所以，我们起初在非常不同的地方，后来走到了一起，现在又各自分开，但一切都进行得很好。

I would — and you’ll hear from them during this meeting — I urge you to send questions if you’re (unintelligble), then you can direct them to me, or you can direct them to anyone of the other three.

我会——你们将在这次会议中听到他们——我敦促你们如果有问题（听不清），可以直接问我，或者问其他三位中的任何一位。

And it will be a big relief to me if you direct a fair number to the other people.

如果你把相当一部分分配给其他人，对我来说将是一个很大的宽慰。

6. Read the 10-Q, but don’t focus on the net earnings

阅读 10-Q，但不要专注于净收益。

WARREN BUFFETT: So, we this morning, as we always do — we always do it on Saturday — we published our 10-Q, which gave the quarterly earnings. It’s up on our website, BerkshireHathaway.com.

沃伦·巴菲特：今天早上，我们像往常一样——我们总是在星期六——发布了我们的 10-Q，公布了季度收益。它已在我们的网站 BerkshireHathaway.com 上发布。

And it’s very interesting. We put these out on Saturday morning. That’s not because the media likes us to do it that way. It’s not because the analysts like to do it that way. But we want to give you the maximum time to digest an awful lot of information that’s in that 10-Q.

这非常有趣。我们在星期六早上发布这些。这并不是因为媒体喜欢我们这样做，也不是因为分析师喜欢这样做。我们希望给你们尽可能多的时间来消化 10-Q 中包含的大量信息。

It can’t be summarized in a perfect way. We’ll give you some summary figures. But if you’re really a student of the place — and most of our investors buy because they simply have faith in these other three fellows to do a good job — and that’s not a misplaced faith.

这无法完美地总结。我们会给你一些概括性的数字。但如果你真的是这个地方的学生——而我们大多数投资者之所以购买，是因为他们对其他三位伙伴有信心，认为他们会做好工作——这并不是一种错误的信任。

But if you really enjoy going into the details and you want to understand the nuts and bolts of Berkshire Hathaway’s various operations, you should read that 10-Q.

但如果你真的喜欢深入细节，并且想要了解伯克希尔·哈撒韦各项业务的具体运作，你应该阅读那份 10-Q 报告。

And it’ll take you — it may take you a couple of hours. I mean, it’s not a small investment of time. But it’s got a lot of information about all our various businesses. And for those of you who are business students of a sort, I recommend you go to it.

这可能需要你几个小时。我是说，这不是一个小的时间投资。但它包含了我们各种业务的很多信息。对于那些有点像商科学生的人，我建议你去看看。

The summary figures you see here, which are the ones we put in our press release, show kind of an interesting pair of numbers.

您在这里看到的摘要数字，即我们在新闻稿中提供的数字，显示了一对有趣的数字。

I mean, down there at the bottom, you know, we have last year. When you see those brackets around numbers, you know, you’ve got to start worrying. (Laughs)

我意思是，在底部，你知道，我们有去年的数据。当你看到数字周围有括号时，你知道，你得开始担心了。（笑）

And first quarter, we actually showed a loss of almost $50 billion. I never thought I’d ever see a figure like that.

在第一季度，我们实际上显示出近 500 亿美元的亏损。我从未想过我会看到这样的数字。

And was thinking back. I was trying to remember whether I’d gone on vacation during that quarter and turned things over to the other guys or what. But I checked the calendar, and that was me. (Laughs)

我在回想。我试图记得我是否在那个季度去度假，把事情交给其他人处理。可是我查了日历，那是我。（笑）

And that figure this year is a positive figure of 11.7 billion.

今年的数字是一个积极的数字，达到 117 亿。

And neither figure is very meaningful in itself. The (Financial) Accounting Standards Board, a few years ago — for many, many, many, many years, unrealized gains or losses of a company like Berkshire were made adjustments to the net worth of Berkshire, but they did not run through earnings.

而这两个数字本身并没有太大意义。几年前，财务会计准则委员会——多年来，像伯克希尔这样的公司的未实现收益或损失被调整到伯克希尔的净资产中，但并没有计入收益。

And a few years ago, the rule was changed so that every time stocks go up or down, it goes through our earnings account.

几年前，规则被更改，每当股票上涨或下跌时，都会经过我们的收益账户。

So, in the first quarter of last year, when stocks went down a lot, we had a huge sum of unrealized — well, it was a reduction of unrealized gains, largely. (Laughs)

所以，在去年的第一季度，当股票大幅下跌时，我们有一大笔未实现的——嗯，主要是未实现收益的减少。（笑）

And when you start saying things like that, you start losing people. But —

当你开始说这样的话时，你就开始失去人们。但——

That item is a mild plus this year.

该项目今年是一个温和的加分项。

But if you — if we reported earnings daily, you would see earnings one day of 3 billion. Next year — day — of minus 2 billion.

但是如果我们每天报告收益，你会看到某一天的收益是 30 亿。明年的某一天是负 20 亿。

And it’s an accounting treatment that we don’t think is particularly appropriate, but it’s required. And we explain, very carefully, both in our press releases — there we got to explain — and I try to write in my letter and explain why I don’t think that’s the way to look at Berkshire.

这是一种我们认为并不特别合适的会计处理，但这是必须的。我们在新闻稿中非常仔细地解释了这一点——在那里我们必须解释——我在信中也尽量写明为什么我认为这不是看待伯克希尔的方式。

We think, over time, that we will have investment gains for reasons I lay out in my letter.

我们认为，随着时间的推移，我们将会获得投资收益，原因我在信中阐述。

Over a period of time, the companies we own stock in retain earnings. And they use those reinvested earnings, usually, to our benefit. And that shows up in capital gains someday.

随着时间的推移，我们持有股票的公司会保留收益。通常，它们会将这些再投资的收益用于我们的利益。这最终会体现在资本收益上。

But reported earnings for a company that has a lot of common stocks — marketable stocks — like ours, you don’t want to look at that final line, and you do want to look at the operating earnings line.

但是，对于像我们这样拥有大量普通股（可交易股票）的公司，报告的收益你不想关注最后一行，而是想关注营业收益这一行。

Now, I would say that if you had taken the first two months of last year and compared to the first two months of this year, those figures would have been quite comparable.

现在，我想说，如果你把去年的前两个月与今年的前两个月进行比较，这些数字是相当可比的。

But, of course, in March of 2020, the economy was shut down, in effect. I mean, it was a self-induced recession. And an abrupt one, very abrupt.

但是，当然，在 2020 年 3 月，经济实际上被关闭了。我的意思是，这是一场自我引发的衰退。而且是一次非常突然的衰退。

And so, the economy went off a cliff in March. It was resurrected in an extraordinarily effective way by Federal Reserve action. And later, on the fiscal front, by Congress. And we’ll get into that later, but —

因此，经济在三月份崩溃了。通过联邦储备的行动，它以一种极其有效的方式复苏了。后来，在财政方面，国会也做出了贡献。我们稍后会详细讨论，但——

The figure you see that — the difference was March, basically, of the two.

你看到的这个数字——基本上是两者之间的差异在三月份。

And our businesses have done — we’ll get into more specifics later — but our business has done really quite well. This has been a very, very, very unusual recession, in that it’s been localized, as to industry, to an extraordinary extent.

我们的业务表现得很好——稍后我们会详细讨论——但我们的业务确实做得相当不错。这是一次非常非常非常不同寻常的衰退，因为它在行业上是极其局部化的。

And right now, business is really very good in a great many segments of the economy, which we’ll talk about later. But there’s still problems if you’re in a few types of business that really have been decimated. You know, such as international air travel or something of the sort.

而现在，经济的许多领域生意确实非常好，我们稍后会谈到。但如果你处于一些真正受到重创的行业，仍然会面临问题。比如，国际航空旅行或类似的行业。

So, with that, we’ll go back to the figures later on, perhaps in some of the questions.

所以，基于此，我们稍后会回到这些数字，也许在一些问题中。

7. Lesson for new investors: Extraordinary things can happen

新投资者的教训：非凡的事情可能会发生

WARREN BUFFETT: I would like to just go over two items that I would like — particularly new entrants to the stock market — to ponder just a bit before they try and do 30 or 40 trades a day in order to profit what — from what looks like a very easy game.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想谈谈两个项目，我希望特别是新进入股市的人在尝试每天进行 30 或 40 笔交易以从看似非常简单的游戏中获利之前，能稍微思考一下。

So, I would like to go to slide L-1. So, put that up.

所以，我想去幻灯片 L-1。请把它放上去。

And these, on March 31st, I ran off a list of the 20 largest companies in the world, by stock market value.

在 3 月 31 日，我列出了全球市值最大的 20 家公司。

And those names — a good many of which will be familiar to you — but they were led by Apple at slightly over 2 trillion. And it went down to the number 20th was worth 330-odd billion.

这些名字——其中许多对你来说会很熟悉——但它们的领头羊是苹果，市值略超过 2 万亿。而第 20 名的市值约为 3300 多亿。

But those are the 20 largest companies in the world, by market value, on March 31st.

但截至 3 月 31 日，这些是全球市值最大的 20 家公司。

Now if I had a little — I was hoping I could get a little quiz machine so I could have everybody weigh on this answer, and we could flash it up a little later, but that proved technically impossible for — but what I would like you to do is look at that list.

现在如果我有一点——我希望我能得到一个小测验机，这样我就可以让大家对这个答案进行投票，然后我们可以稍后显示出来，但这在技术上是不可能的——但我希望你能看看那份名单。

It starts off with Apple, and Saudi Aramco is a pretty kind of a specialized country — company. I don’t know whether it’s 95% owned by the government or what, but it’s essentially a country that’s for sale there (laughs), in terms of that business.

它以苹果公司开始，而沙特阿美是一家相当专业的公司——国家。我不知道它是否 95%由政府拥有，但从商业角度来看，它本质上是一个待售的国家（笑）。

But the top — of the top six companies, five of them are American. So, when you hear people say that America hasn’t done — you know, it’s got all the — it’s not working very well or something of the sort — you know, in the whole world, of the six top companies in value, five of them are in the United States.

但在前六大公司中，有五家是美国公司。因此，当你听到人们说美国没有做到——你知道的，它有所有的——运作得不是很好或类似的说法时——你知道，在全世界六大公司中，五家位于美国。

And if you think about it — you know, we talked a little about this last year — but in 1790, we had one-half of one percent of the world’s population — a little less — we had four million people, 3.9 million people. Six-hundred thousand of them were slaves.

如果你想想看——你知道，我们去年稍微谈到过这个——但在 1790 年，我们拥有世界人口的百分之零点五——稍微少一点——我们有四百万人，三百九十万人。其中六十万是奴隶。

Ireland had more people than the United States had. Russia had five times as many people as the U.S. did. Ukraine had twice as many people as the United States.

爱尔兰的人口超过了美国。俄罗斯的人口是美国的五倍。乌克兰的人口是美国的两倍。

So, here we were, well, what did we have? We had a map for the future, an aspirational map, that somehow, now only 200 and — well, after the Constitution — 232 years later, leaves us with five of the top six companies in the world. You know, that’s not an accident.

所以，我们在这里，嗯，我们有什么？我们有一张未来的地图，一张理想的地图，而现在，仅仅在宪法之后的 232 年后，这张地图让我们拥有了全球前六大公司的五家。你知道，这不是偶然。

And it’s not because we were way smarter, way stronger, you know, anything of the sort. We had good soil, decent climate. But so do some of those other countries I named.

这并不是因为我们更聪明、更强大，或者其他类似的原因。我们有良好的土壤，适宜的气候。但我提到的一些其他国家也有这些条件。

And the system has worked unbelievably well. Just imagine thinking of five of the top six companies in the world ending up with a country that started with a half of one percent of the population just a few hundred years ago.

这个系统运作得令人难以置信。想象一下，世界上六大公司中的五家，最终与一个几百年前仅占人口百分之零点五的国家相联系。

But what I would like you to do is look at that list for a minute or two, if you want to. And then make an estimate, make your own guess. How many of those companies are going to be on the list 30 years from now?

但我希望你能花一两分钟看看那份名单，然后做一个估计，猜测一下。30 年后，这些公司中有多少会在名单上？

Here they are. These powerhouses. How many would you guess are going to be on the list?

它们在这里。这些强者。你猜有多少会在名单上？

Well, you know, it’s not going to be all 20. It may not even be all 20 today or tomorrow. (Laughs) This was March 31st.

好吧，你知道，这不会全是 20。今天或明天可能甚至都不是全 20。（笑）这是 3 月 31 日。

But what would you guess? And think about that yourself. Would you put down five? Eight?

但你会猜多少呢？想想这个问题。你会写下五个吗？八个？

Well, whatever it would be, I would now invite you to look at slide two — or L-2 — which goes back a little more than 30 years. And look at the top 20 from 1989.

好吧，无论是什么，我现在邀请您查看第二张幻灯片——或 L-2——它回溯到 30 多年前。请看 1989 年的前 20 名。

And if you look at the top 20 from 1989, there’s two things that should grab your interest. At least two.

如果你看看 1989 年的前 20 名，有两件事应该引起你的兴趣。至少两件。

None of the 20 from 30 years ago are on the present list. None. Zero.

30 年前的 20 个中没有一个在现在的名单上。一个都没有。零。

There were then six U.S. companies on the list. And their names are familiar to you. They have General Electric. We have Exxon. We have IBM Corp. And these are — they’re still around. Merck is down there at number — none made it to the list 30 years later. Zero.

然后名单上有六家美国公司。它们的名字你一定很熟悉。它们有通用电气。我们有埃克森美孚。我们有 IBM 公司。这些公司——它们仍然存在。默克排在第——没有一家在 30 年后进入名单。零。

And I would guess that very few of you, when I asked you to play the quiz a little — a few minutes ago — would have put down zero. And I don’t think it will be zero.

我猜当我几分钟前请你们玩这个测验时，几乎没有人会写下零。我认为结果不会是零。

But it is a reminder of what extraordinary things can happen. Things that seem obvious to you.

但这提醒我们，非凡的事情是可以发生的。那些对你来说似乎显而易见的事情。

Japan had this wonderful bull market for a very long time. So, you had a number of Japanese companies on the list. Today there are none.

日本经历了很长时间的牛市。因此，名单上有许多日本公司。今天没有一家。

And the United States had the six. Now we have 13. But they aren’t the same six.

美国有六个。现在我们有 13 个。但它们不是同样的六个。

I would invite you to think about one other thing as you look at this list.

我想邀请你在查看这个列表时考虑另一件事。

1989 was not the dark ages. And we weren’t just discovering capitalism or anything else. And people thought they knew a lot about the stock market. And the efficient market theory was in. And they were — it was not a backward time.

1989 不是黑暗时代。我们不仅仅是在发现资本主义或其他任何东西。人们认为他们对股市了解很多。有效市场理论盛行。那时并不是一个落后的时代。

And if you look, the top company at that time had a market value of 100 billion, 104 billion.

如果你看看，当时排名第一的公司市值为 1000 亿，1040 亿。

So, the largest company in the world, of title, in just a shade over 30 years, has gone from 100 billion to 2 trillion.

所以，世界上最大的公司，在短短 30 多年里，从 1000 亿增长到 2 万亿。

At the bottom, the number 20 has gone from 34 billion to something a little over ten times that.

在底部，数字 20 已经从 340 亿变成了略高于十倍的数。

Well, that tells you something about what’s happened with equality, which is a hot subject in this country.

好吧，这告诉你一些关于平等发生了什么的事情，这是这个国家一个热门话题。

It tells you a little bit about inflation. But this was not a highly inflationary period, as a whole.

它告诉你一些关于通货膨胀的情况。但整体而言，这并不是一个高度通货膨胀的时期。

But it tells you that capitalism has worked incredibly well, especially for the capitalists. And it’s a pretty astounding number.

但这告诉你，资本主义运作得非常好，尤其是对资本家来说。这是一个相当惊人的数字。

Do you think it could be repeated now that — 30 years from now — that you could take 2 trillion for Apple, and multiply any company, and come up with 30 times that for the leader?

你认为现在可以重复吗——30 年后——你可以为苹果公司拿出 2 万亿，然后乘以任何公司，得出领导者的 30 倍吗？

You know, it seems impossible. And maybe it is impossible.

你知道，这似乎是不可能的。也许这确实是不可能的。

But that just — we were just as sure of ourselves as investors — and Wall Street was — in 1989 as we are today. But the world can change in very, very dramatic ways.

但那时——我们作为投资者对自己有着同样的信心——而华尔街在 1989 年也是如此，和我们今天一样。但世界可以以非常戏剧性的方式改变。

And I’ll just give you one other example you might ponder.

我再给你一个你可以思考的例子。

This is — when you start feeling too sure of yourself —

这就是——当你开始对自己过于自信时——

One thing it shows, incidentally, is that — it’s a great argument for index funds — is that, you know, the main thing to do was to be aboard the ship — you know, a ship.

这件事顺便表明——这是一个支持指数基金的有力论据——你知道，最重要的是要在船上——你知道，一艘船。

You know, they were all going to a better promised land — you used to know which one was the one they’d necessarily get on — but you couldn’t help but do well if you just had a diversified group of equities — U.S. equities would be my preference — to hold over a 30-year period.

你知道，他们都在前往一个更好的应许之地——你曾经知道他们一定会选择哪个——但如果你只是拥有一个多样化的股票组合，你就无法不表现良好——美国股票是我的首选——在 30 年的时间里持有。

But if you thought you knew a lot about which ones to pick, or the person that you had hiring, you were paying a lot of money to, had all these ideas.

但如果你认为你对选择哪些人有很多了解，或者你雇佣的那个人，你支付了很多钱给他，有很多想法。

And I could tell you their best ideas in 1989 did not necessarily do that well. Although, overall, equities were absolutely the place to be.

我可以告诉你，他们在 1989 年的最佳想法并不一定表现得很好。尽管总体而言，股票绝对是投资的最佳选择。

8. Lesson for new investors: Picking winners isn’t “as easy as it sounds”

新投资者的教训：挑选赢家并不像听起来那么简单

WARREN BUFFETT: Secondly, people get enormously attracted to various industries. I mean, they think if — they think if you know — if a company says it’s in the XYZ industry and that’s a popular one, you can sell IPOs, you can sell SPACs, you can — people disregard sales numbers, earnings numbers — that just, you know, it’s the place to be.

沃伦·巴菲特：其次，人们对各种行业非常感兴趣。我的意思是，他们认为如果——他们认为如果一家公司说它在 XYZ 行业，而那是一个热门行业，你可以出售首次公开募股（IPO），你可以出售特殊目的收购公司（SPAC），人们会忽视销售数字、盈利数字——这就是，您知道的，应该去的地方。

So, Berkshire Hathaway — where was the place to be in 1903 when — my dad was born in 1903, but that wasn’t really that big of news — but it was big news that actually Henry Ford was starting the Ford Motor Company. He’d failed a couple of times before. But he was about to change the world.

所以，伯克希尔·哈撒韦——在 1903 年，那个地方是最重要的——我爸爸是在 1903 年出生的，但这并不算什么大新闻——但亨利·福特创办福特汽车公司的消息却是大新闻。他之前失败过几次。但他即将改变世界。

I mean, the auto — when you think about everything — we’ve got a great auto insurance company. (Laughs) If there weren’t any autos, we wouldn’t have GEICO, the —

我想说，汽车——当你考虑所有事情时——我们有一家很棒的汽车保险公司。（笑）如果没有汽车，我们就不会有 GEICO，——

But it’s transformed the country. And Henry Ford brought in the $5 daily wage, and that was a huge thing. Assembly lines — I mean, everything autos came along.

但这改变了国家。亨利·福特引入了每天 5 美元的工资，这是一件大事。流水线——我的意思是，所有汽车都随之而来。

So, let’s just assume that you had seen a quick glance back in 1903 of all the interstate highways, 290 million vehicles on the road in the United States. You know, everything about it.

那么，假设你在 1903 年快速回顾了一下美国的所有州际高速公路，看到有 2.9 亿辆汽车在路上。你知道，关于这一切。

And you said, “Well, this is pretty easy. It’s going to be cars. It’s going to be autos.”

你说：“嗯，这很简单。这将是汽车。这将是轿车。”

Well, Berkshire — let’s see what we’ve got up there. Yeah, no, stay where you were. Go back. (Laughs) I don’t want to change slides yet. The — go back to the L’s — the —

好吧，伯克希尔——让我们看看我们那里有什么。是的，不，待在你原来的位置。回去。（笑）我还不想换幻灯片。——回到 L 的——那个——

Berkshire, by accident — well, we own a company called Marmon. We bought it from the Pritzker family some years ago. The Pritzkers had built this business from many, many, many companies that they’d acquired. And the name of their company was Marmon.

伯克希尔，偶然间——好吧，我们拥有一家叫做Marmon的公司。我们几年前从普利兹克家族手中购买了它。普利兹克家族通过收购许多许多公司建立了这个业务。他们公司的名字就是Marmon。

And I don’t know exactly why Jay and Bob decided to name it Marmon. But they did own a company called Marmon.

我不知道杰伊和鲍勃为什么决定把它命名为Marmon。但他们确实拥有一家叫Marmon的公司。

And the Marmon Company had — getting slightly ahead of me on the slides again, but that’s OK — the — we called it — it was — they owned this company Marmon, which, in 1911 had been the company whose car won the first Indianapolis 500.

Marmon公司拥有——稍微超前于我的幻灯片，但没关系——我们称之为——它是——他们拥有这家公司Marmon，该公司在 1911 年赢得了第一届印第安纳波利斯 500 的汽车比赛。

And maybe that’s why they called it Marmon. They were proud of the fact that the company in 1911 named the — won the first Indianapolis 500.

也许这就是他们称之为 Marmon 的原因。他们为公司在 1911 年赢得第一届印第安纳波利斯 500 而感到自豪。

It also was the company that invented the rearview mirror. I’m not sure whether that was a big contribution to society. Certainly, around your household — (laughs) — a rearview mirror, you don’t want to emphasize too much.

这也是发明后视镜的公司。我不确定这对社会是否是一个重大贡献。当然，在你的家庭中——（笑）——后视镜，你不想过于强调。

But they — the car that was entered in the Indianapolis 500, the guy who normally sat next to the driver and looked backwards to tell what the competitors were doing, he was sick, so they invented the rearview mirror.

但是他们——参加印第安纳波利斯 500 英里赛的赛车，通常坐在驾驶员旁边并向后看以告诉驾驶员竞争对手在做什么的那个人生病了，所以他们发明了后视镜。

So, let’s just assume that you had decided that autos were this incredible thing. And someday, there’d be an Indianapolis 500. And someday, they’d have rearview mirrors on cars. And someday, 290 million cars would be buzzing around the United States — or autos — they’re counting trucks there.

所以，让我们假设你已经决定汽车是这个令人难以置信的东西。总有一天，会有印第安纳波利斯 500 大赛。总有一天，汽车上会有后视镜。总有一天，2.9 亿辆汽车会在美国四处行驶——或者说汽车——他们在计算卡车。

And so, I decided to look at the history. And I thought I’d put up the list of auto companies from over the years.

因此，我决定查看历史。我想我会列出多年来的汽车公司名单。

And I was originally going to put up just the ones that were the M’s, so I could get them on one slide. But when I went to the M’s, it went on and on and on.

我原本打算只放上那些 M 的，这样我可以把它们放在一张幻灯片上。但是当我去找 M 的时候，它一直延续下去。

So, I just decided to put up the ones that started with M-A. And as you can see, there were almost 40 companies that went into the auto business — just starting with M-A — including our little — our Marmon there in the middle column, which lasted for a while, quite a while. It was selling cars in the 1930s (that) were really quite special.

所以，我决定把以 M-A 开头的公司列出来。正如你所看到的，几乎有 40 家公司进入了汽车行业——仅仅是以 M-A 开头——包括我们的小公司——我们在中间列的 Marmon，它持续了一段时间，确实很长一段时间。它在 1930 年代销售的汽车真的非常特别。

But in any event, there were at least 2,000 companies that entered the auto business, because they clearly had this incredible future. And, of course, you remember, that in 2009, there were three left. Two of which went bankrupt.

但无论如何，至少有 2000 家公司进入了汽车行业，因为它们显然看到了这个令人难以置信的未来。当然，你还记得在 2009 年，只剩下三家公司。其中两家破产了。

So, there’s a lot more to picking stocks than figuring out, you know, what’s going to be a wonderful industry in the future.

所以，挑选股票远不止于弄清楚未来哪个行业会很出色。

The Maytag Company put out a car. Allstate put out a car. DuPont put out a car. I mean, there was a Nebraska Motor Company.

Maytag公司推出了一款汽车。Allstate推出了一款汽车。杜邦公司推出了一款汽车。我的意思是，还有一家内布拉斯加汽车公司。

Everybody started car companies, just like everybody’s starting something now that can be — where you can get money from people.

每个人都开始了汽车公司，就像现在每个人都在开始一些可以从人们那里获得资金的事情。

But there were very, very, very few people that picked the winner, got the opportunity.

但选择赢家并获得机会的人非常非常非常少。

At Ford Motor, Henry Ford had a few partners, and he didn’t like them, so he figured a way to buy them out. That was sort of the — that was one — is sort of the beginning of the auto finance. That’s a long story, but we won’t get into that.

在福特汽车公司，亨利·福特有几个合伙人，他不喜欢他们，于是想办法将他们买断。这算是汽车金融的开始。这是个长故事，但我们就不深入讨论了。

But you couldn’t buy into Ford Motor. And, of course, General Motors became the dominant company, finally, when Henry Ford did not really make the shift from the Model T to the Model A very — it did not work very well.

但你无法投资福特汽车。当然，通用汽车最终成为了主导公司，因为亨利·福特并没有成功地将生产从 T 型车转向 A 型车。

So, I just want to tell you, it’s not as easy as it sounds.

所以，我只想告诉你，这并不像听起来那么简单。

9. Q&A begins

问答环节开始

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, we will go to Becky Quick. And she will ask any of the four of us questions she has selected, and which we don’t — she doesn’t share with us.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我们将交给贝基·奎克。她将向我们四个人提问，问题是她自己选择的，我们并不知道这些问题。

And we will do this for a considerable period of time. So, you can be sending in questions to her. And then later on, after about three and a half hours, we will have the annual meeting, which won’t take long. So, Becky, over to you.

我们将这样做相当长的一段时间。因此，您可以向她发送问题。然后大约三个半小时后，我们将举行年度会议，这不会花太长时间。那么，贝基，交给你了。

10. “I still wouldn’t want to buy the airline business”

“我仍然不想购买航空业务”

BECKY QUICK: Thanks, Warren. And hello to everybody.

贝基·奎克：谢谢，沃伦。大家好。

This first question that came in, came in from Andy Cies. He says he’s the owner of not nearly enough B shares.

这个第一个问题来自安迪·西斯。他说他拥有的 B 股远远不够。

He says, “Mr. Buffett, you’re well known for saying to be fearful when others are greedy and be greedy when others are fearful. But, by all appearances, Berkshire was fearful when others were most fearful in the early months of COVID, dumping airline stocks at or near the low, not taking advantage of the fear gripping the market to buy shares of public companies at exceptional discounts, and being hesitant to buy back significant amounts of Berkshire stock at very attractive prices.

他说：“巴菲特先生，您以‘在别人贪婪时要恐惧，在别人恐惧时要贪婪’而闻名。但从表面上看，伯克希尔在 COVID 初期其他人最恐惧时却显得恐惧，抛售航空股在低点或接近低点时，没有利用市场的恐惧以极具折扣的价格购买上市公司的股票，并且在非常有吸引力的价格上回购大量伯克希尔股票时显得犹豫不决。”

“I’d appreciate hearing your thoughts surrounding this time and how Berkshire approached its decision making, specifically after it was assured, through the CARES Act, that the government would provide a robust backstop to the financial markets.”

“我很想听听您对这个时期的看法，以及伯克希尔是如何进行决策的，特别是在通过《CARES 法案》确保政府将为金融市场提供强有力的支持之后。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it wasn’t until late — until both monetary and fiscal policy kicked in — well, you knew we had an incredible problem. And I am, just as Charlie is the chief culture officer, I’m the chief risk officer of Berkshire. That’s my job. We hope we do well, but we want to be sure we don’t do terribly.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，直到后期——直到货币和财政政策开始发挥作用——你才知道我们面临着一个巨大的问题。而我，就像查理是首席文化官一样，我是伯克希尔的首席风险官。这是我的工作。我们希望能做得很好，但我们想确保不会做得太糟。

But we didn’t sell a substantial amount. I mean we’re a company with six, probably $700 billion worth of businesses, some we own in their entirety, some we own a piece of.

但我们并没有出售大量。我是说，我们是一家价值大约六七千亿美元的公司，有些业务我们完全拥有，有些我们只拥有一部分。

And I don’t know whether we were sellers of maybe 1% of the value of all the businesses we had at that period.

我不知道在那段时间我们是否只占所有业务价值的 1%的卖家。

But the airline — it’s kind of interesting with the airline businesses, in particular. And I’ll get to what was done in fiscal and monetary policy.

但航空公司——航空业务特别有趣。我会谈到财政和货币政策所做的事情。

But we had a few people at various subsidiaries of Berkshire that wanted to go in for help from the government.

但我们在伯克希尔的几个子公司有一些人希望寻求政府的帮助。

And, in some cases, they had minority shareholders who owned a few percent, and they said, well, this — you know, we’re going to get killed by what’s happening with the regulations that are being put out and that were stopping the economy. And they said everybody’s going in for them, and why don’t we go in?

而在某些情况下，他们有一些持有几个百分点股份的少数股东，他们说，这——你知道，我们将会被正在出台的法规所影响，这些法规正在阻碍经济。他们说大家都在参与，为什么我们不参与呢？

I said, you know — (laughs) — Berkshire can handle it. This is for people that can’t handle what’s happening. And so, we’re not applying.

我说，你知道——（笑）——伯克希尔可以应对。这是给那些无法应对发生的事情的人。因此，我们不申请。

But the airlines were the most prominent beneficiaries of what took place immediately. They got 25 billion, initially, most of which went to the big four airlines, and some of which went is as grants, not loans.

但航空公司是立即发生的事件中最显著的受益者。他们最初获得了 250 亿美元，其中大部分流向了四大航空公司，还有一部分以赠款而非贷款的形式发放。

And, you know, I think that was fine public policy. I think it — I wished it could go to every restaurant and dry cleaner and every small business that really was out of business and had no — I mean they were made toast of, you know, basically.

我认为那是很好的公共政策。我希望它能惠及每一家餐馆、干洗店和每一个真正倒闭的小企业，他们基本上已经无路可退了。

But the airlines — clearly, what happened was not their fault in any way, shape, or form. It wasn’t like 2008 and ’09 when people blamed the banks and hated to see them helped. So, it was —

但航空公司——显然，发生的事情完全不是他们的错。并不像 2008 年和 2009 年那样，人们指责银行并厌恶看到它们得到帮助。所以，这就是——

Now, airlines operate in bankruptcy. So, it isn’t like that — three of the four big ones, as we know, went through bankruptcy within the previous 10 or 15 — so the airlines that were kind of used to operating in bankruptcy, they would have kept operating.

现在，航空公司在破产中运营。因此，并不是这样——我们知道，四大航空公司中的三家在过去的 10 到 15 年内经历了破产——所以那些习惯于在破产中运营的航空公司会继续运营。

But it was perfectly proper for the airlines to be helped. The entire airline business, you know — you look at these figures of 2 trillion for Apple and so on — the entire big four airlines, they sold for about $100 billion, almost — I mean it’s a very, very small — combined, they wouldn’t come close to making the cut. I mean, they wouldn’t be in the top 50.

但航空公司得到帮助是完全合适的。整个航空业务，你知道——你看看这些苹果的 2 万亿的数字——四大航空公司总共卖了大约 1000 亿美元，几乎——我的意思是，这个数字非常非常小——合在一起，他们根本无法进入前列。我是说，他们不会进入前 50 名。

So anyway, they went into the government. They needed the government help, or they needed — or they would go bankrupt, some of them.

所以无论如何，他们进入了政府。他们需要政府的帮助，否则他们中的一些人将会破产。

And really the Congress, but (Treasury Secretary) Steve Mnuchin, too, they decided they deserved the help, which I do not quarrel with at all.

而实际上，国会和（财政部长）史蒂夫·姆努钦也认为他们值得得到帮助，我对此完全没有异议。

But imagine if Berkshire was the 10% holder, which they had been, of everyone in the airlines, they said, “Take it up in Berkshire.” (Laughs)

但想象一下，如果伯克希尔是所有航空公司中10%的股东，他们说，“在伯克希尔解决吧。”（笑）

It’s — it would be like one of our — they would have had — they might have very well had a very, very, very different result if they’d had a very, very, very rich shareholder that owned 8 or 9%. And they didn’t have that. You know, when they went in.

这就像我们的一个例子一样——他们可能会有一个非常、非常、非常不同的结果，如果他们拥有一个非常、非常、非常富有的股东，持有8%或9%的股份。但他们没有这样的人物。当他们进入时，没有这样的股东。

So, our — you might not have gotten the same result.

所以，我们——你可能没有得到相同的结果。

In fact, I would think you probably wouldn’t. I mean, I can just see the headlines now. I mean, you know, because you’ve seen the headlines on some companies that took a hundred million or two, you know, and really didn’t need it. And some of them gave it back — most of them gave it back.

事实上，我认为你可能不会。我是说，我现在可以想象那些头条新闻。我是说，你知道，因为你已经看到过一些公司获得了一亿或两亿的资金，而实际上并不需要。而其中一些公司还把钱还回去了——大多数公司都还回去了。

But you were looking — you’re actually looking at probably a different result than if we’d kept our stock.

但你实际上可能会看到一个不同的结果，如果我们一直持有我们的股票的话。

But in any event, an industry that was really selling for less than a hundred billion dollars lost a significant amount of money. They lost prospective earning power. I mean right now, they’re — you know, international travel’s not come back.

但无论如何，一个真正销售额低于一千亿美元的行业损失了大量资金。他们失去了潜在的盈利能力。我的意思是，现在，他们——你知道，国际旅行还没有恢复。

But I would say, overall, to — the economic recovery has gone far better than you could say with any assurance.

但我想说，总体而言，经济复苏的情况远比你能有任何把握的要好。

So, we didn’t like having as much money as we had in banks at that time. So I cut back some of the bank investment.

所以，我们不喜欢当时在银行里存这么多钱。因此，我减少了一些银行投资。

But basically, our net sales were about 1% or one and a half percent.

但基本上，我们的净卖出额大约为 1%或 1.5%。

And looking back, you know, it would have been better to be buying. But what — I do not consider it a great moment in Berkshire’s history. But also, we’ve got more net worth than any company in the United States, under accounting principles. And we’ve got six or 700 billion of generally good businesses.

回顾过去，你知道，买入会更好。但是——我不认为这是伯克希尔历史上的一个伟大时刻。不过，我们的净资产在美国所有公司中是最高的，按照会计原则计算。我们拥有六七千亿的普遍良好的企业。

And I think, as I think, I think the airline business has done better because we’ve sold, and I wish them well.

我认为，航空业做得更好是因为我们已经出售了，我祝他们一切顺利。

But I still wouldn’t want to buy the airline business (laughs). International — people really want to — they want to travel for personal reasons, and business travel is another thing.

但我仍然不想购买航空业务（笑）。国际旅行——人们真的想要——他们想出于个人原因旅行，而商务旅行是另一回事。

And we’ve got a big exposure to business travel, of course, through the fact that we own 19% of American Express and we own Precision Castparts, which services the air business.

我们当然在商务旅行方面有很大的敞口，因为我们拥有美国运通 19%的股份，并且我们拥有 Precision Castparts，这家公司为航空业务提供服务。

So, we’ve still got a big investment in air travel, a big commitment to it.

所以，我们在航空旅行上仍然有很大的投资，对此有很大的承诺。

But we wish the big four the best. And I think their managements have done a very good job during this period.

但我们祝愿四大公司一切顺利。我认为他们的管理层在这一时期做得非常好。

11. Why Berkshire didn’t buy stocks when the pandemic pushed prices lower

为什么伯克希尔在疫情导致股价下跌时没有买入股票

BECKY QUICK: More specifically, beyond the airlines, though, just the idea of — and this came from several questions, too, including one from Chris Blaine (PH). Just —

贝基·奎克：更具体地说，除了航空公司之外，仅仅是这个想法——这也来自几个问题，包括克里斯·布莱恩（PH）提出的一个问题。只是——

“You spent years accumulating cash, insisting you had your elephant gun ready. The March 2020 listed equity selloff came with promises from the U.S. government that they would do what it takes. Yet, you sat on your hands. Please help me understand what I missed.”

“你花了几年时间积累现金，坚称你已经准备好了大象枪。2020 年 3 月的股票抛售伴随着美国政府的承诺，他们会采取必要措施。然而，你却袖手旁观。请帮我理解我错过了什么。”

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t get quite the last part. What was the final question?

沃伦·巴菲特：我没有听清最后一部分。最后一个问题是什么？

BECKY QUICK: Just, “Please help me understand what I missed.” Why — why didn’t you use more of the cash at hand?

贝基·奎克：只是，“请帮我理解我错过了什么。”为什么——你为什么没有更多地使用手头的现金？

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. Well, we have about — our cash on hand has been about 15% of our values — of our businesses — and that’s a healthy chunk.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦。我们手头的现金大约占我们业务价值的 15%——这是一笔相当可观的数额。

And I say it’ll never get below 20 billion, but we’re going to raise that number, because it’s just the size and importance of Berkshire is —

我说它永远不会低于 200 亿，但我们会提高这个数字，因为伯克希尔的规模和重要性是——

But we could have deployed 50 or 75 billion, and right before the Fed acted. I mean, we hit a point where the calls were — two calls came in. But there was two or three days that nothing could happen. When (Federal reserve Chair) Jay Powell acted as he did, that was incredibly important — I mean, I should say the Fed acted as they did — but they moved with a speed and a decisiveness on March 23rd that changed the situation where the economy had stopped.

但我们本可以在美联储采取行动之前部署 500 亿或 750 亿美元。我是说，我们达到了一个点，接到了两个电话。但有两三天什么都无法发生。当（美联储主席）杰伊·鲍威尔采取行动时，这非常重要——我应该说美联储采取了行动——但他们在 3 月 23 日以迅速和果断的方式行动，改变了经济停滞的局面。

The government bond market was even disrupted. Berkshire Hathaway probably could not have gone out with a debt offering the day before.

政府债券市场甚至受到干扰。伯克希尔·哈撒韦可能在前一天无法进行债务发行。

It didn’t get a lot of publicity at the time, but there was a run on money market funds, a very substantial run. And — if you look at the numbers — daily numbers on that — it was a repeat of September 2008.

当时并没有得到很多宣传，但货币市场基金出现了大规模的挤兑。如果你查看相关的每日数据，这就像是 2008 年 9 月的重演。

And this time — I give great credit to what (then-Federal Reserve Chair Ben) Bernanke and (then-Treasury Secretary Henry) Paulson did — but this time, the Fed knew that saying whatever it takes, and saying it and demonstrating it — which they did on March 23rd — they took a market where Berkshire couldn’t sell bonds on the day before and turned it into one where Carnival Cruise Lines or something (laughs) could sell it a day or two later.

这一次——我非常赞赏（时任联邦储备委员会主席）伯南克和（时任财政部长）保尔森所做的——但这一次，美联储知道说“无论如何都要做到”并且说出来并付诸实践——他们在 3 月 23 日做到了——他们把一个伯克希尔在前一天无法出售债券的市场，转变成了一个嘉年华邮轮或其他公司（哈哈）可以在一两天后出售债券的市场。

And there was, you know, this record issuance of corporate debt. And companies losing money, companies who were closed, whatever. It was the most dramatic move that you can imagine.

而且，你知道，这是一种创纪录的企业债务发行。公司亏损，公司关闭，无论如何。这是你能想象的最戏剧性的举动。

And at the time, as I remember the chairman saying, you know, how about a little help on the fiscal front?

当时，我记得主席说，财政方面能不能帮忙一下？

And then Congress acted very, very big. Again, in 2008 and ’09, they argued about, you know, we don’t want to give any money to those dirty banks and all that sort of thing. But this time, there really wasn’t anybody to blame. So, they saw what was necessary, and Congress responded.

然后国会采取了非常大的行动。再次，在 2008 年和 2009 年，他们争论说，我们不想把钱给那些肮脏的银行等等。但这一次，真的没有人可以责怪。因此，他们看到了必要的措施，国会做出了回应。

So, you had fiscal and monetary policy that responded in a way that was incredible. And it did the job. And it did, I think, it did a better job (laughs) than either the Fed or the Treasury or anybody expected.

