1967-10-09 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
October 9, 1967
To My Partners:
Over the past eleven years, I have consistently set forth as the BPL investment goal an average advantage in our performance of ten percentage points per annum in comparison with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Under the environment that existed during that period. I have considered such an objective difficult but obtainable.
在过去十一年里，我一直把 BPL 的投资目标设定为：相对于 Dow Jones Industrial Average，我们的业绩平均每年领先十个百分点。在当时那样的环境下，我一直认为，这个目标虽然困难，但可以达到。
The following conditions now make a change in yardsticks appropriate:
现在，以下这些情况使得调整衡量标准变得合适：
1. The market environment has changed progressively over the past decade, resulting in a sharp diminution in the number of obvious quantitatively based investment bargains available;
过去十年里，市场环境逐步发生变化，导致那种基于明显量化标准、显而易见的投资便宜货数量大幅减少；
2. Mushrooming interest in investment performance (which has its ironical aspects since I was among a lonely few preaching the importance of this some years ago) has created a hyper-reactive pattern of market behavior against which my analytical techniques have limited value;
人们对投资业绩的兴趣急剧膨胀（这件事带有几分讽刺意味，因为几年前我还是少数几个反复强调其重要性的人之一），由此形成了一种高度过度反应的市场行为模式，而在这种模式面前，我的分析方法发挥的作用有限；
3. The enlargement of our capital base to about $65 million when applied against a diminishing trickle of good investment ideas has continued to present the problems mentioned in the January, 1967 letter; and
当我们的资本规模扩大到约 6500 万美元，而可供投入的优质投资想法却在不断减少时，就持续出现我在 1967 年 1 月那封信中提到的问题；以及
4. My own personal interests dictate a less compulsive approach to superior investment results than when I was younger and leaner.
我个人兴趣的变化，也使我不再像自己年轻、精力更盛的时候那样，近乎强迫地追求更高的投资成绩。
Let's look at each of these factors in more detail.
下面逐一更详细地看这些因素。
The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. "Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent - his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group.
出于投资目的去评估证券和企业，一直都同时涉及定性因素和定量因素。在一个极端，完全偏重定性因素的分析师会说：“买对公司（有对的前景、行业内在条件、管理层等等），价格自然会照顾好自己。”而另一边，定量派则会说：“用对的价格买入，公司（和股票）自然会照顾好自己。”正如证券世界里常见而令人愉快的结果一样，这两种方法都可以赚到钱。当然，任何分析师多少都会把两者结合起来——他被归类到哪个学派，取决于他赋予各种因素的相对权重，而不是因为他完全只看一组因素、完全排除另一组因素。
Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a "high-probability insight". This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.
有意思的是，尽管我认为自己主要属于定量学派（而且写到这里时课间休息还没人回来——我可能是班里唯一剩下的人了），但这些年来我那些真正惊人的点子，往往都高度偏向定性一侧，也就是我对某件事产生了“高概率的洞见”的时候。这种情况才会让收银机真正唱起歌来。不过，这种事情并不常见，洞见通常本来就罕见；当然，在定量一侧并不需要什么洞见——那些数字本身就应该像一根棒球棍一样直接敲在你脑袋上。所以，真正的大钱往往是由那些在定性判断上判断正确的投资者赚到的；但至少在我看来，更稳当的钱通常来自那些显而易见的定量判断。
Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It may be due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it's vice versa - I'll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still may be a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance during the past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.
这类统计意义上的便宜货，这些年来一直在趋于消失。这可能是因为过去二十年里，投资标的被反复筛查、来回梳理，却没有出现像 1930 年代那样的经济大动荡，来制造一种对股票的普遍负面偏见，并由此催生出数以百计新的低价便宜证券。也可能是因为社会对于收购要约的接受度越来越高，因此其使用也越来越普遍（当然，也可能因果正好相反——这个就留给行为学家去研究吧），而 收购要约天生就倾向于瞄准便宜货。还可能是因为证券分析师队伍急剧膨胀，使得市场对各类证券的审视力度远远超过了若干年前。无论原因是什么，结果都是：按定量标准衡量的便宜证券几乎已经消失了——而这也意味着，我们赖以为生的东西几乎没了。偶尔也许还是会出现几个。也还会偶尔碰到某只证券，是我确实有能力对其作出重要定性判断的。这种机会会给我们带来获取大额利润的最佳可能。但这种情况终究很少见。过去三年里，我们相当一部分良好业绩，其实都来自这样一个单独的点子。
过去的1999-2015年，这是一个相类似的时期。
The next point of difficulty is the intensified interest in investment performance. For years I have preached the importance of measurement. Consistently I have told partners that unless our performance was better than average, the money should go elsewhere. In recent years this idea has gained momentum throughout the investment (or more importantly, the investing) community. In the last year or two it has started to look a bit like a tidal wave. I think we are witnessing the distortion of a sound idea.
