2023-05-08 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning Session - 2023 Meeting

早晨会议 - 2023 年会议

1. Berkshire’s own ‘King Charles’

伯克希尔自己的“查尔斯王”

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning, good morning. And thanks for coming. Omaha loves it, I love it, Charlie loves it. We’re glad to have you here.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好，早上好。感谢大家的到来。奥马哈喜欢这样，我喜欢这样，查理也喜欢。我们很高兴你们在这里。

We’re going to make this preliminary, before the questions, very short because we want to get in at least 60 questions, half divided by the audience outside this arena and half from you.

我们将把这个初步环节在提问之前简短一些，因为我们希望至少能进行 60 个问题，外部观众和你们各占一半。

So, I would just like to get right to the directors and the earnings that have been put up on a web page this morning, but we’ll cover those very fast and then we’ll get to the questions. Now, when I woke up this morning, I realized that we had a competitive broadcast going out somewhere in the UK.

所以，我想直接谈谈今天早上在网页上发布的董事和收益，但我们会很快覆盖这些内容，然后再进行提问。现在，当我今天早上醒来时，我意识到我们在英国某个地方有一个竞争性的广播正在进行。

And (Laughter) they were celebrating a King Charles, and we’ve got our own King Charles here today. (APPLAUSE AND CHEERING)

而（欢笑）他们在庆祝查尔斯国王，而我们今天也有自己的查尔斯国王在这里。（掌声和欢呼）

And next to him we have Greg Abel, who’s in charge of all the operations except for insurance. (Applause)

接下来是格雷格·阿贝尔，他负责除保险外的所有运营。（掌声）

And next to Greg, we have a man I ran into in 1986 and has made us look good ever since. We have the man in charge of insurance, Ajit Jain. Ajit? (Applause and cheering)

接下来在格雷格旁边，我们有一位我在 1986 年遇到的男士，他从那时起就让我们看起来很不错。我们有负责保险的阿吉特·贾因。阿吉特？（掌声和欢呼）

2. Directors introduced

介绍董事会

WARREN BUFFETT: And now we have our directors here in front. And if they would just stand briefly and then I’ll go onto the next one, and they’re all here today.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们的董事们在这里。如果他们能简短站一下，然后我就会继续下一个，他们今天都在这里。

First of all, doing it alphabetically, there’s Howard Buffett, (Applause). There’s Susie Buffett, there’s Steve Burke, Ken Chenault, Chris Davis, Sue Decker, Charlotte Guyman, Tom Murphy Jr., Ron Olson, Wally Weitz, and Meryl Witmer.

首先，按字母顺序排列，有霍华德·巴菲特，（掌声）。还有苏西·巴菲特，史蒂夫·伯克，肯·陈诺特，克里斯·戴维斯，苏·德克，夏洛特·古伊曼，汤姆·墨菲·小，罗恩·奥尔森，沃利·维茨，以及梅瑞尔·维特默。

That’s as good as you can get.

这就是你能得到的最好结果。

3. The woman who organized the whole thing

组织整个事情的女人

WARREN BUFFETT: And there’s one other person I would like to mention before we get onto the earnings that were put in the press release this morning. Well, let’s see who we have here. We’ve got —

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们讨论今天早上新闻稿中发布的收益之前，我还想提到另一个人。好吧，让我们看看我们这里有什么人。我们有——

This is hard to believe. Can you imagine a name, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro? (Laugh) And she was Melissa Shapiro till she married another Shapiro, and she put this whole thing together with no help from me, no help from Charlie, (Applause) and a lot of help from the people in the other room. Melissa. (APPLAUSE and CHEERING)

这很难让人相信。你能想象一个名字，梅丽莎·夏皮罗·夏皮罗吗？（笑）她在嫁给另一个夏皮罗之前一直是梅丽莎·夏皮罗，她完全靠自己，没有我的帮助，也没有查理的帮助，（掌声）还有很多来自另一个房间的人的帮助。梅丽莎。（掌声和欢呼）

Yeah, it’s very easy. If you can remember her second name, you can remember her third name. So, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro.

是的，这很简单。如果你能记住她的姓，你就能记住她的第三个名字。所以，梅丽莎·夏皮罗·夏皮罗。

4. Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year

大多数伯克希尔的企业明年将报告较低的收益。

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I would like to next move onto the earnings and a couple small slides that explain what we’re all about, and then we’re going to get to Q&A. And the slide is up behind me, and there it is.

沃伦·巴菲特：接下来，我想谈谈收益和几张小幻灯片，解释一下我们的业务，然后我们将进入问答环节。幻灯片在我身后，那里就是。

We reported in the first quarter operating earnings a little over $8 billion. And when we talk about operating earnings, we’re basically referring to the earnings of Berkshire Hathaway as required under GAAP, excluding however, capital gains both realized and unrealized.

我们在第一季度报告的营业收入略超过 80 亿美元。当我们谈论营业收入时，基本上是指根据公认会计原则（GAAP）要求的伯克希尔哈撒韦的收入，但不包括已实现和未实现的资本收益。

There’s a few other very minor items, but basically, we expect to make capital gains over time. Why would we own the stocks otherwise? Doesn’t always work out, but overall, it works out pretty well over time. But in any day, any quarter, any year, even occasionally over a five-year period, the stock prices move around capriciously.

还有一些非常小的事项，但基本上，我们预计随着时间的推移会获得资本收益。否则我们为什么要持有这些股票呢？并不总是能如愿，但总体来说，随着时间的推移，效果还是相当不错的。但在任何一天、任何季度、任何一年，甚至偶尔在五年期间，股价都会任性波动。

Now, we own a lot of other businesses. We consider those stocks businesses. We own a lot of other businesses where they get consolidated, and they don’t move around in value. Now, if we had a little bit of Burlington stock outstanding, if we had a little bit of the energy stock trading, those stocks would move around a lot.

现在，我们拥有许多其他业务。我们将这些股票视为业务。我们拥有许多其他业务，它们被合并在一起，价值不会波动。现在，如果我们有一些伯灵顿的股票在外流通，如果我们有一些能源股票在交易，这些股票的价值会波动很大。

But the businesses are what count. So, the operating earnings, as you’ll see in the first quarter, came it at about $8 billion. And I would say that in the general economy, the feedback we get is that, I would say, perhaps the majority of our businesses will actually report lower earnings this year than last year.

但企业才是关键。因此，正如您将在第一季度看到的，运营收益约为 80 亿美元。我想说，在整体经济中，我们得到的反馈是，我认为我们大多数企业今年的收益实际上会低于去年。

In various degrees in the last six months or so, at various times, the businesses have left the incredible period, which is about extraordinary as I’ve seen a business since World War II, which poured out a lot of money to people who couldn’t get goods.

在过去六个月左右的不同程度和不同时间，这些企业经历了一个令人难以置信的时期，这是我自第二次世界大战以来所见过的最非凡的时期，企业向那些无法获得商品的人们倾注了大量资金。

It was more extreme in World War II, but this was extreme this time. And it was just a question of getting goods to deliver. And people bought, and they didn’t wait for sales. And if you couldn’t sell them one thing, they would put another thing in their backlog. It was an extraordinary period.

在第二次世界大战中情况更为极端，但这次也很极端。关键在于如何将货物送达。人们购买商品，不再等待促销。如果你不能卖给他们一样东西，他们就会把另一样东西放入待处理订单中。这是一个非凡的时期。

And that period has ended. As you know, it isn’t that employment has fallen off a cliff or anything, in the lest. But it is a different climate than it was six months ago. And a number of our managers were surprised. Some of them had too much inventory on order, and then all of a sudden it got delivered, and people weren’t in the same frame of mind as earlier.

那个时期已经结束。如你所知，就业并没有骤然下降。但现在的环境与六个月前不同。我们的许多经理感到惊讶。他们中的一些人下了过多的库存订单，然后突然间货物送到了，而人们的心态与之前并不相同。

And now we’ll start having sales at places where we didn’t need to have sales before. But despite the fact that this year I think in general will be slower than last year, we actually are situated so that I would expect, and believe me when I say expect, nothing is sure.

现在我们会开始在以前不需要打折的地方进行促销。尽管今年总体上可能会比去年慢一些，但我们实际上处于一个良好的位置，所以我预计（请相信我说的“预计”），没有什么是确定的。

Nothing is sure tomorrow, nothing is sure next year, and nothing is ever sure, either in markets or in business forecasts, or in anything else. And we don’t pay much attention to markets or forecasts unless the markets happen to offer something interesting to do.

明天没有什么是确定的，明年没有什么是确定的，任何事情都没有确定性，无论是在市场、商业预测还是其他任何方面。除非市场恰好提供一些有趣的事情可做，否则我们对市场或预测并不太关注。

But nevertheless, we are positioned in two respects, as you’ll see from this first report. Our investment income is going to be a lot larger this year than last year. And that’s built. I mean, as you’ll see in a minute, we’ve had $125 billion or so in very short-term investments.

但是，尽管如此，正如您将在这份初步报告中看到的，我们在两个方面处于有利位置。我们的投资收入今年将比去年大得多。这是有基础的。我的意思是，正如您稍后会看到的，我们在非常短期的投资中有大约 1250 亿美元。

And believe it or not, not that long ago we were getting four basis points, which is next to nothing on that $125 billion, which means we were getting $50 million a year. And now the same money, just the day before yesterday, we actually bought because of some funny twist the market, because of doubts about the debt ceiling.

相信与否，就在不久前，我们在那 1250 亿美元上获得的利率仅为四个基点，这几乎是微不足道的，这意味着我们每年只获得 5000 万美元。而现在，前天我们实际上因为市场的一些奇怪变化，以及对债务上限的怀疑，购买了同样的资金。

We bought $3 billion of bills at 5-90. That’s 5.92 bond equivalent yield. So, we will have what produced just not that long ago on a 12-month basis was producing $50 million a year, producing something in the area of $5 billion a year. So, we’re in a position where the investment income is certain to increase quite a bit.

我们以 5.9%的价格购买了 30 亿美元的国债。这相当于 5.92 的债券等效收益率。因此，我们将拥有不久前在 12 个月基础上产生的每年 5000 万美元的收益，产生的金额大约在每年 50 亿美元左右。因此，我们处于一个投资收入肯定会大幅增加的状态。

And insurance underwriting does not correlate with business activity. It depends on things like hurricanes, and earthquakes, and other events. So, on a perspective basis, on a probability basis, we’re likely to have a better year this year in insurance underwriting than we had last year.

保险承保与商业活动没有直接关联。它取决于飓风、地震和其他事件等因素。因此，从视角和概率的角度来看，我们今年在保险承保方面可能会比去年表现更好。

It just isn’t affected by what you might call the business cycle or what applies to generally in industry, retailing, you name it. So, I would expect in one massive earthquake or one hurricane that came in at just the wrong place could affect that prediction. But on a probabalistic basis, our insurance looks better this year.

它并不受你所称之为商业周期或普遍适用于工业、零售等的影响。因此，我预计一次大地震或一次在错误地点发生的飓风可能会影响这一预测。但从概率的角度来看，我们的保险在今年看起来更好。

So, if you get two of the elements there of our main elements of earnings that look like they will swing in our direction, I would expect, but I can’t promise, that our operating earnings will be greater than last year.

所以，如果你看到我们主要收益要素中的两个元素看起来会朝着我们这边倾斜，我预计，但不能保证，我们的营业收益会超过去年。

投资收益+保险。

And if we’ll move to the second slide, I give you those operating earnings figures just to give you a overview of what has happened since the pandemic started, and also the year before as a base. And we retain all our earnings, as you know.

如果我们转到第二张幻灯片，我给你这些运营收益数据只是为了让你了解自疫情开始以来发生了什么，以及作为基准的前一年。正如你所知道的，我们保留了所有的收益。

So, if we’re retaining $30 billion or $35 billion, or whatever it may be, a year, they should expect more operating earnings over time. I mean, this number should be significantly higher five, or ten, or 15 years from now because we have the advantage of retaining earnings, and that’s what got us to these figures because they were essentially nothing when we started.

所以，如果我们每年保留 300 亿美元或 350 亿美元，或者其他任何数字，他们应该期待随着时间的推移获得更多的运营收益。我的意思是，这个数字在五年、十年或十五年后应该会显著更高，因为我们有保留收益的优势，这就是我们达到这些数字的原因，因为在我们开始时，这些数字基本上是零。

And they got there by retaining earnings and will keep retaining earnings. So, it’s no great triumph if these numbers move up. And what we hope is that they move up at a reasonable rate. Historically, they moved up at an unreasonable rate sometimes.

他们通过保留收益达到了那里，并将继续保留收益。因此，如果这些数字上升，也不算什么伟大的胜利。我们希望它们以合理的速度上升。历史上，它们有时以不合理的速度上升。

But we were working with much smaller sums then, and that can’t be repeated with our present capital base. Because I note there — I believe it’s on this slide. Let’s take a look. No, that will be — let’s see, it’s on the — well, on the next place, page. Let’s move to the next slide. We show that we had on March 31st, now what was it, $504 billion of GAAP net worth.

但那时我们处理的金额要小得多，而这在我们目前的资本基础上是无法重复的。因为我注意到——我相信在这个幻灯片上。让我们看看。不，这将是——让我们看看，它在——好吧，在下一页。让我们移动到下一张幻灯片。我们显示到 3 月 31 日，我们的 GAAP 净资产为 5040 亿美元。

Now, what might surprise you is that there’s no other company in the United States that has a number that is that large. Now, that isn’t because we have the most valuable company in the United States. Other companies have used their money to repurchase shares.

现在，可能让你感到惊讶的是，在美国没有其他公司有这么大的数字。这并不是因为我们拥有美国最有价值的公司。其他公司已经利用他们的钱回购股票。

They could’ve accumulated $504 billion in GAAP. But basically, we have more under GAAP accounting now than any other company in the U.S. And of course, if you measure return on equity that becomes a very big number to increase at a rapid rate, but we hope to do so.

他们本可以在公认会计原则下积累 5040 亿美元。但基本上，我们在公认会计原则下的资产比美国任何其他公司都要多。当然，如果你衡量股本回报率，这将成为一个快速增长的非常大数字，但我们希望能够做到这一点。

Not a rapid rate, a decent rate. And right below that, you see something called float. And float is money that is left in our hands somewhat akin, but very importantly different, than a bank deposit. But you have to pay interest to get a bank deposit.

不是快速的比率，而是合理的比率。在这下面，你会看到一个叫做浮存金的东西。浮存金是留在我们手中的钱，类似于但非常重要的是不同于银行存款。但是你必须支付利息才能获得银行存款。

And you have to pay more interest these days, and you have to run a bank and do a lot of things. And basically, this is money that represents unpaid losses at this time. You get paid in advance in insurance. So, what shows up as a net liability on our balance sheet gives us funds to exercise with an amount of discretion that no other insurance company that I know of in the world enjoys, just because we have so much net worth.

如今你需要支付更多的利息，还要经营银行和做很多其他事情。基本上，这些钱代表了目前未支付的损失。在保险中，你提前获得了支付。因此，显示在我们资产负债表上的净负债，实际上为我们提供了行使相当大自由度的资金，而这种自由度是我所知的世界上其他任何保险公司都没有的，这仅仅是因为我们拥有如此多的净资产。

Charles Schwab

And our float now comes to $165 billion, and the man sitting at the far left is responsible for moving that number up from a pittance in 1986 to this incredible figure, which in most years, practically all years, hasn’t cost us anything. So, it’s like having a bank with no employees, no interest, and no ability to withdraw the money in a hurry that we have working for us.

我们的浮存金现在达到 1650 亿美元，坐在最左边的那个人负责将这个数字从 1986 年的微不足道提升到这个令人难以置信的数字，而在大多数年份，几乎所有年份，这对我们来说几乎没有成本。因此，这就像拥有一家没有员工、没有利息、也没有能力迅速提取资金的银行在为我们工作。

And it’s a very valuable asset that shows up as a liability. And Ajit is responsible for building up this treasure, which has been done by out-competing insurance companies all over the world. And now, a number of our insurance companies, in turn, are run by talented managers who contributed one way or another.

这是一项非常有价值的资产，但却表现为负债。Ajit 负责建立这个宝藏，这一切都是通过在全球范围内超越保险公司实现的。现在，我们的一些保险公司则由才华横溢的管理者运营，他们以某种方式做出了贡献。

Start with GEICO at the beginning of my career. And that float, if you think about it, just think of a balance sheet. You have liabilities here and you have assets over here, and the liability side finances the asset side. It’s very simple. And stockholders’ equity finances it, long-term debt finances it, and so on.

在我职业生涯的开始，我选择了 GEICO。想一想那种浮存金，想象一下资产负债表。这里是负债，那里是资产，负债一侧为资产一侧提供资金。这非常简单。股东权益为其提供资金，长期债务为其提供资金，等等。

But stockholders’ equity is very expensive in a real sense. Long-term debt has been cheap for a while, but it can get expensive, and it can also become due eventually and it may not be available. But float is another item that’s a liability but hasn’t cost us anything.

但股东权益在实际意义上是非常昂贵的。长期债务在一段时间内一直很便宜，但它可能会变得昂贵，并且最终可能到期，可能也无法获得。但浮存金是另一项负债，但并没有给我们带来任何成本。

And it can’t disappear in a hurry. And it finances the asset side in the same way as stockholders’ equity. And nobody else thinks of it much that way, but we’ve always thought of it that way, and it’s a build up over time. So, I show at the bottom what’s happened with cash and Treasury bills through March 31st.

而它不能迅速消失。它以与股东权益相同的方式为资产方提供资金。其他人并不这样看待，但我们一直是这样看待的，这是一种随着时间的积累。因此，我在底部展示了截至 3 月 31 日现金和国库券的变化。

And I will tell you that in the month of April, we’ve probably added about $7 billion to that factor. Now, part of that is because we didn’t buy as much stock, because that reduces cash and Treasury bills. We bought about $400 million worth of stock in the month of April.

在四月份，我们可能在这个因素上增加了大约 70 亿美元。部分原因是我们没有购买太多股票，因为这会减少现金和国库券。我们在四月份购买了大约 4 亿美元的股票。

That’s a minus in terms of cash available. And we, however, sold, net, some stock, which produced maybe $4 billion. And of course, we had operating earnings, probably $2.5 billion or something in that area. And my guess is we probably increased our cash and Treasury bills $6 billion and $7 billion in the month.

这在可用现金方面是一个负面因素。然而，我们净卖出了一些股票，产生了大约 40 亿美元的收入。当然，我们的运营收益大约是 25 亿美元左右。我的猜测是，我们在这个月可能增加了 60 亿到 70 亿美元的现金和国库券。

And I just want to give you a feel for how the cash flows at Berkshire. And then if we move to the final — I think it’s the final one. We should have the one up there, Class A equivalent shares outstanding. And you’ll notice that every year the number of our shares go down.

我只是想让你感受一下伯克希尔的现金流。然后如果我们转到最后一个——我认为这是最后一个。我们应该在那儿看到，A 类等值股份的流通股数量。你会注意到每年我们的股份数量都在减少。

So, if we own more businesses, and the businesses make more money, your share as shareholders at Berkshire increases every year without you laying out any money. Now you’re laying out the alternative which you could receive in dividends. But the reason we’ve gotten to where we are is because we kept the money.

所以，如果我们拥有更多的企业，并且这些企业赚更多的钱，作为伯克希尔的股东，您的股份每年都会增加，而您无需投入任何资金。现在您提出了可以通过分红获得的替代方案。但我们之所以能走到今天，是因为我们保留了这些资金。

We did pay a dividend in 1967, $0.10 a share. It was a terrible mistake. (Laugh) And I always tell people that I’d for the men’s room and the directors voted while I was gone. But that isn’t true. I was there, I confess. (Laugh) But we’ve reinvested, and it’s produced the $500 billion plus of shareholders’ equity and the $30 billion plus of operating earnings.

我们在 1967 年支付了每股 0.10 美元的股息。这是一个可怕的错误。（笑）我总是告诉人们，我去洗手间时董事会投了票。但那不是真的。我在场，我承认。（笑）但我们进行了再投资，这产生了超过 5000 亿美元的股东权益和超过 300 亿美元的营业收入。

And we’ll continue to follow that policy because it makes a great deal of sense. And with that, I think we’ve taken care of the preliminaries. The 10-Q is on the web page. And if you have a week or two vacation, you could spend it reading the 10-Q.

我们将继续遵循这一政策，因为这非常有道理。至于这一点，我认为我们已经处理好了前期工作。10-Q 报告在网页上。如果你有一两周的假期，可以花时间阅读 10-Q 报告。

But that is the essence of Berkshire.

但这就是伯克希尔的本质。

5. Failure to guarantee Silicon Valley Bank’s deposits would have been ‘catastrophic’

未能保证硅谷银行的存款将是“灾难性的”

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I will start with Becky Quick, and we will alternate between Becky and the audience. And her questions have come in from all of the country, and I believe you identified the sender. And go to it, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我将从贝基·奎克开始，我们将在贝基和观众之间轮流提问。她的问题来自全国各地，我相信你已经确认了发件人。贝基，请开始。

BECKY QUICK: Thanks, Warren. The first question comes in from Randy Jeffs in Irvine, California. And his question is, “If Silicon Valley Bank’s deposit had not been fully covered, what do you think the economic consequences would’ve been to the nation?”

贝基·奎克：谢谢，沃伦。第一个问题来自加利福尼亚州尔湾的兰迪·杰夫斯。他的问题是：“如果硅谷银行的存款没有得到完全保障，您认为对国家的经济后果会是什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d would just simply say it would’ve been catastrophic. (Laugh) And that’s why they were covered. And even though the FDIC limit is $250,000, that’s the way the statute reads, but that is not the way the U.S. is going to behave any more than they’re going to let the debt ceiling cause the world to go into turmoil.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我只想说这将是灾难性的。（笑）这就是他们被保护的原因。尽管联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的限额是 25 万美元，但法律是这样规定的，但这并不是美国将要采取的行为，就像他们不会让债务上限导致世界陷入动荡一样。

And I can’t imagine anybody in the administration, in the Congress, in the Federal Reserve, whatever it may have been, FDIC — I can’t imagine anybody saying, “I’d like to be the one to go on television tomorrow and explain to the American public why we’re keeping only $250,000 insured, and we’re going to start a run on every bank in the country and disrupt the world financial system.” (Laugh) So, I think it was inevitable. Charlie, do you have anything?

我无法想象在政府、国会、联邦储备系统或任何其他机构中，有人会说：“我想成为那个明天上电视向美国公众解释为什么我们只保证 25 万美元的存款，并且我们将开始对全国每家银行进行挤兑，从而扰乱全球金融系统的人。”（笑）所以，我认为这是不可避免的。查理，你有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I have nothing to add.

查理·芒格：不，我没有什么要补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

Well, incidentally, I should mention this now, Ajit and Greg will be here in the morning session which ends at noon. And so, if you have questions to direct to them, the time to do it is in the first half of the show. And then after lunch Charlie and I will be back.

好吧，顺便提一下，我现在应该提到，Ajit 和 Greg 将在上午的会议上出席，会议将在中午结束。因此，如果你有问题要问他们，最好在节目前半部分提出来。然后午餐后 Charlie 和我会回来。

6. We’ve never made an emotional investing decision

我们从未做出过冲动投资的决策

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area one?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第一领域？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Narav (PH) Patel, Harel (PH), Massachusetts. Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, it seems like you found the sweet spot between being too conservative and too aggressive as investors. Do you ever make bad investment decisions because of your emotions? And what do you do to try to keep that from happening?

观众成员：你好。我是来自马萨诸塞州的 Narav (PH) Patel，Harel (PH)。巴菲特先生，芒格先生，您似乎找到了作为投资者在过于保守和过于激进之间的最佳平衡。您是否因为情绪而做出过糟糕的投资决策？您采取什么措施来防止这种情况发生？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we make bad investment decisions plenty of times. I make more than Charlie. I like to think it’s because I make more decisions, but probably my batting average is worse. (Laugh) But I can’t recall any time in the history of Berkshire that we made an emotional decision.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们很多时候都会做出糟糕的投资决策。我做的比查理多。我喜欢认为这是因为我做的决策更多，但我的成功率可能更差。（笑）但我无法回忆起在伯克希尔的历史上，我们做过任何情绪化的决策。

I know the movie had Jamie Lee [Curtis] in there, (Laughter) but that was for laughs. I mean, Jamie Lee, she’s good, but she’s not good enough to get me or Charlie to make an emotional decision. (Laughter) Charlie, I’m sure you have something to add on that.

我知道电影里有杰米·李·柯蒂斯，（笑）但那是为了搞笑。我的意思是，杰米·李，她很好，但还不足以让我或查理做出情绪化的决定。（笑）查理，我相信你对此有一些补充。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s a different movie than is shown in most corporate meetings. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，这部电影与大多数公司会议上展示的不同。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But have we ever made an emotional decision?

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们曾经做过情绪化决策吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s in business we’re talking about. Yeah, no. You don’t want to be a no emotion person in all of your life, but you definitely want to be a no emotion person in making an investment or business decision.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们谈论的是商业。是的，不。你不想在生活中成为一个没有情感的人，但在做投资或商业决策时，你绝对想成为一个没有情感的人。

You can argue that we’ve probably made an emotional decision, perhaps, when a manager has been with us for some period, and we’ve ignored the fact that perhaps they weren’t quite what they were earlier.

你可以说我们可能做出了情感上的决定，也许当一位经理与我们在一起一段时间后，我们忽视了他们可能不再像以前那样。

But our businesses are so good that they run better sometimes when — I mean, I’ve talked about Wesco, for example, the wonderful Louis Vincenti. And it ran on automatic pilot for a while, but I don’t think we suffered by it. But you can argue if Louis as much as we did, we might’ve spotted it a little bit earlier. But I don’t think it made any difference in the results. Would you agree with that, Charlie?

但我们的业务非常好，有时在自动驾驶状态下运行得更好——我的意思是，我举了 Wesco 的例子，出色的路易斯·文森特。它曾经在自动驾驶状态下运行了一段时间，但我认为我们并没有因此受到影响。不过你可以争辩说，如果路易斯像我们一样关注，我们可能会稍早发现一些问题。但我认为这对结果没有任何影响。你同意这个观点吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, (UNINTEL PHRASE) with it. I’m glad we the way we did at Wesco. By the way, we bought the thing for a few tens of millions, and it became worth $2 billion or $3 billion.

查理·芒格：是的，（无法识别的短语）与之相关。我很高兴我们在 Wesco 的做法。顺便说一下，我们以几千万的价格买下了它，现在价值 20 亿或 30 亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that wasn’t common in the savings and loan business, as you may have noticed. (Laugh) They really went crazy in that industry, and we had a wonderful guy in Louis.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这在储蓄和贷款行业并不常见，正如你可能注意到的那样。（笑）他们在那个行业真的疯狂了，我们有一个很棒的人，路易斯。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We didn’t go crazy.

查理·芒格：我们没有失去理智。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we didn’t go crazy. Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们没有疯狂。是的。

7. Jain: GEICO’s technology is ‘still a work in progress’

Jain: GEICO 的技术“仍在不断进步中”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Ben Knoll in Minneapolis. He says he’s a Berkshire shareholder of three decades and he’s attended many Berkshire meetings. He’s here again this year.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自明尼阿波利斯的本·诺尔。他说他是伯克希尔的股东已有三十年，并且参加过许多伯克希尔的会议。今年他又来了。

And this is addressed to Ajit and Greg. He says, “Last year I asked you about how GEICO and BNSF appeared to lose ground to their leading competitors, GEICO on telematics and BNSF on precision scheduled railroading.

这个问题是写给 Ajit 和 Greg 的。他说：“去年我问过你们，为什么 GEICO 和 BNSF 似乎在各自的主要竞争对手面前失去了优势，GEICO 在远程信息处理方面，BNSF 在精确调度铁路方面。”

“Ajit, you responded by saying how you expected GEICO to make progress in about a year or two. Greg, you spoke about your pride in BNSF, but you didn’t directly address the threat of precision scheduled railroading. Will each of you please provide perspective on these competitive challenges and our company’s strategies to address them?”

“Ajit，你回应说你预计 GEICO 将在一年或两年内取得进展。Greg，你谈到了对 BNSF 的自豪感，但你没有直接提到精确调度铁路的威胁。请你们每位提供一下对这些竞争挑战的看法，以及我们公司的应对策略？”

AJIT JAIN: In terms of GEICO and telematics, let me make the observation that GEICO has certainly taken the bull by the horns and has made rapid strides in terms of trying to bridge the gap in terms of telematics and its competitors. They have now reached a point where on all new business, close to 90% has a telematics input to the pricing position.

AJIT JAIN：关于 GEICO 和远程信息处理，我想指出，GEICO 确实迎头赶上，在缩小远程信息处理与竞争对手之间的差距方面取得了快速进展。他们现在已经达到一个阶段，在所有新业务中，近 90%的定价都与远程信息处理相关。

非常高的比例，比PGR还要高。

Unfortunately, less than half of that is being taken up by the policyholders. The other point I want to make is even though we have made improvements in terms of bridging the gap on telematics, we still haven’t started to realize the true benefit.

不幸的是，保单持有者所占的比例不到一半。我还想提到的是，尽管我们在弥补远程信息处理差距方面取得了一些进展，但我们仍然没有开始真正实现其好处。

And the real culprit of the bottleneck is technology. GEICO’s technology needs a lot more work than I thought it did. It has more than 600 legacy systems that don’t really talk to each other. And we are trying to compress them to no more than 15, 16 systems that all talk to each other.

真正的瓶颈罪魁祸首是技术。GEICO 的技术比我想象中需要更多的改进。它有超过 600 个遗留系统，这些系统之间并没有真正的沟通。我们正在努力将它们压缩到不超过 15、16 个能够相互沟通的系统。

That’s a monumental challenge, and because of that, even though we have made improvements in telematics, we still have a long way to go because of technology. Because of that, and because of the whole issue more broadly in terms of matching rate to risk, GEICO is still a work in progress.

这是一个巨大的挑战，因此尽管我们在远程信息处理方面取得了进展，但由于技术原因，我们仍然任重道远。因此，考虑到更广泛的匹配率与风险的问题，GEICO 仍在不断完善中。

I don’t know if any of you had a chance to look at the first quarter results, but GEICO has had a very good first quarter, coming in at a combined ratio of 93 and change, which means a margin of six and change. Even though that’s very good, it’s not something we can take to the bank because there are two unusual items that contributed to it.

我不知道你们是否有机会查看第一季度的业绩，但 GEICO 在第一季度表现非常好，综合比率为 93 多一点，这意味着利润率为六多一点。尽管这非常好，但我们不能对此过于乐观，因为有两个异常项目对此有所贡献。

Firstly, we’ve had what is called prior year reserve releases. We’ve reduced reserves for the previous years, and that contributed to it. And secondly, every year the first quarter tends to be a seasonally good quarter for auto insurance writers.

首先，我们进行了所谓的前一年准备金释放。我们减少了前几年的准备金，这对此有所贡献。其次，每年第一季度通常是汽车保险承保商的季节性好季度。

So, if you adjust for those two factors, my guess is the end of the year GEICO will end up with a combined ratio just south of 100, as opposed to the target they’re shooting for is 96. I hope they reach the target of 96 by the end of next year.

所以，如果你考虑这两个因素，我猜到年底时 GEICO 的综合比率会略低于 100，而他们的目标是 96。我希望他们在明年年底前能达到 96 的目标。

But instead of getting too excited about it, I think it’s important to realize that even if you reach 96 it will come at the expense of having lost policyholders. There is a trade-off between profitability and growth, and clearly, we are going to emphasize profitability and not growth. And that will come at the expense of policyholders.

但我认为，与其对此过于兴奋，不如意识到即使你达到了 96，这也会以失去保单持有者为代价。盈利和增长之间存在权衡，显然，我们将强调盈利而不是增长。这将以保单持有者为代价。

So, it will not be until two years from now that we’ll be back on track, fighting the battles on both the profitability and growth fronts.

所以，我们要到两年后才能回到正轨，在盈利和增长两个方面进行斗争。

8. Abel: BNSF continues to work on efficiency and safety improvements

阿贝尔：BNSF 继续致力于提高效率和安全性。

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg? Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？是的。

GREG ABEL: Moving to BNSF, I’ll start again by expressing great pride in the BNSF team. We have an exceptional group led by [CEO] Katie [Farmer] and her managers that show up every day to do great work on the railroad. At the same time, they would be the first to acknowledge there’s more to be done there.

格雷格·阿贝尔：转到 BNSF，我首先要表达对 BNSF 团队的巨大自豪感。我们有一支出色的团队，由[首席执行官]凯蒂[法默]和她的管理者领导，他们每天都在铁路上做出卓越的工作。同时，他们也会首先承认还有更多的工作要做。

The specific reference to precision scheduled railroading, the other large Class A railroads in the U.S. follow that, and including the two in Canada. We’re well aware what they’re doing, and obviously pay close attention to their operating metrics.

具体提到精确调度铁路运输，美国其他大型 A 级铁路公司也在遵循这一模式，包括加拿大的两家。我们非常清楚他们的做法，显然会密切关注他们的运营指标。

And our team strives every day to be more efficient, obviously. I would say we balance it with the needs of our customers. If I look back to pre-2022, so we look at the three-year period of 2019, 2020, 2021, the BNSF team made significant progress on their efficiencies, and delivering overall value back to the shareholders and to their customers.

我们的团队每天都在努力提高效率，显然。我会说我们在满足客户需求和提高效率之间取得了平衡。如果我回顾 2022 年前的情况，看看 2019、2020 和 2021 这三年，BNSF 团队在提高效率方面取得了显著进展，并为股东和客户提供了整体价值。

And at the same time, maintaining a very safe railroad for our employees. So, we’re making excellent progress. That didn’t stop last year. They made great progress.

同时，为我们的员工维护一条非常安全的铁路。因此，我们正在取得优异的进展。这并没有在去年停止。他们取得了很大的进展。

Again, the reality in 2022 is we did go through a period of time where we had to call it, “Reset the Railroad.”

再次，2022 年的现实是，我们确实经历了一段时间，我们不得不称之为“重置铁路”。

We came out of the pandemic, there were the supply challenges. We had certain other labor issues and other things going on at the port.

我们走出了疫情，但面临供应挑战。我们还有一些其他的劳动力问题和港口的其他情况。

And the reality is, our team prioritized getting the railroad back in place for the long-term, not a short-term focus on hitting certain operating metrics in 2022. We’re well aware of where we were relative to those metrics.

现实是，我们的团队优先考虑的是将铁路恢复到长期状态，而不是在 2022 年短期内关注某些运营指标。我们非常清楚我们在这些指标上的位置。

But the real focus was to get the railroad reset in a safe manner so it could deliver long-term value and long-term service to our customers. And that’s really what we’ll continue to see with that team.

但真正的重点是以安全的方式重置铁路，以便为我们的客户提供长期价值和长期服务。这正是我们将继续在那个团队中看到的。

There’ll be continual progress. There’ll be years where it’s not as quick, or even we go backwards. But over the long-term, we’ll see exceptional results from that team, and couldn’t be more proud that we have that asset. Thank you. (Applause)

会持续进步。有些年份进展不会那么快，甚至可能会倒退。但从长远来看，我们会看到那个团队的卓越成果，我们为拥有这样的资产感到无比自豪。谢谢。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would just — well, he deserves — but both of them deserve applause.

沃伦·巴菲特：我只是——好吧，他值得——但他们两个都值得掌声。

软件系统上的努力比想象中需要更大的投入。

9. Todd Combs doing ‘wonderful job’ running GEICO

托德·科姆斯在管理 GEICO 方面做得“非常出色”

WARREN BUFFETT: I would like to add one thing. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想补充一点。（掌声）

At GEICO, Todd Combs was Ajit’s choice and my choice to go back to GEICO to work on the problem of matching rate to risk, which is what insurance is all about. And he arrived with exquisite timing, right before the pandemic broke out and all kinds of things changed.

在 GEICO，Todd Combs 是 Ajit 和我选择回到 GEICO 解决与风险匹配的费率问题的人，这正是保险的核心所在。他的到来时机恰到好处，就在疫情爆发之前，所有事情都发生了变化。

But Todd is doing a wonderful job at GEICO. And he works closely with Ajit. He has a home in Omaha, he comes back here, and we get together on the weekend sometimes too. So, that’s been a remarkable accomplishment under difficult circumstances. And he’s not all the way home, but he’s made a very, very big change in multiple ways at GEICO.

但托德在 GEICO 的表现非常出色。他与阿吉特密切合作。他在奥马哈有一个家，偶尔也会回来，我们有时会在周末聚会。因此，在困难的情况下，这是一项了不起的成就。他还没有完全回家，但他在 GEICO 的多个方面做出了非常大的改变。

And one other thing I would like to mention, there have been a lot of public companies created in the last decade or thereabouts in insurance. And there’s none of them that we would like to own, and they always started out in their perspective saying, “This is a tech company, not an insurance company.”

还有一件我想提到的事情是，在过去十年左右的时间里，出现了很多上市公司专注于保险。但我们没有一家想要拥有，他们总是以“这是一家科技公司，而不是保险公司”来开始他们的叙述。

Of course, they’re a tech company. Everybody, whether they’re insurance or a lot of other places, are using the facility but you still have to properly match rate to risk. And they invariably have reported huge losses, they’ve eaten up capital.

当然，他们是一家科技公司。无论是保险公司还是其他许多地方，大家都在使用这个设施，但你仍然必须正确地将费率与风险匹配。他们不可避免地报告了巨额损失，消耗了资本。

But there’s been one company that nobody has generally heard of. There’s only been one that I know of, company started in the last ten years, that has been an overwhelming success. And that’s a company that Ajit and four people who joined with him set to develop a new business. It’s called Berkshire Hathaway Specialty. What’s the float, Ajit?

但有一家公司，通常没有人听说过。在过去十年中，我知道的只有一家公司取得了压倒性的成功。那就是Ajit和他的四个合伙人创建的公司，叫做Berkshire Hathaway Specialty。Ajit，浮存金是多少？

AJIT JAIN: Coming up to $12 billion.

阿吉特·贾因：即将达到 120 亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve built more float than probably all these companies combined. It’s cost us essentially nothing in terms of an underwriting loss. The four people have turned into, I don’t know, 1,500 around the world. We took on the whole industry and we brought some unique talent in the four people that came.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们建立的浮动资金可能超过所有这些公司的总和。在承保损失方面，这几乎没有给我们带来任何成本。这四个人变成了，我不知道，全球大约 1500 人。我们挑战了整个行业，并引入了四位独特的人才。

And now have, like I said, 1,500 or so worldwide. And we brought capital, and we brought capabilities that really only Berkshire could supply. So, it was the combination of brains, and talent, and energy, and money.

现在，正如我所说，全球大约有 1500 个。我们带来了资本，也带来了只有伯克希尔才能提供的能力。因此，这是智慧、才能、精力和资金的结合。

And no one has really successfully entered this space — plenty of people in the space who didn’t like us coming. And we did it without it costing us a dime of entry. And it’s been unmatched by any of the companies that went public. And people have seen us do it, but they can’t duplicate it.

而且没有人真正成功进入这个领域——很多人不喜欢我们进入这个领域。我们做到这一点没有花费一分钱的入场费。而且这是任何上市公司都无法比拟的。人们看到我们做到这一点，但他们无法复制。

And that’s what Ajit has created. And Peter Eastwood has led this group, Berkshire Hathaway Specialty. And it’s just remarkable. So, anyway, with that — let’s go on — give them a hand for that. (Applause)

而这就是阿吉特所创造的，Peter Eastwood领导了这个团队，Berkshire Hathaway Specialty。这真是令人惊叹。所以，无论如何，接下来——为他们鼓掌吧。（掌声）

10. Munger on AI: ‘Old-fashioned intelligence works pretty well’

芒格谈人工智能：“老式智慧运作得相当不错”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to section two.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们进入第二部分。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie. Hi, Warren. I’m Karen, here from Singapore.

观众成员：嗨，查理。嗨，沃伦。我是凯伦，来自新加坡。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m glad you got that in. Your priorities are right.

沃伦·巴菲特：我很高兴你提到了这一点。你的优先事项是正确的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I have questions on AI and robotics. Here’s my questions. As AI and robotics continue to advance, what do you believe will be the positive and the negative impacts of this technology on both the stock market and society as a whole? And there any specific industries and companies that you believe will be most impacted? (Applause)

观众成员：是的。我对人工智能和机器人技术有一些问题。我的问题是：随着人工智能和机器人技术的不断进步，您认为这项技术对股市和整个社会的积极和消极影响是什么？您认为有哪些特定行业和公司会受到最大的影响？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Karen, I thank you for asking Charlie that question. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：卡伦，谢谢你问查理那个问题。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you went into BYD’s factories in China, you would see robotics going at an unbelievable rate. So, we’re going to see a lot more robotics in the world. I am personally skeptical of some of the hype that has gone into artificial intelligence. I think old-fashioned intelligence works pretty well. (Laughter) (Applause)

查理·芒格：好吧，如果你走进比亚迪在中国的工厂，你会看到机器人以惊人的速度运作。所以，我们将会看到世界上有更多的机器人。我个人对一些关于人工智能的炒作持怀疑态度。我认为传统的智力运作得相当不错。（笑声）（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There won’t be anything in AI that replaces Ajit. State that unqualifiedly. It can do amazing things. You know, Bill Gates brought me out maybe not the latest version, but one he thought maybe I could handle. (Laugh) He has to be careful with me, in terms of leading me too fast.

沃伦·巴菲特：在人工智能中不会有任何东西能取代阿吉特。毫无保留地说这一点。它可以做惊人的事情。你知道，比尔·盖茨带我出来的可能不是最新版本，但他认为我也许能应付得了。（笑）他必须小心对我来说，不能让我走得太快。

And it did these remarkable things. But it couldn’t tell jokes. Bill told me that ahead of time, and it prepared me. And it just isn’t there. But you know, with things like checking all the legal opinions, you know, since the beginning of time and everything, and eliminating all the — I mean, it can do all kinds of things.

它做了这些了不起的事情。但它不会讲笑话。比尔提前告诉我这一点，这让我有了心理准备。它就是不具备这个能力。但你知道，像检查所有法律意见这样的事情，自古以来的所有事情，以及消除所有的——我的意思是，它可以做各种各样的事情。

And when something can do all kinds of things, I get a little bit worried because I know we won’t be able to un-invent it. And you know, we did invent, for a very, very good reason, the atom bomb in World War II. And it was enormously important that we did so.

当某样东西能够做各种各样的事情时，我会有点担心，因为我知道我们无法将其重新发明。而且你知道，我们在第二次世界大战中发明了原子弹，原因非常充分。而我们这样做是极其重要的。

But is it good for the next 200 years of the world that the ability to do so has been unleashed? We didn’t have any choice.

但这种能力的释放对未来 200 年的世界是否有好处？我们没有选择。

When you start something — well, Einstein said after the atom bomb, he said, “This has changed everything in the world except how men think.”

当你开始某件事时——好吧，爱因斯坦在原子弹之后说过，他说：“这改变了世界上的一切，除了人们的思维方式。”

And I would say the same thing may — not the same thing — I don’t mean that — but I mean with AI, it can change everything in the world except how men think and behave. And that’s a big step to take. It’s a good question, and it’s the best answer we can give.

我会说同样的事情可能——不是同样的事情——我不是这个意思——但我的意思是，人工智能可以改变世界上的一切，除了人类的思维和行为。这是一个很大的挑战。这是个好问题，也是我们能给出的最佳答案。

11. Munger: Commercial real estate downturn will be ‘quite significant and quite unpleasant’

芒格：商业房地产下滑将是“相当显著且相当不愉快的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Tom Seymour. He says, “The first sentence of a recent Financial Times article read, ‘Charlie Munger has warned of a brewing storm in the U.S. commercial property market with American banks full of what he said were bad loans as property prices fall.’

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自汤姆·西摩。他说：“最近《金融时报》的一篇文章的第一句话是，‘查理·芒格警告称，美国商业房地产市场正酝酿风暴，随着房地产价格下跌，美国银行充满了他所说的不良贷款。’”

“Please elaborate on what’s going on in commercial real estate. How bad will the losses be, and what sectors or geographies look particularly bad?”

“请详细说明商业房地产的情况。损失会有多严重，哪些行业或地区看起来特别糟糕？”

I’ll just add an addendum from another viewer who wrote in and wanted to know if Berkshire would be more active in commercial real estate as a result.

我只想补充一位其他观众的附录，他写信询问伯克希尔是否会因此在商业房地产方面更加活跃。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Berkshire’s never been very active in commercial real estate. It works better for taxable investors than it does for corporations to act the way that Berkshire is. So, I don’t anticipate huge effects on Berkshire. But I do think that the hollowing out of the downtowns in the United States and elsewhere in the world is going to be quite significant and quite unpleasant.

查理·芒格：嗯，伯克希尔在商业房地产方面从来没有很活跃。这对应税投资者来说比对像伯克希尔这样的公司更有效。因此，我不预期对伯克希尔会有巨大影响。但我确实认为，美国及世界其他地方市中心的空心化将会非常显著且相当不愉快。

I think the country will get through it all right, but as they say, it will often involve a different set of owners.

我认为这个国家会顺利度过，但正如他们所说，这通常会涉及一组不同的所有者。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and the buildings don’t go away, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，建筑不会消失，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The owners do.

查理·芒格：拥有者会不一样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (Laughter) but most people like to buy with non-recourse in real estate. And one time I asked Charlie, there was some real estate guy, we were talking to him, you know, “How do they decide how much a building like this is worth?” And the answer is, “It’s whatever they can borrow without signing their name.”

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，（笑）但大多数人喜欢在房地产中以无追索权的方式购买。有一次我问查理，有一个房地产的人，我们在和他谈话，你知道，“他们是如何决定像这样的建筑值多少钱的？”答案是，“这取决于他们能借到多少而不签名。”

And if you look at real estate generally, you’ll understand the phenomenon that’s happening if you remind yourself that that’s the attitude of most people that have become big in the real estate business. And it does mean that the lenders are the ones that get the property.

如果你普遍观察房地产，你会理解正在发生的现象，如果你提醒自己，大多数在房地产行业取得成功的人都是这种态度。这确实意味着贷款人是获得财产的人。

And of course, they don’t want the property usually, so the real estate operator counts on negotiating with them, and the banks tend to, you know, extend and pretend. And there’s all kinds of activities that (UNINTEL) about us out of commercial real estate development, which occurs on a big scale.

当然，他们通常不想要这块物业，因此房地产运营商依靠与他们谈判，而银行往往会延续和假装。而且在商业房地产开发中，有各种各样的活动（无法识别）发生，这种开发是大规模进行的。

But it all has consequences, and I think we’re starting to see the consequences of people who could borrow at 2.5%, and find out it doesn’t work at current rates, and they hand it back to somebody that gave them all the money they needed to build it. Charlie’s had more experience. Charlie got his start in real estate, though.

但这一切都有后果，我认为我们开始看到那些能够以 2.5%借款的人所面临的后果，他们发现以当前利率借款行不通，然后把它交还给那些给他们提供了建造所需资金的人。查理的经验更丰富。查理虽然是从房地产开始的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, it’s difficult. I like what we do better. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，这很困难。我更喜欢我们所做的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as Charlie once said to me when I was leaving his house a few months ago — I was visiting him, we talked for a couple of hours. And as I left, there wasn’t anybody else in the house except one daughter. I said, “Charlie, I’ll just keep doing what we’ve been doing.” And Charlie, without looking up or pausing a second, said, “That’s all you know how to do, Warren.” (Laughter) He was right too.

