原文信息：

• 标题：1966 Annual Letter to Partners
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：1967-01-25
• 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
• 中文翻译参考：RanRan
• 整理：孙萧萧

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.

610 KIEWIT PLAZA

OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131

TELEPHONE 042-4110

January 25, 1967

The Partnership had its tenth anniversary during 1966. The celebration was appropriate -an all-time record (both past and future) was established for our performance margin relative to the Dow. Our advantage was 36 points which resulted from a plus 20.4% for the Partnership and a minus 15.6% for the Dow.

1966 年是合伙基金成立十周年。这一年，我们创造了我们领先道指的最高纪录（这是过去的最高纪录，也是将来的最高纪录），这是献给成立十周年最好的礼物。合伙基金上涨 20.4%，道指下跌 15.6%，我们领先 36 个百分点。

This pleasant but non-repeatable experience was partially due to a lackluster performance by the Dow. Virtually all investment managers outperformed it during the year. The Dow is weighted by the dollar price of the thirty stocks involved. Several of the highest priced components, which thereby carry disproportionate weight (Dupont, General Motors), were particularly poor performers in 1966. This, coupled with the general aversion to conventional blue chips, caused the Dow to suffer relative to general investment experience, particularly during the last quarter.

我们之所以能取得如此喜人且无法重现的成绩，一部分原因是道指表现欠佳。1966 年，几乎所有基金经理都跑赢了道指。道指是按照 30 只成分股的市值加权计算出来的。市值最高的几只成分股可以左右指数（例如，杜邦和通用汽车），但它们去年跌得很惨。另外，人们普遍回避传统的蓝筹股，导致道指表现比一般投资水平逊色，这个现象在最后一个季度尤其明显。

The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:

下面是道指收益率、普通合伙人分成前合伙基金收益率（收益超过 6% 的部分，普通合伙人提取 25%）以及有限合伙人收益率的最新逐年对比情况。

(1)  Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.

(1) 根据道指年度涨跌计算，其中包含股息。表格中为合伙基金整年运作的年份。

(2)  For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

(2) 1957-61 年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。

(3)  For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement. but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

(3) 1957-61 年的数据按前一列合伙基金收益率计算得出，按照当前合伙协议，扣除了普通合伙人分成，未计算有限合伙人的每月提现。

On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:

下表是累计收益率或复合收益率：

On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.

我们一直拿股票投资占 95-100% 的最大的两只开放式股票型基金（共同基金）和分散投资的最大的两只封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率做对比。与往常一样，下面是最新对比情况。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。

(2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for 1966.

(2) 来源：1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-65。1966 年数据为估算值。

These investment company performance figures have been regularly reported here to show that the now is no patsy as an investment standard. It should again be emphasized that the companies were not selected on the basis of comparability to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. There are important differences including: (1) investment companies operate under both internally and externally imposed restrictions on their investment actions that are not applicable to us; (2) investment companies diversify far more than we do and, in all probability, thereby have less chance for a really bad performance relative to the now in a single year; and (3) their managers have considerably less incentive for abnormal performance and greater incentive for conventionality.

之所以在每年的信里都列出基金公司的业绩，是为了说明道指作为衡量投资业绩的指数，不是那么容易战胜的。我有必要重复一下。虽然我们选这些基金公司进行对比，但是它们和巴菲特合伙基金有很多差异。例如：(1) 基金公司的投资活动，受许多内部和外部因素的限制，我们则没这些限制；(2) 基金公司投资的分散程度远远高于我们。任何一年，与道指相比，它们相对收益极差的可能性比我们小。(3) 按照这些基金公司的激励机制，它们的经理人更愿意随大流，没我们这么大的动力去追求出类拔萃的业绩。

However, the records above do reveal what well-regarded, highly paid, full-time professional investment managers have been able to accomplish while working with common stocks. These managers have been favorites of American investors (more than 600,000) making free choices among many alternatives in the investment management field. It is probable that their results are typical of the overwhelming majority of professional investment managers.

职业基金经理受人尊敬、薪水丰厚。从上面的业绩记录中，我们可以看到他们投资股票的表现如何。投资管理领域有不少选择，这些基金经理承载了 60 多万美国投资者的寄托。或许绝大多数职业基金经理的业绩都是如此。

It is not true, however, that these are the best records achieved in the investment field. A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities. However, they are generally managed by very bright, motivated people and it is only fair that I mention the existence of such superior results in this general discussion of the record of professional investment management.

