1982-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
原文信息：
- 标题：1981 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1982-02-26
- 链接：HTML
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Terrellchen
- 校译：Terrellchen，纪璐
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Operating earnings of $39.7 million in 1981 amounted to 15.2% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost) compared to 17.8% in 1980. Our new plan that allows stockholders to designate corporate charitable contributions (detailed later) reduced earnings by about $900,000 in 1981. This program, which we expect to continue subject to annual evaluation of our corporate tax position, had not been initiated in 1980.
1981 年的经营收益约为 3,970 万美元，期初股本回报率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)从去年的 17.8% 滑落至 15.2% 。我们的新计划是让所有股东皆能指定捐赠的慈善机构(详如后述)，这使得当年度收益减少 90 万美元，往后将视我们公司所得税负状况决定捐赠的金额，但该计划 1980 年还未启动。
Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings 无控制权持股之盈余
In the 1980 annual report we discussed extensively the concept of non-controlled ownership earnings, i.e., Berkshire’s share of the undistributed earnings of companies we don’t control or significantly influence but in which we, nevertheless, have important investments. (We will be glad to make available to new or prospective shareholders copies of that discussion or others from earlier reports to which we refer in this report.) No portion of those undistributed earnings is included in the operating earnings of Berkshire.
去年我们曾详细的讨论无控制权收益的概念，即伯克希尔在我们无法控制或没有重大影响，但有重大投资的公司的未分配收益中所占的份额。(我们很乐意与新股东或潜在股东讨论这项话题)，这部分未分配的收益完全没有显现在伯克希尔的经营收益上。
However, our belief is that, in aggregate, those undistributed and, therefore, unrecorded earnings will be translated into tangible value for Berkshire shareholders just as surely as if subsidiaries we control had earned, retained - and reported - similar earnings.
然而我们深信，那些未分配且未记录的收益仍将转化成伯克希尔股东能享有的有形价值，就像那些我们完全控制的子公司所赚的收益一样
We know that this translation of non-controlled ownership earnings into corresponding realized and unrealized capital gains for Berkshire will be extremely irregular as to time of occurrence. While market values track business values quite well over long periods, in any given year the relationship can gyrate capriciously. Market recognition of retained earnings also will be unevenly realized among companies. It will be disappointingly low or negative in cases where earnings are employed non-productively, and far greater than dollar-for-dollar of retained earnings in cases of companies that achieve high returns with their augmented capital. Overall, if a group of non-controlled companies is selected with reasonable skill, the group result should be quite satisfactory.
我们知道，这种将非控制股权收益转化为伯克希尔已实现和未实现资本收益的时间极不均衡。虽然长期来看市场价值都能很好地反映企业的商业价值，即一美元留存收益增加一美元市值，但在任何一年中，这种关系都可能反复无常，各公司之间留存收益的市场确认也将不均衡。如果留存收益没有投入再生产，回报将是令人失望的低水平或负水平，而在高回报的公司中，通过增加资本再投资实现的回报，将远远超过一美元留存收益增加一美元市值的比率。总的来说，如果以合理的分析投资了一个非控股公司的组合，那么组合的投资回报应该是相当令人满意的。
In aggregate, our non-controlled business interests have more favorable underlying economic characteristics than our controlled businesses. That’s understandable; the area of choice has been far wider. Small portions of exceptionally good businesses are usually available in the securities markets at reasonable prices. But such businesses are available for purchase in their entirety only rarely, and then almost always at high prices.
整体而言，我们的非控股公司比那些控股子公司具有更强大的经济护城河，由于可选范围更广泛，这是可以理解的。在股票市场上我们通常可以以合理的价格买到优秀企业的小部分股权，但是这样的企业很少能完全并购下来，而且几乎往往是以高价出售的。
General Acquisition Behavior 一般的收购行为
As our history indicates, we are comfortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small commitments - “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well”.) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in marketable securities.
我们的历史显示，我们对于拥有整家公司或仅持有部分股权，并无特殊偏好，我们在每个领域不断寻找大金额的投资机会。(我们尽量避免小额投资，因为若一件事根本不值得去做，那就算是把它干得再好也没有多少回报)，事实上，经营保险和优惠券业务对资金的流动性需求，要求我们只能对较大市值的股票进行投资。
Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)
我们的收购决策将以最大化实际经济利益为目标，而不是管理版图或会计数字的最大化。(长期而言，过度注重会计数字而忽略经济实质的管理层，最后通常两者都顾不好)。
Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.
我们宁愿以 X 价格买下一家好公司 10% 股权，也不愿以 2X 价格买下那家好公司 100% 股权，不管这会对帐面利润立即产生什么影响。但大部分公司的管理层恰恰相反，他们都不乏明确的理由。
However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be, singly or in combination, the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:
然而，我们怀疑有三个动机是大多数高溢价收购的重要因素，无论是单独的还是组合的(通常是不言而喻的)：
Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge. At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.
1. 领导阶层，无论是商界还是其他领域，极少有缺乏动物天性的，而且往往散发出好斗与挑战的意念。相对地在伯克希尔，即使是并购成功在望，你们的管理层心跳也不会加快一下。
Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)
2. 大部分的公司及其管理层，多以「规模」而非「获利」作为衡量自己或他人的薪酬标准，(问问那些名列 Fortune 500 大企业的管理层他们在榜单上的排名，回答的总是按销售额的排名，他们可能从来都不知道若以获利能力来排的话，公司会排在第几位)
Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).
3. 大部分的管理层很明显的过度沉浸于小时候所听到的童话故事，一个变成蟾蜍的王子因美丽的公主深深一吻而被拯救，因而确信，他们优异的管理之吻将为目标公司的盈利创造奇迹。
Such optimism is essential. Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?
如此的乐观是必要的，否则公司的股东怎么会甘心以双倍的价钱买下那家好公司，而非以一倍的价格自己从市场上买进。
In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.
换言之，投资人永远可以以蟾蜍的价格买到蟾蜍，而若投资人愿意用双倍的代价资助公主去亲吻蟾蜍的话，最好保佑奇迹会发生，我们看到过太多亲吻，但很少有奇迹。尽管如此，许多管理层的公主们依然坚信她们的亲吻有使蟾蜍变成王子的魔力，即使在她的后院早已养满了齐膝深且毫无反应的蟾蜍。
In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.
平心而论，有两种情况的并购是会成功的：
The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.
