1996-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
1. Welcome
欢迎
WARREN BUFFETT: Just a little early, but I think everyone’s had a chance to take their seats.
沃伦·巴菲特： 时间稍微早了一点，但我想大家都已经找到座位了。
I must say, this is the first time I’ve seen this program. They told me they’d surprise me, and they certainly did. (Laughter)
我必须说，这是我第一次看到这个节目。他们告诉我会给我一个惊喜，他们确实做到了。（笑声）
Marc Hamburg, our chief financial officer, who is now known around the office as CB, was in charge of putting all this together. And we — I want you to know, we have no multimedia (inaudible). (Applause)
马克·汉堡是我们的首席财务官，他现在在办公室里被称为CB。他负责组织了这一切。我想让你们知道，我们没有多媒体（听不清）。(掌声)
This entire meeting is handled by a regular staff. We have no public relations department, or investor relations, or multimedia department, or anything of the sort. So, everybody just pitches in. And Marc will, forevermore, be in charge of the pregame ceremonies. (Laughter)
整个会议都是由普通员工处理的。我们没有公关部门、投资者关系部门或多媒体部门，或类似的部门。因此，大家都积极参与。从今以后，马克将永远负责赛前仪式。（笑声）
We have a very large crowd today. I hope everybody has found a seat, either in this main room or in the three overflow rooms. I think we can handle around 5,400. And historically, 62 percent or just about exactly 62 percent, every year, of the people who request tickets have come to the meeting.
今天有非常多的观众。我希望每个人都已经在主会场或三个分会场找到了座位。我想我们可以容纳大约5,400人。历史数据显示，每年申请门票的人中，有62%，或者说正好是62%的人会来参加会议。
And if that percentage holds true today, we have just filled the rooms. And we will have a problem in the future, which we haven’t figured out the answer to yet. But we’ve got another year.
如果今天这个比例仍然成立，我们的场地就正好坐满了。而我们未来会面临一个问题，我们还没有找到解决办法。但我们还有一年时间来准备。
The way we’ll run the meeting is that we’ll get the business out of the way at the start. And we’ll talk about the Class B issuance, then, too. So, it’ll take a little longer than historically has been the case.
我们的会议安排是，一开始会先处理业务内容。我们也会谈到B类股票的发行。所以，这部分会比以往稍微长一些。
And, then, we’ll have Q & A for — until about noon. We’ll have a short break at noon. There’ll be sandwiches outside, which you can buy. (Laughter)
然后，我们会进行问答环节，持续到中午左右。中午会有一个短暂的休息时间。外面会有三明治出售，你们可以购买。（笑声）
And Charlie and I will have a couple of sandwiches up here at the podium.
查理和我会在讲台上吃几份三明治。
And, then, we will stay around until about 3 o’clock to answer more questions. And at that time, after noon, I’m sure everybody in the overflow rooms will be able to find a seat here in the main room.
然后，我们会一直待到下午3点左右回答更多问题。到那时，中午过后，我相信溢出会场的所有人都可以在主会场找到座位。
But people have come from great distances to attend this meeting. So, we really want to get a — give everyone a chance to get their questions asked. And Charlie and I are delighted to — but we’ll have to break it up at three, no matter what. But we’ll be delighted to stick around.
但是，有人从很远的地方赶来参加会议。所以，我们真的希望给每个人一个机会，让他们可以提问。查理和我很高兴这么做——但无论如何，我们会在三点结束。但我们很乐意待到那时。
You can leave anytime, obviously. As I’ve explained in the past, it’s much better form to leave while Charlie is talking. (Laughter)
当然，您随时可以离开。如我过去所说的，当查理发言时离开会更符合礼仪。（笑声）
But the — feel free to do that. And then at noon you’ll get a chance to do it en masse.
不过，请随意这么做。到了中午，您还有机会一起离开。
We have buses available to take you to — if you have any money left at all after yesterday — to take you to other business establishments of Berkshire, locally.
我们有大巴，可以带您去——如果您在昨天之后还有剩余资金的话——带您去当地伯克希尔的其他业务场所。
So that will be the plan. I hope everyone does get their questions answered.
所以，这就是计划。我希望每个人的问题都能得到解答。
We’ve got a system where we break this room into six zones. And we have a couple of zones in other rooms. And then this afternoon, everybody will be able to be here in the main room. So, that is the procedure.
我们有一个系统，将这个房间分为六个区域。在其他房间也有几个区域。到今天下午，所有人都可以来到主会场。这就是我们的流程。
I’m sure you recognize Charlie Munger, the vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, who also had not seen that movie before. (Laughs)
我相信您们都认识查理·芒格，伯克希尔哈撒韦的副董事长，他之前也没看过那个短片。（笑声）
And showed — we were — I think Marc was afraid to show it to us. But in any event — (laughter) — we will go on.
那短片展示了——我想马克之前可能不敢给我们看。但无论如何——（笑声）——我们会继续进行。
I thought you might be interested. This is a list of people that came in for tickets. And we had, in addition to 99 from Canada and, of course, the U.S., we had Australia, the Channel Islands, England, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland.
我想您们可能会感兴趣。这是申请门票的人名单。除了来自加拿大的99人和美国的观众之外，我们还有来自澳大利亚、海峡群岛、英国、希腊、香港、以色列、葡萄牙、波多黎各、新加坡、瑞典和瑞士的观众。
I’m not sure all of those people are with us today. But they did send for tickets. And I’ve met a number that did come in from a distance.
我不确定所有这些人今天都在现场。但他们确实申请了门票。我也遇到了一些从很远的地方赶来的人。
2. Election of directors
董事选举
WARREN BUFFETT: So, with that introduction, I will call the meeting to order.
沃伦·巴菲特： 那么，介绍完毕后，我宣布会议开始。
I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of the directors. And I do welcome you to this meeting. I hope everybody has a good time this weekend.
我是沃伦·巴菲特，董事会主席。我欢迎大家参加这次会议。希望大家这个周末过得愉快。
And I’d like to introduce the directors, in addition to myself and to Charlie.
除了我和查理之外，我想介绍一下其他董事。
Now, you don’t get quite your money’s worth this year from our directors. They’ve — collectively, they’ve lost 100 pounds since last — our last meeting. I think they’ve been trying to live on the director’s fees. (Laughter)
今年，您们可能没有完全“物有所值”，因为我们的董事们——总共减重了100磅，自上次会议以来。我想他们可能试图靠董事费生活。（笑声）
We have with us Howard Buffett — let’s stand. (Applause)
我们这里有霍华德·巴菲特——请起立。（掌声）
Susan T. Buffett. (Applause)
苏珊·T·巴菲特。（掌声）
Malcolm G. Chace III. (Applause)
马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世。（掌声）
And Walter Scott Jr. (Applause)
以及沃尔特·斯科特二世。（掌声）
Along with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors, Mr. Ron Burgess and Mr. Craig Christiansen (PH). They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
今天与我们同在的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，我们的审计师，罗恩·伯吉斯先生和克雷格·克里斯蒂安森（音）先生。他们可以回答您关于德勤对伯克希尔账户审计的相关问题。
Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings.
福雷斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将为会议制作书面记录。
Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. He will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.
罗伯特·M·菲茨西蒙斯先生被任命为此次会议的选举检查员。他将认证在董事选举中投票的计数结果。
The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing, it says “number to come.” (Laughter)
这次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特二世和马克·D·汉堡。代理投票卡截至上周五已经返回，其中写着“数字待定”。（笑声）
VOICE: There’s another script.
旁白： 还有一份脚本。
WARREN BUFFETT: Ah, OK, there’s another — oh, yeah. Here’s the script on that one: 1,041,567 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders, as indicated on the cards. That number of shares represents a quorum. And we will therefore proceed — directly proceed — with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特： 啊，好吧，还有一份——哦，是的。关于这份的脚本是：1,041,567股伯克希尔股票由代理人根据卡片上的指示投票。这个股份数量达到了法定人数。因此，我们将直接开始会议。
We will conduct the business of the meeting, then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you may have.
我们将进行会议的业务部分，然后结束正式会议。之后，我们会回答大家可能提出的问题。
First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place a motion before the meeting.
第一个议程是宣读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提议一个动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议免去上次股东大会会议记录的宣读。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议吗？
VOICE: I second the motion.
旁白： 我附议。
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say, “Aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特： 该动议已被提出并附议。有没有任何评论或问题？我们将通过口头表决对此动议进行投票。所有赞成的请说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye.
众人： 赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? Motion’s carried.
沃伦·巴菲特： 反对的呢？动议通过。
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股数量、有投票权的股份以及参会股份数量的报告？
ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS: Yes. I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 8, 1996, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,193,512 shares of Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
罗伯特·M·菲茨西蒙斯： 是的，我有。据代理声明中所示，该声明随本次会议通知一同通过优先邮件于1996年3月8日发送给所有登记在册的股东。作为本次会议的登记日期，当时共有1,193,512股伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股流通，每股在会议讨论的动议中拥有一票投票权。
Of that number, 1,041,567 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.
其中，1,041,567股通过上周五返回的代理投票表代表本次会议中的股份。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the two items of business provided for in the proxy statement, he or she may do so.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢。如果有股东希望撤回之前提交的代理投票并亲自对代理声明中列出的两项议题投票，可以这样做。
Also, if any shareholder that’s present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person on those two items, you may do so.
另外，如果有在场的股东尚未提交代理投票且希望亲自投票表决这两项议题，可以领取选票。
If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish two ballots to you, one for each item.
如果您希望这样做，请向过道的会议工作人员表明身份，他们会为您提供两张选票，每项议题一张。
Will those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them?
需要选票的人员请表明身份，以便我们分发选票。
First item of business at this meeting is to elect directors. And I’ll recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting, with respect to election of directors.
本次会议的第一项议题是选举董事。我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提议一个关于董事选举的动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和沃尔特·斯科特二世为董事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有人附议吗？
VOICE: I second the motion.
旁白： 我附议。
WARREN BUFFETT: Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?
沃伦·巴菲特： 有没有其他提名？有没有讨论？
I learned a lot in China. We did so — (Laughter)
我在中国学到了很多东西。我们做了——（笑声）
The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
提名已经可以进行表决。如果有亲自投票的股东，请现在在董事选举的选票上作出标记，并将选票交给选举监察员。
Will the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received?
请代理人也将董事选举的选票提交给选举监察员，并根据收到的指示进行代理投票。
Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you’re ready, you may give your report.
菲茨西蒙斯先生，准备好后请报告结果。
ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 1,040,667 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding.
罗伯特·M·菲茨西蒙斯： 我的报告已准备好。截至上周五收到的代理投票中，每位提名者获得的票数不少于1,040,667票。这个数字远远超过了所有流通股的多数票要求。
The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed in the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的关于票数的精确认证，包括本次会议上亲自投票的票数，将交给秘书记录在会议记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢，菲茨西蒙斯先生。
Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcom G. Chace III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors.
沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世、查尔斯·T·芒格和沃尔特·斯科特二世被选为董事。
3. Why Class B shares were created
为什么创建了B类股票
WARREN BUFFETT: The second item of business of this meeting is to consider the recommendation of the board of directors to amend the company’s restated certificate of incorporation.
沃伦·巴菲特： 本次会议的第二项议题是讨论董事会关于修订公司重述的公司章程的建议。
The proposed amendment would add a provision to the restated certificate of incorporation authorizing the board of directors to issue up to 50 million shares of a new Class B common stock, with each Class B share having economic rights equivalent to 1/30th of a share of the current common stock, and with 1/200th of the vote, and to re-designate the company’s current common stock as Class A common stock and to make each share of Class A common stock convertible into 30 shares of the new Class B stock at the option of the holder.
提议的修订将新增一项条款，授权董事会发行最多5000万股新B类普通股，每股B类普通股的经济权益相当于当前普通股的1/30，投票权为1/200，并将公司当前的普通股重新指定为A类普通股，同时允许A类普通股的持有人选择将每股A类普通股转换为30股新B类普通股。
I think, before we get into moving that motion — I think this would be a good time to have discussion and take your questions regarding the issuance of the Class B. And I should give you a little background.
我认为，在提出这一动议之前，这是一个很好的机会来讨论并回答大家关于B类股票发行的问题。我应该向大家介绍一些背景信息。
I think many of you know the background on this. But over the years, we’ve had probably half a dozen people, one time or another, propose that the creation of an all-Berkshire investment company or unit trust.
我想你们中的许多人都了解一些背景。在过去的几年里，我们可能有半打的人在某个时间点提议创建一个纯伯克希尔投资公司或单元信托基金。
In other words, an entity that would hold nothing but Berkshire stock, and then would parcel out its own shares in smaller denomination pieces to the public.
换句话说，这种实体将只持有伯克希尔股票，然后将其股份分割为较小的面额份额向公众出售。
And we have generally discouraged that because we felt that there was considerable potential for abuse in such an arrangement.
我们通常对此持反对态度，因为我们认为这种安排有很大的滥用潜力。
And our discouragement has been successful up until last fall, when there was one — there were two proposals — that went as far as submission to the SEC for clearance, that involved unit trusts.
而我们的反对意见一直是有效的，直到去年秋天，当时有一个——实际上是两个提案——涉及单元信托，并提交给SEC申请批准。
And these unit trusts would’ve owned nothing but Berkshire shares and, then, been sold to the public in small denominations, probably with a minimum investment of around a thousand dollars or so.
这些单元信托将只持有伯克希尔的股份，然后以小面额出售给公众，最低投资金额可能在1000美元左右。
And holders of those trusts would’ve bought into an entity that had a defined life, but that had considerable, in the way of costs and some tax consequences, that they might not anticipate when they came in.
那些信托的持有人将购买一个有固定期限的实体，但该实体可能会带来相当大的成本和一些税务后果，而他们在进入时可能没有预料到这些问题。
And Charlie and I were worried that a combination of Berkshire’s past record — which cannot be repeated — and high sales commissions, and a low denomination, and a lot of publicity about Berkshire and myself, which, as you’ve seen this morning, we attempt to discourage (Laughter) —
查理和我担心的是，伯克希尔过去的业绩（这种业绩不可能再现）、高额销售佣金、小面额股份、以及关于伯克希尔和我个人的大量宣传——如您们今天早上所见，我们试图避免这种宣传（笑声）——
The — that the — a great many people would end up buying these unit trust holdings without any idea, really, of what they were buying, and with unrealistic expectations as to the future.
这会导致许多人最终购买这些单元信托的份额，而实际上他们对自己买的是什么一无所知，并对未来抱有不切实际的期望。
And that that would, in turn, create a considerable demand — because these unit trusts would go out and buy Berkshire shares — that would create a considerable demand against a fixed supply, much of which is almost unavailable because people have a low tax basis and are reluctant to sell, and I hope they’re reluctant to sell for other reasons.
而这又会导致对伯克希尔股票的巨大需求，因为这些单元信托需要购买伯克希尔股票。这种需求将与固定的供应量产生矛盾，其中许多股份由于持有人有较低的税务成本基础且不愿出售而几乎不可用，我希望他们不愿出售还有其他原因。
And that the very action of the creation of these, and that push on the demand, would — might very well create some speculative spurt in the stock, which in turn, would induce people who had been approached about the trust to feel they were missing even more of a good thing by rushing in.
而这种信托的创建行为和需求的推动，可能会在股票中引发某种投机性飙升，这反过来会让那些接触到信托的人觉得自己错过了更大的好机会，从而匆忙涌入。
Rising prices in certain kinds of markets create their own kind of demand. It’s not a sustained demand. And it’s a demand that the reversal of which, later on, when people become disillusioned, can cause a lot of problems.
某些市场中的价格上涨会产生一种自身的需求。这不是一种可持续的需求。而当人们后来变得失望时，这种需求的逆转可能会引发许多问题。
But that potential was there with a flood of buyers with unrealistic expectations, high commissions, and a fixed supply. So, we attempted to dissuade both of the promoters.
但这一潜在风险确实存在，因为有大量抱有不切实际期望的买家、高额佣金以及固定的供应量。因此，我们试图劝阻这两个发起人。
One backed away and then came out a few months later with something that was a combination of Berkshire and some other securities, which were at least thought to be in our portfolio.
其中一位发起人退出了，但几个月后又推出了一种产品，将伯克希尔和一些其他证券（至少被认为在我们的投资组合中）结合在一起。
And we started hearing from people that it was clear had no understanding of what they were buying, or the costs involved, or the potential tax implications, or anything of the sort.
我们开始听到一些人显然对他们所购买的东西毫无了解，也不了解涉及的成本、潜在的税务影响或任何相关内容。
So, at that time, we faced — we had to make a decision, and we had to make it rather quickly, as to what would be the best solution to this problem that, in turn, wouldn’t create the same sort of thing that we felt had potential harm when being done by these promoters.
因此，当时我们面临一个决策，必须相当迅速地做出决定，找出解决这个问题的最佳方案，同时确保不会像这些发起人所做的那样，制造我们认为可能有潜在危害的情况。
Obviously, we considered a split of the stock. But we were worried that a split would send out signals to all kinds of people who want to believe in things that may not be too believable about future performance and that they would look at it as some grand chance to buy in at a lower price.
显然，我们考虑过拆股。但我们担心拆股会向所有希望相信未来业绩可能并不太可信的各种人群发出信号，他们会将其视为以更低价格买入的绝佳机会。
Of course, it wouldn’t really be a lower price in relation to value. But it would be a lower denomination.
当然，这并不是真正意义上的更低价格，相对于价值来说。但它会是一个更低的面额。
And that, again, against a fixed supply, might very well have created the same kind of problem, maybe even a greater problem, than would occur with the unit trusts.
而这，在固定供应的情况下，可能会再次引发同样的问题，甚至可能比单元信托引发的问题更大。
So, we came upon the idea of the Class B shares, which would create a supply that would match the demand for, in effect, split shares, and that would be offered in a way that did not create special inducements, or to create false inducements to people thinking of buying.
因此，我们想出了B类股票的主意，这将创造一种与拆股需求相匹配的供应，同时以一种不会产生特别诱因或虚假诱因的方式向潜在购买者提供。
And one of the things we did was we stuck a commission on it, on the issuance of the Class B shares, that was about as low as any I’ve ever seen in many years in Wall Street, because we did not want salespeople to have a great inducement — we — to go out and sell the shares.
我们所做的一件事是对B类股票的发行附加了非常低的佣金，这是我在多年华尔街经历中见过的最低之一，因为我们不希望销售人员有很大的动力去推动销售这些股票。
We wanted anyone that was interested to read the prospectus, and think about it, and make their own decisions.
我们希望任何感兴趣的人阅读招股说明书，仔细考虑，并自己做出决定。
And we did another thing, which is quite counter to the normal commercial approach, which is that we said we would issue as many shares as people wanted to buy.
我们还做了另一件事，这完全不同于正常的商业做法，我们说我们会根据人们的需求发行股票，无上限。
And, you know, you do much better in this world if you’re selling something, to say “only one to a customer,” and “you have to get in early,” or “you have to know somebody in order to get shares.” And many new issues are sold that way, and it’s very effective.
您知道，如果您在销售某种产品，通常会更成功地说“每人限购一份”、“您必须早点来”或者“您必须认识某人才能获得股份”。许多新发行的股票就是这样销售的，而且这种方式非常有效。
I mean, you know, it’s like those old stories in Russia where there’d be lines, and people would get in them without knowing what they were going to buy when they got to the front of the line.
我的意思是，这就像以前俄罗斯的那些故事，人们排起了长队，而当他们排到队伍前面时，却不知道自己将买到什么。
And that’s a very effective selling tool. And it’s one that Wall Street is not unfamiliar with.
这是一种非常有效的销售工具，而华尔街对此并不陌生。
But we decided that, to reduce any of that feeling that you have to get in early, or only the big guy’s going to get it, or something of the sort, that we would announce loud and clearly that we would have shares available for everyone that wanted.
我们决定，为了减少那种“您必须早点参与”或“只有大人物才能买到”的感觉，我们会明确地宣布，所有想要的人都可以获得股份。
So, there was no reason to assume that — it couldn’t be a hot stock, in effect. And we’ve done various other things.
因此，没有理由认为——实际上，它不可能是一只“热门股票”。我们还做了许多其他事情。
So, I — our hope is that the Class B shareholders that we attract are of the same quality as the people in this room, that they have an investment attitude where they feel they are buying into part of a business, that they expect to stay with it for the indefinite future, maybe the rest of their lives.
所以，我——我们的希望是，我们吸引的B类股股东能和在座的各位一样优秀。他们应该有一种投资态度，认为自己正在购买一家企业的一部分，并期望长期持有，也许是一辈子。
And they do not think of it as a little piece of paper that may be hot because it’s a new issue or something of the sort.
他们不应该认为它只是因为是新发行的股票或类似原因而变成的一张“热门票据”。
It lets the people who are happy with the present shares stay in exactly the same position, which is what I’m going to do, what Charlie will do.
这使得那些对现有股票满意的人可以完全保持现状，这也是我和查理将要做的。
We have made the B very slightly disadvantageous, in two respects, to the A. It has a lower vote, and it will not participate in the shareholder contributions programs.
我们让B类股在两个方面相较于A类股略显劣势。它的投票权较低，并且不会参与股东捐赠计划。
There were reasons for both of those, but in addition to the — the explicit reasons, there also is the desire that the B not be made fully — it’s just a slight bit inferior —but it’s not fully as attractive as the A, because we did not want to do anything that pushed everybody into converting into the B.
我们这样做是有原因的，除了这些明确的理由之外，还有一个愿望，就是B类股不会完全等同于A类股——它只是稍微逊色一点——但不会完全像A类股那样有吸引力，因为我们不希望做任何事情促使所有人都转向B类股。
If that started in a big way, the B would then enjoy the better market, and it would create its own dynamic where it made sense for everybody to do it.
如果这种情况大规模发生，B类股将享有更好的市场环境，并且会形成一种自身的动力，让所有人都觉得这样做是有道理的。
So we have left it so there’s no reason for you, if you own the A, to convert to the B, unless you wish to sell or give away some portion of your holding that would be less than a full A share.
因此，我们设计的情况是，如果您持有A类股，除非您想出售或赠送少于一整股A类股的部分，否则没有理由转换为B类股。
And it will be convenient for that reason. But beyond that, there should be no incentive.
因此，从这一点来说会很方便。但除此之外，不应有任何额外的动机。
If the B should trade slightly above 1/30th of the price of the A, there will be arbitrage activity that will keep that from being anything other than a negligible amount.
如果B类股的交易价格略高于A类股价格的1/30，将会有套利活动将这一差距维持在可忽略的范围内。
It, of course, could trade well below 1/30th because the B is not convertible into the A.
当然，它的交易价格可能远低于1/30，因为B类股无法转换为A类股。
Charlie, would you like to add anything before we start taking questions on this? And I —
查理，在我们开始就此问题回答提问之前，您还有什么要补充的吗？我——
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 没有。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: — I encourage everyone to ask.
沃伦·巴菲特： ——我鼓励大家提问。
Charlie, as you will note during the meeting, does not get paid by the word. (Laughter)
查理，如您们在会议中会注意到的，他不是按字数拿工资的。（笑声）
But we — I encourage every — anyone to ask any question. There are no bad questions about this. I mean, it — last year, we talked about a preferred issue. And people had very valid questions.
但我——我鼓励每个人提问。关于这个问题，没有“坏问题”。我的意思是，去年我们讨论优先股时，人们提出了非常合理的问题。
I might take those two points of difference between the A and B, just to start with, on the shareholder-designated contributions program, which was $12 a share last year.
我可能会从A类股和B类股之间的两点差异开始谈起，关于股东指定捐赠计划，去年每股是12美元。
In addition to wanting the A to have a very small edge over the B, which would be a reason for not having the B participate, it also would get very impractical, in terms of taking $12, and dividing it by 30, and soliciting the names of charities and to designate contributions.
除了希望A类股比B类股略有优势——这是不让B类股参与的原因之一——将12美元分成30份，然后征集慈善机构的名称并指定捐款，在实际操作中也非常不切实际。
We can handle the present program fairly efficiently. But we would not want to be sending out checks for a dollar or two, and it would get very inefficient.
我们目前的计划处理起来相当高效。但我们不想寄出一两美元的支票，那样会变得非常低效。
So, we have told prospective B holders that that’s not going to happen. And so, they’re fully informed coming in.
因此，我们已经告知潜在的B类股持有人，这种情况不会发生。因此，他们在进入时是完全知情的。
捐的是所有股东的钱，事先约定有没有效力，但这个政策后面就没有了。
In connection with the vote, the issuance of the B does create more votes outstanding. So, absent any change in the situation, through the issuance of shares which we are not particularly eager to issue, the vote — my vote — will be diluted, somewhat, by this.
关于投票，B类股的发行确实会增加流通中的投票权。因此，在没有其他变更的情况下，通过发行我们并不特别热衷的股票，我的投票权会因此略有稀释。
And, frankly, I had no desire to create a lot more shares which would dilute the vote of the Buffett family. It will be diluted, somewhat, by this action because we will have all the present votes outstanding, plus some votes from the B.
坦率地说，我并不希望创造大量稀释巴菲特家族投票权的股份。由于这项行动，我们的投票权会有所稀释，因为现有的投票权仍将存在，同时还会新增一些B类股的投票权。
If there is a lot of conversion to the B, it is true that our holding will go up, percentage-wise. But I see no reason why people really should convert. So, I don’t think that’s likely. I think, in the end, it’ll stay very much the same.
如果有大量A类股转换为B类股，我们的持股比例确实会增加。但我看不出人们真的需要转换的理由。所以我认为这种情况不太可能发生。我认为最终会保持非常相似的状态。
And as I mentioned earlier, we want there to be a slight disadvantage to the B.
正如我之前提到的，我们希望B类股稍微处于劣势。
In all other respects, we will treat the B just as the A. We have a problem with numbers at this annual meeting. We’re going to have to do something next year. And we haven’t figured it out yet, either.
在所有其他方面，我们会像对待A类股一样对待B类股。在本次年会上，我们面临人数上的问题。明年我们必须做点什么，但我们还没有找到解决办法。
But the suggestion was made by someone that maybe the B would get second-class seating or something. We’re not going to have any of that. (Laughter)
有人建议，或许B类股股东应该得到“二等座位”之类的待遇。我们不会这么做。（笑声）
But from this point forward, with the point — with the exception of two things we put in the prospectus, the B shares will be treated, in every way, as equivalent to A. There —
但从现在开始，除了我们在招股说明书中提到的两点例外，B类股在各方面都将被视为与A类股等同。
So, with that, and with Charlie’s reluctance to elaborate, we have a six-zone system in here. And then we have another two zones in the overflow rooms.
好了，说到这里，查理不愿多说的情况下，我们这里采用了六个区域的系统。在溢出会场还有另外两个区域。
So, if there are any questions in zone 1, somebody — just raise your hand and somebody will bring a microphone.
因此，如果一区有人有问题，请举手，会有人把麦克风递给您。
Zone 1 is over there. Two is back in the corner. Three, four, five, and six. So it just goes right around clockwise. Just raise your hand and somebody will bring a microphone to you.
一区在那边。二区在后角。三、四、五和六区按顺时针方向依次排列。请举手，会有人把麦克风递给您。
4. Class B IPO price is the same for everyone
B类股票IPO价格对所有人相同
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve got a question, I think, in zone 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们在一区有一个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Marshall Patton (PH) from Bandera, Texas.
观众： 早上好，我是来自德克萨斯州班德拉的马歇尔·帕顿（音）。
And when the price is struck on the Class B shares, those of us who buy our shares through computer programs, do we have assurance that, whoever we buy from, that that will be the price that we pay for these shares?
当B类股票的价格确定后，对于我们这些通过电脑程序购买股票的人，我们能否确保无论从谁那里购买，支付的价格都是相同的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — well, the price — there’ll be a price established, probably, Wednesday night or thereabouts of this week. And everybody will pay the same price. And a very high percentage of that price, incidentally, will come to Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的——这个价格——大概会在本周三晚上或附近确定。所有人都将支付相同的价格。此外，这个价格的很大一部分将直接进入伯克希尔。
I mean, there is a very, very low underwriting spread, compared to any other offering.
我的意思是，与任何其他发行相比，承销价差非常非常低。
Now, once the initial offering is — everybody will pay the same price: large institutions, the buyer of one share will pay the same price.
现在，在初次发行时，所有人都会支付相同的价格：无论是大机构还是购买一股的人，价格都是一样的。
Subsequently, the stock will, we expect, will be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, probably, Thursday morning. And we have the world’s greatest specialist here, I believe, Jimmy Maguire, who handles the trading, now, of the common and will handle the trading of both the A and B.
之后，我们预计股票将在纽约证券交易所上市，可能是周四上午。我认为，我们这里有世界上最棒的专业交易员，吉米·马奎尔，他目前负责普通股的交易，并将负责A类和B类股票的交易。
Jimmy, are you here? Do you want to stand up? Just so — there he is. The world’s greatest specialist, Jimmy Maguire. (Applause)
吉米，你在这里吗？你愿意站起来吗？就是他。世界上最棒的专业交易员，吉米·马奎尔。（掌声）
I think he leads the singing of “Wait ’Till the Sun Shines, Nellie,” too, annually. You can see him on CNBC occasionally, and the Nightly Business Report. I want to give equal time here. The —
我认为，他还每年带领大家唱《等到阳光普照，内莉》。您可以偶尔在CNBC或《夜间商业报道》中看到他。我想在这里公平地提一下。
But Jimmy will be trading both classes of stock starting Thursday. As I say — as I said, the — it will be impossible, after the first few days, it would be impossible for the B to sell much above 1/30th of the A, because people would buy the A and sell the B if more than a very small — with even the smallest of arbitrage differentials.
但从周四开始，吉米将负责两类股票的交易。正如我所说——在最初几天之后，B类股的价格不可能远高于A类股的1/30，因为只要出现微小的套利差价，人们就会买入A类股并卖出B类股。
But there will be markets in two shares and — in two classes. They will both trade in 10-share lots. That will be the round lot — so-called round lot. Usually, the round lot on the New York Stock Exchange is 100 shares. But in the case of both Berkshire shares, the round lot will be ten shares.
两类股票将会有市场交易。它们的标准交易单位都是10股。这将是所谓的“标准交易单位”。通常，在纽约证券交易所，标准交易单位是100股。但对于伯克希尔的两类股票来说，标准交易单位将是10股。
Now, I read one or two press accounts that said, therefore, the minimum purchase is ten shares. That’s not true. The minimum purchase of each stock — each class of stock — is one share. I mean, you can buy one share or two shares. Or you can sell one share or two shares.
我看到一两篇报道说，因此最低购买量是10股。这并不是真的。每类股票的最低购买量都是1股。也就是说，您可以购买1股或2股。同样，您也可以出售1股或2股。
And you have an odd lot differential, just as you would if you were working with less than 100 shares of a company whose stock traded in 100-share round lots. But there’s no minimum size in the case of either share.
如果您交易的数量少于标准单位（如100股），您将面临“零股交易差价”。这与任何按100股为标准单位的股票交易情况类似。但对于伯克希尔的两类股票来说，没有最低交易数量限制。
And you will see, when they get mechanics straightened out, and they may have a little bit trouble with it, but you will see Berkshire A and Berkshire B in — quoted in the papers. And I think that you’re — that it’ll be quite clear after Thursday what is going on, on that.
当技术流程理顺之后——可能会有点小问题——您会在报纸上看到伯克希尔A类股和B类股的报价。我认为，到了周四之后，这一切都会非常清晰。
I don’t know about the computer purchases. But I don’t — that certainly, in terms of the initial offering, that will be through one of, I think, 137 people — or brokers — in the selling group. And it’s the same, no matter who you deal with.
至于电脑程序购买，我不太清楚。但可以肯定的是，在初次发行时，这将通过销售团体中的137个经纪人之一进行。而无论您与谁交易，价格都是相同的。
5. Downside of Berkshire unit trusts
伯克希尔单位信托的弊端
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域2？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is David Hendel (PH). I’m from Boca Raton, Florida.
观众： 我是大卫·亨德尔（音），来自佛罗里达州博卡拉顿。
To your knowledge, will this program effectively discourage the unit trusts?
据您所知，这项计划是否能有效地遏制单位信托的出现？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s certainly designed to. And I think the answer to that is yes, because I see no way that a unit trust — either in connection with the initial offering or with the subsequent trading — I see no way that the unit trust could offer people as an efficient and inexpensive way of participating in Berkshire as direct purchase of the B.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这个计划的确是为此设计的。我认为答案是肯定的，因为我看不出单位信托无论是在首次发行还是后续交易中，都无法像直接购买B类股票那样为人们提供高效且低成本的方式来参与伯克希尔。
Bear in mind, if a unit trust were established, it would have to buy Berkshire shares in the market. So, it would have the costs that people have in buying shares. And, then, on top of it, it would superimpose these other costs. And in addition to the initial commission, they even had a valuation fee.
请记住，如果成立单位信托，它必须在市场上购买伯克希尔股票。因此，它会承担人们购买股票时的成本。此外，它还会叠加其他成本。除了初始佣金外，他们甚至还设有估值费用。
That was a job I wanted to have because every — (laughter) — three months or however often, maybe every day, somebody, their job was to evaluate this trust value which involved the great skill of being able to locate it alphabetically — (laughter) — in the newspaper.
这可是我想要的工作，因为每——（笑声）——三个月，或者更频繁一点，可能每天，某人的工作就是评估这个信托的价值，这需要极高的技能，比如能够按照字母顺序——（笑声）——在报纸上找到它。
The figure was left blank as to what the evaluator’s fee would be. But I had a feeling that it was one of the more cushy jobs available. (Laughter)
估值员的费用数字是空白的。但我感觉这可能是最轻松的工作之一。（笑声）
There was an added problem, too. I mean, if these unit trusts started and did not get off the ground very far, they could’ve become something in the way of orphans. And they certainly would’ve become expensive to operate.
此外，还有一个额外的问题。我的意思是，如果这些单位信托开始了，但发展得不够远，它们可能会变成某种意义上的“孤儿”。而且它们的运营成本肯定会变得很高。
And, then, with Berkshire paying nothing in the way of dividends, but with the trust incurring expenses, including this evaluator’s fee, among others — but with the trust incurring expenses, they would have to sell small amounts periodically to pay the expenses. And that would create tax consequences for every unit trust holder.
此外，由于伯克希尔不支付任何形式的股息，而信托却有各种费用，包括这个估值员的费用等——信托不得不定期出售少量股份来支付费用。这会为每位单位信托持有人带来税务后果。
I mean, people would not know what — we felt they would not know what they were getting into.
我的意思是，人们可能不会知道——我们觉得他们不会明白自己在参与什么。
The more serious problem is that somebody would flash our past record in front of them or show them some chart on Berkshire’s stock price and say, “You know, this is your chance to do the same thing.” And it, obviously, isn’t — wouldn’t have been.
更严重的问题是，有人可能会向他们展示我们的过去业绩，或者伯克希尔股价的某些图表，说：“你知道，这是你获得同样成功的机会。”而这显然不是真的——也不可能是真的。
And — but based on what we have seen, right now, we anticipate the offering being 350,000 shares. But the extent to which the number of tickets involved, that even seeking out informed purchasers only, there’s very substantial demand.
但根据我们目前的观察，我们预计此次发行规模为35万股。即便仅针对知情购买者，需求量依然非常可观。
So I think if you widen that circle to include uninformed, it might have been quite an experience.
所以我认为，如果将范围扩大到包括不知情的购买者，那可能会变成一次相当混乱的经历。
I think the answer is that we will not have a problem with the unit trusts in the future.
我认为答案是，我们未来不会再遇到单位信托的问题。
6. No plans for Class B secondary offering
没有计划进行B类股票的二次发行
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域3？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Adam Ingle (PH) from Boulder, Colorado.
观众： 我是亚当·英格尔（音），来自科罗拉多州博尔德市。
In terms of the number of shares that you’re going to issue, B shares, do you plan to just look at the book on Wednesday and issue enough to totally satisfy the demand? And do you have any plans to do a secondary if it starts becoming a hot number?
关于您将发行的B类股票数量，您是否计划在周三查看订单并发行足够满足需求的数量？如果它变成一个“热门股票”，您有计划进行二次发行吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I think what we plan is to tailor the size of the offering to fit the demand that appears Tuesday night or Wednesday morning, or whenever the exact moment will be on that. But the offering will be designed to do that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我认为我们的计划是根据周二晚上或周三早晨（或确切时间）出现的需求来调整发行规模。发行将以此为基础进行设计。
Like most offerings, I would anticipate that the underwriter will — and this is a supposition at the moment — but I — it’s frequently done — would sell some more shares than the initial offering with the intention of creating some short position in the security.
与大多数发行类似，我预计承销商可能会——目前这只是一个假设——但通常情况下，他们会出售比初始发行多一些的股票，以形成该证券的空头头寸。
And, then, they have an option to take — from the company — for 30 days up to 15 percent of whatever we initially sell, which protects them on their short position. But the short position also helps in terms of having an orderly market in the stock, subsequently.
然后，他们可以选择从公司额外获得最多相当于初始发行量15%的股票，为期30天，以保护他们的空头头寸。而空头头寸也有助于之后维持股票市场的有序性。
But we will, essentially, tailor the size of the issue to the demand as it appears to us midweek.
但我们基本上会根据周中时显现的需求来调整发行规模。
We have no plans for any secondary offering. I think this has been sufficiently publicized. There’s a large network of selling group members. So that people that are interested, but wanted to buy in a smaller denomination, will have had their chance.
我们没有计划进行任何二次发行。我认为这一计划已经被充分宣传。有一个广泛的销售团体网络。因此，那些有兴趣但希望以较小面额购买的人将有机会参与。
I think there will be a — well, present indications, there’d be 350,000 shares out. There would be a fairly large — a large — number of holders based on what we’re seeing.
我认为，根据目前的情况，预计将发行35万股。从我们看到的数据来看，这将会有一个相当大的——一个非常大的——持股者群体。
So, the market should, starting Thursday morning on the exchange, there should be, in my opinion, a reasonable market based on that kind of quantity and the number of people buying. And so, I anticipate nothing subsequently.
因此，我认为从周四早上开始，基于这种数量和购买者数量，市场应该是合理的。因此，我预计之后不会有进一步的行动。
7. We don’t think Berkshire shares are “undervalued”
我们认为伯克希尔股票“不被低估”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域4？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you hear me?
观众： 你能听到我说话吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yep.
沃伦·巴菲特： 听到了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Tom Conrad (PH). I’m from McLean, Virginia, and I (inaudible) to this meeting and tell all my friends and family members to buy it last week. But I’ve been reading in some publications that you said that you would not advise your friends and family members to buy it at its current pricing.
观众： 我是汤姆·康拉德（音），来自弗吉尼亚州的麦克莱恩。我参加了这次会议，并在上周告诉所有的朋友和家人去买伯克希尔股票。但我在一些报道中看到您说，您不会建议朋友和家人在目前的价格下购买。
And I’m just concerned, if I go out and run and tell them why you’re saying — what your feeling would be, should I go tell my friends and family members? — (Laughter)
我有些担忧，如果我出去告诉他们您的看法，我应该告诉我的朋友和家人什么？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think I’ll leave that one up to you. What I said — (laughter) — I said, at present prices, Charlie and I do not think Berkshire stock is undervalued. And that, now that is not what’s gotten reported sometimes. I mean, sometimes people have said we thought it was overvalued.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我觉得这个问题还是留给您自己决定吧。我是说——（笑声）——我说的是，目前的价格下，查理和我认为伯克希尔的股票不被低估。但有时候报道并不是这样写的。有些人说我们认为它被高估了。
We did not — if you look at the prospectus or if you look at the — if you look at the prospectus, you will see that what we said was we do not think it’s undervalued.
我们并没有这么说——如果您查看招股说明书，或者仔细阅读招股说明书，您会看到我们说的是，我们不认为它被低估。
Now, I find it somewhat entertaining that people regard that as kind of an amazing statement by somebody making a public offering.
现在，我发现有些人认为在公开发行中这么说是一个惊人的声明，这让我觉得有点有趣。
But if you think about it a bit, can you imagine a management that goes out and says to the world, “We are selling you something — in a new stock — and it’s way undervalued.”
但如果您仔细想想，您能想象管理层向全世界宣布，“我们在卖给您某种东西——一种新股票——而它被大大低估了”吗？
What do you say to your present shareholders if you go out and say to the public, “We’re selling you something that’s worth a dollar, and we’re going to sell it to you for 80 cents?” Now, that would leave me very unhappy.
如果您向公众说，“我们要卖给您一件价值1美元的东西，但我们会以80美分的价格卖给您”，那么，您对现有股东怎么交代？那会让我非常不高兴。
So, I feel that any management that is talking about selling their stock and they say it’s very undervalued, either doesn’t know what’s good for their present shareholders or they may have their tongue in cheek.
所以，我认为任何管理层如果在销售股票时说它非常被低估，要么不知道什么对现有股东有利，要么就是在开玩笑。
We would not be selling — we would not sell a part of your interest in Berkshire at a price which we did not feel was adequate for the present shareholders. It’s that simple.
我们不会出售——我们不会以我们认为对现有股东不公平的价格出售您在伯克希尔的部分权益。就是这么简单。
If we sell 1 percent of the company, and 350,000 shares is close to that figure of B, we are selling 1 percent of your ownership in See’s Candy. We’re selling 1 percent of your ownership in GEICO. We’re selling 1 percent of your ownership in The Buffalo News. Those are all valuable assets.
如果我们出售公司1%的股份，而35万股B类股票接近于这个比例，我们实际上是在出售您对See’s Candy 1%的所有权，对GEICO 1%的所有权，对《布法罗新闻》1%的所有权。这些都是非常有价值的资产。
We have no intention of selling 1 percent, or 10 percent, or the hundred percent of any of those entities at a price that is not fair to present shareholders.
我们无意以对现有股东不公平的价格出售这些实体的1%、10%或100%的股份。
That doesn’t mean it’s unfair to new shareholders, but we’re not going to — we would not be selling the stock if we thought it was undervalued.
这并不意味着对新股东不公平，但我们不会——如果我们认为股票被低估了，我们是不会出售的。
I’m not sure what we would’ve done if we’d had that position when the unit trust came along. But we have — and put in the prospectus — but we are not selling any of our shares. Frequently, on a new offering you see present holders. But, you know, I have very close to 100 percent of my net worth in Berkshire and it leaves me quite happy.
我不确定如果当时单位信托出现时我们会怎么做。但我们已经——并在招股说明书中说明——我们没有出售任何股份。新发行股票时您经常会看到现有股东出售股份。但您知道，我的净资产中几乎100%在伯克希尔，这让我非常满意。
I’ve got a trust I run set up in 1964. I’m the sole trustee. I can do anything in that trust I want. And I’m freed by the person who set up the trust of responsibility for a concentration of investments. And I have some members of my family who are beneficiaries of that trust.
我管理着一个在1964年设立的信托。我是唯一的受托人。我可以在这个信托中做任何事情。而设立这个信托的人也免除了我对于投资集中性的责任。我的家族中有一些成员是这个信托的受益人。
That trust owns nothing but Berkshire Hathaway stock. That doesn’t bother me at all. That — I’m not recommending purchase. But I’m perfectly happy owning Berkshire.
这个信托除了伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票外，什么都没有。这一点都不让我感到困扰。我并不是在推荐购买。但我对持有伯克希尔感到非常满意。
But we do not want — (applause) — we do not want people to think, when they buy into Berkshire, that they’re buying something that’s undervalued, because it’s not.
但是我们不希望——（掌声）——我们不希望人们在购买伯克希尔时以为他们买的是被低估的东西，因为事实并非如此。
And we say in that fourth caveat on the prospectus that we want people to buy it only if they expect to be holders for a very long time.
我们在招股说明书的第四项说明中表示，我们希望人们只有在预计长期持有的情况下才购买伯克希尔。
Charlie and I expect to be holders for a very long time. And, in fact, you may see us up here sometime where we don’t know who the guy next to us is. (Laughter)
查理和我预计会长期持有。事实上，有一天您可能会看到我们站在这里，而我们可能都不知道身边的人是谁了。（笑声）
But we’ll put on an act, though. (Laughter)
不过，我们会演得很像样的。（笑声）
You know, that is our attitude toward Berkshire. We do not want people to come in who think it’s going to be a hot stock or selling for more a year from now, because we don’t have the faintest idea whether it’s going to be selling for more or less a year from now. Never have had.
这就是我们对伯克希尔的态度。我们不希望吸引那些认为这是一只热门股票或一年后会涨价的人，因为我们完全不知道一年后它会涨还是会跌。我们从来不知道。
We do think that to the extent that Berkshire attracts a special class of shareholder that really looks at themselves as owning a part interest in a business, like they’d own a part of a farm or part of an apartment house, and they expect to hold it, really, for the rest of their lives, we think that it’s a perfectly sensible thing to do because we’re doing it ourselves. But we don’t want to go beyond that.
我们确实认为，伯克希尔吸引了一类特殊的股东，他们真正把自己视为拥有一家企业的一部分，就像拥有一个农场或公寓的一部分一样，并计划一辈子持有。我们认为这完全合情合理，因为我们自己也是这么做的。但我们不想超出这个范围。
8. No plans for the Class B proceeds
对B类股票募集资金没有具体计划
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure whether we got zone 4. Can we go back there?
沃伦·巴菲特： 我不确定我们是否已经覆盖了区域4。我们可以回到那里吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Gordon Shepherd (PH) from Montreal.
观众： 我是戈登·谢泼德（音），来自蒙特利尔。
I wondered whether you had any plans for what to do with the money? (Laughter)
我想知道您是否对这些资金有任何计划？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that is in the prospectus, but the — we have no immediate plans for the money. But we’ve faced that situation a number of times.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这个问题的答案在招股说明书里，但——我们目前对这笔资金没有任何紧急计划。不过，我们多次面临这种情况。
I mean, the money — the inflow of money and outflow of money should not be, in our view, attempted to be matched too carefully in this world, because you get investment and business opportunities at times that differ from the times that funds come in.
我的意思是，资金的流入和流出，在我们看来，不应该被过于精确地匹配，因为投资和商业机会的出现时间往往与资金到位的时间不同。
And one of the most important disciplines in running a business or managing investments is that — is to not get your — not to try to coordinate your actions simply with the availability of cash.
而经营企业或管理投资最重要的纪律之一就是不要简单地根据现金的可用性来协调您的行动。
Over time, we found a way to use money. It’s much tougher for us to run 17 billion than it was when we had 20 million in the business. There’s no question about that. And we pointed that out many times. And it’ll get tougher still if we get larger, which I hope we do.
随着时间推移，我们找到了一种使用资金的方法。管理170亿美元比管理2000万美元要困难得多，这一点毫无疑问。而且我们多次指出了这一点。如果我们变得更大，这会变得更加困难，但我希望我们能做到这一点。
But the fact that, if 400 million comes in on this offering or whatever, that’s really no different than 400 million coming in in some other manner.
不过，事实上，无论这次发行筹集到4亿美元还是以其他方式筹集到4亿美元，这没有本质区别。
And when our float grows, we take in more money. When our earnings are retained, we take in more money. When we have — I forget what the check would’ve been on the Cap Cities transaction, but it was certainly well over a billion dollars that came in on a single day.
当我们的浮存金增长时，我们会获得更多资金。当我们的收益被留存时，我们会获得更多资金。当我们完成像Cap Cities这样的交易时——我忘记了具体金额，但那天的进账肯定超过了10亿美元。
So, money’s fungible, and we have to keep looking for bigger and bigger things as we go along. And that’s what we do focus on.
所以，资金是可替代的，我们必须不断寻找更大、更重要的投资机会。这正是我们关注的重点。
But it doesn’t bother me to take it. It wouldn’t bother me if we weren’t taking it. It wouldn’t bother me if we took in three times as much. It doesn’t make a lot of difference.
但是否接受这些资金对我来说并没有什么影响。如果我们没有接受，也无所谓。如果我们接受了三倍的资金，也没关系。这不会有太大区别。
And we will have — we — the constant challenge for Charlie and me is to allocate capital as we go along. And it’s a nice challenge. (Laughter)
查理和我一直面临的挑战就是随着业务发展分配资本。这是一个不错的挑战。（笑声）
9. Discouraging buyers with unreasonable expectations
劝阻抱有不切实际预期的买家
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域5？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi there. Lee Debroff (PH), long-time shareholder, I think, going back a number of years now to when it was a little more intimate affair. Not quite sure whether I should look at you in the TV here or in real life, on stage. But anyway, I’m on the very right of you.
观众： 你好，我是李·德布洛夫（音），长期股东，我想可以追溯到多年前那种更私密的股东大会。不太确定我应该看电视屏幕上的您，还是舞台上真实的您。不过无论如何，我在您的右边。
And I see all the guards around you, and I see all the security and that sort of thing. And then, I see this offering of the Class B. And I sort of wonder whether, from your perspective, you feel you might be in the same boat that the pope and the president are?
我看到您周围的保安，还有这些安保措施。然后我看到了B类股的发行。我不禁想，您是否觉得，从您的角度看，自己可能和教皇或总统处在类似的境地？
And I mean this absolutely sincerely, because I don’t think that you have, perhaps, as good a handle as some of us do on the renown that you carry outside of Omaha, Nebraska. People who have no idea what investments are about are fully aware of who you are.
我真诚地说这句话，因为我认为您可能不像我们中的一些人那样了解您在内布拉斯加州奥马哈以外的名声。那些完全不懂投资的人完全知道您是谁。
And when they see this offering, I think you may find that there are substantially more people who are interested in just having a piece of you for the sake of saying they have a piece of you than having absolutely any idea what they’re doing.
当他们看到这次发行时，我认为您可能会发现，许多人只是想拥有一部分“属于您的东西”，只是为了说自己拥有了一部分，而完全不知道自己在做什么。
And I notice that on — I try to read the fine print here — on page 14, first paragraph, second line, that you indicate some 50 million shares of Class B common stock may be offered.
我注意到，在——我试图阅读这里的小字——第14页，第一段，第二行，您提到可能会发行大约5000万股B类普通股。
And so, I’d like you to comment on this situation that you find yourself in, where you may be, perhaps, out of touch with the popularity that you have.
因此，我希望您能对此情形发表看法，您可能已经与自己拥有的受欢迎程度有些脱节了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my first reaction: maybe I should tell my barber we could save the clippings and sell them. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我的第一个反应是：也许我应该告诉我的理发师把剪下来的头发保存起来，然后卖掉。（笑声）
The — I don’t think it’s quite as extreme as you say.
我认为没有您说的那么极端。
But, you know, I — in relation to the 50 million first, we have to authorize enough shares, because we are going to allow every share of class A — or present common stock — but the class A, to convert to B.
