2009-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session

早晨会议

1. Q&A sessions starts

问答环节开始

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren. The hyperkinetic fellow here is Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。我是沃伦。这里这个精力充沛的家伙是查理。（笑声）

And we’re going to go in just a minute to a question and answer section, at least a question section, that will be a little different than last year.

我们马上就要进入一个问答环节，至少是一个提问环节，这将与去年有所不同。

We have a panel — I can’t see very well here — over to the right, of journalists who will ask questions and alternate with the people in the audience.

我们有一个小组——我在这里看得不太清楚——在右边，有记者会提问，并与观众中的人轮流发言。

And we’ll go back and forth. Got a little checklist here that we’ll use as we go back and forth. Here we are. And we should have a pen here someplace to check things off.

我们将来回进行。这里有一个小清单，我们将在来回过程中使用。我们准备好了。我们应该在某个地方有一支笔来勾选事项。

2. Board of directors introduced

董事会介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: But first, even though we’ll have the formal meeting later on, I would like to introduce our directors. And if they would stand as I announce them and then remain standing until the end.

沃伦·巴菲特：但首先，尽管我们稍后会有正式会议，我想介绍我们的董事。如果他们在我宣布时站起来，然后保持站立直到结束。

And if you’ll just hold your applause until the end or even later if you wish — (laughter) — we’ll recognize them. We’ll have a meeting later on to elect them. But if you’ll stand up. And like I say, you can’t see very well here with the lights, but —

如果大家能等到最后再鼓掌，或者稍后再鼓掌也可以——（笑）——我们将对他们表示感谢。稍后我们会召开会议选举他们。如果你们能站起来。就像我说的，灯光下你们可能看不太清，但——

There’s me and Charlie, we start off. And then Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman , Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott. Those are the directors of Berkshire Hathaway. (Applause)

有我和查理，我们开始了。然后是霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克、比尔·盖茨、桑迪·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基欧、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特。这些是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事们。（掌声）

3. Money under your mattress beats Treasurys

床垫下的钱胜过国债

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we only have one slide, which actually is more than we would usually have. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，我们只有一张幻灯片，这实际上比我们通常会有的要多。（笑）

And — but it does tell you something about what happened last year.

而且——但它确实告诉你一些关于去年发生的事情。

And it also acts as a commercial for our Nervous Nellie mattress with the famous night depository feature. (Laughter)

它还充当了我们著名的夜间存款功能的 Nervous Nellie 床垫的广告。（笑声）

Last year — and have we got that up on the slide?

去年——我们把这个放在幻灯片上了吗？

Last year, we wrote a ticket on December 19th. And we sold 5 million of Treasury bills. I hope you can see that. It’s — we’ve got the December 19th circled up there.

去年——我们在12月19日开出了一张票。我们出售了500万美金的国债。我希望你们能看到。那里标记了12月19日。

And those Treasury bills came due, or were to come due, on April 29th of this year. So they were going to come due over four months later.

这些国库券将在今年 4 月 29 日到期，或者说将要到期。因此，它们将在四个月后到期。

And the remarkable thing is, and this tells you about what an extraordinary year it was, is that we sold those $5 million of Treasury bills, which were going to pay off at $5 million on April 29th of 2009, in December of 2008 we sold them for five million and ninety dollars and seven cents.

值得注意的是，这说明了去年是一个多么非凡的一年，我们以5090000美元的价格售出了这500万美元的国债，而这些国债将在2009年4月29日以500万美元的价格支付。

In other words, if the person who bought those from us and paid us five million and ninety dollars, instead had bought the Nervous Nellie mattress and had put their money under the mattress, they would’ve been $90 better off at the end of four months, than by buying Treasury bills.

换句话说，如果从我们这里购买这些国债并支付5090000美元的人，反而选择购买Nervous Nellie 床垫并把钱放在床垫下，把钱放在床垫下，他们在四个月后会比购买国债多出90美元。

If the U.S. Treasury had just sold 5 trillion of these, they could’ve made an easy $90 million and Tim Geithner could’ve put the money under a Nervous Nellie mattress and we all would’ve been better off.

如果美国财政部刚刚出售了5万亿的这类国债，他们可以轻松赚取9000万美元，而蒂姆·盖特纳可以把钱放在“Nervous Nellie”床垫下，我们大家都会更好。

Negative yields on U.S. Treasury bills are really an extraordinary thing. You’ve got less on — less for your money from the U.S. Treasury than you got from sticking it under a mattress.

美国国债的负收益率确实是一件非同寻常的事情。你从美国国债中获得的回报比把钱放在床垫下还要少。

I’m not sure you’ll see that again in your lifetime. But it’s been a very extraordinary year.

我不确定你一生中会再看到那样的事情。但这一年确实非常不寻常。

4. Panel of journalists introduced

记者小组介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: We have with us, the journalists. We have Carol Loomis of Fortune. We have Becky Quick of CNBC. And we have Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们有记者在场。我们有《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯。我们有 CNBC 的贝基·奎克。还有《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金。

They have received questions from shareholders all over the country. Andrew told me that he received a couple hundred just this morning.

他们收到了来自全国各地股东的问题。安德鲁告诉我，他今天早上就收到了几百个问题。

And they have selected what they think are — they’re all Berkshire Hathaway-related questions.

他们选择了他们认为的——这些都是与伯克希尔哈撒韦相关的问题。

We were having a problem in recent annual meetings where we sort of drifted away from Berkshire, into the realm of what people’s children had done in school recently and that sort of thing. (Laughter)

我们在最近的年度会议上遇到了一个问题，我们有点偏离了伯克希尔的话题，转而讨论人们的孩子最近在学校做了什么之类的事情。（笑声）

So we wanted to bring it back a little bit to Berkshire.

所以我们想把它稍微带回到伯克希尔。

So they have selected among the best of the Berkshire-related questions that they’ve received. And we will go from — we will start with Carol Loomis. And we will go then to the audience.

所以他们从收到的与伯克希尔相关的最佳问题中进行了挑选。我们将从卡罗尔·卢米斯开始，然后再转向观众。

We have 13 sections, 12 in this room, one in an overflow room. And we have selected the people in each of the audience sections by a raffle system, half an hour to an hour ago. And we’ll go back and forth. And with that, we’ll start it off with Carol.

我们有13个部分，12个在这个房间，一个在分会场。我们通过抽奖系统在半小时到一个小时之前选定了每个观众部分的人。接下来，我们将由卡罗尔开始。

5. Carol Loomis comments

卡罗尔·卢米斯的评论

CAROL LOOMIS: Good morning. I come first because Loomis outrakes — outranks — the others alphabetically. But this gives me a chance to just have a few sentences to tell you that — about the questions that we received.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：早上好。我首先发言是因为卢米斯在字母顺序上优于其他人。但这给了我一个机会，只用几句话告诉你们我们收到的问题。

We conferred this morning. Andrew definitely got more than any, either Becky or me. We got almost 5,000 questions, which I think even will surprise Warren. Because I don’t think he knew that it’d run that high.

我们今天早上开会了。安德鲁绝对得到了比贝基或我更多的东西。我们收到了将近 5000 个问题，我认为这甚至会让沃伦感到惊讶。因为我不认为他知道会有这么多。

And the main thing I wanted to say is that an awfully lot of them were very good. And we had a real problem trying to get them down to the number that we’re probably going to be able to ask. We don’t even know what that is for sure.

我想说的主要是，他们中有很多人非常优秀。我们确实面临一个真正的问题，就是如何将他们的数量减少到我们可能能够要求的数字。我们甚至不知道那到底是什么。

But we want to apologize to anybody who sent us a Berkshire-related question, because we did have to cut out some because they weren’t that, and whose question we didn’t get asked. And maybe in another year, it will work.

但我们想对任何向我们发送与伯克希尔相关问题的人表示歉意，因为我们确实不得不删减一些问题，原因是它们不相关，因此未能得到提问。也许在明年会有所改善。

6. Our stock index derivatives aren’t dangerous

我们的股票指数衍生品并不危险

CAROL LOOMIS: So, my first question, “Warren and Charlie, Warren particularly.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：那么，我的第一个问题是，“沃伦和查理，特别是沃伦。”

“You have referred to derivatives, this is famous, as weapons — financial weapons — of mass destruction.

“你提到了衍生品，这被称为大规模毁灭性金融武器。”

“In the 1964 movie, ‘Dr. Strangelove,’ Major T.J. Kong, nicknamed ‘King’ Kong and played by Slim Pickens, rides a weapon of mass destruction out of the bomb bay of his B-52.

在 1964 年的电影《奇爱博士》中，T.J. Kong 少校，绰号“金刚”，由斯利姆·皮肯斯饰演，骑着一件大规模杀伤性武器从他的 B-52 轰炸机的炸弹舱中飞出。

“As a long-term Berkshire shareholder, I’m feeling a little like Slim today. I understand that despite the dramatic decline in the stock market, there is a good probability we could make money on our derivatives, taking into account the return on our premiums.

“作为一名长期的伯克希尔股东，我今天的感觉有点像斯利姆。我了解到，尽管股市大幅下跌，但考虑到我们的保费回报，我们的衍生品有很大可能获利。

“But given the amount of accounting equity and statutory capital, and, I would argue, market value —” this is the questioner saying this — “that these derivatives have destroyed, at least temporarily, do you think these large derivative positions are appropriate for a highly-rated insurance company?

“但是，考虑到会计权益、法定资本，以及我认为的市场价值——”这是提问者所说的——“这些衍生品至少暂时破坏了它们，你们认为这些大型衍生品头寸适合一家高评级的保险公司吗？

“And if so, you do you think you will be adding to these positions?”

“如果是这样，你认为你会增加这些头寸吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would say this. The questioner to some extent answers his own question.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想这样说。提问者在某种程度上回答了他自己的问题。

I don’t know whether he anticipates as strongly as I do that, net, these positions will make money.

我不知道他是否像我一样强烈预期，最终这些头寸会赚钱。

But over — you know, our job is to make money over time at Berkshire Hathaway. It does not impinge on capital. We have arranged them so that the collateral posting requirements, which are one of the big dangers in the derivatives field, that we have very, very minimal exposure to that.

但是，总的来说，我们的工作是在伯克希尔·哈撒韦长期赚钱。这不会影响资本。我们已经安排好，使得抵押品的要求——这是衍生品领域的一个重大风险——我们对此的风险非常非常小。

Even on March 31st, at a time when the market was down very substantially from when we entered into these transactions, we had posted collateral of a little less than 1 percent of our total marketable securities.

即使在 3 月 31 日，当市场相比我们进行这些交易时大幅下跌时，我们所提供的抵押品也仅占我们总可交易证券的不到 1%。

So they have no — they pose no — they pose problems to the world, generally. And that’s why I referred to them on a macro basis, in the 2002 report, as being financial weapons of mass destruction.

所以它们不会——它们不会——给世界带来问题。这就是我在2002年报告中将其称为大规模毁灭性金融武器的原因。

But I also said in that report, that we use them in our own business regularly when we think they’re mispriced.

但我在那份报告中也提到，我们在自己的业务中定期使用它们，当我们认为它们定价错误时。

And we think our shareholders are intelligent enough that if we explain the transactions, as we try to do in the annual report, and explain why we think we will make money — there’s no guarantee we’ll make money, but our expectancy is that we will make money — we think that as long as we explain them, that the financial consequences to our shareholders far outweigh any accounting consequences.

我们认为我们的股东足够聪明，如果我们在年度报告中解释交易，并说明我们为什么认为会赚钱——虽然没有保证我们会赚钱，但我们的预期是我们会赚钱——我们认为只要我们解释清楚，给股东带来的财务后果远远超过任何会计后果。

We explained in earlier reports that because of mark-to-market, that these things can swing billions of dollars as an accounting liability.

我们在早期报告中解释过，由于按市值计量，这些事情可能会导致数十亿美元的会计负债波动。

But the only cash that has taken place, for example, in our equity put options, we have received $4.9 billion roughly. And we hold that money. Originally, the terms of these were 15 to 20 years. So we have the use of $4.9 billion for 15 to 20 years.

但在我们的股票认购期权中，例如，实际的现金收入大约为49亿美元。我们持有这笔钱。最初，这些的期限是15到20年。所以我们在15到20年内可以使用49亿美元。

And then markets have to be lower at that time than they were at the time of inception. So I personally think that the odds are extremely good that on the equity put options, we will make money.

然后市场在那个时候必须低于成立时的水平。因此，我个人认为，股票认沽期权赚钱的机会非常大。

I think on the high-yield index, credit default swaps we’ve written, I think that we will probably lose money before figuring the value of the money we’ve held.

我认为我们所写的高收益指数信用违约掉期，可能在扣除我们持有资金的价值之前会亏损。

Now, I told you a year ago, I thought we would make money on those. But we have run into far more bankruptcies in the last year than is normal.

我一年前告诉过你们，我认为我们会在这些上获利。但是我们在过去一年中遭遇的破产数量远超正常水平。

We’ve, in effect, had a financial hurricane. We insure against natural hurricanes. And we insure against a financial hurricane. And we have been in a bit of a financial hurricane.

我们实际上经历了一场金融飓风。我们为自然飓风投保。我们也为金融飓风投保。我们确实经历了一场金融飓风。

So I would expect those contracts, before investment income, would show a loss, and perhaps, after investment income. The bigger contracts are the equity put contracts. And I think the odds are very high that we make money on those.

所以我预计这些合同在投资收入之前会显示亏损，也许在投资收入之后会有所改善。较大的合同是股权认沽合同。我认为我们在这些合同上赚钱的可能性非常高。

Now, it would be nice if we were writing with current prices. But we probably couldn’t write them without getting into collateral posting requirements now. So we have a very favorable position on those.

当然，如果我们按当前价格进行交易那会很好。但现在我们可能无法在没有保证金要求的情况下进行交易。所以我们在这些合同上处于非常有利的地位。

In fact, in the last week, we modified two equity put contracts, one that had a strike price of 1514. That has been reduced to 994 on the S&P 500. Now, we shortened it up eight years. But it still has about 10 years to run.

事实上，在过去的一周里，我们修改了两个股权认购合同，其中一个的执行价格从1514降低到了标准普尔500的994。我们将期限缩短了八年，但它仍然还有大约十年的期限。

So merely for reducing the term from 18 years to about 10 years, we still have the use of the money for 10 years, we reduced the strike price from 1514 to 994.

因此，仅仅为了将期限从 18 年缩短到大约 10 年，我们仍然可以使用这笔钱 10 年，我们将行权价从 1514 降低到 994。

So I think those are going to be very advantageous contracts. I think our shareholders are intelligent enough to, if they’re explained properly, to realize how advantageous they are. And we’ll continue to hold them. And we’ll continue to explain them.

所以我认为这些将是非常有利的合同。我认为我们的股东足够聪明，如果得到适当的解释，他们会意识到这些合同是多么有利。我们将继续持有这些合同，并继续对它们进行解释。

And they have no impact on our financial flexibility. And we are far more than an insurance company. I mean, we have earnings coming in from many areas. We have lots of cash sitting at the parent company. We have lots of cash in the subsidiaries. We have no significant debt maturities of any kind.

它们对我们的财务灵活性没有影响。我们远不止是一家保险公司。我的意思是，我们在许多领域都有收入。我们在母公司有大量现金。我们在子公司也有大量现金。我们没有任何重大债务到期。

So we’re ideally suited to hold this sort of instrument.

所以我们非常适合持有这种工具。

And Charlie, what would you say?

查理，你会怎么说？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would agree with the questioner that there is some limit to the amount of those things we should do. But I think we stayed well short of the limit.

查理·芒格：我同意提问者的观点，我们应该做这些事情是有一定限度的。但我认为我们远未达到这个限度。

7. Financial literacy problem could help Berkshire

财务素养问题可能有助于伯克希尔

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to zone 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们去第一区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name’s Scott Slaybee (PH). I’m from Denver, Colorado.

观众成员：嗨，我叫斯科特·斯莱比（音）。我来自科罗拉多州的丹佛。

First off, I’d like to thank Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger for having us out here today. I appreciate you bringing us out here so thank you very much.

首先，我想感谢巴菲特先生和芒格先生今天邀请我们来到这里。我很感激你们把我们带到这里，非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: And thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And it’s great that you answer our questions.

观众成员：很高兴你回答我们的问题。

I’m a former teacher. Or I’m a teacher. I shouldn’t say former. Being a former teacher yourself, I see a problem with financial literacy with our future generations.

我是一名前教师。或者我是一名教师。我不应该说前。作为一名前教师，我看到我们未来几代人在财务素养方面存在问题。

And I’m curious what you think future generations should know and if there’s anything that needs to be in school curriculums to teach younger people financial literacy as we move forward?

我很好奇你认为未来的世代应该知道什么，以及是否有任何内容需要纳入学校课程，以便在我们前进的过程中教导年轻人财务知识？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I think there’s a problem with financial literacy with our current generation. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为我们这一代人的金融素养存在问题。（笑声）

There’s a — Andy Heyward, who has helped us with the cartoon, has a — will have a — he sold his company last year, but he has a new company.

有一个——安迪·海沃德，他帮助我们制作卡通，他有一个——将会有一个——他去年卖掉了他的公司，但他有一家新公司。

And he will have a program coming out that works on that question. And that I play a very small part in.

他将推出一个关于这个问题的节目，而我在其中扮演了一个非常小的角色。

ABC has a program coming up with a number of well-known personalities in it that will deal with the question of financial literacy.

ABC 将推出一档节目，邀请多位知名人士参与，讨论金融素养的问题。

And it’s, you know, it is a tough sell in a world of credit cards and, you know, a world that depends on calculators rather than people sitting down and doing actual arithmetic and all of that, to teach people. But in the end, I think we make progress over time. I mean, I hope our annual reports contribute to that sort of thing.

在如今信用卡泛滥的世界中，教人们财务知识是一项艰巨的任务。我们的社会依赖计算器而不是人们坐下来进行实际算术，但我认为随着时间的推移，我们会取得进展。我希望我们的年度报告能对此有所贡献。

But you’re going to have people doing very foolish things with money.

但你会看到有人用钱做非常愚蠢的事情。

I remember on my honeymoon. I was 21 and my wife was 19. And we drove west. I’d never been west. And we went through Las Vegas. And it was 1952. And we stopped at the Flamingo. And people were better dressed in the casinos then.

我记得在我的蜜月旅行中。我 21 岁，我的妻子 19 岁。我们向西开车。我从未去过西部。我们经过拉斯维加斯。那是 1952 年。我们在火烈鸟酒店停下。那时赌场里的人们穿得更讲究。

And there were a bunch of Omaha fellows that actually owned part of the Flamingo at that time, terribly nice to us.

当时有一群奥马哈的家伙实际上拥有Flamingo的一部分，他们对我们非常友好。

But I looked around at that casino and I saw all kinds of well-dressed people who had traveled thousands of miles to do something very dumb. And I thought this is a country where you’re going to get very rich. (Laughter)

但我环顾四周，看到很多穿着讲究的人，他们不远万里而来，却在做一些非常愚蠢的事情。我心想，这就是一个能让你致富的国家。（笑）

If people are going to get on a plane in New York and fly a couple thousand miles to stand there and do things with a mathematical expectation that’s negative on every action they take, that is a world of opportunity. So — (Laughter)

如果人们要在纽约登上飞机，飞几千英里去那里做事情，而每个行动的数学期望都是负的，那就是一个充满机会的世界。所以——（笑声）

I, you know, I recommend that you and — you work with your students. I started teaching at the University of Omaha, you know, when I was 21. And you work with your students to make them literate. And they will have a terrific advantage.

所以，我建议你和——你与学生们一起努力。我21岁时就开始在奥马哈大学教书。你与学生合作，让他们具备财务知识，这样他们将会拥有巨大的优势。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a world where legalized gambling is now conducted by a great many states in the form of lotteries where people are encouraged to bet against the odds and a world where we have a vast overuse of high-cost credit card debt, it needs a lot more financial litery. I would argue — literacy.

查理·芒格：嗯，一个很多州合法化赌博并以彩票形式进行的世界，鼓励人们逆向下注，以及一个我们有大量高成本信用卡债务过度使用的世界，确实需要更多的财务知识。我认为我们正在走向错误的方向。

I think we’ve been going in the wrong direction. So I don’t think you can teach people high finance who can’t use a credit card — (laughter) — intelligently.

