1998-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session

1. Welcome

欢迎

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning. Morning. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire, and — this is my partner. This hyperactive fellow over here is Charlie Munger. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好，早上好。我是沃伦·巴菲特，伯克希尔的董事长——这是我的合伙人。这位精力充沛的家伙是查理·芒格。（笑声）

And we’ll do this as we’ve done in the past, following the Saddam Hussein school of management, we’re going to go through the business meeting in a hurry, and then we’re going to do questions.

我们会像往常一样进行，效仿“萨达姆·侯赛因管理学派”，我们会迅速完成正式的业务会议，然后开始回答问题。

And we’ll do those until 3:30, with a break at noon, when we’ll take off for 30 minutes or so while you can grab lunch. And those of you — there’s — we’re operating in an overflow room as well — so those of you who are in the overflow room now can join the main floor after the noon break, because we’ll have plenty of room then.

我们会持续到下午3点半，中午会有30分钟左右的休息时间，大家可以用餐。我们还有一个备用会场，现在在备用会场的各位，中午休息后可以移步到主会场，因为到时会有足够的空间。

We’ll go until 3:30. We’ll try to get to all the questions we can. We’ve got 11 zones, ten of them in this room, and we’ll just make our way around them. I’ve got a little map here, which I’ll get oriented on here in a second. And let’s see.

我们会一直到下午3点半，尽量回答所有的问题。会场分为11个区域，其中10个在这个房间里，我们会依次走遍每个区域。我手上有一张小地图，一会儿我会确认一下位置。

And I think we’ll get through the business meeting now. Incidentally, I don’t see that movie before it’s shown, but that was one of our directors singing at that final session there. (Applause)

我想我们现在可以开始业务会议了。顺便提一下，我事先没有看过刚才的短片，但最后那一段演唱是我们的其中一位董事唱的。（掌声）

We keep costs down at Berkshire. (Laughter)

在伯克希尔，我们努力控制成本。（笑声）

2. Board of directors introduced

董事会成员介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, the meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company and I welcome you to this 1998 annual meeting of shareholders.

沃伦·巴菲特：好了，现在会议正式开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席，欢迎大家参加1998年伯克希尔哈撒韦股东年会。

I will first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present in addition to myself.

首先，我将介绍除我之外出席会议的伯克希尔哈撒韦董事会成员。

So we have — and I can’t see very well with the lights here, but if you’ll stand as I name you.

让我们开始——会场灯光有些刺眼，但请大家在听到名字时站起来。

Susan T. Buffett, the vocalist. (Applause)

苏珊·T·巴菲特，歌手。（掌声）

Howard G. Buffett, the non-vocalist. (Applause)

霍华德·G·巴菲特，非歌手。（掌声）

Malcolm G. Chace. (Applause)

马尔科姆·G·蔡斯。（掌声）

Charlie, you’ve met. And Ron Olson. (Applause)

查理，你们已经认识了。还有罗恩·奥尔森。（掌声）

And Walter Scott Junior. (Applause)

以及沃尔特·斯科特二世。（掌声）

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人出席，他们是我们的审计师，可以回答大家关于伯克希尔账目审计的相关问题。

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings.

福里斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书，他将负责记录会议的书面记录。

Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.

贝基·阿米克小姐被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将核实董事选举中所投票数。

The named proxy owners for this meeting are Walter Scott Junior and Marc D. Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday, representing 1,039,276 Class A Berkshire shares, and 1,080,509 Class B Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards.

本次会议的指定代理投票人是沃尔特·斯科特二世和马克·D·汉堡。截至上周五，共有1,039,276股伯克希尔A类股票和1,080,509股伯克希尔B类股票的投票卡被代理投票人接收并表决。

The number of shares represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

这些股票数量达到了法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。

We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you might have.

我们将完成会议的正式事务，然后休会。休会后，我们会回答大家的问题。

3. Minutes and shares outstanding

会议记录与流通股情况

WARREN BUFFETT: First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr., who will place a motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：首先的事务是宣读上次股东大会会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move the minutes — the reading — reading of the minutes of the last stockholders meeting be dispensed with.

沃尔特·斯科特二世：我提议免去上次股东大会会议记录的宣读。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second? (Voices)

沃伦·巴菲特：有人附议吗？（众声回应）

A lot of seconds. The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say aye.

很多人附议。动议已被提出并附议。有没有任何评论或问题？我们将通过口头表决的方式对此动议进行投票。赞成的人说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye.

众声：赞成。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? Motion’s carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：反对的？动议通过。

Does the secretary — (laughter) — have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?

秘书——（笑声）——是否有关于伯克希尔流通股数量、拥有投票权的股数及会议中出席的股数的报告？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 6, 1998, the record date for this meeting, there were 1,199,680 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at this meeting.

福里斯特·克鲁特：是的，我有。根据随本次会议通知一起通过一类邮件寄给截至1998年3月6日的登记股东的代理声明，当时流通的伯克希尔哈撒韦A类普通股共有1,199,680股，每股在本次会议的动议中有一票投票权。

And 1,245,081 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

伯克希尔哈撒韦B类普通股共有1,245,081股，每股在本次会议的动议中享有1/200票的投票权。

Of that number, 1,039,276 Class A shares and 1,080,509 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.

其中，有1,039,276股A类股票和1,080,509股B类股票通过截至上周五返回的代理表出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Forrest.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，福里斯特。

If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so. Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.

如果在场的股东希望撤回先前提交的代理表并亲自参与董事选举投票，可以这样做。此外，如果有在场的股东尚未提交代理表并希望领取选票以亲自投票，也可以这样做。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. Those persons desiring ballots, please identify themselves so that we may distribute them.

如果您希望这样做，请向过道中的会议工作人员表明身份，他们会为您提供选票。需要选票的人员请表明身份，以便我们发放选票。

4. Election of directors

董事选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The one item of business at this meeting is to elect directors. I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Junior to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：本次会议的唯一议题是选举董事。我现在请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出有关董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT JUNIOR: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Junior, be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特二世：我提议沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世被选为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? It’s been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Junior be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：有人附议吗？提议已经被提出并附议，即沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世被选为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? Nominations are ready to be acted upon.

还有其他提名吗？是否有任何讨论？提名已准备好表决。

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

如果有股东亲自投票，现在请在选票上标记您对董事选举的意见，并将选票交给选举监察员。

Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received.

请代理投票人也向选举监察员提交有关董事选举的选票，并按照他们收到的指示对代理票进行投票。

Miss Amick, when you are ready you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时可以进行报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballots of the proxy holder, in response to proxies that were received through last Friday, cast not less than 1,039,298 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好。根据截至上周五收到的代理表，代理投票人对每位被提名人至少投了1,039,298票。这个数字远远超过了A类和B类股票总票数的多数要求。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as those cast in person at this meeting, if any, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确统计认证，包括本次会议收到的代理投票人额外投出的票数以及亲自投出的票数（如有），将交给秘书存入本次会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Junior have been elected as directors.

沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特二世已被选为董事。

After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the businesses of Berkshire that do not call for any action at this meeting.

在会议结束后，我会回答大家可能提出的关于伯克希尔业务的问题，这些问题无需在本次会议上采取任何行动。

Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?

在我们休会之前，还有人有其他议题需要在本次会议上讨论吗？

5. Adjournment of formal business meeting

正式业务会议休会

WARREN BUFFETT: If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Junior to place a motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果没有其他议题，我请沃尔特·斯科特二世先生提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT JUNIOR: I move this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特二世：我提议本次会议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Second? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：有人附议吗？（笑声）

Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say aye?

休会动议已提出并附议。我们将通过口头表决进行投票。是否有任何讨论？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye.

众声：赞成。

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say I’m leaving. This meeting is adjourned. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：反对的请说“我要走了”。会议休会。（笑声和掌声）

Charlie and I may not get paid much, but we work fast on an hourly basis. (Laughter)

查理和我的薪水可能不高，但按小时算我们效率很高。（笑声）

6. Q&A session begins

问答环节开始

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’re going to do this by zones, and I think you can see who is manning each — yeah, I see we’ve got a number out there already.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们将按区域进行问答，我想你们可以看到每个区域都有工作人员——是的，我已经看到各区域准备好了。

And please ask just one question.

请每次只提一个问题。

The only thing that I can think of that we won’t discuss is what we’re buying or selling or may be buying or selling, but we’ll be glad to talk about anything that’s on your mind. So let’s go right to zone 1 and start in.

唯一我能想到不会讨论的话题是我们正在购买或出售的东西，或者可能会购买或出售的东西，但我们很乐意讨论其他任何你们感兴趣的事情。那么我们从第1区开始吧。

7. Price/earnings explanation

市盈率解释

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks for the beautiful — beautiful weekend in Omaha. I’m Mike Asale (PH) from New York City, with a question for Warren and Charlie about what makes a company’s price-earnings ratio move up relative to other companies in its industry.

听众：感谢奥马哈这个美好的周末。我是来自纽约市的迈克·阿赛尔，我想问沃伦和查理一个问题：是什么原因让一家公司的市盈率相较于其行业中的其他公司上升？

How can we, as investors, find companies, and even industries, that will grow their relative price-earnings ratios as well as their earnings?

作为投资者，我们如何找到那些市盈率相对提高且盈利也能增长的公司或行业？

And thank you for the wonderful weekend and for sharing your brilliance with the shareholders.

感谢这个美好的周末，以及你们与股东分享的智慧。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，谢谢你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. (Applause)

听众：谢谢。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, it’s very simple, the price-earnings ratio — relative price-earnings ratios — move up because people expect either the industry or the company’s prospects to be better relative to all other securities than they have been — than their proceeding view. And that can turn out to be justified or otherwise.

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，这其实很简单，市盈率——或相对市盈率——上升，是因为人们预期该行业或公司的前景相比其他证券变得更好，而这可能是合理的，也可能不是。

Absolute price-earnings ratios move up in respect to the earning power — or the prospective earning power of — that is viewed by the investing public of future returns on equity, and also in response to changes in interest rates.

绝对市盈率上升是由于投资公众对未来股本回报率的预期收益能力的看法改变，同时也受到利率变化的影响。

And in the recent — well really, ever since 1982, but accentuated in recent years, you’ve had decreasing interest rates pushing up stocks, in aggregate.

最近，确切地说，自1982年以来，特别是近年来，利率下降推动了整体股票价格的上升。

And you’ve had an increase in corporate profits. Return on equity of American businesses improved dramatically recently. And that also — and people are starting to believe it, so that has pushed up absolute price-earnings ratios.

企业利润也有所增加。美国企业的股本回报率最近显著改善，人们开始相信这一点，这也推动了绝对市盈率的上升。

And then within that universe of all stocks, when people get more enthusiastic about a specific business or a specific industry, they will push up the relative P/E ratio for that stock or industry.

然后，在所有股票的范围内，当人们对某个特定的业务或行业更加热情时，他们会推高该股票或行业的相对市盈率。

Charlie, you got anything?

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

8. No “degree of difficulty” bonus

没有“难度系数”奖金

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I think he also asked, how do you forecast these improvements in price-earnings ratios.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为他还问了如何预测市盈率的提高。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s your — that’s your part of the question. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是你的部分问题。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Around here I would say that if our predictions have been a little better than other people’s, it’s because we tried to make fewer of them. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：在我们这里，我会说，如果我们的预测比其他人稍微好一些，那是因为我们试图少做一些预测。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We also try not to do anything difficult, which ties in with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们也尽量不做任何困难的事情，这与上述理念相符。

We really do feel that you get paid just as well — you know, this is not like Olympic diving. In Olympic diving, you know, they have a degree of difficulty factor. And if you can do some very difficult dive, the payoff is greater if you do it well than if you do some very simple dive.

我们真的觉得，你可以获得同样的回报——你知道，这不像奥运跳水。在奥运跳水中，他们有一个难度系数。如果你能完成一个非常困难的跳水动作，做得好的话，回报会比完成一个非常简单的动作更高。

That’s not true in investments. You get paid just as well for the most simple dive, as long as you execute it all right. And there’s no reason to try those three-and-a-halfs when you get paid just as well for just diving off the side of the pool and going in cleanly. (Laughter)

但在投资中并非如此。只要你执行得当，即使是最简单的动作，你也能获得同样的回报。没有必要尝试那些三周半的高难度动作，因为简单地从池边跳进去，并干净利落地完成，你也能获得同样的回报。（笑声）

So we look for one-foot bars to step over rather than seven-foot or eight-foot bars to try and set some Olympic record by jumping over. And it’s very nice, because you get paid just as well for the one-foot bars.

所以我们寻找那些一英尺高的栏杆来跨越，而不是七英尺或八英尺高的栏杆来尝试创造奥运纪录。这非常好，因为跨越一英尺高的栏杆你也能得到同样的回报。

9. Efficient market hypothesis “contaminates” business schools

有效市场假说“污染”了商学院

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第二区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Joe Lacey (PH). I’m from Austin, Texas.

听众：早上好，我是乔·莱西（音译），来自德克萨斯州奥斯汀。

In this era when the financial departments of the institutions of higher learning are referring to you as an anomaly, and they preach the efficient markets hypothesis, saying that you can’t outperform the market, where does one go to find a mentor like you found in Ben Graham? Someone you can ask questions to regarding value investing.

在当今这个时代，高等学府的金融系将您称为一个“异常”，并宣扬有效市场假说，声称市场无法被战胜。那么，像您找到本·格雷厄姆那样，我们可以去哪里找到一个关于价值投资的导师来请教问题呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: My understanding is that the University of Florida has instituted a couple of courses that, actually, Mason Hawkins gave them a significant amount of money to finance. And I believe they’re teaching something other than efficient markets there.

沃伦·巴菲特：据我所知，佛罗里达大学开设了一些课程，实际上是由梅森·霍金斯捐助了一大笔资金来支持的。我相信他们在那里教授的内容不是有效市场假说。

There’s a very good course at Columbia I know that gets a lot of visiting teachers to come in. I go there and teach occasionally, but a number of practitioners do.

哥伦比亚大学也有一门非常好的课程，邀请了许多客座教师参与。我偶尔也去那里授课，还有很多实践者也参与教学。

So there — I think the efficient market theory is less holy writ now than it was 15 or 20 years ago in universities, but it’s — there’s a lot of it taught, but I think you can find more diversity in what is being offered now than ten or 20 years ago. And I’d recommend, you know, looking into those two schools.

所以，我认为有效市场理论在大学里现在已经不再像15或20年前那样被奉为“圣经”了。尽管仍有很多教授这方面内容的课程，但现在的教学内容比十或二十年前更加多样化。我建议你关注一下这两所学校。

You know, it’s really quite useful. If you had a merchant shipping business, if all of your competitors believe the world is flat, you know, that is a huge edge, because they will not take on any cargo to go to places that are beyond where they think they will fall off. And so we should be encouraging the teaching of efficient market theories in universities. (Laughter)

你知道，这其实非常有用。如果你经营的是商船业务，而所有竞争对手都相信地球是平的，那对你来说是个巨大的优势，因为他们不会接任何去“世界尽头”以外地方的货物。所以我们应该鼓励大学教授有效市场理论。（笑声）

It amazes me. But, you know, I think one time that — was it Keynes that said that most economists are most economical about ideas? That they make the ones they learned in graduate school last a lifetime. (Laughter)

这让我感到惊讶。不过，我记得凯恩斯好像说过，大多数经济学家在观念上是最节约的？他们会让自己在研究生院学到的理论陪伴一生。（笑声）

And what happens is that you spend years getting your Ph.D. in finance and you learn theories with a lot of mathematics in them that the average layman can’t do.

问题是，你花了多年时间攻读金融学博士，学到许多普通人无法理解的复杂数学理论。

白痴都在寻找表格，低级白痴寻找低级的表格，高级白痴寻找高级的表格。

And you become sort of a high priest. And you get an enormous amount of yourself and ego, and even professional security, invested in those ideas. And it gets very hard to back off after a given point. And I think that to some extent has contaminated the teaching of investing in the universities.

你成了一种“高阶祭司”，将自己、尊严，甚至职业安全感，都大量投入到这些理论中。到了一定程度后，就很难退缩。我认为这在某种程度上“污染”了大学里的投资教学。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that the contamination was massive. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这种污染是大规模的。（笑声）

But it’s waning.

不过它正在减退。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it is waning.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，它确实在减退。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s waning. The good ideas eventually triumph.

查理·芒格：它正在减退，好理念最终会胜利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The word “anomaly” I’ve always found interesting on that, because, you know, after a while — I mean Columbus was an anomaly, I suppose, for a while. But what it means is something that the academicians could not explain, and rather than re-examine their theories, they simply discarded any evidence of that sort as anomalous.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我一直觉得“异常”这个词很有趣，因为过了一段时间——比如哥伦布在某个时候可能也算是个“异常”。但它的意思是指学术界无法解释的现象，他们宁愿不重新审视自己的理论，而是简单地把这类证据抛弃，称之为“异常”。

And I think when you find information that contradicts previously cherished beliefs, that you’ve got a special obligation to look at it and look at it quickly.

我认为，当你发现与先前深信的信念相矛盾的信息时，你有特别的义务去审视它，而且要迅速审视。

I think Charlie told me that one of the things Darwin did was that whenever he found anything that contradicted some previous belief, he knew that he had to write it down almost immediately because he felt that the human mind was conditioned, so conditioned to reject contradictory evidence, that unless he got it down in black and white very quickly his mind would simply push it out of existence.

查理跟我说过，达尔文做的其中一件事就是，每当他发现某些东西与之前的信念相矛盾时，他知道必须立即记下来，因为他觉得人类的大脑被训练得过于倾向于排斥矛盾的证据，如果不快速用文字记录下来，大脑很快就会将其抹除。

Charlie knows more about Darwin than I do. Maybe he can explain that.

查理比我更了解达尔文，也许他可以解释一下。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know about Darwin, but I did find it amusing. One of these extreme efficient market theorists explained Warren for many, many years as an anomaly of luck. And he got the six sigmas, six standard deviations of luck. And then people started laughing at him because six sigmas of luck is a lot. So he changed his theory. Now Warren has six or seven sigmas of skill. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我对达尔文不是很了解，但我确实觉得这很有趣。有一位极端有效市场理论家多年来一直把沃伦解释为一个“运气的异常”。他说沃伦有六个西格玛的运气，六个标准差的运气。然后人们开始嘲笑他，因为六个西格玛的运气实在太多了。于是他改了理论，现在沃伦有六个或七个西格玛的技能。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No.

沃伦·巴菲特：不不不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So you see —

查理·芒格：你看——

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d rather have the six sigmas of luck, actually. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：其实，我更愿意要那六个西格玛的运气。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: The one thing he couldn’t bear to leave was his six sigmas. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：他唯一无法放弃的就是他的六个西格玛。（笑声）

10. “Time is the enemy of the poor business”

“时间是平庸企业的敌人”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s try zone 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们试试第三区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Warren Hayes (PH). I’m from Chicago, Illinois.

听众：我叫沃伦·海斯（音译），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。

I understand from various publications, like Outstanding Investor Digest, that many of the best value investors are buying high-quality, multi-national Japanese companies that are trading below net-net working capital value.

据我从《杰出投资者文摘》等刊物了解到，许多最优秀的价值投资者正在购买一些优质的、日本的跨国公司，这些公司以低于净营运资本的价格交易。

Do you agree that these values exist in Japan? And would you consider a purchase of some of them?

您是否认为日本存在这样的价值？您会考虑购买其中一些公司吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Henry Emerson, who publishes the Outstanding Investor’s Digest is here, so I will give a tout on it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，出版《杰出投资者文摘》的亨利·埃默森今天也在这里，所以我先夸奖一下这本刊物。

I read the Outstanding Investor’s Digest, OID, and it’s a very good publication. And I have read some of the commentary about Japanese securities.

我读过《杰出投资者文摘》（OID），这是一份非常好的刊物。我也看过一些关于日本证券的评论。

We’ve looked at securities in all major markets, and we certainly looked at them in Japan, particularly in recent years when the Nikkei has so underperformed the S&P here.

我们研究过所有主要市场的证券，当然也看过日本的，尤其是最近几年，日经指数表现远逊于美国的标普指数。

We’re quite a bit less enthused about those stocks as being any kind of obvious bargains than the people that you read about in OID.

对于那些股票，我们的兴趣没有《杰出投资者文摘》里的那些人描述的那么高，因为我们并不觉得它们显然是便宜货。

The returns on equity in most areas of Japanese business, returns on equity are very low. And it’s extremely difficult to get rich by owning — by being the owner of a business that earns a low return on equity.

日本大多数行业的股本回报率都很低。而通过持有一个股本回报率低的公司变富是非常困难的。

You know, we always look at what a business does in terms of what it earns on capital.

你知道，我们总是以企业的资本回报来衡量它的表现。

We want to be in good businesses. Where you really want to be is in businesses that are going to be good businesses and better businesses ten years from now. And we want to buy them at a reasonable price.

我们希望投资于优秀的企业。我们真正想要的是那些在未来十年仍然是优秀企业，并且会变得更好的企业。我们希望以合理的价格买入它们。

But many years ago we gave up what I’ve labeled the “cigar butt” approach to investing, which is where you try and find a really kind of pathetic company, but it sells so cheap that you think there’s one good free puff left in it.

但是多年前，我们放弃了我所说的“烟蒂式”投资法。这种方法是寻找一个看起来很差劲的公司，但由于它的价格极低，你觉得还可以从中获得一口“免费烟”。

And — (laughter) — we used to pick up a lot of soggy cigar butts, you know. I mean, I had a portfolio full of them.

我们过去确实捡了很多湿漉漉的烟蒂。我的投资组合里曾经全是这样的公司。（笑声）

And there were free puffs in them. I mean, I made money out of that. But A, it doesn’t work with big money anyway, and B, we don’t find many cigar butts around that we would be attracted to.

这些烟蒂确实还能抽一口，我的确从中赚过钱。但首先，这种方法不适合大资金运作；其次，我们现在几乎找不到让我们感兴趣的“烟蒂”。

But those are the companies that had low returns on equity. And if you have a business that’s earning 5 or 6 percent on equity and you hold it for a long time, you are not going to do well in investing. Even if you buy it cheap to start with.

那些公司都是股本回报率很低的。如果一个企业的股本回报率只有5%或6%，并且你长期持有它，在投资上你不会有好结果。即使你一开始以便宜的价格买入。

Time is the enemy of the poor business, and it’s the friend of the great business. I mean if you have a business that’s earning 20 or 25 percent on equity, and it does that for a long time, time is your friend.

时间是平庸企业的敌人，却是优秀企业的朋友。换句话说，如果你有一家企业的股本回报率是20%或25%，并且长期保持这个水平，时间就是你的朋友。

But time is your enemy if you have your money in a low-return business. And you may be lucky enough to pick the exact moment when it gets taken over by someone else.

但如果你的资金投在一个低回报的企业上，时间就是你的敌人。你或许足够幸运，能在它被其他人收购的那一刻抓住机会。

But we like to think when we buy a stock we’re going to own it for a very long time, and therefore we have to stay away from businesses that have low returns on equity.

但我们喜欢这样想：当我们买入一只股票时，我们会长期持有。因此，我们必须远离那些股本回报率低的企业。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s not that much fun to buy a business where you really hope this sucker liquidates before it goes broke. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是啊，买一个企业，只是希望它在破产前清算掉，这并不是很有趣的事情。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve been in a few of those, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们也经历过这样的企业。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：没错。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I, we — or at least I have, I’ve owned stock in an anthracite company. There are probably people in this room that don’t know what anthracite is. Three railway companies. Windmill manufacturers. What other gems have we had, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我——至少我是这样——我曾经持有一家无烟煤公司的股票。这房间里可能有人都不知道什么是无烟煤。还有三家铁路公司，风车制造商。我们还有过哪些“宝藏”企业，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Textiles. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：纺织业。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, textiles. Don’t even think. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，纺织业。别提了。（笑声）

Yeah, Berkshire was a mistake, believe it or not. I mean we went into Berkshire because it was cheap statistically just as a general investment back in the early ’60s, and it was a company that in the previous ten years had earned less than nothing. I mean it had a significant net loss over the previous ten years.

是的，伯克希尔是个错误，相信与否。我们进入伯克希尔是因为在统计上它很便宜，就像早期60年代的一个普通投资。而在之前十年，它实际上是亏损的，也就是说，十年来净亏损相当严重。

It was selling well below working capital, so it was a cigar butt. And it was — I mean we could have done the things we’ve done subsequently from a neutral base rather than a negative base, and actually it would have worked out better, but it’s been a lot of fun.

它的交易价格远低于营运资本，所以它是一个“烟蒂”。我想，我们本可以从一个中立的基础而不是负面的基础开始做我们后来做的事情，这样实际上会更好，但这一路确实很有趣。

避免从负面资产入手。

11. Munger wants “a good idea we can understand”

芒格希望找到“我们能理解的好主意”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number four.

沃伦·巴菲特：第4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Martin Weigand from Bethesda, Maryland. Again, I want to thank you for your letters and principles. They’re a great help for small business people running their business.

听众：你好，我是来自马里兰州贝塞斯达的马丁·魏根德。我再次感谢你们的信件和原则，它们对经营小型企业的人非常有帮助。

My question is, last year you said you had filters in your mind to help you quickly analyze businesses.

我的问题是，去年您提到过您脑中有一些“过滤器”，可以帮助您快速分析业务。

How do your filters take into account the very fast changes of technology and the way that businesses communicate with their customers, take orders, things like that?

您的过滤器如何考虑技术的快速变化，以及企业与客户沟通、接单等方式的变化？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we do have filters, and sometimes those filters are very irritating to people who check in with us about businesses, because we really can say in ten seconds or so “no” to 90 percent-plus of all the things that come in, simply because we have these filters. We have some filters in regard to people, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们确实有过滤器，这些过滤器有时会让那些向我们介绍业务的人感到很恼火，因为我们通常能在10秒内对90%以上的事情说“不”，这就是因为我们有这些过滤器。我们对人也有一些过滤器。

But the question of technology is very simple. That doesn’t make it through our filter. I mean, so if something comes in where there’s a technological component that’s of significance, or where we think the future technology could hurt the business as it presently exists, we look at, you know, we look at that as something to worry about. We will — it won’t make it through the filter.

但对于技术的问题就很简单了。这种东西不会通过我们的过滤器。我是说，如果有某些业务包含重要的技术成分，或者我们认为未来的技术可能会对现有的业务产生不利影响，我们会把它当作一个令人担忧的问题。它不会通过我们的过滤器。

We want things that we can understand, which filters out a lot of things. (Laughter)

我们希望找到我们能理解的东西，这样就过滤掉了很多东西。（笑声）

And we want them to be good businesses, and we want the people to be people we’re very comfortable with. That means ability and integrity.

我们希望这些是优秀的业务，我们希望这些业务的管理者是我们感到非常放心的人。这意味着他们必须具备能力和正直品质。

And we can do that very fast. We’ve heard a lot of stories in our lives, and it’s amazing how they — you can become quite efficient in, probably, getting 95 percent of the ideas through in a very short period of time that should get through.

我们能非常快地完成筛选。我们这一生听过很多故事，惊人的是，你会变得相当高效，能够在很短时间内筛选出95%的应该通过的想法。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we have to have an idea that is A, a good idea, and B, a good idea that we can understand. It’s just that simple. And so those filters are filters against consequences from our own lack of talent. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我们需要的是一个好主意，而且这个主意必须是我们能够理解的。就是这么简单。所以这些过滤器其实是为了避免我们自身才能不足导致的后果。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Filters haven’t changed much over the years, either. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这些过滤器这些年来也没怎么变过。（笑声）

12. “A lot of different talents” within Berkshire

伯克希尔内部拥有“多种不同的才能”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area five.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Allan Maxwell. I live in the wonderful tropical island of O-maha. (Laughter)

听众：大家好，我是艾伦·麦克斯韦。我住在美丽的热带岛屿奥马哈。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s right up there with Aksarben. That’s Nebraska spelled backwards. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这跟Aksarben差不多。那是Nebraska倒过来拼写的。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Everybody in this room’s got to be wondering the same question. Who, in your opinion, both of you, is the next Warren Buffett?

听众：我想在场的每个人都在思考同样的问题。在你们两位看来，谁会是下一个沃伦·巴菲特？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? Who’s the next Charlie Munger? Well, let’s try that first. That’s a more difficult question. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？那谁会是下一个查理·芒格？我们先试试回答这个问题吧。这是个更难的问题。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s not much demand. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：没有什么需求。（笑声）

I don’t think there’s only one way to succeed in life, and our successors, in due time, may be different in many ways. And they may do better.

我认为人生成功并没有唯一的方式，我们的继任者在适当的时候，可能会在许多方面有所不同。他们可能会做得更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, we have a number of people in the company, some of whom are in this room today, and the ones you saw on that screen, who are leagues ahead of Charlie and me in various kinds of abilities.

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便提一下，公司里有很多优秀的人才，其中一些今天就在这个房间里，还有一些是你们在屏幕上看到的，他们在很多方面的能力远远超过查理和我。

I mean a lot of different talents. We’ve got a fellow in this room today who’s the best bridge player, probably, in the world. And Charlie and I could work night and day, and if he spent ten minutes a week working on it, he’d play better bridge than we would.

他们具备各种不同的才能。今天在这个房间里有一个人可能是世界上最好的桥牌选手。查理和我即使夜以继日地练习，而他每周只花十分钟，仍然会比我们打得好。

And there are all kinds of intellectual endeavors that, for some reason or another, one person’s a little bit better wired for than someone else.

在许多智力活动中，有些人由于某些原因天赋比其他人更适合。

And we have people running our businesses that if Charlie and I were put in charge of those businesses, we couldn’t do remotely as well as they do.

我们的业务由一些人才负责，如果换作查理和我来管理这些业务，我们的表现远远比不上他们。

So there’s a lot of different talents. The two that we’re responsible for is, we have to be able to keep able people, who are already rich, motivated to keep working at things where they don’t need to do it for financial reasons. I mean it’s that simple.

因此，公司拥有各种不同的才能。我们负责的两件事是：第一，我们必须让那些已经富有的能干人才继续有动力工作，而他们并非因为经济原因需要工作。这就是这么简单。

And that’s a problem any of you could think about, and you’d probably be quite good at it if you gave it a little thought, because you’d figure out what would cause you to work if you were already rich and didn’t need the job. Why would you jump out of bed and be excited about going to work that day? And then we try to apply that to the people who work with us.

这是一个你们每个人都可以思考的问题，如果你们花点时间思考这个问题，你们可能会做得很好，因为你们会想明白，如果你已经很富有且不需要这份工作，是什么会让你起床并兴奋地去上班？我们试图将这一点应用到与我们合作的人身上。

主动的意识。

Secondly, we have to allocate capital. And these days we have to allocate a lot more capital than we had to allocate a decade ago.

第二，我们需要分配资本。而现在我们需要分配的资本比十年前多得多。

That job is very tough at present. Sometimes it’s very easy. And it will be easy at times in the future and it’ll be difficult at times in the future. But there are other people that can allocate capital, and we have them in the company.

目前这项工作非常艰难。有时它会非常容易。在未来的某些时候会变得容易，但在某些时候也会很困难。不过有其他人能够分配资本，而公司里就有这样的人才。

Charlie, you have any —?

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

查理·芒格：没有。

13. One of the few reasons to sell a stock

出售股票的几大原因之一

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第六区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Jad Khoury (PH). I’m from Gaithersburg, Maryland. I just want to thank you for sharing your wisdom.

听众：早上好，我叫贾德·库里（音译），来自马里兰州盖瑟斯堡。我非常感谢您分享您的智慧。

And my question is, what criteria do you use to sell stock? I kind of understand how you buy it, but I’m not sure how you sell.

我的问题是，您用什么标准来决定出售股票？我大致理解您如何买股票，但不太清楚您是如何卖的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the best thing to do is buy a stock that you don’t ever want to sell. I mean — and that’s what we’re trying to do.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。其实，最好的做法是买入一只你永远不想卖出的股票。这就是我们一直在努力做的事情。

And that’s true when we buy an entire business. I mean, we bought all of GEICO or we bought all of See’s Candy or The Buffalo News. We’re not buying those to resell.

当我们收购整个企业时也是一样的。我是说，我们收购了整个GEICO、See’s Candy或《布法罗新闻》，但我们并不是为了转手卖出而买下它们。

I mean, what we’re trying to do is buy a business that we will be happy with if we own it the rest of our lives, and we expect to with those.

我们试图做的是收购一家企业，我们会很高兴一辈子持有它。我们对这些企业有这样的期望。

It’s the same principle applies to marketable securities. You get extra options with marketable securities. You can add to holdings. Obviously easier — we can never own more than a hundred percent of a business, but if we own 2 percent of a business and we like it at a given price, we can add and have 4 or 5 percent. So that’s an advantage.

对可交易证券也适用同样的原则。可交易证券为你提供了更多选择。你可以增持股票。这显然更灵活——我们永远不能持有企业超过100%的股份，但如果我们持有某企业2%的股份，并且我们在某个价格上非常看好它，我们可以增加到4%或5%。这是一个优势。

Sometimes, if we need money to move to another sector, like we did last year, we will trim some holdings, but that doesn’t mean we’re negative on those businesses at all. I mean, we think they’re wonderful businesses or we wouldn’t own them.

有时候，如果我们需要资金转向另一个领域，比如去年那样，我们会削减一些持股，但这绝不意味着我们对这些企业持负面看法。我的意思是，我们认为这些是优秀的企业，否则我们不会持有它们。

And we would sell A, if we needed money for other things.

我们会卖出股票的一个原因是我们需要资金用于其他事项。

The GEICO stock that I bought in 1951, I sold in 1952. And it went on to be worth a hundred or more times — before the 1976 problems — 100 or more times what I’d paid. But I didn’t have the money to do something else. So you sell if you need money for something else.

我在1951年买入的GEICO股票，1952年就卖掉了。在1976年问题爆发前，它的价值增长了一百倍以上。但当时我需要资金做其他事情。所以，如果你需要资金去做别的事，就会卖出股票。

You may sell if you believe the valuations between different kinds of markets are somewhat out of whack. And, you know, we have done a little trimming last year in that manner. But that could well be a mistake. I mean the real thing to do with a great business is just hang on for dear life.

如果你认为不同市场之间的估值有些失衡，你可能会卖出。我们去年确实在这方面做了一些调整。但这很可能是一个错误。我是说，对一个优秀企业来说，真正该做的事情是牢牢持有它。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, but the sales that do happen, the ideal way is when you found something you like immensely better. Isn’t that obvious that’s the ideal way to sell?

查理·芒格：是的，但确实会发生的出售行为中，最理想的方式是当你找到一个你极其喜欢的新标的时出售。这不是显而易见的吗？这是出售的理想方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: And incidentally, the ideal purchase is to find — is to have something that you already liked be selling at a price where you feel like buying more of it. I mean, we probably should have done more of that in the past in some situations.

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便提一下，最理想的买入情况是：你已经喜欢的一家公司以一个让你想继续买入的价格出售。我是说，在过去的一些情况下，我们可能应该更多地这么做。

But that’s the beauty of marketable securities. You really do — if you’re in a wonderful business, you do get a chance, periodically, maybe to double up in it, or something of the sort.

但这就是可交易证券的美妙之处。如果你拥有一家优秀的企业，你真的会周期性地有机会加倍投资其中，或做类似的事情。

If the market — if the stock market were to sell a lot cheaper than it is now, we would probably be buying more of the businesses that we already own. They would certainly be the first ones that we would think about. They’re the businesses we like the best.

如果股市的价格比现在便宜很多，我们很可能会更多地买入我们已经持有的企业。它们肯定是我们首先考虑的目标。因为它们是我们最喜欢的企业。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.

查理·芒格：没有更多补充了。

14. Make up your own mind

做出自己的判断

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第七区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Ron Wright (PH) from Iowa City, Iowa.

听众：早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是来自爱荷华州爱荷华市的罗恩·赖特（音译）。

New companies have always been an interest to me. Is it reasonable to assume an Omaha-based company with only $5 billion in the bank might succeed in telecommunications?

我一直对新公司感兴趣。假设一家总部在奥马哈的公司仅有50亿美元现金储备，它在电信行业取得成功是否合理？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that a new company with 5 billion in the bank is probably better off than most new companies. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为一家有50亿美元现金储备的新公司，可能比大多数新公司情况要好得多。（笑声）

Be like Jennifer Gates, as a newborn. (Laughter)

这就像詹妮弗·盖茨刚出生时一样。（笑声）

I think you’re probably referring to a company that was created out of one of our local operations that’s run by Walter Scott, one of our directors, from the Kiewit Company, Level 3.

我想你可能指的是一家从我们本地业务中衍生出来的公司，它由我们的董事之一沃尔特·斯科特领导，来自Kiewit公司，也就是Level 3。

I can tell you, it’s got very able management. And I’ll take your word for it that it’s also got 5 billion in the bank, but you’ll have to make your own judgment on the stock.

我可以告诉你，它的管理团队非常有能力。如果你说它确实有50亿美元现金储备，我相信你的话。但对于它的股票，你需要自己做出判断。

I know Charlie won’t comment on that one. (Laughs)

我知道查理不会对这个发表任何评论。（笑声）

15. Buffett jokes about Nebraska football’s Tom Osborne

巴菲特开玩笑谈内布拉斯加橄榄球队的汤姆·奥斯本

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, good morning. This is Mo Stintz (PH) from Omaha, Nebraska.

听众：早上好，我是来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈的莫·斯廷茨（音译）。

In the past you’ve often said that the insurance operation is the most important business in Berkshire’s portfolio. Is that true? And what are numbers two and three?

过去，您经常说保险业务是伯克希尔投资组合中最重要的业务。这是真的吗？那第二和第三重要的业务是什么？

I’d also like to ask, is it true that Charlie chose the colors for the cover of this year’s annual report?

我还想问，今年年报封面的颜色是查理选的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Did Charlie choose them? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是查理选的吗？（笑声）

He had nothing to do with them. I chose them. (Laughter)

他完全没有参与，是我选的。（笑声）

They were a tribute to the Nebraska football team and Tom Osborne, who you saw. (Applause)

这是向内布拉斯加橄榄球队和你们看到的汤姆·奥斯本致敬。（掌声）

Tom, incidentally, has a very low-key style, and Bobby Bowden, a few years ago, was in Lincoln. And he said that on their first date that Nancy had to slap Tom three times. And somebody said, “Was he that fresh?” And she said, “No, I was just checking to be sure he was alive.” (Laughter)

顺便提一下，汤姆的风格非常低调。几年前，鲍比·鲍登来到林肯，他说在汤姆和南希第一次约会时，南希不得不拍了汤姆三次。有人问：“他是那么放肆吗？” 她说：“不，我只是想确认他还活着。”（笑声）

Tom had a fairly conservative offense for a time in the past, although it hasn’t been so conservative the last few years, but somebody said at that time the most reckless thing he did was to eat some cottage cheese the day after the expiration on the carton by then. (Laughter)

汤姆过去一段时间的进攻策略相当保守，尽管最近几年并没有那么保守，但有人说，当时他最冒险的事就是在奶酪过期后的一天还吃了一些。（笑声）

But I — no, I chose the colors. Now what was the question? (Laughter)

但我——不，颜色是我选的。那么问题是什么来着？（笑声）

What was the question, Charlie? Do you remember?

查理，问题是什么？你记得吗？

A memorable question, but give it to us again. (Laughter)

这是一个值得纪念的问题，但请再问一次吧。（笑声）

16. Proud not to have a strategic plan

以没有战略计划为荣

WARREN BUFFETT: Are we back there in zone 8? Oh, the number — yeah, sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们回到第八区域了吗？哦，好吧。

The question was about the insurance business, which we have said will be, by far, the most important business at Berkshire. We said that many, many years ago, and it’s proven to be the case.

问题是关于保险业务的，我们曾说过，这无疑是伯克希尔最重要的业务。我们很多年前就这么说了，现在事实证明确实如此。

It obviously got a big leg up when we purchased all of GEICO. Insurance, as far as the eye can see, will be, by far, the most significant business at Berkshire.

当我们收购了GEICO全部股份后，这显然是一个重要的推进。从长远来看，保险无疑是伯克希尔最重要的业务。

And the question about two and three: in terms of earnings, FlightSafety is the second largest source of earnings. But we don’t really think of them that way. I mean we do know our main business is insurance, but we really have a lot of fun out of all of our businesses. And I had a great time out at Borsheims yesterday, or at a Dairy Queen.

至于第二和第三重要的业务：从收益来看，FlightSafety是第二大收益来源。但我们并不以这种方式来思考。我是说，我们知道我们的主要业务是保险，但我们在所有业务中都感受到很多乐趣。昨天在Borsheims或者Dairy Queen我都过得很开心。

So it will be accident, to some extent, over the next ten years, what ends up being the second or third or fourth largest. That’ll be determined by opportunity.

因此，在未来十年中，最终成为第二、第三或第四大业务的，某种程度上会是偶然的。这将取决于机会。

We bid on certain businesses — or negotiated on them — that could have been very large businesses if they become part of Berkshire. And that’ll happen again in the future.

我们曾竞标或谈判过一些企业，如果它们成为伯克希尔的一部分，可能会是非常大的业务。这种情况未来还会发生。

So we have no predetermined course of action whatsoever at Berkshire. We have no strategic planning department. We don’t have any strategic plan.

因此，伯克希尔没有任何预定的行动计划。我们没有战略规划部门，也没有任何战略计划。

We react to what we think are opportunities. And if it’s a business we can understand, and particularly if it’s big, you know, we would love to make it number two.

我们根据认为是机会的事情作出反应。如果是一个我们能理解的业务，特别是规模大的业务，我们会很乐意让它成为第二大业务。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I also want to say proudly that we have no mission statement.

查理·芒格：我还想自豪地说，我们也没有使命声明。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：对，我们没有。（笑声和掌声）

It’s hard to think of anything that we do have, as a matter of fact. (Laughter)

实际上，很难想出我们究竟有什么。（笑声）

Yeah, we have never had — I mean I’m sure you all know this. We’ve never had a consultant. And we try to keep things pretty simple.

是的，我们从来没有——我是说，我确信你们都知道这一点。我们从来没有聘请过咨询顾问。我们尽量保持事情简单。

We still have 12 people at headquarters. We have about 40,000 people that now work for Berkshire. And we hope to grow a lot, but we don’t hope to grow at headquarters. (Laughter)

我们的总部仍然只有12个人。而伯克希尔现在大约有4万名员工。我们希望业务能大幅增长，但我们并不希望总部的规模增长。（笑声）

17. In “good shape” to handle Y2K problem

“千禧年问题”准备充分

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：第九区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, my name is Patty Buffett and I’m from Albuquerque, New Mexico.

听众：是的，我叫帕蒂·巴菲特，来自新墨西哥州的阿尔伯克基。

WARREN BUFFETT: I like your name. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我喜欢你的名字。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks.

听众：谢谢。

In your opinion, what effect will the year 2000 compliant issue have on the U.S. stock market and the global economy?

在您看来，“千禧年问题”会对美国股市和全球经济产生什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I get different reports on 2000, but the main report I hear — I think, you know, we — you wouldn’t want to rely on me on this, but you could rely on our managers. And I think we’re in good shape.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我听到了有关2000年的不同报告，但我听到的主要信息是——我觉得，你们可能不该依赖我的判断，但可以相信我们的管理者。我认为我们已经准备充分了。

It’s costing us some money but not huge amounts of money to be prepared for 2000.

为了应对2000年问题，我们花了一些钱，但并不是巨大的开销。

With companies in which I’m a director, you know, I hear some reasonably good-sized numbers. Those numbers are in their annual reports and described as to the cost of compliance.

在我担任董事的公司里，我听到了一些相当大的数字。这些数字在它们的年报中也有所提及，并描述了合规的成本。

But what I’m told by people that know a lot more than I do, is that they think probably that the weakest link may be in governmental units. They seem to think that in terms of where they stand versus the commercial sector, in terms of reaching where they need to be by 2000, that there’s some areas of both national and state and local governments, and foreign government, where they’re really behind the curve.

但据比我更了解情况的人所说，他们认为最薄弱的环节可能是在政府部门。他们似乎认为，无论是国家、州还是地方政府，或者外国政府，在达到2000年所需的准备程度方面，相较于商业部门，他们确实落后了。

Now, that is not an independent judgment of mine. But somebody said, “You want to be very careful about making a phone call at five seconds before midnight at the millennium because you may get charged for 100 years,” you know. (Laughter)

当然，这不是我的独立判断。但有人说，“在千禧年午夜前五秒打电话要非常小心，因为可能会被计费100年。”（笑声）

So it’ll be interesting.

所以，这会很有趣。

I don’t think it’s going to affect Berkshire in any material way, and I certainly have a feeling that the world will get past it very easily. But it is turning — it is expensive for some companies, and it’s going to be very expensive for governments.

我认为这不会对伯克希尔产生实质性的影响，而且我确信世界会很轻松地度过这一问题。但对一些公司来说，这确实是笔不小的开销，对政府来说尤其昂贵。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I find it interesting that it is such a problem. You know, it was predictable that the year 2000 would come.

查理·芒格：是的，我觉得这成为一个问题很有意思。你知道，2000年的到来是完全可以预见的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声和掌声）

Yeah. Yeah, we decided that back in 1985, actually. (Laughter)

是的。实际上，我们在1985年就已经知道了。（笑声）

We didn’t welcome it, understand. That’s not Berkshire’s style, though. (Laughs)

当然，我们并不期待它的到来，这不是伯克希尔的风格。（笑声）

It is fascinating, isn’t it, when you think about it, that a whole bunch of people with 160 IQs that could build up such a problem, but here we are. And — (laughter) — that’s why we stick with simple things. (Laughter)

想想看，这很有趣，不是吗？一群智商160的人竟然能制造出这样一个问题，但事情就是如此。这也是为什么我们坚持做简单的事情。（笑声）

18. Laws needed to check campaign spending “arms race”

需要法律限制竞选支出“军备竞赛”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Kristin Cham (PH). I’m from Springfield, Illinois. And I’m a proud shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway. (Applause)

听众：我叫克里斯汀·查姆（音译），来自伊利诺伊州的斯普林菲尔德。我是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的自豪股东。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad to you have you here.

沃伦·巴菲特：很高兴您能来。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ve heard a little about your thoughts on trying to control campaign spending. Could you tell us more about your thoughts and efforts on this topic? Thank you.

听众：我听说了一些您关于控制竞选支出的想法。能否详细谈谈您在这一话题上的看法和努力？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, did you get all of that?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你听清楚了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it was campaign spending.

查理·芒格：我想是关于竞选支出的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, campaign spending. Yeah, I have joined something that Jerry Kohlberg — this is personal. This has nothing to do with Berkshire — that Jerry Kohlberg spearheaded.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，竞选支出。是的，我参与了由杰里·科尔伯格发起的一项行动——这是我个人的行为，与伯克希尔无关。

And it’s taken a position — and probably 30 or so mostly business people — taken a position against soft money, and also taken a position on very fast disclosure of campaign finance money, because I personally think that the arms race, in terms of campaign spending by businesses, you know, has just begun. It doubled in the last election.

这项行动的立场是反对“软钱”，并主张快速披露竞选资金来源。因为我个人认为，企业在竞选支出上的“军备竞赛”才刚刚开始。上次选举中的支出翻了一番。

But political influence — and I don’t mean that by buying a vote, but I mean just in terms of having a (inaudible) in Washington or in other state capitols.

但是政治影响力——我并不是指购买选票，而是指在华盛顿或其他州议会中拥有发言权。

Political influence has been an underpriced product in the past. I mean, the government is enormously important in this country to most companies. It was amazing how cheap — cheaply — it could be — attention could be purchased.

过去，政治影响力是一种被低估的“产品”。政府对这个国家的大多数公司都至关重要。而获得关注的成本之低令人惊讶。

But the price is going up, and there will be an escalation. And I don’t think it’s easy — if you’re the manager of a business and you own 1/10th of 1 percent of it and you’re in a business that’s heavily affected by government, I don’t think it’s very easy to tell your board of directors that you’re going to take a hands-off approach.

但这个“价格”正在上涨，而且还会不断升级。如果你是一个企业的管理者，拥有其千分之一的股份，而你的业务又受到政府的高度影响，那么你很难对董事会说，你将采取不干涉的态度。

So I think legislation is needed in that arena, and there are over a hundred campaign finance reform bills that have been introduced. Everybody wants to have their name on a bill. They just don’t want to have it passed. (Laughter)

因此，我认为在这个领域需要立法。已经有超过一百个竞选资金改革法案被提出。每个人都想让自己的名字出现在法案上，但他们并不真的希望它通过。（笑声）

And, you know, John McCain’s been working hard on it. And it’s something I think we have to come to grips with because it’s going to be a battle of the wallets for influence.

你知道，约翰·麦凯恩一直在为此努力。我认为这是我们必须解决的问题，因为这将成为一场“钱包争夺战”，争取影响力。

And, like I say, if I were running some other company, and my competitors were spending money to get the attention of would-be legislators, or actual legislators, it’d be very difficult to take some high and mighty position that I wasn’t going to do it myself, and my board and my shareholders might ask me why I was taking that position.

就像我说的，如果我经营另一家公司，而我的竞争对手正在花钱吸引立法者或潜在立法者的注意力，那么我很难站在高高在上的立场上说我不会这么做。我的董事会和股东可能会问我为什么要采取这样的立场。

We are lucky, basically, to be in a business that’s relatively unaffected by legislation, although we will — we’re going to pay a lot of tax this year.

基本上，我们很幸运，从事的业务相对不受立法的影响，尽管我们今年会支付大量税款。

I said two years ago that it would only take 2,000 entities in the whole United States — businesses, individuals, any kind of entity — to pay the same amount of taxes as Berkshire, and that would take care of the entire budget.

我两年前说过，全美只需要2000个实体——包括企业、个人，任何类型的实体——缴纳与伯克希尔一样多的税款，就可以覆盖整个国家预算。

You’d need no Social Security taxes. You’d need no nothing.

不需要社会保障税，什么都不需要。

I think we’re going to be able to say that again this year. I think that if you multiply our tax by 2,000 you will more than account for the entire federal budget, including Social Security and everything else.

我想我们今年还能再说一次。如果你将我们的税款乘以2000，就会发现足以覆盖整个联邦预算，包括社会保障和其他所有项目。

So you might say, “Why aren’t you in Washington lobbying for a capital gains rate at corporations that’s the same as individuals?” or something, but we basically haven’t played that game. We feel very fortunate.

所以你可能会问，“为什么你们不去华盛顿游说，争取让企业的资本利得税率与个人相同？”之类的。但我们基本上没参与这样的游戏。我们感到非常幸运。

I’ll say this. I would rather, in this country, be a huge taxpayer myself than be somebody who needed the other end of it, the government dispensing.

我要说的是，我宁愿在这个国家成为一个巨额纳税人，也不愿成为依靠政府救济的人。

I mean, if anybody here is paying taxes and they want to — (applause)

我的意思是，如果在座有人在纳税并想要——（掌声）

If you’d like to shift positions with somebody in a veteran’s hospital or, you know, that has a couple of children by age 19 and is getting a check from the government, you know, I don’t want to shift positions. I’m happy to be paying the taxes.

如果你愿意与退伍军人医院的某人交换位置，或者与一位19岁就有两个孩子、靠政府支票生活的人交换位置，我想说，我不愿意。我很高兴能缴税。

19. “The secret of life is weak competition”

“生活的秘密是弱竞争”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 11, please. I think 11 is probably the remote — yeah. So we’re going to hear this from the overflow room. Are we there?

沃伦·巴菲特：请第十一区。我想十一区可能是远程的——是的。所以我们将听到来自分会场的问题。听到了吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Patrick Rown (PH) from Charlotte, North Carolina.

听众：是的，早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是帕特里克·罗恩（音译），来自北卡罗来纳州的夏洛特。

And I’ve watched returns on equity for the banking sector in the U.S. go up a good bit over the last few years. And returns on tangible equity for some of the major banks that have led to consolidation have gone up a good bit more. Leads me to wonder whether these returns are sustainable over the near-term or the longer-term, five, 10 years out.

在过去的几年里，我看到美国银行业的股本回报率显著提高。而一些引领行业整合的大型银行，其有形股本回报率增长得更多。这让我想知道，这些回报率在短期或长期（比如五到十年内）是否可持续？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s the $64 question, because the returns on equity — and particularly tangible equity, as the gentleman mentioned — and particularly tangible equity in the banking sector, even — those returns have hit numbers that are unprecedented. And then the question is, if they’re unprecedented, are they unsustainable?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个价值64美元的问题，因为股本回报率——特别是这位先生提到的有形股本回报率——尤其是在银行业领域，这些回报率已经达到了前所未有的水平。问题是，如果这些回报率是前所未有的，它们是否难以为继？

Charlie and I would probably think the — we would certainly prefer — we would not base our actions on the premise that they are sustainable. Twenty percent-plus returns on tangible equity — or on book equity — and much higher returns on tangible equity. In the banking field, you have a number of enterprises that on tangible equity are getting up close to the 30 percent range.

查理和我可能会认为——我们更倾向于——不以这些回报率可持续为前提来进行行动。有形股本回报率超过20%或账面股本回报率超过20%，甚至更高的有形股本回报率。在银行业，有一些企业的有形股本回报率接近30%。

Now, can a system where the GDP in real terms is growing, maybe, 3 percent — where in nominal terms this grows 4 to 5 percent — can businesses consistently earn 20 percent on equity?