所以，你有财政和货币政策以一种令人难以置信的方式作出反应。它完成了任务。我认为，它做得比美联储、财政部或任何人预期的都要好（笑）。

I mean this economy right now is — 85% of it is running in super-high gear. And people can’t — you know, and you’re seeing some inflation and all of that. It’s responded in an incredible way.

我意思是现在的经济——85%处于超高速运转。人们无法——你知道的，你看到了一些通货膨胀等等。它以一种令人难以置信的方式做出了反应。

And we learned something out of 2008 and ’09, and then we applied it. But I don’t think it was a sure thing that would happen.

我们从 2008 年和 2009 年中学到了一些东西，然后我们应用了它。但我认为这并不是一定会发生的事情。

And the one thing about Berkshire is we never want — we don’t want to depend on anybody. We’re not a bank. We can’t go to the Federal Reserves if we need money.

关于伯克希尔，有一点是我们从不想要的——我们不想依赖任何人。我们不是银行。如果我们需要钱，就不能去联邦储备银行。

And we’ve got to be sure that, under any circumstances — any circumstances — we can’t solve nuclear war, and maybe we can’t, you know — but, you know —

我们必须确保，在任何情况下——任何情况下——我们都无法解决核战争，也许我们真的无法解决，你知道——但是，你知道——

Blanche DuBois, if you remember, in (Tennessee Williams’ 1947 play) A Streetcar Named Desire, said, “I depend on the kindness of strangers.” You can’t depend on the kindness of your friends if things have really stopped. I mean I’ve seen that in several different places.

布兰奇·杜波依斯，如果你还记得，在田纳西·威廉斯 1947 年的剧作《欲望号街车》中，她说：“我依赖陌生人的善良。” 如果事情真的停滞不前，你无法依赖朋友的善良。我的意思是，我在几个不同的地方见过这种情况。

And we were start — we were seeing it on March — in the middle of March. Everybody was drawing down the credit lines. The banks did not expect that. They just weren’t sure they were going to be able to draw down their credit lines ten days later. And so, they just drew them down, and they took the money out of money market funds.

我们开始看到这一点是在三月——三月中旬。每个人都在提取信用额度。银行没有预料到这一点。他们只是无法确定十天后是否能够提取他们的信用额度。因此，他们就提取了，并且从货币市场基金中取出了钱。

We got very prompt — I give great credit, on both the monetary and fiscal side, to what was done.

我们反应非常迅速——我非常赞赏在货币和财政方面所做的工作。

But I didn’t think it was a sure thing it would happen. And I didn’t know how it would be implemented. And it’s worked — I think it’s worked better than just about anybody has expected. And I think — well, you’re seeing it now.

但我并不认为这一定会发生。我也不知道它将如何实施。结果是成功的——我认为它的效果超出了几乎所有人的预期。我想——你现在看到了。

You know, Charlie’s got some views on this, too. So, we shouldn’t leave him out of it. (Laughs)

你知道，查理对此也有一些看法。所以，我们不应该把他排除在外。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s crazy to think anybody’s going to be smart enough to husband money and then just come out on the bottom tick in some crazy crisis and spend it all.

查理·芒格：嗯，认为有人会聪明到能够合理管理资金，然后在某个疯狂危机的最低点出来并花光所有钱，这真是疯狂。

There always is some person that does that by accident. But that’s too tough a standard. Anybody expects that of Berkshire Hathaway is out of his mind.

总是有一些人是偶然这样做的。但这标准太苛刻了。任何期望伯克希尔·哈撒韦做到这一点的人都是疯了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I never were very good at dancing. But we really can’t do that dance. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我从来不太擅长跳舞。但我们真的不会跳那个舞。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, we can’t. And by the way, almost nobody else can, either.

查理·芒格：不，不，我们不能。顺便说一下，几乎没有其他人也能。

WARREN BUFFETT: Not with tens of billions.

沃伦·巴菲特：不是数百亿。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: Or hundreds of billions.

沃伦·巴菲特：或者数千亿。

But it’s worked out. 但这已经解决了。

Well, we forgot to show one of the financial sides, actually, if you go back to the balance sheet. But we did buy in, in the first — you’ll see the shares outstanding if we go back to — what is it, E3?

好吧，我们忘记展示其中一个财务方面，实际上，如果你回到资产负债表。但我们确实在第一轮买入了——如果我们回去看看——那是什么，E3？

BECKY QUICK: E2. They look —

贝基·奎克：E2. 他们看起来——

WARREN BUFFETT: Slide. 沃伦·巴菲特：幻灯片。

BECKY QUICK: E2. 贝基·奎克：E2。

WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me?

沃伦·巴菲特：请问？

BECKY QUICK: I think it’s E2, isn’t it?

贝基·奎克：我想是 E2，对吧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — the balance sheet. Yeah, there it shows the shares outstanding at the bottom. And we have — we have — we spent about 25 billion in the first quarter, and more money since.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯——资产负债表。是的，底部显示了流通股数。我们——我们——在第一季度花费了大约 250 亿美元，之后又花了更多的钱。

And we’ve — it’s the best thing — we can’t buy companies as cheap as we can buy our own. And we can’t buy stocks as cheap as we can buy our own. So — and we’ve been able to do that with a fair amount of money.

而我们——这是最好的事情——我们无法以比购买我们自己的公司更便宜的价格购买其他公司。我们也无法以比购买我们自己的股票更便宜的价格购买其他股票。因此——我们能够用相当多的钱做到这一点。

But looking back, I mean if you — you know, definitely, we could have done better things. (Laughs)

但是回头看，我的意思是，如果你——你知道，确实，我们本可以做得更好。（笑）

We would have sold the — we would have sold airlines and cut back on banks regardless.

我们本来会出售航空公司，并削减银行的业务。

Whether we should have bought something else at the same time is another question.

我们是否应该同时购买其他东西是另一个问题。

12. Why Buffett doesn’t recommend buying Berkshire stock

为什么巴菲特不推荐购买伯克希尔股票

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a long-term shareholder who’s been here for more than 25 years. His name’s Ben Knoll. He’s from Minneapolis, Minnesota.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自一位长期股东，他在这里已经超过 25 年了。他的名字叫本·诺尔，来自明尼苏达州的明尼阿波利斯。

And he says, “Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, after a 15-year period of market underperformance, you’re cautious about predicting Berkshire being able to outperform the market in the future.

他说：“芒格先生和巴菲特先生，在经历了 15 年的市场表现不佳后，你们对伯克希尔未来能否超越市场持谨慎态度。”

“Given this, what do you see as the arguments for long-time shareholders to continue holding their stock versus diversifying their risk across an index?”

“鉴于此，您认为长期股东继续持有股票与通过指数分散风险之间的理由是什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to answer that?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想回答这个吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sure. Well, I personally prefer holding Berkshire to holding the market, so —

查理·芒格：当然。我个人更喜欢持有伯克希尔，而不是持有市场，所以——

BECKY QUICK: Because? 贝基·奎克：为什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m quite comfortable holding Berkshire. I like — I think our businesses are better than the average in the market.

查理·芒格：我对持有伯克希尔感到相当满意。我喜欢——我认为我们的业务比市场上的平均水平要好。

BECKY QUICK: Is it because you don’t think the market values it fairly?

贝基·奎克：是因为你认为市场对它的估值不公平吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, these are just accidents of history and things are fluctuating at all times.

查理·芒格：嗯，这些只是历史的偶然，事物始终在波动。

But on a composite basis, I’d bet on Berkshire over the market. And that’s assuming we’re all dead.

但从综合角度来看，我会押注于伯克希尔而不是市场。前提是我们都已经死了。

WARREN BUFFETT: B, I recommend — I recommend the S&P 500 index fund — and I have for a long, long time — to people.

沃伦·巴菲特：我推荐——我推荐标准普尔 500 指数基金——我已经推荐很长时间了——给大家。

And I’ve never recommended Berkshire to anybody. Because I don’t want people to buy it because they think (laughs) I’m tipping them into some — never. I mean, no matter what it was selling for.

我从来没有向任何人推荐过伯克希尔。因为我不想让人们因为觉得我在暗示他们去买它而去买——绝对不。我是说，无论它的价格是多少。

And, you know — I’ve made it public, you know — on my death, there’s a fund for my then-widow, and 90% will go into an S&P 500 index fund and 10% in Treasury bills.

而且，你知道——我已经公开了，你知道——在我去世时，会有一个基金给我的遗孀，90%将投入标准普尔 500 指数基金，10%将投资于国债。

On the other hand, I’m very happy having my future contributions to a group of charities, that’ll be spread over 12 years or so after my death, to stay in Berkshire.

另一方面，我非常高兴我的未来捐赠将分散在我去世后的12年内捐给一群慈善机构，并且这些捐赠将留在伯克希尔。

I think the odds are — Berkshire is — you know, I like it, but I’m not —

我认为机会是——伯克希尔是——你知道，我喜欢它，但我不是——

I do not think the average person can pick stocks. We happen to have a large group of people that didn’t pick stocks, but they picked Charlie and me to manage money for them 50 or 60 years ago.

我认为普通人无法挑选股票。我们恰好有一大群人没有挑选股票，但他们在 50 或 60 年前选择了查理和我来为他们管理资金。

And so we have a very unusual group of shareholders, I think, who look at Berkshire as a lifetime savings vehicle, and one they don’t have to think about, and one that, you know, if they don’t look at it again for 10 or 20 years, that will have taken care of their money reasonably well.

因此，我认为我们有一个非常不寻常的股东群体，他们将伯克希尔视为一种终身储蓄工具，这是一种他们不需要过多考虑的投资，且如果他们在 10 年或 20 年内不再关注它，它也会合理地管理他们的资金。

But that — I wouldn’t argue that the S&P 500, over time — I would — I prefer — I like Berkshire.

但我不会争辩说标准普尔 500 指数，随着时间的推移——我会——我更喜欢——我喜欢伯克希尔。

But I think that the — a person who doesn’t know anything about stocks at all and doesn’t have any special feelings about Berkshire, I think they ought to buy the S&P 500 index.

但我认为，对于一个对股票一无所知且对伯克希尔没有任何特别感情的人来说，我认为他们应该购买标准普尔 500 指数。

13. Why Buffett’s will calls for his wife’s inheritance to be invested in an index fund

为什么巴菲特的遗嘱要求将他妻子的遗产投资于指数基金

BECKY QUICK: As a follow-up to that, Gerald Silver writes in. He says, “The trustees of your estate — I believe you’ve directed the trustees of your estate to invest substantial assets into the index fund. Isn’t that a vote of no confidence to your managers?”

贝基·奎克：作为对此的跟进，杰拉尔德·西尔弗写问题来了。他说：“你们的遗产受托人——我相信你已经指示你们的遗产受托人将大量资产投资于指数基金。这不是对你们的管理者的不信任投票吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, no, because we’re talking about way less than one percent of my estate. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，因为我们谈论的只是我遗产的不到百分之一。（笑）

And one thing I’m going to do, incidentally — I mean all rich people get advised by their lawyers to set up trusts so that nobody can see your will and all that sort of thing.

顺便说一句，我要做的一件事是——我的意思是，所有富人都会被他们的律师建议设立信托，这样就没有人能看到你的遗嘱和那些事情。

My will’s going to be public record. And you can — you’ll be able to check at some point whether I’ve been telling you the truth (laughs) about what is going to get done.

我的遗嘱将成为公开记录。你可以——你将能够在某个时候查证我是否一直在告诉你真相（笑）关于将要完成的事情。

But 99.7%, roughly, of my estate will either go to philanthropies or to the federal government.

但大约 99.7%的我的遗产将会捐给慈善机构或联邦政府。

And before it does it, I think Berkshire is a very good thing to hold. But for a given individual, particularly my wife, I just think that having a tiny fraction — which is all it takes for her to do very well for the rest of her life — I just think that the best thing to do is buy 90% in an S&P 500 index fund.

在它发生之前，我认为伯克希尔是一个非常好的投资。但对于某个特定的人，尤其是我的妻子，我认为拥有一小部分——这足以让她在余生中过得很好——我认为最好的做法是购买 90%的标准普尔 500 指数基金。

Now, the index fund people, naturally, have started — over time — they market more and more products that go to other indices and everything. So, they’re really starting to say to the American public, they’re saying, well, you can pick what continent to invest in, or you can pick what industry (laughs) and we’ll sell you something for that.

现在，指数基金的人们自然地开始——随着时间的推移——他们推出越来越多的产品，投资于其他指数等等。因此，他们真的开始对美国公众说，你可以选择投资哪个大陆，或者你可以选择哪个行业（笑），我们会为你提供相应的产品。

类似于互联网的营销策略。

And when they just have gotten through telling them, you know, you really don’t know anything about stocks, just buy the whole index. (Laughs)

而当他们刚刚告诉他们时，你知道的，你真的对股票一无所知，只需购买整个指数。（笑）

So, I name the 500 index as one.

所以，我将 500 指数命名为一。

But it’s a tiny portion, but it will be her livelihood, and she’ll have all the money she needs, and way beyond it, and that’s that.

但这只是微不足道的一部分，但这将是她的生计，她将拥有她所需的所有钱，甚至远远超过这些，仅此而已。

But I don’t mind having the 99.7% — a large portion of it — assuming the laws are the same as now — that go to philanthropy, to be kept in Berkshire until they finally are disposed of.

但我不介意拥有 99.7%——其中很大一部分——假设法律与现在相同——用于慈善事业，保留在伯克希尔，直到最终处理掉。

14. “Chevron is not an evil company”

“雪佛龙不是一家邪恶的公司”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Andrew Dixon in the UK.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自英国的安德鲁·迪克森。

He says, “My question is in relation to the oil and gas business and your purchase of Chevron stock.

他说：“我的问题与石油和天然气业务以及你们购买雪佛龙股票有关。”

“When being asked a question on tobacco stocks in 1997, you mentioned that individuals and companies occasionally have to draw moral lines about what they’re willing to do.

“在 1997 年被问及烟草股票时，您提到个人和公司有时必须划定道德界限，决定他们愿意做什么。”

“You stated at the time that you were not comfortable in making a big commitment in tobacco stocks, and that you were uncomfortable about their prospects.

“你当时表示你对在烟草股票上做出重大承诺感到不舒服，并且对它们的前景感到不安。”

Charlie has also referenced passing up on a private tobacco deal that you both knew was a cinch, yet you both have no regrets in saying no to the transaction.

查理还提到放弃了一笔你们都知道是轻而易举的私人烟草交易，但你们都对拒绝这笔交易没有任何遗憾。

“I’m not suggesting that the oil and gas business has the same known negative externalities as cigarettes. They do not. With tobacco, the cause and effect relationship between the products and career is direct, obvious, and measurable. With hydrocarbons, the societal costs and benefits are far more complex to evaluate.

“我并不是说石油和天然气行业与香烟有相同的已知负面外部性。它们并不相同。对于烟草，产品与职业之间的因果关系是直接、明显且可衡量的。而对于碳氢化合物，社会成本和收益的评估要复杂得多。”

“However, an increasing portion of society is drawing their lines in such a way that their painting does not include hydrocarbons, period.

然而，社会中越来越多的人将自己的界限划定得如此，以至于他们的画作不包括碳氢化合物，完毕。

“My question is: has the alarmism from the climate community now become pervasive across society to the extent it has become irrational?

我的问题是：气候界的危言耸听是否已经在社会中普遍存在，以至于变得不理性？

“Have we built our own unrealistic consensus on the pace of change achievable with regards to the transition to greener energy sources to the extent that this is becoming an overly expensive tax worn by the current younger generation?”

“我们是否在可再生能源转型的变化速度上建立了自己不切实际的共识，以至于这成为当前年轻一代所承受的过于昂贵的税负？”

“Can we gather from your purchase of Chevron stock that you do not believe the howling from society, regulators, and politicians will impair the prospects of hydrocarbons, and Chevron for that matter, in the next ten years?

“我们能从您购买雪佛龙股票中得出结论，您不相信社会、监管机构和政治家的叫嚣会在未来十年内影响碳氢化合物及雪佛龙的前景吗？”

“Can investors still assume an oil and gas business that finds and produces oil at low cost per barrel can generate a sufficient return on capital for a long time to come?”

“投资者是否仍然可以认为，一个以很低的每桶成本找到和生产石油的油气业务，可以在很长一段时间内产生足够的资本回报？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (laughs), I’ll give you a ten-word answer to that. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，（笑）我给你一个十个字的回答。（笑）

I can’t remember all the questions there were there. But I would say that people that are on the extremes of both sides are a little nuts. (Laughs)

我记不清那里的所有问题了。但我想说，处于两极的人有点疯狂。（笑）

I would hate to have all the hydrocarbons banned in three years. You know, you wouldn’t want a world that — it wouldn’t work.

我不想在三年内禁止所有碳氢化合物。你知道的，你不想要一个这样的世界——那是行不通的。

And on the other hand, you know, what’s happening will be adapted to over time, just as we’ve adapted to all kinds of things.

另一方面，你知道，发生的事情会随着时间的推移而适应，就像我们已经适应了各种事物一样。

I do not think — I’m interested in that quote from 1997, because, you know, we’ve talked about this before.

我不认为——我对 1997 年的那句话感兴趣，因为你知道，我们之前谈过这个。

We have no problem owning Costco or Walmart, you know, and a substantial number of their stores, you know, they sell cigarettes. It’s big item. You know, it’s something that brings people in. They know the price of cigarettes. And, you know, they put them up front.

我们拥有好市多或沃尔玛没有任何问题，你知道，他们相当多的商店，你知道，他们卖香烟。这是一个大项目。你知道，这是吸引人们的东西。他们知道香烟的价格。而且，你知道，他们把它们放在前面。

And so, we don’t — it’s a very tough situation. We made that decision a long time ago when we went to Memphis. And we looked at a business that was a very, very good business. And it was much less harmful — at least from everything I could find out — it was much less harmful than smoking tobacco — chewing tobacco was.

所以，我们并没有——这是一种非常艰难的情况。我们在很久以前去孟菲斯时做出了那个决定。我们看到了一个非常非常好的生意。而且从我能找到的所有信息来看，它的危害远远小于吸烟——咀嚼烟草的危害要小得多。

And these were decent people. And they were running a legal business. And they all chewed tobacco themselves. (Laughs)

这些人都是正派人。他们经营着合法的生意。他们自己也都嚼烟草。（笑）

So, they — and they told me that their mother was 100 and chewing tobacco, and all these things.

所以，他们告诉我他们的母亲已经 100 岁了，还在嚼烟草，诸如此类的事情。

But Charlie and I did go down in the lobby of that hotel. And we just said to ourselves, “This is probably the best business we’ve ever seen.”

但是查理和我确实去了那家酒店的大厅。我们只是对自己说：“这可能是我们见过的最好的生意。”

And I called my then-son-in-law, Allen Greenberg. And he’d studied chewing tobacco and its effects when he was working for a Nader-related organization (Public Citizen). And we decided not to do it.

我打电话给我当时的女婿艾伦·格林伯格。他在为一个与纳德相关的组织（公民公众）工作时研究过嚼烟草及其影响。我们决定不这样做。

But, you know, would we — you know, I see — I used to see ads in our paper from financial companies where I knew they were terrible, you know?

但是，你知道，我们会——你知道，我看到——我以前在我们的报纸上看到金融公司的广告，我知道他们很糟糕，你知道吗？

And it’s a very tough thing to decide whether you get in or out of a business. And it’s a very tough time to decide what — would companies benefit society more than others. I mean it’s — I don’t know whether — I think Chevron’s benefited society in all kinds of ways. And I think it continues to do so.

决定是否进入或退出一个行业是非常困难的事情。决定哪些公司对社会的贡献大于其他公司也是一个非常艰难的时刻。我的意思是——我不知道——我认为雪佛龙在各方面都对社会有益。我认为它仍然在继续这样做。

And I think we’re going to need a lot of hydrocarbon for a long time, and we’ll be very glad we’ve got them.

我认为我们将需要大量的碳氢化合物很长一段时间，我们会很高兴我们拥有它们。

But I do think that the world’s moving away from them, too. And that could change.

但我确实认为世界也在远离他们。这种情况可能会改变。

I don’t like making the moral judgments on stocks in terms of actually running the businesses.

我不喜欢在实际经营企业的情况下对股票做道德判断。

But there’s something about every business that, if you knew it, you wouldn’t like.

但每个企业都有一些事情，如果你知道了，就不会喜欢。

And, you know, meatpackers — have you ever gone through a meatpacking plant? (Laughs)

你知道，肉类加工厂——你去过肉类加工厂吗？（笑）

You know, there’s — if you expect perfection, you know, in your spouse or in your friends or in companies, you’re not going to find it.

你知道，如果你期望在你的配偶、朋友或公司中找到完美，你是不会找到的。

And what you elect to do yourself — if you own an index fund, you’re going the own Chevron.

你自己选择做的事情——如果你拥有一个指数基金，你就是在拥有雪佛龙。

And believe me, Chevron is not an evil company in the least. (Laughs)

相信我，雪佛龙绝不是一个邪恶的公司。（笑）

And I have no compunction about owning — in the least — about owning Chevron.

我对拥有——一点也不——拥有雪佛龙没有任何顾虑。

And if we owned the entire business, I wouldn’t — I would not feel uncomfortable about being in that business. Charlie?

如果我们拥有整个业务，我不会——我不会对参与这个业务感到不舒服。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree.

查理·芒格：我同意。

You know, you can imagine two things. A young man marries into your family. He’s a English professor at, say, Swarthmore, or he works for Chevron. Which would you pick, sight unseen? I want to admit I’d take the guy from Chevron. (LAUGHTER)

你知道，你可以想象两件事。一个年轻人嫁入你的家庭。他是斯沃斯莫尔的英语教授，或者他在雪佛龙工作。你会选择哪个，没见过面？我想承认我会选择那个在雪佛龙的家伙。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Hope your daughters agree with you. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：希望你的女儿们同意你的看法。（笑声）

15. “Asinine” to make a climate report for every subsidiary

“愚蠢的”为每个子公司制作气候报告

BECKY QUICK: On the other side of that argument, because there were lots of emails that came in, both — on both sides of these ESG questions.

贝基·奎克：从另一个角度看，因为有很多电子邮件，都是关于 ESG 问题的。

This one comes from Cristina Gallegos, who’s been a shareholder since 2018. And she says, “On items two and three of the proxy materials, the board recommended voting ‘Against’ on the shareholder proposal regarding the reporting of climate-related risks and opportunities, as well as on the shareholder proposal regarding diversity and inclusion reporting.

这条来自克里斯蒂娜·加列戈斯，她自 2018 年以来一直是股东。她说：“在代理材料的第二和第三项中，董事会建议对关于气候相关风险和机会报告的股东提案，以及关于多样性和包容性报告的股东提案投‘反对’票。”

“Berkshire is such a force for good when it comes to financial literacy and empowerment through wealth creation. Why not be a force for good and an example when it comes to these very two important — two very important issues? Please share with us more about the ‘Against’ recommendation.”

“伯克希尔在财务知识和通过财富创造实现赋权方面是如此的积极力量。为什么不在这两个非常重要的问题上成为积极的力量和榜样呢？请与我们分享更多关于‘反对’建议的信息。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think maybe Greg can talk a little bit about what Berkshire has done, as opposed to — in terms of the environmental.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想也许格雷格可以谈谈伯克希尔在环境方面所做的事情。

I would say this. It’s very interesting. With everything that’s being — I think we have over a million shareholders. I mean you can’t be 100% sure because of street name and duplicate accounts and all that sort. But it certainly seems very, very likely.

我想说的是，这非常有趣。考虑到所有的事情——我认为我们有超过一百万的股东。我的意思是，由于街名和重复账户等原因，你不能百分之百确定。但这看起来确实非常非常可能。

I’ve had — and I get the letters that are written to me. I don’t think I’ve had — I don’t think I’ve had three letters in the last year or anything from shareholders.

我收到过 - 我也收到过写给我的信。我不认为我收到过--我不认为我在去年收到过三封股东来信什么的。

Now, I have them — and our vote on this, as you’ll see later, is that, overwhelmingly, the people that bought Berkshire with their own money voted against those propositions. Most of the votes for it were by — came from people who’ve never put a dime of their own money into Berkshire. (Laughs)

现在，我有了这些——正如你稍后会看到的，我们对此的投票结果是，绝大多数用自己钱购买伯克希尔的人投票反对这些提案。支持这些提案的大多数投票来自那些从未投入自己一分钱到伯克希尔的人。（笑）

And so, they — and I don’t think they’ve read our annual reports. And I don’t think they’ve read the reports of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. And I don’t think they know. You know, if I talk about what we’re doing in high voltage transmission, we’re doing more than any company in the country.

所以，他们——我认为他们没有阅读我们的年度报告。我认为他们没有阅读伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的报告。我认为他们不知道。你知道，如果我谈论我们在高压输电方面的工作，我们所做的比全国任何公司都要多。

The president talked about what the government’s going to do, and how important it is, and, you know.

总统谈到了政府将要做什么，以及这有多重要，你知道的。

We have a record in that’s, overall, is incredibly good.

我们有一个记录，总体来说，非常好。

But we have a group of organizations, just generally, and they’re nice people. But they want us to answer a bunch of questionnaires their way, so they want us to go to Dairy Queen and Borsheims, and all those people, and have them fill out reports that show a bunch of figures.

但是我们有一群组织，通常来说，他们是很好的人。但他们希望我们按照他们的方式回答一堆问卷，所以他们希望我们去德克士和博尔希姆斯，以及所有那些人，让他们填写显示一堆数据的报告。

But the reports that count are the reports that Greg gets on Berkshire Hathaway Energy and the railroad (BNSF). You talk about three of our companies, and you’ve covered 95% of it.

但重要的报告是格雷格关于伯克希尔哈撒韦能源和铁路（BNSF）的报告。你谈到我们三家公司，已经涵盖了 95%的内容。

And it’s asinine, frankly, in my view. Now, we do some other asinine things, because we’re required to do them. So, we’ll do whatever’s required.

坦率地说，在我看来，这真是愚蠢。现在，我们也做一些其他愚蠢的事情，因为我们被要求这样做。所以，我们会做任何被要求的事情。

But to have the people at, you know, Business Wire, you know, Dairy Queen, all these places, filling out reports to make up some common report that comes in — we don’t do that stuff at Berkshire.

但是，让 Business Wire、Dairy Queen 等所有这些地方的人填写报告，以编写一些常见的报告--我们伯克希尔不做这种事。

We’ve got — during the pandemic, we probably have about 12 people who come into headquarters. And we’ve got, you know, 360,000 people working in a company that — all kinds of diverse activities.

在疫情期间，我们大约有 12 个人来到总部。我们公司有大约 360,000 名员工，涉及各种不同的活动。

And it’s built — I don’t want to get in the whole thing of it. But it’s built on autonomy.

而它是建立在自主基础上的——我不想深入讨论这个问题。

And I am probably the only CEO of an S&P 500 company that does not get a consolidated income statement every month. I mean every other company, I’ll bet, in the S&P 500, prints out the earnings they had at the end, you know, from February and March, and CEO gets and a whole bunch of other people get it.

我可能是唯一一位不每月收到合并收入报表的标准普尔 500 公司首席执行官。我是说，我敢打赌，标准普尔 500 中的其他每家公司都会在每个月结束时打印出他们的收益，比如二月和三月，首席执行官和其他很多人都会收到。

I don’t get it. I don’t need it (laughs), you know.

我不明白。我不需要它（笑），你知道的。

And I can put 60 or 70 companies to a whole lot of trouble and everything. And they’d hand me something, and I know the answer to it already, and it doesn’t make any difference. I mean they’ve got the money they need.

我可以让 60 或 70 家公司陷入麻烦之中。他们会给我一些东西，而我已经知道答案了，这并没有什么区别。我的意思是，他们已经有了他们需要的钱。

So, we don’t do things just because we’ve got a department of this or a department of that. And we don’t want to set up a lot of departments like that.

所以，我们做事情不是因为我们有这个部门或那个部门。我们也不想建立很多这样的部门。

And what’s important is what we’re doing in the — well, primarily at Berkshire Hathaway Energy and the railroad. I mean that’s — and I’ll let Greg tell you about that in just one second. But the —

而重要的是我们在——主要是在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源和铁路方面所做的事情。我是说，这就是——我会让格雷格在一秒钟后告诉你关于这方面的事情。但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, I don’t think we think we know the answer to all these questions about global warming and so forth. And the people who ask the questions think they know the answers. We’re just more modest.

查理·芒格：沃伦，我认为我们并不认为我们知道关于全球变暖等所有问题的答案。而提出这些问题的人认为他们知道答案。我们只是更谦虚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, but even if we knew the answer, I mean, in terms of what we — the reports we would —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，但即使我们知道答案，我的意思是，就我们——我们会报告的内容而言——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: —we would not collect a whole lot of things that don’t mean anything to us —

沃伦·巴菲特：——我们不会收集很多对我们没有意义的东西——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: — to satisfy people who actually don’t own any stock themselves and, in many cases, I can tell they haven’t read our annual report, even.

沃伦·巴菲特：——为了满足那些实际上自己并不拥有任何股票的人，而且在很多情况下，我可以看出他们甚至没有阅读我们的年报。

You know, we, as I point out in the annual report, and I never — nobody would have guessed this. People think we’re a bunch of guys that own stocks and all that sort of thing.

你知道，我们，正如我在年度报告中指出的，我从来没有——没有人会猜到这一点。人们认为我们是一群拥有股票之类东西的家伙。

Berkshire Hathaway owns, by GAAP accounting, more property plant equipment, business infrastructure — which the president just got through talking about Wednesday night — infrastructure, the importance of it — we have, measured by GAAP accounting, more than any other company in the United States.

伯克希尔哈撒韦根据公认会计原则（GAAP）拥有更多的物业、厂房和设备，以及商业基础设施——总统刚刚在周三晚上谈到的基础设施，其重要性——根据 GAAP 会计，我们拥有的比美国任何其他公司都要多。

We have more than any of those companies that are on the list of the largest companies in the country, but we — and we’ve got it by a substantial margin.

我们拥有的比那些在全国最大公司名单上的公司还要多，而且我们拥有的优势相当明显。

So, we have an investment in what makes this country move and work. Fifteen percent of the interstate goods move on our railroad. We’re building transmission.

所以，我们在推动和运作这个国家的事务上进行了投资。15%的州际货物通过我们的铁路运输。我们正在建设输电设施。

And we started, in 2006 or ’07, planning how we would close coal plants, but —

我们在 2006 年或 2007 年开始规划如何关闭煤电厂，但——

You can’t close coal plants until you get the electricity from where it’s generated to the customer. And if you’re going to generate it in Wyoming, and it’s going to go to Las Vegas or someplace, and previously they had a coal plant near the place, because that was the way it was done 50 years ago or 75 years ago, you’d better have the transmission. There’s no sense having the wind blow in Wyoming and people turn around and turn on the lights in Las Vegas.

在将电力从发电地点输送到客户手中之前，你不能关闭煤电厂。如果你打算在怀俄明州发电，然后将电力输送到拉斯维加斯或其他地方，而这些地方附近以前就有煤电厂，因为 50 年前或 75 年前就是这样做的，那么你最好有输电设施。如果风从怀俄明州吹来，而人们转过身去打开拉斯维加斯的灯，那就没有意义了。

So, we went at the transmission plan question a lot earlier than people were talking about it. And we’ve done — we said 16 billion or whatever it was in the annual report that we — underway. And we just added 2 billion since the annual report came out. And there’s no utility in the country that’s coming anywhere close to that. Tell them a little bit about it.

所以，我们在传输计划问题上比其他人讨论得早得多。我们在年报中提到的投资额是 160 亿美元，正在进行中。自年报发布以来，我们又增加了 20 亿美元。全国没有任何公用事业公司接近这个数字。给他们讲讲这个情况。

16. Abel details Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s actions on climate change

阿贝尔详细介绍了伯克希尔哈撒韦能源在气候变化方面的行动

GREG ABEL: Sure, Warren. Thank you.

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然，沃伦。谢谢。

And, really, as Warren touched on, BHE and BNSF have our — have the significant carbon footprints when you think of Berkshire.

而且，正如沃伦提到的，BHE 和 BNSF 在考虑伯克希尔时，确实有着显著的碳足迹。

And Warren, you touched on the disclosure that we’ve provided in the past going all the way back to 2007. I did pull those two investor presentations, one from 2007, and then our most recent one in 2021.

沃伦，你提到了我们过去提供的披露信息，追溯到 2007 年。我确实找到了那两份投资者演示文稿，一份是 2007 年的，另一份是我们 2021 年的最新演示文稿。

So, if we could pull up BHE-1 as a slide, I think it would just highlight, going all the way back to 2007, we’ve been doing investor presentations for what we call our fixed-income investors, and we’ve done that through — every year through 2021.

如果我们能调出BHE-1作为幻灯片，我认为它将突出显示，从2007年开始，我们一直为我们所谓的固定收益投资者进行投资者演示，并且从2007年到2021年每年都进行了这些演示。

We’ve provided very similar disclosures to our board on an annual basis and had discussions around Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s plans to decarbonize.

我们每年向董事会提供非常相似的披露，并讨论了伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司脱碳的计划。

Now, it’s interesting. If you go back to the 2007 fixed-income conference — and we are having a conference at that point in time — we have third-party debt, capital debt, that our utilities raise. It’s a traditional capital structure used across our regulated entities to manage our total cost to the customer.

现在，这很有趣。如果你回到 2007 年的固定收益会议——那时我们正在召开会议——我们有第三方债务、资本债务，这是我们的公用事业所筹集的。这是一个在我们受监管的实体中使用的传统资本结构，用于管理我们对客户的总成本。

So, we have investors. We present to them, as we’re highlighting, on an annual basis. And if you go back to that 2007 investor conference, it’s interesting. In that presentation, we’re highlighting climate change, that it’s a fundamental risk. And we discussed what good policy would be.

所以，我们有投资者。我们每年向他们展示，正如我们所强调的。如果你回顾 2007 年的投资者会议，这很有趣。在那次演讲中，我们强调了气候变化，它是一个根本性的风险。我们讨论了什么是良好的政策。

We discussed innovation. We discussed market transformation and the importance of — and the importance of setting targets, at that point in time. And we had recommendations for our industry.

我们讨论了创新。我们讨论了市场转型以及设定目标的重要性，在那个时候。我们对我们的行业提出了建议。

And then, since then, each year, we’ve presented, really, a plan and a strategy around how each of our businesses in BHE, but each of our regulated entities, how they’re going to transform.

然后，从那时起，每年我们都提出了一个计划和战略，关于我们在 BHE 的每个业务，以及我们每个受监管实体，如何进行转型。

And the whole transformation has been around decarbonization, managing that risk on behalf of our stakeholders in our many states, our customers that we serve, and ultimately managing that risk for Berkshire Hathaway’s shareholders.

整个转型围绕去碳化展开，代表我们在多个州的利益相关者、我们服务的客户管理这一风险，最终为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东管理这一风险。

Now, as you go through those presentations, there’s a common theme. And Warren touched on it already.

现在，当你浏览那些演示文稿时，有一个共同的主题。沃伦已经提到了这一点。

You have to build the foundation first. And that foundation is around building the high-voltage — the transmission system.

你必须先建立基础。而这个基础是围绕建立高压——输电系统。

Warren touched on it in his annual report this year and letter. He highlighted that at Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we’ll be spending, just in the West, $18 billion on transmission. Five billion of that’s already been spent as we sit here today. And that $13 billion will be spent over the next ten years.

沃伦在他今年的年度报告和信中提到了这一点。他强调，在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司，我们仅在西部就将花费 180 亿美元用于输电。其中 50 亿美元已经在我们今天坐在这里时花费了。剩下的 130 亿美元将在未来十年内支出。

That’s the foundation that then allows us to build incremental renewable resources and move it to our many states that we serve at Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and well beyond that.

这就是基础，使我们能够逐步建立可再生资源，并将其转移到我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源服务的众多州，以及更远的地方。

I would highlight, well — we’ve been building the transmission infrastructure in place. We have been building renewables. If you look at our investment through the end of 2020, we’ve invested $30 billion — or in excess of $30 billion — into renewables and have really completely changed the way our businesses do business, i.e. our utility businesses. They’ve been decarbonizing and delivering a valued product to our stakeholders, to our customers.

我想强调的是，我们一直在建设传输基础设施。我们一直在发展可再生能源。如果你看看我们到 2020 年底的投资，我们已经投资了超过 300 亿美元于可再生能源，并且真正改变了我们的业务运作方式，即我们的公用事业业务。它们一直在脱碳，并为我们的利益相关者和客户提供有价值的产品。

And I think the — and I think the results are really amazing when you look at them, and I’ll give you a couple of reference points.

我认为结果真的很惊人，当你看它们时，我会给你几个参考点。

If you go back to 2015, when the U.S. was discussing — excuse me — joining the Paris Agreement, very specific targets were set. Prior to those targets being set, Berkshire Hathaway Energy and 12 other companies, including the Apples of the world, Google, Walmart, committed to Paris, and that targets needed to be set. Berkshire Hathaway Energy was one of those companies in 2015.

如果你回到 2015 年，当时美国正在讨论——抱歉——加入巴黎协定时，设定了非常具体的目标。在这些目标设定之前，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司和包括苹果、谷歌、沃尔玛在内的其他 12 家公司已经承诺支持巴黎协定，并且需要设定目标。伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司是 2015 年其中一家公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, how many other utilities were there?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，还有多少其他公用事业公司？

GREG ABEL: Right. Warren, there were no other energy companies that made any type of commitment at that point in time. I’m happy to report we made a variety of pledges.

格雷格·阿贝尔：没错。沃伦，当时没有其他能源公司做出任何承诺。我很高兴地报告，我们做出了多项承诺。

Well, one of them was, at that point, we’d invested $15 billion in renewables, and that we would commit 30 billion in total. Well, we far exceeded that total now.

好吧，其中一个是，到那时我们已经在可再生能源上投资了 150 亿美元，并且我们承诺总共投资 300 亿美元。好吧，我们现在远远超过了这个总额。

So, there’s been a clear commitment to reduce — decarbonizing our businesses. We have focused on very identifiable, quantifiable outcomes. And I think that’s very important.

所以，我们明确承诺减少——使我们的业务脱碳。我们专注于非常明确、可量化的结果。我认为这非常重要。

If you look at the standards that were set with the — that were the original U.S. government’s commitments associated with the Paris Agreement, the target was 26% to 28% reductions in carbon footprints going back to 2005. So, that’s the reduction period through 2025. And they wanted the 26% to 28% reduction level.

如果你看看与巴黎协定相关的美国政府最初承诺所设定的标准，目标是将碳足迹减少 26%到 28%，以 2005 年为基准。因此，这个减排期是到 2025 年。他们希望达到 26%到 28%的减排水平。

We committed to that at BHE. And I’m happy to report, Warren — and we’ve briefed our board — we achieved that in 2020. So, we met our pledge. And we met the commitment under the Paris Agreement.

我们在 BHE 对此做出了承诺。我很高兴地报告，沃伦——我们已经向董事会进行了简报——我们在 2020 年实现了这一目标。因此，我们履行了我们的承诺，并且达成了《巴黎协定》下的承诺。

And then, if you fast forward to the discussions that are occurring right now, or have occurred, around rejoining the Paris Agreement, the current administration has proposed that, again, using 2005 as a starting point, that the emission goals for reduction should be 50% to 52% by 2030.

然后，如果你快进到现在正在进行或已经进行的关于重新加入巴黎协定的讨论，目前的政府提议再次以 2005 年为起点，到 2030 年减排目标应为 50%到 52%。

Again, I’m happy to brief to our shareholders, and in briefings we’ve provided to our board, but Berkshire Hathaway Energy will achieve that by 2030. Our reductions will hit the Paris Agreement target.

再次，我很高兴向我们的股东简要介绍，在我们向董事会提供的简报中，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源将在 2030 年前实现这一目标。我们的减排将达到巴黎协定的目标。

Again, the reason we can do it is we’ve built the foundation through transmission, the substantial investment that Warren’s highlighted, and then followed that up with very specific investments on the renewable side.

再次，我们之所以能够做到这一点，是因为我们通过传输建立了基础，沃伦强调的重大投资，然后在可再生能源方面进行了非常具体的投资。

I’ve one incremental slide that, I hope, sort of pulls it all together, and that’s BHE-2.

我有一张增量幻灯片，希望能将所有内容整合在一起，那就是 BHE-2。

Because, as people discuss carbon, they often go to coal units, how many you own, how many have you closed. And there’s no important — there’s no question that can be an important metric. But it is a transition. And we have very much focused across the three utilities we own and the ones we’ve highlighted on the slide, is to transition from our existing fleet to renewables, using transmission.

