原文信息：

• 标题：1962 Semi-annual Letter to Partners
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：1962-07-06
• 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
• 中文翻译参考：RanRan
• 整理：Ponge

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.

810 KIEWIT PLAZA

OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

July 6, 1962

In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. "And a Prediction." While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that section, in its entirety, may be worthwhile:

在写于 1962 年 1 月 24 日的 1961 年信中，有一段讲了我的“一个预测”。我不想残忍地折磨读者，但一字不差地把这部分搬过来，非常有必要。

And a Prediction

一个预测

Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.

老读者（我王婆卖瓜，自卖自夸了）可能很奇怪，我怎么一反常态开始预测了呢？我一直都不预测，现在我一般也不预测。

I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.

我肯定不会预测明后年宏观经济或股市行情会怎么样，我根本不知道。

I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.

我认为今后十年，有几年大盘肯定会涨 20% 到 25%，有几年大盘肯定会跌 20% 到 25%，其余年份则在二者之间。至于哪年涨、哪年跌，我完全不知道，长期投资者也不关心某一年的涨跌。

Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.

长期来看，算上股息和市值增长，道指的年复合收益率可能在 5% 到 7% 之间。虽然这几年道指涨得很多，但如果你期望道指的年复合收益率高于 5% 到 7%，道指很可能让你失望。

Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

我们的工作是年复一年的超越道指，集小胜为大胜，不特别在意某一年的绝对收益率是正是负。与我们和指数都上涨 20% 的年份相比，我认为，在指数下跌 30% 而我们下跌 15% 的年份，我们的表现更出色。我和合伙人强调这一点的时候，能看得出来，他们有的深信不疑，有的将信将疑。

It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.

你一定要完全理解我为什么这么想，不但要在脑子里认同，而且要在心底里认同。

For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.

在讲我们的投资方法时，我已经说过了，与道指相比，我们表现最好的年份可能出现在下跌或平盘的市场中。因此，我们取得的相对收益可能时高时低，相差很大。有些年份，我们肯定会落后道指。如果长期来看，我们能平均每年战胜道指 10 个百分点，我对我们的业绩就很满意了。

Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year over-all gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.

某一年市场下跌 35% 或 40%（今后十年里某一年出现这种情况的概率很大，但谁都不知道是哪年），我们应该只下跌 15% 或 20%；某一年道指平盘，我们应该上涨 10%；某一年道指上涨超过 20%，我们很难跟上。长期来看，只要我们能有上述表现，如果道指的年化复合收益率在 5% 到 7% 之间，我们的业绩应该是每年 15% 到 17%。

The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!

你可能觉得我的预测不对，等到 1965 年或 1970 年时回头来看，我的预测可能就是不对，甚至是完全错的。我还是要说出我的真实想法，我觉得应该让合伙人知道，但是投资这行就是这样，预期总是很可能出错。单独某一年，波动幅度可能很大。1961 年波动就很大，幸运的是波动是向上的。不可能年年如此！

Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.

从 1961 年末到 1962 年 6 月 30 日，道指从 731.14 下跌到 561.28，期间股息约为 11 美元，投资道指的整体收益率为亏损 21.7%。附录 A 列出了合伙基金成立以来道指每年的收益率，喜欢研究数字的可以看一下。

As stated above, a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which, coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term results. Our target is an approximately 1/2% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.

如上所述，道指下跌的时候，正是我们显身手的时候，我们可以在此时与道指拉开差距，多赢几个百分点。等到市场上涨的时候，只要能跟上，最后我们就能取得非常令人满意的长期收益率。我们的目标是道指每跌 1%，我们只跌 0.5%。这样的表现能说明，与任何其他投资股票的途径相比，我们做的都是非常保守的。

As outlined in Appendix B, showing combined predecessor partnership results, during the first half of 1962 we had one of the best periods in our history, achieving a minus 7.5% result before payments to partners, compared to the minus 21.7% overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points advantage can be expected to widen during the second half if the decline in the general market continues, but will probably narrow should the market turn upward. Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six-months' or even one-year's results are not to be taken too seriously. Short periods of measurement exaggerate chance fluctuations in performance. While circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half, there are bound to be periods when we do relatively poorly. The figures for our performance involve no change in the valuation of our controlling interest in Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months point toward a probable higher realization.

