1995-10-30 WHY WARREN BUFFETT'S BETTING BIG ON AMERICAN EXPRESS THOUGH LOSING MARKET SHARE

1995-10-30 WHY WARREN BUFFETT'S BETTING BIG ON AMERICAN EXPRESS THOUGH LOSING MARKET SHARE


By LINDA GRANT REPORTER ASSOCIATE JOE MCGOWAN
LINDA GRANT 记者（副记者 JOE MCGOWAN）撰稿

October 30, 1995

(FORTUNE Magazine) – Warren Buffett loves to tell a parable about the stock market's irrationality. It was 1963, and a scandal involving fake inventories of salad oil at a small subsidiary of American Express drove down the price of Amex shares. How bad a problem was this? To find out, Buffett spent an evening with the cashier at Ross's Steak House in Omaha seeing if people would stop using their green cards. The scandal didn't seem to give any of the diners indigestion, so Buffett seized the opportunity to buy 5% of the company for \$13 million. He later sold his holding for a \$20 million profit.
《财富》杂志——沃伦·巴菲特喜欢用一个寓言来说明股市的非理性。1963 年，由于美国运通一家小子公司伪造沙拉油库存的丑闻，美运通股价暴跌。问题究竟有多严重？为了弄清真相，巴菲特在奥马哈罗斯牛排馆与收银员一起观察顾客是否停止使用绿卡。结果显示，食客们并未因此“消化不良”，于是巴菲特抓住机会斥资 1300 万美元买下公司 5% 股份，之后以 2000 万美元获利了结。

Now Buffett hopes to relive the story--with much larger numbers. Over the past few years the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway has accumulated more than 49 million shares of American Express, a 10.1% stake. Its value, about \$2.2 billion, makes it one of Buffett's largest investments, along with Coca-Cola, Gillette, and Capital Cities/ ABC. Once again he thinks Wall Street is irrationally down on Amex stock. The trouble this time is not salad oil but a long and well-publicized catalogue of strife: A nearly dysfunctional management team led by James Robinson III damaged the brand in the early 1990s; his grand strategy to build a financial supermarket fell like a house of cards, with Amex's Shearson Lehman brokerage subsidiary eating up \$4 billion in capital before being sold last year. More recently the tarnished American Express card has been losing market share to Visa and MasterCard as Amex's principal consumer benefit--prestige--becomes a tougher sell. And the company's international business, say analysts, is in the doldrums.
如今，巴菲特希望重演这出戏——只是数字更为庞大。过去几年，伯克希尔哈撒韦这位掌门人累计买入超过 4900 万股美国运通，持股 10.1%。按约 22 亿美元计，这使其成为巴菲特与可口可乐、吉列、Capital Cities/ABC 并列的最大投资之一。巴菲特再次认为华尔街对美运通股价的悲观看法过于非理性。这一次的麻烦不在沙拉油，而是漫长且众所周知的动荡史：上世纪 90 年代初，詹姆斯·罗宾逊三世率领的几乎失灵的管理团队损坏了品牌；他打造金融超市的宏大策略如纸牌屋般倒塌，美运通旗下希尔森雷曼券商蚕食 40 亿美元资本后于去年被出售。更近几年，失去光环的美运通卡在Visa和万事达的夹击下失去市场份额，美运通以“身份象征”为主要卖点的优势愈发难以奏效。分析师称，公司国际业务亦陷入低迷。

Always the patient investor, Buffett--worth \$14.2 billion at last count--believes the latest troubles are little more than a distraction. What he likes is exactly what has made him rich before: a mighty brand coupled with a healthy cash flow. After all, American Express, according to London marketing group Interbrand, is still one of the ten most-recognized brands in the world. Buffett believes the name remains "synonymous with financial integrity and money substitutes around the world." As he explained to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders at last spring's annual meeting: "By far the most important factor in \[Amex's] future for a great many years to come will be the credit card. We think American Express's management thinks well about...how to keep the card special." Buffett probably isn't particularly concerned about the company's loss of market share. More likely, he's gambling that Amex, even if it fails to grow dramatically, will become a very profitable niche player in the card market.
作为一贯耐心的投资者，巴菲特——最新身价 142 亿美元——认为近期的麻烦不过是干扰。他看重的正是过去让他致富的东西：强大的品牌加上健康的现金流。伦敦营销机构 Interbrand 的数据显示，美国运通仍是全球十大最知名品牌之一。巴菲特相信这一名称仍然“与全球金融诚信及货币替代品同义”。他在去年春季的伯克希尔股东大会上解释说：“未来很多年，对美国运通最重要的因素无疑将是信用卡。我们认为管理层深谙……如何保持这张卡的特殊性。”巴菲特大概并不担心公司失去的市场份额；更可能的是，他押注即便增长乏力，美国运通也会在卡片市场成为极其盈利的细分玩家。

