1982-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

Operating earnings of $39.7 million in 1981 amounted to 15.2% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost) compared to 17.8% in 1980. Our new plan that allows stockholders to designate corporate charitable contributions (detailed later) reduced earnings by about $900,000 in 1981. This program, which we expect to continue subject to annual evaluation of our corporate tax position, had not been initiated in 1980.

1981年经营收益为3,970万美元，占期初股东权益（按证券成本计价）的15.2%，而1980年这一比例为17.8%。我们新推出的允许股东自主指定公司慈善捐款对象的计划（详见后文）使1981年收益减少了约90万美元。该计划在1980年尚未启动，我们预计将根据每年对公司税务状况的评估决定是否继续。

Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings

无控制权持股之盈余

In the 1980 annual report we discussed extensively the concept of non-controlled ownership earnings, i.e., Berkshire's share of the undistributed earnings of companies we don't control or significantly influence but in which we, nevertheless, have important investments. (We will be glad to make available to new or prospective shareholders copies of that discussion or others from earlier reports to which we refer in this report.) No portion of those undistributed earnings is included in the operating earnings of Berkshire.

在1980年年度报告中，我们详细讨论了无控制权持股收益的概念，即Berkshire在那些我们既不控制、也不能重大影响，但却持有重要投资的公司中，所应占有的未分配收益份额。（我们很乐意向新股东或潜在股东提供该讨论的副本，以及本报告中引用的其他历年报告内容。）上述未分配收益，没有任何部分被计入Berkshire的经营收益。

However, our belief is that, in aggregate, those undistributed and, therefore, unrecorded earnings will be translated into tangible value for Berkshire shareholders just as surely as if subsidiaries we control had earned, retained—and reported—similar earnings.

然而，我们相信，这些未分配、因而也未入账的收益，总体而言终将转化为Berkshire股东实实在在的价值——其确定程度，不亚于我们控股子公司赚取、留存并如实报告了同等收益的情形。

We know that this translation of non-controlled ownership earnings into corresponding realized and unrealized capital gains for Berkshire will be extremely irregular as to time of occurrence. While market values track business values quite well over long periods, in any given year the relationship can gyrate capriciously. Market recognition of retained earnings also will be unevenly realized among companies. It will be disappointingly low or negative in cases where earnings are employed non-productively, and far greater than dollar-for-dollar of retained earnings in cases of companies that achieve high returns with their augmented capital. Overall, if a group of non-controlled companies is selected with reasonable skill, the group result should be quite satisfactory.

我们清楚，这种无控制权持股收益向Berkshire已实现及未实现资本利得的转化，在时间上将极为不规律。市场价值在较长时期内能很好地追踪企业内在价值，但在任何特定年份，两者的关系都可能随性摇摆。市场对留存收益的认可，在不同公司之间也会参差不齐——若收益被低效运用，市场反映将令人失望，甚至为负；而对于那些能以增量资本创造高回报的公司，市场的认可则将远超每留存一美元对应一美元的价值。总体而言，若非控股公司的组合选择得当，整体结果应当相当令人满意。

In aggregate, our non-controlled business interests have more favorable underlying economic characteristics than our controlled businesses. That's understandable; the area of choice has been far wider. Small portions of exceptionally good businesses are usually available in the securities markets at reasonable prices. But such businesses are available for purchase in their entirety only rarely, and then almost always at high prices.

总体而言，我们的非控股商业权益，其潜在经济特质要优于我们的控股业务。这不难理解：可供选择的范围宽广得多。极为出色的企业，其小额股份通常可以在证券市场上以合理价格买到。但若要整体收购此类企业，机会却极为罕见，且几乎无一例外地要付出高昂代价。

General Acquisition Behavior

一般收购行为

As our history indicates, we are comfortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small commitments—"If something's not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well".) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in marketable securities.

我们的历史表明，无论是完全拥有一家企业，还是持有代表企业小额权益的有价证券，我们都同样自在。我们持续寻求在这两个领域大规模运用资金的方式。（但我们力求避免小额投入——"如果一件事根本不值得做，那它也不值得做好。"）事实上，我们保险业务和交易印花业务的流动性要求，本身就决定了必须在有价证券上进行大规模投资。

Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)

我们的收购决策，目标在于实现真实经济利益的最大化，而非扩张管理版图，也非追求账面数字的好看。（从长远来看，那些以会计外观凌驾于经济实质之上的管理层，最终两者往往都所获无几。）

Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.

不论对当期可报告收益有何影响，我们宁愿以每股X的价格买入优秀企业T 10%的股份，也不愿以每股2X的价格收购T的100%。大多数公司管理层恰恰偏好相反的做法，且从不缺乏为此振振有词的理由。

扩张版图的心理动机可以掩盖很多的事实。

However, we suspect three motivations—usually unspoken—to be, singly or in combination, the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:

然而，我们怀疑以下三种动机——通常不会被明说——单独或合并起来，才是大多数高溢价收购背后真正重要的驱动力：

1. Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge. At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.

无论是商界还是其他领域的领导者，动物精神从不匮乏，往往乐于迎接更多行动与挑战。在Berkshire，没有什么时候比一桩收购呼之欲出时，公司的脉搏跳得更快。

2. Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)

无论是商业机构还是其他组织，衡量自身、被他人衡量、以及对管理层的薪酬激励，所用的尺度远比其他任何标准都更偏重规模。（问一位Fortune 500的经理人，他的公司在那份榜单上排第几——得到的答案，几乎无一例外来自按销售额排名的榜单；至于Fortune同样一丝不苟地编制的、按盈利能力对同样500家公司排名的那份榜单，他很可能根本不知道自己的公司排在哪里。）

3. Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad's body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).

许多管理层显然在童年的懵懂岁月里，将那个美丽公主一吻解救了困于蟾蜍之身的英俊王子的故事读得太熟了。于是他们深信不疑，自己管理层的那一吻，必将对目标公司T的盈利能力创造奇迹。

“animal spirits”的说法来自凯恩斯，后面的"institutional imperative"是更深入、更细化的分析，都指向脱离事实的心理现象。

Such optimism is essential. Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?

这种乐观主义不可或缺。若无这番玫瑰色的想象，收购方A的股东们，又有什么理由要以2X的收购成本持有T的权益，而不是自己直接在市场上以X的价格买入？

In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We've observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses—even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.

换言之，投资者随时可以按蟾蜍的市价买入蟾蜍。若投资者转而为那些愿意付双倍价格换取亲吻蟾蜍权利的公主们掏腰包，那这一吻最好真能炸出点什么。我们见过许多吻，却极少见到奇迹。尽管如此，许多管理层公主们依然神态自若地对自己未来那一吻的威力充满信心——即便她们公司的后院，早已蟾蜍成堆、毫无反应。

In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.

