1980-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《1980-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

Again, we must lead off with a few words about accounting. Since our last annual report, the accounting profession has decided that equity securities owned by insurance companies must be carried on the balance sheet at market value. We previously have carried such equity securities at the lower of aggregate cost or aggregate market value. Because we have large unrealized gains in our insurance equity holdings, the result of this new policy is to increase substantially both the 1978 and 1979 yearend net worth, even after the appropriate liability is established for taxes on capital gains that would be payable should equities be sold at such market valuations.

我们还是必须先谈几句会计问题。自上一份年报以来，会计行业已经决定，保险公司持有的权益证券必须按市场价值列示在资产负债表上。此前，我们一直按总成本与总市场价值孰低的原则列示这类权益证券。由于我们保险业务持有的权益投资有大量未实现收益，这项新政策的结果是，即便已经为假设按这些市场估值出售股票时应缴纳的资本利得税确认了相应负债，1978 年和 1979 年末的净资产仍都会大幅增加。

As you know, Blue Chip Stamps, our 60% owned subsidiary, is fully consolidated in Berkshire Hathaway’s financial statements. However, Blue Chip still is required to carry its equity investments at the lower of aggregate cost or aggregate market value, just as Berkshire Hathaway’s insurance subsidiaries did prior to this year. Should the same equities be purchased at an identical price by an insurance subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway and by Blue Chip Stamps, present accounting principles often would require that they end up carried on our consolidated balance sheet at two different values. (That should keep you on your toes.) Market values of Blue Chip Stamps’ equity holdings are given in footnote 3 on page 18.

如各位所知，我们持股 60% 的子公司 Blue Chip Stamps 已完全并入 Berkshire Hathaway 的财务报表。然而，Blue Chip 仍被要求按总成本与总市场价值孰低的原则列示其权益投资，正如 Berkshire Hathaway 的保险子公司在今年以前的处理方式一样。假如 Berkshire Hathaway 的一家保险子公司和 Blue Chip Stamps 以完全相同的价格买入同一批权益证券，现行会计原则往往会要求它们最终在我们的合并资产负债表上以两个不同的价值列示。（这应该能让你保持警觉。）Blue Chip Stamps 所持权益证券的市场价值列示在第 18 页附注 3 中。

1979 Operating Results

1979 年经营成果

We continue to feel that the ratio of operating earnings (before securities gains or losses) to shareholders’ equity with all securities valued at cost is the most appropriate way to measure any single year’s operating performance.

我们仍然认为，用经营收益（不包括证券买卖损益）除以股东权益（所有证券均按成本计价）所得的比率，是衡量任何单一年度经营业绩最恰当的方法。

Measuring such results against shareholders’ equity with securities valued at market could significantly distort the operating performance percentage because of wide year-to-year market value changes in the net worth figure that serves as the denominator. For example, a large decline in securities values could result in a very low “market value” net worth that, in turn, could cause mediocre operating earnings to look unrealistically good. Alternatively, the more successful that equity investments have been, the larger the net worth base becomes and the poorer the operating performance figure appears. Therefore, we will continue to report operating performance measured against beginning net worth, with securities valued at cost.

如果用按市场价值计量证券后的股东权益来衡量这些结果，就可能显著扭曲经营业绩比率，因为作为分母的净资产数字会因市场价值的年度波动而大幅变化。例如，证券价值大幅下跌，可能导致“市场价值”口径下的净资产很低，进而使平庸的经营收益看起来好得不真实。反过来，权益投资越成功，净资产基数就越大，经营业绩比率反而显得越差。因此，我们将继续以期初净资产为基准报告经营业绩，证券按成本计价。

On this basis, we had a reasonably good operating performance in 1979—but not quite as good as that of 1978—with operating earnings amounting to 18.6% of beginning net worth. Earnings per share, of course, increased somewhat (about 20%) but we regard this as an improper figure upon which to focus. We had substantially more capital to work with in 1979 than in 1978, and our performance in utilizing that capital fell short of the earlier year, even though per-share earnings rose. “Earnings per share” will rise constantly on a dormant savings account or on a U.S. Savings Bond bearing a fixed rate of return simply because “earnings” (the stated interest rate) are continuously plowed back and added to the capital base. Thus, even a “stopped clock” can look like a growth stock if the dividend payout ratio is low.

按这个口径看，1979 年我们的经营业绩相当不错，但不如 1978 年，经营收益达到期初净资产的 18.6%。当然，每股收益有所增长（约 20%），但我们认为把注意力放在这个数字上并不恰当。1979 年我们可运用的资本明显多于 1978 年，而我们运用这些资本的表现不如前一年，尽管每股收益上升了。只要“收益”（即名义利率）不断被留存并加入资本基数，一个闲置的储蓄账户，或者一只支付固定收益率的美国储蓄债券，其“每股收益”都会持续上升。因此，如果股息支付率很低，即便是一只“停摆的钟”，看起来也可能像一只成长股。

The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder owners, as well as the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure.

检验管理层经济表现的首要标准，是其能否在所运用的股本资本上取得高收益率（且不依赖过度杠杆、会计花招等），而不是能否实现每股收益的持续增长。在我们看来，如果管理层和金融分析师能够调整他们对每股收益及其年度变化的过度重视，许多企业将会被其股东所有者以及公众更好地理解。

检验管理层经济表现的首要标准。

1、ROE是12%，5%支付股息或者回购股票，下一年的净资产=1X（1+7%），净资产增长7%，下一年的EPS也跟着增长7%，前提是ROE足够高，低收益率的增长没有意义并且可能是个错误；

2、ROE足够高，资本的留存就是一个简单的决策，返还股东多少、留下多少用于增长，非常简单，但如果ROE太低，决策会跟着复杂；

3、后期股东信里用的是净有形资本（net tangible equity capital），净有形资本≈ 必要营运资金 + 净固定资产，主要排除商誉、多余现金的干扰，参考：《2019-02-23 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.

我们看到的是一组我们部分拥有的公司，这些公司按加权计算，对其经营所需的净有形股本赚取约 20% 的回报。而且，这些公司在不依赖过度负债的情况下实现盈利。

Long Term Results

长期业绩

In measuring long term economic performance—in contrast to yearly performance—we believe it is appropriate to recognize fully any realized capital gains or losses as well as extraordinary items, and also to utilize financial statements presenting equity securities at market value. Such capital gains or losses, either realized or unrealized, are fully as important to shareholders over a period of years as earnings realized in a more routine manner through operations; it is just that their impact is often extremely capricious in the short run, a characteristic that makes them inappropriate as an indicator of single year managerial performance.

在衡量长期经济表现时——与衡量年度表现相反——我们认为，完整确认任何已实现的资本利得或损失以及非常规项目，并使用以市场价值列示权益证券的财务报表，是恰当的。无论这些资本利得或损失是已实现还是未实现，从多年期间看，对股东的重要性完全不亚于通过日常经营实现的收益；只是它们在短期内的影响往往极其反复无常，这一特征使其不适合作为衡量单一年度管理层表现的指标。

The book value per share of Berkshire Hathaway on September 30, 1964 (the fiscal yearend prior to the time that your present management assumed responsibility) was $19.46 per share. At yearend 1979, book value with equity holdings carried at market value was $335.85 per share. The gain in book value comes to 20.5% compounded annually. This figure, of course, is far higher than any average of our yearly operating earnings calculations, and reflects the importance of capital appreciation of insurance equity investments in determining the overall results for our shareholders. It probably also is fair to say that the quoted book value in 1964 somewhat overstated the intrinsic value of the enterprise, since the assets owned at that time on either a going concern basis or a liquidating value basis were not worth 100 cents on the dollar. (The liabilities were solid, however.)

