1977-05 Warren Buffett.How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor

Refer To：《HOW INFLATION SWINDLES THE EQUITY INVESTOR》。

It is no longer a secret that stocks, like bonds, do poorly in an inflationary environment. We have been in such an environment for most of the past decade, and it has indeed been a time of troubles for stocks. But the reasons for the stock market’s problems in this period are still imperfectly understood.

众所周知，股票和债券一样，在通货膨胀环境下表现不佳。过去十年中的大部分时间里我们一直处于这样的环境中，而这确实是股票的困顿时期。但关于这一时期股市问题的成因，人们仍未完全理解。

There is no mystery at all about the problems of bondholders of in an era of inflation. When the value of the dollar deteriorates month after month, a security with income and principal payments denominated in those dollars isn’t going to be a big winner. You hardly need a Ph.D. in economics to figure that one out.

在通胀年代，债券持有人的困境一点也不神秘。若美元的价值月复一月地贬损，那么一项本息都以美元计价的证券不可能成为大赢家。得出这个结论并不需要经济学博士学位。

It was long assumed that stocks were something else. For many years, the conventional wisdom insisted that stocks were a hedge against inflation. The proposition was rooted in the fact that stocks are not claims against dollars, as bonds are, but represent ownership of companies with productive facilities. These, investors believed, would retain their value in real terms; let the politicians print money as they might.

长期以来，人们以为股票是另一回事。多年来，传统观点坚持认为股票是对抗通胀的对冲工具。这个命题基于这样的事实：股票不像债券那样是对美元的索取权，而是代表着拥有具备生产设施的公司的所有权。投资者相信，这些资产会在真实购买力层面保持其价值；哪怕政客们想怎么印钞就怎么印。

And why didn’t it turn out that way? The main reason, I believe, is that stocks, in economic substance, are really very similar to bonds.

而为何结果并非如此？我认为主要原因在于，从经济实质看，股票与债券其实非常相似。

I know that this belief will seem eccentric to many investors. They will immediately observe that the return on a bond (the coupon?) is fixed, while the return on an equity investment (the company’s earnings) can vary substantially from one year to another. True enough. But anyone who examines the aggregate that have been earned by companies during the postwar years will discover something extraordinary: The returns on equity have in fact not varied much at all.

我知道这个看法在许多投资者看来颇为离经叛道。他们会立刻指出，债券的回报（票息？）是固定的，而股票投资的回报（公司的盈利）则可能年与年之间大幅波动。确实如此。但任何研究战后企业总体所赚取回报的人都会发现一个非同寻常的事实：股本回报率其实并没有太大变化。

The Coupon Is Sticky

“票息”具有粘性

In the first ten years after the war—the decade ending in 1955—the Dow Jones Industrials had an average annual return on year-end equity of 12.8 percent. In the second decade, the figure was 10.1 percent. In the third decade it was 10.9 percent. Data for the larger universe, the Fortune 500 (whose history goes back only to the mid-1950’s) indicate somewhat similar results: 11.2 percent in the decade ending in 1965, 11.8 percent in the decade through 1975. The figures for a few exceptional years have been substantially higher (the high for the 500 was 14.1% in 1974) or lower (9.5 percent in 1958 and 1970), but over the years, and in the aggregate, the return on book value tends to keep coming back to a level around 12 percent. It shows no signs of exceeding that level significantly in inflationary years (or in years of stable prices, for that matter).

战后最初十年——以 1955 年结束的十年里——道琼斯工业指数公司以年末股本为口径的平均年度回报率为 12.8%。第二个十年是 10.1%。第三个十年是 10.9%。样本更广的《Fortune 500》（其历史仅可追溯到 20 世纪 50 年代中期）也显示了类似结果：截至 1965 年的十年为 11.2%，截至 1975 年的十年为 11.8%。个别年份的数值显著高一些（《Fortune 500》在 1974 年为 14.1%）或低一些（1958 年和 1970 年为 9.5%），但多年下来、从总体看，对账面价值的回报率总会回到大约 12% 这一水平。没有迹象表明在通胀年份（或物价稳定年份）会显著高于这个水平。

S&P500最近20年股本回报在18%左右，除2008年以外都很高，参考：《S&P 500 Earnings by Year》、《S&P 500 Book Value Per Share by Year》。

For the moment, let’s think of those companies, not as listed stocks, but as productive enterprises. Let’s also assume that the owners of those enterprises had acquired them at book value. In that case, their own return would have been around 12 percent too. And because the return has been so consistent, it seems reasonable to think of it as an ―equity coupon.

暂且把这些公司看作生产性企业，而不是上市股票。再假设这些企业的所有者是按账面价值收购的。那么，他们自身的回报也将大约是 12%。正因为这一回报如此稳定，把它视为一种“权益票息”似乎合情合理。

In the real world, of course, investors in stocks don’t just buy and hold. Instead, many try to outwit their fellow investors in order to maximize their own proportions of corporate earnings. This thrashing about obviously fruitless in aggregate, has no impact on the equity coupon but reduces the investor’s portion of it, because he incurs substantial frictional costs, such as advisory fees and brokerage charges. Throw in an active options market, which adds nothing to the productivity of American enterprise but requires a cast of thousands to man the casino, and frictional cost rise further.

当然，在现实世界中，股票投资者并不只是买入并持有。相反，许多人试图胜过其他投资者，以最大化自己分得的企业盈利份额。这种折腾从总体上看显然无果，对“权益票息”本身毫无影响，却会因顾问费、经纪佣金等大量摩擦性成本而减少投资者分到的那部分。再加上活跃的期权市场——它对美国企业的生产率毫无增益，却需要成千上万的人来“操盘”这座赌场——摩擦成本更是水涨船高。

1.I believe Buffett’s article on inflation and its effect on equity investors is one of the best investment articles ever written.

我认为巴菲特关于通货膨胀及其对股票投资者的影响的文章是有史以来最好的投资文章之一。

Stocks Are Perpetual

股票是永续的

It is also true in the real world investors in stocks don’t usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book: usually, however, they’ve had to pay more than book, and more about these relationships later. Meanwhile, let’s focus on the main point: as inflation has increased, the return on equity capital has not. Essentially, those who buy equities receive securities with an underlying fixed return—just like those who buy bonds. Of course, there are some important differences between the bond and stock forms. For openers, bonds eventually come due. It may require a long wait, but eventually the bond investor gets to renegotiate the terms of his contract. If current and prospective rates of inflation make his old coupon look inadequate, he can refuse to play further unless coupons currently being offered rekindle his interest. Something of this sort has been going on in recent years.

现实中，投资者买股票通常并不能以账面价值买入。有时能低于账面买入，但更多时候需要支付高于账面的价格，稍后会再谈这种关系。先聚焦于要点：随着通胀上升，股本资本的回报并未随之提高。实质上，购买股票的人拿到的也是一种固定回报的证券——和买债券的人一样。当然，两者之间也存在一些重要差异。比如说，债券终有到期日。也许需要等待很久，但最终债券持有人可以重新谈判合同条款。如果当前和未来的通胀率让旧票息显得不足，他可以拒绝继续参与，除非新发行的票息能重新吸引他。这类情况近年来确实发生过。

Stocks, on the other hand, are perpetual. They have a maturity date of infinity. Investors in stocks are stuck with whatever return corporate America happens to earn. If corporate America is destined to earn 12 percent, then that is the level investors must learn to live with. As a group, stock investors can neither opt out nor renegotiate. In the aggregate, their commitment is actually increasing. Individual companies can be sold or liquidated, and corporations can repurchase their own shares; on balance, however, new equity flotation’s and retained earnings guarantee that the equity capital locked up in the corporate system will increase.

而股票则不同，它们是永续的，期限是无限的。股票投资者只能接受美国企业赚到的那一份回报。如果美国企业注定赚取 12% 的回报率，那么投资者就必须接受这个水平。整体而言，股票投资者既不能退出，也不能重新谈判。总体上，他们的承诺实际上还在增加。个别公司可以被出售或清算，公司也可以回购自己的股份；但从整体上看，新股发行和留存收益确保了锁定在公司体系里的股本资本会不断增加。

So, score one for the bond form. Bond coupons eventually will be renegotiated; equity ―coupons‖ won’t. It is true, of course, that for a long time a 12 percent coupon did not appear in need of a whole lot of correction.

所以，在这一点上债券占优。债券票息最终可以重新谈判；股票的“票息”却不行。当然，很长一段时间里，12% 的“票息”看起来并不需要太多修正。

The Bondholder Gets It in Cash

债券持有人以现金收取

There is another major difference between the garden variety of bond and our new exotic 12 percent ―equity bond‖ that comes to the Wall Street costume ball dressed in a stock certificate.

普通债券与我们这种披着股票证书外衣、走进华尔街化装舞会的奇特“12% 权益债券”之间，还有一个重大区别。

In the usual case, a bond investor receives his entire coupon in cash is left to reinvest it as best he can. Our stock investor’s equity coupon, in contrast, is partially retained by the company and is reinvested at whatever rates the company happens to be earning. In other words, going back to our corporate universe, part of the 12 percent earned annually is paid out in dividends and the balance is put right back into the universe to earn 12 percent also.

在常见情况下，债券投资者以现金收取全部票息，再自行寻找最佳方式再投资。相比之下，股票投资者的“权益票息”会有一部分被公司留存下来，并按公司当前的收益率再投资。换句话说，回到企业整体，每年赚取的 12% 之中，一部分以股息形式支付出去，剩余部分重新投入企业体系中继续以 12% 的水平赚取收益。

The Good Old Days

美好的旧日时光

This characteristic of stocks—the reinvestment of part of the coupon--can be good or bad news, depending on the relative attractiveness of that 12 percent. The news was very good indeed in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. With bonds yielding only 3 or 4 percent, the right to reinvest automatically a portion of the equity coupon at 12 percent was of enormous value. Note that investors could not just invest their own money and get that 12 percent return. Stock prices in this period ranged far above book value, and investors were prevented by the premium prices they had to pay from directly extracting out of the underlying corporate universe whatever rate that universe was earning. You can’t pay far above par for a 12 percent bond and earn 12 percent for yourself.

股票的这一特征——将部分“票息”再投资——可能是好消息，也可能是坏消息，取决于那 12% 的相对吸引力。在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代初，这无疑是极好的消息。当时债券收益率只有 3% 到 4%，而能以 12% 的收益率自动再投资一部分权益票息是极具价值的。要注意，投资者不能简单地拿出自己的资金就获得那 12% 的回报。当时股票价格远高于账面价值，投资者因必须支付溢价而无法直接从企业体系中提取其所赚取的收益率。你不可能花远高于面值的价格去买一只 12% 的债券，却还能为自己赚到 12%。

But on their retained earnings, investors could earn 12 percent. In effect, earnings retention allowed investors to buy at book value part of an enterprise that, in the economic environment then existing, was worth a great deal more than book value.

但在留存收益上，投资者却能赚取 12%。实际上，留存收益让投资者得以按账面价值“买入”企业的一部分，而在当时的经济环境中，这些企业的真实价值远高于账面价值。

It was a situation that left very little to be said for cash dividends and a lot to be said for earnings retention. Indeed, the more money that investors thought likely to be reinvested as the 12 percent rate, the more valuable they considered their reinvestment privilege, and the more they were willing to pay for it. In the early 1960’s, inventors eagerly paid top-scale prices for electric utilities situated in growth areas, knowing that these companies had the ability to reinvest very large proportions of their earnings. Utilities whose operating environment dictated a larger cash payout rated lower prices.