因为，当人们讨论碳时，他们通常会提到煤电单位，你拥有多少，关闭了多少。毫无疑问，这可以是一个重要的指标。但这是一种过渡。我们非常关注我们拥有的三家公用事业公司以及我们在幻灯片中强调的公司，旨在通过使用输电设施，从现有的发电机组过渡到可再生能源。

We have not become overly dependent on transitioning to gas. That’s been a clear strategy. So, over a period of time, our coal units will retire.

我们并没有过于依赖转向天然气。这一直是一个明确的战略。因此，随着时间的推移，我们的煤电机组将会退役。

I’m happy to report — or pleased to report — to our shareholders that through 2020, we’ve closed 16 units to date.

我很高兴地向我们的股东报告，截至 2020 年，我们已经关闭了 16 个单位。

If you look at — from 2021 through 2030, there will be an incremental 16 units closed. And then if you go through to the end of 2049, our remaining 14 units will be closed. And at that point in time, all our coal units are closed.

如果你看一下——从 2021 年到 2030 年，将会有 16 个机组逐步关闭。然后如果你一直看到 2049 年底，我们剩下的 14 个机组将会关闭。到那时，我们所有的煤电机组都将关闭。

That slide is just an aggregation of all the activities each of our business units have been taking to help facilitate that transition, and really transitioning to decarbonizing those units. And I said, decarbonizing our businesses on behalf of, first and foremost, our customers, the many stakeholders they represent in the various states. And then equally important, decarbonizing those businesses on behalf of our Berkshire Hathaway shareholders.

那张幻灯片只是我们各个业务部门为帮助实现过渡而采取的所有活动的汇总，实际上是为了使这些部门实现脱碳。我提到，代表我们的客户，尤其是他们在各个州所代表的众多利益相关者，来为我们的业务进行脱碳。同样重要的是，代表我们的伯克希尔哈撒韦股东为这些业务进行脱碳。

The only other thing I would add, as it is the entity that has the second-largest carbon footprint in Berkshire — and when you combine BNSF and BHE, you’re talking the material set of emissions within Berkshire — BNSF has also been very active in managing their carbon profile.

我想补充的唯一一点是，作为伯克希尔第二大碳足迹的实体——当你将 BNSF 和 BHE 结合在一起时，你谈论的是伯克希尔内部的主要排放量——BNSF 在管理其碳排放方面也非常积极。

They’ve committed to have science-based targets established for 2030. So, again, those targets will, again, be consistent with the Paris Agreement.

他们承诺在 2030 年前设定基于科学的目标。因此，这些目标将再次与《巴黎协定》保持一致。

We have seen what the other participants, or some of them in the class — in the industry — that have committed to. And our commitment will be very similar, i.e. it’ll be consistent with the Paris Agreement. But it’ll be a 30% reduction in BNSF’s footprint by 2030.

我们已经看到其他参与者，或者说班级中一些参与者——在这个行业——所承诺的内容。我们的承诺将非常相似，即与《巴黎协定》保持一致。但到 2030 年，BNSF 的碳足迹将减少 30%。

So, again, if you look at our — and that’s been publicly disclosed. That’s on the BNSF website. Everything I’ve discussed regarding BHE is on their website, filed in 8-Ks, completely accessible by our many shareholders.

所以，再次强调，如果你查看我们的——这已经公开披露。这在 BNSF 网站上。我所讨论的关于 BHE 的所有内容都在他们的网站上，已在 8-K 文件中提交，完全可以被我们的众多股东访问。

So, when I look at it on — from the perspective of our Berkshire shareholders, I really believe this risk is being well-managed, and we are positioning ourselves for the long term. Thanks, Warren.

所以，当我从我们伯克希尔股东的角度来看这个问题时，我真的相信这个风险得到了很好的管理，我们正在为长期发展做好准备。谢谢，沃伦。

17. “We’ve spent far more than any utility” on renewable energy and transmission

“我们在可再生能源和传输上的支出远远超过任何公用事业。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, incidentally, I mean, the president, the other night, talked about a hundred billion for infrastructure. We’d love to spend a hundred billion. But he was talking about, you know —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，顺便说一下，前几天总统提到了一百亿用于基础设施。我们很想花一百亿。但他说的是，你知道的——

Transmission is really the problem, I mean, a big problem. Because you got to get from where the sun is shining and where the wind is blowing, essentially, to concentrations of population.

传输确实是个问题，我是说，是个大问题。因为你必须从阳光普照和风吹草动的地方到达人口集中的地方。

And it’ll be whether the — you know, you cross state lines and you go through people’s backyards (laughs) and everywhere.

而这将取决于——你知道的，你跨越州界，穿过人们的后院（笑）和各个地方。

Whether the federal government has better luck in just saying this is the way it’s going to be done and ramming it down the throats of where they go and getting it done — I mean, they may have that power. And they’ll be able to do it faster than we are.

无论联邦政府是否更幸运，直接宣布“事情就要这样做”，然后强行推进他们的计划——我的意思是，他们可能确实有这样的权力。他们可能比我们更快地完成这些事情。

On the other hand, we’d love to do it. We’ll spend the a hundred billion.

另一方面，我们很乐意这样做。我们将花费一千亿。

But the speed at which we can do it is — we bought PacifiCorp in 2006, and we had a bunch of customers out in the far West, and they had coal plants serving them. And to change that, you’ve got to be able to go to where wind blows and deliver it. So, it’s —

但是我们能做到的速度是——我们在2006年收购了PacifiCorp，当时我们在远西部有一批客户，他们依靠燃煤电厂供电。要改变这种情况，你必须能够将电力传输到有风力资源的地方。因此，这是——

But it is interesting that we have published this information. We’ve spent far more than any utility, in terms of renewables and transmission in the United States. And we started with a nothing — (laughs) you know, a little operation.

但有趣的是我们发布了这些信息。在可再生能源和美国的传输方面，我们的支出远远超过任何公用事业。而我们起步时几乎一无所有——（笑）你知道的，一个小型运营。

But the people who bought the stock with their own money, the individuals, they seem to understand it. And they read the reports.

但是用自己钱买股票的人，个人，他们似乎理解这一点。他们会阅读报告。

And we get calls, and they say, well, we want to come out and talk to you about it. Well, we’re not talking to them and ignoring the million people (laughs) that have been with us over time and bought it with their own money.

我们接到电话，他们说，我们想出来和你谈谈这个。好吧，我们不和他们谈，忽视了那些一直支持我们的、用自己钱购买的百万股东（大笑）。

We will not give special treatment to — either to analysts or to the — to institutions over the individuals that, basically, trust us with their savings for their lifetime.

我们不会对分析师或机构给予特殊待遇，基本上，信任我们终身保管他们储蓄的个人将优先于他们。

18. Insurance subsidiaries are prepared for “unpleasant surprises”

保险子公司已为“意外惊喜”做好准备。

BECKY QUICK: This question is for Warren and Ajit. It comes from Fernando Lewis, a long-time Berkshire shareholder from Panama, who says, “As a shareholder that intends to remain so for many decades, my biggest concern is around possible losses arising from higher-than-expected insurance losses.

贝基·奎克：这个问题是问沃伦和阿吉特的。来自巴拿马的长期伯克希尔股东费尔南多·刘易斯提出了这个问题，他说：“作为一名打算在未来几十年内继续持有股份的股东，我最大的担忧是可能因保险损失高于预期而导致的损失。”

“We’ve seen this in other great companies where underwriting mistakes end up crippling businesses previously considered exemplar.

“我们在其他伟大的公司中也见过这种情况，承保错误最终使以前被视为典范的企业陷入困境。”

“While I understand that Berkshire’s culture is unique and the insurance division is full of talented individuals, this is a risk that concerns me.

“虽然我理解伯克希尔的文化是独特的，保险部门也充满了才华横溢的人，但这是一个让我担忧的风险。”

“Many of us shareholders feel comfortable now, given the privilege of having Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, and Mr. Jain looking at these deals. However, there will be a day when this is no longer the case. Is it reasonable to think that over the long term, Berkshire should focus on plain, vanilla short-tail insurance businesses like GEICO and reduce the size of some long-tail risk?

“我们许多股东现在感到安心，因为有巴菲特先生、芒格先生和贾因先生在审视这些交易。然而，总有一天这种情况会发生变化。长期来看，伯克希尔是否应该专注于像 GEICO 这样的普通短期保险业务，并减少一些长期风险的规模，这样的想法合理吗？”

“I want to clarify that I have the most respect and gratitude for all of Berkshire employees that have built the best insurance group in the world. I’m confident we have this talent to remain leaders in this field for decades to come. This is focused on the inherent opaqueness and risk of some insurance lines.”

“我想澄清，我对所有在伯克希尔工作的员工怀有最深的尊重和感激，他们建立了世界上最优秀的保险集团。我相信我们拥有这种人才，能够在未来几十年里继续在这个领域保持领先。这是针对某些保险业务固有的不透明性和风险的关注。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Ajit, do you want to lead off, or —?

沃伦·巴菲特：阿吉特，你想先开始，还是——？

AJIT JAIN: I mean, clearly contract certainty is an issue for us in the insurance industry. It is an issue that cuts across not only the long-tail line that you mentioned, but even short-tail property focus lines.

AJIT JAIN：我的意思是，合同确定性显然是我们保险行业面临的问题。这是一个不仅涉及您提到的长尾险种，还涉及短尾财产险种的问题。

The most recent example is business interruption, which is an integral part of any property insurance policy that is bought and sold by corporations.

最近的例子是商业中断，这是任何由公司购买和销售的财产保险条款的一个重要组成部分。

It is a risk every time we issue a contract that, either because of sloppiness in terms of how that contract is written, or because of the regulatory environment we all have to live in, that the words in the contract may be tortured. And normally when they are tortured, they end up going against the insurance industry, not in their favor.

每次我们签发合同时，都存在风险，可能是因为合同的写作不够严谨，或者是因为我们必须遵循的监管环境，导致合同中的措辞被曲解。通常，当措辞被曲解时，结果往往对保险行业不利，而不是有利。

So, it is a risk. It’s an unknown risk, in terms of how bad it can be. I hope we price for it when we price for the product. We throw something for the unknown unknowns, if you will.

所以，这是一种风险。这是一种未知的风险，关于它可能有多糟糕。我希望我们在为产品定价时考虑到这一点。如果你愿意的话，我们为未知的未知因素留出一些空间。

And we try and aggregate our exposures by major risk categories. Hopefully, that’ll give us some comfort, in terms of having some boundaries on what the exposure really can be.

我们尝试按主要风险类别汇总我们的风险敞口。希望这能给我们一些安慰，让我们对风险敞口的实际范围有一些界限。

But there’s no question the regulators play a very important role, in terms of the economics of the business, especially in the U.S., where the 50 state regulators who we have to deal with, in terms of pricing, in terms of contracts, in terms of —

但毫无疑问，监管机构在商业经济方面扮演着非常重要的角色，尤其是在美国，我们必须与 50 个州的监管机构打交道，涉及定价、合同等方面。

WARREN BUFFETT: Most of those surprises in insurance, practically all of them, are unpleasant.

沃伦·巴菲特：保险中的大多数意外，几乎所有的，都是令人不快的。

I mean, (laughs), you get the premium up front. That’s pleasant. And then from there on, you get some very imaginative losses that come through. And you get some that you’ve taken on.

我的意思是，（笑）你一开始就获得了高额的收益。这很愉快。然后从那时起，你会遇到一些非常富有想象力的损失。而且你会承担一些损失。

We are willing to lose, in terms of, sort of, the outside limit, we think, well, we’re willing to lose $10 billion in a single event. And we want to get paid very appropriately for that. But we’ve got the resources to do it. And if —

我们愿意在某种程度上承受损失，我们认为，嗯，我们愿意在一次事件中损失 100 亿美元。我们希望为此获得适当的报酬。但我们有能力做到这一点。如果——

But we don’t want to lose 10 billion in something where we only thought we could (laughs) lose 50 million or something like that.

但我们不想在我们只认为可能损失 5000 万的事情上损失 100 亿（大笑）。

And, you know, the current situation, for example, with The Boy Scouts of America, you know, they — I think there were 11-hundred claims, or something like that, that have been filed and now, there’s 17,000 just in —

而且，你知道，目前的情况，比如Boy Scouts of America，我认为已经提交了大约 1100 个索赔，而现在，仅在——就有 17000 个

AJIT JAIN: No, no. They’re close to a hundred thousand now.

阿吉特·贾因：不，不。他们现在接近十万了。

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，还有——

AJIT JAIN: Up by 50 times.

AJIT JAIN：上涨了 50 倍。

WARREN BUFFETT: And these go back to 1950 or 1960. And you’ve got people advertising for claims. And so, all of a sudden, you get a lot of claims.

沃伦·巴菲特：这些可以追溯到 1950 年或 1960 年。人们开始为索赔做广告。于是，突然间，你就会收到很多索赔。

I’m sure a lot of the claims are valid. I’m sure a lot of them are invalid. And —

我相信很多说法是有效的。我也相信很多说法是无效的。而——

AJIT JAIN: Well — 阿吉特·贾因：好吧——

WARREN BUFFETT: — and how in the world do you pick out the difference? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：——你到底怎么能分辨出其中的差异呢？（笑）

AJIT JAIN: Yeah, and it goes back to the issue that you just raised.

阿吉特·贾因：是的，这与您刚才提到的问题有关。

The reason why this number of claims have skyrocketed from less than 2,000 to close to a hundred thousand is because the statute of limitations had expired, but in several states, if not in most states, they have unilaterally extended the deadline by when you can make claims, and expanded it by a few years.

这一索赔数量从不到 2000 件激增到接近十万的原因是，诉讼时效已过，但在几个州，甚至在大多数州，他们单方面延长了可以提出索赔的截止日期，并将其延长了几年。

As a result of which, a lot more claims have appeared, funded by plaintiff lawyers who are now very well-funded. And that results in claims just skyrocketing.

因此，许多索赔出现了，这些索赔由现在资金充足的原告律师资助。这导致索赔数量急剧增加。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You get a lot of unpleasant surprises in insurance. But we’ve got a very — I’m very biased on this. But I wouldn’t — (laughs) — I think we’ve got the best insurance operation in the world. And Ajit is the guy that created it. And the people at GEICO — we bought that — and they did wonderful things over time to contribute their part of it, too, and other people have.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你在保险业会遇到很多不愉快的惊喜。但我们有一个非常——我对此非常有偏见（笑）。但我认为我们拥有世界上最好的保险业务。而Ajit是创建它的人。GEICO的团队——我们收购了它——他们随着时间的推移也做出了非常出色的贡献，其他人也是如此。

But Ajit is the symphony conductor of it. (Laughs)

但阿吉特是它的交响乐指挥。（笑）

19. “Warren and I don’t have to agree on every damn little thing we do”

“沃伦和我不必在我们做的每一件小事上都达成一致。”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Henry Zhou. And he says, “It looks like Charlie and Warren have some different opinions recently, like Costco and Wells Fargo. Where’s that taking Berkshire?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自亨利·周。他说：“查理和沃伦最近似乎有一些不同的看法，比如关于好市多和富国银行。这将把伯克希尔带向何方？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’re not all that different. And Costco is a company I very much admire, and I have enjoyed my long association with it, that company. And — but I love Berkshire, too, — so.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们并没有那么不同。好市多是一家我非常欣赏的公司，我很享受与这家公司的长期合作关系。不过，我也爱伯克希尔。

And luckily, there’s no conflict. And Warren and I don’t have to agree on every damn little thing we do. We’ve gotten along pretty well.

幸运的是，没有冲突。沃伦和我不必在我们做的每一件小事上达成一致。我们相处得很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: We have — (laughs) — better than pretty — we have never had an argument —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有——（笑）——比不错更好——我们从未争吵过——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — in 62 years. And it’s not that we agree on everything. But we’ve literally — in 62 years, we’ve never gotten mad at each other. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：—— 在 62 年里。并不是说我们在所有事情上都达成一致。但在 62 年里，我们从来没有对彼此生气过。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, no —

查理·芒格：不，不，不 —

WARREN BUFFETT: It just doesn’t happen. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这根本不可能发生。（笑）

20. They’re not as close as Buffett and Munger, but Abel and Jain have a good working relationship

他们的关系没有巴菲特和芒格那么紧密，但阿贝尔和贾因的工作关系很好。

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Jason Plawner. And he says, “Mr. Jain and Mr. Abel, this question is for you.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自杰森·普劳纳。他说：“贾因先生和阿贝尔先生，这个问题是给你们的。”

“One of the successful features of Berkshire is the strong bond between Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, who manage the company better because they had each other.

“伯克希尔成功的一个特点是巴菲特先生和芒格先生之间的紧密联系，他们因为有彼此而更好地管理公司。”

“As you two are clear leaders of the next generation at Berkshire Hathaway, can you please tell us about how you interact with each other, or some of the other incredibly competent Berkshire managers you seek for advice?”

“作为伯克希尔哈撒韦下一代的明确领导者，你们能否告诉我们你们之间是如何互动的，或者你们向哪些其他非常有能力的伯克希尔经理寻求建议？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Who’s that directed at?

沃伦·巴菲特：那是针对谁的？

BECKY QUICK: Greg and Ajit —

贝基·奎克：格雷格和阿吉特——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Ajit. 查理·芒格：阿吉特。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

AJIT JAIN: Well, there’s no question that the relationship Warren has with Charlie is unique, and it’s not going to be duplicated, certainly not by me and Greg, no. I can’t think of very many other pairs that can duplicate it.

阿吉特·贾因：毫无疑问，沃伦与查理的关系是独特的，这种关系是无法复制的，当然我和格雷格也不行。我想不出还有多少对能够复制这种关系。

Nevertheless, both Greg and I, at least certainly from my perspective, and I’m sure Greg will speak for himself, we’ve known each other for a very long time.

尽管如此，格雷格和我，至少从我的角度来看，当然我相信格雷格会为自己发声，我们已经认识很长时间了。

I certainly have a lot of respect, both at a professional level and a personal level, in terms of what Greg’s abilities are. We do not interact with each other as often as Warren and Charlie do. But every quarter, we will talk to each other about our respective businesses and update each other on our respective businesses.

我对格雷格的能力在专业和个人层面上都非常尊重。我们之间的互动没有沃伦和查理那么频繁。但每个季度，我们会互相交流各自的业务，并更新彼此的业务情况。

And then, during the course of the quarter, while we may not have any formal sort of meetings, if you will, but every time a question comes up which is related to insurance, Greg will pick up the phone and call me.

然后，在这个季度的过程中，虽然我们可能没有任何正式的会议，但每当出现与保险相关的问题时，格雷格都会打电话给我。

By the same token, if there’s any question that comes up relating to any of the non-insurance operations that Greg is in charge of, like we had recently where a client of mine was looking for — trying to find a buyer. And I picked up the phone and talked to Greg, and we talked about, you know, how best to proceed.

同样，如果有任何与格雷格负责的非保险业务相关的问题出现，比如最近我有一个客户在寻找买家。我打电话给格雷格，我们讨论了如何最好地进行。

So, that happens. And during the course of the quarter, every quarter we exchange notes. And we have a perfectly well-functioning relationship between the two of us. And I hope it remains that way. Greg?

所以，这就发生了。在这个季度的过程中，每个季度我们都会交换意见。我们之间的关系运作得非常好。我希望它能保持这样。格雷格？

GREG ABEL: Yes. Ajit, well said. And as he touched on, Warren and Charlie have an exceptional relationship. But I’m very proud of the relationship Ajit and I’ve had.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，阿吉特，说得好。正如他提到的，沃伦和查理之间的关系非常出色。但我对我和阿吉特之间的关系感到非常自豪。

And as Ajit touched on, it’s developed over many years. We’ve had the opportunity — or I’ve had the opportunity — to see how Ajit’s run the insurance business.

正如 Ajit 提到的，这个过程经历了许多年。我们有机会——或者说我有机会——看到 Ajit 是如何经营保险业务的。

And as Warren highlight and Charlie highlights, there’s no one better at it. So, I’ve had the opportunity to observe that.

正如沃伦和查理所强调的，没有人比他们更擅长这个。因此，我有机会观察到这一点。

And then, equally over the years, that relationship has just built and become greater and greater. And as Ajit touched on, couldn’t have more personal respect for Ajit, both personally and professionally.

然后，多年来，这种关系不断建立，变得越来越深厚。正如 Ajit 提到的，我对 Ajit 的个人和职业尊重无以复加。

And even though the interaction may be different than, say, how Warren and Charlie do it, as Ajit touched on, there is a regular dialogue, both around opportunities within our two businesses and units, both if we see something unusual that the other individual should hear, we make sure we’re always following up with each other.

即使这种互动可能与沃伦和查理的方式有所不同，正如阿吉特提到的，我们之间始终保持着定期的对话，无论是关于我们两家企业和部门的机会，还是如果我们发现了对方应该知道的异常情况，我们都会确保始终与对方跟进。

But it goes beyond that. Ajit has a great understanding of the Berkshire culture. I strongly believe I do, too. And any time we see anything unusual in one of our businesses, it’s Ajit who I’m going to call and say, are you comfortable that we’re taking this approach? Is it going to be consistent with how you think about it, how you think about it in insurance?

但这不仅仅如此。Ajit 对伯克希尔文化有很深的理解。我也坚信我对此有很好的理解。每当我们在某个业务中看到任何不寻常的情况时，我会打电话给 Ajit，问他是否对我们采取这种方法感到满意？这是否与他在保险方面的思考方式一致？

So, it goes — it goes beyond just discussing the businesses, but that maintaining the exceptional culture we have at Berkshire and building upon that.

所以，这不仅仅是讨论业务，而是保持我们在伯克希尔拥有的卓越文化并在此基础上不断发展。

So, very fortunate to have Ajit as a colleague, and immensely enjoy working with him every day. Thank you.

非常幸运能有 Ajit 作为同事，每天与他一起工作让我非常愉快。谢谢。

21. Buffett defends BNSF as competitive with Union Pacific

巴菲特为 BNSF 辩护，称其与联合太平洋铁路具有竞争力

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Glenn Greenberg. He says — it’s on the profitability of GEICO and BNSF.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自格伦·格林伯格。他说——这是关于 GEICO 和 BNSF 的盈利能力。

He said, “Why do these companies operate at meaningfully lower profit margins than their main competitors, Progressive and Union Pacific? Can we expect current managements to at least achieve parity?”

他说：“为什么这些公司的利润率明显低于他们的主要竞争对手，Progressive和联合太平洋？我们能否期待当前的管理层至少达到平衡？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Was it GEICO and — ?

沃伦·巴菲特：是 GEICO 和——？

BECKY QUICK: BNSF. 贝基·奎克：BNSF。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. Actually, if you look at the first quarter figures, you’ll see that the Berkshire Hathaway/Union Pacific comparison has gotten (laughs) quite better.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦。实际上，如果你看看第一季度的数字，你会发现伯克希尔·哈撒韦与联合太平洋的比较（哈哈）变得好多了。

Katie Farmer’s doing an incredible job at BNSF.

凯蒂·法默在 BNSF 的表现非常出色。

And it’ll be an interesting question, whether five years from now or ten years from now, BNSF or Union Pacific has the higher earnings.

五年后或十年后，BNSF 或联合太平洋，谁的收益更高？这将是一个有趣的问题。

We’ve had higher earnings in the past. Union Pacific passed us.

我们过去的收益更高。联合太平洋超过了我们。

The first quarter, you can look at, and, you know — they think they’ve got the — a slightly better franchise. We think we’ve got a slightly better franchise.

第一季度，你可以看看，他们认为他们有一个稍微更好的特许经营。我们认为我们有一个稍微更好的特许经营。

We know we’re larger than Union Pacific. I mean, we will do more business than they do. And we should make a little more money than they do, but we haven’t in the last few years.

我们知道我们比联合太平洋大。我的意思是，我们的业务量会超过他们。我们应该赚比他们多一点钱，但在过去几年里我们并没有。

But, it’s quite a railroad. I feel very good about that.

但是，这真是一条铁路。我对此感到非常满意。

22. “We will have the slowest-aging management”

“我们将拥有最缓慢老化的管理”

WARREN BUFFETT: I should — I should go back to that previous question.

沃伦·巴菲特：我应该——我应该回到之前的问题。

You know, people talk about the aging management at Berkshire. And I always assume they’re talking about Charlie (laughs) when they say that.

你知道，人们谈论伯克希尔的老龄化管理。我总是认为他们在说查理（大笑）时是这个意思。

But I would like to point out that in three more years, Charlie will be aging at 1% a year. (Laughter)

但我想指出，再过三年，查理将以每年 1%的速度衰老。（笑声）

And he is the — no one is aging (laughs) less than Charlie.

而他是——没有人比查理老得更少了（笑）。

If you could take (laughs) some of these new companies with 25-year-olds, they’re aging at 4% a year. (Laughs)

如果你能和这些 25 岁的新公司一起（大笑），他们每年老化 4%。（大笑）

So, we will have the slowest-aging management, percentage-wise, by far, than any corporate — any American company has.

所以，从百分比上看，我们将拥有迄今为止任何公司——任何美国公司中最慢的管理老化。

23. Progressive has been better lately, but GEICO is catching up

Progressive最近有所改善，但 GEICO 正在赶上。

BECKY QUICK: Did you want to talk about GEICO versus Progressive, too, because I got a lot of questions on that —

贝基·奎克：你想谈谈 GEICO 和 Progressive 的比较吗？因为我对此有很多问题——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Progressive in recent — Progressive has had the best operation in the last — in recent years, in terms of matching rate to risk. I mean, that’s what insurance is all about, among other things.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，Progressive在最近几年中，在风险匹配率方面表现最佳。我是说，这就是保险的核心内容之一。

But, I mean, you have to have the right rate.

但是，我的意思是，你必须有合适的费率。

If you think that 90-year-olds and 20-year-olds have an equal chance of dying, (laughs) I mean, you’re going to be out of business very quickly in the life insurance business. And you will get all the 90-year-old risks, and the other guy will get the 20-year-old risks.

如果你认为 90 岁和 20 岁的人有相同的死亡几率，（笑）我的意思是，你在寿险行业很快就会倒闭。你会承担所有 90 岁老人的风险，而另一个人则会承担 20 岁年轻人的风险。

And the same thing applies in auto insurance. I mean, there is a huge difference between 16-year-old males and how they drive, and 40-year-old married and, you know, employed people.

在汽车保险中也是如此。我的意思是，16 岁男性的驾驶方式与 40 岁已婚且有工作的人的驾驶方式之间存在巨大差异。

So, the companies that do the best job of actually having the appropriate rate for every one of their policyholders is going to do well.

因此，那些能够为每位投保人提供适当费率的公司将会表现良好。

And Progressive has done a very good job on that. And we’re doing a much better job on that already.

而 Progressive 在这方面做得非常好。我们在这方面已经做得更好了。

But Todd Combs has gone there. And —

但托德·科姆斯已经去了那里。而——

It’s a very interesting business. Both Progressive and GEICO were started in the ’30s — I believe I’m right about Progressive on that — and we were started in ’36.

这是一项非常有趣的业务。Progressive 和 GEICO 都是在 30 年代创立的——我相信我对 Progressive 的说法是正确的——而我们是在 1936 年成立的。

You know, we have had the better product for a long, long time, I mean, in terms of cost. And here we are, 85 years later, in our case, and we have about 13% or so of the market, whatever it may be. And Progressive has just a slight bit less.

你知道，从成本角度来看，我们很长时间以来一直拥有更好的产品。如今，85年过去了，在我们的情况下，我们拥有大约13%的市场份额，或者左右。而Progressive的市场份额稍微少一点。

So, the two of us have 25% of the market roughly, in this huge market, after 80-something years of having a better product.

所以，我们两个人在这个庞大的市场中大约占有 25%的份额，经过 80 多年提供更好的产品。

So, it’s a very slow-changing competitive situation. But Progressive has done a very, very good job recently. And we’ve done a very, very good job over the years.

所以，这是一种变化非常缓慢的竞争局面。但 Progressive 最近做得非常非常好。多年来，我们也做得非常非常好。

And we’re doing a good job now. But we have made some very significant improvements. And if you looked at the — you don’t want to look at the quarters too much — but our profitability in the first quarter was good.

我们现在做得很好。但我们已经取得了一些非常显著的进步。如果你看看——你不想过多关注季度——但我们第一季度的盈利能力很好。

But we gave back more money, under our giveback arrangement when the virus broke out — we gave 2.8 billion on our giveback program — that was larger than any company as well. It was the largest, I think in the country.

但在病毒爆发时，我们根据我们的回馈安排返还了更多的钱——我们在回馈计划中返还了 28 亿美元——这比任何公司都要多。我认为这是全国最大的。

And GEICO and Progressive are both (laughs) going to do very well in the future.

GEICO 以及 Progressive 都将（哈哈）在未来表现得非常好。

And actually, Union Pacific and BNSF are going to do well in the future. It’s just, in both cases, we want to do a little bit better than the other guy. (Laughs)

实际上，联合太平洋铁路和 BNSF 在未来会表现良好。只是，在这两种情况下，我们都希望比其他人做得更好。（笑）

AJIT JAIN: Can I — can I just —

AJIT JAIN：我可以——我可以只是——

BECKY QUICK: Yeah. 贝基·奎克：是的。

AJIT JAIN: — add a little bit?

AJIT JAIN: — 加一点吗？

Yeah, there’s no question Progressive is a machine. They are very good at what they do, whether it’s underwriting, which Warren talked about, in terms of matching rate to risk, whether it’s admin claims.

是的，毫无疑问，Progressive 是一台机器。他们在自己所做的事情上非常出色，无论是沃伦提到的承保，还是在风险与费率匹配方面，还是管理索赔。

Having said that, I think GEICO is catching up with Progressive. More than a year ago — about a year ago — Progressive had margins that were almost twice as much as GEICO’s, and growth rates that were almost twice as much as GEICO’s.

话虽如此，我认为 GEICO 正在赶上 Progressive。一年多前——大约一年前——Progressive 的利润率几乎是 GEICO 的两倍，增长率也几乎是 GEICO 的两倍。

If you look at the results as of now, Progressive is still crushing it, in terms of growth, relative to GEICO. But GEICO has certainly caught up with Progressive, in terms of margins. And hopefully, that gap will be nonexistent in the future.

如果你看看目前的结果，Progressive 在增长方面仍然远超 GEICO。但 GEICO 在利润方面确实已经追上了 Progressive。希望未来这个差距将不存在。

The second point I want to make on the issue of matching rate to risk: GEICO had clearly missed the bus and were late in terms of appreciating the value of telematics.

我想在匹配率与风险的问题上提出的第二点是：GEICO 显然错过了机会，未能及时认识到远程信息处理的价值。

They have woken up to the fact that telematics plays a big role in matching rate to risk. They have a number of initiatives. And hopefully, they will see the light of day before not too long, and that’ll allow them to catch up with their competitors, in terms of the issue of matching rate to risk.

他们意识到远程信息处理在匹配费率与风险方面发挥着重要作用。他们有多个计划。希望这些计划能在不久的将来付诸实施，这将使他们在匹配费率与风险的问题上赶上竞争对手。

WARREN BUFFETT: I will predict that five years from now — State Farm is still the largest auto insurer — but I will predict that five years from now, it’s very likely that the top two will be GEICO and Progressive. And in which order, we’ll see.

沃伦·巴菲特：我预测五年后——State Farm仍然是最大的汽车保险公司——但我预测五年后，前两名很可能是 GEICO 和 Progressive。至于顺序，我们拭目以待。

But both companies are going to do very well, in my opinion. Well, they — and they — GEICO’s done well — extremely well.

但我认为这两家公司都会表现得很好。嗯，他们——而且——GEICO 表现得很好——非常好。

But Progressive was better at setting the right rate, and we’re catching up, I think, fairly fast.

但 Progressive 在设定正确的费率方面做得更好，我认为我们正在相当快地赶上。

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. Excuse me.

阿吉特·贾因：是的。对不起。

Progressive has certainly done better. But when it comes to branding, GEICO is, I think, miles — (coughs) excuse me — miles ahead of Progressive. And in terms of managing expenses, well, I think GEICO does a much better job than anyone else in the industry.

Progressive确实做得更好。但在品牌方面，我认为 GEICO 远远领先于进步保险。而在管理开支方面，我认为 GEICO 在行业中做得比其他任何公司都要好得多。

24. Buffett admits “probably a mistake” to sell some shares of “extraordinary” Apple

巴菲特承认出售一些“非凡”苹果股票“可能是个错误”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Vittorio Agueci, from Switzerland, who writes in, “Why, in the recent past, did Berkshire sell some of the common stocks owned on Apple?

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自瑞士的维托里奥·阿圭奇，他写道：“为什么在最近的过去，伯克希尔出售了一些持有的苹果公司普通股？”

“If the company is considered Berkshire’s ‘Fourth Jewel,’ why didn’t Berkshire buy more of Apple’s stocks in 2020? This seems to be counterintuitive.”

“如果这家公司被认为是伯克希尔的‘第四颗宝石’，那么为什么伯克希尔在 2020 年没有购买更多的苹果股票呢？这似乎是违反直觉的。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have 5.3%, or something like that, now. It’s gone up in the first quarter because we bought in our shares, which helps our own shareholders expand their interest in Apple indirectly without laying out a penny.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们现在有 5.3%左右。因为我们在第一季度买入了我们的股票，这帮助我们的股东间接扩大了他们在苹果公司的利益，而无需花费一分钱。

And then Apple’s repurchased its shares and just announced another repurchase program.

然后苹果公司回购了其股票，并刚刚宣布了另一个回购计划。

So, let’s say — we look at Apple as a business that we own at 5.3%. Now we’ve got — it’s a marketable security, so it shows up as way greater than any other marketable security we have.

所以，假设我们把苹果公司看作是我们拥有 5.3%的业务。现在我们有了——这是一种可交易的证券，因此它的价值远远超过我们拥有的任何其他可交易证券。

But, of course, if you look at our railroad, as we mentioned — well, the Union Pacific is selling for about 150 billion on the market, and we own one that’s a little larger than the Union Pacific and making a little less money, but not much less.

但是，当然，如果你看看我们的铁路，正如我们提到的——好吧，联合太平洋的市值大约为 1500 亿美元，而我们拥有一条比联合太平洋稍大、盈利稍少的铁路，但差距不大。

So, it’s a — it’s an extraordinarily — Apple — it’s got a fantastic manager. (CEO) Tim Cook was underappreciated for a while. He’s one of the best managers in the world, and I’ve seen a lot of managers.

所以，这是一个——这是一个非常——苹果——它有一个出色的经理。 (首席执行官) 蒂姆·库克曾一度被低估。他是世界上最优秀的经理之一，我见过很多经理。

And he’s got a product that people absolutely love. And there’s an installed base of people and they get satisfaction rates of 99%.

他有一款人们非常喜欢的产品。并且有一群已经安装的用户，他们的满意度高达 99%。

And I get the figures from the (Nebraska) Furniture Mart as to what’s being sold, and if people come in and they want an Android phone, they want an Android phone. If they want Apple — they want an Apple phone — you can’t sell them the other one. (Laughs)

我从内布拉斯加家具城获取销售数据，发现如果顾客进店想买安卓手机，他们就是想要安卓手机。如果他们想要苹果手机——他们就是想要苹果手机——你没法把另一款卖给他们。（笑）

The brand — and the product is an incredible product. It’s a huge, huge bargain to people.

这个品牌——这个产品是一个令人难以置信的产品。对人们来说，这是一个巨大的、巨大的便宜。

I mean, the part it plays in their lives is huge. I use it as a phone, but I’m probably the only guy in the country. You know, maybe some descendant of Alexander Graham Bell’s doing the same thing.

我意思是，它在他们生活中扮演的角色是巨大的。我把它当作手机，但我可能是全国唯一一个这样做的人。你知道，也许某个亚历山大·格雷厄姆·贝尔的后代也在做同样的事情。

But it is indispensable to people. And, you know, it costs — you know, a car costs $35,000. And I’m sure, with some people, if you asked them whether they want to give up — had to give up — their Apple or give up their car, you know, really make the choice for the next five years, you know, who knows what they’d do?

但对人们来说这是不可或缺的。你知道，汽车的价格是 35,000 美元。我相信，如果你问一些人他们是愿意放弃他们的苹果产品还是放弃他们的汽车，真的要在接下来的五年里做出选择，你知道，他们会怎么做呢？

And, it is — and you know, we got a chance to buy it, and I —

而且，它是——你知道，我们有机会买下它，我——

I sold some stock last year, although our shareholders still had their percentage interest go up because we repurchased shares. But that was probably a mistake.

我去年卖了一些股票，尽管我们的股东仍然因为我们回购了股份而使他们的持股比例上升。但那可能是个错误。

In fact, Charlie, in his usual low-key way, let me know that — you thought it was a mistake, too, didn’t you, Charlie? (Laughs)

事实上，查理以他一贯低调的方式让我知道——你也认为这是个错误，对吧，查理？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑）

Yeah, I can only do so many things that I can get away with, with Charlie. (Laughs)

是的，我能做的事情有限，都是我能和查理一起逃避的事情。（笑）

And I kind of used them up between Costco and Apple. (Laughter)

我在好市多和苹果之间把它们用完了。（笑声）

So — and incidentally, he probably — he’s very likely was right in both circumstances.

所以——顺便提一下，他很可能在这两种情况下都是对的。

It’s an extraordinary business.

这是一项非凡的业务。

But I do want to emphasize that, in his own way — it’s a different way — but Tim Cook is — we see a lot of managers of a lot of businesses, and you’re looking at two great ones on both ends here.

但我确实想强调，以他自己的方式——这是一种不同的方式——蒂姆·库克是——我们看到许多企业的许多管理者，而你们在这里看到的是两位杰出的管理者。

He’s handled that business so well. He couldn’t do what Steve Jobs, obviously, could do in terms of creation.

他处理那项业务非常出色。他显然无法做到史蒂夫·乔布斯在创新方面所能做到的。

But, I don’t — but Steve Jobs couldn’t really, I don’t think, do what Tim Cook has done, in many respects.

但是，我认为史蒂夫·乔布斯在许多方面无法做到蒂姆·库克所做的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I also think it’s clear that that list you showed, of the leading American companies — it’s been very important for America that we’ve done so well in this new tech field.

查理·芒格：我也认为你展示的那份美国领先公司的名单很清楚——在这个新技术领域取得如此成功对美国来说非常重要。

And I personally would not like to see our present giants brought down to some low level by some anti-competitive reasonings. I don’t think they’re doing a lot of harm, anti-competitively.

我个人不希望看到我们现在的巨头因某些反竞争的理由而被拉低到某个低水平。我认为他们在反竞争方面并没有造成太大伤害。

I think they’re a credit to the Americans — credit to our civilization.

我认为他们是美国人的骄傲——是我们文明的骄傲。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and they’re huge.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，它们非常庞大。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And they’re huge. And that’s good for us.

查理·芒格：它们很庞大。这对我们有好处。

25. High-flying tech stocks are “very, very cheap” if interest rates stay so low

如果利率保持如此低，飞速发展的科技股“非常非常便宜”

BECKY QUICK: Well, let me ask a follow-up question on that, then.

贝基·奎克：那么，我再问一个后续问题。

This comes from Jack Tsang, who says, “What’s your mindset when you see so many of these high-fliers? Not the GME or meme stocks, but more like the Big Tech growth stocks, gaining 50%, 100%. 200%, et cetera, in a matter of a year or less?”

这个问题来自杰克·曾，他问道：“当你看到这么多热门股票，不是GME或meme股票，而是那些像大型科技成长股，在一年或更短时间内上涨50%、100%、200%时，你的心态是什么？”

“I know you eventually bought Apple in 2016 because of the quality of their businesses and their management. How do you assess if these high-fliers are worthy of your investment, given these crazy high valuations that muddy the waters?”

“我知道你最终在 2016 年购买了苹果，因为他们的业务质量和管理水平。考虑到这些疯狂高估值使情况变得复杂，你如何评估这些高飞企业是否值得你的投资？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t think they’re crazy. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们不认为他们疯了。（笑）

The — but we don’t — at least I — Charlie, you — I feel that that I understand Apple and its future with consumers around the world better than I understand some of the others.

但是我们不——至少我——查理，你——我觉得我对苹果及其在全球消费者中的未来的理解，比对其他一些公司的理解要好。

But I don’t regard prices — and that gets back — well, it gets back to something fundamental in investments.

但我不看重价格——这又回到了投资中的一些基本问题。

I mean, interest rates, you know, basically are to the value of assets what gravity is to matter, you know, essentially.