但，您知道的，首先关于5000万股，我们必须授权足够的股份，因为我们将允许每一股A类股——或者说目前的普通股——也就是A类股，转换为B类股。
So we have to have the shares authorized to take care of 30 times the present one point almost two million shares. So, 36 million shares, in effect, are reserved for the present common stock. And, as long as we were authorizing it —
我们必须授权这些股份，以应对现有约120万股的30倍需求。因此，实际上有3600万股是为现有普通股保留的。既然我们已经授权了这些股份——
Well, we need that much, or we wouldn’t have the shares actually available if everybody came around to convert. That’s not going to happen. But we still have to be prepared for it.
我们确实需要这么多，否则如果所有人都来转换，我们就不会有足够的股份可用。虽然这种情况不会发生，但我们必须为此做好准备。
We have no plans to issue a lot of shares. The — but the point you mention, which I think you stressed a little more than I would’ve, but the — that is what we were worried about, in terms of the unit trusts.
我们没有计划发行大量股份。不过，您提到的问题，我认为您比我可能更强调了一些，但这确实是我们在单位信托方面所担忧的。
There are people that think that it can all happen again from this kind of a base which, you know, is mathematically a joke. And Charlie and I would settle for one whole lot less, you know, right today.
有些人认为，从这种基数出发，这一切可以再现，但这在数学上显然是个笑话。而查理和我今天都会满足于远远少得多的收益。
And we have done everything we can — I mean, if we hadn’t done this, the unit trusts would’ve moved forward. And I think they would’ve cashed in on that phenomenon you suggested.
我们已经尽了一切努力——我的意思是，如果我们没有采取行动，单位信托会继续推进。而且我认为，他们会利用您提到的现象牟利。
And in a few years, you know, it would not — I would’ve been in a somewhat different position because people can get very disillusioned if they have hopes that aren’t realized.
而几年后，我可能会处于一个完全不同的处境，因为如果人们的期望没有实现，他们可能会非常失望。
And we have done everything possible, I think, to filter out those who might have an unrealistic belief.
我们已经尽可能地采取措施，筛除那些可能抱有不切实际期望的人。
And everyone should read a prospectus before they buy shares, and —
每个人在购买股票之前都应该阅读招股说明书，而且——
I think we have tailored — we’ve designed what we’re doing about as well as we can to moderate that phenomenon you’re talking about. There may be a few come in but not too many.
我认为，我们已经尽可能地设计了我们的计划，以缓解您所提到的那种现象。可能会有少数人参与，但不会太多。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we only issue the amount we’re now talking about, it’s sort of a non-event around Berkshire. It’d be 1 percent —
查理·芒格： 嗯，如果我们仅发行目前讨论的数量，对于伯克希尔来说几乎算不上什么大事。这只占1%——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s 1 percent.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，只占1%。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — or something like that of the —
It solves the problem of these disreputable followers — (laughter) — and 1 percent, what does it matter? (Applause)
查理·芒格： ——或者类似这样的比例——它解决了那些不良追随者的问题——（笑声）——而1%，又有什么关系呢？（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Wait, you heard that remark, referring to Charlie earlier, about all I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 等一下，您听过查理之前提到的那句话吗？“我只想知道我会在哪里死去，这样我就永远不会去那里。”（笑声）
Well, we think about that, in terms — we believe in reverse engineering.
嗯，我们确实考虑过这一点，我们相信“逆向工程”。
And how do we keep people from buying it, who really are going to be unhappy, you know, a few years later?
我们要如何阻止那些几年后可能会感到不满的人买入呢？
You know, it’s a little like singing country songs. You all — you should sing them backwards. That way, you get your home back and your auto back and — (laughter) — your wife back, and —
这有点像唱乡村歌曲。您们知道——应该倒着唱。这样，您就能找回您的家、车——（笑声）——还有您的妻子——
10. Almost like buying direct from Berkshire
几乎就像直接从伯克希尔购买
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? Have we got —?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域6？我们有没有——？
VOICE: There was a hand over here, wasn’t there? Here. Right here.
声音： 这边有一只手举起了，是吧？就在这里。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Rena Lowie (PH) from Chicago, proud to be here. At mic —
观众： 早上好。我是来自芝加哥的瑞娜·洛伊（音），很高兴能在这里。在麦克风这边——
WARREN BUFFETT: Where are we? Oh, over here. OK.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们在哪里？哦，在这里。好的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question that’s been asked me, and I really don’t know. Several people wanted to know if they could buy directly from the company.
观众： 有人问了我一个问题，我确实不知道答案。有几个人想知道是否可以直接从公司购买股票。
WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to that is no. But Salomon Brothers is the underwriter of the issue. They have a hundred and, I think, 37-or-something broker-dealers, all — virtually all — the major ones in the country, in the selling group.
沃伦·巴菲特： 答案是否定的。但所罗门兄弟是此次发行的承销商。他们拥有大约137家左右的经纪公司，几乎包括了全国所有主要的经纪商，都在销售团体中。
The cost to the company of doing this are really very, very low compared to any issue I’ve seen. When AT&T had their spinoff — or sale of Lucent — which was close to a $3 billion deal — you know, their percentage costs were more than double what our costs will be, for example, on this offering of Berkshire.
与我见过的任何发行相比，公司为此付出的成本非常低。当AT&T进行Lucent的分拆或出售时，这是一笔接近30亿美元的交易，他们的百分比成本是我们此次伯克希尔发行成本的两倍以上。
So, it’s almost as if you’re buying it — a Class B holder — is buying it from us, in terms of the, what I would call the frictional costs involved of getting the issue done. In fact, if we handled it ourselves, it might cost more.
因此，从所谓的“完成发行所需的摩擦成本”来看，这几乎就像您直接从我们这里购买B类股票一样。实际上，如果我们自己处理发行，可能会花费更多。
But the company, itself, is not a broker-dealer. And it’s — it would require a whole group of different hoops to jump through in order to have a direct issue. It will be sold only through broker-dealers.
但公司本身并不是经纪商。如果要进行直接发行，需要跨越一系列不同的障碍。股票只能通过经纪商进行销售。
11. All-Berkshire mutual fund for retirement plans?
是否可能为退休计划设立全伯克希尔的共同基金？
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域7？
VOICE: There aren’t any questions in zone 7.
声音： 区域7没有问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: No questions in zone 7. Zone 8?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域7没有问题。区域8呢？
VOICE: No questions from zone 8.
声音： 区域8也没有问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Then, we’ll go back to zone 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好吧，那么我们回到区域1。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Rocker (PH) from Flint, Michigan, God’s country.
观众： 我是来自密歇根州弗林特的迈克·洛克尔（音），上帝的国度。
I noticed in the press, when this issue of the unit trust was going on, that there apparently also were some people trying to form mutual funds to carry Berkshire stock, which I kind of thought was a good idea, because there’s one potential class of Berkshire owners that could only own Berkshire stock via either an open-end mutual fund or a closed-end mutual fund.
我注意到在有关单位信托的讨论中，似乎还有一些人试图设立包含伯克希尔股票的共同基金。我觉得这是个不错的主意，因为有一类潜在的伯克希尔股东只能通过开放式或封闭式共同基金持有伯克希尔股票。
And that is those thousands of teachers and hospital employees whose future retirement money is in 403(b) plans that are limited to investing in mutual funds only. And so, I wonder if, first of all, if you were aware of that? And if so, if you considered that? And if not, if you might?
这些人是成千上万的教师和医院员工，他们未来的退休资金存放在403(b)计划中，这些计划仅限于投资于共同基金。因此，我想知道，首先，您是否知道这一点？如果知道，您是否考虑过？如果没有，是否可能考虑？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is I wasn’t aware of that. So it wasn’t considered.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，答案是我并不知道这一点。所以我们没有考虑过。
There are, of course, some mutual funds that own Berkshire shares. But there’s no all-Berkshire fund, outstanding.
当然，有一些共同基金持有伯克希尔的股票。但目前并没有专门的全伯克希尔基金。
I would say this: that if the law was set up to, in some way, to restrict investments of this group you’re talking about to options that involve mutual funds but that don’t involve individual stocks, I would think it might even be regarded as a way around it, if a fund owned nothing but one stock.
我要说的是，如果法律某种程度上限制了您提到的这类群体只能投资于共同基金，而不能投资于个股，那么一个只持有单一股票的基金可能会被视为一种规避规则的方式。
Because, if you can’t buy General Motors directly under, I assume, the relevant rules or statutes on that, it would seem that a fund that owned nothing but General Motors might be regarded as a way of getting around that.
因为，如果根据相关规则或法规，您不能直接购买通用汽车的股票，那么一个只持有通用汽车股票的基金可能会被视为规避这些规则的方式。
But the answer is that it was not considered. I don’t know where the rules are derived, whether there — whether they can be changed by some organization or they’re part of some statute.
但答案是，我们没有考虑过这一点。我不知道这些规则的来源，是否可以通过某个组织更改，或者它们是否是某些法规的一部分。
But if they’re part of some organization, by a vote of their directors, they might be able to allow purchase of individual stocks within those plans that you describe. But if not, it does seem to me that an all one-stock fund is — might be regarded as simply a way around the rules.
但如果它们是某个组织的规则，通过董事会的投票，可能可以允许在您描述的计划中购买个股。但如果不是这样，我觉得一个只持有单一股票的基金可能会被简单地视为规避规则的一种方式。
12. Suggestion for Class B symbol
关于B类股票代码的建议
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域2？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Alan Rank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
观众： 我是来自宾夕法尼亚州匹兹堡的艾伦·兰克。
Have you determined what the symbol will be for the Class B?
您是否已经确定了B类股票的代码？
WARREN BUFFETT: The symbol? No, we haven’t.
沃伦·巴菲特： 代码？还没有。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: May I make a suggestion? As a broker, the stocks that have come out and given theirselves Class A and Class B cause massive confusion.
观众： 我可以提个建议吗？作为一名经纪人，那些设立A类和B类股票的公司通常会引起很大的混淆。
If there’d be any way to make symbol something like BRB and just keep it a simple, three-letter symbol, it aids people both in following it on the tape on CNBC. As brokers, four-letter symbols on the New York restrict a lot of things we can do as far as punching them in.
如果可以的话，将代码设置为像“BRB”这样的简单三字母代码，这不仅方便人们在CNBC等平台上跟踪，也对我们经纪人输入代码的操作大有帮助。在纽约交易所，四字母代码限制了我们在操作上的很多事情。
If there’s any way you could keep the symbol for the B a simple one, two or three-letter symbol, it would be greatly appreciated.
如果您能将B类股票的代码设置为简单的一至三字母代码，我们将非常感激。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thanks for the suggestion. Now, the exchange has generally been exceptionally cooperative in trying to work with us. I mean, a 10-share trading unit is no piece of cake for them.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，谢谢您的建议。目前，交易所一直非常配合，与我们合作。我指的是，10股为一个交易单位对他们来说也并不轻松。
And I’m sure, at times, that they have wished we were a little more like some of the other companies that list on the exchange. But they’ve been very cooperative and helpful. And we are — they’ll — they listen to things we suggest. We listen to things they suggest.
有时候，我确信他们可能希望我们能更像其他上市公司一些。但他们一直非常配合并提供帮助。他们会听取我们的建议，我们也会听取他们的建议。
So, we will try to do whatever facilitates things at the exchange and the reporting of prices. And it’s nothing we will try to impose on them, believe me.
所以，我们会尽力去做任何有助于交易所和价格报告的事情。相信我，我们不会强加任何要求给他们。
I have no favorite name that I’m looking for. So, we’ll see what they — what ideas they have. And we’ll include that suggestion.
我没有偏爱的代码名称。所以，我们会看看他们有什么想法，并将您的建议纳入考虑。
13. Not expecting big change in Class B offering size
不预期B类股票发行规模会有大变化
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域3？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Paula Finster (PH) from Tulsa, Oklahoma. Very glad to be here. I’m one of those few second generation, finally finagled a ticket out of my dad. (Clears throat)
观众： 我是来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的宝拉·芬斯特（音）。很高兴能来到这里。我是为数不多的第二代股东之一，终于从我父亲那里弄到了票。（清嗓子）
Three years ago —
三年前——
WARREN BUFFETT: Her dad has a soda fountain, incidentally. If you’re ever in Tulsa, be sure to see him. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 顺便说一句，她父亲有一家汽水店。如果您去塔尔萨，一定要去看看。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: He certainly does. And you’re certainly invited to come back. (Laughter)
观众： 确实如此。而且诚邀您再次光临。（笑声）
I was here three years ago for the movie theater. And considering the growth — I know you won’t leave your beloved Omaha — but maybe you could build a stadium with — that’s covered — (laughter) — considering the growth — (Buffett laughs) — with adequate parking. (Laughter)
我三年前在电影院里参加了会议。考虑到这几年的增长——我知道您不会离开您挚爱的奥马哈——但或许您可以建一个有顶棚的体育场——（笑声）——考虑到增长——（巴菲特笑）——并有足够的停车位。（笑声）
Here’s my question. You said there’s going to be unlimited offering, as much as they want. This question is not designed to get a rise out of Mr. Munger, however —
这是我的问题。您说发行是无限量的，想要多少就发多少。不过，这个问题并不是为了激怒芒格先生——
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s not easy to do. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 那可不容易做到。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Understood, considering the bridge game of yesterday.
观众： 理解，尤其是考虑到昨天的桥牌比赛。
Anyway, my question is, you’re authorizing up to 1 percent. What happens if it goes bananas, as zone 5 suggested, and it goes greater?
无论如何，我的问题是，您说这次发行规模约为1%。如果像区域5所说的那样，需求超出了预期，会发生什么？
You said this 1 percent is yours. Is the next 1 percent yours? Is the next 1 percent ours? Do — I know we are limited partners. And you’re a controlling partner. But how far does this ballgame go?
您说这1%是您的。那么下一个1%呢？再下一个1%是我们的吗？我知道我们是有限合伙人，而您是控股合伙人。但这个游戏会走到什么程度？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in terms of the size of the offering, it — whatever the size of the offering, it affects everybody economically the same. I mean, our shares are no different than the ones than the people in this room.
沃伦·巴菲特： 关于发行规模的问题，不管发行规模是多少，经济影响对每个人来说都是一样的。我的股票和在场所有人持有的股票没有任何区别。
So, we do not care, from an economic standpoint, whether the issue turns out to be approximately 1 percent or whether it was 1 1/2 or 3/4 of 1 percent.
因此，从经济角度来说，我们并不关心发行规模是接近1%，还是1.5%或0.75%。
It simply — as long as we’re not selling the stock below its true value, we are not going to be hurt by it. So, that — it’s inconsequential to us. We’re not going to be helped in any significant way by a large sale.
只要我们没有以低于其真实价值的价格出售股票，这对我们来说就不会造成任何伤害。因此，这对我们来说无关紧要。大规模销售也不会对我们产生任何实质性的帮助。
The — it would appear, to me — we’re just a few days away from the offering, and it’s been out there awhile.
看起来，我们距离发行只有几天了，而且这个消息已经公布了一段时间。
So, I would doubt if there’s huge changes. But I don’t know the answer to that. I mean, that could depend on what happens in the general stock market.
因此，我怀疑是否会有大的变化。但我无法给出明确的答案。这可能取决于整体股票市场的表现。
But I don’t think you’ll see any huge change in the offering. If there were a big change, we, obviously, would very promptly let the SEC know. The SEC has wanted us, as we have seen changes in demand as we’ve gone along, promptly change the size of the offering. And the covering page gets modified.
但我认为，您不会看到发行规模有大的变化。如果确实出现重大变化，我们显然会非常迅速地通知美国证券交易委员会（SEC）。随着需求变化，SEC要求我们及时调整发行规模，并修改招股说明书的封面。
And we’ve done that. Every day as indications come along, we’ve tried to be responsive to their instructions on that. And the 350,000 shares is our best estimate, as of last Friday, and —
我们已经这么做了。每天根据需求的变化，我们努力响应他们的要求。截至上周五，35万股是我们最好的估计，——
We’ll look at it the next day or two. But I don’t think it’s going to change dramatically. I don’t know, though. I don’t want to — I’m giving you a definitive answer on that. But it’s just my — it’s a strong impression. Thank you.
接下来的几天我们会再看看。但我认为不会有显著变化。不过，我不能给出确切答案。这只是我的——我的强烈印象。谢谢。
14. Only Class B questions
仅限于关于B类股票的问题
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域4？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City with a question for Charlie —
观众： 我是来自纽约市的迈克·阿赛尔（音），有个问题想问查理——
WARREN BUFFETT: Good.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — about his investment models.
观众： ——关于他的投资模型。
I’d like to know the most useful models on industry consolidation, vertical integration, and models which explain the special cases when it makes sense to invest in retailing stocks —
我想了解关于行业整合、垂直整合最有用的模型，以及哪些特殊情况下投资零售类股票是合理的——
WARREN BUFFETT: Ah, well, I think —
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我想——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — and if —
观众： ——以及是否——
WARREN BUFFETT: — I don’t want to interrupt you now, but I think we’ll save those to the general question and answer. This is only on the issuance of the Class B right now.
沃伦·巴菲特： ——我不想现在打断您，但我认为我们会将这些问题留到稍后的常规问答环节。目前的问题仅限于B类股票的发行。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh. Sorry, sorry.
观众： 哦，抱歉，抱歉。
WARREN BUFFETT: But we’re glad to have that question later on.
沃伦·巴菲特： 不过我们很高兴稍后能收到这个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sorry.
观众： 抱歉。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’ll give Charlie time to figure out the answer for one thing. (Laughter and applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 至少这会给查理一些时间去思考答案。（笑声和掌声）
We’ll go through all of the questions regarding the Class B. And, then, we’ll have a vote on the class —authorization of the Class B. And, then, we’ll get into general questions and answers.
我们会先处理所有关于B类股票的问题。然后，我们将就B类股票的授权进行投票。之后，我们再进入常规问答环节。
15. Do B shares penalize Class A shareholders?
B类股票是否会损害A类股东的利益？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sir —
观众： 先生——
WARREN BUFFETT: Somebody over there — we’ll take another one from zone 4 if there’s somebody — monitor.
沃伦·巴菲特： 那边有人——如果有人提问，我们从区域4再来一个问题——请监控。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mark Findidi (PH) from Connecticut. I’ll apologize ahead. This isn’t meant to be an impudent question or — in any way, shape, or form.
观众： 我是来自康涅狄格州的马克·芬迪迪（音）。事先道歉，这个问题无意冒犯——绝不是以任何方式或形式。
Do you think that the issuance of the B, in any way, might — in an effort to protect the folks who might be out there suckered in by the trust, if you will — in any way penalizes the A shareholders, either, one — or might penalize them — either, one, financially or, two, philosophically in the BRK experience?
您是否认为，发行B类股票是否可能——为了保护那些可能被信托欺骗的人——在某种程度上损害A类股东的利益？无论是经济上还是在伯克希尔的理念上？
I don’t mean that in any kind of elitist fashion, because I don’t think you’ve ever propagated that. BRK doesn’t propagate that. But clearly, there’s a room full of people — or rooms full of people — who have made a commitment financially to show that their philosophy is with you. Does that get diminished?
我并不是以任何精英主义的方式提出这个问题，因为我认为您从未宣扬过这样的理念。伯克希尔也没有宣扬过。但显然，有一屋子——或多屋子的人——在经济上做出了承诺，以表明他们的理念与您一致。这种承诺是否会被削弱？
The other part of the question is the trusts, as you portrayed them, didn’t sound terribly attractive. In a longer term, would they, perhaps, have ultimately failed as folks realize that they hadn’t gotten into what they thought?
问题的另一部分是，正如您描述的那样，这些信托看起来并不是很有吸引力。从长期来看，当人们意识到他们没有得到他们所期望的东西时，这些信托是否可能最终失败？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they might’ve. But I think the rub off would’ve been on us rather than the promoters of the trust — might’ve been on the promoters, too. But in terms of the failure of the trust, I don’t mean failure in an absolute sense, but in terms of disappointing their investors.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，这可能会发生。但我认为，失望的影响可能更多是对我们，而不是对信托的发起人——当然，也可能会影响到发起人。但从信托的失败来说，我不是指绝对意义上的失败，而是让他们的投资者感到失望。
I really think if tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people had come into something that was sold as being an all-Berkshire-type trust, if people came away disappointed in some years, I think they would tend to project that disappointment upon Berkshire fully as much as the promoter who sold the trust, who they might not even be able to find at that time.
我确实认为，如果成千上万甚至几十万人投资于某种被宣传为“全伯克希尔型”的信托，而这些人在几年后感到失望，我认为他们很可能会将这种失望归咎于伯克希尔，而不是那些出售信托的发起人，因为那时他们甚至可能找不到发起人。
The first question, you know, this — I don’t think — we wouldn’t be doing this if we thought it would hurt present shareholders, we — as much as we might detest something else that was going on. And we designed it so it — we felt that it wouldn’t hurt present shareholders.
至于第一个问题，您知道，我们不会这么做，如果我们认为这会伤害现有股东的利益——即使我们非常厌恶其他正在发生的事情。我们设计B类股票时的初衷是，我们认为这不会损害现有股东的利益。
In terms of them having a philosophy — the new shareholders having a philosophy similar to the present ones — we’ve tried to filter those out coming in.
至于新股东是否能拥有与现有股东相似的理念——我们试图在引入过程中筛选出合适的人群。
But I intend, after the offering, to send out a booklet, you know, kind of like freshmen at college, you know, orientation, greetings to Siwash U.
但我计划在发行结束后发出一本小册子，就像大学新生的迎新手册一样，“欢迎来到Siwash大学”。
And we’ll send it to everybody, new shareholders and the old shareholders, explaining our philosophy, just as an orientation course on the company. And we’ll get that out, probably, in a month or so after the offering settles down.
我们会将这本小册子发送给所有人，包括新股东和老股东，解释我们的理念，就像一门关于公司的入门课程。大概会在发行平稳下来后的一个月左右寄出。
I don’t see any reason that — you know, Berkshire has evolved over a long period of time. We had 12 shareholders at the annual meeting 15 years ago. And it — we seem to be able to retain the same class and group of shareholders, in terms of people who really understand the business. It’s a different group than you find at other companies.
我看不出有什么理由会影响——您知道，伯克希尔是经过很长时间演变而来的。15年前的年度股东大会上，我们只有12位股东。而我们似乎能够保持同一类型和群体的股东，他们真正理解我们的业务。这是与其他公司不同的一群人。
And I think we can — as long as we’ve had this filter in effect, operating as new people join us, I think we can keep it.
我认为，只要我们保持这一筛选机制，在新股东加入时有效运作，我们就能够保持这种股东群体。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. If the offering went wild and you issued 3 percent of the company, new, you’re also taking in a billion-odd dollars. It is a — it’s a non-event for us. (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 是的。如果发行需求极高，你新增发行了公司3%的股份，你同时也会收到十亿多美元。对我们来说，这根本不算什么。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s very excitable. Don’t say anything to him. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 他很容易激动，别跟他说太多。（笑声）
16. Berkshire can’t match previous gains
伯克希尔无法再现以往的收益增长
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域5。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ed Johnson (PH) from Park City, Utah.
观众： 我是来自犹他州帕克城的埃德·约翰逊（音）。
As you receive the proceeds of the Class B sale and generate other cash, are you seeing opportunities out in the marketplace to continue to provide the kinds of returns that we’ve been fortunate enough to experience in the past?
随着您收到B类股票发行所得的资金并产生其他现金收入，您是否在市场上看到可以继续提供我们过去所幸运获得的那种回报的机会？
WARREN BUFFETT: With or without the sale of the B, we don’t see things to do that can maintain anything close to the average returns of the past. We’ve tried to convey that.
沃伦·巴菲特： 无论是否发行B类股票，我们都看不到能让我们维持接近过去平均回报率的机会。我们一直试图传达这一点。
And it becomes a mathematical absurdity. Money just won’t compound at that rate in this world, absent extraordinary inflation. It certainly won’t compound in real terms.
这在数学上已变得不切实际。在这个世界上，资金不会以那种速度复利增长，除非出现极端的通货膨胀。而实际上也不可能以这种速度复利增长。
So, absent the issue of the B, we are not looking at them. We’re not seeing things. We’re not hoping to find things that match some of the things that we have found in the past, relative to the capital base we’ve had in the past.
因此，与B类股票发行无关，我们并没有找到这样的机会。我们也不期望能找到与我们过去在较小资本基础上发现的机会相匹配的项目。
But we have that problem with or without the B. And it has not changed in any, even very minor degree, by the issuance of the B.
但无论是否发行B类股票，这个问题都存在。而B类股票的发行对此没有丝毫影响，哪怕是非常轻微的影响。
We are looking for things all of the time. Anytime we find anything that makes sense to us, we will do it.
我们一直在寻找机会。任何时候，只要发现合理的项目，我们就会行动。
The harder part is to make sure that we don’t do something when we don’t find something that makes sense. I mean, that’s the bigger worry.
更难的部分是确保当我们找不到合理的项目时，我们不会去做某些事情。我是说，这才是更大的担忧。
And when we find them, you know, they’ll come along. And you never have — you never know when it’s going to happen.
而当我们发现机会时，您知道，它们自然会出现。但您永远无法预测何时会发生。
We run into businesses — I described a little bit of that in the annual report — almost by accident that we’ve had — contracted to make one purchase this year. The people who run it are here today. And it came about because I was attending a birthday party. And, you know, I’ll go to more in the future. (Laughter)
我们有时几乎是偶然接触到一些业务——在年度报告中我提到了一些。今年我们已经签约收购了一家公司。它的管理者今天也在这里。这笔交易的缘起是因为我参加了一个生日聚会。您知道，我未来会参加更多聚会。（笑声）
So, things have not ended around here. We’ll find interesting things to do over time. But they can’t remotely be as profitable as the things we’ve found in the past, simply because of the large capital base.
所以，这里的事情并没有结束。随着时间推移，我们会找到有趣的事情去做。但由于资本基数变大，这些事情不可能像我们过去找到的机会那样极具盈利性。
17. Not expecting volume spike for B shares
不预期B类股票交易量会激增
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域6？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Matt Zuckerman from Miami.
观众： 你好，我是来自迈阿密的马特·扎克曼。
I don’t know, I think Charlie is the same class as Ev Dirksen. You know, $3 billion, we’ll soon be talking about real money. (Laughter)
我不知道，但我觉得查理和埃夫·德克森差不多，您知道，30亿美元，很快我们就会讨论“真正的钱”了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The two questions I have, basically, are, one — number one, referring to the gentleman over here before who commented on your popularity, which will definitely affect the stock, don’t you think —?
观众： 我的两个问题，首先，第一个问题是，刚才有位先生提到了您的知名度，这肯定会影响股票，您不这么认为吗？
And the second part of that is that even my wife’s beautician has put in for some shares of this stock, and he represents a small tip of a large group who are probably doing the same thing on the one hand, so that there’s going to be a large popular demand for the stock, which probably is not reflected in the numbers that the selling brokers are getting from institutions.
第二部分是，我妻子的美容师甚至也申请购买了这只股票，他可能只是一个更大群体中的一小部分，而这群体中很多人可能也在做同样的事情。因此，可能会对股票产生巨大的民间需求，而这些需求可能没有反映在承销商从机构那里获得的数字中。
And number two, mutual funds themselves, in order to lend some panache or glamour or whatever to their portfolios will certainly be sucking up Berkshire stock after this.
第二个问题是，互惠基金为了给其投资组合增加一点光彩或吸引力，无疑会在此之后吸纳伯克希尔的股票。
And have you taken all of this into consideration when you decided upon the number of shares to go — that you’re sending out, number one?
第一个问题是，当您决定发行的股票数量时，是否将这些因素考虑在内？
And number two, that the reaction, at least in the first 14 days, of the public to the shares, which will probably be in the range of $1,100, might not send the B shares up high enough to make a very, very interesting spike in the price of the A stock.
第二个问题是，公众在最初14天内对股票的反应可能会使B类股票价格上涨到1100美元左右，这是否会导致A类股票出现非常有趣的价格飙升？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — we’ve considered what you’re talking about. I think that the issue has been well enough publicized that the demand will largely be reflected on the books of the underwriter in a day or two.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，我们确实考虑过您所说的这些。我认为这个发行已经被充分宣传，需求在一两天内基本上会体现在承销商的记录上。
And I see no reason at all for a spike in the stock. I mean, the way we’ve designed it should really prevent that. We — and we tell people not to expect it.
我完全看不到股票出现飙升的理由。我们的设计方式实际上应该可以防止这种情况发生。而且我们告诉人们不要期望这种情况会发生。
If any institution wants to buy it, if any individual wants to buy it, they’re going to have a chance to do it.
如果任何机构或个人想买，都将有机会买到。
And I don’t see any reason why there should be some huge influx of people immediately subsequent to the offering that didn’t hear about it during the offering period.
而且我看不出发行结束后为什么会有大量新买家涌入，这些人不可能在发行期间没有听说过这个消息。
It’s interesting. I think most of the demand will be retail and smaller holdings, not so much institutional.
这很有趣。我认为大部分需求将来自于散户和小额持股，而非机构投资者。
The — most new offerings are done in a manner where the idea is to have far more demand than supply, and therefore cause people to, maybe, order stock they didn’t even want, and just on the idea that this restricted supply will cause a big jump the first day, whether, you know — you’ve seen Yahoo or a number of other offerings.
大多数新发行股票的做法是人为制造供不应求的局面，从而让人们可能订购他们根本不需要的股票，仅仅是因为这种受限供应可能在第一天带来大幅上涨，例如，您可能看到过雅虎或其他一些发行。
I think — I don’t personally like that sort of distribution arrangement because you’ll find that 30 to 40 percent of the issue will, perhaps, trade the first day. Well, I think — and, perhaps, at a lot higher price.
我认为——我个人不喜欢这种分销安排，因为您会发现30%到40%的股票可能在第一天就被交易。而且可能价格还高出不少。
I think there’s something a little wrong with that kind of an offering, because the company obviously isn’t getting the proceeds that are equivalent to what people are willing to pay. And favored customers get the chance to flip the stock and really are getting paid an exorbitant underwriting fee themselves, even though they’re called purchasers, because they sell it the first day.
我认为这种发行方式有点问题，因为公司显然没有获得与市场愿意支付的价格相等的收益。而某些被优待的客户有机会快速转手这些股票，尽管他们被称为“购买者”，但实际上通过第一天的转售获得了高额的“承销费”。
We will be very interested in seeing the volume in the B stock the first couple of days, relative to the amount of the issuance.
我们非常感兴趣的是，在前几天B类股票的交易量相对于发行量的比例。
And I will be disappointed and I’ll be surprised if the trading volume in the B stock the first couple days, related to whatever the size of the issue is, turns out to be anywhere near as high as with most new issues.
如果B类股票在头几天的交易量相对于发行规模接近大多数新发行股票的水平，我会感到失望和惊讶。
I think that we will have a better success in finding people who really want to own it and who did not buy it to flip it, I think, by this method of distribution. But we’ll have a test of that. We will see what happens in trading volume.
我认为，通过这种分销方式，我们能够更成功地找到真正想持有它的人，而不是那些买了就想第二天转售的人。但我们会对此进行检验，看看交易量会如何表现。
And I invite you to look at the volume and compare it to the amount we issue and, then, look at that relative to other new issues this year and just see how successful we were in finding real investors rather than people who were buying it to sell it to somebody else the next day.
我邀请大家观察交易量，并将其与我们的发行量进行比较，再将其与今年其他新发行股票进行比较，看看我们在找到真正投资者方面的成功程度，而不是吸引到那些第二天就打算卖给别人的人。
18. Buffett’s visibility and safety concerns
巴菲特的知名度与安全问题
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, was that zone 6? I guess we go to zone 1.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们看看，是不是区域6？我想我们现在去区域1。
(Long pause)
(长时间的停顿)
CHARLIE MUNGER (quietly to Buffett): Maybe we can vote.
查理·芒格（小声对巴菲特）： 或许我们可以开始投票。
WARREN BUFFETT (quietly to Munger): Yeah, but I don’t want to cut off —
沃伦·巴菲特（小声对芒格）： 是的，但我不想打断——
VOICE: Uh —
声音： 嗯——
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie says maybe we can vote, but I do — I want people to have their questions — (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 查理说或许我们可以开始投票，但我确实——我希望大家能提出他们的问题——（掌声）
It just encourages him when you do that. (Laughter)
当你们这么做时，这只会鼓励他。（笑声）
I want to be sure people get their questions answered on this. I don’t want to prolong it beyond —
我想确保人们能就这个话题得到答案。我不想让这个过程拖得太久——
If you feel your question has been 95 percent answered by an earlier question, I hope you’ll skip asking it.
如果您觉得您的问题在之前的问题中已经95%得到了回答，我希望您可以跳过。
But we do want to have people that have questions about it answered, because I can tell by commentary and letters I’ve received that some people have genuine concerns. Yes?
但我们确实希望解答所有对此有疑问的人，因为从我收到的评论和信件中可以看出，有些人确实有真切的担忧。请说？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My concern — oh, my name is Jan Anglin (PH). I’m from Southern Indiana. And this is my first Berkshire meeting.
观众： 我的担忧是——哦，我的名字是简·安格林（音），我来自印第安纳州南部。这是我第一次参加伯克希尔会议。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good.
沃伦·巴菲特： 很好。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I did have a concern about the B shares that’s less business and more — I guess it would be concerned with your and Mr. Munger’s personal safety.
观众： 我确实对B类股票有一些担忧，但这更多与商业无关，而是关于您和芒格先生的人身安全的担忧。
I often see your picture in the newspaper. And I certainly don’t mind seeing it on financial magazines, but now, it’s kind of, like, proliferating. I don’t like the idea that you are so visible. (Laughter)
我经常在报纸上看到您的照片。当然，我不介意在财经杂志上看到，但现在，似乎这种曝光在增加。我不喜欢您如此显眼的这种想法。（笑声）
That bothers me. It’s — I mean, do you understand what I’m saying?
这让我感到困扰。我是说，您明白我的意思吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: No. I understand exactly.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，我完全明白。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This isn’t —
观众： 这并不是——
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s occurred to me. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 我想过这个问题。（笑声）
I appreciate that, and I — but the answer is there’s no other way, I mean, if —
我很感激，但答案是别无他法，我是说，如果——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK.
观众： 好的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — over time —
沃伦·巴菲特： 随着时间的推移——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But can —
观众： 但是能不能——
WARREN BUFFETT: — in terms of what happens. And —
沃伦·巴菲特： 从实际发生的事情来看。并且——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So —
观众： 所以——
WARREN BUFFETT: — as it grows, you get more visible, basically.
沃伦·巴菲特： 随着它的发展，你的曝光度会越来越高，基本上就是这样。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, I know. But along with the B shares and things, can you, kind of, like, be quotable but less available for photos? (Laughter)
观众： 哦，我知道。但随着B类股票的发行，您能不能，比如说，发表言论时被引用但尽量少出镜拍照？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I normally am. I — if you’ve noticed, in terms of interviews or anything of the sort, I do not do them. I’ve been invited to go on all of the news shows. And I, basically, don’t do it.
沃伦·巴菲特： 通常我确实是这样的。如果您注意到，在采访或类似的事情中，我基本上都不参与。我曾被邀请参加所有的新闻节目，但我基本上都拒绝了。
Frankly, with the shareholders, I feel differently about this group. I’m delighted to see everybody come here. And I enjoy getting together with the shareholders. (Applause)
坦白说，对于股东，我的感受是不同的。我很高兴看到大家来到这里。我也很享受与股东们的交流。（掌声）
I think the real protection is, if we’d done something that had caused the stock to balloon way up and then come way down, I might have had to be a little more careful. (Laughter)
我认为真正的保护是，如果我们做了什么导致股价大幅上涨然后再大幅下跌，我可能就需要更加小心了。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think she has a very good idea. Having seen that acting — (Laughter)
查理·芒格： 我认为她的建议非常好。看了那些表演之后——（笑声）
I think hereafter, maybe you should be the voice of Mickey Mouse. (Laughter)
我想今后你或许可以去做米奇老鼠的配音。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I do appreciate the sentiment out of everybody. And there is a — it is unavoidable, to a fair degree. Although, Charlie may have thought I wasn’t pushed into those acting jobs.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我非常感谢大家的关心。这在很大程度上是不可避免的。尽管查理可能觉得我并没有被强迫去做那些表演。
19. Class A “forever” convertible to Class B
A类股票可“永久”转换为B类股票
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域2。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This Joe Greer (PH) from Omaha, Nebraska of all places. (Laughter)
观众： 我是乔·格里尔（音），来自所有地方中的内布拉斯加州奥马哈。（笑声）
Regarding the conversion privilege, is there a time limit on the converting from the A to a B?
关于转换权，A类股票转换为B类股票是否有时间限制？
WARREN BUFFETT: No. That’s a good — I’m glad you asked that question.
沃伦·巴菲特： 没有。这是个好问题——我很高兴你问了这个问题。
The first five days or so after issuance — business days — there’s no conversion. But after that, you’ll be able to convert until judgment day. It’s forever convertible from A to B. But it’s not convertible from B to A.
在发行后的前五个工作日左右，无法转换。但之后，您可以一直转换，直到审判日为止。A类股票可以永久转换为B类股票，但B类股票不能转换为A类股票。
So there’s no need to convert it until you have a reason to do so. It — and as I’ve pointed out, there’s a very slight disadvantage in converting. And I wouldn’t — until I had a need, I would not convert it.
所以，除非您有理由，否则没有必要转换。而且正如我指出的，转换有一个非常小的劣势。所以，除非有需要，我不会进行转换。
20. How to convert Class A shares to B
如何将A类股票转换为B类股票
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域3？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Scott Dowling from Redmond, Washington.
观众： 我是斯科特·道林（音），来自华盛顿州雷德蒙德。
Kind of related to this question, as an A shareholder, I can only see really two reasons to convert A shares into B shares, one of them being gifting reasons.
与此问题相关，作为A类股东，我认为只有两个理由将A类股票转换为B类股票，其中一个是出于赠与的原因。
In regard to that, how does one convert A shares into B?
关于这一点，如何将A类股票转换为B类股票？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That — yeah, there are instructions on that in the proxy statement as to how that — I guess it’s in the annual report, too, that it describes how to do it.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这——是的，在代理声明中有关于如何进行转换的说明。我想在年度报告中也有提到如何操作。
But, basically, you get in touch with the Bank of Boston to do that and proceed from there. Or if you have your shares with a broker, you would instruct your broker to do it.
但基本上，您可以联系波士顿银行来处理此事并从那里开始操作。或者，如果您的股票在经纪商那里，您可以指示您的经纪商进行转换。
21. Class B price meant to discourage unreasonable expectations
B类股票价格旨在打消不切实际的期望
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域4？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Ruth Owades from San Francisco.
观众： 早上好，我是露丝·欧瓦迪斯（音），来自旧金山。
I wondered, how did you decide that the ratio of the Bs should be 30-to-1 instead of 300-to-1 or something in between?
我想知道，您是如何决定B类股票的比例为30:1，而不是300:1或介于两者之间的某个值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We wanted to have something that was roughly — would trade, initially, at least, in the thousand-dollar range.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们想要一个大致能够在初期至少交易于千美元范围的比例。
We thought it very unlikely that anyone would find it commercially feasible to set up a trust that offered units that were denominated much below that.
我们认为，任何人都不太可能会发现建立一个单位价值远低于这个价格的信托在商业上是可行的。
So, that’s as low as we felt we had to go. And we did not want to signal, in any way, that, you know, some sort of last chance, or something like that, to get in for some very low sum for people that, you know, just had some wishes that they could turn a hundred dollars into 100,000 or something.
因此，这是我们认为必须达到的最低水平。而且我们不想以任何方式传递这样的信号，即某种最后的机会，以非常低的金额让那些怀有将100美元变成10万美元愿望的人参与进来。
I get letters from people that, you know, think that somehow that can be done. It can’t be done.
我收到过一些人的来信，他们认为可以通过某种方式实现这种愿望。但那是做不到的。
And we don’t want to appeal subliminally or any other way to people who harbor those hopes.
我们不希望以潜意识或其他任何方式吸引那些抱有这种希望的人。
I’m sympathetic with them. But we don’t have the answer to that. So, we went down to the level to match the unit trusts.
我对他们表示同情，但我们无法解决这个问题。因此，我们选择了一个与单位信托相匹配的水平。
22. B shares will increase book value, but not intrinsic value
B类股票将提高账面价值，但不会提升内在价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域5？
We’ll try and do — we’ll try to end the questions on the B fairly soon. But I don’t want anybody that feels that they’ve got a — got some reservations about this — not to have a shot at asking their question.
我们会尽快结束关于B类股票的问题。但我不希望有任何人心存疑虑却没有机会提出他们的问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bob McClure (PH). I live in Singapore.
观众： 我是鲍勃·麦克卢尔（音），住在新加坡。
And the way I figure it, the sale of the B shares at the price they will probably be sold, will give an immediate boost to the book value of Berkshire Hathaway. So, as far as I’m concerned, the more the merrier.
据我推测，以他们可能的出售价格发行B类股票，将会立即提升伯克希尔·哈撒韦的账面价值。所以对我来说，越多越好。
Can you give us your thinking on that, the accounting treatment, how this will affect the book value of Berkshire?
您能否谈谈您的看法，以及会计处理方式，这将如何影响伯克希尔的账面价值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, any sell — shares we sell at the equivalent per A share of in the range of 33,000 or thereabouts, where the stock is selling now, will increase the book value per share.
沃伦·巴菲特： 好的，任何以目前A类股票大约33,000美元左右价格出售的股票，都将提升每股的账面价值。
But that does not mean it increases the intrinsic value per share.
但这并不意味着它会提升每股的内在价值。
I’ve said many times in the report, we use book value as a proxy in tracking movement of intrinsic value. But it does not represent anything like intrinsic value per share.
我在报告中多次提到，我们使用账面价值作为追踪内在价值变动的一个参考。但它并不代表每股的内在价值。
And the key is not what it does to book value per share, but what it does to intrinsic value per share. And, you know, we believe the intrinsic value is materially higher than the book value.
关键并不在于它对每股账面价值的影响，而是对每股内在价值的影响。我们认为内在价值远高于账面价值。
We don’t spoil your fun by ever giving you a number. But — (laughter) — we do not regard the fact that it increases the book value per share as being any kind of a determinant in deciding to issue the shares.
我们不会通过给出一个具体数字来破坏您的乐趣。（笑声）但我们并不认为提升每股账面价值是决定发行股票的任何决定性因素。
But it will have that consequence mathematically. The key is the relation to intrinsic value.
但从数学上讲，它确实会有这样的结果。关键在于与内在价值的关系。
23. “The facts are out on what we do”
“我们所做的事情事实已摆在明处”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域6？
VOICE: I think there was a question over here.
声音： 我想这边有一个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Any questions in six?
沃伦·巴菲特： 区域6有问题吗？
VOICE: Behind you.
声音： 在您身后。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Your problem seems to be that you’ve attracted a fair number of potential shareholders that don’t have a way of estimating intrinsic value or developing expectations about what Berkshire’s future prospects are.
观众： 您的问题似乎是吸引了相当多的潜在股东，他们没有办法估算内在价值或对伯克希尔的未来前景建立预期。
Now, do you have any suggestions about how they might do that, short of the general guidance that you can’t continue to compound your intrinsic value at the same high rate that you have in the past because of your asset base, and that you don’t believe the share is undervalued?
现在，您是否有任何建议，关于他们如何做到这一点，除了您之前提到的总体指导，即由于资产基数，您无法继续以过去的高增长率复利增长内在价值，以及您认为股票没有被低估？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we’ll probably talk more in the general question and answer period about our various businesses, but we simply try to give you all of the information about our businesses in a large, general way that Charlie and I consider important and that we would want if our positions were reversed.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的。我们可能会在一般的问答环节中更多地谈论我们的各种业务，但我们只是尝试以一种整体和广泛的方式向您提供我们业务的所有信息，这些信息是查理和我认为重要的，也是如果我们的位置调换，我们希望得到的信息。
I can assure you that if all Charlie and I knew about our businesses, what we’ve publicly disclosed, it would not change our estimates from what they might be from being intimately involved with the businesses. The facts are out regarding what we do.
我可以向您保证，如果查理和我对我们的业务所知道的所有事情就是我们公开披露的内容，这并不会改变我们对业务的估计。关于我们所做的事情，事实已经摆在明处。
So, you are in the same position to the extent that you have followed our kind of businesses and understand industry conditions and all of that.
因此，如果您一直关注我们的业务类型并了解行业状况等等，您就处于相同的地位。
And we’ll continue to do that. We essentially regard you as our partners. And we tell — we try to tell you exactly what we, as partners, would want to know if you were running the place. And we’ll continue to do that.
我们将继续这样做。我们本质上把您看作我们的合作伙伴。我们会告诉您——我们试图告诉您，如果您在管理这家公司，作为合作伙伴我们想知道的确切内容。我们将继续这样做。
We won’t tell you a number because we don’t know the number. We have a range in our mind. Things change that range over time. And we’d probably get in all kinds of trouble if we tried to put out that range.
我们不会告诉您一个具体的数字，因为我们不知道那个数字。我们脑海中有一个范围。随着时间的推移，这个范围会发生变化。如果我们试图公开这个范围，可能会惹上各种麻烦。
And Charlie and I would not come up with exactly the same range. But they’d be pretty close. We’ll talk more about that a little later.
查理和我不会得出完全相同的范围，但它们会非常接近。我们稍后会对此作更多讨论。
24. Shareholders approve Class B shares
股东批准发行B类股票
WARREN BUFFETT: We do have questions now from zone 7 and 8 in the other room. So, we’ll take on zone 7, please.
沃伦·巴菲特： 我们现在收到来自另一个房间7号和8号区域的问题。那么，我们先回答7号区域的问题。
VOICE: I guess you’ve answered our questions in seven.
声音： 我想您已经回答了我们7号区域的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, took care of zone 7. How about zone 8?
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，解决了7号区域的问题。那么8号区域呢？
VOICE: No questions from zone 8.
声音： 8号区域没有问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, OK. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦，好吧。（掌声）
I think, at this point, we can move on to general questions after we have this vote.
我想，现在我们可以在投票后转入一般问答环节。
And then, if you have another question or two that comes up during the general question and answer period, I’ll be glad to — we’ll be glad to work those in at that time.
如果在一般问答环节中还有其他问题，我们很乐意解答。
So, we are now at the point: is there a motion to adopt the board of directors’ recommendation?
现在到了这一环节：是否有人提出动议通过董事会的建议？
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move the adoption of the amendment to the fourth article of the restated certificate of incorporation that’s set forth in exhibit A of the company’s proxy statement for this meeting.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议通过修改公司修订后的公司章程第四条的动议，此修订在本次会议的公司委托书声明附件A中列出。
VOICE: I second the motion.
声音： 我附议。
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been made and seconded to adopt the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation. It says here, “Is there any discussion?” but I’m not going to say that. We are ready to act upon the motion.
沃伦·巴菲特： 该动议已被提出并附议，内容是通过拟议的公司章程修订。这里写着“是否有讨论？”不过我就不问了。我们准备对该动议进行表决。
If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在提议的公司章程修订案上标记选票，并将选票交给选举监察员。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the proposed amendment, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received?
请委托书持有人也向选举监察员提交关于提议修订案的选票，并按照他们收到的指示投票。
Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you’re ready, you may give your report.
菲茨西蒙斯先生，您准备好后可以发表您的报告。
ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 970,495 votes in favor of the proposed amendment. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding.
罗伯特·M·菲茨西蒙斯： 我的报告已准备就绪。截至上周五收到的委托书持有人的选票中，不少于970,495票赞成提议的修订案。这个数字远远超过了所有已发行股份的大多数。
The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的选票精确统计认证，包括本次会议中亲自投票的选票，将提交给秘书，并归档于本次会议的记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons.
沃伦·巴菲特： 谢谢您，菲茨西蒙斯先生。
The amendment to the certificate of incorporation, as set forth in exhibit A to the proxy statement for this meeting, is approved.
此次会议委托书声明附件A中所列的公司章程修订案已获批准。
After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the business of Berkshire but do not call for any action at this meeting.
在业务会议结束后，我将回答您可能对伯克希尔业务的任何相关问题，这些问题不涉及本次会议需要采取的任何行动。
Anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting.
在我们休会之前，是否有人对本次会议还有其他业务事项需要提出？如果没有，我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move this meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特二世： 我提议休会。
VOICE: I second the motion.
声音： 我附议。
WARREN BUFFETT: The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say, “Aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特： 休会动议已提出并附议。我们将以口头表决方式进行投票。是否有讨论？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成。”
VOICES: Aye.
声音： 赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say, “No.” The meeting’s adjourned. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特： 反对的请说“反对。”会议休会。（掌声）
25. Berkshire is more than its breakup value
伯克希尔不仅仅是它的分拆价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’ll move to general questions. And we’ll do it by the same zone system.
沃伦·巴菲特： 现在我们将进入一般问答环节。我们仍然使用相同的分区系统。
As I said earlier, any of you are free, obviously, to leave at any time. We will break formally at noon and reconvene about 15 minutes later, after you’ve all had a chance to buy a sandwich, and you can — (Laughter).
正如我之前提到的，您随时可以自由离开。我们将在中午正式休会，15分钟后重新开会，届时您可以去买个三明治——（笑声）。
Those in the other rooms can come in here. And we will go from then until about 3 o’clock.
在其他房间的与会者可以进到这里。从那时起，我们将持续到下午3点左右。
So, we’ll start in with zone 1.
那么，我们从第一区开始。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Will Jacks (PH) from Chicago. I’m sort of representing Benjamin Graham today, the question he might ask.
听众： 我是来自芝加哥的威尔·杰克斯（音）。今天我有点像代表本杰明·格雷厄姆，问他可能会问的问题。
You talked earlier about how you — about the value of your shares, the A shares, let’s say, because the B is tied to the A.
您之前提到过关于您股票的价值，特别是A类股票，因为B类股票与A类股票挂钩。
But — and I know it — I don’t expect a complete answer, but generally, how would you go about placing a value on the A shares?
但是——我知道——我并不期待一个完整的答案，但一般来说，您如何为A类股票估值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that’s obviously a key question. As I’ve said, we try to give you the information.
沃伦·巴菲特： 是的，这显然是一个关键问题。正如我所说，我们尽力为您提供相关信息。
But I think people, to the extent they’ve made a mistake in the past in valuing Berkshire — and they have made this mistake over time, including many commentators, including some institutions — is to look at it as simply a breakup value to our businesses.