现在，在一个实际GDP可能增长3%的系统中——名义GDP增长4%到5%——企业能否持续获得20%的股本回报率？

They certainly can if they retain most of their earnings, because you would have corporate profits rising as a percentage of GDP, to the point that would get ludicrous.

如果企业保留大部分收益，那当然可以，因为这会导致企业利润占GDP的比重不断上升，直至达到荒谬的地步。

So under those conditions, you’d either have to have huge payouts — either by repurchases of shares or by dividends or by takeovers, actually — that would keep the level of capital reasonably consistent among industry, because you couldn’t sustain — let’s just say every company retained all of its earnings and they earned 20 percent on equity — you could not have corporate profits growing at 20 percent as a part of the economy year after year.

因此，在这些条件下，你要么进行大规模分红——通过回购股份、发放股息或收购，实际上是这样——以保持行业内资本水平的合理一致性。因为你无法维持——假设每家公司保留所有收益，并获得20%的股本回报率——那么企业利润不可能年复一年以20%的速度在经济中增长。

This has been a better world than we foresaw, in terms of returns, so we’ve been wrong before. And we’re not making a prediction now, but we would not want to buy things on the basis that these returns would be sustained.

从回报率来看，这个世界比我们预见的要好，所以我们之前也犯过错误。我们现在不做预测，但我们不会基于这些回报率会持续的假设去购买资产。

We told you last year, if these returns are sustained and interest rates stayed at these levels or fell lower, that stock prices, in aggregate, are justified. And we still believe that.

我们去年告诉过大家，如果这些回报率能够持续，并且利率保持在当前水平或进一步降低，那么整体股价是有其合理性的。我们现在仍然相信这一点。

But those are two big ifs. And a particularly big if, in my view, is the one about returns on equity and on tangible assets. It goes against — it certainly goes against classic economic theory to believe that they can be sustained.

但这是两个很大的假设。在我看来，特别大的假设是关于股本回报率和有形资产回报率的。这显然违背了经典经济理论，认为它们可以持续下去是不现实的。

Charlie, how do you feel about it?

查理，你怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think a lot of the increase in return on equity has been caused by the increasing popularity of Jack Welch’s idea that if you can’t be a leader in a line of business, get out of it.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为股本回报率的提高在很大程度上是因为杰克·韦尔奇的理念越来越流行：如果你不能在某个业务领域成为领导者，那就退出。

And if you have fewer people in the business, why, returns on equity can go up.

如果一个行业的参与者减少了，那么股本回报率自然会提高。

Then it’s got more and more popular to buy in shares, even at very high prices per share. And if you keep the equity low enough by buying shares back, why, you could make return on equity whatever you want.

此外，回购股票的做法也变得越来越流行，即使是在每股价格很高的情况下。如果通过回购股票将股本维持在足够低的水平，你可以把股本回报率提高到任何想要的水平。

It would be that, to some extent, a slow revolution in corporate attitudes.

这在某种程度上是一场企业态度的缓慢革命。

But Warren is right. You can’t have massive accumulations of earnings that are retained and keep earning these rates of return on them.

但沃伦是对的。你不可能在大规模保留收益的同时，仍然保持这些回报率。

WARREN BUFFETT: An interesting question is to think about, if you had 500 Jack Welches and they were running the Fortune — they’re cloned — and they were running all of the Fortune 500 companies, would returns on equity for American business be higher or lower than they are presently?

沃伦·巴菲特：有一个有趣的问题可以想一想：如果你有500个杰克·韦尔奇的克隆体，并且他们在运营《财富》500强的所有公司，美国企业的股本回报率会比现在更高还是更低？

I mean if you have 500 sensational competitors, they can all be rational, but that doesn’t — and they will be. And they’ll be smart and they’ll keep trying to do all the right things. But there’s a self-neutralizing effect, just like having 500 expert chess players or 500 expert bridge players. You still have a lot of losers if they get together and play in a tournament.

我的意思是，如果你有500个非常出色的竞争者，他们可能都很理性，而且的确会如此。他们会聪明，努力去做所有正确的事情。但这种情况下会有一个“自我中和”的效果，就像让500个国际象棋大师或500个桥牌大师一起参加比赛一样。即使他们都是高手，仍然会有很多人是输家。

So it’s not at all clear that if all American management were dramatically better, leaving out the competition against foreign enterprises, that returns on equity would be a lot better. They might very well drive things down.

所以，并不确定如果所有美国管理者都显著变得更优秀——假设没有考虑与外国企业的竞争——股本回报率就会大幅提高。他们可能反而会把回报率压低。

人工智能对整个软件行业的意义，是增加竞争力？还是减弱竞争力？如果开发软件变得非常容易。

That’s what, to some extent, can easily happen in securities markets. It’s way better to be in securities markets if you have a hundred IQ and everybody else operating has an 80, than if you have 140 and all the rest of them also have 140.

这也是在证券市场中可能发生的情况。在证券市场中，如果你的智商是100，而其他人的智商是80，那会比你和所有人智商都为140的情况好得多。

So the secret of life is weak competition, you know. (Laughter)

所以，生活的秘密就是弱竞争。（笑声）

Somebody said, “How do you beat Bobby Fischer?” You play him in any game except chess, well — (Laughter)

有人问，“你如何击败鲍比·菲舍尔？”答案是：和他下任何除了国际象棋以外的游戏。（笑声）

That’s how you beat Jack Welch. You play him in any game except business, although he’s a very good golfer, I want to — (laughs) — point out.

这就是如何击败杰克·韦尔奇的方法：在任何除了商业以外的游戏中挑战他。不过，我要指出，他的高尔夫也很棒（笑声）。

He shot a 69 a few months ago when I saw him at a very tough course. Jack manages to play 70 or 80 rounds of golf a year, and come in sub-par occasionally, while still doing what he does at GE. He’s a great manager. But 500 Jack Welches, I’m not at all sure would make stocks more valuable in this country.

几个月前，我看到他在一个非常困难的高尔夫球场打出了69杆。杰克每年能打70到80轮高尔夫，有时还能打出低于标准杆的成绩，同时他还能把GE的工作做得那么好。他是一个了不起的经理人。但如果有500个杰克·韦尔奇，我一点也不确定这会让美国的股票更有价值。

20. Book recommendations

书籍推荐

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.

沃伦·巴菲特： 1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Ben Knoll and I’m from Minneapolis. And first, I just wanted to thank you for providing your past annual letters to the shareholders, and Mr. Munger for providing your speech to the graduate students at USC a couple years ago.

观众：我是本·诺尔，来自明尼阿波利斯。首先，我想感谢您提供的过去给股东的年度信件，还有芒格先生几年前在南加州大学对研究生的演讲。

Drawn a lot of insights from that, not only in investing but also in my day job as a business manager.

从中我学到了很多洞见，不仅是在投资方面，也包括我作为一名业务经理的日常工作中。

And I’m wondering if you could help me with my summer reading list and provide some additional suggestions for reading in the fields of investing and management, other than the standards of Graham and Fisher and so forth.

我想请教您，是否可以为我的暑期阅读清单提供一些建议，推荐一些在投资和管理领域的书籍，除了格雷厄姆和费雪的经典之外？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I have recently read a new book twice, which I very seldom do. And that book is Guns, Germs, and Steel by Jared Diamond. And it’s a marvelous book. And the way the guy’s mind works would be useful in business. He’s got a mind that is always asking why. Why, why, why. And he’s very good at coming up with answers.

查理·芒格：是的。我最近读了一本书，还读了两遍，这是我很少会做的事情。那本书是贾雷德·戴蒙德的《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》。这是一部非常出色的书。这位作者的思维方式在商业中也非常有用。他的思维总是在问“为什么，为什么，为什么”。而且他非常擅长提出答案。

I would say it’s the best work of its kind I have ever read.

我想说，这是我读过的同类书籍中最好的一本。

WARREN BUFFETT: I read a little easier book — (laughter) — recently.

沃伦·巴菲特：我最近读了一本更简单的书（笑声）。

I’m not even sure of the title. I don’t pay much attention to titles when I get into the book, but it’s something to the effect of The Quotable Einstein. I mean it’s a lot of his commentary over the years, and it’s great reading.

我甚至不确定书名。我在阅读时不太关注书名，但它似乎叫《爱因斯坦语录》。这本书汇集了他多年来的许多评论，非常值得一读。

The Fermat Theorem was the book that — that isn’t an exact title either — but it’s the story of the discovery of the answer. That’s a very interesting book. One of our shareholders from Sweden gave me a copy of that when I was in New York and I’ve enjoyed it.

还有一本书是《费马定理》，书名可能不完全准确，但它讲述了答案被发现的故事。这是一本非常有趣的书。我在纽约时，一位来自瑞典的股东送了我一本，我非常喜欢。

21. Higher rates would hurt Freddie and Fannie

利率上升将影响房利美和房地美

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特： 2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Marc Rabinov. I’m a shareholder from Melbourne, Austria.

观众：我是马克·拉比诺夫，来自奥地利墨尔本的股东。

Gentlemen, we have large holdings in Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and as you both know, they were quite — well, they were hurt quite a lot when interest rates went up in the past.

先生们，我们持有大量的房地美和房利美股份。正如你们所知，过去利率上升时，它们受到了相当大的影响。

I’m wondering if you think there’ll be hurt again when interest rates go up in the future?

我想知道你们是否认为将来利率上升时，它们会再次受到影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the question about Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae on interest rates, they are not as interest rate sensitive as people formerly thought they were.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于房地美和房利美与利率的关系，它们对利率的敏感性不像人们以前认为的那么高。

But it would be the pattern, and I have a feeling that if interest rates got extremely low, so that there was a huge turnover in the portfolio, and then rates went up dramatically, that even though they have various ways of protecting themselves against interest rate scenarios, that that might get very tough. I think there would be some kind of squeeze there.

但按照规律，如果利率降得非常低，导致投资组合发生大规模的周转，然后利率再大幅上升，即使它们有多种方式来保护自己免受利率变化的影响，这种情况下也可能会非常困难。我认为会出现某种挤压现象。

They may have good answers as to why that wouldn’t happen, incidentally, because they certainly worry about every kind of interest rate scenario. That’s their job.

顺便说一句，它们可能对为什么不会发生这种情况有很好的解释，因为它们肯定会考虑到各种利率情景。这是它们的职责。

But I think, in a sense, very low interest rates are more of a long-term threat, because if you get a portfolio chock full of, say, 4 percent mortgages or something of the sort, and then you had a huge move upward, that would be quite painful for some period of time, no matter what you’ve done in the way of hedging.

但从某种意义上说，非常低的利率是更长期的威胁。因为如果你的投资组合里充满了例如4%的抵押贷款，然后利率大幅上升，那么无论你在对冲方面做了什么准备，这都会在一段时间内变得相当痛苦。

长期贷款是个非常愚蠢的业务。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有补充。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s what happened to the savings and loans, in effect, you see, 25 years ago or whenever it was.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这实际上就是25年前左右储蓄和贷款协会发生的事情。

And Freddie and Fannie have other functions, and they’ve got a lot of advantages, but they have a savings and loan-type operation. They just do it on a very big scale and they get their money from — in a very different manner than from millions of depositors. But the basic economics have some similarly.

房地美和房利美还有其他功能，并且拥有许多优势，但它们的业务类似于储蓄和贷款机构的操作模式。只是它们的规模非常大，而且筹集资金的方式与从数百万储户那里吸收存款的方式完全不同。但基本经济原理有某些相似之处。

22. No worries about tough times: “It’s a lot of fun”

不担心困难时期：“这很有趣”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jane Bell (PH), Des Moines. Since I became a Berkshire Hathaway shareholder I’ve been coming to these meetings. This is my second. (Laughter)

观众：简·贝尔，得梅因。自从我成为伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东以来，我一直来参加这些会议。这是我第二次参加。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been coming to these meetings ever since I’ve been a shareholder. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：自从我成为股东以来，我就一直来参加这些会议。(笑声)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m a partner and owner in a consulting business, and we tell our clients and potential clients that we design solutions for what keeps them awake at night.

观众：巴菲特先生，我是咨询业务的合伙人和所有者，我们告诉客户和潜在客户，我们设计的解决方案是为了解决那些让他们夜不能寐的问题。

Mr. Buffett, from your perspective as an investor, what keeps you awake at night?

巴菲特先生，从您作为投资者的角度来看，什么事情会让您夜不能寐？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. And that’s one I always ask the managements of our subsidiaries, as well as any new investment. I want to know what their nightmare is.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个好问题。这也是我总是问我们子公司管理层和任何新投资的问题。我想知道他们的噩梦是什么。

Andy Grove, in his book Only the Paranoid Survive, talks about the silver bullet for a competitor. So in terms of, if you only had one silver bullet, which competitor would you fire it at?

安迪·格鲁夫在他的书《只有偏执狂才能生存》中谈到了对竞争对手的“银弹”。换句话说，如果你只有一颗银弹，你会射向哪个竞争对手？

And it’s not a bad question. And your question’s a little broader. If you only had one worry that you could get rid of, what would it be?

这是个不错的问题。而你的问题更广泛一些。如果你只能摆脱一个忧虑，那会是什么？

I would say that, and I think I speak for Charlie — (inaudible) — but we really don’t worry. You know, we will do the best we can, and when we have capital allocated, sometimes it’s very easy to do. Sometimes it’s almost impossible to do.

我会说，我想我可以代表查理发言——（听不清）——但我们真的不担心。你知道，我们会尽力而为。当我们分配资本时，有时很容易做到，有时几乎不可能做到。

But we’re not going to worry about it, because, you know, the world changes. And if we had something we were worried about in the business, we would correct it.

但我们不会为此担忧，因为，世界是会变化的。如果我们在业务中有任何担忧的事情，我们会去纠正它。

I’m not worried about any — I’m not really worried about — you know, we can lose a billion dollars on a California earthquake. But I’m not worried about it, although I have a sister who’s in the audience that lives in California. I told her to call me quickly if the dogs start running in circles or anything like that. (Laughter)

我不担心任何事情——我真的不担心——你知道，加州地震可能会让我们损失十亿美元。但我不为此担忧，尽管我有个妹妹在现场，她住在加州。我告诉她，如果狗开始绕圈跑或类似的事情发生，请迅速给我打电话。(笑声)

But there’s — you know, if you’re worried about something, the thing to do is get it corrected and get back to sleep. And I can’t think of anything I’m worried about at Berkshire. That doesn’t mean that I have any good ideas as to what we should be doing with a whole lot of money that we have around.

但是，如果你担心某件事情，最好的办法是解决它，然后继续睡觉。而对于伯克希尔来说，我想不到有什么让我担心的事情。这并不意味着我对如何使用我们拥有的大量资金有任何好的想法。

But, you know, I can’t do anything about that except keep looking for things that I might understand and do something with the money. And if they aren’t there, they aren’t there. And we’ll see what happens tomorrow and next week and next month and next year.

但是，我除了继续寻找我可能理解的东西并用这笔钱做些事情之外，别无他法。如果机会不存在，那就不存在。我们会看看明天、下周、下个月以及明年会发生什么。

Charlie, what are you worried about?

查理，你在担心什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in the 30-some years I’ve been watching you, I would say what it takes to make you not sleep at night is an illness in the family.

查理·芒格：在我观察你的三十多年里，我会说，能让你晚上睡不着觉的事情，只有家庭成员生病。

Short of that, Warren likes the game. I like the game. And even in the periods that look tough to other people, it’s a lot of fun.

除此之外，沃伦喜欢这个游戏。我也喜欢这个游戏。即使在别人看来很困难的时期，也非常有趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a lot of fun.

沃伦·巴菲特：这很有趣。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a lot of fun. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这很有趣。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: In fact it probably is the most — (applause) — it’s sort of, it is the most — I mean we define tough times differently than other people would, but our idea of tough times is like now, and our idea — we don’t feel it’s tough times when the market’s going down a lot or anything of the sort. So we are having a good time then.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，这可能是最有趣的——（掌声）——我指的是，我们对困难时期的定义与其他人不同。在我们看来，现在就是“困难时期”。而当市场大幅下跌或其他类似情况发生时，我们并不觉得那是困难时期。所以我们那时仍然玩得很开心。

I mean we don’t want to sound like undertakers during a plague or anything, but — (Laughter)

我的意思是，我们不想听起来像是在瘟疫期间的殡葬承办者之类的，但——（笑声）

But there really — you know, it makes no difference to us whether the price of Berkshire is going up or down. We’re trying to figure out ways to make the company worth more money years down the road, and if we figure that out, the stock will take care of itself, so —

但实际上，伯克希尔的股价是涨还是跌，对我们来说并没有区别。我们试图找到方法让公司在未来几年更加值钱。如果我们能做到这一点，股价自然会自己解决。

And usually when the stock is going down, it means other things are going down. And it’s a better chance for us to deploy capital, and that’s our business.

通常，当股价下跌时，意味着其他东西也在下跌。这对我们来说是更好的资本配置机会，而这正是我们的业务。

So you will not see us worrying. Maybe we should. You know, “What, me worry?” (Laughs)

所以你不会看到我们担心。也许我们应该担心吧。你知道的，“我担心什么？”（笑）

23. “What is important and what is knowable?”

“什么是重要的，什么是可知的？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Paul Yoon (PH) from L.A., California.

观众提问者：我是来自加州洛杉矶的保罗·尹（音）。

Mr. Warren Buffett, Mr. Charles Munger, I am one of the persons who highly admire you both. I have two questions.

巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是非常崇拜你们两位的人之一。我有两个问题。

Question one: your view on the world financial business environment in the next decade.

第一个问题：您对未来十年全球金融商业环境的看法。

Question two — (laughter) — U.S. position for economic competition in the next decade. Thank you.

第二个问题——（笑声）——未来十年美国在经济竞争中的地位。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’ve asked two big questions, but you’re going to get very small answers, I’m afraid. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你问了两个大问题，但恐怕你会得到非常简短的答案。（笑声）

And that’s no disrespect. But we — we just — we don’t have that. We don’t think about those things very much.

这并不是不尊重你。但我们——我们只是——我们并不太考虑这些事情。

We just are looking for decent businesses. And incidentally, our views in the past wouldn’t have been any good on those subjects.

我们只是寻找优秀的企业。顺便说一句，我们过去在这些问题上的看法并没有什么价值。

We try to think about two things. We try to think about things that are important and things that are knowable.

我们试图考虑两件事：我们试图考虑什么是重要的，以及什么是可知的。

Now, there are things that are important that are not knowable. In our view, those two questions that you raised fall in that. There are things that are knowable but not important. We don’t want to clutter our minds up with those.

现在，有些事情是重要的但不可知的。在我们看来，你提出的这两个问题就属于这种情况。有些事情是可知的，但并不重要。我们不想让这些事情占据我们的思维空间。

So we say, “What is important and what is knowable?” And what among the things that fall within those two categories can we translate into some kind of an action that is useful for Berkshire.

因此我们会问：“什么是重要的，什么是可知的？”在这些属于两个类别的事情中，哪些可以转化为对伯克希尔有用的行动？

And we really — there are all kinds of important subjects that Charlie and I, we don’t know anything about, and therefore we don’t think about them.

实际上，有各种重要的话题，查理和我完全不了解，因此我们不会去考虑它们。

So we have — our view about what the world will look like over the next ten years in business or competitive situations, we’re just no good.

所以，我们对未来十年商业或竞争形势的看法并不好。

We do think we know something about what Coca-Cola’s going to look like in ten years, or what Gillette’s going to look like in ten years, or what Disney’s going to look like in ten years, or what some of our operating subsidiaries are going to look like in ten years.

但我们认为，我们确实了解可口可乐十年后会是什么样，吉列十年后会是什么样，迪士尼十年后会是什么样，或者我们的一些运营子公司十年后会是什么样。

We care a lot about that. We think a lot about that. We want to be right about that. If we’re right about that, the other things get to be — you know, they’re less important. And if we started focusing on those, we would miss a lot of big things.

我们非常关心这些问题。我们会花很多时间思考这些问题。我们希望在这些问题上是正确的。如果我们能正确预测这些，其他事情就会变得——你知道的，不那么重要。如果我们开始关注那些事情，我们就会错过很多重要的事情。

I’ve used this example before, but Coca-Cola went public in, I think, it was 1919. And the first year one share cost $40. The first year it went down a little over 50 percent. At the end of the year, it was down to $19. There were some problems with bottler contracts. There’s problems with sugar. Various kinds of problems.

我以前用过这个例子，但可口可乐上市是在1919年，那时一股的价格是40美元。上市第一年，股价下跌了超过50%。年底时股价降到了19美元。那时瓶装商合同出现了一些问题，还有糖的问题，各种各样的问题。

If you’d had perfect foresight, you would have seen the world’s greatest depression staring you in the face, when the social order even got questioned. You would have seen World War II. You would have seen atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs. You would have seen all kinds of things.

如果你拥有完美的前瞻能力，你会看到世界上最严重的大萧条就在眼前，社会秩序甚至受到了质疑。你会看到第二次世界大战。你会看到原子弹和氢弹。你会看到各种各样的事情。

And you could always find a reason to postpone why you should buy that share of Coca-Cola. But the important thing wasn’t to see that. The important thing was to see they were going to be selling a billion eight-ounce servings of beverages a day this year. Or some large number.

你总能找到推迟购买可口可乐股票的理由。但重要的并不是看到那些事情。重要的是看到，他们今年每天会销售10亿份8盎司的饮料，或者其他某个庞大的数字。

And that the person who could make people happy a billion times a day around the globe ought to make a few bucks off doing it.

能够每天让全球人们开心10亿次的人，理应从中赚到一些钱。

And so that $40, which went down to $19, I think with dividends reinvested, has to be well over $5 million now. And if you developed a view on these other subjects that in any way forestalled you acting on this more important, specific narrow view about the future of the company, you would have missed a great ride. So that’s the kind of thing we focus on.

因此，那40美元的股票，尽管跌到了19美元，但如果加上股息再投资，现在一定远远超过了500万美元。如果你对其他问题的看法以任何方式阻止了你基于公司未来这一更重要、更具体的观点采取行动，你就会错过一次伟大的机会。所以这就是我们专注的事情。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we’re predicting the currents that will come, just how some things will swim in the currents, whatever they are.

查理·芒格：是的，我们预测潮流将如何到来，以及一些事情将在潮流中如何运转，不管潮流是什么。

24. Praise for Value Line’s “perfect snapshot”

对《价值线》的“完美快照”的赞扬

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第五区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Marc Gerstein from Value Line.

观众提问者：早上好，我是《价值线》的马克·格斯坦。

Mr. Buffett, considering the large amounts of demands on your time, how do you go about reviewing the entire spectrum of choices in the equity markets?

巴菲特先生，考虑到您时间上的大量需求，您是如何审查股票市场中所有选择的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Give me that last part again? I got the demands on my time and —

沃伦·巴菲特：请再重复一下最后一部分？我听到了关于时间需求的部分，然后——

MARK ERSTEIN: How do you and Mr. Munger manage to review the whole spectrum of choices in the equity markets?

马克·格斯坦：您和芒格先生是如何审查股票市场中所有选择的？

WARREN BUFFETT: A fat pitch coming up. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：一个好机会来了。（笑声）

But I don’t mind it at all, because the truth is that we get — I don’t even know what we pay for Value Line. Charlie and I both get it in our respective offices, but we get incredible value out of it because it gives us the quickest way to see a huge number of the key factors that tell us whether we’re basically interested in the company.

但我一点也不介意，因为事实是我们得到——我甚至不知道我们为《价值线》支付了多少钱。查理和我都在各自的办公室收到它，但我们从中获得了难以置信的价值，因为它以最快的方式展示了大量关键因素，让我们知道我们是否对一家公司基本感兴趣。

And it also gives us a great way — good way — of sort of periodically keeping up-to-date. Value Line has 1,700 or so stocks they cover, and they do it every 13 weeks. So it’s a good way to make sure that you haven’t overlooked something if you just quickly review that.

它还为我们提供了一种很好的方式来定期保持更新。《价值线》覆盖了大约1700只股票，并且每13周更新一次。所以快速浏览一下是确保你没有遗漏什么的好方法。

But the snapshot it presents is an enormously efficient way for us to garner information about various businesses.

它提供的快照是我们获取各种企业信息的一种极为高效的方式。

We don’t care about the ratings. I mean that doesn’t make any difference to us. We’re not looking for opinions. We’re looking for facts.

我们不关心评级。我是说，这对我们来说没有任何影响。我们不是在寻找观点，而是在寻找事实。

But I have yet to see a better way, including fooling around on the internet or anything, that gives me the information as quickly. I can absorb the information on — about a company — most of the key information you can get — and probably doesn’t take more than 30 seconds in glancing through Value Line, and I don’t have any other system that’s as good. Charlie?

但我还没有见过比这更好的方式，包括在网上搜索信息或者其他任何方式，能够让我如此快速地获取信息。我能从《价值线》中吸收关于一家公司——几乎是所有关键信息——可能只需要不到30秒的时间，我没有其他任何系统能做到这么好。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the Value Line charts are a human triumph. It’s hard for me to imagine a job being done any better than is done in those charts. An immense amount of information is put in very usable form. And if I were running a business school we would be teaching from Value Line charts.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为《价值线》的图表是一项人类的伟大成就。我很难想象有比这些图表做得更好的工作了。大量的信息被整理成非常实用的形式。如果我在经营一所商学院，我们会用《价值线》的图表进行教学。

WARREN BUFFETT: And when Charlie says the charts, he does not mean just the chart of the price behavior. He means all that information that really is listed under the charts that —

沃伦·巴菲特：当查理提到图表时，他并不仅仅指价格走势的图表。他指的是所有真正列在图表下的信息，那些——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah.

查理·芒格：哦，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: The detailed financial information. You can run your eye across that.

沃伦·巴菲特：那些详细的财务信息。你可以快速浏览一下。

The chart of the price action doesn’t mean a thing to us, although it may catch our eye, just in terms of businesses that have done very well over time.

价格走势的图表对我们来说毫无意义，尽管它可能会吸引我们的注意力，仅仅是因为它显示了那些长期表现优异的企业。

But we — price action has nothing to do with any decision we make. Price itself is all-important, but whether a stock has gone up or down, or what the volume is, or any of that sort of thing, that is — as far as we’re concerned, you know, those are chicken tracks, and we pay no attention to them.

但是我们——价格走势与我们做出的任何决策都无关。价格本身是最重要的，但股票是否上涨或下跌，或者交易量如何，或者任何类似的事情，对我们来说，那些只是“鸡爪印”，我们完全不关注它们。

But that information that’s right below the chart, in those 10 lines or so — 15 lines — if you have some understanding of business, that’s a — it’s a perfect snapshot to tell you very quickly what kind of a business you’re looking at.

但那些在图表下方的10行到15行的信息，如果你对商业有所了解，那就是——一个完美的快照，能让你非常快速地了解你正在研究的是什么类型的企业。

25. Insurance mergers haven’t hurt GEICO

保险业的并购并未对GEICO造成影响

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第六区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Winters from Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.

观众提问者：我是来自新泽西州山湖的戴维·温特斯。

With the consolidation in the insurance industry, how do you think that will affect Berkshire’s insurance businesses and the long-term development of the float?

随着保险业的整合，您认为这会如何影响伯克希尔的保险业务和浮存金的长期发展？

And if I may, not to encourage your dogma to run over your karma, but how do you think your policy of partnership and fair dealing has enhanced or detracted from your investment returns? Thank you.

如果可以的话，我不是想让您的信条超越您的因果关系，但您认为您的合作伙伴政策和公平交易政策对您的投资回报是提升了还是有所减损？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, with the consolidation taking place in insurance, it’s been taking place for some time. There have been some big mergers over the years.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于保险业正在进行的整合，这种情况已经持续了一段时间。多年来发生了一些大型并购。

It should — there are developments in insurance. We mentioned the super-cat bonds, which are not bonds at all. But that has an effect.

保险业确实有一些新的发展。我们提到过超级巨灾债券，尽管它们根本不是债券。但这确实产生了一些影响。

But I would say that there’s no merger that has taken place that I regard as being detrimental, either to our GEICO business or to our reinsurance business.

但我认为，没有任何一次并购对我们的GEICO业务或再保险业务造成了不利影响。

That has not been a factor, and I think if there were some more mergers it would not be a factor. I see no way that any entities being put together would change the competitive situation in respect to GEICO.

这并不是一个因素，我认为即使有更多的并购发生，也不会成为一个因素。我看不出任何实体的合并会改变GEICO的竞争局面。

GEICO operating just as it does, independently, is as competitive as can be, and it would not benefit by being part of any other organization.

GEICO像现在这样独立运营，已经是最具竞争力的了，加入任何其他组织都不会使它受益。

And our reinsurance business is much more opportunistic. And it’s not consolidation there, it’s just lack of fear, generally, by competitors who can price — particularly cat business — at a rate that could be totally inadequate, as I use in an illustration in the report. But nevertheless, it could appear to be profitable for a long time.

我们的再保险业务则更具机会主义。而那里并不存在整合的问题，而是普遍缺乏恐惧感的竞争对手可以定价——尤其是在巨灾保险业务上——以一种完全不足以覆盖风险的水平，就像我在报告中举例说明的那样。但即便如此，它可能在很长一段时间内看起来是盈利的。

And there’s probably more of that going on now, and there’ll probably be a lot more going on in that arena.

现在可能有更多这样的情况发生，并且未来在这一领域可能会有更多。

We have some sensational insurance businesses, though. I have to tell you that — I don’t think you really have to worry too much about how we do in insurance in the future.

不过，我们确实拥有一些非常出色的保险业务。我必须告诉你，我认为你真的不用太担心我们未来在保险业务上的表现。

We have a number of GEICO people here today. I hope you got a chance to meet them. GEICO — and you saw Lorimer Davidson. I really was hoping he could be here, but Davy is 95 years old. I went to visit him a few months ago, and it just isn’t easy for him to get around.

今天我们有一些GEICO的员工在场。我希望你有机会见到他们。GEICO——你也见过洛里默·戴维森。我真的希望他能来，但戴维已经95岁了。我几个月前去拜访过他，但他行动已经不太方便了。

But he built a sensational company and it stumbled once. Jack Byrne got it back on track and Tony Nicely’s got it going down the track at about a hundred miles an hour and it’s getting faster all the time. So we’ve got a great business there.

但他建立了一家非常出色的公司，尽管它曾经出现过一次挫折。杰克·伯恩让它重回正轨，而托尼·奈斯利让它以每小时100英里的速度前进，并且速度越来越快。所以我们在这方面有一项非常棒的业务。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没什么补充的。

26. “Wonderful companies” should buy back stock

“优秀的公司”应该回购股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第七区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Bill Ackman from New York.

观众提问者：是的，我是来自纽约的比尔·阿克曼。

Is there a price at which it’s inappropriate for a company to use its capital to buy back its stock?

是否有某种价格水平使得公司使用资本回购其股票是不合适的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Give me that again?

沃伦·巴菲特：再说一遍？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Example. Coca-Cola at 40 P/E. Is that a smart place for Coke to deploy capital?

观众提问者：例如，可口可乐的市盈率为40倍。在这种水平下，是否是可口可乐使用资本的明智方式？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it sounds like a very high price when you name it in terms of a P/E to buy back the stock at that sort of number. But I would say this: Coca-Cola’s been around a hundred and — what, 12 years now, and there are very few times in that 112 years, if any, when it would not have been smart for Coca-Cola to be repurchasing its shares.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，当你以市盈率来衡量这个价格时，确实听起来非常高。但我要说的是：可口可乐已经存在了一百一十二年了，在这112年中，如果有的话，几乎没有什么时期是不适合可口可乐回购其股票的。

Coca-Cola is, in my view, among businesses that I can understand, it’s the best large business in the world. I mean it is a fantastic business.

在我看来，在我能理解的企业中，可口可乐是世界上最优秀的大型企业。我是说，它是一家非常棒的公司。

And we love it when Coke repurchases shares and our interest goes up. We owned 6.3 percent of Coca-Cola in 1988 when we bought in. We actually increased that a little bit a few years later. But if they had not repurchased shares, we probably would own about 6.7 percent or 6.8 percent of Coke now. As it is, we own a little over 8 percent, through repurchases.

当可口可乐回购股票并让我们的持股比例上升时，我们非常高兴。1988年，我们买入可口可乐时持有6.3%的股份。几年后，我们稍微增加了一些持股。但如果他们没有回购股票，我们现在可能只会持有大约6.7%或6.8%的股份。而实际上，通过回购，我们现在持有略高于8%的股份。

There are going to be about a billion eight-ounce servings of Coke sold around the world — Coca-Cola products — sold around the world today. Eight percent of that is 80 million and 6.8 percent is 68 million. So there are 12 million extra servings for the account of Berkshire Hathaway being sold around the world. And they’re making a little over a penny a serving, so, you know, that gets me kind of excited. (Laughter)

今天全球将会售出大约10亿份8盎司的可口可乐产品。8%的市场份额是8000万，6.8%是6800万。因此，通过回购，伯克希尔在全球范围内多了1200万份的份额。而他们每份赚超过一分钱，所以，这确实让我有点兴奋。（笑声）

I think it — all I can tell you is, I approve of Coke repurchasing shares. I’d a lot rather have them repurchasing shares at 15 times earnings, but when I look at other ways to use capital, I still think it’s a very good use of capital.

我认为——我只能告诉你，我支持可口可乐回购股票。我当然更希望他们以15倍市盈率回购，但当我看到其他使用资本的方式时，我仍然认为这是非常好的资本使用方式。

And maybe the day will come when they can buy it at 20 times earnings, and if they can I hope they go out and borrow a lot of money to ton of it at those prices, and —

也许有一天他们会以20倍市盈率回购，如果真是那样，我希望他们能借入大量资金以这个价格进行大量回购，而且——

I think we will be better off 20 years from now if Coke follows a consistent repurchase approach.

我认为，如果可口可乐坚持一种持续的回购策略，我们在20年后会有更好的收益。

I do not think that is true for many companies. I mean I think that repurchases have become en vogue and done for a lot of silly reasons. And so I don’t think everybody’s repurchase of shares is well reasoned at all. You know, we see companies that issue options by the ton and then they repurchase shares much higher, you know —

我不认为这种观点适用于许多公司。我觉得股票回购已经变得流行起来，但很多回购是出于愚蠢的原因。因此，我并不认为所有公司的股票回购都是经过深思熟虑的。我们看到一些公司大量发行期权，然后又在更高的价格回购股票，你知道的——

I started reading about investments when I was six, and I think the first thing that I read was, you know, buy low, sell high. But these companies, through their options, you know, they sell low and then they buy high. And they’ve got a different formula than I was taught.

我六岁开始阅读投资相关的书籍，我想我读到的第一条准则就是“低买高卖”。但这些公司通过期权操作，他们是“低卖高买”。这显然与我学到的公式完全不同。

So there are a number that we don’t approve of. When we own stock in a wonderful business, we like the idea of repurchases, even at prices that may give you nose bleeds. It generally turns out to be a pretty good policy.

因此，有很多我们并不认可的做法。但当我们持有一家优秀企业的股票时，我们喜欢回购的想法，即便是在高得离谱的价格下进行回购。这通常被证明是一项相当不错的政策。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the answer is that in any company the stock could get to a price so high it would be foolish for the corporation to repurchase its shares.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为答案是，对于任何公司来说，其股票价格都有可能高到一个程度，使得公司回购股票变得愚蠢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And you can even get into gross abuse. Before the crash, the Insull utilities were madly buying their own shares as a way of promoting the stock higher. It was like a giant Ponzi scheme at the end.

查理·芒格：甚至可能出现严重滥用。在股市崩盘之前，Insull公用事业公司疯狂地回购自己的股票，以此来推高股价。到最后，这就像一个巨大的庞氏骗局。

So there’s all kinds of excess that possible, but the really great companies that buy at high price-earnings, that can be wise.

因此，各种过度行为都有可能发生。但对于真正优秀的公司来说，即使在高市盈率下回购股票，也可能是明智的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Our interest in GEICO went from 33 percent to 50 percent without us laying out a dime, because GEICO was repurchasing its shares. And we’ve benefitted substantially.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在GEICO的持股比例从33%增加到了50%，而我们并没有花一分钱，因为GEICO在回购自己的股票。我们从中获益良多。

But we benefitted a lot more, obviously, when prices were lower. I mean we would — our interest in The Washington Post company has gone from nine and a fraction percent, to 17 and a fraction percent over the years without us buying a single share. But The Post or Coke or any number of companies don’t get the bargain in repurchasing now that they used to. We still think it’s probably the best use of many in many cases.

但显然，当价格较低时，我们的受益会更多。比如，我们在《华盛顿邮报》公司的持股比例从9点几增加到了17点几，而我们一股都没有买。尽管《邮报》或可口可乐，或者其他许多公司，现在的回购价格不再像过去那样便宜，但我们仍然认为，在许多情况下，回购可能是资金的最佳用途。

27. Berkshire insurance float has a negative cost

伯克希尔的保险浮存金具有负成本

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第八区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hutch Vernon. I’m from Baltimore, Maryland.

观众提问者：我是来自马里兰州巴尔的摩的哈奇·弗农。

My question has to do with float. You said in the annual, and you’ve said in the past, that float has had a greater value to Berkshire than an equal amount of equity.

我的问题与浮存金有关。您在年度报告中提到过，也在过去说过，浮存金对伯克希尔的价值大于等量的股权。

I wondered if you could clarify that statement. Is that because the float has been generated at such a low cost relative to an imputed cost for equity, or is there something else behind that statement?

我想请您澄清这一说法。这是因为浮存金的生成成本相对于股权的推定成本非常低，还是说这一说法背后还有其他原因？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it’s because the float, which is now, we’ll say, 7 billion, comes to us at a negative cost. We would not make that statement if our float was costing us a couple percent a year, even though float would then be desirable. Highly desirable.

沃伦·巴菲特：不是这样的。这是因为浮存金，现在假设为70亿美元，以负成本的方式来到我们这里。如果我们的浮存金每年需要花费我们几个百分点的成本，即便如此，浮存金仍然是可取的，非常可取。但在我们的情况下，浮存金比这更好，或者说一直更好，它以低于零的成本来到我们这里。它带着附加利润到来。

But our float is even better than that, or it has been, and so it comes to us with a cost of less than zero. It comes to us with a profit attached.

我们的浮存金比这更好，或者说一直以来都更好。它的成本低于零，并附带利润来到我们这里。

So if we were to replace — if we were to get out of the insurance business and give up the 7 billion of float and replace it with 7 billion of equity, we would have less going for us next year than under the present situation, even though our net worth would appear to be 7 billion higher.

所以，如果我们退出保险业务，放弃70亿美元的浮存金，用70亿美元的股权来替代它，那么明年我们所拥有的资源将少于当前的情况，尽管我们的净资产看起来会增加70亿美元。

And I have said, if we were to make the decision — if we were offered the opportunity to go out of the insurance business, and that 7 billion liability would — as part of that decision — would evaporate from our balance sheet, so that our equity would go up 7 billion, with no tax implications, we would turn down that proposition.

我曾说过，如果我们需要做出决定——如果有人提供我们退出保险业务的机会，并且作为这一决定的一部分，那70亿美元的负债将从我们的资产负债表中消失，我们的股权因此增加70亿美元，没有税收影响——我们会拒绝这个提议。

So obviously we think that 7 billion, which is shown as a liability, when it’s part of a — viewed as part of an insurance business, is not a liability at all in terms of real economic value. And of course, the key is not what the float is today, and not what the cost is today.

显然，我们认为那70亿美元，尽管在账面上显示为负债，但当它被看作保险业务的一部分时，从实际经济价值的角度来看，它根本不是负债。当然，关键并不在于当前的浮存金是多少，也不在于当前的成本是多少。

The key is what is the float going to be 10 or 15 years from now, and what is the cost going to be 10 or 15 years ago. And, you know, we will work very hard at both increasing the amount of float and keeping the costs down somewhere close to our present level.

关键在于10年或15年后浮存金将达到多少，以及其成本会是多少。我们会非常努力地既增加浮存金的数量，同时将成本保持在接近我们当前水平的范围内。

That makes it a very attractive business when that can be done. GEICO’s a big part of doing that, but we’ve got other things, other insurance operations, that’ll be important in that, too. And we may have others besides that in the future.

如果能够做到这些，这将是一项非常有吸引力的业务。GEICO是实现这一目标的重要组成部分，但我们还有其他保险业务，这些业务在其中也将发挥重要作用。此外，我们未来可能还会有其他业务加入进来。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. If the float keeps growing, that is a wonderful thing indeed.

查理·芒格：是的，如果浮存金继续增长，那确实是件美妙的事情。

We really have a marvelous insurance business. In addition to having this remarkable earning power, it’s way less likely to get really clobbered than most insurance businesses. So I think it’s safer on the downside and has a better upside.

我们确实有一项了不起的保险业务。除了具备显著的盈利能力外，它比大多数保险业务受到重大打击的可能性要小得多。因此，我认为它在下行风险上更安全，同时具有更好的上行潜力。

WARREN BUFFETT: And it may sound strange, but we don’t regard losing a billion dollars in a California quake as getting really clobbered. I mean that is —

沃伦·巴菲特：这听起来可能很奇怪，但我们并不认为在加州地震中损失10亿美元是受到重大打击。我是说，那是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no.

查理·芒格：不，不是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — I mean that’s part of the game.

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是，那是游戏的一部分。

There are many companies that have greater exposure than that that really aren’t getting paid for it. And you don’t see it specifically, but any company that has a ton of homeowners’ business in Florida or Long Island or along the coast of Texas, may have exposures many times our billion, and really not even be getting paid appropriately or specifically for taking that risk.

有很多公司承担的风险敞口比我们还要大得多，却实际上并没有因此获得足够的报酬。虽然你可能没有明确看到，但任何一家在佛罗里达、长岛或德克萨斯沿海地区拥有大量房主保险业务的公司，其风险敞口可能是我们10亿美元的许多倍，但却没有因此获得恰当或明确的报酬来承担这些风险。

28. Not worried Japan might “dump” U.S. bonds

不担心日本可能“抛售”美国国债

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第九区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Mary Semler (PH) from Seattle, Washington.

观众提问者：大家好，我是来自华盛顿州西雅图的玛丽·塞姆勒（音）。

Japan is a major holder of U.S. Treasurys. Given the troubled Japanese economy, do you foresee Japan cashing in their U.S. investments to bail themselves out? Why or why not?

日本是美国国债的主要持有者。鉴于日本经济陷入困境，您是否认为日本会抛售其美国投资来自救？为什么或者为什么不？

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably didn’t get all that. I was busy chewing.

沃伦·巴菲特：我可能没完全听清。我刚才在吃东西。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t get that, either.

查理·芒格：我也没听清。

WARREN BUFFETT: I was busy chewing here and —

沃伦·巴菲特：我刚才在吃东西，然后——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Japan is a major holder of U.S. Treasurys. Given the troubled Japanese economy, do you foresee Japan cashing in their U.S. investments to bail themselves out? Why or why not?

观众提问者：日本是美国国债的主要持有者。鉴于日本经济陷入困境，您是否认为日本会抛售其美国投资来自救？为什么或者为什么不？

WARREN BUFFETT: The problems with the Japanese economy and does that mean that — are you thinking particularly about them dumping Treasurys or something of the sort?

沃伦·巴菲特：这是关于日本经济的问题，你是否特别指的是他们抛售美国国债或类似的事情？

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s exactly what she’s —

查理·芒格：是的，她的确是指这个。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

Well, you know, it’s very interesting. All the questions about what so-called foreigners do with investments.

嗯，这确实很有趣。所有关于外国人在投资上会做什么的疑问。

Let’s just assume the Japanese, or any other country, decides to sell some U.S. government holdings that they have. If they sell them to U.S. corporations or citizens or anything, what do they receive in exchange? They receive U.S. dollars. What do they do with the U.S. dollars? You know, I mean they can’t get out of the system.

假设日本或者其他国家决定抛售他们持有的一些美国政府债券。如果他们将这些债券卖给美国公司、公民或其他任何实体，他们会收到什么作为回报？他们会收到美元。他们会怎么处理美元呢？他们无法脱离这个系统。

If they sell them to the French, you know, the French give them something in return. Now the French own the government securities.

如果他们将这些债券卖给法国人，那么法国人会给他们一些东西作为回报。这样一来，法国人就持有了这些政府债券。

But really as long as we, the United States, run a deficit — a big deficit — a trade deficit — we are accepting goods and giving something in exchange to foreigners. I mean when they send us whatever it may be — and on balance they send us more of that than we send over there — we give them something in exchange.

但实际上，只要我们美国存在赤字——一个巨大的赤字——一个贸易赤字，我们就在接受商品并向外国人提供某种回报。我是说，当他们向我们输出任何商品——总的来说，他们输出给我们的商品比我们输出给他们的更多——我们会给他们一些东西作为交换。

We give them — we may give them an IOU. We may give them a government bond. But we may give them an investment they make in the United States.

我们会给他们——我们可能会给他们一张借据，可能会给他们一张国债，但也可能会让他们在美国进行投资。

But they have to be net investors in this country as long as we’re net consumers of their goods. It’s a tautology.

但只要我们是他们商品的净消费者，他们就必须是这个国家的净投资者。这是一种逻辑必然。

So I don’t even know quite how a foreign government dumps its government bonds without getting some other type of asset in exchange that may have an effect on a different market.

所以我甚至不明白一个外国政府如何抛售美国国债而不换取某种其他类型的资产，而这些资产可能会对另一个市场产生影响。

The one question you always want to ask in economics is — and not a bad idea elsewhere, too — but is, “And then what?” Because there’s always a second side to a transaction.

在经济学中你总是要问的一个问题是——在其他地方这样问也不错——“然后呢？”因为每笔交易总有另一个面。

And just ask yourself, if you are a Japanese bank and you sell a billion dollars’ worth of government bonds — U.S. government bonds — what do you receive in exchange, and what do you do with it? And if you follow that through, I don’t think you’ll be worried about foreign governments selling U.S. bonds. It is not a threat.

问问你自己，如果你是一家日本银行，你卖出价值10亿美元的美国国债，你会收到什么作为回报？你会如何处理它？如果你将这一过程推导下去，我认为你不会为外国政府出售美国国债而担心。这并不是一个威胁。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: If I owned Japan, I would want a large holding of U.S. Treasurys. You’re on an island nation without much in the way of natural resources. I think their policy is quite intelligent for Japan, and I’d be very surprised if they dumped all their Treasurys.

查理·芒格：如果我是日本的拥有者，我会希望持有大量的美国国债。你处在一个没有多少自然资源的岛国上。我认为他们的政策对日本来说是非常明智的，如果他们抛售所有的国债，我会非常惊讶。

WARREN BUFFETT: If they’re a net exporter to us, though, what choice do they have? When you think about it.

沃伦·巴菲特：但如果他们是我们的净出口国，他们还有什么选择？仔细想想。

If they send over more goods to us than we send to them — which has been the case — they have to get something in exchange. Now for a while they were taking movie studios in exchange, you know — (Laughter)

如果他们向我们输出的商品多于我们向他们输出的商品——这一直是事实——他们必须得到某种回报。有一段时间，他们用电影制片厂作为交换，你知道的——（笑声）

They were taking New York real estate in exchange.

他们用纽约的房地产作为交换。

I mean they’ve got a choice of assets, but they don’t have a choice as to whether — if they send us more than they get from us — whether they get some investment asset in return.

我的意思是，他们可以选择资产，但如果他们向我们输出的多于从我们那里得到的，他们是否获得某种投资资产作为回报，这是没有选择的。

I mean it’s amazing to me how little discussion there is about the fact that there’s two sides to an equation. But it makes for better headlines, I guess, when read the other way.

让我感到惊讶的是，关于这个等式有两个方面的事实，讨论却很少。但我猜，从另一种角度看，这样的讨论更适合制造轰动性新闻标题。

29. Mild endorsement for some Social Security money in stocks

对部分社保资金投资于股票的温和支持

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第十区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is John Vaughan (PH) from Detroit, Michigan.

观众提问者：我是来自密歇根州底特律的约翰·沃恩（音）。

Nebraska’s Senator Kerrey has proposed private investment accounts for up to two percentage points of the current payroll tax. His words were, and I quote, “People want more than just a transfer payment. They want wealth.”

内布拉斯加州参议员克里提出，将当前工资税的两个百分点用于私人投资账户。他的原话是：“人们不仅仅想要转移支付，他们想要财富。”

Do you approve this proposal? And if you do, would you recommend passive investing, i.e., index, or if you recommend active investing, would you and Charlie want to give it a shot? (Laughter)

您是否支持这个提议？如果支持，您会推荐被动投资（比如指数投资）吗？如果您推荐主动投资，您和查理是否愿意尝试一下？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I talked with Bob Kerrey about that, and Bob does like the idea of giving everybody some piece of the American economy and an interest in it. As you know, he’s proposed, really, sort of small grants to the 3 1/2 million or so children born every year, and then some buildup of that account. Senator Moynihan has come up with something recently in conjunction with Kerrey.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我和鲍勃·克里谈过这个问题，鲍勃确实喜欢让每个人拥有一部分美国经济和利益的想法。如你所知，他实际上提议向每年出生的大约350万儿童提供小额资助，然后积累这些账户。参议员莫伊尼汉最近也与克里联合提出了一些建议。

I personally would not like to see any major amount of Social Security — and Moynihan was talking about 2 percent. And actually, I suggested the idea that maybe 2 percent out of the 12 and a fraction percent, at the option of the beneficiary — Social Security participant — could be devoted to some other system, but then they would only get 5/6ths of the basic Social Security benefit.

我个人并不希望看到社会保障的大部分资金被转移——莫伊尼汉提到的是2%。实际上，我建议也许可以将12%多一点的税率中的2%由受益人——也就是社保参与者——自主选择投入到其他系统中，但这样他们只能获得基础社保福利的五分之六。

I don’t think you could drop it below that, because you wouldn’t want people turning 65 — or maybe a more advanced age in the future, 70 — and not having the safety net of Social Security. So I wouldn’t want to drop it below about 5/6ths of the present benefits.

我认为你不能将这一比例降得更低，因为你不希望人们在65岁——或者未来更晚的退休年龄，比如70岁——时没有社保的安全保障。因此，我不希望将其降到目前福利的五分之六以下。

I don’t — I think it’s a perfectly reasonable topic to discuss whether you want to take that 2 percent, then, and let people build up an account, perhaps tax-free, perhaps an IRA-type account, so they would have both wealth and the safety net. But I wouldn’t want to drop the safety net very far.

我认为，讨论是否使用这2%让人们建立一个账户（可能是免税的，或者类似IRA的账户），从而既拥有财富又有安全保障，这是一个完全合理的话题。但我不想让安全网降得太低。

And I think that I would not want to turn an army of salespeople loose on the American public with a mandatory 2 percent going in some direction. I don’t think that would be particularly healthy.

而且，我认为我不会希望将一大群销售人员释放到美国公众中，强制他们将2%的资金投入某个方向。我不认为这会特别健康。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I am much less enthusiastic than you are. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我对此的热情远低于你的。（笑声）

In other words, your negative, or conservative, attitude is way more affirmative than mine.

换句话说，你的否定或保守态度已经比我的肯定态度更积极了。

I think the idea of getting the government into promoting the value of equities — in Japan we have a taste of that now. The Japanese government has been using the postal savings system to buy equities massively year after year after year. I don’t think we need to get the government into the equity market. (Applause)

我认为让政府推动股票价值的想法——在日本，我们现在已经尝到了其中的滋味。日本政府多年来一直通过邮政储蓄系统大量购买股票。我认为我们不需要让政府介入股市。（掌声）

30. Business schools “incoherent” on cost of capital

商学院对资本成本的理论“不连贯”

WARREN BUFFETT: We go to zone 11, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第十一区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Dale Max from University Park, Illinois. And I’ve got a question for each of you. A short question for Charlie, and maybe a little longer for Warren.

观众提问者：我是来自伊利诺伊州大学园的戴尔·马克斯。我有两个问题要问你们，每人一个。查理的比较短，沃伦的可能稍长一点。

My question for Charlie is, in a business school sense, what is the cost of capital for Berkshire Hathaway?

我的问题是，从商学院的角度来看，伯克希尔哈撒韦的资本成本是多少？

And my question for Warren is that I’ve been on the internet and I look at Yahoo and they give you recommendations for companies. And when I search for Berkshire Hathaway, it shows that nobody is recommending Berkshire Hathaway — (laughter) — despite the fact that there are maybe a thousand people that are wearing signs here, “I love Berkshire Hathaway.” And of course I’ve got mine on, too.

我的问题是，我在网上浏览了雅虎财经，他们给出了一些公司推荐。当我搜索伯克希尔哈撒韦时，结果显示没有人推荐伯克希尔哈撒韦——（笑声）——尽管这里可能有一千人都带着“我爱伯克希尔哈撒韦”的标牌。当然，我也有一个。

But what seems to be the problem in lack of recommendations?

那么缺乏推荐的原因是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’re not recommending Yahoo, incidentally, either. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一句，我们也不推荐雅虎。（笑声和掌声）

But I’ll let Charlie have that first question about the cost of capital, which has puzzled people for thousands of years. And then —

不过，我会让查理回答关于资本成本的第一个问题，这个问题困扰了人们几千年。然后——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The way that is taught in most business schools now, I find incoherent. So I’m the one that asks that question and gets the incoherent answers. I don’t have a good answer to a question I consider kind of a stupid question.

