2006-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session

上午会议

1. Welcome

欢迎

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren; he’s Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。我是沃伦，他是查理。

There’s one thing I should probably clear up first because I know it’s puzzling you. In the movie, he always gets the girl.

首先，我想澄清一件事，因为我知道这让你感到困惑。在电影里，他总是能得到女孩。

Now, that’s hard to figure out, isn’t it? But I’ve — Charlie — but I finally understand what the — what’s happening.

这确实很难理解，不是吗？但我终于明白了——查理——但我最终明白了发生了什么。

It’s something called the “Anna Nicole Smith Rule.” That’s when choosing between two old rich guys, pick the older one. (Laughter)

这被称为“安娜·妮可·史密斯法则。” 那就是在两个年老的富翁之间选择时，选年纪更大的那个。（笑声）

Now, in a few minutes we’re going to open this up to your questions. We have a number of zones, and we’ll just proceed around zone by zone.

现在，几分钟后我们将开放提问环节。我们有多个区域，我们将逐个区域进行。

But before we do that, there are a few people I would like to thank, and then there’s a couple of short announcements I’d like to make.

但在此之前，我想感谢几个人，然后我想做几个简短的公告。

First of all, if can we get the spotlight up there on Andy Heyward, Andy does that cartoon for us every year. He travels around. He gets the voices in there. Andy, where are you? (Applause)

首先，我们能不能把聚光灯打到安迪·海沃德那里，安迪每年都为我们制作那部卡通片。他到处旅行。他把声音放进去。安迪，你在哪里？（掌声）

He comes up with the ideas.

他想出了这些主意。

Andy is the — runs DiC Entertainment. DiC is the one I’ve told you about in the past that produced “Liberty’s Kids,” which I think is probably the best way not only for youngsters to learn American history, but for people my age as well.

安迪负责迪克娱乐（DiC Entertainment）。迪克是我以前告诉你们的，制作了《自由之子》（Liberty’s Kids），我认为这是让年轻人学习美国历史的最好方式，同时对我这个年龄的人也是如此。

I mean, it’s a terrific series of young kids — a couple of young ones in the time of the American Revolution. And I watched several of those episodes, and I’d forgotten a lot of American history since I was in school. It’s just a really — it’s a wonderful series.

我的意思是，这是一个很棒的系列，关于美国革命时期的一些年轻孩子。我看了好几集，自从上学以来，我已经忘记了很多美国历史。这真是一个精彩的系列。

It appeared on PBS over time. And if you’re looking to learn American history or have your children or grandchildren learn it, you couldn’t do better.

它曾在 PBS 上播出过。如果你想学习美国历史，或者让你的孩子或孙子学习，你找不到比这更好的了。

And in the months ahead, he’s working on the — what do we call it? — it’s the “Secret Millionaires Club.”

在接下来的几个月里，他正在研究——我们怎么称呼它？——是“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”。

But it’s going to be a program that’s designed to teach young people some of the very basic lessons of — about money. How to avoid getting into trouble with it, how to use it effectively, and what your attitude should be toward it.

但这将是一个旨在教导年轻人一些关于金钱的基本课程的项目。如何避免陷入财务困境，如何有效地使用金钱，以及应该持有什么样的金钱观。

So, we’re looking forward to getting that out early next year. I’ll guarantee you that it will be a terrific program for teaching children and your grandchildren something about the subject of money.

所以，我们期待在明年初推出这个项目。我向你保证，这将是一个很棒的项目，可以教孩子们和你的孙辈们一些关于金钱的知识。

I also want to thank Bob Iger. Bob is up there. Bob runs Disney. He’s doing a terrific job, and — (Applause)

我也想感谢鲍勃·艾格。鲍勃在那里。鲍勃管理迪士尼。他做得非常出色，并且——（掌声）

I thought we could originally entice the “Desperate Housewives” into appearing simply by the chance to appear with Charlie. But after we made that appeal, we then went to Bob Iger and said, “See what you can do for us, Bob.” So thank you, Bob.

我本来以为我们可以通过吸引“绝望主妇”参演，只是因为有机会与查理同台。但在我们提出这个请求之后，我们又去找鲍勃，问他说：“鲍勃，你能为我们做点什么？”所以谢谢你，鲍勃。

Also in that section, I’d like to have a special introduction for the man that first taught Charlie and me something about the value of franchises and the advisability of buying great businesses instead of cheap businesses.

此外，我还想特别介绍一位教会查理和我有关特许经营价值和购买伟大企业的可行性的人。

Prior to the purchase of See’s Candies in 1972, I intended to look primarily at financial measures in buying businesses and buying things that were cheap in relation to book value, and we always tried to get a lot of tangible assets in relation to our money.

在1972年购买See's Candies之前，我主要打算通过财务指标来购买企业，买一些在账面价值上便宜的东西，我们总是试图用相对较多的有形资产来保证我们的资金。

But we found out that the intangible assets, if properly nourished and if properly identified, you can make a whole lot more money with than buying a lot of tangible assets cheap.

但我们发现，如果无形资产得到适当的培育和识别，你可以比购买大量便宜的有形资产赚更多的钱。

And in 1972 — early in ’72, Charlie and I went to See’s Candy, which had been in the hands of the See family for many decades, and we bought it.

1972 年初，查理和我去了 See's Candy，这家公司已经在 See 家族手中经营了几十年，我们买下了它。

And, of course, Charlie and I didn’t know a thing about making candy — we were pretty good at eating it — and we needed someone to run the place.

当然，查理和我对制作糖果一无所知——我们倒是很擅长吃糖果——我们需要找个人来经营这个地方。

We met a young fellow there. It was clear to both of us that he was the ideal person to run See’s Candy, and in just a few minutes we made a deal with him that’s lasted a lifetime.

我们在那里遇到了一位年轻人。我们俩都很清楚，他是经营 See's Candy 的理想人选，仅仅用了几分钟，我们就与他达成了一项持续一生的协议。

And if Chuck Huggins and his wife, Donna, would stand up, I’d love to have you give them a real well-deserved round of applause. (Applause)

如果查克·哈金斯和他的妻子唐娜能站起来，我希望大家能给他们热烈的掌声。（掌声）

As you notice, my daughter Susie produced that movie. She does every year.

正如你所注意到的，我的女儿苏西制作了那部电影。她每年都这样做。

She works hard on it, and we don’t pay her anything, although she does remind me occasionally when I’m out at Borsheims that she worked very hard on the movie — (Laughter) — and I’ll see her there on Sunday.

她工作很努力，尽管她偶尔提醒我，当我在博尔希姆斯（Borsheims）时，她为这部电影工作的很努力——（笑声）——我会在周日见到她。

And, Suz, if you would take a bow, please. (Applause)

苏西，如果你能鞠个躬，谢谢。（掌声）

And the impresario of this event, I just turn it over to her every year and forget about it.

这一活动的策划人，每年我都把它交给她，忘记了。

But she puts on this show. She brings all the exhibitors in. She arranges everything. She moves into the hotel across the street a few days ahead of time, or a week ahead of time, and makes sure everything hums.

但她举办了这个展览。她把所有参展商都请来。她安排一切。她提前几天或一周搬进街对面的酒店，确保一切顺利进行。

And Charlie and I just come down on the day of the meeting and take a bow. And that’s Kelly Muchmore-Broz.

查理和我就在会议当天下来鞠个躬。这就是凯利·马奇莫尔-布罗兹。

Kelly, are you here? Where’s Kelly? There she is. Give her a big hand. (Applause)

凯莉，你在这里吗？凯莉在哪里？她在那里。给她热烈的掌声。（掌声）

We wouldn’t be having this without her.

如果没有她，我们就不会有这个。

2. Berkshire directors introduced

伯克希尔董事介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: Now I’d like to introduce our directors. We’re going to get to the business meeting at 3:15. We do the Q&A first, and we get to that later on.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我想介绍一下我们的董事。我们将在 3:15 开始业务会议。我们先进行问答环节，然后再进行业务会议。

But for those of you who won’t be around — and a lot of people tend to leave at lunchtime — I’d like to introduce the various directors. You’ve met Charlie and myself.

但是对于那些不在场的人——很多人往往在午餐时间离开——我想介绍一下各位董事。你们已经见过查理和我了。

If you’ll just stand individually, we can withhold the applause, if any, until the end. (Laughter)

如果你们能单独站起来，我们可以把掌声（如果有的话）留到最后。（笑声）

That way that embarrassing applause meter that we had on the Omaha Idol Show will not cause anyone distress.

这样一来，我们在奥马哈偶像秀上使用的那个令人尴尬的掌声计不会让任何人感到困扰。

Howard Buffett — Howie — Malcolm Chace, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott, Jr. It’s a terrific group of directors. (Applause)

霍华德·巴菲特——霍伊——马尔科姆·蔡斯，比尔·盖茨，大卫·戈特斯曼，夏洛特·盖曼，唐·基奥，汤姆·墨菲，罗恩·奥尔森，和小沃尔特·斯科特。这是一个非常出色的董事团队。（掌声）

I know of — I literally know of no directors of any large, publicly-owned companies that have, universally, as significant a percentage of their net worth in the company, purchased in the open market, as that group. Do you, Charlie?

我知道——我真的不知道有任何大型上市公司的董事，他们在公司中的净资产比例像那个群体一样显著，并且是在公开市场上购买的。你呢，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: None. 查理·芒格：没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: None. OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：没有。好的。（笑声）

That may be all you hear from him, folks — (Laughter) — so kind of savor a little bit.

这可能是你们从他那里听到的全部，伙计们——（笑声）——所以请稍微品味一下。

3. Jamie Lee Curtis

杰米·李·柯蒂斯

WARREN BUFFETT: I also would particularly like to thank Jamie Lee Curtis, even though she came up with the wrong guy at the end.

沃伦·巴菲特：我也特别想感谢杰米·李·柯蒂斯，尽管她最后选错了人。

Jamie cooperated on this. We’re going to have, as a thank you — Jamie is very interested in the Park Century School. One of her sons goes to that school. It’s for gifted, but learning-challenged students.

杰米对此进行了合作。作为感谢——杰米对世纪公园学校非常感兴趣。她的一个儿子在那所学校上学。这所学校是为有天赋但学习有困难的学生设立的。

They’re having an auction tonight, but it will continue subsequently. And Bill Gates and I have autographed a Monopoly set, and we will personally inscribe it to whoever the winner of that auction is.

他们今晚有一个拍卖会，但随后还会继续。比尔·盖茨和我签名了一套大富翁游戏，我们会亲自为拍卖的赢家题词。

So if you want to go to eBay and check that out, we promise that we will not similarly autograph anything else. So I hope that Jamie Lee and the school have a big success on that.

所以如果你想去 eBay 查看，我们保证不会在其他任何东西上签名。所以我希望杰米·李和学校在这方面取得巨大成功。

4. Berkshire’s Q1 earnings

伯克希尔第一季度收益

WARREN BUFFETT: We have two announcements, one relatively unimportant but, nevertheless, pleasant, and that is that we released our earnings yesterday after the close.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有两个公告，其中一个相对不重要，但仍然令人愉快，那就是我们在昨天收盘后公布了我们的收益。

And I think we can put those up on the screen. Having any luck on that? Did we withdraw those earnings, Marc? Oh, they still have another six hours of audit or so.

我想我们可以把那些放到屏幕上。有没有成功？我们撤回那些收益了吗，Marc？哦，他们还有大约六个小时的审计。

And, as you can see, we don’t pay any attention to realized gains or losses. We had some gains this year; we had some losses in the first quarter of last year.

而且，如你所见，我们并不关注已实现的收益或损失。今年我们有一些收益，去年第一季度我们有一些损失。

So — but that’s meaningless in the short term. Over time, obviously, it makes a difference.

所以——但这在短期内是没有意义的。随着时间的推移，显然会有所不同。

But the — you know, we do not pick anything to buy or sell in any given quarter or any given year in the way of securities based on the effect it will have on our income account for that period. It’s totally immaterial.

但是——你知道，我们在任何一个季度或年度都不会根据当期收入来选择买卖任何证券。这完全无关紧要。

In fact, we’d rather sell things that we have a loss in, just from a tax standpoint.

事实上，仅从税收的角度来看，我们宁愿出售那些亏损的东西。

If we have some high-tax cost stocks and some low-tax cost stock, we’ll sell the high one and record the loss because we would get a better tax result that way for the short term. So we ignore that.

如果我们有一些高税成本的股票和一些低税成本的股票，我们会卖掉高税成本的股票并记录损失，因为这样在短期内我们会获得更好的税务结果。所以我们忽略这一点。

But if you look at the operating earnings, you’ll see that in those main divisions that I take in the annual report — I show our four major businesses and then investment income is aside of it — things worked out pretty well in the first quarter for all of them.

但是，如果你查看营业收入，你会发现，在我在年度报告中提到的那些主要部门——我展示了我们的四大主要业务，然后投资收入是另外的——它们在第一季度的表现都相当不错。

I would caution you that, in our insurance underwriting, our worst quarter would normally be expected to be our third quarter. You’re not going to have hurricanes in this hemisphere in the first quarter.

我想提醒你，在我们的保险承保中，我们最糟糕的季度通常是第三季度。你不会在第一季度在这个半球遇到飓风。

The real exposure — the worst exposure — is in the third quarter, and then there’s a lesser exposure in the fourth quarter.

真正的风险——最严重的风险——在第三季度，然后在第四季度风险较小。

We write a lot of catastrophe insurance business.

我们承保了大量的灾难保险业务。

Earthquakes, as far as we know, don’t have any particular seasonal aspect to them, but hurricanes definitely do.

据我们所知，地震没有任何特定的季节性，但飓风肯定有。

And the interesting thing is that under standard accounting, if we write a hurricane policy for the calendar year 2006 and we receive a million dollars of premium, we would earn a quarter of a million in the first quarter and a quarter of a million in the second quarter and so on.

有趣的是，根据标准会计，如果我们为 2006 日历年制定一项飓风保险政策，并收到一百万美元的保费，我们将在第一季度赚取二十五万美元，第二季度赚取二十五万美元，依此类推。

We would earn a pro rata throughout the year. And that, in our view, actually is not proper accounting, but it’s required accounting.

我们会在全年按比例赚取收入。而在我们看来，这实际上不是合适的会计处理，但这是必需的会计处理。

The real exposure to loss is primarily in the third quarter.

真正的损失风险主要在第三季度。

So you can’t take our insurance underwriting results in any way for a rather benign quarter, like the first quarter, and extrapolate them for the year. But, nevertheless, it was a very good year — a very good quarter.

所以你不能以任何方式将我们的保险承保结果从一个相对平和的季度（如第一季度）推断到全年。不过，尽管如此，这仍然是非常好的一年——一个非常好的季度。

GEICO had excellent growth, I believe that our — well, I’m almost certain that our growth in the first quarter was better than any of our main competitors, and, actually, by — probably by some margin — the underwriting was very good. Our reinsurance underwriting was very good.

GEICO 的增长非常出色，我相信我们的——我几乎可以肯定，我们在第一季度的增长比我们任何主要竞争对手都要好，而且实际上可能有一定的差距——承保非常好。我们的再保险承保也非常好。

Gen Re had a good quarter. Our smaller companies had a good quarter.

通用再保险公司本季度表现良好。我们的小公司本季度表现良好。

So things, generally, have been working very well in all four sectors.

所以，总的来说，所有四个领域的运作都非常顺利。

And that’s nice, but that’s not terribly important. I mean, five years from now, nobody will remember whether the first quarter or the second quarter was good at Berkshire Hathaway.

这很好，但这并不是特别重要。我的意思是，五年后，没有人会记得伯克希尔哈撒韦的第一季度或第二季度表现如何。

5. Acquisition of “really extraordinary” ISCAR

收购“真正非凡”的 ISCAR

WARREN BUFFETT: But what did happen, and which we announced last night — which was very important — the acquisition of a large, extremely well-managed, profitable, really extraordinary company called ISCAR.

沃伦·巴菲特：但确实发生了什么，我们昨晚宣布了——这非常重要——收购了一家名为 ISCAR 的大型的、管理极佳、盈利且非常出色的公司。

And up until October of last year, I knew nothing of ISCAR. I did not know about their extraordinary management.

直到去年的十月，我对 ISCAR 一无所知。我不了解他们非凡的管理。

But I got a letter, and I got a letter from Eitan Wertheimer, and — maybe a page and a half, page and a quarter — and he told me something about this business.

但是我收到了一封信，我收到了一封来自埃坦·韦特海默的信，大概一页半、一页四分之一，他告诉了我一些关于这个生意的事情。

And sometimes character and talents sort of just jump off the page at me, and this was one of those letters, and it came from Israel. And I expressed an interest, after reading this letter, in getting together with Eitan.

有时候，性格和才能会从纸上跳出来吸引我，而这就是其中一封信，它来自以色列。在读完这封信后，我表达了想和埃坦见面的兴趣。

And not long thereafter, I met not only Eitan, but his CEO and president, a remarkable man named Jacob Harpaz; Danny Goldman, the CFO. And we met in Omaha. They subsequently met Charlie.

不久之后，我不仅遇到了艾坦，还遇到了他的首席执行官兼总裁，一位名叫雅各布·哈帕兹的杰出人物；还有首席财务官丹尼·戈德曼。我们在奥马哈见面。他们随后见到了查理。

And this all came to fruition yesterday when we signed a contract. Now we have — well, before I go on to this, maybe Charlie would like to say a word or two about ISCAR.

这一切在昨天签署合同时实现了。现在我们有——好吧，在我继续之前，也许查理想对 ISCAR 说几句话。

He’s the — hard as it is for you to believe, he is not only — he’s as enthusiastic about this as I am.

他是——虽然你很难相信，但他不仅——他对此的热情和我一样高。

Now, have you ever seen that before, I’d ask you? Charlie likes this one extraordinarily well. Charlie?

我想问问你们，难道你们以前见过这样的情景吗？Charlie非常喜欢这项投资。Charlie？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, this is a company that, from very modest beginnings, grows to be the best company in its field in the world. It’s not yet the biggest, but that leaves them something to do.

查理·芒格：嗯，这是一家从非常不起眼的起点成长为世界上该领域最佳公司的公司。它还不是最大的，但这给了他们一些事情去做。

The average quality of the people in this company is not only extraordinary, it’s off the chart. And the beauty of this, as you look at the two of us, is they’re all young.

这家公司的员工平均素质不仅非同寻常，而且超乎寻常。更妙的是，当你看着我们两个人时，他们全都很年轻。

No, this is a real quality enterprise, and these people know how to do some things that we don’t know how to do. A lot.

不，这是真正的优质企业，这些人知道如何做一些我们不知道怎么做的事情。很多。

So, of course we’re enthusiastic about the company. I’m always enthusiastic when I get to deal with some of the best people in the world.

所以，我们当然对这家公司充满热情。当我有机会与世界上最好的人打交道时，我总是充满热情。

I would like if we could get the spotlight down there. They’re right down here in front. I would like, individually, three managers to stand up.

我希望我们能把聚光灯移到那里。他们就在前面。我希望三位经理分别站起来。

And then Eitan is going to talk to us a bit, and then we have a — I think we’ve got it arranged so that we can have a short movie that will tell you something about ISCAR.

然后，艾坦会和我们聊一会儿，然后我们安排了一个短片，可以向你介绍一下 ISCAR。

But, first of all, if Eitan Wertheimer would stand up and we can get the spotlight on him? Over there. OK.

但是，首先，如果埃坦·韦特海默能站起来，我们能把聚光灯打在他身上吗？在那里。好的。

Eitan, let me introduce the other two, and then can we have you speak to the group?

埃坦，让我介绍另外两位，然后你可以对大家讲话吗？

Jacob Harpaz is the president and the CEO. (Applause)

雅各布·哈帕兹是总裁兼首席执行官。（掌声）

Take a good look at these people because they’re going to make you — they’re going to do very, very well for you.

好好看看这些人，因为他们会让你受益匪浅——他们会为你们做得非常非常好。

And Danny Goldman. Danny, would you stand up? (Applause)

丹尼·戈德曼。丹尼，你能站起来吗？（掌声）

Thank you. And if you’ll give the microphone to Eitan, I think Eitan would like to talk to the group just a bit.

谢谢。如果你能把麦克风交给埃坦，我想埃坦会想和大家聊几句。

EITAN WERTHEIMER: Good morning, everybody. It’s Omaha. It’s spring. The fields are green. The days get longer. And we bring a big family into a new home.

艾坦·韦特海默：早上好，大家好。这是奥马哈。现在是春天。田野一片翠绿。白天变得更长。我们把一个大家庭带入了一个新家。

I’m standing here before you representing 5,869 people, not only the people, but the families, their past and their future.

我站在这里代表 5,869 人，不仅是这些人，还有他们的家庭，他们的过去和未来。

It took us three years to look what to do next. We are successful. We still have a lot of mistakes ahead of us to do.

我们花了三年时间来寻找接下来的方向。我们成功了。我们面前仍然有很多错误要犯。

Until we found one day somebody came to us and asked, “Have you heard about Berkshire Hathaway and Mr. Buffett?” We said, “Yes, we heard, but we never thought about it.”

直到有一天，有人来到我们面前问：“你们听说过伯克希尔·哈撒韦和巴菲特先生吗？”我们说：“是的，我们听说过，但我们从未想过。”

And when we started studying about the company, we understood that this is the right combination for us, a family company with a strong culture and a culture we’d love to keep, a young group of people that will love to work, maybe not for very long, but not less than 20, 25 years from today.

当我们开始研究这家公司时，我们了解到这对我们来说是正确的组合，一家拥有强大文化的家族企业，这种文化是我们希望保持的，一个年轻的团队，他们会热爱工作，也许不会很长时间，但至少会在未来的 20 到 25 年内。

And we decided, let’s try it. And we had a very interesting lesson from Warren, we had a very interesting lesson from Charlie, and we survived both of them. (Laughter)

于是我们决定，试试看。我们从沃伦那里学到了一堂非常有趣的课，从查理那里也学到了一堂非常有趣的课，我们都挺过来了。（笑声）

I’m very happy that I represent here, not only the people that make the products and go to the customers, I also in a way represent the big family of customers that make — manufacture things.

我很高兴在这里代表的不仅是那些生产产品并与客户接触的人，我也在某种程度上代表了制造产品的大客户群体。

They make cars go faster and safer. They’ll make airplanes fly. They will make the mold to make the bottles for the Coca-Cola. They’ll make a washing machine. They’ll make the tools to make a carpet.

他们让汽车跑得更快、更安全。他们会让飞机飞行。他们将制造模具来制作可口可乐的瓶子。他们会制造洗衣机。他们会制造工具来制作地毯。

They’ll make many things. And many times the people that manufacture are a little bit in the shade.

他们会制造很多东西。而且很多时候，制造的人有点被忽视。

And I’m very proud to stand as a manufacturing guy, and say I’m standing for all of them, all our customers, which I must thank them every morning, not only for buying, but also for trying new ideas that we bring and working very hard to stay competitive.

我非常自豪地以制造业人士的身份站出来，并说我代表他们所有人，代表我们所有的客户，我必须每天早上感谢他们，不仅因为他们购买，还因为他们尝试我们带来的新想法，并努力保持竞争力。

Whoever will stay competitive will be there long-term. And this is also our goal.

谁能保持竞争力，谁就能长期存在。这也是我们的目标。

Here is Mr. Harpaz, Jacob. In reality, my job is not to disturb. He, in a very gentle way, fired me ten years ago.

这是哈帕兹先生，雅各布。实际上，我的工作是不打扰。他在十年前以一种非常温和的方式解雇了我。

He performed and did better things than I could do, and it didn’t make sense that I’ll disturb him; so I went on to do other things. We’ve been in the company only 34 years, and the real job is done by Jacob and many, many other people.

他表现得比我好，做的事情也比我好，我不应该打扰他；所以我去做其他事情。我们在公司只有 34 年，真正的工作是由雅各布和许多其他人完成的。

I’m sure that you have seen the film “In 80 Days Around the World.” And we prepared for you, “In 61 Companies Around the World.” And I hope you enjoy it.

我相信你一定看过电影《环游世界 80 天》。我们为你准备了《环游世界 61 家公司》。希望你喜欢。

We definitely have to fulfill a lot of expectations. We definitely have to work very hard to make everybody very proud that we joined the family, also our people and for sure everybody in this room.

我们肯定要满足很多期望。我们肯定要非常努力地工作，让每个人都为我们加入这个大家庭感到自豪，也包括我们的人，当然还有在座的每一个人。

So let’s hope we’ll all be successful, and let’s look into the future. And I’m looking forward to come every spring, to Omaha, where the fields are green and the days get longer. Thank you. (Applause)

所以让我们希望大家都能成功，让我们展望未来。我期待着每年春天来到奥马哈，那里的田野一片翠绿，白昼渐长。谢谢。（掌声）

ON TAPE, ANNOUNCER: IMC presents “Better Solutions for a Better World.”

在录音中，播音员：IMC 呈现“更好的解决方案，为了更美好的世界。”

In 1889, the appearance of the first automobiles brought with it the need for sophisticated solutions in metal processing. Such were the beginnings of a new company, launched by engineers in the U.S.: Ingersoll.

1889 年，第一批汽车的出现带来了对金属加工复杂解决方案的需求。这就是一家新公司的起源，由美国的工程师创立：英格索尔。

In the decades to follow, another plant was set up in Germany. Since its creation, Ingersoll has established strong ties with industry, which has placed it firmly in a leadership position.

在接下来的几十年里，德国又建立了一家工厂。自成立以来，英格索尔与工业界建立了牢固的联系，这使其稳居领导地位。

For over a century, time after time, Ingersoll has proved that the best solutions begin with the best engineers.

一个多世纪以来，英格索尔一次又一次地证明，最好的解决方案始于最好的工程师。

In 1999, Ingersoll joined the IMC Group and discovered that the sky is not the limit but only the starting point.

1999 年，英格索尔加入 IMC 集团，发现天空不是极限，而只是起点。

Meantime, at the turn of the 20th century, another metal processing plant was established on the other side of the world in South Korea: TaeguTec. In joining the IMC Group in 1997, TaeguTec reinforced its position as the main supplier of cutting tools for industry in the Far East.

与此同时，在 20 世纪之交，世界另一端的韩国成立了另一家金属加工厂：特固克。1997 年加入 IMC 集团后，特固克巩固了其作为远东地区工业切削工具主要供应商的地位。

Today TaeguTec has achieved unparalleled success, penetrating new markets, streamlining production process, and showing that precise global thinking can cancel distances.

今天，大韩特固取得了无与伦比的成功，打入了新市场，简化了生产流程，并展示了精确的全球思维可以消除距离。

In the middle of the 20th century, in the north of Israel, Stef Wertheimer had predicted, from his little shack in Nahariya, the global need for more advanced cutting tools. “The new world demands better solutions,” said Wertheimer, and established ISCAR.

在 20 世纪中叶，以色列北部，斯特夫·韦特海默在纳哈里亚的小棚屋里预测到了全球对更先进切削工具的需求。“新世界需要更好的解决方案，”韦特海默说，并创立了 ISCAR。

In a relatively short time, ISCAR has become the second largest cutting tool manufacturer in the world, a leader in the area of metal removal.

在相对较短的时间内，ISCAR 已成为世界第二大切削工具制造商，是金属去除领域的领导者。

ISCAR has revolutionized every aspect of machining. Its mission: to apply innovation, quality, and automation on the highest technological level.

ISCAR 在加工的各个方面进行了革命。其使命：在最高技术水平上应用创新、质量和自动化。

Among ISCAR’s groundbreaking achievements are the revolution in cutoff applications; development of SELF-GRIP in the ’70s; the pioneering triumphs in milling; the HELIMILL in the ‘80s; the CHAMDRILL; the revolution in drilling in the ’90s and tangential positive milling; the innovative TANGMILL.

ISCAR 的突破性成就包括切断应用的革命；70 年代开发的 SELF-GRIP；铣削领域的开创性成就；80 年代的 HELIMILL；CHAMDRILL；90 年代钻孔的革命和切向正铣削；创新的 TANGMILL。

These innovations and more have reinforced ISCAR’s position as the world’s leader in development of cutting tools.

这些创新以及更多创新巩固了 ISCAR 作为全球切削工具开发领导者的地位。

The combination of Ingersoll, TaeguTec, and ISCAR has given rise to the IMC Group, taking the best of all worlds and creating the world’s best tools.

Ingersoll、TaeguTec和ISCAR的结合促成了IMC集团的形成，结合了各方的最佳成果，创造出全球最好的工具。

Today’s rapidly advancing world demands that we constantly elevate standards, apply ourselves more and more to provide ever-smarter and precise solutions, pushes us to advance to improve ourselves, to lead.

当今快速发展的世界要求我们不断提高标准，越来越多地应用自己，提供更智能和精确的解决方案，推动我们进步以提升自我，引领前行。

ON TAPE, EITAN WERTHEIMER: You have to be a full line supplier. To be a global company means to be local in many countries, in many places around the world.”

在录音中，埃坦·韦特海默：你必须成为一个全线供应商。成为一家全球公司意味着在世界各地的许多国家和地方都要本地化。

ON TAPE, ANNOUNCER: Other IMC Group companies:

在录音中，播音员：其他 IMC 集团公司：

IT.TE.DI Italy, designers and manufacturers of PCD diamond tools for high-precision aluminum machining in the automotive and aerospace industry;

IT.TE.DI 意大利，汽车和航空航天行业高精度铝加工用 PCD 金刚石工具的设计者和制造商；

UOP Italy, producers of high-quality solid carbide and high-speed steel standard tools and special tailor-made designs for applications in the aerospace and dye and mold industries;

UOP 意大利，生产高质量的整体硬质合金和高速钢标准工具以及用于航空航天和染料模具行业应用的特殊定制设计；

Outiltec France, expert creative solutions in extra-long gun drills for deep drilling and applications that require unique geometries;

Outiltec France，深孔钻和需要独特几何形状的应用领域的超长枪钻创意解决方案专家；

Unitac Japan, deep-drilling BTA-style tools with brazed and indexable heads;

Unitac Japan，采用钎焊和可转位刀头的深孔钻 BTA 式工具；

And Wertec Italy, design and manufacturer of unique counterboring tools for deep and complicated boring applications.

Wertec 意大利公司，设计和制造用于深孔和复杂钻孔应用的独特扩孔工具。

ON TAPE, JACOB HARPAZ: If you look outside and you see some cars over there, be aware that in each car at least one part is manufactured by one of the IMC companies, for sure.

在录音中，雅各布·哈帕兹：如果你往外看，看到那边有一些汽车，要知道每辆车里至少有一个零件是由 IMC 公司之一制造的，肯定的。

ON TAPE, ANNOUNCER: Automotive.

在录音中，播音员：汽车。

ON TAPE, EITAN WERTHEIMER: Before you have a product line, the geography spread, the people that understand the language, you cannot start thinking, “May I try or may I not try to become automotive supplier?”

在录音中，埃坦·韦特海默：在你拥有产品线、地理分布和懂得语言的人之前，你不能开始考虑，“我可以尝试还是不可以尝试成为汽车供应商？”

ON TAPE, ANNOUNCER: We at IMC have made the automotive industry the foremost objective for all the factories of the group. All the Ingersoll vessels connect to contribute massively to the work of the automotive industry in North America.

在录音中，播音员：IMC将汽车工业作为集团所有工厂的首要目标。所有Ingersoll的资源都连接起来，为北美汽车工业的工作做出巨大贡献。

At the same time, on the other side of the globe, TaeguTec cutting tools joins the momentum of the rapidly-developing Japanese and Korean automotive industries.

与此同时，在地球的另一端，特固克切削工具加入了快速发展的日本和韩国汽车工业的行列。

The alliance between ISCAR’s developments and the IMC Group has led to comprehensive solutions, which contribute to the efficiency of global automotive production and pave the way for production cost savings.

ISCAR 的开发与 IMC 集团之间的联盟带来了全面的解决方案，这些解决方案有助于提高全球汽车生产的效率，并为降低生产成本铺平了道路。

ON TAPE, JACOB HARPAZ: We’re not only selling tools, we are selling technology. We are selling the customer a better way to make profit. And we believe, by giving a solution, it can increase its productivity. And the bottom line for the productivity, making more profit for his company.

在录音中，雅各布·哈帕兹：我们不仅在销售工具，我们在销售技术。我们在为客户提供一种更好的盈利方式。我们相信，通过提供解决方案，可以提高生产力。而生产力的最终目标是为他的公司创造更多利润。

ON TAPE, ANNOUNCER: Heavy industry.

在录音中，播音员：重工业。

The power of IMC comes clearly to the fore in heavy industry. The unique combination of the three main manufacturing plants creates new opportunities.

IMC 的力量在重工业中显而易见。三个主要制造工厂的独特组合创造了新的机会。

The geographic location of Ingersoll and TaeguTec has led the companies to develop specific heavy industry specialization. The innovative geometries developed by ISCAR, together with the design and production of tools made to conform to the special requirements of this industry, places IMC at the forefront of this important industry.

因格索尔和大韩特固的地理位置促使公司发展了特定的重工业专业化。ISCAR 开发的创新几何形状，加上根据该行业特殊要求设计和生产的工具，使 IMC 在这一重要行业中处于领先地位。

Aerospace. 航天。

The blend and precision and inventiveness ought to go far.

混合、精确和创造力应该会走得很远。

If you want to reach far and high, you must be on top of the game in technology, in understanding materials, (inaudible).

如果你想走得更远更高，你必须在技术和材料理解方面处于领先地位，（听不清）。

The aerospace industry demands machining solutions for exotic and difficult-to-process materials, proficiency in lightweight materials, such as aluminum, and the ability to machine parts that require massive processing capabilities.

航空航天工业需要针对异型和难加工材料的加工解决方案，精通轻质材料如铝，并具备加工需要大规模处理能力的零件的能力。

The grouping of the three plants and the profound understanding of cutting materials and complex cutting geometries, along with the expertise and building large-size tools, make IMC the strategic partner for the aerospace industry.

这三家工厂的组合以及对切削材料和复杂切削几何形状的深刻理解，加上在制造大型工具方面的专业知识，使 IMC 成为航空航天工业的战略合作伙伴。

General engineering. 通用工程。

All this vast engineering experience accumulated in every field, in every industry, and in every corner of the world, has paved the way for the development of new, groundbreaking tools, which streamline production processes, shorten machining time, and reduce costs for every customer in the world of general engineering.

所有这些在各个领域、各个行业和世界各个角落积累的丰富工程经验，为开发新的突破性工具铺平了道路，这些工具简化了生产流程，缩短了加工时间，并降低了全球通用工程领域每位客户的成本。

ON TAPE, JACOB HARPAZ: After releasing the product into the market, we put another team — our own team — and they’ll now compete against the release of the product.

在录音中，雅各布·哈帕兹：在产品投放市场后，我们派出了另一支团队——我们自己的团队——他们现在将与产品的发布进行竞争。

ON TAPE, EITAN WERTHEIMER: In exhibitions, we are recognized as a very, very innovative company. Many times the sentence is, “Let’s go there because they must have something new. They always have something new.” That’s a big compliment, and innovation will make the difference.

在录音中，埃坦·韦特海默：在展览中，我们被公认为一家非常非常有创新的公司。很多时候人们会说：“我们去那里吧，因为他们肯定有新东西。他们总是有新东西。” 这是一个很大的赞美，而创新将带来不同。

ON TAPE, STEF WERTHEIMER: I believe that, in a way, industry is an art in itself. It’s art. It’s creation. You create something.

在录音中，斯特夫·韦特海默：我相信，从某种意义上说，工业本身就是一种艺术。它是艺术。它是创造。你创造了一些东西。

ON TAPE, ANNOUNCER: You can see it immediately upon entering an IMC branch or factory. The house of IMC is, first and foremost, a home for employees and customers as one. Years of experience have taught us that this is a vital element for success.

在录音中，播音员：一进入 IMC 的分支机构或工厂，你就能立即看到。IMC 之家首先是员工和客户共同的家。多年的经验告诉我们，这是成功的关键要素。

ON TAPE, EITAN WERTHEIMER: Many companies have buildings and machines and a lot of real estate, but it’s only people that have a chance to make any difference.

在录音中，埃坦·韦特海默：许多公司拥有建筑、机器和大量房地产，但只有人才能有机会产生任何影响。

ON TAPE, JACOB HARPAZ: I believe with the ambition of the people, with the hard work of the people, we are going to reach the position of being number 1.

在录音中，雅各布·哈帕兹：我相信凭借人们的雄心壮志和努力工作，我们将达到成为第一的地位。

ON TAPE, ANNOUNCER: The world demands better solutions. That is why we’re here. IMC. (Applause)

在录音中，播音员：世界需要更好的解决方案。这就是我们在这里的原因。IMC。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: This is an important acquisition, as we paid $4 billion for 80 percent of the company. The family remains in partnership with us. They retained 20 percent.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一次重要的收购，因为我们支付了 40 亿美元购买了公司 80%的股份。该家族仍然与我们保持合作关系，他们保留了 20%的股份。

It’s the first business we’ve purchased that is based outside the United States. We have others that have operations there.

这是我们购买的第一家总部设在美国以外的企业。我们还有其他在那里的业务。

I think you’ll look back on this in five or ten years as being a very significant event in Berkshire’s history.

我认为在五年或十年后，你会将此视为伯克希尔历史上一个非常重要的事件。

And it’s interesting. In this world, in which many businesses get auctioned off, figures get dressed up before they sell them and leveraged up and so on, we continue to hear from people periodically who consider their business as too important to auction.

这很有趣。在这个世界上，许多企业被拍卖，数字在出售前被包装和加杠杆等等，我们不断听到有人认为他们的企业太重要而不能拍卖。

And we’ve never really bought one at auction — have we, Charlie — that I can remember?

我们从来没有在拍卖会上买过一个——是吗，查理——我记得吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t remember one either.

查理·芒格：我也记不起来。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. So there’s a benefit in that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。所以这有一个好处。

Because, in effect, the people that pass through that filter of caring enough about their business that they don’t simply put it up like a piece of meat at an auction are also the people, in our view, that make the best managers and make the best partners over time.

因为，实际上，那些通过过滤器的人，他们对自己的企业如此关心，以至于不会像在拍卖会上出售一块肉那样随便处理他们的业务，在我们看来，这些人也是随着时间推移成为最佳管理者和最佳合作伙伴的人。

There is something going on in their brain that says this business is so important, and the people that are here are so important, and the customers we take care of are so important, that we actually care about the home in which these businesses reside.

他们的大脑中有某种东西在说，这个业务是如此重要，这里的人是如此重要，我们照顾的客户是如此重要，以至于我们真正关心这些业务所在的家园。

And I think that filter works very much to our benefit. We’ve bought a number of businesses in the last 15 or 18 months where people have felt that way, and I think the crowning one here is ISCAR.

我认为这种筛选对我们非常有利。在过去的 15 或 18 个月里，我们收购了许多企业，人们对此感到满意，我认为其中最重要的是 ISCAR。

So, I welcome our new friends from Israel. I’m going to go over there and visit in September to see if there are any more girls out there like you, see if we can drum up a little more business.

所以，我欢迎我们来自以色列的新朋友。我打算在九月份去那边看看，是否还有和你一样的女孩，以便我们可以招揽更多的生意。

6. Questions and answers

问题与答案

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, let’s go on to the question period.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，接下来进入提问环节。

And we will do this until noon, at which time we’ll break for 45 minutes or so and come back, and then we’ll continue until about 3 o’clock.

我们会这样做直到中午，届时我们会休息大约 45 分钟，然后回来，然后继续到大约 3 点钟。

Then we’ll break for about 15 minutes, have the formal business meeting from 3:15 to 3:16. (Laughter)

然后我们将休息大约 15 分钟，正式的业务会议将在 3:15 到 3:16 进行。（笑声）

And then at 4 o’clock, Charlie and I are meeting with all of the people who came from outside of North America.

然后在四点钟，查理和我将与所有从北美以外地区来的人会面。

This year we had about 550 requests for tickets from countries outside of North America, as opposed to about 380 last year. So we’re looking forward to meeting all of you that have come a long way to attend this meeting.

今年，我们收到了来自北美以外国家的大约 550 张门票请求，而去年大约是 380 张。因此，我们期待着与所有远道而来的与会者见面。

这一年，段永平以62.01万美元的价格拍下了巴菲特午餐。

7. We can “easily handle” Social Security

我们可以“轻松处理”社会保障

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’ve got a dozen zones in here, and we’ll start off with zone number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们这里有十二个区域，我们将从第一区开始。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. My name is Edward Jannig (PH) from Denver, Colorado.

观众成员：是的。我的名字是爱德华·詹尼格（音），来自科罗拉多州丹佛市。

First, I want to thank Charlie and Peter Kaufman for their wonderful book. I think Benjamin Franklin would be very proud.

首先，我要感谢查理和彼得·考夫曼的精彩书籍。我想本杰明·富兰克林会感到非常自豪。

My question is, last year when asked about Social Security, you said that a country as rich as the U.S. should take care of their old people.

我的问题是，去年当被问及社会保障时，你说像美国这样富裕的国家应该照顾他们的老人。

This year I read Pete Peterson’s book, “Running on Empty,” and I was wondering, from the standpoint that is the greatest benefit to society, where should you draw the line on entitlement spending?

今年我读了皮特·彼得森的书《入不敷出》，我在想，从对社会的最大利益的角度来看，应该在哪里划定福利支出的界限？

And I was wondering if you gentlemen disagree on the subject at all.

我想知道你们几位在这个问题上是否有任何分歧。

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, you always have the question in every society — whether it’s formalized or not — you have the question of how you take care of the old and the young.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，在每个社会中——无论是否正式化——你总是有如何照顾老人和年轻人的问题。

You know, you have people in their productive years turning out goods and services, and you have people that are too young to participate in the turning out of those goods and services but that, nevertheless, need them, and you have people that are old in the same position.

你知道，有人在他们的生产力旺盛时期生产商品和服务，也有一些人因为太年轻而无法参与这些商品和服务的生产，但他们仍然需要这些商品和服务，还有一些年老的人处于同样的境地。

And starting in 1935, I believe, we statutorily formalized that idea. We’d always felt that way about the young, that school should be there for them when they couldn’t pay for them themselves, and that the society owed a duty to both classes. But in 1935, we took up the idea that the government would provide this base limit.

从 1935 年开始，我相信，我们通过立法正式确立了这个理念。我们一直认为，学校应该在年轻人无法自己支付学费时为他们提供教育，社会对这两个阶层都有责任。但在1935年，我们采取了政府提供这一基础保障的想法。

Now, I think there’s some merit to the argument that the 65 became outmoded as longevity improved. And that is now being changed, to some degree, and I think there’s probably some more change needed.

现在，我认为随着寿命的延长，65 岁变得过时的说法有一定道理。而且这在某种程度上正在发生变化，我认为可能还需要更多的改变。

But this country has an output of almost $40,000 of GDP per person. And some people, like Charlie and myself, are very lucky to be wired in a way that in a market system we get enormously wealthy.

但是这个国家的人均 GDP 产出几乎达到 40,000 美元。而且有些人，比如查理和我，非常幸运地在市场体系中以某种方式变得极其富有。

And other people are not so wired, and they come out and they, in a market system, do not necessarily do so well, and they’re fairly lucky if they provide for themselves during their working years and they do not have the ability to earn at a rate that takes care of them in later years.

其他人并不是这样，他们出来后，在市场体系中不一定表现得很好，如果他们在工作期间能够养活自己就算相当幸运了，他们没有能力以足够的速度赚取收入来保障晚年的生活。

And society has taken that on. Our country can easily handle the Social Security question.