沃伦·巴菲特：几个月前我离开查理家时，他曾对我说——我去拜访他，我们聊了几个小时。当我离开时，家里除了一个女儿外没有其他人。我说：“查理，我会继续做我们一直在做的事情。”查理没有抬头，也没有停顿一下，说：“这就是你唯一会做的，沃伦。”（笑声）他也是对的。

12. ′ What gives you opportunities is other people doing dumb things’

给你机会的是别人的愚蠢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Station three, is it?

沃伦·巴菲特：是第三站吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is (UNINTEL PHRASE), I’m from Santa Clara, California. And my question is to Charlie and Warren. Given the rise of disruptive technologies that can improve productivity significantly, and AI being one of them, how do you envision the future of value investing in this new era? And what adaptations or new principles do you think investors should adopt? And any recommendations for investors to remain successful in this rapid changing landscape? Thank you.

观众成员：你好。我叫（无法识别的短语），我来自加利福尼亚州圣克拉拉。我的问题是问查理和沃伦。考虑到颠覆性技术的崛起，这些技术可以显著提高生产力，而人工智能就是其中之一，你们如何看待在这个新时代中价值投资的未来？你们认为投资者应该采取什么适应措施或新原则？对于投资者在这个快速变化的环境中保持成功，有什么建议吗？谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m glad to take that one. I think value investors are going to have a harder time now that there’s so many of them competing for a diminished bunch of opportunities. So, my advice to value investors is to get used to making less.

查理·芒格：好吧，我很高兴回答这个问题。我认为，随着竞争者越来越多，价值投资者在有限的机会中将面临更大的挑战。因此，我对价值投资者的建议是，要习惯于赚得更少。

WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie has been telling me the same thing the whole time we’ve known each other. I mean, we get along wonderfully because —

沃伦·巴菲特：查理一直在告诉我，我们认识的整个时间里都是同样的事情。我的意思是，我们相处得非常愉快，因为——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we are making less.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们的产量在减少。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, but that mostly I think is (Laughter) (UNINTEL PHRASE) —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不过，我认为这主要是（笑声）（听不清的短语）——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We did that when we were younger.

查理·芒格：我们年轻时就这样做过。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we never thought we could manage $508 billion.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们从未想过我们能管理 5080 亿美元。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we never did.

查理·芒格：不，我们从来没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, but I would argue that there are going to be plenty of opportunities. And part of the reason there are going to be plenty of opportunities, the tech doesn’t make any difference for any of that. I mean, if you look at how the world’s changed in the years since 1942 when I started, you’d say, “Well, how does a kid that doesn’t know anything about airplanes, that doesn’t know anything about engines and cars, and doesn’t know anything about electricity and all that?” But new things coming along don’t take away the opportunities.

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，我认为会有很多机会。之所以会有很多机会，部分原因是技术对这些没有任何影响。我的意思是，如果你看看自 1942 年我开始以来世界的变化，你会说：“那么，一个对飞机一无所知、对引擎和汽车一无所知、对电力和所有这些一无所知的孩子，怎么可能呢？”但是新事物的出现并不会减少机会。

What gives you opportunities is other people doing dumb things. (Laughter) (Applause) Well, the 58 years we’ve been running Berkshire, I would say there’s been a great increase in the number of people doing dumb things. And they do big, dumb things, and the reason they do it to some extent is because they can get money from other people so much easier than when we started.

给你机会的是其他人做傻事。（笑声）（掌声）好吧，在我们经营伯克希尔的 58 年里，我可以说做傻事的人数大大增加了。他们做出大而傻的事情，部分原因是他们比我们刚开始时更容易从其他人那里获得资金。

So, you could start ten or 15 dumb insurance companies in the last ten years, and you could become rich if you were adroit at it, whether the business succeeded or not, and the underwriters got paid, and the lawyers got paid. And if that’s done on a large scale — which it couldn’t be done 58 years ago.

所以，在过去十年里，你可以创办十家或十五家愚蠢的保险公司，如果你足够灵巧，无论业务是否成功，你都可以变得富有，而承保人和律师都能获得报酬。如果这种情况在大规模上发生——而这在 58 年前是无法做到的。

You couldn’t get the money to do some of the dumb things that we wanted to do, (Laugh) fortunately. And so, I think that investing has disappeared so much from this huge capitalistic market that anybody can play in, but that the big money is in selling other people ideas.

你无法获得资金去做我们想做的一些愚蠢的事情，（笑）这真是幸运。因此，我认为投资在这个巨大的资本主义市场中已经消失得如此之多，任何人都可以参与，但大钱在于出售其他人的想法。

It isn’t outperforming. And I think if you don’t run too much money, which we do — but if you’re running small amounts of money, I think the opportunities will be greater. But then Charlie and I always differed on this subject. He likes to tell me how gloomy the world is, and I like to tell him, “We’ll find something.” And so far, we’ve both be kind of right. (Laugh) Charlie, would you budge an inch on that, or not? (Laughter)

这并没有超出预期。我认为如果你不投入太多资金，我们确实如此——但如果你投入少量资金，我认为机会会更大。但查理和我在这个问题上总是有不同的看法。他喜欢告诉我世界有多阴暗，而我喜欢告诉他，“我们会找到解决办法。”到目前为止，我们俩都算是对的。（笑）查理，你会在这方面让步一点吗，还是不会？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: There is so much money now in the hands of so many smart people, all trying to outsmart one another and out-promote one another, getting more money out of other people. And it’s a radically different world from the world we started in. And I suppose it will have its opportunities, but it’s also going to have some unpleasant episodes.

查理·芒格：现在有这么多聪明的人手中掌握着大量资金，他们都在试图超越彼此，进行更好的推广，从其他人那里获取更多的钱。这与我们开始时的世界截然不同。我想这将带来一些机会，但也会有一些不愉快的事件。

WARREN BUFFETT: But they’re trying to outsmart each other in arenas that you don’t have to play. I mean, if you look at that government bond market, at the Treasury bill market, I mean, you have this one bill that’s out of line with the others, and went (UNINTEL PHRASE) $3 billion of it the other day.

沃伦·巴菲特：但他们试图在不必要参与的领域中相互超越。我是说，如果你看看政府债券市场，看看国库券市场，我的意思是，你有一张与其他债券不一致的票据，前几天有 30 亿美元的交易。

But the world is overwhelmingly short-term focused. And if you go to an investor relations call, they’re all trying to figure out how to fill out a sheet to show the earnings for the year. And the management is interested in feeding them expectations, so we’ll slightly be beaten.

但世界的关注点主要在短期内。如果你参加投资者关系电话会议，他们都在试图弄清楚如何填写一份表格来展示年度收益。而管理层则希望给他们提供预期，因此我们会稍微受到影响。

重点是决策的质量而不是决策的结果。

I mean, that is a world that’s made to order for anybody that’s trying to think about what you do that should work over five, or ten, or 20 years. And I just think that I would love to be born today, and go out with not too much money, and hopefully turn it into a lot of money. And Charlie would too, actually. (Laugh)

我的意思是，这个世界是为任何想要思考自己在五年、十年或二十年内应该做什么的人量身定制的。我只是觉得我希望今天出生，带着不太多的钱出去，希望能把它变成很多钱。查理其实也是这样想的。（笑）

He would find something to do, I will just guarantee you. And it wouldn’t be exactly the same as before, but he would have a big, big, big pile.

他会找到事情做，我可以保证。而且这不会和以前完全一样，但他会有一大堆。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would not like the thrill of losing my big pile into a small pile. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我不想体验把我的大堆钱变成小堆钱的刺激。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we might —

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们可能——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I like my big pile just the way it is. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我喜欢我的大堆就这样。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We agree on that, incidentally.

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，我们对此意见一致。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, we do. (Laughter) You’re one of the most extreme lovers of the big pile. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我们确实如此。（笑声）你是对大堆东西最极端的爱好者之一。（笑声）

13. AIG liability assumption deal is turning out to be ‘good but not great’

AIG 的责任承担交易被认为是“好但不出色”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question is for both Warren and Ajit. Comes from Jason Plonner (PH) in Livingston, New Jersey.

贝基·奎克：这个问题是问沃伦和阿吉特的。来自新泽西州利文斯顿的杰森·普洛纳（PH）。

He says, “In 2016, you entered into a very unique transition with AIG where you assumed up to $20 billion of liabilities in exchange for about $10 billion upfront. Can you please provide us with an update on this transition in light of the increase in interest rates?

他说：“在 2016 年，你与 AIG 进行了非常独特的过渡，你承担了高达 200 亿美元的负债，以换取大约 100 亿美元的预付款。请你就利率上升的情况下，给我们提供一下关于这一过渡的最新情况。”

And then in Tokyo just a few weeks ago, you talked about the risks of banks with assets that were susceptible to rising interest rates. Any insight as to how Berkshire liabilities are susceptible to duration would be appreciated.”

就在几周前的东京，你谈到了资产容易受到利率上升影响的银行风险。关于伯克希尔的负债如何受到久期影响的见解将不胜感激。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is that directed to Ajit, or me, or what?

沃伦·巴菲特：这是针对阿吉特，还是我，还是其他什么？

BECKY QUICK: Both. 贝基·奎克：两者都。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Let me introduce my one thing, but Ajit is the key to this. He’s the one that put the deal together. But we got handed $10 billion, we’ll say. But we weren’t restricted to putting that into bonds. So, interest rates affect us to some degree maybe, in terms of the deal we did with AIG, or anybody we would do a similar deal with like that.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。让我介绍一下我的一件事，但阿吉特是关键。他是促成这笔交易的人。但我们得到了 100 亿美元，我们可以这么说。但我们并没有被限制只能将其投入债券。因此，利率在某种程度上可能会影响我们，比如我们与 AIG 达成的交易，或者与任何类似的交易。

But we don’t have to put it in matching bonds or anything of the sort. It goes into a general pool of assets, which we manage, and the liquid assets now are $130 plus. But it is not set aside in some little compartment like people like to think.

但我们不必将其放入匹配的债券或类似的东西中。它进入一个我们管理的资产总池，现在的流动资产超过 1300亿美元。但它并没有像人们想象的那样被放在某个小隔间里。

Now, no other insurance company could do it. But they can’t think that way. They aren’t even used to thinking that way. But they can’t think that way because they don’t have our balance sheet. We account for 26% or something like that of the net worth of all property casualty companies in the United States.

现在，没有其他保险公司能够做到这一点。但他们不能那样想。他们甚至不习惯那样思考。但他们不能那样想，因为他们没有我们的资产负债表。我们占美国所有财产意外保险公司净资产的 26%或类似的比例。

So far, the payments that we have had to make have run modestly. And Ajit will correct me on this if I’m wrong, because he paid attention. The amount we have had to pay has run slightly below the amount we anticipated having to pay in terms of our share of the losses.

到目前为止，我们所需支付的款项相对较少。如果我错了，Ajit 会纠正我，因为他很关注。我们需要支付的金额略低于我们预期的损失份额。

But it served AIG’s purposes. It came to us where we are in a unique position. There’s nobody else that was able to write that, just like when we took on Lloyd’s. I mean, Lloyd’s said there was no choice other than Berkshire Hathaway when they essentially resuscitated their market by laying off a lot of liabilities on Berkshire Hathaway.

但这符合 AIG 的目的。它来到了我们这里，因为我们处于一个独特的位置。没有其他人能够做到这一点，就像我们接手Lloyd’s时一样。我的意思是，Lloyd’s说除了伯克希尔哈撒韦没有其他选择，因为他们通过将大量负债转移给伯克希尔哈撒韦基本上复苏了他们的市场。

So, we won’t see those deals very often. If they’re for $500 million or something like that, somebody else will go in there and offer more money. And everybody’s looking for money on Wall Street. But if they start talking with the deal like the AIG deal, there isn’t any other stop now. Correct me on all my numbers there, Ajit. (Laughter)

所以，我们不会经常看到那些交易。如果是 5 亿美元或类似的金额，其他人会进来出更高的价钱。华尔街上的每个人都在寻找资金。但如果他们开始谈论像 AIG 那样的交易，现在就没有其他选择了。Ajit，纠正我所有的数字。（笑声）

AJIT JAIN: No. One way to look at how the deal is performing since we did the deal is at the point in time when we did the deal, we had made certain projections of how much we will pay out each year. And what we do is monitor what the action payments are since the inception of the deal, and how does that compare with what we expected to pay out.

AJIT JAIN：不。我们可以通过一种方式来观察交易自达成以来的表现，那就是在我们达成交易时，我们对每年将支付的金额做出了一些预测。我们所做的是监测自交易开始以来的实际支付情况，以及这些支付与我们预期支付的金额之间的比较。

As Warren mentioned, these two numbers are very close to each other. More specifically, the actual payouts are 96% of what we had projected to pay out at this point in time, which is good but not great. We are still ahead of the curve. If we do end up paying out less than what we projected, not only would we have borrowed money at a very attractive rate, meaning significantly less than 4%, in addition to that we would have made a fee, which in 2015 dollars would be $1 million.

正如沃伦提到的，这两个数字非常接近。更具体地说，实际支付金额是我们在此时预计支付金额的 96%，这很好但还不算优秀。我们仍然走在前面。如果我们最终支付的金额低于我们的预期，不仅我们以非常有吸引力的利率借款，意味着显著低于 4%，此外我们还会获得一笔费用，按 2015 年的美元计算为 100 万美元。

So, we would’ve borrowed money at less than 4% and we would’ve made $1 million fee, which is slightly more than what we were expecting to do. So, net/net, we’re very happy with the deal, we’re happy we did it. But the game is not over. There are tort liabilities that are coming down the pike every second day. So, I’m cautiously optimistic that the deal will work out better than how we expected it to work out.

所以，我们本可以以不到 4%的利率借款，并赚取 100 万美元的费用，这比我们预期的稍微多一些。因此，总的来说，我们对这笔交易非常满意，我们很高兴我们做了这笔交易。但游戏还没有结束。每隔一天就会出现侵权责任。因此，我谨慎乐观地认为这笔交易的结果会比我们预期的更好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the really interesting thing is that within Berkshire, the casualty insurance companies have four times as much stockholder capital behind each dollar of premium value. Four times normal. And of course, we see the big deals. Who would you trust if you had a big liability you wanted to dump on somebody?

查理·芒格：嗯，真正有趣的是，在伯克希尔，财产保险公司每一美元的保费价值背后有四倍的股东资本。是正常水平的四倍。当然，我们看到大交易。如果你有一个想要转移给别人的大责任，你会信任谁？

WARREN BUFFETT: And we have $25 billion or more coming in from things other than insurance, uncorrelated to insurance, every year with no obligations. We don’t pay dividends. If we pay dividends, you know, and you cut your dividend, try going around trying to write insurance the next day.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们每年有 250 亿美元或更多来自与保险无关的其他来源，这些资金没有任何义务。我们不支付股息。如果我们支付股息，你知道的，如果你削减了股息，试着在第二天去写保险。

I mean, and it’s a business where people are counting on you to pay. And when we take that $10 billion, we don’t agree to put it in five-year bonds and ten-year bonds. We don’t even think that way. And the people that do business with us know that they have somebody like nobody else on those that’s going to be able to pay $10 billion no matter what happens to the economy.

我的意思是，这是一项人们指望你支付的业务。当我们拿到那 100 亿美元时，我们并不打算把它放在五年期和十年期的债券中。我们甚至不会那样考虑。与我们做生意的人知道，他们有一个像没有其他人一样的人，能够无论经济发生什么都能支付 100 亿美元。

So, it’s not only the presence of enormous strength in the insurance companies, it’s the fact we have all these earnings that essentially come in every month, we don’t have a lot of debt. I mean, we have debt at the railroad and the energy level. But in terms of the rest of the operation — And we don’t guarantee that debt, but it’s (UNINTEL).

所以，这不仅仅是保险公司拥有巨大的实力，还在于我们每个月基本上都有这些收入，我们没有很多债务。我的意思是，我们在铁路和能源方面有债务。但就其他业务而言——我们并不保证这些债务，但它是（无法识别）。

And there just isn’t another Berkshire, and Ajit recognizes that when he’s negotiating. So does the other party if the sums are big enough. There’s all kinds of people that love to get $500 million or $300 million, and they may think in terms of lending it out because that’s what their insurance companies can do at a somewhere higher rate. But that is not a game we play, and we don’t have any interest in playing in.

而且没有其他的伯克希尔，阿吉特在谈判时意识到这一点。如果金额足够大，另一方也会意识到这一点。有各种各样的人喜欢获得 5 亿美元或 3 亿美元，他们可能会考虑借出这些钱，因为这正是他们的保险公司可以以更高的利率做到的。但这不是我们所参与的游戏，我们对此没有任何兴趣。

14. Never write a will without input from your children

永远不要在没有孩子们的意见下写遗嘱

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station four?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，四号站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Marvin Blum, an estate planning lawyer from Fort Worth, Texas, home to many of your companies. In fact, Warren, I met you at the memorial for our beloved Paul Andrews, who was manager of TTI. I’d like to get your thoughts on a widespread problem in the world of estate planning.

观众成员：你好。我是马文·布卢姆，来自德克萨斯州沃斯堡的遗产规划律师，这里是你们许多公司的所在地。事实上，沃伦，我在我们亲爱的保罗·安德鲁斯的追悼会上见过你，他是 TTI 的经理。我想听听你对遗产规划领域普遍存在的问题的看法。

And that’s the failure of most parents to prepare the next generation for the inheritance coming their way. In particular, if the estate includes a family business, most parents fail to do business succession planning to plan for who’ll run the business on the day when, not if, the founder is no longer there to run it.

这就是大多数父母未能为下一代准备即将到来的遗产的失败。特别是，如果遗产包括一个家族企业，大多数父母未能进行商业继承规划，以计划在创始人不再能够管理企业的那一天，谁将来管理这个企业。

The kids aren’t prepared, unlike the other King Charles, not King Charlie Munger, (Laughter) who has been preparing for his job as King of England now for more than 70 years. I sometimes describe the situation like this: Picture a football game. At one end of the field is a quarterback.

孩子们没有准备好，不像其他的查尔斯国王，不是查理·芒格国王，（笑声）他已经为自己作为英格兰国王的工作准备了超过 70 年。我有时这样描述这个情况：想象一场足球比赛。在球场的一端是一个四分卫。

He has great skills; he throws a beautiful pass to the other end of the field. And at the other end of the field are the receivers. They’ve never been to a practice, they don’t know the rules of the game, they don’t know how to work together as a team. They’re clueless. So, the quarterback is the patriarch and the matriarch. The football is the inheritance or the family business, and the receivers are the kids. So, what are the odds that they’re going to catch the football and go score a touchdown? Probably only around 10%.

他技术高超；他将一个漂亮的传球扔到场地的另一端。而在场地的另一端是接球员。他们从未参加过训练，不知道比赛规则，也不知道如何作为一个团队合作。他们一无所知。因此，四分卫是家长。足球是遗产或家族生意，而接球员是孩子。那么，他们接住足球并得分的几率有多大呢？大概只有 10%左右。

WARREN BUFFETT: I have the picture. (Laughter) (Applause) Just because of my age, and to some extent because of things like the giving pledges, I probably observed as many particularly wealthy families, the problems, and they all are very particular to the family.

沃伦·巴菲特：我有这个画面。（笑声）（掌声）仅仅因为我的年龄，以及在某种程度上因为像捐赠承诺这样的事情，我可能观察到了许多特别富有的家庭，他们的问题都是非常特定于家庭的。

And in my family, I do not sign a will until my three children have read it, understand it, and made suggestions. Now, my children are in their 60s and that would not have been a great success if I’d done the same thing in their 20s. It depends on the family; it depends on how the kids feel about each other.

在我的家庭中，我不会在我的三个孩子阅读、理解并提出建议之前签署遗嘱。现在，我的孩子们已经 60 多岁了，如果我在他们 20 多岁时做同样的事情，那就不会取得很大的成功。这取决于家庭，也取决于孩子们彼此之间的感受。

There’s all kinds of things. Depends on the kind of business you have. So, there’s a thousand variables. But I do think that if the children are grown, and when the will is read to them, it’s the first they’ve heard about what the deceased thought about things, the parents have made a terrible mistake.

有各种各样的事情。这取决于你经营的业务类型。因此，有成千上万的变量。但我确实认为，如果孩子们已经长大，当遗嘱被读给他们时，这是他们第一次听到已故者对事情的看法，父母就犯了一个可怕的错误。

And I’ve run into all kinds of situations, and some people don’t tell their children anything, and some of them try and get them to bend to their will by using their own personal will. They make a million mistakes. And that’s one you don’t get to correct. Well, Charlie’s had a lot of experience too with the —

我遇到过各种情况，有些人什么都不告诉他们的孩子，有些人则试图通过自己的意志让孩子屈服。他们犯了无数错误。而这是一个你无法纠正的错误。好吧，查理在这方面也有很多经验——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at Berkshire we have a simple problem of estate planning. Just hold the goddamn stock. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：在伯克希尔，我们有一个简单的遗产规划问题。就是持有这该死的股票。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (Applause) but that doesn’t fit everybody, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，（掌声）但这并不适合每个人，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it only fits 95%. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不，这只适合 95%。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know necessarily whether if you have billions of dollars, you want to leave it to all of your children. I mean, that’s something —

沃伦·巴菲特：我不一定知道如果你有数十亿美元，你是否想把它留给你所有的孩子。我的意思是，这是一件——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s another question. But if you’re going to place it somewhere, I’d just as soon have Berkshire stock.

查理·芒格：嗯，那是另一个问题。但如果你要把它放在某个地方，我宁愿选择伯克希尔的股票。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, oh, you’re solving the investment problems one. But you have the personal problem of the fact that when they were four, one of the kids pulled the other kid’s cat’s tail or something like that. I mean, you’re dealing with human beings.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，哦，你在解决投资问题。但是你有个人问题，因为当他们四岁时，其中一个孩子拉了另一个孩子猫的尾巴之类的。我是说，你在处理人类。

And the biggest thing you want is you want your children to get along. And you want that all through your life, and the estate isn’t the only place where you can mess that up. But I mean, I know a number of cases where the people did not know what was in the will where there were huge sums involved.

你最希望的就是你的孩子们能够和睦相处。你希望这一点贯穿你的一生，而遗产并不是唯一可能破坏这一点的地方。但我的意思是，我知道有很多案例，那些人并不知道遗嘱中有什么，而涉及的金额却是巨大的。

And you know, within about 15 minutes each one of them had a lawyer, and you know, they don’t get along since. It’s important to handle it target. And if you want your kids to have certain values, it’s important that you live those values. It’s important that you talk about it to them. (Laugh)

你知道，在大约 15 分钟内，他们每个人都有了律师，你知道，他们从那以后就不和了。处理这个问题很重要。如果你希望你的孩子拥有某些价值观，重要的是你要践行这些价值观。重要的是你要和他们谈论这些。（笑）

They’re learning from you from the day they’re born, what you’re really like. And don’t think that a cleverly drawn will substitute for your own behavior in teaching your kids the values you hope that they will have. And then your will should be in conjunction with that.

他们从出生的那天起就开始向你学习，了解你真实的样子。不要认为巧妙的图画可以替代你在教导孩子们希望他们具备的价值观时的行为。然后你的意愿应该与此相结合。

And they grow older, and then they learn to pass along their values in connection with the size of the estate. If there’s family farms it’s one thing, if it’s a bunch of marketable securities it’s something else.

他们变得越来越成熟，然后他们学会将自己的价值观与遗产的大小联系起来。如果是家庭农场，那是一回事；如果是一堆可交易的证券，那又是另一回事。

But I know one instance by a particularly rich fellow that once a year he’d get his kids together, and have a dinner, and do all kinds of things to get them to sign their income tax returns in blank, because he didn’t want them to know how much money they had and everything.

但我知道一个特别富有的家伙，每年都会把他的孩子们聚在一起，举行晚宴，做各种事情让他们在空白的收入税表上签字，因为他不想让他们知道他们有多少钱和一切。

Well, that isn’t going to work. I mean, I don’t know necessarily what would’ve worked with him. But Charlie and I have said, if you want to figure out how you want to live your life, you write your obituary and reverse engineer it. You know, and Paul Andrews incidentally, who you mentioned at TTI, lived as great a life as anybody I’ve known.

好吧，这行不通。我是说，我不一定知道什么对他有效。但查理和我说过，如果你想弄清楚你想如何生活，你就写下你的讣告，然后反向工程。你知道，顺便提一下，你在 TTI 提到的保罗·安德鲁斯，过着我所知道的任何人都一样伟大的生活。

And he thought about these problems, and he came to me. He was 61, I think, had all the money way beyond what he needed. He liked to give it to people. He had all kinds of good things he wanted to do. And he said, “For a year I’ve been worried about my business, TTI.”

他考虑了这些问题，然后来找我。他 61 岁，我想，他的钱远远超过了他所需的。他喜欢把钱给别人。他有各种各样的好事想要做。他说：“我已经为我的生意 TTI 担心了一年。”

And he said, “I have all the money I need. The family has all the money they need. But what do I do with the business? These people have helped me throughout my life.” And he said, “I can sell it to a competitor. And if I sold it to a competitor, they’d fire my people and keep their people when they put it together.

他说：“我有我需要的所有钱。家人有他们需要的所有钱。但我该如何处理这项业务？这些人一生中都在帮助我。”他说：“我可以把它卖给竞争对手。如果我把它卖给竞争对手，他们会解雇我的员工，保留他们的员工。”

“And if I sell it to a private equity firm or something, they’ll be figuring out their exit strategy as they sign the papers.” And he said, “It isn’t that you’re such a great guy, it’s just that you’re the only one left.” (Laughter)

“如果我把它卖给一家私募股权公司，他们在签字的时候就会考虑他们的退出策略。”他说：“并不是说你是个好人，只是你是唯一剩下的人。”（笑声）

And we bought it, and we lived happily ever after. And that was a man that knew the life was about.

我们买下了它，过上了幸福快乐的生活。那是一个懂得生活意义的人。

15. BNSF takes derailments ‘incredibly seriously’

BNSF 对脱轨事件“极为重视”

WARREN BUFFETT: So, with that, let’s go onto Becky. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，接下来我们来听听贝基的意见。（掌声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Don Glickstein in Seattle. He says, “Warren has criticized Norfolk Southern’s handling of its train derailment, yet has been silent about BNSF’s conduct. A federal judge ruled in March that BNSF intentionally and illegally violated an easement agreement on tribal land in Washington State by transporting long trains of crude oil.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自西雅图的唐·格里克斯坦。他说：“沃伦批评了诺福克南方公司对火车出轨事件的处理，但对 BNSF 的行为却保持沉默。一位联邦法官在三月份裁定，BNSF 故意和非法违反了华盛顿州部落土地上的通行权协议，运输长列原油火车。”

“The same money the judge made his ruling a BNSF train derailed on tribal land, spilling oil in an environmentally sensitive area” What is Warren doing to ensure that BNSF and the Berkshire subsidiaries fulfill their ethical responsibilities? He says he’s been a Berkshire owner for more than two decades and he’s concerned that Berkshire has no systems to identify and address what he calls reprehensible behavior at BNSF and other subsidiaries?

“同样是在法官做出裁决时，一列 BNSF 火车在部落土地上出轨，导致油泄漏到一个环境敏感区域。”沃伦正在做什么来确保 BNSF 和伯克希尔子公司履行他们的道德责任？他说他已经是伯克希尔的股东超过二十年，他担心伯克希尔没有系统来识别和解决他所称的 BNSF 及其他子公司的可耻行为

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg? 沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？

GREG ABEL: Sure. It is a valid issue that our team obviously has been dealing with at BNSF. We did move crude across that tribal land. We had an agreement that allowed us to move X number of units per day. And we did breach it. We went over it. There were some fundamental breakdowns there that our team didn’t understand the number of trains that they could move.

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然。这是一个有效的问题，我们的团队显然在 BNSF 处理过。我们确实在那片部落土地上运输了原油。我们有一个协议，允许我们每天运输 X 数量的单位。我们确实违反了这个协议。我们超出了这个数量。我们的团队在理解他们可以运输的火车数量上出现了一些根本性的失误。

We have had significant discussions with the tribe looking to resolve the issues, recognizing we obviously benefited from moving those trains. And those type discussions will continue. I would say there’s lessons learned there that we have to, when we make a commitment, understand what that commitment is and live by it.

我们与部落进行了重要的讨论，旨在解决问题，认识到我们显然从运输这些列车中受益。这类讨论将会继续。我想说，我们在这里学到了教训，当我们做出承诺时，必须理解这个承诺是什么并遵守它。

Or don’t assume we can just move our trains as we wish or the cargo as we wish. We have to respect those agreements. There’s been a moment learned there. But at the same time, we’ve taken it very seriously and attempted to reach a resolution. And at some point, I hope we do come to a true resolution that’s fair both to the tribe and to BNSF.

或者不要假设我们可以随意移动我们的火车或货物。我们必须尊重这些协议。我们在这里学到了一个教训。但与此同时，我们非常认真地对待这个问题，并试图达成解决方案。希望在某个时刻，我们能够达成一个对部落和 BNSF 都公平的真正解决方案。

On the derailment side, we did have an issue around the track derailed. We worked very closely with the tribe to mitigate that issue instantly or at least over a very reasonable period of time. They were very responsive. Our team was very responsive. And there were really no long-term environmental impacts to that spill.

在脱轨方面，我们确实遇到了轨道脱轨的问题。我们与部落紧密合作，迅速或至少在合理的时间内缓解了这个问题。他们反应非常迅速。我们的团队也反应很快。实际上，这次泄漏没有造成长期的环境影响。

And as our teams highlighted in other comments, obviously derailments do occur in the industry. We take them incredibly seriously. They’re not all hazardous, but irrespective of that, we’re constantly looking at how do we prevent them. How do we detect them when we potentially have one that’s going to occur? And what do we do with our trains? And then ultimately it comes down responding properly. Because they will occur. And I think we have an incredibly dedicated team that’s always ready to respond to the communities they’re impacting.

正如我们的团队在其他评论中强调的，行业中显然会发生脱轨事件。我们对此非常重视。并非所有脱轨事件都是危险的，但无论如何，我们始终在寻找如何防止它们的方法。我们如何在可能发生脱轨时进行检测？我们该如何处理我们的列车？最终，这归结为如何正确响应。因为这些事件会发生。我认为我们有一支非常敬业的团队，始终准备好响应他们所影响的社区。

WARREN BUFFETT: There are derailments. How many a year?

沃伦·巴菲特：会有脱轨事件。每年有多少起？

GREG ABEL: Yeah, well, there’s a thousand-plus in the industry.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，行业里有一千多个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. You know, you start hauling freight, and we’re a common carrier. And we take very heavy freight. And we take them in 100° weather. And we take it at 0° and we go around curves. And we have grades. (Laugh) And even a 1% grade, if you’re going down a hill with, I don’t know how much weight behind you, I mean, railroading is not an easy business.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。你知道，你开始运输货物，我们是一个公共承运人。我们运输非常重的货物。我们在 100°F 的天气下运输。在 0°F 的天气下也运输，我们还要转弯。我们有坡度。（笑）即使是 1%的坡度，如果你在下坡，后面有，我不知道多少重量，我的意思是，铁路运输并不是一项简单的生意。

And of course, the systems were designed, you know, basically in the late 1800s, amid the late 1800s. And we have 22,000, I think it is, miles of track. And that doesn’t count sidings and some other things. It is not an easy business. We’ll make mistakes.

当然，这些系统基本上是在 19 世纪末设计的。我们有大约 22,000 英里（约 35,400 公里）的轨道。这还不包括侧线和其他一些设施。这不是一项简单的业务。我们会犯错误。

We’re not making a mistake because we have a derailment. We will have derailments ten, 20 years, or 30 years from now. And we have to carry certain products we wish we didn’t have to carry. We’re a common carrier. Do we like carrying chlorine and ammonia and all? No.

我们并不是因为发生了脱轨而犯错。我们在未来十年、二十年或三十年内都会发生脱轨。我们必须运输一些我们希望不必运输的特定产品。我们是一个公共承运人。我们喜欢运输氯和氨吗？不。

But they’re going to move from one place to another in this society. And we are a common carrier. And we load them if they select our railroad.

但他们将在这个社会中从一个地方移动到另一个地方。我们是一个公共承运人。如果他们选择我们的铁路，我们就会装载他们。

But we are better than we used to be. But we’ve got a long way to go. Is that a fair enough statement?

但我们比以前更好了。但我们还有很长的路要走。这算不算一个公平的说法？

GREG ABEL: Absolutely. 格雷格·阿贝尔：绝对如此。

16. Berkshire utilities focusing on clean energy but coordinated national effort is needed

伯克希尔公用事业公司专注于清洁能源，但需要协调的全国性努力。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station five.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Warren and Mr. Munger. My name is Soo Jing Hua (PH) from China, (FOREIGN LANGUAGE) company. And first of all, I’m so excited and very honored to be here today. And my question is: With more and more people focusing now on environmental competition protection and the government supporting the new energy industry as well, so what are your thoughts on the continued development of new energy? How may the new energy firms achieve better developments in the future?

观众成员：嗨，沃伦先生和芒格先生。我是来自中国的苏静华（音），（外语）公司。首先，我非常兴奋，也很荣幸今天能在这里。我的问题是：随着越来越多的人关注环境竞争保护，政府也在支持新能源产业，您对新能源的持续发展有什么看法？新能源公司未来如何才能实现更好的发展？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Greg I think, is the best to answer that because since we bought a company called MidAmerican but now called Berkshire Hathaway Energy. But he has been talking about it yearly, preparing reports hoping that we can help solve a number of the problems. And we probably spent more money than any utility, I would guess, in the United States.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为格雷格最适合回答这个问题，因为自从我们收购了一家名为中美能源的公司，现在称为伯克希尔哈撒韦能源。他每年都在谈论这个，准备报告，希望我们能帮助解决一些问题。我猜我们在美国可能花费了比任何公用事业公司更多的钱。

GREG ABEL: Absolutely. 格雷格·阿贝尔：绝对如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ve just scratched the surface. But it is not easy when you cross state lines. I mean, you’ve got different jurisdictions. And this country should be ahead of where it is in terms of transmission. We have been the biggest factor in helping that. But why don’t you tell them a little bit about it?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们才刚刚开始。但当你跨越州界时，这并不容易。我的意思是，你会面临不同的管辖权。这个国家在传输方面应该走在前面。我们在帮助这一点上发挥了最大的作用。但你为什么不告诉他们一点关于这方面的事情呢？

GREG ABEL: Sure, thanks, Warren. So, there’s no question there’s an energy transformation going on around the globe and as Warren touched on, in the U.S. And in some ways, I would hope here in the U.S. we’d at least have a clear plan across the nation as to how to approach that.

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然，谢谢，沃伦。所以，毫无疑问，全球正在进行能源转型，正如沃伦提到的，在美国也是如此。在某种程度上，我希望在美国我们至少能有一个全国范围内的清晰计划来应对这一问题。

But the reality is it is state by state with some exceptions. So, as a result, when you think of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we own three U.S. utilities there. And they all participate in multiple states. But they’re developing plans state by state and then trying to integrate them across the various states.

但现实情况是，各州情况不同，存在一些例外。因此，当你想到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源时，我们在美国拥有三家公用事业公司。它们都在多个州运营。但它们正在逐州制定计划，然后尝试在各州之间进行整合。

The opportunities are significant because there is a transformation going on. We’ve outlined our goal on where we’re going relative to carbon at BHE where they’ll by 2030 reduce their carbon footprint by 50% relative to 2005. So, that’s the Paris Accord and the standard they want to hold the utility industry or the utility companies to.

机会是显著的，因为正在发生转型。我们已经概述了在 BHE 相对于碳的目标，他们计划到 2030 年将碳足迹相对于 2005 年减少 50%。这就是巴黎协定，以及他们希望公用事业行业或公用事业公司遵循的标准。

And we’re well on that path. But to achieve it is a true journey. I’ve often talked to Warren. When we bought Pacific back in the mid-2000s, we immediately recognized to build a lot of renewable energy like we’ve been doing in the Midwest and Iowa.

我们在这条路上走得很好。但要实现这一目标是一段真正的旅程。我常常和沃伦谈话。当我们在 2000 年代中期收购太平洋时，我们立即意识到需要像我们在中西部和爱荷华州所做的那样，建设大量可再生能源。

有可能是买入OXY的原因。

But that was basically in a single state. Now PacifiCorp, we’re in six states. We started that back in the mid-2000s. Here we are. And we laid out a great transmission plan. Here’s how we’re going to build it. Here’s how we’re going effectuate it, and all the benefits for our customers over that period of time.

但那基本上是在一个州。现在，PacifiCorp，我们在六个州。我们在 2000 年代中期开始了这一切。现在我们在这里。我们制定了一个很好的输电计划。我们将如何建设它。我们将如何实施它，以及在这段时间内为我们的客户带来的所有好处。

Here we are in 2023, and we have a little more than a third of that. At the time it was a $6 billion transmission project. Today we have a little more than a third of it built. And we’ve spent probably closer to $7 billion. And it’s the right outcome.

我们现在是 2023 年，我们完成的项目略超过三分之一。当时这是一个 60 亿美元的输电项目。今天我们建成的部分略超过三分之一。我们花费的可能接近 70 亿美元。这是正确的结果。

It’s still a great outcome for our customers. But as part of the transformation, you absolutely have to build it to move all that renewable energy. And that’s sort of the complexity Warren was highlighting. You can’t just wake up one day and solve this problem.

这对我们的客户来说仍然是一个很好的结果。但作为转型的一部分，您绝对必须建立它以转移所有可再生能源。这就是沃伦所强调的复杂性。您不能仅仅在某一天醒来就解决这个问题。

You start with transmission, and then you build the resources. But at that same company, and if we look at what we’re doing across BHE Energy and that energy transformation, we have $70 billion of known projects that are really required to properly serve our customers and achieve that type of energy transformation across those utilities.

你从传输开始，然后再建立资源。但在同一家公司，如果我们看看 BHE 能源及其能源转型所做的工作，我们有 700 亿美元的已知项目，这些项目确实是为了更好地服务我们的客户，并实现这些公用事业的能源转型。

And that’s in the coming ten years. So, we have a team that’s absolutely up to the challenge. They’re delivering on their commitments. And it’s a very good business opportunity for each of our companies and for our shareholders. Because as we deploy that capital, we obviously earn a return on equity of it. But it will be a long journey. It’ll happen over an extended period of time. And the further you get out there, the more dependent upon the evolution of a variety of technologies that are progressing, but not there yet.

在接下来的十年里，我们有一支完全能够应对挑战的团队。他们正在履行自己的承诺。这对我们每家公司和我们的股东来说都是一个非常好的商业机会。因为当我们投入资本时，显然会获得相应的股本回报。但这将是一个漫长的旅程。这个过程将持续一段较长的时间。而且，越往后走，就越依赖于各种技术的进展，这些技术正在发展，但还没有到达成熟阶段。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’ve raised a question. I want to just take an extra minute now because it’s so important. And I don’t really know whether our form of government is ideal at all in terms of solving the problem you describe. We have solved it one time. In World War II, we took a country that was semi-limping along.

沃伦·巴菲特：你提出了一个问题。我想花一点额外的时间来讨论，因为这非常重要。我并不确定我们的政府形式在解决你所描述的问题上是否理想。我们曾经解决过一次。在第二次世界大战期间，我们接管了一个半瘫痪的国家。

And we found ourselves in a world war. And what we did in a world war is we brought a bunch of people to Washington at a $1 a year. I don’t know whether it was Sidney Weinberg or Goldman Sachs. You just name them. And we gave them enormous power to reorient the resources of the United States to face the problem that they faced, which was to create a war machine.

我们发现自己身处一场世界大战中。在世界大战中，我们把一群人以每年 1 美元的薪水带到了华盛顿。我不知道是西德尼·温伯格还是高盛。你随便说一个名字。我们赋予他们巨大的权力，以重新调整美国的资源来应对他们面临的问题，那就是建立一台战争机器。

And what they did was they found Henry Kaiser, you know, and told him to build ships. And they went to the Ford Motor Company and said, “You build tanks and some airplanes.” And they reordered the industrial enterprise of the United States in a way that was unbelievable.

他们所做的是找到亨利·凯泽，让他建造船只。他们去福特汽车公司，说：“你们建造坦克和一些飞机。”他们以一种难以置信的方式重新组织了美国的工业企业。

Because they had the power of the federal government. And they had the ingenuity of American business. And they had the facilities of American business. And it led to a very successful outcome. But can we do that in a peace time where you’ve got 50 states and you have to get them to cooperate?

因为他们拥有联邦政府的权力。并且他们拥有美国商业的创造力。还有美国商业的设施。这导致了非常成功的结果。但是在和平时期，我们能否做到这一点，面对 50 个州并让他们合作？

And you can issue orders. But you can’t designate where the capital goes. It’s the other end. And, you know, we try and do it with tax incentives and all of that sort of thing. But we haven’t created the unity of purpose and the machinery that worked in World War II where essentially everybody felt their one job was to win the war.

你可以发布命令，但你不能指定资金的去向。这是另一回事。我们试图通过税收激励和其他类似的方式来实现这一点。但我们没有创造出像第二次世界大战那样的共同目标和机制，当时每个人都觉得自己的唯一任务就是赢得战争。

And we figured out how to use our industrial capacity to in effect defeat the Axis powers. And how do you recreate that with, you know, the present democratic system? I’m not sure I know the answer. But I sure know the problem. And I think that if you’ve got an emergency on your hands, I mean, you really need to re-engineer the energy system of the United States.

我们想出了如何利用我们的工业能力来有效地击败轴心国。那你如何在现有的民主制度下重现这一点呢？我不确定我知道答案。但我确实知道这个问题。我认为如果你手头有紧急情况，实际上你真的需要重新设计美国的能源系统。

I don’t think you can do it without something resembling the machinery, the urgency, whatever. The capital’s there. The people are there. The objective is obvious. And we just don’t seem to be able to do it in a peace time where we’re used to following a given set of procedures.

我认为如果没有类似于机器、紧迫感之类的东西，你是做不到的。资本在这里。人们在这里。目标很明显。我们似乎无法在一个习惯于遵循既定程序的和平时期做到这一点。

And, you know, China’s one country. And we’ve got 50 states. And we got a whole different system of government.

而且，你知道，中国是一个国家。我们有 50 个州。我们有一个完全不同的政府体系。

We should be up to the test, but so far it hasn’t worked. So, thank you for the question.

我们应该能够应对这个考验，但到目前为止还没有成功。所以，谢谢你的提问。

17. Abel will decide on next generation of Berkshire managers

阿贝尔将决定下一代伯克希尔经理。

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky. 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Chris Freed in Philadelphia. He says, “We know that Greg Abel and Ajit Jain are the next generation of Berkshire leaders. Who are currently behind Greg and Ajit in their respective roles?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自费城的克里斯·弗里德。他说：“我们知道格雷格·阿贝尔和阿吉特·贾因是伯克希尔的下一代领导者。谁目前在格雷格和阿吉特各自的角色背后？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that will be the question. Well, Greg will be, absent some extraordinary circumstance, but he’s going to succeed me. And then he will be sitting in a position where he needs his equivalent or something closer to his equivalent, because he’s better at many things than I’ve been.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这将是一个问题。嗯，格雷格将会在没有任何特殊情况的情况下接替我。然后他将处于一个需要他的同等人或更接近他同等人的位置，因为他在许多方面比我更出色。

He will need that substitute. And when the question comes, we know Ajit’s opinion on that. But Greg will probably be the one that will make the final decision, I mean, being his responsibility. And Ajit will give him his best advice. And I think the odds are very, very, very high (Laugh) that Greg would follow it.

他需要那个替代品。当问题出现时，我们知道 Ajit 对此的看法。但 Greg 可能是做出最终决定的人，我是说，这是他的责任。Ajit 会给他最好的建议。我认为 Greg 采纳这个建议的可能性非常非常非常高（笑）。

But those are not easy questions. Everybody talks about the executive bench and all of that sort of thing, which is baloney. I mean, you know, they don’t have that many people that can run five of the largest net worth companies and all kinds of diverse businesses.

但这些问题并不简单。每个人都在谈论高管团队和那些事情，这都是胡说八道。我的意思是，你知道，他们并没有那么多人能够管理五家最大的净资产公司和各种不同的业务。

But you don’t need five people either. And you need a lot of good operating managers. And you need somebody at the top that allocates capital and makes sure that you’ve got the right operating manager. And we’ve designed something where we separate the insurance and the rest of the business.

但你也不需要五个人。你需要很多优秀的运营经理。你需要一个高层来分配资本，并确保你有合适的运营经理。我们设计了一种方式，将保险和其他业务分开。

And I think it’s a very good design. But we wouldn’t be smart to name that decision now about the two different areas of the business because a lot can change between now and then. And the most likely (Laugh) change is that this job changes. Charlie.

我认为这是一个非常好的设计。但我们现在给这两个不同业务领域的决定命名并不明智，因为从现在到那时会有很多变化。而最可能的（哈哈）变化是这个工作会改变。查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I got nothing to add. We have a lot of good people that have risen in the Berkshire subsidiaries. And there’s a reason why our operations have by and large done better than other big conglomerate companies. And one of them is that we change managers way less frequently than other people do. And that’s helped us.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。我们在伯克希尔的子公司中有很多优秀的人才。而且我们的运营总体上表现得比其他大型综合企业更好是有原因的。其中一个原因是我们更少更换管理层。这对我们有很大帮助。

WARREN BUFFETT: When Paul Andrews died, we knew who he thought should take over there. But there wasn’t any reason to announce that. I mean, we should live to be 100. We had one of our managers die not long ago. And how old was he, at Garan?

沃伦·巴菲特：当保罗·安德鲁斯去世时，我们知道他认为谁应该接管那里。但没有理由宣布这一点。我的意思是，我们应该活到 100 岁。我们不久前有一位经理去世。他在加兰时多大了？

GREG ABEL: Yeah, mid-90s, Seymour.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，90 年代中期，西摩。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Seymour Lichtenstein. And Seymour, I wrote him a letter when he was 80 and I said, you know, “I’m glad you’re 80. And I’ll write you again when you’re 90.” And (Laugh) I wrote him again when he was 90. And (Laugh) he didn’t make it to a hundred.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，西摩·利赫滕斯坦。西摩，我在他 80 岁时给他写了一封信，我说：“我很高兴你 80 岁了。我会在你 90 岁时再给你写信。”（笑）我在他 90 岁时又给他写了信。（笑）他没活到 100 岁。

But he had a terrific fellow following him. And he really managed it jointly, to some extent, as the years went by. But it’s case by case. And the main thing to do is have the right person running the whole place.

但他身后有一个了不起的伙伴。随着时间的推移，他确实在某种程度上共同管理。但这要具体情况具体分析。最重要的是要有合适的人来管理整个地方。

18. America has too much ‘tribalism’

美国的“部落主义”太严重了

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station six.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第六站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, my name is Hatch Okamamti (PH) from Miyazaki, Japan. Mr. Buffett, I was one of the 8,000 employees at Salomon Brothers that you saved. I was younger back then. I was working at 7 World Trade Center. I’ve always, always wanted to thank you in person for saving that company, its employees, including myself and my family. So, thank you, Mr. Buffett. (Applause)

观众成员：早上好，我叫哈奇·冈山（音）来自日本宫崎。巴菲特先生，我是你拯救的 8000 名所罗门兄弟员工之一。那时我还年轻。我在世贸中心 7 号楼工作。我一直想亲自感谢您拯救了那家公司及其员工，包括我和我的家人。所以，谢谢您，巴菲特先生。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause) And thank Deryck Maughan who actually had been over in Japan before that and who I met for the first time the day before I put him in. And it wouldn’t have worked if Deryck hadn’t come. So, whatever you taught him in Japan, (Laugh) thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你们。（掌声）还要感谢德里克·莫恩，他在此之前实际上已经去过日本，我是在把他放进来的前一天第一次见到他。如果没有德里克的到来，这一切都不会成功。所以，无论你在日本教了他什么，（笑）谢谢你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, sir. Now, my question time to time you have reminded us to not bet against America. What do you think are the most important things for you guys to remain strong? On the risk side, if the strength of the country’s undermined, what could be the reasons?

