2004-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning session
上午会议
1. Welcome
欢迎
WARREN BUFFETT: (Applause) Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：（掌声）谢谢。
Good morning. Some of you may have noticed a stunt man was used in that [video shown before the meeting]. (Laughter)
早上好。你们中的一些人可能已经注意到，在那个[会议前播放的视频]中使用了一位特技演员。（笑声）
Arnold [Schwarzenegger] just couldn’t handle some of those scenes. (Laughter)
阿诺德[施瓦辛格]就是无法应对其中的一些场景。（笑声）
Before we get started, I’d especially like to thank Andy Heyward, who’s here today and if we can — I don’t know whether we can find him out in the crowd, it’s a little hard to see from up here.
在我们开始之前，我特别想感谢今天在场的安迪·海沃德，如果我们能——我不知道我们能否在人群中找到他，从这里看有点困难。
But Andy runs DiC Productions. He does that cartoon for us and let’s give him a big hand. (Applause)
但是安迪经营着 DiC 制作公司。他为我们制作了那部卡通片，让我们为他热烈鼓掌。（掌声）
Andy has produced a really extraordinary series telling the story of the beginning of this country called “Liberty’s Kids.” It’s been on public broadcasting the last couple of years. It’s great for kids but it’s great for adults, too. I’ve watched a number of sessions myself.
安迪制作了一部非常出色的系列剧，讲述了这个国家开端的故事，名为《自由的孩子》。过去几年一直在公共广播上播出。它对孩子们来说很棒，但对成年人来说也很棒。我自己也看过好几集。
And this summer, in July, it will go on sale at Walmart, a very special celebration. And for those of you who want to pick out something good for your children or your grandchildren, I can’t think of a better series to have them watching. And thanks again Andy.
今年夏天，七月份，它将在沃尔玛上市，这是一个非常特别的庆祝活动。对于那些想为孩子或孙子挑选好东西的人来说，我想不出比这更好的系列让他们观看了。再次感谢安迪。
And thanks also to Kelly Muchemore who puts this whole production on. (Applause)
也感谢凯莉·穆切莫尔，她负责整个制作。（掌声）
This is Kelly’s show. 这是凯莉的节目。
She, along with that dog Dudley, who you saw in the movie — Dudley is a regular at Berkshire Hathaway. We don’t count him in the 15.8 [employees at headquarters], but she, along with Dudley, handle everything. I don’t even give a thought to what’s going to happen here, as might become evident during the meeting. (Laughter)
她和你们在电影中看到的那只狗达德利一起——达德利是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的常客。我们不把他算入总部的15.8名[员工]，但她和达德利处理一切。我甚至不考虑这里会发生什么，可能在会议期间会显现出来。（笑声）
She is responsible for putting up that whole exhibition arrangement and really the whole thing. So, Kelly, I don’t know where you are exactly, but in any event, thank you very much. (Applause)
她负责整个展览的布置，实际上是整个事情。所以，凯莉，我不知道你现在在哪里，但无论如何，非常感谢你。（掌声）
2. Formal business meeting begins
正式商务会议开始
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’ll go through the business part of the meeting. And it may take a little longer than usual, but please be patient.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们将进行会议的业务部分。可能会比平时稍长一些，但请耐心等待。
And I’d like to start out by calling the meeting to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of Berkshire Hathaway, and I welcome you to this meeting.
我想先宣布会议开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的董事会主席，欢迎大家参加这次会议。
This hyperkinetic fellow next to me is Charlie Munger — (laughter) — the vice chairman. And we will have a good time, and I hope you do, too.
坐在我旁边的这位精力充沛的家伙是查理·芒格——（笑声）——副主席。我们会玩得很开心，希望你们也一样。
We work together because he can hear and I can see. I mean, it’s — (laughter) — there are times where we can’t remember each other’s name, but we have a lot of fun together.
我们一起工作，因为他能听见而我能看见。我的意思是，——（笑声）——有时候我们记不住彼此的名字，但我们在一起很开心。
Now, any shareholder who wishes to speak regarding the shareholder proposal expected to be presented by Human Life International, or any other matters germane to the shareholder’s meeting, should now go to microphone zone 1, which is in section 121 over on my right.
现在，任何希望就国际人类生命组织预计提出的股东提案或与股东大会相关的其他事项发言的股东，请现在前往麦克风区域 1，该区域位于我右侧的 121 区。
Or section 2, which is at section 221, I believe that’s higher up on my right. And — let me see if I have that right. Yeah, or go to section 7, which is — or section 105 — which is microphone 7 on my left. Or to section 205, which is microphone 8.
或者第 2 区，在第 221 区，我相信那是在我右边更高的地方。让我看看我是否说对了。是的，或者去第 7 区，或者第 105 区，那是我左边的麦克风 7。或者去第 205 区，那是麦克风 8。
If you’ll go to — if you’re going to want to talk about anything concerning the business of the meeting, not the questions afterwards, but just that relates to the matters germane to the meeting, please go there now, because I’m not going to be able to spot people in a crowd this size.
如果你想谈论任何与会议事务有关的事情，而不是之后的问题，而只是与会议相关的事项，请现在就去那里，因为我无法在人群中找到这么多人。
And when it comes time to do the business, we’re going to ask anybody that cares to speak up on the business to be at those microphones. And that will be in just a couple of minutes.
当我们开始讨论业务时，我们会请任何想要发言的人到那些麦克风前。那将在几分钟后进行。
Now after adjournment of the business meeting, I’ll respond to questions that you may have that relate to the businesses of Berkshire but that don’t call for any action at the meeting.
现在在业务会议休会后，我将回答您可能提出的与伯克希尔业务相关的问题，但这些问题不需要在会议上采取任何行动。
We had some complaints after last year that some people were asking six or seven-part questions. At least, that’s the reason I’m giving that we’re eliminating those.
去年我们收到了一些投诉，说有些人提出了六到七个部分的问题。至少，这就是我给出的取消这些问题的理由。
The bigger reason is Charlie and I can’t remember the first part by the time you get to the fifth part. (Laughter)
更大的原因是查理和我在你到达第五部分时已经记不起第一部分了。（笑声）
So, we are asking you to ask only one question. And don’t try to get too clever about working three or four into a single question. And that will give more people a chance to get their questions asked. Only one question at a time and we will go around from microphone to microphone and get as many in as we can.
所以，我们要求你们只问一个问题。不要试图在一个问题中包含三到四个问题。这样可以让更多的人有机会提问。一次只问一个问题，我们会从一个麦克风到另一个麦克风，尽可能多地让大家提问。
Now, we’re going to do this until noon and then we’ll take a break for lunch and we’ll come back about one and we’ll continue until 3:30. And anything goes on the questions. We’ll answer almost anything, except questions about what we may be buying or selling.
现在，我们会做到中午，然后我们会休息一下吃午饭，我们会在一点左右回来，继续到三点半。任何问题都可以提问。我们几乎会回答任何问题，除了关于我们可能买卖什么的问题。
You’re free, of course, to wander around, go over and buy things. You know, we have a lot of things for sale over there.
当然，你可以随意四处走走，去那边买东西。你知道，我们那里有很多东西出售。
It’s — as I’ve pointed out in the past, it’s better form to leave while Charlie is speaking than when I’m speaking, but you can — (laughter) — use your own judgment on that.
正如我过去指出的，当查理在讲话时离开比我讲话时离开更好，但你可以——（笑声）——自行判断。
Now, I do want to remind you that any audio or video recording of this meeting is prohibited. That if anybody’s seen recording the proceedings, we will have to ask you to leave. So, if you see anybody doing that, we would appreciate it if you would just inform one of the staff personnel around.
现在，我确实想提醒您，禁止对本次会议进行任何音频或视频录制。如果发现有人录制会议，我们将不得不请您离开。因此，如果您看到有人这样做，我们将非常感谢您通知周围的工作人员。
Because there’s certain copyrighted material that we use and people, like Judge Judy, give us permission to use a segment like that. But it’s not intended to be used in any commercial way. So, we do ask that no recording take place.
因为我们使用了一些特定的受版权保护的材料，比如像 Judge Judy 会允许我们使用这样的片段。但这并不打算用于任何商业用途。所以，我们要求不要进行任何录音。
3. Directors introduced
董事介绍
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, I’ll first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present, in addition to myself and Charlie. Now, I’ll ask the directors to stand as their names are read and ask that you withhold applause, if any — (laughter) — until all are introduced.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在，除了我和查理之外，我将首先介绍在场的伯克希尔·哈撒韦董事。现在，我会在念到名字时请董事们站起来，并请大家在所有人介绍完之前不要鼓掌——（笑声）。
We have — I don’t know whether we have anybody here from CalPERS, but they can register their own views as we go along. (Laughter)
我们有——我不知道我们这里是否有来自加州公共雇员退休系统的人，但他们可以在我们进行过程中表达自己的看法。（笑声）
And it is difficult to see from here, so if you’ll just stand as I mention your name and remain standing until the end, when we will see whether you get any applause.
从这里很难看清楚，所以如果我提到你的名字，请站起来并保持站立直到结束，届时我们将看看你是否会得到掌声。
Susan T. Buffett. Howard G. Buffett. Malcolm G. Chace. David S. Gottesman — Sandy had a conflict today. There’s a bat mitzvah, I believe, for a granddaughter, so he’s coming in tomorrow for our director’s meeting on Monday.
苏珊·T·巴菲特。霍华德·G·巴菲特。马尔科姆·G·蔡斯。大卫·S·戈特斯曼——桑迪今天有个冲突。我相信是孙女的成人礼，所以他明天会来参加我们周一的董事会议。
Charlotte Guyman. Donald R. Keough. Thomas S. Murphy. Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. And now you can go crazy. (Applause)
夏洛特·盖曼。唐纳德·R·基奥。托马斯·S·墨菲。罗纳德·L·奥尔森，和沃尔特·斯科特二世。现在你们可以疯狂了。（掌声）
4. Four questions for the auditors
给审计员的四个问题
WARREN BUFFETT: Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，我们的审计师。他们可以回答您可能对他们公司审计伯克希尔账目的相关问题。
In that regard, I wish to report that at Berkshire’s audit committee meeting held on March 2nd, 2004, Deloitte & Touche responded to the four questions I suggested be asked to the independent accountants by all audit committees. And we’re going to put these up in just a second.
在这方面，我想报告，在 2004 年 3 月 2 日举行的伯克希尔审计委员会会议上，德勤会计师事务所对我建议所有审计委员会向独立会计师提出的四个问题作出了回应。我们马上就会展示这些问题。
With respect to Berkshire, the questions and the auditors’ responses will be shown on the following slides.
关于伯克希尔，问题和审计师的回答将显示在接下来的幻灯片中。
And I might mention that I really do think these questions should be asked of all auditors, at least annually, perhaps even quarterly.
我可能会提到，我确实认为这些问题应该至少每年，甚至每季度向所有审计员提出。
And I really think that, if such a procedure had been followed over the years — don’t eat them all Charlie. (Laughter)
我真的认为，如果多年来遵循这样的程序——查理，别全吃了。（笑声）
If such procedures had been followed over the years, there would have been a lot less trouble in corporate America.
如果这些程序多年来一直得到遵循，美国企业界的问题就会少得多。
I mean, for many years, particularly in the ’90s, I think there was a weakening, frankly, in auditor vigilance. And the trick, as I’ve said, is really to have the auditors more worried about the audit committee than they are worried about the management.
我的意思是，多年来，尤其是在 90 年代，我认为审计员的警惕性确实有所减弱。正如我所说，关键在于让审计员对审计委员会的担忧超过对管理层的担忧。
And it’s quite natural when they’re, essentially, hired by the management and when they see the management regularly and they only see the audit committee infrequently, that it’s tempting to listen a little bit more to management than the audit committee.
当他们本质上是由管理层聘用的，并且经常见到管理层，而很少见到审计委员会时，倾向于多听管理层而不是审计委员会是很自然的。
But these questions, if asked, in my view — and if the answers are put on the record — I think it would have a very helpful effect on behavior. Because once on the record, it means the auditors — it means they’re on the line.
但是在我看来，如果提出这些问题——并且如果答案被记录在案——我认为这将对行为产生非常有益的影响。因为一旦记录在案，这意味着审计员——这意味着他们有责任。
And I’ve been on a lot of boards of directors and I’ve seen, in retrospect, things go by that I wish had been called to my attention by the auditors.
我曾在许多董事会任职，事后看来，我看到了一些事情，我希望审计师能提醒我注意。
So we have these four questions. And if we’ll put up the first one — and I’d like to explain one item. Do we have those up? Yeah.
所以我们有这四个问题。如果我们把第一个问题提出来——我想解释一项内容。我们有这些问题吗？好的。
You can read the question and these are the responses, as we go along, that the auditors have given to these questions.
您可以阅读问题，这些是审计员对这些问题给出的回答。
Now you’ll notice on the first one that there is one item that — and incidentally, we owe a shareholder, who I think is going to speak later — it was his suggestion that we actually present these at the meeting. And I think it’s a good suggestion. And I think if more companies did it, it would be a good idea. So I thank him for the suggestion.
现在你会注意到在第一个上面有一项——顺便说一下，我们欠一位股东的建议，我想他稍后会发言——是他的建议让我们在会议上实际展示这些。我认为这是个好建议。我认为如果更多公司这样做，那将是个好主意。所以我感谢他的建议。
The major item, which is not material, as auditors define it, but the major item in which we disagree and use a method which I will explain further — actually, it’s been changed — but concerns the purchase of life insurance policies, or the reinsurance of people who are purchasing life insurance policies, their so-called viatical settlements.
主要项目，虽然不属于审计师定义的实质性项目，但我们在此存在分歧，并使用一种方法（我将进一步解释，实际上已经更改过）涉及购买人寿保险政策，或再保险那些购买人寿保险政策的人，他们所谓的生命结算。
And we have had a business, of sorts, in that. And it’s likely to even be a larger business in the future.
我们在这方面有过某种业务。而且将来可能会成为更大的业务。
And what takes place there is that somebody, usually elderly, has a life insurance policy and they’d rather have the money themselves than have their heirs get it later on. So, they want to cash out early.
在那里发生的情况是，有人，通常是老年人，拥有一份人寿保险，他们宁愿自己拿到钱，而不是让继承人以后得到。因此，他们想提前兑现。
And as you know, a life insurance policy typically has a cash surrender value. And sometimes those cash surrender values are quite low in relation to the actuarial value of the policy. So sometimes those people wish to sell a policy.
正如你所知，人寿保险单通常具有现金退保价值。有时这些现金退保价值与保单的精算价值相比相当低。因此，有时这些人希望出售保单。
We had a case the other day where a 79-year-old woman had an insurance policy amounting to some $75 million. I’ve never met her, but she must be quite a woman, but — (Laughter)
前几天我们遇到一个案例，一位 79 岁的女性拥有一份价值约 7500 万美元的保险单。我从未见过她，但她一定是个了不起的女人，不过——（笑声）
The cash surrender value of that policy was $2 million. Clearly, for even a 79-year-old in the best of health, that was an inadequate sum for her to receive. But yet she wished to have the cash herself rather than eventually die and leave it to her heirs.
该保单的现金退保价值为 200 万美元。显然，即使对于一位健康状况极佳的 79 岁老人来说，这也是一笔不足的金额。然而，她希望自己能拿到这笔现金，而不是最终去世后留给继承人。
So, we paid — or we actually reinsured a transaction where somebody else did it, and we took only 50 percent of it, but I’m going to use a hundred percent figures.
因此，我们支付了——或者说我们实际上对一项交易进行了再保险，别人做了这项交易，而我们只承担了50％，但我将使用100％的数字。
We reinsured — we bought that policy for $10 million. And under accounting rules — GAAP accounting — we — it is recommended that we write that policy down immediately to the cash surrender value of 2 million. Well obviously, we think it’s worth 10 million or we wouldn’t have paid 10 million for it today.
我们再保险了——我们以 1000 万美元购买了那份保单。根据会计准则——GAAP 会计准则——我们——建议我们立即将该保单减记至 200 万美元的现金退保价值。显然，我们认为它值 1000 万美元，否则我们今天就不会为它支付 1000 万美元。
But the rules, as they become more clear, say write it down immediately. I happen to think that rule is wrong. But last year, at the end of the year, there had been a total of $73 million applicable to such policies that reflected our purchase price as opposed to the cash surrender value.
但是，随着规则变得更加明确，它们要求立即记下来。我碰巧认为这个规则是错误的。但是去年年底，总共有 7300 万美元适用于这些政策，这反映了我们的购买价格，而不是现金解约价值。
In the first quarter of 2004, our activity has stepped up in this field some — the people we reinsure have stepped up their activities, so we get our 50 percent. And that amounts to — it’s going to amount in the first quarter to about 30 million.
在 2004 年第一季度，我们在这一领域的活动有所增加——我们再保险的对象也增加了他们的活动，所以我们获得了 50%的份额。这将在第一季度达到大约 3000 万。
So, we have adopted — even though we think it’s in incorrect — we have adopted the GAAP accounting. And you will see in the first quarter report of Berkshire the charge for the 73 million of last year plus the 30 million in the first quarter this year.
因此，我们已经采用了——尽管我们认为这是不正确的——我们已经采用了 GAAP 会计准则。你将在伯克希尔的第一季度报告中看到去年 7300 万的费用加上今年第一季度的 3000 万。
And that gets charged, believe it or not, to realized capital gains. And so, by buying these policies for X on one day and immediately writing them down substantially, that becomes a realized capital loss on our book. Now later on, we expect to get a perfectly satisfactory return from these policies. But that is the main item that is referred to in the auditor’s answer on question one.
这被计入已实现资本收益，不管你信不信。因此，通过在某一天以 X 价格购买这些保单并立即大幅减记，这在我们的账面上成为已实现资本损失。现在，稍后我们预计从这些保单中获得完全满意的回报。但这就是审计师在第一个问题的回答中提到的主要项目。
Now, if we’ll go to number 2. You have time to read that.
现在，我们来看第二个。你有时间阅读。
I like the idea of this question being asked. I’ve read many reports where the footnotes are such that even if I reread them several times, I still don’t know what’s happened. And we try to write everything in plain English at Berkshire, and we try to explain things within the body of the letter that might give people the wrong impression if they simply looked at the figures, or that they might not be able to discern.
我喜欢这个问题被提出来的想法。我读过很多报告，其中的脚注即使我重读了好几遍，仍然不知道发生了什么。在伯克希尔，我们尽量用简单的英语写一切，并试图在信件正文中解释一些事情，这些事情如果人们仅仅看数字，可能会给他们留下错误的印象，或者他们可能无法辨别。
Because Berkshire’s gotten so large that we — there are all kinds of things that are lumped together in the consolidated statements, that I think it’s more helpful if we look at separately.
因为伯克希尔已经变得如此庞大，以至于在合并报表中有各种各样的东西被混在一起，我认为如果我们单独查看会更有帮助。
We’re going to work at — annually — at trying to disaggregate numbers and information in a way that makes it most useful without turning out something as long as the World Book.
我们将每年努力以一种最有用的方式分解数字和信息，而不至于像《世界百科全书》那样冗长。
Third item is very simple.
第三项非常简单。
And the fourth item relates to something that became very prevalent in corporate America in the 1990s, which was moving around numbers from one quarter to another or moving them for one year to another.
第四项涉及到在 1990 年代美国企业中非常普遍的现象，即将数字从一个季度转移到另一个季度，或从一年转移到另一年。
And I have seen a lot of that. It’s deceptive. I like the statement that the two fellows at Google made the other day where they essentially said that if numbers are lumpy or peculiar when they get to them, they’re going to be lumpy or peculiar when they get to the public.
我见过很多这样的情况。这是具有欺骗性的。我喜欢谷歌的两位同事前几天所说的话，他们基本上表示，如果数字在他们那里是波动的或奇怪的，那么当它们到达公众手中时也会是波动的或奇怪的。
And if there’s some reason that requires explanation as to why they’re lumpy, that the management should explain them. But the one thing they shouldn’t do is start playing games from quarter to quarter or year to year in terms of moving numbers around.
如果有某种原因需要解释为什么它们不均匀，管理层应该进行解释。但他们唯一不应该做的事情就是在季度或年度之间通过调整数字来玩弄花招。
And that became very fashionable. I hope it’s on the way to being moderated and we will continue to — each year, we will give you these questions at the meeting and we will report on the auditor’s answers.
这变得非常流行。我希望它正在走向适度，我们将继续——每年，我们将在会议上给你们这些问题，并报告审计师的回答。
5. Election of directors
董事选举
WARREN BUFFETT: Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at the meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg.
沃伦·巴菲特：福雷斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对会议过程进行书面记录。贝基·阿米克小姐已被任命为会议的选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数进行认证。本次会议的指定代理持有人是小沃尔特·斯科特和马克·D·汉堡。
Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?
秘书是否有关于伯克希尔公司在会议上有权投票和出席的流通股数量的报告？
FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 3rd, 2004, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,278,436 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 7,766,293 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.
福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，我有。正如在 2004 年 3 月 3 日发给所有登记股东的会议通知中随附的代理声明中所示，该日期为本次会议的记录日期，当时有 1,278,436 股伯克希尔·哈撒韦 A 类普通股流通，每股在会议上有权对动议投一票，还有 7,766,293 股伯克希尔·哈撒韦 B 类普通股流通，每股在会议上有权对动议投 1/200 票。
Of that number, 1,121,231 Class A shares and 6,473,904 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 29th.
在这个会议上，通过截至 4 月 29 日星期四晚上的代理返回，1,121,231 股 A 类股票和 6,473,904 股 B 类股票被代表。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。
First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.
首先要做的事情是宣读上次股东会议的会议记录。我认可沃尔特·斯科特先生，他将在会议上提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议免去上次股东会议记录的宣读，并批准会议记录。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：有没有第二个？
VOICE: Seconded. 附议。
WARREN BUFFETTT: Motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?
沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并附议。有没有任何评论或问题？
We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor say “aye.”
我们将通过口头表决对这一动议进行投票。所有赞成的人请说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? Motion’s carried.
沃伦·巴菲特：反对？动议通过。
First item of business at this meeting is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he and she may do so. Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.
本次会议的第一项议程是选举董事。如果有股东在场，希望撤回之前发送的代理并亲自对董事选举进行投票，他或她可以这样做。此外，如果有在场的股东尚未提交代理并希望获得选票以便亲自投票，您可以这样做。
If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you.
如果您希望这样做，请在过道中向会议工作人员表明身份，他们会为您提供选票。
Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so that we may distribute them? And I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with a respect to election of directions.
请那些希望领取选票的人表明身份，以便我们分发选票。现在我请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于选举董事的动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Charles T. Munger, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, David S. Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald R. Keough, Thomas S. Murphy, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected directors.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、查尔斯·T·芒格、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、大卫·S·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·R·基奥、托马斯·S·墨菲、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特 Jr.为董事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：有第二个吗？
It’s been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Charles T. Munger, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, David S. Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald R. Keough, Thomas S. Murphy, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.
已经有人提议并附议选举沃伦·E·巴菲特、查尔斯·T·芒格、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、大卫·S·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·R·基奥、托马斯·S·墨菲、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特 Jr.为董事。
Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? Is there anybody that is at the microphones that would —
还有其他提名吗？有任何讨论吗？有谁在麦克风前想要——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Paul Tomasik, Thornton in Illinois.
观众成员：是的。保罗·托马西克，伊利诺伊州桑顿。
I like the idea of inside directors. I think they’re necessary. However, I think we should have the best available. In particular, I’d like you to consider the CEOs of the Berkshire subsidiaries.
我喜欢内部董事的想法。我认为他们是必要的。然而，我认为我们应该选择最优秀的人。特别是，我希望你能考虑伯克希尔子公司的首席执行官。
If you compare their qualifications to Susan Buffett’s and Howard Buffett’s, I think you’ll find that the CEOs have superior qualifications, particularly, business savvy and the ability to stand up to a forceful CEO.
如果你将他们的资历与苏珊·巴菲特和霍华德·巴菲特的资历进行比较，我认为你会发现这些首席执行官的资历更为出色，尤其是在商业头脑和敢于面对强势首席执行官的能力方面。
I’d like to point out that we’ll hear how many of these CEOs are independently wealthy and could easily say, “Take this job and shove it.” So this is why I am withholding my votes for the directors. Thank you.
我想指出的是，我们会听到很多这些首席执行官都是独立富有的，可以轻松地说：“把这份工作拿走。” 这就是我不为董事投票的原因。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that?
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。查理，你对此有什么看法吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we should go on to the next item. (Laughter and applause).
查理·芒格：我认为我们应该继续下一个议题。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election.
沃伦·巴菲特：提名已经准备好进行表决。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举中标记选票，并允许将选票交给选举监察员。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspectors of elections a ballot on the election of directors voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received.
请代理持有人也向选举监察员提交一张关于董事选举的选票，并根据他们收到的指示投票。
Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
阿米克小姐，准备好后您可以开始报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 1,123,189 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告已准备好。根据截至上周四晚上收到的代理投票，代理持有人为每位提名人投了不少于 1,123,189 票。这个数字远远超过了所有已发行 A 类和 B 类股票总票数的多数。
The certification required by the Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to the proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
根据特拉华州法律要求的选票精确计数的认证，包括本次会议上代理持有人根据收到的代理投票所投的额外选票，以及在本次会议上亲自投票的任何选票，将交给秘书并附在本次会议的会议记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase, David S. Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald R. Keough, Thomas S. Murphy, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott, Jr. have been elected as directors.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。沃伦·E·巴菲特、苏珊·T·巴菲特、霍华德·G·巴菲特、马尔科姆·G·蔡斯、大卫·S·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·R·基奥、托马斯·S·墨菲、查尔斯·T·芒格、罗纳德·L·奥尔森和小沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。
6. Proposal to publish political contributions
提议公布政治捐款
WARREN BUFFETT: The next item is business is a proposal put forth by Berkshire shareholder Human Life International, the owner of one Class B share.
沃伦·巴菲特：下一个事项是由伯克希尔股东Human Life International提出的提案，该公司持有一股 B 类股票。
Human Life International’s motion is set forth in the proxy statement and provides that the company be required to publish annually a detailed statement of each contribution made by the company and its subsidiaries in various political causes.
Human Life International的动议在代理声明中提出，要求公司每年公布一份详细声明，列出公司及其子公司在各种政治活动中的每一项捐款。
The directors have recommended the shareholders vote against the proposal. We will now open the floor to recognize the appointed representative of Human Life International to present their proposal. Is someone here to present that?
董事们建议股东投票反对该提案。我们现在将开放发言机会，邀请Human Life International的指定代表来介绍他们的提案。有人在这里介绍吗？
TOM STROBHAR: Yes, Mr. Buffett. My name is Tom Strobhar and I do represent Human Life International. And I’m here to present the shareholder resolution regarding political contributions.
汤姆·斯特罗巴尔：是的，巴菲特先生。我的名字是汤姆·斯特罗巴尔，我代表Human Life International。我在这里提出关于政治捐款的股东决议。
But before I do, I’d like to give you a little background. Some of you may remember, two years ago, there was a resolution asking the company to end its charitable giving program.
但在我这样做之前，我想先给你们一些背景信息。你们中的一些人可能还记得，两年前，有一项决议要求公司终止其慈善捐赠计划。
The resolution said corporate charitable contributions should help, not hinder, the company and suggested certain contributions, especially those related to abortion and population control, were doing just that.
决议指出，公司慈善捐款应当帮助而不是阻碍公司，并建议某些捐款，尤其是与堕胎和人口控制相关的捐款，正是在这样做。
This proposal was soundly defeated by the shareholders, receiving less than 3 percent of the vote. Oddly enough, a little over one year later, Mr. Buffett, in his wisdom, did terminate this program citing the adverse impact his philanthropic interests were having on the livelihoods of some employees at the Pampered Chefs division.
这项提议被股东彻底否决，获得的票数不到 3%。奇怪的是，一年多后，巴菲特先生出于他的智慧，终止了该计划，理由是他的慈善兴趣对 Pampered Chefs 部门一些员工的生计产生了不利影响。
At the time of the resolution, we first learned that Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger were directing their money to their personal foundations rather than more recognized public charities.
在决议时，我们首次了解到巴菲特先生和芒格先生将他们的钱捐给了他们的个人基金会，而不是更知名的公共慈善机构。
While previous chairman’s letters extolled the high participation levels among eligible shareholders, no mention was made that Mr. Buffett, who accounted for 31 percent of the equity of the company, was giving away almost 55 percent of the charitable gifts.
尽管之前的董事长信件夸赞符合条件的股东的高参与率，但并未提及巴菲特先生占公司31%股权的情况下，几乎将55%的慈善捐赠送给了个人基金会。
Why all of you B shareholders, who probably comprise a majority of the people in this audience, were excluded from giving, and whose vote on this proposal was dramatically diluted down to 1/200th of the value of an A share — which obviously is not quite democratic.
为什么你们所有的 B 股股东，可能占据了这个听众的大多数，却被排除在投票之外，并且在这个提案上的投票权被大幅稀释到 A 股价值的 1/200——这显然不太民主。
I refer you to the 1983 Chairman’s Letter. In addressing why he wouldn’t split the stock, Mr. Buffett describes something he calls “shareholder eugenics.”
我请你参考 1983 年的主席信。在解释他为什么不拆分股票时，巴菲特先生描述了一种他称之为“股东优生学”的东西。
Mr. Buffett laments how it’s impossible to screen entering members of the shareholder “club” for quotes, “intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensibility, or acceptable dress.”
巴菲特先生感叹道，无法对进入股东“俱乐部”的成员进行筛选，以评估他们的“智力水平、情绪稳定性、道德感或可接受的着装”。
Splitting the stock and lowering the price of admission to the club — Class B shareholders take note — “would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the existing class” and “downgrade the quality of our present shareholder group,” end quote.
拆分股票并降低进入俱乐部的门槛——B 类股东请注意——“将吸引一个比现有股东群体更低级的买家群体”并且“降低我们现有股东群体的质量”，引文结束。
All told, Mr. Buffett gave to his private foundation almost $100 million, much of it other shareholders’ money. This money, in turn, was devoted almost exclusively to population control seeking to lessen the number of people at a time when Western nations, especially those in Europe and Japan, face economic calamity from a baby bust.
总而言之，巴菲特先生向他的私人基金会捐赠了近 1 亿美元，其中大部分是其他股东的钱。这笔钱几乎全部用于人口控制，旨在减少人口数量，而此时西方国家，尤其是欧洲和日本，正面临因出生率下降而导致的经济灾难。
How do charitable contributions relate to political contributions? It wasn’t until there was a resolution on charitable contributions that we received some disclosure. So too, with the resolution I’m about to present, did we find out the company gave a very modest $200,000 to various political candidates or causes.
慈善捐款与政治捐款有什么关系？直到关于慈善捐款的决议出台后，我们才获得了一些披露。同样，通过我即将提出的决议，我们发现公司向各种政治候选人或事业捐赠了非常适度的 20 万美元。
While the charitable contributions may have been too much, the political contributions may be too little. Not necessarily from the company, but from other shareholders. If there are politicians or causes in which there is legitimate business interest in supporting, why not give the shareholders the opportunity to help them also?
虽然慈善捐款可能过多，但政治捐款可能过少。这不一定是来自公司，而是来自其他股东。如果有政治家或事业是与公司的合法商业利益相关，为什么不让股东们也有机会支持他们呢？
By publishing the list, the word goes out to our thousands of shareholders who may wish to do the same with their own money. It costs little to publish, provides for transparency, checks any personal abuse, and sets an example to the rest of corporate America.
通过公布这份名单，我们的数千名股东可以了解到，他们也可以用自己的资金做同样的事情。公布名单的成本很低，能够提供透明度，防止任何个人滥用，并为美国其他公司树立榜样。
It also provides an opportunity for all the members of our shareholder club, even B shareholders, to get involved and help this company and help their investment.
它还为我们股东俱乐部的所有成员，包括 B 股股东，提供了一个参与并帮助这家公司以及帮助他们投资的机会。
And with that, I’d like to read the actual resolution, which I’m required to do.
因此，我想阅读我必须宣读的正式决议。
“Within one month, after approval by the shareholders of this proposal, management shall publish in The Buffalo News a detailed statement of each contribution made by the company or of any of its subsidiaries, either directly or indirectly, within preceding fiscal year, in the respect of any political campaign, political party, referendum or citizen’s imitative, or attempts to influence legislation, specifying the date and amount of each contribution and the person or organization to whom the contribution was made.
“在本提案获得股东批准后的一个月内，管理层应在《布法罗新闻》上公布公司或其任何子公司在上一财政年度内直接或间接为任何政治竞选、政党、公投或公民倡议，或试图影响立法所作的每一笔捐款的详细说明，具体说明每笔捐款的日期和金额以及捐款对象或组织。”
“Subsequent to this initial disclosure, management shall cause like data to be included in each succeeding report to the shareholders. If no such disbursements were made, to have the facts so noted in the annual report.”
“在最初披露之后，管理层应确保在每份后续的股东报告中包含类似数据。如果没有进行此类支出，应在年度报告中注明事实。”
This proposal, if adopted, will require the management to advise its shareholders how many corporate dollars are being spent for political purposes, and to specify what politicians or political causes the management seeks to promote with these funds.
如果该提案被采纳，将要求管理层告知其股东有多少公司资金用于政治目的，并具体说明管理层希望用这些资金支持哪些政治人物或政治事业。
Political contributions are made with the dollars that belong to the shareholders of the group and they are entitled to know where their dollars are being spent. A vote for this proposal is a vote for full disclosure. Thank you.
政治捐款是用属于集团股东的资金进行的，他们有权知道这些资金的去向。投票支持这一提案就是投票支持全面披露。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there anyone else that would care to speak on the motion?
沃伦·巴菲特：还有其他人愿意就此动议发言吗？
Charlie, do you have any comment?
查理，你有什么评论吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I preferred our old charitable giving program to the way most corporations do it in America — (applause) — where the controlling officers decide. However, it’s a dead horse. It’s gone and there’s no point beating on the corpse. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，我更喜欢我们以前的慈善捐赠计划，而不是大多数美国公司采用的方式——（掌声）——由控股高管决定。然而，这已经是死马了。它已经消失了，再去鞭打尸体也没有意义。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The dead horse will now speak. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：死马现在要说话了。（笑声）
I just want to add one point, because it a little different than occurs at many other corporations. To my knowledge or memory, I don’t believe Charlie and I have ever asked any employee or any vendor to Berkshire — any employee of Berkshire or a vendor to Berkshire — for either political contributions or charitable contributions.
我只想补充一点，因为这与许多其他公司有所不同。据我所知或记忆中，我不认为查理和我曾经要求伯克希尔的任何员工或供应商——伯克希尔的任何员工或伯克希尔的供应商——进行政治捐款或慈善捐款。
There’s been no — there’s been no use of our positions to, in effect, extract money for our own personal causes, either in the charitable area or the political area. Is that correct, Charlie?
没有——我们没有利用我们的职位来为我们个人的事业筹集资金，无论是在慈善领域还是在政治领域。对吗，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but we don’t deserve too much credit for not asking other people for charitable contributions. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格：是的，但我们不应该因为不向其他人请求慈善捐款而获得太多赞誉。（巴菲特笑）
Think what the reciprocity implications would be.
想想互惠的影响会是什么。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）
But it’s a fairly common activity.
但这是一项相当常见的活动。
So here we are. We’ll — if any shareholder’s voting in person, they should now mark their ballots in the — on the motion and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
所以我们在这里。如果有股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记选票，并允许选票交给选举监察员。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the proposal, voting of proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received? Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
请代理持有人也向选举监察员提交关于提案的选票，并根据他们收到的指示进行代理投票。Amick 小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballet of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 27,287.605 votes for the motion and 936,045.815 votes against the motion.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告已准备好。根据截至上周四晚收到的代理投票，代理持有人投了 27,287.605 票赞成该动议，936,045.815 票反对该动议。
As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
由于反对该动议的票数超过了所有已发行 A 类和 B 类股票相关票数的多数，该动议未获通过。根据特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证将交给秘书，并附在本次会议的会议记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The proposal fails.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。提案未通过。
7. Shareholder proposal to “tell us the rules” on motions
股东提案“告诉我们规则”关于动议
WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If so —
沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有其他事项需要在本次会议上讨论吗？如果有的话——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. 观众成员：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: —they should approach microphone 1 to be recognized. I believe we have someone.
沃伦·巴菲特：——他们应该走到麦克风 1 前以便被认出。我相信我们有人。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. Paul Tomasik, Thornton in Illinois.
观众成员：是的。保罗·托马西克，伊利诺伊州桑顿。
I have a proposal to put written rules for this meeting, the formal part, on the web, in order that this meeting can be conducted fairly and with good faith.
我提议将本次会议的书面规则，即正式部分，放在网上，以便会议能够公平且诚信地进行。
Would you like a little more comment?
您想要多一点评论吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。
WARREN BUFFETT: The faster you can make it, the better. But go to it. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：你说得越快越好。请继续。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, that’s it —
观众成员：嗯，就是这样——
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s it.
沃伦·巴菲特：就是这样。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — on that one.
观众成员：— 在那一个上。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。
(To person sitting next to him) Is that a motion?
（对坐在他旁边的人）那是一个动议吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, do you want to — would you place all — if you have more motions, would you place them, or is that it?
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，您想——如果您还有更多的动议，您可以提出，还是就这些？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, certainly. The other three motions are to put the bylaws and the articles of incorporation up on the website, to write it into the bylaws how shareholders should present motions, and the fourth, to write it into the bylaws how shareholders can make director nominations.
观众成员：当然。其他三个动议是将章程和公司章程上传到网站上，写入章程规定股东应如何提出动议，以及第四个动议，写入章程规定股东如何提名董事。
To sum up, what these motions ask for is just tell us the rules. We’ll follow them. That’s it. Thank you.
总而言之，这些动议要求的只是告诉我们规则。我们会遵循它们。就是这样。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢。
I actually think you came up with a very good suggestion on the audit committee report, which we’ve incorporated. I don’t really think this would add much, but if there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots in the motion — on the motion — and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.
实际上，我认为你对审计委员会报告提出了一个非常好的建议，我们已经采纳了。我不认为这会增加太多，但如果有股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记选票，并允许将选票交给选举监察员。
Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the proposal, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they’ve received.
请代理持有人也向选举监察员提交一张关于提案的选票，并根据他们收到的指示投票。
Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.
阿米克小姐，准备好后您可以开始报告。
BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders cast 1,153,600.52 votes against the motion. As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
贝基·阿米克：我的报告已准备好。代理持有人投票 1,153,600.52 票反对该动议。由于反对票数超过了所有 A 类和 B 类流通股的多数票数，该动议未通过。根据特拉华州法律要求的精确票数认证将交给秘书，并附在本次会议的记录中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank, Miss Amick. The proposal fails.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢，阿米克小姐。提案未通过。
I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting.
我现在请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move the meeting be adjourned.
沃尔特·斯科特：我提议会议休会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
沃伦·巴菲特：有第二个吗？
VOICE: I second. 我附议。
WARREN BUFFETT: A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say “aye.”
沃伦·巴菲特：有人提出了休会动议并得到了附议。我们将通过口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成”。
VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。
WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say “no.” The meeting’s adjourned. OK, now we’re — (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：反对的请说“不”。会议结束。好的，现在我们——（掌声）
8. Rebuttal of calls for Buffett to leave Coca-Cola’s board
反驳要求巴菲特离开可口可乐董事会的呼声
WARREN BUFFETT: Now we’re going to move into the questions and answers, at least questions. And just ask one as we spelled out before. And we will start with microphone 1, which is in section, what, 121 on my right. And we’ll keep moving 1 through 12 until we get till noon. Microphone 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们要进入问答环节，至少是提问环节。请按照我们之前说明的那样只提一个问题。我们将从麦克风 1 开始，它位于我右边的 121 区。我们会从 1 到 12 依次进行，直到中午。麦克风 1。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jonathan Mills (PH) from London, England.
观众成员：来自英国伦敦的乔纳森·米尔斯（PH）。
I wondered if you could comment on the views of those people who have stated that, because of so-called conflicts of interest, you should leave the board of Coca-Cola and whether you had any intention of doing so.
我想知道您是否可以对那些认为由于所谓的利益冲突，您应该离开可口可乐董事会的人们的观点发表评论，以及您是否有这样做的意图。
WARREN BUFFETT: That we should do what with the board?
沃伦·巴菲特：我们应该对董事会做什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Leave the board. That you personally should leave the board of Coke.
观众成员：离开董事会。你个人应该离开可口可乐的董事会。
WARREN BUFFETT: I would say that whoever suggested that should do 500 sit-ups. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我会说，建议这样做的人应该做 500 个仰卧起坐。（笑声）
Actually, Charlie and I — certainly I have — well, I’ll Charlie speak for himself — we like the idea and we’ve encouraged the idea of shareholders behaving like owners. I mean, shareholders have too often behaved like sheep in this country and they got shorn, in many cases.
实际上，查理和我——当然我有——好吧，我让查理自己说——我们喜欢这个想法，并且我们鼓励股东像所有者一样行事。我的意思是，在这个国家，股东往往表现得像绵羊，结果在很多情况下被剪了羊毛。
And big institutional shareholders have sat on the sidelines while some things that might possibly have been corrected, had they gotten active, took place. So we have — we actually applaud the idea of shareholders behaving like owners.
而一些大机构股东则袖手旁观，而一些本可能在他们积极参与下得到纠正的事情却发生了。因此，我们实际上赞成股东像所有者一样行事的想法。
The question is whether they, you know, can behave like intelligent owners. And I think that in the last year or two, as they’ve sort of woken up, they’ve searched for checklists of one sort or another to determine whether directors are appropriate in a given company or not.
问题是，他们是否能够表现得像聪明的所有者。我认为在过去一两年中，当他们有所觉醒时，他们已经在寻找各种清单，以确定某个公司的董事是否合适。
And frankly, checklists are no substitute for thinking. The real job of the directors is to come up with the right CEO for a company and prevent him or her for overreaching. If they do that job well, the rest takes care of itself.
坦率地说，清单不能替代思考。董事的真正职责是为公司找到合适的首席执行官，并防止他或她过度扩张。如果他们做好这项工作，其他问题就会迎刃而解。
And you have to think some to determine whether that’s taking place. You can’t solve it by just running down a little checklist.
你必须仔细思考才能确定这是否正在发生。你不能仅仅通过一个小清单来解决这个问题。
I think it was Bertrand Russell who said, “Most men would rather die than think. Many do.” (Laughter)
我想是伯特兰·罗素说过：“大多数人宁愿死也不愿思考。很多人确实如此。”（笑声）
And I think we’ve seen a little bit of what he was thinking about in some of the voting. I think it’s absolutely silly, frankly, if Berkshire Hathaway owns 200 million shares of Coca-Cola, $10 billion worth, to not be able — it’s a little silly not to think that the interest that Berkshire Hathaway has in selling some hours of training at FlightSafety would cause me to do something counter to the interests of the shareholders, when we have $10 billion riding on that side of the table. I mean, it’s almost absurd, and somebody doesn’t understand proportionality at all when they come to that sort of conclusion.
我认为我们在一些投票中已经看到了一点他的想法。坦率地说，我认为这绝对是愚蠢的，如果伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司拥有 2 亿股可口可乐股票，价值 100 亿美元，却不能——不去想伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司在 FlightSafety 出售一些培训课程的利益会让我做出违背股东利益的事情，当我们在那一边有 100 亿美元的赌注时。我是说，这几乎是荒谬的，当他们得出那种结论时，显然有人完全不理解比例原则。
I also think it’s absolutely foolish if — just to use Coca-Cola as an example. I think the directors of Coca-Cola haven’t even looked, but I think we probably received something like $100,000 a year.
我也认为这绝对是愚蠢的——仅以可口可乐为例。我认为可口可乐的董事们甚至没有查看过，但我想我们可能每年收到大约 10 万美元。
And if we were to go out into the welfare line and pick somebody out who has no income and say, “We’d like you to become a director,” and that person would get $100,000 a year, which would be their entire income, and to say that person would be independent — you know, while they would be 100 percent dependent on their income — that person would be independent. Whereas Berkshire Hathaway, or myself representing Berkshire Hathaway with 10 billion of stock — and receiving the same $100,000 a year — is not regarded as independent.
如果我们走到福利队伍中，挑选一个没有收入的人，并说：“我们希望你成为一名董事，”而那个人每年会得到 10 万美元，这将是他们的全部收入，并且说那个人是独立的——你知道，尽管他们 100%依赖于他们的收入——那个人会是独立的。而伯克希尔·哈撒韦，或者我代表拥有 100 亿股票的伯克希尔·哈撒韦，获得同样的每年 10 万美元，却不被视为独立。
So I encourage — I encourage institutional shareholders to — and large owners — to behave like owners. But I also encourage them to really think logically, as owners should think, in determining what causes they take on and how they vote.
所以我鼓励——我鼓励机构股东和大股东——像所有者一样行事。但我也鼓励他们真正像所有者那样逻辑思考，以决定他们支持什么事业以及如何投票。
Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think that they, corporate America, needs a fair amount of reform. But the cause of reform is hurt, not helped, when an activist makes an idiotic suggestion — (laughter) — like the one that — (applause) — having Warren Buffett on the board of the Coca-Cola Company is contrary to the interest of the Coca-Cola Company. Nutty activities do not help the cause for which the person speaks.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为美国企业需要进行相当多的改革。但改革的原因在于，当激进人士提出如此荒谬的建议时——（笑声）——比如说沃伦·巴菲特在可口可乐公司董事会上的存在与可口可乐公司的利益相悖，这对改革的推动没有帮助。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a little bit like having a slicing machine in an orchard where you’re gathering together apples but you’re also picking up a lot of rocks in the process and sticks and stones. So you have a slicing machine with a conveyer belt. And the slicing machine is programmed so that every time something is red and round comes down the line, it slices and comes down, but it doesn’t come down on the rocks and everything and ruin the blades.
沃伦·巴菲特：这有点像在果园里有一台切片机，你在收集苹果的同时也捡起了很多石头和树枝。所以你有一台带传送带的切片机。切片机被编程成每次有红色和圆形的东西下来时就切片，但不会在石头和其他东西上切片，从而损坏刀片。
And, of course, that’s fine until a red balloon comes down the line and then you get a big pop and the machine has followed its little guidelines but it’s not slicing apples anymore.
当然，这一切都很好，直到一个红色气球沿着生产线下来，然后你听到一声巨响，机器虽然遵循了它的小指南，但它不再切苹果了。
And I think — I just — actually, institutions are coming new to really thinking about how they behave as owners. And you would hope that, in the evolutionary nature of learning — that not too many years distance — distant — they would actually think about what’s good for the shareholders of the company.
我认为——我只是——实际上，机构才开始真正思考它们作为所有者的行为。你会希望，在学习的进化过程中——在不太遥远的将来——他们会真正考虑什么对公司股东有利。
9. Surviving inflation
应对通货膨胀
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to microphone number 2, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到 2 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, good morning. My name is Zachys Sarris (PH) and I am from Athens, Greece.
观众成员：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，早上好。我的名字是扎奇·萨里斯（音），我来自希腊雅典。
There is a widespread perception that we’re heading towards an inflationary environment. What advice would you give to investors who need to preserve their capital and their purchasing power in such an environment?
人们普遍认为我们正走向一个通货膨胀的环境。您会给需要在这种环境中保持资本和购买力的投资者什么建议？
WARREN BUFFETT: The best thing is to have a lot of earning power of your own. If you’re the best brain surgeon in town, or even the best lawyer in town, you will retain purchasing power, in terms of your income, no matter what happens, you know, whether people are using seashells for money, or whatever as time goes by.
沃伦·巴菲特：最好的事情是拥有强大的个人赚钱能力。如果你是镇上最好的脑外科医生，或者甚至是镇上最好的律师，无论发生什么，你的收入在购买力方面都会保持不变。你知道，无论人们是用贝壳作为货币，还是随着时间的推移使用其他东西。
In the investment world, it’s tougher. But Charlie and I think the best answer is to own fine businesses that will be able to price in inflationary terms and will not have huge capital investment that is required to handle the larger dollar volume of sales.
在投资领域，这更具挑战性。但查理和我认为，最好的答案是拥有能够按通胀条件定价的优秀企业，并且不需要巨额资本投资来处理更大销售额的企业。
Some years ago, I used See’s Candy in our — in the annual report — as an example of the kind of business that, more or less, can handle an inflationary world and maintain investment and value, no matter what happens to the currency.
