1983-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《1983-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Operating earnings of $31.5 million in 1982 amounted to only 9.8% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost), down from 15.2% in 1981 and far below our recent high of 19.4% in 1978. This decline largely resulted from:

1982年的经营利润为3150万美元，仅占期初股本的9.8%（证券按成本计价），低于1981年的15.2%，也远低于1978年19.4%的近期高点。这一下滑主要源于以下原因：

(1) a significant deterioration in insurance underwriting results;

保险承保业绩的大幅恶化；

(2) a considerable expansion of equity capital without a corresponding growth in the businesses we operate directly; and

股本大幅扩张，但我们直接经营的业务并未相应增长；以及

(3) a continually-enlarging commitment of our resources to investment in partially-owned, nonoperated businesses; accounting rules dictate that a major part of our pro-rata share of earnings from such businesses must be excluded from Berkshire's reported earnings.

我们对部分持股的非经营企业的投入持续增加；会计准则规定，我们在此类企业中按比例应占的收益，大部分必须从Berkshire的报告利润中剔除。

It was only a few years ago that we told you that the operating earnings/equity capital percentage, with proper allowance for a few other variables, was the most important yardstick of single-year managerial performance. While we still believe this to be the case with the vast majority of companies, we believe its utility in our own case has greatly diminished. You should be suspicious of such an assertion. Yardsticks seldom are discarded while yielding favorable readings. But when results deteriorate, most managers favor disposition of the yardstick rather than disposition of the manager.

就在几年前，我们还告诉你们，经营利润与股本之比，在适当考虑其他几个变量后，是衡量单年管理业绩最重要的尺度。尽管我们仍然认为这一点对绝大多数公司成立，但我们认为它对我们自身的适用性已大为降低。你们应当对这种说法保持警惕。尺度在给出有利读数时，鲜少会被抛弃。但当业绩恶化时，大多数管理层倾向于抛弃尺度，而非抛弃管理层自己。

To managers faced with such deterioration, a more flexible measurement system often suggests itself: just shoot the arrow of business performance into a blank canvas and then carefully draw the bullseye around the implanted arrow. We generally believe in pre-set, long-lived and small bullseyes. However, because of the importance of item (3) above, further explained in the following section, we believe our abandonment of the operating earnings/equity capital bullseye to be warranted.

面对这种业绩恶化，管理层往往会想到一套更灵活的衡量体系：先把业绩之箭射入空白画布，再仔细地围绕射入的箭画上靶心。我们一贯主张靶心应当预先设定、长期固定、范围精小。然而，鉴于上述第（3）点的重要性（详见下一节），我们认为放弃以经营利润与股本之比作为靶心，是有充分理由的。

Non-Reported Ownership Earnings

未报告的所有权收益

The appended financial statements reflect "accounting" earnings that generally include our proportionate share of earnings from any underlying business in which our ownership is at least 20%. Below the 20% ownership figure, however, only our share of dividends paid by the underlying business units is included in our accounting numbers; undistributed earnings of such less-than-20%-owned businesses are totally ignored.

附录财务报表所反映的"会计"利润，通常包含我们在持股比例不低于20%的被投资企业中，按比例应占的收益。但对于持股比例低于20%的情况，我们的会计数字中只纳入被投资企业实际派发股息中属于我们的部分；此类低于20%持股企业的未分配收益，则完全不予体现。

There are a few exceptions to this rule; e.g., we own about 35% of GEICO Corporation but, because we have assigned our voting rights, the company is treated for accounting purposes as a less-than-20% holding. Thus, dividends received from GEICO in 1982 of $3.5 million after tax are the only item included in our "accounting" earnings. An additional $23 million that represents our share of GEICO's undistributed operating earnings for 1982 is totally excluded from our reported operating earnings. If GEICO had earned less money in 1982 but had paid an additional $1 million in dividends, our reported earnings would have been larger despite the poorer business results. Conversely, if GEICO had earned an additional $100 million—and retained it all—our reported earnings would have been unchanged. Clearly "accounting" earnings can seriously misrepresent economic reality.

这一规则有若干例外。例如，我们持有GEICO Corporation约35%的股权，但由于我们已转让投票权，该公司在会计处理上被视为低于20%的持股。因此，1982年从GEICO收到的350万美元税后股息，是我们"会计"利润中唯一包含的项目。另有2300万美元——代表我们在GEICO 1982年未分配经营利润中的应占份额——被完全排除在我们的报告经营利润之外。如果GEICO在1982年赚得更少，但多派发了100万美元股息，我们报告的利润反而会更高，尽管实际业绩更差。反之，如果GEICO多赚了1亿美元并全部留存，我们的报告利润则丝毫不变。显然，"会计"利润可能严重歪曲经济现实。

We prefer a concept of "economic" earnings that includes all undistributed earnings, regardless of ownership percentage. In our view, the value to all owners of the retained earnings of a business enterprise is determined by the effectiveness with which those earnings are used—and not by the size of one's ownership percentage. If you have owned .01 of 1% of Berkshire during the past decade, you have benefited economically in full measure from your share of our retained earnings, no matter what your accounting system. Proportionately, you have done just as well as if you had owned the magic 20%. But if you have owned 100% of a great many capital-intensive businesses during the decade, retained earnings that were credited fully and with painstaking precision to you under standard accounting methods have resulted in minor or zero economic value. This is not a criticism of accounting procedures. We would not like to have the job of designing a better system. It's simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers are the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.

我们更倾向于一种"经济"利润的概念，它涵盖所有未分配收益，不论持股比例高低。在我们看来，一家企业留存收益对所有股东的价值，取决于这些收益被运用的效率——而非持股比例的大小。如果你在过去十年持有Berkshire万分之一的股份，无论采用何种会计准则，你都已从我们的留存收益中获得了与持股比例完全相称的经济回报。按比例而言，你的所得与持有那神奇的20%并无二致。但如果你在这十年间持有大量资本密集型企业100%的股权，按标准会计方法被一丝不苟地全额计入你名下的留存收益，带来的经济价值却微乎其微，甚至为零。这并非对会计程序的批评——我们并不想承担设计一套更好体系的工作。这只是想说明：无论是管理层还是投资者，都必须理解，会计数字是企业估值的起点，而非终点。

In most corporations, less-than-20% ownership positions are unimportant (perhaps, in part, because they prevent maximization of cherished reported earnings) and the distinction between accounting and economic results we have just discussed matters little. But in our own case, such positions are of very large and growing importance. Their magnitude, we believe, is what makes our reported operating earnings figure of limited significance.

在大多数公司，低于20%的持股头寸无足轻重（部分原因或许在于，此类持股无助于最大化那些备受珍视的报告利润），我们刚才讨论的会计结果与经济结果之间的差异也几乎无关紧要。但就我们自身而言，这类头寸的重要性极大，且还在持续增长。我们认为，正是其规模之大，使得我们报告的经营利润数字意义有限。

In our 1981 annual report we predicted that our share of undistributed earnings from four of our major non-controlled holdings would aggregate over $35 million in 1982. With no change in our holdings of three of these companies—GEICO, General Foods and The Washington Post—and a considerable increase in our ownership of the fourth, R. J. Reynolds Industries, our share of undistributed 1982 operating earnings of this group came to well over $40 million. This number—not reflected at all in our earnings—is greater than our total reported earnings, which include only the $14 million in dividends received from these companies. And, of course, we have a number of smaller ownership interests that, in aggregate, had substantial additional undistributed earnings.

在1981年年报中，我们预测1982年来自四家主要非控股持仓的未分配收益中，属于我们的份额将合计超过3500万美元。其中三家——GEICO、General Foods和The Washington Post——持股比例未变，第四家R. J. Reynolds Industries的持股则大幅增加，这一组合中属于我们的1982年未分配经营利润合计远超4000万美元。这一数字完全未反映在我们的利润中，却已超过我们的报告利润总额——后者仅包含从这些公司收到的1400万美元股息。当然，我们还持有若干较小的股权头寸，合计亦产生了可观的额外未分配收益。

R. J. Reynolds Industries是美国主要烟草公司之一，旗下最知名的品牌包括Camel和Winston香烟。1985年与Nabisco合并，更名为RJR Nabisco，即后来著名的杠杆收购案（1988年KKR收购RJR Nabisco）的主角。

We attach real significance to the general magnitude of these numbers, but we don't believe they should be carried to ten decimal places. Realization by Berkshire of such retained earnings through improved market valuations is subject to very substantial, but indeterminate, taxation. And while retained earnings over the years, and in the aggregate, have translated into at least equal market value for shareholders, the translation has been both extraordinarily uneven among companies and irregular and unpredictable in timing.