观众成员：谢谢您，先生。现在，我的问题是，您时不时提醒我们不要对美国下赌注。您认为对你们来说，保持强大的最重要的事情是什么？在风险方面，如果国家的实力受到削弱，可能的原因是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve had (Applause) a lot of tests. I mean, we’re such a young country. You know, when you think about Japan and you think about the United States, it’s just incredible how new we are to the block. I mean, you know, what are we? 234 years old since we started.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们经历了很多考验。（掌声）我的意思是，我们是一个如此年轻的国家。你知道，当你想到日本和美国时，真是难以置信我们是多么的新。我的意思是，你知道，我们成立到现在才 234 年。

That’s nothing. I mean, you know, Charlie and I combined, we’ve lived two thirds the life of the country. (Laughter) I mean, we’ve been tested at 46 national elections. And we made some bad choices. And we’ve had a civil war. I mean, so the country has had enormous advantages though in some way.

这没什么。我的意思是，你知道，查理和我加起来，已经生活了这个国家三分之二的时间。（笑声）我的意思是，我们在 46 次全国选举中接受了考验。我们做出了一些错误的选择。我们经历了一场内战。我的意思是，尽管如此，这个国家在某种程度上还是有巨大的优势。

Because we started with one half of 1% of the world’s population in 1790. And we now have something close to 25% of the world’s GDP. And it wasn’t because we had some incredible advantage in terms of the land. It was nice to have two oceans on each side back when people tried to rule the world by ruling the waves.

因为我们在 1790 年时只占世界人口的 0.5%。而现在我们拥有接近 25%的世界 GDP。这并不是因为我们在土地方面有某种不可思议的优势。在人们试图通过统治海洋来统治世界的时候，拥有两侧的两个海洋确实是件好事。

You know, and we’ve had good neighbors in Canada and Mexico. But it’s a miracle. And you say, “How do we keep the good parts of the system?” Well, culling out our obvious defects. And we do it in a very herky-jerky manner. But net, the United States is a better place to live than it was when I was born by a huge factor.

你知道，我们在加拿大和墨西哥有很好的邻居。但这是一种奇迹。你会问：“我们如何保持系统的好部分？”好吧，就是剔除我们明显的缺陷。我们以一种非常不稳定的方式进行。但总体而言，美国是一个比我出生时好得多的地方。

I mean, I just got a root canal a week ago. And I was just thinking, “I don’t know who invented Novocain, but I’m for him.” You know, I mean, (Laugh) but in a million ways. I mean, you can romanticize about the past. But forget it. It is work. But now we do have an atom bomb and we wish nuclear power.

我意思是，我一周前刚做了根管治疗。我刚在想，“我不知道是谁发明了诺沃卡因，但我支持他。”你知道，我的意思是，（笑）但有无数种方式。我是说，你可以对过去进行浪漫化。但算了。这是工作。但现在我们确实有了原子弹，我们希望有核能。

You know, we wish the atom had never been split. But it has been. And you can’t put it back in the bottle. So, the challenges are huge. You know, my dad was in Congress back in the 1940s. And it looked like a mess then. Although it was unified by the war to some degree.

你知道，我们希望原子从未被分裂。但它已经被分裂了。你无法把它放回瓶子里。因此，挑战是巨大的。你知道，我爸爸在 1940 年代时在国会。那时看起来一团糟。尽管在某种程度上因为战争而团结。

But it was still very partisan. Now the problem we have, I think, is that partisanship, it seems to me, has moved toward tribalism. And tribalism just doesn’t work as well. I mean, when it gets to tribalism, you don’t even hear the other side. And tribalism can lead to mobs.

但这仍然非常偏袒。我认为我们现在面临的问题是，党派主义似乎已经向部落主义转变。而部落主义的效果并不好。我的意思是，当变成部落主义时，你甚至听不到另一方的声音。部落主义可能导致暴徒。

I mean, it just flows. I mean, you’ve seen it (UNINTEL). We’ve seen it to a degree here. So, we have to refine in a certain way our democracy as we go along. We deal with the world we live in. But if I still had a choice of any place to be born in the world, I’d want to be born in the United States.

我的意思是，这一切都很自然。我是说，你已经看到了（无法理解）。在某种程度上，我们在这里也看到了。因此，我们必须在某种程度上不断完善我们的民主。我们要面对我们所生活的世界。但是如果我仍然可以选择在世界上任何地方出生，我希望能在美国出生。

And I’d want to be born today. I mean, it is a better world than we have ever had. And with present-day communications, we can also see much more how terrible it is in many ways. And it’s got problems. When I was born in 1930, there were 2 billion in the world.

我希望今天出生。我的意思是，这个世界比我们曾经拥有的更好。随着现代通讯的发展，我们也能更清楚地看到在许多方面它是多么糟糕。它有很多问题。当我在 1930 年出生时，世界上有 20 亿人。

And now there’s maybe 7.7 billion and growing. And we went millennia with really no change in population. And of course, we’ve introduced energy in an incredible way into something where we now have 7.7 billion people using way more energy than they did when I was born when there were 2 billion people.

现在大约有 77 亿人，并且还在增长。在几千年里，人口几乎没有变化。当然，我们以惊人的方式引入了能源，现在有 77 亿人使用的能源远远超过我出生时的 20 亿人口所使用的能源。

So, it’s an exciting world. It’s a challenging world. And, you know, I don’t know the solutions on things. I do think that we do need to think about different solutions in terms of how we get important problems solves and that we don’t kid ourselves that something magic will happen or that everybody will get together and we’ll all just cheer, and it’ll go away by 2050.

所以，这是一个令人兴奋的世界。这是一个充满挑战的世界。而且，我不知道解决问题的办法。我确实认为我们需要考虑不同的解决方案，以解决重要问题，我们不能自欺欺人，以为会发生什么神奇的事情，或者大家会团结在一起，我们都会欢呼，到 2050 年一切就会消失。

And how well we adapt to that, we will see. I would say so far it doesn’t look very promising. But then I’m sure that when Lincoln looked out at what was going on in the Civil War it didn’t look very promising either. So, I think that the U.S. is capable of doing remarkable things. And I think it wouldn’t surprise me if they do it again. Charlie may —

我们将看到我们适应这一切的能力如何。我想到目前为止，这看起来并不太乐观。但我相信，当林肯看到内战发生的情况时，也并不觉得很有希望。因此，我认为美国有能力做出非凡的事情。我认为如果他们再次做到这一点，我也不会感到惊讶。查理可能——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m slightly less optimistic than Warren is. (Laughter) I think the best road ahead to human happiness is to expect less. I think it’s going to get tougher. And I think the solution of having a huge proportion of the young and brilliant people all go into wealth management is a crazy development in terms of its natural consequences for American civilianization. We don’t need as many wealth managers as we have.

查理·芒格：嗯，我比沃伦稍微不那么乐观。（笑声）我认为通往人类幸福的最佳道路是期望更少。我认为情况会变得更加艰难。我认为让大量年轻而聪明的人都去从事财富管理是一种疯狂的发展，这对美国的平庸化有着自然的后果。我们不需要这么多财富管理者。

WARREN BUFFETT: But Charlie was born on January 1st, 1924. And you’d hate to go back to that, wouldn’t you, Charlie? (Laugh)

沃伦·巴菲特：但是查理出生于 1924 年 1 月 1 日。你可不想回到那个时候，对吧，查理？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I would. And I like more wealth managers who are just merely reflecting the fact there’s more wealth. But I don’t like everybody going into wealth management. Better go to MIT or something. I think the world’s a little crazy now.

查理·芒格：是的，我会的。我更喜欢那些只是反映财富增加的财富管理者。但我不喜欢每个人都去做财富管理。最好去麻省理工学院或其他地方。我觉得现在的世界有点疯狂。

WARREN BUFFETT: Take your choice. (Laugh)

沃伦·巴菲特：随你选择。（笑）

19. No corporate raider will have enough money to target Berkshire after Buffett

在巴菲特之后，没有任何企业掠夺者会有足够的资金来瞄准伯克希尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。（笑声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Dennis DeJaniero. As Warren stated in the 2022 annual report, Berkshire will always hold a boat load of cash in U.S. Treasury bills. It will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自丹尼斯·德哈尼罗。正如沃伦在 2022 年年报中所述，伯克希尔将始终持有大量的美国国债现金。它还将避免可能导致在不便时刻出现任何不舒适现金需求的行为，包括金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失。

After Warren passes away, his A shares will be converted into B shares and distributed to various foundations. These foundations will then sell the shares to fund their causes. Warren estimates it will take 12-15 years for all his shares to be sold.

在沃伦去世后，他的 A 股将被转换为 B 股，并分配给各个基金会。这些基金会随后将出售股票以资助他们的事业。沃伦估计，所有的股票出售将需要 12 到 15 年。

I worry that a corporate raider like Carl Icahn or a group will buy up enough of these shares to take control of Berkshire and completely disregard Warren’s philosophy of holding a lot of cash and U.S. Treasury bills, and instead be greedy, reckless, and highly speculative and ruin Berkshire’s position as a rock-solid financial fortress. I also worry that changes might be made in how Berkshire’s subsidiaries are run. Do Warren and Charlie worry that these things could happen?

我担心像卡尔·伊坎这样的企业掠夺者或某个团体会购买足够的股份以控制伯克希尔，并完全无视沃伦持有大量现金和美国国债的理念，而是变得贪婪、鲁莽和高度投机，从而毁掉伯克希尔作为坚如磐石的金融堡垒的地位。我还担心伯克希尔的子公司运营方式可能会发生变化。沃伦和查理是否担心这些事情会发生？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s fair to say we think about it plenty. But I don’t worry enormously. It is true that Greg and the directors will have a honeymoon period for a long time simply because other votes that will still remain. But it’s true that eventually they will get judged based on how well our operation fares versus others.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想可以公平地说我们对此考虑很多。但我并不非常担心。确实，格雷格和董事们会有一个很长的蜜月期，因为其他的投票仍然会存在。但最终，他们会根据我们的运营表现与其他公司的比较来接受评判。

Now if we don’t pay any dividends in 12 or 15 years, you’re talking a trillion and a half that it would take to take over. And I think that limits the group. They like to think about how much they can borrow against it. (Laugh) It doesn’t work.

现在如果我们在 12 年或 15 年内不支付任何股息，你说的是需要一万五千亿来接管。我认为这限制了这个集团。他们喜欢考虑可以借多少。（笑）这行不通。

And there’s nobody that can come close to doing it themselves. And I think that the important thing is that Berkshire be regarded as a national asset rather than a national liability. We’ve got to be a plus to the country with our form of operation. And we certainly have got a record which will then be 12 or 15 years longer, done with much more capital, more companies.

而且没有人能接近自己做到这一点。我认为重要的是，伯克希尔应该被视为国家资产，而不是国家负担。我们必须以我们的运营方式为国家带来积极影响。而且我们确实有一个记录，那将比现在多出 12 或 15 年，投入更多的资本，拥有更多的公司。

More things will have happened where our hundreds of billions can work its way into the economy in terms of lots of jobs, lots of products, lots of behavior. And it can be compared with other things. So, I think we win out if we deserve to win out. And I think the odds of that happening are very, very, very high. Charlie.

更多的事情将会发生，我们的数千亿可以通过创造大量的工作、产品和行为融入经济中。这可以与其他事物进行比较。因此，我认为如果我们值得胜出，我们就会胜出。我认为这种情况发生的几率是非常非常高的。查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t spend much time worrying about something that happened 50 years ago after I’m dead. I think if you sort of take care. Each day’s responsibility is pretty low. And think ahead as well as you can. Then you just take the results as they fall. So, I’m philosophical. But I’m not — I think he’s fretting unnecessarily.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不太花时间担心我死后 50 年前发生的事情。我认为如果你每天都尽量做好自己的责任，考虑未来，那么你就接受结果吧。所以，我是个哲学家。但我认为他在不必要地烦恼。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Neither one of us are worried, basically. (Laughter) But we plan. We do plan. And, you know, I’ve got a model in my mind of what Berkshire has been the model. It’s been modified plenty of times over 58 years. The one thing I knew initially or very quickly was it shouldn’t be a textile company.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们俩基本上都不担心。（笑声）但我们有计划。我们确实有计划。你知道，我心中有一个关于伯克希尔的模型。这个模型在 58 年里经过了很多次修改。我最初或很快就知道的一件事是，它不应该是一家纺织公司。

(Laugh) That was an important decision. (Laughter) And, I mean, we’ve just played the hand as it came along. And we made a few really good decisions. We’ll never make a decision that kills us. Only things that are a threat to the planet, we don’t have any answer for those.

（笑）那是一个重要的决定。（笑声）我的意思是，我们只是顺其自然地应对。我们做出了一些非常好的决定。我们永远不会做出让我们自毁的决定。只有那些对地球构成威胁的事情，我们没有任何答案。

But we keep ourselves in better shape than anybody else. And we just aren’t going to have big maturities of debt that come along. We aren’t going to have insurance policies that can be cashed in en masse. And we will sit with what looks a huge amount of capital.

但我们保持的状态比其他任何人都要好。而且我们不会有大额到期的债务出现。我们不会有可以大量兑现的保险单。我们将拥有看起来巨额的资本。

And it is a huge amount of capital. But there’s a huge amount of earning power. There’s a huge amount of diversity, everything. So, our business model will be graded, and it’ll be graded against a lot of people that we like to be graded against. So, I think we’re handing something very secure over to the future.

这是一笔巨额资本。但也有巨大的盈利能力。还有丰富的多样性，一切都是如此。因此，我们的商业模式将会被评估，并且会与我们希望被评估的许多人进行比较。所以，我认为我们正在将一些非常安全的东西交给未来。

And I think we’ve got a shareholder base like nobody has. I mean, there isn’t anybody in the country that I know of unless they’ve had a employee-owned company prior to going public or something of the sort. But this is the product of, you know, 58 years of regarding the shareholder as the owner of the company.

我认为我们的股东基础是独一无二的。我的意思是，除非他们在上市之前拥有过员工持股公司，否则在这个国家我不知道还有谁。但这是 58 年来将股东视为公司所有者的结果。

But what does that mean? That means having happy customers. It means being (Applause) welcomed by your community rather than having them turn you away. It means that the government feels better with you if there’s a financial crisis. Because you can provide something that actually the country can’t under some circumstances.

但这意味着什么呢？这意味着拥有快乐的客户。这意味着受到你所在社区的欢迎，而不是被他们拒绝。这意味着在金融危机时，政府对你会有更好的感觉。因为在某些情况下，你可以提供一些国家实际上无法提供的东西。

And you’ll be there. And at the same time, it’ll be good for the business. And we will have crises of one sort or another. But if they aren’t challenging the planet, which worries you in terms of some of the threats that we have, we’ll be a plus to the United States. And if we’re a plus to the United States, we’ll survive.

你会在那里。同时，这对业务也会有好处。我们会面临各种危机。但如果这些危机没有对地球造成挑战，而这让你担心我们面临的一些威胁，我们将对美国有利。如果我们对美国有利，我们就会生存下去。

20. Stories about finding Ajit Jain and Ben Rosner’s Chicago submarine

关于找到阿吉特·贾因和本·罗斯纳的芝加哥潜艇的故事

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station seven.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）第七站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for having us this weekend. My name is Beau Clayton (PH), and I’m from Durham, North Carolina.

观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢您们在这个周末接待我们。我叫博·克莱顿（音），来自北卡罗来纳州的达勒姆。

One of the reasons that we are all here is that you’re great storytellers. And we carry those stories back home with us.

我们在这里的原因之一是你们是伟大的讲故事者。我们将这些故事带回家。

Can you please share a couple stories that maybe we haven’t heard before (Laughter) about Mr. Abel and Mr. Jain that capture their character and their caliber as leaders? (Applause)

您能否分享一些我们可能没有听过的关于阿贝尔先生和贾因先生的故事（笑声），以展现他们的性格和作为领导者的素质？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll start out with Ajit. (Laugh) He walked into the office in 1986, and I’d gotten the bright idea of going into the reinsurance business I think in maybe 1969. So, I’d stumbled along for 17 years. And I had a wonderful guy that ran it.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我先从阿吉特开始。（笑）他在 1986 年走进办公室，而我在 1969 年左右想出了进入再保险行业的好主意。所以，我在这方面摸索了 17 年。我有一个出色的人来管理它。

But he also liked certain brokers. I mean, he was running it the traditional way. Top quality and everything else, but he didn’t try and change the system. He tried to improve the system to some degree. And we went nowhere. Seventeen years wandering around in the wilderness.

但他也喜欢某些经纪人。我的意思是，他是以传统的方式运作的。顶级质量和其他一切，但他并没有试图改变系统。他试图在某种程度上改善系统。但我们没有任何进展。十七年在荒野中徘徊。

And I thought we could have something good. And then Ajit came in on a Saturday and Mike Goldberg (PH) had steered him in, I think. And Mike deserves to be enshrined (Laugh) in perpetuity for that act. And I talked with him a while. I think maybe I was opening the mail on Saturday while I talked with him.

我原以为我们可以有一些美好的东西。然后阿吉特在一个星期六进来了，我想迈克·戈德堡（PH）引导了他。迈克应该因为这个行为而永载史册（笑）。我和他聊了一会儿。我想我可能在星期六打开邮件的时候和他交谈。

And he had absolutely zero experience with insurance. But he’d actually seen a good bit about how corporate America operated, because he’d been in management consulting. And after talking with him, I knew I’d struck gold. And so, I hired him and gave him the backing of some money.

他对保险完全没有经验。但他实际上对美国企业的运作有一定了解，因为他曾从事管理咨询。在与他交谈后，我知道我找到了宝藏。因此，我雇用了他，并给予他一些资金支持。

And we hit a very good period in the market almost right away for him to act. And Ajit, you know, if I had the top pick of ten insurance managers in the world, I could take all ten and you can’t replace Ajit. And we still enjoy talking.

我们几乎立即进入了一个非常好的市场时期，让他能够采取行动。阿吉特，你知道，如果我可以从全球十位保险经理中选择第一名，我可以选择所有十位，但你无法替代阿吉特。我们仍然很享受交谈。

We don’t talk as frequently as we used to, but we used to talk about every day. But he’s one of a kind. And, you know, if you’re going to stick around long enough, you only need one of a kind. (Laugh)

我们不再像以前那样频繁交谈，但我们以前几乎每天都聊。但他是独一无二的。你知道，如果你打算待得久一些，你只需要一个独一无二的。（笑）

Paul Andrews (PH) stuck around at TTI, had all the money in the world.

保罗·安德鲁斯（PH）留在 TTI，拥有全世界的钱。

Every time I talked to him about getting a raise or something of the sort, he said, “We’ll talk about that next year.” He was not what you get when you get the top draft picks from the leading business schools. And I will say this, I have never looked at where anybody went to school in terms of hiring.

每次我跟他谈到加薪或类似的事情时，他总是说：“我们明年再谈。”他并不是从顶尖商学院选拔出来的人。我想说的是，我在招聘时从来没有关注过任何人的学校背景。

I mean, somebody mails me a resume or something, I don’t care where they went to school. And it just so happens that Ajit went to some pretty good schools. But he isn’t Ajit because he went to those schools. And Charlie, you can tell a story or two. How’d you find Louis Vincenti? (Laugh)

我意思是，有人给我发简历或其他东西，我不在乎他们上过什么学校。恰好 Ajit 上过一些不错的学校。但他不是因为上了那些学校才是 Ajit。Charlie，你可以讲一两个故事。你是怎么找到 Louis Vincenti 的？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he was there. But you’ve got to recognize him. I asked Louis once how he managed to play first-string football at, I think, Stanford when he only weighed 155 pounds. And he said, “Well,” he said, “I was pretty quick.” And he was pretty quick. But (Laugh) we have found a lot of people within our companies who are pretty quick.

查理·芒格：嗯，他在那里。但你得承认他。我曾经问路易斯，他是怎么在我想是斯坦福大学的第一阵容橄榄球队打球的，尽管他只有 155 磅。他说：“嗯，”他说，“我很快。”而且他确实很快。但是（笑）我们在公司里发现了很多人也很快。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we had one guy that quit at fourth grade, didn’t we? Ben Rosner. Am I wrong?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有一个人在四年级时退学，对吧？本·罗斯纳。我说错了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah. Totally self-educated. Ben Rosner knew more about retailing in those old neighborhoods than anybody. And he watched everything in his business like a hawk, and he was amazing. Now there was an example. We never found anybody who could do what — when Ben died, that ability left us.

查理·芒格：哦，是的。完全自学成才。本·罗斯纳对那些老社区的零售业了解得比任何人都多。他像鹰一样密切关注自己生意的一切，他真是太了不起了。那就是一个例子。我们从未找到过能够做到那样的人——当本去世时，那种能力也随之离开了我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and you want a story that’s kind of interesting, because Ben Rosner had a partner, Leo Simon. And Leo Simon was Mo Annenberg’s son-in-law. And Leo, therefore, was very, very, very wealthy. And Ben started with nothing. But they liked each other.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你想要一个有趣的故事，因为本·罗斯纳有一个合伙人，利奥·西蒙。利奥·西蒙是莫·安嫩伯格的女婿。因此，利奥非常非常非常富有。而本一开始一无所有。但他们彼此很喜欢。

And one time well before they got involved in the business we bought, they got the idea of buying a submarine from World War I and taking it to the Century of Progress, which was the World’s Fair, in effect, in Chicago I think in 1933. So, they bought the submarine for practically nothing.

在他们参与这项业务之前的某个时候，他们想到了购买一艘第一次世界大战的潜艇，并将其带到进步世纪博览会，这实际上是 1933 年在芝加哥举行的世界博览会。因此，他们几乎以无价之宝的价格买下了这艘潜艇。

And they figured the average guy from Omaha who’s going to his first World’s Fair could get a submarine for a quarter or something, that they’d pay it. So, they hauled it from Florida, wherever they got it, hauled it to Chicago. And then they got into Chicago, and they were hauling a submarine down the streets of Chicago. (Laugh)

他们认为，来自奥马哈的普通人去参加他的第一次世博会时，可能会愿意花一角钱买一艘潜艇。所以，他们把潜艇从佛罗里达运来，不管他们从哪里得到的，运到了芝加哥。然后他们到了芝加哥，正在把潜艇拖过芝加哥的街道。（笑）

And, you know, it was creating traffic problems like nobody could imagine. So, a cop came over and he said to Ben, he says, “Where do you think you guys are going with that submarine?” (Laugh) And Ben says, “You’ll have to talk to my partner, Mr. Capone.” (Laugh)

而且，你知道，这造成了前所未有的交通问题。所以，一名警察过来对本说：“你们觉得开着那艘潜艇要去哪儿？”（笑）本说：“你得跟我的搭档卡彭先生谈谈。”（笑）

And the cop says, “You’re on. You know, just keep going.” And (Laughter) that was Ben Rosner. And then Leo Simon died, and when he died in 1967 or so, Ben Rosner kept delivering half the profits to his widow, who was incredibly rich, of course, being Mo Annenberg’s first-born daughter.

警察说：“你继续。你知道，继续下去。”（笑声）那是本·罗斯纳。然后利奥·西蒙去世了，大约在 1967 年，当他去世时，本·罗斯纳继续将一半的利润交给他的遗孀，她当然非常富有，因为她是莫·安嫩伯格的长女。

I think Mo had nine girls in a row before Walter came along, the tenth. I may be off by one. But anyway, I went to his fancy apartment. And anyway, Ben kept her in for half the deal. And he had her sign the rent checks just so she would look like she was doing something in this business.

我认为莫在沃尔特出现之前连续有过九个女孩，沃尔特是第十个。我可能错了一位。不过，我还是去了他那间豪华的公寓。总之，本把她留在里面，作为交易的一半。而且他让她签租金支票，只是为了让她看起来在这个行业里做了些什么。

And she didn’t need the money, obviously, but he just felt he was obligated once his partner, Leo, died. And then she started criticizing him. And at that point, Ben went to his lawyer, who was her lawyer, actually, Will Salsteiner (PH). I don’t know whatever happened to Will.

她显然不需要钱，但他觉得自从他的搭档利奥去世后，他有义务这样做。然后她开始批评他。此时，本去找了他的律师，实际上也是她的律师，威尔·萨尔斯坦（PH）。我不知道威尔后来发生了什么。

But he gave me a call because Ben wanted to call me because he wanted me to buy it. And he wanted me, if I bought it, he’d be rid of the ex-partner’s wife. And he had Charlie and me come back, and we went to Will Salsteiner’s office. And Ben says, “I’ll work until the end of the year, and that’s all. But I’ll sell you this thing for $6 million bucks.”

但他给我打了个电话，因为本想给我打电话，因为他想让我买下它。如果我买下它，他就能摆脱前合伙人的妻子。他让查理和我回来，我们去了威尔·萨尔斯坦的办公室。本说：“我会工作到年底，仅此而已。但我会以 600 万美元的价格把这个东西卖给你。”

And I had $2 million in cash, and a couple of million in real estate, and a couple million of operating earnings. It was just crazy. But he felt if he was getting a lousy price, she was taking a half of the lousy price for half the money. So, he looked at me at some point. Charlie, you describe the rest of it. (Laugh)

我有 200 万美元的现金，还有几百万的房地产，以及几百万的运营收益。这真是疯狂。但他觉得如果他得到一个糟糕的价格，她就以一半的钱拿走一半的糟糕价格。所以，他在某个时刻看着我。查理，你来描述剩下的部分。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: He said, “I hear you’re the fastest draw in the West.” He says, “Draw.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：他说：“我听说你是西部最快的拔枪手。”他说：“拔枪。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re in a New York lawyer’s office. (Laugh) And this guy is selling his baby. And he told us he’s leaving. I got Charlie on the side, I said, “If this guy leaves at the end of the year, you can throw away every psychology book that’s ever been written. I mean, it isn’t going to happen.”

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在纽约一位律师的办公室里。（笑）这个家伙在卖他的孩子。他告诉我们他要离开。我在一旁对查理说：“如果这个家伙年底离开，你可以把所有写过的心理学书籍都扔掉。我是说，这不可能发生。”

And so, we bought it and we lived happily ever after with Ben. And one time he was taking me over to see a property we had in Brooklyn. And along the way I said, “Ben, you know, I promised you I wouldn’t interfere in the business when we started.” And he knew a “but” was coming. And he just said, “Thank you, Warren,” and then he shut me up. (Laughter)

于是，我们买下了它，和本一起幸福地生活着。有一次，他带我去看我们在布鲁克林的一处房产。在路上，我说：“本，你知道，我答应过你在我们开始时不会干涉业务。”他知道接下来会有一个“但是”。他只是说：“谢谢你，沃伦，”然后就让我闭嘴了。（笑声）

He was a lot of fun. We have so many Ben Rosner stories, but now you’ve heard one that hasn’t been published before.

他非常有趣。我们有很多本·罗斯纳的故事，但现在你听到了一个之前未发表过的故事。

21. Jain is happy with property catastrophe reinsurance portfolio

贾因对财产灾难再保险投资组合感到满意

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Chai Gohill (PH). This he writes, this is for Ajit. “Reinsurance industry is going through one of the hardest pricing environments in the last 15 years. Berkshire historically has participated during these stressed times when economic returns are very attractive.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自查伊·戈希尔（PH）。他写道，这是给阿吉特的。“再保险行业正经历过去 15 年来最艰难的定价环境之一。伯克希尔在这些经济回报非常有吸引力的压力时期历来都有参与。”

“This year, it appears Berkshire has not been interested in deploying its resources towards property cat reinsurance despite such strong returns. Can you elaborate on reasons for not participating despite these returns, and your broader view on how you’re planning to shape your reinsurance business post-acquisition of Alleghany?”

“今年，看来伯克希尔并没有兴趣将其资源投入到财产再保险中，尽管回报如此强劲。您能详细说明一下尽管有这些回报却不参与的原因，以及您对收购Alleghany后如何规划再保险业务的更广泛看法吗？”

AJIT JAIN: OK. In terms of Alleghany, that’s an easy response. We treat our operating units independent of each other. And as far as Alleghany is concerned, they have a major presence in the reinsurance business under the brand name of TransAtlantic Re.

AJIT JAIN：好的。关于Alleghany，这是一个简单的回答。我们将我们的运营单位视为相互独立。至于Alleghany，他们在再保险业务中以 TransAtlantic Re 的品牌名有着重要的存在。

That company will operate the way it’s been operating in the past. There will be no change in terms of strategy or management. And they will keep doing what they’re doing. They’ve been very successful, and hopefully will keep being successful.

该公司将继续按照过去的方式运营。在战略或管理方面不会有任何变化。他们将继续做他们正在做的事情。他们一直非常成功，希望能够继续成功。

Now, in terms of the property cat business that I have been active in over these last several years, you’re right that the last 15 years has been a difficult time. Prices have not been attractive. And even though we have had some presence in the property cat business in the last 15 years, it really has been minimal.

现在，关于我在过去几年中活跃的财产灾难险业务，你说得对，过去 15 年是一个困难时期。价格并不吸引人。尽管我们在过去 15 年中在财产灾难险业务中有一些存在，但实际上非常有限。

This December 31st, which is a big renewal date for cat reinsurance, we were hoping that we would get a few days in the sun, and we’d be able to deploy our capital, and be able to write some fairly attractive business. As it happened towards the end of December, until about the third week of December, I was very optimistic that we would get a chance to put several billion dollars on the books.

今年 12 月 31 日，这是灾难险再保险的重要续保日期，我们希望能有几天的好时光，能够部署我们的资本，并能够承接一些相当有吸引力的业务。实际上，直到 12 月的第三周，我一直非常乐观，认为我们会有机会将数十亿美元的业务记录在案。

But in the last ten days of December, unfortunately a lot of capacity came out of the woodworks. Pricing that we were expecting to realize didn’t really come and meet our pricing requirements, as a result of which January 1 was a big disappointment.

但在十二月的最后十天，不幸的是，很多产能突然出现。我们原本期待实现的定价并没有真正达到我们的定价要求，因此，1 月 1 日让人非常失望。

We did not write as much as we were hoping to write. Now, fast forward to April 1, which is another big renewal date, we had a lot of powder dry. And we were lucky that we kept the powder dry. Because April 1, suddenly prices zoomed up again, a lot higher than what they were on January 1, and started to look attractive to us.

我们写的内容没有我们希望的那么多。现在，快进到 4 月 1 日，这是另一个重要的续约日期，我们有很多准备好的资源。我们很幸运保持了这些资源的准备。因为在 4 月 1 日，价格突然又飙升，远高于 1 月 1 日的水平，开始对我们看起来很有吸引力。

So, now we have a portfolio that is very heavily exposed to property catastrophe. To put that in perspective, our exposure today is almost 50% more than what it was five, six months ago. So, I think we have written as much as our capacity will allow us to write.

所以，现在我们的投资组合对房地产灾难的风险暴露非常大。为了让人更好地理解，今天我们的风险暴露比五、六个月前增加了近 50%。所以，我认为我们已经写下了我们能力所允许的最大额度。

We are very happy with what we’ve written. The margins have been healthy. The only thing that I want to mention to you is that, while the mentions have been healthy, we have a very unbalanced portfolio. What that means is if there’s a big hurricane in Florida, we will have a very substantial loss.

我们对所写的内容非常满意。利润一直很可观。我要提到的唯一一点是，尽管提及量很健康，但我们的投资组合非常不平衡。这意味着如果佛罗里达发生大飓风，我们将面临巨大的损失。

As opposed to that if we have a very big loss anywhere other than Florida, relative to our competition, we will have a much smaller loss. Net-net, I’m very happy with the portfolio. It is a lot better than what it’s been in the past. I don’t know how long it’ll last, and of course if the hurricane happens in Florida, we could lose, across all the units, as much as $15 billion. And if there isn’t a loss, we’ll make several billion dollars as profit.

与此相反，如果我们在佛罗里达以外的地方遭受了相对于我们的竞争对手来说非常大的损失，我们的损失将会小得多。总的来说，我对这个投资组合非常满意。它比过去好多了。我不知道这种情况会持续多久，当然如果佛罗里达发生飓风，我们可能会在所有单位中损失高达 150 亿美元。如果没有损失，我们将赚取数十亿美元的利润。

WARREN BUFFETT: And, Ajit, when you called me and said you’d like to expose us to whatever it was, a couple billion more of exposure, how long I took to say yes. (Laugh)

沃伦·巴菲特：阿吉特，当你打电话给我，说你想让我们接触到无论是什么，增加几亿的风险时，我花了多长时间才答应。（笑）

AJIT JAIN: Yeah, so the way we think about our exposure is, you know, in the insurance operations collectively across the entire company. Given that we have about a little less than $300 billion of capital, we think of that as a 5% exposure that we’re willing to take on.

阿吉特·贾因：是的，我们对风险的看法是，在整个公司的保险业务中。考虑到我们大约有不到 3000 亿美元的资本，我们认为这是一种我们愿意承担的 5%的风险。

So, to complete Warren’s story, a few weeks ago we had about $13 billion of exposure all across the globe. And I called up Warren and I said, “We’re up to $13. It’ll be nice if we can go up to $15. That’s a good round number.” And that was less than a 30-second phone call. (Laugh) I think Warren said yes without even listening to what the numbers were. (Laughter)

所以，为了完成沃伦的故事，几周前我们在全球的风险敞口大约是 130 亿美元。我打电话给沃伦，我说：“我们达到了 130 亿。如果我们能达到 150 亿，那就很好，这是个好数字。”这通电话不到 30 秒。（笑）我想沃伦甚至没有听到具体数字就答应了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I hope he calls me again. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望他能再给我打电话。（笑声）

22. ‘We don’t get smarter’ but ‘we get a little wiser’

“我们并不会变得更聪明”，而是“我们变得更有智慧一些”。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station eight.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第八站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Adal Flores (PH), and I’ve been a shareholder for about 16 years. And I’m coming from Guadalajara, Mexico.

观众成员：你好。我叫阿达尔·弗洛雷斯（PH），我已经是股东大约 16 年了。我来自墨西哥的瓜达拉哈拉。

My question is for Warren and Charlie. Companies have the eternal dilemma between building products that can make profits and increase their company’s competitive position.

我想问沃伦和查理。公司面临着一个永恒的困境，即在于制造能够盈利并提升公司竞争地位的产品。

In the best case, you can build products that have both characteristics at the same time, like Google did.

在最佳情况下，您可以同时构建具有这两种特性的产品，就像谷歌所做的那样。

But most of the time, companies need to choose between short-term profits and long-term defensibility. For example, Amazon was focused on building their famous Amazon flywheel with limited profits initially, in order to obtain stronger network effects, with the hope of getting more defensible profits in the future.

但大多数时候，公司需要在短期利润和长期防御能力之间做出选择。例如，亚马逊最初专注于建立他们著名的亚马逊飞轮，尽管利润有限，但为了获得更强的网络效应，希望未来能获得更具防御性的利润。

When you invest, you constantly speak about the importance of building competitive moats. What advice would you give to CEOs about how to balance this dilemma, which is essentially short-term profits versus long-term defensibility? Thank you.

当你投资时，你不断谈论建立竞争护城河的重要性。你会给首席执行官什么建议，以平衡这个本质上是短期利润与长期防御能力之间的困境？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is to control your destiny, which we’ve been able to do at Berkshire. We feel no pressure from Wall Street. You know, we don’t have investor calls. We don’t have to make promises. We get a chance to make our own mistakes, and occasionally find something that works well.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是掌控自己的命运，这一点我们在伯克希尔做到了。我们感受不到华尔街的压力。你知道，我们没有投资者电话会议。我们不需要做出承诺。我们有机会犯自己的错误，偶尔找到一些有效的方法。

But we recognize that the people in this room and people like them are the ones that we’re working for. And we’re not working for a bunch of people that care about whether we meet the core estimate or anything. So, we have a freedom that we get to use.

但我们认识到，这个房间里的每一个人以及像他们一样的人才是我们工作的对象。我们并不是在为那些关心我们是否达到核心估算的人工作。因此，我们拥有可以利用的自由。

And we’re interested in owning a wonderful business forever. We learned from many wonderful businesses. But we do learn a lot as we go along. Charlie and I have often mentioned how we learned so much when we bought See’s Candies, which we did.

我们有兴趣永远拥有一家出色的企业。我们从许多优秀的企业中学习。但在这个过程中我们确实学到了很多。查理和我常常提到，当我们收购 See's Candies 时学到了很多东西。

But we learned when we bought Ben Rosner’s chain of women’s dress shops spread all over the eastern part of the country. We learned when we tried getting into the department store business back in 1966. And as the ink was drying on our purchase price, we realized we’d done something (Laugh) dumb.

但我们在购买本·罗斯纳遍布全国东部的女装店连锁时学到了这一点。我们在 1966 年尝试进入百货商店业务时也学到了这一点。当我们购买价格的合同刚刚签署时，我们意识到我们做了一件（大笑）愚蠢的事。

I mean, we’re learning all the time how consumers behave. I’m not going to be able to learn the technical aspects of businesses. It’d be nice if I knew it, but it isn’t essential. And, you know, obviously we’ve got a business at Apple, which is larger than our energy business.

我意思是，我们一直在学习消费者的行为。我无法学习商业的技术方面。如果我知道那就好了，但这并不是必需的。而且，显然我们在苹果有一个业务，它的规模超过了我们的能源业务。

And we may only own five points, 6% or 7%. But our ownership goes up every year, and I don’t understand the phone at all. But I do understand consumer behavior. And I know how people think about whether to buy a second car. I know how they go out to different — we own auto dealerships.

我们可能只拥有五个点，6%或 7%。但我们的所有权每年都在增加，而我对手机完全不懂。但我了解消费者行为。我知道人们在考虑是否购买第二辆车时的想法。我知道他们如何去不同的地方——我们拥有汽车经销商。

We’re learning all the time from all of our businesses how people react to Garanimals versus selling them something else. And so, See’s was a sort of breakthrough. But we just keep learning as to more about how people behave and how a good business can turn into a bad business, and how some good businesses can maintain their competitive advantage over time.

我们一直在从所有业务中学习人们如何对 Garanimals 的反应与他们购买其他产品的反应。因此，See's 是一个突破。但我们不断学习更多关于人们的行为，以及一个好的企业如何变成一个坏企业，以及一些好的企业如何能够随着时间的推移保持其竞争优势。

And so, we don’t have some formula, Berkshire people. But we can also tell in ten seconds whether it’s something of interest. I mean, when I get these calls and we want to send decks and all that sort of thing, which is nonsense, I mean, it’s a bunch of guys (Laugh) that get paid for drawing up these projections of the future and everything like that.

所以，我们没有什么公式，伯克希尔的人。但是我们也可以在十秒钟内判断这是否是我们感兴趣的事情。我的意思是，当我接到这些电话，我们想要发送资料和所有这些无聊的东西时，我的意思是，这是一群人（笑）为了绘制这些未来的预测而获得报酬。

If they knew the future, you know, we don’t know the future, but we do know certain kinds of businesses. We know what the right price is, and we know what we think we can project out in terms of consumer behavior and threats to a business. And that’s what we’ve been about and that’s what we’ll continue to be about.

如果他们知道未来，你知道，我们不知道未来，但我们确实知道某些类型的业务。我们知道正确的价格是什么，我们知道我们认为可以在消费者行为和对业务的威胁方面进行的预测。这就是我们一直在做的事情，也是我们将继续做的事情。

We don’t get smarter over time, we get a little wiser, though, following it over time. And you can do it while sitting in the office with a telephone, too, which we like. Charlie?

我们并不会随着时间变得更聪明，但随着时间的推移，我们会变得更有智慧。而且你可以在办公室里打电话时做到这一点，这一点我们很喜欢。查理？

23. Why Buffett invested billions in Japanese ‘trading houses’

为什么巴菲特在日本“贸易公司”投资了数十亿

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, tell them the story of the Japanese investment. That should be told again. That’s a nice story.

查理·芒格：好吧，告诉他们日本投资的故事。这个故事应该再讲一次。这是个好故事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it was pretty simple. I mean, back when I started other people were going through Playboy and I was going through Moody’s, I mean, basically. And there’s a movie out called “Turn Every Page,” which I saw again for the second time a couple of days ago, Lizzie Gottlieb.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这很简单。我的意思是，当我开始的时候，其他人都在看《花花公子》，而我则在看穆迪的报告，基本上就是这样。最近有部电影叫《翻开每一页》，我几天前又看了一遍，丽兹·戈特利布。

And I recommend everybody in this world watch that, because I turned every page in the past. And I did it for thousands and thousands of pages at Moody’s, and I did it at the Department of Public Utilities in Boston. I did it in the insurance department. I just kept turning pages. Well, that goes on for a while. But now we need big ideas in order to find things. And what was your question, Charlie?

我建议这个世界上的每一个人都去看这个，因为我在过去翻过每一页。我在穆迪工作时翻了成千上万的页，在波士顿的公共事业部也翻过。我在保险部门也翻过。我就是不断地翻页。这种情况持续了一段时间。但现在我们需要大想法来找到东西。查理，你的问题是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Tell them about the Japanese.

查理·芒格：告诉他们关于日本的事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the Japanese thing was simple. I mean, Ben and I liked looking at companies. I mean, I like looking at figures about companies. And here were five very, very substantial companies, understandable companies. Most of them, maybe all of them we’d done business with in a dozen different ways.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，日本的事情很简单。我的意思是，本和我喜欢研究公司。我喜欢查看关于公司的数据。而这里有五家非常非常重要的公司，易于理解的公司。它们中的大多数，甚至可能是全部，我们都以十几种不同的方式与之做过生意。

If you go a couple miles from where this place is, our last coal generating plant was built by one of the companies. So here they were. They were sitting as a group where they were earning, we’ll say 14% on what we were going to pay to buy them.

如果你从这个地方走几英里，我们最后一座煤电厂是由其中一家公司建造的。所以他们就在这里。他们作为一个团体坐在一起，赚取我们将要支付给他们的 14%。

ROE

They were paying decent dividends. They were going to repurchase shares in some cases. They owned a whole bunch of businesses that we could understand as a group, although it didn’t mean we had deep understanding on any. But we’d seen them operate and everything.

他们支付了不错的股息。在某些情况下，他们打算回购股票。他们拥有一大堆我们可以作为一个整体理解的业务，尽管这并不意味着我们对任何一个都有深入的理解。但我们见过他们的运营和一切。

There wasn’t anything to it. And at the same time, we could take out the currency risk by financing in the end. And that was going to cost a half of 1%. Well, if you get 14% on one side and a half a percent on the other side, and you’ve got money forever, and they’re doing intelligent things, and they’re sizable, so we just started buying them.

这没什么复杂的。同时，我们可以通过融资来消除货币风险。这将花费 0.5%。好吧，如果一边是 14%，另一边是 0.5%，而且你有永恒的资金，他们又在做聪明的事情，而且规模也很大，所以我们就开始购买他们。

I didn’t even probably tell Greg until maybe six months after we’d gotten going. And then when we hit 5% in all of them, we announced on my birthday, 90th, that we owned over 5%. And recently went over for the first time to visit with them. And we were more than pleasantly surprised, delighted, with what we find there. And now we own 7.4% of them. We won’t go over 9.9% without their agreeing, and we sold another $164, whatever it is billion by the end.

我可能直到我们开始大约六个月后才告诉格雷格。然后当我们在所有公司中都达到 5%时，我们在我 90 岁生日那天宣布我们拥有超过 5%。最近我们第一次去拜访他们，我们对那里所发现的感到非常惊喜和高兴。现在我们拥有他们的 7.4%。在没有他们同意的情况下，我们不会超过 9.9%，而且我们在最后又卖出了 164 亿美元，无论是什么。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They would’ve done it for us if we only had $5 billion or something. And it made $10 billion simply in that way. We would look like heroes. Now $10 billion just sort of disappears as if it’s a little dot in Berkshire’s reports.

查理·芒格：如果我们只有 50 亿美元，他们就会为我们做这件事。这样就能轻松赚到 100 亿美元。我们看起来就像英雄。现在 100 亿美元就像在伯克希尔的报告中消失了一样，仿佛只是一个小点。

WARREN BUFFETT: But it’s fun.

沃伦·巴菲特：但这很有趣。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It is fun, and it is $10 billion.

查理·芒格：这很有趣，而且是 100 亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie says it keeps (Laughter) me out of bars when I talk to him about it. And I probably talked to Charlie about those the year after I started. But who knows? I mean, I knew he’d like it, I mean, obviously.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理说这让我（大笑）远离酒吧，当我和他谈论这件事时。我可能在我开始的那一年后和查理谈过这些。但谁知道呢？我的意思是，我知道他会喜欢这件事，显然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We tried to do every dollar. We would do — we could only do about $10 billion.

查理·芒格：我们试图做到每一美元。我们只能做到大约 100 亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, not even quite that much. But, you know, we are $4 or $5 billion ahead, plus dividends. And we’ve got a carry that’s terrific. And they welcome us, and they should welcome us. But we love it the way we’re operating. We’re not there to tell them what to do in the least.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，甚至还没有那么多。但是，你知道，我们先投了40 亿或 50 亿美元，加上股息。而且我们的收益非常好。他们欢迎我们，他们应该欢迎我们。但我们喜欢我们现在的运作方式。我们并不是去告诉他们该怎么做。

But we did say we’d never go over 9.9%, and we mean it. And they know that we’ll be true to our word. And I went over there, partly to introduce Greg to those people, because we’re going to be with them 10, 20, 30, 40 years from now. And they may occasionally find something that we can do jointly. And they look forward to doing that, and we look forward to it, and in addition we have some other operating businesses in Japan. So, Greg, do you have anything?

但我们确实说过我们绝不会超过 9.9%，我们是认真的。他们知道我们会信守承诺。我去那里，部分是为了把格雷格介绍给那些人，因为我们将在未来 10 年、20 年、30 年、40 年与他们在一起。他们可能偶尔会发现一些我们可以共同做的事情。他们期待这样做，我们也期待，而且我们在日本还有其他一些运营业务。那么，格雷格，你有什么要说的吗？

GREG ABEL: No, the only thing I would add is that 1) as, Warren, you went over there, it was to build the trust with these Japanese companies. Because we do hope there’s long-term opportunities. But fundamentally, as you highlighted, they’ve been a very good investment.

格雷格·阿贝尔：不，我唯一想补充的是，1）正如沃伦所说，你去那里是为了与这些日本公司建立信任。因为我们确实希望有长期的机会。但从根本上说，正如你所强调的，他们一直是非常好的投资。

I’d also highlight the five meetings we had were really quite remarkable. I mean, these companies, the culture and the history around it, and how proud they are, you know, there’s just moments of learning from them. So, it was just a great experience to spend really two days with the five companies.

我还想强调我们举行的五次会议真的非常出色。我的意思是，这些公司、它们的文化和历史，以及它们的自豪感，你知道，从中学习的时刻真是太多了。因此，能够与这五家公司共度两天真是一次很棒的经历。

WARREN BUFFETT: And an issue that we intended to be 56 billion of yen that we were issuing and selling turned out to be 164.4 or something like that. And everything’s worked so well. And as Charlie says, you know, it doesn’t move $500 billion of net worth that much.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们原本打算发行和出售的金额是 560 亿日元，结果变成了 1644 亿或类似的数字。一切都运作得非常顺利。正如查理所说，这并不会让 5000 亿美元的净资产有太大变化。

But this one, you know, will keep adding over the years to Berkshire’s value with this very widespread, probably $4 or $500 million a year. And, you know, we’ll just keep looking for more opportunities. And Japan, Berkshire is the largest borrower, outside of corporate borrowers, outside of Japan that exists.