但我认为，过去人们在对伯克希尔估值时犯的一个错误——而且随着时间的推移，人们确实犯过这个错误，包括许多评论员和一些机构——就是仅仅把它看作是我们业务的分拆价值。
I mean, you know, you can — you could do the same with General Electric, we — a magnificently run operation by Jack Welch. But I don’t think the way you should look at a business like General Electric is to think about what would happen if they sold each division today, paid the taxes, and then distributed the proceeds.
我的意思是，您可以用同样的方式看待通用电气——这是杰克·韦尔奇经营得非常出色的一家公司。但我不认为您应该通过假设他们今天出售每个部门、缴税然后分配收益的方式来看待通用电气这样的企业。
And that has tended to be the case with many people looking at Berkshire, looking at it on a static basis. And that is not the way that Charlie and I have looked at it over time.
而对于伯克希尔，许多人倾向于以这种静态的方式来看待它。但这并不是查理和我一直以来看待它的方式。
It lends itself a little more to that kind of analysis because we have a lot of money in marketable securities. But we have a lot of money in other things, too.
伯克希尔确实更容易被用这种方式分析，因为我们在可交易证券上有大量资金。但我们在其他领域也有很多资金。
And the question of Berkshire, in valuing the intrinsic of any business, of course, is what is going to be the stream of cash over many years in the future — in fact, all of the years in the future, discounted back at an appropriate interest rate. I’ve talked about that in the past in the annual report.
关于伯克希尔的估值问题，实际上是在评估任何业务的内在价值时，关键在于未来多年（事实上是未来所有年份）的现金流，并以适当的利率折现。我在过去的年度报告中谈到过这一点。
Berkshire is a collection of businesses. And some of which we own in their entirety, some of which we own part of. And some of those businesses have very interesting dynamics to them.
伯克希尔是一个业务组合。其中一些是我们全资拥有的，一些是部分持股的。这些业务中有一些有非常有趣的动态特性。
And they — the value of our insurance business, for example, if you go back 26 — what was it? Twenty-eight years or so since we — 29, I guess — since we bought it from Jack Ringwalt. We paid 8.7 million, I believe, 8.4 — 8.7 million for two companies that Jack controlled.
比如说我们的保险业务。如果回顾26年——不对，大概是28年或者29年前——自我们从杰克·林格沃尔特那里购买这部分业务以来。我们为杰克控制的两家公司支付了870万美元，我相信是870万美元左右。
If you had the foresight at that time to — and I didn’t, but — if you had the foresight at that time to see what that would develop out of that insurance business, you would’ve come to the conclusion that their value to us was going to be far, far greater than the value at which they were then carried on our balance sheet. They were part of a business which had enormous potential.
如果当时你有远见——我当时并没有——能预见到这项保险业务的发展，你就会得出结论，这些业务对我们的价值远远高于它们当时在资产负债表上的价值。它们是一个拥有巨大潜力的业务的一部分。
And that’s been, probably, the most significant asset that’s been developed at Berkshire. But right now, we have over seven — right at 7 billion — over 7 billion — of float that’s been developed from our insurance business.
这可能是伯克希尔迄今开发出的最重要资产。但现在，我们从保险业务中获得了超过70亿美元的浮存金。
We couldn’t foresee that 25 or 30 years ago. But it would’ve been a big mistake to think in terms of the book value of that business being representative of its actual value to us over time, if it was run right.
25或30年前我们无法预见这一点。但如果当时认为该业务的账面价值能够代表其长期对我们的实际价值，那将是一个巨大的错误，前提是经营得当。
And that situation probably prevails today.
这种情况可能在今天依然成立。
So, it’s a — Berkshire is a group of, on balance, very fine businesses to which we hope to add.
所以，总的来说，伯克希尔是一组非常优秀的业务，我们希望在此基础上增加更多。
The intrinsic value will be affected by the job we do in allocating capital. It’ll be affected by the job our managers do in running their businesses. It’ll be affected by some items that we don’t foresee now and, perhaps, have no control over.
内在价值将受到我们资本分配工作的影响。也将受到我们的管理者经营业务能力的影响。还会受到我们目前无法预见、甚至可能无法控制的一些因素的影响。
But it is not measured, essentially, by what we could sell each separate business for and pay the tax on now. We haven’t run it that way. We’ve run it so that we get the use of a lot of capital at very low cost.
但其价值并不是由我们现在可以将各个独立业务出售并缴纳税款的价格来衡量的。我们并不是以这种方式运营的。我们的运营方式使我们能够以非常低的成本使用大量资本。
Between deferred taxes and our insurance float, we have some 12 billion or so on the liability side that we think will be a very low cost. And that’s — doesn’t show as an asset, but it can be quite valuable.
在递延税款和保险浮存金之间，我们在负债方拥有大约120亿美元的资金，这些资金的成本非常低。这并不作为资产体现，但它可能是非常有价值的。
Charlie, you want to —?
查理，你想补充些什么吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I don’t think I’ve got anything to add to that.
查理·芒格： 不，我认为我没有什么可补充的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. I was all set to write it down, too. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 哦。我刚才还准备记下来呢。（笑声）
26. Buybacks at what appear to be high stock prices
以看似高的股票价格进行回购
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请二号区域提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I’m Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi.
观众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是来自密西西比州杰克逊的提姆·梅德利。
My question is an allocation of capital one. You’ve indicated that one thing you like in companies is a willingness on the part of management to repurchase its own shares.
我的问题是关于资本分配的。您曾表示，您喜欢公司管理层愿意回购公司股票这一点。
I wonder if you would talk for a minute about your own frame of reference on repurchases when it appears that the current price of the stock is rich in relation to its intrinsic value.
我想问问，当股票当前价格似乎高于其内在价值时，您对回购的看法是什么？
And some have said that, with the right company, ongoing repurchases of stock should be made, irrespective of the price.
有些人认为，对于合适的公司，应该不管价格如何继续回购股票。
So, would you speak for a moment, as to how you think it pencils out when the current price of the stock is rich in relation to its intrinsic value?
那么，您能否谈谈，当股票当前价格高于内在价值时，您认为这样的行为如何计算其合理性？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If you’re repurchasing shares above a rationally calculated intrinsic value, you are harming your shareholders, just as if you issue shares beneath that figure, you are harming your shareholders.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果你以高于合理计算的内在价值的价格回购股票，你是在伤害你的股东。就像如果你以低于这个数值发行股票，你同样是在伤害股东。
That’s a truism. Now, the tough part of that, of course, is coming up with the intrinsic value.
这是一个显而易见的道理。当然，困难之处在于如何得出内在价值。
And, for example — a good example might be Coca-Cola.
例如，可口可乐就是一个很好的例子。
I think a number of people might have thought Coca-Cola was repurchasing shares at a very high price, because they’ll look at book value or P/E ratios. But there’s a lot more to intrinsic value than book value and P/E ratios. And anytime anybody gives you some simplified formula for figuring it out, forget it.
我认为很多人可能会认为可口可乐以非常高的价格回购股票，因为他们只看账面价值或市盈率。但内在价值远远不止这些。任何时候，如果有人向你提供一个简单的公式来计算内在价值，忘了它吧。
You have to understand the business. The people who understood that business well, the management, have understood and been very forthright about saying so over the years, that by repurchasing their shares, they are adding to the value per share for remaining shareholders.
你必须了解这项业务。真正了解这项业务的人，比如管理层，多年来一直直言，通过回购股票，他们为剩余股东增加了每股价值。
And like I say, people who didn’t understand Coca-Cola, or who thought mechanistic methods of valuation could — should take precedence, really misjudged the value to the Coca-Cola Company of those repurchases.
正如我所说，不了解可口可乐的人，或者认为机械化的估值方法优先的人，确实误判了这些回购行为对可口可乐公司的价值。
So we favor — when you have a wonderful business — we favor using funds that are generated out of that business to make the business even more wonderful. And we favor repurchasing shares if those shares are below intrinsic value.
我们更倾向于，当你拥有一家优秀的企业时，利用该企业自身产生的资金使其变得更加优秀。我们也支持在股票价格低于内在价值时回购股票。
And I would say that if it’s a really wonderful business, we probably come up with higher intrinsic values than most people do.
我想说，如果这是一个真正出色的企业，我们可能会得出比大多数人更高的内在价值评估。
We have great respect, Charlie and I with — I think it’s developed over the years — we have enormous respect for the power of a really outstanding business. And we recognize how scarce they are. And if a management wishes to further intensify our ownership by repurchasing shares, we applaud.
查理和我对卓越企业的力量有着深刻的敬意，我认为这是多年来形成的。我们也认识到这样的企业是多么稀缺。如果管理层希望通过回购股票进一步加强我们的持股比例，我们会表示赞赏。
We own — we just went over 8 percent of the Coca-Cola Company, probably, in the last three or so months, by a very tiny fraction. But we had a second purchase one time.
我们拥有可口可乐公司超过8%的股份，这可能是在过去三个月左右通过很小的比例增长实现的。但我们有一次是直接进行了额外购买。
But our percentage interest in the Coca-Cola Company has gone up significantly through their repurchases. And we are better off because they have bought those shares at what looked like, to some people, perhaps, high prices. And we thought they were wrong at the time, and I think now it’s been indicated or proven.
不过，通过他们的回购，我们在可口可乐公司的持股比例大幅增加。因为他们以一些人认为的高价回购股票，我们的情况反而变得更好。当时我们认为这些看法是错误的，现在看来也得到了证明。
So, I urge you, if you’re trying to decide on the wisdom of repurchases, or of share issuances, that you don’t think in terms of book value. You don’t think in terms of specific P/Es. You don’t think in terms of any little model.
所以，我建议你在判断回购或股票发行的明智性时，不要考虑账面价值、特定市盈率或任何简单的模型。
But you think in terms of what would you really, A, pick businesses you can understand and, then, think what you really would pay to be in those businesses. And that’s what counts over time, is whether the repurchases are made at a discount from that figure.
而是要思考，首先选择你能理解的企业，然后想想你愿意为参与这些企业支付的真正价格。这才是长期来看真正重要的事情，即回购是否以低于这个数值的价格进行。
And I would say with the companies that we own shares in, we — our interest in GEICO went from 33 or so percent to 50 percent over a 15-year or so period, simply through repurchases. And we benefitted significantly.
以我们持有股份的公司为例，我们在GEICO的持股比例从约33%增长到50%，这大约是在15年的时间里通过回购实现的。我们因此受益匪浅。
So, did every other shareholder, I might add, that stayed with the company. And we benefited in no way disproportionate to them.
我还想补充一点，其他一直持有公司股票的股东也同样受益。而我们获得的好处并没有超过他们的比例。
But that was a very wise action on their part. And there too, they were all — usually buying that stock at at least double book value. And you could compare it to other insurance stocks and say, “Well, that’s too much to pay.”
但这是他们非常明智的举措。而且，在那些时候，他们通常以至少是账面价值两倍的价格回购股票。你可以将其与其他保险股票相比，并说“这价格太高了。”
But GEICO wasn’t an insurance company that was comparable to other insurance companies. It was a very different sort of business. And they were very wise, in my view, to be following that course of action.
但GEICO并不是一个可以与其他保险公司相比的保险公司。它是一种非常不同的业务模式。在我看来，他们遵循这样的做法是非常明智的。
Charlie? No?
查理？没有意见吗？
27. B shares won’t dilute value of A shares
B股不会稀释A股的价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特： 三号区域？
VOICE: That’s you.
观众： 是你。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, sorry. I’m Elaine Cohen (PH) from San Diego.
观众： 哦，对不起。我是来自圣地亚哥的伊莱恩·科恩。
I’m a little confused about how the B shares are going to be moving if they’re at 1/30th of the A shares when they get out on the market.
我对B类股在市场上以A类股1/30的比例交易的情况有点困惑。
Are they always going to be 1/30th of the A shares? And if they are, is that going to dilute the earnings of the A shares? Could you just explain that?
它们是否总是保持在A类股的1/30？如果是这样，这会不会稀释A类股的收益？您能解释一下吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It won’t dilute the earnings or value of the A shares as long as we use the money reasonably effectively that is produced.
沃伦·巴菲特： 不会稀释A类股的收益或价值，只要我们合理有效地使用产生的资金。
As I mentioned earlier, if it happens to be 1 percent, you’ll own 1 percent less of all these other things — on the other hand, will have close to $400 million more of cash. So, it will not — in our view, it will not dilute the value of the A.
正如我之前提到的，如果它是1%，你将少拥有这些其他资产的1%，但另一方面，我们会多出接近4亿美元的现金。因此，在我们看来，这不会稀释A类股的价值。
I expect, over time, that the B, a very large percentage of the time, will be selling very close to a 30th. But it could sell for less than that ratio. It can’t sell for any significant amount more than that ratio, or arbitrage will eat away at any slight premium. I think that takes care of that.
我预计，随着时间的推移，B类股在绝大多数情况下的交易价格会非常接近1/30。但它的交易价格可能会低于这一比例。它不可能以明显高于这一比例的价格交易，否则套利活动会消除任何轻微的溢价。我想这就解决了这个问题了。
28. No “secret formulas” for Wells Fargo
没有“秘密公式”适用于富国银行
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：第4区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Hugh Stephenson. I’m a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia.
观众提问：巴菲特先生，我叫休·史蒂文森。我是来自乔治亚州亚特兰大的股东。
My question involves the company’s interest in Wells Fargo. As you know, Wells Fargo, like most banks, has a very expensive branch system for deposit-gathering and servicing their customers.
我的问题涉及公司对富国银行的兴趣。如您所知，富国银行与大多数银行一样，其网点系统用于吸收存款和服务客户的成本非常高。
As I guess you know, they also have moved more into branches in supermarkets and in online banking that seems to have the potential to very significantly reduce their costs, relative to the branch system.
我想您也知道，他们还在超市设立更多网点，并拓展在线银行业务，这似乎相较传统网点系统具有显著降低成本的潜力。
Would you comment on how you think that might play out and how significant it might be?
您能否评论一下您认为这将如何发展，以及它可能带来的重要性？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the question — you’re right. Wells Fargo has been a leader in moving into supermarkets. They’ve got a couple different formats they’ve used. And they’ve been a — they’ve certainly been a leader in the online banking services.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这个问题——您说得对。富国银行在进入超市这一领域一直是领先者。他们采用了几种不同的形式。在在线银行服务方面，他们无疑也是一个领导者。
Unfortunately, in banking, you know, it’s a little hard to have any secret formulas. Coca-Cola has 7X down there in the vaults of the, what used to be the Trust Company of Georgia, now SunTrust. But in the banking business, anything you do, your competitors can copy.
但遗憾的是，在银行业，很难有什么“秘密公式”。可口可乐的“7X”配方藏在以前的乔治亚信托公司，现在的阳光信托银行的金库里。而在银行业，无论你做什么，竞争对手都可以模仿。
Nevertheless, there’s a — there is an advantage. And sometimes it can be a quite — a significant advantage in being first and learning more about different distribution methods. And I think Wells Fargo has done a terrific job in learning that.
不过，这确实存在优势。有时候，率先行动并了解不同分销方式可能带来相当显著的优势。我认为富国银行在这一点上做得非常出色。
I think they’ve got some advantages. They — but they aren’t advantages that other people can’t work at copying and chipping away at.
我认为他们确实有一些优势。但这些优势并非其他人无法通过模仿和逐步侵蚀来追赶的。
But it’s a good management. They’ve done a very good job of seizing on that particular trend in supermarkets.
不过，他们的管理很出色。他们很好地抓住了超市这一特定趋势。
And as such, they are — they have the potential, perhaps, for having a relatively low-cost deposit-gathering operation. And every other bank in the world will be looking, noticing how that works, not only there but at other banks, to figure out whether they can copy it.
因此，他们可能有潜力建立起相对低成本的存款吸收体系。而全球的其他银行都会关注并研究这种模式的运作方式，不仅仅在富国银行，也包括其他银行，看能否进行模仿。
Charlie? OK.
查理？好的。
29. GEICO benefits from being entirely owned by Berkshire
GEICO 完全归伯克希尔所有带来的益处
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：第5区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Alan Parsow from Omaha.
观众提问：我叫艾伦·帕尔索，来自奥马哈。
Berkshire has increased the rate of growth in its insurance float in excess of 20 percent a year since 1967.
自1967年以来，伯克希尔的保险浮存金增长率每年都超过20%。
In regards to GEICO, its rate of growth, what is its historic rate of growth been in its insurance float? And what impact will it have on the rate of growth in the overall Berkshire insurance float?
关于GEICO，它的增长率如何？其保险浮存金的历史增长率是多少？对伯克希尔整体保险浮存金增长率会产生什么影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that GEICO is a huge plus to Berkshire. Now, we owned 50 percent of it before. I mean, we’ve had a — we’ve benefitted from our GEICO investment in a big way, ever since 1976. So, it’s not entirely a new benefit that’s coming in.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说GEICO对伯克希尔来说是一个巨大的优势。我们以前持有它50%的股份。自1976年以来，我们就已经从GEICO的投资中获益颇丰。所以，这并不完全是一个全新的收益来源。
We paid a good price for GEICO, but it is a terrific company. It has outstanding management. It has a low-cost method of distribution, which is very difficult for people to — I mean, everybody wants to have that. But they — very few come close to it.
我们为GEICO支付了一个合理的价格，但它是一家非常出色的公司。它拥有卓越的管理团队，并采用了一种低成本的分销方式，这种方式是大家都希望拥有但很少有人能够接近的。
The management is focused on bringing costs down even further and widening that competitive moat.
管理层专注于进一步降低成本并扩大其竞争护城河。
GEICO — I personally think that, just from what I see, that GEICO — I would think GEICO’s growth rate is likely to be greater, at least, in the future, that I can see, over where it has been in the past. But it’s been perfectly satisfactory in the past.
GEICO——就我个人观察来看，我认为GEICO的增长率至少在我能预见的未来会比过去更高。不过，它过去的表现已经非常令人满意了。
I think there are some advantages to it being part of Berkshire, in that there are costs attached to bringing new business on the books. And we care not at all about reported quarterly earnings.
我认为成为伯克希尔的一部分有一些优势，因为新增业务会带来一定的成本。而我们对季度财报的盈利并不在意。
GEICO was relatively insensitive to those before. And that’s a compliment when I say that. But they had some more pressure on them in respect to reported earnings than they will have, as part of Berkshire.
过去，GEICO对此相对不敏感。而我说这是一个赞美。不过，相较于现在成为伯克希尔的一部分，过去他们在盈利报告方面承受的压力稍大一些。
And I think there’s some really big opportunities, in terms of what can be done with GEICO as part of Berkshire.
我认为，GEICO作为伯克希尔的一部分，可以实现一些非常重大的机会。
So, I think five years from now, you’ll be very happy with the fact that we own a hundred percent of GEICO.
因此，我相信五年后，你会对我们完全拥有GEICO这一事实感到非常满意。
And I think you will see that as marvelous a company as GEICO was independently — as an independent company — it will flourish maybe even a bit more as being part of Berkshire.
而且，我认为你会看到，尽管GEICO作为一家独立公司已经非常出色，成为伯克希尔的一部分后，它可能会发展得更好一些。
Not because we bring anything to the party. I mean, the management will continue to run it autonomously. But there’s — there are some advantages for it in being part of a larger enterprise.
这并不是因为我们为它带来了什么。我是说，管理层会继续独立运作。但作为一个更大企业的一部分，它确实有一些优势。
30. Berkshire businesses worth more than book value
伯克希尔的业务价值超过账面价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第6区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Steven Tuchner. I’m a shareholder from Toronto, Canada. And my question concerns the valuation of Berkshire shares.
观众提问：巴菲特先生，我叫史蒂文·塔克纳，是来自加拿大多伦多的股东。我的问题涉及伯克希尔股票的估值。
Given the large number and dollar size of the private businesses recorded at historic cost, which Berkshire owns, shouldn’t the multiple to book that the stock trades at, essentially, expand over time to reflect the increases in intrinsic value of the private holdings?
考虑到伯克希尔所拥有的大量私营企业是按历史成本记录的，其价值规模庞大，伯克希尔股票的市净率是否应该随着时间的推移扩大，以反映这些私营企业内在价值的增长？
And I cite Buffalo News on the books at, essentially, I think around zero. And even GEICO now will be on the books at, probably, between 3 and 4 billion — worth more than that — as examples of the disparity between intrinsic value and book value?
我以《布法罗新闻》为例，其账面价值基本为零。即便是GEICO，现在的账面价值可能在30到40亿美元之间，但它的实际价值高于此。这是否说明了内在价值与账面价值之间的差异？
WARREN BUFFETT: Most of the businesses that we own all of, or at least 80 percent of, are carried on the books at considerably less than they’re now worth.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们所完全拥有或至少持有80%股份的大多数业务，其账面价值远低于它们当前的实际价值。
And with some of them, it’s dramatic, although it’s not dramatic compared to a $40 billion total market valuation for Berkshire. It’s dramatic relative to the carrying price.
其中一些业务的价值差异非常显著，尽管与伯克希尔400亿美元的总市值相比，这种差异并不算特别惊人。但相较于账面价值，这种差异是显著的。
Because when we bought See’s Candy for an effective $25 million in 1972, it was earning 4 million, pretax. It earned over 50 million, pretax, last year.
比如，当我们在1972年以2500万美元的实际价格收购See’s Candy时，它的税前利润是400万美元。而去年，它的税前利润超过了5000万美元。
When we bought the Buffalo News, it was making nothing. Paid 30 and a fraction million. And it’s now earning, maybe, 45 million.
我们收购《布法罗新闻》时，它没有任何利润。我们支付了3000多万美元。而现在，它的年利润可能达到4500万美元。
And we’ve got a number of businesses. And GEICO’s worth more than we carry it for because of the accounting peculiarities of the first 50 percent.
我们还有许多这样的业务。由于前50%股份的会计处理特殊性，GEICO的实际价值也高于我们在账面上记录的价值。
So, it is true that, overwhelmingly, our businesses are worth something more than intrinsic value — than book value — and, in many cases, very substantially more, although that’s reflected in the market price of our stock.
因此，确实，我们的业务整体价值远高于其内在价值或账面价值，而且在许多情况下，这种差异非常显著。尽管这些差异已经在我们的股票市场价格中得到了反映。
I don’t think you can go from year to year and trace the intrinsic value precisely by changes in book value. We use changes in book value as a very rough guide as to movement, and sometimes I comment.
我认为你无法通过逐年变化的账面价值来精确追踪内在价值。我们将账面价值的变化作为一种非常粗略的指引来观察趋势，有时我会对此发表一些评论。
There have been certain annual reports where I’ve said our intrinsic values grew more than the proportional change in book value, and there’s been others where I’ve said I thought it was roughly the same.
在一些年度报告中，我曾表示我们的内在价值增长超过了账面价值的比例变化，而在其他时候，我也曾说过两者大致相同。
So, I don’t think you can use it as a — stick some multiplier on it and come up with a precise guide — a precise number. But I do think it’s a guide to movement.
因此，我认为你不能给账面价值加上某种倍数，试图得出一个精确的指引或精确的数值。但我确实认为它是观察趋势的一种指引。
Our insurance business, though, is the most dramatic case of dollar difference between book value and intrinsic value. I mean, the number has gotten very big over time there. I personally think it will tend to get bigger, because I think GEICO will grow, and I think our other businesses will do well.
不过，我们的保险业务是账面价值与内在价值之间美元差异最显著的例子。我的意思是，随着时间推移，这个差距已经变得非常大。我个人认为这种差距还会进一步扩大，因为我认为GEICO会增长，同时我们的其他业务也会表现良好。
The trick, of course, is to take the new capital as it comes along — and not from the issuance of the B, because that’s relatively small compared to the amount of capital we will just generate from operations.
当然，关键在于如何运用新增的资本——而不是通过B股的发行，因为与我们通过运营产生的资本相比，发行B股带来的资本相对较少。
Our float will grow from year to year. Our earnings will be retained. And we’ve got to go out and find things to do that three or five years from now that people say, “Well, that’s worth more than the book value.” And that’s a job. It’s a tougher job than it was. But it’s kind of fun.
我们的浮存金会逐年增长。我们的利润将被保留。而我们必须找到能够让人们在三到五年后说“这比账面价值更有价值”的事情。这是一项任务，也比过去更难了。但这也挺有趣的。
31. Not expecting B shares to affect price of A shares
不指望B股会影响A股价格
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7?
沃伦·巴菲特：第7区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is Jim Elliot (PH). I’m from Minneapolis.
观众提问：是的，我叫吉姆·艾略特（音），来自明尼阿波利斯。
I wonder if you could help me with an upside scenario where the B shares, after they’re issued, are limited and there’s not a significant reissue afterwards. The A shareholders are somewhat reluctant to convert. And you have a run on the B shares where, let’s say, it goes to $2,000 a share.
我想请您帮助想象一种情况：B股发行后总量有限，并且不会有大规模的后续发行。而A股的股东又不太愿意转换。假设B股大受追捧，价格涨到每股2000美元。
Do we then have the tail wagging the dog, where the 2,000 command a $60,000 price on the A shares? And, you know, what — does the — this arbitrage take care of that? Or —
那时是否会出现“尾巴摇狗”的情况？也就是说，B股2000美元的价格会不会推高A股到6万美元？那么，这个套利是否会解决这个问题？还是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — what do we do in that case?
观众提问：——在那种情况下我们该怎么办？
WARREN BUFFETT: If there is demand for the B that pushes the price up somewhat, it will produce conversion from the A. I mean, the only way the B will be able to get — we’ll just pick a figure — if it were to get to $1,200 — there is no way that the A could be selling appreciably below 36,000.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果对B股的需求将价格推高，那么肯定会有A股转换成B股。我的意思是，假设B股涨到1200美元，那A股就绝不可能显著低于3.6万美元。
And I don’t think — I think that introducing the B into the equation, may mean — it will mean — that there will be some people who like a lower denomination stock and come in.
我也不认为——我的看法是，引入B股可能意味着，确实会有一些喜欢低面值股票的人进场。
But it takes a lot of that to, in an appreciable way, affect $40 billion worth of what is now A stock.
但想要对目前价值400亿美元的A股产生明显影响，需要相当大的资金量。
So, you know, if there were incremental demand of a hundred million dollars a year or something like that, that’s a little more than the demand that might otherwise go into the A. But I do not see it producing anything in the way of a big movement.
也就是说，如果每年多出1亿美元之类的需求，可能会比原本流向A股的需求稍多一些。但我不认为这会导致A股出现什么大幅波动。
But you’re quite correct in that there’s no way that the B stock can go up and not really force some conversion from the A. It’ll — I think it’ll be minor.
不过，你说得对，B股涨上去肯定会逼出一部分A股的转换。我认为规模会比较小。
32. World Book Encyclopedia business won’t be sold
《世界图书百科全书》业务不会被出售
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8?
沃伦·巴菲特：第8区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. This is Rick Merliof (PH) from Oakland, California.
观众提问：你好，我叫里克·默里奥夫（音），来自加利福尼亚州的奥克兰。
I wanted to ask you about World Book Encyclopedia. World Book seems to me to be an example where Berkshire has invested in technology without necessarily intending to.
我想问一下关于《世界图书百科全书》的问题。在我看来，世运百科是一个伯克希尔不知不觉中投资于科技的例子。
I would expect that in five or 10 years it’s going to be real tough to sell a paper encyclopedia, because at that time, you’ll probably be able to buy the computer and the electronic encyclopedia for less than the paper encyclopedia.
我想，再过五到十年，要卖一本纸质百科全书恐怕会非常困难，因为到那时，电脑加电子版百科全书的价格可能都比纸质百科全书还要便宜。
Up till now, I haven’t had the impression that World Book has been as aggressive as its competitors in marketing and developing its electronic product.
到目前为止，我并没有感觉到世运百科在营销和研发电子产品方面像它的竞争对手那样积极。
It’s been the highest price that I have seen of the competition. It’s — it asked at least — a year ago, its list price was 600 and the competition was 8,200.
这是我见过的所有竞争对手里价格最高的。一年前，它的标价至少是600美元，而竞争对手的价格是8200美元。
You sold as low as a hundred on special promotions. But it — I don’t think that was the list.
你们在一些特别促销时曾把价钱降到过100美元左右。但我认为那不是它的定价。
A year ago, you were still selling by direct sales. I have not yet seen it in a mass market software store. I’ve never seen it bundled with a computer.
一年前，你们还在通过直销方式卖。我还没在大众软件商店里见过它。我也没见过它和电脑捆绑销售过。
And I have seen one newspaper review of electronic encyclopedias that mention the World Book print version but didn’t seem to be aware that a World Book electronic version was available, which it was at that time.
我在一篇报纸上看到过对电子百科全书的评论，提到了世界百科的纸质版，却似乎不知道它还有电子版——当时明明就已经有了。
In terms of the product itself, we have both the World Book and the Grolier’s at our house. The Grolier’s came with the computer. And both encyclopedias, in this last year, solicited us to buy an upgrade. World Book was asking $85. Grolier’s was asking 30.
就产品本身而言，我们家里既有世界百科，也有格罗利尔百科。格罗利尔是随电脑附带的。过去一年里，这两家百科全书都邀请我们购买升级版。世界百科要价85美元，格罗利尔要价30美元。
But in addition, I ended up buying only the Grolier’s, because it addressed my biggest disappointment on the original version of both of them, which — it’s sort of a — in a way, a minor issue. But I thought it was relevant for kids doing school reports.
不过，最终我只买了格罗利尔，因为它解决了我对这两家百科最初版本的最大失望之处——从某种角度看，这算个小问题，但对于孩子做学校报告却很重要。
Neither one allows you to print out a very big percentage of the pictures in the encyclopedia. They have a lot of pictures. But you can’t print them. And you can get a color inkjet printer for under 200 bucks these days, so it’s real practical to print things out.
这两个百科都不允许你打印出其中很大一部分图片。它们有很多图片，但就是不能打印。而现在几乎只要不到200美元就能买到一台彩色喷墨打印机，所以打印图片实际上很方便。
The World Book made no mention of having any improvement in this area. The Grolier’s said you can print out almost all the pictures. And I have found — since we got the upgrade — I found that to be true.
世界百科没有提到在这方面做任何改进。格罗利尔则说几乎所有的图片都能打印。自从我升级以后，我发现确实如此。
So, I’m concerned that — I’m not an expert on this, but I don’t think World Book is as aggressive in either developing or marketing its electronic encyclopedia.
所以，我有点担心。我并不是这方面的专家，但我觉得世界百科在研发或营销它的电子百科方面都不够积极。
So, my question is, do you plan to become aggressive in this area and a leader in the electronic technology? Or have you considered selling your electronic business and just getting out of it?
我的问题是，你们是否打算在这一领域更加积极，成为电子技术方面的引领者？或者说，你们有没有考虑过把自己的电子业务卖掉，干脆退出这个领域呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We won’t sell the electronic business. That, I can tell you. You’re quite correct. Some of the technical stuff I’m not very good at. I have a little trouble turning on the light switch.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们不会卖掉电子业务。这点我可以肯定地告诉你。你说得很对，我对某些技术性的问题并不精通。我甚至有时候连开灯都觉得有点麻烦。
But the — (laughter) — in terms of the bundled product, which is the encyclopedia that is offered with the purchase of a new computer, there’s no question that that’s become a large business in units. It’s not so large in terms of dollars, because those units, bundled with an original equipment sale, are very low. Actually, Encarta’s probably — well I’m sure has sold, you know, many, many millions of units bundled with a new encyclopedia. It doesn’t necessarily produce a lot of dollars. But it produces a lot of units out there.
但是——（笑声）——就捆绑销售而言，也就是随新电脑一起提供的那种百科全书，在销量（台数）方面毫无疑问已经成为一个大生意。但从金额上看就不算大了，因为那些随原装设备销售的版本价格非常低。实际上，Encarta 可能——我可以肯定地说——已经以捆绑新百科全书的形式卖出了数以百万计的份额。但这并不一定产生可观的收入，不过它确实在市场上投放了大量份额。
We, at World Book — Encyclopedia — some of you may not have noticed, but Encyclopedia Britannica has, within the last couple of weeks, announced the cessation of direct distribution of the print product. And unit sales of encyclopedias — print encyclopedias — in the country have gone down very significantly in the last few years, as they have at World Book.
我们在世界百科这边——有些人也许没注意到，然而不久前不列颠百科全书（Encyclopedia Britannica）刚刚宣布停止通过直销方式销售纸质版本。过去几年里，美国市场上纸质百科全书的销量——包括世界百科在内——都大幅下滑。
We changed the — we are in the process of changing, and have already changed in some parts of the country — the distribution system because we are going to see what can be made to work, if anything, in the direct distribution. There are some indications that we may be able to make money in that business but with a different cost structure than before. And it — well, we’ll know more about that. We’re not that far along, because we changed the distribution within the last — or partially changed it — within the last few months.
我们已经改变了——或者说正在改变——在美国部分地区的分销体系，因为我们想看看在直销方面，是否还有机会找到能运转下去的模式。有一些迹象表明，我们也许能在这块业务上盈利，只是需要采用不同于以往的成本结构。至于具体情况如何，我们还得再看看。我们目前进展并不算太远，因为这些改变都是在过去几个月里才开始——或部分开始——实行的。
We — it’s not easy to figure out how to make money in either the electronic or print encyclopedia end of the business. And we have some ideas in the electronic end that we’ll know a lot more about in about six months or so, but I can’t really — I don’t want to go into any detail on those at present.
无论在电子版还是纸质版的百科业务上，想要盈利都不容易。对于电子版这边，我们有一些想法，大约再过六个月左右就能有更多结论。但现在我还不想，也不方便详谈这些。
I’ve got the electronic product myself. It’s a first-class product. We’ve got ideas about how to make it an even better product. And we have taken a lot of costs out of the print end of the business. We’ll be putting some of those into the electronic end. But we’ve taken a lot of costs out.
我自己也有电子版的产品。我认为这是一个很优秀的产品。我们也有一些改进它的思路。我们已经在纸质业务方面削减了不少成本，其中一部分要投入到电子产品这边。但总之，我们减掉了很多成本。
It may well be that it’ll be a workable business for us, even though it isn’t for anybody else, but the jury’s still out on that.
或许这对我们来说仍然能成为一个可行的生意，尽管对其他人来说未必如此。但这方面还需要继续观察。
It is not the business it was five years ago. And I don’t think it will be the business that it was five years ago, because the world is changed in some ways on that.
现在的情况和五年前已经大不相同了。我也不认为它能回到五年前的状态，因为世界已经在某些方面发生了变化。
But we’re — we will not sell World Book. That I can just — I’ll state that unequivocally. We will not sell electronic World Book. We are in the business to stay. But we are groping a bit in terms of figuring out a configuration that will produce decent profits for us and sell a lot of World Books in the process.
但是——我们不会卖掉世界百科。这点我可以非常明确地告诉你。我们也不会卖掉世界百科的电子业务。我们会一直做下去。只不过，在如何找到合适的模式，既能为我们带来合理的利润，又能让世界百科卖得多这方面，我们还在摸索。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t have any way of avoiding declines in some of our businesses some of the time.
查理·芒格：我们无法避免有些业务在某些时候出现下滑。
Blue Chip Stamps once sold stamps at the rate of $120 million a year. Now, it’s about $200,000 a year. So, we lose some. (Laughter)
蓝筹邮票公司曾经每年能卖出价值1.2亿美元的邮票。现在，每年只有大约20万美元。所以，我们也会有损失（笑声）。
WARREN BUFFETT: We were in the windmill business many years ago. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们很多年前还干过风车生意（笑声）。
We try to make — you know, we think plenty about the problems. But there are industry problems.
我们一直在努力——你也知道，我们非常重视这些问题。但行业本身确实存在一些问题。
I was in anthracite coal at one time, too. Street railways. I’ve seen them all.
我以前也做过无烟煤生意。还有有轨电车。我都见过。
But World Book is a first-class product. It’s a product I use, a product Charlie uses. And there is — through an electronic means, you can deliver information at costs far, far less than — I mean, unbelievably less — than was the case not that many years ago.
不过，《世界图书百科全书》是一款一流的产品。我自己用，查理也用。而且通过电子方式，你能以远远低于——我的意思是低得令人难以置信——几年前的成本来传递信息。
And the world, in many forms, will be adjusting to that, not just in encyclopedias. And it affects some of the businesses we’re in. And it’s something we think about. But it’s very unlikely that Charlie and I are going to be smarter than the rest of the world, in terms of the electronic world.
世界将从许多方面适应这一变化，不仅仅是百科全书领域。它也会影响到我们所从事的部分业务，这的确是我们会去思考的问题。不过，在电子领域，查理和我不太可能比全世界其他人都更聪明。
I mean, we are looking at it as something where we’re looking for the obvious, and something that is within our capability of doing something about. But we’re not trying to beat people at their own game, where we’re not very good at the game.
我的意思是，我们更关注那些显而易见、并且在我们能力范围之内可以去做的事。但我们不会尝试在别人擅长的领域与之较量，因为我们并不擅长那个游戏。
33. Protecting public shows “tremendous integrity”
保护公众体现了“极高的正直”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
沃伦·巴菲特：第1区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Richard Charlton from Canada. One of the highlights of — good afternoon, Mr. Munger, also. (Laughter)
观众提问：巴菲特先生，我是来自加拿大的理查德·查尔顿。今天下午好，芒格先生。（笑声）
One of the highlights, for me, in coming to the annual meeting for the past seven or eight years was the way that you dealt with the question that was inevitably asked by a new shareholder as to why you will not split your shares.
在过去七、八年中，我每次来参加年度股东大会时，最让我印象深刻的事情之一，就是您如何应对新股东们必然会问到的一个问题：为什么您一直不拆股？
I know how much it has meant to you to keep the shares trading in an exclusive way. And you have been my mentor for the last 17 years.
我知道，让股票保持这种独特的交易方式对您来说意义重大。这17年来，您一直是我的导师。
And I think that what you’re doing in splitting these shares in order to protect the public, and indirectly, Berkshire shareholders, but mostly to protect the public, is just another expression of your and Mr. Munger’s tremendous integrity.
我认为，这次您决定通过分股来保护公众，当然也间接保护了伯克希尔的股东，但主要还是为了保护公众。这正是您和芒格先生“极高正直品格”的又一次体现。
And you’re setting a fantastic example for corporate America. And I salute you, sir. And I thank you very much. (Applause)
您为美国企业树立了一个绝佳的榜样。我向您致敬。非常感谢您。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。谢谢。
34. “The fairer, the better” for Berkshire’s stock price
对于伯克希尔的股价而言，“越公平越好”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I hate to leave Zone 1 after that, but we’ll go on to Zone 2. (Laughter) Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，刚刚那位发言后，我真有些舍不得离开第1区，但还是让我们继续前往第2区吧（笑声）。谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wesley Jack from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
观众提问：我是韦斯利·杰克，来自俄克拉荷马州的俄克拉荷马城。
As a stock broker, I can say I definitely don’t like UITs and I appreciate your plan for the B shares. But as long — with the rest of the shareholders, what we hope — that the shares go up in value in the future. Don’t you see a problem with them coming back with this idea in the future?
作为一名证券经纪人，我可以说我真的不喜欢单位投资信托（UIT），所以我很赞赏你们关于B股的计划。可是和其他股东一样，我们当然希望股票未来能升值。您是否认为那些提出卖UIT想法的人以后还会卷土重来呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: On the unit — you mean on the issuance of unit trusts?
沃伦·巴菲特：你指的是单位信托——也就是发行类似 UIT 的东西吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
观众提问：对。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I don’t see any problem because the B will be out there. And it is a superior product, whatever its absolute merits may be. On a relative basis, it is a superior product to anything that is going to carry a big commission to a salesperson and a lot of annual costs.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我认为不会再有问题了，因为B股已经上市了——不管从绝对角度怎样，就相对而言，它一定优于任何需要向推销员支付高额佣金并附带高年费的衍生产品。
So, I think — my guess is we’ve taken care of that problem. I wish it hadn’t come up, but it — I would think that it would be very difficult for anyone to honestly offer a product — a derivative-type product — through a unit trust that would be superior to buying the product that will be available.
所以，我想我们已经把那个问题解决了。说实话，我真希望一开始就没碰到这个事。但我想，要是有人还想通过发行某种衍生品或单位信托——试图提供比直接买到即将上市的B股更好的选择——那恐怕并不现实。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think he’s afraid that the B will go up to the place where the whole story comes again. And I must say that if that were to happen, we’d like it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我想他的担心是，如果B股涨到一个很高的价位，可能还会再出现同样的故事。对此我只能说，如果真那样的话，我们倒乐意看到。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’d like it, only if it reflected underlying values, but — (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们只会喜欢在B股反映基本内在价值的前提下价格上涨。（笑）
CHARLIE: Yeah.
查理：对。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have a very strange attitude on that. I mean, most managements feel that the — on the price of their shares — that the higher, the better. And that’s an understandable feeling. But the trouble is the game isn’t over at any time.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在这方面，我们的态度可能有点奇怪。大多数管理层都觉得自家股价越高越好，这种想法可以理解。但是问题在于，游戏永远不会“结束”。
We really feel the fairer, the better. Our goal is that every shareholder participates in the progress that Berkshire makes, during — as a business — during their holding period. In other words, we don’t want one party getting wealthy off the other. We want them to share based on the gain in value of the business.
我们的想法是：股价越接近公平价值越好。我们的目标是，每位股东在持股期间，都能够合理分享伯克希尔作为一家企业所获得的进步。换句话说，我们不希望有一方通过剥夺另一方而获利，而是希望大家都能按照企业价值增长的比例来分享收益。
And to the extent that the stock got way overvalued or way undervalued, you know, that may make one party — in the first case, the seller, in the second case, the buyer — very happy. But there’s somebody on the other side of the transaction.
如果股价被严重高估或严重低估，那么前一种情况（高估）就会让卖方高兴，而后一种情况（低估）则会让买方高兴。可是在每笔交易当中，总有一个对手方的存在。
In economics, you know, the most important question — maybe important beyond economics, too — but whenever somebody tells you something, you know, the first question to ask yourself is, “And then what?” And we tend to do that around Berkshire.
在经济学中，可能不仅仅是在经济学，最重要的问题之一是：当有人告诉你一件事，你首先要问自己，“然后会怎样呢？”在伯克希尔，我们一直以来都习惯这样思考。
And so, the stock going up is not an end of itself, because it’s — the next question is, “And then what?”
因此，股价上涨并不是我们追求的终极目标，因为接下来的问题就是，“然后呢？”
And to the extent that the stock goes up because the intrinsic value goes up, everyone is getting their fair share of the pie as they go along.
如果股价的上涨是由内在价值的增长所驱动，那么股东们都会在这个过程中获得自己应有的回报。
To the extent it exceeds that in some way, the selling shareholder gets a benefit. But the entering shareholder is at a disadvantage. And we really like the idea of the price tracking intrinsic value over time.
如果股价以某种方式超越了内在价值，那么卖出股票的股东就会受益，而买入股票的股东则会吃亏。所以，我们非常希望股价能够尽可能地与内在价值保持一致。
And we think that, by having the right kind of shareholders and by communicating with them properly and following the right kind of policies, that we can come as close to that as is attainable in a world where markets, essentially, are fairly volatile. And so far, I think it’s worked out pretty well that way.
我们相信，通过吸引合适的股东、通过良好的沟通，并且坚持正确的政策，可以尽量使股价在这个波动性相当大的市场中与内在价值保持一致。到目前为止，我认为我们做得还不错。
But the intention is to — and the goal — is to keep it that way.
而我们的初衷和目标，就是将这一点一直保持下去。
One thing to remember: in the end, the owners of businesses, in aggregate, cannot come out anyway better than the businesses come out.
有一点要记住：从整体来看，企业的所有者，不可能获得比企业本身更好的回报。
I mean, you can — the businesses are the — and not just our businesses, I’m talking about all American business — the profitability of American business determines the profitability of what the owners of American business have, and you can forget all about the little ticker symbols and everything else.
我的意思是，不仅仅是我们的企业，所有的美国企业都是同样的道理：美国企业的盈利能力决定了美国企业所有者的盈利能力，你可以把所有的股票代码以及其它细枝末节都抛到一边。
The owners suffer to the extent that they have some extra costs imposed in broker’s commissions, fees, all kinds of things. That diminishes the return from the business. But no one has figured out yet how to perpetually have owners do better than their businesses.
如果在持股过程中，还有额外的经纪佣金和各种费用，投资者的收益就会因这些成本而受损。但没人能找出一种方式，让企业所有者永远比企业本身更赚钱。
And our idea is to have them do it as they go long in proportion to the gain that occurs during their tenure as a shareholder. And that isn’t easy to do. And it’s not attained perfectly. But that’s the goal as we go along.
而我们的理念是，让股东们在持股期间，根据公司所取得的增长来获得相应的收益。这件事并不容易做到，也不可能做到完美。但这是我们在前行过程中一直追求的目标。
35. Insurance float: “Above all, get it cheap”
保险浮存金：“最重要的是，要获得廉价资金”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
沃伦·巴菲特：第3区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Maurus Spence. And I have a serious question and, then, a less serious question first.
观众提问：我是莫鲁斯·斯潘斯。我有一个严肃的问题，以及一个不太严肃的问题要先提。
The less serious: you said that you and Charlie had lost, between you, a hundred pounds. I was curious who had lost more?
先说不太严肃的：您说您和查理两个人一起减掉了100磅。我想问一下，谁减得更多呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. I said the board had lost a hundred pounds. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。我说的是董事会成员合计减掉了100磅。（笑声）
I have some members of the board who would take umbrage of the fact that they weren’t included in that total. (Laughter)
我们董事会有些成员会因为自己没被算进那个总数而生气的。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK, Who lost —?
观众提问：好的。那么——谁减掉——？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I, we’re pretty close at the moment, aren’t we? Modesty prevents — (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：我和查理现在都差不多，不是吗？谦虚使我无法明说……（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I must say you’re both looking very good, anyway.
观众提问：不管怎样，我必须说你们两个看起来都很好。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re feeling good.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们感觉不错。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was wondering who lost the most and what your diet secrets were. (Laughter) And, then, the more serious question was about float.
观众提问：我想知道谁减掉的最多，以及你们的减肥秘诀是什么？（笑声）然后，我的那个更严肃的问题与浮存金有关。
You touched on this a little bit earlier. But you’ve often said that your insurance business is probably the most important business that you own.
这个话题你们之前稍微提到过。可你们经常说，保险业务大概是你们最重要的业务。
On page 12 of the annual report, you said, “We have benefitted greatly to a degree that has not been generally understood, because our liabilities have cost us very little.”
在年报的第12页，你们说“我们获得的好处非常大，但一般人都没怎么意识到，因为我们的负债成本非常低。”
I was wondering if you could describe this a little bit better so we can understand it.
我想请你们进一步解释一下，让我们更好地理解这一点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — Charlie and I have lost about the same amount, at about 20 pounds each.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我和查理各减了差不多20磅。
The insurance business provides us with float. And float is money that we hold that doesn’t belong to us.
保险业务给我们带来了浮存金。所谓浮存金是我们持有但并不属于我们的资金。
It’s like a bank having deposits. A bank has deposits. The money doesn’t belong to it. But it holds the money.
这有点类似银行持有存款。银行有存款，而这些钱并不属于银行，但银行却保管着这些钱。
Now, when a bank holds deposits, on everything except demand deposits, there’s an explicit cost, an interest rate attached to it. And, then, there are the costs of running the system and gathering the money which is — also must be attributed both to demand and time deposit.
当银行持有存款时，除活期存款外的所有存款都需要付出显性的成本，也就是利率。除此之外，还有运营体系和吸收资金的成本——这些也得算在活期和定期存款中。
So there’s a cost to getting what they would call deposits and we could call float.
因此，他们所谓的存款、而我们称之为浮存金，都是有成本的。
In the insurance business, a similar phenomenon takes place in that policy holders give us their money at the start of the policy period. And therefore, we get the money paid in advance for the product.
在保险业务中，也存在类似的现象：保单持有人在保单生效之初就将保费交给我们，因此我们预先收到了这笔产品费用。
And secondly, it takes time to settle losses, particularly in the liability area. If you bang up a fender on your car, you — it’s going to get settled very quickly, so there’s — but if there’s a complicated injury or something, it may take some years to settle. And during that period, we hold the money.
其次，理赔需要时间，尤其是在责任保险领域。如果你只是把车的保险杠撞坏了，理赔会很快结案。但如果是复杂的人身伤害或其他问题，可能需要几年才能结案。而在这段时间里，钱都由我们来持有。
So, we have, in effect, something that is tantamount to the deposits of a bank. But whereas the deposits of a bank, it’s quite easy to calculate the approximate cost, in the case of the float that the insurance company has, you don’t really know what the cost of that float is until all your policies and losses — policies have expired and your losses have all been settled. Well, that’s forever, in some cases.
因此，实际上我们拥有了一种类似于银行存款的资金。然而，与银行存款不同的是，银行存款的成本很容易计算，而保险公司所持有的浮存金，你并不知道它的成本到底是多少，除非所有保单都到期并且所有理赔都结清。有时候，这几乎是个没有尽头的过程。
So, you’re only making an estimate, as you go along, of what that float is costing.
因此，你只能在进行中估算这一浮存金的成本。
To date with Berkshire, in the 29 years we’ve been in the business, it appears — never certain, because you don’t know for sure what’s going to happen — but it appears that our float has not cost us anything, in — on average.
对伯克希尔而言，到目前为止，我们做保险生意有29年了。现在看来——当然不能完全确定，因为谁也不知道将来会发生什么——但看上去我们的浮存金平均来说几乎没有成本。
There’s been years when we’ve had an underwriting loss when there’s a cost. There’s been years when we had an underwriting profit. And so, we had a reverse cost.
有些年份我们承保亏损时确实会出现成本，有些年份我们承保盈利，于是成本就会倒挂。
So we have obtained that float on very advantageous terms over the years. Far more than — fully as important as that— it’s important to get it at a low cost, in our case, no cost. But the other important thing is that we’ve grown it dramatically.
多年来我们以非常有利的条件获取了浮存金。比“以极低甚至无成本获得浮存金”更重要或者同样重要的是，我们的浮存金规模还大幅增长了。
And so, we’ve gotten more and more money without having any cost attached to it. And if we still had our 16 — or 17 million, I guess — of float that we had in 1967 and it was no cost, it would be very nice.
也就是说，我们获得了越来越多的资金，却不需要支付成本。如果我们现在还和1967年一样，只有1600万或1700万美元的浮存金，且没有成本，虽然不错，但毕竟规模有限。
But 17 million of free money is worth something, but it’s not worth a ton.