下一个难点，是市场对投资业绩的关注显著强化了。多年来，我一直在强调衡量业绩的重要性。我也一贯告诉合伙人：除非我们的业绩高于平均水平，否则这笔钱就应该投向别处。近些年来，这个想法在整个投资界——或者更准确地说，在整个投资群体中——不断扩散、持续升温。而在最近一两年里，它已经开始有点像一股浪潮了。我认为，我们正在目睹一个原本正确的想法被扭曲。
I have always cautioned partners that I considered three years a minimum in determining whether we were "performing". Naturally, as the investment public has taken the bit in its teeth, the time span of expectations has been consistently reduced to the point where investment performance by large aggregates of money is being measured yearly, quarterly, monthly, and perhaps sometimes even more frequently (leading to what is known as "instant research"). The payoff for superior short term performance has become enormous, not only in compensation for results actually achieved, but in the attraction of new money for the next round. Thus a self-generating type of activity has set in which leads to larger and larger amounts of money participating on a shorter and shorter time span. A disturbing corollary is that the vehicle for participation (the particular companies or stocks) becomes progressively less important - at times virtually incidental - as the activity accelerates.
我一直提醒合伙人，在判断我们是否真正“有业绩”时，我认为三年是最短的观察期限。很自然地，随着投资公众越来越急切地扑向这个话题，大家预期的时间跨度也被不断压缩，直到如今，大规模资金的投资业绩已经被按年度、季度、月度，甚至有时按更高频率来衡量了（这就引出了所谓的“即时研究”）。短期业绩出色所带来的回报，已经变得极其巨大；这不仅体现在对已经实现结果的报酬上，也体现在它能够吸引下一轮新资金进入。于是，一种自我强化的活动模式就此形成：参与其中的资金规模越来越大，而考核和操作的时间跨度却越来越短。一个令人不安的推论是，随着这种活动加速，参与所借助的载体——也就是具体的公司或股票——变得越来越不重要，有时甚至几乎只是附带的。
In my opinion what is resulting is speculation on an increasing scale. This is hardly a new phenomenon; however, a dimension has been added by the growing ranks of professional (in many cases formerly quite docile) investors who feel they must “get aboard”. The game is dignified, of course, by appropriate ceremonies, personages and lexicon. To date it has been highly profitable. It may also be that this is going to be the standard nature of the market in the future. Nevertheless, it is an activity at which I am sure I would not do particularly well. As I said on page five of my last annual letter,
在我看来，最终形成的就是规模越来越大的投机。这并不是什么新现象；但如今又多了一层新的维度：越来越多职业投资者——其中很多人过去其实相当温顺克制——如今也觉得自己必须“上车”。当然，这个游戏也被各种恰当的仪式、人物和术语装点得颇为体面。到目前为止，它一直非常赚钱。也有可能，这将成为未来市场的常态。然而，不管怎样，我确信自己并不特别擅长这种活动。正如我在上一封年度信第五页所说的，
"Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called 'fashion' investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach – hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.”