1964 年 9 月 30 日，也就是现任管理层接手前的那个财年末，Berkshire Hathaway 的每股账面价值为 19.46 美元。到 1979 年末，按市场价值列示权益持仓后的每股账面价值为 335.85 美元。账面价值的增长折合为年复合增长率 20.5%。当然，这一数字远高于我们按年度经营收益计算出的任何平均水平，也反映出保险业务权益投资的资本增值，对于决定股东整体结果具有重要意义。也许还可以公平地说，1964 年列示的账面价值在某种程度上高估了企业的内在价值，因为当时拥有的资产，无论按持续经营基础还是清算价值基础，都不值账面上的每一美元。（不过，负债是扎实的。）

We have achieved this result while utilizing a low amount of leverage (both financial leverage measured by debt to equity, and operating leverage measured by premium volume to capital funds of our insurance business), and also without significant issuance or repurchase of shares. Basically, we have worked with the capital with which we started. From our textile base we, or our Blue Chip and Wesco subsidiaries, have acquired total ownership of thirteen businesses through negotiated purchases from private owners for cash, and have started six others. (It’s worth a mention that those who have sold to us have, almost without exception, treated us with exceptional honor and fairness, both at the time of sale and subsequently.)

我们是在使用很低杠杆的情况下取得这一结果的——无论是以债务与权益之比衡量的财务杠杆，还是以保险业务保费规模与资本资金之比衡量的经营杠杆——同时也没有大量发行或回购股票。基本上，我们一直是在用起步时拥有的资本工作。从纺织业务的基础出发，我们，或者我们的 Blue Chip 和 Wesco 子公司，通过与私人业主协商并以现金购买的方式，取得了十三家企业的全部所有权，并创办了另外六家企业。（值得一提的是，把企业卖给我们的人，几乎无一例外，在出售时以及此后，都以极高的荣誉感和公平态度对待我们。）

But before we drown in a sea of self-congratulation, a further—and crucial—observation must be made. A few years ago, a business whose per-share net worth compounded at 20% annually would have guaranteed its owners a highly successful real investment return. Now such an outcome seems less certain. For the inflation rate, coupled with individual tax rates, will be the ultimate determinant as to whether our internal operating performance produces successful investment results—i.e., a reasonable gain in purchasing power from funds committed—for you as shareholders.

但在我们淹没于自我祝贺的海洋之前，还必须作出一个进一步的、也是关键的观察。几年前，一家每股净资产以 20% 年复合增长的企业，几乎可以保证其所有者获得高度成功的实际投资回报。现在，这样的结果似乎不那么确定了。因为通货膨胀率，加上个人税率，最终将决定我们的内部经营表现能否为你们作为股东带来成功的投资结果——也就是所投入资金购买力的合理增长。

Just as the original 3% savings bond, a 5% passbook savings account or an 8% U.S. Treasury Note have, in turn, been transformed by inflation into financial instruments that chew up, rather than enhance, purchasing power over their investment lives, a business earning 20% on capital can produce a negative real return for its owners under inflationary conditions not much more severe than presently prevail.

正如最初 3% 的储蓄债券、5% 的存折储蓄账户，或 8% 的美国国债，先后都被通货膨胀转化为在投资期限内吞噬而不是增强购买力的金融工具一样，在比当前情况并不严重多少的通胀环境下，一家资本回报率为 20% 的企业，也可能为其所有者产生负的实际回报。

If we should continue to achieve a 20% compounded gain—not an easy or certain result by any means—and this gain is translated into a corresponding increase in the market value of Berkshire Hathaway stock as it has been over the last fifteen years, your after-tax purchasing power gain is likely to be very close to zero at a 14% inflation rate. Most of the remaining six percentage points will go for income tax any time you wish to convert your twenty percentage points of nominal annual gain into cash.

如果我们继续实现 20% 的复合增长——这无论如何都不是轻松或确定的结果——并且这一增长像过去十五年那样，转化为 Berkshire Hathaway 股票市场价值的相应上升，那么在 14% 的通货膨胀率下，你们税后的购买力增长很可能非常接近于零。只要你们想把 20 个百分点的名义年度收益变成现金，剩下的大约 6 个百分点中大部分都将交给所得税。

That combination—the inflation rate plus the percentage of capital that must be paid by the owner to transfer into his own pocket the annual earnings achieved by the business (i.e., ordinary income tax on dividends and capital gains tax on retained earnings)—can be thought of as an “investor’s misery index”. When this index exceeds the rate of return earned on equity by the business, the investor’s purchasing power (real capital) shrinks even though he consumes nothing at all. We have no corporate solution to this problem; high inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity.

这个组合——通货膨胀率，加上所有者为了把企业实现的年度收益转入自己口袋而必须支付的资本比例（也就是股息上的普通所得税，以及留存收益上的资本利得税）——可以被视为“投资者痛苦指数”。当这个指数超过企业取得的股本回报率时，即便投资者什么也不消费，他的购买力（实际资本）也会缩水。对于这个问题，我们没有公司层面的解决方案；高通货膨胀率不会帮助我们取得更高的股本回报率。

One friendly but sharp-eyed commentator on Berkshire has pointed out that our book value at the end of 1964 would have bought about one-half ounce of gold and, fifteen years later, after we have plowed back all earnings along with much blood, sweat and tears, the book value produced will buy about the same half ounce. A similar comparison could be drawn with Middle Eastern oil. The rub has been that government has been exceptionally able in printing money and creating promises, but is unable to print gold or create oil.

一位对 Berkshire 友好但目光敏锐的评论者指出，1964 年末我们的账面价值大约可以买到半盎司黄金；十五年后，在我们把所有收益连同大量心血、汗水和眼泪都投入再投资之后，所产生的账面价值仍大约只能买到同样的半盎司黄金。用中东石油也可以作出类似比较。问题的症结在于，政府在印钞和创造承诺方面异常能干，却无法印出黄金，也无法创造石油。

黄金自己不产生现金流，合理估值的基础没有，不知道自己在做什么人的，黄金可能是个选项，但是大概率不如指数基金；知道自己在做什么的，想在黄金的投资中找到“正确的事实”、“合理的推理”，那就是疯了。

We intend to continue to do as well as we can in managing the internal affairs of the business. But you should understand that external conditions affecting the stability of currency may very well be the most important factor in determining whether there are any real rewards from your investment in Berkshire Hathaway.

我们打算继续尽力把企业内部事务管理好。但你们应该明白，影响货币稳定性的外部条件，很可能是决定你们对 Berkshire Hathaway 的投资是否能获得任何实际回报的最重要因素。

Sources of Earnings

报告收益来源

We again present a table showing the sources of Berkshire’s earnings. As explained last year, Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows both aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share. All of the significant capital gains or losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gain figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.

我们再次列出一张表，说明 Berkshire 收益的来源。如去年所解释的，Berkshire 持有 Blue Chip Stamps 约 60% 的股权，而 Blue Chip Stamps 又持有 Wesco Financial Corporation 80% 的股权。该表既列示各项业务实体的合计收益，也列示 Berkshire 应占的部分。归属于任何业务实体的所有重大资本利得或损失，都汇总列入表格底部的已实现证券收益项目，而不包括在经营收益之中。

Blue Chip and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 37-43 of this report, we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1979 operations. Some of the numbers they mention in their reports are not precisely identical to those in the above table because of accounting and tax complexities. (The Yanomamo Indians employ only three numbers: one, two, and more than two. Maybe their time will come.) However, the commentary in those reports should be helpful to you in understanding the underlying economic characteristics and future prospects of the important businesses that they manage.

Blue Chip 和 Wesco 都是公众公司，各自有自己的报告要求。在本报告第 37 至 43 页，我们转载了两家公司主要高管的叙述性报告，他们在其中描述了 1979 年的经营情况。由于会计和税务上的复杂性，他们在报告中提到的一些数字，与上表中的数字并不完全一致。（Yanomamo Indians 只使用三个数字：一、二、超过二。也许他们的时代会到来。）不过，这些报告中的评论应当有助于你们理解他们所管理的重要业务的基本经济特征和未来前景。

在这份名单中只有See's完整留下来了，保险还在但已经有非常大的改变，其他的包括纺织、零售、印花、银行，等等，都不在了。

A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any shareholder of Berkshire upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

任何 Berkshire 股东如需获得任一公司的完整年报，可向 Blue Chip Stamps 的 Robert H. Bird 先生索取，地址为 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040；或向 Wesco Financial Corporation 的 Bette Deckard 女士索取，地址为 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109，相关年报将邮寄给你。

Textiles and Retailing

纺织业及零售业

The relative significance of these two areas has diminished somewhat over the years as our insurance business has grown dramatically in size and earnings. Ben Rosner, at Associated Retail Stores, continues to pull rabbits out of the hat—big rabbits from a small hat. Year after year, he produces very large earnings relative to capital employed—realized in cash and not in increased receivables and inventories as in many other retail businesses—in a segment of the market with little growth and unexciting demographics. Ben is now 76 and, like our other “up-and-comers”, Gene Abegg, 82, at Illinois National and Louis Vincenti, 74, at Wesco, regularly achieves more each year.