1700万美元的无成本资金当然有价值，但也没大到让人瞠目结舌的程度。
Having seven billion, if we can achieve that as free money, it’s worth a lot of money. And that growth has not, probably, generally, been appreciated fully in connection with Berkshire nor has the interplay of how having zero-cost money, in terms of affecting our gain in value over time.
如果我们能把那70亿美元当成无成本的资金，那么它的价值就非常高了。而且，就伯克希尔而言，人们大概并没有充分认识到这种增长的意义，也没有充分理解在我们价值增长的过程中，持有零成本资金所产生的作用。
People have looked at — always looked at our asset side, but they haven’t paid as much attention to the liability side. Charlie and I pay a lot of attention to that.
人们往往只关注我们的资产端，却没有那么关注负债端。而我和查理对此非常重视。
And, I mean, this — it’s not entirely an accident that the business has developed in this manner. And we have intentions of trying to make it continue to develop in this manner, and in that manner, in the future. But we’ve got competitors out there, too.
也就是说，我们能够这样发展并非完全是偶然。我们也希望未来能继续以这种方式、或者类似的方式发展。不过我们在市场上也有竞争对手。
Float, per se, is not a blessing. We can show you many insurance companies that thought it was wonderful to generate float. And they have lost so much money in underwriting that they’d be better off if they’d never heard of the insurance business.
浮存金本身并不一定是好事。我们可以给你看很多保险公司，他们曾经觉得获得浮存金很美好，结果却在承保业务上赔了大量的钱，如果他们从没涉足过保险业务，或许会更好。
But, you know, the job is to get it, get it in increasing quantities, but above all, get it cheap. And that’s what we work at.
但是，你要知道，我们的工作就是争取拿到浮存金，而且数量越来越多，不过最关键的是要拿到便宜的浮存金。这就是我们努力的方向。
And you do that in the business through having some kind of competitive advantages. You won’t do it just by having an ordinary insurance company. The ordinary insurance company is not a good business.
要想在这门生意里做到这一点，就必须拥有某些竞争优势。仅仅是办一家普通的保险公司，你是做不到的。普通的保险公司并不是什么好生意。
We have it, in certain respects, because of our attitude toward the business. We have it because of our financial strength gives us certain competitive advantages, and we have it in the case of GEICO, because of a very low-cost operation.
我们能够做到这一点，部分原因在于我们对待这项业务的态度。我们能做到，是因为我们的财务实力给我们带来了某些竞争优势；在GEICO的案例中，则是因为它的运营成本非常低。
And it’s us — up to us — to try and figure out ways to maximize each one of those competitive advantages over time.
而我们要做的，就是设法在时间的推移中，将这些竞争优势最大化。
We’ve built those advantages. I mean, in 1967, we were not looked at that way in the insurance business. We were — we’ve built a position of competitive strengths. And in the case of GEICO, they had it without us. But we have bought into it over time.
这些优势是我们一点点建立起来的。要知道，在1967年，我们在保险业并不是以这样的形象示人的。我们一步步建立了自己的竞争实力。至于GEICO，它自己就已经拥有这样的优势，而我们是逐步买入这家公司并与之结合的。
It’s a very important asset. And you ought to pay a lot of attention over the years as to what is happening in — with that asset as to both growth and costs. And that will aid you in calculating intrinsic value.
浮存金是一项非常重要的资产。你需要长年累月地关注这项资产的发展状况，包括规模的增长以及成本的变化。这样做能帮助你更好地评估我们的内在价值。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
查理·芒格：我没有补充的。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
36. Intrinsic value isn’t above current stock price
内在价值并未高于当前股价
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4 is the next.
沃伦·巴菲特：接下来是第4区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Henry Neuhoff (PH), shareholder, Dallas, Texas.
观众提问：我是亨利·纽霍夫（音），达拉斯德州的股东。
My guess is that you consider the intrinsic value of the shares to be more than that represented by the price.
我猜想您认为股票的内在价值高于其当前价格所体现的水平。
WARREN BUFFETT: By more than represented by what?
沃伦·巴菲特：您说的高于什么水平？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: More than represented by the current price of the shares.
观众提问：也就是，高于目前的股价水平。
If that be the case, what would be your thoughts about Berkshire repurchasing its own shares?
如果情况确实如此，您怎么看伯克希尔回购自己股票这件事？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no. We have said we do not consider Berkshire undervalued at this price. We didn’t say we thought it was overvalued. But we said we did not consider it undervalued.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，不是这样的。我们曾说过，我们不认为伯克希尔在这个价位是被低估的。我们并没说它被高估了，但我们说过不认为它被低估。
So, a repurchase based on our estimate would not be in the interests of shareholders.
所以，基于我们的判断，回购股票并不符合股东的利益。
It’s conceivable it could be at some time, but we do not think that’s the case. We think intrinsic value far exceeds book value, but we do not think it exceeds present price.
以后某个时候或许会出现这种可能，但我们目前并不这么看。我们认为内在价值远高于账面价值，但并不认为它高于现在的股价。
We’re not selling any shares, though, either. (Laughter)
当然，我们也并没有在卖出任何股票。（笑声）
(Break in tape)
（录音中断）
37. Complications from “street name” shareholders
以“街名”持股的股东所面临的复杂情况
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?
沃伦·巴菲特：第6区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Carlos Lucera (PH). I’m from Idaho. And my question relates to street names.
观众提问：我叫卡洛斯·卢塞拉（音），来自爱达荷州。我的问题和“街名”持股有关。
Our stock at Berkshire Hathaway is in a family limited partnership. And in addition to that, it’s in a street name.
我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦持有的股票属于一个家族有限合伙企业，而且还以“街名”形式持股。
Now, what is the reason, and the rationale behind the reason, for street name shares not being able to participate in the charitable contributions by Berkshire Hathaway?
那么，为什么以街名持股的股票无法参加伯克希尔哈撒韦的慈善捐赠计划？这背后的原因和考量是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We submitted a request for ruling to the IRS — I don’t know, 15 or so years ago, in connection with the shareholder-designated contribution program.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的。大约在15年前，我们曾就股东指令的慈善捐赠计划向美国国税局（IRS）提交过一次裁定请求。
And the ruling we received specifies record holders and not street name holders. Now, that doesn’t mean that a different ruling might not be obtained.
我们当时收到的裁定明确适用于正式登记的股东，而不包括以街名方式持股的股东。当然，这并不意味着我们将来无法获得不同的裁定。
But frankly, when we get into the multitude of indirect holdings and the problems we have with those indirect holdings in other respects, I think it would be a bit of a nightmare for us to attempt to get that program extended through — into street name holders.
但坦率地讲，当涉及到数量庞大的间接持股和其他与间接持股相关的各种问题时，如果我们试图将这一计划扩展到街名持股，我认为对我们来说将是一场噩梦。
I think the costs would far exceed the benefits. And I think that it is the situation, and anybody with it in street name can move it into their own name if they want to.
我认为，所付出的成本将远远超过所获得的益处。现实的情况是，任何以街名持有股票的股东如果希望参加，就可以把股票过户到自己名下。
So I think, with very small amount of effort on the part of an individual shareholder, it would offset an enormous set of problems that we would encounter at Berkshire.
因此，我认为，个人股东只需付出一点点努力，就能免去伯克希尔可能要面对的一大堆麻烦。
We can handle the present system. We’ve got 12 people there. And they run the annual meeting. They make movies. They do all kinds of things. (Laughter)
我们现行的系统可以应付。我们有12个员工处理这些事。他们主持年度股东大会，拍摄影片，处理各种各样的事项。（笑声）
And it would be — it would be very tough and — you know, if an extra 10,000 shares participated, it’d be $120,000 of contributions. I just don’t think it would be worthwhile.
要是再新增1万股参与，意味着12万美元的捐款，但与此同时，我们需要投入大量人力物力，这在我看来并不值得。
Our ruling doesn’t presently cover the subject, in any event. It’s something we’ve thought about.
不管怎样，我们现有的裁定并没有涵盖这部分问题。但我们确实想过这个问题。
Charlie?
查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think even if they changed the ruling, we wouldn’t change the policy. It would be, administratively, very difficult.
查理·芒格：是的。我认为即使他们修改了裁定，我们也不会改变现在的政策。操作起来会非常困难。
WARREN BUFFETT: We run into other problems, in terms of people getting their material — just the material on the annual meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：在让人们获取资料方面——仅仅是获取年度股东大会资料——我们就遇到了一些问题。
And we’ve heard from a number of shareholders that they can’t get it from their broker, and they don’t know what the B is all about because they didn’t get their proxies. And it just — street name posed more problems.
我们听到有不少股东说，他们从经纪人那里拿不到这些资料，也不知道B股到底是怎么回事，因为他们没有拿到投票代理文件。这些都是“街名”持股带来的额外问题。
Although, we have a — now we have — probably have more than — forget about the B. We have more than twice as many, I believe, holders in street name as in direct ownership. Although, the number of shares is far, far — I mean it’s — it’d be less than 20 percent of the shares. But it’s probably double the number of holders.
其实，如今我们这里（不算上B股），我认为街名持股的股东人数要比直接登记的股东人数多一倍以上。虽然街名持股的总股份数比直接登记的股份数要少得多，可能还不到全部股份的20%，但持有者的人数却大约是后者的两倍。
38. No “look-through earnings” in annual report
年度报告中未列示“穿透式收益”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7?
沃伦·巴菲特：第7区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Bill Guerra (PH). I’m from the San Francisco Bay area. I’ve owned your shares for many years and appreciate the good job you’ve done.
观众提问：下午好。我叫比尔·格拉（音），来自旧金山湾区。我持有你们的股票很多年了，对你们的优秀表现深表感谢。
However, in this year’s chairman’s letter — you developed a concept a few years ago called look-through earnings.
然而，在今年的董事长致股东信中——你们几年前提出了一个叫“穿透式收益”的概念。
WARREN BUFFETT: Right.
沃伦·巴菲特：对。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And I failed to see that this year. And I’m wondering if that no longer is a valid concept or why you refrained from showing the data?
观众提问：但我今年没有看到相关内容。我想知道，这个概念是否不再有效，或者你们为什么没有再列示相关数据？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s a good question. I should have actually covered that in the annual report, in terms of mentioning — because I’ve talked about it, and we’ll talk about it in the future.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，问得好。其实我本该在年度报告里谈谈这个概念，因为过去我提到过它，以后也会再谈。
And we do have a goal on look-through earnings of $2 billion in the year 2000. And that’s going to be adjusted upward to allow for the fact there are more shares outstanding. It’ll be the same basic goal.
我们确实定下过一个在2000年实现20亿美元“穿透式收益”的目标。考虑到我们现在发行的股份变多了，我们会做一些上调。但核心目标不变。
But there were two reasons that it was skipped this year. And like I said, I should’ve mentioned it.
今年之所以没有列示，主要有两个原因。正如我刚才说的，我本该提一下的。
One was it was the longest letter we’ve ever had. And having that section in there would’ve elongated it even a bit more. And that, coupled with the fact — and this is the important part of it — we had major changes in our — the composition of the company — immediately after the end of the year.
首先，今年的股东信是我们写过的最长的一封。如果再加上这部分，篇幅会更长。再加上——这是关键原因——年末刚过，我们公司结构就发生了重大变化。
So, our Capital City stock disappeared. At the time it disappeared, we didn’t know whether it was going into cash, or all Disney stock, or a combination.
比如，我们持有的首都城市公司（Capital Cities/ABC）的股票不存在了。当时我们还不清楚这部分资产最后会变成现金呢，还是全部变成迪士尼股票，或者是一部分现金一部分迪士尼股票。
We had the acquisition of the other half of GEICO where, even now, the accounting treatment isn’t clear. And I felt that —
我们还收购了GEICO剩余的另一半股权，但即便到现在，相关会计处理都还没完全确定。我觉得——
The look-through earnings last year were fine. But I felt that, by the time I got through explaining all of the adjustments you would have to make for the transactions then pending, that adding it to the — to already the longest letter I’ve written, would’ve slowed things down a lot and not been particularly helpful.
去年“穿透式收益”这个数字本身还是不错的。但是如果我再去解释所有尚未完成的交易所需要做的调整，那么整个股东信会变得更冗长，而且也不会带来什么特别的帮助。
It will be back in this year, this upcoming report, and future reports, because it’s a very important concept. And it’s something that we’re focused on.
在接下来的年度报告和未来的报告中，这个部分还会重新出现，因为它确实是个非常重要的概念，也是我们关注的重点。
It’s just that last year’s number — it would’ve been a mess by the time I got through trying to explain it.
只是去年这个数字——如果我想把它解释清楚，恐怕会相当混乱。
You know, I normally — the accounting stuff, I know, puts a lot of you to sleep. But believe me, it isn’t so much fun writing it either. (Laughter)
你也知道，平时那些会计问题就已经让很多人听得犯困。相信我，写起来也不怎么有趣。（笑声）
So, I skipped it this year. We’ll have it next year. And the number would’ve been OK last year, but there would’ve been a lot of asterisks attached.
所以今年我就省了这部分。明年会再出。去年那个数字本身是可以的，但会有很多要特别注明的地方。
39. Discount rate for estimating intrinsic value
估算内在价值时使用的折现率
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：第8区，请。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Mr. Buffett, good morning. My name’s Ed Walzak (PH) from New York. I’m a student and an admirer of your investment philosophy. I have a question.
观众提问：是的，巴菲特先生，早上好。我叫埃德·沃尔扎克（音），来自纽约。我是一名学生，也仰慕您的投资理念。我有个问题想问。
In determining a company’s intrinsic value, you seem to write or indicate that you project out a company’s owner earnings for a number of years, and then discount that back by prevailing rates.
在确定一家公司的内在价值时，您似乎提过或暗示过要先预估公司若干年的“所有者收益”（owner earnings），然后用当时的市场利率进行折现。
My question is, how much of a premium, if any, to prevailing risk-free rates do you demand when you discount back the owner earnings of a company?
我的问题是：当您对公司的所有者收益进行折现时，是否会在当时的无风险利率基础上再加上一定的风险溢价？如果会，大概是多少？
Or stated differently, for example, today, with loan rates at about 7 percent, if you did the same exercise with Coca-Cola, at what rate of interest would you discount back their owner earnings?
换种说法举例说明，如果当前贷款利率约为7%，您给可口可乐做同样的收益折现时，会用多少的折现率来计算它的“所有者收益”呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We get asked that question a lot. And we’ve answered it to some extent in past annual reports about what discount rate to use.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这个问题我们经常被问到，在以往的年报里也有一定程度的说明。
We basically think in terms of the long-term government rate.
我们基本上是参考长期国债利率来思考这个问题的。
And there may be times, when in a very — because we don’t think we’re any good at predicting interest rates, but probably in times of very — what would seem like very low rates — we might use a little higher rate.
当然，偶尔也可能在某些时段——比如利率看似非常低的时候——我们会用略高一点的折现率。我们并不擅长预测利率，但偶尔会做一些相应调整。
But we don’t put the risk factor in, per se, because essentially, the purity of the idea is that you’re discounting future cash. And it doesn’t make any difference whether cash comes from a risky business or a safe business — so-called safe business.
但是我们并不把“风险因子”本身再额外加到折现率里，因为这个逻辑的核心是：我们在折现的是未来的现金流。至于现金流来自一家高风险公司，还是所谓的“安全”公司，这在折现的数学逻辑层面并没有区别。
So, the value of the cash delivered by a water company, which is going to be around for a hundred years, is not different than the value of the cash derived from some high-tech company, if any, that — (laughter) — you might be looking at.
因此，对于一家提供自来水的公司（可能会存在100年）的未来现金流，其价值和一家高科技公司所产生（如果能够产生的话）（笑声）的未来现金流，原则上并无不同。
It may be harder for you to make the estimate. And you may, therefore, want a bigger discount when you get all through with the calculation. But up to the point where you decide what you’re willing to pay — you may decide you can’t estimate it at all. I mean, that’s what happens with us with most companies.
当然，对高科技公司的未来现金流估算可能更困难，这意味着在最终做估值时，你也许会“要求”一个更大的安全边际（即间接体现为折现率更高、估值更低），或者你可能干脆觉得无法估算而放弃投资。对我们来说，大多数公司的情况也确实如此。
But we believe in using a government bond-type interest rate. We believe in trying to stick with businesses where we think we can see the future reasonably well — you never see it perfectly, obviously — but where we think we have a reasonable handle on it.
但是我们相信应该使用类似政府债券收益率的利率。我们也相信，应该尽量投资那些我们认为能够相对清晰预见未来的企业——当然不可能看得百分之百清楚——但至少要让我们有相当把握。
And we would differentiate to some extent. We don’t want to go below a certain threshold of understanding. So, we want to stick with businesses we think we understand quite well, and not try to have the whole panoply with all different kinds of risk rates, because, frankly, we think that’d just be playing games with numbers.
而且，我们会在一定程度上有所区分。我们不会涉足自己理解水平达不到某个门槛的企业。我们希望始终专注于我们自认为相当了解的业务，而不是给各种不同的风险业务都设定不同的风险溢价或利率。坦白说，我们觉得那种做法只是玩数字游戏。
I mean, we — I don’t think you can stick something — numbers on a highly speculative business, where the whole industry’s going to change in five years, and have it mean anything when you get through.
我的意思是——对于一个高度投机的行业、可能五年之内整个行业都会改头换面的企业，你如果硬要在折现时额外加上某个数字，最后得出的结果也没多少实际意义。
If you say I’m going to stick an extra 6 percent in on the interest rate to allow for the fact — I tend to think that’s kind of nonsense. I mean, it may look mathematical. But it’s mathematical gibberish in my view.
如果你说，“我要在折现率上额外加6%以应对这些不确定因素”——我觉得那有点荒谬。它也许在数字上看起来挺严谨，但在我看来，那只是数字游戏罢了。
You better just stick with businesses that you can understand, use the government bond rate. And when you can buy them — something you understand well — at a significant discount, then, you should start getting excited.
你还不如选择那些你理解透彻的企业，用政府债券利率进行折现。当你能以显著折价买到这类你熟悉的企业时，那才是值得兴奋的时刻。
Charlie? (Laughter)
查理？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The discounts were once greater than we now see.
查理·芒格：是啊。过去的折价比现在我们能看到的更大。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s all you’re going to get, folks. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：各位，这就是我们要说的一切了。（笑声）
40. See’s Candies not going fat-free anytime soon
See’s Candies 近期不打算推出无脂产品
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：第一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Warren, it’s Peter Newman, Nick and Racky’s son. You can’t see me because I’m on your hard left over here.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：嗨，Warren，我是 Peter Newman，Nick 和 Racky 的儿子。你看不到我，因为我在你最左侧这边。
And by the way, Racky says to send her love to you —
顺便说一下，Racky 让我捎去她对你的问候——
WARREN BUFFETT: Great.
WARREN BUFFETT：太好了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — and Susie.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：——以及对 Susie 的问候。
I’m going to take a cue from something that the guy who asked the questions about the World Book —
我想借用一下刚才那位提 World Book 的听众提问的角度——
I know you’re loathe to, normally, interfere in the running of your individual corporations, because they do so well on their own. And I am particularly fond of See’s Candy and their products. And you may or may not know that we have a chocoholic in our family, as you do in yours.
我知道你平时不太愿意干预各家子公司的具体经营，因为它们自己做得很好。我尤其喜欢 See’s Candy 及其产品。你或许知道，也或许不知道，我们家里有位巧克力爱好者，就像你家一样。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Makes good chocolate syrup, too. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：是啊。他/她做的巧克力糖浆也很棒。（笑）
AUDIENC MEMBER: Yeah, I won’t mention who.
AUDIENC MEMBER：对，我就不点名是谁了。
However, when I was in there this Christmas buying some gifts, I noted that, with the exception of the little candy canes, there’s nothing in that store that is fat-free.
不过，这个圣诞我去店里买礼物时注意到，除了小拐杖糖之外，店里没有任何无脂产品。
And we are facing a trend — (laughter) — in the world, especially in dessert items and ice cream and candy items, of fat-freeness.
而放眼当下的潮流——（笑声）——全球范围，尤其是甜点、冰淇淋和糖果领域，都在追求“无脂化”。
And I just thought that, perhaps, it would be a word — worth a word to management to consider expanding the hard candy line.
我只是想，也许可以向管理层提个建议，考虑扩展硬糖产品线。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we look at a lot of things. One of the problems, as you probably know, for example, in using aspartame is it doesn’t interact well with heat. And so that’s been sort of tough.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们确实在看很多方向。比如，你可能知道，用阿斯巴甜的一个问题是它不太耐热。所以这一直比较棘手。
Now, Charlie and I have kept getting our regular boxes of candy during this weight loss-program. And we’ve — (laughter) — devoured them.
另外，Charlie 和我在减重期间也一直拿到平时那几盒糖。我们——（笑声）——照吃不误。
And candy, you know, it may be, on average, a hundred and — depends on whether it’s a sugar product or not.
而且你知道，糖果平均可能——这取决于是不是含糖产品——
But, take the lollipop, it’d be about 110 calories per ounce. But there’s — that’s one and a half, or one and a quarter lollipops, or something like that.
但拿棒棒糖来说，每盎司大约 110 卡路里。不过——那大概相当于一根半，或者一又四分之一根棒棒糖之类的。
Most things are, you know, in that hundred per ounce to 150 per ounce range. So, candy is not a specific no-no.
大多数东西每盎司也就是一百到一百五十卡这个区间。所以，糖果并不是绝对“禁区”。
If we can find something that the customer likes, that makes them think they’re getting skinnier by eating it — (laughter) — you know, that will be a breakthrough.
如果我们能找到一种顾客喜欢并且让他们觉得“越吃越瘦”的东西——（笑声）——那就真是突破了。
And we look forward — and we test everything that comes along. I can assure you. (Laughter)
我们对此充满期待——也会把出现的一切都拿来测试。我可以保证。（笑声）
In fact, Charlie and I may be the main testers.
事实上，Charlie 和我可能就是主要的试吃员。
Chuck Huggins is here today — and if you’ve got any ideas on it — who runs See’s. Done a terrific job of running See’s ever since we took over in 1972. He’d appreciate ideas.
Chuck Huggins 今天也在——他负责管理 See’s，自从我们 1972 年接手以来他一直做得非常出色。如果你有任何想法，他会很乐意听取。
But we are looking for things that appeal to the consumer that taste good and that they’ll go for. I mean, just as is, you know, the Coca-Cola Company, in terms of carbonated soft drinks. So, it’s a constant subject.
我们确实在寻找那些消费者喜欢、味道好、愿意购买的东西。就像 The Coca-Cola Company 在碳酸软饮领域做的那样。这是个持续不断的话题。
And, you know, there were high hopes on aspartame originally. But it just hasn’t panned out in terms of candy. And I’ve read a few articles about the fat-free stuff.
当初大家对阿斯巴甜寄予厚望。但就糖果而言并没有如愿。我也读过几篇关于无脂替代物的文章。
Well, it should be the fat substitute, which didn’t get me too excited about trying it. But I’m not sure whether some of you read those articles or not. We’ll keep looking, Peter, I appreciate it.
嗯，应该说是脂肪替代品，让我对试用它并不那么兴奋。但我不确定大家是否读过那些文章。我们会继续探索的，Peter，谢谢你的建议。
41. GEICO’s price: “We gulped a few times and paid it.”
GEICO 的价格：“我们咽了几口口水，然后就付了钱。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
WARREN BUFFETT：第二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：早上好，Buffett 先生、Munger 先生。
As an aspiring shareholder, I’m very happy and proud to be here. Maybe I can encourage Mr. Munger to respond to my question this morning.
作为一名希望成为股东的人，我非常高兴也很自豪能来到这里。也许我可以“鼓励”一下 Munger 先生来回答我今天的问题。
In regards to your purchase of the other half of GEICO, would you comment on your reasoning behind paying the premium above market value and why you, instead, did not purchase shares in the open market?
关于你们收购 GEICO 剩余一半股权这件事，能否谈谈你们为何愿意支付高于市场价值的溢价，以及为什么不选择在公开市场上买入股票？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we couldn’t have purchased very many shares in the open market at the quoted price. And the price we paid, with the large number of shares we got, we thought was a very satisfactory price.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我们不可能在公开市场按挂牌价格买到很多股票。而且考虑到我们获得的大量股份，我们支付的价格在我们看来非常令人满意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We — what Charlie said is a hundred percent right. We also had a restriction that we agreed to many, many years ago — almost 20 years ago — as to the number of shares we would own without the consent — of the directors and, I believe, the Insurance Department.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我们——Charlie 说得百分之百正确。我们还有一项很多很多年前——差不多 20 年前——同意的限制，规定在未经董事会以及我认为还有保险监管部门同意的情况下，我们所能持有的股份数量是有限的。
So, we actually had some special restrictions on us in the case of GEICO. But if we hadn’t have had those restrictions, we’d have behaved in exactly the same manner.
所以，就 GEICO 而言，我们确实有一些特殊限制。但即使没有这些限制，我们也会采取完全相同的做法。
And we didn’t think we could buy it any cheaper than that price. And we gulped a few times and paid it. And I think we will be happy that we did, as it’s turning out.
我们不认为能以低于那个价格的水平买到它。于是我们咽了几口口水，咬咬牙就付了钱。而事实证明，我想我们会为此感到高兴。
GEICO is doing very well. It — I mean, I knew it would do well. But I feel very good about it.
GEICO 表现得非常好。我的意思是，我知道它会做得很好。但我对此仍然感觉非常不错。
42. Newspaper business is still good, but not as good
报业仍然是好生意，但不如从前那么好
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：第三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is David Lowe (PH) from Ventura, California.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 David Lowe（PH），来自加州 Ventura。
My first Berkshire meeting, and I want to mention that I’m very intrigued at the influence you have over the shareholders here. I note that the first beverage they ran out of in the lobby was Cherry Coke. (Laughter)
这是我第一次参加 Berkshire 的大会，我想说，我对你在这里对股东的影响力感到很有意思。我注意到，大厅里第一个卖光的饮料是 Cherry Coke。（笑声）
My question is about The Buffalo News. You say, in the letter for the ’95 report, that the newspaper industry has lost another notch in its economic attractiveness. Can you elaborate on that?
我的问题是关于 The Buffalo News。你在 1995 年的年报信中说，报业在经济吸引力方面又下降了一个档次。能详细谈谈吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The — what you are seeing in newspapers is a circulation trend that has been prevalent for a long time, in terms of newspapers per household.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。关于报纸，你们看到的是“每户拥有的报纸份数”这一指标长期以来的发行量趋势。
But that has been declining, and that — daily newspapers — and that I would say the trends of the last couple years are somewhat worse, in that respect.
但这个趋势一直在下降——尤其是日报——而且我认为过去两年的趋势在这方面还要稍微更糟一些。
I would say that the ability to price, both at the circulation and advertising level, is — has weakened a bit in recent years — not dramatically, but it’s weakened a bit.
我还要说的是，无论在发行端还是在广告端，定价能力这几年都有所减弱——不是剧烈下滑，但确实弱了一些。
At one time, newspapers really — daily newspapers in single-newspaper towns were probably as attractive, economically, as any business you could find. I mean, it — a large percentage of advertisers had very little choice, in terms of using them as an advertising medium.
曾几何时，报纸——在只有一份日报的城市里——在经济上可能和你能找到的任何生意一样有吸引力。我的意思是，大量广告主在选择广告媒介时几乎没有什么替代。
People had less options, in the way of learning what was going on around them other than the daily newspaper. So, the — they started from a position of extraordinary strength.
除了每日的报纸，人们获取周围信息的方式也没多少选择。所以——报纸起步时处在一种异常强势的地位。
They still have a very strong position. And I’ve tried to emphasize that in the report. I mean, they’re a bargain at the price they sell for. They give you all kinds of information with very low price. And they’re a magnificent way for most merchants to reach their customers.
它们依然拥有很强的地位。这一点我也在报告里努力强调过。也就是说，以它们的售价来看，报纸非常划算。它们以极低的价格提供各种信息；对大多数商家来说，报纸仍是触达顾客的极佳方式。
But they are not — they do not have the exclusive advantages, in many cases, that they had 15 or 20 years ago.
但在许多情况下，报纸已不再拥有 15 或 20 年前那种独占性的优势。
Third-class mail has become more of an option. People have more ways of obtaining information. As we talked earlier, information can be processed electronically and delivered at far lower cost than people dreamt of 20 years ago.
三类邮政广告邮件（third-class mail）成了更可行的选项。人们获取信息的渠道更多了。正如我们先前谈到的，信息可以被电子化处理，并以远低于 20 年前人们想象的成本进行传递。
So, all of those things eat away a little bit. It’s still a very fine business. But those — I don’t see anything that will reverse those trends. I don’t think that they will necessarily accelerate.
所以，这些因素都会慢慢侵蚀一些护城河。报业仍然是一门非常不错的生意。但我看不到有什么会逆转这些趋势。我也不认为这些趋势一定会加速。
But I think that, if the only thing you owned in life was a daily newspaper in a single-newspaper town 20 years ago, you would feel slightly less secure today than you did at that time. But you’d still be a lot better off than owning virtually any other business.
但我认为，如果你 20 年前在一个只有一份日报的城市里唯一拥有的就是这家日报，那么今天你会比当时感到略微不那么安心。不过，你的处境仍然会比几乎拥有任何其他生意都要好很多。
事实上推进的很快，如果人类掌握了某个技术一定会把这个技术用到极致，现在的AI也会如此。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。
43. “Outside information” in annual reports
年报中的“外部信息”
WARREN BUFFETT: How about zone 4?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 4 区怎么样？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Hutch Vernon. I’m from Baltimore, Maryland.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 Hutch Vernon，来自马里兰州巴尔的摩。
I know that you read lots and lots of annual reports. And I’m curious what you are reading for, if you would share that with us.
我知道你阅读了大量的年报。我很好奇你读年报时在寻找什么信息，能否和我们分享一下。
But I’m more curious — because I think I know what you’re reading for — if there are any disclosures — any further disclosures — that you would like to see companies make in their financial reporting, or that the SEC require in financial reporting or proxies or other communications with their shareholders? And that would be for both you and for Mr. Munger.
但我更好奇的是——因为我以为我大致知道你在寻找什么——你是否希望公司在财务报告中增加某些披露——更进一步的披露，或者希望 SEC 要求在财报、委托书（proxies）或其他与股东的沟通中进行披露？这个问题也想请教 Munger 先生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The main thing that they can’t mandate in annual reports: I really like to have — I like to know as much as I can about the person that’s running it and how they think about the business and what’s really going on in the business.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。年报里他们无法强制的最重要一件事是：我真的想尽可能多地了解经营这家公司的那个人、他如何看待业务，以及业务中真正发生了什么。
In other words, I would like to have a report that would be identical to what — if I owned half of a company but was away for a year, and I had a partner who owned the other half — when I came back, that he would tell me about what had taken place during the past year and what he foresaw coming up and all of that.
换句话说，我想要的报告就像这样：如果我拥有一家公司的一半股份，但离开一年，而我的合伙人拥有另一半股份——当我回来时，他会告诉我这一年发生了什么、对未来的预期，以及所有相关情况。
I — that is what I think the purpose of the report is. Now, the SEC mandates a lot of information, and —
我——这就是我认为报告的目的。现在，SEC 要求披露很多信息，而——
VOICE: — side on?
VOICE：——side on？
WARREN BUFFETT: — some of that is helpful. But there’s an intent behind the report. I mean, if it’s a sales document I’m, you know, I’m less interested. I’m — and —
WARREN BUFFETT：——其中一些是有帮助的。但报告背后应该有意图。我的意思是，如果它更像一份销售文件，那你知道，我兴趣就小得多。我——而且——
I don’t see any way to mandate what I’m talking about. But that’s the kind of report I’m looking for.
我看不出有什么办法可以强制我所说的这些内容。但这正是我在寻找的报告类型。
What I’m trying to do as I read reports, A, I like to understand just generally what’s going on in all kinds of businesses.
当我阅读报告时，我在做的是：第一，我喜欢大体了解各类业务在发生什么。
If we own stock in a company and in an industry, and there are eight other companies that are in the same industry, I want to own or be on the mailing list for the reports for the other eight, because I can’t understand how my company is doing unless I understand what the other eight are doing.
如果我们持有某家公司及其所在行业的股票，而该行业还有另外八家公司，我希望能持有或至少订阅那八家公司的报告，因为除非我了解这八家在做什么，否则我无法理解我们公司表现如何。
I want to have the perspective of, in terms of market share, what’s going on in the business or their margins or the trend of margins, all kinds of things that I can’t get unless I know —
我希望从市场份额、业务动态、利润率及其趋势等角度形成视角——而这些东西如果不了解同行，我就无法获得——
I can’t be an intelligent owner of a business unless I know what all the other businesses in that industry are doing. And so, I try to get that information out of a report.
如果我不知道该行业其他企业在做什么，我就不可能成为一个明智的企业所有者。因此，我尽量从报告中获取这些信息。
If I’m thinking about investing in a specific company, I try to size up their business and the people that are running it.
如果我在考虑投资某一特定公司，我会努力评估其业务以及掌舵的人。
And over the years, I have found reading a lot of reports to be quite useful in terms of making business decisions at Berkshire.
这些年来，我发现大量阅读报告对我们在 Berkshire 做出商业决策非常有用。
If we own all of a business, I want to own shares in all of the competitors just to keep track of what’s going on. And I want to be able to intelligently evaluate how our managers are doing that. And I can’t do that unless I know the industry backdrop against which they’re working.
如果我们全资拥有一家企业，我也希望持有所有竞争对手的一些股份，以便跟踪行业动态。我想要能明智地评估我们的管理者做得如何。而不理解他们所处的行业背景，这是做不到的。
It’s amazing, you know, what — how well you can do in investing, really, with what I would call outside information. I find inside information — I’m not sure how useful that is.
令人惊讶的是，你知道，仅凭我称之为“外部信息”的东西，你在投资中就能做得很好。至于内部信息——我不确定那有多大用处。
But outside information — there’s all kinds of information around, as to businesses. And you don’t have to understand all of them. You just have to understand the ones that you’re thinking about getting in. And you can do it, if you just — nobody will do it for you.
而外部信息——关于企业的信息到处都有。你不必把所有行业都搞懂，只需搞懂你正考虑进入的那些。而且你能做到，只要——没有人会替你做这件事。
You can’t read — in my view — you can’t read Wall Street reports and get anything out of them. You have to do it yourself and get your arms around it.
在我看来，你无法从华尔街报告中读出什么有用的东西。你必须亲自动手，把问题真正“抱在怀里”。
I don’t think we’ve ever gotten an idea, you know, in 40 years from a Wall Street report. But we’ve gotten a lot of ideas from annual reports.
我不认为在过去 40 年里我们曾经从一份华尔街报告中得到过一个点子。但我们从年报中获得了很多想法。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: What I find is that it takes a long time to read the annual report even if it’s a comparatively simple business, because if you really are trying to understand it, it’s not a bit easy.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我的感受是，即便业务相对简单，读完一份年报也要花很长时间；因为如果你真想理解它，这一点也不容易。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say that, on average, in a business we’re really interested in, even though we know what to skip, to some extent, and what to read, I mean, it’s going to be 45 minutes or an hour on a report.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我会说，对于我们真正感兴趣的企业，即使在一定程度上知道哪些可以略过、哪些必须细读，一份报告通常也要花 45 分钟到一小时。
And if there are six or eight companies in the industry, that’s going to be six or eight hours, perhaps, and then their quarterlies and a lot of other —
如果行业里有六到八家公司，那可能就需要六到八个小时，然后还有它们的季报以及很多其他材料——
I mean, it — the way you learn about businesses is by absorbing information about them, thinking, deciding what counts and what doesn’t count, relating one thing to another. And, you know, that’s the job.
我的意思是——了解企业的方式就是吸收关于它们的信息，思考，判别什么重要、什么不重要，把各个点联系起来。你知道，这就是这份工作的本质。
And you can’t get that by looking at a bunch of little numbers on a chart bobbing up and down about a — or reading, you know, market commentary and periodicals or anything of the sort. That just won’t do it. You’ve got to understand the businesses. That’s where it all begins and ends.
而这些不是靠看一堆上下波动的小数字、或者读市场评论、期刊之类的东西就能获得的。那样不行。你必须理解企业。这是一切的起点，也是终点。
44. “Berkshire is not a one-man show”
“Berkshire 不是一场独角戏”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 5 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Hank Strickland (PH). I’m from Fairfax, Virginia, which, if it were a city, would be the tenth largest in the United States. I’m here as a stockholder. And my daughter, who’s also my broker, is here with me.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 Hank Strickland（PH），来自弗吉尼亚州的 Fairfax，如果把它算作城市，它会是全美第十大的城市。我以股东身份来到这里。我的女儿也是我的经纪人，她也和我一起来了。
We were also out there Friday night when we watched you warming up for the beginning of the ballgame. And we noted that you didn’t drop the ball. You seemed to be able to get it to the guy that was warming you up.
我们也在周五晚上看了你在开球前的热身。我们注意到你没有掉球。看起来你能把球顺利传到给你做热身的那位球员手里。
We noticed your first pitch, which I had difficulty characterizing as either being a passed ball or a wild pitch.
我们也注意到你的第一投，我很难界定那到底算接捕失误（passed ball）还是暴投（wild pitch）。
WARREN BUFFETT: It was a premature sinker, actually. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：实际上那是个提前下沉的沉球（sinker）。（笑声）
Very hard to hit, I might add. (Laughter)
我还得补一句：那球非常难打。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And, then, you moved spritely into the stands, did a lot of picture taking, photo opportunities, signed autographs, vaulted over a rail or two. And we noted, with great enthusiasm, your fitness.
然后你轻快地走上看台，拍了很多照片、合影，签了名，还跨过了一两道栏杆。我们都非常兴奋地注意到你的好体能。
Now that all having been said, many people would characterize Berkshire as a one-man company, with all due respect to Charlie. And many of this audience here, I’m sure, are retired or semi-retired. It’s not unthinkable that, perhaps, you might want to retire, or for good — God’s sakes —
话虽如此，很多人还是会把 Berkshire 描述为一人公司，恕我直言，也无意对 Charlie 不敬。这里很多听众，我相信，已经退休或半退休。也许你会想退休，这并非不可想象；或者更糟——天哪——
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s unthinkable. I don’t want that one to go by. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT：那是不可想象的。我不想让这句话就这么过去。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Or for something — something worse could happen. And for those of us —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：或者发生别的——更糟的事。对于我们这些——
WARREN BUFFETT: That would be the worst, I think — (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：那恐怕是最糟的了，我想——（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well I —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：嗯，我——
WARREN BUFFETT: I think death would be second. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我觉得死亡只能排第二。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I could think of some things some of us might want to do to protect our sizeable investments, say, having owned Berkshire since Blue Shamp — Blue Chip Stamp days. But anyway, we could put in a stop order, might take out an insurance policy.
我能想到一些我们可能会做的事来保护自己相当可观的投资，比如有人从 Blue Shamp——Blue Chip Stamp 时代就持有 Berkshire。无论如何，我们可以下止损单，或者买一份保险。
We might ask Charlie to masquerade as Warren after you’ve moved on. Those don’t seem like very attractive options. So, I’m very serious now.
我们也许会请 Charlie 在你走后“伪装成” Warren。但这些看起来都不是很吸引人的选项。所以，我现在是非常认真地提问。
太直接了，老美内部有一大群弄得清的人，这群人不一定出现在社交软件但确实是存在的。
How would you respond to the question of a stockholder that’s really concerned about Berkshire being a one-man show?
对于真正担心 Berkshire 是一场独角戏的股东，你会如何回应？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Berkshire is not a one-man show. It’s a two-man show, in terms of capital allocation. There’s no question about that, at present.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。Berkshire 不是一场独角戏。从资本配置角度看，它是两个人的戏。这一点在目前是毫无疑问的。
But it’s run by many managers that are doing an outstanding job and that don’t need any guidance from Charlie or me as they go along.
但公司由许多经理人运营，他们表现卓越，并不需要我或 Charlie 在日常工作中给予指导。
But I might say that, you know, I will die with all of my Berkshire stock, essentially. And that will — stock will be held, either in the family or in a foundation, depending on the order of death, for a long time thereafter.
不过我要说的是，我基本上会带着全部 Berkshire 股票离世。而这些股票随后会——根据先后离世的顺序——由家庭或基金会长期持有。
So, there’s no one that’s more concerned about the subsequent management issue than I. I mean, this is not something that ends, at all, on my death. And it doesn’t end for the Buffett family or The Buffett Foundation. So, it’s a subject that Charlie and I have both thought about.
因此，没有人比我更关心后续的管理问题。我的意思是，这件事不会因为我去世而结束。对 Buffett 家族或 The Buffett Foundation 来说也不会结束。所以，这个话题我和 Charlie 都认真思考过。
The most likely situation — you got to get away from the idea that it’s a one-man show because, right now, we’ve got 33,000 people working for Berkshire out there, you know, as we speak.
最可能的情况是——你必须摆脱“独角戏”的想法，因为就在我们说话的此刻，Berkshire 有 33,000 名员工在工作。
And I’m sitting around, you know, watching movies about myself or something. I mean, you can see how vital I am to the place. (Laughter) So the — but the question —
而我呢，大概只是坐着看关于我自己的电影之类的。也就是说，你能看出我对这里“多么不可或缺”。（笑声）所以——但问题在于——
And the other thing we do, besides allocate capital, is we do identify these managers. And hopefully, we make it attractive for them to stay and work for Berkshire.
除了配置资本，我们还做的另一件事是识别这些经理人。并且希望能让他们愿意留下来为 Berkshire 工作。
But that — you know, that doesn’t require 150 IQ or anything to do that. It does require a certain sensitivity to why people want to get up in the morning and do what they do.
但这——你知道，并不需要 150 的智商才能做到。它需要的是对“人们为什么每天早上起床去做他们所做的事”有某种敏感度。
And when I’m not around, the logical, at some point — it depends on exactly when it happens, again. But Charlie’s a little older than I am. And it’s likely that it will be broken into a two-person function again, but not exactly the way Charlie and I function.
当我不在时，按照逻辑，在某个时点——这还要取决于事情发生的具体时间。由于 Charlie 比我年长一些，很可能会再次分成两个人的职能，但不完全是我和 Charlie 现在这种分工方式。
And that is that there will be someone in charge of investments and capital allocation. I mentioned Lou Simpson’s position, because he is younger than I am, in the annual report, and then someone in charge of operations. And we have that person in the organization now.
也就是说，会有人负责投资与资本配置——我在年报里提到过 Lou Simpson 的角色，因为他比我年轻——同时还会有人负责运营。而我们现在组织内已经有这样的人选。
Now, I don’t know what the situation will be when I die, because it could be in 20 minutes or it could be in 20 years. And when that — so, I can’t specifically name the individuals.
不过我不知道自己去世时的具体情况，因为那可能是 20 分钟后，也可能是 20 年后。既然如此——我就无法具体点名这些人。
We have the individuals now for both those functions. We’ll have the individuals for the same functions 20 years from now. I don’t know whether they’ll be the same people.
现在我们在这两个职能上都有人；20 年后我们在同样的职能上也会有人。我不知道是否还是同一批人。
But it’s quite a logical way to run the business. GEICO was run that way and still is run that way and has been for some years.
但这是一种相当合理的经营方式。GEICO 就是这样运作的，现在仍是如此，而且已经这样很多年了。
It’s always struck me as terribly illogical, the way property-casualty insurance companies are run, because they’ve been dominated by the underwriting side of the business. And here they have this important investment side, but it’s always been — virtually every company’s been subservient to the underwriting.
我一直觉得财产意外险公司的管理方式非常不合逻辑，因为它们长期由承保端主导。而明明还有极其重要的投资端，但几乎每家公司都让投资端从属于承保端。
And GEICO, very logically, set up a co-CEO arrangement some years back where — originally Bill Snyder before that — but Tony Nicely ran the underwriting end of the business and Lou Simpson ran the investment side.
而 GEICO 很合理地在若干年前设立了联席 CEO 架构——在那之前是 Bill Snyder——Tony Nicely 负责承保端业务，Lou Simpson 负责投资端。
And those are two very different functions. Same person, logically, doesn’t fit both functions in most cases. I mean, it’s a rarity when the same person happens to hit for both functions.
这两项是截然不同的职能。从逻辑上说，同一个人多数情况下并不适合同时胜任二者。同一人能在两端都打出好成绩是非常罕见的。
So GEICO worked very well that way. Still works that way. Lou runs investments. Tony runs underwriting.
因此 GEICO 以这种方式运作得非常好。现在还是这样。Lou 负责投资，Tony 负责承保。
And Berkshire — slightly different — it’s a variant on it. But, essentially, at Berkshire headquarters, you need someone overseeing and not meddling in them too much, but making sure you’ve got the right manager and you’re treating him fairly.
而 Berkshire——略有不同——是这种模式的一个变体。基本上，在 Berkshire 总部，你需要有人进行监督，但不过度干预；要确保你找对了经理人，并公平对待他。
You need someone on the operating side. You need someone on the investment/capital allocation side. We’ve got those people now. And we’ll have them, you know, whenever it happens, too.
你需要一个负责运营的人；你也需要一个负责投资/资本配置的人。我们现在就有这些人。不管事情何时发生，我们届时也会有这些人。
That’s the — that is the structure. And we’ve got some very good businesses.
这——这就是结构。而且我们拥有一些非常优秀的业务。
And, you know, nobody’s buying See’s Candy because they think I’m sitting in some office in Omaha. And no one’s buying a GEICO insurance policy because, you know, my name is there as chairman or CEO. The businesses are marvelous businesses. They’ll continue very well.
而且你知道，没有人是因为以为我坐在奥马哈某个办公室里才去买 See’s Candy。也没有人是因为我的名字挂着董事长或 CEO 才去买 GEICO 的保单。这些业务本身就很出色，它们会继续发展得很好。
And there will be a capital allocation problem then just like there is now. And there will be the problem of keeping good managers in place and treating them fairly. And that’s a solvable problem.
届时仍会像现在一样面临资本配置问题，也会面临如何留住优秀经理人并公平对待他们的问题。而这些都是可解的问题。
So, that’s the future as seen from Kiewit Plaza.
所以，这就是从 Kiewit Plaza 望去所看到的未来。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. If you just run your mind through all the assets, I think you will quickly decide that there are large momentums in place that would do very well without us.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。如果你把所有资产在脑中过一遍，我想你会很快得出结论：有强大的惯性在起作用，即使没有我们，它们也会运行得很好。
I mean, is Coca-Cola going to suddenly stop selling because some manager’s dead at Berkshire Hathaway?
我的意思是，难道因为 Berkshire Hathaway 的某位管理者去世，Coca-Cola 就会突然不卖了吗？
You know, are the people going to stop using Gillette razor blades? Is GEICO suddenly going to stop being intelligently run? Are — is the Nebraska Furniture Mart going to try any less hard?
人们会停止使用 Gillette 的剃须刀片吗？GEICO 会突然变得不再被聪明地管理吗？Nebraska Furniture Mart 会因此而不再努力吗？
So, the existing assets, you can argue, have been lovingly put together, so as not to require continuing intelligence at headquarters. (Laughter)
所以，你可以说，现有的资产是被精心拼装起来的，以便不需要总部持续不断地施展“聪明才智”。（笑声）
And what — there would be a disadvantage in that I think it would be unreasonable to expect that a successor would be as good at making new investments as Warren has been in the past. Well, that’s just too damn bad. (Laughter and applause)
但有一点不利之处在于，我认为指望接班人在进行新的投资时像过去的 Warren 一样出色是不现实的。嗯，那就只能说太遗憾了。（笑声与掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The sympathetic ear over here. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：这边这位可是很会安慰人啊。（笑声）
45. Buffett doesn’t answer individual letters
Buffett 不会逐一回复个人来信
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, where are we? Zone 6 now?
WARREN BUFFETT：让我看看，我们到哪儿了？现在是第 6 区吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m indebted to Walter Schloss for introducing me to you some 40 years ago. And finally in the early ’80s, I became a stockholder.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，感谢 Walter Schloss 在大约 40 年前把我介绍给你。最后在 80 年代初，我成为了股东。
My question is, now that you’ve expanded headquarters 9 percent from 11 people to 12 people — (laughter) — do you now more frequently answer letters from stockholders?
我的问题是，既然你们把总部从 11 人扩大 9% 到 12 人——（笑声）——那么你现在会更频繁地回复股东来信吗？
As a specific, had you looked at my letter from January 1986? (Laughter)
具体说，你有没有看过我 1986 年 1 月的那封信？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We haven’t gotten to January yet. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我们还没看到 1 月份那一批呢。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Relating to Cap Cities/ABC and talk radio, the problem that occurred last month at cape — Cap Cities might have been prevented.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：关于 Cap Cities/ABC 和谈话类广播，上个月在 cape——Cap Cities 发生的问题本可以避免。
WARREN BUFFETT: You should get a form letter from us. But the — we do not — A, we do not get into the activities of our investee companies.
WARREN BUFFETT：你应该会收到我们的模板回信。但是——我们不会——第一，我们不会介入被投资公司的具体活动。
I mean, it — if people are unhappy about Coca-Cola or Gillette, and they shouldn’t be — (laughs) — but if they happen to be, they should talk to the companies themselves. I don’t interject myself into the management or operations of the investee companies.
我的意思是——如果人们对 Coca-Cola 或 Gillette 有不满，当然他们不该不满——（笑）——但如果真的不满，他们应该直接与这些公司沟通。我不会把自己插入被投资公司的管理或运营中。
In terms of questions about Berkshire — I put in the annual report a few years back — just running Berkshire takes up a fair amount of time, in terms of keeping track of a lot of businesses.
至于关于 Berkshire 的问题——几年前我在年报里写过——仅仅是运营 Berkshire、跟踪众多业务就要花费相当多的时间。
And it doesn’t need to take up as much time as it does with me. But I enjoy it. But the — I feel that the annual report, the annual meeting, are the time to take up everything on shareholder’s minds. And so, I don’t answer one-on-one questions.
而且它不必像我这样花这么多时间。只是我乐在其中。不过——我认为年报和股东年会才是处理股东所关心一切问题的时间。因此，我不做一对一的答复。
I get all kinds of letters. They want career guidance. They want advice on their business. I mean, there’s a million letters that come in.
我会收到各种各样的信件：有人想要职业指导，有人想要业务建议。我的意思是，有成千上万的信寄来。
And it would really be — it would take a significant amount of time, that otherwise would be spent on Berkshire, to reply to that sort of thing. I may note them, in terms of what I address in subsequent annual reports.