附录 B 列出了合伙基金前几年的业绩。自成立以来，1962 年上半年是合伙基金业绩最好的一段时期，道指整体下跌 21.7%，而我们分成之前的收益率是负 7.5%。1962 年下半年，如果市场继续下跌，我们这 14.2 个百分点的领先优势可能扩大；如果市场好转，则可能缩小。我嘱咐大家很多遍了，六个月或一年的业绩，别看得太重。用短期表现衡量表现，只能放大偶然的业绩波动。虽说机缘巧合，上半年我们的表现异常出色，但相对表现较差的时候，我们一定会有。我们持有登普斯特风车制造公司 (Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company) 的控股权益。这部分控股权益的估值，在计算业绩时我们没调整，但最近几个月已经有了进展，我们可能会实现更高的价值。

Past letters have stressed our belief that the Dow is no pushover as a yardstick for investment performance. To the extent that funds are invested in common stocks, whether the manner of investment be through investment companies, investment counselors, bank trust departments, or do-it-yourself, our belief is that the overwhelming majority will achieve results roughly comparable to the Dow. Our opinion is that the deviations from the Dow are much more likely to be toward a poorer performance than a superior one.

我们在往年的信里多次强调，我们相信，作为衡量投资业绩标准的道指不是那么容易战胜的。只要资金是投资股票，无论是什么形式，基金公司、投资顾问、银行信托还是自己打理，我们认为，绝大部分人的业绩也就是和道指不相上下。那些业绩偏离道指的，大幅跑输的多，大幅跑赢的少。
To illustrate this point, we have continually measured the Dow and limited partners' results against the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a program of common stock investment and the two largest closed-end investment companies. The tabulation in Appendix C shows the five -years' results, and you will note the figures are extraordinarily close to those of the Dow. These companies have total assets of about $3.5 billion.

为此，我们一直都拿最大的两只开放式股票型基金和最大的两只封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与道指和合伙基金的收益率做对比。从附录 C 中这四家基金公司五年的业绩可以看出来，它们的收益率和道指非常接近。它们管理的资产规模合计约 35 亿美元。

In the interest of getting this letter out promptly, we are mailing it before results are available for the closed-end companies. However, the two mutual funds both did poorer than the Dow, with Massachusetts Investors Trust having a minus 23% overall performance, and Investors Stock Fund realizing a minus 25.4%. This is not unusual as witness the lead article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL of June 13, 1962 headed "Funds vs. Market.” Of the 17 large common stock funds studied, everyone had a record poorer than the Dow from the peak on the Dow of 734, to the date of the article, although in some cases the margin of inferiority was minor.

为了让大家尽快看到这封信，我们邮寄出去的时候两家封闭式基金的业绩还没出来。两只开放式基金的业绩都不如道指，Massachusetts Investors Trust 亏损 23%，Investors Stock Fund 亏损 25.4%。这个现象很正常。1962 年 6 月 13 日，《华尔街日报》在头版刊发了一篇文章“基金 vs. 市场”(Funds vs. Market)。文章研究了 17 只股票基金，从道指 734 点起到撰文时止，它们全军覆没，都输给了道指，差别就是输多输少而已。

Particularly hard hit in the first half were the so-called “growth” funds which, almost without exception, were down considerably more than the Dow. The three large "growth" (the quotation marks are more applicable now) funds with the best record in the preceding few years, Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund, and Wellington Equity Fund averaged an overall minus 32.3% for the first half. It is only fair to point out that because of their excellent records in 1959-61, their overall performance to date is still better than average, as it may well be in the future. Ironically, however, this earlier superior performance had caused such a rush of new investors to come to them that the poor performance this year was experienced by very many more holders than enjoyed the excellent performance of earlier years. This experience tends to confirm my hypothesis that investment performance must be judged over a period of time with such a period including both advancing and declining markets. There will continue to be both; a point perhaps better understood now than six months ago.

