1981-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
原文信息：
- 标题：1980 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1981-02-27
- 链接：HTML
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Terrellchen
- 校译：Terrellchen
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Operating earnings improved to $41.9 million in 1980 from $36.0 million in 1979, but return on beginning equity capital (with securities valued at cost) fell to 17.8% from 18.6%. We believe the latter yardstick to be the most appropriate measure of single-year managerial economic performance. Informed use of that yardstick, however, requires an understanding of many factors, including accounting policies, historical carrying values of assets, financial leverage, and industry conditions.
1980 年本公司的经营收益为 4,190 万美元，较 1979 年的 3,600 万美元有所增长，但期初股本回报率(持有证券投资以原始成本计)却从去年的 18.6% 滑落至 17.8%。我们认为这个比率最能够作为衡量公司管理层单一年度经营绩效的指针。当然要运用这项指针，还必须对包含会计原则、资产取得历史成本、财务杠杆与产业状况等在内的主要因素有所了解才行。
In your evaluation of our economic performance, we suggest that two factors should receive your special attention - one of a positive nature peculiar, to a large extent, to our own operation, and one of a negative nature applicable to corporate performance generally. Let’s look at the bright side first.
各位在评估本公司的经营绩效时，有两个因素是你必须特别注意的，一项是对公司营运相当有利的，而另一项则对企业绩效相对不利。让我们先从好的那一面看起：
Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings 无控制权持股之盈余
When one company owns part of another company, appropriate accounting procedures pertaining to that ownership interest must be selected from one of three major categories. The percentage of voting stock that is owned, in large part, determines which category of accounting principles should be utilized.
当一家公司拥有另一家公司部分股权时，在会计上通常有三种方式来处理投资公司在被投资公司中所拥有的权益，其所持有的股权多寡，将决定公司采用何种方式。
Generally accepted accounting principles require (subject to exceptions, naturally, as with our former bank subsidiary) full consolidation of sales, expenses, taxes, and earnings of business holdings more than 50% owned. Blue Chip Stamps, 60% owned by Berkshire Hathaway Inc., falls into this category. Therefore, all Blue Chip income and expense items are included in full in Berkshire’s Consolidated Statement of Earnings, with the 40% ownership interest of others in Blue Chip’s net earnings reflected in the Statement as a deduction for “minority interest”.
一般公认会计原则 (GAAP) 规定，若持有股权比例超过 50% (除了少数例外，如我们先前持有的银行子公司)，则被投资公司，包含营收、费用、所得税与收益等在内的所有会计科目，都需要完全并表。比如伯克希尔持有 60% 股权的蓝筹印花公司，便是属于这一类，所以蓝筹印花的所有收入和支出项都完全并入了伯克希尔的财务报表里，至于其它 40% 股东的权益在财务报表上则以少数股东权益列示。
Full inclusion of underlying earnings from another class of holdings, companies owned 20% to 50% (usually called “investees”), also normally occurs. Earnings from such companies - for example, Wesco Financial, controlled by Berkshire but only 48% owned - are included via a one-line entry in the owner’s Statement of Earnings. Unlike the over-50% category, all items of revenue and expense are omitted; just the proportional share of net income is included. Thus, if Corporation A owns one-third of Corporation B, one-third of B’s earnings, whether or not distributed by B, will end up in A’s earnings. There are some modifications, both in this and the over-50% category, for intercorporate taxes and purchase price adjustments, the explanation of which we will save for a later day. (We know you can hardly wait.)
而若是持有股权比例介于 20~50% 之间，像 Wesco 金融公司虽系由伯克希尔所控制但却仅持有 48% 的股权，则在投资公司的帐上仅简单记录一个分录，将被投资公司依股权比例认列的净收益予以入帐，收入和费用的所有项目都被省略。因此如果 A 公司拥有 B 公司三分之一的股权，则不论 B 公司是否将年度收益全数发放，A 公司都必须依比例认列收益。另外，这两类的会计原则都规定，必须附带一些企业间所得税、购买法价格调整等调整分录，这部分的细节请容我们以后再详加说明(虽然我知道大家可能等不及了)。
Finally come holdings representing less than 20% ownership of another corporation’s voting securities. In these cases, accounting rules dictate that the owning companies include in their earnings only dividends received from such holdings. Undistributed earnings are ignored. Thus, should we own 10% of Corporation X with earnings of $10 million in 1980, we would report in our earnings (ignoring relatively minor taxes on intercorporate dividends) either (a) $1 million if X declared the full $10 million in dividends; (b) $500,000 if X paid out 50%, or $5 million, in dividends; or (c) zero if X reinvested all earnings.
最后，若是持股比例低于 20%，则依照会计原则，投资公司仅能认列被投资公司实际发放的股利部分，至于保留而不发放的部分收益则不予理会，也因此假若我们持有一家 X 公司 10% 的股份，又假设 X 公司在 1980 年共计赚了 1,000万 美元，若 X 公司将收益全部发放，则我们可认列 100 万的收益，反之若 X 公司决定保留全部收益不予发放，则我们连一毛钱都不能认列。
We impose this short - and over-simplified - course in accounting upon you because Berkshire’s concentration of resources in the insurance field produces a corresponding concentration of its assets in companies in that third (less than 20% owned) category. Many of these companies pay out relatively small proportions of their earnings in dividends. This means that only a small proportion of their current earning power is recorded in our own current operating earnings. But, while our reported operating earnings reflect only the dividends received from such companies, our economic well-being is determined by their earnings, not their dividends.
之所以强迫大家上了堂稍微简单的会计课，原因在于，伯克希尔将发展的重点集中于保险业务，使得其资金大量集中投注于第三类投资比例小于 20% 的股权之上，这些被投资公司仅将它们所赚的收益的一小部分以现金股利的方式分配给我们，这代表其获利能力仅有一小部分呈现在我们公司的收入上，但就经济实质来说，股息只是实际获利的冰山一角而已。
Our holdings in this third category of companies have increased dramatically in recent years as our insurance business has prospered and as securities markets have presented particularly attractive opportunities in the common stock area. The large increase in such holdings, plus the growth of earnings experienced by those partially-owned companies, has produced an unusual result; the part of “our” earnings that these companies retained last year (the part not paid to us in dividends) exceeded the total reported annual operating earnings of Berkshire Hathaway. Thus, conventional accounting only allows less than half of our earnings “iceberg” to appear above the surface, in plain view. Within the corporate world such a result is quite rare; in our case it is likely to be recurring.
近年来我们旗下保险业务蓬勃发展，同时股票市场出现许多不错的投资机会，第三类投资持股大幅增加，再加上这些公司本身获利能力的增长使得我们实际获得的成果相当可观，以去年来说，仅是保留在这些公司而未分配给伯克希尔的收益，便超过了伯克希尔报告的整年度的报告收益总额，因此，按照通常的方式，传统会计仅允许我们一半的收益冰山浮出水面，虽然这样的情况在一般企业界并不多见，但我们预期这种情况在伯克希尔将会持续出现。
Our own analysis of earnings reality differs somewhat from generally accepted accounting principles, particularly when those principles must be applied in a world of high and uncertain rates of inflation. (But it’s much easier to criticize than to improve such accounting rules. The inherent problems are monumental.) We have owned 100% of businesses whose reported earnings were not worth close to 100 cents on the dollar to us even though, in an accounting sense, we totally controlled their disposition. (The “control” was theoretical. Unless we reinvested all earnings, massive deterioration in the value of assets already in place would occur. But those reinvested earnings had no prospect of earning anything close to a market return on capital.) We have also owned small fractions of businesses with extraordinary reinvestment possibilities whose retained earnings had an economic value to us far in excess of 100 cents on the dollar.