我们认为这些数字的大致量级具有重要意义，但我们并不认为需要将其精确到小数点后十位。Berkshire通过市值提升来实现这些留存收益，将面临相当可观但难以确定的税负。尽管多年来留存收益在总量上已为股东转化为至少等值的市场价值，但这种转化在不同公司之间极不均衡，在时间上也不规律、难以预测。

However, this very unevenness and irregularity offers advantages to the value-oriented purchaser of fractional portions of businesses. This investor may select from almost the entire array of major American corporations, including many far superior to virtually any of the businesses that could be bought in their entirety in a negotiated deal. And fractional-interest purchases can be made in an auction market where prices are set by participants with behavior patterns that sometimes resemble those of an army of manic-depressive lemmings.

然而，正是这种不均衡与不规律，为以价值为导向的部分股权买家提供了优势。这类投资者几乎可以从美国所有主要上市公司中自由挑选，其中不乏远优于任何可通过协议谈判整体收购的企业。而部分股权的买入，可以在一个拍卖市场中完成——在那里，定价者的行为模式有时酷似一群狂躁抑郁症发作的旅鼠。

Within this gigantic auction arena, it is our job to select businesses with economic characteristics allowing each dollar of retained earnings to be translated eventually into at least a dollar of market value. Despite a lot of mistakes, we have so far achieved this goal. In doing so, we have been greatly assisted by Arthur Okun's patron saint for economists—St. Offset. In some cases, that is, retained earnings attributable to our ownership position have had insignificant or even negative impact on market value, while in other major positions a dollar retained by an investee corporation has been translated into two or more dollars of market value. To date, our corporate over-achievers have more than offset the laggards. If we can continue this record, it will validate our efforts to maximize "economic" earnings, regardless of the impact upon "accounting" earnings.

在这个巨大的拍卖场中，我们的任务是挑选那些具备优良经济特征的企业——使每一美元留存收益最终能转化为至少一美元的市场价值。尽管犯过不少错误，我们迄今仍实现了这一目标。在此过程中，Arthur Okun为经济学家供奉的守护圣人——"抵消圣人"（St. Offset）——给了我们极大的帮助。也就是说，在某些情况下，归属于我们持股部分的留存收益对市场价值几乎没有贡献，甚至产生了负面影响；而在另一些重要持仓中，被投资企业每留存一美元，却转化为两美元乃至更多的市场价值。迄今为止，我们的超额表现者已充分弥补了落后者的拖累。如果我们能延续这一记录，将验证我们致力于最大化"经济"利润的努力，无论其对"会计"利润的影响如何。

Satisfactory as our partial-ownership approach has been, what really makes us dance is the purchase of 100% of good businesses at reasonable prices. We've accomplished this feat a few times (and expect to do so again), but it is an extraordinarily difficult job—far more difficult than the purchase at attractive prices of fractional interests.

尽管我们的部分股权方式令人满意，但真正让我们手舞足蹈的，是以合理价格买下优秀企业的100%股权。我们已经做到过几次（并期待再度做到），但这是一件极其困难的事——远比以有吸引力的价格买入部分股权难得多。

As we look at the major acquisitions that others made during 1982, our reaction is not envy, but relief that we were non-participants. For in many of these acquisitions, managerial intellect wilted in competition with managerial adrenaline. The thrill of the chase blinded the pursuers to the consequences of the catch. Pascal's observation seems apt: "It has struck me that all men's misfortunes spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room."

回顾1982年他人完成的重大收购，我们的感受不是羡慕，而是庆幸自己置身事外。因为在许多这类收购中，管理层的理智败给了肾上腺素。追逐的快感令追猎者对猎获的后果视而不见。Pascal的观察在此颇为贴切："我深感震惊——人类所有的不幸，皆源于同一个原因：他们无法安静地待在一个房间里。"

(Your Chairman left the room once too often last year and almost starred in the Acquisition Follies of 1982. In retrospect, our major accomplishment of the year was that a very large purchase to which we had firmly committed was unable to be completed for reasons totally beyond our control. Had it come off, this transaction would have consumed extraordinary amounts of time and energy, all for a most uncertain payoff. If we were to introduce graphics to this report, illustrating favorable business developments of the past year, two blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate centerfold.)

（你们的董事长去年离开房间的次数实在太多了一次，差点在"1982年收购闹剧"中主演一角。事后回想，我们这一年最大的成就，是一笔我们已经坚定承诺的重大收购，因完全超出我们控制的原因而未能完成。如果这笔交易真的成交，将会消耗大量的时间和精力，换来的却是极不确定的回报。如果我们要在这份报告中加入图表，用来展示过去一年令人欣慰的业务进展，那么用两页空白来描绘这笔告吹的交易，将是最恰当的跨页插图。）

Our partial-ownership approach can be continued soundly only as long as portions of attractive businesses can be acquired at attractive prices. We need a moderately-priced stock market to assist us in this endeavor. The market, like the Lord, helps those who help themselves. But, unlike the Lord, the market does not forgive those who know not what they do. For the investor, a too-high purchase price for the stock of an excellent company can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable business developments.

我们的部分股权方式能否持续健全地推进，完全取决于能否以有吸引力的价格买入优秀企业的部分股权。我们需要一个定价适中的股票市场来配合这一努力。市场如同上帝，会帮助那些自助者。但与上帝不同，市场不会宽恕那些不知道自己在做什么的人。对投资者而言，以过高的价格买入一家优秀公司的股票，足以抵消此后十年有利业务发展所带来的全部成果。

Should the stock market advance to considerably higher levels, our ability to utilize capital effectively in partial-ownership positions will be reduced or eliminated. This will happen periodically: just ten years ago, at the height of the two-tier market mania (with high-return-on-equity businesses bid to the sky by institutional investors), Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries owned only $18 million in market value of equities, excluding their interest in Blue Chip Stamps. At that time, such equity holdings amounted to about 15% of our insurance company investments versus the present 80%. There were as many good businesses around in 1972 as in 1982, but the prices the stock market placed upon those businesses in 1972 looked absurd. While high stock prices in the future would make our performance look good temporarily, they would hurt our long-term business prospects rather than help them. We currently are seeing early traces of this problem.

一旦股票市场大幅上涨至更高水平，我们通过部分股权有效运用资本的能力将会削弱乃至消失。这种情况会周期性地出现：就在十年前，在"两级市场"狂热的顶峰（机构投资者将高股本回报率企业的股价哄抬至天际），Berkshire保险子公司持有的股票市值（不含其在Blue Chip Stamps的权益）仅有1800万美元。彼时，此类股票持仓约占我们保险公司投资组合的15%，而现在这一比例已达80%。1972年与1982年同样不乏优秀企业，但股市在1972年对这些企业的定价看起来荒谬至极。尽管未来股价高企会让我们的业绩短期内看起来亮眼，但对我们的长期业务前景而言是损害而非裨益。目前我们已经隐约看到了这一问题的苗头。

Long-Term Corporate Performance

长期的公司业绩

Our gain in net worth during 1982, valuing equities held by our insurance subsidiaries at market value (less capital gain taxes payable if unrealized gains were actually realized) amounted to $208 million. On a beginning net worth base of $519 million, the percentage gain was 40%.

1982年我们的净资产增长了2.08亿美元——保险子公司持有的股票按市值计算，并扣除未实现收益若实际兑现所需缴纳的资本利得税。以期初净资产5.19亿美元为基数，增幅为40%。

During the 18-year tenure of present management, book value has grown from $19.46 per share to $737.43 per share, or 22.0% compounded annually. You can be certain that this percentage will diminish in the future. Geometric progressions eventually forge their own anchors.

在现任管理层执掌的18年间，账面价值从每股19.46美元增长至737.43美元，年复合增长率为22.0%。你们可以确信，这一比率在未来必将下降。几何级数终将为自身锻造锚点。

Berkshire's economic goal remains to produce a long-term rate of return well above the return achieved by the average large American corporation. Our willingness to purchase either partial or total ownership positions in favorably-situated businesses, coupled with reasonable discipline about the prices we are willing to pay, should give us a good chance of achieving our goal.

Berkshire的经济目标依然是实现远高于美国大型企业平均水平的长期回报率。我们愿意以合理的价格纪律，买入处于有利地位企业的部分或全部股权，这应当使我们有较大把握实现这一目标。

Again this year the gain in market valuation of partially-owned businesses outpaced the gain in underlying economic value of those businesses. For example, $79 million of our $208 million gain is attributable to an increased market price for GEICO. This company continues to do exceptionally well, and we are more impressed than ever by the strength of GEICO's basic business idea and by the management skills of Jack Byrne. (Although not found in the catechism of the better business schools, "Let Jack Do It" works fine as a corporate creed for us.)