但这个，你知道，随着时间的推移，将以每年大约 4 亿或 5 亿美元的规模不断增加伯克希尔的价值。而且，我们会继续寻找更多的机会。在日本，伯克希尔是最大的借款方，除了日本的企业借款方之外。

And we didn’t set out to be that. But (Laugh) it’s turned out that way. And we’re not done. I mean, you know, in terms of what may come along there. And we have some direct operations there, as I mentioned. And we’ve got some really wonderful partners working for us. And I don’t have to do anything.

我们并不是为了这个目标而出发的。但是（笑）结果却变成了这样。而且我们还没有完成。我是说，你知道，关于可能会出现的事情。而且正如我提到的，我们在那儿有一些直接的业务。我们有一些非常出色的合作伙伴在为我们工作。我不需要做任何事情。

24. Apple is a ‘better business’ than any Berkshire company

苹果是一家比任何伯克希尔公司都要“更好的企业”。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This next question comes from Ellie Amin Tebet (PH), who asks, “During an episode of Investing the Templeton Way podcast, Professor Damodaran, who he respects almost as much as Warren and Charlie, mentioned that he is not comfortable with positions becoming a large part of his portfolio. For example, when they reach 25-35%. He mentioned that Apple is now 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio and thinks that that is near a danger zone.” Wonders if Warren and Charlie can comment.

贝基·奎克：下一个问题来自艾莉·阿敏·特贝特（菲律宾），她问：“在《以坦普顿方式投资》播客的一集中，达莫达兰教授提到，他对某些头寸占据他投资组合的很大一部分感到不安。例如，当它们达到 25-35%时。他提到苹果现在占伯克希尔投资组合的 35%，并认为这接近危险区。”想知道沃伦和查理是否可以评论。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d like to make one comment first, but Charlie will come up with —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我想先说一句，但查理会接着说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think he’s out of his mind.

查理·芒格：我认为他疯了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I knew that was coming. (Laughter) Apple is not 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio. Berkshire’s portfolio includes the railroad, the energy business, Garanimals, you name it, See’s Candies, they’re all businesses. And, you know, the good thing about Apple is that we can go up.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我知道这会发生。（笑声）苹果并不是伯克希尔投资组合的 35%。伯克希尔的投资组合包括铁路、能源业务、Garanimals，你说的都有，See's Candies，它们都是企业。而且，你知道，苹果的好处在于我们可以继续增长。

They buy in their stock, and instead of owning 5.6%, they got about 15 billion, 700 and some million shares outstanding. They get down to 15 and a quarter billion without us doing anything. We got 6%. So, we can’t own more than 100% of the BNSF.

他们购买了他们的股票，而不是拥有 5.6%，他们大约有 150 亿，7 亿多的流通股。在我们不做任何事情的情况下，他们的股份降到了 152.5 亿。我们拥有 6%。所以，我们不能拥有超过 100%的 BNSF。

We can’t own more than 100% of Garanimals or See’s Candies. And it would be nice. We’d love to own 200%, but it just isn’t doable. But they’re all the same. They’re good businesses. And to think that our criteria for Apple is different than the other businesses we own, it just happens to be a better business than any we own.

我们不能拥有超过 100%的 Garanimals 或 See’s Candies。这样很好。我们希望拥有 200%，但这不可能。但它们都是一样的。它们都是好生意。想想我们的苹果标准与我们拥有的其他业务不同，这恰好是比我们拥有的任何业务都要好的生意。

And we put a fair amount of money in it, but we haven’t got more money in it than we’ve got in the railroad. And Apple is a better business. Our railroad is a very good business. But it’s not remotely as good as Apple’s business. Apple, you know, has a position with consumers where they’re paying, you know, maybe the $1,500 bucks or whatever it may be for a phone.

我们投入了相当多的钱，但我们在这方面投入的钱并没有超过我们在铁路上的投入。而苹果的业务更好。我们的铁路业务非常好，但远不如苹果的业务。苹果在消费者中占有一席之地，他们愿意为一部手机支付大约 1500 美元或其他价格。

And these same people pay $35,000 for having a second car. And if they had to give up a second car or give up their iPhone, they’d give up their second car. I mean, it’s an extraordinary product. We don’t have anything like that that we own 100% of.

这些人花 35,000 美元买第二辆车。如果他们必须放弃第二辆车或放弃他们的 iPhone，他们会选择放弃第二辆车。我的意思是，这是一款非凡的产品。我们没有任何类似的产品是我们 100%拥有的。

But we’re very, very, very happy to have 5.6%, or whatever it may be, and we’re delighted every tenth of a percent that goes up. That’s like adding $100 million to our share of the earnings. And they use the earnings to buy out our partners, which we’re glad to see them sell out, too.

但我们非常非常非常高兴能有 5.6%或其他任何数字，每增加百分之一我们都感到高兴。这就像给我们的收益增加了 1 亿美元。他们用这些收益来收购我们的合作伙伴，我们也很高兴看到他们出售股份。

The index funds have to sell if they (Laugh) bring the number of shares down. And, you know, we went up slightly last year, and I made a mistake a couple years ago when I sold some shares when I had certain reasons why gains were useful to take that year from a tax standpoint.

指数基金必须出售，如果他们（大笑）减少股票数量。你知道，我们去年略有上涨，而我在几年前犯了一个错误，当时我因为某些原因出售了一些股票，因为从税务角度来看，那一年获得收益是有用的。

But having heard me say that, it was a dumb decision. (Laugh) And, Charlie, you’ve already given your comment about it. But we do not have 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio. Berkshire’s portfolio is the funds we have to work with. And we want to own good businesses. And we also want to have plenty of liquidity. And beyond that, you know, the sky’s the limit or our mistakes. Who knows what the bottom is? (Laugh) Charlie, do you want to add anything to your earlier comment?

但听我这么说，这真是个愚蠢的决定。（笑）查理，你已经对此发表过看法。但我们并没有持有伯克希尔 35%的投资组合。伯克希尔的投资组合是我们可以运用的资金。我们想拥有好的企业。我们也希望有充足的流动性。除此之外，你知道，天花板是无限的，或者是我们的错误。谁知道底线是什么？（笑）查理，你想对你之前的评论补充些什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think one of the inane things that’s taught in modern university education is that a vast diversification is absolutely mandatory in investing in common stocks. That is an insane idea. It’s not that easy to have a vast plethora of good opportunities that are easily identified.

查理·芒格：我认为现代大学教育中教授的一个愚蠢观点是，投资于普通股绝对需要广泛的多样化。这是一个疯狂的想法。要有大量容易识别的良好机会并不是那么简单。

And if you’ve only got three, I’d rather be in my best ideas instead of my worst. And now, some people can’t tell their best ideas from their worst. And the act of deciding that an investment is already good, they get to thinking it’s better than it is.

如果你只有三个，我宁愿处于我最好的想法中，而不是最糟的想法中。现在，有些人无法分辨他们的最佳想法和最糟的想法。而决定某项投资已经不错的行为，让他们开始认为它比实际情况要好。

I think we make fewer mistakes like that than other people. And that is a blessing to us.

我认为我们犯这样的错误比其他人少。这对我们来说是一种祝福。

We’re not so smart, but we kind of know where the edge of our smartness is. That is a very important part of practical intelligence. And a lot of people who are geniuses on IQ tests think they’re a lot smarter than they are. And what they are is dangerous.

我们并不是那么聪明，但我们大致知道自己聪明的边界。这是实践智慧中非常重要的一部分。许多在智商测试中表现出色的人认为自己比实际聪明得多。而他们实际上是危险的。

But if you know the edge of your own ability pretty well, you should ignore most of the notions of our experts about what I call “deworsification” of portfolios.

但如果你对自己能力的边界有相当清晰的认识，你应该忽略我们专家关于我所称的投资组合“恶化多样化”的大多数观点。

25. U.S. and China both need to reduce ‘stupid, stupid, stupid’ economic tensions

美国和中国都需要减少“愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢”的经济紧张关系

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station nine?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）第九站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie and Warren. Thank you for this superb shareholder meeting celebration. My name is David Chung (PH) from Hong Kong, and a proud graduate of Chicago Booth. I’m also here with my two sons, Aiden (PH) and Ashen (PH), who are currently studying at the University of Chicago as a freshman and sophomore.

观众成员：嗨，查理和沃伦。感谢你们举办这场精彩的股东大会庆祝活动。我叫大卫·钟（PH），来自香港，是芝加哥布斯商学院的自豪毕业生。我还带着我的两个儿子，艾登（PH）和阿申（PH），他们目前在芝加哥大学读大一和大二。

This is my second time attending the conference, last being 2019 four years ago, which I was only a guest shareholder of my friend, Andrew. So, after the shareholder meeting, I have decided to buy into Berkshire Hathaway, which has given me a great return of 62% since 2019.

这是我第二次参加会议，上一次是四年前的 2019 年，那时我只是我朋友安德鲁的客人股东。因此，在股东会议之后，我决定投资伯克希尔哈撒韦，自 2019 年以来我获得了 62%的丰厚回报。

So, I wanted to thank you for that. (Applause) I have also taken your advice to give my children a share for each of their birthdays. Although they want Berkshire Hathaway A shares, (Laughter) they will do just fine with B shares. (Laughter)

所以，我想感谢你。（掌声）我也听从了你的建议，在每个孩子的生日给他们一份礼物。虽然他们想要伯克希尔·哈撒韦的 A 类股票，（笑声）但 B 类股票对他们来说也很好。（笑声）

My question is how do you see the current U.S./China internet companies’ valuation and the price disparity, given there have been many uncertainties such as geopolitical tensions, significant cost optimizations with leading U.S. tech firms, while China tech has been through all that already? Thank you.

我的问题是，考虑到地缘政治紧张局势、美国领先科技公司显著的成本优化等许多不确定性，您如何看待当前美中互联网公司的估值和价格差异，而中国科技公司已经经历了这一切？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想要吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s been some tension in the economic relationship of United States and China. I think that that tension has been wrongly created on both sides. I think we’re equally guilty of being stupid. If there’s one thing we should do, it’s get along with China.

查理·芒格：嗯，美国和中国之间的经济关系一直存在一些紧张。我认为这种紧张是双方错误造成的。我认为我们在愚蠢方面同样有罪。如果有一件事我们应该做，那就是与中国和睦相处。

And we should have a lot of free trade with China in our mutual interest. (Applause)

我们应该与中国进行大量的自由贸易，以符合我们双方的利益。（掌声）

And I just can’t imagine. It’s just so obvious. There’s so much safety and so much creativity that’s possible. Think of what Apple has done by engaging in a partnership with China as a big supplier.

我简直无法想象。这太明显了。安全性和创造力的可能性如此之大。想想苹果通过与中国作为一个大供应商建立合作关系所做的事情。

It’s been good for Apple and good for China. That’s the kind of business we ought to be doing with China. And more of it. Everything that increases the tension between the two countries is stupid, stupid, stupid. It ought to be stopped on each side. And each side ought to respond to the other side’s stupidity with reciprocal kindness. That’s my view.

这对苹果和中国都是好事。这就是我们应该与中国开展的业务类型。而且应该更多。任何加剧两国之间紧张关系的事情都是愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢的。双方都应该停止这种行为。双方应该以互惠的善意回应对方的愚蠢。这是我的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: And it creates one enormous problem, of course, which is that you have the two superpowers of the world, and they know they have to get along with each other. Either one can destroy the other. And they’re going to be competitive with each other. But part of it is, always in a game like that, is trying to judge how far you can push the other guy without them reacting wrong.

沃伦·巴菲特：这当然会造成一个巨大的问题，那就是世界上有两个超级大国，他们知道必须相互和睦相处。任何一方都可以摧毁另一方。他们之间会有竞争。但在这样的游戏中，总是要判断你可以在多大程度上逼迫对方，而不让他们做出错误反应。

And, you know, if either side is a bully in some ways, they can get away with it, to an extent, because the alternative would drive them both into destruction. But if they push it too far, they increase the probability that something really does go wrong.

而且，你知道，如果任何一方在某种程度上是个恶霸，他们在一定程度上可以逃避责任，因为替代方案会将他们都推向毁灭。但如果他们过于强硬，就会增加事情真的出错的可能性。

So, it’s one of those game theory dilemmas. But you really need the leader of both countries. And you need the populace to understand, at least, the general situation in which these countries are going to operate over the next century. And know that some leader that promises too much can get you in a hell of a lot of trouble.

所以，这就是一种博弈论困境。但你真的需要两个国家的领导人。而且你需要民众至少了解这两个国家在下个世纪将要运作的一般情况。并且要知道，某些承诺过多的领导人可能会让你陷入巨大的麻烦。

And, you know, you’ve got one kind of a system that gets its leader one way. They’ve got another system that gets its leader another way. And keeping either side from trying to play the game too hard, and thinking the other side will go along, you know, it’s like playing chicken, you know, and driving toward a cliff.

而且，你知道，你有一种系统以一种方式选出领导者。他们有另一种系统以另一种方式选出领导者。要防止任何一方过于激烈地玩游戏，并认为另一方会配合，你知道，这就像在玩“鸡”，朝悬崖开去。

So, if you’ve got any diplomacy skills, persuasive skills, or anything like that, you really want people that will convince the other country, as well as his own or her own country, that, “This is what we’re engaged in. We’ve got to do it right. We won’t give away the store, but we won’t try and take the whole store, either.”

所以，如果你有任何外交技巧、说服能力或类似的技能，你真的需要那些能够说服其他国家以及他自己国家的人，让他们相信，“这就是我们所参与的。我们必须做到正确。我们不会把所有的东西都让出去，但我们也不会试图把整个商店都拿走。”

And we’re just at the beginning of this, unfortunately. I mean, we learned what the situation was. It used to be the Soviet. And mutually assured destruction was our policy then. And that kept a lot of things from happening, but it also came with a very, very, very close call with Cuba.

而我们不幸的是，这只是一个开始。我的意思是，我们了解了情况。以前是苏联。相互确保毁灭是我们的政策。这防止了很多事情发生，但也带来了与古巴非常非常接近的危机。

And these are different games that existed hundreds of years ago. Britain might rule and seize France or Spain, but now you’re playing with a game that you can’t really make a huge mistake in. And I think that the better that’s understood in both countries, the more the leaders feel that their citizenry does understand that, the better off we’ll be.

这些是几百年前存在的不同游戏。英国可能统治并夺取法国或西班牙，但现在你正在玩一个你不能真的犯大错的游戏。我认为，如果两个国家都能更好地理解这一点，领导人感到他们的公民确实理解这一点，我们就会更好。

And that a lot of demography, or a lot of inflammatory speaking, but a lot of authoritarian action, I mean, it all carries its dangers. And the world has stumbled through the years post 1945 with a lot of close calls in the nuclear arena.

而且很多人口统计，或者很多煽动性的言论，以及很多专制的行动，我的意思是，这一切都带来了危险。自 1945 年以来，世界在核领域经历了许多惊险的时刻。

And now we’ve got pandemics. And we’ve got cyber, and a whole bunch of other things. So, we’ve got more tools of destruction than the world’s ever had. And it’s imperative that China and the United States both understand what the game is and understand that you can’t push too hard.

现在我们面临着疫情，还有网络安全以及其他一系列问题。因此，我们拥有的破坏工具比世界上任何时候都要多。中美两国必须理解游戏规则，并明白不能过于施压。

But both places are going to be competitive. And both can prosper. That’s the vision that is out there, that China will have a more wonderful country, the United States will have a more wonderful country. And the two are not [incompatible].

但这两个地方都将具有竞争力。两者都可以繁荣。这是一个愿景，中国将拥有一个更美好的国家，美国也将拥有一个更美好的国家。这两者并不是[不兼容的]。

They’re almost imperative in terms of what’s going to happen in the next 100 years or so. And I think that the leaders of both countries have got an important job in having that understood, and not to do inflammatory things. And we’ll see whether the luck that has taken us from 1945 to present holds out. And I think we can affect, to some extent, that luck. And with that cheery message, we will hand it to Becky. (Laugh)

它们在未来大约 100 年内将是至关重要的。我认为两国的领导人有一个重要的任务，就是让人们理解这一点，而不是做出煽动性的事情。我们将看看自 1945 年至今带给我们的运气是否会持续下去。我认为我们在某种程度上可以影响这种运气。带着这个愉快的信息，我们将把话题交给贝基。（笑）

26. ‘I feel better about the capital we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan’

“我对我们在日本投入的资本比在台湾的更有信心。”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Roheet Bellany (PH). “Berkshire bought a substantial position in Taiwan Semiconductor, and contrary to its normal holding timeline, sold almost the entire position within a few short months.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自罗希特·贝拉尼（PH）。“伯克希尔在台积电购买了大量股份，与其正常的持股时间表相反，在短短几个月内几乎卖掉了全部股份。”

While you cited in a CNBC interview that geopolitical issues were the catalyst, these issues were seemingly no different when you acquired that stock.

尽管你在接受 CNBC 采访时提到地缘政治问题是催化剂，但在你收购那只股票时，这些问题似乎并没有什么不同。

So, what else, if anything, changed in those few months and prompted the firm to offload close to $5 billion worth of Taiwan Semiconductor shares?”

那么，在这几个月里，还有什么变化促使该公司出售近 50 亿美元的台积电股份？

WARREN BUFFETT: Taiwan Semiconductor’s one of the best managed companies and important companies in the world. And I think you’ll be able to say the same thing five, or ten, or 20 years from now.

沃伦·巴菲特：台湾半导体是全球管理最优秀和最重要的公司之一。我认为五年、十年或二十年后你也会这样说。

I don’t like its location. And I’ve reevaluated that. I mean, I don’t think it should be any place but Taiwan, although they will be, obviously, opening up chip capacity in this country.

我不喜欢它的位置。我重新评估过这个问题。我的意思是，我认为它不应该在其他地方，除了台湾，尽管显然他们会在这个国家扩大芯片产能。

And actually, one of our subsidiaries that we got in Alleghany is participating in their Arizona construction activities.

实际上，我们在Alleghany获得的一个子公司正在参与他们在亚利桑那州的建设活动。

But it’s a question of we would rather have the same kind of company. And there’s nobody in the chip industry that’s in their league, at least in my view.

但我们更希望有同样类型的公司。在我看来，芯片行业没有人能与他们相提并论。

And the man that is a 91-year-old or so connected with it, that I think I played bridge with in Albuquerque, and they’re marvelous people, marvelous company. But I’d rather find marvelous people — and I won’t find it in the chip industry.

与此相关的那位大约 91 岁的男士，我想我曾在阿尔伯克基和他打过桥牌，他们是了不起的人，令人愉快的公司。但我更想找到了不起的人——而我在芯片行业找不到。

已经在观察这个行业，NVDA表现的不够优秀。

But marvelous people and marvelous competitive position and everything, I’d rather find it in the United States.

但我更愿意在美国找到那些了不起的人、了不起的竞争地位和一切。

I feel better about the capital that we’ve got deployed in Japan than Taiwan. I wish it weren’t so, but I think that’s the reality. And I’ve reevaluated that in the light of certain things that were going on. Charlie?

我对我们在日本投入的资本感到比在台湾更好。我希望不是这样，但我认为这就是现实。考虑到一些正在发生的事情，我重新评估了这一点。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my view is that Warren ought to feel comfortable if he wants to. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我的看法是，如果沃伦想的话，他应该感到舒服。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. Put that in the minutes. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。把这个记录在会议纪要里。（笑声）

27. Ben Graham’s great investment book is still popular

本·格雷厄姆的伟大投资书籍仍然很受欢迎。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station ten?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第十站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: First of all, thank you for making our lives better. My name is Bugomil Baranowsky. I’m a founding partner of Sicart Associates in New York. We manage multi-generational family fortunes, hence my question. Mr. Buffet, in 1976 in your tribute to Benjamin Graham you wrote, “Walter Lippmann spoke of men who plant trees that other men will sit under.” Ben Graham was such a man. You’re both such people. Could you share with us your 100-year vision for Berkshire? It’s a question to you both.

观众成员：首先，感谢您让我们的生活变得更好。我的名字是布戈米尔·巴拉诺夫斯基。我是纽约 Sicart Associates 的创始合伙人。我们管理多代家庭财富，因此我有这个问题。巴菲特先生，1976 年在您对本杰明·格雷厄姆的致敬中，您写道：“沃尔特·李普曼谈到那些为他人栽树的人。”本杰明·格雷厄姆就是这样的人。你们两位都是这样的人。您能与我们分享一下您对伯克希尔的 100 年愿景吗？这是对你们两位的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would like to add one thing about Ben Graham. Ben Graham did all kinds of things for me, and he never expected one thing in return. I mean, just you name it, and he did it, and there wasn’t any hidden — you know, the slightest hint, I should say, of anything he expected in return.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想补充一点关于本·格雷厄姆的事。本·格雷厄姆为我做了各种事情，他从来没有期待过任何回报。我的意思是，你只要提到，他就会去做，而且他没有任何隐含的——我应该说，丝毫的暗示，表明他期待什么回报。

And I checked: He wrote a book in 1949 that, in a sense, said to me, in very persuasive terms, that what I’d been spending the previous eight or nine years worked at, and loving, was all wrong. And that book has been — I check it every now and then on Amazon where it ranks, and, you know, Amazon ranks hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of books by sales.

我查了一下：他在 1949 年写了一本书，从某种意义上说，用非常有说服力的语言告诉我，我在过去八九年里所做的工作和热爱的事情都是错的。那本书我时不时会在亚马逊上查看它的排名，众所周知，亚马逊根据销量对成千上万本书进行排名。

And Ben Graham’s book has been up there, like, number 300, or 350, or something like that, forever. And there isn’t book like it. I wrote Harper Collins a note the other day because they’re bringing out another edition. And I asked them how many copies have been sold. And they said the records didn’t go back far enough, but they had 7.3 million copies of this little book that changed my life and continues to outsell every investment book ever.

本·格雷厄姆的书一直在那儿，像是第 300 或 350 名，永远如此。没有其他书能与之相比。前几天我给哈珀·柯林斯写了一封信，因为他们要出版另一个版本。我问他们卖出了多少本。他们说记录没有追溯得那么远，但他们有 730 万本，这本改变我生活的小书，至今仍然销量超过所有投资书籍。

Investment books come along and, you know, they’re number 400, or 1000 or something for a while, and then all of a sudden, they’re number 25,000, or (Laugh) 200,000.

投资书籍一开始可能排名 400 或 1000，过一段时间后，突然间，它们的排名变成了 25000，或者（笑）200000。

And this book — you know, in how many areas can you find any book that has had that sustained position? You go back and look at number one in 1950, or number two or number three, and you look at it in ’51 and ’52: They don’t continue.

这本书——你知道，有多少领域能找到一本保持如此持久地位的书？你回头看看 1950 年的第一名，或者第二名、第三名，然后再看看 1951 年和 1952 年：它们并没有持续下去。

I mean, they just don’t continue. Cookbooks, maybe one or two of them, last for a while, but there is nothing. And this book lives on, and everybody keeps bringing out new books, and saying a lot of other things. But they aren’t saying anything that’s as important as what he said in 1949 in this relatively thin little book.

我的意思是，他们就是不继续。食谱书，可能一两本能持续一段时间，但没有其他的。而这本书依然存在，大家不断推出新书，讲很多其他的事情。但他们说的都没有 1949 年他在这本相对薄的小书中所说的那么重要。

So, you know, our vision for Berkshire is exactly what we said today: We want it to be a company that is owned by shareholders and behaves in a way that society is happy that it exists, and not unhappy. And we will have unlimited capital, we’ll get lots of talent, and we’ve got a base that can’t be beat.

所以，你知道，我们对伯克希尔的愿景正是我们今天所说的：我们希望它成为一个由股东拥有的公司，以一种让社会感到高兴而不是不高兴的方式运作。我们将拥有无限的资本，吸引大量人才，并且我们有一个无与伦比的基础。

And there’s no reason why it can’t be perpetuated, just like Ben’s book, and maybe be an example to other people. And, if so, we’ll be very happy. Charlie?

而且没有理由它不能被延续，就像本的书一样，也许可以成为其他人的榜样。如果是这样，我们会非常高兴。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. One of the really interesting things about Ben Graham: He was a really gifted teacher, a very honorable profession. And that is what has lasted. However, an interesting fact that he was sheepish about in his old age, was that more than half of all the investment return that Ben Graham made in his whole life came from one stock, one growth stock: GEICO, Berkshire subsidiary.

查理·芒格：是的。关于本·格雷厄姆，有一件非常有趣的事情：他是一位非常有天赋的老师，这是一种非常高尚的职业。这就是他所留下的。然而，他在晚年对此感到羞愧的一个有趣事实是，本·格雷厄姆一生中超过一半的投资回报来自一只股票，一只成长股：GEICO，伯克希尔的子公司。

And at the time he operated, there were a lot of sort of lousy companies that were too cheap, and you could make a little money floating from one to another. But the big money he made was one growth stock, buying one undervalued great company is a very good thing, as Berkshire has found out again and again and again.

在他操作的那个时候，有很多廉价的公司，你可以通过在这些公司之间切换赚一点钱。但他赚到的大钱来自于一只成长股，购买一只被低估的优秀公司是非常好的事情，正如伯克希尔一次又一次发现的那样。

WARREN BUFFETT: And Ben wrote a postscript to the ’49 edition pointing out exactly that fact, and acknowledging it, but also took some good lessons from it. “You know,” he said, “that’s the way life is: That you prepare, and you, you know, don’t lose on everything along the way, and then something comes along.”

沃伦·巴菲特：本在 1949 年版的后记中指出了这个事实，并对此表示认可，同时也从中吸取了一些好的教训。“你知道，”他说，“生活就是这样：你要准备好，你知道，在这个过程中并不是所有事情都要失败，然后就会有一些事情出现。”

And GEICO came along because a banker in Fort Worth that had financed Leo Davidson, and I think the banker got three-quarters of it. I don’t mean “Leo Davidson,” Leo Goodwin, who founded GEICO then called Government Employees Insurance Company, and you can figure out the acronym.

而 GEICO 的出现是因为一位在沃斯堡的银行家为里奥·戴维森提供了融资，我认为这位银行家得到了四分之三的收益。我不是指“里奥·戴维森”，而是创立了 GEICO 的里奥·古德温，当时称为政府雇员保险公司，你可以想象这个缩写。

The deal almost fell apart. The deal was, as I remember, for maybe a million and a half or something like — a million and a quarter. And it almost fell apart because of a difference of $25,000 in the net worth delivered. This is a business that’s, you know, worth tens of billions.

这笔交易差点破裂。根据我的记忆，这笔交易大约是 150 万美元或类似的金额——大约 125 万美元。它差点破裂是因为交付的净资产差了 25,000 美元。这是一项价值数百亿美元的业务。

But he pointed out the irony in that, too. I mean, he was honest, he was totally intellectually honest about the failings, and also the strengths, of his approach. And, to some extent, you know, Charlie and I have seen that in our lives.

但他也指出了其中的讽刺。我的意思是，他很诚实，对自己方法的缺陷和优点都完全诚实。在某种程度上，你知道，查理和我在我们的生活中也看到了这一点。

I mean, sort of the prepared mind, the willingness to act when you need to act, and the willing to ignore every salesman in the world — and it’s imperative to ignore them, and it’s one or two things that make the right decision.

我的意思是，准备好的心态，必要时愿意采取行动，以及愿意忽视世界上所有的推销员——忽视他们是至关重要的，做出正确决定的关键在于一两件事。

If you make the right decision on a spouse, I mean, you’ve won the game. You know, there’s an enormously important decision, and you’ve got all the time in the world. I mean, you’ve got more time than you used to have when I was a kid to make that decision.

如果你在配偶上做出正确的决定，我的意思是，你就赢得了游戏。你知道，这个决定非常重要，而你有的是时间。我的意思是，你现在有比我小时候更多的时间来做这个决定。

And, you know, I don’t know whether a third, or whatever percentage, blow that one. You know, it is really interesting.

而且，你知道，我不知道第三次，或者任何百分比，打击那个。你知道，这真的很有趣。

The thing to do is just keep trying to think things through and not do too many stupid things, “And, sooner or later, you have a lollapalooza,” as Charlie would say.

要做的就是不断尝试思考事情，不要做太多愚蠢的事情，“迟早你会有一个盛大的成功，”正如查理所说。

28. GEICO is talking to carmakers about selling insurance in the showroom

GEICO 正在与汽车制造商洽谈在展厅销售保险。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: “All right. This question comes from Terafta (PH), a shareholder in Sierra Vista, Arizona, who is asking a question of Ajit.

贝基·奎克：“好的。这个问题来自亚利桑那州塞拉维斯塔的股东特拉夫塔（PH），他在向阿吉特提问。”

He wants to know about electric vehicles getting insurance from the manufacturer instead of car insurance companies. A recent article in The Wall Street Journal shows that EVs are a small-but-growing percentage of sales. Tesla and GM are offering their own electric vehicle insurance: What will GEICO do to combat this?

他想了解电动车如何从制造商那里获得保险，而不是从汽车保险公司获得保险。《华尔街日报》最近的一篇文章显示，电动车在销售中占比虽小但正在增长。特斯拉和通用汽车正在提供自己的电动车保险：GEICO 将采取什么措施来应对这一情况？

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. So, GEICO is talking to a number of original equipment manufacturers as well to try and see how best they can work with the auto manufacturers and offer insurance at the point of sale. There haven’t been very many success stories (Laugh) as yet.

AJIT JAIN：是的。所以，GEICO 也在与一些原始设备制造商进行沟通，试图了解他们如何与汽车制造商合作，并在销售时提供保险。目前还没有太多成功的案例（笑）。

So, we’ll wait and see. You know, clearly, it is a very convenient way to sell auto insurance at the point of sale. But there’s a fair amount of data that needs to be collected on the driver, not just the car. And that makes it a little more complicated.

所以，我们将拭目以待。你知道，显然，在销售点销售汽车保险是一种非常方便的方式。但需要收集大量关于驾驶员的数据，而不仅仅是汽车。这使得事情变得有些复杂。

So, we are talking to some auto manufacturers ourselves, we are hopeful that we will strike a deal with some of them before too long.

所以，我们自己也在与一些汽车制造商交谈，我们希望能在不久的将来与他们达成协议。

Tesla and GM both have talked a lot in the press in terms of getting into the insurance business. And, in fact, GM, I think, has projected they’ll write $3 billion of premiums. Which, you know, it’s hard to imagine where it’ll come from. But there all hot to trot. I think somebody will find the secret sauce before too long, and we ourselves are in that race.

特斯拉和通用汽车在媒体上谈论了很多关于进入保险业务的事情。事实上，我认为通用汽车预计他们将写出 30 亿美元的保费。很难想象这些保费将来自哪里。但他们都很积极。我认为在不久的将来会有人找到成功的秘诀，而我们自己也在这场竞争中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would point out that — General Motors Insurance, for decades — and, I mean, this is not a new idea. And Uber wrote a lot of insurance for a while, they laid it off with somebody, and that company got killed by it. But — and I don’t know the deal between Uber and — I forget the name of the company that took it on, Ajit would probably know.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想指出——通用汽车保险，几十年来——我的意思是，这不是一个新想法。而且，优步曾经写了很多保险，他们把它转给了某个公司，而那家公司因此遭受了重创。但是——我不知道优步和——我忘了接手的公司的名字，阿吉特可能知道。

AJIT JAIN: James River. 阿吉特·贾因：James River。

WARREN BUFFETT: James — yeah. And, you know, it is not a new idea, it’s not magic in the least. I mean, it is hard to come up with something that is better at matching risk to reward — I’m sorry, risk to price, than a bunch of very smart people are doing at Progressive, and a bunch of very smart people are doing, to a greater extent, at GEICO.

沃伦·巴菲特：詹姆斯——是的。你知道，这不是一个新想法，根本不是魔法。我的意思是，很难想出一种更好地将风险与价格匹配的方法——抱歉，我是说风险与回报，除了许多非常聪明的人在 Progressive 所做的，以及在 GEICO 做得更好的许多非常聪明的人。

And, I mean, it just was fascinating to me when Uber went into it, you know? And they were going to get their head handed to them. But they laid off a good bit of it — a very substantial percentage of it, with somebody else, who got their head handed to them.

而且，我的意思是，当优步进入这个领域时，这对我来说真是太吸引人了，你知道吗？他们本来会遭遇很大的损失。但他们去掉了相当一部分——一个非常可观的比例，和其他人一起，其他人也遭遇了很大的损失。

(Laugh) And, you know, but it was a story, you know, and Wall Street loves it. We’ve got 80 car dealerships that do a lot of business, and, you know, we’ve got the people buying the cars, and the place, and we form an insurance company around those dealer groups, for some reason, that writes insurance: You know, it’s hard to improve on the present system. And — (Laugh)

（笑）你知道，这就是一个故事，华尔街喜欢这个故事。我们有 80 家汽车经销商，生意很好，你知道，我们有买车的人，还有地方，我们围绕这些经销商集团成立了一家保险公司，出于某种原因，提供保险：你知道，改进现有系统是很困难的。然后——（笑）

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. 阿吉特·贾因：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: I wouldn’t pay a penny — oh, I’d pay to avoid it, actually. I mean — (laughs) and — go ahead, Ajit.

沃伦·巴菲特：我不会花一分钱——哦，我会花钱来避免它，实际上。我的意思是——（笑）然后——继续，阿吉特。

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. The only point I’d like to add is the margins on writing auto insurance are 4%. Which is a very small number, and once there are more people that are trying to take a bite of the apple, it just becomes very, very difficult to keep all the mouths fed in a profitable manner.

AJIT JAIN：是的。我想补充的一点是，汽车保险的利润率是 4%。这个数字非常小，一旦有更多的人想要分一杯羹，就会变得非常非常困难，以盈利的方式让所有人都能得到满足。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You can say there was one big, new idea in property — in car insurance, back in 1920 or so when State Farm started, and State Farm still has it. Next to Berkshire, it’s the leader in having net worth. It’s a mutual company, but some guy just figured that there was a cartel running car insurance. “A Farmer from Merna” is the name of the book, I think, over in Illinois, and he created a system where he really took 20 points or so out of the cost.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你可以说在 1920 年左右，当State Farm成立时，财产保险——特别是汽车保险——有一个重大的新想法，而State Farm至今仍然拥有这个想法。它是仅次于伯克希尔的净资产领导者。它是一家互助公司，但有个人发现汽车保险行业存在一个卡特尔。我想那本书的名字是《A Farmer from Merna》，在伊利诺伊州，他创建了一个系统，实际上将成本降低了大约 20 个百分点。

And surprise, surprise, here he is, you know? And nobody’s owned stock in State Farm — it’s an insult to capitalism, actually. Everything (Laughs) you learned at the business school says it shouldn’t work, because nobody owns it, nobody’s going public with it, no nothing.

而且惊喜，惊喜，他来了，你知道吗？而且没有人拥有State Farm的股票——这实际上是对资本主义的侮辱。你在商学院学到的所有东西（笑）都说这不应该成立，因为没有人拥有它，没有人将其上市，什么都没有。

But it’s got more net worth — it’s almost probably double. Leaving Berkshire out of the picture, it’s probably double the next guy, and nobody’s really improved on their system that much.

但它的净资产更高——可能几乎是双倍。撇开伯克希尔不谈，它可能是下一个人的双倍，而且没有人真的在他们的系统上有太大改进。

So, it’s fascinating how people don’t really look at the essence. You know, these are cases that should carry a message. But the truth is, in Wall Street anything can get sold.

所以，人们真的不关注本质，这一点很吸引人。你知道，这些案例应该传达一个信息。但事实是，在华尔街，任何东西都可以被出售。

The test is whether you can sell it or not. If you can sell it, it’ll get sold, and a bunch of insurance companies came along and got it sold. And this can be a story about this stock or that stock, and it sounded good when they talked about it at Uber for a while. And it is really interesting. The investing public does not learn much.

测试是你能否将其出售。如果你能出售，它就会被卖掉，一些保险公司也参与其中并成功出售。这可以是关于这只股票或那只股票的故事，当他们在 Uber 谈论它时听起来不错。这真的很有趣。大众股民并没有学到太多。

29. Index funds are ‘backing off’ from using voting power

指数基金正在“退缩”不再使用投票权。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。站点 11。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name’s Jeff Merriam (PH). I’m from Edina, Minnesota. We’ve been coming for years. To make that professor from the earlier question really nervous, half our family’s wealth is in Berkshire Hathaway. (Laugh)

观众成员：嗨。我叫杰夫·梅里亚姆。我来自明尼苏达州的埃迪纳。我们已经来了很多年。为了让之前提问的教授真的紧张，我们家一半的财富都在伯克希尔·哈撒韦。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laugh) But let’s make Charlie nervous. (Laugh)

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）但让查理紧张一下。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question has to do with voting control in the future. There was a question earlier about corporate raider. I was more wondering about who is actually going to own the voting control? Is it going to be institutions? CalPERS? BlackRock? Are they eventually going to get their way with the ESG checkboxes that we’re going to have to check? And what should we be thinking about that?

观众成员：我的问题与未来的投票控制有关。之前有一个关于企业掠夺者的问题。我更想知道谁实际上会拥有投票控制权？是机构吗？加州公共员工退休系统？黑石集团？他们最终会通过我们必须勾选的 ESG 检查项吗？我们应该对此考虑些什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re thinking very well. And the interesting thing is the big aggregations look like, of course, they’d be in index funds. But what index funds want is they want a world in which society doesn’t get upset with them about the fact they’ve got all the voting power. And I would say in the last year or two it’s looked like a better idea for them not quite to get as — what was the phrase that Charlie used?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你的思考非常到位。有趣的是，大型聚合体看起来当然会在指数基金中。但指数基金想要的是一个社会不会因为他们拥有所有投票权而对他们感到不满的世界。我会说在过去一两年里，对他们来说，似乎不那么——查理用的是什么词？

CHARLIE MUNGER: But they’ve backed off a lot.

查理·芒格：但他们已经退缩了很多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they backed off a lot. And it’s in their interest to back off. And, interestingly enough, in looking at money management, you know, the game is not performance, it’s assets under management. And index funds produce a tiny, tiny, tiny fee on assets under management. Because it was pioneered by Vanguard, and when it became successful it was very easy to replicate. Not so “easy,” but, I mean, it was inevitable that it be copied.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们退缩了很多。这对他们来说是有利的。有趣的是，在观察资金管理时，你知道，游戏不是表现，而是管理资产。指数基金在管理资产上产生的费用非常非常少。因为这是先锋集团首创的，当它成功后，复制起来非常简单。虽然不是那么“简单”，但我意思是，复制是不可避免的。

But it came with a management fee of two basis points. So, what people that have offered index funds would really like is you to buy their other funds, or let them manage money in some other way, so that they get higher fee on assets under management.

但这附带了两基点的管理费。因此，提供指数基金的人真正希望的是你购买他们的其他基金，或者让他们以其他方式管理资金，以便他们在管理资产上获得更高的费用。

互联网的销售策略。

Which, of course, is (Laugh) exactly why the index fund was invented in the first place. So, it’s not a “loss leader,” but it is a way to pull money in, and then you hope that people ignore what was said by —what’s the name that — you know, that — John Bogel — Jack Bogel — ignore him.

当然，这正是指数基金最初被发明的原因。所以，这不是一个“亏损引导”，但它确实是一种吸引资金的方式，然后你希望人们忽略——那个名字——你知道的——约翰·博格——杰克·博格——忽略他。

And, essentially, they give up the (UNINTEL) idea, “And that we’ll offer you a fund that does this in India, and we’ll offer you another fund that does that.” And, of course, those management fees are higher.

而且，基本上，他们放弃了（UNINTEL）这个想法，“我们会为您提供一个在印度做这个的基金，我们还会为您提供另一个做那个的基金。”当然，这些管理费用更高。

So, they’re really counter-selling the idea that John Bogel came along with. But in the process, they have achieved a lot of votes, and that was fun for a while, but the last thing in the world they want to do is have Washington, or the American public, decide that they’re throwing around their weight too much.

所以，他们实际上是在反对约翰·博格尔提出的想法。但在这个过程中，他们获得了很多选票，这一度很有趣，但他们最不想做的就是让华盛顿或美国公众认为他们过于张扬自己的权力。

So, they’re tending to back off. Now, if you figure out where their self-interest is, you can judge where their behavior is going to go. Charlie? You want to defend them? (Laugh)

所以，他们倾向于退缩。现在，如果你弄清楚他们的自我利益在哪里，你就可以判断他们的行为将会如何。查理？你想为他们辩护吗？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, you can square what you just said. (Laugh) You’re totally right on everything.

查理·芒格：不，你可以把你刚才说的说得更清楚。（笑）你在所有方面都是完全正确的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in that case I won’t ask anybody else.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，在这种情况下，我就不问其他人了。

30. Buffett: Greg Abel ‘understands capital allocation as well as I do’

巴菲特：格雷格·阿贝尔“对资本配置的理解和我一样好”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？（笑声）

BECKY QUICK: All right. This question comes from Almu (PH) Grinnell (PH), and this is for Warren and Greg.

贝基·奎克：好的。这个问题来自阿尔穆（PH）格里内尔（PH），这是给沃伦和格雷格的。

“Since 2019 Berkshire repurchased huge amounts of stock, reducing approximately 10% of the share count, and increasing the intrinsic value per share for the continuing shareholders. Greg is expected to be the successor of Warren as CEO, so will he be in charge of the main capital allocation decisions, including future share buybacks?

自 2019 年以来，伯克希尔回购了大量股票，减少了大约 10%的股份数量，提高了持续股东的每股内在价值。格雷格预计将成为沃伦的接班人，担任首席执行官，那么他是否会负责主要的资本配置决策，包括未来的股票回购？

Greg has been key in the development of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and I think a good capital allocator. Has he been involved in the share repurchases that have been executed over the past years?

格雷格在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的发展中发挥了关键作用，我认为他是一位优秀的资本配置者。他是否参与了过去几年执行的股票回购？

And do you, both Warren and Greg, work together in the estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value, and the share buyback decisions?”

你们两位，沃伦和格雷格，在评估伯克希尔的内在价值和股票回购决策时是一起合作的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is that Greg — I’m going to turn it over to him, but the answer is Greg understands capital allocation as well as I do, and that’s lucky for us.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是格雷格——我将把它交给他，但答案是格雷格对资本配置的理解和我一样好，这对我们来说是幸运的。

And he will make those decisions, I think, very much in the same framework as I would make them. And we’ve laid out that framework now for 30 years, (Laugh) or something like that. People make it way more complicated than — I mean, particularly if you’re working on a doctorate or something, it’s just a great subject to have lots of footnotes in, you know, 50 pages, or 100 pages.

他会在我会做出决定的同样框架下做出那些决定。我想，我们已经为这个框架奠定了基础，差不多有 30 年了（笑）。人们把它搞得比——我的意思是，特别是如果你在攻读博士学位之类的，那真是一个可以有很多脚注的好主题，知道吗，50 页或 100 页。

But it’s no more complicated than if you and I and Charlie had a business, and you wanted to sell your interest, and we could buy it for less than we thought it was worth, and without misleading you in any way about what was going on. And we’d buy it then. But, Greg, you’re on because you’re going to be doing it in the future. (Laugh)

但这并不比你我和查理有一家公司更复杂，如果你想出售你的股份，而我们可以以低于我们认为的价值的价格购买，并且在任何方面都没有误导你关于发生的事情。然后我们就会买下它。但是，格雷格，你在这里是因为你将来会这样做。（笑）

GREG ABEL: Right. Yeah, well, I think, Warren, you said it really well. I mean, the framework’s been laid out, we know how you approach it, and how you and Charlie have approached it, and really don’t see that framework changing. When the opportunity present itself, we’ll want to be an active repurchaser of Berkshire shares. We think it’s a great outcome for Berkshire shareholders to own a larger piece of each of our operating businesses and the portfolio of the equity companies when the opportunity presents itself.

格雷格·阿贝尔：没错。是的，我认为，沃伦，你说得很好。我的意思是，框架已经建立，我们知道你是如何处理这个问题的，以及你和查理是如何处理的，实际上并不认为这个框架会改变。当机会出现时，我们希望积极回购伯克希尔的股票。我们认为，对于伯克希尔的股东来说，拥有我们每个运营业务和股权公司组合的更大份额是一个很好的结果，当机会出现时。

几十年反复挑选的结果，跳出这个框架是很愚蠢的行为。

WARREN BUFFETT: It can be the dumbest thing you can do, or it can be the smartest thing you can do. And (Laugh) you know, to make it more complicated than that, and start getting into all this (UNINTEL), you obviously do what the business needs to do first if the opportunities are there: Grow your present business, buy additional businesses, whatever it may be.

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能是你能做的最愚蠢的事情，也可能是你能做的最聪明的事情。（笑）你知道，要把事情复杂化，开始涉及所有这些（听不清），显然，如果机会存在，你首先要做的是满足业务的需求：发展你现在的业务，收购其他业务，无论是什么。

And then you make a decision on dividends. But that decision becomes pretty irrevocable because you don’t cut dividends without having major effects in your shareholder base and a lot of things.

然后你要决定分红。但这个决定变得相当不可逆，因为一旦你减少分红，会对你的股东基础和许多其他方面产生重大影响。

And then, if you’ve got ample capital, and you don’t see that you’re going to use it all, and your stock is attractive, and it enhances the intrinsic value for the remaining shareholders, it’s a no-brainer.

然后，如果你有充足的资本，并且你认为不会全部使用这些资本，而你的股票又很有吸引力，并且能提升剩余股东的内在价值，那就毫无疑问。

And if it’s above the price of intrinsic value, it’s a no-brainer that you don’t even listen to anybody, no matter what investment banker comes in and tells you, “Here’s how to do a repurchase program.”

如果它的价格高于内在价值，那么你根本不需要考虑任何人说的话，无论哪个投资银行家进来告诉你：“这是如何进行回购计划的。”

31. Munger has two words for COVID vaccine skeptic

芒格对 COVID 疫苗怀疑者有两个字

WARREN BUFFETT: OK: Station 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的：站点 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Tom Nelson, a podcaster from North Oaks, Minnesota.

观众成员：我是汤姆·尼尔森，来自明尼苏达州北橡树的播客主持人。

Charlie, in 2022 you used phrases like, “really massively stupid,” “massive kind of ignorance,” and “crazy” to describe what you said was the 30% of Americans hesitant to submit themselves to untested mRNA COVID gene therapy. Do you stand behind those quotes today?

查理，2022 年你用“真的非常愚蠢”、“极大的无知”和“疯狂”等短语来形容你所说的 30%对接受未经测试的 mRNA COVID 基因疗法持犹豫态度的美国人。你今天还支持这些说法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Sure. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的。当然。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we got time for one more, then, before lunch.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们还有时间再问一个问题，然后就可以吃午饭了。

32. ‘It’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business’ like Berkshire

在像伯克希尔这样真正优秀的企业中，很难评判继任管理层。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）贝基？

BECKY QUICK: OK. (Laughter) Thought I was out, but let’s see. How about — let’s see here — (Laughter)

贝基·奎克：好的。（笑）我以为我结束了，但让我们看看。怎么样——让我们看看——（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Could be, “How about lunch?” pretty soon. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：很快就可能会是“吃午饭怎么样？”但是——

BECKY QUICK: (Laugh) No, no, OK. Let’s take that one for you. This one comes from Drew Estes. This is a question for Warren: “In your 1969 Letter to Partners you said, ‘In any company where the founder and chief driving force behind the enterprise is still active, it’s still very difficult to evaluate second men.’”

贝基·奎克：（笑）不，不，好吧。我们来看看这个问题。这是来自德鲁·埃斯特斯的问题。这是给沃伦的问题：“在你 1969 年的致合伙人的信中，你说过，‘在任何一家创始人和企业的主要推动力仍然活跃的公司中，评估第二把手仍然非常困难。’”

‘“The only real way to see how someone is going to do when running a company is to let them run it.’