然而，这些基金经理的业绩不代表投资领域的最高水平。有一些基金和私募机构，它们创造的业绩记录远远领先道指，其中有些也远远高于巴菲特合伙基金。它们的投资方法一般和我们不一样，不在我的能力范围之内。但是，它们的管理人一般都很聪明、很努力。既然是在讨论职业基金经理的业绩，我就得如实告诉各位，确实有能取得超一流业绩的基金经理。

A keen mind working diligently at interpreting the figures on page one could come to a lot of wrong conclusions.

要是有谁很好奇，非常认真地解读第一页中的数字，他可能得出很多错误的结论。

The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated during the next decade. They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty-five year old working with $105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy.

第一个十年的业绩，在下一个十年里，我们绝对没任何机会复制甚至接近。我们起步时，我才 25 岁，充满饥饿感，最初管理的资金只有105,100 美元，在这十年的商业和市场环境里，我的投资理念如鱼得水。

They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty-six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership capital who presently finds perhaps one-fifth to one-tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement his investment philosophy.

十年之后，我现在已 36 岁，小有成就，合伙基金的规模达到 54,065,345 美元，虽然我的投资理念没变，但现在能找到的好机会只有以前的 10% 到 20%。

Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the Missouri. May 5. 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and $105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)

巴菲特合伙基金于 1956 年 5 月 5 日成立于密西西比河西岸。最初的几个合伙人都是我最坚定的支持者，四位家人，三个好朋友，我们一共投资了105,100 美元。（我找到了 1957 年 1 月的信，想从里面发现一两句闪光的话，能在这里引用一下。一定有人把我这封信给篡改了，要不里面的金句怎么没了？）

At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below the "value to a private owner" criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty-five issues and be enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.

合伙基金成立之初以及随后的几年里，按照我们低估类的标准，遍地都是远远低于产业资本所能给予的估值的股票。套利机会也接连涌现，都是胜算非常大的机会。机会太多，我都挑不过来了。于是，我们买入 15 到 25 个品种，构建胜券在握的组合。

In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. In the last three years we have come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance. Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution of one's own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment; (2) our increased size; and (3) substantially more competition.

过去几年里，环境彻底变了。现在我们基本找不到我能看懂、规模合适、而且符合每年收益率能领先道指 10 个百分点这个条件的投资机会。在过去三年里，我们每年只能找到两三个符合这个条件的新投资机会。好在我们充分利用了其中的一些机会。成立之初那几年，这样的机会，不怎么费劲就能找到一大把。自己发掘投资机会的能力降低了，很难做到客观地分析其中的原因。有三个原因是比较明显的：(1) 市场环境变化了；(2) 我们的规模增加了；(3) 竞争更加激烈了。

It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is only so much one can digest (million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar bank accounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years. However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.

过去的好机会像奔腾不止的大河，现在的好机会像潺潺流淌的小溪，现在的前景与过去相比，当然不能同日而语。这几年，没了奔腾的大河，从潺潺溪流中，我们也同样汲取了养分，没少赚钱。为什么？原因有两点：首先，一个人的饭量是有限的（几百万的资金才能利用的投资机会，对只有几千块钱的人来说没多大用，我年轻时对这一点感触很深）。其次，好机会越少，投资的时候就越珍惜，越要把少量的机会用好。显然，这几年我们靠的就是第二个原因。虽说如此，与大河相比，小溪太容易干涸。

These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don't go for the "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward "If you can't join ‘em, lick 'em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment decision. I know about as much about semi-conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz. (That's a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)

我不会因为现在的情况变了，就去做我不懂的投资。（有人说“斗不过，就入伙”，这不是我的作风，我是“不入伙，斗到底”。）有些投资机会，一定要懂高科技，我对高科技一无所知，就不做这样的投资。我对半导体和集成电路一无所知，就像我对 chrzaszcz 的交配习性一无所知。（同学们，chrzaszcz 是波兰的一种甲虫，要是你不会念这个词的话，请跟我读 thrzaszcz。）

Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called "fashion" investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.

在证券投资中，预测市场走势，忽略商业估值的行为经常盛行。我们不会效仿。近年来，这种投资风气经常能迅速赚大钱，就在我写这封信的这个月就是如此。这个投资方法是否合理？我无法证实，也无法否认。我的理智（或许是我的偏见）不认可这种投资方法，我的秉性也不适合这种投资方法。我不会拿自己的钱这么投资，也绝对不会拿各位的钱这么投资。

Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations, where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.