我们本身对投资收益如何认列的看法与一般公认会计原则并不尽相同，尤其是在目前通货膨胀高涨之际更是如此，(但话说回来，批评要比修改这套原则要容易多了，有些问题早已是根深蒂固了)，我们有些 100% 持股的公司帐面上报告的收益，实质上并不值那个钱，即使依照会计原则我们可以完全地控制它的处置，(就理论而言，我们对他具有控制权，但实际上我们却必须被迫把所赚到的每一分钱，继续投注在更新资产设备，以维持原有生产力，并赚取微薄的利润，否则现有资产的价值将发生大规模恶化，而再投资的收益却远低于市场资本回报)，相较之下，我们也有一些仅持有少数股份而其所赚的收益远超过帐面列示之数，甚至其所保留的资金还能为我们赚取更多的收益。
The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage. This is true whether we determine the usage, or whether managers we did not hire - but did elect to join - determine that usage. (It’s the act that counts, not the actors.) And the value is in no way affected by the inclusion or non-inclusion of those retained earnings in our own reported operating earnings. If a tree grows in a forest partially owned by us, but we don’t record the growth in our financial statements, we still own part of the tree.
因此对伯克希尔而言，对留存收益的价值认定并非取决于持股比例是 100% 、 50% 、 20% 、或 1%，留存收益的真正价值在于其将来再投资方向及其再投资所能产生的效益，这与是否由我们自己或是专业经理人来决定使用情况并不相关，也与我们认列或不认列收益不相关(重要的是剧本而不是演员)。假设一棵树生长在我们公司部分拥有的一片山林中，即使财务报表没有记录他的增长情况，也无法掩盖我们拥有这棵成长中树木的一部分。
Our view, we warn you, is non-conventional. But we would rather have earnings for which we did not get accounting credit put to good use in a 10%-owned company by a management we did not personally hire, than have earnings for which we did get credit put into projects of more dubious potential by another management - even if we are that management.
我必须提醒诸位，这样的论点是突破传统的，我们宁愿将所赚的收益能够继续交由不受我们控制的人好好发挥，也不希望转由我们自己来浪掷。
(We can’t resist pausing here for a short commercial. One usage of retained earnings we often greet with special enthusiasm when practiced by companies in which we have an investment interest is repurchase of their own shares. The reasoning is simple: if a fine business is selling in the market place for far less than intrinsic value, what more certain or more profitable utilization of capital can there be than significant enlargement of the interests of all owners at that bargain price? The competitive nature of corporate acquisition activity almost guarantees the payment of a full - frequently more than full price when a company buys the entire ownership of another enterprise. But the auction nature of security markets often allows finely-run companies the opportunity to purchase portions of their own businesses at a price under 50% of that needed to acquire the same earning power through the negotiated acquisition of another enterprise.)
我们忍不住在这里停下来插一个简短的广告。 当我们拥有投资权益的公司在使用留存收益时，我们经常对一种用法感到特别高兴，那就是公司回购自己的股票。道理很简单：如果一家优秀的企业在市场上以远低于内在价值的价格出售，那么还有什么比以这个便宜的价格显着扩大所有股东利益更确定或更有利可图的资本利用呢？公司并购活动的竞争性质决定，在一家公司并购另一家企业的全部股权时，需要支付全价——通常高于全价。 但证券市场的竞价拍卖机制通常允许经营良好的公司，有机会以低于通过协商收购相同盈利能力的另一家企业所需价格的 50% 的价格购买其部分业务。
Long-Term Corporate Results 企业长期绩效
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders’ equity with securities valued at cost. Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized. We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns. The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value.
如先前所说，我们以经营收益除以股东权益(证券投资以原始成本计)来评估企业单一年度的绩效，至于长期评量的标准，则须加计所有已实现或未实现的资本利得或损失。而一直以来，长期股本回报率远远超过前面每年平均股本回报率，最主要的原因是前段所提那些无控制权的公司收益持续累积，最终反映在其市值增加之上。
Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis. And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation. But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur. Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings.
当然，将留存收益转化为市值增加的过程是高度不平衡的(有些年甚至会出现相反的情况)，时间不可预测，更无法真正量化数字到底是多少，有时一个高价买进的错误，甚至可能把公司往后十年收益累积的效果都给抵销掉，但是只要市场回归理性，市值终究会反映公司累积收益的能力，你甚至会定期收到蛋糕上的糖霜：市场增值远远超过购买后累积的留存收益。
In the sixteen years since present management assumed responsibility for Berkshire, book value per share with insurance-held equities valued at market has increased from $19.46 to $400.80, or 20.5% compounded annually. (You’ve done better: the value of the mineral content in the human body compounded at 22% annually during the past decade.) It is encouraging, moreover, to realize that our record was achieved despite many mistakes. The list is too painful and lengthy to detail here. But it clearly shows that a reasonably competitive corporate batting average can be achieved in spite of a lot of managerial strikeouts.
自现任管理层接掌伯克希尔的 16 年来，公司每股的账面价值(其中保险业务的股权投资以市价计)已由原先的 19.46 美元增长至 400.8 美元，相当于年复合增长率 20.5%，(事实上你做的更好：过去十年来人体内所含矿物质成份的价值以年复合增长率 22% 增加)，值得庆幸的是，虽然我们也犯了不少错，但还是能达到这样的记录，这份错误清单太痛苦和冗长，无法在此详述。尽管在管理上时常遭到三振，但不错的企业平均打击率仍可实现。
Our insurance companies will continue to make large investments in well-run, favorably-situated, non-controlled companies that very often will pay out in dividends only small proportions of their earnings. Following this policy, we would expect our long-term returns to continue to exceed the returns derived annually from reported operating earnings. Our confidence in this belief can easily be quantified: if we were to sell the equities that we hold and replace them with long-term tax-free bonds, our reported operating earnings would rise immediately by over $30 million annually. Such a shift tempts us not at all.
我们旗下的保险业务将会持续地把大量资金投向那些不具控制权的公司上，这些公司经营良好，有竞争优势，且保留大部分收益用在公司发展之上，按照这个策略，可预期的长期的投资回报率将持续大于每年帐面列示的回报率，而我们对此坚信不移是很容易用数字量化的，只要我们愿意，把手上的股权投资出清，然后转进长期免税债券，公司每年报告收益马上就能净增加 3 千万美元，但这种转换对我们毫无吸引力。
So much for the good news.
好消息到此为止。
Results for Owners 股东权益报告
Unfortunately, earnings reported in corporate financial statements are no longer the dominant variable that determines whether there are any real earnings for you, the owner. For only gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forego ten hamburgers to purchase an investment; (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers; and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, after-tax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real income from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars. You may feel richer, but you won’t eat richer.
很不幸的，公司财务报表列示的报告收益已不再代表是股东们实际上所赚的，只有当购买力增加时，才表示投资获得真正的收益。假设当初你放弃享受十个汉堡以进行一项投资，期间公司分配的税后股利足够让你买两个汉堡，而最后你出售投资资产获得的税后收益可换八个汉堡，那么你会发现，事实上不管最后你拿到是多少钱，你的这项投资并无实际收入，你可能觉得更有钱(名义回报率不错)，但不表示你可以吃的更饱(实际购买力不变甚至下降)。
High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners. This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years. The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil.
