原文信息：

• 标题：1964 Semi-annual Letter to Partners
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：1964-07-08
• 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
• 中文翻译参考：RanRan
• 整理：孙萧萧

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.

810 KIEWIT PLAZA

OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

July 8, 1964

First Half Performance 上半年业绩

The whole family is leaving for California on June 23rd so I am fudging a bit on this report and writing it June 18th. However, for those of you who set your watches by the receipt of our letters. I will maintain our usual chronological symmetry in reporting, leaving a few blanks which Bill will fill in after the final June 30th figures are available.

6 月 23 日，我们一家人要去加州，所以这封信我 6 月 18 日就写了，有些仓促。有的合伙人习惯了收到我们整半年的报告，为了和往年保持一致，有些数字我先不写，比尔会把 6 月 30 日出来的最终数据填上。

During the first half of 1964 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “DOW”) advanced from 762.95 to 831.50. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.40 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%. As I write this on June 18th, it appears that our results will differ only insignificantly from those of the Dow. I would feel much better reporting to you that the Dow had broken even, and we had been plus 5%, or better still, that the Dow had been minus 10%, and we had broken even. I have always pointed out, however, that gaining an edge on the Dow is more difficult for us in advancing markets than in static or declining ones.

1964 年上半年，道指从 762.95 上涨到 831.50，其间股息为 14.40，整体收益率是 10.0%。6 月 18 日，在我写这封信时，我看我们的半年业绩可能和道指不相上下。我多想向各位报告道指持平，而我们上涨 5%，要是道指下跌 10%，而我们持平，那就更好了。我一直和大家说，与市场持平或下跌时相比，在市场上涨时，我们更难领先道指。

To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner and the limited partners' results:

下面是道指收益率、普通合伙人分成前合伙基金收益率以及有限合伙人收益率的最新逐年对比情况。

(See next page for footnotes to table.)

Footnotes to preceding table:

注释：

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.

(1) 根据道指年度涨跌计算，其中包含股息。表格中为合伙基金整年运作的年份。

(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

(2) 1957-61 年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。

(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

(3) 1957-61 年的数据按前一列合伙基金收益率计算得出，按照当前合伙协议，扣除了普通合伙人分成，未计算有限合伙人的每月提现。

Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. Our General category now includes three companies where B.P.L. is the largest single stockholder. These stocks have been bought and are continuing to be bought at prices considerably below their value to a private owner. We have been buying one of these situations for approximately eighteen months and both of the others for about a year. It would not surprise me if we continue to do nothing but patiently buy these securities week after week for at least another year, and perhaps even two years or more.

上半年，我对我们的买入情况非常满意。在我看来，投资的 90% 是买入，所以买入顺利，我特别满意。在低估类中，我们的合伙基金现在是三家公司的最大单一股东。这些股票，我们买入的价格远远低于产业资本所能给予的估值，我们还会按这样的价格继续买入。其中一只，从 18 个月前，我们就一直在买；另外两只，都是从大约一年以前，我们一直在买。在今后一年，两年，甚至更长时间，我们不干别的，就继续一周接一周地耐心买入这些股票，这也很正常。

What we really like to see in situations like the three mentioned above is a condition where the company is making substantial progress in terms of improving earnings, increasing asset values, etc., but where the market price of the stock is doing very little while we continue to acquire it. This doesn't do much for our short-term performance, particularly relative to a rising market, but it is a comfortable and logical producer of longer-term profits. Such activity should usually result in either appreciation of market prices from external factors or the acquisition by us of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. Either alternative suits me.

像前面说的这三只股票，在我们持续买入时，最好是公司一直在取得实质的进步，例如，盈利改善、资产价值提升，但股票的市场价格毫无反应，这种情况是我们最愿意看到的。我们的短期业绩不会从中受益，特别是在市场上涨时，但是我们觉得很踏实，我们必然会从中获得更好的长期业绩。我们就这么一直买，最后不是外部因素激发股价上涨，就是我们以低廉的价格获得公司的控股权，这两种情况我都喜欢。

It is important to realize, however, that most of our holdings in the General category continue to be securities which we believe to be considerably undervalued, but where there is not the slightest possibility that we could have a controlling position. We expect the market to justify our analyses of such situations in a reasonable period of time, but we do not have the two strings to our bow mentioned in the above paragraph working for us in these securities.

但是，有一点大家应该知道，对于我们的低估类中的大部分股票，虽然我们认为仍然严重低估，但我们根本不可能取得控股权。对于这些股票，经过较长的一段时间，市场应该能证明我们的分析是正确的，但是和我们能控股的股票不一样，在这些股票上，我们没有两手准备。

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95%-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $28 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown below. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我们一直拿最大的两只开放式股票型基金（股票占 95-100%）和最大的两只分散投资的封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率做对比。Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp. 这四家公司管理着 40 多亿美元的资金，基金行业管理的总资产是 200 亿美元，它们应该能代表大多数的基金公司，以下是这四只基金的业绩。有些投资顾问机构管理的资产规模更大，它们绝大多数的业绩应该和这四家基金公司不相上下。

注释：

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。

(2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for first half 1964.

(2) 来源：1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63。1964 年上半年数据为估算值。

These figures continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment management has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks. The results of these companies in some ways resemble the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. SPCA or no SPCA, I think the duck can only take the credit (or blame) for his own activities. The rise and fall of the lake is hardly something for him to quack about. The water level has been of great importance to B.P.L’s performance as the table on page one indicates. However, we have also occasionally flapped our wings.