今年，部分持股企业的市值增幅再度超过其内在经济价值的增幅。例如，我们2.08亿美元收益中有7900万美元来自GEICO市价的上涨。这家公司持续表现出色，我们对GEICO基本商业理念的强大力量以及Jack Byrne的管理才能，比以往任何时候都更为折服。（虽然在顶尖商学院的教义中找不到这条，但"让Jack来做"作为我们的企业信条，效果极佳。）

However, GEICO's increase in market value during the past two years has been considerably greater than the gain in its intrinsic business value, impressive as the latter has been. We expected such a favorable variation at some point, as the perception of investors converged with business reality. And we look forward to substantial future gains in underlying business value accompanied by irregular, but eventually full, market recognition of such gains.

然而，GEICO过去两年的市值增幅已远超其内在商业价值的增长——尽管后者本身已相当可观。我们预料到在某个时点会出现这种有利偏差，那是投资者的认知向商业现实靠拢的结果。我们期待未来内在商业价值取得实质性增长，并最终获得市场的充分认可——尽管这一认可的过程将是不规律的。

Year-to-year variances, however, cannot consistently be in our favor. Even if our partially-owned businesses continue to perform well in an economic sense, there will be years when they perform poorly in the market. At such times our net worth could shrink significantly. We will not be distressed by such a shrinkage; if the businesses continue to look attractive and we have cash available, we simply will add to our holdings at even more favorable prices.

然而，逐年的偏差不可能始终对我们有利。即便我们的部分持股企业在经济意义上持续表现良好，也会有某些年份其市场表现差强人意。届时我们的净资产可能大幅缩水。对于这种缩水，我们不会感到忧虑——如果这些企业依然具有吸引力，而我们手头有现金，我们只会以更有利的价格继续增持。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In 1981 and 1982 Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owned 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.

下表列示了Berkshire报告收益的各项来源。1981年和1982年，Berkshire持有Blue Chip Stamps约60%的股权，后者又持有Wesco Financial Corporation 80%的股权。该表同时列示了各业务实体的汇总经营利润，以及Berkshire在其中应占的份额。各业务实体因非经常性资产出售所产生的重大损益，均并入表格底部附近"证券交易"一行，不计入经营利润。

On pages 45-61 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of Blue Chip and Wesco, in which they describe 1982 operations. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Jeanne Leach for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

本报告第45至61页转载了Blue Chip和Wesco主要管理人员的叙述性报告，其中描述了1982年的经营情况。如需索取任一公司的完整年报，Berkshire股东可致函以下地址：Blue Chip Stamps请联系Robert H. Bird先生，地址为加利福尼亚州洛杉矶市South Eastern Avenue 5801号，邮编90040；Wesco Financial Corporation请联系Jeanne Leach女士，地址为加利福尼亚州帕萨迪纳市East Colorado Boulevard 315号，邮编91109。

I believe you will find the Blue Chip chronicle of developments in the Buffalo newspaper situation particularly interesting. There are now only 14 cities in the United States with a daily newspaper whose weekday circulation exceeds that of the Buffalo News. But the real story has been the growth in Sunday circulation. Six years ago, prior to introduction of a Sunday edition of the News, the long-established Courier-Express, as the only Sunday newspaper published in Buffalo, had circulation of 272,000. The News now has Sunday circulation of 367,000, a 35% gain—even though the number of households within the primary circulation area has shown little change during the six years. We know of no city in the United States with a long history of seven-day newspaper publication in which the percentage of households purchasing the Sunday newspaper has grown at anything like this rate. To the contrary, in most cities household penetration figures have grown negligibly, or not at all. Our key managers in Buffalo—Henry Urban, Stan Lipsey, Murray Light, Clyde Pinson, Dave Perona and Dick Feather—deserve great credit for this unmatched expansion in Sunday readership.

我相信你们会发现，Blue Chip关于Buffalo报业形势发展的记述尤为引人入胜。目前全美只有14个城市的日报工作日发行量超过Buffalo News。但真正令人瞩目的，是周日版发行量的增长。六年前，在News推出周日版之前，老牌的Courier-Express作为Buffalo唯一的周日报纸，发行量为27.2万份。如今News的周日版发行量已达36.7万份，增长35%——尽管主要发行区域内的家庭数量六年来几乎没有变化。据我们所知，在美国所有拥有七日出版悠久历史的城市中，没有任何一个城市的周日报纸家庭订阅渗透率能以接近这样的速度增长。恰恰相反，大多数城市的家庭渗透率几乎毫无增长，甚至停滞不前。我们在Buffalo的核心管理团队——Henry Urban、Stan Lipsey、Murray Light、Clyde Pinson、Dave Perona和Dick Feather——为这一无可比拟的周日读者群扩张居功至伟。

As we indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion of non-controlled earnings, of course, finds its way into that table primarily through the net investment income segment of Insurance Group earnings.

如我们此前所述，我们在非控股企业中的未分配收益，如今与前表所列的报告经营利润同等重要。非控股企业已分配收益的部分，当然主要通过保险集团收益中的净投资收益一项体现于该表之中。

We show below Berkshire's proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our earnings.

下表列示了Berkshire在各非控股企业中的持股比例——对于这些企业，我们的收益中仅计入已分配收益（股息）。

In case you haven't noticed, there is an important investment lesson to be derived from this table: nostalgia should be weighted heavily in stock selection. Our two largest unrealized gains are in Washington Post and GEICO, companies with which your Chairman formed his first commercial connections at the ages of 13 and 20, respectively After straying for roughly 25 years, we returned as investors in the mid-1970s. The table quantifies the rewards for even long-delayed corporate fidelity.

如果你们尚未留意，这张表格中蕴含着一条重要的投资启示：在选股时，应当对"怀旧情结"给予充分的权重。我们两笔最大的未实现收益分别来自Washington Post和GEICO——你们的董事长与这两家公司的初次商业缘分，分别始于他13岁和20岁之时。在游离了大约25年之后，我们于1970年代中期以投资者的身份重返。这张表格，将迟来的企业忠诚所换来的回报，以数字的形式呈现了出来。

Our controlled and non-controlled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum that detailed commentary here would prove too lengthy. Much financial and operational information regarding the controlled businesses is included in Management's Discussion on pages 34-39, and in the narrative reports on pages 45-61. However, our largest area of business activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the property-casualty insurance area. So commentary on developments in that industry is appropriate.

我们的控股与非控股业务涵盖范围极广，若在此逐一详述，篇幅将过于冗长。有关控股业务的大量财务与经营信息，已载于第34至39页的管理层讨论，以及第45至61页的叙述性报告中。然而，我们最主要的业务领域一直是，且几乎可以肯定将继续是财产意外险领域。因此，对该行业发展动态作一番评述是适宜的。

Insurance Industry Conditions

保险业务

We show below an updated table of the industry statistics we utilized in last year’s annual report. Its message is clear: underwriting results in 1983 will not be a sight for the squeamish.

下表是去年年报中使用过的最新行业统计数据表。它传达的信息很明确：对那些胆小鬼来说，1983 年的承销结果将不敢直视。

The Best's data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total operating and loss costs as compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

Best's数据反映了几乎整个行业的经营情况，涵盖股份制、互助制和互惠制保险公司。综合比率代表总运营成本与赔付成本之和与保费收入之比；低于100表示承保盈利，高于100则表示亏损。

For reasons outlined in last year's report, as long as the annual gain in industry premiums written falls well below 10%, you can expect the underwriting picture in the next year to deteriorate. This will be true even at today's lower general rate of inflation. With the number of policies increasing annually, medical inflation far exceeding general inflation, and concepts of insured liability broadening, it is highly unlikely that yearly increases in insured losses will fall much below 10%.

基于去年报告中阐述的原因，只要行业保费收入的年增幅远低于10%，就可以预期次年的承保状况将会恶化。即便在当前较低的整体通胀环境下，这一判断依然成立。随着保单数量逐年增加、医疗通胀大幅超越整体通胀，以及保险责任概念的持续扩展，保险赔付损失的年增幅不太可能大幅低于10%。

You should be further aware that the 1982 combined ratio of 109.5 represents a "best case" estimate. In a given year, it is possible for an insurer to show almost any profit number it wishes, particularly if it (1) writes "long-tail" business (coverage where current costs can be only estimated, because claim payments are long delayed), (2) has been adequately reserved in the past, or (3) is growing very rapidly. There are indications that several large insurers opted in 1982 for obscure accounting and reserving maneuvers that masked significant deterioration in their underlying businesses. In insurance, as elsewhere, the reaction of weak managements to weak operations is often weak accounting. ("It's difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.")