“此外，我们不会采用那种如今相当流行的做法：在投资证券时，试图预判市场走势这件事，压倒了对企业价值的判断。近几年里，这种所谓的‘时髦式’投资，确实经常带来非常可观而且来得很快的利润（而且我在一月份写这封信时，这种情况仍在发生）。这代表的是一种投资方法，而它是否站得住脚，我既无法肯定，也无法否定。它并不能完全让我的理智信服（或者也许是我的偏见不肯信服），而且毫无疑问，它绝不符合我的性情。我不会按照这种方式来投资我自己的钱——因此，我当然更不会拿你们的钱这样做。”
Any form of hyper-activity with large amounts of money in securities markets can create problems for all participants. I make no attempt to guess the action of the stock market and haven't the foggiest notion as to whether the Dow will be at 600, 900 or 1200 a year from now. Even if there are serious consequences resulting from present and future speculative activity, experience suggests estimates of timing are meaningless. However, I do believe certain conditions that now exist are likely to make activity in markets more difficult for us for the intermediate future.
任何拿大量资金在证券市场里进行高度活跃操作的做法，都会给所有参与者制造问题。我从不试图猜测股市接下来会怎么走，也完全不知道一年之后 Dow 会在 600、900，还是 1200。即使当前和未来的投机活动最终会带来严重后果，经验也表明，对时点的判断毫无意义。不过，我确实相信，眼下已经存在的一些条件，很可能会让我们在未来中期这段时间里的市场操作变得更加困难。
The above may simply be "old-fogeyism" (after all, I am 37). When the game is no longer being played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, etc. I have been scornful of such behavior by others in the past. I have also seen the penalties incurred by those who evaluate conditions as they were - not as they are. Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.
上面这些话，也许不过是一种“老顽固”心态罢了（毕竟，我才 37 岁）。当这个游戏已经不再按你的方式来玩时，人总会很自然地说，新方法全是错的，迟早会出问题，诸如此类。过去，我一向瞧不起别人这种反应。我也同样见过另一类人付出的代价：他们评估局势时，依据的是过去的样子，而不是现在的样子。归根结底，我与当前的市场环境确实有些脱节。不过，有一点我很明确：我不会放弃一种我理解其内在逻辑的方法——哪怕这种方法如今已经很难应用——转而去拥抱另一种我并不真正理解、也从未成功实践过、而且还有可能导致重大永久性资本损失的方法；即便前者意味着我要放弃那些看起来又大又容易赚的利润。
The third point of difficulty involves our much greater base of capital. For years my investment ideas were anywhere from 110% to 1000% of our capital. It was difficult for me to conceive that a different condition could ever exist. I promised to tell partners when it did and in my January, 1967 letter had to make good on that promise. Largely because of the two conditions previously mentioned, our greater capital is now something of a drag on performance. I believe it is the least significant factor of the four mentioned, and that if we were operating with one-tenth of our present capital our performance would be little better. However, increased funds are presently a moderately negative factor.
第三个难点，在于我们的资本基础已经大得多了。多年以来，我手里的投资想法，规模通常相当于我们资本的 110% 到 1000%。我过去很难想象，居然会出现一种不同的情形。我曾答应过合伙人，一旦这种情况出现，我会告诉大家；而在 1967 年 1 月的那封信里，我不得不兑现这个承诺。很大程度上，由于前面提到的那两个条件，我们如今更大的资本规模，已经在一定程度上拖累了业绩。我认为，在前面提到的四项因素里，这是最不重要的一项；而且我也认为，就算我们现在运作的资本只有目前的十分之一，业绩也不会好出太多。不过，资金规模的增加，在当前确实是一个中度负面因素。
这之后的美国进入的恶性通胀的时期。
The final, and most important, consideration concerns personal motivation. When I started the partnership I set the motor that regulated the treadmill at "ten points better than the DOW". I was younger, poorer and probably more competitive. Even without the three previously discussed external factors making for poorer performance. I would still feel that changed personal conditions make it advisable to reduce the speed of the treadmill. I have observed many cases of habit patterns in all activities of life, particularly business, continuing (and becoming accentuated as years pass) long after they ceased making sense. Bertrand Russell has related the story of two Lithuanian girls who lived at his manor subsequent to World War I. Regularly each evening after the house was dark, they would sneak out and steal vegetables from the neighbors for hoarding in their rooms; this despite the fact that food was bountiful at the Russell table. Lord Russell explained to the girls that while such behavior may have made a great deal of sense in Lithuania during the war, it was somewhat out of place in the English countryside. He received assenting nods and continued stealing.
