1981-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Operating earnings improved to $41.9 million in 1980 from $36.0 million in 1979, but return on beginning equity capital (with securities valued at cost) fell to 17.8% from 18.6%. We believe the latter yardstick to be the most appropriate measure of single-year managerial economic performance. Informed use of that yardstick, however, requires an understanding of many factors, including accounting policies, historical carrying values of assets, financial leverage, and industry conditions.
1980 年的经营收益从 1979 年的 3,600 万美元提高到 4,190 万美元，但按期初权益资本计算的回报率（其中证券按成本计价）却从 18.6% 降至 17.8%。我们认为，后者这个尺度，才是衡量单一年份管理层经济表现最恰当的指标。不过，要正确使用这一指标，必须理解许多因素，包括会计政策、资产的历史账面价值、财务杠杆以及行业状况。
In your evaluation of our economic performance, we suggest that two factors should receive your special attention - one of a positive nature peculiar, to a large extent, to our own operation, and one of a negative nature applicable to corporate performance generally. Let’s look at the bright side first.
在你评估我们的经济表现时，我们建议你特别关注两个因素——一个是积极因素，在很大程度上是我们自身经营所特有的；另一个则是消极因素，普遍适用于公司整体业绩。先来看光明的一面。
Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings
无控制权持股之盈余
When one company owns part of another company, appropriate accounting procedures pertaining to that ownership interest must be selected from one of three major categories. The percentage of voting stock that is owned, in large part, determines which category of accounting principles should be utilized.
当一家公司持有另一家公司部分股权时，针对这项持股所采用的适当会计处理，必须从三大主要类别中选择其一。决定应采用哪一类会计原则，在很大程度上取决于所持有表决权股票的比例。
Generally accepted accounting principles require (subject to exceptions, naturally, as with our former bank subsidiary) full consolidation of sales, expenses, taxes, and earnings of business holdings more than 50% owned. Blue Chip Stamps, 60% owned by Berkshire Hathaway Inc., falls into this category. Therefore, all Blue Chip income and expense items are included in full in Berkshire’s Consolidated Statement of Earnings, with the 40% ownership interest of others in Blue Chip’s net earnings reflected in the Statement as a deduction for “minority interest”.
通用会计准则要求（当然也有例外，比如我们过去的银行子公司）对持股超过 50% 的企业进行全面并表，将其销售、费用、税项和收益全部纳入。Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 持有 60% 的 Blue Chip Stamps 就属于这一类。因此，Blue Chip 的全部收入和费用项目都会完整计入 Berkshire 的合并利润表，而其他股东所持有的 Blue Chip 40% 净收益权益，则在利润表中以“少数股东权益”扣减项反映。
Full inclusion of underlying earnings from another class of holdings, companies owned 20% to 50% (usually called “investees”), also normally occurs. Earnings from such companies - for example, Wesco Financial, controlled by Berkshire but only 48% owned - are included via a one-line entry in the owner’s Statement of Earnings. Unlike the over-50% category, all items of revenue and expense are omitted; just the proportional share of net income is included. Thus, if Corporation A owns one-third of Corporation B, one-third of B’s earnings, whether or not distributed by B, will end up in A’s earnings. There are some modifications, both in this and the over-50% category, for intercorporate taxes and purchase price adjustments, the explanation of which we will save for a later day. (We know you can hardly wait.)
对另一类持股——即持股 20% 到 50% 的公司（通常称为“被投资公司”）——其底层收益通常也会被完整地纳入，只不过采用不同方式。来自这类公司的收益，例如由 Berkshire 控制但仅持有 48% 的 Wesco Financial，会通过所有者利润表中的单行项目计入。与持股超过 50% 的类别不同，这里所有收入和费用项目都不列示，只计入按比例享有的净利润。因此，如果 A 公司持有 B 公司三分之一股权，那么 B 公司三分之一的收益——无论 B 是否分配——都会进入 A 的收益之中。在这一类以及持股超过 50% 的那一类中，还存在一些关于公司间税收和收购价调整的修正，具体解释留待以后再说。（我们知道你们几乎等不及了。）
Finally come holdings representing less than 20% ownership of another corporation’s voting securities. In these cases, accounting rules dictate that the owning companies include in their earnings only dividends received from such holdings. Undistributed earnings are ignored. Thus, should we own 10% of Corporation X with earnings of $10 million in 1980, we would report in our earnings (ignoring relatively minor taxes on intercorporate dividends) either (a) $1 million if X declared the full $10 million in dividends; (b) $500,000 if X paid out 50%, or $5 million, in dividends; or (c) zero if X reinvested all earnings.
最后一种情况，是持有另一家公司表决权证券低于 20% 的股份。在这些情况下，会计规则规定，持有方公司只能将从这些持股中实际收到的股息计入自身收益，未分配收益则被忽略。因此，假设我们持有 X 公司 10% 的股权，而 X 公司在 1980 年赚取了 1,000 万美元，那么我们在自己的收益中（忽略公司间股息税这类相对较小的税项）所报告的将会是以下三种情况之一：(a) 如果 X 将这 1,000 万美元全部作为股息分配，我们将报告 100 万美元；(b) 如果 X 只分配 50%，即 500 万美元股息，我们将报告 50 万美元；或者 (c) 如果 X 将全部收益都用于再投资，我们将报告为零。
We impose this short - and over-simplified - course in accounting upon you because Berkshire’s concentration of resources in the insurance field produces a corresponding concentration of its assets in companies in that third (less than 20% owned) category. Many of these companies pay out relatively small proportions of their earnings in dividends. This means that only a small proportion of their current earning power is recorded in our own current operating earnings. But, while our reported operating earnings reflect only the dividends received from such companies, our economic well-being is determined by their earnings, not their dividends.
我们之所以把这门简短而且过度简化的会计课强加给你们，是因为 Berkshire 在保险业务上的资源集中，导致其资产也相应集中在第三类公司上——也就是那种持股低于 20% 的公司。这些公司中有许多只把其收益中的相对较小一部分以股息形式分配出来。这意味着，它们当前盈利能力中只有很小一部分，会被记录进我们自己当前的经营收益里。但是，尽管我们报告出来的经营收益只反映了从这些公司收到的股息，我们的经济福祉却是由它们的盈利决定的，而不是由它们的股息决定的。
Our holdings in this third category of companies have increased dramatically in recent years as our insurance business has prospered and as securities markets have presented particularly attractive opportunities in the common stock area. The large increase in such holdings, plus the growth of earnings experienced by those partially-owned companies, has produced an unusual result; the part of "our" earnings that these companies retained last year (the part not paid to us in dividends) exceeded the total reported annual operating earnings of Berkshire Hathaway. Thus, conventional accounting only allows less than half of our earnings "iceberg" to appear above the surface, in plain view. Within the corporate world such a result is quite rare; in our case it is likely to be recurring.
随着我们的保险业务日益兴旺，以及证券市场在普通股领域提供了格外有吸引力的机会，我们在这第三类公司的持仓近年来大幅增加。这类持仓的大幅增长，再加上那些部分持股公司自身盈利的增长，带来了一个不寻常的结果：去年这些公司替我们“留存”的那部分收益（也就是没有以股息形式支付给我们的那部分），竟然超过了 Berkshire Hathaway 当年报告出来的全部经营收益。因此，传统会计只允许我们这座收益“冰山”不到一半的部分露出水面，清晰可见。在公司世界里，这种情况相当罕见；而在我们的情形下，它很可能会反复出现。
Our own analysis of earnings reality differs somewhat from generally accepted accounting principles, particularly when those principles must be applied in a world of high and uncertain rates of inflation. (But it's much easier to criticize than to improve such accounting rules. The inherent problems are monumental.) We have owned 100% of businesses whose reported earnings were not worth close to 100 cents on the dollar to us even though, in an accounting sense, we totally controlled their disposition. (The "control" was theoretical. Unless we reinvested all earnings, massive deterioration in the value of assets already in place would occur. But those reinvested earnings had no prospect of earning anything close to a market return on capital.) We have also owned small fractions of businesses with extraordinary reinvestment possibilities whose retained earnings had an economic value to us far in excess of 100 cents on the dollar.