你们还应当了解，1982年109.5的综合比率不过是一个"最乐观"的估计。在某一特定年度，一家保险公司几乎可以呈现任何它希望展示的利润数字，尤其是当它（1）承保"长尾"业务（即当前成本只能估算、因为赔付迟迟延后才发生的险种），（2）过去积累了充足的准备金，或（3）正处于高速扩张阶段。有迹象表明，若干大型保险公司在1982年采用了晦涩的会计手法和准备金操作，掩盖了其基础业务的重大恶化。俗话说空麻袋很难立起来，保险业像其它行业一样，糟糕的管理面对糟糕的经营结果的本能反应往往是糟糕的会计掩饰。

The great majority of managements, however, try to play it straight. But even managements of integrity may subconsciously be less willing in poor profit years to fully recognize adverse loss trends. Industry statistics indicate some deterioration in loss reserving practices during 1982 and the true combined ratio is likely to be modestly worse than indicated by our table.

然而，绝大多数管理层仍力求如实反映。但即便是诚信的管理层，在盈利不佳的年份，也可能在潜意识中不愿充分确认不利的赔付趋势。行业统计数据显示，1982年赔付准备金计提实践有所恶化，真实的综合比率很可能比我们表格所呈现的略差。

The conventional wisdom is that 1983 or 1984 will see the worst of underwriting experience and then, as in the past, the "cycle" will move, significantly and steadily, toward better results. We disagree because of a pronounced change in the competitive environment, hard to see for many years but now quite visible.

传统观点认为，1983年或1984年将是承保业绩最差的时期，此后如历史规律一样，"周期"将显著而稳定地朝着好转的方向演进。我们对此持异议——原因在于竞争环境出现了一个显著变化，多年来难以察觉，但如今已相当清晰。

To understand the change, we need to look at some major factors that affect levels of corporate profitability generally. Businesses in industries with both substantial over-capacity and a "commodity" product (undifferentiated in any customer-important way by factors such as performance, appearance, service support, etc.) are prime candidates for profit troubles. These may be escaped, true, if prices or costs are administered in some manner and thereby insulated at least partially from normal market forces. This administration can be carried out (a) legally through government intervention (until recently, this category included pricing for truckers and deposit costs for financial institutions), (b) illegally through collusion, or (c) "extra-legally" through OPEC-style foreign cartelization (with tag-along benefits for domestic non-cartel operators).

要理解这一变化，我们需要审视若干普遍影响企业盈利水平的主要因素。在产能严重过剩且产品高度同质化（在客户关心的任何维度上——如性能、外观、服务支持等——均无差异）的行业中，企业最容易陷入盈利困境。当然，若价格或成本能够以某种方式得到管控，从而至少部分隔离于正常市场力量之外，这种困境或可避免。这种管控可以通过以下方式实现：（a）政府干预下的合法管控（直至近期，这一类别还包括对卡车运输商的定价管制以及对金融机构的存款成本管制）；（b）通过合谋进行的非法管控；或（c）通过OPEC式的境外卡特尔化实施的"法外"管控（国内非卡特尔运营商可顺势搭车获益）。

If, however, costs and prices are determined by full-bore competition, there is more than ample capacity, and the buyer cares little about whose product or distribution services he uses, industry economics are almost certain to be unexciting. They may well be disastrous.

然而，如果成本与价格完全由充分竞争决定，产能远超需求，而买家对选用谁的产品或分销服务又漠然置之，那么该行业的经济前景几乎注定令人提不起兴趣。甚至可能是灾难性的。

Hence the constant struggle of every vendor to establish and emphasize special qualities of product or service. This works with candy bars (customers buy by brand name, not by asking for a "two-ounce candy bar") but doesn't work with sugar (how often do you hear, "I'll have a cup of coffee with cream and C & H sugar, please").

因此，每一个供应商都在不断努力，试图建立并强调其产品或服务的独特品质。这对棒棒糖有效（顾客按品牌购买，而不是开口要"两盎司棒棒糖"），但对白糖却行不通（你多久才会听到有人说："请给我一杯咖啡，加奶油，用C&H的糖"）。

In many industries, differentiation simply can't be made meaningful. A few producers in such industries may consistently do well if they have a cost advantage that is both wide and sustainable. By definition such exceptions are few, and, in many industries, are non-existent. For the great majority of companies selling "commodity" products, a depressing equation of business economics prevails: persistent over-capacity without administered prices (or costs) equals poor profitability.

在许多行业，差异化根本无从实现。在这类行业中，少数生产商若拥有既宽广又可持续的成本优势，或许能持续表现出色。但按定义，此类例外寥寥无几，在许多行业中甚至根本不存在。对于绝大多数销售同质化产品的公司而言，一个令人沮丧的商业经济等式始终成立：持续的产能过剩加上缺乏价格（或成本）管控，等于低劣的盈利能力。

Of course, over-capacity may eventually self-correct, either as capacity shrinks or demand expands. Unfortunately for the participants, such corrections often are long delayed. When they finally occur, the rebound to prosperity frequently produces a pervasive enthusiasm for expansion that, within a few years, again creates over-capacity and a new profitless environment. In other words, nothing fails like success.

当然，产能过剩最终可能通过产能收缩或需求扩张实现自我修正。然而不幸的是，对于身处其中的参与者而言，这种修正往往迟迟不来。而当它终于到来时，复苏带来的普遍扩张热情，往往在数年之内再度制造出新一轮产能过剩和无利可图的环境。换言之，没有什么比成功更容易导致失败。

What finally determines levels of long-term profitability in such industries is the ratio of supply-tight to supply-ample years. Frequently that ratio is dismal. (It seems as if the most recent supply-tight period in our textile business—it occurred some years back—lasted the better part of a morning.)

在这类行业中，最终决定长期盈利水平的，是供给紧张年份与供给充裕年份的比例。这一比例通常令人沮丧。（我们纺织业务最近一次供给紧张的时期——发生在若干年前——似乎撑不过一个上午的大半。）

In some industries, however, capacity-tight conditions can last a long time. Sometimes actual growth in demand will outrun forecasted growth for an extended period. In other cases, adding capacity requires very long lead times because complicated manufacturing facilities must be planned and built.

然而在某些行业，产能紧张的状态可以持续相当长的时间。有时实际需求增长会在较长时期内超出预测增长。另一些情况下，扩充产能需要极长的准备周期，因为复杂的生产设施必须经过规划和建设。

But in the insurance business, to return to that subject, capacity can be instantly created by capital plus an underwriter's willingness to sign his name. (Even capital is less important in a world in which state-sponsored guaranty funds protect many policyholders against insurer insolvency.) Under almost all conditions except that of fear for survival—produced, perhaps, by a stock market debacle or a truly major natural disaster—the insurance industry operates under the competitive sword of substantial overcapacity. Generally, also, despite heroic attempts to do otherwise, the industry sells a relatively undifferentiated commodity-type product. (Many insureds, including the managers of large businesses, do not even know the names of their insurers.) Insurance, therefore, would seem to be a textbook case of an industry usually faced with the deadly combination of excess capacity and a "commodity" product.

但回到保险业这一话题——在这个行业，产能可以由资本加上承保人愿意签字的意愿即时创造出来。（在各州政府担保基金保护众多投保人免受保险公司破产之虞的世界里，资本的重要性甚至有所降低。）除了因股市崩溃或真正重大自然灾害所引发的生存危机之外，在几乎所有情形下，保险业都在严重产能过剩的竞争利剑之下运营。此外，尽管业界作出种种努力，保险业销售的通常仍是相对同质化的大宗商品类产品。（许多投保人，包括大企业的管理层，甚至不知道自己保险公司的名字。）因此，保险业堪称教科书式的案例——一个长期面临产能过剩与同质化产品这一致命组合的行业。

Why, then, was underwriting, despite the existence of cycles, generally profitable over many decades? (From 1950 through 1970, the industry combined ratio averaged 99.0. allowing all investment income plus 1% of premiums to flow through to profits.) The answer lies primarily in the historic methods of regulation and distribution. For much of this century, a large portion of the industry worked, in effect, within a legal quasi-administered pricing system fostered by insurance regulators. While price competition existed, it was not pervasive among the larger companies. The main competition was for agents, who were courted via various non-price-related strategies.

那么，为何承保业务尽管存在周期波动，在过去数十年间总体上仍能保持盈利？（从1950年到1970年，行业综合比率平均为99.0，使得全部投资收益加上1%的保费得以转化为利润。）答案主要在于历史上的监管与分销方式。在本世纪的大部分时间里，很大一部分保险业实际上是在保险监管机构所扶持的一套合法的准管制定价体系内运作的。价格竞争虽然存在，但在大型公司之间并不普遍。主要的竞争集中在对代理人的争夺上，各方通过各种与价格无关的策略来赢得代理人的青睐。

For the giants of the industry, most rates were set through negotiations between industry "bureaus" (or through companies acting in accord with their recommendations) and state regulators. Dignified haggling occurred, but it was between company and regulator rather than between company and customer. When the dust settled, Giant A charged the same price as Giant B—and both companies and agents were prohibited by law from cutting such filed rates.