这些年来，随着我们的保险业务在规模和收益上大幅增长，这两个领域的相对重要性有所下降。Associated Retail Stores 的 Ben Rosner 仍在不断变魔术——从一顶小帽子里变出大兔子。年复一年，他在一个增长有限、人口结构也并不令人兴奋的细分市场中，相对于所运用资本创造出非常可观的收益——而且这些收益是以现金实现的，并不像许多其他零售业务那样体现在应收账款和库存的增加上。Ben 现在 76 岁了，和我们其他“后起之秀”一样，包括 Illinois National 82 岁的 Gene Abegg，以及 Wesco 74 岁的 Louis Vincenti，他每年仍持续取得更多成就。

Our textile business also continues to produce some cash, but at a low rate compared to capital employed. This is not a reflection on the managers, but rather on the industry in which they operate. In some businesses—a network TV station, for example—it is virtually impossible to avoid earning extraordinary returns on tangible capital employed in the business. And assets in such businesses sell at equally extraordinary prices, one thousand cents or more on the dollar, a valuation reflecting the splendid, almost unavoidable, economic results obtainable. Despite a fancy price tag, the “easy” business may be the better route to go.

我们的纺织业务也仍在产生一些现金，但相对于所运用资本，回报率很低。这并不是对管理人员的否定，而是他们所处行业本身的问题。在某些业务中——例如一家全国性电视网电视台——几乎不可能避免在该业务所运用的有形资本上赚取非凡回报。而这类业务的资产也会以同样非凡的价格出售，每一美元资产售价可达十美元甚至更高，这样的估值反映了其能够取得的出色、几乎不可避免的经济结果。尽管价格标签昂贵，“容易”的生意也许反而是更好的道路。

We can speak from experience, having tried the other route. Your Chairman made the decision a few years ago to purchase Waumbec Mills in Manchester, New Hampshire, thereby expanding our textile commitment. By any statistical test, the purchase price was an extraordinary bargain; we bought well below the working capital of the business and, in effect, got very substantial amounts of machinery and real estate for less than nothing. But the purchase was a mistake. While we labored mightily, new problems arose as fast as old problems were tamed.

我们是有亲身经验的，因为我们曾经尝试过另一条路。几年前，你们的董事长决定收购位于 New Hampshire 州 Manchester 的 Waumbec Mills，从而扩大我们在纺织业上的投入。按任何统计标准来看，收购价格都是极其便宜的；我们的买价远低于该业务的营运资本，实际上还以低于零的价格取得了大量机器设备和房地产。但这次收购是个错误。当我们拼尽全力时，新问题出现的速度和旧问题被解决的速度一样快。

Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price. Although a mistake, the Waumbec acquisition has not been a disaster. Certain portions of the operation are proving to be valuable additions to our decorator line (our strongest franchise) at New Bedford, and it’s possible that we may be able to run profitably on a considerably reduced scale at Manchester. However, our original rationale did not prove out.

我们的经营经验和投资经验都使我们得出结论：“困境反转”很少真正反转；同样的精力和才干，用在以合理价格买入一家好企业上，远比用在以便宜价格买入一家差企业上要好得多。尽管 Waumbec 的收购是一个错误，但它并没有成为一场灾难。该业务的某些部分正在被证明是对我们 New Bedford 装饰面料产品线（我们最强的特许经营业务）的有价值补充，而且我们也有可能在 Manchester 以大幅缩小后的规模实现盈利。不过，我们最初的收购理由并没有得到验证。

不容易的生意，从一开始就存在结构性的困难，比如，受重资产拖累的航空公司，内容不受控的影视业，等等。

Insurance Underwriting

保险承保

We predicted last year that the combined underwriting ratio (see definition on page 36) for the insurance industry would “move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a whole into an underwriting loss position”. That is just about the way it worked out. The industry underwriting ratio rose in 1979 over three points, from roughly 97.4% to 100.7%. We also said that we thought our underwriting performance relative to the industry would improve somewhat in 1979 and, again, things worked out as expected. Our own underwriting ratio actually decreased from 98.2% to 97.1%. Our forecast for 1980 is similar in one respect; again we feel that the industry’s performance will worsen by at least another few points. However, this year we have no reason to think that our performance relative to the industry will further improve. (Don’t worry—we won’t hold back to try to validate that forecast.)

我们去年预测，保险行业的综合承保比率（定义见第 36 页）将“至少上升几个百分点，也许足以使整个行业陷入承保亏损状态”。实际情况差不多就是这样。1979 年，行业承保比率上升了三个多百分点，从大约 97.4% 上升到 100.7%。我们还说过，我们认为 1979 年我们的承保表现相对于行业会有所改善，结果也再次符合预期。我们自己的承保比率实际上从 98.2% 降至 97.1%。我们对 1980 年的预测在一个方面相似；我们仍然认为行业表现至少还会再恶化几个百分点。不过，今年我们没有理由认为，相对于行业，我们的表现还会进一步改善。（别担心——我们不会为了验证这个预测而故意有所保留。）

Really extraordinary results were turned in by the portion of National Indemnity Company’s insurance operation run by Phil Liesche. Aided by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, this section of the business produced an underwriting profit of $8.4 million on about $82 million of earned premiums. Only a very few companies in the entire industry produced a result comparable to this.

Phil Liesche 负责的 National Indemnity Company 保险业务部分取得了真正非凡的成绩。在承保方面有 Roland Miller 协助，在理赔方面有 Bill Lyons 协助，这部分业务在约 8200 万美元已赚保费上产生了 840 万美元的承保利润。整个行业中，只有极少数公司取得了可与之相比的结果。

You will notice that earned premiums in this segment were down somewhat from those of 1978. We hear a great many insurance managers talk about being willing to reduce volume in order to underwrite profitably, but we find that very few actually do so. Phil Liesche is an exception: if business makes sense, he writes it; if it doesn’t, he rejects it. It is our policy not to lay off people because of the large fluctuations in work load produced by such voluntary volume changes. We would rather have some slack in the organization from time to time than keep everyone terribly busy writing business on which we are going to lose money. Jack Ringwalt, the founder of National Indemnity Company, instilled this underwriting discipline at the inception of the company, and Phil Liesche never has wavered in maintaining it. We believe such strong-mindedness is as rare as it is sound—and absolutely essential to the running of a first-class casualty insurance operation.

你们会注意到，这一部分的已赚保费比 1978 年有所下降。我们听到很多保险经理人谈论，为了实现盈利性承保，他们愿意减少业务量，但我们发现真正这么做的人很少。Phil Liesche 是个例外：如果业务合理，他就承保；如果不合理，他就拒绝。我们的政策是，不会因为这种主动调整业务量所造成的工作量大幅波动而裁员。我们宁愿组织里不时有一些闲置产能，也不愿让每个人都忙得不可开交，去承保那些会让我们亏钱的业务。National Indemnity Company 的创始人 Jack Ringwalt 在公司创立之初就灌输了这种承保纪律，而 Phil Liesche 在维持这种纪律方面从未动摇。我们认为，这种意志坚定既罕见，也正确——并且是经营一家一流意外险公司绝对必要的条件。

John Seward continues to make solid progress at Home and Automobile Insurance Company, in large part by significantly expanding the marketing scope of that company in general liability lines. These lines can be dynamite, but the record to date is excellent and, in John McGowan and Paul Springman, we have two cautious liability managers extending our capabilities.