所以我认为，如果一个人连信用卡都不能聪明地使用，就不能教他们高端金融。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If you’re — I talk to students about that. If you’re willing to pay 18 or 21 percent on a credit card —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。如果你——我和学生们谈过这个。如果你愿意在信用卡上支付 18%或 21%的利息——

And the credit cards companies need it, incidentally, currently, because you have losses running close to 10 percent. So with expenses, they may need that.

顺便提一下，信用卡公司目前需要这个，因为他们的损失接近 10%。所以考虑到开支，他们可能需要这个。

But there’s no way that you’re going to financially come out borrowing money at those kind of rates. And I wouldn’t know how to do it. And it’s too bad. On the other hand, it’s probably good for our business.

但你不可能以那种利率借钱而在财务上获利。我也不知道该怎么做。这真可惜。另一方面，这对我们的生意可能是好事。

I mean, one of — you know — we are looking for things that are mispriced. And the more people think that borrowing money on credit cards is intelligent, they probably will not think that doing long-term equity put contracts is intelligent. And we’ll go our way and they’ll go their way.

我的意思是，我们在寻找那些定价错误的东西。人们越觉得用信用卡借钱是明智的，他们可能就越不会认为做长期股票认沽合约是聪明的。我们会走我们的路，他们会走他们的路。

8. Buffett “commends” DC’s response to credit crisis

巴菲特“赞扬”华盛顿对信贷危机的回应

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: Warren, first of all, we’ve been asked to pass on a message that the attendance today is 35,000.

贝基·奎克：沃伦，首先，我们被要求传达一个消息，今天的出席人数是 35,000。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good. (Applause) Now —

沃伦·巴菲特：很好。（掌声）现在——

BECKY QUICK: This — 贝基·奎克：这——

WARREN BUFFETT: Now if they all just spend appropriately, it’ll be a big day. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果他们都能适当地花费，那将是一个大日子。（笑声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from James Lewis (PH) from Logan, Ohio, who said it was OK to use his name and city.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自俄亥俄州洛根的詹姆斯·刘易斯（PH），他说可以使用他的名字和城市。

He says, “One of the substantial investments of Berkshire is Wells Fargo. The chairman of Wells Fargo supposedly indicated that he did not want to take TARP funds from the federal government.

他说：“伯克希尔的一项重要投资是富国银行。富国银行的董事长据说表示他不想从联邦政府那里接受 TARP 资金。”

“He, furthermore, recently said that some of the programs of the federal government to reinvigorate the banks were asinine.

他最近还表示，联邦政府为振兴银行而采取的一些措施是愚蠢的。

“Mr. Munger, do you agree with the chairman of Wells Fargo? And please explain why you do or do not agree. And Mr. Buffett, do you agree with Mr. Munger?” (Laughter)

“芒格先生，您同意富国银行的董事长吗？请解释一下您同意或不同意的原因。巴菲特先生，您同意芒格先生吗？”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: When a government is reacting to the biggest financial crisis in 70 years, which threatens important values in the whole world, and the decisions are being made hurriedly and under pressure and with good faith, I think it’s unreasonable to expect perfect agreement with all of one’s own ideas.

查理·芒格：当一个政府在应对 70 年来最大的金融危机时，这场危机威胁到全世界的重要价值观，而决策是在匆忙和压力下做出的，并且是出于善意，我认为期望与自己所有的想法完全一致是不合理的。

I think the government is entitled to be judged more leniently when it’s doing the best it can under trouble.

我认为政府在困难时期尽力而为时，应该受到更宽容的评判。

Of course, there’s going to be some reactions that are foolish. And I happen to share one of the troubles of some of the Wells Fargo executives, in that I’m pretty blunt.

当然，会有一些反应是愚蠢的。我恰好与一些富国银行高管分享了一个烦恼，那就是我相当直言不讳。

I happen to think that the accounting principle that says your earnings go up as your credit is destroyed — because if you had any money left, you could buy your own debt back at a discount — I happen to think that’s insane accounting.

我认为那种说法，即当你的信用被摧毁时，你的收益会上升——因为如果你还有剩余的钱，你可以以折扣价回购自己的债务——我认为那是疯狂的会计。

And I think the people who voted it into effect ought to be removed from the accounting board. So a man who talks like that has to have some sympathy with the people at Wells Fargo.

我认为投票通过这一措施的人应该被撤离会计委员会。因此，一个这样说话的人肯定对富国银行的人有一些同情。

WARREN BUFFETT: He usually gets to hang them by their thumbs, but he held back this morning.

沃伦·巴菲特：他通常会让他们拇指朝上挂着，但今天早上他忍住了。

The government, in mid-September last year, really did — they were facing a situation that was as close to a total meltdown throughout the financial system as I think you can imagine.

政府在去年九月中旬确实面临着一种情况，这种情况在我看来几乎接近整个金融系统的全面崩溃。

You had a couple hundred billion dollars move out of money market funds in a couple of days. You had the commercial paper market freeze up, which meant that companies all over the country that had nothing to do with the financial world, basically, were going to have trouble meeting payrolls.

你在几天内看到几千亿美元从货币市场基金中撤出。商业票据市场冻结，这意味着全国各地的公司，尽管与金融领域毫无关系，基本上也会面临无法支付工资的问题。

We were — we really were looking into the abyss at that time. And a lot of action was taken very promptly. And overall, I commend the actions that were taken.

我们当时确实是在凝视深渊。很多行动都迅速采取了。总体而言，我赞赏所采取的行动。

So as Charlie says, to expect perfection out of people that are working 20-hour days and are getting hit from all sides by new information, bad information, that one weekend with Lehman going, AIG going, Merrill would’ve gone, in my view, unless the BofA had bought it.

正如查理所说，期望那些工作 20 小时、受到来自各方新信息和错误信息冲击的人们做到完美，是不现实的。在我看来，如果没有美国银行收购，美林也会倒闭，正如雷曼和 AIG 那样。

I mean it was — when you’re getting punched from all sides and you have to make policy and you have to think about congressional reaction and the American people’s reaction, you know, you’re not going to do everything perfectly.

我的意思是——当你受到四面八方的攻击，必须制定政策，还要考虑国会的反应和美国人民的反应时，你知道，你不可能做到完美无缺。

But I think overall, they did a very, very good job.

但我认为总体来说，他们做得非常非常好。

I’m sympathetic — that remark was made by Dick Kovacevich, who came in second last year to Charlie in the plain speaking contest around the world. (Laughter)

我很同情——这句话是由迪克·科瓦切维奇说的，他在去年的全球直言不讳比赛中获得了第二名，排在查理之后。（笑声）

And it’s true that Dick Kovacevich was called on a Sunday at a little after noon, as I understand it, and told would be in Washington the next day at 1- or 2 o’clock, without being told what it was about.

据我了解，迪克·科瓦切维奇在一个星期天中午过后接到了电话，得知第二天将在华盛顿出现，时间是 1 点或 2 点，但没有被告知是什么事情。

And there were 11 bankers there and some officials. And they were told that they were going to take TARP money. And they were going to take loans from the government and preferred stock. And that they only had an hour or two to sign it and they didn’t get to consult with boards.

那里有 11 位银行家和一些官员。他们被告知将要接受 TARP 资金。他们将从政府那里获得贷款和优先股。他们只有一两个小时的时间来签署协议，并且没有机会与董事会进行咨询。

But that’s the nature of an emergency. You know, it — I think you — well, you’re going to have some decisions that later can be looked back at and somebody will say, “I could’ve done it a little bit better.” But, by and large, the authorities, in my view, did a very good job.

但这就是紧急情况的本质。你知道，我认为你会面临一些决定，后来可以回过头来看，有人会说：“我本可以做得更好。”但总体而言，在我看来，相关部门做得非常好。

And all banks aren’t alike by a long shot. And in our opinion, Wells Fargo is a — among the large banks particularly — it’s a fabulous bank and has some advantages that the other banks don’t have.

并不是所有银行都一样。我们认为，富国银行在大型银行中尤其是一家出色的银行，拥有其他银行所没有的一些优势。

But in a time like that, you’re not dealing in nuances.

但在那样的时刻，你并不在处理细微差别。

Incidentally, I would recommend to all of you, that you go to the internet and read Jamie Dimon’s letter to his shareholders. Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase. It’s a fabulous letter. It talks about a point that Charlie made there.

顺便说一下，我建议你们都去网上阅读一下杰米·戴蒙给股东的信。杰米·戴蒙是摩根大通的首席执行官。这是一封精彩的信，提到了查理在那里的一个观点。

But it — Jamie did a great job of writing about what caused this and what might be done in the future. It’s as good a shareholders letter that I’ve ever seen. So by all means, look it up. It’s long, but it’s worth reading.

但是，杰米在写这件事的原因以及未来可能采取的措施方面做得非常出色。这是我见过的最好的股东信。因此，尽管它很长，但值得一读。

9. Higher mathematics can be dangerous for investing

高等数学对投资可能是危险的

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to area 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们去第二个区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, thank you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Rick Franklin (PH). I’m from St. Louis, Missouri. I’d like to follow up on the microphone 1′s question on financial literacy. And my own question from two years ago on your discount rate.

观众成员：是的，谢谢您，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫瑞克·富兰克林（音）。我来自密苏里州的圣路易斯。我想跟进麦克风 1 上关于金融素养的问题，以及我两年前关于您折现率的问题。

But before I do that, I hope you’ll indulge me. Torstol’s (PH) wife, Rosemary Coons (PH), if you could come to section 222. I found your husband. (Laughter)

但在我这样做之前，我希望你们能宽容我。托斯托尔的妻子，罗丝玛丽·库恩斯，如果你能来 222 号区域。我找到了你的丈夫。（笑声）

You can come to microphone 2, if that’s easier.

你可以来麦克风 2，如果那样更方便的话。

WARREN BUFFETT: You get a little of everything here. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：在这里你会听到各种声音。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So my question is, free cash flow: sell-side analysts like to do a 10-year discounted cash flow analysis with a terminal value.

观众成员：我的问题是，自由现金流：卖方分析师喜欢进行 10 年的折现现金流分析，并计算终值。

Even some of the books written about your style — “The Warren Buffett Way”, “Buffettology” — imply that you go through that exercise.

甚至有些关于你们风格的书籍——《沃伦·巴菲特之道》《巴菲特学》——暗示你们会进行这样的分析。

But I know you’re famous for not using computers or calculators. I’m wondering if those type of exercises fall into the “too hard” file, and you just do a simple free cash flow — normalized free cash flow — over a discount rate?

但我知道你以不使用电脑或计算器而闻名。我在想这些类型的练习是否属于“太难”的范畴，你只是简单地计算自由现金流——标准化自由现金流——与折现率？

And if you care to augment the answer with your numerical analysis of Coke, I’d appreciate that. (Laughter)

如果你愿意用你对可口可乐的数字分析来补充这个答案，我会很感激的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is that investing — all investing is, is laying out cash now to get more cash back at a later date. Now, the question is how much do you get back, how sure are you of getting it, when do you get it? It goes back to Aesop’s fables. You know, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是投资——所有的投资就是现在花钱，以便在未来获得更多的钱。现在，问题是你能得到多少，你对获得它的把握有多大，你什么时候能得到它？这回到了伊索寓言。你知道，“手中一鸟胜过林中两鸟。”

Now, that was said by Aesop in 600 B.C. He was a very smart man. He didn’t know it was 600 B.C. But I mean, he couldn’t know everything. (Laughter)

这句话是公元前 600 年由伊索说的。他是个非常聪明的人。他不知道这是公元前 600 年。但我的意思是，他不可能知道一切。（笑声）

But the — but that’s what’s being taught in the finance — you got a Ph.D. now and you do it more complicated, and you don’t say, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” because you can’t really impress the laity with that sort of thing.

但这就是金融中所教授的内容——你现在有了博士学位，你做得更复杂，而你不会说“手中一鸟胜过林中两鸟”，因为你无法用这种说法给外行人留下深刻印象。

But the real question is, how many birds are in the bush? You know you’re laying out a bird today, the dollar. And then how many birds are in the bush? How sure are you they’re in the bush? How many birds are in other bushes? What’s the discount rate?

但真正的问题是，灌木丛里有多少鸟？你知道你今天放出了一只鸟，也就是一美元。那么灌木丛里有多少鸟？你对它们的存在有多大的把握？其他灌木丛里又有多少鸟？折现率又是多少？

In other words, if interest rates are 20 percent, you got to get those two birds faster than if interest rates are 5 percent and so on.

换句话说，如果利率是20%，你必须更快地得到那两只鸟，而不是利率为5%时那么快。

That’s what we do. I mean, we are looking at putting out cash now to get back more cash later on.

这就是我们所做的。我的意思是，我们现在投入现金，以便以后获得更多现金。

You mentioned that I don’t use a computer or a calculator. If you need to use a computer or a calculator to make the calculation, you shouldn’t buy it.

你提到我不使用电脑或计算器。如果你需要使用电脑或计算器来进行计算，那你就不应该买它。

需要通地耐心等到显而易见的机会。

I mean, it should be so obvious that you don’t have to carry it out to tenths of a percent or hundredths of the percent. It should scream at you.

我的意思是，这应该是显而易见的，你不需要精确到千分之一或百分之一。它应该让你感到震惊。

So if you really need a calculator to figure out that it’s — the discount rate is 9.6 percent instead of 9.8 percent — forget about the whole exercise. Just go onto something that shouts at you. And essentially, we look at every business that way.

所以如果你真的需要计算器来算出折扣率是 9.6%而不是 9.8%——那就忘掉整个过程吧。去做一些更直接的事情。基本上，我们就是这样看待每个业务的。

But you’re right, we do not make — we do not sit down with spreadsheets and do all that sort of thing. We just see something that obviously is better than anything else around, that we understand. And then we act.

但你说得对，我们并不制作——我们并不坐下来用电子表格做那些事情。我们只是看到一些显然比周围其他任何东西都要好的东西，我们理解它。然后我们就采取行动。

And Charlie, do you want to add to that?

查理，你想补充一下吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d go further. I’d say some of the worst business decisions I’ve ever seen are those that are done with a lot of formal projections and discounts back.

查理·芒格：我会更进一步。我认为我见过的一些最糟糕的商业决策，正是那些进行大量预测和折现计算的决策。

Shell Oil Company did that when they bought the Belridge Oil Company. And they had all these engineers make all these elaborate figures.

壳牌石油公司在收购贝尔里奇石油公司时就是这样做的。他们让所有工程师制作了这些复杂的图表。

And the trouble is you get to believe the figures. And it seems that the higher mathematics, with more false precision, should help you. But it doesn’t.

问题是你开始相信这些数字。似乎高级数学、更多的虚假精确度应该能帮助你。但事实并非如此。

The effects, averaged out, are negative when you try and formalize it to the degree you’re talking about. They do that in business schools because, well, they got to do something. (Laughter and applause)

当你试图将其正式化到你所谈论的程度时，平均效果是负面的。他们在商学院这样做，因为，嗯，他们必须做点什么。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s a lot of truth to that. I mean, if you stand up in front of a class and you say, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” you know, you’re not going to get tenure. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这句话有很多道理。我的意思是，如果你站在课堂前说：“手中的一只鸟胜过林中的两只鸟”，你知道，你是不会获得终身教职的。（笑声）

It’s very important if you’re in the priesthood to look, at least, like you know a whole more lot more than the people you’re preaching to.

如果你是神职人员，至少看起来比你所传教的人知道得多是非常重要的。

And if you come down and just — if you’re a priest, and you just hand down the 10 Commandments and you say, “This is it,” and we’ll all go home, you know, it just isn’t the way to progress in the world.

如果你只是像个牧师一样，逐条地传授十诫，告诉大家，“这就是全部”，然后我们就回家了，你知道，这可不是在这个世界上进步的方式。

So, the false precision that goes into saying that this is a two standard deviation event or this is a three standard deviation event, and therefore we can afford to take this much risk and all that, it’s totally crazy.

所以，声称这是一个两个标准差事件或这是一个三个标准差事件的虚假精确性，以及因此我们可以承担这么多风险等等，完全是疯狂的。

I mean, you saw it with Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. You’ve seen it time and time and time again.

我意思是，你在 1998 年看到了长期资本管理公司。你一次又一次地看到了这一点。

And it only happens to people with high IQs. You know, those of you who are — have 120 IQs are all safe. (Laughter)

而这只发生在那些高智商的人身上。你们当中有120智商的人都很安全。（笑）

But if you have a very high IQ, and you’ve learned all this stuff, you know, you feel you have to use it. And the markets are not that way.

但是如果你有很高的智商，并且你学到了这些东西，你知道，你会觉得必须去运用它。而市场并不是那样的。

The markets of mid-September last year, when people who ran huge institutions were wondering how they were going to get funding the next week, you know, that doesn’t appear on a — you can’t calculate the standard deviation with — that that arises at.

在去年9月中旬，当那些经营庞大机构的人不知道下周该如何获得资金时，你知道，这些东西并不会出现——你无法用标准差计算出这种情况的发生。

It’s going to arise much more often than people think, in markets that are made by people that get scared and get greedy. And they don’t observe the laws of flipping coins, it’s — in terms of the distribution of results.

这将比人们想象的更频繁地出现，在那些由害怕和贪婪驱动的人所形成的市场中。而他们并不遵循抛硬币的规律，就结果分布而言。

And it’s a terrible mistake to think that mathematics will take you a long place in investing. You have to understand certain aspects of mathematics. But you don’t have to understand higher mathematics.

认为数学在投资中会带你走得很远是一个可怕的错误。你必须理解数学的某些方面。但你不必理解高等数学。

And higher mathematics may actually be dangerous and it will lead you down pathways that are better left untrod.

而高级数学实际上可能是危险的，它会引导你走向不应走的道路。

10. Moody’s wasn’t alone in making mistakes

穆迪并不是唯一犯错的机构

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew, one of those 200 questions from this morning? Or what are —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。安德鲁，今天早上那 200 个问题中的一个？或者是什么——

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This one’s not from this morning, but it relates to Moody’s. And we’ve probably received about 300 questions, at least, on this topic.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个不是今天早上的，但它与穆迪有关。我们大概收到了至少 300 个关于这个话题的问题。

This question, which is representative of many, comes from Aaron Goldsmeizer (PH). And the question is the following:

这个问题代表了许多类似的问题，来自亚伦·戈尔德斯梅泽（PH）。问题如下：

“Given the role of rating agencies in the current economic crisis — their conflict of interest, their reliance on, quote, ‘flawed history-based models,’ as you described in this year’s letter to shareholders, and the likelihood that a loss of credibility and/or regulatory reforms could force drastic changes in their business models or earning streams — why do you retain such a large holding in Moody’s?

“考虑到评级机构在当前经济危机中的角色——他们的利益冲突、依赖于你在今年给股东的信中描述的‘有缺陷的基于历史的模型’，以及失去信誉和/或监管改革可能迫使他们的商业模式或收益流发生剧烈变化的可能性——为什么你们仍然保留如此大比例的穆迪股份？

“And more important, why didn’t you use your stake to try to do something to prevent conflicts of interest and reliance on these flawed history-based models?”

“更重要的是，为什么你们没有利用你们的股份尝试去防止利益冲突和依赖这些有缺陷的基于历史的模型？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think the conflict of interest question was the — was the biggest —by anywhere close to the major cause of the shortcomings of the rating agencies in foreseeing what would happen with CDOs and CNBSs and all sorts of instruments like that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我认为利益冲突的问题并不是——绝对不是评级机构未能预见CDOs和CMBS等各种工具的最大原因。

Basically, five years ago, virtually everybody in the country had this model in their mind, formal or otherwise, that house prices could not fall significantly.

基本上，五年前，几乎全国每个人心中都有这样的模型，无论是正式的还是非正式的，那就是房价不可能大幅下跌。

They were wrong. Congress was wrong. Bankers were wrong. People that bought the instruments were wrong. Lenders — the borrowers were wrong.

他们错了。国会错了。银行家错了。购买这些工具的人错了。贷款人——借款人错了。

But people thought that if they were going to buy a house next year, they better buy it this year because it was going to be selling for more money the following year.