对于行业巨头而言，大多数费率通过行业"协会"（或按照其建议行事的公司）与州监管机构之间的谈判来确定。虽有一番体面的讨价还价，但那是在公司与监管机构之间进行的，而非公司与客户之间。尘埃落定之后，巨头A与巨头B收取相同的价格——而法律明令禁止公司和代理人擅自降低已备案的费率。

The company-state negotiated prices included specific profit allowances and, when loss data indicated that current prices were unprofitable, both company managements and state regulators expected that they would act together to correct the situation. Thus, most of the pricing actions of the giants of the industry were "gentlemanly", predictable, and profit-producing. Of prime importance—and in contrast to the way most of the business world operated—insurance companies could legally price their way to profitability even in the face of substantial over-capacity.

公司与州政府协商确定的费率包含了具体的利润容差，当赔付数据显示当前费率已无利可图时，公司管理层与州监管机构都预期双方会携手纠正这一局面。因此，行业巨头的大多数定价行为是"君子式的"、可预期的，且能产生利润的。至关重要的一点——与商业世界大多数行业的运作方式截然不同——保险公司即便面对严重的产能过剩，也能合法地通过定价手段维持盈利。

That day is gone. Although parts of the old structure remain, far more than enough new capacity exists outside of that structure to force all parties, old and new, to respond. The new capacity uses various methods of distribution and is not reluctant to use price as a prime competitive weapon. Indeed, it relishes that use. In the process, customers have learned that insurance is no longer a one-price business. They won't forget.

那个时代已经过去。尽管旧体制的部分残余尚存，但游离于该体制之外的新产能已远远过剩，足以迫使新旧各方不得不作出回应。新产能采用多样化的分销方式，毫不忌惮地将价格作为主要竞争武器，甚至乐此不疲。在这一过程中，客户已经意识到保险不再是统一定价的生意。这一认知不会消失。

Future profitability of the industry will be determined by current competitive characteristics, not past ones. Many managers have been slow to recognize this. It's not only generals that prefer to fight the last war. Most business and investment analysis also comes from the rear-view mirror. It seems clear to us, however, that only one condition will allow the insurance industry to achieve significantly improved underwriting results. That is the same condition that will allow better results for the aluminum, copper, or corn producer—a major narrowing of the gap between demand and supply.

行业未来的盈利能力将由当前的竞争特征决定，而非过去的。许多管理层对此认识迟缓。偏爱打上一场战争的不只是将军。大多数商业与投资分析同样来自后视镜。然而在我们看来，有且只有一种条件，能让保险行业的承保业绩实现显著改善——那与让铝、铜或玉米生产商获得更好业绩的条件相同：供需缺口的大幅收窄。

Unfortunately, there can be no surge in demand for insurance policies comparable to one that might produce a market tightness in copper or aluminum. Rather, the supply of available insurance coverage must be curtailed. "Supply", in this context, is mental rather than physical: plants or companies need not be shut; only the willingness of underwriters to sign their names need be curtailed.

不幸的是，保险需求不可能出现类似铜或铝市场那样能够造成供给紧张的需求激增。真正需要收缩的，是可供保险承保的供给。这里所说的"供给"，是心理层面的而非物质层面的：无需关闭工厂或公司，只需收敛承保人签字画押的意愿即可。

This contraction will not happen because of generally poor profit levels. Bad profits produce much hand-wringing and finger-pointing. But they do not lead major sources of insurance capacity to turn their backs on very large chunks of business, thereby sacrificing market share and industry significance.

这种收缩不会仅仅因为普遍低迷的利润水平而发生。糟糕的利润只会引发大量的哀叹与相互指责，却不会促使主要保险产能来源放弃大量业务，从而牺牲市场份额与行业地位。

Instead, major capacity withdrawals require a shock factor such as a natural or financial "megadisaster". One might occur tomorrow—or many years from now. The insurance business—even taking investment income into account—will not be particularly profitable in the meantime.

相反，主要产能的退出需要一个冲击性因素，例如自然界或金融领域的"巨灾"。这种事件也许明天就会发生，也许要等到许多年之后。在此之前，保险业——即便将投资收益纳入考量——将不会有特别可观的盈利。

When supply ultimately contracts, large amounts of business will be available for the few with large capital capacity, a willingness to commit it, and an in-place distribution system. We would expect great opportunities for our insurance subsidiaries at such a time.

当供给最终收缩时，大量业务将向少数几家手握雄厚资本、愿意投入资本且拥有现成分销体系的公司敞开。届时，我们预期我们的保险子公司将迎来绝佳的机遇。

During 1982, our insurance underwriting deteriorated far more than did the industry's. From a profit position well above average, we slipped to a performance modestly below average. The biggest swing was in National Indemnity's traditional coverages. Lines that have been highly profitable for us in the past are now priced at levels that guarantee underwriting losses. In 1983 we expect our insurance group to record an average performance in an industry in which average is very poor.

1982年，我们的保险承保业绩恶化程度远超行业平均水平。我们从远高于平均水平的盈利位置，滑落至略低于平均水平的表现。最大的落差出现在National Indemnity的传统险种上。过去为我们带来丰厚盈利的险种，如今的定价水平已注定会产生承保亏损。1983年，我们预计我们的保险集团将在一个"平均即糟糕"的行业中录得平均水平的业绩。

Two of our stars, Milt Thornton at Cypress and Floyd Taylor at Kansas Fire and Casualty, continued their outstanding records of producing an underwriting profit every year since joining us. Both Milt and Floyd simply are incapable of being average. They maintain a passionately proprietary attitude toward their operations and have developed a business culture centered upon unusual cost-consciousness and customer service. It shows on their scorecards.

我们旗下的两位明星——Cypress的Milt Thornton和Kansas Fire and Casualty的Floyd Taylor——自加入我们以来，每年均实现承保盈利的卓越记录得以延续。Milt和Floyd这两个人，根本不具备平庸的能力。他们对各自的业务怀有一种近乎主人翁式的热忱，并建立了一种以非凡的成本意识和客户服务为核心的企业文化。他们的成绩单说明了一切。

During 1982, parent company responsibility for most of our insurance operations was given to Mike Goldberg. Planning, recruitment, and monitoring all have shown significant improvement since Mike replaced me in this role.

1982年，母公司对大部分保险业务的管理责任移交给了Mike Goldberg。自Mike接替我承担这一职责以来，规划、招募与监督各方面均有显著改善。

GEICO continues to be managed with a zeal for efficiency and value to the customer that virtually guarantees unusual success. Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder are achieving the most elusive of human goals—keeping things simple and remembering what you set out to do. In Lou Simpson, additionally, GEICO has the best investment manager in the property-casualty business. We are happy with every aspect of this operation. GEICO is a magnificent illustration of the high-profit exception we described earlier in discussing commodity industries with over-capacity—a company with a wide and sustainable cost advantage. Our 35% interest in GEICO represents about $250 million of premium volume, an amount considerably greater than all of the direct volume we produce.

GEICO始终以对效率和客户价值的高度热忱来经营管理，这几乎注定了其非凡的成功。Jack Byrne和Bill Snyder正在实现人类最难以企及的目标——保持简单，并始终记得自己出发时的初心。此外，GEICO还拥有Lou Simpson——财产意外险行业中最出色的投资经理。我们对这家公司的每一个方面都感到满意。GEICO是我们此前在讨论产能过剩的同质化行业时所描述的那种高盈利例外的绝佳范本——一家拥有宽广且可持续成本优势的公司。我们持有GEICO 35%的权益，对应约2.5亿美元的保费规模，远超我们直接承保业务的全部保费量。

Issuance of Equity

发行股份

Berkshire and Blue Chip are considering merger in 1983. If it takes place, it will involve an exchange of stock based upon an identical valuation method applied to both companies. The one other significant issuance of shares by Berkshire or its affiliated companies that occurred during present management's tenure was in the 1978 merger of Berkshire with Diversified Retailing Company.

Berkshire与Blue Chip正在考虑于1983年合并。如果合并成行，将涉及基于对两家公司采用相同估值方法的股票交换。在现任管理层任期内，Berkshire或其关联公司另一次重要的股份发行，发生在1978年Berkshire与Diversified Retailing Company的合并中。

Our share issuances follow a simple basic rule: we will not issue shares unless we receive as much intrinsic business value as we give. Such a policy might seem axiomatic. Why, you might ask, would anyone issue dollar bills in exchange for fifty-cent pieces? Unfortunately, many corporate managers have been willing to do just that.