在这种情况下，现金股息几乎无足轻重，而留存收益却极其重要。事实上，投资者预期能有越多资金以 12% 的收益率被再投资，他们就越看重这种再投资权利，并愿意为之支付更高的价格。20 世纪 60 年代初，投资者热切地以高价购买位于增长区域的电力公司股票，因为这些公司有能力将大部分盈利再投资。那些经营环境迫使其支付更高现金分红的电力公司，估值则较低。

现在的情况正相反，大量企业通过回购的方式把资金还给股东，这些还回去的资本不见得能产生18%的平均收益（从整体的角度看），最终很可能还是巴菲特说的12%。

If, during this period, a high-grade, non callable, long-term bond with a 12 percent coupon had existed, it would have sold far above par. And if it were a bond with a further unusual characteristic—which was that most of the coupon payments could be automatically reinvested at par in similar bonds—the issue would have commanded an even greater premium. In essence, growth stocks retaining most of their earnings represented just such a security. When their reinvestment rate on the added equity capital was 12 percent while interest rates generally were around 4 percent, investors became very happy—and, of course, they paid happy prices.

如果在那个时期存在一只高等级、不可赎回、长期、票息 12% 的债券，它一定会以远高于面值的价格出售。而如果这只债券还有一个更为特殊的特征——大部分票息可以按面值自动再投资于类似债券——那么它的溢价会更高。本质上，留存大部分收益的成长股就相当于这种证券。当其新增股本资本的再投资收益率为 12%，而市场利率普遍在 4% 左右时，投资者当然非常高兴——而且他们也愿意支付“快乐的价格”。

Heading for the Exits.

奔向出口

Looking back, stock investors can think of themselves in the 1946-66 period as having been ladled a truly bountiful triple dip. First, they were the beneficiaries of any underlying corporate return on equity that was far above prevailing interest rates. Second, a significant portion of that return was reinvested for them at rates that were otherwise unattainable. And third, they were afforded an escalating appraisal of underlying equity capital as the first two benefits became widely recognized. This third dip meant that, on top of the basic 12 percent or so earned by corporation on their equity capital, investors were receiving a bonus as the Dow Jones Industrials increased in price from 133 percent of book value in 1946 to 220 percent in 1966. Such a marking-up process temporarily allowed investors to achieve a return that exceeded the inherent earning power of the enterprises in which they had invested.

回顾来看，股票投资者在 1946 至 1966 年期间可谓享受了丰盛的“三重好处”。第一，他们受益于远高于当时利率水平的企业股本回报。第二，这些回报中有相当一部分以他们无法在其他地方获得的利率再投资。第三，随着前两项好处逐渐被广泛认识，他们还获得了对基础股本价值不断上调的估值。这第三重好处意味着，除了企业在股本上赚取的大约 12% 的基本收益外，投资者还收到了“奖金”，即道琼斯工业指数的市价从 1946 年的账面价值 133% 上升到 1966 年的 220%。这种“标高”过程一度让投资者获得了超过企业内在盈利能力的回报。

现在的大型科技企业吸收新增资本的能力越来越弱，而保险业把资本当成承担风险的能力，几十年以来吸收新增资本的能力一直在提升。

This heaven-on-earth situation finally was ―discovered in the mid-1960’s by many major investing institutions. But just in as these financial elephants began trampling on one another in their rush to equities, we entered an era of accelerating inflation and higher interest rates. Quite logically, the marking-up process began to reverses itself. Rising interest rates ruthlessly reduced the value of all existing fixed coupon investments. And as long-term corporate bond rates began moving up (eventually reaching the 10 percent area), both the equity return of 12 percent and the reinvestment ―privilege‖ began to look different.

这种“人间天堂”的局面最终在 20 世纪 60 年代中期被许多大型投资机构“发现”。但正当这些金融大象蜂拥而至、相互践踏之时，我们却进入了通胀加速和利率上升的时代。合乎逻辑地，估值上调过程开始逆转。利率的上升无情地压低了所有既有固定票息投资的价值。随着长期公司债利率开始上升（最终达到 10% 左右），12% 的股本回报及其“再投资特权”看起来已大不相同。

Stocks are quite properly thought of as riskier than bonds. While that equity coupon is more or less fixed over periods of time, it does fluctuate somewhat from year to year. Investor’s attitudes about the future can be affected substantially, although frequently erroneously, by those yearly changes. Stocks are also riskier because they come equipped with infinite maturities. (Even your friendly broker wouldn't have the nerve to peddle a 100-year bond, if he had any available, as ―safe.‖) Because of the additional risk, the natural reaction of investors is to expect an equity return that is comfortable above the bond return—and 12 percent on equity versus, say, 10 percent on bonds issued buy the same corporate universe does not seem to qualify as comfortable. As the spread narrows, equity investors start looking for the exits.

股票理所当然被视为比债券风险更大。尽管“权益票息”在较长时期内大致固定，但它年与年之间仍有波动。投资者对未来的态度会受到这些年度变化的显著影响，尽管这种影响往往是错误的。股票还因其无限期的到期日而更具风险。（即使是你那位热情的经纪人，如果手头真有一只 100 年期的债券，也不敢厚颜无耻地把它当作“安全”产品推销。）由于额外的风险，投资者的自然反应是要求股本回报明显高于债券回报——而同一企业群体发行的债券利率为 10%，股本回报仅 12% 时，并不足以称为“舒适”。随着利差缩小，股权投资者便开始寻找出口。

But, of course, as a group they can’t get out. All they can achieve is a lot of movement, substantial frictional costs, and a new, much lower level of valuation, reflecting the lessened attractiveness of the 12 percent equity coupon under inflationary conditions. Bond investors have had a succession of shocks over the past decade in the course of discovering that there is not magic attached to any given coupon level: at 6 percent, or 8 percent, or 10 percent, bonds can still collapse in price. Stock investors, who are in general not aware that they too have a ―coupon, are still receiving their education on this point.

但当然，作为一个整体，他们是无法集体退出的。他们所能做到的只是频繁换手，承担大量摩擦成本，并接受一个新的、更低的估值水平——这反映了在通胀环境下 12% 权益票息吸引力下降的事实。债券投资者在过去十年中已经接连遭遇震撼，逐渐认识到没有任何票息水平能带来魔法：即使是 6%、8% 或 10%，债券价格依然可能暴跌。而股票投资者——通常并未意识到自己其实也有一个“票息”——仍在接受这一点的教育。

Five Ways to Improve Earnings.

提高盈利的五种方式

Must we really view that 12 percent equity coupon as immutable? Is there any law that says the corporate return on equity capital cannot adjust itself upward in response to a permanently higher average rate of inflation?

我们真的必须把那 12% 的权益票息看作不可变的吗？是否存在一条法律，规定企业的股本回报率无法因应长期更高的平均通胀率而自行上调？

There is no law, of course. On the other hand, corporate America cannot increase earnings by desire or decree. To raise that return on equity, corporations would need at least one of the following:

当然，并没有这样的法律。另一方面，美国企业也无法凭愿望或命令就提高盈利。要提升股本回报率，企业至少需要以下几种途径之一：

(1) an increase in turnover, i.e., in the ratio between sales and total assets employed in the business;

(1) 提高周转率，即销售额与企业所用总资产的比率；

(2) cheaper leverage;

(2) 更低成本的杠杆；

(3) more leverage;

(3) 更多杠杆；

(4) lower income taxes;

(4) 更低的所得税；

(5) wider operating margins on sales.

(5) 更宽的销售营业利润率。

And that’s it. There simply are no other ways to increase returns on common equity. Let’s see what can be done with these.

这就是全部了。根本没有其他方式可以提高普通股的回报。让我们来看看这些途径中能做些什么。

We’ll begin with turnover. The three major categories of assets we have to think about for this exercise is accounts receivable, inventories and fixed assets such as plants and machinery.

我们从周转率开始。这里要考虑的三类主要资产是：应收账款、存货，以及厂房、机器等固定资产。

Accounts receivable go up proportionally as sales go up, whether the increase in dollar sales is produced by more physical volume or by inflation. No room for improvement here.

应收账款会随着销售额的上升而同比例增加，不管这种销售增长是由销量增加还是通胀引起的。在这里没有改进的余地。

With inventories, the situation is not quite so simple. Over the long-term, the trend in unit inventories may be expected to follow the trend in unit sales. Over the short term, however, the physical turnover rate may bob around because of special influences—e.g., cost expectations, or bottlenecks.

存货情况则没那么简单。从长期看，单位存货的趋势大致会跟随单位销售的趋势。但在短期内，受一些特殊因素影响——例如成本预期或瓶颈——实物流转率可能出现波动。

The use of last-in, first out (LIFO) inventory-valuation methods serves to increase the reported turnover rate during inflationary times. When dollar sales are rising because of inflation, inventory valuations of a LIFO company either will remain level (if unit sales are not rising) or will trail the rise in dollar sales (if unit sales are rising). In either case, dollar turnover will increase.

采用后进先出（LIFO）的存货计价方法，在通胀时期会提高企业报告的周转率。当美元销售额因通胀上升时，使用 LIFO 的公司库存估值要么保持不变（如果销量未增长），要么落后于美元销售额的增长（如果销量在增长）。无论哪种情况，美元口径的周转率都会增加。

During the early 1970’s, there was a pronounced swing by corporations toward LIFO accounting which has the effect of lowering a company’s reported earnings and tax bills). The trend now seems to have slowed. Still, the existence of a lot of LIFO companies, plus the likelihood that some others will join the crowd, ensures some further increase in the reported turnover of inventory.

在 20 世纪 70 年代初，企业明显转向采用 LIFO 会计方法（其效果是降低公司报告的盈利和税负）。目前这一趋势似乎已经放缓。但大量 LIFO 公司仍然存在，再加上一些其他公司可能加入其中，确保了存货报告周转率的进一步提升。

The Gains Are Apt to be Modest

收益往往有限

In the case of fixed assets, any rise in the inflation rate, assuming it affects all products equally, will initially have the effect of increasing turnover. That is true because sales will immediately reflect the new price level, while the fixed-asset account will reflect the change only gradually, i.e., as existing assets are retired and replaced at the new prices. Obviously, the more slowly a company goes about this replacement process, the more the turnover ratio will rise. The action stops, however, when a replacement cycle is completed. Assuming a constant rate of inflation, sales and fixed assets will then begin to rise in concert at the rate of inflation.

就固定资产而言，假设通胀率上升对所有产品的影响相同，它最初会起到提高周转率的作用。这是因为销售额会立即反映新的价格水平，而固定资产账户的变化则是逐步体现的，也就是现有资产被淘汰并以新价格替代时才逐渐调整。显然，公司更慢地进行这一替换过程，周转率就会更高。但当一个替换周期完成时，这一效应便会停止。在假设通胀率保持不变的情况下，销售额和固定资产将会以通胀率同步增长。

To sum up, inflation will produce some gains in turnover ratios. Some improvement would be certain because of LIFO, and some would be possible (if inflation accelerates) because of sales rising more rapidly than fixed assets. But the gains are apt to be modest and not of a magnitude to produce substantial improvement in returns on equity capital. During the decade ending in 1975, despite generally accelerating inflation and the extensive use of LIFO accounting, the turnover ratio of the Fortune 500 went only from 1.18/1 to 1.29/1.