公平而言，我们应当承认，某些收购记录确实令人眼前一亮。其中有两大类尤为突出。

The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.

第一类是那些无论出于主动设计还是歪打正着，收购目标始终局限于特别适应通胀环境的企业。此类受青睐的企业须具备两个特质：（1）能够相当轻松地提价——即便产品需求平淡、产能未被充分利用——且无需担心市场份额或销售量的明显流失；（2）能够以极少的追加资本投入，承接业务金额的大幅增长（这种增长往往更多来自通胀而非真实扩张）。近几十年来，能力平平的管理者，只要专注于符合上述条件的收购机会，便已取得了出色的成果。然而，同时具备这两种特质的企业少之又少，争购此类企业的竞争如今已激烈到自我消耗的程度。

The second category involves the managerial superstars—men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial "twofer", whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives' achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)

第二类涉及管理界的超级明星——他们能识别出那个乔装成蟾蜍的稀有王子，并具备将伪装剥除的管理能力。我们向这样的管理者致敬：Northwest Industries的Ben Heineman、Teledyne的Henry Singleton、National Service Industries的Erwin Zaban，尤其是Capital Cities Communications的Tom Murphy（一位真正的管理"双料冠军"——他的收购努力恰当地聚焦于第一类，而他的经营才能也使他跻身第二类的领军人物）。从直接和间接的经验来看，我们深知这些管理者成就的难度与罕见程度。（他们自己也清楚；这些冠军近年来鲜有出手，往往发现回购本公司股份才是运用企业资本最明智的方式。）

Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And, despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate. Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn't count, building arks does.)

遗憾的是，你们的董事长并不具备第二类的资格。而且，尽管对驱使人专注于第一类的经济因素有着相当深入的理解，我们在该类别的实际收购行动却零星而不足。我们的说教强于我们的表现。（我们忽视了诺亚原则：预测下雨不算数，造出方舟才是真。）

在一个充满噪音、充满“animal spirits”的商业环境中，关键的“商业模式”不好，所引发的不确定是需要特别引起关注的。

We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes—but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn't turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.

我们偶尔尝试过以低廉的价格买入蟾蜍，结果已在历年报告中有所记载。显然，我们的吻毫无效果。我们也确实在几位王子身上做得不错——但他们被收购时本就是王子。至少我们的吻没有把他们变成蟾蜍。最后，我们偶尔在以蟾蜍般的价格买入易于辨识的王子的零星权益方面，取得了相当不错的成绩。

Berkshire Acquisition Objectives

伯克希尔的收购目标

We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past. We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting. But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party—for we find that we ordinarily don't bring a lot.

我们将继续寻求以合理价格整体收购企业——即便被收购企业的未来大体沿着过去的轨迹发展，这个价格也应当说得通。对于第一类企业，如果我们对所买的东西有相当把握，我们很可能愿意支付相当可观的价格。但在任何收购中，我们通常不会为自己"应当带来的贡献"付出太多——因为我们发现，我们通常带来的并不多。

During 1981 we came quite close to a major purchase involving both a business and a manager we liked very much. However, the price finally demanded, considering alternative uses for the funds involved, would have left our owners worse off than before the purchase. The empire would have been larger, but the citizenry would have been poorer.

1981年，我们曾非常接近一笔重大收购，涉及一家我们非常喜欢的企业和一位我们非常欣赏的管理者。然而，考虑到相关资金的其他用途，对方最终要求的价格将使我们的股东在收购后比收购前更糟。帝国版图会更大，但子民会更穷。

Although we had no success in 1981, from time to time in the future we will be able to purchase 100% of businesses meeting our standards. Additionally, we expect an occasional offering of a major "non-voting partnership" as discussed under the Pinkerton's heading on page 47 of this report. We welcome suggestions regarding such companies where we, as a substantial junior partner, can achieve good economic results while furthering the long-term objectives of present owners and managers.

尽管1981年我们一无所获，但未来我们时不时仍将有机会收购符合我们标准的企业的100%股权。此外，我们预计偶尔会出现一种重要的"无表决权合伙"安排，如本报告第47页Pinkerton's条目下所讨论的那样。我们欢迎有关此类公司的建议——在这些公司中，我们作为举足轻重的次级合伙人，既能取得良好的经济回报，又能推进现有股东和管理层的长期目标。

Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.

目前，我们发现最容易获得价值的方式，是在公开市场上买入那些拥有出色商业特许经营权、管理层既能干又诚实的公司的部分股权。我们从不指望经营这些公司，但我们确实期望从中获利。

We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don't, we have made mistakes as to either: (1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.

我们预期此类公司的未分配收益将为Berkshire及其股东创造充分的价值（实现时须缴税）。若未能如此，则我们在以下某方面犯了错误：（1）我们选择加入的管理层；（2）企业未来的经济状况；或（3）我们所支付的价格。

We have made plenty of such mistakes—both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most common. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes—sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion—now aggregating approximately 180 degrees—have since been required.

我们犯过大量此类错误——无论是在收购非控股权益还是控股权益方面。第（2）类误判最为常见。当然，要从我们的历史中找到此类错误的例证，需要深挖——有时要追溯到两三个月前那么久远。举个例子，去年你们的董事长主动就铝业光明前景发表了他的专家意见。此后，该意见经历了若干细微调整——累计幅度大约达到了180度。

For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries. Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.

然而，出于个人原因以及更客观的原因，我们在非控股企业（有价证券）方面纠正此类错误的速度，通常远快于控股子公司。缺乏控制权，实际上往往反而成了一种经济上的优势。

As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our non-recorded "ownership" earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue. In just four ownership positions in this category—GEICO Corporation, General Foods Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. and The Washington Post Company—our share of undistributed and therefore unrecorded earnings probably will total well over $35 million in 1982. The accounting rules that entirely ignore these undistributed earnings diminish the utility of our annual return on equity calculation, or any other single year measure of economic performance.

正如我们去年所提到的，我们未入账的"权益"收益规模已增长到超过我们已报告经营收益总额的程度。我们预计这一情况将持续下去。仅在该类别的四个持股头寸中——GEICO Corporation、General Foods Corporation、R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.以及The Washington Post Company——我们所占的未分配、因而未入账的收益份额，1982年很可能将远超3,500万美元。完全忽视这些未分配收益的会计准则，削弱了我们年度净资产收益率计算的实用性，以及任何其他单一年度经济表现衡量指标的意义。

Long-Term Corporate Performance

公司的长期业绩表现

In measuring long-term economic performance, equities held by our insurance subsidiaries are valued at market subject to a charge reflecting the amount of taxes that would have to be paid if unrealized gains were actually realized. If we are correct in the premise stressed in the preceding section of this report, our unreported ownership earnings will find their way, irregularly but inevitably, into our net worth. To date, this has been the case.