社会已经接受了这一点。我们国家可以轻松处理社会保障问题。

I mean, it — and it’s kind of astounding to me that a government that is quite happy to run a 3- or $400 billion deficit now worries a lot about the fact they’re going to have a $100 billion deficit or something in Social Security 30 years from now. I mean, there’s a little bit of irony in that. (Applause)

我的意思是，这——让我感到惊讶的是，一个现在乐于运行三四千亿美元赤字的政府，却非常担心 30 年后社会保障会有一千亿美元的赤字。我是说，这其中有一点讽刺。（掌声）

It is true that, if we maintain the present age brackets, that eventually you have one person in the older years for every two that are producing in the younger years.

确实，如果我们保持现有的年龄段，最终每两个年轻人中就会有一个老年人。

But we produce more every year as we go along. And there will always be a struggle in a representative society, in a democratic society, between how you divide up that pie.

但随着时间的推移，我们每年都会生产更多。在一个代议制社会，一个民主社会中，如何分配这块蛋糕总会存在斗争。

But we have a huge pie. We have a growing pie. And we can very easily take care of people, in a manner at least as well as we take care of them now, in the future from that growing pie without the people in their productive years not — also having a gain in their standard of living.

但是我们有一个巨大的蛋糕。我们的蛋糕在不断增长。我们可以很容易地照顾人们，至少像现在这样照顾他们，在未来从那个不断增长的蛋糕中，而不会让他们在生产年限内的人们的生活水平没有提高。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the world of Pete Peterson, but I don’t come to the same conclusion.

查理·芒格：是的。我非常敬佩皮特·彼得森，但我没有得出相同的结论。

Of course, if we didn’t tinker with Social Security, it would eventually run low on funds.

当然，如果我们不对社会保障进行调整，它最终会面临资金短缺的问题。

But if the country is going to grow at 2 or 3 percent per annum for decades ahead, it’s child’s play to take a little larger share of the pie and divert it to the people who are older.

但如果这个国家在未来几十年每年增长 2%或 3%，那么分得更大一块蛋糕并将其转移给年长者就如同小菜一碟。

It would be crazy, I think, to think you would always freeze the share of money going to the old at exactly the same sum no matter how rich you got.

我认为，无论你变得多么富有，始终将给老年人的资金份额冻结在完全相同的金额上，这种想法是疯狂的。

It’s a perfectly reasonable thing to do to pay a little more in the future to support what I regard as one of the most successful programs in the history of our country.

在未来多付一点钱来支持我认为是我国历史上最成功的项目之一，这是完全合理的。

Social Security has a low overhead and does a world of good. It’s a very reasonable promise to make, and I wish my own party would wise up a little on how little an issue it is. (Applause)

社会保障的管理费用很低，并且带来了极大的好处。这是一个非常合理的承诺，我希望我自己的政党能更明智地认识到这其实不是个大问题。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: This is what happens when you ask a couple of guys our age how you feel about treating older people. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：当你问几个我们这个年纪的人对待老年人的看法时，这就是会发生的事情。（笑声）

Incidentally, the — currently — and everybody likes to talk about the unified budget — you didn’t hear talk about the unified budget 30 years ago on the national level.

顺便说一下，目前每个人都喜欢谈论统一预算——30 年前在国家层面你是听不到关于统一预算的讨论的。

But the unified budget means that the Social Security surplus now gets counted toward reducing the overall budget. So they’re very happy at present to take the Social Security surplus and trumpet the number that is after that.

但统一预算意味着，社会保障的盈余现在被计入到减少整体预算中。因此，当前他们乐于接受社会保障的盈余，并高调宣扬这一数字。

But then when they start talking about a Social Security deficit out 20 or 30 years, they tend to get — they want to separate that off and get very panicky about it. So I think there’s a lot of hypocrisy in the argument.

但当他们开始谈论20年或30年后社会保障的赤字时，他们却倾向于将其单独剥离，变得非常惊慌。所以我认为这个论点中存在许多虚伪。

8. Different businesses, different compensation

不同的业务，不同的补偿

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第二个问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Phil Rafton (PH), shareholder from Orinda, California.

观众成员：早上好。我叫菲尔·拉夫顿（PH），来自加利福尼亚州奥林达的股东。

My question for you: How would you design a compensation system in a very cyclical industry that can swing from boom to bust?

我想问你：在一个周期性很强、可能从繁荣到萧条的行业中，你会如何设计一个薪酬体系？

You want to tie compensation to results in some way, but this can lead to huge swings in pay. And, for example, today in booming industries, like energy and mining, profits are large as a result of the boom in the industry and not necessarily the results of management skill.

您想以某种方式将薪酬与业绩挂钩，但这可能导致薪酬的大幅波动。而且，例如，今天在能源和采矿等蓬勃发展的行业中，利润很大程度上是由于行业的繁荣，而不一定是管理技能的结果。

Conversely, when the industry is down, profits are low due to no fault of management.

相反，当行业低迷时，利润低下并非管理层的过错。

So, again, my question: How do you design a compensation package to best reward management performance?

所以，我的问题是：你如何设计一个薪酬方案以最佳方式奖励管理绩效？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That’s a terrific question. Because if you’re running a copper company now with copper at 3.50 a pound, you can coin money even if you happen to be the village idiot, you know.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是个很好的问题。因为如果你现在经营一家铜公司，而铜价是每磅 3.50 美元，即使你是个村里的傻瓜，你也能赚大钱。

And, similarly, when copper was 80 or 90 cents a pound, which has been most of our adult lifetime, in that general — there were fairly sparse times in mining much of the time.

同样，当铜价在80或90美分时，这在我们成年人的大部分时间里都是如此，采矿的环境往往相对艰难。

And we design compensation systems at Berkshire. We have dozens and dozens of companies. Some of them are capital-intensive. Some of them are cyclical. Some of them don’t require much capital.

我们在伯克希尔设计薪酬系统。我们有许多公司。其中一些是资本密集型的。一些是周期性的。一些不需要太多资本。

Some of them are terrific businesses if no one runs them. Some of them are very difficult businesses, even if the best of management comes.

其中一些是很棒的企业，即使没有人管理它们。即使有最好的管理，一些企业也非常困难。

And we have a wide variety of compensation systems. You’re wise when you say, “How do you design one for that kind of a situation?” Because so often people come in with, sort of, standardized systems or whatever the highest system they see is, and then apply it to their own benefits.

我们有各种各样的补偿系统。你所说的“在这种情况下如何设计？”是非常明智的。因为很多时候，人们会带着某种标准化的系统，或者是他们所见到的最高系统，然后将其应用到自己的利益上。

Most people, if left to select their own compensation systems, will come up with the appropriate, from their standpoint, comparable arrangement.

大多数人，如果让他们自己选择补偿制度，会从他们自己的立场出发，提出适当的、可比的安排。

If we owned a copper mining company in its entirety, we would measure it, probably, more by cost of production than we would by whether copper was selling for $2.00 a pound or a dollar a pound.

如果我们完全拥有一家铜矿公司，我们可能会更多地通过生产成本来衡量它，而不是通过铜是以每磅 2.00 美元还是 1.00 美元的价格出售。

I mean, they — the management has control — depending on the kind of ore bodies and everything — but they certainly have control over operating conditions. They do not have control over market prices.

我的意思是，他们——管理层有控制权——这取决于矿体的种类和其他因素——但他们肯定可以控制运营条件。他们无法控制市场价格。

And we would have something, I think, that would not fluctuate a lot in a business like that, the bonus available, but it would probably tie to what we thought was under the control of the individual who’s managing the business. That’s what we try to measure.

因此，在像这样的行业中，我们会设定一个相对不波动的奖金，并将其与我们认为在管理者控制范围内的因素挂钩。这就是我们尝试衡量的目标。

We try to understand the industry in which they operate, and we try to understand the things that the manager can have an impact on, and how well they’re doing in that.

我们努力了解他们所处的行业，并努力理解经理可以影响的事情，以及他们在这方面的表现如何。

We measure, at GEICO, for example, we measure by two unit measures: one is growth — unit growth — and one is the profitability of seasoned business.

在 GEICO，我们用两个单位指标来衡量：一个是增长——单位增长——另一个是成熟业务的盈利能力。

New business costs money. We want new business; so we don’t charge that against the manager or the 20,000 other employees who share in it.

新业务需要花钱。我们想要新业务，所以我们不会把这笔费用算在经理或其他 2 万名参与其中的员工头上。

We do not want to pay for anything that is not under their control. We do not want to pay for the wrong things.

我们不想为不在他们控制范围内的任何事情付费。我们不想为错误的事情付费。

And I would say, in a cyclical business, that you — you know, if oil is $70 a barrel, I don’t think any particular management deserves credit for it. In fact, they all sort of deny that they’ve got anything to do with it when they get called before Congress.

我会说，在一个周期性行业中，如果石油价格是每桶 70 美元，我认为没有哪个管理层应该因此获得功劳。事实上，当他们被国会传唤时，他们都否认自己与此有任何关系。

But I would not give them credit for the fact that oil is $70 a barrel or $40 a barrel. I would give them credit for low finding costs for — over time.

但我不会因为石油价格是每桶 70 美元或 40 美元而给予他们赞誉。我会因为他们长期以来的低勘探成本而给予他们赞誉。

I mean, what you really want to do, if you have a producing oil company, is you want a management that, over a five- or ten-year period, discovers and develops oil at lower-than-average unit cost.

我的意思是，如果你有一家石油生产公司，你真正想要的是一个管理层，在五到十年的时间里，以低于平均单位成本发现和开发石油。

There‘s been a huge difference in performance in that among even the major companies, and I would pay the people that did that well. I would pay them very well, because they’re creating wealth for me.

在即使是大公司中，表现也有很大差异，我会支付那些表现出色的人。我会给他们很高的报酬，因为他们在为我创造财富。

And I would not pay the guy a lot of money that simply is cashing in on $70 oil and that really has got a terrible record in finding it at reasonable prices. Charlie?

我不会给那个仅仅靠 70 美元的石油赚钱的人付很多钱，而且他在以合理价格找到石油方面的记录非常糟糕。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s easy to have a fair compensation system like we have at Berkshire.

查理·芒格：是的。像我们在伯克希尔那样拥有一个公平的薪酬体系是很容易的。

And a lot of other publicly-traded corporations also have fair compensation systems, but about half of them have grossly unfair systems in which the top people get paid too much.

而许多其他上市公司也有公平的薪酬体系，但其中约一半的公司存在极不公平的体系，高层人员的薪酬过高。

We know how to fix Berkshire, but our ability to influence the half of American industry where the compensation systems are unfair has so far been about zero.

我们知道如何修复伯克希尔，但到目前为止，我们对美国工业中薪酬制度不公平的那一半的影响几乎为零。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. One thing you may find interesting, we have — I don’t know — 68 operating companies. We probably have — I probably have responsibility for the compensation system of, perhaps, 40 managers or thereabouts, because some of them have businesses grouped under them.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你可能会发现有趣的是，我们有大约68家运营公司。我们可能对大约40位管理者的补偿系统负有责任，因为有些管理者旗下有多家公司。

I can’t think — again, I can’t think of anyone we have lost over a 40-year period because of differences in views on compensation.

我想不出——再次，我想不出在 40 年间因为对薪酬观点的不同而失去任何人。

I also — we’ve never had a compensation consultant come into Berkshire. They may have had them at the subsidiaries, but they’re smart enough not to tell me. (Laughter)

此外，我们从未让薪酬顾问进入过伯克希尔。可能他们在子公司中曾经有过，但他们足够聪明，不会告诉我。（笑声）

They — it’s never happened. I mean, we do not — and we do not have lots of meetings. We don’t spend a lot of time on it. It is not rocket science.

他们——这从未发生过。我的意思是，我们没有——而且我们没有很多会议。我们不会花很多时间在这上面。这不是火箭科学。

It’s made more complicated than it needs to be, more confusing than it needs to be, because having a system that is complicated and confusing serves the needs of some who want to get paid a whole lot more than their worth.

它被弄得比需要的更复杂、更令人困惑，因为拥有一个复杂且令人困惑的系统符合某些人的利益，他们想要获得远超其价值的报酬。

And the system won’t change because it’s working to the advantage of the people that have their hand on the switch, the people that pick the human relations consultants and pick the people who are on the comp committee.

而且这个系统不会改变，因为它对那些掌控开关的人有利，这些人选择人力关系顾问并选择薪酬委员会成员。

I was put on one comp committee, and Charlie can tell you what happened. (Laughter) He was there.

我被安排到一个薪酬委员会，查理可以告诉你发生了什么。（笑声）他在场。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We were the biggest shareholder at Solomon. Two of us were on the board, and Warren was on the comp committee.

查理·芒格：是的。我们是所罗门公司的最大股东。我们两个人在董事会，沃伦在薪酬委员会。

And in that frenzy of envy, which characterizes compensation in investment banking, Warren remonstrated, softly, I thought, towards a slightly more rational result, and he was outvoted.

在那种充满嫉妒的狂热中，这种狂热在投资银行业的薪酬中尤为明显，沃伦轻声抗议，我认为，他倾向于一个稍微更理性的结果，但他被投票否决了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie used the term “envy” rather than “greed,” which is interesting, because that’s been our experience, is that envy is probably a bigger motivation, in terms of people wanting to be in that top quartile, or whatever it may be, than greed.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理用了“嫉妒”而不是“贪婪”这个词，这很有趣，因为根据我们的经验，嫉妒可能是一个更大的动机，促使人们想要进入那个前四分之一，或者其他什么，而不是贪婪。

It’s a very interesting phenomenon that you can hand somebody a $2 million bonus, and they’re fine until they find out that the person next to them got 2-million-1, and then they’re sick for the next year. (Laughter)

这是一个非常有趣的现象，你可以给某人发 200 万美元的奖金，他们会觉得很好，直到他们发现旁边的人得到了 200 万零 1 美元，然后他们接下来的一年都会感到不舒服。（笑声）

Charlie has pointed out — you know, of the seven deadly sins — that envy is kind of the silliest because you don’t feel better. You know, I mean, if you get envious of somebody, you feel worse the whole time.

查理指出——你知道，在七宗罪中——嫉妒是最愚蠢的一种，因为你不会感觉更好。你知道，我的意思是，如果你嫉妒某人，你会一直感觉更糟。

Now, you know, gluttony — you know, I’ve had some of my best times while being gluttonous. (Laughter)

现在，你知道，暴食——你知道，我在暴食的时候度过了一些最美好的时光。（笑声）

There’s a real upside to gluttony. (Laughter)

暴饮暴食确实有好处。（笑声）

We won’t get into lust. (Laughter)

我们不会陷入情欲。（笑声）

But I’ve heard that there are upsides to that, occasionally.

但我听说那偶尔也有好处。

But envy, you know, all you do is sit around and make yourself sick and can’t get to sleep. But that’s — it’s part of the human psyche, and you see it big time and you get this irony.

但是嫉妒，你知道，你所做的就是坐在那里让自己生病，无法入睡。但那是——这是人类心理的一部分，你会看到它的巨大影响，并感受到这种讽刺。

The SEC wants even more transparency on pay, which I think, you know, basically is a good idea except for the fact that it becomes a shopping list for every other CEO when they see that somebody is getting their haircuts paid for by the company.

美国证券交易委员会希望在薪酬方面有更多的透明度，我认为，基本上这是个好主意，除了当其他首席执行官看到有人由公司支付理发费用时，这就成了他们的购物清单。

They decide that they, too, need their haircuts paid for by the company, and they suddenly become big tippers.

他们决定他们也需要公司支付理发费用，并且他们突然变成了大方的小费者。

9. Our managers are “trained” by our culture

我们的经理是由我们的文化“培养”的

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s move on to number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们继续第三个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Greetings to all of you from the Midwest of Europe. I’m Norman Wintrop (PH) from Bonn, Germany.

观众成员：向你们所有人问好，来自欧洲中部。我是来自德国波恩的诺曼·温特罗普（PH）。

Thank you very much for writing your shareholder letter in such a way that we feel treated as partners.

非常感谢您以这样的方式撰写股东信，使我们感受到被视为合作伙伴。

Warren, in the shareholder letter, you ended with your thoughts on managing Berkshire Hathaway in the future.

沃伦，在股东信中，你以对未来管理伯克希尔·哈撒韦的想法作为结尾。

May I ask you, how do you train your successors? What do you tell them? How do you summarize to them what is important to you?

请问，您是如何培训您的继任者的？您会告诉他们什么？您如何向他们总结对您来说重要的事情？

And how, if you are able to do so, how would you measure whether or not they have lived up to your expectations?

如果你能够做到，你将如何衡量他们是否达到了你的期望？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。

And, I think, actually, in reading that letter — you know, that’s part of the — part of the reason it’s written — is to convey, not only to our partners, our shareholders, but also to our managers and anybody else in the public, you know, what Berkshire is all about.

而且，我认为，实际上，在阅读那封信时——你知道，那是——写信的部分原因——是为了传达，不仅是给我们的合作伙伴、我们的股东，也给我们的经理和公众中的任何其他人，你知道，伯克希尔的全部意义所在。

This meeting, you know, in terms of what we do is intended to give a personality and a character to Berkshire. And we don’t say it’s better than anybody else’s, necessarily, but we do think it’s us.

这次会议，你知道，就我们所做的而言，旨在赋予伯克希尔一个个性和特征。我们并不一定说它比其他任何人都好，但我们确实认为这就是我们。

And we think — we want managers to join us who believe in the sort of operation we have, a partnership with shareholders, a lifetime commitment to the businesses. We want those people to join us.

我们希望那些相信我们这种运作方式的经理加入我们，与股东建立伙伴关系，对企业作出终身承诺。我们希望这些人加入我们。

We want what they see after they join us to underscore the values we have. So everything we do we hope is consistent with what most people would call a “culture” at Berkshire.

我们希望他们加入我们后看到的东西能够强调我们的价值观。因此，我们所做的一切都希望与大多数人所称的伯克希尔的“文化”保持一致。

So the written word, what they see, what they hear, what they observe. And that is training in itself.

所以书面文字，他们所看到的，他们所听到的，他们所观察到的。这本身就是一种训练。

It’s the same sort of training you get as a child. I mean, you — when you are in the home and you’re learning something every day by the behavior of these terribly important people, these big people that are around you.

这和你小时候接受的训练是一样的。我的意思是，当你在家里时，你每天都通过这些非常重要的人，这些在你周围的大人物的行为来学习一些东西。

And a home has a culture. A business has a culture. To some extent, a country can have a culture. And we try to do everything that’s consistent with that. We try to do nothing that is inconsistent with that.

一个家庭有一种文化。一个企业有一种文化。在某种程度上，一个国家也可以有一种文化。我们努力做一切与之相符的事情。我们尽量不做任何与之不符的事情。

And, believe me, if you’re a bright Berkshire manager — and they are bright — you know, they buy into it to start with, they see that it works, you know, and it doesn’t require formal lessons or mentoring or anything of the sort.

而且，相信我，如果你是一个聪明的伯克希尔经理——而他们确实很聪明——你知道，他们一开始就接受这个理念，他们看到它有效，你知道，这不需要正式的课程或指导或任何类似的东西。

I mean, if you talk to our Berkshire managers, you would find that they think consistently with how, in effect, Charlie and I think.

我的意思是，如果你和我们的伯克希尔经理交谈，你会发现他们的思维方式与查理和我的思维方式是一致的。

There are plenty of people that don’t, and they don’t join us.

有很多人不这样做，他们不加入我们。

I mean, you know, we hear all the time from people — I’ve got one coming in a little while, actually, that, you know, nothing is going to come of it because this guy — I mean, his brain processes things different than mine does.

我的意思是，你知道，我们总是听到人们说——实际上，我过一会儿就有一个这样的情况，你知道，不会有什么结果，因为这个人——我的意思是，他的大脑处理事情的方式和我的不同。

And I’m kind of interested in learning about his business, so we’ll get together, but it wouldn’t fit. You know, it would just not — it would be a mismatch.

我对了解他的生意有点兴趣，所以我们会见面，但这不合适。你知道，这只是——这会不匹配。

And the nice thing about it is our culture is so well-defined that there aren’t many mistakes, in terms of people entering it or behaving in a way inconsistent with it. So I think that — I don’t think there’s any formal training necessary.

而且好的一点是，我们的文化定义得非常清晰，因此在进入或表现与之不一致方面几乎没有什么错误。所以我认为——我不认为有任何正式培训是必要的。

I mention in the annual report the fact that, if I die tonight, there are three obvious candidates to take my place.

我在年度报告中提到，如果我今晚去世，有三个明显的候选人可以接替我。

Now, the board knows which one of them they would agree on tonight. Might be different three years from now, but any of those three would not miss a beat in terms of stepping into the culture that I hope we have here, because it’s theirs too.

现在，董事会今晚知道他们会同意哪一个人。可能三年后会有所不同，但这三个人中的任何一个在融入我希望我们在这里所拥有的文化方面都不会有任何问题，因为那也是他们的文化。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you know, if Warren has kept the faith until he’s 75 years old in maintaining a certain kind of culture and a certain way of thinking, do you really think he’s going to blow the job of passing the faith on?

查理·芒格：嗯，你知道，如果沃伦在 75 岁时仍然保持着某种文化和某种思维方式的信念，你真的认为他会在传递信念的过程中搞砸吗？

What could be more important, in terms of his duties in life? You all have something — (Applause)

在他的人生职责中，还有什么比这更重要的呢？你们都有一些东西——（掌声）

You all have something more important to do than worry about the fact that the candle is going to go out at Berkshire just because some people die.

你们都有比担心伯克希尔的蜡烛会因为一些人去世而熄灭更重要的事情要做。

This is a place where the faith is going to go on for a long time.

这是一个信仰将持续很长时间的地方。

Of course, at headquarters, we aren’t training executives. We find them. And they’re not hard to find.

当然，在总部，我们不是在培训高管。我们在寻找他们。而且他们并不难找。

You know, if a mountain stands up like Everest, you don’t have to be genius to recognize that it’s a high mountain. (Laughter)

你知道，如果一座山像珠穆朗玛峰那样耸立，你不需要是天才就能认出那是一座高山。（笑声）

10. Irrational pricing of closed-end funds

封闭式基金的非理性定价

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 4?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。号码 4？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Yuen Gunn (PH), and I’m from Whitehaven in England.

观众成员：我的名字是袁·冈（音），我来自英格兰的怀特黑文。

Actually, the last time I was this nervous asking a question, I’d just presented my wife with an engagement ring from Borsheims. (Laughter)

其实，上一次我这么紧张地问问题时，我刚刚给我妻子送上了一枚来自 Borsheims 的订婚戒指。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I hope you get nervous again. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我希望你再次紧张。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question for you is, with the enthusiasm at the moment for emerging markets, many closed-end funds which contain emerging market stocks are trading at significant premiums to their net asset values, even when open-ended funds can be used to acquire similar portfolios of stocks for the net asset values.

观众成员：我想问的是，目前对新兴市场的热情高涨，许多包含新兴市场股票的封闭式基金的交易价格远高于其净资产值，即使开放式基金可以用来以净资产值获取类似的股票组合。

This doesn’t seem very rational to me. Why do these premiums persist, and do you agree that it’s irrational?

这对我来说似乎不太理性。为什么这些溢价持续存在，你是否同意这是不理性的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say it would tend to be. I don’t know anything about the specifics that you’re referring to on emerging market funds. I haven’t looked at the size of the premiums.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我会说它可能会倾向于这样。我对你提到的新兴市场基金的具体情况一无所知。我没有查看过溢价的规模。

But, history would certainly show that most closed-end funds — just about all closed-end funds — eventually go to discounts.

但是，历史无疑会显示，大多数封闭式基金——几乎所有封闭式基金——最终都会出现折价。

I actually worked — well, I’ll skip that analogy. But the — overwhelmingly, closed-end funds have gone to discounts.

实际上，我曾经工作过——好吧，我会跳过那个比喻。但是——绝大多数封闭式基金都出现了折价。

You know, initially, if they’re sold with a 6 percent commission, of course, the initial people are getting 94 cents of net asset value by paying the dollar, but I know I — if I saw two — if I had an interest in buying into emerging markets through other people’s management and I could buy an open-end fund at X, or an asset value, and I had to pay 120 percent of X for some closed-end fund, you’d have to convince me very strongly that the management of the closed-end fund was better.

你知道，最初如果他们以 6%的佣金出售，当然，最初的人通过支付一美元获得 94 美分的净资产价值，但我知道——如果我对通过他人管理投资新兴市场感兴趣，并且我可以以 X 或资产价值购买开放式基金，而我必须为某个封闭式基金支付 X 的 120%，你必须非常有力地说服我封闭式基金的管理更好。

So I think you’re right. I don’t — again, I don’t know the — if the premium is a few percent, it doesn’t really make much difference.

所以我认为你是对的。我不知道——如果溢价是几个百分点，那真的没什么区别。

But occasionally, Charlie and I have witnessed in the past closed-end funds that have sold even at 30 or 40 percent premiums over asset value.

但有时，查理和我过去见过封闭式基金的交易价格甚至比资产价值高出 30%或 40%。

Overseas Securities was a tiny fund that used to do that for years and baffled everybody. But eventually they will come back down to earth.

海外证券是一个小型基金，多年来一直如此，令所有人感到困惑。但最终他们会回到现实。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s hitting his stride now. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他现在正进入状态。（笑声）

11. Corporate boards should think like owners

公司董事会应像所有者一样思考

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：第五名？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren and Charlie, I want to thank you for putting a once obscure Midwestern city on the map last year with your acquisition of Pete Liegl’s company, Forest River.

观众成员：沃伦和查理，我想感谢你们去年通过收购皮特·利格尔的公司森林河，把一个曾经默默无闻的中西部城市推上了地图。

I’m Frank Martin (PH) from Elkhart, Indiana, the RV capital of the world. I also want to thank —

我是来自印第安纳州埃尔克哈特的弗兰克·马丁（PH），这里是世界房车之都。我也想感谢——

WARREN BUFFETT: Glad to have you here, Frank.

沃伦·巴菲特：很高兴你能来，弗兰克。

Frank has just brought out a book, incidentally, that’s a history of some of his annual letters. It’s a good book, and I recommend you get it.

弗兰克刚刚出版了一本书，顺便提一下，这是他一些年度信件的历史。这是一本好书，我建议你去买。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Warren.

观众成员：谢谢你，沃伦。

I also want to thank you for your influence over Robin Williams and other Hollywood stars. Those of you who have seen the movie “RV” realize that Warren will go to no ends to promote the products of the companies he acquires. (Laughter)

我也想感谢你对罗宾·威廉姆斯和其他好莱坞明星的影响。看过电影《房车之旅》的你们会意识到，沃伦会不遗余力地推广他收购的公司的产品。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: A few people have already noticed that, actually, Frank. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，已经有几个人注意到了，弗兰克。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: On a more serious note, there’s a small but growing trend in American business governance to move from plurality voting for directors to majority voting, long the standard in Great Britain.

观众成员：更严肃一点，目前在美国商业治理中，有一个小但逐渐增长的趋势，即从董事的相对多数投票制转向绝对多数投票制，而这在英国早已成为标准。

What do you see as the upside and downside of majority voting, as it relates to raising the standard of ethics in the corporate boardroom?

您认为绝对多数投票制在提高公司董事会道德标准方面的优点和缺点是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to take a swing at that?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你想试试吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’ll have any effect at all on ethics in the corporate boardroom.

查理·芒格：我认为这对公司董事会的道德没有任何影响。

There get to be fashions in the governance subject. I think that the troubles in American corporations are not going to be fixed by something like that.

在治理问题上也会有时尚潮流。我认为美国公司的问题不会通过那样的方式得到解决。

All these reforms have to be considered in the light of the kind of people that are likely to be activist in using new powers, and that crowd is a mixed crowd, to put it gently.

所有这些改革都必须考虑到可能积极使用新权力的人群，而这个人群是一个混合的人群，委婉地说。

WARREN BUFFETT: The question in the boardroom is to what extent — and you have to understand, it’s partly a business situation; it’s partly a social situation.

沃伦·巴菲特：董事会中的问题是到什么程度——你必须明白，这部分是商业情况，部分是社会情况。

The question is to what extent do the people that are participating there think like owners, and whether they know enough about business so that even if they’re trying to think like owners, that their decisions will be any good.

关键在于参与者在多大程度上像业主一样思考，以及他们是否对商业有足够的了解，以至于即使他们试图像业主那样思考，他们的决策也会是合理的。

And Charlie and I have been on boards of companies with dual voting. Berkshire has that, although it’s so minor that it doesn’t really make any difference. But we’ve been on other boards.

查理和我曾在拥有双重投票权的公司董事会任职。伯克希尔也有这种安排，尽管它微不足道，实际上没有什么影响。但我们也曾在其他董事会任职。

I have never really seen any difference in behavior based on the nature of the votes that got them into the boardroom.

我从未真正看到过任何基于投票性质而导致他们进入会议室的行为差异。

But there’s an enormous difference — I think you’d be blown away if you watched boardrooms over the years — there’s just an enormous difference in terms of, really, the business savvy of the people in the room, the degree to which they are thinking like owners as they go along.

但是有一个巨大的差别——我想如果你多年来观察董事会会议，你会感到震惊——在房间里的人们的商业头脑方面确实有巨大的差别，他们在进行过程中思考得像所有者的程度。

And I’ve seen no — I don’t know that dual voting or the lack of dual voting really is going to have very much to do with that.

我没有看到——我不知道双重投票或缺乏双重投票是否真的会对此有很大影响。

The key — I’ve mentioned it in the past — there’s all these fashions, as Charlie says, in corporate governance.

关键是——我过去提到过——正如查理所说，公司治理中有各种时尚。

But the job of the board is to get the right CEO, to prevent that CEO from overreaching. Because sometimes you have some people that are very able, but they still want to take it all for themselves.

但董事会的工作是找到合适的首席执行官，防止该首席执行官过度扩张。因为有时候你会遇到一些非常有能力的人，但他们仍然想把一切都据为己有。

But if they take nothing and they’re the wrong CEO, they’re still a disaster. So low pay itself is not the criteria.

但如果他们什么都不拿，而且他们是错误的 CEO，他们仍然是个灾难。所以低薪本身不是标准。

So you want the right CEO. You do not want them overreaching.

所以你想要合适的首席执行官。你不希望他们过度扩张。

And then I think the board needs to exercise independent judgment on important acquisitions, because I think CEOs — even smart CEOs — are motivated, frequently, in acquisitions by other than rational reasons.

然后我认为董事会需要在重要收购上行使独立判断，因为我认为首席执行官——即使是聪明的首席执行官——在收购中经常受到非理性原因的驱动。

And in those three areas, you know, American directors have — I don’t think they’ve given a tremendous account of themselves in recent years, whether at dual system places or otherwise.

在这三方面，我认为美国董事们最近几年来的表现并不出色，无论是在双重投票制的公司还是其他公司。

The only cure to better corporate governance, in my view, is that the very large shareholders start really zeroing in on whether those questions I just mentioned are being addressed properly.

在我看来，改善公司治理的唯一办法是非常大的股东开始真正关注我刚才提到的那些问题是否得到了妥善解决。

If they go on to all these peripheral issues, you know, they have a lot of fun and they get in the papers. You know, they have little checklists and they can issue grades and all that. It isn’t going to do anything in terms of making American business work any better.

如果他们继续关注所有这些外围问题，你知道，他们会很开心，并且上报纸。你知道，他们有小清单，可以打分等等。但这对改善美国商业运作没有任何帮助。

But if the eight or ten largest shareholder groups, if the really large institutional investors say, you know, “This compensation plan doesn’t make any sense and we’re not voting for the directors, and here’s why we’re not voting for the directors,” you’d get change. But so far, they’ve been unwilling to do that.

但如果八到十个最大的股东，如果那些真正的大型机构投资者说：“这个薪酬计划没有任何意义，我们不会投票支持这些董事，原因在于这里”，那么你会看到改变。但到目前为止，他们一直不愿意这样做。

It takes the big shareholders. It’s not going to be done by any coalition of small shareholders or people sticking things on ballots. But the big shareholders of this country, you know, basically they — some of them farmed out their voting, even.

这需要大股东的参与。这不是由任何小股东联盟或在选票上贴东西的人来完成的。但这个国家的大股东，你知道，他们中的一些人甚至把投票外包出去。

I was amazed to find that out, that a number of very large institutional investors have actually just turned their voting process over to somebody else. They don’t want to think like owners. And, you know, they bear — we all bear — the penalty for that.

我惊讶地发现，一些非常大的机构投资者实际上已经将他们的投票过程交给了其他人。他们不想像所有者那样思考。而且，你知道，他们承受——我们都承受——因此带来的惩罚。

12. Tech is still in the “too hard” pile

技术仍然在“太难”一类

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6?

沃伦·巴菲特：第六号？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Andy Pollen (PH) from Adrian, Michigan. Thank you, once again, for having me to Omaha.

观众成员：你好。我的名字是安迪·波伦（音），来自密歇根州的阿德里安。再次感谢您邀请我来到奥马哈。

My question is for Warren, but, Charlie, please add your thoughts as well.

我的问题是给沃伦的，但查理，请也分享你的看法。

Warren, I’ve heard you say many times that you don’t understand technology and that you rely on Bill for that, and that’s fine. And I see from this year’s movie that you’re learning, so that’s good.

沃伦，我听你说过很多次你不懂技术，并且你依赖比尔来处理这些，这没问题。我从今年的电影中看到你在学习，这很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Slowly. 沃伦·巴菲特：慢慢地。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m also curious to hear what you’ve learned so far about the other information technology companies, such as IBM, Sun Microsystems, Oracle, Dell, EMC, and Intel.

观众成员：我也很好奇想听听你到目前为止对其他信息技术公司，如 IBM、Sun Microsystems、Oracle、Dell、EMC 和 Intel，有什么了解。

WARREN BUFFETT: I know — what I’ve learned is I know enough not — to know that I don’t know enough to make an investment decision.

沃伦·巴菲特：我知道——我学到的是，我知道自己不够了解，无法做出投资决策。

The — Charlie and I have circles of competence that extend to evaluating a number of types of businesses, and there are a whole lot of businesses that we won’t be able to evaluate.

查理和我有能力圈，可以评估多种类型的业务，但有很多业务是我们无法评估的。

Some of them, I don’t think — I think very few people can evaluate.

他们中的一些人，我不认为——我认为很少有人能评估。

I mean, you get outside of — you just get into businesses that — where the future is so likely to be different than the present that maybe there’s a few people that have great insights on it, but we sure don’t.

我的意思是，你进入那些未来很可能与现在不同的行业，也许有少数人对此有很好的见解，但我们肯定没有。

We are best at the businesses where we can come to a judgment that they’re going to look a good bit like they do now five years from now, ten years from now. They’ll be bigger. They’ll be doing different things, but the fundamentals will be the same.

我们最擅长的业务是那些我们可以判断在五年后、十年后它们会与现在相似的业务。它们会变得更大，会做不同的事情，但基本面会保持不变。

ISCAR will be a bigger company five years from now. It may be a much bigger company, and we may get a chance to do interesting acquisitions.

ISCAR五年后将成为一家更大的公司。它可能会成为一家更大的公司，我们可能会有机会进行有趣的收购。

But what you saw there, the fundamentals, won’t change. The way the people think won’t change.

但你在那里看到的，基本面不会改变。人们的思维方式不会改变。

I can name a number of businesses that are bound to change dramatically. I mean, when you think of how much the telecom business, for example, has changed over the last 15 or 20 years, it’s startling.

我可以列举出一些注定会发生巨大变化的企业。我的意思是，当你想到过去 15 或 20 年间电信行业的变化有多大时，这令人震惊。

Even with hindsight, it’s a little hard to figure out, you know, who was going to make all the money and so on. There’s just — there’s just games that are too tough.

即使事后看来，也很难弄清楚，谁会赚到所有的钱等等。有些游戏实在是太难了。

Charlie says, you know, “We’ve got three boxes at the company: in, out, and too hard.” (Laughter)

查理说，你知道，“我们公司有三个盒子：进、出和太难。”（笑声）

And a lot of things end up in the “too hard” pile, and it doesn’t bother us. You know, we don’t have to be able to do everything well.

很多事情最终被归入“太难”那一堆，这并不会困扰我们。你知道，我们不必事事都做得很好。

If you go to the Olympics, you know, if you run the hundred meter well, you don’t have to throw the shotput. You know, some other guy can throw the shotput and you’ll still get a gold ribbon, you know, if you run the hundred meter fast enough.

如果你去参加奥运会，你知道，如果你百米跑得好，你就不必投掷铅球。你知道，其他人可以投掷铅球，如果你百米跑得足够快，你仍然可以得到金牌。

So, we try to stay within the circle of competence.

所以，我们尽量保持在能力圈内。

Tom Watson, Sr. — I think it was Senior — yeah, Tom Watson, Sr. — many years ago said, “I’m no genius, but I’m smart in spots, and I stay around those spots.”

汤姆·沃森，老汤姆·沃森——我想是老汤姆·沃森——是的，老汤姆·沃森——多年前曾说过：“我不是天才，但我在某些方面很聪明，并且我会留在那些方面。”

Well, that was pretty damn smart, you know. And we have found a lot of our managers who don’t think, you know, they can solve every problem in the world, but they run their businesses extraordinarily well.

嗯，那真是非常聪明，你知道的。而且我们发现很多经理并不认为自己能解决世界上的每一个问题，但他们经营业务非常出色。

You do not want to — Frank Martin mentioned Forest River. You do not want to go and compete with Pete Liegl and his business. He’s going to kill you. He’s very, very, very good.

你不想——弗兰克·马丁提到了森林河。你不想去和皮特·利格尔及他的生意竞争。他会打败你的。他非常非常非常厉害。

But he doesn’t come around and try and tell us how to run the insurance business, because that’s not his game.

但他不会过来告诉我们如何经营保险业务，因为那不是他的领域。

We look for people that are very good at things they understand. And we don’t get any inferiority complex at all about the fact that — well, I — you mentioned Intel, I believe.

我们寻找那些在他们所理解的事情上非常出色的人。我们完全不会因为——嗯，我——你提到了英特尔，我相信。

I was virtually there at the birth of Intel because I was on the board of Grinnell, and Bob Noyce was the chairman of the board of Grinnell. And we bought — at Grinnell — we bought $300,000 worth of their original debentures.

我几乎见证了英特尔的诞生，因为我在格林内尔的董事会，而鲍勃·诺伊斯是格林内尔董事会的主席。我们在格林内尔购买了价值 30 万美元的他们的原始债券。

And, you know, I knew Bob was always a very, very smart guy, but I wouldn’t have had the faintest idea how to evaluate the future of Intel then, and I really don’t have it now, you know.

而且，你知道，我一直知道鲍勃是个非常非常聪明的人，但我当时根本不知道如何评估英特尔的未来，现在也真的不知道，你知道。

And I think they probably had a few surprises themselves in the last few years with AMD and what’s been happening in their business.

我认为在过去几年里，他们自己可能也对 AMD 以及他们业务中发生的事情感到惊讶。

But what that’s going to look like in five years, I don’t have any idea. And I’m not so sure, if you’re in the industry, you’d know exactly what it was going to look like in five years. Some businesses just are very, very hard to predict.

但五年后会是什么样子，我没有任何想法。而且我不太确定，即使你在这个行业，你也会确切知道五年后会是什么样子。有些业务确实非常难以预测。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. One of the foreign correspondents last year, after looking at us carefully, said, in effect, “You guys don’t seem smart enough to do so much better than other people as you’re doing.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。去年，一位外国记者在仔细观察我们之后，实际上说：“你们看起来不够聪明，怎么能比其他人做得好这么多。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Were they looking at me or you, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：他们是在看我还是看你，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Both. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：两者。（笑声）

“Have you got an explanation?” And we said, “We know the edge of our competency better than most people do.”

“你有解释吗？”我们说：“我们比大多数人更了解自己能力的边界。”

It’s a very useful thing to know the edge of your competency. And I always say it’s not a competency if you don’t know the edge of it.

知道自己能力的边界是非常有用的。我总是说，如果你不知道它的边界，那就不算是能力。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll have to think about that a little bit. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我得好好想想这个问题。（笑声）

Bill will explain it to me later.

比尔稍后会向我解释。

13. Too many tax breaks for the rich

给富人的税收优惠太多

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请到第 7 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am John Bailey (PH) from Boston, Massachusetts.

观众成员：我是来自马萨诸塞州波士顿的约翰·贝利。

I wanted to ask, Warren and Charlie, if you could consider three hypothetical securities for a long-term investment.

我想问您，沃伦和查理，如果您考虑三种假设性的证券作为长期投资，您会有什么看法。

The first would be, like, a share in median family income for the United States. The background there that, in real terms, median family income has been stagnant for approximately 30 years.

第一种证券是美国中位家庭收入的股份。背景是，在实际层面上，中位家庭收入在过去大约30年里一直停滞不前。

The second security would be a share in all corporate income in the United States. The background there that corporate income has been taking an ever larger slice of GDP for several years.

第二种证券是美国所有企业收入的股份。背景是，企业收入在过去几年中占GDP的比例越来越大。

And, finally, a bit more abstract, a share in all capital assets in the United States, and I would like to include all intangible capital assets, if possible.

最后一种稍微抽象一些的证券是美国所有资本资产的股份，如果可能的话，我想包括所有的无形资本资产。

So would any of these be of interest for a long-term holding, perhaps 20 years or so? And, if not, why not?

那么这些中有任何一个对长期持有（可能 20 年左右）感兴趣吗？如果没有，为什么不呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think I’d rather buy ISCAR. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想我宁愿买 ISCAR。（笑声）

The corporate profits, as you point out, have been close to their highs, except for a very few years post- World War II, as a percentage of GDP. It’s hard to imagine being much larger.

正如你所指出的，企业利润接近其高点，除了二战后极少数年份，占 GDP 的百分比。很难想象会更大。

It’s interesting. While corporate profits is reported — you take S&Ps, percentage of book, percentage of sales, put on the line, they’re all on the high end.

这很有趣。当企业利润被报告时——你看标普指数，账面百分比，销售百分比，放在线上，它们都处于高端。

Corporate income taxes, really, are not that high relative to the total revenues of the country. So you can see that there’s been a little disconnect there in some manner.

企业所得税相对于国家的总收入来说，实际上并不算高。所以你可以看到，在某种程度上存在一些脱节。

But median family income is something that Charlie and I have never even considered. We’re not shooting for that.

但家庭收入中位数是查理和我从未考虑过的事情。我们并不追求这个。

It is certainly true that, in the last five to ten years, that the disparity in income has widened significantly and that the tax breaks for the wealthy have been extraordinary.

确实，在过去五到十年间，收入差距显著扩大，富人的税收优惠也非常惊人。

I’ve pointed out in the past that most of the members of the Forbes 400, myself included, pay a lower percentage of their income to the U.S. government, counting Social Security taxes, than does the receptionist that works in their office.

我过去指出，包括我自己在内的大多数福布斯 400 强成员，支付给美国政府的税款比例（包括社会保障税）低于在他们办公室工作的接待员。

That was not true 30 years ago, and I don’t think it’s something that should be true in a rich society, but it has happened.

那在 30 年前并不是真的，我认为在一个富裕的社会中这不应该是真的，但它确实发生了。

And I just computed my 2005 return. In 2004 — and I have no tax shelters. I don’t have a tax adviser. I just do things, and at the end of the year I add it all up.

我刚刚计算了我的 2005 年报税。在 2004 年——我没有避税措施。我没有税务顾问。我只是做事情，到年底我把所有的都加起来。

In 2004, my rate was the lowest of the 15 or 16 people in the office, and in 2005, my rate was even lower.