But if American Express is to fulfill Buffett's expectations, it will have to breathe new life into its brand--no easy task. The big question is whether Harvey Golub, who became CEO in 1993 after the board booted Robinson, is up to the job. He came to Amex from McKinsey & Co. and has done a sterling job doing what consultants do--cutting costs and shedding money-losing divisions like Shearson Lehman. He imposed discipline on Amex's free-spending ways by cutting a draconian \$1.6 billion out of gross operating costs. Amex, with 1994 revenues of \$15.6 billion (No. 55 on the Fortune 500), saw operating profits grow 18% last year. Since Buffett started heavily buying the stock over the past year, it has risen--thanks mostly to the cost cutting--from \$25 a share to a recent \$44. (For more on Buffett's investing style, see box.)
但若要实现巴菲特的期望，美国运通必须为其品牌注入新活力——这绝非易事。关键在于，1993 年董事会驱逐罗宾逊后上任的首席执行官哈维·戈鲁布是否胜任。他来自麦肯锡，擅长顾问拿手的“本事”——削减成本、剥离亏损业务，如希尔森雷曼。他对美国运通大手大脚的作风实施铁腕整顿，将总运营成本硬生生削减 16 亿美元。美运通 1994 年营收 156 亿美元（《财富》500 强第 55 位），去年营业利润增长 18%。自巴菲特过去一年大举买入以来，得益于成本削减，股价已从 25 美元升至最近的 44 美元。（有关巴菲特投资风格的更多内容，见附框。）

"American Express has the best and most loaded-up battleships," says Salomon Brothers analyst Thomas Facciola: "Now it's a question of whether the company can hit its targets." The answer is not at all clear. In the highly competitive credit card market, which includes Visa and MasterCard, American Express is launching salvos of new cards like Optima True Grace as well as ones aimed at students. But so far critics find Amex's new credit cards ho-hum, modest successes that seem too little too late. The company, they say, needs to wow the market with a sizzling hit like AT\&T's Universal card or GM's 5% rebate card. Argues H. Eugene Lockhart, MasterCard CEO and one of Golub's biggest rivals: "Will Golub ever achieve the growth rates that we and Visa are achieving now? I really doubt it because of the basic core proposition. We offer better value to the customer than they do."
“美国运通拥有最强大、火力最猛的战列舰，”所罗门兄弟分析师托马斯·法乔拉说，“现在问题在于公司能否命中目标。”答案并不明朗。在竞争激烈的信用卡市场（涵盖Visa与万事达）上，美国运通接连推出新卡——如 Optima True Grace，以及面向大学生的产品。然而批评者迄今认为，美运通的新信用卡乏善可陈，成功有限，行动过迟且力度不够。他们表示，公司需要像 AT\&T Universal 卡或通用汽车 5% 返利卡那样的爆款来惊艳市场。美运通最大对手之一、万事达 CEO H·尤金·洛克哈特质疑道：“戈鲁布是否能实现我们和Visa当前的增长率？我真怀疑，因为核心价值主张不同，我们为客户提供的价值优于他们。”

Seated behind a gleaming cherry-wood conference table on the 51st floor of his company's baronial headquarters in Manhattan's World Financial Center, Golub puffs on a Benson & Hedges cigarette and sips coffee from a mug promoting his company's PARTNERSHIPS WITH SUPERMARKETS. This day he comes off as a taciturn man, given to monosyllabic answers and long pauses. During this interview with Fortune he displayed no excitement about his campaign to resuscitate Amex.
在曼哈顿世界金融中心 51 层、公司古堡般总部的光亮樱桃木会议桌后，戈鲁布叼着一根 Benson & Hedges 香烟，端着印有“与超市伙伴关系”字样的公司咖啡杯啜饮。当日的他显得沉默寡言，只以单音节回答并长时间停顿。在接受《财富》采访时，他对振兴美运通的计划丝毫未显兴奋之情。

Golub is a classic McKinsey consultant, a brilliant analyst who, as he has proved, knows how to restructure a broken business. But that doesn't mean he knows how to inspire, revitalize, and grow one profitably. At IBM, CEO Louis Gerstner, also a McKinsey alumnus (and former Amex president), has done a skilled job cutting costs but now faces a similar dilemma in making Big Blue grow. At Westinghouse, yet another McKinseyite, Michael Jordan, has so far failed to get a troubled company rolling.
戈鲁布是典型的麦肯锡顾问型人物——才华横溢的分析师，已证明自己擅长重组濒危企业。但这并不意味着他懂得如何激励、复兴并盈利增长一家企业。在 IBM，亦出身麦肯锡（且曾任美运通总裁）的 CEO 路易斯·郭士纳同样精于削减成本，却在让“大蓝”重拾增长上面临类似困境。而在西屋电气，另一位麦肯锡出身者迈克尔·乔丹迄今也未能让这家陷入困境的公司重回正轨。