在衡量长期经济表现时，我们保险子公司持有的股票按市值计价，并扣除一项反映未实现收益若实际兑现所须缴纳税款的费用。如果我们在本报告前一部分所强调的前提是正确的，那么我们未入账的权益收益将以不规律但不可避免的方式，最终体现在我们的净资产中。迄今为止，情况正是如此。

An even purer calculation of performance would involve a valuation of bonds and non-insurance held equities at market. However, GAAP accounting does not prescribe this procedure, and the added purity would change results only very slightly. Should any valuation difference widen to significant proportions, as it has at most major insurance companies, we will report its effect to you.

更纯粹的业绩计算方式，将涉及按市值对债券及非保险业务持有的股票进行估值。然而，GAAP会计准则并不要求这一做法，而增加的这份纯粹性对结果的改变也极为有限。若任何估值差异扩大到显著程度——正如大多数主要保险公司所出现的情况——我们将向您报告其影响。

On a GAAP basis, during the present management's term of seventeen years, book value has increased from $19.46 per share to $526.02 per share, or 21.1% compounded annually. This rate of return number is highly likely to drift downward in future years. We hope, however, that it can be maintained significantly above the rate of return achieved by the average large American corporation.

按GAAP口径，在现任管理层任职的十七年间，每股账面价值从19.46美元增长至526.02美元，年复合增长率为21.1%。这一回报率数字在未来几年极有可能逐渐下滑。然而我们希望，它能够维持在远高于美国大型企业平均回报率的水平。

Over half of the large gain in Berkshire's net worth during 1981—it totaled $124 million, or about 31%—resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year considerably outstripped the gain in underlying business values. Such market variations will not always be on the pleasant side.

1981年Berkshire净资产的大幅增长——总计1.24亿美元，约31%——超过一半来自单一投资GEICO Corporation的市场表现。总体而言，我们当年来自证券的市场收益远超标的业务内在价值的增长。这种市场波动并不总是令人愉快的那一面。

In past reports we have explained how inflation has caused our apparently satisfactory long-term corporate performance to be illusory as a measure of true investment results for our owners. We applaud the efforts of Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker and note the currently more moderate increases in various price indices. Nevertheless, our views regarding long-term inflationary trends are as negative as ever. Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration.

在过去的报告中，我们已经解释过，通货膨胀如何使我们表面上令人满意的长期公司业绩，作为衡量股东真实投资回报的尺度而言，不过是一种幻象。我们对美联储主席Volcker的努力表示赞赏，也注意到各项价格指数目前的涨幅趋于温和。然而，我们对长期通胀趋势的看法依然悲观如故。稳定的价格水平，就像贞洁一样——似乎可以维持，却无法恢复。

Despite the overriding importance of inflation in the investment equation, we will not punish you further with another full recital of our views; inflation itself will be punishment enough. (Copies of previous discussions are available for masochists.) But, because of the unrelenting destruction of currency values, our corporate efforts will continue to do a much better job of filling your wallet than of filling your stomach.

尽管通货膨胀在投资方程式中具有压倒一切的重要性，我们不打算再次用我们观点的完整陈述来惩罚你们；通胀本身就已经是足够的惩罚了。（此前讨论的副本可供受虐狂取阅。）但是，由于货币价值的无情侵蚀，我们公司的努力将继续在充实你们钱包方面做得远比充实你们胃口好得多。

Equity Value-Added

股权投资的附加价值

An additional factor should further subdue any residual enthusiasm you may retain regarding our long-term rate of return. The economic case justifying equity investment is that, in aggregate, additional earnings above passive investment returns—interest on fixed-income securities—will be derived through the employment of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in conjunction with that equity capital. Furthermore, the case says that since the equity capital position is associated with greater risk than passive forms of investment, it is "entitled" to higher returns. A "value-added" bonus from equity capital seems natural and certain.

还有一个因素，应当能进一步压制你们对我们长期回报率残存的任何热情。为股权投资提供经济依据的论点是：通过将管理与企业家才能与股权资本结合运用，总体而言将获得超越被动投资回报——固定收益证券利息——的额外收益。此外，该论点还认为，由于股权资本头寸承担着比被动投资形式更大的风险，它"理应"获得更高的回报。股权资本带来"增值"红利，似乎既自然又确定。

But is it? Several decades back, a return on equity of as little as 10% enabled a corporation to be classified as a "good" business—i.e., one in which a dollar reinvested in the business logically could be expected to be valued by the market at more than one hundred cents. For, with long-term taxable bonds yielding 5% and long-term tax-exempt bonds 3%, a business operation that could utilize equity capital at 10% clearly was worth some premium to investors over the equity capital employed. That was true even though a combination of taxes on dividends and on capital gains would reduce the 10% earned by the corporation to perhaps 6%-8% in the hands of the individual investor.

但真的如此吗？几十年前，仅仅10%的净资产收益率就足以使一家公司被归类为"好"企业——即在该企业中，每再投入一美元，理所当然地可以预期市场对其估值超过一百美分。因为，当长期应税债券收益率为5%、长期免税债券为3%时，一家能以10%回报运用股权资本的企业，在投资者眼中显然值得相对于所用股权资本支付一定溢价。即便股息税与资本利得税合并计算，会将企业赚取的10%压缩到个人投资者手中的6%至8%，上述判断依然成立。

Investment markets recognized this truth. During that earlier period, American business earned an average of 11% or so on equity capital employed and stocks, in aggregate, sold at valuations far above that equity capital (book value), averaging over 150 cents on the dollar. Most businesses were "good" businesses because they earned far more than their keep (the return on long-term passive money). The value-added produced by equity investment, in aggregate, was substantial.

投资市场认可了这一事实。在那个早先的时期，美国企业运用股权资本平均获得约11%的回报，股票总体上以远高于该股权资本（账面价值）的估值出售，平均超过每美元150美分。大多数企业都是"好"企业，因为它们的盈利远超维持自身运转的成本（长期被动资金的回报）。股权投资所产生的增值，总体而言相当可观。

That day is gone. But the lessons learned during its existence are difficult to discard. While investors and managers must place their feet in the future, their memories and nervous systems often remain plugged into the past. It is much easier for investors to utilize historic p/e ratios or for managers to utilize historic business valuation yardsticks than it is for either group to rethink their premises daily. When change is slow, constant rethinking is actually undesirable; it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday's assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has become breathtaking.