高通货膨胀率相当于对投入的资本额外征了一次税，至少以实际投资回报率为正的这个门槛标准来衡量的话( ROE >通膨率)，可能使得大部分的投资变得不明智。这一"门槛率"是指公司为了给其投资者带来任何实际正回报而必须实现的股本回报率，而近几年来通货膨胀造成这个门槛标准大幅上升了。每个纳税投资者就好象是在一个向下滑的自动扶梯上拼命往上跑一样，虽然速度又加快了一些，但最后的结果却是愈跑愈往后退。
For example, in a world of 12% inflation a business earning 20% on equity (which very few manage consistently to do) and distributing it all to individuals in the 50% bracket is chewing up their real capital, not enhancing it. (Half of the 20% will go for income tax; the remaining 10% leaves the owners of the business with only 98% of the purchasing power they possessed at the start of the year - even though they have not spent a penny of their “earnings”). The investors in this bracket would actually be better off with a combination of stable prices and corporate earnings on equity capital of only a few per cent.
例如，在一个通胀率为 12% 的世界里，一家股本回报为 20% 的企业(很少有管理层能够始终如一地做到这一点)并将其全部收入分配给 50% 高税率等级的个人，这实际是在蚕食投资人的真实资本，而不是增强。因为 20% 回报中的一半将缴纳所得税；剩下的一半被通胀吃光还要倒贴 2%，企业所有者相比年初仅剩 98% 的购买力，尽管他们没有花掉一分钱的"收益"。如果通膨率温和，公司股本收益即使平庸到只有几个百分点，投资者的境况实际上会更好。
Explicit income taxes alone, unaccompanied by any implicit inflation tax, never can turn a positive corporate return into a negative owner return. (Even if there were 90% personal income tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, some real income would be left for the owner at a zero inflation rate.) But the inflation tax is not limited by reported income. Inflation rates not far from those recently experienced can turn the level of positive returns achieved by a majority of corporations into negative returns for all owners, including those not required to pay explicit taxes. (For example, if inflation reached 16%, owners of the 60% plus of corporate America earning less than this rate of return would be realizing a negative real return - even if income taxes on dividends and capital gains were eliminated.)
假设若只有单纯的显性所得税负，而无隐性的通货膨胀税，则不论如何，正的投资回报永远不会变成负的(即使所得税率高达 90%，在零通胀率下，仍会获得一些实际收益)，但通货膨胀却不管公司帐面到底赚不赚钱，如同最近这几年的高通膨率，使得大部分公司实现的正回报水平转变为投资人实质的负回报，即使有些公司不必缴所得税也是一样，举例来说，如果通货膨胀率达到 16%，60% 以上的美国企业股东实际的投资回报率变为负值，即使不必缴纳资本利得与股利所得税也一样。
Of course, the two forms of taxation co-exist and interact since explicit taxes are levied on nominal, not real, income. Thus you pay income taxes on what would be deficits if returns to stockholders were measured in constant dollars.
当然这两种税收是共存并相互影响的，因为显性税收是对名义收入而非实际所得征收的。因此，如果以不变的美元购买力来衡量股东的回报，那么你就要为实际为负的收益缴纳所得税。
At present inflation rates, we believe individual owners in medium or high tax brackets (as distinguished from tax-free entities such as pension funds, eleemosynary institutions, etc.) should expect no real long-term return from the average American corporation, even though these individuals reinvest the entire after-tax proceeds from all dividends they receive. The average return on equity of corporations is fully offset by the combination of the implicit tax on capital levied by inflation and the explicit taxes levied both on dividends and gains in value produced by retained earnings.
而以目前的通货膨胀率来看，我们相信对适用中等或高等级所得税率的投资人而言(除非你是通过退休基金、慈善团体等免税机构来投资)，将无法从投资一般美国企业获得任何实质的回报，即使他们把分配到的税后股利全部再投资进去也一样，因为从公司的获利早已被隐性的通货膨胀与显性的所得税给吸收殆尽。
As we said last year, Berkshire has no corporate solution to the problem. (We’ll say it again next year, too.) Inflation does not improve our return on equity.
正如去年我们所说的一样，我们目前对于这个问题无解(明年我们的回答很可能也是如此)，通货膨胀对我们股权投资的报酬没有任何一点帮助。
Indexing is the insulation that all seek against inflation. But the great bulk (although there are important exceptions) of corporate capital is not even partially indexed. Of course, earnings and dividends per share usually will rise if significant earnings are “saved” by a corporation; i.e., reinvested instead of paid as dividends. But that would be true without inflation. A thrifty wage earner, likewise, could achieve regular annual increases in his total income without ever getting a pay increase - if he were willing to take only half of his paycheck in cash (his wage “dividend”) and consistently add the other half (his “retained earnings”) to a savings account. Neither this high-saving wage earner nor the stockholder in a high-saving corporation whose annual dividend rate increases while its rate of return on equity remains flat is truly indexed.
资本指数式增长 (Indexing) 是所有人都在寻求的对抗通胀的一种有效方法，但大部分的企业资本却从未实现指数式增长，当然，如果公司保留了大量收益用于再投资，而不是支付股息，帐面每股收益与股利通常会渐渐增加，如果没有通货膨胀，这是真实的增加。同样的，一个勤俭的工薪阶层可以在不加薪的情况下实现总收入的定期增长：如果他愿意只拿薪水的一半(他的工资"红利")，并持续地把另一半(他的"留存收益")存入银行。无论是这个高储蓄的工薪阶层，还是一家高保留收益公司的股东，其股本回报率保持不变的情况下年度股息率都会上升，但他们都没有真正的实现指数式增长。
For capital to be truly indexed, return on equity must rise, i.e., business earnings consistently must increase in proportion to the increase in the price level without any need for the business to add to capital - including working capital - employed. (Increased earnings produced by increased investment don’t count.) Only a few businesses come close to exhibiting this ability. And Berkshire Hathaway isn’t one of them.
理论上，为了使资本真正实现指数增长，股本回报率必须上升，即企业收益必须与价格水平的上升成比例地持续增长，而无需企业增加新的资本(包括营运资本)。增加投资产生的收益增加不算在内，但只有极少数的公司表现出此种能力，而伯克希尔并不在其中。
We, of course, have a corporate policy of reinvesting earnings for growth, diversity and strength, which has the incidental effect of minimizing the current imposition of explicit taxes on our owners. However, on a day-by-day basis, you will be subjected to the implicit inflation tax, and when you wish to transfer your investment in Berkshire into another form of investment, or into consumption, you also will face explicit taxes.
当然伯克希尔在保留收益再投资以求成长性、差异性、茁壮的企业政策下，其附带效应是最大限度地减少目前对我们股东征收的显性所得税，只有当你在伯克希尔的投资要转移到另一种形式的投资或消费时，才将面临显性税收。然而，隐性的通货膨胀税，却是每天你醒来就必须面对的问题。
Sources of Earnings 报告收益的来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps, which in turn owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant capital gains and losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gains figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. Our calculation of operating earnings also excludes the gain from sale of Mutual’s branch offices. In this respect it differs from the presentation in our audited financial statements that includes this item in the calculation of “Earnings Before Realized Investment Gain”.