总之，通胀会使周转率有所提升。由于 LIFO，会有一些确定的改善；而若通胀加速，因销售增长快于固定资产增长，还可能带来进一步提升。但这些收益往往有限，不足以显著改善股本资本的回报。在截至 1975 年的十年间，尽管通胀普遍加速、LIFO 会计方法广泛使用，《财富 500》公司的周转率也仅从 1.18/1 上升至 1.29/1。

算了很细的账，现在的情况，科技进步让所有企业的设备更新速度都加快了，相当于电影院里所有人都站起来看，通胀是整体性的影响，科技进步也是整体性的影响。

Cheaper leverage? Not likely. High rates of inflation generally cause borrowing to become dearer, not cheaper. Galloping rates of inflation create galloping capital needs; and lenders, as they become increasingly distrustful of long-term contracts, become more demanding. But even if there is no further rise in interest rates, leverage will be getting more expensive because the average cost of the debt now on corporate books is less than would be the cost of replacing it. And replacement will be required as the existing debt matures. Overall, then, future changes in the cost of leverage seem likely to have a mildly depressing effect on the return on equity.

更便宜的杠杆？不大可能。高通胀率通常导致借贷更昂贵，而非更便宜。飞速上涨的通胀催生飞速扩张的资本需求；而放贷方对长期合同的信任度越来越低，因此提出更苛刻的条件。即便利率不再进一步上升，杠杆的成本依然会增加，因为公司账上的债务平均成本低于未来替换债务的成本。而随着现有债务到期，替换在所难免。总体来看，未来杠杆成本的变化很可能对股本回报产生轻微的压制效应。

More leverage? American business already has fired many, if not most, of the more-leverage bullets once available to it. Proof of that proposition can be seen in some other Fortune 500 statistics: in the twenty years ending in 1975, stockholders’ equity as a percentage of total assets declined for the 500 from 63 percent to just under 59%. In other words, each dollar of equity capital now is leveraged much more heavily than it used to be.

更多杠杆？美国企业早已打光了许多（如果不是大部分的话）可用的杠杆子弹。对此的佐证可见于《财富 500》公司的另一组数据：在截至 1975 年的二十年中，股东权益占总资产的比例从 63% 降至不到 59%。换句话说，如今的每一美元股本资本被施加的杠杆远比过去大。

S&P500，2024-06-30：总资产 46,126,058（百万美元），总权益 10,498,468（百万美元）→ 权益/资产 = 22.76%；2025-06-30：总资产 48,972,699（百万美元），总权益 11,353,920（百万美元）→ 权益/资产 = 23.18%，参考：《S&P 500 Total Equity》、《S&P 500 Total Assets》。

What the Lenders Learned

贷款人的教训

An irony of inflation-induced financial requirement is that the highly profitable companies—generally the best credits—require relatively little debt capital. But the laggards in profitability never can get enough. Lenders understand this problem much better than they did a decade ago—and are correspondingly less willing to let capital-hungry, low-profitability enterprises leverage themselves to the sky.

通胀驱动的资金需求有一个讽刺之处：高盈利公司——通常信用最好——对债务资本的需求相对很少。但盈利能力落后的公司却总觉得不够。贷款人如今比十年前更明白这个问题，因此也更不愿意让这些资金饥渴、低盈利的企业把杠杆堆到天上去。

Nevertheless, given inflationary conditions, many corporations seem sure in the future to turn to still more leverage as a means of shoring up equity returns. Their managements will make that move because they will need enormous amounts of capital—often merely to do the same physical volume of business—and will wish to get it without cutting dividends or making equity offerings that, because of inflation, are not apt to shape up as attractive. Their natural response will be to heap on debt, almost regardless of cost. They will tend to behave like those utility companies that argued over an either of a point in the 1960’s and were grateful to find 12 percent debt financing in 1974.

然而，在通胀环境下，许多公司未来几乎必然会转向更多杠杆，以支撑股本回报。管理层会采取这种做法，因为他们需要巨额资本——往往仅仅是为了维持同样的实物业务量——而又希望在不削减股息或不通过因通胀而缺乏吸引力的股权融资的前提下获得资金。他们的自然反应就是不断增加债务，几乎不顾成本。他们的行为会类似于那些 20 世纪 60 年代为四舍五入小数点争论不休、却在 1974 年能找到 12% 债务融资而感激不已的公用事业公司。

Added debt at present interest rates, however, will do less for equity returns than did added debt at 4 percent rates in the early 1960’s. There is also the problem that higher debt ratios cause credit ratings to be lowered, creating a further rise in interest costs.

然而，以当前利率增加的债务，对股本回报的助益远不如 20 世纪 60 年代初 4% 利率时的债务增加。此外，更高的债务比率还会导致信用评级下降，从而进一步推高利息成本。

So that is another way, to be added to those already discussed, in which the cost of leverage will be rising. In total, the higher costs of leverage are likely to offset the benefits of greater leverage.

因此，这又是杠杆成本上升的一种途径，叠加前面提到的因素，最终更高的杠杆成本很可能抵消更多杠杆带来的好处。

Besides, there is already far more debt in corporate America than is conveyed by conventional balance sheets. Many companies have massive pension obligations geared to whatever pay levels will be in effect when present workers retire. At the low inflation rates of 1955-56, the liabilities arising from such plans were reasonably predictable. Today, nobody can really know the company’s ultimate obligation. But if the inflation rate averages 7 percent in the future, a twenty-five-year-old employee who is now earning \$12,000, and whose raises do no more than match increases in living costs, will be making \$180,000 when he retires at sixty-five.

此外，美国企业实际承担的债务远超常规资产负债表所披露。许多公司有庞大的养老金义务，与现有员工退休时的工资水平挂钩。在 1955-56 年低通胀率时期，这类计划产生的负债尚可合理预测。如今，却没有人能真正知道企业的最终义务。如果未来通胀率平均为 7%，一名现年 25 岁、年薪 12,000 美元、工资增长仅跟上生活成本上涨的员工，到 65 岁退休时的年薪将达到 180,000 美元。

Of course, there is a marvelously precise figure in many annual reports each year, purporting to be the unfunded pension liability. If that figure were really believable, a corporation could simply ante up that sum, add to it the existing pension-fund assets, turn the total amount over to any insurance company, and have it assume all the corporation’s present pension liabilities. In the real world, alas, it is impossible to find an insurance company willing even to listen to such a deal.

当然，每年许多年报里都会出现一个“精确无比”的数字，据称是未拨备的养老金负债。如果这个数字真可信，公司只需拿出这笔钱，加上现有养老金基金资产，将总额交给任何一家保险公司，就能让它承担公司现有的所有养老金义务。但在现实中，唉，没有任何保险公司愿意听这种交易。

Virtually every corporate treasurer in America would recoil at the idea of issuing a ―cost-of-living‖ bond—a non-callable obligation with coupons tied to a price index. But through the private pension system, corporate America has in fact taken on a fantastic amount of debt that is the equivalent of such a bond.

几乎所有美国企业财务主管一听到发行“生活成本债券”（即不可赎回、票息与物价指数挂钩的债务）就会退避三舍。但通过私人养老金体系，美国企业事实上已经承担了等同于这种债券的巨额债务。

More leverage, whether through conventional debt or unbooked and indexed ―pension debt,‖ should be viewed with skepticism by shareholders. A 12 percent return from an enterprise that is debt-free is far superior to the same return achieved by a business hocked to its eyeballs which means that today’s 12 percent equity returns may will be less valuable than the 12 percent returns of twenty years ago.

无论是通过常规债务，还是通过未入账、与指数挂钩的“养老金债务”，更多的杠杆都应受到股东的质疑。一个无债企业赚取的 12% 回报，远胜于一个债务缠身的企业实现的同样 12% 回报——这意味着当今的 12% 股本回报可能远不如二十年前的 12% 股本回报有价值。

与上世纪中叶相比，美国企业整体已不再以相同方式承担大规模、通胀敏感的养老金承诺；风险更多被转移（向个人/向保险）和对冲（LDI/资金比率改善）。

More Fun in New York

纽约的更多乐趣

Lower corporate income taxes seem unlikely. Investors in American corporations already own what might be thought of as a Class D stock. The Class A, B, and C stocks are represented by the income-tax claims of the federal, state, and municipal governments. It is true that these ―investors‖ have no claim on the corporation’s assets; however, they get a major share of the earnings, including earnings generated by the equity buildup resulting from retention of part of the earnings owned by the Class D shareholders.

企业所得税降低的可能性不大。美国公司的投资者实际上已经持有可被称为 D 类股票的权益。A、B、C 类股票则由联邦、州和市政府的所得税征收权所代表。诚然，这些“投资者”对公司的资产没有要求权；但他们却能分走公司盈利中的大部分，包括由 D 类股东所持收益留存再投资而产生的新增权益所带来的利润。

A further charming characteristic of these wonderful Class A, B, and C stocks is that their share of the corporation’s earning can be increased immediately, abundantly, and without payment by the unilateral vote of any one of the ―stockholder‖ classes, e.g., by congressional action in the case of the Class A. To add to the fun, one of the classes will sometimes vote to increase its ownership share in the business retroactively—as companies operating in New York discovered to their dismay in 1975. Whenever the Class A, B, or C ―stockholder‖ vote themselves a larger share of the business, the portion remaining for Class D—that’s the one held by the ordinary investor—declines.

这些可爱的 A、B、C 类“股票”的另一个迷人特征是：它们在公司盈利中的份额，可以通过任何一个“股东”类别的单方面投票，立即、大幅度、而且无需支付就增加。例如，A 类的份额就可以通过国会行动来提升。更添乐趣的是，有时其中某一类股东甚至会投票决定**追溯性**地增加其在业务中的持股份额——正如 1975 年在纽约运营的公司痛苦发现的那样。每当 A、B、C 类“股东”为自己投票增加更大份额时，留给 D 类——也就是普通投资者的那部分——就会减少。

Looking ahead, it seems unwise to assume that those who control the A, B, and C shares will vote to reduce their own take over the long run. The Class D shares probably will have to struggle to hold their own.

展望未来，假设控制 A、B、C 类股份的人会在长期内投票削减自己的份额，似乎是不明智的。D 类股份大概率只能艰难地维持现状。

Bad News from the FTC

来自联邦贸易委员会的坏消息

The last of our five possible sources of increased returns on equity is wider operating margins on sales. Here is where some optimists would hope to achieve major gains. There is no proof that they are wrong. But there are only 100 cents on the sales dollar and a lot of demands on that dollar before we get to the residual, pretax profits. The major claimants are labor, raw materials, energy, and various non-income taxes. The relative importance of these costs hardly seems likely to decline during an age of inflation.

提高股本回报的五个可能来源中的最后一个是更高的销售营业利润率。部分乐观主义者希望在此实现重大收益。不能说他们必然错误。但每一美元销售额只有 100 美分，而在到达剩余的税前利润之前，这一美元要满足许多要求。主要的分食者是劳动力、原材料、能源以及各类非所得税。在通胀时代，这些成本的相对重要性几乎不可能下降。

Recent statistical evidence, furthermore, does not inspire confidence in the proposition that margins will widen in a period of inflation. In the decade ending in 1965, a period of relatively low inflation, the universe of manufacturing companies reported on quarterly by the Federal Trade Commission had an average annual pretax margin on sales of 8.6 percent. In the decade ending in 1975, the average margin was 8 percent. Margins were down, in other words, despite a very considerable increase in the inflation rate.