那个时代已经过去。但在那个时代习得的教训，却难以割舍。投资者和管理者虽然必须将双脚踏入未来，他们的记忆与神经系统却往往仍插在过去。投资者沿用历史市盈率、管理者沿用历史商业估值标准，都远比每天重新审视自己的前提假设来得容易。当变化缓慢时，不断重新思考实际上并不可取——收效甚微，还会拖慢反应速度。但当变化剧烈时，坚守昨日的假设只会付出沉重代价。而经济变化的速度，已经令人窒息。

During the past year, long-term taxable bond yields exceeded 16% and long-term tax-exempts 14%. The total return achieved from such tax-exempts, of course, goes directly into the pocket of the individual owner. Meanwhile, American business is producing earnings of only about 14% on equity. And this 14% will be substantially reduced by taxation before it can be banked by the individual owner. The extent of such shrinkage depends upon the dividend policy of the corporation and the tax rates applicable to the investor.

过去一年，长期应税债券收益率超过16%，长期免税债券达14%。此类免税债券所取得的总回报，当然直接落入个人所有者的口袋。与此同时，美国企业的股权回报率仅约14%。而这14%在个人所有者将其存入账户之前，还将被税收大幅侵蚀。侵蚀的程度，取决于企业的股息政策以及适用于投资者的税率。

Thus, with interest rates on passive investments at late 1981 levels, a typical American business is no longer worth one hundred cents on the dollar to owners who are individuals. (If the business is owned by pension funds or other tax-exempt investors, the arithmetic, although still unenticing, changes substantially for the better.) Assume an investor in a 50% tax bracket; if our typical company pays out all earnings, the income return to the investor will be equivalent to that from a 7% tax-exempt bond. And, if conditions persist—if all earnings are paid out and return on equity stays at 14%—the 7% tax-exempt equivalent to the higher-bracket individual investor is just as frozen as is the coupon on a tax-exempt bond. Such a perpetual 7% tax-exempt bond might be worth fifty cents on the dollar as this is written.

因此，以1981年末的被动投资利率水平，一家典型的美国企业对个人股东而言，已不再值每美元一百美分。（若该企业由养老基金或其他免税投资者持有，算术虽仍不诱人，但会大幅改善。）假设一位处于50%税率档的投资者；若我们这家典型公司将全部收益分配出去，投资者的收益回报将相当于一只7%免税债券的回报。而且，若这种状况持续下去——全部收益悉数分配、净资产收益率维持在14%——对高税率档的个人投资者而言，这个7%的免税等价回报，就像免税债券的票息一样被冻住了。这样一只永续7%免税债券，在撰写本文时，市值可能仅值五十美分。

If, on the other hand, all earnings of our typical American business are retained and return on equity again remains constant, earnings will grow at 14% per year. If the p/e ratio remains constant, the price of our typical stock will also grow at 14% per year. But that 14% is not yet in the pocket of the shareholder. Putting it there will require the payment of a capital gains tax, presently assessed at a maximum rate of 20%. This net return, of course, works out to a poorer rate of return than the currently available passive after-tax rate.

另一方面，若我们这家典型美国企业将全部收益留存，且净资产收益率同样保持不变，则收益将以每年14%的速度增长。若市盈率保持不变，这只典型股票的价格也将以每年14%的速度增长。但这14%尚未落入股东口袋。要将其落袋，需要缴纳资本利得税，目前最高税率为20%。这一净回报，当然低于目前可获得的被动投资税后回报率。

Unless passive rates fall, companies achieving 14% per year gains in earnings per share while paying no cash dividend are an economic failure for their individual shareholders. The returns from passive capital outstrip the returns from active capital. This is an unpleasant fact for both investors and corporate managers and, therefore, one they may wish to ignore. But facts do not cease to exist, either because they are unpleasant or because they are ignored.

除非被动投资利率下降，否则那些每股收益年增14%却不派发现金股息的企业，对其个人股东而言是经济上的失败。被动资本的回报超越了主动资本的回报。这对投资者和企业管理者而言都是一个令人不快的事实，因此他们或许希望对此视而不见。但事实不会因为令人不快而消失，也不会因为被忽视而消失。

Most American businesses pay out a significant portion of their earnings and thus fall between the two examples. And most American businesses are currently "bad" businesses economically—producing less for their individual investors after-tax than the tax-exempt passive rate of return on money. Of course, some high-return businesses still remain attractive, even under present conditions. But American equity capital, in aggregate, produces no value-added for individual investors.

大多数美国企业会将相当一部分收益分配出去，因而介于上述两个极端之间。而从经济角度而言，大多数美国企业目前都是"差"企业——为其个人投资者税后创造的回报，低于资金的免税被动回报率。当然，即便在目前条件下，某些高回报企业仍具吸引力。但美国股权资本总体而言，对个人投资者并不产生增值。

It should be stressed that this depressing situation does not occur because corporations are jumping, economically, less high than previously. In fact, they are jumping somewhat higher: return on equity has improved a few points in the past decade. But the crossbar of passive return has been elevated much faster. Unhappily, most companies can do little but hope that the bar will be lowered significantly; there are few industries in which the prospects seem bright for substantial gains in return on equity.

必须强调的是，这种令人沮丧的局面，并非因为企业在经济上跳得比以前低。事实上，它们跳得还略高了一些：净资产收益率在过去十年间提升了几个百分点。但被动回报的横杆抬升得快得多。令人遗憾的是，大多数企业除了寄望于横杆大幅下降之外，几乎无能为力；净资产收益率能大幅提升的行业，已属凤毛麟角。

Inflationary experience and expectations will be major (but not the only) factors affecting the height of the crossbar in future years. If the causes of long-term inflation can be tempered, passive returns are likely to fall and the intrinsic position of American equity capital should significantly improve. Many businesses that now must be classified as economically "bad" would be restored to the "good" category under such circumstances.

通胀的经历与预期，将是影响未来几年横杆高度的主要因素——但非唯一因素。若长期通胀的成因能够得到遏制，被动投资回报很可能随之下降，美国股权资本的内在地位也将显著改善。许多目前不得不被归类为经济上"差"的企业，在这种情况下将重新回到"好"的行列。

A further, particularly ironic, punishment is inflicted by an inflationary environment upon the owners of the "bad" business. To continue operating in its present mode, such a low-return business usually must retain much of its earnings—no matter what penalty such a policy produces for shareholders.