我们自己对“真实收益”的分析，与通用会计准则多少有些不同，尤其是在这些准则必须应用于一个高通胀且通胀率不确定的世界时更是如此。（不过，批评这些会计规则要比改进它们容易得多，问题本身极其棘手。）我们曾 100% 持有一些企业，而这些企业报告出来的收益，对我们而言其价值远远达不到“每赚一美元就值一美元”，尽管从会计角度说，我们完全控制了这些收益的处置。（这种“控制”只是理论上的。除非我们把全部收益都再投资，否则已在位资产的价值会发生大幅恶化。但这些再投资收益根本没有希望赚到任何接近市场资本回报率的收益。）我们也曾只持有某些企业很小的一部分股权，而这些企业拥有极其出色的再投资机会，它们的留存收益对我们的经济价值却远远超过每赚一美元就值一美元。
The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage. This is true whether we determine the usage, or whether managers we did not hire—but did elect to join—determine that usage. (It's the act that counts, not the actors.) And the value is in no way affected by the inclusion or non-inclusion of those retained earnings in our own reported operating earnings. If a tree grows in a forest partially owned by us, but we don't record the growth in our financial statements, we still own part of the tree.
Berkshire Hathaway 从留存收益中获得的价值，并不取决于我们持有那些企业 100%、50%、20% 还是 1% 的股权。相反，这些留存收益的价值取决于它们被如何使用，以及这种使用随后带来了多高水平的盈利。无论是由我们来决定这些收益的用途，还是由那些并非我们雇用、而是我们选择与之同行的经理人来决定，都是如此。（关键在于行为本身，而不在于行为者是谁。）而且，这种价值丝毫不会因为这些留存收益是否被计入我们自己报告的经营收益而受到影响。如果森林里有一棵树在生长，而我们拥有这片森林的一部分，哪怕我们没有在财务报表中记录这棵树的生长，我们仍然拥有那棵树的一部分。
Our view, we warn you, is non-conventional. But we would rather have earnings for which we did not get accounting credit put to good use in a 10%-owned company by a management we did not personally hire, than have earnings for which we did get credit put into projects of more dubious potential by another management—even if we are that management.
我们的看法——先提醒你——并不符合常规。但我们宁愿看到那些在会计上没有记到我们名下的收益，被一家我们仅持有 10% 股权、且管理层并非我们亲自聘请的公司拿去好好使用；也不愿看到那些在会计上记到了我们名下的收益，被另一套管理层——哪怕那套管理层就是我们自己——投入到前景更可疑的项目中去。
(We can't resist pausing here for a short commercial. One usage of retained earnings we often greet with special enthusiasm when practiced by companies in which we have an investment interest is repurchase of their own shares. The reasoning is simple: if a fine business is selling in the market place for far less than intrinsic value, what more certain or more profitable utilization of capital can there be than significant enlargement of the interests of all owners at that bargain price? The competitive nature of corporate acquisition activity almost guarantees the payment of a full—frequently more than full price when a company buys the entire ownership of another enterprise. But the auction nature of security markets often allows finely-run companies the opportunity to purchase portions of their own businesses at a price under 50% of that needed to acquire the same earning power through the negotiated acquisition of another enterprise.)
（我们忍不住要在这里插播一小段广告。对于我们持有投资权益的公司来说，有一种留存收益的使用方式，往往最能激起我们的热情，那就是回购它们自己的股票。道理很简单：如果一家优秀企业在市场上的交易价格远低于其内在价值，那么，还有什么资本运用方式，能比以这样便宜的价格显著扩大所有股东的权益，更确定、也更赚钱呢？公司并购活动的竞争性质，几乎注定了一家公司在整体收购另一家企业时，必须支付足价——而且往往是高于足价的价格。但证券市场的拍卖性质，却常常让经营优异的公司有机会，以不到通过协商收购另一家企业、以取得相同盈利能力所需价格 50% 的成本，买回自身业务的一部分。）
Long-Term Corporate Results
企业长期绩效
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders' equity with securities valued at cost. Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized. We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns. The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value.
正如我们所指出的，我们评估单一年度公司业绩时，是将经营收益与股东权益进行比较，并且其中证券按成本计价。然而，我们衡量长期业绩的标尺，则包括全部资本利得或损失，不论其已实现还是未实现。我们的长期净资产回报率，仍持续显著高于各年度回报率的平均值。造成这一令人愉快结果的主要因素其实很简单：我们前面讨论过的那些非控股持仓，其留存收益已经转化为了市场价值的增长。
Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis. And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation. But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur. Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings.
当然，这种把留存收益转化为股价升值的过程是高度不均匀的（有些年份甚至会反向发生），在时间上无法预测，而且不太可能精确地以一美元对一美元的方式体现出来。并且，如果你以一个荒唐的价格买入一家公司的大宗股票，那么该公司十年的留存收益效应都可能被这笔愚蠢的买价抵消掉。但只要买入价格是合理的，市场几乎肯定会在长期中以某种方式认可留存收益的累积。偶尔你甚至还会拿到“蛋糕上的糖霜”——市场升值远远超过买入后公司所积累的留存收益。
In the sixteen years since present management assumed responsibility for Berkshire, book value per share with insurance-held equities valued at market has increased from $19.46 to $400.80, or 20.5% compounded annually. (You've done better: the value of the mineral content in the human body compounded at 22% annually during the past decade.) It is encouraging, moreover, to realize that our record was achieved despite many mistakes. The list is too painful and lengthy to detail here. But it clearly shows that a reasonably competitive corporate batting average can be achieved in spite of a lot of managerial strikeouts.
自现任管理层接手 Berkshire 以来的十六年间，若将保险公司持有的股票按市价计入，每股账面价值已从 19.46 美元增长到 400.80 美元，按年复合增长率计算为 20.5%。（你们的表现更好：过去十年里，人体矿物质含量的价值按年复合 22% 增长。）而且，想到我们的这份成绩是在犯了许多错误的情况下取得的，也颇令人鼓舞。这份错误清单太痛苦，也太长，不适合在这里详细展开。但它清楚说明了一点：即使管理层有很多次挥棒落空，公司仍然可以取得一个相当有竞争力的长期打击率。
“容错的能力”来自大方向的正确，选择越来越难、都是左右为难的选择，越来越需要极端的假设，这些现象很可能是大方向错了。
Our insurance companies will continue to make large investments in well-run, favorably-situated, non-controlled companies that very often will pay out in dividends only small proportions of their earnings. Following this policy, we would expect our long-term returns to continue to exceed the returns derived annually from reported operating earnings. Our confidence in this belief can easily be quantified: if we were to sell the equities that we hold and replace them with long-term tax-free bonds, our reported operating earnings would rise immediately by over $30 million annually. Such a shift tempts us not at all.
我们的保险公司将继续对那些经营良好、处境有利、但我们并不控制的公司进行大额投资，而这些公司往往只把其收益中的很小一部分以股息形式分配出来。沿着这项政策走下去，我们预期自己的长期回报将继续超过每年由报表经营收益所体现出来的回报。我们对这一判断的信心，其实很容易量化：如果我们把目前持有的股票全部卖掉，改为持有长期免税债券，那么我们报告出来的经营收益将立刻每年增加 3,000 多万美元。可这样的转换，对我们毫无诱惑。
So much for the good news.
好消息说到这里为止。
Results for Owners
股东权益报告
Unfortunately, earnings reported in corporate financial statements are no longer the dominant variable that determines whether there are any real earnings for you, the owner. For only gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forego ten hamburgers to purchase an investment; (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers; and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, after-tax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real income from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars. You may feel richer, but you won’t eat richer.
不幸的是，公司财务报表中报告的收益，已经不再是决定你这个所有者是否真正获得收益的首要变量了。因为只有购买力的增长，才代表投资的真实收益。如果你：(a) 放弃了十个汉堡去买一项投资；(b) 收到股息，税后可以买两个汉堡；并且 (c) 在卖出持股时，税后所得可以买八个汉堡；那么 (d) 不管这项投资在美元计价上升值了多少，你都没有从中获得任何真实收入。你可能感觉自己更富了，但你并不会吃得更饱。
High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners. This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years. The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil.