几年前，我在年度报告中用喜诗糖果作为一个例子，说明一种能够或多或少应对通货膨胀世界并维持投资和价值的业务，无论货币发生什么变化。
Unfortunately, most businesses will not come out well in real terms during inflation. Their earnings may go up a fair amount over time, but they’re compelled to put more and more dollars into the business just to stay in the same place.
不幸的是，大多数企业在通货膨胀期间的实际表现不会很好。它们的收益可能会随着时间的推移而增加不少，但它们被迫投入越来越多的资金到业务中，仅仅是为了维持现状。
You know, the worst kind of a business is one that’s — makes you put more money on the table all the time and doesn’t give you greater earnings. So you really want a business that can have pricing that reflects inflation and does not have very much capital investment that reflects inflation. But inflation is the enemy of the investor, in terms of real returns.
你知道，最糟糕的生意就是那种——让你不断投入更多资金，却没有带来更高收益的生意。所以你真正想要的是一个能够定价反映通货膨胀，并且不需要太多资本投资来反映通货膨胀的生意。但就实际回报而言，通货膨胀是投资者的敌人。
As you know, there are, in this country as well as a half a dozen other countries, there are what they call “inflation protected bonds” — we call them TIPS in the United States — where the income is adjusted — or, the principle amount is adjusted — to inflation. And that’s not a bad investment for people that have worries about inflation heating up. And I think, incidentally, we’re starting to see it heat up in this country.
正如你所知，在这个国家以及其他六个国家，有所谓的“通胀保值债券”——在美国我们称之为 TIPS——其收入或本金会根据通胀进行调整。对于担心通胀升温的人来说，这不是一个坏的投资。而且，顺便说一下，我认为我们开始看到这个国家的通胀升温。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, most people are going to get a very small real return from investment after considering inflation and taxes. I think that’s an iron law of the world and if, for a brief period, some of us do better than that, we ought to be very thankful.
查理·芒格：是的，大多数人在考虑通货膨胀和税收后，从投资中获得的实际回报会非常小。我认为这是世界的铁律，如果在短时间内我们中的一些人表现得更好，我们应该非常感激。
One of the great defenses to being worried about inflation is not having a lot of silly needs in your life. In other words, if you haven’t created a lot of artificial demand to drown in consumer goods, why, you have a considerable defense against the vicissitudes of life.
对抗通货膨胀的一个重要防御措施就是不要在生活中有太多无谓的需求。换句话说，如果你没有制造出大量的虚假需求来淹没在消费品中，那么你就对生活的变迁有了相当大的防御能力。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, we’re selling consumer goods in the other room. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我们在另一个房间卖消费品。（笑声）
It’s OK to talk that way at home, but — (Laughter)
在家里这样说是可以的，但——（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: It doesn’t do any good there. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：在那儿没什么用。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I know the feeling. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我知道这种感觉。（笑声）
10. Reluctance to hold special meetings for analysts
不愿召开分析师特别会议
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to microphone 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来听听 3 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman. My name is Larry Coats, from Durham, North Carolina.
观众成员：早上好，先生们。我叫拉里·科茨，来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆。
Mr. Buffett, after last year’s meeting, my longtime friend and business partner George Brumley [III] sent you a letter addressing several issues. Having participated in the preparation of that letter and on his behalf, I thank you for your response.
巴菲特先生，在去年的会议之后，我的长期朋友和商业伙伴乔治·布鲁姆利（第三世）给您写了一封信，讨论了几个问题。我参与了那封信的准备工作，并代表他感谢您的回复。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In such, you suggested that many of those issues would be appropriately addressed in this forum. In his honor, I’d ask you to address just one of those, and that is the ultimate generational transfer of Berkshire away from its current base of long-term, self-selected, and well-informed shareholders, and the potential of instituting a series of analyst meetings to address the relative lack of interest in, and ownership, and understanding of, Berkshire by institutional shareholders and investors. Thank you and good morning.
观众成员：在这种情况下，您建议许多问题将在此论坛中得到适当解决。为了表示敬意，我想请您解决其中一个问题，那就是伯克希尔如何最终实现长期的、自我选择且信息充分的股东群体的代际传承，以及可能通过一系列分析师会议来解决机构股东和投资者对伯克希尔相对缺乏兴趣、持有和理解的问题。谢谢，早上好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you. I mean, George was a wonderful man. A great analyst and a friend.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，谢谢。我是说，乔治是个很棒的人。他是一位出色的分析师，也是我的朋友。
I have some problem with having meetings with subgroups of investors, such as institutional investors. If we had something like that, I think we would want it to be open to everybody. And, you know, that gets to be quite a production.
我在与投资者子群体（如机构投资者）开会时遇到了一些问题。如果我们有这样的会议，我想我们会希望它对所有人开放。而且，你知道，这会变成一个相当大的活动。
But I can understand, you know, why A) you’d like to see our managers and hear what they have to say about their businesses. We try to convey a lot about the businesses in the report, but —
但我能理解，你知道，为什么 A)你想见见我们的经理，听听他们对业务的看法。我们在报告中尽量传达很多关于业务的信息，但——
Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that?
查理，你对此有什么想法吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it fits our temperament at all well. Many corporations have a huge amount of effort spent in talking to groups of analysts. One of Berkshire’s strengths has been that we don’t spend time in that way.
查理·芒格：我认为这完全不符合我们的性格。许多公司花费大量精力与分析师团体交流。伯克希尔的一个优势是我们不以这种方式花费时间。
That’s a very time-consuming process. And it does give some shareholders some advantage over others. We try and be more egalitarian in events like this and the way we write the annual report, et cetera.
这是一个非常耗时的过程。而且确实给了一些股东相对于其他股东的优势。在这样的事件中，我们尽量做到更平等，包括我们撰写年度报告的方式等。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we really like the group of shareholders we have. I mean, we’re not about enticing new people into it. But I know your point also is that the present shareholders could better understand Berkshire if they would listen to Bob Shaw talk about Shaw Carpet or Rich Santulli talk about NetJets. And the truth is, it is fun to listen to those people.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们真的很喜欢我们拥有的这群股东。我的意思是，我们并不是要吸引新的人加入。但我也明白你的观点是，如果现有股东能听鲍勃·肖谈论肖地毯或里奇·桑图利谈论 NetJets，他们会更好地理解伯克希尔。而事实是，听这些人讲话确实很有趣。
But one of the things we promise managers when they join up with us, too, is they that they don’t have to listen to bankers, they don’t have listen to investment analysts. They just get to run their businesses. They can devote a hundred percent of their time to it. And people like that, and they’re more productive because of it.
但是，我们向加入我们的经理承诺的一件事是，他们不必听银行家的意见，也不必听投资分析师的意见。他们只需经营自己的业务。他们可以将百分之百的时间投入其中。人们喜欢这样，因此他们的工作效率更高。
I mean, we really place no impediments in the way of our managers doing what they do best and what they like to do best, which is run their businesses.
我的意思是，我们确实没有在阻碍我们的经理做他们最擅长和最喜欢做的事情，也就是经营他们的业务。
And frankly, a number of them have expressed to me that they’re very happy because they existed in a different mode before. And in that mode, they would spend maybe 25 percent of their time on activities that they didn’t enjoy and they didn’t feel were very productive.
坦率地说，他们中的许多人向我表示，他们非常高兴，因为他们之前处于不同的模式。在那种模式下，他们可能会花费大约 25%的时间在他们不喜欢且觉得不太有成效的活动上。
So we want to get across the information about our businesses to you. And believe me, when I write the report and Charlie looks at it, we say to ourselves, “Are we telling you what we would want to know about if our positions were reversed, if we were on the receiving end?” And we really try to put in the report everything that’s germane to evaluation.
所以我们想把关于我们业务的信息传达给你们。相信我，当我写报告时，查理会看一看，我们会问自己：“如果我们的角色互换，如果我们是接收方，我们是否告诉了你们我们想知道的事情？”我们确实努力在报告中包含所有与评估相关的重要信息。
Now, if you have a market cap of 130 billion, you know, it’s really not too important to get keen insights into some business that’s making a relative small amount of money. But anything that counts — and really, you have to look at them in aggregates — we want to get across to you.
现在，如果你的市值是 1300 亿，你知道，深入了解一些赚取相对少量利润的业务并不是特别重要。但任何重要的事情——实际上，你必须从整体上看待它们——我们希望传达给你。
So, you know, it’s — I’m very respectful of your suggestion. It’s conceivable to do it.
所以，你知道，我非常尊重你的建议。这是可以做到的。
The Washington Post has a shareholder day, because their annual meeting is turned into a farce often because it’s largely dominated by people who are complaining about this story or that story. But the shareholder day is very useful and they do have their managers there and talk about it.
《华盛顿邮报》有一个股东日，因为他们的年度会议常常变成一场闹剧，主要是因为会议大多被抱怨这篇报道或那篇报道的人所主导。但股东日非常有用，他们的管理人员也会在场并进行讨论。
But I really think if we spend six hours here answering your questions about the business and we do a half-way decent job of writing the annual report, we should get across the essential information.
但我真的认为，如果我们在这里花六个小时回答你关于业务的问题，并且我们在撰写年度报告时做得还算不错，我们应该能够传达基本信息。
And we’re really not trying to get across — we’re not trying to talk to an audience that is trying to get some special insight into what next quarter or next year is going to look like.
我们真的不是在试图传达——我们不是在试图与那些想要获得下个季度或明年会是什么样的特别见解的观众交流。
We’re really looking for owners who join us in what we regard as kind of a lifelong investment. And I would say that certainly analysts, like your group, have exactly the same objective we do and want to understand the business that way.
我们真正寻找的是那些与我们一起视为一种终身投资的业主。我会说，像你们这样的分析师群体，确实有着与我们完全相同的目标，并希望以这种方式理解业务。
But my experience, you know, in talking to hundreds of them, is that there are relatively few that are actually thinking about, “What do we buy and put away forever?” Like, we’d buy a farm or an apartment house or something. So we’ll consider it, but I don’t want to make any promises.
但根据我的经验，你知道，与数百人交谈后，我发现实际上很少有人在真正思考：“我们该买什么并永久持有？”就像我们会购买一座农场或公寓大楼一样。所以我们会考虑这个问题，但我不想做出任何承诺。
11. Compensation plans: specific to the business, simple, and generous
薪酬计划：针对业务，简单且慷慨
WARREN BUFFETT: Go to number 4, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到第 4 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman. My name is Matt Sauer and I’m from Durham, North Carolina.
观众成员：早上好，先生们。我的名字是马特·绍尔，我来自北卡罗来纳州的达勒姆。
Regarding compensation, you have commented along the lines of people willing to bet big on their (inaudible) usually have a lot of bet on.
关于薪酬，你曾评论说，愿意在他们的（听不清）上下注的人通常会有很多赌注。
A MidAmerican regulatory filing indicated some attractive prospective compensation possibilities for its senior executive team, subject, of course, to meeting profitability milestones.
MidAmerican的一份监管文件显示，其高级管理团队有一些有吸引力的潜在薪酬的可能性，当然，这取决于是否达到盈利里程碑。
Perhaps you might provide some details on the thought process that went into crafting that compensation structure, and in doing so, use this specific example as a reminder about Berkshire’s compensation philosophy, related to pay for performance versus the more popular approaches.
也许您可以提供一些关于制定该薪酬结构的思考过程的细节，并在这样做时，使用这个具体例子来提醒大家伯克希尔的薪酬理念，涉及绩效薪酬与更流行的方法。
If it’s easier to figure out and administer, better for owners, and can still attract talented people, why don’t more companies adopt such practices?
如果这种做法更容易理解和管理，对业主更有利，并且仍然能够吸引有才华的人，为什么更多公司不采用这种做法呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — you could make a lot of money working for Berkshire. Not if you’re chairman or vice chairman, but there’s a chance to make a lot of money. But it will relate to performance. No one is going to make lots of money at Berkshire for average performance.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们——在伯克希尔工作可以赚很多钱。如果你是董事长或副董事长就不行，但有机会赚很多钱。但这将与业绩相关。没有人在伯克希尔凭借平均业绩赚大钱。
And you mentioned the MidAmerican situation. We’ve got some extraordinary management at MidAmerican. And it’s — in terms of how that compensation arrangement was worked out, I was thinking one day about what would be appropriate for the two individuals who are key to the success of MidAmerican. And I took a yellow pad and I spent about three minutes sketching out a proposal.
你提到了MidAmerican的情况。我们在MidAmerican有一些非常出色的管理人员。在制定薪酬安排时，我有一天思考过，什么是适合那两位对MidAmerican成功至关重要的个体的薪酬。我拿起一张黄色便签，花了大约三分钟草拟了一个提案。
And I went to Walter Scott, who is our partner in the business and now actually heads the comp committee. And I said, “Walter this is an idea I have, what do you think of it?” And he looked at it and he said, “It looks fine to me.”
我去找了沃尔特·斯科特，他是我们业务的合伙人，现在实际上负责薪酬委员会。我说：“沃尔特，这是我的一个想法，你怎么看？”他看了看，说：“我觉得挺好的。”
And we talked to the two managers about it and actually, as we presented it, we had it so that something over 50 percent went to the CEO, Dave Sokol and something under 50 percent went to the number two man, Greg Abel, who’s enormously well named.
我们和两位经理谈过这件事，实际上，当我们提出这个方案时，我们安排了超过 50%的份额给首席执行官戴夫·索科尔，少于 50%的份额给二号人物格雷格·阿贝尔，他的名字非常贴切。
And when we gave it to David, he said, “Let’s just” — he said, “I like it fine, but let’s make it 50/50.” That’s the extent of it.
当我们把它交给大卫时，他说：“我们就这样吧”——他说，“我觉得挺好，但让我们做成 50/50。” 就这样。
As you have commented, that’s wildly different than the approach at companies. I mean, most companies go through very elaborate procedures in working out executive compensation. I don’t think that Charlie and I have spent ever, maybe five minutes, on thinking about any.
正如你所说，这与公司的做法截然不同。我的意思是，大多数公司在制定高管薪酬时会经历非常复杂的程序。我认为查理和我可能从未花过五分钟来考虑任何问题。
We have an arrangement at See’s Candy with Chuck Huggins. We worked it out in 1972. It’s still in force now.
我们与查克·哈金斯在 See's Candy 有一个安排。我们在 1972 年达成了协议。现在仍然有效。
John Holland took over Fruit of the Loom a couple of years ago. I met with him for a couple of minutes, suggested something, takes up a paragraph or two. And that’s what we’ll have with John the rest of his life.
约翰·霍兰德（John Holland）几年前接管了Fruit of the Loom。我与他见面几分钟，建议了几句话，内容不过一两段。这就是我们与约翰余生的关系。
It’s not highly complex. You have to understand the businesses. There is no one formula we could use at Berkshire that would fit across our businesses, that’s asinine.
这并不十分复杂。你必须了解这些业务。在伯克希尔，我们没有一个可以适用于所有业务的公式，那是愚蠢的。
You don’t want them complicated. We don’t have anything that goes on for pages and pages. It’s not needed. It establishes a relationship between us and the manager that’s not good.
你不希望它们变得复杂。我们没有任何冗长的内容。这是不需要的。它在我们和经理之间建立了一种不好的关系。
So all of our stuff is very, very simple.
所以我们所有的东西都非常非常简单。
复杂约等于噪音和摩擦，乔布斯说好莱坞的合同都很复杂。
At GEICO we have two variables and they’re what count, you know. So we make — from Tony Nicely on down, we have everybody participating based on that. We worked that out whenever we took over at GEICO and it’s worked fine since and it’ll keep working.
在 GEICO，我们有两个变量，它们是关键，你知道的。因此，我们从 Tony Nicely 开始，让每个人都基于此参与。我们在接管 GEICO 时就解决了这个问题，从那时起它一直运作良好，并将继续运作。
But we do not bring in compensation consultants. We don’t have a human relations department. We don’t have — at the headquarters, as you could see, we don’t have any human relations department. We don’t have a legal department. We don’t have a public relations department. We don’t have an investor relations department.
但我们不引入薪酬顾问。我们没有一个人事部门。我们没有——在总部，如你所见，我们没有任何人事部门。我们没有法律部门。我们没有公共关系部门。我们没有投资者关系部门。
We don’t have those things because they make life way more complicated and everybody gets a vested interest in going to conferences and calling on other consultants and it takes on a life of its own.
我们没有那些东西，因为它们让生活变得更加复杂，每个人都对参加会议和邀请其他顾问产生了既得利益，并且它会自成一体。
In the typical large corporation, there’s a comp committee. And, as I pointed out in the past, they don’t put Dobermans on the comp committees, usually. They — they look for Chihuahuas that have been sedated and — (Laughter)
在典型的大公司中，有一个薪酬委员会。而且，正如我过去指出的，他们通常不会在薪酬委员会中安排杜宾犬。他们——他们寻找被镇静过的吉娃娃——（笑声）
I’ve been on 19 boards. They put me on one committee once, and I was chairman and I got outvoted. Do you remember that, Charlie? (Laughs)
我曾在 19 个董事会任职。他们有一次让我加入一个委员会，我是主席，但我被投票否决了。你记得吗，查理？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I certainly do.
查理·芒格：我当然同意。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这个——
CHARLIE MUNGER: By two very fine guys.
查理·芒格：由两位非常优秀的人。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, terrific guys, actually. And they — you know, the nature of it is that now, particularly with Sarbanes-Oxley, there’s lot of committee meetings. The directors meetings are filled up with process.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上是很棒的人。而且，你知道，现在的情况是，特别是随着萨班斯-奥克斯利法案，有很多委员会会议。董事会会议充满了流程。
And you have on one side of the table, some people that usually are spending an hour or two and getting presented with a bunch of material by the human relations department and some outside consultants.
在桌子的一边，有些人通常花一两个小时，由人力资源部门和一些外部顾问提供大量材料。
And I’ve never seen the head of a human relations department or a consultant come in and say, “This bozo you’ve got is only worth about half what you’ve been paying him.” This just isn’t going to happen.
我从未见过人力资源部门的负责人或顾问进来说：“你们雇的这个家伙只值你们付给他的一半。” 这根本不会发生。
So it’s, you know — it’s a situation where the intensity of interest on both sides is seldom equal. The directors are often dealing with something my friend Tom Murphy in the past has called, “play money,” and the CEO is dealing with something very dear to his heart.
所以，你知道——这是一个双方兴趣强度很少相等的情况。董事们经常处理我朋友汤姆·墨菲过去称之为“游戏钱”的东西，而首席执行官则在处理对他来说非常重要的事情。
So you’ve got to expect a situation like that to get gamed over time. Not over time, promptly, actually.
所以你必须预料到这样的情况会随着时间的推移被操纵。实际上，不是随着时间的推移，而是立即。
And there is some change in that that’s taking place. But it’s not being — in large part, it’s not being led by CEOs and it’s difficult for directors to do — to get a lot done.
在这一过程中确实发生了一些变化。但在很大程度上，这并不是由首席执行官们主导的，董事们也很难做到——很难完成很多事情。
They get handed a sheet of paper that shows them comparables elsewhere, and everybody thinks their CEO is in the top 25 percent or something. And so there’s a ratcheting effect that takes place.
他们拿到一张纸，上面显示了其他地方的可比数据，每个人都认为他们的 CEO 在前 25%或类似的位置。因此，就会出现一种逐步上升的效应。
And now stock options are coming out of favor, so restricted stock comes in. But the idea is to keep the pie very large for CEOs. And if I needed the money, I’d probably be doing the same thing.
现在股票期权不再受欢迎，因此限制性股票开始流行。但其想法是为CEO保留一块非常大的蛋糕。如果我需要钱，我可能也会这样做。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would rather throw a viper down my shirtfront than hire a compensation consultant. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：嗯，我宁愿把毒蛇扔进我的衬衫里，也不愿雇佣薪酬顾问。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Tell me which kind of consultants you actually like, Charlie? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你到底喜欢哪种顾问？（笑声）
He’s not going to answer that.
他不会回答这个问题。
12. We don’t think about investing “categories”
我们不考虑投资“类别”
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to number 5. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 5 号。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren and Charlie, good morning. My name is Mo Spence from Waterloo, Nebraska.
观众成员：沃伦和查理，早上好。我的名字是莫·斯彭斯，来自内布拉斯加州的滑铁卢。
Years ago, you listed the four or five investment vehicles you considered appropriate for Berkshire, including, I believe, common stocks, long-term debt, and arbitrage opportunities.
多年前，你列出了四到五种你认为适合伯克希尔的投资工具，包括我相信的普通股、长期债务和套利机会。
In light of your comments in this year’s annual report, I was wondering if you could review that list, in order of preference, and specifically comment on them, including the current environment for arbitrage.
鉴于您在今年年度报告中的评论，我想知道您是否可以按照优先顺序审查该列表，并对其进行具体评论，包括当前的套利环境。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the items you name — and you could break that down by high-grade bonds, you know, versus junk bonds.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，你提到的这些项目——你可以把它们分为高等级债券和垃圾债券。
The items you mention are all alternatives. You know, Charlie and I sit around and think about what’s the best thing to do with Berkshire’s money. It’s a fairly simple proposition.
你提到的项目都是替代方案。你知道，查理和我坐在一起思考如何最好地使用伯克希尔的钱。这是一个相当简单的命题。
And we have a number of things that we feel competent to make judgments on, and we have a number of things that we’re not competent to make judgments on. So we narrow — we hope to narrow the field to investments that we think we can understand. And there are a reasonable number of those, although there are a lot that we can’t understand.
我们有一些事情是我们觉得有能力做出判断的，也有一些事情是我们没有能力做出判断的。所以我们缩小——我们希望缩小到我们认为可以理解的投资领域。虽然有很多我们无法理解的，但我们能理解的数量还是相当可观的。
Anything I would say today, you know, can change tomorrow. We don’t think about the categories by themselves.
今天我说的任何话，你知道，明天可能会改变。我们不会单独考虑这些类别。
Now, in a period like summer to mid-fall of 2002, when junk bonds became very attractive, we bought a lot of them. But we didn’t make some great decision to buy junk bonds, we just started seeing things, individual items, that started screaming at us, you know, “buy, buy, buy.” And then that came to an end.
现在，在像 2002 年夏季到秋季中期这样的时期，当垃圾债券变得非常有吸引力时，我们买了很多。但我们并没有做出购买垃圾债券的重大决定，我们只是开始看到一些东西，个别项目，开始对我们大喊，“买，买，买。” 然后这一切就结束了。
And so we don’t go to the office in the morning thinking what category — how do we prioritize our categories. You know, we have an open mind and whatever we see that day that overcomes, or that crosses the threshold to where we take money out of short-term cash and move into it.
所以我们早上去办公室时不会想着什么类别——我们如何优先考虑我们的类别。你知道，我们保持开放的心态，无论那天看到什么超越了，或者达到了我们从短期现金中取出资金并投入其中的门槛。
It could be arbitrage — it’s unlikely to be arbitrage now, because that’s a game that, to play on a scale that would have a meaningful effect at Berkshire, is hard to do.
这可能是套利——现在不太可能是套利，因为要在伯克希尔达到有意义的规模进行这种游戏是很难做到的。
I mean, take very big deals, and it’s something we’ve done successfully in the past. We’ve made a lot of money over the years in arbitrage and quite consistently sometimes in the past.
我的意思是，做非常大的交易，这是我们过去成功做到的事情。多年来，我们通过套利赚了很多钱，有时相当稳定。
But we don’t — Charlie and I do not have a checklist that we talk about every day, or every month, or every year, in terms of prioritizing categories.
但查理和我并没有一个检查清单，每天、每月或每年讨论如何优先考虑这些类别。
We just hope — I hope he gets a good idea, he hopes I get a good idea. And when we get one, we move in a big way.
我们只是希望——我希望他有个好主意，他希望我有个好主意。当我们有了一个好主意时，我们会大动作。
They have to be big now and that’s a limiting factor in terms of what’s available for us.
他们现在必须变大，这在我们可用的资源方面是一个限制因素。
As you know, if you read the annual report, you know, we took a significant position in currencies. We’re buying viatical settlements, in terms of the transaction I mentioned a little earlier.
正如你所知，如果你阅读了年度报告，你就会知道，我们在货币方面采取了重要的立场。我们正在购买生命保险结算，正如我稍早提到的交易。
We’re open to anything we can understand. Charlie?
我们对任何我们能理解的事情都持开放态度。查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you really asked us to determine an order of precedency among two or three activities we don’t have much interest in at the moment. And that’s not something we spend a lot of time at.
查理·芒格：是的，你实际上是在让我们决定两三个活动之间的优先顺序，而我们目前对此并不感兴趣。这并不是我们花很多时间去做的事情。
In other words, we have all this cash because we don’t much like any of those fields at the moment. And spending all the time thinking about orders of precedency among things you clearly are not going to do is pretty fruitless for us.
换句话说，我们有这么多现金是因为我们目前不太喜欢这些领域中的任何一个。而花时间去思考那些你显然不会去做的事情的优先顺序对我们来说是相当无益的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I thought I had a slide here but I don’t. But it — when we were buying junk bonds in the summer to fall of 2002, we were literally buying securities — and we limited it to the kind of junk bonds we can understand, which is far from the whole universe — but we were literally buying things on a 30, 35, 40 percent yield to maturity basis.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我以为我这里有一张幻灯片，但我没有。但是——当我们在 2002 年夏季到秋季购买垃圾债券时，我们实际上是在购买证券——我们将其限制在我们能理解的那种垃圾债券上，这远非整个宇宙——但我们实际上是在以 30%、35%、40%的到期收益率购买东西。
Now, we buy those with a mental attitude of buying common stocks.
现在，我们以购买普通股的心态购买这些。
Interestingly enough, within 12 months, some of those same securities that were yielding 30 or 35 percent went to prices where they yielded only 6 percent. I mean, that is truly remarkable when you think about that happening in a country that was not in the throes of depression or anything.
有趣的是，在 12 个月内，其中一些收益率为 30%或 35%的证券价格下跌到收益率仅为 6%。我想，当你想到这种情况发生在一个没有处于萧条或其他任何困境的国家时，这确实是非常了不起的。
I mean, prices do amazing things in securities markets. And when they do something that strikes us as amazing in our direction, you know, we will act.
我的意思是，价格在证券市场上会做出惊人的事情。当它们在我们认为惊人的方向上发生变化时，我们会采取行动。
But we do not know today what we’re going to be doing tomorrow. We have — you know, we have some things — a few things we may be doing. They’re likely — It’s likely we’re doing them tomorrow, but there’s — we don’t hold any committee meetings on this.
但我们今天不知道明天要做什么。我们有——你知道，我们有一些事情——我们可能会做的一些事情。它们很可能——我们很可能明天会做，但我们没有就此召开任何委员会会议。
And there’s, you know, this business where somebody says, “You should have 50 percent of your money in bonds and 35 percent, you know, in equities, and 15 —.” We don’t go through anything like that. I mean, we regard that as nonsense.
你知道，有人说，“你应该把 50%的钱放在债券上，35%放在股票上，15%——。”我们不这样做。我是说，我们认为那是无稽之谈。
Any further thoughts, Charlie?
还有其他想法吗，查理？
No further thoughts, evidently. (Laughter)
显然没有进一步的想法。（笑声）
13. “Very dangerous to project out high growth rates”
“预测高增长率是非常危险的”
WARREN BUFFETT: Microphone 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：麦克风 6。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman. My name is Tony Ado (PH) and I come from New Jersey.
观众成员：早上好，先生们。我的名字是托尼·阿多（音），我来自新泽西。
Mr. Buffett, my question is on business valuation and growth. In one of your letters, you mentioned the discounting formula on earnings divided by the difference between the discount and the growth rate.
巴菲特先生，我的问题是关于企业估值和增长的。在您的一封信中，您提到过收益的贴现公式是收益除以贴现率与增长率的差。
But if the growth rate is larger than the discount rate and if we use this formula, then we get a negative number. And one way around this — let’s call it method A — is to have two growth stages, one with a high growth and the second stage with a low growth.
但是，如果增长率大于折扣率，并且我们使用这个公式，那么我们会得到一个负数。解决这个问题的一种方法——我们称之为方法 A——是设定两个增长阶段，一个是高增长阶段，另一个是低增长阶段。
And the second way, method B, would be to estimate how much the earnings is on the third year for the company and then multiply this by the average price-to-earning ratio to get the price in the tenth year.
第二种方法，方法 B，是估算公司第三年的收益，然后将其乘以平均市盈率，以获得第十年的价格。
I don’t know if you use the method A or method B, but if not, I would like to ask, Mr. Buffett, how do you estimate how much a company is worth if the growth rate is larger than the discount rate?
我不知道您是使用方法 A 还是方法 B，但如果不是，我想请教巴菲特先生，如果增长率大于贴现率，您如何估算一家公司的价值？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you put your finger on an interesting mathematical relationship. Because if you’re using a present value discount formula and you put in a growth rate that is higher than the discount rate, as you have postulated, the answer, of course, will be infinity.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你指出了一个有趣的数学关系。因为如果你使用现值折现公式，并且你输入的增长率高于折现率，就像你假设的那样，答案当然将是无限大。
And there are a lot of managements around who like to think their stocks are worth infinity, but we — (laughs) — haven’t found one yet.
而且有很多管理层喜欢认为他们的股票价值无限，但我们——（笑）——还没有找到一个。
That precise subject was covered in a paper called “The St. Petersburg Paradox” by a fellow named [David] Durand probably 30 years ago. And somewhere, we probably have a copy at our office. My guess, if you go to Google and you put in the name Durand and you put in St. Petersburg, you may be able to call up that article, although they aren’t necessarily terrific on old articles.
大约 30 年前，一个名叫[大卫]杜兰德的人在一篇名为《圣彼得堡悖论》的论文中讨论了这个精确的主题。我们办公室可能有一份副本。我猜，如果你去谷歌搜索杜兰德的名字并输入圣彼得堡，你可能能够找到那篇文章，尽管他们对旧文章的收录不一定很好。
So if you’d like it, we would — if you’ll let somebody know in our office, we’ll look around a little and see if we can find that.
所以，如果你愿意的话，我们会——如果你能让我们办公室的某个人知道，我们会四处看看，看看能否找到。
It gets very dangerous to project out high growth rates because you get into this paradox. If you say the growth rate of a company is going to be 9 percent between now and judgment day and you use a 7 percent discount rate, it goes off, you know, you get into infinity. And that’s where people get in a lot of trouble.
将高增长率预测出来变得非常危险，因为你会陷入这种悖论。如果你说一家公司从现在到审判日的增长率将是 9%，而你使用 7%的折现率，它就会无限增长，你知道的，你会陷入无穷大。这就是人们遇到很多麻烦的地方。
高增长不可能持续，相比之下，买的便宜是更容易实现。
The idea of projecting out extremely high growth rates for very long periods of time has caused investors to lose, you know, very, very large sums of money.
将极高的增长率投射到非常长的时间段的想法导致投资者损失了非常非常大的一笔钱。
There aren’t many companies — just take a look at the Fortune 500, go back 50 years — they’re commemorating that — and look at the companies that were there and how many have really maintained rates much above 10 percent. It’s not an easy hurdle. And when you get up to 15, you know, you’re in the atmosphere and rarified atmosphere.
没有多少公司——看看《财富》500 强，回顾 50 年前——他们正在纪念这一点——看看当时的公司，有多少真正保持了超过 10%的增长率。这不是一个容易的门槛。当你达到 15%时，你知道，你已经进入了稀薄的大气层。
So that’s — there’s a real danger in projecting out high growth rates. And Charlie and I will very seldom — virtually never — get up into high digits. You can lose a lot of money doing that.
所以——预测高增长率确实存在真正的风险。查理和我很少——几乎从不——达到高位。这样做可能会损失很多钱。
You may miss an opportunity some time, but I haven’t seen people who have been consistently successful doing that. And you do run into this paradox you mentioned.
有时候你可能会错过一个机会，但我还没见过一直这样做而持续成功的人。而且你确实会遇到你提到的这个悖论。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’re obviously right, when you get a mathematical result that is infinity, to back off and realize that can’t happen. And, of course, what people do is they project that the growth rate will reduce and, indeed, eventually stop. And then you get more realistic numbers. What else could anyone do?
查理·芒格：嗯，你显然是对的，当你得到一个数学结果是无穷大时，要退一步并意识到那是不可能发生的。当然，人们所做的是预测增长率会降低，并且最终会停止。然后你会得到更现实的数字。还有谁能做什么呢？
14. NYSE specialist system has “worked pretty well”
纽约证券交易所专家系统“运作得相当好”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to microphone 7. I believe that’s over here.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们将转到 7 号麦克风。我相信就在这边。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, My name is Jack Oneil (PH). I’m from New Brighton, Minnesota. Thank you for the opportunity to ask questions here and for the opportunity to learn from you and Charlie.
观众成员：是的，我的名字是杰克·奥尼尔（音）。我来自明尼苏达州的新布莱顿。感谢您提供在这里提问的机会，并感谢您和查理让我学习的机会。
I had a two-part question and I’m striking the first part, which dealt with my concern over how long the country can continue with this ballooning national debt.
我有一个分为两部分的问题，我取消了第一部分，该部分涉及我对国家债务不断膨胀的担忧，以及国家还能持续多久。
My second — my question then is, what is your opinion of the need for specialists on the New York Stock Exchange? Thank you.
我的第二个——那么我的问题是，您对纽约证券交易所需要专业交易员的看法是什么？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to tackle that one? (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想回答这个问题吗？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, thank you, Warren. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：谢谢你，沃伦。（笑声）
Generally speaking, I think the specialist system has worked pretty well over the years. There may have been a few troubles lately, but averaged out, it’s worked pretty well for a long time. And I’m not all that horrified that some people who stand there all day make a fair amount of money.
一般来说，我认为多年来专家制度运作得相当好。最近可能出现了一些问题，但平均来看，它长期以来运作得相当不错。而且我并不太惊讶那些整天站在那里的人赚了不少钱。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie actually had a specialist firm, you should know that. That’s why I turned the question over to him, despite his snide remark. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：你应该知道，查理实际上有一家专业公司。这就是为什么我把问题交给他，尽管他有些挖苦的评论。（笑声）
How long were you and Jack [Wheeler] the specialists in General Motors on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange?
你和杰克·惠勒（Jack Wheeler）在太平洋交易所担任通用汽车的专业交易员多久了？
CHARLIE MUNGER: About 13 years.
查理·芒格：大约 13 年。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah — 沃伦·巴菲特：是的——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re looking at an experienced specialist.
沃伦·巴菲特：你们现在看到的是一位经验丰富的专业交易员。
15. Buffett predicts “big problems” from derivatives
巴菲特预测衍生品将带来“大问题”
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 8 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman. I’m Neil Steinhoff from Phoenix, Arizona.
观众成员：早上好，先生们。我是来自亚利桑那州菲尼克斯的尼尔·斯坦霍夫。
Thanks for the tips on TIPS. Also thanks for the information in the newsletter — your annual letter — about the books. I particularly enjoyed “Bull!” by Maggie Mahar, I think it was.
感谢您对TIPS的建议。也感谢您在年度信件中的信息——关于书籍。我特别喜欢玛吉·马哈尔（Maggie Mahar）的《Bull!》。
I’m concerned about the future for a number of different reasons, in America. The debt, both accumulated by the government and personally, the stock buybacks, which are benefiting the top five executives, continues. The insanity of derivatives and the overpriced market with a P/E, which is also insane. Any comments?
我对美国的未来感到担忧，原因有很多。政府和个人积累的债务，股票回购继续让前五名高管受益。衍生品的疯狂以及市盈率过高的市场也很疯狂。有什么看法吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, which one do you want us to comment on? You only get one question. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：那么，你想让我们评论哪一个？你只能问一个问题。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Derivatives.
观众成员：衍生品。
WARREN BUFFETT: Derivatives.
沃伦·巴菲特：衍生品。
Well, Charlie and I have expressed ourselves on derivatives. You know, we don’t think the probability, in any given year, is necessarily very high, that derivatives will either lead to or greatly accentuate some financial trauma. But we think it’s there.
好吧，查理和我已经表达了我们对衍生品的看法。你知道，我们不认为在任何特定年份，衍生品导致或大大加剧某些金融创伤的概率一定很高。但我们认为这种可能性是存在的。
And I think it’s fascinating to look at something like Freddie Mac, where you had an institution that perhaps even hundreds of financial analysts were looking at — certainly many, many dozens of financial analysts were looking at. You had an oversight office. You had a creature that was created by Congress, presumably with committees that would be interested in their activities.
我认为，观察像房地美这样的机构是很有趣的，因为可能有数百名金融分析师在关注它——当然，至少有几十名金融分析师在关注它。你有一个监督办公室。你有一个由国会创建的机构，想必有一些委员会会对他们的活动感兴趣。
You had on the board two of the smartest and highest-grade people that you could have, in terms of fixed income markets, in Marty Leibowitz and Henry Kaufman, and you had a bunch of other very good directors, too.
在董事会中，你拥有了固定收益市场中最聪明和最高水平的两个人，马蒂·利博维茨和亨利·考夫曼，还有一群其他非常优秀的董事。
And, with an auditor present, they managed to misstate earnings by some $6 billion in a fairly short period of time.
而且，在审计员在场的情况下，他们在相当短的时间内设法将收益误报了大约 60 亿美元。
Now, all of that wasn’t accounted for by derivatives, but a very large portion of it — 6 billion, that, you know, that is real money even — well, in any place. A large part of that was facilitated by activities and derivative instruments.
现在，所有这些并不是由衍生品造成的，但其中很大一部分——60 亿，你知道，那是真正的钱——在任何地方都是如此。很大一部分是通过衍生工具的活动所促成的。
Now you can look at the Freddie Mac annual report for 2000, whatever it is, ’2 or 2001. And you can read the footnotes and you can read the auditor’s certificate. And you can look at bunch of high-class, very smart directors.
现在你可以查看房地美 2000 年的年度报告，无论是 2002 年还是 2001 年。你可以阅读脚注，也可以阅读审计师的证明书。你还可以看看一群高素质、非常聪明的董事。
And you can be comforted by the fact that dozens of people in Wall Street, who are paid just to follow relatively few stocks, were studying this, and that they had conference calls all of the time.
而且你可以感到安慰的是，华尔街有几十个人专门负责跟踪相对较少的股票，他们在研究这个问题，并且一直在进行电话会议。
And in the end, what happened? It was 6 billion. It probably could have been 12 billion if they’d wanted.
最后，发生了什么？是 60 亿。如果他们愿意，可能会是 120 亿。
A lot of mischief can happen with derivatives. And as we’ve pointed out, Charlie and I have seen it happen.
衍生品可能会引发许多恶作剧。正如我们所指出的，查理和我已经见识过这种情况。
When there’s a derivative transaction, particularly a complicated one — the plain vanilla ones, probably people will not get in big trouble on — but when you have a complicated derivative transaction, and the trader at investment house A is on one side and a trader on investment house B is on the other side, and they record a transaction — which has to be a zero-sum game between the two of them — and both put on the books a profit that day — I’ve never seen one where they both put on a loss that day — it lends itself to mischief. And the scale is absolutely huge and getting larger all the time.
当有衍生品交易时，尤其是复杂的交易——普通的简单交易，人们可能不会遇到大麻烦——但当你有一个复杂的衍生品交易时，投资公司 A 的交易员在一边，投资公司 B 的交易员在另一边，他们记录了一笔交易——这在他们之间必须是一个零和游戏——而且两者在当天的账面上都记录了利润——我从未见过他们在当天都记录亏损的情况——这就容易滋生不当行为。而且规模绝对巨大，并且一直在扩大。
And I will tell you that I know the managements of some of the companies that have big derivative activities, and they do not have their minds around what is happening.
我会告诉你，我了解一些进行大量衍生品活动的公司的管理层，他们并没有真正理解正在发生的事情。
We didn’t have our mind around what was happening at Gen Re Securities. We couldn’t. We tried to get our mind around it. We couldn’t do it. And that was far from, you know, the most extensive or complicated derivative operation around.
我们没有弄清楚 Gen Re Securities 发生了什么。我们无法弄清楚。我们试图弄清楚，但做不到。而且，那还远不是最广泛或最复杂的衍生品操作。
We had the same experience at Salomon. But whatever the figures were at Salomon, they would be a great multiple today. And there was a Sunday in 1991 when we were preparing — or we had the lawyers preparing — bankruptcy papers at Salomon.
我们在所罗门也有过同样的经历。但无论所罗门的数字是多少，今天都会是一个很大的倍数。1991 年的一个星期天，我们正在准备——或者说我们的律师正在准备——所罗门的破产文件。
And if the Treasury hadn’t reversed itself, we would have found a judge some place in Manhattan. He probably would have been watching baseball, eating popcorn. And we would’ve walked up to his door and said, “You know, here is a situation with Salomon. There’s these 1.2 trillion of derivative contracts that the guy on the other side thinks is good and they’re not going to be any good,” and a lot of other things, and, you know, “It’s your baby.”
如果财政部没有改变主意，我们会在曼哈顿找个法官。他可能正在看棒球，吃爆米花。我们会走到他门前说：“你知道，这里有个关于所罗门的情况。对方认为这些 1.2 万亿的衍生品合约是好的，但它们不会有任何价值，”还有很多其他事情，然后说，“这是你的问题。”
A lot of things correlate in the securities world that people don’t expect to correlate. And there are people following similar strategies all over the world, as happened when Long-Term Capital had its problems.
在证券界，很多事情的相关性是人们没有预料到的。而且，世界各地的人们都在采用类似的策略，就像长期资本管理公司遇到问题时那样。
And the world — the financial world — operates on a hair trigger, to some extent. People want to jump the gun and move just ahead of the other fellow.
世界——金融世界——在某种程度上是处于高度紧张状态的。人们想抢先一步，领先于其他人。
And when you get huge amounts of transactions, which many people only vaguely understand, you are creating a potential huge problem that may come about because of some other exogenous event that triggers defaults on a huge scale. And that can be very disruptive to financial markets.
当你有大量交易时，许多人只是模糊地理解，你正在制造一个潜在的巨大问题，这可能由于某些其他外部事件触发大规模违约而产生。这可能对金融市场造成极大的干扰。
So we think they’re dangerous as used in society. We use them ourselves, incidentally. You know, we get them collaterized. We’ve made money off of them.
所以我们认为它们在社会中的使用是危险的。顺便说一下，我们自己也使用它们。你知道，我们用它们做抵押。我们从中赚了钱。
But I would predict that sometime, in the next 10 years, that you will have some very big problems that will either be caused by, or accentuated in a big way, by people’s activities in derivatives.
但我预测，在未来 10 年内，你将面临一些非常大的问题，这些问题要么是由衍生品中的人类活动引起的，要么是被大大加剧的。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think part of the trouble in — you were talking about — came because people didn’t think enough about the consequences of the consequences.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为你所谈论的问题的一部分是因为人们没有充分考虑到后果的后果。
That’s a common error. You start trying to hedge against interest rate changes, which is a very complicated thing to do when you’ve got a mortgage portfolio where people have options to pay the mortgages off early.
这是一个常见的错误。你开始尝试对抗利率变化的风险，这是一件非常复杂的事情，尤其是在你拥有一个有提前还款选择的抵押贷款组合时。
And then, under the accounting conventions, the hedges started making the quarterly results lumpy instead of nice and regular, the way all the institutional analysts like them. So then they gave us another bunch of derivatives to smooth out the returns. Well, now you’ve morphed into lying.
然后，根据会计惯例，对冲开始使季度业绩变得不均匀，而不是所有机构分析师喜欢的那种良好和规律的方式。所以他们又给了我们一堆衍生品来平滑收益。好吧，现在你已经变成了撒谎。
Well, it’s complicated enough to start with. But when you add lying to the process, it’s a Mad Hatter’s Tea-Party.
嗯，开始就已经够复杂的了。但当你在这个过程中加入谎言时，就像是疯帽子的茶会。
And yet, this happens with eminent directors of vast financial sophistication sitting on the board. It shows that the sophistication won’t save you. Somebody has to have the common sense to say, “We’re just not going there.” It’s too tough.
然而，这种情况发生在具有高度金融专业知识的知名董事坐在董事会中。这表明这种复杂性无法拯救你。必须有人有常识地说：“我们就是不去那里。”这太难了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie was on the audit committee at Salomon and changed it into, you know, six and seven hours meetings. I think you found mismarks that were in the tens of millions of dollars on a single contract with a place with many — you know, tens of thousands of contracts. Isn’t that correct?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理曾在所罗门的审计委员会，并将会议改为六到七个小时。我想你发现了一个合同上有数千万美元的错误标记，而这个地方有成千上万个合同。不是吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s fair to say that it was bonkers and that the accountants sold out.
查理·芒格：我认为可以公平地说，那是疯狂的，且会计师出卖了自己。
WARREN BUFFETT: Uh-huh. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯哼。（笑声）
It’s interesting stuff. You might — if you feel in kind of a nasty mood, you might go to a shareholders meeting of some company that has very large positions in derivatives and grill the CEO a little bit about some of the more esoteric transactions.
这很有趣。如果你心情不太好，你可能会去参加某个在衍生品上有很大头寸的公司的股东大会，并向首席执行官询问一些更深奥的交易。
They get very, very complicated. They get mind-boggling, in terms of trying to figure out the consequences.
它们变得非常非常复杂。在试图弄清后果时，它们让人感到难以置信。
And the one thing you can be sure of is that the trader that puts them on will certainly want to mark them at a profit, either immediately or within a year or two, because he gets his bonus too often based on the figures for that year, and will be done in 20 years, because some of these are very long-dated. Will be gone — when the consequences fall to the firm.
有一件事你可以确定，那就是进行这些交易的交易员肯定希望立即或在一两年内以盈利的方式标记它们，因为他的奖金往往是基于那一年的数据，并且在 20 年内完成，因为其中一些是非常长期的。当后果落到公司时，他将不在。
Anytime you have incentives, with people who are quite smart, to mismark things, you’re going to get mismarks, or temptations to take on risk in an inappropriate manner.
只要有激励措施，并且有相当聪明的人去错误标记事物，你就会得到错误标记，或者在不适当的方式下承担风险的诱惑。
Originally with derivatives, the argument was made that it would disperse risk. That, you know, the Coca-Cola Company faced foreign exchange risk, or some bank faced, you know, interest rate risk.
最初关于衍生品，有人提出它可以分散风险。比如，可口可乐公司面临外汇风险，或者某些银行面临利率风险。
And the theory was that you would use these derivatives to spread risk around the system. And indeed, there are many people that make that argument now.
理论是你会使用这些衍生品来在系统中分散风险。确实，现在有很多人提出这个论点。
I would say that that may work in that manner a great percentage of the time. But the time that counts is when the system has intensified risk and placed enormous credit risk on very, very few institutions.
我认为在很大程度上，它可能在大多数情况下有效。但关键时刻，系统会加大风险，并将巨额信贷风险集中在极少数机构上。
Believe me, the Coca-Cola Company is in a better position to accept foreign exchange or interest rate risk in a year than some derivatives dealer who has tons of positions on.
相信我，可口可乐公司在一年内比那些持有大量头寸的衍生品交易商更有能力接受外汇或利率风险。
And I think, actually, there is much more risk in the system because of derivatives than the proponents of derivatives would say has been dispersed because of the activities.
我认为，实际上，由于衍生品的存在，系统中的风险比衍生品支持者所说的因这些活动而分散的风险要大得多。
16. Bill Gates as next Berkshire chairman?
比尔·盖茨将成为下任伯克希尔董事长？
WARREN BUFFETT: Microphone 9, please?
沃伦·巴菲特：请使用 9 号麦克风？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Robert Piton (PH) from Chicago, Illinois. Thank you very much for your countless insights about investing, and life, for that matter.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的罗伯特·皮顿（PH）。非常感谢您在投资和生活方面提供的无数见解。
My question has to do with Bill Gates. You’ve gone on record stating that Bill Gates is the smartest person you’ve probably met in your life. Charlie, sorry to break it to you.
我的问题与比尔·盖茨有关。你曾公开表示，比尔·盖茨可能是你一生中遇到的最聪明的人。查理，很抱歉告诉你。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, and I haven’t said that quite — but you’re close. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我没有完全这么说——但你很接近。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m close. And you’ve also mentioned that he can do your job, but you probably could not do his.
观众成员：我很接近。你也提到过他可以做你的工作，但你可能无法做他的工作。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s entirely correct.
沃伦·巴菲特：那完全正确。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. So that being the case, given his aptitude, his accomplishments, his ability to keep great people together within Microsoft, would you consider having him become the future chairman of Berkshire in one of two ways.
观众成员：好的。那么在这种情况下，鉴于他的才能、成就以及在微软内部团结优秀人才的能力，您是否会考虑让他以两种方式之一成为伯克希尔未来的主席。
Either a merger — and if a merger doesn’t make sense because it’s a technology company and you don’t understand it, so you don’t want anything to do with Microsoft.