“判断一个人在经营公司时表现如何的唯一真实方法就是让他们去经营。”

This wise statement now applies to Berkshire. Once the ‘second men’ are running Berkshire, what would you advise owners of Berkshire to watch for? Specifically what actions, if taken, should give us concern?”

这句明智的话现在适用于伯克希尔。一旦“第二把手”接管伯克希尔，你会建议伯克希尔的所有者关注什么？具体来说，哪些行动如果发生，应该引起我们的担忧？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think I would have some comfort in the fact that 99% of my net worth is (Laugh) in the company — so I’ve probably got a stronger interest in it, and perhaps $100 billion or more of philanthropy will be affected by it. But I would say that I don’t have a second choice. I mean, it is that tough to find, but I’ve also seen Greg in action, and I feel 100% comfortable.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我觉得我会对 99%的净资产（大笑）在公司中感到一些安慰——所以我可能对它有更强的兴趣，也许有超过 1000 亿美元的慈善事业会受到影响。但我想说我没有第二个选择。我的意思是，这真的很难找到，但我也见过格雷格的表现，我感到 100%放心。

And, like I say, I don’t know: If something happened to Greg I would tell the directors, you know, they have a problem, and I don’t have anybody to name, and if they put somebody in Berkshire on automatic pilot, it can work extremely well for a long time.

正如我所说，我不知道：如果Greg发生了什么事，我会告诉董事们，他们面临一个问题，我没有人选。如果他们让伯克希尔自动运行，它可以在很长时间内非常有效地运作。

I mean, it isn’t like the businesses go away or any other thing of the sort. And it’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business. Because if they don’t show up at the office, it’ll keep working for a long time. And maybe that lack of useful input may show itself in five years. I mean, it may go a long, long, long time.

我的意思是，业务并不会消失，也不会发生其他类似的事情。在真正优秀的业务中，评估接班人的管理能力很困难。因为即使他们不出现在办公室，业务也会长期运作下去。也许这种缺乏有效投入的情况可能要等五年后才会显现出来。也就是说，这可能会持续很长很长时间。

And how are the shareholders, you know, advised by a bunch of people that are concerned about whether you’re meeting earnings projections or something telling them whether the management’s any good? It is very, very hard, it’s very hard. I’ve been on the board of 20 companies: It’s very hard. If you asked me to rank the management of each one, it’s very difficult to do.

股东们怎么能通过一群担心你是否达到收益预测的人的建议来判断管理层是否优秀呢？这非常困难，非常困难。我曾在20家公司担任董事：这真的很难。如果你让我对每家公司的管理层进行排名，那是非常困难的。

Because some are just better businesses than others. Some would be better off not managed hardly at all. Others really need help, but they got a lousy business. And Tom Murphy told me a long, long, long time ago, he said, “The secret of business is to buy a good business. And it’s OK to inherit one, too.” (Laugh)

因为有些企业比其他企业更好。有些企业根本不需要太多管理。还有一些企业确实需要帮助，但它们的业务很糟糕。汤姆·墨菲很久很久以前告诉我，他说：“商业的秘密是购买一个好的企业。继承一个也没问题。”（笑）

And Greg is inheriting a good business, and I think he will make it better. But I don’t think it’s easy to put any one of the next ten nominees in and try and judge, three years later, whether they’ve done a good job or not. So, that’ll be a very interesting job for the board.

格雷格继承了一家不错的企业，我认为他会把它做得更好。但我认为在接下来的十位提名者中，任命任何一位并在三年后判断他们是否做得好并不容易。因此，这将是董事会的一项非常有趣的工作。

But it shouldn’t listen to Wall Street on it. They’ve got the job. If they put somebody in — if there’s a surprise, we both go down in a plane, they put somebody in, they’ve got a real job in assessing that person. I mean, it will depend on how good he or she is as a talker, it’ll depend on, you know, them courting Wall Street to be supportive of them, all kinds of things.

但不应该听从华尔街的意见。他们有这个工作。如果他们选了一个人——假设我们俩都遇到意外，他们需要评估那个人的真正能力。这个过程会依赖于他或她是否能善于交谈、是否能够争取华尔街的支持，还有很多其他因素。

And we’ve got some very good people on the board, but they would be challenged in that position, as would I, where I have been in that position in other companies, where a very great leader has left, and on the way from the funeral, you know, nobody knows what to do exactly.

我们董事会有一些非常优秀的人，但在这个职位上他们会面临挑战，我也是如此。我在其他公司担任过这个职位，当一位伟大的领导者离开后，从葬礼回来的路上，大家都不知道该怎么做。

Afternoon Session - 2023 Meeting

下午会议 - 2023 年会议

33. Washington should explicitly guarantee all U.S. bank deposits

华盛顿应该明确保证所有美国银行存款。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, so take your seats please. Sales are terrific out there, so you're my kind of crowd. (LAUGH) I've been getting reports we're breaking all kinds of records. And we're going to start off with question number 26, which goes to station two.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请就座。外面的销售情况非常好，所以你们是我喜欢的观众。（笑）我收到的报告显示我们正在打破各种记录。我们将从第 26 个问题开始，问题将由第二个站点提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren and Charlie. My name is James from Malaysia. Given the recent challenges faced by the U.S. banks, what is your outlook on the banking industry? How do you assess the risk and the opportunity in this section?

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我是来自马来西亚的詹姆斯。鉴于美国银行最近面临的挑战，您对银行业的前景怎么看？您如何评估这一领域的风险和机会？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, anticipating a few questions on banks, I decided we should start using bank language here to (LAUGHTER) describe —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，考虑到可能会有一些关于银行的问题，我决定我们应该在这里开始使用银行术语来（笑声）描述——

And Charlie. (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)

查理。（笑声和掌声）

The situation in banking is very similar to what it's always been in banking, that fear is contagious, always.

银行业的情况与以往一样，恐惧是具有传染性的，始终如此。

And historically sometimes the fear was justified, and sometimes it wasn't. My dad lost his job in 1931 because of a bank run, and they had a bank run on state banks. And the head of the Alamo National Bank said, "Well, we're a national bank, and they didn't never a run on the national banks."

历史上，有时这种恐惧是有道理的，有时则不是。我父亲在 1931 年因为银行挤兑失去了工作，州立银行也发生了挤兑。阿拉莫国家银行的负责人说：“我们是国家银行，从来没有人对国家银行进行过挤兑。”

And, of course, they both faced the same problem. So, it used to be that if you saw people lining up at a bank, the proper response was to get into the line. And they'd always leave it. And the story is that Sidney Weinberg of Goldman Sachs, during one of the bank runs back in 1907 or thereabouts, had a job as a runner at Goldman Sachs, and asked his boss if he could take the week off.

当然，他们都面临着同样的问题。以前，如果你看到人们在银行排队，正确的反应就是加入队伍。但他们总是会离开。故事是，高盛的西德尼·温伯格在 1907 年左右的一次银行挤兑中，担任高盛的跑腿，向他的老板请假一周。

And the boss said, "Sure, not much is going on anyway." So, he got in line, whether it was the Knickerbocker Trust or wherever. And as he got toward the front of the line, he sold his place in line to somebody. He didn't have an account at the bank, but that was an asset. (LAUGHTER)

老板说：“当然，反正也没什么事情。”于是，他排队，不管是在尼克博克信托还是其他地方。当他快到队伍前面时，他把自己的位置卖给了某个人。他在银行没有账户，但那算是一项资产。（笑声）

And the banking system has changed so much over the years. And we did something enormously sensible, in my view, when we set up the FDIC. As many as 2,000 banks had failed in one year back after World War I. I mean, bank runs were just part of the picture.

银行系统多年来发生了很大变化。在我看来，当我们设立联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）时做了一件非常明智的事情。在第一次世界大战后，有多达 2000 家银行在一年内倒闭。我是说，挤兑银行只是其中的一部分。

And if you have people that are worried about whether their money is safe in the bank and are all trying to withdraw, you can't run an economy very well. So, the FDIC was very logical. It's got changed over the years some, but here we are in, you know, 2023.

如果有人担心他们的钱在银行是否安全，并且都在试图取款，那么经济就无法很好地运转。因此，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）是非常合乎逻辑的。多年来它有所变化，但我们现在已经到了 2023 年。

And we actually see the FDIC pay off at a hundred cents on the dollar to everybody or make it available on all demand deposits. And yet you still have people very worried about their — periodically, geographically, all kinds of crazy ways.

我们实际上看到联邦存款保险公司以每美元一百美分的方式向每个人支付，或者将其提供给所有活期存款。然而，人们仍然非常担心他们的存款——不时地、在不同地区，以各种疯狂的方式。

And that just shouldn't happen. So, the messaging has been very poor. It's been poor by the politicians, who sometimes have an interest in having it poor. It's been poor by the agencies, and I would say it's been poor by the press.

这根本不应该发生。因此，信息传递非常糟糕。政治家们有时出于自身利益故意让信息传递变差，相关机构的表现也很差，我认为媒体的表现同样糟糕。

I mean, you shouldn't have so many people that misunderstand the fact that although there may be a debt ceiling, it's going to get changed.

我意思是，你不应该有这么多人误解这个事实：虽然可能有债务上限，但它会被改变。

Although there's a $250,000 limit on FDIC, the FDIC and the U.S. government and the American public have no interest in having a bank fail and have deposits actually lost by people. We had a demonstration project the weekend of Silicon Valley Bank, and the public is still confused.

尽管联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）有 25 万美元的限额，但 FDIC、美国政府和美国公众都不希望银行倒闭，导致人们的存款实际损失。我们在硅谷银行倒闭的那个周末进行了一个示范项目，公众仍然感到困惑。

So, it really, it's something to have a law that became effective in 1934, although mollified it in some ways, not understood about something as important as the banking system.

所以，确实，这是一项在 1934 年生效的法律，尽管在某些方面有所缓和，但对像银行系统这样重要的事情却没有得到理解。

I don't think the American public is that dumb, and I just, well, I made that offer over in Tokyo, incidentally, that I haven't heard from anybody that wants to take up my $1 million bet on whether the public will lose money if they have a demand deposit at a bank, no matter what the size.

我不认为美国公众那么傻。顺便提一下，我在东京时提出了一个百万美元的赌注，至今没有人来接受我的赌注：无论银行的需求存款的规模大小，公众是否会亏钱。

So that's the world we live in. It means that a lighted match can turn into a conflagration, or it can be blown out. And who knows what will happen. And we don't have any worry — we keep our money in cash and Treasury bills at Berkshire, because we keep $128 billion or whatever it was at the end of the quarter.

所以这就是我们生活的世界。这意味着一根点燃的火柴可以变成一场大火，或者可以被吹灭。谁知道会发生什么。我们没有任何担忧——我们把钱存放在现金和伯克希尔的国债中，因为我们在季度末保持了 1280 亿美元或其他金额。

And we want to be there if the banking system temporarily even gets stalled in some way. It shouldn't, I don't think it will, but I think it could. And I think that the incentives in bank regulation are so messed up, and so many people have an interest in having them messed up, that it's totally crazy.

我们希望在银行系统暂时出现某种停滞时能够介入。我认为它不应该这样，我也不认为它会这样，但我认为它有可能。银行监管中的激励机制非常混乱，许多人都有兴趣让它们保持混乱，这完全是疯狂的。

I mean, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were doing 40% or so of the mortgage business in the United States. That is huge. They were regulated, just those two companies were regulated by some group. I forget what they called it. But they had 150 people that were in charge of just figuring out whether Freddie and Fannie were doing the right thing.

我意思是，房利美和房地美在美国的抵押贷款业务中占了大约 40%。这非常庞大。它们受到监管，这两家公司是由某个组织监管的。我忘了他们叫什么了。但他们有 150 个人专门负责判断房地美和房利美是否在做正确的事情。

Well, I could've done it. You know, Charlie could've done it. You know, and I'm not sure they needed an assistant even to do it. But the incentives were all wrong. And Freddie and Fannie, which were doing fine in August, or apparently doing fine in July and August of 2008, were put into conservatorship, you know, early in September.

好吧，我本可以做到。你知道，查理本可以做到。你知道，我不确定他们甚至需要一个助手来做这件事。但激励措施都是错误的。而在 2008 年 7 月和 8 月表现良好的弗雷迪和范妮，在 9 月初被置于监管之下。

And the things that followed from that were just incredible. So, there are second order and third order and fourth order effects that are somewhat unpredictable, as to what they will be and the sequence and all that. But things change. And if people think that deposits are sticky anymore, they're just living in a different era.

随之而来的事情真是不可思议。所以，接下来的第二、第三、第四层次的影响是有些不可预测的，包括它们的具体表现和顺序等等。但情况在变化。如果有人认为存款还像以前那样稳定，他们就真的活在一个不同的时代。

You know, press a button, you don't have to get in a line and wait for days and have the teller counting out the money slowly in gold so (LAUGH) that you hope the line goes away. You're going to have a run in a few seconds. So, the way it hasn't been addressed properly is a problem.

你知道，现在只需按下一个按钮，就不需要排队等待几天，慢慢让出纳员用黄金数钱（大笑），以期望排队的人会散去。现在几秒钟内就会出现挤兑现象。因此，这种问题没有得到妥善解决。

And who knows where it leads.

谁知道它会通向哪里。

34. Buffett: CEOs of failed banks should be punished

巴菲特：失败银行的首席执行官应该受到惩罚

WARREN BUFFETT: But you will have to have a punishment for the people that do the wrong thing. And if you take First Republic, for example, you could look at their 10-K and see that they were offering non-government guaranteed mortgages to, in jumbo amounts, at fixed rates, sometimes for ten years before they changed to floating.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是你必须对那些做错事的人施加惩罚。以第一共和国银行为例，你可以查看他们的 10-K 报告，看到他们在固定利率下提供非政府担保的巨额抵押贷款，有时长达十年，然后才转为浮动利率。

And that's a crazy proposition. If it's to the advantage of a bank, they've got the guy coming in and says, "I'll refinance at 1.5% and then 1%," and if it's to the advantage the other way, they keep it out ten years. You don't give options like that.

这真是个疯狂的提议。如果对银行有利，他们就会让那个人进来，说：“我会以 1.5%的利率再融资，然后是 1%”，而如果反过来对他们有利，他们就会把它保持十年。你不能提供这样的选择。

But that what First Republic was doing, and it was in plain sight. And the world ignored it till it blew up. And some of the stock in some of these banks that were held by insiders was sold. And who knows whether they had a plan, or some plan that was innocent, or whether they started sensing what was coming.

但第一共和国所做的事情是显而易见的。世界对此视而不见，直到它爆炸。而一些内部人士持有的这些银行的股票被出售。谁知道他们是否有计划，或者是否有一些无辜的计划，或者他们是否开始察觉到即将发生的事情。

But you do know that the directors are not going to be able to read some book or anything like that. But they do have the ability to hold the CEO accountable. The CEO gets the bank in trouble, both the CEO and the director should suffer.

但你知道董事们不可能去读什么书之类的。但他们确实有能力让首席执行官负责。如果首席执行官让银行陷入麻烦，首席执行官和董事都应该受到惩罚。

The stockholders of the future shouldn't suffer. They didn't do anything. It doesn't teach anybody any lessons or anything, it teaches the lesson that if you run a bank and you screw it up, you're still a rich guy and the clubs don't drop you and the charity groups don't quit asking you to their benefits.

未来的股东不应该受苦。他们没有做错任何事。这并没有给任何人上课，反而教会了一个道理：如果你经营一家银行并搞砸了，你仍然是个富人，俱乐部不会把你踢出去，慈善团体也不会停止邀请你参加他们的活动。

And the world goes on. And that is not a good lesson to teach people who are holding the behavior of the economy in their hands. So, I think there's some work to be done, but it's not a difficult problem. It's just we've screwed up the answer and we've screwed up the communication of it. Charlie?

世界仍在继续。这对那些掌握经济行为的人来说，并不是一个好的教训。所以，我认为还有一些工作要做，但这并不是一个难题。只是我们搞错了答案，也搞错了沟通。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I'm so old fashioned that I kind of liked it that when banks didn't do investment banking. That makes me very outmoded in the modern world.

查理·芒格：嗯，我是个老派的人，我有点喜欢银行不做投资银行的那种情况。这让我在现代世界中显得非常过时。

WARREN BUFFETT: And the country decided it was contrary to public interest for a while, and then the banks wanted to get back into it.

沃伦·巴菲特：国家决定这与公众利益相悖了一段时间，然后银行想要重新参与其中。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Did they ever.

查理·芒格：他们确实做到了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No, I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不是，我的意思是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don't think having a bunch of bankers, all of whom are trying to get rich, leads to good things. But I (APPLAUSE) think a banker should be more like an engineer. He's more, like, into avoiding trouble than he is getting rich.

查理·芒格：我认为一群银行家都在试图致富并不会带来好结果。但我（掌声）认为银行家应该更像工程师。他更应该关注避免麻烦，而不是致富。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and they could do fine.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们可以做得很好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They can do fine that way. And I think that we're making a big mistake when we get a bank where everybody who joins it plans to get rich. It's a contradiction in values.

查理·芒格：他们那样做可以很好。我认为，当我们有一家银行，所有加入的人都计划致富时，我们犯了一个大错误。这是价值观的矛盾。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we came to that conclusion, I don't know when Glass-Steagall was passed or anything, but then they want to get back in. How many of you know, and maybe I'm wrong on this, I haven't looked lately, but the Federal Reserve actually was given the responsibility for setting margin requirements.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们得出了这个结论，我不知道格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案是什么时候通过的，但他们想要重新进入。你们中有多少人知道，也许我错了，我最近没有查过，但实际上联邦储备委员会被赋予了设定保证金要求的责任。

And they change margin requirements a lot of time because it was known that people that borrow a lot of money cause a danger to the banking system if you get too many in the picture and all of that sort of thing. And what's happened? The banks figured out a thousand different ways to get so you could borrow on 100% margin, you know? I mean, through derivatives and everything, they just totally distorted all the lessons that were learned in the '29 crash and —

他们经常改变保证金要求，因为众所周知，借贷过多的人会对银行系统构成危险，如果你把太多人放进去，就会出现这种情况。结果是什么呢？银行想出了无数种方式，使得你可以以100%的保证金借贷。通过衍生品等手段，他们完全扭曲了在1929年崩盘中学到的所有教训。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Imagine taking banking into derivatives trading. Who in his right mind would have allowed that?

查理·芒格：想象一下将银行业务带入衍生品交易。谁会在理智的情况下允许那样？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there's more money in it. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，这里面有更多的钱。而且——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that's why they're in on it.

查理·芒格：嗯，这就是他们参与其中的原因。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。还有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And but it isn't necessarily a great social outcome for the rest of us.

查理·芒格：但这对我们其他人来说不一定是一个伟大的社会结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: That's what those Senate committees decided back in 1931 and '32. And then in the late 1990s, particularly, I mean, very decent people, but, you know, Bob Ruhlman and some of the people, you know, they said this was the modern world. And here's what the modern world has turned out to hand us. And banking can have all kinds of new inventions, but it needs to have old values. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是那些参议院委员会在 1931 年和 1932 年所决定的。然后在 1990 年代末，特别是，我是说，非常正派的人，但你知道，鲍勃·鲁尔曼和一些人，他们说这是现代世界。现代世界给我们带来了这样的结果。银行可以有各种新的发明，但它需要有旧的价值观。还有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we do —

查理·芒格：好吧，如果我们这样做——

WARREN BUFFETT: —we don't know what's going to happen. You know, because there are a lot of things that could happen out of the present situation.

沃伦·巴菲特：——我们不知道会发生什么。你知道，因为在当前情况下可能会发生很多事情。

Depositors will not lose money. Stockholders and debt holders, the holding company and all that, they should lose money.

存款人不会亏钱。股东和债权人、控股公司及其他相关方，他们应该亏钱。

And people borrowed out on commercial real estate and now it isn't, the loans aren't getting extended, they should leave. It's too bad. That's part of borrowing on 100% margin, which is what people have been doing with commercial real estate.

人们在商业房地产上借款，现在贷款没有得到延期，他们应该离开。真可惜。这是以 100%敞口借款的一部分，而这正是人们在商业房地产上所做的。

You've got to have the penalties, hit the people that cause the problems. And if they took risks that they shouldn't have, it needs to fall on them if you're going to change how people are going to behave in the future. (APPLAUSE)

你必须要有惩罚，惩罚那些造成问题的人。如果他们冒了不该冒的风险，那么责任就应该落在他们身上，这样才能改变人们未来的行为。（掌声）

35. Aside from Bank of America, Berkshire is being cautious on bank stocks

除了美国银行，伯克希尔对银行股票持谨慎态度。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Davis Hans in Houston, Texas. He writes, "What do you think about the business models of the big banks as compared to the regional banks in the wake of the events at Silicon Valley Bank? And how does the perceived implicit guarantee of all deposits at all banks affect big banks and those regional banks?"

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自德克萨斯州休斯顿的戴维斯·汉斯。他写道：“在硅谷银行事件之后，您如何看待大银行与地区银行的商业模式？所有银行对所有存款的隐性担保的认知如何影响大银行和这些地区银行？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I can say this. If you follow sound banking methods, which means not doing some things that other people do, a bank can be a perfectly decent investment. And in fact, Charlie and I, well, me originally in 1969, we bought a bank at Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我可以这样说。如果你遵循稳健的银行方法，这意味着不做一些其他人做的事情，银行可以是一个非常不错的投资。事实上，查理和我，嗯，最初是我在 1969 年，我们在伯克希尔买了一家银行。

差异化。

And we had $19 million invested in that bank. And we had $17 million I think invested in our insurance companies. And if the Banking Holding Company Act of 1970 hadn't been passed, we might've ended up owning a lot of banks instead of a lot of insurance companies.

我们在那家银行投资了 1900 万美元。我想我们在我们的保险公司投资了 1700 万美元。如果 1970 年的银行控股公司法没有通过，我们可能会拥有很多银行，而不是很多保险公司。

We were looking at more banks, and Harry Keefe was taking us around Chicago. And there were other things we could do. And then, bingo, they passed the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act, and we had to divest ourselves of that bank in ten years, which we did —

我们在考察更多的银行，哈里·基夫带我们游览芝加哥。还有其他事情我们可以做。然后，突然，他们通过了 1970 年银行控股公司法，我们必须在十年内剥离那家银行，我们做到了——

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, it never had a bad debt.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，它从来没有坏账。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, it —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，它——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It never had an unnecessary cost. It made nothing but money with no risk. It never presented any deposit insurance risk to the government.

查理·芒格：它从来没有不必要的成本。它只赚取了没有风险的利润。它从未给政府带来任何存款保险风险。

WARREN BUFFETT: Zero. 沃伦·巴菲特：零。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a lovely, sound, constructive institution in this community. And any person who went in and deserved credit could get credit.

查理·芒格：这是一个在这个社区中美好、健全、建设性的机构。任何进入这里并值得获得信任的人都可以获得信任。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and we were going to buy more banks.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们打算再买更多的银行。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we were forced out of it.

查理·芒格：我们被迫退出了。

WARREN BUFFETT: We were going to buy more banks. And if we bought more banks, we probably wouldn't have expanded the insurance business. But, you know, the law changed and so we divested, and we've done OK in insurance. But banking was more attractive to us. It was bigger and there were more targets to buy.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们本打算购买更多的银行。如果我们购买了更多的银行，可能就不会扩展保险业务。但是，你知道，法律发生了变化，所以我们进行了剥离，而在保险方面我们做得还不错。但银行对我们更具吸引力。它更大，购买的目标也更多。

And you could run a perfectly sound bank then, and no negotiable certificates of deposit. All these things, all the inventions that came later, and you could still run them today and you could earn good money. Very good money. And we would've found more banks. But we're precluded from doing that.

而你可以经营一家完全健康的银行，而不需要可转让的存款证。所有这些事情，所有后来出现的发明，今天你仍然可以经营它们，并且可以赚到不错的钱。非常不错的钱。我们本可以找到更多的银行。但我们被禁止这样做。

And we've sold banks, bank stocks in the last, well, we sold them first when the pandemic broke out, and then we sold some more in the last six months. And we don't know where the shareholders of the big banks, necessarily, or the regional banks or any bank, are heading now.

我们在过去出售了银行和银行股票，首先是在疫情爆发时出售的，然后在过去六个月又出售了一些。我们不知道大型银行、地区银行或任何银行的股东现在的动向。

I've got my own personal money, and I'm probably above the FDIC limit, and I've got it with a local bank. And I think, I don't worry about it in the least. But in terms of owning banks, events will determine their future. And you've got politicians involved.

我有自己的个人资金，可能超过了 FDIC 的限额，而且我把钱存放在一家当地银行。我对此一点也不担心。但在拥有银行方面，事件将决定它们的未来。而且你有政治家参与其中。

You've got a whole lot of people who don't really understand how the system works. And I would say you've had something less than a perfect communication between various people and the American public. So, the American public is probably as confused about banking as ever.

你有很多人并不真正理解系统是如何运作的。我想说，各方与美国公众之间的沟通并不完美。因此，美国公众对银行的理解可能比以往任何时候都更加困惑。

And that has consequences. And nobody knows what the consequences are because every event starts recreating a different dynamic. I mean, in physics you know that pie is going to be 3.14, you know, infinite number of numbers after that, but no matter what happens.

这会带来后果。没有人知道后果是什么，因为每个事件都会重新创造一种不同的动态。我的意思是，在物理学中，你知道圆周率是 3.14，后面有无数个数字，但无论发生什么。

But you don't know what has happened to the stickiness of deposits at all. It got changed by 2008. It's gotten changed by this. And that changes everything. And so, we're very cautious in a situation like that about ownership of banks. And we do remain with one bank holding, a deal, but we originated that deal with the Bank of America.

但你根本不知道存款的稳定性发生了什么变化。2008年它发生了变化，这次也发生了变化。这改变了一切。因此，在这种情况下，我们对银行的持有非常谨慎。我们确实保留了一笔银行持股的交易，但我们是与美国银行一起发起的那笔交易。

And I like Bank of America. I like the management. And I proposed the deal with them, so I stick with it. But do I know how to project out what's going to happen from here? The answer is I don't, because I've seen so many things in the last few months which really weren't that unexpected to me to see.

我喜欢美国银行。我喜欢他们的管理层。我和他们提出了交易，所以我坚持下去。但是我知道如何预测接下来会发生什么吗？答案是我不知道，因为在过去几个月里，我看到的许多事情对我来说并不是那么意外。

But which reconfirmed my beliefs that the American public doesn't understand our banking system, and some people in Congress perhaps don't understand it any more than I don't understand why the spaceships go up. I mean, there's all kinds of things I don't know about. But if you're in Congress, you have to take a position on everything. And sometimes it's to your advantage if you really understand it not to say exactly what you feel. And here we are. Charlie?

但这再次确认了我的信念，即美国公众并不理解我们的银行系统，而国会中的一些人或许也和我一样不理解为什么宇宙飞船会升空。我的意思是，有很多我不知道的事情。但是如果你在国会，你必须对每件事都表态。有时候，如果你真的理解它，不完全表达你的真实感受对你来说是有利的。我们就在这里。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a lot has happened in banking in my lifetime. I welcomed all that early banking of the deserving immigrants by the early Bank of America. And I think all the credit cards when they came in as original bank cards were a great contribution to civilization.

查理·芒格：嗯，在我的一生中，银行业发生了很多变化。我欢迎早期美国银行对那些值得的移民的支持。我认为，当信用卡作为最初的银行卡出现时，是对文明的伟大贡献。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And but the gamier it gets and the more it looks like investment banking, the less I like it, as a citizen. I don't want, I am always, I am deeply distrustful of situations in which everybody wants to get rich and envies everybody else. I regard that atmosphere as utterly toxic.

查理·芒格：越是投机，越像投资银行，我作为公民就越不喜欢。我总是对每个人都想发财并且嫉妒其他人的情况深感不信任。我认为那种氛围是完全有毒的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And to people who like one story, which this is, again, a true story, and I'm not naming the name, and it wasn't Pete Jefferies, because he might fit this name, but it wasn't Pete. But our hero, Gene Abegg, was going to have to retire at some point.

沃伦·巴菲特：而对于喜欢这个故事的人来说，这确实是一个真实的故事，我不提名字，虽然彼得·杰弗里斯可能符合这个名字，但他不是彼得。不过，我们的英雄，基恩·阿贝格，最终必须在某个时候退休。

And so, we hired a future replacement. This is kind of a little bit of the problem I talked before, about having the perfect business, and now we're going to bring in somebody. We actually bring in somebody who went to Central High with Charlie, although —

因此，我们雇佣了一个未来的替代者。这有点像我之前提到的问题，关于拥有完美的生意，而现在我们要引入一个人。我们实际上引入了一个和查理在中央高中一起上学的人，尽管——

CHARLIE MUNGER: My class.

查理·芒格：我的班级。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGH) And Charlie didn't know I was picking out this guy. He wasn't —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑）查理不知道我在挑选这个家伙。他并不知道——

CHARLIE MUNGER: If he'd have asked me, we wouldn't have hired him. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：如果他问我，我们就不会雇用他。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if I asked you, I probably wouldn't have hired anybody, but that's another question. But this guy comes over, and perfectly decent guy, but presentable, you know, looks like a banker and everything. And, of course, the first thing he wants to do, we've got this wonderful bank, but we've got the crummiest looking building in Rockford.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果我问你，我可能不会雇任何人，但那是另一个问题。不过这个人过来了，完全是个体面的人，看起来像个银行家，样子也不错。当然，他想做的第一件事是，我们有这家很棒的银行，但我们在罗克福德的建筑看起来是最糟糕的。

And we don't need a great building, we just need a great banker. And naturally this guy wants to build a new building. And because we were the most profitable bank, but we didn't look like we were the most profitable (LAUGH) bank. So, I told him he could have any building he wanted, as long as it was not higher than, it had to be shorter than our nearest competitor.

我们不需要一座伟大的建筑，我们只需要一位伟大的银行家。自然，这家伙想要建一座新建筑。因为我们是最赚钱的银行，但我们看起来并不像是最赚钱的（大笑）银行。所以，我告诉他，他可以选择任何他想要的建筑，只要它的高度不超过我们最近的竞争对手。

And he lost interest totally. (LAUGH) He wanted to be on the top floor of the biggest building in town, and I told him he could horizontally do anything he wanted but he couldn't do it vertically. And it taught me a lot about the guy's motivations in life. But — and he didn't end up running the bank anyway. Anyway, that's all I know about banking and probably more.

他完全失去了兴趣。（笑）他想在城里最高的建筑的顶层，我告诉他他可以横向做任何他想做的事情，但他不能纵向去做。这让我对这个家伙的生活动机有了很多了解。但是——他最终也没有去经营银行。总之，这就是我对银行业的了解，可能还更多。

36. It is 'madness to keep printing money'

疯狂的是不断印钞。

WARREN BUFFETT: Station three?

沃伦·巴菲特：第三站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, hi.

观众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，您好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Daphne. I'm 13 years old, and this is my sixth annual Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder's Meeting. (APPLAUSE) And I've had the privilege to ask you both questions in years past.

观众成员：我叫达芙妮，13 岁，这是我第六次参加伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东大会。（掌声）我有幸在过去的几年里向你们提问。

My question for you today is the following. As you know, the U.S. national debt is currently at an estimated $31 trillion, making up about 125% of the U.S. GDP.

我今天要问你的问题是：如你所知，美国的国债目前估计为 31 万亿美元，约占美国 GDP 的 125%。

In the meantime, over the past few years, the Federal Reserve has telegraphed that they intend to monetize the debt by printing trillions of dollars, even as they insist that they're fighting inflation. Already other major economies in the world, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil are moving away from the dollar in anticipation of this.

与此同时，在过去的几年里，美联储已经暗示他们打算通过印刷数万亿美元来货币化债务，即使他们坚持认为自己在抗击通货膨胀。世界上其他主要经济体，如中国、沙特阿拉伯和巴西，已经在预期这一点的情况下开始远离美元。

My question is are we likely to face a time in the future when the U.S. dollar is no longer the global reserve currency? How is Berkshire prepared for this possibility? And what can we do as American citizens to attempt to shelter ourselves from what's beginning to look like the beginnings of de-dollarization?

我的问题是，我们是否可能在未来面临美元不再是全球储备货币的时刻？伯克希尔对此可能性有何准备？作为美国公民，我们可以做些什么来保护自己，免受看起来像是去美元化开始的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (APPLAUSE) I should ask you to come up here and answer some questions. I mean, (LAUGHTER) maybe. It's very interesting, I mean, we are the reserve currency. I see no option for any other currency to be the reserve currency. And I think that nobody understands the situation better than Jay Powell.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，（掌声）我应该请你们上来回答一些问题。我是说，（笑声）也许吧。这非常有趣，我的意思是，我们是储备货币。我看不到其他任何货币成为储备货币的选项。我认为没有人比杰伊·鲍威尔更了解这个情况。

And but he's not in control of fiscal policy, and every now and then he drops a few hints. And there was no question that when the pandemic broke out, I mean, it was a semi-war-like situation. But nobody knows how far you can go with a paper currency before it gets out of control.

但他并不掌控财政政策，时不时会透露一些暗示。毫无疑问，当疫情爆发时，这是一种半战争状态。但没有人知道纸币可以使用到什么程度才会失控。

If, and particularly if you're the world's reserve currency, nobody knows the answer to that. And you don't want to try and pick out the point at where it does become a problem, because then it's all over. And I think we should be very careful.

如果，特别是当你是世界储备货币时，没有人知道答案是什么。你也不想试图找出何时会成为问题的那个点，因为那样一来就一切都结束了。我认为我们应该非常小心。

I mean, you know, we all learned Keynesianism and we applied it in World War II to the advantage of the country, and we did everything we could to prevent inflation during the war. And then the war ended in August of '45 and I think in January of '46, and I'm not giving you exact figures at all now, but in January of '46 I think the rate of inflation was at, you know, something like 1% or thereabouts.

我意思是，你知道，我们都学习了凯恩斯主义，并在第二次世界大战中将其应用于国家的利益，我们尽一切努力在战争期间防止通货膨胀。然后战争在 1945 年 8 月结束，我想在 1946 年 1 月，我现在并没有给你确切的数字，但在 1946 年 1 月，我认为通货膨胀率大约在 1%左右。

And by the end of the year, I think it was at, like, 15%. And again, I'm doing this from long memories. But it's easy for America to do it a lot, but if we do too much it's very hard to see how you recover once you let the genie out of the bottle.

到年底时，我记得它的比例大约是15%。再次说明，我这都是从长时间的记忆中回忆的。对美国来说，做这件事很容易，但如果我们做得太多，很难看到一旦把妖怪放出瓶子后，怎么才能恢复过来。

And people lose faith in the currency. And they behave in an entirely different manner than they do when they feel that if they put some money in the bank or have a pension plan, or whatever it may be, that they're going to get to have something with roughly equal purchasing power.

人们对货币失去信心。他们的行为与当他们觉得把钱存入银行或拥有养老金计划时完全不同，因为他们认为这样做可以获得大致相等购买力的东西。

And it just changes the (UNINTEL). And all kinds of things can happen then. And I can't predict them and nobody else can predict them. But I do know they aren't good. And we will see, and I do this as, you know, I've voted for both parties. And it's not limited to politicians of either party or anything of the sort.

它只是改变了（UNINTEL）。然后各种事情可能发生。我无法预测它们，其他人也无法预测。但我知道它们不好。我们将拭目以待，我这样做是因为，我投过两党的票。这并不限于任何一党的政治家或类似的事情。

But people take positions, some of them understand what they're doing, some of them don't understand what they're doing. And, you know, if they put me on some medical board, I don't understand what I'm doing. You know, there's nothing wrong with the fact that you can't master everything.

但是人们会采取立场，有些人理解自己在做什么，有些人则不理解。如果他们让我加入某个医学委员会，我也不理解自己在做什么。你知道，不能掌握一切并没有什么错。

We can't all be Isaac Newton. But you can't go around pretending you do or making decisions on it. And we are not as well off in relation to curbing inflation expectations, which become self-fulfilling, then we are not as well off as we were earlier.

我们不能都成为艾萨克·牛顿。但你不能到处假装自己是或者基于此做出决策。而且我们在抑制通胀预期方面的情况并不如以前好，这些预期会自我实现。

And Berkshire is better prepared than most investments for that kind of a period. And, I mean, I said this in the annual report, but we aren't perfectly prepared, because there's no way to perfectly prepare. You don't know what course of action will occur.

伯克希尔在这种时期比大多数投资更具备准备。我在年报中提到过这一点，但我们并不是完全准备好，因为没有办法做到完美的准备。你无法预知会发生什么样的行动方案。

And it's a very political decision now. It's a tribal decision to some degree. And you hope for leadership that actually will do something, recognizes the problem. And America's an incredible society, rich, you know? We've got everything going for us. But that doesn't mean we can just print money indefinitely as debt. And it'll be interesting to see how it turns out. Charlie?

这现在是一个非常政治的决定。在某种程度上，这是一个部落的决定。你希望有领导能够真正采取行动，认识到问题。美国是一个令人难以置信的社会，富裕，你知道吗？我们拥有一切优势。但这并不意味着我们可以无限制地以债务的形式印钞票。看看结果如何会很有趣。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at some point printing money to buy votes will be counterproductive.

查理·芒格：好吧，在某个时候，印钞票来买选票将适得其反。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yup. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we don't know (APPLAUSE) exactly where that comes. And if something is going to be dangerous and unproductive, you ought to keep it a fair distance away. Now, if you have a culture that is exceptionally strong, like Japan, they have done some strange things there.

查理·芒格：我们不知道（掌声）这究竟来自哪里。如果某些东西会是危险和无效的，你应该把它保持在一个相当远的距离。现在，如果你有一个特别强大的文化，比如日本，他们在那里做了一些奇怪的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: But they couldn't have been a reserve currency.

沃伦·巴菲特：但它们不可能成为储备货币。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, of course not. And, but Japan bought back most of the national debt and most of the, a lot of the common stocks and debt. Just the federal reserve owns practically everything in Japan, and the country's working. It's had 30 years of economic stasis, but it's not going to hell. I really admire Japan. And, but I don't think we should try and imitate it. I don't think we're as good as Japan at taking —

查理·芒格：当然不是。但是，日本回购了大部分国债和许多普通股和债务。几乎所有的东西都被联邦储备拥有，而这个国家仍在运作。它经历了 30 年的经济停滞，但并没有走向灭亡。我真的很欣赏日本。但是，我认为我们不应该试图模仿它。我认为我们在某些方面不如日本。

WARREN BUFFETT: They have a cohesive culture, and we don't, Charlie. We —

沃伦·巴菲特：他们有一个凝聚力强的文化，而我们没有，查理。我们——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that's exactly right.

查理·芒格：是的，完全正确。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: In Japan, everybody's supposed to suck it up and cope, and in America we complain. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：在日本，每个人都应该忍耐并应对，而在美国我们则抱怨。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: So, I hope you come next year with a tougher question. (LAUGHTER) But — and thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：所以，我希望你明年能带来一个更棘手的问题。（笑声）但是——谢谢你。

And I predict, I would love to be being born again today in the United States. I mean, we can do a lot of dumb things and get away with it. We can't do an unlimited number.

我预测，我今天在美国重生会很开心。我的意思是，我们可以做很多愚蠢的事情而不受惩罚。我们不能做无限数量的事情。

There are people who care about that. And, you know, you have to be willing to be extraordinarily unpopular. I mean, Paul Volcker, there are other Federal Reserve chairpeople that would not have done what he did. It's just, it's too uncomfortable.

有些人对此很在意。而且，你知道，你必须愿意变得非常不受欢迎。我的意思是，保罗·沃尔克，还有其他一些美联储主席不会做他所做的事情。这实在是太不舒服了。

And there used to be a politician in Nebraska, and if you asked him some really tough question like, you know, how do you stand on abortion, he would look you right in the eye and he'd say, "I'm all right on that one." And then he'd move next.

在内布拉斯加州曾经有一位政治家，如果你问他一些非常棘手的问题，比如你对堕胎的立场，他会直视你的眼睛说：“我对此没问题。”然后他就会继续下一个问题。

Well, that's what people have done basically on inflation. And they, one way or another, they say, "I'm all right on that," and then they don't really think about what the consequences of their actions could be, particularly. And it's so much fun to, if there's 435 of you, to just be one of 435 instead of being the person actually responsible.

好吧，这基本上就是人们对通货膨胀所做的。他们以某种方式说：“我对此没问题”，然后他们并没有真正考虑自己行为可能带来的后果，尤其是。如果你们有 435 个人，作为 435 人中的一员而不是实际负责的人，真是太有趣了。

Anyway, I am still, next to the question of two superpowers and when you get in to really destroying a planet, destroying the reserve currency of the world when there's really no substitute, and forget about all the toys, you know, I mean, it's a joke to think of any tokens or (LAUGH) that sort of madness.

无论如何，我仍然在谈论两个超级大国的问题，以及当你真的要摧毁一个星球时，摧毁世界的储备货币而没有真正的替代品时，忘掉所有的玩意儿，我是说，认为任何代币或（大笑）那种疯狂的事情简直是个笑话。

But it's also madness to just keep printing money, yeah. And we know how to do it, and we actually came from a money-printing economy in World War II, which was required. And we suffered significant inflation, the price level — I mean, there's a million ways to judge it — but it's maybe ten times what it was then or something like that.

但仅仅不断印钞也是疯狂的，是的。我们知道怎么做，我们实际上来自于二战时期的印钞经济，那是必要的。我们经历了显著的通货膨胀，物价水平——我的意思是，有无数种方式来判断——但可能是当时的十倍左右。

Well, that's getting close to the edge of where you don't want to hold dollars anymore, you want to hold something else. You want to hold real estate; you want to hold interest in a business. There's a lot of good, and your best defense is your own earning power.

好吧，这接近了你不想再持有美元的边缘，你想持有其他东西。你想持有房地产；你想持有对某个企业的股份。有很多好的选择，而你最好的防御就是你自己的赚钱能力。

If you're the best doctor in town, if you're the best lawyer in town, if you're the best teacher in town, or even if you're the tenth best, you're going to make a good living. You know, the economy is productive. And you will succeed with your talents. But you won't succeed by hoarding dollars, you'll just succeed by the fact that your value to the community, which is a rich community overall, is sustained. And so the best investment is always in yourself. That's the answer I would give you.

如果你是镇上最好的医生，镇上最好的律师，镇上最好的老师，甚至如果你是第十好的，你都会过得不错。你知道，经济是有生产力的。你会凭借你的才能取得成功。但你不会通过囤积美元来成功，你的成功来自于你对社区的价值，而这个社区总体上是富裕的。因此，最好的投资永远是投资于自己。这就是我给你的答案。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we have a situation where we've learned to print money in gobs, and a big chunk of our young people go right into wealth management. (LAUGHTER) This is —

查理·芒格：好吧，我们面临一种情况，我们学会了大量印钞，而我们很多年轻人直接进入财富管理领域。（笑声）这就是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Like we did. (LAUGH)

沃伦·巴菲特：就像我们做的那样。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, like we did, like we did. Yes, we're bad examples.

查理·芒格：是的，就像我们做的那样。是的，我们是坏榜样。

And I want to say that I didn't realize wealth management was going to get so big when I went into it. And I want to apologize for what's happened. (LAUGHTER)

我想说，当我进入财富管理行业时，我没有意识到它会变得如此庞大。我想为发生的事情道歉。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. Anyway, you did well. (LAUGH)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，好吧。无论如何，你做得很好。（笑）

37. Buffet would have preferred to buy more of Pilot earlier, but it wasn't for sale

巴菲特本希望能更早地购买更多的 Pilot，但它并没有出售。

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Gary Gambino in Parma, Ohio, who says he's been a Berkshire shareholder since 2004.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自俄亥俄州帕尔马的加里·甘比诺，他说自 2004 年以来一直是伯克希尔的股东。

He says, "The amount paid this year for the 41.4% stake in Pilot values the entire company at around $19 billion. That's about six times what BP is paying for Travel Centers of America, but Pilot's market share is just three times Travel Centers of America's.

他说：“今年为41.4%的股份支付的金额使整个公司估值约为190亿美元。这大约是BP为美国旅行中心支付的六倍，但Pilot的市场份额仅是美国旅行中心的三倍。”

"Was it a big mistake to base the final price in 2022 earnings, which has unusually high fuel margins?"

将 2022 年的收益作为最终价格的基础是一个大错误吗？那年的燃料利润异常高

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that's a very good question. And the answer is that we arranged to buy it in three stages, with the third stage being at the option of the owner of 20%. The first stage we bought at what turned out to be a very attractive price. The second stage turned out to be a very good year for the diesel business, which means that the seller got a very good price.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是个很好的问题。答案是我们安排分三阶段购买，其中第三阶段由20%股份的拥有者决定。第一阶段我们以非常有吸引力的价格购买了。第二阶段是柴油业务表现非常好的一年，这意味着卖方得到了一个非常好的价格。

And I would say that overall, we feel very good about the fact that we own the 80% at the price that we do, but we would've been better if we just bought the 80% to start with. And the last 20% the seller has the option, and that's always an unintelligent way of structuring something.

总体来说，我们对以这样的价格拥有 80%的股份感到非常满意，但如果我们一开始就直接购买 80%的股份，那就更好了。最后 20%的股份由卖方选择，这总是一种不明智的结构方式。

We've had that arrangement with other, well, we had it with the Furniture Mart, we bought 80% of the [Nebraska] Furniture Mart on August 30th, 1983, almost 40 years ago, and it's worked out perfectly. But when you give the other person the option, they've got some advantage.

我们与其他人有过这样的安排，嗯，我们与家具市场有过这样的安排，我们在 1983 年 8 月 30 日购买了 80%的[内布拉斯加]家具市场，差不多是 40 年前，这一切运作得非常顺利。但是当你给对方选择的机会时，他们就有了一些优势。

We have 80% now of a business we like very much, and the comparison to Travel America is really spurious, because Travel America is not only much smaller, but they rent all their properties. And we have hundreds and hundreds of locations on the interstate that are zoned for what we, commercial, maybe 15 acres or, there's nothing like it.

我们现在拥有 80%的业务，我们非常喜欢，与 Travel America 的比较实际上是毫无根据的，因为 Travel America 不仅规模小得多，而且他们租赁所有的物业。我们在州际公路上有数百个地点，都是商业用途的，可能有 15 英亩，根本没有类似的。

And they're not going to move the interstate two miles to the right or something, you know, or anything of the sort. So, we've got a position that, you know, BP may or may not have made a fine deal. I've read the prospectus and I can understand.

他们不会把州际公路向右移动两英里之类的事情，你知道的，或者其他类似的事情。所以，我们的立场是，BP 可能做了一个不错的交易，也可能没有。我读过招股说明书，我能理解。

I mean, it's a big source of output for BP. But I like the management we have had at Pilot. I like very much the fellow who's coming in that's the new CEO. I just have to tell you a little bit about Adam Wright, who's taking that job on. He came from Omaha.

我想，这对 BP 来说是一个重要的输出来源。但我喜欢我们在 Pilot 的管理。我非常喜欢即将上任的新 CEO。我必须告诉你一点关于接任这个职位的亚当·赖特的信息。他来自奥马哈。

He wasn't selected because he came from Omaha. He came from Omaha. He came from North High, a public school that my wife graduated from. I've got grandchildren that graduated from there. He went to the University of Nebraska and almost set the rushing record in football, which will never be beaten because they've given up football, but I think he rushed for maybe (LAUGHTER) 3,600 yards.

他之所以被选中并不是因为他来自奥马哈。他确实来自奥马哈，来自北高中——我妻子就是从那里毕业的，我的孙子孙女也都毕业于那里。他去了内布拉斯加大学，差点打破了橄榄球的冲球记录，这个记录永远不会被打破，因为他们已经放弃了橄榄球，但我记得他冲了大约（笑）3600码。

He held three jobs while he went through there. He interned at MidAmerica 20 years ago, his mother worked to put him through school. I mean, it's just, it's Horatio Alger-squared. And we have him to manage Pilot. And the Haslams have given us a wonderful business, "Big Jim," and now he (UNINTEL) great people. And here we are.