我意思是，利率基本上对资产的价值就像重力对物质一样，基本上。

And on the way out here, I tore out a little clipping from The Wall Street Journal yesterday — probably the only one that read it — so small I’m having trouble finding it.

在来这里的路上，我从《华尔街日报》撕下了一小段剪报——可能是唯一读过它的人——那么小，我现在很难找到它。

But, anyway, on Thursday, the U.S. Treasury sold some eight-week — some four-week notes — Treasury bills.

但是，无论如何，在星期四，美国财政部出售了一些八周和四周的国库券。

And the price was — if you looked at your Wall Street Journal, down in a little corner, next-to-the-last page in my paper, in the very bottom corner, the — here it is — the results of the Treasury auction — little, tiny thing. (Laughs)

而价格是——如果你查看你的《华尔街日报》，在我的报纸的倒数第二页的小角落里，在最底部的角落，这里就是——财政拍卖的结果——小小的东西。（笑）

They sold four — they had applications on the four-week Treasury bill for a hundred-and-some billion. They accepted bids for 43 billion worth.

他们出售了四个——他们在四周国库券上申请了超过一千亿。他们接受了价值 430 亿的投标。

And it says average — average price: one hundred point-zero-zero-zero-zero-zero-zero — six zeroes.

它说平均——平均价格：一百点零零零零零零——六个零。

And, essentially, people were giving $40-some billion to the Treasury — and they offered to give 130 billion or something, whatever the amount tendered — and the Treasury received the money at zero.

而且，基本上，人们向财政部提供了大约 400 亿美元——他们提出要提供 1300 亿美元或其他任何金额——而财政部以零利率接收了这些资金。

And (Treasury Secretary) Janet Yellen has talked a couple of times about the reduced carrying cost of the debt. And I think in the last fiscal quarter, the U.S. Treasury, which — the U.S. Government — which owes a few billion — a few trillion dollars, I should say — a few trillion dollars more than a year ago, their interest expense was down 8%.

财政部长珍妮特·耶伦曾多次谈到债务的持有成本降低。我认为在上一个财政季度，美国财政部——也就是美国政府——所欠的几万亿（我应该说是几万亿）比一年前多了几万亿，他们的利息支出下降了 8%。

So, you’ve had this incredible reduction in the so-called “super risk-free” group, the short-term Treasury bill. And that is the yardstick against which other values are measured.

所以，你在所谓的“超级无风险”组，即短期国库券中，经历了这种令人难以置信的减少。这是衡量其他价值的标准。

I mean, if I could reduce gravity’s pull by about 80%, I mean, I’d be in the Tokyo Olympics, jumping. (Laughs)

我的意思是，如果我能把重力的吸引力减少大约 80%，我想，我就能参加东京奥运会，跳跃。（笑）

And, essentially, if interest rates were 10%, valuations (unintelligible) had this incredible change in the valuation of everything that produces money, because the risk-free rate produces, really, short enough, right now, nothing.

而且，从本质上讲，如果利率是 10%，估值（无法理解）对所有产生金钱的事物的估值发生了这种不可思议的变化，因为无风险利率实际上现在产生的短期收益几乎为零。

It’s very interesting. I brought this book along because for 25 or more years, Paul Samuelson’s book was the definitive book on economics. It was taught in every school.

这非常有趣。我带了这本书，因为在过去 25 年或更长时间里，保罗·萨缪尔森的书是经济学的权威书籍。它在每所学校都被教授。

And Paul was the — he was the first — he was the first Nobel Prize winner — it’s sort of a cousin to the Nobel Prize, they started giving it in economics, I think, in the late ’60s. He was the first winner from the United States, Paul Samuelson.

保罗是——他是第一个——他是第一个诺贝尔奖得主——这有点像诺贝尔奖，我想他们在 60 年代末开始颁发经济学奖。他是第一位来自美国的获奖者，保罗·萨缪尔森。

Amazingly enough, the second winner was Ken Arrow, and both of them are the uncles of Larry Summers. (Laughs)

令人惊讶的是，第二位获胜者是肯·阿罗，他们俩都是拉里·萨默斯的叔叔。（笑）

Larry Summers had the first two winners as uncles.

拉里·萨默斯的前两位获胜者是他的叔叔。

But Paul — he was a wonderful guy, he was a wonderful writer, the definitive writer — and so I got out the ’73 economics books. And bear in mind, probably economics kind of started in — as kind of an interesting science, and respectable — with Adam Smith, we’ll say.

但是保罗——他是个了不起的人，他是个了不起的作家，权威的作家——所以我拿出了 73 年的经济学书籍。请记住，经济学大概是从亚当·斯密开始的——作为一种有趣的科学，并且是受人尊敬的——我们可以这么说。

You know, he wrote “The Wealth of Nations” in 1776, and he’d written some books earlier. But you sort of date it from kind of when our country started.

你知道，他在 1776 年写了《国富论》，而且他之前还写过一些书。但你可以说这大致是我们国家开始的时间。

And then you had all these famous economists subsequently. And Paul became the most famous of his time.

然后你有了所有这些著名的经济学家。保罗成为了他那个时代最著名的人。

So, I looked up in the back, under “interest rates,” I looked for “negative interest rates.” There’s nothing there. So, I finally found “zero interest rates,” and Paul Samuelson — brilliant man, after a couple of hundred years we’ve had of, kind of, studying economics, basically, he said that — he said you can conceivably, technically, he said, you can conceive perhaps of negative interest rates, but it can’t ever really happen.

所以，我在后面查了一下，在“利率”下，我寻找“负利率”。那里什么都没有。于是，我最终找到了“零利率”，保罗·萨缪尔森——一个杰出的人，在我们几百年的经济学研究之后，基本上他说——他说你可以设想，技术上来说，他说，你或许可以设想负利率，但这实际上是永远不可能发生的。

And that was, you know, in the 1970s. This wasn’t back in the Dark Ages. And this was — and no economist rode up and said this is a terrible line to have in a book, or anything.

那是在 1970 年代。这可不是黑暗时代。而且，没有经济学家上前说这句话在书中是个糟糕的选择，或者其他什么。

You know, and here we are in this world where we had zero interest rates last year on a — I mean, last week on — or this week — on a four-week note.

你知道，我们现在身处这个世界，去年我们在四周的票据上有零利率——我意思是，上周——或者这周。

And Berkshire Hathaway, which had a — has more than this — but let’s say we had $100 billion in Treasury Bills. We have more than that.

而伯克希尔·哈撒韦拥有——实际上比这更多——但我们可以说我们有 1000 亿美元的国债。我们拥有的比这更多。

Before the epidemic — pandemic — we were getting about a billion and a half from that a year. At present rates, if it’s two basis points, we’d get 20 million.

在疫情之前，我们每年大约能从中获得十五亿。按目前的利率，如果是两个基点，我们将获得两千万。

Imagine your wages going from $15 an hour to twenty cents an hour or something. (Laughs)

想象一下你的工资从每小时 15 美元降到每小时 20 美分或其他什么的。（笑）

It’s been a sea change. And it was designed to be that. I mean, it was — that’s why the Fed moved the way they did. They wanted to give a massive push, just like (then-European Central Bank president) Mario Draghi did in Europe in, whenever it was, 2012, when he says, “whatever it takes,” and they went to negative rates.

这是一场巨大的变化。它就是为了这个目的而设计的。我的意思是，这就是美联储采取这种行动的原因。他们想要给予一个巨大的推动，就像（时任欧洲中央银行行长）马里奥·德拉吉在 2012 年所做的那样，当时他说：“不惜一切代价”，然后他们采取了负利率。

And we — the Fed has said it doesn’t want to go to negative rates, and I think the Treasury actually has got some small (unintelligible).

而我们——美联储表示不想采取负利率，我认为财政部实际上有一些小的（听不清）。

But if present rates were destined to be appropriate, if the 10-year should really be at the price it is, those companies that the fellow mentioned in his question, they’re bargains.

但如果目前的利率注定是合适的，如果 10 年期债券的价格确实应该是现在的价格，那么那位提问者提到的那些公司就是便宜货。

They have the ability to deliver cash at a rate that’s, if you discount it back — and you’re discounting at present interest rates — stocks are very, very cheap.

他们有能力以一种如果你折现回去——而且你是以当前利率折现——股票非常非常便宜的速度交付现金。

Now, the question is what interest rates do over time. But there’s a view of what interest rates will be based in the yield curve out to 30 years, and, you know, so on.

现在的问题是利率随时间的变化。但根据 30 年的收益率曲线，有一种对未来利率的看法，等等。

It’s a fascinating time. We’ve never really seen what shoveling money in, on the basis that we’re doing it on a fiscal basis, while following a monetary policy of something close to zero interest rates, and it is enormously (unintelligible).

这是一个引人入胜的时刻。我们从未真正见过在财政基础上投入资金，同时遵循接近零利率的货币政策，这种情况是极其（无法理解的）。

But in economics, there’s one thing always to remember. You can — you can never do one thing. You always have to say, “And then what?”

但在经济学中，有一件事始终要记住。你可以——你永远不能只做一件事。你总是要问：“然后呢？”

And we’re sending out huge sums. I mean, the president said it on Wednesday: 85% of the people were going to get a $1,400 check, you know: 85%. And a couple years ago we were saying 40% of the people never could come up with $400 in cash.

我们正在发放巨额资金。我是说，总统在星期三说过：85%的人将会收到 1400 美元的支票，你知道的：85%。而几年前我们说过，40%的人根本无法凑出 400 美元现金。

So, we’ve got 85% of the people getting those sums. And so far, we’ve had no unpleasant consequences from it. I mean, people feel better. The people who get the money feel better, and — the people who are lending money don’t feel very good.

所以，我们有 85%的人获得了这些款项。到目前为止，我们没有遇到任何不愉快的后果。我的意思是，人们感觉更好。获得钱的人感觉更好，而借钱的人感觉并不好。

But it causes stocks to go up, it causes business to flourish, it causes an electorate to be happy, and we’ll see if it causes anything else.

但它导致股票上涨，导致商业繁荣，导致选民快乐，我们将看看它是否还会导致其他事情。

And if it doesn’t cause anything else, you can count on it continuing (laughs) in a very big way.

如果它没有造成其他任何事情，你可以指望它以非常大的方式继续下去（笑）。

But, you know, there are consequences to everything in economics.

但是，你知道，经济学中的一切都有后果。

But that is why the Googles and the Apples — and we didn’t own Google, we don’t own Microsoft, we don’t — but they are incredible companies, in terms of what they earn on capital. They don’t require a lot of capital, and they gush out more money.

但这就是为什么谷歌和苹果——我们不拥有谷歌，我们不拥有微软，我们不——但它们是令人难以置信的公司，就其资本收益而言。它们不需要大量资本，却能源源不断地赚取更多的钱。

And if you’re trying to find bonds that gush out (unintelligible) more money from the federal government, we got a hundred billion that’s gushing out. (Laughs)

如果你试图找到从联邦政府涌出更多资金的债券，我们有一千亿正在涌出。（笑）

Like, you know, 30 or $40 million a year, or whatever it may be, depending on the short-term rates.

像你知道的，每年 3000 万或 4000 万美元，或者根据短期利率的不同而有所变化。

So, that puts the pressure on, which is exactly, of course, what the monetary authorities want done. I mean, that’s — they’re pushing the economy in a —

所以，这就施加了压力，这正是货币当局想要做到的。我是说，他们正在推动经济朝着一个——

And they’re doing it in Europe, you know, even more extreme. And they’re pushing and we’re aiding it with fiscal policy, and people feel good, and —

他们在欧洲也在这样做，你知道，甚至更加极端。他们在推动，而我们通过财政政策在支持这一点，人们感觉很好，——

And people have become numb to numbers. You know, trillions don’t mean anything to anybody, you know. And $1,400 does mean something to them.

人们对数字变得麻木。你知道，万亿对任何人来说都没有意义，而 1400 美元对他们来说是有意义的。

So, we’ll see where it all leads, but it’s — Charlie and I consider it the most interesting movie, by far, we’ve ever seen, in terms of economics, don’t we, Charlie?

所以，我们会看看这一切会引向何处，但——查理和我认为这是我们见过的最有趣的电影，远远超过其他，尤其是在经济学方面，是吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, and the professional economists, of course, have been very surprised by what’s happened.

查理·芒格：是的，专业经济学家们当然对发生的事情感到非常惊讶。

It reminds me of what (Conservative Party U.K. Prime Minister Winston) Churchill said about (his successor as PM from the Labour Party) Clement Atlee.

这让我想起了（英国保守党首相温斯顿）丘吉尔对（工党接任首相的）克莱门特·阿特利所说的话。

He said he was a very modest man and had a great deal to be modest about. And that’s exactly what’s happened with the professional economists.

他说他是一个非常谦虚的人，有很多值得谦虚的地方。这正是专业经济学家们所经历的。

They were so confident about everything. It turns out the world is more complicated than they thought.

他们对一切都如此自信。结果发现，世界比他们想象的要复杂得多。

26. Munger: Government spending with no limit will eventually “end in disaster”

芒格：无限制的政府支出最终将“以灾难告终”

BECKY QUICK: As a follow-up to that, Pat Cain writes in, “What’s your opinion about the economic theory MMT, especially the United States, because it’s the reserve currency for the world?”

贝基·奎克：作为后续，帕特·凯恩写道：“你对经济理论 MMT 有什么看法，特别是关于美国，因为它是世界的储备货币？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think they’re more — I think the Modern Monetary Theorists are more confident than they ought to be, too.

查理·芒格：我认为现代货币理论家们的信心过于充足。

I don’t think we, any of us, know what’s going to happen to this stuff.

我认为我们任何人都不知道这些东西会发生什么。

I do think there’s a good chance that this extreme conduct is more feasible than everybody thought. But I do know, if you keep just doing it without any limit, it will end in disaster.

我确实认为这种极端行为比大家想象的更可行。但我知道，如果你无限制地继续这样做，最终会以灾难告终。

27. Negative interest rates would have unknown consequences

负利率将会产生未知的后果

BECKY QUICK: On a related question, (Chi Shen Lai from Taiwan) wrote in on this, too, and said, “If you can borrow money at a guaranteed low, or even zero, interest rate, is it still worthy of borrowing money for not that guaranteed cost from the insurance operation?”

贝基·奎克：关于一个相关的问题，（来自台湾的）陈世来也对此写道：“如果你可以以保证的低利率，甚至零利率借钱，那么从保险业务中以不那么有保障的成本借钱是否仍然值得？”

WARREN BUFFETT: It reduces the value of float by a substantial amount. And we have a flexibility with our float that virtually no one has. And I’ve written about this in the annual letter.

沃伦·巴菲特：这大大降低了浮存金的价值。我们对浮存金的灵活性几乎是无人能及的。我在年度信中写过关于这个的内容。

But the value of float has gone down dramatically because everything is — everything is off of interest rates.

但浮存金的价值已经大幅下降，因为一切都与利率有关。

And when you get to negative interest rates — the country can borrow at negative interest rates — you get into something that’s kind of akin to the St. Petersburg Paradox. And those of you who want to search, you can find some interesting things on it. But it becomes infinite then.

当你达到负利率时——国家可以以负利率借款——你就进入了一种类似于圣彼得堡悖论的状态。想要搜索的朋友可以找到一些有趣的内容。但这时它变得无穷大。

It’s a crazy consequence of a bunch of abstract mathematics, where you get there.

这是一堆抽象数学的疯狂结果，你会到达那里。

But you lose gravity entirely. And, you know, if you tell me that I’m going to have to lend money to the government at minus two percent a year, and I’m talking nominal figures, not — you know, you’re just telling me how I’ll go broke over time (laughs) if I do that.

但你完全失去了重力。而且，你知道，如果你告诉我我必须以每年负 2%的利率借钱给政府，而我说的是名义数字，不是——你知道，你只是在告诉我如果我这样做，我会随着时间的推移破产（笑）。

So, it pushes you to do other things. And, of course, we’ve seen it. Well, we saw the rest of the world do it in even more extreme fashion. But nobody — Paul Samuelson, brilliant man — nobody thought you could do this.

所以，这促使你去做其他事情。当然，我们已经看到了。好吧，我们看到世界其他地方以更极端的方式做到这一点。但没有人——保罗·萨缪尔森，这位杰出的人物——没有人认为你可以这样做。

And we don’t really know what the consequences are. But we know there are consequences, obviously.

我们并不真正知道后果是什么。但显然，我们知道会有后果。

28. “It’s a killer” to compete with SPACs buying with other people’s money

“与使用他人资金的 SPAC 竞争是个杀手”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Sam Butler. And it says he’s been a shareholder for many years, and asks, “What impact does the rise of so many new SPACs have on Berkshire’s ability to find and close new acquisitions?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自萨姆·巴特勒。他说他已经是股东很多年了，并问道：“那么多新 SPAC 的崛起对伯克希尔寻找和完成新收购的能力有什么影响？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s a killer.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这真是个杀手。

The SPACs generally have to spend their money in two years, as I understand it, so they have to buy a business in two years.

根据我的理解，SPAC 通常必须在两年内花费他们的钱，因此他们必须在两年内收购一家公司。

If you put a gun to my head and said, “You’ve got to buy a big business in two years,” you know, I’d buy one. But (laughs), it wouldn’t be much of one.

如果你把枪指着我的头说：“你必须在两年内买一个大公司，”你知道，我会买一个。但（笑）这也不会是一个太好的公司。

You know, we look and look. And now there are, I don’t know how many, whether it’s hundreds —there’s always been the pressure from private equity funds. I mean, if you’re running money for somebody else, and you’re getting paid a fee, and you get the upside, and you don’t have a downside, you’re going to buy something.

你知道，我们一直在寻找。现在有多少，我不知道，可能是几百个——私募股权基金一直存在压力。我的意思是，如果你在为别人管理资金，并且你收取费用，获得收益，而没有下行风险，你就会去买一些东西。

I could tell you about a — I had a very famous — I had a call from a very famous figure many years ago who was involved in it and wanted to learn about reinsurance. And I said, “Well, I don’t really think it’s a very good business.” And he said, “Yeah.” (Laughs)

我可以告诉你一个——我曾接到一个非常著名的人物的电话，很多年前他参与了这件事，并想了解再保险。我说：“嗯，我真的不认为这是一项很好的生意。”他说：“是啊。”（笑）

“But,” he says, “if I don’t spend this money in six months, I’ve got to give it back to the investors.”

“但是，”他说，“如果我在六个月内不花掉这笔钱，我就得把它还给投资者。”

So, you know, it’s a different equation that you have if you’re working with other people’s money, where you get the upside and you have to give it back to them if you don’t do something. (Laughs)

所以，你知道，如果你在使用别人的钱，那就是一个不同的方程式，你可以获得收益，但如果你不采取行动，就必须把它还给他们。（笑）

And, frankly, we’re not competitive with that, you know? And that won’t go on forever.

老实说，我们在这方面没有竞争力，你知道吗？而且这种情况不会永远持续下去。

But it’s where the money is now, and Wall Street goes where the money is. And it does anything, you know, basically that works. And SPACs have been working for a while, and you stick your — a famous name on it and you can sell almost anything.

但现在钱在这里，华尔街会去有钱的地方。它基本上会做任何有效的事情。而 SPAC 已经运作了一段时间，你只需在上面贴上一个著名的名字，就几乎可以卖出任何东西。

It’s — but it’s an exaggerated version of what we’ve seen in kind of, well, gambling (unintelligible) type market.

这是一种夸张的版本，类似于我们在赌博（听不清）类型市场中看到的情况。

In fact, I did have a quote from (economist John Maynard) Keynes that we might put up on the — let’s see if I’ve got — yeah, this is probably the most famous — one of the most famous quotes in history, because it really sums up the problem of the fact we’ve got the greatest markets the world could ever imagine.

事实上，我确实有一句（经济学家约翰·梅纳德）凯恩斯的名言，我们可以放在——让我看看我是否有——是的，这可能是历史上最著名的——最著名的名言之一，因为它真正概括了我们拥有世界上最伟大的市场这一事实所带来的问题。

I mean, imagine being able to own parts of the biggest businesses in the world, and putting billions of dollars in them, then take it out of — you know, two days later.

我意思是，想象一下能够拥有世界上最大企业的部分股份，并投入数十亿美元，然后在两天后将其取出。

I mean, compared to farms or apartment houses or office buildings, where it takes months to close a deal, I mean, the markets offer a chance to participate and invest in earning assets on a basis that’s very, very low cost and instantaneous, huge, all kinds of good things.

我意思是，与农场、公寓或办公大楼相比，那里需要几个月才能达成交易，市场提供了一个参与和投资于收益资产的机会，成本非常低且即时，带来了许多好处。

But it makes its real money if they can get the gamblers to come in, because they provide more action and they’re willing to pay sillier fees and all kinds of things. So, you have this incredible, huge asset to humanity, but it really makes its money when people are doing stupid things. I mean, that’s where the money really is.

但它真正赚钱的地方在于能让赌徒们进来，因为他们提供更多的赌注，并且愿意支付更高的费用和各种费用。所以，你拥有这个对人类来说不可思议的巨大资产，但它真正赚钱的时刻是人们在做愚蠢的事情。我是说，真正赚钱的地方就在这里。

And Keynes wrote this 1936 — it says 1939 on the slide, but he wrote it in 1936 in “The General Theory” — that, you know: “Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on the steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”

凯恩斯在1936年写了这个——虽然幻灯片上写的是1939年，但他在1936年的《通论》中写道：“投机者作为企业稳步发展的泡沫，可能不会造成什么危害。但当企业本身变成投机旋涡中的泡沫时，情况就变得严峻了。当一个国家的资本发展变成赌场活动的副产品时，这项工作很可能会做得不好。”

Well, the stock market — we’ve had a lot of people in the casino in the last year. You have millions and millions of people have set up accounts where they day-trade, where they — where they’re selling puts and calls, where they — I would say that you had the greatest increase in the number of gamblers, essentially, that — and there’s — you know, there’s nothing wrong with gambling. They got better odds than they’ve got if play the state lottery.

好吧，股市——在过去一年里，我们有很多人进入了赌场。你有数以百万计的人开设了账户进行日间交易，他们——他们在卖看跌期权和看涨期权，我想说，你有了赌徒人数的最大增长，基本上——而且你知道，赌博没有什么错。他们的赔率比玩州彩票要好。

But they have cash in their pocket. They’ve had action. And they actually, you know, have a lot of good results. And if they just bought stocks, they’d do fine, and held them.

但他们口袋里有现金。他们有过行动。实际上，他们有很多好的结果。如果他们只是买了股票，持有它们，他们会做得很好。

But the gambling impulse is very strong in people worldwide, and occasionally it gets an enormous shove. And conditions lead to this place where more people are entering the casino than are leaving every day, and it creates its own reality for a while. And nobody tells you when the clock’s going to strike twelve and it all turns to pumpkins and mice.

但全球人们的赌博冲动非常强烈，偶尔会受到巨大的推动。条件导致了这样一个地方，每天进入赌场的人数超过离开的人数，这在一段时间内创造了自己的现实。没有人会告诉你什么时候钟声会敲响十二下，一切都会变成南瓜和老鼠。

The — when the competition is playing with other people’s money — or — whether — and if they’re playing foolishly with their own money — but the big stuff is done with other people’s money (laughs) — they’re going to beat us, I mean —

当竞争是在用别人的钱进行时——或者——他们是否在愚蠢地用自己的钱进行——但大部分事情都是用别人的钱来做的（笑）——他们会打败我们，我是说——

We’re not — that’s a different game, and they’ve got more – they’ve got a lot of money. So, we’re not going to have much luck on acquisitions while this sort of a period continues.

我们不是——那是另一个游戏，他们有更多——他们有很多钱。因此，在这种时期持续的情况下，我们在收购方面不会有太多运气。

But it’s happened before. This is about as extreme as we’ve seen it, isn’t it, Charlie? Or —

但这以前发生过。这是我们见过的最极端的情况之一，不是吗，查理？或者——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Of course, I call it fee-driven buying. In other words, it’s not buying because it’s a good investment. They’re buying it because the advisor gets a fee.

查理·芒格：是的，当然，我称之为费用驱动的购买。换句话说，这不是因为它是一个好的投资而购买。他们购买是因为顾问获得了费用。

And, of course, the more of that you get, the sillier your civilization is getting. And to some extent, it’s a moral failing, too.

当然，你得到的越多，你的文明就变得越愚蠢。在某种程度上，这也是一种道德上的失败。

Because the easy money made by things like SPACs and total return derivatives, and so on and so on — you push that to excess, it causes horrible problems for the civilization. And it reflects no credit on the people who are doing it, and no credit on the regulators and voters that allow it.

因为像 SPAC 和总回报衍生品等轻松赚钱的方式，如果过度推崇，会给文明带来可怕的问题。这对那些参与其中的人没有任何好处，也对允许这种情况的监管者和选民没有任何好处。

So, I think we have a lot to be ashamed of in the current conditions.

所以，我认为在目前的情况下我们有很多值得感到羞愧的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: But it’s where the money is.

沃伦·巴菲特：但这就是钱所在的地方。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but we still have — (laughter) — it’s shameful what’s going on, you know? It’s not just stupid, it’s shameful.

查理·芒格：是的，但我们仍然有——（笑声）——发生的事情真是可耻，你知道吗？这不仅仅是愚蠢，这真是可耻。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not — I don’t regard it as shameful on a lot of the people that gamble. I mean, gambling is a very human instinct, and they’ve got money in their pocket, and they know somebody else has made money who they don’t think’s any smarter than they are, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：我不认为很多赌博的人是可耻的。我的意思是，赌博是一种非常人性的本能，他们口袋里有钱，他们知道其他人赚了钱，而他们认为那些人并不比他们聪明，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no, I don’t mind the poor fish that gamble. I don’t like the professionals that take the suckers.

查理·芒格：不，我不介意那些赌博的可怜人。我不喜欢那些欺骗傻瓜的专业人士。

29. We have $70 to $80 billion “we’d love to put to work,” but can’t with prices so high

我们有 700 亿到 800 亿美元“我们希望投入使用”，但由于价格太高而无法做到。

BECKY QUICK: All right. Moshe Levine writes in — he’s an American living in Israel. He says, “If you deem stock prices to be overvalued or in a bubble, do you think it’s best to keep your money in cash while waiting for prices to come down to a fair price, or would it be a better idea to invest this money in some way while waiting until stock prices are fair again, and then sell the investment to buy the stocks?”

贝基·奎克：好的。莫谢·莱文写道——他是住在以色列的美国人。他问：“如果你认为股价被高估或者处于泡沫中，你认为最好把钱留在现金中等待价格回落到合理水平，还是在等待股价回到合理水平的过程中先把钱投资在某处，然后再卖掉这些投资去买股票？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie and I have had that discussion on a lot of things. We bought some stocks we really don’t know that much about, but I’m not really comfortable doing that.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理和我在很多事情上都有过讨论。我们买了一些我们其实并不太了解的股票，但我对此并不太舒服。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re used to shooting fish in a barrel, but that’s gotten harder. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们习惯于在桶里射鱼，但这变得更难了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve got probably 10% to 15% of our total assets in cash beyond what I would like to have, just as a way of protecting the owners and the people who are our partners from ever having — having us ever get in a pickle, you know.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们大概有 10%到 15%的总资产以现金形式存在，这超过了我希望拥有的比例，这只是为了保护我们的所有者和我们的合作伙伴，避免我们陷入困境。

We really run — Berkshire makes sure that — we don’t want to lose a lot of other people’s money who have — will stick with us for years. We can’t help what somebody does that buys it today and sells it tomorrow. But we’ve got a real gene that pushes us in that direction.

我们确实在努力——伯克希尔确保——我们不想失去很多其他人的钱，他们会——和我们坚持多年。我们无法控制今天买入明天卖出的人。但我们有一种真正的基因，推动我们朝这个方向前进。

But we’ve got more than we — we’ve got probably 70 or 80 billion, something like that, maybe, that we’d love to put to work. But that’s 10% of our assets, roughly. And we probably won’t get — well, we won’t get a chance to do it under these conditions. But conditions change very, very, very rapidly sometimes in markets.

但我们拥有的远不止这些——我们可能有 700 亿或 800 亿，差不多是这样的资金，我们希望能够投入使用。但这大约是我们资产的 10%。在这种情况下，我们可能不会——好吧，我们不会有机会去做。但市场条件有时变化非常非常快。

And we do have people that would like the join us, but the market option they have is just too great for them. And if they’re publicly traded, I mean, they basically can’t — they would have great difficulty in making a deal with us because somebody else would come along with — using other people’s money. It’s — you know, we may be unhappy about the 70 billion, but we’re very happy about the other 700 billion (laughs).

我们确实有一些人想要加入我们，但他们的市场选择对他们来说实在太大了。如果他们是上市公司，我的意思是，他们基本上无法与我们达成交易，因为其他人会用别人的钱来进行竞争。你知道，我们可能对 700 亿感到不满，但我们对其他的 7000 亿非常满意（笑）。

And so, it’s not like — not like we should complain.

所以，这并不是说我们应该抱怨。

30. Why we sometimes buy stocks we’re not wild about

为什么我们有时会购买我们并不热衷的股票

BECKY QUICK: Warren, when we spoke before the annual meeting, you said that it was OK if I asked a follow-up or two, and I’d like to —

贝基·奎克：沃伦，当我们在年会上之前交谈时，你说如果我问一两个后续问题是可以的，我想——

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

BECKY QUICK: — take one of those right now.

贝基·奎克：——现在就拿一个。

You said you bought some stocks that you don’t know a lot about. What are they?

你说你买了一些你不太了解的股票。它们是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — I will not get into naming (laughs) what we — stocks.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——我不想提到（大笑）我们——股票。

And it may be that there’s some there that I think I know about that I don’t know about.

也许那里有一些我认为我知道的，但实际上我并不知道。

But we have bought stocks where Charlie and I — I mean, we know the business, generally — but we don’t have any insights.

但我们买了股票，查理和我——我的意思是，我们一般了解这个行业——但我们没有任何洞察。

And they are, as a group — if I had — if they told me I was going to be shot unless I got the best result, I would rather own those stocks than the Treasury bills we own.

他们作为一个整体——如果我有——如果他们告诉我除非我获得最佳结果，否则我将被枪毙，我宁愿拥有那些股票，而不是我们拥有的国库券。

But, on the other hand, we work with quantities of money where if we put 50 billion into the things that I’m kind of so-so about, but that are better than Treasury bills, it doesn’t — I’m not wildly comfortable about that, even though it can be undone.

但是，另一方面，我们处理的资金数量是，如果我们把 500 亿投入那些我觉得一般般的东西，但比国债更好，我对此并不是特别放心，尽管这可以被撤回。

平庸是有代价的，平庸的代价是放弃卓越，这在数学上都是成立的。

Selling 50 billion to — when it’s really attractive to buy something else, there’s a lot of — there’s a lot of slippage that can happen in moving sums like that around.

出售 500 亿到——当购买其他东西真的很有吸引力时，有很多——在移动这样的金额时可能会发生很多滑点。

So, that’s something we talk about all the time. They’re good companies. They’re fine companies. But do we know something about those companies, or have a way of evaluating that gives us an edge? The answer — I think — what do you feel about it, Charlie? We’ve talked about it a lot.

所以，这就是我们一直在谈论的事情。它们是好公司。它们是不错的公司。但是我们是否对这些公司有了解，或者有一种评估方法能让我们占据优势？答案——我认为——你觉得怎么样，查理？我们已经谈论过很多次了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, it’s a lot harder.

查理·芒格：当然，这要困难得多。

31. Munger: Bernie Sanders has accidentally won his fight against wealth inequality

芒格：伯尼·桑德斯意外地赢得了他对财富不平等的斗争

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I think one consequence of the present situation is that (Senator) Bernie Sanders (I- Vermont) has basically won.

查理·芒格：我认为当前形势的一个结果是（参议员）伯尼·桑德斯（独立-佛蒙特州）基本上赢了。

And that’s because the — with the — everything boomed up so high and interest rates so low, what’s going to happen is the Millennial Generation is going to have a hell of a time getting rich, compared to our generation.

这就是因为——随着——一切都飙升得如此之高，而利率又如此之低，千禧一代将比我们这一代人更难致富。

And so, the difference between the rich and the poor in the generation that’s rising is going to be a lot less. So, Bernie has won.

因此，正在崛起的这一代人中，富人和穷人之间的差距将会小得多。所以，伯尼赢了。

32. Motivation determines the morality of share repurchases

动机决定了股票回购的道德性

BECKY QUICK: Right, this question comes from Denny Poland, a shareholder from Pittsburgh.

贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自于来自匹兹堡的股东丹尼·波兰。

“A prominent senator (Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Massachusetts) recently categorized share buybacks as a form of market manipulation. You’ve often said that repurchasing shares at prices below intrinsic value benefits continuing shareholders.

一位知名参议员（马萨诸塞州民主党参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦）最近将股票回购归类为市场操纵的一种形式。你常常说，以低于内在价值的价格回购股票有利于长期的股东。

“Could you and Charlie please elaborate on the higher order effect that these share repurchases have on society?”

“你和查理能否详细说明这些股票回购对社会的更高层次影响？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they’re a way of — they’re a way of, essentially, of distributing cash to the people that want the cash when other co-owners mostly want you to reinvest. And it’s a savings vehicle.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，它们基本上是一种将现金分配给想要现金的人，而其他共同所有者大多希望你再投资。这是一种储蓄工具。

If the four of us sitting at this table decided we’d buy a few Dairy Queen franchises, we form a little company, and we all put in a million dollars or something like that, and we buy the Dairy Queen franchises, and they’re doing well.

如果我们四个坐在这张桌子上决定购买几个冰雪皇后特许经营权，我们成立一个小公司，大家各出一百万美元或类似的金额，然后我们购买冰雪皇后特许经营权，而它们的生意很好。

And three of the four of us want to keep buying more Dairy Queen franchises. And we’re not done building and saving for the future. And we’re in the wealth creation business. And the fourth one says, “Listen, I’ve gotten rich enough. I’d rather take some money out.”

我们四个人中有三个人想继续购买更多的冰雪皇后特许经营权。我们还没有完成建设，也在为未来储蓄。我们是在创造财富的行业。而第四个人说：“听着，我已经足够富有了。我宁愿拿出一些钱。”

And, well, there’s only two ways to do it. We can pay dividends to all four of us, three of us — of whom don’t want it. And we can repurchase the shares at a fair price — if it’s just the four of us — we pick out a fair price and the fourth one gets bought out of his interest.

而且，嗯，只有两种方法可以做到。我们可以给我们四个人中的所有人支付股息，或者给我们三个人——其中三个人不想要股息。我们也可以以公平的价格回购股份——如果只有我们四个人——我们选出一个公平的价格，第四个人的股份就被买断。

I find it almost impossible to believe some of the arguments that are made that it’s terrible to repurchase shares from a partner if they want to get out of something (laughs) and you’re able to do it at prices advantageous to the people who are staying. And it helps slightly the person that wants out.

我几乎无法相信有人会提出这样的论点：如果一个合伙人想退出某个业务，而你能够以对留下来的股东有利的价格回购股份，这是件糟糕的事情（笑）。其实，这对想退出的人也稍微有帮助。

And a majority of the Berkshire shareholders — a great majority — we had a vote on dividends one time — we’ve got savers.

而且大多数的伯克希尔股东——绝大多数——我们曾经就股息进行过投票——我们有储户。

Now, that’s partly because we’ve advertised ourselves as being that sort of a vehicle. We’ve created that something. We’ve stuck with it for 57 years.

现在，这部分是因为我们将自己宣传为那种车辆。我们创造了那样的东西。我们坚持了 57 年。

And people look — individuals — a huge number — look at Berkshire as something they’re going to own till they die.

人们看——个体——大量的人——把伯克希尔视为他们将拥有直到去世的东西。

Now they may — their circumstances may change. Their needs may change. But the savers generally keep saving.

现在他们可能会——他们的情况可能会改变。他们的需求可能会改变。但储蓄者通常会继续储蓄。

We just recently had somebody that (unintelligible) 60 years ago, and billions of dollars. And they just — they weren’t saving, exactly, for their old age, just was sort of built into them that they liked to do it. Now, philanthropies will get a lot of money and so on.

我们最近有一个人（听不清）60 年前，和数十亿美元。他们并不是为了老年而存钱，只是他们喜欢这样做。现在，慈善机构会获得很多资金等等。

It’s the most — what could be more logical than, if a very small minority of your holders want to get out, and most of them want to stay in, and the person that wants to get out wants the money, you don’t give the money to everybody. You give it to the one who wants it. And you do it at a price that is beneficial to most parties.

这最符合逻辑——如果你的一小部分持有者想要退出，而大多数人想要留下，想要退出的人想要钱，你就不把钱给每个人。你把钱给那个想要的人。而且你以对大多数人有利的价格进行交易。

On a private deal, you’d work out the fair value. The market tells you the value, in the case of a publicly traded company.

在私人交易中，你会计算出公平价值。市场告诉你价值，在公开交易的公司中。

Charlie, got anything? 查理，有什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you’re repurchasing stock, just a bull it higher, it’s deeply immoral.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你在回购股票，只是为了把它抬高，这非常不道德。

But if you’re repurchasing stock because it’s a fair thing to do in the interest of your existing shareholders, it’s a highly moral act. And the people who are criticizing it are bonkers.

但如果你是因为对现有股东来说这是公平的事情而回购股票，那就是一种高度道德的行为。而那些批评它的人简直是疯了。

33. Tax law change wouldn’t affect Berkshire’s no-dividend stance

税法变更不会影响伯克希尔的无分红立场

BECKY QUICK: OK, this comes from Gary Gambino. He wants to know “if Berkshire would switch it’s capital return policy to dividends from buybacks if the capital gains rate goes up to 43.4%. Dividends would be far more taxed-advertised for shareholders under that scenario.”

贝基·奎克：好的，Gary Gambino提出了这样一个问题：“如果资本利得税率上升到43.4%，伯克希尔是否会将资本回报政策从股票回购转向派发股息？在这种情况下，股息对股东来说的税收负担会更大。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We literally did have a vote by our shareholders.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们确实进行了股东投票。

Now, we’ve got a different group of shareholders than a REIT would have or, you know, an MLP might have. I mean there’s different — people select what they go into. And people that go into SPACs are hoping the stock goes up next week, you know, I mean, basically, and —

现在，我们的股东群体与房地产投资信托基金（REIT）或主有限合伙（MLP）可能拥有的股东群体不同。我的意思是，不同的人选择他们所投资的项目。进入 SPAC 的人希望股票下周会上涨，基本上就是这样。

We’ve got a bunch of people that were assembled over 55 years, but they started with a base of people that — it was a lifetime investment. And if they wanted to cash out, they thought they’d get a fair price at that time. But they really didn’t — they bought it with no intentions like that.

我们有一群人，这些人经过 55 年的积累而成，但他们是从一群人开始的——这是一项终身投资。如果他们想要兑现，他们认为那时会得到一个公平的价格。但实际上并没有——他们购买时并没有这样的意图。

So, we had a vote, and I think it was something like 97% or something of the shares said they don’t want a dividend.

所以，我们进行了投票，我认为大约有 97%或类似的股份表示他们不想要分红。

And now, that wouldn’t be true at other companies. And it would be crazy to be paying a regular dividend, like Coca-Cola has done for many years, and then, all of a sudden, change the policy on millions of people who had bought it with one expectation in mind, and try and change it into a different animal.

而现在，这在其他公司并不成立。像可口可乐多年来所做的那样，支付常规股息，然后突然改变政策，对数百万以某种期望购买它的人来说，这将是疯狂的，并试图将其转变为另一种形式。

But Coca-Cola isn’t going to change to Berkshire, and Berkshire isn’t going to change to Coca-Cola. We’ve got a different group of owners.

但可口可乐不会变成伯克希尔，伯克希尔也不会变成可口可乐。我们有一群不同的股东。

And it will keep self-selecting, because people have a choice every day: which do you want — sort of thing do you want to be in? And Berkshire is a certain kind of animal in that respect.

这将继续自我选择，因为人们每天都有选择的机会：你想参与哪种类型的业务？在这方面，伯克希尔是一种特定类型的公司。

So, we will not — if they jig around the tax laws, I mean, that’s really got nothing to do with the decision.

所以，如果他们在税法上做改变，我的意思是，这真的与决定无关。

I mean we’ve got a very substantial majority of people that want us to reinvest the money. And what they’re more concerned about is whether we find something to do with the money, the hundred billion or something.

我意思是，我们有很大一部分人希望我们重新投资这笔钱。他们更关心的是我们是否能找到一些方法来使用这笔钱，或者说那一百亿。

And repurchasing shares is something that helps them in their — they own a larger percentage of Berkshire as they go along.