And that could be a problem. Golub needs to transform a slow-moving, arrogant American Express culture into one that more closely resembles those of its competitors: gung-ho, innovative, and fast moving. Over the years, Amex acquired a reputation for being a bear to work with. You may recall the Boston Fee Party, when one restaurateur, upset about the high fees Amex was charging, stuck a chef's knife through an Amex green card, an event that made national TV. In another instance, AT\&T, American Airlines, and others approached the company with offers to issue joint cards with nifty perks for customers, but Amex management haughtily turned them down. Says Golub: "We should have seen what was happening, but we let success blind us. We were inflexible. We were arrogant. We were dreaming."
这就成了一个难题。戈鲁布必须把行动迟缓、自负傲慢的美国运通文化改造成更像竞争对手那样——充满干劲、富于创新、动作敏捷。多年来，美国运通被业内视为难以合作的“熊”公司。你也许记得那场“波士顿手续费事件”：一名餐馆老板因不满美国运通收取高额手续费，将厨刀刺穿一张美国运通绿卡，这一幕登上全国电视。在另一例中，AT\&T、美国航空等公司提出发行联名卡、为客户提供精妙福利，但美国运通管理层傲慢地拒绝了。戈鲁布说：“我们本应看清形势，却被成功冲昏头脑。我们僵化、自大、做着白日梦。”

Yet Golub can't readily explain his antidote. When asked whether arrogance is still a problem at Amex, the portly 56-year-old with blue eyes blazing behind wire-rim glasses responded as follows: "You want to have an organization that is humble and proud, that is confident but not arrogant, is confident but not self-delusional. So it's a fine line, and I'm sure that to some people what may be viewed as confidence comes across as arrogance. To others it comes across as humility. If we had everybody saying we're not arrogant, my guess is we would be servile."
然而，戈鲁布并不能轻易说明他的解药。当被问及傲慢是否仍是美国运通的问题时，这位戴细框眼镜、蓝眼炯炯的 56 岁胖子这样回答：“你希望组织既谦逊又自豪，自信但不傲慢，自信而不自欺。这是一条微妙的界线。我肯定在一些人眼里，自信可能显得傲慢，在另一些人看来则是谦逊。如果人人都说我们不傲慢，我猜我们就会变得卑躬屈膝。”

Even if his strategy is on target, little in Golub's past suggests he has the charisma to rally the troops. In 1967 he joined McKinsey, where he stayed for 14 years, save for a three-year stint running a New Jersey trucking firm. His attempt to grow that company never got off the ground. Golub left, he says, over a strategy disagreement. The business later went bust.
即便策略正确，戈鲁布过去的经历也几乎看不到他能号召人心的魅力。1967 年他加入麦肯锡，除在新泽西一家卡车公司任职三年外，在那里待了 14 年。他试图扩张那家公司却始终未能起飞。据称因战略分歧离职，该企业后来破产。

Golub's entree to Amex was through his work at McKinsey, which included advising Amex's Travel Related Services business. He championed quality programs like replacing lost cards within 24 hours. In 1984 he took a job at IDS, American Express's personal finance division, where he gets much credit for improving the sales force and customer service.
戈鲁布进入美国运通缘于其在麦肯锡的工作，当时他为美国运通旅游相关服务业务提供咨询。他倡导的优质计划包括 24 小时内补发挂失卡。1984 年，他加入美国运通个人理财部门 IDS，人们公认他改进了销售团队和客服。

But even Golub's fans wonder whether he has the right stuff to take on as big a challenge as Amex. Colleagues admire his blunt, direct style, feeling he's not afraid to face the truth, no matter how bad--a rare quality in a CEO. At the same time, he is not seen as what anyone would call a forceful leader. Says a former Amex manager who wished not to be named: "Harvey is regarded as very tough. I've never heard anyone say that they like him. Never heard anyone say they would lay down their life for him. No one at Amex waxes about what a great guy he is. He's basically 'In Your Face Harvey,' just like those awful pictures of him where he's always leaning forward in his suspenders looking like he's about to bite your face off."
即便戈鲁布的支持者也怀疑，他是否具备承担美国运通如此巨大挑战的素质。同事欣赏他直率坦诚，认为他再糟糕的现实也敢面对——这在 CEO 中很罕见。但同时，他并不被视为真正强势的领导者。一位不愿具名的前美国运通经理说：“大家都觉得哈维很强硬。我从未听过有人说喜欢他，也没人说愿为他赴汤蹈火。没有人在美国运通夸他是个好人。他基本就是‘扑面而来的哈维’，就像那些糟糕的照片里，他总吊着背带前倾，似要咬你一口。”