高通胀率会对资本形成一种税负，使得许多公司的投资变得不明智——至少如果用“所有者获得正的真实投资回报”这个标准来衡量的话是如此。这个“门槛收益率”——也就是一家公司为了让其个人所有者获得任何真实回报而必须实现的股本回报率——近年来已大幅上升。如今，普通纳税投资者就像是在逆向下行的自动扶梯上奋力向上奔跑，而这扶梯下行的速度已经快到使他的向上进展几乎归零。
For example, in a world of 12% inflation a business earning 20% on equity (which very few manage consistently to do) and distributing it all to individuals in the 50% bracket is chewing up their real capital, not enhancing it. (Half of the 20% will go for income tax; the remaining 10% leaves the owners of the business with only 98% of the purchasing power they possessed at the start of the year - even though they have not spent a penny of their “earnings”). The investors in this bracket would actually be better off with a combination of stable prices and corporate earnings on equity capital of only a few per cent.
例如，在一个通胀率为 12% 的世界里，一家股本回报率达到 20% 的企业（能够持续做到这一点的企业极少），如果将全部收益分配给处于 50% 税率档的个人投资者，那么它实际上是在侵蚀他们的真实资本，而不是增加它。（20% 收益中的一半要缴纳所得税；剩下的 10%，意味着企业所有者在年末所拥有的购买力，仅相当于年初的 98%——尽管他们连自己“收益”中的一分钱都没有花掉。）对于处于这一税率档的投资者来说，实际上，价格稳定再加上企业股本仅有几个百分点的收益率，都会比这种情况更好。
Explicit income taxes alone, unaccompanied by any implicit inflation tax, never can turn a positive corporate return into a negative owner return. (Even if there were 90% personal income tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, some real income would be left for the owner at a zero inflation rate.) But the inflation tax is not limited by reported income. Inflation rates not far from those recently experienced can turn the level of positive returns achieved by a majority of corporations into negative returns for all owners, including those not required to pay explicit taxes. (For example, if inflation reached 16%, owners of the 60% plus of corporate America earning less than this rate of return would be realizing a negative real return - even if income taxes on dividends and capital gains were eliminated.)
单独存在的显性所得税，如果没有任何隐含的通胀税相伴，永远不可能把企业层面的正回报变成所有者层面的负回报。（即使股息和资本利得的个人所得税税率都高达 90%，在零通胀率下，所有者仍然会剩下一些真实收入。）但是，通胀税并不受报告收入的限制。与近些年经历过的水平相差不远的通胀率，就可能把大多数公司所实现的正回报，转化为所有所有者的负回报，甚至包括那些无需缴纳显性税收的人。（例如，如果通胀率升至 16%，那么美国公司中那超过 60%、盈利回报率低于这一水平的企业之所有者，都将实现负的真实回报——即便股息和资本利得税被取消也是如此。）
Of course, the two forms of taxation co-exist and interact since explicit taxes are levied on nominal, not real, income. Thus you pay income taxes on what would be deficits if returns to stockholders were measured in constant dollars.
当然，这两种税负形式是并存并相互作用的，因为显性税收是对名义收入而非真实收入征税。因此，如果按不变美元计算股东回报，你所缴纳所得税的那部分，本来其实应当算作亏损。
At present inflation rates, we believe individual owners in medium or high tax brackets (as distinguished from tax-free entities such as pension funds, eleemosynary institutions, etc.) should expect no real long-term return from the average American corporation, even though these individuals reinvest the entire after-tax proceeds from all dividends they receive. The average return on equity of corporations is fully offset by the combination of the implicit tax on capital levied by inflation and the explicit taxes levied both on dividends and gains in value produced by retained earnings.
按照当前的通胀水平，我们认为，处于中等或较高税率档的个人所有者（区别于养老基金、慈善机构等免税主体），从普通美国公司身上不应期待获得任何真实的长期回报——即便这些个人把收到的全部股息税后所得都再投资进去。企业平均的净资产收益率，已经被两种因素的结合完全抵消：一是通胀对资本征收的隐性税；二是对股息以及由留存收益带来的价值增长所征收的显性税。
As we said last year, Berkshire has no corporate solution to the problem. (We’ll say it again next year, too.) Inflation does not improve our return on equity.
正如我们去年所说的，Berkshire 在公司层面并没有解决这个问题的办法。（明年我们还会再说一遍。）通胀并不会改善我们的净资产收益率。
Indexing is the insulation that all seek against inflation. But the great bulk (although there are important exceptions) of corporate capital is not even partially indexed. Of course, earnings and dividends per share usually will rise if significant earnings are “saved” by a corporation; i.e., reinvested instead of paid as dividends. But that would be true without inflation. A thrifty wage earner, likewise, could achieve regular annual increases in his total income without ever getting a pay increase - if he were willing to take only half of his paycheck in cash (his wage “dividend”) and consistently add the other half (his “retained earnings”) to a savings account. Neither this high-saving wage earner nor the stockholder in a high-saving corporation whose annual dividend rate increases while its rate of return on equity remains flat is truly indexed.
指数化，是所有人都在寻求的对抗通胀的“绝缘层”。但绝大多数公司资本（虽然也有一些重要的例外）甚至连部分指数化都做不到。当然，如果一家公司把相当一部分收益“存下来”——也就是留存再投资，而不是作为股息分配——那么它的每股收益和每股股息通常都会上升。但即使没有通胀，这也同样会发生。一个节俭的工薪阶层也是一样：即使从未加薪，他也可以实现总收入的逐年稳定增长——只要他愿意每次只把一半工资以现金形式拿走（他的“工资股息”），并持续把另一半（他的“留存收益”）存进储蓄账户。无论是这种高储蓄的工薪者，还是那种年度股息持续增长、但净资产收益率始终不变的高留存收益公司之股东，都不能算是真正实现了指数化。
留存收益的重要性，这里涉及一个注意力的问题，产品还是财务指标。
1、乔布斯认为注意力应该放在产品上而不是财务指标，注意力放在财务指标上就可能走向偷工减料，而注意力放在产品上，财务指标自然会跟上；
2、巴菲特显然更强调财务指标，因为很多产品上的想法都是幻觉，或者是一些极端的假设，价值投资不能依赖于幻觉或者极端的假设。
For capital to be truly indexed, return on equity must rise, i.e., business earnings consistently must increase in proportion to the increase in the price level without any need for the business to add to capital - including working capital - employed. (Increased earnings produced by increased investment don’t count.) Only a few businesses come close to exhibiting this ability. And Berkshire Hathaway isn’t one of them.
如果资本要真正实现指数化，净资产收益率就必须上升；也就是说，企业盈利必须能够持续按物价水平的上升幅度同步增长，而且企业不需要增加所投入的资本——包括营运资本。（靠增加投资带来的盈利增长不算。）只有极少数企业接近具备这种能力。而 Berkshire Hathaway 并不属于其中之一。
We, of course, have a corporate policy of reinvesting earnings for growth, diversity and strength, which has the incidental effect of minimizing the current imposition of explicit taxes on our owners. However, on a day-by-day basis, you will be subjected to the implicit inflation tax, and when you wish to transfer your investment in Berkshire into another form of investment, or into consumption, you also will face explicit taxes.
当然，我们有一项公司政策：将收益再投资，以追求增长、多元化和实力增强，这个政策附带会减少目前施加在所有者身上的显性税负。然而，在日常每一天，你仍然会承受通胀带来的隐性税；而当你想把你在 Berkshire 的投资转成其他形式的投资，或者转为消费时，你也同样将面临显性税。
Sources of Earnings
报告收益的来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps, which in turn owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant capital gains and losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gains figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. Our calculation of operating earnings also excludes the gain from sale of Mutual’s branch offices. In this respect it differs from the presentation in our audited financial statements that includes this item in the calculation of “Earnings Before Realized Investment Gain”.
下表列示了 Berkshire 报告收益的来源。Berkshire 持有 Blue Chip Stamps 约 60% 的股权，而 Blue Chip Stamps 又持有 Wesco Financial Corporation 80% 的股权。该表同时列示了各个业务实体的合计收益，以及 Berkshire 在这些收益中所占的份额。归属于这些业务实体的所有重大资本利得与损失，都在表格底部的“已实现证券收益”项目中汇总体现，并未计入经营收益。我们对经营收益的计算还剔除了出售 Mutual 分支机构所得的收益。在这一点上，它不同于我们经审计财务报表中的列报方式；后者在计算 “Earnings Before Realized Investment Gain” 时，将这项收益包含在内。
Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 40 to 53 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1980 operations. We recommend a careful reading, and suggest that you particularly note the superb job done by Louie Vincenti and Charlie Munger in repositioning Mutual Savings and Loan. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
Blue Chip Stamps 和 Wesco 都是上市公司，各自都有独立的信息披露要求。在本报告第 40 至 53 页，我们转载了这两家公司主要高管的文字报告，其中他们描述了 1980 年的经营情况。我们建议你仔细阅读，并特别留意 Louie Vincenti 和 Charlie Munger 在重新调整 Mutual Savings and Loan 布局方面所做的出色工作。任何 Berkshire 股东如有需要，只要提出请求，即可获寄这两家公司任一家的完整年报：Blue Chip Stamps 请联系 Mr. Robert H. Bird，地址是 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040；Wesco Financial Corporation 请联系 Mrs. Bette Deckard，地址是 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109。
As indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income section of Insurance Group earnings.