要么合并——如果合并没有意义，因为它是一家科技公司，而你不理解它，所以你不想与微软有任何关系。
With the second being he resign his post as chairman of Microsoft in order to keep the masterpiece that you’ve assembled together, as well as keep these very talented managers of all the Berkshire Hathaway companies together, with a leader that you so respect because of his accomplishments and aptitude.
第二个原因是他辞去了微软董事长的职位，以便保持您所组建的杰作，以及将所有伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的这些非常有才华的经理们团结在一起，并且有一位您非常尊敬的领导者，因为他的成就和才能。
WARREN BUFFETT: Did Bill put you up to this? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是比尔让你这样做的吗？（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: He did not.
观众成员：他没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I know that.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我知道。
You know, it’s not a crazy suggestion, but we’ve got a better answer.
你知道，这不是一个疯狂的建议，但我们有一个更好的答案。
Bill could do my job very well. And I could not do his job. But we also have at least four people within the Berkshire organization that, in many respects, could do my job better than I do. And probably in one or two respects, they might not be as good at certain parts of it. But they would be terrific successors.
比尔可以很好地完成我的工作。而我无法胜任他的工作。但在伯克希尔公司内部，我们至少有四个人在很多方面可以比我更好地完成我的工作。可能在一两个方面，他们在某些部分上不如我。但他们会是出色的继任者。
We’re more blessed in that situation than we’ve ever been in the history of Berkshire. If you go back 15 years, we did not have four.
在这种情况下，我们比伯克希尔历史上任何时候都更幸运。如果回到 15 年前，我们没有四个。
And as we add businesses, it’s not inconceivable that more potential future leaders come with those businesses. So we’re well-equipped.
随着我们增加业务，未来可能会有更多潜在的领导者随之而来。因此，我们装备精良。
And we would — we will — barring something terribly unusual — we will have a leader that succeeds me that comes from within Berkshire and has been around for a long time.
我们将会——除非发生极其不寻常的事情——我们将会有一位继任我的领导者，他来自伯克希尔内部，并且已经在公司待了很长时间。
One advantage of that — and this would not be necessarily a disadvantage if it were Bill — but one advantage to that is that we really like the culture at Berkshire. And having someone that has operated in that culture for a number of years, I think, is a plus.
这样做的一个好处——如果是比尔的话，这不一定是个坏处——但这样做的一个好处是我们真的很喜欢伯克希尔的文化。我认为，有人在这种文化中运作了多年是一个优势。
Plus, you know, we’ve seen how they work and we know their pluses and minuses. We are very well-equipped now.
另外，你知道，我们已经见识过他们的工作方式，并且了解他们的优缺点。我们现在装备得非常好。
And Bill, I think — to the extent that he spends less time at Microsoft and he will probably be — you know, the Gates foundation will take up, perhaps, more of his time — I don’t really think he is looking for my job, although he may salivate at the pay level that’s available. (Laughter)
比尔，我认为——在他减少在微软的时间的情况下，他可能会——你知道，盖茨基金会可能会占用他更多的时间——我不认为他真的在觊觎我的工作，尽管他可能会对这个职位的薪水垂涎三尺。（笑声）
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.
查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。
17. Reading list for improving investment knowledge
提高投资知识的阅读清单
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来看第 10 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Oliver Graussa (PH) and I’m Vienna, Austria.
观众成员：我的名字是奥利弗·格劳萨（PH），我来自奥地利维也纳。
I have studied economics and I’ve read about 40 books about investing and want to be such a successful investor as you have been.
我学习了经济学，并阅读了大约 40 本关于投资的书籍，希望能像你一样成为成功的投资者。
Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, when both of you were younger and had much less capital for investing, how many — which publications were the best to get a few excellent investment ideas to be so successful? And how many hours per week, on average, did you spend with reading about companies? Thank you.
巴菲特先生和芒格先生，当你们都更年轻并且投资资本较少时，哪些出版物是获得一些优秀投资理念以取得成功的最佳选择？平均来说，你们每周花多少小时阅读有关公司的信息？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, when we were younger, we spent — probably Charlie, compared to now, spent a lot more time — I spent a fair amount more time — looking at companies.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，当我们年轻的时候，我们花了——可能查理相比现在花了更多的时间——我也花了相当多的时间——研究公司。
But we would — if we were doing it over again, we would do it over again pretty much the same way.
不过如果我们再做一次，我们还是会以几乎相同的方式再做一次。
We would look at everything in sight that we thought we could understand. And it — the world hasn’t changed in that respect. There may be some more people doing it, but there are a lot more companies to look at now.
我们会查看视线范围内所有我们认为可以理解的事物。而且——在这方面，世界并没有改变。可能有更多的人在这样做，但现在有更多的公司可以看。
And we would — we would read everything in sight about the businesses and the industries we thought we could understand.
我们会阅读我们认为能够理解的企业和行业的所有相关资料。
We would look for things that jumped out at us as being very cheap in relation to the value. And we would have one enormous advantage because we would be working with far less capital, which means the universe of potential ideas would be far greater.
我们会寻找那些相对于价值来说非常便宜的东西。而且我们会有一个巨大的优势，因为我们使用的资本要少得多，这意味着潜在想法的范围会大得多。
But there’s no — there’s nothing different, in my view, about analyzing securities now than there was 50 years ago.
但在我看来，现在分析证券与 50 年前没有什么不同。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we read a lot and we thought a lot. I don’t know anybody who is wise who doesn’t read a lot.
查理·芒格：是的，我们读了很多书，也思考了很多。我不知道有哪个聪明的人不读很多书。
On the other hand, that alone won’t do it. You have to have a temperament, really, which grabs the correct ideas and does something with those ideas. And I think most people who read a lot don’t have the necessary temperament, and they grab the ideas or they’re simply confused by the mass of material. And, of course, that won’t work.
另一方面，光靠这个是不够的。你必须有一种性格，真正能够抓住正确的想法并对这些想法采取行动。而我认为，大多数阅读很多的人并没有必要的性格，他们要么抓住了想法，要么只是被大量的材料弄得困惑。当然，这样是行不通的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s probably something — Phil Carret used to talk about having a “money mind,” and I would call it a “business mind.” And, you know, there are people that are better with, you know, identical IQs, that are better adapted for one than the other. And the temperament is all important.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，可能有一些东西——菲尔·卡雷特曾经谈到拥有“金钱头脑”，而我称之为“商业头脑”。而且，你知道，有些人，即使智商相同，也更适合其中一个。性格是非常重要的。
I mean, if you can’t control yourself, no matter what the intellect you bring to the process, you know, you’re going to have disasters. And Charlie and have seen one after another that —
我的意思是，如果你不能控制自己，无论你在这个过程中带来什么智慧，你都知道会有灾难。查理和我已经看到一个又一个——
It’s not a business that requires extraordinary intellect. It does require extraordinary discipline.
这不是一个需要非凡智慧的生意。它确实需要非凡的纪律。
That shouldn’t be so difficult. But as I look around the world sometimes, apparently it is quite difficult. I mean, the whole world went a little mad a few years back in terms of investments.
这不应该那么困难。但有时当我环顾世界时，显然这相当困难。我的意思是，几年前整个世界在投资方面有点疯狂。
And you say to yourself, “How could that happen? Don’t they learn anything for the earlier ones?” But, you know, what we learn from history is that people don’t learn from history. And you certainly see that in financial markets all the time.
你对自己说：“怎么会发生这种事？他们从之前的事件中没有学到什么吗？”但是，你知道，我们从历史中学到的是，人们并没有从历史中学到东西。而在金融市场中，你肯定一直都能看到这一点。
Incidentally, you mentioned books. Charlie, you didn’t recommend any books this year?
对了，你提到了书。查理，你今年没有推荐任何书吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, one book I really like I couldn’t buy because it’s published only in England. But it’ll get here in due course. And that’s called “Deep Simplicity” by John Gribbin. It’s a perfectly marvelous book. And of course, that’s a great title: “Deep Simplicity.” That’s what we’re all looking for.
查理·芒格：嗯，我非常喜欢的一本书我买不到，因为它只在英国出版。但它迟早会到这里。那本书叫《深度简单》，作者是约翰·格里宾。这是一本非常精彩的书。当然，这是一个很棒的书名：“深度简单”。这正是我们都在寻找的东西。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve been reading “A Short History of Nearly Everything.” It’s very impressive to — you know, to read about people pondering how to figure out the weight of the Earth or something in the 18th century.
沃伦·巴菲特：我一直在读《万物简史》。读到人们在 18 世纪思考如何计算地球的重量或其他事情，真是令人印象深刻。
And you would think that minds that would do that would do very well in financial matters. But, you know, if you remember, Isaac Newton spent a significant part of his life trying to turn lead into gold. And he might have made a good stockbroker. (Laughter)
你会认为能够做到这一点的人在财务问题上会做得很好。但是，你知道，如果你记得，艾萨克·牛顿花了他生命中相当大的一部分时间试图把铅变成金子。而且他可能会成为一个不错的股票经纪人。（笑声）
But it didn’t do much for him financially. Charlie knows more about Isaac than I do, so —
但这对他的经济状况没有多大帮助。查理比我更了解艾萨克，所以——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, and he lost an enormous —
查理·芒格：嗯，他失去了巨大的——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in the bubble —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，在泡沫中——
CHARLIE MUNGER: —chunk of his net worth in the South Sea Bubble. So he invested in an absolute crooked mania. And here was the smartest man in the world. So just IQ points alone won’t do it.
查理·芒格：——他在南海泡沫中投入了他净资产的一大部分。所以他投资于一个绝对疯狂的骗局。而他是世界上最聪明的人。所以仅仅靠智商是不够的。
18. Admiration for Treasury’s crack down on tax shelters
钦佩财政部对避税措施的打击
WARREN BUFFETT: Microphone 11, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请使用 11 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Martin Wiegand from Bethesda, Maryland. Thank you for hosting this wonderful, educational, and fun weekend. We —
观众成员：我叫马丁·维根德，来自马里兰州贝塞斯达。感谢你们举办这个精彩、有教育意义且有趣的周末。我们——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thanks for coming —
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢你的到来——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: —appreciate it.
观众成员：——感谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: —Martin, yeah. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：—马丁，是的。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In this year’s annual report, you defended Berkshire’s tax payment record against criticism from certain newspaper columnists and Assistant Secretary [for Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury] Pamela Olson.
观众成员：在今年的年度报告中，你为伯克希尔的纳税记录进行了辩护，回应了某些报纸专栏作家和美国财政部税收政策助理秘书帕梅拉·奥尔森的批评。
Compared to other large corporations, particularly insurance companies, does Berkshire pay its fair share so we can our Berkshire Activewear with the American flag on it with pride?
与其他大公司，特别是保险公司相比，伯克希尔是否支付了其应有的份额，以便我们可以自豪地穿上印有美国国旗的伯克希尔运动服？
WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, Pamela Olson is here today. I don’t know whether she can stand up. But I owe her an apology.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，帕梅拉·奥尔森今天在这里。我不知道她是否能站起来。但我欠她一个道歉。
She’s done a great job as a public servant and I teased her a little bit in the annual report. But she actually has worked actively at the Treasury in cracking down on tax shelters and some things that Charlie and I think shouldn’t exist. So Pamela has my admiration. And, like I say, if she’s here and can stand up, we’ll give her hand. (Applause).
她作为公务员做得非常出色，我在年度报告中稍微调侃了她一下。但实际上，她在财政部积极打击避税措施和一些查理和我认为不应该存在的事情。所以我很钦佩帕梅拉。而且，正如我所说，如果她在这里并能站起来，我们会为她鼓掌。（掌声）。
Some of the tax shelter proposals — I met with her yesterday — and she told me of some things that I’ve sort of seen myself. But some of the things that have been done and, in some cases, sponsored by the most prominent auditing firms, you know, are absolutely disgusting, and are the reason why, in my view at least, the middle class probably pays a lot more than they should be in terms of raising the total funds that are needed to sustain the government.
有些避税方案——我昨天和她见面了——她告诉我一些我自己也见过的事情。但是，有些事情已经做了，而且在某些情况下，是由最知名的审计公司赞助的，你知道，真是令人厌恶，这也是为什么，至少在我看来，中产阶级可能支付的比他们应该支付的多得多，以筹集维持政府所需的总资金。
Berkshire, as we noted in the report, is a heavy contributor to the Treasury. As I mentioned, if only 540 entities in the country paid what we pay in income tax, no one else would have to pay anything, no Social Security, no nothing.
正如我们在报告中指出的，伯克希尔是财政部的重要贡献者。正如我提到的，如果全国只有 540 个实体支付我们所支付的所得税，那么其他人就不需要支付任何费用，没有社会保障，什么都不用付。
We have not — I mean, we may own tax-exempt bonds. We own dividends, which receive a dividend receive credit. But we pay on a very, very high percentage of our income — including capital gains — we pay at the full 34 percent corporate rate.
我们没有——我的意思是，我们可能拥有免税债券。我们拥有股息，这些股息可以获得股息抵免。但我们在我们收入的非常非常高的百分比上缴税——包括资本收益——我们按完整的 34%公司税率缴税。
So go out and buy the Fruit of the Loom underwear with the flag on it, you’re entitled to wear it. (Laughs)
所以去买带有国旗的 Fruit of the Loom 内衣吧，你有权穿它。（笑）
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. But you understate the evil that crept into our leading accounts — accounting firms — when they started selling these fraudulent tax shelters in exchange for contingent fees.
查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。但你低估了当我们的主要会计公司——会计师事务所——开始以或有费用为交换条件出售这些欺诈性避税措施时，所渗入的邪恶。
One of them actually explained to me that they were an ethical seller of fraudulent tax shelters. (Laughter)
他们其中一人实际上向我解释说，他们是一个出售虚假避税手段的道德卖家。（笑声）
He said, “The other firms just sold these to anybody. And we just sold them to our 20 most important clients so they were more likely to stay secret.”
他说：“其他公司只是把这些卖给任何人。而我们只卖给我们最重要的 20 个客户，所以它们更有可能保密。”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And of course, the lawyers would write the opinions so that, if they did get caught with these things that they hoped that no one even picked up because they were so obscure, convoluted, the lawyers wrote the opinions so that the — they could walk — you know, when the IRS came around, they could wave that letter and say, “Well, gee, we’re sorry we made a mistake, but we did it on the advice of counsel and therefore you shouldn’t assess fraud penalties or anything.” I mean, they would — we don’t want to leave the lawyers out of this, Charlie. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当然，律师们会写出这样的意见书，以便如果他们真的被抓住了这些他们希望没有人注意到的东西，因为它们非常晦涩、复杂，律师们写的意见书可以让他们在国税局来时挥舞那封信，说：“哦，天哪，我们很抱歉犯了错误，但我们是根据律师的建议这样做的，因此你们不应该评估欺诈罚款或其他任何东西。”我的意思是，他们会——我们不想把律师排除在外，查理。（笑）
We had people come to our office. Not the auditing firm that we use, I want to make that clear. But we had people come to our office from the top auditing firms with these propositions which they said we had to sign away a given percentage of the amount we saved. And then they would give us these proprietary methods, you know, which would usually involve about 20 off-shore trusts and partnerships around the world and all kinds of things.
我们有一些人来到了我们的办公室。不是我们使用的审计公司，我想要明确这一点。但是，我们有来自顶级审计公司的人员来到我们的办公室，带着这些提议，他们说我们必须签署协议，放弃我们节省金额的某个百分比。然后他们会给我们这些专有的方法，你知道，通常涉及大约 20 个离岸信托和全球各地的合伙企业以及各种各样的东西。
Many of — part of the design being to have so many entities involved so that the numbers that popped up here or there on the return, that no agent could figure out what the totality of the transaction was.
许多——设计的一部分是让如此多的实体参与其中，以至于在退税中出现的数字让任何代理都无法弄清交易的全貌。
You know, it’s — those are — the people who don’t pay taxes because of that, increase the taxes of the people in this room. So we — I applaud Pamela for her efforts on that and a lot more are needed.
你知道，那些不缴税的人因此增加了这个房间里人们的税收。所以我们——我为帕梅拉在这方面的努力鼓掌，并且还需要更多的努力。
19. “If you’re innumerate, you’re going to be a klutz”
“如果你不懂数学，你就会变得笨手笨脚”
WARREN BUFFETT: We will go to number 12, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请我们去第 12 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Johann Freudenberg (PH) from Germany.
观众成员：早上好。我的名字是约翰·弗洛伊登伯格，来自德国。
Mr. Munger, you said in a speech that scientific reality is often only revealed by math, as if math, it’s a language of God. Could you elaborate on that, and especially tell us the reason why math often reflects reality? Thank you.
芒格先生，您在演讲中说科学现实往往只有通过数学才能揭示，就好像数学是上帝的语言。您能详细说明一下吗，特别是告诉我们为什么数学经常反映现实的原因？谢谢。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s just the way it is. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：事情就是这样。（笑声）
If you — it’s as though God made the world so that only people fluent in math could understand it.
如果你——就好像上帝创造了这个世界，使得只有精通数学的人才能理解它。
I think you can handle an ordinary human activity pretty well. But if you want to understand, say, science, you can’t do it without math. That’s just the way it is. And in business, if you’re innumerate, you’re going to be a klutz.
我认为你可以很好地处理普通的人类活动。但如果你想理解，比如说，科学，没有数学是不行的。事实就是这样。而在商业中，如果你不懂数字，你就会变得笨拙。
WARREN BUFFETT: Keep talking, I’m chewing. (Laughter) We’ll go back — go ahead.
沃伦·巴菲特：继续说，我在吃东西。（笑声）我们会回来的——继续。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The good thing about business is you don’t have to know any high math.
查理·芒格：商业的好处是你不需要懂高等数学。
WARREN BUFFETT: It may be a disadvantage to know high math, Charlie.
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，懂高等数学可能是个劣势。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I think it is. Because you look for opportunities to use this marvelous, complicated tool. And by and large, that doesn’t work nearly as well as just using the simple math.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为是这样。因为你会寻找机会来使用这个奇妙而复杂的工具。总的来说，这远不如仅仅使用简单的数学来得有效。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. When my mother sang me songs about compound interest, there really wasn’t any need to go further. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当我母亲给我唱关于复利的歌时，真的没有必要再深入了。（笑声）
20. Buffett’s $10 billion Walmart mistake
巴菲特的100 亿美元沃尔玛错误
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go back to number 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：让我们回到第一点。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is David Farlow (PH) from Minnesota, Minneapolis. Thank you, Warren and Charlie.
观众成员：我的名字是大卫·法洛（PH），来自明尼苏达州，明尼阿波利斯。谢谢你，沃伦和查理。
A few minutes ago you mentioned the importance of learning from history. What have you learned from the investments you did not make over the last few years that you now regret refraining from?
几分钟前你提到了从历史中学习的重要性。对于过去几年中你没有进行的投资，你从中学到了什么，现在后悔没有参与？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the mistakes we made, and we made them — some of them big time — are of two kinds. One is when we didn’t invest at all in something that we understood that was cheap, maybe because we weren’t even working hard enough at looking at the whole list, or because, for one reason or another, we just didn’t — we didn’t take action.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们犯的错误，有些是非常严重的，主要有两种情况。一种是我们完全没有投资于我们理解且价格便宜的东西，可能是因为我们没有足够努力地查看整个清单，或者因为某种原因，我们就是没有采取行动。
And the second was starting in on something that could have been a very large investment and not maximizing it.
第二种是开始进行本可以成为非常大投资的项目，但没有最大化投资。
Charlie is a huge believer in the idea that you don’t sit around sucking your thumb when you can — when something comes along that should be done that you pour into it.
查理坚信这样一个理念：当有事情需要去做时，你不应该闲坐着无所事事，而是全力以赴地去完成。
And that’s generally what we’ve tried to do. But there have been times — and it’s usually happened when I’ve started buying something at X and it went up to X plus an eighth or some intolerable amount like that — and I quit or waited for it to come back. And we’ve missed, in some cases, billions of dollars of profit because of the fact that I’d gotten anchored, in effect, to some initial price when I could have paid more subsequently and it really was inconsequential.
这通常是我们努力去做的事情。但有时候——通常发生在我开始以 X 价格购买某物，然后价格上涨到 X 加八分之一或其他无法忍受的程度时——我就停止或等待它回落。由于我实际上被某个初始价格所固定，而实际上我本可以随后支付更多，这在某些情况下导致我们错过了数十亿美元的利润。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Do you have anything worse to confess than Walmart?
查理·芒格：你有比沃尔玛更糟糕的事情要忏悔吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, Walmart — I cost us about — it’s up to 10 billion now. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不，沃尔玛——我让我们损失了大约——现在已经达到 100 亿了。（笑声）
I cost us about 10 billion. I set out to buy 100 million shares of Walmart, pre-split, at about 23. And Charlie said it didn’t sound like the worst idea ever came up with, which is — from him, I mean, it was just ungodly praise. (Laughter)
我花了我们大约 100 亿。我计划以大约 23 的价格购买 1 亿股沃尔玛股票，未拆分。查理说这听起来不像是他听过的最糟糕的主意，这对他来说简直是天大的赞美。（笑声）
And then, you know, we bought a little and then it moved up a little bit. And I thought, “Well, you know, maybe it will come back” or what —
然后，你知道，我们买了一点，然后它涨了一点。我想，“嗯，你知道，也许它会回来”或者什么——
Who knows what I thought? I mean, you know, only my psychiatrist can tell me. And that thumb sucking, reluctance to pay a little more — the current cost is in the area of 10 billion.
谁知道我在想什么？我的意思是，你知道，只有我的精神科医生能告诉我。还有那个吮拇指，不愿多付一点——目前的成本大约是 100 亿。
And there have been other examples, too. And there will probably be more examples in the future, unfortunately.
还有其他例子。不幸的是，将来可能会有更多的例子。
But that is — that’s — on the other hand, it doesn’t bother us. I mean, you know, it’s maybe instructional to talk about it just a little and I’m glad to respond to the question.
但那是——那是——另一方面，这并不困扰我们。我的意思是，你知道，稍微谈论一下可能是有益的，我很高兴回答这个问题。
But in the end, we’re going to make a lot of mistakes at Berkshire. And we’ve made them in the past, we’ll make them in the future.
但最终，我们在伯克希尔会犯很多错误。我们过去犯过错误，将来也会犯错误。
You know, if every shot you hit in golf was a hole-in-one, it wouldn’t be — you know, the game would soon lose interest. So you have to hit a few in the woods occasionally just to make it a little more interesting.
你知道，如果你打高尔夫的每一杆都是一杆进洞，那就不会——你知道，游戏很快就会失去兴趣。所以你偶尔得把球打进树林里几次，这样才会更有趣一点。
We’ll try not to do that too often. But those will be the kind of mistakes we make. We probably won’t make the kind of mistakes — although we have — we made one with Dexter Shoe — but we probably won’t make the kind that cost us a ton of money. They’ll be much more of omission than commission, I think, you’ll find in the future.
我们会尽量避免这类事件再次发生。但这类错误是难免的。我们可能会犯类似的错误，尽管我们已经犯过一次，比如 Dexter Shoe 的事件，但我们不会再犯那种代价巨大的错误。你会发现，未来更多的是错过机会的错误，而不是错误的决策。
Charlie, you want to add any more?
查理，你还想再加点什么吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. At least we are constantly thinking about the past occasions when we blew opportunities. Since those don’t hit financial reports, the opportunities you had but didn’t accept, most people don’t bother thinking about them very much. At least that is a mistake we don’t make. We rub our own noses in our mistakes in blowing opportunities, as we just did.
查理·芒格：是的。至少我们一直在思考过去我们错失机会的情况。由于这些不会出现在财务报告中，那些你有但没有接受的机会，大多数人不会太在意。至少这是我们不会犯的错误。我们会反思自己在错失机会时犯下的错误，就像我们刚刚做的那样。
21. Very hard to find a good, honest stock advisor
很难找到一个好的、诚实的股票顾问
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第二个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren and Charlie, my name is Peter Brotchie from Beverly, Massachusetts. And I would like to thank you both for helping me become a better businessman and a better investor. Perhaps more importantly, you have created, by example, a kind of true north on the moral compass for me to steer by.
观众成员：沃伦和查理，我的名字是彼得·布罗奇，来自马萨诸塞州的贝弗利。我想感谢你们两位帮助我成为一个更好的商人和投资者。也许更重要的是，你们通过榜样为我在道德指南针上创造了一种真正的北极星。
While the education has been fantastic, I have found that the demands of owning a successful business and having a large family do not leave time to apply the research stance I have become so wonderfully accustomed to by being a member of this cult.
尽管教育非常出色，但我发现拥有一家成功的企业和拥有大家庭的要求并没有留下时间去应用我作为这个“教派”成员而习惯的研究态度。
Please imagine, for a moment, that you are 30 years younger, and have only —
请想象一下，你年轻了 30 岁，并且只有——
WARREN BUFFETT: I like him.
沃伦·巴菲特：我喜欢他。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — a few holes left in your investment punch card. If you were in my situation, to the extent that you would diversify your holdings beyond Berkshire Hathaway, given this environment, how would you choose the investment managers? Or as Charlie has just discussed when addressing foundations, would you hunt for two more great companies to invest in via common stocks?
观众成员：——在您的投资打卡中还剩下几个空位。如果您处于我的情况，在这种环境下，您会在伯克希尔·哈撒韦之外多元化您的持股，您会如何选择投资经理，或者正如查理在谈到基金会时所讨论的那样，您会再寻找两个伟大的公司通过普通股票进行投资吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, why don’t you take a swing at that?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你为什么不试试呢？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course you’re hunting, that’s part of the fun of life. And — but I would say that the chief lesson would be that you’re unlikely to find very many in a whole lifetime. And when you find one in which you really have thought it out and have confidence, for God’s sakes, don’t do it in a niggardly fashion.
查理·芒格：当然，你在寻找，这是生活乐趣的一部分。但是，我想说主要的教训是，在一生中你不太可能找到很多这样的机会。当你找到一个你真正深思熟虑并有信心的机会时，千万不要吝啬。
The idea that very smart people with investment skills should have hugely diversified portfolios is madness. It’s a very conventional madness. And it’s taught in all the business schools. But they’re wrong. (Applause)
非常聪明且具备投资技能的人应该拥有高度多元化投资组合的想法是疯狂的。这是一种非常传统的疯狂。而且所有商学院都在教授这种理念。但他们是错的。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: The question of finding other advisers is a tough one. I mean, when I wound up my partnership in 19 — at the end of 1969 — and I had all these partners that had counted on me and I was going to mail them back a lot of money, you know, I felt an obligation to at least suggest some alternatives for them.
沃伦·巴菲特：寻找其他顾问的问题是一个棘手的问题。我的意思是，当我在 1969 年底结束合伙关系时，我有很多依赖我的合伙人，我要把很多钱寄回给他们，你知道，我觉得有义务至少为他们建议一些替代方案。
And I recommended two people who I knew were exceptionally good and exceptionally honest. We put one of them on the board not long ago and reaffirmed it today — Sandy Gottesman. The other one was Bill Ruane.
我推荐了两个人，他们都非常优秀且非常诚实。我们不久前让其中一位加入了董事会，并在今天再次确认了这一点——桑迪·戈特斯曼。另一个是比尔·鲁安。
Now, I’d been around the investment world for a long time at that point, and those were the two I knew, but they were more or less contemporaries of mine. And I’d gotten to know them over the years and I’d seen them for a long time.
当时，我在投资界已经待了很长时间，那两个人是我认识的，但他们或多或少是我的同龄人。多年来我逐渐了解了他们，并且认识他们很长时间了。
So I not only knew their results, but I knew how they’d accomplished their results, which is terribly important. I don’t know that generation of managers now. But the fact that, with the number of people I knew, that I could only come up with two, at a time when I was very active, says something about the difficulties of finding managers.
所以我不仅知道他们的结果，还知道他们是如何取得这些结果的，这非常重要。我现在不认识那一代的经理。但事实上，以我认识的人数来看，我当时非常活跃，却只能想到两个人，这说明了找到经理的困难。
The one thing I can almost guarantee to you is that the promotional types going around to solicit the institutional investors are very unlikely to meet any long-term tests of ability, and sometimes, integrity.
我几乎可以向你保证的是，那些到处游说机构投资者的推销类型很难通过任何长期能力测试，有时甚至是诚信测试。
It’s not an easy job spotting an investor. I think it’s probably easier, depending on the amount of time — you know, you mention having children and a business and the amount of time you can spend on. Every now and then you do — if you’re conscious of the investment world and you have some kind of sort of grounding knowledge about what’s going on, and you can see something, you know, as we did in junk bonds a couple of years ago, or as we did with all kinds of things, some years back, when stocks were cheaper.
识别投资者并不是一件容易的事。我认为这可能会更容易，取决于时间的多少——你知道，你提到有孩子和一份工作，以及你能投入的时间。时不时地，如果你对投资世界有意识，并且对正在发生的事情有某种基础知识，你就能看到一些东西，比如我们几年前在垃圾债券中所做的，或者我们在几年前股票便宜时所做的各种事情。
You will occasionally see something that you should load up on. And, as Charlie says, that’s what you really have to do. I mean, some of the people in this room loaded up on Berkshire many years ago. And the truth was, they didn’t need diversification, you know. I loaded up on it. Charlie did. And you’ll see opportunities occasionally but you’re not going to see them every day or every week.
有时候你会看到一些你应该大量投资的东西。正如查理所说，那就是你真正需要做的。我是说，这个房间里的一些人多年前就大量投资了伯克希尔。事实是，他们不需要多元化，你知道的。我大量投资了，查理也是。你偶尔会看到机会，但你不会每天或每周都看到。
If you think you’re going to see an opportunity every week, you’re going to lose a lot of money because people will come around and tell you that they’ve got them, and they may not be quite as flagrant as that fellow we had in the movie — (laughs) — but they’re a version of them.
如果你认为每周都会看到一个机会，你会损失很多钱，因为人们会过来告诉你他们有机会，而他们可能不像我们电影中那个人那么明显——（笑）——但他们是那种人的一个版本。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: The business of selecting investment managers was recently shown to be even harder than I had previously thought it was. A significant fraction of the institutional investment managers who run the nation’s mutual funds actually accepted propositions to take bribes for betraying their own shareholders.
查理·芒格：选择投资经理的工作最近被证明比我之前认为的更难。实际上，管理国家共同基金的机构投资经理中有相当一部分接受了贿赂提议，以背叛他们自己的股东。
It was as if a man came to you and said, “I have a wonderful proposition. Why don’t I kill your mother and we’ll split the insurance money?” And it was that ridiculous. And yet, a significant number of the people said, “Gee, I would like some insurance money.” And they just went right ahead.
就好像一个人来到你面前说：“我有一个绝妙的提议。为什么我不杀了你的母亲，然后我们平分保险金呢？”这真是荒谬至极。然而，还是有相当多的人说：“哎，我倒是想要一些保险金。”然后他们就这样继续下去了。
WARREN BUFFETT: And they were already rich beforehand.
沃伦·巴菲特：而且他们之前已经很富有了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. And they’ve destroyed themselves, many of them, by making this insane decision. And I think many of them will probably think the outcome is unjust.
查理·芒格：是的。他们中的许多人通过做出这个疯狂的决定而自我毁灭。我认为他们中的许多人可能会认为结果是不公正的。
WARREN BUFFETT: And the —
沃伦·巴菲特：还有——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I mean the downfall they’ve had.
查理·芒格：我是说他们经历的衰落。
WARREN BUFFETT: And the interesting thing about it, of course, is that here is a huge industry that — where the people who weren’t doing it have a great interest in having that reputation of the industry not get stained. And a number of them had to know what was going on.
沃伦·巴菲特：当然，有趣的是，这里有一个庞大的行业——那些没有参与其中的人非常关心这个行业的声誉不被玷污。而且他们中的一些人一定知道发生了什么。
I mean, this was — I don’t — it’s hard for me to imagine that people at most large mutual funds, even the ones that didn’t — that are mutual fund management companies — even the ones that weren’t engaging in the activities mentioned weren’t aware of it. I mean, you just — if you’re in an industry like that, you’re going to hear what’s going on.
我的意思是，我不——我很难想象大多数大型共同基金的人，即使是那些没有——那些是共同基金管理公司的人——即使是那些没有参与所提到活动的人也不知道这件事。我的意思是，你只要——如果你在那样的行业中，你就会听到正在发生的事情。
And the Investment Company Institute was busy patting itself on the back, you know, at one meeting after another and becoming very cozy with legislators.
投资公司协会忙于自我表扬，你知道的，在一次又一次的会议上，并与立法者变得非常亲密。
And there wasn’t one thing done until a whistleblower when to [New York State Attorney General] Eliot Spitzer and he got active in a very strong way with a very limited staff.
直到一名举报者去找[纽约州总检察长]埃利奥特·斯皮策，他才在人员非常有限的情况下积极采取了强有力的行动。
And he uncovered, and put on the front pages, what was taking place. But the industry itself, with hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of people that most have known what was going on — and it went on for a long time. Never said a word. It’s — you know, it makes you wonder a little bit.
他揭露了正在发生的事情，并把它放在头版。但这个行业本身，有成百上千的人，大多数人都知道发生了什么——而且这种情况持续了很长时间。却从未说过一句话。这让你有点怀疑。
22. Asset allocation models are “pure nonsense”
资产配置模型是“纯粹的胡说八道”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3?
沃伦·巴菲特：第三名？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Bob Klein (PH) from Los Angeles.
观众成员：嗨，我是来自洛杉矶的鲍勃·克莱因。
You’ve touched on the issue of asset allocation — capital allocation — in response to previous questions. But I wonder if you could elaborate from a risk management perspective. Wall Street and financial planning firms charge a lot of money for their asset allocation models, say, 50 percent stocks, 40 percent bonds, et cetera.
您已经在回答之前的问题时提到了资产配置——资本配置的问题。但我想知道您是否可以从风险管理的角度详细说明。华尔街和财务规划公司对他们的资产配置模型收费很高，比如，50%股票，40%债券，等等。
I know you take a more opportunistic approach to building your portfolio and managing risk, as you mentioned by — as you illustrated — by your junk bond example.
我知道你在建立投资组合和管理风险时采取更具机会主义的方法，正如你通过垃圾债券的例子所说明的那样。
And so I just want you to hammer out how you use price and value as a tool of risk management and asset allocation as opposed to coming at it with a pre-conceived idea of how much should be allocated to each asset class.
所以我只是想让你阐明如何将价格和价值用作风险管理和资产配置的工具，而不是带着对每个资产类别应该分配多少的先入为主的想法来处理这个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we think the best way to minimize risk is to think. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们认为降低风险的最佳方式是思考。（笑声）
And the idea that you have — you know, you say, “I’ve got 60 percent in stocks and 40 percent in bonds,” and then have a big announcement, now we’re moving it to 65/35, as some strategists or whatever they call them in Wall Street do.
你有这样的想法——你知道，你说，“我有 60%的股票和 40%的债券”，然后有一个重大宣布，现在我们将其调整为 65/35，就像华尔街的一些策略师或他们称之为的那样。
I mean, that has to be pure nonsense. I mean, 60/40 or 65/30 — it just doesn’t make any sense.
我的意思是，那纯粹是胡说八道。我的意思是，60/40 或 65/30 —— 这根本没有任何意义。
What you ought to do is have — your default position is always short-term instruments. And whenever you see anything intelligent to do, you should do it. And you shouldn’t be trying to match up with some goal like that.
你应该做的是——你的默认立场总是短期工具。每当你看到有任何明智的事情可以做时，你就应该去做。而且你不应该试图去迎合某个目标。
I found it entertaining — I was just reading yesterday in an article, I think it was, about the two fellows at Google and all of the problems they’re going to have because they’re each going to get a few billion dollars. I mean, it was — I want to send a sympathy card. I almost went down to Hallmark store because this article went on — they’ve got this terrible problem and that terrible problem and they’re going to need lawyers, and they’re going to need financial — they don’t need anybody.
我发现这很有趣——我昨天在一篇文章中阅读到，关于谷歌的两位男士，他们将面临所有这些问题，因为他们每人都会得到几亿美元。我的意思是——我想寄一张同情卡。我几乎要去霍尔马克（Hallmark）商店，因为这篇文章提到——他们面临着可怕的问题，还有那些可怕的问题，他们需要律师，他们需要财务顾问——他们根本不需要任何人。
Those guys are smarter than the people that are coming to them. And they do not have a big problem, and they are very capable of thinking it through themselves.
那些家伙比来找他们的人聪明得多。他们并没有什么大问题，而且他们非常有能力自己理清思路。
The people that have the problem are the people who want to sell their services to them and are going to have to convince them that they have a problem.
有问题的人是那些想要向他们出售服务的人，并且必须说服他们自己有问题。
But so much of what you see when you talk about asset allocation — it’s just merchandising. It’s a way to make you think that if you don’t know how to determine whether it should be 60/40 or 65/35, that you need these people. And you don’t need them at all in investing.
但是，当你谈论资产配置时，你所看到的很多东西——这只是营销。这是一种让你觉得如果你不知道应该是 60/40 还是 65/35，你就需要这些人的方式。而在投资中，你根本不需要他们。
Most of the professionals that tell you that you’re going to get in great trouble unless you listen to them and sign up for their services, you know, they’re good at selling, but —
大多数专业人士告诉你，如果不听他们的话并注册他们的服务，你会遇到大麻烦，你知道，他们很擅长推销，但——
It’s what my brother-in-law — former brother-in-law — that worked at the stockyards used to say was that people would bring in cattle or something. And I’d say to him, you know, “How do get the farmer to employ you to sell to Swift or Armour or Cudahy instead of the guy right next to you. I mean, you know, a cow is a cow and Armour’s going to buy it the same way.”
这是我姐夫——前姐夫——在牲畜市场工作时常说的话，人们会带来牛或其他东西。我会对他说，“你怎么让农民雇你去卖给 Swift、Armour 或 Cudahy，而不是旁边的那个人。我是说，你知道，牛就是牛，Armour 会以同样的方式买下它。”
And he gave me this disgusted look and he said, “Warren, it’s not how you sell them, it’s how you tell them.” Well, there’s a lot of that in Wall Street.
他用一种厌恶的表情看着我，说：“沃伦，关键不是你怎么卖，而是你怎么说。”华尔街有很多这样的情况。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, people have always had this craving to know the future. You know, the king used to hire the magician or the forecaster and he’d look in sheep guts or something for an answer as to how to handle the next war. And so there’s always been a market for people who purported to know the future based on their expertise.
查理·芒格：是的，人们总是渴望知道未来。你知道，国王过去常常雇佣魔法师或预言家，他们会通过观察羊的内脏或其他东西来寻找如何处理下一场战争的答案。因此，总是有市场给那些声称根据他们的专业知识了解未来的人。
And there’s a lot of that still going on. It’s just as crazy as when the king was hiring the forecaster who looked at the sheep guts.
而这样的事情仍然在发生。这就像国王雇用观察羊内脏的预言家时一样疯狂。
And people have an economic incentive to sell some nostrum. It can be sold over and over and over again.
人们有经济动机去出售一些秘方。它可以一卖再卖。
The really interesting figures are when you combine the underperformance of the market, say, by the mutual fund industry, which is probably a couple of points per annum. And that understates it.
真正有趣的数字是，当你把共同基金业的市场表现不佳（比如说，每年可能只有几个百分点）结合起来时。而这是低估了。
Now, if you take all of the investors in the mutual funds who are constantly whipsawing from one fund to another by a bunch of brokers who want commissions, now you take a sub-normal performance and it goes on another three or four percentages points due to the shuffling of the mutual fund investments.
现在，如果你把所有在共同基金中不断被一群想要佣金的经纪人从一个基金转到另一个基金的投资者考虑在内，那么由于共同基金投资的频繁变动，表现会比正常水平再低三到四个百分点。
So the poor guy in the general public is getting a terrible result from contacting the experts. And these guys are hitting the Scout troop and the Community Chest drive and are locally reputable people.
所以，普通公众因联系这些专家而得到的结果非常糟糕。这些家伙正在为童子军和社区募捐活动捐款，并且是当地声誉良好的人。
I think it’s disgusting. It’s much better to make a living by being part of system that delivers value to the people who are buying the product. But nobody refrains from creating gambling casinos or something, on my theory.
我认为这很恶心。通过成为一个向购买产品的人提供价值的系统的一部分来谋生要好得多。但根据我的理论，没有人会因此而避免创建赌场或类似的东西。
If it’ll work to make money, why, we tend to do it in this country.
如果它能赚钱，为什么我们在这个国家倾向于这样做。
23. Workers’ compensation insurance fraud
工伤赔偿保险欺诈
WARREN BUFFETT: Microphone 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：麦克风 4。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Steven West and I am a framed art manufacturer in Morganton, North Carolina.
观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是史蒂文·韦斯特，我是北卡罗来纳州摩根顿的一名装裱艺术品制造商。
I feel especially tied to Berkshire Hathaway as I am both a vendor to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Star Furniture, and RC Willey, and also a customer of Larson Jewel.
我对伯克希尔·哈撒韦特别有感情，因为我既是内布拉斯加家具市场、星家具和 RC Willey 的供应商，也是 Larson Jewel 的客户。
My question relates to workers’ compensation fraud being committed by workers’ compensation carriers on manufacturers such as myself, a scandal which I believe is far greater than the scandals that have been mentioned heretofore at this meeting.
我的问题涉及工伤赔偿保险公司对像我这样的制造商进行的工伤赔偿欺诈，我认为这一丑闻远比在本次会议上提到的丑闻更为严重。
As an example, in 1998, when I was trying to figure out why my experience mods were going way out of whack, I received a loss run and I believe, mistakenly, also a check run from my insurance carrier.
举个例子，1998年，当我试图弄清楚为什么我的经验修正系数（experience mods）大幅上升时，我从我的保险承保商那里收到了损失报告，我认为这也是错误地收到了支票报告。
It was shocking. Four losses for $152,000 they claimed to the state of North Carolina actually amounted to less than $6,000. And one claim, which they claim they spent $70,072 on, they actually only spent $86.88.
这令人震惊。他们向北卡罗来纳州申报的四项损失金额为 152,000 美元，实际上不到 6,000 美元。其中一项声称花费了 70,072 美元，实际上只花了 86.88 美元。
Now naturally, this threw my company into the high-risk pool. It’s cost me hundreds of thousands of dollars.
现在自然地，这使我的公司进入了高风险池。这让我损失了数十万美元。
And my question is, are they trying to pull the same stunt on Berkshire Hathaway companies, especially in labor intensive operations, such as Dairy Queen. Because I have not, in the intervening years, been able to get one single copy of a negotiated check out of these insurance company. They will not give it up, even under subpoena, and their behavior is entirely consistent with criminal fraud.
我的问题是，他们是否试图对伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司耍同样的花招，特别是在劳动密集型业务中，比如冰雪皇后。因为在这几年间，我无法从这些保险公司获得一份谈判支票的副本。即使在传票下，他们也不愿交出，而他们的行为完全符合刑事欺诈。
Now, my question relating to the Berkshire Hathaway problems — or companies — is, are your managers attuned to this and are they receiving the actual copies of the negotiated checks that the insurance companies claim that they’re spending to settle workers’ compensation injury cases? Thank you.
现在，我关于伯克希尔哈撒韦问题或公司的问题是，你们的经理是否注意到这一点，他们是否收到了保险公司声称用于解决工伤赔偿案件的协商支票的实际副本？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yup. Well, I would say that there’s plenty of fraud in various aspects of insurance.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我会说保险的各个方面都有很多欺诈行为。
In auto insurance, for example, I mean, obviously, we have fraud units, but I know you’re directing your question more to the insurance carriers than actually what takes place with policy holders and doctors and lawyers and various other parties.
在汽车保险方面，我的意思是，显然我们有反欺诈部门，但我知道你的问题更多是针对保险公司，而不是实际发生在保单持有人、医生、律师和其他各方之间的事情。
But we find that for every dollar we spend on fraud prevention or detection, I think we get back well over $10.
但是我们发现，每花一美元在防止或检测欺诈上，我认为我们能收回超过 10 美元。
In the comp field, workers comp, you know — we have lost more money in workers’ compensation insurance, I would guess — I may be wrong on this, but I would guess than just about any line.
在工伤领域，工人赔偿，你知道——我猜我们在工人赔偿保险上损失的钱比几乎任何其他领域都多——我可能会错，但我猜是这样。
Not necessarily as a percentage of premiums, but in terms of aggregate dollars. It’s been a very tough period.
不一定是以保费的百分比来计算，而是以总金额来衡量。这是一个非常艰难的时期。
So from the standpoint of — we have one small workers’ compensation direct operation in California called Cypress. And then Gen Re had — has written a lot of workers’ comp reinsurance and it’s been a bit of a blood bath. The rates have not covered the losses.
因此，从——我们的一个小型工人赔偿直接运营在加利福尼亚，叫做 Cypress。然后，通用再保险公司写了很多工人赔偿再保险，这有点像一场血战。费率没有覆盖损失。
And I would say that there is a fair amount of fraud that enters into the losses we’ve experienced, or at least the industry’s experienced, particularly at the direct level.
我会说，我们或至少整个行业所经历的损失中，有相当一部分是由于欺诈造成的，特别是在直接层面。
But I — in terms of your dispute with an insurance company, I don’t know what company that would be, but I would say that most — many companies that have been in the workers’ compensation business, particularly in California in recent years, wish they hadn’t been in the business. I mean, they have not been making a lot of money off of defrauding policy holders that I know about.
但就你与保险公司的纠纷而言，我不知道那会是哪家公司，但我想说，大多数——许多近年来在加州从事工伤赔偿业务的公司，希望他们没有从事这项业务。我的意思是，据我所知，他们并没有通过欺诈保单持有人赚很多钱。
But Charlie, do you have anything to say on that?
但是查理，你对此有什么要说的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the experience may be related. If a company gets into a lot of trouble from fraud practiced on it by lawyers, doctors, and claimants, and its own affairs are disrupted by fear and agony, that company is likely to start behaving badly with its own policy holders in order to lay the troubles off on somebody. I think that’s just human nature.
查理·芒格：嗯，这种经历可能是相关的。如果一家公司因为律师、医生和索赔人对其进行的欺诈而陷入困境，并且由于恐惧和痛苦而导致自身事务受到干扰，那么该公司很可能会开始对自己的保单持有人表现不佳，以便将麻烦转嫁给其他人。我认为这只是人性。
But I don’t think the main fraud in workman’s comp is by the carriers against the small businessmen. It’s by the claimants, the attorneys, and the doctors, against the whole system. (Applause)
但我认为工伤赔偿中的主要欺诈行为并不是保险公司对小企业主的欺诈，而是索赔人、律师和医生对整个系统的欺诈。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: That really would be our experience.
沃伦·巴菲特：那确实是我们的经验。
As a sidelight, I noticed you were from Morganton, North Carolina. We have a business there, Carolina Shoe. We make work boots. And I give a talk at University of North Carolina some time ago. In fact, I think they have a tape of it still.
顺便提一下，我注意到你来自北卡罗来纳州的摩根顿。我们在那里有一家企业，Carolina Shoe。我们生产工作靴。我曾在北卡罗来纳大学做过一次演讲。事实上，我想他们现在还有那次演讲的录音。
And afterwards — I had mentioned in the talk that we had this business in Morganton. And one of students came up to me afterwards. And there were a number of them, and I shook his hand and, making idle conversation, I said, “Where are you from?” And he said, “I’m from Morganton.”
之后——我在演讲中提到我们在摩根顿有这个业务。之后有一个学生走到我面前。有好几个学生，我和他握手，闲聊时我问道：“你来自哪里？”他说：“我来自摩根顿。”
And I said, “Oh,” I said, “Do you know Carolina Shoe?” And he thought a second, he said, “I don’t know her, but I think I know her family.” (Laughter)
我说：“哦，”我说，“你认识卡罗莱纳·舒吗？”他想了一下，说：“我不认识她，但我想我认识她的家人。”（笑声）
Never forgotten that fellow.
从未忘记那个家伙。
24. Utility law repeal would help MidAmerican, but no bonanza
公用事业法废除将有助于 MidAmerican，但不会带来意外之财
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：第五位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. Andrew Sole from New York City.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自纽约市的安德鲁·索尔。
I just want to preface my question by saying that I have a deep admiration and affection for both of you men. And in that spirit, I had got a Golden Retriever puppy a few months ago, and he’s been proudly named “Munger.”