Inside the company, Golub is both feared and respected. Basically, he has three different styles:
在公司内部，戈鲁布既令人畏惧又受人尊敬。他基本有三种不同风格：

The Brooder. In the first he becomes silent and angry looking, and doesn't say anything. He just conveys unhappiness.
沉思者：他沉默、面露愠色，一言不发，仅以表情传递不满。

The Attacker. In the second he gets angry. Says a former top executive who has left the company: "I was in a budget review with him where he attacked people at the most basic level. He yelled at them, 'Why the hell should we pay all this money when nothing happens? All you do is cause problems, you aren't even trying, this is the first area I should cut.' "
攻击者：他暴怒。已离职的前高管说：“我曾参加一次预算审查，他从最根本层面怒斥下属。大喊：‘花这么多钱却毫无成效？你们光制造麻烦，根本不努力，这是我首先要砍掉的部门！’”

The Consultant. His third is the highly analytical consultant who cross-examines people. It's an acceptable style that can work, but only when accompanied with reinforcing actions like recognizing people and thanking them. Says the ex-employee: "I have no knowledge of his ever doing that."
顾问型：第三种是高度分析、对人进行交叉询问的顾问风格。若辅以认可和感谢，尚属可行。但那位前员工说：“我从未见他这么做过。”

Vice chairman Kenneth Chenault, on the other hand, is well liked and trusted by employees. Before coming to Amex, he worked for two years as a consultant at Bain & Co. His sunny personality and marketer's savvy are welcome contrasts to Golub's gloomy persona. But when Golub's friend George "Chuck" Farr left McKinsey last May to join the CEO's office as another vice chairman, employees wondered why. They questioned whether another consultant was what Amex needed.
相比之下，副董事长肯尼斯·谢诺特深受员工喜爱和信任。加入美国运通前，他在贝恩公司做了两年顾问。他的阳光性格和营销头脑与戈鲁布阴郁的形象形成鲜明对比。但去年五月，戈鲁布的朋友乔治“查克”法尔离开麦肯锡加入 CEO 办公室担任另一位副董事长，员工不解其因，质疑美国运通是否还需要多一个顾问。

No matter what kind of leader Golub turns out to be, most everyone in the industry agrees that his strategy to revive the brand basically makes sense. Says one consultant: "What I've picked up working there is that compared with the old regime, people now have a clear sense of where they are going."
无论戈鲁布最终成为什么样的领导，业内几乎公认他振兴品牌的战略基本合理。一位顾问说：“在那里工作时我发现，相比旧时代，人们如今对未来方向有了清晰认识。”

Golub is convinced that Amex can clamber back to its former preeminence by adhering to a starkly simple statement of strategy: "To become the world's most respected service brand." Whether that turns out to be a rallying cry or just hubris, it has so far provided Golub & Co. with a road map for revival. Says Farr: "The brand is the engine that will drive the business. If we can't use the brand, we won't be in the business." Clearly words that would comfort Buffett.
戈鲁布坚信，只要坚持一句极其简单的战略宣言——“成为世界最受尊敬的服务品牌”——美国运通便能重新攀上昔日巅峰。究竟是号角还是狂妄，目前为止，它已为戈鲁布团队提供复兴路线图。法尔说：“品牌是推动业务的引擎。如果无法利用品牌，我们就别谈业务。”这番话显然能让巴菲特安心。

If the brand is the strategy, the heart of the brand remains the American Express card. Amex today consists of two main parts: Travel Related Services, including cards, traveler's checks, and a travel agency business, which last year contributed 72% of revenues and 65% of pretax earnings, and American Express Financial Advisors (formerly IDS), which sells mutual funds and other financial products and accounted for 23% of revenues and 29% of earnings.
既然品牌就是战略，品牌的核心仍是美国运通卡。如今的美国运通由两大板块组成：一是旅游相关服务，包括信用卡、旅行支票及旅行社业务，去年贡献了 72% 的收入和 65% 的税前利润；二是美国运通财务顾问（前称 IDS），销售共同基金及其他金融产品，占收入 23%，利润 29%。
Warning
可能都不能避免现实中的噪音。
The good news for Golub is that the card market is booming. Credit cards--think of them as a pawnshop for yuppies--have been a hugely profitable business. Last year Americans tallied up \$611 billion in card charges; that's \$2,336 for every man, woman, and child, and 23% more than the year before. This \$611 billion represents only 10% of total consumer spending, so the industry still has room to grow.
对戈鲁布而言，好消息是信用卡市场正蓬勃发展。信用卡——可谓雅皮士的当铺——一直是利润丰厚的生意。去年，美国人的信用卡刷卡总额高达6,110亿美元；折合每位男女老幼2,336美元，比前年增加23%。这6,110亿美元仅占消费者总支出的10%，因此该行业仍有增长空间。

