1977-03-21 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
原文信息：
- 标题：1976 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1977-03-21
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Terrellchen
- 校译：
To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
After two dismal years, operating results in 1976 improved significantly. Last year we said the degree of progress in insurance underwriting would determine whether our gain in earnings would be “moderate” or “major.” As it turned out, earnings exceeded even the high end of our expectations. In large part, this was due to the outstanding efforts of Phil Liesche’s managerial group at National Indemnity Company.
经历了两年的惨淡业绩后，1976 年经营业绩明显改善。去年我们预计保险承保的进展程度将决定我们收益的大小。最终收益超过了我们的最高预期。这在很大程度上取决于国民保险菲尔·列舍 (Phil Liesche) 管理团队的杰出努力。
In dollar terms, operating earnings came to $16,073,000, or $16.47 per share. While this is a record figure, we consider return on shareholders’ equity to be a much more significant yardstick of economic performance. Here our result was 17.3%, moderately above our long‐ term average and even further above the average of American industry, but well below our record level of 19.8% achieved in 1972.
以美元计，我们的经营收益达到 1607.3 万美元，或每股盈利 16.47 美元。尽管这是个创记录的数字，我们仍然认为股本回报率是衡量财务业绩的更重要的指标。本年我们的股本回报率为 17.3%，略高于我们的长期平均水平，甚至远高于美国工业的平均股权回报率，但远低于我们在 1972 年 19.8% 的创纪录水平。
Our present estimate, subject to all the caveats implicit in forecasting, is that dollar operating earnings are likely to improve somewhat in 1977, but that return on equity may decline a bit from the 1976 figure.
考虑到所有可能的不利因素，目前我们预计 1977 年的经营利润可能会有所增加，但股权回报率可能会比 1976 年略有下降。
Textile Operations 纺织业务
Our textile division was a significant disappointment during 1976. Earnings, measured either by return on sales or by return on capital employed, were inadequate. In part, this was due to industry conditions which did not measure up to expectations of a year ago. But equally important were our own shortcomings. Marketing efforts and mill capabilities were not properly matched in our new Waumbec operation. Unfavorable manufacturing cost variances were produced by improper evaluation of machinery and personnel capabilities. Ken Chace, as always, has been candid in reporting problems and has worked diligently to correct them. He is a pleasure to work with -- even under difficult operating conditions.
1976 年我们纺织部门经营非常令人失望。无论以销售利润率还是投入资本回报率来衡量，业绩都很差。部分原因是，行业状况没有达到一年前的预期，另外要归咎于我们自身的不足。我们新运营的 Waumbec 纺织工厂，营销和产能没能很好的匹配。对机器和员工能力判断错误导致了不利的生产成本偏差。Ken Chace 一如既往地坦诚汇报问题并努力的加以纠正。即使在运营艰难的情况下，与他一起工作也是一种乐趣。
While the first quarter outlook is for red ink, our quite tentative belief is that textile earnings in 1977 will equal, or exceed modestly, those of 1976. Despite disappointing current results, we continue to look for ways to build our textile operation and presently have one moderate‐size acquisition under consideration. It should be recognized that the textile business does not offer the expectation of high returns on investment. Nevertheless, we maintain a commitment to this division -- a very important source of employment in New Bedford and Manchester -- and believe reasonable returns on average are possible.
虽然一季度预期会亏损。我们初步预计 1977 年纺织业务的盈利将与 1976 年持平或略高。尽管目前的业绩不尽如人意，我们仍在寻找巩固纺织业务的方法，并正在考虑一个中等规模的收购。应当承认纺织业务无法提供一个高的投资回报预期。然而，我们恪守着社会责任，因为它是 New Bedford 和 Manchester 的重要就业来源，我们相信未来获得平均的合理回报是可能的。
Insurance Underwriting 保险承保业务
Casualty insurers enjoyed some rebound from the disaster levels of 1975 as rate increases finally outstripped relentless cost increases. Preliminary figures indicate that the stockholder owned portion of the property and casualty industry had a combined ratio of 103.0 in 1976, compared to 108.3 in 1975. (100 represents a break‐even position on underwriting—and higher figures represent underwriting losses.) We are unusually concentrated in auto lines where stock companies had an improvement from 113.5 to 107.4. Our own overall improvement was even more dramatic, from 115.4 to 98.7.