正如前面所指出的，如今，在那些我们并不控制的公司中，未分配收益的重要性，已经完全不亚于前表中详细列示的报告经营收益。当然，其中已分配的那一部分，主要是通过保险业务集团收益中的净投资收益项目进入该表的。
We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our own earnings.
下面我们列示 Berkshire 在这些非控股企业中的按比例持股情况。对这些企业而言，只有已分配收益（股息）会被计入我们自己的收益。
From this table, you can see that our sources of underlying earning power are distributed far differently among industries than would superficially seem the case. For example, our insurance subsidiaries own approximately 3% of Kaiser Aluminum, and 1 1/4% of Alcoa. Our share of the 1980 earnings of those companies amounts to about $13 million. (If translated dollar for dollar into a combination of eventual market value gain and dividends, this figure would have to be reduced by a significant, but not precisely determinable, amount of tax; perhaps 25% would be a fair assumption.) Thus, we have a much larger economic interest in the aluminum business than in practically any of the operating businesses we control and on which we report in more detail. If we maintain our holdings, our long-term performance will be more affected by the future economics of the aluminum industry than it will by direct operating decisions we make concerning most companies over which we exercise managerial control.
从这张表里你可以看出，我们底层盈利能力的来源，在行业间的分布，与表面上看起来的情形大不相同。举例来说，我们的保险子公司持有 Kaiser Aluminum 大约 3% 的股权，以及 Alcoa 约 1¼% 的股权。我们在这两家公司 1980 年收益中所占的份额，大约为 1,300 万美元。（如果这一数字最终能够以市场价值增长和股息的组合形式，一美元不差地转化出来，那么还必须扣除一笔相当可观、但无法精确确定的税负；假设约为 25%，也许算是合理的。）因此，我们在铝业上的经济利益，实际上远远大于我们几乎任何一家受控经营企业中的经济利益，而对后者我们反而有更详细的披露和报告。只要我们继续持有这些股票，我们的长期业绩受铝行业未来经济状况的影响，就会超过我们对大多数由自己行使管理控制权的公司所作出的直接经营决策之影响。
泛化能力的提升需要想法与想法之间的竞争，更好的想法来自一堆想法之间的竞争。
GEICO Corp.
Our largest non-controlled holding is 7.2 million shares of GEICO Corp., equal to about a 33% equity interest. Normally, an interest of this magnitude (over 20%) would qualify as an “investee” holding and would require us to reflect a proportionate share of GEICO’s earnings in our own. However, we purchased our GEICO stock pursuant to special orders of the District of Columbia and New York Insurance Departments, which required that the right to vote the stock be placed with an independent party. Absent the vote, our 33% interest does not qualify for investee treatment. (Pinkerton’s is a similar situation.)
我们最大的非控股持仓是 GEICO Corp. 的 720 万股，约相当于 33% 的权益。通常，这么大比例的持股（超过 20%）会被归类为“被投资公司”持股，并要求我们在自身收益中反映按比例应享有的 GEICO 收益。然而，我们购买 GEICO 股票是依据 District of Columbia 和 New York 保险监管部门的特别命令进行的，这些命令要求该股票的表决权必须交由独立第三方行使。没有表决权，我们这 33% 的权益就不符合被投资公司会计处理的条件。（Pinkerton’s 也是类似情况。）
Of course, whether or not the undistributed earnings of GEICO are picked up annually in our operating earnings figure has nothing to do with their economic value to us, or to you as owners of Berkshire. The value of these retained earnings will be determined by the skill with which they are put to use by GEICO management.
当然，GEICO 的未分配收益是否每年计入我们的经营收益数字，与这些收益对我们、以及对你们这些 Berkshire 所有者的经济价值毫无关系。这些留存收益的价值，取决于 GEICO 管理层以何等高明的方式加以运用。
On this score, we simply couldn’t feel better. GEICO represents the best of all investment worlds - the coupling of a very important and very hard to duplicate business advantage with an extraordinary management whose skills in operations are matched by skills in capital allocation.
在这一点上，我们简直不可能感觉更好了。GEICO 代表着投资世界里最理想的组合——一方面，它拥有极其重要且极难复制的商业优势；另一方面，它配备了一支非凡的管理层，这支团队不仅经营能力卓越，资本配置能力也同样出色。
As you can see, our holdings cost us $47 million, with about half of this amount invested in 1976 and most of the remainder invested in 1980. At the present dividend rate, our reported earnings from GEICO amount to a little over $3 million annually. But we estimate our share of its earning power is on the order of $20 million annually. Thus, undistributed earnings applicable to this holding alone may amount to 40% of total reported operating earnings of Berkshire.
正如你所看到的，我们持有这些股份的成本是 4,700 万美元，其中大约一半是在 1976 年投入的，绝大部分剩余部分则是在 1980 年投入的。按照目前的股息率，我们从 GEICO 得到的报告收益每年略高于 300 万美元。但我们估计，我们所占有的 GEICO 盈利能力大约是每年 2,000 万美元。因此，仅这一项持股所对应的未分配收益，就可能相当于 Berkshire 全部报告经营收益的 40%。
We should emphasize that we feel as comfortable with GEICO management retaining an estimated $17 million of earnings applicable to our ownership as we would if that sum were in our own hands. In just the last two years GEICO, through repurchases of its own stock, has reduced the share equivalents it has outstanding from 34.2 million to 21.6 million, dramatically enhancing the interests of shareholders in a business that simply can’t be replicated. The owners could not have been better served.
我们要强调的是，对于 GEICO 管理层保留那笔估计约 1,700 万美元、归属于我们持股权益的收益，我们感到和这笔钱握在自己手里一样放心。就在过去两年里，GEICO 通过回购自身股票，已将其流通在外的股份折算数从 3,420 万股降到了 2,160 万股，大幅提升了股东在这家根本无法被复制的企业中的权益。股东不可能得到比这更好的服务。
We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses. Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations. Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.
过去我们在年报中曾写过，收购并经营“turnaround”型企业，通常带来的都是失望。多年来，几十个行业里字面上有数百个 turnaround 机会被介绍到我们面前；无论是作为参与者还是观察者，我们都持续追踪了这些案例的实际表现与最初预期之间的差距。我们的结论是：除了极少数例外，当一位以才华横溢著称的管理者去接手一家以基本经济特性糟糕著称的企业时，最终保持完好无损的，往往是那家企业糟糕的名声。
GEICO may appear to be an exception, having been turned around from the very edge of bankruptcy in 1976. It certainly is true that managerial brilliance was needed for its resuscitation, and that Jack Byrne, upon arrival in that year, supplied that ingredient in abundance.
GEICO 看上去也许像个例外，因为它在 1976 年曾从濒临破产的边缘被扭转回来。的确，要让它起死回生，确实需要管理层的非凡才智，而 Jack Byrne 在那一年到来时，确实充分提供了这种要素。
But it also is true that the fundamental business advantage that GEICO had enjoyed - an advantage that previously had produced staggering success - was still intact within the company, although submerged in a sea of financial and operating troubles.
但同样也是真的：GEICO 过去一直享有的那种根本性商业优势——一种此前曾给它带来惊人成就的优势——在公司内部其实依然完好无损，只不过被淹没在一片财务和经营麻烦的汪洋大海之中。
GEICO was designed to be the low-cost operation in an enormous marketplace (auto insurance) populated largely by companies whose marketing structures restricted adaptation. Run as designed, it could offer unusual value to its customers while earning unusual returns for itself. For decades it had been run in just this manner. Its troubles in the mid-70s were not produced by any diminution or disappearance of this essential economic advantage.