我想先说一下，我对你们两位男士都怀有深深的敬意和喜爱。正是在这种精神下，几个月前我养了一只金毛猎犬幼犬，并自豪地给他取名为“芒格”。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is he housebroken? (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他会在家里乖乖的吗？（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And Charlie, you’d be very proud. He’s just like you. I bring him to Central Park and hundreds of women flock over to pet him.
观众成员：查理，你会感到非常自豪。他就像你一样。我带他去中央公园，成百上千的女人都过来抚摸他。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Really? 查理·芒格：真的吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s well-named. He’s well named. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他的名字取得很好。他的名字取得很好。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That’s serious, but this is also serious.
观众成员：这是真的，但我的问题也很重要。
My question has to do with the Public Utility Holdings Company Act, which obviously affects MidAmerica’s businesses.
我的问题与公共事业控股公司法案（PUHCA）有关，这显然会影响到MidAmerican的业务。
You’ve spoken that, if it were repealed, you’d be able to commit billions of dollars into the energy infrastructure for the country.
你曾说过，如果它被废除，你将能够投入数十亿美元用于国家的能源基础设施。
And despite the fact that there was a massive blackout in this country over the last summer, the act has not been repealed. And I’m curious as to what effect it might have if PUHCA wasn’t repealed for MidAmerica.
尽管去年夏天在这个国家发生了大规模停电，但该法案并没有被废除。我很好奇，如果PUHCA没有被废除，将对MidAmerican产生什么影响。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The Public Utility Holding Company Act was passed in 1935. It was a reaction, and a justified reaction, to some real wild antics that had taken place in the ’20s in the public utility field that were most dramatic in the case of Sam Insull, but occurred with a lot of other companies, Associated Gas and Electric and various other companies.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。《公共事业控股公司法》于 1935 年通过。这是对 20 年代公共事业领域发生的一些非常疯狂的行为的反应，也是合理的反应，这些行为在萨姆·因苏尔的案例中最为显著，但也发生在许多其他公司，如联合燃气电力公司和其他各种公司。
And there was pyramiding of the utility capital structure. And there were a lot of things that were wrong that were addressed in that act. And in our view, that act is long outmoded. And I think that — I mean, the SEC, which has responsibility for administering it, I think there’s a lot of feeling there that it’s long been unneeded.
公用事业资本结构存在金字塔式的累积。该法案解决了许多错误的问题。在我们看来，该法案早已过时。我认为，负责执行该法案的美国证券交易委员会（SEC）内部也有很多人觉得它早已不再需要。
And I think that there’ve been various energy bills that have included the repeal of it. But there was no energy bill passed in the last year. So we live with the Public Utility Holding Company Act. And it does restrict what we do.
我认为有各种能源法案包括废除它。但去年没有通过任何能源法案。所以我们仍然受《公共事业控股公司法》的约束。它确实限制了我们的行动。
It’s an interesting question, though, if it were repealed, whether that necessarily would open up lots of opportunities. Because if it were repealed, it’s quite conceivable that a number of other companies would also be competing with us, in terms of possibly buying utilities that might have been difficult for us to acquire, or for them to acquire, back when the law was in existence.
这是一个有趣的问题，不过，如果它被废除，是否一定会带来很多机会。因为如果它被废除，很可能会有许多其他公司也与我们竞争，可能会购买一些在法律存在时我们或他们难以获得的公用事业。
So I don’t want you to think that, if it gets repealed, that Berkshire Hathaway is necessarily worth a lot more money.
所以我不希望你认为，如果它被废除，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的价值就一定会大幅增加。
But I do think it should be — I mean, I think it’s logical. It’s — there are lots of — there’s plenty of appropriate regulation in the public utility field and there are advantages to having strong companies like Berkshire Hathaway pouring money — energy requires enormous sums of money. And to the extent we can use capital advantageously in that business, we’re ready to do it. And it should not be impeded by the act.
但我确实认为这应该是——我的意思是，我认为这是合乎逻辑的。在公共事业领域有很多适当的监管，并且有像伯克希尔·哈撒韦这样强大的公司投入资金的优势——能源需要巨额资金。我们可以在这个行业中有利地使用资本，我们已经准备好这样做。而且不应该被该法案阻碍。
If I had to bet, that act will probably go off the books at some time. But it doesn’t seem to be, you know, in the immediate future. It will not necessarily mean we get a lot richer.
如果让我打赌，那项法案可能会在某个时候被废除。但似乎不会在不久的将来发生。这并不一定意味着我们会变得更富有。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but if we had a wonderful opportunity in the field now, we would find a way to do it. Probably through MidAmerican, right?
查理·芒格：是的，但如果我们现在在这个领域有一个很好的机会，我们会找到办法去做。可能通过MidAmerican，对吧？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’d find a way to do it. Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们会找到办法的。是的。
There’s been nothing that’s been presented to us that we couldn’t get done so far. Now it might involve a more awkward structure, but we have not — you know, there’s been nothing that we wish we could have done and when we got to the finish line, or a yard from the finish line, we said, “Well, we can’t do this because of the Public Utility Holding Company Act.”
到目前为止，还没有什么事情是我们无法完成的。现在可能涉及一个更尴尬的结构，但我们没有——你知道，没有什么是我们希望能做到的，当我们到达终点线，或者离终点线还有一码时，我们说：“好吧，我们不能因为公共事业控股公司法而做这件事。”
Now, there might have been other things presented if that act hadn’t been on the books.
现在，如果那项法案没有被记录在案，可能会有其他事情被提出。
But it will be no bonanza for us at all if it goes away. It may make life simpler on some very large transaction.
但如果它消失了，对我们来说根本不会是一个意外之财。它可能会使一些非常大的交易变得更简单。
25. Berkshire real estate business will grow
伯克希尔房地产业务将会增长
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7? I’m sorry, number 6. I skipped 6. Number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 个？对不起，第 6 个。我跳过了 6。第 6 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Andy Lewis Charles from Miami. I think I speak for everyone when I wish both of you gentleman continued health. I would wish you continued wealth, but I think you have that covered.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自迈阿密的安迪·刘易斯·查尔斯。我想我代表大家祝愿你们两位先生身体健康。我本想祝愿你们财富持续，但我想你们已经不缺这个了。
WARREN BUFFETT: We could use more. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们可以更多。（笑声）
Of each. 每个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Speaking of MidAmerican Energy, a unit company underneath it, HomeServices, I see as a great opportunity. I would love to see and hear your thoughts about the future growth potential for it, especially against large consolidators like Cendant Corporation. Thank you.
观众成员：说到 MidAmerican Energy，其下属公司 HomeServices，我认为这是一个很好的机会。我很想了解您对其未来增长潜力的看法，特别是与像 Cendant Corporation 这样的大型整合商相比。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, HomeServices will grow. HomeServices, as you know, owns a number — I can’t recall how many, but probably in the area of 15 or 16 maybe — controls a number of local real estate firms. And they retain all of their local identity.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，HomeServices 会增长。正如你所知，HomeServices 拥有一些——我记不清具体多少，但可能在 15 或 16 家左右——控制了一些本地房地产公司。而且它们保留了所有的本地身份。
In that way, it’s somewhat akin to the whole Berkshire Hathaway model, where we leave our subsidiary companies quite autonomous and they operate as if they were — the managers operate as if they own them themselves.
这样一来，这有点类似于整个伯克希尔·哈撒韦的模式，我们让子公司相当自主地运作，经理们就像他们自己拥有这些公司一样进行管理。
Well, HomeServices is somewhat along the same line in that we have no national identity, where Cendant works under a couple of big names.
好吧，HomeServices在这方面也是类似，我们没有全国性的身份，而Cendant则在几个大品牌名下运作。
We’ve acquired one company in North Carolina here in the last month or 6 weeks, Prudential of North Carolina. And we will end up — unquestionably, in my view — we’ll end up buying either a few or a whole lot of additional companies over the next 10 years.
在过去一个月或六周内，我们在北卡罗来纳州收购了一家公司，北卡罗来纳州的 Prudential 公司。毫无疑问，在我看来，在未来十年内，我们最终会收购一些或大量的其他公司。
We will — we’ve got great management. We like the business. We hear about opportunities from time to time.
我们会——我们有出色的管理。我们喜欢这个业务。我们时不时会听到一些机会。
Last year, you know, we participated in roughly $50 billion of transactions. And I think — I’m really vague on this one, but — I better not give you a percentage of the national total that is, but it’s a very small percentage. It’s a lot of transactions, a couple hundred-thousand transactions.
去年，你知道，我们参与了大约 500 亿美元的交易。我想——我对这个数字不是很确定，但——我最好不要给你一个全国总额的百分比，但这是一个非常小的百分比。这是很多交易，几十万笔交易。
We’re very big in Southern California, for example. We’re very big in Minnesota. We’re very big in Iowa. Very big right here in Omaha and in Lincoln. But there’s an awful lot of places where we aren’t at all.
我们在南加州非常受欢迎，比如说。我们在明尼苏达州非常受欢迎。我们在爱荷华州非常受欢迎。在奥马哈和林肯这里也非常受欢迎。但是，还有很多地方我们根本没有涉足。
We like to buy leading firms as we go around. And we sometimes like to buy more than one in a community.
我们喜欢在各地收购领先公司。有时我们还喜欢在一个社区中收购不止一家。
It’s a good business. It’s a very cyclical business. Right now, it’s very good. We will go through periods in the next five years. I’m sure we’ll go through a period where it’s very slow. But we’ll keep buying. We’ll buy when business is slow, we’ll buy when business is good, depending on the price of the institution and the kind of business we’re buying.
这是一个好生意。这是一个非常周期性的生意。现在，它非常好。我们将在未来五年经历一些时期。我确信我们会经历一个非常缓慢的时期。但我们会继续购买。我们会在生意缓慢时购买，也会在生意好时购买，这取决于机构的价格和我们购买的业务类型。
I don’t know how big it can become. It will become bigger than it is now. Relative to Berkshire’s total market value, it may not be that — a huge factor. But it’s conceivable as we buy more operations, we’ll find other things to do with them, too.
我不知道它能变得多大。它会比现在更大。相对于伯克希尔的总市值，它可能不是一个巨大的因素。但可以想象的是，随着我们购买更多的业务，我们也会找到其他事情来做。
I mean, the purchase of a home is a big deal to people. You know, often they’re buying furniture at the same time and maybe we can make a suggestion or two.
我的意思是，买房对人们来说是一件大事。你知道，他们通常会同时购买家具，也许我们可以提出一两个建议。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add about that business.
查理·芒格：关于这个业务，我没有什么要补充的。
26. Charity program reluctantly dropped after anti-abortion boycott
慈善项目在反堕胎抵制后被迫取消
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Jim Hayes (PH) from Alexandria, Virginia.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自弗吉尼亚州亚历山大市的吉姆·海斯。
I hate to beat a dead horse, but I really like the charitable plan. Suppose you brought it back and then personally opted out and then we floated you a bonus equal to what you might otherwise be entitled. Would you consider that?
我不想再重复一个已经死去的马，但我真的很喜欢这个慈善计划。假设您将其恢复，然后个人选择退出，然后我们给您提供一个奖金，等于您可能原本应得的金额。您会考虑这样做吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Are you talking about renewing the shareholder-designated contribution program?
沃伦·巴菲特：你是在谈论续签股东指定捐赠计划吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. And then personally opting out, and then we could have a shareholders’ vote to grant you an option bonus or some kind of tax-advantaged bonus.
观众成员：是的。然后个人选择退出，然后我们可以进行股东投票，授予您期权奖金或某种税收优惠奖金。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think that might get a little complicated.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为这可能会有点复杂。
Additionally, I wasn’t the only one giving money at all, nor was Charlie, to organizations, primarily pro-choice organizations, in fact over — I don’t know of any other than pro-choice organizations — that the people that were causing harm to the Pampered Chef representatives. We had dozens and dozens, maybe even hundreds, giving money on both sides of the issue.
此外，我并不是唯一向某些组织捐款的人，查理也不是。事实上，我们主要是向一些支持堕胎的组织捐款，实际上——我不知道还有其他什么组织——那些导致对Pampered Chef代表造成伤害的人。我们有几十甚至上百人在这个问题的双方捐款。
I mean, if you looked at one class — well, the largest classification of gifts went to churches. Probably the largest classification in that, I’m (inaudible) positive, were Catholic churches.
我的意思是，如果你看一个类别——嗯，最大的捐款分类是给教堂的。我（听不清）肯定，其中最大的分类可能是天主教堂。
And we had people giving money to everything in the world, which is exactly the way we wanted it. I mean, whatever — it’s the shareholders’ money.
我们让人们把钱捐给世界上的一切，这正是我们想要的。我的意思是，不管怎样——这是股东的钱。
So even if you had the two of us opt out, we would have organizations that would get violent about the fact that some money was going to pro-choice organizations. And rather than take it out on us, whom they can’t hurt, they’ve taken it out on some very innocent people.
所以即使我们两个人选择退出，我们也会有一些组织因为资金流向支持堕胎权的组织而变得暴力。与其对我们下手，他们伤害不了我们，他们却对一些非常无辜的人下手。
And neither Charlie nor I like the idea of somebody — you know, some woman that’s developed a living, you know, in Dubuque, Iowa or in Casper, Wyoming, having her livelihood destroyed because of what we’re doing.
查理和我都不喜欢这样的想法——你知道，有些在爱荷华州迪比克或怀俄明州卡斯珀生活的女性，因为我们所做的事情而生计被毁。
So reluctantly, we gave up the practice. I mean, we — actually, I received a letter one time from somebody — some organization was monitoring — said they didn’t give — they didn’t care if we were giving $10 million to pro-life organizations and $1 to pro-choice organizations, they were still going to boycott our people.
所以我们不情愿地放弃了这个做法。我的意思是，我们——实际上，我曾经收到过一封信，来自某个组织，他们在监控——说他们不在乎我们是否给了反堕胎组织一千万美元，而给了支持堕胎权组织一美元，他们仍然会抵制我们的人。
Well, boycotts don’t bother me. We had some of that right along, always on a small scale. But — because they can’t — they basically can’t hurt us in any significant way.
好吧，抵制对我来说无所谓。我们一直都有一些这样的情况，规模总是很小。但是——因为他们不能——他们基本上无法以任何显著的方式伤害我们。
But they can hurt individuals very badly and we’re not going to have something around Berkshire that’s hurting a bunch of people that have devoted their lives to working with us. So we reluctantly gave it up.
但他们确实可以对个人造成非常大的伤害，而我们不想让伯克希尔周围出现损害那些为我们工作的人。所以我们不情愿地放弃了它。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, as I said, it’s a dead horse and I miss it, too.
查理·芒格：嗯，正如我所说，这是一个死马，我也很怀念它。
27. Buffett family and Berkshire managers will protect the company
巴菲特家族和伯克希尔的管理人员将保护公司
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 8 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Jay Leiber (PH) from Houston, Texas.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自德克萨斯州休斯顿的杰伊·莱伯（音）。
Mr. Buffett, since I’m older than you and maybe even as old, or older, than Charlie, I feel like I can ask this question. And I’ll ask it as delicately as possible.
巴菲特先生，由于我比您年长，甚至可能和查理一样老，或者更老，我觉得我可以问这个问题。我会尽量委婉地问。
When the time comes that you, I, and Charlie have gone to that big stock market in the sky, I understand that you planned — or at least, I have read — that you plan to give the bulk of your Berkshire Hathaway stock to your charitable foundation, along with your 30 percent of the votes of the company.
当你、我和查理都去到天上的那个大股票市场时，我了解到你计划——或者至少我读到——你计划将你持有的大部分伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股票捐赠给你的慈善基金会，以及公司 30%的投票权。
If this is correct — and if it’s not correct, this question is moot — but if so, what assurance do the Berkshire Hathaway shareholders have that the company will continue to be run as honestly and straightforward as it is now, such as only 15.8 employees or so at headquarters and no —
如果这是正确的——如果不正确，这个问题就没有意义——但如果是这样，伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东有什么保证，公司将继续像现在这样诚实和直率地运营，比如总部只有大约 15.8 名员工，没有——
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，那个——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — huge salaries or other ridiculous giveaways to dilute and weaken the equity of the shareholders at that time.
观众成员：——巨额薪水或其他荒谬的赠品，以免稀释和削弱股东在那时的权益。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, for a short while there’ll only be 14.8, actually. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，实际上在短时间内只有 14.8。（笑声）
But it’s a good question — a very good question. Since you’re older than I, apparently, I hope we don’t go at the same time. The —
但这是个好问题——一个非常好的问题。既然你比我年长，显然，我希望我们不会同时离开。——
There’s one slight twist to the estate plans we have. If I die first, all of my Berkshire goes to my wife. And if we died simultaneously, it would all go to the foundation.
我们的遗产计划有一个小小的变化。如果我先去世，我所有的伯克希尔股份都会留给我的妻子。如果我们同时去世，所有股份将捐给基金会。
But all of the stock will end up in the foundation. In fact, if I died first, she might put my stock in the foundation before her death, but that would be up to her. But it will end up in the foundation — all of the stock.
但所有的股票最终都会进入基金会。事实上，如果我先去世，她可能会在去世前把我的股票放入基金会，但这取决于她。但所有的股票最终都会进入基金会。
As you mention, it has 30-odd percent of the votes, although under the tax law, once it’s in the foundation, within five years, it would have to either convert to be some of it — it would have to get down to 20 percent of the vote. That’s required under foundation law.
正如您所提到的，股票的投票权占约30%，尽管根据税法，一旦进入基金会，五年内它必须降到20%的投票权。这是根据基金会法规定的。
In terms of how it would be run in the future, I think it has a far better chance than any company — any major company I know in the country — of maintaining the culture, because it has — it will have people running it who have grown up in the culture.
就未来的运营方式而言，我认为它比我所知的任何公司——任何国内的大公司——都有更好的机会保持这种文化，因为它将由在这种文化中成长起来的人来管理。
Earlier, it was — the criticism was made about my wife and my son being on the board, but they are guardians of the culture. They are not there to profit themselves, they are there to profit as the shareholders profit, but also to keep the company in the same way as previously.
早些时候，有人批评我妻子和儿子在董事会中，但他们是文化的守护者。他们不是为了自己的利益而在那里的，他们是为了在股东获利的同时，也保持公司一如既往。
One great example of that, of course, has been at Walmart where, when Sam Walton died, a not too dissimilar amount of stock was left among the family. And essentially the Walton family has, in my opinion, done a magnificent job, not only of selecting successors to run the place, but having successors who, if anything, reinforced the culture of Walmart. And it’s been an enormously successful arrangement.
一个很好的例子当然是在沃尔玛，当山姆·沃尔顿去世时，家族中留下了数量相当的股票。在我看来，沃尔顿家族不仅在选择继任者方面做得非常出色，而且这些继任者在某种程度上加强了沃尔玛的企业文化。这是一个极其成功的安排。
The Waltons are there, in case anything goes wrong, to make a change if needed, but they’re not there to run the business. And that’s exactly the pattern that we hope to have at Berkshire. And I think we have it.
沃尔顿家族在那里，以防万一出现问题，可以在需要时进行更改，但他们并不负责经营业务。这正是我们希望在伯克希尔实现的模式。我认为我们已经做到了。
I think I — you know, I can’t give you a hundred percent guarantee, but I would far rather bet on the integrity of the family that succeeds me, plus the managers that succeed me, at Berkshire remaining true than I would any other company in — for a long, long time — any other company I can think of.
我认为，我不能给您100%的保证，但我更愿意相信继承我的家族以及继承我的经理在伯克希尔保持诚信的机会，比任何其他我能想到的公司都要高得多——在很长很长的一段时间里。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would have a reason to fret about this subject, just as you would. And I, of course, have known the members of the Buffett family that would be here after Warren is gone for decades. Don’t worry about it. You should be so lucky. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：嗯，我有理由为这个问题感到担忧，就像你一样。当然，我认识巴菲特家族的成员已经几十年了，他们会在沃伦离开后继续在这里。别担心。你应该感到幸运。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a question we don’t wish to have an instant answer for, though, however. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：不过，这是一个我们不希望立即得到答案的问题。（笑声）
28. Profits as GDP percentage won’t be moved by technology
利润占 GDP 的百分比不会因技术而改变
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 9 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. James Easterlin (PH) from Durham, North Carolina.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆的詹姆斯·伊斯特林（音）。
My question — statement is, you have often written in reference to average corporate profitability remaining fairly consistent in the long run, such that return on equities are in the 12 percent range for U.S. companies, and after-tax profits as a percentage of GDP is sticky in the 4 to 6 1/2 percent range.
我的问题——陈述是，您经常写到平均企业盈利在长期内保持相当一致，以至于美国公司的股本回报率在 12%左右，而税后利润占 GDP 的比例在 4%到 6.5%之间保持稳定。
And the question is, given the advances in technology that brought the inventory-to-sales ratios down to historic lows, given the widespread adoption of the EVA principles by companies, might you think that might change over time?
问题是，鉴于技术进步使库存与销售比率降至历史最低水平，鉴于公司广泛采用 EVA 原则，您是否认为这可能会随着时间的推移而改变？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think any of the factors that you mentioned will act to move corporate profitability out of the range that has historically existed.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为你提到的任何因素都不会使企业盈利能力超出历史上存在的范围。
It’s going to bob around, obviously, some, but I certainly don’t think EVA will do a thing for American corporations in terms of making them receive a greater share of GDP in profits.
显然，它会有一些波动，但我肯定不认为经济增加值（EVA）会让美国公司在利润中获得更大份额的 GDP。
Technology, that’s just as likely to reduce profits as to increase profits. I mean, as the economic machine of the United States works better and better over time, the main beneficiaries are going to be consumers.
技术同样可能减少利润，也可能增加利润。我的意思是，随着美国经济机器随着时间的推移运作得越来越好，主要受益者将是消费者。
If you took whoever you think is the best business manager in the United States and you put a clone of that person in charge of each one of the Fortune 500, the profits of the Fortune 500 would not necessarily go up, because there’s this competitive nature to capitalism where the improvement you get one day, your competitor gets the next day.
如果你把你认为是美国最好的商业经理的人选出来，并让这个人的克隆体负责每一家财富 500 强公司，财富 500 强的利润不一定会上升，因为资本主义有一种竞争性质，你今天获得的改进，你的竞争对手明天就会获得。
And it very much tends to work to the benefit of consumers but not to increase overall profitability.
这往往有利于消费者，但不会增加整体盈利能力。
We see that in the industries we’re in. Every — we were in the textile business for a long time and various new products — various new machinery — would come along and it would promise to deliver a 40 percent internal rate of return and get rid of 43 employees or something like that.
我们在我们所处的行业中看到了这一点。我们在纺织行业待了很长时间，各种新产品——各种新机器——会出现，并承诺提供 40%的内部回报率，并裁减 43 名员工或类似的情况。
And, you know, we just did one after another of those, and when we got all through we didn’t make any money, because the other guy was doing the same thing.
你知道，我们一个接一个地做了那些，当我们全部完成时，我们没有赚到钱，因为另一个人也在做同样的事情。
And I liken it to everybody at a parade — you know, a huge crowd watching it and somebody stands up on tiptoes and, you know, 10 seconds later, everybody in the crowd is up on tiptoes and they’re not seeing any better and their legs hurt. Well, that was the textile business.
我把它比作游行中的每个人——你知道，一大群人观看游行，然后有人踮起脚尖，十秒钟后，人群中的每个人都踮起脚尖，但他们并没有看得更清楚，腿却疼了。这就是纺织业。
And there’s an awful lot of self-neutralizing things in capitalism. So I don’t really expect any of the factors you named, or any other factors that I can think of, that will move profits up as a percentage of GDP.
在资本主义中有很多自我中和的东西。所以我并不真的期望你提到的任何因素，或者我能想到的任何其他因素，会使利润占 GDP 的百分比上升。
And indeed, I think that if you’re looking at GDP as being the national pie and profits being what investors get out of it, and the rest belonging to people who are out there working for a living every day, I don’t think the relative — the proportions — are inappropriate.
事实上，我认为，如果你把 GDP 看作是国家的蛋糕，利润是投资者从中获得的，而其余的属于每天为生计而工作的人民，我不认为相对比例是不合适的。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that.
查理·芒格：我对此没有什么要补充的。
29. Method for estimating a company’s future growth and establishing a margin of safety
估算公司未来增长并建立安全边际的方法
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia.
观众成员：早上好。我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺夫。
Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, I’d like to ask you, when you assess a business and derive its intrinsic value, how do you estimate the future growth of the business, and how do you decide what margin of safety to use? Thank you.
巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我想问您，当您评估一家企业并得出其内在价值时，您如何估计企业的未来增长，以及如何决定使用多少安全边际？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: It was the future growth and what, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：那是未来的增长，还有什么，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — I have difficulty understanding that question fully. He’s talking about how do we combine our estimates of future growth with our passion for having a margin of safety. Surely, you can handle that. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯——我很难完全理解这个问题。他在问我们如何将对未来增长的估计与我们对安全边际的追求结合起来。当然，你可以处理这个问题。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can certainly handle it as well as you can. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我当然可以处理它，就像你一样。（笑声）
Every time he laterals them off to me, you know, he calls those audibles. (Laughter)
每次他把球传给我时，你知道，他都会叫那些临场指令。（笑声）
You calculate — I think you take all of the variables and calculate them reasonably conservatively. But you don’t try and put too much windage in at every level.
你计算——我认为你会合理保守地计算所有变量。但你不会在每个层面都加入过多的余量。
And then when you get all through, you apply the margin of safety. So I would say, don’t focus too much on taking it on each variable in terms of the discount rate and the growth rate and so on. But try to be as realistic as you can on those numbers, but with any errors being on the conservative side. And then when you get all through, you apply the margin of safety.
然后，当你完成所有这些时，应用安全边际。所以我会说，不要过于关注折现率、增长率等每个变量。尽量让这些数字尽可能现实，但任何错误都要偏向保守。然后，当你完成所有这些时，应用安全边际。
Ben Graham had a very simple formula he used for just the most obvious situations, which was to take working capital — net working capital — and try and buy it at a third off working capital. And overall, that worked for him. But that method sort of ran out of steam when the sub-working capital stocks disappeared.
本·格雷厄姆有一个非常简单的公式，他用来处理最明显的情况，就是取营运资本——净营运资本——并尝试以营运资本的三分之一折扣购买。总体来说，这对他是有效的。但当低于营运资本的股票消失时，这种方法就有些失效了。
But it’s the same thing we do in insurance. I mean, if we’re trying to figure out what we should charge for, we’ll just say, the chances of a 6.0 earthquake in California, well, we know that in the last century, I think that there have been 26 or so 6.0 or greater quakes in California.
但这和我们在保险中做的事情是一样的。我的意思是，如果我们试图弄清楚我们应该收取什么费用，我们就会说，加州发生 6.0 级地震的几率，好吧，我们知道在上个世纪，我认为加州发生过大约 26 次 6.0 级或更大的地震。
And let’s forget about whether they occur in remote areas, let’s just say we were writing a policy that paid off on a 6.0 or greater quake in California, regardless of whether it occurred in a desert and did no damage or anything.
而且不考虑它们是否发生在偏远地区，我们就假设我们正在制定一项保单，该保单在加利福尼亚发生 6.0 级或更大地震时支付赔偿，无论它是否发生在沙漠中且没有造成任何损害或其他影响。
Well, we would look at the history and we’d say, “Well, there’ve been 26 in the last century.” And we would probably assume a little higher number in the next century, that’d just be our nature. But we wouldn’t assume 50. If we did, we wouldn’t write any business.
好吧，我们会查看历史，然后说：“嗯，上个世纪有 26 次。” 我们可能会假设下个世纪的次数会稍微多一些，这就是我们的本性。但我们不会假设有 50 次。如果我们这样做了，我们就不会开展任何业务。
So we would — we might assume a little higher. I would, if I was pricing it myself, I’d probably say, “Well, I’ll assume there are going to be 30, or maybe 32, or something like that.”
所以我们会——我们可能会假设稍微高一点。如果是我自己定价，我可能会说：“好吧，我会假设会有 30 个，或者可能是 32 个，或者类似的数量。”
Then when I get all through, I’ll want to price the — I’ll want to put a premium on it that now puts in a margin of safety. In other words, if I figured the proper rate for 32 is a million dollars, I would probably want to charge something more than a million dollars to build in that margin of safety.
然后，当我全部完成后，我会想要给它定价——我会想要在上面加一个溢价，以便现在有一个安全边际。换句话说，如果我认为 32 的合适价格是一百万美元，我可能会想要收取超过一百万美元的费用，以建立那个安全边际。
But I don’t want to hit it at — I want to be conservative at all the levels and then I want to have that significant margin of safety at the end.
但我不想达到那个水平——我想在所有层面上保持保守，然后在最后留出显著的安全边际。
And I guess that, as I understand the question, that’d be my answer. And Charlie, do you want to add to that?
我想，根据我对问题的理解，那就是我的回答。查理，你想补充些什么吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that book, “Deep Simplicity,” that I recommended to you says that you can predict out of those 26 earthquakes how the size will be likely to be allocated.
查理·芒格：是的，我推荐给你的那本书《Deep Simplicity》说，您可以预测这26次地震的大小将如何分配。
In other words, there’s a standard power law that will tell you the likelihood of earthquakes of varying sizes. And of course the big earthquakes are way less likely than the small ones.
换句话说，有一个标准的幂律可以告诉你不同规模地震发生的可能性。当然，大地震的可能性远小于小地震。
So you count the math and you know the applicable power law and you guess as to how much damage is going to — it’s not that difficult.
所以你计算数学，知道适用的幂律，并猜测会造成多少损害——这并不那么困难。
WARREN BUFFETT: It becomes more difficult if somebody said they really want protect against a 9.0 or something like that. You know, is it one in 300 years? Is it one in a thousand years? You know, when you get really off the data points.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果有人说他们真的想防范 9.0 级或类似的地震，那就变得更加困难。你知道，这是 300 年一遇吗？还是一千年一遇？当你真的偏离数据点时，就会这样。
But that is not what you’re looking at in investments. You don’t want to look at the things that are that — you don’t want to come up with the companies where you make the assumptions that get that extreme.
但这不是你在投资中要看的东西。你不想关注那些——你不想选择那些需要做出极端假设的公司。
And you don’t have to, that’s the beauty about investments. You only have to look at the ones that you feel capable of evaluating and you skip all rest.
而且你不必，这就是投资的美妙之处。你只需关注那些你觉得有能力评估的投资，其他的都可以跳过。
30. No single formula for regulatory impact on businesses
对企业监管影响没有单一公式
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11?
沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. It’s James Tarkenton of Durham, North Carolina.
观众成员：下午好。我是来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆的詹姆斯·塔肯顿。
Current examples, including discussion of media ownership rules, FCC regulation of the telecom industry, and proposed oversight changes for mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are all examples of the legislative, regulatory, and lobbying process as an influence in shaping and reshaping economic moats.
目前的例子，包括对媒体所有权规则的讨论、FCC对电信行业的监管，以及对抵押贷款巨头房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）拟议的监管变更，都是立法、监管和游说过程影响经济护城河形成与重塑的例子。
We would be interested in your comments on these and other examples of how competitive advantages are shaped by government.
我们想听听您对此以及其他如何通过政府影响竞争优势的看法。
In general, how do you incorporate the impact of regulation on the size and ferocity of economic moats for various businesses?
一般来说，您如何将法规对各种企业经济护城河的规模和强度的影响纳入考虑？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that varies enormously by the business. I mean, there’re some businesses that we think that it’s not a very big factor, and there’s other businesses we’re in — the energy business, the insurance business — where regulatory change could have a huge impact.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这在很大程度上取决于业务类型。我的意思是，有些业务我们认为这不是一个很大的因素，而我们所处的其他业务——能源业务、保险业务——监管变化可能会产生巨大影响。
You know, we don’t have any one-size-fits-all type arrangement. We just try to think intelligently about any business we’re in. And if it’s — when we bought GEICO in 1995, or bought that last half of it or whichever year it was, the question, you know, whether the regulatory climate would change in some major way, you nationalize auto-insurance — well, all of those things go through our mind and we evaluate them.
你知道，我们没有任何一刀切的安排。我们只是试图对我们所从事的任何业务进行明智的思考。而且，如果是——当我们在 1995 年购买 GEICO，或者购买了最后一半，不管是哪一年，问题是，监管环境是否会以某种重大方式改变，你将汽车保险国有化——所有这些事情都会在我们脑海中闪过，我们会对它们进行评估。
But there is no — there’s no formula. You know, if we’re — if we’re in furniture retailing, you know, that is not something we’re going to worry about. We’re going to worry about plenty of things, in terms of competition, but there are different variables that apply with different intensity to each business we’re in. And it’s up to Charlie and me to try and think about any of the variables that might hit those businesses, and to weigh them appropriately, and to crank that into our evaluation.
但是没有——没有公式。你知道，如果我们在家具零售业，你知道，那不是我们要担心的事情。我们会担心很多事情，关于竞争方面，但不同的变量以不同的强度适用于我们所从事的每个业务。查理和我需要努力思考可能影响这些业务的任何变量，并适当地权衡它们，并将其纳入我们的评估中。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it would be fair to say that in our early days, we tended to overestimate the difficulties from regulation. We refrained from buying television station stocks for a long, long time because it seemed like such a peculiar asset when anybody could just ask to have your license jerked away from you each year and they could ask a government agency to do it. And — but it turned out, the way the system evolved, that almost never happened.
查理·芒格：我认为可以公平地说，在我们早期的时候，我们往往高估了监管带来的困难。我们很长一段时间都没有购买电视台的股票，因为这似乎是一种非常特殊的资产，任何人都可以每年要求吊销你的执照，他们可以要求政府机构这样做。但是，事实证明，随着系统的发展，这种情况几乎从未发生过。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Tom Murphy figured that one out before we did. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，汤姆·墨菲比我们更早发现了这一点。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and we had it — we were slow on the learning curve. Murphy was way better at it than we were.
查理·芒格：是的，我们在学习曲线上进展缓慢。墨菲在这方面比我们好得多。
31. Buy Berkshire or low-cost index fund?
购买伯克希尔还是低成本指数基金？
WARREN BUFFETT: Microphone 12, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请使用 12 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, gentleman. My name is Vivian Pine and I’m from Tarzana, California.
观众成员：你好，先生们。我的名字是薇薇安·派恩，我来自加利福尼亚州的塔扎纳。
And my question is, for a new investor buying stocks today, would you recommend that they buy a low-cost S&P index fund or Berkshire Hathaway, and why?
我的问题是，对于今天购买股票的新投资者，您会建议他们购买低成本的标普指数基金还是伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股票，为什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we never recommend buying or selling Berkshire. But I would say that, among the various propositions offered you, a very low-cost index fund where you don’t put all your money in at one time.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们从不建议买入或卖出伯克希尔。但我会说，在提供给你的各种建议中，一个非常低成本的指数基金是不错的选择，而且不要一次性投入你所有的钱。
I mean, if you accumulate a low-cost index fund over 10 years with fairly regular sums, I think you will probably do better than 90 percent of the people around you that take up investing at a similar time.
我的意思是，如果你在 10 年内以相对固定的金额积累低成本指数基金，我认为你可能会比周围 90%同时开始投资的人做得更好。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would agree with that, totally. It’s awkward for us sitting here at these annual meetings where we have a sampling of some of the most honorable and skillful stockbrokers around who’ve done a wonderful job for their own clients and families. But the stockbroking fraternity, in toto, can be guaranteed to do so poorly that the index fund is a better option.
查理·芒格：我完全同意这一点。我们坐在这些年度会议上感到有些尴尬，因为我们有一些最有声望和最有能力的股票经纪人，他们为自己的客户和家庭做得非常出色。但股票经纪行业整体表现如此糟糕，以至于指数基金是更好的选择。
32. Leverage can prevent you from playing out a winning hand
杠杆作用可能会阻止你打出一手好牌
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to number 1 again.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们再回到第 1 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Bailey from Boston.
观众成员：来自波士顿的约翰·贝利。
As of last week, my house is almost totally covered with Benjamin Moore now. (Laughter)
截至上周，我的房子几乎完全被本杰明·摩尔覆盖了。（笑声）
But more seriously, you spent a fair amount of time talking about the low-probability transformative events. I recall a discussion on the probability of a nuclear event not occurring in any given year for, say, 50 years, at which point it begins to look like, over the time period, it’s pretty darn likely and therefore the expected value is a pretty big negative.
但更严肃地说，您花了相当多的时间谈论低概率的重大事件。我记得讨论过某个年份核事件不发生的概率，比如说50年，过了这么长时间之后，从总体上来看，实际上它发生的可能性就相当高，因此预期价值可能是相当大的负数。
There are some other things that could be happening that somebody might expect. For instance, perhaps there is, in fact, a ceiling on consumer debt coverage ratios. If they quit falling, there — that could be a big change.
可能还会发生其他一些事情，这是某些人可能预期的。例如，或许实际上存在一个消费者债务覆盖率的上限。如果它们不再下降，那可能是一个重大变化。
If you even listen to the United States Geological Survey, they’re now saying that sometime in the next 50 years, there could be a fall in the production of oil.
如果您甚至听过美国地质调查局（United States Geological Survey）的说法，他们现在表示在未来50年内，石油生产可能会下降。
And so, I’d like you to address how you conceive of the portfolio of businesses in the context of these possible transformative events, especially given that over this same time period of maybe the next 50 years, at some point, you’re not going to be able to personally revise the portfolio.
所以，我希望您能谈谈如何在这些可能的重大事件背景下构思您的业务组合，尤其是考虑到在未来50年内的某个时刻，您将无法亲自调整该组合。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think it’s a fair statement that over the next 50 years at some point, Charlie and I will not personally be able to — (laughs) — participate in portfolio revisions. The —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为可以公平地说，在未来 50 年的某个时候，查理和我将无法亲自参与投资组合的调整。——
Well, you’re quite correct that people tend to underestimate low-probability events when they haven’t happened recently and overestimate them when they have happened recently.
嗯，你说得很对，人们往往在低概率事件最近没有发生时低估它们，而在它们最近发生时高估它们。
That is the nature of the human animal. You know, Noah ran into that some years back. But he looked pretty good after 40 days. The —
这就是人类的本性。您知道，诺亚（Noah）曾经历过这样的事情。但在40天后，他看起来还不错。——
What you mention on the nuclear question, it’s a matter — you can do the math easily. What you don’t know is whether you’re using the right assumptions. But it —
你提到的核问题，这是一个——你可以很容易地计算出来。你不知道的是你是否使用了正确的假设。但是它——
For example, if there is a 10 percent chance in any given year of a major nuclear event, the chance that you’ll get through 50 years without it happening, if the 10 percent is correct, is a half of 1 percent.
例如，如果在任何一年中发生重大核事件的概率是 10%，那么在 50 年内不发生这种事件的概率（如果 10%是正确的）是 0.5%。
I mean, 99 1/2 percent of the time a 10 percent event per year will catch up with you in 50 years. If you can reduce that to 1 percent, there’s a 60 percent chance you get through the next 50 years without it happening.
我的意思是，99.5%的情况下，每年发生 10%概率的事件将在 50 年内赶上你。如果你能将其减少到 1%，那么在接下来的 50 年里不发生这种情况的概率是 60%。
P（10年内不发生）=P（不发生）10次方=0.9的10次方，P（至少发生一次）=1-0.9的10次方=65.13%。
That’s a good argument for trying to reduce the chances of it happening.
这是一个很好的理由来尝试减少其发生的可能性。
In terms of our businesses, I think Charlie and I are — I mean, we think about low-probability events. In fact, in insurance, we probably think about low-probability events more than most people who have been insurance executives throughout their years. It’s just our nature to think about that sort of thing.
就我们的业务而言，我认为查理和我——我的意思是，我们考虑低概率事件。事实上，在保险方面，我们可能比大多数多年来担任保险高管的人更关注低概率事件。这就是我们的本性。
But I would say, if you talk about transforming events, or really talk about major events that could have huge consequences that are low probability, they’re more likely to be in the financial arena than in the natural phenomena arena. But we’ll think about them in both cases.
但我会说，如果你谈论变革性事件，或者真正谈论那些可能产生巨大后果但概率较低的重大事件，它们更有可能出现在金融领域，而不是自然现象领域。但我们会在这两种情况下考虑它们。
But we do spend a lot of time thinking about things that can go wrong in a very big and very unexpected way.
但是我们确实花了很多时间思考那些可能以非常大和非常意外的方式出错的事情。
And financial markets are — they have vulnerabilities to that, you know, we try to think of and we try to build in ways to protect us against it and perhaps even build in some capabilities where we think we might profit in a huge way from it.
金融市场存在脆弱性，你知道，我们试图考虑这些问题，并尝试建立保护我们的方式，甚至可能建立一些能力，让我们认为可以从中获得巨大收益。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that temporary collapse in the junk bonds, where they got down, many of them, to 35 and 40 percent yields, that’s a strange thing. And to have all those things pop back — you know, quadrupling in a short time. There was absolute chaos at the bottom tick of that.
查理·芒格：是的，那次垃圾债券的暂时崩溃，很多债券的收益率降到了 35%和 40%，这真是件奇怪的事情。而所有这些东西又迅速反弹——你知道，在短时间内翻了四倍。在那次最低点时，绝对是一片混乱。
And that isn’t as much chaos as you could have. And of course, it can happen in common stocks instead of junk bonds.
这并不是你可能遇到的最大混乱。当然，这种情况也可能发生在普通股而不是垃圾债券上。
So I think if you’re talking about the next 50 years, we all have to conduct ourselves so that we — it won’t be all that awful if a real financial crunch of some kind could come along. Either inflationary or a typical deflationary crunch of the time [kind] that people used to have a great many decades ago.
所以我认为，如果你在谈论未来 50 年，我们都必须以这样的方式行事，以便如果某种真正的金融危机来临时——无论是通货膨胀还是几十年前人们常经历的典型通货紧缩危机——情况不会那么糟糕。
WARREN BUFFETT: Probably the most dramatic way in which we are — give evidence of our — of your worries, is we just don’t believe in a lot of leverage. I mean, you could have thought junk bonds were wonderful at 15 percent because they eventually did go to 6 percent, you would have made a lot of money.
沃伦·巴菲特：可能最能体现我们——展示你们担忧的方式，就是我们不太相信大量杠杆。我的意思是，你可能认为垃圾债券在 15%的时候很棒，因为它们最终确实降到了 6%，你会赚很多钱。
But if you owed a lot of money against them in between, you know, you wouldn’t have been around for the party at the end.
但是如果你在这期间欠了很多钱，你知道的，你就不会在最后的聚会上出现了。
So we believe almost anything can happen in financial markets. And the only way smart people can get clobbered, really, is through leverage. If you can hold them, you have no real problems.
所以我们相信金融市场几乎任何事情都可能发生。而聪明人唯一可能被重创的方式，实际上，是通过杠杆。如果你能坚守住，你就不会有真正的问题。
So we have a great aversion to leverage and we would predict that a very high percentage of the smart people operating in Wall Street, at one time or another, are likely to get clobbered through the use of leverage.
因此，我们非常反感杠杆，并且我们预测，在华尔街工作的聪明人中，很大一部分人可能会因为使用杠杆而在某个时候遭受重创。
It’s the one thing that forces you — it’s the one thing that ends — or can prevent you from playing out your hand. And all of the hands we enter into look pretty good to us. But you do have to be able to play them out.
这是唯一能迫使你——唯一能结束——或能阻止你打出好牌的东西。我们参与的所有好牌对我们来说看起来都不错。但你确实需要能够打出它们。
And the fascinating thing to me is that — just take the junk bond situation. In 2002, you had people with terrific IQ — tens of thousands of them operating in Wall Street. You had the — money was available. They all had a desire to make money.
令我着迷的是——就拿垃圾债券的情况来说吧。2002 年，有成千上万智商极高的人在华尔街运作。资金是充足的。他们都有赚钱的欲望。
And then you see these extraordinary things happen in markets and you say to yourself, you know, can these be the same individuals that two years later or two years earlier were buying these things at prices that were double or triple or quadruple what they sunk to in between? And did they all go on vacation? You know, did they lose their ability to raise money?
然后你看到市场上发生了这些非凡的事情，你对自己说，你知道，这些人是否就是两年前或两年后以两倍、三倍或四倍的价格购买这些东西的人，而这些东西在这期间的价格却下跌了？他们都去度假了吗？他们失去了筹集资金的能力吗？
No, the money was — you know, Wall Street was awash in money, and it was awash in talent, and yet you get these absolutely extraordinary swings.
不，钱是——你知道，华尔街充斥着金钱，也充斥着人才，但你仍然会看到这些极其不寻常的波动。
I mean, it doesn’t happen with apartment houses in Omaha or, you know, with McDonald’s franchises or farms or something. But it’s just astounding what can happen in the marketable securities department.
我的意思是，这种情况不会发生在奥马哈的公寓楼，或者麦当劳的特许经营店，或者农场之类的地方。但在可交易证券部门发生的事情实在是令人震惊。
And the big thing you want to do is, at a minimum, you want to protect yourself against that sort of insanity wiping you out.
而你想做的一件大事是，至少，你要保护自己不被那种疯狂摧毁。
And better yet, you want to be prepared to take advantage of it when I happens.
更好的是，你希望在机会来临时做好准备以利用它。
Now it’s about noon, so we will come back and begin at microphone 2 about, say, a quarter of one.
现在大约是中午，所以我们会回来，大约一点一刻从麦克风 2 开始。
Afternoon session
下午场
33. Difficulties of judging whether a company has ethics
判断一家公司的道德标准是否合乎伦理的困难之处
(Note: Video recording begins with meeting already in progress.)
（注意：视频录制从会议已经开始时开始。）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: After reading this story on Enron, I would like to ask you the following question.
观众成员：在阅读了关于安然的这个故事后，我想问你以下问题。
How does an entry-level employee in a large company find out if her employer operates with a long-term perspective, and with honesty and integrity?
一名大公司初级员工如何了解她的雇主是否以长期视角经营，并且具有诚实和正直的品格？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very good question. I’m not sure I’m going to have an equally good answer. It —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个非常好的问题。我不确定我会有一个同样好的答案。它——
You know, you pick up signals — or frequently, you can pick up some signals — about what is going on at the top of a business if you’re at a lower level. But I would say it would be very easy to be fooled on that subject.
你知道，你会接收到一些信号——或者经常可以接收到一些信号——关于在一个企业的高层发生了什么，如果你处于较低的层级。但我会说，在这个问题上很容易被误导。
Charlie and I would tend to be looking at things that they do in public in relation to their investors and the promises they make, and all of that sort of thing. But I think that might be tough for people, and it wouldn’t always give you a great guide.
查理和我倾向于关注他们在公众面前对投资者所做的事情以及他们所做的承诺，诸如此类的事情。但我认为这对人们来说可能很难，并不总能给你一个很好的指导。
I’ve — we’ve been suspicious of companies, for example, that place a whole lot of emphasis on the price of their stock.
我——我们一直对那些非常重视其股票价格的公司持怀疑态度。
I mean, when we see the price of a stock posted in the lobby of the headquarters or something, you know, things like that make us nervous. But I’m not so sure that’s, you know, that that would be enormously helpful.
我的意思是，当我们看到总部大厅里张贴的股票价格或类似的东西时，你知道，这些事情会让我们感到紧张。但我不太确定这会有多大帮助。
So I guess you just have to sort of pick up from coworkers, publications, pronouncements of the leaders, the sort of culture that was being presented to them and the world, and, you know, you might get suspicious about it.
所以我想你只需要从同事、出版物、领导者的声明中了解他们和世界所展示的那种文化，你可能会对此产生怀疑。
But I don’t think I have a really good answer for that, do you Charlie?
但我觉得我没有一个很好的答案，你呢，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it’s obviously easy when you’ve got a caricature of a person like Bernie Ebbers or Kenny Lay. I think it’s easy to say that you’ve got almost a psychopath — (laughter) — in charge.
查理·芒格：不，当你有像伯尼·埃伯斯或肯尼·莱这样的人的漫画形象时，这显然很容易。我认为很容易说你几乎有一个精神病患者——（笑声）——在掌权。
But what fools you is a place like Royal Dutch. If I’d been asked to guess —
但让您感到困惑的地方是像皇家荷兰（Royal Dutch）这样的公司。如果让我猜测——
WARREN BUFFETT: Ah! 沃伦·巴菲特：啊！
CHARLIE MUNGER: — major companies with sound, long-term cultures, and a good engineering values, and so forth, Royal Dutch would have been near the top of my list.
查理·芒格：——拥有健全的长期文化和良好工程价值观等的主要公司，荷兰皇家壳牌本来会在我名单的前列。
And to have the oil reserves phonied for years, and internal reports of people who were tired of lying.