但人们认为，如果他们打算明年买房子，最好今年就买，因为明年房子的价格会更高。

And people who lent them money said it doesn’t make any difference if they’re lying on their application or they don’t have the income because houses go up, and if we have to foreclose we won’t lose that much money. And besides, they can probably refinance next year and pay.

借钱给他们的人说，无论他们在申请中是否撒谎，或者他们没有收入都没有关系，因为房价会上涨，如果我们不得不止赎，我们也不会损失太多钱。而且，他们可能明年就能再融资并偿还。

So there was an almost total belief — and there was always a few people that disagreed — but there was almost a total belief throughout the country that house prices would certainly not fall significantly, and that they would probably keep rising.

因此，几乎全社会都相信——虽然总有一些人持不同意见——但全国几乎普遍相信房价肯定不会大幅下跌，并且可能会继续上涨。

And the people at the rating agencies, one way or another, built that into their system.

评级机构的人员以某种方式将其纳入了他们的系统。

And I don’t — I really don’t I think it was primarily the payment system that created the problem. I think they just didn’t understand the various possibilities of what could happen in a market— or in a bubble, really — where people leveraged up enormously on the biggest asset that most Americans possess, their house.

我认为主要是支付系统造成了问题。他们只是没有理解市场中可能发生的各种情况——或者说在一个泡沫中——人们在大多数美国人拥有的最大资产上，房子上，进行了巨大的杠杆投资。

And so you had a $20 trillion asset class in a $50 trillion of total assets of American families that got leveraged up very high. And then once it started melting down, it had self-reinforcing aspects on the downside.

因此，美国家庭的总资产为 50 万亿美元，其中有 20 万亿美元的资产类别被高度杠杆化。一旦开始崩溃，它在下行过程中具有自我强化的特征。

So I say that they made a major mistake in terms of analyzing the instruments. But they made a mistake that a great, great, great many people made.

所以我说他们在分析工具方面犯了一个重大错误。但他们犯了一个很多很多人都犯过的错误。

And that probably if they had taken a different view of residential mortgages four or five years ago, they would’ve been answering to Congressional committees that would be saying, “How can you be so un-American as to deny all these people the right to buy houses simply because you won’t rate these securities higher?”

如果他们在四五年前对住宅抵押贷款采取了不同的看法，他们可能会面临国会委员会的质问：“你们怎么能如此不美国，以至于拒绝所有这些人购房的权利，仅仅因为你们不愿意对这些证券给予更高的评级？”

So I — they made a huge mistake. But the American people made a huge mistake. Congress made a huge mistake.

所以我——他们犯了一个巨大的错误。但是美国人民犯了一个巨大的错误。国会犯了一个巨大的错误。

Congress presided over the two largest mortgage companies. And they were their creatures. And they were supervised by them. And, you know, they’re both in conservatorship now.

国会主持了两家最大的抵押贷款公司。它们是国会的产物，并且由国会监督。你知道，它们现在都处于接管状态。

So I don’t think they were unique in their inability to spot what was coming.

所以我认为他们在无法预见即将发生的事情方面并不独特。

In terms of us influencing their behavior, I don’t think I’ve ever made a call to Moody’s.

至于我们对他们行为的影响，我认为我从未给穆迪打过电话。

But it’s also true that I haven’t made it to, or made — maybe made one or two — to other companies in which we’re involved.

但我也确实没有去过，或者说——也许去过一两次——我们参与的其他公司。

I mean, we don’t tell, you know, the Burlington Northern what safety procedures to put in.

我意思是，我们不告诉伯灵顿北方铁路该采取什么样的安全程序。

We don’t tell American Express who to cut off on credit cards and, you know, what they’re — who they should lend to and who they shouldn’t.

我们不会告诉美国运通应该停止哪些信用卡的服务，也不会告诉他们应该借给谁，或者不应该借给谁。

We are — when we own stock, we are not there to try and change people.

我们拥有股票时，并不是为了试图改变别人。

Our luck in changing them is very low, anyway. In fact, Charlie and I have been on boards of directors where we’re the largest shareholders. And we’ve had very little luck in changing behavior.

我们改变他们的运气非常低，反正。事实上，查理和我曾在董事会中担任最大股东。我们在改变行为方面几乎没有运气。

So, we think that if you buy stock in a company, you know, you better not count on the fact that you’re going to change their course of action.

所以，我们认为如果你在一家公司买股票，你最好不要指望你能改变他们的行动方向。

And in terms of selling the stock, the odds are that the rating agency business is probably still a good business. It is subject to attack. And who knows where that leads? And who knows what Congress does about it?

在出售股票方面，评级机构的业务可能仍然是一个好业务。这一业务受到攻击。谁知道这会导致什么？谁知道国会会对此做些什么？

But it’s a business with very few people in it. It’s a business that affects a large segment of the economy. I mean, the capital markets are huge. I think there will probably be rating agencies in the future. And I think that it’s a business that doesn’t require capital. So it has the fundamentals of a pretty good business.

但这是一个参与人数非常少的行业。它影响着经济的一个大部分。我是说，资本市场是巨大的。我认为未来可能会有评级机构。我认为这是一个不需要资本的行业。因此，它具备了一个相当不错的行业的基本面。

It won’t be doing the volume in the next — probably for a long time in certain areas of the capital markets. But capital markets are going to grow over time.

在未来的很长一段时间内，它可能在某些资本市场领域不会有那么大的交易量。但资本市场将随着时间的推移而增长。

We have said in this meeting in the past, many times, that Charlie and I don’t pay any attention to ratings. I mean, we don’t believe in outsourcing investment decisions.

我们在这次会议上多次表示，查理和我并不关注评级。我的意思是，我们不相信将投资决策外包。

So we — if we buy a bond, the rating is immaterial to us, except to the extent if we think it’s rated more poorly than it should, it may help us buy it at an attractive price.

所以我们——如果我们购买债券，评级对我们来说并不重要，除非我们认为它的评级低于应有水平，这可能帮助我们以有吸引力的价格购买。

But we do not think that the people at Moody’s, or Standard and Poor’s, or Fitch, or anyplace else, should be telling us the credit rating of a company. We figure that out for ourselves. And sometimes we disagree with the market in a major way. And we’ve made some money that way.

但我们认为穆迪、标准普尔、惠誉或其他任何地方的人不应该告诉我们一家公司的信用评级。我们自己来判断。有时我们与市场有重大分歧。我们因此赚了一些钱。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think the rating agencies, being good at doing mathematical calculations, eagerly sought stupid assumptions that enabled them to do clever mathematics. It’s an example of being too smart for your own good.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为评级机构擅长进行数学计算，热衷于寻找愚蠢的假设，以便进行巧妙的数学运算。这是一个聪明反被聪明误的例子。

There’s an old saying, “To a man with hammer, every problem looks pretty much like a nail.” And that’s — (laughter) — what happened in the rating agencies.

有句老话说：“对一个手握锤子的人来说，所有问题看起来都像钉子。”这就是——（笑声）——评级机构发生的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the interesting things about all those triple-As, is the people that created them ended up owning a lot of them. So they believed their own baloney, themselves. Every — the belief was enormous.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，所有这些三 A 级别的有趣之处在于，创造它们的人最终拥有了很多。因此，他们自己相信自己的胡说八道。每个人的信念都是巨大的。

So you had these people stirring up the Kool-Aid and then they drank it themselves. And they — (laughter) — you know, they paid a big penalty for it. But I don’t think it was — I think it was stupidity and the fact that everybody else was doing it.

所以你有这些人搅拌果汁饮料，然后他们自己喝了。然后他们——（笑声）——你知道，他们为此付出了很大的代价。但我认为这不是——我认为这是愚蠢，以及其他人都在这样做的事实。

I send out a letter to our managers, only every couple of years. But the one reason you can’t give at Berkshire, as far as I’m concerned, for any action, is that everybody else is doing it.

我每隔几年才会给我们的经理们发一封信。但在我看来，你在伯克希尔不能给出的任何行动理由就是“大家都在这么做”。

You know, and just — if that’s the best you can come with, you know, something’s wrong. But that happens in security markets all the time.

你知道，如果这是你能想到的最好的理由，某种程度上就是出问题了。但这在证券市场中经常发生。

And of course, it’s — when Charlie and I were at Salomon or someplace like that, it’s very difficult to tell a huge organization that you shouldn’t be doing something that people, well-regarded competitors, are doing. And particularly when there’s a lot of money in it.

当然，当查理和我在所罗门或类似的地方时，告诉一个庞大的组织不应该做某些事情是非常困难的，尤其是当人们认为这是值得做的事情时，尤其是在这里面有很多钱。

And so it’s very hard to stop these things once you get sort of a industry acceptance of behavior. And you know, we were very unsuccessful, Charlie and I, at Salomon at saying, “Well, we just don’t want to do this sort of thing.”

因此，一旦你获得某种行业接受的行为，阻止这些事情就非常困难。而且你知道，查理和我在所罗门就很不成功地说，“我们就是不想做这种事情。”

We couldn’t even get them — initially, when we got in there at first, they were doing business with Marc Rich. And we said, “Let’s stop doing business with Marc Rich.”

当我们刚进去的时候，他们与马克·里奇（Marc Rich）做生意。我们说：“我们停止与马克·里奇做生意吧。”

You know, that’s like saying in the ’30s, “Let’s stop doing business with Al Capone,” or something. And they said, “But it’s good business. If he doesn’t do it with us, he’ll do it with somebody else.” And they felt that way. And I think we won that one. But it wasn’t easy.

你知道，这就像在 30 年代说：“让我们停止与阿尔·卡彭做生意。”他们说：“但这生意很好。如果他不和我们做生意，他会和其他人做。”他们就是这样想的。我认为我们赢了这一局。但这并不容易。

You remember that, Charlie?

你还记得吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I certainly do.

查理·芒格：我当然这样做。

11. Housing markets are beginning to improve

房地产市场开始改善

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to area 3. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们去第三区。（笑声）

OK, zone 3, are we on?

好的，三区，我们准备好了吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Laurie Gould (PH) from Berkeley, California.

观众成员：我来自加利福尼亚州伯克利，我是劳里·古尔德（PH）。

Where do you see the residential real estate market headed nationally, particularly in California, over the next year or two?

您认为全国范围内，特别是在加利福尼亚，未来一两年住宅房地产市场将走向何方？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t know what real estate is going to do. We didn’t know what it was going to do a few years ago. We thought it was getting kind of dangerous in certain ways. But it’s very hard to tell.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们不知道房地产会怎样。几年前我们也不知道它会怎样。我们认为在某些方面变得有点危险。但很难判断。

I would say this. From what we’re — from what I’m seeing, and I do see a lot of data — there’s — and California, incidentally, is a very big — I mean, there are many markets within California. Stockton is going to be different than San Francisco and so on.

我想说的是，根据我们的观察——根据我看到的很多数据——加利福尼亚州，顺便说一句，是一个非常大的市场——我的意思是，加利福尼亚州内有许多不同的市场。斯托克顿（Stockton）将不同于旧金山（San Francisco）等等。

But, in the last few months, you’ve seen a real pickup in activity, although at much lower prices. But you’ve seen — I think you’ve seen something in the medium- to lower-priced houses. And medium means a different thing in California than it does in Nebraska.

但在过去几个月里，你确实看到活动有所回升，尽管价格要低得多。但你确实看到中低价位房屋的活动有所增加。我认为你在中低价位的房屋上看到了些许增长。而“中等”在加利福尼亚的含义与内布拉斯加州不同。

But you’ve seen, in maybe $750,000 and under houses, you’ve seen a real pickup in activity, many more bidders. You haven’t seen it bounce back in price. Prices are down significantly and it varies by the area.

但你确实看到，价格在75万美元及以下的房屋，活动有了显著增加，竞标者更多。价格还没有回升。价格大幅下跌，并且因地区不同而有所差异。

But it looks as if — you know, you had a foreclosure moratorium for a while. And so get into distortions because of that.

但看起来——你知道，你曾经有过一段时间的止赎暂停。因此因此产生了扭曲。

But what it looks like, looking at our real estate brokerage data — and we have the largest real estate brokerage firm in Southern California, in Orange County, Los Angeles County, and San Diego in Prudential of California that’s owned by MidAmerican — we see something close, I would say, to stability at these much-reduced prices in the medium to lower group.

但从我们的房地产经纪数据来看——我们拥有南加利福尼亚最大的房地产经纪公司，在橙县、洛杉矶县和圣地亚哥的加利福尼亚普天寿（Prudential of California）由MidAmerican所有——我们看到的是，在这些大幅降低的中低价位群体中，接近稳定的状态。

If you’ve got a $5 million or $3 million house, that still looks like a very — erratic — it’s a market in which there still isn’t a lot of activity.

如果你有一栋价值 500 万美元或 300 万美元的房子，那看起来仍然是一个非常——不稳定——的市场，活动仍然不多。

But in the lower levels, there’s plenty of activity now. Houses are moving. Interest rates, of course, are down so it’s much easier to make the payments.

但在较低的层面上，现在有很多活动。房屋在交易。利率当然下降了，所以还款变得容易得多。

The mortgages being put on the books every day in California, are much better than, you know, the mix that you had a few years earlier.

加利福尼亚每天记录的抵押贷款，比几年前的组合要好得多。

So it’s improving. And I don’t know what it’ll do next month or three months from now.

所以它在改善。我不知道下个月或三个月后会发生什么。

The housing situation is pretty much this way. You can look at it this way.

住房情况大致是这样的。你可以这样看待它。

We create about 1,300,000 or so households a year. It bounces around some. But — and it tends to — in a recession, it tends to be fewer because people postpone matrimony and so on to some extent.

我们每年大约创造 130 万个家庭。这一数字会有所波动。但是——在经济衰退时，通常会减少，因为人们在某种程度上会推迟结婚等。

But if there’s 1,300,000 households created in a year and you create two million housing starts annually, you are going to run into trouble. And that’s what we did. We just created more houses than the demand was — the fundamental demand — was going to absorb.

但是如果一年内新建了 130 万个家庭，而你每年新开工 200 万个住房，你就会遇到麻烦。这就是我们所做的。我们新建的房屋数量超过了基本需求能够吸收的数量。

So we created an excess of houses. How much excess is there now? Perhaps a million and a half units. We were building two million units a year. That’s down to 500,000 units a year.

所以我们建造了过多的房屋。现在有多少过剩？也许有一百五十万套。我们每年建造两百万套房屋。现在降到每年五十万套。

Now, if you create 500,000 units a year and you have a 1,300,000 households created, you are going to absorb the excess supply.

现在，如果你每年生产 500,000 个单位，而你有 1,300,000 个家庭成立，你将会消化过剩的供应。

It will be very uneven around the country. South Florida’s going to be tough for a long, long time. So it isn’t like you can move a house from one place to another if there’s demand in one place and not another.

全国各地的情况将非常不均衡。南佛罗里达将会面临很长一段时间的困难。因此，如果一个地方有需求而另一个地方没有，就不能像搬家一样将房子从一个地方移动到另一个地方。

But we are eating up an excess inventory now. And we’re probably eating it up at the rate of 7- or 800,000 units a year. And if we have a million and a half excess, that takes a couple of years. There’s no getting away from it.

但我们现在正在消耗过剩的库存。我们每年可能以 70 万到 80 万单位的速度消耗。如果我们有 150 万的过剩库存，那需要几年的时间。这个问题是无法避免的。

You have three choices. You could blow up a million and a half houses, you know. And if they do that, I hope they blow up yours and not mine, but that’s a — (Laughter)

你有三个选择。你可以炸掉一百五十万栋房子，你知道。如果他们这样做，我希望他们炸掉的是你的而不是我的，但这就是——（笑声）

We could get rid of it. We could try to create more households. We could have 14-year-olds start getting married and having kids, and — (Laughter)

我们可以摆脱它。我们可以尝试创造更多的家庭。我们可以让 14 岁的孩子开始结婚生子，——（笑声）

Or we can produce less than the natural demand increase. And that’s what we’re doing now.

或者我们可以生产少于自然需求增长的量。这就是我们现在所做的。

And we’re going to eat up the inventory. And you can’t do it in a day. And you can’t do it in a week. But it will get done.

我们将消耗库存。你不能一天内完成。你也不能一周内完成。但这件事会完成。

And when it gets done, then you’ll have a stabilization in pricings. And then you will create the demand for more housing starts. And then you go back up to a million and a quarter, and then our insulation business and our carpet business and our brick business will all get better.

当这完成后，价格会稳定下来。然后你会创造更多的住房开工需求。然后你会回到每年120万套左右，然后我们的保温材料业务、地毯业务和砖业务都会有所改善。

Exactly when that happens nobody knows. But it will happen.

确切发生的时间没有人知道。但它会发生。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think in a place like Omaha, which never had a really crazy boom in terms of housing prices, with interest rates so low if you’ve got good credit, that if I were a young person wanting a house in Omaha, I would buy it tomorrow. (Applause)

查理·芒格：哦，我认为在像奥马哈这样的地方，房价从来没有经历过真正疯狂的繁荣，利率如此之低，如果你有良好的信用，如果我是一个想在奥马哈买房的年轻人，我会明天就买。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We own the largest real estate brokerage firm in Omaha. So — (laughter) — Charlie will be — if he qualifies, we will give him a mortgage application.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们拥有奥马哈最大的房地产经纪公司。所以——（笑声）——查理如果符合条件，我们会给他一个抵押贷款申请。

If is true that 4 1/2 million houses will change hands. There’s about 80 million houses in the country. Twenty-five million of those do not have a mortgage. About a third of the houses in the country do not have a mortgage. You’ve got about 55 million, or a little less, that have a mortgage. And five or six million of those are in trouble one way or another.

如果确实有450万套房屋会转手。全国大约有8000万套房屋。其中2500万套没有抵押贷款。全国大约三分之一的房屋没有抵押贷款。你大约有5500万套，或者稍少一些，有抵押贷款。而其中500万到600万套以某种方式处于困境中。

But we’re selling 4 1/2 million houses every day. And by and large, they’re going into stronger hands. The mortgages are more affordable. The down payments are higher. We’re — the situation is getting corrected.

但我们每天出售 450 万套房子。总体而言，这些房子进入了更强的买家手中。抵押贷款更可负担，首付款更高。我们——情况正在得到改善。

应该是每年。

But it wasn’t created in a day or a week or a month. And it’s not going to get solved in a day or a week or a month. We are on the road to solution.

但这不是一天、一周或一个月内创造的。也不会在一天、一周或一个月内解决。我们正在走向解决方案的道路。

12. 2008 wasn’t great for investment manager candidates

2008 对投资经理候选人来说并不理想

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: Perhaps I should have said one other thing at the beginning. Those of you who read the annual report carefully know that Charlie and Warren were to be given no clue as to what any of the three of us were going to ask. So don’t think that they have gotten a little list. They have seen nothing.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：也许我应该在一开始说另外一件事。那些仔细阅读年报的人知道，查理和沃伦不会被告知我们三个人将要问的任何问题。所以不要认为他们有一个小名单。他们什么都没看到。

This question, I got many versions of this question. This one happened to come from Jonathan Grant of New York City. It concerns the four investment managers you have said are in the wings as possible successors to you.

这个问题，我收到了很多版本。这个问题恰好来自纽约市的乔纳森·格兰特。它涉及到你所说的四位投资经理，他们可能是你的接班人。

“Can you please tell us, without naming names, but preferably in both quantitative and qualitative terms, how each of the four did in 2008 with the money they are managing — they were managing — for their clients.

“请您告诉我们，尽量不提名字，但最好用定量和定性两种方式，说明这四位经理在 2008 年为客户管理资金的表现如何。”

“You said you hoped to pick people who would be able to anticipate things that had never occurred before. While the world has seen credit crises before, there were a lot of things that happened in 2008, especially in the last few months of the year, that few were predicting and that you, yourself, have described as almost unprecedented.

“你说过希望挑选能够预见从未发生过的事情的人。虽然世界上曾经出现过信用危机，但在 2008 年，尤其是年末的几个月里，发生了很多事情，几乎没有人预测到，而你自己也形容这些事情几乎是前所未有的。”

“How would you rate the way that these managers — these four managers — did in managing against these low-probability risks? Are all four still on the list?

