原文信息：

• 标题：1966 Semi-annual Letter to Partners
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：1966-07-12
• 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
• 中文翻译参考：RanRan
• 整理：孙萧萧

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.

610 KIEWIT PLAZA

OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131

TELEPHONE 042-4110

July 12, 1966

During the first half of 1966, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "Dow") declined from 969.26 to 870.10. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.70 would have been received, reducing the overall loss of the Dow to about 8.7%.

1966 年上半年，道指从 969.26 点下跌到 870.10 点。在此期间，股息约为 14.70 美元，投资道指的整体收益率为亏损 8.7% 左右。

It is my objective and my hope (but not my prediction!) that we achieve over a long period of time, an average yearly advantage of ten percentage points relative to the Dow. During the first half we did considerably better than expected with an overall gain of approximately 8.2%. Such results should be regarded as decidedly abnormal. I have previously complimented partners on the good-natured tolerance they display in shrugging off such unexpected positive variances. The nature of our business is such that over the years, we will not disappoint the many of you who must also desire a test of your capacity for tolerance of negative variances.

长期平均每年跑赢道指 10 个百分点，这是我的目标，也是我的希望（但我保证不了一定能做到！）。今年上半年，我们的表现远高于预期，整体收益率大约是 8.2%。各位都应该明白，这样的业绩绝对是特殊的例外情况。业绩偏离预期，好的超出预料，这样的情况我们之前也遇到过，各位合伙人总能不为所动，我曾经在信里赞许各位表现出的温和与宽容。许多合伙人一定也想经历一下业绩偏离预期、差的超出预料的情况，考验一下自己的承受能力。既然是做投资，长期来看，各位一定会有这样的机会。

The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:

下面是道指收益率、普通合伙人分成前合伙基金收益率以及有限合伙人收益率的最新逐年对比情况。

1. Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.

1. 根据道指年度涨跌计算，其中包含股息。表格中为合伙基金整年运作的年份。

2. For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

2. 1957-61 年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。

3. For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

3. 1957-61 年的数据按前一列合伙基金收益率计算得出，按照当前合伙协议，扣除了普通合伙人分成。

Even Samson gets clipped occasionally. If you had invested $100.000 on January 1 equally among -

就连大力士参孙 (Samson) 也有被痛扁的时候。假如你今年 1 月 1 日拿出 100,000 美元，把资金平均分成 8 份，买入下列公司：

a. the world's largest auto company (General Motors);

a. 世界上最大的汽车公司（通用汽车）；

b. the world's largest oil company (Standard of New Jersey);

b. 世界上最大的石油公司（新泽西标准石油）；

c. the world's largest retailing company (Sears Roebuck);

c. 世界上最大的零售公司（西尔斯罗巴克）；

d. the world's largest chemical company (Dupont);

d. 世界上最大的化学公司（杜邦）；

e. the world's largest steel company (U.S. Steel);

e. 世界上最大的钢铁公司（美国钢铁）；

f. the world's largest stockholder-owned insurance company (Aetna);

f. 世界上最大的上市保险公司（安泰保险）；

g. the world’s largest public utility (American Telephone & Telegraph);

g. 世界上最大的公用事业公司（美国电话电报）；

h. the world's largest bank (Bank of America);

h. 世界上最大的银行（美国银行）。

your total portfolio (including dividends received) would have been worth $83,370 on June 30 for a loss of 16.6%. The total market value on January 1 of these eight giants was well over $100 billion. Everyone of them was selling lower on June 30.

到 6 月 30 日，你的投资组合的总资产（包括股息）是 83,370 美元，亏损 16.6%。1 月 1 日，这八家巨无霸的总市值是 1000 多亿美元。到了 6 月 30 日，这八家公司都跌了，无一例外。

On the next page we bring up to date our regular comparison with the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.

我们一直拿股票投资占 95-100% 的最大的两只开放式股票型基金（共同基金）和分散投资的最大的两只封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率做对比。以下是最新对比情况。

YEARLY RESULTS

年度业绩

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。

(2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.

(2) 来源：1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-65。1966 年上半年数据为估算值。

Proponents of institutional investing frequently cite its conservative nature. If “conservative” is interpreted to mean "productive of results varying only slightly from average experience" I believe the characterization is proper. Such results are almost bound to flow from wide diversification among high grade securities. Since, over a long period, "average experience" is likely to be good experience, there is nothing wrong with the typical investor utilizing this form of investment medium.