GEICO 原本就是被设计成一个在庞大市场（汽车保险）中以低成本运营的公司，而这个市场上的大多数公司都受制于自身营销结构，难以适应变化。只要按最初设计方式运营，它就能够在为客户提供非凡价值的同时，也为自己赚取非凡回报。几十年来，它一直就是这样运作的。它在 70 年代中期遭遇的困难，并不是由于这种根本经济优势的削弱或消失造成的。
GEICO’s problems at that time put it in a position analogous to that of American Express in 1964 following the salad oil scandal. Both were one-of-a-kind companies, temporarily reeling from the effects of a fiscal blow that did not destroy their exceptional underlying economics. The GEICO and American Express situations, extraordinary business franchises with a localized excisable cancer (needing, to be sure, a skilled surgeon), should be distinguished from the true “turnaround” situation in which the managers expect - and need - to pull off a corporate Pygmalion.
GEICO 当时的问题，使它所处的位置与 American Express 在 1964 年色拉油丑闻之后的处境颇为相似。两者都是独一无二的公司，都只是暂时被一次财务打击震得东倒西歪，但这种打击并未摧毁它们卓越的底层经济特性。GEICO 和 American Express 这样的情形——也就是拥有非凡商业特许权、却长了一个局部可切除的癌瘤（当然，确实需要一位高明的外科医生）——应该和真正的“turnaround”情形区分开来；后者是那种管理者期待、并且必须完成一场公司版 Pygmalion 式改造的局面。(注：《Pygmalion》 希腊神话，剧中 Higgins 语言学教授与人打赌能把一个粗俗的街头卖花女 Eliza 转变成了仪态万方的大家闺秀。)
尽可能少的外部合作，决心不依赖于外部的气质太少了，科技企业中AAPL、GOOG、腾讯有这方面的气质，其他的无从谈起。
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company. A 100% interest of that kind gives the owner the options of leveraging the purchase, changing managements, directing cash flow, and selling the business. It may also provide some excitement around corporate headquarters (less frequently mentioned).
不管该怎么命名，我们都对所持有的 GEICO 股份感到非常满意——正如前面所说，这笔投资的成本是 4,700 万美元。若想买到类似的、每年 2,000 万美元盈利能力，而且还具备一流经济特性和光明前景的企业，如果必须通过协商整家公司收购来完成，最低成本也要 2 亿美元（在某些行业里要高得多）。拥有这样一家企业的 100% 股权，当然会赋予所有者一些选择权：可以加杠杆进行收购，可以更换管理层，可以支配现金流，也可以出售企业。它还可能给公司总部带来一些兴奋感（这一点倒不常被提起）。
We find it perfectly satisfying that the nature of our insurance business dictates we buy many minority portions of already well-run businesses (at prices far below our share of the total value of the entire business) that do not need management change, re-direction of cash flow, or sale. There aren’t many Jack Byrnes in the managerial world, or GEICOs in the business world. What could be better than buying into a partnership with both of them?
我们觉得非常满意的是：我们保险业务的性质决定了，我们会去买入许多已经经营良好的企业中的少数股权，而且买入价格远低于我们按比例应分得的整家企业总价值；这些企业既不需要更换管理层，也不需要重定现金流方向，更不需要被出售。管理世界里没有多少 Jack Byrnes，商业世界里也没有多少 GEICOs。能同时和这两者结成合伙关系，还有什么能比这更好呢？
Insurance Industry Conditions
保险产业现况
The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page 37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980. It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982. To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well-written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’s mailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
保险行业承保状况的发展，持续大致符合我们的预期：综合赔付率（定义见第 37 页）已从 1979 年的 100.6 上升到 1980 年估计的 103.5。几乎可以肯定，这一趋势还会继续，行业承保亏损将在 1981 年和 1982 年显著且逐步扩大。若要理解其中原因，我们建议你读一读 Barbara Stewart（Chubb Corp.）在 1980 年 10 月一篇论文中，对财产险和责任险行业竞争动态所做的出色分析。（Chubb 的年报一贯对行业状况作出最有洞见、最坦率、也最出色的书面讨论；你应该把自己加入这家公司的邮寄名单。）Stewart 女士的分析也许不令人愉快，但我们认为它极可能是准确的。
And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony. It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
而且，不幸的是，还有一个几乎未被充分报道、却尤其恶性的难题，很可能会延长并加剧即将到来的行业痛苦。它不仅很可能使许多保险公司在承保亏损创下纪录时仍疯狂争抢业务——而且还很可能使它们在那种时候加倍努力去抢。
This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value. Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth. If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth. And shrink they have. Some of the largest and best known property-casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market. Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth. Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless. The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
这个问题源于债券价格的下跌，以及保险行业的一项会计惯例：无论市场价值如何，公司都可以按摊余成本来计量债券。许多保险公司持有的长期债券，按摊余成本计，规模相当于其净资产的两到三倍。若是三倍，那么债券价格相对成本只要缩水三分之一——如果这种缩水必须在账上确认——就足以把净资产全部抹掉。而现实中，债券价格确实已经下跌了。现在，一些规模最大、知名度最高的财产险和责任险公司，如果把债券按市价计量，实际上会发现自己只剩名义上的净资产，甚至是负净资产。当然，债券价格也可能上涨，从而部分地，甚至在理论上完全地，恢复账面净资产的完整性；但它们也可能进一步下跌。（我们认为，对股票或债券价格的短期预测毫无用处。这类预测也许能告诉你许多关于预测者本人的事情，却什么也告诉不了你关于未来。）
It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all. The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline. It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value. Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately. And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
有些人也许会觉得奇怪：一家保险公司如果股票投资组合价格下跌到足以显著削弱净资产，其生存就会受到威胁；但如果债券价格下跌得更厉害，却似乎完全不会引发任何反应。对此，行业的解释会是：不管当前市价如何，这些债券到期时都会按面值足额偿付，因此任何中间过程中的价格下跌，终归都会被消除。这个论点会说，也许需要二十年、三十年，甚至四十年，但只要这些债券不必卖出，最终它们都会值回面值。当然，如果这些债券被卖出——即便卖出后换成了相似、但相对价值更高的债券——那笔损失就必须立刻入账。而且，已公布的净资产也必须同样迅速地按照这笔损失向下调整。
Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades. For example, when large underwriting losses are in prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurers to shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds. Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
在这种情况下，许多投资选择会消失，甚至可能一消失就是几十年。比如说，当巨额承保亏损已在眼前时，对某些保险公司而言，从免税债券转向应税债券，可能在商业逻辑上是极其合理的选择。而不愿确认重大的债券亏损，可能就是阻止这种理性举措发生的唯一因素。
But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect. For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policyholders and claimants (with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer. As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold. If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will if the volume of business declines significantly - assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities. And if those assets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
但由大规模未实现债券亏损所引出的全部后果，要比单单使投资决策僵化严重得多。因为，用来购买并持有这些债券的资金来源，是一池来自保单持有人和索赔人（尽管面孔不断变化）的资金——这些钱，实质上是暂时存放在保险公司那里的。只要这池资金的规模不缩小，就无需卖出债券。可如果这池资金收缩——而一旦业务量明显下降，它就一定会收缩——公司就必须出售资产来偿付这些负债。而如果这些资产正是那些存在巨额未实现亏损的债券，那么这些亏损就会迅速变成已实现亏损，并在这一过程中重创净资产。
银行、信托、P2P都有相似的问题，亏的越多，经营上越激进。2023年的Silicon Valley Bank（SVB）、Charles Schwab是眼面前的例子。
1、Silicon Valley Bank受到冲击的速度很快，问题很快暴露，很快就倒闭了；
2、Charles Schwab有可能更麻烦，有可能通过旗下的券商业务掩盖问题，比如，零佣金、亏损的方式吸收业务。
商业的本质是提供有价值的产品和服务，不赚钱、低利润的业务是需要重点关注的警示信号，比如：
（1）亚马逊低空飞行的模式就值得怀疑，如果剔除AWS，亚马逊的价值需要打很大的折扣；
（2）对于亚马逊来说，AWS不是必然的结果，即使抓住了先机也很难说能赢到最后，正面临激烈的竞争；
（3）AWS是电商业务的衍生品，自己用、别人也能用，这个属性决定了很难差异化，结果也是个同质化竞争的业务。
Thus, an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced with inadequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options. One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
因此，一家保险公司如果其债券市值缩水已接近其账面净资产（现在这种公司已有很多），同时又面临明显不足、而且注定还会进一步恶化的费率水平，那么它其实只有两个选择。管理层的一个选择，是告诉承保人员继续按照风险暴露来定价——“务必要为每 1 美元的费用成本加上预期赔付成本，收取至少 1 美元的保费”。
The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be a lagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
这一指令的后果是可以预见的：(a) 由于大多数业务既对价格敏感，又是按年度续保的，账上现有的大量保单很快就会流失给竞争对手；(b) 随着保费规模显著收缩，负债（未赚保费和应付赔款）也会滞后但相应地减少；(c) 为了与负债减少相匹配，资产（债券）就必须被出售；以及 (d) 过去尚未被确认的净资产消失，将会在保险公司公开财务报表中被部分确认出来（具体程度取决于出售规模）。
Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth. The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses. This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers - while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner in the long term.