此外，最近的统计数据也并未支持“利润率将在通胀期间扩大”的说法。在截至 1965 年的十年里（相对低通胀时期），联邦贸易委员会按季度统计的制造企业平均销售税前利润率为 8.6%。而在截至 1975 年的十年中，平均利润率为 8%。换句话说，尽管通胀率大幅上升，但利润率却下降了。

If business was able to base its prices on replacement costs, margins would widen in inflationary periods. But the simple fact is that most large businesses, despite a widespread belief in their market power, just don’t manage to pull it off. Replacement cost accounting almost always shows that corporate earnings have declined significantly in the past decade. If such major industries as oil, steel, and aluminum really have the oligopolistic muscle imputed to them, one can only conclude that their pricing policies have been remarkably restrained.

如果企业能够基于重置成本来定价，那么在通胀时期利润率会扩大。但简单的事实是，大多数大型企业尽管被普遍认为有市场支配力，却未能做到这一点。重置成本会计几乎总是显示，在过去十年中企业盈利显著下降。如果像石油、钢铁和铝这样的主要行业真的拥有人们赋予它们的寡头力量，那只能得出结论：它们的定价政策实际上相当克制。

There you have the complete lineup: five factors that can improve returns on common equity, none of which, by my analysis, are likely to take use very far in that direction in periods of high inflation. You may have emerged from this exercise more optimistic than I am. But remember, returns in the 12 percent area have been with us a long time.

以上就是全部内容：五个可能改善普通股回报的因素。但按照我的分析，在高通胀时期，它们都不太可能带我们走得太远。或许你在阅读之后比我更乐观。但请记住，12% 水平的回报率已经伴随我们很久了。

The Investor’s Equation the dollar

投资者的美元方程式

Even if you agree that the 12 percent equity coupon is more or less immutable, you still may hope to do well with it in the years ahead. It’s conceivable that you will. After all, a lot of investors did well with it for a long time. But your future results will be governed by three variables: the relationship between book value and market value, the tax rate, and the inflation rate.

即使你同意 12% 的权益票息大致不可改变，你仍可能希望在未来的岁月里凭此获得不错的结果。这并非不可想象。毕竟，许多投资者长期以来确实凭此表现优异。但你的未来结果将取决于三个变量：账面价值与市场价值的关系、税率以及通货膨胀率。

Let’s wade through a little arithmetic about book and market value. When stocks consistently sell at book value, it’s all very simple. If a stock has a book value of \$100 and also an average market value of \$100, 12 percent earnings by business will produce a 12 percent return for the investor (less those frictional costs, which we’ll ignore for the moment). If the payout ratio is 50 percent, our investor will get \$6 via dividends and a further \$6 from the increase in the book value of the business, which will, of course, be reflected in the market value of his holdings.

我们来算一笔关于账面价值和市场价值的小账。当股票始终以账面价值交易时，情况非常简单。如果一只股票的账面价值是 100 美元，平均市场价值也是 100 美元，公司赚取 12% 的利润，就会为投资者带来 12% 的回报（先忽略摩擦性成本）。如果派息率是 50%，我们的投资者会通过股息获得 6 美元，并通过企业账面价值增加再获得 6 美元，这当然也会反映在其持股的市场价值中。

If the stock sold at 150 percent of book value, the picture would change. The investor would receive the same \$6 cash dividend, but it would now represent only a 4 percent return on his \$150 cost. The book value of the business would still increase by 6 percent (to \$106) and the market value of the investor’s holdings, valued consistently at 150 percent of book value, would similarly increase by 6 percent to (\$159). But the investor’s total return, i.e., from appreciation plus dividends, would be only 10 percent versus the underlying 12 percent earned by the business.

如果股票以账面价值的 150% 交易，情况就会改变。投资者仍然获得 6 美元现金股息，但这只占其 150 美元成本的 4%。企业账面价值仍将增加 6%（至 106 美元），而投资者持股的市场价值（始终按账面价值的 150% 计算）也同样增加 6% 至 159 美元。但投资者的总回报，即升值加股息，只有 10%，而非企业赚取的 12%。

When the investor buys in below book value, the process is reversed. For example, if the stock sells at 80 percent of book value, the same earnings and payout assumptions would yield 7.5 percent from dividends (\$6 on an \$80 prices) and 6 percent from appreciation—a total return of 13.5 percent. In other words, you would do better buy buying at a discount rather than a premium, just as common sense would suggest.

当投资者以低于账面价值的价格买入时，过程则相反。例如，如果股票以账面价值的 80% 交易，在同样的盈利和派息假设下，股息回报为 7.5%（6 美元 ÷ 80 美元），再加上 6% 的升值，总回报为 13.5%。换言之，折价买入比溢价买入表现更好，正如常识所暗示的那样。

During the postwar years, the market value of the Dow Jones industrials has been as low at 84 percent of book value (in 1974) and as high as 232 percent (in 1965); most of the time the ratio has been well over 100 percent. (Early this spring, it was around 110 percent.) Let’s assume that in the future the ratio will be something close to 100 percent—meaning that investors in stocks would earn the full 12 percent. At least, they could earn that figure before taxes and before inflation.

在战后年代，道琼斯工业指数的市净率最低为 84%（1974 年），最高为 232%（1965 年）；大多数时间远高于 100%。（今年春初大约在 110%。）让我们假设未来这一比例接近 100%——这意味着股票投资者将获得完整的 12% 回报。至少，他们可以在税前和通胀前获得这个水平。

7 Percent after Taxes

税后 7%

How large a bite might taxes take out of the 12 percent? For individual investors, it seems reasonable to assume that federal, state, and local income taxes will average perhaps 50% on dividends and 30 percent on capital gains. A majority of investors may have marginalized rates somewhat below these, but many with larger holdings will experience substantially higher rates. Under the new tax law, as Fortune observed last month, a high-income investor in a heavily taxed city could have a marginal rate on capital gains as high as 56 percent. (See ―The Tax Practioners Act of 1976.)

税收会从 12% 中咬走多少？对个人投资者而言，合理的假设是联邦、州和地方所得税对股息的平均税率约为 50%，对资本利得的平均税率约为 30%。大多数投资者的边际税率可能略低于此，但大额持股者的税率则会显著更高。根据新税法，正如《财富》上月所指出的，在税负沉重的城市中，一位高收入投资者的资本利得边际税率可能高达 56%。（见《1976 年税务从业者法案》）

So let’s also assume, in line with recent experience, that corporations earning 12 percent on equity pay out 5 percent in cash dividends (2.5% after tax). And retain 7 percent, with those retained earnings producing a corresponding market-value growth (4.9 percent after the 30 percent tax). The after-tax return, then, would be 7.4 percent. Probably this should be rounded down to about 7 percent to allow for frictional costs. To push our stocks- as-disguised-bonds thesis one notch further, then, stocks might be regarded as the equivalent, for individuals, of 7 percent tax-exempt perpetual bonds.

因此，让我们结合近期经验来假设：企业在股本上赚取 12%，其中 5% 以现金股息形式支付（税后 2.5%），另有 7% 留存，且这些留存收益带来相应的市值增长（税后 4.9%）。那么税后回报为 7.4%。考虑到摩擦性成本，可能应将其四舍五入至 7%。进一步推动我们“股票即伪装债券”的论点，股票可以被视为相当于个人持有的 **7% 免税的永续债券**。

现在税率更低但PB更高，股息：联邦15%，高的不超过30%；长期资本利得：联邦顶格23.8%，高的可到35-37%，套回巴菲特的计算逻辑，5%的现金股息扣税后（税率15%）得4.25%，留存的7%扣税后（税率25%）得5.25%，合计9.5%。

The Number Nobody Knows

那个无人知晓的数字

Which brings us to the crucial question—the inflation rate. No one knows the answer on this one—including the politicians, economists, and Establishment pundits, who felt, a few years back, that with slight nudges here and there unemployment and inflation rates would respond like trained seals.

这把我们带到了关键问题——通胀率。没有人知道答案——包括政客、经济学家和建制派评论家在内，他们几年前还认为只需稍加推动，失业率和通胀率就会像训练有素的海豹一样做出反应。

But many signs seem negative for stable prices: the fact that inflation is now worldwide; propensity of major groups in our society to utilize their electoral muscle to shift, rather than solve, economic problems; the demonstrated unwillingness to tackle even the most vital problems (e.g., energy and nuclear proliferation) if they can be post-poned; and a political system that rewards legislators with reelection if their actions appear to produce short-term benefits even though their ultimate imprint will be to compound long-term pain.

但许多迹象对物价稳定而言都不乐观：通胀如今是全球性的事实；社会中主要群体倾向于利用选举力量去转嫁而非解决经济问题；即便是最关键的问题（如能源与核扩散），只要能拖延，他们就表现出不愿解决的态度；还有一个政治体系，如果议员的行动能带来短期好处，即便最终会加剧长期痛苦，他们也会因此获得连任的奖赏。

Most of those in political office, quite understandably, are firmly against inflation and firmly in favor of policies producing it. (This schizophrenia hasn’t caused them to lose touch with reality, however; Congressmen have made sure that their pensions—unlike practically all granted in the private sector—are indexed to cost-of-living changes after retirement.)

在任的政客们，理所当然地，强烈反对通胀，却又强烈支持制造通胀的政策。（这种“精神分裂”并没有让他们与现实脱节；国会议员已经确保他们的养老金——与几乎所有私营部门不同——在退休后与生活成本指数挂钩。）

Discussions regarding future inflation rates usually probe the subtleties of monetary and fiscal policies. These are important variables in determining the outcome of any specific inflationary equation. But, at the source, peacetime inflation is a political problem, not an economic problem. Human behavior, not monetary behavior, is the key.

有关未来通胀率的讨论通常会深入货币与财政政策的微妙之处。这些确实是决定具体通胀方程结果的重要变量。但从根本上说，和平时期的通胀是政治问题，而非经济问题。关键在于人的行为，而不是货币行为。

And when you very human politicians choose between the next election and the next generation, it’s clear what usually happens.

而当这些极具人性的政客在下一次选举与下一代之间做选择时，结果往往不言自明。

Such broad generalizations do not produce precise numbers. However, it seems quite possible to me that inflation rates will average 7 percent in future years. I hope this forecast proves to be wrong. And it may well be. Forecasts usually tell us more of the forecaster than of the future. You are free to factor your own inflation rate into the investor’s equation. But if you foresee a rate averaging 2 percent or 3 percent, you are wearing different glasses than I am.

这样的笼统结论并不能得出精确数字。然而，在我看来，未来几年通胀率平均达到 7% 的可能性相当大。我希望这一预测被证明是错误的，而且它也完全可能是错的。预测往往更多地揭示了预测者本身，而非未来。你可以在投资者的方程式中自由代入你自己的通胀率。但如果你预见的平均通胀率是 2% 或 3%，那你戴的眼镜和我可不一样。

So there we are: 12 percent before taxes and inflation; 7 percent after taxes and before inflation; and maybe zero(0) percent after taxes and inflation. It hardly sounds like a formula that will keep all those cattle stampeding on TV.