他在那段时间里做了三份工作。他在 20 年前的中美能源实习，他的母亲努力工作来供他上学。我的意思是，这简直就是霍雷肖·阿尔杰的平方。而我们让他来管理 Pilot。哈斯拉姆家族给了我们一个很棒的生意，“大吉姆”，现在他（无法识别）优秀的人。我们就在这里。

And I'm very glad we own Pilot, I just wish we bought 100% (LAUGH) of it when I first made the deal, but that was not the deal that was offered to us —

我很高兴我们拥有 Pilot，只是我希望在我第一次达成交易时能买下 100%（笑），但那不是当时提供给我们的交易——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, it wasn't for sale.

查理·芒格：沃伦，这不是出售的。

WARREN BUFFETT: It wasn't for sale. Yeah. And the last 20% of the Furniture Mart wasn't for sale when we bought it, so we bought 80% of it. And that's worked out well. And we've done various deals various ways. The best way to do it is just write people the check and get the stock.

沃伦·巴菲特：它并不出售。是的。当我们购买时，家具市场的最后 20%并不出售，所以我们购买了 80%。这运作得很好。我们以各种方式进行了各种交易。最好的方法就是给人们写支票，获得股票。

But we did that with TTI, but you can't always make the same deal. If we like the business well enough and the people well enough, we will tailor it differently, but our preference is to write a check and own the whole place and keep the management in place. Charlie, anything to add on?

但我们和 TTI 是这样做的，但你不能总是达成相同的交易。如果我们对业务和人员都足够满意，我们会以不同的方式量身定制，但我们的首选是写支票，拥有整个公司，并保持管理层不变。查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It's really wonderful to watch something like Adam Wright work out. I mean, basically, you know, I don't know what his mother was earning, but he went to North High, which is probably four or five miles from here. Public school graduate. And worked his way up.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。看到亚当·赖特这样的人成长真是太棒了。我的意思是，基本上，我不知道他母亲的收入，但他上的是北高中，离这里大约四五英里。公立学校毕业生。他一步步努力向上。

Went through a short period at Pacific Gas and Electric, and we brought him home there on Pilot. And Pilot, well, Pilot, the prices on diesel were way different last year. Pilot was close to $80 billion of sales last year, but more normal prices this, it's significant, you know, it's half that or thereabouts, maybe a little more.

在太平洋煤气和电力公司工作了一段时间，我们把他带回了 Pilot。在 Pilot，去年的柴油价格差异很大。Pilot 去年的销售额接近 800 亿美元，但今年的价格更正常，差不多是去年的一半，可能稍微多一点。

But he is, I don't know how old Adam would be, but he's in his 40s. And he came up through the organization that Greg Abel was involved with. And now here he is, running a very major business. It's good at Berkshire to be able to do that. And I don't, you know, somebody else may have gone to more prestigious business schools, and I think so what? You know, we've seen what Adam can do.

但他是，我不知道亚当多大，但他大约四十多岁。他是通过格雷格·阿贝尔参与的组织成长起来的。现在他在经营一个非常重要的业务。能够在伯克希尔做到这一点很好。我觉得，其他人可能上过更有声望的商学院，但我觉得那又怎么样呢？我们已经看到了亚当的能力。

38. 'You should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it'

你应该写下你的讣告，然后试着找出如何去实现它。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station four?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，四号站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is J.C. I am 15 years old and I'm from Ohio. This is my fourth in-person Berkshire meeting. I have a lot of passion learning from your speeches, interviews, and articles. Thank you for sharing your wisdom all the time.

观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫 J.C.，我 15 岁，来自俄亥俄州。这是我参加的第四次伯克希尔现场会议。我非常热衷于从你们的演讲、采访和文章中学习。感谢你们一直分享智慧。

Mr. Buffett, in your annual shareholder letter this year, you said that Berkshire's journey consisted of "continuous savings, the power of commanding, the American tailwind, and avoidance of major mistakes". You have humbly admitted in the past that you have made many mistakes.

巴菲特先生，在您今年的年度股东信中，您提到伯克希尔的旅程包括“持续的储蓄、指挥的力量、美国的顺风和避免重大错误”。您曾谦逊地承认自己犯过许多错误。

But this is the first time that major mistakes stood out to me. Could you please advise us on what major mistakes we should avoid in both investing and in life? I would also like to have Mr. Munger's thoughts too, please. Thank you very much.

但这是我第一次注意到重大错误。您能否建议我们在投资和生活中应该避免哪些重大错误？我也想听听芒格先生的看法。非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the main, (APPLAUSE) Charlie said the major mistake you could make, you know, you're lucky if you're in the United States. If you go around the world you don't have a lot of choices in some places.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，主要是，（掌声）查理说你可能犯的一个重大错误，你知道，如果你在美国，你是幸运的。如果你环游世界，在某些地方你没有很多选择。

But you should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it.

但你应该写下你的讣告，然后试着找出如何去实现它。

And, you know, that's something you get wiser on as you go along. The business mistakes, you just want to make sure you don't make any mistakes that take you out of the game or come close to taking you out of your game. You should never have a night when you're worried about investing, I mean, assuming you have any money to invest at all.

而且，你知道，这是一件随着时间推移而变得更明智的事情。商业错误，你只想确保自己不犯任何让你退出游戏的错误，或者接近让你退出游戏的错误。你绝不应该有一个晚上担心的投资，我是说，假设你有任何可以投资的钱。

And you should just spend a little bit less than you earn. And you can spend a little bit more than you earn, and then you've got debt, and the chances are you'll never get out of debt. I'll make an exception in terms of a mortgage on your house.

你应该花费稍微少于你赚的钱。你可以花费多于你赚的钱，但那样你就会有债务，而你很可能永远无法摆脱债务。我会对房子的按揭做个例外。

But credit card debt, and we're in the credit card business big time, and we'll stay in the credit card business, but why get behind the game? And if you're effectively paying 12% or 14% or whatever percent you're paying on a credit card, you know, you're saying, "I'm going to earn more than 12% or 14% of my money."

但信用卡债务，我们在信用卡业务中占据重要地位，我们会继续留在信用卡业务中，但为什么要落后于游戏呢？如果你实际上在信用卡上支付 12%或 14%或其他任何百分比，你知道，你是在说，“我将赚到超过 12%或 14%的收益。”

And if you can do that, come to Berkshire Hathaway. So, it's, I hate to say this when Charlie's around me, but it's straight out of Ben Franklin. I mean, (LAUGH) and it's not that complicated. But you, well, I'll give you a couple lessons.

如果你能做到这一点，就来伯克希尔·哈撒韦吧。所以，我不想在查理身边说这个，但这完全是出自本·富兰克林。我是说，（笑）这并不复杂。不过，你，好吧，我给你几个教训。

You know, Tom Murphy, the first time I met him, said two things to me. He said, "You can always tell someone to go to hell tomorrow." Well, that was great advice then. And think of what great advice it is when you can sit down at a computer and screw your life up forever by telling somebody to go to hell, or something else, in 30 seconds. And you can't erase it.

你知道，汤姆·墨菲，第一次见到他时对我说了两件事。他说：“你总是可以告诉某人明天去地狱。”好吧，那时这是个很好的建议。想想看，当你坐在电脑前，花 30 秒钟告诉某人去地狱或其他什么，永远搞砸自己的生活，这个建议是多么好。你无法抹去它。

And, you know, haven't lost the option. And he said, you know, "Praise my name, criticize my category." Well, what makes more sense than that? I mean, who do you like that criticizes you all the time? And you don't need to vilify anybody to make your point on subjects of discussion.

他说：“赞美某人，批评某个类别。” 那么，除了这句话，还有什么更有意义的呢？我意思是，谁会喜欢总是受到批评的人呢？而且，你不需要贬低任何人来表明你在讨论话题上的观点。

And then the other general piece of advice, I've never known anybody that was basically kind that died without friends. And I've known plenty of people with money that have died without friends, including their family. But I've never known anybody, and you know, I've seen a few people, including Tom Murphy Sr. and maybe Jr., who's here, (LAUGH) but certainly his dad, I never saw him, I watched him for 50 years, I never saw him do an unkind act.

然后另一个普遍的建议是，我从来没有见过一个本质上善良的人死时没有朋友。我见过很多有钱的人死时没有朋友，包括他们的家人。但我从来没有见过任何人，你知道，我见过一些人，包括汤姆·墨菲老先生，也许还有他的儿子在这里（笑），但他的父亲，我从来没有见过，我观察了他 50 年，我从来没有见过他做过不善良的事。

I didn't see him do very many stupid acts either. I mean, it wasn't that he was non-discriminating, he just decided that there was no reason to do it. And wow, what a difference that makes in life. Charlie?

我也没看到他做过很多愚蠢的事情。我的意思是，他并不是没有判断力，只是决定没有理由去做。哇，这在生活中带来了多大的不同。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it's so simple to spend less than you earn, and invest shrewdly, and avoid toxic people and toxic activities, and try and keep learning all your life, et cetera, et cetera, and do a lot of deferred gratification because you prefer life that way.

查理·芒格：嗯，花费少于你赚的，聪明地投资，避免有毒的人和有毒的活动，努力终身学习等等，做很多延迟满足，因为你更喜欢这样的生活，这些都是非常简单的。

And if you do all those things, you are almost certain to succeed. And if you don't, you're going to need a lot of luck. And you don't want to need a lot of luck. You want to go into a game where you're very likely to win without having any unusual luck.

如果你做了所有这些事情，你几乎可以肯定会成功。如果你不这样做，你将需要很多运气。而你不想依赖很多运气。你想进入一个你很可能赢的游戏，而不需要任何特别的运气。

WARREN BUFFETT: I'd add one more thought too, you need to know how people can manipulate other people, and you need to resist the temptation to do it yourself.

沃伦·巴菲特：我还想再补充一点，你需要了解人们是如何操纵其他人的，同时你也需要抵制自己去这样做的诱惑。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yes, the toxic people who are trying to fool you or lie to you or aren't reliable in meeting their commitments. A great lesson of life is get them the hell out of your life.

查理·芒格：哦，是的，那些试图欺骗你、对你撒谎或在履行承诺方面不可靠的有毒人。生活中的一个重要教训就是把他们赶出你的生活。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And do it fast. (APPLAUSE) Do it fast.

查理·芒格：快点做。（掌声）快点做。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I would add, Charlie would totally agree with me, do it tactfully, if possible, too. (LAUGH) But do get them out of your life.

沃伦·巴菲特：我还想补充一点，查理完全会同意我的，尽量做到得体。（笑）但一定要把他们从你的生活中剔除。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yeah, I don't mind a little tact. (LAUGHTER) Or even a little financial cost. But the question is getting them the hell out of your life.

查理·芒格：是的。我不介意一点策略。（笑声）甚至一点经济成本。但问题是要把他们彻底赶出你的生活。

39. 'Tough problem' when family members are negative

当家庭成员消极时，"棘手的问题"

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: All right, this comes from Roger Lee Tan. He says, "My name is Roger from Hong Kong, a long-term shareholder of Berkshire, admirer and follower of Mr. Buffett's and Munger's wisdom and principle. Both of you have said before that the most difficult problems in life are always people problems.

贝基·奎克：好的，这来自罗杰·李·谭。他说：“我叫罗杰，来自香港，是伯克希尔的长期股东，崇拜并追随巴菲特和芒格的智慧与原则。你们两位之前都说过，生活中最困难的问题总是人际关系问题。”

"And one of the key lessons you have learned to be able to live a happy life and a successful life is to stay away from negative people. My question is what to do if those negative people are your families, the people (LAUGHTER) whom you can't simply stay away from?"

"你学到的一个关键教训是，要过上快乐和成功的生活，就要远离消极的人。我的问题是，如果那些消极的人是你的家人，(笑声) 是你无法简单远离的人，该怎么办？"

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You minimize it. But you can't, no, I mean, there's no question about it. And Charlie gave an answer I thought was master of tact the other day when he says, "You always ought to interact with people who behave well." He says, "Of course, you have to make some exceptions for your family."

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你要尽量减少它。但你不能，当然，我是说，这毫无疑问。查理前几天给出的回答我认为非常得体，他说：“你总是应该与表现良好的人互动。”他说：“当然，你必须为你的家人做一些例外。”

But (LAUGH) it's true. And, you know, you really, I don't know what it's like to have, you know, a drunken, you know, bully-ish, probably father, but parent, just generally. I mean, you know, how do you handle it? It's very interesting that the MacArthur family, the very famous John MacArthur, the man who set up the MacArthur Foundation, he had five kids.

但是（笑）这是真的。你知道，我真的不知道有一个酗酒的、霸凌的，可能是父亲，但一般来说是父母，是什么感觉。我是说，你知道，你怎么处理这个？麦克阿瑟家族非常有趣，著名的约翰·麦克阿瑟，创立麦克阿瑟基金会的人，他有五个孩子。

And four of them turned out to be superstars of one sort or another, and then they had this crazy, itinerant, drunken father. But they all decided that the thing to do was to get the hell out of the house.

而他们中有四个最终成为了某种程度的超级明星，然后他们有一个疯狂、流浪、酗酒的父亲。但他们都决定要离开这个家。

And so, he had this, the father of the — of the MacArthur Foundation that did that along with three of the siblings out of five.

因此，他有这个，麦克阿瑟基金会的创始人和五个兄弟姐妹中的三个一起做了这件事。

So, you know, I was lucky, I mean, and Charlie was lucky that, you know, if you have, I mean, our fathers saw plenty of shortcomings in both of us, but, you know, they would still be there for us.

所以，你知道，我很幸运，我的意思是，查理也很幸运，你知道，如果你有，我的意思是，我们的父亲在我们俩身上看到了很多缺点，但你知道，他们仍然会支持我们。

And if you have one that won't be there for you, you know, it's a very tough problem. And I think one way or another I probably would have gotten through with that, if I had that situation, but I think my life would've been a lot different. Charlie?

如果你有一个不会支持你的人，这确实是一个非常棘手的问题。我想无论如何，如果我处于那种情况，我可能会挺过去，但我认为我的生活会大不相同。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

40. Why are Garanimals only sold at Walmart?

为什么 Garanimals 只在沃尔玛出售？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station five?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五站？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey Warren and Charlie, good afternoon. My name is Sudakaredi Anapredi. I am from Bentonville, Arkansas, home of Walmart. I'm a shareholder since 2019, and my daughters are shareholders since 2020. My question is, this is my first time coming to shareholders, and my question is Walmart and Berkshire Hathaway has a very great relationship with BNSF, McLane, and consumer goods like Fruit of the Looms and Garanimals, and et cetera.

观众成员：嘿，沃伦和查理，下午好。我叫苏达卡雷迪·阿纳普雷迪。我来自阿肯色州的本顿维尔，沃尔玛的故乡。我自 2019 年起成为股东，我的女儿们自 2020 年起成为股东。我的问题是，这是我第一次参加股东大会，我的问题是沃尔玛和伯克希尔·哈撒韦与 BNSF、麦克莱恩以及像 Fruit of the Loom 和 Garanimals 等消费品之间有着非常良好的关系，等等。

My question is Garanimals is exclusively sold at Walmart, and Fruit of the Loom is sold at many other retailers. How does Berkshire Hathaway decide some items are sold at some retailers exclusively, versus others are sold at many retailers?

我的问题是，Garanimals 仅在沃尔玛出售，而 Fruit of the Loom 则在许多其他零售商处出售。伯克希尔·哈撒韦是如何决定某些商品在某些零售商处独家销售，而其他商品则在许多零售商处销售的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's a good question. But obviously you'd love to control, if you have a product, you'd love to control the distribution. And you're probably going to get better gross of margins if they ask for you by name. I mean, they just had an article about Bernard Arnault, who built LVMH, and you know, he's got a blue box at Tiffany.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。但显然，如果你有一个产品，你会希望控制分销。而且如果他们以你的名字来要求，你可能会获得更好的毛利率。我的意思是，他们刚刚有一篇关于伯纳德·阿尔诺的文章，他建立了 LVMH，你知道，他在蒂芙尼有一个蓝色的盒子。

And the blue box itself means something. And Coca-Cola, the bottle meant something. In the 1920s, I think, there was a study that kind of (UNINTEL) bottle and blindfolded, and a very high percentage of the population could recognize it was Coca-Cola.

蓝色盒子本身也意味着某种东西。而可口可乐，这瓶子也意味着某种东西。在 1920 年代，我认为有一项研究，参与者被蒙上眼睛，能够识别出这是可口可乐的比例非常高。

When they can recognize not only the product, but the container, you know, you're going to have good gross margins. And if you're just another cola, and there have been hundreds of them, and even if you have distribution through something like Walmart, who has Sam's Cola, it just doesn't, it's not the same.

当他们不仅能识别产品，还能识别容器时，你就知道你会有良好的毛利率。如果你只是另一种可乐，而这样的可乐已经有数百种，即使你通过像沃尔玛这样的渠道进行分销，而沃尔玛有山姆可乐，这也不是同样的。

I mean, here I am, you know? And 1886 or so, John Pemberton in Atlanta created it, and they spent a very significant amount of money advertising. And on the other hand, Hershey's didn't spend any money on advertising. So, we have observed, Charlie and I both, have observed so many products, so many methods of retail.

我的意思是，我在这里，1886年左右，约翰·彭伯顿在亚特兰大创造了它，并花费了大量的钱进行广告宣传。而另一方面，赫希巧克力却没有花费任何广告费用。所以，查理和我都观察到了许多产品、许多零售方法。

And we really think we know quite a bit about them, and we also know how much we don't know about it at the same time. And it doesn't mean that we want to go into retailing ourselves, but it does mean we've learned, to some extent, what to avoid.

我们真的认为我们对他们了解很多，同时也知道我们有多少不知道。这并不意味着我们想自己进入零售行业，但确实意味着我们在某种程度上学会了应该避免什么。

And we've learned when somebody really has something. And Garanimals has something. It's just that there's only been, you know, Walmart does a great job of distribution for us. And it's a good product for Walmart, it's a good product for us.

我们已经学会了当某些东西确实有价值时。Garanimals 就是这样一个例子。只是，沃尔玛为我们提供了极好的分销服务。对沃尔玛来说这是一个好产品，对我们来说也是一个好产品。

And on Fruit of the Loom, they can sell lots of types of underwear, and they can do a big volume, but we're not going to make as much money, as well as I believe the capital employed or anything, with a product that has a whole bunch of competitors.

在 Fruit of the Loom，他们可以销售多种类型的内衣，并且可以做到大规模，但我认为我们不会赚到那么多钱，此外，我相信投入的资本或其他方面，面对有很多竞争对手的产品。

And if the kid wants a Garanimals, well, pajamas or something, it's not the sort of product that causes people to drive 20 miles out of their way to buy it, or anything of the sort. But if you're in the Walmart and you're picking out pajamas or something for the kid, and he or she wants a particular product, and it's reasonably priced and everything, and wears well and everything, you know, we're happy to have it distributed through somebody with the distribution power of Walmart.

如果孩子想要 Garanimals，或者睡衣之类的东西，这种产品并不会让人开车 20 英里特意去买，或者类似的事情。但是如果你在沃尔玛，正在为孩子挑选睡衣或其他东西，而他或她想要某个特定的产品，而且价格合理，质量也不错，我们很高兴能够通过像沃尔玛这样有分销能力的渠道进行分销。

And they're very happy to have the product. On balance it's obviously better if you own See's Candy than if you own the no-name candy company. You know, particularly when people buy it as gifts a couple times a year. I mean, they know that if they give their girlfriend, if they give somebody in the hospital, if they give a gift at Christmas or going to a dinner, they know if they hand the box of candy to somebody they don't say at the same time, "Here, I got a wonderful deal on this candy."

他们非常高兴拥有这个产品。总体来说，拥有 See's Candy 显然比拥有无名糖果公司要好。你知道，特别是当人们一年买几次作为礼物的时候。我是说，他们知道如果他们送给女朋友，送给医院里的某个人，或者在圣诞节或去参加晚宴时送礼物，他们知道如果把糖果盒递给某个人，他们不会同时说：“嘿，我在这糖果上得到了一个很好的交易。”

I mean, that just kills the moment, right? What they really want to see is a smile on the other person's face that they're receiving it, and they get it. So, knowing what customers, and See's boxed chocolates, A, are not remotely the market that soft drinks are.

这就彻底破坏了气氛，对吧？他们真正想看到的是对方脸上露出笑容，表示他们接受了这个礼物，并且感到高兴。所以，了解客户需求是很重要的，而 See's 盒装巧克力和软饮料市场的情况完全不同。

And the product does not travel particularly. Hershey's chocolate didn't travel. I mean, if you look at candy bars, what's popular in the U.K. isn't that popular in the U.S. and all kinds of things. Coca-Cola travels. There's 200 countries, roughly, and probably 180 of them it's the dominant product.

而且这个产品并没有特别流行。好时巧克力并不流行。我的意思是，如果你看看糖果棒，在英国受欢迎的东西在美国并不那么受欢迎，还有各种各样的东西。可口可乐是流行的。大约有 200 个国家，可能其中 180 个国家它是主导产品。

And how do you do it? Well, it helps if you started in 1886 (LAUGH) and go from that point forward. So, we've learned a lot. We got lots to learn. But we did learn that something like Garanimals we understood. When it came around nobody had ever heard of it and we bought it for a very low price, as it turned out.

你是怎么做到的呢？嗯，如果你从 1886 年开始（哈哈），那就更好了，从那个时候往前走。所以，我们学到了很多。我们还有很多要学的。但我们确实学到了像 Garanimals 这样的东西我们是理解的。当它出现时，没人听说过它，结果我们以非常低的价格买下了它。

And 20 years ago, and still nobody knows it, or that we own it, and that's fine. But they know what Garanimals are, and it has legs. It just keeps going year after year. And some things are like pet rocks. And we're learning all the time. Charlie? (LAUGHTER)

20年前，以及现在，没人知道我们拥有它，这也没关系。但他们知道 Garanimals，这个品牌一直在持续发展，年年增长。有些东西就像宠物石一样短暂。我们一直在学习。查理？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. You probably have never bought any Garanimals.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。你可能从来没有买过任何 Garanimals。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I never have. (LAUGH) I don't even wear them. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：不，我从来没有过。（笑）我甚至不戴它们。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You wouldn't fit. (LAUGH)

沃伦·巴菲特：你不合适。（笑）

41. Paramount Global faces tough competition in streaming

派拉蒙全球在流媒体领域面临激烈竞争

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Barry Laffer in New York City. "Berkshire owns about 94 million shares of Paramount Global as of the last published data. This asset-rich company has disappointed on recent quarterly earnings reports, and just this week slashed its dividend by 80%.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自纽约市的巴里·拉弗。“根据最新发布的数据，伯克希尔拥有大约 9400 万股派拉蒙全球的股份。这个资产丰富的公司在最近的季度财报中令人失望，并且就在本周将其股息削减了 80%。”

"How do you see the streaming wars evolving? And do you still have conviction in your investment thesis? Is your investment thesis based on the company being an acquisition target, or based on its fundamentals?"

你如何看待流媒体战争的发展？你对你的投资论点仍然有信心吗？你的投资论点是基于公司成为收购目标，还是基于其基本面？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And how would you like to manage my money for nothing? (LAUGH) They, you know, we are not in the business of giving stock advice to people. And people who don't know anything about stocks can make a lot of money doing that, and we don't think it's something we should give away.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你想怎么免费管理我的钱？（笑）你知道，我们并不是给人们提供股票建议的行业。那些对股票一无所知的人也能通过这样做赚很多钱，我们认为这不是我们应该免费提供的东西。

But I will say this, it's not good news when any company passes its dividend or cuts its dividend dramatically.

但我会说，当任何公司暂停分红或大幅削减分红时，这不是好消息。

And the streaming business is extremely interesting to watch, because there's, people love to use their iPhones, watching, being entertained on a screen in front of them, or a phone, or whatever it may be.

流媒体业务非常有趣，因为人们喜欢使用他们的 iPhone，在他们面前的屏幕上或手机上观看和娱乐，无论是什么设备。

But there's a lot of companies doing it. And you need fewer companies, or you need higher prices. And, well, you need higher prices, or it doesn't work. And you don't lock in people when you get them to join up for the streaming period when your serial runs.

但有很多公司在做这个。你需要更少的公司，或者需要更高的价格。嗯，你需要更高的价格，否则它就行不通。而且，当你的节目播出时，你不能让人们在流媒体期间固定下来。

I mean, you know, you keep them on for a while, but you get them for, like, a month. And we'll see what happens. I mean, I had a gasoline station when I was 21 or 22, and it's about three or four, four or five miles from here. And we had one competitor.

我意思是，你知道，你保持它们一段时间，但你得到它们大约一个月。我们看看会发生什么。我是说，我在 21 或 22 岁时有一个加油站，离这里大约三到四、四到五英里。我们只有一个竞争对手。

And he determined our profit, because we looked at his price every day. And if we cut the price he'd match it, and we couldn't raise the price. And he did twice the gallonage, so he won. And there's just basic business problems that you see with certain industries that you don't see with the other.

他决定了我们的利润，因为我们每天都查看他的价格。如果我们降价，他就会跟着降，而我们无法提高价格。他的销量是我们的两倍，所以他赢了。在某些行业中，你会看到一些基本的商业问题，而在其他行业中则看不到。

Disney was unique in its animated — what it offered, you know — in the '30s and '40s. And they wrote the stuff off at the first showing, and then they rejuvenated Snow White and all these other people every seven years, and that was fine.

迪士尼在其动画方面是独一无二的——你知道的——在 30 年代和 40 年代。他们在第一次放映时就将这些作品注销，然后每七年就重新制作《白雪公主》和其他这些角色，这样做很好。

But this is a different world. And the eyeballs aren't going to increase dramatically in the time they can spend is not going to increase dramatically. And you've got a bunch of companies that don't want to quit. And who knows what pricing does under that. But anybody who tells you that they know what pricing will do in the future is kidding themselves.

但这是一个不同的世界。用户的注意力不会大幅增加，他们能花费的时间也不会大幅增加。而且你有一堆不想退出的公司。谁知道在这种情况下定价会怎样。但任何告诉你他们知道未来定价会怎样的人都是在自欺欺人。

Charlie? Charlie's had a lot of experience, incidentally, with Hollywood. I mean, he used to, before I even met him —

查理？顺便说一下，查理在好莱坞有很多经验。我的意思是，在我甚至见到他之前——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the movie business is one tough business.

查理·芒格：我认为电影行业是一个艰难的行业。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That's my view.

查理·芒格：这是我的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: The talent will make the money; the agents will make the money. And if you've got a theater, you know, the theaters are now doing 70% of the business that they did before the pandemic. And big hits, you know, have enormous grosses. But you can't reduce the supply.

沃伦·巴菲特：人才会赚钱；经纪人会赚钱。如果你有一个剧院，你知道，剧院现在的营业额是疫情前的 70%。而大热剧目，知道的，票房收入巨大。但你无法减少供应。

People have only got so many hours in the day. They've only got two eyeballs. And they've got more choice than ever before, and they've got stuff that's cheaper that offers them the same experience. And some of them like the experience, you know, particularly with the big hits of going.

人们一天只有那么多小时。他们只有两个眼球。而且他们的选择比以往任何时候都多，还有一些更便宜的东西能提供相同的体验。有些人喜欢这种体验，尤其是那些热门的东西。

But it isn't like you can double the number of people or double the eyeballs or anything like that. And you've got a lot of people. The talent will always get paid. And when you essentially are packaging that talent one way or another, and you need to get higher prices, and you've got a lot of strong companies who don't want to quit, that's an interesting equation.

但并不是说你可以将人数翻倍或增加关注度之类的。你有很多人。人才总是会得到报酬。当你以某种方式打包这些人才，并且需要提高价格时，而你又有很多不想退出的强大公司，这就是一个有趣的方程式。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And if you think the movies are tough, try to invest in a New York show on a conventional stage. There they think it's a breach of faith in that business to let the person who put up the money to ever get any money back. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：如果你觉得电影行业很艰难，那就试试在纽约的传统舞台上投资一场演出。在那里，他们认为让出资人拿回任何钱都是对这个行业的背叛。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, well, Charlie saw a lot of that actually when —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的，查理实际上看到过很多这一点，当——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don't like those businesses.

查理·芒格：是的。我不喜欢那些生意。

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what happened on "Cleopatra, Charlie." (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们“ Cleopatra，查理”发生了什么。（笑声）

It, no, it's a business that everybody's tempted. They love the idea of going in it, you know, and they get a certain amount of psychic income. But —

这，没错，这是一项让每个人都心动的生意。他们喜欢参与其中的想法，你知道，他们会获得一定的心理收益。但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I never owned any racehorses, either.

查理·芒格：我从来没有拥有过任何赛马。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my father-in-law and I used to talk about claiming a horse at AK-SAR-BEN, but we never quite got around to it. And we had a lot of fun going to the track together. (LAUGH)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我岳父和我曾经讨论过在AK-SAR-BEN（阿克萨本）赛马场认领一匹马，但我们从未真正实现过。我们一起去赛马场玩得很开心。（笑）

42. 'Our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility'

我们的风能和太阳能记录没有被任何公用事业公司超越。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, section six?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第六部分？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Hannah Hayes and I'm a high schooler from Iowa. You said earlier today that transitioning to renewable energy has the people and capital to support it.

观众成员：下午好。我叫汉娜·海斯，是来自爱荷华州的高中生。你今天早些时候说过，转向可再生能源有人民和资本的支持。

So, with enough investment in renewables, the development of energy storage technology to soon meet Iowa's energy needs, and support from the government system through Inflation Reduction Act funding, why hasn't Berkshire Hathaway Energy truly invested in the future by accelerating retirement plans for the coal plants, which have high operating costs and are currently Iowa's biggest carbon polluter, and will continue to be until they're finally retired in 2049, which is too late to be curbing emissions, according to the IPCC?

因此，在对可再生能源进行足够投资、开发能源存储技术以尽快满足爱荷华州的能源需求，以及通过通货膨胀削减法案资金获得政府系统的支持的情况下，为什么伯克希尔哈撒韦能源没有通过加速煤电厂的退役计划来真正投资未来呢？这些煤电厂的运营成本高，是爱荷华州最大的碳排放者，直到 2049 年才会最终退役，而根据 IPCC 的说法，这样做已经太晚，无法遏制排放

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It's very interesting. In Iowa, we have actually produced more wind energy than is the total amount of energy used by our customers. But it's not producible 24 hours a day necessarily. So, there's problems. And incidentally, in Iowa, a significant majority of counties welcome us when we come around and want to put in wind.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这非常有趣。在爱荷华州，我们实际上生产的风能超过了我们客户所使用的总能量。但这并不一定能 24 小时生产。因此，存在一些问题。顺便提一下，在爱荷华州，大多数县在我们来这里想要建设风电时都欢迎我们。

And some don't want it. I mean, you know, there's a not-in-my-backyard someplace. There's other places where they love the money they get from a small plot of ground. And people like the taxes that are paid. But I would say that if there's one state in the Union that stands out in the development, it's Iowa. But what's also interesting in Iowa is that we have one other major company.

有些人不愿意。我是说，有些地方的人不愿意在自己家附近开发。而其他地方的人则喜欢从一小块土地上获得的收入，人们也喜欢税收带来的好处。但我认为，如果说在整个联邦中有哪个州在发展方面突出，那就是爱荷华州。不过，在爱荷华州还有另一家主要公司。

There's always loads of little co-ops and all kinds of things that sell electricity. But we have one major competitor. And our prices are significantly lower. And, as a matter of fact, we are now in the Omaha Public Power District. And three miles or four miles away, we're selling the electricity in Iowa.

总是有很多小型合作社和各种各样的东西在卖电。但我们有一个主要竞争对手。我们的价格明显更低。事实上，我们现在在奥马哈公共电力区。而在三到四英里外，我们在爱荷华州销售电力。

And we are selling it cheaper, even though public power was invented in Nebraska, and has been — I think it's going on — George Norris did it back in the 1930s. And, you know, Nebraska's resisted, to some extent wind power, more than Iowa. But like I said, our competitor — alternate source — hasn't really pursued it the way we have.

尽管公共电力是在内布拉斯加州发明的，并且从乔治·诺里斯在1930年代开始就一直存在，尽管内布拉斯加州在一定程度上对风能的接受度低于爱荷华州，但我们还是在以更便宜的价格出售电力。我们的竞争对手——替代能源公司——并没有像我们一样积极地追求这项业务。

But I would say that our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility in the United States. And, of course, it's been aided by the fact that most utilities pay out 70% or 80% of earnings and dividends. And we haven't taken a common dividend, you know, for 20 years. We reinvested I don't know how many billion.

但我想说，我们在风能和太阳能方面的记录没有被美国的任何公用事业公司超越。当然，这也得益于大多数公用事业公司支付 70%或 80%的收益和股息。而我们已经 20 年没有发放普通股息了。我们再投资了不知道多少亿。

That's the reason why the earnings have gone from $200,000,000 to $4 billion, but we're not earning a higher rate of return on capital than we were when we started. We just put way more capital into the business as we went along, kept reinvesting the capital.

这就是为什么收益从 2 亿美元增长到 40 亿美元的原因，但我们的资本回报率并没有比我们开始时更高。我们只是随着时间的推移投入了更多的资本，不断地再投资这些资本。

So, I wish Greg were here to tell you more details about it. But I would say that we'd really put up Berkshire Hathaway Energy's record against any utility in the United States. Charlie, you've watched it.

所以，我希望格雷格在这里能告诉你更多细节。但我想说，我们真的可以将伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的业绩与美国任何公用事业公司相提并论。查理，你一直在关注这件事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have. And I'm not personally at all sure how bad the global warming is going to be. I don't think anybody knows for sure whether the seas are going to rise two inches or 20 feet. And so, I think there's a lot of false claims here in a world where much is not known.

查理·芒格：嗯，我有。我个人并不确定全球变暖会有多严重。我认为没有人确切知道海平面会升高两英寸还是 20 英尺。因此，我认为在一个许多事情尚不清楚的世界里，这里有很多虚假的说法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (APPLAUSE) There is a lot of wind in Wyoming. And we are building transmission lines that extend out through the West. But it was World War II when they told us to do it. And we had a czar in Washington that could say, you know, "Just get it done," like they said to said Henry Kaiser on building ships.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）怀俄明州有很多风。我们正在建设延伸到西部的输电线路。但这是在第二次世界大战期间，他们告诉我们去做这件事。华盛顿有一个沙皇可以说，“就这样完成它，”就像他们对亨利·凯泽建造船只时所说的那样。

You know, you can't believe how ahead we would be down from where we are. But we've got the money. We've got the know-how. This year our depreciation in our utility company is on the order of $4 billion. And we spend maybe $3 billion additional to that. So, maybe we spend $7 billion.

你知道吗，你无法想象如果我们从现在的地方出发会走得多远。但我们有资金。我们有技术。今年我们公用事业公司的折旧大约是 40 亿美元。我们可能还额外花费 30 亿美元。所以，我们可能花费 70 亿美元。

And there are very few companies in the utility industry that are spending, you know, that percentage of their depreciated money.

在公用事业行业，极少有公司愿意花费这么大比例的折旧资金。

But we'd love to be spending more, but there are people all over that don't want the pipeline to go through there. They don't want the tower, whatever it may be.

但我们希望能花更多的钱，但有很多人不希望管道通过那里。他们不想要那个塔，无论它是什么。

And that is the problem of a democracy. And even, as I mentioned, within Iowa, you've got a great many counties that — majority, great majority of the counties I think would welcome the wind power.

这就是民主的问题。正如我提到的，在爱荷华州，你有很多县——我认为大多数、绝大多数县会欢迎风能。

And you've got some counties that don't like it. And we're obviously going to work with the ones that want to work with us. We do not have the ability to go in and tell anybody what do on that.

有些县对此不太满意。显然，我们会与那些想要与我们合作的县一起工作。我们没有能力去告诉任何人该怎么做。

And there's a public utility commission in every state that basically governs what we earn on it, what we do, and that's the way the industry's developed. And that's not bad, unless you get into the things that in effect, you know, extend — they're part of a country-wide system, rather than state-wide system.

每个州都有一个公共事业委员会，基本上管理我们在这方面的收入和我们所做的事情，这就是行业发展的方式。这并不坏，除非你涉及到实际上延伸的事情——它们是全国性系统的一部分，而不是州级系统。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think also that even if we weren't worried about global warming, it would make sense to —

查理·芒格：我认为即使我们不担心全球变暖，这也是有意义的——

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — shift to renewables to conserve our hydrocarbons. There're certain things hydrocarbons can do that nothing else can do. And there's only so much of them there. Why not be cautious in conserving them?

查理·芒格：——转向可再生能源以保护我们的碳氢化合物。碳氢化合物有一些其他东西无法做到的事情。而且它们的数量是有限的。为什么不谨慎地保护它们呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: And the cost, they've gotten so much more efficient, too. I mean, the wind. I mean, if you look at what we're doing now, those towers are way more efficient than —

沃伦·巴菲特：而且，成本也变得更加高效。我是说，风能。如果你看看我们现在所做的，那些塔的效率远远超过——

But there's a lot of people that are talking about things that can't be done. And then there's —

但有很多人谈论一些无法做到的事情。然后还有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: There's a lot of nonsense in this field. If you like nonsense, this is the field for you. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：这个领域有很多胡说八道。如果你喜欢胡说八道，这里就是适合你的领域。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we're in the field, so. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们在这个领域，所以。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I know. I know.

查理·芒格：我知道。我知道。

43. 'We will not be making any offer for control of Occidental'

我们不会对收购西方石油提出任何报价。

WARREN BUFFETT: Ok, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Monroe Richardson (PH). The Wall Street Journal reported in March that oil producers are producing less oil and may have reached their peak in the Permian Basin.

贝基·奎克：这是来自门罗·理查森（PH）的问题。《华尔街日报》在三月份报道，石油生产商的产量正在减少，可能已经在二叠纪盆地达到了峰值。

Given the major positions of both Occidental Petroleum and Chevron in the Permian, which you please explain the rationale for Berkshire's significant holdings of both those companies, considering that future outlook for oil there?

考虑到西方石油公司和雪佛龙在二叠纪的重要地位，请您解释一下伯克希尔对这两家公司大量持股的理由，考虑到那里的石油未来前景？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there's no question — it's really interesting about oil, and Charlie knows way more about oil than I do, when did you buy that royalty in Bakersfield, or wherever it is? But that was before I met you, right?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，毫无疑问——关于石油真的很有趣，查理对石油的了解远超过我，你是什么时候在贝克斯菲尔德或其他地方购买那个特许权的？但那是在我认识你之前，对吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes — no, it wasn't before — it was — yes, it was. It was just before. You're right. And that goddamn royalty is still paying me $70,000 a year.

查理·芒格：是的——不，不是之前——是——是的，是的。就在之前。你说得对。那该死的权证仍然每年给我支付 70,000 美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: What'd you pay for the royalty?

沃伦·巴菲特：你为特许权支付了多少钱？

CHARLIE MUNGER: A thousand dollars.

查理·芒格：一千美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Now that's the opposite of the Permian. My dad bought $1,000 or $1,500 worth of royalties before he died in 1964. He left them to my mother. My mother left them to her two daughters. And my older sister died. And my younger sister is here today.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。这与二叠纪正好相反。我父亲在 1964 年去世前购买了价值 1000 或 1500 美元的特许权。他把这些留给了我母亲。我母亲把它们留给了她的两个女儿。我的姐姐去世了，而我的妹妹今天在这里。

And she gets these checks every month. And she knows about all these different fields, and what they're producing. And that's the reality of half of the oil production, or something around that, in the United States. And then the other half is shale.

她每个月都会收到这些支票。她了解所有这些不同的领域，以及它们的产出。这就是美国一半石油生产的现实，或者说大约是这样的情况。另一半则是页岩。

And, you know, if you've gone to the movies, and ever watched oil, you've never watched the things that are pumping Charlie's royalties in California. You'll see these gushers of oil. Well, in the Permian, this should sink in on you, in the first day, the first day when you bring in a well, you know, it may be 12,000 barrels, or maybe 15,000 barrels.

而且，你知道，如果你去看过电影，曾经看过石油，你就从未见过那些在加利福尼亚为查理的权证提供资金的东西。你会看到这些喷涌而出的石油。好吧，在二叠纪，这应该让你意识到，在第一天，当你开采一口井时，你知道，可能是 12,000 桶，或者可能是 15,000 桶。

And it's dangerous. Occidental had one come in at I think at 19,000 barrels or something like that in one day. And in a year, year and a half, it becomes partly nothing. It's a different business in effect. In the United States, it's interesting. We use maybe 11 and a fraction — well, we produce 11 and a fraction million barrels of oil equivalent a day.

这很危险。 Occidental曾经在一天之内有一次产量达到1.9万桶。结果，在一年或一年半之后，这个产量几乎变成了零。从本质上讲，这是一种不同的业务。在美国，这很有趣。我们每天生产大约1100万桶油当量。

But if shale stopped, I mean, it would drop to six million very fast. Well, just imagine taking five million barrels a day out of production in the world. And then we're also taking down our strategic petroleum reserve. Strategic petroleum reserve is the ultimate oilfield. You don't have to drill. It's just we've got them.

但如果页岩停止，我的意思是，它会很快降到六百万桶。想象一下，全球每天减少五百万桶的产量。然后我们还在减少我们的战略石油储备。战略石油储备是终极油田。你不需要钻探。我们就是拥有这些。

And it was supposed to be strategic, but it gets involved in politics. And so, there's all — when you talk about the oil business, you're talking about different kinds of businesses, basically. And we like Occidental's position in the Permian. And we wouldn't like that position — well, it got to minus one day. It got to minus $30 a barrel.

这本应是战略性的，但却卷入了政治。因此，当你谈论石油业务时，基本上是在谈论不同类型的业务。我们喜欢西方石油在二叠纪的地位。我们不喜欢那个地位——好吧，它曾经跌到过负值。它曾跌到每桶负 30 美元。

That was crazy, of course. But if oil sells at X, you know, you do very well. And if it sells at half of X, you know, your costs are the same, and it doesn't change the production. And it doesn't work as well, but it also brings down the oil production of the United States very fast.

那当然是疯狂的。但是如果石油以 X 的价格出售，你知道，你会赚得很好。如果它以 X 的一半的价格出售，你知道，你的成本是一样的，这不会改变生产。虽然效果没有那么好，但它也会很快降低美国的石油生产。

So, we don't know what oil prices will be. But we do very much like the Occidental position they have. And that's why we financed them a few years ago, when it looked like it was a terrible mistake. Then the oil market just totally collapsed. And then it changed around. And we bought a lot of the common stock.

所以，我们不知道油价会是多少。但我们非常喜欢他们的西方石油公司立场。这就是为什么我们在几年前为他们提供融资，当时看起来这是一项可怕的错误。然后油市完全崩溃。之后情况发生了变化。我们购买了很多普通股。

In the last few months, they've reduced our preferred, which we don't like, obviously. But we'd be disappointed in them if they didn't reduce it. It's intelligent from their standpoint. So, we've taken — of the $10 billion preferred, we've gotten maybe $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 of it, retired at 110% of par.

在过去几个月里，他们减少了我们的优先股，这显然是我们不喜欢的。但如果他们不减少，我们会对他们感到失望。从他们的角度来看，这是明智的。因此，在 100 亿美元的优先股中，我们大约获得了 4 亿到 5 亿美元，以 110%的面值退还。

But, Vicki Hollub, she's an extraordinary manager of Occidental. Her first job was with Cities Service. That was the first stock I bought in 1942. She knows what happens beneath the surface. I know the math of it. But I wouldn't have the faintest idea what to do if I was in an oil field.

但是，维基·霍卢布是西方石油公司的一位杰出经理。她的第一份工作是在城市服务公司。那是我在 1942 年购买的第一只股票。她知道表面之下发生了什么。我知道其中的数学原理。但如果我在油田里，我根本不知道该怎么做。

I mean, I can dig two feet down in my backyard. And that's my understanding of subsoil in the world. I can't picture the field that Charlie has been collecting that monthly check from, from 50-plus years, 60 years roughly, or my sister, getting at various fields, where they just keep pumping, and pumping, and pumping.

我的意思是，我可以在我后院挖两英尺深。这是我对世界下层土壤的理解。我无法想象查理从中收取每月支票的那片土地，已经超过 50 年，大约 60 年，或者我姐姐在不同的土地上，那里他们不断地抽水、抽水、再抽水。

And we, in the United States, we're lucky to have the absolutely to produce the kind of oil we've got from shale. But it is not a long-term source, like you might think, by watching movies about oil, or something of the sort. Charlie, do you have anything to add?

在美国，我们很幸运能够从页岩中生产出我们拥有的这种石油。但这并不是一个长期的来源，正如你可能通过观看关于石油的电影或类似的东西所想的那样。查理，你有什么想补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It really dies fast, those shale wells. If you like quick death in your oil wells, we have them for you.

查理·芒格：是的，那些页岩油井真的很快就枯竭。如果你喜欢油井快速枯竭，我们有这样的油井供你选择。

WARREN BUFFETT: But Occidental, they're doing a lot of good things.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是西方石油，他们正在做很多好事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. They drill a lot of new wells. And they're doing it at a profit, but it's a different kind of oil than this.

查理·芒格：是的。他们钻了很多新井。而且他们是盈利的，但这是一种不同类型的石油。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's just different. Yeah. Yeah. And that's true of almost half the oil produced in the United States. And there's times —

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是不同。是的。是的。这几乎适用于美国生产的近一半石油。有时候——

CHARLIE MUNGER: There's a lot of oil down there that nobody knows how to produce. And they've been working at it for, like, 50 years. But they worked at the existing shale production for about 50 years before they figured it out. And it was weirdly complicated when they finally were able to do it. There's only one type of sand that works.

查理·芒格：那里有很多石油，但没有人知道如何开采。他们已经在这方面工作了大约 50 年。但在他们弄明白之前，他们在现有的页岩生产上工作了大约 50 年。当他们最终能够做到这一点时，过程异常复杂。只有一种沙子是有效的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Can you imagine a horizontal pipe, you know, maybe a mile and a half or something? It's just so different than what you think about.

沃伦·巴菲特：你能想象一根水平管道吗，可能有一英里半长？这与你想象的完全不同。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It goes laterally for three miles, two miles down. How in the hell do you drill two or three miles laterally, when you're already two or three miles under the Earth? They have mastered a lot of very tricky technology to be able to get any oil out of these wells at all.

查理·芒格：它横向延伸三英里，向下两英里。你到底怎么能在已经在地球下两三英里的情况下，横向钻两三英里？他们掌握了很多非常复杂的技术，才能从这些井中提取出任何石油。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we love the position with Occidental. And we love having Vicki run it. And they've been —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们非常喜欢与西方石油的合作。我们也很喜欢让维基来管理它。他们一直在——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And there's a lot more oil down there, if anybody can figure out another magic trick. That's all we need is another magic trick.

查理·芒格：如果有人能想出另一个魔法把戏，那里还有更多的石油。我们所需要的就是另一个魔法把戏。

WARREN BUFFETT: But Occidental has some other things too.

沃伦·巴菲特：但西方石油还有其他一些事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yes. But —

查理·芒格：是的。是的。但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: But the price of oil still is incredibly important in terms of the economics of short-lived oil. I mean, no question about that.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是石油的价格在短期石油的经济学中仍然是非常重要的。我是说，这毫无疑问。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if it's —

查理·芒格：好吧，如果是——

WARREN BUFFETT: And we will incidentally — you know — There's speculation about us buying control. We're not going to buy control. (Laughs) We don't want to run — We've got the right management running it. We can't — we wouldn't know what to do with it. And (UNINTELLIGLE) wouldn't know what to do with an oil field.