But American Express has mostly missed out on the best part, the business of financing credit card loans. Its most obvious difference from such competitors as Visa and MasterCard is that you must pay the entire balance each month. The competition's business is astonishingly lucrative because of an equally astonishing spread; issuers today borrow at about 7%, then lend those funds to cardholders at around 17%. Various bells and whistles like below-market teaser rates, insurance, frequent-flier miles, and cash rebates eat into some of that lucre. Issuers must also invest substantial sums in technology to keep track of all that business.
但美国运通基本错过了最赚钱的部分——信用卡贷款融资业务。与Visa和MasterCard等竞争对手最显著的区别是，美国运通要求持卡人每月全额还款。竞争对手的业务之所以惊人暴利，源于同样惊人的利差：发行机构如今的资金成本约为7%，却以约17%的利率放款给持卡人。低利率诱导期、保险、常旅客里程、现金返现等五花八门的优惠会侵蚀部分利润，但发行机构仍须投入可观资金于技术系统来追踪海量交易。

Why are consumers willing to pay an ungodly 17% to borrow money for things like White Sox tickets and a night out at a Sizzler? This anomaly so mystifies University of Maryland economist Lawrence Ausubel that he recently presented a paper on the subject to the National Bureau of Economic Research. His conclusion: Issuers can get away with charging such steep interest rates because consumers underestimate the amount they'll borrow. And once cardholders do borrow, rose-colored glasses of denial prevent them from acknowledging how much debt they've assumed. In a 1992 study, Ausubel reports, borrowers claimed to owe cumulatively \$70 billion in debt when in truth they owed \$156 billion.
为什么消费者愿意以高达17%的利率借钱，只为买芝加哥白袜球票或去牛排餐厅小酌一晚？这一反常现象令马里兰大学经济学家劳伦斯·奥苏贝尔十分困惑，以至他最近向美国国家经济研究局提交了相关论文。他的结论是：发行机构之所以能收取如此高昂利率，原因在于消费者低估了自己的借款金额；而一旦欠款，戴着玫瑰色眼镜的自我否认又让他们无法正视自身债务。奥苏贝尔在1992年的一项研究中指出，借款人自称累计欠债700亿美元，实际上却欠了1,560亿美元。

THE BIZARRE consumer behavior doesn't stop there. Some people, not wanting to hassle with the paperwork, don't bother to trade in their high-interest credit card for one with a lower rate. Others just don't think about the financial ramifications. A woman in Westchester County, New York, chalked up \$4,000 on her Visa last month. Though she could afford to pay off the whole thing, she cut a check for only \$1,000. As she explains, "I wanted to keep a high balance so I wouldn't be tempted to run up my card again." Understand? In any case, lucky Visa collects a handsome 17% annual interest on her balance.
怪异的消费者行为远不止于此。有些人嫌换卡手续麻烦，宁愿继续使用高息卡，也不去办理低息卡；另一些人则干脆不考虑财务后果。纽约州威彻斯特县一名女子上月在Visa卡上刷了4,000美元；虽然她有能力一次性还清，却只支付了1,000美元。她解释说：“我想保持较高余额，免得再次刷爆。”明白了吧？无论如何，幸运的Visa都能从她的余额上收取高达17%的年利息。

This has been one great party that Amex came late to--and now the party looks to be ending. Michael Auriemma, a credit card consultant at a Westbury, New York, firm that bears his name, thinks commoditization in the card business is only a matter of time, irrational cardholders notwithstanding. The industry is shifting to a buyer's market as the 5,000 financial institutions that issue Visas, MasterCards, and others scramble to grab customers by eliminating annual fees and offering attractive initial interest rates. In the U.S. an incomprehensible 2.4 billion preapproved credit card solicitations were mailed last year, enough for every family to receive two a month.
美国运通迟到的一场盛宴眼下似乎即将散席。位于纽约州韦斯特伯里的同名顾问公司信用卡专家迈克尔·奥里埃马认为，即便持卡人行为再不理性，信用卡业务走向商品化仅是时间问题。随着 5,000 家发卡机构——发行 Visa、MasterCard 及其他品牌——通过取消年费、提供极具吸引力的首年低利率等手段争夺客户，行业正转变为买方市场。去年美国邮寄了 24 亿封预先批准的信用卡邀请函，算下来平均每个家庭每月收到两封，可谓骇人听闻。