由于 1975 年的保险业的灾难，使得保险的费率上涨超过了残酷的成本上涨，财产意外险公司从 1975 年的困难运营中有所恢复。初步结果显示，我们所拥有的财产意外险公司 1976 年的综合成本率为 103%，1975 年为 108.3%。 100% 是承保的盈亏平衡点，综合成本率高于 100 代表承保亏损。我们非常关注车险业务，本年其他车险公司的综合成本率从 113.5% 下降到 107.4%，我们自身的整体改善则更为显著，综合成本率从 115.4% 下降到 98.7%。
Our major insurance sector in insurance, the traditional auto and general liability business of National Indemnity Company, had an outstanding year, achieving profit levels significantly better than the industry generally. Credit for this performance must be given to Phil Liesche, aided particularly by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims.
我们在保险业最主要的部分，国民保险公司的传统业务今年业绩非常好，实现利润显著高于行业平均水平。这要归功于菲尔·列舍 (Phil Liesche) 的领导及承保方面的 Roland Miller 和索赔方面的 Bill Lyons 的出色工作。
Volume at National Indemnity Company grew rapidly during 1976 as competitors finally reacted to the inadequacy of past rates. But, as mentioned in last year’s annual report, we are concentrated heavily in lines that are particularly susceptible to both economic and social inflation. Thus present rates, which are adequate for today, will not be adequate tomorrow. Our opinion is that before long, perhaps in 1978, the industry will fall behind on rates as temporary prosperity produces unwise competition. If this happens, we must be prepared to meet the next wave of inadequate pricing by a significant reduction in volume.
1976 年，竞争对手终于意识到以往费率过低而大幅提价，因此国民保险公司的承保保费大增。但正如去年年报中所提到的，我们直接保险主要集中在特别容易受到经济和社会通胀影响的领域。目前的费率充足，明天就不一定了。我们的看法是不久以后，可能在 1978 年，随着市场的短期繁荣造成的不明智的竞争可能使整个行业在费率上落后于通胀水平。那样的话，我们就要准备好迎接又一波定价不足的冲击，我们的承保保费会大幅下降。
Reinsurance underwriting has lagged the improvement in direct business. When mistakes are made in the pricing of reinsurance, the effects continue for even longer than when similar mistakes are made in direct underwriting. George Young, an outstanding manager, has worked tirelessly to achieve his goal of profitable underwriting, and has cancelled a great many contracts where appropriate rate adjustments were not obtainable. Here, as in the direct business, we have had a concentration in casualty lines which have been particularly hard hit by inflationary conditions. The near term outlook still is not good for our reinsurance business.
再保险业务滞后于直接保险业务的改善。当再保险定价出现错误时，其影响持续的时间甚至比直接承保中出现类似错误的时间还要长。 George Young 是一个优秀的经理人，他为实现承保盈利的目标而不懈努力，他取消了许多费率不能进行合理调整的保单。像直接保险业务一样，我们过度集中于受通货膨胀影响特别严重的意外险领域。近期前景仍然不利于我们的再保险业务。
Our “home state” operation continues to make substantial progress under the management of John Ringwalt. The combined ratio improved from 108.4 in 1975 to 102.7 in 1976. There still are some excess costs reflected in the combined ratio which result from the small size of several operations. Cornhusker Casualty Company, oldest and largest of the home state companies, was the winner of the Chairman’s Cup in 1976 for achievement of the lowest loss ratio among the home state companies. Cornhusker also achieved the lowest combined ratio in its history at 94.4, marking the fifth time in its six full years of existence that a ratio below 100 has been recorded. Premium growth was 78% at the home state companies in 1976, as market position improved significantly. We presently plan a new home state operation later this year.
