1962-12-24 Warren Buffett’s Letter Explaining “ad­vanced accounting tech­niques”

1962-12-24 Warren Buffett’s Letter Explaining “ad­vanced accounting tech­niques”

To the Editor:

I have just finished read­ing your articles .regarding publicly owned real estate companies, which were most interesting and perceptive. This is a story that needed to be told.
我刚刚读完你关于公众持股的不动产公司的文章,内容非常有趣且见解深刻。这是一个确实需要被讲出来的故事。

An item fully as impor­tant as the lack of quantita­tive coverage of dividends may well turn out to be the dubious quality of the in­come of many of these com­panies. Whereas it is some­what difficult in many cases to determine this quality, there are certain known in­stances which literally shout for disclosure, and I think there is reason to believe that continued probing would develop still more instances.
与对股息缺乏量化覆盖同等重要的,极有可能是这些公司中许多家收入质量的可疑性。尽管在不少情形下评估这种质量颇为困难,但某些已知的实例简直在大声要求披露;而且我认为,有理由相信继续深挖还会发现更多这样的案例。

To give you an example of the sort of thing I have in mind, let me cite two in­stances, to which, you re­ferred, from the Kratter Corp. prospectus of 1961, pre­pared in connection with the debenture issue which never materialized:
为说明我所指的情况,让我引用两个你提到过的实例,均来自Kratter Corp. 1961年的招股说明书,该说明书是为一笔最终未能成行的债券发行所准备:

1.On page 50 of the “red herring” prospectus, refer­ence is made to 140,000 con­tainers under lease to F. & M. Schafer Brewing Co. These containers were pur­chased by a joint venture in August 1958, for $2,800,000 and immediately net leased back to the brewery for five years at $710,000 annually. What this really amounted to, of course, was a financ­ing transaction for the brew­ing company. However, the impression the public stock­holder gets is that this $710,- 000, comingled with other op­erating income from real estate, has the same quality and expected longevity that might be expected from a first-class office building. Therefore, if the casual stockholder takes the $710,- 000 and capitalizes it at 9%, he immediately attributes a value of almost $8 million to something which initially only had a value of $2,800,- 000 and whose value is de­clining at an extreme rate. Various brokerage offices have issued reports involv­ing just this sort of valua­tion. This would appear to be trading upon the lower level of intelligence in Wall Street.
在这份“red herring”招股说明书的第50页,提到有140,000个容器租赁给F. & M. Schafer Brewing Co.。这些容器由一家合资企业于1958年8月以$2,800,000购入,随即以净租赁方式回租给这家酿酒厂,为期五年,每年租金$710,000。当然,这实质上是为这家酿酒公司提供的一笔融资交易。然而,公众股东得到的印象却是,这笔与其他不动产经营收入混在一起的$710,000,具备与一座一流写字楼相同的质量和可预期的持久性。因此,如果一个漫不经心的股东把这$710,000按9%的资本化率估值,他会立刻给某个最初只值$2,800,000,而且其价值正以极快速度下降的东西赋予接近$8,000,000的价值。多家券商已发布涉及这种估值方式的报告。这看起来就是在利用Wall Street较低层次的智力水平进行交易。

2.On the same page in the “red herring,” reference is made to various machines acquired from Dashew Bus­iness Machines and under lease either to Standard Oil of California or Dashew, itself. There are two ar­rangements here, but suf­fice to say that the eight machines leased to Dash­ew were purchased for $660,000 in August 1960 and leased back for five years for $153,000 per annum with the subsequent five years available to Dashew at $9,900 per annum. Anyone assum­ing that the $153,000, which is contributing just that much to the current operating in­come of Kratter, has the as­pect of long-term prime real estate income is due for a real shock when the renewal period comes up.
同一页的“red herring”还提到,从Dashew Business Machines购入的各类机器,随后租给Standard Oil of California或Dashew本身。这里有两种安排,但简而言之,租给Dash­ew的八台机器是在1960年8月以$660,000购入,并以每年$153,000的价格回租五年;随后五年,Dashew可按每年$9,900续租。任何把这每年$153,000(目前正等额计入Kratter的经营收入)当成长期优质不动产租金的人,在续租期到来时都将大吃一惊。

This sort of transaction is very similar to buying a royalty on a short-lived oil well. If the gross receipts are spent each year, one soon finds out that the capital is not self-replacing. To ig­nore the concept of amortiza­tion or depreciation on such transactions is dubious, if not fraudulent.
这种交易与购买一口寿命短暂的油井的特许权分成非常相似。如果每年都把毛收入口袋,很快就会发现资本并不会自我补偿。在这类交易上无视摊销或折旧的概念,至多是可疑,甚至可以说近乎欺诈。

I think you have done a real public service in taking a good, hard look at the “ad­vanced accounting tech­niques” of this new indus­try. It has many of the as­pects of a chain letter scheme or a “Ponzi” opera­tion, and the sooner articles such as yours are given wide circulation, the less likeli­hood of serious harm to the public.
我认为,你对这个新兴行业所谓“ad­vanced accounting tech­niques”的认真审视,确实是在为公众提供一项真正的服务。它的许多做法带有连锁信件(chain letter)式计划或“Ponzi”式操作的特征;像你这样的文章越早广为传播,公众遭受严重伤害的可能性就越小。

Warren E. Buffett
Genl. Ptr.
Buffett Partnership, Ltd.
Omaha,Nebr.

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