我们的股份发行遵循一条简单的基本原则：除非我们所获得的内在商业价值与我们所付出的相当，否则我们不会发行股份。这一原则看似不言而喻。你或许会问：谁会愿意用一美元纸币换五十美分硬币呢？遗憾的是，许多企业管理层恰恰愿意这样做。

The first choice of these managers in making acquisitions may be to use cash or debt. But frequently the CEO's cravings outpace cash and credit resources (certainly mine always have). Frequently, also, these cravings occur when his own stock is selling far below intrinsic business value. This state of affairs produces a moment of truth. At that point, as Yogi Berra has said, "You can observe a lot just by watching." For shareholders then will find which objective the management truly prefers—expansion of domain or maintenance of owners' wealth.

这些管理层在进行收购时，首选或许是动用现金或举债。但CEO的欲望往往超出现金与信贷资源所能支撑的范围（我自己肯定也一直如此）。而且，这种欲望往往在自家股票的市价远低于内在商业价值时涌现。这种局面会造就一个见真章的时刻。正如Yogi Berra所说："光靠观察，你就能看到很多。"届时股东将发现，管理层真正看重的目标究竟是扩张版图，还是维护股东财富。

The need to choose between these objectives occurs for some simple reasons. Companies often sell in the stock market below their intrinsic business value. But when a company wishes to sell out completely, in a negotiated transaction, it inevitably wants to—and usually can—receive full business value in whatever kind of currency the value is to be delivered. If cash is to be used in payment, the seller's calculation of value received couldn't be easier. If stock of the buyer is to be the currency, the seller's calculation is still relatively easy: just figure the market value in cash of what is to be received in stock.

在这两个目标之间必须作出抉择，原因很简单。公司在股票市场上的交易价格往往低于其内在商业价值。但当一家公司希望在协议交易中整体出售时，它必然希望——通常也能够——以任何支付形式获得完整的商业价值。如果以现金支付，卖方对所获价值的计算再简单不过。如果以买方股票作为支付货币，卖方的计算仍然相对容易：只需折算成现金，算出所收股票的市场价值即可。

Meanwhile, the buyer wishing to use his own stock as currency for the purchase has no problems if the stock is selling in the market at full intrinsic value.

与此同时，若买方希望以本公司股票作为收购货币，只要该股票在市场上的交易价格反映了完整的内在价值，便不存在任何问题。

But suppose it is selling at only half intrinsic value. In that case, the buyer is faced with the unhappy prospect of using a substantially undervalued currency to make its purchase.

但假设该股票的交易价格仅为内在价值的一半。在这种情况下，买方将面临一个令人沮丧的前景：以大幅低估的货币来完成收购。

Ironically, were the buyer to instead be a seller of its entire business, it too could negotiate for, and probably get, full intrinsic business value. But when the buyer makes a partial sale of itself—and that is what the issuance of shares to make an acquisition amounts to—it can customarily get no higher value set on its shares than the market chooses to grant it.

颇具讽刺意味的是，如果买方反过来整体出售自身业务，它同样可以谈判争取到——并且很可能真的获得——完整的内在商业价值。但当买方对自身进行部分出售时——发行股票进行收购本质上就是如此——它通常只能接受市场愿意赋予其股票的价值，而无法获得更高的估值。

The acquirer who nevertheless barges ahead ends up using an undervalued (market value) currency to pay for a fully valued (negotiated value) property. In effect, the acquirer must give up $2 of value to receive $1 of value. Under such circumstances, a marvelous business purchased at a fair sales price becomes a terrible buy. For gold valued as gold cannot be purchased intelligently through the utilization of gold—or even silver—valued as lead.

仍然一意孤行的收购方，最终是在用低估的（市场价值）货币购买充分定价的（协议价值）资产。实际上，收购方必须付出2美元的价值，才能换回1美元的价值。在这种情况下，即便以公允价格买入一家出色的企业，也会变成一笔糟糕的交易。因为以黄金之价值的黄金，无法用被当作铅来估价的黄金——甚至白银——来聪明地购买。

为自己喜欢的东西付出更高的代价。

If, however, the thirst for size and action is strong enough, the acquirer's manager will find ample rationalizations for such a value-destroying issuance of stock. Friendly investment bankers will reassure him as to the soundness of his actions. (Don't ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)

然而，如果对规模与行动的渴望足够强烈，收购方的管理层总能为这种损害价值的股票发行找到充足的理由。友善的投资银行家会向他保证其行为的合理性。（别去问理发师你是否需要理发。）

A few favorite rationalizations employed by stock-issuing managements follow:

以下是发行股票的管理层惯用的几种借口：

(a) "The company we're buying is going to be worth a lot more in the future." (Presumably so is the interest in the old business that is being traded away; future prospects are implicit in the business valuation process. If 2X is issued for X, the imbalance still exists when both parts double in business value.)

"我们收购的公司未来将价值更高。"（被交换出去的原有业务权益想必同样如此；未来前景已隐含在企业估值过程之中。如果以2X换取X，那么当双方的业务价值都翻倍时，这种失衡依然存在。）

(b) "We have to grow." (Who, it might be asked, is the "we"? For present shareholders, the reality is that all existing businesses shrink when shares are issued. Were Berkshire to issue shares tomorrow for an acquisition, Berkshire would own everything that it now owns plus the new business, but your interest in such hard-to-match businesses as See's Candy Shops, National Indemnity, etc. would automatically be reduced. If (1) your family owns a 120-acre farm and (2) you invite a neighbor with 60 acres of comparable land to merge his farm into an equal partnership—with you to be managing partner, then (3) your managerial domain will have grown to 180 acres but you will have permanently shrunk by 25% your family's ownership interest in both acreage and crops. Managers who want to expand their domain at the expense of owners might better consider a career in government.)

"我们必须增长。"（不妨问一句，这个"我们"指的是谁？对现有股东而言，现实是：每当发行新股，所有既有业务都在缩水。如果Berkshire明天发行新股进行收购，Berkshire将拥有其现有的一切加上新业务，但你在See's Candy Shops、National Indemnity等难以复制的优秀业务中的权益将自动被摊薄。打个比方：（1）你家拥有一座120英亩的农场；（2）你邀请一位拥有60英亩同等土地的邻居，将他的农场合并成一个平等的合伙——由你担任管理合伙人；那么（3）你的管理版图将扩大至180英亩，但你家对土地和收成的所有权将永久缩减25%。那些想以牺牲股东利益来扩张版图的管理层，或许应当考虑去从政。）

(c) "Our stock is undervalued and we've minimized its use in this deal—but we need to give the selling shareholders 51% in stock and 49% in cash so that certain of those shareholders can get the tax-free exchange they want." (This argument acknowledges that it is beneficial to the acquirer to hold down the issuance of shares, and we like that. But if it hurts the old owners to utilize shares on a 100% basis, it very likely hurts on a 51% basis. After all, a man is not charmed if a spaniel defaces his lawn, just because it's a spaniel and not a St. Bernard. And the wishes of sellers can't be the determinant of the best interests of the buyer—what would happen if, heaven forbid, the seller insisted that as a condition of merger the CEO of the acquirer be replaced?)

"我们的股票被低估了，我们在这笔交易中已尽量减少股票的使用——但我们需要给出售方股东51%的股票和49%的现金，以便其中某些股东能获得他们希望的免税交换。"（这一说法承认了压低股票发行数量对收购方有利，这一点我们认同。但如果以100%股票支付会损害老股东的利益，那么以51%股票支付很可能同样如此。毕竟，如果一只小猎犬糟蹋了你的草坪，你不会因为它是小猎犬而非圣伯纳犬就感到高兴。而且，卖方的意愿不能成为决定买方最佳利益的准则——试想，如果卖方坚持要求以撤换收购方CEO作为合并条件，那会是什么局面？）

There are three ways to avoid destruction of value for old owners when shares are issued for acquisitions. One is to have a true business-value-for-business-value merger, such as the Berkshire-Blue Chip combination is intended to be. Such a merger attempts to be fair to shareholders of both parties, with each receiving just as much as it gives in terms of intrinsic business value. The Dart Industries-Kraft and Nabisco Standard Brands mergers appeared to be of this type, but they are the exceptions. It's not that acquirers wish to avoid such deals; it's just that they are very hard to do.