John Seward 在 Home and Automobile Insurance Company 继续取得稳健进展，很大程度上是通过显著扩大该公司在一般责任险业务上的营销范围。这些业务可能像炸药一样危险，但迄今为止的记录很好，而且在 John McGowan 和 Paul Springman 身上，我们拥有两位谨慎的责任险经理人，正在扩展我们的能力。

Our reinsurance division, led by George Young, continues to give us reasonably satisfactory overall results after allowing for investment income, but underwriting performance remains unsatisfactory. We think the reinsurance business is a very tough business that is likely to get much tougher. In fact, the influx of capital into the business and the resulting softer price levels for continually increasing exposures may well produce disastrous results for many entrants (of which they may be blissfully unaware until they are in over their heads; much reinsurance business involves an exceptionally “long tail”, a characteristic that allows catastrophic current loss experience to fester undetected for many years). It will be hard for us to be a whole lot smarter than the crowd and thus our reinsurance activity may decline substantially during the projected prolonged period of extraordinary competition.

由 George Young 领导的再保险部门，在计入投资收益后，继续为我们带来总体上相当令人满意的结果，但承保表现仍不令人满意。我们认为，再保险业务是一门非常艰难的生意，而且很可能会变得更加艰难。事实上，资本流入这一业务，以及在风险暴露持续增加情况下由此形成的更软弱价格水平，很可能给许多进入者带来灾难性结果（在他们深陷其中之前，他们也许还会幸福地毫无察觉；很多再保险业务具有异常“长尾”的特征，这一特征会让灾难性的当前亏损经验在多年里未被发现地持续恶化）。我们很难比大众聪明很多，因此，在预计将持续很长时间的异常激烈竞争时期，我们的再保险活动可能会大幅下降。

The Homestate operation was disappointing in 1979. Excellent results again were turned in by George Billings at Texas United Insurance Company, winner of the annual award for the low loss ratio among Homestate companies, and Floyd Taylor at Kansas Fire and Casualty Company. But several of the other operations, particularly Cornhusker Casualty Company, our first and largest Homestate operation and historically a winner, had poor underwriting results which were accentuated by data processing, administrative and personnel problems. We have made some major mistakes in reorganizing our data processing activities, and those mistakes will not be cured immediately or without cost. However, John Ringwalt has thrown himself into the task of getting things straightened out and we have confidence that he, aided by several strong people who recently have been brought aboard, will succeed.

Homestate 业务在 1979 年令人失望。Texas United Insurance Company 的 George Billings 再次取得优异成绩，并获得 Homestate 各家公司中低损失率年度奖项；Kansas Fire and Casualty Company 的 Floyd Taylor 也取得了优异成绩。但其他几个业务表现不佳，尤其是 Cornhusker Casualty Company——这是我们最早也是最大的 Homestate 业务，历史上一直表现优秀——其承保结果很差，而且数据处理、行政管理和人员问题进一步加剧了这种情况。我们在重组数据处理活动时犯了一些重大错误，而这些错误不会马上被纠正，也不会没有代价。不过，John Ringwalt 已经全身心投入到理顺这些问题的任务中，并且在最近加入的几位强有力人士的协助下，我们有信心他会成功。

Our performance in Worker’s Compensation was far, far better than we had any right to expect at the beginning of 1979. We had a very favorable climate in California for the achievement of good results but, beyond this, Milt Thornton at Cypress Insurance Company and Frank DeNardo at National Indemnity’s California Worker’s Compensation operation both performed in a simply outstanding manner. We have admitted—and with good reason—some mistakes on the acquisition front, but the Cypress purchase has turned out to be an absolute gem. Milt Thornton, like Phil Liesche, follows the policy of sticking with business that he understands and wants, without giving consideration to the impact on volume. As a result, he has an outstanding book of business and an exceptionally well functioning group of employees. Frank DeNardo has straightened out the mess he inherited in Los Angeles in a manner far beyond our expectations, producing savings measured in seven figures. He now can begin to build on a sound base.

我们在工伤赔偿险上的表现，远远好于我们在 1979 年初有资格期待的水平。California 的环境非常有利于取得好结果，但除此之外，Cypress Insurance Company 的 Milt Thornton 以及 National Indemnity 的 California 工伤赔偿险业务负责人 Frank DeNardo，都表现得极其出色。我们承认——而且有充分理由承认——在收购方面犯过一些错误，但 Cypress 这笔收购已经证明是一颗真正的宝石。Milt Thornton 和 Phil Liesche 一样，坚持只做自己理解并愿意承保的业务，而不考虑这会对业务量产生什么影响。结果，他拥有一本出色的业务账簿，以及一支运行异常良好的员工队伍。Frank DeNardo 把他在 Los Angeles 接手的烂摊子整理得远超我们的预期，节省金额达到七位数。现在，他可以开始在一个稳固基础上建设业务了。

At yearend we entered the specialized area of surety reinsurance under the management of Chet Noble. At least initially, this operation will be relatively small since our policy will be to seek client companies who appreciate the need for a long term “partnership” relationship with their reinsurers. We are pleased by the quality of the insurers we have attracted, and hope to add several more of the best primary writers as our financial strength and stability become better known in the surety field.

年末，在 Chet Noble 的管理下，我们进入了保证再保险这一专业领域。至少在初期，这项业务规模会相对较小，因为我们的政策是寻找那些理解有必要与其再保险人建立长期“合伙”关系的客户公司。我们对已经吸引到的保险公司的质量感到满意，并希望随着我们的财务实力和稳定性在保证保险领域变得更加为人所知，能够再增加几家最优秀的原保险承保人。

The conventional wisdom is that insurance underwriting overall will be poor in 1980, but that rates will start to firm in a year or so, leading to a turn in the cycle some time in 1981. We disagree with this view. Present interest rates encourage the obtaining of business at underwriting loss levels formerly regarded as totally unacceptable. Managers decry the folly of underwriting at a loss to obtain investment income, but we believe that many will. Thus we expect that competition will create a new threshold of tolerance for underwriting losses, and that combined ratios will average higher in the future than in the past.

传统看法认为，1980 年保险承保总体上会很差，但费率将在一年左右后开始走强，从而在 1981 年某个时候带来周期转折。我们不同意这种看法。当前的利率鼓励保险公司在过去被认为完全不可接受的承保亏损水平上获取业务。经理人会谴责为了获得投资收益而亏损承保的愚蠢行为，但我们相信许多人仍会这么做。因此，我们预计竞争将创造一个新的承保亏损容忍门槛，未来的综合比率平均水平将高于过去。

通胀有利于保险公司，大量的浮存金可以获得更高的收益。

To some extent, the day of reckoning has been postponed because of marked reduction in the frequency of auto accidents—probably brought on in major part by changes in driving habits induced by higher gas prices. In our opinion, if the habits hadn’t changed, auto insurance rates would have been very little higher and underwriting results would have been much worse. This dosage of serendipity won’t last indefinitely.

在某种程度上，清算之日被推迟了，因为汽车事故频率显著下降——这很可能主要是由于更高汽油价格诱发驾驶习惯变化所造成的。在我们看来，如果这些习惯没有改变，汽车保险费率只会略高一点，而承保结果会糟糕得多。这剂意外好运不会无限期持续。

Our forecast is for an average combined ratio for the industry in the 105 area over the next five years. While we have a high degree of confidence that certain of our operations will do considerably better than average, it will be a challenge to us to operate below the industry figure. You can get a lot of surprises in insurance.

我们预测，未来五年保险行业的平均综合比率将在 105 左右。虽然我们高度相信，我们某些业务的表现会显著好于平均水平，但要低于行业数字，对我们来说仍将是一项挑战。保险业会给你带来很多意外。

Nevertheless, we believe that insurance can be a very good business. It tends to magnify, to an unusual degree, human managerial talent—or the lack of it. We have a number of managers whose talent is both proven and growing. (And, in addition, we have a very large indirect interest in two truly outstanding management groups through our investments in SAFECO and GEICO.) Thus we expect to do well in insurance over a period of years. However, the business has the potential for really terrible results in a single specific year. If accident frequency should turn around quickly in the auto field, we, along with others, are likely to experience such a year.