第一类是你买到的(不管是有意或无意的)是那种特别能够适应通货膨胀的公司，这种受青睐的业务必须具备两种特征： (1) 能够相当轻松地提高价格，即使在产品需求平稳产能过剩的情况下，且不怕会失去市场占有率或销售量。 (2) 只要增加额外少量的资本支出，便可以使营业额大幅增加，虽然增加的原因大部分是因为通货膨胀而非实际增加产出的缘故。 近几十年来，能力一般的管理者只关注满足这些测试条件的收购，就已经取得了优异的成绩。然而，同时具备这两个特点的企业很少，现在激烈的竞买已经到了自取灭亡[1]的地步。
The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)
第二类是那些经营奇才，他们能够认出那些裹着蟾蜍外衣的罕见王子，并且有能力让它们脱去伪装，我们向诸如西北工业的本·海涅曼 (Northwest Industries：Ben Heineman) 、特利丹的亨利·辛格尔顿 (Teledyne：Henry Singleton) 、国民服务工业的埃尔文·扎班 (National Service Industries：Erwin Zaban) 等管理者致敬，尤其是大都会通信公司的汤姆·墨菲 (Capital Cities Communications：Tom Murphy) ，汤姆·墨菲是那种能将并购目标锁定在第一类的公司，而本身具有的管理才能又使他成为第二类的佼佼者。直接或间接的经验使我们认识到，达到这些高管成就的困难性和稀有性，当然他们也确实如此，这些冠军近年来很少进行交易，并且发现利用公司闲置资金买回自家股份是最明智的方法。
Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And, despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate. Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.)
而很不幸的，你们的董事长并不符合第二类的资格，尽管已充分认识到须将重点放到第一类的公司，但真正命中的机率却是少之又少，我们的说教比实际做的要好得多，(我们忘了诺亚的叮咛：能预测什么时候下大雨没有用，必须要能建造方舟才算数)。
We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.
我们曾用划算的价钱买下不少蟾蜍，过去的报告多已提及，很明显的我们的吻表现平平，我们有遇到几个王子级的公司，但是早在我们买下时他们就已是王子了，而至少我们的吻没让他们变回蟾蜍，而最后我们偶尔也会成功地以蟾蜍般的价格买到一些容易辨认的王子级公司的部分股权。
Berkshire Acquisition Objectives 伯克希尔的收购目标
We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past. We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting. But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.
我们将继续寻求以合理的价钱买下整个公司，即使那家公司未来的发展与过去大体相同(没有增长)。我们也愿意以不错的价钱买下第一类的公司，若我们确实有理由相信他们就是第一类公司。但我们通常不会因我们带来的改变而去支付高价，因为我们发现我们通常不会（因我们的到来）改善多少。[2]
During 1981 we came quite close to a major purchase involving both a business and a manager we liked very much. However, the price finally demanded, considering alternative uses for the funds involved, would have left our owners worse off than before the purchase. The empire would have been larger, but the citizenry would have been poorer.
今年我们曾几乎谈成一笔大生意，那家公司与其经理都是我们所喜爱的，但就是价钱谈不陇，若坚持买下，考虑到所涉资金更好的用途，股东的利益不见得会更好。整个伯克希尔帝国版图可能会变大，但股东会变更穷。
Although we had no success in 1981, from time to time in the future we will be able to purchase 100% of businesses meeting our standards. Additionally, we expect an occasional offering of a major “non-voting partnership” as discussed under the Pinkerton’s heading on page 47 of this report. We welcome suggestions regarding such companies where we, as a substantial junior partner, can achieve good economic results while furthering the long-term objectives of present owners and managers.
尽管 1981 年我们并没有成功的个案，但我们预计未来仍能买到 100% 符合我们标准的公司，此外我们期望偶尔能有像后面报告所述平克顿安保 (Pinkerton) 这样大型无投票权的股权投资机会，我们欢迎有关此类公司的建议，作为一个次要的大股东，我们可以在帮助现有所有者和管理者的实现长期目标的同时取得可观的经济效益。
Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.
我们发现通过公开市场购买一些由有能力且正直的人经营的，并具有特许经营特权公司的少部分股权，最容易赚到钱，而事实上我们也从未打算自己去经营这些公司，但我们的确想要从这些公司上获利。
We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either: (1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.
而我们也预期这些公司的未分配收益将会百分之百回报给伯克希尔及其股东，若最后没有，则可能是出了以下几种差错： (1) 我们任命加入的管理层有问题。 ^5 公司的未来的前景有问题。 (3) 我们支付的价格有问题。
We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most common. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes - sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion - now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.
而事实上，不论在买进具控制权或非控制权的股权方面，我们曾犯了许多错误，其中以第二类误判的情况最常见。当然有必要翻开我们投资的历史，深入挖掘此类的案例(可能至少要回溯至少 2-3 个月以上吧)，例如，去年，你们的主席主动提出他对铝业前景看好的专家意见。 自那以后，他对这一观点进行了几次微小的调整——现在总计调整了大约 180 度。[3]
For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries. Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.
然而基于个人与客观的原因，通常我们改正在对不具控制权的股权投资的错误，要比对具控制权的来得容易许多，这时候缺少控制权反而成为一种优点。
As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our non-recorded “ownership” earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue. In just four ownership positions in this category - GEICO Corporation, General Foods Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. and The Washington Post Company - our share of undistributed and therefore unrecorded earnings probably will total well over $35 million in 1982. The accounting rules that entirely ignore these undistributed earnings diminish the utility of our annual return on equity calculation, or any other single year measure of economic performance.
正如我们去年提到的，我们不具控制权的投资收益（应按比例分配但会计报表尚未记录的）规模，已经增长到超过了我们（会计报告的）总收益的程度。 我们预计这种情况还会继续下去[4]。1982 年光是其中四家(GEICO 保险、通用食品、雷诺烟草及华盛顿邮报)未分配收益加起来就超过 3500 万美元，由于会计原则使得我们在计算帐面股东权益报酬与单一年度获利表现时，无法将这些未分配收益记入。
Long-Term Corporate Performance 公司的长期业绩表现
In measuring long-term economic performance, equities held by our insurance subsidiaries are valued at market subject to a charge reflecting the amount of taxes that would have to be paid if unrealized gains were actually realized. If we are correct in the premise stressed in the preceding section of this report, our unreported ownership earnings will find their way, irregularly but inevitably, into our net worth. To date, this has been the case.
在衡量一家公司长期的经济表现时，我们的保险子公司所持有的股票会以市价估值，但需扣除变现时必须支付的税款，而若我们前面所作的推论正确的话，那些非控制的股权其未分配收益，最后终将不定期的反映在我们帐面上，至少到目前为止确是如此。
An even purer calculation of performance would involve a valuation of bonds and non-insurance held equities at market. However, GAAP accounting does not prescribe this procedure, and the added purity would change results only very slightly. Should any valuation difference widen to significant proportions, as it has at most major insurance companies, we will report its effect to you.