下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的来源。伯克希尔拥有蓝筹印花 60% 的股份，而蓝筹印花又拥有威斯科金融 80% 的股份。该表显示了各商业实体的总收益，以及伯克希尔所占的份额。归属于任何商业实体的所有重大资本利得和损失汇总在表底部的已实现证券收益项目中，不包括在经营收益中。我们对经营收益的计算也不包括出售互助储蓄分支机构的收益。在这方面，它不同于我们经审计的财务报表中的列报，该财务报表在计算"未实现投资收益前的收益"时包含了该项目。
Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 40 to 53 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1980 operations. We recommend a careful reading, and suggest that you particularly note the superb job done by Louie Vincenti and Charlie Munger in repositioning Mutual Savings and Loan. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
蓝筹印花及 Wesco 两家公司因为本身是公开发行公司已公开年报，我们复制了两家公司主要高管的叙述性报告，其中描述了 1980 年的运营情况。我们建议您仔细阅读，并建议您特别注意路易文森蒂 (Louie Vincenti) 和查理芒格在重新定位互助储贷业务所作的改造。任何一家公司的完整年度报告副本都将邮寄给伯克希尔股东，请 Robert H. Bird 先生 (Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040) 或 Bette Deckard 夫人 (Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109) 索取。
As indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income section of Insurance Group earnings.
就像先前我们所提到的，那些不具控制权的股票投资其未分配的收益的重要性与前表帐列的报告收益同样重要，至于那些已分配的部分则列示在保险公司投资收益项下。
We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our own earnings.
下表展示了伯克希尔在非控制业务中的持股比例，这些非控制业务仅已分配收益(股息)包含在我们报表中。
(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries.
(a) 伯克希尔或其保险子公司持有
(b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies.
(b) 蓝筹印花或 Wesco 持有
All numbers represent Berkshire’s net interest in the larger gross holdings of the group.
所有数字都代表了伯克希尔在该集团更大的总持股中的净权益。
From this table, you can see that our sources of underlying earning power are distributed far differently among industries than would superficially seem the case. For example, our insurance subsidiaries own approximately 3% of Kaiser Aluminum, and 1 1/4% of Alcoa. Our share of the 1980 earnings of those companies amounts to about $13 million. (If translated dollar for dollar into a combination of eventual market value gain and dividends, this figure would have to be reduced by a significant, but not precisely determinable, amount of tax; perhaps 25% would be a fair assumption.) Thus, we have a much larger economic interest in the aluminum business than in practically any of the operating businesses we control and on which we report in more detail. If we maintain our holdings, our long-term performance will be more affected by the future economics of the aluminum industry than it will by direct operating decisions we make concerning most companies over which we exercise managerial control.
从本表中，你可以看到，我们的潜在盈利能力来源在各行业中的分布与表面上看起来的情况大不相同。譬如保险子公司约持有凯撒铝业 3% 和美国铝业 1.25% 的股份，我们在这些公司 1980 年的收益中所占的份额约为 1300 万美元。(当然若将这些收益实际转为资本利得或股利，则大约会被课以 25% 的税负)，因此单单在制铝行业，我们的经济利益就大于任何我们可以直接控制且须详尽报告的公司。如果我们的持股不改变，则制铝产业的景气变动，将比那些我们具有实质控制权的产业，对本公司长期业绩表现更有影响力。
GEICO Corp. GEICO保险公司
Our largest non-controlled holding is 7.2 million shares of GEICO Corp., equal to about a 33% equity interest. Normally, an interest of this magnitude (over 20%) would qualify as an “investee” holding and would require us to reflect a proportionate share of GEICO’s earnings in our own. However, we purchased our GEICO stock pursuant to special orders of the District of Columbia and New York Insurance Departments, which required that the right to vote the stock be placed with an independent party. Absent the vote, our 33% interest does not qualify for investee treatment. (Pinkerton’s is a similar situation.)
目前我们最大的非控股的股权投资是 GEICO 保险，持有 33% 股权约 720 万股，通常若持有一家公司股权超过 20% 的比例，便必须采用权益法每年依比例认列其投资损益，但由于伯克希尔当初系依照政府部门一特别命令购买该公司股份，该命令要求股票的投票权交给独立方，失去投票权，意味伯克希尔对 GEICO 保险 33% 的权益不具实质控制权。( Pinkerton 也有类似的状况)。
Of course, whether or not the undistributed earnings of GEICO are picked up annually in our operating earnings figure has nothing to do with their economic value to us, or to you as owners of Berkshire. The value of these retained earnings will be determined by the skill with which they are put to use by GEICO management.
当然认不认列损益对伯克希尔及其股东而言，并不影响其实质的经济利益，这些留存收益的实际价值将取决于运用它们的 GEICO 保险管理层能力的高低。
On this score, we simply couldn’t feel better. GEICO represents the best of all investment worlds - the coupling of a very important and very hard to duplicate business advantage with an extraordinary management whose skills in operations are matched by skills in capital allocation.
关于这一点，我们再满意不过了。 GEICO 保险可以说是投资业界的最佳典范，它将一个非常重要且难以复制的商业优势和一个非凡的管理层的结合，管理层的承保运营能力与资本配置能力完美结合。
As you can see, our holdings cost us $47 million, with about half of this amount invested in 1976 and most of the remainder invested in 1980. At the present dividend rate, our reported earnings from GEICO amount to a little over $3 million annually. But we estimate our share of its earning power is on the order of $20 million annually. Thus, undistributed earnings applicable to this holding alone may amount to 40% of total reported operating earnings of Berkshire.
如你所见到的，我们的持股成本约 4700 万美元，其中 1976 年 3.2 美元买入 129 万股，其余 1980 年投入，均价 6.6 美元持有 720 万股，依目前股息率，我们每年约从 GEICO 保险认列 300 万美元，但实际上我们每年应占的收益却高达 2 千万美元，换言之，我们仅在 GEICO 保险未分配的收益中，就高达伯克希尔帐面报告收益的 40%。
We should emphasize that we feel as comfortable with GEICO management retaining an estimated $17 million of earnings applicable to our ownership as we would if that sum were in our own hands. In just the last two years GEICO, through repurchases of its own stock, has reduced the share equivalents it has outstanding from 34.2 million to 21.6 million, dramatically enhancing the interests of shareholders in a business that simply can’t be replicated. The owners could not have been better served.
另外我们必须强调的是，我们完全赞同 GEICO 保险管理层保留属于我们的 1,700万 美元不予分配的作法，这笔钱就像在我们自己手中一样。因为过去两年，GEICO 保险陆续回购自家股票，使其流通在外的股份由 3,400 万股缩减至 2,100 万股，大大提高了原有股东在这根本无法复制生意中应占的权益，如此对待股东的方式实在是无话可说。
We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses. Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations. Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.
过去几年我们一再提醒，买入那些困境反转题材 (Turnaround) 的产业结果往往令人大失所望，这些年我们大约接触了数十个行业数百家类似的公司，无论是作为参与者还是观察者，我们都持续跟踪了他们的后续发展，在比较了起始预期和后续实际表现后，我们的结论是，除了少数的例外，当一个赫赫有名的经营者遇到一个逐渐没落的夕阳产业时，往往是后者占了上风。
GEICO may appear to be an exception, having been turned around from the very edge of bankruptcy in 1976. It certainly is true that managerial brilliance was needed for its resuscitation, and that Jack Byrne, upon arrival in that year, supplied that ingredient in abundance.