最后，有的投资，很可能产生严重的人际冲突，就算利润前景很可观，我们也不会做。

What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly so that we may all take alternative action.

有一点，我可以向各位合伙人保证，我将努力保住眼前的潺潺溪流，尽最大可能利用有限的机会。然而，如果溪流可能完全干涸，我会在第一时间如实相告，以便我们另寻出路。

All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1966. Specifically, we had a total overall gain of $8,906,701 derived as follows:

1966 年我们的四大类投资都表现不错。我们实现的总收益是 8,906,701 美元，具体如下：

A few caveats are necessary before we get on with the main discussion:

开始讨论之前，有几个地方需要说明一下：

1. An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition. we'll be glad to give you a copy.

1. 1965 年 1 月 18 日的信中介绍了上述各个投资类别。如果你需要回顾一下，在附近的报刊亭又买不到便携版，欢迎向我们索取。

2. The classifications are not iron-clad. Nothing is changed retroactively but the initial decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary.

2. 分类不是严丝合缝的。一笔投资归在哪个类别，事后不会更改，但最初归类时多少有些主观因素。

3. Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be understated relative to partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the above figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 150 on December 31 would have an average investment of 125 producing a 40% result contrasted to a 50% result by the customary approach. In other words, the above figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the average investment.

3. 计算合伙基金收益率时，我们以年初投资金额为基准。上述表格记录的是各类投资的平均投资金额，这样计算出来的收益率比实际低。例如，一只股票，我们 1 月 1 日以 100 美元买入，到 12 月 31 日，它上涨到 150 美元，则平均投资金额是 125 美元，收益率是 40%，而按照常用的计算方法，收益率则是 50%。换言之，上表中的平均投资金额是以每月的平均市值计算的。

4. All results are based on a 100% ownership, non-leverage, basis. Interest and other general expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category. When securities are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable average investment category.

4. 所有数字均按照 100% 自有资金、无杠杆的基础计算。利息和日常费用从总收益中扣除，不分摊到各个类别。与具体某笔投资直接相关的费用，例如，因做空股票而支付的股息，直接从相应类别中扣除。在涉及融券做空的情况下，计算平均投资金额时，用多头仓位减去空头仓位得出净投资金额。

5. The above table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non-homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.

5. 上述表格用处有限。各个投资类别的收益都主要是一两笔投资贡献的。如果你收集了大量稳定的数据（例如，美国男性的死亡率），就可以从中得出一些结论和预测，但我们的投资不是这么回事。我们在投资中面临的是一系列不知何时出现、各有不同特点的事件，我们要前思后想，琢磨各种可能性，然后做出决定。

6. Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely self-checking.

6. 最后，我们在进行上述计算时不像数钱时那么上心，再说这也算不上纯粹的自检，所以里面可能有笔误或计算错误。

There were three main sources of gain during 1966 in respect to controlled companies. These arose through: (1) retained business earnings applicable to our holdings in 1966; (2) open market purchases of additional stock below our controlling interest valuation and; (3) unrealized appreciation in marketable securities held by the controlled companies. The total of all positive items came to $2,600,838 in 1966.

就我们控股的公司而言，1966 年的收益主要有三个来源：(1) 1966 年归属于我们的留存收益；(2) 以低于我们控股权益的价值在公开市场买入更多股票；(3) 控股公司持有的有价证券的未实现增值。1966 年，控制类的总收益是 2,600,838 美元。

However, due to factors mentioned in my November 1, 1966 letter, specific industry conditions, and other relevant valuation items, this gain was reduced by $1,034,780 in arriving at our fair valuation applicable to controlling interests as of December 31, 1966. Thus the overall gain in the control category was reduced to $1,566,058 for the year.

如 1966 年 11 月 1 日信所述，受行业状况和其他一些与估值相关的因素影响，在计算 1966 年 12 月 31 日控股权益的公允价值时，我们进行了 1,034,780 美元的减值，因此 1966 年控制类的整体收益下降到 1,566,058 美元。

We were undoubtedly fortunate that we had a relatively high percentage of net assets invested in businesses and not stocks during 1966. The same money in general market holdings would probably have produced a loss, perhaps substantial, during the year. This was not planned and if the stock market had advanced substantially during the year, this category would have been an important drag on overall performance. The same situation will prevail during 1967.