尽管如此，我们仍然认为保险可以是一门非常好的生意。它往往会以一种不同寻常的程度，放大人的管理才能——或者放大这种才能的缺失。我们有多位管理人员，他们的才能既已经得到证明，也仍在成长。（此外，通过我们对 SAFECO 和 GEICO 的投资，我们还间接拥有两个真正卓越管理团队中的很大权益。）因此，我们预计在多年期间内会在保险业务中取得好成绩。不过，这门生意在某个特定年份也有可能产生真正糟糕的结果。如果汽车领域的事故频率迅速反转，我们和其他公司一样，很可能会经历这样的一年。

"放大管理层经营能力"。

1、坚持只做自己理解并愿意承保的业务，而不考虑这会对业务量产生什么影响；

2、更扎实的证据是浮存金的资本配置。

Insurance Investments

保险投资业务

In recent years we have written at length in this section about our insurance equity investments. In 1979 they continued to perform well, largely because the underlying companies in which we have invested, in practically all cases, turned in outstanding performances. Retained earnings applicable to our insurance equity investments, not reported in our financial statements, continue to mount annually and, in aggregate, now come to a very substantial number. We have faith that the managements of these companies will utilize those retained earnings effectively and will translate a dollar retained by them into a dollar or more of subsequent market value for us. In part, our unrealized gains reflect this process.

近年来，我们在这一部分已经较为详细地讨论过我们的保险权益投资。1979 年，它们继续表现良好，这在很大程度上是因为我们所投资的标的公司，几乎无一例外，都取得了出色的经营表现。归属于我们保险权益投资的留存收益，并未反映在我们的财务报表中，但每年仍在持续累积；从总体上看，现在已经达到一个相当可观的数字。我们相信，这些公司的管理层会有效运用这些留存收益，并且会把他们每留存的一美元，转化为我们随后获得的一美元或更多市场价值。我们的未实现收益，有一部分正反映了这一过程。

Below we show the equity investments which had a yearend market value of over $5 million:

下面列示的是年末市场价值超过 500 万美元的权益投资：

We currently believe that equity markets in 1980 are likely to evolve in a manner that will result in an underperformance by our portfolio for the first time in recent years. We very much like the companies in which we have major investments, and plan no changes to try to attune ourselves to the markets of a specific year.

我们目前认为，1980 年的股票市场很可能会以某种方式发展，导致我们的投资组合出现近年来第一次表现落后。我们非常喜欢自己重仓投资的那些公司，也不打算为了适应某一特定年份的市场而作出调整。

Since we have covered our philosophy regarding equities extensively in recent annual reports, a more extended discussion of bond investments may be appropriate for this one, particularly in light of what has happened since yearend. An extraordinary amount of money has been lost by the insurance industry in the bond area—notwithstanding the accounting convention that allows insurance companies to carry their bond investments at amortized cost, regardless of impaired market value. Actually, that very accounting convention may have contributed in a major way to the losses; had management been forced to recognize market values, its attention might have been focused much earlier on the dangers of a very long-term bond contract.

由于我们在近几年的年报中已经大量阐述了关于股票的投资理念，因此在本年报中，对债券投资作更展开的讨论也许是合适的，尤其是考虑到年末以来发生的情况。保险行业在债券领域已经损失了异常巨大的金额——尽管会计惯例允许保险公司按摊余成本列示其债券投资，而不管市场价值是否受损。实际上，正是这种会计惯例本身，可能在很大程度上促成了这些损失；如果管理层被迫确认市场价值，他们的注意力也许会更早集中到极长期债券合同的危险上。

Ironically, many insurance companies have decided that a one-year auto policy is inappropriate during a time of inflation, and six-month policies have been brought in as replacements. “How,” say many of the insurance managers, “can we be expected to look forward twelve months and estimate such imponderables as hospital costs, auto parts prices, etc.?” But, having decided that one year is too long a period for which to set a fixed price for insurance in an inflationary world, they then have turned around, taken the proceeds from the sale of that six-month policy, and sold the money at a fixed price for thirty or forty years.

具有讽刺意味的是，许多保险公司已经认定，在通货膨胀时期，一年期汽车保单并不合适，于是引入了六个月期保单作为替代。许多保险经理人会说：“我们怎么可能向前看十二个月，去估算医院费用、汽车零件价格等这些难以衡量的因素？”但是，在认定在通胀世界里一年已经太长、不适合为保险设定固定价格之后，他们转过身来，却把出售六个月期保单所得的资金，以固定价格卖出了三十年或四十年。

The very long-term bond contract has been the last major fixed price contract of extended duration still regularly initiated in an inflation-ridden world. The buyer of money to be used between 1980 and 2020 has been able to obtain a firm price now for each year of its use while the buyer of auto insurance, medical services, newsprint, office space—or just about any other product or service—would be greeted with laughter if he were to request a firm price now to apply through 1985. For in virtually all other areas of commerce, parties to long-term contracts now either index prices in some manner, or insist on the right to review the situation every year or so.

极长期债券合同，是在一个深受通胀困扰的世界中，仍然经常签订的最后一种主要的长期固定价格合同。一个要在 1980 年到 2020 年之间使用资金的资金买方，现在就能够为每一年的资金使用取得确定价格；而购买汽车保险、医疗服务、新闻纸、办公空间——或者几乎任何其他产品或服务——的人，如果要求现在就确定一个适用到 1985 年的固定价格，只会被人嘲笑。因为在几乎所有其他商业领域，长期合同的各方现在要么以某种方式将价格指数化，要么坚持保留每一年左右重新审视情况的权利。

A cultural lag has prevailed in the bond area. The buyers (borrowers) and middlemen (underwriters) of money hardly could be expected to raise the question of whether it all made sense, and the sellers (lenders) slept through an economic and contractual revolution.

债券领域存在一种文化滞后。资金的买方（借款人）和中间人（承销商）几乎不可能主动提出这一切是否合理的问题，而资金的卖方（贷款人）则在一场经济和契约革命中沉睡过去。

愚蠢的不对齐的行为往往跟局部泛化有关，而局部泛化又可以归结到“institutional imperative”。

1、“institutional”：系统性的、有固定剧本的愚蠢行为；“imperative”：接受命令、按命令行事，"institutional imperative"的说法很可能源自于巴甫洛夫的条件反射（respondent conditioning），当一个人的心理惯性获得很多次的正反馈以后，行为模式就固定下来了；

2、条件反射一旦建立，你能做的最好的事情不是消除它，而是在它之上建立一个更强的新反射来覆盖它。但新反射必须提供足够强的无条件刺激，才能与旧反射竞争。

For the last few years our insurance companies have not been a net purchaser of any straight long-term bonds (those without conversion rights or other attributes offering profit possibilities). There have been some purchases in the straight bond area, of course, but they have been offset by sales or maturities. Even prior to this period, we never would buy thirty or forty-year bonds; instead we tried to concentrate in the straight bond area on shorter issues with sinking funds and on issues that seemed relatively undervalued because of bond market inefficiencies.

过去几年，我们的保险公司一直不是任何普通长期债券的净买方（这里指没有转换权或其他提供获利可能属性的债券）。当然，我们在普通债券领域也有过一些买入，但这些买入被出售或到期所抵消。甚至在这一时期之前，我们也从不买三十年或四十年期债券；相反，在普通债券领域，我们试图集中于期限较短、带有偿债基金的债券，以及那些由于债券市场无效率而显得相对低估的债券。

However, the mild degree of caution that we exercised was an improper response to the world unfolding about us. You do not adequately protect yourself by being half awake while others are sleeping. It was a mistake to buy fifteen-year bonds, and yet we did; we made an even more serious mistake in not selling them (at losses, if necessary) when our present views began to crystallize. (Naturally, those views are much clearer and definite in retrospect; it would be fair for you to ask why we weren’t writing about this subject last year.)

然而，面对我们周围正在展开的世界，我们所采取的温和谨慎程度是不恰当的。当别人都在睡觉时，你半醒着并不能充分保护自己。买入十五年期债券是一个错误，而我们确实买了；当我们现在的看法开始成形时，没有把它们卖掉（必要时即使亏损也应卖掉），则是一个更严重的错误。（当然，事后看来，这些看法要清楚和确定得多；你们完全可以问，为什么我们去年没有写这个主题。）

Of course, we must hold significant amounts of bonds or other fixed dollar obligations in conjunction with our insurance operations. In the last several years our net fixed dollar commitments have been limited to the purchase of convertible bonds. We believe that the conversion options obtained, in effect, give that portion of the bond portfolio a far shorter average life than implied by the maturity terms of the issues (i.e., at an appropriate time of our choosing, we can terminate the bond contract by conversion into stock).