并且回购股票有助于他们——随着时间的推移，他们拥有更大比例的伯克希尔。

And they’d love to see us buy another business. But they don’t mind us intensifying their interest in the present business.

他们很希望看到我们收购另一家企业，但他们并不介意我们加强对现有业务的投入。

34. Buffett voted for Biden but doesn’t want to talk taxes at the meeting

巴菲特投票支持拜登，但不想在会议上谈论税收。

BECKY QUICK: You had a lot of questions that came in on taxes. So, I’ll run through a few of them. We’ll see, kind of, how many of you answered them — how many you answer before we get to them.

贝基·奎克：你们有很多关于税务的问题。所以，我会快速浏览其中的一些。我们看看你们中有多少人回答了这些问题——在我们讨论之前有多少人回答了。

But this one came from Arthur Lewis in Denver: “What are your thoughts on the new administration’s capital gains, corporate tax, and stepped-up basis tax increases?”

但这条来自丹佛的亚瑟·刘易斯：“您对新政府的资本利得、企业税和增值基础税的增加有什么看法？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if Charlie wants to answer that, I’ll be glad to have him do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果查理想回答这个问题，我很乐意让他来回答。

I, long ago, many times, have said that I don’t put my political opinions or anything in a blind trust when I take this job. But I also don’t speak for Berkshire Hathaway.

我很久以前多次说过，当我担任这份工作时，我不会将我的政治观点或任何事情放在盲目信托中。但我也不代表伯克希尔·哈撒韦发言。

I mean we’ve got people that have very different views on taxes. And, you know, I’ve expressed some things in the past. I don’t like to speak on behalf of — when I’m sitting in a Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, presumably, speaking for Berkshire, I don’t really like to get into political questions, generally. I don’t really think I should.

我意思是我们有一些对税收有非常不同看法的人。而且，你知道，我过去表达过一些观点。我不喜欢在伯克希尔哈撒韦的年度会议上代表——当我坐在那里时，假设是在为伯克希尔发言，我一般不喜欢涉及政治问题。我真的认为我不应该这样做。

But I also think, if somebody asked me who I voted for the last election, on a personal basis, I voted for Biden.

但我也认为，如果有人问我在上次选举中投票给谁，从个人角度来看，我投票给了拜登。

But I don’t — I’ve never asked a single employee of ours who they voted for, you know, anything of the sort — what religion — it just — it’s — and I am not authorized to go around signing my name as chairman of Berkshire Hathaway to proposals. If I wrote op-ed pieces, I do it as an individual. I try and make it clear.

但我从来没有问过我们任何一位员工他们投票给谁，或者类似的问题——他们信仰什么——这就是——而且我没有权力以伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事长的身份签署提案。如果我写评论文章，我是以个人身份写的。我尽量让这一点明确。

So, I don’t think I’ll use — I don’t want to use the meeting to give a lot of views on taxes. Charlie?

所以，我不认为我会使用——我不想在会议上发表很多关于税收的看法。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but —

查理·芒格：不，但——

35. Munger on tax hikes: “Mistake to be basically anti-capitalist”

芒格谈税收增加：“基本上反资本主义是个错误”

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s probably a mistake to be basically anti-capitalist. I think capitalism is what raises GDP for everybody. And so —

查理·芒格：我认为基本上反对资本主义可能是个错误。我认为资本主义是提升每个人 GDP 的原因。因此——

And I have also a feeling that Benjamin Franklin was right when he said that, “It’s hard for an empty sack to stand upright.”

我也有一种感觉，班杰明·富兰克林说得对：“空袋子很难立起来。”

And to some extent, the prosperity of leading American institutions helps them behave better.

在某种程度上，领先的美国机构的繁荣帮助它们表现得更好。

Now, there are exceptions in promotional finance, and so on. But, by and large, Franklin was right.

现在，促销金融等方面有一些例外。但总的来说，富兰克林是对的。

And so, I’m a little wary of just constantly being mad at people because they have a little more money.

所以，我对总是因为别人有一点更多的钱而生气感到有些谨慎。

36. Munger on taxes: “It is stupid for states to drive out their wealthiest citizens”

芒格谈税收：“让最富有的公民离开是愚蠢的。”

BECKY QUICK: Charlie, there was a question that came in specifically to you on the tax issue (from Tony G. Lee of El Monte, California).

贝基·奎克：查理，有一个问题专门问你关于税务问题的（来自加利福尼亚州埃尔蒙特的托尼·G·李）。

“Over the years, and with emphasis in 2020, we’ve heard people leaving California for various reasons, such as high cost of living, high taxes, etc. I understand that you believe it’s dumb for states to have policies and laws that provoke rich residents leaving. But are your thoughts — what are your thoughts on those people leaving? What keeps you in California?”

“多年来，尤其是在 2020 年，我们听到很多人因各种原因离开加利福尼亚，比如高生活成本、高税收等。我理解你认为各州制定政策和法律来刺激富裕居民离开是愚蠢的。但你对那些离开的人有什么看法？是什么让你留在加利福尼亚？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s a very interesting question. I have frequently said I wouldn’t move across the street to save my children 500 million in taxes.

查理·芒格：嗯，这是个非常有趣的问题。我常常说，我不会为了给我的孩子节省 5 亿税款而搬到街对面。

And so, I have — that’s my personal view on the subject.

所以，我对此有个人看法。

But I do think it is stupid for states to drive out their wealthiest citizens.

但我确实认为，州政府驱逐最富有的公民是愚蠢的。

The old people, they don’t commit any crimes. They donate to the local charity. Who in the hell in their right mind would drive out the rich people?

老人们，他们不犯罪。他们向当地慈善机构捐款。谁会在理智的情况下驱逐富人呢？

I mean Florida, and places like that, are very shrewd. And places like California are being very stupid. It’s contrary to the interests of the state.

我指的是佛罗里达州和类似的地方，非常精明。而加利福尼亚这样的地方则非常愚蠢。这与州的利益相悖。

37. It’s “fiction” that all corporate tax hikes are passed on to consumers

所有企业税收增加都转嫁给消费者是“虚构”的。

BECKY QUICK: One more question for you. Jack Robbins asks, “How will a 25 to 28% corporate tax rate affect Berkshire’s companies?”

贝基·奎克：我还有一个问题。杰克·罗宾斯问：“25%到 28%的企业税率将如何影响伯克希尔的公司？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think it would be the end of the world. We’ve adapted to the tax rate, whatever it is.

查理·芒格：我认为这不会是世界的末日。我们已经适应了税率，无论它是什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say, if they raise the tax rate, they’re owning a — the federal government’s owning a larger percentage of the business. I’m not — but I’m not saying what the tax rate is.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说，如果他们提高税率，联邦政府就会拥有更大比例的企业。我不是——但我并不是在说税率是多少。

But we have a Class A stock and a Class B stock. The U.S. government owns what I call the Class AA stock. And it’s a very special stock.

但我们有 A 类股票和 B 类股票。美国政府拥有我称之为 AA 类股票的股票。这是一种非常特殊的股票。

They get a percentage of the earnings, but they don’t own the assets. And they don’t vote on who gets to run the place or anything else. But if the government wants to take — when I was first starting, they used to take 52%, the federal government did, of corporate profits.

他们获得收益的一部分，但他们不拥有资产。他们也不投票决定谁来管理这个地方或其他任何事情。但是如果政府想要征税——在我刚开始的时候，联邦政府曾经会征收企业利润的 52%。

And they’ve got — what would you pay to own the government’s Class A — double-A — stock? If there was a public issue by the U.S. Treasury and they said this vehicle — give it a name like SPAC or something even sexier, but — and all it will do is it owns the future tax payments of Berkshire Hathaway forever. And how much is that stock now worth?

如果美国财政部公开发行一类“A类”或“双A类”股票，你会愿意支付多少来拥有这类股票？比如他们给这个投资工具起个名字，像SPAC（特殊目的收购公司）或者更时髦的名称，而它唯一的作用就是拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦未来永远的税款收入。那么这类股票现在值多少钱呢？

And it gets — and it’ll pay a big cash dividend, and they’ll go up as we retain earnings and build the company and everything else.

而且它会——而且它会支付丰厚的现金红利，随着我们保留收益、发展公司以及其他一切，它们的价值会提升。

Well, it’s worth more if it’s — if the tax rate is 25% or 28% or 52%, than at 21%.

那么，如果税率是 25%、28%或 52%，它的价值就更高，而不是 21%。

They own a special stock. And when people talk about how it all gets passed through to the customer and everything — in the utility business, it actually does. That’s a special case.

他们拥有一种特殊的股票。当人们谈论这一切如何传递给客户时——在公用事业行业，这确实是这样。这是一个特殊的情况。

But it doesn’t — it doesn’t in most of our businesses. I mean it’s just — it’s a corporate fiction when they put out statements about the fact that this will be terrible for all of you people who have — (laughs) — if we pay more taxes.

但这并不会影响我们大多数的业务。我的意思是，当他们发布声明说“如果我们支付更多税款，这对大家来说会很糟糕”时，这只是企业的虚构说法（笑）。

It hurts the Berkshire shareholders if rates are higher. And that may be quite appropriate.

如果税率更高，这对伯克希尔的股东来说是有害的。这可能是相当合适的。

But to say otherwise is just — it doesn’t make any sense.

但说其他的就是——这没有任何意义。

I would love to see the government actually issue — they could have — I mean they could set up a company. Just call it the Berkshire Hathaway Tax Company. And it would take all the taxes we paid every year. How much would they be able to sell that asset for?

我希望看到政府实际上发行——他们本可以——我的意思是他们可以成立一家公司。就叫它伯克希尔哈撒韦税务公司。它将收取我们每年支付的所有税款。他们能以多少价格出售这个资产？

They talk about unfunded obligations of the government. That’s an unreported asset of the federal government.

他们谈论政府的未拨资金义务，但这其实是联邦政府未披露的资产。

They own part of Berkshire, and they get to determine how much. I mean, it’s an interesting question.

他们拥有伯克希尔的一部分，并且他们可以决定多少。我是说，这是一个有趣的问题。

38. Buffett: I’d like my money to go to philanthropy rather than reduce the national debt

巴菲特：我希望我的钱用于慈善事业，而不是用来减少国债。

BECKY QUICK: One last tax question. This one comes from William Barnard, who says, “In the Owner’s Manual, a portion of your annual report, Warren, you state, ‘On my death, none of my stock will have to be sold to take care of the cash bequests I’ve made or for taxes.’

贝基·奎克：最后一个税务问题。这个问题来自威廉·巴纳德，他说：“在业主手册中，你在年度报告的一部分中提到，‘在我去世时，我的股票不需要出售来处理我所做的现金遗赠或税款。’”

“Would the recent Biden proposal to treat unrealized gains as sold and taxable at death at a 43.4% rate change the amount of stock required to be sold for payment of taxes upon your death?”

“最近拜登提议将未实现的收益视为已售出并在死亡时按 43.4%的税率征税，这会改变您去世时需要出售的股票数量以支付税款吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the tax law can be changed tomorrow. And I don’t — you know, it can be done a lot of different ways. And it’s been done a lot of different ways in the past.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。税法明天就可以改变。我不知道，你知道，这可以通过很多不同的方式来实现。在过去，这已经通过很多不同的方式实现过。

I can tell you — I can actually make a promise to society, that 99.7% of what I have when I die will either go to philanthropy or to the federal government.

我可以告诉你——我实际上可以向社会承诺，我去世时 99.7%的财产将会用于慈善事业或交给联邦政府。

And the federal government can actually determine the rules on that.

联邦政府实际上可以确定相关规则。

And no, I would prefer that it would go to philanthropy. I think it actually will accomplish more utility if it goes to be used by some smart people in philanthropy than if it simply reduces the federal debt by a hundred billion dollars or something when I die.

我更希望它能用于慈善事业。我认为，如果它被一些聪明的人用于慈善事业，实际上会产生更多的效用，而不是在我去世时仅仅减少一千亿美元的联邦债务。

I don’t think it makes a damn bit of difference (laughs) you know, if the federal debt is 100 billion higher or lower. It won’t change anything in the world.

我认为这毫无意义（笑），你知道，联邦债务高或低 1000 亿都没关系。这不会改变世界上的任何事情。

And in present days, it doesn’t really save them anything, because they can borrow a hundred billion, and it doesn’t cost them anything anyway. But that debt condition won’t prevail.

在现在的日子里，这并没有真正为他们节省任何东西，因为他们可以借入一千亿，而这对他们来说无论如何都没有成本。但这种债务状况不会持续下去。

But I don’t — I would not regard — I’m just talking personally, I’m not really advocating as this public policy. But I wouldn’t — if they took it all, you know, it would not bother me. I mean it —

但我不——我不会认为——我只是个人在说，我并不真正在倡导这种公共政策。但如果他们全部拿走，我也不会在意。我的意思是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I guarantee it won’t bother you.

查理·芒格：我保证这不会打扰到你。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah! (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的！(笑声)

Charlie says, “You won’t know.” (Laughter)

查理说：“你不会知道。”（笑声）

You know, if you decide — if American democracy decides that it’s better to take it all — which I don’t think they will, and I don’t think they should — but nevertheless, you know, so what, you know? (Laughs)

你知道，如果你决定——如果美国民主决定最好把一切都拿走——我认为他们不会这样做，我也认为他们不应该这样做——但无论如何，你知道，那又怎么样呢？（笑）

I would like to see it used to accomplish the most for humanity. I mean, and that means having smart people, properly motivated — and more importantly, not improperly motivated — distribute it in a way — and who knows what the hell it would be, 10, 20, 30, or 40 years from now?

我希望看到它被用来为人类实现最大的成就。我的意思是，这意味着要有聪明的人，正确的动机——更重要的是，不要有不当的动机——以某种方式分配它——谁知道在 10 年、20 年、30 年或 40 年后会是什么样子呢？

I do know, if it goes to government, it basically reduces the national debt by that amount. I don’t think it changes whether they change the minimum wage laws or does anything else. (Laughs)

我确实知道，如果这笔钱用于政府，它基本上会减少国家债务。我认为这并不会改变他们是否会修改最低工资法或做其他任何事情。（笑）

I just think that little figure changes. It’ll be — you know, it’ll show up in the budget one day, you know, received from Buffett, you know, X, and then (laughs) some huge figure appears down below.

我只是觉得那个小数字会变化。它会在某一天出现在预算中，你知道，从巴菲特那里收到的，X，然后（笑）下面会出现一个巨大的数字。

I don’t think it really — so I would prefer it be used privately. But that’s really up to the people in the United States to decide through their representatives.

我认为这并不重要——所以我更希望它能私下使用。但这真的要由美国人民通过他们的代表来决定。

39. Pandemic risk was “totally underpriced” by insurance industry

疫情风险在保险行业中“完全被低估”

BECKY QUICK: Now this next question’s for Ajit. It comes from Professor Don Wunsch at the Missouri University of Science and Technology, who says, “Mr. Jain, what has COVID-19 taught us about systemic and correlated risk? And is there anything that we will do differently from now on?”

贝基·奎克：下一个问题是问阿吉特的。这个问题来自密苏里科技大学的唐·温什教授，他说：“贾因先生，COVID-19 教会了我们关于系统性和相关风险的什么？从现在开始我们会有什么不同的做法吗？”

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. In the insurance business, we often think about pandemic risk as one of the risk factors that we need to cope with in our business.

阿吉特·贾因：是的。在保险行业，我们经常将疫情风险视为我们在业务中需要应对的风险因素之一。

Having said that, I think the big lesson for us, having gone through what we’ve gone through recently, is that, while we were aware of the fact that pandemic risk is a risk factor, it was totally, totally underpriced by all of us in the industry.

说到这一点，我认为我们最近经历的事情给我们的一个重要教训是，尽管我们意识到疫情风险是一个风险因素，但在我们行业中，所有人都完全低估了这一风险。

AJIT JAIN: Several of us thought it’s an event that’ll happen, at most, once in a hundred years. And even then, those odds are pretty high.

AJIT JAIN：我们几个人认为这是一个最多每百年才会发生一次的事件。即便如此，这个概率也相当高。

So, I think the big lesson for us is to recalibrate and rethink about what the return time is for something like a pandemic risk.

所以，我认为我们最大的教训是重新校准和重新思考像疫情风险这样的事情的回报时间。

And separately, we haven’t yet done a good enough job as an industry, I’m saying, in terms of correlating the risk and aggregating the risk and making sure we can deal with the aggregate numbers.

而且，作为一个行业，我们在关联风险、汇总风险以及确保我们能够处理汇总数字方面，做得还不够好。

For example, pandemic risk has obviously taken the lives — taken people’s lives. But then separately, a bunch of us used to write something called “event cancellation,” or “contingency” policies.

例如，疫情风险显然夺去了人们的生命。但与此同时，我们中的一部分人曾经写过一些叫做“事件取消”或“应急”政策的东西。

And, in terms of pricing for the contingency policies, like the Olympics being canceled, NBC would buy insurance for their rights, which might suddenly be not worth much.

在应急政策的定价方面，比如奥运会被取消，NBC 会为他们的版权购买保险，这可能会突然变得不值钱。

And when pricing something like that, we would think in terms of earthquake and risk and, more recently, terrorism. But we would never factor something like what portion of the price should come from the pandemic exposure.

在定价类似的东西时，我们会考虑地震和风险，以及最近的恐怖主义。但我们从来不会考虑像疫情暴露应该占价格的多少部分。

So, I think the industry will become a lot more sophisticated, in terms of thinking through what is the impact of pandemic risk across the entire portfolio, as opposed to it just being localized to one or two areas.

所以，我认为这个行业在思考疫情风险对整个投资组合的影响时会变得更加复杂，而不仅仅局限于一两个领域。

BECKY QUICK: And I’m sorry, Don asked if anyone else on the stage wanted to comment after Ajit on that same topic.

贝基·奎克：对不起，唐问是否还有其他人想在阿吉特之后就同一话题发表评论。

WARREN BUFFETT: I missed that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我错过了那个。

BECKY QUICK: Oh, he was just looking if anyone else on the stage wanted to comment on that.

贝基·奎克：哦，他只是看看舞台上是否还有其他人想对此发表评论。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as Ajit mentioned, people were throwing in — well, in event cancellation, you know, I mean lots of people buy insurance against the Olympics being canceled, or the United States not participating. I mean they try to think of all kinds of risk because they have ad campaigns based upon all —

沃伦·巴菲特：正如阿吉特提到的，人们在事件取消时会投入——很多人购买保险以防奥运会被取消，或者美国不参与。我是说，他们试图考虑各种风险，因为他们的广告活动基于所有——

So, there’s a lot of event cancellation insurance. And it was probably underpriced — the implicit part of that premium that was attributable to a pandemic risk.

有很多活动取消保险，而与大流行风险相关的隐含保费部分可能被低估了。

I mean, you know, Bill Gates gave a terrific talk at Ted events five or six years ago, and people ignored it.

我意思是，你知道，比尔·盖茨在五六年前的 TED 活动上做了一个很棒的演讲，但人们却忽视了它。

And it’s very interesting, because this isn’t a worst case, what we’ve seen. And yet, it’s staggering, in terms of what has happened.

这非常有趣，因为我们看到的并不是最坏的情况。然而，就发生的事情而言，这令人震惊。

And people that wrote insurance, that — they may have found out, sometimes, that they were covering things they didn’t want to — didn’t even intend to cover and maybe the insured didn’t think they were buying. But nevertheless, after the event occurs, that they get very inventive in coming after them.

而那些写保险的人，有时可能会发现，他们在承保一些他们不想承保的事情——甚至是他们根本不打算承保的事情，而被保险人可能也认为他们并没有购买这些保险。但无论如何，在事件发生后，他们会非常有创意地追究责任。

保险对投资的影响，极端事件发生的概率比想象中要高。

There are certain risks, too, that are just too big. The nuclear risk, for example. I mean the federal government is, very early on, recognized it. The private insurance industry — they can’t handle the risk involved in — the financial risk — that would be involved in terms of a massive nuclear strike or something like that. So, it’s —

有些风险实在是太大了。例如，核风险。我是说，联邦政府很早就认识到了这一点。私人保险行业——他们无法应对与大规模核打击相关的财务风险。因此，这就是——

Pandemics — the wording will be much more careful (laughs) in future policies on trying to define it very precisely.

大流行——未来政策中对其定义将更加谨慎（笑）。

And incidentally, I mean, in the way the cases have come so far, in the United Kingdom — I mean, and I think there was one particular insurer — I mean, the cases are coming down much tougher on insurers than in the United States. I mean, the policies were just written differently.

顺便说一下，我的意思是，就目前在英国的案件情况而言——我的意思是，我认为有一家特定的保险公司——我的意思是，这里的案件对保险公司的要求比美国要严格得多。我的意思是，保单的写法就是不同。

You don’t — you don’t get insurance against something you don’t buy (unintelligible) for. And generally, the court decisions have come down favorable to insurers. And at Berkshire, it just so happens, we are not a big player. But that’s — in commercial multiple peril — which might be where — it is not a huge factor for Berkshire.

你不能为没有购买的东西获得保险（未听清）。总体而言，法院的裁决大多对保险公司有利。而对于伯克希尔来说，碰巧我们并不是这一领域的大玩家。在商业多重风险保险领域，这可能是一个问题，但对伯克希尔来说，这并不是一个巨大的因素。

40. Berkshire COVID-19 insurance payouts will be “a lot, lot higher” than current reserve of $1.6 billion

伯克希尔的 COVID-19 保险赔付将“远远高于”目前的 16 亿美元储备。

BECKY QUICK: This follow-up question is from Martin Devine. And he asks both Ajit and Warren, “What’s your best estimate of Berkshire’s insurance claim exposure from the COVID-19 pandemic?”

贝基·奎克：这个后续问题来自马丁·德瓦因。他问阿吉特和沃伦：“你们对伯克希尔因新冠疫情的保险索赔风险的最佳估计是什么？”

AJIT JAIN: Well, in terms of reserves, starting from last year to the end of the first quarter this year, we have put up a billion-six and change, in terms of reserves.

AJIT JAIN：好吧，从去年的储备开始，到今年第一季度末，我们已经增加了十六亿多的储备。

Now, what that doesn’t take into account is some of the frequency benefit because of COVID-19 that results because of fewer accidents. And GEICO has had a huge tailwind because of that.

现在，这并没有考虑到由于 COVID-19 导致的事故减少所带来的某些频率好处。而且，GEICO 因此受益匪浅。

But in terms of what the insurance operations collectively are going to be writing checks for, that number, as of now, is about a billion-six.

但就保险业务整体将要支付的金额而言，目前这个数字大约是十六亿。

And my guess is that’ll probably grow. Because if you look upon it — the industry as a whole has reserved — we reserved 1.6, as I mentioned — the industry as a whole has reserved about 25 to $30 billion for COVID-19 as of now.

我的猜测是这可能会增长。因为如果你看一下——整个行业已经预留了——我们预留了 16 亿，正如我提到的——整个行业目前为 COVID-19 预留了大约 250 亿到 300 亿美元。

If you believe the pundits in the industry, they will tell you that number is probably going to be closer to a hundred billion. So, there’s another, about 70-75 billion dollars of COVID-19 losses that need to flow through insurance industry’s balance sheet and income statement.

如果你相信行业内的专家，他们会告诉你这个数字可能更接近一千亿。因此，还有大约 700-750 亿美元的 COVID-19 损失需要在保险行业的资产负债表和利润表中体现。

Our number, therefore, of 1.6 that we have as of now, is going to be a lot, lot higher. But it’s not something that we cannot manage completely.

因此，我们目前的数字 16亿将会高得多。但这并不是我们无法完全应对的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We will not be in the top five payers of, my guess, of insurance claims, even though we’re — it’s —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不会是保险索赔的前五大支付者，我猜，即使我们——这——

And we write a much smaller amount of both life insurance and annuities, actually. And, you know, in the end, we get — we had more life insurance claims. But the annuities are not going to last. More people will have died that would have otherwise got payments on their annuities. It cuts a lot of ways.

实际上，我们的寿险和年金业务规模都较小。最终，我们确实有更多的寿险索赔，但年金支付不会持续那么久，因为更多人去世了，而这些人本来可以继续收到年金支付。这在多个方面都会产生影响。

It’s — it’s a — you know, one of the great human catastrophes of all time. But it is not that big in insurance.

这是一场人类历史上伟大的灾难之一。但在保险方面并没有那么严重。

And I would say this, if the insurance industry thinks they’re going to lose a hundred billion dollars, the hundred billion ought to be up on their books now, I mean — (Laughs)

我想说的是，如果保险行业认为他们会损失一千亿美元，那么这一千亿美元现在应该在他们的账本上，我是说——（笑）

The idea of feeding in losses — you’ve got a liability. And our goal is not — our goal is to have — put up the liability when we think it’s happened, and —

将损失计入的想法——你有一个负债。我们的目标不是——我们的目标是当我们认为它发生时，提出负债，并——

If — we should not be at a billion-six, I would say this, if we really think we’re going to have some proportional share of a hundred billion. But —

如果——我们不应该达到十六亿，我会这么说，如果我们真的认为我们会有一百亿的某种比例份额。但是——

But that’s enough said on that. (Laughs)

但关于这个就说到这里吧。（笑）

41. Kansas City Southern acquisition won’t have huge impact on BNSF

堪萨斯城南方铁路的收购不会对 BNSF 产生巨大影响

BECKY QUICK: This next question is for Greg, but also for Warren and Charlie.

贝基·奎克：下一个问题是问格雷格的，但也适用于沃伦和查理。

It’s from Blair Miller, who asks, “What does the combination of Kansas City Southern with either Canadian Pacific or Canadian National mean to BNSF, in terms of competition?

这是来自布莱尔·米勒的提问：“堪萨斯城南方铁路与加拿大太平洋或加拿大国家铁路的结合对 BNSF 意味着什么，特别是在竞争方面？”

“And do you think the synergies of the merger will justify the multiple paid?”

“你认为合并的协同效应会证明支付的倍数是合理的吗？”

GREG ABEL: Sure. So, obviously, a transaction we followed very closely with both Canadian National and Canadian Pacific bidding to purchase Kansas City Southern.

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然。所以，显然，这是一个我们非常密切关注的交易，加拿大国家铁路和加拿大太平洋铁路竞标购买堪萨斯城南方铁路。

Either of those companies acquiring Kansas City Southern will have an impact on BNSF. We — what they’re basically proposing is to create a north/south railway that goes from Canada into Mexico.

无论哪家公司收购堪萨斯城南方铁路都会对 BNSF 产生影响。他们基本上提议创建一条从加拿大到墨西哥的南北铁路。

We do have a strong presence in Mexico — not as strong as some of our competition. But we would feel competition there.

我们在墨西哥确实有很强的存在——虽然不如我们的一些竞争对手强。但我们会感受到那里的竞争。

So, we’ll follow that transaction very closely. As it goes before the Surface Transportation Board, the standard that will be applied is that competition has to be protected or enhanced.

因此，我们会密切关注这笔交易。当它提交到地面运输委员会时，所适用的标准是必须保护或增强竞争。

So that’s our opportunity to protect our franchise on behalf of our customers.

这就是我们代表客户保护我们特许经营的机会。

So, we move intermodal business both in and out of there on behalf of certain customers. We’ll want to protect the rights of our customers there. So, we’ll be active in the approval process. But there’s no question, in the end, it impacts our franchise. Warren?

因此，我们代表某些客户在那儿进行进出多式联运业务。我们希望保护客户在那里的权益。因此，我们将在审批过程中积极参与。但毫无疑问，最终这会影响我们的特许经营。沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s not huge. But it affects both the Union Pacific and BNSF to a small degree — a relatively small degree.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这并不大。但它对联合太平洋和 BNSF 都有一定程度的影响——相对较小的程度。

But that’s— that’s not really the worry of the Surface Transportation Board. Their job is to do what’s best for the shippers.

但这并不是地面运输委员会真正担心的事情。他们的工作是为发货人做最好的决定。

And in terms of the price that’s being paid, you know, like you say, if you can borrow all the money at nothing — for nothing — you know, (laughs), it doesn’t make much difference to people.

在支付的价格方面，你知道，就像你说的，如果你可以以零利率借到所有的钱——没有成本——你知道，（笑），这对人们来说没有太大区别。

And this would not be being paid under a different interest rate environment. I mean it’s very simple.

这不会在不同的利率环境下支付。我的意思是，这非常简单。

But it would make — there’s no magic to the Kansas City Southern. It’s got a — I think their deal with Mexico ends in 2047. It’s — it’s — you know, it will — the number of carloads carried and everything, it’s not going to change that much.

但是，堪萨斯城南方铁路公司并没有什么神奇之处。我记得他们与墨西哥的协议到期于2047年。运载的车厢数量等等，不会有太大的变化。

But it is kind of interesting. There’s only — there’s two major Canadian — what they call Class I railroads. And there’s five in the United States.

但这有点有趣。加拿大只有两家主要的——他们称之为一级铁路。而美国有五家。

And this will result, you know, in essentially, three of the units being Canadian, four being U.S., which is not the way you normally think of (laughs) the way of the development of the railroad system would work in the United States.

这将导致，您知道，基本上三个单位是加拿大的，四个是美国的，这并不是您通常认为的（笑）美国铁路系统发展的方式。

But it’s — you know, we’ve talked about it plenty. And CP — or either Canadian Pacific or Canadian National — is very likely to get it. I think the Surface Transportation Board will — voted four-to-one, didn’t they, the other day? Didn’t get —

但我们已经谈过很多了。CP——无论是加拿大太平洋还是加拿大国家——很可能会得到它。我认为地面运输委员会会——前几天投票是四比一，对吧？没有得到——

GREG ABEL: They voted on an initial trust structure that they had to approve for Canadian Pacific. And that was a four-to-one vote, as you noted, Warren.

格雷格·阿贝尔：他们对必须批准的加拿大太平洋初始信托结构进行了投票。正如你所提到的，沃伦，这是四比一的投票结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

GREG ABEL: So, they’re moving forward with the evaluation of it.

格雷格·阿贝尔：所以，他们正在推进对它的评估。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And normally, railroad deals are very long — take a long time for them to evaluate.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。通常，铁路交易需要很长时间来评估。

But in this case, I think they have two opposing trust proposals. And in effect, by making a — if they make a quick decision on the — which trust proposal they allow — I don’t see how you allow two proposals, exactly. So, it may be a very accelerated decision, not — I don’t know.

但在这种情况下，我认为他们有两个相互对立的信托提案。实际上，如果他们对允许哪个信托提案做出快速决定——我看不出你如何允许两个提案。因此，这可能是一个非常快速的决定，不——我不知道。

But it’s up to the Surface Transportation Board to do what’s best for what their obligation is to the country to do.

但这取决于地面运输委员会做出对国家义务最有利的决定。

BECKY QUICK: There was a follow-up question on that —

贝基·奎克：对此有一个后续问题——

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

BECKY QUICK: — do you think the valuation that they’re paying is worth it?

贝基·奎克：——你认为他们支付的估值值得吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we — in a very, very mild way.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们——以一种非常温和的方式。

I mean, everybody’s kind of played at making deals with different railroads, you know, ever since I’ve been in the railroad business. (Laughs)

我意思是，自从我进入铁路行业以来，每个人都在和不同的铁路公司打交道，知道吗？（笑）

So, you know, we’ve talked about it. When CP — when Hunter Harrison or — you know, came after — was it Hunter that bid on CP that kind of led the way?

所以，你知道，我们谈过这个。当 CP——当亨特·哈里森或者——你知道，来竞标 CP 的是亨特吗？这算是开了个头吗？

And, you know, we looked at buying CP. I mean, everybody looks at everything, and —

而且，你知道，我们考虑过购买 CP。我是说，每个人都会考虑所有事情，和——

We would not pay this price. And it implies a price for BNSF that’s even higher than what the UP is selling for.

我们不会支付这个价格。这意味着 BNSF 的价格甚至高于 UP 的售价。

But, you know, it’s kind of play money, to some degree.

但是，你知道，这在某种程度上有点像玩钱。

I mean when interest rates are this low, and I’m sure from the standpoint of both CP and CN, there’s only one KC Southern. And they’re not going to get a chance to expand — they’re not going to buy us, they’re not going to buy the UP. And the juices flow, and the prices go up, and —

我的意思是，当利率这么低时，我相信从 CP 和 CN 的角度来看，只有一个 KC Southern。他们不会有机会扩张——他们不会收购我们，也不会收购 UP。资金流动，价格上涨，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re buying it with somebody else’s money.

查理·芒格：他们是用别人的钱在购买。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s somebody else’s money. And you’re going to retire —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是别人的钱。你将要退休——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — in five or 10 years. And people are not going to remember what you paid, but they’re going to remember whether you built a larger system.

沃伦·巴菲特：——在五年或十年后。人们不会记得你支付了多少，但他们会记得你是否建立了一个更大的系统。

And the investment bankers are cheering you on at every move. You know, they’re saying you could pay more, and this is the — you know, and they’re moving the figures around, the spreadsheets are out, and the fees are flowing. (Laughs)

投资银行家们会为你的每一个动作喝彩。你知道，他们会说你可以支付更多，并且他们不断调整数字，电子表格在更新，费用也在源源不断地流入。（笑）

42. Successful acquisitions naturally become a bigger part of the business

成功的收购自然会成为业务的更大部分。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Asher Haft in Brooklyn, who says — Asher’s been a shareholder since 2006. Says that he appreciates your honestly and candidness when it comes to explaining costly errors you made.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自布鲁克林的阿舍·哈夫，他说——阿舍自 2006 年以来一直是股东。他表示，他很欣赏您在解释您所犯的昂贵错误时的诚实和坦率。

“In this year’s chairman letter, you discussed that you made a mistake in 2016 when calculating Precision Castpart’s average amount of future earnings, which resulted in Berkshire overpaying to acquire it.

在今年的董事长信中，您提到您在 2016 年计算 Precision Castpart 未来收益的平均金额时犯了一个错误，这导致伯克希尔在收购时支付了过高的价格。

“It appears that Precision’s earnings declined substantially in 2020 because of the pandemic and the effect of airline and travel industry. What calculations could you have made in 2016 that might have altered your decision to acquire it? And secondly, are the problems Precision is currently facing larger than the pandemic?

“看起来，Precision 的收益在 2020 年因疫情以及航空和旅游行业的影响大幅下降。你在 2016 年可以做出哪些计算，可能会改变你收购它的决定？其次，Precision 目前面临的问题是否比疫情更严重？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Berkshire didn’t make the mistake, I made the mistake, incidentally. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，伯克希尔没有犯错，我犯了错，顺便说一下。（笑）

No, any time we look at buying a business, we’re evaluating the competitive strengths of the business, the price we have to pay, the management we get and everything.

不，每当我们考虑购买一家公司时，我们都会评估该公司的竞争优势、我们需要支付的价格、我们获得的管理层以及所有其他因素。

And we didn’t make a mistake on the management. But in terms of the earning power, on average, and, you know — when Boeing has troubles with the Max, well, that’s a probability.

我们在管理上没有犯错。但就盈利能力而言，平均来看，你知道——当波音在 Max 上遇到问题时，这就是一种概率。

I mean, any time, any customers of big — I mean, all kinds of things can happen.

我意思是，任何时候，任何大客户——我的意思是，各种事情都可能发生。

And we have seen some of those things happen. And therefore, I paid too much, in relation to average earnings. It’s a terrific company. And, you know, it’s — I’m happy with the management and everything, and —

我们已经看到一些事情发生。因此，我支付的价格相对于平均收入来说太高了。这是一家很棒的公司。而且，你知道，我对管理层和一切都很满意，——

But GE doesn’t need as many engines as we thought they would need. (Laughs)

但通用电气并不需要我们想象中那么多发动机。（笑）

And they get into the power business, and a variety of things. And we knew they were in the businesses. But we did not think those businesses would necessarily be in something close to a depression when other businesses are — that we bought end up, sometimes, doing better than we think.

他们进入了电力行业和各种其他业务。我们知道他们在这些行业。但我们并不认为这些行业在其他行业接近衰退时会如此——我们购买的某些业务有时表现得比我们想象的要好。

But we’ll continue making mistakes. I mean — and I shouldn’t say we will — I will.

但我们会继续犯错误。我是说——我不应该说我们会——我会。

But even these other —

但即使是这些其他——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The rest of us will help. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们其他人会帮忙。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ll — you know, we’ve got some wonderful deals, and some terrible deals.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有一些很棒的交易，也有一些糟糕的交易。

And the nice thing about it is — as I pointed out, this doesn’t really apply in the case of Precision, precisely — but when we’re disappointed in a business, it usually becomes a smaller and smaller percentage of our business, just by the nature of things, because it isn’t going anyplace.

而这件事的好处在于——正如我所指出的，这在精确度的情况下并不适用——但当我们对一项业务感到失望时，它通常会逐渐成为我们业务中越来越小的百分比，这就是事物的本质，因为它没有任何进展。

And when we get a successful business, like a GEICO or something of the sort — GEICO’s doing — they’re doing 15 times as much business as when we bought control in 19 — they become a proportionally much more important part of our mix.

当我们获得一个成功的业务，比如 GEICO 或类似的公司——GEICO 的业务——他们的业务量是我们在 19 年收购控制权时的 15 倍——他们在我们的组合中变得相对更重要。

So, you really get, through just natural forces, you get more of your money in the things that have developed more favorably than you thought. You actually end up getting a greater concentration in the ones that work out.

所以，通过自然力量，你实际上会在那些发展得比你想象中更有利的事物上获得更多的收益。你最终会在那些成功的项目上获得更大的集中度。

通过控股的方式，把资金投向那些效率更高的企业，只有控股才能这么做。

It’s not like — as Charlie would say, it’s not like having children. I mean — (Laughs)

这并不像——正如查理所说，这并不像有孩子。我是说——（笑）

The one that — the bad ones cause you more problems. (Laughs)

坏的那些会给你带来更多问题。（笑）

But the — in this — in the children of businesses, the small ones kind of — by the way, we started with three businesses, Charlie and I. And Berkshire was textiles, Diversified Retailing was a department store, and trading stamps were Blue Chip’s business. And those were the three companies we put together. And all three of the original businesses failed.

但是在这方面，孩子们的企业，小企业有点——顺便说一下，我们是从三家企业开始的，查理和我。伯克希尔是纺织业，多元化零售是百货商店，交易邮票是蓝筹公司的业务。这三家公司是我们组合在一起的。而且这三家原始企业都失败了。

Which sort of gets me, in terms of the people that are worried about, don’t we know that coal is going to be phased out over time? (Laughs)

这让我有点困惑，关于那些担心的人，我们难道不知道煤炭会逐渐被淘汰吗？（笑）

Of course, we know coal’s going to be — you know, but that doesn’t mean we’re going to be phased out over time. I mean that —

当然，我们知道煤炭会被淘汰——你知道的，但这并不意味着我们会随着时间的推移而被取代。我的意思是——

Every business has some things to think about, about that way.

每个企业都有一些事情需要考虑，关于那种方式。

43. Top “risk factor” for any business is getting the wrong management

任何企业的首要“风险因素”是管理层不当。

WARREN BUFFETT: The biggest danger — they have that section in the prospectus called, what do they call that? About — certain —

沃伦·巴菲特：最大的危险——他们在招股说明书中有一个部分，叫什么来着？关于——某些——

GREG ABEL: Risk factors. 格雷格·阿贝尔：风险因素。

AJIT JAIN: Risk factors. 阿吉特·贾因：风险因素。

WARREN BUFFETT: Risk factors, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：风险因素，是的。

The number one risk factor — you never see it — the number one risk factor is that this business gets the wrong management. And you get a guy or a woman in charge of it that are — they’re personable, the directors like them. They don’t know what they’re doing, but they know how to put on an appearance.

首要风险因素——你永远看不到——首要风险因素是这个企业得到了错误的管理。你可能会让一个人或一个女人负责这个企业，他们很有亲和力，董事们喜欢他们。他们不知道自己在做什么，但他们知道如何营造一种表象。

That’s the biggest single danger that a business — and that that person stays and runs it for 10 or 15 years, and either stays in the textile business or department store business and expands. (Laughs)

这对一个企业来说是最大的单一危险——那个人在那里待了 10 或 15 年，要么继续留在纺织行业或百货商店行业并扩展。（笑）

足够正确的人可以让企业起死回生，巴菲特和乔布斯都是例子。

And, you know, I’ve looked at a lot of businesses. And that’s what’s caused the number one problem. And it isn’t the kind of thing where they list them all because the lawyers tell them to list them.