“你如何评价这四位经理在应对这些低概率风险方面的表现？这四位经理都还在名单上吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is all four are still on the list. Let me just make one point first, though, because it got misreported a little bit.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是这四个仍然在名单上。不过，我先要说一点，因为这点被误报了一些。

We have three candidates for the CEO position. And this is always a major subject of discussion at our director’s meetings. All of them are internal candidates. You should know that.

我们有三位候选人竞选首席执行官职位。这在我们的董事会议上总是一个主要讨论话题。他们都是内部候选人。你应该知道这一点。

That’s been said before. But it got misreported here once or twice. And it got confused, I think, because of the four possibilities for the investment job. And you could have all four come to work for us in that case.

这已经说过了。但这里有一两次被误报了。我认为这是因为投资职位有四种可能性，所以可能让人误以为我们会有四个人来为我们工作。

We won’t have three CEOs or two CEOs. But we might have multiple investment managers after I’m not around. Or we might just have one. That would be up to the board at that time.

我们不会有三个首席执行官或两个首席执行官。但在我不在的时候，我们可能会有多个投资经理。或者我们可能只有一个。这将取决于当时的董事会。

They are both inside and outside the organization. And we don’t preclude anything in terms of where they come from. So we could have a whole big list from outside the organization.

他们既在组织内部，也在外部。我们不排除任何来源。因此，我们可能会有一整大堆来自组织外部的名单。

That will not be true about the CEO position. The person that follows me will come from within Berkshire Hathaway.

关于首席执行官职位，这并不是真的。接替我的人将来自伯克希尔·哈撒韦内部。

The four, I don’t have precise figures from them, although I’ve got a fair amount of information on some of them. I would say they did no better than match the S&P last year, which was minus 37 after adding back dividends.

这四人，我没有他们的精确数据，尽管我对其中一些人有相当多的信息。我会说他们在去年表现不超过标准普尔500指数，扣除股息后下跌了37%。

So I would say that in terms of 2008, by itself, you would not say that they covered themselves with glory. But I didn’t cover myself with glory, either. So I’m very tolerant of that in 2008. (Laughter) They —

所以我想说，单就 2008 年而言，你不会说他们表现得光彩夺目。但我自己也没有表现得光彩夺目。所以我对 2008 年持非常宽容的态度。（笑声）他们——

Charlie, you know some of the records pretty well. Wouldn’t you say that’s true?

查理，你对一些记录很熟悉。你不觉得这是真的吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. What’s interesting to me is that practically every investment manager that I know of in America, and regard as intelligent and disciplined and with a unusual record of past success, they all got creamed last year. (Scattered laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。对我来说有趣的是，我所知道的几乎每一个在美国的投资经理，他们都被认为是聪明、严谨，并且有着不寻常的成功记录，去年他们都遭遇了重创。（零星的笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: The group — I don’t hear a lot of laughter about that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这个小组——我没有听到很多关于这件事的笑声。（笑声）

I think you’re hitting a nerve out there, Charlie.

我觉得你触动了某个敏感点，查理。

The four have a better-than-average record over time. If you’d asked me at the start of the year, if you’d said, “There’s going to be a minus 37 percent year, will this group do better than average?” I would’ve said yes.

这四个在一段时间内的表现优于平均水平。如果你在年初问我，如果你说：“会有一个负 37%的年份，这个团队会表现得比平均水平好吗？”我会说是的。

But I think I would’ve been wrong. And like I said, I haven’t got audit returns from every one of them. But I would say I would be wrong.

但我觉得我会错了。正如我所说，我没有从他们每一个人那里得到审计的回报数据。但我会说我会错的。

I would say that their record over 10 years has been, in each case, has been anywhere from modestly to significantly better than average. And I’d be willing to be that would be the case over the next 10 years.

我会说，他们在过去10年的记录，在每一种情况下，都是从适度优于平均到显著优于平均。我愿意相信在未来10年也是如此。

But certainly, last year, you know, there were a lot of things that didn’t work. And our group was not exempt from them.

但当然，去年，你知道，有很多事情没有按计划进行。我们的团队也未能幸免。

I have not changed the list. That doesn’t mean that we’re always looking with the idea of finding more people to add to it.

我没有改变名单。这并不意味着我们总是在考虑增加更多的人。

And as opposed to the CEO job, you know, if I dropped dead tonight, the board needs to put somebody in as a CEO tomorrow morning. And they will do so. And they know who it is. And they feel very good about it.

与首席执行官的工作相反，如果我今晚突然去世，董事会明天早上需要任命一个人担任首席执行官。他们会这样做。他们知道是谁。他们对此感到非常满意。

Not too good, I hope, but — (Laughter)

我希望不会太满意，但——（笑声）

But on the investment officers — one or more, and it could easily be more — they don’t need to do something the next day or the next week.

但对于投资经理——一个或多个，可能会更多——他们不需要在第二天或下周做些什么。

I mean, the portfolio isn’t — everything doesn’t stop because of that. So that can be a somewhat more leisurely decision they’ll have. And it will be made, in an important way, in consultation and agreement with the new CEO.

我的意思是，投资组合并不是——一切都不会因为这个而停止。所以他们可以更从容地做出决定。而且这个决定将在与新任首席执行官的咨询和一致意见中以重要的方式做出。

So that is something that you shouldn’t expect the next day to hear an announcement on the investment managers. But you should expect to hear, you know, within a month or something like that.

所以你不应该期待第二天就听到关于投资经理的公告。但你应该期待在一个月内听到类似的消息。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think we would want a manager who thought he could just go to cash based on macroeconomic notions and then hop back in when it was no longer advantageous to be in cash. Since we can’t do that ourselves —

查理·芒格：我认为我们不会想要一个认为自己可以基于宏观经济观点随意转向现金，然后在现金不再有利时再重新投入的经理。因为我们自己都做不到——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we think it’s impossible if we can’t do it ourselves.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们认为如果我们自己做不到，那就不可能。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：对，没错。（笑）

So we’re not looking for a type who went to cash totally.

所以我们并不是在寻找完全转向现金的类型。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that would — in fact, we would leave out anybody that did that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上，我们会排除任何这样做的人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we would exclude them.

查理·芒格：是的，我们会排除他们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. That —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。那——

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re not dumb enough for us. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：他们不够傻。（笑声）

13. Munger expects public/private hybrid health care system

芒格预期公共/私营混合医疗系统

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to zone 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们去第 4 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Vern Cushenbery. I’m from Overland Park, Kansas.

观众成员：嗨，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫维恩·库申贝里。我来自堪萨斯州的奥弗兰帕克。

I wonder if you might share your thoughts on the likelihood of a nationalized health care system, what that might look like and the effects on your portfolio?

我想知道您是否愿意分享一下您对国家化医疗系统的可能性、它可能的样子以及对您投资组合的影响的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m going to let Charlie answer that one since I don’t know how to. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我让查理来回答这个问题，因为我不知道怎么回答。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Personally, I think something more like Europe will come to the United States in due course. And I think it’ll be supplemented by a private system, which is the equivalent of private school competition for public education.

查理·芒格：就我个人而言，我认为类似欧洲的模式将在适当的时候来到美国。我认为这将由一个私营系统来补充，这相当于公立教育中的私立学校竞争。

And, although I’m a Republican, I’m not horrified by that probable development. Personally, I wish they’d put it off for a year while we solve the economic problems. (Applause)

而且，尽管我是一名共和党人，但我并不对这一可能的发展感到恐惧。就我个人而言，我希望他们能推迟一年，等我们解决经济问题后再说。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And I would say that in terms of its impact on Berkshire, you know, we have a broad cross section of companies — we have 246,000 people working for us — that we will adjust, like American business generally will adjust, to any developments along that line.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想说，就对伯克希尔的影响而言，我们有一个广泛的公司横截面——我们有 246,000 名员工——我们会像美国企业一样，针对任何相关的发展进行调整。

It won’t pose special problems for us. It won’t offer us special opportunities. We’ll see what the national sentiment is, as expressed through Congress. And we’ll behave accordingly.

这对我们不会造成特别的问题，也不会给我们提供特别的机会。我们将观察国会所表达的国家情绪，并据此行事。

14. Why we’re not training or naming our next CEO

为什么我们不培训或命名我们的下一任首席执行官

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This is a question that follows up on the succession question. This one is a, in particularly, though, addressed to the three candidates for CEO. It comes from Irving Fenster who writes:

贝基·奎克：这是一个关于继任问题的后续问题。这一个尤其是针对三位首席执行官候选人的问题。它来自欧克拉荷马州的欧文·芬斯特（Irving Fenster），他写道：

“Running Berkshire is very complex and complicated. Give us some insight for your reluctance to bring in your replacement to give him the benefit of your training, instead of his having to tackle the myriad of problems of the transition on his own.

管理伯克希尔非常复杂和困难。为什么您不愿意培训您的接班人，以便让他受益于您的培训，而不是让他独自应对过渡中的种种问题。

“The benefits for Berkshire, your replacement, and you, are so compelling your reluctance is puzzling. Having him on board may relieve some of the stress on you and help add many, many more years of good health for you.”

“这对伯克希尔、您的接班人和您本人都有如此巨大的好处，您不愿意的原因令人困惑。让他加入可能会减轻您的一些压力，并帮助您保持更多年的良好健康。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Irving is a friend of mine in Oklahoma. Went in in my partnership 40 years ago, Irving and Irene. And he’s been writing me on this for 30 or 40 years. And he’s had — (laughter) — he’s had no luck with me. So he decided to write Becky, apparently. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：欧文是我在奥克拉荷马的一个朋友。40年前加入了我的合伙企业，欧文和伊琳。过去30或40年里他一直在就这个问题给我写信。——（笑声）——他一直没能说服我。所以他决定显然写信给贝基。（笑声）

If we had a good way to inject somebody into some role that was — would make them a better CEO of Berkshire, we would try it.

如果我们有一个好的方法可以让某人进入某个角色，使他们成为更好的伯克希尔首席执行官，我们会尝试。

But the truth is that the candidates we have are running businesses. They’re making capital allocation decisions. They’re doing things every day of an operating nature. And these are major businesses.

但事实是，我们的候选人正在经营业务。他们在做资本配置决策。他们每天都在做运营性质的事情。这些都是大型业务。

And to sit around headquarters while I’m sitting in there reading and on the phone and, you know, who knows what else, they — it — there just is — there wouldn’t be anything to do.

而让他们在总部闲坐，而我则坐在那里阅读和打电话，谁知道还有什么，他们——这——根本没有什么可做的。

I mean, we could meet every hour. You know, I could say, “Here’s what I’m thinking about now. What do you think about this?” and — (Laughter)

我的意思是，我们可以每小时见一次面。你知道，我可以说：“这是我现在在想什么。你怎么看？”——（笑声）

It’d be a waste of talent. It’d be ridiculous.

这将是对人才的浪费。这太荒谬了。

And Irving has this notion that somehow, that they would be absorbing all these things that I’m doing. I just throw The Wall Street Journal to him after I’m done reading it, and I’d throw him The New York Times and I’d throw him the FT. (Laughs)

而欧文有这种想法，认为他们会吸收我所做的所有这些东西。我读完《华尔街日报》后就把它扔给他，然后我会把《纽约时报》扔给他，还会把《金融时报》扔给他。（笑）

And these are people that know how to run big businesses. They run businesses that make many, many, many millions, or even billions, of dollars.

这些人知道如何经营大企业。他们经营的企业赚取了数百万、数千万，甚至数十亿美元。

So, they are ready for the job right now. I wouldn’t be happy unless we have — they are 100 percent ready. They know how to allocate capital.

所以，他们现在已经为这份工作做好了准备。我不会满意，除非我们有——他们100%准备好了。他们知道如何分配资本。

The biggest job they’ll have is the fact that they will have to develop relationships with potential sellers of businesses, with the world, generally, with you, the shareholders, with other managers. That takes some time, not an extraordinary time.

他们面临的最大挑战是必须与潜在的企业卖家、整个世界、你们这些股东以及其他管理者建立关系。这需要一些时间，但并不是特别长的时间。

But that — you know, they will have to become acquainted with people. But — different constituencies. But that — there’s, you know, that is nothing that really needs to be hastened along. It’s nothing terribly important.

但这——你知道，他们必须熟悉不同的群体。但这——这并不需要被急于推进。这并不是什么特别重要的事情。

I mean, they know how to run businesses. And they would do many things much better than I would. The biggest — probably the biggest challenge, because we have all of those talented managers that you saw during the movie.

我的意思是，他们知道如何经营企业。他们会做很多事情，比我做得好得多。最大的——可能是最大的挑战，因为我们有所有那些有才华的经理人，就像你在电影中看到的那样。

And those people have different styles. And they have different needs to some degree. They have different ways of operating. They’re all successes.

那些人有不同的风格。他们在某种程度上有不同的需求。他们有不同的操作方式。他们都是成功的。

But you know, some of them bat left-handed. Some of them bat right-handed. Some of them stand deep in the box. You know, some of them crowd the plate. I mean, they all have a little bit of variation. But they all hit terrifically.

但是你知道，有些人是左手击球。有些人是右手击球。有些人站得很深在击球区。你知道，有些人则靠得很近。我是说，他们都有一点变化。但他们的击球都非常出色。

And for the CEO of Berkshire, it does require some knowledge of the individual personalities. And which ones like to run by themselves totally and which ones like to check in occasionally and all that.

对于伯克希尔的首席执行官来说，这确实需要对各个个体的性格有一些了解。要知道哪些人喜欢完全独立运作，哪些人则喜欢偶尔汇报一下情况等等。

But that is no reason to take a talent that’s now running a business very successfully and building value and to have them sit in an office next to me and have us chew over the day’s events.

但这并不是让一个现在非常成功地经营着业务并创造价值的人坐在我旁边的办公室里，和我一起讨论日常事务的理由。

I mean, Charlie and I worked together now for decades. And I’ve learned a lot from Charlie. But I haven’t done it by, you know, having him sit next door and have hourly meetings or anything of the sort.

我的意思是，查理和我已经一起工作了几十年。我从查理身上学到了很多。但我并不是通过让他坐在隔壁，每小时开会或类似的方式来做到这一点的。

What do you think, Charlie?

你怎么看，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think, averaged out, you’re more likely to be qualified to be a CEO by running a subsidiary with an enormous amount of discretion than you are to being around headquarters watching somebody else do it his way.

查理·芒格：我认为，综合来看，通过管理一个拥有大量自主权的子公司，你更有可能具备成为首席执行官的资格，而不是在总部，按照别人的方式观察别人经营。

A lot of the models that have worked well in the world, like Johnson & Johnson, are quite Berkshire-like, in that they’re decentralized and they let these people pop up from the subsidiaries. They don’t try and just create CEOs in a hothouse in headquarters.

许多在世界上运作良好的模型，比如强生公司，都是相当类似于伯克希尔的，因为它们是分散的，并且让这些人从子公司中崭露头角。它们并不试图在总部的温室中培养首席执行官。

WARREN BUFFETT: We have an unusual situation at Berkshire that most of the people at the top, virtually all of them, are doing what they want to do. I mean, they like running their businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在伯克希尔有一个不寻常的情况，几乎所有高层人员都在做他们想做的事情。我的意思是，他们喜欢经营自己的业务。

That’s what they came in expecting to do. And that’s what they’re doing, and we’re letting them do it the way they like to do it.

他们就是抱着这个期望而来的。他们正在这样做，我们也让他们按照自己喜欢的方式去做。

And so we don’t have 50 people that all think they’re on some pyramid to get to the top. And Irving would like me to name — he’s talked to me about it. He would like to me name who it would be. But that could change in the future. It could create some possible —

因此，我们没有 50 个人都认为自己在某个金字塔上向上爬。欧文希望我能说出——他已经和我谈过这个问题。他希望我能说出接班人是谁。但这在未来可能会改变。它可能会带来一些可能的——

Well, we saw it at General Electric, I mean, when Jeff Immelt got appointed from among three, the other two left. And I don’t really see any advantage in having some crowned prince around. But Irving will keep writing me, I can promise you that. (Laughter)

好吧，我们在通用电气看到了这一点，我是说，当杰夫·伊梅尔特在三人中被任命时，其他两个人离开了。我真的看不出有任何好处让某个王子在身边。但欧文会继续给我写信，我可以向你保证这一点。（笑声）

15. Buffett’s business school: only two courses

巴菲特的商学院：只有两门课程

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. That’s a little loud, sorry. Hi. My name’s Sarah. And I’m from Omaha, Nebraska.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。声音有点大，抱歉。嗨，我叫萨拉。我来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。

I’d like to know if you could explain your strategies, namely value investing, in regards to cultivating the next generation of investors. How will you teach this young group?

我想知道您是否可以解释一下您的策略，即价值投资，关于培养下一代投资者。您将如何教导这一年轻群体？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I had 49 — mostly universities, a few colleges — that came to Omaha this year. We do them in clumps of six. And then the last one, we had an added university. So we had eight sessions, full-day sessions.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，今年有49所——大部分是大学，少数是学院——来到奥马哈。我们分批进行，每批六个。最后一批，我们又加了一所大学。所以我们有八个全天的课程。

And they asked me what — sometimes they asked me what I’d do if I was running a business school, teaching investments.

他们问我，如果我在经营一所商学院，教授投资，我会怎么做。

And I’d tell them I’d only have two courses. One would be how to value a business, and the second would be how to think about markets.

我会告诉他们我只会有两门课程。一门是如何评估一个企业，第二门是如何思考市场。

And there wouldn’t be anything about modern portfolio theory or beta or efficient markets or anything like that. We’d get rid of that in the first 10 minutes. The —

而且不会有关于现代投资组合理论、贝塔、有效市场或类似内容的任何东西。我们会在前 10 分钟内把这些都去掉。

But if you know how to value a business — and you don’t have to know how to value all businesses. On the New York Stock Exchange, I don’t know, there’s 4- or 5,000, probably, businesses and a whole lot more on NASDAQ.

但如果你知道如何评估一家企业——而且你不需要知道如何评估所有企业。在纽约证券交易所，我不知道，大概有四千或五千家公司，在纳斯达克还有更多。

You don’t have to be right on 4,000 or 5,000. You don’t have to be right on 400. You don’t have to be right on 40.

你不必在 4000 或 5000 上正确。你不必在 400 上正确。你不必在 40 上正确。

You just have to stay within the circle of competence, the things that you can understand. And look for things that are selling for less than they’re worth, of the ones you can value.

你只需在自己的能力范围内活动，也就是你能理解的事物。并寻找那些售价低于其实际价值的东西，前提是你能对其进行评估。

And you can start out with a fairly small circle of competence and learn more about businesses as you go along.

你可以从一个相对较小的能力范围开始，随着时间的推移，逐渐了解更多的商业知识。

But you’ll learn that there are a whole bunch of them that simply don’t lend themselves to valuations and you forget about those.

但你会发现，有很多东西根本不适合估值，你会忘记那些。

And I think if — accounting helps you in that, you need to understand accounting to know the language of business, but accounting also has enormous limitations. And you have to learn enough to know what accounting is meaningful and when you have to ignore certain aspects of accounting.

我认为，如果会计在这方面对你有帮助，你需要理解会计以了解商业语言，但会计也有巨大的局限性。你必须学到足够的知识，以了解什么会计是有意义的，以及何时需要忽略会计的某些方面。

You have to understand when competitive advantages are durable and when they’re fleeting.

你必须理解竞争优势何时是持久的，何时是短暂的。

I mean, you have to learn the difference between a hula hoop company, you know, and Coca-Cola. But that isn’t too hard to do.

我意思是，你必须学会区分一个呼啦圈公司和可口可乐。但这并不难。

And then you have to know how to think about market fluctuations and really learn that the market is there to serve you rather than to instruct you.

然后你必须知道如何看待市场波动，真正学会市场是为了服务你，而不是来指导你。

And to a great extent, that is not a matter of IQ. If you have — if you’re in the investment business and you have a IQ of 150, sell 30 points to somebody else, ’cause you don’t need it.

在很大程度上，这并不是智商的问题。如果你在投资行业，智商是 150，那就把 30 分卖给别人，因为你不需要它。

I mean, it — (laughter) — you need to be reasonably intelligent. But you do not need to be a genius, you know. At all. In fact, it can hurt.

我的意思是，哈哈，你需要有一定的智力。但你不需要是天才，知道吗？根本不需要。实际上，这可能会有害。

But you do have to have an emotional stability. You have to have sort of an inner peace about your decisions. Because it is a game where you get subjected to minute-by-minute stimuli, where people are offering opinions all the time.