所以结论是：税前和通胀前是 12%；税后通胀前是 7%；税后通胀后可能就是 0%。这听起来可不像是一条能让电视上牛群狂奔的公式。

房价（资产价格，S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller 全美房价指数，NSA）：2005-05 = 169.547 → 2025-05 = 331.107，20年年化 ≈ 3.40%。数据源与点位见 FRED。

As a common stockholder you will have more dollars, but you may have no more purchasing power, Out with Ben Franklin (A penny saved is a penny earned‖) and in with Milton Friedman (A man might as well consume his capital as invest it‖).

作为普通股股东，你会拥有更多美元，但未必拥有更多购买力。于是，本杰明·富兰克林的名言（“一分钱省下就是一分钱赚到”）要让位于米尔顿·弗里德曼的说法（“一个人投资资本还不如直接消费资本”）。

What Widows Don’t Notice

寡妇没有注意到的事

The arithmetic makes it plain that inflation is a far more devastating tax than anything that has been enacted by our legislatures. The inflation tax has a fantastic ability to simply consume capital. It makes no difference to a widow with her savings in a 5 percent passbook account whether she pays 100 percent tax on her interest income during a period of zero inflation, or pays no income taxes during years of 5 percent inflation. Either way, he is―taxed‖ in a manner that leaves her no real income whatsoever. Any money she spends comes right out of capital. She would find outrageous a 120 percent income tax, but doesn’t seem to notice that 6 percent inflation is the economic equivalent.

算术表明，通胀是一种比立法者制定的任何税收都更具毁灭性的税。通胀税有惊人的能力能直接吞噬资本。对于一位把积蓄存入 5% 存折账户的寡妇来说，在零通胀时期，她的利息收入被征收 100% 的税，和在 5% 通胀时期她不用缴纳任何所得税，其结果没有区别。无论哪种方式，她都被“征税”，最终没有任何真实收入。她花的每一分钱都来自资本。如果有人征收 120% 的所得税，她会觉得不可理喻，但她似乎没有注意到 6% 的通胀在经济学上与此等价。

If my inflation assumption is close to correct, disappointing results will occur not because the market falls, but in spite of the fact that the market rises. At around 920 early last month, the Dow was up fifty-five points from where it was ten years ago. But adjusted for inflation the Dow is won almost 345 points—from 865 to 520. And about half of the earnings of the Dow had to be withheld from their owners and reinvested in order to achieve even that result.

如果我的通胀假设接近正确，令人失望的结果将不会因为市场下跌而发生，而是尽管市场上涨却仍会发生。上个月初，道琼斯指数约为 920，比十年前高出 55 点。但经通胀调整后，道琼斯指数实际上下跌了近 345 点——从 865 点跌至 520 点。而且，为了实现这一结果，道琼斯公司的利润约有一半被扣留并再投资，而不是分配给股东。

In the next ten years, the Dow would be doubled just by a combination of the 12 percent equity coupon, a 40 percent payout ratio, and the present 110 percent ratio of market to book value. And with 7 percent inflation, investors who sold at 1800 would still be considerably worse off than they are today after paying their capital- gains taxes.

在未来十年里，仅凭 12% 权益票息、40% 派息率和目前 110% 的市净率，道琼斯指数就能实现翻倍。而在 7% 通胀下，投资者即便在 1800 点卖出，在缴纳资本利得税之后，他们的状况仍会显著不如今天。

I can almost hear the reaction of some investors to these downbeat thoughts. It will be to assume that, whatever the difficulties presented by the new investment era; they will somehow contrive to turn in superior results for themselves. Their success is most unlikely. And in aggregate of course, impossible. If you feel you can dance in and out of securities in a way that defeats the inflation tax, I would like to be your broker—but not your partner.

我几乎能听到一些投资者对这些悲观想法的反应：无论新的投资时代带来多少困难，他们总能设法取得更好的结果。他们的成功可能性极低。而从整体上说，当然是不可能的。如果你觉得自己能进进出出、战胜通胀税，我倒是乐意做你的经纪人——但绝不会愿意做你的合伙人。

Even so-called tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds and college endowment funds, do not escape the inflation tax. If my assumptions of a 7 percent earned each year as merely as a replenishment of purchasing power, endowment funds are earning nothing until they have outpaced the inflation treadmill. At 7 percent inflation and, say, overall investment returns of 8 percent, these institutions, which believe they are tax-exempt, are in fact paying ―income taxes‖ of 87.5 percent.

即便是所谓的免税投资者，比如养老金基金和大学捐赠基金，也无法逃脱通胀税。如果我的假设正确，即每年 7% 的回报仅仅能补充购买力，那么捐赠基金在超过通胀跑步机之前其实一无所获。在 7% 通胀和 8% 总投资回报下，这些自以为免税的机构，实际上是在缴纳 87.5% 的“所得税”。

The Social Equation

社会方程式

Unfortunately, the major problems from high inflation rates flow not to investors but to society as a whole. Investment income is a small portion of national income, and if per capita real income could grow at a healthy rate alongside zero real investment returns, social justice might well be advanced.

不幸的是，高通胀率带来的主要问题并非落在投资者身上，而是殃及整个社会。投资收入只是国民收入的一小部分，如果在人均实际收入能够健康增长的同时，投资回报率为零，社会公正或许反而会有所进展。

A market economy creates some lopsided payoffs to participants. The right endowment of vocal chords, anatomical structure, physical strength, or mental powers can produce enormous piles of claim checks (stocks, bonds, and other forms of capital) on future national output. Proper selection of ancestors similarly can result in lifetime supplies of such tickets upon birth. If zero real investment returns delivered a bit greater portion of the national output from such stockholders to equally worthy and hardworking citizens lacking jack-pot producing talents, it would seem unlikely to pose such an insult to an equitable world as to risk Divine Intervention.

市场经济会为参与者创造一些不均衡的回报。拥有合适的声带、体格、体力或智力的人，可以在未来的国民产出上积累起庞大的索取权（股票、债券和其他形式的资本）。同样，若“挑对了祖先”，一个人一出生就能终身享有这样的凭证。如果零的实际投资回报能使这类股东所占的国民产出份额稍多一些地流向同样值得尊敬、同样勤奋但没有中大奖式天赋的公民，这看起来并不会对一个公平世界构成如此大的冒犯，以至于要冒着遭遇上帝干预的风险。

But the potential for real improvement in the welfare of workers at the expense of affluent stockholders is not significant. Employee compensation already totals twenty-eight times the amount paid out on dividends, and a lot of those dividends now go to pension funds, nonprofit institutions such as universities, and individual stockholders who are not affluent. Under these circumstances, if we now shifted all dividends of wealthy stockholders into wages—something we could do only once, like killing a cow (or, if you prefer, a pig)—we would increase real wages by less then we used to obtain from one year’s growth of the economy.

但若以富裕股东的利益为代价，工人的福利实际上并不会有明显改善。员工报酬已是股息支付总额的 28 倍，而其中许多股息如今流向养老金、非营利机构（如大学），以及并不富裕的个人股东。在这种情况下，即便我们把富裕股东的全部股息都转移为工资——这是只能做一次的事情，就像宰掉一头牛（或者，你愿意的话，一头猪）——所增加的实际工资还不及以往从一年经济增长中获得的提升。

The Russians Understand It Too

俄罗斯人也明白这一点

Therefore, diminishment of the affluent, through the impact of inflation on their investments, will not even provide material short-term aid to those who are not affluent. Their economic well-being will rise or fall with the general effects of inflation on the economy. And those effects are not likely to be good.

因此，通过通胀对富裕阶层投资的冲击来削弱他们的财富，甚至无法在短期内为不富裕的人提供实质性的帮助。他们的经济福祉将随通胀对整体经济的影响而起落。而这些影响，很可能不会是好的。

Large gains in real capital, invested in modern production facilities are required to produce large gains in economic well-being. Great labor availability, great consumer wants, and great government promises will lead to nothing but great frustration without continuous creation and employment of expensive new capital assets throughout industry. That’s an equation understood by Russians as well as Rockefellers. And it’s one that has been applied with stunning success in West Germany and Japan. High capital-accumulation rates have enabled those countries to achieve gains in living standards at rates far exceeding ours, even though we have enjoyed much the superior position in energy.

要显著提升经济福祉，需要大量实物资本的增长，并投资于现代化生产设施。如果缺乏在整个工业领域不断创造和使用昂贵新资本资产的过程，那么再充足的劳动力、再强劲的消费需求、再宏大的政府承诺，都只会带来巨大的失望。这是俄罗斯人和洛克菲勒家族都明白的方程式。西德和日本已经成功地将其应用，取得了惊人的成效。高资本积累率使这些国家的生活水平增长速度远远超过美国，尽管在能源方面，美国一直占据优势地位。

To understand the impact of inflation upon real capital accumulation, a little math is required. Come back for a moment to that 12 percent return on equity capital. Such earnings are stated after depreciation, which presumable will allow replacement of present productive capacity—if that plant and equipment can be purchased in the future at prices similar to their original cost.

要理解通胀对实际资本积累的影响，需要做一点数学推算。让我们回到那 12% 的股本回报上来。这一盈利是扣除折旧之后的，按理说这应当能支持现有生产能力的更替——前提是未来能够以接近原始成本的价格购买厂房和设备。

The Way It Was

往昔的状况

Let’s assume that about half of earnings are paid out in dividends, leaving 6 percent of equity capital available to finance future growth. If inflation is low—say, 2 percent—a large portion of that growth can be real growth in physical output. For under these conditions, 2 percent more will have to be invested in receivables, inventories, and fixed assets next year just to duplicate this year’s physical output—leaving 4 percent for investment in assets to produce more physical goods. The 2 percent finances illusory dollar growth reflecting inflation and the remaining 4 percent finances real growth. If population growth is 1 percent, the 4 percent gain in real output translates into a 3 percent gain in real per capita net income. That, very, roughly, is what used to happen in our economy.

假设大约一半的盈利作为股息派发，剩下的 6% 股本资本可用于支持未来增长。如果通胀率较低——比如 2%——那么这部分增长中有相当比例是真实的实物产出增长。在这种情况下，为了在下一年仅仅复制今年的实物产出，需要在应收账款、存货和固定资产上多投入 2%，从而剩余 4% 可用于投资以生产更多实物商品。那 2% 用于弥补通胀反映出的虚增美元增长，而剩余的 4% 则用于真实增长。如果人口增长是 1%，那么 4% 的实际产出增长会转化为人均实际净收入的 3% 增长。这，大致上，就是过去我们经济中曾经发生的情况。

Now move the inflation rate to 7 percent and compute what is left for real growth after the financing of the mandatory inflation component. The answer is nothing—if dividend policies and leverage ratios remain unchanged. After half of the 12 percent earnings are paid out, the same 6 percent is left, but it is all conscripted to provide the added dollars needed to transact last year’s physical volume of business.

现在把通胀率提高到 7%，再来计算在满足强制性的通胀成分融资后，还剩多少可用于真实增长。答案是：零——如果股息政策和杠杆比率保持不变。在 12% 盈利的一半派发为股息之后，仍剩下 6%，但这部分全部被征用来提供维持去年同等实物业务量所需的新增美元。

Many companies, faced with no real retained earnings with which to finance physical expansion after normal dividend payments, will improvise. How, they will ask themselves, can we stop or reduce dividends without risking stockholder wrath? I have good news for them: a ready-made set of blueprints is available.