在 John Ringwalt 的管理下，我们的住宅保险业务 (Home-State) 继续取得了实质性进展。综合成本率从 1975 年的 108.4% 下降到 1976 年的 102.7%。由于一些公司规模太小，综合成本率里仍然存在超额成本。内布拉斯加意外险 (Cornhusker) 是该业务中历史最久、规模最大的公司，也是 1976 年业绩最好的一个，它在这些公司中赔付率最低。同时，综合比率 94.4% 也是史上最低的，这是它成立六年来第五次综合比率在 100% 以下了。 1976 年随着市场地位的显著提升，Home-State 业务保费收入增长率达到了 78%。目前我们计划在今年晚些时候成立一家新的 Home-State 保险公司。
Our Home and Automobile Insurance Company subsidiary, writing primarily automobile business in the Cook County area of Illinois, experienced a strong recovery in 1976. This is directly attributable to John Seward who, in his first full year, has revamped significantly both rating methods and marketing. The auto business has been shifted to a six month direct bill policy, which permits a faster reaction time to underwriting trends. Our general liability business at Home and Automobile has been expanded significantly with good results. While it remains to be proven that we can achieve sustained underwriting profitability at Home and Auto, we are delighted with the progress John Seward has achieved.
我们的附属公司家庭汽车保险 (Home & Auto)，主要在伊利诺伊州库克县地区经营汽车业务，在 1976 年经历了一个强劲复苏。这要直接归功于 John Seward，在他任职的第一年就对市场营销和承保评定方法进行改革，并取得了不错的效果。车险业务已经修改为 6 个月为期的直接险种，这样我们就能对承保趋势有更快的反应了。我们家庭和汽车保险公司的一般责任险业务也显著扩张并取得了很好的业绩。虽然家庭和汽车保险公司能否取得持续的承保盈利仍有待证明，但我们对 John Seward 所取得的进展感到高兴。
Overall, we expect a good year in insurance in 1977. Volume is high and present rate levels should allow profitable underwriting. Longer term, however, there are significant negatives in the insurance picture. Auto lines, in particular, seem highly vulnerable to pricing and regulatory problems produced by political and social factors beyond the control of individual companies.
总的来说，我们预计 1977 年将是保险业的好年景。目前承保量很高且费率应该可以获得承保盈利。然而长远来看，保险行业有很多不利因素。特别是车险业务，它看起来极易受个别公司无法控制的政策和社会因素所引发的定价和管理问题的影响。
Insurance Investments 保险投资业务
Pre‐tax investment income in 1976 improved to $10,820,000 from $8,918,000 as invested assets built up substantially, both from better levels of profitability and from gains in premium volume.
1976 年由于保费收入增加和承保盈利，可投资资产显著增长，保险投资的税前投资收入从 891.8 万美元上升到 1082 万美元。
In recent reports we have noted the unrealized depreciation in our bond account, but stated that we considered such market fluctuations of minor importance as our liquidity and general financial strength made it improbable that bonds would have to be sold at times other than those of our choice. The bond market rallied substantially in 1976, giving us moderate net unrealized gains at yearend in the bond portfolios of both our bank and insurance companies. This, too, is of minor importance since our intention is to hold a large portion of our bonds to maturity. The corollary to higher bond prices is that lower earnings are produced by the new funds generated for investment. On balance, we prefer a situation where our bond portfolio has a current market value less than carrying value, but more attractive rates are available on issues purchased with newly‐generated funds.
在最近的报告中，我们提到了债券账户上的未实现减值，但我们认为这些市场波动的影响是次要的，因为我们的流动性和财务实力使我们不太可能在不恰当的时机卖出这些债券。在 1976 年，债券市场大幅上扬，这使得我们的银行和保险公司拥有的债券组合的年末未实现收益有微幅上升。这也是次要的，因为我们的目的是将大部分债券持有到期。较高债券价格的必然结果是新投资的资金的收益会下降。总的来说，我们更喜欢我们的债券市值小于其账面价值。这样再投资时就能获得更有吸引力的回报率。
Last year we stated that we expected 1976 to be a year of realized capital gains and, indeed, gains of $9,962,000 before tax, primarily from stocks, were realized during the year. It presently appears that 1977 also will be a year of net realized capital gains. We now have a substantial unrealized gain in our stock portfolio as compared to a substantial unrealized loss several years ago. Here again we consider such market fluctuations from year to year relatively unimportant; unrealized appreciation in our equity holdings, which amounted to $45.7 million at yearend, has declined by about $5 million as this is written on March 21st.