通胀环境还对"差"企业的所有者施加了另一重、尤为讽刺的惩罚。为了维持目前的经营模式，此类低回报企业通常必须留存大部分收益——无论这一政策对股东造成怎样的代价。

Reason, of course, would prescribe just the opposite policy. An individual, stuck with a 5% bond with many years to run before maturity, does not take the coupons from that bond and pay one hundred cents on the dollar for more 5% bonds while similar bonds are available at, say, forty cents on the dollar. Instead, he takes those coupons from his low-return bond and—if inclined to reinvest—looks for the highest return with safety currently available. Good money is not thrown after bad.

理性当然会给出截然相反的处方。一个持有5%债券、距到期日尚有多年的人，不会在同类债券以四十美分可购的情况下，用债券票息以一百美分的价格继续买入更多5%债券。他会拿着这只低回报债券的票息——若有意再投资——去寻找当前可得的最高安全回报。好钱不该追着坏钱扔。

What makes sense for the bondholder makes sense for the shareholder. Logically, a company with historic and prospective high returns on equity should retain much or all of its earnings so that shareholders can earn premium returns on enhanced capital. Conversely, low returns on corporate equity would suggest a very high dividend payout so that owners could direct capital toward more attractive areas. (The Scriptures concur. In the parable of the talents, the two high-earning servants are rewarded with 100% retention of earnings and encouraged to expand their operations. However, the non-earning third servant is not only chastised—"wicked and slothful"—but also is required to redirect all of his capital to the top performer. Matthew 25: 14-30)

对债券持有人合理的，对股东同样合理。从逻辑上讲，一家历史上和可预见未来净资产收益率都高的企业，应当留存大部分乃至全部收益，使股东能在增厚的资本上获得超额回报。反之，低回报的企业股权则意味着应采取极高的股息分配政策，以便所有者能将资本导向更具吸引力的领域。（《圣经》在此表示赞同。在按才受职的比喻中，两位高收益的仆人获得了100%的收益留存作为奖励，并被鼓励扩大经营。然而，那位没有收益的第三个仆人不仅遭到斥责——"又恶又懒"——还被要求将他全部的资本转交给表现最优者。马太福音25：14-30）

But inflation takes us through the looking glass into the upside-down world of Alice in Wonderland. When prices continuously rise, the "bad" business must retain every nickel that it can. Not because it is attractive as a repository for equity capital, but precisely because it is so unattractive, the low-return business must follow a high retention policy. If it wishes to continue operating in the future as it has in the past—and most entities, including businesses, do—it simply has no choice.

但通货膨胀将我们带过了镜子，进入了《爱丽丝梦游仙境》那个颠倒的世界。当物价持续上涨，"差"企业必须留存它能留存的每一分钱。不是因为它作为股权资本的容身之所有何吸引力，恰恰是因为它如此缺乏吸引力，低回报企业才不得不奉行高留存政策。若它希望未来像过去一样继续经营下去——大多数实体，包括企业，都有这种意愿——它根本别无选择。

For inflation acts as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. That tapeworm preemptively consumes its requisite daily diet of investment dollars regardless of the health of the host organism. Whatever the level of reported profits (even if nil), more dollars for receivables, inventory and fixed assets are continuously required by the business in order to merely match the unit volume of the previous year. The less prosperous the enterprise, the greater the proportion of available sustenance claimed by the tapeworm.

通货膨胀的作用，犹如一条巨大的企业绦虫。这条绦虫不管宿主机体的健康状况如何，都会先发制人地消耗其每日所需的投资养分。无论报告利润水平如何（哪怕为零），企业都持续需要更多的资金用于应收账款、存货和固定资产，仅仅是为了维持与上一年相同的实物销量。企业越不景气，绦虫所占据的可用养分比例就越大。

几十年后，绦虫的比喻被用在另一个地方：美国的医药行业。

Under present conditions, a business earning 8% or 10% on equity often has no leftovers for expansion, debt reduction or "real" dividends. The tapeworm of inflation simply cleans the plate. (The low-return company's inability to pay dividends, understandably, is often disguised. Corporate America increasingly is turning to dividend reinvestment plans, sometimes even embodying a discount arrangement that all but forces shareholders to reinvest. Other companies sell newly issued shares to Peter in order to pay dividends to Paul. Beware of "dividends" that can be paid out only if someone promises to replace the capital distributed.)

在目前条件下，一家净资产收益率为8%或10%的企业，往往在扩张、偿债或派发"真实"股息方面已无剩余。通胀这条绦虫将盘子舔得干干净净。（低回报企业无力派息的窘境，可以理解地往往被掩饰起来。美国企业界越来越多地转向股息再投资计划，有时甚至设置折扣安排，几乎是强迫股东将股息再投入。另一些公司则向张三发行新股，以便向李四支付股息。当心那些只有在有人承诺补充所分配资本的前提下才能派发的"股息"。）

Berkshire continues to retain its earnings for offensive, not defensive or obligatory, reasons. But in no way are we immune from the pressures that escalating passive returns exert on equity capital. We continue to clear the crossbar of after-tax passive return—but barely. Our historic 21% return—not at all assured for the future—still provides, after the current capital gain tax rate (which we expect to rise considerably in future years), a modest margin over current after-tax rates on passive money. It would be a bit humiliating to have our corporate value-added turn negative. But it can happen here as it has elsewhere, either from events outside anyone's control or from poor relative adaptation on our part.

Berkshire继续留存收益，出于进攻性而非防御性或被迫的理由。但我们绝非对不断攀升的被动投资回报对股权资本所施加的压力免疫。我们继续越过税后被动回报的横杆——但仅此而已，勉强而过。我们历史上21%的回报率——对未来绝无保证——在扣除当前资本利得税率（我们预期未来几年将大幅上升）之后，仍较目前被动资金的税后利率保有一点微薄的余量。若我们的公司增值变为负数，未免有些丢人。但这在我们身上也可能发生，正如它在其他地方已经发生过的那样——无论是源于任何人都无法掌控的外部事件，还是源于我们自身相对适应不良。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的主要来源

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table and are not included in operating earnings.

下表列示了Berkshire已报告收益的来源。Berkshire持有Blue Chip Stamps约60%的股权，后者又持有Wesco Financial Corporation 80%的股权。该表列示了各业务实体的汇总经营收益，以及Berkshire在这些收益中所占的份额。各业务实体因非常规资产出售而产生的所有重大损益，均汇总列入表格底部附近的证券交易一行，不计入经营收益。

Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 38-50 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1981 operations. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Jeanne Leach for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

Blue Chip Stamps与Wesco均为上市公司，各自负有信息披露义务。本报告第38至50页转载了两家公司主要管理人员的叙述性报告，其中描述了1981年的运营情况。任何Berkshire股东如需任一公司的完整年报副本，可分别致函Blue Chip Stamps的Robert H. Bird先生（地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040）或Wesco Financial Corporation的Jeanne Leach女士（地址：315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109），副本将以邮寄方式送达。

As we indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion of earnings, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income segment of Insurance Group earnings.