The landscape is becoming so treacherous that among the fastest-growing issuers today are four barely known low-cost Visa/ MasterCard credit card companies: Advanta, Capital One, First USA, and MBNA (see credit card box).
竞争环境之险恶可见一斑——当今增速最快的发卡机构竟是四家名不见经传、费用低廉的 Visa/MasterCard 发卡公司：Advanta、Capital One、First USA 与 MBNA（详见信用卡专栏）。

Commoditization is bad news for Amex because the American Express card has always been marketed as a high-fee, high-prestige item--\$55 a year for a green card, \$300 for a top-end platinum. Although its corporate card business remains strong, many individuals are beginning to doubt whether this privilege still merits a premium. Amex's share of the U.S. card market, measured by dollar volume, has dropped from nearly 25% in 1990 to 16% this year, behind Visa (49%) and MasterCard (27%). Explains MasterCard's Lockhart: "The consumer today simply doesn't see the need to pay fees for a card that gives them no greater functionality than anything we or Visa would give them."
对于美国运通而言，商品化是坏消息，因为美国运通卡一直定位于高收费、高声望——绿卡年费 55 美元，顶级白金卡高达 300 美元。尽管其企业卡业务仍然稳健，许多个人用户却开始质疑这种特权是否仍值得支付溢价。按刷卡金额计算，美国运通在美国市场的份额已从 1990 年的近 25% 降至今年的 16%，落后于 Visa（49%）和 MasterCard（27%）。万事达 CEO 洛克哈特解释道：“如今的消费者根本看不到为一张功能与我们或 Visa 无异的卡支付年费的必要。”

Golub's challenge, then, is one of the trickiest in management--to make his brand all things to all people. "The company thinks of its brand as homogeneous," says Thomas O. Jones, a former Amex executive: "But it's not. It is one brand internationally for the business traveler, one for the general public that remembers Karl Malden and 'Don't leave home without it,' and one for the merchants who accept it. It is a huge asset that needs to be watered properly, but I think the company could be doing a much better job."
于是，戈鲁布面临管理学中最棘手的挑战之一——让品牌兼顾所有人。前美国运通高管托马斯·O·琼斯说：“公司把品牌当成同质的，但事实并非如此。对国际商务旅客是一种品牌，对仍记得卡尔·马尔登和‘别出门不带它’的普通大众是另一种，对接受它的商户又是另一种。这是巨大的资产，需要精心灌溉，我认为公司本可做得更好。”

Priority No. 1 is hanging on to its high-profit, high-rolling customers. Amex cardholders charge on average \$4,000 a year, vs. \$1,500 for Visa and MasterCard, and Golub wants to offer them more value through special services. American Express Platinum Card members, for instance, now can get calls reminding them to buy a present for their mother's birthday--which they can, by the way, charge. He also wants to capitalize on the company's vast database of information about customer purchases and retailers' sales. The company's goal is to glean from these records individual tastes such as, say, a customer's predilection for Italian food. Armed with the knowledge, Amex might run a promotion that offers the cardholder a free bottle of wine at a new Italian restaurant opening in his neighborhood. Such customized rewards won't be widely available until next year.
首要任务是留住高利润、高消费的客户。美国运通持卡人年均刷卡额 4,000 美元，而 Visa 与 MasterCard 持卡人仅约 1,500 美元。戈鲁布希望通过特殊服务为这些客户提供更多价值。例如，美国运通白金卡会员现在可收到提醒电话，提示为母亲生日购买礼物——当然，可以刷卡支付。他还打算利用公司庞大的客户消费和商家销售数据库。目标是从记录中提炼个人偏好，比如客户是否钟爱意大利菜。有了这些信息，美国运通或可推出促销活动：在客户家附近新开业的意大利餐厅用餐即赠一瓶葡萄酒。这类定制化奖励要到明年才会广泛推出。

WHEN IT COMES to polishing the card's carriage trade image, Golub also needs to work on what marketers call "the experience." This is the strategy that has helped companies like Disney and McDonald's flourish. Disneyland, for example, is more than a theme park. It provides a certain type of enjoyable and predictable experience for its little Mouseketeers. Similarly, McDonald's is not just any fast-food restaurant. Diners know what to expect under the golden arches. Ask a McDonald's executive what the company provides, and he'll give you the official answer: "a consistent, family-oriented, convenient hamburger experience." Or as a Coke exec would say: "a simple moment of refreshment."
在提升持卡“尊享”形象方面，戈鲁布同样需要着力打造营销人员所说的“体验”。正是这一策略，让迪士尼和麦当劳等公司蓬勃发展。比如迪士尼乐园不仅是主题公园，更为“小小米老鼠”们提供一种愉悦且可预期的体验。同样，麦当劳也并非普通快餐店，顾客在金色拱门下知道自己将获得何种服务。若问麦当劳高管公司提供的是什么，他会给出官方答案：“一致、以家庭为核心且便捷的汉堡体验。”可口可乐高管则会说：“简单的畅爽时刻。”