多年来石油储备数据被伪造，还有内部报告显示有人厌倦了撒谎。
If it can happen at Royal Dutch, believe me, it can happen a lot of other places.
如果这能发生在荷兰皇家壳牌，相信我，它也能在很多其他地方发生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I would not have spotted it at Royal Dutch by any of the means that we normally use.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我通常会用的任何方式都无法发现皇家荷兰的这些问题。
In fact, we — as Charlie said, we might have used that as an example of some place that was almost certainly above reproach. And then you do read the emails and all that.
事实上，正如查理所说，我们可能会把那作为一个几乎可以肯定无可指责的地方的例子。然后您会看到那些电子邮件和所有的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But we don’t learn, because I would still expect that Exxon’s figures were fair.
查理·芒格：但我们不会吸取教训，因为我仍然会期望埃克森（Exxon）的数字是公正的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
I think you — what was — what transpired in the 1990s, you know, was this gradual — and later on, not so gradual — embracing at the top of the feeling that anything goes.
我认为你——在 1990 年代发生的事情，你知道，是这种逐渐的——后来不那么逐渐的——在高层接受了一种什么都可以的感觉。
You know, I don’t — I’m not going to speculate as to the motives at the top of Shell.
你知道，我不——我不会去猜测壳牌高层的动机。
But there was so much going on where people saw the fellows — in most cases fellows, unfortunately — that were at their clubs, that they saw at other corporate meetings, were respected business leaders, they saw just one after another that were really cutting corners in one way or another.
但是有太多的事情发生，人们看到那些家伙——在大多数情况下不幸的是那些家伙——在他们的俱乐部里，他们在其他公司会议上看到的，是受人尊敬的商业领袖，他们看到一个接一个的人在某种程度上真的在走捷径。
And, you know, situational ethics can take over in that. People do, I think, they sink faster to a lower prevailing morality than they rise to a higher prevailing morality.
在这种情况下，情境伦理可能会占上风。我认为，人们更容易迅速沉沦到较低的普遍道德水平，而不是提升到较高的普遍道德水平。
But they do move in the direction of what they perceive to be the prevailing morality of those around them, in many cases. And certainly the corporate world in the late 1990s, particularly, it was extreme on that.
但在许多情况下，他们确实朝着他们认为周围人普遍道德观的方向发展。而且可以肯定的是，尤其是在 1990 年代后期的企业界，这种情况尤为极端。
34. Congress shouldn’t make (immoral) accounting rules
国会不应制定（不道德的）会计规则
WARREN BUFFETT: And that leads me into — I ran into a friend at the lunch break who’s involved in these matters. And he suggested, and I’m delighted to put in a plug to encourage all of you to write your congressman and senators to give your views on whether stock options should be expensed, or whether indeed, whether Congress has got any business legislating on the question of what proper accounting is.
沃伦·巴菲特：这让我想起——我在午休时遇到了一位参与这些事务的朋友。他建议我，我很高兴借此机会鼓励大家写信给你们的国会议员和参议员，表达你们对股票期权是否应该作为费用处理的看法，或者国会是否有权就什么是正确的会计进行立法。
It was a disgrace some 10 years ago when the United States Senate essentially threatened the accounting standards board with extinction and bludgeoned Arthur Levitt, then running the SEC, at the behest of a lot of rich contributors, to declare that — to override the accounting standards board’s pronouncement that options should be treated as expense.
大约 10 年前，美国参议院威胁会计准则委员会，并在许多富有捐助者的要求下，迫使当时负责证券交易委员会的阿瑟·莱维特宣布推翻会计准则委员会关于期权应被视为费用的声明，这是一种耻辱。
And it was — and I think in a very significant way, it accelerated the “anything goes” mentality of 1990s.
而且我认为，在很大程度上，它加速了 1990 年代的“无所顾忌”心态。
At that point, when Congress says it’s more important to have stock prices go up than it is to tell the truth, and they voted 88 to 9 in order to do it, as I remember, I think there was a shift in morality among many corporate executives.
在那时，当国会表示让股价上涨比讲真话更重要，并且据我记得，他们以 88 票对 9 票通过了这一决定时，我认为许多企业高管的道德观发生了转变。
You may remember that the FASB then backed off, but still said that expensing was preferable. And having said it was preferable, 498 out of the 500 companies in the S&P took the less preferable method.
您可能记得，当时 FASB 退缩了，但仍然表示费用化是更可取的。既然说费用化更可取，标普 500 指数中的 500 家公司中有 498 家选择了较不理想的方法。
All of the big auditing firms at that time endorsed their big clients’ views, in order to report higher earnings. Now, all four accounting firms say you should count them as expenses.
当时所有大型审计公司都支持其大客户的观点，以报告更高的收益。现在，所有四大会计师事务所都表示你应该将它们计入费用。
Well, they’re right, now, but it just shows what was going on in that period when, on a question of accounting principles, and when really nothing has changed, when what were then five — the Big Five —have shifted 100 percent to where the Big Four are now, and, now, they say options should be expensed.
好吧，他们现在是对的，但这只是显示了在那个时期发生的事情，当时在会计原则的问题上，实际上什么都没有改变，当时的五大——现在的四大——已经完全转变，现在他们说期权应该作为费用处理。
So, if you are inclined to write your congressman or senator, tell him you really think the FASB knows more about accounting than they do. And I think you’ll be right.
所以，如果你想给你的国会议员或参议员写信，告诉他你真的认为 FASB 比他们更了解会计。我认为你是对的。
If you want to have some fun, go to Google and type in two words. Type in the word “Indiana,” and type in the word “pi,” that’s the mathematical symbol pi. And when you do that, you’ll see a number of stories come up.
如果你想找点乐子，可以去谷歌输入两个词。输入“Indiana”和“pi”，就是数学符号π。当你这样做时，会看到许多相关故事出现。
And they relayed how in 1897, at the instigation of one legislator who was responding to a constituent, the House in Indiana voted almost unanimously, it may have even been unanimously, it says what it was on Google, to change the value of pi. (Laughter)
他们转述说，1897 年，在一位回应选民的立法者的推动下，印第安纳州众议院几乎全票通过，甚至可能是全票通过，谷歌上有说，决定改变圆周率的值。（笑声）
I’m, you know, I’m not making this up. It’s checkable.
我，你知道，我不是在编造。这是可以核实的。
And it seems that there was a fellow that thought he’d discovered some new relationship between circumference and diameter, and area, and a few things. And it came out to 3.20 if you worked through his formula.
似乎有一个人认为他发现了圆周和直径、面积以及一些其他东西之间的新关系。按照他的公式计算，结果是 3.20。
And he offered to give this royalty-free, as he put it, to the State of Indiana to teach its children so that they would have not only the truth, but they’d have an easier number to work with than the long decimal that heretofore had been thought of as pi.
他提出将其免费赠予印第安纳州，以便教导该州的孩子们，这样他们不仅能获得真相，还能使用一个比之前被认为是圆周率的长小数更简单的数字。
Well, that passed the Indiana legislature. And it passed the House. By the time it got to the Senate, there were a few people that were still clinging to the old values who managed to shoot it down.
好吧，那通过了印第安纳州议会。并且通过了众议院。当它到达参议院时，有一些仍然坚持旧价值观的人设法将其否决。
But I would submit that in the — in 1993, that the U.S. Senate cleansed the record of the Indiana legislature by outdoing them in attempting to change the rules on something, on a subject, they knew nothing about.
但我想说的是，在 1993 年，美国参议院通过在他们一无所知的主题上试图改变规则，超过了印第安纳州立法机构，从而清除了他们的记录。
And I think some of the excesses of the 1990s that followed came about through the fact that they knew 88 senators were willing to declare the world was flat if constituents who had contributed enough money to them wanted it thus.
我认为，随后的 1990 年代的一些过度行为是因为他们知道有 88 位参议员愿意宣布世界是平的，只要那些向他们捐赠了足够资金的选民希望如此。
Let’s — we pause now, go back to our schedule here.
让我们——我们现在暂停，回到我们的日程安排。
Number 3. Oh, Charlie, do you have anything to say about the Indiana legislature?
第三个。哦，查理，你对印第安纳州立法机构有什么要说的吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I — the current members of Congress that want to retain the former abusive accounting, which are probably a majority of the House of Representatives, are way worse than the people who wanted to round pi to an even number.
查理·芒格：嗯，我——想要保留以前滥用会计方法的现任国会议员，可能是众议院的大多数，比那些想把圆周率四舍五入为整数的人要糟糕得多。
Those people were stupid. (Laughter)
那些人真傻。（笑声）
These people are mostly not stupid, but dishonorable. I mean, they know it’s wrong, and they want to do it anyway. (Applause)
这些人大多不是愚蠢，而是不光彩。我的意思是，他们知道这是错的，但他们还是想去做。（掌声）
35. “Too many conflicts” for a Berkshire fund management company
伯克希尔基金管理公司“冲突太多”
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 3 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Nate Anthony (PH), from Hinsdale, Illinois.
观众成员：你好，我叫内特·安东尼（PH），来自伊利诺伊州的欣斯代尔。
First, I would like to venture a response to an earlier question about the future of Berkshire.
首先，我想冒险回答一个关于伯克希尔未来的早期问题。
I believe it is our responsibility as shareholders to think for ourselves and ensure that Berkshire is run as respectably in the future it has been until now.
我相信，作为股东，我们有责任独立思考，并确保伯克希尔在未来的运营能够像过去一样受到尊重。
You both have had a lot to say, both today and in the past, about how mutual funds should be run. But to my knowledge, we do not directly have a fund management business.
你们两位在今天和过去都对共同基金的管理发表了很多看法。但据我所知，我们并没有直接从事基金管理业务。
What do you think about putting your words in action, and offering to have a Berkshire company manage the assets of funds where the directors are dissatisfied with present management?
你认为将你的话付诸行动，并提议让伯克希尔公司管理那些董事对现有管理不满的基金资产怎么样？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the problem would be, there would be too many conflicts.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，问题是会有太多的冲突。
You know, we’re managing so much of our own money at Berkshire that to take on the responsibility for managing another group of people to whom we would owe our best efforts, and handling that situation of wearing two hats ethically, I wouldn’t know how to do it.
你知道，我们在伯克希尔管理着我们自己的大量资金，如果再承担起为另一群人管理资金的责任，我们需要尽最大努力，并在道德上处理好身兼两职的情况，我不知道该怎么做。
I certainly wouldn’t want to start a fund management company and be prorating all purchases between Berkshire and that fund management company, or the funds that it managed.
我当然不想创办一家基金管理公司，并在伯克希尔和那家基金管理公司或其管理的基金之间按比例分配所有购买。
I — we’ve thought about it plenty. I mean, we’ve had all kinds of propositions put to us.
我——我们已经考虑过很多。我是说，我们收到了各种各样的提议。
And obviously, we could sell it big time. But when we got through selling it, then we’d have the problem of administering it fairly. And I don’t know how we would do it. Charlie, do you?
显然，我们可以大规模销售它。但是，当我们完成销售后，我们将面临公平管理的问题。我不知道我们该怎么做。查理，你知道吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, that’s why we don’t do it. But — (laughter) — I must say it’s an attitude that doesn’t seem to bother many other people. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，这就是我们不这样做的原因。但是——（笑声）——我必须说，这种态度似乎并没有困扰许多其他人。（笑声）
36. New Omaha convention center allows more people to attend
新奥马哈会议中心允许更多人参加
WARREN BUFFETT: Microphone 4, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请使用 4 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Norman Rentrop from Bonn, Germany.
观众成员：来自德国波恩的诺曼·伦特罗普。
Two thanks and one question. My thanks go to both of you for allowing us investors to participate on equal terms with you.
两次感谢和一个问题。感谢你们两位让我们投资者能够与你们平等参与。
No management fees, no performance fees, no transaction fees. (Applause)
无管理费，无业绩费，无交易费。（掌声）
My thanks also go to the people of Omaha for building this very fine new convention center. (Applause)
我也要感谢奥马哈的人民建造了这个非常出色的新会议中心。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Our thanks, too.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们也表示感谢。
I’ll interrupt you for just one second. We wouldn’t be able to hold this meeting if we’d been limited to the facilities we had last year.
我打断你一下。如果我们还使用去年的设施，我们就无法召开这次会议。
Last year we had the biggest facility in town. And I was told that we have at least 19,500 people here. And that would have been many, many thousands beyond what we could have had last year. And this is, — (applause) — this facility really does the job.
去年我们拥有镇上最大的设施。据说我们这里至少有 19,500 人。这比我们去年能容纳的人数多了好几千。而且这个设施确实很有效。
Incidentally it’s known as the Qwest Center. If you read about it in the paper, they have a — they seem to have some unwritten rule — or maybe it’s a written rule — that they can’t use the name. So you will not see that name in the paper for reasons that absolutely baffle me.
顺便提一下，它被称为 Qwest 中心。如果你在报纸上读到关于它的内容，他们似乎有一些不成文的规定——或者可能是成文的规定——他们不能使用这个名字。所以你在报纸上不会看到这个名字，这让我感到非常困惑。
But this is the Qwest Center, and they’ve done a wonderful job with it. And Omaha has 19,500 people here today that otherwise might have to go to Kansas City. So, thank you for thanking them, and now, your question, please. (Applause)
但这里是 Qwest 中心，他们做得非常出色。今天有 19,500 人在奥马哈，否则他们可能得去堪萨斯城。所以，感谢你们感谢他们，现在请提问。（掌声）
37. “I’m the only one that can double-cross you”
“我是唯一一个能背叛你的人”
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is your outlook on buying companies. You have taught us when stocks are priced high, and companies are priced low, then buy companies.
观众成员：我的问题是您对购买公司的看法。您教过我们，当股票价格高而公司价格低时，就买公司。
In the 1960s and ’70s, we did see the rise of the conglomerates. Then came in the pure industry plays. Now, we see a huge amount of money in private equity. And somehow private equity is competing for buying companies.
在 20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代，我们确实看到了企业集团的兴起。然后出现了纯粹的行业运作。现在，我们看到私募股权中有大量资金。而且私募股权正在以某种方式竞争收购公司。
So my question is, what is your outlook on the future of the buyout and the buying company industry?
所以我想问，您对未来收购和购买公司的看法是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you’re absolutely correct that the private equity funds are a form of competition with Berkshire in buying businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你说得完全正确，私募股权基金在收购企业方面确实是伯克希尔的竞争对手。
We don’t really seek to buy businesses cheap, because you’re not going to get the chance to do that. We haven’t been able to do that.
我们并不是真的想以便宜的价格购买企业，因为你不会有这样的机会。我们一直没能做到这一点。
We do get occasional chances to buy them at what we would regard as fair value. You’ll never buy companies as cheap as stocks sometimes get. I mean, sometimes stocks sell for very low valuations compared to intrinsic value.
我们确实偶尔有机会以我们认为的公允价值购买它们。你永远不会以股票有时达到的低价买到公司。我的意思是，有时股票的售价与内在价值相比非常低。
Businesses just don’t do it. I mean, the reason is the prices of stocks, like those junk bonds we talked about earlier, are set in an auction market, and that market can do extreme things. But businesses are sold in a negotiated transaction, and that doesn’t get as extreme.
企业就是不这样做。我的意思是，原因在于股票的价格，就像我们之前谈到的那些垃圾债券，是在拍卖市场中设定的，而那个市场可能会做出极端的事情。但企业是在协商交易中出售的，这不会变得那么极端。
Nevertheless, our preference — our strong preference — is that we would rather buy businesses at fair prices than stocks even a little cheaper. And the private equity funds are our competition.
然而，我们的偏好——强烈的偏好——是，我们宁愿以合理的价格收购企业，而不是以稍微便宜的价格购买股票。私募股权基金是我们的竞争对手。
On the other hand, we have bought a reasonable number of businesses in recent years, and we’ll buy more in the future.
另一方面，近年来我们购买了相当数量的企业，未来我们还会购买更多。
If somebody wants what we are offering, you know, we are somewhat one of a kind, in that we can — we will buy a business, and the people that sold it to us, if they built that business, are really able to run it as if it’s their own indefinitely in the future. So they —
如果有人想要我们提供的东西，您知道，我们是有点独一无二，因为我们可以——我们会收购一个企业，而卖给我们的人，如果他们建立了这个企业，实际上可以像拥有自己的企业一样继续经营下去。所以他们——
If they have a tax reason, if they have a family situation, or whatever, where they want to sell some business they love, and they don’t want to auction it off like a piece of meat, and they don’t want some guy buying it and then leveraging it up, and then reselling a couple years after changing the accounting or something of the sort, they come to us.
如果他们有税务原因，或者有家庭情况，或者其他原因，他们想出售一些他们热爱的业务，但又不想像拍卖一块肉那样拍卖掉，也不想让某个人买下后加杠杆，然后在改变会计处理或类似操作后几年内转售，他们就会来找我们。
And they know they’ll get the result they want. And that happens periodically.
他们知道他们会得到想要的结果。这种情况会周期性地发生。
It doesn’t enable us to buy super bargains or anything like that. It just doesn’t work that way. But it does let us put the money to work at a sensible rate.
它并不能让我们买到超级便宜的东西或类似的东西。事情不是那样运作的。但它确实让我们以合理的利率运用资金。
There will be more people like that. Unfortunately, we need big businesses, and, you know, they don’t come along every day. But as I’ve said, when they — if you find that kind of owner —
会有更多这样的人。不幸的是，我们需要大企业，而且，你知道，它们不是每天都有的。但正如我所说，当他们——如果你找到那种老板——
If I owned a business that was big, and maybe my father had started, my grandfather had started, and I worked a long time for it but for one reason or another I had to monetize it, you know, I would sell to Berkshire.
如果我拥有一家规模很大的企业，可能是我父亲或祖父创办的，我为之工作了很长时间，但由于某种原因我不得不将其变现，你知道，我会卖给伯克希尔。
It’s very simple, because I wouldn’t regard the carving up of it to get perhaps the highest — a higher price — which might or not — might not be higher — but I wouldn’t regard that as the ultimate goal in life.
这很简单，因为我不会把它的分割视为获得可能更高价格的手段——这可能会或可能不会更高——但我不会把那视为人生的最终目标。
I think it’s kind of crazy, you know, to spend — I think it’d be kind of silly to auction off your daughter to whatever, you know, whatever man is willing to pay the most for her. And I feel the same way about a business you’ve created lovingly over decades, and decades, and decades.
我觉得这有点疯狂，你知道的，去花——我觉得拍卖掉你的女儿给任何愿意出最高价的人有点愚蠢。对于你用几十年、几十年、几十年心血创建的企业，我也有同样的感觉。
And we will buy some more. It’s a matter of luck whether it happens in any given quarter, or even any given year.
我们会再买一些。这是否会在某个季度，甚至某一年发生，是运气的问题。
But there’s really no one else can quite make the promises that we can make. I mean, the degree of ownership that I have in Berkshire, and the way I’ve got it set up for the future, where none has to be sold, you know, my promises will probably be about as good as you can get in that arena.
但实际上没有其他人能像我们这样做出承诺。我的意思是，我在伯克希尔的持股程度，以及我为未来设定的方式，根本不需要出售，你知道，我的承诺可能是你在这个领域能得到的最好的承诺。
Most big companies simply can’t do that. If their board of directors, you know, decides they wanted to have a pure play, as you put it, in something. You know, what can be done about it?
大多数大公司根本无法做到这一点。如果他们的董事会决定要在某个领域进行纯粹的投资，如你所说的那样。那么，你知道，能对此做些什么呢？
I tell perspective sellers basically, “I’m the only one that can double-cross you.” I mean — and I can double-cross them. I mean, if I, the next day, want to pull something on them, I — it’s not contractual, what I’ve said to them, in all probability.
我基本上告诉潜在卖家，“我是唯一能背叛你的人。” 我的意思是——我可以背叛他们。我的意思是，如果我第二天想对他们做些什么，我——我对他们说的话很可能不是合同性的。
But nobody else can. We’re not going to get some management consultants in, and they say you ought to rearrange the business, or we’re not going to get Wall Street dictating to us.
但是其他人做不到。我们不会请一些管理顾问来，他们说你应该重新安排业务，或者让华尔街来指挥我们。
And that’s, I think, a significant advantage over time. I think it’ll enable us to buy businesses, but we do have a lot of competition, as you point out.
我认为，这随着时间的推移是一个显著的优势。我认为这将使我们能够收购企业，但正如你所指出的，我们确实面临很多竞争。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s been interesting, though, that we’ve had this private equity competition for a long time, and one way or another we’ve managed to buy a few things. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，这很有趣，尽管我们已经有很长时间的私募股权竞争，但无论如何我们还是设法买了一些东西。（笑声）
38. David Sokol defends MidAmerican’s environmental record
大卫·索科尔为MidAmerican的环保记录辩护
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来看第 5 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Dan Cunningham, and I’m from Boston, Massachusetts, home of the 2004 world champion Boston Red Sox. (Applause and laughter)
观众成员：你好，我叫丹·坎宁安，来自马萨诸塞州波士顿，2004 年世界冠军波士顿红袜队的故乡。（掌声和笑声）
Thank you, Warren and Charlie, for providing this forum, and teaching over the years. It’s much appreciated.
谢谢你们，沃伦和查理，感谢你们提供这个论坛，并多年来的教导。非常感激。
In a recent New York Times magazine cover story titled, “Up in Smoke,” David Sokol, who runs Berkshire’s MidAmerican Energy business was cited as a prominent CEO actively working to roll back the United States Clean Air Act, which 80 percent of Americans view as crucial to our public health.
在最近一期《纽约时报》杂志封面故事中，题为“烟消云散”，伯克希尔旗下中美能源业务的负责人大卫·索科尔被提及为一位积极努力推翻《美国清洁空气法》的知名首席执行官，而 80%的美国人认为该法对我们的公共健康至关重要。
MidAmerican, itself, was cited as a major mercury polluter, among other things.
MidAmerican 本身被列为主要的汞污染者之一，除此之外还有其他问题。
With this in mind, could you see a role for a type of independent oversight committee charged with the purpose of auditing for shareholders the social responsibility of Berkshire’s businesses?
考虑到这一点，您是否认为可以设立一个独立的监督委员会，负责为股东审计伯克希尔公司业务的社会责任？
This committee would monitor costs that Berkshire’s businesses incur for our society, but do not show up anywhere in an income statement. Maybe in Berkshire’s case, this would be a fraction of a person instead of a committee. Thank you.
该委员会将监控伯克希尔公司为我们的社会产生的成本，但这些成本不会出现在损益表中。也许在伯克希尔的情况下，这将是一个人而不是一个委员会的一部分。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Is Dave here? I can’t, it’s hard for me to see here. Do you see Dave? Marc [Hamburg], is David here?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。戴夫在这里吗？我看不清楚。你看到戴夫了吗？马克（汉堡），大卫在这里吗？
We’ll go to a — yeah, he might —
我们会去一个——是的，他可能——
I’d like to have David respond to that, because, you know, I have seen MidAmerican actually lauded in many — a great many respects.
我想让大卫对此作出回应，因为你知道，我在很多方面看到 MidAmerican 受到了赞扬。
I did not see that particular article, but I know that if there were anything being done, that had been judged wrong, I would have heard about it. So maybe David can address that, if he will.
我没有看到那篇特定的文章，但我知道如果有任何事情被认为是错误的，我会听说的。所以也许大卫可以解决这个问题，如果他愿意的话。
Well, he can — there’s a mic. Either come up here, or go to the microphone that’s nearest.
好吧，他可以——那里有一个麦克风。要么到这里来，要么去最近的麦克风那里。
DAVID SOKOL: Yeah, Warren, this is David.
大卫·索科尔：是的，沃伦，我是大卫。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, OK, uh-huh.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，好的，嗯。
DAVID SOKOL: The article actually does not criticize MidAmerican for any air emissions. It criticized me for two years ago being a “Ranger” in President [George W.] Bush’s election.
大卫·索科尔：这篇文章实际上并没有批评中美能源的任何空气排放问题。它批评我两年前在总统乔治·W·布什的选举中担任“游骑兵”。
For what it’s worth, I’m no longer a Ranger, but that was the — the focus of the article was energy CEOs trying to influence legislation.
就其价值而言，我不再是游骑兵，但文章的重点是能源公司首席执行官试图影响立法。
That’s not why I was a Ranger, and frankly, MidAmerican’s environmental policies, I think, rank among the best in the industry.
这不是我成为护林员的原因，坦率地说，我认为中美能源的环保政策在行业中名列前茅。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks, David. Yeah, I’ve never seen any criticism of MidAmerican. And matter of fact — (applause) — David, could you tell them what happened with that J.D. Edwards [J.D. Power] study just recently?
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢，大卫。是的，我从未见过对中美能源的任何批评。事实上——（掌声）——大卫，你能告诉他们最近那个 J.D. Edwards [J.D. Power]研究发生了什么吗？
DAVID SOKOL: Yeah, we were ranked nationally number two in the country for environmental reliability, availability, and customer satisfaction — number one in the Midwest out of 55 utility companies.
大卫·索科尔：是的，我们在全国的环境可靠性、可用性和客户满意度排名第二，在中西部的 55 家公用事业公司中排名第一。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks, Dave. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢，戴夫。（掌声）
39. U.S. has “certainly benefited enormously” by immigration
美国“无疑从移民中受益匪浅”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 6 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Van Argyrakis. I’m from Omaha.
观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是范·阿吉拉基斯。我来自奥马哈。
Many U.S. multi-national corporations depend on the importation of foreign workers.
许多美国跨国公司依赖于外国工人的引进。
What is your opinion on the current state of U.S. immigration law as it applies to the employment of highly-skilled permanent workers?
您对美国移民法目前的状态有什么看法，特别是关于高技能永久工人的雇佣？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to comment on that?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想对此发表评论吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, that’s a subject on which reasonable minds disagree.
查理·芒格：当然，这是一个理智的人会有不同意见的话题。
My personal view is that I’m almost always glad to have very talented people come into the United States, and I’m almost never pleased when the very bottom of the mental barrel comes in. (Laughter)
我个人的看法是，我几乎总是很高兴有非常有才华的人来到美国，而当精神层次最低的人进来时，我几乎从不感到高兴。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We may differ just a bit on that one. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在这个问题上可能会有一点不同。（笑声）
The — this country has certainly benefited enormously over the decades, you know, by immigration.
这个国家几十年来确实从移民中受益匪浅。
We started out with 4 million people in 1790. China had 290 million at that time, just about what we have now. Europe had well over 75 million.
1790 年，我们的人口为 400 万。中国当时有 2.9 亿人，正好是我们现在的人口。欧洲的人口远超过 7500 万。
So you had 70 times as many people in China. You had, probably, 20 times as many people in Europe. We had the same degree of intelligence in China, or in Europe, as we had here. We had similar natural resources. And now this country has well over 30 percent of the GDP of the world.
所以中国的人口是这里的 70 倍。欧洲的人口可能是这里的 20 倍。中国或欧洲的智力水平与我们这里相同。我们有类似的自然资源。现在这个国家的 GDP 占世界的 30%以上。
So it’s a pretty remarkable story. And how to attribute — or how to quantify the various components that entered into that is very difficult, but we’ve certainly been a country characterized by lots of immigration.
所以这是一个相当了不起的故事。如何归因——或者如何量化其中的各种成分是非常困难的，但我们无疑是一个以大量移民为特征的国家。
And whether that is responsible in any way for the incredible record of this country, I don’t know. But I suspect that it was. And I think what Charlie would like to do is perhaps be the admitting officer. And — (laughs) — it would work —
我不知道这是否在任何方面对这个国家的非凡记录负责，但我怀疑是的。我认为查理想做的是或许担任录取官。（笑声）这会运作得很好——
CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re right.
查理·芒格：你是对的。
WARREN BUFFETT: It would work pretty well if Charlie was, but in the absence of that I think — I don’t think, net, this country has been hurt by immigration over time.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果查理是这样的话，这会很有效，但在没有这种情况的情况下，我认为——我不认为从总体上看，这个国家在长期内因移民而受到伤害。
40. Why we don’t split Berkshire’s stock
为什么我们不拆分伯克希尔的股票
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7?
沃伦·巴菲特：第七号？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I would like to thank you for being here.
观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。感谢你们的到来。
Well, my question pertains to price discovery and liquidity. It is a common perception that, unless there is adequate liquidity, price discovery is hurt.
那么，我的问题涉及价格发现和流动性。普遍的看法是，除非有足够的流动性，否则价格发现会受到影响。
Now if liquidity helps price discovery, then does it make sense to split the stock of a company which has a low liquidity problem? As a corollary, why do you consider stock splits and bonus issues to be bad for shareholders in the long run? Thank you.
现在，如果流动性有助于价格发现，那么拆分一家流动性问题较低的公司的股票是否有意义？作为推论，为什么您认为股票拆分和红股在长期对股东不利？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Stock splits, and what else Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：股票拆分，还有什么，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Bonus issues.
查理·芒格：股票分红问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: And what’s the relation, I don’t get it.
沃伦·巴菲特：这有什么关系，我不明白。
CHARLIE MUNGER: He didn’t indicate a relation —
查理·芒格：他没有表明关系——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦。
CHARLIE MUNGER: He just asked you to describe —
查理·芒格：他只是让你描述——
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s just two —
沃伦·巴菲特：这只是两个——
CHARLIE MUNGER: — what’s wrong with both.
查理·芒格：——两者有什么问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s two questions, then. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：那是两个问题。（笑声）
Yeah, well, our — we have explained how we think about stock splits. There’s no religious view against them. We don’t think companies that do them are evil or anything of the sort.
是的，我们已经解释了我们对股票拆分的看法。我们并没有宗教上的反对意见。我们不认为进行股票拆分的公司是邪恶的或类似的。
We do think we’ve got the best group of shareholders in the world, and I think that a meeting like this, to some extent, is evidence of it.
我们确实认为我们拥有世界上最好的股东，我认为这样的会议在某种程度上证明了这一点。
We’ve got people that are more in sync, I think, with the policies of the company. We certainly have people who are more long-term in their view of Berkshire — or their intentions — regarding Berkshire.
我认为我们有更多与公司政策同步的人。我们当然有更多从长远角度看待伯克希尔或对伯克希尔有长期意图的人。
I think we have people that understand their investment in Berkshire better than — well, really better than other large American corporation. We’ve got the lowest turnover of any large American corporation. Now, why is that?
我认为我们有一些人比其他大型美国公司更了解他们在伯克希尔的投资。我们是所有大型美国公司中股东流动率最低的。那这是为什么呢？
Well, people can buy stock in any company they want to. I mean, you could have bought stock in Berkshire, or something else. But there’s this self-selection process of who comes in, and there’s a self-selection process of the people that just say, you know, that company doesn’t interest me.
好吧，人们可以购买任何他们想要的公司的股票。我的意思是，你本可以购买伯克希尔的股票，或者其他公司的股票。但是，谁会进来是一个自我选择的过程，而那些说“你知道，那家公司对我没兴趣”的人也是一个自我选择的过程。
And I would say that people who say they aren’t interested in a stock that sells in the thousands of dollars a share simply because it sells in the thousands of dollars a share, are not — would not as a group be as intelligent, and informed, and long-term in their outlook, and as in sync with the policies of management, as this group.
我会说，那些仅仅因为股票每股售价数千美元就表示不感兴趣的人，作为一个群体来说，并不像这个群体那样聪明、知情、具有长远眼光，并且与管理层的政策保持一致。
It’s not a killer of a thing, obviously. But it’s a sign — it’s a symptom — of people with a somewhat different attitude toward the stocks they own. Now, somebody is going to —
这显然不是一件致命的事情。但这是一个迹象——是一个症状——表明人们对他们所持有的股票有着稍微不同的态度。现在，有人要——
If we have a million and a half Class A equivalent shares — we have a little more than that — outstanding, somebody’s going to own them all. So it’s just a question of who is attracted and who is repelled to your — from your shares.
如果我们有一百五十万股 A 类等价股票——我们实际上有多一点——在外流通，总会有人持有这些股票。所以问题只是是谁被吸引，谁被排斥在你的股票之外。
And I think not splitting, and some other things we do at Berkshire — a number of other things we do at Berkshire — has attracted a group of shareholders that really come the closest to an investment-oriented group, as is almost possible in a widely traded, widely available company.
我认为不拆分，以及我们在伯克希尔做的一些其他事情——我们在伯克希尔做的许多其他事情——吸引了一群股东，他们几乎是可能在广泛交易、广泛可得的公司中最接近投资导向的群体。
And we like the group we’ve got. We’re not looking for the people who think it would be a more attractive stock if, instead of selling at 90,000 a share, it sold at $9 a share. Nothing wrong with those people, but they are —
我们喜欢我们拥有的这个群体。我们不寻找那些认为如果股票不是以每股 90,000 美元出售，而是以每股 9 美元出售会更有吸引力的人。这些人没有错，但他们是——
If we were choosing partners, we would choose the group we have over the people who think a $9 stock is a wonderful thing.
如果我们在选择合作伙伴，我们会选择我们拥有的团队，而不是那些认为 9 美元股票是好东西的人。
Charlie? 查理？
41. Munger: liquidity is not a “great contributor to capitalism”
芒格：流动性不是“对资本主义的伟大贡献者”
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and on the second part of that question, I think the notion, which is taught in so much of modern academia, that liquidity is this — of tradable common stock — is a great contributor to capitalism — I think that is mostly twaddle.
查理·芒格：是的，关于问题的第二部分，我认为现代学术界所教授的观念，即流动性——可交易普通股的流动性——是对资本主义的巨大贡献，我认为这大多是胡说八道。
The GNP of the United States grew at very good rates long before we had highly-liquid markets for common stock.
在我们拥有高度流动性的普通股市场之前，美国的国民生产总值就已经以非常好的速度增长。
I don’t know where people got that silly notion. I think the liquidity gives us these crazy booms, which have many problems as well as virtues.
我不知道人们从哪里得到了那个愚蠢的想法。我认为流动性给了我们这些疯狂的繁荣，这些繁荣既有问题也有优点。
And in England, if you’ll remember, after the South Sea Bubble, England banned tradable common stocks for decades. It was absolutely illegal to have a company so widely held you got a liquid market in the shares, and England did fine during that period when you didn’t have a stock market.
在英国，如果你还记得，在南海泡沫事件之后，英国禁止了可交易的普通股长达数十年。拥有一家广泛持有的公司以至于股票市场流动是绝对非法的，而在没有股票市场的那段时间里，英国发展得很好。
So, if you think that liquidity is a great contributor to civilization, why then you probably believe that all the real estate in America, which is relatively illiquid, hasn’t been developed properly.
所以，如果你认为流动性是对文明的重大贡献者，那么你可能会认为美国所有相对不流动的房地产都没有得到适当的发展。
WARREN BUFFETT: The — [John Maynard] Keynes actually commented on the perversions brought about by liquidity. But of course, the truth is that Berkshire trades on average $50 million or so of stock a day. So there’s very few people that are going to have any problem with Berkshire, the liquidity in the stock.
沃伦·巴菲特：约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯实际上评论过流动性带来的扭曲。但当然，事实是伯克希尔平均每天交易约 5000 万美元的股票。所以几乎没有人会对伯克希尔的股票流动性有任何问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But we’re trying to create more of them.
查理·芒格：但我们正在努力创造更多这样的机会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Uh-huh. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗯哼。
CHARLIE MUNGER: More people who have this big liquidity problem, because they own so much stock.
查理·芒格：更多的人有这个大的流动性问题，因为他们持有太多股票。
42. Buffett’s moral distinction between owning a company or a stock
巴菲特在拥有公司和股票之间的道德区别
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go on to number 8, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请继续第 8 个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, there. This is Michael Angelo (PH) from San Francisco.
观众成员：你好，我是来自旧金山的迈克尔·安吉洛（PH）。
My general question is about how ethical concerns enter into your asset allocation decisions.
我的一般问题是关于伦理问题如何进入你的资产配置决策。
So, for example, I think there’s some strong arguments that can be made that, say, Classic Coke should never be part of anyone’s diet.
例如，我认为可以提出强有力的论据，认为可口可乐不应该出现在任何人的饮食中。
If such an argument could be made, and you were convinced of it, would that change the way that you viewed Coca-Cola Company as part of your portfolio?
如果这样的论点可以成立，并且你对此深信不疑，这会改变你将可口可乐公司视为投资组合一部分的看法吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that’s a hypothetical that simply wouldn’t happen. I mean, I’ve been drinking five of them a day, you know, and maybe it’s the combination of that and peanut brittle, you know, that does the job. But I just feel terrific. The — (Laughter and applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为那是一个根本不会发生的假设。我是说，我每天喝五瓶，你知道的，也许是和花生脆糖的组合，起到了作用。但我就是感觉很好。——（笑声和掌声）
We passed one time on the chance to buy an extraordinarily profitable company, because Charlie and I met the people that ran it. And they were perfectly decent people, too.
我们曾经有一次放弃了购买一家极其盈利的公司的机会，因为查理和我见到了经营这家公司的人。而且他们也是非常正派的人。
And we went down in the lobby of the hotel that we met them in, and we just decided that in the end we didn’t want to be involved in that.
我们下到酒店的大堂，就是我们见到他们的地方，最后我们决定不想参与其中。
On the other hand, I would have bought stock, as a publicly traded stock, in the same company. Charlie will give you his view on that later.
另一方面，我会购买该公司的股票，作为一只上市公司的股份。查理稍后会给你他的看法。
So, I do not have a problem buying stock in companies — marketable securities — the bonds of companies in the market — that engage in activities that I wouldn’t probably endorse myself.
所以，我并不介意购买那些从事我可能不会自己支持的活动的公司的股票——股票和公司债券。
I would have trouble owning outright, and actually directing the activities, of some of those companies.
但如果是直接拥有这些公司的全部股份，并且实际管理它们的活动，我就会感到为难。
But, you know, the — any major retailer in this country is — virtually — is going to be selling cigarettes, for example. And if they’re not declared illegal, it does not bother me to own — it would not bother me to own those retailers outright — or it does not bother me to own the stock.
但是，你知道，这个国家的任何主要零售商几乎都会卖香烟，例如。如果它们没有被宣布为非法，我完全不介意拥有这些零售商——或者我不介意拥有这些股票。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but you wouldn’t buy a company that made the tobacco and concocted the advertisements.
查理·芒格：是的，但你不会买一家生产烟草和策划广告的公司。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, we — and, you know, I can’t tell you perfectly why that, I mean, I can’t tell you that’s the perfect line, or I can’t tell you precisely why that’s where I draw it. But I will tell you that is where I draw it.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们——你知道，我不能完美地告诉你为什么，我的意思是，我不能告诉你那是完美的界限，或者我不能准确地告诉你为什么我在那儿划线。但我会告诉你，那就是我划线的地方。
We would not be in the manufacture of it, but I — we owned stock at one time in R.J. Reynolds. Before it had the LBO, we owned bonds in it. And, you know, I would still be doing it if I liked either the bonds or the stock.
我们不会参与它的制造，但我——我们曾经拥有 R.J. Reynolds 的股票。在它进行杠杆收购之前，我们持有它的债券。而且，你知道，如果我喜欢这些债券或股票，我仍然会这样做。
We would not buy the manufacturer. And like I say, we walked on one that — and we went down to the hotel to talk about it though, too. (Laughs)
我们不会收购这家制造商。就像我说的，我们放弃了一个——不过我们还是去了酒店讨论这件事。（笑）
So we’d have to say that we were thinking about it, but we decided not to do it.
所以我们得说我们考虑过，但决定不去做。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: We didn’t think very long. The — (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我们没有想很久。——（笑声）
We don’t claim to have some kind of perfect morals. You can draw these lines where you wish. But at least we’ve got a huge area of things which is perfectly legal to do, that we think beneath us. So we won’t do them.
我们不声称拥有某种完美的道德标准。你可以根据自己的意愿划定界限。但至少我们有一大片完全合法的事情，我们认为这些事情不值得我们去做。所以我们不会去做。
And we see more and more in America, a culture where just anything that’s unlikely to send you to prison, which looks like it’ll make money, is OK. And that is a very bad development.
我们在美国越来越多地看到一种文化，只要不会让你入狱，看起来能赚钱的事情都可以。这是一个非常糟糕的发展。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but I think it’s a little crazy myself — (applause) — to say that it’s terrible if people eat hamburgers, or eat — or drink Coca-Cola, or eat candy, or anything like that, because they’re likely to gain weight. That is a perfectly optional decision.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但我自己觉得有点疯狂——（掌声）——说如果人们吃汉堡包，或者喝可口可乐，或者吃糖果，或者类似的东西就很糟糕，因为他们可能会增重。这完全是一个可选择的决定。
And who knows whether somebody has lived a happier life, that lives to 75, and they’re overweight condition causes them to die a little sooner than if they lived to 85 and lived on carrots and broccoli, you know, has lived a better life. I know which one I prefer. (Laughter)
谁知道一个活到 75 岁的人是否过得更幸福，而他们的超重状况导致他们比活到 85 岁并只吃胡萝卜和西兰花的人早一点去世，是否过得更好。我知道我更喜欢哪一种。（笑声）
43. Give Buffett a salary bump for his retirement
给巴菲特加薪以备退休
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 9, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请第 9 位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett. I’m Allan Maxwell. My wife and I are shareholders from Omaha. I’m going to keep things simple so you can understand them.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生。我是艾伦·麦克斯韦。我和我的妻子是来自奥马哈的股东。我会尽量简单地说，以便您能理解。
WARREN BUFFETT: Good. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：很好。（笑声）
Allan’s a friend of mine, so he can get away with that.
艾伦是我的朋友，所以他可以这样做而不受责备。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Colonel.
观众成员：谢谢你，上校。
Excluding the Buffett’s stake, I’m going to combine A and B shares. And there are approximately one million A shares outstanding, correct?
排除巴菲特的持股，我将合并 A 股和 B 股。大约有一百万股 A 股在外流通，对吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: That’d be about right, uh-huh .
沃伦·巴菲特：那差不多，对。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK, about. Your salary is approximately — or is — $100,000 a year.
观众成员：好的，大约。您的年薪大约是——或者是——10 万美元。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been stuck there for a while. We’ll talk about the board. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：它已经卡在那里有一段时间了。我们会谈论董事会。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, you’ll be happy with my question.
观众成员：嗯，你会对我的问题感到满意的。
WARREN BUFFETT: You can make it a motion —
沃伦·巴菲特：你可以提出一个动议——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In other words —
观众成员：换句话说——
WARREN BUFFETT: — if you’re heading where I think you are. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果你正朝着我认为的方向走。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In other words, we’re paying you 10 cents a share to manage a $90,000 investment. That’s remarkable in today’s corporate culture. Thank you, Mr. Buffett, thank you. (Applause)
听众成员：换句话说，我们支付你每股 10 美分来管理一笔 90,000 美元的投资。在当今的企业文化中，这真是了不起。谢谢你，巴菲特先生，谢谢你。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, thanks. Allan, thank you. But I have to tell you, as I did last year, I would pay to have this job. I mean, it doesn’t get any better than this.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，谢谢。艾伦，谢谢你。但我得告诉你，就像我去年说的那样，我愿意付钱来做这份工作。我的意思是，没有比这更好的了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, rather than you doing something for us, I would like to suggest that we, the shareholders, do something for you. As a shareholder, I would be willing to pay you 25 cents an A share. (Laughter)
观众成员：嗯，与其让您为我们做些什么，我想建议我们股东为您做些什么。作为股东，我愿意为每股 A 股支付您 25 美分。（笑声）
That way you could save a little extra money for your retirement. (Laughter)
这样你就可以为你的退休生活多存一点钱。（笑声）
Would you support such an idea?
你会支持这样的想法吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Allan, I’m getting Social Security now. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：艾伦，我现在正在领取社会保障金。（笑声）
And that really pretty well takes care of things. My family would go crazy if I made any more money. (Laughter)
这就差不多解决了问题。如果我赚更多的钱，我的家人会疯掉的。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This would help you —
观众成员：这会帮助你——
WARREN BUFFETT: But I appreciate the offer, however.
沃伦·巴菲特：不过，我还是很感谢这个提议。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My heart’s with you, thank you.
观众成员：我的心与你同在，谢谢你。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, thanks, Allan. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢，艾伦。（掌声）
44. Why Berkshire’s insurance companies never have layoffs
为什么伯克希尔的保险公司从不裁员
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 10, and see if we can get 50 cents. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看看第十个，看看能不能得到 50 美分。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about a dollar? (Laughter)
观众成员：一美元怎么样？（笑声）
David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Thank you, Warren and Charlie, for a fabulous weekend and for the discussion about governance in the mutual fund industry in the shareholder letter.
大卫·温特斯，新泽西州山湖市。感谢沃伦和查理带来的精彩周末，以及在股东信中关于共同基金行业治理的讨论。
Specifically, have you altered the compensation potential for the insurance underwriters to make sure, as Charlie has described, the incentive-caused bias creates an environment that encourages writing new policies that, when the tide goes out again in the property and casualty business, Berkshire Hathaway minimizes losses, maximizes float, while compensating underwriters for not writing business?
具体来说，您是否改变了保险核保人的薪酬潜力，以确保正如查理所描述的那样，激励造成的偏见创造出一种环境，鼓励写新保单，当财产和意外伤害业务的潮水再次退去时，伯克希尔·哈撒韦能够最大限度地减少损失，最大化浮存金，同时补偿核保人不开展业务？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you, that feeds into an interesting set of slides I’ve got, if I can find them here to tell the projector what to put up, because that’s a very important point you raise.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，谢谢，这正好引出了我准备的一组有趣的幻灯片，如果我能找到它们来告诉投影仪要放什么，因为你提到的这个点非常重要。
I mean, we are very big in insurance, and having the wrong incentives in place could be very harmful.
我的意思是，我们在保险业非常大，而设置错误的激励措施可能会非常有害。
So let’s put up a couple of slides. Let’s put up slide number one, if we would, please.
那么让我们放上几张幻灯片。请放上第一张幻灯片。
Slide number one is the situation at Berkshire, and Shirley, I’ll give you one of these, but that’s the situation at Berkshire shortly before we bought National Indemnity.
幻灯片一是伯克希尔的情况，雪莉，我会给你一份，但这是我们购买国家赔偿公司前不久伯克希尔的情况。
There’s our balance sheet there. And as you’ll notice, we just had a few million dollars extra. We had about $20 million tied up in the textile business.
这是我们的资产负债表。正如您所注意到的，我们刚刚有几百万美元的盈余。我们在纺织业务中投入了大约 2000 万美元。
And then I heard that Jack Ringwalt wanted to sell his company. Some of you here in the audience know him. He — for 15 minutes every year, Jack would feel like selling his company. He would get mad at something or other.
然后我听说杰克·林瓦尔特想要卖掉他的公司。这里的一些观众认识他。他——每年有 15 分钟，杰克会想要卖掉他的公司。他会因为某些事情生气。
And so my friend Charlie Heider knew Jack pretty well, and I’d said to Charlie, “Charlie, next time Jack is in heat, have him, you know, get him over here.” (Laughter)
所以我的朋友查理·海德尔对杰克很了解，我对查理说：“查理，下次杰克情绪发作的时候，让他过来。”（笑声）
And so Jack, early in 1967, came by 11:30, 11:45 in the morning, and said he’d had it with insurance, and with the insurance regulators and everything, he’d like to sell. So we bought it.
于是，杰克在 1967 年初，大约上午 11:30 或 11:45 过来，说他受够了保险、保险监管机构和一切，他想卖掉。所以我们买下了。
Now, we bought, that was the — made a major — that’s when we really embarked on what has happened subsequently.
现在，我们买了，那是——做了一个重大——这是我们真正开始实施后续发展战略的重大决策。
As you can see from that slide, the following year the textile business made all of $55,000. So sticking with textiles would not have been a great idea. We spent $8 1/2 million to buy National Indemnity.
正如你从那张幻灯片中看到的，第二年纺织业务总共赚了 55,000 美元。因此，坚持纺织业并不是一个好主意。我们花了 850 万美元收购了 National Indemnity。
Now, on the next slide, slide two, you will see a record like has never been, I don’t think there’s another insurance company in the world that has a record like this. That’s the premium volume of National Indemnity’s traditional business.
现在，在下一张幻灯片，幻灯片二，你将看到一个前所未有的记录，我认为世界上没有另一家保险公司有这样的记录。这是国家赔偿公司传统业务的保费额。
And you will see a company that went from 79 million in that first year of premiums — if you go all the way back to the time we bought it — it was 16 million, but by 1980 we were up to 79 million.
你会看到一家公司从第一年的保费 7900 万——如果你回到我们购买它的时候——是 1600 万，但到 1980 年我们已经达到 7900 万。
And you will see that in what was known as the “hard market” of the mid-’80s, we got up to 366 million.