当然，配合我们的保险经营，我们必须持有相当数量的债券或其他固定美元债权。过去几年，我们新增的固定美元承诺仅限于购买可转换债券。我们认为，所取得的转换选择权，实际上使这一部分债券组合的平均期限远短于这些债券到期条款所显示的期限（也就是说，在我们选择的适当时点，我们可以通过转换为股票来终止债券合同）。

This bond policy has given us significantly lower unrealized losses than those experienced by the great majority of property and casualty insurance companies. We also have been helped by our strong preference for equities in recent years that has kept our overall bond segment relatively low. Nevertheless, we are taking our lumps in bonds and feel that, in a sense, our mistakes should be viewed less charitably than the mistakes of those who went about their business unmindful of the developing problems.

这项债券政策使我们的未实现损失明显低于绝大多数财产与意外险公司。近几年我们强烈偏好股票，也使我们的整体债券部分保持在相对较低水平，这同样帮助了我们。尽管如此，我们仍在债券上吃了亏，并且认为，从某种意义上说，我们的错误应当比那些对正在发展的这些问题毫无察觉、照常行事的人所犯的错误受到更少宽容。

Harking back to our textile experience, we should have realized the futility of trying to be very clever (via sinking funds and other special type issues) in an area where the tide was running heavily against us.

回想我们的纺织业经验，我们本应意识到，在大潮强烈逆着我们而来的领域，试图通过偿债基金和其他特殊类型债券来表现得非常聪明，是徒劳无益的。

We have severe doubts as to whether a very long-term fixed-interest bond, denominated in dollars, remains an appropriate business contract in a world where the value of dollars seems almost certain to shrink by the day. Those dollars, as well as paper creations of other governments, simply may have too many structural weaknesses to appropriately serve as a unit of long term commercial reference. If so, really long bonds may turn out to be obsolete instruments and insurers who have bought those maturities of 2010 or 2020 could have major and continuing problems on their hands. We, likewise, will be unhappy with our fifteen-year bonds and will annually pay a price in terms of earning power that reflects that mistake.

我们严重怀疑，在一个美元价值几乎肯定会日复一日缩水的世界里，以美元计价的极长期固定利率债券，是否仍然是一种合适的商业合同。这些美元，以及其他政府创造出来的纸面货币，可能只是存在太多结构性弱点，以至于无法适当地作为长期商业参照单位。如果是这样，真正的长期债券可能会变成过时工具，而那些买入 2010 年或 2020 年到期债券的保险公司，可能会面临重大且持续的问题。同样，我们也会对自己持有的十五年期债券感到不满意，并且每年都将以盈利能力为代价，为这一错误付费。

Some of our convertible bonds appear exceptionally attractive to us, and have the same sort of earnings retention factor (applicable to the stock into which they may be converted) that prevails in our conventional equity portfolio. We expect to make money in these bonds (we already have, in a few cases) and have hopes that our profits in this area may offset losses in straight bonds.

我们持有的一些可转换债券在我们看来极具吸引力，并且具备与我们普通股票组合中常见的那种留存收益因素（适用于它们可转换成的股票）。我们预计会在这些债券上赚钱（在少数情况下，我们已经赚到了），并且希望这一领域的利润可以抵消普通债券上的损失。

And, of course, there is the possibility that our present analysis is much too negative. The chances for very low rates of inflation are not nil. Inflation is man-made; perhaps it can be man-mastered. The threat which alarms us may also alarm legislators and other powerful groups, prompting some appropriate response.

当然，也存在一种可能：我们目前的分析过于负面。出现非常低通货膨胀率的可能性并非为零。通货膨胀是人为制造的；也许它也可以被人类驾驭。令我们警觉的威胁，也可能令立法者和其他有影响力的群体警觉，从而促使他们作出某种适当回应。

Furthermore, present interest rates incorporate much higher inflation projections than those of a year or two ago. Such rates may prove adequate or more than adequate to protect bond buyers. We even may miss large profits from a major rebound in bond prices. However, our unwillingness to fix a price now for a pound of See’s candy or a yard of Berkshire cloth to be delivered in 2010 or 2020 makes us equally unwilling to buy bonds which set a price on money now for use in those years. Overall, we opt for Polonius (slightly restated): “Neither a short-term borrower nor a long-term lender be.”

此外，当前利率所包含的通胀预期，远高于一两年前。这样的利率可能会被证明足以、甚至绰绰有余地保护债券买方。我们甚至可能错过债券价格大幅反弹带来的丰厚利润。然而，既然我们不愿意现在就为 2010 年或 2020 年交付的一磅 See’s 糖果或一码 Berkshire 布料确定价格，我们同样不愿意买入那些现在就为这些年份使用的资金确定价格的债券。总体上，我们选择 Polonius 的格言（略作改写）：“既不要做短期借款人，也不要做长期贷款人。”

美国政府的债务是通胀的推动因素。

1、30万亿的美国国债中，Treasury bills 占可交易公众债务的比例，从 2014 财年的 13% 上升到 2025 财年的约 22%，而长期平均水平约 20%。

2、10年期美国国债如下图所示，在2023年10月一度升破 5%。

3、美国的政府支出、再工业化，人工智能的重资产投入，这些都会推动利率的上升，参考：《2024-05-29 James Dimon.Bernstein's 40th Annual Strategic Decisions Conference》。

James Dimon Chairman & CEO

You have -- now you have the scenario-plan it, okay? If we have a soft landing and rates stay where they are, come down a little bit, which is what the world expects, everyone is fine. If you have a harder landing with stagflation, yes, you're going to see a lot of stress and strain in the system, from banks, to leverage companies, to real estate, to a whole bunch of stuff.

詹姆斯·戴蒙董事长兼首席执行官

你得做情景规划。如果经济软着陆、利率维持或小幅下降——世界普遍预期如此——那大家都没问题。如果出现滞胀式硬着陆，系统内将承受巨大压力，从银行到杠杆公司、房地产等各方面都会受影响。

That's what it is. If things get worse, it's going to filter right through all those things. And in my view, is the world's just not ready for that. I mean, a lot of you in this audience have never seen rates at 6% on a 10-year bond. And I don't know why you think it's not possible. It is possible. I for one think the odds are much higher than the people think. So you got to look at the scenarios for that. And so -- but I also think -- what I see a lot of banks doing in particular is thinking ahead in terms of capital, interest rate exposure, real estate exposure, reserves. Then you got to go bank by bank at that point. It doesn't help to make a generic statement about banks.

情况就是这样。如果变得更糟，冲击会层层传导。我认为世界对此并未做好准备。现场很多人从未见过 10 年期国债收益率 6%。我不明白你们为何认为不可能，它完全可能。我个人认为概率远高于大家的想象，所以必须审视这些情景。此外，我看到许多银行在资本、利率风险、房地产敞口、拨备方面开始超前思考。此时你必须逐家机构具体分析，泛泛而谈毫无意义。

And so -- but I think real estate, too. I remind people in real estate, because I heard Charlie talking about it a little bit, rates went up 300 basis points. That makes any cash flow worth 30% less. So it's got nothing to do with real estate. If an asset was worth \$100, it's now worth \$70. If people were lending \$60 against \$100, they're now lending \$50 against a \$70. That's all it is. That's got -- that's not even real estate. That could be almost any asset out there. So -- and of course, people have personal guarantees. They put in equity. And a bank will rollover not at 50%, but maybe 90% to keep the thing alive. But that is the kind of math. That's -- I call it, that's the gravity of interest rates. That's a cosmological constant. And so people need to be prepared for that.

关于房地产，我也提醒大家，因为我听查理提到：利率上升 300 个基点意味着任何现金流的现值减少 30%。这与房地产本身无关。如果资产价值原本 100 美元，现在只有 70 美元。如果原先借款人能贷 60，现在只能贷 50。这就是全部，仅仅是利率作用，几乎适用于任何资产。当然，人们提供个人担保，投入自有资金。银行可能不会只续贷 50%，而是 90%，以维持项目运转。但这就是数学，我称之为利率引力，是宇宙常数，人们必须为此做好准备。

The surprise will be stagflation. I'm not saying it's going to happen. I just give the odds much higher than other people. I look at the amount of fiscal and monetary stimulus that's taken place over the last 5 years has been so extraordinary. How can you tell me it won't lead to stagflation? Now it might not, but I for one, we're quite prepared for it.