1966 年，在我们的净资产中，我们对实体公司的投资高于对股票的投资，毫无疑问，在这一点上，我们占了便宜。如果将所有资金投入到股票中，我们今年可能会出现亏损，甚至是严重亏损。这不是事先有意为之。如果去年市场大涨，控制类可能严重拖累整体业绩。1967 年仍然如此。

Our performance here falls in the "twenty-one dollars a day, once a month" category. In the middle of 1965 we started purchasing a very attractive widely held security which was selling far below its value to a private owner. Our hope was that over a two or three year period we could get $10 million or more invested at the favorable prices prevailing. The various businesses that the company operated were understandable and we could check out competitive strengths and weaknesses thoroughly with competitors, distributors, customers, suppliers, ex-employees, etc. Market conditions peculiar to the stock gave us hope that, with patience, we could buy substantial quantities of the stock without disturbing the price.

我们这类投资的表现就像 “一天工资 21 美元，一个月就发一天的”。1965 年年中，我们开始买入一只公众大量持股的股票，它价格非常便宜，远远低于产业资本所能给予的估值。当时，我们希望可以一直有这个价格，在两三年的时间里，能买到 1000 万美元以上的货。这家公司的各项业务，我们能看懂。它的竞争优势和弱点，我们可以从竞争对手、经销商、客户、供应商和前员工那里了解到。按照当时这只股票的行情，我们觉得，耐心一些，在不抬高价格的情况下买到大量的货，还是很有希望的。

At yearend 1965 we had invested $1,956,980 and the market value of our holding was $2,358,412 so that $401,432 was contributed to performance luring 1965. We would have preferred, of course, to have seen the market below cost since our interest was in additional buying, not in selling. This would have dampened Buffett Partnerships Ltd.’s 1965 performance and perhaps reduced the euphoria experienced by limited partners (psychically, the net result to all partners would have been a standoff since the general partner would have been floating) but would have enhanced long term performance. The fact that the stock had risen somewhat above our cost had already slowed down our buying program and thereby reduced ultimate profit.

1965 年末，我们在这只股票上投入了 1,956,980 美元，持仓市值是 2,358,412 美元，它为 1965 年贡献了 401,432 美元的收益。因为我们还想接着买，不想卖，如果市场价格低于我们的成本价，那才好呢。果真如我所愿，它会拉低我们 1965 年的业绩，也会让有限合伙人的情绪比较低落（所有合伙人的整体情绪保持不变，因为普通合伙人会兴高采烈），但最后能给我们带来更高的长期业绩。这只股票涨了一些，现在高于我们的成本价了，我们已经放缓了买入的节奏，最后能赚到的利润减少了。

An even more dramatic example of the conflict between short term performance and the maximization of long term results occurred in 1966. Another party, previously completely unknown to me, issued a tender offer which foreclosed opportunities for future advantageous buying. I made the decision that the wisest course (it may not have been) for us to follow was to dispose of our holdings and we thus realized a total profit of $1,269,181 in February, of which $867,749 was applicable to 1966.

1966 年，从这笔投资的进展中，我们更能看出短期收益与长期收益之间的矛盾。有人对这只股票提出了要约收购，以后再也没机会低价买入了。我以前根本没听说过这个要约收购方。根据当时的情况，我们认为我们最好的选择（将来未必如此）是卖出。于是，二月份，我们兑现了 1,269,181 美元的总利润，其中 867,749 美元归属于 1966 年。

While any gains looked particularly good in the market environment that intimately developed in 1966, you can be sure I don't delight in going round making molehills out of mountains. The molehill, of course, was reflected in 1966 results. However, we would have been much better off from a long range standpoint if 1966 results had been five percentage points worse and we were continuing to buy substantial quantities of the stock at the depressed prices that might have been expected to prevail in this year's market environment.

1966 年的股市如何，我们都知道，在这样的市场环境里还能赚钱，那是相当抢眼了，但说真的，我不喜欢杀鸡取卵。1966 年的业绩可以说是杀鸡取卵的结果。如果我们 1966 年的业绩低五个百分点，如果在去年的市场环境中，这只股票还是价格低廉，我们能一直大量买入，从长远的角度考虑，我们最终获得的收益会远远更高。

Good ideas were a dime a dozen, such a premature ending would not be unpleasant. There is something to be said, of course, for a business operation where some of the failures produce moderate profits. However, you can see how hard it is to develop replacement ideas by examining our average investment in the Private Owner category - we came up with nothing during the remainder of the year despite lower stock prices, which should have been conducive to finding such opportunities.