机构投资者经常以保守标榜自己。如果他们所谓的“保守”意思是“业绩和平均水平亦步亦趋”，那我没意见。广泛分散投资优质证券，最后取得的业绩差不多就这样。长期来看，“平均水平”也相当不错，普通投资者选择基金没什么不对。

However, I believe that conservatism is more properly interpreted to mean "subject to substantially less temporary or permanent shrinkage in value than total experience". This simply has not been achieved, as the record of the four largest funds (presently managing over $5 billion) illustrates. Specifically, the Dow declined in 1957, 1960, 1962 and the first half of 1966. Cumulating the shrinkage in the Dow during the three full year periods produces a decline of 20.6%. Following a similar technique for the four largest funds produces declines of 9.7%, 20.9%, 22.3% and 24.6%. Including the interim performance for the first half of 1966 results in a decline in the Dow of 27.5% and for the funds declines of 14.4%, 23.1%, 27.1% and 30.6%. Such funds (and I believe their results are quite typical of institutional experience in common stocks) seem to meet the first definition of conservatism but not the second one.

依我之见，保守要这么定义才更合理：“与平均水平相比，承受远远更低的价值损失，无论是暂时的，还是永久的。”按这个定义衡量，从这四只大型基金（目前管理资产超过 50 亿美元）的历史业绩来看，它们都没做到保守。1957 年、1960 年、1962 年和 1966 年上半年，道指都下跌了。将 57 年、60 年和 62 年的下跌累计计算，道指下跌 20.6%。按同样的计算方法，四大基金分别下跌 9.7%、20.9%、22.3% 和 24.6%。再把 1966 年上半年的下跌也算上，道指累计下跌 27.5%，四大基金分别累计下跌 14.4%、23.1%、27.1% 和 30.6%。按照上述保守的第一种定义，这几只基金是保守的。按照第二种定义，它们算不上保守。（这几只基金的业绩可以代表机构投资者。）

Most investors would climb a rung intellectually if they clearly delineated between the above two interpretations of conservatism. The first might be better labeled "conventionalism" - what it really says is that “when others are making money in the general run of securities, so will we and to about the same degree; when they are losing money, we'll do it at about the same rate." This is not to be equated with "when others are making it, we'll make as much and when they are losing it, we will lose less.” Very few investment programs accomplish the latter - we certainly don't promise it but we do intend to keep trying. (I have always felt our objectives should be somewhat loftier than those Herman Hickman articulated during the desperate years when Yale was losing eight games a season. Said Herman, "I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous.”)

大多数投资者，要是他们能分清上述两种不同的保守定义，他们的投资理念就上了一个台阶。第一种保守可能叫“随大流”(conventionalism) 更合适，它的意思其实是说“股市普遍上涨，别人都赚钱时，我们一样赚；别人亏钱时，我们一样亏。”我所说的保守是这样的：“别人赚钱时，我们一样赚；别人亏钱时，我们少亏。” 这两个保守不一样。在投资中，能做到第二种保守的，很少。我们保证不了就能做到，但会以追求这种保守为目标。（耶鲁橄榄球队当年输得很惨，曾经在一个赛季里输掉八场比赛，教练 Herman Hickman 解释说：“我争取把我的工作做好，不把校友们惹火就行，他们不满意就不满意吧。”我始终觉得我们应该有更高的追求。）（译注：引用这句话的原文是 I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous. 这句话是教练 Herman Hickman 说的。耶鲁橄榄球队很弱，高校之间橄榄球比赛很激烈，教练很难常胜。他这句话是在解释球队成绩为什么那么差的时候说的，意思是，成绩肯定好不了，校友不满意也没办法。只是成绩别太差，别把校友们惹火了就行。 ）

During the first half we, and two 10% partners, purchased all of the stock of Hochschild, Kohn & Co., a privately owned Baltimore department store. This is the first time in the history of the Partnership that an entire business has been purchased by negotiation, although we have, from time to time, negotiated purchase of specific important blocks of marketable securities. However, no new principles are involved. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the business are evaluated and weighed against price, both on an absolute basis and relative to other investment opportunities. HK (learn to call it that - I didn't find out how to pronounce it until the deal was concluded) stacks up fine in all respects.