真正的意外将是滞胀。我并不是说一定会发生，只是认为概率比别人估计的高得多。过去五年实施的财政和货币刺激极其庞大，你怎样能肯定不会导致滞胀？当然也可能不会发生，但至少我们已经做好充分准备。

Banking

银行业务

This will be the last year that we can report on the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company as a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway. Therefore, it is particularly pleasant to report that, under Gene Abegg’s and Pete Jeffrey’s management, the bank broke all previous records and earned approximately 2.3% on average assets last year, a level again over three times that achieved by the average major bank, and more than double that of banks regarded as outstanding. The record is simply extraordinary, and the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway owe a standing ovation to Gene Abegg for the performance this year and every year since our purchase in 1969.

这将是我们最后一年把 Illinois National Bank and Trust Company 作为 Berkshire Hathaway 子公司来报告。因此，特别令人愉快的是，我们可以报告，在 Gene Abegg 和 Pete Jeffrey 的管理下，这家银行打破了以往所有纪录，去年平均资产回报率约为 2.3%，这一水平再次超过主要银行平均水平的三倍，也超过那些被认为表现优秀的银行的两倍。这个纪录实在非同寻常，Berkshire Hathaway 的股东应该为 Gene Abegg 在今年以及自我们 1969 年收购以来每一年的表现起立鼓掌。

As you know, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1969 requires that we divest the bank by December 31, 1980. For some years we have expected to comply by effecting a spin-off during 1980. However, the Federal Reserve Board has taken the firm position that if the bank is spun off, no officer or director of Berkshire Hathaway can be an officer or director of the spun-off bank or bank holding company, even in a case such as ours in which one individual would own over 40% of both companies.

如各位所知，1969 年《银行控股公司法》要求我们在 1980 年 12 月 31 日之前剥离这家银行。多年来，我们一直预计会在 1980 年通过分拆来满足这一要求。然而，Federal Reserve Board 已经采取了坚定立场：如果这家银行被分拆出去，Berkshire Hathaway 的任何高管或董事都不能同时担任被分拆银行或银行控股公司的高管或董事，即使像我们这种情况，一个人将同时拥有两家公司超过 40% 的股权，也不例外。

Under these conditions, we are investigating the possible sale of between 80% and 100% of the stock of the bank. We will be most choosy about any purchaser, and our selection will not be based solely on price. The bank and its management have treated us exceptionally well and, if we have to sell, we want to be sure that they are treated equally as well. A spin-off still is a possibility if a fair price along with a proper purchaser cannot be obtained by early fall.

在这些条件下，我们正在研究出售该银行 80% 至 100% 股权的可能性。对于任何买方，我们都会非常挑剔，我们的选择不会只基于价格。这家银行及其管理层一直极其善待我们；如果我们不得不出售，我们希望确保他们也能受到同样好的对待。如果到初秋仍无法获得公平价格并找到合适买方，分拆仍然是一种可能。

However, you should be aware that we do not expect to be able to fully, or even in very large part, replace the earning power represented by the bank from the proceeds of the sale of the bank. You simply can’t buy high quality businesses at the sort of price/earnings multiple likely to prevail on our bank sale.

不过，各位应该明白，我们并不指望能够用出售这家银行所得的资金，完全、甚至在很大程度上替代这家银行所代表的盈利能力。你根本不可能用我们出售这家银行时很可能适用的那种市盈率，买到高质量企业。

Financial Reporting

财务报告

During 1979, NASDAQ trading was initiated in the stock of Berkshire Hathaway. This means that the stock now is quoted on the Over-the-Counter page of the Wall Street Journal under “Additional OTC Quotes”. Prior to such listing, the Wall Street Journal and the Dow-Jones news ticker would not report our earnings, even though such earnings were one hundred or more times the level of some companies whose reports they regularly picked up.

1979 年，Berkshire Hathaway 股票开始在 NASDAQ 交易。这意味着，该股票现在会在 Wall Street Journal 的场外交易页面中，以“Additional OTC Quotes”的名义报价。在这种挂牌之前，Wall Street Journal 和 Dow-Jones 新闻滚动条不会报道我们的收益，尽管我们的收益水平是某些它们经常报道公司的 100 倍甚至更多。

Now, however, the Dow-Jones news ticker reports our quarterly earnings promptly after we release them and, in addition, both the ticker and the Wall Street Journal report our annual earnings. This solves a dissemination problem that had bothered us.

不过现在，在我们发布季度收益后，Dow-Jones 新闻滚动条会迅速报道；此外，新闻滚动条和 Wall Street Journal 都会报道我们的年度收益。这解决了一个长期困扰我们的信息传播问题。

In some ways, our shareholder group is a rather unusual one, and this affects our manner of reporting to you. For example, at the end of each year about 98% of the shares outstanding are held by people who also were shareholders at the beginning of the year. Therefore, in our annual report we build upon what we have told you in previous years instead of restating a lot of material. You get more useful information this way, and we don’t get bored.

在某些方面，我们的股东群体相当不寻常，这也影响了我们向你们报告的方式。例如，在每年年末，约 98% 的流通股仍由年初就是股东的人持有。因此，在年报中，我们是在过去几年已经告诉你们的内容基础上继续展开，而不是重复大量材料。这样，你们能获得更有用的信息，我们也不会感到无聊。

Furthermore, perhaps 90% of our shares are owned by investors for whom Berkshire is their largest security holding, very often far and away the largest. Many of these owners are willing to spend a significant amount of time with the annual report, and we attempt to provide them with the same information we would find useful if the roles were reversed.

此外，也许我们 90% 的股份由那些把 Berkshire 作为其最大证券持仓的投资者持有，而且很多时候是遥遥领先的最大持仓。这些所有者中，有许多人愿意花大量时间阅读年报，而我们也试图向他们提供一种信息：如果角色互换，我们自己也会认为有用的信息。

In contrast, we include no narrative with our quarterly reports. Our owners and managers both have very long time-horizons in regard to this business, and it is difficult to say anything new or meaningful each quarter about events of long-term significance.

相比之下，我们的季度报告不附带叙述性说明。我们的所有者和管理者，对这项业务都拥有非常长期的时间视野；而对于具有长期意义的事项，要在每个季度都说出什么新的或有意义的内容，是很困难的。

But when you do receive a communication from us, it will come from the fellow you are paying to run the business. Your Chairman has a firm belief that owners are entitled to hear directly from the CEO as to what is going on and how he evaluates the business, currently and prospectively. You would demand that in a private company; you should expect no less in a public company. A once-a-year report of stewardship should not be turned over to a staff specialist or public relations consultant who is unlikely to be in a position to talk frankly on a manager-to-owner basis.

但是，当你们确实收到我们的沟通时，它会来自你们付钱请来经营企业的那个人。你们的董事长坚定地相信，所有者有权直接听 CEO 说明正在发生什么，以及他如何评价企业的当前状况和未来前景。如果这是一家私人公司，你们会要求这样；在一家公众公司中，你们也不应期待更少。一年一次的受托经营报告，不应交给员工专家或公共关系顾问来处理，因为他们不太可能以管理者对所有者的身份坦率交谈。

We feel that you, as owners, are entitled to the same sort of reporting by your manager as we feel is owed to us at Berkshire Hathaway by managers of our business units. Obviously, the degree of detail must be different, particularly where information would be useful to a business competitor or the like. But the general scope, balance, and level of candor should be similar. We don’t expect a public relations document when our operating managers tell us what is going on, and we don’t feel you should receive such a document.