而如果要回复此类来信——这确实会占用大量本该用于 Berkshire 的时间。当然我可能会把这些问题记下来，用于之后在年报中回应。
But the annual meeting and the annual report, I feel, are the best ways to communicate with shareholders. And I really don’t do it the rest of the year, although you will get some form reply or you should get some form reply on it.
不过我认为，与股东沟通的最佳方式是股东年会和年报。除此之外的时间我基本不会这么做，尽管你会收到或应该会收到我们的模板回复。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks. It’s noon now. And I’d like to give everybody a chance to visit our other stores and everything. But we will be back here at 12:15.
WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。现在是中午了。我想让大家有机会去看看我们的其他门店之类的。但我们会在 12:15 回到这里。
Afternoon session
46. Investing with “the two wealthiest guys”
与“全球最富的两个人”一起投资
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, if we’ve got a monitor over in zone 1, we’re ready to start.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，如果第 1 区有显示屏，我们就可以开始了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Thank you very much. My name is Maria Nicholas Kelly (PH). I’m from Tacoma, Washington.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的，非常感谢。我叫 Maria Nicholas Kelly（PH），来自华盛顿州的 Tacoma。
And my husband and I have rather different investment approaches. And in 1988, he bought me one share of Berkshire, so that I could learn something about investing. We both started about that same time.
我和我丈夫的投资方法相当不同。1988 年，他给我买了一股 Berkshire，让我可以学习一些投资的东西。我们两人几乎是同时开始的。
And he has chosen to invest in, let’s say, about 40 different stocks and buying and selling, and doing rather well for us, frankly.
而他选择投资，大概说有 40 只不同的股票，买进卖出，坦白讲，为我们做得相当不错。
My approach is more simple. And basically, I finally figured out last year that I should invest in the companies of the two wealthiest men in the world.
我的方法更简单。基本上，我去年终于想明白了，我应该投资于全球最富有的两个人所掌舵的公司。
So — (laughter) — I decided we should buy, monthly, more Berkshire and Microsoft. So, then this year — and so, we’ve been able to do that.
所以——（笑声）——我决定我们每个月都要多买一些 Berkshire 和 Microsoft。于是到今年——我们也确实做到了。
This year, we read in your report that Berkshire is selling “at a price at which Charlie and I would not consider buying it,” so my husband has challenged my investment strategy. (Laughter)
今年，我们在你的报告里读到，Berkshire 的交易价格“已经到达 Charlie 和我都不会考虑买入的水平”，所以我丈夫对我的投资策略提出了质疑。（笑声）
I know that you are an honest man. And while you may not — (laughter) — you may not recommend to “my partner, Charlie,” to buy more Berkshire at this time, do you recommend that I continue — (Buffett laughs) — my rather automatic investment buying of Berkshire?
我知道你是个诚实的人。尽管你可能不会——（笑声）——不会建议“我的合伙人 Charlie”此时买入更多的 Berkshire，但你是否建议我继续——（Buffett 大笑）——我这种相对自动化地定投 Berkshire 的做法？
And I wanted — I think I know the answer. But I wanted my husband to hear it from the horse’s mouth. (Laughter)
而且我想——我觉得我知道答案。但我想让我的丈夫亲耳听到“权威本人”的说法。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think you’re using me here. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我觉得你这是在“利用”我啊。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：但是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — we don’t recommend selling it, but we don’t recommend buying it, either. We are neutral on that subject.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我——我们不建议卖出，但我们也不建议买入。对此我们保持中立。
And I hope you continue to be in with the two wealthiest guys. I like the other fellow, too. (Laughter)
而且我希望你能继续和那两位最富的人“站在一起”。我也挺喜欢那位“另一位”的。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。
47. American Express has “slipped” in credit cards
American Express 在信用卡业务上“退步”了
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 2 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I am Harriet Morton from the Emerald City [Seattle], the same area, the land of Microsoft. And I have a couple small questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我是 Harriet Morton，来自“翡翠之城”【西雅图】，同一片区域，也就是 Microsoft 的地盘。我有几个小问题。
The first one is, recognizing your lack of interest in technology or sense of familiarity with it, I’m wondering if you’d give a few comments on Bill Gates as a manager.
第一个问题是，考虑到你对科技不那么感兴趣、也不太熟悉，我想请你谈谈对 Bill Gates 作为一名管理者的看法。
But the second one, dealing with a business that you’re familiar with, has to do with American Express.
第二个问题与你熟悉的一门业务有关，关于 American Express。
Would you comment on American Express’ strategy to deal with their declining market share in the credit card industry and the rising importance of debit cards? Thank you.
你能否谈谈 American Express 针对其在信用卡行业市场份额下滑、以及借记卡重要性上升所采取的战略？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure I got that entirely, Charlie. Did you? I mean, I got the part about American —
WARREN BUFFETT：我不太确定我完全听清了，Charlie，你呢？我是说，我听到了关于 American——
CHARLIE MUNGER: She wanted you to comment on Gates as a manager and American Express as — with the problems in declining in market share.
CHARLIE MUNGER：她想让你谈谈 Gates 作为管理者的情况，以及 American Express 在市场份额下降方面的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first part is very easy. You know, Bill Gates is, you know, one of the great managers of all time and is an exceptional business talent who loves his business.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，第一部分很容易。你知道，Bill Gates 是史上最出色的管理者之一，是一位热爱自己事业的非凡商业人才。
And when you get that combination and a high energy level and, now, an heir to leave it to, I don’t think you do much better than that.
当你把这种组合再加上充沛的精力，以及如今还有继承人可以托付时，我觉得很难做得比这更好了。
American Express has, you know — has slipped over from where they were 20 years ago, obviously, in the credit card business. And I think they may have taken their customer a little bit for granted for a while.
American Express 在信用卡业务上——你知道的——相较 20 年前显然退步了。我认为他们有一段时间可能有点把自己的客户视作理所当然。
I think [CEO] Harvey Golub is very focused on correcting that and has made some progress. But the credit card business is a very different competitive struggle now than it was 20 or 25 years ago.
我认为【CEO】Harvey Golub 正非常专注于纠正这一点，并且已有所进展。但如今的信用卡业务竞争态势，与 20 或 25 年前已大不相同。
Interestingly enough, American Express, itself, backed into the business. Because they were worried about what was going to happen to their traveler’s check business, originally.
颇有意思的是，American Express 本身是“倒着”进入这项业务的。起初他们担心自己的旅行支票业务会发生什么变化。
And they saw Diners Club come along. A fellow named Ralph Schneider and — started it. And they saw the inroads that were being made. So, the credit card was a reactive move. And for a while, they really dominated the field. And of course, they still dominate the travel and entertainment part of it.
他们看到 Diners Club 出现了。一个叫 Ralph Schneider 的人——创办了它。他们看到了对自身的渗透。因此，进入信用卡是一个反应性的举措。有一段时间，他们确实主导了这个领域。当然，他们在差旅和娱乐（T&E）部分仍占据主导地位。
But credit cards are going to be a very competitive business over time. And you need to establish — American Express needs to establish — special value for its card in some way, or it gets more commodity-like.
但从长期看，信用卡会是一桩竞争非常激烈的生意。你需要建立——American Express 需要以某种方式为其卡片建立——独特的价值，否则就会愈发商品化。
It’s not an easy business. But their franchise — they’ve got a strong franchise. It is not what it was 20 years ago, relative to the competition.
这不是一门容易的生意。但他们的特许经营力——他们拥有很强的护城河。只是相对于竞争而言，它已不如 20 年前那样强了。
48. “A lot of mediocrity” among CEOs
许多 CEO 身上存在“相当多的平庸”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 3 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is John Weaver. I’m a shareholder from Bellingham, Washington.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：下午好。我叫 John Weaver，是来自华盛顿州 Bellingham 的股东。
You have discussed what a wonderful business is. One of the criterias in your acquisition, page 23 of your annual report, is management.
你谈过什么样的生意是“伟大的生意”。在你们并购标准中（你们年报第 23 页）有一条是关于“管理层”的。
Could you discuss how you decide what good management is and how you decide whether you have a good manager?
你能否谈谈你如何判断什么是“好的管理层”，以及如何判断你是否拥有一位“好经理人”？
WARREN BUFFETT: The really great business is one that doesn’t require good management. I mean, that is a terrific business. And the poor business is one that can only succeed, or even survive, with great management. And —
WARREN BUFFETT：真正伟大的生意是不需要“好管理”也能运转的生意。我的意思是，那才是了不起的生意。相反，糟糕的生意只有在“卓越管理”下才能成功，甚至才能存活。然后——
But we look for people that know their businesses, love their businesses, love their shareholders, want to treat them as partners. And we still look to the underlying business, though. We —
但我们寻找的人，必须了解自己的业务、热爱自己的业务、热爱自己的股东，并愿意把股东当作合伙人来对待。与此同时，我们仍然要看业务本身的质地。我们——
If we have somebody that we think is extraordinary, but they’re locked into one of those terrible businesses, because we’ve been in some terrible businesses, and you know, the best thing you can do, probably, is get out of it and get into something else.
如果我们遇到一个我们认为很出色的人，但他被困在一门糟糕的生意里——我们也曾待过一些糟糕的行业——那么你知道，最好的做法大概是退出那门生意，转到别的更好的生意中去。
But there’s an enormous difference, frankly — there’s an enormous difference in the talent of American business managers.
不过，坦率说，美国企业管理者的才能差异巨大——差异非常大。
The CEOs of the Fortune 500 are not selected like 500 members of the American Olympic track and field team. And it is not the same process. And you do not have the uniformity of top quality that you get with the American Olympic team in any sport. You do not get that in top management in American business.
《财富》500 强公司的 CEO 并不是像从美国奥运田径队中挑选 500 名队员那样被选出的。过程完全不同。你在奥运代表队任何项目中看到的那种顶级水准的一致性，并不会在美国企业的高层管理中出现。顶层管理者并不存在那样的均质顶尖质量。
You get some very able people, some terrific people, like a Bill Gates, that we just mentioned. But you get a lot of mediocrity, too.
你会遇到一些非常能干、极其出色的人——比如我们刚提到的 Bill Gates——但你同样会遇到大量的平庸。
这些领域往往吸引这些能干的人，就像刘强东说的不难就不做，还有左晖：难而正确的事，有点麻烦。
And the test — I think, in some cases, that it’s fairly identifiable, who has done an extraordinary job. And we like people that have batted .350 or .360, in terms of predicting that they’re going to bat over .300 in the future.
而衡量标准——我认为在某些情况下，谁做得格外出色是相当容易识别的。我们喜欢那些“打击率 .350 或 .360”的人，因为这能让我们预期他们未来“能继续保持 .300 以上”的水平。
And some guy says, you know, “I batted .127 last year. But I’ve got a new bat or a new batting coach,” you know, some management consultant has come in and told them how to do it, supposedly.
而如果有人说，“我去年打击率只有 .127，但我换了新球棒/新击球教练”，你懂的——某位管理顾问据称教会了他们该怎么做。
We’re very suspicious of that. So we don’t like banjo hitters who suddenly proclaim that they can become power hitters.
我们对此非常怀疑。所以我们不喜欢那些“banjo hitters”（轻打者/软弱打者）突然宣称自己能变成“power hitters”（长打型强打者）。
And then we try to figure out what their attitude is toward shareholders. And that isn’t uniform, either, throughout corporate America. It’s far from uniform.
接着我们会去判断他们对股东的态度。而在整个美国企业界，这一点也并不一致，差得远着呢。
We still want them to be in a good business, though. I would emphasize that.
我仍要强调，我们还是希望他们所处的是一门好生意。
We feel that — I mean, I gave the illustration of Tom Murphy in the annual report.
我们的看法是——我是说，我在年报里举了 Tom Murphy 的例子。
I mean, no one had either the ability — no one could top his ability or integrity, in terms of the way he ran Cap Cities for decades. I mean, and you could see it in 50 different ways.
也就是说，在他数十年经营 Cap Cities 的方式上，无论是能力还是操守，都无人能出其右。你可以从五十种不同的迹象上看出来。
I mean, he was thinking about the shareholders. And he not only thought about them, he knew what to do to forward their interests, and —
他时刻想着股东。他不仅想着股东，还知道如何推动他们的利益向前发展，而且——
In terms of building the business, he only built it when it made sense, not when it did something for his ego or to make it larger alone. He did it when it was in his shareholders’ interests.
在扩张业务上，他只在“有意义”的时候才去做，而不是为了满足自我或仅仅为了做大而做。他是在符合股东利益时才去做。
And they’re not all Tom Murphys. But when you find them, and they’re in a decent business, you want to bet very heavily and not make the same mistake I made by selling out once or twice, too. (Laughter)
当然，并不是人人都是 Tom Murphy。但当你找到这种人，而且他们所处还是一门像样的生意时，你就应该大注下注，而不要重蹈我曾经一两次“卖飞”的错误。（笑声）
49. “Diversification is a protection against ignorance”
“分散化是对无知的保护”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone — was that zone 3 or —? Yeah, zone 4.
WARREN BUFFETT：分区——刚才是第 3 区还是——？对，第 4 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, my name is Mark Hake (PH). I’m from Scottsdale, Arizona.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：好的，我叫 Mark Hake（PH），来自亚利桑那州的 Scottsdale。
And I am very interested in your policies on diversification and also how you concentrate your investments.
我对你们关于分散化的政策，以及你们如何集中配置投资，非常感兴趣。
And I’ve studied your annual reports going back a good number of years, and there’s been years where you had a lot of stocks in your marketable, equitable securities portfolio. And there was one year where you only had three, in 1987.
我回溯研究了你们多年的年报，有些年份你们在可流通权益证券组合中持有很多股票。而在 1987 年那一年，你们只持有三只。
So, I have two questions. Given the number of stocks that you have in the portfolio now, what does that imply about your view of the market in terms of, is it fairly valued, that kind of idea?
所以我有两个问题。考虑到你们目前组合中的持股数量，这对你们的市场观点意味着什么？比如，市场是否处于合理估值之类的看法？
And second of all, whenever you — it seems that, whenever you take a new investment, you never take less than about 5 percent and never more than about 10 percent of the total portfolio with that new position. And I wanted to see if I’m correct about that.
第二，每当你们——看起来每当你们建立一个新仓位时，这个新头寸占整个组合的比重从不低于约 5%，也不高于约 10%。我想确认我是否理解正确。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, on the second point, that really isn’t correct.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。关于第二点，其实并不准确。
We have positions which you don’t even see, because we only listed the ones above 600 million in the last report. And obviously, those are all smaller positions.
我们有一些头寸你们在报告里看不到，因为我们在上一份报告中只列示了规模超过 6 亿的持仓。显然，被省略的都是更小的头寸。
Sometimes, that’s because they’re smaller companies, and we couldn’t get that much money in. Sometimes, it’s because the prices moved up after we’d bought them. Sometimes, it’s because we may be selling the position down, even. So there’s nothing magic.
有时是因为标的公司体量较小，我们无法投入太多资金；有时是因为买入后价格上涨；有时甚至是因为我们在减仓。所以并没有什么“固定魔法数”。
We like to put a lot of money in things that we feel strongly about. And that gets back to the diversification question.
我们喜欢在自己非常有把握的标的上投入大量资金。这就回到了分散化的问题。
You know, we think diversification is — as practiced generally — makes very little sense for anyone that knows what they’re doing.
你要知道，我们认为对于真正懂自己在做什么的人而言，通常所实践的分散化意义不大。
Diversification is a protection against ignorance.
分散化是对无知的保护。
I mean, if you want to make sure — (laughter) — that nothing bad happens to you relative to the market, you own everything. There’s nothing wrong with that. I mean, that is a perfectly sound approach for somebody who does not feel they know how to analyze businesses.
我的意思是，如果你想确保——（笑声）——相对市场别出什么大差错，那就把所有东西都买一些。这没什么不对。对于不觉得自己会分析企业的人而言，这是一种完全合理的方法。
If you know how to analyze businesses and value businesses, it’s crazy to own 50 stocks or 40 stocks or 30 stocks, probably, because there aren’t that many wonderful businesses that are understandable to a single human being, in all likelihood.
如果你会分析企业、评估企业价值，那么持有 50 只、40 只、甚至 30 只股票，大概率是疯狂的做法，因为很可能并没有那么多“既优秀又能被单个人真正看懂”的企业。
And to have some super-wonderful business and then put money in number 30 or 35 on your list of attractiveness and forego putting more money into number one, just strikes Charlie and me as madness.
而当你面前已经有一家“超优秀”的企业，却把钱投向你吸引力清单上第 30 或第 35 名，而不是加码第 1 名，在我和 Charlie 看来这简直是疯狂。
And it’s conventional practice, and it may — you know, if you all you have to achieve is average, it may preserve your job. But it’s a confession, in our view, that you don’t really understand the businesses that you own.
而这在业内却是“常规操作”。如果你的目标只是“跑个平均”，它或许能保住你的饭碗。但在我们看来，这等于承认你并不真正理解你所持有的企业。
You know, I base — on a personal portfolio basis — you know, I own one stock. But it’s a business I know. And it leaves me very comfortable. (Laughter)
你看，就我个人投资组合而言——我只持有一只股票。但那是一家我非常了解的企业。这让我非常踏实。（笑声）
So you know, do I need to own 28 stocks, you know, to have proper diversification, you know? It’d be nonsense.
所以你说，我需要持有 28 只股票来实现所谓“恰当分散”吗？那是无稽之谈。
And within Berkshire, I could pick out three of our businesses. And I would be very happy if they were the only businesses we owned, and I had all my money in Berkshire.
在 Berkshire 体系内，我可以挑出我们旗下三家业务。如果它们是我们唯一拥有的业务，而我所有的钱都投在 Berkshire 上，我也会非常满意。
Now, I love it — the fact that we can find more than that, and that we keep adding to it. But three wonderful businesses is more than you need in this life to do very well.
当然，我更喜欢的是我们能找到不止三家，并且持续新增。但三家优秀企业，已经足以让你此生过得非常不错。
And the average person isn’t going to run into that. I mean, if you look at how the fortunes were built in this country, they weren’t built out of a portfolio of 50 companies. They were built by someone who identified with a wonderful business. Coca-Cola’s a great example. A lot of fortunes have been built on that.
而普通人未必会遇到这种机会。看看这个国家的财富是如何建立的——不是靠持有 50 家公司的大杂烩组合，而是靠某个人发现并认同一家了不起的企业。Coca-Cola 就是个很好的例子，很多财富都是依托它建立起来的。
And there aren’t 50 Coca-Colas. You know, there aren’t 20. If there were, it’d be fine. We could all go out and diversify like crazy among that group and get results that would be equal to owning the really wonderful one.
但“像 Coca-Cola 这样的企业”并没有 50 家。你知道的，也不是 20 家。如果有，那也很好，我们都可以在这组里疯狂分散，获得与持有那家“最出色的企业”相当的结果。
But you’re not going to find it. And the truth is, you don’t need it. I mean, if you had — a really wonderful business is very well protected against the vicissitudes of the economy over time and the competition.
但你不会找到那么多。事实是，你也不需要那么多。真正优秀的企业，长期来看能很好地抵御经济波动与竞争。
I mean, you know, we’re talking about businesses that are resistant to effective competition. And three of those will be better than 100 average businesses.
我们说的是那些能抵御“有效竞争”的企业。而其中的三家要胜过一百家普通企业。
And they’ll be safer, incidentally. I mean, there is less risk in owning three easy-to-identify, wonderful businesses than there is in owning 50 well-known, big businesses. And it’s amazing what has been taught, over the years, in finance classes about that.
顺带说一句，这样做更安全。持有三家“容易识别的优秀企业”的风险，要小于持有 50 家“知名大型企业”。这些年来金融课堂在这方面的教导，真是让人惊讶。
But I can assure you that I would rather pick — if I had to bet the next 30 years on the fortunes of my family that would be dependent upon the income from a given group of businesses, I would rather pick three businesses from those we own than own a diversified group of 50.
但我可以保证，如果我必须把未来 30 年家族的财富押在一组企业所产生的收益上，我宁愿从我们拥有的企业中挑出三家，也不愿意去持有一个分散化的 50 家组合。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what he’s saying is that much of what is taught in modern corporate finance courses is twaddle. (Laughter and applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER：对，他的意思是，现代公司金融课程里教的很多东西都是废话。（笑声与掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: You want to elaborate on that, Charlie? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：你要不要详细解释一下，Charlie？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: You cannot believe this stuff. I mean, it’s modern portfolio theory and — yeah, it’s —
CHARLIE MUNGER：这些东西简直难以置信。比如现代投资组合理论之类的——对，就是它——
WARREN BUFFETT: It has no utility. But you know, it will tell you how to do average. But, you know, I think anybody can figure out how to do average in fifth grade. I mean, it’s just not that difficult, and —
WARREN BUFFETT：它毫无用处。它能教你如何拿到“平均数”。可你知道，我觉得五年级的孩子就能学会如何做到“平均”。这并不难，而且——
It’s elaborate. And you know, there’s lots of little Greek letters and all kinds of things to make you feel that you’re in the big leagues. But it — (laughter) — there is no value added. (Laughs)
它看起来很繁复，有一堆希腊字母和各种符号，让你觉得自己仿佛身处“顶级联赛”。但——（笑声）——没有任何“增值”。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I have great difficulty with it because I am something of a student of dementia — (laughter) — and I have —
CHARLIE MUNGER：我对它很难苟同，因为我多少算是“痴呆症研究的学生”——（笑声）——而我——
WARREN BUFFETT: And we hang around a lot together. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：而我们俩经常混在一起。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I get ordinarily — classified dementia, you know, on some theory, structure of models. But the modern portfolio theory, it involves a type of dementia I just can’t even classify. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：把某些理论、模型结构，归为一般性的“痴呆症”，我还能做到。但现代投资组合理论涉及的那种“痴呆”，让我都无法归类。（笑声）
Something very strange is going on. (Buffett laughs)
有些非常奇怪的事情在发生。（Buffett 大笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: If you find three wonderful businesses in your life, you’ll get very rich. And if you understand them — bad things aren’t going to happen to those three. I mean, that’s the characteristic of it.
WARREN BUFFETT：如果你一生能找到三家优秀企业，你就会非常富有。而且如果你真正理解它们——那些坏事基本不会发生在这三家身上。这正是它们的特征。
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, maybe that’s the reason there’s so much dementia. If you believed what Warren said, you could teach the whole course in about a week. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一句，也许这就是“痴呆症如此之多”的原因。如果你相信 Warren 所说的，一个星期就能把整门课教完。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and the high priests wouldn’t have any edge over the laypeople. And that never sells well. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：对，这样“高僧”们就不会比“信众”更有优势了。而这种东西从来卖不动。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没错。
50. Downsizing is sometimes needed to correct excessive hiring in the past
精简裁员有时是为纠正过去的过度招聘所必需
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone — what, 5, are we over there?
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，分区——第 5 区，对吗，我们那边准备好了吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, board of directors.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的。下午好，Warren Buffett 先生、Charlie Munger 先生、以及各位董事。
Wanted to ask, in looking ahead, do you see the trends of extensive outsizing, the offshoring, the downsizing, the expendable workforce, the rightsizing, the diminished commitment to company loyalty, and the greater emphasis on the short term, quick buck, bottom line versus your commitment to the long-term investment affecting your pool of investment possibilities and your decision processes?
我想请问，展望未来，您是否认为以下趋势——大规模外包、离岸外包、裁员、可替代劳动力、规模优化（rightsizing）、对公司忠诚度的承诺减弱、以及更强调短期、快速获利和底线——与您对长期投资的承诺之间，会影响到您可投资标的的范围以及您的决策过程？
And do you possibly think of creating new companies on your own?
另外，您是否会考虑亲自创立新的公司？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that the trends you talk about, and the attention devoted to them, could have some effect, just in terms of how the public and Congress may feel toward business.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为你提到的这些趋势以及公众对其关注度，确实可能产生一些影响，至少会影响公众和国会对企业的看法。
Historically, you know, every industry, at all times, is interested in downsizing or becoming more efficient.
从历史上看，你也知道，各个行业在任何时期都希望通过裁员或提升效率来精进运营。
Now, if the industry is growing, you can achieve efficiency by doing more work, or turning out more output, with the same people.
当然，如果行业在增长，你可以在不增加员工的情况下，通过让同样的人完成更多工作、产出更多产品来实现效率提升。
But you know, if you go back 150 years and look at the percentage of people in farming, for example, farming has downsized from being a very appreciable percentage of the American workforce to a very small percentage. And essentially, that’s released people to do other things.
但你要知道，如果回溯 150 年，比如看农业从业者占比，农业从美国劳动力中占比很高，逐步“精简”到如今只占很小一部分。实质上，这释放了劳动力去从事其它事情。
So, it’s in the interest of society to get as much output in anything as it can per unit of labor input. It’s very difficult on the individual involved.
因此，从社会整体利益看，任何行业都应该尽可能提高单位劳动投入的产出。但这对涉及到的个人来说确实很艰难。
And you know, it’s no fun — I guess it’s no fun being a horse when the tractor comes along, or a blacksmith, and when the car comes along. But the —
而且你知道，这并不好受——当拖拉机出现时，对马来说不会好受；当汽车出现时，对铁匠来说也不会好受。但是——
So, I don’t quarrel with the activities. I quarrel, sometimes, with how it’s done. And I do think there’s been a certain lack of, in certain cases, some empathy or sensitivity in terms of the way it’s being done.
所以，我并不反对这些行为本身。我有时反对的是执行方式。我确实认为在某些情况下，执行这些举措时缺乏一定的同理心与敏感度。
You should try to make your businesses more efficient. We hope we’re not in businesses that will require us to lay off people over time, because we hope that physical output grows, and that we become more productive and can keep the same number of people to get greater output.
你应该努力让业务更高效。我们也希望自己所处的业务不需要随着时间推移去裁员，因为我们希望实物产出增长、生产率提高，从而在保持同样人数的情况下实现更高产出。
Dexter Shoe has done a great job of that over time. They’ve become more and more productive. But they’ve sold more shoes instead of selling the same number of shoes and letting people go. But sometimes, industry trends —
Dexter Shoe 多年来在这方面做得很好。他们的生产率越来越高，但他们是通过卖出更多的鞋来消化效率提升，而不是维持同样销量却裁掉员工。但有时，行业趋势会——
I mean, at World Book, we have fewer people than we had a year or two ago. And we didn’t — we don’t have any answer to that.
比如在 World Book，我们现在的人数比一两年前更少。对此我们也——我们并没有更好的办法。
Over time, we got out of the textile business. I wish we didn’t have to. But we did not know how to run a textile company in New England and compete effectively.
随着时间推移，我们退出了纺织业务。我本希望不必如此，但我们确实不知道如何在新英格兰地区有效经营一家纺织公司并保持竞争力。
Like I say, I would — I love avoiding those businesses. And to the extent we can, we will.
就像我所说的，我——我乐于避开这些业务。只要能做到，我们就会尽量避开。
I mean, GEICO is going to add people over time. And I think Berkshire Hathaway’s going to add people over time.
我的意思是，GEICO 会随着时间推移增加员工，我认为 Berkshire Hathaway 也会逐步增加员工。
But I can’t — but it is in the interest of society to do jobs more effectively. It’s also in the interest of society, it seems to me, to take care, in some way, of the people that are affected by that activity. And either — in some cases, it may be retraining.
但我不能——不过更高效地完成工作符合社会利益。同时，在我看来，以某种方式妥善安置受到影响的人群也符合社会利益。有些情况下，这可能意味着再培训。
But in other cases, you know, it doesn’t work so well if you’re 55 years old, and you’ve been working in a textile mill all your life, and all of a sudden the guy that runs the place can’t make any money out of selling your output. I mean, that’s not the fellow’s fault that’s been working at the textile mill for 30 years.
但在其他情况下，你知道，这并不好办。比如当你 55 岁、一辈子都在纺织厂工作，而突然之间厂主卖你的产品赚不到钱了。这并不是那位在纺织厂工作了 30 年的人的过错。
So, there’s a balance in that. I think that the attention that’s come about lately, I think there’s — to some degree, it was a media fad based on some particularly dramatic examples at a couple of companies.
所以，这里面需要平衡。我认为近期对这些现象的关注，在某种程度上是媒体基于个别公司特别戏剧性的案例所引发的一股风潮。
I don’t think there is more displacement going on now, as a percentage of the labor force, annually, than there was 10 years ago, in terms of reconstituting what people do. But it’s gotten a lot of attention lately.
就“人们所从事工作的重组”而言，我不认为如今每年被替代的劳动力占比，比 10 年前更高。只是最近这类事情获得了更多关注。
There could be a backlash on that, in terms of corporate tax rates or a number of things. And we might feel it in that direction.
这可能会引发一些反弹，例如在公司税率或其他方面的政策反应。我们可能会在那个方向感受到影响。
We want, at Berkshire, to do everything as efficiently as we can. Part of that, in a big way, is not taking on a lot of people we don’t need.
在 Berkshire，我们希望把一切做得尽可能高效。很重要的一点，就是不要招入大量不需要的人手。
A lot of the mistakes that are being corrected now are because people got very fat. And their businesses got very fat in the past and took on all kinds of people they don’t need. We see that in a lot of businesses that we’re exposed to.
如今正在纠正的许多错误，是因为过去企业“吃得太胖”。他们的业务在过去臃肿不堪，招了各种不需要的人。我们在很多接触到的企业里都看到了这一点。
And as long as they’re very prosperous, really, no one does very much about it. And then when the time comes, they all of a sudden find out they can get way more output.
只要日子很滋润，基本没人会认真处理这个问题。直到时机到来，他们才突然发现可以用更少的人获得更多产出。
The oil companies are a classic example. You know, the people, probably, actually needed to produce, refine, and market oil probably hasn’t changed that much. But if you look at the employment relative to barrels produced, refined, and marketed, it’s gone down dramatically over 20 years ago.
石油公司就是典型例子。你知道，真正需要从事原油生产、炼制和销售的人数，可能并没有发生太大变化。但如果你看“雇员数量与产量（生产、炼制、销售的桶数）”的比值，相比 20 年前已经大幅下降。
To me, it just means that they weren’t being run that well 20 years ago. And it never should’ve occurred in the first place.
在我看来，这只意味着 20 年前它们的管理并不好。最初就不该让这种臃肿发生。
We don’t want to take on more people than we need in any of our businesses, because we don’t want to lay people off, either.
我们在任何业务中都不想招入超出所需的人，因为我们同样不想去裁员。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you put it in reverse, you’d say, name a business that has been ruined because it was over-downsized. I cannot think of a single one.
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果反过来想，请你举出一家“因为精简过度而被毁掉”的企业。我一个也想不出来。
But if you asked me to name businesses that were half-ruined, or ruined, by bloat, I mean, I could just rattle off name after name after name.
但如果你让我列举那些因为臃肿而半毁或全毁的企业，我可以一口气说出一长串名字。
It’s gotten fashionable to assume that downsizing is wrong. Well, it may have been wrong to let the business get so fat that it eventually had to downsize.
现在把裁员视作错误似乎成了“时髦观点”。可真正的错误也许是让业务变得如此臃肿，以至于最终不得不裁员。
But if you’ve got way more people than are needed in the business, I see no social benefit in having people sit around half employed or unemployed.
但如果企业的人手远超所需，我看不出让人们半就业或闲置着有什么社会收益。
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re very likely to compete against some guy, at some point, who doesn’t have more people around than needed in the business, too. But it doesn’t change. For the people involved, they’ve got real problems, and —
WARREN BUFFETT：在某个时点，你很可能会与那些“没有冗员”的竞争对手过招。但这并不改变一个事实：对被波及的人来说，他们面临的是真实的问题，而且——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, can you name one that has been ruined by over-downsizing? There must be one, but —
CHARLIE MUNGER：Warren，你能举出一家“因为裁员过度而被毁掉”的公司吗？应该有一家，但——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s like Eisenhower said about Nixon. Give me a week, and I’ll come up with something. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这就像 Eisenhower 谈到 Nixon 时说的那样：给我一周时间，我就能想出一个来。（笑声）
51. No layoffs at insurance operations due to reduced volume
保险业务不会因为保费规模下降而裁员
WARREN BUFFETT: How about zone 6?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 6 区怎么样？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I’m Walter Kaye of New York City.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生、Munger 先生，我是来自纽约市的 Walter Kaye。
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad to have you here, Walter.
WARREN BUFFETT：很高兴你能来，Walter。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad to have you here. Walter’s been a good friend of ours.
WARREN BUFFETT：很高兴你能来。Walter 一直是我们的好朋友。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very, very much. You just make me more of an egomaniac, a humble egomaniac, by saying that.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：非常非常感谢。你这么说只会让我更自我一点——一个谦逊的“自我狂”。
I don’t know if Mr. Munger’s wife is here and Mrs. Buffett is here, but back East, where I come from, in New York, they say, “When people — when men are successful, it’s their wife’s doing. But if they’re a failure, it’s because they’re lazy.” (Laughter)
我不知道 Munger 先生的夫人和 Buffett 夫人是否在场，但在我来自的纽约，在东岸，人们常说：“一个男人成功，是他妻子的功劳；如果他失败，那就是他自己太懒。”（笑声）
But anyhow, I just wanted to, again, thank you very much. You’ve done such great things for our family. It’s absolutely incredible.
不过不管怎样，我再次向你们致谢。你们为我们家做了很多了不起的事，实在令人难以置信。
And to those of you who don’t know these two gentlemen, besides being financial geniuses, and you all know Mr. Buffett and, somewhat, Mr. Munger, too, they’re the finest human beings you’ll ever meet. I mean, just the way they explained this downsizing is the most intelligent thing that I’ve ever heard.
对于还不太了解这两位先生的人来说，除了他们是金融天才——大家都知道 Buffett 先生，也多少了解 Munger 先生——他们也是你能遇到的最优秀的人。我是说，他们刚才解释精简裁员的方式，是我听过最有见地的说法。
And eventually, like, you know, these people eventually find work. They have to be reeducated and everything like that.
而且最终，你知道，这些人最终会再就业。他们需要再教育之类的帮助。
But one point of business I’d like to ask you, if you don’t mind. I have been noticing that there has been a tremendous amount of new capital going into reinsurance carriers.
不过如果可以的话，我有一个业务上的问题。我注意到有大量新资本涌入再保险公司。
And I was wondering if you could make a few comments about that, if you think that will affect the reinsurance business — have any effect on the insurance business in general, because, as you know better than I, we’re still in a very soft market.
我想请你们谈谈对这一现象的看法，你们是否认为这会影响再保险业务——甚至更广泛地影响整个保险业，因为，如你们比我更清楚的，我们仍处在一个非常疲软的市场。
And there isn’t a month that goes by that I don’t hear of some new reinsurance carrier, whether in Bermuda or London or somewhere. Thank you.
而且几乎每个月我都能听到有新的再保险公司成立，不管是在百慕大、伦敦，还是别的地方。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Walter knows more about insurance than I do. But I’ll, nevertheless, comment on that.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。Walter 比我更懂保险。不过我还是谈谈看法。
There has been a fair amount of capital. And there was a rush of it about, I’d say, maybe three years ago into the reinsurance business.
确实有相当多的资本流入。我想大概在三年前，曾经有一波资金蜂拥进入再保险行业。
But there has been capital come in, and that is negative for our business. I mean, because any capital that’s brought in, basically, will get employed.
但资金的进入对我们的业务是不利的。因为基本上，只要资本被引入，最终就会被动用起来。
We are willing, at Berkshire — and we do it — we are willing to sit on the sidelines in the reinsurance business.
在 Berkshire，我们愿意——而且确实会——在再保险业务上选择观望。
We’ll offer quotes. But somebody that — will cut those prices substantially, if they’ve got a lot of capital and want to keep busy. And if you’ve got a lot of capital in this business, or if you attracted a lot of capital, you will do something. You might like to do something smart, but if need be, you’ll do something dumb.
我们会提供报价。但如果有人有大把资本、又想保持忙碌，他们就会大幅压价。而在这个行业里，如果你手里有很多钱，或者你吸引了很多钱，你就会去做点什么。你可能想做聪明的事，但必要时你也会去做愚蠢的事。
You’ll rationalize it, so you think it’s smart. But you will do it. You won’t just sit there and write the shareholders at the end of the year and say, you know, “We asked you for $300 million last year. And we’d like to report that it’s all safely in a bank account at Citicorp.” It just doesn’t work that way.
你会给自己找理由，以为那是聪明做法。但你还是会去做。你不会年底就坐在那里给股东写信说：“我们去年向你们要了 3 亿美元，现在报告一下，钱都安全地躺在花旗银行的账户里。”事情不是这么运作的。
So they will go out and do something. People don’t like to sit around all day and do nothing.
所以他们会出去接业务。人们不喜欢整天什么都不做。
And that means that prices will get cut under certain circumstances. And those circumstances — that’s happening now.
这意味着在某些情况下价格会被压低。而这些情况——现在正在发生。
We will — at Berkshire, we do have a rule about downsizing on that. We have promised people, at all of our insurance operations, that we will never have layoffs because of a drop in volume. We do not want the people who run our insurance business to feel they have to write X dollars in order to keep everybody there.
我们在 Berkshire 的相关业务上有一条关于“精简”的规则。我们已向所有保险业务的员工承诺：绝不会因为保费规模下降而裁员。我们不希望负责保险业务的人觉得必须写出某个保费规模，才能让所有人保住饭碗。
We can afford some overhead around that’s costing us a little money for lack of using it at full capacity, because it isn’t that much, relative to the size of our insurance operation.
我们承受得起一定的固定开销，即使产能未满会多花点钱，因为相对于我们保险业务的总体规模，这部分并不大。
What we can’t afford are people feeling some internal compulsion to keep writing business in order to keep their job. So, we have a strong policy on that.
我们承受不起的是：让员工为了保住工作而产生内在压力、硬着头皮去接业务。因此，我们在这点上有非常明确的政策。
And if the business falls away, in terms of price, we won’t be doing business. But we will be around to do business in a big way when the circumstances reverse.
如果价格层面恶化，我们就不做业务。但当形势逆转时，我们会在场，并且大规模地开展业务。
They reversed in the casualty business for a while in 1985 or thereabouts. And we did a terrific amount of business.
大约在 1985 年左右，意外险业务曾经出现过一段时间的逆转。那时我们做了大量业务。
They reversed in catastrophe reinsurance four or five years ago, and we became very active in that, and —
四五年前，巨灾再保险也出现过逆转，我们在那段时间也非常活跃，而且——
We will have times that are very good for us in insurance. It’s a lot like investments. If you feel you have to invest every day, you’re going to make a lot of mistakes. It just — it isn’t that kind of a business. You have to wait until you get the fat pitch.
保险业务也会有对我们非常有利的时期。这很像投资。如果你觉得每天都非投不可，那你会犯很多错误。保险不是那种天天都要“下单”的生意。你必须等到“肥球”出现。
And in insurance, it’s similar. You do not — if we had a budget for premium volume for our insurance companies, it would be the dumbest thing we could do, because they would meet the budget.
在保险中也是一样。如果我们给保险公司制定保费规模预算，那将是我们能做的最愚蠢的事，因为他们一定会“完成指标”。
They could meet any budget I set out. I could tell some operation that wrote a hundred million last year to write 500 million this year, and they would meet it, you know, and I would be paying the bills for decades to come, so —
无论我定多少，他们都能“完成”。我可以对某个去年写了 1 亿保费的部门说，今年写到 5 亿——他们也会“完成”。但随后几十年里，埋单的人就是我——你懂的——所以——
It’s a very illogical way to try and plan 8 or 10 percent-a-year growth.
试图用这种方式去规划每年 8% 或 10% 的增长，是非常不合逻辑的。
Now, GEICO is a different story in that GEICO is a business that is the low-cost operator and can attract, from a huge pool, business at, I think, a very good rate of growth simply by letting people know what’s available out there. So that is a business that I see growing under almost any circumstances.
当然，GEICO 的情况不同。GEICO 是低成本经营者，只要让人们知道它提供的产品，就能从庞大的市场池中以我认为相当不错的速度吸引业务。因此，我认为它几乎在任何环境下都能增长。
But our reinsurance business will swing around enormously, in terms of volume, based on what the competitor is doing. And what the competitors are doing depends, to a great extent, on how much money they’ve got burning a hole in their pocket.
但我们的再保险业务在规模上会随着对手的动作而大幅波动。而竞争对手做什么，在很大程度上取决于他们口袋里“烫手”的钱有多少。
Progressive要转型做其他类型的保险业务会很困难。
And right now, it’s going one direction. But it will change, I mean, just like investment markets change, you know. I’ve been through at least a half a dozen periods where people think, you know, they’re never going to get a chance to buy securities at intelligent prices. And it always changes.
而现在，它正朝着一个方向发展。但它会改变——就像投资市场会变化一样。至少有过六七次，大家觉得“再也没有机会以合理价格买到证券了”。而每次最终都会改变。
In the insurance business, people that misprice their policies will pay the price for it. And the world will still need insurance. And we will still be there.
在保险业中，定价错误的人终将为此付出代价。而世界仍然需要保险，我们也会一直在场。
52. International expansion for GEICO would be dangerous distraction
GEICO 的国际扩张将是危险的分心之举
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7? Oh, we don’t have any. I guess we have everybody in here now, so we’ll go back to zone 1.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 7 区？哦，我们没有。我想大家都在这个大厅里了，那我们回到第 1 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, salutations from Portugal. I am from Portugal. My name is Herculano Fortado (PH). I have been a shareholder of your company since it was traded on the NASDAQ.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，来自葡萄牙的问候。我来自葡萄牙。我叫 Herculano Fortado（PH）。自从你们公司在 NASDAQ 交易起，我就是股东。
And I hold the shares and went on accumulating year after year, whenever funds were available and were at my disposal.
而且我一直持有并逐年增持，只要我手头有可用资金就会买入。
Now, a little bit about my history. As a student, I am from India. I was born in India, of Indian parentage. And my parents were very modest and could not afford me higher education. I started my school —
现在简单说一下我的经历。学生时代我来自 India。我出生在 India，父母都是印度人。我的父母很拮据，供不起我接受高等教育。我开始上学——
WARREN BUFFETT: I think maybe you’d better just get to the question, though, if you will, please.
WARREN BUFFETT：我想也许您最好直接进入问题本身，好吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. And then started writing insurance, life insurance, for a company which was a subsidiary of American Life.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：好的。后来我在一家 American Life 的子公司做寿险代理。
My question now is this. I am now living in Portugal, and I see that the European market is developing and Berkshire Hathaway is having a very big slice of insurance investments.
我的问题是这样的。我现在住在葡萄牙，我看到欧洲市场正在发展，而 Berkshire Hathaway 在保险投资方面占有很大的份额。
They don’t seem to be operating in the new markets that are emerging in Europe, and as well as in countries like India or the Pacific area, where the human — two-thirds of human beings are living.
但你们似乎并未在欧洲新兴市场，以及像 India 或太平洋地区那些居住了全人类三分之二人口的国家/地区从事业务。
Is there a policy or a plan, on the part of Berkshire Hathaway, to diversify and internationalize their insurance business? This is my only question.
Berkshire Hathaway 是否有多元化与国际化其保险业务的政策或计划？这就是我唯一的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢你。
The reinsurance business of Berkshire Hathaway is totally international. I mean, we deal with risks all over the world. We deal with companies all over the world.
Berkshire Hathaway 的再保险业务是完全国际化的。我的意思是，我们承保来自世界各地的风险，也与全球各地的公司打交道。
And that’s the nature of the reinsurance business, generally, although there might be some that would be more specialized to this country, but —
而这基本上也是再保险行业的本质，尽管也可能存在一些更偏向于某个国家的专业化业务，但——
We are quite willing to take on risks around the world, although they have to be risks with a large premium. I mean, that’s the nature of our reinsurance business. We’re not in the retail end of the business.
我们非常愿意承接全球范围内的风险，尽管这些风险必须伴随较高的保费。我的意思是，这就是我们再保险业务的性质。我们并不从事零售端业务。
But we do that worldwide. And we’ll continue to do that worldwide, because there are huge risks that exist for primary insurers around the world. And they need somebody to lay them off on.
但我们在全球范围内开展这类业务，而且将继续如此，因为全球的原保险公司面临巨大的风险，他们需要有人来分保/分散这些风险。
Now, whether they will pay the proper price is another question. And it may be a little more difficult, in a few jurisdictions, to do business than in others. But that’s an international operation.
至于他们是否愿意支付合理价格，这是另一回事。在某些法域做生意可能比在其他地方更困难一些。但这确实是一项国际化业务。
GEICO has two-and-a-fraction percent of the U.S. auto market. We have about 2 1/2 million policyholders. There are over a hundred million in the country.
GEICO 在美国汽车险市场的份额只有两个多百分点。我们的保单持有人大约 250 万，而全国总量超过一亿。
And there is such an opportunity here that it would be diversionary to go into other countries with GEICO.
这里的机会如此之大，如果让 GEICO 走向其他国家反而会分散注意力。
There’s been a firm that was very successful over in England that introduced a somewhat GEICO-like operation about 10 years ago. And they did very well. They are now encountering more competition. And their results are falling off somewhat, but —
大约 10 年前，英国有一家公司推出了某种类似 GEICO 的模式，非常成功。他们曾经做得很好。现在竞争更多了，业绩有所回落，但——
There’s a huge potential for GEICO in this country. And I would not want the management of GEICO to be going off in other directions now, when there’s so much to be done here.
GEICO 在美国的潜力巨大。在国内尚有如此多事情可做的时候，我不希望 GEICO 的管理层去做其他方向的尝试。
I mean, three percentage points on our growth rate here, for example, you know, would be 75 million or so of volume. And that, in turn, would keep compounding over time. Well that — there’s too much to do here before we set up some startup operation around the world.
举例说，国内增长率多 3 个百分点，大约就意味着 7,500 万的保费规模。而且这个基数会随时间复利增长。可以说，在我们跑去全球设立某些创业型业务之前，国内还有太多事情要做。
And there are actually various problems in a lot of jurisdictions in — to run a GEICO-like operation — although I wouldn’t say that that prevails every place. I mean, there could be opportunities. But the opportunity here in this country is huge. And the management of GEICO is focused.
而且在不少法域要运行类似 GEICO 的模式会遇到各种问题——尽管不是处处如此，也可能存在机会。但美国国内的机会极大。GEICO 的管理层也在专注于此。
I love focused management. The management of — if you read the Coca-Cola annual report, you will not get the idea that Roberto Goizueta is thinking about a whole lot of things other than Coca-Cola.
我喜欢专注的管理。如果你读 The Coca-Cola 的年报，你绝不会觉得 Roberto Goizueta 在想可口可乐以外的许多事情。
And I have seen that work time after time. And when they lose that focus — as, actually, did Coke and Gillette both, at one point 20 to 30 years ago somewhat — it shows up.
我一次次看到“专注”带来的效果。反之，一旦失去专注——事实上在 20 到 30 年前，Coke 和 Gillette 都曾在某个阶段有些分心——问题就会显现。
I mean, it — two great organizations were not hitting their potential 20 years ago. And then they became refocused. And what a difference it makes. It makes tens of billions of dollars’ worth of difference, in terms of market value.
也就是说，20 年前这两家伟大公司并未发挥其潜力。后来它们重新聚焦，结果天差地别：就市值而言，带来了数百亿美元的差异。
GEICO actually started — they started fooling around in a number of things in the early ’80s, and they paid a price to do it. They paid a very big price.
GEICO 实际上在 80 年代初曾经“分心”去做了不少事情，并为此付出了代价——而且代价很大。
They paid a direct price, in terms of the cost of those things, because they almost all worked out badly. And then they paid an additional price in the loss of focus on the main business.
他们首先为那些尝试的直接成本买单，因为几乎全部效果不佳；其次还为主业注意力的流失支付了额外代价。
That will not happen with the present management. Tony Nicely thinks about nothing else but doing — carrying the GEICO message to people who — that 97 1/2 percent or so that are not policyholders. And that will work very well for us over time.
现任管理层不会再犯这种错误。Tony Nicely 除了把 GEICO 的信息传递给尚未成为保单持有人的那约 97.5% 的人之外，别无他想。长期来看，这对我们非常有利。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: We are indirectly in all of these emerging markets through Coca-Cola and Gillette. So, it isn’t true that we’re totally absent.
CHARLIE MUNGER：通过 Coca-Cola 和 Gillette，我们间接地已经进入所有这些新兴市场。所以说我们完全缺席并不准确。
WARREN BUFFETT: No. Well, at Coca-Cola the international markets are 80 percent of profits — actually, a little more.
WARREN BUFFETT：对。以 Coca-Cola 为例，海外市场贡献了 80% 的利润——实际上还要多一点。
Gillette, I think they’re about 70 percent or so. So, the — we love the international aspects of the Coca-Cola or Gillette businesses. And that’s a very major attraction.
至于 Gillette，我想大概在 70% 左右。由此可见，我们非常喜欢 Coca-Cola 与 Gillette 的全球化属性，这对我们极具吸引力。
But the management of those companies is focused on that. But they are doing — they have distribution systems, and they have recognition, and they’ve got a lot going for them over there. But the beauty of it is that they’re maximizing what they do have going for them, which was not the case 20 years ago.
而这些公司的管理层也专注其上。他们在海外有完善的分销体系和品牌认知，具备诸多优势。更妙的是，他们将这些既有优势发挥到极致——而 20 年前并非如此。
They just sort of let it go more by default, and they started fooling around with a lot of diversification. And you know, basically, that has not worked that well. So, we like focus. We love focus.
当年他们有点“任其自然”，还去折腾了许多多元化尝试。你知道，整体表现并不理想。所以我们喜欢专注，我们热爱专注。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and doing it indirectly, as we’ve done, one can argue that we, thereby, do it a lot better. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，而且像我们这样通过间接方式来做，某种意义上可以说效果更好。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t explore the implications of that. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我们就不深入探究这句话的含义了。（笑声）
53. Shareholders boost Borsheims sales
股东推动了 Borsheims 的销售
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 2 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s George Olson (PH). I’m from Atlanta, Georgia. I have a couple quick questions for you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 George Olson（PH），来自乔治亚州亚特兰大。我有几个简短的问题。
First of all, I’d like to have your comments on the USAir preferred that were — they’re several quarters in arrears on.