GEICO 保险或许是一个例外，从 1976 年几乎破产的边缘东山再起了，从新任管理层杰克·伯恩 (Jack Byrne) 上任的第一天起优异的表现，正是它能获得重生的最大因素。
But it also is true that the fundamental business advantage that GEICO had enjoyed - an advantage that previously had produced staggering success - was still intact within the company, although submerged in a sea of financial and operating troubles.
当然即使身陷于财务与经营危机当中，GEICO 保险仍保有其最重要的产业竞争优势也是重要因素。
GEICO was designed to be the low-cost operation in an enormous marketplace (auto insurance) populated largely by companies whose marketing structures restricted adaptation. Run as designed, it could offer unusual value to its customers while earning unusual returns for itself. For decades it had been run in just this manner. Its troubles in the mid-70s were not produced by any diminution or disappearance of this essential economic advantage.
身处于汽车保险广大市场中，不同于大部分营销组织僵化的同业，一直以来 GEICO 保险将自己定位为低成本营运的公司，所以能够在为客户创造价值的同时，也为自己赚进大把钞票，几十年来都是如此，而即使它在 70 年代中期发生危机，也从未减损其在此方面的经济竞争优势。
GEICO’s problems at that time put it in a position analogous to that of American Express in 1964 following the salad oil scandal. Both were one-of-a-kind companies, temporarily reeling from the effects of a fiscal blow that did not destroy their exceptional underlying economics. The GEICO and American Express situations, extraordinary business franchises with a localized excisable cancer (needing, to be sure, a skilled surgeon), should be distinguished from the true “turnaround” situation in which the managers expect - and need - to pull off a corporate Pygmalion.
GEICO 保险的危机与 1964 年美国运通所爆发的色拉油丑闻事件类似，两家公司皆为独一无二的，暂时的打击并未毁掉其卓越的经济优势，就像是一个身体健壮的人患了局部可切除的肿瘤，只要遇到一位经验丰富的外科医生就能化险为夷。 GEICO 保险和美国运通的非凡商业特许经营权遇到暂时的运营困难，应该与真正的困境反转情况区分开来，管理层期望也需要完成一个公司的皮格马利翁转变。(注：《Pygmalion》 希腊神话，剧中 Higgins 语言学教授与人打赌能把一个粗俗的街头卖花女 Eliza 转变成了仪态万方的大家闺秀，而过程中教授却爱上了自己的作品。)
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company. A 100% interest of that kind gives the owner the options of leveraging the purchase, changing managements, directing cash flow, and selling the business. It may also provide some excitement around corporate headquarters (less frequently mentioned).
不论怎么说，我们还是很高兴能够以 4,700 万美元的代价买到 GEICO 保险的股份，因为通过谈判并购的方式想要买下一家具有类似经济特质与光明前景，且每年可创造 2000 万收益的公司，至少得花上 2 亿美金(有些产业的要价可能还更高)，虽然 100% 的持股更可使所有权人得以掌握公司的生杀大权，可以操控杠杆并购、变革管理层、现金流重新分配和拆分出售业务等，同时也给企业总部带来一些刺激(这一点通常很少人会提及)。
We find it perfectly satisfying that the nature of our insurance business dictates we buy many minority portions of already well-run businesses (at prices far below our share of the total value of the entire business) that do not need management change, re-direction of cash flow, or sale. There aren’t many Jack Byrnes in the managerial world, or GEICOs in the business world. What could be better than buying into a partnership with both of them?
非常令人满意的是，我们保险业务的性质决定了我们只能购买绩优企业的少数股权(以远低于买下整家企业的价格投资)，这些业务不需要更换管理层、无需对资金做重新配置甚至拆分出售，管理界的 Jack Byrne 和 GEICO 保险的商业模式都算是极少数，还有什么能够以伙伴的关系与它们共同合作更好的呢？
Insurance Industry Conditions 保险产业现况
The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page 37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980. It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982. To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well-written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’s mailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
保险产业的情况持续依我们先前所预期般地发展，综合比率从 1979 年的 100.6% 升高到 1980 年估计的 103.5%，可预期的是 1981 到 1982 年这个趋势将继续持续下去，业界的承保损失将向上攀升，想要了解个中原因的人，我建议你读读 Chubb 保险集团(丘博全球最大的财产责任险公司之一) Barbara Stewart 写于 1980 年 10 月的文章，其对产险业竞争态势所作的精譬分析，虽然分析并不令人愉快，但绝对中肯。(Chubb 的年报一直呈现了最深刻、坦诚的文笔流畅的行业情况讨论。你应当加入其公司年报邮寄名单中)。
And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony. It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
而不幸的是，一个尚未浮现但却非常棘手的问题很可能会延长并加剧即将到来的行业痛苦。这不仅可能使许多保险公司在承保损失达到创纪录水平时，争先恐后地开展业务，还可能导致他们在这个时候加倍努力去扩张。
This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value. Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth. If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth. And shrink they have. Some of the largest and best known property-casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market. Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth. Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless. The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
这个问题源于债券价格的下跌，而保险会计惯例又允许公司以摊余成本而非市价列示其帐面价值，结果导致许多业者以摊销成本记录的长期债券投资金额达到其账面价值的 2-3 倍之多，换言之，如果是三倍的话，只要债券价格下跌超过三分之一，便很有可能把公司的净值全部抹掉，而这些债券确实贬值了，这其中甚至包括好几家最大最知名的大公司在内，如果债券持有按市值计，他们的账面价值甚至是负值。当然债券价格也有可能会回升，使得其部分，甚至全部的账面价值得以恢复，但也没有人敢保证债券价格不会继续下跌。(我们深信对股票或债券价格所作的短期预测是无用的，预测这件事或许能够让你更了解预测者本身，但对于了解未来却是一点帮助也没有)。
It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all. The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline. It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value. Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately. And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
有点吊诡的是，若持有的股票投资组合价格下跌到大幅减少净资产时，会影响到保险业者的生存，但若换作是债券价格下跌却是一点事都没有，保险业者的理由是不管现在的市价是多少，反正只要到期日前不卖出，便能按照票面赎回，所以短期间价格的波动并无太大影响，就算是二十年、三十年或甚至是四十年后到期，只要不出售，等时间一到，就能够以票面金额收回，反倒是若我现在出售这些债券，那么就算是再买进类似相对价值更高的债券，反而要立即认列相关损失，使得账面价值大幅缩水。
Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades. For example, when large underwriting losses are in prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurers to shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds. Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
在这种情况下，许多投资选择消失了，也许会持续几十年。例如，当有可能出现巨额承保损失时，一些保险公司从免税债券转向应税债券可能是一个很好的商业逻辑。不愿承认重大债券损失可能是阻止这一明智之举的唯一因素，其结果反而错失其它更好的投资机会。
But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect. For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policyholders and claimants (with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer. As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold. If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will if the volume of business declines significantly - assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities. And if those assets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
但是，大量未实现的债券损失所带来的全面影响远比投资智慧的停滞更严重。购买和持有这些债券的资金来源是来自投保人和索赔人(脸色是不断变化的)的资金池——实际上，这些资金只是暂时存放在保险公司。只要能保持资金池的规模，就不必出售任何债券。如果业务量大幅下降，资金池就会萎缩，资金流动不足时就要出售资产来偿还债务(应对赔付)。如果这些资产由巨大未认列损失的债券组成，那么这些损失将浮出水面，并在这一过程中摧毁保险公司的资产净值。
Thus, an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced with inadequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options. One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
因此，如果一家保险公司的债券市值缩水到接近监管规定的净值(现在有很多)，同时市场费率又低到不合理甚至继续恶化时，通常有两种选择，第一种是告诉承保部门，必须坚守费率底限风险定价，即：对每一美元的成本和预计赔付，一定要得到一美元的保费。
The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be a lagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
这种选择的结果可以预测： (a) 由于大部分的业务都是对价格都相当敏感而且是年度续约，所以很多保单在到期后都会流到竞争对手那边，(b) 随着保费收入大幅缩水，相对应的负债科目(预收保费和应付索赔)也会慢慢减少，(c) 资产(债券)必须跟着出售，以平衡负债的减少，(d) 原先台面下的未认列损失，将被迫认列在保险业者的财务报表之上(当然要看出售的情况)。
Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth. The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses. This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers - while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner in the long term.