2004 年，我的税率是办公室里 15 或 16 个人中最低的，到了 2005 年，我的税率甚至更低。

And that’s courtesy of the U.S. government. It’s not courtesy of a lot of tax write-offs or anything of the sort.

这要归功于美国政府。这不是因为大量的税收减免或类似的东西。

And I think that’s — I think it’s crazy, and I don’t think the American people understand it very well. And I think that if they did understand it, they should, and would, be quite unhappy about it.

我认为这很疯狂，我认为美国人民对此并不十分了解。我认为如果他们了解，他们应该会对此感到非常不满。

So I think that — I think that the lower incomes, median — and the medium — people making medium amounts of income, have not shared in the prosperity of the last decade or so in a way that’s all proportional to the way the wealthy participate in it.

所以我认为——我认为低收入、中等收入——以及中等收入的人，并没有以与富人参与其中的方式成比例的方式分享过去十年左右的繁荣。

The last point you mentioned was too esoteric for me, so I’ll pass it over to Charlie.

你提到的最后一点对我来说太深奥了，所以我会把它交给查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The main figure that matters to all of us, including the people at the median, is how does GDP per capita grow? And those figures have been very good.

查理·芒格：是的。对我们所有人，包括中位数的人来说，最重要的数字是人均 GDP 如何增长？这些数字一直很好。

And so, I wouldn’t get too wild on the subject of median income. It isn’t like we’re all permanently in some status from nobody moving from status A to status B.

所以，我不会对中位收入这个话题过于激动。并不是说我们都永久处于某种状态，没有人从状态 A 移动到状态 B。

There’s a huge flux, both up and down. And what’s really important is that the pie keep growing at a decent clip.

有很大的波动，无论是上升还是下降。真正重要的是蛋糕要以一个不错的速度持续增长。

All that said, I think that Warren is right, that some of those tax changes were a little crazy. I mean, they caused more envy than we needed. But I don’t think it’s all that important.

尽管如此，我认为沃伦是对的，那些税收变化有些疯狂。我的意思是，它们引起了比我们需要的更多的嫉妒。但我认为这并不是那么重要。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We might think it was more important if we were working at the median income, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果我们是拿中位数收入工作的话，查理，我们可能会觉得这更重要。（笑声）

14. Munger: Ethanol is “stupid”

芒格：乙醇是“愚蠢的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to Number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第八个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Diane Ryan (PH) from Kansas City.

观众成员：早上好。我是来自堪萨斯城的黛安·瑞安（PH）。

My question is, what is your opinion on the economics of ethanol and as — just as a fuel additive?

我的问题是，您对乙醇作为燃料添加剂的经济学有何看法？

And, as a potential investor, should I be looking at that industry?

作为一个潜在的投资者，我是否应该关注那个行业？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know enough to answer the latter part. I know we don’t — Charlie and I would not know enough to evaluate ethanol projects.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对后半部分了解不够。我知道我们不——查理和我对评估乙醇项目了解不够。

We’ve been approached on them. And, of course, they’re quite popular now.

我们已经接触过它们了。当然，它们现在很受欢迎。

But in terms of figuring out what an ethanol plant is going to be earning on capital five or ten years from now, it’s far easier for us to figure out whether people will be drinking Coca-Cola, or even eating See’s Candy, which I highly recommend. (Laughter)

但要弄清楚一家乙醇工厂在五年或十年后将从资本中赚取多少，对我们来说，更容易弄清楚人们是否会喝可口可乐，甚至吃 See's 糖果，我强烈推荐。（笑声）

So, you know, it will depend on government policy. It will depend on a lot of variables that we’re not particularly good at predicting.

所以，你知道，这将取决于政府政策。这将取决于我们不太擅长预测的许多变量。

It’s easy to raise money for it now. I mean, it’s a popular item. You know, it’s hot.

现在很容易为它筹集资金。我的意思是，这是一个受欢迎的项目。你知道，它很火。

And our general experience is that we don’t look at things very much that are hot at any given time.

我们的普遍经验是，我们不会过多关注任何特定时间内热门的事物。

I know nothing about the — you know, the biochemistry or anything of the sort.

我对——你知道，生物化学或类似的东西一无所知。

I have a son who was a head of the ethanol board in Nebraska. And if I notice that he suddenly starts getting richer than I am, you know, I will suspect that I should start looking at ethanol very hard.

我有一个儿子，他曾是内布拉斯加州乙醇委员会的负责人。如果我发现他突然变得比我更富有，你知道，我会怀疑我应该开始认真研究乙醇。

But so far, I haven’t seen tangible evidence of that.

但到目前为止，我还没有看到具体的证据。

There’s no question ethanol usage is going to grow. I mean, that we will see.

毫无疑问，乙醇的使用将会增长。我的意思是，我们将会看到。

Generally speaking, ag processing — agriculture processing — businesses have not earned high returns on capital. I mean, if you look at Cargill, you look at ADM, you look at the big processers, that has not been a great business.

一般来说，农业加工业务的资本回报率并不高。我的意思是，如果你看看嘉吉、ADM 和其他大型加工企业，这并不是一个很好的业务。

Ethanol could prove an exception, but I’m not sure how you gain a significant competitive advantage over time, you know, with any given ethanol plant.

乙醇可能是个例外，但我不确定随着时间的推移，你知道，如何在任何特定的乙醇工厂中获得显著的竞争优势。

And if you get too many of them around, you know, it will not be a good thing when you’re turning out a commodity.

如果你周围有太多这样的东西，你知道，当你生产商品时，这将不是一件好事。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my attitude is even more hostile than Warren’s.

查理·芒格：嗯，我的态度比沃伦的更为敌对。

I have just enough glimmers of thermodynamics left in me to suspect that it takes more fossil fuel energy to create ethanol than you can get out of the ethanol you’ve created.

我对热力学的了解仅剩一点点，但足以让我怀疑，制造乙醇所需的化石燃料能量比从制造出的乙醇中获得的能量要多。

If so, that’s a very stupid way to try and solve an energy problem. (Applause)

如果是这样，那是一个非常愚蠢的解决能源问题的方法。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, considering my family situation, I would say I have friends who like ethanol, and I have friends who don’t like ethanol.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，考虑到我的家庭情况，我会说我有喜欢乙醇的朋友，也有不喜欢乙醇的朋友。

And I want my position to be perfectly clear: I’m for my friends. (Laughter)

我想明确表明我的立场：我支持我的朋友们。（笑声）

15. Watch out for speculative commodity bubbles

当心投机性商品泡沫

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来看第 9 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Johann Freudenberg (PH) from Hanover, Germany.

观众成员：你好。我的名字是约翰·弗洛伊登伯格（音），来自德国汉诺威。

Do you think we are in a commodity bubble? Thank you.

你认为我们处于商品泡沫中吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, certainly — not in agriculture commodities, they haven’t done anything, if you’re talking about wheat or corn or soybeans or something.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，当然——在农业商品方面，它们没有任何变化，如果你指的是小麦、玉米或大豆之类的东西。

But if you get into the metals, oil, there’s been a terrific move. The most extreme, probably, has been copper, I would say.

但是如果你进入金属、石油领域，已经有了极大的变动。我认为最极端的可能是铜。

Oil, if you go back a few years to when it was $10 a barrel — it’s been more extreme than copper — but you were undoubtedly — it’s like most trends. At the beginning, it’s driven by fundamentals, and at some point, speculation takes over.

如果你回到几年前，当时石油价格是每桶 10 美元——它比铜更极端——但毫无疑问——这就像大多数趋势一样。一开始是由基本面驱动的，而在某个时候，投机就会占据主导地位。

The very fact that — the fundamentals cause something that people looked at for years without getting excited about. Fundamentals change the picture in some way.

事实上，基本面导致人们多年来一直关注却没有感到兴奋的事物。基本面以某种方式改变了局面。

Copper does get a little short, you know, or people get a little worried about currency and, maybe, gold goes up or whatever it may be.

铜确实有点短缺，你知道的，或者人们对货币有点担心，也许黄金上涨了，或者其他什么情况。

But, you know, it’s that old story of what the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.

但是，你知道，这就是那个古老的故事：智者在开始时做的事情，愚者在最后才做。

And with any asset class that has a big move, that’s based initially on fundamentals, is going to attract speculative participation at some point, and that speculative participation can become dominant as time goes by.

任何基于基本面而大幅波动的资产类别，都会在某个时候吸引投机参与，而随着时间的推移，这种投机参与可能会变得占主导地位。

And, you know, famous case always being tulip bulbs. I mean, tulips may have been more attractive than dandelions or something, so people paid a little more money for them.

你知道，著名的例子总是郁金香球茎。我的意思是，郁金香可能比蒲公英或其他东西更有吸引力，所以人们为它们支付了更多的钱。

But once a price history develops that causes people to start looking at an asset that they never looked at before and to get envious of the fact that their neighbor made a lot of money without any apparent effort because he saw this early and so on, that takes over.

但是，一旦形成了一个价格历史，使人们开始关注他们以前从未关注过的资产，并对他们的邻居因为早早发现而在没有任何明显努力的情况下赚了很多钱感到羡慕，这种情况就会占据上风。

And my guess is that we’re seeing some of that in the commodity area. And, of course, I think we’ve seen some of it in the housing area, too.

我猜我们在商品领域看到了一些这样的情况。当然，我认为我们在住房领域也看到了其中的一些。

How far it goes, you never know. I mean, it just — some things go on to just unbelievable heights, and then, you know, silver went back and that was manipulation, to some extent, but it got up to $50 an ounce very briefly back in the early ’80s.

它能走多远，你永远不知道。我的意思是，有些事情会达到难以置信的高度，然后，你知道，白银回落了，那在某种程度上是操控，但在 80 年代初，它曾短暂地涨到每盎司 50 美元。

But the eyes of the world that never looked at silver when it was $1.60 or — or $1.30 back in the ’60s, you know, everybody in the world was looking at it. And some were shorting and some were buying, but it becomes a speculative football.

但是，当白银在 60 年代价格为 1.60 美元或 1.30 美元时，世界的目光从未关注过它，你知道，世界上的每个人都在关注它。有些人在做空，有些人在买入，但它变成了一个投机的足球。

And my guess is that an awful lot of the activity in something like copper now is speculative on both sides of the market.

我猜现在铜市场上的大量活动在市场的双方都是投机性的。

If — you know, if it goes to $5 a pound, who knows? But it — you are looking at a market that is responding more to speculative forces now than to fundamental forces, in my view.

如果——你知道，如果涨到每磅 5 美元，谁知道呢？但在我看来，你看到的市场现在更多地对投机力量作出反应，而不是对基本力量作出反应。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think we’ve demonstrated how little we know about commodity prices by our very skillful operations in silver.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我们通过在白银市场上非常巧妙的操作，已经展示了我们对商品价格知之甚少。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think you can change that from “our” to — it’s mine, actually.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为你可以把“我们的”改成——其实是“我的”。

I bought it very early. I sold it very early. Other than that, everything I did was perfect. (Laughter)

我买得很早。我卖得很早。除此之外，我做的一切都很完美。（笑声）

We managed to minimize things there with great efficiency, or I managed to. Charlie didn’t have anything to do with that. I was the silver king there for a while.

我们设法以极高的效率将事情最小化，或者说是我设法做到的。查理对此没有任何贡献。有一段时间，我是那里的银王。

We did make a few dollars on it. But we’re not good at the game of, when it gets into the speculative area, figuring out how far a speculative boom will go.

我们确实赚了几美元。但我们不擅长在进入投机领域时，判断投机热潮会持续多久。

If the fundamentals are attractive, we think we’re getting a lot for our money, buying equities or whatever it may be, we’ll make some money.

如果基本面具有吸引力，我们认为我们用钱买入股票或其他东西会得到很多，我们就会赚钱。

We will — we may not make as much money — remotely as much money — as somebody who is, you know, plays out the last 30 days or 30 weeks of a real wild orgy.

我们将——我们可能赚不到那么多钱——远远不如那些在最后 30 天或 30 周经历疯狂狂欢的人赚得多。

I mean, these things, they tend to be the wildest toward the end.

我的意思是，这些事情往往在接近尾声时最为疯狂。

But that gets back to the question, you know, of Cinderella at the ball. I mean, you know, you’re there. You’re having a wonderful time. The punch bowl is flowing and the dance partners are getting prettier all the time.

但这又回到了那个问题，你知道的，关于舞会上的灰姑娘。我的意思是，你知道，你在那里。你玩得很开心。酒碗里的饮料源源不断，舞伴也越来越漂亮。

And you know at midnight, it’s going to turn to pumpkins and mice.

你知道到了午夜，一切都会变成南瓜和老鼠。

And, you know, you look around the room and you think, “Just one more dance, one more good-looking guy,” you know, “one more glass of champagne.”

而且，你知道，你环顾房间，心想：“再跳一支舞，再找一个帅哥，”你知道，“再喝一杯香槟。”

And you think you’re going to get out of there at midnight, and, of course, everybody else thinks they’re going to get out of there at midnight, too. And in the end, it does turn to pumpkins and mice.

你以为你会在午夜离开那里，当然，其他人也都以为他们会在午夜离开那里。最后，事情真的变成了南瓜和老鼠。

And in this game, as I’ve said — you know, Adam Smith said it many years ago — a fellow named Jerry Goodman wrote under the pseudonym of Adam Smith — says the problem with that particular dance for Cinderella is that there are no clocks on the wall.

在这个游戏中，正如我所说的——你知道，亚当·斯密多年前说过——一个名叫杰里·古德曼的人以亚当·斯密的笔名写道——说灰姑娘的那个特定舞会的问题是墙上没有钟。

You know, and in the markets — if you’re talking copper now, if you’re talking Internet stocks in 1999, if you’re talking uranium stocks in the 1950s — there are no clocks on the wall.

你知道，在市场上——如果你现在谈论铜，如果你在 1999 年谈论互联网股票，如果你在 1950 年代谈论铀股票——墙上是没有钟的。

And the party does get to be more fun, you know, minute after minute, hour after hour, and then it does turn to pumpkins and mice.

而且聚会确实变得越来越有趣，你知道的，一分钟接一分钟，一小时接一小时，然后就变成了南瓜和老鼠。

16. “Brazil would not be off limits”

“巴西不会被排除在外”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10?

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Luisa Loredo (PH). I’m a student at University of Kansas, and I’m originally from Brasilia, Brazil.

观众成员：我的名字是路易莎·洛雷多（音）。我是堪萨斯大学的学生，我来自巴西利亚，巴西。

My question is for both Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.

我的问题是给巴菲特先生和芒格先生的。

The stock market in South America has been growing quickly in the last few years. What do you think about investment opportunities in South America, given the political environment and underlying risks?

南美洲的股市在过去几年中增长迅速。考虑到政治环境和潜在风险，您如何看待南美洲的投资机会？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We would — our problem in many markets is that we have to put a lot of money to work to move the needle at Berkshire. We’ve got a market value of 135 billion or something like that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在许多市场上的问题是，我们必须投入大量资金才能在伯克希尔取得显著进展。我们的市值大约是 1350 亿美元左右。

So we are looking to put out hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars at a minimum when we look at marketable securities. And that really narrows the field in terms of countries or in terms of businesses within those countries.

因此，当我们考虑有价证券时，我们至少要投入数亿甚至数十亿美元。这实际上缩小了国家或这些国家内企业的选择范围。

But, you know, we made an investment about three years ago in PetroChina. Now, PetroChina is one — probably one of the — well, it is one of the five largest oil companies in the world — and, yet, we were only able to — even there — to get 400 and some million dollars into it, which fortunately is worth a couple of billion now.

但是，你知道，我们大约三年前在中国石油公司进行了投资。现在，中国石油公司是——可能是——嗯，它是世界上五大石油公司之一——然而，我们只能——即使在那里——投入四亿多美元，幸运的是，现在价值几十亿。

But here it’s a country the size of China, largest company in that country, and even there we only got 400-and-some million dollars in, although we would have liked to have gotten more.

但这里是一个像中国这样大的国家，该国最大的公司，即使在那里我们也只获得了四亿多美元，尽管我们希望能获得更多。

But we weren’t afraid to go into China. We wanted to get paid more for going into China, and we did, because we don’t know the game as well there. We would feel the same way in Brazil.

但我们并不害怕进入中国。我们希望进入中国能获得更多报酬，而我们确实做到了，因为我们对那里的情况不太了解。在巴西我们也会有同样的感觉。

I mean, we — a great beer company down there that a friend of mine ran, and, you know, we should have been in that. We knew he was a great manager, and he was going to do a great job with it.

我的意思是，我们——我一个朋友经营的那家很棒的啤酒公司，我们本该参与其中。我们知道他是个出色的经理，他会把事情做得很好。

So, Brazil would not be off limits at all, but we’d have to be able to get a lot of money into a business we understood at an attractive price.

所以，巴西完全不会被排除在外，但我们必须能够以有吸引力的价格将大量资金投入到我们了解的业务中。

We would want it to be cheaper than if it were in the United States. We wouldn’t understand the tax laws as well, the nuances of governance, a whole bunch of things. But after allowing for that, at a price, we would do it.

我们希望它比在美国更便宜。我们可能不太了解税法、治理的细微差别以及其他一大堆事情。但在考虑到这些因素后，只要价格合适，我们会去做。

We’re unlikely to put a lot of money into — Brazil is a big country, but we’re unlikely to put a lot of money into really small economies because we can’t get enough money into them. Charlie?

我们不太可能投入大量资金——巴西是一个大国，但我们不太可能将大量资金投入到非常小的经济体中，因为我们无法向其中投入足够的资金。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No more. 查理·芒格：我没有更多要补充的。

17. Outlook for Clayton and manufactured homes

克莱顿和预制房屋的前景

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11?

沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jeff Bingham (PH). I’m from Chicago, Illinois.

观众成员：我的名字是杰夫·宾厄姆（PH）。我来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。

I have a question regarding the manufactured housing industry. What is your outlook on demand for the industry? And, correspondingly, in your opinion, will lending increase in a meaningful way over the next few years?

我有一个关于预制房屋行业的问题。您对该行业的需求前景如何？相应地，您认为在未来几年内贷款会以有意义的方式增加吗？

And are the homes priced attractively relative to competitive products, like stick-built housing and apartments, in the face of continued site rent increases at the community level and, in some cases, lenders requiring shorter maturities on mortgages?

在社区层面持续的场地租金上涨以及在某些情况下贷款机构要求缩短抵押贷款期限的情况下，与竞争产品如传统建造的房屋和公寓相比，这些房屋的定价是否具有吸引力？

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been kind of an interesting history on manufactured housing. If you go back — you have to go back 30 or 40 years — 40 years, I think, almost, to have — find volume as low as it’s been in the last couple of years. And the houses are better than — by far better — than they were then.

沃伦·巴菲特：预制房屋的发展历史相当有趣。如果你回溯——你必须回溯 30 或 40 年——我想是 40 年，才能找到像过去几年那样低的销量。而且现在的房屋比那时的要好得多。

There have been years when 20 percent of the housing — the new housing product in the United States — was manufactured housing. One out of every five.

曾经有些年份，美国的新住房产品中有 20%是工厂制造的住房。每五个中就有一个。

Last year, leaving out FEMA demand, you know, we were bumping along for the third year, I believe, just a tiny bit over the 130,000 level, you know, which is like 6 or 7 percent — probably 7 percent — of new housing starts.

去年，撇开联邦紧急事务管理署的需求，你知道，我们已经是第三年徘徊在略高于 13 万的水平，我相信，大约是 6%或 7%——可能是 7%——的新住房开工。

So, the percentage of the total new housing stock that has been manufactured housing in recent years has really been very low, while the houses are better — considerably better — quality than in the earlier years.

因此，近年来新建住房总量中属于预制房屋的比例实际上非常低，而这些房屋的质量比早些年要好得多。

You can look at the house. We’ve got two houses out there on the exhibition floor, around $45 a square foot. You know, that’s good value.

你可以看看房子。我们在展览区有两栋房子，大约每平方英尺 45 美元。你知道，这很划算。

There’s a lot of resistance, through local zoning laws and that sort of thing by the local builders, to the influx of manufactured housing. We’ve made progress on that in some areas. We’re actually developing subdivisions in that business.

当地建筑商通过地方分区法和类似的规定，对预制房屋的涌入有很大的抵制。在某些地区，我们在这方面取得了进展。我们实际上正在该业务中开发分区。

The houses were mis-sold four or five years ago in huge quantity because you had manufactured housing retailers selling the properties, getting any kind of a down payment, taking the loans — selling to people that shouldn’t be buying them — taking the loans, securitizing them, so somebody in some insurance company someplace lost significant sums of money.

这些房屋在四五年前被大量错误销售，因为你有预制房屋的零售商在出售这些房产，接受任何形式的首付款，发放贷款——卖给不应该购买的人——发放贷款，将其证券化，所以某个地方的某家保险公司损失了大量资金。

So you had, really, an abuse of credit in the field. And there’s a hangover from that, and it’s taken a long time for that hangover to work its way through.

所以，实际上，在这个领域存在信用滥用的问题。这种滥用的后遗症仍然存在，并且需要很长时间才能消除。

I think Clayton Homes, which we own, has done a terrific job in both the financing — they should be financed on shorter terms, incidentally.

我认为我们拥有的 Clayton Homes 在融资方面做得非常出色——顺便说一下，他们应该在较短的期限内融资。

I’m — if you put them on owned land, that’s one thing, but financing them for 30 years, in my view, was a mistake.

如果你把它们放在自有土地上，那是一回事，但在我看来，为它们融资 30 年是一个错误。

But the terms got very lax for a while, and, you know, we’re bearing the consequences of that now.

但是这些条款有一段时间变得非常宽松，你知道，我们现在正在承受其后果。

But I think the market will get bigger, but I do not think it will get bigger this year. I see a year that, counting some FEMA demand and some hurricane-induced demand, maybe 150,000 units, 145,000 units. And by industry standards, that’s down a lot.

但我认为市场会变大，但我不认为今年会变大。我预计今年的需求，包括一些 FEMA 需求和一些飓风引发的需求，可能是 15 万套，14.5 万套。按照行业标准来看，这已经下降了很多。

Now, the number of plants is down a lot and the number of retailers are down a lot.

现在，工厂的数量大幅减少，零售商的数量也大幅减少。

Clayton’s position is very strong. And their record is so much better than anybody in the industry that you have to look very hard to find number two.

克莱顿的地位非常强大。他们的业绩比业内任何人都要好得多，以至于你必须非常努力才能找到第二名。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You asked about stick-built housing and how competitive it was. That’s been one of the troubles of the manufactured housing game is that the stick-built housing has gotten so efficient.

查理·芒格：是的。你问到传统木结构房屋的竞争力。这一直是预制房屋行业的一个问题，因为传统木结构房屋变得非常高效。

But there the system is aided greatly by Berkshire’s subsidiary MiTek. So — and stick-built housing is amazingly efficient when it’s done in big quantity with systems like MiTek provides.

但是，伯克希尔的子公司 MiTek 极大地帮助了该系统。因此，当使用像 MiTek 提供的系统进行大规模建造时，传统木结构房屋的效率是惊人的。

And if it weren’t for that, there would be a lot more manufactured housing.

如果不是因为那样，预制房屋会更多。

Personally, I think manufactured housing is going to get a lot better and take a lot more of the market. It may take a considerable period, but that is so logical that I think it will eventually happen.

就我个人而言，我认为预制房屋将会变得更好，并占据更多的市场份额。这可能需要相当长的时间，但这是如此合乎逻辑，我认为最终会发生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Somewhere down the road, you would expect 200,000-plus units for the industry. But I don’t think you’ll see it in the next year or two.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在未来的某个时候，你会期望这个行业达到 20 万以上的单位。但我认为你不会在一两年内看到这种情况。

The industry has to think through — and they have, they’ve made a lot of progress on this — but they have to think through what’s the logical way of financing these things, and what’s the way to make sure that the person who buys it really has an asset that’s in excess of their loan value five and ten years down the road.

这个行业必须仔细考虑——他们已经在这方面取得了很大进展——但他们必须考虑如何以合理的方式为这些事情融资，以及如何确保购买者在五年和十年后拥有的资产价值超过他们的贷款价值。

And, really, very little consideration was given to that five years ago. It was just a question of put together the papers, sell it on Wall Street, and let somebody else worry about it later on.

而实际上，五年前对此几乎没有给予多少考虑。那时只是把文件整理好，在华尔街出售，然后让其他人以后再去操心。

Clayton did a way better job than other companies in that respect, but those were the industry conditions that existed then.

克莱顿在这方面做得比其他公司好得多，但那时的行业条件就是如此。

But I think Clayton will be — Clayton could easily be — the largest homebuilder in the United States in future years because we will be a big part of an industry that, as Charlie says, should be doing more volume.

但我认为克莱顿将会——克莱顿很可能会——在未来几年成为美国最大的住宅建筑商，因为我们将成为一个行业的重要组成部分，正如查理所说，这个行业应该有更大的产量。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I also think that some of the sin that was in the manufactured housing finance a few years ago has shifted into the finance of the stick-built houses.

查理·芒格：我也认为，几年前存在于预制房屋金融中的一些罪恶已经转移到了传统建造房屋的金融中。

There is a lot of ridiculous credit being extended in America in the housing field. And it had a horrible aftermath in the manufactured housing sector, and my guess is there will be some trouble in the stick-built sector in due course.

在美国，住房领域有很多荒谬的信贷被延长。这在预制房屋行业产生了可怕的后果，我猜测在适当的时候，传统建筑房屋行业也会出现一些问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, dumb lending always has its consequences and usually on a big scale, but you don’t see it for quite a while. So, therefore, it’s like a disease that doesn’t manifest itself for, you know, a few weeks.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，愚蠢的借贷总是会产生后果，而且通常是大规模的，但你不会马上看到。因此，这就像一种几周内不会显现的疾病。

And you can have an epidemic of something like that, and by the time you know you have an epidemic, you’re very well into it. Well, that’s what happens in dumb financing.

你可能会遇到类似的流行病，而等到你意识到有流行病时，已经深陷其中了。这就是愚蠢融资中发生的情况。

And you had that — you periodically — you certainly had it in commercial financing in the ’80s, and you had the RTC and the savings and loan crisis and all of that because, literally, one dumb project was put up after another.

你有过那种情况——你时不时地——你在 80 年代的商业融资中肯定经历过这种情况，你有过 RTC 和储蓄贷款危机，所有这些都是因为一个又一个愚蠢的项目被提出来。

A developer will develop anything he can borrow the money against. It’s that simple. And when the lending institutions pour the money out for something, it will get built.

开发商会开发任何他能借到钱的东西。就是这么简单。当贷款机构为某个项目提供资金时，它就会被建造。

And that happened in manufacturing housing. It happened in commercial real estate in the ’80s. I think it’s happened in conventional housing here in recent years.

这发生在预制住房中。它发生在 80 年代的商业房地产中。我认为近年来也发生在传统住房中。

And if you look at the 10-Qs that are getting filed for the first quarter of some lending institutions, and 10-Ks that were last year, and you look at the balances increasing on loans for interest that’s accrued but was not paid because people had adjustable mortgages, but they’re only adjustable so far, but the lending institutions are taking in the income as if it were paid, you’ll see some very interesting statistics.

如果你查看一些贷款机构第一季度提交的 10-Q 报告，以及去年的 10-K 报告，并查看因人们拥有可调利率抵押贷款而未支付的应计利息贷款余额增加的情况，但这些利率只是有限度的可调，而贷款机构却将这些收入视为已支付，你会看到一些非常有趣的统计数据。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. And some of this dumb lending is being facilitated by contemptible accounting. The accounting profession has not stopped compromising its way into terrible behavior.

查理·芒格：是的。其中一些愚蠢的借贷行为是由可鄙的会计手段促成的。会计行业一直在妥协，导致了糟糕的行为。

WARREN BUFFETT: Our auditing bill just went up.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们的审计费用刚刚上涨。

18. No interest in investing in Russia

对投资俄罗斯没有兴趣

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第十二个？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Elliott Samuels (PH). I’m from New York City.

观众成员：我的名字是埃利奥特·塞缪尔斯（音）。我来自纽约市。

Thanks to high energy prices and other factors, Russia has been one of the best performing markets recently. The country’s financial condition has stabilized since the 1990s.

由于高能源价格和其他因素，俄罗斯最近成为表现最好的市场之一。自 1990 年代以来，该国的财政状况已趋于稳定。

A fledging middle class is taking shape as personal incomes grow. And there are also risks — political, legal — risks to minority investors.

随着个人收入的增长，一个新兴的中产阶级正在形成。同时也存在风险——政治、法律——对少数投资者的风险。

But there are also potentially great values among second tier companies there.

但在那里的二线公司中也可能存在巨大的价值。

I was wondering, what needs to happen in Russia for you to invest there, whether for Berkshire or for yourself, and what kind of companies would interest you there?

我想知道，在俄罗斯需要发生什么事情才能让你在那里投资，无论是为伯克希尔还是为你自己，并且在那里什么样的公司会引起你的兴趣？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sounds like you may own a few Russian stocks yourself. The — I would — as you know, in 1998, Walter Wriston said sovereign governments don’t default.

沃伦·巴菲特：听起来你自己可能也持有一些俄罗斯股票。正如你所知，1998 年，沃尔特·里斯顿说主权政府不会违约。

In 1998, in Russia, at least, he was proven wrong. And Charlie and I were — inherited a business at Salomon that was in the oil business big time-out in the — in Siberia.

1998 年，至少在俄罗斯，他被证明是错的。查理和我在所罗门继承了一项业务，这项业务在西伯利亚的石油行业中占有重要地位。

And there came a time when — we got to dig the holes. We sent the money in. And as long as we were drilling, we were welcome. And then when we wanted to start taking the oil out, after our money had been used to drill the holes, they weren’t quite as friendly. In fact, it was really kind of extreme what took place with us.

然后到了一个时候——我们得挖洞。我们把钱寄了过去。只要我们在钻井，我们就受到欢迎。然后当我们想开始抽取石油时，在我们用钱钻完洞之后，他们就不那么友好了。事实上，发生在我们身上的事情真的有点极端。

So, having had a few experiences like that, it might take us quite a while before we wanted to sink a lot of money into Russia. It may be different now, but I don’t think it’s any certainty.

所以，有过几次这样的经历后，我们可能需要相当长的时间才会想在俄罗斯投入大量资金。现在可能有所不同，但我不认为这是确定的。

I had breakfast in Sun Valley three years ago this July, I believe it was, with [Mikhail] Khodorkovsky, and we had a translator there. And he talked to me about whether — he was thinking about listing Yukos on the New York Stock Exchange, but he said, you know, it would require registering with the SEC or something, and he wasn’t sure whether that would be too dangerous.

三年前的七月，我在太阳谷吃早餐，我记得是和[米哈伊尔]·霍多尔科夫斯基一起，我们有一个翻译。他和我谈论了是否——他在考虑将尤科斯在纽约证券交易所上市，但他说，你知道，这需要在美国证券交易委员会注册之类的，他不确定这是否会太危险。

Well, I don’t think he listed it there, but he went back to Russia, and he’s been in jail now for — well, just about ever since.

好吧，我认为他没有在那里上市，但他回到俄罗斯后，就被监禁了，差不多从那以后就一直在监狱里。

And Yukos was put into bankruptcy with tax claims, and, you know, it — I don’t — I just think it’s a little hard to develop a lot of confidence that the world has changed permanently there in terms of its attitude toward capital, and particularly toward outside capital.

尤科斯因税务索赔而破产，你知道，我——我只是觉得很难对那里的世界在资本态度上，特别是对外来资本的态度发生永久性变化产生很大的信心。

Charlie, what are your thoughts?

查理，你有什么想法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The situation reminds me a little of POLY Petroleum, which, years ago, was much traded in Los Angeles.

查理·芒格：是的。这种情况让我想起了多年前在洛杉矶被大量交易的 POLY 石油公司。

The saying always was, “If they ever do find any oil, that old man will steal it.” And I’m afraid we have some of that problem in many of the countries in which we’re seeking for oil.

俗话说：“如果他们真的找到石油，那老头会偷走它。” 恐怕我们在许多寻求石油的国家中都有这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Didn’t we really have the livelihood of our guys threatened over there, Charlie?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我们那边的人们的生计不是确实受到了威胁吗？

I think we sent in some people to get out the equipment, and they said if we sent in the people to get out the equipment, not only would the equipment not get out, but the people wouldn’t get out.

我想我们派了一些人去取出设备，他们说如果我们派人去取出设备，不仅设备出不来，人也出不来。

So we understood the situation. That was not that long ago.

所以我们了解了情况。那是没多久之前的事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

19. Hottest real estate markets are cooling off

最热门的房地产市场正在降温

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1 again.

沃伦·巴菲特：再次是第1个问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Lori Gold (PH) from San Francisco, California.

观众成员：我是来自加利福尼亚州旧金山的洛里·戈尔德（PH）。

My question is, what are your thoughts about the residential real estate market in the U.S., where it’s headed? And how is California different, if so?

我的问题是，您对美国住宅房地产市场的看法是什么，它的发展方向如何？如果有区别，加州有什么不同？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie is our California expert. We’ve managed one time to develop a great piece of property in California. We spent about 20 years or so developing it, Charlie, or —

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理是我们的加州专家。我们曾经在加州开发了一块很棒的地产。我们花了大约 20 年左右的时间来开发它，查理，或者——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. And we got our money back with interest.

查理·芒格：是的。我们连本带息收回了资金。

WARREN BUFFETT: Barely. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：勉强。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Barely, yeah.

查理·芒格：勉强，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We finished it at just the wrong time. We — the land value that we nurtured — that was a terrific piece of land. Charlie lives there. And I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say we spent 20 years —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在错误的时间完成了它。我们——我们培育的土地价值——那是一块极好的土地。查理住在那里。我认为说我们花了 20 年时间并不夸张——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: — working on developing the land. And the land value, which, in effect, we cashed out for, what, 5 or $6 million, now would have an — the implicit land value — would be what?

沃伦·巴菲特：——来开发这片土地。而这片土地的价值，我们最后兑现时是5或600万美元，而现在的隐含土地价值又是多少？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Maybe a hundred million dollars.

查理·芒格：也许一亿美元。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But we finished it at the wrong time.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但我们在错误的时间完成了它。

So, you know, it’s a wonderful — the climate is wonderful. Everything is wonderful about this property.

所以，你知道，气候很棒。关于这个物业的一切都很棒。

It’s just that, from time to time, even in great localities — you’ve seen it happen in New York a couple of times, you know, in the last 30 years, where the swing in property values has just been huge.

只是有时候，即使在很好的地区——你知道，在过去的 30 年里，你在纽约也见过几次，房产价值的波动非常大。

And what we see in our residential brokerage business — and we’re in, I don’t know how many different states — is we see a slowdown every place.

在我们的住宅经纪业务中——我们在很多不同的州——我们看到每个地方都在放缓。

Now, we see it most dramatically in some of the — what have been the hottest markets.

现在，我们在一些曾经是最热门市场的地方最为明显地看到了这一点。

In the markets where you’re going to — in my view — you’re likely to see the greatest fall-off and where you’ve had the biggest bubble are the ones — they tend to be the high-end market, and they tend to be ones where people have bought for investment or speculation, rather than use.

在我看来，你要去的市场中，最有可能出现最大跌幅的地方，以及你经历过最大泡沫的地方，往往是高端市场，并且往往是那些人们为了投资或投机而购买的市场，而不是为了使用。

People will pay $300,000 for a house and mortgage it for 270,000, and if the value goes to 250, if they have a job and everything, they won’t move out.

人们会花 30 万美元买一栋房子，并为其抵押 27 万美元，如果房子的价值降到 25 万，只要他们有工作和一切，他们就不会搬出去。

I mean, you don’t lose a lot of money even though the market value on a given day is less than the loan value when families stay together and employment is present and all that.

我的意思是，即使在某一天的市场价值低于贷款价值时，只要家庭团结在一起并且有就业机会，你也不会损失很多钱。

But when you have investment-type holdings, speculation-type holdings, when you, in effect, have had the day traders, you know, of the Internet move into the day trading of condos, then you — then you get — then you get a market that can move in a big way.

但是，当你拥有投资型持有、投机型持有时，当你实际上有日间交易者，比如互联网的日间交易者转向公寓的日间交易时，那么你就会得到一个可以大幅波动的市场。

First it sort of stops, and then it kind of reopens. Real estate is different than stocks. If you own a hundred shares of General Motors, it’s going to trade on Monday and that’s what it’s worth and you can’t kid yourself about it.

首先，它会有点停滞，然后又会有点重新开放。房地产与股票不同。如果你拥有一百股通用汽车的股票，它将在周一交易，那就是它的价值，你不能自欺欺人。

But if you own real estate, you know, there’s a great tendency to think about the one that sold down the street a few months ago. And there’s a great tendency to think, you know, you only need one buyer who hasn’t gotten the word that things have slowed down and you’ll make your sale.

但是，如果你拥有房地产，你知道，人们很容易去想几个月前街上卖掉的那一套。人们也很容易去想，你只需要一个还不知道市场已经放缓的买家，你就能完成交易。

I can tell you that in Dade and Broward County, for example, in Florida, where the average condo is about 500,000, if you go back to December of 2004, there were less than 9,000 condos listed for sale, and I think 2,900 of them sold in the month so you were — turnover one every three months, less than that.

我可以告诉你，例如在佛罗里达的戴德县和布劳沃德县，平均公寓价格约为 50 万美元，如果你回到 2004 年 12 月，当时挂牌出售的公寓不到 9,000 套，我认为当月售出了 2,900 套，所以你每三个月就能周转一套，甚至不到三个月。

Now, the listings are up to 30,000, and the sales are down to under 2,000 a month. Well, 30,000 is $15 billion worth of properties. And you are — very likely, you can get real discontinuities in a market like that, where all of a sudden people realize that the whole supply-demand situation has changed.

现在，房源数量增加到 30,000 个，而销售量下降到每月不到 2,000 个。那么，30,000 个房源价值 150 亿美元。而且在这样的市场中，你很可能会遇到真正的断层，突然之间人们意识到整个供需情况已经发生了变化。

So I think we’ve had a bubble, to some degree, and it’s very hard to measure that degree until after it’s all over.

所以我认为我们在某种程度上经历了一个泡沫，而在一切结束之前，很难衡量这种程度。

But I would be surprised if there aren’t some significant downward adjustments from the peak, particularly in the higher-end properties.

但如果高端物业的价格没有从峰值出现一些显著的下调，我会感到惊讶。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The man is right that the bubbles came in Manhattan and in certain places in California. In Omaha, housing prices are quite reasonable. So it’s — the country is not all the same, at all.

查理·芒格：是的。这个人说得对，泡沫出现在曼哈顿和加州的某些地方。在奥马哈，房价相当合理。所以，这个国家并不完全一样。

20. Attendance estimate and Furniture Mart sales

出席人数估计和家具市场销售

WARREN BUFFETT: We just got an estimate of the attendance at 24,000, which was about what it looked like from the tickets we had gotten. I thank you all for coming, on that note. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们刚刚得到了 24,000 人的出席估计，这与我们收到的门票数量大致相符。感谢大家的到来，就此致谢。（掌声）

Even better, the Furniture Mart, which had sales in 1997 of 5-and-a-fraction million, 2003 sales of 17 million, sales last year of 27 million, is up so far 2 1/2 million, with the best yet to come.

更好的是，家具商场在 1997 年的销售额为 500 多万，2003 年的销售额为 1700 万，去年的销售额为 2700 万，到目前为止增长了 250 万，最好的还在后头。

So we’re — I would say we’re likely to do over 30 million at the Furniture Mart. And that, incidentally, is about equal to a normal monthly volume for the store. So you’re doing your part. Thank you. (Applause)

所以我会说我们很可能在家具市场做到超过三千万。而这，顺便说一下，大约相当于商店正常的月销售量。所以你们在尽自己的一份力。谢谢。（掌声）

21. Don’t like excess cash, but we hate dumb deals

不喜欢过多的现金，但我们讨厌愚蠢的交易

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2?

沃伦·巴菲特：第二名？

But you can do more. (Laughter)

但你可以做得更多。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is John Norwood (PH) from Des Moines, Iowa.

观众成员：早上好。我叫约翰·诺伍德（音），来自爱荷华州得梅因。

I have a two-year rule for my closet. If I don’t wear a particular pair of pants or a shirt within two years, I give it away to Goodwill so that someone else can put it to better use.

我对我的衣橱有一个两年的规则。如果我在两年内没有穿过某条裤子或衬衫，我就会把它送给好意（Goodwill），让别人能更好地利用它。

With 40 billion in cash, I’m wondering whether Berkshire Hathaway should have a similar closet rule for deployment of surplus shareholder cash.

拥有 400 亿美元现金，我在想伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司是否应该对多余的股东现金的使用制定类似的“壁橱规则”。

WARREN BUFFETT: It won’t go to Goodwill, I promise you that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我向你保证，它不会去Goodwill。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. And wouldn’t it be better if you had a smaller budget and fewer gifts you needed to — you and Charlie needed to shop for? Wouldn’t you have more time for the beach and a better chance of hitting some home runs?

观众成员：谢谢你。你不觉得如果你们有一个更小的预算和更少的礼物需要——你和查理需要购物——那你们会有更多的时间去海滩，也有更大的机会击中一些本垒打吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t think we’ll hit any home runs, under any circumstances. But the — you might consider a normal level of cash at Berkshire as being about 10 billion, although we — you know, there could be circumstances where we’d go below that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为在任何情况下我们都不会打出全垒打。但是——你可以认为伯克希尔的正常现金水平大约是 100 亿，尽管我们——你知道，可能会有一些情况让我们低于这个水平。

But because of the catastrophe insurance business we’re in and all of that, we do not — you know, we do not scrape the bottom of the barrel, but we don’t need anything like 40 billion.

但是由于我们涉及的灾难保险业务等等，我们并不——你知道，我们不会刮底，但我们不需要像400亿美元那样多。

I think you’ll see in the 10-Q that we have — I think it was about 37 billion at the end of March — double check that — and I’m not counting the cash and the finance business — yeah, 37-something — and we’re spending 4 billion on ISCAR.

我认为你会在10-Q中看到——我想那时在3月底大约有370亿美元——再确认一下——我没有计算现金和融资业务——是的，370多亿美元——而我们在ISCAR上正在花掉40亿美元。

We’ve spent — we’re spending some money on some other things as well.

我们已经花了一些钱在其他事情上。

But we would be happier — much happier — if we had 10 billion of cash and all the balance in things that we liked very much.

但是，如果我们有 100 亿现金，并且所有余额都在我们非常喜欢的东西上，我们会更快乐——非常快乐。

And we work toward that end at all times. But there is nothing even about the way businesses come to us.

我们始终为此目标而努力。但企业与我们接触的方式并不均衡。

We’ve got one idea at present, low probability, but that would take — could take — as much as 15 billion or close to 15 billion of cash. And whether it comes to fruition or not, who knows, but we do work on them.

我们目前有一个想法，可能性很低，但这可能需要——可能需要——多达 150 亿或接近 150 亿的现金。至于是否会实现，谁也不知道，但我们确实在研究这些想法。

And, what we care more — we don’t like having excess cash around. We like even less doing dumb deals because we do them forever.

而且，我们更关心的是——我们不喜欢有多余的现金。我们更不喜欢做愚蠢的交易，因为我们会永远做下去。

I mean, if we make a dumb deal, it just sits there. We don’t resell it three months later by having an IPO of it or something of the sort.

我的意思是，如果我们做了一个愚蠢的交易，它就会停在那里。我们不会在三个月后通过首次公开募股或类似的方式转售它。

So you’re right to say that we should be very uncomfortable about the fact that we’ve got the cash. But it’s also important that we not be so uncomfortable that we go out and do something just to be doing something.