许多公司在正常支付股息后，面临没有实际留存收益可用于支持实物扩张的困境，只能即兴应对。他们会问自己：我们如何才能停止或减少股息支付，而又不冒股东愤怒的风险？对此，我有一个好消息：一套现成的蓝图早已可供参考。

In recent years the electric-utility industry has had little or no dividend-paying capacity. Or, rather, it has had the power to pay dividends if investors agree to buy stock from them. In 1975 electric utilities paid common dividends of \$3.3 billion and asked investors to return \$3.4 billion. Of course, they mixed in a little solicit – Peter-to-Pay-Paul technique so as not to acquire a Con Ed reputation. Con Ed, you remember, was unwise enough in 1974 to simply tell its shareholders it didn’t have the money to pay the dividend. Candor was rewarded with calamity in the market place.

近年来，电力公用事业行业几乎没有股息支付能力。或者，更准确地说，如果投资者同意从它们手里买股票，它们就能支付股息。1975 年，电力公司支付了 33 亿美元的普通股股息，同时要求投资者返还 34 亿美元。当然，他们掺入了一点“拆东墙补西墙”的手法，以免落得像 Con Ed 那样的名声。你还记得吧，Con Ed 在 1974 年不够聪明，直接告诉股东没钱支付股息。结果这种坦率换来的，是市场上的灾难。

The more sophisticated utility maintains—perhaps—increases the quarterly dividend and then asks shareholders (either old or new) to mail back the money. In other words, the company issues new stock. This procedure diverts massive amounts of capital to the tax collector and substantial sums to underwriters. Everyone, however, seems to remain in good spirits (particularly the underwriters).

更“老练”的公用事业公司会维持——甚至增加——季度股息，然后再要求股东（无论新旧）把钱寄回来。换句话说，公司发行新股。这一做法把巨额资金转移给了税收部门，也让承销商赚取了不少。但似乎每个人都心情不错（尤其是承销商）。

More Joy at A.T. &T.

AT&T 的更多乐趣

Encouraged by such success, some utilities have devised a further shortcut. In this case, the company declares the dividend, the shareholder pays the tax, and –presto—more shares are issued. No cash changes hands, although the IRS, spoilsport as always, persists in treating the transaction as if it had.

在这种“成功”的鼓舞下，一些公用事业公司又设计了进一步的捷径。在这种情况下，公司宣布分红，股东缴纳税款，然后——瞧——更多新股被发行。没有现金流转，尽管 IRS 一如既往地扫兴，坚持将这笔交易当作现金发生的来处理。

A. T. &T., for example, instituted a dividend-reinvested program in 1973. This company, in fairness, must be described as very stockholder-minded, and its adoption of this program, considering the folkways of finance, must be regarded as totally understandable. But the substance of the program is out of Alice in Wonderland.

比如，AT&T 在 1973 年推出了股息再投资计划。公平地说，这家公司必须被形容为非常以股东为中心，而它采用这一计划，在金融行业的风气下，也完全可以理解。但该计划的实质，却仿佛出自《爱丽丝梦游仙境》。

In 1976, A. T. & T. paid \$2.3 billion in cash dividends to about 2.9 million owners of its common stock. At the end of the year, 648,000 holders (up from 601,000 the previous year) reinvested \$432 million (up from \$327 million) in additional shares supplied directly by the company.

1976 年，AT&T 向约 290 万普通股东支付了 23 亿美元现金股息。到年底，其中有 64.8 万名股东（较前一年的 60.1 万有所增加）将 4.32 亿美元（较前一年的 3.27 亿美元上升）再投资于公司直接发行的新增股票。

Just for fun, let’s assume that all A.T. & T. shareholders ultimately sign up for this program. In that case, no cash at all would be mailed to shareholders—just when Con Ed passed a dividend. However, each of the 2.9 million owners would be notified that he should pay income taxes on his share of the retained earnings that had that year been called a ―dividend.‖ Assuming that ―dividends‖ totaled \$2.3 billion, as in 1976, and that shareholders paid an average tax of 30 percent on these, they would end up, courtesy of this marvelous plan, paying nearly \$700 million to the IRS. Imagine the joy of shareholders, in such circumstances, if the directors were then to double the dividend.

假设所有 AT&T 股东最终都加入这一计划。在这种情况下，没有任何现金会寄给股东——就像 Con Ed 当年停止分红时一样。然而，290 万名股东每个人都会被告知：他们必须为自己那份被称为“股息”的留存收益缴纳所得税。假设这些“股息”总额如 1976 年一样为 23 亿美元，且股东对此平均缴纳 30% 的税，他们最终将在这一奇妙计划的安排下向 IRS 上缴近 7 亿美元。想象一下，在这种情况下，如果董事会再把股息翻倍，股东们会有多么“开心”。

The Government Will Try to Do it.

政府会尝试去做

We can expect to see more use of disguised payout reductions as business struggles with the problem of real capital accumulation. But throttling back shareholders somewhat will not entirely solve the problem. A combination of 7 percent inflation and 12 percent returns will rescue the stream of corporate capital available to finance real growth.

随着企业在真实资本积累问题上苦苦挣扎，我们可以预见到更多“变相削减股息”的做法。但稍微压缩股东利益并不能彻底解决问题。只有在 **7% 通胀与 12% 回报** 相结合的情况下，才能维持企业用于支持真实增长的资本流。

And so, as conventional private capital-accumulation methods falter under inflation, our government will increasingly attempt to influence capital flows to industry, either unsuccessfully as in England or successfully as in Japan. The necessary cultural and historical underpinnings for a Japanese-style enthusiastic partnership of governments, business, and labor seems lacking here. If we are lucky, we will avoid following the English path, where all segments fight over division of the pie rather than pool their energies to enlarge it.

因此，当传统的私人资本积累方式在通胀下失灵时，我们的政府会越来越多地尝试去影响资本向产业的流动——要么像英国那样失败，要么像日本那样成功。美国缺乏促成日本式“政府—企业—劳工”热情合作的文化与历史基础。如果我们幸运的话，至少能避免走上英国的道路：各方为争夺蛋糕而彼此争斗，而不是汇聚力量去扩大蛋糕。

On balance, however, it seems likely that we will hear a great deal more as the years unfold about underinvestment, stagflation, and the failures of the private sector to fulfill needs.

总的来说，随着时间推移，我们很可能会听到更多关于投资不足、滞胀以及私营部门未能满足需求的讨论。

Inflation

通货膨胀

A further, particularly ironic, punishment is inflicted by an inflationary environment upon the owners of the "Bad" business. To continue operating in its present mode, such a low-return business usually must retain much of its earnings - no matter what penalty such a policy produces for shareholders.

通胀环境对“劣质”企业的所有者施加了一种尤为讽刺的惩罚。为了维持现有运营模式，这类低回报企业通常必须保留大部分盈利——无论这种政策会给股东带来怎样的损失。

Reason would prescribe just the opposite policy. An individual, stuck with a 5% bond with many years to run before maturity, does not take the coupons from that bond and pay one hundred cents on the dollar. Instead, he takes those coupons from his low-return bond and—if inclined to reinvest—looks for the highest return with safety currently available. Good money is not thrown after bad. What makes sense for the bondholder makes sense for the shareholder. Logically, a company with historic and prospective high returns on equity should retain much or all of its earnings so that shareholders can earn premium returns on enhanced capital. Conversely, low returns on corporate equity would suggest a very high dividend payout so that owners could direct capital toward more attractive areas. (The Scriptures concur. In the parable of the talents, the two high-earning servants are rewarded with 100% retention of earnings and encouraged to expand their operations. However, the non-earning third servant is not only chastised—"wicked and slothful"—but also is required to redirect all of his capital to the top performer. Matthew 25: 14-30).

理性会要求采取完全相反的政策。一个人若持有一张多年后才到期、收益率只有 5% 的债券，他不会把债券票息再投入这只债券里去兑付 100 美元面值。相反，他会把这些低回报债券的票息拿出来——如果他愿意再投资——寻找当前可得的最高安全回报。好钱不会投到坏钱上。对债券持有人有意义的事，对股东同样有意义。逻辑上看，历史和未来都具有高股本回报的公司应当保留大部分甚至全部盈利，使股东能在新增资本上获得溢价回报。相反，低股本回报的公司应当支付很高的股息，以便股东把资本引向更具吸引力的领域。（《圣经》也是这样教导的。在“才干”的比喻里，两个高收益的仆人得到 100% 的收益留存，并被鼓励扩大经营。而那个没有收益的第三个仆人，不仅被斥责为“又恶又懒”，还被要求把他的全部资本转交给表现最好的仆人。马太福音 25:14-30）

When prices continuously rise, the "bad" business must retain every nickel that it can. Not because it is attractive as a repository for equity capital, but precisely because it is so unattractive, the low-return business must follow a high retention policy. If it wishes to continue operating in the future as it has in the past—and most entities, including businesses, do—it simply has no choice.

当物价持续上涨时，“劣质”企业必须保留它能攥住的每一分钱。原因不是它作为股本资本的存放地有吸引力，而是恰恰因为它如此缺乏吸引力，这类低回报企业才不得不执行高留存政策。如果它希望未来还能像过去一样继续经营——而大多数实体，包括企业，都是这样——它根本别无选择。

For inflation acts as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. That tapeworm preemptively consumes its requisite daily diet of investment dollars regardless of the health of the host organism.

因为通胀就像一条巨大的企业绦虫。这条绦虫无论宿主（企业）的健康状况如何，都会预先吞食它每日所需的投资美元。

Whatever the level of reported profits (even if nil), more dollars for receivables, inventory and fixed assets are continuously required by the business in order to merely match the unit volume or the previous year. The less prosperous the enterprise, the greater the proportion of available sustenance claimed by the tapeworm. A business earning 8% or 10% on equity often has no leftovers for expansion, debt reduction or "real" dividends. The tapeworm of inflation simply cleans the plate. (The low-return company's inability to pay dividends, understandably, is often disguised. Corporate America increasingly is turning to dividend reinvestment plans, sometimes even embodying a discount arrangement that all but forces shareholders to reinvest. Other companies sell newly issued shares to Peter in order to pay dividends to Paul. Beware of "dividends" that can be paid out only if someone promises to replace the capital distributed.)

无论报告利润水平如何（即便为零），企业总是需要投入更多美元于应收账款、存货和固定资产，仅仅是为了维持与上一年相同的单位业务量。企业越不景气，这条绦虫索取的口粮比例就越高。一家股本回报率 8% 或 10% 的企业，往往根本没有盈余用于扩张、减债或支付“真实”的股息。通胀这条绦虫只是把盘子舔得干干净净。（低回报企业无力支付股息，这一点通常被掩饰起来。美国企业越来越多地转向股息再投资计划，有时甚至设置折扣安排，几乎强迫股东再投资。其他公司则通过向甲发行新股来支付乙的股息。要警惕那些只能在有人承诺补充分配资本的情况下才能支付的“股息”。）

END

2008 Notes:

While a number of simple measures of valuation have also been useful over the years, even metrics such as price- to-peak earnings have been skewed by the unusual profit margins we observed at the 2007 peak, which were about 50% above the historical norm - reflecting the combination of booming and highly leveraged financial sector profits as well as wide margins in cyclical and commodity-oriented industries. Accordingly, using price-to-peak requires the additional assumption that the profit margins observed in 2007 will be sustained indefinitely. Our more comprehensive measures do not require such assumptions, and reflect both direct estimates of normalized earnings, and compound estimates derived from revenues, profit margins, book values, and return- on-equity.