但你必须有情绪稳定。你必须有某种内心的平静来做出决策。因为这是一个你会受到分分秒秒的刺激的游戏，人们一直在提供意见。

You have to be able to think for yourself. And, I don’t know whether — I don’t know how much of that’s innate and how much can be taught.

你必须能够独立思考。我不知道这其中有多少是天生的，有多少是可以教的。

But if you have that quality, you’ll do very well in investing if you spend some time at it. Learn something about valuing businesses.

但如果你具备这种素质，花一些时间去投资会做得很好。了解一些关于评估企业的知识。

It’s not a complicated game. As I say — said many times — it’s simple, but not easy.

这不是一个复杂的游戏。正如我多次所说的——它很简单，但并不容易。

It is not a complicated game. You don’t have to understand higher math. You don’t — you know, you don’t have to understand law. There’s all kinds of things that you don’t have to be good at. There’s all kinds of jobs in this world that are much tougher.

这不是一个复杂的游戏。你不需要理解高等数学。你不——你知道，你不需要理解法律。还有很多事情你不需要擅长。这个世界上有很多工作要困难得多。

But you do have to have sort of an emotional stability that will take you through almost anything. And then you’ll make good investment decisions over time.

但你必须有某种情绪稳定，这将带你度过几乎任何事情。然后，随着时间的推移，你会做出良好的投资决策。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you do have the basic problem that exactly half of the future investors of the world are going to be in the bottom 50 percent.

查理·芒格：是的，你确实面临一个基本问题，未来世界的投资者中恰好有一半将处于底部 50%。

In other words — (laughter) — you’re always going to have more skill at the top than you have at the bottom. And you’re never going to be able to homogenize the investment expertise of the world.

换句话说——（笑声）——你总会在顶层拥有比底层更多的技能。你永远无法使世界上的投资专业知识达到同质化。

There is so much that’s false and nutty in modern investment practice, and in modern investment banking, and in modern academia in the business schools, even in the Economics departments, that if you just reduce the nonsense, that’s all I think you should reasonably hope for.

现代投资实践、现代投资银行业务，甚至在商学院的经济学系中，有太多的错误和荒谬的东西，如果你只是减少那些无稽之谈，那就是我认为你可以合理期望的。

噪音。

WARREN BUFFETT: Beyond a certain basic level, though, of skill, wouldn’t you say your emotional make-up’s more important than the — than some super high degree of skill?

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，在某种基本技能水平以上，你不会说你的心理状态比某种超高技能更重要吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely. And if you think your talent — if you think your IQ is 160 and it’s 150, you’re a disaster. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：绝对如此。如果你认为你的才能——如果你认为你的智商是 160，而实际上是 150，那你就是个灾难。（笑声）

You know, much better a guy with a 130 that’s operating well within himself.

你知道，一个智商130的人，能很好地自我运作，要好得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: I get to see the students that come by. I loved a fellow from the University of Chicago, one of the students. And the first question that was asked of me was, “What are we learning that’s most wrong?” That’s the kind of — I mean, I wish they’d ask that sort of thing of the panel here.

沃伦·巴菲特：我能见到来访的学生。我很喜欢一位来自芝加哥大学的学生。第一个问我的问题是：“我们学到的最错误的是什么？”这就是我想要的——我希望他们能在这里的讨论小组中问这样的问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: How do you handle that in one session?

查理·芒格：你如何在一次会议中处理这个？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

But it was holy writ 25 years ago, efficient market theory. You know, I never understood how you could even teach it.

但25年前，这可是圣经般的内容，有效市场理论。你知道，我从未理解过你怎么能教它。

I mean, if you walked in in the first five minutes, you said to the students, “Everything is priced properly,” I mean, how do you kill the rest of the hour?

我的意思是，如果你在前五分钟走进来，对学生们说：“一切定价都很合理，”那么接下来的一个小时你该怎么继续呢？

But — (Laughter) — they did it. And they got Ph.D.s for doing it well. You know, and the more Greek symbols they could work into their, you know, their writings, you know, the more they were revered.

但是——（笑）——他们做到了。而且他们因为做得好而获得了博士学位。你知道，他们在自己的著作中融入的希腊符号越多，他们就越受到尊敬。

It’s astounding to me and I — that may have even given me a jaundiced view of academia generally — is the degree to which ideas that are nutty take hold and get propagated.

让我感到震惊的是——这甚至可能让我对学术界产生了偏见——那些疯狂的想法竟然能够如此深入人心并被传播。

And then I read a quote the other day that may have partially explained it. Max Planck was talking, the famous physicist.

然后我前几天读到一句话，可能部分解释了这个问题。著名物理学家马克斯·普朗克在谈论。

Max Planck was talking about the resistance of the human mind, even the bright human mind, to new ideas. And particularly the ones that had been developed carefully over many years, and were blessed by others of stature, and so on.

马克斯·普朗克谈到了人类思维，甚至是聪明的人类思维，对新思想的抵抗。特别是那些经过多年精心发展，并得到其他有声望的人认可的思想。

And he said, “Science advances one funeral at a time.” And I think there’s a lot of truth to that. Certainly been true in the world of finance.

他说，“科学是一次一个葬礼地进步的。”我认为这句话有很多真理。在金融界，这一点尤其真实。

16. Ajit Jain’s successor won’t have the same broad authority

Ajit Jain 的继任者将不会拥有同样广泛的权力

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. We have a succession question. However, this one has a twist, coming from Ben Knoll.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的。我们有一个继任问题。不过，这个问题有点不同，来自本·诺尔。

“You famously said, quote, ‘You should invest in businesses that a fool can run, because someday a fool will.’ (Laughter)

“你曾著名地说过，‘你应该投资于那些傻瓜也能经营的企业，因为总有一天傻瓜会来经营。’（笑声）”

“Given your reinsurance company’s capacity and inclination for big financial bets, can you provide us more reassurance about the risk once Ajit is gone?

“考虑到贵再保险公司的能力和对大额金融投资的倾向，您能否在阿吉特离开后为我们提供更多关于风险的保障？”

“Do you have a succession plan for him?”

“你有他的接班计划吗？”

Ben says, “The Titanic-like ending at AIG, once Greenberg was gone, has me spooked.”

本说：“格林伯格一走，AIG 就像泰坦尼克号一样的结局让我感到害怕。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say that it would be impossible to replace Ajit. And we wouldn’t try. And, therefore, we wouldn’t give the latitude, in terms of size of risk or that sort of thing, that we give to Ajit.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会说替代Ajit是不可能的，我们也不会尝试。因此，我们不会给予Ajit那样的权力，比如风险规模之类的。

No, we’ve got a unique talent, in my view there, and I think in Charlie’s. And so, when you get somebody like that, you give enormous authority to them after you firmly establish in your mind that that’s who you’re dealing with.

不，我们在那里有独特的人才，我认为查理也是如此。所以，当你拥有这样的人时，你会给予他们巨大的权力，同时在内心深处确立你正在处理的就是这样的人。

But that doesn’t mean that the authority goes with the position. The authority goes with the individual. And we would not — giving your pen away in insurance, as they say, is extraordinary dangerous.

但这并不意味着权力与职位相连。权力与个人相连。我们不会——正如他们所说，随意给予你的保险业务权限是极其危险的。

And we have in this town, we have Mutual of Omaha, which in the 1980s, had been built up carefully over, probably, 75 years by that time, and become the largest health and accident association in the world, I believe.

在这个城市，我们有Mutual of Omaha，它在 1980 年代时，经过大约 75 年的精心发展，成为了世界上最大的健康和意外协会，我相信。

And they got the idea that they should be writing property-casualty reinsurance. So they gave a pen to somebody within the place. And probably nobody had even heard the guy’s name, you know.

他们得出了一个想法，认为他们应该写财产意外再保险。所以他们给了一个人一支笔。可能没有人听说过这个人的名字，你知道的。

And in just signing a few contracts, they lost half their net worth in a very short period of time. And they were worried that they might have lost more than that.

仅仅签署了几份合同，他们在很短的时间内就失去了半数的净资产。他们担心自己可能损失更多。

So you can do enormous damage in the insurance business with a pen. And you’d better — have to be very careful about who you give your pen to. And we’ve given our pen to Ajit in a way that we wouldn’t give it to anyone else.

所以你可以在保险行业用一支笔造成巨大的损失。你最好——必须非常小心你把笔给谁。我们把我们的笔交给了 Ajit，以一种我们不会给其他任何人的方式。

Now, it just so happens that I enjoy hearing about the kind of things he does. So we talk daily. But we don’t talk daily because he needs my approval on anything. We talk daily because I find it very interesting.

现在，恰好我喜欢听他做的事情。所以我们每天都聊。但我们每天聊并不是因为他需要我对任何事情的认可。我们每天聊是因为我觉得这非常有趣。

When he says, “How much should we charge to insure Mike Tyson’s life for a couple of years?” I mean, that’s the kind of thing I can get kind of interested in. I — (Laughter)

当他说：“我们应该向Mike Tyson的生命保险收取多少费用，持续几年？”我的意思是，这是我会感兴趣的事情。我——（笑声）

I asked him whether there was an exclusion in case he got shot by a woman that felt unhappy about her treatment or something, but —

我问他，是否有一个除外条款，如果他被一个对他的待遇不满意的女人射杀了，等等，但——

And it makes a difference in the price, but —

这会影响价格，但——

I enjoy that sort of thing. But I’m not needed. And Ajit is needed. And we won’t find a substitute for him. And you know, there’s some things that have to be faced that way.

我喜欢那种事情。但我并不被需要。而阿吉特是被需要的。我们找不到他的替代品。你知道，有些事情必须以那种方式面对。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. What that quotation indicates is sometimes, stated differently, you say if it won’t stand a little mismanagement it’s not much of a business. Of course, you prefer a business that will prosper pretty well, even if it’s not managed very well.

查理·芒格：是的。这句话的意思是，有时，换句话说，你说如果一个企业不能承受一点点管理不善，那它就不是一个好的企业。当然，你更喜欢一个即使管理得不太好也能相当繁荣的企业。

But that doesn’t mean you don’t like even better when you get such a business that’s managed magnificently. And both factors are quite important.

但这并不意味着你不喜欢拥有一个管理出色的企业。这两个因素都很重要。

We’re not looking for mismanagement. We like the capacity to stand it, if we stumble into it. But we’re not looking for it.

我们并不寻求管理不善。如果我们偶然遇到这种情况，我们有能力应对。但我们并不在寻找它。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will not do things that we think are — we will not assign tasks to people that we think are beyond their capabilities. And it just so happens that Ajit has enormous capabilities.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不会做那些我们认为——我们不会分配那些超出他们能力的任务给人。而恰好Ajit拥有巨大的能力。

So he gets assigned some very unusual things. But you don’t see that prevailing throughout our insurance operation. And our managers don’t expect to operate that way.

所以他被分配了一些非常不寻常的事情。但你不会看到这种情况在我们的保险业务中普遍存在。我们的经理们也不期望以那种方式运作。

That’s a one-off situation with Ajit. And he’s in good health. And, you know, we send him all the Cherry Coke or fudge that he wants. (Laughter)

这是Ajit的一次性情况。他身体健康。你知道，我们给他所有他想要的Cherry Coke或软糖。（笑声）

17. Berkshire was “cheaper” at the end of 2008

2008 年底，伯克希尔的价格“更便宜”了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area 6. I recommend this fudge, incidentally. It’s terrific. I’m having a good time. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第 6 区。顺便说一下，我推荐这个软糖。太棒了。我玩得很开心。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Steve Fulton (PH) from Louisville, Kentucky. I gave up box tickets to the Kentucky Derby this afternoon to come out and ask you this question. Thank you for this opportunity.

观众成员：早上好。我是来自肯塔基州路易斯维尔的史蒂夫·富尔顿。我放弃了今天下午的肯塔基德比的包厢票，来这里问您这个问题。感谢您给我这个机会。

My question relates to how you view, or what your view is of the market’s valuation of Berkshire’s shares.

我的问题与您如何看待市场对伯克希尔股票的估值有关。

You commonly comment that Berkshire has two primary components of value: the investments that they own — the stocks, the bonds, and similar — and the earnings from the non-insurance operating companies that you’ve got.

你常常评论伯克希尔的价值主要由两个组成部分构成：他们拥有的投资——股票、债券及类似的投资——以及来自你所拥有的非保险运营公司的收益。

And when you compare 2007 to 2008, the investments were down about 13 percent. And the earnings were down about 4 percent. But the value that the market was placing on the shares was down about 31 percent. And I was curious as to your comments on that valuation.

当你将 2007 年与 2008 年进行比较时，投资下降了大约 13%。收益下降了大约 4%。但市场对股票的估值下降了大约 31%。我对你对这种估值的看法很感兴趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I think you put your finger on something.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为你说到了关键点。

We do think that the — we think, obviously, the investments are worth what they’re carried for, or we wouldn’t own them.

我们确实认为——我们显然认为，这些投资的价值与它们的账面价值相符，否则我们就不会拥有它们。

In fact, we think they’re worth more money than they’re carried for at any given time because we think, on balance, they’re underpriced. So we have no problem with that number.

事实上，我们认为它们的价值超过了任何时候的市场价格，因为我们认为，从整体上看，它们被低估了。因此，我们对这个数字没有问题。

We define our earning power — we leave out insurance underwriting profit or loss, on the theory that insurance is — if it breaks even — will give us float, which we will invest. And on balance, I actually think that insurance probably will produce some underwriting profit. So I think we even understate it a little bit in that respect.

我们定义我们的盈利能力——我们不考虑保险承保的利润或损失，基于这样的理论：保险如果持平，就会给我们带来浮存金，我们会进行投资。总体而言，我实际上认为保险可能会产生一些承保利润。因此，我认为在这方面我们甚至有些低估了它。

贴着生存的边缘很难赚到钱，特别是长期，经不起市场的波动。

But we think the earning power of those businesses was not as good last year as normal. It won’t be as good this year as normal.

但我们认为这些企业去年的盈利能力不如正常情况。今年的盈利能力也不会像正常情况那样好。

But we think those are pretty good businesses overall. A few of them have got problems. And — but most of them will do well. And I think a few of them will do sensationally.

但我们认为这些整体上都是不错的业务。其中一些存在问题，但大多数会表现良好。我认为其中一些会表现得非常出色。

So, I think it’s perfectly reasonable to look at Berkshire as the sum of two parts. A lot of liquid marketable securities — or maybe not so liquid, but at least fairly priced, or maybe even undervalued, securities — and a lot of earning power, which we are going to try and increase over time.

所以，我认为将伯克希尔视为两个部分的总和是完全合理的。很多流动的可交易证券——或者可能不是那么流动，但至少是合理定价的，或者甚至是被低估的证券——以及很多盈利能力，我们将努力随着时间的推移来提高。

And if you look at it that way, you would come to the conclusion that Berkshire was cheaper in relation to its intrinsic value at the end of 2008 than it was at the end of 2007. But you would also come to the conclusion that was true of most securities. In other words, the whole level of securities.

如果你从这个角度看，你会得出结论，伯克希尔在 2008 年底相对于其内在价值来说比 2007 年底更便宜。但你也会得出结论，这对大多数证券来说也是如此。换句话说，整个证券市场的水平。

And every stock is affected by what every other stock sells for. I mean, if the value of ABC stock goes down, XYZ, absent any other variables, but XYZ is worth less.

每只股票都受到其他股票售价的影响。我的意思是，如果 ABC 股票的价值下降，那么 XYZ 股票在没有其他变量的情况下，其价值也会降低。

If you can buy stocks at eight times earnings, good companies, you know, or nine times earnings, you know, they — it reduces the value of Berkshire, as opposed to when stocks were selling, well, at 18 or 20 times earnings. I’m pulling those numbers out of the air.

如果你能以每股收益 8 倍或 9 倍的价格买入优质公司的股票,这会降低伯克希尔的价值,相比之下,当股票以每股收益 18 倍或 20 倍的价格出售时,情况就不同了。这些数字都是我随意说的。

But everything is affected by everything else in the financial world.

但金融世界中的一切都受到其他一切的影响。

When you say a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, you’re comparing it — you’ve got to compare that to every other bush that’s available.

手中的鸟胜过 bush 中的两只鸟，这句话的意思是你在进行比较——你必须将其与所有其他可用的机会进行比较。

So, you’re correct that Berkshire was cheaper in relation to intrinsic value at the end of 2008, than 2007, at least in my opinion.

所以，在我看来，伯克希尔在 2008 年底相对于内在价值来说比 2007 年便宜。

And that that those two variables will count. We’ll report them to you regularly. And over time, we would hope that both increase.

这两个变量将会被计算在内。我们会定期向您报告它们。随着时间的推移，我们希望这两个变量都能增加。

And we particularly hope the operating earnings aspect increases, because that’s our major focus. We would like to move money into good operating businesses over time and build that number a lot.

我们特别希望运营收益方面有所增加，因为这是我们的主要关注点。我们希望随着时间的推移，将资金投入到良好的运营业务中，并大幅提升这个数字。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that last year was a bad year for a float business. It was naturally going to make the owner of the float appear, briefly, to be at a disadvantage.

查理·芒格：我认为去年对浮存金来说是个糟糕的一年。这自然会使浮存金的拥有者在短时间内看起来处于不利地位。

But long-term, having a large float, which you’re getting at a cost of less than zero, is going to be a big advantage. And I wouldn’t get too excited about the fact that the stock goes down.

但从长远来看，拥有一个大规模的浮存金，而你以低于零的成本获得它，将是一个很大的优势。我不会对股票下跌这一事实过于兴奋。

I happen to know that there was one buyer there who rather inartistically bought about 10,000 shares when Berkshire was driven to its absolute peak. And how much significance does that have in the big scheme of things over the long term?

我恰好知道那里有一个买家在伯克希尔达到绝对高峰时，以相当不艺术的方式购买了大约 10,000 股。这在长期的大局中有多大的意义呢？

What matters are things like this: our casualty insurance business is probably the best big casualty business in the world — our utility subsidiary, well, if there’s a better one, I don’t know it — and if I had to bet on one carbide cutting tool business in the world, I’d bet on ISCAR against any other comer.

重要的是这样的事情：我们的意外保险业务可能是世界上最好的大型意外保险业务——我们的公用事业子公司，如果有更好的我也不知道——如果我必须押注全球一家碳化物切割工具公司，我会押注ISCAR，而不是任何其他竞争者。

And I could go down the list a long way. I think those things are going to matter greatly over the long term. And if you think that it’s easy to get in that kind of a position, the kind of position that Berkshire occupies, you are living in a different world from the one I inhabit. (Applause)

我可以列出很多这样的例子。我认为这些事情在长期内会非常重要。如果你认为进入像伯克希尔这样的位置很容易，那么你生活的世界与我所处的世界是不同的。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, our insurance business now, it is a remarkable business. And it’s got some remarkable managers.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们的保险业务现在是一项了不起的业务。它有一些了不起的管理者。

18. How GEICO benefited from the financial crisis

GEICO 如何从金融危机中受益

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s one interesting thing that’s happened. In September, when we had a financial meltdown and, really, almost the ultimate — it was almost the China Syndrome-type thing — Americans started behaving differently.

沃伦·巴菲特：发生了一件有趣的事情。在九月份，当我们经历金融崩溃时，实际上几乎达到了极限——这几乎是中国综合症那种情况——美国人的行为开始发生变化。

Probably people around the world, but I certainly know in terms of our businesses, it was like a bell had been rung. And one manifestation of it was kind of interesting.

可能是世界各地的人，但我确实知道就我们的业务而言，就像敲响了一个钟。而其中一个表现形式相当有趣。

Whereas it hurt very much our jewelry business, our carpet business, it hurt NetJets, it hurt all the businesses. Hurt American Express, for example. You know, the average ticket went down almost 10 percent.

这对我们的珠宝业务、地毯业务造成了很大伤害，对 NetJets 也造成了伤害，所有业务都受到了影响。例如，美国运通也受到了影响。你知道，平均票价下降了近 10%。

I mean, it just was like that, that people’s behavior changed. But one of the things it did, was it also caused the phones to start ringing even more at GEICO.