查理·芒格：现在大多数商学院教授的方式，我觉得是不连贯的。所以我通常是问那个问题的人，得到的答案也不连贯。我没有一个好的答案来回答一个我认为有点愚蠢的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: That isn’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：这并不是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: What is the cost of capital at Berkshire Hathaway when we keep drowning in this torrent of cash which we have to reinvest?

查理·芒格：当伯克希尔哈撒韦沉浸在必须再投资的现金洪流中时，资本成本是多少？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There’s really only two questions that get to that, but you don’t need a mathematical answer.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，关于这个问题实际上只有两个核心问题，但你不需要一个数学答案。

The first question is, is when you have capital, is it better to keep it or return it to shareholders? It’s better to return it to shareholders when you cannot create more than a dollar of value with that capital. That’s test number one.

第一个问题是，当你拥有资本时，是保留它更好，还是将它返还给股东更好？当你无法用这笔资本创造超过一美元的价值时，将其返还给股东是更好的选择。这是第一个检验。

And if you pass that threshold, that you think you can achieve more than a dollar of value for every dollar retained, then you simply look around for the thing that you feel the surest about, and that promises the greatest return weighted for that certainty.

如果你通过了这个门槛，认为每保留一美元可以创造超过一美元的价值，那么你只需寻找你最有把握的事情，并且根据确定性的权重选择回报最大的事情。

So our cost of capital is, in effect, measured by the ability to create more than a dollar of value for every dollar retained. If we’re keeping dollar bills that are worth more in your hands than in our hands, then we’ve exceeded the cost of capital, as far as I’m concerned.

所以，实际上我们的资本成本是通过每保留一美元能否创造超过一美元的价值来衡量的。如果我们保留的美元在你手中比在我们手中更有价值，那么在我看来，我们已经超越了资本成本。

And once we think we can do that, then the question is, is how do we do it to the best of our ability? And frankly, all the stuff I see in business schools — and I’ve not found any way to improve on that formula.

一旦我们认为我们能做到这一点，那么问题就是如何尽我们最大的能力去实现它？坦率地说，我在商学院看到的所有内容中，我没有发现任何能够改进这个公式的方法。

20年以后开始把大量资本投入能源基建行业。

Now the trouble that you may have is that many managements would be reluctant to distribute money to shareholders even if they would rationalize that they would do better than they actually do. But that’s — that may be a danger on it, but that won’t be solved by them hiring a bunch of people to come up with some cost of capital that also justifies them keeping the money, because that’s what they’ll do otherwise.

现在，你可能面临的问题是，许多管理层即使合理化认为他们可以比实际表现得更好，也会不愿意向股东分配资金。但这可能是一种危险，但这种危险不会因为他们雇了一群人来制定一个合理的资本成本公式以证明他们保留资金的正当性而得到解决，因为否则他们会这样做。

31. We prefer individual shareholders

我们更喜欢个人股东

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about recommending the stock, we very seldom had stock recommendations over the years. As I think back to 1965, I can’t think of a lot of brokerage reports that have recommended Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于推荐股票的问题，多年来我们很少有股票推荐。如果回顾到1965年，我想不出有多少经纪报告推荐过伯克希尔。

I’m not looking for any, you know, reports at all. We are not looking to have Berkshire sell at the highest possible price, and we’re not looking to try and attract people to Berkshire who are buying stocks because somebody else recommends them to them.

我根本不期待任何这类报告。我们并不希望伯克希尔以最高可能的价格出售股票，我们也不想吸引那些因为别人推荐而买入伯克希尔股票的人。

We prefer people who figure out for themselves why they themselves want to buy Berkshire, because they’re much more likely to stick around if they enter the restaurant because they decide it’s the restaurant they want to eat at, than if somebody has touted them on it. And that’s our approach.

我们更喜欢那些自己弄明白为什么想买伯克希尔的人。因为如果他们是自己决定进入这家餐厅，而不是因为别人吹嘘这家餐厅，他们更有可能长期留下来。这是我们的做法。

So we do nothing to encourage. But I think even if we did, we probably wouldn’t generate a lot of recommendations. It’s not a great stock to get rich on, if you’re a broker.

所以我们不会采取任何措施去鼓励推荐。但我认为，即使我们这样做了，也可能不会引来太多推荐。对于经纪人来说，这不是一只让人迅速致富的股票。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think the reason — (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的，我认为其中一个原因是——（笑声和掌声）

I think one of the main reasons why it’s so little recommended in the institutional market is that it’s perceived as hard to buy in quantity. (Laughter)

我认为伯克希尔在机构市场上很少被推荐的主要原因之一是，它被认为难以大规模买入。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We prefer — we’ve got some good institutions as holders, including one that’s run by a very good friend of ours, but frankly it’s more fun for us to have a bunch of individual shareholders.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们更喜欢——我们确实有一些优秀的机构股东，包括一家由我们的一位好朋友管理的机构。但坦率地说，我们觉得拥有一群个人股东更有趣。

I mean you see it — it translates — if there’s money made, it translates into changes in people’s lives and not some change in somebody’s performance figure for one quarter.

我的意思是，你可以看到——如果赚到了钱，它会转化为人们生活的变化，而不是某个季度的业绩数字的变化。

And we think that individuals are much more likely to join us with the idea of staying with us for as long as we stay around. And, you know, that’s the way we look at the business.

我们认为个人更有可能以长期与我们共存的理念加入我们。你知道的，这就是我们看待业务的方式。

Very few institutions look at investments that way, and, frankly, we think they’re often less rational holders than we get with individuals.

很少有机构以这种方式看待投资。坦率地说，我们认为它们通常比个人股东更不理性。

32. “The earthquake doesn’t know the premium you receive”

“地震并不知道你收到的保费”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Good morning, gentlemen. I’m Hugh Stevenson (PH), a shareholder from Atlanta.

观众提问者：早上好，先生们。我是来自亚特兰大的股东休·史蒂文森（音）。

My question involves the company’s super-cat reinsurance business. You’ve addressed some of this, but I would like for you to expound on it, please.

我的问题涉及公司的巨灾再保险业务。您之前提到过一些相关内容，但我希望您能详细阐述一下。

You’ve indicated that you think this is the most important business of the company. And my question is, what do you think the long-term impact of catastrophe bonds and catastrophe derivatives will be on the float and the growth in float of the company?

您表示这是公司最重要的业务之一。我的问题是，您认为巨灾债券和巨灾衍生品对公司的浮存金及其增长会有什么长期影响？

And I understand that the mispricing of risk in these instruments doesn’t really affect the way you price your business, but I’m wondering how you think it can affect the volume of the business.

我理解这些工具中的风险定价错误并不会真正影响您为业务定价的方式，但我想知道您认为这会如何影响业务量。

And I remember several years ago, Mr. Buffett, you talked about, you can never be smarter than your dumbest competitor.

我记得几年前，巴菲特先生，您提到过“你永远不会比你最愚蠢的竞争对手更聪明。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And these are some potentially dumb competitors.

观众提问者：而这些可能就是一些愚蠢的竞争对手。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’ve got it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你说得对。（笑声）

I just want to put an asterisk on one thing. We say insurance will be our most important business. We’ve not said the super-cat business will be our most important.

我想在这里加一个注释。我们说过保险将是我们最重要的业务。但我们并没有说巨灾业务是我们最重要的业务。

Super-cat has been a significant part of our business, and may well over the years remain a significant part, but it is far less significant than GEICO. And I’ll mention a word or two about that.

巨灾保险一直是我们业务的重要组成部分，未来很可能仍然是重要组成部分，但它的重要性远不及GEICO。我会稍后再提到这一点。

But the super-cat business, you can price wrong, as I illustrated in my report. You can be pricing it at half what it should be priced at.

但巨灾业务的定价可能会出错，就像我在报告中说明的那样。你可能会以应有价格的一半来定价。

I used an illustration in the report of how you could misprice a policy that you should be getting, say, a million and a half for, namely a $50 million policy on writing — on something that had one chance in 36 of happening, so you should get almost a million and a half for it.

我在报告中用了一个例子说明你如何错误定价一份保单。例如，一份5000万美元的保单，其发生概率为1/36，你应收取大约150万美元的保费。

I said if you price it at a million a year, you know, you would think you were making money after ten years 70-odd percent of the time. The interesting thing about that is if you price it for a dollar a year you would have thought you made money 70-odd percent of the time, because when you are selling insurance against very infrequent events, you can totally misprice them but not know about it for a long time.

我说，如果你将其定价为每年100万美元，你可能会认为在十年后的70%多的时间里你是赚钱的。有趣的是，如果你将其定价为每年1美元，你仍然会认为在十年后的70%多的时间里你是赚钱的。因为在针对极少发生事件的保险中，你可能完全定错价格，却在很长时间内都不会发现。

Super-cat bonds open up that field wide open. I mean you’ve always had the problem of dumb competitors, but you have a much more chance of having dumb competitors when you have a whole bunch of people who, in the case of hedge funds who have bought some of these, where the manager gets 20 percent of the profits in a year when there are profits and there is no hurricane, and when there happens to be a hurricane or an earthquake he doesn’t take the loss. His limited partners do.

巨灾债券让这个领域变得更加开放。我是说，你总是会遇到愚蠢的竞争对手，但当有一群人，比如购买了这些债券的对冲基金介入时，你更有可能遇到愚蠢的竞争对手。因为基金经理在有利润且没有飓风的一年里拿走20%的利润，而当飓风或地震发生时，他自己不会承担损失，有限合伙人则要承担。

So it’s very likely to be a competitive factor that brings our volume down a lot. It won’t change our prices.

因此，这很可能成为一个竞争因素，大幅减少我们的业务量。但这不会改变我们的价格。

You know, the thing to remember is the earthquake does not know the premium that you receive. (Laughter)

你要记住，地震并不知道你收到的保费。（笑声）

I mean the earthquake happens regardless.

我的意思是，不管怎样，地震都会发生。

So it doesn’t say — you know, you don’t have somebody out there on the San Andreas Fault that says, “Well, he only charged a 1 percent premium so we’re only going to do this once every 100 years.” (Laughter)

所以这并不是说——你知道，不会有人在圣安德烈亚斯断层上说：“嗯，他只收取1%的保费，所以我们每100年才会发生一次地震。”（笑声）

Doesn’t work that way.

事情不是这样的。

So we will probably do a whole lot less volume in the next few years in the super-cat business. We have these two policies that run for a couple more years. But in terms of new business, we will do a whole lot less.

因此，未来几年我们在巨灾业务上的业务量可能会大幅减少。我们还有两份保单将再运行几年。但就新业务而言，我们会少做很多。

GEICO is by far the most important part of our insurance business, though. GEICO in the 12 months ended April 30th had a 16.9 percent increase in policies in force. Year-end, I told you it was 16.0. A year ago, I told you it was 10. Year before that, I think it was six and a fraction.

不过，GEICO无疑是我们保险业务中最重要的部分。截至4月30日的12个月内，GEICO的在保保单增长了16.9%。年初时，我告诉你们是16.0%。一年前是10%。再之前一年，我记得是6点几。

So its growth is accelerating and it should be in a whole lot more homes around the country than it is now, you know, by a big factor. And it will be, in my view. So that will be the big part of our insurance business.

所以它的增长正在加速，它应该进入全国比现在更多的家庭，并且会是一个很大的增幅。在我看来，这将是我们保险业务的主要部分。

But we may be in the insurance business in some other ways too as time goes along. It’s a business that if you exercise discipline you should find some ways to make money, but it won’t always be the same way.

但随着时间的推移，我们可能还会以其他方式进入保险业务。这是一项如果你能保持纪律性，就能找到一些赚钱方式的业务，但方式并不总是相同的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。

33. What Buffett wants in an annual report

巴菲特对年度报告的期望

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第二区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Steve Davis (PH) from San Francisco.

观众提问者：你好，我是来自旧金山的史蒂夫·戴维斯（音）。

I’d like your advice on how to understand annual reports. What you look for, what’s important, what’s not important, and what you’ve learned over the years from reading thousands of reports? Thank you.

我想请教您关于如何解读年度报告的建议。您关注什么，什么重要，什么不重要，以及您从阅读数千份报告中学到了什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve read a lot of reports, I will tell you that.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们确实读过很多报告，我可以告诉你。

And we — well, we start by looking at the reports of companies that we think we can understand. So we hope to find — we hope to be reading reports — and I do read hundreds of them every year — we hope to be reading reports of businesses that are understandable to us.

我们——我们首先会看那些我们认为可以理解的公司报告。所以我们希望找到——我们希望阅读那些——我每年确实阅读数百份——我们希望阅读的报告是关于我们能够理解的业务的。

And then we see from that report whether the management is telling us about the things that we would want to know about if we owned a hundred percent of the company.

然后，我们会从报告中看管理层是否在告诉我们，如果我们拥有公司100%的股份，我们想了解的内容。

And when we find a management that does tell us about those things, and that is candid in the same way that a manager of a subsidiary would be candid with us, and talks in language that we can understand, it definitely improves our feeling about investing in such a business.

当我们发现管理层确实在告诉我们这些内容，并且像子公司经理对我们坦诚一样坦率，并且以我们能够理解的语言交流时，这确实会增强我们对投资该业务的信心。

And the reverse turns us off, to some extent. So if we read a bunch of public relations gobbledygook, you know, and we see lots of pictures and no facts, it has some effect on our attitude toward a business.

反之，这在某种程度上会让我们感到不满。所以，如果我们读到的是一堆公关套话，充满了图片却没有事实，这会对我们对该业务的态度产生一些影响。

We want to understand the business better when we get through with the annual report than when we picked it up. And that is not difficult for a management to do if they want to do it.

我们希望在读完年度报告后比拿起报告时更好地理解该业务。而如果管理层愿意这样做，这并不难实现。

If they don’t want to do it, you know, we think that is a factor in whether we want to be their partners over a ten-year period or so.

如果他们不想这样做，我们认为这是我们是否愿意在十年左右的时间里与他们成为合作伙伴的一个考量因素。

But we’ve learned a lot from annual reports. For example, I would say that the Coca-Cola annual report over the last good many years is an enormously informative document. I mean, I can’t think of any way if I’d have a conversation with Roberto Goizueta, or now Doug Ivester, and they were telling me about the business, they would not be telling me more than I get from reading that annual report.

但我们从年度报告中学到了很多东西。例如，我会说，可口可乐多年来的年度报告是一份信息量极大的文件。我的意思是，我无法想象即使我与罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔或现在的道格·艾维斯特交谈，他们能告诉我的内容会比我从阅读年度报告中获得的更多。

We bought that stock based on an annual report. We did not buy it based on any conversation of any kind with the top management of Coca-Cola before we bought our interest. We simply bought it based on reading the annual report, plus our knowledge of how the business worked.

我们买入这只股票完全是基于年度报告。我们在买入可口可乐的股份之前，并没有与其高管进行任何形式的交谈。我们只是通过阅读年度报告，再加上对业务运作方式的了解，做出了买入决定。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I do think the — if you’ve got a standardized bunch of popular jargon that looks like it came out of the same consulting firm, I do think it’s a big turnoff. That’s not to say that some of the consulting mantras aren’t right. But I think there’s a lot — that for a sort of candid, simple, coherent prose — a lot to be said for it.

查理·芒格：是的。我确实认为，如果一份报告充斥着一堆看起来像是出自同一家咨询公司的流行术语，会让人非常反感。这并不是说某些咨询流行语不正确。但我认为，坦率、简单、连贯的表达有很大的价值。

WARREN BUFFETT: Almost every business has problems, and we’d just as soon the manager would tell us about them.

沃伦·巴菲特：几乎每个企业都有问题，而我们希望经理能直接告诉我们这些问题。

We would like that in the businesses we run. In fact, one of the things, we give very little advice to our managers, but one thing we always do say is to tell us the bad news immediately. And I don’t see why that isn’t good advice for the manager of a public company.

我们希望在我们经营的企业中看到这种做法。事实上，我们很少给经理们建议，但我们总是告诉他们的一件事就是，立即告诉我们坏消息。我不明白为什么这对上市公司的经理来说不是一个好建议。

Over time, you know, I’m positive it’s the best policy. But a lot of companies, for example, have investor relations people, and they are dying just to pump out what they think is good news all the time.

随着时间的推移，我确信这是最好的政策。但很多公司都有投资者关系团队，他们热衷于不停地发布他们认为的好消息。

And they have this attitude that, you know, you’ve got a bunch of animals out there to be fed. And that they’re going to feed them what they want to eat all the time. And over time the animals learn.

他们的态度是，你知道，你有一群需要被喂养的动物。他们会一直喂给这些动物想要的东西。但随着时间的推移，这些动物也会学会辨别。

So we’ve tried to stay away from businesses like that.

因此，我们尽量避开这样的公司。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What you seldom see in an annual report is a sentence like this: “This is a very serious problem and we haven’t quite figured out yet how to handle it.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你很少在年度报告中看到这样一句话：“这是一个非常严重的问题，我们还没有完全想出如何解决它。”（笑声）

But believe me, that is an accurate statement much of the time.

但相信我，这在很多时候是一个准确的描述。

VOICE: — just a moment.

旁白：稍等一下。

(Buffett leaves the table after someone tells him something in his ear.)

(巴菲特听完别人耳语后离开了座位。)

34. Munger goes it alone on Coke vs Pepsi

芒格单独回答可口可乐与百事可乐的对比

CHARLIE MUNGER: All right. Zone 3. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好的，第三区。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Leta Gurtz (PH) and I live in the area. And I would like to know what your prediction is for Coca-Cola’s long-term growth versus Pepsi-Cola’s recent efforts to increase the competitiveness with Coke?

观众提问者：我是丽塔·格茨（音），住在这个地区。我想知道，您对可口可乐的长期增长与百事可乐最近增强竞争力的努力之间的预测是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯。（笑声）

Long-term, I would expect Coke to continue to gain versus Pepsi. (Laughter and applause)

长期来看，我预计可口可乐将继续超越百事可乐。（笑声和掌声）

(Buffett returns and sits down)

(巴菲特回来并坐下)

WARREN BUFFETT: What has he been doing while I was gone? What’d you say, Charlie? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我离开的时候他在干什么？你说了什么，查理？（笑声）

I knew I was taking a chance. (Laughter)

我就知道这是冒险。（笑声）

What was the question?

问题是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I said that long-term I expected Coke to continue to gain versus Pepsi.

查理·芒格：我说，从长期来看，我预计可口可乐将继续超越百事可乐。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. Well. It’s those kind of insights as to why we keep him on the job year after year. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好吧。这种洞见就是为什么我们年复一年让他继续工作的原因。（笑声）

In a moment of particular confidence, he one time told me the same thing about RC. (Laughter)

有一次，他非常自信地跟我说过同样的话，关于RC可乐。（笑声）

Now, that was probably zone 3 you were answering, so we’ll go to 4.

刚才你回答的可能是第三区的问题，所以我们现在到第4区。

What have you got there? You got peanut brittle?

你那里是什么？花生糖？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Um-huh. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯哼。（笑声）

35. Ignoring asset gains at Coca-Cola

忽略可口可乐的资产收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Nat Chase (PH), Houston, Texas.

观众提问者：我是来自德克萨斯州休斯顿的纳特·蔡斯（音）。

My first question’s on the quality of earnings and your evaluation of quality of earnings in the U.S. right now.

我的第一个问题是关于收益质量以及您对目前美国收益质量的评价。

And the second is, what multiples should be put on asset gains such as sale of bottling assets or reversal of merger reserves? Thanks.

第二个问题是，像出售瓶装资产或合并准备金的转回这样的资产收益应赋予什么倍数？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, taking the second question, for example, with Coca-Cola, the bottling transactions are incidental to a long-term strategy which, in my view, has been enormously successful to date, and which has more successes ahead of it.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，关于第二个问题，以可口可乐为例，瓶装业务交易是其长期战略的一部分。在我看来，这一战略迄今为止取得了巨大的成功，未来还会取得更多成功。

But in the process of rearranging and consolidating the bottling system, and expanding to relatively undeveloped markets, there have been, and there will be, a lot of bottling transactions. And some produce large gains. Some produce small gains. I ignore those in my evaluation of Coke.

但在重新安排和整合瓶装系统以及向相对未开发市场扩展的过程中，发生了许多瓶装业务交易，未来还会有很多。其中一些产生了大量收益，一些产生了较少的收益。但我在评估可口可乐时会忽略这些。

The two important elements in Coke are unit case sales and shares outstanding. And if the shares outstanding go down and the unit case sales advance at a good clip, you are going to make money over time in Coca-Cola.

在可口可乐中，两个重要的因素是单位箱销售量和流通股数量。如果流通股数量减少而单位箱销售量快速增长，你在可口可乐上的投资会随着时间赚到钱。

There have been transactions where people have purchased rights to various drinks. Coca-Cola’s purchased some of those around the world. And when you see what is paid for a million or 100 million unit cases of a business, and then you think to yourself that maybe Coke will add a billion and a half cases a year, that’s a real gain in value. It’s a dramatic gain in value.

有一些交易是购买各种饮料的销售权。可口可乐在全球范围内也购买过一些。当你看到某业务每百万或一亿单位箱的交易价格，再想到可口可乐每年可能会增加15亿箱，这是真正的价值增长。这是一个巨大的价值增长。

And that is what counts, in terms of the Coca-Cola Company. If you think the Coca-Cola Company’s going to sell some multiples of its present volume 15 or 20 years from now, and you think there’ll be a lot fewer shares outstanding, you’ve gone about as far as you need to go. But I would pay no attention to asset gains. I would just take those out of the picture.

这才是可口可乐公司真正重要的地方。如果你认为15到20年后，可口可乐的销售量将是目前的数倍，并且流通股数量会大幅减少，那么你已经达到了所需的评估深度。但我不会关注资产收益，我会将其完全排除在外。

36. Stock options and inflated earnings

股票期权与虚增收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, as to quality of earnings, Charlie and I feel that, in several respects, but in one important respect, that the quality of earnings has gone down. Not because the policy has changed, but because it’s just become more significant. And that’s in the case of stock options.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于收益质量，查理和我觉得在几个方面，尤其是一个重要方面，收益质量有所下降。这并不是因为政策发生了变化，而是因为这一因素变得更加重要。这与股票期权有关。

We have — there are certain companies that we’ve evaluated for possible purchase where, in our calculation of earnings, the earnings are maybe 10 percent less per year per share than reported. And that isn’t necessarily the end of the world, but it is a difference in valuation that is significant and is not reported under standard accounting.

我们评估过一些可能收购的公司，按照我们的收益计算，这些公司的每股收益可能比报告的少10%左右。这并不一定是世界末日，但这确实是一个在标准会计准则下未被报告的重大估值差异。

So we think the quality of earnings as reported by a company with significant stock option grants every year, we think is dramatically poorer than for one where that doesn’t exist. And there are a lot of companies that fall in that category.

因此，我们认为，每年发放大量股票期权的公司，其报告的收益质量远低于不存在这种情况的公司。有很多公司属于这一类别。

Coca-Cola’s earnings are very easy to figure out. Just figure out what they’re, you know, what they’re earning per case from operations, and you’ll see over the years the earnings per case go up. And the cases go up and the shares go down. And it doesn’t get much more complicated than that.

可口可乐的收益非常容易计算。只需看看他们每箱的经营收益是多少，你会看到多年来每箱收益在增加，销售箱数在增长，而流通股数量在减少。这并没有那么复杂。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’ve said it wonderfully. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你说得太好了。（笑声）

I just wish we had more like that.

我只是希望我们有更多这样的公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

GEICO, the key — I mean the same way. It’s policies in force and underwriting experience per policy. And that is exactly the way, as noted in the annual report, we pay people there. We pay them, from the bottom to the very top, based on what happens with those two variables.

GEICO的关键——我的意思是，同样的道理。关键在于有效保单数量和每张保单的承保经验。正如年度报告中指出的那样，这正是我们为那里的人支付报酬的方式。从底层员工到高层管理者，他们的薪酬完全基于这两个变量的表现。

And we don’t talk about earnings per share at GEICO, and we don’t talk about investment income. We don’t get off the track, because there are two things that are going to determine what kind of business that GEICO is over a long period of time. And policies at GEICO are unit cases at Coca-Cola.

我们在GEICO不谈每股收益，也不谈投资收入。我们不会偏离轨道，因为从长远来看，有两件事决定了GEICO是什么样的业务。而GEICO的保单就像可口可乐的销售箱数一样重要。

37. Benjamin Graham and how Buffett would teach investing

本杰明·格雷厄姆及巴菲特对投资教学的看法

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s James Claus (PH) from New York City. And I just wanted to ask you a question.

观众提问者：你好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自纽约市的詹姆斯·克劳斯（音），我有个问题想问您。

Both you and Mr. Munger have repeatedly said that you don’t believe that business valuation is being taught correctly at our universities, and as a Ph.D. student at Columbia Business School, that troubles me, understandably, because in a couple of years I’ll be joining the ranks of those teaching business valuation.

您和芒格先生都多次表示，您认为我们的大学没有正确地教授企业估值。作为哥伦比亚商学院的一名博士生，这让我感到困扰，因为几年后我也会加入教授企业估值的行列。

My question isn’t what sources, such as Graham or Fisher or Mr. Munger’s talks, you would point people that are teaching business valuation to, but do you have any counsel about the techniques of teaching business valuation?

我的问题并不是您会推荐像格雷厄姆、费舍尔或芒格先生的演讲这样的资料，而是您对教授企业估值的方法是否有任何建议？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I was lucky. I had a sensational teacher in Ben Graham, and we had a course there, there’s at least one fellow out in the audience here that attended with me. And Ben made it terribly interesting, because what we did was we walked into that class and we valued companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：我很幸运，我有一位非常出色的老师——本·格雷厄姆。在他的课程中，我们至少有一位观众和我一起上过他的课。本让课程变得非常有趣，因为我们进入课堂后，就开始评估公司。

And he had various little games he would play with us. Sometimes he would have us evaluate company A and company B with a whole bunch of figures, and then we would find out that A and B were the same company at different points in its history, for example.

他会设计各种小游戏和我们互动。有时，他会让我们用一堆数据评估公司A和公司B，然后我们会发现A和B其实是同一家公司在其历史上的不同阶段。

And then there were a lot of little games he played to get us to think about what were the key variables and how could we go off the track.

他还设计了许多小游戏，让我们思考关键变量是什么，以及我们可能会在哪些方面偏离轨道。

I remember one time Ben met with Charlie and me and about nine or so other people down in San Diego in 1968 or so, when he gave all of us a little true/false test, and we all thought we were pretty smart — we all flunked.

我记得1968年左右，本在圣地亚哥和查理、我以及其他大约九个人见面时，给了我们一个小的是非测试。我们都认为自己很聪明——结果全都不及格。

But that was his way of teaching us that a smart man playing his own game and working at fooling you could do a pretty good job at it.

但这是他教导我们的方式：一个聪明人玩自己的游戏并试图愚弄你时，可能会做得非常成功。

But I would, you know, if I were teaching a course on investments, there would be simply one valuation study after another with the students, trying to identify the key variables in that particular business, and evaluating how predictable they were first, because that is the first step.

如果是我来教一门投资课程，我会让学生们进行一个又一个的估值研究，尝试识别特定业务中的关键变量，并首先评估这些变量的可预测性，因为这是第一步。

If something is not very predictable, forget it. You know, you don’t have to be right about every company. You have to make a few good decisions in your lifetime.

如果某件事情不可预测，那就忘了它。你不需要对每家公司都做出正确判断。你只需要在一生中做出几个好的决定。

But then when you find — the important thing is to know when you find one where you really do know the key variables — which ones are important — and you do think you’ve got a fix on them.

但当你发现一个公司时，重要的是知道你是否真正掌握了它的关键变量——哪些变量重要——并且你认为自己已经掌握了这些变量。

Where we’ve been — where we’ve done well, Charlie and I made a dozen or so very big decisions relative to net worth, but not as big as they should have been. And we’ve known we were right on those going in. I mean they just weren’t that complicated. And we knew we were focusing on the right variables and they were dominant.

在我们做得好的地方，查理和我做出了十几个与净值相关的重大决定，但这些决定本应做得更大一些。而且我们知道自己在这些决策上是对的。它们并不复杂。我们知道自己关注的是正确的变量，而且这些变量是主导因素。

And we knew that even though we couldn’t take it out to five decimal places or anything like that, we knew that in a general way we were right about them. And that’s what we look for. The fat pitch. And that’s what I would be teaching — trying to teach students to do. And I would not try to teach them to think they could do the impossible.

我们知道，即使我们无法精确到小数点后五位或类似的程度，我们还是能够总体上正确把握这些变量。这就是我们寻找的——“好球”。这也是我会教学生的内容——尝试让他们学会这样做。我不会试图教他们认为自己可以完成不可能的任务。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. If you’re planning to teach business valuation, and what you hope to do is teach the way people teach real estate appraising. So you can take any company, and your students, after studying your course, will be able to give you an appraisal of that company, which will indicate, really, its future prospects compared to its market price, I think you’re attempting the impossible.

查理·芒格：是的。如果你打算教授企业估值，并希望以教房地产评估的方式进行教学，也就是说，任何一家公司，你的学生在学习了你的课程后，能够给出一个评估结果，指出该公司未来的前景与其市场价格相比的真实价值，那么我认为你是在尝试完成不可能的任务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, probably on the final exam I would take an internet company, and I would say the final exam, the question is, “How much is this worth?” And anybody that gave me an answer I would flunk. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，也许在期末考试中，我会拿一家互联网公司作为例子，我会问，“这家公司值多少钱？”如果有人给出了答案，我会让他不及格。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. Right.

查理·芒格：没错，没错。

WARREN BUFFETT: Make grading papers easy, too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这样改试卷也轻松了。（笑声）

38. Munger: Wesco is a “historical accident”

芒格：Wesco是一场“历史意外”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Laurence Balter (PH), Carlsbad, California. Question for the two of you.

观众提问者：早上好，我是来自加州卡尔斯巴德的劳伦斯·巴尔特（音）。我有两个问题要问你们。

There was an article, I think about last year in The New York Times, that regarded Wesco as a Berkshire Class C share-type company, and I’d like to know your comments on that.

去年，《纽约时报》有一篇文章将Wesco视为一种伯克希尔C类股份类型的公司，我想听听你们对此的评论。

And the second question is, if I were to write you a check for the operating businesses that Berkshire owns, how much would it have to be?

第二个问题是，如果我给您写一张支票，购买伯克希尔拥有的运营业务，这张支票需要填多少金额？

WARREN BUFFETT: Big. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：很大。（笑声）

Charlie is the resident expert on Wesco, so I’m going to let him address that side. He gets very eloquent on this.

查理是Wesco的驻场专家，所以我会让他来解答这个问题。他对这个话题有很多话要说。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We always say that, per unit of book value, Wesco is worth way less than Berkshire, and indeed the market is saying the same thing. It is not a clone of Berkshire. It’s a historical accident. (Audience mumbling)

查理·芒格：是的。我们总是说，就账面价值而言，Wesco的价值远低于伯克希尔，实际上市场也是这样认为的。它并不是伯克希尔的复制品。它是一场历史意外。（观众议论声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We want it to do well, obviously, for Wesco. We own 80 percent of it and we’ve got strong feelings about the people who are partners there, particular the Peters family, who, in effect, invited us in 20-odd years ago and trusted us to manage a big part of their money, in effect, by letting us buy control. So we’ve got strong fiduciary feelings about it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们显然希望Wesco表现良好。我们持有它80%的股份，并对那些作为我们合作伙伴的人有很强的责任感，尤其是Peters家族。20多年前，他们实际上邀请我们加入并信任我们管理他们的大部分资金，让我们通过收购控股权来管理。所以我们对它有很强的信托责任。

It suffers in comparison with Berkshire because for one thing, anybody that wants a tax-free merger is going to want to come to Berkshire. You know, that’s just the way it is, unfortunately.

与伯克希尔相比，它在一些方面处于劣势。因为任何希望实现免税合并的人都会选择伯克希尔。不幸的是，这就是现实。

And we are looking for big ideas, primarily, and the big ideas are going to fit into Berkshire.

我们主要在寻找大的想法，而这些大的想法通常适合放入伯克希尔。

We would love to get ideas that fit into Wesco, and we had a very good one a couple years ago, thanks to Roy Dinsdale pointing me in the right direction. And we added Kansas Bankers Surety to Wesco, and it’s a gem. And it’s run by Don Towle, who’s done a terrific job.

我们很愿意寻找适合Wesco的想法。几年前我们有一个非常好的想法，多亏了Roy Dinsdale让我找对了方向。我们将Kansas Bankers Surety并入了Wesco，它是一个瑰宝，由Don Towle管理，他干得非常出色。

But that’s the exception, unfortunately. Because if a FlightSafety comes along, it’s not going to fit Wesco.

但不幸的是，这是个例外。因为如果再来一个像FlightSafety这样的机会，它是不会适合Wesco的。

So we will do our best for Wesco, but the nature of things is that most of the opportunities that make a lot of sense are going to come to Berkshire.

因此，我们会尽力为Wesco做得更好，但事情的本质是，大多数有意义的机会都会来到伯克希尔。

Charlie, do you have anything?

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.

查理·芒格：没有了。

39. Buy Berkshire or the stocks it buys?

买伯克希尔还是买伯克希尔持有的股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第7区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bob Swanson (PH) from Phoenix.

观众提问者：我是来自凤凰城的鲍勃·斯旺森（音）。

And I’m wondering, what are the advantages of investing in Berkshire Hathaway as opposed to investing in the stocks that Berkshire owns?

我想知道，投资伯克希尔哈撒韦与投资伯克希尔持有的股票相比，有什么优势？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, a lot of people do one or the other and some people do both. But you have to really make up your own mind on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，很多人会选择其一，也有人两者都选。但你必须自己做出决定。

We’re not going to go to great lengths to tell you about everything that Berkshire is doing as we go along, and there could be some changes, and there will be things that can happen in Berkshire that I think you would have trouble duplicating elsewhere.

我们不会费很大劲去告诉你伯克希尔正在做的每一件事，这中间可能会有一些变化。而在伯克希尔发生的某些事情，我认为你很难在其他地方复制。

But on the other hand, you know, if you’d put all your money in Coca-Cola some years back, you might have done better than if you’d put it in Berkshire.

但另一方面，如果你几年前将所有资金投到可口可乐，你可能会比投到伯克希尔赚得更多。

So we really make no recommendations as to what people do with their money. We do not seek to become investment advisors through, in effect, our portfolio actions at Berkshire.

因此，我们并不对人们如何使用他们的钱提出建议。我们也不想通过伯克希尔的投资组合行动，实质上成为投资顾问。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Amazingly, we hate it when people following us — follow us around buying what we buy. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：令人惊讶的是，我们讨厌有人跟随我们——到处买我们买的东西。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Nothing personal.

沃伦·巴菲特：没有针对个人的意思。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：没有。（笑声）

40. Shareholders get info they need to value Berkshire

股东获得评估伯克希尔所需的信息

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, the questioner before this last one asked what is the market value under the hammer of all Berkshire’s operating subsidiaries, and the answer is you have to figure that out yourself. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，上一个提问者问到伯克希尔所有运营子公司拍卖的市场价值是多少，答案是你得自己算。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Mr. Nice Guy. (Laughter) Zone —

沃伦·巴菲特：好家伙。（笑声）第——

But we give you the information, incidentally, where your judgment on it should be about as good as ours. There’s nothing mysterious about valuing The Buffalo News, or See’s Candy, or FlightSafety, or Dairy Queen. So you really have the same information we have in that.

顺便说一句，我们确实提供了信息，你对此的判断应该和我们的差不多。评估《水牛城新闻》、See's Candy、FlightSafety或Dairy Queen并没有什么神秘之处。所以你实际上拥有和我们一样的信息。

I mean if there’s material information that we aren’t giving you about any important Berkshire subsidiary, we’d like to give it to you, because we think you are entitled to have the information. It enables you to value the various pieces.

我的意思是，如果我们没有向你提供关于任何重要伯克希尔子公司的重要信息，我们愿意提供给你，因为我们认为你有权获得这些信息。这可以让你对各部分进行评估。

Because of the aggregate size of Berkshire now, in terms of market capitalization and some of the positions we own, the smaller subsidiaries really cannot have that much effect. We love them just as much. I enjoy all of the businesses we’re in and I enjoy the people that run them.

由于伯克希尔现在的总规模、市场资本化以及我们持有的一些头寸，较小的子公司实际上不会产生太大的影响。我们依然非常喜爱它们。我喜欢我们从事的所有业务，也喜欢管理这些业务的人们。

So, we don’t make a — there’s not — we don’t differentiate in our attitude within the company, but in terms of the actual impact on the valuation of Berkshire, there are a number that really just don’t make that much difference in terms of figuring out whether Berkshire’s worth X or X minus a thousand or plus a thousand, because a thousand now is over a billion dollars, in terms of valuation. A billion is still a lot of money.

因此，我们在公司内部并没有不同的态度，但从实际对伯克希尔估值的影响来看，有许多业务实际上并不会在评估伯克希尔的价值是X还是X减一千或加一千方面产生太大影响，因为一千现在代表的是十亿美元。十亿仍然是一笔很大的钱。

41. Three factors driving the bull market

推动牛市的三大因素

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第8区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Robert McCormick, I’m from Holdrege, Nebraska.

观众提问者：您好，巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我是来自内布拉斯加州霍尔德里奇的罗伯特·麦考密克。

And I would like to know how much you attribute the gains enjoyed by the stock market these past years to the baby boomer generation investing for their retirement?

我想知道，您认为过去这些年股市的涨幅有多大程度归因于婴儿潮一代为退休进行投资？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say that, personally, I would not think that has much to do with it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我个人认为这与之关系不大。

I think the two big factors are in — well, there’s three big factors. One is the improved return on equity, which was a fundamental factor that pushed stock prices up.

我认为有两个主要因素——不，其实是三个主要因素。第一是股本回报率的提高，这是推动股价上涨的一个根本性因素。

Two is a decline in interest rates that pushed stock prices up.

第二是利率的下降，这也推动了股价上涨。

And then finally, stock prices advancing, themselves, brings in buying. It doesn’t go on forever, but it creates its own momentum, to some extent, if you have these underlying factors that started to push it along.

最后，股价的上涨本身会吸引更多买盘。虽然这不会永远持续，但在一定程度上，它会形成一种自身的动能，尤其是在这些基础因素已经推动的情况下。

So I would say two of the three factors are fundamental and the third is a market-type factor that bull markets do feed on themselves, and I think that you’ve seen some evidence of that.

因此，我会说三个因素中有两个是基本面的，第三个是市场类型的因素，即牛市确实会自我强化，我认为你可以看到一些这方面的证据。

But I don’t think that any specific — you know, the 401(k) factor or whatever it may be, was it by itself.

但我不认为任何具体的因素，比如401(k)或其他原因，能单独解释这一现象。

But I do think money is pouring into mutual funds, for example, because people have had a very favorable experience with those funds. And that does bring investors along. People want to be on the train.

不过，我确实认为，资金涌入共同基金，比如说，是因为人们对这些基金的体验非常好。这确实吸引了更多投资者。人们想上车。

Charlie?

查理？

And I think, incidentally, many of them have very unrealistic expectations.

顺便说一下，我认为很多人对收益有着非常不现实的期望。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The general investment experience in the last, what, 18 years in common stocks has been awesomely high, I think by any past standards now, isn’t that right, Warren?

查理·芒格：是的。在过去18年里，普通股的总体投资收益确实非常高，我认为按任何以往的标准来看，都是如此，对吧，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. Well you’ve had — since 1982 you’ve had roughly tenfold in the Dow, and probably similar in the S&P. With a huge amount of money and with more participants all the time.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。从1982年以来，道琼斯指数大约上涨了10倍，标普指数可能也差不多。同时有大量资金涌入，参与者也越来越多。

And there are people coming into the market every day because they feel that they’ve missed the boat or they’re coming in heavier than they came in before, simply because they’ve had a pleasant experience.

每天都有新的人进入市场，因为他们觉得自己错过了机会，或者比以前投入得更多，仅仅是因为他们有过良好的投资体验。

Past experience doesn’t — does not mean much, in terms of what you should expect from your investments. You will do well in your investments because you own or bought things at the right price and the businesses behaved well from that point forward.

过去的经验对你的投资预期意义不大。你的投资之所以表现良好，是因为你以合理的价格买入了优质资产，并且这些业务从那时起表现良好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you won’t have 18 more years of 17 percent or 18 percent per annum. That I think we can virtually guarantee.

查理·芒格：嗯，你不会再有连续18年每年17%或18%的回报率了。我认为这一点几乎是可以保证的。

42. Buffett and Munger about equal at “goofing off”

巴菲特和芒格在“偷懒”方面差不多

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第9区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Tubby Stayman from Palm Beach, Florida.

观众提问者：你好，我是来自佛罗里达州棕榈滩的塔比·斯泰曼（音）。

I know you enjoy bridge very much. I know you play my late husband’s convention.

我知道您非常喜欢打桥牌。我也知道您使用我已故丈夫的打法规则。

Tell me, how often are you able to devote to this wonderful game? How many times a week do you play other than the internet?

请告诉我，您能多经常投入到这个美妙的游戏中？除了在网上打牌，您每周玩几次？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t get all of that, Charlie? Did you?

沃伦·巴菲特：我没完全听清，查理，你听明白了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: How much bridge are you playing?

查理·芒格：你打了多少桥牌？

WARREN BUFFETT: Uh-oh.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦哦。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. (Laughter)

观众提问者：是的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, this week — we should put this in the annual report, because it may be a material factor. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这周——我们应该把这个写进年度报告，因为这可能是一个重要因素。（笑声）

I’m probably — at least ten hours a week. Maybe a little more. I don’t get any better by doing it, either, so it’s rather discouraging, but it is a lot of fun. And it has to have come out of reading time.

我每周可能至少打十个小时，也许更多一些。而且无论打多久，我也没什么长进，所以有点让人沮丧，但确实很有趣。这必然占用了我的阅读时间。

I don’t think it’s hurt Berkshire yet, but that may be because we’re in a slow period generally.

我不认为这对伯克希尔造成了什么影响，但这可能是因为我们目前总体上处于一个缓慢的时期。

If the market goes down a lot, I promise to cut back on my bridge. (Laughter)

如果市场大幅下跌，我保证会减少打桥牌的时间。（笑声）

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I probably play three or four hours a week. But I don’t play on the internet.

查理·芒格：是的。我每周可能打三到四个小时的桥牌。但我不在网上打牌。

WARREN BUFFETT: He plays a lot of golf, though. Confess Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是他打了很多高尔夫球。坦白吧，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yes. (LAUGH)

查理·芒格：哦，是的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we both spend about the same amount of time goofing off. I mean if you —(laughter) — want to know.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们俩花在偷懒上的时间差不多。我是说，如果你想知道的话——（笑声）。

43. Defending Walt Disney-Capital Cities accounting

为迪士尼-首都城市并购的会计处理辩护

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第10区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, my name is Cary Blecker (PH), also from West Palm Beach, Florida.

观众提问者：是的，我叫凯里·布莱克尔（音），也来自佛罗里达州西棕榈滩。

With all due respect to Mr. Eisner if he’s in the audience, there’s been some criticism levied recently at the Disney Company, mainly from an accounting professor at one of the state universities in New York, in reference to Disney’s purchase of Capital Cities and the way they accounted for that purchase.

如果艾斯纳先生在场，我想表达我的尊重。最近，迪士尼公司受到了批评，主要来自纽约州一所大学的一位会计教授，涉及迪士尼收购首都城市的会计处理方式。

Basically, what this professor is saying is that Disney somehow created a slush fund and is charging the expenses to the merger to this slush fund rather than earnings.

这位教授基本上是在说，迪士尼以某种方式建立了一个“小金库”，并将合并相关的费用计入这个小金库，而不是计入收益。

If you’re familiar with this criticism, I’m wondering what you think of it? And if you’re not, are you familiar with the way Disney accounted for the purchase of Capital Cities?

如果您熟悉这种批评，我想知道您对此的看法。如果不熟悉，您是否了解迪士尼对首都城市的会计处理方式？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I am familiar.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我很熟悉。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.

观众提问者：谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: And actually, Abe Briloff, who wrote that, is a fellow who, in general, I admire.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，写这篇文章的艾比·布里洛夫总体上是一位我很敬佩的人。

Abe wrote me a letter not more than about three or four weeks ago and asked me to talk at a university where he teaches. And I wrote him back and I told him I wouldn’t be able to do it because it’s not in proximity to where I’ll be.

大约三四周前，艾比给我写了一封信，邀请我去他任教的大学演讲。我回信告诉他，我无法出席，因为地点离我将要去的地方不近。

And I told him — and he asked me about the Disney thing. And I told him I disagreed with him on —

他还问了我关于迪士尼的事情。我告诉他，我在这个问题上不同意他的观点。

I admire what Abe does in the attempt to have accounting reflect economic reality, but he and I don’t see it exactly the same on some points, although we would agree on other points.

我很欣赏艾比试图让会计反映经济现实的努力，但在某些方面，我和他的看法并不完全相同，尽管在其他方面我们可能会达成一致。

I think — I don’t think Disney is a very complicated enterprise to evaluate. I mean there are — when Cap Cities bought ABC, there were purchase accounting adjustments, and they tend to wash through, to some extent.

我认为——我不认为迪士尼是一家很难评估的企业。我的意思是，当Cap Cities收购ABC时，有一些并购会计调整，而这些调整在某种程度上会逐渐平息。

I mean if you have programs that you’re stuck on, you may write those down from what the previous carrying cost was. Maybe the previous management should have written them down, too, at that point. But I don’t think that — I think with Disney, what you see now is what you get.

我的意思是，如果有一些节目项目你已经坚持不下去，你可能会将其原来的账面成本减记。或许之前的管理层也应该在那个时候将它们减记。但我不认为——我认为对于迪士尼来说，现在你看到的就是你能得到的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I’ve got no great quarrel with the accounting at Disney. I think —

查理·芒格：是的。我对迪士尼的会计处理没有什么大的异议。我认为——

WARREN BUFFETT: Abe Briloff is a wonderful guy.

沃伦·巴菲特：艾比·布里洛夫是个很棒的人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. He’s got a good sense of humor and he generally fights the right demons, but I don’t think you can criticize Disney’s accounting.

查理·芒格：是的。他有很好的幽默感，而且通常与“正确的恶魔”作斗争，但我不认为你可以批评迪士尼的会计处理。

WARREN BUFFETT: We certainly disagree with Abe, who, like I say, I agree with Charlie, he is a good guy.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们确实不同意艾比的看法，就像我说的，我同意查理的意见，他是个很好的人。

But he — we disagree with him on amortization of intangibles entirely. So we would say that if Disney is charging, whatever it may be, probably 400 million a year for amortization of intangibles, which is not tax deductible, we would include that as a component of earnings.

但在无形资产摊销的问题上，我们完全不同意他的观点。因此，如果迪士尼每年因为无形资产摊销而计入大约4亿美元（不可抵税），我们会将其视为收益的一部分。

So there might be some plusses and minuses that you’d make in adjustments, but I would say, by the time you add back amortization of intangibles that we would probably think the economic earnings of Disney might well be more than the reported earnings in the next few years.

因此，可能会有一些需要调整的正负项，但我会说，如果你将无形资产摊销加回来，我们可能会认为迪士尼的经济收益在未来几年内可能高于其报告的收益。

44. Buffett wants accounting change

巴菲特希望会计准则变革

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that the intangible amortization question — which the FASB is looking at now — I think it should be changed. I mean I think it absolutely distorts economic reality, and I think that it influences whether people go to purchase, or accounting, or pooling, and they do all kinds of acrobatics to try and get pooling accounting.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为关于无形资产摊销的问题——目前FASB（美国财务会计准则委员会）正在研究——我认为应该改变。我认为这绝对扭曲了经济现实，而且我认为它影响了人们选择购买会计还是合并会计，为了实现合并会计，他们会做各种花招。

And, you know, it shouldn’t make that kind of difference in reported numbers, based on whether a transaction, which has exactly the same economics, is done through a purchase or pooling. But I have seen managements, some I know quite well, arrange to do things on a pooling basis that they think — where if they were private they would do it on a purchase basis.

而且，你知道，同样经济实质的交易，不应该因为是通过购买还是合并进行而在报告数字中产生这样的差异。但我确实见过一些管理层，我很熟悉他们，他们为了实现合并会计安排交易，而如果是私人公司，他们会采用购买方式。

And I think that’s nuts. And I think if accounting is pushing people to doing things that are nuts, that it’s time for accounting to look at itself.

我认为这是荒谬的。如果会计准则迫使人们去做这些荒谬的事情，那么是时候让会计准则审视自身了。

I would say that — (applause) — net, the economic earnings of Disney, in our view, are somewhat higher than reported earnings.

我要说的是——（掌声）——从净收益来看，我们认为迪士尼的经济收益比其报告的收益略高。

45. I’ll never know enough to buy tech stocks

我永远无法了解足够多去买科技股

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 11, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第11区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett. My name is Prakash Puram (PH) from Minneapolis.

观众提问者：早上好，芒格先生和巴菲特先生。我是来自明尼阿波利斯的普拉卡什·普拉姆（音）。

There seem to be great values in the technology sector that meet most of your criteria and philosophy in investing, with the exception of the simplicity criterion. Names like IBM, Microsoft, HP, Intel.

科技领域似乎有一些符合您大部分投资标准和理念的优质公司，除了“简单”这一标准，比如IBM、微软、惠普、英特尔等。

Would you ever consider investing in companies in this sector in the future?

您将来会考虑投资这一领域的公司吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is no, and it’s probably pretty unfortunate, because I’ve been an admirer of Andy Grove and Bill Gates and, you know, I wish I had translated that admiration into backing it up with money.

沃伦·巴菲特：答案是否定的，这可能有点遗憾，因为我非常钦佩安迪·格鲁夫和比尔·盖茨，你知道，我希望我能将这种钦佩转化为投资。

But the truth is, I don’t know where Microsoft or Intel — I don’t know what that world will look like in 10 years.

但事实是，我不知道微软或英特尔——我不知道10年后的科技世界会是什么样子。

And I don’t want to play in a game where I think the other guys have got an advantage over me, and —

而且，我不想参与一场我认为对手占据优势的游戏。

I could spend all my time thinking about technology for the next year and I wouldn’t be the hundredth or the thousandth or the 10,000th smartest guy in the country in looking at those businesses.

即使我花整整一年时间思考科技行业，我在研究这些公司时也不会成为全美国最聪明的前100、前1000或前10000人之一。

So that is a seven or eight foot bar that I can’t clear. There are people that can clear it, but I can’t clear it. And no matter how I train, I can’t clear it.

这是一道七八英尺高的障碍，我跨不过去。有些人可以跨过去，但我不行。无论我如何训练，我都做不到。

So, the fact that there will be a lot of money made by somebody doesn’t bother me, really. And I mean there may be a lot of money made by somebody in cocoa beans, but I don’t know anything about them.

因此，有人能从中赚很多钱，这真的不会让我感到困扰。我是说，可能有人在可可豆上赚了很多钱，但我对此一无所知。

And there are a whole lot of areas I don’t know anything about. So, you know, more power to them.

还有很多领域我完全不了解。所以，你知道，他们能做得好就好。

And I think it would be a very valid criticism if Charlie and I — if it were possible that Charlie and I, by spending a year working on it, could become well enough informed so that our judgment would be better than other people’s, but that wouldn’t happen. And it would be a waste of time.

我认为，如果有人批评我们，说如果查理和我花一年时间研究科技行业就能掌握足够的信息，并且判断力超过其他人，那是完全合理的批评。但这是不可能的，那只会浪费时间。

It’s much better for us to swing at the easy pitches.

对我们来说，挥棒打容易的球更好。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Whatever you think you know about technology, I think I know less. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：无论你认为自己对科技行业了解多少，我想我知道得更少。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s probably about true, incidentally. Charlie has a little more of — he understands some things in the physical world a lot better than I do.

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能确实是事实。顺便说一下，查理对物理世界中的一些东西比我理解得更好。

46. We’ve “missed the boat” on share buybacks

我们在股票回购上“错失良机”

WARREN BUFFETT: But anyway. We’ll go to zone 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们到第1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Murray Cass from Markham, Ontario.

观众提问者：早上好，我是来自安大略省马克姆的穆雷·卡斯。

First off, against my dentist’s advice, I’d like to thank you for the free Coke and ice cream last night. (Laughter)

首先，不顾我的牙医建议，我要感谢你昨晚提供的免费可乐和冰淇淋。（笑声）

Earlier this morning, Mr. Buffett, you mentioned that you liked when wonderful companies like Coke purchased their shares back.

今天早上早些时候，巴菲特先生，您提到您喜欢像可口可乐这样的优秀公司回购自己的股票。

Similarly, I own shares in a wonderful company, that’s Berkshire. Should I be hoping that you buy your own shares back?

同样，我也拥有一家优秀公司的股票，那就是伯克希尔。我是否应该希望您回购自己的股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s interesting, we should have — perhaps we should have bought some shares back, but usually at the time we could have bought something else that also did very well for us.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这很有意思。我们本应该——或许我们应该回购一些股票，但通常在当时我们可以用资金买其他也为我们带来不错回报的东西。

I mean maybe when we were buying Coke we could have been buying our own shares back. To some extent there hasn’t been that much trading in it.

我的意思是，也许当我们在买入可口可乐时，我们本可以回购自己的股票。在某种程度上，我们的股票交易量并不大。

But I think it’s a valid criticism to say that we have missed the boat at various times in not repurchasing shares.