所以你说我们应该对拥有这笔现金感到非常不安是对的。但同样重要的是，我们不应该因为不安而随便去做一些事情。

I would say it’s likely, but far from certain, that three years from now we have significantly less cash and, I hope, significantly more earning power. But the goal of that cash is to be translated into permanent earning power over time.

我会说，三年后我们现金显著减少的可能性很大，但还远未确定，我希望我们的盈利能力显著提高。但这些现金的目标是随着时间的推移转化为永久的盈利能力。

Like I say, with the 4 billion that we’ve just committed on ISCAR, you know, we love having that 4 billion employed there instead of sitting around in short-term securities.

就像我说的，对于我们刚刚在 ISCAR 投入的 40 亿美元，你知道，我们喜欢将这 40 亿美元用于那里，而不是闲置在短期证券中。

And that’s our job. Charlie and I don’t do anything else, except appear in movies and that sort of thing.

这就是我们的工作。查理和我不做其他事情，除了出演电影之类的事情。

But the — you know, you’re right to keep jabbing us on that because — but we jab ourselves. You know, we — neither one of us is — basically likes cash.

但是——你知道，你说得对，继续刺激我们是有意义的——但是我们也在刺激自己。你知道，我们——我们两个人基本上都不喜欢现金。

We always want to have adequate cash and we always will have adequate cash. And we are the biggest player in the world in cat insurance, and people come to us because they know we’re going to run a place that’s very strong financially. But it doesn’t have to be as liquid as we are now.

我们总是希望拥有充足的现金，并且我们将始终拥有充足的现金。我们是全球最大的灾难保险公司，人们选择我们是因为他们知道我们会经营一个财务非常稳健的公司。但它不必像我们现在这样强的流动性。

We spent 5 billion — well, we didn’t spend that much. At the Berkshire level, we spent about 3 1/2 billion on PacifiCorp.

我们花了 50 亿——其实我们没花那么多。在伯克希尔层面，我们在 PacifiCorp 上花了大约 35 亿。

You know, we contracted (inaudible) earlier, but we will get more chances, I think, in that field, but you never can tell when they’ll come.

你知道，我们之前签了（听不清），但我认为我们会在那个领域获得更多机会，不过你永远无法预测它们何时会到来。

So come back next year, and I hope we have less cash.

所以明年再来，我希望我们有更少的现金。

OK. We’ll go to 13 now.

好的。我们现在去 13。

OK. Charlie, would you like to add anything on that?

好的。查理，你想补充些什么吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think you may get some perspective on what bothers you if you go back to the annual report of Berkshire ten years ago and then compare that report with the last one.

查理·芒格：是的。我认为，如果你回顾一下十年前伯克希尔的年度报告，然后将其与最近的一份报告进行比较，你可能会对困扰你的事情有一些看法。

Despite the great difficulties of deploying cash, we managed to put an awful lot of wonderful stuff into Berkshire in the last ten years. So, we aren’t altogether gloomy about that process continuing. (Applause)

尽管在部署现金方面存在巨大困难，但在过去十年中，我们设法将大量美好的东西投入到伯克希尔。因此，我们对这一过程的持续并不完全感到悲观。（掌声）

22. Should have sold Coca-Cola at “silly” price

本应以“荒唐”的价格出售可口可乐

WARREN BUFFETT: I neglected to go to the adjacent room, which has a number of people in it as well. So I’m going to go to No. 13 now, which will come from the ballroom.

沃伦·巴菲特：我忽略了去隔壁的房间，那里也有一些人。所以我现在要去 13 号房间，那是从宴会厅来的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is Phil McCaw (PH) from Connecticut.

观众成员：这是来自康涅狄格州的菲尔·麦考（PH）。

I wonder — it’s been some time since you’ve commented on Coca-Cola. And now that you’re off the board, I wonder if you feel free to comment on it?

我想知道——你已经有一段时间没有评论可口可乐了。现在你已经不在董事会了，我想知道你是否觉得可以自由地评论它？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I won’t make particularly different comments than from when I was on the board.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我不会发表与我在董事会时特别不同的评论。

But Coca-Cola is a fabulous company. Coca-Cola will sell over 21 billion cases of various products — more Coke than anything else — around the world this year, and it goes up every year.

但可口可乐是一家了不起的公司。今年，可口可乐将在全球销售超过 210 亿箱各种产品，其中可乐的销量最多，而且每年都在增长。

It’s interesting. The stock in, what, 1997 or ’98, whenever it was, sold over $80 a share when the earnings were — I don’t remember whether they were $1.50 a share, or something like that — and the earnings then were not as good quality as the earnings are now when, you know, they were $2.17 or something like that.

有趣的是，股票在1997年或1998年，反正是那个时候，曾以每股超过80美元的价格出售，当时的收益——我不记得是每股1.50美元，还是其他什么——而当时的收益质量不如现在好，现今收益大约是每股2.17美元。

And every year the — you know, they have — they account for a little greater share of the liquids consumed by people in the world.

而且每年，他们——你知道，他们的市场份额在不断增加，消费液体的比例也在上升。

They make fabulous returns on invested capital. You know, it’s a business that has — exclude the bottling part of it — has 5 or 6 billion of tangible assets and makes a similar amount.

他们在投资资本上获得了极好的回报。你知道，这是一项业务——不包括装瓶部分——拥有 50 到 60 亿的有形资产，并赚取了相似的金额。

So, there are not lots of big businesses in the world that earn 100 percent pretax on tangible assets.

所以，世界上没有很多大企业在有形资产上获得 100%的税前收益。

And it will be a great business, and it’s been a great business.

这将是一个伟大的生意，而且一直是一个伟大的生意。

The stock got to what, in retrospect, clearly was a ridiculous level, but you can’t hold the present management, Neville Isdell, responsible for that.

这只股票达到了一个事后看来显然是荒谬的水平，但你不能因此责怪现任管理层内维尔·伊斯德尔。

And he — you know, if the company sells 4 or 5 percent more units this year than last year, and the population of the world goes up 2 percent, it just means that more people are putting that particular source of liquid down their throats than the year before, and that’s been going on ever since 1886.

你知道，如果公司今年的单位销售量比去年多4%或5%，而全球人口增长了2%，这仅仅意味着更多的人比去年喝下了这种液体，而这种趋势自1886年以来就一直在持续。

So it strikes us as a really wonderful business that sold at a very silly price some years back.

所以在我们看来，这是一家非常出色的公司，几年前以一个非常愚蠢的价格出售。

And you can definitely fault me for not selling the stock. I always thought it was a wonderful business, but clearly, at 50 times earnings, it was a silly price on the stock.

你当然可以责怪我没有卖掉股票。我一直认为这是一家很棒的公司，但显然，以 50 倍的市盈率来看，这个股票价格是荒谬的。

So we like it. We’ll own it ten years from now, in my view. Charlie?

所以我们喜欢它。在我看来，十年后我们还会拥有它。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No more. 查理·芒格：没有更多。

WARREN BUFFETT: This peanut brittle gets caught occasionally, but it’s worth it. It’s worth it, definitely.

沃伦·巴菲特：这花生脆糖偶尔会卡住，但它是值得的。绝对值得。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Why don’t you share with me?

查理·芒格：你为什么不和我分享？

WARREN BUFFETT: What? Oh, you want some, huh? Get your own box next time. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：什么？哦，你也想要一些，是吗？下次自己买一盒吧。（笑声）

23. Reinsurance rate variations

再保险费率变动

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, do you want us to go to 14 or not? Yes. OK. Number 14.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，你想让我们去 14 号吗？是的。好的。14 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is John Gosh (PH) from Key West.

观众成员：我叫约翰·戈什（音），来自基韦斯特。

Have insurance rates hardened as much as you anticipated, and have you seen a significant flight to quality in the last few years?

保险费率是否像你们预期的那样坚挺？你们在过去几年中是否看到了对质量的明显追求？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think you’re probably asking more about reinsurance rates.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想你可能更多地在问再保险费率。

Actually, in auto insurance, you can figure it out. Our policies are up more than our premium volume. So the average premium in auto insurance, which, after all, is close to 40 percent of the whole market for insurance — the average premium in auto insurance is actually down a little bit.

实际上，在汽车保险方面，你可以算出我们的保单数量超过了我们的保费收入。因此，汽车保险的平均保费——毕竟，汽车保险市场占整个保险市场的近40%——汽车保险的平均保费实际上稍微下降了一点。

财产与伤害保险（Property and Casualty Insurance）在美国总的市场规模是8000-9000亿美元，汽车保险是最大的险种，占到40%，其次是房屋保险。

But in reinsurance, in which we are a big player, you will — there’s great variances.

但在再保险领域，我们是一个重要的参与者，这其中存在很大的差异。

If you take insurance for marine risks in the Gulf Coast — drilling rigs and offshore platforms and that sort of thing — those prices are up very dramatically, but they should be.

如果你为墨西哥湾沿岸的海洋风险投保——钻井平台、海上平台之类的东西——这些价格大幅上涨，但这是应该的。

I think in the last couple of years, there’s been, like, 2 1/2 billion of premium in the Gulf Coast and 15 billion in losses. So if you paid out 15 billion and took in 2 1/2 billion, the more astute of you would figure that you needed a little more money for that particular risk.

我认为在过去几年里，墨西哥湾沿岸的保费大约是 25 亿，而损失是 150 亿。所以如果你支付了 150 亿而只收了 25 亿，更精明的人会意识到你需要为这种特定风险多准备一些资金。

We have been, historically — at least in recent years — the largest writer of cat — catastrophe — mega catastrophe insurance in world, and I think we will be this year. In fact, I’m almost sure we will be this year.

从历史上看，至少在最近几年，我们一直是全球最大的灾难——巨灾保险的承保商，我认为今年我们也会是。事实上，我几乎可以肯定今年我们会是。

Our mix has changed some. Prices are up a lot, but what we don’t know is whether exposures are up even more.

我们的组合有所变化。价格上涨了很多，但我们不知道的是，风险是否增加得更多。

We don’t know whether the experience of the last two years, we’ll say, with hurricanes in this hemisphere, is more to be relied upon than the experience of the last hundred years.

我们不知道过去两年的经验——我们可以说是由于气旋造成的——是否比过去一百年的经验更有说服力。

You can take the hundred-year experience and it tells you one thing, and you can take the last couple years and it tells you something else. And which is more meaningful? We don’t know the answer to that.

你可以参考百年的经验，它告诉你一件事；你也可以参考过去几年的经验，它告诉你另一件事。哪个更有意义？我们不知道答案。

We do know that it would be kind of silly to assume that the 100-year experience is the relevant criteria when conditions — we know certain atmospheric conditions have changed. We know water temperature’s changed.

我们确实知道，在某些条件下——我们知道某些大气条件已经改变的情况下，假设 100 年的经验是相关标准有点愚蠢。我们知道水温已经改变。

But we do not know all of the variables that are into the propensity of hurricanes to occur and the degree to how intense they may be if they do occur. We don’t know the answer to that. We don’t think anybody else knows the answer to it, either.

但是我们不知道影响飓风发生倾向的所有变量，也不知道如果飓风发生，它们可能有多强烈。我们不知道答案。我们认为其他人也不知道答案。

So we are getting more money for hurricane insurance. We’re getting appreciably more money.

所以，我们正在为飓风保险收取更多费用。我们收取的费用显著增加。

If the last two years are the relevant years, we’re not getting enough. If the last hundred years are the relevant years, we’re getting plenty. And we will know more as time unfolds.

如果过去两年是相关年份，我们得到的还不够。如果过去一百年是相关年份，我们得到的已经很多了。随着时间的推移，我们会知道更多。

The really scary possibility is that variables are changing in some way so that the change is continuous and that what we’ve seen the last two years is not a worst-case example at all.

最令人担忧的可能性是，某些变量正在以某种方式发生变化，导致变化是持续的，而我们过去两年看到的并不是最坏的情况。

And, of course, you get into chaos-type theory with some of these variables where the outcome is not a linear relationship to the input, and you can dream up some pretty scary scenarios on this.

当然，涉及这些变量时，你会接触到混沌理论，结果与输入之间不是线性关系，因而你可以设想出一些非常可怕的场景。

I don’t know whether they’re true and nobody knows.

我不知道它们是否是真的，没有人知道。

We are willing to write certain areas, certain coverages, because we believe the prices are adequate, and we can sustain the losses.

我们愿意承保某些领域和某些保险范围，因为我们相信价格是合理的，并且我们能够承受损失。

We’re willing to lose many billions of dollars in a given catastrophe if we think we’ve been paid appropriately for it.

如果我们认为得到了适当的补偿，我们愿意在某次灾难中损失数十亿美元。

But it is not like figuring out the odds on flipping coins or rolling dice or something like that. You are dealing with changing variables, and you — the worst thing you could have would be a 100-year history book in making those judgments.

但这不像计算抛硬币或掷骰子等的概率。你在处理不断变化的变量，而最糟糕的情况是用一本 100 年的历史书来做出这些判断。

The third quarter, we will have a lot of exposure for wind. We don’t have as much exposure now — well, we may. I’d say we’re getting there. But we don’t have as much — certainly as much as we had a couple of years ago.

在第三季度，我们将面临很多风的风险的敞口。现在我们的风险敞口并不像——好吧，我们正在接近。但至少没有几年前那么大。

Prices — question about prices hardening. Prices are getting — are hardening — in that particular area. And if they get to what the — where we really feel they’re appropriate — you know, we might take on a fair — we will take on — a fair amount more risk.

价格——关于价格上涨的问题。价格在那个特定领域正在上涨。如果它们达到我们认为真正合适的水平——你知道，我们可能会承担——我们将承担——更多的风险。

If they don’t get there, even though they’re higher than last year, we won’t write — you know, we’re not interested in writing it, because it’s a dangerous business.

如果他们没有到达那里，即使他们比去年高，我们也不会写——你知道，我们对写它不感兴趣，因为这是一项危险的业务。

And we don’t believe in modelers at all. I read all this stuff about modeling. I wrote about that a few years ago. It’s silly. You know, the modelers don’t know a thing, in my view, about what’s going to happen.

我们根本不相信建模者。我读过所有关于建模的东西。我几年前写过关于这个的文章。这很荒谬。你知道，在我看来，建模者对将要发生的事情一无所知。

And we get paid for making guesses on it. If, over a lifetime, the guesses are decent, we will know that, you know, we were doing the right thing.

我们通过对此进行猜测来获得报酬。如果在一生中，这些猜测是合理的，我们就会知道，我们做的是正确的事情。

But if this year goes by and nothing happens, we still don’t know whether we were right on the prices.

但是如果今年过去了什么都没有发生，我们仍然不知道我们对价格是否正确。

Because if you get a 25 percent rate for something and it doesn’t happen in a year, that does not mean that you didn’t need 40 percent or 50 percent. It just means that if you do it enough times, you will find out whether, overall, your judgments are any good.

因为如果你对某项保险收取25%的费用，而在一年内没有发生任何事情，这并不意味着你不需要收取40%或50%的费用。这只是意味着，如果你这样做很多次，你最终会发现你的判断整体上是否合理。

It’s still a business we like. We bring a lot to the party. Everybody knows we can pay. You get into the question of creditworthiness.

这仍然是一个我们喜欢的业务。我们为这个行业带来了很多。大家都知道我们有支付能力。你就进入了信用风险的问题。

If there is some super, super catastrophe — and I regard, sort of, the outer limits of that being a $250 billion insured loss — for reference, Katrina was a — presently estimated — was about a $60 billion loss.

如果发生某种超级、超级灾难——我认为，这种灾难的极限是 2500 亿美元的保险损失——作为参考，卡特里娜飓风的损失——目前估计——大约是 600 亿美元。

So, if something comes along that’s four times Katrina, which could happen, you know, we can pay, and we can comfortably pay. We would probably have about 4 percent of that, maybe 10 billion.

所以，如果出现一个是卡特里娜飓风四倍的事件，这种情况是可能发生的，你知道，我们可以支付，而且我们可以轻松支付。我们可能会承担其中的约 4%，也许是 100 亿。

A very large percent of the industry would be in very, very serious trouble.

该行业中很大一部分将面临非常非常严重的问题。

So, we can play bigger than others, and we can survive better than others if something bad comes along. And we will see, over a five- or ten-year period, how we do. You can’t judge it by any one year.

所以，我们可以比其他人玩得更大，如果有不好的事情发生，我们也能比其他人更好地生存。我们将在五年或十年内看到我们的表现。你不能仅凭一年来判断。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: The record of the past, if you average it out, has been quite respectable.

查理·芒格：如果平均来看，过去的记录是相当不错的。

And why shouldn’t we use our capital strength to get into volatile stuff that makes other people frightened?

那么，为什么我们不利用我们的资本实力进入其他人感到害怕的波动性业务呢？

24. NetJets losses and retroactive policies

NetJets 损失和追溯政策

WARREN BUFFETT: Do we go back to number — to here? One more. Number 15?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们回到号码——到这里？再来一个。号码 15？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello? 观众成员：你好？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia. I had a two-part question on the 2005 annual report.

观众成员：我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺夫。我有一个关于 2005 年年度报告的两个部分的问题。

Firstly, NetJets is a substantial part of our operations. Unfortunately, its value is obscured by losses in recent years, and I can’t estimate its value from the report. I was hoping you might be able to help me on that.

首先，NetJets 是我们运营的重要组成部分。不幸的是，近年来的亏损使其价值变得模糊不清，我无法从报告中估计其价值。我希望你能帮我解决这个问题。

The second thing, how do I value the Berkshire Hathaway reinsurance group in light of the deferred charges on retroactive policies? Thank you.

第二件事，我如何在考虑到追溯保单的递延费用的情况下评估伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: The second question, that — about the — we have an item that’s about $2 billion on the asset side.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二个问题，关于——我们在资产方面有一项大约 20 亿美元的项目。

I think I’m addressing the question of deferred charges on retroactive policies. That reflects the fact that those retroactive policies, where we insure — we reinsure, in effect — the losses that somebody has already incurred, although they may not know how much they’ve incurred, and we have limits on these.

我想我正在解决关于追溯政策递延费用的问题。这反映了这样一个事实，即那些追溯政策中，我们为某人已经发生的损失提供保险——实际上是再保险——尽管他们可能不知道他们已经发生了多少损失，并且我们对此有一定的限制。

But we set up a factor that, essentially, recognizes the fact that we will have that money for a considerable period of time. We set up an asset, and that gets amortized over the length of time we have that asset.

但是我们设立了一个因素，基本上承认我们将在相当长的一段时间内拥有这笔资金。我们设立了一项资产，并在我们拥有该资产的时间内进行摊销。

That number, which I think has gotten as high as 3 billion over the years, since we haven’t done any of those — any big contracts recently, is down around 2 billion.

那个数字，我认为多年来曾高达 30 亿，因为我们最近没有签订任何大合同，现在降到了大约 20 亿。

There’s nothing magic about that. It means that we’re going to amortize that 2 billion over the lifetime of the use of the funds, and we think we’ll make money, net, during that time.

这并没有什么神奇之处。这意味着我们将在资金使用的整个生命周期内摊销这 20 亿，并且我们认为在此期间我们将净赚到钱。

But we misguessed on one a couple years ago and took a $100 million charge, for example, in the first quarter of — I think it was the year before last.

但是我们在几年前有一次判断失误，并因此在第一季度承担了一亿美元的费用，我想那是前年。

The other question was about NetJets, wasn’t it, Charlie?

另一个问题是关于 NetJets 的，对吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I didn’t get it all. I love the Australian accent of our gecko, but I didn’t pick up the exact nuances of what you asked.

沃伦·巴菲特：我没有完全听懂。我喜欢我们壁虎的澳大利亚口音，但我没有抓住你所问问题的确切细微差别。

But my guess is you asked about the earnings and operation of NetJets.

但我猜您是问关于 NetJets 的收益和运营。

And NetJets has grown rapidly, and so far, our expenses have grown faster than our revenue.

而 NetJets 发展迅速，到目前为止，我们的开支增长速度超过了收入增长速度。

We’ve got the top service in the world. We’ve got, really, the only worldwide service. We have a very strong position, particularly in larger airplanes.

我们拥有世界上最顶级的服务。我们确实是唯一的全球性服务。我们在大型飞机方面拥有非常强大的地位。

But I’d have to tell you that I did not anticipate — I thought we would have economies of scale, to some degree, and so far you can almost argue that we’ve had diseconomies of scale.

但我得告诉你，我没有预料到——我以为我们会在某种程度上实现规模经济，但到目前为止，你几乎可以说我们遇到了规模不经济。

And our expenses, particularly last year, you know, basically got out of hand. And there are various reasons I could give you for that. All I can tell you is, it’s being addressed.

我们的开支，尤其是去年，基本上失控了。我可以给你各种理由解释这一点。我只能告诉你，这个问题正在解决中。

Rich Santulli, who runs that operation, you could not have a better operator. He loves NetJets. He works at it 16 hours a day. He’s — there’s nobody in the world I would have run that except for Rich.

里奇·桑图利负责运营这个业务，你找不到比他更好的运营者了。他热爱 NetJets，每天工作 16 个小时。除了里奇，我不会让世界上任何人来运营这个业务。

I think it’s an important service. It’s tough to make money with airplanes. They’re capital-intensive. We’ve had fuel do what it has, although that’s a pass-through to people, but it still affects the business.

我认为这是一项重要的服务。用飞机赚钱很难。它们是资本密集型的。虽然燃料成本可以转嫁给消费者，但它仍然会影响业务。

And I would — I had expected we would be profitable last year, and as I put in the annual report, I was dead wrong.

我本以为我们去年会盈利，正如我在年度报告中所写的，我完全错了。

I think we will be profitable before long, but you should take my prediction there with — probably with — a certain amount of skepticism until it actually happens because I, like I say, I’ve been wrong.

我认为我们很快就会盈利，但在这之前，你应该对我的预测持有一定程度的怀疑，因为正如我所说，我曾经错过。

We’ve got a good business in that almost anybody looking for a large plane on a fractional jet program comes to us. We are able to get full price for our service. But there were a variety of inefficiencies last year which added up to a lot of dollars.

我们有一个很好的业务，几乎任何寻找大型飞机的分时共享计划的人都会来找我们。我们能够为我们的服务获得全价。但是，去年有各种各样的低效率，累计造成了大量的开支。

And you know, you’re entitled to hold me accountable for the fact that we paid a lot of money for the business many years ago, and we haven’t earned any money since.

你知道，你有权让我为多年前我们花了很多钱买下这家公司负责，而自那以后我们没有赚到任何钱。

And we’ve got a much bigger business now, probably five times or so the size of the business we bought. That may be some solace to — I looked at Raytheon’s figures the other day. They lost a lot of money, and they have the second largest operation.

我们现在的业务规模大了很多，可能是我们当初购买时的五倍左右。这或许能给一些安慰——我前几天看了雷神公司的数据。他们亏了很多钱，而且他们是第二大运营商。

They sell their — they sell airplanes too, so they may not feel it the way I do.

他们也在出售飞机，因此他们可能不会像我这样感到压力。

But if I had to bet one way or the other, I would bet we will be making money before long, but I’ve lost that bet in the past.

但如果我非要赌一个方向的话，我会赌我们不久就会赚钱，但我过去曾输掉过这个赌注。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The product integrity is so extreme between flight safety and NetJets. The pilots are subjected to real oxygen withdrawal in the course of the safety training so they will recognize the subtle sensation that you get, and not everybody does that. It’s an expensive, difficult thing to do.

查理·芒格：是的。飞行安全和 NetJets 之间的产品完整性非常极致。飞行员在安全训练过程中会经历真正的缺氧，以便他们能识别出细微的感受，而并非所有人都能做到。这是一件昂贵且困难的事情。

In place after place after place, that system is very obsessive about product integrity, and it’s my guess that that obsession, in due course, will be rewarded.

在一个又一个地方，这个系统对产品完整性非常执着，我猜这种执着最终会得到回报。

25. Why Buffett bought, and sold, silver

巴菲特为何买入和卖出白银

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们来看第 3 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Warren and Charlie, I’m Oliver Couchet (PH) from Frankfurt in Germany.

观众成员：亲爱的沃伦和查理，我是来自德国法兰克福的奥利弗·库切特（PH）。

Here’s a question to the Silver King: Some commodity investors give you as a reference as one of the largest owner of physical silver. Could you please clarify what kind of exposure you or Berkshire currently have in silver?

我有个问题想问银王：一些商品投资者将您视为最大的实物银持有者之一。您能否澄清一下您或伯克希尔目前在银方面的风险敞口？

And, further, could you please help us to understand how you determine the value of a noninterest-bearing precious metal?

另外，您能否帮我们理解一下您是如何确定一种无息贵金属的价值的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you have any silver on you, Charlie? We had a lot of silver at one time, but we don’t have it now.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你身上有银子吗？我们曾经有很多银子，但现在没有了。

The original decision — my decision — was that the production of silver and the reclamation of silver — I don’t remember the numbers exactly now — but they were running, perhaps, 100 million ounces or thereabouts, less than the consumption.

最初的决定——我的决定——是白银的生产和回收——我现在不记得具体数字了——但它们的产量可能是 1 亿盎司左右，低于消费量。

And, now, a lot of consumption has gone down in photography, but that’s where the reclamation was, too, so that those tended more to balance each other out.

而且，现在摄影方面的消费大幅减少，但这也是复苏的地方，因此这些往往会相互平衡。

I haven’t looked at the figures for the last year or so, but silver was out of balance.

我没有查看过去一年左右的数据，但白银的供需失衡。

Now, on the other hand, there were enormous quantities of silver aboveground, and there were huge quantities of silver that could possibly be removed from other uses, perhaps, you know, in jewelry and all kinds of things, that could conceivably add to supply as they did in the early 1980s when the Hunt Brothers thing took place.

现在，另一方面，地面上有大量的白银，并且可能有大量的白银可以从其他用途中移除，比如首饰和各种各样的东西，这些白银可能会增加供应，就像在 1980 年代初亨特兄弟事件发生时那样。

But, overall, silver was being produced and reclaimed at a lesser rate than it was being consumed.

但是，总体而言，白银的生产和回收速度低于其消耗速度。

And added to that was the fact that there are relatively few pure silver mines. Silver is largely produced as a by-product of copper and lead and zinc, and so that it was not easy to bring on added production.

再加上纯银矿相对较少这一事实。白银主要是作为铜、铅和锌的副产品生产的，因此增加产量并不容易。

So, all of that added up to the fact that I thought that silver would get tight at some point.

所以，所有这些加起来让我觉得白银在某个时候会变得紧张。

And, as I said, I was very — I was early in that conclusion, and I was early in selling.

正如我所说，我很早就得出了那个结论，并且很早就开始出售。

So we have no silver now, and we did not make much money on it.

所以我们现在没有银子了，而且我们没有赚到多少钱。

And you’re right that it doesn’t earn anything. So you sit with it. It’s not like sitting with a stock where, in most cases, earnings are piling up for you.

你说得对，它确实不赚任何钱。所以你就持有它。这不像持有股票，在大多数情况下，收益会为你积累。

You have to hope that it — you have to hope that a commodity moves in price, because it is not producing anything as it sits there looking at you. And that’s one of the drawbacks of commodities.

你必须希望商品价格会上涨，因为它在你面前静静地待着，并没有产生任何东西。这就是商品的一个缺点。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We didn’t get where we are by owning noninterest-bearing commodities. I don’t think it’s a big issue around here.

查理·芒格：我们之所以能走到今天这一步，不是因为持有无息商品。我认为这在这里不是一个大问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: We actually owned oil at one time too, didn’t we? But we didn’t make much money on it. We made a little money.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们实际上也曾经拥有过石油，不是吗？但我们没有赚到很多钱。我们赚了一点钱。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. You made quite a bit out of oil.

查理·芒格：不。你从石油中赚了不少。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But, you know, it’s a good habit to trumpet your failures and be quiet about your successes. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：但是，你知道，宣扬你的失败而对成功保持沉默是一个好习惯。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We have more to trumpet than we have to be quiet about. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们有更多的失败可以吹嘘，而成功的事情则不多。（笑声）

26. “We don’t play big trends”

“我们不追随大趋势”

WARREN BUFFETT: How about number 4?

沃伦·巴菲特：第四个怎么样？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Bill Gurn (PH). I’ve traveled from the United Kingdom.

观众成员：早上好。我的名字是比尔·格恩（音）。我从英国过来的。

And I would like to ask if you think it’s a good investment strategy to invest in regions of high resources per capita?

我想问一下，您认为投资于人均资源丰富的地区是否是一个好的投资策略？

In particular, I should like to ask if you think that the analysis per capita should lead to higher growth for businesses in that region, plus the bonus of a relative exchange rate growth? Thank you.

特别是，我想问一下，您认为人均分析是否应该导致该地区企业的更高增长，以及相对汇率增长的额外收益？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure about the per capita part, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：我不太确定人均部分，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: My understanding is he was talking about investing in a region with high resources per capita. I think he means natural resources.

查理·芒格：据我了解，他是在谈论投资于人均资源丰富的地区。我认为他指的是自然资源。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Are you thinking of places like Canada or something of the sort where the —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你是在想像加拿大这样的地方，还是类似的地方——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I can clarify. Yes, high natural resources, but also good infrastructure. Thank you.

观众成员：我可以澄清。是的，高自然资源，但也有良好的基础设施。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: And whether there would be relative currency strength in those as well and —

沃伦·巴菲特：以及这些货币是否也会有相对强势的货币，以及——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Whether it’s a good area for us to be operating in.

查理·芒格：不。这是否是我们应该经营的好领域。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that would be a little macro for us. We really just zero in on, you know, whether people will keep eating candy and whether we can charge a little more for it next year.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，那对我们来说有点宏观。我们实际上只是专注于，人们是否会继续吃糖果，以及明年我们是否可以多收一点钱。

We don’t play big trends. You know, we don’t think about demographic trends or anything of the sort. We think about our own age as getting older.

我们不追随大趋势。你知道，我们不考虑人口趋势或类似的事情。我们考虑的是我们自己年龄的增长。

But other — big trends, they just don’t mean that much. There’s too much money to be made from year to year to think about things that take decades to manifest themselves.

但是其他——大趋势，它们实际上并没有那么重要。每年都有太多的钱可以赚，而不必考虑那些需要几十年才能显现的事情。

So I can’t recall of a decision we’ve ever made on a purchase of a business or a stock or a junk bond or a currency or anything else based on a macro.

所以我不记得我们曾经基于宏观因素做出过关于购买企业、股票、垃圾债券、货币或其他任何东西的决定。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Not only that, we’ve recently failed to profit much from one of the biggest commodity booms in history.

查理·芒格：不仅如此，我们最近还未能从历史上最大的商品繁荣之一中获利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we’ll probably continue to fail in the same way. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们可能会继续以同样的方式失败。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we’ll search for new ways to fail. I mean, we’re not trying to limit ourselves. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们会寻找新的失败方式。我的意思是，我们并不想限制自己。（笑声）

It’s probably true, incidentally, in a country like Canada, where you’ve got, probably, millions of barrels of oil of — millions of barrels a day — of oil production coming on and where there’s, you know, relatively few people and where there’s already a surplus.

顺便说一句，在像加拿大这样的国家，这可能是真的，因为你可能每天有数百万桶的石油产量，而那里的人口相对较少，并且已经有盈余。

When they’re running a significant current account surplus, that — you know, it’s not strange that their currency should be strong relative to a country like ours where we’re running a huge current account deficit and we don’t have that same natural — the gain in natural exports coming on that they do.

当他们运行着显著的经常账户盈余时，—您知道，相对来说，他们的货币应该比我们这样的国家强是很正常的，因为我们在运行着巨大的经常账户赤字，而我们没有像他们那样自然的出口增长。

But that — there’s so many more important factors that are going to hit us immediately that that’s what we really think about day-to-day.

但是，还有许多更重要的因素会立即影响我们，这才是我们每天真正考虑的事情。

27. Nuclear threat is “ultimate problem of mankind”

核威胁是“人类的终极问题”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：第五名？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Glen Strong (PH). I’m from Canton, Ohio.

观众成员：早上好。我的名字是格伦·斯特朗（音）。我来自俄亥俄州坎顿市。

I’m an optimistic person, and I’m sure it would be more enjoyable to discuss the Chicago Cubs’ march to the World Series.

我是一个乐观的人，我相信讨论芝加哥小熊队进军世界大赛会更令人愉快。

WARREN BUFFETT: You are optimistic. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你很乐观。（笑声）

But everybody has a bad century now and then, as somebody said about the Cubs. (Laughter)

但正如有人对小熊队所说的，每个人时不时都会有一个糟糕的世纪。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: However — (Laughter) — I have an information deficit on a certain topic that I hope you can fix. Please gaze into your crystal ball.

观众成员：然而——（笑声）——我在某个话题上有信息缺口，希望你能解决。请看看你的水晶球。

As an investor, I want to know how to address the risk of nuclear terrorism in the United States.

作为一名投资者，我想知道如何应对美国的核恐怖主义风险。

Consider a scenario where terrorists have detonated a nuclear device in a major U.S. city. I know there would be a terrible cost in human lives.

考虑一种情况，恐怖分子在美国一个大城市引爆了一枚核装置。我知道这将造成巨大的人员伤亡。

Gentlemen, what would happen to our economy? How would it respond? How resilient would it be? Thank you.

先生们，我们的经济会发生什么？它会如何反应？它的韧性如何？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it would certainly depend on the extent of it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这当然取决于它的程度。

But, if you’re asking how to profit from that, there’s probably some dealer that will sell you mortality derivatives. But I’m not sure that’s what we would be thinking about then.

但是，如果你问我如何从中获利，可能有某个交易商会卖给你死亡衍生品。但我不确定那是不是我们当时会考虑的事情。

No. I agree with you. I couldn’t agree with you more about that being the ultimate problem of mankind, not necessarily a terrorist-type usage, but a state-sponsored usage of weapons of mass destruction.

不。我同意你的看法。我完全同意你所说的，这确实是人类的终极问题，不一定是恐怖主义类型的使用，而是国家支持的大规模杀伤性武器的使用。

And it will happen someday. The extent to which it will happen, where it will happen, who knows. But we’ve always had evil people. We’ve always had people who wish evil on others.

总有一天会发生。至于会发生到什么程度，会在哪里发生，谁也不知道。但我们一直都有邪恶的人。我们一直都有那些希望别人遭遇不幸的人。

And, you know, thousands of years ago, if you were psychotic or a religious fanatic or a malcontent and you wished evil on your neighbor, you picked up a rock and threw it at them, and that was about the damage you could do. But we went on to bows and arrows and cannons and a few things.

你知道，几千年前，如果你是精神病患者、宗教狂热者或不满分子，并且希望你的邻居遭殃，你就捡起一块石头扔向他们，那就是你能造成的伤害。但我们后来有了弓箭、大炮和其他一些东西。

But since 1945, it’s — the potential for inflicting enormous harm on incredible numbers of people has increased, you know, at a geometric pace.

但自 1945 年以来，伤害大量人的潜力已经以几何级数的速度增加。

So it is the problem of mankind. It may happen here. It may happen someplace else.

所以这是人类的问题。它可能发生在这里，也可能发生在其他地方。

People say it’s a — sometimes they say, “Well, you know, if we’d solve poverty, we’d solve this.” Well, I will just remind you that nuclear weapons have only been used twice, and those were by the richest country in the world, the United States, in 1945.

人们说这是一个——有时他们会说，“你知道，如果我们解决了贫困，我们就能解决这个问题。” 好吧，我只想提醒你，核武器只被使用过两次，而那是由世界上最富有的国家——美国在 1945 年使用的。

So, people will justify their use under some circumstances, if they feel threatened. They will justify them for religious reasons. They will do all kinds of crazy things.

所以，如果他们感到受到威胁，人们会在某些情况下为他们的使用辩护。他们会出于宗教原因为其辩护。他们会做各种疯狂的事情。

And the — what holds it in check is the degree to which the lack of knowledge of how to do it is controlled, and the degree to which the materials are controlled, and which the deliverability is circumscribed.

而使其受限的，是关于如何进行核武器使用的知识程度，以及材料的控制程度，以及可交付性的限制。

And we’re losing ground on all of those fronts. The knowledge is more widespread. The possibility of getting your hands on materials — you know, the Dr. Khans [Pakistani nuclear scientist] of the world and so on, has increased.

我们在所有这些方面都在失去优势。知识更加普及。获得材料的可能性——你知道，世界上的汗博士（巴基斯坦核科学家）等等，已经增加了。

And it will be a — it’s a real problem, but we won’t be thinking about what Berkshire did that day in the stock market.

这将是一个——这是真正的问题，但我们不会去想伯克希尔那天在股市上做了什么。

And I don’t know how money attacks that. I mean, I’ve always saw that as the top priority, I think should be the top priority for philanthropy, in my particular case.

我不知道金钱如何解决这个问题。我的意思是，我一直认为这是首要任务，我认为这应该是慈善事业的首要任务，就我个人而言。

But it’s a difficult — it’s a very difficult — it’s a worst-case problem. You know, you have 6 billion people in the world, and you have a certain percentage of them who are, one way or another, a little crazy, or very crazy, and some of whom in that craziness would manifest itself by trying to do great harm to a lot of people.

但这是一个困难的——非常困难的——最坏情况的问题。你知道，世界上有 60 亿人，其中有一定比例的人在某种程度上有点疯狂，或者非常疯狂，其中一些人在这种疯狂中会表现出试图对很多人造成巨大伤害。

And it’s — only one of them has to succeed.

而且——只需要其中一个成功。

I don’t know how many we’ve intercepted over the years. I’m sure we’ve intercepted a lot of incipient ones.

我不知道我们这些年来拦截了多少。我相信我们拦截了许多潜在的威胁。

But it is a worst-case problem, and one will succeed at some point. And it may be state-sponsored; it may be terrorists.

但这是一个最坏的情况问题，总有一天会成功。可能是国家支持的，也可能是恐怖分子。

But, you know, Berkshire is better set to survive than anybody else, but it won’t make much difference.

但是，你知道，伯克希尔比其他任何公司都更能生存下来，但这不会有太大区别。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that the chances we’ll have another 60 or 70 years with no nuclear devices used on purpose is pretty close to zero.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我们再有六七十年没有故意使用核装置的可能性几乎为零。

So, I think you’re right to worry about it, but I don’t, myself, think there’s much that any of us can do about it, except be as sensible as we can and take the consequences as they come.

所以，我认为你有理由担心，但我自己不认为我们能做太多事情来改变这种情况，除了尽可能理智并接受随之而来的后果。

WARREN BUFFETT: The only thing you can do about it — but you only have one vote — is to elect leaders who are terribly conscious of the product — problem — and who devote a significant part, you know, of their thought and energy into minimizing it.

沃伦·巴菲特：你唯一能做的事情——但你只有一票——就是选出对这个问题非常有意识的领导者，并将他们的思想和精力的一大部分投入到尽量减少这个问题上。

You can’t eliminate it. You know, the genie is out of the bottle. And you would like to have the leading — the leaders — of the major countries of the world regarding it as their primary — as a primary — focus.

你无法消除它。你知道，瓶中的精灵已经放出来了。你希望世界主要国家的领导人将其视为他们的首要——作为一个首要——关注点。

Actually, in the 2004 campaign, I think that both candidates said it was the major problem of our time. But, you know, they probably suffer from the same feeling that I do, that it’s very hard to address.

实际上，在 2004 年的竞选中，我认为两位候选人都说这是我们这个时代的主要问题。但是，你知道，他们可能和我有同样的感觉，那就是这个问题很难解决。

28. A Berkshire stock buyback won’t be a secret

伯克希尔的股票回购不会是秘密

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6?

沃伦·巴菲特：第六号？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is William Schooler (PH), and I’m a shareholder visiting from Spicewood, Texas.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我的名字是威廉·斯库勒（音），我是一名来自德克萨斯州斯派斯伍德的股东。

I would like to thank you both for being so generous to the public with your ideas.

我想感谢你们两位对公众如此慷慨地分享你们的想法。

Last year, I read “Poor Charlie’s Almanack” and came across a passage on share repurchases.

去年，我读了《穷查理宝典》，并看到一段关于股票回购的内容。

It reads, quote: “When Berkshire has gotten cheap, we’ve found other even cheaper stocks to buy. I’d always prefer this. It’s no fun to have the company so lacking in repute that we can make money for some shareholders by buying out others,” end quote.

内容是：“当伯克希尔变得便宜时，我们发现其他更便宜的股票可供购买。我更喜欢这样。没有人会喜欢公司名声如此欠佳，以至于我们只能通过回购股票来为一些股东赚钱。”

Last year, you bought stock in some great businesses trading at fair prices, such as Walmart and Budweiser, but did not attempt to buy our own shares.

去年，你购买了一些以合理价格交易的优秀企业的股票，比如沃尔玛和百威，但没有尝试购买我们自己的股票。

Would shareholders be correct to infer from this decision that you both felt Walmart and Budweiser were trading at a deeper discount to their intrinsic values than Berkshire was?

股东是否可以从这一决定中推断出，你们都认为沃尔玛和百威的交易价格比伯克希尔的内在价值折扣更深？

And would it be possible to buy as much Berkshire in the open market as you did Walmart without running up the share price?

并且，您认为能否在公开市场上购买与沃尔玛同等数量的伯克希尔股票，而不抬高股价？

WARREN BUFFETT: Most of the time, we would not be able to buy an amount that would be material, in terms of increasing the value of the remaining Berkshire shares. But that doesn’t mean it would never happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：大多数情况下，我们无法购买到足够数量的股份，以显著增加剩余伯克希尔股份的价值。但这并不意味着这种情况永远不会发生。

But it — if you look at the trading volume on Berkshire — and, [CFO] Marc [Hamburg], you might put that up, if we can, in a second — we probably have less opportunity than most companies if our stock is selling — should be selling — below intrinsic value to have anything meaningful happen.

但是——如果你查看伯克希尔的交易量——而且，[首席财务官]马克[汉堡]，如果可以的话，你可能会在一秒钟内把它放上去——我们可能比大多数公司有更少的机会，如果我们的股票以低于内在价值的价格出售——应该出售——以使任何有意义的事情发生。

We would also have — if we regarded some other company as worth X, a good business, and we could buy it at 90 percent of X, we might be doing that now, whereas we wouldn’t have done it many years ago.

如果我们认为某家公司价值为 X，是一个好生意，并且我们可以以 X 的 90%购买它，我们现在可能会这样做，而多年前我们不会这样做。

But we might require a somewhat greater margin, in terms of buying Berkshire shares, simply because our view on that might be less — we probably have more knowledge on it, but we might be less objective than on some other things.

但是我们可能需要更大的余地来购买伯克希尔的股票，因为我们对它的看法可能不太客观——尽管我们可能对它了解更多，但可能不如对其他事情那么客观。

We think that when we buy — if we were to buy in Berkshire shares — and, if you remember, four or five years ago I announced we would if the price stayed the same — that the case ought to really be compelling, and if it’s compelling, we ought to do it. It was compelling at that time.

我们认为，当我们购买——如果我们要购买伯克希尔的股票——如果你还记得，四五年前我宣布过，如果价格保持不变，我们就会购买——这种情况应该是非常有说服力的，如果有说服力，我们就应该去做。当时是非常有说服力的。

But simply the act of writing about it — you know, a little bit of a Heisenberg principle — the act of writing about it, in effect, eliminated the opportunity to do it, which is fine.

但仅仅是写下这件事的行为——你知道，有点像海森堡原理——写下这件事的行为实际上消除了去做这件事的机会，这也没关系。

Because we do not — we are not looking to make money off of buying from shareholders at a depressed price.