你会看到，在 80 年代中期被称为“艰难市场”的时期，我们达到了 3.66 亿。
And then we took it down — not intentionally, but just because the business became less attractive — all the way from 366 million down to 55 million. And now the market became more attractive in the last few years, and it soared up to almost $600 million.
然后我们把它降下来了——不是故意的，而是因为业务变得不那么有吸引力——从 3.66 亿一直降到 5500 万。现在市场在过去几年变得更有吸引力，飙升到近 6 亿美元。
I don’t think there’s a public company in America that would feel they could survive a record of volume going down like that, year after year after year after year.
我不认为美国有其他上市公司会觉得它们能以这样的记录生存下来，年复一年地保费量不断下降。
But that was the culture of National Indemnity. It was the culture started by Jack Ringwalt, and it was the culture all the way through several other managers, Phil Liesche, and Rolly [Roland] Miller, to Don Wurster, who has done a fabulous job. And we don’t worry about premium volume.
但这就是国家赔偿公司的文化。这是由杰克·林格沃尔特创立的文化，并且贯穿于其他几位经理，菲尔·利舍和罗利·米勒，到唐·沃斯特，他做得非常出色。而且我们不担心保费收入。
But if you’re not going to worry about premium volume, then you have to take a look at slide three. Because if the silent message had gone out to our employees that unless you write a lot of business, you’re going to lose your job, they would have written a lot of business. You could —
但是，如果你不打算担心保费收入，那么你必须看看第三张幻灯片。因为如果无声的信息传达给我们的员工，除非你做很多业务，否则你会失去工作，他们就会做很多业务。你可以——
National Indemnity can write a billion dollars’ worth of business in any month it wanted to, all it has to do is offer silly prices. If you offer a silly price, brokers will find you in the middle of the ocean at four in the morning. I mean, you cannot afford to do that.
国家赔偿公司可以在任何一个月内写下价值十亿美元的业务，只要它愿意，所要做的就是提供荒谬的价格。如果你提供一个荒谬的价格，经纪人会在凌晨四点在大海中找到你。我的意思是，你不能这样做。
So what we have always told people in our insurance businesses generally, specifically at National Indemnity, is that if they write no business, their job is not in jeopardy.
所以我们一直告诉我们保险业务中的人，特别是在国家赔偿公司，如果他们没有业务，他们的工作不会有危险。
We cannot afford to have our unspoken message to employees, that you write business, or your job, or the guy sitting next to you’s, you know, may be lost.
我们不能让员工感受到这样一个未明说的信息：你要么做出业绩，否则你的工作，或者你旁边那个人的工作，可能会丢掉。
So when we bulged up to 366 million, we — employment went up modestly, and when we went all the way down, you’ll see it trickle downward, but that was all by attrition. We never had a layoff during that period. Other people would have, but we didn’t.
所以当我们膨胀到 3.66 亿时，我们——就业略有增加，当我们一路下降时，你会看到它逐渐减少，但那都是通过自然减员实现的。在那段时间里，我们从未裁员。其他人可能会裁员，但我们没有。
And now we’re going back up some, and we’ll go back down again at some time in the future.
现在我们要往上走一些，未来的某个时候我们会再往下走。
Now, if you go to the next slide, you’ll see that that created an expense ratio that went up dramatically, up as high as 41 percent in 1999, as volume shrunk back. And when we were writing a lot of business, our expense ratio was as low as 25.9.
现在，如果你翻到下一张幻灯片，你会看到这导致了费用比率急剧上升，1999 年高达 41%，因为业务量缩减。而当我们业务量很大时，我们的费用比率低至 25.9%。
Now, some companies would feel that was intolerable, but what we feel is intolerable is writing bad business. And again, we can take an expense ratio that’s out of line, but we can’t afford to write bad business. For one thing, if you get a culture of writing bad business, it’s almost important to get rid of.
现在，一些公司会觉得这是不可容忍的，但我们认为不可容忍的是做不好的生意。同样，我们可以承受不合理的费用比率，但我们不能承受承保不好的生意。首先，如果形成了承保不好的生意的文化，几乎就必须要消除。
So we would rather suffer of having too much overhead, than we would want to teach our employees that to retain their jobs, they needed to write any damn thing that came along, because that’s a very hard habit to get rid of once you get hooked on it.
所以我们宁愿承受过多的管理费用，也不愿教导员工为了保住工作而随便写任何东西，因为一旦养成这种习惯，就很难摆脱。
Now, move on to slide number five, you will see what the result has been of that policy. And it’s been that we had a few years, bad years, in the early ’80s — that’s what led to that hard market. But even with a high expense ratio, you’ll see that we made money underwriting in virtually every year.
现在，请移到第五张幻灯片，您将看到该政策的结果。我们在 80 年代初经历了几年的艰难时期——这导致了那个困难的市场。但即使费用比率很高，您会看到我们几乎每年都通过承保赚钱。
You’ll see the year 2001 at 108.4, but that will, in my view, that will come down. I think that will turn out to be quite a good year. These are the — that year is not fully developed yet.
你会看到 2001 年是 108.4，但在我看来，那会下降。我认为那一年会是相当好的一年。这些是——那一年还没有完全发展。
Now, you’ll see in 1980 — in ’86 — we had this incredible year, when we wrote at 69.3, that’s a 30 percent underwriting margin. And the nice thing about it is, we did it with the most volume we ever had to that point, 366 million.
现在，你会看到在 1980 年——在 1986 年——我们有一个令人难以置信的年份，当时我们的承保比率是 69.3，这意味着 30%的承保利润率。更好的是，我们在当时创下了最高的承保量，达到 3.66 亿。
So we coined money when we wrote huge amounts of business, and we made a little money when we wrote small amounts of business.
所以，当我们做大量业务时，我们赚了很多钱，而当我们做少量业务时，我们赚了一点钱。
So it’s absolutely imperative in our view, and I think we’re almost the only insurance company like this — certainly public — in the world that sends the absolutely unequivocal message to the people that are associated with us, that they will never be laid off because of lack of volume, and therefore, we don’t want them to write one bit of bad business.
因此，在我们看来，这绝对是至关重要的，我认为我们几乎是世界上唯一这样做的保险公司——当然是上市公司——向与我们相关的人传达绝对明确的信息，即他们永远不会因为业务量不足而被解雇，因此，我们不希望他们做任何不良业务。
And we’ll make mistakes, and we’ll have a high expense ratio when business is slow, but we’ll win the game. And that’s what National Indemnity has done over a period of time.
我们会犯错误，当业务缓慢时，我们的费用比率会很高，但我们会赢得比赛。这就是国家赔偿公司在一段时间内所做的。
National Indemnity was a no-name company 30 years ago operating through a general agency system which everybody said was obsolete.
30 年前，国家赔偿公司还是一家无名公司，通过一个被大家认为过时的普通代理系统运营。
It had no patents, no real estate, no copyrights, no nothing, that distinguished it, essentially, from other insurance — dozens of other insurance companies could do the same thing. But they have a record almost like no one else’s because they had discipline. You know, they really knew what they were about.
它没有专利，没有房地产，没有版权，没有任何东西能使它本质上区别于其他保险公司——几十家其他保险公司都可以做同样的事情。但他们有几乎无人能及的记录，因为他们有纪律。你知道，他们真的知道自己在做什么。
And they’ve stayed with that. In fact they’ve intensified it over time. And their record has left, you know, other people in the dust.
他们一直坚持这一点。事实上，随着时间的推移，他们更加强化了这一点。他们的成绩让其他人望尘莫及。
It wouldn’t be a record you would point to Wall Street, you know, if you went to Wall Street with that record alone in 1990 or 1995, they’d say, “What’s wrong with you?”
如果你在 1990 年或 1995 年仅凭那份记录去华尔街，你知道，那不会是一个你会向华尔街展示的记录，他们会说：“你怎么了？”
But the answer’s nothing’s wrong with it. And you put your finger on having the incentives in place to write the right kind of business for the shareholders at Berkshire. And we try to think those things through.
但答案是没有问题。你指出了为伯克希尔的股东制定正确的业务激励措施的重要性。我们努力仔细考虑这些事情。
I mean, you can’t run a — you can’t run an auto company without having layoffs. You know, you can’t run a steel company that’s this way. But this is the right way to run an insurance company.
我的意思是，你不能在没有裁员的情况下经营一家汽车公司。你知道，你不能这样经营一家钢铁公司。但这是经营保险公司的正确方式。
And that’s why these cookie-cutter approaches to employment practices, or bonuses, and all that are nonsense. You have to think through the situation that faces you in a given industry with its given competitive conditions, and its own economic characteristics.
这就是为什么这些千篇一律的就业做法或奖金等等都是无稽之谈。你必须考虑在特定行业中面临的情况，以及其特定的竞争条件和自身的经济特征。
Charlie, you want to comment on that?
查理，你想对此发表评论吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the main thing is that practically nobody else does it. And yet to me it’s obvious it’s the way to go.
查理·芒格：嗯，主要是几乎没有其他人这样做。然而对我来说，很明显这是正确的做法。
There’s a lot in Berkshire that is like that. It’s just a little different from the way other people do it, partly the luxury of having a controlling shareholder of strong opinions.
在伯克希尔有很多这样的情况。它只是与其他人做事的方式有些不同，部分原因是拥有一个有强烈意见的控股股东的奢侈。
That accounts for this. It would be hard for a committee, including a lot of employees, to come up with these decisions.
这就是这一切的原因。对于一个委员会，包括许多员工来说，很难做出这样的决定。
45. “PetroChina was both cheaper and had less risk”
“中石油既便宜又风险较小”
WARREN BUFFETT: We go to number 11. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 11 号。（掌声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, my name is Andy Peake, and I’m from Weston, Connecticut.
观众成员：下午好，我叫安迪·皮克，来自康涅狄格州的韦斯顿。
As a keen China watcher, I was very interested in your PetroChina investment.
作为一个热衷于观察中国的人，我对你在中国石油的投资非常感兴趣。
Could you please tell us more about your thought process on investing in a complicated, opaque country like China, and PetroChina?
您能否详细说明一下您在像中国这样复杂、不透明的国家以及在中国石油公司投资时的思考过程？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, PetroChina itself is not a complicated or opaque company. You know, the country, you know, has obviously, different characteristics in many respects than the United States.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，中石油本身不是一个复杂或不透明的公司。你知道，这个国家在许多方面显然与美国有不同的特征。
But the company is very similar to big oil companies in the world. I — and I — PetroChina may have been the fourth largest — fourth most profitable — oil company in the world last year. I may be wrong on that.
但这家公司与世界上的大型石油公司非常相似。我——而且我——中石油可能是去年世界上第四大——第四最赚钱的——石油公司。我可能在这方面错了。
But they produce 80 or 85 percent as much crude daily as Exxon does, as I remember. And it’s a big, big company. And it’s not complicated.
但据我记得，他们每天生产的原油量是埃克森美孚的 80%或 85%。这是一家非常非常大的公司。而且这并不复杂。
I mean, you know, obviously, a company with half a million employees, and all of that. But a big integrated oil company, it’s fairly easy to get your mind around the economic characteristics that will exist in the business.
我的意思是，你知道，显然，一家拥有五十万员工的公司，以及所有这些。但对于一家大型综合石油公司来说，理解其业务中存在的经济特征相对容易。
And in terms of being opaque, actually their annual report may well tell you more about that business, you know, than you will find from reading the reports of other oil giants.
就不透明性而言，实际上他们的年度报告可能会比你从阅读其他石油巨头的报告中了解到的更多信息。
And they do one thing that I particularly like, which other oil companies don’t, at least to my knowledge, is that they tell you they will pay out X percent, I think it’s 45 percent of their earnings, absent some change in policy.
而且他们做了一件我特别喜欢的事情，这是其他石油公司没有做的，至少据我所知，就是他们会告诉你他们将支付 X 百分比，我认为是 45%的收益，除非政策有所改变。
But I like the idea of knowing in a big enterprise like that that 45 percent of what they earn is going to come to Berkshire, and the remainder will be plowed back.
但我喜欢这样的想法：在那样的大企业中，他们赚取的 45%将归伯克希尔，其余的将被再投资。
It was bought not because it was in China, but it was bought simply because it was very, very cheap in relation to earnings, in relation to reserves, in relation to daily oil production, and relation to refining capacity.
它之所以被购买，不是因为它在中国，而是因为它在收益、储备、每日石油产量和炼油能力方面都非常非常便宜。
Whatever metric you wanted to use, it was far cheaper than Exxon, or BP, or Shell, or companies like that.
无论你想用什么指标，它都比埃克森、美孚、壳牌或类似的公司便宜得多。
Now, you can say it should be cheaper, because you don’t what’ll happen with it 90 percent owned by the government in China, and that’s obviously a factor that what — you stick in valuation. But I did not think that was a factor that accounted for the huge differential in the price at which it could be bought.
现在，你可以说它应该更便宜，因为你不知道在中国政府拥有 90%股份的情况下会发生什么，这显然是一个影响估值的因素。但我不认为这是导致其购买价格巨大差异的因素。
And, you know, so far it looks OK on that basis.
而且，你知道，到目前为止看起来还不错。
We weren’t — we aren’t there because it’s China, but we’re not avoiding it because it’s China, either. We just — we stick in a fairly appropriate number.
我们不是——我们不在那里是因为那是中国，但我们也不是因为那是中国而回避它。我们只是——我们保持一个相当合适的数量。
But if you read the annual report of PetroChina, I think that there’s no — you will have as good an understanding of the company as you would if you read the annual report of any of the other big oil majors.
但是，如果你阅读中国石油的年度报告，我认为你对这家公司的了解不会逊色于阅读其他大型石油公司年度报告时的理解。
And then you would factor in your own thinking about whether there could be some huge disruption in Chinese-American relationships or something of the sort, where you would lose for reasons other than what happened in terms of world oil prices, and that sort of thing. But we’re happy with it.
然后你会考虑自己的想法，比如中美关系是否会出现一些巨大的破坏，或者类似的事情，你会因为其他原因而遭受损失，而不是因为世界油价的变化之类的事情。但我们对此感到满意。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.
查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。
If a thing is cheap enough, obviously you can afford a little more country risk, or regulatory risk, or whatever. This is not complicated.
如果一件东西足够便宜，显然你可以承担更多的国家风险、监管风险或其他风险。这并不复杂。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you can — Yukos, as you know, is a very big Russian oil company. And in evaluating Russia versus China, in terms of country risk, you know, you can make your own judgments.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你可以——正如你所知，尤科斯是一家非常大的俄罗斯石油公司。在评估俄罗斯与中国的国家风险时，你可以自行判断。
But in our view, something like PetroChina was both cheaper and had less risk. But other people might see that differently.
但在我们看来，像中国石油这样的公司既便宜又风险较小。但其他人可能会有不同的看法。
46. Dubious asbestos claims are taking compensation from true victims
可疑的石棉索赔正在从真正的受害者那里夺走赔偿
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to number 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们将去第 12 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. My name is Hugh Stephenson. I’m a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia. This question is for both of you.
观众成员：下午好，先生们。我的名字是休·史蒂芬森。我是来自乔治亚州亚特兰大的股东。这个问题是给你们两位的。
If you would both comment on the subject of tort reform, specifically asbestos tort. And if you could construct an optimal solution, how would you construct it, balancing the interest of legitimate plaintiffs versus the attorneys, versus the opportunists?
如果你们两位能就侵权改革的话题发表评论，特别是石棉侵权。如果你能构建一个最佳解决方案，你会如何构建它，以平衡合法原告、律师和机会主义者的利益？
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Charlie’s the lawyer, so he’s going to get to answer this one.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，查理是律师，所以他会来回答这个问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: As a matter of fact, that is an easy question.
查理·芒格：事实上，这是一个简单的问题。
What’s happened in asbestos is that a given group of people get mesothelioma, that came — which is a terrible form of lung cancer that kills people — really only from asbestos. And those people got it from somebody’s asbestos. And that’s one group of claimants.
石棉的问题在于，一群人患上了间皮瘤，这是一种可怕的肺癌，几乎只由石棉引起。这些人是因为某些人的石棉而患病的。这就是一组索赔人。
Then there’s another group of claimants, and these are people who’ve smoked two packs a day of cigarettes most of their lives, and they’ve got one little spot here or there, in an elderly lung.
然后还有另一组索赔者，他们是大部分时间每天抽两包香烟的人，他们的老年肺部这里或那里有一个小斑点。
And God knows what the spot is, but an enterprising lawyer can get an enterprising physician, who just happens to find that every damn spot in any lung must be asbestos-caused.
而上帝知道那是什么斑点，但一个有进取心的律师可以找到一个有进取心的医生，他恰好发现任何肺部的每一个该死的斑点都必须是由石棉引起的。
And once you’ve got one expert witness whom you can bribe, in effect, to say that, you’ve got a claim that can be filed.
一旦你有一个可以贿赂的专家证人来这样说，你就有了可以提出的索赔。
And so you get millions of claims on behalf of people who have no symptoms, and who say that I’m worried about getting cancer from this spot that my attorney’s doctor says was caused as asbestos.
因此，你会看到数以百万计的索赔，这些索赔是代表那些没有症状的人提出的，他们说我担心会因为我律师的医生说是由石棉引起的这个地方而得癌症。
There isn’t enough in the companies that made the asbestos to pay off everybody. And what happens is that a huge percentage of the money does not go to the people that got the cancer, or another group of people who got terrible lung impairment that is obvious.
制造石棉的公司没有足够的资金来赔偿所有人。结果是，大部分资金并没有流向那些患上癌症的人，或者另一群明显患有严重肺损伤的人。
But that’s another small group relative to these people who just have one little spot and are — and now say they are worried about getting cancer.
但与那些只有一个小斑点并且现在说他们担心患癌症的人相比，这又是一个相对较小的群体。
And they can file those cases where they say they’re worried in some state, usually a southern state, where they’ve got a jury pool that just hates all big corporations.
他们可以在那些他们声称担心的州提起这些案件，通常是在南方的某个州，那里的陪审团对所有大公司都怀有敌意。
And so you’ve got an industry — and of course the lawyers who are representing the people that aren’t hurt are really stealing money from the people who are hurt.
因此，你有一个行业——当然，那些代表未受伤害者的律师实际上是在从受伤害者那里偷钱。
And the guy who gets mesothelioma doesn’t get as much as he should. And all these other people are getting money they’re not entitled to.
那个得了间皮瘤的人没有得到他应得的那么多。而所有这些其他人却得到了他们无权获得的钱。
It’s a bonkers system. But with federalism the way it is, there’s just no way to stop it.
这是一个疯狂的系统。但由于联邦制的现状，根本无法阻止它。
And the United States courts — United States Supreme Court — refused to enter it, and just grab hold and make a decision. And so it just goes on, and on, and on, and the claims come in.
美国法院——美国最高法院——拒绝介入，只是抓住并做出决定。因此，这件事就这样一直拖下去，索赔不断出现。
I think the Manville Trust had more new claims come in last year than in any year in history.
我认为曼维尔信托去年收到的新索赔比历史上任何一年都多。
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s correct.
沃伦·巴菲特：那是正确的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And they have mined and sold asbestos for the last time, what 35 years ago, or —?
查理·芒格：他们最后一次开采和销售石棉是什么时候，35 年前，还是——？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And it just never stops.
查理·芒格：它就是永不停歇。
The people who are trying to buy these people off, it’s like trying to douse a fire by pouring gasoline on it, because word processing machines can grind out these phony claims, and the doctors can ground up — grind out these phony opinions.
那些试图收买这些人的人，就像试图用汽油浇灭火焰一样，因为文字处理机可以制造出这些虚假的索赔，而医生可以制造出这些虚假的意见。
And so, a huge proportion of all the money that’s available to pay people who’ve suffered from asbestos goes to lawyers, experts, doctors, contingent fees to the lawyers, defense lawyers.
因此，可用于赔偿石棉受害者的所有资金中，有很大一部分流向了律师、专家、医生、律师的或有费用和辩护律师。
I think — is it something like 20, 25 percent of the money is flowing through to people who were injured? So it’s a total national disgrace.
我认为——大约有 20%、25%的资金流向了受伤的人？所以这完全是国家的耻辱。
The only people who have the power to fix it would either be the Supreme Court of the United States or Congress.
唯一有权力解决此问题的人要么是美国最高法院，要么是国会。
The Supreme Court — some people would say rightly, other people would say in too chicken a fashion — ducked the issue. That means the only party that has the power to fix it is Congress. And Congress so far, given the politics, has not fixed it.
最高法院——有些人会说这是正确的，另一些人会说这是过于胆小的方式——回避了这个问题。这意味着唯一有权解决这个问题的是国会。而到目前为止，鉴于政治因素，国会尚未解决这个问题。
Once you get wrongdoers so rich, they get this enormous political power to prevent change in the laws that are enriching them.
一旦让不法之徒变得如此富有，他们就会获得巨大的政治权力来阻止改变使他们致富的法律。
I mean, it means that we should all be more vigilant about stepping on these wrongs when they’re small. Because when they get large, they’re very hard to stop.
我的意思是，我们都应该更加警惕，在这些错误还小的时候就加以制止。因为当它们变大时，就很难阻止了。
But it would be easy to fix this. The right way to fix it, we just are not going to pay off on these tiny claims.
但这很容易解决。正确的解决方法是，我们只是不打算支付这些小额索赔。
WARREN BUFFETT: But Johns Manville — we own Johns Manville. They went bankrupt. They were the first, at least big one, that asbestos took into bankruptcy, and probably on the history of things, they somewhat deserved it, I think, Charlie. Isn’t that right?
沃伦·巴菲特：但是约翰斯·曼维尔——我们拥有约翰斯·曼维尔。他们破产了。他们是第一个被石棉拖入破产的公司，至少是第一个大公司。在历史上，他们可能有点罪有应得，我想，查理。不是吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Their behavior was among the worst in the history of American corporations.
查理·芒格：他们的行为是美国公司历史上最糟糕的行为之一。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: They knew this stuff was causing terrible injury, and they deliberately covered it up, time after time, and year after year, to make more money. There’s no doubt about the guilt of the original management at Johns Manville.
查理·芒格：他们知道这些东西会造成严重伤害，并且一次又一次、年复一年地故意掩盖事实，以赚取更多的钱。约翰斯·曼维尔公司原管理层的罪责毋庸置疑。
WARREN BUFFETT: So they went bankrupt in the early ’80s, and out of that bankruptcy was formed something, as Charlie mentioned, called the Manville Personal Injury Trust. We’ve got — have no connection with that.
沃伦·巴菲特：所以他们在 80 年代初破产了，从那次破产中形成了一个东西，正如查理提到的，叫做曼维尔人身伤害信托。我们与此没有任何联系。
I mean, this is a new company that we bought a few years ago, and this company has no connection with that except the historical — history.
我的意思是，这是我们几年前收购的一家新公司，这家公司除了历史之外与那没有任何联系。
The — but the Manville Personal Injury Trust was established, and had over time — had a couple billion dollars in it.
但是，曼维尔人身伤害信托基金已经成立，并且随着时间的推移，里面有几十亿美元。
And as Charlie said, last year — it’s been around now for almost, I would say, close to 20 years — and last year they had a record number of claims introduced.
正如查理所说，去年——我想说这已经存在了将近 20 年——去年他们创下了引入索赔的记录数量。
They didn’t have a record number because of the incidents of asbestos compared to the ones that were prevailing at the time it was established, or something of the sort. It’s just that it’s become a honey pot.
他们没有创纪录的数字，因为与建立时的情况相比，石棉事件的数量有所增加，或者类似的情况。只是因为它已经变成了一个蜜罐。
And as a result, the Mansville Personal Injury Trust is now paying out five percent because their 2 billion will only go so far. They’re paying five percent of claims.
因此，曼斯维尔人身伤害信托现在只支付百分之五，因为他们的 20 亿资金有限。他们支付索赔的百分之五。
So as Charlie says, the guy that’s got a — that has really been drastically injured by asbestos gets this tiny fraction, and the tens of thousands of claimants for whom it’s a gleam in the eye, or rather a gleam in their lawyer’s eye, perhaps, also get their five percent.
所以正如查理所说，那些真正因石棉而受到严重伤害的人只得到很小的一部分，而成千上万的索赔者——对他们来说这只是一个希望，或者更确切地说，是他们律师眼中的希望——也得到了他们的 5%。
And it’s, you know, it’s not the right way to do it, but it’s very hard to correct.
你知道，这不是正确的方法，但很难纠正。
We’ve observed the asbestos legislation over the — proposed legislation — over the last year. And in the end, what they came up with, we did not support because it didn’t get the answer that’s needed.
在过去的一年中，我们观察了石棉立法——拟议的立法。最终，他们提出的方案我们没有支持，因为它没有得到所需的答案。
And it was Charlie’s and, you know, my view that the Supreme Court, when they ducked it, I mean, they left open a can of worms which will be around for decades, and decades, and decades. And the right people will not get compensated.
这是查理和我的观点，最高法院在回避这个问题时，留下了一个将持续几十年的麻烦。而且，合适的人将得不到补偿。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And those of you who want to be cynical ought to look into it, and see the perjury.
查理·芒格：那些想要持怀疑态度的人应该调查一下，看看是否有伪证。
What’s happened, of course, is that all the really horrible people pretty well are broke and gone, and maybe there’s some money left in a trust here or there. But by and large, there isn’t enough money.
当然，发生的事情是，所有真正可怕的人几乎都破产了，消失了，也许在某个信托基金里还剩下一些钱。但总的来说，钱不够。
But now, there’re, like, three solvent people left. And you’ve got some little spot, or something or other. And by a strange coincidence, every one of those people can only remember three names of products that —
但现在只剩下大约三位有偿债能力的公司。而你们有一小块斑点，或者其他东西。而奇怪的是，这些人每个人都只能记住三个产品的名字——
WARREN BUFFETT: Might’ve caused it?
沃伦·巴菲特：可能引起了它？
CHARLIE MUNGER: — somehow saw, that might’ve caused it. And it’s an amazing coincidence, the three that are left solvent are the only names he can remember.
查理·芒格：——不知怎么地看到了，这可能是原因。而且这是一个惊人的巧合，剩下的三个有偿付能力的公司是他唯一能记住的名字。
And so you — it’s obvious you have a vast amount of perjury being suborned by practicing lawyers. It’s not a pretty picture.
所以，很明显，你有大量的伪证被执业律师教唆。这不是一个美好的画面。
47. Dividends vs stock buybacks
股息与股票回购
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to microphone 1.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来听听 1 号麦克风。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name’s Charlie Rice, and I’m a stockholder in from St. Louis, Missouri.
观众成员：你好，我叫查理·赖斯，我是来自密苏里州圣路易斯的股东。
I’d appreciate hearing your comments on publicly-held companies using their cash for dividends versus stock buybacks?
我很想听听你对上市公司使用现金进行分红与股票回购的看法
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we — the equation is pretty simple, but the practice doesn’t necessarily follow logic. The —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们——这个公式很简单，但实践不一定遵循逻辑。这个——
It’s obviously — as long as you’re telling the truth to your shareholders about what’s going on so that you aren’t manipulating the stock downward or something — when a stock can be bought well below its business value, that probably is the best use of cash.
显然，只要你如实告知股东正在发生的事情，以免操纵股票下跌或其他情况，当一只股票的购买价格远低于其商业价值时，这可能是现金的最佳用途。
It’s something The Washington Post did on a huge scale back in the 1970s. Teledyne may have bought 90 percent, or something, or close to it, of their stock back.
这是《华盛顿邮报》在 20 世纪 70 年代大规模进行的事情。Teledyne 可能回购了他们 90%或接近 90%的股票。
And that was the reason a very significant percentage of companies bought stock back in the past, because they actually thought it was selling for less than it was worth.
这就是过去许多公司回购股票的原因，因为他们实际上认为股票的售价低于其实际价值。
Like I say, that that can be abused if you do various things to bury your stock in one way or another, but that wasn’t the usual case.
正如我所说，如果你采取各种措施来压低你的股价，这可能会被滥用，但这并不是通常的情况。
Stock repurchases were relatively unpopular in those days. They’ve become quite popular now.
在那些日子里，股票回购相对不受欢迎。现在它们变得相当受欢迎。
And to the extent that I’ve been around a good number of them, and been able to pick up on what I thought was the underlying rationale, if not the professed rationale, you know, I think it’s often done for people that are hoping that it causes their stock price not to go down, and their — and often done at prices that don’t really make a lot of sense for continuing shareholders.
在我观察到的许多情况下，回购的潜在动机，与他们所宣称的动机并不一致。我认为，回购通常是出于希望股价不下跌的考虑，且回购的价格往往对继续持有股票的股东来说并没有太多意义。
If we wanted to return a bunch of cash to shareholders, we would — if our stock was undervalued — we would go to the shareholders, and say, “We think it’s cheap, and we think that this cash can be better used by you than by us.
如果我们想把一大笔现金返还给股东，我们会——如果我们的股票被低估——我们会去找股东，并说：“我们认为它很便宜，我们认为这笔现金由你们使用会比我们使用更好。”
“And we will, therefore, have — be repurchasing at what we think is a discount intrinsic value.” And the people that remain will be better off, and the people that get out will get out at a little bit better price than they would otherwise.
“因此，我们将以我们认为是折扣的内在价值进行回购。” 留下的人会更好，而离开的人会以比他们原本能得到的稍微好一点的价格离开。
In terms of dividends, you get into an expectational situation. And for most companies that follow a — that pay a cash dividend — it doesn’t make sense to bounce around the dividend from year to year, although private companies frequently do that.
至于股息，你就进入了一个期望的状况。对于大多数支付现金股息的公司来说，从年到年变化股息是没有意义的，尽管私营公司经常这样做。
And we do it ourselves with our subsidiaries. They — some subsidiary can pay us a lot of money one year, and not so much money the next year.
我们通过子公司自己来做。他们——有些子公司某一年可以支付我们很多钱，而下一年可能就没有那么多。
But with public companies, people do — a lot of people do buy stocks to obtain dividends, and they hope for regularity, and that there’s a signally aspect to it and everything.
但是对于上市公司来说，很多人确实购买股票以获得股息，他们希望股息具有规律性，并且这其中有一个信号方面的意义。
So I would say that once you establish a dividend policy with a public company, you should think a long time before you change that policy in a material way.
因此，我会说，一旦你为一家上市公司制定了股息政策，在以重大方式改变该政策之前，你应该仔细考虑很长时间。
But I think the best use of cash, if you don’t have a good use for it in the business, if the stock is underpriced, is to repurchase it. And if it’s overpriced, you got no business buying in a single share. But a lot of companies do it.
但我认为，如果在业务中没有好的用途，现金的最佳用途是回购股票，前提是股票被低估了。如果股票被高估了，你就没有理由买入一股。但很多公司都这样做。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, dividends are a very interesting subject. If you count the unnecessary stock trading, and the cost of investment advice, and the cost of making a lot of errors, and the trading costs in and out, I don’t think we’d be too extreme to say that now the total amount that’s paid out in dividends is roughly equal to the amount that is wasted in all this trading and investment advice.
查理·芒格：是的，股息是一个非常有趣的话题。如果你计算不必要的股票交易、投资建议的成本、大量错误的成本以及进出交易的成本，我认为我们说现在支付的股息总额大致等于在所有这些交易和投资建议中浪费的金额并不算太极端。
So that the net dividends that come to the shareholders are approximately zero. This is a very peculiar way to run a republic. And very few people comment about it.
以至于股东获得的净股息大约为零。这是一种非常特殊的管理共和国的方式。很少有人对此发表评论。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, actually I did in an article, some time ago in Fortune. The frictional costs to American shareholders in sort of changing chairs for all American business as a whole, those frictional costs, are probably not much different than the entire amount paid out by American corporations.
沃伦·巴菲特：际上，我在《财富》杂志的一篇文章中提到过，所有美国企业的股东在转移股票时产生的摩擦成本，可能与美国公司支付的总股息没有太大差别。
So — but getting to the individual corporation level, a company that expects to regularly earn more than it can profitably employ in its business, should be paying out dividends.
但如果说到个别公司，一个预计会定期赚取更多利润且无法有效利用其业务资金的公司，应该支付股息。
Take a subsidiary of ours like See’s Candy. We would love to expand See’s Candy to double or triple its present size, but it doesn’t work. We’ve tried it a lot of different ways. So it should be paying out its earnings.
以我们的一家子公司如 See's Candy 为例。我们很想将 See's Candy 的规模扩大到现在的两倍或三倍，但这行不通。我们尝试了很多不同的方法。因此，它应该将其收益支付出去。
If it was a public company, and it was at one time, you know, you could argue that something approaching a 100 percent payout would make sense there.
如果这是一家上市公司，而且曾经是，你知道，你可以认为接近 100%的派息是有道理的。
But most managements worrying about earnings falling off at some time in the future would rather establish a lower level, and therefore, ensure regularity of dividends by going with a conservative level. I — you know, we —
但大多数管理层担心未来某个时候收益会下降，他们宁愿设定一个较低的水平，因此通过选择一个保守的水平来确保股息的规律性。我——你知道，我们——
It’s obviously something we think about at Berkshire when we have 30-odd billion dollars around. If we can’t figure out a way to employ that over time, you know, it’s a mistake to keep it in corporate form.
显然，当我们在伯克希尔有大约三百亿美元时，这是我们会考虑的事情。如果我们无法找到一种方法在一段时间内使用这些资金，那么将其保留在公司形式中就是一个错误。
But we have this expectation, and I think it’s a reasonable expectation, that we get the — put it to work.
但是我们有这样的期望，我认为这是一个合理的期望，就是我们要把它付诸实践。
If we ever came to a different conclusion, if our stock — we thought our stock was significantly undervalued, we’d probably figure in terms of disbursing it through repurchases, particularly where now dividends and capitals gains are neutral for individuals.
如果我们得出不同的结论，如果我们认为我们的股票被严重低估，我们可能会考虑通过回购来分配，特别是在现在股息和资本收益对个人来说是中性的情况下。
And if our stock was not underpriced, and we fell, we would probably do something by a dividend.
如果我们的股票没有被低估，而我们的股价下跌了，我们可能会通过分红来采取一些措施。
It’s not going to happen soon, however. (Laughs)
这不会很快发生。（笑）
48. GEICO and Dell: the low cost is going to win
GEICO 和戴尔：低成本将获胜
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is J.P., as in justice of peace, or Jell-O pudding.
观众成员：下午好。我的名字是 J.P.，就像和平法官，或者果冻布丁。
My last name is Tan, as in suntan. I flew in from the suntan city of Orlando, Florida where an elderly man told me, “J.P. Tan stands for ‘just perfect tan.’”
我的姓是谭，就像晒黑一样。我是从佛罗里达州的晒黑城市奥兰多飞来的，那里的一个老人告诉我，“J.P. 谭代表‘完美的晒黑’。”
Mr. Buffett, allow me to give you a big thank you before I ask my question. Some time ago I sent you my business analysis of your investment in Scott Fetzer Company.
巴菲特先生，在我提问之前，请允许我向您表示衷心的感谢。前段时间，我向您发送了我对您投资于 Scott Fetzer 公司的商业分析。
I was not sure if you even bothered to read it. Yet you were very kind to write me that my analysis of Scott Fetzer Company is very much on the money.
我不确定你是否费心去读它。然而，你非常友好地写信告诉我，我对斯科特·费策公司的分析非常准确。
You also invited me to my first annual meeting where I had the privilege of meeting Mr. Andrew Kilpatrick, who was kind enough to include my analysis of Scott Fetzer Company in his book, “Of Permanent Value: The Story of Warren Buffett.” I want to thank you for making this possible.
您还邀请我参加了我的第一次年度会议，在那里我有幸见到了安德鲁·基尔帕特里克先生，他非常友好地在他的书《永久价值：沃伦·巴菲特的故事》中收录了我对斯科特·费策公司的分析。我想感谢您使这一切成为可能。
Here comes my question. Mr. Buffett, you have said that the nine most important words ever written about investing are these nine words: “Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.”
现在是我的问题。巴菲特先生，您曾说过，有关投资最重要的九个字就是这九个字：“投资最聪明的时候就是最像生意的时候。”
Mary Buffett said that you have built your entire business success upon these nine words. Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.
玛丽·巴菲特说，你的整个商业成功都是基于这九个字。投资最聪明的时候就是最像生意的时候。
For this reason, I started businesslike.com, looking up to guide GEICO and Dell as direct marketing models, since they have the lowest cost structure.
出于这个原因，我创办了 businesslike.com，仰望 GEICO 和戴尔作为直接营销的典范，因为它们拥有最低的成本结构。
Please kindly share with us in elaborate details the direct marketing methods of GEICO and your friend, Michael Dell? (Laughter)
请详细分享一下 GEICO 和您的朋友迈克尔·戴尔的直接营销方法？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT (to Munger): What?
沃伦·巴菲特（对芒格）：什么？
CHARLIE MUNGER: He wants you to analyze the marketing methods of GEICO — the direct-marketing methods of GEICO — and Dell.
查理·芒格：他希望你分析 GEICO 的营销方法——GEICO 的直接营销方法——以及戴尔的营销方法。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I’m not as familiar with Dell as I am with GEICO.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我对戴尔不如对 GEICO 那么熟悉。
The idea of direct marketing in auto insurance at GEICO came from Leo Goodwin, who — and his wife Lillian — who had come from USAA.
在 GEICO，汽车保险直接营销的理念来自于 Leo Goodwin 和他的妻子 Lillian，他们来自 USAA。
And USAA was set up some years — and GEICO was set up in 1936 — USAA was set up, I believe, in the early ’20s, because military personnel moved around a lot, and they had trouble getting auto insurance. And a great organization was established.
USAA 成立于几年前——而 GEICO 成立于 1936 年——我相信 USAA 成立于 20 世纪 20 年代初，因为军人经常搬迁，他们在获取汽车保险方面遇到了困难。于是，一个伟大的组织成立了。
Leo Goodwin took that idea, and decided to broaden it beyond the officer ranks of the military. And first went to government employees generally, and now that’s been extended dramatically over the years to the American public as a whole. It’s a better system.
利奥·古德温接受了这个想法，并决定将其扩展到军官阶层以外。首先是面向政府雇员，经过多年的显著扩展，现在已经面向整个美国公众。这是一个更好的系统。
You know, if you go back a hundred years, auto insurance when the auto first came in, was sold by the casualty affiliates of the big fire companies. That’s where — that — in the 1800s, the major insurance companies were fire companies, and casualty insurance was something that came along later.
你知道，如果你回到一百年前，当汽车刚出现时，汽车保险是由大型火灾公司的意外事故附属公司出售的。那就是——在 19 世纪，主要的保险公司是火灾公司，而意外事故保险是后来才出现的。
And it was sold through a system whereby the agent got large commissions, where there was sort of cartel-like rates established through something called a “bureau.” And that system prevailed for several decades.
它是通过一个系统出售的，在这个系统中，代理商获得了高额佣金，通过一个叫做“局”的东西建立了类似卡特尔的费率。这个系统持续了几十年。
And then State Farm came along, formed in the early 1920s. A farmer from Merna, Illinois in his 40s. No background in insurance, no capital, but he came in with the idea of having a captive insurance — agency force. And that brought down costs somewhat.
然后，State Farm 出现了，成立于 1920 年代初期。一个来自伊利诺伊州默纳的 40 多岁的农民。没有保险背景，没有资本，但他带着建立专属保险代理队伍的想法进入了这个行业。这在一定程度上降低了成本。
And State Farm, in time, became the largest auto insurer in the country. And Allstate, which followed that system, became the second largest. And that was a better system, a better mouse trap.
随着时间的推移，State Farm 成为全国最大的汽车保险公司。而采用该系统的 Allstate 成为第二大公司。这是一个更好的系统，一个更好的捕鼠器。
And then USAA, followed by Leo Goodwin at GEICO, came along what a direct-marketing operation that bypassed the agent and brought down costs further.
然后，美国军人协会（USAA）出现了，接着是 GEICO 的 Leo Goodwin，他们推出了一种直接营销的运营模式，绕过了代理商，进一步降低了成本。
Now, every American family, virtually, wants to have a car. They don’t want to have insurance, but they can’t drive their car without insurance. So they’re a buying a product they really don’t like very well. It cost them a significant part of their family budget. And cost, therefore, becomes very important.
现在，几乎每个美国家庭都想拥有一辆车。他们不想买保险，但没有保险就不能开车。所以他们在购买一个他们并不太喜欢的产品。这花费了他们家庭预算中的一大部分。因此，成本变得非常重要。
It’s not a luxury item, it’s a mandatory item, virtually. And saving significant money makes a real difference in a lot of household budgets. So the low cost is going to win.
这不是奢侈品，而是几乎必需品。而且节省大量资金对许多家庭预算产生真正的影响。因此，低成本将会胜出。
And our direct operation — Progressive has a wonderful direct operation competing with us — we’re the two that will be slugging it out over the years — is a better system, and better systems win over time.
我们的直接运营——Progressive 有一个很棒的直接运营与我们竞争——我们两家将在未来几年激烈竞争——是一个更好的系统，而更好的系统会随着时间的推移获胜。
Now, I — again, I’m not that familiar with Dell, but I have the impression that Dell is a very low-cost operation, enormously efficient. You know, very low amounts of inventory.
现在，我——再次声明，我对戴尔不是很熟悉，但我有印象戴尔是一家成本非常低、效率极高的公司。你知道，库存量非常少。
And, you know, I would hate to compete with them. The — if they can — if they turn out a decent competitive product at the best price, you know, that system will win.
而且，你知道，我不想与他们竞争。如果他们能够以最优惠的价格推出一个不错的竞争产品，你知道，那种系统就会胜出。
You know, Charlie is a director of Costco, and Costco and Walmart figured out ways to do things at lesser costs that people needed — where people spent money in big quantity. And those two companies are winning.
你知道，查理是好市多的董事，好市多和沃尔玛找到了以更低成本做事的方法，满足人们的需求——人们大量消费的地方。这两家公司正在获胜。
So, we have a terrific marketing operation, and a terrific insurance operation in GEICO. And in my view it will grow very, very substantially.
所以，我们有一个出色的营销运营，还有一个出色的保险运营在 GEICO。在我看来，它将会非常、非常大幅度地增长。
And we have a very tough competitor in Progressive, because they’ve seen how well our model works, and they, in effect, have shifted over. I mean, they’re not totally shifted over, but they’ve moved towards a direct operation, and away from an agency operation.
我们在 Progressive 有一个非常强劲的竞争对手，因为他们已经看到了我们的模式运作得多么好，并且实际上已经转变过来。我的意思是，他们并没有完全转变过来，但他们已经向直接运营转变，而远离代理运营。
It’s always a good idea to go with a low-cost producer over time. I mean, you could mess it up in other ways, but being a low-cost producer of something that’s essential to people, it’s going to be a very good business usually.
随着时间的推移，选择低成本生产商总是一个好主意。我的意思是，你可能会在其他方面搞砸，但作为人们必需品的低成本生产商，通常会是一个非常好的生意。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you’ve chosen a wonderful field. And if you fail in it, it’s your own fault. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，你选择了一个很棒的领域。如果你在这个领域失败了，那是你自己的错。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I should say also that that — those nine words, they came from Ben Graham, they didn’t come from me. But Ben said those, and they are very important words, although they tie in with some others that he said. But they are very important words.
沃伦·巴菲特：我还要说，那九个字是本·格雷厄姆说的，不是我说的。本说过这些话，它们是非常重要的话，尽管它们与他所说的其他一些话有关。但它们是非常重要的话。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, I want make an apology, too, because last night I said that some of our modern business tycoons — and I remembered particularly Armand Hammer — were the type that, when they were talking, they were lying. And when they were quiet they were stealing. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：沃伦，我也想道歉，因为昨晚我说我们的一些现代商业大亨——我特别记得阿曼德·哈默——是那种在说话时在撒谎，而在安静时在偷窃的人。（笑声）
And some people got the impression that that was my witticism. That was said a great many decades ago about one of the robber barons.
有些人认为那是我的俏皮话。那是在许多年前关于某个强盗大亨说的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we start confessing here to the number of quotations we’ve stolen, we’ll be here all afternoon. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们开始承认我们抄袭的名言，恐怕会一直聊到下午。 （笑声）
49. Praise for Google’s co-founders and their owner’s manual
对谷歌联合创始人及其所有者手册的赞美
WARREN BUFFETT: So let’s go on to microphone 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：那么我们继续到麦克风 3。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Matt Lynch, and I’m from Palo Alto, California.
观众成员：下午好。我的名字是马特·林奇，我来自加利福尼亚州帕洛阿尔托。
Mr. Buffett, a couple of times today you alluded to Google and its co-founders.
巴菲特先生，今天您几次提到了谷歌及其联合创始人。
I was hoping you could share with us your thoughts and reactions to the owner’s manual the co-founders included in Google’s S-1 filed last week, especially in light of the similarities and differences between it and that of Berkshire Hathaway?
我希望你能与我们分享你对联合创始人在上周提交的谷歌 S-1 文件中包含的用户手册的想法和反应，特别是考虑到它与伯克希尔·哈撒韦的相似之处和不同之处
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a real softball for me. The obviously —
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这对我来说是个很简单的问题。显然——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You’re welcome.
观众成员：不客气。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m very pleased that the Google — the fellows at Google decided — and they say they, it was, I think they used the word “inspired” by the Berkshire Owner’s Manual.
沃伦·巴菲特：我很高兴谷歌的那些人决定——他们说，他们用了“受到伯克希尔所有者手册的启发”这个词。
And, you know, it obviously pleases us enormously that other people think that it’s a good idea to talk to their owners — or in their case, their prospective owners — in a very straight-forward manner.
而且，你知道，显然让我们非常高兴的是，其他人认为以非常直接的方式与他们的股东——或者在他们的情况下，与他们的潜在股东——交谈是个好主意。
If you buy into Google, having read their owner’s manual, you know, you will — I think you’ll know the kind of people you’re associating with. You’ll know what they will do and won’t do.
如果你购买谷歌的股票，读过他们的用户手册，你知道，我想你会知道你在与什么样的人交往。你会知道他们会做什么，不会做什么。
It’s the kind of thing that one person would say to another if you were setting up a partnership. And were — you said, you know, “I’d like you to join me in a partnership. I need your money. And here’s the way we’re going to do business.”
这就是如果你在建立合作关系时，一个人会对另一个人说的话。你说，“我希望你加入我的合作伙伴关系。我需要你的资金。这就是我们做生意的方式。”
And I think more companies — obviously, I think more companies ought to do it.
我认为更多公司——显然，我认为更多公司应该这样做。
It’s been simple for us at Berkshire. We’ve had these principles in mind for a long time. And we really want people to understand those principles before they join with us.
在伯克希尔，对我们来说一直很简单。我们很久以来就牢记这些原则。我们真的希望人们在加入我们之前了解这些原则。
And the Google fellows, in a very straightforward manner, you know, I liked their prose. You know, it doesn’t mean I agree with every idea they have, but, you know, I do know what ideas they do have. And I hope more companies sign on for that sort of thing.
谷歌的那些家伙，以一种非常直截了当的方式，你知道，我喜欢他们的文笔。你知道，这并不意味着我同意他们的每一个想法，但你知道，我确实知道他们有什么想法。我希望更多的公司能参与这种事情。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you know, most of the world does not, in any way, imitate Berkshire Hathaway. This is a quirky few. It may look — there may be 19,500 of you that came — but it’s still a quirky few by the standards of the country.
查理·芒格：嗯，你知道，世界上大多数地方都没有以任何方式模仿伯克希尔·哈撒韦。这是一个古怪的少数。看起来可能有 19,500 人来了，但按照国家的标准，这仍然是一个古怪的少数。
And what’s interesting about Google is those two guys who created that are two of the smartest young men in the whole country. And it’s much more fun to be copied by people that smart, than — (Laughter)
有趣的是，谷歌的创始人是全国最聪明的两个年轻人。被这样聪明的人模仿要有趣得多，比——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Hey, we even think they are smarter than we thought they were last week. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：嘿，我们甚至认为他们比我们上周想象的还要聪明。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: And we now think they’re a lot smarter, yeah. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：我们现在认为他们聪明多了，是的。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s going to be a lot of fun to watch that. I — and my guess is that their annual reports are going to make very good reading. They’re actually going to alternate the two of them in writing the reports. And I think you’ll know a lot about them, and a lot about their business if you read it.