而且，你知道，我看过很多企业。这就是造成头号问题的原因。这并不是他们因为律师告诉他们要列出所有问题而列出的问题。

44. Buffett follows politician’s lead and dodges Bitcoin question

巴菲特效仿政治家的做法，回避比特币问题

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Raghu Baichwal, and it’s for both Warren and Charlie.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自拉古·拜奇瓦尔，问的是沃伦和查理。

“Now that the crypto market overall is valued at $2 trillion, do you still consider cryptos as worthless artificial gold?”

“现在加密市场的整体价值达到 2 万亿美元，你还认为加密货币是毫无价值的虚假黄金吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) 沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）

Well, I knew there’d be a question on Bitcoin or crypto. And I thought to myself, well, I’ve watched these politicians dodge questions all the time, you know. And I always find it kind of disgusting when they do it, but the truth is, I’m going to dodge that question, (laughs), because we’ve probably got hundreds of thousands of people watching this that own bitcoin, and we’ve probably got two people that are short.

好吧，我知道会有人问比特币或加密货币的问题。我心想，我见过这些政治家总是躲避问题，你知道的。我总觉得他们这样做有点恶心，但事实是，我也要躲避这个问题（笑），因为我们可能有成千上万的人在看这个，他们拥有比特币，而我们可能只有两个人在做空。

So, we got a choice of making 400,000 people mad at us and unhappy and — or making two people happy. And that’s just a dumb equation.

所以，我们面临一个选择：让 40 万人对我们生气和不快乐，或者让两个人快乐。这真是个愚蠢的方程式。

So, I thought about it. We had a governor one time in Nebraska — a long time ago — but he would get a tough question, you know, what do you think about property taxes? Or, you know, what should we do about schools?

所以，我考虑了一下。我们在内布拉斯加州曾经有过一位州长——很久以前——但他遇到一个棘手的问题，比如，你觉得财产税怎么样？或者，你觉得我们应该如何处理学校？

And he’d look right at the person and he’d say, “I’m all right on that one!” (Laughter)

他会直视那个人，说：“我对此没问题！”（笑声）

And then he’d just walk off. Well, I’m all right on that one, and maybe we’ll see how Charlie is. (Laughs)

然后他就走开了。好吧，我对此没问题，也许我们可以看看查理怎么样。（笑）

45. Munger: “Of course, I hate the Bitcoin success”

芒格：“当然，我讨厌比特币的成功”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, those who know me well are just waving the red flag at the bull. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，那些了解我的人就像是在对公牛挥舞红旗。（笑声）

Of course, I hate the Bitcoin success. And I don’t welcome a currency that’s so useful to kidnappers and extortionists and so forth, nor do I like just shoveling out a few extra billions and billions and billions of dollars to somebody who just invented a new financial product out of thin air.

当然，我讨厌比特币的成功。我不欢迎对绑架者、勒索者等如此有用的货币，也不喜欢仅仅把数十亿、数十亿、数十亿的美元送给那些凭空发明新金融产品的人。

So, I think I should say modestly that I think the whole damn development is disgusting and contrary to the interest of civilization. And I’ll leave the criticism to others. (Laughter)

所以，我想我应该谦虚地说，我认为整个该死的发展令人厌恶，违背了文明的利益。我会把批评留给其他人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m all right on that one! (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我对此没问题！(笑声)

46. Our Texas energy proposal may not be the best, but it’s better than Musk’s

我们的德克萨斯能源提案可能不是最好，但比马斯克的要好。

BECKY QUICK: The next question that comes in — or the next series of questions — are from James Hernandez. He has two questions, one for Ajit and one for Greg. They both concern Elon Musk.

贝基·奎克：下一个问题，或者说下一系列问题，来自詹姆斯·埃尔南德斯。他有两个问题，一个问阿吉特，一个问格雷格。它们都与埃隆·马斯克有关。

For Greg, this question is for you.

对于格雷格，这个问题是给你的。

“Elon Musk has stated that Berkshire Hathaway’s energy proposal for Texas, spending more than $9 billion for new generating capacity, is wrong. Instead, Mr. Musk argues that load balancing using battery storage is the appropriate course of action.

埃隆·马斯克表示，伯克希尔·哈撒韦在德克萨斯州提出的能源方案，花费超过 90 亿美元用于新的发电能力，是错误的。相反，马斯克先生认为，使用电池储存进行负载平衡是适当的行动方案。

“Can you explain why the BHE proposal is the better course of action for Governor (Greg) Abbott and the state of Texas? Specifically, what amount of savings can the citizens of Texas expect above and beyond what Mr. Musk is proposing?”

“你能解释一下为什么 BHE 提案是德克萨斯州州长（格雷格）阿博特和德克萨斯州更好的行动方案吗？具体来说，德克萨斯州的公民可以期待比马斯克提议的更多的节省金额是多少？”

GREG ABEL: Sure. So the — obviously, there is the very unfortunate event in Texas in February. And it basically lasted four days. Many lives were lost. The economic damage was significant. Texas has highlighted that anywhere from 80 to $130 billion in incurred losses over that period of time.

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然。所以——显然，二月份在德克萨斯州发生了非常不幸的事件。它基本上持续了四天。许多生命丧失，经济损失也很严重。德克萨斯州指出，在那段时间内，损失从 800 亿到 1300 亿美元不等。

I think when you look at the power sector, it fundamentally let the citizens down. It didn’t perform as they expected.

我认为，当你看电力部门时，它从根本上让公民失望了。它的表现没有达到他们的期望。

And then when it did perform, it was extremely expensive. They incurred billions and billions of dollars of energy costs versus a multiple of, basically, 10 times what they paid — they paid 10 times in energy costs over those four days what they paid in the past year.

然后当它确实运行时，成本极其高昂。他们的能源成本达到了数十亿美元，而在这四天里，他们的能源支出是过去一年支付的十倍。

So, a very substantial event for Texas.

所以，这是一个对德克萨斯州非常重要的事件。

We’ve gone to Texas with what we believe is a good solution. We spent a lot of time pulling it together, understanding the fundamental issues around it. And our proposal is really based upon the fact that the health and welfare of Texans were at risk.

我们已经带着我们认为是一个好解决方案的方案去了德克萨斯州。我们花了很多时间将其整理在一起，理解其基本问题。我们的提案实际上是基于德克萨斯州人民的健康和福利处于风险之中的事实。

And we needed to have, effectively, an insurance policy in place for them — that if they needed the power on very short notice, it would be able to be dispatched and it would be there for the four days — we’re actually proposing it could be there for seven days.

我们实际上需要为他们制定一项保险政策——如果他们在很短的时间内需要电力，能够迅速调度，并且能够持续四天——我们实际上提议可以持续七天。

And the fundamental concept of our proposal has always been, if there’s a better proposal that’s brought forward, we’ve accomplished our mission.

我们提案的基本概念一直是，如果有更好的提案被提出，我们就完成了我们的使命。

We’ve just been really there to — it’s the best proposal or option we could come up with. And obviously if Texas or Elon or someone else comes up with a better proposition, we’ve always said, Texas, you should pursue it.

我们一直在努力——这是我们能想到的最佳提议或选项。显然，如果德克萨斯州、埃隆或其他人提出更好的方案，我们一直说，德克萨斯州，你应该去追求它。

We strongly believe right now we have — what remains is a very good proposal for Texas. And it will continue to be discussed and evaluated.

我们坚信现在我们拥有——剩下的就是一个非常好的德克萨斯州提案。它将继续被讨论和评估。

The big difference between a battery proposal and our proposal is that we will have power that can be generated continuously for seven consistent days, where if you went to a battery solution, you may release that power that’s been stored for four hours. But we’re talking four days of a problem, not four hours. And it’s just a completely different cost equation and solution.

电池提案和我们的提案之间的最大区别在于，我们将能够连续产生七天的电力，而如果你选择电池解决方案，你可能只能释放存储了四小时的电力。但我们谈论的是四天的问题，而不是四小时。这完全是不同的成本计算和解决方案。

So, very proud that our teams brought forward what I thought was a very unique solution. We’ve worked hard with our suppliers and Peter Kiewit & Sons to put together what we believe is a firm cost that can also be delivered by November of ’23.

我非常自豪我们的团队提出了我认为非常独特的解决方案。我们与供应商和彼得·基维特父子公司紧密合作，制定了我们相信可以在 2023 年 11 月交付的固定成本。

So again, we put a firm date on — it won’t be ready next winter, unfortunately. It won’t be ready this summer.

所以我们再次确定了一个明确的日期——不幸的是，它在明年冬天不会准备好。这夏天也不会准备好。

But it’s a valuable solution and one that we hope, at least, leads to the right discussion and the right long-term solution for the state.

但这是一个有价值的解决方案，我们希望至少能引导出正确的讨论和为州带来正确的长期解决方案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and we’re also willing to put up $4 billion that if we don’t deliver when we say we’re going to deliver, we’ll pay it as a penalty, basically.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们还愿意提供 40 亿美元，如果我们没有按承诺的时间交付，我们将支付这笔钱作为罚款。

You know, we went to Kiewit, we went to General Electric and said, you know, how long can we get turbines in the — you know.

你知道，我们去了Kiewit，我们去了通用电气，问他们，你知道，我们多久能拿到涡轮机——你知道的。

You know, if you’re going to be prepared for 2023, you have to start at a point fairly soon. And you have inflation going on. And Kiewit’s not going to change things on us in a month. We don’t try to get the contracts all written out. But they had a hundred people working on it or —

你知道，如果你想为 2023 年做好准备，你必须在不久的将来开始。而且你还面临通货膨胀。Kiewit 不会在一个月内改变我们的情况。我们并不试图把合同全部写好。但他们有一百个人在为此工作。

GREG ABEL: Yeah, they have hundreds working on it — (Laughs)

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，他们有数百人在为此工作——（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And, you know, and GE’s cooperative and everything —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你知道，通用电气的合作以及一切——

But it doesn’t mean we have the best solution. We just know what we can do. And if anybody can do it faster, they can do it cheaper, you know, whatever, that’s terrific.

但这并不意味着我们有最好的解决方案。我们只是知道我们能做什么。如果有人能做得更快，能做得更便宜，随便怎样，那太好了。

But they should have something to lose, though, if they don’t do it, I mean —

但如果他们不这样做，他们应该有一些东西可以失去，我是说——

And we will back our promise up by $4 billion, which —

我们将用 40 亿美元来支持我们的承诺，这——

You know, and we won’t have any rinky-dink clauses in there that if this happens or that happens, we don’t pay.

你知道，我们不会在里面加入任何小条款，比如如果发生这种或那种情况，我们就不付款。

But we won’t be able to do that a year from now. I mean, we can do it a year from now with the cost then from what they are then, and then it will be a year further out.

但我们一年后就无法做到这一点。我的意思是，我们可以在一年后做到这一点，但那时的成本与现在相比会有所不同，而且那时又会再推迟一年。

But we want Texas — Texas is a terrific place to do business. We do a lot of business there. It’s where BNSF has its headquarters. And it’s a great place.

但我们想要德克萨斯州——德克萨斯州是一个做生意的绝佳地方。我们在那里做了很多生意。BNSF 的总部就在那里。而且那里是个好地方。

And this was out of the blue, but one way or another — the nature of utility business is that you got to — you have to be prepared for something that probably isn’t going to happen. (Laughs)

这完全是出乎意料，但无论如何——公用事业的性质就是你必须——你必须为一些可能不会发生的事情做好准备。（笑）

You know, you don’t want to say, well, it’s a one in 30-year event, you know, and people die. I mean, so —

你知道的，你不想说，这是一场 30 年才发生一次的事件，你知道，人们会死。我是说，所以——

You want — you want a margin of safety in it. And we’ve got one solution and other people may have other solutions. And we will cheer when a solution is reached of any kind. And we will cheer a little louder if it’s ours. (Laughs)

你想要——你想要一个安全边际。我们有一个解决方案，其他人可能有其他解决方案。当任何一种解决方案达成时，我们都会欢呼。如果是我们的解决方案，我们会欢呼得更响亮一点。（笑）

47. Buffett jokes that decision to insure a Elon Musk mission to Mars would depend on the premium

巴菲特开玩笑说，是否为埃隆·马斯克的火星任务投保将取决于保费。

BECKY QUICK: Ajit, your question from this gentleman.

贝基·奎克：阿吉特，这位先生的问题。

“Suppose the hypothetical situation arises where Warren Buffett calls you on the phone to tell you that Elon Musk has contacted him about writing an insurance policy on his proposed mission to, and subsequent colonization of, Mars.

假设出现这样一个假设情况，沃伦·巴菲特给你打电话，告诉你埃隆·马斯克联系了他，想为他计划的火星任务及随后的殖民写一份保险条款。

“Specifically, he wants insurance to insure his SpaceX heavy rocket capsule, payload, and human capital. Would you underwrite any portion of a venture like that?”

“具体来说，他希望为他的 SpaceX 重型火箭舱、有效载荷和人力资本投保。你会承保这样的风险吗？”

AJIT JAIN: This is an easy one. No, thank you. I’ll pass. (Laughter)

AJIT JAIN：这很简单。不，谢谢。我不需要。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say it would depend on the premium. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说这要看溢价。（笑声）

And I would say that I would probably have a somewhat different rate if Elon was on board or not on board. I mean, you know — (Laughter)

我想说，如果埃隆在场或不在场，我的费率可能会有所不同。我的意思是，你知道——（笑声）

No, it makes a difference. I mean, if somebody’s asking to insure something, you know. (Laughs)

不，这很重要。我的意思是，如果有人要求为某样东西投保，你知道的。（笑）

So, I would — that’s called getting skin in the game and — but if — you know. (Laughter)

所以，我会——这叫做投入风险——但是如果——你知道的。（笑声）

AJIT JAIN: But in general, I would be very concerned about writing an insurance policy where Elon Musk is on the other side.

AJIT JAIN：但一般来说，我会非常担心写一份保险单，而埃隆·马斯克在另一方。

BECKY QUICK: OK. 贝基·奎克：好的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell Elon to call me instead of Ajit. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉埃隆给我打电话，而不是阿吉特。（笑声）

48. “Everybody’s looking” for businesses that don’t need much capital

“每个人都在寻找”不需要太多资本的企业

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Michael Liu from California. This is for both Warren and Charlie.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自加利福尼亚的迈克尔·刘。这是给沃伦和查理的。

“In your shareholder letter, you mention that the best investment results come from the companies that require minimum assets to conduct high-margin businesses.

在您的股东信中，您提到最佳投资结果来自于那些需要最少资产来进行高利润业务的公司。

“In today’s world, many of these companies tend to be software-driven businesses. While Berkshire has avoided investing in high-growth technology companies in the past, this appears to be slowly changing with your investments in Apple and Snowflake.

在当今世界，许多这些公司往往是以软件为驱动的企业。虽然伯克希尔过去避免投资于高增长的科技公司，但随着您对苹果和 Snowflake 的投资，这种情况似乎正在慢慢改变。

“As shareholders, should we expect that high-margin businesses will begin to constitute a larger proportion of Berkshire’s investment portfolio over time, particularly as (portfolio managers) Todd (Combs) and Ted (Weschler) take on larger roles in the investment decision process?”

作为股东，我们是否应该期待高利润业务在伯克希尔的投资组合中随着时间的推移会占据更大比例，特别是在（投资组合经理）托德（科姆斯）和泰德（韦施勒）在投资决策过程中扮演更大角色的情况下？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve always known that the dream business is the one that takes very little capital (laughs) and grows a lot.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们一直知道，理想的生意是那种需要很少资本（笑）并且能够快速增长的生意。

And — and Apple and Google and Microsoft and Facebook are terrific examples of that.

而——而苹果、谷歌、微软和 Facebook 就是很好的例子。

I mean, Apple has $37 billion in property plant equipment, you know. Berkshire has 170 billion or something like that, and they’re going to make a lot more money than we do. They’re in better — it’s a much better business than we have. And so — and Microsoft’s business is a way better business than we have. Google’s business is a way better business, so —

我的意思是，苹果有 370 亿美元的固定资产，你知道的。伯克希尔有 1700 亿美元左右，他们会赚比我们多得多的钱。他们的业务更好——这比我们的业务好得多。所以——微软的业务比我们的业务好得多。谷歌的业务也比我们的业务好得多，所以——

We’ve always looked — we’ve known that a long time. We found that out with See’s Candy in 1972. I mean, See’s Candy just doesn’t require that much capital. It doesn’t have — you know, it has, obviously, a couple of manufacturing plants — they call them kitchens, and —

我们一直在关注——我们早就知道这一点。我们在 1972 年通过 See's Candy 发现了这一点。我的意思是，See's Candy 并不需要那么多资本。它没有——你知道，它显然有几个制造工厂——他们称之为厨房，和——

But it doesn’t have big inventories, except very seasonably for a short period. It doesn’t have a lot of receivables. So, you know, those are the kinds of businesses — they’re the best businesses.

但它没有大规模的库存，除了在季节性短期内。它的应收账款也不多。所以，你知道，这些就是最好的商业类型。

But they command the best prices, too. And there aren’t that many of them. And they don’t always stay that way, so —

但它们的价格也很高。而且数量并不多。并且它们并不总是保持这种状态，所以——

We’re looking for them all the time. And we’ve got — we’ve got a few that are pretty darn good. But we don’t have anything as big (laughs) as the big guys.

我们一直在寻找他们。我们有一些相当不错的。但我们没有像大公司那样大的东西（笑）。

But that’s what everybody’s looking for. That’s what capitalism is about. People getting a return on capital. (Laughs)

但这正是每个人所追求的。这就是资本主义的本质。人们希望获得资本回报。（笑）

And the way you get it is having something that doesn’t take too much capital. I mean, if you have to really put out tons and tons of capital — utility business is that way. It’s not a super-high return business. You just have to put out a lot of capital. You get a return on that capital, but you don’t get fabulous return. You don’t get Google-like returns, you know, or anything remotely close to it.

获得它的方法是拥有一些不需要太多资本的东西。我的意思是，如果你真的需要投入大量资本——公用事业就是这样。它不是一个超高回报的行业。你只需要投入大量资本。你会从这些资本中获得回报，但你不会获得惊人的回报。你不会获得像谷歌那样的回报，或者任何接近的回报。

You know, we’re proposing a return in the transaction — the proposition with Texas — I think it’s 9.3%, isn’t it —

你知道，我们提议在交易中进行回报——与德克萨斯州的提议——我想是 9.3%，不是吗——

GREG ABEL: Yeah, 9.3 —

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，9.3 —

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and you know, that — but if you look at the return on most American businesses on net tangible assets, it’s a lot higher than 9.3. But they aren’t utility businesses, either.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你知道，但如果你看看大多数美国企业在净有形资产上的回报率，它远高于 9.3。但它们也不是公用事业公司。

BECKY QUICK: Charlie, did you want to add anything to that?

贝基·奎克：查理，你想对此补充些什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, thank you.

查理·芒格：不，谢谢。

BECKY QUICK: OK. 贝基·奎克：好的。

49. Why portfolio managers Todd Combs and Ted Weschler don’t answer shareholder questions

为什么投资组合经理托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒不回答股东问题

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Ryan Fusaro in New York City, who says, ”(Portfolio managers) Todd (Combs) and Ted (Weschler) have taken on increased responsibility at Berkshire over the years, managing larger pools of capital, including the company’s sizable Apple holdings, participating in M&A strategy, and even overseeing the company’s now shuttered health care partnership with Amazon and JPMorgan.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自纽约市的瑞安·富萨罗，他说：“（投资组合经理）托德（科姆斯）和泰德（韦施勒）多年来在伯克希尔承担了更多责任，管理更大规模的资本，包括公司的大量苹果股份，参与并购战略，甚至监督公司与亚马逊和摩根大通的现已关闭的医疗保健合作伙伴关系。”

“We are grateful for their efforts. But Todd and Ted are still not made available to shareholders at the annual meeting each year. Given their growing importance to the firm, can you discuss this policy and whether we can expect to hear from them more in the coming years?”

“我们对他们的努力表示感谢。但托德和泰德在每年的股东大会上仍然没有向股东公开。考虑到他们对公司的日益重要性，您能否讨论一下这一政策，以及我们是否可以期待在未来几年听到他们更多的声音？”

WARREN BUFFETT: They’re both absolutely terrific. And that’s one reason I don’t want people quizzing them on stocks. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他们俩都非常出色。这也是我不希望人们问他们股票问题的原因之一。（笑声）

They are assets to Berkshire. And just —

他们是伯克希尔的资产。就这样——

There’s no reason for them to be out educating other people on how to compete with us. You wouldn’t — it always seems so silly that people expect — they don’t expect you to — they don’t expect Merck or Pfizer or something to tell them exactly what their scientists are working on, (laughs) you know, and where they stand and what the failures have been so they can eliminated those. And, you know —

他们没有理由去教育其他人如何与我们竞争。你不会——人们总是觉得很可笑，他们期望——他们不期望你——他们不期望默克或辉瑞之类的公司告诉他们他们的科学家到底在研究什么，（笑）你知道的，以及他们的进展和失败是什么，以便他们可以避免这些。还有，你知道——

If you’ve got talent that knows how to evaluate businesses — and those two fellows have been — they’ve gone far beyond that — they’re terrific assets, and they love Berkshire, and they work extraordinary hours.

如果你有评估企业的才能——而那两位朋友确实有——他们远远超出了这一点——他们是了不起的资产，他们热爱伯克希尔，并且工作时间非常长。

But we don’t really want them going around with people asking them questions about why you like this industry better than that (laughs) industry or anything of the sort.

但我们并不希望他们到处去和人们讨论为什么你更喜欢这个行业而不是那个（哈哈）行业或类似的问题。

50. Munger: “The Chinese government will allow businesses to flourish”

芒格：“中国政府将允许企业蓬勃发展”

BECKY QUICK: This question’s for Charlie. It comes from Stephen Tedder in Atlanta. He’s been a Berkshire shareholder for 10 years and says, “You and your friend Li Lu have been very optimistic with respect to investing opportunities in China.

贝基·奎克：这个问题是问查理的。来自亚特兰大的斯蒂芬·泰德尔。他已经是伯克希尔的股东 10 年了，他说：“你和你的朋友李录在中国的投资机会方面一直非常乐观。”

“BYD has performed spectacularly for Berkshire since its initial purchase in 2008 and it’s currently valued at $5.8 billion.

比亚迪自 2008 年首次购买以来为伯克希尔表现出色，目前估值为 58 亿美元。

“The Daily Journal recently bought a large position in Alibaba after founder Jack Ma had been reprimanded by the Chinese Communist Party and Ma’s other company, Ant, was not allowed to proceed with its IPO.

《每日新闻》最近在阿里巴巴创始人马云被中国共产党批评、以及马云的另一家公司蚂蚁集团被禁止进行IPO之后，买入了大量阿里巴巴的股票。

“What are your current thoughts on China and whether the communist leaders will allow businesses with strong leadership to flourish in decades to come?”

“您目前对中国的看法是什么？共产党领导人是否会允许具有强大领导力的企业在未来几十年蓬勃发展？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that the Chinese government will allow businesses to flourish.

查理·芒格：我认为中国政府会允许企业蓬勃发展。

It was one of the most remarkable things that ever happened in the history of the world, when a bunch of committed communists just looked at the prosperity of places like Singapore and said the hell with this, we’re not going to stay here in poverty. We’re going to copy what works.

这是世界历史上最显著的事情之一，当一群坚定的共产主义者看到新加坡等地的繁荣时，便说：“去他的，我们不想留在贫困中。我们要复制有效的做法。”

And they changed communism. They just accepted Adam Smith and added it to their communism and said now we have communism with Chinese characteristics, which is China with a free market with a bunch of billionaires and so forth. And they made that shift. They deserve a lot of credit.

他们改变了共产主义。他们只是接受了亚当·斯密，并将其添加到他们的共产主义中，声称现在我们有了具有中国特色的共产主义，这就是一个拥有自由市场和一大堆亿万富翁的中国。他们做出了这样的转变，值得给予很多赞誉。

Warren and I are not quite as good at that as changing our minds, in many cases. (Laughs)

沃伦和我在这方面不如改变主意那么擅长，在很多情况下。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And that was a remarkable change coming from such a place. And, of course, it’s worked like gangbusters. That is enormous growth in the average income of the average Chinese.

查理·芒格：这真是一个来自如此地方的显著变化。当然，这一切都取得了巨大的成功。这是中国人均收入的巨大增长。

They’ve lifted 800 million people out of poverty. Fast. There was never anything like it in the history of the world.

他们使 8 亿人摆脱了贫困。速度很快。在世界历史上从未有过这样的事情。

So, my hat is off to the Chinese. And I think they will continue to allow people to make money. They learned it works.

所以，我向中国人致敬。我认为他们会继续允许人们赚钱。他们明白这有效。

The Chinese — I loved what the guy (Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping) said in the first place. “I don’t care whether the cat is black and white as long as it catches mice.” That’s my kind of talk.

中国人——我喜欢那位（中国领导人邓小平）最初所说的话。“我不在乎猫是黑色还是白色，只要它能抓到老鼠。”这就是我喜欢的说法。

WARREN BUFFETT: In that list of the 20 most valuable companies that just — three are Chinese.

沃伦·巴菲特：在那份最有价值的 20 家公司名单中——只有三家是中国公司。

Now if you’re looking out 30 years, you know, how many do you think will be Chinese? My guess is more.

现在如果你展望 30 年，你认为会有多少人是中国人？我的猜测是会更多。

But I don’t think it will top the United States. But who knows? It’s amazing what has been accomplished.

但我认为这不会超过美国。但谁知道呢？所取得的成就真是令人惊叹。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s really amazing.

查理·芒格：是的，这真的很惊人。

WARREN BUFFETT: And they found what works. I mean, there’s (laugh) nothing like finding something that works in order to, sort of, reinforce ideas over time. And we’ll see what happens.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们找到了有效的方法。我的意思是，（笑）没有什么比找到有效的方法更能随着时间的推移来巩固想法了。我们拭目以待。

But I would bet there will be more than three. But I will bet the United States has more than China has, too.

但我敢打赌会有超过三个。但我也敢打赌美国的数量会超过中国。

51. “We don’t know” if Biden’s $1.9T stimulus plan would cause inflation

“我们不知道”拜登的 1.9万亿美元刺激计划是否会导致通货膨胀

BECKY QUICK: This one comes from Tim Medley — (coughs) — Sorry — Tim Medley in Jackson, Mississippi, who’s been a Berkshire shareholder since 1987.

贝基·奎克：这条来自密西西比州杰克逊的蒂姆·梅德利——（咳嗽）——抱歉——他自 1987 年以来一直是伯克希尔的股东。

He writes, “On March 19th, respected economist Larry Summers, the former president of Harvard University and the former secretary of the treasury under President Obama, was critical of President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue stimulus plan.

他写道：“3 月 19 日，受人尊敬的经济学家拉里·萨默斯，哈佛大学前校长和奥巴马总统任内的前财政部长，批评了乔·拜登总统的 1.9 万亿美元美国救助刺激计划。”

“In an interview with Bloomberg television he said, ‘I am much more worried that we will have more inflation or that we will have a pretty dramatic fiscal monetary collision. This goes way beyond what is necessary.’ He said also, ‘This is the least responsible macroeconomic policy we’ve had in the last 40 years.’ Your thoughts?”

在接受彭博电视采访时，他表示：“我更担心我们会有更多的通货膨胀，或者我们会经历一次相当剧烈的财政货币冲突。这远远超出了必要的范围。”他还说：“这是我们过去 40 年来最不负责任的宏观经济政策。”你怎么看？

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re asking me on that? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：你在问我这个吗？（笑）

BECKY QUICK: He didn’t write to whom. So, I guess it’s anybody on the stage —

贝基·奎克：他没有写给谁。所以，我想这可以是舞台上的任何人——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would — I would say that Larry’s been reading his uncle’s book (laughs), which was Paul Samuelson.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想——我想说拉里一直在读他叔叔的书（笑），那是保罗·萨缪尔森的书。

But no, I think — Larry is a very, very, very smart fellow. And he’s laying out possibilities, which actually now have probably been voiced a little more even since that March 19th — whatever date it was — that he made that — it’s —

但不，我认为——拉里是一个非常非常聪明的人。他正在列出可能性，实际上自从 3 月 19 日——无论是什么日期——他提出的那些可能性，现在可能已经被更多地表达出来了。

You can’t just do one thing in economics.

在经济学中，你不能只做一件事。

And if we really could shovel out more and more debt, and the carrying cost turned out to be something very low —

如果我们真的能够不断增加债务，而持有成本却非常低——

People thought Japan couldn’t do what they’ve done. But they — you know — they — it used to be called the widow-maker around Salomon (Brothers). And people were shorting Japanese bonds, but —

人们认为日本做不到他们所做的事情。但他们——你知道——他们——以前在所罗门（兄弟）周围被称为“寡妇制造者”。人们在做空日本债券，但——

The answer is, we don’t know, but Larry’s view is an important view. And it’s just as good as — in my — probably — the view on the other side might be.

答案是，我们不知道，但拉里的观点是一个重要的观点。这和——在我看来——另一方的观点可能一样好。

We don’t know what happens from the present policies.

我们不知道目前的政策会导致什么。

We do know, as (Federal Reserve Chair) Jay Powell said the other day, the idea that a hundred percent of GDP was some terribly dangerous level for — in terms of debt — that doesn’t really make a whole lot of sense now, and that used to be, kind of, accepted wisdom.

我们知道，正如（美联储主席）杰伊·鲍威尔前几天所说，认为 GDP 的百分之百是一个非常危险的债务水平，这种想法现在并没有太多意义，而这曾经被视为一种公认的智慧。

We’ve learned that a lot of things we thought before weren’t true. But what we haven’t learned yet (laughs) is whether what we’re doing now is true.

我们已经了解到很多我们之前认为的事情并不真实。但我们还没有学到的（哈哈）是我们现在所做的事情是否真实。

And the best thing to do is recognize you don’t know and proceed in a way where you get a decent result no matter what happens. And that’s what we try and do at Berkshire Hathaway.

最好的做法是承认你不知道，并以一种无论发生什么都能获得不错结果的方式进行。这就是我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦所尝试做的。

We do not think we can make money by making macroeconomic predictions. We do think we can — we do think we can pretty darn — be pretty darn sure we’ll get a reasonable result under policies that will not maximize result, if we could do that sort of thing.

我们认为通过宏观经济预测来赚钱是不可能的。我们确实认为——我们确实认为——在不会最大化结果的政策下，我们可以相当确定地获得合理的结果，如果我们能做到那种事情的话。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not at all clear whether Larry is right or wrong.

查理·芒格：拉里是否正确并不清楚。

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s a smart man, though.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过他是个聪明人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He is a smart man. And it’s courageous of him to be raising it, too. He’s practically the only one talking that way, which I admire, by the way.

查理·芒格：他是个聪明人。提出这个问题也很勇敢。他几乎是唯一一个这样说的人，我对此很钦佩。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It guarantees he won’t get a position in the administration. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这保证了他不会在政府中获得职位。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Well, that’s one of the reasons I admire him.

查理·芒格：是的。这就是我钦佩他的原因之一。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Not that there’s anything wrong with having a position in the administration, but I think people who kind of tell it the way they think it is, I like it.

查理·芒格：在政府中有一个职位并没有什么错，但我喜欢那些直言不讳、如实表达自己想法的人。

52. “I like banks generally” but we “didn’t want as much in banks as we had”

“我一般喜欢银行”，但我们“并不想在银行里存那么多钱。”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes — it circles back to banking, which you touched on earlier.

贝基·奎克：这个问题回到了银行业，您之前提到过。

But Jerome Bonnard from Switzerland writes, “Could you please explain why you decided to exit most of your bank stocks in 2020 except for Bank of America? And what’s your view on the future of the banking industry?”

但来自瑞士的杰罗姆·博纳尔写道：“您能否解释一下为什么您决定在 2020 年退出大部分银行股票，除了美国银行？您对银行业的未来有什么看法？”

WARREN BUFFETT: I like banks generally, I just didn’t like the proportion we had in it, compared to the possible risk if we got bad results that did not — so far, we haven’t gotten. So, I just — and I —

沃伦·巴菲特：我一般喜欢银行，只是我不喜欢我们在其中的比例，相比于如果我们得到不好的结果可能带来的风险——到目前为止，我们还没有遇到这种情况。所以，我只是——我——

We were over 10% of Bank of America. It’s a real pain in the neck, both to the bank —more to the banks than to us, if we go over 10%, there’s just a whole lot of —

我们超过了美国银行的 10%。这对银行来说真是个麻烦——对银行来说比对我们更麻烦，如果我们超过 10%，那就会有很多——

And, I like the Bank of America. I mean — and I like (CEO) Brian Moynihan very much.

我喜欢美国银行。我是说——我非常喜欢（首席执行官）布莱恩·莫伊尼汉。

And I like the banking business fine, so we took that up, but we took the overall bank position down. We didn’t want to go above 10 in any of the others. And we didn’t want to increase the BofA position, but we, overall, didn’t want as much in banks as we had.

我对银行业务很满意，所以我们继续投资，但我们降低了整体银行的持仓。我们不想在其他任何银行的持仓超过 10%。同时，我们也不想增加美国银行的持仓，但总体上，我们不想在银行的投资比之前多。

We like — the banking business is way better than it was, in the United States, than 10 or 15 years ago.

我们喜欢——美国的银行业务比 10 或 15 年前好得多。

The banking business around the world, in various places, might worry me.

全球各地的银行业务可能让我感到担忧。

But we — our banks are in far, far better shape than 10 or 15 years ago.

但我们——我们的银行状况比 10 或 15 年前好得多。

But when things froze for a short period of time, the biggest thing the banks had (laughs) going for them is that the Federal Reserve was behind them. And Federal Reserve is not — they’re not behind Berkshire. It’s up to us to take care of ourselves.

但是当事情短暂冻结时，银行最大的优势（哈哈）就是有联邦储备在支持他们。而联邦储备并不支持伯克希尔。我们必须自己照顾自己。

53. Buffett declines to explain his thinking on purchase of Verizon stock

巴菲特拒绝解释他购买Verizon股票的想法

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Matt in Los Angeles.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自洛杉矶的马特。

“You recently purchased a large stake in Verizon. For educational purposes, could you please explain your thinking behind this investment? In general, many people see telecoms as dumb pipes that have to spend heavily on CapEx, building out the 5G infrastructure, only for the other tech companies to take advantage and capture most of the value created from the infrastructure, like Facebook, Uber, Airbnb, and DoorDash.”

“您最近在 Verizon 购买了大量股份。出于教育目的，您能否解释一下您对这项投资的思考？一般来说，许多人将电信视为愚蠢的管道，必须在资本支出上投入大量资金，建设 5G 基础设施，结果却让其他科技公司利用并捕获大部分由基础设施创造的价值，比如 Facebook、Uber、Airbnb 和 DoorDash。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think he’s analyzed the situation well.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为他分析得很好。

But we are not in a — in the business of explaining (laugh) why we own a stock, which we either might buy more of, or sell, or who knows what. So, he’s on his own. But he sounds like he’s very capable of thinking it through very well himself. (Laughs)

但我们并不在——解释（笑）我们为什么拥有一只股票的业务中，我们可能会买更多，或者卖掉，或者谁知道呢。所以，他得自己想办法。但听起来他非常有能力自己好好思考这个问题。（笑）

54. We don’t spend time thinking about what happens if laws change

我们不花时间考虑如果法律改变会发生什么。

BECKY QUICK: Slaven Vukobrat writes in, “Senator Josh Hawley (R-Missouri) recently unveiled a new antitrust proposal that would ban mergers and acquisitions by firms with a market capitalization over a hundred billion dollars.

贝基·奎克：斯拉文·武科布拉特写道：“参议员乔希·霍利（R-密苏里州）最近公布了一项新的反垄断提案，禁止市值超过一千亿美元的公司进行合并和收购。”

“While this legislation is unlikely to go through, increasing antitrust regulation could represent a material risk for Berkshire.

虽然这项立法不太可能通过，但日益增加的反垄断监管可能对伯克希尔构成实质性风险。

“Has Berkshire’s board already discussed what would happen to the company over the long term if Berkshire was to be prevented from acquiring controlled businesses?”

“伯克希尔的董事会是否已经讨论过如果伯克希尔被阻止收购控股企业，公司在长期内会发生什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t discuss that as a specific. But the board is very, very, very familiar with what Berkshire does — why they do it — you know, how we think in deploying capital. Buy we could — you know —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们不具体讨论这个。但董事会非常非常非常熟悉伯克希尔所做的事情——为什么这样做——你知道，我们在部署资本时的思考方式。我们可以——你知道——

Everybody knows that if you change the antitrust laws, it can change things for Berkshire. If they change the tax laws, it can change things for Berkshire. You know, there’s a lot of things, and — we can spend hours discussing them.

大家都知道，如果你改变反垄断法，可能会改变伯克希尔的情况。如果他们改变税法，也可能会改变伯克希尔的情况。你知道，有很多事情，我们可以花几个小时来讨论它们。

But in the end, you know, is it a 22.3% risk that, you know, something changes? (Laughs)

但最终，你知道，这是否是 22.3%的风险，某些事情会发生变化？（笑）

It’s a good way to fill the time at board meetings, and if you’re getting three or four hundred thousand dollars a year as a board director, you might want to spend your time doing that. But we really don’t focus on that.

在董事会会议上，这是一个很好地填充时间的方法，如果你作为董事每年赚取三四十万美元，你可能会想花时间做这个。但我们真的不专注于此。

The main thing about Berkshire is how they preserve the culture, how they make sure that if you get the wrong person as the CEO, you can do something about it. That’s the biggest risk a board has is if you pick the wrong CEO.

伯克希尔的主要特点是他们如何保护文化，以及如何确保如果你选错了首席执行官，你可以采取措施。这是董事会面临的最大风险，就是如果你选错了首席执行官。

And I’ve been on 20 boards and it’s happened more than once. And sometimes it’s a terrible problem to get rid of them. You know, years go by and, you know —

我曾在 20 个董事会任职，这种情况发生过不止一次。有时候，摆脱他们是个可怕的问题。你知道，岁月流逝，嗯——

If a dissident comes in, it’s one thing, but if you just sit there and you collect your three or four hundred thousand a year and the chief executive keeps proposing you get increases (laughs) from time to time —

如果一个持不同政见者进来，那是一回事，但如果你就坐在那里，每年收三四十万，而首席执行官不时提议给你加薪（笑）——

And it’s worse yet if he’s a nice person, you know, doing his best. (Laughs)

如果他是个好人，尽力而为，那就更糟了，你知道吗？（笑）

It’s — but — we’re not going to spend a lot of time — we may do it on a personal basis, but we’re not going to take a lot of people and —

这——但是——我们不会花很多时间——我们可能会以个人的方式来做，但我们不会带很多人去——

We want them to know more about what’s going on with BNSF and how (CEO) Katie’s (Farmer) doing and whether the KCS (Kansas City Southern railroad acquisition contest) thing can injure us in any material way and so on.

我们希望他们更多地了解 BNSF 的情况，以及（首席执行官）凯蒂（法默）的情况，以及 KCS（堪萨斯城南方铁路收购竞赛）是否会以任何实质性方式对我们造成伤害等等。

And we really don’t, except maybe on a private side, we don’t start talking about, you know, what the effects will be in 2050 if this projection or that projection is met. Charlie?

我们确实没有，除了可能在私下里，我们不开始讨论，如果这个预测或那个预测实现，2050 年的影响会是什么。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有什么好补充的。

55. Less demand for Berkshire’s ability to quickly insure enormous risks

对伯克希尔快速承保巨大风险的需求减少。

BECKY QUICK: This question was sent in by Don Graham during the meeting, based on something you said earlier today. And he says, “Why does Warren say Berkshire’s ability to insure enormous risk quickly is a less valuable asset than it used to be?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题是唐·格雷厄姆在会议期间根据你今天早些时候说的内容提出来的。他说：“为什么沃伦说伯克希尔迅速承保巨大风险的能力比以前不那么有价值了？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, because the demand is less, I mean, basically on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，因为需求减少，基本上就是这样。

If you take a period like happened after 9/11, I remember — I may be wrong on the details a little on this — but Cathay Pacific, for example, they couldn’t land in Hong Kong, as I remember, unless they had an insurance policy by Monday of the following week.

如果你考虑像 911 事件后那样的时期，我记得——我可能在细节上有些错误——但例如国泰航空，他们不能在香港降落，按照我的记忆，除非他们在下周一之前有保险单。

Well, we can do it. I mean, Ajit (Jain) calls me up and he thinks of a price and I think of a price. (Laughs) And then —

好吧，我们可以做到。我是说，Ajit（Jain）给我打电话，他想了一个价格，我也想了一个价格。（笑）然后——

But we can do it. We can take the loss if it happens.