去年我们提到，预计 1976 年将会实现资本收益。事实上，我们在 1976 年获得了的 996.2 万美元的税前资本收益，主要来自股票投资。现在看来，1977 年同样是实现净资本收益的一年。与前几年大量未实现亏损相比，我们的股票投资组合现在有大量未实现收益，我们依然认为年复一年的市场波动相对而言并不重要。我们股票组合中的未实现资本收益，年终高达 4570 万美元，在我们 3 月 21 日写这封信时已经下降了 500 万美元。
However, we consider the yearly business progress of the companies in which we own stocks to be very important. And here, we have been delighted by the 1976 business performance achieved by most of our portfolio companies. If the business results continue excellent over a period of years, we are certain eventually to achieve good financial results from our stock holdings, regardless of wide year‐to‐year fluctuations in market values.
然而，我们认为所投资公司业务的进展是非常重要的。1976 年，我们对大多数投资组合公司的优秀业绩表示满意。如果公司未来几年业绩继续如此出色的话，我们肯定能从股票投资中取得丰厚的回报，而每年的股市波动是无关紧要的。
Our equity holdings with a market value of over $3 million on December 31, 1976 were as follows:
我们在 1976 年 12 月 31 日持有的超过 300 万美元的投资如下：
You will notice that our major equity holdings are relatively few. We select such investments on a long-term basis, weighing the same factors as would be involved in the purchase of 100% of an operating business: (1) favorable long-term economic characteristics; (2) competent and honest management; (3) purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner; and (4) an industry with which we are familiar and whose long-term business characteristics we feel competent to judge. It is difficult to find investments meeting such a test, and that is one reason for our concentration of holdings. We simply can't find one hundred different securities that conform to our investment requirements. However, we feel quite comfortable concentrating our holdings in the much smaller number that we do identify as attractive.
你会发现，我们的主要持股相对较少。我们基于公司的长期表现进行投资，并会仔细考虑如果 100% 收购整个公司所要考虑的因素： (1) 良好的长期经济护城河； (2) 称职且诚实的管理层； (3) 以私有化的标准来衡量，价格具有吸引力； (4) 我们所熟悉的行业，我们能判断其长期的经济特征。寻找到符合我们标准的公司很困难，这也是我们喜欢集中持股的原因之一。我们无法找到一百只满足我们投资标准的股票。然而，我们觉得集中持有少量我们已确认有吸引力的股票是非常舒适的。
Our intention usually is to maintain equity positions for a long time, but sometimes we will make a purchase with a shorter expected time horizon such as Kaiser Industries. Here a distribu- tion of securities and cash from the parent company is expected to be initiated in 1977. Purchases were made in 1976 after the announcement of the distribution plan by Kaiser management.
我们通常是打算长期持股，但有时我们也做短线投资，如对凯撒工业的投资。该公司预计 1977 年母公司将进行现金红利和股票红利的分配。在该公司管理层宣布了红利分配方案后，我们在 1976 年买入了这家公司的股票。
Banking 银行业务
Eugene Abegg, Chief Executive of Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, our banking subsidiary, continues to lead the parade among bankers - just as he has ever since he opened the bank in 1931.
我们附属银行伊利诺伊国民银行和伊利诺伊州的罗克福德信托投资公司的 CEO，Eugene Abegg 继续引领银行界，正如他在 1931 年银行刚成立时所做的一样。
Recentlv. National City Corp. of Cleveland, truly an outstandingly well-managed bank, ran an ad stating "the ratio of earnings to average assets was 1.34% in 1976 which we believe to be the best percentage for any major banking company." Among the really large banks this was the best earnings achievement but, at the Illinois National Bank, earnings were close to 50% better than those of National City, or approximately 2% of average assets.