正如我们此前所指出的，我们不具控制权的公司的未分配收益，如今与前表中详述的已报告经营收益同等重要。已分配的收益部分，当然主要通过保险集团收益中的净投资收益科目体现于表中。

We show below Berkshire's proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our earnings.

下表列示Berkshire在各非控股企业中的按比例持股情况，就这些企业而言，仅已分配收益（股息）计入我们的收益。

Our controlled and non-controlled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum of activities that detailed commentary here would prove too lengthy. Much additional financial information is included in Management's Discussion on pages 34-37 and in the narrative reports on pages 38-50. However, our largest area of both controlled and non-controlled activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the property-casualty insurance area, and commentary on important developments in that industry is appropriate.

我们的控股与非控股业务横跨如此广泛的领域，在此逐一详述未免过于冗长。更多财务信息已载于第34至37页的管理层讨论，以及第38至50页的叙述性报告中。然而，我们在控股与非控股业务中规模最大的领域，过去是、而且几乎可以肯定将来仍会是财产意外险领域，对该行业重要动态的评述自然在所应当。

1975年，SEC对Blue Chip Stamps展开调查，调查其在收购Wesco Financial（一家储蓄贷款机构）过程中是否存在欺诈行为。Buffett被传唤作证，一度面临被列入SEC违规认定书的风险。最终SEC对Blue Chip处以11.5万美元罚款，但并未将Buffett列入违规认定。

这段历史后来直接推动了Berkshire的结构整合：这场历时多年的调查，迫使Buffett处理他同时控制并交叉投资多家公司所产生的利益冲突问题，最终将Diversified Retailing和Blue Chip Stamps并入Berkshire Hathaway。

Insurance Industry Conditions

保险业务

"Forecasts", said Sam Goldwyn, "are dangerous, particularly those about the future." (Berkshire shareholders may have reached a similar conclusion after rereading our past annual reports featuring your Chairman's prescient analysis of textile prospects.)

"预测，"Sam Goldwyn说，"是危险的，尤其是那些关于未来的预测。"（Berkshire股东在重读我们过去几年年报中你们董事长对纺织业前景那些高瞻远瞩的分析之后，或许已经得出了类似的结论。）

There is no danger, however, in forecasting that 1982 will be the worst year in recent history for insurance underwriting. That result already has been guaranteed by present pricing behavior, coupled with the term nature of the insurance contract.

然而，预测1982年将是近年来保险承保最糟糕的一年，却并无危险。这一结果已经被当前的定价行为，加上保险合同的期限特性，共同保证了。

While many auto policies are priced and sold at six-month intervals—and many property policies are sold for a three-year term—a weighted average of the duration of all property-casualty insurance policies probably runs a little under twelve months. And prices for the insurance coverage, of course, are frozen for the life of the contract. Thus, this year's sales contracts ("premium written" in the parlance of the industry) determine about one-half of next year's level of revenue ("premiums earned"). The remaining half will be determined by sales contracts written next year that will be about 50% earned in that year. The profitability consequences are automatic: if you make a mistake in pricing, it you have to live with it for an uncomfortable period of time.

尽管许多汽车保险以六个月为间隔定价和出售——而许多财产险则以三年为期销售——所有财产意外险保单期限的加权平均值大概略低于十二个月。当然，保险保障的价格在合同有效期内是固定的。因此，今年的销售合同（业内术语称为"已签保费"）决定了明年收入水平（"已赚保费"）的约一半。另一半将由明年签订的销售合同决定，这些合同在当年约有50%被赚取。盈利后果是自动的：若在定价上犯了错误，你不得不在一段令人不安的时间里与之共存。

Note in the table below the year-over-year gain in industry-wide premiums written and the impact that it has on the current and following year's level of underwriting profitability. The result is exactly as you would expect in an inflationary world. When the volume gain is well up in double digits, it bodes well for profitability trends in the current and following year. When the industry volume gain is small, underwriting experience very shortly will get worse, no matter how unsatisfactory the current level.

请注意下表中全行业已签保费的逐年增幅，以及它对当年和次年承保盈利水平的影响。结果与你在通胀世界中所预期的完全一致。当保费增幅远超两位数时，预示着当年和次年盈利趋势向好。当行业保费增幅较小时，承保状况很快就会恶化，无论当前水平已经多么不尽如人意。

The Best's data in the table reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio indicates total operating and loss costs as compared to premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

表中的Best's数据反映了几乎整个行业的经验，包括股份制、互助制和互惠制公司。综合比率表示总运营成本与赔付成本相对于保费的比例；比率低于100表示承保盈利，高于100则表示亏损。

As Pogo would say, "The future isn't what it used to be." Current pricing practices promise devastating results, particularly if the respite from major natural disasters that the industry has enjoyed in recent years should end. For underwriting experience has been getting worse in spite of good luck, not because of bad luck. In recent years hurricanes have stayed at sea and motorists have reduced their driving. They won't always be so obliging.

正如Pogo所言，"未来已不复从前。"当前的定价惯例预示着灾难性的结果，尤其是若该行业近年来所享有的远离重大自然灾害的喘息期宣告终结。因为承保状况一直在恶化，不是因为运气不好，而是在运气尚好的情况下就已如此。近年来飓风滞留海上，驾车者也减少了出行。但它们不会永远如此配合。

And, of course the twin inflations, monetary and "social" (the tendency of courts and juries to stretch the coverage of policies beyond what insurers, relying upon contract terminology and precedent, had expected), are unstoppable. Costs of repairing both property and people—and the extent to which these repairs are deemed to be the responsibility of the insurer—will advance relentlessly.

当然，货币通胀与"社会"通胀这对孪生——后者指法院和陪审团将保单承保范围延伸至保险公司依据合同措辞和先例所预期之外的倾向——是不可阻挡的。修复财产和人身的成本——以及这些修复被认定为保险公司责任的范围——将无情地持续攀升。

Absent any bad luck (catastrophes, increased driving, etc.), an immediate industry volume gain of at least 10% per year probably is necessary to stabilize the record level of underwriting losses that will automatically prevail in mid-1982. (Most underwriters expect incurred losses in aggregate to rise at least 10% annually; each, of course, counts on getting less than his share.) Every percentage point of annual premium growth below the 10% equilibrium figure quickens the pace of deterioration. Quarterly data in 1981 underscore the conclusion that a terrible underwriting picture is worsening at an accelerating rate.