沃伦·巴菲特：观看这个过程会很有趣。我猜他们的年度报告会非常值得一读。他们实际上会轮流撰写报告。我认为如果你读了这些报告，你会对他们以及他们的业务了解很多。
Although they had an interesting — as I remember, they had an interesting sentence of two in there, which I admired also, where they said that, you know, certain of the things that might affect their business prospects really would be better left unsaid, in terms of competition, and so on. And if so, they weren’t going to tell you. (Laughter)
尽管他们在其中有一句或两句有趣的话，我也很欣赏，他们说，有些可能影响他们商业前景的事情，实际上最好还是不提及，关于竞争等。如果是这样，他们不会告诉你。 （笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: I kind of enjoyed that.
沃伦·巴菲特：我有点喜欢那样。
50. Buffett doesn’t see big changes for how homes are sold
巴菲特认为房屋销售方式不会有大的变化
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 4 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks, Warren, thanks. My question — my name is Chad Bliss (PH), Lincoln, Nebraska.
观众成员：谢谢，沃伦，谢谢。我的问题——我叫查德·布利斯（音），来自内布拉斯加州林肯市。
My question pertains to MidAmerican Energy and the Home Service division. You said earlier that you would continue buying, you know, companies in the real estate industry.
我的问题涉及到 MidAmerican Energy 和家庭服务部门。你之前说过，你会继续购买房地产行业的公司。
Given the growth in “for sale by owners,” discount brokers, also maybe even banks now, do you think the current business model of home services is sustainable, or do you think commissions need to be lowered?
鉴于“业主自行出售”、折扣经纪人，甚至可能还有银行的增长，您认为当前的房屋服务业务模式是否可持续，还是认为佣金需要降低？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I really do think it’s sustainable. It’s a good question. In fact, I forget where I saw the article a few weeks ago, maybe in the Sunday New York Times, about Barry Diller’s interest, I think through Lending Tree, on the internet.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我真的认为这是可持续的。这是个好问题。事实上，我忘了在几周前在哪里看到的一篇文章，可能是在《纽约时报》周日版，关于巴里·迪勒通过网络平台Lending Tree的兴趣。
And there’ve been a lot of real estate sales-related operations that have been on the internet. And the internet is a threat to any business, including real estate brokerage.
有很多与房地产销售相关的操作已经在互联网上进行了。而互联网对任何业务都是一种威胁，包括房地产经纪。
But, you know, when I think about the process of buying a home, and the degree of personal involvement involved in that, you know, the “for sale by owner.” They call them FSBOs in the business.
但是，你知道，当我想到买房的过程，以及其中涉及的个人参与程度时，你知道，“房主自行出售”。在这个行业中，他们称之为 FSBOs。
I remember talking with my friend, Chuck Peterson about that 50 years ago, and FSBOs were with us then, and FSBOs are with us now.
我记得 50 年前和我的朋友查克·彼得森谈论过这个问题，那时有房主自行出售，现在也有房主自行出售。
But my guess is that a very significant percentage of home transactions 30 years from now will be done through a pipeline, and through a distribution mechanism, or brokerage mechanism, like exists now.
但我猜测，30 年后的房屋交易中，很大一部分将通过管道和分销机制或类似于现有的经纪机制来完成。
I do not see it changing dramatically, although there are people that are going to try and change it dramatically. So you’ve got competitors. But I love the idea of expanding Home Services.
我并不认为这一过程会发生剧烈变化，尽管会有人尝试进行重大改变。所以你有竞争对手。但我喜欢扩展房屋服务的想法。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you tried to change it once yourself dramatically, right here in Omaha, and you fell on your ass. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：嗯，你曾经在奥马哈尝试过一次戏剧性的改变，但你失败了。（笑声）
He tried to — 他试图——
WARREN BUFFETT: His memory’s better than mine.
沃伦·巴菲特：他的记忆力比我好。
CHARLIE MUNGER: He tried to take away the — a good part of the home advertising business from the World-Herald to, you know, your then-little newspaper —
查理·芒格：他试图从《世界先驱报》那里夺走很大一部分房屋广告业务，转移到你当时的小报纸上——
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, right, it was very thin, yeah. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，对，那期报纸很薄，是的。 （笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah. And it didn’t work worth a damn.
查理·芒格：是的，是的。结果一点用都没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）
And that’s the last time I call on him. The — (Laughter)
这是我最后一次请他发言。 （笑声）
51. Remembering Phil Fisher
纪念菲尔·费舍尔
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 5 个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I’m Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi.
观众成员：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是来自密西西比州杰克逊的蒂姆·梅德利。
Recently Mr. Philip Fisher died.
最近菲利普·费舍尔先生去世了。
At this meeting many years ago, you, Mr. Buffett, mentioned your fondness for chapters 8 and 20 of “The Intelligent Investor,” the first edition of “Security Analysis,” and you said, “Phil Fisher’s first two books.”
在多年前的这次会议上，巴菲特先生，您提到您对《聪明的投资者》第 8 章和第 20 章的喜爱，以及《证券分析》的第一版，您还提到“菲尔·费舍尔的前两本书”。
And you Mr. Munger, have also been complimentary of Mr. Fisher’s writings and investment approach.
而您，芒格先生，也对费舍尔先生的著作和投资方法表示赞赏。
I wonder if the two of you would tell us of your experiences with Mr. Fisher, the circumstances of your meeting, et cetera.
我想知道你们两位是否愿意告诉我们你们与费舍尔先生的经历、你们相遇的情况等等。
And did his writings, or your discussions with him, start you thinking about the idea of the great business, or the franchise company, or was it simply an affirmation of thoughts which you had already begun to have? And anything else you would like to say about Mr. Fisher.
他的著作或你与他的讨论是否让你开始思考大企业或特许经营公司的想法，还是仅仅是对你已经开始产生的想法的一种肯定？还有什么关于费舍尔先生你想说的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Phil Fisher was a great man. He died maybe a month ago, or thereabouts, and well into his 90s.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，菲尔·费舍尔是个伟大的人。他大约一个月前去世了，享年 90 多岁。
His first book, and I believe it was “Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits,” it was written in 1958. And the second book was written a few years later, those two books were terrific books.
他的第一本书，我相信是《普通股与非凡的利润》，写于 1958 年。第二本书是在几年后写的，这两本书都是非常出色的书。
And as with Ben Graham, you could really get it all by reading the books. I met Phil Fisher just once, and it was great. I enjoyed it, I loved it. He was nice to me.
就像本·格雷厄姆一样，你可以通过阅读这些书籍真正掌握一切。我只见过菲尔·费舍尔一次，那次见面很棒。我很享受，我很喜欢。他对我很好。
But similarly, actually, to my experiences with Ben Graham, I worked for him, I took his class and everything else — it was in the books.
但同样地，实际上，与我和本·格雷厄姆的经历类似，我为他工作，我上了他的课以及其他一切——都在书中。
I mean, they were such good writers, and their thoughts were so clear, that you didn’t need to meet them personally. I enjoyed meeting them personally, obviously. But they got it across in words.
我的意思是，他们是如此优秀的作家，他们的思想如此清晰，以至于你不需要亲自见到他们。我当然很享受亲自见到他们。但他们通过文字传达了出来。
And the only time I met Phil was some time after that 1962 book, or whatever it was, ’61 or ’62. And I was in San Francisco, I think it was in the Russ Building, I may be wrong on that. And I just went there.
我唯一一次见到菲尔是在那本 1962 年的书之后，或者是 1961 年或 1962 年。我当时在旧金山，我想是在 Russ 大楼，我可能记错了。我只是去了那里。
I used to do that all the time when I was younger. I’d go to New York, and I’d just drop in on all kinds of people. And I guess they thought because I was from Omaha that, you know, one time and they’d be rid of me. So — (Laughs)
我年轻的时候经常这样做。我会去纽约，随便拜访各种各样的人。我猜他们可能认为因为我是从奥马哈来的，所以见我一次就能摆脱我。所以——（笑）
And I would usually get in to see them. And Phil — I did that with Phil. And he was extraordinarily nice to me. But it wasn’t that I gained new ideas though, however, by meeting him, because I’d already read it in his books.
通常我会去见他们。我对菲尔也是这样做的。他对我非常友好。但通过见他，我并没有获得新的想法，因为我已经在他的书中读过了。
And Charlie actually, I met Charlie in 1959, and Charlie was sort of preaching the Fisher doctrine, also, to me. Little different form, but his ideas paralleled those of Phil. So I was sort of getting it from both sides. It made a lot of sense to me. I don’t know what Charlie’s experiences were with Phil.
实际上，我是在 1959 年认识查理的，查理也在向我宣扬费雪理论。形式有点不同，但他的想法与菲尔的相似。所以我算是从两方面都接触到了这个理论。这对我来说很有道理。我不知道查理与菲尔的经历是什么样的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I always like it when somebody who’s attractive to me, agrees with me. And therefore, I’ve got very fond memories of Phil Fisher.
查理·芒格：嗯，我总是喜欢那些我觉得有吸引力的人同意我的观点。因此，我对菲尔·费舍尔有非常美好的回忆。
The basic idea of that it was hard to find good stocks, and it was hard to find good investments, and that you wanted to be in good investments. And therefore, you just find a few of them that you knew a lot about, and concentrate on those, it seemed to me such an obviously good idea.
这个基本想法是，很难找到好的股票，也很难找到好的投资，而你想要进行好的投资。因此，你只需找到一些你非常了解的，并专注于这些，对我来说，这似乎是一个显而易见的好主意。
And indeed, it’s proved to be an obviously good idea. Yet, 98 percent of the investing world doesn’t follow it. That’s been good for us. It’s been good for you.
事实上，这被证明是一个显然不错的主意。然而，98%的投资界并没有遵循这一点。这对我们有好处，对你也有好处。
52. “No single yardstick” for compensation and incentive systems
补偿和激励系统没有单一的标准
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to number 6, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请到第 6 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, my name is Stan Leopard, and I’m from Menlo Park, California. I’m very pleased to be here, Warren and Charlie.
观众成员：下午好，我叫斯坦·利奥帕德，来自加利福尼亚州的门洛帕克。我很高兴能在这里，沃伦和查理。
I first heard about you, Warren, in the late ’80s, and began reading your writings. Unfortunately I didn’t invest until the late ’90s.
我第一次听说你，沃伦，是在 80 年代末，并开始阅读你的作品。不幸的是，我直到 90 年代末才开始投资。
You have shaped my business thinking, and as I listen to you, and as I continue to read what you write, and the things you recommend to read, it continues to shape my thinking.
你塑造了我的商业思维，当我听你说话时，当我继续阅读你写的东西以及你推荐阅读的内容时，它继续塑造着我的思维。
My question’s about compensation. And I’ve seen your writing, and I heard the earlier comments today. And they still leave me, as a guy who is a business owner, not quite sure how to act to design compensation for managers.
我的问题是关于薪酬的。我看过你的文章，也听过今天早些时候的评论。作为一名企业主，我仍然不太确定如何为经理设计薪酬。
For most of my career, I’ve been the senior manager in my businesses, but now I’m in a situation where I’m looking to own a majority interest of businesses that I don’t manage every day directly, and I’m very concerned with this compensation issue.
在我职业生涯的大部分时间里，我一直是我所在企业的高级经理，但现在我正处于这样一种情况：我打算拥有一些我不直接管理的企业的多数股份，我非常关心这个薪酬问题。
When I think about things, like, return on equity, or growth, or risk, or like that, but if you could speak a little more towards the specific of how you approach the getting it to the right things to measure and incent, I’d appreciate that.
当我考虑诸如股本回报、增长或风险等问题时，如果您能更具体地谈谈您如何确定正确的衡量标准和激励措施，我将不胜感激。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s a very good question, and it’s — you know, there is no formula that applies across all industries or businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是一个非常好的问题，而且——你知道，没有一个适用于所有行业或企业的公式。
You take something like return on equity. You know, if you pay way too much for the business that you buy, the person who runs it is going to get a lousy return on your equity.
你可以看看股本回报率。如果你为所购买的业务支付过高的价格，经营该业务的人将会让你的股本获得糟糕的回报。
And they may get a good return on the tangible assets employed in the business, but your purchase price may defeat them, in terms of earning good returns.
他们可能在实际使用的有形资产上获得了不错的回报，但您的购买价格可能会导致他们无法实现良好的回报。
If you base the — on earnings on tangible equity, you know, there are businesses like a network television station where, you know, if you have an idiot nephew, you can put him in charge, and they’ll earn huge returns on equity as long as they manage to stay away from the office. So it’s —
如果你根据有形股本的收益来判断，你知道，有些业务，比如网络电视台，如果你有一个愚蠢的侄子，你可以让他负责，只要他们设法不去办公室，他们就能获得巨大的股本回报。所以这是——
And there are other businesses where you have to be a genius to earn 7 or 8 percent returns on equities. So there is no single yardstick.
还有一些业务，你必须是天才才能在股权上获得 7%或 8%的回报。所以没有单一的衡量标准。
To have a fair compensation system, both you and the manager have to really understand the economics of the business. In some businesses, the amount of capital employed is all-important. In some businesses, the amount of capital employed doesn’t mean anything.
要建立一个公平的薪酬体系，您和经理都必须真正了解业务的经济状况。在某些业务中，所使用的资本量至关重要。在某些业务中，所使用的资本量则无关紧要。
So we have certain businesses where we have charges for capital and all of that, and where we have other businesses where that would just be an exercise to go through, and it wouldn’t really change any results, anyway.
所以我们有一些业务需要收取资本费用等等，而在其他业务中，这样做只是走个过场，无论如何都不会真正改变任何结果。
We have a great preference for making them simple. I mean, we concentrate on the variables that count to us, and then we try to put that against the backdrop of the competitive nature, or the economic — the true economics — of the business they’re in, and really reward where they’re adding value, even if that value is from a very low base in a lousy business. And we make it — the base — very high if they’re in a very easy business.
我们非常倾向于让它们变得简单。我的意思是，我们专注于对我们重要的变量，然后尝试将其置于竞争性质或他们所处行业的经济——真正的经济——背景下，并真正奖励他们增加价值的地方，即使这种价值来自一个糟糕业务中的非常低的基础。如果他们在一个非常容易的业务中，我们会把基础设得很高。
And it hasn’t been a problem. But I would say it would’ve been an enormous problem if we’d brought in some compensation consultants, because they would have wanted something that would spread across the whole group, and it would have had all kinds of variables.
这一直不是问题。但我会说，如果我们请了一些薪酬顾问，那将是一个巨大的问题，因为他们会想要一些适用于整个团队的方案，并且会有各种各样的变量。
And they particularly would’ve wanted something that would’ve to come in every year and redo in some way, so that they would have a continuing stream of income.
他们特别希望有一些东西每年都要以某种方式重新做一次，这样他们就会有持续的收入来源。
You know, if I knew what kind of a business you were looking at it, it’s easier to talk about what kind of a system to have.
你知道，如果我知道您在考虑什么样的企业，那么讨论该如何设置系统会更容易。
If you had a group of television stations, just to pick an example — let’s say they were network television stations, all of a reasonable size.
如果您有一组电视台，比如说它们都是网络电视台，规模相当。
You know, you would probably figure that a chimpanzee could run the place, and have 35 percent pretax margins. And you might want to pay for performance above some number like that.
你知道，你可能会认为一只黑猩猩就能管理这个地方，并且拥有 35%的税前利润率。而且你可能愿意为超过这个数字的表现付费。
But there’s — it’s silly to have something that starts at 10 percent or 15 percent, when you do that. And a lousy manager will always suggest an arrangement like that.
但是，当你这样做时，起始比例为 10%或 15%是很荒谬的。而一个糟糕的经理总是会建议这样的安排。
Charlie and I have seen all kinds of compensation arrangements where, basically, you get paid for showing up. But they try to make it look, by constructing some mathematics around it, like, you really had to achieve something.
查理和我见过各种各样的补偿安排，基本上就是你出席就能得到报酬。但他们试图通过构建一些数学公式，使其看起来像是你真的必须取得一些成就。
But in the end, if you get a great manager, you want to pay him very well.
但最终，如果你找到了一位出色的经理，你会想要给他很高的报酬。
You know, we’ve got great managers, for example, at a place like MidAmerican. And somebody mentioned that there’s a big carrot out there for them if they achieve the results that we’ve set out. And that’ll be a check I’ll be very happy to write.
你知道，我们有很出色的经理，比如在像 MidAmerican 这样的地方。有人提到，如果他们实现了我们设定的目标，他们将会得到很大的奖励。而那将是一张我非常乐意签发的支票。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, if you want to read one book that will demonstrate really shrewd compensation systems in a whole chain of small businesses, read the autobiography of Les Schwab, who had a bunch of tire shops — has a bunch of tire shops — all over the Northwest.
查理·芒格：是的，如果你想读一本能展示一整条小企业链中真正精明的薪酬系统的书，读一下莱斯·施瓦布的自传，他在西北地区拥有一堆轮胎店——拥有一堆轮胎店。
And he made a huge fortune in one of the world’s really difficult businesses by having shrewd systems. And he can tell you a lot better than we can.
他通过精明的系统在世界上真正困难的行业之一中赚取了巨额财富。他能比我们更好地告诉你。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and he worked that out himself. I mean, it’s an interesting book, and, you know, selling tires, how do you make any money doing that? And —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他自己想出了这个办法。我的意思是，这是一本有趣的书，而且，你知道，卖轮胎，你怎么能通过那样赚钱呢？而且——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Hundreds of millions selling tires.
查理·芒格：数亿个轮胎的销售。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. It’s a — and people like Sam Walton. I mean, the compensation system, I will guarantee you, at Walmart, or Charlie’s involved in Costco, they’re going to be rational because you had very rational people running them.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。这是一个——像山姆·沃尔顿这样的人。我是说，我可以保证沃尔玛的薪酬体系，或者查理参与的好市多，他们会是理性的，因为有非常理性的人在管理它们。
And they wanted to get the best — they wanted to attract good managers, and they wanted to get the best out of them. And they had no use in paying for mediocrity.
他们想要得到最好的人才——他们想吸引优秀的管理者，并想从他们身上获得最大的价值。他们不愿意为平庸买单。
But that does require a knowledge of the business. I mean, you don’t want to let — if you don’t understand a business, you know, you’re going to have a problem with both the manager and the consultant in terms of getting film-flamed on how you pay people.
但这确实需要对业务的了解。我的意思是，如果你不理解一个业务，你知道，你在支付员工方面会在经理和顾问那里遇到问题。
53. Easier to find bargains among stocks than IPOs
在股票中比在首次公开募股中更容易找到便宜货
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.
沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good day. My name is Martin Krawitz. I’m a shareholder from Sydney, Australia. (Applause)
观众成员：你好。我的名字是马丁·克拉维茨。我是来自澳大利亚悉尼的股东。（掌声）
And thank you so much for some of your wonderful hospitality here. We’ve had a chance to get on some of Omaha’s 65 golf courses, and it’s just great being in the second-best country in the world. (Laughter)
非常感谢你们的热情款待。我们有机会去体验了奥马哈的 65 个高尔夫球场中的一些，能在世界上第二好的国家真是太棒了。（笑声）
My question to you, sir, is regarding two IPOs. We had one of the authors about a book on yourself visit us in Sydney last year, and apparently you dislike IPOs.
我对您的问题是关于两个 IPO 的。去年，我们有一本关于您的书的作者之一来悉尼拜访我们，显然您不喜欢 IPO。
My question is, there are some really poor businesses that try and get passed off, but there are some good ones. There’s some government privatizations, or decentralizations, the demographics of baby boomers, and we have some friends wanted to exit some really good businesses.
我的问题是，虽然有一些确实很糟糕的企业试图通过IPO，但也有一些好的公司，比如一些政府的私有化或去中心化，以及一些朋友希望退出的一些很好的企业。
Could we as investors, and Berkshire Hathaway, not apply some of your disciplines to look at investing in some of these?
作为投资者，我们和伯克希尔哈撒韦，能否运用您的一些原则来考虑投资其中的一些？
And finally, would your answer be different in its applicability to Berkshire Hathaway as a company, as opposed to us as investors? Thank you, sir.
最后，您对伯克希尔哈撒韦作为公司和我们作为投资者的回答是否会有所不同？谢谢您，先生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the first question, is it entirely possible that you could use our mental models to find good things to buy among IPOs, the answer is sure.
查理·芒格：嗯，第一个问题是，是否完全有可能使用我们的思维模型在首次公开募股中找到值得购买的好东西，答案是肯定的。
There are a zillion IPOs every year. And buried in those IPOs, I’m sure there are a few cinches that a really intelligent person could find and pounce on. So, welcome. On the —
每年都有无数的 IPO。在这些 IPO 中，我相信一定有一些很容易被真正聪明的人发现并抓住的机会。所以，欢迎。在——
But the average person buying IPOs is going to get creamed.
但是，购买 IPO 的普通人将会遭受重创。
So if you’re talented enough, why sure, that will work. The second question, I forget.
所以如果你足够有才华，当然，那会奏效。第二个问题，我忘了。
WARREN BUFFETT: About the government offering (inaudible).
沃伦·巴菲特：关于政府提供的（听不清）。
CHARLIE MUNGER: About government spin-offs?
查理·芒格：关于政府剥离？
WARREN BUFFETT: Give him the spotlight again. There he is.
沃伦·巴菲特：再给他聚光灯。他在那儿。
CHARLIE MUNGER: What was the second question?
查理·芒格：第二个问题是什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It was just would the attitude of Berkshire Hathaway be different if it was opposed to investors?
听众成员：只是伯克希尔哈撒韦的态度是否会与投资者不同。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.
观众成员：谢谢。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, because the IPOs are normally small enough, so that they won’t work for us, or they’re high tech, where we couldn’t understand them. And so, by and large, if Warren is looking at them, why, I don’t know about it. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，因为IPO通常规模较小，所以不适合我们，或者是高科技的，我们可能无法理解。因此，总体而言，如果沃伦正在关注这些，我就不知道了。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I mentioned earlier how you — an auction market, prevailing in the stock market, will offer up extraordinary bargains sometimes, because somebody will sell a half a percent, or one percent of a company at a price that may be a quarter of what it’s worth, whereas in negotiated deals, you don’t get that.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我之前提到过，拍卖市场在股市中有时会提供极好的交易机会，因为有人会以可能是其价值四分之一的价格出售公司百分之零点五或百分之一的股份，而在协商交易中，你不会得到这样的机会。
An IPO situation more closely approximates a negotiated deal. I mean, the seller decides when to come to market in most cases. And they don’t pick a time necessarily that’s good for you. So, it has —
IPO 情况更接近于协商交易。我的意思是，在大多数情况下，卖方决定何时进入市场。而且他们不一定会选择对你有利的时机。所以，它有——
I think it’s way less likely that, in scanning a list of a hundred securities that are trading in the auction market, well, in the — a hundred IPOs, if you scan a hundred IPOs, you’re going to come up with something cheaper than scanning a hundred companies that are already trading in the auction market.
我认为，在扫描拍卖市场中交易的一百种证券的列表时，嗯，在——一百个 IPO 中，如果你扫描一百个 IPO，你找到比扫描已经在拍卖市场中交易的一百家公司更便宜的东西的可能性要小得多。
It is more of a negotiated sale. And negotiated transactions are very hard to get bargains. If you take the houses in Omaha, you know, somebody that lives next door to somebody who sold their house for 80,000 or — dollars, and their house is more or less comparable, they’re not going to sell it for 50.
这更像是一种协商销售。而协商交易很难获得便宜货。如果你看看奥马哈的房子，你知道，有人住在隔壁，刚卖掉他们的房子，价格是 80,000 美元或——美元，而他们的房子差不多是可比的，他们不会以 50,000 美元的价格出售。
It just doesn’t happen. People are — it’s too important an asset, and they’re cognizant of what it brings — what is being brought for similar properties. That’s what happens in negotiated sales.
这根本不会发生。人们——这是一个太重要的资产，他们意识到它带来的价值——类似物业带来的价值。这就是在协商销售中发生的情况。
Now if, on the other hand, there were some — a whole bunch of entities that owned one percent of each house in Omaha, and you had an auction market on those one percentage points, they might sell at damn near anything. And occasionally, they sell at crazy prices.
现在，另一方面，如果有一些——一大堆实体各自拥有奥马哈每栋房子百分之一的股份，并且你在这些百分之一的股份上有一个拍卖市场，它们可能会以几乎任何价格出售。有时，它们会以疯狂的价格出售。
So you’re way — in my view — you’re way more likely to get incredible bargains in the — in an auction market. It’s just the nature of things.
所以在我看来，你在拍卖市场中更有可能获得难以置信的便宜货。这就是事情的本质。
And the IPO is closer — sometimes there will be IPOs in terrible markets, and they may come very cheap. But by and large, that is not when IPOs come. They come when the seller thinks that the market is ready for them.
IPO情况更接近——有时在糟糕的市场中也会有 IPO 出现，而且它们可能会非常便宜。但总的来说，这并不是 IPO 出现的时机。它们出现的时机是当卖方认为市场已经为它们做好准备时。
And they come with an informed seller thinking it’s a pretty good time to go public. And, you know, you’ll make better buys, in my view, in an auction market.
他们带着一个消息灵通的卖家来，认为现在是上市的好时机。而且，你知道，在我看来，你会在拍卖市场上做出更好的购买。
54. Buffett and Munger don’t shop at Whole Foods
巴菲特和芒格不在全食超市购物
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.
沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Mark Stender (PH) from San Francisco.
观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是来自旧金山的马克·斯滕德（音）。
My question involves, if you live in California, which I understand you do some time of the year, it’s almost mandatory that you shop at Whole Foods Markets.
我的问题是，如果你住在加利福尼亚州，我知道你一年中的某些时候会住在那里，那么几乎是必须在全食超市购物的。
They sell a lot of organic foods there. And I was wondering if anyone ever tried to feed you organic food, or organic food stock?
那里出售很多有机食品。我想知道是否有人尝试过给您提供有机食品，或者投资于有机食品股票？
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve never been near the place, but — (laughter) — Charlie, who I’ve never thought of as a health nut, but he may have some comment to make on this, being a Californian.
沃伦·巴菲特：我从未去过那个地方，但是——（笑声）——查理，我从未认为他是个健康狂，但作为一个加州人，他可能对此有一些评论。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, my idea of a good place to shop is Costco. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：不，我认为购物的好地方是好市多。（笑声）
Costco has these heavily marbled filet steaks in the — (laughter) — finest grade. And the idea of eating a little whole grain whatever and washing it down with some carrot juice has just never appealed to me. (Laughter)
Costco 有这些大理石纹理丰富的菲力牛排——（笑声）——最好的等级。而吃一点全谷物什么的，然后用胡萝卜汁冲下去的想法从来没有吸引过我。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t have a lot of arguments between the two of us about where to eat. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：我们两个人之间关于去哪吃饭没有太多争论。（笑声）
55. American business “has never let investors down”
美国商业“从未让投资者失望”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.
沃伦·巴菲特：第九。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, thank you. I’m Sherman Silber from St. Louis. I’m a fertility doctor in St. Louis. We kind of view ourselves as the Berkshire Hathaway of infertility treatment.
观众成员：你好，谢谢。我是来自圣路易斯的谢尔曼·西尔伯。我是圣路易斯的一名生育医生。我们有点把自己看作是不孕不育治疗领域的伯克希尔·哈撒韦。
We don’t know anything, really, about business. We’re doctors and scientists.
我们对商业一无所知。我们是医生和科学家。
And so, first I’d just like to say, I really appreciate the people that you have on your board, and would like to keep it that way. Because we do know a lot about character, and I’m happy to have our savings safe with you and the people of character that represent the company. (Applause)
所以，首先我想说，我非常感谢你们董事会的成员，并希望保持这种状态。因为我们确实对品格了解很多，我很高兴我们的储蓄能安全地托付给你们和代表公司的品格高尚的人。（掌声）
I just had an opportunity a couple of weeks ago, I was talking to one of the former managers of the Fidelity Magellan Fund, managed huge amounts of money, and he never really met you. And I was saying, I may have a chance to ask Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger a question. What would that question be? I wanted to have some idea of something intelligent I could ask business-wise.
几周前我有一个机会，我在和一位前富达麦哲伦基金的经理交谈，他管理过巨额资金，但他从未真正见过你。我当时说，我可能有机会向沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格提问。那个问题会是什么？我想要有一些关于商业方面的聪明问题可以问。
And he thought if he had the opportunity to talk to you, the best thing is to give you what would sound like a softball question, because you could maybe bring more profoundness to this than we hear, usually. What —
他想，如果有机会和你交谈，最好的办法是给你一个听起来像是简单的问题，因为你可能会比我们通常听到的带来更多的深刻见解。什么——
In view of the Iraq war, consumer debt that’s increasing, declining job growth, declining pay in the jobs that are growing, prospects of increased interest rates, he has this view that the next five to 10 years are going to be very difficult.
鉴于伊拉克战争、不断增加的消费者债务、下降的就业增长、不断下降的工资、利率上升的前景，他认为未来五到十年将会非常困难。
What would your view be about this — the investment future — for the next five to 10 years, in view of all these negative factors going on?
鉴于所有这些负面因素，您对未来五到十年的投资前景有何看法？
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s too soft for me. I think Warren should take that. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：这个问题对我来说太简单了，我觉得沃伦应该来回答。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that at any given point in history, including when stocks were their cheapest, you could find an equally impressive number of negative factors.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会说，在历史上的任何一个时刻，包括股票最便宜的时候，你都可以找到同样令人印象深刻的负面因素。
I mean, you can — you could’ve sat down in 1974 when stocks were screaming bargains, and you could’ve written down all kinds of things that would’ve caused you to say, you know, the future is just going to be terrible.
我的意思是，你可以——你本可以在 1974 年股票极具吸引力的时候坐下来，然后写下各种各样的事情，这些事情会让你说，未来会很糟糕。
And similarly, at the top, you know, or anytime, you can write down a large list of things that would be quite on the bullish side.
同样地，在顶部，或者在任何时候，你可以写下一长串相当看涨的事情。
We don’t pay — we really don’t pay any attention to that sort of thing. I mean, we have —
我们不在意——我们真的不在意那种事情。我的意思是，我们有——
You might say that our underlying premise — and I think it’s a pretty sound underlying premise — is that this country will do very well, and in particularly, it will do well for business. Business has done very well.
你可能会说我们的基本前提——我认为这是一个相当合理的基本前提——是这个国家会发展得很好，尤其是对商业来说会发展得很好。商业已经做得非常好。
You know, the Dow went from 66 to 10,000-plus in the hundred years of the 20th century. And we had two world wars, and nuclear bombs, and flu epidemics, and you name it, Cold War.
你知道，道琼斯指数在 20 世纪的一百年间从 66 点涨到了超过一万点。而且我们经历了两次世界大战、核弹、流感疫情，还有冷战等等。
There’s always — there are always — there’s always problems in the future, there are always opportunities in the future. And in this country the opportunities have won out over the problems over time.
未来总是有问题，也总是有机会。在这个国家，机会随着时间的推移战胜了问题。
And I think they will continue to do so, absent weapons of mass destruction, which is another question. And business won’t make much difference if anything really drastic happens along that line. So we don’t — I don’t —
我认为他们会继续这样做，除非出现大规模杀伤性武器，这是另一个问题。如果在这方面发生任何真正激烈的事情，商业也不会有太大影响。所以我们不——我不——
I can’t remember any discussions Charlie and I have had, ever, going back to 1959, that where we would’ve come to the conclusion at the end of them that we would’ve passed on a great business opportunity — a business to buy — because of external conditions.
我不记得查理和我曾经有过任何讨论，可以追溯到 1959 年，在这些讨论结束时，我们会得出结论，因为外部条件而放弃一个很好的商业机会——一个可以收购的企业。
Nor did we ever buy anything that we thought was mediocre simply because we thought the world was going to be wonderful. The —
我们也从未因为认为世界会变得美好而购买任何我们认为平庸的东西。——
It won’t be the American economy, in my view, that does in investors over a five, or 10, or 20-year period. It will be the investors themselves.
在我看来，在五年、十年或二十年的时间里，击垮投资者的不会是美国经济，而是投资者自己。
If you look at the record of the 20th century, you’d say how can anybody have missed, you know, in owning equities during that time? And yet, you know, we had all kinds of people wiped out, you know, in the ’29-’32 period. We had all kinds of things that were bad.
如果你查看 20 世纪的记录，你会说，怎么会有人在那段时间错过拥有股票呢？然而，你知道，在 1929-1932 年期间，我们有各种各样的人被淘汰。我们经历了各种不好的事情。
But if you had just owned stocks right straight through, didn’t leverage them, you know, you would — you’d have gotten a perfectly decent return.
但是如果你只是一直持有股票，没有加杠杆，你知道，你会得到一个相当不错的回报。
So we are unaffected, in essence, by the variables you mentioned. Just show us a good business tomorrow, and we’ll jump at the hook.
所以从本质上讲，我们不受你提到的变量影响。明天给我们展示一个好的生意，我们就会立刻抓住机会。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think, but it’s also true that both of us have said at various times over the last three years that we wouldn’t be at all surprised if professionally invested money in America had a pretty modest result over a fairly extended period in the future, compared to the very dramatically high returns that it had achieved up to about three years ago.
查理·芒格：是的，我认为，但同样真实的是，在过去三年中，我们两人都曾在不同场合表示，如果未来相当长的一段时间内，美国的专业投资资金取得的结果相对较为平淡，我们一点也不会感到惊讶，相比于大约三年前所取得的非常高的回报。
And so far that’s been proved out to be pretty much right.
到目前为止，这已被证明是相当正确的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, our —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们的——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Certain stretches are easier than other stretches.
查理·芒格：某些阶段比其他阶段更容易。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, our expectations were more modest than most people’s a few years ago. We didn’t say the world was coming to an end or anything. We just said that people have gone crazy in certain sectors.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，几年前我们的预期比大多数人更为保守。我们并没有说世界末日即将来临或类似的事情。我们只是说在某些领域人们已经变得疯狂。
And that anybody that thought that you could, you know, sit at home and day trade, and make double-digit returns over time, or do anything, or that you were entitled to that, you know, by just sticking a little money in your 401(k) or something, was really living in a fool’s paradise.
任何认为可以坐在家里进行日间交易，并随着时间的推移获得两位数回报，或者做任何事情，或者认为只需在你的 401(k)账户或其他地方投入一点钱就有权获得这些回报的人，实际上是在痴人说梦。
But that was never accompanied by any predictions of disaster for the American economy as a whole, or for American business as a whole. It’s —
但这从未伴随着对整个美国经济或整个美国商业的灾难预测。这是——
People get crazy notions from time to time in financial markets. I commented on this earlier, but they just believe things that there’s — it’s hard to understand how they can believe.
人们时不时会在金融市场上产生疯狂的想法。我之前对此发表过评论，但他们就是相信一些事情——很难理解他们怎么会相信。
Now, to some extent they get sold that by other people. But American business, really, has never let investors down as a group, but investors have done themselves in quite frequently.
在某种程度上，他们也受到他人的影响。但美国企业实际上从未让投资者失望过，然而投资者自己却常常犯错。
56. “Demented” derivatives aren’t like insurance
“疯狂的”衍生品不像保险
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sam Kidston, from Cambridge, Massachusetts.
观众成员：来自马萨诸塞州剑桥市的山姆·基德斯顿。
I’d like you to ask to discuss the similars and differences between what you do in your reinsurance operations, and what Gen Re did in its securities division, as it would seem that reinsurance is often a form of weather derivative.
我想请你讨论一下你在再保险业务中所做的事情与通用再保险在其证券部门所做的事情之间的相似点和不同点，因为再保险通常被视为一种气候衍生品。
I would also like to ask you, why you are so comfortable writing what appears to be one type of derivative, and so uncomfortable writing another? Thank you.
我还想问您，为什么您对写作某一类衍生品如此自信，而对另一类衍生品则感到如此不安？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the derivatives contracts that Gen Re wrote in Gen Re Securities, I would say bore very little relation to the insurance businesses we see.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，通用再保险在其证券部门所写的衍生合约，我认为与我们所见的保险业务几乎没有关系。
I mean, we are insuring against events that people either can’t or aren’t willing to take on the risk themselves.
我的意思是，我们正在为人们自己无法或不愿承担风险的事件提供保险。
In the derivatives business, a lot of that was speculative activity of one sort or another. The more complex the arrangements were, the easier it was to claim that large profits were being made, when maybe large losses really awaited you over time.
在衍生品业务中，很多都是某种形式的投机活动。安排越复杂，就越容易声称获得了巨额利润，而实际上可能随着时间的推移会面临巨额损失。
They were created transactions without much economic necessity. In a great many cases, they were just facilitating speculation.
它们是没有太多经济必要性而创建的交易。在许多情况下，它们只是为了促进投机。
Insurance deals with taking on risks that people incur in their business or personal life, that they don’t want to bear themselves, or that they’re unable to bear themselves. There was very little connection between the business. I think that in going into the business, they dreamt up a lot of reasons for it.
保险涉及承担人们在商业或个人生活中遇到的风险，这些风险是他们不想自己承担或无法自己承担的。业务之间几乎没有联系。我认为，在进入这个行业时，他们为此想出了很多理由。
You know, they said they’re both in the risk business, and their clients were going to demand it and everything.
你知道，他们说他们都在风险业务中，他们的客户会要求这样做和一切。
But when people want to go into a business, they always dream up reasons. In our view, it made no sense whatsoever. And I really see very little connection between them.
但是当人们想要进入一个行业时，他们总是会想出各种理由。在我们看来，这完全没有意义。而且我确实看不出它们之间有什么联系。
Do you, Charlie? 你呢，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re radically different. The derivatives business is chock full of clauses saying that if one party’s credit gets downgraded by a rating agency, they have to start posting collateral. And that’s just like a margin account.
查理·芒格：它们是截然不同的。衍生品业务充满了这样的条款：如果一方的信用被评级机构下调，他们就必须开始提供抵押品。这就像一个保证金账户。
And when you sign pieces of paper like that, you can go absolutely broke, into default and catastrophe, and having other people liquidating your positions under distress conditions, et cetera, et cetera. So there’s a lot of irresponsible mechanics.
当你在这样的文件上签字时，你可能会彻底破产，陷入违约和灾难，其他人在困境中清算你的头寸，等等。因此，有很多不负责任的操作。
In attempting to protect themselves, they’ve introduced this enormous instability into the system, through all these clauses about collateral posting. And nobody seems to recognize what a disaster of a system they’ve created in an attempt to make each party feel safer.
在试图保护自己时，他们通过所有这些关于抵押品的条款，将这种巨大的不稳定性引入了系统。而且似乎没有人意识到，他们在试图让每一方感到更安全的过程中创造了一个多么灾难性的系统。
It’s a demented system. And you don’t get properly paid in most cases for playing the game. And therefore, we’re not in it.
这是一个疯狂的系统。而且在大多数情况下，你玩这个游戏并没有得到合理的报酬。因此，我们不参与其中。
WARREN BUFFETT: Absent the ability to raise new capital at the time, and who knows whether that would’ve been — they’d been able to or not — Gen Re, which had been rated triple-A — it still is because Berkshire’s involved — but it had been rated triple-A — could well have run into really terrible financial difficulty post-September 11th, particularly if they’d fully recognized the liabilities that they’d already incurred, but not fully recognized, at that time.
沃伦·巴菲特：如果没有能力在当时筹集新资本——谁知道他们是否能够——通用再保险本来是获得了AAA评级的——现在由于伯克希尔的介入，它仍然是AAA评级，但它曾经是AAA评级——在911事件后，可能确实会面临严重的财务困难，尤其是如果他们当时全面认识到自己已经承担但尚未完全认识的负债。
Because their capital would’ve shrunk, they would’ve had way more in equities, which would have shrunk further. And who knows how far, you know, at the time, how far it would have gone?
因为他们的资本会缩水，他们会在股市上持有更多的股票，而这些股票会进一步缩水。谁知道，当时会缩水到什么程度？
Plus they would have had, in my view, they would have been downgraded quite significantly, and that might well have triggered things in their derivatives activities, which would have required coming up with loads of cash.
另外，在我看来，他们的评级会被大幅下调，这很可能会触发其衍生品活动中的一些问题，从而需要筹集大量现金。
It was not built to last. And it is now built to last. But I would say that that threat exists with other financial institutions as well.
这并不是一个能持久的系统。而现在它已经能够持久。但我认为，其他金融机构也面临着这样的威胁。
But I think many of the CEOs — or some of them anyway, I should say — don’t really fully comprehend that.
但我认为许多首席执行官——或者至少其中一些，我应该说——并没有真正完全理解这一点。
When you get margin calls for huge amounts of money, you know, it only has to be one day when you can’t meet it. That almost happened.
当你收到巨额保证金追缴通知时，你知道，只要有一天你无法满足要求，事情就会发生。那几乎发生了。
If you go back to October of 1987, there was a large wire transfer that didn’t make it to the — for a while — it didn’t make it to the clearing house at the — in Chicago. And that came close to halting the whole system at the time, and we were very close to closing the exchange.
如果你回到 1987 年 10 月，当时有一笔大额电汇一度没有到达芝加哥的清算所。这几乎导致整个系统在当时停摆，我们非常接近关闭交易所。
And a lot of things would have unraveled. The money finally showed up. But it’s dangerous to have a system where people are depending on billions of dollars coming in from other people.
很多事情本来会崩溃。资金终于到位了。但是，依赖于从其他人那里获得数十亿美元的系统是很危险的。
Well, we had that on Salomon, on that Sunday in 1991.
好吧，我们在 1991 年的那个星期天在Salomon经历了那件事。
If Salomon had gone bankrupt, the next day you would have had people on the other side of 1.2 trillion of notional amount of — something like that — of derivatives, who would have had a contract with a party where they would have been dealing with a bankruptcy court.
如果Salomon倒闭，第二天，你将会看到有1.2万亿美元的衍生品名义金额的交易，而这些交易都是与一家可能破产的公司签订的合同。
You would have had all kinds of security settlements that wouldn’t necessarily have settled. You would have all kinds of confusion.
你本会有各种各样的安全结算，但不一定会结算。你会有各种各样的混乱。
And believe me, it would have been huge at that time, between what was going on in Japan, what was going on in the U.K., and what was going on in the United States, because the accounts were all intermingled.
相信我，那时候会非常巨大，因为日本、英国和美国发生的事情都交织在一起。
As a matter of fact, Salomon was a — was banking — was running a bank in Germany where — which took on large amounts of deposits from individuals, and just loaned it all to Salomon.
事实上，Salomon在德国经营一家银行，该银行从个人那里吸收了大量存款，然后将所有资金借给了Salomon。
So it would have had a receivable from a bankrupt company and owed money to I don’t know how many German depositors. There are all kinds of things that would have come out at that time. And who knows what the effect would be on the system?
因此，那时的结果是，它将拥有来自破产公司的应收款，并欠下不知道有多少名德国存款人的钱。届时会出现各种各样的事情。而谁知道那时对整个系统的影响会是什么？
You don’t need to put more and more of those kind of linkages and strains on an economic system that already is pretty damn leveraged.
你不需要在一个已经相当杠杆化的经济系统上增加越来越多的这种链接和压力。
Charlie, got any further thoughts? We love talking about disasters, so don’t stop us. (Laughs)
查理，有什么进一步的想法吗？我们喜欢谈论灾难，所以请继续。（笑）
57. Salomon and Robert Maxwell, “The Bouncing Czech”
Salomon和罗伯特·麦克斯韦，“弹跳的捷克人”
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s simply amazing what goes in these seemingly rational places. Salomon was at least as disciplined, and honorable, and rational as the other leading investment banks.
查理·芒格：在这些看似理性的地方发生的事情简直令人惊讶。所罗门至少和其他领先的投资银行一样有纪律、正直和理性。
And yet, toward the end of our pleasant period, Salomon was begging for new investment banking business from [Robert] Maxwell. And his nickname was “The Bouncing Czech.” (Laughter)
然而，在我们愉快时期的末尾，所罗门正在向[罗伯特]·麦克斯韦乞求新的投资银行业务。而他的绰号是“弹跳的捷克人”。（笑声）
Now, and of course it wasn’t very much after that that he committed suicide after massive embezzlements of pension funds, and a huge collapse.
现在，当然在那之后不久，他在大规模挪用养老金和巨大崩溃后自杀了。
Now, you’d think if a guy’s nickname was “The Bouncing Czech,” you wouldn’t be madly seeking his investment banking business. But all the leading investment banks were.
现在，你可能会认为，如果一个人的绰号是“弹跳的捷克人”，你不会疯狂地寻求他的投资银行业务。但所有主要的投资银行都在这样做。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’m fuzzy it on now, but actually the morning, or the day he was discovered to be bobbing around in the ocean, the —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我现在有点模糊了，但实际上是在早上，或者说是在他被发现漂浮在海上的那一天，——
I think at Salomon, we had transferred a bunch of money to somebody over in Germany or Switzerland, and we were supposed to get some more money back that afternoon.
我记得在所罗门，我们把一大笔钱转给了德国或瑞士的某个人，按计划那天下午我们应该收到更多的钱。
This is basically correct — I may be a little bit off on the details — but the money that got sent, got sent. But the money was to be received, did not get received. And then we went over to England and tried to collect it from his sons, and we got stiff-armed in one way or another.
这基本上是正确的——我可能在细节上有些偏差——但寄出去的钱确实寄出去了。但是应该收到的钱却没有收到。然后我们去了英国，试图从他的儿子那里收回这笔钱，但我们以各种方式被拒绝了。
I mean, we got what we deserved, frankly, in a transaction like that. But to the investment banker involved, his earnings that year was — were going to be affected in a significant way by whether he wrote a ticket or two more with Maxwell. And, you know, in the end, that carried the day.
我的意思是，坦率地说，在那样的交易中，我们得到了应得的结果。但对参与的投资银行家来说，他那一年的收入会受到很大影响，取决于他是否多给麦克斯韦写了一两张票。最终，这成为了决定因素。
And it’s very hard to control people when their income depends on bringing in dubious people into the door. They care enormously about it, and you’ve got this big system that doesn’t quite pick up on it.
当人们的收入依赖于将可疑的人带进门时，很难控制他们。他们对此非常在意，而你有一个庞大的系统却没有完全注意到这一点。
And Charlie’s mentioned before, you know, one of the underwriting clients that came forth, that Salomon took on, that professed to be doing wonderful things with money, and it turned out to be a huge fraud.
查理之前提到过，你知道，有一个承销客户出现了，所罗门接手了，声称在用钱做很棒的事情，结果却是一个巨大的骗局。
Well, it’s tough to stop. You’ve got dozens and dozens of people running around out there all thinking about how big their bonus is going to be at the end of the year. And, you know, they are not inclined to run morality checks on who they do business with.
嗯，这很难停止。外面有成群结队的人到处奔走，心里都在想着年底他们的奖金会有多大。而且，你知道，他们并不倾向于对他们做生意的对象进行道德检查。
CHARLIE MUNGER: That was a wonderful experience. Warren and I, and Lou Simpson are all directors of a company, and we are by far the biggest shareholder. And we all said we should not be doing business with this guy. This is a very dangerous transaction.
查理·芒格：那是一次美妙的经历。沃伦、我和卢·辛普森都是一家公司的董事，而且我们是最大的股东。我们都说不应该和这个人做生意。这是一笔非常危险的交易。
And they told us it had been approved by the underwriting committee. And of course that settled matters. And —
他们告诉我们已经得到了承保委员会的批准。当然，这就解决了问题。而且——
WARREN BUFFETT: This guy had a neon sign that sign that said “Crook” on him, as far as we were concerned.
沃伦·巴菲特：在我们看来，这家伙就像挂着一个写着“骗子”的霓虹灯招牌。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And he was waving it vigorously, yeah. (Buffett laughs)
查理·芒格：他在用力挥舞它，是的。（巴菲特笑）
But it had been through the underwriting committee. They — the transaction closed, but not financially. I mean, they had the underwriting, but they hadn’t had the financial closing.
但它已经通过了承销委员会。他们——交易已经完成，但不是在财务上。我是说，他们有了承销，但还没有财务结算。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they caught him on the way to the bank. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们在他去银行的路上抓住了他。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: You’re right, they pulled back just from the edge of the precipice, from this big, fraudulent — and of course they got egg all over their faces.
查理·芒格：你说得对，他们刚好从悬崖边缘退了回来，避免了这场巨大的欺诈——当然，他们也因此颜面尽失。
That phrase reminds me of one of the leading lawyers of yore, and he said, “Captain of my soul,” he says, “Or captain of my fate,” he says, “Hell, I don’t even pull an oar.”
那句话让我想起了过去的一位著名律师，他说：“我掌握着我的灵魂，”他说：“或者我掌握着我的命运，”他说：“见鬼，我连桨都不划。”
I mean, here we are — (laughs) — with all three of us on the board, you know, the biggest shareholder, and we can’t even stop one stupid little underwriting.