霍赫希尔德•科恩公司 (Hochschild, Kohn & Co.) 是位于巴尔地摩的一家私营百货商店。上半年，我们出资 80%，还有两个合伙方各出资 10%，我们共同买下了这家公司的全部股权。虽然我们之前也曾经通过谈判完成有价证券大宗交易，但这笔投资是合伙基金成立以来，我们第一次通过谈判收购整个公司。投资的原则没变，还是从定量和定性两个方面评估，然后看价格高低，既进行绝对分析，也和其他投资机会做对比，进行相对分析。从各个方面来看，霍赫希尔德•科恩公司都不错。

We have topnotch people (both from a personal and business standpoint) handling the operation. Despite the edge that my extensive 75 cents an hour experience at the Penney's store in Omaha some years back gives us (I became an authority on the Minimum Wage Act), they will continue to run the business as in the past. Even if the price had been cheaper but the management had been run-of-the-mill, we would not have bought the business.

科恩公司的管理层，无论是人品，还是业务能力，都是一流的。虽说我当年在奥马哈的彭尼百货商店打过工，一小时赚 75 美分，积累了丰富的零售业经验（也成了关于《最低工资法案》的专家），科恩公司将仍有原来的管理层经营。要是管理层庸庸碌碌，就算科恩公司出售的价格更低，我们也不会买。

It is impossible to avoid some public notice when a business with several thousand employees is acquired. However, it is important that you do not infer the degree of financial importance to BPL from its news value to the public. We have something over $50 million invested, primarily in marketable securities, of which only about 10% is represented by our net investment in HK. We have an investment of over three times this much in a marketable security where our ownership will never come to public attention. This is not to say an HK is not important - a 10% holding definitely is. However, it is not as significant relative to our total operation as it would be easy to think. I still prefer the iceberg approach toward investment disclosure.

一家拥有几千名员工的公司被收购，这样的事肯定会上新闻。但是，各位注意，别因为这笔投资上新闻了，就以为它在我们的整体投资中举足轻重。我们合伙基金主要投资的是有价证券，总投资金额是 5000 多万美元，其中投资科恩公司所占的比例只有 10% 左右。有一只有价证券，它在我们的投资组合中所占比例是科恩公司的三倍多，但是这笔投资肯定不会上新闻。我不是说科恩公司这笔投资不重要，占总投资 10% 怎么能不重要，只是这笔投资给各位的感觉可能是在我们的整体投资中占的比重很大，其实不然。关于披露投资活动，我还是喜欢只露出冰山一角。

It is my intention to value HK at yearend at cost plus our share of retained earnings since purchase. This policy will be followed in future years unless there is a demonstrable change in our position relative to other department stores or in other objective standards of value. Naturally we wouldn't have purchased HK unless we felt the price was quite attractive. Therefore, a valuation policy based upon cost may somewhat undervalue our holdings. Nevertheless, it seems the most objective figure to apply. All of our investments usually appear undervalued to me - otherwise we wouldn't own them.

今年年末，在评估科恩公司的价值时，我打算用买入成本加上我们买入后分得的留存收益。除非与其他百货公司相比，科恩公司发生了重大变化，或除非按照其他客观价值标准衡量，科恩公司发生了重大变化，今后我们将一直按照这个方法给科恩公司估值。要是我们觉得科恩公司的价格不便宜，我们不会买。按买入成本价给科恩公司估值，多少是低估了的。但在各种估值方法中，这个方法最客观。在我看来，我们投资的基本都是低估的，否则我们也不会买的。

Ground Rule No.6 (from our November packet) says: “I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”

“基本原则”第六条：“我做的是投资，不是预测股市涨跌或经济波动。如果你觉得我能预测出来，或者认为不预测就做不了投资，合伙基金不适合你。”

Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex, ambiguous, vague, etc. Nevertheless, I think the point is well understood by the great majority of our partners. We don't buy and sell stocks based upon what other people think the stock market is going to do (I never have an opinion) but rather upon what we think the company is going to do. The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.

有人可能会说这条原则模糊、含混、不明确。我个人认为，绝大多数合伙人明白我说的是什么意思。我们买卖股票，不管别人对股市的预测（我从来不知道怎么预测），只分析公司的未来。我们什么时候对，主要取决于股市的走势。我们到底对不对，主要取决于我们对公司的分析是否准确。换言之，我们集中精力研究的是将来会发生什么，不是什么时候发生。

In our department store business I can say with considerable assurance that December will be better than July. (Notice how sophisticated I have already become about retailing.) What really counts is whether December is better than last December by a margin greater than our competitors' and what we are doing to set the stage for future Decembers. However, in our partnership business I not only can't say whether December will be better than July, but I can't even say that December won't produce a very large loss. It sometimes does. Our investments are simply not aware that it takes 365-1/4 days for the earth to make it around the sun. Even worse, they are not aware that your celestial orientation (and that of the IRS) requires that I report to you upon the conclusion of each orbit (the earth's - not ours). Therefore, we have to use a standard other than the calendar to measure our progress. This yardstick is obviously the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow. We have a strong feeling that this competitor will do quite decently over a period of years (Christmas will come even if it's in July) and if we keep beating our competitor we will have to do something better than "quite decently". It's something like a retailer measuring his sales gains and profit margins against Sears' - beat them every year and somehow you'll see daylight.