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下——你知道——关于我们购买控股权的猜测。我们不会购买控股权。（笑）我们不想管理——我们有合适的管理团队在运营它。我们不能——我们不知道该怎么做。而且（听不清）也不知道该怎么处理一个油田。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Admitting you're buying coal would be like going out and seeking to acquire cancer or something. You can't even borrow to expand a coal mine now. It got very unfashionable.

查理·芒格：承认你在购买煤炭就像是出去寻求获得癌症一样。现在你甚至无法借钱来扩展煤矿。它变得非常不时尚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we think, frankly, some of the things said are ridiculous.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。坦率地说，我们认为有些说法是荒谬的。

And on both sides. In both extremes.

在两侧。在两个极端。

I mean, you're dealing with physics. You're dealing with — the politicization of positions on something that's enormously important in terms of energy just lends itself to demagogues, and fundraisers, and advisory organizations, and everybody in sight. And we will make rational decisions. And we do not think it's un-American to be producing oil.

我的意思是，你在处理物理学。你在处理——对某些在能源方面极其重要的问题的立场政治化，这很容易被煽动者、筹款者、顾问组织以及所有人利用。我们会做出理性的决定。我们认为生产石油并不是不爱国的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And there is no oil basin in the United States that compares to the Permian, in terms of promise.

查理·芒格：在美国，没有哪个油田能与二叠纪相比，具有如此大的潜力。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We were lucky.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们很幸运。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don't —

查理·芒格：嗯，我不——

WARREN BUFFETT: We didn't know it was there until –

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不知道它在那里，直到——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — not that many years ago.

沃伦·巴菲特：——就在几年前。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It had sort of been used up. And then they always knew the shale oil was there. But they thought it was going to stay unrecoverable forever.

查理·芒格：这似乎已经被用尽了。他们一直知道页岩油在那里。但他们认为它将永远无法开采。

WARREN BUFFETT: The second or third stock I bought was Texas Pacific Land Trust. And they owned 3,000,000 acres down there. And they were raising revenues of $10,000 a year or something like that. And they were sitting on this incredible amount of oil. And basically, that company is now actually part of Chevron.

沃伦·巴菲特：我买的第二或第三只股票是德克萨斯太平洋土地信托。他们在那儿拥有 300 万英亩的土地，年收入大约是 1 万美元。他们坐拥着大量的石油。基本上，这家公司现在实际上是雪佛龙的一部分。

And it went through Texaco and did all kinds of things. And there's still a Texas Pacific Land Trust. But a lot of that property is fee owned by — the minerals are owned by Chevron, which is some advantage. But it's an interesting subject, I'll put it that way.

它经过了德克萨斯石油公司，做了各种事情。现在仍然有德克萨斯太平洋土地信托。但很多财产是由——矿产由雪佛龙公司拥有，这有一些优势。不过，这是一个有趣的话题，我就这么说吧。

And we will not be making any offer for control of Occidental. But we love the shares we have. And we may or may not own more in the future. But we certainly have warrants, which we got as part of the original deal, on a very sustainable amount of stock, at around $59 a share. And those warrants last a long time. I'm glad we have them.

我们不会对西方石油公司提出任何控制权的报价。但我们喜欢我们拥有的股票。未来我们可能会增持，也可能不会。但我们肯定拥有认股权证，这是我们在最初交易中获得的，涉及相当可持续的股票，价格约为每股 59 美元。这些认股权证的有效期很长。我很高兴我们拥有它们。

44. Elon Musk is a 'brilliant, brilliant guy' who 'likes taking on the impossible job'

埃隆·马斯克是一个“聪明、聪明的人”，他“喜欢接受不可能的工作”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station seven.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第七站。

AUDINCE MEMBER: My name is Max Joa (PH). I'm from Toronto, Canada. I have a question for Charlie regarding a statement you made in the past.

观众成员：我叫马克斯·乔（PH）。我来自加拿大多伦多。我有一个问题想问查理，关于你过去所说的一句话。

You once mentioned that you'd prefer to hire someone with an IQ of 130 who believes it's 120, over someone with the IQ of 150 who thinks it's 170.

你曾提到过，你更愿意雇佣一个智商为 130 但认为自己智商是 120 的人，而不是一个智商为 150 却认为自己智商是 170 的人。

I understand that you are referring to Elon Musk. (LAUGHTER)

我明白你指的是埃隆·马斯克。（笑声）

Given the recent success of his ventures, such as Tesla, SpaceX, and Starlink, I'm curious to know if you still hold the view that Elon Musk overestimates himself. Thank you so much. (APPLAUSE)

鉴于他最近在特斯拉、SpaceX 和 Starlink 等企业的成功，我很好奇你是否仍然认为埃隆·马斯克高估了自己。非常感谢。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. I think Elon Musk overestimates himself. But he has a — he is very talented. So, he's overestimating somebody who doesn't need to overestimate to be very talented.

查理·芒格：嗯，是的。我认为埃隆·马斯克高估了自己。但他非常有才华。所以，他高估了一个不需要高估就能非常有才华的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: There's a Bill Maher program, about a week old, maybe two weeks old.

沃伦·巴菲特：有一个比尔·马赫的节目，大约一周前，可能是两周前。

But he interviews Elon. And Elon does a terrific job toe-to-toe with Bill Maher. It's worth watching.

但他采访了埃隆。埃隆在与比尔·马赫的对话中表现得非常出色。值得一看。

And Elon is — he's a brilliant, brilliant guy. And I would say that, you know, he might score over 170.

埃隆是个非常聪明的人。我认为他的智商可能超过 170。

But he — you know, it's — he dreams about things. And his dreams have got a foundation.

但是他——你知道，这——他梦想着一些事情。他的梦想有一个基础。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He would not have achieved what he has in life if he hadn't tried for unreasonably extreme objectives.

查理·芒格：如果他没有追求不合理的极端目标，他就不会在生活中取得现在的成就。

He likes taking on the impossible job and doing it. We're different, Warren and I. Warren and I are looking for the easy job that we can identify. (LAUGHTER)

他喜欢接受不可能的工作并完成它。我们不同，沃伦和我。沃伦和我在寻找我们能识别的简单工作。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If we can do it playing tic-tac-toe, we'll do it, you know? (LAUGHS)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果我们能通过下井字棋来做到这一点，我们就会做到，你知道吗？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have a totally different way of going about it.

查理·芒格：我们有一种完全不同的方法。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we don't want to compete with Elon in a lot of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们不想在很多事情上与埃隆竞争。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don't want that much failure.

查理·芒格：我们不想要那么多失败。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGHTER) Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑）是的。

And it takes over your life in a way that it just doesn't fit us. But there are going to be — well, there have been important things done by Elon already. And it requires — fanaticism isn't the word.

这以一种不适合我们的方式占据了你的生活。但将会有——实际上，埃隆已经做了一些重要的事情。这需要——狂热并不是这个词。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It is the word.

查理·芒格：是的。这就是那个词。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

Well, it isn't quite the word. But it's a dedication to solving the impossible. And every now and then, he'll do it. But it would be torturous to me or Charlie. And I like the way I'm living. And I wouldn't enjoy being in his — but he wouldn't enjoy being in my shoes, either.

嗯，这并不是完全正确的说法。但这是一种对解决不可能问题的奉献。时不时地，他会做到这一点。但对我或查理来说，这将是折磨。而我喜欢我现在的生活。我不想过他的生活——但他也不会喜欢过我的生活。

Watch the Bill Maher interview.

观看比尔·马赫的采访。

45. We want to save Berkshire's cash to buy businesses

我们想要保存伯克希尔的现金来购买企业。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Foster Taylor (PH).

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自福斯特·泰勒（PH）。

"At the 2010 Berkshire annual meeting, you said the one question that you would ask of the Berkshire CEO would be about the distribution of cash to shareholders, as the Berkshire cash pile grows larger and larger.

在 2010 年伯克希尔年会上，您说您会问伯克希尔首席执行官的一个问题是关于向股东分配现金的问题，因为伯克希尔的现金储备越来越大。

"So, let me ask that question. Do you still feel confident of the future prospects for our over $100 billion in cash on hand, or are we getting closer to cash distributions?"

那么，让我问这个问题。您是否仍然对我们手头超过 1000 亿美元的现金的未来前景感到信心，还是我们越来越接近现金分配？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the one thing, if Berkshire shares are selling for less than we think they're worth, that could be a pretty big way to distribute cash. But what we would really like to do is buy great businesses. If we could buy a company for $50 billion, or $75 billion, $100 billion, we could do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果伯克希尔的股票价格低于我们认为的价值，这可能是分配现金的一个很大方式。但我们真正想做的是收购优秀的企业。如果我们能以 500 亿美元、750 亿美元或 1000 亿美元的价格收购一家公司，我们是可以做到的。

And we could do it. And our word's good. It's difficult with a public company, because in effect, if you bid on a company, you make the bid, and their shareholders vote months later. And you're giving out an option. If we're good for it, and the other guy has a way to —

我们可以做到。我们的承诺是可靠的。对于一家上市公司来说，这很困难，因为实际上，如果你对一家公司出价，你提出出价后，他们的股东几个月后才会投票。而你是在提供一个选择。如果我们能做到，而另一个人有办法——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Top you. 查理·芒格：顶你。

WARREN BUFFETT: —top you, or all kinds of things, they can get out of it. And then you get paid 2% for that, or 1% that, that is not an appropriate price. And on the other hand, Delaware will decide whether they should do it or not. And that's the way the world is. I mean, that's the law. So, it'd be easier to do with a private company.

沃伦·巴菲特：——你会被顶替，或者各种事情，他们可以从中获利。然后你为此获得 2%的报酬，或者 1%的报酬，这不是一个合适的价格。另一方面，特拉华州将决定他们是否应该这样做。这就是世界的运作方式。我是说，这就是法律。因此，和一家私人公司合作会更容易。

And there aren't very many that are big. On the other hand, there's nobody else that can quite make a deal like we can, under the right circumstances. And there could be a situation where a number of very decent companies have got a very uncomfortable borrowing structure, and money comes due to them at the exact wrong time.

而且大公司并不多。另一方面，没有其他公司能像我们一样在合适的情况下达成交易。可能会出现一些相当不错的公司有着非常不理想的借贷结构，而资金在完全错误的时间到期。

And that's when they pick up a phone, as did Tiffany, and Harley-Davidson, and you name it. I mean, a whole bunch of companies in 2008. That sort of thing will happen again, whether it results in us getting the calls, or what the world is exactly at that time.

然后他们就会打电话，就像蒂芙尼、哈雷-戴维森，以及你能想到的其他公司一样。我是说，2008 年有一大堆公司会这样做。这种事情会再次发生，无论是我们接到电话，还是当时世界的具体情况。

But the one thing we know is that the number of phone calls that you can make at a time like that is very, very limited. And there can be good companies, they don't want to sell the company necessarily, but they just may need $5 billion, or $10 billion, or $20 billion, depending on what company you're talking about.

但我们知道的一件事是，在那种情况下，你可以拨打的电话数量非常有限。可能有一些优秀的公司，他们并不一定想出售公司，但他们可能只需要 50 亿美元、100 亿美元或 200 亿美元，这取决于你所谈论的公司。

And that can happen. And our own shareholders can be selling the stock too cheap. And we'll never do anything to make them sell it cheap. And we'll tell them the truth about what the business is. But if market circumstances result in us being able to buy in $50 billion of our own stock, we'll buy it.

这可能会发生。我们的股东也可能以过低的价格出售股票。我们绝不会做任何事情让他们以低价出售。我们会告诉他们关于业务的真实情况。但如果市场情况使我们能够回购 500 亿美元的自家股票，我们会买入。

So, we'll see what the world holds. But we don't have the opportunities we used to have. But we've got enough. And we're making money with the things we have. It isn't killing us to hold $130 billion of bills at 5% plus bond equivalent yields.

所以，我们将看看世界会带来什么。但我们没有以前那么多的机会。不过我们有足够的。我们正在利用现有的东西赚钱。持有 1300 亿美元的债券，收益率超过 5%并没有让我们感到痛苦。

And everybody says, "Well, yields are going to go down in the future." I don't have the faintest idea what yields are going to do in the future.

每个人都说：“未来收益会下降。”我对未来收益会如何完全没有头绪。

And, you know, the prime rate was 21.5% in 1981 or '2. And people were worried that it was going to go totally out and spin out of control. And [Federal Reserve Chairman Paul] Volcker kept it from happening.

而且，你知道，1981 年或 1982 年的基准利率是 21.5%。人们担心它会完全失控。然后[美联储主席保罗]沃尔克阻止了这种情况的发生。

But if Volcker hadn't been in there, who the hell knows what would've happened.

但如果沃尔克不在那儿，谁知道会发生什么。

So, we're running Berkshire so that we'll do OK. And maybe we'll do a little bit better than OK. Charlie?

所以，我们在经营伯克希尔，以便我们能做得不错。也许我们会做得比不错更好。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: OK. Maybe. Fine.

查理·芒格：好的。也许。好吧。

46. Munger: 'Life is too short' to be an ambitious lawyer

芒格：“人生太短”不能成为一个有抱负的律师

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station eight.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第八站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Carlos Sanchez (PH). And I am honored to be here from Guadalajara, Mexico. Mr. Munger, as a fellow lawyer, I have a question regarding corporate law.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫卡洛斯·桑切斯（PH）。我很荣幸能来自墨西哥瓜达拉哈拉。芒格先生，作为一名律师，我有一个关于公司法的问题。

Considering your experience and success, if you were to offer guidance to someone like Ralph Tortorella when he was at the beginning of his career, and before becoming Berkshire Hathaway Company's lawyer, what key principles or lessons would you suggest to help him excel in his profession?

考虑到您的经验和成功，如果您要为像拉尔夫·托托雷拉这样的人提供指导，在他职业生涯的初期，以及在成为伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的律师之前，您会建议哪些关键原则或经验教训来帮助他在职业生涯中脱颖而出？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I'm not sure I quite caught all of that. But I don't think I have a lot of advice about how to succeed as a lawyer. I have a son-in-law who describes modern law practice in a big firm.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不太确定我完全听懂了。不过，我认为我没有很多关于如何成功成为律师的建议。我有一个女婿，他描述了大公司中的现代法律实践。

He says, "It's like a pie-eating contest where if you win you get to eat more pie." (LAUGHTER) And I advise you to avoid that kind of a law firm. Life is too short to just do nothing but eat pie.

他说：“这就像一个吃派比赛，如果你赢了，你就可以吃更多的派。”（笑声）我建议你避免那种律师事务所。生活太短暂，不能只做吃派的事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie has not practiced law since what 1964 maybe, whatever it was.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理自 1964 年左右就没有从事法律工作了，不管是什么时候。

CHARLIE MUNGER: 1962. 查理·芒格：1962 年。

WARREN BUFFETT: '62. And Charlie has given me four or five pieces of advice that don't really come from his legal background, but because he knows the system so well, and, you know, really did do quite well at Harvard Law School, despite his taunting of teachers in a few things.

沃伦·巴菲特：“62年。查理给了我四五条建议，这些建议并不完全来自他的法律背景，而是因为他对系统非常了解，尽管他在一些事情上嘲弄老师，但他在哈佛法学院确实表现得相当不错。”

He has given me four of five solutions on things that nobody else in the world would've given me, law firm or otherwise. And it's been within a nanosecond of when I described the problem to him. And he just gave me the answer that nobody else would've come up with.

他给了我四个或五个解决方案，这些是世界上其他人，包括律师事务所，都不会给我的。而且在我向他描述问题的瞬间，他就给了我答案，这是其他人想不出来的。

And I told you one of them last year. So, I won't repeat it at this meeting. But we've got the best lawyer in the world in Charlie, if it's something that really matters. And there've been times when I've taken advantage of that. And Charlie didn't want to be a lawyer.

我去年告诉过你其中一个。所以，我在这次会议上不会重复。但如果这件事真的很重要，我们有世界上最好的律师查理。我曾经利用过这一点。而查理并不想当律师。

He didn't want to sell his time, maybe at 20 bucks an hour or something, to people he thought were making the wrong the decisions. And he knew more about it than they did. And that just did not strike him as a good way to go through life. And I think he's probably right on that.

他不想以每小时 20 美元或其他什么价格把自己的时间卖给那些他认为做出错误决定的人。他比他们更了解这些事情。这让他觉得这不是一种好的生活方式。我认为他在这方面可能是对的。

I think he'd have really gotten to be miserable if he had to keep doing that. It's just no fun. It'd be like me giving investment advice to somebody that — or taking it from somebody. I just wouldn't want to do it. And Charlie figured that out. And so, we decided to work for ourselves. And this worked. Been happy, happily ever after.

我认为如果他不得不一直这样做，他真的会变得很痛苦。这实在没有乐趣。就像我给某人提供投资建议——或者从某人那里接受建议。我根本不想这样做。查理明白了这一点。因此，我们决定为自己工作。这很有效。我们一直很快乐，幸福地生活下去。

向下兼容没一件是好事，包括争取卖的更便宜的零售业，“关闭大脑”欣赏的电视和电影。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have no complaints.

查理·芒格：我们没有任何抱怨。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. None.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。没有。

47. New minimum 15% corporate tax 'doesn't bother me in the least'

新的最低 15%企业税“对我来说一点也不在乎”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We're at Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们在贝基那里。

BECKY QUICK: This question come from Ryan Harding (PH). And it's about the new 15% corporate minimum tax rate. As he sees it, its implementation is currently understood, he thinks as he understands it, to apply over rolling three-year periods, and to be based on reported earnings.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自瑞安·哈丁（PH）。它是关于新的 15%企业最低税率。他认为，目前对其实施的理解是，适用于滚动的三年周期，并基于报告的收益。

First, does the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses in reported earnings under the current financial reporting standards contribute to the calculation for corporate minimum tax rate purposes?

首先，在当前财务报告标准下，未实现的收益和损失是否计入报告的收益中，会对企业最低税率的计算产生影响？

And could it potentially convert some of those notional deferred taxes into cash taxes, even if a rise in the market price of a major holding is only temporary, but rather extreme? And then second, could it reduce the effect of some of the renewable energy tax incentives, and others?

并且它是否有可能将一些名义上的递延税款转化为现金税款，即使主要持股的市场价格上涨只是暂时的，但却相当极端？其次，它是否能够减少一些可再生能源税收激励及其他激励的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the answer on the second part, probably, is no. But I don't want to say it is for sure, because he's asking the same questions I ask of Marc Hamburg, who's the smartest guy on combining understanding a business, understanding the tax code, understanding SEC rules, and everything else, that you'll find in corporate America.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为第二部分的答案可能是否定的。但我不想肯定地说，因为他问的问题和我问马克·汉堡的问题一样，他是理解商业、税法、证券交易委员会规则以及其他一切方面最聪明的人，你在美国企业界能找到的。

And these questions — the particular question on marginable securities — I don't think has been answered yet. And I think that there are a number of things about the new tax act that were not enacted yet. But I would say this. We have said ourselves what we think the proper approach to operating income.

这些问题——特别是关于可融资证券的问题——我认为尚未得到解答。我认为新的税法中有一些内容尚未实施。但我会这么说：我们已经阐明了我们对运营收入的正确处理方式。

We didn't design that because this tax law came along, we did some years back. So, we would think that you wouldn't include capital gains, unrealized capital gains in. But we've got enough, I think no matter how things turn out. The 15% tax doesn't bother me in the least.

我们并不是因为这项税法的出现而设计的，而是几年前就做了这个设计。因此，我们认为你不会将资本利得和未实现的资本利得包括在内。但我认为无论事情如何发展，我们都有足够的准备。15%的税率对我来说一点也不在意。

And we can figure ways, once we know the rules, where we will pay the 15% tax. And, you know, we were paying 52% tax as federal income taxes when I bought control in the partnership of Berkshire Hathaway. I mean, the tax rate has come down dramatically.

我们可以找到方法，一旦我们知道规则，我们将支付 15%的税。你知道，当我获得伯克希尔哈撒韦合伙企业的控制权时，我们支付的联邦所得税税率是 52%。我的意思是，税率已经大幅下降。

And the deferred tax that was embodied, for example, at Sanborn MAT, when it was involved in a system that was allowed under the tax law to avoid that tax. But that was a huge tax, 52%. So, we will live with this tax code. And we do not think corporations are overtaxed in the United States.

例如，Sanborn MAT 所体现的递延税款，它涉及的系统在税法允许下可以避免缴纳该税。但是那是一个巨额税收，52%。所以，我们将继续遵守这个税法。我们不认为美国的公司税负过重。

And, you know, I think that the conversation about how we'd lose out to the world, and all that sort of thing is really nonsense. But we've got a new law that the regulations haven't been written on. And when we know what the game is, we will absolutely figure out a way to pay 15% every year, which generally, we've been paying anyway.

而且，你知道，我认为关于我们如何在世界上失去机会的讨论，以及所有这些事情，实际上都是无稽之谈。但我们有一项新法律，相关的规定还没有制定。当我们知道规则是什么时，我们绝对会找到每年支付 15%的方法，实际上，我们一直在支付。

And as I pointed out, if there were a thousand corporations in the United States that paid what Berkshire has been paying, nobody else in the United States, no individual, no corporation, would ever pay any income tax, social security tax, gift tax, estate tax, anything else.

正如我所指出的，如果美国有一千家公司支付与伯克希尔相同的税款，那么美国其他任何人，无论是个人还是公司，都将不再支付任何所得税、社会保障税、赠与税、遗产税或其他任何税款。

A thousand like Berkshire Hathaway would produce the revenue that's being derived under the present tax code from everybody in the United States. And I don't feel badly about that. And I love to get it to one five-hundreth, or something of the sort. But I'd like to do it — we can do it at this rate. I'm happy to do it.

一千个像伯克希尔·哈撒韦这样的公司将产生根据现行税法从美国每个人那里获得的收入。我对此并不感到不好。我喜欢把它降低到五百分之一，或者类似的比例。但我想这样做——我们可以以这个速度做到。我很乐意这样做。

I think we are privileged to live in the United States. But we also have to control spending. And that's something that Congress doesn't quite like to do. And they didn't like to do it when my dad went to Congress. But they've dug in more, as the years have gone by. Charlie?

我认为我们有幸生活在美国。但我们也必须控制开支。这是国会不太喜欢做的事情。当我父亲去国会时，他们也不喜欢这样做。但随着时间的推移，他们更加固执了。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we covered this subject earlier.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们之前讨论过这个话题。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

48. We are in 'the perfect sort of game'

我们正处于“完美的游戏状态”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station nine.

沃伦·巴菲特：第九站。

Am I right on this? Yeah.

我这样说对吗？是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Avlon Gross (PH). And I am from Los Angeles, California. I am a shareholder. And it's my fourth year coming to the "Woodstock of Capitalism." (LAUGHTER)

观众成员：我叫阿夫隆·格罗斯（音）。我来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。我是一名股东。这是我第四年参加“资本主义的伍德斯托克”。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We're glad you came.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们很高兴你来了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you so much for everything Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.

观众成员：非常感谢沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格所做的一切。

What is the funniest story that you have never told about each other? And also, what is the hardest part of your business? (APPLAUSE)

你们之间从未讲过的 funniest 故事是什么？还有，你们生意中最困难的部分是什么？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I'll answer the second. The second part of your question is that we don't have a hard business. We love our business. Every morning, when I get up, I feel good. I don't know what's going to happen that day. Maybe nothing will happen. But maybe something will happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：我来回答第二个问题。你问题的第二部分是我们没有一个艰难的生意。我们热爱我们的事业。每天早上，当我起床时，我感觉很好。我不知道那一天会发生什么。也许什么都不会发生。但也许会发生一些事情。

And if nothing else, I'll roll some T-bills or something. But I work with the greatest group of people you can imagine. I mean, we like each other. And nobody is after anybody else's job, or anything of the sort. It's ideal working conditions. And it's five minutes from my home, or thereabouts. So, I haven't spent my life commuting. I just can't imagine having anything better.

如果没有其他选择，我会投资一些国库券之类的。但我和一群你能想象到的最棒的人一起工作。我的意思是，我们彼此喜欢。而且没有人想抢其他人的工作，或者类似的事情。这是理想的工作环境。而且离我家只有五分钟，差不多。所以，我没有花费我的一生在通勤上。我真的无法想象还有什么比这更好的。

And Charlie's got a lot of funny stories you haven't heard. But we'll see which one he comes up with.

查理有很多你没听过的有趣故事。但我们看看他会讲哪个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think Warren and I are naturally so ridiculous that we don't need very many funny stories. We each do things that are peculiar enough so that we can keep one another amused.

查理·芒格：我认为沃伦和我天生就很可笑，所以我们不需要太多有趣的故事。我们各自做的事情都足够奇特，以至于可以让彼此保持娱乐。

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what you told the lawyer when we were buying Hochschild Kohn.

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们你在我们购买Hochschild Kohn时对律师说了什么。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don't remember. You tell them.

查理·芒格：我不记得了。你告诉他们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you remember? (LAUGHTER) It was 1966, and we were down in Baltimore, buying a department store. And we needed a lawyer. And we needed a lawyer who was nearby and would do exactly as told. And Charlie came up with a very good lawyer from Wilmer Cutler's, I believe. And I don't know whether Charlie remembers the instructions he gave the lawyer or not.

沃伦·巴菲特：你还记得吗？（笑声）那是 1966 年，我们在巴尔的摩，买一家百货商店。我们需要一个律师。我们需要一个在附近并且会完全按照指示行事的律师。查理推荐了一位来自威尔默·卡特尔的非常好的律师，我相信。至于查理是否记得他给律师的指示，我就不知道了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I don't.

查理·芒格：不，我不这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie told the lawyer, who we never met before. And he said, "Treat Warren like" — I was 36 at the time or 35. He said, "Treat Warren like any other 90-year-old client." (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，查理告诉了我们从未见过的律师。他说：“把沃伦当作”——那时我 36 岁或 35 岁。他说：“把沃伦当作任何其他 90 岁客户来对待。”（笑声）

This guy knew exactly what he meant. And we made the deal in a hurry. And then we went to the bank, First National Bank, I believe it was — or Maryland National Bank, actually. And there was a fellow named Cammy Slack there, wasn't there, Charlie?

这个家伙知道他是什么意思。我们匆忙达成了交易。然后我们去了银行，我相信是第一国家银行——实际上是马里兰国家银行。那里有个叫卡米·斯莱克的家伙，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We wanted to borrow $6,000,000 bucks against a $12,000,000 purchase. And Cammy looked at us with bewilderment. And he says, "You want you borrow $6,000,000 for this little old Hochschild-Kohn?" And Charlie and I said something to the effect, "Well, the Maryland National was our first call. And if they didn't want to do it, we had another bank we'd go to."

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想借 600 万美元来购买 1200 万美元的资产。卡米看着我们，满脸困惑。他说：“你们想为这个小小的Hochschild Kohn借 600 万美元？”查理和我说了类似的话：“好吧，马里兰国家银行是我们的首选。如果他们不愿意，我们还有另一家银行可以去。”

And, anyway, they lent us the money. But when he said little old Hochschild-Kohn, we immediately started thinking, "Maybe this isn't the best deal we've ever seen in our lives." And from that point on, we were trying to figure out how to sell it. Sandy Gottesman was involved with us then too.

而且，他们确实借给了我们钱。但是当他说到小老头Hochschild Kohn时，我们立刻开始想，“也许这不是我们一生中见过的最好交易。”从那时起，我们就开始想办法如何出售它。桑迪·戈特斯曼那时也参与了我们。

And we had as much fun out of deals that didn't work in a certain sense as the ones that did work. I mean, if you knew you were going to play golf and you were going to hit a hole in one on every hole, you just hit the ball, and it went in the hole that was 300 yards away, or 400 yards away, nobody would play golf.

我们从那些在某种意义上没有成功的交易中获得的乐趣，和那些成功的交易一样多。我的意思是，如果你知道你要打高尔夫球，并且每个洞都能一杆进洞，你只需击球，球就会进 300 码或 400 码远的洞，那就没人会去打高尔夫了。

I mean, part of the fun of the game is the fact that you hit them to the woods. And sometimes you get them out, and sometimes you don't.

我想，游戏的乐趣部分在于你把他们打到树林里。有时候你能把他们弄出来，有时候则不能。

So, we are in the perfect sort of game. And we both enjoy it. And we have a lot of fun together. And we don't have to do anything we don't really believe in doing.

所以，我们正处于一种完美的游戏中。我们都很享受这个过程。我们在一起玩得很开心。我们不必做任何我们不真正相信的事情。

I mean, we are not dictated to by any group. And so, we get to forge our own destiny. And in a sense, forge the principle by which we can run the company. And that's a huge luxury in life.

我的意思是，我们不受任何团体的支配。因此，我们可以塑造自己的命运。在某种意义上，塑造我们可以运营公司的原则。这在生活中是一种巨大的奢侈。

And we don't want to be president of any other company in the world, or CEO, or anything else. We'd have to conform to certain things that we really don't want to conform to.

我们不想成为世界上任何其他公司的总裁、首席执行官或其他任何职位。我们必须遵循一些我们真的不想遵循的事情。

Is that a fair description, Charlie?

那是一个公平的描述吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it is.

查理·芒格：是的，确实如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

49. Arbitrage bet on Activision isn't looking good

对动视的套利投注看起来不太好

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from David Kass, who is a professor at the business school at University of Maryland.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自大卫·卡斯，他是马里兰大学商学院的教授。

He says, "At last year's annual meeting, Warren mentioned that Berkshire had taken a large stake in Activision Blizzard as a merger arbitrage play. Since the U.K. regulator has blocked its acquisition by Microsoft, has Berkshire reduced or sold its stake?"

他说：“在去年的年会上，沃伦提到伯克希尔在动视暴雪中进行了大规模投资，作为并购套利的策略。由于英国监管机构已阻止微软收购，伯克希尔是否减少或出售了其股份？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think in terms of what we do with stocks, we don't give information except when required to, which is in the 13F, or whatever we file. And there's certain things you can actually figure out by looking at our 10-Q, which we filed this morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为就我们对股票的处理而言，除非有要求，否则我们不会提供信息，这就是在 13F 中，或者我们提交的其他文件中。实际上，有些事情你可以通过查看我们今天早上提交的 10-Q 来弄清楚。

But you have to look pretty hard. But I would say this. I think Microsoft has been remarkably, what's the word, willing to cooperate with governing bodies. I mean, they want to do the deal. And they've met the opposition, it seems to me, more than halfway.

但你必须仔细观察。不过我想说的是，我认为微软在这方面非常，怎么说呢，愿意与监管机构合作。我的意思是，他们想达成交易。而且在我看来，他们已经在很大程度上迎合了反对意见。

But that doesn't mean that it gets done if a given country, in this case the U.K., wants to block it. They're in a better position to block it than the United States, by just the way the world works. And that doesn't get solved by offering more money.

但这并不意味着如果一个特定国家，比如英国，想要阻止它，就能做到。根据世界运作的方式，他们比美国更有能力阻止它。而仅仅通过提供更多资金是无法解决这个问题的。

So, I don't know how it turns out. But if it doesn't go through, I don't think it's through any shortcoming by either Microsoft or Activision. But not everything that should happen does happen. And, well, we ran into it when we made the deal with Dominion Energy 18 months ago. And they let us buy a good bit of what we wanted to buy.

所以，我不知道结果会怎样。但如果没有通过，我认为这并不是微软或动视的任何缺陷。但并不是所有应该发生的事情都会发生。嗯，我们在 18 个月前与多米尼能源达成交易时遇到了这个问题。他们让我们购买了我们想要购买的很多东西。

And then the government in effect said, "You can't buy something else," which I think we would've done a better job with than anybody else did, and which the states involved did not object to it, which the customers didn't object to it. But you don't take on the United States government, you know?

然后政府实际上说：“你不能买其他东西，”我认为我们会比其他任何人做得更好，而相关的州对此没有反对，客户也没有反对。但是你不能与美国政府对抗，你知道吗？

And you try and figure out things that you won't have a problem with. And I think in that case, the U.S. government made a mistake. I think the British government's making a mistake in this case.

你试着找出一些你不会有问题的事情。我认为在这种情况下，美国政府犯了一个错误。我认为英国政府在这个案例中也犯了一个错误。

But that's life in the big city, as Charlie would say.

但这就是大城市的生活，正如查理所说。

And what we do will depend on a lot of things. Charlie?

我们所做的将取决于很多因素。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think — well, we do — yeah — you kissed that one off beautifully. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为——嗯，我们确实——是的——你把那个处理得很好。（笑声）

50. If you can't work for yourself, working for Berkshire is almost as good

如果你不能为自己工作，为伯克希尔工作几乎也一样好。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name's Anderson Fuller (PH). And I'm from Avonport, Nova Scotia in Canada.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我叫安德森·富勒（音）。我来自加拿大新斯科舍省的阿冯港。

And before I ask my question, I just want to thank you for all you've done to give us insight into your minds as investors.

在我提问之前，我想感谢你们为我们提供了对你们作为投资者的思考的深入了解。

So, for me, the most compelling takeaway from Berkshire is your guys' emphasis on and successful use of properly aligned incentives.

所以，对我来说，伯克希尔最引人注目的收获是你们对正确对齐激励的重视和成功运用。

In my view, owning and leading a business has two central benefits. First, you directly benefit as the company grows, through your equity in it, and second, you have autonomy. Incentives for employees are a bit easier to understand, such as offering benefits, fair pay, and creating a strong culture.

在我看来，拥有和领导一家公司有两个主要好处。首先，随着公司成长，你可以直接受益于你的股权；其次，你拥有自主权。员工的激励措施相对容易理解，例如提供福利、公平的薪酬和营造强大的企业文化。

But I've always struggled to understand them at the highest level. Even though you say Berkshire gives its managers significant flexibility, it must be less than what they had when they were independent.

但我一直很难在最高层面上理解他们。尽管你说伯克希尔给了管理者很大的灵活性，但这一定比他们独立时要少。

Additionally, you would think passion and a willingness to sell would be inversely correlated. So, how exactly does Berkshire bridge this gap and incentivize owners of its subsidiaries to give up these benefits to Berkshire? Thank you.

此外，您可能会认为热情和愿意出售之间存在反比关系。那么，伯克希尔是如何弥合这个差距并激励其子公司的所有者将这些利益转让给伯克希尔的呢？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what we really hope to find is managers who love their business, but don't like a lot of what comes with it as a public company. I mean, if they have to spend a lot of time listening to people tell them what to do about this or that, and they can't afford to irritate them, or they have to go along with their trade association, or whatever they may call it, because you don't want to look like a free rider.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们真正希望找到的是那些热爱自己业务的管理者，但不喜欢作为上市公司所带来的许多事情。我的意思是，如果他们不得不花很多时间听别人告诉他们该如何做这或那，而他们又不能惹恼这些人，或者他们必须顺应他们的行业协会，或者他们可能称之为的其他东西，因为你不想看起来像个搭便车者。

There's all kinds of things, compromises that people have to make in most jobs. And Charlie and I solved that problem. I had five bosses in my life. And I liked all five of them. And two of them were just huge factors in making my life better. But I liked all five of them.

在大多数工作中，人们必须做出各种妥协。查理和我解决了这个问题。我一生中有五个老板。我喜欢这五个老板。其中两个对改善我的生活起到了巨大的作用。但我喜欢这五个老板。

A couple of them were, you know, some people hear JCPenney, Cooper Smith, you know, I worked for 75 cents an hour and I loved working at Penny's. Well, I didn't love working at Penney's. But I loved working for Cooper Smith. And, you know, it was 75 cents an hour.

有几个人，比如说，有些人听到 JCPenney、Cooper Smith，你知道，我的时薪是 75 美分，我喜欢在 Penny's 工作。其实，我并不喜欢在 Penny's 工作。但我喜欢为 Cooper Smith 工作。你知道，那时的时薪是 75 美分。

But I had to do what they told me to do, which was to sell men's shirts first, and then men's clothing, and then children's clothing, and so on. And I loved working for the newspaper. And I had a great manager when I was at the University of Nebraska. I got to work for Ben Graham. I mean, everything worked out.

但我必须按照他们的要求去做，首先是卖男士衬衫，然后是男士服装，再然后是儿童服装，依此类推。我喜欢为报纸工作。在内布拉斯加大学时，我有一个很棒的经理。我有机会为本·格雷厄姆工作。我的意思是，一切都很顺利。

But there's nothing like working for yourself. And if you can't own a big company, working at Berkshire Hathaway, from running a company is the closest thing you will get. You don't have to spend time courting analysts who you'll probably have contempt for in many cases.

但没有什么比为自己工作更好。如果你不能拥有一家大公司，在伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作，从管理公司来说是你能得到的最接近的体验。你不必花时间去迎合那些在很多情况下你可能会鄙视的分析师。

You don't have to spend time with banks, you know, getting money, and particularly in terrible times.

你不必花时间和银行打交道，知道吗，获取资金，尤其是在艰难时期。

There's all kinds of — you get a lot in the way of freedom that I would think would be meaningful to me. And it might be better if you own the whole place yourself.

有各种各样的——你会获得很多我认为对我有意义的自由。如果你自己拥有整个地方，可能会更好。

But maybe you've got siblings that want out. Maybe — there's a million reasons why you may not be able to achieve that unless you sell to Berkshire. And that's easier, probably, if you have a family business, where people want to go in different directions, than it is with a public company. But there's still possibilities there.

但也许你有想要退出的兄弟姐妹。也许——有一百万个理由让你无法实现这一点，除非你出售给伯克希尔。如果你有一个家族企业，大家想朝不同的方向发展，这可能更容易，而不是一家上市公司。但那里仍然有可能性。

So, that's why I think if I owned a public company, and it was worth a great many billions of dollars, and Berkshire Hathaway wanted to buy it, and the shareholders were willing to vote it, I would consider the way I would feel about life, for one thing, I wouldn't want to retire at 65. I'd want to keep working.

所以，这就是为什么我认为如果我拥有一家上市公司，而且它价值数十亿美元，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦想要收购它，股东们愿意投票支持，我会考虑我对生活的感受，首先，我不想在 65 岁时退休。我想继续工作。

And there are reasons to sell to Berkshire, which Charlie and I, in certain positions, if we were on the other side, would take the deal. But it isn't for everybody. Charlie?

而且有理由向伯克希尔出售，查理和我在某些情况下，如果我们在对立面，会接受这个交易。但这并不适合每个人。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we have a pretty good one. We've been very lucky. And I don't know. It seems to me that most of the people who are going to end up the way we did, they almost already know how to do it.

查理·芒格：我认为我们有一个相当不错的结果。我们非常幸运。我不知道。对我来说，似乎大多数最终会像我们这样的人，他们几乎已经知道该怎么做了。

WARREN BUFFETT: But the most important purchase, in retrospect, that we may have made was National Indemnity. Now because specifically what it did, but what it led to. And Jack Ringwalt controlled the company. And I knew him and liked him. And he knew me. And once a year, he'd get irritated when the Nebraska Department of Insurance, or somebody would come around.

沃伦·巴菲特：但回顾起来，我们可能做的最重要的购买是国家赔偿公司。不是因为它具体做了什么，而是因为它带来的结果。杰克·林沃特控制着这家公司。我认识他，也喜欢他。他也认识我。每年一次，当内布拉斯加州保险局或其他人来检查时，他会感到恼火。

And he said they always came around when the AK-SAR-BEN racetrack was open. I mean, he had all these theories about why it was a pain in the neck to be regulated. And I told Charlie Heider, "Next time Jack is in that mood, where he's ready to sell, just because he's tired of fooling around with all these guys, be sure and find him."

他说他们总是在 AK-SAR-BEN 赛马场开放时出现。我的意思是，他有很多关于为什么被监管是一件麻烦事的理论。我告诉查理·海德，“下次杰克心情不好，准备出售，只是因为他厌倦了和这些家伙打交道时，一定要找到他。”

And so, Charlie called me one day. And he says, "Jack is in heat." And I said, "Bring him over." And we made a deal. But that's why Jack sold. And he was happy after he made the deal. And I was happy after we made the deal. So, there's a man that controlled a business, but just decided these people didn't seem to bother him as much once they were my problem and not his.

于是，有一天查理给我打电话。他说：“杰克发情了。”我说：“把他带过来。”我们达成了一笔交易。这就是杰克被卖掉的原因。他在达成交易后很高兴。我在达成交易后也很高兴。所以，有一个人控制着一项生意，但他只是决定这些人似乎在成为我的问题而不是他的之后，就不再打扰他了。

And you just can't tell when lightening will strike. And that didn't do magnificent things for us initially. But just look at what it led to, you know?

你永远无法预测闪电何时会击中。而这最初对我们并没有带来辉煌的成就。但看看它最终导致了什么，你知道吗？

So, you never — you know, if you knew how you were going to shoot all 18 holes, it wouldn't be any fun playing. You wouldn't get out on the first tee. I mean, it's the uncertainty, the fun of playing the game, the opponents, all kinds of things that make a game interesting. And I think Charlie and I are in the most interesting game in the world.

所以，你从来没有——你知道，如果你知道自己将如何打完所有 18 个洞，打球就没有乐趣了。你根本不会走上第一个发球台。我的意思是，这种不确定性、打球的乐趣、对手，以及各种各样的事情让比赛变得有趣。我认为查理和我正在进行世界上最有趣的比赛。

51. See's Candies is a 'wonderful brand that doesn't travel'

See's Candies 是一个“美妙的品牌，不会旅行”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: Here's a question from Simon Withers (PH), in Perth, in Western Australia.

贝基·奎克：这是来自西澳大利亚珀斯的西蒙·威瑟斯（PH）的问题。

"It's been a long time since we've heard about See's Candy and NetJets. Could you please give us an update on See's performance, and when you project it will run out of places to open stores in the United States?

我们很久没有听到关于 See's Candy 和 NetJets 的消息了。您能否给我们更新一下 See's 的表现，以及您预计它在美国开店的地方何时会用尽？

"And could you also give us an overview of how NetJets has performed since its acquisition, and whether it's achieved the potential you saw at the time of that acquisition?"

“您能否给我们概述一下 NetJets 自收购以来的表现，以及它是否达到了您当时看到的潜力？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with See's it hasn't been a question of opening stores. We found out that we have this wonderful brand that doesn't travel. You know? The mystique, the actual product, the feelings people have about some things, as we said before, I mean, it sometimes it's limited to given markets.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，对于 See's 来说，问题不在于开店。我们发现我们有这个美妙的品牌，但它并不适合远行。你知道吗？神秘感、实际产品、人们对某些事物的感觉，正如我们之前所说的，有时它仅限于特定市场。

Dr. Pepper sells at a huge rate in Dallas-Fort Worth, and maybe at 10 times the percentage per capita, maybe that it has in Detroit, or Boston. And you say, "Well, how can that be with a product that's been around for a century?" And people travel. You have national advertising.

德克萨斯州达拉斯-沃斯堡的德克萨斯博士汽水销量巨大，可能是底特律或波士顿人均销量的 10 倍。你会问：“那么，一个已经存在了一个世纪的产品怎么会这样？”人们会旅行。你有全国性的广告。

And I'm not sure. But I keep learning more, as I watch different brands. And Charlie and I, our economics were so good in California, that we tried in many cases the same experiment over and over again. It doesn't cost much to experiment. And we've tried everything in the world to cause a brand to travel.

我不太确定。但我在观察不同品牌时不断学习更多。查理和我在加利福尼亚的经济状况非常好，以至于我们在许多情况下反复尝试同样的实验。实验的成本不高。我们尝试了世界上所有的方法来让一个品牌传播。

And we always think we were right for the first week. And then we find out that the magic — we can beat any other candy store, pretty much. But there aren't any candy stores anymore to speak of, as the world has changed. So, See's is 101 years now. It has magic.

我们总是认为我们在第一周是对的。然后我们发现，魔力——我们几乎可以打败任何其他糖果店。但现在几乎没有糖果店可言，因为世界已经改变。所以，See's 现在已经 101 年了。它有魔力。

And it has limited magic in sort of the adjacent West. It's gravitational, almost. And then you get to the East. And incidentally, in the East, people prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate. In the West, people prefer milk chocolate to dark. In the East, you can sell miniatures, and dark — in the West —

它在邻近的西部地区具有有限的魔力，几乎是引力的作用。然后你来到东部。顺便说一下，在东部，人们更喜欢黑巧克力而不是牛奶巧克力。在西部，人们更喜欢牛奶巧克力而不是黑巧克力。在东部，你可以销售迷你巧克力，而在西部——

I mean, there's all kinds of crazy things in the world that consumers do. But you want to keep observing it, because you do learn a little. And with Charlie and I, the temptation to keep trying things, because the economics were so good if we succeeded, so we tried various things. And, of course, every manager wants to try that comes along.

我意思是，世界上有各种疯狂的事情发生在消费者身上。但你想要继续观察，因为你确实能学到一些东西。和查理在一起时，我们有继续尝试各种事情的诱惑，因为如果成功，经济效益会非常好，所以我们尝试了各种方法。当然，每个经理都想尝试任何出现的机会。

Because they've learned that it should work. But it doesn't work. So, but that's what makes it very interesting.

因为他们已经学会了它应该有效。但它并没有有效。所以，这正是使它非常有趣的原因。

52. NetJets is a 'marvelous' company

NetJets 是一家“奇妙”的公司

WARREN BUFFETT: And NetJets, we have really learned how to distinguish, and justifiably distinguish a service to people that you have to be very well to do to use it.

沃伦·巴菲特：在 NetJets，我们确实学会了如何区分，并且有理由区分一种服务，这种服务需要非常富有的人才能使用。

But if you're very well to do, in effect, you're spending your heir's money. I mean, it's what I told my Aunt Alice after she went from teaching to be worth millions and millions of dollars. And she came to see me. She'd never been married. And she said, "Can I afford to buy this fur coat?" in 1968 or '69. And I said, "Alice, you aren't buying it. Your nieces and nephews are buying it, because that's who you're leaving your money to."

但如果你非常富有，实际上你是在花你继承人的钱。我是说，这是我在阿姨爱丽丝从教书变得身价数百万后告诉她的。她来见我，她从未结过婚。她问我：“我能买得起这件毛皮大衣吗？”是在 1968 年或 1969 年。我说：“爱丽丝，你不是在买它。是你的侄子侄女们在买，因为你要把钱留给他们。”

"Speaking on behalf of your nieces and nephews I would say we want you to buy it." And it's the same way. Do your heirs want you to fly around in that jet? Or do they want you to leave a little more money to your foundation or your kids? And the way to solve that one is to offer your kids a few hours themselves.

“代表你的侄子侄女们，我想说我们希望你买下它。”情况也是如此。你的继承人希望你乘坐那架喷气机吗？还是希望你留更多的钱给你的基金会或孩子们？解决这个问题的方法是给你的孩子们提供几个小时的时间。

Then their attitude can change. So, it's in a class by itself. It's done what Ferrari has done in a different sort of way in cars. Ferrari sells 11,000 cars a year. I mean, maybe 12,000. And they're known throughout the world. And we'll have a Chevy dealership in Boston or something. We'll sell as many cars. But we're not Ferrari.

然后他们的态度可能会改变。所以，这是一种独特的存在。它以不同的方式做到了法拉利在汽车领域所做的事情。法拉利每年销售 11,000 辆汽车。我是说，可能是 12,000 辆。它们在全世界都很有名。而我们在波士顿或其他地方会有一家雪佛兰经销商。我们会卖出同样多的汽车。但我们不是法拉利。

And NetJets has 600 — well, counting Europe, I mean, it's maybe 650, but we're going to buy 100 planes this year. And we won't sell any, because we've got a backlog. And we took a NetJet flight over to Tokyo. And we arrived in good shape. And we spent a couple days there. And we flew back.