这一令人沮丧的过程也会有一些变体，其对账面净资产的惩罚会稍轻一些。有些公司在走到步骤 (c) 时，可能会选择卖出那些已经按市价计量的股票，或者卖出近期购入、亏损较轻的债券。这种鸵鸟式做法——卖掉较好的资产，却把亏损最严重的资产留在手里——虽然短期内没那么痛苦，但从长期看，多半不会有好结果。
The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities - and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices. There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow” underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates. This second option might properly be termed “asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
第二种选择就简单得多：不管费率水平如何，也不管未来承保亏损会有多么惊人，照样继续承保业务，以此维持当前的保费规模、资产规模和负债规模——然后祈祷会有更好的日子到来，无论是承保环境改善，还是债券价格回升。行业媒体对“cash flow” 式承保有很多批评；也就是为了获取可投资于当前高利率环境中的资金，而不顾预期承保亏损照样承保业务。这第二种选择，更恰当的称呼也许应该是“资产维持型”承保——接受糟糕透顶的业务，只为了保住你现在手上的资产。
Of course you know which option will be selected. And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting. For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices. Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a “sell-at-any-price” policy.
当然，你知道大家会选哪一种方案。而且也很清楚：只要许多大型保险公司觉得自己被迫只能选第二种方案，承保环境就不会迎来什么更好的日子。因为如果行业中相当一部分公司觉得自己必须不顾价格是否合理、无论如何都维持保费规模，那么所有保险公司都不得不去接近这些价格。仅次于你自己陷入财务困境的第二糟糕处境，就是你有一大群竞争对手也陷入财务困境，而它们还能通过“赔本也要卖”的政策把问题往后拖。
防御式的反应都没有好的结果，无论是竞争的结果，还是心理上的防御，很多人因为生存的需求，仅有的一点钱只能存在银行拿一点微不足道的利息，陷进去以后安全边际越来越窄、越陷越深，很难出来。
We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer. But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem. Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
我们前面提到过，那些由于各种原因——包括公众反应、机构自尊，或者保护账面净资产——而不愿在会迫使其确认重大亏损的价格水平上卖出债券的公司，可能会发现自己在投资姿态上被冻结十年甚至更久。但正如前面所说，这还只是问题的一半。那些在长期债券上作了大规模配置的公司，在相当长的一段时间里，失去的恐怕不仅是许多投资选择，也包括许多承保选择。
Our own position in this respect is satisfactory. We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups. When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)[1]
就这一点而言，我们自己的处境是令人满意的。我们相信，在把所有保险公司的债券都按摊余成本计量的前提下，我们相对于保费规模的净资产实力，在所有大型、股东所有的财产险与责任险集团中是最强的。当债券按市价计量时，我们的相对实力就更加显著了。（不过，为了防止自己太过自满，我们也提醒自己：我们的资产与负债期限结构依旧比我们希望的要错配得多；而且我们自己在债券上也亏掉了相当重要的一笔钱，因为你们的董事长该行动的时候，却在讲话。）
Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing. But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us. Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry. It just gives us more staying power and more options.
我们充足的资本和投资灵活性，将使我们在未来这段预计会持续较长时间的费率不足时期里，能够去做任何我们认为最有道理的事情。但是，行业的麻烦也就是我们的麻烦。我们的财务实力，并不能把我们从如今笼罩整个财产险与责任险行业的敌意定价环境中隔离出去。它只是让我们拥有更强的持久力和更多的选择。
浮存金和高流动性的资产、以及所有者权益之间应该有一个大致的比例。
1、浮存金大于所有者权益
浮存金投向风险较低的债券类资产，所有者权益投向股票，BRK的早期就是这么安排的。
2、浮存金大致等于所有者权益
存在比较大的安全边际，假设100亿美元的浮存金，对应100亿美元的所有者权益，可以将浮存金的大部分和所有者权益的全部拿去做股票投资，在相对极端的情况下，比如，下跌不超过50%，还能够保证保险的兑付。
3、浮存金小于所有者权益
BRK，2025年的数据，浮存金1760亿美元，类现金资产3690亿美元，股票2941亿美元，所有者权益7174亿美元，如果把类现金资产全部配成股票，整体下跌50%，还剩下3315.50亿美元，足以兑付保险，并且缩水后的所有者权益还有3858.50亿美元。
BRK，2025年的数据，浮存金1760亿美元，类现金资产3690亿美元，股票2941亿美元，所有者权益7174亿美元，如果把类现金资产全部配成股票，整体下跌50%，还剩下3315.50亿美元，足以兑付保险，并且缩水后的所有者权益还有3858.50亿美元。
安全边际有了，缺点是浮存金对于整体的贡献也下降了，但仍然有价值，相当于7174亿美元的净资产+1760亿美元低成本的负债，19.70%的负债率。
Insurance Operations
保险业务的运营
The National Indemnity managers, led by Phil Liesche with the usual able assistance of Roland Miller and Bill Lyons, outdid themselves in 1980. While volume was flat, underwriting margins relative to the industry were at an all-time high. We expect decreased volume from this operation in 1981. But its managers will hear no complaints from corporate headquarters, nor will employment or salaries suffer. We enormously admire the National Indemnity underwriting discipline - embedded from origin by the founder, Jack Ringwalt - and know that this discipline, if suspended, probably could not be fully regained.
National Indemnity 的管理团队，在 Phil Liesche 领导下，并有 Roland Miller 和 Bill Lyons 一如既往的得力协助，在 1980 年的表现可谓超常发挥。虽然业务规模持平，但相对于行业水平的承保利润率却创下历史新高。我们预计这项业务在 1981 年的规模会有所下降。但这家公司的管理者不会从总部听到任何抱怨，他们的就业和薪酬也不会因此受影响。我们极其钦佩 National Indemnity 的承保纪律——这是创始人 Jack Ringwalt 从一开始就植入进去的——并且我们知道，这种纪律一旦被中断，很可能就再也无法完全恢复。
需要对自我解释、叙事有一些深刻的体会，自己习惯于自我解释、叙事的就不需要多想了。
John Seward at Home and Auto continues to make good progress in replacing a diminishing number of auto policies with volume from less competitive lines, primarily small-premium general liability. Operations are being slowly expanded, both geographically and by product line, as warranted by underwriting results.
John Seward 在 Home and Auto 继续稳步推进，把不断减少的汽车保单，逐步替换为竞争没那么激烈的业务量，主要是小保费的一般责任险。只要承保结果支持，业务就在地域范围和产品线两个方向上缓慢扩张。
The reinsurance business continues to reflect the excesses and problems of the primary writers. Worse yet, it has the potential for magnifying such excesses. Reinsurance is characterized by extreme ease of entry, large premium payments in advance, and much-delayed loss reports and loss payments. Initially, the morning mail brings lots of cash and few claims. This state of affairs can produce a blissful, almost euphoric, feeling akin to that experienced by an innocent upon receipt of his first credit card.
再保险业务仍然在反映原保险公司的种种过度行为和问题。更糟的是，它本身还有可能把这些过度行为进一步放大。再保险这个行业的特点是：进入极其容易、保费大额预收、而损失报告与赔付却严重滞后。刚开始的时候，每天早晨的来信往往带来大量现金，却几乎没有多少索赔。这种状态会带来一种幸福感，甚至近乎欣快，和一个毫无防备的人第一次收到信用卡时的感觉颇为相似。
The magnetic lure of such cash-generating characteristics, currently enhanced by the presence of high interest rates, is transforming the reinsurance market into “amateur night”. Without a super catastrophe, industry underwriting will be poor in the next few years. If we experience such a catastrophe, there could be a bloodbath with some companies not able to live up to contractual commitments. George Young continues to do a first-class job for us in this business. Results, with investment income included, have been reasonably profitable. We will retain an active reinsurance presence but, for the foreseeable future, we expect no premium growth from this activity.