要是好机会遍地都是，这样一笔投资提前收网也没什么。如果生意多的是，一两笔没做好，利润一般般，没多大关系。但是，看看我们的“低估类（基于产业资本视角）”中的平均投资额是多少，你就知道了。这笔投资结束后，新投资太难找了。去年卖出这只股票后，股市整体还是较低的，本来应该能比较容易找到投资机会，可我们一个新机会都没找到。

Our relative performance in this category was the best we have ever had - due to one holding which was our largest investment at yearend 1965 and also yearend 1966. This investment has substantially out-performed the general market for us during each year (1964, 1965, 1966) that we have held it. While any single year's performance can be quite erratic, we think the probabilities are highly favorable for superior future performance over a three or four year period. The attractiveness and relative certainty of this particular security are what caused me to introduce Ground Rule 7 in November, 1965 to allow individual holdings of up to 40% of our net assets. We spend considerable effort continuously evaluating every facet of the company and constantly testing our hypothesis that this security is superior to alternative investment choices. Such constant evaluation and comparison at shifting prices is absolutely essential to our investment operation.

去年，相对低估类取得了此类别设立以来的最高收益，主要得益于一笔投资，它是我们 1965 年末的规模最大的投资，也是我们 1966 年末规模最大的投资。我们持有这笔投资以来，它每年（1964、1965、1966）都遥遥领先大市。任何一年的表现都很难说，但是我们认为，把时间拉长到三四年，这笔投资将来取得优异表现的概率非常大。正是因为看好这只股票，而且比较有把握，1965 年 11 月，我在《基本原则》中加入了第七条，允许单笔投资最多占我们净资产的 40%。我们投入了大量精力，对这家公司各个方面的评估从未停止，与其他投资的比较从未停止，我们一直在在检验我们的结论是否正确，即这只股票是所有投资里的最佳选择。在我们的投资中，这种持续不断的评估和比较是必须的。

It would be much more pleasant (and indicate a more favorable future) to report that our results in the Generals -Relatively Undervalued category represented fifteen securities in ten industries, practically all of which outperformed the market. We simply don't have that many good ideas. As mentioned above, new ideas are continually measured against present ideas and we will not make shifts if the effect is to downgrade expectable performance. This policy has resulted in limited activity in recent years when we have felt so strongly about the relative merits of our largest holding. Such a condition has meant that realized gains have been a much smaller portion of total performance than in earlier years when the flow of good ideas was more substantial.

我当然希望能这样向各位报告（并告诉大家我对未来很看好）：我们的相对低估类投资包含 10 个行业中的 15 只股票，它们都跑赢了市场。我们根本没找到这么多好机会。刚才也说了，我们总是把新机会和已有机会做比较，如果新机会只能降低预期收益，我们不会将就。这几年，我们很看好我们持有的这笔规模最大的投资，没找到更好的，所以我们也没什么新的动作。早些年，好机会层出不穷，那时候实现的收益在总收益中占比较高，现在就少多了。

The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.

在相对低估类中，我们集中投资，所以必然给短期业绩带来巨大的波动，有些波动肯定是令人不快的。我向合伙人报告的周期是一年时间，其实在一年之内，我们有过较大的波动。报告的太频繁不是好事，我们的投资着眼于长远，总盯着短期业绩容易走偏。

Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.

就我个人而言，我坚持去年的信中谈分散时所说的理念，在此基础上，我愿意承受短期波动的痛苦（欢乐我都不谈），换取长期收益的最大化。但是，我不愿为了追求更高的长期收益，去承受严重的本金永久损失风险。我想把话说清楚：既然我们选择了集中持股的投资策略，合伙人就应当做好充分准备，我们的表现会有遥遥领先的时候（例如 1965 年和 1966 年），也会有远远落后的时候（特别是在市场大涨时），这是我们为了追求出色的长期表现而要付出的代价。

All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that “even five minutes is a long time if one's head is being held under water." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.

我总是谈长远，一位合伙人对我说“要是脑袋浸在水里，五分钟都太长”。没错，所以我们在投资中对于借钱谨小慎微。1966 年，我们从银行借贷的资金远低于合伙基金平均净值的 10%。

One final word about the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category. In this section we also had an experience which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term prospects. We had just one really important new idea in this category in 1966. Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to about $1.6 million (it could be bought steadily but at only a moderate pace) when outside conditions drove the stock price up to a point where it was not relatively attractive. Though our overall gain was $728,141 on an average holding period of six and a half months in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock done nothing for a long period of time while we accumulated a really substantial position.