但我们可以做到。如果发生损失，我们可以承受。

They called us on the Sears Tower, I think, back — then after the, you know — nobody knew —

他们在Sears Tower给我们打电话，我想，那时在——然后在你知道的之后——没有人知道——

They didn’t know whether, you know, bombs might be placed all over.

他们不知道，您知道，炸弹可能会到处放置。

And they wanted more insurance all of a sudden. And we gave them a price, and —

他们突然想要更多的保险。我们给了他们一个价格，然后——

So, that thing — that sort of an environment hasn’t really persisted. I mean, there were times, I think — perhaps AIG, when Hank Greenberg was there, he would do the same thing.

所以，那种环境并没有真正持续下去。我的意思是，我认为曾经有过这样的时刻——也许在 AIG，汉克·格林伯格在的时候，他也会这样做。

But there weren’t — 10 or 20 people — and they needed big limits, in some cases. And we were good for it. And they knew that if they bought insurance and it happened that we’d write a check and it would clear. (Laughs)

但并没有——10 或 20 个人——他们在某些情况下需要大额度的限制。我们对此很有信心。他们知道如果他们购买保险，而发生了事情，我们会开支票并且支票会兑现。（笑）

Ajit, you might have some —

阿吉特，你可能有一些——

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. In addition to the demand side, the supply side has become a lot more competitive as well. There are a lot of people who can put up big limits — not as much as we do — but they can syndicate a program and put up a billion dollar very easily.

阿吉特·贾因：是的。除了需求方面，供应方面的竞争也变得更加激烈。很多人可以提供大额的资金——虽然没有我们那么多——但他们可以联合起来轻松筹集到十亿美元。

So that competitive advantage we had, we still have, but it’s no longer as big a deal as it used to be.

我们曾经拥有的竞争优势，现在仍然存在，但已经不再像以前那样重要了。

56. Abel: “Pleased” with Kraft Heinz CEO

阿贝尔：“对卡夫亨氏首席执行官感到满意”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a shareholder in Scotland who wants to know Warren, Charlie, and Greg’s views on how Kraft Heinz has performed over the last 12 months compared to the disappointing performance pre-COVID. And what are your current and longer-term views on Kraft Heinz’ prospects?

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自一位来自苏格兰的股东，他想知道沃伦、查理和格雷格对卡夫亨氏在过去 12 个月的表现与疫情前令人失望的表现相比的看法。你们对卡夫亨氏的当前和长期前景有什么看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that Greg’s on the board. So, he — (laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为格雷格在董事会中。所以，他——（笑）

I don’t know that we’re in a position to give advice on Kraft Heinz. You know, we entered a, in effect, a semi-formal partnership with 3G many years ago when it was just the Heinz deal, and then went on to acquire Kraft with our partners.

我不知道我们是否有能力对卡夫亨氏提供建议。你知道，多年前我们与 3G 建立了一个实际上是半正式的合作关系，当时只是亨氏的交易，然后与我们的合作伙伴一起收购了卡夫。

And they’ve done more than — they hold up their share of things, you know. And we do what we said we’d do going in, which is to be a financial partner. And they’re more of the operating partner, or we participate, to a degree, in any big decisions, and that they would listen to us.

他们不仅仅是这样——他们承担了他们应有的责任，你知道的。我们也履行了我们最初的承诺，成为一个财务合作伙伴。他们更多的是运营合作伙伴，或者在任何重大决策中，我们在一定程度上参与，他们会倾听我们的意见。

But we’re not making any — in terms of Kraft Heinz stock — that’s up to somebody else to evaluate.

但我们不做任何——就卡夫亨氏的股票而言——这要由其他人来评估。

GREG ABEL: Yeah. The only thing I would add, Warren, is I think we’re very comfortable with the fact that they put a strong manager in place in (CEO) Miguel (Patricio). And he’s put a very good team in place at Kraft Heinz. So, we’re pleased with the leadership and management team in place.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。我想补充一点，沃伦，我们对他们任命了强有力的管理者（首席执行官）米格尔·帕特里西奥感到非常满意。他在卡夫亨氏组建了一支非常优秀的团队。因此，我们对现有的领导和管理团队感到满意。

They’re very focused on how they’re executing as they’ve gone forward and rationalizing their capital structure and managing down their debt structure. So, very pleased with the path forward with the existing team —

他们非常专注于如何执行，因为他们在前进的过程中理顺了资本结构并降低了债务结构。因此，对现有团队的前进方向感到非常满意——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we feel better about the —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们对——感到更好

57. Danger of the “myths” CEOs create about their companies

首席执行官们为他们的公司创造的“神话”的危险

WARREN BUFFETT: One of the — this is a more general subject, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个更一般的话题，但——

One of the subjects— I might even write about it in one of the future annual reports — is the problems caused by the myths that people have about their own organization.

其中一个主题——我甚至可能在未来的年度报告中写到——是人们对自己组织的神话所造成的问题。

And I’ve seen that so many times in various forms. And to some extent, the problem has become accentuated in the last 20 or 30 years because the CEO often — and works with the investor relations (unintelligible) — and they say well, we have to have constant contact with the analyst community.

我在各种形式中见过很多次。某种程度上，这个问题在过去 20 或 30 年中变得更加突出，因为首席执行官通常——并与投资者关系（听不清）合作——他们说，我们必须与分析师社区保持持续联系。

And of course — so they go on every couple of months, and they repeat certain things about their company, and it becomes part of, sort of, the catechism.

当然，他们每隔几个月就会这样做，重复一些关于他们公司的事情，这就成了某种教义的一部分。

And nobody’s going to go on two months after the CEO has said one thing and say, well, actually that really isn’t the way. (Laughs)

而在首席执行官说了一件事后，两个月内没有人会说，实际上并不是那样的。（笑）

They’re not going to contradict themselves or change course.

他们不会自相矛盾或改变方向。

And so, if you get these myths — and they can occur in a lot of different ways. I could give a lot of examples, which I won’t do. As I tell my friends in corporate America, I’m really not going to squeal on them. (Laughs)

所以，如果你理解这些神话——它们可以以很多不同的方式出现。我可以给出很多例子，但我不会这样做。正如我告诉我在美国企业的朋友们，我真的不会揭发他们。（笑）

But there’s a lot of mythology that gets handed down from one CEO to the next. Can the succeeding CEO say the guy that picked him, you know, was on the wrong course, or, he’s been telling us something that isn’t really quite true. He can’t do it. You know, and then he starts repeating it.

但有很多神话是从一个首席执行官传递到下一个首席执行官的。接任的首席执行官能否说挑选他的人走错了方向，或者他一直在告诉我们一些并不完全真实的事情。他不能这样做。然后他就开始重复这些话。

And it leads to enormous errors. But it’s hard to tell the story without giving examples, and I don’t like to give examples. (Laughs)

这会导致巨大的错误。但很难在不举例的情况下讲述这个故事，而我不喜欢举例。（笑）

So, we’ll see when I write about it sometime.

所以，我们会看看我什么时候写关于它的事情。

Charlie, you’ve probably got some thoughts. We’ve —

查理，你可能有一些想法。我们——

He’s been – he’s had a ringside seat at a lot of — he’s been on boards that I haven’t been on, I mean. And it doesn’t just extend to business. It goes beyond that into education, into — well, a lot of areas.

他一直在很多事情上都有近距离观察——他参与了我没有参与的董事会。我是说，这不仅仅局限于商业。它还扩展到教育，以及——很多领域。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What’s really interesting, is the way you prattle out all the time, you’re pounding back in even if it’s wrong.

查理·芒格：真正有趣的是，你总是喋喋不休地说话，即使是错的，你也在不断地反驳。

And so, one of my favorite remarks in the history of human remarks was by Sir Cedrick Hardwicke who was a great British actor. And he said, “I have been a great actor for so long, that I no longer know what I truly think on any subject.” And I think that happens to a lot of people. And it happens to virtually every politician.

因此，我最喜欢的人类言论历史上的一句话是由伟大的英国演员塞德里克·哈德威克爵士所说。他说：“我已经是一位伟大的演员很久了，以至于我不再知道自己对任何主题的真实想法。”我认为这发生在很多人身上，几乎每位政治家都会经历这种情况。

WARREN BUFFETT: And it gets embedded in corporate —

沃伦·巴菲特：这就嵌入了企业——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Gets embedded and so on —

查理·芒格：被嵌入等等——

WARREN BUFFETT: And the trouble is now, the CEOs speak out so often. So, if they’ve got some crazy thing that they’re saying about their company and they keep repeating it, the subordinates aren’t going to contradict it. The — and as Charlie just said, they just believe it after a while. And it’s dangerous.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在的问题是，首席执行官们发言太频繁了。如果他们对自己的公司说了一些疯狂的话并不断重复，下属是不会反驳的。正如查理刚才所说，他们最终会相信这些话。这是危险的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. And of course, the young people get these ideas after their liberal educations and think that God has given them direct insights. And they’re just as crazy as the politicians.

查理·芒格：是的。当然，年轻人在接受了自由教育后会产生这些想法，认为上帝赋予了他们直接的洞察力。他们和那些政治家一样疯狂。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s some old people that have them, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，有些老年人也有这些。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，嗯——（笑声）

But the old people are already crazy. But —

但老人们已经疯了。但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: They’re going to die sooner, so —

沃伦·巴菲特：他们会更早死去，所以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have our old insanities. The new insanities, the young get. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们有我们旧的疯狂。年轻人会得到新的疯狂。（笑声）

58. Why Berkshire’s Haven joint venture lost against the “tapeworm” of health care costs

为什么伯克希尔的Haven合资企业在医疗成本的“寄生虫”面前失败

BECKY QUICK: All right, this question comes from Bill Begley, who said, “Could you tell us what happened to the (Haven) joint venture between Berkshire, JPMorgan, and Amazon to investigate what could be done about the current state of medical health care in the United States? The only item I read was that it was disbanded. Do you have any lessons to be learned from your effort?”

贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自比尔·贝格利，他说：“你能告诉我们伯克希尔、摩根大通和亚马逊之间的（Haven）合资企业发生了什么吗？这个合资企业是为了调查美国当前医疗保健状况可以做些什么。我只读到的消息是它被解散了。你们从这次努力中有什么教训可以总结吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we learned a lot about the difficulty of changing around an industry (laughs) that’s 17% of GDP. And we’re — we leaned —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们了解到改变一个占 GDP 17%的行业是多么困难（笑）。我们——我们倾向于——

We accomplished a lesser objective, which was probably more important to us, even, than either JPMorgan or to Amazon, because we knew less about our own system than they did.

我们完成了一个较小的目标，这对我们来说可能甚至比摩根大通或亚马逊更重要，因为我们对自己的系统了解得比他们少。

They knew — they’re a more centralized operation. So, we got some benefits in the sense that we looked at 60 or 70 different operations we had presently.

他们知道——他们是一个更集中化的运作。因此，我们在某种意义上获得了一些好处，因为我们审视了目前的 60 或 70 个不同的运作。

And that’s one case where a certain amount of centralization, at least in certain aspects of it, can save real money. I mean, we found inefficiencies. And like I say, we probably saved more than the other two partners because they knew their situation better. We found some dumb things we were doing.

这就是一个在某些方面进行一定程度集中化可以节省实际资金的案例。我的意思是，我们发现了低效的地方。正如我所说，我们可能节省的比其他两个合作伙伴更多，因为他们对自己的情况了解得更好。我们发现了一些愚蠢的做法。

So, we got our money’s worth. But in terms of the big picture of changing something that so many people have a vested interest in doing — and there’s one additional factor to it, which is really interesting.

所以，我们得到了物有所值。但从改变许多人都有既得利益的事情的大局来看——还有一个额外的因素，这真的很有趣。

There’s an ingenious aspect to it that goes back to a fellow named — which didn’t have any direct connection — but Beardsley Ruml.

这其中有一个巧妙的方面，可以追溯到一个名叫——的家伙——虽然没有任何直接的联系——但比尔兹利·鲁姆尔。

And nobody’s ever heard of Beardsley Ruml, but Beardsley Ruml, in 1941, came up with the idea of the withholding tax.

而没有人听说过比尔兹利·鲁姆尔，但比尔兹利·鲁姆尔在 1941 年提出了预扣税的想法。

So, people instead of April 15th having to write a check and thinking how much they hated their politicians, and hated the government and everything else, they actually looked at it as kind of a Christmas club, and there were overpayments involved, and they actually got a check when the final payment came due.

所以，人们不再在 4 月 15 日写支票，想着他们有多讨厌自己的政治家，讨厌政府和其他一切，而是把这看作一种圣诞俱乐部，涉及到超额付款，最终付款到期时他们实际上收到了支票。

So, when you aren’t writing the check yourself, you know — you may know that the health benefit from your company is worth $10,000 a year to you or 15,000, and may cost them that much, but — it may cost the company that much — but you don’t see it. So, the company pays it.

所以，当你自己没有写支票时，你知道——你可能知道你公司提供的健康福利对你来说价值每年 10,000 美元或 15,000 美元，并且可能花费公司那么多，但——公司确实花费了那么多——但你看不到。所以，公司支付了这笔费用。

And most of the people in that waiting room sitting next to me when — they are not sitting there thinking about whether I can afford to do this, you know, or what’s this going to do? They’re generally under some kind of a plan — not always, obviously.

在那个等候室里，坐在我旁边的大多数人——他们并不是在想我是否能负担得起这个，或者这会有什么影响。他们通常是在某种计划下——当然，并不总是如此。

But they don’t think that if the company wasn’t paying them that, they could pay them that in additional compensation. But of course, the weird system is the company gets a deduction if they pay it. But if you pay it yourself on a policy, I don’t believe you get a deduction.

但他们并不认为如果公司不支付他们这些，他们可以通过额外补偿来支付。但当然，奇怪的制度是如果公司支付了，就可以扣除。但如果你自己在保单上支付，我不相信你能得到扣除。

So, it’s something that most of the people are not seeing as a cost to them. And they like that pretty well.

所以，这对大多数人来说并不是他们所看到的成本。他们对此相当满意。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No kidding. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不是开玩笑。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, but that’s true of the federal income tax. I mean, it was an act of genius, from the standpoint of the government, to go to a withholding system.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不过，这对联邦所得税也是如此。我的意思是，从政府的角度来看，采用预扣税制是一项天才之举。

And if you didn’t, just think of how many people on April 15th would have to sit down and write a pretty good-sized check. And they’d be mad. (Laughs)

如果你没有这样做，想想在 4 月 15 日有多少人得坐下来写一张相当大的支票。他们会很生气。（笑）

They wouldn’t like it, and they don’t feel it now.

他们不会喜欢这样，现在也没有这种感觉。

So, we were up — you know, that’s an obvious point. But you also — people like their doctor, in general. And they don’t like the fact that it’s 17% of GDP. But one is just kind of a, you know, amorphous sort of thing. And the other is very, very real to them.

所以，我们的确在上升——你知道，这是一个显而易见的观点。但你也知道，人们通常喜欢他们的医生。他们不喜欢医疗占 GDP 的 17%。但一个只是有点模糊的东西，而另一个对他们来说是非常真实的。

And the most prestigious people in the community are on the hospital boards. And, you know, a lot of people that — are fairly happy with the system.

社区中最有声望的人都在医院董事会中。而且，你知道，很多人对这个系统相当满意。

So, we did not make inroads on that. And we are paying 17% of GDP for health care. And no major country is more than 11%.

所以，我们在这方面没有取得进展。我们为医疗保健支付的费用占 GDP 的 17%。而没有哪个主要国家超过 11%。

And in the pandemic, you know, we’ve had a death rate — or a death total — as a percentage of population — that’s way higher than the rest of the world. Not every single country, but way higher, so it —

在疫情期间，我们的死亡率——或死亡总数——占人口的百分比，远高于世界其他地方。并不是每个国家，但确实高得多，所以这——

You know, we’ve laid out more money and gotten a poorer result, in terms of this particular pandemic, in terms of deaths per capita. Now, that may not turn out to be the —

你知道，我们投入了更多的钱，却在这场特定的疫情中得到了更差的结果，按人均死亡人数来看。现在，这可能并不会成为——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, Warren, even though you shot at and missed, you were at least shooting at an elephant.

查理·芒格：哦，沃伦，尽管你瞄准了却没有打中，但至少你是在瞄准一头大象。

The cost of health care in Singapore is 20% of what it is in the United States. And their medical system works better.

新加坡的医疗费用仅为美国的 20%。而且他们的医疗系统运作得更好。

So, you were shooting at a huge elephant. But as you found out, it’s very hard to — people get very enthusiastic about losing part of their income.

所以，你在射击一头巨大的大象。但正如你所发现的，这非常困难——人们对失去部分收入非常热衷。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah. No, I said we were fighting a tapeworm —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。我是说我们在与寄生虫作斗争——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You were —

查理·芒格：是的。你是——

WARREN BUFFETT: — in the American economy and the tapeworm won. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：——在美国经济中，寄生虫赢了。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the tapeworm — the tapeworm —

查理·芒格：是的，绦虫——绦虫——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s exact — good, wonderful phrase, the tapeworm —

查理·芒格：正是如此——好极了，精彩的短语，绦虫——

I’ll have to copy that.

我得复制那个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it wasn’t a phrase we were looking — but — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这不是我们在寻找的短语——但是——（笑声）

59. Munger unintentionally reveals Greg Abel designated to eventually replace Buffett as CEO

芒格无意中透露格雷格·阿贝尔被指定为最终接替巴菲特担任首席执行官。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes in from Mark Blakley in Tulsa.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自塔尔萨的马克·布莱克利。

“This is for Warren and Charlie. When we discuss Berkshire, we often focus on the insurance operations and the largest non-insurance businesses, the “Redwoods,” as you mentioned in 2019.

“这是给沃伦和查理的。当我们讨论伯克希尔时，我们常常关注保险业务和最大的非保险业务，即你在 2019 年提到的‘Redwoods’。”

“However, Berkshire owns a large number of subsidiary businesses, most of which are never mentioned. Is there a point at which Berkshire becomes too large to manage? And should we have any concern over the lack of information for most of Berkshire’s companies? Is there a time that could come when Berkshire’s too large and complex?”

然而，伯克希尔拥有大量子公司，其中大多数从未被提及。伯克希尔是否有一个管理上过于庞大的界限？我们是否应该对伯克希尔大多数公司的信息缺乏表示担忧？是否会有一个时刻，伯克希尔变得过于庞大和复杂？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s too large to do certain things, that’s for sure. I mean, you know, it’s not — we can’t spend our time looking for a hundred million-dollar acquisitions, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这太大了，无法做某些事情，这一点是肯定的。我的意思是，你知道，我们不能花时间寻找一亿美元的收购，但——

We have a couple — a wonderful company (TTI) in Fort Worth. And we had a marvelous man running it (Paul Andrews), and he died recently. But he ran it — he sold it to me 15 years ago, and he just basically ran it, you know. And I couldn’t find my way to the company.

我们有一对——一家位于沃斯堡的优秀公司（TTI）。我们有一位出色的负责人（保罗·安德鲁斯），他最近去世了。但他一直在管理这家公司——15 年前他把公司卖给了我，他基本上就是在管理它，你知道的。我找不到进入公司的方法。

We’ve got this terrific company that makes recreational vehicles (Forest River), the Elkhart — based in Elkhart, Indiana. And we bought it 15 years ago. I’ve never been there, you know. Maybe there’s some guy in a closet just making up numbers to send to me every month.

我们有一家很棒的公司，生产休闲车辆（Forest River），位于印第安纳州的埃尔克哈特。我们在 15 年前收购了它。我从来没有去过那里，你知道吗。也许有个家伙在一个小房间里，每个月给我编一些数字。

But I feel I understand the business pretty well. But I’ve never seen it. And the fellow that runs it (Peter Liegl) likes running it. And he likes me keeping my nose out of it. And he’ll let Greg (Abel) in a little more than he’ll let me because — (laughs)

但我觉得我对这个业务了解得很好。但我从未见过它。经营这个业务的人（彼得·利格尔）喜欢经营它。他也喜欢我不插手。他会让格雷格（阿贝尔）比让我参与得多，因为——（笑）

But it’s — we’ve got a system that will work with wonderful businesses and wonderful managers.

但我们有一个系统，可以与优秀的企业和优秀的管理者合作。

And it’s up to us to find them. But it’s also (up to) us to nurture them when we find them. And if you get somebody like Paul Andrews, who ran TTI, and who built it from nothing, absolutely nothing, and nobody ever heard of him, and the earnings have octupled during the period that he ran it for us.

这要靠我们去发现他们。但当我们发现他们时，也要靠我们去培养他们。如果你遇到像保罗·安德鲁斯这样的人，他曾经营 TTI，并从零开始建立了它，绝对是从一无所有开始的，没人听说过他，而在他为我们经营的期间，收益增长了八倍。

And he was happy. The employees were happy. He was a wonderful man. We were happy. And I would call him at the end of the year, and I’d say, Paul, you know, this place is — you’re shooting the lights out and everything, and you should take a raise — and he said — or bonus — he’s say, “Well, we’ll talk about that next year, Warren.”

他很快乐。员工们也很快乐。他是个了不起的人。我们很快乐。年末我会给他打电话，我会说，保罗，你知道，这个地方——你表现得非常出色，应该加薪——他会说——或者奖金——他说：“嗯，我们明年再谈这个，沃伦。”

I mean, he just loved — he loved the business. I love Berkshire. He loved the business. And I wasn’t going to add anything by having him fill out a bunch of reports about (laughs) how much he’s using in the way of carbon or anything.

我意思是，他就是热爱——他热爱这个行业。我爱伯克希尔。他热爱这个行业。我不打算让他填写一堆关于（大笑）他在碳方面使用多少的报告来增加什么。

You know, it’s just — it’s ridiculous to think of a guy like Paul Andrews behaving in an antisocial manner (laughs) or anything of the sort.

你知道，想象一个像保罗·安德鲁斯这样的人表现出反社会行为（笑）或类似的事情，真是太荒谬了。

And we’d love to have more of those. And obviously, if we get bigger, they get harder to buy.

我们希望能有更多这样的机会。显然，如果我们变得更大，它们就更难购买。

But we’ve got a number in the place. And I don’t think we’ve bought our last one, over time. But I certainly don’t see anything in the near future at all.

但我们在这个地方有一个数字。我认为我们还没有买到最后一个，随着时间的推移。但我确实看不到近期内有任何变化。

But we’re intensifying our interest a little bit in the ones we have by repurchasing shares. So, our shareholders own more of those companies every year while we’re — assuming we’re repurchasing shares, which is price-sensitive.

但我们通过回购股票对我们拥有的公司加大了一些兴趣。因此，假设我们在回购股票（这对价格敏感），我们的股东每年拥有这些公司的股份会更多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t think we’re getting too big to manage, because we’re different from practically every other big corporation in the United States, in that we are so excessively decentralized.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为我们并没有变得太大而无法管理，因为我们与美国几乎所有其他大型公司不同，我们是如此高度去中心化。

We have decentralized so much, and we have so much authority in the subsidiaries, that we can keep doing it for a long, long time, as long as it keeps working.

我们已经去中心化了很多，并且在子公司中拥有如此多的权力，只要它继续有效，我们就可以这样做很长很长时间。

And I would say, so far, that our decentralization has caused more benefits than defects. But nobody seems to copy us.

我想说，到目前为止，我们的去中心化带来的好处超过了缺陷。但似乎没有人愿意模仿我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, but that’s absolutely true. But I would say this. Decentralization won’t work (laughs) unless you have the right kind of culture accompanying it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这绝对是正确的。但我想说的是，去中心化不会奏效（笑），除非你有合适的文化来伴随它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but we do.

查理·芒格：是的，但我们确实这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we do. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有。但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But Greg is —

查理·芒格：但是格雷格是——

WARREN BUFFETT: — and it’s dependent on it. I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：——这取决于它。我的意思是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And Greg will — and Greg will keep the culture.

查理·芒格：格雷格会——格雷格会保持文化。

WARREN BUFFETT: If we’d had the — if we had a culture of people who were trying to make a lot of money for themselves in the next five years at the top, it would not have worked.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们有一种文化，顶层的人在接下来的五年里试图为自己赚很多钱，那是行不通的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, of course not. And the culture is part of it. But assuming we keep the culture, it can go on quite a ways.

查理·芒格：不，当然不是。而文化是其中的一部分。但假设我们保持这种文化，它可以持续很长一段时间。

WARREN BUFFETT: For a long, long time.

沃伦·巴菲特：很长很长一段时间。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Long, long time. I think it may amaze everybody. And by the way —

查理·芒格：很久很久以前。我想这可能会让大家感到惊讶。顺便说一下——

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie (unintelligible) —

沃伦·巴菲特：查理（听不清）——

CHARLIE MUNGER: —the Roman Empire worked as long as it did because it was so decentralized.

查理·芒格：——罗马帝国之所以能够持续这么久，是因为它非常分散。

WARREN BUFFETT: As Charlie says to me, you won’t know. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：正如查理对我说的，你不会知道。（笑）

60. “You really got to be in love with your business”

“你真的必须热爱你的事业”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Kevin Young. It’s for Ajit and Greg.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自凯文·杨。是问阿吉特和格雷格的。

“Warren spends his days reading, and his literature of choice is annual reports. How do each of you spend your days? What do you read? And how do you review investment decisions?”

“沃伦每天都在阅读，他选择的文学作品是年度报告。你们每个人是如何度过你们的日子的？你们读什么？你们如何审查投资决策？”

AJIT JAIN: Well, in my job, I spend a lot of my time reading deals that people — brokers and people — send us, reading what they’re proposing, trying to analyze them, and having a point of view, whether it is something that is of interest to us or not.

阿吉特·贾因：在我的工作中，我花很多时间阅读人们——经纪人和其他人——发送给我们的交易，阅读他们的提议，尝试分析它们，并形成一个观点，无论这是否是我们感兴趣的事情。

I might add, I do not spend a lot of time reading annual reports because I’m not in the stock picking business per se. But in terms of keeping track of what’s going on in the insurance business, that’s what 90% of my reading is all about.

我可能还要补充一点，我并不花很多时间阅读年报，因为我并不专门从事股票挑选的业务。但就跟踪保险行业的动态而言，这就是我 90%的阅读内容。

Greg? 格雷格？

GREG ABEL: Yeah. So generally, in a day, what I’m going to focus on when I’m reading is really around our businesses, what industries they’re in. I’m trying to understand what our competitors are doing. What’s the fundamental risks around those businesses? How they’re going to get disrupted.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。一般来说，在一天中，我阅读时关注的主要是我们的业务，它们所处的行业。我试图了解我们的竞争对手在做什么。这些业务的基本风险是什么？它们将如何受到干扰。

And then it always comes back to, are we allocating our capital properly in those businesses, relative to the risks we’re seeing, both in our business and in the industry? So, a lot of time spent on that.

然后总是回到一个问题，我们是否在这些业务中合理分配了我们的资本，相对于我们在业务和行业中看到的风险？所以在这方面花了很多时间。

And as that knowledge is built, it’s sharing it back and forth with our management teams of those relevant subsidiaries, and sort of fine-tuning it, is really the approach.

随着知识的积累，我们与相关子公司的管理团队进行双向分享，并进行微调，这就是我们的方法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Both of these fellows can absorb information to an extraordinary degree. I mean, they have — and for one thing, they’re terribly interested in it. I mean, you know, and it’s theirs.

沃伦·巴菲特：这两位都能以惊人的程度吸收信息。我的意思是，他们非常感兴趣。而且，这些信息是属于他们的。

So, I’m amazed at both of them, the degree (to) which they just, sort of, know everything. (Laughs)

所以，我对他们俩都感到惊讶，他们几乎知道所有的事情。（笑）

And — but they enjoy it. I mean, they’re not thinking about whether they’ll get the next job that opens up at some huge place or anything like that.

而且——但他们享受其中。我的意思是，他们并没有考虑到是否会得到某个大公司开放的下一个职位或其他类似的事情。

Nobody leaves us, you know, basically, the ones we want.

没有人离开我们，你知道，基本上，只有我们想要的人。

But you really got to kind of be in love with your business. And that makes a huge difference. And that means that we’ve got to have the conditions that allow that love to flourish. And it wouldn’t flourish under many — under many — with many organizations.

但你真的要对你的事业充满热爱。这会带来巨大的不同。这意味着我们必须拥有能够让这种热爱蓬勃发展的条件。而在许多组织中，这种热爱是无法蓬勃发展的。

61. Robinhood encourages financial market “gambling”

Robinhood 鼓励金融市场“赌博”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Robert Miles in Nebraska.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自内布拉斯加州的罗伯特·迈尔斯。

“The trading apps. What do you think about Robinhood and other trading apps, or fintech companies, enabling all ages and experience to participate in the stock market?”

“交易应用程序。你怎么看待 Robinhood 和其他交易应用程序，或者金融科技公司，让所有年龄和经验的人都能参与股市？”

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, I’m looking forward to reading the S-1 on Robin — that’s the big thing you file with the SEC when you’re going to be offering securities., and —

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）好吧，我期待着阅读Robinhood的 S-1 文件——这是你在要提供证券时向 SEC 提交的重要文件。

It’s — you know, it’s become a very significant part of the casino aspect — of the casino group — that has joined into the stock market in the last year or year and a half.

这已经成为赌场方面——赌场集团——在过去一年或一年半中加入股市的一个非常重要的部分。

And I do want to say I’m concerned of how they handle the source of income when they say they don’t charge the customer anything. I mean, you know, I’m — it’ll just be interesting to watch how they describe it. I mean, but —

我确实想说，我对他们在说不向客户收取任何费用时如何处理收入来源感到担忧。我的意思是，你知道，我——这将很有趣，看看他们如何描述这一点。我的意思是，但是——

But they — they have attracted — maybe set out to attract — but they have attracted, I think I read where 12 or 13% of their casino participants were dealing in (option) puts and calls.

但他们——他们吸引了——也许是打算吸引——但我认为我读到他们的赌场参与者中有 12%或 13%在进行（期权）看跌和看涨交易。

I looked up on Apple, you know, the number of seven-day calls and 14-day calls outstanding. And I’m sure a lot of that is coming through Robinhood. And that’s a bunch of people writing — they’re gambling on the price of Apple over the next seven days or 14.

我查看了苹果的七天和十四天未平仓期权的数量。我相信很多都是通过 Robinhood 来的。这是一群人在下注——他们在赌苹果在接下来的七天或十四天的价格。

There’s nothing, you know — there’s nothing illegal about it. There’s nothing immoral.

这没有什么，你知道——这没有什么非法的。没有什么不道德的。

But — I don’t think you’d build a society around people doing it. I mean, if a group of — a group of us landed on a desert island, and we knew we would never be rescued, and I was one of the group, and I said, well, I’ll set up the exchange over here. (Laughs) And I’ll trade our corn futures and everything around —

但是——我认为你不会围绕这样的人建立一个社会。我的意思是，如果我们一群人降落在一个荒岛上，我们知道我们永远不会被救援，而我也是其中的一员，我说，好吧，我会在这里建立交易所。（笑）我会交易我们的玉米期货和周围的一切——

I think — I think the degree to which a very rich society can reward people who know how to take advantage, essentially, of the gambling instincts of the — not only the American public — worldwide public — it’s, you know, it’s not the most admirable part of the accomplishment.

我认为——我认为一个非常富裕的社会能够奖励那些懂得如何利用赌博本能的人，这不仅仅是美国公众，还有全球公众——这并不是成就中最值得钦佩的部分。

But I think what America’s accomplished is pretty admirable overall. (Laughs)

但我认为美国所取得的成就是相当令人钦佩的。（笑）

And I think actually, you know, American corporations have turned out to be a wonderful place for people to put their money and save. But they also make terrific gambling chips.

我认为，实际上，美国公司已经成为人们投资和储蓄的绝佳场所。但它们也成为了很好的赌博筹码。

And if you cater to those gambling chips when people have money in their pocket for the first time, and you tell them they can make 30 or 40 or 50 trades a day, and you’re not charging them any commission, but you’re selling your order flow or whatever, it —

如果你在那些人第一次口袋里有钱的时候迎合他们的赌博筹码，并告诉他们他们可以每天进行 30、40 或 50 笔交易，而你不收取任何佣金，但你在出售你的订单流或其他东西，这——

I hope we don’t have more of it, I’ll put it that way. And I will be interested in reading the prospectus.

我希望我们不要再有更多这样的事情，我就这么说吧。我会对阅读招股说明书感兴趣。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that is really waving the red flag at the bull. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，这真是在向公牛挥动红旗。（笑声）

I think it’s just God-awful that something like that would draw investment from civilized men and decent citizens. It’s deeply wrong.

我认为这样的事情竟然能吸引文明人和正直公民的投资，真是太糟糕了。这是非常错误的。

We don’t want to make our money selling things that are bad for people.

我们不想通过销售对人们有害的东西来赚钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we’ve got the states doing it with the lottery, you know.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是我们有各州通过彩票来做这件事，你知道的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but that’s bad, too.

查理·芒格：不，但那也不好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I know. I understand, but I’m saying —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我知道。我明白，但我想说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s very bad. That’s very bad —

查理·芒格：这非常糟糕。这非常糟糕——

WARREN BUFFETT: Once you —

沃伦·巴菲特：一旦你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s one of the things that’s wrong with it. It’s getting respectable to do these things.

查理·芒格：这就是它的一个问题。做这些事情变得越来越体面。

The states are just as bad as Robinhood.

各州和Robinhood一样糟糕。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in a sense they’re worse. I mean, they’re really taxing the —

沃伦·巴菲特：从某种意义上说，他们更糟。我是说，他们真的在征税——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I know it’s — I know, I know.

查理·芒格：我知道，这我知道，我知道。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They’re taxing hope.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们在征税希望。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Not only that —

查理·芒格：不仅如此——

WARREN BUFFETT: And they don’t get much in the way of taxes from me and Charlie than they do —

沃伦·巴菲特：他们从我和查理那里获得的税收并不多

CHARLIE MUNGER: The states in America replaced the Mafia as the proprietor of the numbers game. That’s what happened.

查理·芒格：美国的各州取代了黑手党，成为数字游戏的经营者。这就是发生的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They pushed the Mafia aside and said that’s our business, not yours. Doesn’t make me proud of my government.

查理·芒格：他们把黑手党推到一边，说那是我们的事，不是你的事。这让我对我的政府感到不自豪。

WARREN BUFFETT: When I was a kid, my dad (Howard Buffett) was in Congress. They had a numbers runner in the House office building (laughs), actually.

沃伦·巴菲特：当我还是个孩子时，我的父亲（霍华德·巴菲特）在国会。他们在众议院办公大楼里有一个数字跑腿（哈哈），实际上。

62. Berkshire subsidiaries are seeing unexpectedly high inflation

伯克希尔的子公司正面临意外的高通胀。

BECKY QUICK: I will ask this question from Chris Fried from Philadelphia, and whoever wants to take this on stage —

贝基·奎克：我将问这个来自费城的克里斯·弗里德的问题，谁想在台上回答这个问题——

“From raw material purchases by Berkshire subsidiaries, are you seeing signs of inflation beginning to increase?”

“从伯克希尔子公司的原材料采购来看，您是否看到通货膨胀开始上升的迹象？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let me answer that. Then, I think Greg can give more —

沃伦·巴菲特：让我来回答这个问题。然后，我认为格雷格可以提供更多——

We’re seeing very substantial infla — it’s very interesting.

我们看到非常显著的通货膨胀——这非常有趣。

I mean, we’re raising prices. People are raising prices to us.

我的意思是，我们在涨价。人们也在对我们涨价。

And it’s being accepted. I mean, it’s not — if we get — well, you know, take home building.

而且这正在被接受。我的意思是，这并不是——如果我们得到——好吧，你知道，家庭建筑。

I mean, you know, the cost of — we’ve got nine home builders, in addition to our manufactured housing thing — and then — operation, which is the largest in the country. So, we really do a lot of housing. (Laughs)

我的意思是，你知道，成本——我们有九个房屋建筑商，除了我们的制造住房业务——然后——运营，这是全国最大的。所以，我们真的做了很多住房。（笑）

The costs are just up, up, up. Steel costs, you know, just every day, they’re going up.

成本就是不断上涨。钢铁成本，你知道，天天都在上涨。

There hasn’t yet been — because the wage stuff follows. I mean, the UAW writes a three-year contract, we got a three-year contract.

还没有——因为工资的事情还在后面。我是说，UAW 签订了三年的合同，我们也有三年的合同。

But if you’re buying steel at General Motors or someplace, you’re paying more every day.

但是如果你在通用汽车或其他地方购买钢材，你每天都在支付更多。

So, it’s — it’s an economy, really — it’s red-hot, I mean.

所以，这实际上是——这是一种经济——它非常火热，我的意思是。

And we weren’t expecting it. I mean, all our companies, when they — they thought when they were allowed to go back to work, you know, at — for various operations — we closed the furniture stores, I mentioned. You know, they were closed for six weeks or so, on average.

我们没有预料到这一点。我的意思是，所有我们的公司，当他们——他们认为当他们被允许回去工作时，你知道，对于各种运营——我们关闭了家具店，我提到过。你知道，他们平均关闭了大约六周。

And they didn’t know what was going to happen when they opened them. And, you know, they can’t stop people from buying things. And we can’t deliver them if they say, well, that’s OK, (laughs) because nobody else can deliver them, either. And we’ll wait for three months or something of the sort. But the backlog grows.

他们不知道打开它们时会发生什么。而且，你知道，他们无法阻止人们购买东西。如果他们说，好吧，（笑）我们就无法交付，因为其他人也无法交付。我们会等三个月或类似的时间。但积压在增加。

And then we thought it would end when the $600 payments ended in, I think, you know, around August of last year. It just kept going. And it keeps going, and it keeps going, and it keeps going.

然后我们以为在去年的八月左右，600 美元的支付结束时，一切就会结束。结果它一直持续下去。它一直在持续，一直在持续，一直在持续。

And I get the figures. Every week I call — or (Nebraska Furniture Mart Chairman) Irv Blumkin calls me — and we go over day-by-day what happened at the three different stores in Chicago, and Kansas City, and Dallas.

我会得到数据。每周我都会打电话——或者（内布拉斯加家具市场主席）伊尔夫·布卢姆金给我打电话——我们逐日讨论芝加哥、堪萨斯城和达拉斯三家不同商店发生的事情。

And it just won’t stop. People have money in their pocket. And they pay the higher prices. And when carpet prices go up in a month or two, you know — they announced a price increase for April — our costs are going up. Supply chains, all screwed up, you know, (laughs) for all kinds of people.

而且这根本停不下来。人们口袋里有钱。他们支付更高的价格。当地毯价格在一两个月内上涨时，你知道——他们宣布了四月份的涨价——我们的成本在上涨。供应链一团糟，你知道的，（笑）对各种人来说都是如此。

But it’s a buying — it’s almost a buying frenzy, except certain areas you can’t buy yet. You know, you really can’t buy international air travel, and there’s —

但这是一种购买——几乎是一种购买狂潮，除了某些地区你还不能购买。你知道，你真的不能购买国际航空旅行，还有——

So, the money is being diverted from a little — some — a piece of the economy into the rest. And everybody’s got more cash in their pocket than — except for — meanwhile, you know, it’s a terrible situation for a percentage of the people.

所以，资金正在从经济的一小部分转移到其余部分。每个人口袋里都有比以前更多的现金——除了——与此同时，你知道，这对一部分人来说是个可怕的情况。

The — you know, this suit — I haven’t worn a suit, you know, for a year, practically. And that means that the dry cleaner near us just went out of business. I mean, nobody’s bringing in suits to get dry cleaned. And nobody’s bringing in white shirts to the place where my wife goes.

这套西装，你知道，我差不多一年没穿西装了。这意味着我们附近的干洗店刚刚关门。我是说，没人拿西装去干洗。也没有人把白衬衫送到我妻子去的那家店。

The small businessperson — if you didn’t have takeout and delivery services for restaurants — you got killed.

小企业主——如果你没有餐厅的外卖和送餐服务——你就会被淘汰。

On the other hand, if you’ve got takeout facilities, it doesn’t — you know, same-store sales at Dairy Queen are up a whole lot. And they adapted.

另一方面，如果你有外卖设施，那就不一样了——你知道，德克士的同店销售额大幅上升。他们进行了调整。

But it’s — it is not a price-sensitive economy right now, in the least. And I don’t know exactly how one shows up in different price indices. But there’s more inflation going on than — quite a bit more inflation — going on than people would have anticipated just six months ago or thereabouts.