虽然多年来一些简单的估值指标也颇为有用，但即使像市盈率峰值法（price-to-peak earnings）这样的指标，也被 2007 年峰值时的异常利润率所扭曲，当时的利润率大约比历史常态高出 50% ——这反映了金融部门在繁荣且高度杠杆化时的利润，以及周期性和大宗商品导向行业的高利润率。因此，使用市盈率峰值法需要额外假设：2007 年观察到的利润率会无限期维持下去。而我们更全面的衡量方法则不需要这种假设，它既反映了对标准化盈利的直接估算，也反映了从收入、利润率、账面价值和股本回报率推导出的复合估算。

This is a good post from http://www.gannononinvesting.com/ A blog written by a self-taught investor.

这是一篇不错的文章，来自 http://www.gannononinvesting.com/ —— 一个自学成才的投资者所写的博客。

I attach it here because it reinforces the points made in Buffett‟s great article. Read it and reap.

我附上这篇内容，因为它强化了巴菲特那篇伟大文章中的观点。读一读，你会有所收获。

A reader sent me an email asking me why the company shown in my blind stock valuation contest has free cash flow that's so much lower than reported earnings.

一位读者给我发来邮件，问我为什么在我的盲测股票估值比赛中展示的那家公司，自由现金流远低于报告的盈利。

Let’s look at something Warren Buffett said in his 2009 letter to shareholders:

让我们看看沃伦·巴菲特在 2009 年致股东信中的一段话：

Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities. In both cases we provide fundamental services that are, and will remain, essential to the economic well-being of our customers, the communities we serve, and indeed the nation. Both will require heavy investment that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances for decades to come….”

“值得注意的是，我们的 BNSF 运营具有一些重要的经济特征，与我们的电力公用事业相似。在这两种情况下，我们都提供至关重要的基本服务，这些服务对我们的客户、所服务的社区，乃至整个国家的经济福祉都是并将继续是必不可少的。两者在未来几十年都需要大量投资，且远远超过折旧准备……”

Without giving too much away, the mystery company in the blind stock valuation exercise fits that description.

不多透露细节的话，在盲测股票估值练习中的那家神秘公司正符合这一描述。

But why does any company fit that description?

但为什么会有公司符合这种描述呢？

Why would a company require capital spending “that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances” not just for one year or two but decade after decade?

为什么一家企业会需要资本开支“远远超过折旧准备”，而且不是一两年，而是几十年如一日？

The answer is inflation.

答案就是通货膨胀。

Now, before I get into illustrating why railroads all vastly overstate their true economic earnings, I want to stress that this overstatement is not caused by fraud or management’s desire to mislead. If investors are misled, it’s only because they look at the P/E ratio without looking at free cash flow.

现在，在说明为什么铁路公司普遍严重高估了它们的真实经济利润之前，我要强调，这种高估不是由于欺诈或管理层有意误导。如果投资者被误导，那只是因为他们只看市盈率，而没有看自由现金流。

It is well known that railroads can’t pay out all their earnings in dividends. The big reason for this is that some of those stated earnings are completely illusory.

众所周知，铁路公司不能把所有盈利都以股息的形式派发。主要原因是，其中一部分账面盈利完全是虚幻的。

It’s an earnings mirage.

这是一种盈利幻象。

This railroad earnings mirage come from a continual gap between capital spending and depreciation. Year after year, railroads spend more on new property than they count as a replacement expense. In other words, the ―upkeep‖ expense at railroads is vastly understated. This causes vastly overstated earnings.

铁路盈利幻象源自资本开支与折旧之间持续存在的差距。年复一年，铁路在新资产上的支出总是超过其计入替换费用的部分。换句话说，铁路的“维护”费用被严重低估。这导致了盈利的严重高估。

Railroads depreciate against the original cost of their old assets. But they replace their old assets with new assets. Because of inflation, replacing any asset bought or built in 1991 with an identical one in 2011 will cost more money.

铁路按照旧资产的原始成本进行折旧。但它们用新资产替换旧资产。由于通货膨胀，替换一项在 1991 年购置或建造的资产，在 2011 年时需要花费更多的钱。

Depreciation doesn’t adjust for cost inflation.

折旧并不会因成本通胀而调整。

Obviously, inflation isn’t specific to railroads. But an inflation rate of say 2% a year makes little difference when you’re replacing an asset after 1 or 2 or 3 years.

显然，通胀并非铁路行业特有的现象。但如果一项资产在 1、2 或 3 年后就被替换，那么每年 2% 的通胀影响不大。

Inflation makes a huge difference when you’re replacing an asset after 10 or 15 or 20 years. A movie ticket cost \$4.20 in 1991. Try getting a replacement ticket for \$4.20 today.

但如果一项资产在 10 年、15 年或 20 年后才需要替换，通胀的影响就极大了。1991 年一张电影票售价 4.20 美元。今天你试试看能不能用 4.20 美元再买一张。

Railroads tend to have free cash flow that is no greater than about 50% of their reported earnings. That's true of American railroads over the last 15 years or so (when inflation ran 2% a year using the GDP deflator). A couple railroads had free cash flow - the actual amount they could have paid in dividends each year - running around half of earnings. Most actually did even worse than that. This means their earnings don't all come in the form of cash.

铁路公司的自由现金流往往不超过其报告盈利的大约 50%。过去 15 年左右，美国铁路公司确实如此（按 GDP 平减指数衡量，通胀约为每年 2%）。少数铁路公司自由现金流——即它们每年实际能够支付的股息金额——大约是盈利的一半。而大多数公司的表现甚至更差。这意味着它们的盈利并非完全以现金形式实现。

Some of the 50% difference was caused by capital spending meant to grow the business. But a lot of that 50% difference between net income and free cash flow was caused by a gap between depreciation expense and the actual cost required to replace the railroad’s assets.

这 50% 的差额有一部分是因为用于扩展业务的资本支出。但其中很大一部分是由折旧费用与替换铁路资产所需的实际成本之间的差距造成的。

Depreciation charges were too low relative to the actual cash upkeep needed to maintain the same assets and do the same volume of business.

相对于维持相同资产与相同业务量所需的实际现金维护开支，折旧费用过低。

That’s bound to happen if railroads are replacing equipment that's 15 or 20 years old. Obviously, inflation makes the replacement cost higher than the original cost.

如果铁路公司替换的是使用了 15 或 20 年的设备，这种情况必然会发生。显然，通胀使得替换成本高于原始成本。

Yet depreciation isn’t adjusted for inflation.

然而，折旧并不会因通胀而调整。

Companies depreciate against the original cost of the asset they use up over those 15 or 20 years. So if they buy something for \$1,000 that will last 20 years they charge themselves \$50 a year (\$1,000 / 20 years = \$50/year). But even if inflation is just 3% a year over the next 20 years, the actual replacement cost when the thing breaks down in 2031 will be \$1,800. It'll be \$2,200 if inflation is 4%.

公司按照资产的原始成本在 15 或 20 年内进行折旧。比如，如果它们花 1,000 美元购买一件可用 20 年的设备，就会每年计提 50 美元的折旧（1,000 ÷ 20 = 50 美元/年）。但即使未来 20 年的通胀率仅为每年 3%，当这件设备在 2031 年报废时，实际替换成本将是 1,800 美元。如果通胀率是 4%，则为 2,200 美元。

Let's assume inflation will be 3% over the asset’s 20 year life. That means the replacement cost of something we buy in 2011 and replace in 2031 will be \$1,800 in 2031 for every \$1,000 we pay today.

假设资产 20 年的使用期内通胀率为 3%，那么我们今天花 1,000 美元购买的设备，到 2031 年替换时的成本将是 1,800 美元。

If instead of depreciating against the original \$1,000 cost we make up a non-GAAP fantasy account I'll call "Provision for Future Equipment Replacement" we might use a straight-line method where we take the actual replacement cost (\$1,800) in 2031 and space it out evenly over 20 years. \$1,800 divided by 20 years equals \$90 a year.

如果我们不再按原始 1,000 美元成本折旧，而是假设建立一个非 GAAP 的“未来设备更换准备金”账户，我们可能会采用直线法，将 2031 年的实际替换成本（1,800 美元）均摊到 20 年。1,800 ÷ 20 = 每年 90 美元。

So, we'd report depreciation of \$50 a year under the original cost method - assuming 3% inflation - even though we know full well that we have to set aside \$90 a year for the actual replacement cost of the equipment in 2031 if we live in a world of 3% inflation. That means our owner earnings should be reduced by multiplying depreciation by 1.8 (\$90/\$50 = 1.8). So, economic depreciation is really 1.8 times the depreciation we put on the books.

因此，在原始成本法下，我们每年报告的折旧是 50 美元（假设 3% 通胀），但我们完全清楚，如果通胀是 3%，到 2031 年实际替换设备需要每年预留 90 美元。这意味着我们的所有者收益应当通过折旧乘以 1.8 来减少（90 ÷ 50 = 1.8）。换句话说，经济折旧实际上是账面折旧的 1.8 倍。

If you look at a group of 5 or 10 railroads, power companies, etc. you'll get a feel for how long the useful life of their entire business is. A big clue is property, plant, and equipment / capital spending. If a no-growth business has \$32,000 of PP\&E and \$2,000 in capital spending, it's shedding and regrowing its PP\&E skin at a rate of once every 16 years (since it's replacing 1/16th this year). That's how long the business's life span is. It has to regenerate all its tangible assets every 16 years.

如果你观察 5 到 10 家铁路公司、电力公司等企业，你会对它们整个业务的使用寿命有个直观感受。一个重要线索是固定资产净值（PP&E）/资本支出。如果一家零增长企业拥有 32,000 美元的固定资产，每年资本支出是 2,000 美元，那么它实际上每 16 年更新一遍资产（因为它今年替换了 1/16）。这就是业务寿命——它必须每 16 年再生一次全部有形资产。

This is only meaningful for an asset heavy business like a railroad. It’s not a relevant calculation for businesses that depend primarily – or entirely – on their current assets to produce earnings.

这种计算只对铁路这样资产密集型企业有意义。对于主要依赖流动资产甚至完全依赖流动资产来产生收益的企业，这种计算并不适用。

And all of this is in nominal terms. In reality, the company’s property, plant, and equipment isn’t being replaced every 17 years in a business where annual capital spending is 6% of PP\&E (1/0.06 = 16.67). It’s not like you’re replacing the same 100 miles of track every 17 years. It’s more like you’re replacing the same \$100 worth of track every 17 years. How much track \$100 buys changes over the years.

以上所有计算都是名义上的。实际上，在资本支出占固定资产净值 6% 的企业里（1 ÷ 0.06 = 16.67），它并不是每隔 17 年就替换同样的 100 英里铁轨，而是每隔 17 年替换价值 100 美元的铁轨。而 100 美元能买到多少铁轨，会随着时间而变化。

Why should you care how long it takes a business to shed and regrow its balance sheet skin?