因为我们不希望从股东那里以低价购买而获利。

On the other hand, if the price is sufficiently depressed, we will announce again that we intend to do it, and then we’ll see whether we actually get a chance to do it. Charlie?

另一方面，如果价格足够低迷，我们将再次宣布我们打算这样做，然后我们将看看我们是否真的有机会这样做。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The whole climate in the country is different now.

查理·芒格：是的。现在整个国家的气候都不同了。

It used to be that almost every company that bought in shares was buying them in at an obvious bargain price. Now I think a lot of share buying is designed to, sort of, prop the stock price.

过去，几乎每家回购股票的公司都以明显的低价回购。现在我认为，很多回购股票的行为旨在“支撑”股价。

In other words, it’s not bargain-seeking. It’s more like Sam Insull.

换句话说，这并不是寻找便宜货。更像是山姆·印苏尔（Sam Insull）的做法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Forty years ago, 30 years ago, it was a very fertile field for making money to look at companies that were aggressively buying in their shares, the most extreme case probably being Teledyne.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。四十年前，三十年前，研究那些积极回购股票的公司是一个非常有利可图的领域，最极端的例子可能是 Teledyne。

But those people were buying overwhelmingly — Gurdon Wattles was doing it at the companies he controlled — those people were motivated simply by the fact they wanted to buy the stock below what it was really worth and — significantly below — and you could make money with that group, and we did a little of that at the time.

但是那些人正在大量购买——Gurdon Wattles 在他控制的公司中也是这样做的——那些人仅仅是因为他们想以低于实际价值的价格购买股票而受到激励——显著低于——你可以通过那群人赚钱，我们当时也做了一些这样的事情。

I would say in recent years, that motivation has been swamped by people who either think it’s fashionable to buy in shares, or by people who really like the idea of trying to prop their stock up somewhat.

我会说，近年来，这种动机被那些认为买股票很时髦的人，或者那些真正喜欢尝试稍微支撑他们股票的人所淹没。

And the SEC has certain rules, in terms of the way you conduct your repurchases to prevent daily, sort of, propping up.

美国证券交易委员会在进行股票回购时有某些规则，以防止日常的、某种程度上的支撑。

But I think there’s a lot of motivation that our stock has got to be cheaper than other people’s stock, and we’ve got a wonderful company, and we’re just going to buy the stock come hell or high water, and that is not the way we would go about repurchasing shares.

但我认为有很多动机让我们的股票比其他人的股票便宜，而且我们有一家很棒的公司，我们无论如何都会买入股票，但这不是我们回购股票的方式。

We’ve got — well, we had up there, I think — some figures that showed the turnover of Berkshire shares compared — in a year — compared with a few others I picked out.

我们有——嗯，我想我们刚才有——一些数据显示伯克希尔股票的周转率——在一年内——与我挑选出的其他几只股票相比。

I think Berkshire has the lowest turnover, by some margin, of any major company in the United States.

我认为伯克希尔是美国所有大公司中股票流动率最低的公司之一。

And I put Walmart up there because the Walton family owns about the same — in fact, they own more — of Walmart than I do of Berkshire.

我提到沃尔玛是因为沃尔顿家族拥有的沃尔玛股份大约和我在伯克希尔的股份一样多，事实上，他们拥有的还更多。

So, this is not a function of simply the fact that we’ve got concentrated holdings with the Buffett family.

因此，这不仅仅是因为巴菲特家族有集中持股。

This is a reflection of the fact that we’ve got a really unusual shareholder body in that they think of themselves as owners and not as people who are moving around with little pieces of paper every week or month.

这反映了一个事实，即我们的股东群体非常特殊，他们把自己视为所有者，而不是每周或每月拿着小纸片到处走动的人。

We have the most — in my view — we have the most what I would call honest-to-God ownership attitude among our 400,000 or so shareholders of any company — of any big traded company — in the United States.

在我看来，我们在美国所有大公司中，我们的 40 万左右股东拥有最真实的所有权态度。

People buy Berkshire to own it, and hold it, and that’s reflected in our turnover. That does mean if, for some reason, the stock gets cheap — real cheap — that we would not be able to buy a lot of stock in.

人们购买伯克希尔是为了拥有它，并持有它，这反映在我们的换手率上。这确实意味着如果由于某种原因，股票变得便宜——非常便宜——我们将无法买入大量股票。

But we don’t want — we are not looking to buy out our partners at a discount. If it sells there and we tell them we’re going to buy it, we’ll buy it. But that’s not a way that we’re trying to make money.

但我们不想——我们并不是想以折扣价收购我们的合作伙伴。如果它在那里出售，我们告诉他们我们要买，我们就会买。但这不是我们赚钱的方式。

Charlie, any more? 查理，还有吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I’ve said my piece.

查理·芒格：不，我已经说完了。

29. Advice to young investment professionals

给年轻的专业投资者的建议

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7?

沃伦·巴菲特：第七号？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is David Saber (PH), shareholder from Minneapolis, Minnesota. Looking for some advice you might give the young professionals here.

观众成员：早上好。我叫大卫·萨伯（音），来自明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯的股东。想请教您对这里年轻专业人士的一些建议。

I could be classified as one of those helpers you describe in your annual report. In fact, most of my friends are helpers, and some could be classified as super helpers.

我可以被归类为您在年度报告中描述的那些助手之一。事实上，我的大多数朋友都是助手，有些甚至可以被归类为超级助手。

Most would love to step out and explore some of their more innovative ideas, innovative business models, strategies, and things of that nature.

大多数人都希望走出去，探索他们一些更具创新性的想法、创新的商业模式、策略以及类似的事物。

But the risk of giving up a significant salary, health insurance, flights, other ridiculous corporate perks some of us young professionals earn.

但是，放弃可观的薪水、健康保险、航班和其他一些我们这些年轻专业人士所享受的“荒谬”的企业福利的风险，让他们犹豫不决。

What advice would you have for us in pursuing those dreams?

您对我们追求这些梦想有什么建议？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, what do you think?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s certainly a lot more helpers in the economy than there used to be, and the ones that come here tend to be the very best of the helper class.

查理·芒格：嗯，经济中确实有比过去更多的助手，而来到这里的往往是助手阶层中最优秀的。

So, I don’t think you should judge the helper class by those you meet here. We get the best of them.

所以，我认为你不应该根据你在这里遇到的人来评判助理的群体。我们接触到的是最优秀的。

And as to what the young helpers ought to do so that they’ll eventually be like Warren Buffett, I would say the best thing you can do is reduce your expectations. (Laughter and applause)

至于年轻的助手们应该怎么做才能最终像沃伦·巴菲特一样，我会说你能做的最好的事情就是降低你的期望。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think I’ve heard that before.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我以前听过这个。

Well, you know, as I wrote about — and I — trying to tweak the system a little bit — but it is an interesting business in that the activities of the professionals are self-neutralizing.

好吧，正如我在年报中所写的——我试图稍微调整一下系统——这是一个有趣的行业，因为专业人士的活动是自我中和的。

And if you’re going to — if your wife is going to have a baby — you’re going to be better off if you call an obstetrician, probably, than if you do it yourself. You know, and if your plumbing pipes are clogged or something, you’re probably better off calling a plumber.

如果你要——如果你的妻子要生孩子——你最好还是找个产科医生，而不是自己动手。你知道的，如果你的水管堵了或者出了什么问题，你可能还是找个水管工比较好。

Most professions have value added to them above what the laymen can accomplish themselves. In aggregate, the investment profession does not do that.

大多数职业都比外行能自己完成的工作有更高的附加值。总体而言，投资行业并没有做到这一点。

So you have a huge group of people making — I put the estimate as $140 billion a year — that, in aggregate, are, and can, only accomplish what somebody can do, you know, in ten minutes a year by themselves.

所以你有一大群人，我估计每年要花1400亿美元，他们总共只能够做到某个人一年只需花十分钟就能完成的事情。

And it’s hard to think of another business like that, Charlie.

很难想到还有其他类似的生意，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t think of any.

查理·芒格：我想不到。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：没有。

But it’s become a bigger and bigger business.

但这已经成为一个越来越大的生意。

And, as I’ve pointed out in the report, the main thing that’s been learned is that the more you charge, at least temporarily, the more money you bring in, that people have this idea that price equals value.

正如我在报告中指出的，主要的经验是，至少在短期内，你收取的费用越高，你带来的收入就越多，人们有这样的想法，即价格等于价值。

It’s useful to get into a business like that.

进入这样的行业是有用的。

Sometimes, if I’m talking to the people at a business school and I ask them what the — what a great — to name me a great business — and, of course, one of the great businesses is a business school because, basically, the more you charge, the more your prestige is, to some extent.

有时，如果我在商业学校与人交谈，问他们什么是伟大的生意，当然，一个伟大的生意就是商学院，因为基本上，收费越高，声望在某种程度上就越高。

And people think that a business school that charges 50,000 a year tuition is going to be better than one that charges 10,000 a year of tuition.

人们认为每年收取 5 万学费的商学院会比每年收取 1 万学费的商学院更好。

So there’s some of that that — well, there’s a lot of that that’s gotten into the investment field recently, and you now have large — certain large — portions of investment management that are charging fees that, in aggregate, cannot work out for investors.

所以，这些——嗯，最近在投资领域出现了很多这样的情况，你现在会看到，投资管理的大部分收费，累计起来，对投资者来说是无法获得回报的。

Now, obviously some do, you know. But you cannot be paying people 2 percent and 20 percent where they get up it in the good years, and they fold their partnerships and start another one if they have a bad year and that sort of thing.

现在，显然有些人确实这样做了，你知道的。但是你不能在好年头给人们支付 2%和 20%的费用，而在他们遇到坏年头时，他们就解散合伙关系并重新开始，这种事情。

You can’t have that coming out of an economy that’s only going to produce, we’ll say, you know, 7 percent or something like that a year for investors, and have people net better off. It isn’t going to work.

你不能指望一个每年只为投资者带来 7% 或类似收益的经济体，还能让人民的净收益更高。这行不通。

And then the question that you will have is, “How do I pick out the few exceptions?” And everyone that calls upon you to sell you this will tell you that they are an exception.

然后你会问：“我该如何挑选出少数例外？”而每个打电话给你推销的人都会告诉你他们是个例外。

And, I am willing to bet a significant sum of money, we’ll put it up, to anybody who wants to name ten partnerships that are $500 million or more of management and pit those, after fees, against the S&P over a ten-year period.

我愿意打一个相当大的赌注，我们会拿出来，给任何想要列出十个管理规模在 5 亿美元或以上的合伙企业的人，并在扣除费用后，在十年内把这些合伙人放在一起，与标准普尔指数进行对比。

It — you know, it gets away from the survivorship bias and all that kind of a thing. And it isn’t going to happen.

你知道，这样就避开了幸存者偏差和所有那类事情。这不可能发生。

But a few will do well. They’re bound to do well.

但是，少数会做得很好。他们注定会做得很好。

And, actually, I think I do know how to pick a few that will do well. I mean, I did it in the past.

而且，实际上，我想我确实知道如何挑选一些表现不错的。我是说，我过去就这么做过。

When I wound up my own partnership in 1969, I told people to go to either Bill Ruane or Sandy Gottesman, and that would have been a very good decision, whichever place they went.

当我在 1969 年结束自己的合伙企业时，我告诉人们去找比尔·鲁安或桑迪·戈特斯曼，无论他们去哪里，这都会是一个非常好的决定。

So, if you know enough about the person, know enough how they’ve done it in the past, know enough about their personality, honesty, and a whole bunch of things, I think that occasionally you can make a very intelligent choice in picking an investment manager.

所以，如果你对这个人了解得足够多，了解他们过去是如何做到的，了解他们的个性、诚实以及许多其他方面，我认为有时你可以在选择投资经理时做出非常明智的选择。

But I don’t think you can do it if you’re sitting running a pension fund in some state and you have 50 people calling on you.

但我认为如果你坐在某个州管理一个养老金基金，并且有 50 个人找你，你是做不到的。

You’re going to go with the ones that are the best salespeople and not the ones that are the best investors. Charlie?

你会选择那些最好的销售人员，而不是那些最好的投资者。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. On that state pension fund investment subject, I think it ought to be a crime to entertain, in any way, a state pension fund official, and I think it ought to be a crime, if you are a state pension fund official, to accept the entertainment.

查理·芒格：是的。关于州养老金基金投资的问题，我认为招待任何州养老金基金官员应该被视为犯罪，我认为如果你是州养老金基金官员，接受招待也应该被视为犯罪。

It’s not a pretty scene, a lot of investment management, in America now. And, human nature being what it is and the amounts of money being what they are, I don’t think much is going to be improved.

现在，美国的投资管理领域并不乐观。由于人性使然以及涉及的资金数额巨大，我认为不会有太多改善。

30. Break for lunch

午餐休息

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we wanted to leave you in a good mood for lunch. So — (laughter) — we will break now, and we’ll come back in about 45 minutes or so.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们希望让你们心情愉快地去吃午饭。所以——（笑声）——我们现在休息一下，大约 45 分钟后回来。

And those of you who are in the other rooms, by then the crowd thins, for some explainable reason, and you can all join us here in the main room. And we’ll be back in about 45 minutes.

而在其他会场的你们，到那时人群会因为某种可以解释的原因而减少，你们都可以加入我们这里的主会场。我们将在大约 45 分钟后回来。

Afternoon session

下午场

31. Buffett favors path to citizenship for some illegal immigrants

巴菲特支持为部分非法移民提供入籍途径

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to zone 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们将前往第 8 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Where’s the light?

观众成员：灯在哪里？

Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett. First of all, I want to thank you for responding to all my letters throughout the years. I will always treasure them.

下午好，巴菲特先生。首先，我要感谢您多年来回复我所有的信件。我会永远珍惜它们。

Last week, demonstrations in many cities across the United States took place on the subject of illegal immigration. Many companies want to stay in the U.S. but have grown dependent on cheap, illegal labor as a way to remain globally competitive.

上周，美国各地许多城市就非法移民问题举行了示威活动。许多公司希望留在美国，但为了在全球竞争中保持竞争力，它们越来越依赖廉价的非法劳动力。

A recent Businessweek article describes Shaw’s competitor, Mohawk Carpets, and their employment of illegal immigrants. If illegal immigration reform were to occur, how would you see this affecting Shaw, Clayton, and other Berkshire subsidiaries?

最近的一篇《商业周刊》文章描述了 Shaw 的竞争对手 Mohawk 地毯公司及其雇用非法移民的情况。如果非法移民改革发生，您认为这将如何影响 Shaw、Clayton 和其他伯克希尔的子公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I didn’t read that, and I don’t know much about the Mohawk situation. I don’t — I don’t know anything about it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我没有读过那个，我对莫霍克的情况不太了解。我——我对此一无所知。

I’m sure in Nebraska, you know, there are very substantial numbers of illegal immigrants employed. Meatpacking has been an area that a number have gone into.

我确信在内布拉斯加州，你知道，有相当多的非法移民被雇用。肉类加工是他们进入的一个领域。

And I actually was down at the Omaha airport about 2 years ago, and there was a very large plane there, and I saw these — well over 100 people that were in shackles that were being put on that plane.

大约两年前，我确实在奥马哈机场，那里有一架非常大的飞机，我看到这些——有一百多人被戴上镣铐，被送上那架飞机。

I kind of wondered what they did, if they ever had some kind of emergency on the plane. But they were being deported. So there’s a lot of it goes on in Nebraska.

我有点想知道，如果飞机上发生紧急情况，他们会怎么做。但他们正在被驱逐出境。所以在内布拉斯加州经常发生这种情况。

You know, I think it’s a problem that should be addressed and addressed promptly. I don’t believe in shipping 11 million people back away from the United States. Whatever acceptable way that the country can handle giving those people citizenship, I, basically, would support.

我认为这是一个需要及时解决的问题。我不相信将1100万人送回美国的做法。无论是什么可接受的方式，能够让这些人获得公民身份，我基本上都会支持。

I think we ought to enforce the rules in the future. I think they ought to be liberal rules, but I think they ought to be enforced.

我认为我们应该在未来加强法律的执行。我认为这些规则应该是宽松的，但应该得到执行。

But I don’t think it would make dramatic differences. I mean, if one meatpacking plant employs people at subpar wages, you know, the rest of them are going to do the same thing.

但我认为这不会带来显著的差异。我的意思是，如果一家肉类加工厂以低于标准的工资雇佣员工，你知道，其他工厂也会这样做。

You may end up paying a little bit more for meat in the end, but I do not think it would have a dramatic effect on the economy or even on specific industries, except to change, maybe, relative prices a bit.

最终你可能会多花一点钱买肉，但我认为这不会对经济或特定行业产生显著影响，除了可能稍微改变相对价格。

But I don’t think it would have a dramatic effect on the economy if the people that are here illegally became legal in some manner.

但我认为，如果非法居留的人以某种方式合法化，这不会对经济产生显著影响。

You know, who’s to say if Charlie and I had been born into some terrible situation in some other country, we wouldn’t have tried to get into this place ourselves.

谁能说如果查理和我生在其他国家的糟糕境况下，我们自己不会试图进入这个地方呢？

So it’s a — I’m pretty empathetic with it, but I believe that we do need to have laws that are enforced in the future. I don’t think we should send 11 million people back.

所以我对此非常有同感，但我相信我们确实需要在未来执行法律。我不认为我们应该把 1100 万人送回去。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you don’t like the results, I think you should get used to it because we never seem to have the will to enforce the immigration laws. I just think that what you’ve seen is what you’re going to get.

查理·芒格：如果你不喜欢这个结果，我我认为你应该适应，因为我们似乎从来没有意愿去执行移民法。我认为你所看到的就是你将要得到的结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t — in terms of the carpet industry specifically — you mentioned Clayton Homes. I wouldn’t — I would think the mobile manufactured housing industry — I’d be surprised if there was any unusual number at all of illegal immigrants, but I — the answer is, I don’t know that for sure.

沃伦·巴菲特：至于地毯行业的具体情况——你提到克莱顿住宅。我认为移动预制房屋行业——我会很惊讶其中有任何异常数量的非法移民，但我——答案是，我不确定。

But I don’t see any change in those industries.

但是我不认为这些行业会有任何变化。

32. Business schools have improved “considerably”

商学院已经“显著”改善

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9?

沃伦·巴菲特：第九？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name is Jeremy Cleaver (PH), and I come from Lawrence, Kansas. I’m a Jayhawk.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我的名字是杰里米·克利弗（音），我来自堪萨斯州的劳伦斯。我是一个 Jayhawk。

And what do believe is the best finance program in the U.S.? (Buffett laughs)

你认为美国最好的金融项目是什么？（巴菲特笑）

Also, I will be graduating in a year. Could you compare and contrast the financing opportunities now and when you graduated college?

另外，我将于一年后毕业。您能比较一下现在的融资机会和您大学毕业时的机会吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: He comes from a school that has set some classes up in the last couple years that are absolutely terrific.

沃伦·巴菲特：他来自一所学校，该校在过去几年开设了一些绝对出色的课程。

I’ve had — I will have in this school year, probably close to 40 schools where the students come out. And now I usually double up schools, because 20 of these a year is about all I can handle.

在这个学年，我已经有——我将会有大约接待 40 所学校的学生。现在我通常会把学校合并，因为一年 20 所学校是我能应付的极限。

And we’ve had some terrific groups come out. And I would say that the teaching in finance departments, based on what I’ve seen, has improved quite a bit over 20 years ago. But that was from a very, very low base.

我们接待了很多优秀的团队。根据我的观察，金融系的教学比 20 年前有了很大改善。但那是从一个非常非常低的基础开始的。

The orthodoxy of 20 or so years ago where, really, you know, the flat Earth was being embraced, has improved considerably.

大约 20 年前，地平理论被广泛接受的正统观念已经有了显著改善。

And one particular place is KU. Professor Hirschey has done a great job. (Applause)

一个特别的地方是堪萨斯大学。Hirschey 教授做得很好。（掌声）

Missouri, Florida, Columbia, a lot of good schools — Stanford — have got people in those departments that are doing a very good job.

密苏里州、佛罗里达州、哥伦比亚，有很多好的学校——斯坦福——在这些学校里都有优秀的人才。

And 25 years ago, you’d have had a tough job getting a position at a finance department, and you certainly would have had your advancement stifled, unless you went along with the orthodoxy: efficient markets and modern portfolio theory and a lot of stuff that, not only wouldn’t do you any good, but might get you in trouble.

25 年前，你很难在财务部门找到一个职位，如果你不遵循正统观念，你的晋升肯定会受到阻碍：有效市场、现代投资组合理论以及许多不仅对你没有好处，反而可能让你陷入麻烦的东西。

And that has — that’s improved a lot. And I enjoy seeing these groups of students as they come out, because it’s quite encouraging. Now, they all think they’re going to get rich by, sort of, copying what Charlie and I did many, many years ago. I wish them well.

这已经——改善了很多。我很高兴看到这些学生群体的涌现，因为这很令人鼓舞。现在，他们都认为通过模仿查理和我多年前所做的事情，他们会变得富有。我祝他们好运。

It’s — the amount of brain power going into money management gets a little distressing, particularly to Charlie. But I would — you know, it’s a great time to be 22 or 23 or 25 and getting out of school.

投入到资金管理中的脑力有点令人不安，特别是对查理来说。但我会说，现在是 22 岁、23 岁或 25 岁并刚刚毕业的人的好时机。

So, you can look ahead to a very — I think a very interesting future in this country, even though you may find that the method of using the talents you have in investing get used in a somewhat different manner than where they — where they’re used presently.

所以，我认为你可以期待这个国家一个非常有趣的未来，尽管你可能会发现你在投资中使用才能的方法与目前使用的方式有所不同。

I mean, right now an awful lot of the students that come to visit Omaha say private equity or hedge fund, and it’s hard to imagine a world where everybody is running a hedge fund. I’m not sure exactly what we would do for food and clothing, and a few things like that.

我的意思是，现在很多来奥马哈参观的学生都说私募股权或对冲基金，很难想象一个人人都在经营对冲基金的世界。我不太确定我们会如何解决食物和衣服之类的问题。

But I am encouraged by the kind of students I meet. When the KU group comes up — we had a great time. They put on various skits. They tried to sell me companies. I’m hoping they succeed.

但我对我遇到的学生感到鼓舞。当堪萨斯大学的团队出现时——我们度过了一段美好的时光。他们表演了各种小品。他们试图向我推销公司。我希望他们成功。

We haven’t had any luck yet, but they keep coming up with good ideas, and I’ll keep pursuing them. And one of these days, every one of those students will get — I’ve offered them two B shares, and that’s a limited-time offer to try to spur extra activity.

我们还没有运气，但他们不断提出好主意，我会继续追求这些想法。总有一天，每个学生都会得到——我已经向他们提供了两股 B 类股份，这是一个限时优惠，旨在激励更多的活动。

And I hear from a lot of students later, and I think a lot of them have their heads screwed on right. Charlie?

我后来听到很多学生的反馈，我觉得他们中很多人都很有头脑。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve heard that something like half of the business school graduates in the elite eastern schools want to go into private equity or hedge funds.

查理·芒格：嗯，我听说在东部精英学校的商学院毕业生中，大约有一半想进入私募股权或对冲基金行业。

And those whom I bump into seem to judge their progress in life as to whether or not they’re keeping up with their age cohort at Goldman Sachs. That appears to be the minimum standard by which progress of life is measured, and this can’t possibly end well. (Laughter)

那些我碰到的人似乎根据他们是否跟上了高盛的同龄人来判断他们的人生进展。这似乎是衡量人生进步的最低标准，而这不可能有好的结果。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You can see why they come —

沃伦·巴菲特：你可以明白他们为什么来——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — in terms of satisfying all these expectations.

查理·芒格：——在满足所有这些期望方面。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why they come to see me instead of Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是为什么他们来找我而不是查理。（笑声）

He’d give them better advice, don’t misunderstand me, but go away with very long faces.

他会给他们更好的建议，别误会我的意思，但他们会带着很长的脸离开。

33. New CEO will go through a “media probation-type affair”

新任首席执行官将经历“媒体试用期”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10?

沃伦·巴菲特：第十个？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My namaste and good afternoon to Swamiji and respected Charlie Munger. Yes, I did say “Swamiji.” I see your inner dress crowned by your truth, by your humbleness, by your simplicity.

观众成员：我向尊敬的查理·芒格问好，下午好。是的，我说了“尊敬的”。我看到了你内心的光辉，代表了真理、谦卑和简单。

But your outer dress — I mean your wealth — is for the needy, at large. So you look upon us, your children, your friends, and your partners.

但你的外衣——我是说你的财富——是为了广大有需要的人。所以你看着我们，你的孩子，你的朋友和你的伙伴。

My name is Shekhar Agarwal. I’m from Sugarland, Texas, suburb of Houston.

我的名字是谢卡尔·阿加瓦尔。我来自德克萨斯州休斯顿郊区的糖城。

Since May ’99, I got interested in Berkshire Hathaway. And I have read a lot of what you have written. So, I can judge a little about you.

自 1999 年 5 月以来，我对伯克希尔·哈撒韦产生了兴趣。我读了很多你写的东西。所以，我可以对你做出一点判断。

By the way, I bought B shares March 3, 2000, at 1410 before they hit the low on March 10, and it became at that time 40 percent of my portfolio, and I still own all those shares and many more.

顺便说一下，我在 2000 年 3 月 3 日以 1410 的价格购买了 B 股，然后在 3 月 10 日触底之前，它当时占我投资组合的 40%，我现在仍然持有所有这些股票，还有更多。

As you tell the students who come to Omaha to run a portfolio with real money to have a real feeling and real learning, I had the same experience with you.

当你告诉来奥马哈的学生用真钱管理投资组合以获得真实感受和真实学习时，我也有同样的经历。

You know, three years back, I had a chance, with my wife, my daughter, and my 6-year-old son, who is with me today, to spend a few minutes with you when you came to Houston during the opening of a new Star Furniture store.

你知道，三年前，我和我的妻子、女儿以及今天和我在一起的 6 岁儿子有机会在你来休斯顿参加一家新的Star Furniture store开业时与你共度几分钟。

As we were posing for a family picture with you, my 6-year little one was standing just beside you, while you were sitting on a high-bar chair. And you said to this stranger, “Son” — you said — “Son, you come and sit in my lap.” Sir, Swamiji, that is your simplicity. That is your humbleness.

当我们和您一起拍家庭照时，我六岁的小孩就站在您旁边，而您坐在高脚椅上。您对这个陌生人说：“儿子”——您说——“儿子，你来坐在我腿上。”先生，斯瓦米吉，这就是您的简单。这就是您的谦逊。

And you talk about the contribution of Ajit Jain and ask us to bend really down if we see him, or name our children Tony to honor his contribution. Well, 40 years of selfless services to this corporation and to the humanity, you rightly deserve this distinction or this title of ”Swamiji.”

你谈到 Ajit Jain 的贡献，并让我们在见到他时深深鞠躬，或者给我们的孩子取名为 Tony 以表彰他的贡献。嗯，40 年的无私服务于这家公司和人类，你确实值得获得这个荣誉或“Swamiji”这个称号。

There is a beautiful, beautiful — (Applause) — beautiful prayer in the Holy Vedas that says “tvam jīvehiṁ śaddhā-śataṁ.” It means, “The Almighty God says, ‘Oh, my child, may you live hundred and longer peacefully.’”

在《神圣吠陀》中有一个美丽的、美丽的——（掌声）——美丽的祈祷，祈祷词是“tvam jīvehiṁ śaddhā-śataṁ。”意思是，“全能的上帝说，‘哦，我的孩子，愿你平安地活到一百岁甚至更长。’”

So that’s my wish. That’s my prayer on your 75th birthday. And, Swamiji, I’m waiting for my chance to touch your feet and get your blessings. (Applause)

所以这就是我的愿望。这是我在您 75 岁生日时的祈祷。而且，斯瓦米吉，我在等待机会触摸您的脚并获得您的祝福。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Let me finish, please. Swamiji, I have a question anyway. (Laughter)

观众成员：请让我说完。斯瓦米吉，我无论如何都有一个问题。（笑声）

A lot of business people have a great amount of respect and trust for this 75-years-young teenager girl who is sitting by the phone waiting for it to ring, and now and then that phone rings.

许多商界人士对这位 75 岁仍充满活力的少女怀有极大的尊重和信任，她正坐在电话旁等待电话响起，而电话时不时会响。

I have no concern about the next CEO of Berkshire Hathaway to take this company forward, but I do wonder about this phone. It may not ring as often as it does now, until the new CEO earns the respect and the trust of these phone dialers.

我对伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的下一任首席执行官带领公司前进没有担忧，但我确实对这部电话感到好奇。在新任首席执行官赢得这些拨电话者的尊重和信任之前，它可能不会像现在这样经常响起。

Do you see that a concern? And do you think it is a good idea that you may become the only chairman, and let someone else become the CEO, and let him earn the respect and trust under your umbrella while you are still young and healthy? Thank you very much.

你认为这是一个问题吗？你觉得成为唯一的董事长是个好主意吗？让其他人成为 CEO，并在你的庇护下赢得尊重和信任，而你仍然年轻健康？非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。谢谢。（掌声）

I don’t think there’s any question, but — that my successor, you know, will go through, sort of, a media probation-type affair for a year or so.

我认为毫无疑问，我的继任者会经历一年的媒体考验。

And people will, understandably, wonder whether the culture is going to be different under the successor than it’s been at this point.

人们会情有可原地想知道，在继任者的领导下，文化是否会与目前有所不同。

That’s going to happen. It won’t be the end of the world. It will mean that the phone will — it — the phone probably won’t ring less, it will just be a different kind of suitor that is calling.

这将会发生。这不会是世界末日。这意味着电话——它——电话可能不会少响，只是打来的是不同类型的追求者。

The investment bankers will all try out this guy to see if he’s softer than I am and wants to participate in auctions and all of that sort of thing.

投资银行家们都会试探这个人，看看他是否比我更软弱，是否愿意参与拍卖和类似的事情。

But I think it will become evident — and it will take a year, two years, maybe — I think it will become evident that the culture is the same, that the yardsticks, the metrics, the attitude towards shareholders, the whole thing, will not change, the board will not change.

但我认为这将变得显而易见——可能需要一年、两年，也许——我认为这将变得显而易见，文化是相同的，衡量标准、指标、对股东的态度，整体而言，都不会改变，董事会也不会改变。

But I think there will be a hiatus of sorts where people do not have the same feeling immediately that joining Berkshire is going to be the same experience as it — with our companies — as its been in the past. But it won’t last long.

但我认为会有一段时间，人们不会立即觉得加入伯克希尔会像过去那样与我们的公司有相同的体验。但这种情况不会持续很久。

I can tell you that the successors that the board has in mind — you know, they’re very smart. They understand. They’ve bought into the whole corporate personality we have.

我可以告诉你，董事会心目中的继任者——你知道，他们非常聪明。他们理解。他们已经认同了我们整个公司的个性。

And they will develop — be somewhat different in style, but they will — they will develop the confidence of the world that — and to possible sellers of businesses — they will develop the confidence that it’s going to be the same Berkshire going forward.

他们将会发展——风格上可能会有所不同，但他们会——他们会让世界对他们产生信心——以及对可能的企业卖家——他们会让人们相信未来的伯克希尔将保持不变。

But it’s a good question. And there will be — there will be a period when the phone won’t ring for a while until people realize that Berkshire is, sort of, one-of-a-kind, and it’s continuing to be one-of-a-kind.

但这是个好问题。会有一段时间，电话不会响，直到人们意识到伯克希尔是独一无二的，并且将继续是独一无二的。

I don’t think it would work well, you know — but it’s the kind of the thing we talk over with the board, though — but I don’t think it works well to have, sort of, a half-and-half arrangement.

我认为这不会很好地运作，你知道的——但这是我们和董事会讨论的事情——但我不认为这种半对半的安排会很好地运作。

I mean, you could say that I could handle, or encourage the handling, of the deals and somebody else could, sort of, be the operating guy. But the truth is, we don’t need an operating guy.

我的意思是，你可以说我可以处理或鼓励处理这些交易，而其他人可以算是运营人员。但事实是，我们不需要一个运营人员。

You know, we’ve got people running the businesses that are running them, and they’re very good at it. And the main thing to do is to not destroy or damage the spirit they bring to it and the fact that they like this method of operation.

你知道，我们有一些人在经营这些企业，他们非常擅长这项工作。最重要的是不要破坏或损害他们带来的精神，以及他们喜欢这种运营方式的事实。

So it would — I’m not sure what a chief operating officer would do at Berkshire except expose the fact that I wasn’t doing anything. (Laughter)

所以，我不确定在伯克希尔首席运营官会做什么，除了揭露我什么都没做。（笑声）

And as long as I’m around, they’re not going to get the calls on the deals. I mean, people are going to want to talk to me. I mean, that’s not a handoff that would work.

只要我在，他们就不会接到交易的电话。人们想与我交谈。这不是一种能够顺利交接的方式。

So I think we’ll go along in this mode. And, you know, you will have a period, everybody — there will be stories a year after I die that, you know, says one year later and what’s happened and all that sort of thing, but that will fade out.

所以我想我们会以这种方式继续下去。而且，你知道的，在我去世一年后，会有一些报道说一年后发生了什么之类的事情，但这些都会逐渐消失。

And my successor will put his own particular stamp on the place, but he won’t mess with the culture. They’re too smart. They’ve seen it work too well. So that — the calls will start coming in again after a while.

我的继任者会在这个地方留下他自己的印记，但他不会破坏文化。他们太聪明了。他们已经看到它运作得非常好。所以，过一段时间电话就会再次打进来。

We will still represent, sort of, a one-of-a-kind place for the owner that really cares about the future of his business.

我们仍将代表一个独一无二的地方，为真正关心其业务未来的业主服务。

For one reason or another — tax reasons, family division of shares or something — you know, they have to — they have to solve the ownership problem.

由于某种原因——税务原因、家庭分割股份或其他原因——他们必须解决所有权问题。

But they want to solve it in a way that really doesn’t change the psychic ownership of the place and the management of the place. And they can’t find that elsewhere, and they’ll continue to find it at Berkshire.

但他们希望以一种真正不改变企业心理所有权和管理方式的方式解决这一问题。他们无法在其他地方找到这种解决方案，而在伯克希尔会继续找到。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, speaking for the Munger heirs, I would rather the current method of operation continue to wring the last drop of good out of Warren. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，代表芒格的继承人，我宁愿目前的运作方式继续从沃伦身上榨取最后一滴好处。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: At low pay.

沃伦·巴菲特：以低薪。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, yes.

查理·芒格：是的，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Part of Charlie’s instructions under all circumstances.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是查理在任何情况下的指示。

No, if we — if we thought there was some better way to make this place function better or to even make the transition easier to the next person, you know, we’d be delighted.

不，如果我们——如果我们认为有更好的方法让这个地方运作得更好，或者甚至让下一个人的过渡更容易，你知道，我们会很高兴。

But I really think it’s going to work pretty darn well. If I die tonight, the person who will take over tomorrow will not get as many phone calls for a while, perhaps, but very, very smart people. Know the business. You know, they know a lot about all businesses. They’ve got a general business knowledge.

但我真的认为这会非常顺利。如果我今晚去世，明天接任的人可能会有一段时间不接到那么多电话，但这些人都是非常聪明的人。他们了解业务，知道各行各业的事情。他们有很强的商业知识。

I use “they” because there’s three candidates, but there would be one specific one in mind. They know how to make deals. These people are plenty deal-savvy, and they know how to avoid other kinds of deals, which is equally important.

我用“他们”是因为有三个候选人，但心里会有一个特定的。他们知道如何做交易。这些人非常精通交易，他们也知道如何避免其他类型的交易，这同样重要。

And the world would not fully grasp that for a year, maybe even two years. But once it happened, you can argue that it would be even stronger than before because at that point people would realize that it was institutionalized and not just a person.

世界可能在一两年内不会完全意识到这一点。但一旦发生，你可以说这可能会比以前更强，因为到那时人们会意识到，这已经制度化，而不仅仅是依靠某一个人。

You’ve got a — kind of a hat — I mean, I don’t want to compare myself because it’s not in the same league, but, you know, everybody, when Sam Walton died in, I think, 1991 or something, wondered whether Walmart would continue in the same tradition.

你有一种——我不想把自己与之相比较，因为这不是同一个级别，但你知道，1991年，山姆·沃尔顿去世时，大家都在想沃尔玛是否会继续保持传统。

Well, the fact that it did has made that place a lot stronger than if it had just depended on the guy in the pickup truck. I mean, it was not — it was the creation of one person at Walmart, but it was not required for the continuation at all. And we’re not in the same league, but it’s the same idea.

实际上，它能够继续运作使得这个地方比依赖那个坐在皮卡车上的人更加强大。它不是一个人的创造，但并不需要一个人来维持它。我们不是同一个级别，但想法是一样的。

34. Go with your gut when picking a charity

在选择慈善机构时要跟随直觉

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Martin Wiegand from Chevy Chase, Maryland. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, on behalf of the assembled shareholders, we thank you and all the Berkshire staff who put so much work and thought into making this weekend such a wonderful community-building event. (Applause)

观众成员：我叫马丁·维根，来自马里兰州的切维查斯。巴菲特先生和芒格先生，代表在场的股东们，我们感谢您和所有为这个周末活动付出努力和思考的伯克希尔员工，让这个社区建设活动变得如此美好。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Martin, is Janie (PH) with you?

沃伦·巴菲特：马丁，珍妮（PH）和你在一起吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir.

观众成员：是的，先生。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Well, she sent me some great sweetbreads the other day. I love them. Keep them coming. Thank you. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。嗯，她前几天给我送了一些很棒的甜面包。我很喜欢。继续送来吧。谢谢。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Through the years, you have generously helped us thinking through capital allocation decisions for funding our businesses and feeding our families.

观众成员：多年来，您慷慨地帮助我们思考资金配置决策，以支持我们的业务和养活我们的家庭。

Would you please help us think through the capital allocation decisions we face when it comes to charitable giving, particularly as it concerns how we pick effective charities? Thank you.

请您帮我们思考在慈善捐赠方面面临的资本分配决策，特别是关于我们如何选择有效的慈善机构？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, it’s tough to give other people advice on that. But, you know, you have to pick the things that are important to you. And, you know, many people — majority in the United States — it’s their church. You know, there’s more money given to churches than anything else.

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，给别人建议是很难的。但是，你知道，你必须选择对你重要的事情。而且，你知道，很多人——美国的大多数人——他们的教会。你知道，捐给教会的钱比其他任何东西都多。

Many people — very many people — it’s their school, or schools generally. You know, I think, to a great extent, you should pick whatever gives you the most satisfaction, and that will probably be something that you know, something you’ve, maybe, benefited from yourself.

许多人——非常多人——是他们的学校，或者一般的学校。你知道，我认为，在很大程度上，你应该选择能给你带来最大满足感的东西，那可能是你了解的东西，也许是你自己受益过的东西。

I look at it a little differently. The amount of funds are different, too, but I like to think of things that are important but that don’t have natural funding constituencies.

我对此有些不同的看法。资金的数量也不同，但我喜欢考虑那些重要但没有自然资金支持的事情。

But that isn’t something, you know, for millions of people to be following as an example or something. Nothing wrong with doing something that gives you plenty of personal satisfaction and does some good for other people in the process.

但这不是数百万人应该效仿的例子。做一些让你个人感到满意并在此过程中对他人有益的事情没有错。

So I would not be reluctant — I would not feel I had to be as objective about that, necessarily, as I was about buying securities or something of the sort. I would, kind of, go where my gut led me and make it something you participate in.

所以我不会犹豫——我不会觉得我必须像购买证券或类似的事情那样客观。我会跟随直觉，参与其中。

And, like I say, I think if you’re doing it with large sums, you may have some reason, maybe even some obligation, to try and think about where really large sums can have an important impact on a societal problem that might not get attention otherwise. And, you know, that’s, sort of, where my own thinking leads me.

而且，正如我所说，我认为如果你在处理大笔资金，你可能有一些理由，甚至可能有某种义务，去思考这些巨额资金在某个社会问题上能产生重要影响，而这个问题可能不会得到其他关注。而且，你知道，这就是我的思考方向。

But I would — I would go with something where I felt I knew where the money was going to go and I knew some good was going to come out of it. And maybe, by observing what took place, I could make the next gift more efficient than the last gift and more beneficial.

但我会选择一些我觉得知道钱会去向何处的事情，并且我知道会有一些好的结果。也许，通过观察所发生的事情，我可以让下一个捐赠比上一个更有效率，更有益。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. But I have a question: would you pour me a cup of coffee? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。但我有一个问题：你能给我倒一杯咖啡吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t sell coffee, Charlie. We sell Coke. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，我们不卖咖啡。我们卖可乐。（笑声）

We get the profit on one out of every 12 Cokes. So I don’t care whether you drink them, just open the can. (Laughter)

我们每卖出 12 罐可乐就能赚一罐的利润。所以我不在乎你是否喝它们，只要打开罐子就行。（笑声）

35. We like the regulated utility business the way it is

我们喜欢现有的受监管的公用事业业务

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十二号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Robert Piton (PH) from Chicago, Illinois.

观众成员：下午好。我的名字是罗伯特·皮顿（PH），来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。

And my question is, did the possible future deployment of telecommunications services over power lines factor into Berkshire’s decision to invest in the utility space? Thank you.

我的问题是，未来可能通过电力线路部署电信服务是否影响了伯克希尔在公用事业领域的投资决策？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The answer is no. We’re in the utility business — the regulated utility business — because we like the business as is.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。答案是否定的。我们从事公用事业业务——受监管的公用事业业务——因为我们喜欢目前的业务。

Where it leads, you know, will be determined — well, in specific states — by what they want us to do and maybe by technological changes, generally.

它将通向何方，你知道，将由特定州决定——取决于他们希望我们做什么，也可能取决于技术变革。

But we’re going to earn a return on capital employed if we do an efficient job, keep consumers happy, whether we transmit it the old way or, you know, some new processes come along.

但是，如果我们高效地完成工作，让消费者满意，无论是通过旧方式传输，还是采用一些新的流程，我们都将获得资本回报。

So it’s a business where we’re trying to be efficient, which means serving our customers while keeping their costs down as much as possible. And we will — even in terms of what generating sources we use — we are following the will of the people in the states in which we operate.

所以这是一个我们努力提高效率的业务，这意味着在尽可能降低成本的同时为客户服务。即使在我们使用的发电来源方面，我们也遵循我们运营所在州人民的意愿。

There are different costs associated with different forms of generation. And we feel that if people want to elect a more expensive way to generate electricity but one that they’re more comfortable with in terms of the environment, you know, that’s the decision of the people whose state in which we operate.

不同形式的发电方式有不同的成本。我们认为，如果人们希望选择一种更昂贵但在环境方面让他们更安心的发电方式，那就是我们运营所在州的人民的决定。

And we — so I do not see us — I don’t see any large developments that change the economics of what we’re doing. And we’re certainly not going in — we’re not buying an electric utility because we expect it to generate revenues from activities other than that.

我们——所以我不认为我们——我不认为有任何大的发展会改变我们正在做的事情的经济性。而且我们当然不会去——我们不会购买电力公司，因为我们期望它从其他活动中产生收入。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。

36. “Media businesses do not have a great outlook”

“媒体行业的前景不太乐观”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. First, my name is Egil Dahl. I’m a retailer from Norway. I would like first to thank you gentlemen for the opportunity to come here and ask two of the best businessmen in the world a question.