最后，也是最重要的一个考量，关乎个人动机。刚成立合伙企业时，我把那台调节跑步机速度的马达设在“比 DOW 高十个百分点”这一档。那时我更年轻，更穷，大概也更有竞争心。即使没有前面提到的那三个会压低业绩的外部因素，我仍然会认为，个人处境的变化已经使得把这台跑步机的速度调低一些，成为明智之举。我见过太多这样的例子：生活中各种领域，尤其是商业领域里的行为习惯，在它们早已失去合理性之后，仍会继续存在，甚至随着岁月流逝而变本加厉。Bertrand Russell 讲过一个故事：第一次世界大战之后，有两个 Lithuanian 女孩住在他的庄园里。每天晚上，天一黑，她们就会偷偷溜出去，从邻居那里偷些蔬菜，囤在自己房间里；尽管 Russell 家的餐桌上食物十分充裕。Lord Russell 向她们解释说，这种行为在战时的 Lithuania 也许非常说得通，但在英国乡间就多少有些不合时宜了。她们点头表示同意，然后继续去偷。
He finally contented himself with the observation that their behavior, strange as it might seem to the neighbors, was really not so different from that of the elder Rockefeller.
最后，他只能安慰自己说：她们的行为，虽然在邻居看来很奇怪，其实和老 Rockefeller 的做派也并没有太大不同。
结构化的思维方式、对边界的感知能力、“能力圈”，同一件事不同的表述方式，都源自于Basic trust。巴菲特在这里所描述的反例很多时候是一个认知的盲区，比如：
关于芒格的性格分析，我有一段自己的评价：
“对事物是否有效感兴趣”源自于想解决现实的问题，并且相信“正确答案是存在的”，最后指向的是专注；“理解一切”的出发点和目的地跟前者是不一样的，前者相信知识是收敛的，后者不相信知识是收敛的，即使被告之、被引导、被证明、甚至自己也同意是应该收敛的。
2、减肥
减肥是更普遍的例子，非常多的人都需要控制体重，也知道需要少吃、控制饮食，但又有几个人能够做到？减肥和巴菲特所描述的“偷菜的故事”、老 Rockefeller，以及芒格的“理解一切”都是一回事。
3、事实和幻觉
医疗、房地产、照顾弱势群体，都是部分事实和部分幻觉的混合，一开始的边界是清晰的，慢慢的开始模糊，后面就完全看不清边界了。
4、模糊的正确
巴菲特给企业估值的方法就是典型的例子：下行保护+上行收益，下行保护要有90%的把握，上行收益对应未来的变数，两者要有清晰的界线。
“模糊的正确”和结构化的思维方式有很大的联系，有些人在面对大量信息时会习惯性的做知识上的收敛，想办法收敛到一个简单的结构，然后将现实中的各种现象放在结构中，进入结构的现象是有边界的，也就有了“模糊的正确”。
Elementary self-analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all-out effort to achieve a publicly proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All-out effort makes progressively less sense. I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non-economic activity. This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return. More money would be made buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.
最起码的自我分析告诉我，对于那些把资本托付给我的人，只要我公开宣示了一个目标，我就不可能不用尽全力去实现它。而这种全力以赴，正变得越来越不合时宜。我希望自己拥有一个经济目标，这个目标能给相当多的非经济活动留出空间。这可能意味着去做一些投资领域之外的事情；也可能只是意味着，在投资领域内部，去走一些未必能带来最高经济回报的路子。后者的一个例子是：继续持有一家令人满意的控股企业——虽然它离“惊艳”还差得很远——只是因为我喜欢那里面的人，也喜欢这门生意本身，哪怕别的投资机会预期能提供更高的回报率。用有吸引力的价格买下企业，再转手卖掉，当然能赚更多钱。不过，继续持有它们，并希望通过一些涉及财务策略的决策，通常是以比较小的方式，去改善它们的经营表现，也许会更让人享受这一过程；尤其是在新增资本对个人的边际价值已经没那么高的时候。
Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have always operated with considerable conservatism. The long-term downside risk will not be less; the upside potential will merely be less.