但这种恶性循环对于净值影响程度不一，有些公司在 (c) 阶段的反应是出售成本与市价相当的股票，或是新进投资损失较小的债券，出售好的投资，留下烂的部分是一种驼鸟心态，虽然在短期内不那么痛苦，但从长远来看不太可能成为赢家。
The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities - and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices. There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow” underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates. This second option might properly be termed “asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
第二种选择比较简单，那就是不管保费水准有多低，将来要赔多少钱，都照单全收以维持现有保费收入和资产负债水平，然后暗地里祈祷不要发生什么重大意外，无论是承销还是债券价格。行业媒体一直对这种"现金流承销"有相当大的批评。也就是说，不考虑潜在的承保损失而承销业务，以获得资金以在当前的高利率下进行投资。这种做法可以恰当地称为"资产维持式承保"，接受糟糕的业务只是为了保留您现在拥有的资产。
Of course you know which option will be selected. And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting. For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices. Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a “sell-at-any-price” policy.
当然各位都晓得我们应该选择哪个选项。而且产业的趋势也很清楚，只要大部分的保险公司都被迫采取第二种做法，那么保险市场就不会有好转的一天，因为如果大部分的业者，不论费率是否合理，都以维持保费收入水准为第一优先，那么市场价格就一定不会好转，除了本身已经发生财务问题之外，下一个最糟糕的困境就是，市场上大部分的同业都因为财务问题而纷纷采取流血式的杀价竞争以延缓问题爆发。
We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer. But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem. Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
我前面提到，保险公司不愿认赔卖掉债券。他们这样做可能有很多原因，公众反应，机构的自尊，或者保护规定的净资产。他们这样做有可能导致束缚自己的投资方式长达十年甚至更久。但是，如前面所说，这只是问题的一半。购买了大量长期债券的保险公司有可能在很长时期内，不但失去了更多的投资选择，还有他们的承销原则的选择。
Our own position in this respect is satisfactory. We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups. When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)[1]
在这方面我们自己的状况还是令人满意的。我们相信，在所有股东拥有的大型产险集团中，以摊余成本对所有保险公司的债券进行估值，我们的净资产相对于保费而言是最强的。当债券价值以市价评估时，我们的竞争优势则更加明显。（但为了避免过于自大，我们提醒自己，我们的资产和负债期限仍远比我们希望的要错配。我们也在债券上损失了大笔资金，因为你们的主席在应该采取行动的时候只是在夸夸其谈。)[1]
Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing. But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us. Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry. It just gives us more staying power and more options.
我们雄厚的资本实力和投资的灵活性让我们能够在长期定价不足的条件下做出我们认为最明智的决策。但是，行业的麻烦就意味着我们的麻烦。在目前席卷了整个财产意外险行业的恶性价格战环境下，我们的财务优势并不能让我们免受影响，我们的优势只给了我们更好的持续能力与更多的选择。
Insurance Operations 保险业务的运营
The National Indemnity managers, led by Phil Liesche with the usual able assistance of Roland Miller and Bill Lyons, outdid themselves in 1980. While volume was flat, underwriting margins relative to the industry were at an all-time high. We expect decreased volume from this operation in 1981. But its managers will hear no complaints from corporate headquarters, nor will employment or salaries suffer. We enormously admire the National Indemnity underwriting discipline - embedded from origin by the founder, Jack Ringwalt - and know that this discipline, if suspended, probably could not be fully regained.
今年由菲尔·列舍 (Phil Liesche) 所领导的国民保险公司在承保部门 Roland Miller 以及理赔部门 Bill Lyons 的通力协助下，不断地超越自我，虽然保费收入持平，但承保利润率却创同业新高，虽然我们预期明年保费收入将减少，但身为总部的我们不会有任何的抱怨，他们的薪资考绩也不会受影响，对于公司创办人杰克·林沃尔特 (Jack Ringwalt) 所定下的承保准则我们信奉不渝，而且相当清楚一旦失去就永难再恢复。
John Seward at Home and Auto continues to make good progress in replacing a diminishing number of auto policies with volume from less competitive lines, primarily small-premium general liability. Operations are being slowly expanded, both geographically and by product line, as warranted by underwriting results.
John Seward 领导的 Home&Auto 家庭与汽车险公司则小有进展，我们将较不具竞争力的小额一般责任险转为金额较大的汽车保险，同时随着承保绩效的改进，营运规模，不论是在地区或是产品线，也在缓步提升中。
The reinsurance business continues to reflect the excesses and problems of the primary writers. Worse yet, it has the potential for magnifying such excesses. Reinsurance is characterized by extreme ease of entry, large premium payments in advance, and much-delayed loss reports and loss payments. Initially, the morning mail brings lots of cash and few claims. This state of affairs can produce a blissful, almost euphoric, feeling akin to that experienced by an innocent upon receipt of his first credit card.
再保业务部门继续反映出直接承保人的过度行为和问题。更糟糕的是，它有可能放大这种过度行为。由于进入障碍较小，还是持续受到供过于求的局面，加上主要保险业者面临的问题，事前可先收取巨额保费，但灾害真正发生与理赔时程却拉得很长，业务起初带来了大量现金，而索赔却很少。这种感觉有点像青少年第一次拥有自己的信用卡一样。
The magnetic lure of such cash-generating characteristics, currently enhanced by the presence of high interest rates, is transforming the reinsurance market into “amateur night”. Without a super catastrophe, industry underwriting will be poor in the next few years. If we experience such a catastrophe, there could be a bloodbath with some companies not able to live up to contractual commitments. George Young continues to do a first-class job for us in this business. Results, with investment income included, have been reasonably profitable. We will retain an active reinsurance presence but, for the foreseeable future, we expect no premium growth from this activity.
高现金的磁性吸引力使得大笔的资金涌入这个行业，目前的高利率环境更加深了这样的现象，导致的结果是若某一年未发生大灾难，则往后几年的承保绩效便会变得很差，相反的，若有大灾难发生，则更大的灾难将会降临在保险公司身上，因为有些同业可能无法履行与客户当初签订的合约，而我们 George Young 在这一行的表现一向是一流的，在加计投资收益后，仍能维持合理的获利，我们将继续留在再保险市场，但在可预见的未来，保费收入将很难有大幅的增长。
We continue to have serious problems in the Homestate operation. Floyd Taylor in Kansas has done an outstanding job but our underwriting record elsewhere is considerably below average. Our poorest performer has been Insurance Company of Iowa, at which large losses have been sustained annually since its founding in 1973. Late in the fall we abandoned underwriting in that state, and have merged the company into Cornhusker Casualty. There is potential in the homestate concept, but much work needs to be done in order to realize it.