这种“能不断生出现金”的特性，本来就具有磁石般的诱惑力，而当前高利率环境又进一步放大了这种诱惑，正把再保险市场变成一场“业余之夜”。如果没有发生超级巨灾，那么未来几年行业承保结果都会很差；而如果真的发生了这样的巨灾，行业里可能会出现一场血洗，一些公司甚至可能无法履行合同义务。George Young 在这项业务上持续为我们做着一流的工作。若把投资收益也算进去，整体结果还算是相当合理的盈利。我们会继续保持在再保险业务中的积极存在，但在可预见的未来，我们并不预期这项业务会有任何保费增长。
We continue to have serious problems in the Homestate operation. Floyd Taylor in Kansas has done an outstanding job but our underwriting record elsewhere is considerably below average. Our poorest performer has been Insurance Company of Iowa, at which large losses have been sustained annually since its founding in 1973. Late in the fall we abandoned underwriting in that state, and have merged the company into Cornhusker Casualty. There is potential in the homestate concept, but much work needs to be done in order to realize it.
我们在 Homestate 业务上仍然面临严重问题。Kansas 的 Floyd Taylor 做出了非常出色的工作，但我们在其他地区的承保记录却明显低于平均水平。表现最差的是 Insurance Company of Iowa，自 1973 年成立以来，它几乎每年都遭受重大亏损。去年深秋，我们停止了在该州的承保业务，并将该公司并入了 Cornhusker Casualty。Homestate 这一概念本身是有潜力的，但要把这种潜力真正兑现出来，还有大量工作要做。
Our Workers Compensation operation suffered a severe loss when Frank DeNardo died last year at 37. Frank instinctively thought like an underwriter. He was a superb technician and a fierce competitor; in short order he had straightened out major problems at the California Workers Compensation Division of National Indemnity. Dan Grossman, who originally brought Frank to us, stepped in immediately after Frank’s death to continue that operation, which now utilizes Redwood Fire and Casualty, another Berkshire subsidiary, as the insuring vehicle.
我们的工伤保险业务在去年遭受了一次沉重打击：Frank DeNardo 在 37 岁时去世。Frank 天生就具备承保人的思维方式。他是一位卓越的专业技术人才，也是一位极具斗志的竞争者；在很短时间内，他就理顺了 National Indemnity 旗下 California Workers Compensation Division 的重大问题。最初把 Frank 带到我们这里来的 Dan Grossman，在 Frank 去世后立刻接手并延续了那项业务；这项业务现在使用 Berkshire 另一家子公司 Redwood Fire and Casualty 作为承保主体。
Our major Workers Compensation operation, Cypress Insurance Company, run by Milt Thornton, continues its outstanding record. Year after year Milt, like Phil Liesche, runs an underwriting operation that far outpaces his competition. In the industry he is admired and copied, but not matched.
我们主要的工伤保险业务——由 Milt Thornton 经营的 Cypress Insurance Company——继续保持其卓越记录。年复一年，Milt 和 Phil Liesche 一样，都在经营一项远远领先竞争对手的承保业务。在这个行业里，他备受敬佩，也常被模仿，但从未被真正赶上。
Overall, we look for a significant decline in insurance volume in 1981 along with a poorer underwriting result. We expect underwriting experience somewhat superior to that of the industry but, of course, so does most of the industry. There will be some disappointments.
总体而言，我们预计 1981 年保险业务量会显著下降，同时承保结果也会变差。我们预期自己的承保表现会略优于行业平均水平——当然，行业里的大多数公司也都是这么想的。到头来，总会有一些失望发生。
Textile and Retail Operations
纺织业务及零售业务
During the past year we have cut back the scope of our textile business. Operations at Waumbec Mills have been terminated, reluctantly but necessarily. Some equipment was transferred to New Bedford but most has been sold, or will be, along with real estate. Your Chairman made a costly mistake in not facing the realities of this situation sooner.
在过去一年里，我们缩减了纺织业务的规模。Waumbec Mills 的运营已经终止——这是一个令人不情愿、但又必不可少的决定。其中一部分设备被转移到了 New Bedford，但大部分设备以及房地产都已经出售，或者即将出售。你们的董事长没有更早面对这一局面的现实，为此犯下了代价高昂的错误。
At New Bedford we have reduced the number of looms operated by about one-third, abandoning some high-volume lines in which product differentiation was insignificant. Even assuming everything went right - which it seldom did - these lines could not generate adequate returns related to investment. And, over a full industry cycle, losses were the most likely result.
在 New Bedford，我们将运转中的织机数量削减了大约三分之一，放弃了一些高销量、但产品差异化微不足道的业务线。即使假设一切都进展顺利——而现实中这种情况很少发生——这些业务线也不可能产生与投入资本相称的回报。而从一个完整的行业周期来看，最有可能出现的结果其实是亏损。
Our remaining textile operation, still sizable, has been divided into a manufacturing and a sales division, each free to do business independent of the other. Thus, distribution strengths and mill capabilities will not be wedded to each other. We have more than doubled capacity in our most profitable textile segment through a recent purchase of used 130-inch Saurer looms. Current conditions indicate another tough year in textiles, but with substantially less capital employed in the operation.
我们剩下的纺织业务，规模仍然不小，现已被划分为制造部门和销售部门，两者都可以彼此独立地开展业务。因此，分销上的优势和工厂的生产能力将不再被强行捆绑在一起。通过最近购入二手的 130 英寸 Saurer 织机，我们在最赚钱的那一块纺织业务上的产能已经翻了一倍多。当前形势表明，纺织业务又将是艰难的一年，但投入其中的资本已经明显减少。
Ben Rosner’s record at Associated Retail Stores continues to amaze us. In a poor retailing year, Associated’s earnings continued excellent - and those earnings all were translated into cash. On March 7, 1981 Associated will celebrate its 50th birthday. Ben has run the business (along with Leo Simon, his partner from 1931 to 1966) in each of those fifty years.
Ben Rosner 在 Associated Retail Stores 的业绩，仍然让我们惊叹不已。在零售业表现糟糕的一年里，Associated 的盈利依旧十分出色——而且这些盈利全部都转化成了现金。1981 年 3 月 7 日，Associated 将迎来它的 50 岁生日。Ben 在这整整五十年里一直经营着这家公司（1931 年到 1966 年间，还有他的合伙人 Leo Simon 与他并肩经营）。
Disposition of Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford
伊利诺国民银行及Rockford信托处分案
On December 31, 1980 we completed the exchange of 41,086 shares of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (which owns 97.7% of Illinois National Bank) for a like number of shares of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
在 1980 年 12 月 31 日，我们完成了交换：以 41,086 股 Rockford Bancorp Inc. 的股份（该公司持有 Illinois National Bank 97.7% 的股权），换取等量的 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 股份。
Our method of exchange allowed all Berkshire shareholders to maintain their proportional interest in the Bank (except for me; I was permitted 80% of my proportional share). They were thus guaranteed an ownership position identical to that they would have attained had we followed a more conventional spinoff approach. Twenty-four shareholders (of our approximate 1300) chose this proportional exchange option.
我们的交换方式，使所有 Berkshire 股东都能够维持他们在该银行中的按比例权益（我除外；我只被允许取得自己按比例份额的 80%）。因此，他们所获得的银行持股地位，与我们若采用更常规的分拆方式时他们本会得到的地位完全一致。大约 1300 名 Berkshire 股东中，有 24 位选择了这一按比例交换方案。
We also allowed overexchanges, and thirty-nine additional shareholders accepted this option, thereby increasing their ownership in the Bank and decreasing their proportional ownership in Berkshire. All got the full amount of Bancorp stock they requested, since the total shares desired by these thirty-nine holders was just slightly less than the number left available by the remaining 1200-plus holders of Berkshire who elected not to part with any Berkshire shares at all. As the exchanger of last resort, I took the small balance (3% of Bancorp’s stock). These shares, added to shares I received from my basic exchange allotment (80% of normal), gave me a slightly reduced proportional interest in the Bank and a slightly enlarged proportional interest in Berkshire.