首先，我想听听你对 USAir 优先股的看法——他们拖欠了几个季度的股息。
And secondly, I was wondering about the Borsheims report from yesterday. You usually comment on that. (Laughter)
其次，我想问问昨天的 Borsheims 报告。你通常会点评一下。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Susan Jacques, who runs Borsheims, called me this morning. And her voice was hoarse but happy, and — (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，负责 Borsheims 的 Susan Jacques 今天早上打电话给我。她的声音有点嘶哑，但很开心——（笑）
Borsheims — that comparable day last year was the biggest day of the year. And it was about 60 percent up this year, so — I’m — you’ve done your part. (Applause)
Borsheims——去年的同一天是全年最旺的一天。而今年同比增长了大约 60%，所以——我想说——你们功不可没。（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: We are starting a new custom at Berkshire Hathaway’s annual meetings. A shareholder came up to me and asked for my autograph on his sales slip from Borsheims — (laughter) — which was a $54,000 watch.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我们准备在 Berkshire Hathaway 的年会上开个新风尚。刚才有一位股东拿着他在 Borsheims 的小票来找我签名——（笑声）——那是一块价值 54,000 美元的手表。
Now, that is the kind of autographs we like to give. (Laughter and applause)
这种类型的“签名请求”，我们非常乐意满足。（笑声与掌声）
And so our message to you all is, “Go thou and do likewise.” (Laughter)
所以我们要对大家说的是：“去吧，也请各位效法之。”（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It wasn’t a member of Charlie’s family, incidentally. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：顺带一提，那位可不是 Charlie 家里的人。（笑声）
54. USAir investment has improved, but was still a mistake
对 USAir 的投资有所改善，但仍然是个错误
WARREN BUFFETT: The USAir preferred, as I mentioned in the annual report, it looks considerably better than it did 18 months ago or thereabouts.
WARREN BUFFETT：关于 USAir 的优先股，正如我在年报里提到的，如今看起来比大约 18 个月前要好得多。
But their fundamental problem — and Steve Wolf has said this — the new CEO of USAir — the fundamental problems are there. And they either address and correct those fundamental problems, or those problems will address and correct them. (Laughter)
但他们的根本问题——而且 USAir 的新任 CEO Steve Wolf 也说过——仍然存在。要么他们解决并纠正这些根本性问题，要么这些问题会“解决并纠正他们”。（笑声）
And the — you know, their costs are out of line. Their costs are those that are relics of a regulated, protected environment. And they are not in a regulated, protected environment. And so far, they have not had any great success in correcting the situation.
你知道，他们的成本结构并不合理。他们的成本水平是受管制、受保护环境的遗留物。而现在他们处在一个非管制、非保护的环境中。截至目前，他们在纠正这种状况方面并没有取得什么显著成效。
Knowing Mr. Wolf, I’m sure he is, you know, focused entirely on getting that changed. And he will need to get it changed. And he — his record has been pretty successful at that.
就我对 Wolf 先生的了解，我确信他现在完全专注于改变这一点。而且他必须改变。这方面他过去的成绩相当成功。
So, we’re a lot better off with our US Air preferred than we were 18 months ago, but it still is a mistake I made.
所以，相比 18 个月前，我们持有的 US Air 优先股状况要好得多，但这仍然是我当初犯下的一个错误。
And we would’ve been a lot better off if I’d just, as Charlie says, gone out to a bar that night instead. (Laughter)
如果当初我像 Charlie 说的那样，那晚去酒吧待着，我们的处境可能会好得多。（笑声）
You got any comments, Charlie, on USAir? He doesn’t want to comment. It may sound like it’s his deal. (Laughter)
Charlie，你对 USAir 有什么评论吗？——他不想评论。要不然听起来像是他主导的交易。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s, plainly, worth a lot more than it was last year. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：很显然，它现在比去年值钱多了。（笑声）
55. Newspapers may evolve, but won’t disappear entirely
报纸可能会演化，但不会完全消失
WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, we’ll move to zone 3. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：好了，接下来我们进入第 3 区。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我是 David Winters，来自新泽西州的 Mountain Lakes。
Without ruining my fun, can you give me a few hints about how I should think about calculating the intrinsic value — (Buffett laughs) — of the insurance businesses?
在不破坏我乐趣的前提下，你能给我一些提示，告诉我应当如何思考保险业务的内在价值计算吗——（Buffett 大笑）——？
And secondly, I’m wondering about, not that you can foretell the future, either one of you, but with regards to newspapers, is there any concern that it goes the way of the printed World Book and Blue Chip Stamps?
其次我想请教，当然你们谁都不能预言未来，但就报纸而言，你们是否担心它会走上印刷版 World Book 和 Blue Chip Stamps 的道路？
WARREN BUFFETT: It could — I think it’s very — I’ll answer the second part first.
WARREN BUFFETT：有这种可能——我认为非常——我先回答第二部分。
I think it’s very unlikely — very, very unlikely, you know, down to a few percentage points, that newspapers will go the way of Blue Chip Stamps.
我认为这不太可能——非常、非常不可能，概率只占几个百分点——报纸会像 Blue Chip Stamps 那样消亡。
World Book is a different story. World Book has got — they have a reasonable shot at a decent future. But it’s not automatic.
World Book 则是另一回事。World Book——他们有一个合理的机会去获得不错的未来。但这并非自动发生。
But the newspaper, it may be configured somewhat differently. It may get a different percentage of its revenue from circulation and advertising than it does. I mean, there may be some evolutionary-type changes in it. But it’s still a bargain.
不过报纸的形态可能会有所变化。它来自发行和广告的收入占比也许会与现在不同。我的意思是，它可能会出现一些演化式的改变。但它仍然很划算。
It is a bargain to anybody that is interested in their community. It’s still a bargain to a great many advertisers.
对于关心自己社区的人来说，报纸很划算。对许多广告主而言，它依然很划算。
We spend a lot of money advertising in newspapers in our various businesses. And we feel we are getting our money’s worth, obviously. And it works.
我们在各项业务中花了很多钱在报纸上投放广告。显然我们觉得物有所值。而且确实有效。
But it just doesn’t have the lock that it used to have on the business.
但它对这门生意的“锁定力”已不如从前。
56. Why $7B of insurance float is better than $7B of cash
为什么 70 亿美元的保险浮存金比 70 亿美元的现金更好
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, what was the other question about?
WARREN BUFFETT：那么，另一个问题是什么来着？
Did you want to repeat the first one?
你要不要重复一下第一个问题？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：（听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah, the question about the insurance business, the intrinsic value.
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，对，是关于保险业务及其内在价值的问题。
I would say this. We have — I’m not going to give you a precise answer, but I will tell you this.
我这样说吧。我们已经——我不会给出精确答案，但我要告诉你这一点。
We have 7 billion, presently, of float. That’s the money we’re holding that belongs to someone else but that we have the use of.
我们目前有 70 亿美元的浮存金。那是我们持有、但属于他人的资金，不过由我们使用。
Now, if I were asked, would I trade that for $7 billion and not have to pay tax on the gain that would result if I did that, but I would then have to stay out of the insurance business forever — total forever non-compete clause of any kind in insurance — would I accept that? And the answer is no.
现在，如果有人问我，是否愿意把这笔浮存金换成 70 亿美元现金，并且对由此产生的收益无需纳税，但条件是此后永远不得涉足保险业务——对保险的任何形式施以永久竞业禁止——我会接受吗？答案是不会。
Now, that is not because I would rather have 7 billion of float than 7 billion of net proceeds of free money. It’s because I expect the 7 billion to grow.
这并不是因为我更愿意要 70 亿的浮存金而不是 70 亿“净到手”的自由现金，而是因为我预期这 70 亿会增长。
And if I’d made that trade — that I’m just suggesting now — if I’d made that 27 years ago and said, “Will you take 17 million for the float you have, no tax to be paid, the float for which you just paid 8-million-7 when we bought the companies, and gotten out of the insurance business,” I might’ve said yes in those days, but it would’ve —
而如果我在 27 年前就做了这种交易——也就是我刚刚设想的：用我们当时的浮存金换取 1700 万美元、无需缴税；那笔浮存金对应的是我们当初以 870 万美元收购公司时获得的——并且退出保险业；在那个年代我可能会说“好”，但那会——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, you would’ve?
CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，你会吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter) Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：会的。（笑声）会的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, he keeps learning. That’s one of his tricks. (Laughter and applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER：不，他一直在学习。这是他的“绝招”之一。（笑声与掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s probably true in this case. I’m not sure about other cases.
WARREN BUFFETT：在这个例子里大概确实如此。其他情况我不敢说。
But it would’ve been a terrible mistake. It would’ve been a mistake to do it 10 or 12 years ago with 300 million.
但那会是个可怕的错误。即使在 10 或 12 年前、浮存金达 3 亿时那么做，也会是错误。
It is not worth $7 billion to us to forego being in the insurance business forever at Berkshire Hathaway.
让 Berkshire Hathaway 永久退出保险业务，对我们来说不值 70 亿美元。
Even though it would all be, you know, it would be — if it were nontaxed profits, so we got the full 7 billion, pure addition to equity — we would not take it. And we wouldn’t even think about it very long. So as Charlie says, that is not the answer that we would’ve given some time back. But it’s a very valuable business.
即便那将全部是——你知道的——免税利润、我们能拿到整整 70 亿、作为净增权益，我们也不会接受。我们甚至不会为此多想。正如 Charlie 所说，这并不是我们在早年会给出的答案。但这是一门非常有价值的生意。
非常真实，安全边际提升以后所做的选择也会跟着变化。
It has to be run right. I mean, GEICO has to be run right. The reinsurance business has to be run right, National Indemnity, the Homestate Company. They all have to be run right. And it’s not automatic.
它必须被正确经营。也就是说，GEICO 要正确经营；再保险业务要正确经营；National Indemnity、Homestate Company 都要正确经营。这并非自然而然就会发生。
But they have the people, the distribution structure, the reputation, the capital strength, the competitive advantages. They have those in place. And if nurtured, you know, they can become more valuable as time goes by.
但它们具备人才、分销架构、声誉、资本实力与竞争优势。这些要素都已到位。只要培育得当，随着时间推移，它们会变得更加有价值。
57. Keeping more mortgages has increased Freddie Mac’s risk a “tiny bit”
持有更多抵押贷款使 Freddie Mac 的风险“略微”上升
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 4 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I’d like to ask the chairman and Mr. Munger about Freddie Mac.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的。我想请教主席和 Munger 先生关于 Freddie Mac 的问题。
A few years ago, I think they were earning most of their money from the guarantee fees and the float. Now, they’ve got the huge balance sheet, a lot of short-term liabilities.
几年前，我认为他们的大部分收益来自担保费和浮存金。现在，他们有庞大的资产负债表，负担了大量的短期负债。
Do you think that’s a more risky business now and that the spread might go away in some, you know, less-than-foreseen event?
你认为他们现在的业务风险更大了吗？以及在某些、你知道、难以预料的情况下，利差可能会消失吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I think he aimed that one at you. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：Charlie，我想他这是冲着你来的。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s probably slightly more risky, but I don’t think they’re taking horrible risks. It’s still a very good business.
CHARLIE MUNGER：风险大概是略微上升了，但我不认为他们在承担可怕的风险。这仍然是一门很好的生意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, what the question referred to is that, formerly, Freddie Mac emphasized, normally, just the guarantee of credit and then passed all interest rate risk onto the market.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，这个问题指的是，以前 Freddie Mac 通常只强调信用担保，并把所有利率风险转嫁给市场。
Now, they’ve retained, for their portfolio, a greater percentage of the mortgages that come through their hands.
而现在，他们在自有投资组合中留存了更高比例的经手抵押贷款。
I think they’ve structured the liabilities quite intelligently to handle what they call in the investment world “the convexity problem,” but — which is that the borrower has the option of calling off the deal tomorrow or retaining it for 30 years. And that is a very disadvantageous contract to enter into, if you lend money.
我认为他们在负债结构上相当聪明，用以应对投资界所谓的“凸性问题”（convexity problem）——也就是借款人可以选择明天就提前还款，或者把贷款一直持有 30 年。对于放贷方而言，这是一个非常不利的合约形态。
They have done quite an intelligent job of attacking that by callable debt and various things. But you can’t address a problem like that totally. There is no way to set up some model that satisfies that entire risk.
他们通过可赎回债务等多种手段相当巧妙地对冲这一点。但这种问题不可能被完全解决。没有任何模型能够完全覆盖并化解这类风险。
They’ve done a good job. But as Charlie says, the larger the portfolio, as compared to guarantee fees — because you’ve still got the — you got the credit risk on the portfolio, and you’ve added a little interest rate risk at the extremes.
他们做得不错。但正如 Charlie 所说，相较于单纯的担保费业务，资产组合越大——因为你仍然承担投资组合中的信用风险，并在利率极端情形下增加了一些利率风险。
And it doesn’t keep us up nights, but it’s a tiny bit riskier than it used to be.
这还不至于让我们夜不能寐，但它确实比过去略微更具风险。
58. Don’t wait for downturn to buy a great company
不要等下行周期才去买一家伟大的公司
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 5 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) — I’m the guy who asked you my question, my family last year — (inaudible) — my mom. This guy said fine, so I — (inaudible) — (laughter).
AUDIENCE MEMBER：（听不清）——我是去年问过你关于我家人的那个——（听不清）——关于我妈妈。那位说可以，所以我——（听不清）——（笑声）。
I know you said do what you want. I just wanted to let you know that —
我知道你说过“做你想做的”。我只是想让你知道——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you did what you wanted. I mean, you followed my advice. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，你确实照自己的意思做了。我的意思是，你遵循了我的建议。（笑声）
I’m batting 1.000. We’ll see what you’re batting next year. (Laughter)
我现在打击率是 1.000。看看你明年的打击率如何吧。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I had one quick question — (inaudible) — you said, if you have three great companies, wonderful businesses, they could last you a lifetime.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我有一个简短的问题——（听不清）——你说过，如果你拥有三家伟大的公司、优秀的业务，它们可以陪伴你一生。
And I have — one thing that struck me in a way that — (inaudible) — great businesses get pounded down. And then you bet big on them, like American Express and Disney at one time.
还有一点让我印象很深——（听不清）——伟大的公司有时会被市场猛砸。然后你会重注押上，比如当年的 American Express 和 Disney。
And my question is, I have capital to invest, but I haven’t yet invested it. I have three great companies, which I’ve identified: Coca-Cola, Gillette, and McDonald’s.
我的问题是，我手上有可投资的资金，但还没有投入。我已经识别出三家伟大的公司：Coca-Cola、Gillette 和 McDonald’s。
And my question is, if I have a lifetime ahead of me, where I want to keep an investment for more than 20 or 30 years, is it better to wait a year or two to see if one of those companies stumble, or to get in now and just stay with it over a long time horizon?
我的问题是，如果我还有一生的时间，打算持有 20 或 30 年以上，我是更应该等一两年看这些公司是否会“绊倒”一下再买，还是现在就买入并长期持有？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I won’t comment on the three companies that you’ve named.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。嗯，我不会评论你提到的这三家公司。
But in general terms, unless you find the prices of a great company really offensive, if you feel you’ve identified it —
但总体而言，除非一家伟大公司的价格真让你反感，否则如果你确认它是伟大的——
And by definition, a great company is one that’s going to remain great for 30 years. If it’s going to be a great company for three years, you know, it ain’t a great company. I mean, it — (Laughter)
按定义，伟大的公司是那种 30 年后依然伟大的公司。如果它只会在三年内伟大，你知道，那就不叫伟大。（笑声）
So, you really want to go along with the idea of something that, if you were going to take a trip for 20 years, you wouldn’t feel bad leaving the money in with no orders with your broker and no power of attorney or anything, and you just go on the trip. And you know you come back, and it’s going to be a terribly strong company.
所以你真正想要的，是那种即便你要出门旅行 20 年、不给经纪人任何指示、不给任何授权，你也能安心把钱放着；等你回来时，它依然会是一家极其强大的公司。
I think it’s better just to own them. I mean, you know, we could attempt to buy and sell some of the things that we own that we think are fine businesses. But they’re too hard to find.
我认为最好就是直接拥有它们。我的意思是，我们也可以尝试在所持的优质企业上做些买卖。但这类企业太难找了。
I mean, we found See’s Candy in 1972, or we find, here and there, we get the opportunity to do something. But they’re too hard to find.
比如我们在 1972 年找到了 See’s Candy，或者偶尔在别处遇到机会。但这种机会太难遇到。
So, to sit there and hope that you buy them in the throes of some panic, you know, that you sort of take the attitude of a mortician, you know, waiting for a flu epidemic or something, I mean — (laughter) — it — I’m not sure that will be a great technique.
因此，坐在那里盼着在某次恐慌中抄到底，像个殡仪馆馆长那样等着“流感大流行”——（笑声）——我不确定那是很好的策略。
I mean, it may be great if you inherit. You know, Paul Getty inherited the money at the bottom, in ’32. I mean, he didn’t inherit it exactly. He talked his mother out of it. But — (laughter) — it’s true, actually.
当然，如果你“继承”就另当别论。你知道，Paul Getty 在 1932 年市场底部得到了资金。严格说不是继承——他把母亲的钱“说服”了出来——但——（笑声）——确有其事。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Close enough.
CHARLIE MUNGER：差不多就那意思。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, close enough, right?
WARREN BUFFETT：对，差不多，是吧？
But he benefitted enormously by having access to a lot of cash in 19 — in the early ’30s — that he didn’t have access to in the late ’20s. And so, you get some accidents like that.
但他之所以受益匪浅，是因为在 1930 年代初能动用大量现金——而在 1920 年代末他并没有这种条件。你偶尔会遇到这种“意外之喜”。
But that’s a lot to count on. And you know, if you start with the Dow at X, and you think it’s too high, you know, when it goes to 90 percent of X, do you buy?
但把希望寄托在这种事上，未免太多。再比如，如果你认为道指在 X 太高，那它跌到 0.9X 时你会买吗？
Well, if it does, and it goes to 50 percent of X, it gets — you know, you never get the benefits of those extremes anyway, unless you just come into some accidental sum of money at some time.
如果你买了，它再跌到 0.5X，又会——你知道，你几乎不可能抓住这些极端价位，除非你在那个时刻“偶然”正好有一大笔钱。
So, I think the main thing to do is find wonderful businesses.
所以，我认为最主要的是找到优秀的企业。
Is Phil Carret here? We’ve got the world —there’s the hero of investing. Phil, would you stand up?
Phil Carret 在场吗？我们这里——这位才是投资界的英雄。Phil，能站起来让大家看看吗？
Phil is 99. He wrote a book on investing in 1924 [“Buying a Bond”]. (Applause)
Phil 今年 99 岁。他在 1924 年写过一本投资书籍【《Buying a Bond》】。（掌声）
Phil has done awfully well by finding businesses he likes, and sticking with them, and not worrying too much about what they do day to day.
Phil 的成功在于找到他喜欢的企业，坚持持有，不去过度在意它们日常的波动。
There’s going to be — I think there’s going to be an article in the Wall Street Journal about Phil on May 28th, and I advise you all to read it. And you’ll probably learn a lot more than by coming to this meeting, but —
我想《The Wall Street Journal》在 5 月 28 日会刊登一篇关于 Phil 的文章，我建议大家读一读。你们可能从中学到的东西，甚至比来这次会议还多，不过——
It’s that approach of buying businesses — I mean, let’s just say there was no stock market. And the owner of the best business in whatever your hometown is came to you and said, “Look it, you know, my brother just died, and he owned 20 percent of the business. And I want somebody to go in with me to buy that 20 percent.
这就是“买企业”的方法——我的意思是，假设没有股票市场。你家乡里最好的那家企业的老板来找你，说：“听着，我兄弟刚去世，他持有公司 20% 股权。我想找人跟我一起把这 20% 买下来。
“And the price looks a little high, maybe, but this is what I think I can get for it. You know, do you want to buy in?”
“价格看上去可能有点高，但我认为这是可以成交的价位。你愿意入股吗？”
You know, I think, if you like the business, and you like the person that’s coming to you, and the price sounds reasonable, and you really know the business, I think, probably, the thing to do is to take it and don’t worry about how it’s quoted. It won’t be quoted tomorrow, or next week, or next month.
我认为，如果你喜欢这门生意，认可来找你的这位老板，价格也合理，而且你真正了解这门生意，那么最好的做法大概就是买下它，不必担心所谓“报价”。因为明天、一周后、一个月后都不会有“报价”。
You know, I think people’s investment would be more intelligent, you know, if stocks were quoted about once a year. But it isn’t going to happen that way, so —
你知道，如果股票每年只报价一次，人们的投资可能会更理性一些。但现实不是这样，所以——
And if you happen to come in to some added money at some time when something dramatic has happened — I mean, we did well back in 1964, because American Express ran into a crook.
如果碰巧在某个“戏剧性事件”发生之际你拿到了额外资金——比如我们在 1964 年做得很好，因为 American Express 遇上了一个骗子。
You know, we did well in 1976, because GEICO’s managers and auditors didn’t know what their loss reserves should’ve been the previous couple of years.
我们在 1976 年也做得很好，因为 GEICO 的管理层和审计师并不清楚前几年应该提多少准备金。
So, we’ve had our share of flu epidemics. But you don’t want to spend your life — (laughs) — waiting around for them.
所以，我们也遇到过不少“流感大流行”。但你不该把一生都——（笑）——用来等待它们。
59. “Change is likely to work against us”
“变化很可能对我们不利”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 6 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Joe Condon (PH) from London.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Joe Condon（PH），来自伦敦。
Both Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger have addressed my question in annual reports and at previous meetings here. This is my first time. It has to do with investment in a few great, high-technology stocks.
Buffett 先生和 Munger 先生之前在年报和以往的会上都谈到过我的问题。这是我第一次来。问题与投资于少数几只伟大的高科技股票有关。
I know your answer has been that, if you don’t understand it, and I can’t, after this performance, can’t really believe that both of you don’t understand most of the high-technology questions. But I’m thinking about not only Microsoft but, say, Pfizer and J&J.
我知道你们的回答一直是：如果你不理解就不要投。但在你们的表现之后，我很难相信你们二位不理解大多数高科技领域的问题。不过我想的不仅是 Microsoft，还有比如 Pfizer 和 J&J。
All three companies, which have already proven that not only do they have a great product, proven management over 10 to 15 years, great market share positions, which are not easy to get into.
这三家公司都已经证明，不仅拥有出色的产品，还有 10 到 15 年经验证明的管理层，以及很难进入的优越市场份额地位。
And I, frankly, don’t see a big difference in the P/E ratios, for example, you could say, Coca-Cola, or, you know, against Johnson & Johnson or Pfizer, which are very powerful companies. I wonder if either or both of you would address that question again.
而且坦率说，我看不出它们与比如 Coca-Cola，或者与你知道的 Johnson & Johnson、Pfizer 这些非常强大的公司在市盈率上的巨大差别。不知两位能否再谈谈这个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, why don’t you? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：Charlie，要不你来说？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: If you have something you think you understand that looks very attractive to you, we think it’s smart to do what you understand. If — we’ve been unable to find companies that fit our slender talents.
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果你有自己理解透彻、而且看起来非常有吸引力的东西，我们认为做你所理解的事是明智的。至于我们——我们没能找到与我们“有限天赋”相匹配的公司。
We well might have been in the Pfizers and Microsofts and so forth. But we’ve never had to revert to it.
我们本来也可能投过 Pfizer、Microsoft 等等。但我们从未需要那样做。
We don’t sneer at it. Other people with more talent have found that a wonderful course of action.
我们并不嗤之以鼻。更有才干的人发现那是一条很好的路径。
WARREN BUFFETT: We generally look at businesses — we feel change is likely to work against us. We do not have great ability — we do not think we have great ability to predict where change is going to lead.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们通常看业务——我们觉得变化很可能对我们不利。我们并不具备——我们不认为自己具备预测变化将把事情带向何处的强大能力。
We think we have some ability to find businesses where we don’t think change is going to be very important.
我们认为自己有能力找到那些变化不太重要的业务。
Now, at a Gillette, the product is going to be better 10 years from now than now, or 20 years from now than 10 years from now. You saw those earlier ads going back to the Blue Blade and all that. The Blue Blade seemed great at the time. But they keep — the shaving technology gets better and better.
拿 Gillette 来说，10 年后产品会比现在更好，20 年后会比 10 年后更好。你们看过早期广告，从 Blue Blade 起一路演进。Blue Blade 在当时看起来很棒。但他们一直——剃须技术在不断进步。
But you know that Gillette — although they had that little experience with Wilkinson in the early ’60s — but you know that Gillette is basically going to be spending many multiples the money on developing better shaving systems than exist now, compared to anyone else.
但你知道 Gillette——尽管他们在 60 年代初和 Wilkinson 有过一段小插曲——你仍然知道，相比任何对手，Gillette 基本上会在研发更好的剃须系统上投入成倍于别人的资金。
You know, they’ve got the distribution system. They’ve got the believability. If they bring out a product, and they say, “This is something that men ought to look at,” men look at it.
你知道，他们有分销系统。他们有可信度。如果他们推出一款产品并说“这是男性应该关注的东西”，男性就会关注。
And they found out here a few years ago that the same thing happened when they said to women to look at it in the shaving field. They wouldn’t have that same credibility someplace else. But in the shaving field, they have it.
几年前他们也发现，在剃须领域，如果他们号召女性去看一看，同样有效。换作其他领域，他们未必拥有同样的公信力。但在剃须领域，他们拥有。
Those are assets that can’t be built. And they’re very hard to destroy.
这些是无法复制的资产，而且极难被摧毁。
So change — we think we know, in a general way, what the soft drink industry or the shaving industry or the candy business is going to look like 10 or 20 years from now.
所以谈到变化——我们认为，整体而言我们知道 10 或 20 年后的软饮行业、剃须行业、糖果行业会是什么样子。
We think Microsoft is a sensational company run by the best of managers. But we don’t have any idea what that world is going to look like in 10 or 20 years.
我们认为 Microsoft 是一家了不起的公司，由最出色的管理者掌舵。但我们不知道 10 或 20 年后的那个世界会是什么样。
Now, if you’re going to bet on somebody that is going to see out and do what we can’t do ourselves, I’d rather bet on Bill Gates than anybody else.
当然，如果你要押注某个能看清远方、去做我们自己做不到之事的人，我宁愿押注 Bill Gates，而非其他人。
But that — I don’t want to bet on anybody else. I mean, in the end, we want to understand, ourselves, where we think a business is going. And if somebody tells us the business is going to change a lot, in Wall Street, they love to tell you that, you know, that’s great opportunity.
但问题在于——我不想押注任何其他人。归根结底，我们希望亲自理解一家企业将走向何处。如果有人告诉我们这门生意将发生巨变，华尔街最爱说“那是巨大机会”。
They don’t think it’s a great opportunity when Wall Street itself is going to change a lot, incidentally. (Laughter)
顺便说一句，当华尔街自身要发生巨变时，他们却并不认为那是巨大机会。（笑声）
But they — you know, it’s a great opportunity. We don’t think it’s an opportunity at all. I mean, we — it scares the hell out of us. Because we don’t know how things are going to change.
但他们——你知道，总说那是巨大机会。而我们根本不这么看。坦白讲——这会把我们吓坏。因为我们不知道事情会如何变化。
快速变化往往导致不理性的行为，我自己一直有一个简单的假设，人都是野生动物，对风险极其敏感，那些快速接近的事物很可能引起的不理性的行为。
We are looking, you know — when people are chewing chewing gum, we have a pretty good idea how they chewed it 20 years ago and how they’ll chew it 20 years from now. And we don’t really see a lot of technology going into the art of the chew, you know? (Laughter) So, that —
我们关注的是——当人们在嚼口香糖时，我们大致知道他们 20 年前如何咀嚼，也能预见 20 年后会如何咀嚼。而且我们看不出“咀嚼的艺术”里会涌入多少技术，你懂的？（笑声）所以——
And as long as we don’t have to make those other decisions, why in the world should we? I mean, you know, if I — all kinds of things, we don’t know. And so, why going around trying to bet on things we don’t know, when we can bet on the simple things?
只要我们不必做那些别的决策，我们为什么非要去做？我的意思是，你知道，有很多事情我们并不知道。既然可以押注简单明了的事物，为什么要四处押注我们不了解的东西呢？
Zone 1? (Applause)
第 1 区？（掌声）
I can see the shareholders like us sticking with the simple ones. They understand us, yeah.
我看得出来，股东们喜欢我们坚持做简单的事。他们理解我们，没错。
60. We don’t reveal more about our stocks than we have to
我们不会披露超出必要范围的持股信息
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren. Jerry Zucker (PH), Los Angeles, California.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：下午好，Warren。我是 Jerry Zucker（PH），来自加州 Los Angeles。
In the annual report, the second-largest holdings of unsecured securities are labeled, “Others.”
在年报中，第二大未担保证券持仓被标注为“Others（其他）”。
Could you please expand on some of the holdings there? Like, do we still own PNC? And are we supposed to be buying Big Macs, as the press has reported?
你能否多介绍一下那部分持仓？比如我们是否仍持有 PNC？媒体报道所说的我们是不是在买 Big Macs，这是真的吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, actually, it’s a very descriptive title, “Others.” (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，嗯，其实“Others”这个标题非常贴切。（笑声）
We do that for several reasons. But one is that we have no interest in people buying Berkshire or looking at the Berkshire report or anything else, in order to generate investment ideas for themselves. Some people may do it, but we are not in that business.
我们这样做有几个原因。其中之一是我们无意让人们通过买 Berkshire 的股票、读 Berkshire 的报告或其他资料来为自己寻找投资点子。有人也许会这么做，但那不是我们的业务。
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders are not being paid for that. There is no way it benefits the owners of the company.
Berkshire Hathaway 的股东并不会因此得到任何报酬。这种做法也不可能让公司的所有者受益。
So, we will not disclose, in the way of our security holdings, more than we feel we have to disclose in order to be fair about things that can be material to the company.
因此，关于我们的证券持仓，除了我们认为为了公平起见、对公司具有重要性而必须披露的部分之外，我们不会披露更多。
And we certainly have no interest in disclosing them to people who, essentially, want to use the information to try and figure out where our buying power may be, subsequently, or something of the sort.
而且我们当然无意把这些信息披露给那些想借此推断我们后续买入力度和方向之类的人。
So, we will keep raising the cutoff level. And you may see more and more in others.
因此，我们会持续提高披露的门槛。你们可能会在“Others”里看到越来越多的项目。
And I will say this. There’s a lot of speculation about what we do, in the press, and I’d say about half of it’s accurate and about half of it’s inaccurate.
另外我想说，媒体对我们所作所为有很多猜测，我会说大概一半是对的，一半是不对的。
And again, we leave to you the fun of figuring out which half is right. (Laughter)
至于哪一半是对的，我们把这个“乐趣”留给各位自己去判断。（笑声）
Yeah, we hope you get a lot for your money in buying a share of Berkshire. But we don’t want to act as an investment advisory service.
是的，我们希望你们买一股 Berkshire 能物有所值。但我们不想充当投资咨询服务。
61. Buffett isn’t worrying about the Y2K computer problem
Buffett 不担心“千年虫”电脑问题
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 2 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Coles, Appleton, Wisconsin.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：David Coles，威斯康星州 Appleton。
Earlier, you made reference to the vicissitudes of time. What are the plans to ensure that all the computer systems and companies in which Berkshire has an interest will function correctly with dates of January 1st of the year 2000 and beyond?
你先前提到了时间的变迁。请问有哪些计划，能确保 Berkshire 相关的所有计算机系统和公司在进入 2000 年 1 月 1 日及其之后时都能正确运行？
And what will you do to reassure shareholders that we will not suffer serious business loss or failure due to incorrect handling of these dates by computer systems?
你们将如何让股东放心，确保不会因为计算机系统对这些日期处理不当而遭受严重的业务损失或故障？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually, I’ve got a friend that’s quite involved in the — (laughter) — question of — no, I’m serious about that — the 2000 question with computers. But that’s the kind of thing I don’t worry about.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，事实上，我有一位朋友深度参与了——（笑声）——这个……我是认真的——关于计算机进入 2000 年的问题。但这类事情并不是我会担心的事。
I mean, I will let the people who run the operating businesses work on that. And I’ll work on capital allocation. And I have a feeling, one way or another, we’ll get through it.
我的意思是，我会让运营各项业务的人去处理这些问题，而我来负责资本配置。我有种感觉：无论用哪种方式，我们都会渡过去的。
But like I say, we have — there are a lot of things at Berkshire we don’t — (applause) — we don’t spend a lot of time on a lot of things at the headquarters that other companies have whole departments on.
不过就像我说的，Berkshire 有很多事情——（掌声）——我们总部不会花费太多时间，而其他公司则为此设有整支部门。
And our managers have not let us down. I mean, I must say that we’ve got a group at one business after another. And they focus on their business. And they mail the money to us in Omaha. And we’re all happy. (Laughter)
而我们的经理人从未让我们失望。我的意思是，我们在各个业务中都有这样一群人——他们专注于各自的业务，然后把钱寄到奥马哈给我们，我们大家都很开心。（笑声）
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I have the feeling that our people will be quite good at keeping the computer systems in order and with backups. I also have the feeling that few companies could handle a big computer snafu better than we could.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我觉得我们的人会把计算机系统维护得井井有条，并做好备份。我也认为，很少有公司能比我们更好地应对重大的电脑故障。
I have the feeling the Coca-Cola stock would be there. The Gillette stock would be there. The Nebraska Furniture Mart would be full of furniture and know the customers.
我相信我们持有的 Coca-Cola 股票还在，Gillette 股票还在；Nebraska Furniture Mart 里仍然摆满家具，也仍然认识它的顾客。
I don’t think a computer crash is going to do us in.
我不认为一次电脑崩溃会把我们打倒。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You’re correct, though, that that is a problem for the computer world. But as Charlie says, it’ll hit other people a lot harder than it hits us.
WARREN BUFFETT：对。你说得没错，这确实是计算机领域的问题。但正如 Charlie 所说，它对别人的冲击会远大于对我们的影响。
Most of the things — we try to be in businesses that are fairly simple and that can’t get all messed up.
我们大多数时候——是尽量选择那些相对简单、不至于被搞得一团糟的生意。
And by and large, I think that we’ve got an unusual portfolio of those. And when it gets to our investees, you know, they’re going to worry about those problems themselves.
总体而言，我认为我们拥有一个相当特别的此类业务组合。至于我们的被投资公司，你知道，他们会自己为这些问题操心。
We really worry about allocating money around Berkshire and having the right managers in place. That — if we can do those two right, everything else’ll take care of itself.
我们真正关心的是在 Berkshire 内部如何分配资金，以及是否安排了合适的经理人。只要把这两件事做好，其他问题基本就会迎刃而解。
62. Berkshire businesses are “way easier to predict”
Berkshire 的业务“要容易预测得多”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 3 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Peter Bevelin from Sweden.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Peter Bevelin，来自瑞典。
You have said that you like franchise companies, companies that have — that are castles surrounded by moats, companies that are possible to — you can have some prediction five, 10 years down the road.
你说过你喜欢特许经营型公司，那些像护城河环绕的城堡一样的公司——对于这类公司，你可以对未来五年、十年做出一定的预测。
But aren’t businesses like See’s Candy, the furniture business, the jewelry business, the shoe business, businesses that are hard to predict the future, five, 10 years down the road?
但像 See’s Candy、家具、生珠宝、制鞋这类业务，难道不是在五到十年的跨度上更难预测未来吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: What was that on the last part of that?
WARREN BUFFETT：你最后那部分是什么意思？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Aren’t these businesses hard to predict five or 10 years down the road?
CHARLIE MUNGER：这些业务在五到十年的维度上难以预测，不是吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think —
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Things like shoe business and —
CHARLIE MUNGER：比如制鞋业务，以及——
WARREN BUFFETT: I think they’re far easier to predict than most businesses. I think I can come closer to telling you the future of virtually all of the businesses we have, and not just because we have them — I mean, if they belonged to somebody else — than if I took the Dow 30, excluding the ones we own, or you know, the first 100 companies alphabetically on the New York Stock Exchange.
WARREN BUFFETT：我认为这些业务比大多数业务容易预测得多。我几乎可以更接近地判断我们所拥有的所有业务的未来——不是因为它们归我们所有（即便它们属于别人也一样）——这种把握度要远胜于去预测道琼斯30成分股（剔除我们持有的那些）或纽约证交所按字母排序的前100家公司。
I think ours are way easier to predict. There are fair — they tend to be fundamental things, fairly simple. Rate of change is not fast, so I feel pretty comfortable.
我认为我们的业务要容易预测得多。它们多是一些基本面层面的东西，相对简单，变化速率不快，所以我感到相当踏实。
I think, when you look at Berkshire five years from now, the businesses we have now will be performing pretty much as we’ve anticipated at this time.
我认为，五年后你回看 Berkshire，如今这些业务的表现大体会与我们现在的预期相符。
I hope there are some new ones, and I hope they’re big ones. But I don’t think that we’ll have had lots of surprises in the present ones.
我希望届时会新增一些业务，而且规模可观。但我不认为现有业务会出现很多意外。
My guess is we’ll have had one surprise. I don’t know what it’ll be. But I mean, you know, that happens in life. But there won’t be a series of them.
我的猜测是也许会出现一个意外。我不知道它会是什么。不过你知道，人生中总会有这种事，但不会是一连串的。
Whereas, if you — if we were to buy — if we owned a base metals business or many retailing businesses I can think of, or an auto business, I’m not sure I’d know where we would stand in the competitive pecking order five or 10 years from now.
相反，如果我们去收购、或拥有一家基本金属企业、我能想到的许多零售企业，或者一家汽车企业，我就不太确定五到十年后我们会处于怎样的竞争位置。
I would not want to try and come in and displace See’s Candies, for example, in the business it does, or the Furniture Mart. It’s not an easy job.
我并不想尝试闯入并取代 See’s Candies 在其所处业务中的地位，或者取代 Furniture Mart。那可不是件容易的事。
So, I don’t think you’ll get lots of surprises with the present businesses of Berkshire, but the key is developing more of them.
所以，我不认为 Berkshire 现有业务会有很多意外；关键在于继续发展更多这类业务。
63. Eisner is “most important factor” in Disney’s success
Eisner 是推动 Disney 成功的“最重要因素”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 4 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Stafford Ordahl. I’m from Morris, New York.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Stafford Ordahl，来自纽约州的 Morris。
I was just wondering if the surprise could be coming from Disney. Because it seems to me they’ve been coasting, up until very recently, on the efforts of a person that’s no longer with the company, [Jeffrey] Katzenberg, who is one of those rare geniuses, like [filmmaker Steven] Spielberg, that has his finger on the pulse of the American people.
我在想，那“意外”是否可能来自 Disney。因为在我看来，直到最近，Disney 一直在“吃老本”，靠的是那位已不在公司的 [Jeffrey] Katzenberg 的努力；他属于那种罕见的天才，像电影人 [Steven] Spielberg 一样，能把握美国大众的脉搏。
And that — they don’t come along every day, even in Hollywood.
而这种天才——即使在 Hollywood——也并非每天都会出现。
They might be a very different company now that all of his efforts are, so to speak, out of the pipeline.
如今，随着他的成果可以说都“出清”了，Disney 可能会成为一家非常不同的公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Have you finished, or —?
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。你说完了吗，还是——？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：说完了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I — Katzenberg is a real talent. I would say that, by far, I mean, by far, the most important person at Disney in the last 12 years, or whatever it’s been, has been [CEO] Michael Eisner.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我——Katzenberg 的确是个人才。但我会说，迄今为止，在过去 12 年（或类似的时间）里，Disney 最重要的人物，毫无疑问是 [CEO] Michael Eisner。
I mean, if you know him and what he has done in the business, there’s no one — [former President and Chief Operating Officer] Frank Wells did a terrific job in conjunction with Eisner.
我的意思是，如果你了解他以及他为这门业务所做的事，就会明白无人能及——[前任总裁兼首席运营官] Frank Wells 与 Eisner 搭档表现也非常出色。
But Eisner has been the “Walt Disney,” in effect, of his tenure. He knows the business. He loves the business. You know, he eats and lives and breathes it. And he has been, in my view, by far, the most important factor in Disney’s success.
但在他任内，Eisner 实际上一直扮演着“Walt Disney”的角色。他懂业务、热爱业务，你知道，他把这当作吃穿呼吸般的存在。在我看来，他无疑是推动 Disney 成功的最重要因素。
Now, they face competition. The money is in — you know, the big money is in the animated films and everything that revolves around that, because you go from films to parks to character merchandising and back. And I mean, it’s a circular sort of thing, which feeds on itself. There’s going to be plenty of competition in that.
当然，他们面临竞争。真正的大钱在于——你知道，动画电影以及围绕它的一切：从电影到乐园、到角色商品化，再回到电影。这是一个自我强化的循环体系，而这方面的竞争会非常激烈。
I mean, they’ve — you know, you’ve seen what MCA and Universal’s going to do in the parks in Florida. And you know what DreamWorks is going to do in animation. And now, you’ve got new technology in animation, you know, through [Pixar CEO Steve Jobs.] And there’s a lot of things going on in that field.
比如，你看到 MCA 和 Universal 在佛罗里达乐园要做什么；你也知道 DreamWorks 在动画方面会做什么。如今动画又有了新技术，由 [Pixar CEO Steve Jobs] 推动。这个领域正发生很多事。
So the question is, 10 years from now, what place in the mind — because it’s a share of mind. You know, they call it share of market, but it starts with share of mind — and what place in the mind of billions of children around the world, and their parents, does Disney itself have, and their characters, relative to that owned by other organizations and other characters?
所以问题在于，10 年后，在人们心智中的位置——因为先是“心智份额”，所谓“市场份额”其实始于“心智份额”。在全球数十亿儿童及其父母的心中，Disney 以及它的角色形象，与其他机构和角色相比，会占据怎样的位置？
And it’s a competitive world, so there will be people fighting for that. But I would rather start with Disney’s hand than anyone else’s, by some margin. And I would rather start with Michael Eisner running the place than with anyone else, by some margin.
这个世界充满竞争，会有人为此角力。但我宁可选择站在 Disney 这一边，这一优势相当明显；而且我也宁可让 Michael Eisner 来执掌公司，这同样是明显更好的起点。
So that does not mean that it can’t become a much more competitive business. Because people look at the video releases of a “Lion King,” and they salivate.
当然，这并不意味着这门生意不会变得更加竞争。毕竟，当人们看到《Lion King》的录像带发行数字时，都会眼红。
You know, you sell 30 million copies of something at whatever it may be, 16 or $17, and you can figure out the manufacturing cost. And you know, it gets your attention. And it gets your competitors’ attention.
你知道，某个产品卖出 3000 万套，每套 16 或 17 美元——制造成本你也能算出来——这当然会引人注目，也会引起竞争对手的注意。
But going back, if I had to — if I thought the children of the world were going to want to be entertained 10 or 20 years from now, and I had my choice of betting on who is going to have a special place, if anyone has a special place, in the minds of those kids and their parents, I think I would probably rather bet on Disney.
但回到根本，如果我认为 10 或 20 年后全世界的孩子仍然需要娱乐，而我可以选择押注谁会在这些孩子及其父母的心中占据特殊位置（若真有人能做到），我大概会押注 Disney。
And I would feel particularly good about betting on them, if I had the guy who has done what Eisner has done over those years presiding in the future.
而且如果未来仍由像过去那些年里 Eisner 那样做出成绩的人来执掌，我对押注 Disney 会感觉尤其踏实。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it helps to do the simple arithmetic. Suppose you have a billion children of low-middle income 20 years from now. And suppose you could make $10 per year per child, after taxes, from your position. It gets into very large numbers.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我觉得做个简单算术很有帮助。假设 20 年后有 10 亿名低至中等收入的儿童；假设你每个孩子、税后每年能赚 10 美元。这会是非常巨大的数字。
And — (laughter) — I don’t know about your children and grandchildren, but mine want to see Disney. And they want to see it — (applause) — over and over and over again. They don’t want to see Katzenberg. (Laughter)
而且——（笑声）——我不清楚你们的子孙如何，但我的孩子就想看 Disney。他们想一遍又一遍地看——（掌声）——他们不想看 Katzenberg。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well I —
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I mean, in terms of the trade name. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我是说，就“商标/品牌名”而言。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a pretty good trade name. I mean, when you think about names around the world, it’s interesting that, you know, it’s very hard to beat the name Coca-Cola. But Disney’s got a — it’s very, very big name.
WARREN BUFFETT：这是个很强的品牌名。放眼全球，Coca-Cola 这个名字很难被超越，但 Disney 也是——它是一个非常非常大的名字。
And Charlie’s point that they want to see them over and over again, and it’s kind of nice to be able to recycle Snow White every seven or eight years. You hit a different crowd.
而且正如 Charlie 所说，受众想一遍遍重看；能每隔七八年把《Snow White》重新上映一遍，这是件很妙的事——你触达的是一批新的观众。
And — (laughter) — it’s kind of like having an oil field, you know, where you pump out all the oil and sell it. And then it all seeps back in over seven or eight years. (Laughter)
而且——（笑声）——这有点像你拥有一个油田，把油都抽出来卖掉，然后过七八年它又都“渗回来”了。（笑声）
64. Why Wall Street businesses are “tough” to manage
为什么华尔街的业务“难以”管理
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 5 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Randall Bellows (PH) from Chicago. Thank you for this marathon question-and-answer period.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Randall Bellows（PH），来自 Chicago。感谢这场马拉松式的问答。
WARREN BUFFETT: We enjoy it. Thanks.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们很享受这个过程。谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. My question is on the security business, Wall Street firms, in general, and specifically, what you feel about Salomon at this time. Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢。我的问题是关于证券业，整体而言是华尔街的公司，尤其是你现在对 Salomon 的看法。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we know more about the security business than we knew 10 years ago. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们现在对证券业的了解比 10 年前多了。（笑声）
And it, you know, it is a tough business to manage.
而且你知道，这是一门很难管理的生意。
There’s a lot of money made in the business and then — throughout Wall Street, I’m talking about. There’s, you know, there’s very big sums of money made. And then the question is, how does it get divided up between the institution and the people there?
在这行里赚到很多钱——我说的是整个华尔街。你知道，会赚到非常大笔的金钱。问题在于，这些钱如何在机构和在那里工作的人之间分配？
And you get to this question — I’ve often used the analogy of, you know, would you rather — if you’re an investor, and you get a chance to buy the Mayo Clinic, you know, that is one sort of an investment. And if you get a chance to buy the local brain surgeon, that’s another one.
你会碰到这样的问题——我常用一个类比：作为投资者，如果你有机会买下 Mayo Clinic，那是一种投资；如果你有机会“买下”当地最好的脑外科医生，那又是另一种投资。
You buy the local brain surgeon and his practice for X millions of dollars. And the next day, you know, what do you own?
你花 X 百万美元“买下”这位脑外科医生及其门诊业务。第二天，你到底拥有什么？
And if you’re buying the local brain surgeon, you would not pay any real multiple of earnings because he’s going to have this revelation, several days later, that it’s really him and not you there, with your little stock certificate, that’s producing the earnings. And it’s his reputation. And he doesn’t care.
如果你“买的是”这位医生，你不会为其收益支付什么像样的倍数，因为没过几天他就会醒悟：真正创造收益的是他本人，而不是你手中的小小股票凭证。那是他的声誉带来的，他并不在乎你。
Can you imagine Berkshire Hathaway advertising brain surgery, you know, how much business we would do?
你能想象 Berkshire Hathaway 去打“脑外科手术”的广告吗？你知道我们能做成多少这样的业务吗？
So — (laughter) — he owns the business, even though you’ve got the stock certificate.
所以——（笑声）——即便你拿着股权凭证，真正拥有这门生意的还是他。
Now, if you go to the Mayo Clinic, no one can name the name of anybody at the Mayo Clinic, unless you live within 10 miles of Rochester [Minnesota].
再看 Mayo Clinic，除非你住在明尼苏达州 Rochester 周边 10 英里内，否则没人能叫出那里的医生名字。
And there, the institution has the power. Now, it has to keep quality up and do all the things that an institution has to do. But whoever owns the Mayo Clinic has an asset that is independent of the attitude of any one person in the place the next day.
在那里，力量属于“机构”。当然，它必须保持质量，做机构应做的一切。但不管谁拥有 Mayo Clinic，他拥有的是一种不依赖于某个个体次日态度的资产。
Wall Street has a mix of both. And there are some businesses that are more — where the value resides more in the institution. And there are some where the value resides more in the individuals.
华尔街两者兼而有之。有些业务更多地体现为“机构价值”，另一些则更多地依赖“个人价值”。
We’ve got a couple of sensational people running Salomon. And they wrestle with this problem as they go along. And they seem to be wrestling considerably more successfully currently than was the case close to a year ago.
我们有几位出色的人在管理 Salomon。他们在推进业务的同时也在与这个问题较劲。看起来他们现在比一年前左右在这方面应对得成功得多。
But it is not an easy business to run. And it’s not an easy business to predict, unless you have a business that’s very institutional in character, and there aren’t many of those in Wall Street.
但这绝不是一门容易经营的生意，也不是一门容易预测的生意，除非它高度“机构化”。而在华尔街，这样的业务并不多。
65. Not important if part of the market is “kind of screwy”
即使市场的某个部分“有点离谱”，也无关紧要
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 6 区？
Sorry we got a — the microphone’s over here.
抱歉，我们——话筒在这边。
CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible)
CHARLIE MUNGER：（听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Just raise your hand and the monitor will supply the microphone.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。请举手，工作人员会把话筒递过去。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Howard Winston (PH) from Cincinnati, Ohio.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢。我是 Howard Winston（PH），来自俄亥俄州 Cincinnati。
One question. Are you concerned about the rising valuations on the NASDAQ market, where companies trade at multiples of revenues instead of multiples of earnings?
只有一个问题。你是否担心 NASDAQ 市场估值走高——公司按营收倍数而不是按盈利倍数交易？
WARREN BUFFETT: The rising value of what, did you say?
WARREN BUFFETT：你说什么的估值在上升？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The NASDAQ market —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：NASDAQ 市场——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh.
WARREN BUFFETT：哦。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — where they trade at 10 times revenues or more, 30 times revenues, instead of 10 times earnings?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：——它们按 10 倍营收、甚至 30 倍营收交易，而不是按 10 倍盈利？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we don’t pay much attention to that. Because throughout the careers Charlie and I have had in investing, there have always been hundreds of cases, or thousands of cases, of things that are ridiculously priced, and phony stock promotions, and the gullible being led in to believe in things that just can’t come true.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。嗯，我们并不太在意这种事。因为在我和 Charlie 的整个投资生涯中，总是存在数以百计、甚至上千起的离谱定价、虚假“炒股故事”、以及轻信的人被引导去相信根本不可能成真的东西。
So that’s always gone on. It always will go on. And it doesn’t make any difference to us.
所以这种情况一直存在，也会一直存在。但这对我们毫无影响。
I mean, we are not trying to predict markets. We never will try and predict markets. We’re trying to find wonderful businesses. And the fact that a part of the market is kind of screwy, you know, that’s unimportant to us.