当然若严格一点计算的话，还必须把债券投资及非保险子公司所持的股票以市价计算才更准确，然而 GAAP (一般公认会计原则)并未如此规定，而且这样做对我们来说其实影响不大，而当其影响大到一定程度时，我一定会向各位报告。
On a GAAP basis, during the present management’s term of seventeen years, book value has increased from $19.46 per share to $526.02 per share, or 21.1% compounded annually. This rate of return number is highly likely to drift downward in future years. We hope, however, that it can be maintained significantly above the rate of return achieved by the average large American corporation.
按 GAAP 原则，自现今经营层接手十七年来，伯克希尔的帐面价值从每股 19.46 美元增加到如今的 526.02 美元，年复合增长率约 21.1%，预计这个比率在未来将会逐年下滑，但我们期望它至少要高于一般美国大企业的平均水准。
Over half of the large gain in Berkshire’s net worth during 1981 - it totaled $124 million, or about 31% - resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year considerably outstripped the gain in underlying business values. Such market variations will not always be on the pleasant side.
在 1981 年账面价值大幅增加 50% 以上——约 1.24 亿美元，其中 31% 要归功于 GEICO 保险一家，总得来说，今年我们投资股票获得的收益远远超过基本业务的收益，但股票市场并不会一直朝好的方向走。
In past reports we have explained how inflation has caused our apparently satisfactory long-term corporate performance to be illusory as a measure of true investment results for our owners. We applaud the efforts of Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker and note the currently more moderate increases in various price indices. Nevertheless, our views regarding long-term inflationary trends are as negative as ever. Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration.
在去年报告我们曾解释过，通货膨胀是如何使我们的虚幻帐面表现比经济实质好看得多的，目前市场各种价格指数的上涨已经较为温和，我们对美联储主席保罗·沃尔克 (Volcker) 先生所作的努力表示感谢，尽管如此，我们对未来的通胀趋势仍感到悲观，就像处女，稳定的物价水平只能维持，却不能恢复原状。
Despite the overriding importance of inflation in the investment equation, we will not punish you further with another full recital of our views; inflation itself will be punishment enough. (Copies of previous discussions are available for masochists.) But, because of the unrelenting destruction of currency values, our corporate efforts will continue to do a much better job of filling your wallet than of filling your stomach.
尽管通胀对投资来讲实在是太重要了，但我不会再次复述我的观点惩罚你一次，通胀本身对大家的折磨已够大了(若谁是被虐狂可向我索取副本)，但由于通胀持续的使货币贬值，我们会尽最大的努力使你的皮夹满满，而不是仅仅填饱肚子。
Equity Value-Added 股权投资的附加价值
An additional factor should further subdue any residual enthusiasm you may retain regarding our long-term rate of return. The economic case justifying equity investment is that, in aggregate, additional earnings above passive investment returns - interest on fixed-income securities - will be derived through the employment of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in conjunction with that equity capital. Furthermore, the case says that since the equity capital position is associated with greater risk than passive forms of investment, it is “entitled” to higher returns. A “value-added” bonus from equity capital seems natural and certain.
如果你仍然对我们的长期回报率抱有热情的期望，那另外一项因素可能会再给你浇上一盆冷水。人们投资于企业股权而不是被动的投资固定收益债券的典型经济理由是，具有管理和企业家才能的管理层，可运用这笔资金创造出比固定收益更高的回报。这种说法还认为，由于股权投资相比被动投资要承担更大风险，因此，它需要获得更高的回报，于是股权投资自带"价值增值"福利就似乎是理所当然又确定无疑的了。
But is it? Several decades back, a return on equity of as little as 10% enabled a corporation to be classified as a “good” business - i.e., one in which a dollar reinvested in the business logically could be expected to be valued by the market at more than one hundred cents. For, with long-term taxable bonds yielding 5% and long-term tax-exempt bonds 3%, a business operation that could utilize equity capital at 10% clearly was worth some premium to investors over the equity capital employed. That was true even though a combination of taxes on dividends and on capital gains would reduce the 10% earned by the corporation to perhaps 6%-8% in the hands of the individual investor.
该理论正确吗？过去数十年来，即使一家公司的股本回报率只有 10%，便能被归类为「好」生意，也就是说，当我们把一美元投入到这家公司，逻辑上可以预期市场价值将会超过一美元。因为当时长期应税债券收益率约为 5%，免税债券则约 3%，一个以 10% 回报运营资本的生意，显然比被动出借资本更值得溢价。尽管加计资本利得税和红利税后，公司赚取的 10% 回报到了投资者手中仍然有 6-8%。
Investment markets recognized this truth. During that earlier period, American business earned an average of 11% or so on equity capital employed and stocks, in aggregate, sold at valuations far above that equity capital (book value), averaging over 150 cents on the dollar. Most businesses were “good” businesses because they earned far more than their keep (the return on long-term passive money). The value-added produced by equity investment, in aggregate, was substantial.
股票市场认同这个道理，在过去的一段时间，一家平均股本回报率达到 11% 的美国企业，其交易市价远高于账面价值，平均每一美元账面价值卖到 1.5 美元 (PB=1.5)，这样看大多数企业还都算是「好」生意，因为企业的回报远远超过那些长期被动资金的回报，总的来说，股权投资产生的附加价值是相当可观的。
That day is gone. But the lessons learned during its existence are difficult to discard. While investors and managers must place their feet in the future, their memories and nervous systems often remain plugged into the past. It is much easier for investors to utilize historic p/e ratios or for managers to utilize historic business valuation yardsticks than it is for either group to rethink their premises daily. When change is slow, constant rethinking is actually undesirable; it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday’s assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has become breathtaking.
然而那一切已成过去，但过去所得到的经验法则却很难拋弃，投资大众与管理层必须着眼未来，但他们的记忆与神经系统却还深陷于过去。投资大众习惯于利用历史市盈率，而管理层则惯用传统企业评价标准，但却不去深思其前提是否早已改变，若改变是缓慢的，那么不断的反思便就没那么必要，因为收获不大，反而会拉长反应时间。若变化很大，则固守昨日的假设可能会付出极大的代价，而如今经济步调的变动之快是令人窒息的。
During the past year, long-term taxable bond yields exceeded 16% and long-term tax-exempts 14%. The total return achieved from such tax-exempts, of course, goes directly into the pocket of the individual owner. Meanwhile, American business is producing earnings of only about 14% on equity. And this 14% will be substantially reduced by taxation before it can be banked by the individual owner. The extent of such shrinkage depends upon the dividend policy of the corporation and the tax rates applicable to the investor.