观众成员：好的。首先，我的名字是埃吉尔·达尔。我是来自挪威的零售商。首先，我想感谢各位先生给我这个机会来到这里，向世界上最优秀的两位商人提问。

My question is regarding the media and entertainment business. Do you think that the nature of newspapers, magazine, television, and maybe movie and music business as well, are about to change permanently and become less predictable because of new technology and internet?

我的问题是关于媒体和娱乐行业的。你认为报纸、杂志、电视，或许还有电影和音乐行业的性质，会因为新技术和互联网而永久改变并变得不那么可预测吗？

And the second part is, if not so, do you think that some of these businesses represent good purchases at the moment because the market thinks so? Thank you.

第二部分是，如果不是这样，您是否认为其中一些企业目前是不错的购买机会，因为市场是这样认为的？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, people are always going to want to be entertained and they’re going to want to be informed and some mix thereof. But, you know, we only have two eyeballs, and we only have 24 hours a day.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，人们总是想要娱乐，也想要获取信息，或者两者兼而有之。但是，你知道，我们只有一双眼睛，每天只有 24 小时。

So if you go back 50 or 60 years and think about how people got informed or entertained then, the choices were far fewer. You had the local movie theater, and you had the radio, and you had newspapers.

所以，如果你回到五六十年前，想想那时人们是如何获取信息或娱乐的，选择要少得多。你有当地的电影院，有收音机，还有报纸。

And as the years have gone by, what technology has done is opened up a huge variety of ways of being informed faster, certainly. And whether it’s better or not depends on who you ask.

随着岁月的流逝，技术所做的是开辟了多种更快获取信息的方式。当然，这是否更好取决于你问谁。

And certainly entertained in way many more forms, many that are free. And it hasn’t expanded the time you have for entertainment or for acquiring knowledge.

当然，以更多的形式娱乐，许多是免费的。而且它并没有增加你用于娱乐或获取知识的时间。

And any time you get more and more people competing in any given area, generally, the economics deteriorate.

而且，任何时候在某个特定领域竞争的人越来越多，通常经济状况会恶化。

And the economics have deteriorated for newspapers, although they’re still enormously profitable in relation to tangible equity employed, but they do not have the same economic prospects, if you look at the future stream of earnings, that it looked like they had 20 or 30 or 40 years ago.

尽管报纸在使用有形股本方面仍然有非常好的盈利，但其经济状况已经恶化。如果你看未来的收益流，它们的经济前景不再像 20 或 30 或 40 年前那样。

And television, again, the margins have been maintained surprisingly well, but the audience keeps going down and — for any given means of distribution.

电视方面，利润率依然保持得出乎意料的好，但观众数量持续下降——对于任何给定的分发方式都是如此。

So, that has to erode economics over time. Cable was thought to operate pretty much all by itself, and the telecoms come in.

所以，这必然会随着时间的推移侵蚀经济状况。人们曾认为有线电视几乎可以独立运营，但电信公司进来了。

And very few businesses get better because of more competition. They like to talk about it, you know, but it — you know, the idea —

而且很少有企业因为更多的竞争而变得更好。你知道，他们喜欢谈论它，但你知道，这个想法——

I had one friend in the newspaper business. And I think Charlie used to tease her a bit by saying that her idea of a competitor was a corpse laid out on a slab with a toe twitching, you know. And the — it is not a better business when more people compete.

我在报业有一个朋友。我想查理过去常常取笑她，说她对竞争对手的看法是一个躺在石板上的尸体，脚趾还在抽动。竞争者多了，生意并不会更好。

竞争=噪音，短期可能不是问题，长期一定会有问题。

So I think that, generally speaking, the economics of media businesses do not have a great outlook, I mean, compared to — like I say, they’re enormously profitable now, in returns on tangible assets.

所以我认为，总的来说，媒体行业的经济前景并不乐观，我的意思是，相比之下——就像我说的，它们现在在有形资产回报方面是非常盈利的。

I mean, it’s a business — you know, a license from the federal government became a royalty stream on huge amounts of money.

我的意思是，这是一个生意——你知道，从联邦政府获得的许可证变成了巨额资金的版税收入。

I mean, there were only three highways between — electronic highways — between Procter & Gamble and Ford Motor and the eyeballs of several hundred million people, and those three highways could make a lot of money when there were only three highways.

我的意思是，在宝洁公司和福特汽车公司与数亿人眼球之间，只有三条高速公路——电子高速公路——而当时只有这三条高速公路可以赚很多钱。

But you keep building more ways to — for the P&Gs, or the Gillettes, or whomever it might be, or Ford Motor, or General Motors — to get to those eyeballs, and you decrease the value of the highways. It’s not complicated.

但是你不断为宝洁、吉列、或者其他公司，或者福特汽车、通用汽车等，创造更多途径来吸引那些眼球，而这降低了公路的价值。这并不复杂。

So, I think you will see — it’s hard to imagine those businesses having great prospects in aggregate.

所以，我认为你会看到——很难想象这些企业整体上有很好的前景。

We owned the World Book. We still own the World Book. We were selling 300,000 sets a year or something like that in the mid ’80s. It’s a very valuable product. It sold for $600 or thereabouts, and it was worth it.

我们拥有《世界图书》。我们仍然拥有《世界图书》。在 80 年代中期，我们每年销售大约 30 万套。它是一个非常有价值的产品。售价大约为 600 美元，而且物有所值。

But the problem became that you could get that same information, or a good bit of the same information, you know, very, very cheap through the internet.

但问题在于，你可以通过互联网以非常非常便宜的价格获得相同的信息，或者大部分相同的信息。

And you didn’t have to cut down trees. And you didn’t have to run paper mills. And you didn’t have to hire United Parcel Service to deliver a very bulky package.

你不必砍伐树木。你不必运行造纸厂。你不必雇用联合包裹服务公司来递送一个非常笨重的包裹。

And it isn’t that the product we have isn’t worth the money; it’s that people have lots of other alternatives. And that’s true in information and entertainment in a big, big way, and it won’t stop, in my view.

并不是说我们的产品不值这个价钱，而是人们有很多其他选择。在信息和娱乐方面尤其如此，而且在我看来，这种情况不会停止。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It’s simplicity itself. It will be a rare business that doesn’t have a way worse future than it had a past.

查理·芒格：是的。这非常简单。很少有企业的未来不会比过去更糟。

WARREN BUFFETT: Give them the bad news, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们坏消息，查理。（笑声）

The thing to do was to buy the NFL originally or something like that.

最初要做的事情是购买 NFL 或类似的东西。

I mean, you know, there still is only — you know, there are certain primary events, but it’s the people who transmit them — there’s more ways to transmit those events, and so the value gets extracted in a much different way.

我想，您知道，确实还有——有些主要事件，但传递这些事件的人越来越多，提取价值的方式也大相径庭。

37. “Significant consequences” from U.S. trade imbalance

美国贸易失衡的“重大后果”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2? 沃伦·巴菲特：第二区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Yuji Siamoto (PH) from New York City.

观众成员：下午好。我的名字是 Yuji Siamoto（音译），来自纽约市。

I would like to ask Mr. Buffett regarding your views in respect to currency: the renminbi, the yen, and the euro, in particular.

我想请教巴菲特先生关于您对货币的看法：特别是人民币、日元和欧元。

During the visit by Hu Jintao, this issue of the currency level had become a big issue. And increasingly, this is becoming a very, very important issue for economic health of this country.

在胡锦涛访问期间，汇率平衡问题已成为一个大问题。而且，这越来越成为该国经济健康的一个非常非常重要的问题。

United States is becoming highly dependent on very cheap, underpriced Chinese exports in all consumer goods. You go to Walmart, and most of the high product — high-end product electronics — or most of the — any value-added products — are manufactured in China.

美国在所有消费品方面越来越依赖非常便宜、价格低廉的中国出口商品。你去沃尔玛，大多数高端电子产品或大多数任何增值产品都是在中国制造的。

U.S. is almost addicted to very low-priced Chinese goods, thanks to artificially maintained currency level. At the same time, U.S. is becoming addicted to very cheap capital from China and Japan, as they provide infusion of capital to U.S. Treasury markets, thus keeping the interest rate low for mortgage rates.

由于人为维持的汇率水平，美国几乎对非常低价的中国商品上瘾。同时，美国也逐渐依赖来自中国和日本的非常廉价的资本，因为它们为美国国债市场提供了资本注入，从而使抵押贷款利率保持在低水平。

I see a great danger if this is maintained for long time, as U.S. becomes addicted to this cheap Chinese or Asian exports for all our consumption, and also for all of our cheap mortgage rates.

如果这种情况长期维持下去，我看到一个巨大的危险，因为美国会对这些廉价的中国或亚洲出口产品上瘾，不仅用于我们的所有消费，还用于我们所有的低廉抵押贷款利率。

And this is almost like being addicted to opium, as Chinese were addicted to opium during Opium Wars.

这几乎就像对鸦片上瘾一样，就像中国人在鸦片战争期间对鸦片上瘾一样。

And should government try harder to break this vicious cycle? And, if so, what would you think about the currency level?

政府是否应该更加努力地打破这个恶性循环？如果是这样，您对汇率平衡有何看法？

And you have — previously, you have held very strong views about the dollar, but what are your views now, and are you capitalizing on your views on the currency?

你以前对美元持有非常强烈的观点，但你现在的观点是什么？你是否在利用你对货币的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, my views — and Charlie may disagree — but my views are strong as ever, perhaps a bit stronger. The — we are doing less directly in currency futures because the — as I explained in the annual report — the carry cost has gone from being positive to quite negative.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我的观点——查理可能不同意——但我的观点依然坚定，甚至可能更坚定一些。我们在货币期货方面的直接操作减少了，因为正如我在年度报告中所解释的，持有成本已经从正变得相当负面。

So there are better ways, in my view — considerably better ways — of mitigating the consequences of the dollar becoming a lot weaker in the future.

因此，在我看来，有更好的方法——相当多更好的方法——来减轻未来美元大幅走弱的后果。

We like the idea of developing earning power in other currencies around the world, and, in effect, in ISCAR itself, the — a large portion of the earnings are not in dollars, and we’re doing it in other areas as well. We will hold less in currency futures unless the carry picture changes.

我们喜欢在全球其他货币中发展盈利能力的想法，实际上，在ISCAR本身中——很大一部分收入不是以美元计的，我们也在其他领域这样做。除非持有成本情况发生变化，否则我们将减少货币期货的持有。

But the fundamental picture, what, in my view, is almost — you never say “certain,” but a very high probability of happening, is that the U.S. currency weakens over time.

但从根本上看，在我看来，几乎——你永远不会说“确定”，但发生的可能性非常高——是美国货币随着时间的推移会走弱。

No idea about the next 6 months or year or anything, but over a long period of time, weakens against other currencies because we are following policies that don’t seem much — don’t seem to leave much alternative.

不知道接下来的 6 个月或一年会怎样，但从长远来看，由于我们正在执行的政策似乎没有太多选择，导致相对于其他货币贬值。

Here is a quote referring to running a large current account deficit that was given on February 28, 2002. The quote is, “Countries that have gone down this path invariably have run into trouble, and so would we. Eventually the current account deficit will have to be restrained.”

这里有一句关于在 2002 年 2 月 28 日提到的经常账户赤字的引用。引用是：“走上这条路的国家无一例外地遇到了麻烦，我们也会如此。最终，经常账户赤字将不得不受到限制。”

Now, that was said by a very smart fellow whose name was Alan Greenspan. And at that time, the current account deficit was 385 billion, and it will be more than double that now.

现在，这句话是由一位非常聪明的人说的，他的名字是艾伦·格林斯潘。当时，经常账户赤字是 3850 亿美元，而现在将会超过这个数字的两倍。

So here, 4 years later, we have gone down that path, which he talked about, and we’ve gone faster and faster down the path. And he says, invariably, it runs into trouble.

所以在这里，四年后，我们走上了他所说的那条路，而且我们在这条路上越走越快。他说，这条路总是会遇到麻烦。

Now, in his later years as Fed chairman, he did not emphasize this view as much. He never repudiated it, but he sort of talked about other things more.

现在，在他担任美联储主席的后期，他并没有过多强调这一观点。他从未否定过它，但他似乎更多地谈论其他事情。

But it — it’s going to lead to something, and it — in my view, it’s likely to be something significant. And people talk about a soft landing, but they never explain to me exactly how it’s going to take place.

但它——它会导致一些事情发生，而且——在我看来，这很可能是一些重大的事情。人们谈论软着陆，但他们从未向我解释过这将如何实现。

And Chairman Bernanke recently gave a talk where he said the probabilities were that the ending would be good but that he couldn’t rule out the possibility otherwise.

伯南克主席最近发表了一次讲话，他说结局很可能是好的，但他不能排除其他可能性。

I think you will see significant consequences at some point. We will have, at Berkshire, a fair amount of our earning power coming from other countries with other currencies, but we will always be primarily in the United States.

我认为在某个时候你会看到显著的后果。在伯克希尔，我们相当一部分的盈利能力将来自其他国家和其他货币，但我们将始终主要在美国。

And, you know, we may — one consequence certainly seems possible is significantly higher inflation as the years go by.

而且，你知道，我们可能——一个结果似乎很有可能是随着时间的推移出现显著更高的通货膨胀。

Because as you owe more and more money as a country, it gets more and more tempting to devalue what you owe by paying in a cheaper currency than in the one in which the debts were incurred.

因为当一个国家欠越来越多的钱时，用比债务发生时的货币更便宜的货币偿还债务，从而降低所欠金额的诱惑也越来越大。

Charlie, what do you have to say on this?

查理，你对此有什么看法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t feel I have any special capacity to predict whether the euro was exactly priced right, right now. I don’t consider it a big deal that Berkshire has had the position it’s had.

查理·芒格：嗯，我不觉得我有特别的能力去预测欧元现在是否定价准确。我不认为伯克希尔持有的头寸是件大事。

In effect, about half of our surplus cash was stashed short-term in currencies other than the dollar. I regard that as almost a nonevent. Now, as it happened —

实际上，我们大约一半的盈余现金都是短期存放在美元以外的货币中。我认为这几乎算不上什么事件。现在，事情是这样的——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we made a couple billion dollars off it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们从中赚了几十亿美元。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I was — as I was about to say, that as it’s happened so far, it’s been a very profitable nonevent, but... (Laughter) Generally —

查理·芒格：是的。我正要说，到目前为止，这是一件非常有利可图的无事发生，但……（笑声）总的来说——

WARREN BUFFETT: If it doesn’t mean anything to him, he can always give his share to me. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果这对他来说没有任何意义，他可以把他的那份给我。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Generally speaking, it can’t be good to be running a big current account deficit and a big fiscal deficit and have them both growing.

查理·芒格：是的。一般来说，运行巨额经常账户赤字和巨额财政赤字，并且两者都在增长，这不可能是好事。

I mean, a great civilization may be able to stand something like that for a way longer period than you might have thought at the outset.

我的意思是，一个伟大的文明可能能够比你一开始想象的更长时间地承受那样的事情。

But you think that in the end, there would be a comeuppance and that we would have to change policies, perhaps painfully. In fact, I would say almost surely painfully. Wouldn’t you, Warren?

但是你认为最终会有报应，我们将不得不改变政策，可能会很痛苦。事实上，我几乎可以肯定地说会很痛苦。你不这么认为吗，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would. And it’s interesting because I think almost everybody says it’s unsustainable, and then they never explain how it doesn’t keep being sustained until something comes — very unpleasant comes along.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会的。这很有趣，因为我认为几乎每个人都说这是不可持续的，但他们从未解释为什么它不会一直持续下去，直到出现一些非常不愉快的事情。

But then they also say that there will be a soft landing, and I don’t always get from A to B to C when I listen to them. The —

但他们也说会有一个软着陆，当我听他们说话时，我并不总是能从 A 到 B 再到 C。

Certainly the longer it goes on, the greater the credit — the greater the net debtor position the United States is in, the more people see that we are, sort of, addicted to this kind of behavior, the more chance there is at some point, probably brought about by some other extraneous affair, that currency doesn’t —

毫无疑问，这种情况持续的时间越长，美国的信用——美国的净债务人地位越强，越多的人看到我们似乎依赖于这种行为，就越有可能在某个时候，由其他外部事件引发——这可能导致货币不

There aren’t some big adjustments that take place and, perhaps, some chaotic markets in which currency adjustments play a part. But knowing when or exactly how, it’s impossible to say that sort of thing — predict that sort of thing.

没有发生一些大的调整，也许在一些混乱的市场中，货币调整起到了一定作用。但要知道何时或确切如何，很难说出那种事情——预测那种事情。

Charlie and I, in the 1980s, saw something called “portfolio insurance” — and that was a very popular term then — catch on with institutions.

在 20 世纪 80 年代，查理和我看到一种叫做“投资组合保险”的东西——当时这是一个非常流行的术语——在机构中流行起来。

And what happened was that a group was around selling the idea that this was a sophisticated, superior way for large institutions to manage money. And they charged appreciable sums for people — to people — to set up mechanistic procedures for dealing with stock market fluctuations.

发生的事情是，一群人向大机构推销这种被认为是成熟的、优越的资金管理方式。他们向人们收取可观的费用，以建立机械化的程序来应对股市波动。

They did this with pension funds and various big guys. And it was very popular, and the academic literature was full of it, and people were teaching about it in the schools.

他们用养老金和各种大公司做了这件事。这非常受欢迎，学术文献中充满了这方面的内容，人们在学校里教授这些内容。

And then October 19, 1987, came along, and a relatively small portion of American money invested — American investments — were being guided by this portfolio insurance doctrine.

然后，1987 年 10 月 19 日到来，一小部分美国投资——美国的投资——是由这种投资组合保险理论指导的。

But just that small amount of money was a leading factor in producing a 22 percent change in the value of American stocks in one day.

但就是这小部分资金却成为了导致美国股票在一天内贬值22%的主要因素。

Every one of these people individually thought what they were doing was intelligent, but, when aggregated, and having to follow a given signal, in effect, you created a doomsday machine. It was out of control, and some really chaotic things happened then.

这些人每个人都认为自己所做的是聪明的，但当他们聚集在一起并且必须遵循一个给定的信号时，实际上就创造了一台末日机器。它失去了控制，然后发生了一些非常混乱的事情。

I would say the potential for that sort of thing — not that exact thing at all, but that sort of thing to happen in the world ahead is — it’s probably magnified quite a bit from what existed in the ’80s.

我会说，那种事情发生的可能性——不是完全相同的事情，而是那种事情在未来世界中发生的可能性——可能比 80 年代存在的情况大大增加了。

And currency enters into it, but it’s not — who knows where it starts or exactly why somebody yells “fire.” But when “fire” is yelled, there will be — the currency markets will play a part in the rush for the door.

货币也会参与其中，但这并不是——谁知道它从哪里开始，或者为什么有人会喊“着火了”。但当有人喊“着火了”时，货币市场将在争相逃离中发挥作用。

38. “CPI has understated inflation”

“消费者价格指数低估了通货膨胀”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, there. Alex Rubalcava from Los Angeles.

观众成员：你好，我是来自洛杉矶的亚历克斯·鲁巴尔卡瓦。

Warren, you just brought up the topic of inflation, and so I wanted to ask, do you believe — or do you believe that the Consumer Price Index is a good and true and accurate measure of inflation?

沃伦，你刚刚提到了通货膨胀的话题，所以我想问，你是否认为消费者价格指数是一个良好、真实和准确的通货膨胀衡量标准？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. Bill Gross has written a little bit about that in some of his PIMCO methods and — messages. And, you know, if you go out to the Furniture Mart and construct a price index, it hasn’t moved very much.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。比尔·格罗斯在他的一些 PIMCO 方法和信息中写过一点关于这个的内容。而且，你知道，如果你去家具市场构建一个价格指数，它并没有太大变化。

I mean, it makes it very tough for comparable store sales when you were selling DVD players at X few years ago, and now you’re selling them at a quarter of X. So there’s certain areas that there have been a huge — in effect, deflationary aspects.

这使得可比门店销售非常困难，因为您几年前以X价格销售DVD播放器，而现在您以X的四分之一价格销售它们。所以某些领域确实出现了巨大的——实际上是通缩的方面。

But I do think the CPI — and, like I said, Gross has written about this — but the CPI is not particularly a good index.

但我确实认为 CPI——就像我说的，格罗斯也写过这个——但 CPI 不是一个特别好的指数。

I always get a kick out of when they talk about the core CPI, and then they — and they say that excludes food and energy.

每当他们谈论核心 CPI 时，我总是感到很有趣，然后他们说这不包括食品和能源。

You know, food and energy strike me as pretty core to anything, in terms of the average — I can’t think of anything that’s much more core.

你知道，食品和能源对任何事情来说都是相当核心的，就平均而言——我想不出有什么比这更核心的了。

The CPI, as you may or may not know, many, many years ago had housing figured in directly.

CPI，如你所知或不知道，很多很多年前就已经直接将住房计算在内。

There is no — the CPI now has a rental — which is an imputed rental type computation. It’s still a large portion of the CPI, but it does not reflect the new housing prices, or —

现在CPI有一个租金——这是一种估算的租金计算。虽然这仍然是CPI的很大一部分，但它并不反映新的住房价格，或者——

And rentals — the rental factor has lagged, in my view, significantly below what housing costs really are for an American family. And since housing is a big portion, I don’t think it picks it up well.

而租金因素在我看来显著滞后于美国家庭的实际住房成本。由于住房占很大一部分，因此我认为CPI并没有很好地反映这一点。

So I would say that the CPI has understated inflation for a great many people.

所以我会说，消费者价格指数对许多人的通货膨胀程度低估了。

Now, if you’re older and you own your own house — I mean, everybody has their own way of living.

现在，如果你年纪较大并且拥有自己的房子——我的意思是，每个人都有自己的生活方式。

And, I mean, if all you do is drink Coca-Cola all day, you know, Coca-Cola hasn’t gone up in price enough, in my view, and you — my CPI has not changed very much.

而且，我的意思是，如果你整天都在喝可口可乐，你知道，在我看来，可口可乐的价格还没有涨得够多，而你的——我的 CPI 并没有太大的变化。

But for somebody buying a new house versus 6 or 8 years ago and driving 30 or 40 miles to work or having a lot of driving in the family, the CPI has gone up a lot more than the government figures would indicate.

但对于那些购买新房子的人来说，与6或8年前相比，驾驶30或40英里上下班或者家庭中有大量驾驶的人来说，CPI上涨的幅度远高于政府数据显示的水平。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I see it at Costco where there’s been almost no inflation in the composite product that flows through Costco, and, yet, in other places you get these dramatic rising figures.

查理·芒格：是的。我在好市多看到，流经好市多的综合产品几乎没有通货膨胀，而在其他地方，你会看到这些急剧上升的数字。

I don’t feel sorry for the people that pay $27 million for an 8,000-foot condo in Manhattan. You know, if they’ve had little inflation, I guess it doesn’t matter to the rest of us.

我对那些花 2700 万美元在曼哈顿买 8000 平方英尺公寓的人不感到遗憾。你知道，如果他们经历了一点通货膨胀，我想这对我们其他人来说无关紧要。

But it’s almost weird the way the situation works in terms of how it’s —

但这种情况的运作方式几乎有些奇怪——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — it comes in just a few places.

查理·芒格：——它只出现在几个地方。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you look at the Costco annual report or the Walmart annual report — these are huge enterprises — and you’ll see their LIFO adjustment is just peanuts.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你查看 Costco 的年度报告或沃尔玛的年度报告——这些都是巨大的企业——你会发现他们的 LIFO 调整只是小数目。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Almost nothing.

查理·芒格：几乎没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Just peanuts — is Costco on LIFO for —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。只是小事——好市多采用后进先出法吗——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure. 查理·芒格：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: — for fuel? I know they’re on LIFO generally. Are they on it for gasoline or not?

沃伦·巴菲特：——关于燃料？我知道他们通常使用后进先出法。他们在汽油上也使用这种方法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think so. I can’t imagine they’re not.

查理·芒格：我想是的。我无法想象他们不是。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But they wouldn’t have a large inventory relative to —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但相对于——他们不会有大量库存。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: — their sales volume. But they — at Walmart, it’s inconsequential. I just got through reading their annual report, and the LIFO adjustment isn’t worth a hiccup, you know, basically.

沃伦·巴菲特：——他们的销售量来说不会有很大的库存。但在沃尔玛，几乎没有。刚刚我阅读了他们的年报，LIFO调整没什么值得一提的，基本上。

And you’re dealing with 300 billion — well, in the United States a little less than that — but $200-and-some billion worth of sales, and the LIFO adjustment would have picked up changes in prices of that mix overall relative to their inventory level.

你正在处理 3000 亿美元的销售额——在美国稍微少一点——但有 200 多亿美元的销售额，LIFO 调整将会反映出相对于其库存水平的整体价格变化。

So in jewelry, you know, because of gold and some things, we had some big LIFO adjustments last year.

所以在珠宝行业，你知道，由于黄金和其他一些因素，我们去年进行了较大的后进先出调整。

Steel, we’ve had big LIFO adjustments. We have a steel service center in Chicago and we buy a lot of steel at MiTek and there’s a big LIFO adjustment. So it’s very uneven.

钢铁，我们有很大的 LIFO 调整。我们在芝加哥有一个钢铁服务中心，并且在 MiTek 购买了大量钢铁，因此有很大的 LIFO 调整。所以这非常不均匀。

Carpet went no place for 20 years, but because it’s petrochemical-based, there have been substantial price changes in the carpet business in the last couple years.

地毯在过去的 20 年里没有变化，但由于它是石化产品，地毯行业在过去几年中出现了显著的价格变化。

And our LIFO — we had a LIFO net — a minus LIFO figure, in effect — 3 years ago, and now we have 100 million or so of LIFO adjustments. So there’s been a significant price change there.

而我们的 LIFO——我们有一个 LIFO 净额——实际上是一个负的 LIFO 数字——3 年前，现在我们有大约 1 亿的 LIFO 调整。所以那里有一个显著的价格变化。

I think overall, though, for a typical young family, that the CPI probably underestimates the burden they have faced, in terms of their own living situation.

不过，我认为对于一个典型的年轻家庭来说，CPI 可能低估了他们在生活状况方面所面临的负担。

39. Why we don’t “do deals” with investment banks

为什么我们不与投资银行“做交易”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Mike Kelly (PH) from Iowa City.

观众成员：你好。我是来自爱荷华市的迈克·凯利。

We’ve heard a bit about ISCAR today. Could you tell us some things about some of the other acquisitions of the past year?

我们今天听说了一些关于 ISCAR 的事情。你能告诉我们一些关于去年其他收购的事情吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: What would you like to know, Mike? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你想知道什么，迈克？（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Um. 观众成员：嗯。

WARREN BUFFETT: I mean, we described it a bit in the annual report, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是，我们在年度报告中稍微描述了一下，但是——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Right. Well, I believe since the annual report, there have been a couple others. Russell, for instance.

观众成员：好的。我相信自年度报告以来，还有其他几个。例如，拉塞尔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Russell is in the works. There’s just been a proxy statement that isn’t out yet, but it’s been filed with the SEC. You can get a copy of the filing. But that is one in process and is probably a couple months off from actual completion.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。拉塞尔正在进行中。刚刚提交了一份尚未发布的代理声明，但已提交给美国证券交易委员会。你可以获取提交文件的副本。但这还在进行中，可能还需要几个月才能真正完成。

You know, we — I described the Business Wire situation in the annual report where I got a letter from Cathy after reading — reading a Wall Street Journal article. And, you know, these — they just all sort of pop up.

你知道，我们——我在年度报告中描述了Business Wire的情况，我在读了一篇《华尔街日报》的文章后收到了凯西的来信。而且，你知道，这些事情就这样突然出现了。

Medical protective, I think I suggested to Jeff Immelt at GE, that if — I knew they were interested in doing things with their insurance assets, and I suggested that was one portion of their insurance assets that Berkshire would have an interest in. And he and I met one time and we made a deal on that one.

Medical protective，我想我曾向通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特建议过，如果——我知道他们对处理他们的保险资产感兴趣，我建议伯克希尔会对他们保险资产的一部分感兴趣。我和他见过一次面，我们就那件事达成了协议。

PacifiCorp — that originated with Dave Sokol and the people at Scottish Power. I’m not even exactly sure what the sequence was.

PacifiCorp——起源于戴夫·索科尔和苏格兰电力公司的人。我甚至不太确定具体的顺序是什么。

But the one thing we haven’t done is we haven’t participated in any auctions.

但我们唯一没有做的事情是我们没有参与任何拍卖。

I get books occasionally on various businesses, and the projections are just plain silly in these books. I mean, it’s a — I would — maybe that’s why they don’t sign their names in the books, the people that write them, because they’d be embarrassed about the projections they put forth.

我偶尔会收到一些关于各种企业的项目报告，报告中的预测简直是荒谬。我是说，我会——也许这就是他们在报告中不签名的原因，因为他们会为他们所做的预测感到尴尬。

I would just love to meet the people that write those investment banking books and make them a bet on the earnings that they project four years out. I would win a lot of money over time. They wouldn’t be met.

我真希望能见到那些撰写这些投资银行报告的人，并与他们打个赌，关于他们四年后的盈利预测。我会在长期内赢得很多钱。他们的预测不会实现。

But we get the calls, occasionally, from the people that care about where their businesses end up.

但是我们偶尔会接到那些关心自己企业去向的人的电话。

We’re going to close on Applied Underwriters in just probably a few days, and those are two terrific guys, built it up from absolutely nothing.

我们可能只需几天就会完成对 Applied Underwriters 的收购，那是两个非常出色的人，他们从无到有建立了这家公司。

Actually, I bought a tiny business here in Omaha — as I explained in the report — that’s why it’s here.

实际上，我在奥马哈买了一家小企业——正如我在报告中解释的那样——这就是它在这里的原因。

But they wanted to come with Berkshire. They think their own — they’re keeping 19 percent of the company. They think their own future will be the best in many ways, including financially, I’m sure, of being associated with us. They feel it’s the best place for the people, have the most opportunity to grow. And, you know, they came to us directly.

但他们想和伯克希尔合作。他们认为自己的——他们保留了公司 19%的股份。他们认为自己的未来在许多方面，包括在财务上，与我们合作将是最好的。我相信，他们觉得这是对员工来说最好的地方，有最多的成长机会。而且，你知道，他们是直接来找我们的。

You know, I don’t know how many stories you read about a $4 billion deal, as appeared today in connection with ISCAR, where it doesn’t say anything about an investment banker, on either side.

你知道，我不知道你读过多少关于 40 亿美元交易的故事，就像今天与 ISCAR 有关的那样，其中没有提到任何一方的投资银行家。

But you’ll see more of those, I think, with Berkshire over the years.

但我认为，随着时间的推移，您会看到更多这样的交易出现在伯克希尔身上。

Charlie, do you have anything in particular to add on our acquisitions recently?

查理，你对我们最近的收购有特别要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the interesting thing about it to me is the mindset. With all of these new helpers in the world, they talk about doing deals. That is not the mindset at Berkshire. We are trying to welcome partners. It’s a total different mindset.

查理·芒格：对我来说，有趣的是心态。世界上所有这些新的助手都在谈论做交易。这不是伯克希尔的心态。我们试图欢迎合作伙伴。这是完全不同的心态。

The guy who’s doing a deal, he wants to do the deal and unwind the deal and — not too far ahead and make a large profit, et cetera, and that’s not our mindset at all.

做交易的人想要做交易，想要解除交易——没多久后就想赚取大量利润，而这完全不是我们的心态。

We like the things that we can buy and that never leave us, and we like the relationships that last and are fruitful, not just for us, but for the people working there and the customers and everybody else.

我们喜欢那些可以购买且永远不会离开我们的东西，我们也喜欢持久且富有成效的关系，不仅对我们，对在那里工作的人、顾客和其他所有人都是如此。

I think our system is going to work better, long term, than flipping a lot of deals. And we have so many new deal flippers in the game that I think they’re going to get in one another’s way.

我认为从长远来看，我们的系统会比频繁交易更有效。而且游戏中有这么多新的交易者，我认为他们会互相干扰。

In other words, I don’t think there’s enough money out there to have all this new class make all the money they expect to make on a permanent basis just flipping, flipping, flipping, flipping.

换句话说，我认为没有足够的钱让所有这些新阶层通过不断地买卖来永久性地赚到他们期望赚到的钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: They’ll make it on fees, fees, fees, fees. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：他们会通过费用、费用、费用、费用赚钱。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren reminds me, once I asked a man who just left a large investment bank — and I said, “How does your firm make its money?” He said, “Off the top, off the bottom, off both sides, and in the middle.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：沃伦让我想起，有一次我问一个刚离开大型投资银行的人，我说：“你们公司是怎么赚钱的？”他说：“从上面，从下面，从两边，还有中间。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I know which firm he’s talking about, too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我也知道他在说哪家公司。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s not our culture. And a lot of you have been here so long, you can see that’s not our culture. But in the end, it may be that Omaha will do better than Wall Street.

查理·芒格：那不是我们的文化。你们中很多人已经在这里待了很久，你们可以看到那不是我们的文化。但最终，可能奥马哈会比华尔街做得更好。

40. Salomon’s 1991 reprieve prevented “absolute chaos”

Salomon1991 年的缓刑阻止了“绝对混乱”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：第五名。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Steve Rosenberg (PH) from Michigan, originally. First, I’d just like to thank you both very much for continuing to serve as role models for integrity and common sense.

观众成员：你好。我是史蒂夫·罗森伯格（PH），来自密歇根州。首先，我想非常感谢你们两位继续作为正直和常识的榜样。

Can you describe a little bit more specifically — (Applause) — how a derivatives meltdown might progress and, ultimately, get resolved after it’s been precipitated, and is there a plausible way to resolve it without some sort of a major bailout that would exacerbate a too-big-to-fail moral hazard problem?

你能否更具体地描述一下——（掌声）——衍生品崩溃可能如何发展，并最终在引发后得到解决，是否有可能在不进行某种重大救助的情况下解决它，而这种救助会加剧“大而不倒”的道德风险问题？

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s really hard to tell. I mean, it — you know, it — what will cause people to yell “fire,” what will — how many people will rush for the exits, what they’ll do when they get there — it happens occasionally.

沃伦·巴菲特：这真的很难说。我的意思是，你知道，是什么会让人们喊“着火了”，有多少人会冲向出口，他们到达那里后会怎么做——这种情况偶尔会发生。

You know, with LTCM — Long-Term Capital Management — in 1998, you know, it affected the financial world in a big way. It didn’t affect it in the biggest way. I mean, the feds stepped in. But there were some pretty — pretty strange things happened during that period, in markets.

你知道，1998 年的长期资本管理公司（LTCM），对金融界产生了很大的影响。虽然不是最大的影响。我的意思是，联邦政府介入了。但在那段时间，市场上发生了一些相当奇怪的事情。

What happened in the junk bond market in 2002? I mean, it closed for a while almost, and it was chaos. So it’s very hard to know exactly what would happen. I’ll give Charlie a question here.

2002 年垃圾债券市场发生了什么？我的意思是，它几乎关闭了一段时间，简直是一片混乱。所以很难确切知道会发生什么。我这里给查理一个问题。

In 1991, when we were in Salomon — it was in August, middle of August — and on a Sunday we were within, probably, a half an hour of seeking out a federal judge to turn over the keys to the place to him and go into bankruptcy.

1991 年，当我们在Salomon的时候——那是在八月，八月中旬——在一个星期天，我们可能在半小时内就要找一位联邦法官，把公司的钥匙交给他，然后申请破产。

And, fortunately, the Treasury reversed itself, and we got out of that particular predicament. But the law firm was drawing up the papers for bankruptcy.

而幸运的是，财政部改变了决定，我们摆脱了那个特定的困境。但律师事务所正在起草破产文件。

Now, that was on a Sunday. What would have happened Monday — and we had a good — we had, for those days, a good-sized derivative book. It would be peanuts now, but it was — it looked big at the time. We had a lot of security settlements due the next day.

那是在星期天。星期一会发生什么——我们有一个不错的——在那个时候，我们有一本相当大的衍生品账簿。现在看起来微不足道，但在当时看起来很大。我们有很多证券结算在第二天到期。

Now, it happened to be the same day that Gorbachev was spirited away, and the Dow opened down a couple hundred points the next day off of a much lower Dow.

巧合的是，那一天正好是戈尔巴乔夫被秘密拘留的同一天，第二天道琼斯指数开盘下跌了几百点，那是一个较低的道琼斯。

Now, if you had superimposed upon that the fact that Salomon failed in Japan starting at 7 o’clock or so the previous night and that it was — if you were delivering securities to them against payment the next day, you weren’t going to get paid.

现在，如果你把这种情况叠加上去，假设Salomon在前一天晚上大约七点左右在日本倒闭了，并且如果你第二天向他们交付证券以换取付款，你是不会得到付款的。

And if you were expecting securities from them, you weren’t going to get those securities. And, by the way, you had a — I think a 6- or $700 billion derivative book.

如果你期望从他们那里获得证券，你是不会得到那些证券的。顺便说一下，我想你有一个六百亿或七百亿美元的衍生品账簿。

And people who had traded off those derivatives had to try and figure out where they stood and scrambled around and whether their counterparties were any good.

那些交易过这些衍生品的人不得不试图弄清楚自己的处境，并四处奔走，看看他们的交易对手是否可靠。

What do you think would’ve happened on that Monday, Charlie?

你认为那个星期一会发生什么，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it could have been absolute chaos. That was a very interesting story with an interesting moral. Nick Brady really prevented that bankruptcy.

查理·芒格：嗯，那本可能是一场绝对的混乱。那是一个非常有趣的故事，带有一个有趣的道德寓意。尼克·布雷迪确实阻止了那次破产。

And he knew about Berkshire Hathaway from having been a family shareholder with the Chaces way, way back. And that had caused him to follow the matter with interest, particularly since he’d sold his own stock and watched his relatives, the Chaces, hold theirs.

他很早以前就通过家族股东的身份了解了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司。这使他对这件事产生了兴趣，尤其是因为他卖掉了自己的股票，而他的亲戚查斯家族则持有他们的股票。

So he knew about us, and I think he trusted you, Warren. And I think that mattered that day. So these old-fashioned reputational —

所以他知道我们，我想他信任你，沃伦。我认为那天这很重要。所以这些老式的声誉——

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what would have happened the next day? I —

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，第二天会发生什么呢？我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — 查理·芒格：嗯——

WARREN BUFFETT: It was terrifying. I’ll put it that way.

沃伦·巴菲特：那是令人恐惧的。我就这么说吧。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it was terrifying. And — but there was an element of personal reputation in the avoidance of finding out what would have happened that next day.

查理·芒格：是的，那是令人恐惧的。但是，避免发现第二天会发生什么的过程有个人声誉的成分。

WARREN BUFFETT: Kim Chace, who I introduced you to earlier, his father actually introduced me to Nick Brady many, many years earlier, mid ’60s, when Nick was working — was at Dillon Read and Malcom Chace said, “I’d like you to meet” — I guess he was a nephew or grandnephew.

沃伦·巴菲特：金·查斯（Kim Chace），我之前向您介绍过，他的父亲实际上在几十年前把我介绍给尼克·布雷迪，当时尼克在迪伦·里德（Dillon Read）工作，马尔科姆·查斯（Malcom Chace）说：“我想让你见见——”我想他是侄子或外甥。

In any event, I went over to Dillon Read and — I would have been in my 30s then — and Nick was a few years older — and we had a good time talking.

无论如何，我去了迪伦·里德，那时我大概三十多岁，尼克比我大几岁，我们聊得很愉快。

And then in 1991, he was secretary of the Treasury. And the Treasury had issued a death sentence to us at 10 o’clock in the morning on Sunday, and, fortunately, Nick, reversed that about 2:30 in the afternoon.

然后在 1991 年，他担任财政部长。财政部在星期天早上 10 点对我们下达了死刑判决，幸运的是，尼克在下午 2 点 30 分左右推翻了这一决定。

And if he hadn’t, I don’t know what would have happened. But that would have been kind of a pilot case for a mild derivatives daisy-chain-type panic. But that would be nothing compared to something now.

如果他没有这样做，我不知道会发生什么。但那会是一种温和的衍生品连锁反应恐慌的试点案例。但与现在的情况相比，那根本不算什么。

If — now, there’s way more of the stuff that is collateralized these days than formerly, but it would not be a — it’s not an experiment you would want to voluntarily conduct, I’ll put it that way.

如果——现在，比以前有更多的东西被抵押，但这不会是一个——这不是一个你会自愿进行的实验，我会这样说。

41. We love reading them, but newspapers are in trouble

我们喜欢阅读它们，但报纸正面临困境

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Jeremy from San Diego. And, first of all, I want to thank you all for the tremendous impact that you’ve had on my career as a professional investor.

观众成员：你好。我叫杰里米，来自圣地亚哥。首先，我想感谢你们对我作为职业投资者的职业生涯产生的巨大影响。

My question is also about the newspaper industry that the gentleman earlier touched on.

我的问题也涉及到刚才那位先生提到的报业。

And for some of those same points that you brought up, some of the largest newspaper stocks seem to earn incredible return on invested capital as compared to a lot of the businesses in the S&P 500.

由于你提到的一些相同的原因，一些最大的报纸股票似乎在投资资本回报率方面表现出色，相比之下，S&P 500 中的许多企业则逊色不少。

My question is more specifically related to valuation. If either of you were looking at a newspaper stock today and watching them fall, as some people may categorize falling knives, what would you use to determine — or how would you determine a very comfortable margin of safety to protect yourself against the deteriorating aspects of the newspaper industry?

我的问题更具体地与估值有关。如果你们中的任何一位今天在看报纸股票并看到它们下跌，正如有些人可能将其归类为下跌的刀子，你会用什么来确定——或者你会如何确定一个非常舒适的安全边际，以保护自己免受报纸行业恶化方面的影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the question is what multiple you — what multiple should you pay for a business that’s earning $100 million a year — call it pretax — whose earnings are going to go down 5 percent a year compared to what you should pay for a business with a — that’s earning $100 million a year whose earnings are going to go up 5 percent a year.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。那么，问题是你应该为一家每年赚取 1 亿美元的企业支付多少倍的价格——假设是税前收入——其收益每年将下降 5%，相比于你应该为一家每年赚取 1 亿美元的企业支付多少倍的价格，其收益每年将增长 5%。

And I would say that — I’m not saying that those are percentages I predict on newspaper companies — but certainly newspaper companies face the prospect of their newspaper earnings eroding.

我想说的是——我并不是说这些是我对报纸公司的预测百分比——但报纸公司确实面临着收入下降的前景。

And we’ve seen some of it already. We see every trend pointing in that direction. We own a newspaper ourselves.

我们已经看到了一些。我们看到每个趋势都指向那个方向。我们自己拥有一家报纸。

And, you know, I do not think the circulation of our paper will be larger in five years, and I don’t think the advertising pages will be greater.

而且，你知道，我不认为我们的报纸发行量在五年后会更大，我也不认为广告页数会增加。

And I think that’s true even of newspapers that operate in more prosperous — or, actually, more growing, I should say — areas of the country than we do.

我认为，即使是那些在比我们更繁荣——或者实际上应该说是更有增长——的地区运营的报纸，这也是正确的。

So — but I don’t think — I don’t think most owners of papers still have quite gotten to the point where they start projecting out declining earnings.

所以——但我不认为——我不认为大多数报纸的所有者已经完全意识到他们的收益正在下降。

Certainly multiples on newspaper stocks are unattractively high if you would see some decline, like 5 or 6 percent a year on earnings, occurring to this point. They just — they’re not cheap enough to compensate for that sort of erosion in earning power.