对于我们的百货公司，我基本上可以肯定地说，12 月份的经营状况会比 7 月份好。（怎么样，我对零售业已经很在行了吧？）最重要的是，今年 12 月份的情况与去年 12 月份相比如何，利润率是否领先竞争对手，怎么才能给明年后年的 12 月份打好基础。至于我们合伙基金的投资活动，我根本不知道今年 12 月份是否能比 7 月份更好，甚至都不敢保证 12 月份不会严重亏损，年底亏损的情况也不是没有。我们投资的股票可不知道地球围绕太阳公转一周是 365.25 天。股票哪里知道，地球每公转完一周，我就要写总结报告，递交给你们和国税局。所以说，我们不能用日历年来衡量我们的业绩，必须要选个别的标准。最合适的衡量标准当然就是道指，因为它可以代表投资股票的普遍业绩。对于道指这个竞争对手，我们认为它的长期表现会相当好。为了打败它，我们必须比“相当好”更上一层楼。这就像在零售业里，大家都和西尔斯百货比销售额和利润率，只要每年都胜过西尔斯，早晚会脱颖而出。

I resurrect this "market-guessing" section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind: (1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in on it then; and, (2) if they didn't know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points: (1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you – or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn't look so clear in retrospect.

我为什么老调重弹，又讲“猜测市场”这个问题？因为道指二月份达到 995 点的高位，此后到五月份跌到 865 点，有几个合伙人给我打电话，他们告诉我股市会继续跌。每次遇到这种情况，我总会想到这两点：(1) 要是他们在二月份的时候早知道五月份能跌到 865 点，为什么当时不告诉我？ (2) 既然他们二月份时不知道接下来三个月会怎样，现在五月份就能知道了？每次市场跌个一百点左右，总会有一两个人告诉我，先抛了，等跌势缓和了再买回来。我还是想说两点：(1) 未来会怎样，我从来都看不透（要是什么时候，你真知道今后几个月或接下来几个小时会怎样，请打电话告诉我们）；(2) 每次市场涨个一百多点的时候，从来没人找我，没人说未来不明朗。现在回头看，二月份的时候，未来的方向真就不明朗。

If we start deciding, based on guesses or emotions, whether we will or won't participate in a business where we should have some long run edge, we're in trouble. We will not sell our interests in businesses (stocks) when they are attractively priced just because some astrologer thinks the quotations may go lower even though such forecasts are obviously going to be right some of the time. Similarly, we will not buy fully priced securities because "experts" think prices are going higher. Who would think of buying or selling a private business because of someone's guess on the stock market? The availability of a question for your business interest (stock) should always be an asset to be utilized if desired. If it gets silly enough in either direction, you take advantage of it. Its availability should never be turned into a liability whereby its periodic aberrations in turn formulate your judgments. A marvelous articulation of this idea is contained in chapter two (The Investor and Stock Market Fluctuations) of Benjamin Graham's "The Intelligent Investor". In my opinion, this chapter has more investment importance than anything else that has been written.

一个公司，长期投资投资的话，我们会有优势，但是如果我们根据猜测或情绪决定是否投资，那就完了。无论是我们投资的公司，还是买的股票，价格低廉的时候，就算某些算命的说价格会继续跌，我们也不会卖，虽然它们肯定有蒙对的时候。同样的道理，有的股票，价格已经很高，就算某些“专家”宣称还会涨，我们也不会买。如果公司是自家的，怎么可能听信股市上别人的猜测来决定买卖？别人给你的股权（股票）报价，这是好事，要善于利用。什么时候看到报价高或低得离谱，你就从中获利。别让频繁失常的报价左右了自己的判断，别把本来的优势变成羁绊自己的劣势。在《聪明的投资者》这本书的第二章（投资者与市场波动）中，本杰明•格雷厄姆强有力地阐述了这个理念。我个人认为，在所有关于投资的著述中，这个章节的重要性无出其右。

We will have a letter out about November 1 with the Commitment Letter for 1967 and an estimate of the 1966 tax situation.

我们将在 11 月 1 日左右寄出 1967 年承诺书以及 1964 年纳税估算数据等文件。

Cordially,

Warren Buffett

沃伦·巴菲特谨上