我们还允许超额交换，另外有 39 位股东接受了这一选项，因此他们增加了自己在该银行中的持股，同时减少了自己在 Berkshire 中的按比例持股。由于这 39 位持有人想要的 Bancorp 股份总数，略低于其余 1200 多位决定一股 Berkshire 也不交出的股东所留下的可供分配股份数量，因此他们每个人都得到了自己请求的全部 Bancorp 股票。作为最后承接剩余份额的交换方，我拿下了那一点点余额（约占 Bancorp 股票的 3%）。这些股份，加上我从基本交换配额中取得的股份（正常比例的 80%），使我在该银行中的按比例权益略微下降，而在 Berkshire 中的按比例权益则略微上升。
Management of the Bank is pleased with the outcome. Bancorp will operate as an inexpensive and uncomplicated holding company owned by 65 shareholders. And all of those shareholders will have become Bancorp owners through a conscious affirmative decision.
银行管理层对这一结果感到满意。Bancorp 将作为一家低成本、结构简单的控股公司运营，由 65 位股东持有。而且，这 65 位股东中的每一位，都是通过自己有意识、明确的决定而成为 Bancorp 股东的。
Financing
融资
In August we sold $60 million of 12 3/4% notes due August 1, 2005, with a sinking fund to begin in 1991.
8 月，我们发行了 6,000 万美元、票息 12¾%、到期日为 2005 年 8 月 1 日的票据，并设定自 1991 年开始的偿债基金安排。
The managing underwriters, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation, represented by Bill Fisher, and Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc., represented by Charlie Heider, did an absolutely first-class job from start to finish of the financing.
本次融资的主承销商——Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation（由 Bill Fisher 代表）以及 Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc.（由 Charlie Heider 代表）——从头到尾都完成得极其出色。
Unlike most businesses, Berkshire did not finance because of any specific immediate needs. Rather, we borrowed because we think that, over a period far shorter than the life of the loan, we will have many opportunities to put the money to good use. The most attractive opportunities may present themselves at a time when credit is extremely expensive - or even unavailable. At such a time we want to have plenty of financial firepower.
和大多数企业不同，Berkshire 这次融资并不是因为有什么迫在眉睫的具体资金需求。相反，我们之所以借钱，是因为我们认为，在一个远短于贷款期限的时期内，我们将会遇到许多能够把这笔钱用好的机会。而最有吸引力的机会，很可能恰恰会出现在信用极其昂贵——甚至根本借不到钱——的时候。在那种时候，我们希望自己手里拥有充足的金融火力。
Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it. As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business. There is a certain mirage-like quality to such operations. However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.
我们的收购偏好，倾向于那些能够产生现金的企业，而不是那些消耗现金的企业。随着通胀加剧，越来越多的公司发现，它们必须把内部产生的全部资金都花掉，才能仅仅维持现有的实物业务规模。这类企业带有某种海市蜃楼般的特质。无论其盈利数字看起来多么诱人，我们始终对那些似乎永远无法把这些漂亮数字转化为“没有任何附带条件的现金”的企业保持警惕。
Businesses meeting our standards are not easy to find. (Each year we read of hundreds of corporate acquisitions; only a handful would have been of interest to us.) And logical expansion of our present operations is not easy to implement. But we’ll continue to utilize both avenues in our attempts to further Berkshire’s growth.
符合我们标准的企业并不容易找到。（每年我们都会看到数以百计的公司并购案例；其中只有极少数会引起我们的兴趣。）而对我们现有业务进行合乎逻辑的扩张，也同样不容易落实。但在继续推动 Berkshire 增长的过程中，我们仍会持续沿着这两条道路去努力。
Under all circumstances we plan to operate with plenty of liquidity, with debt that is moderate in size and properly structured, and with an abundance of capital strength. Our return on equity is penalized somewhat by this conservative approach, but it is the only one with which we feel comfortable.
无论在任何情况下，我们都计划保持充足的流动性、规模适度且结构合理的债务，以及丰沛的资本实力。这样的保守做法，确实会在一定程度上拖累我们的净资产回报率，但这是唯一一种让我们感到安心的方式。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Gene Abegg, founder of our long-owned bank in Rockford, died on July 2, 1980 at the age of 82. As a friend, banker and citizen, he was unsurpassed.
Gene Abegg——我们长期持有的 Rockford 银行的创始人——于 1980 年 7 月 2 日去世，享年 82 岁。作为朋友、银行家和公民，他无与伦比。
You learn a great deal about a person when you purchase a business from him and he then stays on to run it as an employee rather than as an owner. Before the purchase the seller knows the business intimately, whereas you start from scratch. The seller has dozens of opportunities to mislead the buyer - through omissions, ambiguities, and misdirection. After the check has changed hands, subtle (and not so subtle) changes of attitude can occur and implicit understandings can evaporate. As in the courtship-marriage sequence, disappointments are not infrequent.
当你从一个人手里买下一家公司，而他随后又以雇员而非所有者的身份留下来继续经营时，你会对这个人有很深的了解。在交易发生之前，卖方对这门生意了如指掌，而你则是一切从零开始。卖方有无数机会可以误导买方——通过遗漏、含糊其辞，或故意引导偏向。等到支票交割完成之后，态度上微妙的（有时也并不微妙的）变化就可能出现，而那些隐含的默契也可能烟消云散。就像恋爱走向婚姻一样，失望并不罕见。
From the time we first met, Gene shot straight 100% of the time - the only behavior pattern he had within him. At the outset of negotiations, he laid all negative factors face up on the table; on the other hand, for years after the transaction was completed he would tell me periodically of some previously undiscussed items of value that had come with our purchase.
从我们第一次见面开始，Gene 就始终百分之百地坦诚直接——这是他唯一具备的行为模式。在谈判一开始，他就把所有不利因素摊开放在桌面上；而另一方面，在交易完成后的很多年里，他还会不时告诉我一些此前从未提到过、却随着收购一并归我们的额外价值项目。
Though he was already 71 years of age when he sold us the Bank, Gene subsequently worked harder for us than he had for himself. He never delayed reporting a problem for a minute, but problems were few with Gene. What else would you expect from a man who, at the time of the bank holiday in 1933, had enough cash on the premises to pay all depositors in full? Gene never forgot he was handling other people’s money. Though this fiduciary attitude was always dominant, his superb managerial skills enabled the Bank to regularly achieve the top position nationally in profitability.
尽管他在把银行卖给我们时已经 71 岁了，但此后他为我们工作时比为自己工作时还要更加卖力。只要有问题，他从不耽搁一分钟才报告；不过在 Gene 手下，问题本来也很少。对于这样一个人，你还能期待别的吗——在 1933 年银行休业期间，他所在银行现场持有的现金甚至足以全额兑付所有存款人。Gene 从未忘记，自己经手的是别人的钱。虽然这种受托人态度始终占据主导，但他卓越的管理能力，也使得这家银行在盈利能力上经常做到全国第一。
“唯一具备的行为模式”的心理状态是存在的，好的、坏的都有很好的一致性。
Gene was in charge of the Illinois National for close to fifty years - almost one-quarter of the lifetime of our country. George Mead, a wealthy industrialist, brought him in from Chicago to open a new bank after a number of other banks in Rockford had failed. Mr. Mead put up the money and Gene ran the show. His talent for leadership soon put its stamp on virtually every major civic activity in Rockford.
Gene 掌管 Illinois National 近五十年——差不多相当于我们国家寿命的四分之一。富有的实业家 George Mead 把他从芝加哥请来，在 Rockford 多家银行倒闭后开设一家新银行。Mead 先生出资，而 Gene 来掌舵。很快，他的领导才能就在 Rockford 几乎所有重要的市政活动中都打下了鲜明烙印。
Dozens of Rockford citizens have told me over the years of help Gene extended to them. In some cases this help was financial; in all cases it involved much wisdom, empathy and friendship. He always offered the same to me. Because of our respective ages and positions I was sometimes the junior partner, sometimes the senior. Whichever the relationship, it always was a special one, and I miss it.
多年来，几十位 Rockford 市民都告诉我，Gene 曾向他们伸出援手。在一些情况下，这种帮助是财务上的；而在所有情况下，其中都包含着大量的智慧、同理心和友谊。他对我也始终如此。由于我们彼此年龄和身份的关系，有时我是晚辈，有时我是前辈。不管是哪一种关系，它始终都很特别，而我很怀念它。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 27, 1981
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