当然，如果你看到报纸股票的市盈率很高，比如每年收益下降 5%或 6%，那么它们的吸引力就不大。它们的价格不足以弥补这种收益能力的下降。

And then you face the added risk that they may have, sort of, a perception lag and that they may continue to use some of that money to buy other newspapers at prices which, again, don’t make much sense.

然后你面临的额外风险是，他们可能会有某种程度的认知滞后，并且他们可能会继续用其中的一些钱以不太合理的价格购买其他报纸。

It’s pretty hard in a declining business to buy things cheap enough to compensate for the decline.

在一个衰退的行业中，要以足够便宜的价格购买东西来弥补衰退是相当困难的。

People in the business always tend to think that they’re seeing the first robin, you know, or something, and that it’s going to get better. And I would say in the newspaper business, the decline, if anything, is accelerated somewhat. I —

在这个行业里的人总是倾向于认为他们看到了第一只知更鸟，或者类似的东西，并且认为情况会好转。而我会说，在报纸行业，衰退如果有变化的话，是有所加速的。我——

You know, when they take — when they take people out to the cemetery, they’re taking newspaper readers, and when people graduate from school, they’re not gaining newspaper readers.

你知道，当他们把人送到墓地时，他们带走的是报纸读者，而当人们从学校毕业时，他们并没有增加报纸读者。

And that may not change things overnight, but it goes in the wrong direction. And the less the readers, the less the readership, the less compelling argument to have to advertisers.

这可能不会在一夜之间改变事情，但它朝着错误的方向发展。读者越少，读者群就越少，对广告商的吸引力就越小。

So that virtuous circle where everybody read a paper because every ad was in it, and every ad was in it because everybody read a paper, that virtuous cycle is going in the other direction now. And I don’t think present prices for papers compensate for that.

因此，那个每个人都读报纸是因为所有广告都在上面，而所有广告都在上面是因为每个人都读报纸的良性循环，现在正朝着相反的方向发展。我认为目前的报纸价格无法弥补这一点。

And you are now hearing from a couple of guys that just love newspapers.

你现在听到的是几个热爱报纸的家伙。

We think newspapers are indispensable, but we don’t have a lot of — we have less company in that view. We love — I read five newspapers every day. Charlie probably does about the same.

我们认为报纸是不可或缺的，但我们在这个观点上没有太多同伴。我们喜欢——我每天读五份报纸。查理可能也差不多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Four. 查理·芒格：四。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, he’s — well, it shows too. The — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他——嗯，这也说明了这一点。——（笑声）

The — we couldn’t live without them. But a lot of people can, and more people can every day. And though we started out — we love the idea of buying newspapers. We traveled to Cincinnati, cheap hotels, all kinds of things, to buy newspapers.

——我们离不开它们。但很多人可以，而且每天都有更多的人可以。尽管我们一开始——我们喜欢买报纸的想法。我们去辛辛那提旅行，住便宜的酒店，做各种事情，去买报纸。

But — and we thought, incidentally, we loved them as products, and we thought they were the greatest of businesses, the ultimate bulletproof franchise. But it became apparent we were wrong.

但是——顺便说一下，我们认为我们喜欢它们作为产品，并且我们认为它们是最伟大的企业，终极的防弹特许经营。但显然我们错了。

You know, we still love them as news — as products, but we were wrong about the bulletproof franchise. And, you know, we’ve got to believe our eyes, in terms of what we’re seeing in that world.

你知道，我们仍然爱它们作为新闻——作为产品，但我们对坚不可摧的特许经营权判断错误。而且，你知道，我们必须相信自己的眼睛，看看我们在那个世界中看到的东西。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I have an even greater sin to admit to. I once thought General Motors was a bulletproof franchise. And — but we have a wonderful way of coping with a lot of these things. We have this “too hard” pile.

查理·芒格：是的。我还有一个更大的罪过要承认。我曾经认为通用汽车是一个坚不可摧的企业。但是，我们有一个很好的方法来应对很多这样的事情。我们有一个“太难”堆。

I don’t know if Warren is buying General Motors or not, but I have a good guess.

我不知道沃伦是否在购买通用汽车，但我有一个很好的猜测。

And it’s just too hard. If something is too hard to do, we look for something that isn’t too hard to do. (Laughter)

这太难了。如果某件事太难做，我们就找一些不太难做的事情。（笑声）

What could be more obvious than that? (Laughter)

这还有什么比这更明显的吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It may mean that we don’t do very much. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这意味着我们可能不会做很多事情（笑声）。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Yeah.

查理·芒格：是的。是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t get into specifics. The news — it’s — I don’t think anybody has watched the newspaper business much more carefully than Charlie and I have for, really, 50 years.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会涉及具体细节。新闻——我认为没有人比查理和我更仔细地观察报纸行业，实际上已经有 50 年了。

We used to — we always talked about every paper in the country, and the potential for buying it and, all that sort of thing.

我们过去常常谈论全国的每一家报纸，以及购买它的可能性，诸如此类的事情。

And it was a — it was easily understood. I mean, it was about as easy an economic — a business economics problem — as you could imagine. And we slowly woke up to the change on it.

而且这很容易理解。我的意思是，这几乎是你能想象到的最简单的经济——商业经济问题。我们慢慢意识到了其中的变化。

Actually, I wrote in the 1991 annual report, the newspaper — the very — the preprints of the world, you know, started turning the newspaper into a wrapper. It contained a whole bunch of things that could have been contained in some other package.

实际上，我在 1991 年的年度报告中写道，报纸——非常——世界的预印本，你知道，开始把报纸变成包装纸。它包含了许多本可以装在其他包装中的东西。

Now, your newspaper wasn’t reproducible in some other package, but this thing was carrying around a bunch of preprints. Now, the question is there a bunch — is there — are there easier ways to carry around those preprints?

事实上，我在1991年的年报中写道，报纸——各种插页广告——开始把报纸变成了一个外包装。报纸包含了很多东西，这些东西本可以包含在其他包装中。

But there was nothing magical about the paper except it got inside the house and brought the preprints inside the house. And as the newspaper lost penetration, it became a somewhat less efficient way of getting things into the house and other ways became more efficient at getting things into the house.

但报纸本身并不具备魔力，除了它能进入人们的家门并带来这些插页广告。而随着报纸的渗透率下降，报纸变得不再是进入家庭的最有效途径，而其他方式变得更有效。

So these things — it’s not a hard business to understand. And it has been interesting to me to watch both owners — direct owners — and investors in the business sort of resist seeing what’s right in front of them, you know?

所以这些事情——这不是一个难以理解的生意。我发现有趣的是，看到无论是直接的业主还是投资者都在某种程度上抗拒看到他们面前的事实，你知道吗？

It just — it went so long the other way that you couldn’t make a mistake buying a monopoly newspaper. Nobody ever made a mistake buying one, you know, until, what, 1975 or ’80 or something like that.

它只是——它在另一条路上走了太久，以至于你买一家垄断报纸不会出错。你知道，直到 1975 年或 1980 年左右，才有人买错过。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. If the technology had not changed, they’d still be impregnable franchises. But the technology did change. Fortunately, carbide cutting tools appear to have no good substitute. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。如果技术没有改变，他们仍然是坚不可摧的特许经营。但技术确实改变了。幸运的是，硬质合金切削工具似乎没有好的替代品。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a lot better business over time, if you have the right management. Now, it takes very good management. Nice thing about the newspaper business 30 or 40 years ago, it took no management at all.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你有合适的管理层，从长远来看，这是一项更好的业务。现在，这需要非常好的管理。30 或 40 年前，报纸行业的好处是根本不需要管理。

I mean, if you had an idiot nephew, you know, you — that would be a perfect — or a network television station. I mean, they were going to make money no matter what happened.

我的意思是，如果你有一个愚蠢的侄子，你知道的，那将是一个完美的——或者一个网络电视台。我的意思是，无论发生什么，他们都会赚钱。

They were going to make more money if they were under good management. I mean, if Tom Murphy was running your television stations, you were going to do much better than if you had your nephew doing it, but the nephew would have done all right. (Laughs)

如果他们在良好的管理下，他们会赚更多的钱。我的意思是，如果汤姆·墨菲在管理你的电视台，你会做得比让你的侄子来做要好得多，但侄子也会做得不错。（笑）

42. Don’t let your fear overcome your logic

不要让恐惧战胜你的理智

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren, Charlie. My name is Matt Peterson (PH). I’m a shareholder from Seattle, Washington, and it is a true pleasure being here today. My question for you is simple.

观众成员：你好，沃伦，查理。我的名字是马特·彼得森（音）。我是一名来自华盛顿州西雅图的股东，今天能在这里真是太高兴了。我有一个简单的问题要问你们。

The two of you have had a — many great opportunities throughout your years to work with many fine mentors and teachers.

多年来，你们两位有过许多与优秀导师和老师合作的绝佳机会。

And I’m wondering if you could provide us with a few names of some present-day mentors that we may look to for advice and our own ways to approach problems and situations, people similar to the Grahams and the Fishers of the present day?

我想知道您是否可以为我们提供一些当代导师的名字，我们可以向他们寻求建议以及解决问题和情况的方法，这些人类似于当今的格雷厄姆和费舍尔？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the interesting thing, you don’t have to look at the present-day ones, necessarily.

沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是，你不一定非得看现在的那些。

I mean, if you wanted to look at great business careers, you could look at Tom Murphy or Don Keough on our board.

我的意思是，如果你想看看伟大的商业生涯，你可以看看我们董事会的汤姆·墨菲或唐·基奥。

And you can learn everything you could learn about being an outstanding businessperson by just studying them. And you don’t have to study somebody that is 55 and currently in some executive position. Their lessons are timeless.

你可以通过研究他们来学习成为一名杰出商人所需的一切。你不必研究一个 55 岁并且目前担任某个高管职位的人。他们的经验是永恒的。

And there’s going to be a study — I think the Harvard Business — somebody sent it to me from the Harvard Business School, you know, on Cap Cities.

而且会有一项研究——我想是哈佛商学院的——有人从哈佛商学院发给我的，你知道的，关于 Cap Cities 的。

But there’s been others in the past. And, you know, if you learn the lessons of Tom Murphy, you don’t need to learn any other lessons in terms of business.

但过去也有其他人。而且，你知道，如果你学会了汤姆·墨菲的经验教训，在商业方面你就不需要再学习其他教训了。

And I would say if you learn the lessons of certain investors in the past, you know, you don’t need to worry about a contemporary example.

我会说，如果你学习过去某些投资者的经验教训，你就不需要担心当代的例子。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it’s also true that Warren and I are not following very well the 40-year-old investment professionals. Isn’t that right? (Laughter) Are you hiding something from me?

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为沃伦和我也确实没有很好地跟随那些 40 岁的投资专业人士。不是吗？（笑声）你有没有对我隐瞒什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t know there were any 40-year-olds. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道有 40 岁的人。（笑）

I thought they’re all 25 now.

我以为他们现在都是 25 岁。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: The — investing is not that — is really not complicated. I mean, the basic framework for it is simple. Now, then, you — you have to work at it some to find the best pockets of undervaluation, maybe, or something.

沃伦·巴菲特：投资并不是那么复杂。我的意思是，它的基本框架很简单。现在，然后，你——你可能需要花些功夫去寻找最被低估的领域，或者其他什么。

But you didn’t have to have a — you didn’t have to have a high IQ. You didn’t have to have lots of investment smarts to buy junk bonds in 2002 or even to do some of the stuff that was available when LTCM got in trouble.

但你不需要有——你不需要有高智商。你不需要有很多投资智慧就能在 2002 年购买垃圾债券，甚至在长期资本管理公司遇到麻烦时做一些可用的事情。

You really had to have, sort of, the courage of your convictions. You had to have the willingness to do something when everybody else was petrified.

你真正需要的是对自己信念的坚定信心。当所有人都吓坏了的时候，你需要有勇气去做点什么。

And — but that was true in 1974 when, you know, we were buying stocks at very, very low multiples of earnings. It wasn’t that anybody didn’t know that they were cheap.

而且——但在 1974 年确实如此，你知道，当时我们以非常非常低的市盈率购买股票。并不是没有人知道它们很便宜。

They were just paralyzed for one reason or another. And, you know, that — the lesson of following logic rather than emotion, you know, is something that — it’s obvious. And some people have great trouble with it, and others have less trouble.

他们因为这样或那样的原因而感到无所适从。你知道，遵循逻辑而不是情感的教训是显而易见的。有些人对此非常困难，而另一些人则较少困难。

Charlie, can you give them any more?

查理，你能再给他们一些吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think this is different. When we were young, we had way less competition than you people have now.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为这是不同的。当我们年轻时，我们面临的竞争远比你们现在少得多。

There weren’t very many smart people in the investment management field. (Laughter) There really weren’t. And you should have seen the people who were in the bank trust departments. (Laughter)

在投资管理领域没有很多聪明人。（笑声）真的没有。而且你应该看看那些在银行信托部门工作的人。（笑声）

I mean — so, now we’ve got armies of brilliant young people and all these private partnerships and all these proprietary desks in all the big investment banks. It’s a — and we’ve got a vast amount of talent in the investment management business.

现在，我们有大批聪明的年轻人在私人合伙企业里工作，还有所有这些私人合作伙伴关系，以及所有大型投资银行中的专有部门。投资管理业务中充满了才华横溢的人。

So — and there’s a lot of competition. Now, if there were suddenly a crisis now, there would be 500 firms that would be studying it intensely, each having capital that they could commit on a hair trigger. In our day, we would frequently be all alone.

所以——竞争非常激烈。现在，如果突然发生危机，会有 500 家公司密切研究，每家公司都有可以随时投入的资本。在我们那个时代，我们经常是孤军奋战。

WARREN BUFFETT: But in 2002 —

沃伦·巴菲特：但是在 2002 年——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’d be the only buyer.

查理·芒格：我们将是唯一的买家。

WARREN BUFFETT: But in 2002, Charlie, there were tons of people that had investment experience and high IQs and lots of money was around. It wasn’t a question about money, it’s just they were terrified of that particular arena.

沃伦·巴菲特：但在2002年，查理，有很多有经验的投资者，智商高，资金充足。当时不是钱的问题，只是他们对那个领域感到恐惧。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, when you have a huge convulsion, which is like a big fire in this auditorium right now, you know, you get a lot of weird behavior. (Laughter) And if you — (Laughter) — and if you can —

查理·芒格：嗯，当你遇到巨大的动荡，就像现在这个礼堂里发生了一场大火，你知道的，会出现很多奇怪的行为。（笑声）如果你——（笑声）——如果你能——

WARREN BUFFETT: Particularly at the head table. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：尤其是在主桌上。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and if you can be wise when everybody else is going crazy, sure, there will still be opportunities. But that may give you long, dull stretches, if that’s your strategy.

查理·芒格：——如果在别人都疯狂的时候你能保持智慧，当然，仍然会有机会。但如果这是你的策略，那可能会让你经历漫长而乏味的时期。

WARREN BUFFETT: Three years ago — two — three years ago you could find a number of securities in Korea, population 50 million, advanced society, strong balance sheets, strong industry positions, at three or so times earnings. Now —

沃伦·巴菲特：三年前——两三年前，你可以在韩国找到许多证券，人口 5000 万，先进的社会，强劲的资产负债表，强大的行业地位，市盈率大约三倍。现在——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But that took a convulsion to create that, a real — a big convulsion.

查理·芒格：但这需要一次剧变来创造，一个真正的——一个大的剧变。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But the convulsion happened three or four years earlier —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但动荡发生在三四年前——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — five years earlier. And plenty of smart people in Korea in the investment business, plenty of smart people here scouring — the information was all available.

沃伦·巴菲特：——五年前。韩国投资行业有很多聪明人，这里也有很多聪明人在搜寻——所有信息都是可用的。

You can go to the internet and get information about Korean companies that’s just as good as you get it from the SEC. And there they were, dozens of companies at very, very, very cheap prices. Now, where —

你可以上网获取关于韩国公司的信息，这些信息和你从美国证券交易委员会获得的一样好。那里有几十家公司，价格非常非常非常便宜。现在，在哪里——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It did —

查理·芒格：确实如此——

WARREN BUFFETT: — were all these smart people with all this money —

沃伦·巴菲特：——所有这些有钱的聪明人——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It did happen. But if I asked you to name 20 more like it, you would have great difficulty.

查理·芒格：确实发生了。但如果我让你再举出 20 个类似的例子，你会很难做到。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if I have 20 more like it, I’m not going to name them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果我还有 20 个这样的，我不会说出它们的名字。（笑声）

43. If we were starting out again …

如果我们重新开始……

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：第八号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Simon Denison-Smith from the UK.

观众成员：我叫西蒙·丹尼森-史密斯，来自英国。

My question is this: if you were starting out today with a million dollars, with a vision of building a business with 20 percent average growth in value over 40 years, what type of investments and investment strategy would you look to make in the first five years?

我的问题是：如果你今天有一百万美元，并且有一个在 40 年内实现平均价值增长 20%的商业愿景，那么在最初的五年里，你会选择进行哪种类型的投资和投资策略？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s somewhat interesting that we formed the first partnership 50 years ago last — 2 days ago, Thursday, May 4, 1956, which was 105,000. (Applause) That’s my sister clapping. She was in the partnership. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，有趣的是，我们在 50 年前的上周四，即 1956 年 5 月 4 日成立了第一个合伙企业，当时是 105,000。（掌声）那是我妹妹在鼓掌。她也是合伙人之一。（笑声）

The — we would — if Charlie and I were starting all over again and we were in this, Charlie would say we shouldn’t be doing this. (Laughter)

如果查理和我重新开始，我们处在这种情况下，查理会说我们不应该这样做。（笑声）

But if we were to succumb to Satan and engage in the same kind of activity, we would, I think, be doing something very similarly. If we were investing in securities, we would look around the world, and we would look at a Korea.

但是，如果我们屈服于撒旦并从事同样的活动，我认为我们会做出非常相似的事情。如果我们投资于证券，我们会环顾世界，并关注韩国。

And Charlie says you can’t find 20 of them, but you don’t have to find 20 of them; you only have to find one, really. You do not have to have tons of good ideas in this business, you just have a good idea that’s worth a ton, occasionally.

查理说你找不到 20 个这样的机会，但你不需要找到 20 个；你只需要找到一个，真的。在这个行业中，你不需要有大量的好点子，你只需要偶尔有一个价值连城的好点子。

And in securities, we would be doing the same thing, which would probably mean smaller stocks — it would mean smaller stocks — because we would find things that could have an impact on a small portfolio that will have no impact on a portfolio the size of Berkshire.

在证券方面，我们也会做同样的事情，这可能意味着较小的股票——这确实意味着较小的股票——因为我们会找到一些能够对小型投资组合产生影响的东西，而这些对像伯克希尔这样规模的投资组合没有影响。

If we were trying to buy businesses, we’d have a tough time. We would have no reputation, so people would not be coming to us. We’d be too small a player, if you’re talking about a million dollars. So we would not have much success, I don’t think, with small amounts, buying businesses.

如果我们试图收购企业，我们会遇到困难。我们没有声誉，所以人们不会来找我们。如果你说的是一百万美元，我们的规模会太小。因此，我认为用少量资金收购企业不会取得太大成功。

Charlie started out, you know, in real estate development because it took very, very little capital, and you could magnify brain power and energy — or, I should say, brain power and energy could magnify small amounts of capital in a huge way that was not true in securities.

查理起初从事房地产开发，因为这需要非常少的资本，而通过智慧和努力可以将小资本放大，这是证券市场无法做到的。

You know, my natural inclination was to look at securities and just kind of do it one foot in front of the other over time. But the basic principles wouldn’t be different.

你知道，我的自然倾向是查看证券，并随着时间的推移一步一步地进行。但基本原则不会有所不同。

You know, I think if I’d been running a partnership a couple of years ago with a small amount of money, I think I’d have probably been 100 percent in Korea.

你知道，我想如果我在几年前用一小笔资金经营一个合伙企业，我想我可能会百分之百投资在韩国。

And, you know, I would be looking around for something that was very mispriced and which — and that I understood. And every now and then, that’s going to happen.

而且，你知道，我会寻找一些价格非常不合理且我能理解的东西。偶尔，这种情况会发生。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with that. The concept that you’re likely to find just one thing where it will make 20 percent per annum and you just sit back for the next 40 years, that tends to be dreamland.

查理·芒格：嗯，我同意这一点。认为你可能会找到一个每年能赚取 20%收益的东西，然后在接下来的 40 年里坐享其成，这种想法往往是幻想。

And in the real world, you have to find something that you can understand that’s the best you have available. And once you’ve found the best thing, then you measure everything against that because it’s your opportunity cost.

在现实世界中，你必须找到你能理解的、你所能获得的最好的东西。一旦你找到了最好的东西，就用它来衡量其他一切，因为那是你的机会成本。

That’s the way small sums of money should be invested. And the trick, of course, is getting enough expertise that your opportunity cost — meaning your default option, which is still pretty good — is very high.

这就是小额资金应该投资的方式。当然，诀窍在于获得足够的专业知识，使你的机会成本——也就是说你的默认选项，仍然相当不错——非常高。

And so, the game hasn’t changed at all in terms of its basic arithmetic. That’s why modern portfolio theory is so asinine. (Laughter)

所以，游戏在基本算术方面根本没有改变。这就是为什么现代投资组合理论如此愚蠢。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It really is, folks.

沃伦·巴菲特：确实如此，大家。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. When Warren said he would have been all in one country, that’s pretty close to right. He wouldn’t have quite done that when he had the partnership, but he would have been way more concentrated than is conventional if you listen to modern portfolio theory.

查理·芒格：是的。当沃伦说他会全押在一个国家时，那几乎是对的。在他有合伙企业的时候，他不会完全这样做，但如果你听从现代投资组合理论，他会比传统做法更加集中。

Most people aren’t going to find thousands of things that are equally good; they’re going to find a few things where one or two of them are way better than anything else they know. And the right way to think about investing is to act thinking about your best opportunity cost.

大多数人不会发现成千上万同样好的东西；他们会发现其中一两样比他们知道的其他任何东西都要好得多。考虑投资的正确方式是以最佳机会成本来行动。

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：第九。

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, that’s in the freshman course in economics everywhere in the basic textbook; it just hasn’t made its way into modern portfolio theory.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，这在各地经济学基础教材的大一课程中都有，只是还没有进入现代投资组合理论。

WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t get asked to do book reviews. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们没有被邀请做书评。（笑声）

44. Munger thinks Prof. Jeremy Siegel is “demented”

芒格认为杰里米·西格尔教授是“精神错乱的”

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It’s Anvayas Vegar (PH) from Munich, Germany. Thank you very much for the open discussion that you had with us.

观众成员：来自德国慕尼黑的 Anvayas Vegar（音）。非常感谢您与我们的开放讨论。

Actually, I’d like to ask a question on a book, so I’ll come back to the book review.

实际上，我想问一个关于书的问题，所以我会回到书评。

Jeremy Siegel had some ideas in his second book, and I would like to understand what — how this would impact your investment strategies, if there are any changes from his ideas, and how you react to these recommendations that he makes? Thank you.

杰里米·西格尔在他的第二本书中提出了一些想法，我想了解这些想法会如何影响您的投资策略，如果他的想法有任何变化，您会如何应对他的这些建议？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: This is which book? Jeremy Spiegel?

沃伦·巴菲特：这是哪本书？杰里米·斯皮格尔？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jeremy Siegel, the second book, “Why the Tried and the True Triumph Over the Bold and the New.”

观众成员：杰里米·西格尔，第二本书《为什么经过考验和真实的胜过大胆和新颖》。

WARREN BUFFETT: That — it’s had no effect on us.

沃伦·巴菲特：那对我们没有影响。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, is that the fellow who’s very optimistic about common stock investment over long periods of time?

查理·芒格：不，那是对长期普通股投资非常乐观的人吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The University of Pennsylvania. Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：宾夕法尼亚大学。是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, I think he’s demented. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我认为他疯了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he’s a very nice guy, Charlie. But — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，他是个很好的人，查理。但是——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he may well be a very nice guy, but he’s comparing apples against elephants and trying to make accurate projections. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，他可能是个很好的人，但他是在拿苹果和大象作比较，并试图做出准确的预测。（笑声）

45. “Things are really screwed up if you’re getting calls on Sunday”

“如果你在星期天接到电话，那事情真的很糟糕”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Bob Klein (PH) from Los Angeles. You so eloquently stated that you can’t see who’s swimming naked until the tide goes out.

观众成员：我是来自洛杉矶的鲍勃·克莱因（PH）。你如此雄辩地说过，只有当潮水退去时，才能看到谁在裸泳。

Could you discuss the issue of trying to employ a rational decision-making process in investing, or in business generally, as opposed to focusing on outcomes or results of just a few instances or over a short period of time?

你能否讨论一下在投资或一般商业中尝试采用理性决策过程的问题，而不是仅仅关注少数情况的结果或短期内的结果？

For example, it may not be a good idea to underwrite some insurance policies if competition has lowered the premiums too far. And, likewise, in the stock market, momentum investors may get good results for a while. But buying high and trying to sell higher isn’t a good long-term strategy.

例如，如果竞争导致保费过低，承保某些保险保单可能不是一个好主意。同样，在股票市场上，动量投资者可能会在一段时间内获得良好的结果。但是，高买并试图更高卖并不是一个好的长期策略。

So I’d just like to hear you guys provide some detail on the importance of using an effective decision-making process, even though it may lead to some bad outcomes and underperformance in the short run.

所以我想听听你们详细说明使用有效决策过程的重要性，尽管这可能在短期内导致一些不良结果和表现不佳。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, Ben Graham said long ago that you’re neither right nor wrong because people agree with you or disagree with you.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。早在很久以前，本·格雷厄姆就说过，你的对错并不取决于别人是否同意或反对你。

In other words, being contrarian has no special virtue over being a trend follower.

换句话说，逆向思维并不比追随潮流有特别的优点。

You’re right because your facts and reasoning are right. So all you do is you try to make sure that the facts you have are correct. And that’s usually pretty easy to do in this country. I mean, information is available on all kinds of things. Internet makes it even easier.

你是对的，因为你的事实和推理是正确的。所以你要做的就是确保你掌握的事实是正确的。在这个国家，这通常是很容易做到的。我的意思是，各种信息都可以获取。互联网让这一切变得更加容易。

And then once you have the facts, you’ve got to think through what they mean. And you don’t take a public opinion survey. You don’t pay attention to things that are unimportant. I mean, what you’re looking for is something — things that are important and knowable.

然后，一旦你掌握了事实，你就必须思考它们的意义。你不进行民意调查。你不关注不重要的事情。我的意思是，你要寻找的是重要且可知的事情。

If something’s important but unknowable, forget it. I mean, it may be important, you know, whether somebody’s going to drop a nuclear weapon tomorrow but it’s unknowable. It may be all kinds of things. So you — and there are all kinds of things are that knowable but are unimportant.

如果某件事情很重要但无法知道，那就忘了它。我的意思是，它可能很重要，比如明天是否有人会投放核武器，但这是无法知道的。可能有各种各样的事情。所以你——而且有各种各样的事情是可以知道的，但却不重要。

In focusing on business and investment decisions, you try to think — you narrow it down to the things that are knowable and important, and then you decide whether you have information of sufficient value that — you know, compared to price and all that — that will cause you to act.

在专注于商业和投资决策时，你会尝试思考——你将其缩小到那些可知且重要的事情，然后你决定是否拥有足够有价值的信息——你知道，相对于价格等等——这会促使你采取行动。

What others are doing means nothing. It’s what Graham writes in Chapter 8 of “The Intelligent Investor,” that the market is there to serve you and not to instruct you. That’s of enormous importance.

别人做什么并不重要。正如格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》第八章中所写的，市场是为你服务的，而不是指导你的。这一点极为重要。

When people talk about momentum in stocks or charting or any kind of things like that, they’re saying that the market is instructing you. The market doesn’t instruct us; the market is there to serve us.

当人们谈论股票动量或图表分析或类似的事情时，他们是在说市场在指导你。市场并不指导我们；市场是为我们服务的。

If it does something silly, we get a chance to do something because it’s doing something silly. We do it. But it doesn’t tell us anything. It just tells us prices.

如果它做了一些愚蠢的事情，我们就有机会做一些事情，因为它正在做一些愚蠢的事情。我们做了。但这并没有告诉我们任何事情。它只是告诉我们价格。

And if the price is out of line where the facts and reasoning lead you, then you — then action is called for. And if it doesn’t, you forget it and go play bridge that day and the next day, see whether there’s something new. And the nice thing is there always is something new.

如果价格与事实和推理的结果不符，那么你就需要采取行动。如果没有，你就忘掉它，去打桥牌，看看当天或第二天是否有新情况。好在总会有新情况出现。

I mentioned the LTCM crisis. We were getting calls on Sunday from people that had portfolios that were in trouble. Now, I will tell you that if — you can make a lot of money on Sunday.

我提到了 LTCM 危机。我们在星期天接到了那些投资组合出现问题的人的电话。现在，我会告诉你，如果——你可以在星期天赚很多钱。

You may not get a chance very often, but any calls you get on Sunday you’re probably going to make money on. (Laughter)

你可能不会经常有机会，但你在星期天接到的任何电话可能都会赚钱。（笑声）

Things are really screwed up if you’re getting calls on Sunday. And all you have to do is make sure that you’re the callee and not the caller — (laughs) on Sunday.

如果你在星期天接到电话，那事情真的很糟糕。你所要做的就是确保自己是接电话的人，而不是打电话的人——（笑）在星期天。

But if you get those calls — you get a call on a Sunday and somebody says that the off-the-run is trading 30 basis points away from the on-the-run, you know, all you have to do is decide whether — how you handle that particular piece of information — whether it’s correct in the first place — but how you handle that piece of information, whether you can play out your hand.

但是，如果你接到这些电话——你在周日接到一个电话，有人说非流通债券的交易利差比流通债券高出 30 个基点，你知道，你所要做的就是决定如何处理这条特定的信息——首先它是否正确——但你如何处理这条信息，是否能利用它。

You never get in a position, obviously, where the other fellow can call your tune. You have to be able to play out your hand under all circumstances. But if you can play out your hand, and you’ve got the right facts, and you reason by yourself, and you let the market serve you and not instruct you, you can’t miss.

你绝不能让别人左右你的决定。你必须在任何情况下都能掌控自己的局面。但如果你能掌控局面，并且掌握了正确的事实，独立思考，让市场为你服务而不是指挥你，你就不会失败。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would say some of you probably can miss. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不过，我要说，有些人可能还是会失误。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say Charlie can’t miss. I’ll put it that way. He’ll agree with that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我会说查理不会错。我就这么说吧。他会同意的。

Do you have anything further to add?

你还有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter) At least I’ve got him off that previous subject.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）至少我让他离开了之前的话题。

46. How to read Berkshire’s annual report

如何阅读伯克希尔的年度报告

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：第十一位。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. I’m Randall Bellows from Maryland. I would like to know how you would look at the Berkshire annual report.

观众成员：你好。我是来自马里兰的兰德尔·贝洛斯。我想知道你会如何看待伯克希尔的年度报告。

What numbers in the balance sheet or the cash flows would tell you that Berkshire is underpriced? And what numbers would you look at to determine if Berkshire is overpriced? Thank you.

资产负债表或现金流中的哪些数字会告诉你伯克希尔被低估了？你会看哪些数字来判断伯克希尔是否被高估了？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: We try to — and we take it very seriously — we try to put everything in that report that we would want to know if the positions were reversed.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们努力——而且我们非常认真地对待——我们努力把所有我们希望在角色互换时知道的信息都放在那份报告中。

If I were sitting with all of my net worth in Berkshire and had been on a desert island for a year and I — and the manager was reporting to me about the business, we’d try to have that same information that I would want from him. And we would try to present it to you in a way that’s understandable.

如果我把我所有的净资产都放在伯克希尔，并且在一个荒岛上呆了一年，而经理向我汇报业务情况，我们会努力获取我想从他那里得到的同样信息。我们会努力以一种易于理解的方式向您呈现这些信息。

And we don’t leave out things that we think are important. We try not to put — I mean, there’s — it runs about 76, I think, or maybe even 80 pages this year. I mean, there’s — you can drown people in information that really doesn’t make much difference.

我们不会遗漏我们认为重要的事情。我们尽量不放——我的意思是，今年大约有 76 页，或者甚至 80 页。我是说，你可以用那些实际上没有多大意义的信息淹没人们。

But we’ve tried to organize it in a way by talking about these different groups of businesses. We try to explain how we think about it, in terms of things like the amount of operating earnings we’ve generated and the investments we have.

但是我们试图通过讨论这些不同的企业群体来组织它。我们试图解释我们是如何看待它的，比如我们产生的营业收入和我们的投资。

It’s really as if it’s a report that I was making to Charlie or Charlie would be making to me if one of us were inactive in the business and the other was running it.

这真的就像是我在向查理汇报，或者查理在向我汇报，如果我们其中一个在业务中不活跃而另一个在经营它。

And so I think — I mean, it may take a few hours to do it, but I think if you regard yourself as a serious owner of Berkshire, it’s really worth reading the whole report.

所以我认为——我的意思是，这可能需要几个小时来完成，但我认为如果你把自己视为伯克希尔的认真持有者，真的值得阅读整个报告。

Thinking about: what is there? What are these guys going to do with it? What are they trying to attempt? What are the odds they’re going to be successful in that attempt? What are they —?

在思考：有什么？这些家伙打算怎么处理它？他们想尝试什么？他们成功的几率有多大？他们是——？

You know, what is it worth if they don’t succeed very well in deploying additional capital? What might be the case if they were successful in deploying excess capital and incremental capital?

你知道，如果他们在部署额外资本方面不太成功，那有什么价值？如果他们在部署过剩资本和增量资本方面成功了，会是什么情况？

But I can tell you that, obviously, we think it’s very important.

但我可以告诉你，显然，我们认为这非常重要。

What counts is the kind of businesses we have, the kind of managers we have running those businesses, what those businesses are likely to earn over time — and we’ve expressed ourselves a little on that —

重要的是我们拥有的企业类型、管理这些企业的经理类型、这些企业随着时间推移可能赚取的收益——我们对此稍微表达了一下——

And then what are the resources that are available to keep adding to that collection of businesses? What are the kind of businesses we are looking to add?

然后，有哪些资源可以用来不断增加那个企业集合？我们希望添加哪种类型的企业？

And I think — you know, I think you’ll find the information that you need to evaluate Berkshire, and it’s not a — you know, you don’t carry it out to four decimal places.

我认为——你知道，我认为你会找到评估伯克希尔所需的信息，而且这不是——你知道，你不需要精确到小数点后四位。

Charlie and I, if we had to stick a number down on a piece of paper right now as to some pinpoint number — we wouldn’t do it because we know that’s impossible. But if we had to stick a number down, it would be a different number between the two of us.

如果查理和我现在必须在纸上写下一个具体的数字——我们不会这样做，因为我们知道这是不可能的。但如果我们必须写下一个数字，我们两个人写下的数字会不同。

It would be a different number if I did it today from tomorrow, probably. But we’d be in the same ballpark, and we’d be looking at the same things. And the things we would be looking at we report to you in that report.

如果我今天而不是明天做这件事，可能会是一个不同的数字。但我们会在同一个范围内，并且会关注相同的事物。我们关注的事物会在那份报告中向您汇报。

I would focus — you know, the real question of what Berkshire is going to be worth 10 years from now will depend on the — earnings that we have developed — annual earnings that we’ve developed by that time, the quality of those earnings, the possibilities going forward from that point of those businesses, and the liquid assets we have.

我会关注——你知道，伯克希尔 10 年后价值的真正问题将取决于——我们到那时所发展的——年度收益，这些收益的质量，从那时起这些业务的前景，以及我们拥有的流动资产。

And we’ve worked on increasing both of those elements over the years, and we’ll keep working on it. And it’s a lot tougher, in terms of percentage gains, from this point forward than it was in the past.

多年来，我们一直在努力提高这两个要素，并将继续努力。从现在开始，按百分比增长来说，这比过去要困难得多。

There’s no way in the world that we can replicate what’s happened in the past. It just won’t happen. The question is whether we can do a reasonable job or not.

世界上不可能重现过去发生的事情。这是不可能的。问题在于我们能否做得合理。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I generally try and approach a complex task, like the one you presented, by quickly disposing of what I call the no-brainer decisions and — meaning the easy ones.

查理·芒格：是的。我通常尝试通过快速处理我称之为显而易见的决策来应对像你所提出的那样复杂的任务——也就是说那些简单的决策。

I think, if you go through all the operating insurance that don’t involve surplus cash, and the insurance operations, that that’s the easiest valuation process in Berkshire.

我认为，如果你查看所有不涉及盈余现金的运营保险和保险业务，那就是伯克希尔中最简单的估值过程。

And the insurance operation is very interesting, and so is the process by which the huge amounts of excess cash are continually redeployed. But I would go at it in that sequence: taking the no-brainers first.

保险业务非常有趣，巨额多余现金的持续再部署过程也是如此。但我会按这个顺序进行：先处理那些显而易见的事情。

47. Buffett’s key insurance question

巴菲特的关键保险问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十二号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.

观众成员：大卫·温特斯，新泽西州山湖市。

Would you please discuss how your underwriting standards have changed as the weather patterns seem to become more severe, the challenges of global terrorism seem to escalate, and unforeseen super-cat events, such as earthquakes and pandemics, go into your thinking, and just what the prospects are for the development of the float?

请您讨论一下，随着天气模式似乎变得更加严峻，全球恐怖主义的挑战似乎在升级，以及地震和大流行病等不可预见的超级灾难事件进入您的思考，您的承保标准发生了怎样的变化，以及浮存金发展的前景如何？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the development of the float is a different question. That really depends on how much business we write in the future and the nature of the business, whether it’s long-tail or short-tail.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，浮存金的发展是一个不同的问题。这实际上取决于我们未来写多少业务以及业务的性质，是长期的还是短期的。

I think it will be very hard to increase our float of 48 or -9 billion at a big clip in the future. I mean, I’ve been amazed as what’s happened in the past. And it’s done way better than Charlie and I ever would’ve dreamt.

我认为在未来大幅增加我们 480 亿或-90 亿的浮存金将会非常困难。我的意思是，过去发生的事情让我感到惊讶。它的表现远远超出了我和查理的想象。

But, you know, we have — we’re getting to where we’re close to 10 percent of the float of the entire American insurance — property-casualty insurance industry — and some of it’s abroad that we have.

但是，你知道，我们已经接近拥有整个美国保险业——财产-意外保险行业——10%的浮存金，其中一些是在国外的。

But it just can’t — it can’t grow at very rapid rates. But it can be very attractive, and so far, it has been.

但它就是不能——不能以非常快的速度增长。但它可以非常有吸引力，到目前为止，它一直如此。

In terms of the questions about underwriting in terms of pandemics or terrorism and all of that, I mean, you know, I’m aware of them. You’re aware of them.

关于与大流行病或恐怖主义等相关的承保问题，我的意思是，我知道这些问题。你也知道这些问题。

We get propositions offered to us virtually every day, and in the end I — mostly Ajit, I mean, in this particular case, in terms of big-type contracts — financial-type contracts I would evaluate. He would —

我们几乎每天都会收到投保建议，最终我——主要是阿吉特，我的意思是，在这种情况下，涉及大型合同——金融类合同我会评估。他会——

But we talk about what we think the probabilities are of $50 billion events and up, or $20 billion events and up. And, he’s the fellow that does most of — he applies it, but we kick around the possibilities.

但是我们讨论的是我们认为发生 500 亿美元及以上事件或 200 亿美元及以上事件的概率。他是负责应用这些概率的人，但我们会一起探讨各种可能性。

But that’s all there is to it. I mean, it’s a question of making judgments about whether you’re getting paid enough. And if we have a lot of money, you know, 30 years from now, it will mean that our judgments overall were decent.

但事情就是这样。我是说，这是一个判断你是否得到足够报酬的问题。如果我们有很多钱，你知道，30 年后，这将意味着我们的整体判断是不错的。

And if we have a big loss on one this year, it does not mean that our judgment’s wrong because it — it’s going to lead to peaks and valleys. But there’s no magic to it.

如果我们今年在某个项目上有很大的损失，这并不意味着我们的判断是错误的，因为这会导致高峰和低谷。但这并没有什么神奇之处。

There’s probably — I would feel that the earthquake experience of the last 100 or 200 years has more validity than the windstorm or the hurricane experience of the last hundred or 200 years. I don’t know that for sure, but I would bet real money that way, and we have.

在过去100或200年的地震经验可能比过去100或200年的风暴或飓风经验更具有效性。我不敢保证，但我会在这方面下真金白银。

What is — what will hurricane experience be like 10 years from now, in terms of the number of those that hit the United States and the ferocity of the ones that do hit? You know, I don’t know. But I’ll keep thinking about it every day.

未来十年飓风的经历会是什么样的？就袭击美国的数量和袭击的猛烈程度而言，会有什么变化？你知道，我不知道。但我会每天都在思考这个问题。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the laws of thermodynamics are such that if the oceans get warmer — I think they are getting warmer — the weather is going to be — have more high-energy uproar in it.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为热力学定律表明，如果海洋变暖——我认为它们确实在变暖——天气将会有更多的高能量动荡。

So I think we’d be out of our minds if we wrote weather-related insurance on the theory that global warming would have no effect at all. And the natural reaction is to raise your prices, as the risks go up.

所以我认为，如果我们在撰写与天气相关的保险时认为全球变暖完全没有影响，那我们就是疯了。自然的反应是随着风险的增加提高价格。

And whether you’ve raised them enough, and carefully controlled your risks enough, that’s the art of the business.

而你是否已经足够提高它们，并足够仔细地控制你的风险，这就是商业的艺术。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And you have this possibility that, you know, 1 percent changes or 2 percent changes in something can produce 100 percent of probabilistic changes in cost.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且你有这种可能性，你知道，某件事情的 1%或 2%的变化可能会导致成本 100%的概率变化。

It’s an explosive sort of equation that you’re dealing with. And, you know, but that’s the game we’re in, and we don’t have to play it ever.

这是一种爆炸性的方程，你正在处理。你知道，但这就是我们所处的游戏，我们不必一直玩下去。

If we don’t like what we’re being offered — and we didn’t like what we were being offered a while back in many areas — somebody else can take our place in line. We’ll be happy to have them.

如果我们不喜欢被提供的东西——而且前段时间我们在许多方面确实不喜欢——那么其他人可以代替我们的位置。我们很乐意让他们这样做。

48. Health care is in Berkshire’s “too hard” pile

医疗保健属于伯克希尔的“太难”类别

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Warren and Charlie, my name is Dr. Rashad Patel (PH). I’m a family physician from Taunton, Massachusetts. Two years ago I wrote you a letter; you responded with me back quickly. Thank you for that.

观众成员：亲爱的沃伦和查理，我叫拉沙德·帕特尔（音译）博士。我是一名来自马萨诸塞州汤顿的家庭医生。两年前我给你们写了一封信，你们很快就回复了我。谢谢你们。

My question is, what are the criteria or principles to find a person like you in health care? It seems that a person moves up the ladder in this ethical business, they are more prone to become more unethical, get more options, sell shares, open a shop next door.

我的问题是，您认为在健康护理领域，怎样的人才符合像您这样的标准或原则？似乎在这个伦理行业中，向上发展的个人更容易变得不道德，获得更多选择，出售股票，在隔壁开店。

How do you find those checkpoints? Can you please express your view, on this soon $2 trillion economy, how to find the leaders so we don’t get a surprise in dog-eat-dog world?

您如何找到这些检查点？您能否表达一下您对即将达到2万亿美元经济规模的健康护理行业的看法，如何找到合适的领导者，以免在这个竞争激烈的世界中受到意外的冲击？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, did you get that? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你明白了吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I will try that. I’m not sure I understood the whole — I think she’s asking about the health care business —

查理·芒格：好的，我会试试。我不确定我完全理解了——我想她是在问医疗保健业务——

WARREN BUFFETT: That part I got.