去年长期应税债券收益率超过 16%，而免税债券也超过 14%，当然此类免税债券收益都直接落入投资人的口袋。在此同时，美国企业的股本回报率仅为 14%，而且尚未计算落袋前所须支付的税负，缩水程度取决于公司股利政策和投资人适用的所得税率。
Thus, with interest rates on passive investments at late 1981 levels, a typical American business is no longer worth one hundred cents on the dollar to owners who are individuals. (If the business is owned by pension funds or other tax-exempt investors, the arithmetic, although still unenticing, changes substantially for the better.) Assume an investor in a 50% tax bracket; if our typical company pays out all earnings, the income return to the investor will be equivalent to that from a 7% tax-exempt bond. And, if conditions persist - if all earnings are paid out and return on equity stays at 14% - the 7% tax-exempt equivalent to the higher-bracket individual investor is just as frozen as is the coupon on a tax-exempt bond. Such a perpetual 7% tax-exempt bond might be worth fifty cents on the dollar as this is written.
因此，以 1981 年末的债券利率水平而言，投资美国公司一美元对投资人来说不再值一美元，(当然若投资人是养老基金等免税机构，则情况可能会好一点，但数据依然没有吸引力)，假设投资人适用于 50% 税率，而公司把所有收益皆发放出来，则股东的投资回报率约等于投资 7% 的免税债券，而这种情况若一直持续下去，等于是套牢于一长期 7% 的免税债券一样，而这样的企业真正的价值可能连其原始投资额的一半还不到。
If, on the other hand, all earnings of our typical American business are retained and return on equity again remains constant, earnings will grow at 14% per year. If the p/e ratio remains constant, the price of our typical stock will also grow at 14% per year. But that 14% is not yet in the pocket of the shareholder. Putting it there will require the payment of a capital gains tax, presently assessed at a maximum rate of 20%. This net return, of course, works out to a poorer rate of return than the currently available passive after-tax rate.
但如果把所有收益都保留不分红，而股东回报率 14% 维持不变，则收益每年会以 14% 的速度增加，再假设市盈率不变，则公司的股价每年也会以 14% 的速度上涨，但这 14% 还不在投资人的口袋中，因为卖出需要付最高约 20% 的资本利得税，所以不管怎么说，还是比现时可买的免税债券的 14% 被动税后收益率低。
Unless passive rates fall, companies achieving 14% per year gains in earnings per share while paying no cash dividend are an economic failure for their individual shareholders. The returns from passive capital outstrip the returns from active capital. This is an unpleasant fact for both investors and corporate managers and, therefore, one they may wish to ignore. But facts do not cease to exist, either because they are unpleasant or because they are ignored.
除非被动税后收益率降低，否则即使不分红且公司收益每年以 14% 增长，对投资人而言，经济上等于是投资失败。被动投资回报超过主动投资，这对股东与管理层都是不怎么愉快的事实，而管理层更是选择假装不知道，但事实不会因为令人不爽或被忽视而停止存在。
Most American businesses pay out a significant portion of their earnings and thus fall between the two examples. And most American businesses are currently “bad” businesses economically - producing less for their individual investors after-tax than the tax-exempt passive rate of return on money. Of course, some high-return businesses still remain attractive, even under present conditions. But American equity capital, in aggregate, produces no value-added for individual investors.
目前多数美国公司把收益大部分都用来分红了，算是介于两个极端的例子之间，所以这些美国公司从投资上说不算「好」企业，因为税后投资回报比投资免税债券还要差，当然也有少数高回报的公司仍具有吸引力，但总的来说，多数对美国企业的股权投资不会给投资人带来任何附加增值。
It should be stressed that this depressing situation does not occur because corporations are jumping, economically, less high than previously. In fact, they are jumping somewhat higher: return on equity has improved a few points in the past decade. But the crossbar of passive return has been elevated much faster. Unhappily, most companies can do little but hope that the bar will be lowered significantly; there are few industries in which the prospects seem bright for substantial gains in return on equity.
但要强调的是，这并不是说整体美国公司的表现比以往更令人沮丧，事实上，反而是比以往还好一点，过去十年平均股本回报率提高了几个百分点，只是被动投资收益率(无风险收益率)这道门槛却比以前提高了许多，不幸的是，几乎没有哪个行业回报率的增长前景是光明的，大多数公司除了寄希望无风险收益率降低以外对此都无能为力。
Inflationary experience and expectations will be major (but not the only) factors affecting the height of the crossbar in future years. If the causes of long-term inflation can be tempered, passive returns are likely to fall and the intrinsic position of American equity capital should significantly improve. Many businesses that now must be classified as economically “bad” would be restored to the “good” category under such circumstances.
通胀经历与通胀预期将是未来几年影响被动收益率的主要的因素，但非惟一因素。如果导致长期通胀的因素能得到控制，被动收益率自然会下降，而美国股权投资的状况也能大幅改善，由「差」企业转为「好」企业。
A further, particularly ironic, punishment is inflicted by an inflationary environment upon the owners of the “bad” business. To continue operating in its present mode, such a low-return business usually must retain much of its earnings - no matter what penalty such a policy produces for shareholders.
特别具有讽刺意味的是，通胀环境对「差」企业的股东造成了进一步的惩罚。为了维持目前的运营模式，这种低回报的企业通常必须保留其大部分收益——无论会对股东带来了什么惩罚。
Reason, of course, would prescribe just the opposite policy. An individual, stuck with a 5% bond with many years to run before maturity, does not take the coupons from that bond and pay one hundred cents on the dollar for more 5% bonds while similar bonds are available at, say, forty cents on the dollar. Instead, he takes those coupons from his low-return bond and - if inclined to reinvest - looks for the highest return with safety currently available. Good money is not thrown after bad.