最近，National City Corp.of Cleveland 克利夫兰国民城市公司，一家拥有真正出色管理的银行在一则广告中写道：" 1976 年我们平均资产收益率 ROA 为 1.34%，我们相信这是在所有主要银行公司中的最好水平。"在真正的大银行中这是最好的盈利业绩，但伊利诺伊国民银行的盈利比国民城市公司的盈利水平要高出接近 50%，平均资产收益率 ROA 大约为 2%。
This outstanding earnings record again was achieved while:
这一优秀的盈利记录是在以下措施的作用下再次实现的：
(1) paying maximum rates of interest on all consumer savings instruments (timedeposits now make up well over two-thirds of the deposit base at the Illinois National Bank),
(1) 所有客户储蓄工具支付了最高的利率(定期存款超过了总存款的三分之二)；
(2) maintaining an outstanding liquidity position (Federal funds sold plus U. S. Government and Agency issues of under six months' duration presently are approximately equal to demand deposits), and
(2) 保持了良好的流动性(出售的联邦基金加上目前买入的六个月以下美国政府债券规模大约等于活期存款总额)；
(3) avoiding high-yield but second-class loans (net loan losses in 1976 came to about $12,000, or 02% of outstanding loans, avery tiny fraction ofthe ratio prevailing in 1976in the banking industry).
(3) 避免高利率的二级贷款 (second-class loans 劣级贷款，1976 年贷款坏账约为 1.2 万美元，或着说 0.02% 的坏账率。这与 1976 年的银行界的现行坏账率相比非常小)。
Cost control is an importantfactor in the bank's success. Employment is still at about the level existing at the time of purchase in 1969 despite growth in consumer time deposits from $30 million to $90 million and considerable expansion in other activities such as trust, travel and data processing.
成本控制是银行成功的一个重要因素。尽管消费者定期存款从 3000 万上升到 9000 万，并在信托、旅行支票和数据处理等其他业务上有显著的扩张。该银行的雇员数量仍然保持在 1969 年购买它时的水平，
Blue Chip Stamps 蓝筹印花公司
During 1976 we increased ourinterest in Blue Chip Stamps, and by yearend we held about 33% uf that company's outstanding shares. Our interest in Blue Chip Stampsis of growing importance to us. Summary financial reports of Blue Chip Stampsare contained in the footnotes to our attached financial statements. Moreover, shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. are urged to obtainthe current and subsequent annual reports of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting them from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
1976 年我们增加了在蓝筹印花公司的权益，年底前我们已持有该公司 33% 的流通股。蓝筹印花的股权对我们日益重要。蓝筹印花的简要财务报告在我们所附的财务报表的脚注里。另外，伯克希尔公司的股东可以从蓝筹印花公司的秘书 Robert H. Bird 那里得到现在和后续的年报。他的地址是加利福尼亚州洛杉矶东南大道 5801 号蓝筹印花公司，邮编 90040。
Miscellaneous 其他杂项
K & W Products has performed well inits first year as asubsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.. Both sales and earnings were up moderately over 1975.
伯克希尔的子公司 K & W 第一年已表现出不错的业绩，销售额和利润较之 1975 年均有适度增长。
We have less than four years remaining to comply with the requirement that our bank be divested by December 31, 1980. We intend to accomplish such a divestiture in a manner that minimizes disruption to the bank and produces good results for our shareholders. Most probably this will involve a spin-off of bank shares in 1980.
按规定在 1980 年 12 月 31 日之前把我们的银行部门剥离出去，我们只有不到四年的时间。我们打算以一种对我们银行部门损害最小的方式完成这种剥离，并为股东赢得最大利益。最大的可能是我们以分拆上市的办法在 1980 年把我们的银行部门剥离出去。
We also hope at somepoint to merge with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc.. Both corporate simplification and enhanced ownership position in Blue Chip Stamps would bebenefits of such a merger. However, it is unlikely that anything will be proposed in this regard during 1977.
我们也希望在合适的时候对多元零售公司进行合并。这样的合并既有利于公司的简化，也有利于增强蓝筹印花的所有权地位。然而，与合并相关的各项任务都在 1977 年推行暂时是不可能的。
Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
沃伦·巴菲特 董事长
March 21, 1977
1977 年 3 月 21 日
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