关于相对低估类，还有一件事。在这个类别中，我们也经历了对去年业绩有利，但对长期业绩不利的情况。1966 年，我们在这个类别中只找到了一个新的大机会。我们是从去年三月份开始买的，但是刚投入了 160 万美元（当时这只股票一直能买到，但是买到的不多），外界情况就发生了变化，股价被抬高了，这只股票算不上相对低估了。这只股票，我们在 1966 年平均持有了六个半月，取得了 728,141 美元的总收益。要是它的价格能一直保持低迷，让我们持续大量买入，那该多好。

In last year's letter I forecast reduced importance for workouts. While they were not of the importance of some past years. I was pleasantly surprised by our experience in 1966 during which we kept an average of $7,666,314 employed in this category. Furthermore, we tend to ascribe borrowings to the workout section so that our net equity capital employed was really something under this figure and our return was somewhat better than the 22.4% indicated on page six. Here, too, we ran into substantial variation. At June 30, our overall profit on this category was $16,112 on an average investment of $7,870,151 so that we really had a case of an extraordinarily good second half offsetting a poor first half.

在去年的信中，我预测套利的重要性将降低。虽说套利没前几年贡献那么大了，1966 年我们平均能将 7,666,314 美元用于套利，这给了我一个惊喜。另外，因为我们在套利中使用一部分借来的资金，所以我们实际使用的净自有资本低于这个数字，我们的收益也比 22.4% 高一些。去年，在套利投资中，我们也经历了巨大的起伏。6 月 30 日，套利类平均投资 7,870,151 美元，整体利润 16,112 美元。由此可见，我们下半年的表现特别抢眼，弥补了上半年的黯淡。

In past years, sometimes as much as 30-40% of our net worth has been invested in workouts, but it is highly unlikely that this condition will prevail in the future. Nevertheless, they may continue to produce some decent returns on the moderate amount of capital employed.

前几年，套利类投资有时候占我们净资产的 30-40%，今后出现这种情况的可能性非常小了。虽然套利类能够吸纳的资金规模变小了，但应该仍能给我们带来良好的收益率。

Operationally, we continue to function well above rated capacity with Bill, John, Elizabeth and Donna all contributing excellent performances. At Buffett Partnership. Ltd. we have never had to divert investment effort to offset organizational shortcomings and this has been an important ingredient in the performance over the years.

运营方面，比尔、约翰、伊丽莎白和多娜，他们都工作出色，保证了我们高效运转。在巴菲特合伙基金，我们一直可以把精力集中到投资上，从来没因为基金组织结构的问题而分心，我们这些年取得的业绩与这一点密不可分。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., aided for the second year by their computer, turned in the usual speedy, efficient and comprehensive job.

去年是毕马威使用电脑审计的第二年，他们的工作一如既往地高效、细致。

We all continue to maintain more than an academic interest in the Partnership. The employees and I, our spouses and children, have a total of over $10 million invested at January 1, 1967. In the case of my family, our Buffett Partnership, Ltd. investment represents well over 90% of our net worth.

我们各位员工对合伙基金利益的关心不是口头上的。1967 年 1 月 1 日，合伙基金员工和我、还有我们的配偶、子女在合伙基金共投资 1000 多万美元。我自己家庭在合伙基金的权益占我们家庭净资产的 90% 以上。

Within the coming two weeks you will receive:

在今后两周，各位合伙人会收到如下文件：

1. A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1966 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.

1. 一份包含税收数据的信函，其中列有申报 1966 年联邦所得税所需的所有巴菲特合伙基金信息。

2. An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1966, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.

2. 毕马威会计师事务所出具的 1966 年审计报告，其中包含巴菲特合伙基金的运营数据和财务状况以及合伙人资本账户的信息。

3. A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1967. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.

3. 一份由我签署的、证明您于 1967 年 1 月 1 日持有巴菲特合伙基金权益的文件，其中的权益数据与审计报告中列出的数据一致。

Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 15 summarizing the first half of this year.

如果对信中内容有任何疑问，或者年中遇到任何问题，请随时与我联系。下一封信是上半年总结，各位将在  7 月 15 日左右收到。

Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett

沃伦 E. 巴菲特谨上

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