在发行股票进行收购时，有三种方式可以避免对老股东造成价值损害。其一是实现真正意义上的商业价值对等合并，Berkshire与Blue Chip的合并即意图如此。这类合并力求对双方股东公平，各方以内在商业价值衡量，所获与所付等值。Dart Industries与Kraft的合并，以及Nabisco与Standard Brands的合并，看似属于这种类型，但它们是例外。并非收购方不愿做此类交易，只是这类交易极难实现。

The second route presents itself when the acquirer's stock sells at or above its intrinsic business value. In that situation, the use of stock as currency actually may enhance the wealth of the acquiring company's owners. Many mergers were accomplished on this basis in the 1965-69 period. The results were the converse of most of the activity since 1970: the shareholders of the acquired company received very inflated currency (frequently pumped up by dubious accounting and promotional techniques) and were the losers of wealth through such transactions.

第二种途径出现在收购方股票的市价等于或高于其内在商业价值之时。在这种情况下，以股票作为支付货币实际上可能增厚收购方股东的财富。1965至1969年间，许多合并正是在这一基础上完成的。其结果与1970年后大多数并购活动恰好相反：被收购方的股东收到的是严重虚高的货币（往往由可疑的会计手法和宣传技巧推波助澜），并通过此类交易蒙受了财富损失。

During recent years the second solution has been available to very few large companies. The exceptions have primarily been those companies in glamorous or promotional businesses to which the market temporarily attaches valuations at or above intrinsic business valuation.

近年来，第二种途径对极少数大型公司才具有可行性。例外主要集中在那些从事光鲜亮丽或善于自我营销业务的公司——市场暂时给予这类公司等于乃至高于其内在商业价值的估值。

The third solution is for the acquirer to go ahead with the acquisition, but then subsequently repurchase a quantity of shares equal to the number issued in the merger. In this manner, what originally was a stock-for-stock merger can be converted, effectively, into a cash-for-stock acquisition. Repurchases of this kind are damage-repair moves. Regular readers will correctly guess that we much prefer repurchases that directly enhance the wealth of owners instead of repurchases that merely repair previous damage. Scoring touchdowns is more exhilarating than recovering one's fumbles. But, when a fumble has occurred, recovery is important and we heartily recommend damage-repair repurchases that turn a bad stock deal into a fair cash deal.

第三种解决方案是收购方在完成收购之后，随即回购数量与合并中所发行股票相当的股份。通过这种方式，原本的股票换股票合并可以实际上转化为现金换股票的收购。此类回购是亡羊补牢之举。老读者不难猜到，我们更偏好那种直接增厚股东财富的回购，而非仅仅弥补此前损失的回购。达阵得分远比捡回自己的漏球更令人振奋。但当漏球已经发生，捡回来至关重要——我们衷心推荐这种将糟糕的股票交易转化为公平现金交易的补救性回购。

使账面保持清晰，至少可以让自己直面现实。

The language utilized in mergers tends to confuse the issues and encourage irrational actions by managers. For example, "dilution" is usually carefully calculated on a pro forma basis for both book value and current earnings per share. Particular emphasis is given to the latter item. When that calculation is negative (dilutive) from the acquiring company's standpoint, a justifying explanation will be made (internally, if not elsewhere) that the lines will cross favorably at some point in the future. (While deals often fail in practice, they never fail in projections—if the CEO is visibly panting over a prospective acquisition, subordinates and consultants will supply the requisite projections to rationalize any price.) Should the calculation produce numbers that are immediately positive—that is, anti-dilutive—for the acquirer, no comment is thought to be necessary.

并购中惯用的措辞往往模糊问题的实质，助长管理层的非理性行为。例如，"稀释"通常会针对账面价值和当期每股收益仔细进行预估计算，且尤其强调后者。当这一计算结果从收购方角度来看为负值（即产生稀释）时，总会有一套说辞来自圆其说（即便不对外，至少在内部如此）——称两条线终将在未来某个时点有利地交叉。（交易在实践中时常失败，但在预测中从不失败——如果CEO明显对某项潜在收购垂涎欲滴，下属和顾问自会提供所需的预测数据，为任何价格提供合理化依据。）而若计算结果对收购方立即呈现正值——即反稀释——则无需任何评论，理所当然。

The attention given this form of dilution is overdone: current earnings per share (or even earnings per share of the next few years) are an important variable in most business valuations, but far from all powerful.

对这种形式稀释的过度关注是本末倒置的：当期每股收益（乃至未来几年的每股收益）在大多数企业估值中固然是重要变量，但绝非决定性因素。

There have been plenty of mergers, non-dilutive in this limited sense, that were instantly value destroying for the acquirer. And some mergers that have diluted current and near-term earnings per share have in fact been value-enhancing. What really counts is whether a merger is dilutive or anti-dilutive in terms of intrinsic business value (a judgment involving consideration of many variables). We believe calculation of dilution from this viewpoint to be all-important (and too seldom made).

在这种有限意义上不构成稀释的并购，已有不少在完成的瞬间即对收购方造成了价值损毁。而某些稀释了当期及近期每股收益的并购，事实上却实现了价值增厚。真正重要的，是一项并购在内在商业价值层面究竟是稀释性的还是反稀释性的（这是一项需要综合考量众多变量的判断）。我们认为从这一视角出发的稀释计算至关重要——而实践中却极少有人真正去做。

A second language problem relates to the equation of exchange. If Company A announces that it will issue shares to merge with Company B, the process is customarily described as "Company A to Acquire Company B", or "B Sells to A". Clearer thinking about the matter would result if a more awkward but more accurate description were used: "Part of A sold to acquire B", or "Owners of B to receive part of A in exchange for their properties". In a trade, what you are giving is just as important as what you are getting. This remains true even when the final tally on what is being given is delayed. Subsequent sales of common stock or convertible issues, either to complete the financing for a deal or to restore balance sheet strength, must be fully counted in evaluating the fundamental mathematics of the original acquisition. (If corporate pregnancy is going to be the consequence of corporate mating, the time to face that fact is before the moment of ecstasy.)

第二个措辞问题涉及交换方程式。如果A公司宣布将发行股票以与B公司合并，这一过程通常被描述为"A公司收购B公司"或"B公司出售给A公司"。若换用一种更拗口但更准确的表述，思路会更加清晰："A公司出售部分自身以换取B公司"，或"B公司股东将以其资产换取A公司的部分股权"。在一笔交易中，你所付出的与你所获得的同等重要。即便对所付出之物的最终盘点有所延迟，这一点依然成立。后续的普通股增发或可转换证券发行——无论是为了完成一笔交易的融资，还是为了恢复资产负债表的强健——在评估原始收购的基本数学逻辑时，都必须被完整纳入计算。（如果企业结合可能带来企业孕育的后果，那么正视这一事实的时机，应在狂喜之前。）

Managers and directors might sharpen their thinking by asking themselves if they would sell 100% of their business on the same basis they are being asked to sell part of it. And if it isn't smart to sell all on such a basis, they should ask themselves why it is smart to sell a portion. A cumulation of small managerial stupidities will produce a major stupidity—not a major triumph. (Las Vegas has been built upon the wealth transfers that occur when people engage in seemingly-small disadvantageous capital transactions.)

管理层和董事们或许可以通过自问来磨砺思维：如果在同样的条件下，他们是否愿意出售100%的业务——而现在他们被要求出售的不过是其中一部分。如果在这种条件下出售全部并不明智，他们就应当扪心自问：出售一部分又明智在何处？管理层小错误的积累，终将酿成大错误——而非大胜利。（拉斯维加斯正是建立在人们不断参与看似微小的不利资本交易所发生的财富转移之上的。）

The "giving versus getting" factor can most easily be calculated in the case of registered investment companies. Assume Investment Company X, selling at 50% of asset value, wishes to merge with Investment Company Y. Assume, also, that Company X therefore decides to issue shares equal in market value to 100% of Y's asset value.

"付出与所得"这一因素，在注册投资公司的案例中最易于计算。假设投资公司X的市价为其资产价值的50%，希望与投资公司Y合并。同时假设，X公司因此决定发行市值相当于Y公司资产价值100%的股票。

Such a share exchange would leave X trading $2 of its previous intrinsic value for $1 of Y's intrinsic value. Protests would promptly come forth from both X's shareholders and the SEC, which rules on the fairness of registered investment company mergers. Such a transaction simply would not be allowed.

这样的股票交换将使X公司以2美元的原有内在价值换取Y公司1美元的内在价值。X公司股东和美国证券交易委员会——后者负责裁定注册投资公司合并的公平性——将立即提出抗议。这样的交易根本不会被允许。

In the case of manufacturing, service, financial companies, etc., values are not normally as precisely calculable as in the case of investment companies. But we have seen mergers in these industries that just as dramatically destroyed value for the owners of the acquiring company as was the case in the hypothetical illustration above. This destruction could not happen if management and directors would assess the fairness of any transaction by using the same yardstick in the measurement of both businesses.