我们认为，你们作为所有者，有权获得管理者提供的报告，其性质应与 Berkshire Hathaway 各业务单元管理者向我们提供的报告相同。显然，细节程度必须有所不同，尤其是在某些信息可能对商业竞争者或类似对象有用的情况下。但是，整体范围、平衡性和坦诚程度应当相似。当我们的经营管理者告诉我们正在发生什么时，我们并不期待收到一份公共关系文件；我们也认为，你们不应收到这样的文件。

In large part, companies obtain the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve. If they focus their thinking and communications on short-term results or short-term stock market consequences they will, in large part, attract shareholders who focus on the same factors. And if they are cynical in their treatment of investors, eventually that cynicism is highly likely to be returned by the investment community.

在很大程度上，公司会得到它们寻求并配得上的股东群体。如果它们把思考和沟通的重点放在短期结果或短期股票市场后果上，它们很大程度上也会吸引关注同样因素的股东。如果它们以犬儒态度对待投资者，最终这种犬儒态度很可能会被投资界反过来还给它们。

2015年，50周年的回顾中有一句更严厉的表述，前后隔了35年，这个句子的前缀都是“很大程度上”，参考：《2015-02-27 Berkshire - Past Present and Future》。

To a large degree, both good and bad cultures self-select to perpetuate themselves.

在很大程度上，好和坏的文化都是自我选择使自己永存。

Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele—patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, Oriental food, etc.—and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently. But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and take-out chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers.

Phil Fisher 是一位受人尊敬的投资者和作者，他曾把公司吸引股东的政策，比作餐厅吸引潜在顾客的政策。一家餐厅可以寻求某一类顾客——快餐顾客、精致餐饮顾客、东方菜顾客，等等——并最终获得一群合适的忠实顾客。如果这项工作做得专业，这些顾客会因其提供的服务、菜单和价格水平而满意，并持续回头。但餐厅不可能不断改变自己的特征，最后还能拥有一群满意且稳定的顾客。如果一家餐厅在法国菜和外带炸鸡之间摇摆不定，结果只会是一扇旋转门，进出的都是困惑而不满意的顾客。

So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can’t be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc.

公司及其所寻求的股东群体也是如此。你不可能同时满足所有人，同时寻求不同类型的所有者，而这些人的主要兴趣从高当前收益率，到长期资本增长，再到股票市场烟火表演，等等，各不相同。

The reasoning of managements that seek large trading activity in their shares puzzles us. In effect, such managements are saying that they want a good many of the existing clientele continually to desert them in favor of new ones—because you can’t add lots of new owners (with new expectations) without losing lots of former owners.

那些追求其股票大量交易活动的管理层，其思路令我们困惑。实际上，这样的管理层是在说，他们希望相当多现有顾客不断离开他们，转而让新顾客进来——因为你不可能在增加大量新所有者（带着新的期待）的同时，不失去大量原有所有者。

We much prefer owners who like our service and menu and who return year after year. It would be hard to find a better group to sit in the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder “seats” than those already occupying them. So we hope to continue to have a very low turnover among our owners, reflecting a constituency that understands our operation, approves of our policies, and shares our expectations. And we hope to deliver on those expectations.

我们更喜欢那些喜欢我们的服务和菜单、并且年复一年回来的所有者。很难找到比现在已经坐在 Berkshire Hathaway 股东“座位”上的这些人更好的群体。因此，我们希望继续保持非常低的所有者周转率，这反映出一个理解我们经营、认可我们政策、并分享我们预期的股东群体。而我们也希望兑现这些预期。

Prospects

未来前景

Prospects

前景

Last year we said that we expected operating earnings in dollars to improve but return on equity to decrease. This turned out to be correct. Our forecast for 1980 is the same. If we are wrong, it will be on the downside. In other words, we are virtually certain that our operating earnings expressed as a percentage of the new equity base of approximately $236 million, valuing securities at cost, will decline from the 18.6% attained in 1979. There is also a fair chance that operating earnings in aggregate dollars will fall short of 1979; the outcome depends partly upon the date of disposition of the bank, partly upon the degree of slippage in insurance underwriting profitability, and partly upon the severity of earnings problems in the savings and loan industry.

去年我们说过，预计以美元金额表示的经营收益会改善，但股本回报率会下降。事实证明这一判断是正确的。我们对 1980 年的预测也是如此。如果我们错了，错误将出现在下行方向。换句话说，我们几乎可以确定，按约 2.36 亿美元的新股本基数计算（证券按成本计价），我们的经营收益占股本的百分比将低于 1979 年达到的 18.6%。同时，经营收益的总美元金额也有相当可能低于 1979 年；结果部分取决于银行处置的日期，部分取决于保险承保盈利能力下滑的程度，部分取决于储蓄贷款行业收益问题的严重程度。

We continue to feel very good about our insurance equity investments. Over a period of years, we expect to develop very large and growing amounts of underlying earning power attributable to our fractional ownership of these companies. In most cases they are splendid businesses, splendidly managed, purchased at highly attractive prices.

我们仍然非常看好我们的保险权益投资。经过多年时间，我们预计会形成非常庞大且不断增长的基础盈利能力，这些盈利能力归属于我们对这些公司的部分所有权。在大多数情况下，它们都是卓越的企业，由卓越的管理层经营，并且是以极具吸引力的价格买入的。

Your company is run on the principle of centralization of financial decisions at the top (the very top, it might be added), and rather extreme delegation of operating authority to a number of key managers at the individual company or business unit level. We could just field a basketball team with our corporate headquarters group (which utilizes only about 1500 square feet of space).

你们的公司是按照这样一个原则经营的：财务决策集中在高层（也许应该补充一句，是最高层），而经营权则相当彻底地下放给各个公司或业务单元层面的若干关键经理人。我们的公司总部团队刚好可以组一支篮球队（而且只使用大约 1500 平方英尺的办公空间）。

This approach produces an occasional major mistake that might have been eliminated or minimized through closer operating controls. But it also eliminates large layers of costs and dramatically speeds decision-making. Because everyone has a great deal to do, a very great deal gets done. Most important of all, it enables us to attract and retain some extraordinarily talented individuals—people who simply can’t be hired in the normal course of events—who find working for Berkshire to be almost identical to running their own show.

这种方法偶尔会产生重大错误，而这些错误也许可以通过更严密的经营控制来消除或减轻。但它也消除了大量管理层级成本，并大幅加快了决策速度。因为每个人都有大量事情要做，所以也确实有大量事情被完成。最重要的是，它使我们能够吸引并留住一些极其有才干的人——这些人在通常情况下根本无法被雇到——他们发现，为 Berkshire 工作几乎就像经营自己的事业一样。

这里涉及“able”和“institutional imperative”的具体理解，巴菲特关于“able”的定义有两点：（1）实现企业全部潜力的能力？（2）明智运用现金流的能力？如果就讲一点，那就是在所运用的股本上取得足够高的收益率，这时候问题已经出来了，无论哪种情况，所有上述情况下，时间久了都会被“institutional imperative”侵蚀。

1、一直保持很高的收益率，比如，See's。

从See's赚到的钱不知道怎么办？存银行拿很低的收益率，知道怎么办需要跳出原来的框框。

2、一直保持勉强、不赚钱的状态，比如，Berkshire的纺织厂。

原来的管理团队只能在纺织业的框框里思考出路，是不是真实的思考，还是更接近于条件反射？而巴菲特又是如何一步步走出来的？

3、越做越低的收益率，比如，Berkshire的报纸。

互联网兴起是一个压倒性的变化，有没有看到？事实变了、想法能不能跟着改变？可以再看一看Google的搜索引擎，有没有过度思考的成分？

“明智运用现金流”需要保持结构化的压缩大量信息的能力，挣脱“条件反射”的束缚，事实变了、想法跟着改变，能在大量信息中压缩出“模糊正确”的边界，压缩后的知识结构还要足够的简洁、有效，能抵抗错误条件反射的干扰。

“institutional imperative”和“条件反射”是企业管理中最大的风险，能挣脱“条件反射”的束缚非常罕见也是最理想的结果，但是不增加发生的可能性是更务实的做法，这就是巴菲特说的去除大量的管理层级。

We have placed much trust in them—and their achievements have far exceeded that trust.

我们对他们给予了很大的信任——而他们取得的成就远远超过了这份信任。

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman

March 3, 1980

1980-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1980-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1979 Operating Results

Sources of Earnings

Textiles and Retailing

Insurance Underwriting

Insurance Investments

Banking

Financial Reporting

Prospects

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