In American Express's world, the card is supposed to offer a sense of financial security and cachet--an announcement that when you use this card, you've made it in the world. For years that's what has made American Express cards and traveler's checks successful--both products projected the comforting image of Amex taking care of its members whether at home or traveling abroad. Studies show that some 70% of cardholders feel that emotion is as important as price when choosing a card. Some people believe that whipping out an American Express card will impress a client--will announce they've arrived.
在美国运通的世界里，这张卡应当赋予持有人一种财务安全感与身份象征——宣示使用此卡即意味着事业有成。多年来，正是这种形象令美国运通卡和旅行支票成功——两种产品都传递出美国运通无论在家还是出行都照料会员的安心感。研究显示，约七成持卡人在选卡时认为情感因素与价格同等重要。一些人相信掏出美国运通卡会令客户刮目相看——象征他们已跻身成功人士行列。

To his credit, Golub is working hard to improve the Amex experience by making sure members aren't treated like lepers when they pull out their platinum cards. By lowering merchants' fees and making payments to restaurants and stores more promptly, Golub has multiplied the number of places that accept his cards. In addition to the usual four-star restaurants and resorts, consumers can now use American Express cards to buy plebeian items such as stamps at the post office, eggs at ShopRite, socks at Kmart, a cup of coffee at Starbucks, and a movie at Blockbuster. But the company still has a long way to go to build up the Amex experience overseas, especially in Europe, where the card is not nearly as widely accepted for shopping as Visa and MasterCard.
值得肯定的是，戈鲁布正努力改善美运通体验，确保会员掏出白金卡时不会受到“嫌弃”。通过降低商户手续费并更及时向餐馆和商店结算，他让接受美国运通卡的地点激增。如今，除了常见的四星级餐厅与度假村，消费者还可用美国运通卡在邮局买邮票、在 ShopRite 买鸡蛋、在 Kmart 买袜子、在星巴克买咖啡、在 Blockbuster 看电影。不过在海外，尤其是欧洲，美国运通要塑造同等体验仍有很长路要走，当地购物领域对该卡的接受度远不及 Visa 和 MasterCard。

Just rebuilding the traditional Amex aura will be tough enough, but Golub must do it while moving downscale to find more cardholders. Observes David Aaker, a U.C. Berkeley marketing professor and author of the soon-to-be-published book Building Strong Brands: "When you move down-market you run the risk of losing what you had, and then you don't have anything." Adds Atlanta credit card consultant Bruce Brittain: "Can you maintain an upscale image while you go after a downscale market?"
仅仅重塑美国运通的传统光环已属不易，而戈鲁布还必须在下探市场、吸引更多持卡人的同时完成此事。加州大学伯克利分校营销学教授、大作《打造强势品牌》作者大卫·阿克指出：“向下扩张时，你有失去原有优势的风险，最终可能一无所有。”亚特兰大信用卡顾问布鲁斯·布里顿补充道：“在开拓低端市场的同时，你能保持高端形象吗？”

Amex plans to capture the downscale market by going mano a mano against Visa and MasterCard with its Optima card. As with Visa and MasterCard, you must pay your Optima balance each month or pay interest. Optima is what is known in marketing circles as a subbrand, which means it capitalizes on the brand name but has a distinct identity of its own. That's why the Optima card is blue, not green, and has a different name, though American Express is printed prominently on the card. Says Aaker: "You use a subbrand to represent the mass market, while still keeping your prestige brand. The problem is not losing the overall distinction of the brand." It could happen. If the green-, gold-, and platinum-card members sense the brand is being debased with Optima, they'll flee. Conversely, a brand with a history of snob appeal isn't necessarily an easy sell to the masses in an increasingly egalitarian age.
美国运通计划凭借 Optima 卡与 Visa、MasterCard 正面交锋，进军低端市场。与 Visa、MasterCard 相似，Optima 卡持有人若不按月全额还款则需支付利息。Optima 是营销领域所谓“子品牌”，既借力于母品牌，又拥有独立身份。故此，Optima 卡呈蓝色而非传统绿卡，并采用不同名称，虽然“American Express”的字样依然醒目。阿克表示：“通过子品牌服务大众市场，同时保留高端品牌。关键在于不丢失整体品牌的独特性。”然而风险确实存在：若绿卡、金卡和白金卡持有人感到品牌因 Optima 而贬值，他们可能转身离去；反过来，在愈加平等的时代，具有“贵族光环”的品牌未必易于打动大众。