当然，理性会采取相应对策，一个人持有的 5% 低息债券还需要很多年才到期，他不会从该债券中取出息票，并以 100% 的价格购买更多类似低息债券，因为这种低息债券市场价只卖 40 美分。相反，他从该债券中获得的息票，如果倾向于再投资，他会在现有安全的情况下寻找更高回报。明智的资金不会虚掷在糟糕的投资上。
What makes sense for the bondholder makes sense for the shareholder. Logically, a company with historic and prospective high returns on equity should retain much or all of its earnings so that shareholders can earn premium returns on enhanced capital. Conversely, low returns on corporate equity would suggest a very high dividend payout so that owners could direct capital toward more attractive areas. (The Scriptures concur. In the parable of the talents, the two high-earning servants are rewarded with 100% retention of earnings and encouraged to expand their operations. However, the non-earning third servant is not only chastised - “wicked and slothful” - but also is required to redirect all of his capital to the top performer. Matthew 25: 14-30)
如同债券持有人，股权投资人也是一样。从逻辑上讲，一家过往历史上和可预期的未来，都拥有高股本回报率的公司，应该保留大部分或全部收益，以便股东能够从再投人的资本中获得更多回报。但若这家公司回报率很差，为何不把所赚的收益分配给股东，让股东自己去寻找其它更有吸引力机会呢？(圣经亦赞同：有个三个仆人比拼才能的寓言，老天爷让其中二个会赚钱的仆人，保留他们所赚的钱并鼓励他们扩大业务，而另外一个懒惰不会赚钱的仆人，则被严厉的惩罚，并叫他把钱交给前面二个仆人管理/马太福音 25 章 14-30 )。
But inflation takes us through the looking glass into the upside-down world of Alice in Wonderland. When prices continuously rise, the “bad” business must retain every nickel that it can. Not because it is attractive as a repository for equity capital, but precisely because it is so unattractive, the low-return business must follow a high retention policy. If it wishes to continue operating in the future as it has in the past - and most entities, including businesses, do - it simply has no choice.
但通胀让我们像穿过镜子来到爱丽丝梦游的仙境一样，当通胀肆虐时，「差」企业被迫保留它所有的每一分钱，不是因为保留收益更有利可图，而实在是迫不得已，因为只有这样才能辛苦地维持它过去的营运能力。
For inflation acts as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. That tapeworm preemptively consumes its requisite daily diet of investment dollars regardless of the health of the host organism. Whatever the level of reported profits (even if nil), more dollars for receivables, inventory and fixed assets are continuously required by the business in order to merely match the unit volume of the previous year. The less prosperous the enterprise, the greater the proportion of available sustenance claimed by the tapeworm.
通胀就像是寄生在企业体内的巨大绦虫，不管被宿主健康状况如何，绦虫都会抢先消耗其每日必需的运营资金。无论实际获利水平如何(即使为零)，企业持续将更多的资金，沉淀于应收账款、存货和固定资产，以便维持上一年的营收规模。企业越不景气，绦虫所占用的资金比例就越大。
Under present conditions, a business earning 8% or 10% on equity often has no leftovers for expansion, debt reduction or “real” dividends. The tapeworm of inflation simply cleans the plate. (The low-return company’s inability to pay dividends, understandably, is often disguised. Corporate America increasingly is turning to dividend reinvestment plans, sometimes even embodying a discount arrangement that all but forces shareholders to reinvest. Other companies sell newly issued shares to Peter in order to pay dividends to Paul. Beware of “dividends” that can be paid out only if someone promises to replace the capital distributed.)
以目前的情况来讲，一家公司若只赚到 8% 或 10% 的话，根本没钱拿来扩张、还债或发放实在的股利，通胀这条寄生虫早就把盘子清光光了，(而事实上，企业通常利用许多方法将无法发放股利的窘境掩饰住，例如常常提出收益转投资计划，强迫股东再投资，或是发行新股，拿张三的钱发放给李四，要小心这种必须要另外找到金主才能发放的股利)。
Berkshire continues to retain its earnings for offensive, not defensive or obligatory, reasons. But in no way are we immune from the pressures that escalating passive returns exert on equity capital. We continue to clear the crossbar of after-tax passive return - but barely. Our historic 21% return - not at all assured for the future - still provides, after the current capital gain tax rate (which we expect to rise considerably in future years), a modest margin over current after-tax rates on passive money. It would be a bit humiliating to have our corporate value-added turn negative. But it can happen here as it has elsewhere, either from events outside anyone’s control or from poor relative adaptation on our part.
反观伯克希尔继续保留收益是出于进攻性投资的目的，而绝非防御性或被迫性的原因。当然我们也不能免除高企的被动投资回报率对股权投资造成的压力，我们历史累计的回报率 21% 扣除潜在的资本利得税后，比目前的税后被动投资回报率稍稍高出一点点。我们虽然仍能持续地跨过那最低的门槛，但也只是低空掠过，这对未来毫无保障。而只要再出一点点差错，便可能使我们面临无法跨过门槛的窘境，这要么来自任何人都无法控制的事件，要么来自我们相对较差的适应通胀的运营能力。
Sources of Reported Earnings 报告收益的主要来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table and are not included in operating earnings.
下表显示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，其中伯克希尔拥有蓝筹印花 60% 的股权，而后者又拥有 Wesco 金融 80% 的股权。该表显示了各个业务实体的经营收益，以及伯克希尔在这些收益中所占份额。任何业务实体因异常出售资产而产生的所有重大损益都汇总在表最后"已实现出售证券利得"一栏，不计入经营收益。虽然本表列示的方式与一般公认会计原则不尽相同，但最后的损益数字却是一致的。
* Amortization of intangibles arising in accounting for purchases of businesses (i.e. See’s, Mutual and Buffalo Evening News) is reflected in the category designated as “Other”.
* "其他"科目包含并购企业产生的商誉摊销 (See's，Mutual bank，Buffalio Evening News)；
** Berkshire divested itself of its ownership of the Illinois National Bank on December 31, 1980.
** Illinois国民银行和信托公司已于 1980/12/31 从伯克希尔剥离；
Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 38-50 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1981 operations. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Jeanne Leach for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
BlueChip 及 Wesco 两家公司本身是公开发行公司，按规定编有自己的年报，在本报告后面附上这两家公司高管的叙述性报告，其中描述了 1981 年的运营情况。任何一家公司的完整年度报告副本都将邮寄给伯克希尔股东，请 Robert H. Bird 先生 (Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040) 或 Jeanne Leach夫人(Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109) 索取。
As we indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion of earnings, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income segment of Insurance Group earnings.
就像先前我们所提到的，不具控制权的股权投资其已分配的收益已列示于保险业务的投资收益之中，但我们不控制的公司的未分配收益现在与上表中详述的经营收益一样重要。
We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our earnings.
下表列示的是那些我们不具控制权的股权投资的持股，这些非控制业务仅分配收益(股息)包含在我们的收益中：
(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries.
(a) 代表伯克希尔持有。
(b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies. All numbers represent Berkshire’s net interest in the larger gross holdings of the group.
(b) 代表 BlueChip 或 Wesco 持有。所有数字都代表了伯克希尔在该集团更大的总持股中的净权益。
Our controlled and non-controlled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum of activities that detailed commentary here would prove too lengthy. Much additional financial information is included in Management’s Discussion on pages 34-37 and in the narrative reports on pages 38-50. However, our largest area of both controlled and non-controlled activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the property-casualty insurance area, and commentary on important developments in that industry is appropriate.