在没有任何坏运气（巨灾、驾车增加等）的情况下，每年至少10%的行业保费增幅，大概是稳定将于1982年中自动形成的创纪录承保亏损水平所必需的。（大多数承保人预期总赔付损失每年至少上升10%；当然，每家都指望自己承担的比例低于平均。）每年保费增幅每低于10%这个平衡点一个百分点，恶化的速度就会加快一分。1981年的季度数据强化了这一结论：糟糕的承保状况正在以加速的节奏恶化。

In the 1980 annual report we discussed the investment policies that have destroyed the integrity of many insurers' balance sheets, forcing them to abandon underwriting discipline and write business at any price in order to avoid negative cash flow. It was clear that insurers with large holdings of bonds valued, for accounting purposes, at nonsensically high prices would have little choice but to keep the money revolving by selling large numbers of policies at nonsensically low prices. Such insurers necessarily fear a major decrease in volume more than they fear a major underwriting loss.

在1980年的年度报告中，我们讨论了那些已经损害许多保险公司资产负债表完整性的投资政策，迫使它们放弃承保纪律，不惜以任何价格承揽业务以避免现金流为负。很明显，那些持有大量债券、这些债券在会计上被评以荒谬高价的保险公司，将别无选择，只能通过以荒谬低价出售大量保单来保持资金周转。此类保险公司必然更惧怕保费大幅萎缩，甚于惧怕重大承保亏损。

But, unfortunately, all insurers are affected; it's difficult to price much differently than your most threatened competitor. This pressure continues unabated and adds a new motivation to the others that drive many insurance managers to push for business; worship of size over profitability, and the fear that market share surrendered never can be regained.

但不幸的是，所有保险公司都受到波及；要在定价上与处境最危险的竞争对手拉开太大差距，实属不易。这种压力持续不减，并为驱使许多保险管理者拼命揽业务的其他动机再添一条：以规模而非盈利为崇拜对象，以及一旦放弃市场份额便永难收复的恐惧。

Whatever the reasons, we believe it is true that virtually no major property-casualty insurer—despite protests by the entire industry that rates are inadequate and great selectivity should be exercised—has been willing to turn down business to the point where cash flow has turned significantly negative. Absent such a willingness, prices will remain under severe pressure.

无论出于何种原因，我们相信，事实上几乎没有任何主要财产意外险公司——尽管整个行业都在大声疾呼费率不足、应当高度审慎选择业务——真正愿意拒绝承保，直至现金流明显转负。若无此种意愿，价格将持续承受严重压力。

Commentators continue to talk of the underwriting cycle, usually implying a regularity of rhythm and a relatively constant midpoint of profitability. Our own view is different. We believe that very large, although obviously varying, underwriting losses will be the norm for the industry, and that the best underwriting years in the future decade may appear substandard against the average year of the past decade.

评论人士继续谈论承保周期，通常言下之意是有规律的节奏和相对稳定的盈利中点。我们自己的看法不同。我们认为，巨额——尽管幅度明显参差——的承保亏损将成为行业常态，未来十年最好的承保年份，与过去十年的平均年份相比，也可能显得不达标准。

We have no magic formula to insulate our controlled insurance companies against this deteriorating future. Our managers, particularly Phil Liesche, Bill Lyons, Roland Miller, Floyd Taylor and Milt Thornton, have done a magnificent job of swimming against the tide. We have sacrificed much volume, but have maintained a substantial underwriting superiority in relation to industry-wide results. The outlook at Berkshire is for continued low volume. Our financial position offers us maximum flexibility, a very rare condition in the property-casualty insurance industry. And, at some point, should fear ever prevail throughout the industry, our financial strength could become an operational asset of immense value.

我们没有什么魔法公式，能让我们的控股保险公司免受这种日益恶化的未来影响。我们的管理者，尤其是Phil Liesche、Bill Lyons、Roland Miller、Floyd Taylor和Milt Thornton，在逆流而上方面做出了出色的成绩。我们牺牲了大量保费规模，但相对于全行业的承保结果，我们保持了显著的承保优势。Berkshire的展望是继续维持低保费规模。我们的财务状况赋予我们最大的灵活性——这在财产意外险行业是极为罕见的条件。而在某个时刻，若恐惧情绪蔓延整个行业，我们的财务实力可能成为一项具有巨大价值的经营资产。

We believe that GEICO Corporation, our major non-controlled business operating in this field, is, by virtue of its extreme and improving operating efficiency, in a considerably more protected position than almost any other major insurer. GEICO is a brilliantly run implementation of a very important business idea.

我们认为，GEICO Corporation——我们在这一领域的主要非控股业务——凭借其极致且持续提升的运营效率，处于比几乎任何其他主要保险公司都更受保护的地位。GEICO是一个极为重要的商业理念的出色实践。

Shareholder Designated Contributions

股东指定捐赠

Our new program enabling shareholders to designate the recipients of corporate charitable contributions was greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. A copy of the letter sent October 14, 1981 describing this program appears on pages 51-53. Of 932,206 shares eligible for participation (shares where the name of the actual owner appeared on our stockholder record), 95.6% responded. Even excluding Buffet-related shares, the response topped 90%.

我们新推出的允许股东自主指定公司慈善捐款受益方的计划，获得了热烈响应。1981年10月14日就该计划发出的说明信副本载于第51至53页。在符合参与条件的932,206股（即实际所有者姓名出现在我们股东名册上的股份）中，95.6%作出了回应。即便剔除与Buffett相关的股份，回应率也超过了90%。

In addition, more than 3% of our shareholders voluntarily wrote letters or便条，all but one approving of the program. Both the level of participation and of commentary surpass any shareholder response we have witnessed, even when such response has been intensively solicited by corporate staff and highly paid professional proxy organizations. In contrast, your extraordinary level of response occurred without even the nudge of a company-provided return envelope. This self-propelled behavior speaks well for the program, and speaks well for our shareholders.

此外，超过3%的股东自发写来信件或便条，除一位外均对该计划表示赞同。无论是参与程度还是评论数量，都超过了我们所见过的任何股东回应——即便那些回应是由公司员工和高薪专业代理机构大力征集的。相比之下，你们如此非凡的回应率，连公司预付邮资的回邮信封都没有提供。这种自发的行为，既是对该计划的褒奖，也是对我们股东的褒奖。

Apparently the owners of our corporation like both possessing and exercising the ability to determine where gifts of their funds shall be made. The "father-knows-best" school of corporate governance will be surprised to find that none of our shareholders sent in a designation sheet with instructions that the officers of Berkshire—in their superior wisdom, of course—make the decision on charitable funds applicable to his shares. Nor did anyone suggest that his share of our charitable funds be used to match contributions made by our corporate directors to charities of the directors' choice (a popular, proliferating and non-publicized policy at many large corporations).