但我认为，批评我们在某些时候错过了回购股票的机会是有道理的。

We’ll see what we do in the future on it. If it looks like the best thing to do with money, it’s what we should be doing.

未来我们会看看该怎么做。如果回购股票看起来是最好的资金使用方式，那就是我们应该做的事情。

And in the past, I’ve probably been not optimistic enough in respect to Berkshire compared to other things we were doing with money.

而在过去，相较于我们用资金做的其他事情，我可能对伯克希尔本身不够乐观。

Now, the money we spent buying the GEICOs and all of that has turned out to be a good use of money, too.

当然，我们用来收购GEICO等公司的资金也被证明是很好的资金使用方式。

But we’ve never wanted to leverage up. That’s just not our game. So we’ve never wanted to borrow a lot of money to repurchase shares. We might advise other people to do it, but we would — it’s not our style ourselves.

但我们从不想加杠杆。这并不是我们的风格。所以我们从未想过借很多钱来回购股票。我们可能会建议别人这样做，但我们自己不会这样做。

We’ve got all our money in the company. We’ve got all of our friends’ and our relatives’ money virtually.

我们的所有资金都在公司里。实际上，我们朋友和亲戚的所有资金也在这里。

So we have never felt that we wanted to leverage up this company like it was just one of a portfolio of a hundred stocks.

因此，我们从未觉得需要将公司杠杆化，好像它只是投资组合中的一百只股票之一。

But it’s a valid criticism to say that we have not repurchased shares when we should have. And it’s also a valid criticism to say that we’ve issued some shares we shouldn’t have issued.

但批评我们在应该回购时没有回购股票是合理的。同样，批评我们发行了一些本不应该发行的股票也是合理的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I would agree with both comments.

查理·芒格：哦，我同意这两个观点。

47. “Smile train”

“微笑列车”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area two.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fellow investors of Berkshire and Hathaway, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. I am from originally China. Now I have a company in Michigan.

观众提问者：伯克希尔和哈撒韦的投资者们，沃伦·巴菲特先生和查理·芒格先生，我原籍中国，现在在密歇根拥有一家公司。

I want to ask questions based on facts. I want to sell Coke, GEICO, and a little book called The Wizard of Omaha: The Investment Philosophy of Warren Buffett, in China. Through all the villages, the cities, little towns, I want to make that a reality. Cheers.

我想基于事实提问。我想在中国销售可口可乐、GEICO，以及一本名为《奥马哈巫师：沃伦·巴菲特的投资哲学》的书。我希望能在所有的乡村、城市、小镇实现这一目标。干杯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Cheers. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：干杯。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Cheers.

查理·芒格：干杯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone three. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第3区。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have not asked the question.

观众提问者：我还没有提问。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, just warming up. OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，只是热身。好的。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I will.

观众提问者：我会提问的。

WARREN BUFFETT: They always tell me to get off the stage while you’re in good shape, but I’ll say it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他们总是告诉我，在状态好的时候下台，但我还是说了。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I could (inaudible), but you missed your chance. (Laughter)

观众提问者：我可以（听不清），但你错过了机会。（笑声）

I’m a owner of Berkshire and I spent 6 percent of my net worth to be engaged to Berkshire.

我是伯克希尔的股东，我花了6%的净资产投资伯克希尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Wise decision. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：明智的决定。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I did better than guess who? Bill Gates. I notice Bill Gates and you were traveling on a slow boat in China. I want to go home, on a fast train.

观众提问者：我比猜猜谁做得更好？比尔·盖茨。我注意到您和比尔·盖茨曾在中国坐慢船旅行。我想搭快车回家。

You want to cut me off?

你想打断我吗？

VOICE: Do you have a question or —?

旁白：你有问题要问吗，还是——？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: If you want to cut off, fine. Up to the investors. (Applause)

观众提问者：如果你想打断，可以，取决于投资者们。（掌声）

I’ll quit if you want to do that.

如果你们希望的话，我可以停下。

VOICE: Do you have a question? A question?

旁白：你有问题吗？问题？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I come long ways.

观众提问者：我从很远的地方过来。

VOICE: OK. Ask your question.

旁白：好的，请问你的问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. I know I’m a problem for you. (Laughter)

观众提问者：好的，我知道我对你们来说是个麻烦。（笑声）

VOICE: Not a problem. Just ask the question.

旁白：不是问题，请直接提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But I’m here for a reason. Because I made some money, I’m go on a train. A smile train. Yesterday, or the day before, at the baseball I asked Mr. Warren Buffett, “Have you heard of the smile train?” He said, “No.” I’m back here to respond. This is a smile train.

观众提问者：但我有原因来到这里。因为我赚了一些钱，我要搭一列火车——一列“微笑列车”。昨天或前天，在棒球赛时我问过沃伦·巴菲特先生，“您听说过‘微笑列车’吗？”他说，“没有。”我今天回来回应。这是一列“微笑列车”。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we thank you. But I think that’s your question.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们感谢你。但我认为这就是你的问题了。

48. Why Buffett bought silver

巴菲特为何购买白银

WARREN BUFFETT: We’d better go to zone 4, I think. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们还是到第4区吧。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, or afternoon, actually. My name’s Matt Schwab. I’m from New York. Pound Ridge, New York.

观众提问者：早上好，或者说下午好。我叫马特·施瓦布，来自纽约庞德里奇。

I actually had a question about the silver purchase last year. When you announced it, you said that you believed that supply and demand fundamentals would only be established at a higher price — re-established at a higher price.

我想问一下去年购买白银的事情。当时您宣布这一消息时说，您认为供需基本面只能在更高的价格上重新建立平衡。

I was just wondering if you could go into more detail about what some of those fundamentals are. I mean, we’ve read a lot about, like, battery technology and some other things.

我想知道，您能否详细说明这些基本面是什么？我们看到过一些关于电池技术等方面的报道。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have no inside information about great new uses for silver or anything of the sort. But the situation — and you can get these figures and they’re not precise, but I think they’re in general — they’re generally accurate.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们并没有关于白银的新用途或类似信息的内幕消息。但情况是这样的——你可以查到这些数字，尽管它们并不精确，但总体来说应该是大致准确的。

You can see from looking at the numbers that aggregate demand, primarily from photography, from industrial uses, and from ornamental jewelry-type uses, is close. Call it 800 million-plus ounces a year.

从数据中可以看出，总需求主要来自摄影、工业用途以及装饰性珠宝用途，总量接近每年超过8亿盎司。

And there are 500 million or so ounces being produced of silver, annually, although there will be more coming on in the next couple of years. There’s more coming on right now.

每年大约有5亿盎司的白银被开采出来，尽管在接下来的几年里产量会有所增加。目前的确有更多白银产出。

However, most of that silver is produced as a byproduct in the mining of gold or copper and lead zinc, so that since it’s a byproduct, it’s not responsive to — not very responsive to price changes, because obviously, if you’ve got a copper mine and you get a little silver out of it, you’re much more interested in the price of copper than silver.

然而，大部分白银是金矿、铜矿或铅锌矿开采中的副产品，因此作为副产品，它对价格变化的反应并不大。显然，如果你经营一个铜矿，并从中获得少量白银，你更关心的是铜价而不是银价。

So you have 500 million ounces or so of mine production, and you have 150 million ounces or so of reclaimed silver, a large part of which relates to the uses in photography.

因此，你有约5亿盎司的矿产白银，还有约1.5亿盎司的回收白银，其中很大一部分来自摄影用途。

So there’s been a gap in recent years of perhaps 150 million ounces — but none of these figures are precise — which has been filled by an inventory of bullion above ground, which may have been a billion-two, or more, ounces a few years back, but which has been depleted.

最近几年，存在约1.5亿盎司的缺口——虽然这些数字并不精确——这个缺口是通过消耗地面上的白银库存来填补的。几年前库存可能有12亿盎司或更多，但现在已经被大量消耗。

And no one knows the exact figures on this, but there’s no question that the bullion inventory has been depleted significantly.

虽然没有人确切知道这些数字，但毫无疑问白银库存已经显著减少。

Which means that the present price for silver does not produce an equilibrium between supply, as measured by newly-mined silver plus reclaimed silver, and usage.

这意味着，当前的白银价格不足以使新开采和回收的白银与需求之间达到平衡。

And that — eventually something will happen to change that picture. Now, it could be reduced usage, it could be increased supply, or it could be a change in price.

最终，会有一些事情发生以改变这种局面。这可能是需求减少、供应增加，或者价格变化。

And that imbalance is sufficiently large, even though there is some new production coming on, and there’s the threat of digital imaging that will reduce silver usage, perhaps, in the future in photography.

这种不平衡已经足够大，尽管有一些新的产量正在增加，同时数字成像技术可能会在未来减少摄影领域对白银的需求。

But we think that that gap is wide enough so that it will continue to deplete inventories — bullion inventories — to the point where a new price is needed to establish equilibrium.

但我们认为，这种缺口足够大，以至于库存——特别是白银库存——会继续减少，直至需要一个新价格来建立供需平衡。

And because of the byproduct nature, which makes the supply inelastic, and because of the nature of demand, which is relatively inelastic, that — we don’t think that that price change would necessarily be minor.

由于白银作为副产品的特性导致供应缺乏弹性，加上需求的相对刚性，我们认为价格的变化可能不会是微小的。

It’s interesting, because silver has been artificially influenced for a long time. You saw that movie about — you know, it was William Jennings Bryan, who was editor of The Omaha World-Herald and a congressman from Nebraska — and his brother was governor of Nebraska — who was the big silver man.

这很有趣，因为白银长期以来受到人为干预。你可能听说过那部电影——威廉·詹宁斯·布莱恩，他曾是《奥马哈世界先驱报》的编辑，也是一位来自内布拉斯加州的国会议员——他的兄弟是内布拉斯加州的州长——他是白银的重要支持者。

And they used to talk 16-to-1. The 16-to-1 ratio, I think, goes back to Isaac Newton, when he was master of the mint. Charlie will know all about that, because he’s our Newtonian expert here. But that ratio had kind of a mystical significance for a while. Didn’t really mean anything.

他们过去常谈到16比1的比例。这个16比1的比例，我认为可以追溯到艾萨克·牛顿担任铸币局局长时。查理对此一定很熟悉，因为他是我们这里的牛顿专家。但这一比例在一段时间内具有某种神秘意义，实际上并没有实际意义。

And in 1934, the government passed an act called The Silver Purchase Act of, surprisingly, 1934, which set an artificially high price for silver at that time, when production and usage was much less.

1934年，美国政府通过了一项名为《1934年白银购买法案》的法律，在那时设定了一个人为的高银价，而当时的白银产量和使用量都少得多。

And the government, U.S. government, ended up accumulating two billion ounces of silver. Now, this was at a time when demand was a couple hundred million ounces a year, so you’re talking ten years’ supply.

美国政府最终积累了20亿盎司的白银。当时的年需求量仅为几亿盎司，所以这相当于10年的供应量。

So there was an artificially high price for a while. By the early 1960s, that became an artificially low price of $1.29, and at that time I could see the inventories of the U.S. government being depleted, somewhat akin to what inventories are being depleted now.

因此，白银价格曾一度被人为地抬高。到了20世纪60年代初，这变成了每盎司1.29美元的人为低价，那时我可以看到美国政府的白银库存正在减少，有点类似于现在库存减少的情景。

And despite the fact that Lyndon Johnson and the administration said they would not demonetize silver, they did demonetize it, and silver went up substantially. That was the last purpose we had of silver, but I’ve kept track of the figures ever since.

尽管林登·约翰逊政府声称不会废除银本位，但他们确实这样做了，白银价格大幅上涨。这是我们对白银最后的关注目的，但自那时起我一直在关注这些数据。

The Hunt brothers caused a great amount of silver to be converted into bullion form, including a lot of silver coins. So they, again, increased the supply in a very big way by their action in pushing the price way up to the point where people started melting it down.

亨特兄弟的行为导致大量白银被转化为银条形式，包括许多银币。他们通过将价格推高到让人们开始熔化银币的程度，再次大幅增加了白银的供应量。

So you had this — dislocations in silver over a 60-plus year period, which has caused the price to be affected by these huge inventory accumulations and reductions.

因此，在过去的60多年里，白银市场经历了这种错位，价格受到库存大量积累和减少的影响。

And we think right now that — or we thought last summer when we started buying it — that the price we bought it, that that was not an equilibrium price, and that sooner or later — and we didn’t think it was imminent, because we don’t wait till things are imminent.

我们认为，现在或者去年夏天当我们开始购买时，我们买入的价格不是一个均衡价格。迟早——我们并不认为会很快发生，因为我们不会等到事情迫在眉睫才行动。

You know, we were going to buy a lot of silver. We didn’t want to buy so much as to really disrupt the market, however. We had no intention of replaying any Hunt scenario. So we wanted to be sure we didn’t buy that much silver. But we liked it.

我们确实计划购买大量白银。然而，我们不想买到破坏市场的程度。我们没有意图重演亨特兄弟的剧本。所以我们确保不会买那么多白银。但我们喜欢它。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think this whole episode will have about as much impact on Berkshire Hathaway’s future as Warren’s bridge playing. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这整个事件对白银市场的影响，就像沃伦打桥牌对于伯克希尔哈撒韦未来的影响一样。（笑声）

You’ve got a line of activity where once every 30 or 40 years you can do something employing 2 percent of assets. This is not a big deal for —

你有一项活动，可能每30或40年才能利用2%的资产做一次。这对伯克希尔来说并不是什么大事——

WARREN BUFFETT: No.

沃伦·巴菲特：确实不是什么大事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — Berkshire. The fact that it keeps Warren amused and — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：伯克希尔的确如此。不过，这让沃伦感到有趣——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I do like —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我确实喜欢——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and not doing counterproductive things — (Laughter)

查理·芒格： ——并且避免做出适得其反的事情——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It makes me feel good about — it makes me feel better about all those pictures that people take over the weekend. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这让我觉得——让我对人们周末拍的所有照片感觉更好。（笑声）

They all use a little bit of silver. (Laughter)

这些照片都用了一点点银。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: At least it shows something that teaches an interesting lesson. Think of the discipline it takes to think about something for three or four decades, waiting for a chance to employ — (laughter) — 2 percent of your assets.

查理·芒格：至少这说明了一件有趣的事情。想想需要怎样的自律，才能思考一个问题三四十年，等待一个机会来动用——（笑声）——2%的资产。

I’m afraid that’s the way we are. (Laughter)

恐怕这就是我们的风格。（笑声）

It means there’ll be some dull stretches.

这意味着会有一些枯燥的时光。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. Yeah, it’s less than a billion dollars in silver. It’s $15 billion in Coke. You know, it’s a —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，白银的投资不到10亿美元，可口可乐是150亿美元。你知道，这——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a non-event.

查理·芒格：这不算一件大事。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s 5 billion in American Express. I mean it is close to a non-event, but if you see it there — you know?

沃伦·巴菲特：在美国运通的投资是50亿美元。我是说，这几乎算不上什么大事，但如果你看到机会在那里——你懂的？

CHARLIE MUNGER: At least it shows the human personality at work. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：至少这体现了人性的作用。（笑声）

Very peculiar personality, I might add. (Laughter)

顺便说一句，是非常特殊的人性。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Reinforced by a partner.

沃伦·巴菲特：并且有一个搭档加强了这种特点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

49. I only talk to students

我只与学生交谈

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to area five.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们到第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My family is a Class B shareholder. Thank you for issuing those shares.

观众提问者：我们家是B类股股东，谢谢您发行这些股票。

I have one observation and one question. Your Class B share is creating a new phenomenon in this country. These “baby shares” are not only attracting my baby boomer generation, but also X generation and (inaudible) generation, your grandchildren.

我有一个观察和一个问题。您发行的B类股在这个国家创造了一种新现象。这些“小额股票”不仅吸引了我们婴儿潮一代，也吸引了X世代和（听不清）世代，包括您的孙子辈。

My question is, this next generation would like to hear from you your investment discipline, your lifestyle, and your philosophy of contributing the wealth back to the society in a language they can understand and communicate back to their friends when they get back to school on Tuesday. Thank you.

我的问题是，这下一代希望听到您用一种他们能理解的语言分享您的投资原则、生活方式，以及回馈社会的理念，这样他们在周二回到学校后可以与朋友们交流。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

Well, I appreciate that, and I would say the only speeches I give — I get a lot of requests, perhaps because I don’t do them. But I get a lot of requests, including from a lot of our managers, in terms of trade conventions, all kinds of things.

嗯，我很感激。我想说，我唯一的演讲对象——尽管我接到了很多邀请，可能因为我不常接受邀请——包括我们的一些经理人，他们邀请我参加行业会议和各种活动。

I don’t do — the only groups I talk to are students. And I try to talk to college and university students, although I talk to high school students, too. Whenever it fits, in terms of travel schedules.

我不接受这些邀请——我唯一会与之交谈的群体是学生。我尽量与大学生和研究生交流，尽管我也会与高中生交流，只要旅行时间允许。

And I just think that if you’re going to spend your time with groups talking, that rather than entertain people, that it probably is better to talk to the group you talked about.

我认为，如果你要花时间与群体交流，与其去娱乐他人，不如与像你提到的这种群体交谈可能更有意义。

Charlie and I are never reluctant to talk, so we do it. Charlie has given a couple of talks. One I sent you a few years ago from USC, but there’s been another one recently that I think everybody would profit by reading.

查理和我从不抗拒交流，所以我们愿意这样做。查理曾发表过几次演讲。有一场是几年前我寄给你的一篇来自南加州大学的演讲，但最近还有另一场演讲，我认为每个人读了都会受益。

So, it was reprinted in the Outstanding Investor Digest, but if you write Charlie, I’m sure he’ll send you a copy.

这篇演讲被重新刊登在《优秀投资者文摘》中，但如果你写信给查理，我相信他会寄给你一份。

50. If forced to choose, we’d keep the operating businesses

如果必须选择，我们会保留运营型业务

WARREN BUFFETT: Area six, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is David Oosterbaan. I’m from Kalamazoo, Michigan.

观众提问者：你好，我叫大卫·乌斯特班，来自密歇根州卡拉马祖。

This is a hypothetical question about Berkshire. It’s going to take a little imagination, I think.

这是一个关于伯克希尔的假设性问题。我想这需要一些想象力。

The scenario is as follows, that the U.S. Justice Department makes a ruling that Berkshire must split into two parts immediately. You and Mr. Munger must decide which part to keep.

假设的情景是，美国司法部裁定伯克希尔必须立即分拆为两部分。您和芒格先生必须决定保留哪一部分。

You can either choose your marketable securities, Coke, Gillette, Disney, et cetera, or you can choose your insurance and private businesses. Which one do you choose and why?

您可以选择您的可交易证券部分，如可口可乐、吉列、迪士尼等，或者选择保险和私营企业部分。您会选择哪一个？为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s an easy question for me. I would choose the operating businesses anytime, because it’s more fun.

沃伦·巴菲特：对我来说，这是一个简单的问题。我会选择运营型业务，因为这更有趣。

And I have a good time out of the investments too, but I like being involved with real people, in terms of the businesses where they’re a cohesive unit that can grow over time, and —

虽然我也从投资中获得了很多乐趣，但我更喜欢与实际运营的人们互动，这些企业是一个能够随着时间增长的凝聚力单元，而且——

You know, I wished we owned all of Disney or Coca-Cola or Gillette, but we aren’t going to. So if I had to give up one or the other, I’d give up the marketable securities.

你知道，我希望我们拥有迪士尼、可口可乐或吉列的全部股份，但那是不可能的。所以，如果我必须放弃其中一个，我会放弃可交易证券。

But it’s not going to happen, so we’re going to be happy in both arenas, and I look forward to being in both arenas for the rest of my life.

但这不会发生，所以我们会在这两个领域都感到满意，我期待在余生中继续参与这两个领域。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ll be in a hell of a fix if I am not in the same arena. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，如果我不在同一个领域，我会陷入极大的困境。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’d both be in a hell of a fix.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们俩都会陷入困境。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah.

查理·芒格：是的，是的。

51. We’d be fine even if our top 25 execs all dropped dead

即使我们前25名高管全都不在了，公司也会没问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第7区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, hello to Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett. My name is Jerry Gonzalez (PH) from Plantation.

观众提问者：是的，芒格先生和巴菲特先生，大家好。我叫杰里·冈萨雷斯（音），来自普兰泰申。

My question is, what are your recommendations of Berkshire Hathaway if Charlie Munger were in charge, or your third man in charge — your third man, which I think you said, is the CEO of GEICO, what are your recommendations?

我的问题是，如果芒格先生完全负责伯克希尔，或者由您提到的“第三人”——也就是GEICO的CEO负责，您对伯克希尔有什么建议？

WARREN BUFFETT: I missed that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我没听清。

JERRY GONZALEZ: If Charlie Munger were to stay in charge fully, 100 percent, or your third man, the CEO of GEICO.

杰里·冈萨雷斯：如果芒格先生完全负责，或者由您的“第三人”——GEICO的CEO来负责呢？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in due course this corporation will have a change in management. I’m afraid we have no way of fixing that. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，适时地，这家公司会经历管理层的变更。恐怕我们无法改变这一点。（笑声）

But we do not — apart from making sure we’ve got good options and having some system in place, we are not obsessing about a future management yet.

不过，除了确保我们有好的选择并建立一些制度，我们还没有对未来的管理层过于执着。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. The directors —

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。董事会——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren plans to live almost indefinitely.

查理·芒格：沃伦计划几乎无限期地活下去。

WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：绝对是这样。（笑声）

Although I must say, at my last birthday somebody asked me how old I was. And I said, “Well, why don’t you just count the candles on the cake?” And he said he was driven back by the heat, so — (Laughter)

不过我得说，在我上次生日时，有人问我多大了。我说，“你为什么不数数蛋糕上的蜡烛？”他说，他被蜡烛的热量吓退了。（笑声）

But we’re not going to leave willingly.

但我们不会主动离开。

And we do — the directors know who — they have a letter that says who we think should be the ones to succeed us at both the operating aspect and the investment allocation aspect. And those letters can change over time as we keep hanging around.

董事会知道——他们有一封信，信中说明我们认为在运营和投资分配方面谁应该接替我们。随着我们继续在任，这些信件内容可能会变化。

But I don’t worry about the fact that 99 percent-plus of my estate will be in Berkshire Hathaway stock or that a foundation will eventually receive that stock. So it doesn’t bother me in the least. I can’t think of a place I’d rather have it.

但我并不担心我的遗产中超过99%是伯克希尔的股票，或者最终这些股票将由一个基金会继承。这一点也不会让我困扰。我想不出还有什么地方比这里更适合的。

And that includes my appraisal of the managers that we have who can step in and do what Charlie and I do. And who knows, one of them may even understand technology. (Laughter)

这包括我对我们现有管理者的评价，他们可以接手并做查理和我正在做的事情。谁知道呢，也许他们中有人甚至懂得科技。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think this place would have very respectable prospects if the top 25 managers all dropped dead at once.

查理·芒格：我认为，即使我们的前25位管理者同时去世，公司依然会有非常体面的前景。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s not an experiment we intended to pursue. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，那可不是我们打算进行的实验。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but I see no reason to think it wouldn’t continue to do quite well.

查理·芒格：是的，但我看不出有什么理由认为公司不会继续表现良好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

沃伦·巴菲特：对的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s been lovingly put together to have a certain margin of safety.

查理·芒格：它是精心设计的，拥有一定的安全边际。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. We actually — if we have a choice, it’s number three through 23, though — 25 — that we’re interested in. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：对的。实际上，如果我们可以选择的话，我们更关心的是从第三到第二十三位，或者第二十五位的管理者。（笑声）

52. “Honesty will only do so much for you”

“诚实只能带你走这么远”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 8, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第8区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is Raul from Walnut Creek, California.

观众提问者：我是来自加州沃尔纳特克里克的劳尔。

Thanks Mr. Buffett, thanks Mr. Munger, thanks for your great company. I wish I had known about it 10 years ago. You are not only the greatest but the most honest. I want to commit 99 percent of what I have to Berkshire Hathaway, and I will.

谢谢巴菲特先生，芒格先生，感谢你们的伟大公司。我真希望在十年前就知道它。你们不仅是最伟大的，也是最诚实的。我想把我99%的财富投入伯克希尔哈撒韦，并且我会这么做。

The question I want to ask is, how do you calculate the intrinsic value of the company? And based on intrinsic value, to me, Berkshire Hathaway looks a great bargain at these prices, especially based on look-through earnings. Is that true?

我想问的问题是，你们如何计算公司的内在价值？基于内在价值，对我来说，伯克希尔哈撒韦在当前价格看起来是一笔非常划算的交易，尤其是基于透视收益。这是真的吗？

And one last question I want to ask, just for fun. What do you think about telecom IPOs like Qwest, (inaudible)? They seem to pop up 50 percent at opening. Does it make any sense to invest in these? Thank you very much.

最后一个问题，纯属娱乐。你们如何看待像Qwest这样的电信IPO？它们似乎在开盘时就暴涨50%。投资这些是否有意义？非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to tackle that?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想回答这个问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t follow that all.

查理·芒格：我没有完全听懂。

Intrinsic value, we give you the facts and you make your own conclusions.

内在价值，我们提供事实，由你自己得出结论。

I like the fact that you think we’re honest, but, you know, if you people keep bidding up the price of our stock, honesty will only do so much for you in the future. (Laughter)

我很喜欢你觉得我们诚实这一点，但你知道，如果你们不断抬高我们的股价，未来诚实对你们的帮助可能也就到此为止了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve never been tested. I mean we’re very lucky. We’ve never had anything that we needed, really, that we haven’t had.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们从未被真正考验过。我是说，我们很幸运，我们从未缺少任何我们真正需要的东西。

And, you know, who knows what the situation would be if your family was starving or something? So our intention is to continue the position where we’ll never be tested, too, I might add.

你知道，如果你的家庭正在挨饿或发生类似情况，谁知道会是什么情形？所以我想补充说，我们的意图是继续保持这种从未被考验的状态。

53. Intrinsic value: “Easy to say and impossible to figure”

内在价值：“说起来容易，计算起来不可能”

WARREN BUFFETT: The intrinsic value question. I mean, by definition, intrinsic value is the present value of the stream of cash that’s going to be generated by any financial asset between now and doomsday.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于内在价值的问题。按定义，内在价值是从现在到世界末日，任何金融资产所能产生的现金流的现值。

And that’s easy to say and impossible to figure, but it’s the kind of thing that we’re looking at when we look at a Coca-Cola, where we think it’s much easier to evaluate the stream of cash that comes in the future than it is in a company such as Intel, marvelous as it may be. It’s easier for us. Andy Grove may be better at figuring out Intel than Coke.

说起来容易，计算起来却不可能。但这就是我们在评估像可口可乐这样的公司时所关注的方面。我们认为，评估可口可乐未来的现金流比评估像英特尔这样的公司要容易得多，尽管英特尔很出色。对我们来说更容易些。而安迪·格罗夫可能比我们更擅长评估英特尔，而不是可口可乐。

And in Berkshire, it is complicated by the fact that we have no business that naturally employs all of the capital that flows to us, so it is dependent, to some extent, on the opportunities available and the ingenuity used when that cash pours in, as it does.

在伯克希尔，这一问题更加复杂，因为我们没有任何业务可以自然地利用流向我们的全部资本。因此，这在某种程度上取决于当现金流入时，我们是否能找到合适的机会，以及我们如何巧妙地利用这些机会。

Some businesses have a natural use for the cash. Actually, Intel has a good natural use for the cash over time as they’ve expanded in their business. And many businesses do.

有些业务对现金有天然的用途。实际上，英特尔在其业务扩张过程中，对现金有良好的天然需求。许多企业都是如此。

But we do not have a natural use. We have some businesses that use significant amounts of cash. FlightSafety will buy a lot of — build a lot of simulators this year and they cost real money.

但我们并没有这种天然用途。我们有一些业务确实需要大量现金。今年，FlightSafety将购买并建造许多模拟器，这需要真金白银。

But in relation to the resources available, we have to come up with new uses, new ways to use cash. And that makes for a more difficult valuation job than if you’ve got — well, the classic case used to be a water or electric utility where the cash could be deployed and the return was more or less guaranteed within a narrow range, and it was very easy to make calculations then as to the expectable returns in the future.

但相对于我们可用的资源，我们必须找到新的用途、新的现金使用方式。这使得我们的估值工作比那些经典案例更困难，比如以前的水务或电力公司，现金可以被部署，并且回报在一个较小的范围内几乎是有保证的，因此很容易计算出未来的预期回报。

But that’s not the case at Berkshire. We’ve got very good businesses, both directly and partially owned. And those businesses are going to do well for a long, long time.

但伯克希尔并非如此。我们拥有非常好的业务，无论是直接控股还是部分持股。这些业务将在很长时间内表现出色。

But we do have new cash coming in all the time, and sometimes we have good ideas for that cash and sometimes we don’t. And that does make your job more difficult, in terms of computing intrinsic value.

但我们不断有新现金流入，有时我们有很好的想法来利用这些现金，有时却没有。这确实让计算内在价值变得更加困难。

We’ll have — yeah, we’re going to break after the next question. At that time — we break whenever Charlie and I run out of candy up here, actually. (Laughter)

我们会——是的，我们将在下一个问题后休息。实际上，每当查理和我吃完糖果，我们就会休息。（笑声）

We’re going to let everybody — you can get something to eat, if you want to stick around, and we will be here till 3:30 when we reconvene at 12:30.

大家可以去吃点东西，如果你想留下来，我们会一直在这里，直到下午3:30再次开会，中间在12:30继续。

And those of you who have been with us this morning and had enough, we thank you for being here this weekend. We’ve had a terrific time with you, so I’m very appreciative of that.

对那些今天上午陪伴我们、觉得已经足够的观众，我们感谢你们这个周末的到来。和你们共度的时光非常美好，我对此深表感激。

54. “Multiple models is the game” for Munger

芒格的“多模型方法论”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s have a question from zone 9 and then we’ll go to lunch.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们从第9区提一个问题，然后去午餐。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name’s Frank Gurvich (PH). I’m a shareholder from London, Ontario in Canada.

观众提问者：早上好，我叫弗兰克·古尔维奇（音），我是加拿大安大略省伦敦市的一名股东。

My question is for Mr. Munger, and it concerns his models. And the question specifically is related to market valuation. I know I’m not going to get a prediction. That’s not your bag.

我的问题是给芒格先生的，关于他的模型。这一问题具体涉及市场估值。我知道我不会得到一个预测，因为那不是你的风格。

What I’m curious about, is there any specific touchstone models that you reflect upon in trying to gain perspective at these markets where the historic valuations are quite high? And why do you draw on those models?

我很好奇，在面对历史估值较高的市场时，您是否有任何具体的参照模型来获得视角？您为什么使用这些模型？

And my second question is for Mr. Buffett and it relates to taxation. If you were able to trade your portion of your portfolio, at least, in a tax-exempt fashion, like 401(k) plans, or in Canada, the RSP plans, would you possibly trade more actively?

我的第二个问题是给巴菲特先生的，关于税收。如果您可以像美国的401(k)计划或加拿大的RSP计划那样，以免税的方式交易您的投资组合，您是否可能会进行更积极的交易？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to answer yours first?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想先回答你的问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, the Munger system for dealing with reality is to have multiple models in the head, and then run reality against multiple models.

查理·芒格：好的。芒格应对现实的方法是将多个模型放在脑海中，然后用这些模型与现实对照。

I think it’s a perfect disaster to look at reality through just one model or two. It’s —

我认为，仅通过一个或两个模型看待现实是完全的灾难。

There’s an old proverb that says, “To the man with only a hammer, every problem looks pretty much like a nail.” (Laughter)

有句古老的谚语说：“对于只有一把锤子的人来说，每个问题看起来都像一颗钉子。”（笑声）

And that is not our system. So I can’t sit here and run through all the models in my head, even though there aren’t that many. But multiple models is the game.

而这并不是我们的系统。所以即使我头脑中的模型并不多，我也无法坐在这里一一列举。但多模型才是关键。

55. Buffett: Taxes don’t bother me

巴菲特：税收不会困扰我

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about taxation. It would not — if we were running Berkshire absent a capital gains tax, I don’t think it would make much difference in what we do. I don’t think it would make — certainly it wouldn’t make a difference in causing us to trade actively.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于税收的问题。如果我们经营伯克希尔的时候没有资本利得税，我不认为这会对我们的行为产生太大的影响。当然，这不会促使我们更积极地进行交易。

We own the businesses we want to own. We don’t own them because taxes have restrained us from selling them.

我们拥有我们想要拥有的企业。我们持有它们不是因为税收限制了我们出售这些企业的行为。

And as I mentioned earlier, I’m fairly sure we’ll pay at least a billion dollars in income tax this year. We might not, but it looks that way to me, that we’ll pay a billion dollars.

正如我之前提到的，我很确定我们今年将至少支付10亿美元的所得税。虽然最终可能不一定，但目前看来，我们会支付大约10亿美元。

And I could do things that at least deferred, and perhaps — and I certainly could do things by doing nothing — that avoided paying that billion in tax, or a good bit of the billion, call it 800 million of the billion. But that is not a big factor with me. It’s never been a big deal with me.

我可以采取一些措施，至少延迟支付，甚至完全避免支付这10亿美元税款，或者很大一部分，比如8亿美元。但这对我来说并不是一个重要因素。这从来都不是一个大问题。

I paid my first income tax when I was 13, so I guess I got brainwashed at the time. And it doesn’t bother me a lot to be paying taxes. I think, net, personally, I’m under-taxed in relation to what the society has delivered to me, and, you know, I don’t send along any voluntary payments to I.R.S., I want you to understand. (Laughter)

我在13岁时就支付了第一笔所得税，所以我猜那时我的脑子就已经被洗礼了。支付税款对我来说并不是很困扰。我认为，从整体上看，个人而言，我所支付的税款相较于社会给予我的回报来说是偏低的。不过，我也想让你明白，我并不会主动向国税局缴纳额外的税款。（笑声）

But I really do. I mean, there’s nobody I want to trade places with because their tax situation is better than mine. So it would not increase the activity.

但我确实这样认为。我不会因为别人的税务情况比我好而想与他们交换位置。所以税收并不会促使我们更频繁地进行交易活动。

56. Looking for owners who love their business more than money

寻找那些热爱业务胜过金钱的企业主

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been asked to take one more question from zone 10. I’m not sure why, but maybe because they see that I still have candy up here. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我被要求从第10区再回答一个问题。我不知道为什么，可能是因为他们看到我这里还有糖果。（笑声）

So zone 10, please, and then we’ll break.

请第10区提问，然后我们休息。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Sanjiv Mirchandani, shareholder from Boston.

观众提问者：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我叫桑吉夫·米尔昌达尼，是来自波士顿的一名股东。

First of all, thank you to both of you for everything. I have two questions.

首先，感谢你们为我们所做的一切。我有两个问题。

For you, Mr. Buffett, you obviously have filters that you apply on selecting people as you do on stocks. Can you tell us a little bit about what those filters are?

巴菲特先生，显然您对挑选人和挑选股票都有一套筛选标准。您能否告诉我们一些关于这些筛选标准的情况？

WARREN BUFFETT: Filters on people?

沃伦·巴菲特：对人的筛选标准？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, in selecting — you have an ability to motivate people who have a lot of money to keep working. What do you look for to figure out who those people are?

观众提问者：是的，在挑选——您能够激励那些已经拥有大量财富的人继续工作。您如何判断这些人是谁？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a key, key question, because when we buy businesses we don’t have managers to put in them. I mean we are not buying them that way. We don’t have a lot of MBAs around the office that we’re —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是一个非常重要的问题，因为当我们购买企业时，我们并没有经理可以安插进去。我是说，我们并不是以这种方式购买企业的。我们办公室里没有很多MBA——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank God.

查理·芒格：谢天谢地。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

And, you know, I have not promised that they’re going to have all kinds of opportunities or anything.

而且，我并没有承诺他们会有各种机会或其他类似的东西。

So as a practical matter, we need management with the businesses that we buy. And three times out of four, thereabouts, the manager is the owner and is receiving tens of millions, maybe hundreds of millions of dollars. So they don’t have to work.

因此，实际上，我们需要那些企业现有的管理团队。而在大约四分之三的情况下，这些管理者就是企业的所有者，并且可能已经收到了数千万甚至上亿美元的回报，所以他们其实不需要再工作。

And we have to decide in that time when we meet them whether they love the business or love money. And we’re not making a moral judgment. Charlie may, but I’m not making a moral judgment about whether it’s better to love the business or love money, but it’s very important for me to know which of the two is the primary motivator with them.

我们必须在与他们见面的过程中决定，他们究竟是热爱这项业务还是热爱金钱。我们并不是在做道德评判。查理可能会，但我不会判断热爱业务还是热爱金钱更好。不过，对我来说，弄清楚哪一个是他们的主要动力非常重要。

And we have had extremely good luck in identifying people who love their business. And so all we have to do is avoid anything that, on our part, that diminishes that love of the business or makes other conditions so intolerable that they overcome that love of the business.

我们在识别那些热爱自己业务的人方面非常幸运。因此，我们所要做的就是避免我们自己做任何可能削弱他们对业务热爱的事情，或者制造其他难以忍受的条件，从而让他们对业务的热爱无法维持下去。

And we have a number of people working for us, they have no financial need to work at all. And they probably outwork, you know, 95 percent or more of the people in the world, and they do it because they just love smacking the ball. And we almost — we virtually had no mistakes in that respect.

我们有很多人为我们工作，他们完全没有经济上的需求继续工作。他们的工作努力程度可能超过世界上95%以上的人，他们这样做只是因为他们热爱击球的感觉。在这一点上，我们几乎没有犯过错误。

And we have identified a number of people, Charlie and I have, in terms of proposals to us, where we’ve felt that they did really — they liked the money better than the business. They were kind of tired of the business. You know?

查理和我在面对一些提案时发现，有些人确实更喜欢金钱胜过业务。他们对自己的业务感到有些厌倦。你明白我的意思吧？

And they might promise us that they would continue on and they would do it in good faith, but something would happen six months later or a year later and they’d say to themselves, “Why am I doing this, you know, for Berkshire Hathaway when I could be doing,” whatever else they want to do?

他们可能向我们承诺会继续下去，并且会真心实意地去做，但六个月或一年后，他们可能会问自己：“我为什么要为伯克希尔哈撒韦做这些，而不是去做自己想做的事情？”

I can’t tell you exactly how we — what filter it is that we put them through mentally, but I can tell you that if you’ve been around a while, you can — I think you can have a pretty high batting average in coming to those conclusions. As you can about other aspects of human behavior.

我无法确切告诉你我们用什么心理筛选器来判断，但如果你积累了足够的经验，我认为你在得出这些结论时的成功率会很高，就像判断其他方面的人类行为一样。

I’m not saying you can take a hundred people and take a look at them and analyze their personalities or anything of the sort. But I think when you see the extreme cases, the ones that are going to cause you nothing but trouble, or the ones that are going to bring you nothing but joy, I think you can identify those pretty well.

我不是说你可以看一百个人然后分析他们的性格或类似的东西。但我认为，当你看到那些极端的案例时，比如那些只会给你带来麻烦的人，或那些只会带给你欢乐的人，我认为你可以很好地识别出来。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, I think it’s pretty simple. You’ve got integrity, intelligence, and experience, and dedication. And that’s what human enterprises need to run well, and we’ve been very lucky in getting this marvelous group of associates to work with all these years.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这很简单。你需要诚信、智慧、经验和奉献精神。这是让人类企业运行良好的必要条件。而我们很幸运，能够在这些年里与这样一群了不起的合作伙伴共事。

It would be hard to do better, I think, than we’ve done on that respect.

在这方面，我认为我们已经做到极致，很难做得更好了。

Look around this place. I mean, and really, you young people look around this place. And look at how much gratification can come into these lives which have been mostly spent in deferring gratification. It’s a very funny group of people, you shareholders. (Laughter)

看看这个地方。我是说，年轻人们，真的看看这个地方。看看这些大部分时间都在推迟满足感的人生中能获得多少成就感。你们这些股东，真是一群有趣的人。（笑声）

Afternoon session

57. When is it time to buy a house?

什么时候是买房的合适时机？

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s settle down please and we’ll —

沃伦·巴菲特：请大家安静下来，我们来——

We’re going to go to — we skipped one last time so we’re going to go first to zone 4.

我们上次跳过了一个问题，所以这次我们先从第4区开始。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name’s Nelson Arata (PH), I’m from Southern California.

观众提问者：你好，我叫纳尔逊·阿拉塔（音），来自南加州。

And I have a question. It’s not really related to intrinsic value or any of that stock stuff, but more on — (laughter) — houses.

我有一个问题。这和内在价值或股票之类的内容无关，而是关于——（笑声）——房子的问题。

I’m still quite young, I don’t have a house yet and I’m thinking about buying a house someday soon. And in order to do that I’m going to have to put a down payment, which means I might have to sell my shares.

我还很年轻，目前还没有房子，但我想不久的将来会买一套房子。为了做到这一点，我需要支付首付款，这意味着我可能需要卖掉我的股票。

And I was wondering if you can provide some insight on when is the best time to buy a house and how much down payment — (laughter) — you should be putting down, in relation to interest rates and also in relation to available cash and the stock market.

我想知道，您是否可以提供一些建议，关于什么时候是买房的最佳时机，以及应该支付多少首付款——（笑声）——尤其是结合利率、可用现金以及股市的情况。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie’s going to give you an answer to that in a second. I’ll just relay one story, which was when I got married we did have about $10,000 starting off, and I told Susie, I said, “Now, you know, there’s two choices, it’s up to you. We can either buy a house, which will use up all my capital and clean me out, and it’ll be like a carpenter who’s had his tools taken away for him. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，查理稍后会给你一个答案。我先讲一个故事。当我结婚时，我们大约有1万美元的起始资金。我对苏茜说：“现在，有两个选择，由你决定。我们可以买一套房子，这会用光我的所有资本，把我彻底清空，这就像一个木匠失去了他的工具。（笑声）

“Or you can let me work on this and someday, who knows, maybe I’ll even buy a little bit larger house than would otherwise be the case.”

“或者，你可以让我继续努力工作，谁知道呢，将来或许我还能买一套比现在更大的房子。”

So she was very understanding on that point. And we waited until 1956. We got married in 1952.

她对此非常理解。我们等到了1956年才买房，而我们是1952年结婚的。

And I decided to buy a house when it was about — when the down payment was about 10 percent or so of my net worth, because I really felt I wanted to use the capital for other purposes. But that was a way different environment in terms of what was available to buy.

我决定买房是在首付款大约相当于我净资产的10%左右的时候，因为我真的觉得我想把这些资本用于其他用途。不过，当时的市场环境与现在可供购买的房产情况完全不同。

In effect, if you have the house you want to buy, you know, I definitely believe in just going out and probably getting the job done. But in effect, you’re probably making something in the area of a 7 or 8 percent investment, implicitly, when you do it. So you know, you’ll have to figure out your own equation from that.

实际上，如果你有你想买的房子，我绝对建议你直接去做，可能就把这件事办了。但本质上，当你这么做时，你可能在隐含地进行7%到8%左右的投资。所以你需要根据这个情况计算自己的方程。

Charlie probably has better advice on that. He’s a big homeowner — (laughter) — in both senses of the word.

查理可能对此有更好的建议。他是个“大房主”——（笑声）——无论从哪个角度来说都是如此。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the time to buy a house is when you need one. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为买房的时机就是你需要一套房子的时候。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And when do you need one?

沃伦·巴菲特：那你什么时候需要一套房子？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have very old-fashioned ideas on that, too. The single people, I don’t care if they ever get a house. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我对此也有非常传统的看法。对于单身人士，我不在乎他们是否需要买房。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: When do you need one if you’re married, Charlie? I’ll follow up for the — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你结婚了，什么时候需要买房，查理？我接着问这个——（笑声）

You need one when your wife wants one.

当你的妻子想要一套房子的时候，你就需要了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yes. (Laughter) I think you’ve got that exactly right. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，是的。（笑声）我认为你完全说对了。（笑声）

VOICE: Mr. Buffett?

声音：巴菲特先生？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

VOICE: May I make an announcement?

声音：我可以做一个公告吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然可以。

VOICE: Gregory Crawford needs to go to the security office, please, for emergency message. Gregory Crawford to the security office for emergency message. Thank you.

声音：请格雷戈里·克劳福德前往安保办公室，有紧急消息。格雷戈里·克劳福德请前往安保办公室领取紧急消息。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, hope it isn’t a margin call. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，希望这不是补仓通知。（笑声）

58. Executive compensation: Buffett slams big money for mediocrity

高管薪酬：巴菲特抨击庸才拿高薪

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to zone 1, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来听第1区的问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Ralph Bedford (PH) from Phoenix, Arizona.

观众提问者：我是来自亚利桑那州凤凰城的拉尔夫·贝德福德（音）。

The question I’m going to ask does not pertain to Berkshire Hathaway, but I would appreciate it if you gentlemen, if you can, explain the justification and rationalization for the exorbitant salaries, bonuses, perks, directors’ fees, and other benefits that most public corporations are paying. (Applause)

我要问的问题与伯克希尔哈撒韦无关，但如果您能解释一下，大多数上市公司支付的高额薪资、奖金、福利、董事费和其他收益的合理性和理由，我将不胜感激。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say this. In my own view, the most exorbitant are not necessarily the biggest numbers. What really bothers me is when companies pay a lot of money for mediocrity, and that happens all too often.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想说的是，在我看来，最过分的并不一定是最大金额的薪酬。真正让我困扰的是，当公司为庸才支付大笔薪水时，而这太常见了。

But we have no quarrel in our subsidiaries, for example, for paying a lot of money for outstanding performance. I mean, we get it back 10 or 20 or 50-for-1.

但我们对旗下子公司支付高额薪酬以奖励杰出表现并无异议。我的意思是，我们能以10倍、20倍甚至50倍的回报收回这些投入。

And similarly in public companies, we think that there have been managers — in our managers — who have taken companies to many, many, many billions of market value more than would’ve happened with virtually anyone else.

同样在上市公司中，我们认为有一些管理者——包括我们的管理者——让公司的市值增加了数十亿，而这几乎是其他任何人都无法做到的。

And they sometimes take a lot of money for that. Sometimes, as in the case of Tom Murphy at Cap Cities, you know, it just didn’t make a difference to him.

为此，他们有时会获得大量薪酬。但有时，比如Cap Cities的汤姆·墨菲，他根本不在意这些。

I mean, he performed in a way that would justify — would have justified huge sums, but it wasn’t — he would tell you that he had all the money he needed and he just didn’t care to take what the market might bear.

我的意思是，他的表现足以证明他值得拿巨额薪酬，但他会告诉你，他已经有了足够的钱，他不在意拿市场可能承受的高额回报。

But I am bothered by irrational pay systems. And I’m particularly bothered when average managers take really large sums.

但我对非理性的薪酬体系感到困扰。尤其当普通的管理者拿到高额薪酬时，这让我尤为不安。

I’m bothered when they design, or have designed for them, systems that are very costly to the company — maybe partly to make themselves look good because they want huge options themselves, so they feel if they give options widely throughout the company — so they design a system that is illogical company-wide because they want one that’s illogical for them personally.

我很反感当他们设计，或为他们设计的薪酬体系对公司成本极高——可能部分原因是为了让自己看起来很好，因为他们想要巨额期权，所以他们觉得如果给公司全员发放期权，就可以合理化自己的高额期权。这种个人不合理的需求最终导致了公司范围内的不合理制度。

But large sums, per se, don’t bother me. I’m not saying, you know, whether any individual should — might want to take them or not. But I do not mind paying a lot of money for performance.

但单纯的大额薪酬并不会困扰我。我并不是说某个人是否应该拿这些薪酬或想拿这些薪酬。而是我不介意为优秀的业绩支付高薪酬。

It’s done in athletics, it’s done in entertainment, but in business the people who are the .200 hitters and the people who would not attract a crowd as an entertainer have worked it out so that — I mean, the system has evolved in such a way that — many of them take huge sums. And I think that’s obscene, but I can tell you, there isn’t much you can do about it.

在体育和娱乐领域，这是可以接受的，但在商业领域，那些表现平庸的人——比如击球率只有0.200的选手，或者那些不会吸引观众的表演者——却能设计出一种体系，让他们拿到巨额薪酬。我认为这是荒唐的，但我可以告诉你，这几乎无能为力。

The system feeds on itself. And companies do look at other companies’ proxy statements, every CEO does. And they say, “Well, if Joe Smith is worth X I have to be worth more.” And they tell the directors that, “Certainly you wouldn’t be hiring anybody that was below average, so how can you pay me below average?” And the consultants come in and ratchet up the rewards.

这个体系是自我强化的。公司会查看其他公司的委托书，每个CEO都会这样做。他们会说：“如果乔·史密斯值X，那么我一定要值更多。”然后他们对董事们说：“你肯定不会雇佣一个低于平均水平的人，所以你怎么能给我低于平均水平的薪水？”接着咨询公司介入，将薪酬水平再一步步抬高。

And it’s not anything that’s going to go away. It’s like we were talking about campaign finance reform earlier. The people who have their hands on the switch are the beneficiaries of the system. And it’s very hard to change the system when the guy whose hand is on the switch is benefitting enormously, and perhaps disproportionately, from that system.

这并不是会自动消失的问题。就像我们早些时候谈论的竞选财务改革一样，掌控开关的人是系统的受益者。当掌控开关的人从这个系统中获得了巨大利益，甚至是不成比例的利益时，想要改变这个系统是非常困难的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well yeah, I’d like to report that the original Vanderbilt behaved even better than the people at Berkshire Hathaway. He didn’t take any salary at all. He thought it was beneath him as a significant shareholder to take a salary. That ideal, I’m afraid, died with him. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我想提到的是，第一代范德比尔特的行为比伯克希尔哈撒韦的人更好。他完全不拿薪水。他认为，作为一个重要股东，领取薪水是有失身份的。我恐怕这种理想也随着他一起消逝了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I — our directors are paid $900 a year, but I tell them on an hourly basis they’re making a fortune because we don’t work them that hard. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我——我们的董事每年薪酬是900美元，但我告诉他们，从每小时薪资来看，他们赚大了，因为我们对他们的要求并不高。（笑声）

But Charlie and I did not think through, when we established that $900 a year, is that they set our salaries, too, so — (Laughter)

但查理和我在设定每年900美元薪酬时并没有想到，他们还要设定我们的薪资，所以——（笑声）

We have not followed the standard procedure, which is to load it on the directors, and the directors shall load it on you.

我们并没有遵循那种标准流程，也就是由董事们去抬高你的薪资，而你再去推动董事们的薪资。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I do think it will have pernicious effects for the country in its entirety as this thing keeps escalating, because I think you’re getting a widespread perception that at the very top, corporate salaries in America are too high. And that is not a good thing for a civilization, when the leaders are regarded as not dealing fairly with the institutions that they head.

查理·芒格：我确实认为，如果这种趋势继续加剧，这会对整个国家产生有害影响，因为我认为，越来越多人普遍认为，美国公司高层的薪资水平过高。当领导者被认为没有公平对待他们所领导的机构时，这对一个文明社会来说是不好的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果——（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And as for the corporation consultants who advise on salaries, all I can say is that prostitution would be a step up for them. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：至于那些给企业提供薪酬咨询的顾问，我只能说：做妓女对他们而言都是一种升级。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Put him down as undecided. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：把他记作“还没想好”。（笑声）

59. Class B stock “worked out as well as possible”

B类股票“尽可能实现了目标”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone two, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第2区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Dan Blum (PH), from Seattle, Washington via Cambridge, Massachusetts.

观众提问者：我是丹·布鲁姆（音），来自华盛顿州西雅图，目前住在马萨诸塞州剑桥。

I want to ask whether the issuance of Class B stock has achieved the objective which you announced for it, when it was created.

我想问一下，当初宣布发行B类股票时设定的目标是否已经实现？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say this, that considering the alternatives we faced, which was the imminence of unit trusts that would’ve been promoted with heavy front-end commissions, with substantial annual fees, with bad tax consequences, and with, probably, a misrepresentation of the historical record in such a way that people who really didn’t know much about securities would’ve been enticed in — with that as an alternative I think the B stock was the best thing we could’ve done, and I feel good about how it’s worked out.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说，考虑到我们当时面临的其他选择——比如即将出现的单位信托基金，这些基金通常伴随着高额的前端佣金、可观的年费、不利的税务后果，以及可能对历史记录的误导性陈述，从而吸引对证券了解不多的人参与进来——相比之下，我认为发行B类股票是我们能做的最好选择。我对它的效果感到满意。

I think that, you know, we didn’t set out to issue it. We don’t like talking anybody into buying our stock. But I don’t think in any way that the group we have here is diminished in the least by having a mix of B and A shareholders, as opposed to A only.

我认为，我们并不是一开始就计划发行B类股票。我们并不喜欢劝别人买我们的股票。但我并不认为，股东群体因为A股和B股的混合而受到任何影响，相比于只有A股股东的情况。

The B has worked out as well as possible. I hope that, you know, we haven’t enticed anybody in with unreasonable expectations. That’s the biggest thing that Charlie and I worry about. And it’s hard not to have that happen with the historical record. I know it would’ve happened in a big way with the unit trust.