大基金费用高昂、地位尊崇，道指是无人管理的一揽子蓝筹股，但是我们从这些数据中可以看出来，大基金始终跟不上指数。基金就像漂在池塘上的鸭子。水（市场）涨起来时，鸭子跟着往上涨；水（市场）落下去时，鸭子跟着往下落。不管有没有动物保护协会，鸭子的功劳大小，都要看他自己的表现，不能对池塘水位的涨跌呱呱乱叫。如上表所示，水位对巴菲特合伙基金的业绩有很大影响，不过我们一直在扑腾翅膀。

I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self- management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.

道指不是衡量股票投资业绩的唯一标准，但所有投资管理活动（包括管理自己的资金在内）都要经受客观的检验，检验标准应该事先确定，不能事后自己随便选。

The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.

资管行业规模庞大。基金经理非常重视评估汽车、钢铁、化工等各行各业的公司的管理层。为了分析公司管理层优劣，他们会严肃认真地投入大量时间和精力。基金经理不辞辛苦地评估投资组合中公司的管理层，他们自己却不会受到同样的评估，这实属不该。我们认为，投资者和基金经理必须确立业绩评估标准，并且像研究自己的投资标的一样，经常客观地审视自己的业绩。

We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results--it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the "Ground Rules" regarding application of the standard--namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we'll keep it that way. If we don't measure up, we won't change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.

我们就这么做，不管评估结果如何。不用我说，大家也知道，我们有确定的业绩衡量标准，只能保证我们能做到客观评估，绝对不等于我们就能取得良好的业绩。提到衡量业绩，我们再回顾一下“基本原则”(Ground Rules) 是怎么说的。基本原则中说，鉴于我们的投资方式，衡量我们的表现，至少要看三年，而且投机气氛浓厚时，我们很可能落后。有一点，我可以向各位保证。既然我们已经把标准定在了 90 厘米，标准就始终是 90 厘米。我们不会因为达不到标准而修改标准。依我之见，在规模高达几千亿的资管行业中，如果人人都确立合理的标准来衡量能力，并有意识地付诸实践，这个行业会更健康地发展。在日常商业活动中，无论是评估市场、人员、机器，还是流程，人们普遍遵循既定标准，资管可是世界上规模最大的商业行业。

We entered 1964 with net unrealized gains of $2,991,090 which is all attributable to partners belonging during 1963. Through June 30th we have realized capital gains of $2,826,248.76 (of which 96% are long term) so it appears very likely that at least all the unrealized appreciation attributable to your interest and reported to you in our letter of January 25, 1964, (item 3) will be realized this year. I again want to emphasize that this has nothing to do with how we are doing. It is possible that I could have made the above statement, and the market value of your B.P.L. interest could have shrunk substantially since January 1st, so the fact that we have large realized gains is no cause for exultation. Similarly when our realized gains are very small there is not necessarily any reason to be discouraged. We do not play any games to either accelerate or defer taxes. We make investment decisions based on our evaluation of the most profitable combination of probabilities. If this means paying taxes I'm glad the rates on long-term capital gains are as low as they are.

1964 年初，我们有 2,991,090 美元的未实现收益，这些都属于 1963 年的合伙人。从年初到 6 月 30 日，我们实现了 2,826,248.76 美元的资本收益（其中 96% 是长期资本利得），这样看来，1964 年 1 月 25 日所报告的归属各位合伙人的所有未实现增值今年应该都会实现。我要再提醒一下各位，收益的实现与我们的业绩表现无关。其实，在我们实现大量资本收益的同时，各位在合伙基金的权益市值可能是大幅缩水的，所以说，别因为实现的资本收益多就欢欣鼓舞，也别因为实现的资本收益少就愁眉苦脸。我们从不搞提前交税或延迟交税的手段。我们做投资决策是综合考虑，选取能实现利润最大化的概率组合。如果最佳选择是交税，那就交，好在长期资本利得税还比较低。

As previously stated in our most recent tax letter of April 1, 1964 the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1964 as your actual tax was for 1963. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.

在 1964 年 4 月 1 日寄给大家的税收函件中，我已经和大家说了，在申报 1964 年纳税金额估算时，填写 1963 年的实际纳税金额比较稳妥，这样不会受罚。

The tax liability for partners who entered January 1st will, of course, be quite moderate, as it always is in the first year for any partner. This occurs because realized capital gains are first attributed to old partners having an interest in unrealized appreciation. This, again, of course, has nothing to do with economic performance. All limited partners, new and old, (except for Bill Scott, Ruth Scott and Susan Buffett per paragraph five of the Partnership Agreement) end up with exactly the same results. As usual, net ordinary income for all partners is nominal to date.

1 月 1 日新加入的合伙人只需缴纳少量税款，所有合伙人加入第一年都是如此，因为我们会把实现的资本利得先分配给有未实现增值的老合伙人，这也与实际收益无关。所有有限合伙人，无论新老，最终收益都完全相同（按照《合伙协议》第五段，Bill Scott、Ruth Scott 和 Susan Buffett 除外）。和往常一样，我们现在向各位报告的只是纸面上的收益。

As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest, to us by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the Partnership Agreement, Commitment Letter for 1965, estimate or the 1964 tax situation, etc. In the meantime, keep Bill busy this summer clearing up anything in this letter that comes out fuzzy.

按照惯例，我们将在 11 月 1 日左右（向合伙人以及有意在 11 月 1 日前后加入的准合伙人）寄出修订版合伙协议、1965 年承诺书以及 1964 年纳税估算数据等文件。今年夏天，别让比尔闲着，这封信里有什么不清楚的地方，尽管问他。

Cordially, Warren E. Buffett

沃伦 E. 巴菲特谨上