上半年，最受伤的是所谓的“成长”基金，它们比道指跌得惨多了，几乎无一幸免。前几年业绩最好的三只“成长”（这里真该用引号）基金，Fidelity Capital Fund、Putnam Growth Fund 和 Wellington Equity Fund，上半年平均下跌 32.3%。说句公道话，这些成长基金在 1959-61 年业绩亮丽，到现在为止，它们的总业绩还是比指数高，将来也可能领先指数。令人匪夷所思的是，许多人被这几只基金前几年傲人的业绩吸引，争先恐后地买入，正好赶上了今年的业绩大跌，那些能享受到前几年优异业绩的人肯定是少数。这恰好证明了我的观点：评判投资业绩必须看经过一个牛熊周期的长期表现。股市总有牛熊，和六个月前相比，可能大家现在更能明白这个道理。

In outlining the results of investment companies, I do so not because we operate in a manner comparable to them or because our investments are similar to theirs. It is done because such funds represent a public batting average of professional, highly-paid investment management handling a very significant $20 billion of securities. Such management, I believe, is typical of management handling even larger sums. As an alternative to an interest in the partnership, I believe it reasonable to assume that many partners would have investments managed similarly.

之所以列出基金公司的业绩，不是因为我们的投资方法和它们的一样，也不是因为我们投资的股票和它们一样，而是因为它们代表了管理 200 亿美元证券的高薪职业基金经理人的打击率 (batting average)。我认为，它们的表现也能代表管理更大资产规模的投资机构。如果合伙人没选择我们的合伙基金，很多合伙人选择的就是类似的投资管理方式。

The above calculations of results are before allocation to the General Partner and monthly payments to partners. Of course, whenever the overall results for the year are not plus 6% on a market value basis (with deficiencies carried forward) there is no allocation to the General Partner. Therefore, non-withdrawing partners have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first six months of 7.5% and partners who have withdrawn at the rate of 6% per annum have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first half of 10.5%. Should our results for the year be less than plus 6% (and unless there should be a material advance in the Dow, this is very probable) partners receiving monthly payments will have a decrease in their market value equity at December 31, 1962. This means that monthly payments at 6% on this new market equity next year will be on a proportionately reduced basis. For example, if our results were an overall minus 7% for the year, a partner receiving monthly payments who had a market value interest of $100,000 on January 1, 1962 would have an equity at December 31, 1962 of $87,000. This reduction would arise from the minus 7% result, or $7, 000 plus monthly payments of $500 for an additional $6,000. Thus, with $87,000 of market equity on January 1, 1963, monthly payments next year would be $435.00.

上述业绩计算未扣除普通合伙人的分成和每月向合伙人支付的利息。若按市值计算的合伙基金整体收益率未达到 6% 以上（亏损将在下一年度抵减），普通合伙人没有分成。因此，在本年度前六个月，没有提现的合伙人市值权益减少 7.5%，按照年利率 6% 提现的合伙人市值权益减少 10.5%。如果本年业绩低于 6%（除非道指大涨，否则很可能），1962 年 12 月 31 日，获得每月利息的合伙人的市值权益会减少。按照新市值权益，明年以 6% 的利率每月支付的利息同样会相应减少。假如我们今年整体亏损 7%，一位获得每月利息的合伙人 1962 年 1 月 1 日拥有市值权益 100,000 美元，1962 年 12 月 31 日，他的权益则是 87,000 美元。权益下降是因为亏损 7% 减少 7, 000 美元，再扣除每月 500 美元，全年 6,000 美元的利息。1963 年 1 月 1 日，新的市场权益为 87,000 美元，明年每月的利息就是 435 美元。

None of the above, of course, has any applicability to advance payments received during 1962 which do not participate in profits or losses, but earn a straight 6%.

以上计算完全不适用于 1962 年收到的预先存入资金，因为这部分资金只是获得 6% 的利息，不参与盈亏。

DOW-JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE

道琼斯工业指数

PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE

合伙基金业绩

(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partners.

(1) 1957-61 年的数据包含全年管理的所有有限合伙人综合业绩，已扣除营业费用，未扣除有限合伙人和普通合伙人分成

(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.

(2) 1957-61 年的数据在前一列合伙基金业绩基础上计算，按照当前合伙协议扣除普通合伙人分成。

APPENDIX C 附录 C

YEARLY RESULTS

年度业绩

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 按照当年资产价值变化以及持有人分红计算。

(2) From Moody's Bank & Finance Manual - 1962.

(2) 数据来源于 Moody Bank & Finance Manual – 1962。

CUMULATIVE RESULTS

累计收益率