但现在这并不是一个对价格敏感的经济。我不太清楚如何在不同的价格指数中体现出来。但实际上，通货膨胀的情况比人们六个月前或左右预期的要严重得多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and there’s one very intelligent man who thinks it’s dangerous. And that’s just the start.

查理·芒格：是的，还有一个非常聪明的人认为这很危险。这只是个开始。

63. Abel: Scarcity of some raw materials is driving up prices

阿贝尔：某些原材料的稀缺正在推高价格

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg, you probably are in a good position to comment —

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格，你可能很适合发表评论——

GREG ABEL: Yeah. Well, Warren, I think you touched on it. When we look at steel prices, timber prices, any petroleum input, you know, fundamentally there’s pressure on those raw materials.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的。沃伦，我认为你提到了这一点。当我们查看钢铁价格、木材价格以及任何石油输入时，基本上这些原材料面临压力。

I do think something you’ve touched on, Warren, and it goes really back to the raw materials.

我确实认为你提到的某些事情，沃伦，这实际上与原材料密切相关。

There’s a scarcity of product right now of certain raw materials. It’s impacting price and the ability to deliver the end product.

目前某些原材料的产品稀缺。这影响了价格和交付最终产品的能力。

But, you know, that scarcity factor is also real out there right now, as our businesses address that challenge.

但是，你知道，稀缺因素在现在的市场上也是一个真实存在的挑战，我们的企业正在应对这个问题。

And it may that be some of that’s contributed — or arisen — from the storm we previously discussed in Texas. When you take down that many petrochemical plants in one state that the rest of the country is dependent upon it, we’re seeing it flow through, both on price, but overall, in scarcity of product, which obviously go together.

这可能是之前我们讨论的德克萨斯州风暴所导致的部分原因。当一个州关闭如此多的石化工厂，而其他州又依赖于此时，我们看到这影响了价格，同时也导致了产品的稀缺，这显然是相互关联的。

But there’s challenges. That’s for sure.

但这确实有挑战。

64. Munger: Quant funds do better with short-term trading than long-term trading

芒格：量化基金在短期交易中表现优于长期交易

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Bijay Koirala.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自比贾伊·科伊拉。

“What do you think of quants? Jim Simon’s Medallion Fund has done 39% net of fees for three decades, which proves that it works. Will you consider hiring a quant lieutenant in Berkshire to work alongside with Ted (Combs) or Todd (Weschler)?”

“你怎么看量化分析师？吉姆·西蒙斯的奖章基金在三十年里净收益达 39%，这证明了它的有效性。你会考虑在伯克希尔雇佣一位量化副手，与泰德（科姆斯）或托德（韦施勒）一起工作吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll say no to the second part, and I’ll let Charlie handle the first part. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我对第二部分说不，我让查理来处理第一部分。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s rather interesting. The (unintelligible) quant fund did fabulously on the short-term trading bit, they found little algorithms that worked to make them — they had predictive value. And as long as they kept working, they just kept doing it, as long as the money kept coming in.

查理·芒格：嗯，这相当有趣。那个（听不清）量化基金在短期交易方面表现得非常出色，他们找到了一些有效的小算法——它们具有预测价值。只要这些算法继续有效，他们就会继续使用，只要资金不断流入。

When they got to using the same system just to finding some little algorithm and trying to do it mechanically for long-term stock predictions, the record was not nearly as good.

当他们使用相同的系统仅仅是为了寻找一些小算法并尝试机械地进行长期股票预测时，记录并没有那么好。

And in the short-term stuff, they found that if they tried to do it too much, they destroyed their own advantage. So, there was a limit on the amount they could make.

在短期内，他们发现如果过于频繁地尝试这样做，就会破坏自己的优势。因此，他们的产量是有限的。

WARREN BUFFETT: But they were very, very smart.

沃伦·巴菲特：但他们非常聪明。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, they got very rich.

查理·芒格：是的，他们变得非常富有。

WARREN BUFFETT: Very, very smart.

沃伦·巴菲特：非常非常聪明。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Very smart, and very rich, yes.

查理·芒格：非常聪明，而且非常富有，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And — 沃伦·巴菲特：而——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And very high grade, by the way.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，非常高档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Jim Simons.

查理·芒格：吉姆·西蒙斯。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we’re not trying to make money trading stocks. I mean — (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们并不是想通过交易股票来赚钱。我是说——（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer — we don’t think we know how to do it. I mean, it isn’t — if we knew how to make a lot more money trading stocks, we’d probably be trading stocks, too. But we don’t know how to do it. And we really don’t trust anybody else to do it for us. That simple.

沃伦·巴菲特：答案是——我们认为我们不知道怎么做。我的意思是，如果我们知道如何通过股票交易赚更多的钱，我们可能也会在交易股票。但我们不知道怎么做。我们也真的不信任其他人来为我们做这件事。就是这么简单。

65. Turnover in Berkshire’s stock portfolio hasn’t changed but “it’s still too much”

伯克希尔的股票投资组合的周转率没有变化，但“仍然太高”。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Richard Werner.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自理查德·维尔纳。

“Mr. Buffett has espoused for decades the philosophy of buy and hold — or hold forever was too short of a time period. Is it a misperception on my part, or has his philosophy changed? It seems to be a much greater turnover in the equity portfolio lately.”

“巴菲特先生几十年来一直倡导买入并持有的理念——或者说持有永远，这个时间段太短了。这是我个人的误解，还是他的理念发生了变化？最近他的股票投资组合似乎有了更大的周转。”

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think there’s that much turnover, I mean, with —

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为 turnover 并没有那么大，我是说，和——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but there’s too much.

查理·芒格：不，但太多了。

WARREN BUFFETT: What? 沃伦·巴菲特：什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s way too much. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：太多了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s still too much. It’s the same amount.

查理·芒格：这仍然太多了。数量是一样的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’d agree with that. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我同意这一点。（笑）

And the truth is, we own — our businesses are equities, so we own 400 or 500 billion in — maybe more — in businesses. We don’t turn them over at all. We don’t resell businesses.

事实是，我们拥有——我们的企业是股权，所以我们拥有 4000 亿或 5000 亿——甚至更多——的企业。我们根本不转手。我们不转售企业。

We could probably — well, we won’t even get into that — what we could do. But we don’t do it.

我们可能——好吧，我们甚至不想讨论这个——我们能做什么。但我们并没有这样做。

And we do relatively little, and as Charlie says we’d do better if we — not if we — if I’d done less. (Laughter)

而我们做得相对较少，正如查理所说，如果我做得更少，我们会做得更好。（笑声）

66. States still have “big, big, big” pension problems

35. 各州仍然面临“非常非常非常大的”养老金问题

BECKY QUICK: This is from Daniel Gauthier.

贝基·奎克：这是来自丹尼尔·戈蒂耶的。

“Warren Buffett’s 2013 letter, in the middle of page 21, made a prediction that in the next decade you’ll see lots of really bad news about pensions.

沃伦·巴菲特在 2013 年的信中，在第 21 页中间，预测在接下来的十年里，你会看到很多关于养老金的坏消息。

“Given recent events like COVID-19 and that 2023 is two years away, would Mr. Buffett like to comment or revise his 2013 prediction? Did COVID-19 delay, accelerate, eliminate or not change it?”

“鉴于最近发生的事件，如 COVID-19，以及 2023 年距离现在还有两年，巴菲特先生是否愿意对此评论或修正他 2013 年的预测？COVID-19 是延迟、加速、消除还是没有改变它？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well (laughs), in a very limited — I mean, in a terrible way, COVID improves the pension position, because — if you — it’s, you know — you have less pensioners.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧（笑），在一个非常有限的——我意思是，以一种糟糕的方式，COVID 改善了养老金的状况，因为——如果你——你知道——你有更少的养老金领取者。

But the pension situation is terrible in a great many states. It’s not so bad at the corporate level, and there are some multi-employer plans, obviously, that have got problems.

但在许多州，养老金情况非常糟糕。在企业层面情况还不算太差，显然有一些多雇主计划存在问题。

But basically, it’s a terrible problem for the states — and, of course — some states — and states are going to go to Washington now and say, you know, we all want to get a lot of money because we had these terrible things happen to us during the pandemic, which they did.

但基本上，这对各州来说是个可怕的问题——当然——一些州——各州现在要去华盛顿说，你知道，我们都想要很多钱，因为在疫情期间发生了这些可怕的事情，确实如此。

But, some of those states have enormous pension deficits, and they’ll come again if they get — (laughs) — if they get a check once.

但是，其中一些州的养老金赤字巨大，如果他们得到一次支票，他们会再次出现——（笑）——如果他们得到一次支票。

It may turn out to be a federal obligation de facto or something than a state situation. It has not gotten better — it has not gotten better at all, and — obviously.

这可能实际上成为一种联邦义务，而不是州的情况。情况没有好转——一点也没有好转，显然。

And to a certain extent, the pension managers get more and more desperate as interest rates go down. So, they’ll listen to almost anybody that promises them — they’ve always had that tendency anyway — but they’ll listen to people that promise them that they’re going to, one way or another, solve their problem for them. And that isn’t going to work.

在某种程度上，随着利率的下降，养老金管理者变得越来越绝望。因此，他们会倾听几乎任何承诺能解决他们问题的人——他们本来就有这种倾向——但他们会倾听那些承诺以某种方式解决他们问题的人。而这并不会奏效。

So, it’s a big, big, big problem. And of course, the real problem is — let’s just take a hypothetical state that has a huge pension deficit and maybe even has a cost of living factor in it, which is going to really be a killer.

所以，这是一个非常非常大的问题。当然，真正的问题是——我们假设一个有巨大养老金赤字的州，可能还有生活成本因素，这将真的非常棘手。

And you can move, if you’re an individual. Charlie won’t move to save that 500 million — he’s not going to move to Nevada or someplace — but you can move, if you’re an individual, to some degree, particularly if you’re rich and old and retired.

如果你是个人，你可以搬家。查理不会为了节省那 5 亿而搬家——他不会搬到内华达州或其他地方——但如果你是个人，特别是如果你富有、年长且退休，你在某种程度上是可以搬家的。

And you can actually take away an asset from that kind of an environment and give it to another state that doesn’t really need it as much. So, you’ll get adverse selection over time.

你实际上可以从那种环境中拿走一个资产，并将其交给另一个并不那么需要它的州。因此，随着时间的推移，你会面临不利选择。

But if you’re a company and you put a plant there, you can’t move the plant in five or 10 or 20 years.

但是如果你是一家公司，并且在那儿建立了一个工厂，你就不能在五年、十年或二十年后搬走这个工厂。

So as the taxable base of individuals falls down, simply because people select out of being a part of the population, you can’t select out very well as a corporation, so you have to be very careful and think a long time before you go into some state with a huge pension deficit and a declining population. Because you’re going to be the last man left, and you’re — and the pensions won’t go away.

因此，个人的应税基础下降，仅仅是因为人们选择不再成为人口的一部分，作为公司你无法很好地选择退出，所以在进入一些养老金赤字巨大且人口下降的州之前，你必须非常小心并仔细考虑很长时间。因为你将是最后一个留下的人，而养老金不会消失。

And I don’t think — well, anybody with a short-term outlook doesn’t worry about that. I mean, just get me past the next election, and I’m all right on that one, you know.

我认为——好吧，任何有短期眼光的人都不会担心这个。我的意思是，只要让我度过下一个选举，我就没问题，你知道的。

But the — you know, we don’t want to be — we’re not going to say our plant’s going to be around for 50 years in someplace where the population gets halved and the richer part gets cut dramatically — even more dramatically — and we’ve still got a valuable plant there and we got to keep operating, and —

但是——你知道，我们不想——我们不会说我们的工厂会在一个人口减半、富裕部分大幅削减的地方存在 50 年——甚至更大幅度——而我们仍然在那儿有一个有价值的工厂，我们必须继续运营，——

We’re going — one way or another, we’re going — it’s not going to be a good place to be.

我们要走——无论如何，我们要走——那里不会是个好地方。

BECKY QUICK: And we’re almost out of time, so I’ll make this last question.

贝基·奎克：我们快要没时间了，所以我来问最后一个问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s a good answer, Warren. It reminds me of my old Harvard law professor who used to say, “Let me know what your problem is, and I’ll try and make it more difficult for you.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这是个好答案，沃伦。让我想起了我以前的哈佛法教授，他常常说：“告诉我你的问题是什么，我会尽量让它变得更难。”（笑声）

67. “Strange things” have happened, but we always try not to disappoint the shareholders

“奇怪的事情”发生过，但我们总是尽量不让股东失望。

BECKY QUICK: So, this one comes from Jan Michael Ottlinger. It’s for Warren and Charlie.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自扬·迈克尔·奥特林格。是给沃伦和查理的。

“I have one question, which is inspired by Charlie’s mantra, ‘You have to be a continuous learning machine.’ So, here’s my question. What’s the biggest lesson both of you learned during the last year?”

“我有一个问题，这个问题受到查理的座右铭‘你必须成为一个持续学习的机器’的启发。那么，我的问题是：你们两人在过去一年中学到的最大教训是什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my biggest lesson has been to listen more to Charlie. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我最大的教训就是多听听查理的意见。（笑）

He’s been right on some things that I’ve been wrong on.

他在一些我错的事情上是对的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know. If you’re not a little confused by what’s going on, you don’t understand it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我不知道。如果你对发生的事情没有一点困惑，那你就不理解它。(笑声)

It is — we’re in, sort of, uncharted territory.

我们正处于一种未开发的领域。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We enjoy, in a crazy way, actually seeing what happens. I mean, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们以一种疯狂的方式享受看到事情的发展。我是说，——

This has — this has made us — halfway through the movie, much more interested (laughs) in watching even more of —

这让我们在电影进行到一半时，更加感兴趣（哈哈）想要观看更多的——

This is an unusual movie, but —

这是一部不寻常的电影，但——

We — our basic principles of, you know — we start with the fact we don’t want to disappoint the people who left their money with us, and things flow out of that.

我们——我们的基本原则是，你知道——我们首先考虑的是我们不想让那些把钱交给我们的人失望，其他事情都是基于这个出发点。

And we may disappoint people that they don’t make quite as much money as they want, but we don’t —

我们可能会让人失望，因为他们赚的钱没有他们想要的那么多，但我们并不——

And we’ve seen it — some strange things happen in the world in the last year, and 15 months, and we’ve always recognized the fact that stranger things are going to happen in the future.

我们已经看到了——在过去的一年和 15 个月里，世界上发生了一些奇怪的事情，我们始终认识到，未来还会发生更奇怪的事情。

And I would say, if anything, it’s reinforced, you know, our desire — well — to figure out everything possible we can do to make sure that Berkshire is, 50 or 100 years from now, you know, every bit the organization and then some that it is now.

我想说，如果有什么的话，这加强了我们的愿望——好吧——去弄清楚我们能做的一切，以确保伯克希尔在 50 年或 100 年后，依然是现在的组织，甚至更优秀。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course that’s the idea. I think it’s pretty likely to work.

查理·芒格：当然，这就是想法。我认为这很可能会奏效。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, we wouldn’t have spent 55 years at it unless we did.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果我们没有做到这一点，我们就不会花费 55 年去做。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

And Becky, is that — is that the last question?

贝基，那是——那是最后一个问题吗？

BECKY QUICK: That’s the last question.

贝基·奎克：这是最后一个问题。

68. Formal meeting begins

正式会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well, in that case, we’ll move on to the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，那么我们就开始会议。

The other three fellows here can leave. It’s not going to be that exciting, but we’ve got a script here, even, somewhat. I don’t like scripts, but they — (laughs) — not my nature.

这里的其他三个家伙可以离开。不会太刺激，但我们这里甚至有一个剧本。我不喜欢剧本，但他们——（笑）——这不是我的本性。

And one of the proposers for the two items on the proxy is here in the building to present his argument personally, and the other one has recorded it.

其中一位提议代理两项议案的人在大楼内亲自陈述他的论点，另一位则已录制了发言。

So, we’ll get to that in just a minute, but —

所以，我们马上就会谈到这个，但——

We offered both of — I mean, they either could record or come, and I’m happy one of them came.

我们提供了两种选择——我的意思是，他们可以选择录音或亲自来，我很高兴其中一个来了。

So here we go, and the meeting will now come to order.

那么我们开始吧，会议现在开始。

I am Warren Buffett — not that you didn’t know by this time (laughs) — chairman of the board of directors of the company.

我是沃伦·巴菲特——你们现在应该都知道了（笑）——公司的董事会主席。

I welcome you to the 2021 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. Marc Hamburg is secretary of Berkshire Hathaway. He will make a written record of the proceedings.

我欢迎您参加 2021 年股东年会。马克·汉堡是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的秘书。他将对会议进行书面记录。

Rebecca Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election of directors and the motions to be voted upon at this meeting.

瑞贝卡·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数以及本次会议上待投票动议进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

69. Quorum

法定人数

WARREN BUFFETT: Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

沃伦·巴菲特：秘书是否有关于在会议上有投票权并代表的伯克希尔股份总数的报告？

MARC HAMBURG: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 3rd, 2021, the record day for this meeting, there were 639,747 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,335,074,355 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/10,000th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

马尔克·汉堡：是的，我知道。正如 2021 年 3 月 3 日发送给所有登记股东的会议通知所附的委托书中所示，本次会议的记录日为 639,747 股 A 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权，以及 1,335,074,355 股 B 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有 1/10,000 的投票权。

Of that number, 456,040 Class A shares and 663,442,069 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 29th.

在这个数字中，456,040 股 A 类股份和 663,442,069 股 B 类股份通过截至 4 月 29 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。

70. Minutes of previous meeting approved

上次会议记录已批准

WARREN BUFFETT: The first order of business will a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders.

沃伦·巴菲特：首要任务是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。

I recognize Miss Debbie Bosanek, who will place a motion before the meeting.

我认识德比·博萨内克小姐，她将向会议提出一项动议。

DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

德比·博萨内克：我提议省略上次股东会议记录的阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

FEMALE VOICE: I second the motion.

女性声音：我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion is carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：动议通过。

71. Board of directors elected

董事会选举产生

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is to elect directors. I recognize Miss Debbie Bosanek to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是选举董事。我请德比·博萨内克小姐在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Gregory Abel, Howard Buffett, Steven Burke, Kenneth Chenault, Susan Decker, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

德比·博萨内克：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷戈里·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂文·伯克、肯尼斯·陈诺特、苏珊·德克、戴维·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

FEMALE VOICE: I second the motion.

女性声音：我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that the 14 individuals named in Miss Bosanek’s motion be elected as directors. The nominations are ready to be acted upon.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提议并第二次支持将博萨内克女士提名的 14 位个人选为董事。提名已准备好进行表决。

Mr. Hamburg, when you are ready, you may provide the voting results from Miss Amick’s preliminary report.

汉堡先生，当您准备好时，可以提供阿米克小姐初步报告中的投票结果。

MARC HAMBURG: Miss Amick has reported that the ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 473,474 votes for each nominee.

马尔克·汉堡：阿米克小姐报告说，代理持有人的投票结果显示，截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 473,474 票。

Miss Amick’s report also states that this number exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. The report also states that the certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

阿米克小姐的报告还指出，这个数字超过了所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份总投票数的多数。报告还指出，根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you Mr. Hamburg. The 14 nominees have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，汉堡先生。14 名提名人已被选为董事。

72. Climate change shareholder proposal

气候变化股东提案

WARREN BUFFETT: The next two items of business relate to two shareholder proposals that are each set forth in the proxy statement that can be accessed at BerkshireHathaway.com. If you haven’t read those proposals, just go to BerkshireHathaway.com, because they’re interesting proposals.

沃伦·巴菲特：接下来的两项议程与两项股东提案有关，这些提案均在可以访问的委托书声明中列出，网址为 BerkshireHathaway.com。如果您还没有阅读这些提案，请访问 BerkshireHathaway.com，因为这些提案很有趣。

And the proponents’ views are set forth well there, and I think our views are set forth. And I welcome you reading it.

支持者的观点在这里阐述得很好，我认为我们的观点也得到了阐述。我欢迎你阅读它。

To get back to the script, the first proposal requests that the company publish an annual assessment addressing how the company manages physical and transitional climate-related risks and opportunities.

为了回到脚本，第一项提案要求公司发布年度评估，说明公司如何管理与气候相关的物理和过渡风险及机遇。

The directors have recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now recognize Tim Youmans, a representative of Federated Hermes to present the proposal.

我现在将请联邦哈密斯的代表蒂姆·尤曼斯来介绍提案。

I think we’re connected up with Mr. Youmans.

我想我们和尤曼斯先生有联系。

TIM YOUMANS: I thank the chair — I thank the chair of the board and fellow shareholders.

TIM YOUMANS: 我感谢主席——我感谢董事会主席和各位股东。

I’m Tim Youmans, Lead North America EOS at Federated Hermes, here today on behalf of item two cosponsors Federated Hermes, CalPERS, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, and CDPQ, Caisse de Depot et Placement du Quebec, and our combined millions of ultimate beneficiaries.

我是 Tim Youmans，Federated Hermes 北美 EOS 的负责人，今天代表两个共同赞助方 Federated Hermes、加州公共雇员退休系统（CalPERS）和魁北克存款与投资公司（CDPQ），以及我们共同的数百万最终受益人。

For well more than a year, the parent company has been unresponsive to the co-sponsors’ requests to discuss the parent company’s lack of climate-related financial disclosures.

超过一年以来，母公司对共同赞助商要求讨论其缺乏气候相关财务披露的请求一直没有回应。

In order to have some kind of dialogue with the parent company, we have co-filed a proposal that Berkshire Hathaway’s board issue a report annually assessing how the company manages physical and transitional climate-related risks and opportunities, including climate-related financial reporting, where material, for subsidiaries and for the parent company, how the board oversees climate-related risks for the combined enterprise, and the feasibility of the parent company and its subsidiaries establishing science-based greenhouse gas reduction targets consistent with limiting climate change to well below 2 degrees.

为了与母公司进行某种对话，我们共同提交了一项提案，要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事会每年发布一份报告，评估公司如何管理与气候相关的物理和过渡风险及机会，包括气候相关的财务报告（如有必要），针对子公司和母公司，董事会如何监督整个企业的气候相关风险，以及母公司及其子公司建立与将气候变化限制在远低于 2 度相一致的基于科学的温室气体减排目标的可行性。

We ask that the annual assessment follows the recommendations of the task force on climate-related financial disclosures, TCFD.

我们要求年度评估遵循气候相关财务信息披露工作组（TCFD）的建议。

The board argues that since it manages its operating businesses on an unusually decentralized basis, and there are few centralized or integrated business functions, the board believes that the shareholder proposal is inconsistent with Berkshire’s culture.

董事会认为，由于它以异常分散的方式管理其运营业务，并且几乎没有集中或综合的业务职能，董事会认为股东提案与伯克希尔的文化不一致。

The co-sponsors note, despite Berkshire’s culture and decentralized management, shareholders can only purchase shares in the combined parent company entity. Shares cannot be purchased in the individual subsidiaries that may or may not have the climate disclosures that the board cites in its opposition statement.

共同赞助方指出，尽管伯克希尔的文化和分散管理，股东只能购买合并母公司实体的股份。无法购买可能有或没有董事会在反对声明中提到的气候披露的各个子公司的股份。

The company has more than a hundred billion dollars in cash equivalence. The co-sponsors, and many in the $54 trillion climate action 100-plus investor coalition, want the parent company to put more resources into sustainability and in mitigating the financial impact of climate change and the energy transition.

该公司拥有超过一千亿美元的现金等价物。共同赞助商以及在 54 万亿美元气候行动 100+投资者联盟中的许多人希望母公司在可持续发展和减轻气候变化及能源转型的财务影响方面投入更多资源。

The company’s sustainability website consists only of links to 15 subsidiaries. We note the parent company has 60 subsidiaries.

该公司的可持续发展网站仅包含 15 个子公司的链接。我们注意到母公司有 60 个子公司。

This is insufficient disclosure to shareholders who think that sustainability risks, especially climate risks, may be material to the parent company’s long-term future prospects, of course, recognizing the company’s strong past financial performance.

这对认为可持续性风险，特别是气候风险，可能对母公司的长期前景具有重要影响的股东来说，披露不足，当然也要承认公司过去强劲的财务表现。

No doubt, climate change and the energy transition to a low-carbon economy pose a systemic risk to the economy. The company’s auditor, Deloitte, says on its website, “Climate change is not a choice, it’s billions of them. We are all compelled to act.”

毫无疑问，气候变化和向低碳经济的能源转型对经济构成了系统性风险。公司的审计师德勤在其网站上表示：“气候变化不是一个选择，而是数十亿人的选择。我们都被迫采取行动。”

Deloitte does not assess climate change-related financial impacts in the company’s audit. When asked by the co-sponsors why climate change impacts are excluded from audits like Berkshire’s, Deloitte failed to provide any meaningful reply.

德勤在公司的审计中不评估与气候变化相关的财务影响。当被共同赞助方问及为何气候变化影响在像伯克希尔这样的审计中被排除时，德勤未能提供任何有意义的回复。

In his new book, former Berkshire director Bill Gates says, “Companies accepting more risk is needed to avoid climate disaster,” and “shareholders and board members will have to be more willing to share in this risk, making it clear to executives that they’ll back smart investments even if they don’t ultimately pan out.” This is the Gates position, and the chair is one of three Gates Foundation trustees.

在他的新书中，前伯克希尔董事比尔·盖茨表示：“公司需要接受更多风险以避免气候灾难，”并且“股东和董事会成员必须更愿意分享这种风险，明确告诉高管们，即使最终没有成功，他们也会支持明智的投资。”这是盖茨的立场，而主席是盖茨基金会三位受托人之一。

We ask the board to take the cultural risk for a modest degree of centralization needed to issue the annual climate-related financial assessment. We all need to take action now to limit climate change impact on our long-term sustainability.

我们请求董事会承担文化风险，以实现发布年度气候相关财务评估所需的适度集中化。我们都需要立即采取行动，以限制气候变化对我们长期可持续性的影响。

We strongly urge Berkshire Hathaway shareholders to support item two, as climate risk may be material to the parent company.

我们强烈敦促伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东支持第二项提案，因为气候风险可能对母公司产生重大影响。

And we have a question for the chair. Will you please change your mind and vote your personal shares in support of item two? Thank you.

我们有一个问题要问主席。请您改变主意，投票支持第二项的个人股份吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Youmans.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，尤曼斯先生。

The proposal is now ready to be acted upon. Mr. Hamburg, when you’re ready, you may provide the voting results disclosed in Miss Amick’s preliminary report.

提案现在已准备好进行处理。汉堡先生，当您准备好时，可以提供阿米克小姐初步报告中披露的投票结果。

MARC HAMBURG: Ms. Amick’s report states that the ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 131,376 votes for the motion and 385,336 votes against the motion.

马尔克·汉堡：阿米克女士的报告指出，代理持有人的选票在上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，支持该动议的票数为 131,376 票，反对该动议的票数为 385,336 票。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares properly cast on the matter, the motion has failed.

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类股份在此事项上有效投票的多数，提案已被否决。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将与本次会议的会议记录一起存放。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Hamburg. The proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，汉堡先生。提案失败。

73. Employee diversity shareholder proposal

员工多样性股东提案

WARREN BUFFETT: The second shareholder proposal requests that Berkshire Hathaway companies annually publish reports assessing their diversity and inclusion efforts.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二项股东提案要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司每年发布评估其多样性和包容性努力的报告。

The directors have recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

I will now ask that the audiotape provided by Meredith Benton, a representative of As You Sow, be played to present the proposal.

我现在要求播放由 As You Sow 的代表梅雷迪思·本顿提供的录音带，以展示提案。

MEREDITH BENTON: Hello. I am Meredith Benton. I am speaking on behalf of the nonprofit advocacy organization, As You Sow, and I am also the CEO of the consultancy Whistle Stop Capital.

梅雷迪斯·本顿：你好。我是梅雷迪斯·本顿。我代表非营利倡导组织“你所播种的”发言，同时也是咨询公司 Whistle Stop Capital 的首席执行官。

I formally move proposal number three, asking for Berkshire Hathaway to report on how it assesses diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts, including the process that the board follows for determining the effectiveness of its diversity and inclusion programs, and how it assesses goals, metrics, and trends related to recruitment, promotion, and retention.

我正式提出第三号提案，要求伯克希尔哈撒韦公司报告其如何评估多样性、公平性和包容性工作，包括董事会在确定其多样性和包容性项目有效性时遵循的流程，以及如何评估与招聘、晋升和留任相关的目标、指标和趋势。

What would it mean if the majority of Berkshire’s operating units weren’t managing their diversity programs? It would mean that Berkshire companies are missing out on the benefits that an inclusive workplace culture can provide, such as, according to the studies, access to top talent, to good people, better understanding of consumer preferences, a stronger mix of leadership skills, informed strategy discussions, and improved risk management.

如果伯克希尔的大多数运营单位没有管理他们的多样性项目，这意味着什么？这意味着伯克希尔的公司错过了包容性工作文化所能提供的好处，例如，根据研究，获得顶尖人才、优秀员工、更好地理解消费者偏好、更强的领导技能组合、知情的战略讨论和改善的风险管理。

Best practices in diversity and inclusion reporting exist and are increasingly standardized across companies. Berkshire companies can publish their workforce composition through their consolidated EEO-1 form. This form is already submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, so it requires no additional effort on behalf of the companies to collect or reconcile.

在多样性和包容性报告方面，最佳实践已经存在，并且在各公司之间越来越标准化。伯克希尔公司的企业可以通过其合并的 EEO-1 表格发布其员工组成情况。该表格已经提交给平等就业机会委员会，因此公司无需额外努力来收集或对账。

It is a universally disliked form, but it is standardized, and companies will often publish their EEO-1 along with an explanation of their own internal structures and ways.

这是一种普遍不受欢迎的形式，但它是标准化的，公司通常会发布他们的 EEO-1，并附上对其内部结构和方式的解释。

Seventy-two of the S&P 100 companies publicly share, or have committed to share, this form.

标准普尔 100 指数中的 72 家公司公开分享或已承诺分享此表格。

To my knowledge, no Berkshire company currently does — not one.

据我所知，目前没有任何伯克希尔公司在这样做——没有一家。

The release of workforce composition data is akin to a balance sheet detailing diversity at a single point in time. Just as a balance sheet would by itself be insufficient to identify the strength of a company’s financials, so, too, the EEO-1, by itself, is insufficient in assessing effectiveness of DEI programs.

发布劳动力组成数据类似于在某一时点详细说明多样性的资产负债表。正如资产负债表本身不足以识别公司财务状况的强度一样，EEO-1 本身也不足以评估 DEI 项目的有效性。

The company’s inclusion data, the hiring, retention, and promotion rates of diverse employees must also be shared. Investors need to have a full understanding of the actual experience of Berkshire employees.

公司的包容性数据，包括多元化员工的招聘、留任和晋升率，也必须被分享。投资者需要全面了解伯克希尔员工的实际体验。

In theory, companies should want to share their retention data. If it’s a good company to work for, people want to stay, and they should want to share their promotion data, in theory.

理论上，公司应该愿意分享他们的留存数据。如果这是一个好的工作公司，人们会想留下来，他们理论上也应该愿意分享他们的晋升数据。

If it’s a company that hires good people and treats them well, those good people will ascend, with mentorship and time.

如果是一家雇佣优秀人才并善待他们的公司，这些优秀的人才会在指导和时间的帮助下不断晋升。

Seventy percent of the S&P 500 currently share diversity and inclusion data at some level — 70%.

目前，70%的标准普尔 500 指数公司在某种程度上分享多样性和包容性数据——70%。

Only 22% of Berkshire companies do, at any level, and only four Berkshire companies speak to workplace equity with any meaningful depth.

只有 22%的伯克希尔公司在任何层面上做到这一点，只有四家伯克希尔公司在工作场所公平方面有任何有意义的深入讨论。

Berkshire is a serious outlier here.

伯克希尔在这里是一个严重的异常值。

Berkshire’s famously decentralized. Its units operate independently. Yet, if an issue isn’t conveyed as important from headquarters, can we expect it to be prioritized by an operating unit?

伯克希尔以其著名的分散化而闻名。其各个单位独立运作。然而，如果总部没有将某个问题传达为重要，我们能期待它在运营单位中被优先考虑吗？

Here’s the thing. Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, board members, and the team headquarters, you may each individually truly and genuinely hire, mentor, and promote the best people for the job regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or any immutable characteristic.

事情是这样的。巴菲特先生、芒格先生、董事会成员和总部团队，你们每个人都可以真正地、真诚地雇佣、指导和提升最适合这个工作的最佳人才，无论他们的性别、种族、民族、性取向或任何不可改变的特征。

But we can’t conclude that this is the mindset of each of your employees, managers, and hiring directors.

但我们不能得出结论，认为这是你们每位员工、经理和招聘主管的心态。

Berkshire headquarters can’t sit passively and hope that their independent units are addressing bias and discrimination in their workplace. Active management, proactive attention, is needed.

伯克希尔总部不能被动地坐等其独立单位解决工作场所的偏见和歧视。需要积极管理和主动关注。

In its statement in opposition to the proposal, the board said, “Mr. Buffett, Berkshire’s chairman and CEO, has set the tone at the top for Berkshire and its employees for over 50 years.” It also states, “Mr. Buffett has a record of opposing efforts seen or unseen to suppress diversity or religious inclusion.”

在对该提案的反对声明中，董事会表示：“巴菲特先生，伯克希尔的董事长兼首席执行官，已经为伯克希尔及其员工设定了超过 50 年的高层基调。”它还指出：“巴菲特先生有反对任何被视为或未被视为压制多样性或宗教包容性的努力的记录。”

Mr. Buffett holds extraordinary influence over his own companies and over the broader business community. He opposes efforts to suppress diversity. Given that, we ask for him to step forward decisively, in his own inimitable words, in his own inimitable way, to detail how important diversity and inclusion is to his companies, the expectations he has, and the efforts he expects to see, the metrics that will be used to judge success.

巴菲特先生对他自己的公司以及更广泛的商业社区具有非凡的影响力。他反对压制多样性的努力。基于此，我们请求他以他独特的方式，果断地站出来，详细说明多样性和包容性对他的公司有多重要，他的期望是什么，以及他希望看到的努力，评估成功的指标。

Actions speak louder than words, but silence here speaks volumes. Thank you.

行动胜于言辞，但在这里沉默胜过千言万语。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. The proposal is now ready to be acted upon.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。提案现在可以执行了。

Mr. Hamburg, when you are ready, you may provide the voting results disclosed in Miss Amick’s preliminary report.

汉堡先生，当您准备好时，可以提供阿米克小姐初步报告中披露的投票结果。

MARC HAMBURG: Ms. Amick’s report states that the ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast 124,842 votes for the motion and 391,662 votes against the motion.

马尔克·汉堡：阿米克女士的报告指出，代理持有人的选票在上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，支持该动议的票数为 124,842 票，反对该动议的票数为 391,662 票。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes of all Class A and Class B shares properly cast on the matter, the motion has failed.

由于反对该提案的票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类股份在此事项上有效投票的多数，提案已被否决。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将与本次会议的会议记录一起存放。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Hamburg. The proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，汉堡先生。提案失败。

74. Meeting adjourns 会议休会

DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move —

德比·博萨内克：我提议——

WARREN BUFFETT: Miss Bosanek? Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：博萨内克小姐？是的。

DEBBIE BOSANEK: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

德比·博萨内克：我提议休会。

FEMALE VOICE: I second the motion to adjourn.

女性声音：我支持休会的提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。

This meeting is adjourned, and I would just like to add one final comment that I really hope, and I think the odds are very, very good that we get to hold this next year in Omaha.

本次会议到此结束，我想再补充一句，我真的希望，而且我认为我们明年在奥马哈举行的机会非常非常大。

And I hope that we get a record turnout of Berkshire shareholders, and we look forward to — we really look forward — to meeting you in Omaha — I guess it’ll be next April 30th, but we’ll be sure of that date a little later.

我希望我们能迎来伯克希尔股东的创纪录出席人数，我们期待着——我们真的很期待——在奥马哈见到你们——我想这将在明年 4 月 30 日，但我们稍后会确认这个日期。

So, thank you for watching and we will see you next year, and hopefully, in Omaha.

谢谢观看，我们明年再见，希望在奥马哈见面。

2021-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2021-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Good morning from Los Angeles

2. Charlie Munger introduction: He’s lived in the same house for 62 years

3. Greg Abel introduction: He plays hockey

4. Ajit Jain introduction: He’s learned a lot about insurance

5. We all lived in Omaha at one point

6. Read the 10-Q, but don’t focus on the net earnings

7. Lesson for new investors: Extraordinary things can happen

8. Lesson for new investors: Picking winners isn’t “as easy as it sounds”

9. Q&A begins

10. “I still wouldn’t want to buy the airline business”

11. Why Berkshire didn’t buy stocks when the pandemic pushed prices lower

12. Why Buffett doesn’t recommend buying Berkshire stock

13. Why Buffett’s will calls for his wife’s inheritance to be invested in an index fund

14. “Chevron is not an evil company”

15. “Asinine” to make a climate report for every subsidiary

16. Abel details Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s actions on climate change

17. “We’ve spent far more than any utility” on renewable energy and transmission

18. Insurance subsidiaries are prepared for “unpleasant surprises”

19. “Warren and I don’t have to agree on every damn little thing we do”

20. They’re not as close as Buffett and Munger, but Abel and Jain have a good working relationship

21. Buffett defends BNSF as competitive with Union Pacific

22. “We will have the slowest-aging management”

23. Progressive has been better lately, but GEICO is catching up

24. Buffett admits “probably a mistake” to sell some shares of “extraordinary” Apple

25. High-flying tech stocks are “very, very cheap” if interest rates stay so low

26. Munger: Government spending with no limit will eventually “end in disaster”

27. Negative interest rates would have unknown consequences

28. “It’s a killer” to compete with SPACs buying with other people’s money

29. We have $70 to $80 billion “we’d love to put to work,” but can’t with prices so high

30. Why we sometimes buy stocks we’re not wild about

31. Munger: Bernie Sanders has accidentally won his fight against wealth inequality

32. Motivation determines the morality of share repurchases

33. Tax law change wouldn’t affect Berkshire’s no-dividend stance

34. Buffett voted for Biden but doesn’t want to talk taxes at the meeting

35. Munger on tax hikes: “Mistake to be basically anti-capitalist”

36. Munger on taxes: “It is stupid for states to drive out their wealthiest citizens”

37. It’s “fiction” that all corporate tax hikes are passed on to consumers

38. Buffett: I’d like my money to go to philanthropy rather than reduce the national debt

39. Pandemic risk was “totally underpriced” by insurance industry

40. Berkshire COVID-19 insurance payouts will be “a lot, lot higher” than current reserve of $1.6 billion

41. Kansas City Southern acquisition won’t have huge impact on BNSF

42. Successful acquisitions naturally become a bigger part of the business

43. Top “risk factor” for any business is getting the wrong management

44. Buffett follows politician’s lead and dodges Bitcoin question

45. Munger: “Of course, I hate the Bitcoin success”

46. Our Texas energy proposal may not be the best, but it’s better than Musk’s

47. Buffett jokes that decision to insure a Elon Musk mission to Mars would depend on the premium

48. “Everybody’s looking” for businesses that don’t need much capital

49. Why portfolio managers Todd Combs and Ted Weschler don’t answer shareholder questions

50. Munger: “The Chinese government will allow businesses to flourish”

51. “We don’t know” if Biden’s $1.9T stimulus plan would cause inflation

52. “I like banks generally” but we “didn’t want as much in banks as we had”

53. Buffett declines to explain his thinking on purchase of Verizon stock

54. We don’t spend time thinking about what happens if laws change

55. Less demand for Berkshire’s ability to quickly insure enormous risks

56. Abel: “Pleased” with Kraft Heinz CEO

57. Danger of the “myths” CEOs create about their companies

58. Why Berkshire’s Haven joint venture lost against the “tapeworm” of health care costs

59. Munger unintentionally reveals Greg Abel designated to eventually replace Buffett as CEO

60. “You really got to be in love with your business”

61. Robinhood encourages financial market “gambling”

62. Berkshire subsidiaries are seeing unexpectedly high inflation

63. Abel: Scarcity of some raw materials is driving up prices

64. Munger: Quant funds do better with short-term trading than long-term trading

65. Turnover in Berkshire’s stock portfolio hasn’t changed but “it’s still too much”

66. States still have “big, big, big” pension problems

67. “Strange things” have happened, but we always try not to disappoint the shareholders

68. Formal meeting begins

69. Quorum

70. Minutes of previous meeting approved

71. Board of directors elected

72. Climate change shareholder proposal

73. Employee diversity shareholder proposal

74. Meeting adjourns 会议休会

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