由于我们具控制权与不具控制权的企业经营遍布各行各业，所以恕我无法在此赘述，但无论如何，集团的重点一定是摆在产险/意外险之上，所以有必要对其产业未来发展加以说明。
Insurance Industry Conditions 保险业务
“Forecasts”, said Sam Goldwyn, “are dangerous, particularly those about the future.” (Berkshire shareholders may have reached a similar conclusion after rereading our past annual reports featuring your Chairman’s prescient analysis of textile prospects.)
山姆·戈德温 (Sam Goldwyn) 说：预测是危险的，尤其是那些关于未来的预测。(伯克希尔的股东在过去几年的年报中读到你们的董事长对纺织业的前景分析后，可能也会深有同感)
There is no danger, however, in forecasting that 1982 will be the worst year in recent history for insurance underwriting. That result already has been guaranteed by present pricing behavior, coupled with the term nature of the insurance contract.
但若预测 1982 年将会是保险业承销史上最惨的一年应该是没什么问题的，目前同业竞相杀价行为加上保险合同的滞后性质，巨亏的结果是确定无疑的。
While many auto policies are priced and sold at six-month intervals - and many property policies are sold for a three-year term - a weighted average of the duration of all property-casualty insurance policies probably runs a little under twelve months. And prices for the insurance coverage, of course, are frozen for the life of the contract. Thus, this year’s sales contracts (“premium written” in the parlance of the industry) determine about one-half of next year’s level of revenue (“premiums earned”). The remaining half will be determined by sales contracts written next year that will be about 50% earned in that year. The profitability consequences are automatic: if you make a mistake in pricing, you have to live with it for an uncomfortable period of time.
虽然许多汽车保险保单以六个月为期来定价销售，但许多产险合同以三年为期，所有产险意外险的加权平均期限略低于一年，当然在保险合同期内价格是固定的，因此今年销售的保单(保费收入)大概会决定明年保费收入的一半水平，而另外一半则由明年签下的保单来决定，因此获利的情况自然而然会顺延，也就是说若你在定价上犯了错误，那你所受的痛苦可能会持续一阵子。
Note in the table below the year-over-year gain in industry-wide premiums written and the impact that it has on the current and following year’s level of underwriting profitability. The result is exactly as you would expect in an inflationary world. When the volume gain is well up in double digits, it bodes well for profitability trends in the current and following year. When the industry volume gain is small, underwriting experience very shortly will get worse, no matter how unsatisfactory the current level.
注意下表所列为每年保费收入增长率和其对当年与隔年度获利的影响，而结果正如同你对通胀所预期的一样，当保费收入以两位数增长，则当年与隔年的获利数字就会很好看，但若保费收入增长很少时，则表示承销结果就会变得很差。
The Best’s data in the table reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio indicates total operating and loss costs as compared to premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
下表反映一般同业所面临的情势，综合比率表示所有营运成本加上理赔损失占保费收入的比率，比率低于 100 表示承保盈利，反之则承保亏损：
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
As Pogo would say, “The future isn’t what it used to be.” Current pricing practices promise devastating results, particularly if the respite from major natural disasters that the industry has enjoyed in recent years should end. For underwriting experience has been getting worse in spite of good luck, not because of bad luck. In recent years hurricanes have stayed at sea and motorists have reduced their driving. They won’t always be so obliging.[5]
诚如 Pogo 所说："未来绝不会与过去相同"。现在的定价趋势已注定日后悲惨的结果，尤其若因近几年无重大灾难所得的喘息机会结束时。保险承保的情况反而却因行业运气好(而非运气坏)而越来越差：近几年来飓风大多仅停留在海上，汽车司机也减少了驾车出行的次数。但现实不会永远有利于我们（指承保人）。[5]
And, of course the twin inflations, monetary and “social” (the tendency of courts and juries to stretch the coverage of policies beyond what insurers, relying upon contract terminology and precedent, had expected), are unstoppable. Costs of repairing both property and people - and the extent to which these repairs are deemed to be the responsibility of the insurer - will advance relentlessly.
当然货币与社会的双重通胀是无法抵挡的，法院与陪审团对保险投保范围的认定，超越合约和判例的不断扩张，财产修复与人身医疗等这些被视为保险合同义务的成本也无情的不断增加。
Absent any bad luck (catastrophes, increased driving, etc.), an immediate industry volume gain of at least 10% per year probably is necessary to stabilize the record level of underwriting losses that will automatically prevail in mid-1982. (Most underwriters expect incurred losses in aggregate to rise at least 10% annually; each, of course, counts on getting less than his share.) Every percentage point of annual premium growth below the 10% equilibrium figure quickens the pace of deterioration. Quarterly data in 1981 underscore the conclusion that a terrible underwriting picture is worsening at an accelerating rate.
若没遇上什么倒霉事(如大灾难或危险驾驶行为增加等)，行业保费收入平均至少要提价 10% 才能覆盖成本的上涨，使 1982 年创纪录的综合比率水平不再恶化(估计大部分同业承保损失每年都以 10% 增加，当然大家都期望自己的亏损比率低于行业)。保费涨价每低于 10% 一个百分点，就会加快亏损恶化的速度。 1981 年的季度数据强调了这样一个结论，即糟糕的承保亏损正在加速恶化。
In the 1980 annual report we discussed the investment policies that have destroyed the integrity of many insurers’ balance sheets, forcing them to abandon underwriting discipline and write business at any price in order to avoid negative cash flow. It was clear that insurers with large holdings of bonds valued, for accounting purposes, at nonsensically high prices would have little choice but to keep the money revolving by selling large numbers of policies at nonsensically low prices. Such insurers necessarily fear a major decrease in volume more than they fear a major underwriting loss.
去年年报我们曾经提到许多保险公司因投资不当使得其公司财务变得不健康，迫使他们放弃原有承保原则，不惜以低价承接保单以维持既有流动性。很明显的帐上持有不合理高估的债券的同业，为了现金流动性而以明显不合理的低价大量卖出保单，他们更担心的是业务量的大幅下降，而根本无暇关心承保的潜在损失。
But, unfortunately, all insurers are affected; it’s difficult to price much differently than your most threatened competitor. This pressure continues unabated and adds a new motivation to the others that drive many insurance managers to push for business; worship of size over profitability, and the fear that market share surrendered never can be regained.
然而不幸的是所有的同业皆因此受波及，因为你的价格不可能与竞争同业差得太远，这种压力有增无减，并迫使愈来愈多的同业跟进，盲目追求保费的增长而非盈利的增加，害怕失去的市场占有率永远无法恢复。
Whatever the reasons, we believe it is true that virtually no major property-casualty insurer - despite protests by the entire industry that rates are inadequate and great selectivity should be exercised - has been willing to turn down business to the point where cash flow has turned significantly negative. Absent such a willingness, prices will remain under severe pressure.