Amex knows it is plunging into a competitive inferno and is working hard to boost its appeal with new services. Last year, for example, Amex successfully introduced a variation on Optima called Optima True Grace. This card starts running the interest meter only after a grace period of 25 days has passed from the date of a purchase. True Grace was snatched up by an estimated 1.4 million users, about twice as many as the company says it predicted, in part because of an effective \$40 million ad campaign featuring that purveyor of Waspy lifestyles, magazine publisher-cover model Martha Stewart. This summer Amex sewed up an important deal by winning the right to issue a new Optima credit card jointly with Delta Air Lines, the last big airline without its own card. The launch of Delta SkyMiles Optima is a coup for Amex, says Card News editor Lurdes Abruscato, because at least 13 other competitors, including Chemical Bank and Wachovia, lobbied hard for it.
美国运通深知自己正跳入竞争火海，因此努力以新服务提升吸引力。例如，去年美国运通成功推出 Optima 变体——Optima True Grace。该卡自消费日起享有 25 天宽限期，期满后才开始计息。True Grace 估计吸引了约 140 万用户，约为公司原先预测的两倍，部分原因在于 4,000 万美元广告攻势奏效，广告由象征高端生活方式的杂志出版人兼封面模特玛莎·斯图尔特担纲。今年夏天，美国运通又达成一笔重要交易——赢得与达美航空联合发行新款 Optima 信用卡的权利，达美是最后一家没有自有信用卡的大型航空公司。卡片新闻编辑路德斯·阿布鲁斯卡托表示，Delta SkyMiles Optima 的推出对美国运通是一大胜利，因为至少有 13 家竞争对手（包括化学银行和瓦乔维亚）为此积极游说。

Today, Amex is testing all manner of combinations--cards with rebates, low rates, no fees, and a card targeted at students.
如今，美国运通正在测试各种组合——返现卡、低利率卡、免年费卡，以及面向学生的专属卡。

Among them is a so-called stored-value card, a handy plastic substitute for quarters and dollar bills in various denominations, say, \$25, \$50, and \$100. Armed with this plastic, college students can call home, buy meals at their cafeteria, or purchase books, and New Yorkers can pay for washing clothes in apartment laundry facilities.
其中包括一种所谓的储值卡，这是一种方便的塑料替代品，可取代面额为 25 美元、50 美元和 100 美元等的硬币和纸钞。有了这张卡，大学生可以打电话回家、在食堂买饭或买书，纽约人则可在公寓洗衣房支付洗衣费用。

It's a great niche for Amex since the company plans to invest the float, i.e., funds paid for the card but not yet spent. Traveler's checks are such a stored-value product, and currently Amex carries a hefty \$6.7 billion of these free funds on its balance sheet.
这对美国运通来说是一块极佳的细分市场，因为公司计划投资“沉淀资金”，即已付卡款但尚未使用的金额。旅行支票也是此类储值产品，美国运通目前在资产负债表上持有高达 67 亿美元的这类无息资金。

Is Golub up to bringing all this together? He thinks so. As he made clear in a recent talk to students at New York University's Stern School: "To succeed, I believe an organization has to change and adjust before it is forced to do so by external forces. It must reinvent itself and become the very company that could put it out of business before somebody else does."
戈鲁布能否把这一切整合在一起？他自信可以。他在纽约大学斯特恩商学院最近一次演讲中明确表示：“要获得成功，我认为一个组织必须在外部压力迫使其变革之前就先行调整。它必须自我革新，抢先成为那个可能让自己出局的公司。”

No matter how tough the challenges that lie ahead for Amex, it's rarely wise to bet against Warren Buffett. After all, he has wagered on strong brands like Coke and Gillette and made a bundle. He also invested successfully in auto insurer Geico, which, like Amex, has a strong cash flow. When Buffett comes up aces, it's usually because he's backing a strong management hand. What's hard to see this time around is how a bunch of consultants can rake in the pot in a truly cutthroat game.
无论美国运通未来面临的挑战多艰巨，与沃伦·巴菲特对赌往往不是明智之举。毕竟，他押注过可口可乐、吉列等强势品牌并赚得盆满钵满；他还成功投资了现金流同样强劲的汽车保险公司 Geico。巴菲特之所以屡屡胜出，通常是因为他押宝于强大的管理团队。难以看清的是，这一次，一群顾问能否在真正残酷的博弈中赢得筹码。

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