我的意思是，我们都在董事会里（笑），你知道，作为最大股东，我们甚至无法阻止一个愚蠢的小承销。
WARREN BUFFETT: He did go to jail, though, I think, didn’t he?
沃伦·巴菲特：不过他是去坐牢了，是吧？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: He claimed, incidentally, to be a huge shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway. And had made all this money. And I went to the shareholder’s list, and admittedly he could have it in a street name someplace.
沃伦·巴菲特：顺便提一下，他声称自己是伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的大股东，并赚了很多钱。我查看了股东名单，承认他可能在某个地方以街名持有股份。
But it was a big quantity, he claimed. Though we — I couldn’t find any record in any place. But he did have some kind of a little from an accounting firm that —
但他说数量很大。虽然我们——我在任何地方都找不到任何记录。但他确实有一些来自会计师事务所的小东西——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: — was backing him up. Didn’t back him up all the way, though, it turned out. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：——在支持他。不过，结果证明并没有完全支持他。（笑）
58. Hedge funds are a fad with huge fees
对冲基金是一种收取高额费用的时尚潮流
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11, please.
沃伦·巴菲特：请给我 11 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, I’m Manuel Fernandez, from Mexico City, Mexico. And I want to thank you for your valuable lessons on how to be good partners, you — and for exporting some good ideas and principles to the world for free.
观众成员：下午好，我是曼努埃尔·费尔南德斯，来自墨西哥墨西哥城。我想感谢您关于如何成为好伙伴的宝贵课程，以及您免费向世界传播的一些好想法和原则。
My simple question is, do you think it makes sense for individual investors to invest a part of their capital in hedge funds, or a fund of hedge funds, somewhat like the $600 million investment Berkshire made in Value Capital?
我的简单问题是，您认为个人投资者将部分资本投资于对冲基金或对冲基金组合是否有意义，有点像伯克希尔在 Value Capital 中投资的 6 亿美元？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say that people that are now investing in hedge funds, in aggregate, are going to be disappointed.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会说，现在投资对冲基金的人，总体上会感到失望。
You don’t get smarter because you’re running something called a hedge fund, or something called private equity, or something, you know, called anything — an LBO fund.
你不会因为经营一个叫做对冲基金的东西，或者叫做私募股权的东西，或者任何其他名称的东西——比如杠杆收购基金——而变得更聪明。
But what you do gain periodically is the ability to merchandise those things. I mean, there are fads in Wall Street, and Wall Street will sell what it can sell, just remember that. You know, that may be as good as what the fellow quoted up in the upper levels there.
但你会定期获得推销这些东西的能力。我的意思是，华尔街有潮流，华尔街会出售它能出售的产品，记住这一点。你知道，那可能和上面那位引用的家伙一样好。
And the hedge fund right now is in the midst of a fad. It’s distinguished not by the ability to make more money. It’s distinguished by the extraordinary amount of fees that are collected.
目前，对冲基金正处于一种潮流之中。它的特点不是赚钱的能力，而是收取的费用数量异常之多。
And believe me, if the world on $600 billion of money, is paying 2 percent fees, and a percentage of the profits, and the losers go out of existence, and the winners continue for a while, and take money off the table, it is not going to be a great experience, in aggregate, for investors.
相信我，如果全球有6000亿美元的资金支付2%的费用，再加上利润分成，失败者会消失，赢家会继续一段时间并从中抽取资金，那么整体上，投资者的体验不会很好。
Obviously, there are a few smart, honest people out there running funds, and they can — they will do quite well. But if you buy them across the board, in my view, you’re going to get a bad result.
显然，确实有一些聪明、诚实的人在管理基金，他们会做得不错。但如果你从整体上投资这些基金，在我看来，你会得到一个糟糕的结果。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, why would you want to invest with a guy whose basic thought process runs something like this, “If a second layer of fees on top of a first layer of substantial fees is good for an investor, then a third layer of fees must be better yet?” (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，为什么你会想投资于一个人的思维方式是这样的：“如果在第一层大量费用上再加第二层费用对投资者有好处，那么第三层费用一定更好？”（笑声）
Why would you invest with somebody with a proposition like that?
你为什么要投资给提出那种建议的人？
WARREN BUFFETT: It — just the idea of taking two percent, you know, plus percentages on top of that, that reflects — you know, it may be what the traffic can bear, you know, Collis P. Huntington style, but that reflects an attitude toward people that we tend to regard as partners, investors — I just think it’s a basically unfair type of arrangement.
沃伦·巴菲特：仅仅是收取 2% 的费用，然后在上面加上百分比，这反映了——你知道，这可能是市场所能承受的，你知道，柯利斯·P·亨廷顿式的，但这反映了一种对我们倾向于作为合作伙伴、投资者看待的人的态度——我只是认为这是一种从根本上不公平的安排。
And I don’t like getting in — in general, I think it’s a mistake to get in with people who propose unfair arrangements.
而且我不喜欢参与——总的来说，我认为与提出不公平安排的人合作是一个错误。
You know, in effect they’re getting — probably getting four times standard fees to begin with. And then on top of that, they say we want part of the action. And I would guess in many of those cases, that they don’t have all of their own money in the fund themselves. Maybe they have a substantial sum outside.
你知道，实际上他们一开始可能就获得了四倍的标准费用。而且在此基础上，他们还说我们想要分一杯羹。我猜在很多情况下，他们自己并没有把所有的钱都投入到基金中。也许他们在外面有一大笔钱。
Charlie and I both run — ran — partnerships in the ’60s, and ‘50s with me, and into the ’70s with him, that would generally be classified as hedge funds. They had the compensation arrangement somewhat similar, although not like they are now. And we did some —
查理和我都在 60 年代经营——过去经营——合伙企业，我是在 50 年代，他是在 70 年代，这些合伙企业通常被归类为对冲基金。它们的补偿安排有些相似，尽管不像现在这样。而且我们做了一些——
They had some similarities, but I don’t think we had quite the attitude toward the people who were trying to — that were asking to join us — that the present managers have. It’s —
他们有一些相似之处，但我认为我们对那些想要加入我们的人——那些请求加入我们的人——的态度并不像现在的管理者那样。它是——
As Charlie said, the fund-to-funds type stuff, I mean, it’s really sort of unbelievable just piling on layer after layer on costs. It doesn’t make the companies that are underlying these stocks they buy any better. I mean, it —
正如查理所说，基金中的基金类型的东西，我的意思是，这真的是在成本上层层叠加，令人难以置信。这并不会让他们购买的这些股票背后的公司变得更好。我的意思是，它——
And believe me, people don’t become a genius just because you walk into some office, and it says “hedge funds” on the door. I mean they are — what they may be very good at is marketing. In fact, if they’re good at marketing, they don’t have to be good at anything else.
相信我，人们不会因为你走进某个办公室，门上写着“对冲基金”就变成天才。我的意思是，他们可能非常擅长的是营销。事实上，如果他们擅长营销，他们不需要擅长其他任何事情。
59. Basic principles and “uncommon sense”
基本原则和“不常见的常识”
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12.
沃伦·巴菲特：第十二号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Arturo Brulenborg (PH). I’m from Washington, D.C. I’ll be graduating from Harvard College in June and beginning a career in value investing, so I sure hope we’re all right in thinking that this century will be just as good as the last for value investors.
观众成员：我叫阿图罗·布鲁伦博格，来自华盛顿特区。我将在6月毕业于哈佛大学，并开始我的价值投资生涯，所以我确实希望我们都能正确地认为，本世纪的价值投资者会像上个世纪一样好。
You’ve been doing this since you were my age, if not younger. So I’m wondering what habit, or habits have contributed most to your ability to continue learning and improving your investment decisions in a changing business and financial environment?
你从我这个年纪，甚至更小的时候就开始这样做了。所以我想知道，哪些习惯对你在不断变化的商业和金融环境中持续学习和改进投资决策的能力贡献最大？
WARREN BUFFETT: I would say that, at least in my case, I haven’t been continually learning, in terms of the basic principles. You always learn a little more about given techniques, or we learn — you know, I learn more about some industries over time, and therefore, maybe I’ve widened the universe in which I can operate, although more funds narrows it back down, unfortunately.
沃伦·巴菲特：我会说，至少就我而言，我并没有在基本原则方面持续学习。你总是会多学一点关于特定技术的知识，或者我们会学到——你知道，我随着时间的推移对某些行业了解更多，因此，也许我扩大了我可以操作的领域，尽管更多的资金不幸地又将其缩小了。
But I know more about businesses than I knew 20 years ago, or 40 years ago. I haven’t really changed the principles.
但我现在对商业的了解比 20 年前或 40 年前更多。我并没有真正改变原则。
The last change — the basic principles are still Ben Graham. They were affected in a significant way by Charlie and Phil Fisher, in terms of looking at the better businesses. But they — but I didn’t leave any of — I didn’t leave Graham behind on that.
最后的变化——基本原则仍然是本·格雷厄姆的。查理和菲尔·费雪在寻找更好的企业方面对其产生了重大影响。但他们——但我没有抛弃——我没有在这方面抛弃格雷厄姆。
And I really haven’t learned any new fundamental principles. But I may have learned a little bit more about how business operates over time.
而且我确实没有学到任何新的基本原则。但我可能对商业运作的方式有了更多的了解。
And there’s really nothing — I mean, you ought to get an investment framework that comes straight from, in my view, from “The Intelligent Investor,” and from Phil Fisher, more from “The Intelligent Investor,” actually.
而且实际上没有什么——我的意思是，你应该获得一个投资框架，我认为这个框架直接来自《聪明的投资者》，以及菲尔·费雪的著作，实际上更多来自《聪明的投资者》。
And then I think you ought to learn everything you can about industries and businesses that — where you think you have the ability to get your mind around them if you work at them. And with that arsenal, you’ll do very well, and if you’ve got the temperament for the business.
然后我认为你应该尽可能多地了解那些你认为通过努力能够理解的行业和企业。凭借这些知识储备，如果你有适合商业的性格，你会做得非常好。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, of course I’ve watched Warren all these decades, and he’s learned a hell of a lot, even the last 20 or 30 years. So it’s a game of continuing to learn. And he can denigrate this little frou-frou that enables him to pick the biggest oil company in China, or this or that.
查理·芒格：是的，当然，我这些年来一直在观察沃伦，他学到了很多东西，甚至在过去的 20 或 30 年里也是如此。所以这是一场持续学习的游戏。他可以贬低这个小小的花招，这使他能够挑选出中国最大的石油公司，或者其他什么。
But those basic principles alone, that he knew a long time ago, wouldn’t have given him the ability to make the recent investment decisions as well as he’s made them. It’s a life-long game, and it you don’t keep learning, other people will pass you by.
但是仅靠那些他很久以前就知道的基本原则，并不足以让他做出最近的投资决策并取得成功。这是一场终身的游戏，如果你不持续学习，其他人就会超过你。
WARREN BUFFETT: I would say temperament, though, still is the most important, wouldn’t you, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特：不过，我还是会说性格是最重要的，你说呢，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, of course.
查理·芒格：是的，当然。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But temperament alone won’t do it.
查理·芒格：但仅靠性格是不够的。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, temperament alone won’t do it.
沃伦·巴菲特：不，光靠性格是不行的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You have to have the temperament, and the right basic idea. And then you have to keep at it with a lot of curiosity for a long, long time.
查理·芒格：你必须具备合适的性格和正确的基本理念。然后，你必须长期保持强烈的好奇心。
WARREN BUFFETT: But you don’t have to be blindingly, and have any blinding insights, or have a high IQ to look at a PetroChina for example, and —
沃伦·巴菲特：但你不需要有惊人的洞察力，也不需要高智商就能看懂像中国石油这样的公司，举个例子。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。
WARREN BUFFETT: You know, it, I mean, it’s a — when you get, you know, a company that is doing 2 1/2 million barrels a day, that’s 3 1/2 percent of the — or 3 percent — of the world’s oil production.
沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，这意味着，当你拥有一家每天生产 250 万桶的公司时，那就是世界石油产量的 3.5%或 3%。
You know, and they’re selling based on U.S. prices using WTI — you know, as West Texas Intermediate — as a base price, and where they have a significant part of the marketing and refining in a country, the tax rate’s 30 percent.
你知道，他们是根据美国价格使用 WTI——你知道，就是西德克萨斯中质原油——作为基准价格进行销售的，并且在一个税率为30%的国家拥有大量的营销和炼油能力。
They say they’re going to pay out 45 percent to you in dividends. Don’t have unusual amounts of leverage.
他们说他们将向你支付 45%的股息。没有异常高的杠杆。
If you’re buying something like that at well under half what — or maybe a third — of what comparable oil companies are selling for, that’s not high-level stuff.
如果你以不到一半的价格，或者可能是三分之一的价格购买类似的东西，而可比的石油公司却以更高的价格出售，那就不是什么高水平的东西。
I mean, you have to read some — you have to be willing to read the reports. But I enjoy doing that. But you wouldn’t say that requires any high-level insights or anything, Charlie?
我的意思是，你必须读一些——你必须愿意阅读这些报告。但我喜欢这样做。不过你不会说这需要什么高水平的见解或其他东西，对吧，查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, when you were buying that block of stock, nobody else to speak of was buying. So —
查理·芒格：嗯，当你购买那批股票时，几乎没有其他人购买。所以——
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank heavens.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢天谢地。
CHARLIE MUNGER: The insights can’t have been all that common.
查理·芒格：这些见解不可能都那么常见。
No, I think that takes a certain amount of what an old Omaha friend used to call “uncommon sense.” He used to say, “There is no common sense. When people say common sense, they mean uncommon sense.”
不，我认为这需要一定程度的“不常见的常识”，正如我以前在奥马哈的一个老朋友所说的。他常说：“不常见的常识。人们说常识时，他们指的是不常见的常识。”
Part of it, I think, is being able to tune out folly as distinguished from recognizing wisdom. And if you just got whole categories of things you just bat away, so your brain isn’t cluttered with them, then you’re better able to pick up a few sensible things to do.
我认为，部分原因在于能够排除愚蠢，与识别智慧相区别。如果你能把整类事情都排除掉，这样你的大脑就不会被它们弄得一团糟，那么你就能更好地抓住一些明智的事情去做。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t consider many stupid things. You know, we get rid of them fast.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不会考虑很多愚蠢的事情。你知道，我们会很快摆脱它们。
And in fact, people get irritated with us, because they’ll call us, and when they’re in the middle of the first sentence, we’ll just tell them “forget it.” You know, and we don’t — we can see it coming.
实际上，人们会对此感到恼火，因为他们会打电话给我们，当他们说出第一句时，我们就会告诉他们“忘了它”。你知道，我们能看出来。
And, you know, that’s the way, actually, the mind works. There was a great article in The New Yorker magazine 30 years ago or so — little more than that. It was when the Fischer-Spassky chess matches were going on. And it got into this speculation of would the humans be able to take on computers in chess.
你知道，实际上，心智就是这样运作的。大约 30 年前，《纽约客》杂志上有一篇很棒的文章——稍微久一点。当时正值费舍尔-斯帕斯基国际象棋比赛进行中。文章探讨了人类是否能够在国际象棋中对抗计算机。
And, you know, here were these computers doing hundreds of thousands of calculations a second. And they said, “How can the human mind, when all you’re really looking at is the future, you know, the results from various moves in the future, how can a human mind deal with a computer that’s thinking it at speeds that are unbelievable?”
而且，你知道，这些计算机每秒进行数十万次计算。他们说：“当你真正关注的是未来时，你知道，未来各种动作的结果，人类的大脑如何能应对以难以置信的速度思考的计算机？”
And of course, they examined the subject some. And a mind, like — well, in fact, all minds, but some much better than others — but a Fischer or Spassky, essentially, was eliminating about 99.99 percent of the possibilities without even thinking about it.
当然，他们对这个主题进行了一些研究。一个头脑，就像——实际上，所有的头脑都是这样，但有些比其他的要好得多——但像费舍尔或斯帕斯基这样的人，基本上在不假思索的情况下就排除了大约 99.99%的可能性。
So it wasn’t that they could outthink the computer in terms of speed, but they had this ability in what you might call grouping, or exclusion, where, essentially, they just got right down to the few possibilities out of the zillions of possibilities that really had any chance of success.
所以，并不是他们在速度上能胜过计算机，而是他们在所谓的分组或排除方面有这种能力，基本上，他们能够从无数种可能性中直接缩小到真正有成功机会的几种可能性。
And getting rid of the nonsense, I mean, just figuring that, you know, people start calling you and say, “I’ve got this great, wonderful idea.” Don’t spend 10 minutes, you know, once you know in the first sentence that it isn’t a great, wonderful idea.
摆脱那些无稽之谈，我的意思是，只要弄清楚，你知道，人们开始打电话给你，说：“我有一个很棒的想法。” 一旦你在第一句话中知道这不是一个很棒的想法，就不要花 10 分钟。
Don’t be polite, go through the whole process. And Charlie and I pretty good at that. We can hang up very fast, right? (Laughter)
别客气，走完整个过程。查理和我对此很在行。我们可以很快挂断，对吧？（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there you have it. All you’ve got to do is go at it in the way that Vasily Smyslov did when he was the world champion, and — of chess — and just do the same thing in investments. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：好了，你知道了。你所要做的就是像瓦西里·斯米斯洛夫在成为世界冠军时那样去做——在国际象棋中——然后在投资中做同样的事情。（笑声）
60. Estimating intrinsic value
估算内在价值
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, microphone 1. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，麦克风 1。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Richard Azar. I’m from Trinidad in the West Indies.
观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我的名字是理查德·阿扎尔。我来自西印度群岛的特立尼达。
You guys have been very generous with your intellect over the years. It’s been a huge help to me in my personal and financial life.
多年来，你们在智力上一直非常慷慨。这对我的个人和财务生活有很大帮助。
I wondered if it was appropriate for me to describe the methodology in which I’m trying to determine the range of Berkshire’s intrinsic value, and if you can guide me on if my methodology is flawed, or is reasonably accurate.
我想知道我描述我正在尝试确定伯克希尔内在价值范围的方法是否合适，如果您能指导我我的方法是否有缺陷，或者是否相当准确。
WARREN BUFFETT: If it doesn’t take too long, we’ll be glad to, although I think I know the answer already. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特：如果不需要太长时间，我们很乐意，尽管我想我已经知道答案了。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. We ended 2003 with about 5.422 billion of operating earnings. I estimated our look-through earnings to be approximately 915 million. So in total, that was about 6.337 billion of estimated look-through earnings.
观众成员：好的。我们在 2003 年结束时的经营收益约为 54.22 亿美元。我估计我们的透视收益大约为 9.15 亿美元。所以总的来看，预计的透视收益约为63.37亿美元。
I knew that we spent a billion-two on CAPEX, and our net depreciation on tangible assets was 829 million. So, there was a difference there of 173 million. And we spent more on CAPEX over the appreciation, over the last few years.
我知道我们在资本支出上花费了 12 亿，而我们在有形资产上的净折旧是 8.29 亿。所以，这里有 1.73 亿的差额。过去几年中，我们在资本支出上的花费超过了折旧。
But in extrapolating out 20 years, I thought I might be kidding myself to ascertaining the differences between CAPEX and depreciation. And I’m using look-through earnings as a rough proxy for distributable earnings.
但是在推算出 20 年后，我想我可能是在自欺欺人，以确定资本支出和折旧之间的差异。而且我正在使用透视收益作为可分配收益的粗略代理。
And I’ve assumed that Berkshire can grow its look-through earnings at 15 percent per annum, from years one to five, and at 10 percent per annum, from years six to 20. And the business will stop growing after year 20, resulting in a 7 percent coupon from year 21 onwards.
我假设伯克希尔在前五年内可以每年增长15%的透视收益，并在第六到第二十年内每年增长10%。并且在第二十年后，业务将停止增长，从第二十一年开始产生7%的收益。
I discounted the cumulative flows in years one to 20 by 7 percent, and I discounted the terminal value by 7 percent. I added the two together, to get what I thought was the intrinsic value of Berkshire’s cash stream.
我将第 1 年至第 20 年的累计现金流以 7%的利率折现，并以 7%的利率折现终值。我将两者相加，得出了我认为伯克希尔现金流的内在价值。
I knocked off 103 billion of liabilities and minority interests. I divided by 1,537,000 shares, to arrive at what I thought was a conservative calculation of the range of Berkshire’s intrinsic value.
我扣除了 1030 亿的负债和少数股东权益。我除以 1,537,000 股，以得出我认为是伯克希尔内在价值范围的保守计算。
Am I off the mark, or is that the sort of methodology you might use yourself?
我是不是偏离了方向，还是这就是你可能会使用的方法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well — (Laughter and applause) — well, you’ve done your homework. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：（笑声和掌声）——嗯，你做了功课。（笑声）
The line of thinking is correct, it just depends on what variables you plug in. And we might have different ideas on variables, and neither one of us knows.
这种思路是正确的，只是取决于你代入了什么变量。而我们可能对变量有不同的看法，并且我们都不知道。
But the approach, in general, the approach of trying to figure out distributable cash over a period of time. The business today is worth, the present value at some number — you’re using 7 percent, but the question of what number to use —
但是，总的来说，试图在一段时间内计算可分配现金的方法。今天的业务价值，即某个数字的现值——你使用的是 7％，但问题是使用哪个数字——
But it’s worth the present value of all the cash it can distribute between now and Judgment Day. And if cash can be retained, and it’s at a rate higher — it produces — at a rate higher than your discount rate, obviously, you’ll get some benefit from that retention.
但它的价值在于从现在到审判日之间可以分配的所有现金的现值。如果现金可以保留，并且其产生的收益率高于你的贴现率，显然，你会从这种保留中获得一些好处。
But, you know, I would say that your assumptions about CAPEX, and related to depreciation, I would expect CAPEX to be, on average, a little more than depreciation unless we run into highly inflationary times.
但是，你知道，我会说你对资本支出的假设，以及与折旧相关的假设，我预计资本支出平均会比折旧多一点，除非我们遇到高度通货膨胀的时期。
But of course, we have to keep buying businesses, and using the capital in the business that we retain. If we retain those earnings, we have to use that to buy more businesses. And then the question is, what kind of returns can we expect on those?
但当然，我们必须继续收购企业，并在我们保留的业务中使用资本。如果我们保留这些收益，我们就必须用它来购买更多的企业。然后问题是，我们可以期望从中获得什么样的回报？
I don’t quarrel with the approach you’re using, but, you know, everybody has to do their own equation and plug in some numbers.
我不反对你使用的方法，但是，你知道，每个人都必须做自己的计算并代入一些数字。
And I think we might settle for lower numbers on earnings gains than you postulated because we’re very large, and it’s — it gets harder all the time to deploy the kind of funds that keep flowing into Omaha.
我认为，我们可能对收益增长的预期会低于你假设的，因为我们非常庞大，而继续投入资金变得越来越困难。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and you shouldn’t necessarily get overly excited about last year, as Warren said, that was a very unusual year when everything worked together pretty darn well.
查理·芒格：是的，正如沃伦所说，你不应该对去年过于兴奋，那是一个非常不寻常的年份，一切都配合得相当好。
WARREN BUFFETT: Except interest rates on —
沃伦·巴菲特：除了利率——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, but a lot worked together very well.
查理·芒格：是的，不过很多事情配合得很好。
The interesting thing about Berkshire’s present valuation is how much cash, and cash equivalents it has to do something.
这是一个非常有趣的问题。我们将如何利用这一大笔可投资的现金和现金等价物？
And that is a very interesting question. How well are we going to do with this massive amount of investable cash and cash equivalents?
这是一个非常有趣的问题。我们将如何处理这大笔可投资的现金及现金等价物？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we should be out working now. I mean — (laughter) — that is the test.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们现在应该出去工作。我是说——（笑声）——这就是考验。
I mean, we’ve got a bunch of good businesses. We’ve got a lot of money that we’d like to use to buy more good businesses. We may get lucky and deploy that quite rapidly. We may wait a long time.
我的意思是，我们有一堆好企业。我们有很多钱，希望用来购买更多好企业。我们可能会很幸运地很快部署这些资金。我们也可能会等很长时间。
Cash may pile up faster than we can use it, in which case we’ll have to rethink the whole game.
现金可能会堆积得比我们使用得更快，在这种情况下，我们将不得不重新考虑整个计划。
But our hope is — and so far we feel OK about what’s happened in that — our hope is that we can deploy the money that flows in at — in businesses that come close to being as good as the ones that we’ve bought over the years.
但我们的希望是——到目前为止，我们对所发生的事情感到满意——我们的希望是，我们可以将流入的资金投入到接近于我们多年来所购买的那些优秀企业中。
61. Timing of Berkshire earning reports
伯克希尔收益报告的时间安排
WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, Whitney Tilson, a shareholder from New York City.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是来自纽约市的股东惠特尼·蒂尔森。
It’s past three o’clock, and we’ve heard almost nothing about how these great businesses are doing right now, or at least in the first quarter.
已经过了三点，我们几乎没有听到关于这些大企业目前或至少在第一季度的表现的任何消息。
And I recall at last year’s annual meeting, you took the fairly unusual step, at least from my recollection, of putting up slides and actually giving us a preview of how phenomenally the businesses were doing.
我记得在去年的年度会议上，你采取了一个相当不寻常的步骤，至少在我的记忆中，是放幻灯片并实际给我们预览了业务的惊人表现。
And I can imagine that if you had the wind to your back a year ago, the situations in the first quarter of this year, you must really, really have the wind at your back. And I was wondering if you can share with us what you can?
我可以想象，如果你在一年前有顺风，今年第一季度的情况，你一定真的、真的有顺风。我想知道你能和我们分享些什么吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we can’t give you the speed of the wind.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们不能告诉你风速。
The — we’re going to have the 10-Q out when, Marc? Well, it’s going to be out in a few days.
——我们什么时候发布 10-Q，Marc？嗯，几天后就会发布。
And if we throw out any numbers now, or make any commentary, we’d have to put that up on the website, and perhaps even try to cover the nuances in my voice. So I think you’ll just have to wait a few days, and they’ll go up, the figures will go up, at that time.
如果我们现在抛出任何数字或发表评论，我们就必须把它放到网站上，甚至可能还要尝试涵盖我语气中的细微差别。所以我想你们只能再等几天，数据会在那时上传。
And if there are any surprises, they will be surprises then, and everybody will get them at the same time.
如果有任何意外，那时它们才会是意外，大家会同时得到。
Incidentally, we’re going to have a little more trouble in the next year or two, because the —
顺便说一下，在接下来的一两年里，我们会遇到更多麻烦，因为——
We like to publish everything — all the figures — or anything important if we can do it — we like to do that on Friday night after the close, or Saturday morning, so that everybody has an opportunity to look at them, and have a maximum amount of time to digest them before trading begins.
我们喜欢公布所有内容——所有数据——或者任何重要的东西，如果我们能做到的话——我们喜欢在周五收盘后或周六早上这样做，以便每个人都有机会查看，并在交易开始前有充足的时间消化这些信息。
And the SEC is shortening up reporting times so that we’re going to be scrambling just to meet whatever day of the month it is that recording requirements are met. And so we may not —
美国证券交易委员会正在缩短报告时间，因此我们将不得不忙于满足任何日期的记录要求。所以我们可能无法——
We won’t have the luxury — although we’ll try to do it when we can — we won’t have the luxury of picking the Saturday before the due date, and targeting that as our release date.
我们不会有这样的奢侈——尽管我们会尽量在可能的情况下这样做——我们不会有奢侈的条件选择截止日期前的那个星期六，并将其作为我们的发布日期。
You know, when we had 45 days, or what was it, yeah, 45 days to report, we could pick the Saturday before the 45 days.
你知道，当我们有 45 天，或者是什么，对，45 天来报告时，我们可以选择在 45 天之前的那个星期六。
If that gets down to 30 days, you know, if the 30th day is on a Tuesday, we’re going to be hard put probably to get it done by that Tuesday. So we’ll obviously put it out after the close, so people have between four o’clock and the next morning to digest it.
如果那减少到 30 天，你知道，如果第 30 天是星期二，我们可能很难在那个星期二之前完成。所以我们显然会在收盘后发布，这样人们就有从四点到第二天早上来消化它。
But we won’t be able to follow the procedure that we’ve followed to date, which we regard as the best procedure of all, giving people close to two days to digest whatever is in the figures.
但是我们将无法遵循迄今为止所遵循的程序，我们认为这是所有程序中最好的程序，给人们近两天的时间来消化数据中的内容。
But I can’t help you, Whitney, on how the first quarter looks. And Charlie, I don’t think you’ll want to add anything on that, will you? (Laughs)
但我帮不了你，惠特尼，关于第一季度的情况。查理，我想你不会想对此补充什么，对吧？（笑）
62. Advice to young people: avoid credit card debt and hang out with people better than you
给年轻人的建议：避免信用卡债务，多与比你优秀的人交往
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 3.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第三个。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, and Mr. Munger. My name is Justin Fong. I am 14 years old, from California. This is my fourth consecutive meeting attendance.
观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是贾斯汀·方。我今年 14 岁，来自加利福尼亚。这是我连续第四次参加会议。
I read in a book that you prefer talking to young people about life and financial concepts because we still have time to implement them. Can you please share some of the concepts with us? Thank you.
我在一本书中读到，你更喜欢和年轻人谈论生活和财务概念，因为我们还有时间去实施它们。你能和我们分享一些这些概念吗？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t catch the last part.
沃伦·巴菲特：我没听清最后一部分。
CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t. It’s something about sharing concepts. You want to repeat it?
查理·芒格：我没有。这是关于分享概念的。你想重复一遍吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you please share the life and financial concepts that you prefer talking to young people about?
观众成员：您能否分享一些您喜欢与年轻人谈论的生活和财务概念？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Share — he wants to know your life concepts, and financial concepts, that are useful to young people.
查理·芒格：分享——他想知道对年轻人有用的人生观念和财务观念。
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) — well, that’s a fairly broad question. But I think the financial concepts, you know, we’ve obviously spelled out in the reports. Charlie’s probably better on the life concepts than I am.
沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）——嗯，这是个相当宽泛的问题。但我认为，财务概念显然已经在报告中阐明了。查理可能比我更擅长生活概念。
It is true, that I do believe in spending the time that I spend giving talks, or answering questions, doing it with young people. I do, I’m sure, well over a dozen a year.
确实，我相信花时间做演讲或回答问题，与年轻人一起。我每年肯定会做十几次。
And I just think that, obviously, young people are more receptive to change, or to actually at even forming habits that are going to be useful in life.
我只是认为，显然，年轻人显然更能接受变化，或者更容易养成对生活有用的习惯。
And I think that people underestimate — until they get older — they underestimate just how important habits are, and how difficult they are to change when you’re 45 or 50, and how important it is that you form the right ones when you’re young.
我认为人们低估了——直到他们年纪大了——他们低估了习惯有多重要，以及在你 45 或 50 岁时改变习惯有多困难，以及在年轻时养成正确习惯是多么重要。
But Charlie, what do you have to say on that?
但是查理，你对此有什么看法？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, all the trite stuff is what works. I mean, you avoid doing the really dumb things, like, racing moving trains to the crossing — (laughter) — experimenting with cocaine — (laughter) — risking getting AIDS or other unfortunate ailments.
查理·芒格：嗯，所有老生常谈的东西都是有效的。我的意思是，你要避免做那些真正愚蠢的事情，比如和行驶中的火车赛跑到十字路口——（笑声）——尝试可卡因——（笑声）——冒着感染艾滋病或其他不幸疾病的风险。
There are just a lot of standard things that take people down. And you just give those a wide berth.
有很多常见的事情会让人陷入困境。你只需对这些保持距离。
And then you want to develop a good character, and good mental habits, and you want to learn from your mistakes, every single one, as you go along. It’s pretty obvious, isn’t it? (Laughter)
然后你想要培养良好的品格和良好的心理习惯，并且你想从每一个错误中学习，随着时间的推移。这很明显，不是吗？（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we would say even though we issue lots of credit cards and everything, we’d say, probably, if I had one piece of advice to give to young people, you know, across the board, it would be just to don’t get in debt. It —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们会说，尽管我们发行了很多信用卡和其他东西，但我们会说，如果我要给年轻人一条建议，那就是不要负债。它——
The game plays a lot easier if you’re a little bit ahead of the game than if you’re behind the game. And Ben Franklin said that long ago in better terms, which Charlie can recite.
如果你稍微领先于比赛，游戏会容易得多，而不是落后于比赛。很久以前，本·富兰克林用更好的措辞说过这句话，查理可以背诵。
But there’s a real difference. I get letters every day from people that are in all kinds of financial trouble. And often it’s health related, which is tragic. But very often it’s — it relates to debt. I mean, they get behind the game, and they’re never going to catch up.
但确实有一个真正的区别。我每天都收到来自各种财务困境中的人的信件。通常这与健康有关，这很悲惨。但很常见的是——这与债务有关。我的意思是，他们落后于游戏，他们永远无法赶上。
And often — it may surprise you — but often, I write these people — they’re very decent people, they’ve just made mistakes — and I just tell them the best course is bankruptcy.
通常，你可能会感到惊讶，但我写信给这些人——他们都是非常体面的人，只是犯了一些错误——我告诉他们，最好的办法就是破产。
I mean, they are not going to catch up. And they should start all over again, and they should never look at a credit card the rest of their life.
我的意思是，他们不会赶上。他们应该重新开始，并且他们这辈子都不应该再看信用卡。
And — but it would have been better if they’d gotten that advice a little earlier. But it’s very tempting to spend more than you earn. I mean, I — you know, it’s very understandable. But it’s not a good idea.
而且——但如果他们能早点得到那个建议就好了。但是花钱超过收入是很诱人的。我是说，我——你知道的，这是很容易理解的。但这不是个好主意。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And of course you particularly want to avoid evil, or seriously irrational people, particularly if they are attractive members of the opposite sex. That can — (Laughter)
查理·芒格：当然，你特别想要避免邪恶或严重不理智的人，尤其是如果他们是异性中有吸引力的成员。这可能会——（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie knows more about this —
沃伦·巴菲特：查理对此了解更多——
CHARLIE MUNGER: It can lead to a lot of trouble.
查理·芒格：这可能会导致很多麻烦。
WARREN BUFFETT: The expert. The — yeah, the — you know —
沃伦·巴菲特：专家。那个——是的，那个——你知道——
It’s better to hang out with people better than you. I found that very easy to do over the years. (Laughs)
最好和比你优秀的人在一起。我发现多年来这样做很容易。（笑）
But if you’re picking associates, pick out those whose behavior is somewhat better than yours, and you’ll drift in that direction.
但是，如果你在选择伙伴，选择那些行为比你稍好的人，你就会朝那个方向发展。
And similarly if you hang out with a bad bunch, you’re very likely to find your own behavior worse over time.
同样地，如果你和一群坏人混在一起，你的行为很可能会随着时间的推移变得更糟。
But all — like Charlie says, the trite advice which Ben Franklin was handing out a few hundred years ago, really works.
但正如查理所说，本·富兰克林几百年前给出的陈词滥调的建议确实有效。
You know, just — we’ve said it, but look at the people you like to associate with. You know, what qualities do they have that you can have if you want to?
你知道，就是——我们已经说过了，但看看你喜欢交往的人。你知道，他们有什么品质是你如果想要也可以拥有的？
Look at the people that you can’t stand to be around. What qualities do you have that they have? Can you get rid of them? You can do all of that a young age. It gets harder as you go along. It’s not very complicated.
看看那些你无法忍受的人。你有什么品质是他们也有的？你能摆脱它们吗？你可以在年轻时做到这一切。随着时间的推移，这会变得更难。这并不复杂。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And my final word of advice would be, if this gives you a little temporary unpopularity in your peer group, the hell with them. (Laughter and applause)
查理·芒格：我最后的建议是，如果这让你在同龄人中暂时不受欢迎，那就让他们见鬼去吧。（笑声和掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: And as advice a little more applicable to me and Charlie, I was reading about a woman that was 103, and they said, “What do you like about being 103?” And she says, “No peer pressure.” (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：对于我和查理来说，有一个建议更适用，我读到一个 103 岁的女人，他们问她：“你喜欢 103 岁的什么？”她说：“没有同龄人的压力。”（笑声）
63. Buffett: Major commodity markets aren’t rigged
巴菲特：主要商品市场没有被操纵
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to number 4.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们将去第 4 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Mike McGowan. I’m from Pasadena, California.
观众成员：下午好。我的名字是迈克·麦高文。我来自加利福尼亚州帕萨迪纳。
Everything you just said seems to apply to precious metals, specifically silver —
你刚才所说的一切似乎都适用于贵金属，特别是白银——
WARREN BUFFETT: Applies to what? I’m sorry I missed that.
沃伦·巴菲特：适用于什么？对不起，我没听清。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Precious metals.
观众成员：贵金属。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, sure.
沃伦·巴菲特：哦，当然。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Specifically, silver. As I recall, Berkshire Hathaway bought 129 1/2 million ounces of silver. And at the time, you said supply/demand fundamentals were good, you saw inflation kicking back, and lots of other reasons. I’m assuming you still own at least 90 million ounces of that.
观众成员：具体来说，银。我记得，伯克希尔·哈撒韦购买了 1.295 亿盎司的白银。当时，你说供需基本面良好，你看到通货膨胀回升，还有很多其他原因。我假设你仍然至少持有其中的 9000 万盎司。
The problem would be the pricing mechanism. Apparently the COMEX, or at least certain of the managers of the silver price on the COMEX, are in debt. The New York banks and financial institutions are short 400-plus million ounces. And it doesn’t look as if they really want the price to go anywhere.
问题在于定价机制。显然，纽约商品交易所（COMEX），或者至少是 COMEX 上某些白银价格的管理者，负债累累。纽约的银行和金融机构空头超过 4 亿盎司。而且看起来他们并不真的希望价格有任何变动。
So given that Berkshire has all of this silver, do you see the price of silver actually trading in a free market at some point, or would you look at shares instead of the physical metal?
鉴于伯克希尔拥有所有这些白银，您认为白银的价格会在某个时候在自由市场上交易，还是您会考虑股票而不是实物金属？
And otherwise, we’re kind of at the point, I guess, where John Maynard Keynes said, “The market can remain irrational a lot longer than we can remain solvent.”
否则，我想我们正处于约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯所说的那种境地：“市场保持非理性的时间可以比我们保持偿付能力的时间长得多。”
WARREN BUFFETT: The — we have no comment at all to make on our present position in silver, if any, we may — we could own more, we could own the same, we could own less, we could own none. So — and we won’t comment.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们对目前在白银市场的持仓情况没有任何评论，无论是否持有，我们可能持有更多，可能持有相同数量，可能持有更少，或者可能完全不持有。因此——我们不会发表评论。
We commented one time because the Bank of England asked us to comment. And since it was the only time the Bank of England had ever talked to me, I felt quite flattered. (Laughter) The —
我们评论过一次，因为英格兰银行要求我们发表评论。而且因为这是英格兰银行唯一一次和我交谈，我感到相当受宠若惊。（笑声）——
But I would say this. I would disagree very much with your thoughts that the market is in some way rigged, or something of the sort. The — there’s —
但我要说的是，我非常不同意你认为市场在某种程度上被操控或类似的看法。这个——有——
I find that most of the people that write — or many of the people that write — on gold and silver tend to have various theories, some of which are conspiratorial, and there’s always, you know, the selling forwards is doing this and that to the market, or that somebody’s short.
我发现大多数写关于黄金和白银的人，或者许多写作的人，往往有各种理论，其中一些是阴谋论，总是有，你知道，卖空对市场造成了这样那样的影响，或者有人在做空。
You know, the answer is that there’s plenty of silver above ground. Whether there’s more or less than there was a few years ago, in terms of the supply-demand since then, I’m not a hundred percent sure. It’s tough to figure out what goes on in China in a lot of things.
你知道，答案是地面上有大量的白银。至于比几年前多还是少，从那时起的供需情况来看，我不敢百分之百确定。要弄清楚中国在很多事情上的情况是很困难的。
But I — there’s nothing flawed, in my view, about the market for silver, or copper, or gold, or really any commodity that I can think of that trades in real quantity.
但在我看来，白银、铜、黄金或任何我能想到的大宗商品市场都没有什么缺陷。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think it also should be pointed out that you’re asking for the opinions of people who have not particularly distinguished themselves in this arena. (Laughter)
查理·芒格：是的，我认为还应该指出的是，您询问的意见来自于在这个领域并没有特别出色表现的人。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: He was pointing at me. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特：他在指着我。（笑声）
With good reason. 理由充分。
64. Buffett doesn’t see Wells Fargo as a “big player” in derivatives
巴菲特不认为富国银行是衍生品领域的“大玩家”
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go to number 5.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们将去第 5 号。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Travis Keith (PH), from Dallas, Texas.
观众成员：下午好，特拉维斯·基思（音），来自德克萨斯州达拉斯。
The OCC’s quarterly report on bank derivatives shows that Wells Fargo has one of the largest derivatives portfolios of any U.S. bank.
美国货币监理署的银行衍生品季度报告显示，富国银行拥有美国银行中最大的衍生品投资组合之一。
In spite of your high-profile criticism of derivatives, Berkshire added to its position in Wells Fargo last year.
尽管你对衍生品进行了高调批评，伯克希尔去年还是增加了在富国银行的持仓。
What about Wells Fargo’s derivatives portfolio did you find less objectionable, and what disclosure did you examine in considering the risks of Wells Fargo’s derivatives portfolio?
关于富国银行的衍生品投资组合，您发现哪些方面不那么令人反感？在考虑富国银行衍生品投资组合的风险时，您查看了哪些披露信息？
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t have their report here, but without looking at it, I would be willing to bet that JPMorgan Chase has a derivatives portfolio that’s far, far greater than Wells.
沃伦·巴菲特：我这里没有他们的报告，但不用看，我敢打赌，摩根大通的衍生品投资组合远远大于富国银行。
I do not think of Wells, and I may be wrong, I do not think of Wells as being a big player.
我不认为富国银行是一个重要角色，我可能错了。
Now, all the big banks have various derivative positions. But I do not — I don’t think of Wells as being a big player in the derivative game. And I — you can’t —
现在，所有大银行都有各种衍生品头寸。但我不认为富国银行是衍生品游戏中的大玩家。而且我——你不能——
There is no perfect measurement of the size of a derivative position. I mean, you hear all these huge numbers thrown around, and they sound great, but they tend to exaggerate things in a huge — in a very dramatic way, in terms of trillions of this or that. But so —
没有一种完美的方法来衡量衍生品头寸的规模。我的意思是，你会听到这些巨大的数字被抛出来，它们听起来很棒，但它们往往会以非常夸张的方式夸大事情，以万亿为单位。但所以——
You know, there can be — you could talk about a billion dollar notional amount of one kind of derivative, and it could have less danger in it than a $50 million position of — in some other type.
你知道，可以有——你可以谈论一种衍生品的十亿美元名义金额，而它可能比其他类型的五千万美元头寸风险更小。
But I really don’t think you’ll find that Wells, particularly compared to a JPMorgan Chase, or a Citibank, or something of the sort, is a really big derivatives player.
但我真的不认为你会发现富国银行，尤其是与摩根大通或花旗银行等相比，是一个真正的大型衍生品参与者。
And Charlie and I — at least I — and think Charlie’ll agree — Wells, I think, is an extraordinarily well-managed bank.
查理和我——至少我——我想查理会同意——我认为富国银行是一家管理得非常好的银行。
I disagree with them violently on expensing of stock options. I mean, Dick Kovacevich, who runs that, and I would have entirely different opinion. He’s written about it in the last couple of annual reports. And much as I — and I really admire the management. I think he’s done a great job — but much as I admire the management, I voted the other — our Berkshire stock — the other way, and for expensing options. And I noticed that 57 percent of the stock at this meeting just the other day voted to expense options.
我强烈反对他们关于股票期权费用化的观点。我的意思是，管理那家公司的迪克·科瓦切维奇和我有完全不同的看法。他在过去几年的年度报告中写过这件事。尽管我非常钦佩管理层，我认为他做得很出色，但尽管我钦佩管理层，我还是投了相反的票——我们伯克希尔的股票——投票支持将期权费用化。而且我注意到，就在前几天的这次会议上，有 57%的股票投票支持将期权费用化。
But even though I disagree with him on that particular accounting point, Wells has a — an absolutely terrific record. Dick is a terrific businessperson.
但即使我在那个特定的会计问题上与他意见不一致，富国银行也有一个绝对出色的记录。迪克是一位出色的商人。
And I think in terms of taking risk, or handling the risk that he necessarily takes, I think that I would rank him very way up there in terms of bank managers.
我认为在承担风险或处理他必须承担的风险方面，我会把他在银行经理中排得很高。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that.
查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。
65. Leverage is the biggest danger to investors
杠杆是投资者面临的最大危险
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re going to take one more from number 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们将从第 6 号再选一个问题。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much, Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett.
观众成员：非常感谢您，芒格先生和巴菲特先生。
My question regards — well, I’m Michael Stofski (PH) from New York.
我的问题是——我是来自纽约的迈克尔·斯托夫斯基（PH）。
My question regards financial institutions and the potential of collapses.
我的问题涉及金融机构及其潜在的崩溃。
And how is Berkshire protected, and how can the individual investor protect themselves against potential bank failures, stock brokerage failures, and things like that?
伯克希尔是如何受到保护的，个人投资者又如何保护自己免受潜在的银行倒闭、股票经纪公司倒闭等影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think as a depositor with large banks, or as somebody that leaves their securities with large brokerage firms, I really don’t think you to worry very much.
沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为作为大型银行的储户，或者作为将证券留在大型经纪公司的人，我真的认为你不需要太过担心。
We have a “too big to fail” doctrine operating in this country, relative to what you might call the innocent parties in big financial institution failures. We don’t have it in respect to the equity holders, nor should we have it.
在这个国家，我们有一个“太大而不能倒”的原则，适用于大型金融机构倒闭中所谓的无辜方。我们对股权持有人没有这样的原则，也不应该有。
But I would not — I don’t worry about leaving my securities — my personal securities — or for that matter, Berkshire securities — with the large securities firms. I don’t worry about my bank accounts at big banks, so —
但我不会——我不担心把我的证券——我的个人证券——或者就此而言，伯克希尔的证券——留在大型证券公司。我不担心我在大银行的银行账户，所以——
CHARLIE MUNGER: But you’re talking cash accounts?
查理·芒格：但你在谈论现金账户吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, cash accounts.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，现金账户。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Not margin.
查理·芒格：不是保证金。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And the — but if you, in terms of owning the equities of companies like that, or in terms of the fallout, the big thing that will —
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但是，如果你从拥有那样公司的股票的角度来看，或者从影响的角度来看，最大的事情将是——
Really, the only way a smart person that’s reasonably disciplined in how they look at investments can get in trouble is through leverage. I mean, if somebody else can pull the plug on you during the worst moment of some kind of general financial disaster, you go broke. And Charlie and I both have friends that have — where that’s happened to them.
实际上，一个聪明且在投资方面相当有纪律的人唯一可能遇到麻烦的方式就是杠杆。我的意思是，如果在某种普遍的金融灾难的最糟糕时刻，有人能拔掉你的插头，你就会破产。查理和我都有朋友经历过这种情况。
But absent leverage, and absent just kind of going crazy in terms of valuation on things, the world won’t hurt you over time in securities.
但是，如果没有杠杆，也没有在估值方面疯狂行事，长期来看，证券市场不会伤害你。
And, I mean, you won’t be subject to the financial cataclysms that — they don’t need to do you in. If you have any more money during periods like that, you buy.
而且，我的意思是，你不会受到金融灾难的影响——它们不需要把你拖下水。如果在那样的时期你有更多的钱，你就买入。
Berkshire, I think, is in an extraordinarily strong position in respect to any kind of a financial cataclysm. I think we would be definitely the last man standing, and then some.
我认为，伯克希尔在应对任何金融灾难方面都处于极其强大的地位。我认为我们绝对会是最后一个屹立不倒的公司，甚至更多。
And while we don’t go around, you know, like undertakers looking for a plague or anything like that, you know, we would probably do very, very well in the end.
虽然我们不会像殡葬人员那样到处寻找瘟疫或类似的东西，但最终我们可能会做得非常非常好。
And that’s happened a couple of times, actually, in the past, where we’ve had cash, and we’ve had courage when the world was panicking, and it’s — we’ve done reasonably well during that period.
实际上，在过去，这种情况发生过几次，当世界陷入恐慌时，我们有现金，也有勇气，在那段时间我们表现得相当不错。
And we’ve never gotten hurt by what was happening in the world around us, at least in the last 30 or 40 years.
在过去的 30 或 40 年里，周围世界发生的事情从未伤害过我们。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s plainly right.
查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这显然是对的。
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