B类股票尽可能地实现了目标。我希望，我们没有让任何人抱着不合理的预期参与进来。这是查理和我最担心的事情。考虑到历史业绩，这种情况很难完全避免。我知道，如果是单位信托基金，这种问题肯定会大规模出现。

So, you know, it’s like making the mistake originally of starting with Berkshire, I think. We enjoy things as they come along and we’ve gotten a good group with the B shareholders, and we’re happy with the present situation.

所以，你知道，这有点像我们一开始买下伯克希尔时犯的错误。我认为，我们对事情的进展感到满意，我们拥有了一批优秀的B类股东群体，我们对目前的状况感到高兴。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we wanted to step hard on what we regarded as a disreputable financial scheme, and that we did. And — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我们想要严厉打击我们认为是不道德的金融计划，而我们确实做到了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And I think the way we sold the B was such as to not — as to attract the kind of people who really did look at it on a long-term basis. We did everything we could to discourage people who thought they were going to make a lot of money in a hurry.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为，我们销售B类股票的方式是为了吸引那些真正从长期角度看待投资的人。我们尽了一切努力来阻止那些想要快速赚大钱的人参与进来。

So I think we attracted a whole new group of shareholders who are quite similar in perspective to the shareholder group that we already had, and that was our hope.

所以，我认为我们吸引了一批全新的股东群体，他们的视角与我们原有的股东群体非常相似，这正是我们的期望。

60. Berkshire’s investing minimum

伯克希尔的投资门槛

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3, please?

沃伦·巴菲特：请第3区提问？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Alan Rank from Pittsburgh.

观众提问者：我是来自匹兹堡的艾伦·兰克。

I first want to thank Susan Jacques for returning the cocktail yesterday, and I hope she was rewarded with good sales at Borsheims.

首先，我想感谢苏珊·雅克昨天归还了鸡尾酒，我希望她在伯尔诗美（Borsheims）的销售中得到了良好的回报。

Question is regarding the fact that you don’t report details of anything under $750 million, and with the change of the values of small-cap in relation to large-cap, would that be something that Berkshire or individuals might try to look as opportunity with the small-cap premium shrinking, as it has?

我的问题是，鉴于您不报告7.5亿美元以下的细节，并且随着小市值与大市值之间价值差距的变化，伯克希尔或个人是否会将小市值溢价缩小视为机会？

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t worry about whether a stock is small-cap or large-cap except to the extent that by now we’ve gotten to a point where anything below a certain level just is not of interest to us because it can’t be material to our results, so —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们并不在意股票是小市值还是大市值，只是现在我们已经到了一个阶段，任何低于某个水平的投资对我们来说都没有吸引力，因为它对我们的业绩不会有实质性影响，所以——

We never think of opportunities as existing because something is small-cap, or sectors, or all that, you know, what generally gets merchandised.

我们从不认为因为某些东西是小市值、某个行业，或其他通常被推销的理由就存在机会。

So our cutoff point is set more or less at the point where we think it’s material. That’s not as defined by the SEC, we could have a higher limit.

因此，我们的投资门槛基本上设在我们认为有实质性意义的水平。这并不是由SEC（美国证券交易委员会）定义的，我们的门槛可以设得更高。

But we think when you get down below 2 percent of assets or thereabouts that the reporting of positions would not affect anybody’s calculation of intrinsic value or give them insights about the way we run the business, but it would be more for the people who were looking for things to piggyback on.

但我们认为，当投资规模低于资产的2%左右时，报告这些头寸并不会影响任何人对内在价值的计算，也不会让他们对我们经营业务的方式有更多了解，反而更像是为那些想要“搭便车”的人提供信息。

And so we will move the cutoff point up as we go along. Because of our size, we will never be in companies that have capitalizations that, you know, of a half a billion or a billion dollars, because we just can’t put enough money in it. Occasionally we’ll be in one just by accident.

因此，我们会随着发展将门槛提高。由于我们的规模，我们永远不会投资市值只有5亿或10亿美元的公司，因为我们无法投入足够多的资金。有时我们偶尔会意外参与这样的公司。

But we’re looking at things that we can put $500 million in ourselves, at least. At 500 million, a 5 percent position has a $10 billion market cap.

但我们会寻找那些我们至少能投入5亿美元的机会。以5亿美元计算，5%的持股比例意味着公司市值需要达到100亿美元。

That limitation has hurt, will hurt, is hurting, our performance to some degree. You would — if Berkshire were exactly 1/100th of its present size in all respects, owning the operating businesses it did but all 1/100th the size, our prospects would be better than they are with the kind of money we have presently.

这种限制在某种程度上确实损害了、正在损害，也将继续损害我们的业绩。如果伯克希尔在各个方面的规模都只有现在的1%，但仍然拥有同样的运营业务，我们的前景会比现在拥有这种规模资金的情况下更好。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么补充的。

61. “Sandy Weill is a very, very good manager”

“桑迪·威尔是一位非常非常优秀的经理人”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone four, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第4区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. My name is Tom Conrad (PH), I’m from McLean, Virginia.

观众提问者：我是汤姆·康拉德（音），来自弗吉尼亚州麦克莱恩。

I just wanted to first thank you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, for each year answering our questions. I found myself at 5 a.m. standing outside the door here, and I don’t do that for anyone. (Laughter)

首先，我想感谢巴菲特先生和芒格先生每年回答我们的提问。我今天早上5点就在门外排队，而我通常不会为任何人这样做。（笑声）

And it’s a real pleasure to hear your answers. I have two questions.

听到你们的回答真是一种享受。我有两个问题。

One is, with Travelers, the company Travelers, and their merger with Citibank, do you have confidence in the management of Sandy Weill?

第一，关于旅行者集团（Travelers）和花旗银行的合并，你们对桑迪·威尔的管理能力有信心吗？

My second question is, you said it in a few meetings ago that diversification is a protection against ignorance. And it only takes three great companies to be set for an investment lifetime. And I invested in those three companies: Coca-Cola, Gillette, and Disney.

第二，你在几次会议前曾说过，‘分散投资是对无知的一种保护。只需要找到三家出色的公司，就足够支撑你一生的投资。’于是我就把钱投到了这三家公司：可口可乐、吉列和迪士尼。

And I went ahead and invested in a fourth company without asking you. I invested in Pfizer. And I just wonder what you think about the pharmaceutical industry, if you feel there’s some great companies in that industry. Thank you very much.

然后，我没有征求你们的意见，就又投资了第四家公司——辉瑞。我想知道你们如何看待制药行业，你们是否认为这个行业中有一些伟大的公司。非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, A) we think Sandy Weill is a very, very good manager. Sandy is — I mean, the record is clear. It is not easy to manage in Wall Street, and Sandy has done an excellent job there as well as in other allied, or somewhat allied, fields. So his record is proven.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，首先，我们认为桑迪·威尔是一位非常非常优秀的经理人。桑迪——他的业绩是显而易见的。在华尔街管理并不容易，而桑迪在华尔街以及其他相关或类似领域都表现出色。所以他的能力是经得起验证的。

And he has been (inaudible) ever since buying Commercial Credit from Control Data. He’s built a terrific company.

自从他从Control Data手中购买Commercial Credit以来，他一直在努力建立一家出色的公司。

And he built a terrific company in businesses that themselves aren’t necessarily so terrific, so it’s required real management skill.

他在一些本身并不算特别出色的行业中建立了一家了不起的公司，这需要真正的管理能力。

62. Pharmaceutical stocks: “We stupidly blew that one”

制药股：“我们愚蠢地错过了”

WARREN BUFFETT: Pharmaceuticals, we missed. We would not have known how to pick out any single business, but we — single company — within the industry, but we certainly should’ve recognized — did recognize, didn’t do anything about it — that the industry as a whole represented a group that would achieve good returns on equity, and where some sort of a group purchase might’ve made sense.

沃伦·巴菲特：制药行业，我们错过了。我们无法判断如何挑选出行业中的任何一家单独的公司，但我们确实应该认识到——实际上我们也认识到了，但并没有采取行动——这个行业整体上是一个能够实现良好股本回报率的群体，进行某种形式的行业组合投资可能是有意义的。

We did buy one a while back, but we didn’t — it was peanuts. And it would of been — it was within our circle of competence to identify the industry as likely to enjoy very high profits over time. It would not have been within our circle of competence to try and pick a single company.

我们确实曾买过一家，但那只是一点点投资。我们确实有能力识别出这个行业可能会随着时间获得非常高的利润，但尝试挑选单个公司并不在我们的能力范围之内。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we stupidly blew that one. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我们愚蠢地错过了这个机会。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll blow more, too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们以后还会错过更多的机会。（笑声）

63. Decentralization “just short of total abdication”

分权管理：“仅差一步到完全放权”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone five.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第5区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir. Good afternoon. My name is Matt Lovejoy from Lexington, Kentucky. And gladly, I’m not a consultant. (Laughter)

观众提问者：下午好，我是马特·洛夫乔伊（音），来自肯塔基州列克星敦。很高兴，我不是顾问。（笑声）

I have a question, sir, Mr. Buffett, about your operating management style. In my opinion, the mainstream media minimizes the significance of your nonpublic operating investments.

巴菲特先生，我想问一个关于您运营管理风格的问题。在我看来，主流媒体低估了您非上市运营投资的重要性。

When you consider capital allocation in these companies, do you have the managers submit annual business plans? And if so, do you formally meet with those managers to see how well you can track progress against those plans?

在这些公司进行资本分配时，您是否要求管理者提交年度业务计划？如果是，您是否正式与这些管理者会面，以跟踪他们对计划的执行进展？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s a good question. And the answer is that we may meet with some of them annually, we may meet with others semiannually, but we have no formal system whatsoever, and we will never have a formal system. We don’t demand any meetings of any of our managers. We have no operating plan submitted to headquarters.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是一个好问题。答案是，我们可能会与一些人每年会面一次，也可能与另一些人每半年会面一次，但我们完全没有任何正式的系统，也永远不会有。我们不要求任何管理者召开会议，也没有要求他们向总部提交运营计划。

Some of the companies use operating plans themselves, some of them don’t. They are all run by people who have terrific records, and they have different batting styles. And we’re not about to tinker with somebody that’s batting with .375 just because somebody else holds the bat a little differently or uses a different weight bat, or something of the sort.

有些公司会自己使用运营计划，有些公司则不会。它们都由有着出色业绩的人管理，而他们的管理风格各不相同。我们不会因为某人持球棒的方式与别人不同，或用的球棒重量不同，就去干涉一个打击率是.375的人。

So we believe in letting them do, currently and in the future, what has been successful for them in the past.

因此，我们相信，让他们继续沿用过去让他们成功的方法，无论现在还是未来。

And different people have very different styles. I’ve got my own style, you know?

不同的人有非常不同的风格。我自己也有我的风格，对吧？

But we have managers that like to talk things over, we have other managers that like to go their own way. And we have managers that have a by-the-book approach which works well, we have other managers who wouldn’t dream of that. We have managers that — most managers probably have monthly statements of financials. We have other managers that don’t.

但我们有喜欢讨论事情的经理，也有喜欢按自己的方式行事的经理。有些经理按规章办事，而且效果很好；另一些经理可能从来不这样想。大多数经理可能会有月度财务报表，而另一些经理则没有。

And that really isn’t a problem. What we want to have is good managers, and there’s more than one way to get to, at least, business heaven, and we have a number that have found different ways to get there.

这并不是问题。我们希望拥有的是优秀的管理者，而通往商业天堂的道路不止一条，而我们有很多人找到了不同的方式到达那里。

So we have never imposed — we have certain requirements because we’re a public company, and SEC requirements, and International Revenue Service coordination.

我们从未强加任何要求——除了作为一家上市公司需要满足的某些要求，例如SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的规定以及与国际税务服务的协调。

But we’ve never imposed anything from the top on any of the operating managements.

但我们从未向任何运营管理层强加来自上层的要求。

We have MBAs running companies, we have people who never saw a business school. And talent is the scarce commodity, and when you find talent and they’ve got their own way of doing things, we let it — we’re delighted to have them do it. More than letting them do it — we want them to do it their way. We don’t want to change them.

我们有MBA在管理公司，也有从未踏入过商学院的人才在管理公司。人才是一种稀缺资源，当我们发现一个人才，并且他们有自己的方式去做事时，我们不仅允许他们这样做——更重要的是，我们希望他们按照自己的方式去做。我们不想改变他们。

Charlie?

查理?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the truth of the matter is that we have decentralized power in the operating businesses to a point just short of total abdication. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，事实是，我们已经将运营业务的权力分权到了几乎完全放权的地步。（笑声）

And we don’t think our system is right for everybody. It has suited us and the kind of people that have joined us. But we don’t have criticism for other people, like Emerson Electric or something, who have operating plans, and compare performance quarterly against plan and all that sort of thing. It’s just not our style.

我们不认为我们的体系适合所有人。它适合我们，也适合加入我们的那些人。但对于像艾默生电气这样的公司，我们没有批评，他们有运营计划，每季度将业绩与计划进行对比等等。这只是我们的风格不同。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we centralize money and — (laughs) — everything else we decentralize, pretty much, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们集中管理资金——（笑声）——而其他几乎所有事情都分散管理，但是——

I don’t know whether you’ve met him here, but for example, Al Ueltschi is here. He started FlightSafety in 1951 and he’s — I don’t know what he’ll spend on simulators this year, but it could easily be a hundred million dollars or thereabouts.

我不知道你是否在这里见过他，例如，Al Ueltschi 在这里。他在1951年创立了FlightSafety，我不知道他今年会在模拟器上花多少钱，但很可能轻松达到1亿美元左右。

And he — if I spent hours with him, I couldn’t add 1/100th of 1 percent to his knowledge of how to allocate that money. It would be ridiculous. It’d be a waste of his time and it would be an act of arrogance on my part. And I have no worries about how Al allocates the money. And that’s an unusually capital intensive business compared to most of our businesses.

如果我花几个小时和他讨论，我对他如何分配资金的知识增加不到万分之一。这会很荒谬，不仅浪费他的时间，也会显得我非常傲慢。而且，我对Al如何分配资金完全不担心。与我们大多数业务相比，这是一项资本密集度异常高的业务。

There’s some that I get into the details more because I just worked with the person that’s running things a long time and we kind of enjoy it.

有些业务，我会更深入地了解细节，因为我和负责这些业务的人合作时间长了，我们都挺享受这种过程。

Ajit and I talk virtually every night about the reinsurance business. You know, I am not improving the quality of his decisions at all, but it’s an interesting game and I like hearing about it, and he doesn’t mind talking about it, so we talk them over. But that’s just a matter of personal chemistry.

Ajit 和我几乎每天晚上都会讨论再保险业务。你知道，我对他的决策质量没有任何提升，但这是一个有趣的游戏，我喜欢听他说，而他也不介意谈论这些，所以我们会讨论。这纯粹是个人之间的化学反应。

And as we add managers, we will adapt to them. We adapt our accounting systems, to a degree, to them. Now, we do have certain requirements that result from the SEC and IRS. But we don’t — our managers know their businesses and they know how to run them.

随着我们增加管理人员，我们会适应他们。我们会在一定程度上调整我们的会计系统以适应他们。当然，SEC和IRS的某些要求是我们必须遵守的。但我们不会——我们的管理者了解自己的业务，也知道如何管理它们。

And if they don’t — this hasn’t been the case — but if they didn’t, we would, you know, we’d do something about the manager, we wouldn’t try and build a bunch of systems.

如果他们不懂——虽然这还从未发生过——但如果他们不懂，我们会处理管理者的问题，而不会试图建立一堆系统。

64. Avoid the “Frozen Corporation”

避免“冻结的公司”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第6区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. My name is George Donner from Fort Wayne, Indiana.

观众提问者：下午好，先生们。我是乔治·多纳，来自印第安纳州韦恩堡。

My question has to do with estimating the intrinsic value of a company, in particular the capital-intensive companies like you were mentioning. I’m thinking of things like McDonald’s and Walgreens, but there are lots of others where you have a very healthy and growing operating cash flow, but it’s marginally or completely offset by heavy expenditures on putting up new stores or restaurants, or building a new plant.

我的问题与评估公司的内在价值有关，特别是您提到的资本密集型公司。我想到的是像麦当劳和沃尔格林这样的公司，还有许多类似的公司，它们拥有非常健康且不断增长的经营现金流，但这些现金流却被用于新开店、新餐馆或建新厂房的大量支出部分或完全抵消。

And so my question is, what do you do for your estimate of future free cash flow? And with Treasurys around — long Treasurys around 6 percent — at what rate do you discount those cash flows?

所以我的问题是，您是如何估算未来的自由现金流的？当长期国债收益率大约在6%左右时，您会以什么折现率来折算这些现金流？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we discount at the long rate just to have a standard of measurement across all businesses. But we would take the company that is spending the money as it comes in, and they don’t get credit for gross cash flow, they get credit for whatever net cash is left every year.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们以长期利率作为折现率，只是为了对所有企业采用一个统一的衡量标准。但对于那些随着收入进来就花掉资金的公司，我们不会依据总现金流给出价值，而是依据每年剩余的净现金流。

But of course, if they’re spending the money wisely, even though you have to discount it for more years, the growth in cash development should offset that or they weren’t investing it wisely.

当然，如果他们将资金用在明智的投资上，即使需要折现更多的年份，现金增长所带来的收益应该能弥补这种支出，否则说明他们的投资并不明智。

The best business is one that gives you more and more money every year without putting up anything to get it, or very little. And we’ve got some businesses like that.

最好的生意是每年给你越来越多的钱，而你几乎不需要投入额外的资金来实现这些收益。我们有一些这样的公司。

The second-best business is a business that also gives you more and more money. It takes more money, but the rate at which you invest — reinvest — the money to get that growth is a very satisfactory rate.

第二好的生意是同样每年给你更多的钱，但需要投入更多资金。然而，这些资金再投资所获得的增长率是非常令人满意的。

The worst business of all is the one that grows a lot, and where you’re forced — forced, in effect — forced to grow to stay in the game at all, and where you’re reinvesting the capital at a very low rate of return. And sometimes people are in those businesses without knowing about it.

最糟糕的生意是那种增长很快，但实际上你被迫投入资金来维持竞争力，而这些资金的再投资回报率却非常低。有时，人们进入这样的业务而毫不知情。

But in terms of discounting, in terms of calculating intrinsic value, you look at the cash that is expected to be generated and you discount back at — in our case, we use the long-term Treasury rate. That doesn’t mean that you pay the amount that that present value calculation leads to, but it means that you use that as a common yardstick, that Treasury rate.

至于折现和计算内在价值，我们会根据预计产生的现金流并使用长期国债利率进行折现。这并不意味着你就要支付折现计算得出的现值金额，而是将国债利率作为一个统一的衡量标准。

And that means that if somebody is reinvesting all their cash flow the next five years, they’d better have some very big figures coming in down the road. Because at some day, a financial asset has to give you back cash to justify you laying out cash for it now.

这也意味着，如果某家公司未来五年将所有现金流再投资，那么之后必须要有巨大的现金流回报才行。因为任何金融资产最终必须返还现金，才能证明你现在的现金投入是合理的。

Investing is the art, essentially, of laying out cash now to get a whole lot more cash later on, and something at some point better deliver cash.

投资本质上是现在支付现金以期未来获得更多现金的艺术，而任何资产在某个时刻必须回报现金。

Ben Graham in his class, we used to talk about what he called the Frozen Corporation. And the Frozen Corporation was a company whose charter prohibited it from ever paying anything to its owners, or ever being liquidated, or ever being sold and —

本·格雷厄姆在他的课堂上曾谈到他所称的“冻结的公司”。这种公司章程规定禁止向所有者支付任何款项，也不允许清算或出售。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sort of like a Hollywood producer. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：有点像好莱坞的制片人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And the question was, what was such an enterprise worth? Well, that’s sort of a theoretical question, but it forces you to think about the realities of what business is all about. And business is all about putting out money today to get back more money later on.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。问题是这样的企业值多少钱？这虽然是个理论问题，但它迫使你思考商业的本质。而商业的本质是今天投入资金，未来获得更多回报。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I do think there is an interesting problem that you raise, because I think there is a class of businesses where the eventual cash back part of the equation tends to be an illusion. I think there are businesses where you just keep pouring it in and pouring it in, and then all of a sudden it doesn’t work, and no cash comes back.

查理·芒格：我确实认为你提到的这个问题很有趣，因为我觉得有一类企业，最终的现金回报往往是种幻觉。这些企业需要你持续投入，直到某一天突然无法运作，再也没有现金回来了。

And what makes our life interesting is trying to avoid those and get in the alternative kind that drowns you in cash. (Laughter)

让我们的生活变得有趣的地方在于，我们努力避免这些企业，选择另一种“用现金淹没你”的企业。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: The one figure we regard as utter nonsense is the so-called EBITDA. I mean, the idea of looking at a figure before the cash requirements and merely staying in the same place — and there usually are — any business with significant fixed assets almost always has with it a concomitant requirement that major cash be reinvested in order simply to stay in the same place competitively and in terms of unit sales — to look at some figure that is before — that is stated before those cash requirements, is absolute folly and it’s been misused by lots of people to sell lots of merchandise in recent years.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们认为完全荒谬的一个指标就是所谓的 EBITDA（税息折旧及摊销前利润）。它忽视了现金需求，而实际上任何拥有大量固定资产的企业，几乎都需要大量现金再投资，仅仅是为了保持竞争力和销量不下滑。而看 EBITDA 这种未扣除这些现金需求的指标，是绝对愚蠢的，但近年来很多人用它来误导并卖掉大量商品。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not to the credit of the investment banking fraternity that it has learned to speak in terms of EBITDA. I mean, the idea of using a measure that you know is nonsense, and then piling additional reasoning on that false assumption, it’s not creditable intellectual performance. And then once everybody is talking in terms of nonsense, why, it gets to be standard. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：投资银行行业将 EBITDA 奉为准则并不光彩。明知道这是个荒谬的指标，还以此为基础进行额外推理，这是不值得称道的智力表现。一旦所有人都开始用荒谬的逻辑说话，这种荒谬就变成了标准。（笑声）

65. Checklist for selecting stocks

选股清单

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第7区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Brennan Vecchio (PH) and I’m in the Academy of Finance at Northwest High School in Omaha.

观众提问：您好，我叫布伦南·韦基奥（音），来自奥马哈西北高中的金融学院。

Could you explain the criteria you look at when selecting your stocks?

您能解释一下您选股时考虑的标准吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we look at — I’m glad you came. I hope there’s a large group. I got a note, I think from your teacher, on that. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们会看——很高兴你能来。我希望你们有一个大团队。我想我收到了你老师写的便条。（掌声）

We look at it — the criteria for selecting a stock is really the criteria for looking at a business. We are looking for a business we can understand. That means they sell a product that we think we understand, or we understand the nature of the competition, what could go wrong with it over time.

我们看的是——选股的标准实际上就是看一家企业的标准。我们寻找的是我们能够理解的业务。这意味着他们销售的产品是我们认为能够理解的，或者我们能够理解竞争的本质以及随着时间推移可能会出现的问题。

And then when we find that business we try to figure out whether the economics of it means the earning power over the next five, or 10, or 15 years is likely to be good and getting better or poor and getting worse. But we try to evaluate that future stream.

接着，当我们找到这样的业务时，我们会试图弄清它的经济状况是否意味着未来五年、十年或十五年的盈利能力可能会很好并不断改善，还是会不好并逐渐恶化。我们努力评估这个未来的收益流。

And then we try to decide whether we’re getting in with some people that we feel comfortable being in with.

然后我们会决定是否与我们感到放心的一些人合作。

And then we try to decide what’s an appropriate price for what we’ve seen up to that point.

接着，我们会尝试确定一个适当的价格，基于我们到那时为止所看到的情况。

And as I said last year, what we do is simple but not necessarily easy.

正如我去年所说，我们所做的事情很简单，但不一定容易。

The checklist that is going through our mind is not very complicated. Knowing what you don’t know is important, and sometimes that’s not easy. And knowing the future is definitely — it’s impossible in many cases, in our view, and it’s difficult in others. And sometimes it’s relatively easy, and we’re looking for the ones that are relatively easy.

我们脑海中形成的清单并不复杂。知道自己不知道什么很重要，而有时这并不容易。而且了解未来在我们看来绝大多数情况下是不可能的，在其他情况下则很困难。有时会相对容易，而我们寻找的是那些相对容易的机会。

And then when you get all through you have to find it at a price that’s interesting to you, and that’s very difficult for us now. Although there have been periods in the past where it’s been a total cinch.

在完成所有这些之后，你还必须找到一个对你来说有吸引力的价格。而现在这对我们来说非常困难，尽管在过去有些时期，这完全是轻而易举的。

And that’s what goes through our mind. If you were thinking of buying a service station, or a dry cleaning establishment, or a convenience store in Omaha to invest your life savings in and run as a business, you’d think about the same sort of things.

这就是我们脑海中考虑的内容。如果你打算在奥马哈购买一个加油站、干洗店或便利店，用你的毕生积蓄进行投资并运营它，你也会考虑同样的事情。

You’d think about the competitive position and what it would look like five or 10 years from now, and how you were going to run it, and who was going to run it for you, and how much you had to pay.

你会考虑竞争地位、五年或十年后的发展前景，以及你将如何运营它、谁来替你管理它以及需要支付多少费用。

And that’s exactly what we think of when we look at a stock, because the stock is nothing other than a piece of a business.

而这正是我们看待股票时所考虑的，因为股票不过是一部分企业的所有权而已。

Charlie?

查理？

66. Easy decision case study: National Cash Register

简单决策案例研究：National Cash Register

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. If finance were — when finance is properly taught, it should be taught from cases where the investment decision is easy.

查理·芒格：是的。如果金融学能够——在金融学被正确教授的时候，应该从那些投资决策显而易见的案例开始教学。

And the one I always cite is the early history of National Cash Register Company, and that was created by a fanatic who bought all the patents, and had the best salesforce, and the best production plants. He was a very intelligent man and passionately dedicated to the cash register business.

而我总是引用的一个例子是National Cash Register Company的早期历史。这家公司是由一个狂热者创立的，他买下了所有的专利，拥有最好的销售团队和生产设施。他是一个非常聪明的人，对现金出纳机业务充满激情。

And of course, the cash register business was a godsend to retailing when cash registers were invented. So that was the pharmaceuticals of a former age.

当然，在现金出纳机被发明时，它对零售业来说简直是天赐之物。所以那就是那个时代的“制药行业”。

If you read an early annual report prepared by Patterson, who was CEO of National Cash Register, an idiot could see that this was a talented fanatic. Very favorably located, and that, therefore, the investment decision was easy.

如果你读过帕特森（Patterson）的早期年报，他是National Cash Register的首席执行官，哪怕是个笨蛋也能看出这是一个才华横溢的狂热者。他的位置极其有利，因此投资决策非常简单。

If I were teaching finance, I would collect a hundred cases like that. And that’s the way I would teach the students.

如果我教金融学，我会收集一百个这样的案例。这就是我教学生的方法。

WARREN BUFFETT: We have that annual report. What was that, 1904 or something, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有那份年报。那是什么时候的？1904年还是其他年份，查理？

But it’s really a classic report because Patterson not only tells you why his cash register is worth about 20 times what he’s selling for to people, but he also — (laughs) — tells you that you’re an idiot if you want to go in competition with him. It’s a classic.

但那真的是一份经典的年报，因为帕特森不仅告诉你为什么他的现金出纳机的价值是他卖给人们价格的20倍左右，他还——（笑）——告诉你，如果你想与他竞争，那你就是个傻瓜。这真的是经典。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It is just a (inaudible). But no intelligent person can read this report and not realize — (laughs) — that this guy can’t lose.

查理·芒格：这实在是……（听不清）。但没有一个聪明人读了这份报告后不会意识到——（笑）——这个家伙不可能失败。

67. “Norman Rockwell frame of mind”

“诺曼·洛克威尔式心态”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第8区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Robert Rowland (PH) from London, England.

观众提问：下午好。我叫罗伯特·罗兰（音），来自英国伦敦。

I’ve been in Omaha all weekend with my wife on the first leg of my honeymoon, and I’ve noticed you’re quite a buyer of nostalgic assets. Can I ask whether nostalgia is one of your filters? (Buffett laughs)

整个周末，我和妻子在奥马哈度蜜月的第一站。我注意到您似乎很喜欢收购怀旧性质的资产。我能问一下怀旧是否是您的一个筛选标准吗？（巴菲特笑）

Are there any assets like that left in the U.S. to buy? And if not, can I suggest you come to the U.K. where all we do is sell them? (Laughter)

美国还有这样的资产可供购买吗？如果没有，我能否建议您来英国？我们这边只负责出售这些东西（笑声）。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t want to interrupt your honeymoon. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不想打扰你的蜜月（笑声）。

But if you’d send me a list of those companies over there that are long on nostalgia, that might be to our liking. Because Charlie and I tend to operate from sort of a Norman Rockwell frame of mind. And it is true that the kind of companies we like sort of do have a homey, Norman Rockwell, Saturday Evening Post-type character to them.

但是，如果你能给我发一份那些充满怀旧色彩的公司名单，我们可能会感兴趣。因为查理和我确实有一种诺曼·洛克威尔式的心态。我们喜欢的公司确实带有一种温馨、诺曼·洛克威尔风格，或者《周六晚邮报》那种特质。

They have character. And they’re the kind of companies, I think, frequently, that people, when they join them, expect to spend the rest of their lives there rather than look at it as something to stick on their resume.

这些公司有自己的特色。我认为，它们通常是那种员工加入后希望在这里度过职业生涯，而不是将其仅作为简历上的一部分的公司。

苹果有足够清晰的文化，Google只招名牌大学的学生，文化上的不足很难改变了。

And there are businesses like that. If you look at the businesses that we’ve bought in the last three or four years, there is real character to the businesses and to the people that build them.

确实有这样的公司。如果你看看我们过去三四年收购的企业，它们的业务和建立这些企业的人都带有真正的特色。

And that’s why the people that build them stay on and feel very strongly about running them correctly, even though they have no financial consequence to themselves whatsoever, so —

这也是为什么这些企业的创始人会继续留下来，并且对正确运营企业抱有很强的责任感，即使这对他们个人的经济收益没有直接影响，——

If you’ve got a list of those in England and you still have any strength left after your honeymoon, drop me a line. (Laughter)

如果你在英国有这样的公司名单，并且蜜月后还精力充沛，可以给我写信（笑声）。

68. A and B shares are nearly equivalent investment choices

A股和B股几乎是等效的投资选择

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 9, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第9区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Joshua Andrews (PH) from Omaha Northwest High School, Academy of Finance.

观众提问：下午好。我是约书亚·安德鲁斯（音），来自奥马哈西北高中的金融学院。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good.

沃伦·巴菲特：很好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And on behalf of the Academy of Finance, we want to thank you for the tickets. There’s 33 of us in attendance today.

观众提问：代表金融学院的同学们，我们感谢您提供的门票。今天我们有33人到场。

WARREN BUFFETT: Terrific. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：太棒了。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We had the opportunity to play a national game, the Investment Challenge. And on the list of the stocks there were BRK A and BRK B. Can you explain what the difference of the two stocks are?

观众提问：我们有机会参与一个全国性的比赛，投资挑战赛。在股票列表中包括了BRK A和BRK B。您能解释一下这两种股票的区别吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the difference between the Berkshire A and B is simply that an A can be converted to a B at any time in the ratio of one A into 30 Bs. The B cannot be converted into the A, so it’s a one-way street on conversion.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，伯克希尔A股和B股的区别仅在于，A股可以随时按1股A股转为30股B股的比例进行转换。而B股不能转回A股，所以这是一条单向转换通道。

The economic value of the B is exactly 1/30th that of the A. So anytime the A ever gets any money of any kind from dividends, or liquidation, or a merger, or something of the sort, for every $30 that you get on the A you’re going to get $1 on the B.

B 股的经济价值恰好是 A 股的 1/30。因此，无论何时只要 A 股从股息、清算、并购或类似的事情中获得任何收益，A 股每获得 30 美元，你就能从 B 股获得 1 美元。

The two differences are that there is less voting power, proportionately, in the B. And the B does not participate in a designated-contributions program that Berkshire runs, simply because that would be very, very hard to administer. And when we issued the B we pointed out those two differences.

两者的区别还在于，B股的投票权比例较少。此外，B股不参与伯克希尔公司运行的指定贡献计划，因为管理起来非常困难。在发行B股时，我们就指出了这两点差异。

The B should never sell for more than 1/30th of the price of the A. When it sells just a tiny bit above that then arbitrage settles in as people buy the A and convert it to B, and sell the B. Occasionally the B may be at a slight discount to the A because it’s not convertible the other way.

B股的售价永远不应超过A股价格的1/30。当B股价格稍微高于这个比例时，会出现套利机会，人们会购买A股并将其转换为B股，然后卖出B股。偶尔B股的价格可能会低于A股的比例价格，因为它不能逆向转换为A股。

But I think as a practical matter you can treat the A and B as very equivalent investment choices. There’s not enough difference to make it significant.

但实际上，我认为你可以将A股和B股视为非常等效的投资选择。两者之间的差异不足以构成显著影响。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing further.

查理·芒格：没有补充。

69. How teenagers can prepare for the future

青少年如何为未来做好准备

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 10, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第10区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Sheena Cho (PH) from the Academy of Finance.

观众提问：我叫希娜·乔（音），来自金融学院。

What recommendations would you give us as teenagers to prepare for our future and become as successful as you? (Laughter)

您对我们青少年有哪些建议，可以帮助我们为未来做好准备并像您一样成功？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you’re interested in business, I definitely think you ought to learn all the accounting you can by the time you’re in your early 20s. Accounting is the language of business.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果你对商业感兴趣，我绝对认为你应该在20岁出头之前尽可能多地学习会计。会计是商业的语言。

Now, that doesn’t mean it’s a perfect language, so you have to know the limitations of that language, as well as all aspects of it. So I would advise you to learn accounting. And I would advise you to be — in terms of part-time employment or anything else, work at a number of businesses.

当然，这并不意味着它是完美的语言，所以你需要了解这种语言的局限性以及它的所有方面。因此，我建议你学习会计。同时，我建议你通过兼职或其他方式参与多种业务工作。

There’s nothing like seeing how business operates to build your judgment in the future about businesses. You know, when you understand what kind of things are very competitive, and what kind of things are less competitive, and why that works that way, all of that adds to your knowledge.

没有什么比亲眼观察业务运作更能帮助你在未来建立对企业的判断力。你知道，当你理解哪些领域竞争激烈，哪些领域竞争较少，以及其中的原因时，这些都会丰富你的知识。

So I would do a lot of reading. If you’re interested in investments, I would — A, I would take the accounting courses.

因此，我会建议你多读书。如果你对投资感兴趣，我会首先建议你参加会计课程。

I’d do a lot of reading about investments and I would get as much business experience. I would talk business with people that are in business to find out what they think makes their operation tick, or where they have problems and why. I just think you just kind of sop it up every place that you can.

我会阅读大量与投资相关的书籍，并尽可能多地积累商业经验。我会与从事商业的人交谈，了解他们认为是什么让他们的业务运转，或者他们遇到的问题在哪里以及为什么。我认为你应该尽可能多地汲取这些知识。

And if it turns you on, you’ll do well in it. I mean, I think that, you know, certain activities grab different people. But if business is of interest to you, my guess is you’ll do well.

如果你对这件事情感兴趣，你就会在其中表现出色。我认为，不同的活动会吸引不同的人。但如果你对商业感兴趣，我猜测你会干得不错。

And if you understand business you understand investments. Investments are simply business decisions in terms of capital allocation. I wish you well on it.

如果你理解商业，你也就理解了投资。投资不过是关于资本配置的商业决策。我祝你一切顺利。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there’s also the little matter of underspending your income year after year after year.

查理·芒格：是的，还有一件小事，就是年复一年地花费少于你的收入。

WARREN BUFFETT: Which we have mastered. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是我们已经掌握的技能（笑声）。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. That really works if you keep at it.

查理·芒格：是的。如果你坚持下去，这确实管用。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I mean, Charlie and I both — Charlie started having children at a rapid rate, so — and he was a lawyer when there was not big money in then.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我是说，查理和我都经历过——查理很快就开始有了孩子，而且那时他还是一名律师，当时律师并没有赚很多钱。

But, I was — any money you save before you get out and start having a family is probably — any dollar — is probably worth $10 later on simply because you can save it.

而我认为，在你独立生活并开始组建家庭之前存下的每一美元，未来可能值十美元，因为你可以把它存起来。

The time to save is young, and you’ll never have a better time to save than really, pre-formation of a family. Because the expenditures come along then whether you like them or not. So I —

储蓄的最佳时间是年轻的时候。在组建家庭之前，你再也找不到更好的储蓄机会了。因为无论你愿意与否，支出都会随之而来。所以我——

You know, work for yourself first and put the money aside. I was lucky that way, I didn’t have to pay for my own college. Probably wouldn’t have gone to college if I’d had to pay for it.

你知道，先为自己工作，把钱存起来。我在这方面很幸运，我不用为自己的大学学费买单。如果我必须自己支付学费，我可能不会上大学。

But I, you know, I was able to save everything I made in my teens and those dollars got magnified quite a bit.

但我能够把我十几岁时赚的每一分钱都存起来，那些钱最终得到了相当大的增值。

Whereas the money I — when I started first selling securities, I mean, the money I made then was taken up by family needs to quite an extent. So start saving early. A lot of it’s habit anyway, so it’s a great habit to have.

而当我刚开始卖证券时，我赚的钱有很大一部分都被家庭需求占用了。所以尽早开始储蓄。无论如何，储蓄在很大程度上是一种习惯，而这是一种值得拥有的好习惯。

70. “We are not reluctant to invest abroad”

“我们并不排斥海外投资”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 1, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第1区提问。

TONI: I’m Toni Ausnit (PH) from New York City, following up on the questioner from London.

托尼：我是托尼·奥斯尼特（音），来自纽约市，接着上一位来自伦敦的提问。

In light of the current dearth of investment opportunities, do you see yourselves investing in non-U.S. companies which are well-managed, understandable, and growing?

考虑到当前投资机会的稀缺，您是否会投资于那些管理良好、易于理解且正在增长的非美国公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we find such companies as you describe at a price that’s half attractive we’re perfectly willing to buy them. So the answer to that is yes.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果我们发现如你所描述的公司，并且价格具有一定吸引力，我们当然愿意买。所以答案是肯定的。

But we would be looking, to an extent, worldwide irrespective of market conditions in the United States. Now, market valuations in this country tend to be fairly well-matched in most of the major countries. So we don’t — there’s been a bull market all over the world in a huge way in the bigger markets.

不过，我们会在一定程度上放眼全球，而不局限于美国的市场状况。如今，美国市场的估值与大多数主要国家的市场估值往往匹配得相当好。换句话说，世界上的主要市场都经历了一场大规模牛市。

And so unfortunately — I mean, it would of been nice for us if the U.S. market had tripled and other markets had stayed the same, and then we would be very likely to be finding things abroad. We’re not finding them abroad, but we’re certainly looking for the kind of thing you’re talking about.

因此，不幸的是——我意思是，如果美国市场翻了三倍而其他市场保持不变，那对我们来说会很好，这样我们很可能会找到海外的投资机会。但目前我们并没有在海外找到这样的机会，不过我们确实在寻找你提到的那种公司。

We are not reluctant to invest abroad.

我们并不排斥海外投资。

And our two — well, all three of our largest holdings — American Express, Gillette, and Coke — and we’re talking about $25 billion of market value there that we have — all three of those have major businesses abroad. And in the case of Coke and Gillette, it’s a majority of their earnings from abroad.

而且我们三大持仓——美国运通、吉列和可口可乐——它们的市值加起来大约为250亿美元。它们都在海外有重要业务。对于可口可乐和吉列来说，它们的多数盈利都来自海外市场。

So we’re interested and there’s better growth opportunities in many areas abroad than here. But we’re not finding bargains as we look around the world.

所以我们对此很感兴趣，海外许多地区的增长机会优于本地。但目前我们环顾全球，还没有找到划算的机会。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.

查理·芒格：没有补充。

71. Philanthropy share sales won’t hurt stock price

慈善股权出售不会影响股价

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area two.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第2区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Henry Allen (PH), Mamaroneck, New York.

观众提问：我叫亨利·艾伦（音），来自纽约州马马罗内克。

Question I have is a little delicate, relates to my family and heirs rather than myself, because I’m a couple of decades older than you gentlemen.

我的问题有点敏感，涉及到我的家庭和继承人，而不是我自己，因为我比你们两位年长二十多年。

You’ve been very candid about the succession and the estate planning, but how will the recipients of huge grants — charitable grants — get the liquidity they need without — to use the money without unduly driving the stock down?

您对接班和遗产规划一直非常坦率。但问题是，那些获得巨额慈善赠款的机构如何在不对股价造成过度下跌的情况下获得所需的流动性并使用这笔资金？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think that supply and demand, in terms of specific — you know, let’s just say that 3 percent of Berkshire were to be added to the supply, anyway. I don’t think that makes much difference.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不认为供应和需求会对具体情况产生很大的影响。比如说，如果伯克希尔3%的股份被投入市场供应，我认为这不会造成太大的影响。

What really makes the difference is the prospects of the business.

真正重要的是公司的前景。

If my charitable foundation were operative today, it would have to sell — it would have to give away 5 percent of the value of the foundation every year. And if Berkshire paid no dividend, that means it would have to sell 5 percent of the holdings per year.

如果我的慈善基金会今天开始运作，它每年必须捐赠其价值的5%。如果伯克希尔不支付股息，这意味着每年需要出售5%的持股。

I don’t think that the price of Berkshire would be materially different if there were a seller of — that would be, in this case, 2 percent of Berkshire’s capitalization — I don’t think it would be materially different.

即使市场上有一个出售方出售相当于伯克希尔2%市值的股份，我认为伯克希尔的股价也不会有实质性的不同。

If it is, it probably should be different. I mean, there should be a reasonable amount of trading that can take place annually without affecting the price of the stock materially or the price of the stock is being propped for sort of unnatural reasons.

如果确实有影响，那可能说明股价本来就应该有所不同。我的意思是，每年应该有一个合理的交易量可以进行，而不会实质性地影响股价。如果影响显著，那可能意味着股价因某些不自然的原因而被维持在了某种水平。

So I wouldn’t really worry about that. We had one shareholder die about a year, year and a half ago, that had 3/4 of 1 percent of the company, for example. It was sold in, I don’t know, six weeks or thereabouts, and they raised, at that time, $250 million or thereabouts from the sale.

所以我并不为此感到担忧。例如，大约一年前或一年半前，有一位股东去世，他持有公司约0.75%的股份。这些股份在大约六周内被出售，当时从中筹得了大约2.5亿美元。

I am not worried about that. I’m worried about — I mean, I don’t worry — but the key factor is what are the prospects of the businesses? If the businesses are worth money — there are all kinds of companies on the New York Stock Exchange who are perfectly decent businesses where 30 or 40 percent of the stock turns over a year.

我不为此担心。我担心的——不是担心——但关键因素在于公司的前景。如果公司的业务有价值——纽约证券交易所上有各种完全体面的公司，它们的股票年换手率达到30%或40%。

And Berkshire’s price should not be way different if 10 percent trades a year as opposed to the present 3 percent.

如果伯克希尔的股票年换手率从现在的3%升至10%，其股价不应该有太大的变化。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I agree with that. I don’t think there’d be any problem at all at the present time if the Buffett Foundation were selling 5 percent of its holdings every year.

查理·芒格：我同意这个观点。我认为，如果现在巴菲特基金会每年出售其持股的5%，完全不会有任何问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Could be 500 shares a week or something like that. But if there isn’t demand for 500 shares a week of A on a company with our capitalization, then the price probably is artificially wrong at that time.

沃伦·巴菲特：可能每周出售500股A股，或类似的数量。如果在我们的市值规模下，每周500股的需求都无法满足，那么当时的股价可能是被人为扭曲的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But I just had lunch with Susie and it doesn’t look to me like she’s in any imminent danger of mortality. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不过，我刚和苏茜一起吃了午饭，我觉得她看起来完全没有即将去世的危险（笑声）。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Yeah, it will — it will come into play when the survivor of the two of us dies and when the estate gets cleaned up and everything else.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这将在我们两人中最后一个人去世时才会发生，当时遗产会被清算，以及其他相关事宜。

So I think — I certainly hope and I think it’s quite a ways away.

所以我认为——我当然希望如此，并且我也认为这还很遥远。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You people have more important things to worry about. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：各位还有更重要的事情需要担心。（笑声与掌声）

72. Buffett’s favorite book on his philosophy

巴菲特对其哲学的推荐书籍

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第3区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jim Howard (PH). I’m from Syracuse, Indiana.

观众提问：我叫吉姆·霍华德（音），来自印第安纳州锡拉丘兹。

My question is, does the book Buffettology by Mary Buffett present fairly, in all material respects, the calculations you use in evaluating a business for purchase, or did the lady just write a book?

我的问题是，玛丽·巴菲特所著的《巴菲特ology》是否在所有重要方面公正地呈现了您在评估企业购买时所使用的计算方法，还是她只是写了一本书？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it was written by two authors. But I would say that — no, I would say that in a general way, it gets at the investment philosophy.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这本书是两位作者共同完成的。但我想说，不，我认为它在某种程度上确实触及了投资哲学。

But I wouldn’t say that — it’s not the book I would’ve written, precisely, but I have no quarrel with it, either.

不过，我不会说这本书完全符合我会写的那种风格，但我也不反对它。

I actually think by reading Berkshire’s reports, you should be able to get more — I would think you’d get more of our philosophy than in any other manner.

实际上，我认为通过阅读伯克希尔的年报，你应该能够获得更多的东西——我认为，你通过这种方式获取的我们的哲学比任何其他方式都多。

I think Larry Cunningham, the fellow who held the symposium at the Cardozo School at Yeshiva, did the best job, actually, of sort of reconstructing the various things that have been written at Berkshire into sort of the best-organized presentation of our philosophy. So and he —

我认为拉里·坎宁安（Larry Cunningham），他曾在耶西瓦大学的卡多佐法学院举办过研讨会，他做得非常出色。他将伯克希尔所写的各种材料重构成一个最佳组织的哲学陈述。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And he’s selling it right here. It’s a very practical —

查理·芒格：而且他正在这里销售这本书。这是一本非常实用的书——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, he had it at Borsheims — in the mall outside Borsheims yesterday.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他昨天在Borsheims外的商场里有售这本书。

And Larry did a very good job. You know, I had nothing to do with it, but I think that that — I really think he’s done a first-class job of sort of organizing by topic, I mean, all these things that I’ve sort of written annually and Charlie’s written over time. So that would be — that would probably be my — if I were picking one thing to read, that would probably be the one.

拉里确实做得非常好。虽然我与这本书的制作没有任何关系，但我真的认为，他按照主题整理这些内容的工作是一流的。我指的是我每年写的一些东西，以及查理多年来写的一些东西。所以，如果让我推荐一本阅读的书，这本可能是我的选择。

73. Disney sale in the ’60s was a “huge mistake”

20世纪60年代出售迪士尼是“一个巨大错误”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 4, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第4区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Leigh (inaudible). I’m from Los Angeles, California.

观众提问：我叫莉（听不清），来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。

And I want to begin by thanking you for having Bob Hamman. It was a stroke of genius. I could shop at Borsheims and my husband was entertained while I did so. (Laughter)

首先，我要感谢您请来了鲍勃·哈曼。这真是一个天才之举。我可以在Borsheims购物时，我的丈夫也得到了娱乐。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Bob is not only the best bridge player around but he is an entertaining guy, too. We —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，鲍勃不仅是最好的桥牌选手，也是一个很有趣的人。我们——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: He’s great.

观众提问：他很棒。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, he is great. I agree with you.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他确实很棒。我同意你的看法。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question. You owned Disney once before and sold it. You also owned advertising companies in the ’70s, I believe —

观众提问：我的问题是，您曾经拥有迪士尼的股份但后来卖掉了。我相信您在70年代还持有过广告公司的股份——

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — and you sold them. Could we have some insight into your thinking as to why you sold them?

观众提问：——然后也卖掉了。您能不能分享一下您当时卖掉它们的思考过程？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure I want to give you any insight into that thinking. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我不确定是否想让你了解我的那些想法（笑）。

Well, we’ll start off with the fact that when I was 11, I bought some Cities Service preferred at 38 and it went to 200, but I sold at 40, so — (laughter) — grabbing my $2 a share of profit.

嗯，让我们从我11岁时的经历开始。我以38美元买了一些城市服务公司的优先股，这些股票后来涨到了200美元，但我在40美元时就卖掉了——（笑声）——赚取了每股2美元的利润。

So I — everything we’ve ever sold has gone up subsequently, but some of them have gone up more painfully, subsequently, than others.

所以，我卖掉的每一样东西后来都涨了，但其中一些涨幅让人更加痛心。

And certainly the Disney sale in the ’60s was a huge mistake. I should have been buying, forget about holding, and —

当然，20世纪60年代出售迪士尼是一个巨大的错误。我当时应该买入，而不是想着持有，更不用说卖掉了——

That’s happened many times. I mean, we think that anything we sell should go up subsequently, because we own good businesses and we may sell them because we need money for something else, but we still think they’re good businesses, and we think good businesses are going to be worth more over time.

这种事情发生过很多次。我的意思是，我们认为我们卖掉的任何东西都会在之后涨价，因为我们持有的是优秀的企业。我们可能因为需要资金用于其他用途而卖掉它们，但我们仍然认为这些是好企业，而且优秀的企业随着时间推移会越来越有价值。

So everything I sold in the past, virtually that I can think of, has gone on to sell at a lot more — for a lot more money. And I would expect that would continue to be the case.

所以，我过去卖掉的每一样东西，几乎可以说，后来都以更高的价格被卖出——价格远远超过我当时的出售价。我预计这种情况还会继续。

That’s not a source of distress. But I must say that selling the Disney was a mistake, and actually the ad agencies had done very well since we sold them, too. Now, maybe some of that money went into Coca-Cola or something else, so I don’t worry about that.

这并不会让我感到困扰。但我必须说，出售迪士尼是一个错误，而且事实上那些广告公司自我们出售后也表现得非常好。当然，也许部分资金被投入到可口可乐或其他领域了，所以我对此并不担心。

I would worry, frankly, if I sold a bunch of things right at the top, because that would indicate that, in effect, I was practicing the bigger fool-type approach to investing, and I don’t think that can be practiced successfully over time.

坦率地说，如果我在市场高点时卖出一堆东西，我会感到担忧，因为那会表明我实际上是在践行一种“更大的傻瓜”投资法，而我认为这种方法无法长久成功。

I think the most successful investors, if they sell at all, will be selling things that end up going a lot higher, because it means that they’ve been buying into good businesses as they’ve gone along.

我认为，最成功的投资者即使会卖出一些资产，最终那些资产也可能会涨得更高。这表明他们一直在购买优质的企业。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m glad that the questioner brought this touch of humility, because it is really useful to be reminded of your errors. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我很高兴提问者带来了这一点谦逊的提醒，因为回顾自己的错误确实很有用。（笑声）

And I think we’re pretty good at that. I mean, we kind of mentally rub our own noses in our own mistakes. And that is a very good mental habit.

我认为我们在这方面做得还不错。我是说，我们在内心里反复强调自己的错误。这是一种非常好的心理习惯。

Warren can tell you the exact number of cents per shares that he sold at and compare it with the current price. It actually hurts him. (Laughter)

沃伦可以告诉你他以多少美分每股的价格卖出的，并将其与当前价格作比较。这实际上让他很痛苦。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It actually doesn’t hurt. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上并不痛苦（笑）。

The truth is, you know, because, you know, you just keep on doing things.

事实是，你知道的，因为你会不断做事。

But it is instructive to look at — to do postmortems on everything and say — as long as you don’t get carried away with it.

但对一切事情进行复盘，并从中总结经验教训是很有意义的——只要你不被情绪左右。

But every acquisition decision, that kind of thing, you know, there should be postmortems. Now, most companies don’t like to do postmortems on their capital expenditures.

每一个收购决策之类的事情，都应该进行复盘。不过，大多数公司并不喜欢对他们的资本支出进行复盘。

I’ve been a director of a lot of companies over the years and they’ve usually not spent a lot of time on the postmortems. They spend a lot of time on telling you how wonderful the acquisitions are going to be, or the capital expenditures, but they don’t like to look so hard, necessarily, at the results.

多年来，我曾是许多公司的董事，这些公司通常并不花很多时间在复盘上。他们花大量时间告诉你收购或资本支出将会多么美好，但他们不一定愿意仔细审视实际结果。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Think of how refreshing a board of directors meeting would be if they sat down, “And now we’ll spend three hours examining all our stupid blunders and how much we’ve blown.”

查理·芒格：想象一下，如果董事会会议上大家坐下来，说：“现在我们要花三个小时来审视我们所有愚蠢的错误，以及我们浪费了多少钱。”那会是多么振奋人心的一件事。

WARREN BUFFETT: And then after that the compensation committee will meet. Now — (laughter) — that’s not going to happen. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：然后接着召开薪酬委员会会议。现在——（笑声）——这是不可能发生的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right.

查理·芒格：没错。

74. Phil Carret is one of Buffett’s heroes

菲尔·卡雷特是巴菲特的英雄之一

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 5, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第5区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Keller, Harpel Keller, from Portland, Oregon.

