原文信息：
1958 Letter
Warren E Buffett
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
A friend who runs a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote: "The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘exuberant’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least".
我有位朋友，他管理一只中等规模的投资信托，最近他写了这样一句话：“阴晴不定，这是美国人典型的性格特征。1958 年，他们的情绪变化很大，要用一个词来形容 1958 年他们在股市上的情绪，这个词就是“兴高采烈”。
I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year almost any reason has been seized upon to justify “Investing” in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices, I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it.
这句话很好地总结出了 1958 年股市的主要情绪变化，无论业余投资者，还是专业投资者，都这样。在过去一年里，人们找各种理由来证明“投资”股市的正确。和前些年相比，现在股市里性格阴晴不定的人更多了，只要他们觉得能轻松赚大钱，就一直不会离开。还有更多这样的人在不断涌入股市，把股价炒得越来越高，这个现象什么时候才能休止，不得而知。有一点我是确定的，股市里这样的人越多，持续时间越长，将来的后果越严重。
I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profits from investment in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.
我不想预测股市，我的精力都放在了寻找低估的股票上。但是，所有人都以为买股票肯定能赚钱，最后一定不会有好结果。到时候，就连低估的股票也难免受到牵连，虽然它们的内在价值不会减少，但股价会大跌。
In my letter of last year, I wrote:
我在去年的信中写道：
“Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well1. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.”
“与一般水平相比，我们在熊市里会比牛市里做得更好。我们今年的业绩不错，但在这样的年份中，我们的表现本来就应该比指数更好。当股市整体大幅上涨时，只要能跟上指数涨幅，我就非常满意了。”
The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones Industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that a substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.
1958 年就属于最后一句话说的情况，我说中了。道指从 435 点上升到 583 点，算上 20 点的股息，道指整体上涨 38.5%。过去一年，我管理的五个合伙人账户获得的平均收益率是略高于 38.5%。按照年末净值计算，各个合伙人账户的收益率在 36.7% 到 46.2% 之间。在我们的投资组合里，有很大一部分股票并没从快速上涨的行情中受益，考虑到这个情况，我认为我们的业绩很不错了。我始终相信，在下跌或平盘的行情中，我们的业绩会跑赢指数，在上涨的行情中，我们能跟上指数涨幅就很好了。
So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.
我觉得以我们在 1958 年所做的一项投资为例进行分析，可以让大家更好地了解我们的投资方法。去年，我提到了我们的第一重仓股，它占各个合伙人账户 10% 到 20% 的仓位。我说我希望这只股票最好下跌或者平盘，这样我们才能买到更多的货，继续增加仓位。因此，在牛市里，这个股票可能会拖累我们的相对收益。
This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we had a very well managed bank with substantial earnings power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Management was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate loss seemed minimal.
这只股票是新泽西州联合市的联邦信托公司 (Commonwealth Trust Co.)。在我们开始买入这只股票时，保守估算，它的内在价值是每股 125 美元。虽然这家公司每年有 10 美元左右的盈利，但它出于正当理由，并不发放现金股息，可能主要就是因为不分红，它才会有 50 美元左右这么低的股价。于是，我们就有了这个投资机会：一家管理优良的银行，盈利能力强，按内在价值计算折价高。管理层对我们的到来表示欢迎，这笔投资最终亏损的风险非常小。
Commonwealth was 25.5% owned by a larger bank (Commonwealth had assets of about $50 Million – about half the size of the First National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for persona1 reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of:
联邦信托的第一大股东是另一家规模更大的银行，持股比例是 25.5%（联邦信托总资产为 5000 万美元，规模大约是奥马哈第一国民银行 (First National) 的一半）。多年来，第一大股东一直希望能并购联邦信托。某些个人原因阻碍了并购，但是有迹象表明这种状况不会无限期持续下去。综合起来看，摆在我们面前的这家公司情况是这样的：
Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposal.
我们用了一年左右时间，买到了这家银行 12% 的股份，买入平均成本大约是每股 51 美元。不难看出，这只股票股价沉闷对我们绝对是好事。这家公司的股票，我们持有的越多，价值越高，特别是我们成为第二大股东后，我们就有了充足的投票权，在任何并购提议上，我们的意见都有举足轻重的作用。
Commonwealth only had about 300 stockholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally had very little effect on the price movement of some of our holdings.
联邦信托只有 300 多个股东，平均每月只有两笔交易。这样你就明白了，为什么我说我们持有的一些股票受大盘行情的影响很小。
Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which railed the price to about $65 where we were neither buyer nor seller. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any "Leakage" regarding our portfolio holdings.
很可惜，我们在买入过程中确实遭遇了竞争对手，股价涨到了 65 美元，在这个价格，我们既没买，也没卖。对于不活跃的股票，很小的买单就能导致价格发生这么大的变化，所以说一定不能“泄漏”我们的投资组合持股。
Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holder at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.
去年年末，我找到了一个特殊情况投资机会，可以以很便宜的价格成为最大股东。于是，我卖出了我们持有的联邦信托股票，卖出价是每股 80 美元，当时市场报价比这个价格低 20%。
It is obvious that we could still be sitting with $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such at Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.
我们完全可以继续持有 50 美元买入的联邦信托，继续耐心地零星买入。我很愿意这么做，不过要是这样做的话，我们去年的业绩就跟不上市场了。买联邦信托这样的股票，我们在哪一年能获利，有很大的偶然因素，很难说。我们在一个年度里的盈亏完全不足以衡量我们的长期业绩。虽然如此，我相信投资低估的、能得到良好保护的股票，是取得长期收益最可靠的途径。
I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with an intrinsic value $135 is quite different from a price $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.
顺便说一句，80 美元买入联邦信托的，长期来看，收益会相当不错。可是，135 美元的内在价值，80 美元价格的低估，与 125 美元的内在价值，50 美元价格的低估，比起来差距还是很大的。我认为，我把资金换到另一只股票上，在这只股票上，我们的资金可以创造更多收益。这只新股票体量比联邦信托大一些，占各个合伙人账户资产的 25% 左右。虽说与我们现在持有的许多（或一些）其他股票相比，这只新股票的折价没它们高，但是我们是这只新股票的最大股东，这个大股东的地位给了我们巨大优势，我们可以施加更多影响，控制估值修复所需的时间。就这只股票而言，在我们持有期间，我们几乎可以保证它的表现会优于道指。
The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.
股市越高，低估的股票越少。我现在发现找到足够多的便宜的股票，有些不容易了。我想提升套利类的占比，但很难找到条件合适的套利品种。
To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.
如果可能的话，我想大量买入几只低估的股票，自己创造套利机会。按照这样的策略，我们应该能做到我之前所预测的——在熊市中跑赢指数。我希望合伙人按照这个标准评价我的表现。如果有问题，请随时问我。
WARREN E. BUFFETT
2-11-59