我们在住宅保险业务 (Home-State) 持续面临重大的问题，除了堪萨斯州的 Floyd Taylor 外，其余的承保表现均在同业水准之下，自 1973 年成立以来，爱荷华州每年皆发生巨额损失，去年我们决定结束该州的业务，并将之并入内布拉斯加州，住宅保险概念其实也很大的潜力，但还需要很多努力才有办法实现它。
Our Workers Compensation operation suffered a severe loss when Frank DeNardo died last year at 37. Frank instinctively thought like an underwriter. He was a superb technician and a fierce competitor; in short order he had straightened out major problems at the California Workers Compensation Division of National Indemnity. Dan Grossman, who originally brought Frank to us, stepped in immediately after Frank’s death to continue that operation, which now utilizes Redwood Fire and Casualty, another Berkshire subsidiary, as the insuring vehicle.
我们的工伤赔偿保险业务在去年痛失英才，37 岁的弗兰克·德纳多 (Frank DeNardo) 因心脏病不幸去世，他天生就是个保险专家，积极进取，努力上进，很快他就解决了国民保险公司旗下加州工伤赔偿业务的主要问题。当初介绍 Frank 加入的丹·格罗斯曼 (Dan Grossman，不懂保险后不堪压力辞职)立即接手其原有工作，并以伯克希尔以另一家子公司 Redwood 火险为主体，承接业务。
Our major Workers Compensation operation, Cypress Insurance Company, run by Milt Thornton, continues its outstanding record. Year after year Milt, like Phil Liesche, runs an underwriting operation that far outpaces his competition. In the industry he is admired and copied, but not matched.
至于由 Milt Thornton 所领导的加州 Cypress 保险公司一直是我们在这项业务的主力，且表现一直相当优异，与菲尔·列舍 (Phil Liesche) 一样，广为同业所仰慕与模仿，但其优秀的表现却是同业无法比拟的。
Overall, we look for a significant decline in insurance volume in 1981 along with a poorer underwriting result. We expect underwriting experience somewhat superior to that of the industry but, of course, so does most of the industry. There will be some disappointments.
总之保险业务量在 1981 年将大幅下滑，整体承保表现也不会太好，虽然我们预期自己的绩效应该会比同业好许多，但其它同业也都这样认为，最后肯定有人会大失所望。
Textile and Retail Operations 纺织业务及零售业务
During the past year we have cut back the scope of our textile business. Operations at Waumbec Mills have been terminated, reluctantly but necessarily. Some equipment was transferred to New Bedford but most has been sold, or will be, along with real estate. Your Chairman made a costly mistake in not facing the realities of this situation sooner.
去年我们缩减在纺织业的营运规模，虽然不愿意但却不得不关闭 Waumbec 工厂，除了少数设备转移至 New Bedford 外，其余设备连同厂房都将处置掉，我本人由于无法早日面对事实而犯了重大的错误。
At New Bedford we have reduced the number of looms operated by about one-third, abandoning some high-volume lines in which product differentiation was insignificant. Even assuming everything went right - which it seldom did - these lines could not generate adequate returns related to investment. And, over a full industry cycle, losses were the most likely result.
而在 New Bedford 我们也淘汰了将近三分之一的织布机，放弃了一些产品差异不显著的大批量生产线，而即使一切顺利(这种情况很少)，这些保留的生产线仍不具投资效益，在整个行业周期中，损失将无可避免。
Our remaining textile operation, still sizable, has been divided into a manufacturing and a sales division, each free to do business independent of the other. Thus, distribution strengths and mill capabilities will not be wedded to each other. We have more than doubled capacity in our most profitable textile segment through a recent purchase of used 130-inch Saurer looms. Current conditions indicate another tough year in textiles, but with substantially less capital employed in the operation.
我们剩余的纺织业务规模仍然相当可观，已分为制造和销售部门，每个部门都可以独立开展业务。因此，分销优势和工厂能力不会相互关联。最近通过购买二手 130 英寸 Saurer 织机，我们在利润最高的产品线的产能翻了一番多。情势告诉我们纺织业又将面临艰困的一年，所幸我们在这一行所投入的资本已大幅减少。
Ben Rosner’s record at Associated Retail Stores continues to amaze us. In a poor retailing year, Associated’s earnings continued excellent - and those earnings all were translated into cash. On March 7, 1981 Associated will celebrate its 50th birthday. Ben has run the business (along with Leo Simon, his partner from 1931 to 1966) in each of those fifty years.
Ben Rosner 在联合零售商店的表现持续令我们惊艳，在零售业普遍惨淡的一年，该公司收益表现仍佳，且大部分皆为现金收入，而 1981 年 3 月 7 日联合零售将迈入第 50 个年头，Ben 经营这家公司整整有 50 年了 (1931 至 1966 年，与合伙人 Leo Simon 一起)。
Disposition of Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford 伊利诺国民银行及Rockford信托处分案
On December 31, 1980 we completed the exchange of 41,086 shares of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (which owns 97.7% of Illinois National Bank) for a like number of shares of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
1980 年底，我们完成了将 Rockford Bancorp Inc. (拥有伊利诺伊国民银行 97.7% 的股份)的 41,086 股股票交换为伯克希尔公司同等数量的股份。
Our method of exchange allowed all Berkshire shareholders to maintain their proportional interest in the Bank (except for me; I was permitted 80% of my proportional share). They were thus guaranteed an ownership position identical to that they would have attained had we followed a more conventional spinoff approach. Twenty-four shareholders (of our approximate 1300) chose this proportional exchange option.
交换的方式准许伯克希尔股东维持各自在该银行的权益(除了我本人仅能维持原来的 80% )，如此他们将可确保在该银行的权益与传统的分割方式一样受到保障，总计有 24 位股东选择了这一比例交换 (目前股东总人数为 1300 人)。
We also allowed overexchanges, and thirty-nine additional shareholders accepted this option, thereby increasing their ownership in the Bank and decreasing their proportional ownership in Berkshire. All got the full amount of Bancorp stock they requested, since the total shares desired by these thirty-nine holders was just slightly less than the number left available by the remaining 1200-plus holders of Berkshire who elected not to part with any Berkshire shares at all. As the exchanger of last resort, I took the small balance (3% of Bancorp’s stock). These shares, added to shares I received from my basic exchange allotment (80% of normal), gave me a slightly reduced proportional interest in the Bank and a slightly enlarged proportional interest in Berkshire.
另外股东们也可要求增加其在该银行的权益(相对地，其在伯克希尔的权益将减少)，所有提出此项要求的股东皆如愿拿到股票，因为这 39 位股东需求的股份数量刚好略低于其它 1,200 多位选择全数保留伯克希尔股份所释出的银行股份，剩下的中间差额则由本人承受(约占 Bancorp 3% 的股份)，在加计先前基本 80% 的分配额度后，最后的结果，本人在银行的权益稍微减少，而在伯克希尔的权益则略微增加。
Management of the Bank is pleased with the outcome. Bancorp will operate as an inexpensive and uncomplicated holding company owned by 65 shareholders. And all of those shareholders will have become Bancorp owners through a conscious affirmative decision.