为什么你要关心一家企业需要多久才能“蜕掉并重新长出”它的资产负债表外壳？

It gives you a clue as to how inflation is disguising the economic reality behind the reported earnings. Only businesses that are very asset heavy will be affected by inflation in this way.

这会给你一个线索，说明通胀是如何掩盖报告利润背后的经济现实的。只有那些资产极其沉重的企业才会以这种方式受到通胀的影响。

But – even among asset heavy businesses – there’s a big difference between a business that replaces those tangible assets every 6 years and a business that replaces those tangible assets every 16 years.

但是——即便在资产沉重型企业之间——一家每 6 年替换一次有形资产的公司，与一家每 16 年替换一次有形资产的公司，差别也非常大。

A business that replaces its tangible assets every 6 years will be depreciating some of those assets in 2005 dollars instead of 2011 dollars. But a business that replaces its tangible assets every 16 years will be depreciating some of those assets in 1995 dollars instead of 2011 dollars.

一家每 6 年替换一次有形资产的公司，会用 2005 年的美元为基数折旧其中一些资产，而不是用 2011 年的美元。相比之下，一家每 16 年替换一次有形资产的公司，则会用 1995 年的美元为基数折旧其中一些资产，而不是用 2011 年的美元。

Railroads are an odd business in that their assets don’t have to be replaced very often. It’s just that they have to use unfathomable amounts of assets to move stuff around. Some other asset heavy businesses – especially very dense, very heavily used networks – have high capital spending but short asset lives.

铁路是一种奇特的生意，因为它们的资产并不需要经常替换。只是它们必须依靠庞大得难以想象的资产来完成运输任务。其他一些资产沉重型企业——尤其是密度极高、使用强度极大的网络型企业——虽然资本开支也很大，但资产寿命较短。

Their depreciation expense is more accurate even though they’re also big capital spenders, because the original cost of their assets is always closer to the replacement cost of those same assets.

这些公司的折旧费用更为准确，尽管它们也是资本支出大户，因为它们资产的原始成本总是更接近于同类资产的替换成本。

None of this would be true if we lived in a non-inflationary world. But since the 1940s, we in the United States have tended to have more or less constant inflation. Prices never really fall for very long. And they rise ever higher over time.

如果我们生活在一个无通胀的世界，这些问题就不会存在。但自 20 世纪 40 年代以来，美国几乎一直处于持续通胀之中。价格从未长时间真正下降过，并且随着时间推移不断攀升。

The result is that our companies understate their depreciation expense in proportion to the age of the assets chewed up by their day-to-day operations.

结果就是，我们的公司在日常运营中，随着资产使用年限的增长，越来越低估折旧费用。

Ravi Nagarajan of Rational Walk sent me an email where he mentioned that some industries do a good job of breaking down capital spending and explaining depreciation. That’s true. The two examples he gave were railroads and offshore oil drillers.

Rational Walk 的 Ravi Nagarajan 给我发了一封邮件，他提到有些行业在拆解资本支出和解释折旧方面做得很好。确实如此。他举的两个例子是铁路和海上石油钻井。

If you’re wondering about how railroads calculate depreciation, there’s a note in each company’s 10-K that explains how it calculates depreciation.

如果你想知道铁路公司如何计算折旧，每家公司的 10-K 报告里都有一条附注，解释其折旧方法。

Here is note #10 from the Union Pacific (UNP) 10-K:

以下是 Union Pacific (UNP) 10-K 报告中的第 10 条附注：

“…Properties and equipment are carried at cost and are depreciated on a straight-line basis over their estimated service lives, which are measured in years, except for rail in high-density traffic corridors (i.e., all rail lines except for those subject to abandonment, yard and switching tracks, and electronic yards), which are measured in millions of gross tons per mile of track…”

“…房地产和设备按成本入账，并按预计使用年限采用直线法折旧，这些年限以年份衡量，但高密度交通走廊的铁轨（即除废弃线路、调车场、转换轨道和电子调度场以外的所有铁路线）则按每英里轨道上的百万总吨数来衡量…”

Basically, Union Pacific is saying that they don’t adjust their depreciation charges for inflation. They just take the original cost of the property and depreciate it using one of two methods.

基本上，Union Pacific 的意思是，他们不会因通胀调整折旧费用。他们只是采用两种方法之一，用资产的原始成本来进行折旧。

The easiest way to think of the two depreciation methods is to imagine a hammer and an anvil. The property is the hammer. You can either set aside money to pay for a new hammer in equal installments every day or in equal installments every time the hammer strikes the anvil. For something like a hammer, the economically accurate way to depreciate the asset is based on the number of anvil strikes, because the anvil will eventually destroy the hammer. Time doesn’t destroy hammers. Anvils destroy hammers.

理解这两种折旧方法最简单的方式，就是想象一把锤子和一块铁砧。资产就是锤子。你可以每天存下一点钱来准备买新锤子，也可以每次锤子敲击铁砧时存下一点钱。对于锤子来说，经济上准确的折旧方式是基于敲击铁砧的次数，因为铁砧最终会毁坏锤子。时间并不会毁掉锤子，铁砧才会毁掉锤子。

Always ask what forces a company to replace its assets.

要始终追问，是什么迫使公司更换资产。

Is it time? Is it use? Is it technology? Or is it customer taste? The best asset is one that can survive all those changes.

是时间？是使用？是技术？还是客户偏好？最好的资产是能经受住所有这些变化的资产。

The worst asset is one that can’t survive any of those changes.

最差的资产则是经不起任何一种变化的资产。

Twenty years ago – back in 1991 – this is what Warren Buffett told a group of Notre Dame Students:

二十年前——1991 年——沃伦·巴菲特对一群圣母大学的学生这样说过：

“The telephone company (AT&T), with the patents, the MBAs, the stock options, and everything else, had one problem, and that problem is illustrated by those figures on that lower left hand column. And those figures show the plant investment in the telephone business. That‟s $47 billion, starting off with, growing to $99 billion over an eight or nine year period. More and more and more money had to be tossed in, in order to make these increased earnings, going from $2.2 billion to $5.6 billion. So, they got more money, but you can get more money from a savings account if you keep adding money to it every year. The progress in earnings that the telephone company made was only achievable because they kept on shoving more money into the savings account and the truth was, under the conditions of the „70s, they were not getting paid commensurate with the amount of money that they had to shove into the pot, whereas Lord Thompson, once he bought the paper in Council Bluffs, never put another dime in. They just mailed money every year. And as they got more money, he bought more newspapers. And, in fact, he said it was going to say on his tombstone that he bought newspapers in order to make more money in order to buy more newspapers. The idea was that, essentially, he raised prices and raised earnings there every year without having to put more capital into the business. One is a marvelous, absolutely sensational business, the other one is a terrible business.”

“这家电话公司（AT&T），拥有专利、MBA、股票期权和其他一切，但有一个问题，这个问题就在左下角那组数字中。那组数字显示的是电话业务的工厂投资。起初是 470 亿美元，八九年时间里增长到 990 亿美元。为了实现盈利从 22 亿美元增长到 56 亿美元，他们不得不投入越来越多的钱。所以，他们确实赚到了更多的钱，但如果你每年往储蓄账户里不断存钱，也能得到更多钱。电话公司盈利的增长，只是因为他们不断往这个‘储蓄罐’里塞钱。事实是，在 70 年代的环境下，他们得到的回报与他们投入的钱完全不成比例。而汤普森勋爵则不同，他一旦买下 Council Bluffs 的报纸，就再也没往里投过一分钱。每年只是源源不断寄出现金。而随着钱越来越多，他又买更多报纸。事实上，他还说过，他的墓碑上会刻着：‘我买报纸是为了赚更多的钱，从而买更多报纸。’他的逻辑是：本质上，他每年都能通过涨价来提升盈利，而无需往业务里再投更多资本。一个是极其出色、令人赞叹的生意，另一个则是糟糕透顶的生意。”

So why did Warren Buffett buy Burlington Northern?

那么，为什么沃伦·巴菲特要收购 Burlington Northern 呢？

That’s a great question. Buffett has given some clues. His best explanation is probably what he told Charlie Rose.

这是个好问题。巴菲特给出过一些线索。他最好的解释，大概就是他对 Charlie Rose 说过的那番话。

Since I don’t agree with Buffett’s purchase, I can’t do his argument justice.

由于我并不认同巴菲特的这笔收购，所以我没法替他的论点辩护。

I just have no interest in owning a railroad. It’s not a business I want to be in. That may be close minded. But that’s the truth.

我对拥有铁路毫无兴趣。这不是我想涉足的行业。或许这显得心胸狭隘，但这是事实。

What I wanted to do here is just make sure that the folks who are interested in buying railroads aren’t overly fixated on the P/E ratio.

我在这里想要强调的是，那些有意买铁路的人，不要过度执迷于市盈率。

A railroad’s reported earnings are not comparable to reported earnings in other industries.

铁路的报告盈利，不能与其他行业的报告盈利直接比较。

3. Rnagarajan says on Jan 23, 2011 at 9:30 AM:

Rnagarajan 在 2011 年 1 月 23 日上午 9:30 说：

Very interesting and insightful article. I think part of the answer regarding Buffett's decision to purchase BNSF is related to the deregulation that took place after passage of the Staggers Act in 1980. While it took the industry some time to show the benefits of deregulation, the performance over the past several years (and particularly during the recession) has demonstrated the incredible operating efficiencies of the rail network in general and the advantages over trucking given rising fuel costs and our increasingly decrepit interstate highway system. While maintenance capex is meaningfully higher than depreciation for the reasons noted in the article, inflation also has the effect of increasing the value of the existing network, so there are two sides to the coin. For example, when Berkshire purchased BNSF, the purchase price allocation assigned significantly more value to property, plant, and equipment than the predecessor company's prior carrying value.

非常有趣且富有洞见的文章。我认为巴菲特决定收购 BNSF 的部分原因，与 1980 年《Staggers 法案》通过后行业的放松管制有关。虽然行业花了一些时间才显现出放松管制的好处，但过去几年的表现（尤其是在经济衰退期间），已经证明铁路网络总体上的惊人运营效率，以及在燃料成本上升和州际公路系统日益老化的背景下，铁路相较卡车运输的优势。虽然正如文章所指出的那样，铁路的维持性资本支出明显高于折旧，但通胀也会提高现有铁路网络的价值，所以这是硬币的两面。例如，当伯克希尔收购 BNSF 时，购买价分配中，给物业、厂房和设备的估值远高于该公司此前的账面价值。

In any event, I've been looking at BNSF and rails closely in recent days as part of my work on an upcoming report on Berkshire. I think the following data presents some revealing stats about the industry as a whole and BNSF in particular. An interesting observation is that the operating ratio for 2010 is likely to be at or near 70% - a historically excellent figure. Union Pacific has also reported excellent results - thanks to operating leverage and the industry's recovery in 2010.

无论如何，作为我即将发布的伯克希尔研究报告的一部分，我最近一直在仔细研究 BNSF 及铁路行业。我认为以下数据揭示了行业整体以及 BNSF 尤其值得注意的一些统计特征。一个有趣的观察是，2010 年铁路的营业比率很可能在 70% 左右——这是一个历史上极为出色的数字。Union Pacific 也报告了优异的业绩——这得益于经营杠杆以及 2010 年行业的复苏。

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The Good Old Days

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