我的意思是，我们不试图预测市场，也永远不会去预测市场。我们要做的是寻找优秀的企业。至于市场的某个部分“有点离谱”，你知道的，那对我们并不重要。
We tried, a few times, shorting some of those things in our innocence of youth. And it’s very tough to make money shorting even the obvious frauds. And there are some obvious frauds.
我们年轻时也曾天真地做过几次这类标的的空头。但即使针对“显而易见的骗局”做空，要赚钱也很难。确实存在一些显而易见的骗局。
It really is — it’s not tough — it’s not so tough to find the obvious frauds, and it’s not tough to be right over 10 years. But it’s very tough to make money being short them, although we tried a few times way back.
说真的——要发现那些显而易见的骗局并不难，十年后被事实证明正确也不难。但靠做空它们赚钱却非常难，尽管我们早年也尝试过几次。
It’s — we don’t look at indicia from stocks in general, or from P/Es, or price-sales ratios, or what other things are doing.
我们——不会去看所谓“整体股票的各种迹象”，也不会盯着 P/E、price-sales ratios，或者别的东西在做什么。
We really just focus on businesses. We don’t care if there’s a stock market. I mean, would we want to own Coca-Cola, the 8 percent we own of Coca-Cola, or the 11 percent or Gillette, if they said, you know, “We’re just going to delist the stock and we’re never — you know, we’ll open it again in 20 years?”
我们真正关注的是企业本身。有没有股票市场，我们不在乎。我的意思是，就算他们说：“我们要把股票退市，二十年后再重新挂牌”，我们是否还愿意持有 Coca-Cola（我们持有 8% 的 Coca-Cola）或 Gillette（我们持有 11%）的股份？
It’s fine with us, you know. And if it goes down on the news, we’ll buy more of it. So we care about what the business does. Yeah.
对我们来说照样可以。要是因为这新闻股价下跌，我们还会多买一些。所以我们在乎的是企业的经营表现。对。
66. A business is more important than where it’s based
一门生意本身比它的注册地更重要
WARREN BUFFETT: Norton, did — why don’t you give him the microphone there?
WARREN BUFFETT：Norton——能不能把话筒递给那位？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Warren, for including me — (Buffett laughs) — out of order.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢你，Warren，破例让我——（Buffett 大笑）——插个队。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s good to have you here. Norton [Dodge] represents a family that came in nineteen-fifty —
WARREN BUFFETT：很高兴你能来。Norton【Dodge】所代表的这个家族是在一九五——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Six.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：六。
WARREN BUFFETT: Six! Yeah, that joined up with the partnership and has been with us ever since. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT：六！对，当年加入了我们的合伙企业，从那时起一直和我们在一起。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A very, very fortunate connection. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：这真是非常非常幸运的缘分。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Both ways, Norton, both ways.
WARREN BUFFETT：彼此彼此，Norton，彼此彼此。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：而且——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Careful, Norton. We don’t want you mobbed on the way out. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：小心点，Norton。我们可不想你一会儿被大家围住。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But I might say that it all began with my father [Homer Dodge] discovering — thanks to a professor of finance that was also at the University of Oklahoma — Ben Graham, back in 1940.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：不过我得说，一切要从我父亲【Homer Dodge】说起。多亏了当时也在 University of Oklahoma 的一位金融学教授，他在 1940 年结识了 Ben Graham。
And then later, when Ben Graham was about to retire, we were trying to find his protégé. And clearly, that was Warren. And so he belongs to that long tradition.
后来，当 Ben Graham 快要退休时，我们试图找到他的门生。显然，那就是 Warren。所以他延续了那条悠久的传统。
But the question I wanted to ask was, you’ve mentioned the very strong companies that Berkshire has that are really international companies, like Coca-Cola and the — Gillette.
但我想问的问题是：你提到 Berkshire 拥有一些非常强大的公司，它们实际上是国际化公司，比如 Coca-Cola 和——Gillette。
But are you considering, or have you ever thought of considering, the foreign companies that are undervalued? Or have you, for some reason, not included that in your universe of companies to consider?
那么你们是否在考虑，或曾想过考虑，被低估的海外公司？还是说出于某种原因，你们并未把它们纳入可选标的范围？
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve looked at companies domiciled in other countries. And we continue to look at companies domiciled in other countries.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们看过注册在其他国家的公司，也会继续关注这些境外注册公司。
We wouldn’t — you know, we’re happy for the U.S. and for Atlanta that Coca-Cola’s domiciled in Atlanta. But would we pass on it if it happened to be domiciled in England? No, we’d love it, if it were domiciled in England, too.
我们当然——你知道，我们为美国、也为 Atlanta 感到高兴，因为 Coca-Cola 注册在 Atlanta。但如果它碰巧注册在 England，我们会因此错过吗？不会，即便注册在 England，我们一样会喜欢。
And we feel that the important thing is the business, not the domicile. Although, it’s — A, we’re more familiar, in a general way, with domestic companies that are domiciled here, although they make — they may make their money internationally.
我们认为关键在于生意本身，而不是注册地。尽管——第一，总体上我们对本土注册的公司更熟悉，哪怕它们的利润可能来自全球市场。
And we feel a tiny bit more comfortable, just a tiny bit, in terms of understanding the nuances of taxes, and politics, and shareholder governance, and all of that in something where we’ve been reading and thinking about it daily than someplace where we’ve had a little less experience.
而在税务、政治、股东治理等细微差别上，我们对每天接触、长期思考的本土环境会**略微**更有把握——仅仅是略微——相比那些我们经验稍少的法域。
But we would love to find a wonderful business that is domiciled in any one of 30 or so countries around the world.
不过，如果能在全球三十来个国家中的任何一个找到一家出色的企业，我们会非常乐意。
We look some. We don’t look as hard as we look at domestic companies. We’re not as familiar with them.
我们会看一些，但研究强度不如本土公司，因为对它们不那么熟悉。
But I have read hundreds of annual reports of companies spread around the world. And we’ve owned a few, just a couple.
不过我确实读过全球各地公司数以百计的年报。我们也持有过少数几家——只是寥寥几家。
They’re usually not as big, so just getting the kind of money in, in many cases, is more of a problem. But some of them are big.
它们通常没有那么大，所以在很多情况下要投入足够的资金并不容易——但也有一些体量很大的例外。
And we do not have such a surplus of ideas that we can afford to ignore any possibilities. And if we can find something with a market cap, probably, of at least $5 billion or greater, that strikes us as having our kind of qualities, and the price is right and everything, we will buy.
而且我们的好主意并没有多到可以忽视任何可能性的地步。如果我们能找到一家市值**至少**50 亿美元、具备我们偏好的品质、且价格合适的公司，我们就会买入。
67. We never reach “for an extra eight of a percent”
我们从不为“多八分之一个点”的收益去冒险
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 1 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett. I’m Nelson Coburn (PH) from Silver Spring, Maryland. I have one question I want to ask that hasn’t come up here yet.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：下午好，Buffett 先生。我是 Nelson Coburn（PH），来自马里兰州的 Silver Spring。我有一个问题，之前还没人提到过。
Where does the money sit that comes in, say, from dividends and whatever other income that comes into Berkshire, that you’re waiting to invest someplace else? Is it get — someplace where it’s taking in a profit? Or is it just sitting, gathering dust? (Laughter)
来自分红或其他收入、流入 Berkshire 而暂时等待再投资的资金会放在哪儿？它们是否被放在某个会产生收益的地方？还是就这么闲置在那里、落灰？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we only have about four or five commercial paper names we accept. We’re very picky about where we put — the money all gets invested. We do not have anything sitting around in a safe or anyplace else. So it’s all invested.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们只接受大约四到五个 commercial paper（商业票据）发行主体。我们对资金的存放地点非常挑剔——所有钱都会被投资。我们不会把资金闲置在保险柜或其他任何地方。所以全部都会投出去。
But we do not get venturesome, in the least, in terms of where our short-term money goes. So we only have, like I say, maybe four or five approved names on commercial paper, all of which I approve. I mean, if anything ever goes haywire on this, it’s my fault.
但对于短期资金的去向，我们一点也不会冒险。所以正如我说的，我们在商业票据上只有四五个“批准名单”，而且都由我亲自核准。也就是说，如果这方面出了纰漏，那就是我的责任。
Right now, we have, maybe, a billion and something in relatively short-term Treasurys. And we have a little extra in some commercial paper, maybe.
目前，我们可能持有大约十多亿美元的相对短期的国债（Treasurys）。另外还有一小部分放在一些商业票据上。
But you will never see us reaching for an extra eighth of a percent on short-term yields.
但你绝不会看到我们为了短期收益多拿**八分之一个百分点（1/8%）**而去“伸手够一够”。
Some of you may remember the fiasco in the — in Penn Central, in the commercial paper market. And Penn Central, around 1970 or thereabouts, was paying a quarter of a point, as I remember, more than other commercial paper issuers.
你们中有些人可能还记得商业票据市场上 Penn Central 的那场闹剧。大概在 1970 年前后，Penn Central 的票据利率比其他发行人高出约**四分之一个点（1/4%）**，如果我没记错的话。
And of course, they, one day, despite showing a positive net worth, I think, of a billion and a half or so, they said they had a lot of net worth but no cash. Turned out cash was more important. And so they defaulted.
结果，有一天他们虽然账面净资产仍为正值（我记得大概有 15 亿美元），却承认“净资产很多，但没有现金”。事实证明，现金更重要，于是他们违约了。
Now, the interesting thing about doing that is, if you’re getting a quarter of a point extra, and you came over on the Mayflower, and you landed, and you said, “Well, I’m going to apply myself to getting a quarter of a point extra on short-term money,” and you didn’t make any mistake until you got to Penn Central, you would — aside from the compounding aspect — you would be behind at that point.
有趣的是：如果你从“五月花号”靠岸那天起就决定“我要在短期资金上多拿四分之一个点”，一路从不犯错，直到遇上 Penn Central 才第一次“中招”，那么——先不谈复利效应——到了那一刻你已经**整体落后**了。
And I don’t like a business that you can do right for 300 years and then make one mistake and — (laughter) — be behind.
我不喜欢那种“做对 300 年，只要一次犯错就——（笑声）——一朝回到解放前”的生意。
So we are very picky about short-term paper. But it is all invested. And when it’s large amounts, it probably will be in Treasurys. A couple firms’ commercial paper, we take.
因此我们对短期票据极为挑剔。但资金都会投出去。规模较大时，通常会投国债；另外我们也会持有**少数几家**公司的商业票据。
68. Volatile earnings to be expected at Salomon
预期 Salomon 的盈利会波动较大
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2, please?
WARREN BUFFETT：请第 2 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is George Gotti (PH) from Zurich, Switzerland. I’ve got a question with respect to Salomon.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 George Gotti（PH），来自瑞士 Zurich。我有一个关于 Salomon 的问题。
Salomon experienced quite a large volatility in profits and even revenues in the past years. What are your views on how this will develop in the future with respect to volatility in profits and revenues?
过去几年，Salomon 的利润，甚至收入，都出现了相当大的波动。请问你们对未来利润和收入波动性的看法如何？
WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t get a hundred percent of that, Charlie. Want to —?
WARREN BUFFETT：我不太完全听清，Charlie，你要不要——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well —
CHARLIE MUNGER：好的，嗯——
WARREN BUFFETT: I can see, he can hear. We make a great combination. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我看得清，他听得清。我们是绝佳组合。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you can see we aren’t wasting much around the joint. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，你也看出来我们这儿没怎么浪费资源。（笑声）
Salomon’s earnings have always been volatile, at least all the time I’ve been around the place. And I don’t think that that volatility will — is likely to disappear.
Salomon 的盈利一直都很波动，至少在我接触这家公司的这段时间里如此。我不认为这种波动性会——会消失。
All that said, we very much like the people at Salomon. And they’ve done a ton of business with Berkshire over the years and in a whole lot of different capacities. And they’ve done it very well.
尽管如此，我们非常认可 Salomon 的团队。多年来他们以多种身份和 Berkshire 开展了大量业务，而且做得非常出色。
So we’re high on the firm, as a customer. And the firms we like, as a customer, we think, maybe, other people will like, as a customer. And generally, we love it, volatile or no.
因此，作为客户，我们对这家公司评价很高。我们喜欢作为客户去合作的公司，或许其他人作为客户也会喜欢。总体上，不管其波动与否，我们都很满意。
WARREN BUFFETT: If you — at Salomon, as well as other firms of that type, they mark their securities to market. And so the changes in those marks go through earnings daily, actually, but you see them quarterly.
WARREN BUFFETT：像 Salomon 以及同类公司，会按市值计量其证券。因此，这些估值变动其实每天都会进入损益，只是你们在季度报表里才看到。
Interestingly, if you took Berkshire over the last 30 years, and marked to market, as we do now for balance sheet purposes, but not for income statement purposes, because the rules are different in that case — if you did that, you would see enormous volatility, quarter to quarter, in Berkshire’s figures.
有趣的是，如果把 Berkshire 过去 30 年也全部按市值计量——就像我们现在在资产负债表上所做的那样，但利润表并不要求这么做——如果那样处理，你会看到 Berkshire 的季度数字出现巨大的波动。
You would — I don’t think you’d necessarily have seen any down year. But you would’ve seen swings between a few percent and, perhaps, 50 percent or something.
你可能——我不认为你一定会看到全年为负的年份，但季度间的波动可能在几个百分点到也许 50% 左右之间。
And if you looked quarterly, you’d have seen a number of quarters of losses. And you would’ve seen some great upsurges, too.
如果逐季看，你会看到若干个亏损季度，也会看到大幅上升的季度。
The volatility would be extreme, if it had all been run through the income account. But accounting convention does not call for running it through the income account, in the case of Berkshire. And it does, in the case of Salomon.
如果把这些都通过利润表反映，波动会非常极端。但对 Berkshire 而言，会计准则并不要求这么做；而对 Salomon 来说，则是要通过利润表反映的。
But the nature of their business is volatile earnings. The nature of most Wall Street businesses is going to be volatile earnings. Some may follow policies that tend to make it look a little less volatile than it might actually be, even.
不过，他们业务的本质就是盈利波动。大多数华尔街业务的本质都是盈利波动。甚至有些公司会采取政策，让报表看起来比实际波动要小一些。
The real thing that counts is two things, really. I mean, it’s running it so that the volatility never kills you in any way, and the second is having a decent return on equity over time. And I think that the people at the top of Salomon are very focused on that.
真正重要的是两点：第一，经营方式要确保这种波动绝不会以任何方式“要了你的命”；第二，是长期取得不错的股东权益回报。我认为 Salomon 的管理层非常专注于这两点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s illogical for the credit rating agencies to mark down Salomon as much as they do because the earnings are volatile. But they’re in a style business. And it’s their game.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我觉得评级机构因为盈利波动就把 Salomon 降级那么多并不合逻辑。但他们身处的是一种“风格化”的行业，这就是他们的游戏规则。
69. Very little interaction between Berkshire subsidiaries
Berkshire 子公司之间的互动非常少
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone — what are we? Zone 3 now? Yeah, zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：分区——我们到哪儿了？现在是第 3 区吗？对，第 3 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I have three quick questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的。我有三个简短的问题。
Do you have any formal or informal way where the managements — I know that you don’t interfere with the managements of the holdings — but where they can cross-pollinate ideas, for instance, you know, selling World Book through the GEICO channel or something like that?
你们是否有任何正式或非正式的方式，让各家管理层——我知道你们不会干预所持公司的管理——彼此“交叉授粉”分享想法？比如，通过 GEICO 的渠道销售 World Book 之类的做法？
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll answer that right now. There’s very, very, very little of that, I — you know, maybe once in two or three years, maybe some idea might strike me as worth passing along. But I — they’re doing fine running their own operations.
WARREN BUFFETT：我现在就回答。此类事情非常、非常、非常少。你知道，可能两三年才有一次，我会觉得某个点子值得转达。但总体上——他们各自把业务经营得很好。
We don’t do it within Berkshire, either. They really go their own way.
我们在 Berkshire 内部也不会这么做。各家公司基本都是各走各的路。
Now, they know what businesses we’re in. And so they can always go directly to somebody else. But they don’t need me to communicate.
当然，他们知道我们拥有哪些业务，所以随时可以直接联系别的公司。但这不需要通过我来传话。
70. Lloyd’s of London reputation problems have helped Berkshire
Lloyd’s of London 的声誉问题反而帮助了 Berkshire
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 4 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Mike Macey (PH) from Las Vegas, Nevada.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Mike Macey（PH），来自内华达州 Las Vegas。
My question is this. There have been some recent news articles on the problems at Lloyd’s. What effect, if any, do you see the problems at Lloyd’s having on an increase in the Berkshire insurance or reinsurance business?
我的问题是：近期有一些关于 Lloyd’s 出现问题的新闻。你认为这些问题会不会、以及如何影响 Berkshire 的保险或再保险业务增长？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think, probably, I think it’s fair to say that the problems of Lloyd’s have helped us because Lloyd’s had a terrific reputation. It was the first stop and, usually, the last stop for all kinds of unusual risks and large risks 20 years ago.
WARREN BUFFETT：我认为，可以公平地说，Lloyd’s 的问题对我们是有利的。过去 Lloyd’s 名声极佳。二十年前，针对各种非常规风险与大额风险，它往往是第一站、也常常是最后一站。
跟着没落，环境的影响还是很大的。
And the fact that they have lost some of their luster in that period has helped us. And, you know, we didn’t do anything to contribute to it, but it obviously benefits us, as a competitor, when questions develop about an organization which has been a premier player in the industry.
而在这段时期里，他们光环的褪去，确实帮助了我们。我们当然没有推波助澜，但当业界翘楚的声誉出现质疑时，作为竞争者，我们自然从中受益。
So, Berkshire probably possesses more capital than all of Lloyd’s put together, and it has established a reputation for being willing to quote on very large risks very quickly and to do exactly what it says. And it might very well be that, in many cases, we would get a call before they would get the call now.
因此，Berkshire 的资本规模可能超过整个 Lloyd’s 之和；我们也已建立起一种声誉：愿意对超大风险迅速报价，并严格兑现承诺。现在在许多情况下，很可能我们会先接到电话，而不是他们。
So we’ve been a beneficiary and, probably, in a fairly good-sized way, from their problems. And it’s more difficult for them to make inroads on us now than would’ve been the case 10 years ago.
所以，我们是受益者，而且受益规模不小。如今他们要想在我们这块地盘上取得进展，比 10 年前要困难得多。
We have a — I don’t like to lay it on too strong — but we do have a preeminent position in a certain area of really large-scale reinsurance that will be difficult for anyone else to replicate.
我们在某些真正大型的再保险领域拥有——我不想夸得太过——但确实拥有一种难以被他人复制的领先地位。
Now, they may not like our prices. There may not be demand for some of the things we can do. But if there is demand, we are very likely to get some very significant business out of that position. And we’ve seen it some in recent years. And we’ll see it more in the future.
当然，他们可能不喜欢我们的价格；我们能提供的一些能力也未必总有需求。但一旦有需求，我们极有可能凭借这种地位拿到非常可观的业务。过去几年已见端倪，未来会更多。
71. “We assume we’ll be around forever”
“我们假定自己会永远存在”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 5 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City with a question for Charlie about the hundred or so models we ought to have in our head —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 New York City 的 Mike Assail（PH），想请教 Charlie 关于我们脑子里应该装的那一百来个模型——
WARREN BUFFETT: Here we go.
WARREN BUFFETT：开始了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — mentioned at the end of the excellent “Worldly Wisdom” speech.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：——就是那篇精彩的“Worldly Wisdom”演讲结尾提到的那些。
I’d like to know the most useful models on industry consolidation, on product extension, on vertical integration, and any models which explain the special cases when it makes sense to invest in retailing stocks. And if Warren has anything to add or subtract, I’d love to hear it. Thank you very much.
我想知道在行业整合、产品延伸、纵向一体化这几方面最有用的模型，以及解释在何种特殊情形下投资零售类股票有意义的模型。如果 Warren 有任何补充或删减意见，我也很乐意听。非常感谢。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m glad to answer such a modest question. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我很乐意回答这样一个“谦虚”的问题。（笑声）
I spoke about having a hundred models in your head. But those are all great, big models of considerable generality that are useful over and over again.
我所说的“脑中百模”指的是那些范围很广、可一再复用的“大模型”。
Now, you’re down into very complex sub-modeling when you get into a separate model for what’s going to happen in industrial consolidations and retail and so on, and I’m not up to all those sub-models. (Laughter)
但如果你要为行业整合、零售等分别建立单独的细分模型，那就会陷入非常复杂的次级建模——而我并不具备所有那些子模型。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The truth is, you know, we’re up to a few. But we take the general models and, you know, plug them in. And sometimes, the light goes on. And sometimes, it doesn’t. But if it does, they could be quite useful.
说实话，我们确实只掌握其中的少数。我们会把那些通用模型拿来套用。有时会“灵光乍现”，有时则不会。但一旦奏效，它们就会非常有用。
If you focus, you do see repetition of certain business patterns and business behavior. And Wall Street tends to ignore those, incidentally. I mean, Wall Street really doesn’t seem to learn, for very long, business lessons.
如果你足够专注，你会看到某些商业模式和行为不断重复。顺带说一句，华尔街往往忽视这些。我的意思是，华尔街似乎很难长期记住商业教训。
It may not be to their advantage to learn it. Charlie would — that would probably plug right in to Charlie’s model. It’s —
学会这些可能并不符合他们的利益。Charlie 会——这大概正好对应 Charlie 的模型。也就是说——
替老鸡友把问题挡下来。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You bet.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没错。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s better, if you’re out selling the future, it may be better to forget the past, if you’re getting paid on selling it and not on betting your life on it in some way.
对。如果你的工作是“兜售未来”，那忘掉过去或许更有利——毕竟你的报酬来自“销售”，而不是用自己的身家去押注。
One situation at Berkshire that really is somewhat different than many companies: we assume, and unfortunately, it’s in error, but we assume we’ll be around forever.
Berkshire 有一点跟很多公司真的不同：我们假定——虽然这在现实上是错误的——但我们假定自己会永远存在。
So when we — in our insurance business, we assume we’re going to be here to pay every claim. And we’re not going to retire at 65 and hand over something to someone else. And there wouldn’t be any sense paying games on accounting because it would catch up with us later on.
因此，在我们的保险业务里，我们假设自己会一直在场，履行每一笔理赔。我们不会在 65 岁退休把摊子交给别人。玩会计花样毫无意义，因为迟早会“找上门”。
And whereas, in many businesses, I don’t think they have quite the same horizon on things. They do at a Coca-Cola, or they do at a Gillette.
而在许多企业里，我不认为他们看问题有同样的时间视野。当然在 Coca-Cola、在 Gillette 这样的公司里会有。
But many companies are thinking about what kind of — I think, I’m afraid that, more than you’d like — are thinking about what little pictures they can paint for the next four quarters or so. And that’s easy to do.
但很多公司——恐怕远超你所希望的数量——在思考的是未来四个季度要“画出怎样的小图景”。而这很容易做到。
But our problem is we’re going to be around a lot longer, we think, than four quarters, so that’s not an option available to us. And we have to — we really run it as if, in the year 2050 or something, somebody’s going to look and say, “Did — how’d it work out?”
可我们的难处在于：我们自认为会存在远超四个季度的时间，所以那种做法对我们不可用。我们必须——我们真的要把公司当作会在 2050 年之类的某一天被人回望、然后问一句“结果怎样？”来经营。
72. Compensation plans must include cost of capital
薪酬计划必须计入资本成本
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone, where are we, 5 or 6? Wherever the microphone is.
WARREN BUFFETT：分区，我们现在在哪儿，5 还是 6？话筒在哪儿我们就去哪儿。
Zone 5, we got a mic over there? Maybe that was — 6! OK, we’ll go to 6.
第 5 区，那边有话筒吗？也许是在——6！好的，我们去第 6 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You state, in your letter —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你在致股东信里说——
WARREN BUFFETT: Could you have the microphone? Or do we have one in the — yeah. Want to bring him the microphone? Particularly for the people behind you, it’s a little difficult.
WARREN BUFFETT：能拿到话筒吗？或者我们这边有——好。把话筒递给他好吗？尤其是后面的人，听起来会有些困难。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Glen Rollins (PH), Atlanta, Georgia.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Glen Rollins（PH），乔治亚州 Atlanta。
You state, in your letters to shareholders, that with your wholly owned companies, you reward them at a higher rate when they release capital to you. And you, likewise, charge them a higher rate when they need capital. Could you elaborate on that?
你在致股东信里提到，对于全资子公司，当它们把资本上缴给你们时，你们给予更高的奖励；而当它们需要资本时，你们也按较高的费率向其收费。能否详细解释一下？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we — some of our businesses don’t need capital at all, or need so little that it doesn’t make sense to build it into a formula.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们——有些业务几乎不需要资本，或者需要得非常少，以至于没必要把它写进某种公式。
So we have certain businesses, those are the best businesses, incidentally, that take — to take, essentially, no capital because it means that, if you double the size of the business, you don’t need any more capital. And those are really wonderful businesses. And we’ve got a few of those.
所以我们有些业务——顺便说一句，这些是最好的业务——基本不占用资本，这意味着即使你把业务规模翻倍，也不需要更多资本。这类业务非常棒。我们有几项这样的业务。
But where our businesses do produce capital, we could have all kinds of complicated systems and have capital budgeting groups at headquarters and do all kinds of things.
但对于会产生、也会使用资本的业务，我们本可以设立各种复杂的体系，在总部搞资本预算小组，做一大堆事。
But we just figure it’s simpler to charge people a fair amount for the money and then let them figure out, you know, whether they really want to buy a new slitter or whatever it may be in their business.
但我们认为更简单的做法是：对资金收取一个公允的成本，然后让各业务线自己判断——比如，是否真的要买一台新的分切机，或者其他任何设备。
And it varies a little bit. It varies on the history of when we came in. It varies on interest rates that they — but we generally will be charging people something in the area of 15 percent, in terms of working out compensation arrangements for capital.
这个费率会有些许差异，取决于我们进入该业务的历史、当时的利率水平等等；但总体上，在设计“资本相关的激励/计费安排”时，我们一般按**15%**左右收取。
Now, 15 percent pretax, depending on state income taxes, is only 9 to 9 1/2 percent after-tax. So you can say that isn’t even enough to charge people, but we find that 15 percent gets their attention.
当然，15% 是税前口径；按各州所得税不同，税后也就 9% 到 9.5%。你可以说这对他们来说都不算“贵”，但我们发现 15% 足以让他们重视起来。
And it should get their attention, but it shouldn’t be such a high-hurdle rate that things that we want to do don’t get done.
它应该引起重视，但又不至于把门槛抬得太高，以致我们想做的好事反而做不成。
Our managers expect to be running their businesses for a long, long time. So we don’t worry about them doing something that works for them in the next year but doesn’t work five years out or vice — you know, where they don’t make longer plans, because they see themselves as part-owners of the business. But we want them to be owners with a cost attached to capital.
我们的经理人预期会长期经营他们的业务。所以我们不担心他们只做“未来一年好看、五年后不行”的事，或反过来——他们会做长期规划，因为他们把自己视作业务的共同所有者。但我们希望他们是带着资本成本来做所有者。
We think it’s awful, frankly, the way businesses reward executives with absolutely no regard for the cost of capital. I mean, a fixed-price option for 10 years — you know, imagine giving somebody an interest-free loan for 10 years. You’re not going to do it.
坦白说，我们认为很多公司无视资本成本去奖励高管的做法很糟糕。举例，给 10 年期固定行权价的期权——这就像给某人一笔 10 年免息贷款。你会这么干吗？当然不会。
And if a company is retaining a significant part of its earnings, and you give out a fixed-price option for 10 years, you know, they can do nothing with it but put it in a savings account, and they’ll make some money off of it. So it — we like attaching a cost to the capital.
而且如果公司留存了大量利润，你又发了 10 年期的固定价期权——什么都不做、就像把钱存活期，过几年也会赚到钱。所以——我们倾向于给资本附上成本。
If we had options for me and Charlie at Berkshire, which would not — it’s not going to happen, but it would not be illogical. We have responsibility for the whole place.
假设 Berkshire 给我和 Charlie 发期权——虽然不会发生，但理论上并非不合逻辑——毕竟我们对整个公司负责。
You could have some kind of a compensation arrangement that worked in respect to how the whole enterprise fared, and it would make sense for the two of us.
你可以把薪酬安排与整个企业的整体表现挂钩，这对我们两人是说得通的。
It wouldn’t make sense for the rest of our managers because they work on specific units. And you should have compensation arrangements that apply to those units.
但对其他经理人就不合适了，因为他们各自负责具体事业部；薪酬就应该与各自事业部挂钩。
But assuming you had it for the two of us — which we’re not going to have, I want to assure you — but we would say the fair way to do that would be to have an option at not less than present intrinsic value.
但就算给我们两人——再次强调，我们不会这么做——公平的方式应该是：期权行权价不低于当前的内在价值。
Forget what the market price is. Because, believe me, it — the idea of having the more depressed your market price be, the better your option price be, does not make any sense.
别管市价是多少。相信我——市价越低、期权越便宜就越好的想法是没有意义的。
So we would have it at not less than intrinsic value. And then we would have it step up yearly based on something relating to a cost to capital. Because we would say, “Why should we get free use of the shareholders’ capital?” And we could work out a fair stock option.
因此，行权价应不低于内在价值；并且每年按资本成本进行台阶式上调。因为问题在于：“为什么我们可以免费使用股东资本？”据此我们就能设计出一个公平的期权方案。
That would be perfectly appropriate. We won’t do it, but it’d be a perfectly appropriate way to have us compensated that involved an issuance, then an initial price of not less than intrinsic value, and involve carrying costs.
这会是完全恰当的安排。我们不会去做，但若要做，就该包含发行、初始价格不低于内在价值，并按资本成本计提持有成本。
And then we would be in a position, still, not totally analogous to shareholders, because we wouldn’t have a downside that you have, but we would at least have the carrying cost that you have of ownership.
这样一来，我们的处境虽然仍与股东不完全对等（因为我们没有你们那样的下行风险），但至少会承担你们作为所有者所承担的持有成本。
And we work that through into our unit compensation plans by having a cost of capital that, like I say, tends to run about that 15 percent area.
我们把这种理念落实到各事业部的薪酬计划里，就是设定一条资本成本线，正如我所说，通常在 15% 附近。
And if people can give us money, we should be able to figure out a way to do something better than 15 percent pretax with it. That’s part of our job, too. So we will pay them to give us back money.
如果各单位把钱上缴给我们，我们理应能找到方式把这笔钱做到税前超过 15% 的回报。这也是我们工作的一部分。所以我们会付钱奖励他们把钱还给我们。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we really invented a more extreme system. And that is the executives can buy Berkshire Hathaway stock in the market for cash.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我们实际上还有一套更“极端”的体系：高管可以拿现金在市场上买 Berkshire Hathaway 的股票。
This is a — (laughter) — very old-fashioned system, but most of them — it doesn’t take any lawyers, or compensation consultants, or — and most of them have done it. And most of them have done very well with it. I don’t know why it doesn’t spread more. (Laughter)
这——（笑声）——是非常老派的制度，不需要律师、也不需要薪酬顾问——而且大多数人都这么做了，也做得很好。我不明白为什么它没更广泛地流行。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: People say they want their management to think like shareholders. Management, you know, they’re compensating them. We’re going to have them think like shareholders. It’s very easy to think like a shareholder. Become one, you know? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：人们总说他们希望管理层“像股东那样思考”。管理层嘛，你知道，他们总在谈薪酬。要让他们像股东那样思考很简单：先做一个股东，懂吗？（笑声）
And you’ll think exactly like a shareholder.
这样你就会完全像股东那样思考了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没错，没错。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not a great — it’s not a huge psychological hurdle to get over, if you actually write a check. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：当你真的写了一张支票，这个“心理门槛”其实并不高。（笑声）
73. Unlike many movie companies, Disney makes money for shareholders
与许多电影公司不同，Disney 能为股东赚钱
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 1 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Lichter from Boulder, Colorado.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是 John Lichter，来自科罗拉多州 Boulder。
Are there some worthwhile books that you could recommend to us?
有没有一些值得阅读的书籍可以推荐给我们？
And secondly, with respect to Eisner and Disney, how would you define Michael Eisner’s circle of competence? And are you concerned that he might step outside it?
其次，关于 Eisner 和 Disney，你会如何界定 Michael Eisner 的能力圈？你是否担心他可能走出这个能力圈？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that he has proven himself very good at understanding what Disney is really all about.
WARREN BUFFETT：我会说，他已经证明自己非常擅长理解 Disney 的真正本质。
And you can look back to the predecessor management, between Walt and Eisner. And they didn’t really do much with that, if you look at those years.
你可以回看 Walt 与 Eisner 之间那段前任管理层的时期。看看那些年，他们在这方面并没有做出太多文章。
What is special about Disney? And how do you make it more special? And how do you make it more special to more people? I mean, those are the things that you want to — and you’ve got wonderful ingredients to work with when you’re working with something like Disney.
Disney 的特别之处是什么？如何让它更特别？又如何让更多的人感到它更特别？我的意思是，这些才是你要思考的——而当你面对像 Disney 这样的资产时，你手里拥有极佳的“原材料”。
I mean, it — you know, one of the advantages — we were talking about the Mayo Clinic and brain surgeons. The nice thing about the mouse is that he doesn’t have an agent, you know. I mean, the mouse is yours. (Laughs)
我的意思是——你知道，我们刚才谈到 Mayo Clinic 和脑外科医生。关于那只老鼠的一个好处是：它没有经纪人。也就是说，这只老鼠是你的。（笑）
He is not in there renegotiating and, you know, every week or every month and saying, you know — (laughter) — “Just look at how much more famous I’ve become in China,” you know, or something. (Laughter)
它不会每周或每月跑来重新谈判，你知道的——（笑声）——说“看看我在中国又变得多有名了”之类的。（笑声）
So if you own the mouse, you own the mouse. And Eisner understands all of that very well. I would say he’s been very skillful, in terms of how he’s thought about it.
所以，如果你拥有这只老鼠，你就真正拥有它。Eisner 对这一切理解得非常透彻。我会说，他在思考与运用这些方面非常老练。
I worry about any manager. It has nothing to do with Michael Eisner. But Charlie and I worry about ourselves in terms of getting out of our circle of competence.
我会对任何管理者保持警惕。这与 Michael Eisner 无关。但在是否走出能力圈的问题上，Charlie 和我同样警惕我们自己。
And we’ve done it. It is very tempting. And it’s probably part of the human condition, in terms of hubris or something, that if, you know, that if you’ve — as Charlie would say, if you’ve — you know, if you’re a duck floating on a pond, and it’s been raining, and you’re going up in the world, after a while, you think it’s you and not the rain.
而且我们确实也犯过这种错。这种诱惑很强，大概是人性的一部分，带着点傲慢之类。正如 Charlie 会说的，如果你是一只漂在池塘上的鸭子，碰巧下了雨，水位上涨让你“节节高升”，久而久之你会以为是你自己厉害，而不是那场雨。
You know, that there — that you’re some duck. (Laughter) But —
你会觉得自己真是“了不起的鸭”。（笑声）但是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没错，没错。
WARREN BUFFETT: And we all succumb to that a little bit.
WARREN BUFFETT: 我们都会在某种程度上屈从于这种心理。
But I think that Disney, Coca-Cola, Gillette — I think those companies are very focused. I think our operating units are very focused.
但我认为 Disney、Coca-Cola、Gillette——这些公司都非常专注。我也认为我们的运营子公司非常专注。
And I think that gives us a huge advantages over the managers that are getting a little bored and decide that they’d better fool around with this or that to show just how talented they really are.
而这种专注，让我们相对那些有点厌倦、决定到处折腾以证明自己多有才华的管理者，拥有巨大的优势。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Eisner is quite creative. And he also distrusts projections. And that is a very good combination to have in the motion picture business. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。Eisner 相当有创造力，而且他对各种“预测”持怀疑态度。在电影行业，这种组合非常好。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie was a lawyer for, what, 20th Century in the old —
WARREN BUFFETT：对，Charlie 早年在 20th Century 做过律师——
CHARLIE: Yes.
CHARLIE：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — days? Yeah, and he saw a little bit of how Hollywood operated. And it kept us out of buying any motion picture stocks for about 30 years. Every time I’d go near one, he’d regale me with a few stories of the past.
WARREN BUFFETT：——对吧？他见识过一些 Hollywood 的运作方式。这让我们大约 30 年都没去碰任何电影股。每当我靠近一点，他就会给我讲几段过去的故事，把我劝退。
So it’s a business where people are — can trade other people’s money for their own significance in their world. And that is a dangerous combination, where if I can buy significance in my world with your money, you know, there’s no telling what I’ll do. (Laughter)
这门生意里，人们常常可以用别人的钱来“购买”自己在圈子里的重要性。这是种危险的组合：如果我能用你的钱来换取我的“江湖地位”，你很难想象我会做出什么事。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Part of the business reminds me of an oil company in California. And it was controlled by one individual. And people used to say, about it, “If they ever do find any oil, that old man will steal it.” (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：这行的一部分让我想起加州的一家油企，由某位个人控制。人们常说：“要是哪天真的打到油，那位老爷子会把油给偷了。”（笑声）
The motion picture business, it’s only about half of it that has normal commercial morals.
电影行业里，只有大约一半还能算遵循正常的商业道德。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re not applying that to Disney.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，但我们并不是把这话套在 Disney 身上。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
CHARLIE MUNGER：不是。
WARREN BUFFETT: Disney is really — Disney’s done an extraordinary job for the shareholders.
WARREN BUFFETT：Disney 确实——Disney 为股东做得非常出色。
And they make real money out of movies. Most movie companies have — they make money for everybody associated with it, but not a lot has stuck to the shareholders.
他们能真正从电影中赚到钱。多数电影公司则——能让所有相关方都赚钱，但真正留给股东的并不多。
Zone 2?
第 2 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我——
74. Book recommendations
书籍推荐
WARREN BUFFETT: What? Oh, the books! Charlie, what are you reading these days? (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：什么？哦，说到书！Charlie，你最近在读什么？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m almost ashamed to report because I’ve gone back and picked up the part of biology that I put up — should’ve picked up 10 or 15 years earlier. And if any of you haven’t done it, it’s a total circus, what they figured out over the last 20 or 30 years in biology.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我都有点不好意思说了，因为我回去补生物学里我当年搁置的那一块——本该在 10 或 15 年前就补的。如果你们还没做过这事，你会发现生物学在过去 20 或 30 年里的发现简直“精彩纷呈”。
And I — if you take [evolutionary biologist Richard] Dawkins, “The Selfish Gene” and “The Blind Watchmaker”, I mean, these are marvelous books. And there are words in those books that are entering the English language that are going to be in the next Oxford Dictionary. I mean, these are powerful books. And they’re a lot of fun.
而且——如果你读读【进化生物学家 Richard Dawkins】的《The Selfish Gene》和《The Blind Watchmaker》，我得说这些都是了不起的书。书中的一些词汇正在进入英语词库，将会出现在下一版《Oxford Dictionary》中。也就是说，这些书影响力巨大，而且读起来很有趣。
I had to read “The Selfish Gene” twice before I fully understood it. And there were things I believed all my life that weren’t so, and I think it’s just wonderful, when you have those experiences. We always say, “It isn’t the learning that’s so hard. It’s the unlearning.”
我把《The Selfish Gene》读了两遍才彻底明白。而且我一辈子深信的一些东西其实并非如此——当你获得这样的体验时，我觉得非常美妙。我们常说，“难的不是学习，而是去除旧知（unlearning）。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I made the mistake of taking Charlie up to Microsoft in December. And he became friends with [Chief Technology Officer] Nathan Myhrvold.
WARREN BUFFETT：是啊。我在十二月犯了个错误，带 Charlie 去了 Microsoft。然后他和【Chief Technology Officer】Nathan Myhrvold 成了朋友。
And they are corresponding back and forth with increasing fervor and enthusiasm about mole rats. And they copy me on all these communications. So I’m getting to see this flow back and forth on the habits of mole rats.
随后他们开始来回通信，热情与日俱增，话题全是鼹鼠。他们在所有邮件里都抄送我，于是我也见证了关于鼹鼠习性的“往来长河”。
I really haven’t found a way to apply it at Berkshire. But I’m sure Charlie — (laughs) — has got something he’s working on, on that. He’s gotten very interested in biology lately.
我确实还没找到把它应用到 Berkshire 的方法。但我确信 Charlie——（笑）——会从中琢磨出点什么。他最近对生物学非常着迷。
I like — you know, I’ve always liked reading biography, but since the — the computer has changed my life. I now find myself playing bridge on the computer about 10 hours a week. And unfortunately, I didn’t want to give up sleep or eating or Berkshire. So the reading has been kind of light.
我喜欢——你们知道，我一直喜欢读传记，但自从——计算机改变了我的生活。我现在每周会在电脑上打桥牌大约 10 小时。不幸的是，我不想放弃睡觉、吃饭或 Berkshire，所以阅读就“清淡”了一些。
On investment books, if you’re asking about that, I would recommend the first two books that Phil Fisher wrote back around 1960, “Common Sense [Stocks] and Uncommon Profits” and the second one [“Paths to Wealth Through Common Stocks”]. They’re very good books.
如果你问投资类书籍，我会推荐 Phil Fisher 在 1960 年前后写的头两本书，《Common Sense [Stocks] and Uncommon Profits》以及第二本【《Paths to Wealth Through Common Stocks》】。它们都非常好。
You know, I obviously recommend, first and foremost, [Benjamin Graham’s] “The Intelligent Investor,” with chapters eight and 20 are the ones that you really should read.
当然，首推【Benjamin Graham】的《The Intelligent Investor》，其中第八章和第二十章是你**一定**要读的。
Two of the — well, all of the important ideas in investing, really, are in that book, because there’s only about three ideas. And those — two of them are emphasized in those two chapters.
投资中重要的理念——其实都在那本书里，因为真正关键的理念也就三条左右。而其中两条就在那两章里被重点阐述。
Actually, I think John Train’s “Money Masters” is an interesting book.
另外，我认为 John Train 的《Money Masters》也是一本有意思的书。
I don’t know. Can you think of any others, Charlie, that we want to tout? (Laughs)
我想想。Charlie，你还能想到我们想“安利”的其他书吗？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know. We have such a fingers-and-toes style around Berkshire Hathaway. (Laughter) So you sort of count.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我不确定。我们在 Berkshire Hathaway 一贯是“用手指脚趾头数数”的风格。（笑声）所以你就“算一算”吧。
WARREN BUFFETT: The three —
WARREN BUFFETT：那三条——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve never seen — you know, Warren talks about these discounted cash flows. I’ve never seen him do one. (Laughter and applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我从来没见过——你知道，Warren 总在谈折现现金流（DCF）。可我从没见他真做过一次。（笑声与掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: If it ever —
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果真要——
WARREN BUFFETT: There are some things you only do in private, Charlie. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：有些事只适合私下里做，Charlie。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: If it isn’t pluperfect obvious that it’s going to work out well, if you do the calculation, he tends to go on to the next idea.
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果不是“再明显不过、算都不用算就知道会很好”的那种，他通常会直接去看下一个主意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s sort of — it is true. You don’t — if you have to actually do it on — with pencil and paper, it’s too close to think about. I mean, it ought to just kind of scream at you that you’ve got this huge margin of safety.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，差不多就是这样。事实确实如此：如果你非得拿起纸笔来算，那就说明这事“太接近”了不值得考虑。我的意思是，它应该“冲你大喊”，告诉你这里有**巨大的安全边际**。
I mentioned the three ideas. The three ideas, I should elaborate on. One is that — to think of yourself — to think of investing as owning a business and not buying something that wiggles around in price.
我提到过“三条理念”。我该展开说说。第一条——把自己当成企业主来思考，把投资当作**拥有一门生意**，而不是买一个价格上下摆动的“票”。
And the second one is your attitude, which ties in with that, the attitude toward the market, that’s covered in chapter eight. And if you have the proper attitude toward market movements, it’s an enormous help in securities.
第二条是心态，与第一条相连——即对市场的态度（第八章）。如果你对市场波动有正确心态，这对证券投资会有巨大的帮助。
And the final chapter is on the margin of safety, which means, don’t try and drive a 9,800-pound truck over a bridge that says it’s, you know, “Capacity: 10,000 pounds.” But go down the road a little bit and find one that says, “Capacity: 15,000 pounds.”
最后一条是“安全边际”，意思是：不要把一辆 9,800 磅的卡车开上“限重 10,000 磅”的桥；再往前开一段，找一座写着“限重 15,000 磅”的桥。
75. We’ll do more in insurance, but we don’t know what
我们会在保险领域做更多，但具体做什么还不知道
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 2 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Chip Tucker (PH), Minneapolis.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的，我是 Chip Tucker（PH），来自 Minneapolis。
Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, what market share does Berkshire have in super-cat insurance business? And what’s your outlook for both the market growth in that business and the potential market share growth with — from Berkshire?
Buffett 先生和 Munger 先生，Berkshire 在超大额巨灾（super-cat）再保险业务中的市场份额是多少？你们如何看待该业务的市场增长，以及 Berkshire 可能的市场份额增长前景？
You answered a related question regarding GEICO’s auto opportunities. Are there other insurance businesses potentially worth expanding into? Or is your focus on super-cat and autos opportunity enough?
你们刚才回答了与 GEICO 汽车险机会相关的问题。是否还有其他值得扩张进入的保险业务？还是专注于巨灾和车险机会就足够了？
CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, Warren can answer that question a lot better than I can.
CHARLIE MUNGER：你知道，Warren 比我更能回答这个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: I — we don’t — there wouldn’t be any good market share figures in something like super-cat.
WARREN BUFFETT：我——我们并没有——像巨灾这种业务很难有可靠的市场份额数据。
We know that, a couple years, and last year, I think, too, we had to be the biggest in terms of premium volume.
我们知道，有好几年——我想去年也一样——按保费规模算我们应该是最大的。
We simply take on so much more than anyone else will. And we were getting the calls on the big risks, you know, 400 million here or something of the sort. We had a quote we put out on a billion dollars on the New Madrid fault here a little while ago. Nobody else will be doing that.
我们承接的规模远超其他任何公司。巨额风险的电话会打到我们这儿，你知道，四亿美元的单子之类。不久前我们还对 New Madrid 断层开出过 10 亿美元的报价。没有别人会做这种事。
So we got market share by our willingness to do large volume, by the fact that people knew we would pay subsequently, but we don’t — while we know we were the largest, we can’t give you any precise figures.
因此，我们的市场份额来自我们愿意做大体量业务，以及人们知道我们会如期赔付。但即便我们知道自己最大，也无法给出精确数字。
We also know we’re slipping in that now, but that makes no difference to us. We’d only be interested if we were slipping in profitable markets.
我们也知道现在在这方面有所下降，但这对我们无关紧要。只有当我们在**有利可图**的市场上滑落时，我们才会关心。
And what was the second part of the question on that, Charlie?
还有这个问题的第二部分是什么，Charlie？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What other opportunities —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：还有哪些机会——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, what other opportunities in the insurance business?
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，保险业务中的其他机会？
We — just this year, we bought a very, very small company [Kansas Bankers Surety], the managers of whom are here, a very fine insurance company. It has a little niche.
我们——就在今年，收购了一家非常非常小的公司【Kansas Bankers Surety】——他们的管理层今天也在现场——这是一家很不错的保险公司，做一个小细分市场。
It — I mean, it will never be huge or anything of the sort, but it’s the kind of business that we can understand. And we like the people that run it. And we like the position they’ve achieved in the market. So we’re delighted to be in it.
它——我的意思是，它永远不会变得很大之类，但这是我们能看懂的业务。我们喜欢管理它的人，也喜欢它在市场上取得的位置。所以我们很高兴进入这项业务。
We are willing to think about a whole variety of things to do in insurance. But most of them, we find, make no sense. We’ll be — we’ll do other things in insurance over the next 10 or 15 years. It’s just bound to happen, but I can’t tell you what they will specifically be.
我们愿意思考在保险领域做各种各样的事情。但我们发现大多数并不合理。未来 10 到 15 年我们还会在保险上做其他事情，这是必然的，但我不能告诉你具体会是什么。
The biggest single thing we will do in terms of value, though, probably, is grow GEICO. But we will do other things. And who knows what they might be?
从价值贡献看，最大的单项很可能仍是推动 GEICO 增长。但我们也会做别的事——至于是什么，谁也说不准。
We have expanded some in the — it’s a small business — the structured settlement business, from when we talked a year or two ago. And we are the preferred provider of structured settlements. Those are annuities, essentially, that are payable to people who are usually the victims of a very bad accident.
与一两年前相比，我们在结构化赔偿（structured settlement）业务上也有所扩张——这是一门小生意。我们是该领域的优先提供者。它本质上是年金，支付给通常遭遇严重事故的受害者。
So they’re very severely injured people, with injuries that will probably last for life. And so we will be making payments to people who are incapable of earning a living, may incur substantial medical bills, for many decades, sometimes, 50 or 60 years.
也就是说，这些人伤情严重，可能终身持续。因此我们会在很多年里向他们支付款项——有时长达五六十年——他们可能丧失谋生能力并承担巨额医疗费用。
Those annuities are provided by our companies to other insurance companies and to these injured people, usually, with the approval of the injured person’s attorney.
这些年金由我们的公司提供，服务对象包括其他保险公司和这些受伤者本人，通常需要受伤者律师的同意。
And when the advisors to the injured person think, “Who is going to be around in 50 years to pay money to this person who’s been incapacitated,” they frequently, and in our view, logically, think of Berkshire. So we have become much better known in that over the last couple of years.
当受伤者的顾问思考“谁能在 50 年后仍然在场，持续向这位丧失劳动能力的人支付款项？”时，他们往往——在我们看来也是合乎逻辑地——想到 Berkshire。因此过去几年我们在这个领域的知名度高了许多。
It’s not a big business. And it won’t be a big business. But it’s a perfectly decent business. And it’s one where we have a competitive advantage over time.
这不是一门大生意，将来也不会。但它是体面的业务；而且在这类业务上，我们具备随着时间积累的竞争优势。
We don’t obtain the competitive advantage by price. We obtain the competitive advantage from the peace of mind that the injured party obtains from knowing that that check will be in the mail 50 years from now.