NetJets 有 600 架——嗯，算上欧洲的话，可能有 650 架，但我们今年要购买 100 架飞机。我们不会出售任何飞机，因为我们有积压订单。我们乘坐 NetJet 的航班飞往东京。我们到达时状态良好。在那里待了几天。然后我们飞回来了。

And there's just nothing to it. Now, you can say, "Well, you're getting sort of decadent and all that in your old age." But the money will go to philanthropy. And the money will probably be a hundred billion or more. And I figured the philanthropies want me to spend a few bucks on myself.

这没什么好复杂的。现在，你可以说：“好吧，你在老年时有点堕落。”但这笔钱将用于慈善事业。而这笔钱可能会超过一千亿。我想慈善机构希望我花一点钱在自己身上。

All it has to do is be better than the last dollars that are spent by various philanthropies, which have plenty of problems finding things to do that make lots of sense. So, NetJets, there isn't any competitor. We had looked the other day at Wheels Up.

它所要做的就是比各种慈善机构花费的最后一美元更好，这些慈善机构在寻找有意义的事情上有很多问题。因此，NetJets 没有任何竞争对手。我们前几天看过 Wheels Up。

Stock came out at $10 a couple years ago. It was selling at 48 cents the other day. And they've got 12,600 people that have given a billion dollars, a little over a billion dollars on prepaid cards where they've given them money, and they get a certain number of hours later on.

股票几年前以 10 美元的价格上市。前几天的售价是 48 美分。他们有 12,600 人已经在预付卡上投入了超过 10 亿美元的资金，这些人给了他们钱，之后会获得一定数量的小时。

模仿AMEX。

And they don't — I think there's a good chance that some people are going to be very disappointed later on.

他们不会——我认为有很大可能一些人会在后面感到非常失望。

When they have money to do the NetJets, they know they'll get on the same planes, with the same pilots as I and my family have flown on since before we bought the company. So, the decision wasn't shaped by some commercial objective.

当他们有钱使用 NetJets 时，他们知道自己将与我和我的家人一起乘坐同样的飞机，和同样的飞行员，这在我们购买公司之前就已经开始了。因此，这个决定并不是出于某种商业目的。

A couple years before, I'd never heard of NetJets. And Frank Rooney mentioned it to me. And I bought share immediately. And we bought the company. And, well, my kids have to fly commercial sometimes. But sometimes they get to use ours, too.

几年前，我从未听说过 NetJets。Frank Rooney 提到它时，我立刻买了股份。然后我们买下了公司。嗯，我的孩子们有时不得不乘坐商业航班。但有时他们也能使用我们的飞机。

But I've never flown anything else. And why would I? I mean, it's the gold standard. And nobody will match our fleet. I mean, if you got 600 planes, you've got them a lot more places in the United States than anybody else will have theirs. I think we're the second largest fleet (UNINTEL) commercial airliners.

但我从来没有飞过其他任何飞机。那我为什么要呢？我的意思是，这是黄金标准。没有人能匹配我们的机队。我的意思是，如果你有 600 架飞机，你在美国的很多地方都有它们，而其他人则没有。我认为我们是第二大（UNINTEL）商业航空公司机队。

And our fleet's growing, like I said, at the rate of a hundred planes a year. So, it's a marvelous company.

我们的机队正在增长，正如我所说的，每年增加一百架飞机。所以，这是一家了不起的公司。

And Adam Johnson has performed. You just can't believe what he's done with the business. It was a tough model for a long time. But he's brought it where it is. And we should have a wonderful company forever. Charlie?

亚当·约翰逊已经表现出色。你简直无法相信他在这个业务上所做的事情。这个模式曾经很艰难。但他把它带到了现在的状态。我们应该永远拥有一家出色的公司。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, NetJets has been remarkable. You can argue that it's worth as much as any airline now.

查理·芒格：嗯，NetJets 非常出色。你可以说它现在的价值与任何航空公司一样高。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's so different. And Charlie — we had a hard time selling Charlie a NetJets membership. And then we figured the way to get him to buy a membership was to put a coach seat in the fuselage. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：这太不同了。查理——我们很难说服查理购买 NetJets 的会员。然后我们想出一个办法，让他购买会员，就是在机身里放一个经济舱座位。（笑声）

And that really knocked him off. I think he's the only one we sold on the basis of that.

这真的让他感到震惊。我认为他是我们唯一一个基于这个原因成交的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I used to come to the Berkshire annual meetings on coach from Los Angeles. And it was full of rich stockholders. And they would clap when I came into the coach section. I really liked that. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE)

查理·芒格：我以前从洛杉矶乘长途汽车来伯克希尔的年会。车上满是富有的股东。当我走进车厢时，他们会鼓掌。我真的很喜欢那样。（笑声）（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But I've got to tell you, we semi-corrupted him. He feels he kind of has to explain it, but he still flies in NetJet himself, so. And it'd be crazy not to. You know, your heirs are paying for it. I mean, find me anybody whose estate came in at less than zero because of what they spend on NetJets, threw them into that position, let me know.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过我得告诉你，我们半把他“腐化”了。他觉得自己有点儿需要解释这些事情，但他仍然亲自乘坐NetJets。所以，不乘坐那简直是疯了。你知道，继承人们在为这买单。我是说，找找看有没有哪个遗产因花费NetJets而降到零以下的，如果有的话，让我知道。

But I've never seen a case yet. And it won't be the case for the Buffett family. And it's the residual bottom beneficiary that's paying for your membership.

但我还没见过这种情况。而且对于巴菲特家族来说也不会这样。实际上，是剩余的最终受益者在为你的会员资格付费。

And it's a little hard to get used to paying that much money though, when you've lived like Charlie and I have most of our lives.

不过，当你像查理和我一样生活了大部分时间后，习惯支付这么多钱还是有点困难。

53. Auto industry is fascinating but hard to predict

汽车行业令人着迷，但难以预测。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We will go to section 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们将进入第 11 节。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Humphrey Liu, I'm from Charlottesville, Virginia.

观众成员：你好。我叫汉弗里·刘，我来自弗吉尼亚州的夏洛茨维尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Ah! 沃伦·巴菲特：啊！

AUDIENCE MEMBER: First, I wanted to add my thanks to you and Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, and all of Berkshire, for throwing this grand event each year.

观众：首先，我想对您、芒格先生、巴菲特先生以及整个伯克希尔表示感谢，感谢你们每年举办这样盛大的活动。

Looking at the global trends, it increasingly does seem that zero-emission vehicles may have finally reached the cusp of mass adoption. Do you see any opportunities in this space, either in specific vehicle manufacturers or in related technologies?

从全球趋势来看，零排放车辆似乎终于达到了大规模采用的临界点。您在这个领域看到任何机会吗，无论是在特定的汽车制造商还是相关技术方面？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that Charlie and I, we long have felt that the auto industry is just too tough. You know, the Ford Motor Company, I mean, Henry Ford, looked like he owned the world with the Model T. And he brought down the price dramatically, he took up wages dramatically. He might have been, with a different personality, or some different views, elected President of the United States.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想说，查理和我一直认为汽车行业实在太艰难了。你知道，福特汽车公司，亨利·福特，似乎凭借 T 型车拥有了整个世界。他大幅降低了价格，大幅提高了工资。如果他有不同的个性或一些不同的观点，可能会当选美国总统。

当年的技术革新。

I mean, there's a good book that came out on that recently that told about the story — it tells a little about Nebraska in terms of it, but Henry Ford and Thomas Edison joining up, maybe a year or two it was. If you're interested in autos, you ought to read that book.

我指的是，最近有一本好书讲述了这个故事——它在某种程度上提到了内布拉斯加州，但亨利·福特和托马斯·爱迪生联手，大约是一两年前的事。如果你对汽车感兴趣，应该读那本书。

But Henry Ford did that, you know, and 20 years later they were losing money. And the other guy, with a gun in his pocket, I think Harry Bennett, you know, was running the Ford Motor Company. It was on its way to the junk heap when the whiz kids came in.

但是亨利·福特做到了，你知道，20 年后他们开始亏损。而另一个口袋里有枪的人，我想是哈里·本内特，你知道，他在管理福特汽车公司。当天才们进来的时候，福特汽车公司正走向废弃的边缘。

And Henry Ford II, "Hank the Deuce," as they called him, brought in Tex Thornton, and my friend RJ Miller, and a few people. I was reading the other day, actually, the 1932 Annual Report of General Motors. And it's one of the best annual reports I've read. It's a totally honest, you know, assessment of exactly where they were: They had 19,000 dealers then, and the population, as I mentioned earlier, was about 120 million or so.

亨利·福特二世，“汉克·德尤斯”，正如他们所称呼的，带来了特克斯·索恩顿，我的朋友 RJ·米勒，以及一些人。前几天我在阅读 1932 年通用汽车的年报。这是我读过的最好的年报之一。它是一个完全诚实的评估，准确地反映了他们当时的状况：当时他们有 19000 家经销商，而我之前提到的人口大约是 1.2 亿。

And now, with 330 million people, all brands in the United States have, like, 18,000 dealers or something. It's just a business where you've got a lot of worldwide competitors, they're not going to go away. And it looks like there are winners in any given time, but it doesn't get you a permanent place. Although, as I mentioned, I would say Ferrari is in a special place.

现在，美国有 3.3 亿人，所有品牌大约有 18,000 个经销商。这只是一个有很多全球竞争对手的行业，他们不会消失。在任何给定的时间，看起来都有赢家，但这并不能让你获得一个永久的位置。尽管如此，正如我提到的，我认为法拉利处于一个特殊的位置。

But they only sell 11,000 or 12,000 cars a year. In the U.S. last year, I think there were 14 million-something. And it's not a business where we find it fascinating to be in. We like our dealership operation, but I don't think I can tell you what the auto industry will look like five or ten years from now.

但他们每年只卖一万一千到一万两千辆车。去年在美国，我想大约有一千四百万辆。而这并不是一个我们觉得有趣的行业。我们喜欢我们的经销商运营，但我不认为我能告诉你汽车行业在五年或十年后会是什么样子。

I do think that you're right that, you know, you will see a change in the vehicles. But you won't see anybody that owns the market because they changed the vehicle. Charlie?

我确实认为你说得对，你会看到车辆的变化。但你不会看到任何人因为改变了车辆而拥有市场。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the electric vehicle is coming big time, and that's a very interesting development. At the moment, it's imposing huge capital costs and huge risks. And I don't like huge capital costs and huge risks.

查理·芒格：电动车正在大规模到来，这是一个非常有趣的发展。目前，它带来了巨大的资本成本和巨大的风险。我不喜欢巨大的资本成本和巨大的风险。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we're subsidizing it in the United States, and we're actually doing it — tried putting in a pro-labor-type — I mean, it is subject to politics like you can't believe, too. But it's going to be with us, we're not going to quit driving cars, and — the American public has love affair with them.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在美国对其进行了补贴，实际上我们也在尝试推动一种支持劳动者的政策——我的意思是，这也受到政治的影响，真是难以置信。但这将伴随我们，我们不会停止开车，而——美国公众与汽车之间有着深厚的感情。

But I think I know where Apple's going to be in five or ten years, and I don't know where the car companies are going to be in five or ten years. And I may be wrong. But Charlie and I follow the auto business with intense interest. Charlie's firm was the specialist at General Motors on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, and that was a franchise, wasn't it, Charlie?

但我认为我知道苹果公司在五年或十年后会处于什么位置，而我不知道汽车公司在五年或十年后会是什么样的。我可能错了。但查理和我对汽车行业保持着高度的兴趣。查理的公司曾是太平洋证券交易所上通用汽车的专营商，那是一个特许经营权，不是吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. By working very hard, we could make a minor amount of money.

查理·芒格：是的。通过非常努力的工作，我们可以赚到一小笔钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Wasn't "minor" at the time, though. Come on — (LAUGH) but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。不过当时并不是“次要”的。来吧——（笑）但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it was. It was —

查理·芒格：是的，确实如此。确实是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Was it? 沃伦·巴菲特：是吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: — pretty minor at the time even.

查理·芒格：——当时其实相当微不足道。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah? Well, it was pretty minor.

沃伦·巴菲特：是吗？嗯，这件事算是小事。

54. Buffett isn't worried about the Federal Reserve's balance sheet

巴菲特并不担心联邦储备的资产负债表

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Lindsay Peter Schumacher in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自爱荷华州锡达拉皮兹的林赛·彼得·舒马赫。

"Does the current size of the Federal Reserve balance sheet concern you? In particular, the result of quantitative easing — the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet out of nothing. The net effect in essence is a form of single-entry accounting creating something of value out of nothing other than a series of book entries. And wondering what Mr. Munger thinks about this as well."

您是否对美联储资产负债表的当前规模感到担忧？特别是量化宽松的结果——美联储凭空扩大了其资产负债表。其净效应本质上是一种单式记账，通过一系列账面条目创造出某种价值，而不是其他任何东西。也想知道芒格先生对此有何看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don't think the Federal Reserve is the problem, and I think they can't solve the fiscal problem. I do not worry about the Federal Reserve. I think it's fulfilling the functions for which it was established. They have two objectives, and I would not have been one probably that would have changed the inflation objective: to 2% a year from 0.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为美联储不是问题，我认为他们无法解决财政问题。我不担心美联储。我认为它正在履行其成立的职能。他们有两个目标，我可能不会改变通胀目标：从 0%到每年 2%。

You know, I think that if you tell people that you're shooting to depreciate your currency at 2% a year, that has a lot of implications. Although it feels good to a (LAUGH) lot of people. A lot of people want a little inflation, but nobody wants a lot of inflation except somebody's that got a lot of debts.

你知道，我认为如果你告诉人们你计划每年贬值 2%的货币，这会有很多影响。虽然这让很多人感觉不错（笑）。很多人希望有一点通货膨胀，但除了那些背负大量债务的人，没有人想要大量通货膨胀。

And I do not worry about the Federal Reserve balance sheet. I enjoy looking at it, and the numbers are big — I always like big numbers. But it's interesting: One of the most interesting figures, to me, is currency in circulation. I mean, it has gone — they were saying, "Cash is trash," back in 2007 and '08, "and all that cash is going to disappear."

我并不担心联邦储备的资产负债表。我喜欢看它，数字很大——我总是喜欢大数字。但有趣的是：对我来说，最有趣的数字之一是流通中的货币。我的意思是，它已经——他们在 2007 年和 2008 年说过，“现金是垃圾”，“所有这些现金都将消失。”

Well, if you look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet, it's gone from $800 billion to $2.2 trillion, and most of that's in hundred-dollar bills, overwhelmingly. And I figured out I think there's about 50 $100 bills per person — babies, everybody, in the United States, and I would really like to know where all of that is.

好吧，如果你看看美联储的资产负债表，它从 8000 亿美元增加到 2.2 万亿美元，其中大部分是百元钞票，绝大多数。我算了一下，我认为每个人——包括婴儿在内——在美国大约有 50 张 100 美元的钞票，我真的很想知道这些钱都在哪里。

I mean, nobody's hoarding eurodollars, you know, in South America, or Africa, or wherever. And the demand for currency now — you know, some of it may be subtle drug dealers' activities and of that. But anybody who thinks "cash is trash" ought to look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet. And, actually, you can look at how many $5 bills and $2 bills, and ones and all that, and the action has been in $100 bills.

我的意思是，没有人在南美、非洲或其他地方囤积欧元美元。现在对货币的需求——你知道，其中一些可能是微妙的毒贩活动等等。但任何认为“现金是垃圾”的人都应该看看美联储的资产负债表。实际上，你可以看看有多少五美元、两美元和一美元的钞票，所有的交易都集中在一百美元的钞票上。

I mean, it is just astounding the way that hundred-dollar bills have spread. And, of course, I don't know where they are, and I don't think the Fed can know exactly, but they'd probably make a lot better guess than I could. But I do it's happened, and you can watch it every week, and you'll watch currency in circulation probably grow a little bit. And, believe me, "cash" is not trash. Charlie?

我意思是，百元钞票的传播方式真是令人震惊。当然，我不知道它们在哪里，我也不认为美联储能确切知道，但他们可能比我更能做出更好的猜测。但我确实知道这已经发生了，你可以每周观察到这一点，你会看到流通中的货币可能会稍微增长。相信我，“现金”并不是垃圾。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don't know where we're headed with all of this. It's been very extreme. I think you could be pretty extreme in fighting it: depressions and so forth, if you reverted afterwards to a period of some discipline. But if you just —

查理·芒格：嗯，我不知道我们这一切将走向何方。这一切都非常极端。我认为如果在经历了抑郁等极端情况后，能够恢复到一个有些纪律的时期，你可以在抗击这些问题时表现得相当极端。但如果你只是——

But if you're going to just keep printing money and spending it, I think eventually it causes bad trouble. And you can see it Latin America. Latin America let its currency get out of control all the time, and, of course, it lagged the United States in economic achievement greatly. So, I think we pay a price if we ever give up our old ways entirely and go into a new world where we just try and print money, just make it easier to get through the year.

但是如果你只是继续印钞和花钱，我认为最终会导致严重的问题。你可以看到拉丁美洲。拉丁美洲的货币总是失控，当然在经济成就上远远落后于美国。因此，我认为如果我们完全放弃旧的方式，进入一个只试图印钞、让生活更容易度过一年的新世界，我们就会付出代价。

WARREN BUFFETT: We paid a price in World War II, I mean, everybody: school kids and everybody else, myself included. And we bought what were originally called "War Bonds," and "Defense Bonds," and "Savings Bonds," and all that. But from 1942 to 1944 or '45, you paid out $18.75 and you got $25.00 back, and every kid saved savings stamps and all that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在第二次世界大战中付出了代价，我是说，所有人：学生和其他人，包括我自己。我们购买了最初被称为“战争债券”、“国防债券”和“储蓄债券”的东西。但从 1942 年到 1944 年或 1945 年，你支付 18.75 美元，得到 25.00 美元的回报，每个孩子都在存储蓄邮票等等。

But when you got all through, you know, you had 120% of GDP in the national debt instead of 30% or 40%. And we had a lot of inflation subsequently, a lot. So, the people that really bought those bonds and supported the war had a portion of their purchasing power taken away from them.

但是当你完成所有事情时，你知道，国家债务达到了 GDP 的 120%，而不是 30%或 40%。随后我们经历了很多通货膨胀，真的很多。因此，那些真正购买这些债券并支持战争的人，他们的购买力被削弱了一部分。

Well, there wasn't anything wrong with that, particularly. But when the country gets in the habit of doing that, I think it's tough to figure out where the breaking point is with society. But I don't think you want to come anywhere close to it.

嗯，这样做本身并没有什么错。但当一个国家习惯于这样做时，我认为很难判断社会的临界点在哪里。但我认为你不想接近这个临界点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but it's also tough to have a mass of people unemployed. That's the tension.

查理·芒格：是的，但大量失业的人也是很困难的。这就是矛盾所在。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. Well, that's why the Fed has two objectives, in terms of employment and inflation. But they are not the ones that could create the deficits. And so far, the system has worked pretty well, although, like I say, it's been —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这就是为什么美联储在就业和通货膨胀方面有两个目标。但它们并不是造成赤字的原因。到目前为止，系统运作得相当不错，尽管，正如我所说的，它一直是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: So, far, the man who just jumped off a tall building —

查理·芒格：到目前为止，那位刚从高楼跳下来的男人——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, right.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — is all right until he hits the ground.

查理·芒格：——在他落地之前一切都好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGHTER) Well, but there could be ways we can stop now at the third floor, or the sixth floor. We don't know what floor it is, but we know it hasn't hit the ground. But, you know, politically it's very, very, very tempting to vote appropriations, and it's not fun to vote taxes.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）不过，我们可以在三楼或六楼停下来。我们不知道是哪一层，但我们知道它还没有到达地面。不过，你知道，从政治上讲，投票拨款是非常非常非常诱人的，而投票税收就没那么有趣了。

And Russell Long, head of the Senate Finance Committee, they've got a building named after him now, he said, "You know, don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that guy behind the tree." And (LAUGH) basically that is the attitude — I mean, it's the reality of what is useful in politics.

拉塞尔·朗，参议院财政委员会的主席，现在有一栋大楼以他的名字命名，他曾说过：“你知道，不要对你征税，不要对我征税，去征税那个树后面的人。”（笑）基本上这就是态度——我的意思是，这就是政治中有用的现实。

And so far, this country's managed to work very well with lot of things that could theoretically cause a lot of problems. But it doesn't guarantee us the future on it and being the reserve currency lets us do a lot of things, but it also creates a lot of consequences if we screw it up. Charlie?

到目前为止，这个国家在许多理论上可能导致问题的事情上运作得很好。但这并不能保证我们未来的安全，作为储备货币让我们能够做很多事情，但如果我们搞砸了，也会带来很多后果。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we're beating a subject to death, but it is a problem. I wish we had a solution.

查理·芒格：好吧，我们在这个问题上反复讨论，但这确实是个问题。我希望我们能找到解决方案。

55. We need to take care of people displaced by capitalism

我们需要照顾因资本主义而流离失所的人们。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. With that we'll go to station one and see if we —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。那我们就去第一站看看我们——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name's Connor, I'm an economics student at the University of Nottingham.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫康纳，是诺丁汉大学的经济学学生。

My question for you today is during the pandemic we witnessed supply chain shortages, especially from Asia. As a result, companies have chosen, with political intentions, to move production away.

我今天要问你的问题是，在疫情期间，我们目睹了供应链短缺，尤其是来自亚洲。因此，出于政治意图，公司选择将生产转移。

Should companies make these decisions? And should the government support them?

公司应该做出这些决定吗？政府应该支持他们吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? 沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that's a good question.

查理·芒格：嗯，这是个好问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Obviously, it's logical — if you're in business and you can make the thing in Mexico way cheaper, it's natural to open a factory in Mexico and get your parts cheaper. And a lot of the auto manufacturers have done exactly that.

查理·芒格：显然，这是合乎逻辑的——如果你在做生意，而你可以在墨西哥以更低的成本生产东西，那么在墨西哥开一家工厂并以更便宜的价格获取零件是很自然的。许多汽车制造商正是这样做的。

On the other hand, nobody wants to hollow out the whole country, so all the manufacturing jobs are elsewhere and we're all living like a bunch of farmers: You know, like English colonies in 1820 or something. And these ideas are, of course, in big tension. We don't have that much foreign production, right, Warren?

另一方面，没有人想要掏空整个国家，因此所有的制造业工作都在别处，我们都像一群农民一样生活：你知道，就像 1820 年的英属殖民地那样。这些想法当然存在很大的矛盾。我们没有那么多的外国生产，对吧，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, but we've lost — well, originally Berkshire Hathaway, as a textile manufacturer, lost because the South became feasible versus the North. And, of course, then eventually —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不过，我们失去了——最初，伯克希尔·哈撒韦作为一家纺织制造商，失去了因为南方变得比北方更具可行性。当然，最终——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The South got expensive —

查理·芒格：南方变得昂贵了——

WARREN BUFFETT: South got —

沃伦·巴菲特：南方得到了——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and moved to China.

查理·芒格：——并移到中国。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. And society benefits and some people get killed in that sort of a situation. And a rich society should take care, one way or another, of people that worked in our shoe factories, people who worked in our textile companies. I mean, if you worked in our textile operation, in 1964 when we took it over, half our workers only spoke Portuguese.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。在这种情况下，社会受益，但也有一些人会遇害。一个富裕的社会应该以某种方式照顾那些在我们鞋厂工作的人，以及在我们纺织公司工作的人。我的意思是，如果你在我们 1964 年接管的纺织厂工作，当时一半的工人只会说葡萄牙语。

And, you know, they weren't getting great wages at all. But now you could do it in the South, and we were doomed to go out of business. And it wasn't the fault of the worker in any way, shape, or form. It wasn't our fault: We kept trying to compete.

而且，你知道，他们的工资根本不高。但现在你可以在南方做到这一点，而我们注定要倒闭。这完全不是工人的错。也不是我们的错：我们一直在努力竞争。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, TVA had cheap power down there.

查理·芒格：嗯，田纳西河谷管理局那里的电力便宜。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And tax dollars really can yield power.

查理·芒格：税收确实可以带来权力。

WARREN BUFFETT: And air conditioning changed everything because the heat in those damn places was impossible. And so, a lot of things. But then it moves offshore in many ways, and net the country is better off because of it.

沃伦·巴菲特：空调改变了一切，因为那些地方的热量是无法忍受的。因此，有很多事情。但随后它在许多方面转移到了海外，结果这个国家因此变得更好了。

But it displaces a lot of people who really can't do something else in life. You can't talk about "retraining" somebody that's 55 or 60, and speaks only Portuguese, and really tell them they're going to have "a great future" in New Bedford, Mass.

但这使很多在生活中真的无法做其他事情的人失去了工作。你无法对一个 55 或 60 岁，只会说葡萄牙语的人谈论“再培训”，并真的告诉他们他们将在马萨诸塞州的新贝德福德拥有“美好的未来”。

You know, and so you don't want to be glib about it. And we can afford to take care of those people. And we've got some systems that work reasonably well, but there's a tension between — you know, what about the person that doesn't do anything and all that kind of stuff. So, these are not easy problems to solve.

你知道，所以你不想对此轻率。我们有能力照顾那些人。我们有一些运作得相当不错的系统，但在于——你知道，那些什么都不做的人怎么办，这类问题之间存在紧张关系。所以，这些问题并不容易解决。

But I would say that, by and large, we want the whole world to prosper, we do not want the United States to be a country of extraordinary prosperity, and have the rest of the world —

但我想说，总的来说，我们希望整个世界繁荣，我们不希望美国成为一个极度繁荣的国家，而让其他国家——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — starving.

查理·芒格：——饿死了。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. It isn't going to work. And it particularly isn't going to work in a nuclear world. So — and you can have your own feelings about it as a humane person, but it can be done better. And we've got the resources to do it. I mean, the output of this country, one, can be done with a lot fewer people, and doing more specialized things.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。这是行不通的。尤其是在核世界中更是如此。所以——你可以作为一个人道主义者有自己的看法，但可以做得更好。我们有资源去做到这一点。我的意思是，这个国家的产出可以用更少的人来完成，并且做更多专业化的事情。

And, of course, it has been. The workweek in the United States, you know, in my lifetime, has dropped dramatically. And people still feel busy. And it will be the human lot to say, you know, "How can I get all these things done?" But my mother didn't drive three kids anyplace, I mean, if you wanted to go anyplace, if you were lucky and you got old enough, you had a bicycle.

当然，情况确实如此。在我这一生中，美国的工作周时间大幅减少。然而，人们仍然感到忙碌。人们总是会问：“我怎么才能完成所有这些事情？”但我母亲并没有开车带着三个孩子去任何地方，我的意思是，如果你想去任何地方，如果你运气好，长大了，你就有一辆自行车。

And the world just keeps looking at everything moving up as becoming sort of a base that leaves them somewhat dissatisfied. And with our prosperity, we can do a lot of things we couldn't do in 1930, including taking care of people that got displaced by the fact that somebody else can do that work and improve their lot in life.

世界只是在看着一切向上发展，这让他们感到有些不满。随着我们的繁荣，我们可以做很多在 1930 年无法做到的事情，包括照顾那些因他人能够做那份工作而被迫迁移的人，并改善他们的生活。

And we've got to make sure that we have the best system that takes care of the people who get displaced by that. But doing that in the political system we have and everything, we'll make a lot of mistakes along the way. But we've got to keep moving in that direction. And I'd say —

我们必须确保我们拥有最好的系统来照顾那些因此而被迫迁移的人。但在我们现有的政治体系中，这样做会让我们在过程中犯很多错误。但我们必须朝着这个方向不断前进。我想说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The really interesting thing about it is that Adam Smith was right: that free market capitalism automatically leaves a property in private hands. And free trade and all that automatically creates GDP per capita that grows and helps everybody, including the people at the bottom: helps everybody a lot.

查理·芒格：真正有趣的是，亚当·斯密是对的：自由市场资本主义自动将财产留在私人手中。而自由贸易和其他一切则自动创造了人均GDP的增长，并帮助所有人，包括底层的人民：帮助每个人很多。

But inherent in the process, there's a lot of pain in that free market capitalism: for instance, for the Portuguese workers in a textile company in New Bedford. And nobody's ever figured out how to take all the pain out of it. We do have government safety nets that take some of the pain out, and we make those safety nets a little bigger as time goes by.

但在这个过程中，自由市场资本主义中固有的痛苦是很大的：例如，对于新贝德福德一家纺织公司的葡萄牙工人来说。没有人能找到消除所有痛苦的方法。我们确实有政府的安全网，可以减轻一些痛苦，随着时间的推移，我们会让这些安全网变得更大一些。

But, apart from that, if you try and take all the pain out, you'll also take all the gains out of it. We won't have a growing GDP per capita. You'll have an economy like Russia's, which has been characterized as saying: "They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work." (LAUGHTER)

但是，除此之外，如果你试图消除所有的痛苦，你也会消除所有的收获。我们将不会有增长的人均 GDP。你会拥有一个像俄罗斯那样的经济，俄罗斯的经济被形容为：“他们假装支付我们，而我们假装工作。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The other systems haven't worked better, but it also produces more and more disparities in wealth. And people that do nothing but get assets under management without actually performing anything extra make fortunes. And, I mean, it's a job of government to keep the best aspects of capitalism, while not causing people that only speak Portuguese to suffer in the process.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。其他系统并没有更好地运作，但它也产生了越来越多的财富差距。那些只是在管理资产而不实际做任何额外工作的人成为富翁。我的意思是，政府的职责是保留资本主义的最佳方面，同时不让只说葡萄牙语的人在这个过程中受苦。

I mean, the two aren't compatible politically over time. And we stumble along making progress on things like Social Security and all that. And we are a lot better off than we are when I was born.

我的意思是，从政治上来说，这两者随着时间的推移并不兼容。我们在社会保障等问题上磕磕绊绊地取得进展。我们现在的状况比我出生时要好得多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Net, the United States has done a very good job of this tension between capitalistic growth and a growing social safety net. We can be pretty proud of our country, looking backward.

查理·芒格：总体而言，美国在资本主义增长与日益增长的社会保障网之间的紧张关系上做得非常好。回顾过去，我们可以为我们的国家感到自豪。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That may be why we have 25% of the world's GDP starting with a half-a-percent of the population and did it in a few centuries. I mean, it's a miracle. And it wasn't because we're smarter, but we've got to say there must be something to the system that's worked pretty well even though it's produced a civil war and all kinds of things, you know?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这可能就是为什么我们拥有世界 GDP 的 25%，而人口仅占 0.5%，并且在几个世纪内实现的原因。我是说，这真是个奇迹。而这并不是因为我们更聪明，但我们必须说，这个系统一定有某种有效的地方，尽管它产生了内战和各种问题，你知道吗？

And women, you know, not getting a shot at anything, you know, even after they passed the 19th Amendment. But it's a work in progress. I think actually there's been progress, but it's mankind's nature to see the things wrong with it if you —

而女性，你知道，连任何机会都没有，甚至在她们通过第十九修正案之后。但这仍在不断进展中。我认为实际上已经取得了一些进展，但人类的本性是看到其中的缺陷，如果你——

缺陷看到缺陷。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It's even worse: It's man's nature to take the progress as a right. Not something to be earned or strive for, but something that should automatically just flow in over the transom. And that attitude is poison. It doesn't do anybody any good.

查理·芒格：情况更糟：人性使然，人们把进步视为一种权利。不是应该去争取或努力获得的东西，而是应该自动涌入的东西。这种态度是有害的，对任何人都没有好处。

56. When it comes to accounting, 'We'll consistently do what is legal, and we'll consistently say what we think is right'

在会计方面，“我们将始终遵循法律，并始终表达我们认为正确的观点。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Now ask us an easy question, Becky. (LAUGH) (APPLAUSE)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在问我们一个简单的问题，贝基。（笑）（掌声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Doug DeShiel (PH). "Since the accounting rules changed requiring Berkshire to report the change in fair value of its equity investments through the income statement, Mr. Buffett has repeatedly told shareholders to ignore those changes as they're not reflective of the long-term returns that those investments will produce.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自道格·德希尔（PH）。“自从会计规则改变，要求伯克希尔通过利润表报告其股权投资的公允价值变动以来，巴菲特先生反复告诉股东忽略这些变动，因为它们并不反映这些投资将产生的长期回报。”

"Recently, Mr. Buffett has argued that hold-to-maturity accounting used by the banks to avoid reflecting the changes in fair value of bank investment portfolios in the income statement and the shareholder equity account do a disservice to its various stakeholders. Can Mr. Buffett elaborate on why he views mark-to-market accounting differently for banks in comparison to Berkshire?"

最近，巴菲特先生表示，银行使用的持有至到期会计方法为了避免在损益表和股东权益账户中反映银行投资组合公允价值的变化，对其各个利益相关者造成了不利影响。巴菲特先生能否详细说明他为何对银行的公允价值会计与对伯克希尔的看法不同？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I believe, in both cases, in doing it on the balance sheet and not in the income statement. And it's a very tough problem the auditors face is that obviously the income statement feeds into the balance sheet. But the balance sheet tells you whether deposits can be paid, it tells you a lot of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我相信，在这两种情况下，应该在资产负债表上处理，而不是在损益表上。这是审计师面临的一个非常棘手的问题，因为显然损益表会影响资产负债表。但资产负债表告诉你存款是否可以支付，它告诉你很多事情。

And we show it on our balance sheet. We believe in showing market values on our balance sheet. We just don't believe in running it through the income account. And in getting there we would put in "other comprehensive income," like it was for a long time.

我们在资产负债表上展示它。我们相信在资产负债表上显示市场价值。我们只是不相信将其计入收入账户。为了实现这一点，我们会将其放入“其他综合收益”，就像很长一段时间以来那样。

So, I sympathize, to some extent — a far extent, with the audit group. But they have to really decide whether they want the balance sheet to represent values — except it doesn't reflect them on the upside if we buy a See's Candy and it's worth way more money, so it's conservative in that sense; or whether they want to have an income account that becomes meaningless to people. Because it really changes every five seconds, you know?

所以，在某种程度上——很大程度上，我对审计组表示同情。但他们必须真正决定是否希望资产负债表反映价值——除非如果我们购买了 See's Candy，它的价值远远超过了账面价值，那么在这个意义上它是保守的；或者他们是否希望有一个对人们变得毫无意义的收入账户。因为它每五秒钟就会真正改变一次，你知道吗？

I mean — well, the market's closed today, but, you know, I guess Apple was up, what, seven or eight points or something on Friday. I mean, that's $7 billion: I mean, that's a crazy income account. It is a reflection of where we stand at that point.

我意思是——好吧，今天市场关闭，但你知道，我想苹果在周五上涨了七八个点。我是说，那是 70 亿美元：这真是一个疯狂的收入账户。这反映了我们当时的状况。

And, of course, if you're a bank, where you're putting out money really at things — mortgages, I mean, primarily, that are terrible instruments for a bank to own, but a great instrument for a consumer to buy; and built-in to the whole society now in a way that is entirely different than in the past, you've got to pay attention to whether they've gotten out of whack in terms of the value of what they own and what can be demanded of them tomorrow morning. (LAUGH)

当然，如果你是一家银行，你投入资金的地方——主要是抵押贷款，这对银行来说是糟糕的资产，但对消费者来说却是很好的投资；而且现在整个社会的构造与过去完全不同，你必须关注他们所拥有的资产的价值是否失衡，以及明天早上对他们的要求是什么。（笑）

And if we had all of our money that could be demanded from us tomorrow morning, we'd have to behave a lot differently than Berkshire does. So, I really think the way to do it is the way we recommend doing. Which is exactly what was being done until a few years ago. I recommend the shareholders look at it that way, but we're going to follow the rules, obviously that the SEC, you know, the state authorities and everybody require of us.

如果明天早上我们所有的钱都被要求交出来，我们就必须以与伯克希尔截然不同的方式行事。因此，我真的认为我们推荐的做法是正确的。实际上，这正是几年前的做法。我建议股东们以这种方式看待问题，但显然我们会遵循 SEC、州政府和所有相关机构对我们的要求。

But I'll still explain to the shareholders exactly what I would explain to my sister about what really counts at Berkshire. And I think every management actually has an obligation to that, and instead of it, they go in the other direction and give them a lot of figures that are total nonsense.

但我仍然会向股东们解释我会向我妹妹解释的关于伯克希尔真正重要的事情。我认为每个管理层实际上都有这个义务，而不是相反，他们却朝另一个方向走，给出很多完全无意义的数字。

You can't imagine some of the — you know, EBITDA, I thought, was about as bad as you could get. But they've kept going. You know, earnings before everything: EBE. (LAUGHTER) But that doesn't change what I would tell my sister, who's here in the audience, I hope. And I should tell this to all the shareholders: "We'll consistently do what is legal, and we'll consistently say what we think is right." Charlie?

你无法想象一些——你知道，EBITDA，我认为这已经糟糕到极点了。但他们还在继续。你知道，所有事情之前的收益：EBE。（笑声）但这并没有改变我想对我在观众席上的姐姐说的话，我希望她在这里。我应该把这告诉所有股东：“我们会始终做合法的事情，并且我们会始终说我们认为正确的事情。”查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (APPLAUSE)

查理·芒格：是的。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We want owners who understand what they own. You know? That doesn't mean they have to understand the detail of it. But that's why we have people that have been around 50 or 60 years. That doesn't mean that they read the 10-Qs or anything like that. But they feel we're telling it to them like, you know, they lived next door to us.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们希望拥有者理解他们所拥有的东西。你知道吗？这并不意味着他们必须理解其中的细节。但这就是为什么我们有一些在这里待了 50 或 60 年的人。这并不意味着他们会阅读 10-Q 报告或其他类似的东西。但他们感觉我们就像在跟他们说话一样，仿佛他们就住在我们隔壁。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don't know what the accountants were thinking when they made that change. It strikes me as bonkers, absolutely bonkers. I don't see how anybody who understands how businesses really operated, and should be operated by owning managers, would have made that accounting change. The accountants did it just because they had a wild moment.

查理·芒格：是的，我不知道会计师在做出那个改变时在想什么。我觉得这简直是疯了，完全疯了。我看不出任何一个了解企业实际运作情况的人，尤其是那些由所有者经理管理的企业，会做出这样的会计变更。会计师之所以这么做，只是因为他们有了一个疯狂的时刻。

WARREN BUFFETT: Twenty-five years ago, I suggested to the audit profession that the audit committee ask auditors four questions, and the shareholders would know a lot more about the company if those questions were asked. But it wasn't good for the auditors to be asked those questions because it might increase their liability if they answered them. And the client didn't want them to answer them because the management didn't want them to.

沃伦·巴菲特：二十五年前，我建议审计行业，审计委员会应该向审计师提出四个问题，如果这些问题被问及，股东将对公司了解得更多。但审计师被问这些问题并不好，因为如果他们回答了，可能会增加他们的责任。而客户也不希望他们回答这些问题，因为管理层不希望他们这样做。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, they want a system where, if they follow certain rules, they're safe. And that's understandable. But I don't think the past year, this rule requiring changes in marketable securities to go through the income account quarterly, they didn't do that to protect themselves from —

查理·芒格：不，他们想要一个系统，如果他们遵循某些规则，他们就安全。这是可以理解的。但我认为过去一年，这项要求可交易证券的变动每季度通过收入账户的规则，他们并不是为了保护自己而这样做的——

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — liability. They just did that for some crazy reason of their own.

查理·芒格：——责任。他们出于某种疯狂的理由这样做了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You get a bunch of people who will all be drawing a lot of pay out of a big, complicated system, and rising in it like so many of our officers in the Army, God knows what they'll do if you put them in a little room by themselves and tell them to invent new accounting standards.

查理·芒格：你会得到一群人，他们都将从一个庞大复杂的系统中获得丰厚的薪水，就像我们军队中的许多军官一样，天知道如果把他们放在一个小房间里，让他们自己去创造新的会计标准，他们会做出什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to our auditor, remember that's Charlie talking, and he doesn't really — (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，听我们的审计师，记住这是查理在说话，他其实并不——（笑声）

But I agree with him, (LAUGH) 100%. He's 99, he can get away with more than I can get away with. (LAUGHTER)

但我同意他的观点，（笑）100%。他 99 岁，他能逃脱的事情比我能逃脱的多。（笑声）

OK. Station two — 好的。第二站——

But what he said is enormously important. I mean, you've got to have some insights into what the hell really goes on.

但他说的内容非常重要。我的意思是，你必须对究竟发生了什么有一些洞察。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Even if you're (inaudible) accountant.

查理·芒格：即使你是（听不清）会计师。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

57. Munger: I'm 'philosophical about my grandchildren not thinking exactly the way I do'

芒格：我对我的孙子孙女们不完全和我一样的想法持哲学态度。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Station two.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Warren, dear Charlie. My name is Victoria Winthrop, I am 22 years old, and I study in Munich at the CDTM, the Center of Digital Technology and Management.

观众成员：亲爱的沃伦，亲爱的查理。我叫维多利亚·温斯罗普，22 岁，我在慕尼黑的数字技术与管理中心（CDTM）学习。

As your grandchildren are more in my age group, let me ask you: How do you transfer your wisdom to your grandchildren and heirs? How do you lead them to investing? Do you see value in investing as a family, or individually? Thank you.

当你的孙子孙女更接近我的年龄时，让我问你：你是如何将你的智慧传递给孙子孙女和继承人的？你如何引导他们进行投资？你认为作为家庭还是个人投资更有价值？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm going to let Charlie do the answer now. He's got more —

沃伦·巴菲特：我现在让查理来回答。他更有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have more grandchildren. But (LAUGH) I am quite philosophical about my grandchildren not thinking exactly the way I do.

查理·芒格：嗯，我有更多的孙子孙女。但是（笑）我对我的孙子孙女不完全和我一样的想法持相当哲学的态度。

It seems to me that's almost the natural course of life. And I just live my life my own way, and they can observe it as an example if they want to. And if they don't, they can try some other way.

在我看来，这几乎是生活的自然过程。我只是按照自己的方式生活，如果他们想的话，可以把我当作一个例子来观察。如果他们不想，他们可以尝试其他方式。

I don't like it when they try some other way. (LAUGHTER)

我不喜欢他们尝试其他方式的时候。（笑声）

And I have to pretend that I like some of the boyfriends and girlfriends I don't like, (LAUGHTER) but I just struggle through like everybody else. (LAUGHTER)

我必须假装喜欢一些我不喜欢的男朋友和女朋友，（笑声）但我就像其他人一样努力应对。（笑声）

And usually, I just bite my tongue and keep silent. That's my way of handling it.

通常，我只是咬紧牙关保持沉默。这是我处理这种情况的方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that I think, in my case, my three children have grown a lot smarter in the last 30 years, and I think I've grown smarter. (LAUGH) And —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说，在我看来，我的三个孩子在过去的 30 年里变得聪明了很多，我也变得聪明了。（笑）而且——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I know, but you needed a lot of help.

查理·芒格：我知道，但你需要很多帮助。

WARREN BUFFETT: That is for sure — (LAUGHTER) no, I would totally acknowledge that. That's why I have the room to grow. I mean, I have plenty of room for improvement. But —

沃伦·巴菲特：这点是肯定的——（笑声）不，我完全承认这一点。这就是我有成长空间的原因。我的确有很多改进的空间。但是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We all had a lot to grow. I worked a year for US Steel, which was in their fabrication department in Los Angeles, a big operation. The thing was utterly doomed, and three years later it went back to greenfields. The whole thing was razed to the ground.

查理·芒格：我们都有很多成长的空间。我在美国钢铁公司工作了一年，那个时候我在洛杉矶的制造部门，那里是一个大规模的操作。这个项目完全注定要失败，三年后它回到了荒地。整个地方被夷为平地。

I did not see it coming. Now, to be that ignorant as I was at that age, it was a sin. And my professors by and large were even more ignorant than I was. Nobody had observed the basic economics of business in a scientific way at all when I was young.

我没有预料到这一点。现在，像我那个年龄那样无知，真是一种罪过。而我的教授们大多数甚至比我更无知。年轻时，没有人以科学的方式观察商业的基本经济学。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we're getting into confession time, I have to tell you: It's 3:30. So, (LAUGH) we don't want to keep going on: Who knows what we'll be saying in another half-hour. So, (LAUGHTER) I thank you all very much for coming. At 4:30 we will have the shareholders meeting here.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果我们要进入忏悔时间，我得告诉你：现在是 3:30。所以，（笑）我们不想继续下去：谁知道再过半小时我们会说些什么。所以，（笑声）非常感谢大家的到来。我们将在 4:30 在这里召开股东大会。

2023-05-08 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2023-05-08 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Berkshire’s own ‘King Charles’

2. Directors introduced

3. The woman who organized the whole thing

4. Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year

5. Failure to guarantee Silicon Valley Bank’s deposits would have been ‘catastrophic’

6. We’ve never made an emotional investing decision

7. Jain: GEICO’s technology is ‘still a work in progress’

8. Abel: BNSF continues to work on efficiency and safety improvements

9. Todd Combs doing ‘wonderful job’ running GEICO

10. Munger on AI: ‘Old-fashioned intelligence works pretty well’

11. Munger: Commercial real estate downturn will be ‘quite significant and quite unpleasant’

12. ′ What gives you opportunities is other people doing dumb things’

13. AIG liability assumption deal is turning out to be ‘good but not great’

14. Never write a will without input from your children

15. BNSF takes derailments ‘incredibly seriously’

16. Berkshire utilities focusing on clean energy but coordinated national effort is needed

17. Abel will decide on next generation of Berkshire managers

18. America has too much ‘tribalism’

19. No corporate raider will have enough money to target Berkshire after Buffett

20. Stories about finding Ajit Jain and Ben Rosner’s Chicago submarine

21. Jain is happy with property catastrophe reinsurance portfolio

22. ‘We don’t get smarter’ but ‘we get a little wiser’

23. Why Buffett invested billions in Japanese ‘trading houses’

24. Apple is a ‘better business’ than any Berkshire company

25. U.S. and China both need to reduce ‘stupid, stupid, stupid’ economic tensions

26. ‘I feel better about the capital we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan’

27. Ben Graham’s great investment book is still popular

28. GEICO is talking to carmakers about selling insurance in the showroom

29. Index funds are ‘backing off’ from using voting power

30. Buffett: Greg Abel ‘understands capital allocation as well as I do’

31. Munger has two words for COVID vaccine skeptic

32. ‘It’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business’ like Berkshire

33. Washington should explicitly guarantee all U.S. bank deposits

34. Buffett: CEOs of failed banks should be punished

35. Aside from Bank of America, Berkshire is being cautious on bank stocks

36. It is 'madness to keep printing money'

37. Buffet would have preferred to buy more of Pilot earlier, but it wasn't for sale

38. 'You should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it'

39. 'Tough problem' when family members are negative

40. Why are Garanimals only sold at Walmart?

41. Paramount Global faces tough competition in streaming

42. 'Our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility'

43. 'We will not be making any offer for control of Occidental'

44. Elon Musk is a 'brilliant, brilliant guy' who 'likes taking on the impossible job'

45. We want to save Berkshire's cash to buy businesses

46. Munger: 'Life is too short' to be an ambitious lawyer

47. New minimum 15% corporate tax 'doesn't bother me in the least'

48. We are in 'the perfect sort of game'

49. Arbitrage bet on Activision isn't looking good

50. If you can't work for yourself, working for Berkshire is almost as good

51. See's Candies is a 'wonderful brand that doesn't travel'

52. NetJets is a 'marvelous' company

53. Auto industry is fascinating but hard to predict

54. Buffett isn't worried about the Federal Reserve's balance sheet

55. We need to take care of people displaced by capitalism

56. When it comes to accounting, 'We'll consistently do what is legal, and we'll consistently say what we think is right'

57. Munger: I'm 'philosophical about my grandchildren not thinking exactly the way I do'

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