我的意思是，情况就是这样，人们的行为发生了变化。但它造成的其中一件事是，GEICO 的电话铃声也开始更加频繁地响起。

And we didn’t change our advertising, particularly. Our price advantage, relative to other companies, didn’t change that much. But all of a sudden, just — it was remarkable. Thousands and thousands and thousands of more people came to our website or phoned us every week.

而我们并没有特别改变我们的广告。相对于其他公司，我们的价格优势并没有太大变化。但突然之间，真是令人惊讶。每周有成千上万的人访问我们的网站或给我们打电话。

So, it — all of a sudden, saving $100 or $150 or whatever it might be, became important. Not only the people who were watching our ads that day, but just with the people that it was lurking in the back of their minds. They went to geico.com.

所以，突然之间，节省 100 美元或 150 美元或其他任何金额变得重要。不仅是那些当天观看我们广告的人，还有那些在心里潜意识里想着的人。他们去了 geico.com。

So in the first four months of this year — last year, we added about 665,000 policy holders. That’s a lot of people. It made us, by far, the fastest growing auto insurer among the big companies.

因此，在今年的前四个月——去年，我们增加了大约 665,000 名保单持有者。这是很多人。这使我们成为大公司中增长最快的汽车保险公司。

First four months of this year, we’ve added 505,000 in four months. It’s the behavioral changes. And that franchise, that competitive advantage, has been built up over decades.

今年前四个月，我们增加了 505,000 人。这是行为变化的结果。而这个特许经营，这种竞争优势，是经过数十年建立起来的。

And Tony Nicely has nurtured it like nobody else could, just day after day, office after office, associate after associate. But then it just pays off huge when the time comes.

托尼·尼克利以无人能及的方式精心培育着它，日复一日，办公室接着办公室，合伙人接着合伙人。但当时机来临时，这一切就会带来巨大的回报。

Because we can — we are the low-cost producer among big auto insurance companies. That means we can offer the best value. And now people are value conscious.

因为我们可以——我们是大型汽车保险公司中成本最低的生产者。这意味着我们可以提供最佳价值。而现在人们对价值非常关注。

So these things are going on all the time with our subsidiaries, with those managers. And it’s — it builds a lot of value over time.

这些事情一直在我们的子公司和那些经理之间发生。这会随着时间的推移积累很多价值。

I mean, every GEICO policy holder is a real asset to the company. I could give you an estimated value. But I don’t think it’d necessarily be smart. But they’re worth real money.

我意思是，每个 GEICO 的保单持有者对公司来说都是一个真正的资产。我可以给你一个估计的价值。但我认为这不一定明智。但他们确实值钱。

And, we are now the third largest auto insurer in the country. I think we’ll end up the year maybe at 8 1/2 percent of the market.

而且，我们现在是全国第三大汽车保险公司。我认为我们年底时的市场份额可能会达到 8.5%。

And it was 2 and a small fraction percent back in 1993 when Tony took charge of the business. And the fundamentals are in place — (applause) — to take us much higher.

1993 年，当托尼接管业务时，增长率为 2%和一个小的百分比。基本面已经到位——（掌声）——可以让我们更进一步。

19. 2008 was tough, but still no plans for dividend

2008 年很艰难，但仍然没有分红计划。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Quietly) Can you reach that peanut brittle?

查理·芒格：（轻声）你能拿到那个花生糖吗？

CAROL LOOMIS: I promise you, this question did not come from Susan Lucci. However, it does concern dividend policy. It came from Peter Sargent of Yardley, Pennsylvania.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：我向你保证，这个问题不是来自苏珊·卢奇。然而，它确实与股息政策有关。这个问题来自宾夕法尼亚州雅德利的彼得·萨金特。

And to ask that, he quotes from principle number 9 of the “Owner’s Manual.” And Warren wrote there, quote:

并且为了问这个，他引用了《业主手册》第 9 条原则。沃伦在那儿写道，引用：

“We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention over time delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met.” Now, this was written some time ago.

“我们认为高尚的意图应该定期与结果进行对比。我们通过评估保留收益是否随着时间的推移为股东带来每保留 1 美元至少 1 美元的市场价值来检验保留收益的智慧。到目前为止，这一测试已经达成。”这段话是很久以前写的。

“We will continue to apply it on a 5-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.”

“我们将继续以五年滚动的方式应用它。随着我们的净资产增长，明智地使用留存收益变得更加困难。”

So I’m now quoting the questioner here:

所以我现在引用提问者的话：

“The recent annual report made me think about the performance of both the company and the stock price. Berkshire seems to have done quite well in the past few years. But the stock price seems to have not quite kept pace.

最近的年度报告让我思考了公司和股价的表现。伯克希尔在过去几年似乎表现得相当不错。但股价似乎没有跟上。

“So I looked at the last five years of earnings per share. They’re on page 26 of the annual report. And they add up, in total, to $29,207.

“所以我查看了过去五年的每股收益。它们在年报的第 26 页上。总共加起来是 29,207 美元。”

“As you probably know, the closing price of Berkshire on December 31st, 2008 was 84,250. If you add the 29,207 per share of retained earnings to this, you come up with a, quote, ‘minimum market value of 113,457.’

“正如你可能知道的，2008 年 12 月 31 日，伯克希尔的收盘价为 84,250。如果你将每股 29,207 的留存收益加到这个数字上，你就得出了一个，引用，‘最低市场价值为 113,457’。”

“Since Berkshire closed on 12/31/2008 at 96,600” — oh, wait, I have read something wrong here.

“由于伯克希尔在 2008 年 12 月 31 日以 96,600 收盘”——哦，等等，我在这里读错了什么。

“The closing price of Berkshire on 12/31/2003 was 84,250.

“伯克希尔在 2003 年 12 月 31 日的收盘价为 84,250。”

“And since Berkshire closed on 12/31/2008 at 96,600, and it’s been lower than that since, and is now around that now, it would seem that the market value has not increased for each $1 retained.

“由于伯克希尔在 2008 年 12 月 31 日的收盘价为 96,600，并且自那时以来一直低于该价格，现在大约在这个水平，因此似乎每保留 1 美元的市场价值并没有增加。”

“Assuming my analysis is correct, it raises the question of whether or not Berkshire will pay a dividend in the coming year or not.”

“假设我的分析是正确的，这就引出了一个问题，即伯克希尔在来年是否会支付股息。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll now have a short quiz on that program — (laughter) — on the question.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我们现在将对那个项目进行一个简短的测验——（笑声）——关于这个问题。

The earnings, incidentally, of the 5-year period would include gains from things that were listed in unrealized appreciation at the end of the period.

顺便提一下，五年期间的收益将包括在期末未实现增值中列出的收益。

In other words, some of those were actually built into the asset value at the time, but then become realized.

换句话说，其中一些实际上在当时已经计入资产价值，但随后变得显现。

But the truth is if you take all of the money we earned in the five years, and the stocks, bonds, businesses purchased, and you sold them for cash on December 31st, 2008, we would not have — we would’ve had a loss on that, I mean, under the conditions that existed on December 31st, 2008.

但事实是，如果你把我们在五年内赚的所有钱，以及购买的股票、债券和企业，全部在 2008 年 12 月 31 日出售换成现金，我们将会——在 2008 年 12 月 31 日的情况下，我们会亏损。

I think that’s probably true of almost all capital programs that were (inaudible) — if you really measured it by what you could’ve sold, the businesses we bought — we love those businesses.

我认为这可能适用于几乎所有的资本项目——如果你真的用你本可以出售的东西来衡量，我们购买的那些业务——我们喜欢这些业务。

But there was no market to speak of for many businesses at that time. And security values were down significantly.

但当时许多企业几乎没有市场可言。而且证券价值大幅下跌。

So I would say that he’s absolutely right, that measured on the value on December 31st, 2008, that the reinvested earnings had not produced a dollar market value at that particular market point.

所以我想说他绝对是对的，按照 2008 年 12 月 31 日的价值来看，重新投资的收益在那个特定的市场点并没有产生一美元的市场价值。

Now, I would say this, that we also say we measure our business performance against the S&P. And we use book value as a conservative proxy for intrinsic business value.

现在，我想说的是，我们也说我们将业务表现与标准普尔指数进行比较。我们使用账面价值作为内在商业价值的保守代理。

We think intrinsic business value is higher, but we use that as a proxy. And we’ve done that consistently throughout the history of Berkshire.

我们认为内在商业价值更高，但我们将其作为一个代理。我们在伯克希尔的历史中始终如一地这样做。

And during that 5-year period — or during any — we’ve never had a 5-year period when we’ve under-performed the S&P, in terms of the — what I would call the intrinsic value measure of Berkshire.

在那五年期间——或者在任何期间——我们从未有过一个五年期间在内在价值衡量上表现不及标准普尔 500 指数。

And, as I said a few years ago, it’s — as we get larger, it’s much harder to do that, and we’ll settle for a couple of points better.

而且，正如我几年前所说的，随着我们规模的扩大，这变得更加困难，我们将满足于提高几个百分点。

But so far, that test has been made — been met. And it’s been met while we reinvested all earnings.

但到目前为止，这一测试已经完成。并且在我们将所有收益再投资的同时完成了这一测试。

So I think that we still have got the burden of — we still should have to prove by the fact that Berkshire will sell above the earnings we’ve retained. Berkshire sells above it — every dollar that’s been retained at Berkshire translates even today into more than a dollar of market value.

所以我认为我们仍然有责任——我们仍然应该通过伯克希尔以高于我们留存的收益来证明自己。伯克希尔的每一美元留存收益，即使在今天，也转化为超过一美元的市场价值。

But I would certainly say that if you took the five years and just sold all the things we bought during that period at that price, that there would be a loss.

但我肯定会说，如果你拿五年时间，把我们在那期间购买的所有东西按那个价格全部卖出，那会亏损。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don’t get too excited about these oddball things that happen once every 50 years.

查理·芒格：是的，我对这些每 50 年才发生一次的奇怪事情并不太兴奋。

If you’re reasonably prepared for them and you’re dented a little on the bottom tick, and other people are suffering a lot more, and unusual opportunities are coming to you that you don’t see under other conditions, I don’t think we deserve any salt tears.

如果你对此有合理的准备，并且在最低点略有受损，而其他人遭受更大的痛苦，并且出现了你在其他条件下看不到的非凡机会，我认为我们不值得流泪。

20. Wells Fargo’s stock price plunge shouldn’t spark selling

富国银行的股价暴跌不应引发抛售

CHARLIE MUNGER: Take Wells Fargo. I think Wells Fargo’s going to come out of this mess way stronger. The fact that the stock at the bottom tick scared a lot of people, I think will prove to be a very temporary phenomenon.

查理·芒格：以富国银行为例。我认为富国银行会在这场混乱中变得更强大。股票在最低点时让很多人感到恐慌，我认为这将被证明是一个非常短暂的现象。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Wells Fargo got down below — actually, ticked below $9 a share at a time when spreads on business were never better, when depositing flows were never better, when their advantage in relation of costs of funds versus other large banks had never been better.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。富国银行的股价一度跌破每股 9 美元，而此时商业利差从未如此之好，存款流入从未如此之好，他们在资金成本方面相对于其他大型银行的优势也从未如此之好。

But you know, in a market that was terrified, it — literally, I had a class meeting that day, and it was the only time any of those classes have ever got me to name a stock. But they actually pushed me.

但你知道，在一个感到恐慌的市场中，那天我有一个培训会议，这是我唯一一次在那些课堂上被要求说出一只股票。但他们确实逼我这样做。

And somebody there with a BlackBerry, or whatever those instruments are that they carry around these days, checked the price and it was below $9. And I said, if I had to put all my net worth in one stock, that would’ve been the stock.

有人在那里用黑莓手机，或者现在人们随身携带的那些设备，查了价格，发现低于 9 美元。我说，如果我必须把我的全部净资产投入一只股票，那就是这只股票。

The — their business is — you know, the business model is fabulous.

他们的生意是——你知道，商业模式非常棒。

And it, you know, when would you get a chance to buy something like Wachovia, which had the fourth largest deposit base in the United States, and bring that in? And then start getting the spread on assets versus liabilities that Wells gets and build the relationships they have. It’s a great business opportunity.

而且，你知道，什么时候你会有机会购买像 Wachovia 这样的东西，它在美国拥有第四大存款基础，并将其引入？然后开始获得与负债相比的资产利差，正如富国银行所做的那样，并建立他们所拥有的关系。这是一个很好的商业机会。

Wells Fargo will be better off — unless they have to issue a lot of shares, which they shouldn’t — Wells Fargo will be a lot better off a couple of years from now, than if none of this had happened.

富国银行将会更好——除非他们不得不发行大量股票，否则他们几年后会比这一切未发生时更好。

And I think that’s true of some of other businesses as well. But you — you know, you have to be prepared. You can’t let somebody else get you in a position where you have to sell out your position.

我认为其他一些企业也是如此。但是你——你知道，你必须做好准备。你不能让别人把你置于必须出售你持有的股份的境地。

Leverage is what causes people trouble in this world. So you don’t — you never want to be in a position where somebody can pull the rug out from under you. And you also never want to be emotionally in a position where you pull the rug out from under yourself.

杠杆是导致人们在这个世界上遇到麻烦的原因。因此，你永远不想处于一个别人可以让你失去支撑的境地。你也永远不想在情感上处于一个让自己失去支撑的境地。

自主意识跟环境和所处的位置有关。

I mean, you don’t want to have other people force you to sell and you don’t want to let your own fears or emotions to cause you to sell at the wrong time.

我的意思是，你不想让其他人强迫你出售，也不想让自己的恐惧或情绪导致你在错误的时间出售。

I mean, why anybody sells Wells Fargo at $9 a share when they owned it at $25 and the business is better off, is one of the strange things about the way markets behave. But people do it. And they get very affected by looking at prices.

我想，为什么有人在以每股 9 美元的价格出售富国银行，而他们曾以 25 美元的价格拥有它，并且业务状况更好，这就是市场行为的奇怪之处。但人们确实这样做了。他们会受到价格波动的很大影响。

If they own a farm like I do, you know, 30 miles from here, they don’t get a price on it every day. You know, they —

如果他们像我一样拥有一座农场，离这里 30 英里，他们并不会每天都知道它的价格。你知道，他们——

I bought that farm 25 years ago. And you look to the production of corn. You look to the production of soy beans and prices and cost of fertilizer and a few things. And you look to the asset itself to determine whether you made an intelligent investment. You have your expectations about what the asset will produce.

我在 25 年前买下了那块农场。你关注玉米的产量，关注大豆的产量、价格和化肥的成本，以及其他一些因素。你还关注资产本身，以判断你是否做出了明智的投资。你对资产将产生的收益有自己的预期。

But people in stocks tend to look at the price. So they let the price tell them how they should feel or — that’s kind of crazy in our view.

但股票中的人往往关注价格。因此，他们让价格告诉他们应该如何感受——在我们看来，这有点疯狂。

We think you should look at the business just like you’d look at the apartment house that you bought or the farm you want. They let the fact that a quote is available every day turn into a liability rather than an asset.

我们认为你应该像看待你购买的公寓或你想要的农场一样看待这个业务。他们让每天都有报价这一事实变成了负担，而不是资产。

And all I would say there is you better go back and read chapter 8 of “The Intelligent Investor,” where it tells you how to think about the market. And it will do you more good than learning what modern portfolio theory is all about.

我只想说，你最好回去读一下《聪明的投资者》第八章，里面告诉你如何看待市场。这对你来说比了解现代投资组合理论更有帮助。

21. Big stimulus spending bound to have some “slop”

大规模刺激支出必然会有一些“浪费”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第七个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jim Powers (PH). I’m from West Newton, Massachusetts. My question has to do with this stimulus bill by the federal government.

观众成员：我叫吉姆·鲍尔斯（PH）。我来自马萨诸塞州的西纽顿。我的问题与联邦政府的这项刺激法案有关。

I’ve read that only 8 percent of the money is intended to go to infrastructure. When you invest money, you normally look at the asset you’re getting for the money.

我读到只有 8%的资金是用于基础设施的。当你投资钱时，通常会考虑你为这笔钱获得的资产。

With the country going into so much debt, don’t you think it would be better if a great percentage of the money invested by the federal government go to solid assets, as it did during the Great Depression with the Tennessee Valley Authority, Hoover Dam, other facilities, that are still making money today, and paying back the original investment by the government many times over, while putting numerous people to work?

随着国家债务的增加，您不觉得如果联邦政府投资的大部分资金用于实物资产会更好吗？就像在大萧条时期的田纳西河谷管理局、胡佛大坝以及其他设施一样，这些设施至今仍在盈利，并且多次偿还了政府的原始投资，同时为许多人提供了就业机会

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me answer that one. Yes. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：让我来回答这个。是的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I would certainly agree. I mean the ’30s — a lot of really wonderful things were done with the money that was used to then to stimulate the economy. And that should be the goal and a model.

沃伦·巴菲特：我当然同意。我的意思是，30 年代——用来刺激经济的钱做了很多非常美好的事情。这应该是目标和榜样。

I can’t evaluate perfectly what the current stimulus bill will do. I know that I — I did get a notice the other day from the Social Security Administration telling me I’m getting $250 more. That ought to last me 6 or 7 months. (Laughter)

我无法准确评估当前的刺激法案会带来什么。我知道我——前几天收到了社会保障局的通知，告诉我我将多得到 250 美元。这应该能让我维持 6 到 7 个月。（笑声）

Charlie will make his last longer, I’m sure. (Laughter)

查理会让他的持续时间更长，我相信。（笑声）

But you know, that’s the stimulus that the Buffett household has received at the present time.

但你知道，这就是巴菲特家族目前所受到的刺激。

Obviously, you want to use the money as intelligently as possible.

显然，您希望尽可能聪明地使用这笔钱。

Obviously, also, anytime the federal government does anything on a massive scale — any time any big organization, a church or a business or anything, you know, throws all kinds of resources at something, usually there’s a fair amount of slop.

显然，每当联邦政府在大规模上做任何事情时——无论是任何大型组织、教会还是企业，或者其他任何东西，你知道的，当它们投入各种资源时，通常都会有相当多的马虎。

I think that the intent — but by the time it gets through Congress and everything, I can’t guarantee how the result comes out — but I think the intent is to get the money into action quickly and to end up having it utilized in intelligent ways.

我认为这个意图——但等它通过国会和其他程序时，我无法保证结果会如何——但我认为意图是迅速将资金投入使用，并最终以明智的方式加以利用。

But if the day after Pearl Harbor happened, you know, if you’d attached 5 or 6 thousand earmarks to the declaration of war, you know, it would not have been a pretty sight.

但是如果珍珠港事件发生后的第二天，你知道，如果你在宣战声明上附上五六千个特别标记，那场面就不会好看。

I mean, it — we have a system now where — that doesn’t seem to be perfectly effective, I would say, in detaching the interests of particular legislators away from the common goal.

我想说，我们现在有一个系统——我认为这个系统在将特定立法者的利益与共同目标分离方面似乎并不完全有效。

I mean, I get distressed when I look at what gets attached to some of these bills. And that certainly was a case in point. So I’ll go along with Charlie on the answer.

我意思是，当我看到一些法案附加的内容时，我感到很痛苦。这确实是一个例子。所以我会同意查理的回答。

But I think the intent of the administration is the right thing. When the American public pulls back like they have, government does need to step in.

但我认为政府的意图是正确的。当美国公众像现在这样退缩时，政府确实需要介入。

It will have consequences. We are doing things on a scale — we’re doing the conventional things, but we’re doing them in unconventional amounts.

这将会有后果。我们正在以一种规模进行事情——我们在做常规的事情，但我们以非常规的数量在做。

And we will see consequences from what we are doing now. I think we should be doing it. But I don’t think we should think it’s a free ride.

我们将看到我们现在所做的事情的后果。我认为我们应该这样做。但我认为我们不应该认为这是一次免费的机会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we have one big no-brainer on the list of infrastructure investments that can be made. And that is a hugely improved nationwide electricity grid. The chances that that won’t help us are zero.

查理·芒格：是的，我们在基础设施投资清单上有一个显而易见的项目。那就是大幅改善全国电网。它不会对我们有帮助的可能性为零。

And that, when it happens, will enormously benefit Berkshire’s utility subsidiary. But that isn’t the reason I’m raising it. I would be making this argument if we didn’t have a utilities subsidiary.