我们的竞争优势并非来自价格，而是来自“心安”：受伤者相信 50 年后还能如期收到汇票。
And that’s the kind of business where we have some edge. And we’ll find other things to do over time, but can’t — I can’t —
这正是我们具备优势的业务类型。我们会逐步找到其他可做之事，但不能——我不能——
It isn’t like we’re looking at some specific area and saying, “We’re focusing on this.” We’re aware, generally, of what’s going on in the insurance business. And we’re very ready to move when the time comes, so that we can do something intelligent.
并不是说我们盯着某个特定领域说“我们就专注于此”。我们总体了解保险业正在发生什么；当时机到来时，我们已做好行动准备，以便做出明智之举。
76. People rewarded by capitalism need to help those who aren’t
在资本主义中被奖励得多的人应当帮助那些未被充分奖励的人
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 3 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my family’s been associated with Berkshire since 1968. So I ask this question with a great deal of respect for your integrity and your wisdom.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生、Munger 先生，我的家族自 1968 年起就与 Berkshire 结缘。所以我怀着对你们诚信与智慧的崇敬来提这个问题。
I work as an inner-city schoolteacher, where there is a rising and pervasive sense of hopelessness.
我是一名市中心学校的教师，那里一种不断上升且弥漫的无望感正在蔓延。
When I ask my students, “What would make you happy?” their predominant response is, “A million dollars.” As some of the richest men in the world, I wonder what your response to them might be.
当我问学生，“什么会让你快乐？”他们最常见的回答是：“一百万美元。”作为世界上最富有的人之一，我想知道你们会如何回答他们。
And as a second part of this question, the philosophical underpinnings of capitalism have largely ignored a systemic perspective involving issues of ongoing depletion of limited global resources exploited to sustain a market economy, widening gaps between the very wealthy and the severely impoverished, and an international view of America as a country whose primary values are greed and imperialism.
另外，资本主义的哲学基础很大程度上忽视了系统性视角：为维持市场经济而对有限全球资源的持续消耗、极富与极贫之间日益扩大的鸿沟，以及国际社会将美国视为以贪婪与帝国主义为主要价值的国家。
As we move into the 21st century, do you see a need to re-envision capitalist premises towards original notions of democracy, justice, and humanitarian concerns?
随着我们进入 21 世纪，你们是否认为有必要重新审视资本主义前提，使之回归民主、公正与人道主义的原初理念？
WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t get all of that.
WARREN BUFFETT：我没完全听清。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — (laughter) — I will say this. I am higher on the existing social order than you are. (Applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯——（笑声）——我要说的是，我对现有社会秩序的评价比你要高。（掌声）
I — there’s always plenty wrong with a social order. And certainly, there are places where ours is a lot more broken than it used to be.
我——任何社会秩序都存在大量问题。当然，我们的社会在某些方面确实比过去更破碎。
I don’t think Warren and I have any wonderful solution to all the problems of the world. But wishing for a million dollars instead of some more tangible short step is the wrong frame of mind. That isn’t the way we got our million dollars.
我不认为我和 Warren 对世界所有问题有妙计。但把“一百万美元”当目标，而不是采取更具体可行的小步骤，这是错误的心态。我们获得第一桶金并不是这么来的。
WARREN BUFFETT: But I don’t — (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT：不过我并不——（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren might give a different answer, by the way. He’s a —
CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一下，Warren 也许会给出不同回答。他——
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I would agree with the — I, you know — wishing for a job makes a lot of sense to me and figuring out how to get one and then going from there. But it —
WARREN BUFFETT：不，我同意——你知道——“希望拥有一份工作”在我看来很有道理，接着思考如何获得它，然后一步步走下去。只是——
There is and always has been — that doesn’t mean it always should be — but there is a tremendous amount of inequality.
一直以来——并不意味着理应如此——社会都存在巨大的不平等。
What you don’t want is an inequality of opportunity. There will be a lot of inequality in ability.
我们真正不愿见到的是机会的不平等。至于能力的不平等，将会大量存在。
A market system, like we have, churns out what people want. If they want to watch a heavyweight fight, and they want to watch Mike Tyson, they’re going to pay him $25 million for getting in the ring for a few minutes.
像我们这样的市场体系，会源源不断产出人们想要的东西。若他们想看重量级拳赛、想看 Mike Tyson，就会为他上台几分钟支付 2500 万美元。
And it produces what people like. And it produces it in abundance. And it’s done very well in terms of production.
它生产人们喜欢的东西，而且是大量生产；在“产出”这件事上做得非常出色。
It is much better to be in the bottom 20 percent in this country now than it was 50 years ago. And it’s better to be in the bottom 20 percent of this country than in any other country. But it still isn’t very satisfactory.
在这个国家处于底部 20% 的人，如今的处境比 50 年前好多了；放眼各国，身处本国底部 20% 的生活也优于其他国家。但这依然远称不上令人满意。
The market system does not reward — it does not reward teachers, does not reward nurses — I mean, it does not reward all kinds of people who do all kinds of useful things in any way comparable to how it will reward entertainers, or people who can figure out the value of businesses, or athletes, or that sort of thing.
市场机制并不会给予教师、护士——以及许多做着有用工作的人——与它给予娱乐者、能评估企业价值的人、运动员等相当的回报。
A market system pays very big for something that will entertain them. People want to be entertained a good bit of the day. And it pays better for people that will entertain than educate.
市场对能“取悦大众”的事物支付极高价码。人们一天中有很大一部分时间希望被娱乐；因此，相比教育，市场更愿为“娱乐他人者”支付高价。
I think — I don’t want to tinker with the market system. I don’t think I should be telling people what they should want to do with their lives.
我认为——我不想去摆弄市场体系。我也不该告诉人们他们的人生该追求什么。
But I do think that it’s incumbent on the people that do very well under that system to be taxed in a manner that takes reasonable care of anybody that is not well adapted to that system, but that is a perfectly decent citizen in every other regard.
但我确实认为，那些在该体系下受益甚多的人有义务通过合理的税制去照拂那些不那么适应该体系、但在其他方面完全正派的公民。
And that is — you know, I don’t want to start getting into comparable worth in terms of how I tax. But I do think that somebody like me, that happens to just fit this system magnificently, but wouldn’t be worth a damn in Bangladesh or someplace, you know, because what I have wouldn’t pay off there — their system would not reward that.
这意味着——你知道，我不想用“同工同酬”的概念去设计税制。但我确实认为，像我这样恰好非常契合此体系的人，若在 Bangladesh 或别处可能毫无用处，因为我的本事在那里并不变现——他们的体系不会奖励这一点。
I think that we get from society — society provides me — this society provides me — with enormous rewards for what I bring to the game. And it does the same with Mike Tyson. And it does the same with some guy whose adenoids are right for singing or whatever it may be.
社会给予了我们——这套社会给予了我——对我“参与游戏”所带来东西的巨大回报。它也同样奖励 Mike Tyson，也奖励那些腺样体结构恰好适合歌唱的人，诸如此类。
And I don’t want to tamper with that. But I do think those people who are getting all kinds of claim checks on the rest of society from that — I think there should be a system that people — where people who are not well adapted to that system, but that are perfectly decent citizens in every other respect, do not really, you know, fall through the slats on that.
我不想干预这种分配。但我认为，那些从社会其他成员处“领取大量支票”的人所处的体系，应该确保不那么适应该体系、但在其他方面完全正派的公民不会从缝隙中坠落。
And I think progress has been made on that over the last 50 years. But I think we’re far from a perfect society in that respect. And I hope, you know, more progress is made in the next 50 years.
过去 50 年里，这方面已取得进步。但我们离“理想社会”仍很远。我希望在未来 50 年能取得更多进展。
I don’t think the wishing for the million dollars, though — you know, it doesn’t work that way. I think —
不过，我不认为“渴望一百万美元”是办法——事情并不是这么运作的。我认为——
But if you are lucky enough to have something that the market system rewards, you do very well here. And if you’re unlucky enough to have something it doesn’t reward, you do better now than you would’ve 30 or 40 years ago. And you do better than in other countries.
如果你够幸运，具备市场体系会奖励的能力，你在这里会混得很好；不够幸运，拥有的能力恰好不被市场奖励，你现在的处境也比 30、40 年前好，也比在其他国家好。
But I can see where it seems very unjust to look at somebody else who has just a little different mix of talents that can achieve claim checks in a way that keeps them and the next five generations of their family in a position where they don’t have to do very much.
但我能理解，这看起来仍很不公：某些人仅仅因为才赋组合不同，就能获得足以让他本人及其后五代几乎无需再做什么的“索取权”。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say that I like a certain amount of social intervention that takes some of the inequality out of results in capitalism.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我想说，我赞成一定程度的社会干预，用以削减资本主义结果中的一部分不平等。
But I hate, with a passion, rewarding anything that can be easily faked. Because I think then people lie, and lying works, and the lying spreads. And I think your whole civilization deteriorates.
但我强烈厌恶对“容易造假”的东西进行奖励。因为那会引诱人说谎、使说谎奏效、并促使谎言扩散；我认为整个人类文明会因此滑坡。
If I were running the world, the compensation for stress under workman’s compensation would be zero, not because there isn’t real stress. Because there’s no way to keep the fakery out, if you reward stress at all.
如果由我来治理世界，“工伤补偿”里对“精神压力”的赔偿应为零，并非因为不存在真实压力，而是因为一旦你对“压力”给予补偿，就无法阻止造假。
WARREN BUFFETT: There was a great article, and this applies — (applause) — to an earlier question.
WARREN BUFFETT：有一篇很棒的文章，这也——（掌声）——呼应了先前的问题。
There was a very good article in Forbes about one issue ago that showed the occupational profile of the U.S. at a couple of different intervals, going back to 1900.
在《Forbes》不久前的一期里，有篇文章对比了自 1900 年以来美国在若干时点的职业结构。
And one problem you can see, just by looking at that profile, is that, if you assume 20 percent of the — the bottom 20 percent — however you measure it, in terms of employability — whether it’s measured by IQ, or interest in working, or energy level, or whatever you want to do — they fit, very well, most of the jobs that were available a hundred years ago.
仅凭这张“结构图”，你就能看到一个问题：如果我们假设最末端的 20%（无论你用“就业能力”、IQ、工作兴趣、精力水平等指标衡量），在一百年前，他们与当时大量可供选择的工作高度匹配。
In other words, you could do most of the jobs, of which there were many, with relatively unimpressive mental abilities. And as jobs have changed, the profile of people hasn’t changed. So there are more people that end up on the short end.
换言之，当时有许多岗位并不需要突出的心智能力；而如今工作性质已改变，但人群“能力画像”并未同速改变，于是落在不利端的人更多了。
Now, the good part of that is the society produces so much more that it can take care of those people, one way or another. Now, the trick is to take care of them and make them not only feel, but be productive and be part of the act, and —
好的一面是，社会总产出大幅提升，有能力以某种方式照顾这些人。难点在于：既要照顾他们，也要让他们不仅有“被参与的感觉”，而且能真正产生产出、成为行动的一部分，并且——
We’ve got enough product to do that. But the country turns out way more output than 50 or a hundred years ago.
我们的“蛋糕”足够大；国家的产出比 50 年、100 年前高出许多。
We don’t have — we’re not perfect at figuring out how to make the bottom 20 or 30 percent, in terms of abilities, fit a new, changing job profile.
但我们并不擅长——也还远未完善——如何让“能力处于底部 20%—30% 的人”去适配这套不断变化的职位结构。
I really recommend you look at that Forbes magazine. Because if you think through the implications of those charts, I think you’ll see what social problems have to be attacked.
我强烈建议你看看那期《Forbes》。当你把那些图表的含义想透，我想你会更清楚：我们究竟该攻克哪些社会问题。
可以想象但巴菲特还需要实实在在的证据。
77. “No magic” to running a bank — just don’t do “something foolish”
经营银行没有“魔法”——只要别做“愚蠢的事”就行
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 4 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Edward Barr, Lexington, Kentucky.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Edward Barr，肯塔基州 Lexington。
Earlier, you led us through a discussion of the competitive position of Disney. And you also discussed share repurchase.
之前你带我们讨论了 Disney 的竞争地位，也谈到了回购股票。
I wondered if you could also lead us through a discussion of the competitive position of Wells Fargo, since they just effected such a large combination [with First Interstate], in addition with, perhaps, some discussion of their share repurchase, which is probably as large, in percentage terms, as any company I can think of at the present time.
我想请你也谈谈 Wells Fargo 的竞争地位，毕竟他们刚完成与 First Interstate 的大规模合并；同时也请谈谈他们的股份回购，在比例上或许已经是我能想到的公司里数一数二的规模。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Wells should repurchase their shares, if they feel that they’re repurchasing them below intrinsic business value. And that’s a calculation that they make.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，如果 Wells 认为自己以低于企业内在价值的价格回购，那么他们就应该回购。这需要他们自己来做判断与计算。
And you should — have to ask the question of them what their calculus is of that. But that will determine whether that share repurchase program makes good sense or not.
你应该——需要问他们用的是什么计算标准。这将决定那项回购计划是否合理。
The advantages of an in-market merger are — can be dramatic. Sometimes, it just causes a bank to do what they should’ve done anyway.
同城（in-market）合并的优势——可能非常显著。有时它只不过促使一家银行去做本来就该做的事情。
I mean, I’m not so — I’m not always as convinced that the economies come about through — totally through scale, as they are just from taking a hard look at how they run their business.
我的意思是，我并不总是相信效率提升完全来自规模，更大程度上是来自对自身经营方式的深刻检视。
We may have in the audience today — he was here earlier — the CEO of the Bank of Granite, which is in Granite, North Carolina. And that bank earned 2.58 percent on assets, I believe, in the most recent quarter, annualized, and had a 33 percent efficiency ratio.
今天在场的观众里——他刚才还在——可能有 Bank of Granite（位于北卡罗来纳州 Granite）的 CEO。据我所知，这家银行最近一个季度（年化）资产回报率达到 2.58%，效率比率为 33%。
Now, that bank is 400 million or 500 million of assets. You know, it doesn’t need to be 5 billion in order to get more efficient or anything of the sort.
而这家银行的资产规模只有 4 亿到 5 亿美元。你看，要变得更高效并不需要做到 50 亿美元的体量之类。
It’s got — it’s so much more efficient than any of those larger banks that had to be put together to get those ratios that it makes you kind of wonder about the underlying rationale.
它的效率远超那些必须通过并购才能凑出类似比率的大银行，这会让你去质疑那些合并背后的真正逻辑。
But I’m sure that Mr. [John] Forlines, who runs that bank, just focuses on — and he’s been focusing on it for a lot of years — just doing the right things day after day. And it didn’t take any in-market merger or anything of the sort to cause him to do that.
但我确信这家银行的负责人 John Forlines 先生，多年来只是日复一日地专注把正确的事做好。这并不需要什么同城合并之类的操作来驱动。
I recommend any of you in the banking business to get his report because there is nothing magic about the community of Granite, North Carolina.
我建议从事银行业的各位去读读他们的报告，因为北卡罗来纳州 Granite 这个社区并没有什么“魔法”。
Nor does he work under laws that are way different than the rest of bankers or anything of the sort. He just gets a record that — achieves a record — that makes all the rest of the records look silly.
他所处的监管法律与其他银行家并无不同。他只是交出了——达成了——让其他银行成绩看起来都很“可笑”的业绩。
We had a fellow over in Rockford, Illinois, in the bank we owned back in the ’70s, Gene Abegg, whose brother is going to be 104. There was a fellow from Rockford here that got me to sign a note to Ed Abegg, who will be 104 soon. I wish Gene had lived to 104.
上世纪 70 年代我们在伊利诺伊州 Rockford 拥有的一家银行里，有位同行叫 Gene Abegg，他的兄弟很快就 104 岁了。今天还有位来自 Rockford 的朋友让我给即将 104 岁的 Ed Abegg 签了张便条。我也希望 Gene 能活到 104 岁。
But Gene ran a bank in Rockford that, when banks — the best banks were earning one percent on assets, he earned two percent on assets. And he did it with way less leverage than anyone else and lower loan losses and big investment portfolio.
但当年 Gene 在 Rockford 经营的银行，在同行最佳资产回报率只有 1% 的年代，能做到 2% 的资产回报率；而且他的杠杆更低、贷款损失更小、投资组合还更大。
And there wasn’t any magic about it. He just didn’t do anything that didn’t make sense.
这里面并没有任何魔法。他只是从不去做不合逻辑的事。
And there’s a lot of room for improvement in the banking business with or without mergers.
无论是否有并购，银行业都有大量改进空间。
But I would say that Wells, on the record, has done an exceptionally good job of running their bank compared to other big banks. And I would say that those two operations put together will be run a whole lot more efficiently than if First Interstate had been run by — run on its own.
但我想说，与其他大型银行相比，Wells 的经营记录相当出色。而把这两家（指合并后的两家业务）放在一起运营，效率会明显高于 First Interstate 单独运营时的水平。
It’s a business that can be a very good business, when run right, as the Bank of Granite or Illinois National Bank in Rockford proved. There’s no magic to it. You just have to stay away from doing something foolish.
只要经营得当，这门生意可以是一门非常好的生意，Bank of Granite 和 Rockford 的 Illinois National Bank 都证明了这一点。这并无魔法可言——只要避免做“愚蠢的事”。
It’s a little like investing. You know, you don’t have to do anything very smart. You just have to avoid doing things that are ungodly dumb when looked at about a year later and — you know, airlines and that sort of thing. (Laughter)
这有点像投资。你并不需要做什么“极其聪明”的事；你只需避免做那些一年后回头看“蠢得要命”的事——比如航空业，那类事情。（笑声）
不必要的竞争，为了规模和面子的竞争。
And you know, that’s the trick. It is not some great crystal ball game where you look into the future and see all these things that other people can’t possibly see. I mean, what’s complicated about Coca-Cola or Gillette or Wells Fargo, for that matter?
这就是诀窍。它不是靠“水晶球”预言未来、看见别人看不见的东西。说真的，Coca-Cola、Gillette 或 Wells Fargo 又有什么复杂难懂的呢？
And that’s — we like businesses like banking, if we’ve got somebody in charge of them that is going to run them right. We’ve got a — I don’t know whether Bob Wilmers is here. But he runs First Empire, which we have a good-sized investment in. Bob just runs it right, you know?
所以——如果我们能找到把业务“正确地”经营的人，我们就喜欢像银行这样的生意。我们有一位——不确定 Bob Wilmers 是否在场——他管理着 First Empire，我们在那儿有不小的投资。Bob 就是把事情“正确地”做。
I do not worry about surprises from Bob or First Empire. And he’ll do things — if he can grow, and it’s logical, he’ll grow. And if it isn’t logical to do something, he’ll pass. He has no ego compulsions forcing him into some sort of action. And he runs a terrific bank.
我从不担心 Bob 或 First Empire 会出什么“幺蛾子”。能增长、且合乎逻辑，他就发展；不合逻辑，他就放弃。他不会被自负驱使去做某些动作。他经营着一家极其优秀的银行。
Charlie?
78. We do “whatever comes along that makes sense”
我们会“做任何合乎逻辑的事，来什么做什么”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 5.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。第 5 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dorothy Craig (PH) from Seattle.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是 Dorothy Craig（PH），来自 Seattle。
And I noticed, in the annual report, that your recent acquisitions doubled the revenue for Berkshire Hathaway. And it seemed astounding for me. I’m wondering how that’s possible.
我注意到在年报中，你们近期的收购使 Berkshire Hathaway 的营收翻了一番。这让我感到非常震惊。我想知道这是如何做到的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s — for one thing, we started from kind of a small base. The — but we — the GEICO acquisition, you know, added 3 billion or so of revenues, and — actually more than that, a little more than that, but not much more. And RC Willey and Helzberg’s probably added 600 million or so in the current year.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这个——首先，我们的起点基数相对较小。其次，我们——收购 GEICO 你知道，带来了大约 30 亿美元的收入——实际上略多一些，但也不多。RC Willey 和 Helzberg’s 在当年大概又增加了 6 亿左右。
And since we were working off a base of 3 1/2 or so billion, those three acquisitions did double the revenues. We won’t have many years when that happens. It’s not any goal of ours to double the revenues or increase them 20 percent, even, or anything.
而由于我们原本的基数大约是 35 亿美元，这三笔收购确实使收入翻倍。这样的年份不会有很多。我们的目标并不是让营收翻倍，甚至不是一定要增长 20% 之类的。
We just — we try to do whatever comes along that makes sense. And if there’s a lot that comes along in one year that makes sense, we’ll do a lot. And if there’s nothing that comes along that makes sense, we’ll do nothing.
我们只是——遇到合乎逻辑的事情就去做。如果某一年合乎逻辑的机会很多，我们就多做；如果没有，我们就什么也不做。
So it’s — there’s a lot of accident in it. But last year, you know, a fair amount happened. And I’d love to see a lot happen next year. But we don’t know at this point.
所以这当中——有不少偶然性。去年，确实发生了不少事。我也希望明年能发生很多事。但目前我们并不知道会如何。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing.
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。
79. GEICO’s Lou Simpson has more investing options now
GEICO 的 Lou Simpson 现在有了更多投资选择
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 6 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh me? Yes, my name is Victor Lapuma (PH). And I’m from the Virgin Islands. And my question is on the GEICO asset side.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：哦，是我吗？是的，我叫 Victor Lapuma（PH），来自 Virgin Islands。我的问题与 GEICO 的资产端有关。
One of the things that makes Berkshire unique is the high percentage in equity as opposed to fixed assets. And GEICO, as of the end of the year, looked like a typical insurance company with four times the fixed assets as equity assets.
让 Berkshire 与众不同的一点是其资产中股票（equity）比例较高，而非固定收益。而截至年末，GEICO 看起来像一家典型的保险公司，固定收益资产大约是股票资产的四倍。
And my question is, over time, will they have the same composite as Berkshire on the asset side?
我的问题是，随着时间推移，他们的资产结构会否与 Berkshire 相同？
And the second part of that question is, how are the asset allocations decisions being made at GEICO after the merger as compared to before the merger?
第二个问题是，与并入之前相比，GEICO 在并入之后资产配置的决策是如何进行的？
WARREN BUFFETT: The decisions at GEICO, which, as you say, is about 5 billion of marketable securities, have been made, and are being made, and will be made, by Lou Simpson. Lou has done a fabulous job of running the investments of GEICO since about 1979. And we’re lucky to have him.
WARREN BUFFETT：GEICO 约 50 亿的可交易证券——正如你所说——其投资决策过去、现在、将来都由 Lou Simpson 负责。自大约 1979 年起，Lou 一直把 GEICO 的投资管理得非常出色。我们有他，十分幸运。
There are very few people that I will let run money running businesses that we have control over. But we’re delighted, in the case of Lou. I mean, that’s one in a thousand or something. But Lou has done a terrific job, will do a good job.
在我们控股的业务里，我很少把资金交给别人打理。但对 Lou 我们非常放心。可以说这是一千里挑一。Lou 过去做得很出色，未来也会继续做好。
And the one thing we offer him, he has the ability to do whatever he wants to do with those assets now. He did not have that ability before GEICO became part of Berkshire. Because at that time, there were certain ratios that were necessary for — which were understandably necessary, that made sense.
我们给他的一个重要变化是：现在他可以对这部分资产“想怎么配就怎么配”。在 GEICO 并入 Berkshire 之前，他做不到这一点，因为当时出于合理且必要的监管/经营考虑，必须维持某些比例约束。
With GEICO as a standalone entity, with its own net worth of a billion and a half or 2 billion, and doing 3 billion of business, it would’ve been inappropriate for him to take on a different configuration, beyond a certain point, in equities.
当 GEICO 独立运作、净值约 15–20 亿、业务量约 30 亿时，若股票资产超过某一程度的配置上限，就并不合适。
So he was constrained by the nature of the business he was in and its capitalization. That constraint no longer applies. So he, with that 5 billion, can do whatever he wants.
因此，他受到业务性质与资本规模的限制。现在这些限制不再适用。对这 50 亿的资产，他可以按自己意愿配置。
Now, if he does certain things, we would need to provide backup to GEICO, so that their policyholders would be protected under the most adverse of circumstances. But that’s no problem for us.
当然，如果他做出某些配置，我们需要为 GEICO 提供支持，以确保在最不利的情形下保单持有人仍然受到保护。但对我们来说，这不是问题。
We could do it by quota share reinsurance. We could do a lot of things. We could just guarantee their obligations. And we are in a position to do that.
我们可以通过成数分保等多种方式实现；也可以直接为其义务提供保证。我们具备这样做的能力与地位。
We haven’t done it yet because it’s not — hasn’t been necessary yet. But if it made sense — if Lou wanted to be 5 billion in equities and it made sense, we would arrange things so that the GEICO policyholders would be every bit as secure as under the most conservative of investment portfolios.
我们尚未这样做，是因为目前没有必要。但如果有必要、且合乎逻辑——比如 Lou 想把全部 50 亿配成股票——我们会作出安排，确保 GEICO 的保单持有人享有与最保守投资组合完全一致的安全性。
So Lou has another string to his bow now. And there may be a time when it gets used. He’s been great under the old system. And he may be better under this system.
因此，Lou 现在多了一根“弦”。未来或许会用上。旧体系下他已经表现优异，而在新体系下他可能表现得更好。
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s a very shrewd question. You’re to be complimented.
CHARLIE MUNGER：这是个非常敏锐的问题。值得称赞。
WARREN BUFFETT: That means it’s something we thought about — (laughs) — before, but you are to be complimented, right.
WARREN BUFFETT：这意味着这是我们之前确实思考过的——（笑）——不过你仍然值得称赞，对的。
80. “Permanent holdings” probably won’t be sold even if market overvalues them
“永久持有”很可能不会因为市场高估而被卖出
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see. Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：让我看看。第 1 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Neil McMahon (PH), New York City.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Neil McMahon（PH），New York City。
Berkshire owns several companies — stock in several companies — which are called permanent holdings.
Berkshire 持有若干公司的股份——被称为“永久持有”。
In the early ’70s, we had a two-tier market, the one-decision stocks, high P/Es — 50, 60 times earnings.
上世纪 70 年代初，我们见过“两层市场”，所谓“一次决策股票”，市盈率很高——50 倍、60 倍。
If that were to reappear again, would Berkshire’s companies still be permanent? Or is there a price for everything?
如果那种情况再度出现，Berkshire 的这些公司是否仍会被视为“永久持有”？还是说万物皆有价？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there are things that we think there’s no price for. And we’ve been tested sometimes and haven’t sold them, but —
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，有些东西在我们看来“无价”。我们也确实在某些时候经受过考验，但依然没有卖出，不过——
You know, my friend, Bill Gates, says, you know, it has to be illogical at some point. The numbers have — at some price, you have to be willing to sell something that’s a marketable security, forgetting about a controlled business.
你知道，我的朋友 Bill Gates 说过，总会有到“再持有就不合逻辑”的时刻。从数字上看——在某个价格水平上，对于可流通证券你总该愿意卖出（不谈我们控股的整家公司）。
But I doubt if we ever get tested on — there’s only a couple of them in that category.
但我怀疑我们是否会真的被这样考验——符合这种情形的标的其实就那么一两个。
Actually, there — you know — I won’t comment on that. (Laughs)
实际上，这里——你知道——我就不具体评论了。（笑）
We really have a great reluctance to sell businesses where we like both the business and the people. So I don’t think I’d count on seeing many sales. But if you ever attend a meeting here, and there are 60 or 70 times earnings, keep an eye on me. (Laughs)
对于那些我们既喜欢业务、又欣赏管理层的公司，我们确实非常不愿意卖出。所以我认为你不会看到很多出售。但如果你哪天来开会，碰巧市盈率到了 60 或 70 倍，请盯紧我一点。（笑）
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: The so-called two-tier market created difficulties, I would say, primarily because a lot of people or companies were called tier one when they really weren’t. They just had been, at some time, a tier one. If you’re right about the companies, you can hold them at pretty high values.
CHARLIE MUNGER：所谓“两层市场”之所以麻烦，我认为主要是因为很多人/公司被称为“一线”，但其实并非如此——他们只是曾经是一线而已。如果你对公司判断正确，即使在很高的估值下你也可以继续持有。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you can really hold them at extraordinary levels if you’ve got — it’s too hard to find. You’re not going to find businesses that are as good.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，如果你持有的是极其优秀、又极难再找到替代的公司，确实可以在“非常高”的水平上继续持有。你很难再找到同等优质的标的。
So then you have to say, “Am I going to get a chance to buy back the same business at a lot lower price? Or am I going to buy something that’s almost as good at a lot lower price?”
于是问题变成：“我是否有机会以便宜很多的价格把同一家买回来？或者能否以大幅更低的价格买到几乎一样好的公司？”
We don’t think we’re very good at doing that. We’d rather just sit and hold the business and pretend the stock market doesn’t exist.
我们不认为自己擅长做这种“换手术”。我们宁可继续持有，把股市当作“并不存在”。
That actually has worked out way better for us than I would’ve predicted 20 years ago. I mean, that mindset is — or 25 years ago — that mindset is — there’s been a fair amount of good fortune that’s flowed out of that that I really wouldn’t have predicted.
事实证明，这种做法带来的效果远比我 20 年前、甚至 25 年前的预期要好。我的意思是，这种心态——带来了相当多我当年未曾预料的好运气与结果。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But there, you’re demonstrating your trick again, you know? Still learning. A lot of people regard that as cheating. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：不过你看，你又展示了你的“绝招”——持续学习。很多人把这当成“作弊”。（笑声）
81. Buffett doesn’t expect Gates will join Berkshire’s board
Buffett 不认为 Gates 会加入 Berkshire 董事会
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 2 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, Alan Rank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我是 Alan Rank，来自宾夕法尼亚州 Pittsburgh。
Knowing your aversion to technology but your close affiliation with Bill Gates, Microsoft, have you ever considered either inviting him to be part of the Berkshire through the board, or being involved to maybe solve some of the problems with World Book and taking it to the new technology and expanding it?
考虑到你对科技领域的“敬而远之”，但又和 Microsoft 的 Bill Gates 关系密切，你是否考虑过邀请他通过加入董事会的方式参与 Berkshire？或者请他协助解决 World Book 的一些问题，把它带入新技术并加以扩展？
And on the other end, you also love insurance and the float. Have you considered the other businesses that would have that similarity, such as cemeteries and funeral homes with their pre-need and their large cash reserves?
另外，你也热衷于保险与浮存金。你是否考虑过其他具有类似特征的生意，比如墓园和殡葬（预需服务与大额现金储备）？
WARREN BUFFETT: The — Bill and I talked about the encyclopedia business some years ago. But he was pretty far down the line at Encarta, quite far down the line at Encarta, actually, before I even met him. So it wasn’t — my guess is, if we had met earlier, that there might have been something evolve in that.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯——我和 Bill 多年前确实聊过百科全书这门生意。但在我认识他之前，他在 Encarta 上已经推进得相当深入了。我的猜测是，如果我们更早结识，也许会在这事上产生点什么合作。
But he had put a lot of chips on Encarta and had done a good job with it. So it really wasn’t — it wasn’t a real option to work with him on World Book.
但他已经把大量筹码押在 Encarta 上，并且做得很好。所以在 World Book 上合作，其实并没有现实的选项。
Bill also is very focused on his business. And I believe he’s on the board of some biotech company in which he’s got a significant investment.
Bill 对自己的事业非常专注。我记得他在一家自己持有重要投资的生物科技公司里担任董事。
But you will not see him on the boards of, at least I don’t believe that you will, of American corporations — I think, if you look at the boards in the, say, up in the Pacific Northwest, where he had a lot of friends and knows the companies well and maybe grew up with some of the people.
但你不会——至少我不认为你会——在美国各类公司董事会名单里经常看到他的名字。即便在太平洋西北地区，他朋友多、熟悉不少公司、甚至跟某些人一起长大，也如此。
But I don’t think you’ll see him on anything which really doesn’t — which is just a business that doesn’t grab him intellectually on something. I do think there’s one biotech company that he’s involved in that way. And you know, he’d be a terrific asset.
我不认为你会看到他加入那些不能在智识上抓住他的公司董事会。我知道他以那种方式参与了一家生物科技公司。毫无疑问，他会是一项极佳的资产。
But he really focuses on Microsoft. He has his board meetings, as I remember, on Saturday. They last, you know, all day. And then he goes after the business that way. He’s not —
但他的重心仍然在 Microsoft。据我所知，他们把董事会安排在周六，常常一开就是一整天。接着他就以这种方式“扑在业务上”。他并不会——
I don’t think he’d be interested on being on a bank board or an insurance company board because he just figures he’s got other things to do with his time. And I think he’s probably right. (Laughs)
我不认为他会有兴趣去当银行或保险公司的董事，因为他觉得时间该做别的事。我想他大概是对的。（笑）
82. Not all “float” businesses are attractive
并非所有“浮存金型”业务都吸引人
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? Oh, the question was about other kinds.
WARREN BUFFETT：第 3 区？哦，问题是关于其他类型的。
We’ve always had an interest in float businesses of one sort or another, but —
我们一直对各种类型的“浮存金型”业务感兴趣，但是——
You know, Blue Chip Stamps was such a business, until it disappeared — (laughs) — one day, and we couldn’t find it. We went — looked in the closet. We looked everywhere, out in the backyard. (Laughs) Where was it?
你知道，Blue Chip Stamps 就是这样的业务，直到有一天它“消失了”——（笑）——我们找遍了壁橱、后院，到处都找过。（笑）它去哪儿了？
So we like that sort of business. But most of the float businesses, the costs are pretty explicit. And like I say, we don’t like most insurance companies as float businesses. We are not interested in buying the typical insurance business, because we think the float will end up costing us too much.
所以我们喜欢这类生意。但大多数“浮存金型”业务，它的成本是十分明确的。正如我说过的，我们并不喜欢大多数保险公司作为“浮存金”的载体。我们对收购“典型保险公司”并不感兴趣，因为我们认为那样的浮存金最终成本太高。
We’d rather borrow money with an explicit cost attached to it rather than have the implicit costs of an underwriting loss with most companies.
相比之下，我们宁愿以明确的成本去借钱，也不愿承受绝大多数公司那种“核保亏损”所带来的隐性成本。
But we’re always — we are interested in businesses that provide cash rather than use up cash. We’re willing to have them use cash, if the — if what they use will produce high enough returns. But we’ve got this bias toward things that throw off cash.
不过我们始终——对那些产出现金而非消耗现金的业务更感兴趣。当然，只要能带来足够高的回报，我们也愿意让它“先用现金”。但我们的偏好确实是“能吐现金”的东西。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we go into the pre-need funeral home business, that’ll be the day. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，要是哪天我们真的去做“预需殡葬”生意，那就见鬼了。（笑声）
83. Expect a “better” market for Class A than Class B
预计 A 股的交易“更好”于 B 股
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：第 3 区。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Charlie is a difficult act to follow. I’m Robert Keeley (PH) from Washington, D.C.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：要接 Charlie 的话可不容易。我是 Robert Keeley（PH），来自华盛顿特区。
I have a brief comment and a brief question. The comment is that I think you may be considerably underestimating the interest there will be in purchases of Class B stock later this week and next week.
我有一个简短评论和一个简短问题。评论是：我觉得你们可能显著低估了本周晚些时候至下周市场对 B 股的兴趣。
I have at least 10 friends in Washington who are aware that I’m a Berkshire shareholder and that I was coming to this meeting. And they’ve insisted that I report back to them tomorrow on just what happened with the Class B stock because they’re very interested in buying some of it.
我在华盛顿至少有 10 个朋友知道我是 Berkshire 股东、也知道我要来参会。他们都要求我明天向他们汇报 B 股的情况，因为他们很想买点。
Now, that’s anecdotal, to be sure. But if you take that ratio of 10 people to even the shareholders who are present here today, you’re talking about tens of thousands of people who are going to be in that market.
当然，这只是个例。但如果把“10 人/在场股东”的比例外推，你会得到“将有成千上万人参与”的结论。
And my question relates to liquidity. On page 18 of your annual report, you say, and I quote, “The prospect that most shareholders will stick to the A stock suggests that it will enjoy a somewhat more liquid market than the B.”
我的问题与流动性有关。你在年报第 18 页写道（引述）：“多数股东会坚持持有 A 股，这意味着 A 股的市场流动性会略好于 B 股。”
Could you explain that? It seems to me that if most shareholders keep their A stock, do not convert it or sell it, that the B stock will be much more liquid. Maybe I don’t understand liquidity.
你能解释一下吗？在我看来，如果多数股东都保留 A 股、不转换也不卖，那 B 股的流动性应该更好。也许是我对“流动性”的理解有误。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I think you do. You understand it. And I’ll elaborate just a bit.
WARREN BUFFETT：不，我觉得你的理解没有问题。我来补充说明一下。
The — certainly, in the first week, I would expect the B stock to trade far more, although I hope it doesn’t trade like most new issues trade in relation to the amount sold.
当然，在第一周，我预计 B 股的成交会多得多；尽管我也希望它不要像多数新股那样，成交量相对发行量“炒过头”。
It’s just the nature of a new offering that there’s usually — there’s always some flurry of activity. Sometimes, I think it’s quite excessive. And I don’t think it will be with Berkshire. But there will be some flurry of activity.
新发行的证券通常都会——总会——有一阵交易喧嚣。有时我认为这种喧嚣很过度。我不觉得 Berkshire 会如此，但也会有一阵热闹。
But longer range, let’s just assume that there’s $400 million worth of B stock. There will be 40 billion of A.
但从长期看，假设 B 股的市值是 4 亿美元，而 A 股是 400 亿美元。
Now, admittedly, you know, I’m not going to do anything with my stock. And many people in this room have a very low tax basis and, except under very unusual circumstances, have no intention of doing anything with their stock.
当然，显而易见，我是不会动我手里的股票的。在座很多人税基很低，除非非常特殊的情况，也没有任何操作打算。
So of that 40 billion, there’s a very significant percentage that you might say is almost inoculated against reaction to market changes.
因此，在这 400 亿的盘子里，有相当一部分可以说几乎对市场变化“免疫”。
But there still is a very significant dollar value. There’s a fair amount held by funds, for example.
但剩下仍有相当规模，其中不少由基金等持有。
And so the market value of what I would call the potentially tradeable A is likely to far exceed the market value of the potentially tradeable B. Now, it may be that all of the B is potentially tradeable, whereas, only a small portion of the A is.
因此，我所谓“潜在可交易的 A 股”的市值，很可能远超“潜在可交易的 B 股”。或许 B 股几乎全部都可交易，而 A 股只有一小部分可交易。
But that 40-billion-to-400-million ratio, I think, almost ensures that, after the initial flurry, that the better market — and when I say, “better market,” I mean the ability to move large dollar amounts in both directions with minimal movement of price — the better market — not by a huge margin — but the better market is likely to be in the A. And frankly, we hope that it is. We still hope there’s a good market in the B, obviously.
但 400 亿：4 亿这种量级差距，几乎可以保证在“首周热闹”过去后，“更好”的市场——我说的“更好”是指：在价格波动最小化的前提下，能双向搬动大额资金——会出现在 A 股，尽管差距不会特别大。坦白讲，我们也希望如此。当然，我们也希望 B 股的市场依然良好。
But if you’re talking 10 shares of the A, which is a $300,000 or so investment, I think that, two months from now — that it’s likely to be that buying or selling $300,000 worth of A will have slightly less of a percentage impact than buying or selling $300,000 worth of B, but not by a significant amount.
举例说，如果是 10 股 A 股（约 30 万美元）的交易，我想两个月后，买/卖 30 万美元的 A 股对价格的影响会略小于买/卖同等金额的 B 股，但差距不大。
But that’s what I meant by that comment of having a slightly better market in the A than the B. And that’s important from our standpoint because, if that situation became reversed and the B became the better market, then people would have a real incentive to convert from A to B over time, and eventually the B market would dominate.
这就是我所谓“A 股的市场会略好于 B 股”的含义。从我们的角度看，这一点很重要——如果形势反过来，B 股变成了“更好”的市场，那人们会有充分动机把 A 转成 B，久而久之 B 股市场可能会占主导。
We don’t anticipate that happening. And I think the way we’ve arranged it, it won’t happen. But it could happen.
我们并不预期这种情况发生。按我们设计的方式，它不太会发生，但也不是绝无可能。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, I think we’ve also created arrangements in the way we’ve written the prospectus and rewarded the selling brokers that tend to dampen demand, both individual and institutional. And we sometimes accomplish what we try to do. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我想我们在招股说明书的撰写方式、以及对销售经纪人的激励安排上，也做了能抑制需求（无论个人还是机构）的设计。而我们有时确实能达成自己的目标。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? Don’t ask us for a list of those, what we’ve accomplished. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：第 4 区？别问我们“抑制了哪些需求”的清单。（笑声）
84. Corporate return on equity will probably drop
企业股本回报率大概率会回落
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dan Pecaut, Sioux City, Iowa.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Dan Pecaut，爱荷华州 Sioux City。
In the mid-’70s, you wrote an article on how inflation swindles the equity investor and that the average return on equity for corporate America would be like 12 or 13 percent.
在上世纪 70 年代中期，你写过一篇文章，论述通胀如何欺骗股票投资者，并认为美国企业的平均股本回报率大概在 12% 到 13% 左右。
Last year, the average was more like 20. Have the laws of economics been repealed or modified? Or if not, what sort of calamities might occur as we revert to the mean?
去年，平均数更接近 20%。这是经济规律被废止或修改了吗？如果不是，那么回归均值时可能会发生什么样的“灾难”？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I have been surprised by returns on equity. There was a good article in Fortune about two issues ago. Well, it was in the “Fortune 500” issue, whenever that was. And it discussed the question of return on equity.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我确实被这几年股本回报率的水平所惊讶。《Fortune》大概两期之前——应该是“Fortune 500”那期——有篇不错的文章，专门讨论了股本回报率的问题。
And it made some good points about how the introduction of putting post-retirement health benefits on the balance sheet tends to swell equity returns subsequently. In other words, it moves down the denominator in terms of total equity employed.
那篇文章有个要点：把退休后医疗福利进表（计入资产负债表）会“抬高”此后披露的 ROE。换言之，它把分母——账面股东权益——压低了。
And there’s been a lot of big-bath accounting, where there have been write-offs, so that counting that, I don’t think it has gotten to 20 percent. But it’s higher than — it’s certainly higher than I anticipated when I wrote that article.
此外还有不少“大洗澡”式会计处理，一次性大额冲销。把这些都算上，我不认为真实平均 ROE 达到 20%，但无疑高于我当年写那篇文章时的预期。
And I would say that it would seem very extreme to me, in a world of — like we’re living in now — to have equity cap — returns on equity — close to the 20 — average close to the 20 percent rate over time. But it has surprised me, how high returns have been.
我会说，在我们所处的这个环境里，让平均ROE长期接近 20% 看起来非常极端。不过，这几年ROE之高确实超出了我的意料。
Now, you have had situations like at Coke, for example, where 25 years ago, they would not have repurchased stock. And so, they’d have piled up more equity in the business. And Coke’s return on equity, if it had been following the policies of 1970 or ’75, would be far less than it is now.
以 Coke 为例，25 年前他们不会回购股票，因此企业内的股东权益会越堆越厚。如果 Coke 仍沿用 1970 或 1975 年的资本政策，今天的 ROE 会远低于当前水平。
Coke really doesn’t need equity. And so, it can earn extraordinary returns and very large dollar sums. To the extent that impacts the figures, that has some impact on them.
Coke 实际上不需要太多账面股本，因此能在小分母上赚取极高的回报和很大的美元利润。这一类因素对整体统计是有影响的。
跟我们自己的想法一样，回购抬高了ROE，综合起来没那么高。
To the extent that General Motors sets up many, many billions of a reserve for post-retirement health benefits, that tends to make the returns on GM look a lot better than it did in the past, when it wasn’t even recognizing those costs and, therefore, had an equity that really was much larger than the true equity.
再比如 General Motors 为退休后医疗福利计提了数百亿美元的准备，这会让 GM 的ROE看起来比过去更好；过去未确认这些成本，导致账面权益远大于“真实权益”。
So there have been some things happen like that. But all in all, I don’t think, under any system of accounting, the 20 percent returns for American industry are in the cards.
所以确实存在这些“技术性”原因。但总体而言，在任何会计体系下，我都不认为美国企业部门能长期维持 20% 的平均 ROE。
Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree. And I think that this business of having way more consolidation and the successful companies, like Wells Fargo, buying in stock, I think that’s had a huge effect, too.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我同意。此外，并购整合的大幅增加，以及像 Wells Fargo 这样成功公司持续回购股票，这些也起了巨大的推动作用。
I don’t think it’s actually gotten that much — obviously, we had a long period of real growth and so on. And I think that, on average, business has earned higher returns on equity. But I think a whole lot of things have combined to goose the results. And I don’t see how it could go much farther.
我不认为真实创造的价值就增长了那么多——当然，我们经历了很长一段真实增长期。我认为平均 ROE 的确提高了，但更多是多种因素**叠加“催高”**了结果。我看不出它还能走得更远。
85. Buffett’s investment doesn’t reflect any real estate insights
巴菲特这笔投资不代表他对房地产有任何见解
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
WARREN BUFFETT：第 5 区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. My name is Ted Elliott (PH) from Connecticut.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的。我叫 Ted Elliott（PH），来自 Connecticut。
The press reported a recent investment you made in the real estate business. And I wondered if you would comment as to your outlook for that business.
媒体报道了你最近在房地产领域的一笔投资。我想请你谈谈对这门生意的看法。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s just sort of an asterisk. I’ve got virtually everything in Berkshire, and I own a few municipal bonds outside and a few other things, but I don’t want to buy anything that Berkshire’s involved in. It just complicates life. And all the best things I like — (laughs) — are in Berkshire.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，那更像是个脚注。我几乎把所有资产都放在 Berkshire，此外只在场外持有一些市政债和少量其他东西；但我不想买 Berkshire 参与的任何标的，那只会让生活变复杂。而且我最喜欢的那些东西——（笑）——都在 Berkshire 里了。
So every now and then, some little thing happens to hit the radar screen that is too small, really, for Berkshire. And I’d bought a hundred shares of that company back when I — it’s called Property Capital Trust — I’d bought 100 shares of that back when we owned NHP, which had done a couple of deals with them. So I — my policy of reading every annual report in sight that can further my knowledge about anything, I bought 100 shares.
所以偶尔会有一些太小、实在不适合 Berkshire 的小标的出现在我的雷达上。当年我买过那家公司一百股——它叫 Property Capital Trust——那是我们持有 NHP 的时候，NHP 曾与他们做过几笔交易。按照我“凡是能增广见闻的年报都要读”的习惯，我就买了 100 股。
And then I happened to see a year or so ago, where they said they were going to liquidate. So having some money around, I bought that. But it’s not based on any feeling about the real estate business, any sophisticated analysis of the company, or anything else. It’s a minor personal investment.
大约一年前我碰巧看到他们宣布要清算。手头有点闲钱，我就买了点。但这既不是基于对房地产行业的看法，也不是基于对公司的精细分析或其他什么原因。只是一个很小的个人投资。
I have no insights whatsoever. We’ve done a few things in real estate at Berkshire. But they’ve been large things. And there was a brief period when there were a couple things that were intelligent to do.
我对此完全没有见解。Berkshire 在房地产上做过几件事，但都是大项目。曾有一个短暂时期确实有几件“值得做”的事情。
If we’d started a little earlier, there might’ve been a lot more things. But we started a little late. So we’re doing nothing now. But we listen to things, occasionally.
如果我们更早开始，也许能做更多。但我们启动得稍晚一些，所以现在没有在做什么。不过我们偶尔会听一听市场上的动静。
But we’re looking. We’re basically looking for big things at Berkshire. And we haven’t found anything in real estate in a long time. And we may never.
但我们会留意。Berkshire 基本上只在寻找“大项目”。我们已经很久没在房地产上找到合适的标的了，也许以后也不会有。
But who can tell? I mean, we’ve got our oar in the water. And the couple things we’re in are working out fine. But they’re not significant relative to Berkshire’s size.
但谁也说不准。我的意思是，我们还是下着桨在水里。我们参与的那两三件事进展都不错，但相对于 Berkshire 的体量而言，它们并不重要。
86. Berkshire’s past growth not a yardstick for new investments
Berkshire 过去的增长不应作为新投资的标尺
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to zone 6. And this is the last question because it’s going to be 3 o’clock. And let’s have zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们到第 6 区。这是最后一个问题，因为快到 3 点了。请第 6 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name’s Mike Nolan from New Jersey. My wife and I have been shareholders since 1984, and happy ones. Thank you both. Two questions today.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我叫 Mike Nolan，来自 New Jersey。我和妻子从 1984 年起就是股东，而且很开心。谢谢两位。今天有两个问题。
In the retail store industry, in light of Berkshire’s outstanding 23 percent annual growth in book value per share and the industry’s roughly 8 to 9 percent growth in equity over the last several years, we wonder, why would Berkshire exchange stock for securities such as these, when the growth and the net worth of the acquired companies, if they’re anywhere near the industry average that you’ve acquired this year, are one-third or less?
在零售行业里，考虑到 Berkshire 每股账面价值年增长 23% 的优异纪录，以及过去几年行业股本增长大约 8% 到 9%，我们想知道：当被收购公司的净资产及其增长（就像你们今年收购的那些，如果接近行业平均）只有三分之一或更少时，为什么 Berkshire 还会以股票去交换这类资产？
To quote Barnett Helzberg from the annual report, “The diamond business is a very competitive industry.”
引用年报中 Barnett Helzberg 的话，“钻石生意是一个竞争非常激烈的行业。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, all retail is competitive. And both of those companies have averaged a lot better returns on equity than the numbers you cite for the industry.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，所有零售业都竞争激烈。而那两家公司平均股本回报率远好于你所引用的行业数字。
And the second point, you know, we have no way of making 23.6 percent in the future. So we do not use our historical — if we used our historical average as a yardstick for new investments, we would make no new investments because we don’t know how to make 23.6 percent in the future.
其次，你知道，我们未来无法做到 23.6% 的回报。所以我们不会把历史——如果把历史平均当作新投资的标尺，我们将不会做任何新投资，因为我们不知道未来如何再做出 23.6%。
But we like — we regard the retail business as a very tough business. We like the records of those companies, their market positions, and their managements. And when we find a business like that, and we feel very comfortable with the people running it, we will make the deal.
但我们喜欢——我们把零售视为非常艰难的生意。我们喜欢这些公司的过往纪录、它们的市场地位以及管理层。当我们找到这样的业务，并且对经营者感到非常放心时，我们就会达成交易。
But we won’t expect to make 23.6 percent on our money over time doing that.
但我们不会指望通过这些投资在长期里获得 23.6% 的回报。
I’d like to thank everybody for coming. You’ve, you know — (Applause)
我想感谢各位到来。你们，嗯——（掌声）
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