观众提问：我叫凯勒，哈佩尔·凯勒，来自俄勒冈州波特兰市。

Two questions, one of a personal nature. Obviously there are many, many people here today. And I wonder if one of the true patriarchs of the investment business is here today, Phil Carret —

我有两个问题，其中一个与个人有关。显然，今天这里有很多人。我想知道投资领域的真正元老之一——菲尔·卡雷特（Phil Carret）今天是否在场？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll answer —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我来回答——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Many of his friends and admirers would wish him well.

观众提问：他的许多朋友和崇拜者都会祝愿他一切顺利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Phil, up till a week ago was going to be here today. Phil is 101, wrote a book on investments in 1924, and I’ve known Phil for about 46 or ’7 years.

沃伦·巴菲特：直到一周前，菲尔还计划今天到场。菲尔今年101岁，1924年写了一本关于投资的书。我认识菲尔大约有46或47年了。

And Phil has made all the meetings for a number of years, would be here today, and he broke a hip about five or six days ago. But he sent a message that he will definitely be here next year. (Laughter) And he will be, too. (Applause)

多年来，菲尔参加了所有的会议，他本该今天到场，但大约五六天前他摔断了髋骨。不过他传来信息，说他明年一定会到场。（笑声）而且他确实会来。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Phil is a hero of mine. Go ahead.

沃伦·巴菲特：菲尔是我的英雄之一。请继续提问吧。

75. End of Cold War isn’t an investing factor

冷战结束不是投资的决定性因素

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Second question. Has to do with Ben Graham. And he changed his valuation standards as the decades progressed.

观众提问：第二个问题与本·格雷厄姆有关。他随着时间的推移改变了自己的估值标准。

When he couldn’t buy stocks below a net-net, he changed his standards because the environment changed.

当他无法以低于净流动资产的价格买入股票时，他改变了自己的标准，因为环境发生了变化。

Now, the world today seems to be a much different place than in 1989 when the U.S.S.R. collapsed. Even they are stumbling toward the free enterprise system. The Russian mafia is a perverse illustration of that.

如今，今天的世界看起来与1989年苏联解体时大不相同。即使是他们，也在踉踉跄跄地走向自由企业体系。俄罗斯黑手党就是一种反常的体现。

Now there is only one superpower in the world, the U.S.A., and we must be extremely grateful for the men who put us on the track to the free enterprise system.

现在世界上只有一个超级大国，那就是美国。我们必须非常感激那些让我们走上自由企业体系道路的人们。

Now, the free enterprise system is out of the bottle, it’s not going to get back in. It seems to be expanding and accelerating around the world. With the resulting expansion of world trade, may that lead to a reevaluation of historical measures for measuring investments?

如今，自由企业体系已经走出了瓶子，不会再被关回去。它似乎正在全球范围内扩展和加速。伴随着世界贸易的扩张，这是否会导致对衡量投资的历史标准进行重新评估？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my answer to that would be that I doubt it, but I, you know, I also don’t know.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对此的回答是，我对此表示怀疑，但我也不确定。

But I don’t think that the end of the Cold War is something that I would factor into my evaluation of businesses. There are all kinds of events that happened, and their impact, in terms of being quantified, very difficult to figure over time, very difficult to isolate any single variable in a complex economic equation.

但我不认为冷战的结束会成为我评估企业时的一个考虑因素。世界上发生了各种各样的事件，而要对它们的影响进行量化，在时间长河中非常困难，很难在复杂的经济方程中孤立出单一的变量。

So in terms of how the world was going to work ten years from now, or the returns are going to be on equity in business, you know, I don’t know what will be all the variables that impact on that.

所以，关于世界十年后的运行方式，或者企业股权的回报，我不知道有哪些变量会对这些产生影响。

And obviously, right now people are very bullish about the fact that those returns — or something like those returns — will continue.

显然，现在人们对这些回报——或类似的回报——能够持续下去感到非常乐观。

But I don’t — I would not rely in making such a projection on the fact that the Cold War has ended or really any political or economic development around the world.

但我不会依赖冷战结束的事实，或世界上任何政治或经济发展的事实来进行这样的预测。

I don’t know how to predict future earnings of American business. And when I look at all of the great historic events of the past, nothing there gives me much in the way of a clue as to which ones would signal major changes in profitability of American business.

我不知道如何预测美国企业的未来收益。而当我回顾过去所有的重大历史事件时，没有任何事件能给我提供关于哪些事件会导致美国企业盈利能力发生重大变化的线索。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you raise one very interesting question. If the rest of the world becomes very much more prosperous, as it will if it adopts the free enterprise system, which investments are likely to do best?

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为你提出了一个非常有趣的问题。如果世界其他地区变得更加繁荣——假如它们采用自由企业体系——哪些投资可能表现得最好？

I would argue that the Cokes and Gillettes and so on are likely to be helped by a great increase in prosperity in what is now the Third World. And I’m not so sure that’s true of a lot of other businesses.

我认为，可口可乐、吉列等公司可能会因目前第三世界国家的巨大繁荣而受益。而我不确定这一点是否适用于许多其他企业。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we like the international businesses we have. And as I say, our three top holdings all have a major international aspect to them, and really, in aggregate, a dominant international aspect to them.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们喜欢我们拥有的国际化业务。正如我所说，我们的三大主要持仓都有重要的国际化特性，实际上，总体上它们具有主导性的国际化特征。

And there’s no question in my mind that a Coke will grow faster outside of the United States than in the United States, and the same is true of Gillette, maybe the same is true of American Express. So that’s built into what we — our evaluation of those businesses.

毫无疑问，可口可乐在美国以外的增长速度会比在美国更快，吉列也是如此，也许美国运通也是如此。这些都被纳入了我们对这些业务的评估之中。

But I felt that way before 1989, too. I mean, it’s very hard to evaluate how the ball is going to bounce, generally, around the world. But it is a plus to have products such as Gillette has or Coke has, that have demonstrated the fact that they travel extraordinarily well around the world, the people crave those products, and that they’re going to — no one’s going to find a way to do it better than those two companies in their respective fields. And they sell an inexpensive product, so all of that’s going for us.

但早在1989年之前我就有这种看法。我的意思是，很难评估全球格局的走势。但拥有像吉列或可口可乐这样的产品是一大优势，这些产品已经证明它们在全球范围内非常受欢迎，人们对它们有很大的需求。而且没有人会在各自的领域找到比这两家公司更好的运营方式。它们销售的是廉价的产品，这对我们来说是一个优势。

But in terms of how stocks generally sell or the profitability of American business generally is in the future, it doesn’t help me much.

但关于股票的整体表现或美国企业未来的盈利能力，这些对我帮助不大。

Charlie, any more on that?

查理，还有补充吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No more.

查理·芒格：没有补充了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

76. Subsidiary managers are never second-guessed

子公司经理的决定从不被质疑

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第6区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Bartley Cohen (PH). I just want to thank you for a great weekend.

观众提问：您好，我叫巴特利·科恩（音）。我想感谢您让我们度过了一个美好的周末。

And my question is, after you bought Dairy Queen I heard they put Coca-Cola into all the stores, but yesterday when I went to the Nebraska Furniture Mart they said they don’t take American Express. And my question is — (crowd noise) — my question is, do you encourage the subsidiaries and the companies that you have stock to use each other’s products, or do you leave it up to the management of the subsidiary?

我的问题是，在您收购了冰雪皇后之后，我听说他们把可口可乐引入了所有门店，但昨天我去内布拉斯加家具商城时，他们告诉我不接受美国运通卡。我的问题是，您会鼓励子公司和您持股的公司互相使用彼此的产品，还是把这些决定留给子公司的管理层？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. And it does tell you something about the Berkshire method of operation.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。这也确实能让你了解一些伯克希尔的运营方式。

We tell each subsidiary to run their business in the way that they think is best for their operation. Borsheims takes American Express, See’s takes American Express, the Furniture Mart doesn’t, for example. But that’ll be true in other areas, too.

我们告诉每家子公司，以他们认为对自己业务最有利的方式来运营。例如，Borsheims接受美国运通卡，See’s糖果也接受，但家具商城不接受。这种情况在其他领域也是如此。

If Harvey Golub at American Express — who has absolutely done a sensational job for us — if he wants to talk with — or have his representatives talk — with anybody at any of our operations, you know, we’re all for that happening.

如果美国运通的哈维·戈卢布——他确实为我们做得非常出色——想要与我们任何一个业务部门的人交谈，或者让他的代表去谈，我们完全支持。

But we will never tell a subsidiary manager which vendor to patronize or anything of that sort.

但我们绝不会告诉子公司经理该光顾哪家供应商或类似的事情。

Once we start making decisions for our managers in that respect then we become responsible for the operation, and they are no longer responsible for the operation.

一旦我们开始在这些方面替经理们做决定，那么我们就会对运营负责，而他们就不再对运营负责了。

They are responsible for their operations, and that means they get to call the decisions. And they should do what is best for their subsidiary, and it’s up to any other company that wants to do business with them to prove why that is best for them. That’s the Berkshire approach to things.

他们对自己的业务负责，这意味着他们有权做出决定。他们应该为自己的子公司做出最好的选择。至于任何希望与他们合作的公司，需要证明这样做为什么对他们有利。这就是伯克希尔的处理方式。

And I think on balance, our managers like it that way. So they’re not getting second-guessed and somebody can’t go over their head. I get letters all the time from people who are trying to jump over the heads of our managers, and they want us to say this advertising agency should be used or that, and that sort of thing.

我认为总体来看，我们的经理们喜欢这种方式。这样他们不会被质疑，也不会有人越过他们做决定。我经常收到一些人的信件，他们试图绕过我们的经理，想让我们指定某个广告公司之类的要求。

It doesn’t work at Berkshire. They deal with the managers of the businesses and they’re not going to get around them.

在伯克希尔，这行不通。他们必须直接与业务经理打交道，而不是绕过他们。

Charlie? (Applause)

查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I love your answer. It gives Warren lots of time to read annual reports at headquarters. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我喜欢你的回答。这让沃伦在总部有更多时间阅读年报。（笑声）

77. Buffett smells trouble for tobacco companies in settlement

巴菲特嗅到烟草公司在和解中的麻烦

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第7区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Steve Errico (PH). I’m from New York.

观众提问：你好，我叫史蒂夫·埃里科（音），来自纽约。

What do you think is likely to happen with respect to the tobacco settlement, and what do you think should happen?

您认为烟草和解可能会发生什么？您觉得应该发生什么？

And secondly, McDonald’s and Dairy Queen are similar businesses. Was there a relationship between your acquisition of Dairy Queen and the disposal of McDonald’s? Thank you.

其次，麦当劳和冰雪皇后是相似的业务。您收购冰雪皇后与出售麦当劳之间有关系吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s no connection in the second case. They have certain similarities, but there’s certainly a lot of differences, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，第二个问题的答案是没有关系。两者确实有一定的相似性，但也有很多不同之处。

You know, a Burger King and McDonald’s would be much more similar, or a Wendy and McDonald’s. But Dairy Queen is much more of a niche and away from that.

比如汉堡王和麦当劳会更加相似，或者温迪汉堡和麦当劳更像。但冰雪皇后是一个更加独特的小众业务，与这些快餐连锁店有明显的区别。

The tobacco settlement’s interesting, just in terms of watching the dynamics of it. Because one of the things in labor negotiations that’s always a problem is that when you — as a manager you have a labor negotiation, at the end of the negotiation you as management are committed, and basically the union isn’t, because the union is going to have a vote on it.

烟草和解案很有趣，单从其动态来看。因为在劳资谈判中总有一个问题：当你作为管理层进行谈判时，在谈判结束时你作为管理层已经承诺了，但工会基本上还没有，因为工会还需要进行投票。

And that’s just the way it is. I mean, you can’t get away from that. But it is not fun to be in a negotiating position where you’re bound and the other side is not bound.

这就是现实情况，我的意思是，你无法避免这种情况。但处于一个自己受制而对方没有约束的谈判位置并不愉快。

And although that wasn’t totally contractually necessarily the situation of tobacco area, it smelled like trouble to me for the tobacco companies — whether you feel they should’ve had that trouble or not — but it smelled like trouble to me when they were bound and you had another side that was not bound in any way, and where there were lots of political considerations, and where there was a lot of time was going to expire.

虽然烟草领域的情况并非完全是合同上的约束，但在我看来，这对烟草公司来说就是麻烦——不管你是否觉得他们应该遇到这些麻烦——但当烟草公司受约束而对方完全不受约束时，在涉及大量政治考虑和时间压力的情况下，这在我看来就是个麻烦。

I mean, that did not smell to me like a deal that would stick.

我的意思是，这在我看来不像是一个能够长久维持的协议。

And I don’t know any of the tobacco executives that were involved in that. I don’t know how much they agonized over getting in a position where they were bound and the other party wasn’t. But I can tell you from labor negotiations that that’s not a pleasant place to be, and it’s not a great strategic place to be.

我不认识任何参与其中的烟草行业高管。我不知道他们在处于自己受约束而对方不受约束的位置时感到有多痛苦。但我可以从劳资谈判的经验告诉你，这不是一个令人愉快的处境，也不是一个好的战略位置。

Charlie, what do you think of it?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t feel I’ve got any great expertise in this situation.

查理·芒格：我觉得自己在这种情况下没有太多专业见解。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, neither did I, but I’m — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我也没有，但我——（笑声）

78. Buffett on inheritance: “Enough to do anything, not enough to do nothing”

巴菲特谈遗产：“足够让他们做任何事情，但不足以让他们无所事事”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 8, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第8区提问。

JAIME MCMAHON: Hello, I’m Jaime McMahon (PH) from Birmingham, Alabama.

杰米·麦克马洪：你好，我是杰米·麦克马洪（音），来自阿拉巴马州伯明翰市。

And I was hoping that, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, y’all would expand a little bit on your ideas of an inheritance, and the positive and negative influences that that can have on your heirs, and what you might be able to do as a businessperson, and an investor, and as a parent to sort of mitigate those negative influences.

我希望巴菲特先生和芒格先生能谈谈你们对遗产的看法，以及遗产对继承人可能产生的积极和消极影响。作为一个企业家、投资者和父母，你们认为可以做些什么来减轻这些消极影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I quoted — I think Kay Graham was quoting her father at the time but — some years back as saying, “If you’re quite rich, probably the idea of leaving your children enough so they can do anything, but not enough so they can do nothing, is not a bad formula.”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我曾引用过——我认为这是凯·格雷厄姆当时引用她父亲的话——多年前她说，“如果你很富有，可能留给你的孩子足够让他们做任何事情，但不足以让他们无所事事，这并不是一个坏的方式。”

I think, if you’re talking about people that aren’t quite rich, I’ve seen — you know, socially, I wouldn’t have a system that involved inheritances. But recognizing the situation that exists, I think probably at lower levels, that leaving to the children in this society is perfectly OK.

我认为，如果你谈论的是那些不太富有的人，我认为从社会角度来看，我不会设计一个包含遗产的系统。但基于现有的社会情况，我认为在较低的财富水平上，留给孩子一些遗产是完全可以接受的。

But I believe enough in a meritocracy that if I were devising the system with a consumption tax and everything, I would probably make inheritance a form of consumption that would be very heavily taxed, because I don’t believe that because you happen to be the — come out of the right womb, essentially, that you are entitled to live an entirely different life than somebody who wasn’t quite as lucky, in terms of womb selection. (Laughter)

但我足够相信精英主义，如果让我设计一个包含消费税的系统，我可能会把遗产视为一种消费，并对其征收重税。因为我不认为仅仅因为你——从“正确的子宫”出生，你就有权过上完全不同于那些在“子宫选择”上不太幸运的人的生活。（笑声）

But in my own case, you know, I follow the “enough so they can do anything, but not enough so they can do nothing.” I think that society showered all these —

但在我自己的情况下，我遵循的是“足够让他们做任何事情，但不足以让他们无所事事”的原则。我认为社会赋予了我们这些机会——

I was very lucky, I was wired the right way at the right time in history to do very well in this kind of a market economy. Whereas Bill Gates has told me if I was born some thousands of years ago, I’d been some animal’s lunch. (Laughter)

我非常幸运，在历史的正确时机具备了适合市场经济的才能。而比尔·盖茨曾告诉我，如果我出生在几千年前，我可能会成为某种动物的午餐。（笑声）

You know, I don’t run very fast. (Laughter)

你知道的，我跑得不快。（笑声）

And there are different assets that are useful at different times.

在不同的时代，有用的能力是不同的。

And I’ll add, I’m not wired to play championship bridge, or championship chess, or not wired to be a basketball star or anything. It just so happens I’m in an area where it pays off like crazy to be good at capital allocation.

我再补充一下，我的能力并不适合打冠军桥牌或国际象棋，也不适合成为篮球明星或其他领域的明星。只是碰巧我擅长资本分配，而这在我的领域里带来了非常高的回报。

And that doesn’t make me a more worthwhile human being than anybody else or anything. It just means I was lucky.

但这并不意味着我比其他人更有价值。这只是意味着我很幸运。

And should that luck, in effect, enable many generations of people that are good at womb selection to do nothing in this world? You know, I would have some reservations about that.

而这种幸运是否应该使得许多代擅长“子宫选择”的人在这个世界上无所事事？对此我有一些保留意见。

So that’s my own feeling on inheritance. But Charlie has a bigger family and he can give you a better answer.

所以这就是我对遗产的看法。但查理的家庭更大，他可以给你更好的答案。

79. Munger on inheritance: Few people are “ruined by money”

芒格谈遗产：“很少有人被金钱毁掉”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I feel, in a capitalist system, that there should be an inheritance tax, and that once that’s been imposed and paid, what each person wants to do in his own testamentary arrangements is up to that person.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为在资本主义体系中应该有遗产税。一旦遗产税被征收和缴纳，每个人如何安排自己的遗嘱就是他自己的选择了。

I see very few people that I regard as ruined by money. Many of the people that I see ruined who have money would have been ruined without money. (Laughter)

我见过的因金钱被毁掉的人非常少。我见过的那些有钱却被毁掉的人，假如没有钱，他们也会被毁掉。（笑声）

And I think the percentage of the people that are going to be living the life of the French aristocracy before the revolution is always going to be very small.

我认为，那些过着法国大革命前贵族生活的人所占的比例总是非常小。

And there are plenty of grasping people to take the money away from the incompetents who inherit it.

而且有很多精明的人会从那些继承遗产却无能的人手中夺走这些钱财。

I don’t think we have to worry about a whole class of incompetents ruling the world as their money cascades ever higher.

我不认为我们需要担心一整个阶级的无能者会因为他们的财富不断增加而统治世界。

芒格的安全感不足以正确的配置资产。

So I like a fair amount of charity, and certainly some testamentary charity is OK. But I feel it’s an individual choice that people have to make.

因此，我喜欢适量的慈善行为，当然一些遗赠慈善是可以的。但我认为这是一个人们必须做出的个人选择。

WARREN BUFFETT: They get a choice there.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们在这方面有选择的自由。

80. Two conditions needed for a market that’s not overvalued

市场不过于高估的两个条件

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第9区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Samuel Wong from Irvine, California. I have two questions.

观众提问：我叫塞缪尔·黄，来自加利福尼亚州尔湾市。我有两个问题。

Question number one, do you think the U.S.A. market is overvalued today?

第一个问题，您认为今天美国市场被高估了吗？

And question number two, would you buy Berkshire Hathaway stock today, considering the fact that they’ve had a nice ride up already this year?

第二个问题，考虑到伯克希尔哈撒韦今年股价已经表现不错，您今天还会买入伯克希尔的股票吗？

And if yes, presuming I have a kid, 20 years old, and he has $150,000 to invest in Berkshire Hathaway, and you won’t need the money until five years later, gradually, would you recommend to buy A share or B share, or the combination? Thank you.

如果会，那么假设我有一个20岁的孩子，他有15万美元要投资伯克希尔哈撒韦，并且这笔钱五年内不会用到，您会建议买A股、B股，还是两者的组合？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you decide to buy Berkshire, I don’t think it really makes much difference whether you buy A or B.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你决定买伯克希尔，我认为买A股还是B股并没有太大区别。

But we don’t make any recommendations about whether people buy or sell Berkshire. We never have and that’s a game we don’t want to get into.

但我们不会建议人们是否买入或卖出伯克希尔的股票。我们从来没有这样做过，这也不是我们想参与的游戏。

In terms of — overvalue — the question whether the market’s overvalued, generally, it’s simply as we said last year here in the annual report.

至于是否高估——关于市场是否被高估的问题，总体来说，正如我们去年在年报中所说的。

It’s not — the general market is not overvalued if two conditions are met, which is — in our view — which is that interest rates remain at or near present levels or go lower or — and that corporate profitability in the U.S. stay at the present — or close to the present — levels, which are virtually unprecedented.

如果满足两个条件，我们认为总体市场并未被高估。这两个条件是：利率保持在当前水平或接近当前水平，甚至更低；以及美国企业的盈利能力维持在当前或接近当前的水平，而这种水平几乎是前所未有的。

Now, those are a couple of big ifs, as we pointed out. A lot of the stories that came out after the annual report would emphasize one aspect or another but it’s simply — and they say, “What does he mean by that?” Well, it means exactly what I say.

现在，这两个假设条件非常重要，正如我们指出的那样。年报发布后出现的许多报道可能会强调某一方面或另一方面，但实际上——他们问，“他这是什么意思？”这正是我的意思。

If the two conditions are met, I think it’s not overvalued. And if either of the conditions is breached in an important way, I think it will turn out to be overvalued.

如果这两个条件都满足，我认为市场并未被高估。如果其中任何一个条件被显著破坏，我认为市场最终会被证明是高估的。

And I don’t know the answer, which is why I put it in the form that I did.

我并不知道答案，这就是为什么我以这种形式表达我的观点。

It’s very tough at any given time to look forward and know what level of valuation is justified. You do know when certain dangerous things appear, and certainly if you’re predicating your answer that stocks are OK at these prices — if you come to that conclusion — you have to also come to the conclusion, in our view, that corporate earnings, at present levels, are likely to be maintained. And that’s a conclusion you would have to come to. I don’t think it’s obvious that that’s the case.

在任何特定时刻，展望未来并知道何种估值水平是合理的，这都是非常困难的。你可以知道某些危险信号何时出现。而且，如果你基于目前的价格认为股票是可以的——如果你得出了这个结论——在我们看来，你也必须得出这样一个结论：目前的企业盈利水平可能会被维持。我不认为这一点是显而易见的。

81. No exact formula on retaining earnings

保留收益没有确切的公式

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 10, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第10区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name’s Stanley Harmon (PH) and I’m from Boston.

观众提问：下午好，我叫斯坦利·哈蒙（音），来自波士顿。

You say that companies should only spend a dollar on capital expenditures if it will create more than $1 of market value. I’m wondering, how do you determine this?

您说过，公司只有在资本支出能创造超过1美元的市场价值时才应该花这1美元。我想知道，您是如何判断这一点的？

Is it based on A, historical returns on capital; B, a qualitative judgment of the company’s competitive position; C, a quantitative projection of returns on capital; or D, something else?

是基于以下哪个因素：A，历史资本回报率；B，对公司竞争地位的定性判断；C，对资本回报率的定量预测；还是D，其他？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it’s based on all of those factors you mention and more. But in the end we can say to date every dollar we’ve retained has been worthwhile, because on balance those dollars have produced more than a dollar of market value.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这确实是基于你提到的所有因素以及更多因素。但最终我们可以说，到目前为止，我们保留的每一美元都是值得的，因为总体来说，这些美元产生的市场价值超过了1美元。

It’s — actually, with a great many companies you can say that now, because things have turned out so well.

事实上，对于许多公司来说，现在可以这样说，因为结果确实很好。

But it would be a case — the check on it is, if after three or four years, you’ve found that the dollars we’ve retained hasn’t created more of that in value, then the presumption becomes very strong at that point that we should start paying out money.

但这是一种情况——对此的验证是，如果三到四年后，你发现我们保留的资金并未创造出更多的价值，那么在那时，我们应该开始分配资金的假设就会变得非常有力。

But almost any management that wants to retain money is going to rationalize it by saying, “We’re going to do wonderful things with the money we retain.” And we think there should be checks on that, which is why in the report, in the ground rules, I suggest making checks on the validity of those projections.

但几乎任何希望保留资金的管理层都会通过说“我们将用这些保留的资金做一些了不起的事情”来使其合理化。我们认为应该对这种说法进行验证，这就是为什么我在年报和基本规则中建议对这些预测的有效性进行检验的原因。

Charlie and I, if you ask us today whether the single dollar we retain from the earnings today, we’ve got a use for today that will produce more than a dollar of value, the answer is no.

如果你今天问查理和我，我们今天从收益中保留的每一美元是否已经有用途可以产生超过1美元的价值，答案是否定的。

But we do think that based on history, that the prospects are better than 50 percent — well over 50 percent — that in the next few years, we would have an opportunity to do that. But there’s no certainty to it.

但我们确实认为，根据历史数据，未来几年我们有超过50%的机会做到这一点，甚至远高于50%。但这并不确定。

Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.

查理·芒格：没有补充。

82. Berkshire stock tracks intrinsic value “better than most”

伯克希尔股票比大多数公司更好地跟踪内在价值

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 1, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第1区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name’s Gary Bialis (PH), I’m from Southern California.

观众提问：下午好。我叫加里·比亚利斯（音），来自南加州。

I want to thank you again for producing this Owner’s Manual that you did a couple of years ago. I find it quite useful and use it quite often.

感谢您几年前制作的这本《股东手册》。我觉得它非常有用，并且经常参考它。

Two questions: can you tell me if the rule of thumb is still applicable regarding the statement in the Owner’s Manual, that the percentage increase in the book value tracks pretty well with the percent increase in intrinsic value?

我有两个问题：您能告诉我，在《股东手册》中提到的经验法则是否仍然适用，即账面价值的增长百分比与内在价值的增长百分比基本一致？

Or is the fact that you now have more owned businesses, especially ones like GEICO and FlightSafety, mean that the spread between those two has possibly narrowed?

还是说，现在您拥有了更多的自营业务，尤其是像GEICO和FlightSafety这样的公司，这是否意味着两者之间的差距可能已经缩小了？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well no, the two have tracked pretty well over the years. I mean, compared to the record of most businesses that are publicly owned, I would say that over the 33 or so year span, our market price has tracked intrinsic value more closely than, you know, 80 or 90 percent of the companies that we view, probably 90 percent.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，不，这两者多年来跟踪得相当好。我的意思是，与大多数公开上市公司的记录相比，在过去大约33年里，我们的市场价格与内在价值的跟踪程度比我们观察的80%或90%的公司要更接近，可能接近90%。

But that doesn’t mean it does it all the time. And there are times when the market price will outpace intrinsic value — the change in intrinsic value — and there are times when, obviously then, that it will lag behind. So it’s far from perfect but it’s better than most.

但这并不意味着它始终如此。有时市场价格会超过内在价值的变化，有时显然会落后于内在价值的变化。所以它远非完美，但比大多数公司要好。

Ideally, we would like it to track it perfectly. If we ran this as a private company and we met once a year, and set a price on the stock to have it traded once a year, and Charlie and I were responsible for setting that price, we would try to set a price that was as close to intrinsic value as we could.

理想情况下，我们希望市场价格能够完美地跟踪内在价值。如果我们以私人公司运营，每年开一次会，为股票设定一个价格，并每年交易一次，由查理和我负责设定价格，我们会努力将价格设定得尽可能接近内在价值。

And that would be — to the extent that we could do it — it would be a perfect tracking. The market isn’t like that, and the market responds to a lot of other things. So it’s perfect. It’s not getting more perfect, in our view. But we still think that Berkshire tracks it better than most companies.

如果我们能做到，那将是一个完美的跟踪。然而，市场并不是这样的，市场会对许多其他因素作出反应。所以它并不完美，在我们看来也不会变得更完美。但我们仍然认为，伯克希尔的跟踪程度比大多数公司要好。

Charlie, you have —

查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：没有补充。

83. KKR sale of Gillette shares “means nothing to us”

KKR出售吉列股票“对我们来说没有任何意义”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第2区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Elizabeth Cruz (PH) from New York City. I have a question about Gillette.

观众提问：我是伊丽莎白·克鲁兹（音），来自纽约市。我有一个关于吉列的问题。

Another significant Gillette investor, KKR, recently sold over a billion dollars in Gillette shares, shares that they had acquired through Gillette’s acquisition of Duracell.

吉列的另一位重要投资者KKR最近出售了超过10亿美元的吉列股票，这些股票是通过吉列收购金霸王公司获得的。

Knowing that KKR has also been a successful investor, do you see this as a negative signal about Gillette’s future prospects, particularly on the eve of the launch of the Mach 3 razor? And what do you think their plans are for the remainder of their shares?

考虑到KKR也是一位成功的投资者，您是否认为这对吉列未来的前景是一个负面信号，特别是在即将推出Mach 3剃须刀之际？您认为他们剩余股份的计划是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think they may have even publicly stated — I’m pretty sure they have — the Duracell shares from which the Gillette shares came were held by a specific investment fund that was formed in, I don’t know what year, but a given year, and which is scheduled to disband at a certain point.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为他们可能已经公开说明过——我很确定他们说明过——这些吉列股票来源于金霸王公司的股票，而这些股票是由一个特定的投资基金持有的。这个基金是在某一年成立的，具体年份我不清楚，并计划在某个时间点解散。

So those shares, whether they were of Duracell or whether they’re of Gillette, were scheduled for disposition at some point within a given term. And I think that KKR made the decision — and they’ve made it with other stocks, too — is to have maybe three or so offerings between now and that terminal date for their partnership.

因此，无论是金霸王的股票还是吉列的股票，它们都计划在一定期限内进行处置。我认为，KKR做出了一个决定——他们对其他股票也做过类似决定——即在他们合伙企业的终止日期之前，可能进行三次左右的股票出售。

And why they pick any one of — any given date, you know, is up to them and their advisors.

至于他们为什么选择某一个日期，你知道的，那是他们和他们的顾问的决定。

It means nothing to us. I mean, if they didn’t have that kind of a fund and they decided to sell, it wouldn’t make any difference to us. And I presume if we made a decision to sell, it wouldn’t make any difference in their case.

这对我们来说没有任何意义。我的意思是，如果他们没有这样的基金并决定出售，这对我们没有任何影响。我想，如果我们决定出售，对他们也不会有任何影响。

So we, you know, we form our ideas of valuation independent of anybody else’s thinking on it. But in the case of KKR, specifically, they have a termination date on a partnership that owned those shares, and have to dispose of them one way or another between now and the termination date, and probably decided that with the quantity of stock they had, that they were going to have several sales.

因此，我们形成的估值观点是独立于其他任何人的想法的。但就KKR而言，他们的合伙企业持有这些股票，并有一个终止日期，在此之前必须以某种方式处置这些股票。他们可能决定，鉴于持有的股票数量，他们会分几次出售。

The Mach 3 is terrific, incidentally. I’ve been using it since October. So Henry did not decide to sell that stock based on the Mach 3. (Laughter)

顺便说一下，Mach 3非常棒。我从去年10月开始就一直在用。所以，亨利决定出售这些股票并不是基于Mach 3的表现。（笑声）

84. No split means “better class of shareholders”

不拆股意味着“更好的股东群体”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第3区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Gertrude Goodman (PH) from Palm Springs, California.

观众提问：我是格特鲁德·古德曼（音），来自加利福尼亚州棕榈泉。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, there are many stocks that rise and eventually split. My question is, do you foresee in the near future a split for Berkshire Hathaway Class A?

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，许多股票在上涨后最终会拆股。我的问题是，您是否预计伯克希尔哈撒韦A类股在不久的将来会拆股？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s an easy one. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这个问题很简单。（笑声）

No. The answer is no. We have no plans to split the A.

不会。答案是否定的。我们没有计划拆分A类股。

In effect, we let people who want to split the A split it themselves into a B. So that anybody who owns the A can have a 30-for-1 split any morning they wake up and want to have such a split. (Laughter)

实际上，我们允许那些希望拆分A类股的人自行将其转换为B类股。所以，任何拥有A类股的人，每天早上醒来都可以随时以30比1的比例进行这种拆分。（笑声）

Charlie, do you have any additional comment?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你有补充吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think you said “no” perfectly. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：没有，我认为你说“不”得非常到位。（笑声与掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t take that attitude because we’re cavalier about how shareholders feel. We really think that in the long range interest of Berkshire that the policy we followed on not splitting has benefitted the company and shareholders.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们之所以采取这种态度，并不是因为我们对股东的感受漫不经心。我们确实认为，从长远来看，我们坚持不拆股的政策对伯克希尔以及股东都有利。

Nothing dramatic about it, but I think that we have a better class of shareholders, in aggregate, in this room, than we would have if we were selling at $3 a share, or $30 a share, or maybe even $300 a share.

这并没有什么特别激烈的变化，但我认为，总体来说，我们现在的股东群体比我们如果以每股3美元、30美元，甚至300美元的价格出售股票时要更优秀。

85. “Book value is not a factor we consider”

“账面价值不是我们考虑的因素”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第4区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Jack Sutton (PH) from New York City. I have two questions.

观众提问：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫杰克·萨顿（音），来自纽约市。我有两个问题。

The Japanese stock market has been likened to the U.S. market in 1974. With Japanese stocks selling at very low price-to-book values, as compared to U.S. stocks, would it not make sense to invest in a basket of Japanese stocks or an index fund of Japanese stocks?

日本股市被比作1974年的美国股市。与美国股票相比，日本股票的市净率非常低。那么，投资于一篮子日本股票或日本股票指数基金是否有意义？

Question number two: Berkshire Hathaway tends to invest in companies with high margins and high return on common equity. Berkshire’s investment in the airline business seems to have digressed widely from those principles.

第二个问题：伯克希尔哈撒韦倾向于投资于高利润率和高普通股权益回报率的公司。但伯克希尔在航空业的投资似乎与这些原则有很大的偏离。

Could you elaborate on why Berkshire invested in the airline industry, and would Berkshire consider new investments in the industry in the future?

您能否详细说明伯克希尔为何投资航空业？伯克希尔未来会考虑在这一行业进行新的投资吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m going to the first question. The reason that — and I don’t know the exact figures — that Japanese stocks would sell at a lower price-book ratio than U.S. stocks is simply because Japanese companies are earning far less on book than American companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：我先回答第一个问题。日本股票的市净率低于美国股票的原因——我不知道确切的数据——只是因为日本公司的账面回报率远低于美国公司。

And earnings are what determine value, not book value. Book value is not a factor we consider. Future earnings are a factor we consider. And as we mentioned earlier this morning, earnings have been poor for a great many Japanese companies.

决定价值的是收益，而不是账面价值。账面价值不是我们考虑的因素。未来的收益才是我们考虑的因素。正如我们今天早上提到的，许多日本公司的收益表现很差。

Now, if you think that the return on equity of Japanese business is going to increase dramatically, then you’re going to make a lot of — I mean, and you’re correct, you’re going to make a lot of money in Japanese stocks.

现在，如果你认为日本企业的股本回报率将大幅提高，那么你将赚到很多钱——如果你的判断是正确的——你确实会从日本股票中获利。

But the return on equity for Japanese businesses has been quite low, and that makes a low price-to-book ratio very appropriate because earnings are measured against book. And if a company’s earning 5 percent on book value, I don’t want to buy it at book value if I think it’s going to keep earning 5 percent on book value. So a low price-book ratio means nothing to us. It does not intrigue us.

但日本企业的股本回报率一直很低，这使得较低的市净率是非常合理的，因为收益是以账面价值为基准衡量的。如果一家公司的账面回报率是5%，而我认为它会继续维持在这个水平，那么我就不会以账面价值购买它。因此，低市净率对我们来说毫无意义，并不能引起我们的兴趣。

In fact, if anything, we are less likely to look at something that sells at a low relationship to book than something that sells at a high relationship to book, because the chances are we’re looking at a poor business in the first case and a good business in the second case.

事实上，如果非要说的话，我们更可能关注市净率较高的公司，而不是市净率较低的公司，因为前者更可能是一个好的企业，而后者更可能是一个不好的企业。

86. Airlines not “intriguing” enough to buy stock

航空业不足以引起购买股票的兴趣

WARREN BUFFETT: What was the other question on, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，另一个问题是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Buying — airlines.

查理·芒格：购买——航空股。

WARREN BUFFETT: Airlines. Yeah, I always repress everything on airlines. I don’t want to — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：航空股。是的，我总是刻意压抑关于航空业的一切。我不想——（笑声）

No, we’ve never bought an airline common stock that I can remember. So what we did was we lent money to USAir for a 10-year period and we had a conversion privilege there.

不，据我所知，我们从未购买过任何航空公司的普通股。所以我们做的事情是向USAir提供了一笔10年的贷款，并拥有转股权。

It looked like it — it was a terrible mistake. I made the mistake. But we got bailed out. But we — we never made the determination — when we bought our stock, USAir was selling at $50 a share or thereabouts, the common. And we didn’t have an interest in buying USAir at 50, or 40, or 30, or 20. And we got a chance to as things went along — (laughter) — all the way down to 4. (Laughter)

当时看来，这是一个可怕的错误。我犯了这个错误，但我们最终得到了挽救。不过，我们从未决定买入USAir的普通股。当时USAir的股价大约是每股50美元。而且我们对以50、40、30，甚至20美元的价格购买USAir并没有兴趣。后来我们有机会——（笑声）——看到它一路跌到了4美元。（笑声）

烂企业可以表现的远比想象的更烂。

And we never bought it. And we’ve never bought American, or United, or Delta, or any other airline. It is not a business that intrigues us.

我们从未买入它。我们也从未买入过美联航、联合航空、达美航空或其他任何航空公司的股票。这不是一个让我们感兴趣的行业。

We did think it was intriguing to lend money to them with a conversion privilege and it’s worked out now because we got lucky, and because Steve Wolf came along and really rescued the company from right at the brink of bankruptcy.

我们确实觉得向他们提供带有转股权的贷款很有吸引力。这件事最终有了好的结果，因为我们运气不错，而且史蒂夫·沃尔夫出现并真正把公司从破产的边缘救了回来。

But we’re unlikely to be in airlines, although again, we wouldn’t mind lending money to a lot of businesses that we wouldn’t buy common equity in. I mean, that could happen again in various industries, including the airline industry.

但我们不太可能投资航空公司股票。不过，再说一次，我们并不介意向许多我们不会购买普通股的企业提供贷款。我是说，这种情况可能会在包括航空业在内的各个行业中再次发生。

Charlie, do you have anything to say on either the airlines or the Japanese market?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你对航空业或日本市场有补充吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the airline experience was very unpleasant for us. The net worth just melted. It was (inaudible) a billion and a half, and it just went a hundred million, a hundred million, a hundred million, and finally the cash is running down. It is a very unpleasant experience. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，航空业的经历对我们来说非常不愉快。净资产几乎融化了。从15亿美元开始，不断减少一亿美元、一亿美元，直到现金也快耗尽。这是一段非常不愉快的经历。（笑声）

We try and learn from those experiences but we’re very slow learners. (Laughter)

我们试图从这些经历中学习，但我们的学习速度很慢。（笑声）

87. No “good returns” on Japanese stocks unless profits increase

除非利润增加，否则日本股票无法获得“良好回报”

WARREN BUFFETT: Japanese market (inaudible)?

沃伦·巴菲特：关于日本市场（听不清）？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, the Japanese market.

查理·芒格：哦，日本市场。

I suppose anything — (Laughter as Buffett reaches for box of candy)

我想一切皆有可能——（笑声，巴菲特拿起一盒糖果）

I suppose anything could happen. After all, we bought silver. (Laughter)

我想一切都可能发生。毕竟，我们还买过白银呢。（笑声）

But we have never made a big sector play on a country. In fact, we’ve almost never made a big sector play.

但我们从未在一个国家进行过大规模的行业投资。事实上，我们几乎从未进行过大规模的行业投资。

WARREN BUFFETT: We would have to come to the conclusion that Japanese business, instead of earning whatever it’s earning on equity now, is going to earn appreciably more on equity.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们必须得出这样的结论：日本企业的股本回报率不仅维持现状，还将显著提高。

I’ve got no basis for it — I wouldn’t argue if anybody else feels that way — I wouldn’t argue with them. But I have no basis for coming to that conclusion.

但我没有任何依据——如果别人这样认为，我不会与他们争论。但我自己没有依据得出这样的结论。

And unless you come to that conclusion, you’re not going to make good returns. I mean, unless that happens, you’re not going to make good returns from Japanese stocks.

除非你得出这个结论，否则你不会获得良好的回报。我的意思是，除非这一点发生，否则你不可能从日本股票中获得良好的回报。

You can not — you can’t earn a lot of money from businesses that are earning 5 percent on — or 6 percent — on equity. And I look at the reports but I don’t see the earning power now.

从股本回报率仅为5%或6%的企业中，你无法赚到很多钱。我查看了报告，但我目前没有看到日本企业的盈利能力。

Now, maybe it’ll all change. I mean, there’s talk of — there’s already been a small temporary tax cut, but corporate tax rates are quite high, as you know, in Japan.

当然，也许一切都会改变。现在已经在讨论——已经有了小幅的临时减税措施，但正如你所知，日本的企业税率相当高。

And they used to be 52 percent here in the United States, now they’re 35. So you could have things happen that increase corporate profits, but I don’t have any special insight into that that anyone that reads the press generally would not have.

在美国，企业税率曾经是52%，而现在是35%。因此，有可能出现一些增加企业利润的事情，但我对这种情况没有任何特别的洞见——这些洞见是普通阅读新闻的人不会有的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: There are also readings in corporate culture that have to be made. Owning stock in a corporation where you know that if shareholders or somebody else has to suffer, the choice is likely to be that somebody else will be chosen.

查理·芒格：还有企业文化需要考量。持有某家公司的股票，如果你知道在需要某人承担损失时，股东通常不会是首选，那这种公司会有所不同。

That is a different kind of a company to invest in than one that thinks that the principal purpose of life is to keep some steam boiler company going in a particular community or something, no matter how much the shareholders suffer.

这与那些认为企业存在的主要目的是为了让某个社区中的锅炉公司继续运营，而不管股东损失多少的公司完全不同。

I think it’s hard to judge corporate culture in the foreign countries as well as we can judge it in our own.

我认为，评估外国的企业文化比评估我们本国的企业文化要困难得多。

88. “We’re only interested in price and value”

“我们只对价格和价值感兴趣”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area five?

沃伦·巴菲特：请第5区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yvonne Edmonds (PH) from Cedar Mountain, North Carolina.

观众提问：我是伊冯·埃德蒙兹（音），来自北卡罗来纳州锡达山。

I have a specific question but not a trivial one. You regularly compare Berkshire Hathaway’s performance to the S&P 500, which is very helpful and very interesting.

我有一个具体但并不琐碎的问题。您经常将伯克希尔哈撒韦的表现与标普500指数进行比较，这非常有帮助也很有趣。

But I haven’t seen a correlation coefficient between the S&P 500 daily — from day-to-day — performance — to close, say — and Berkshire Hathaway’s close.

但我没有看到标普500指数每日表现（比如收盘）与伯克希尔哈撒韦收盘之间的相关系数。

Now, it so happens for me — and I’m sure some other people in the audience — that I don’t always have access to newspapers — or the internet, for that matter — newspapers that publish Berkshire Hathaway performance on a daily basis, or even a weekly basis for that matter, or a monthly basis.

对我来说（我相信在场的其他人也有类似情况），我并不总是能看到报道伯克希尔哈撒韦每日表现的报纸或网站，甚至每周或每月的报道。

It would be very helpful to know the extent of a correlation coefficient between those two variables. If you have that, would you let us know what it is? And if you don’t, would you please consider calculating it in the future?

了解这两个变量之间的相关系数会很有帮助。如果您知道这个系数，能否告诉我们？如果没有，您是否可以考虑未来计算它？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it could be calculated but I don’t think it would have much meaning. I mean, it would be an historical correlation coefficient which, you know, I would be very reluctant to have people place any weight in.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这个系数可以计算，但我不认为它有多大意义。它只是一个历史相关系数，我不愿意让人们过于看重这个数字。

I try to indicate even the limitations of the yearly comparison of the relative performance, because what was doable by us in the past is not doable today. I mentioned in my annual report, the best decade I ever had on comparative performance by far was the 50s.

我试图指出年度相对表现比较的局限性，因为我们过去能做到的事情，现在已经做不到了。我在年报中提到过，我在相对表现上的最佳十年是20世纪50年代。

Now, I don’t think it was because I was a lot smarter then — (laughs) — unwilling to accept that.

现在，我不认为这是因为我当时比现在聪明得多——（笑声）——我拒绝接受这个观点。

But you know, I had some edge of — well, it’s probably 40-plus points per year. But I was working with it — that has no relevance to today whatsoever. It would be misleading to publish it or make calculations based on it.

但你知道，当时我有一些优势——大概每年超过40个百分点。但这些成就与今天毫无关联。公布这些或基于此进行计算会具有误导性。

So I think that you would find — I don’t know what you’d find on a specific correlation between Berkshire and the S&P.

所以，我认为你可能会发现——但我不知道你能否找到伯克希尔和标普500之间的具体相关性。

You’d find a lot of correlation — well, you might not find so much — you’d find it in intrinsic value between that and Coke, and a few stocks like that.

你可能会发现一些相关性——但也可能发现不多——可能更多的是伯克希尔的内在价值与可口可乐和其他几只类似股票之间的相关性。

But I don’t really think that’s particularly useful information going forward. We have no objection, anybody wants to make the calculation. But it wouldn’t be something that would be of any utility to us, and if we don’t think it’s utility to us, we don’t want to put it out for shareholders as being of possible utility.

但我并不认为这种信息对未来特别有用。我们不反对任何人去做这样的计算，但对我们来说，这没有任何实用价值。如果我们认为对我们无用，我们也不会将其展示给股东，误导他们认为它可能有用。

We do think that the S&P annual calculation has some meaning because it’s an alternative for people to invest. They don’t need us to buy the S&P. So unless, over time, we have some advantage over that, you know, what are we contributing? What value is added by our management?

我们确实认为，标普500的年度表现计算是有意义的，因为这是人们的一个投资替代选项。他们不需要我们就可以买标普500。所以，如果从长远来看，我们不能比它有任何优势，那么我们在贡献什么？我们的管理增加了什么价值？

So we think that that’s — people should hold us accountable even though we would prefer not to be. Because it is a tough comparison for us as a tax-paying entity against a non — pre-tax calculation on the S&P.

所以我们认为，人们应该以此来要求我们负责，尽管我们可能更希望不被这样要求。因为作为一个纳税实体，与标普500这种未税计算相比，这对我们来说是一个艰难的比较。

But we don’t pay any attention to beta or any of that sort of thing. It just doesn’t mean anything to us. We’re only interested in price and value. And that’s what we’re focusing on all the time, and any kind of market movements or anything don’t mean anything.

但我们从不关注贝塔值或类似的东西。这些对我们来说毫无意义。我们只关心价格和价值。这是我们始终关注的重点，任何市场波动或其他事情都毫无意义。

I don’t know what Berkshire is selling for today and it really makes no difference. You know, it just doesn’t make any difference.

我不知道今天伯克希尔的股价是多少，这实际上也没有任何区别。你知道，这根本不重要。

What does count is where it is 10 years from now. And I can’t tell you what it was selling for on May 4th, 1983, or May 4th, 1986, so I don’t care what it sells for on May 4th, 1998.

重要的是10年后的情况。我不能告诉你1983年5月4日或1986年5月4日的股价是多少，所以我也不关心1998年5月4日的股价是多少。

I do care, you know, where it is, in general, 10 years from now, and that’s where all the focus is.

我关心的是，10年后总体上它会是什么样子，这是我们所有的关注点所在。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we’re publishing data in the form where we would like it if we were the passive shareholder. And so you’re getting the data and you’re getting it on a time schedule based on what we would want if we were in your position.

查理·芒格：是的，我们以一种我们作为被动股东也会喜欢的方式发布数据。所以你们得到的数据，以及时间安排，都是基于我们在你们的位置上会希望得到的内容。

And we don’t think — (laughter as Buffett holds up a Dairy Queen Dilly Bar that was just given to him) — and we don’t think the correlation coefficients would help us.

我们不认为——（笑声，巴菲特拿起刚刚递给他的冰雪皇后Dilly Bar）——相关系数会对我们有帮助。

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t think anything that relates either to volume, price action, relative strength, any of that sort of thing — and bear in mind, when I was in my teens I used to eat that stuff up. I mean, I was making calculations based on it all the time, and kept charts on it, even wrote an article or two on it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不认为任何与成交量、价格行为、相对强弱等相关的东西有任何意义——请记住，我十几岁的时候对此着迷不已。我那时总是在做这类计算，绘制相关图表，甚至还写过一两篇文章。

But it just — it just has no place in the operation now.

但现在，这些在我们的操作中毫无位置可言。

CHARLIE MUNGER: One of the pleasant things about dealing with Warren all these years is he’s never talked about a correlation coefficient. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这些年来，与沃伦共事的一件令人愉快的事情是，他从来没有谈过相关系数。（笑声）

If the correlation isn’t so extreme you can see it with the naked eye, he doesn’t compute it. (Laughter)

如果相关性没有明显到你用肉眼就能看出来，他是不会去计算它的。（笑声）

89. Beware of companies that must “spend money like crazy”

小心那些“疯狂花钱”的公司

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re going to go to zone 6 and I’m going to have a Dilly Bar, and Charlie has got one here, too. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，现在请第6区提问。我先吃一根Dilly Bar，查理也有一根。（笑声与掌声）

These are terrific.

这些真的很棒。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question has to do with what you mentioned earlier about how companies have to reinvest a certain amount of cash in their business every year just to stay in place.

观众提问：我的问题与您之前提到的公司每年必须在业务中再投资一定数量的现金以保持现状有关。

And if one could say that the best businesses are the ones that not only throw off lots of cash, but can reinvest it in more capacity. But I suppose the paradox is that the better a company’s opportunities for making expansionary capital expenditures, the worse they appear to be as consumers of cash rather than generators of cash.

如果说最优秀的企业不仅能创造大量现金流，还能将这些现金再投入到扩大产能上去的话，那么这里就存在一个悖论：一家企业越是拥有更好的机会来进行扩张性资本支出，就越会显得它在消耗现金，而非在创造现金。

What specific techniques have you used to figure out the maintenance capital expenditures that you need to do in order to figure out how much cash a company is throwing off? What techniques have you used on Gillette or other companies that you’ve studied?

您使用了哪些具体方法来确定维护性资本支出，以了解一家公司能产生多少现金？在吉列或其他公司上，您使用了哪些方法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you look at a company such as Gillette or Coke, you won’t find great differences between their depreciation — forget about amortization for the moment — but depreciation and sort of the required capital expenditures.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果你看像吉列或可口可乐这样的公司，你会发现它们的折旧费用——暂时不考虑摊销——与所需的资本支出之间没有太大差异。

If we got into a hyperinflationary period or — I mean, you can find — you can set up cases where that wouldn’t be true.

如果我们进入一个超级通胀时期——我的意思是，你可以设想一些例子，这种情况可能不成立。

But by and large, the depreciation charge is not inappropriate in most companies to use as a proxy for required capital expenditures. Which is why we think that reported earnings plus amortization of intangibles usually gives a pretty good indication of earning power.

但总体来说，大多数公司的折旧费用用作所需资本支出的替代指标是比较适当的。这也是为什么我们认为报告的收益加上无形资产摊销通常能很好地反映公司的盈利能力。

I don’t — I’ve never given a thought to whether Gillette needs to spend a hundred million dollars more, a hundred million dollars less, than depreciation in order to maintain its competitive position. But I would guess the range is even considerably less than that versus its recorded depreciation.

我从未考虑过吉列是否需要比折旧多花一亿美元，或少花一亿美元，以维持其竞争地位。但我猜测，这个范围比其记录的折旧费用还要小得多。

Businesses you have to worry about — I mean, an airline business is a good case. In the airlines, you know, you just have to keep spending money like crazy. And you have to spend money like crazy if it’s attractive to spend money, and you have to spend it the same way if it’s unattractive. You just — it’s part of the game.

你需要担心的业务——我的意思是，航空业就是一个很好的例子。在航空业，你知道的，你必须不停地疯狂花钱。即使花钱很有吸引力，你也得这么做；而即使花钱不划算，你也得这么做。这就是游戏的一部分。

Even in our textile business, to stay competitive we would’ve needed to spend substantial money without any necessary — any clear prospects of making any money when we got through spending it.

即使在我们的纺织业务中，为了保持竞争力，我们也需要投入大量资金，而在投入后并没有明确的赚钱前景。

And those are real traps, those kind of businesses. And they make out one way or another, but they’re dangerous.

而这些业务就是实实在在的陷阱。这些业务可能会通过某种方式取得一些成果，但它们很危险。

And in a See’s Candy we would love to be able to spend 10 million, 100 million, $500 million and get anything like the returns we’ve gotten in the past.

在See’s糖果业务中，我们很想投入1000万、1亿、甚至5亿美元，并获得类似我们过去的回报。

But there aren’t good ways to do it, unfortunately. We’ll keep looking, but it’s not a business where capital produces the profits.

但不幸的是，没有好的方式实现这一点。我们会继续寻找，但这不是一个资本能直接带来利润的业务。

At FlightSafety, capital produces the profits. You need more simulators as you go along, and more pilots are to be trained, and so capital is required to produce profits. But it’s just not the case at See’s.