而当这发生时，将极大地惠及伯克希尔的公用事业子公司。但这并不是我提到它的原因。如果我们没有公用事业子公司，我也会提出这个论点。

WARREN BUFFETT: We might make it a little more strongly if we had the utilities subsidiary, however. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们有公用事业子公司，我们可能会更强烈一些。不过。（笑声）

22. Hard to compete with government-guaranteed debt

难以与政府担保的债务竞争

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Rita Addison (PH), who says, “How does Berkshire’s strong balance sheet and credit rating help take advantage of buying opportunities when even weak financial companies can now borrow more cheaply than Berkshire by using U.S. government guarantees of their debt?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自丽塔·阿迪森（PH），她说：“伯克希尔强大的资产负债表和信用评级如何帮助抓住购买机会，即使是弱势金融公司现在也可以通过利用美国政府对其债务的担保以比伯克希尔更便宜的价格借款？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, as I pointed out in the annual report, we are at a significant disadvantage in any financing-type business where we are competing against people who are getting their funding and their financing with a government guarantee.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，正如我在年报中指出的，我们在任何融资类业务中都处于显著劣势，因为我们与那些获得政府担保的资金和融资的人竞争。

Our raw material costs us a lot more money. And that’s particularly applicable at Clayton where we have 10- or $11 billion of, really, mortgage paper on mostly manufactured homes.

我们的原材料成本高得多。这在Clayton特别适用，我们有100亿或110亿美元的，实际上是主要用于制造房屋的抵押贷款。

And it’s exceptionally good quality portfolio. Kevin Clayton and the people at Clayton Homes have done a great job in terms of lending responsibly. Our borrowers have behaved very well.

这是一份质量极高的投资组合。凯文·克莱顿和克莱顿住宅公司的团队在负责任地放贷方面做得非常出色。我们的借款人表现得非常好。

But the raw material to fund that portfolio — money — costs us a whole lot more than some bank that’s in trouble.

但是，资助该投资组合的原材料——资金——对我们来说成本远高于一些陷入困境的银行。

And that’s a real problem for us. And it’s forcing us to try to come up with various other sources of funding that portfolio where, one way or another, we get people with government guarantees involved in the program.

这对我们来说是一个真正的问题。这迫使我们尝试寻找各种其他资金来源，以便在某种程度上让有政府担保的人参与到这个项目中。

That’s just a fact of life with us now. There are the blessed who have government guarantees. And there’re the ones that aren’t.

这就是我们现在生活中的一个事实。有些人是受到政府保障的幸运者，而有些人则不是。

And of course, you see that dramatically, in the case of some companies that have a government guarantee for part of their money and then sell other money — and then sell other bonds — that aren’t guaranteed.

当然，你会明显看到，一些公司部分资金有政府担保，然后卖出其他不受担保的资金——以及其他债券，这些都没有得到担保。

I mean, just the other day, as I remember, I may be wrong on this, but I think Goldman Sachs sold something with a 400 basis point spread that wasn’t guaranteed. Whereas their guaranteed paper would be hundreds of basis points underneath that.

我记得，就在前几天，我可能记错了，但我认为高盛出售了一些没有担保的产品，利差为 400 个基点。而他们的担保产品的利差会低几百个基点。

General Electric sold something earlier this year that wasn’t guaranteed. And the spread between the guaranteed and the un-guaranteed was huge.

通用电气在今年早些时候出售了一些没有保证的东西。而有保证和没有保证之间的差距非常大。

We don’t have anything guaranteed to sell, so we are not in that favored class in any way. And we can’t become a bank holding company. So as long as the situation goes on, we have to figure out ways that we adjust.

我们没有任何保证能出售的东西，因此我们并不属于那种受惠的类别。而且我们不能成为银行控股公司。因此，只要这种情况持续下去，我们就必须想办法进行调整。

We only really use borrowed money — we use it in our utility business. But other utilities are not in this favored class. I mean, the utility industry generally.

我们真正使用借来的钱——我们在我们的公用事业业务中使用它。但其他公用事业并不在这个受惠的类别中。我的意思是，公用事业行业通常是这样。

So our utility borrows money quite well, compared to most utilities. MidAmerican’s credit is regarded as very good.

所以我们的公用事业借钱的能力相对大多数公用事业来说非常好。MidAmerican 的信用被认为是非常好的。

And generally speaking, we’ve raised our money at a lower rate, which benefits our customers in the utility business.

一般来说，我们以较低的利率筹集资金，这对我们在公用事业的客户有利。

We don’t use much money in the rest of our businesses, except for the financing at Clayton. And we won’t use much money.

除了在Clayton的融资外，我们在其他业务中并没有使用太多的资金。而且我们也不会使用太多的资金。

So we get our money by float, basically. And our float is — it was $58 billion. I mentioned a little while ago, that Wells Fargo raises its money in the first quarter at, I think, 1.12 percent — 112 basis points — which is very cheap.

所以我们基本上是通过浮存金获得资金。我们的浮存金是——580 亿美元。我刚才提到，富国银行在第一季度以 1.12%的利率筹集资金——112 个基点——这非常便宜。

But our money’s cheaper. We can’t get as much of it as Wells does. But we do have 58 billion — in fact, we have more now — that you would think will cost us less than zero over time, although there will be given periods when we have a cost to it.

但我们的资金更便宜。我们无法像富国银行那样获得那么多。但我们确实有 580 亿——实际上，我们现在有更多——你会认为这随着时间的推移会让我们的成本控制在零以下，尽管在某些时期我们会有成本。

But we don’t have an answer for going head-to-head against a government-sponsored business that gets — can raise money with a government guarantee. We do not have a way of going head-to-head with them at any business, no matter how prudently we conduct our operations.

但我们没有办法与一个获得政府支持的企业正面竞争，因为它可以在政府担保下筹集资金。无论我们多么谨慎地进行运营，我们都无法在任何业务上与他们正面竞争。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course we’re at a funding disadvantage. But on the other hand, we aren’t regulated like a bank or a bank holding company.

查理·芒格：当然，我们在资金方面处于劣势。但另一方面，我们并不像银行或银行控股公司那样受到监管。

I think we’d be pretty ungrateful if we took this one disadvantage that has come to us and obsessed on it.

如果我们把这个给我们带来的一个劣势拿出来并对此过分关注，我认为我们会相当不知足。

WARREN BUFFETT: I get those kind of lectures all the time. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我经常收到这种类型的说教。（笑声）

23. Graham would probably agree with us on derivatives

格雷厄姆可能会同意我们关于衍生品的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第 8 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett. Hi, Mr. Munger. My name is Mary Kimble (PH) from New York City.

观众：嗨，巴菲特先生。嗨，芒格先生。我叫玛丽·金布尔，来自纽约市。

In getting back to basics, what do you think Ben Graham would have said about derivatives?

在回归基本面时，你认为本·格雷厄姆会对衍生品说些什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: He would not have liked them. I think he probably would’ve said pretty much what I said back in 2002, that they pose a real risk to the system.

沃伦·巴菲特：他不会喜欢他们。我想他可能会说出我在 2002 年所说的差不多的话，那就是他们对系统构成了真正的风险。

They cause leverage to run wild. They cause counterparties to sign up for things that may be difficult to achieve under certain circumstances. That they place an already fragile economic system — added strains on them — which can pop up in unpredictable ways.

它们导致杠杆失控。它们使交易对手签署某些情况下可能难以实现的协议。它们给已经脆弱的经济系统增加了额外的压力，这种压力可能以不可预测的方式出现。

But he would probably also say if he saw some that were mispriced, he would act accordingly. But he wouldn’t get himself in a position where the problems of the people who didn’t act prudently could cause him any problems. And I think that probably would be the answer.

但他可能也会说，如果他看到一些定价错误的情况，他会采取相应地行动。但他不会让自己处于一个位置上，让那些不谨慎行事的人的问题给他带来麻烦。我认为这可能就是答案。

The — one of the — one basic problem on derivatives — well, there are several problems.

衍生品的一个基本问题——好吧，还有几个问题。

I mean, back in — after 1929, Congress met — there was a Pecora committee and so on— and they decided that it was very dangerous to let people borrow a lot of money against securities and that it contributed to the Great Depression.

我的意思是，回到1929年，国会成立了佩科拉委员会（Pecora Committee）等等，他们决定让人们用证券作为大量借款的抵押非常危险，这导致了大萧条。

And therefore, they said the Federal Reserve should regulate how much people could borrow against securities. And it was important for society.

因此，他们认为联邦储备应该规范人们可以用证券借款的额度。这对社会来说非常重要。

And the Federal Reserve started requiring margin — they had margin requirements. Those requirements still exist. You are not supposed to be able to borrow more than 50 percent against your securities.

联邦储备开始要求保证金——他们有保证金要求。这些要求仍然存在。你借入的资金不能超过你证券价值的50%。

Actually, during one period, they went to where they didn’t — the Federal Reserve allowed no borrowing whatsoever. They went to a hundred percent margin.

实际上，在某个时期，他们甚至不允许任何借贷。他们将保证金要求提高到100%。

But derivatives came along and just turned that into a — made those rules a laughingstock. You have what they call “total return swaps,” which means you can borrow a hundred percent against what you own. That goes way beyond anything that existed in 1929.

但衍生品出现后，这些规则变成了笑柄。你有所谓的“总回报掉期”（total return swaps），这意味着你可以用你拥有的资产作为100%的抵押借款。这远远超出了1929年存在的任何规定。

So derivatives became a way around regulation of leverage in markets, which like I say, Congress felt was important and the Federal Reserve still has a responsibility for enforcing.

因此，衍生品成为了一种规避市场杠杆监管的方式，正如我所说，国会认为这很重要，而联邦储备仍然有责任执行这些规则。

Derivatives also meant that settlement dates got pushed out. One of the problems in securities markets comes about when you have a trade today, if you had — didn’t have to settle it for a year, you’d find it very hard sometimes to find the person on the other side.

衍生品也意味着结算日期被推迟。证券市场中的一个问题是，当你今天进行交易时，如果你不需要在一年内结算，有时你会发现很难找到对方。

And derivatives allow these very long settlement periods. Whereas security markets demand them in three days. There’s a reason they demand them in three days.

衍生品允许这些非常长的结算周期。而证券市场要求在三天内完成结算。它们要求在三天内完成结算是有原因的。

As you extend out periods, you get more and more defaults. So they’re a danger — they are a danger to the system. There’s no question about that.

随着你延长期限，违约的情况会越来越多。因此，它们是一个危险——它们对系统构成了威胁。这一点毫无疑问。

We have a book in The Bookworm called “The Great Crash” by Galbraith. It’s one of the great books. You really ought to buy it. It tells the story of the ’29 and it gets into margin requirements, so…

我们在《书虫》中有一本书，名为《大崩溃》，作者是加尔布雷思。这是一本伟大的书。你真的应该买一本。它讲述了 1929 年的故事，并涉及保证金要求，所以……

Ben Graham would not like a system that used derivatives heavily. But he would — I don’t think he would have been above — if he saw something that looked way out of line and he knew he could handle it himself — I think he would have been quite willing to buy or sell one that was mispriced.

本·格雷厄姆不会喜欢一个大量使用衍生品的系统。但他会——我认为如果他看到某些看起来严重失衡的衍生品，并且他知道自己可以处理它们——我认为他会非常愿意买入或卖出那些被错误定价的衍生品。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think there’s been a deeper problem in the derivative business. The derivative dealer takes two advantages of the customer.

查理·芒格：我认为衍生品业务存在更深层次的问题。衍生品交易商利用客户，并且有两个优势。

One, there’s croupier-style mathematical advantage equivalent to the house advantage in Las Vegas.

首先，就像拉斯维加斯赌场的庄家优势一样，存在一种荷官式的数学优势。

And two, the derivative dealer is playing in the same game with his own clients, with the advantage of being a better player. So —

其次，衍生品交易商与他们的客户玩同一个游戏，拥有成为更好的玩家的优势。所以……

WARREN BUFFETT: And having knowledge of what they’re doing.

沃伦·巴菲特：并了解他们在做什么。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and having knowledge of what the clients are doing.

查理·芒格：——并了解客户正在做什么。

This is basically a dirty business. And you’re really selling things to your clients who trust you, that are bad for the clients.

这基本上是一个肮脏的生意。你实际上是在向信任你的客户出售对他们有害的东西。

We don’t need more of this kind of thing in America. We need less. (Applause)

我们在美国不需要更多这样的事情。我们需要更少。（掌声）

24. Bailouts shouldn’t hurt senior debt holders

救助措施不应损害高级债权人的利益

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Well, this question came in this morning. And it’s a timely, philosophical one, given the results of the stress test that will coming out next week. And it relates to your stakes in Wells, U.S. Bancorp and Goldman Sachs. And the question is the following:

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题今天早上收到。考虑到下周将公布的压力测试结果，这是一个及时且具有哲学性的问题。它涉及到您在富国银行（Wells Fargo）、美国班克公司（U.S. Bancorp）和高盛（Goldman Sachs）的持股。问题如下：

“The government’s proposed restructuring plans for Chrysler and GM require creditors, as well as common shareholders, to bear losses.

政府提出的对克莱斯勒和通用汽车的重组计划要求债权人以及普通股东共同承担损失。

“Yet, with the banks, the government’s actions, to date, have not required concessions from holders of preferred stock and debt. The government has merely required the dilution of common stock holders.

然而，至今为止，政府对银行的行动并未要求优先股和债务持有者做出让步。政府仅要求稀释普通股股东的权益。

“To what extent should holders of preferred stock and debt share losses in the bank rescue plans or in the resolution of a major bank holding company? And do you expect to be diluted in any of your holdings?”

“优先股和债务持有者在银行救助计划或大型银行控股公司的清算中应承担多大程度的损失？您是否预计会在您的任何持股中被稀释？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say this. That’s very institution specific. With Freddy and Fannie, the preferred was gone. I mean, there was no equity. And the preferred got — in effect, it’s gotten wiped out along with the common stock.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我会这么说。这非常依赖于具体的机构。对于房利美（Freddie Mac）及房地美（Fannie Mae），优先股已经不存在了。我的意思是，没有股本。优先股实际上已经和普通股一起被抹去了。

With U.S. Bancorp or Wells, those are companies making lots of money. There’s lots of equity there. So there’s no reason to go up to senior securities and say that they should give up anything when there’s lots of common equity underneath.

对于美国银行或富国银行来说，这些公司盈利丰厚，拥有大量的股本。所以，当下面有大量普通股股东时，没有理由要求高级证券持有者放弃任何东西。。

It’d be like if I have a mortgage on my house and it’s 70 percent against its current value, saying, just because other people are having trouble in the neighborhood paying their mortgages because they got much higher mortgage or something, your saying my mortgage holder with 70 percent mortgage, that he should give up something and increase my equity even further.

这就像如果我在房子上有一笔70%的抵押贷款，说只是因为邻居的人在支付抵押贷款时遇到了麻烦，因为他们的抵押贷款利率更高，要求我的70%抵押贷款持有者放弃一些东西，进一步增加我的股本。

There’s lots of equity there, which there is at Goldman, U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo. There’s lots of equity, lots of earning power. There’s really no reason for senior debt to give up anything.

那里有很多股权，正如高盛、美国银行和富国银行一样。股权很多，盈利能力强。高级债务没有理由放弃任何东西。

You know, you could make an argument at Freddy and Fannie, about the subordinated debt, whether they should’ve suffered as well as the preferred stock and the common. But I don’t see it as applying to earning institutions with lots of future earning power.

你知道，你可以对房利美（Freddie Mac）及房地美（Fannie Mae）的次级债务提出一个论点，关于他们是否也应该承受与优先股和普通股一样的损失。但我认为这并不适用于那些拥有大量未来盈利能力的盈利机构。

I would love to buy all of U.S. Bancorp. You know, or I’d love to buy all of Wells if we could do it. You know, we’re not allowed to do it because it’d make us a bank holding company. But those businesses, there’s no reason for the creditors to suffer.

我很想收购美国银行。你知道，或者我很想收购所有的富国银行，如果我们能做到的话。你知道，我们不被允许这样做，因为这会使我们成为一家银行控股公司。但是这些业务，债权人没有理由遭受损失。

Now, you get into Chrysler or something of that sort, you know, there is no — I mean, they’re losing money all of time and they do not have a competitive advantage. You know, whether they’ve got a sustainable business model under any circumstances is open to question.

现在，你进入克莱斯勒或类似的公司，你知道，他们一直在亏损，并且没有竞争优势。你知道，无论在任何情况下，他们是否有可持续的商业模式都是值得怀疑的。

Whether there’s any common equity there is not open to question. You know, there isn’t any common equity. Nobody would pay a dollar, you know, if they had to take on Chrysler and all its debts.

是否存在任何普通股是毫无疑问的。你知道，根本没有普通股。如果他们必须承担克莱斯勒及其所有债务，没有人会愿意支付一美元。

Lots of people would pay billions of dollars to take on U.S. Bancorp or Goldman Sachs, you know, with all their debt. So those are different situations. I —

很多人愿意花数十亿美元来收购美国银行或高盛，你知道的，他们的债务很高。所以这些是不同的情况。我 —

If you get into a situation where the common equity is wiped out, then you get into a question of — then you get into the proper allocation of things within the capital structure — who gives up so much, and the senior debt may give up something, and so on.

如果你陷入一个普通股被抹去的情况，那么你就会面临一个问题——然后你就会进入资本结构内部的适当分配——谁放弃了多少，优先债务可能会放弃一些，等等。

But I don’t see it as applying at all to businesses that are worth a lot of money, where the equity’s worth a lot money.

但我认为这根本不适用于那些价值很高的企业，因为它们的股权价值很高。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

25. Ignore original cost when reviewing your portfolio

在审查您的投资组合时忽略原始成本

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第九个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett. Sorry, about that. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name’s Kelly Cardwell from Warrenville, Illinois.

观众：您好，巴菲特先生。抱歉，刚才的事情。巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我叫凯利·卡德威尔，来自伊利诺伊州的沃伦维尔。

Guys, if either of you were starting a smaller investment fund today, let’s say in Warrenville, Illinois, $26 million fund called Central Square Capital — hypothetically?

伙计们，如果你们中的任何一个今天在伊利诺伊州的沃伦维尔启动一个较小的投资基金，比如说一个名为中央广场资本的 2600 万美元的基金——假设一下？

WARREN BUFFETT: What? You’ll get billed for a commercial later on. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：什么？你稍后会收到广告费的账单。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: With this smaller asset base, what would you do differently, both in terms of the number of positions and frequency of turnover?

观众成员：以这个较小的资产基础，您会在持仓数量和换手频率方面做出哪些不同的调整？

For example, if you owned a portfolio of 10 stocks and five of them doubled in a short time period, would it make sense to actively manage the portfolio and take profits in the five that had doubled and redeploy the proceeds into your positions, into the ones that had not moved higher, where, presumably, more upside exists and the odds are more dramatically stacked in your favor? Or would you favor the strategy of sitting on your hands in the name of long-term investing?

例如，如果你拥有一个包含 10 只股票的投资组合，其中五只股票在短时间内翻了一番，那么主动管理投资组合并在五只翻倍的股票中获利了结，然后将收益重新投入到那些没有上涨的股票中，这样做是否合理？因为可以推测，后者可能有更大的上涨空间，且成功的几率更高？还是你更倾向于以长期投资的名义静观其变？

WARREN BUFFETT: We would own the half of dozen or so stocks we like best. Their — and it wouldn’t have anything to do with what our cost on them was.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会持有我们最喜欢的半打左右的股票。它们——这与我们的成本无关。

It would only have to do with our evaluation of their price versus value. It doesn’t make any difference what the cost is.

这只与你对它们的价格与价值的评估有关。成本是多少并没有任何区别。

And incidentally, if they went down 50 percent, we would say the same thing. I — you know, and using your illustration, I don’t know whether that fund has actually had something that went up or went down.

顺便说一下，如果它们下跌了50%，我们也会做同样的决定。你知道，按照你的例子，我不知道那个基金实际上是否有些股票上涨或下跌。

So, we would — our cost basis, except in rare cases — and we actually have a situation like this at Berkshire now, which I may explain a little later. But the cost basis doesn’t have anything to do the fund.