银行的经营团队对于这样的结果感到满意，Bancorp 将成为一个只有 65 位股东，组织单纯且不复杂的控股公司。
Financing 融资
In August we sold $60 million of 12 3/4% notes due August 1, 2005, with a sinking fund to begin in 1991.
8 月份，我们发行了 12.75% 票面利率 25 年期 (2005 年 8 月到期)，金额 6,000 万美元的公司债。
The managing underwriters, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation, represented by Bill Fisher, and Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc., represented by Charlie Heider, did an absolutely first-class job from start to finish of the financing.
依合约规定我们将于 1991 年开始提存备偿基金。这项融资案的主要承销商 Donaldson 自始至终皆提供我们一流的服务。
Unlike most businesses, Berkshire did not finance because of any specific immediate needs. Rather, we borrowed because we think that, over a period far shorter than the life of the loan, we will have many opportunities to put the money to good use. The most attractive opportunities may present themselves at a time when credit is extremely expensive - or even unavailable. At such a time we want to have plenty of financial firepower.
与大部分公司不同，伯克希尔并不会为了一些特定的短期资金需求而去融资，我们借钱反而是因为当我们觉得在一定期间内(约略短于融资年限)将有许多好的投资机会出现，最佳的投资机会大多是出现在市场银根最紧的时候，那时候你一定希望拥有庞大的火力。
Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it. As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business. There is a certain mirage-like quality to such operations. However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.
对于并购的对象，我们偏爱那些会"生产现金"而非"消耗现金"的公司。随着通货膨胀的加剧，越来越多的公司发现它们必须将所赚得的每一分钱再投入才能维持其原有的营运规模，这种操作具有某种海市蜃楼般的意味。就算这些公司帐面数字再好看，除非看到白花花的现金，我们对之仍保持高度警戒。
Businesses meeting our standards are not easy to find. (Each year we read of hundreds of corporate acquisitions; only a handful would have been of interest to us.) And logical expansion of our present operations is not easy to implement. But we’ll continue to utilize both avenues in our attempts to further Berkshire’s growth.
符合我们标准的公司并不容易找到，(每年我们研究上百件的并购案，其中仅有少数能引起我们的兴趣)，所以要让我们规模合理稳定扩充的想法并不容易落实，但我们仍将继续利用这两种途径以促进伯克希尔的成长。
Under all circumstances we plan to operate with plenty of liquidity, with debt that is moderate in size and properly structured, and with an abundance of capital strength. Our return on equity is penalized somewhat by this conservative approach, but it is the only one with which we feel comfortable.
无论如何，我们皆希望能够保持适当的流动性，负债比例合理结构适当，并保留充裕的资本实力，虽然这种保守的态度将使得我们的投资回报率因此打了点折扣，但这也是惟一能让我们感到舒服的方式。
Gene Abegg, founder of our long-owned bank in Rockford, died on July 2, 1980 at the age of 82. As a friend, banker and citizen, he was unsurpassed.
Gene Abegg ，我们长期投资的 Rockford 银行创办人，于 1980 年 7 月 2 日逝世，享年 82 岁，身为一位挚友、银行家与杰出公民，他是无可超越的。
You learn a great deal about a person when you purchase a business from him and he then stays on to run it as an employee rather than as an owner. Before the purchase the seller knows the business intimately, whereas you start from scratch. The seller has dozens of opportunities to mislead the buyer - through omissions, ambiguities, and misdirection. After the check has changed hands, subtle (and not so subtle) changes of attitude can occur and implicit understandings can evaporate. As in the courtship-marriage sequence, disappointments are not infrequent.
当你向某个人买下一家公司，然后他以雇员而不是所有者的身份继续经营时，你会对这个人有更多的了解。在购买之前，卖方对这家公司了若指掌，而买方却一无所知，卖方可以通过疏漏、含糊不清和误导有太多机会欺骗买方，在支票易手后，态度可能会发生微妙的变化，而隐含的理解可能会蒸发。就像是求婚的过程一样，失望总是难免的。
From the time we first met, Gene shot straight 100% of the time - the only behavior pattern he had within him. At the outset of negotiations, he laid all negative factors face up on the table; on the other hand, for years after the transaction was completed he would tell me periodically of some previously undiscussed items of value that had come with our purchase.
而当我们第一次碰面，Gene 就百分之百坦诚，这是他内心唯一的处事方式，谈判的开始，他把公司所有负面的因素摊开在桌上，另一方面，在交易完成数年后，他还会定期地告知你当初交易时未讨论到的地方。
Though he was already 71 years of age when he sold us the Bank, Gene subsequently worked harder for us than he had for himself. He never delayed reporting a problem for a minute, but problems were few with Gene. What else would you expect from a man who, at the time of the bank holiday in 1933, had enough cash on the premises to pay all depositors in full? Gene never forgot he was handling other people’s money. Though this fiduciary attitude was always dominant, his superb managerial skills enabled the Bank to regularly achieve the top position nationally in profitability.
虽然他把银行卖给我们时已 71 岁高龄，Gene 仍然辛勤工作更甚于以往，虽然极少发生问题，但一有问题便立刻报告毫不迟疑，如果一个人在 1933 年银行休息日时都有足够的现金支付所有储户的全部存款，你还能指望他做什么？ Gene 从未忘记他是在处理别人的钱，虽然这种信托态度一直占主导地位，但他精湛的管理技能使该银行的盈利能力经常在全国名列前茅。
Gene was in charge of the Illinois National for close to fifty years - almost one-quarter of the lifetime of our country. George Mead, a wealthy industrialist, brought him in from Chicago to open a new bank after a number of other banks in Rockford had failed. Mr. Mead put up the money and Gene ran the show. His talent for leadership soon put its stamp on virtually every major civic activity in Rockford.
Gene 负责伊利诺国民银行的营运将近 50 年，约当美国历史的四分之一，当初是一位工业巨子 George Mead 在 Rockford 的其他几家银行倒闭后，把他从芝加哥找来开设银行，Mead 先生出钱，Gene 出力，他的领导才能很快就 在Rockford 的几乎每一项主要公民活动中都留下了印记。
Dozens of Rockford citizens have told me over the years of help Gene extended to them. In some cases this help was financial; in all cases it involved much wisdom, empathy and friendship. He always offered the same to me. Because of our respective ages and positions I was sometimes the junior partner, sometimes the senior. Whichever the relationship, it always was a special one, and I miss it.
这些年来许多 Rockford 的居民告诉我，Gene 给予他们很多帮助，有时是金钱上的，但更多时候包含的是智慧、同情与友谊，而我本身也从他身上获得许多，因为各自年纪与工作上的关系，我们亦师亦友，不论如何，这种关系相当特殊，我永远怀念他。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
February 27, 1981
1981 年 2 月 27 日
[1]By Terrellchen @20231001
原文： (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)
肖良版：但为了避免过于自大，我们提醒自己，我们的资产和负债期限仍远比我们希望的要错配，我们也损失了大量债券，因为你们的主席本应采取行动的时候却在讲话。
修改为：(但为了避免我们过于自大，我们提醒自己，我们的资产和负债期限仍然远比我们希望的要错配，我们也在债券上损失了大笔资金，因为你们的主席在应该采取行动的时候只是在夸夸其谈。)
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