即使大家一致认同费率极不合理，我们认为没有一家大型保险业者，能够承受现金极度流出的情况下不接任何保单，而只要这种心态存在，则保单价格将持续面临调降压力。
Commentators continue to talk of the underwriting cycle, usually implying a regularity of rhythm and a relatively constant midpoint of profitability Our own view is different. We believe that very large, although obviously varying, underwriting losses will be the norm for the industry, and that the best underwriting years in the future decade may appear substandard against the average year of the past decade.
产业专家认为保险行业是景气周期循环的，并且长期而言承保损益接近两平。对此我们则持不同的看法，我们相信承保面临巨额损失(虽然程度不一)将成为保险业界的常态，未来十年内最好的表现在以往仅能算得上是普通而已。
We have no magic formula to insulate our controlled insurance companies against this deteriorating future. Our managers, particularly Phil Liesche, Bill Lyons, Roland Miller, Floyd Taylor and Milt Thornton, have done a magnificent job of swimming against the tide. We have sacrificed much volume, but have maintained a substantial underwriting superiority in relation to industry-wide results. The outlook at Berkshire is for continued low volume. Our financial position offers us maximum flexibility, a very rare condition in the property-casualty insurance industry. And, at some point, should fear ever prevail throughout the industry, our financial strength could become an operational asset of immense value.
虽然面临持续恶化的未来，伯克希尔的保险业务并无任何良方，但我们管理层却在力争上游，尤其是 Phil Liesche、Bill Lyons、Roland Miller、Floyd Taylor 和 Milt Thornton，虽然保单数量减少了，但承保损益相较于同业仍显优越。展望未来，伯克希尔将继续维持低保单的现状，我们的财务实力使我们能在业务上保持最大的弹性，这在同业间并不多见。而将来总有一天，当同业保单接到怕之时，伯克希尔的财务实力将成为营运发展最有利的后盾。
We believe that GEICO Corporation, our major non-controlled business operating in this field, is, by virtue of its extreme and improving operating efficiency, in a considerably more protected position than almost any other major insurer. GEICO is a brilliantly run implementation of a very important business idea.
其中 GEICO 保险是我们不具控制权中的主要股权投资，它凭借其非凡且不断提高的运营效率，比几乎任何其他大型保险公司都处于更安全的地位，它堪称企业理念的最佳实践典范。
Shareholder Designated Contributions 股东指定捐赠
Our new program enabling shareholders to designate the recipients of corporate charitable contributions was greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. A copy of the letter sent October 14, 1981 describing this program appears on pages 51-53. Of 932,206 shares eligible for participation (shares where the name of the actual owner appeared on our stockholder record), 95.6% responded. Even excluding Buffet-related shares, the response topped 90%.[6]
我们的新计划让股东能够指定公司慈善捐款的接受者受到了热烈欢迎。在1981年10月14日寄出的那封信的第 51-53 页，描述了这项计划。在 932,206 张符合标准的有效股份中(即在本公司股份系由本人登记者)，有 95.6% 参与回复，而在即使不包含本人股份的情况下，也超过了 90%。[6]
In addition, more than 3% of our shareholders voluntarily wrote letters or notes, all but one approving of the program. Both the level of participation and of commentary surpass any shareholder response we have witnessed, even when such response has been intensively solicited by corporate staff and highly paid professional proxy organizations. In contrast, your extraordinary level of response occurred without even the nudge of a company-provided return envelope. This self-propelled behavior speaks well for the program, and speaks well for our shareholders.
此外有 3% 的股东主动写信来支持本计划，而股东参与的热烈与提供的意见也是我们前所未见的，这种自动自发的态度说明了本计划成功与否，也可看出伯克希尔股东的天性。
Apparently the owners of our corporation like both possessing and exercising the ability to determine where gifts of their funds shall be made. The “father-knows-best” school of corporate governance will be surprised to find that none of our shareholders sent in a designation sheet with instructions that the officers of Berkshire - in their superior wisdom, of course - make the decision on charitable funds applicable to his shares. Nor did anyone suggest that his share of our charitable funds be used to match contributions made by our corporate directors to charities of the directors’ choice (a popular, proliferating and non-publicized policy at many large corporations).
很明显的，他们都希望能拥有并自由掌控其捐赠金钱的去向的能力，教授父权式的管理学院可能会惊讶的发现，没有一位股东表示希望由伯克希尔的管理层来帮他们作决定，或是依董监事捐赠比例行事(这是目前一般美国大企业普遍的作法)。
All told, $1,783,655 of shareholder-designed contributions were distributed to about 675 charities. In addition, Berkshire and subsidiaries continue to make certain contributions pursuant to local level decisions made by our operating managers.
除了由伯克希尔及其子公司管理层决定的捐献外，总计 1,783,655 美元的股东指定捐赠款共分配给 675 个慈善机关团体。
There will be some years, perhaps two or three out of ten, when contributions by Berkshire will produce substandard tax deductions - or none at all. In those years we will not effect our shareholder designated charitable program. In all other years we expect to inform you about October 10th of the amount per share that you may designate. A reply form will accompany the notice, and you will be given about three weeks to respond with your designation. To qualify, your shares must be registered in your own name or the name of an owning trust, corporation, partnership or estate, if applicable, on our stockholder list of September 30th, or the Friday preceding if such date falls on a Saturday or Sunday.
往后几年伯克希尔将会因这项捐款计划获得些许的税负抵减，而每年十月十日以前，我们将会通知股东每股可捐赠的金额，你有三个礼拜的时间可以作决定，为免丧失资格，股份须必须由你本人名义登记在 9 月 30 日的股东名单上。
Our only disappointment with this program in 1981 was that some of our shareholders, through no fault of their own, missed the opportunity to participate. The Treasury Department ruling allowing us to proceed without tax uncertainty was received early in October. The ruling did not cover participation by shareholders whose stock was registered in the name of nominees, such as brokers, and additionally required that the owners of all designating shares make certain assurances to Berkshire. These assurances could not be given us in effective form by nominee holders.
对于去年这项计划我们惟一感到遗憾的是，有些股东虽然不是因为本身的错误，而无法参加，由于税务单位的解释令于十月初才下来，并规定股份若由代理人或经纪人名义登记者不适用，由于时间紧迫，再加上联络前述股东仍须通过其代理人，使得部分股东没能参加，在此我们强烈呼吁那些股票经纪人尽速通知其客户，以免股东的权利被剥夺。
Under these circumstances, we attempted to communicate with all of our owners promptly (via the October 14th letter) so that, if they wished, they could prepare themselves to participate by the November 13th record date. It was particularly important that this information be communicated promptly to stockholders whose holdings were in nominee name, since they would not be eligible unless they took action to re-register their shares before the record date.