因此，我今后很可能会把自己限制在那些相当容易、相当安全、有利可图而且做起来也愉快的事情上。这不会使我们的运作比过去更保守，因为我相信——当然这判断难免带有偏见——我们过去一直都已经相当保守。长期下行风险并不会因此变得更小；只是上行潜力会变得更小。
Specifically, our longer term goal will be to achieve the lesser of 9% per annum or a five percentage point advantage over the Dow. Thus, if the Dow averages -2% over the next five years, I would hope to average +3% but if the Dow averages +12%, I will hope to achieve an average of only +9%. These may be limited objectives, but I consider it no more likely that we will achieve even these more modest results under present conditions than I formerly did that we would achieve our previous goal of a ten percentage point average annual edge over the Dow. Furthermore, I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort (I'm quite sure the converse is true).
具体来说，我们的长期目标将改为：每年取得9%的回报，或者取得比 Dow 高五个百分点的回报，二者取其较低者。也就是说，如果未来五年 Dow 的平均回报是-2%，那我希望我们的平均回报能达到+3%；但如果 Dow 的平均回报是+12%，那我所希望达到的平均回报就只有+9%。这些目标也许算是受限的目标，但在当前条件下，我并不觉得我们实现这组较为温和结果的可能性，会比我当年相信我们能够实现“每年平均领先 Dow 十个百分点”这一旧目标的可能性更高。此外，我也希望，受限的目标会带来受限的努力程度（我很确定，反过来是成立的）。
BRK最初的假设。
I will incorporate this new goal into the Ground Rules to be mailed you about November 1, along with the 1968 Commitment Letter. I wanted to get this letter off to you prior to that mailing so you would have ample time to consider your personal situation, and if necessary get in touch with me to clear up some of the enclosed, before making a decision on 1968. As always, I intend to continue to leave virtually all of my capital (excluding Data Documents stock), along with that of my family, in BPL. What I consider satisfactory and achievable may well be different from what you consider so. Partners with attractive alternative investment opportunities may logically decide that their funds can be better employed elsewhere, and you can be sure I will be wholly in sympathy with such a decision.
我会把这个新目标写进大约11 月 1 日寄给各位的 Ground Rules 中，并随信附上1968 年 Commitment Letter。我想在那次邮寄之前，先把这封信寄给你们，这样你们就有充足时间去考虑自己的个人情况；如果有需要，也可以在决定1968 年安排之前，和我联系，把这封信里某些内容弄清楚。和往常一样，我打算继续把我几乎全部的资本（除了Data Documents的股票）连同我家人的资金，一起留在BPL。我认为令人满意且可以实现的目标，很可能和你认为的并不一样。那些拥有有吸引力替代投资机会的合伙人，完全可以合乎逻辑地决定，把自己的资金配置到别处去；而你们可以确信，我会完全理解并赞同这样的决定。
I have always found behavior most distasteful which publicly announces one set of goals and motivations when actually an entirely different set of factors prevails. Therefore, I have always tried to be l00% candid with you about my goals and personal feelings so you aren't making important decisions pursuant to phony proclamations (I've run into a few of these in our investment experience). Obviously all the conditions enumerated in this letter haven't appeared overnight. I have been thinking about some of the points involved for a long period of time. You can understand, I am sure, that I wanted to pick a time when past goals had been achieved to set forth a reduction in future goals. I would not want to reduce the speed of the treadmill unless I had fulfilled my objectives to this point.
我一向最厌恶这样一种行为：公开宣示的是一套目标和动机，而实际上起作用的却完全是另一套因素。因此，我一直尽力对你们 100% 坦诚，把我的目标和个人感受如实告诉你们，免得你们依据虚假的宣示去作出重要决定（在我们的投资经历里，我已经碰到过一些这样的事）。显然，这封信里列举的所有情况，并不是一夜之间突然出现的。这里涉及的有些问题，我已经思考了很长时间。我相信你们能够理解：我之所以选择在过去目标已经实现的时候，提出下调未来目标，是有意为之。除非我已经完成了截至目前为止的目标，否则我不会愿意把这台跑步机的速度降下来。
Please let me know if I can be of any help in deciphering any portion of this letter.
如果这封信中有任何部分你需要我帮忙解释，请告诉我。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
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