在FlightSafety，资本确实带来了利润。随着业务发展，你需要更多的模拟器，需要培训更多的飞行员，因此资本是产生利润的必要条件。但在See’s糖果业务中情况并非如此。

And at Coca-Cola, particularly when new markets come along, you know, the Chinas of the world or East Germany or something of the sort, the Coca-Cola Company itself would frequently make the investments needed to build up the bottling infrastructure to rapidly capitalize on those markets, the old Soviet Union.

在可口可乐公司，尤其是当新市场出现时，比如中国、东德或类似的地方，可口可乐公司本身通常会进行必要的投资，建立瓶装基础设施，以快速抓住这些市场的机会，比如前苏联市场。

So those are — those are expenditures — you don’t even make the calculation on them, you just know you’ve have to do it.

所以这些——这些支出——甚至无需计算，你只需要知道必须这么做。

You got a wonderful business, and you want to have it spread worldwide, and you want to capitalize on it to its fullest.

你拥有一个出色的业务，你希望它在全球范围内扩展，并充分利用其潜力。

And you can make a return on investment calculation, but as far as I’m concerned it’s a waste of time because you’re going to do it anyway, and you know you want to dominate those markets over time.

你可以进行投资回报计算，但在我看来，这是浪费时间，因为你无论如何都会去做，而且你知道你希望长期主导那些市场。

And eventually, you’ll probably fold those investments into other bottling systems as the market gets developed. But you don’t want to wait for conventional bottlers to do it, you want to be there.

最终，随着市场的发展，你可能会将这些投资纳入其他瓶装系统中。但你不想等传统的瓶装公司来做，你希望自己提前布局。

One of the ironies, incidentally — and might get a kick out of it, some of the older members of the audience — that when the Berlin Wall went down and Coke was there that day with Coca-Cola for East Germany, that Coke came from the bottling plant at Dunkirk.

顺便提一下，这有点讽刺——在场的年长观众可能会觉得有趣——当柏林墙倒塌时，可口可乐当天为东德提供的饮料是来自敦刻尔克的瓶装厂。

So there was a certain poetic — (crowd noise) — irony there.

所以，这里确实有某种富有诗意的——（观众骚动）——讽刺。

Charlie, do you have anything on this?

查理，你对这个问题有什么补充吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve heard Warren say since very early in his life that the difference between a good business and a bad business is usually the good business just throws up one easy decision after another, whereas the bad business gives you a horrible choice where the decision is hard to make and, is this really going to work? And is it worth the money?

查理·芒格：从很早的时候起，我就听沃伦说过，好的生意和坏的生意之间的区别通常在于，好的生意会不断抛出一个又一个简单的决策，而坏的生意则会让你面临一个又一个糟糕的选择，让人难以决断：“这真的会有效吗？值得投入这笔钱吗？”

If you want a system for determining which is a good business and which is a bad business, just see which one is throwing the management bloopers time after time after time.

如果你想要一个评估什么是好生意，什么是坏生意的系统，那就看看哪种生意不断地让管理层轻松做出明智决策。

Easy decisions. It’s not very hard for us to decide to open a new See’s store in a new shopping center in California that’s obviously going to succeed. It’s a blooper.

简单的决策。比如，我们决定在加州一个显然会成功的新购物中心开一家See’s店，这并不难。这就是轻松的选择。

On the other hand, there are plenty of businesses where the decisions that come across your desk are just awful. And those businesses, by and large, don’t work very well.

另一方面，有许多生意的决策非常糟糕。而这些生意整体表现通常不太好。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been on the board of Coke now for 10 years, and we’ve had project after project come up, and there’s always an ROI. But it doesn’t really make much difference to me, because in the end almost any decision you make that solidifies and extends the dominance of Coke around the world in an industry that’s growing by a significant percentage, and which has great inherent underlying profitability, the decisions are going to be right and you’ve got people there that will execute them well.

沃伦·巴菲特：我已经在可口可乐董事会待了10年，期间我们审议了一个又一个项目，每个项目都有投资回报率（ROI）的计算。但这对我来说并不重要，因为最终，只要你做出的决策能巩固和扩大可口可乐在全球的主导地位，而这个行业的增长率又非常可观，且具有巨大的内在盈利能力，那么这些决策大概率是正确的，而且公司有优秀的人去很好地执行它们。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re saying you get blooper after blooper.

查理·芒格：你的意思是，你们一个又一个地做出简单的明智决策。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And then Charlie and I sat on USAir, and the decisions would come along, and it would be a question of, you know, do you buy the Eastern Shuttle, or whatever it may be?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而查理和我在USAir的董事会时，做出的决策就完全不同了，比如“你是否要买下东部航线”，或者其他类似问题。

And you’re running out of money. And yet to play the game and to keep the traffic flow with connecting passengers, I mean, you just have to continually make these decisions — whether you spend a hundred million dollars more on some airport.

而且你的资金快用完了。但为了参与竞争并维持转机乘客的流量，你必须不断做出这些决策——比如是否再在某个机场投入一亿美元。

And they’re agony because, again, you don’t have any real choice, but you also don’t have any real conviction that it’s going to translate — those choices are going to — or lack of choices — are going to translate themselves into real money later on.

这些决策很痛苦，因为你其实没有真正的选择，而且你也没有真正的信心认为这些选择——或者说缺乏选择——最终会带来实际的收益。

So one game is just forcing you to push more money in to the table with no idea of what kind of a hand you hold, and the other one you get a chance to push more money in, knowing that you’ve got a winning hand all the way.

所以，一个是你被迫投入更多资金，但对自己手上的牌完全没底；而另一个则是你有机会投入更多资金，同时知道自己从头到尾都握着一副好牌。

Charlie? Why’d we buy USAir? (Laughter)

查理？我们为什么会买USAir？（笑声）

Could’ve bought more Coke.

我们本可以买更多可口可乐的股票。

90. Berkshire is prepared for adversity

伯克希尔为逆境做好了准备

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第7区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bakul Patel (PH). I am from upstate New York.

观众提问：我叫巴库尔·帕特尔（音），来自纽约州北部。

And my question is, is Berkshire prepared for 1929 style of depression or, like, a prolonged bear market that exists in Japan? And would it be as successful in those situations?

我的问题是，伯克希尔是否为类似1929年那样的大萧条，或者像日本那样长期的熊市做好了准备？在这种情况下，公司是否仍会取得成功？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we are probably — we don’t expect what you’re talking about, but we are probably about as well-prepared as any company can be for adversity, because Berkshire has been built to last.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们可能——我们并不期望出现你提到的情况，但我们可能是为逆境做好准备的公司中准备得最充分的一家，因为伯克希尔是为了长久运营而建立的。

Net, we would benefit over a 20-year period by having some periods of terrible markets periodically in that 20-year period. That doesn’t mean we’re wishing for them and it doesn’t mean they’re going to happen, but —

总的来说，在20年里，若期间有一些糟糕的市场阶段，我们会受益。这并不意味着我们希望这种情况发生，也不意味着它一定会发生，但——

We make our money by allocating capital well, and the lower the general stock market would be, the better we can allocate capital. So we’re well-prepared but we’re not necessarily expecting.

我们通过良好的资本配置赚钱，而股市越低迷，我们的资本配置能力越能得到发挥。所以我们做好了准备，但并不一定预期这种情况会发生。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we are not going to ever sell everything and go to cash and wait for the crash so we can go back in.

查理·芒格：是的，我们永远不会卖掉所有资产转为现金，然后等待市场崩盘后再进入市场。

On the other hand, we are structured so that I think, net, a lot of turmoil in the next 20 years will help us, not hurt us. I don’t mean it’ll be pleasant to go through the downcycle, but it’s part of the game.

另一方面，我们的结构使得我认为，在接下来的20年里，市场的很多动荡总的来说对我们有利，而非不利。我并不是说经历下行周期会令人愉快，但这就是游戏的一部分。

91. “We’re never going to give out advice on Berkshire stock”

“我们永远不会就伯克希尔股票给出建议”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第8区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Pete Banner (PH) from Boulder, Colorado. First of all, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for your genuine generosity today.

观众提问：我是皮特·班纳（音），来自科罗拉多州博尔德市。首先，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢你们今天的真诚慷慨。

Berkshire closed yesterday, the A share was about — or Friday — $69,000 and the B share was about $2,300. Do you feel that price is grossly overpriced, or grossly underpriced, or reasonably priced?

伯克希尔昨天（或上周五）收盘时，A类股约为69,000美元，B类股约为2,300美元。您觉得这个价格是严重高估、严重低估，还是合理的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll let Charlie answer that one. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我让查理回答这个问题。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m not going to say. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我不会回答。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we’re just never going to — we’re never going to give out advice on Berkshire stock. There’s no —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们绝不会——我们永远不会就伯克希尔股票给出建议。没有任何理由——

You know, that is up to people who want to buy and sell it, and anything we would say could easily get magnified, and people would be acting on it months later, and who knows all the problems that it could produce, so —

你知道，这是由想买卖股票的人自己决定的。而我们说的任何话都可能被轻易放大，人们可能会在几个月后依据这些话采取行动，谁知道这可能会带来什么问题，所以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It would be quite eccentric if we were to every day put out an announcement, “Now’s the time to buy, now’s the time to sell,” our own stock.

查理·芒格：如果我们每天都发布公告，说“现在是买入的时机”或“现在是卖出的时机”，那就太古怪了。

Eccentric we are, but that eccentric we aren’t. (Laughter and applause)

我们是有些古怪，但还没古怪到那种程度。（笑声与掌声）

92. George Burns: role model for surviving unhealthy habits

乔治·伯恩斯：健康恶习中存活的榜样

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第9区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Irene Finster, your longtime partner from Tulsa, Oklahoma —

观众提问：我是艾琳·芬斯特（音），您在俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的长期合作伙伴——

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi, Irene. Yeah, Irene has a soda fountain. You ought to go visit her. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗨，艾琳。对，艾琳有一家汽水店，你们应该去拜访她。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: First I want to thank you for giving your shareholders the opportunity to select their own charities.

观众提问：首先，我要感谢您给股东提供了选择自己支持慈善机构的机会。

And second, I’m very concerned about your health due to your diet — (Laughter) — of red meat —

其次，我非常担心您的健康，因为您的饮食——（笑声）——包含红肉——

WARREN BUFFETT: Irene. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：艾琳。（掌声）

Irene, these are our products that I’m eating. (Laughter)

艾琳，这些是我们的产品，我在吃这些。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Red meat, candy, ice cream — (laughter) — and —

观众提问：红肉、糖果、冰淇淋——（笑声）——还有——

WARREN BUFFETT: And that’s just what I do — that’s what I do in public —

沃伦·巴菲特：而且这些只是我——只是我在公开场合吃的——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: —and Coke. (Laughter)

观众提问：——还有可乐。（笑声）

And I want to know what your doctor says. (Laughter)

我想知道您的医生是怎么说的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: My doctor says I must be heavily relying on my genes. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我的医生说，我肯定非常依赖我的基因。（笑声）

No, I will tell you, I — I mean, Charlie and I are both very healthful. If you were in the life insurance business, you would be happy to write us at standard rates, I could assure you of that. (Laughter)

不，我告诉你——我的意思是，查理和我都非常健康。如果你从事寿险业务，你会乐于为我们按标准费率承保，这一点我可以向你保证。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, they asked George Burns when he was 95, “What does your doctor say about smoking these big, black cigars?” And he said, “My doctor’s dead.” (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：你知道，有人问乔治·伯恩斯，95岁的时候，“你的医生对你抽这些又大又黑的雪茄有什么看法？”他说：“我的医生已经去世了。”（笑声与掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I played bridge with George when he was about 97, I’d say, at the Hillcrest Country Club. And there was a big sign behind him that said, “No smoking by anyone under 95.” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我记得，查理和我大约在乔治97岁时和他一起在希尔克雷斯特乡村俱乐部打桥牌。身后挂着一块大牌子，上面写着：“95岁以下的人禁止吸烟。”（笑声）

And actually, at his 95th birthday party, he had about five very good-looking young girls that were there to greet him with a big cake and everything. And he looked them over one after another and he said, “Oh girls,” he said, “I’m 95. One of you is going to have to come back tomorrow.” (Laughter and applause)

实际上，在他95岁的生日派对上，有五位非常漂亮的年轻女孩拿着大蛋糕来迎接他。他一个接一个地看着她们，说：“哦，姑娘们，”他说，“我已经95岁了，你们中的一个明天还得再来。”（笑声与掌声）

We’re very big on George Burns in recent years. (Laughter)

近年来，我们对乔治·伯恩斯非常推崇。（笑声）

93. “We wait indefinitely”

“我们无限期等待”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第10区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hubert Vose (PH). I’m from Santa Barbara, California.

观众提问：我叫休伯特·沃斯（音），来自加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉市。

Earlier this morning, you made a comment that if the market fell you would be spending less time on the internet because you’d be very busy. And this is reinforced an impression I have had that the cash flows of Berkshire Hathaway are enormous, but that possibly in the last 12 months you’ve been investing less than you had previously.

今天早上，您提到如果市场下跌，您将在互联网上花费更少时间，因为您会非常忙。这让我更深刻地印象到，伯克希尔哈撒韦的现金流非常庞大，但可能在过去的12个月里，您的投资少于以前。

And if so — if this is correct, what does that say about waiting for attractive values? How long are you willing to wait, and what does that say to the investment public in their own habits?

如果是这样——如果这是正确的，那么这对等待具有吸引力的价值意味着什么？您愿意等多久？这对普通投资者的投资习惯又有什么启示？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re correct that we have not found anything to speak of in equities in a good many months, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你的说法是正确的，我们确实已经很多个月没有在股票市场找到值得一提的投资机会了，而且——

The question of how long we wait, we wait indefinitely. We are not going to buy anything just to buy something. We will only buy something if we think we’re getting something attractive.

至于我们会等多久，我们会无限期地等待。我们不会为了买而买。我们只会在认为得到了具有吸引力的东西时才会买入。

And that — and incidentally, if things were 5 percent cheaper that — or 10 percent cheaper — that wouldn’t change anything materially.

顺便说一句，即使价格降低5%或10%，也不会从根本上改变我们的决策。

So we have no idea when that period ends. We have no idea whether — as I’ve said, it can turn out that these valuations are perfectly appropriate if returns on equity stay where they are. But even then, they aren’t in the least mouthwatering, so we won’t feel we’ve missed anything particularly if returns stay where they are.

因此，我们不知道这种等待会持续多久。正如我所说的，如果股本回报率保持在现有水平，那么这些估值可能是完全合适的。但即便如此，这些估值也一点都不诱人，所以如果股本回报率保持在当前水平，我们也不会觉得自己错过了什么特别的机会。

Because if it turns out that these levels are OK, they still will not produce great returns from here, in our view. That doesn’t mean you couldn’t have a tremendous market in the short-term or something of the sort.

因为如果事实证明这些估值水平是合理的，从我们的角度来看，它们仍然不会带来巨大的回报。当然，这并不意味着短期内市场不会出现一波大涨或类似的情况。

Markets can do anything. And you look at the history of markets and you just see everything under the sun.

市场可以做任何事情。当你回顾市场的历史时，你会看到各种可能的情况。

But we will not — you know — we have no timeframe. If the money piles up, the money piles up. And when we see something that makes sense, we’re willing to act very fast, very big. But we’re not willing to act on anything that doesn’t check out in our view.

但我们不会——你知道的——设定任何时间表。如果资金积累起来了，那就积累起来。当我们看到合理的机会时，我们愿意快速、大规模地采取行动。但我们不会对那些在我们看来不符合标准的机会采取行动。

There’s no — you don’t get paid for activity, you only get paid for being right.

没有必要——你不会因为活动频繁而赚钱，你只会因为正确而赚钱。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. An occasional dull stretch for new buying, this is no great tragedy in an investment lifetime.

查理·芒格：是的。偶尔在新买入方面经历一段沉闷的时期，这在投资生涯中并不是一场巨大的悲剧。

Other things may be possible in such an era, too. I mean, it isn’t like we have a quiver with only one arrow.

在这种时期可能还会有其他机会。我的意思是，我们的箭袋里不止一支箭。

WARREN BUFFETT: We sat through periods before. I mean, the most dramatic one being the early ’70s — late ‘60s and early ’70s.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们之前也经历过类似的时期。我指的是最戏剧化的一次是20世纪70年代初——60年代末和70年代初。

20年前。

For a long time it seemed — doesn’t seem so long when you look back on it, seems long when you’re going through it — but it — like having a tooth pulled or something, but it’s, you know, what can you do about it?

当时看起来似乎很漫长——回顾起来不觉得那么长，但经历时感觉很长——就像拔牙一样，但你知道，没什么能改变这种状况。

The businesses aren’t going to perform better in the future just because you got antsy and decided you had to buy something. We will wait till we find something we like.

企业的未来表现不会因为你焦虑并决定必须买点什么而变得更好。我们会等到找到我们喜欢的东西为止。

We’ll love it when we can swing in a big way, though. That’s our style.

但当我们可以大手笔出击时，我们会非常喜欢。这就是我们的风格。

94. “Certified record of failure” in real estate

“房地产领域的失败纪录”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第1区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Larry Pekowski (PH), Millburn, New Jersey.

观众提问：我是拉里·佩考斯基（音），来自新泽西州米尔本。

Berkshire seems never to have made any real, pure real estate investments, not counting facilities the operating companies might own, with the exception of Wesco’s involvement in the residential project in California.

伯克希尔似乎从未进行过真正的、纯粹的房地产投资，不包括运营公司可能拥有的设施，除了Wesco参与加州的住宅项目。

I was wondering if you’ve ever looked at a real estate transaction and tried to apply the same filters, meaning competitive advantages, returns on capital, that you do in operating companies.

我想知道，您是否曾经评估过房地产交易，并尝试应用与运营公司相同的过滤标准，比如竞争优势和资本回报率？

And if not, is it a circle of competence issue, or is there something you find disinteresting about real estate?

如果没有，是因为能力圈的问题，还是您对房地产领域不感兴趣？

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible)

查理·芒格：（听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: You want to take it? OK, Charlie wants to take this one.

沃伦·巴菲特：你想回答这个问题？好的，查理想回答这个问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me take this one, because here’s an area where we have a perfect record that extends over many decades.

查理·芒格：让我来回答这个问题吧，因为在这个领域，我们几十年来拥有一个完美的纪录。

We have been demonstrably foolish in almost every operation that had to do with real estate we’ve ever touched.

我们在几乎每一笔涉及房地产的操作中，都表现得极其愚蠢。

Every time we had a surplus plant and didn’t want to hit the bid and let some developer kind of take an unfair advantage of us, we would of been better off later if we’d hit the bid and invested the money in fields where we had the expertise.

每次我们有闲置的厂房，不愿意接受出价，害怕被某些开发商占了便宜，但后来事实证明，如果当时接受出价并把资金投向我们擅长的领域，会更明智。

That housing tract that I developed because I didn’t want to let the zoning authorities rob me the way they wanted to. I wish I had let them. (Laughter)

我开发的那个住宅项目是因为我不想让规划部门按照他们的意图“抢劫”我。但现在我希望当时就让他们得逞。（笑声）

We have a certified record of failure in this deal. (Laughter)

在这方面，我们确实有一个失败的认证纪录。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And the funny thing is, we understand real estate. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是，我们其实懂房地产。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we’re good at it. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：而且我们还挺擅长的。（笑声与掌声）

Right.

是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Actually, (inaudible), we do understand real estate. And Charlie got his start in real estate.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，（听不清）我们确实了解房地产。而且查理是从房地产起步的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but we understand other things better. And so the chances that we’re going to be big in real estate are low.

查理·芒格：是的，但我们对其他领域的理解更深。因此，我们在房地产领域大展拳脚的可能性很低。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve seen lots of things, and we’ve — the prices, you know, just don’t intrigue us, in terms of what we get for our money.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。我们见过很多项目，但从投资回报来看，这些价格并不吸引我们。

I tried to buy a town when I was, what, 21 years old. The U.S. government had a town in Ohio for sale and it would of worked out very well. I’m always — there’s nothing about the arena that turns us off, but we don’t see great returns available.

我21岁的时候曾试图买下一座城镇。美国政府在俄亥俄州出售一座城镇，如果当时买了会是个不错的投资。我一直觉得，这个领域没有什么让我们感到排斥的地方，但我们看不到很好的回报机会。

And like Charlie says, the few things — (inaudible) old plant or something, that is not — we have not been great at working our way out of those.

正如查理所说，那些零星的项目——比如旧厂房之类的——我们在这些领域表现得并不出色，也没有很好地从中脱身。

Fortunately, they haven’t been very important in relation to the net worth of Berkshire.

幸运的是，这些项目与伯克希尔的净资产相比并不重要。

95. Nike: “We keep all of those views to ourselves”

耐克：“我们将这些观点保留给自己”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第2区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Fred Costano (PH) from Detroit, Michigan. My question concerns Nike.

观众提问：下午好。我叫弗雷德·科斯塔诺（音），来自密歇根州底特律。我的问题与耐克有关。

Nike is a company experiencing some short-term problems, but it’s a great company with an excellent track record. Phil Knight is similar to Bill Gates in the respect that he’s a marketing genius and is a very hard worker. Making sneakers is a very simple business with high margins.

耐克目前遇到了一些短期问题，但这是一家拥有卓越业绩记录的伟大公司。菲尔·奈特与比尔·盖茨相似，他是一个营销天才，同时也是一个非常勤奋的人。做运动鞋是一项简单但利润率很高的业务。

How do you view Nike and what do you think of the company?

您如何看待耐克？您对这家公司有什么看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think Phil Knight is a terrific operator. I think — and he’s a competitor. He’s got a lot of money in Nike.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为菲尔·奈特是一位出色的运营者。他是一个竞争者，同时在耐克有大量投资。

But as terms of what we think of the stock, you know, we keep all of those views to ourselves pretty much.

但至于我们对耐克股票的看法，这些观点基本上是我们保留在自己内部的。

96. Buffett doesn’t expect litigation over fats in food

巴菲特认为食品中的脂肪不会引发诉讼

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：请第3区提问？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Ed Clinton and I’m from Chicago, Illinois.

观众提问：你好，我是埃德·克林顿（音），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。

I’m wondering about the tobacco litigation. There’s also — there have been some comments about fatty food.

我想问一下烟草诉讼。关于脂肪含量高的食品也有一些评论。

Do you think there’s going to be a new trend of fatty food litigation coming out of the tobacco problems?

您认为是否会因为烟草问题而引发关于脂肪食品的诉讼新趋势？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I sign a waiver before I — (laughs) — do any of that myself.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我在参与任何此类事情之前都会先签一份免责声明——（笑声）。

No, I would doubt — I would — I do not see those two as being remotely similar.

不，我对此表示怀疑——我不认为这两者有任何相似之处。

But Charlie, do you have any different views on it?

不过，查理，你对此有不同的看法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the traditional tort system is particularly ill-suited for solving what might be called the tobacco health problem. So I regard that whole thing as sort of a Mad Hatter’s Tea-Party. And we sit out from afar.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为传统的侵权法体系特别不适合解决所谓的烟草健康问题。所以我把整个事情看作是一场疯帽子的茶会。而我们只是远远地旁观。

97. Lots of credit to go around for strong economy

美国经济强劲表现归功于多方努力

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第4区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, I’m Fred Bunch from near Tightwad, Missouri.

观众提问：是的，我是弗雷德·邦奇（音），来自密苏里州泰特沃德镇附近。

WARREN BUFFETT: What was the name of that town? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你说那个镇叫什么名字？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Tightwad, Missouri.

观众提问：密苏里州泰特沃德镇。

WARREN BUFFETT: Tightwad, Missouri, huh? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：泰特沃德镇，密苏里州，是吗？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: There’s a bank there.

观众提问：那里有一家银行。

WARREN BUFFETT: Did they name it after me or Charlie? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他们是用我的名字还是查理的名字命名的？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, either one, really. (Buffett laughs)

观众提问：嗯，其实两位都挺合适的。（巴菲特笑）

You’d both fit in. (Buffett laughs)

你们两个都很适合。（巴菲特笑）

In light of today’s healthy growth and stability of the American economy at the present time and over the last five years or so, how much credit, if any, do you give the Clinton administration and why?

考虑到当前以及过去五年来美国经济的健康增长和稳定表现，您认为克林顿政府对此有多大功劳？为什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I give credit to — I give credit going back to Volcker, significant credit to Volcker.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会将功劳归于——我认为沃尔克应该得到很大的功劳。

I give credit to Reagan. I give credit to — certainly to Greenspan and to Rubin, and I give credit to Clinton on that — I think that first tax bill was very important. It carried by one vote. And I think he may listen to Rubin.

我也归功于里根，当然还有格林斯潘和鲁宾。我也认为克林顿应该得到一些功劳——我认为他通过的第一份税收法案非常重要，这份法案是以一票之差通过的。我觉得他可能听取了鲁宾的建议。

So I think there’s a lot to give credit for and I think you can spread it around a fair amount.

所以，我认为有很多值得表扬的地方，而且这些功劳可以合理地分散给多方。

Charlie may be less charitable here. Let’s see. (Laughter)

查理可能不会这么慷慨，让我们听听他的看法。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’ve got no great quarrel with the way the country — the economy’s reformed. I think it’s way better than any of us would’ve predicted.

查理·芒格：不，我对国家——或者说经济改革的方式没有大的异议。我认为它的表现远超我们任何人的预期。

98. How Phil Fisher’s “scuttlebutt” method changed Buffett’s life

菲尔·费雪的“边界调查法”如何改变了巴菲特的人生

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：请第5区提问？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Travis Heath (PH). I’m from Dallas, Texas.

观众提问：我叫特拉维斯·希思（音），来自德克萨斯州达拉斯。

And my question regards what Phil Fisher referred to as “scuttlebutt.” When you’ve identified a business that you consider to warrant further investigation — more intense investigation — how much time do you spend commonly, both in terms of total hours and in terms of the span in weeks or months that you perform that investigation over?

我的问题是关于菲尔·费雪提到的“边界调查法”。当您确定一家值得进一步深入调查的企业时，通常您会花多少时间进行这项调查？总时长是多少？调查通常会持续几周或几个月？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that question is that now I spend practically none because I’ve done it in the past. And the one advantage of allocating capital is that an awful lot of what you do is cumulative in nature, so that you do get continuing benefits out of things that you’d done earlier.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这个问题的答案是，我现在几乎不花时间了，因为过去我已经做过这些调查了。而资本配置的一大优势在于，很多事情的性质是累积性的，因此你会从之前做过的事情中持续受益。

So by now, I’m probably fairly familiar with most of the businesses that might qualify for investment at Berkshire.

因此，到现在为止，我可能已经相当熟悉那些可能符合伯克希尔投资标准的业务了。

But when I started out, and for a long time I used to do a lot of what Phil Fisher described — I followed his scuttlebutt method. And I don’t think you can do too much of it.

但在我刚起步的时候，以及很长一段时间里，我做了很多菲尔·费雪描述的事情——我遵循了他的“边界调查法”。而且我认为这方面的调查永远不会做得过多。

Now, the general premise of why you’re interested in something should be 80 percent of it or thereabouts. I mean, you don’t want to be chasing down every idea that way, so you should have a strong presumption.

不过，你感兴趣的某件事情的总体前提应该占到80%左右。我的意思是，你不想用这种方法追踪每一个想法，所以你需要有一个强有力的假设前提。

You should be like a basketball coach who runs into a seven-footer on the street. I mean, you’re interested to start with; now you have to find out if you can keep him in school, if he’s coordinated, and all that sort of thing. That’s the scuttlebutt aspect of it.

你应该像一个篮球教练在街上遇到一个七英尺高的球员一样。我的意思是，你一开始就应该感兴趣；然后你需要了解他是否能留在学校，是否协调，诸如此类的事情。这就是“边界调查法”的一个方面。

But I believe that as you’re acquiring knowledge about industries in general, companies specifically, that there really isn’t anything like first doing some reading about them, and then getting out and talking to competitors, and customers, and suppliers, and ex-employees, and current employees, and whatever it may be.

但我相信，在你获取行业一般知识和具体公司信息时，确实没有什么比先阅读资料，然后与竞争对手、客户、供应商、前雇员、现雇员以及其他相关人士交流更有效的方法了。

And you will learn a lot. But it should be the last 20 percent or 10 percent. I mean, you don’t want to get too impressed by that, because you really want to start with a business where you think the economics are good, where they look like seven-footers, and then you want to go out with a scuttlebutt approach to possibly reject your original hypothesis.

你会从中学到很多。但这应该是最后的20%或10%的工作。我的意思是，你不想对这些印象过深，因为你确实应该从一家你认为经济状况良好的企业开始，就像那些七英尺高的球员一样，然后用“边界调查法”来验证或否定你的原始假设。

And if you talk to a bunch of people on an industry and you ask them what competitor they fear the most, and why they fear them, and all of that sort of thing. You know, who would they use the silver bullet of Andy Grove’s on and so on, you’re going to learn a lot about it.

如果你和一群业内人士交谈，问他们最害怕的竞争对手是谁，为什么害怕，以及相关的事情，比如他们会用“安迪·格罗夫的银弹”瞄准谁，你会从中学到很多东西。

You’ll probably know more about the industry than most of the people in it when you get through, because you’ll bring an independent perspective to it, and you’ll be listening to everything everyone says rather than coming in with these preconceived notions and just sort of listening to your own truths after a while.

等你完成调查时，你可能比业内大多数人对行业的了解更多，因为你带来了一个独立的视角，并且会倾听每个人的看法，而不是抱着预设立场，仅仅听从自己一开始的成见。

I advise it. I don’t really do it much anymore. I do it a little bit, and I talked in the annual report about how when we made the decision on keeping the American Express when we exchanged our Percs for common stock in 1994, I was using the scuttlebutt approach when I talked to Frank Olson.

我建议大家使用这种方法。我现在几乎不怎么用了，只是偶尔用一下。我在年度报告中提到过，当我们1994年决定将我们的优先股换成美国运通的普通股时，我就是通过与弗兰克·奥尔森的对话使用了“边界调查法”。

I couldn’t have talked to a better guy than Frank Olson. Frank Olson, running Hertz Corporation, lots of experience at United Airlines, and a consumer marketing guy by nature. I mean, he understands business.

没有人比弗兰克·奥尔森更适合交谈了。他经营着赫兹公司，有丰富的United Airlines经验，本质上是一个消费品营销专家。他真的很懂生意。

And when I asked him how strong the American Express card was and what were the strengths and the weaknesses of it, and who was coming along after it, and so on, I mean, he could give me an answer in five minutes that would be better than I could accomplish in hours and hours and hours or weeks of roaming around and doing other things.

当我问他美国运通卡有多强，它的优势和劣势是什么，以及未来可能有哪些竞争对手时，他能在五分钟内给我一个比我花数小时甚至数周时间调查得到的答案更好、更全面的答案。

So you can learn from people. And Frank was a user of it. I mean, Frank was paying X percent to American Express for his Hertz cars. And Frank doesn’t like to pay out money, so why was he paying that? And if he was paying more than he was paying on Master Charge or Visa, why was he paying more? And then what could he do about it?

你可以从人那里学到很多东西。弗兰克自己就是美国运通的用户。他为赫兹的租车业务向美国运通支付了X%的费用。而弗兰克并不喜欢支付额外的费用，那么他为什么愿意支付这笔钱？如果这比他支付给万事达或Visa的费用更高，他为什么还愿意支付？他还能做些什么？

I mean, you just keep asking questions.

我的意思是，你需要不断地问问题。

And I guess Davy [Lorimer Davidson] explained that in that video we had ahead of time. I’m very grateful to him for doing that, because that was a real effort for him.

我想洛瑞默·戴维森在我们之前的视频中解释过这一点。我非常感激他这么做，因为这对他来说确实是一次重要的付出。

But that was really what I was doing back in 1951 when I visited him down in Washington, because I was trying to figure out why people would insure with GEICO rather than with the companies that they were already insuring with, and how permanent that advantage was.

但实际上，这正是我1951年去华盛顿拜访他时所做的事情。当时我试图弄清楚，人们为什么会选择和GEICO投保，而不是继续使用他们已经在使用的保险公司，这种优势能持续多久。

You know, what other things could you do with that advantage? And you know, there were just a lot of questions I wanted to ask him, and he was terrific in giving me the answer. It, you know, changed my life in a major way. So I have nobody to thank but Davy on that.

这种优势还能带来什么？我有很多问题想问他，而他给了我非常出色的答案。这在很大程度上改变了我的人生。所以，这方面我只能感谢戴维。

But that’s the scuttlebutt method and I do advise it.

但这就是“边界调查法”，而且我确实建议大家使用它。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：无可补充。

99. “Real test is the gain in intrinsic value”

“真正的考验是内在价值的增长”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第6区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Richard Lontok (PH) from Toronto, Canada. I have a question for both of you.

观众提问：大家好，我是理查德·隆托克（音），来自加拿大多伦多。我有一个问题想问两位。

Mr. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway’s earnings in 1997 is less than that of 1996. What do you intend to do in 1998 to improve that earning? (Laughter)

巴菲特先生，伯克希尔哈撒韦1997年的收益低于1996年。您打算在1998年做些什么来提高收益呢？（笑声）

And Mr. Munger, I’ve been watching you and Mr. Buffett eating the See’s candies and drinking the Coca-Cola the whole day.

芒格先生，我注意到您和巴菲特先生一整天都在吃See’s糖果和喝可口可乐。

WARREN BUFFETT: Join in. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：加入我们吧。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you intend to do any commercials in the future like what Dave Thomas does with Wendy’s? (Laughter and applause)

观众提问：您打算像戴夫·托马斯为温迪汉堡做广告那样，为产品拍摄一些商业广告吗？（笑声与掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Which of us do you think should do them? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：你认为我们中谁更适合做广告？（笑声）

Now you’re talking.

现在你算是说到点上了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We aren’t old enough to be really good in a commercial. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们还不够老，不能在广告里表现得足够出色。（笑声）

What we would like to do is have somebody up here happily eating See’s candy and answering these questions who’s about 110 years old. Now, that would really be helpful.

我们更希望能找到一个110岁的人，他一边开心地吃着See’s糖果，一边回答这些问题。那才真的有帮助。

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of the earnings, the final bottom line GAAP reported earnings mean absolutely nothing at Berkshire to us.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于收益，伯克希尔的最终GAAP（一般公认会计原则）报告的净收益对我们而言完全没有意义。

Now, the look-through earnings which we publish do have some meaning, but even those have to be interpreted in terms of whether there was a super-cat occurrence, or whether GEICO had an unusually good year, and we try to mention those factors.

不过，我们发布的“透视收益”确实有一些意义，但即使如此，也需要解释是否发生了超大灾难，或者GEICO是否经历了异常好的一年。我们会尽量提到这些因素。

But we do hope that the look-through earnings do build at a reasonable clip over time.

但我们确实希望透视收益能随着时间以合理的速度增长。

But our final earnings include capital gains and we can report those in any number that we wanted to, and we pay no attention whatsoever to realized capital gains at Berkshire.

不过，我们的最终收益包括资本收益，我们可以随意报告这些数字。对于伯克希尔来说，我们完全不关心已实现的资本收益。

The IRS does, but — and that’s why we may send them a billion or more dollars this year. But they mean nothing in terms of measuring our progress.

但国税局关心这点——这也是为什么今年我们可能会向他们缴纳10亿美元甚至更多税款。但这些收益在衡量我们的进展方面毫无意义。

The look-through earnings say something about it. That table, the first couple of pages, it shows our change in book value versus the S&P says something about it, not perfect.

透视收益说明了一些问题。我们报告前几页的表格显示了我们的账面价值变化与标普500的比较，这也说明了一些问题，但不完美。

The real test is the gain in intrinsic value, for sure, over time. And there’s no hard number for that, but so far Charlie and I judge it satisfactory, but we also judge it as non-repeatable.

真正的考验是内在价值随时间的增长。当然，这没有具体的硬性数字，但到目前为止，查理和我认为结果令人满意，但我们也认为它不可重复。

Charlie, anything more —?

查理，还有什么吗——？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

查理·芒格：没有补充。

100. “We prefer what other people call risk”

“我们更喜欢别人称之为风险的东西”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第7区提问。

KEIKO MAHALICK: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Keiko Mahalick (PH) and I’m an M.B.A. student at Wharton, but please don’t hold that against me.

观众提问：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫凯科·马哈里克（音），是沃顿商学院的一名MBA学生，但请不要因此对我有偏见。

WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会的。（笑声）

I never made it that far. I was an undergraduate student. (Laughs)

我从没读到那个程度。我只是一名本科生。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you please explain how you differentiate between types of businesses in your cash flow valuation process, given that you use the same discount rates across companies?

观众提问：您在现金流估值过程中是如何区分不同类型的企业的，尤其是在对不同公司使用相同的折现率的情况下？

For example, in valuing Coke and GEICO, how do you account for the difference in the riskiness of their cash flows?

例如，在评估可口可乐和GEICO时，您是如何处理其现金流风险差异的？

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t worry about risk in the traditional — the way you’re taught, actually, at Wharton. We — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不以传统方式——尤其是沃顿商学院教授的方法——担忧风险。（笑声）

But it’s a good question, believe me. But we are — if we could see the future of every business perfectly, it wouldn’t make any difference whether the money came from running streetcars or from selling software, because all the cash that came out, which is all we’re measuring between now and judgment day, would spend the same to us.

但这是一个好问题，相信我。不过，如果我们能完全看清每家企业的未来，无论这些钱是来自经营有轨电车还是销售软件，对我们来说都没有区别，因为我们测量的是从现在到审判日之间的所有现金流，这些现金流对我们来说的价值是一样的。

It really — the industry that it’s earned in means nothing except to the extent that it may tell you something about the ability to develop the cash. But it has no meaning on the quality of the cash once it becomes distributable.

事实上——产生现金流的行业并不重要，除非它能告诉你一些关于产生现金能力的信息。但一旦现金可以分配，它的行业来源对现金质量毫无意义。

We look at riskiness, essentially, as being sort of a go/no-go valve in terms of looking at the future businesses. In other words, if we think we simply don’t know what’s going to happen in the future, that doesn’t mean it’s necessarily risky, it just means we don’t know. It means it’s risky for us. It might not be risky for someone else who understands the business.

我们看待风险性，本质上是将其视为未来业务的“通过/不通过”阀门。换句话说，如果我们认为我们完全不知道未来会发生什么，这并不一定意味着它本身有风险，而是意味着我们不了解。这对我们来说是风险，但对其他了解该业务的人来说可能并不是。

In that case, we just give up. We don’t try to predict those things.

在这种情况下，我们会直接放弃。我们不会试图预测那些事情。

And we don’t say, “Well, we don’t know what’s going to happen, so therefore we’ll discount it at 9 percent instead of 7 percent,” some number that we don’t even know. That is not our way to approach it.

我们不会说，“嗯，我们不知道会发生什么，所以我们将其折现率从7%改为9%。”我们甚至不知道这些数字是否合理。这不是我们的处理方式。

We feel that once it passes a threshold test of being something about which we feel quite certain, that the same discount factor tends to apply to everything. And we try to do only things about which we are quite certain when we buy into the businesses.

我们认为，一旦某个项目通过了我们的信心门槛测试，我们通常会对所有项目使用相同的折现率。在投资业务时，我们只尝试那些我们非常有把握的事情。

So we think all the capital asset pricing model-type reasoning with different rates of risk-adjusted return and all that, we tend to think it is — well, we don’t tend to — we think it is nonsense.

因此，我们认为，所有关于资本资产定价模型及其不同的风险调整回报率之类的推理，我们倾向于——不，我们完全认为这些是无稽之谈。

But we do think it’s also nonsense to get into situations, or to try and evaluate situations, where we don’t have any conviction to speak of as to what the future is going to look like.

但我们也认为，参与或评估我们对未来没有任何明确信念的情况，同样是无意义的。

And we don’t think you can compensate for that by having a higher discount rate and saying it’s riskier, so then I don’t really know what’s going to happen and I’ll have a higher discount rate. That just is not our way of approaching things.

我们不认为可以通过提高折现率来补偿这种不确定性，比如说“因为它更有风险，所以我会用更高的折现率”。这根本不是我们处理问题的方式。

Charlie?

查理，你怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. This great emphasis on volatility in corporate finance we just regard as nonsense.

查理·芒格：是的。我们认为，企业财务中对波动性的过度关注完全是无稽之谈。

If we have a statistical probability of putting out a million and having it turn into —

如果我们有统计概率表明投入100万美元并将其变成——

Put it this way: as long as the odds are in our favor and we’re not risking the whole company on one throw or anything close to it, we don’t mind volatility in results.

换句话说：只要胜率对我们有利，而且我们没有将整个公司押在一场赌注上，或者接近于此，我们就不会介意结果的波动性。

What we want is the favorable odds. We figure the volatility, over time, will take care of itself at Berkshire.

我们想要的是有利的胜率。我们认为，从长期来看，伯克希尔的波动性会自行解决。

WARREN BUFFETT: If we have a business about which we’re extremely confident as to the business result, we would prefer that it have high volatility than low volatility. We will make more money out of a business where we know where the endgame is going to be if it bounces around a lot.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们对一家企业的业务结果非常有信心，我们更喜欢它有较高的波动性而不是较低的波动性。在我们清楚最终结果会如何的情况下，如果业务出现较大的波动，我们会赚更多的钱。

I mean, for example, if people reacted to the monthly earnings of See’s, which might lose money eight months out of the year and makes a fortune, you know, in November and December — if people reacted to that and therefore made its stock as an independent company very volatile, that would be terrific for us because we would know it was all nonsense. And we would buy in July and sell in January.

我的意思是，比如说，如果人们对See’s糖果每月的收益作出反应，而它可能在一年中的八个月亏损，但在11月和12月赚大钱——如果人们对这些收益波动反应过度，从而让作为独立公司的See’s股票波动剧烈，那对我们来说简直太好了，因为我们知道这完全是无稽之谈。我们会在七月买入，明年一月卖出。

Well, obviously, things don’t behave that way. But when we see a business about which we’re very certain, but the world thinks that its fortunes are going up and down, and therefore it behaves volatile — with great volatility — you know, we love it. That’s way better than having a lower beta.

当然，现实中事情不会总是这样发展。但当我们发现一家我们非常确定的企业，而外界认为它的命运起伏不定，因而表现出剧烈波动时——我们非常喜欢这种情况。这比拥有较低的贝塔系数要好得多。

So we think that — we actually would prefer what other people would call risk.

所以我们认为——实际上，我们更喜欢别人所谓的“风险”。

When we bought The Washington Post — I’ve used that as — it went down 50 percent in a matter of a few months. Best thing that could’ve happened. I mean, doesn’t get any better than that.

当我们收购《华盛顿邮报》时——我用它作为例子——它在短短几个月内下跌了50%。这是可能发生的最好的事情。我的意思是，没有比这更好的了。

Business was fundamentally very nonvolatile in nature. I mean, TV stations and a strong, dominant newspaper, that’s a nonvolatile business, but it was a volatile stock. And you know, that is a great combination from our standpoint.

从业务本质上来说，它其实是非常稳定的。我指的是，电视台和一家强大的主导性报纸，这是非波动性的业务，但它的股票却非常波动。从我们的角度来看，这是一个极佳的组合。

101. We want shareholders who look at Berkshire the same way we do

我们希望股东以与我们相同的方式看待伯克希尔

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第8区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, and thank you for staying around to answer our questions.

观众提问：下午好，谢谢您愿意留下来回答我们的提问。

I have two. First of all, would you give us what logic went into your decision to both buy and sell McDonald’s?

我有两个问题。首先，您能否解释您对麦当劳的买入和卖出决策的逻辑是什么？

And my second question goes to a term that you’ve used. You talked about the caliber of the shareholders at Berkshire Hathaway. How do you define the caliber and what difference does it really make?

第二个问题是关于您提到的“股东素质”这一术语。您如何定义股东素质？它真的有那么重要吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it makes a lot of difference. Our idea of a high-caliber group is one that is just like us. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这确实非常重要。我们对高素质股东的定义是：他们和我们非常相像。（笑声）

And that’s not entirely facetious in that we basically want shareholders who look at the business the same way we do. Because we’re going to be around running something, and what could be worse than having a group out there that had a whole different set of expectations than we did, and evaluated us in a different way, and all of this sort of thing?

而且这并非完全是开玩笑。我们基本上希望股东能以与我们相同的方式看待业务。因为我们会长期管理这家公司，如果外部有一群股东，他们的预期和我们完全不同，用不同的方式评估我们，这种情况还有什么比这更糟的呢？

I mean, if you are going to — you’re going to have a given number of shares outstanding. Let’s say we have an equivalent of a million, two-hundred and some thousand A shares. Somebody’s going to own every single share.

我的意思是，公司会有一定数量的流通股。比如说，我们大约有120多万股A类股票。每一股都会被某些人持有。

Now, would you rather have them owned by people who understand your business, who understand your objectives, who measure you the same way you do, who have similar time horizons, or would you rather have the reverse?

那么，您是希望这些股票由那些了解您的业务、理解您的目标、用与您相同的方式衡量公司、具有类似时间视角的人持有，还是希望反其道而行之？

It makes a real difference over time to be in with people that are compatible with you.

从长期来看，与志同道合的人合作真的会产生很大的差异。

So it’s a significant plus to us, the operation of the business, and it leads to a more consistent relationship between price and intrinsic value when you have a group like that, because they understand themselves and the business, and they’re not likely to do silly things in either direction.

因此，对我们来说，这对业务的运作是一项重要的优势。当您拥有这样一群股东时，这会让价格和内在价值之间的关系更加一致，因为他们了解自己和公司的业务，他们不太可能在任何方向上做出愚蠢的事情。

So you get a much more consistent relationship than if we had a whole bunch of people who were thinking that the most important thing in evaluating this business was next quarter’s earnings.

因此，我们的价格与内在价值之间的关系要比那些只关注下季度收益的人持有时更加一致。

Question about McDonald’s simply is, you know, it’s an outstanding business and we don’t talk about it when we buy it, we don’t talk about it if we sell it.

关于麦当劳的问题很简单，这是一家出色的企业。当我们买入时，我们不会谈论它；当我们卖出时，我们也不会谈论它。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The question of what difference does it make to the management who the shareholders are, well, if you are into what I call trustee capitalism, where the shareholders aren’t just a faceless bunch of nothings, you feel as a kind of a hair shirt, an obligation to do as well as you can by the shareholders. Well, wouldn’t you rather feel an obligation to people you liked instead of people you didn’t like? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。关于“股东是谁对管理层有什么影响”这个问题——如果你相信我称之为“受托资本主义”的东西，即股东不仅仅是一些没有面孔的虚无之物，那么你会感到一种责任感，就像穿着一件粗糙的衬衣，你有义务尽可能为股东做到最好。那么，你不是更愿意对自己喜欢的人感到这种责任，而不是对你不喜欢的人感到责任吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, let’s say you were running a business and — (applause) — and you had a choice of three owners.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，假设你经营着一家公司——（掌声）——而你有三个所有者的选择。

You could have a hundred percent of it owned by whatever your favorite philanthropy is, you could have a hundred percent of it owned by the U.S. government, and you could have a hundred percent of it owned by, you know, the worst person you can think of, you know, in your hometown.

一种是由你最喜欢的慈善机构百分之百持有，一种是由美国政府百分之百持有，还有一种是由你家乡里你能想到的最糟糕的人百分之百持有。

I mean, I think it would make a difference in how you felt about going to work every day.

我的意思是，这肯定会影响你每天上班时的心情。

102. “Get more quality than you’re paying for”

“获得比你支付价格更高的质量”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第9区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, my name is Steve Jack (PH). I’m from Southern California. And my question has to deal with kind of quality versus price.

观众提问：是的，我叫史蒂夫·杰克（音），来自南加州。我的问题涉及质量和价格的关系。

I’ve been to three annual meetings and I’ve heard great things about Coke every year. But as far as I’m aware, you have not bought any additional shares of Coke over the last three years even though the stock has done just fine.

我参加了三次年度股东大会，每次都听到关于可口可乐的好评。但据我所知，尽管可口可乐股票表现良好，您在过去三年里并未增持任何股份。

If an investor has a relatively short timeframe, say three to five years, how much weight do you think one should give to quality versus price?

如果一位投资者的时间框架相对较短，比如三到五年，您认为在权衡质量与价格时应该赋予质量多少权重？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if your timeframe is three to five years, A) I wouldn’t advise it being that way. Because I think if you think you’re going to get out then, it gets more toward — leaning toward the bigger fool theory.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果你的时间框架是三到五年，我的第一建议是不要这样做。因为如果你认为自己会在那时退出，这更像是依赖“更大的傻瓜理论”。

The best way to look at any investment is, how will I feel if I own it forever, you know, and put all my family’s net worth in it?

看待任何投资的最佳方式是想想：“如果我永远持有它，并把我整个家庭的净资产都放进去，我会有什么感觉？”

But we basically believe in buying — if you talk about quality meaning the certainty that the business will perform as you expect it to perform over a period of time, so the range of possible performance is fairly narrow — you know, that’s the kind of business we like to buy.

但我们基本上相信，购买的核心是质量——如果质量指的是企业在一段时间内按预期表现的确定性，且可能的表现范围相当狭窄——这就是我们喜欢买的那种业务。

And all I can say is that we like to pay a comfortable price, and that depends to some extent on what interest rates are.

我只能说，我们喜欢以一个舒适的价格买入，而这在某种程度上取决于利率水平。

We haven’t found comfortable prices for the kind of businesses we like in the last year. We don’t find them uncomfortable, in the sense that we want to sell them. But they’re not prices at which we — we added to Coke one time about, I don’t know, five years ago or thereabouts, and it’s conceivable we would add again. It’s a lot more conceivable we would add than subtract.

在过去一年里，我们没有找到适合的价格来买入我们喜欢的企业。从我们不想卖出的意义上说，我们也不觉得这些价格不舒适。但这些价格还不足以促使我们买入。我们大概五年前增持过一次可口可乐，不排除我们将来还会增持的可能性。但增持的可能性远远大于减持的可能性。

But that’s the way we feel about most of the businesses. We did make a decision last year that we thought bonds were relatively attractive, and we trimmed certain holdings and eliminated certain small holdings in order to make a bigger commitment in bonds.

但这就是我们对大多数业务的感觉。去年我们确实做出了一个决定，我们认为债券相对有吸引力，因此我们削减了一些持仓，并清除了某些小额持仓，以便更大规模地投资债券。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You talk about quality versus price. The investment game always involves considering both quality and price. And the trick is to get more quality than you’re paying for in the price. It’s just that simple.

查理·芒格：是的。你提到质量与价格的问题。投资游戏总是涉及同时考虑质量和价格。诀窍就是以价格买到超过价格的质量。就这么简单。

WARREN BUFFETT: But not easy.

沃伦·巴菲特：但并不容易。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, but not easy.

查理·芒格：是的，但并不容易。

103. No interest in spinning off subsidiaries

对分拆子公司没有兴趣

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第10区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, good afternoon. Jeff Kirby from Green Village, New Jersey.

观众提问：下午好，两位先生。我是来自新泽西州绿村的杰夫·柯比。

Would you comment please on tax-free spinoffs to shareholders in general, and particularly how you would feel about those were you to believe that a materially higher value would be ascribed to one of your operating companies in the public arena than as part of Berkshire Hathaway?

请您谈谈一般情况下的免税分拆业务，尤其是在您认为将其中一家运营公司从伯克希尔中分拆出来，在公开市场上能获得显著更高估值的情况下，您对此怎么看？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s certainly been times in Berkshire’s history when certain components of Berkshire might well have sold at higher multiples as individual companies than the amount they contributed to the whole of Berkshire, although I don’t think that would be the case now.

沃伦·巴菲特：确实，在伯克希尔的历史上，某些业务组件作为独立公司，可能会以更高的倍数估值出售，而不是它们作为伯克希尔整体的一部分所贡献的价值。不过，我认为这种情况现在并不存在。

But our reaction to spinoffs would be — even if we thought there was some immediate market advantage, it would have no interest, basically, to us.

但我们对分拆业务的反应是——即使我们认为这样做可能在短期内有一定的市场优势，我们也基本上对此没有兴趣。

We like the group of businesses we have as part of a single unit at Berkshire. We hope to add to that group of businesses. We will add to that group of businesses over time.

我们喜欢我们目前作为伯克希尔整体一部分的这组业务。我们希望能在这组业务的基础上增加更多业务。随着时间推移，我们会继续增加新的业务。

And the idea of creating a lot of little pieces because we could get a little more market value in the short term, it just doesn’t mean anything to us.

为了在短期内获得一些额外的市场价值而将公司分拆成许多小部分，这对我们来说毫无意义。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it would add a lot of frictional costs and overheads. We have the — I don’t know anybody our size who has lower overhead than we do, and we like it that way.

查理·芒格：是的，这会增加大量的摩擦成本和管理费用。我不知道有没有哪家像我们规模的公司，能像我们一样拥有如此低的管理费用，而我们也非常喜欢这种方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）

Right now our after-tax cost of running the operation has gotten down to a half a basis point of capital value. And when you think that many mutual funds are at 125 basis points, that means they have 250 times — (laughs) — the overhead ratio to capitalization that we have —

目前，我们的运营税后成本已经降到了资本价值的万分之五。而许多共同基金的成本是125个基点，这意味着它们的运营成本相当于我们的250倍——（笑声）——占比要高得多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And all they’ve got is a bunch of marketable securities, and we got that plus businesses.