显然，我们公司的股东既喜欢拥有、也喜欢行使决定其资金捐往何处的权利。"父亲最懂"派的公司治理信徒，想必会惊讶地发现，没有一位股东在指定表上填写说，请Berkshire的管理层——当然是凭借他们高超的智慧——就其所持股份对应的慈善资金自行做主。也没有人建议将其名下的慈善资金，用于配捐公司董事们向其自选慈善机构的捐款（这是许多大公司一项流行、蔓延且不对外公开的惯例）。

All told, $1,783,655 of shareholder-designed contributions were distributed to about 675 charities. In addition, Berkshire and subsidiaries continue to make certain contributions pursuant to local level decisions made by our operating managers.

合计而言，共有1,783,655美元的股东指定捐款分配给了约675家慈善机构。此外，Berkshire及其子公司继续按照各运营管理层在当地层面的决定，进行若干捐赠。

There will be some years, perhaps two or three out of ten, when contributions by Berkshire will produce substandard tax deductions—or none at all. In those years we will not effect our shareholder designated charitable program. In all other years we expect to inform you about October 10th of the amount per share that you may designate. A reply form will accompany the notice, and you will be given about three weeks to respond with your designation. To qualify, your shares must be registered in your own name or the name of an owning trust, corporation, partnership or estate, if applicable, on our stockholder list of September 30th, or the Friday preceding if such date falls on a Saturday or Sunday.

在十年中，或许有两三年，Berkshire的捐款将产生低于标准的税收抵扣——或完全没有抵扣。在这些年份，我们将不实施股东指定慈善计划。在其他所有年份，我们预计在10月10日前后通知您每股可指定的金额。通知将附上回复表格，您将有约三周时间回复您的指定。为符合资格，您的股份必须以您本人名义，或相关信托、公司、合伙企业或遗产的名义，在9月30日（若该日期为周六或周日，则为前一个周五）的股东名册上登记。

Our only disappointment with this program in 1981 was that some of our shareholders, through no fault of their own, missed the opportunity to participate. The Treasury Department ruling allowing us to proceed without tax uncertainty was received early in October. The ruling did not cover participation by shareholders whose stock was registered in the name of nominees, such as brokers, and additionally required that the owners of all designating shares make certain assurances to Berkshire. These assurances could not be given us in effective form by nominee holders.

我们对1981年该计划唯一感到遗憾的是，部分股东完全非因自身过失而错失了参与机会。财政部允许我们在无税务不确定性情况下推进的裁定，于十月初才收到。该裁定不涵盖股票以代名人（如经纪商）名义登记的股东的参与，并额外要求所有指定股份的实际所有者向Berkshire作出若干保证。代名人持有者无法以有效形式向我们提供这些保证。

Under these circumstances, we attempted to communicate with all of our owners promptly (via the October 14th letter) so that, if they wished, they could prepare themselves to participate by the November 13th record date. It was particularly important that this information be communicated promptly to stockholders whose holdings were in nominee name, since they would not be eligible unless they took action to re-register their shares before the record date.

在此情况下，我们尝试通过10月14日的信件迅速与所有股东沟通，以便他们若有意愿，可在11月13日的登记截止日前做好参与准备。将这一信息及时传达给以代名人名义持股的股东尤为重要，因为除非他们在截止日前采取行动重新登记其股份，否则将没有资格参与。

Unfortunately, communication to such non-record shareholders could take place only through the nominees. We therefore strongly urged those nominees, mostly brokerage houses, to promptly transmit our letter to the real owners. We explained that their failure to do so could deprive such owners of an important benefit.

不幸的是，与此类非登记股东的沟通只能通过代名人进行。因此，我们强烈敦促这些代名人——主要是经纪商——及时将我们的信件转交给实际所有者。我们解释说，若未能做到这一点，可能会剥夺这些所有者的一项重要权益。

The results from our urgings would not strengthen the case for private ownership of the U.S. Postal Service. Many of our shareholders never heard from their brokers (as some shareholders told us after reading news accounts of the program). Others were forwarded our letter too late for action.

我们敦促的结果，不足以为美国邮政服务的私有化增添任何说服力。许多股东从未收到经纪商的任何消息（一些股东在读到有关该计划的新闻报道后告知了我们）。另一些人收到我们信件的转发时，已为时过晚，无从采取行动。

One of the largest brokerage houses claiming to hold stock for sixty of its clients (about 4% of our shareholder population), apparently transmitted our letter about three weeks after receipt—too late for any of the sixty to participate. (Such lassitude did not pervade all departments of that firm; it billed Berkshire for mailing services within six days of that belated and ineffectual action.)

其中一家最大的经纪商，声称为其六十位客户（约占我们股东总数的4%）持有股票，显然在收到我们的信件约三周后才予以转发——这六十位客户因此无一得以参与。（这种懈怠并未蔓延至该公司的所有部门；该公司在那次迟来且毫无成效的行动后六天之内，便向Berkshire开具了邮寄服务的账单。）

We recite such horror stories for two reasons: (1) if you wish to participate in future designated contribution programs, be sure to have your stock registered in your name well before September 30th; and (2) even if you don't care to participate and prefer to leave your stock in nominee form, it would be wise to have at least one share registered in your own name. By so doing, you can be sure that you will be notified of any important corporate news at the same time as all other shareholders.

我们叙述这些令人沮丧的故事，出于两个原因：（1）若您希望参与未来的指定捐款计划，请务必在9月30日前将股票登记在您本人名下；（2）即便您无意参与、并倾向于将股票留存于代名人名下，至少将一股登记在自己名下也是明智之举。如此一来，您便可以确保与所有其他股东同步收到任何重要的公司消息。

The designated-contributions idea, along with many other ideas that have turned out well for us, was conceived by Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and Chairman of Blue Chip. Irrespective of titles, Charlie and I work as partners in managing all controlled companies. To almost a sinful degree, we enjoy our work as managing partners. And we enjoy having you as our financial partners.

指定捐款的构想，连同许多其他最终对我们大有裨益的主意，均出自Charlie Munger之手——他是Berkshire的副董事长，也是Blue Chip的董事长。不论头衔如何，Charlie与我作为合伙人共同管理所有控股公司。我们享受作为管理合伙人的工作，享受程度几近失当。我们也享受有你们作为我们的财务合伙人。

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

February 26, 1982

1982-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1982-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings

General Acquisition Behavior

Berkshire Acquisition Objectives

Long-Term Corporate Performance

Equity Value-Added

Sources of Reported Earnings

Insurance Industry Conditions

Shareholder Designated Contributions

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