对于制造业、服务业、金融公司等，价值通常不像投资公司那样可以精确计算。但我们已经看到，这些行业中的某些合并，对收购方股东造成的价值损毁，与上述假设案例同样触目惊心。如果管理层和董事们能够以同一把尺子衡量交易双方的公平性，这种损毁本不会发生。

Finally, a word should be said about the "double whammy" effect upon owners of the acquiring company when value-diluting stock issuances occur. Under such circumstances, the first blow is the loss of intrinsic business value that occurs through the merger itself. The second is the downward revision in market valuation that, quite rationally, is given to that now-diluted business value. For current and prospective owners understandably will not pay as much for assets lodged in the hands of a management that has a record of wealth-destruction through unintelligent share issuances as they will pay for assets entrusted to a management with precisely equal operating talents, but a known distaste for anti-owner actions. Once management shows itself insensitive to the interests of owners, shareholders will suffer a long time from the price/value ratio afforded their stock (relative to other stocks), no matter what assurances management gives that the value-diluting action taken was a one-of-a-kind event.

最后，有必要谈谈当价值稀释性股票发行发生时，收购方股东所遭受的"双重打击"效应。在这种情况下，第一重打击是合并本身所造成的内在商业价值损失。第二重打击是市场对那已被稀释的业务价值所作出的理性向下重估。这是可以理解的：无论是现有股东还是潜在投资者，都不会为托付在一个有着通过愚蠢股票发行损毁财富记录的管理层手中的资产，支付与另一个拥有完全相同经营才能、但明确厌恶损害股东利益行为的管理层所管理资产同等的价格。一旦管理层表现出对股东利益的漠视，无论其如何保证此次价值稀释行为是个别例外，股东都将在很长时间内为其股票所获得的价格/价值比（相对于其他股票）付出代价。

Those assurances are treated by the market much as one-bug-in-the-salad explanations are treated at restaurants. Such explanations, even when accompanied by a new waiter, do not eliminate a drop in the demand (and hence market value) for salads, both on the part of the offended customer and his neighbors pondering what to order. Other things being equal, the highest stock market prices relative to intrinsic business value are given to companies whose managers have demonstrated their unwillingness to issue shares at any time on terms unfavorable to the owners of the business.

市场对这类保证的态度，颇似餐厅顾客对"沙拉里只有一只虫"解释的态度。这类解释，即便换上一个新服务员，也无法消除对沙拉需求（进而市场价值）的打击——无论是对那位深受其害的顾客，还是对正在斟酌点餐的邻桌食客，皆是如此。在其他条件相同的情况下，股票市价相对于内在商业价值最高的，往往是那些管理层始终表现出不愿在任何对股东不利的条件下发行股票的公司。

At Berkshire, or any company whose policies we determine (including Blue Chip and Wesco), we will issue shares only if our owners receive in business value as much as we give. We will not equate activity with progress or corporate size with owner-wealth.

在Berkshire，或任何由我们制定政策的公司（包括Blue Chip和Wesco），我们只会在股东所获得的商业价值与我们所付出的相当时，才会发行股份。我们不会将行动等同于进步，也不会将企业规模等同于股东财富。

Miscellaneous

其他杂项

This annual report is read by a varied audience, and it is possible that some members of that audience may be helpful to us in our acquisition program.We prefer:

由于会有许多不同的读者看到这份年报，其中可能会有人对我们的收购计划有所帮助，我们对具以下条件的公司有兴趣：

(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings),

具有一定的规模，税后净利润至少达到 500 万美元。

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations),

表现出持续稳定的盈利能力，我们对美好前景或困境反转的公司没有兴趣。

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

企业在很少或没有负债的情况下，取得了良好的股本回报率 ROE。

(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),

公司具备强大的管理团队，我们不参与管理。

(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

简单的容易理解的商业模式，我们对复杂的高科技一无所知。

(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

合理的价格，在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费双方太多时间。

We will not engage in unfriendly transactions. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer as to possible interest - customarily within five minutes. Cash purchases are preferred, but we will consider the use of stock when it can be done on the basis described in the previous section.

我们不会进行恶意并购。我们承诺完全保密，并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)，我们倾向现金交易，但若公司内在价值跟我们付出的一致时也会考虑发行股份。我们欢迎潜在卖家通过联系过去与我们有业务往来的人来了解我们，对于合适的企业和合适的人，我们会提供一个好的归宿。

Our shareholder-designated contributions program met with enthusiasm again this year; 95.8% of eligible shares participated. This response was particularly encouraging since only $1 per share was made available for designation, down from $2 in 1981. If the merger with Blue Chip takes place, a probable by-product will be the attainment of a consolidated tax position that will significantly enlarge our contribution base and give us a potential for designating bigger per-share amounts in the future.

今年的股东指定捐赠计划再度得到热烈回响，虽然每股仅分配 1 美元用于指定捐赠，较去年的 2 美元少，仍有 95.8% 的有效票参与，若与蓝筹印花的合并案成真，附带的好处是合并报税将使我们可捐赠的总额大幅增加，每股可分配的金额未来也会跟着增加。

If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the actual owner’s name, not a “street” or nominee name. For new shareholders, a more complete description of the program is on pages 62-63.

若你也想参加的话，我们强烈建议你赶快把股份从经纪人那儿改登记于自己的名下。对于新股东，更完整的计划描述在第 62-63 页。

In a characteristically rash move, we have expanded World Headquarters by 252 square feet (17%), coincidental with the signing of a new five-year lease at 1440 Kiewit Plaza. The five people who work here with me - Joan Atherton, Mike Goldberg, Gladys Kaiser, Verne McKenzie and Bill Scott - outproduce corporate groups many times their number. A compact organization lets all of us spend our time managing the business rather than managing each other.

在一时冲动之下，我们将总部的面积增加 252 平方英尺(约 17% )，同时在 Kiewit Plaza 1440 号重新签订五年的租约，和我一同工作的五个人： Joan Atherton 、 Mike Goldberg 、 Gladys Kaiser 、 Verne McKenzie 与 Bill Scott 其生产力远超过企业集团数倍，精简的组织使我们有更多的时间管理旗下公司而非互相管理。

Charlie Munger, my partner in management, will continue to operate from Los Angeles whether or not the Blue Chip merger occurs. Charlie and I are interchangeable in business decisions. Distance impedes us not at all: we’ve always found a telephone call to be more productive than a half-day committee meeting.

不管与蓝筹印花的合并成功与否，我的合伙人查理·芒格将继续留在洛杉矶，查理跟我在企业决策上是可以互相替代的，距离一点也不会妨碍我们：我们发现打一通电话比开沉闷的会议更有效率。

Two of our managerial stars retired this year: Phil Liesche at 65 from National Indemnity Company, and Ben Rosner at 79 from Associated Retail Stores. Both of these men made you, as shareholders of Berkshire, a good bit wealthier than you otherwise would have been. National Indemnity has been the most important operation in Berkshire’s growth. Phil and Jack Ringwalt, his predecessor, were the two prime movers in National Indemnity’s success. Ben Rosner sold Associated Retail Stores to Diversified Retailing Company for cash in 1967, promised to stay on only until the end of the year, and then hit business home runs for us for the next fifteen years.

今年我们有两位经营明星退休，国民保险 65 岁的菲尔·列舍 (Phil Liesche) 和联合零售 79 岁的 Ben Rosner ，作为伯克希尔的股东，这两个人都让你变的更为富有。国民保险是支持伯克希尔成长的重要业务。 Phil 和他的前任杰克·林沃尔特 (Jack Ringwalt) 是该公司成功主要的推动者，而 Ben Rosner 在 1967 年将联合零售以现金卖给多元零售后，原本仅承诺继续待到当年度年底，结果在往后的十五年仍持续表现杰出。

Both Ben and Phil ran their businesses for Berkshire with every bit of the care and drive that they would have exhibited had they personally owned 100% of these businesses. No rules were necessary to enforce or even encourage this attitude; it was embedded in the character of these men long before we came on the scene. Their good character became our good fortune. If we can continue to attract managers with the qualities of Ben and Phil, you need not worry about Berkshire’s future.

他们两人皆为伯克希尔尽心尽力管理公司就好象是他们 100% 拥有这家公司一样，无须制定额外的规则来强迫或甚至鼓励他们，早在我们加入前，这种态度便已深植在他们的人格特质中，他们的好品格成就我们更多的好福气，如果我们能持续吸引到像 Ben 和 Phil 这样的人，你将根本不必担心伯克希尔的未来。

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦.巴菲特

Chairman of the Board

董事会主席

1983-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1983-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Non-Reported Ownership Earnings

Long-Term Corporate Performance

Sources of Reported Earnings

Insurance Industry Conditions

Issuance of Equity

Miscellaneous

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