沃伦·巴菲特：那部分我明白了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and whether or not, with the — much bad ethics being present — we have anything to contribute about doing well in that sector. Is that about right?

查理·芒格：——以及是否在存在许多不良道德的情况下，我们有任何关于在该领域表现良好的贡献。这样说对吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. 观众成员：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Oh no.

查理·芒格：是的。哦，不。

WARREN BUFFETT: Now I understand the question, I still —it’s still yours. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我明白这个问题了，我还是——这仍然是你的。（笑声）

I’d be glad to answer it, but I’m eating candy at the moment. (Laughter)

我很乐意回答，但我现在正在吃糖果。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: That has tended to go into the too hard pile — (laughter) — at Berkshire. (Applause)

查理·芒格：在伯克希尔，这往往被归入太难的类别——（笑声）——（掌声）

A lot of people have made a lot of money writing health insurance. And I’ve watched the behavior of some of those people, wearing my hat as the chairman of a big central city hospital.

许多人通过撰写健康保险赚了很多钱。我以大城市医院主席的身份观察过其中一些人的行为。

And you are right, there’s a lot of bad ethics in health care. There’s also a lot of good ethics. It’s a very, very complex field with a lot of change, a lot of technological differences.

你说得对，医疗保健中有很多不良的伦理问题。同时也有很多良好的伦理。这是一个非常非常复杂的领域，充满了变化和技术差异。

And in terms of investments, I think the policy has generally been that it all goes into the too hard pile. We don’t — unless Warren has something he’s keeping secret from me.

在投资方面，我认为我们的政策通常是把所有东西都放到太难处理的那一堆。我们没有——除非沃伦有一些他对我保密的东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. We have not owned much in health care. My only expertise is in diet. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不。我们在医疗保健领域没有太多投资。我的唯一专长是食品。（笑声）

But I appreciate the seriousness of the question. You know, there — it is just — it is a very, very tough problem on which I have no particular insights.

但我很欣赏这个问题的严肃性。你知道，这确实是一个非常非常棘手的问题，我对此没有特别的见解。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And you’re right. The worst of the ethics is really bad.

查理·芒格：你说得对。最糟糕的伦理确实非常糟糕。

49. “A complicated bankruptcy can offer opportunities for profit”

“复杂的破产可以提供获利的机会”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Barry Steinhart (PH), shareholder from New York. My question relates to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process.

观众成员：你好。我的名字是巴里·斯坦哈特（音），来自纽约的股东。我的问题与第 11 章破产程序有关。

I know you have been active in the past in some activity in the bankruptcy court. And if you had thoughts on possible reforms in that area, if you believe that any reforms are necessary?

我知道你过去曾在破产法院的一些活动中活跃。如果你对该领域的可能改革有任何想法，你是否认为有必要进行任何改革？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. Charlie is probably better qualified to answer than I am. I mean, we have bought Fruit of the Loom out of bankruptcy.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。查理可能比我更有资格回答。我是说，我们从破产中收购了 Fruit of the Loom。

And we have had some involvement in owning junk bonds. You know, we get — we think about the bankruptcy process. But in terms of the practicalities of improving on it, what do you think, Charlie?

我们也曾参与过持有垃圾债券。你知道，我们会考虑破产程序。但在如何实际改进方面，你怎么看，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think much of that is pretty horrible.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为很多都是相当可怕的。

You have a competition there, where the courts themselves have gone into bidding contests to get bankruptcy business attracted. Meaning that the —

你们那里有一个竞争，法院本身已经进入竞标比赛以吸引破产业务。这意味着——

There are various courts that can handle bankruptcy cases. And they have found that if they develop a culture where they overpay a lot of people egregiously, they can attract more business: lawyers, trustees, consultants, et cetera, et cetera.

有不同的法院可以处理破产案件。他们发现，如果他们培养一种文化，让许多人获得过高的报酬，他们就能吸引更多的业务：律师、受托人、顾问等等。

I find it so unpleasant to watch that I don’t pay as much attention to bankruptcy as I probably should. You know, I’m an old man, and I don’t like to have an upset stomach. (Laughter)

我觉得看这个很不愉快，所以我可能没有像我应该的那样多关注破产。你知道，我是个老人，我不喜欢让我的胃不舒服。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we will — we look at — at least I do, I’m not sure about Charlie — but he — you know, bankruptcies will be something that we will — one way or another, over the next 20 years — we’ll have various ways of participating.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们会——至少我会，我不确定查理——但他——你知道，破产将是我们在未来 20 年中以某种方式参与的事情。

And we have bought — well, we bought certain of the bonds, for example, of Enron after they entered bankruptcy — we bought something called the Ospreys.

我们购买了——嗯，我们购买了某些债券，例如，在安然公司破产后，我们购买了一种叫做 Ospreys 的东西。

And a complicated bankruptcy can offer opportunities for profit. Now, there’s so many people looking at bankruptcies currently, or potential bankruptcies, it’s a field that I would say does not have a lot of promise right now, but it has had promise in the past.

复杂的破产可以提供获利的机会。现在，有很多人正在关注破产或潜在的破产，我会说这是一个目前没有太多前景的领域，但在过去曾有过前景。

We actually, in the Fruit of the Loom situation, I first went into that just by buying some Fruit of the Loom bonds, but — when I had no notion that we might conceivably end up with the company. But, you know, I knew enough about it to buy the bonds.

实际上，在 Fruit of the Loom 的情况下，我最初只是通过购买一些 Fruit of the Loom 的债券进入的，但——当时我完全没有想到我们可能最终会拥有这家公司。但是，你知道，我对它了解足够多以至于去买这些债券。

And Enron comes along, and it’s a big mess. The Penn Central came along 20-odd years ago, and it was a big mess, and there was a lot of money made in the Penn Central, simply because it was such a complicated mess.

然后安然公司出现了，这是一团糟。宾州中央铁路公司大约在 20 多年前出现过，那也是一团糟，而且在宾州中央铁路公司上赚了很多钱，仅仅因为它是一个如此复杂的烂摊子。

So anytime there’s something big, complicated, there’s certainly a good chance of mispricing. Now, lately the mispricing may be more on the high side than on the low side. But, over time, you’re going to find some — there will be some attractive things to do in bankruptcy situations.

因此，任何时候遇到重大、复杂的事情，肯定有很大可能出现定价错误。现在，定价错误可能更多地出现在高估而不是低估。但随着时间的推移，你会发现一些——在破产情况下会有一些有吸引力的事情可以做。

We’ve had other bankruptcy situations where we’ve gotten involved in the process and then been outbid. It happened at Burlington and it happened at Seitel. And — but we owned all the bonds at Seitel, so we came out fine.

我们曾遇到过其他破产情况，我们参与了这个过程，但随后被出价超过。这种情况在伯灵顿和 Seitel 都发生过。不过，我们持有 Seitel 的所有债券，所以我们最终没事。

It’s something to understand if you’re in the business of buying investments or businesses. And I would say that, you know, if we’re around for another 10 or 15 years that we’ll do something or other, maybe substantial, in the bankruptcy field.

如果你从事购买投资或企业的业务，这是需要理解的事情。我想说，如果我们再存在 10 或 15 年，我们可能会在破产领域做一些事情，也许是重大的。

The Enrons — the payment is still being made in various ways. But the Ospreys, which were kind of a complicated situation — the whole thing was complicated.

安然公司——付款仍然以各种方式进行。但Ospreys，这是一种复杂的情况——整个事情都很复杂。

But, you know, we didn’t buy at the bottom or anything like that. But, you know, we considerably more than tripled our money in something that you could have put a fair amount of money in. So they can be interesting.

但是，你知道，我们并没有在最低点买入或类似的事情。但是，你知道，我们的钱翻了不止三倍，而且这是你可以投入相当多资金的东西。所以它们可能很有趣。

Charlie, do you want to —

查理，你想要——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I remember the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy, where there were a lot of employees that would’ve — and communities that would’ve been affected. And the courts in that case, I would say, abused the senior creditors horribly.

查理·芒格：嗯，我记得东方航空的破产案，当时有很多员工和社区会受到影响。在那个案例中，我会说法院对高级债权人进行了严重的滥用。

And so you could have read a law book and reached one conclusion, and if you’d bought the wrong securities, why, you would have found out you’d guessed wrong. It’s a very interesting field.

因此，你可能读了一本法律书籍并得出了一个结论，如果你买错了证券，你就会发现你猜错了。这是一个非常有趣的领域。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It — and it can be very unpredictable. In the Penn Central case, you had an incredible variety of claims. I mean, you had leased lines and you had all kinds of first and second liens and everything.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这可能非常不可预测。在宾夕法尼亚中央铁路的案例中，你会遇到各种各样的索赔。我是说，你有租赁线路，还有各种第一和第二留置权等等。

And the judge, as I remember — I may be wrong a little bit on this on the details — but as I remember, the judge just looked at this incredible — probably the most complicated bankruptcy that had come down the pike in the history of bankruptcy to that point — and he just said, “This is just too damn complicated. I’m just, sort of, going to ignore the various priorities and all this. I’m just going to” — perhaps you might call it substantive consolidation, or something — “I’m just going to put this all together, and I’m going to give you a quick, fast solution.”

据我记得，法官——在细节上我可能有点记错——但据我记得，法官只是看着这个令人难以置信的案件——可能是到那时为止破产史上最复杂的破产案——他说：“这实在是太复杂了。我就不去理会各种优先权和所有这些。我就要”——也许你可以称之为实质性合并，或者其他什么——“我就要把这一切放在一起，给你们一个快速的解决方案。”

And I think it was a very smart way to handle things, because otherwise I think Penn Central might still be going. But it wasn’t what the book said would be done at —

我认为这是一个非常聪明的处理方式，否则我认为宾州中央可能还会继续。但这并不是书中所说的做法——

Judges can determine things in a very big way. I remember when we were in Cincinnati on that newspaper case I mentioned earlier, I said to Charlie — a judge had stayed an order, I think, for a week or something like that.

法官可以在很大程度上决定事情。我记得我们在辛辛那提处理我之前提到的那个报纸案件时，我对查理说——一位法官暂停了一项命令，我想是一个星期左右。

And I said to Charlie — I said, “How much power does a federal judge have?” And Charlie says, “Well, for a while, as much as he thinks he has.” (Laughter)

我对查理说：“联邦法官有多大权力？”查理说：“嗯，有一段时间，他认为自己有多大权力就有多大权力。”（笑声）

I learned a lot out of that.

我从中学到了很多。

50. Buffett endorses Procter & Gamble-Gillette merger

巴菲特支持宝洁-吉列合并

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：第三名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen. Long-time listener, first-time caller here. This is my first shareholder meeting. Thanks for hosting. You guys do a great job. I’m looking forward to coming back for several more years.

听众成员：下午好，先生们。长期听众，首次提问。这是我第一次参加股东大会。感谢你们的举办。你们做得非常好。我期待着未来的好几年能再来。

My name is Craig Beachler. I’m from Cincinnati, where my paychecks are signed by Uncle Procter and Mr. Gamble.

我叫克雷格·比奇勒，来自辛辛那提，那里我的薪水由叔叔宝洁和先生吉列签发。

Thinking about that, I know that when the P&G-Gillette merger was announced, you called it a, quote, “dream deal.”

想到这一点，我知道当宝洁与吉列合并宣布时，你称其为“梦幻交易”。

Considering that P&G is primarily thought of as a consumer products company, what are your thoughts on the short- and long-term fit for P&G’s pharmaceutical business?

考虑到宝洁主要被视为一家消费品公司，您对宝洁制药业务的短期和长期契合度有什么看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: For just the pharmaceutical business or, did you say, or —

沃伦·巴菲特：仅仅是制药业务，还是，你说，或者——

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Long-term growth of P&G as a whole.

观众成员：宝洁公司整体的长期增长。

WARREN BUFFETT: As a whole. Yeah. Well, you know, I think it’s clear that P&G is a consumer powerhouse of sorts. And I think Gillette — in its field, they have just about as strong a consumer position as anybody will ever have.

沃伦·巴菲特：总体来说，是的。嗯，你知道，我认为很明显，宝洁公司在某种程度上是一个消费品巨头。而我认为吉列——在其领域，他们拥有几乎任何公司都无法企及的强大消费者地位。

And when you get into blades and razors, stronger than the — most of the P&G brands, strong as they may be. And I do think that the big retailers are becoming — and more so all the time — brands of their own. And they are become — and there’s more and more concentration going on.

当谈到刀片和剃须刀时，吉列的品牌地位比大多数宝洁品牌还要强。这是显而易见的。我确实认为，主要零售商正在变得越来越——而且这种趋势还在不断加深——它们自己也是品牌。零售商之间的集中度也在增加。

So I think the struggle between the manufacturers of brands and retailers will go on and on and on and become more intensified. So I would think, if I were on either side of that equation, I would want to be strengthening my hand.

所以我认为品牌制造商和零售商之间的斗争将会持续不断，并且变得更加激烈。因此，如果我是这个等式中的一方，我会想要加强我的实力。

And I think that — I think the future of both Gillette and P&G are better as a combined enterprise than they would have been as a separate enterprise.

我认为，吉列和宝洁的未来作为一个合并的企业会比作为独立的企业更好。

And I think that’s particularly true because of the strengths of the Walmarts and the Costcos and — you name it — around the world. I don’t know.

我认为这尤其正确，因为沃尔玛和好市多等在全球范围内的实力。我不知道。

How do you see it, Charlie?

你怎么看，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: He also wants you to tell him how P&G will be affected by its pharmaceutical business.

查理·芒格：他还想让你告诉他，宝洁的制药业务将如何影响公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know a thing about that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我对此一无所知。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That makes two of us. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们两个都是这样。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I really don’t. I’d help if I could, but I can’t.

沃伦·巴菲特：我真的没有。如果我能帮忙，我会的，但我不能。

51. “A strategic buyer is some guy that pays too much”

“战略买家就是那个出价过高的人”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4?

沃伦·巴菲特：第四名？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Andy Von Dorn (PH), and I’m here from Omaha.

观众成员：你好。我的名字是安迪·冯·多恩（PH），我来自奥马哈。

I’m currently employed by Oriental Trading Company, and they just announced that they were putting themselves up for sale.

我目前受雇于Oriental Trading Company，他们刚刚宣布要出售公司。

I was just wondering if Berkshire would have any interest in a company like Oriental Trading Company as an acquisition.

我只是想知道伯克希尔是否会对像Oriental Trading Company这样的公司有收购兴趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s interesting, and I didn’t know they put themselves up for sale. But I looked at it — whenever it was — four or five years ago when Terry Watanabe sold it.

沃伦·巴菲特：这很有趣，我不知道他们把自己挂牌出售。但我查看过——不管是什么时候——大约四五年前，当时Terry Watanabe卖掉了它。

And I haven’t really followed it since then, but just from listening to what you say — and I have no knowledge of it at all — but it sounds to me as if some private group bought it and now they’re reselling it.

从那以后我就没有真正关注过，但仅仅从听你说的话来看——我对此完全不了解——但在我看来，好像是某个私募基金买下了它，现在他们正在转售。

And we get approached on that sort of thing all the time, where a financial group has bought the business and then wants to resell it fairly quickly. And they almost — well, they invariably, I would say — auction the business.

我们经常遇到这种情况，一个金融集团收购了企业，然后希望相当快地转售它。而且他们几乎——我可以说是总是——拍卖这个企业。

They seek what they call a strategic buyer. A strategic buyer is some guy that pays too much. (Laughter) Because — you know, and he wants to justify it, so he says it’s strategic. I mean, I have never understood being a strategic buyer.

他们寻找他们所谓的战略买家。战略买家就是一个出价过高的人。（笑声）因为——你知道，他想为此辩解，所以他说这是战略性的。我的意思是，我从来没有理解过成为一个战略买家。

Every time somebody calls me up and says, you know, “We think, maybe, you’re the logical strategic buyer for that,” you know, I hang up faster than Charlie would. (Laughter)

每次有人打电话给我，说，“我们认为，也许你是那个合适的战略买家，”我挂电话的速度比查理还快。（笑声）

The — and I’m not talking to the specifics of this one at all because I really don’t know on Oriental Trading.

我对这个具体情况不了解，所以我不谈论东方贸易。

But the idea that we’re going to find a business to buy from some guy who, from the moment he bought it a few years ago, has been thinking, “How do I get out of this thing?”

但是，我们要从一个几年前买下这家企业后就一直在想“我该如何摆脱这个东西？”的人那里找到一个可以购买的企业，这种想法是不现实的。

You know, “What do I do to make it earn — have those figures for a couple years look a certain way so that I can get the maximum amount in a couple years?” You know, that — we’re just not going to make any attractive buys there. We won’t trust the figures.

你知道，“我该怎么做才能让它盈利——让那些数字在几年内看起来某种方式，以便我能在几年内获得最大收益？”你知道，那——我们在那里不会做任何有吸引力的购买。我们不会相信这些数字。

You know, we — it just — it’s — what we like is a business that — where the guy before was running with the idea of running it a hundred years, and taking care of the business in every way possible and was not contemplating sale, but, for one reason or another, finally needs to monetize the company.

你知道，我们——这只是——我们喜欢的生意是——前任经营者以经营一百年的理念来管理，并尽一切可能照顾业务，并没有考虑出售，但由于某种原因，最终需要将公司货币化。

We won’t — we will not get any sensible buys, really, from the resellers.

我们不会——我们真的不会从转售商那里得到任何合理的购买。

Some of the — it’s amazing to me what’s going on. Some of these things, literally, you know, Fund A is selling to Fund B to Fund C.

有些事情——对我来说，正在发生的事情真是令人惊讶。其中一些事情，实际上，你知道，基金 A 卖给基金 B，再卖给基金 C。

I mean, I’ve seen some that have changed hands three or four times. They’re just marking them up, and everybody’s getting two — they’re getting 20 percent of the profit so they mark it up.

我的意思是，我见过一些已经转手三四次的。他们只是加价，每个人都拿到两成——他们拿到 20%的利润，所以他们加价。

And probably Fund C or Fund D may be owned by the same pension funds that own Fund A, except that everybody’s just taking a big 20 percent slice out of it every time they move it from one place to another.

而且可能基金 C 或基金 D 由拥有基金 A 的同一养老金基金持有，只是每次从一个地方转移到另一个地方时，每个人都从中抽取了 20% 的大份额。

We’re not buyers of anything the financial buyers have been in in recent — you know, and currently own.

我们不购买金融买家最近参与并目前拥有的任何东西。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: In the 1930s there was a stretch when certain kinds of real estate — when with certain kinds of real estate — you could borrow more against the real estate than you could sell it for.

查理·芒格：在 20 世纪 30 年代，有一段时间某些类型的房地产——对于某些类型的房地产——你可以借到的金额比你能卖出的价格还要高。

And I think that’s happened in some of these private equity deals, and it’s weird. It’s weird. This is not our field. (Laughter)

我认为这在一些私募股权交易中发生了，这很奇怪。这很奇怪。这不是我们的领域。（笑声）

52. Looking for bright spots in U.S. trade imbalance

寻找美国贸易失衡中的亮点

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5?

沃伦·巴菲特：第五名？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m John Golob from Kansas City.

观众成员：你好。我是来自堪萨斯城的约翰·戈洛布。

I’d like to get you back to the current account deficit. I was looking for reasons not to despair, so I have a couple of factoids I’d like to throw at you and see how you react.

我想让你回到经常账户赤字的问题上。我在寻找不绝望的理由，所以我有几个小事实想抛给你，看看你的反应。

If you add up all of the current account deficits over the last couple of decades, you get about $4 1/2 trillion. Now, you’d think that means our net indebtedness to a foreign investor should be minus 4 1/2 trillion, but it’s not.

如果你把过去几十年的经常账户赤字加起来，总额大约是 4.5 万亿美元。现在，你可能会认为这意味着我们对外国投资者的净负债应该是负 4.5 万亿，但事实并非如此。

It’s only 2 1/2 trillion because capital gains for domestic investors has exceeded those for foreign investors. So, essentially, $2 trillion of our current account deficit has been financed by cap gains.

这只是 2.5 万亿，因为国内投资者的资本收益超过了外国投资者的资本收益。因此，本质上，我们的经常账户赤字中有 2 万亿是通过资本收益融资的。

Now, the other factoid is that if you look at the income on assets, the U.S. investors are still in a net positive position. That is —

现在，另一个小事实是，如果你查看资产收入，美国投资者仍然处于净正面位置。也就是说——

WARREN BUFFETT: They went negative in the last quarter, actually.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，他们在上个季度出现了负增长。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, excuse me. So it’s been close. So I guess my question is, do these facts influence your concern or maybe mitigate your concern about the current account deficit?

观众成员：哦，抱歉。所以情况很接近。那么我想问的是，这些事实是否会影响或减轻您对经常账户赤字的担忧？

And the second part of the question is, do you have any cultural reasons why the U.S. should earn more on investments abroad than foreign investors earn on domestic investments?

问题的第二部分是，您是否有任何文化原因认为美国在海外投资中应该比外国投资者在国内投资中赚得更多？

And, of course, the dollars explain a little bit of it because we’re not paying any interest on those dollars. But I’d like your comments.

当然，美元在其中起到了一定作用，因为我们没有为这些美元支付任何利息。但我想听听你的意见。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, those are a couple interesting points. But, we have earned more on American assets owned outside this country than people outside this country have earned on assets in this country. I mentioned that in the annual report this year.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，那是几个有趣的观点。但是，我们在国外拥有的美国资产上赚的钱比外国人在美国资产上赚的钱更多。我在今年的年度报告中提到了这一点。

It did flip. The net balance flipped in the other direction in the most recent quarter, and my guess is it keeps going in that direction. There are a lot of reasons for that.

它确实翻转了。净余额在最近一个季度翻转到了另一个方向，我猜它会继续朝那个方向发展。原因有很多。

One important reason a year or two ago was the fact that foreigners owning our Treasury bonds were getting as little as — you know, a little over 1 percent.

一两年前的一个重要原因是，持有我们国债的外国人获得的收益仅为——你知道的，略高于 1%。

So if the rest of the world owned a trillion of our bonds and got 1 percent, that was 10 billion, and if we owned a trillion of their bonds and got 4 percent, you know, that would have been 40 billion.

所以，如果世界其他地方持有我们一万亿的债券并获得 1%的收益，那就是 100 亿，而如果我们持有他们一万亿的债券并获得 4%的收益，那就是 400 亿。

And the higher — the lower interest rates in this country, the higher interest rates abroad — just simply meant that you got paid — that you were going to have — with a balance of investment — you were going to have a favorable net balance in interest income in this year. We were earning more on our assets abroad than they were earning here.

在这个国家，较低的利率和国外较高的利率意味着你会获得投资平衡，从而在今年的利息收入中获得有利的净余额。我们在国外资产上的收益超过了他们在这里的收益。

That is turning somewhat. I mean, our interest rates have been increased.

这正在有所改变。我的意思是，我们的利率已经上调。

Now, they didn’t all own short maturities or anything of the short — sort. And it may well be that our direct investment — as opposed to our marketable securities investment — our direct investment abroad was made in earlier times and returning higher returns. But, over time, it’s going against us.

当然，他们并不全是短期到期的债券。而且，我们的直接投资——与我们的可流通证券投资相比——我们对国外的直接投资可能是早期的投资并且回报更高。但从长远来看，这种情况正对我们不利。

Now, when you get into the net debtor position that we’re in, which you — is now over 3 trillion, that varies with what the dollar is doing.

现在，当你进入我们所处的净债务人地位时，也就是现在超过 3 万亿，这会随着美元的变化而变化。

Because, say, in recent weeks, the dollar has weakened, and that means that brings down, actually, our net debtor position. That’s why inflation could be something that becomes a real attractive possibility to politicians in the future.

因为，比如说，最近几周，美元走弱，这实际上降低了我们的净债务人地位。这就是为什么通货膨胀可能成为未来政治家真正有吸引力的选择。

But I wouldn’t — it’s not a huge factor. I know what you’re talking about in terms of those year-to-year variances in the net debtor position.

但我不会——这不是一个重要因素。我知道你在说净债务人地位的年度差异。

They’re affected much more by the actual currency that’s — change that’s been made — because they’re expressed in dollars. And if the dollar gets weaker, it makes us look better for the time being.

他们受到实际货币变化的影响更大，因为它们是以美元表示的。如果美元走弱，暂时会让我们看起来更好。

Overall, that will not be what determines the consequences three, five, or 10 years from now, in terms of the current account problems, or in terms of the possibility of them — of currency — exacerbating some other kind of chaos in markets.

总的来说，这不会是决定三年、五年或十年后后果的因素，无论是就经常账户问题而言，还是就货币可能加剧市场中其他某种混乱的可能性而言。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: This is not a field to which I’ve devoted the same attention as Warren. And — but I do share his general pessimism that, eventually, there will be a price to pay for the course we’re on.

查理·芒格：这不是我像沃伦那样投入同样精力的领域。但是，我确实和他一样持有一种普遍的悲观态度，认为最终我们所走的道路会付出代价。

Where I’ve disagreed a little with Warren is I’ve always feel there’s more ruinous behavior that could be tolerated in a great place, probably, than he does.

在我与沃伦有些分歧的地方是，我总觉得在一个伟大的地方可能可以容忍更多的破坏性行为，而他不这么认为。

It’s just amazing how much ruinous behavior you can get by with if you’re a successful governor — government.

如果你是一位成功的州长——政府，你可以有多少毁灭性的行为，真是令人惊讶。

Now, if you start with a lousy reputation as a government, it doesn’t work that well. But when you start with the reputation the United States had, the people who expected instant calamity, I think, were wrong. It —

现在，如果你作为一个政府开始时声誉不好，那效果就不太好。但当你以美国曾经拥有的声誉开始时，我认为那些预期会立即发生灾难的人是错的。它——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If you landed from Mars, you’d probably still rather land in the United States than anyplace else.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果你从火星降落，你可能还是会选择降落在美国，而不是其他地方。

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you stop to think about this subject, do you want to invest in Europe where, you know, 10 or 12 percent of the young people are unemployed because of their crazy employee security policies?

查理·芒格：如果你停下来思考这个问题，你是否想投资于欧洲，在那里，由于他们疯狂的员工安全政策，10%或 12%的年轻人失业？

And a lot of 28-year-olds are living at home and going to university because it’s a fairly comfortable way to, kind of, while away the time with the state paying for most of it?

很多 28 岁的人住在家里上大学，因为这是一种相当舒适的消磨时间的方式，国家支付了大部分费用

Do you want to go into a place with fabulous assets, like Brazil, with a lot of political instability that you fear, or Venezuela?

你想进入一个拥有丰富资源的地方，比如巴西，尽管你担心政治不稳定，还是委内瑞拉？

So it isn’t as through all the other options look wonderful compared to us. And so, I don’t think it’s just totally irrational that everybody still likes the United States in spite of its faults.

所以，并不是所有其他选项看起来都比我们好。因此，我认为大家仍然喜欢美国，尽管它有缺点，这并不是完全不理性的。

And so that gives me some feeling that what happened with regard to fiscal misbehavior on our part could go on quite a long time without paying the due price.

这让我感觉到，我们在财政不当行为方面所发生的事情可能会持续相当长的时间而不付出应有的代价。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And I agree with that, although there’s always the potential, when you’re doing something dangerous, that it can get accelerated.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我同意这一点，尽管当你做一些危险的事情时，总是有潜在的加速风险。

Generally speaking, if you had to bet on anybody to get away with misbehavior fiscally for a long time, you’d bet on the United States.

一般来说，如果你必须赌谁能长期在财政上不当行为而不受惩罚，你会赌美国。

And we still think it’s by far the best place to be, and we have a majority of our assets in it. We just recognize certain things going on that could cause significant problems, particularly in markets.

我们仍然认为这是迄今为止最好的地方，我们的大部分资产都在其中。我们只是认识到某些正在发生的事情可能会导致重大问题，特别是在市场中。

53. Key distinction between insurance and gambling

保险与赌博的关键区别

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. It’s Peter Webb here from London, UK.

观众成员：你好。我是来自英国伦敦的彼得·韦布。

Your views on gambling are well-known, and I think most people would agree that gambling is for the fiscally challenged.

你对赌博的看法是众所周知的，我认为大多数人会同意赌博是给经济状况不佳的人准备的。

But when I look at the insurance industry, what I see is an industry — I can’t even say it — I see an industry that’s based upon probabilities, and people not knowing those true probabilities, and money being made for the house in the same way as you see in a gambling market.

但当我看到保险行业时，我看到的是一个——我甚至不想说——我看到的是一个基于概率的行业，而人们并不知道那些真实的概率，并且像在赌博市场上一样，资金是为赌场所赚取的。

So the question I have for you is, how do you reconcile your views with gambling versus the insurance industry, and is the insurance industry for the fiscally challenged?

所以我想问的是，您如何调和您对赌博和保险行业的看法？保险行业是否也是针对经济状况不佳的人？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, gambling, I think — I think the distinction that usually is made is that gambling involves creating risks that don’t need to be created.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，赌博，我认为——我认为通常的区别在于，赌博涉及创造不必要的风险。

I mean, if the — you want to go out and gamble on where a little ball is going to fall on a wheel that’s revolving, that is not something that — that is a created risk.

我的意思是，如果你拥有一处位于沿海地区的房屋或商业地产，这个风险是客观存在的。

Whereas, if you’ve got a home or a business, you know, on a coastal area, the risk is there.

然而，如果你在沿海地区有一个家或一家公司，你知道，风险是存在的。

It wasn’t created intentionally — I mean, you say you built in that place, but — and then the question is who bears it. So there’s a transfer of — in the case of cat coverage — large existing risks as opposed to the creation of a risk that is not required.

它不是有意创造的——我的意思是，你说你在那个地方建造了，但——问题是谁承担它。因此，在灾难险的情况下，有一个大型现有风险的转移，而不是创造一个不必要的风险。

I mean, you can watch a football game without betting on it. But you can’t live in a house, you know, on a Florida coast without having a risk that your entire investment disappears.

我的意思是，你可以在不下注的情况下观看一场足球比赛。但是你不能住在佛罗里达海岸的一所房子里，而不冒着整个投资消失的风险。

So that’s the distinction, basically. I hope you’re right that the house wins in both cases. (Laughter)

所以这就是区别，基本上。我希望你是对的，无论哪种情况，赌场都能赢。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think I can add to that either. The whole concept of house advantage is a very interesting one in modern commerce.

查理·芒格：嗯，我想我也没什么可以补充的。赌场优势的整个概念在现代商业中是一个非常有趣的课题。

A lot of the investment management operations, which were not ordinarily spoken of in the past in croupier terms — but the terms of a lot of private equity investment now —

许多投资管理操作，过去通常不会用庄家的术语来描述——但现在许多私募股权投资的术语——

I think the proprietors of the partnerships are taking a house edge that looks a lot like the rake of the croupier in Monte Carlo, except it’s bigger. (Laughter)

我认为合伙企业的所有者正在获得一种看起来很像摩纳哥赌场的“抽水”优势，只不过更大。(笑声)

本质都是赌场，保险的适用场景更加自然，也更加普遍。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there anyone we’ve forgotten to insult? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有没有忘记侮辱谁？（笑声）

Want to make sure we don’t miss anyone here. (Laughs)

想确保我们不会漏掉任何人。（笑）

54. Selling short isn’t unethical, but it’s tough to make money

卖空并非不道德，但很难赚钱

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：第七位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Tom Nelson (PH) from North Oaks, Minnesota.

观众成员：我是来自明尼苏达州北橡树的汤姆·尼尔森。

What are your thoughts on the issue of illegal naked short selling?

您对非法裸卖空问题有何看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as you know, I — you may know — I have a friend that’s been fairly outspoken on that. And we — from our standpoint — we have no objection to anybody selling Berkshire short at all.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如你所知，我——你可能知道——我有一个朋友对此发表了相当直率的看法。而我们——从我们的立场来看——我们完全不反对任何人做空伯克希尔。

The more shorts, the better, because they have to buy the stock later on. And some of our shareholders may make some money lending — we — Charlie and I can’t do it, but there’s nothing I would love better, if it were legal, than to lend my stock to shorts and have them pay me something for doing it.

空头越多越好，因为他们以后必须买入股票。我们的一些股东可能会通过借出股票赚些钱——我们——查理和我不能这样做，但如果合法的话，我最希望的就是把我的股票借给空头，并让他们为此付我一些钱。

I might want to get prepaid, in certain cases. The — (Laughter)

在某些情况下，我可能想要预付款。——（笑声）

There’s nothing evil, per se, about — in my view — about selling things short.

在我看来，卖空本身并没有什么邪恶之处。

I would say that it’s a very, very tough way to make a living.

我会说这是一种非常非常艰难的谋生方式。

It’s not only often painful financially, it’s very painful emotionally because it — a stock that you sell short — a stock that you buy at 20 can go down 20 points, and a stock that you sell short at 20 can go up an infinite amount.

不仅在经济上常常令人痛苦，而且在情感上也非常痛苦，因为——你做空的一只股票——你以 20 买入的股票可能会下跌 20 点，而你以 20 做空的股票可能会上涨到无限。

And you don’t think about that until you’ve gone short and it goes up 10 or 15 points, and then you don’t sleep very well. So it’s a very tough way to make a living.

直到你做空后，它上涨了 10 或 15 点，你才会想到这一点，然后你就睡不好觉了。所以这是一种非常艰难的谋生方式。

There are people on the short side that have done, and that do things, to try to make stocks go down, some of which are appropriate and some of which are inappropriate. There are people on the long side that have done the same exact — the same sort of things go on.

有些做空的人曾经做过，也正在做一些事情，试图让股票下跌，其中有些是合适的，有些是不合适的。有些做多的人也做过完全相同的事情——同样的事情也在发生。

So I don’t see any — I have no ax to grind in the least against short sellers.

所以我完全没有对空头卖家有任何偏见。

And in terms of — it’s called naked shorting, which you — which means that you don’t have the stock lined up to be borrowed and maybe you have a whole bunch of fails-to-deliver and that sort of thing.

就裸卖空而言，这意味着你没有准备好要借的股票，可能会有一大堆未交割的情况等等。

I don’t have a great problem with that. If anybody wants to do that with Berkshire, you know, they — more power to them.

我对此没有太大问题。如果有人想对伯克希尔这样做，你知道，我会说——祝他们好运。

Short sellers — the situations in which there have been huge short interests very often — very often have been later revealed to be frauds or semi-frauds. Now, the one my friend runs is not at all.

卖空者——在有大量卖空兴趣的情况下——往往后来被揭露为欺诈或半欺诈。然而，我朋友经营的那家公司完全不是这样。

But the — the batting average — I mean, I’ve — over the years, I’ve probably had a hundred ideas of things that should be shorted, and I would say that almost every one of them have turned out to be correct.

但是——击球率——我的意思是，多年来，我可能有过一百个应该做空的想法，我会说几乎每一个都被证明是正确的。

And I’ll bet if I’d tried to do it and make money out of it, I probably would have lost money, I would have had no fun, and the opportunity cost, as Charlie said, would have been enormous.

我敢打赌，如果我试图去做并从中赚钱，我可能会赔钱，我不会有乐趣，而且正如查理所说，机会成本会非常大。

Because if somebody’s running something that’s semi-fraudulent, they’re probably pretty good at it and they’re working full time at it and they’ve succeeded for a while and they may keep succeeding.

因为如果有人在经营某种半欺诈的事情，他们可能对此非常在行，并且全职投入其中，他们已经成功了一段时间，并且可能会继续成功。

And if they succeed and you go in at X and it goes to 5X, you know, all you’re hoping after a while it that it goes back to X again or something of the sort.

如果他们成功了，而你在 X 时进入，然后它涨到 5X，你知道，过了一段时间你只希望它能回到 X 或类似的水平。

It’s a very tough psychological game to play. Few people may be well-suited for it.

这是一个非常艰难的心理游戏。很少有人适合这个。

I would never put any money with a short fund, but not because I would think it would be ethically wrong. I just think they’re unlikely to make money.

我绝不会把钱投到做空基金，但不是因为我认为这在道德上是错误的。我只是认为他们不太可能赚钱。

Charlie, do you have any thoughts on short selling or naked short selling?

查理，你对卖空或裸卖空有什么看法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you’re absolutely right there — in the sense that it’s — that would be one of the most irritating experiences in the world, to figure out something is crooked and foolish and so forth and then short it at X and have it go to 3X.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为你说得非常对——从某种意义上说，这将是世界上最令人恼火的经历之一，发现某件事是欺诈和愚蠢的，然后在 X 点做空它，结果它涨到 3X。

Now you’re watching all these happy crooks splashing around in your money while you’re meeting margin calls. (Laughter)

现在你看着这些快乐的骗子在你的钱里嬉戏，而你却在应对追加保证金的要求。（笑声）

Why would you want to go in hailing distance of an experience like that?

你为什么想要接近那样的经历？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve hit 3 o’clock. We’re going to adjourn until 3:15. We will then have the business meeting of Berkshire. And you’re all welcome to stay, you’re all welcome to shop, you’re all welcome to enjoy Omaha, and thanks for coming. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好了，现在是 3 点钟。我们将休会到 3 点 15 分。然后我们将举行伯克希尔的业务会议。欢迎大家留下来，欢迎大家购物，欢迎大家享受奥马哈，谢谢大家的到来。（掌声）

55. Berkshire formal business meeting

伯克希尔正式商务会议

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll now convene the business part of the meeting. I introduced the directors to you before.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在我们将召开会议的业务部分。我之前已经向你们介绍过董事们。

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors. They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you may have concerning the firm — their firm’s — audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，我们的审计师。他们可以回答您可能对该公司——他们公司的——伯克希尔账目审计的相关问题。

Mr. Forrest Krutter, the secretary of Berkshire, will make a written record of the proceedings. Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.

伯克希尔的秘书福雷斯特·克鲁特先生将对会议过程进行书面记录。贝基·阿米克小姐已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议指定的代理人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at this meeting?

秘书是否有关于伯克希尔公司在本次会议上流通、享有投票权和出席的股票数量的报告？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 8, 2006 — being the record date for this meeting — there were 1,260,704 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 8,407,392 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，我有。正如在 2006 年 3 月 8 日发给所有登记股东的会议通知中所附的代理声明中所示——这是本次会议的记录日期——伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司有 1,260,704 股 A 类普通股流通，每股在会议上有权对议案投一票，伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司有 8,407,392 股 B 类股票流通，每股在会议上有权对议案投 1/200 票。

Of that number, 1,096,383 are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, May 4.

在这个数字中，有 1,096,383 人通过代理出席了截至 5 月 4 日星期四晚上的会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。

First order of the meeting will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.

会议的第一项议程是宣读上次股东会议的会议记录。我认可沃尔特·斯科特先生，他将在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议免去上次股东会议记录的宣读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：有没有第二个？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我附议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments and questions?

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并附议。有没有任何评论和问题？

We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All those in favor, say “aye.”

我们将通过口头表决对这一动议进行投票。所有赞成的人，请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? Motion is carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：反对？动议通过。

56. Election of Berkshire directors

伯克希尔董事的选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The only item of business before this meeting is to elect directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：本次会议的唯一议程是选举董事。

If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.

如果有股东希望撤回先前发送的代理并亲自对董事选举进行投票，他或她可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisle, who will furnish a ballot to you.

此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交代理并希望亲自投票，您可以这样做。如果您希望这样做，请在过道中向会议官员表明身份，他们会为您提供选票。

Those persons desiring ballots, please identify themselves so that we may distribute them.

那些想要选票的人，请表明身份，以便我们分发选票。

I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我现在请沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WARREN BUFFETT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chace, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：我提议沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、马尔科姆·蔡斯、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特当选为董事。

VOICE: Second the motion.

附议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chace, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经有人提议并附议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、马尔科姆·蔡斯、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

Are there any other nomination? Is there any discussion?

还有其他提名吗？有任何讨论吗？

Nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

提名已准备好进行。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应在董事选举中标记选票，并允许将选票交给选举监察员。

Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections the ballot on the election of directors voting and the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received.

请代理持有人也将董事选举投票的选票和代理权按照他们收到的指示提交给选举监察员。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，准备好后您可以开始报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballots of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 1,125,034 votes for each nominee.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已准备好。代理持有人的选票响应截至上周四晚收到的代理，共为每位提名人投了不少于 1,125,034 票。

That number far exceeds the majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

该数字远远超过了与所有已发行 A 类和 B 类股票相关的总票数的大多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的选票精确计数的认证，包括本次会议上代理持有人根据提交的代理投票所投的额外票数，以及任何在本次会议上亲自投下的票数，将交给秘书并附在本次会议的会议记录中。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chace, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、马尔科姆·蔡斯、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐纳德·基奥、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。

57. Formal business meeting adjourns

正式商务会议休会

WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有人有其他事项要在本次会议上提出吗？如果没有，我请斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

VOICE: Second. 语音：第二。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say “aye.”

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已提出并获得附议。我们将通过口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成的请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：赞成。

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say “no.” The meeting is adjourned. Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：反对的请说“不”。会议结束。谢谢。（掌声）

2006-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2006-05-06 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Welcome

2. Berkshire directors introduced

3. Jamie Lee Curtis

4. Berkshire’s Q1 earnings

5. Acquisition of “really extraordinary” ISCAR

6. Questions and answers

7. We can “easily handle” Social Security

8. Different businesses, different compensation

9. Our managers are “trained” by our culture

10. Irrational pricing of closed-end funds

11. Corporate boards should think like owners

12. Tech is still in the “too hard” pile

13. Too many tax breaks for the rich

14. Munger: Ethanol is “stupid”

15. Watch out for speculative commodity bubbles

16. “Brazil would not be off limits”

17. Outlook for Clayton and manufactured homes

18. No interest in investing in Russia

19. Hottest real estate markets are cooling off

20. Attendance estimate and Furniture Mart sales

21. Don’t like excess cash, but we hate dumb deals

22. Should have sold Coca-Cola at “silly” price

23. Reinsurance rate variations

24. NetJets losses and retroactive policies

25. Why Buffett bought, and sold, silver

26. “We don’t play big trends”

27. Nuclear threat is “ultimate problem of mankind”

28. A Berkshire stock buyback won’t be a secret

29. Advice to young investment professionals

30. Break for lunch

31. Buffett favors path to citizenship for some illegal immigrants

32. Business schools have improved “considerably”

33. New CEO will go through a “media probation-type affair”

34. Go with your gut when picking a charity

35. We like the regulated utility business the way it is

36. “Media businesses do not have a great outlook”

37. “Significant consequences” from U.S. trade imbalance

38. “CPI has understated inflation”

39. Why we don’t “do deals” with investment banks

40. Salomon’s 1991 reprieve prevented “absolute chaos”

41. We love reading them, but newspapers are in trouble

42. Don’t let your fear overcome your logic

43. If we were starting out again …

44. Munger thinks Prof. Jeremy Siegel is “demented”

45. “Things are really screwed up if you’re getting calls on Sunday”

46. How to read Berkshire’s annual report

47. Buffett’s key insurance question

48. Health care is in Berkshire’s “too hard” pile

49. “A complicated bankruptcy can offer opportunities for profit”

50. Buffett endorses Procter & Gamble-Gillette merger

51. “A strategic buyer is some guy that pays too much”

52. Looking for bright spots in U.S. trade imbalance

53. Key distinction between insurance and gambling

54. Selling short isn’t unethical, but it’s tough to make money

55. Berkshire formal business meeting

56. Election of Berkshire directors

57. Formal business meeting adjourns

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