在这种情况下，我们试图更迅速地与所有股东联络(通过 10 月 14 日的信)，那样如果他们希望的话，他们就可以在 11 月 13 日的登记日之前参与了。股份代持的股东知晓这个消息尤其重要，因为他们如果不在登记日前重新注册所持股份，信息就不可查了。
Unfortunately, communication to such non-record shareholders could take place only through the nominees. We therefore strongly urged those nominees, mostly brokerage houses, to promptly transmit our letter to the real owners. We explained that their failure to do so could deprive such owners of an important benefit.
不幸的是，与这些隐名股东联络只能通过代持人。因此我们强烈敦促所有代持人(大多数是经纪公司)，尽快将我们的信件转给实际持有人。我们解释过了，如果不能及时登记，就会失去这项重要的所有权。
The results from our urgings would not strengthen the case for private ownership of the U.S. Postal Service. Many of our shareholders never heard from their brokers (as some shareholders told us after reading news accounts of the program). Others were forwarded our letter too late for action.
但我们强烈呼吁的结果并不能强化美国邮政系统的作用。我们有很多股东从没收到过股票经纪的信息(这是有些股东在知道了这个项目情况后告诉我们的。)其他人得到信件时已经太迟。
One of the largest brokerage houses claiming to hold stock for sixty of its clients (about 4% of our shareholder population), apparently transmitted our letter about three weeks after receipt - too late for any of the sixty to participate. (Such lassitude did not pervade all departments of that firm; it billed Berkshire for mailing services within six days of that belated and ineffectual action.)
其中有家证券经纪商代表六十位股东(约占 4% 强股权)很明显地在接到邮件三个礼拜后，才将之转到客户的手上。讽刺的是，该公司并非所有部门皆如此懒散，转寄邮件的帐单在六天内就送到伯克希尔公司。)
We recite such horror stories for two reasons: (1) if you wish to participate in future designated contribution programs, be sure to have your stock registered in your name well before September 30th; and (2) even if you don’t care to participate and prefer to leave your stock in nominee form, it would be wise to have at least one share registered in your own name. By so doing, you can be sure that you will be notified of any important corporate news at the same time as all other shareholders.
我们之所以告诉大家这件事有两个理由： (1) 若你希望参加这项股东指定捐赠计划的话，请务必将你的股份在九月底以前改登记在自己的名下； (2) 就算你更愿意使用代理人，最好还是至少将一股登记在自己的名下，如此才能确保你与其它股东一样在第一时间知道有关公司的重大消息。
The designated-contributions idea, along with many other ideas that have turned out well for us, was conceived by Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and Chairman of Blue Chip. Irrespective of titles, Charlie and I work as partners in managing all controlled companies. To almost a sinful degree, we enjoy our work as managing partners. And we enjoy having you as our financial partners.
最后包含这项股东指定捐赠计划在内的许多很好的主意，都是由伯克希尔公司的副董事长兼蓝筹印花的董事长查理·芒格所构思，不管头衔为何，查理跟我皆以执行合伙人的心态管理所有事业，而各位股东就像是我们一般的合伙人一样。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
February 26, 1982
1982 年 2 月 26 日
[1]By 纪璐 @20231105
原文：to the point of being self-defeating.
共读版：已经到了适得其反的地步。
修改为：已经到了自取灭亡的地步。
[2]By 纪璐 @20231105
原文：But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.
共读版：但我们通常不会去买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。
修改为：但我们通常不会因我们带来的改变而去支付高价，因为我们发现我们通常不会（因我们的到来）改善多少。
[3]By 纪璐 @20231105
原文：For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion - now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.
共读版：例如去年你们的董事长发表看好铝业发展的前景，只是到后来陆续经过些微的调整，最后的结论却是 180 度的转弯。
修改为：例如，去年，你们的主席主动提出他对铝业前景看好的专家意见。 自那以后，他对这一观点进行了几次微小的调整——现在总计调整了大约 180 度。
[4]By 纪璐 @20231105
原文：As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our non-recorded “ownership” earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue.
共读版：而就像去年我曾提到的，我们在不具控制权的股权投资已经大到其依投资比例应分得之未分配收益甚至超越公司整体的报告收益，且我们预期这种情况将会持续下去
修改为：正如我们去年提到的，我们不具控制权的投资收益（应按比例分配但会计报表尚未记录的）规模，已经增长到超过了我们（会计报告的）总收益的程度。 我们预计这种情况还会继续下去。
[5]By Terrellchen @20230929
原文： In recent years hurricanes have stayed at sea and motorists have reduced their driving. They won’t always be so obliging.
肖良版：近几年来飓风大多仅停留在海上，同时高油价汽车驾驶员较少上路，但他们不会永远都那么守规矩。
参照有道翻译，修改为：近几年来飓风大多仅停留在海上，同时乘汽车旅行者减少了驾驶出行，但他们不会总是那么乐于助我们。
经讨论后，再次修改为：近几年来飓风大多仅停留在海上，汽车司机也减少了驾车出行的次数。但现实不会永远有利于我们（指承保人）。
[6]By Terrellchen @20230929
原文：Our new program enabling shareholders to designate the recipients of corporate charitable contributions was greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. A copy of the letter sent October 14, 1981 describing this program appears on pages 51-53. Of 932,206 shares eligible for participation (shares where the name of the actual owner appeared on our stockholder record), 95.6% responded. Even excluding Buffet-related shares, the response topped 90%.
原文：我们的新计划允许股东指定公司慈善捐款的接受者，受到了极大的欢迎。1981 年 10 月 14 日发出的介绍该计划的信函副本见第 51-53 页。在符合参与条件的 932,206 股股份（实际所有人的姓名出现在我们的股东记录中）中，95.6% 的股份做出了回应。即使不包括与巴菲特有关的股份，回复率也高达 90%。
肖良版：我们的新计划让股东能够指定公司慈善捐款的接受者受到了热烈欢迎。，在932,206张符合标准的有效股份中(即在本公司股份系由本人登记者)，有95.6%参与回复，而在即使不包含本人股份的情况下，也超过了90%。
（未译全，中英文对应不上）
补全：我们的新计划让股东能够指定公司慈善捐款的接受者受到了热烈欢迎。在1981年10月14日寄出的那封信的第 51-53 页，描述了这项计划。在932,206张符合标准的有效股份中(即在本公司股份系由本人登记者)，有95.6%参与回复，而在即使不包含本人股份的情况下，也超过了90%。
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