查理·芒格：而且它们拥有的仅仅是一堆可交易证券，而我们不仅有这些，还有真正的业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We don’t need any more, incidentally —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且我们不需要更多的管理成本——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We can get lower, Warren. (Buffett laughs)

查理·芒格：我们还可以更低，沃伦。（巴菲特笑声）

We can get a lot lower —

我们确实可以更低——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I know. I know. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我知道。我知道。（笑声）

You think they’d [Berkshire’s board of directors] work for $500 a year instead of $900, Charlie? (Laughter)

你觉得我们的董事会成员愿意把薪水从每年900美元降到500美元吗，查理？（笑声）

Groans from the front row.

前排传来哀叹声。

104. Shareholders boost sales at Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheims

股东为内布拉斯加家具城和波仙珠宝店带来销售增长

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第1区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.

观众提问：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。

I was kind of curious if you could tell me, do you know or can you tell us how much business Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheims did this weekend?

我很好奇，您是否知道或能告诉我们，这个周末内布拉斯加家具城和波仙珠宝店的销售情况如何？

And secondly, do you have any interest in investing in the auto industry? And if not interested now, what would change your mind about this industry in the future?

第二个问题，您对投资汽车行业有兴趣吗？如果现在没有兴趣，未来什么因素会改变您的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first question, I don’t know what the Mart did but I do know they had a lot of shareholders there. Got a verbal report on that.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于第一个问题，我不知道家具城具体的销售数据，但我知道那里有很多股东前往购物。我得到了一个口头报告。

There would be less change in their normal — they do — you know, you’re talking about a company that — at the Mart — that does $800,000 a day on average. It is a big operation.

他们的日常业务变化相对较小——你知道，家具城是一家平均每天销售额达80万美元的公司。这是一个大规模的运营。

So our shareholders have an impact, but not the relative impact that they would have at Borsheims.

所以我们的股东确实带来了影响，但在家具城的相对影响不如在波仙珠宝店那么大。

Borsheims did over twice as much this year as last year, and they had a big day. (Laughter)

波仙珠宝店今年的销售额是去年的两倍多，他们度过了一个非常繁忙的日子。（笑声）

105. No special insights into automobile industry

对汽车行业没有特别洞察

WARREN BUFFETT: And what was the other question, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，另一个问题是什么来着？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — industry. The auto industry.

观众提问：——是关于汽车行业的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, the auto industry. Yeah, Charlie was big in General Motors in the mid-’60s, right Charlie? It was your biggest commitment?

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是汽车行业。是的，查理在60年代中期在通用汽车上投入很大，对吧，查理？那是你最大的投资吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I had a temporary delusion. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：当时我有过一个短暂的幻想。（笑声）

Luckily, it passed. (Laughter)

幸好这种幻想过去了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

No, he made money on it.

不过他确实赚到了钱。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I did.

查理·芒格：是的，确实赚了。

WARREN BUFFETT: We — it’s the kind of industry that’s — it’s interesting for us to follow.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们——这类行业对我们来说还是挺有趣的，值得关注。

I mean, many years ago it was the dominant factor — or overwhelming factor — in the economy. It’s diminished a fair amount but it’s still a very important industry.

我指的是，多年前，它是经济中的主导因素——甚至是压倒性因素。虽然它的重要性已经有所降低，但它依然是一个非常重要的行业。

And it’s the kind of industry that anyone can follow. I mean, you have experience with the product and competing products, and you — everyone in this room understands in a general way the economic nature of the industry.

这也是任何人都可以关注的行业。你会对这个行业的产品以及竞争产品有一定的体验——坐在这里的每个人都能大致理解这个行业的经济本质。

But we’ve never felt that we understood it better than other people. So we’ve seen auto companies at very low multiples sometimes and with prices that in hindsight looked very attractive, but we never really felt that we knew who among the auto companies five years from now would have gained the most ground relative to where they are now, or that gained the most ground relative to what the market might expect. It just isn’t given to us, that knowledge.

但我们从未觉得自己比别人更了解这个行业。所以有时我们看到一些汽车公司的估值非常低，价格在事后看来也很有吸引力，但我们从未感到有信心知道五年后哪些汽车公司会相较于现在取得最大进展，或者相较于市场预期表现最出色。这种知识对我们来说并不是与生俱来的。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I agree.

查理·芒格：我同意。

106. Selling on internet could help Borsheims and GEICO

互联网销售或能帮助波仙珠宝和GEICO

WARREN BUFFETT: Area two.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第2区提问。

SCOTT RUDD: Hi, my name is Scott Rudd from Evening Prairie, Minnesota.

观众提问：您好，我是来自明尼苏达州伊夫宁草原的斯科特·鲁德。

And my question is this: ten years from now — and I’m referring to Borsheims as the retail part of it to the consumer, not so much the corporate division — ten years from now, what would be the three things that you would expect to change on a day-to-day operating basis, to change the most and affect your ability to be dominant in that area.

我的问题是：十年后——我指的是波仙珠宝的零售部分，而不是企业业务部分——在日常运营中，您预计会发生的三大变化是什么？这些变化将如何影响您在这一领域的主导地位？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think — are you talking about Borsheims specifically?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想——您是专门在谈波仙珠宝吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

观众提问：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think Borsheims — I won’t have three things — but Borsheims may be one of a couple of our companies where the internet could be a huge — have a huge potential for us.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为波仙珠宝——我可能说不出三件事——但波仙珠宝可能是我们几家公司之一，互联网可能对它们有巨大的潜力。

I don’t know if that’ll happen, but there’s no question that we operate — and I’ve got a message on the internet — at considerably — very considerably — lower gross margins than does a Tiffany or publicly-held jewelry operations.

我不知道这是否会实现，但毫无疑问，我们的运营——特别是在互联网领域——我们的毛利率比蒂芙尼或其他上市珠宝公司要低得多。

We are giving customers considerably more for their money. We’ve got way lower operating costs than the public companies.

我们让顾客的每一分钱都更有价值。我们的运营成本比那些上市公司低得多。

And I say on the internet, our operating costs are 15 to 20 percentage points, and even more in some cases, less than publicly-owned competitors. So we’ve got a lot to offer.

在互联网上，我们的运营成本比那些上市竞争对手低15到20个百分点，有些情况下甚至更多。所以我们有很多优势可以提供。

Now, the big question people always have with jewelers is, “How do you know who to trust?” I mean, you know, it is an article that most people feel very uncomfortable buying.

现在，人们在购买珠宝时最大的疑问是：“如何知道该信任谁？”因为大多数人对购买珠宝感到不太放心。

And I think that the Berkshire Hathaway identification can help people feel comfortable on it. I think that the experience of customers around the country as they see it.

我认为伯克希尔哈撒韦的品牌识别可以让人们在购买时感到更安心。我认为，随着全国各地客户的购买体验增多，这种信任会加强。

And I don’t think that — I think it’s a product — it’s a high-ticket item, so saving money gets to be really important. Just like auto insurance, saving money gets to be really important.

我认为，这是一个高价商品，所以省钱显得尤为重要。就像汽车保险一样，省钱对消费者来说非常重要。

So I think that the internet could be of significant assistance to Borsheims in terms of spreading and facilitating its nationwide reputation. So Borsheims could have a lot of growth and the internet could be a big part of it.

因此，我认为互联网可以极大地帮助波仙珠宝推广并巩固其全国声誉。波仙珠宝未来可能会有很大的增长，而互联网可以成为其中的重要一环。

Our job is to get the message to people around the country that they can literally, you know, have us send a half a dozen items to them, that they can look at with no high-pressure salesmanship at all or anything of the sort, and look at the prices, decide what they want in their own homes, and they will do very well with us.

我们的任务是向全国的消费者传递信息——让他们知道，我们可以将几件珠宝送到他们家中，没有任何高压推销或类似行为。他们可以在家中查看价格并决定自己想要的东西，与我们合作会非常愉快。

And we have a lot of people taking advantage of that now. But we could have 10, or 20, or 50 times that number as the years go by. And I think we should work very hard on that.

现在已经有许多人在利用这种服务。但随着时间推移，我们的用户数量可能是现在的10倍、20倍，甚至50倍。我认为我们应该在这方面付出很大的努力。

GEICO has possibilities through the internet, obviously, also.

显然，GEICO也可以通过互联网开发潜力。

Anything where you’re offering a terrific deal to the consumer, but one of the problems has been how do you talk to that consumer, you know, the internet offers possibilities (inaudible). The thing is that everybody in the world is going to be there, and why should they click on you instead of somebody else?

无论何种业务，只要你能为消费者提供优质的交易，其中一个问题始终是如何与消费者建立联系。互联网提供了这样的可能性（听不清）。问题在于，全球都有竞争者存在，消费者为什么要点击你的产品而不是别人的？

Actually, the Berkshire Hathaway name may help a little bit on that, although GEICO’s name is extremely well known. GEICO is — I said in the annual report we were going to spend a hundred million dollars in — basically in promotion this year. We’ll spend more money than that.

事实上，“伯克希尔哈撒韦”这个名字可能会在一定程度上帮助推广，尽管GEICO的品牌本身已经非常知名。我在年度报告中提到过，我们今年计划花费1亿美元进行推广，实际上我们将投入更多。

The brand potential in GEICO is very, very big. And we intend to push and push and push on that.

GEICO的品牌潜力非常大。我们打算全力推动这个品牌的增长。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well all that said, if the internet helps some of our business, why certainly the CD-ROM and the personal computer combined to clobber World Book for us.

查理·芒格：虽然我们说了这些，但如果互联网可以帮助我们的一些业务，也不得不提，CD-ROM和个人电脑的结合确实重创了我们的《世界图书》业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we paid our entry fee.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们为此付出了代价。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we — (laughter) — it’s not all plus.

查理·芒格：是的，我们——（笑声）——这并不全是正面影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: No.

沃伦·巴菲特：确实如此。

107. McDonald’s vs. Dairy Queen

麦当劳与冰雪皇后

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第3区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jorge Gobbi (PH) from Zurich, Switzerland, and my question refers to food businesses, mainly McDonald’s and Dairy Queen.

观众提问：我叫乔治·戈比，来自瑞士苏黎世。我的问题与食品业务有关，主要是麦当劳和冰雪皇后。

Are there major differences in the investment territories fixed between McDonald’s and Dairy Queen? And if yes, would you explain them?

在麦当劳和冰雪皇后之间的固定投资领域是否存在主要差异？如果有，请您解释一下。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there are major differences. McDonald’s owns, perhaps, in the area of a third of all locations worldwide. I can’t tell you the exact percentage, but if they’ve got 23,000 outlets, they own many, many thousands of them, and operate them. And then of the remainder, they own a very high percentage and lease them to their operators, their franchisees.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，确实有很大的差异。麦当劳可能拥有其全球三分之一左右的门店。我无法告诉您确切的百分比，但如果他们有23,000家门店，他们直接拥有并运营了其中成千上万家。而在剩余部分中，他们拥有非常高的比例，并将其租赁给经营者或特许加盟商。

So they have a very large investment, on which they get very good returns, in physical facilities all over the world.

因此，他们在全球的固定资产上进行了非常大的投资，并获得了非常好的回报。

Dairy Queen has — counting Orange Julius — 6,000-plus operations, of which 30-odd are operated by the company. And even those, some are in joint ventures or partnerships.

冰雪皇后（包括橙朱利叶斯品牌）拥有6,000多家门店，其中只有30多家由公司直接运营。而即使是这些门店，有些也是合资或合作形式的。

So the investment in fixed assets is dramatically different between the two.

因此，这两者在固定资产投资方面存在显著差异。

The fixed-assets investment by the franchisee, or the person — his landlord — obviously is significant at a Dairy Queen. But it’s not significant to the company as the franchisor, so that the capital employed in Dairy Queen is relatively small compared to the capital employed in McDonald’s.

在冰雪皇后，加盟商或其房东在固定资产上的投资显然是重要的。但作为特许经营商的冰雪皇后公司，其自身的固定资产投资并不显著。因此，与麦当劳相比，冰雪皇后所使用的资本相对较少。

But McDonald’s also makes a lot of money out of owning those locations and receives —

但麦当劳通过拥有这些门店物业赚了很多钱，并且获得——

Whereas Dairy Queen will, in most cases, receive 4 percent of the franchisee’s sales, in terms of a royalty, at a McDonald’s there’s that — there’s more than that percentage, plus rentals and so on.

而冰雪皇后在大多数情况下，会从加盟商的销售额中获得4%的特许经营权费，而麦当劳除了这部分收入外，还能从租金等其他方面获益更多。

跟AMEX的收费差不多。

So they’re two different — very different — economic models. They both depend on the success of the franchisee in the end. I mean, you have to have a good business for the franchisee to, over time, have a good business for the parent company. Both companies have that situation to deal with.

所以，这两家公司有两种完全不同的经济模式。但归根结底，它们都依赖于加盟商的成功。也就是说，如果加盟商的生意不好，母公司从长远来看也无法做好。两家公司都必须面对这一点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. The 4 percent is not very much when you stop to think about providing a group of franchisees with a nationally recognized brand, and quality control, and all sorts of desirable business aids.

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。如果你仔细想想，为加盟商提供一个全国知名品牌、质量控制以及各种有用的业务支持，4%的特许经营费并不算高。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, 4 percent is at the low — if you look at the whole industry — 4 percent is in the lower part of the range. But it works fine —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，4%确实偏低——如果你看整个行业的话——4%属于低范围。但这种模式运作得很好——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Part of what attracted us was the fact that the charges to the franchisees are low at Dairy Queen.

查理·芒格：我们被冰雪皇后吸引的一部分原因是它对加盟商的收费很低。

WARREN BUFFETT: A successful franchisee can sell his operation for significantly more than he has invested in tangible assets. And we want it that way, obviously, because that means he’s got a successful business, and it means that, over time, we will have a successful business.

沃伦·巴菲特：一个成功的加盟商可以以远高于其有形资产投资的价格出售其业务。而我们显然希望这种情况发生，因为这意味着他拥有一个成功的业务，这也意味着从长远来看，我们的业务会成功。

You want — you want a franchise operation — you want the franchise operator to make money and you want him to create a capital asset that’s worth more than he’s put in it. That’s the goal.

你希望——你希望一个特许经营业务的运营商能够盈利，并创造出一个比他投入的资本更有价值的资产。这就是目标所在。

108. Making money with the Byrne family

与伯恩家族共同致富

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：请第4区提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett.

观众提问：芒格先生和巴菲特先生，下午好。

My name is Patrick Byrne, I’m a shareholder, and I’m here from Cincinnati, Ohio, back again this year to ask a question to see if I can get the two of you to disagree on a subject. I’ve picked education as an area where we might see some daylight between the two of you.

我是帕特里克·伯恩，我是一名股东，来自俄亥俄州辛辛那提。今年我又来了，想提一个问题，看看能不能让你们两位在某个话题上产生分歧。我选择了教育这一领域，因为也许在这个问题上你们会有不同的看法。

First though, on the subject of education, I’d like to offer some brief thanks.

不过在讨论教育之前，我想先表达一些感谢。

I’m lucky in that my parents, in the late ’70s, made the wise choice of buying some Berkshire stock and putting it in a college fund for my brothers and me, and that basically paid for our higher education.

很幸运的是，我的父母在70年代末做了一个明智的决定，购买了一些伯克希尔的股票，并将其放入我们兄弟几个的大学基金中。这基本上支付了我们的高等教育费用。

I suspect there must be thousands of people like us who had our education paid for by wealth that the two of you created, and we owe you. Although we probably all have been a lot better to skip college and keep the stock. (Laughter and applause)

我猜像我们这样的人可能有成千上万，我们的教育费用是由你们两位创造的财富支付的，我们欠你们的。尽管我们可能会更好地选择跳过大学，直接持有这些股票。（笑声和掌声）

Well, on the subject of education, Milton Friedman has said, or has written, that if you really care about poverty in the U.S. and the disadvantage of women and minorities and so on, and you could cure one single thing in the U.S., it would be the public education system.

关于教育，米尔顿·弗里德曼曾说过，或者写过，如果你真的关心美国的贫困问题，以及女性和少数族裔的弱势地位等等，那么如果你可以解决美国的一个问题，那就应该是公共教育体系。

Mr. Buffett, of course you’ve been very publicly supportive and done many things, and I’m sure Mr. Munger has as well, for public education.

巴菲特先生，您当然一直非常公开地支持并为公共教育做了很多事情，我相信芒格先生也一样。

But I noticed last year, in this annual meeting, Mr. Munger — or both of you, of course, criticized some aspects of higher education, like business schools.

但我注意到去年在年度会议上，芒格先生——当然你们两位都提到过——批评了高等教育的某些方面，比如商学院。

But Mr. Munger included — he was a tad critical, I would say, of the U.S. public education system.

但芒格先生在其中——我认为，他对美国公共教育体系也有一些批评。

And I wonder if you two agree with what Friedman says and what you think the importance of public education is, and what might be done to improve it.

我想知道你们是否同意弗里德曼的说法，以及你们如何看待公共教育的重要性，以及应该做些什么来改善它。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m going to let Charlie go in a second, but I just want to say, Patrick Byrne is the son of Jack Byrne, who made a fortune for us by resuscitating GEICO when it got into trouble in the mid-’70s.

沃伦·巴菲特：我稍后会让查理发言，但我想先说，帕特里克·伯恩是杰克·伯恩的儿子。杰克在70年代中期挽救了陷入困境的GEICO，为我们创造了巨大的财富。

In fact, I met Patrick’s dad on a Wednesday night, about 8 o’clock at night, in Washington, when GEICO was — it was bankrupt and it was about — very close to being declared so.

事实上，我是在一个星期三晚上，大约8点，在华盛顿见到了帕特里克的父亲。当时GEICO已经接近破产，几乎快被正式宣布破产了。

And after talking with him about three hours that night, the next day I went out and bought 500 and some-thousand shares of GEICO, that Davy [Lorimer Davidson] referred to, at 2 1/8, so — which is forty cents on the stock that we paid $70 for later on.

那天晚上与他交谈了大约三个小时后，第二天我出去买了五十多万股GEICO的股票，当时的价格是2又1/8美元，而后来我们为这些股票支付了每股70美元的价格。

So Patrick’s dad — we may have made — (laughs) — we may have made the Byrne family more money; he made us a lot of money.

所以说，帕特里克的父亲——我们可能为伯恩家族赚了更多钱（笑），而他也为我们赚了很多钱。

Patrick is now running Fechheimers in Cincinnati and doing a sensational job. His brother, Mark, on June 30, if we hit the target date, will be establishing a major operation in London and Bermuda that will — in which we will be a very large partner.

帕特里克现在在辛辛那提经营Fechheimers，并做得非常出色。他的兄弟马克将在6月30日（如果我们按计划进行）在伦敦和百慕大建立一个重要的业务，而我们将在其中成为非常大的合作伙伴。

So he’s only got one other brother left, and he’s out playing golf in California. But if times get tough we’re going to try and recruit him, too.

他还有一个兄弟，现在正在加州打高尔夫。但如果未来形势艰难，我们也会试着把他招募过来。

109. Fixing public education

修复公共教育

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, with all that time to prepare, what do you have to say about education? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，给你这么长时间准备，你对教育有什么要说的呢？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree with Milton Friedman, that there’s — it would be hard to name one factor, if we could fix it, that would be more worthy of fixing than education in the United States, particularly the lower grades in education where the failures are so horrible, in many big cities particularly.

查理·芒格：我当然同意米尔顿·弗里德曼的观点，很难找到另一个因素，比修复美国的教育，尤其是基础教育更值得努力的事情了。尤其是在许多大城市，基础教育的失败现象非常严重。

So yes, I think it’s a terrible problem and it needs fixing.

所以，是的，我认为这是一个严重的问题，需要解决。

Of course, it’s a huge debate as to what the best way is to fix it. And I am skeptical, myself, of big city school systems getting fixed under their own momentums. In other words, I’m quite sympathetic to the people who say we may have to go to an alternative, like vouchers.

当然，关于解决问题的最佳方法存在很大的争论。我个人对大城市的学校系统靠自身动力修复的可能性持怀疑态度。换句话说，我对那些提出需要采用替代方法，比如教育券的人表示同情。

That the incentive structure has — (applause) — gotten so bad in some places that you can’t fix it with evolution; it takes revolution.

有些地方的激励结构已经变得如此糟糕，以至于不能通过渐进的方式来修复；需要通过变革来实现。（掌声）

Warren, you’re more optimistic about big city public schools —

沃伦，你对大城市公立学校似乎更乐观——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m not necessarily more optimistic. I probably feel, though, that democracy without a good public school system available to the entire population is sort of a mockery.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不一定更乐观。但我确实认为，如果没有一个对全体人口开放的良好公共教育体系，民主就像是一场讽刺。

Because there’s so much — (applause) — inequality to start with. I mean, it isn’t just inequality of money. But I mean, my kids, whether they inherit any money, or your kids, whether they inherit any money, compared to the kids of somebody where both parents are struggling to keep the place going, or maybe just one parent, and living in poverty — I mean, it is so unequal to start with that if you accentuate that inequality by giving those who are generally higher up on the ladder also a far better education than you give those who have chosen the wrong womb, I think that’s just — I don’t think that society should tolerate that — a rich society — should tolerate it.

因为一开始就存在如此大的不平等。（掌声）我的意思是，不仅仅是金钱的不平等。例如，我的孩子，无论他们是否继承了财富，或者你的孩子，无论他们是否继承了财富，与那些父母为了维持生活而拼命挣扎，甚至只有一个父母的贫困家庭的孩子相比，这种不平等从一开始就存在。如果你通过为处于更高位置的人提供更好的教育，进一步加剧这种不平等，我认为这简直是——我认为社会不应该容忍这种情况，尤其是一个富裕社会不应该容忍它。

That doesn’t mean it’s easy to solve. Because I’ve said a lot of times that, unfortunately, it seems like a good public school system is like virginity, that it can be preserved but not restored.

但这并不意味着它容易解决。我说过很多次，不幸的是，一个良好的公共教育体系就像贞操，可以被保持，但无法被恢复。

And it’s very hard, when you get a system that’s lousy, to do much about it, because under those circumstances the wealthy people are going to all opt out of the system, and they’re going to be less interested in the bond issues, they’re going to be less interested in the PTA, they’re going to be less interested in the outcome of the other people’s children, if they have all opted out for their own system.

当一个体系已经变得糟糕时，很难有所作为，因为在这种情况下，有钱人会选择退出这个体系。他们会对债券问题不感兴趣，对家长教师协会（PTA）不感兴趣，也不会关心其他人孩子的结果，因为他们已经为自己的体系另辟蹊径了。

And to have one educational system for the rich and another for the poor, with the poor being — getting the poorer system — strikes me as doing nothing but accentuating inequality and other problems that result from that in the future.

为富人和穷人建立两个教育体系，而穷人得到的是更差的体系，这在我看来无异于加剧不平等以及未来由此产生的其他问题。

So I don’t know the answers on improving the system. You know, I read some of the experiments that take place.

所以我不知道如何改善这个体系的答案。我也读到了一些正在进行的实验。

But I do believe to start with that if you have a good public school system, as we do in Omaha, that you do your damndest to maintain that so that there is no incentive for the rich grandparent or the rich parent to say, you know, “I love the idea of equality, but I love my grandchildren or my child more, so I’m going to yank him from the public school system,” and then you get this sort of exodus which leaves behind only those who can’t afford to make that choice.

但我确实相信，如果你已经有一个好的公立学校体系，比如我们在奥马哈拥有的那样，你就应该尽全力维护它，这样富有的祖父母或父母就没有动力说，“我热爱平等的理念，但我更爱我的孙子或孩子，所以我要把他从公立学校体系中拉出来。”然后，这种退出现象就会发生，只留下那些无法做出这种选择的人。

And the problem I have with the voucher system, if there were a way — the idea of competition I like, you know, and I think a good parochial system does, for example, create a better public system — and I think we’ve had that situation in Omaha — but I think the voucher system, if it simply amounts to giving everyone an additional amount, simply means that the rich get X dollars of the public school system subsidized, but the poor still are — whatever that differential is — remains.

而我对教育券制度的问题在于，如果有一种方法——我喜欢竞争的理念，比如，我认为一个好的教区学校系统可以创造出一个更好的公立系统——我认为我们在奥马哈就有这样的情况。但我认为，如果教育券制度只是简单地给每个人额外的补贴，这只会意味着富人从公共教育体系中获得了X美元的补贴，而穷人依然存在差距，无论这个差距有多大。

I mean, you could have a golf voucher system — because I play golf — I don’t play very often — but if I play at the Omaha Country Club then you could have a voucher system so that everybody in Omaha would have more access to the country club by giving everybody a thousand dollars a year to play golf.

比如说，你可以有一个高尔夫券制度——因为我打高尔夫球——虽然我不常打——但如果我在奥马哈乡村俱乐部打球，那么你可以建立一个券制度，这样通过每年给每个人一千美元，每个人就可以更多地进入乡村俱乐部打高尔夫球。

But it just means it would reduce my bill by a thousand bucks, but it still wouldn’t do the job for the guy who’s on the public course because he’d still be beyond his means to move to full-scale equality with me.

但这只意味着我的账单减少了一千美元，但对于在公共球场打球的人来说，这仍然不足以让他与我达到全面平等，因为这超出了他的能力范围。

I — you know, I don’t think there’s anything more important — and I agree with Charlie totally — I think the first eight grades, you know, you can forget it after that. If you have the first eight grades right, good things are going to flow. And if you have those wrong, you’re not going to correct it as you get beyond that point.

我——你知道，我认为没有什么比这个更重要的了——我完全同意查理的看法——我认为，前八年的教育至关重要。你可以说，过了这八年，你就没法弥补了。如果前八年的教育是正确的，那么好的事情就会随之而来。如果这些做错了，那在之后的阶段是无法纠正的。

And I think that — you know, I commend Walter Annenberg on the $500 million. I think it is very tough to see results in that arena. And if you find something that is producing results, I think it should be replicated elsewhere.

我认为——你知道，我赞扬沃尔特·安嫩伯格提供的5亿美元。我认为在这个领域要看到成果非常困难。如果你发现某种方法产生了成果，我认为它应该在其他地方复制。

I think that, obviously — a fellow in Chicago says that the unions have caused considerable problems in getting adjustments made, but he had the political clout behind him to overcome some of those problems.

显然——芝加哥的一位朋友说，工会在调整方面造成了相当大的问题，但他有政治影响力支持，得以克服其中的一些问题。

It ought to be a top national priority. We have the money to educate everybody well in this country, and the question is, can we execute? And that’s something I hope good minds like Patrick’s work on.

这应该是国家的首要任务。我们有足够的资金为每个人提供良好的教育，问题是，我们能否执行？这是一件我希望像帕特里克这样优秀的头脑可以投入精力解决的事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think when something is demonstrably failing at performing the function to which it’s assigned by a civilization, just to keep pouring more and more money into a failing modality is not the Munger system.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为，当某件事明显未能履行其文明赋予的职能时，仅仅向一个失败的模式投入越来越多的资金，这不是芒格体系的做法。

So I’m all for taking the worst places where there’s failure and trying a new modality. And it wouldn’t bother me at all to have vouchers only for the poor.

因此，我完全支持在失败最严重的地方尝试新的模式。只为穷人提供教育券，我一点也不介意。

But I think we have to do something in our most troubled schools to change our techniques. I think it’s insane to keep going the way we are.

但我认为，我们必须在问题最严重的学校中采取一些措施来改变我们的方法。我认为，继续以现有方式行事是疯狂的。

WARREN BUFFETT: So you’d go for means-tested vouchers, basically?

沃伦·巴菲特：所以你基本上会支持基于收入标准的教育券，对吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I —

查理·芒格：哦，我——

WARREN BUFFETT: I mean, I don’t disagree with that idea.

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是，我并不反对这个想法。

CHARLIE MUNGER: All I know is we’re — it is a terrible place to fail.

查理·芒格：我所知道的是，这绝对是一个不该失败的地方。

And part of the trouble is ideological. If you have an absolute rule there can’t be any tracking by ability, no matter how much better reading can measurably be taught by systems that involve tracking, well, people that brain-blocked shouldn’t have the power. You know, we should — (applause) — do what works.

问题的一部分在于意识形态。如果你制定一个绝对的规则，禁止根据能力分层，即使分层教育能显著提高阅读能力，这种固执己见的人就不应该掌权。我们应该——（掌声）——采用行之有效的方法。

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, we got plenty — I mean, in Omaha, it works. The problem is that once it gets beyond a certain point on a downhill slope, essentially you have the citizens that are able to do something about it, essentially, opt out. And that — I don’t know —

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，我们有很多——我的意思是，在奥马哈，这个体系是有效的。但问题是，一旦它滑坡到一定程度，本有能力做出改变的公民基本上都会选择退出。这一点——我不知道——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I am a product of the Omaha public schools, and in my day, the people who went to private schools were those who couldn’t quite hack it in the public schools. That is still the situation in Germany today. I mean, private schools are for people who aren’t up to the public schools.

查理·芒格：我是奥马哈公立学校的产物。在我那个年代，上私立学校的人通常是那些无法适应公立学校的人。在德国，这种情况至今仍然存在。也就是说，私立学校是为那些达不到公立学校水平的人提供的。

I’d prefer a system like that. But once a big segment of that system measurably fails then I think you have to do something. You don’t just keep repeating what isn’t working.

我更喜欢这样的体系。但一旦这个体系的很大一部分明显失败了，那么我认为你必须采取一些措施。你不能一味地重复那些不起作用的方法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I agree with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我同意这一点。

Patrick, have you gotten your answer? (Applause)

帕特里克，你得到答案了吗？（掌声）

110. “The truth is you can have the reputation that you want”

“事实上，你可以拥有你想要的声誉”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to area 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们转到第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Kevin Murphy, I’m from Camarillo, California.

观众：我叫凯文·墨菲，来自加州卡马里奥。

And my question is, what do you look for when determining if a person is honest or not?

我的问题是，当你判断一个人是否诚实时，你看重哪些特质？

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, that’s a good question, Kevin.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个好问题，凯文。

You — I think, generally, Charlie and I can do pretty well with the situations we see, but we have to have some evidence of behavior in front of us. And I would say even there’s some occupations where we’re going to expect to find a higher percentage of people who behave well than in others.

你看——我认为，总体来说，查理和我对我们见过的情况判断得还不错，但我们需要一些行为上的证据。我甚至会说，在某些职业中，我们可能会期望看到更高比例的行为良好的人。

But if we work with someone over a period of a few months or more, I think we’ve got — we can come up with a pretty high batting average, in terms of how they behave.

但是，如果我们与某人合作几个月或更长时间，我认为我们能够以相当高的准确率判断出他们的行为如何。

At Salomon, I think I was able to separate out the people who I felt very good about and the people I was a little more nervous about fairly quickly, among the ones I worked with actively.

在所罗门兄弟公司时，我认为我能够很快区分出那些让我感到放心的人和那些让我有些紧张的人，在我主动接触的团队中。

But how you spot that precisely, you know — leave your lunch money on their — (laughs) — on their desk sometime, Kevin. Maybe you’ll find out in a hurry, but — (Laughter)

但是，如何准确发现这一点呢？——你知道的，凯文，有时候把你的午餐钱留在他们的桌上（笑）。也许你会很快发现答案，但——（笑声）

We like people — you know, I mean, the great example, you know, is somebody like a Tom Murphy, where they’re just bending over backwards all the time to make sure that you get the better end of the deal.

我们喜欢这样的人——比如，汤姆·墨菲这样的例子，他总是尽全力确保你能得到更好的待遇。

That doesn’t mean they aren’t competitive. I mean, if you play him at a golf game for money or something like that, you know, he wants to win in the worst way. But he —

这并不意味着他们没有竞争性。我的意思是，如果你和他打高尔夫比赛赌钱之类的，他绝对想尽全力赢。但他——

But there are people that just — they don’t take credit for things that they didn’t do. In fact, they give you credit for some of the things that maybe they did. You can get a feel for it over time.

但有些人从来不会抢功劳，甚至会把他们自己做的事情的功劳归于你。随着时间的推移，你能感受到这些品质。

Charlie, you have any good guidelines on that?

查理，你对此有什么好的建议吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. I think that people leave track records in life. And so, somebody at your age should figure that by the time he’s 22 or ’3, well, he will have left quite a track record and the world will be able to figure you out.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为人们在生活中会留下记录。所以，像你这个年纪的人应该明白，到他22岁或23岁时，他已经留下了一定的记录，社会会通过这些记录了解你。

So I think that track records are very important. And if you start early, trying to have a perfect record in some simple thing like honesty, you’re well on the way to success in this world. (Applause)

所以，我认为记录非常重要。如果你从年轻时就开始，在像诚实这样简单的事情上尽量保持良好的记录，你就已经在通往成功的路上了。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: [Italian industrialist] Gianni Agnelli one time told me, he said, “When you get older, you have the reputation you deserve.” He said you can get away —

沃伦·巴菲特：[意大利实业家]詹尼·阿涅利曾经对我说：“当你年纪大了，你就会拥有你应得的声誉。”他说，在年轻时你可以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah.

查理·芒格：是的，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — with it for a while early on. But by the time anybody gets to be 60 or so, they very probably have the reputation they deserve. And the truth is you can have the reputation that you want.

沃伦·巴菲特：——在早年一段时间内混过去。但当一个人到了60岁左右时，他们很可能就拥有了自己应得的声誉。事实上，你完全可以拥有你想要的声誉。

If you list all of the things that you admire in other people, you’ll find out that almost everything you list — you may not be able to kick a football 60 yards or something of that sort — but almost everything you list in the people that you admire and like, they’re qualities that you can have if you just set out to do that.

如果你列出你钦佩别人身上的所有特质，你会发现几乎所有列出来的东西——也许你踢不了60码远的橄榄球之类的——但几乎所有你钦佩和喜欢的人的品质，如果你努力去做到，你也可以拥有。

Didn’t Ben Franklin do that, Charlie?

查理，本杰明·富兰克林不就是这么做的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, sure. I always say that the best way to get what you want is to deserve what you want.

查理·芒格：哦，当然。我总是说，获得你想要的东西的最佳方式就是去配得上你想要的东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll have some more peanut brittle. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我再吃点花生脆糖。（笑声）

111. No expectations of investment problems due to Y2K

对2000年问题未预期出现投资问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Nancy Sill (PH) from Atlanta, Georgia.

观众：我是来自乔治亚州亚特兰大的南希·西尔（音）。

You were asked earlier this morning a question about the year 2000 computer problem. Do you anticipate any negative financial impact to the economy or to our companies due to the millennium problem, and if so what financial strategies are you considering?

今天早上您被问到了关于2000年电脑问题的一个问题。您是否预期千禧年问题会对经济或我们的公司造成任何负面财务影响？如果是，您会考虑什么样的财务策略？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think there’ll be major problems for our companies. You know, there are going to be some problems — (laughs) — anytime you have something that big.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为我们的公司不会有大的问题。你知道的，这种规模大的事情总会有一些问题——（笑）。

If people didn’t see it coming in 1980 or 1985, they’re not going to be perfect at solving it by 2000, you can count on that.

如果人们在1980年或1985年没有预见到这个问题，那么到2000年也不可能完全解决，你可以确信这一点。

But I don’t think it has any investment consequences for Berkshire Hathaway that we should be considering now. And I do think you’ll see most of the problems in the governmental area.

但我认为这对伯克希尔·哈撒韦不会有任何投资上的影响，我们也不需要为此进行考量。我确实认为，大多数问题会出现在政府领域。

You know, maybe they won’t find your tax return for two or three years. (Laughter) Who knows?

你知道的，可能他们两三年都找不到你的报税表。（笑）谁知道呢？

Charlie?

查理？

112. McDonald’s will keep its real estate

麦当劳将保留其房地产

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: In your description of McDonald’s, you have a sense that there’s a great business buried in McDonald’s and two good businesses that are mixed in with it. And the problem is with the real estate and the operational business, that as the company is currently capitalized, they can’t earn the same kind of returns they can earn in the franchising business.

观众：在您对麦当劳的描述中，您认为麦当劳内部隐藏着一个很棒的业务，以及两个不错的业务掺杂其中。问题出在房地产和运营业务上，以公司目前的资本结构，他们无法赚取与特许经营业务相同的回报。

You were, or still are, a significant shareholder of McDonald’s. I guess my question is, the solution is obvious: why don’t you push for a solution that creates the same opportunity to have at International Dairy Queen?

您曾经或仍然是麦当劳的重要股东。我想我的问题是，解决方案显而易见：为什么您不推动一个像国际冰雪皇后那样的解决方案呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my guess is — I don’t know the details on it — but my guess is that with 23,000 locations all over the world, I think it would be extraordinarily difficult to separate the real estate business out from the franchising business at this point.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我猜——我不知道具体细节——但我的猜测是，对于全球有23,000个门店的规模来说，现在将房地产业务与特许经营业务分离开会非常困难。

I think they could’ve gone a different route. I’m not saying it would’ve been a better route at all. In fact, I think the odds are they followed the right route in owning and controlling so much real estate.

我认为他们本可以选择另一条路线。我并不是说那会是更好的路线。事实上，我认为他们选择拥有和控制如此多的房地产可能是正确的路线。

But I just think the problems would be horrendous. Certainly you wouldn’t want to sell it and lease it back because you would not end up with more value, in my view, by doing that.

但我认为问题会非常复杂。当然，你不会希望通过出售并回租的方式来解决，因为在我看来，这样做不会创造更多的价值。

And spinning it off in a real estate trust or something, with operating in 100-plus countries, and with all of the franchise arrangements, I think it would be a huge, huge problem. I would not want to tackle it myself.

将其分拆成房地产信托或类似的东西，在100多个国家运营，并且还要考虑所有的特许经营安排，我认为这将是一个巨大的、巨大的难题。我自己不想处理这样的事情。

So I think that you should look at McDonald’s — and I don’t know anything about their plans on this — but I think you should look at McDonald’s as being a very good business, but one that will continue in its present mode vis a vis the real estate. Although I think they’ve signaled that they’re going to do less on new properties — somewhat less — in connection with ownership, than they’ve done to this point.

所以我认为你应该将麦当劳看作一个非常好的业务——尽管我对他们在这方面的计划一无所知——但我认为你应该将麦当劳视为一个将在房地产方面继续沿用现有模式的业务。虽然我认为他们已经表明，他们在新物业上的所有权投入会比现在少一些。

But there’s 23,000 locations out there and every operator, his own arrangement is very important to him. And it just — it would be a mammoth job, and I’m not sure how much extra value would be created in the end anyway.

不过，外面有23,000个门店，每个运营商的安排对他们自己来说都非常重要。而且这将是一项巨大的工作，我不确定最终能创造出多少额外的价值。

在互联网时代这个问题的难度降低了，但竞争对手也可能更多了。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the net returns on capital McDonald’s has earned all these years are high, even though they have owned a lot of their real estate. I think it’s hard to quarrel with the way they did it. They had the best record.

查理·芒格：是的，这些年来，麦当劳在资本上的净回报率很高，即使他们拥有了大量的房地产。我认为很难对他们的方式提出异议。他们有最好的记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: And the multiple is not greatly different, in my view, than if the real estate were separate. You know, I mean, if you get all the real estate detached in some arrangement, you might get a little more out of it. But it doesn’t strike me as a big deal.

沃伦·巴菲特：而且在我看来，其市盈率与房地产分离的情况相比并没有很大的差别。我的意思是，如果你通过某种安排将所有房地产分离出来，也许会多出一些价值。但在我看来，这不是什么大事。

113. Berkshire is “poorly” structured for owning securities

伯克希尔在持有证券方面的结构“不佳”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, hi. I’m Rachel White (PH) from Missoula, Montana.

观众：嗨，我是来自蒙大拿州米苏拉的雷切尔·怀特（音）。

And during the lunch break, I heard some people talking about double taxation and how that impacts Berkshire’s investment philosophy. So I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about it. I’m not sure I understood it. And if you could explain whether that impacts your investments.

午餐休息时，我听到一些人讨论双重征税以及它如何影响伯克希尔的投资理念。所以我想问您能不能谈谈这个问题。我不确定自己是否理解了。如果可以的话，请解释一下这是否影响您的投资。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we are structured very poorly. And if you were looking — if you’re going to start all over again and do most of the things we’ve done, you would probably not do it in corporate form, or precisely like we do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们的结构确实很差。如果你重新开始，并打算做我们已经做的大部分事情，你可能不会选择公司形式，或者不会完全像我们现在的方式一样运作。

I mean, what that gentleman was talking about in connection with McDonald’s applies much more to Berkshire Hathaway by far than McDonald’s, in terms of de-taxing part of the income stream.

我的意思是，那位先生提到的关于麦当劳的问题，从减少部分收入流的税负角度来看，这一点对伯克希尔的适用程度远远超过麦当劳。

If we own Coca-Cola with a cost of a billion-two or a billion-three and a market value of 15 billion, we’re not going to sell it.

比如说，我们持有可口可乐的成本为12亿或13亿美元，而其市值是150亿美元，我们不会卖掉它。

But if we did sell it, we would incur a capital gains tax on the order, almost, of $5 billion.

但是如果我们卖掉它，我们将面临大约50亿美元的资本利得税。

That means that the 15 becomes 10 billion. Now, if that 10 billion is reflected in Berkshire’s value and you bought your stock when we bought our Coke, then you pay a second tax, in turn, in reflection of the Coca-Cola appreciation that has taken place after tax. So it’s a very disadvantageous way of owning securities, to have a corporation in between you and the securities themselves.

这意味着150亿美元变成了100亿美元。如果这100亿美元反映在伯克希尔的价值中，而你在我们购买可口可乐时买入了我们的股票，那么你将再一次支付税，这反映了可口可乐税后升值的部分。因此，通过公司持有证券是一种非常不利的方式，因为公司位于你与证券之间。

If we ran as a partnership that would not be the case. I ran Berkshire Hathaway — I mean, I ran Buffett Partnership for many years and we only had one tax at the individual level.

如果我们以合伙企业的形式运作，就不会出现这种情况。我曾经营伯克希尔——我是说，我经营过巴菲特合伙公司很多年，那时我们只有个人层面的单一税。

So our stockholders are — to the extent that we own marketable securities — and we own a lot of them — and to the extent that we have a lot of profits over time in those — own those securities in a disadvantageous way.

因此，我们的股东——在我们持有大量可交易证券并长期获得大量利润的情况下——实际上以一种不利的方式持有这些证券。

Now, we also have a float, which helps us own them, which is a big plus.

当然，我们还有浮存金，这帮助我们持有这些证券，这是一大优势。

But corporate ownership of securities — if you have the option of owning them directly or through a partnership — corporate ownership is disadvantageous.

但是，公司持有证券——如果你有直接持有或通过合伙企业持有的选择——公司持有是较为不利的。

And we’re stuck with it. We’ve had it for all these years. We’ve got no plans to do anything about it. We couldn’t, probably, do anything about it if we wanted to.

我们被困在这种结构中。我们多年来一直如此。我们没有计划对此采取任何行动。如果我们想做些什么，可能也无法做到。

So that is a drag on our performance, compared to what would be the situation if we operated as a partnership.

因此，与以合伙企业形式运作的情况相比，这对我们的表现是一个拖累。

And Lloyd’s syndicates, for example, didn’t have that problem. Some insurance companies that operate in Bermuda may not have that problem to the same extent. Certainly partnerships don’t have that problem, to the extent they own securities. But it’s a fact of life with us and we’re going to pay a lot of taxes.

例如，劳合社的辛迪加就没有这个问题。一些在百慕大运营的保险公司可能没有这个问题，至少没有到同样的程度。当然，合伙企业在持有证券的情况下也没有这个问题。但对我们来说，这就是现实，我们将缴纳大量的税款。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we have no cure for the corporate income tax, and it is a big disadvantage for the indirect owner of securities.

查理·芒格：是的，我们对公司所得税无能为力，而这对证券的间接持有者来说是一个很大的劣势。

So far we’ve surmounted it well enough but we’re carrying a load there.

到目前为止，我们应对得还不错，但我们确实背负着这个负担。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s become a bigger disadvantage since the individual rate went to 20 percent with our corporate rate being 35 percent. If we make a dollar on a stock, it becomes 65 cents, and to the extent that you’ve owned Berkshire, that 65 cents, now 20 percent off that, becomes 52 cents. Whereas if you’d owned the stock directly, you’d have had 80 cents.

沃伦·巴菲特：自从个人税率降到20%，而我们的公司税率是35%以来，这个劣势变得更大了。如果我们在股票上赚了一美元，这一美元变成了65美分。而如果你拥有伯克希尔的股份，这65美分再被扣掉20%的税，就变成了52美分。而如果你直接持有该股票，你将拥有80美分。

Now, when we owned GEICO and it wasn’t consolidated with us, you carried that one more extreme. I mean, GEICO had capital gains and we had a capital gain proportionately in GEICO, and so on.

而当我们持有GEICO但未将其合并入我们时，这种情况变得更极端。比如，GEICO有资本增益，而我们按比例在GEICO中也有资本增益，依此类推。

I mean, how you’re structured does make a real difference. But usually once you get into a given structure, you’re kind of stuck with it, as I indicated in the answer to the gentleman on McDonald’s.

我的意思是，你的结构确实会产生实质性的影响。但通常一旦进入某种结构，你就很难改变，就像我在回答那位关于麦当劳问题的先生时提到的那样。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, to the extent we have very long holding periods at the corporate level, the real mathematical disadvantage shrinks.

查理·芒格：不过，从我们在公司层面非常长期持有的角度看，这种数学上的劣势会缩小。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and we might not have been able to get the float that we have, if we hadn’t been operating it in a corporate structure, so that is a mitigating factor, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果我们不是以公司结构运作，我们可能就无法获得我们目前的浮存金，所以这也是一个缓解因素。

But we like to have the mitigating factors without anything to mitigate, if we get our choice. (Laughter)

不过，如果可以选择的话，我们更喜欢有缓解因素但不需要缓解任何问题。（笑）

114. Due diligence is useless and misses the point

尽职调查无用且抓错重点

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 9, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：第九区，请提问。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Fred Strasheim (PH) and I’m from here in Omaha.

观众：下午好。我是弗雷德·斯特拉斯海姆（音），来自这里的奥马哈。

I have a question about your acquisition methodology. And I was intrigued to read in your annual report about your acquisition of Star Furniture.

我想问您关于收购方法的问题。我在您的年报中读到您收购Star Furniture的过程，感到很有趣。

And as I understand the process you followed, Mr. Buffett, you met with Mr. — or you — I’m sorry, you reviewed financials for a brief period, liked what you saw, then you met with Mr. Melvyn Wolff for two hours and struck a deal. And you wrote you had no need to check leases, work out employment contracts, et cetera.

据我所知，巴菲特先生，您的过程是这样的：您花了一小段时间审阅财务数据，觉得不错，然后与梅尔文·沃尔夫先生会面两个小时并达成协议。您写道，您认为不需要检查租约、制定雇佣合同等事宜。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think that most companies, when they do acquisitions, would feel the need to do a significant amount of legal due diligence, to do things like check the leases, check into things like undisclosed environmental liability, or perhaps threatened litigation.

观众：我认为大多数公司在进行收购时，会觉得需要做大量的法律尽职调查，比如检查租约、调查未披露的环境责任或可能的法律诉讼等事项。

And I guess my question is, have you ever been burned by your approach?

所以我的问题是，您的这种方法是否让您吃过亏？

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve been burned by the — we’ve been burned only in the sense that we’ve made mistakes on judging the future economics of the business, which would’ve had nothing to do with due diligence.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们吃过亏，但仅限于在判断企业未来经济状况时犯了错误，而这与尽职调查无关。

We regard what people normally refer to “due diligence” as, as really sort of boilerplate in most cases.

我们认为，人们通常所说的“尽职调查”，在大多数情况下实际上只是例行公事。

It’s a process that big companies go through. And they feel they have to go through it. And they’re ignoring — oftentimes, in our view — they’re ignoring what really counts, which is evaluating the people they’re getting in with, and evaluating the economics of the business. That’s 99 percent of the deal.

这是大公司会走的一个流程。他们觉得必须这么做。但他们忽视了——在我们看来经常忽视了——真正重要的东西，那就是评估与他们合作的人，以及评估企业的经济状况。这占交易的99%。

You know, you may run into an environmental liability problem, you know, one time in a hundred, or you may, you know, you may find a bad lease.

你可能会遇到环境责任问题，这种情况大概百次中有一次，或者你可能会发现一个糟糕的租约。

I asked Melvin about, you know, “Do you have any bad leases?” I mean, that’s the easiest way to do it. And I could read them all and try and look for every clause or something, but it isn’t going to — you know, that is not the problem.

我问梅尔文，“你有没有什么糟糕的租约？”这是最简单的方法。我可以全部读一遍，试图寻找每一条条款或问题，但这不会——你知道，这不是问题的关键。

We’ve made bad — lots of bad deals. We made a bad deal when we bought Hochschild Kohn, for example, the department store operation, back in 1966. But it had — fine people — but we were wrong on the economics of the business.

我们确实做过糟糕的交易，很多糟糕的交易。例如，在1966年，我们收购百货商店Hochschild Kohn时就是一次糟糕的交易。当时有很好的人在经营，但我们对业务的经济状况判断错误。

But the leases didn’t make any difference. You know, that sort of thing just was not important. And I can’t recall any time that what other people refer to as due diligence would’ve avoided a bad deal for us.

但租约并没有什么影响。这种事情根本不重要。我想不起有任何时候，其他人所说的尽职调查能帮我们避免一笔糟糕的交易。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t either.

查理·芒格：我也想不起有过这样的情况。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. That’s 30-some years. And I —

沃伦·巴菲特：没有。这是三十多年来的经验。并且——

The key thing — you just don’t want to do — I go — I’m on various public company boards — I’ve been on 19 public company boards — and you know, their idea of the due diligence is to send the lawyers out and have a bunch of investment bankers come in and make presentations and all that.

关键是——你不想做的事情就是——我在不同的上市公司董事会中任职——我曾在19个上市公司董事会任职——你知道，他们所谓的尽职调查就是派律师去，然后让一群投资银行家进来做演示之类的事情。

And I regard that as terribly diversionary, because the board sits there, you know, entranced by all of that, and everybody reporting how wonderful this thing is and how they checked out patents and all that sort of thing. And nobody is focusing really on where the business is going to be in five or 10 years.

我认为这完全是分散注意力，因为董事会坐在那里，被这些东西迷住了，每个人都在汇报这件事多么好，他们检查了专利等等。而没有人真正关注这个业务五年或十年后会怎样。

You know, business judgment about economics — and people to some extent — but the business economics — that is 99 percent of deal making. And the rest, people may do it for their protection. I think too often they do it as a crutch just to go through with the deal that they want to go through with anyway, and of course all the professionals know that. So believe me, they come back with the diligence, whether due or not. And — (Laughter)

你知道，对经济状况的商业判断——以及某种程度上的对人的判断——但关键是业务的经济状况——这是交易中99%的关键。剩下的，人们可能出于自我保护而做这些事。我认为他们太常把尽职调查当成一种借口，只是为了推进他们本来就想推进的交易。当然，所有专业人士都知道这一点。所以相信我，无论尽职调查是否必要，他们都会把结果带回来。（笑）

We are not big fans of that. I don’t know how many deals we’ve made over the years, but I cannot think of anything that traditional due diligence has had a thing to do with.

我们不是这种方式的忠实拥护者。我不知道这些年来我们做了多少笔交易，但我想不出有哪笔交易与传统的尽职调查有关。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we’ve had surprises on the favorable side a couple of times —

查理·芒格：不过，有几次我们在积极方面得到了意外惊喜——

WARREN BUFFETT: That is true. That is true.

沃伦·巴菲特：确实如此，确实如此。

The kind of people that we’ve generally dealt with have usually told us the bad things first and good things after we made the deal.

我们通常打交道的人，往往会先告诉我们坏消息，而好消息是在交易完成后才告诉我们的。

We made a deal with a fellow over in Rockford in 1969, Eugene Abegg, Illinois National Bank and Trust Company. I made that deal in a couple of hours and, I mean, there just wasn’t any way that Gene was going to be hiding anything bad.

1969年，我们在罗克福德和尤金·阿贝格（Eugene Abegg）达成了一笔交易，他是伊利诺伊国家银行和信托公司的负责人。我在几个小时内就完成了这笔交易，我的意思是，吉恩不可能隐瞒任何坏消息。

For the next ten years when I went over there, every time I’d go to lunch he’d point out some building in town that we owned that wasn’t on the books, or some foundation we had that had money in it he hadn’t told me about.

在接下来的十年里，每次我去那里吃午餐时，他都会指出城里一些我们拥有但未记录在账上的建筑，或者告诉我一些我们有资金但他之前没提过的基金会。

And he even gave me some bills, one of which I carry in my pocket, that he had still sitting around that were issued by the bank that were our own money which he never told me about. We could cut them out like paper dolls. I mean, Gene was not a guy to show all his cards. (Laughter)

他甚至给了我一些钞票，其中一张我现在还放在口袋里，那是银行发行的我们自己的钱，但他从未告诉过我。我们甚至可以像剪纸一样把它们剪出来。我的意思是，吉恩并不是那种会把所有底牌都亮出来的人。（笑）

And those are the kind of people we’ve generally dealt with, and I would certainly say that Melvyn and [his sister] Shirley [Toomin] fit that description in spades.

这些人正是我们通常打交道的对象，我可以肯定地说，梅尔文和[他的妹妹]雪莉[图明]完全符合这个描述。