所以，我们会——除非在极少数情况下——我们的成本基础——实际上我们现在在伯克希尔也有类似的情况，我稍后可能会解释。但成本基础与基金无关。

When Charlie and I ran funds, we didn’t worry about whether something was up or down. We worried about what it was worth compared to what it was selling for.

当查理和我管理基金时，我们并不担心某样东西是上涨还是下跌。我们关心的是它的价值与它的售价相比如何。

And we tried to have most of our money in a relatively few — very few — positions which we thought we knew very well. We do the same thing now. We’d do the same thing a hundred years from now.

我们尽量将大部分资金投入到相对较少的——非常少的——我们认为非常了解的投资中。我们现在也这样做。百年后我们也会这样做。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, he’s tactfully suggesting that you adopt a different way of thinking. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的，他在巧妙地建议你采用一种不同的思维方式。（笑声和掌声）

26. Berkshire’s competitive advantage no longer requires us

伯克希尔的竞争优势不再依赖于我们

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Michael Welter (PH) of Portland, Oregon.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自俄勒冈州波特兰的迈克尔·韦尔特（PH）。

“You’ve often said that two things you look for in an investment are a sustainable competitive advantage and a simple, easy to grasp business model. Berkshire’s sustainable competitive advantage is arguably you, Warren and Charlie. And that obviously is not sustainable over the long term.”

“你常常说你在投资中寻找的两个因素是可持续的竞争优势和简单易懂的商业模式。伯克希尔的可持续竞争优势可以说是你、沃伦和查理。而这显然在长期内是不可持续的。”

WARREN BUFFETT: I reject that. Defeatism. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我拒绝那种想法。失败主义。（笑）

CAROL LOOMIS: I knew you would.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：我就知道你会这样。

“While at this point, Berkshire does not have a simple, easy to grasp business model. So if the two of you were outside investors, is it possible that, no matter what combination of intrinsic value and price Berkshire offered, you would not invest in it today?”

“虽然此时，伯克希尔并没有一个简单易懂的商业模式。那么如果你们两位是外部投资者，是否有可能无论伯克希尔提供什么样的内在价值和价格组合，你们今天都不会投资于它？”

WARREN BUFFETT: No, our sustainable competitive advantage is we have a culture and a business model, which people are going to find very, very difficult to copy, even semi-copy.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们的可持续竞争优势在于我们有一种文化和商业模式，这些是人们将会发现非常非常难以复制，甚至是半复制的。

We have an unusual group of shareholders. We have a business that’s owned by people where the turnover on our stock, even allowing for all the double-counting and everything like that, may be something like 20 percent a year, when virtually every stock in the S&P 500 turns over a hundred percent a year.

我们有一群不同寻常的股东。我们拥有的企业由那些对业务有不同理解的人拥有，即使考虑到所有的双重计算和其他因素，我们的股票周转率可能每年只有20%，而几乎每只标准普尔500指数的股票周转率都是100%。

So we have a different shareholder base. We have people that understand their business differently.

所以我们有一个不同的股东基础。我们有一些人对他们的业务有不同的理解。

And we have a business that can offer, to people who own private businesses, the chance to keep running their businesses as they have in the past and get rid of the problems of lawyers and bankers and all kinds of things like that.

我们有一种业务模式，可以为拥有私营企业的人提供继续经营他们企业的机会，就像他们过去一直做的那样，摆脱律师、银行家和各种各样的东西带来的问题。

And I don’t see any other company in the United States that has the ability to do that now, or probably the ability to adopt that model in any big way.

我看不出美国还有其他公司现在有能力做到这一点，或者可能以任何大规模的方式采用这种模式。

So I would say we have sort of an ultimate — and it’s not peculiar to me and Charlie. We may have helped create it. But it is a deeply embedded culture which any CEOs that follow are going to be well-versed in when they come into the job, and dedicated to, and able to continue in the future.

所以我想说我们有一种终极文化——这并不是我和查理所特有的。我们可能帮助创造了它。但这是一种深深植根的文化，任何接任的首席执行官在上任时都会对此非常熟悉，并且会致力于并能够在未来继续下去。

And you can’t — I don’t want to name names about other companies — but you can’t do that elsewhere.

而且你不能——我不想提及其他公司的名字——但你在其他地方是做不到的。

So I think anybody wanting to copy Berkshire is going to have a very hard time. And I think the advantages we have are going to be very, very long lasting. And they’re not peculiar to the fact that Charlie and are I sitting up here anymore. They may have been, originally. But no longer.

所以我认为任何想要复制伯克希尔的人都会非常困难。我认为我们拥有的优势将会非常持久。而且这些优势并不仅仅是因为查理和我现在坐在这里。最初可能是这样，但现在已经不是了。

Our culture, our managers join that culture. Our shareholders join that culture. It gets reinforced all the time. They see that it works.

我们的文化，我们的管理者融入这种文化。我们的股东也融入这种文化。这种文化不断得到强化。他们看到这有效。

You know, it’s something that I don’t know how I would copy it, if I were running, you know, some other company.

你知道，这是一件我不知道如果我在经营其他公司时该如何复制的事情。

And it’s meaningful. Because there will be businesses, just as there was with ISCAR awhile back, just as the management at GEICO felt back in the mid-’90s in terms of what they wanted to do, there will be people that want to join up with us. And they really won’t have a good second choice. They’ll be plenty that don’t, too. But that’s OK.

这很有意义。因为会有企业，就像前段时间ISCAR一样，就像90年代中期GEICO的管理层在他们想做什么方面一样，会有想要加入我们的人。他们真的不会有好的第二选择。他们也会有很多不愿意加入的。但那也没关系。

We just need to have the right ones — some of the right ones — join us. And it can go on a long, long time.

我们只需要一些合适的人加入我们。这样可以持续很长很长时间。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. I might state that a little differently. A lot of corporations in America are run stupidly from headquarters, as they try and force the divisions to come up with profits for every quarter that are better than the profits from the same quarter in the previous year.

查理·芒格：是的。我可能会稍微不同地表述一下。美国很多公司总部的管理方式很愚蠢，因为他们试图强迫各个部门每个季度的利润都要超过去年同季度的利润。

And a lot of terrible decisions and terrible practices creep into those businesses. In the Berkshire model, that doesn’t happen.

许多糟糕的决策和糟糕的做法会渗入这些企业。在伯克希尔的模式中，这种情况不会发生。

So while Warren and Charlie will soon be gone — not too soon in my case, but I’m a little worried about Warren (laughter) — the stupidity of management practice in the rest of the corporate world will likely remain ample enough to give this company some comparative advantage way into the future. (Applause)

所以虽然沃伦和查理很快就会离开——在我看来并不太快，但我有点担心沃伦（笑声）——但其他公司管理实践的愚蠢可能仍然足够多，给这家公司在未来很长一段时间内带来一些比较优势。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll go to — it’s very important isn’t it, to watch what you eat, as you — (laughter) — in terms of preserving longevity. So we watch it for hours up here at a time. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们会去——看你吃什么非常重要，就像你——（笑声）——为了保持长寿。所以我们在这上面花了几个小时。（笑声）

27. We don’t keep every stock, but we do keep every business

我们不保留每一只股票，但我们会保留每一个业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett, and Mr. Munger. My name is Aznar Midolf (PH). I’m from (Inaudible) organization, San Francisco.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫阿兹纳尔·米多夫（音）。我来自（听不清）组织，旧金山。

And my question is from one of financial blogs. How do you justify holding stocks forever when the fundamentals have permanently changed?

我的问题来自一个财经博客。当基本面发生永久性变化时，你如何证明永远持有股票是合理的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is we don’t. You know, and — if we lose confidence in the management, if we lose confidence in the durability of the competitive advantage, if we recognize we made a mistake when we went into it — we sell plenty of times. So it’s not unheard of.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是我们不会。你知道，如果我们对管理层失去信心，如果我们对竞争优势的持久性失去信心，如果我们意识到在进入时犯了错误——我们有过很多次的出售。所以这并不是闻所未闻的。

On the other hand, if you really get a wonderful business with outstanding management — but mostly the wonderful business part of it — when in doubt, keep holding. But it’s no inviolable rule.

另一方面，如果你真的拥有一个出色的业务和卓越的管理层——但主要是出色的业务部分——在怀疑的时候，继续持有。但这不是一个不可侵犯的规则。

Now, among the businesses we own, not just securities we own, we have an attitude, which we express in our economic principles, that when we buy a business it’s for keeps.

现在，在我们拥有的企业中，不仅仅是我们拥有的证券，我们有一种态度，这种态度体现在我们的经济原则中，那就是当我们购买一家企业时，是为了长期持有。

And we make only two exceptions: when they promise to start losing money indefinitely or if we have major labor problems. But otherwise, we are not going to sell something just ’cause we get offered more money for it, even than it’s worth.

我们只做两个例外：当他们开始无限期的亏损，或者如果我们有重大的劳资问题。但除此之外，我们不会仅仅因为有人出价更高而出售某样东西，即使那样的价格超过它的价值。

买进又卖出，从一朵花跳到另一朵花，每次跳转都是成本，放长了看是没有好处的。

And that’s a peculiarity we have. And we want our partners to know about that.

这是我们的一种特殊性。我们希望我们的合作伙伴了解这一点。

We do think it probably helps us in terms of buying businesses over time. It’s also the way we want to run our business.

我们确实认为这可能在一定程度上帮助我们随着时间的推移收购企业。这也是我们希望经营业务的方式。

But with stocks, bonds, we sell them. But we’re more reluctant to sell them than most people. I mean, if we made the right decision going on, we like to ride that a very long time. And we’ve owned many — we’ve owned some stocks for decades.

但对于股票和债券，我们会卖掉它们。但我们比大多数人更不愿意卖掉它们。我的意思是，如果我们做出了正确的决定，我们喜欢长期持有。我们拥有过许多股票——有些股票我们持有了几十年。

But if the competitive advantage disappears, if we really lose faith in the management, if we were wrong in the original analysis — and that happens — we sell. Or if we find something more attractive —

但如果竞争优势消失，如果我们真的对管理层失去信心，如果我们在最初的分析中犯了错误——这种情况是会发生的——我们就会卖出。或者如果我们发现更有吸引力的东西——

Normally we have plenty of money around. But in September of last year, late September, we had committed to put 6.6 million — billion — in Wrigley. We — and then Goldman Sachs needed 5 billion, GE needed 3 billion.

通常我们有很多资金。但在去年的九月，九月底，我们承诺向Wrigley投资 66 亿美元。然后高盛需要 50 亿美元，通用电气需要 30 亿美元。

I sold a couple billion dollars’ worth of J&J just because I didn’t like getting our cash level down below a certain point, under the circumstances that existed then.

我卖掉了价值几十亿美元的强生股票，仅仅因为我不喜欢在当时的情况下让我们的现金水平降到某个点以下。

That not was a negative decision on J&J. It just — it meant that I wanted a couple billion more around. And I saw an opportunity to do something that I probably wouldn’t see too much later. Whereas, I could always buy J&J back at a later date. But that’s an unusual situation.

这并不是对J&J的负面决策。只是——这意味着我想要多几亿美元。我看到了一个我可能不会太久之后看到的机会。而且，我总是可以在稍后的日期买回J&J。但这是一个不寻常的情况。

28. We run Berkshire as if we owned all of it

我们经营伯克希尔就像我们拥有它的全部一样。

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to go back to one point on the earlier question, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想回到之前问题的一个点。

I always — I frequently ask CEOs of companies what they would do differently if they owned the whole place themselves.

我总是——我经常问公司的首席执行官，如果他们自己拥有整个公司，他们会有什么不同的做法。

You know, when I’m talking to, either companies where we’ve invested in, sometimes other companies, friends of mine run them. You know, “What would you do different if this was a hundred percent owned by you and your family?”

你知道，当我和我们投资的公司，或者有时是其他公司交谈时，我的一些朋友在经营这些公司。我会问：“如果这完全是你和你家人的公司，你会有什么不同的做法？”

And they give me a list of things. There is no list at Berkshire. You know, we basically run this place the same way we’d run if we owned a hundred percent of it.

他们给我一份清单。在伯克希尔没有清单。你知道，我们基本上是以我们拥有百分之百的方式来管理这个地方。

And that is a difference that — in terms of people joining in with us. They don’t have to adjust their lives to a bunch of rules that are kind of self-imposed, in terms of how people think about public companies, in terms of earnings, predictions, and all of that sort of thing.

这就是一个区别——在于人们加入我们时。他们不必为了那些自我施加的规则而调整自己的生活，这些规则涉及人们对上市公司的看法，包括收益、预测以及所有这些事情。

And there are certain people that would prefer to be associated with an enterprise like that. And also —following through on this rule I just explained — know that they’ve made a one decision on where that business that they built up over decades and cherish and everything — they make one decision on where it’s going to go, and they’re not going to get surprised later on.

有些人更喜欢与这样的企业相关联。同时——遵循我刚才解释的这个规则——知道他们在几十年里建立和珍惜的业务上做出一个决策，他们会做出一个关于它未来发展的决策，并且他们不会在以后感到惊讶。

They’re not going to get some management consultant come in and say, “You ought to have a pure player, Wall Street’s saying, so you ought to spin this off or sell it,” or anything like that.

他们不会请管理顾问来告诉他们：“你们应该有一个纯粹的参与者，华尔街说，所以你们应该剥离或出售这个，”或者类似的话。

And they know we’re not going to leverage it up. So they know they’re really going to get to do what they love the most, which is to continue to run their business, not bothered by bankers or lawyers or public expectancies or anything of the sort.

他们知道我们不会加杠杆。所以他们知道他们真的可以做他们最喜欢的事情，那就是继续经营他们的业务，不用被银行家、律师或公众期望等事情所打扰。

And that is a — like I said earlier, that’s a real advantage.

这就是一个——就像我之前说的，这真是一个优势。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, in the show business, they say the show has legs if it’s going to last a long time. I think Berkshire Hathaway’s system has legs.

查理·芒格：是的，在娱乐行业，他们说如果一个节目能持续很长时间，那它就有生命力。我认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的系统是有生命力的。

29. Why the annual meeting isn’t webcast

为什么年度会议没有网络直播

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. With that, we’ll go to Becky. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。接下来我们请贝基。(笑声)

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Humin Timadin (PH) in Seattle, Washington. He’s got a two-part question. But he says, “From time to time, you purchase shares of public companies.

贝基·奎克：这是来自华盛顿州西雅图的胡敏·提马丁（PH）提出的问题。他有一个两部分的问题。他说：“不时地，你会购买上市公司的股票。

“Presumably, you feel that those shares are a better investment than Berkshire shares at the time, since you never buy back Berkshire shares.

“可以推测，你认为那些股票在当时比伯克希尔的股票更值得投资，因为你从未回购过伯克希尔的股票。”

“If Berkshire shareholders can purchase shares in the same companies for the same price as you, why shouldn’t they shell — sell their Berkshire shares and buy what you are buying?”

“如果伯克希尔的股东可以以与你相同的价格购买相同公司的股票，他们为什么不卖掉自己的伯克希尔股票，去买你正在购买的东西呢？”

And secondly, he wants to know why, because he, “like thousands of other shareholders, is unable to attend the annual meeting, how come Berkshire does not webcast the meeting? I am aware of the irony that I will not hear your answer.” (Laughter)

其次，他想知道为什么，因为他“和其他成千上万的股东一样，无法参加年度会议，为什么伯克希尔不进行网络直播？我意识到我将听不到你的回答的讽刺。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, our meeting does get written up, at least it gets written up a lot with various blogs and everything else. It gets written up pretty well in its entirety by Outstanding Investor Digest.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们的会议确实会被记录下来，至少在各种博客和其他地方都有很多报道。优秀投资者文摘对它进行了相当全面的记录。

And there are others that prepare extensive reports. And they pop up on the internet. So he will, in all likelihood, find out the answer.

还有一些人会准备详尽的报告。这些报告会出现在互联网上。因此，他很可能会找到答案。

We could webcast. I get asked the same question about webcasting the meetings I have with students. You know, why not do that? It’s so much easier and everything.

我们可以进行网络直播。我经常被问到关于我与学生开会时网络直播的同样问题。你知道，为什么不这样做呢？这要简单得多，所有事情都会变得更容易。

I think there is something gained by personal contact. I certainly know that when I was studying and all of that, I gained a lot by personal contact.

我认为通过个人接触可以获得一些东西。我确实知道，当我在学习和所有这些时，我通过个人接触获得了很多。

Even though I’d read Ben Graham’s books, just going and being with him. And I follow that practice in teaching. And I think that —

即使我读过本·格雷厄姆的书，和他在一起的经历让我受益匪浅。我在教学中也遵循这种做法。我认为——

I like the turnout we get. I like our partners to show up and see the products we sell and all of that. This is not something where we’re going to go and hide and hold our meeting, you know, in some hamlet, you know, in western Nebraska or something to discourage attendance.

我喜欢我们得到的出席率。我希望我们的合作伙伴能够出席，看到我们销售的产品等等。这不是我们要去隐藏，或在某个小村庄，比如说西内布拉斯加的某个小地方举行会议，以阻止出席。

We’ve got a different attitude. And I think that that — I hope that comes across. And I think that if we webcast it, you know, it was something like turning on a television show, I don’t think it would be quite the same.

我们有一种不同的态度。我希望这能传达出来。我认为如果我们进行网络直播，就像打开一档电视节目，我觉得效果不会完全一样。

30. No “quarrel” with copycats

不与模仿者“争吵”

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of the first part of the question about buying the securities we buy, plenty of people do that. And some of them — but they — incidentally, they’re not buying it with free float that’s available from insurance.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于第一个问题，关于我们购买的证券，很多人都会这么做。其中一些人——顺便说一下，他们并不是用保险公司提供的浮存金来购买这些证券。

So if they have $58 billion that they can get interest-free, they will be in the same position we are in buying those securities. But they are — on the other hand, they have some tax advantages we don’t have. So I don’t quarrel with people who do that.

所以如果他们有 580 亿美元的无息借贷，他们在购买那些证券时将处于与我们相同的境地。但另一方面，他们有一些我们没有的税收优惠。因此，我不与做那件事的人争论。

We have to publicize to some extent what we own. Some things they wouldn’t be able to buy because we make direct purchases.

我们必须在某种程度上公开我们所拥有的东西。有些东西他们无法购买，因为我们进行的是直接购买。

They wouldn’t be able to buy into the businesses we own. But they might very well do better piggybacking us in some way. And they’re certainly free to do it.

他们无法购买我们所拥有的业务。但他们可能会通过某种方式搭便车，做得更好。他们当然可以这么做。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, generally, I think it’s quite smart to do what you’re talking about — is to identify some investors you regard as very skilled, and carefully examine everything they’re buying, and copy what you please. I think you have a very good idea. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，总的来说，我认为你所说的做法非常聪明——就是识别一些你认为非常有能力的投资者，仔细研究他们所购买的一切，然后随意模仿。我认为你有一个非常好的主意。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I used — when I was 21 years old, I had to mail away to the SEC in those days — and you had these crummy copies about a week later and paid a lot per page to get them — but I used to get the semi-annual reports of Graham-Newman Corp before I went to work there.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我在 21 岁的时候，必须向证券交易委员会邮寄申请——那时候你大约一周后才能收到这些糟糕的复印件，而且每页的费用很高——但在我去那里工作之前，我曾经获取过格雷厄姆-纽曼公司的半年度报告。

And I would look at every security that was listed there. And I got some of my ideas that way. So it’s a — there’s nothing wrong with that.

我会查看那里列出的每一项证券。这样我得到了我的一些想法。所以这没什么不对。

31. Your best inflation protection

你最好的通胀保护

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Sam Alter (PH). I’m 11 years old and I’m from Westminster, New Jersey.

观众成员：我叫萨姆·阿尔特（PH）。我 11 岁，来自新泽西州的威斯敏斯特。

My question is, how will inflation affect my generation? And how is Berkshire investing to prepare for this time? (Applause)

我的问题是，通货膨胀将如何影响我们这一代人？伯克希尔又是如何投资以应对这个时期的？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that was about inflation, right? How inflation was going to affect him?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，那是关于通货膨胀的，对吧？通货膨胀将如何影响他？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. How is inflation —?

查理·芒格：是的。通货膨胀怎么样？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, inflation is going to affect you. You know, the — it’s certain we will have inflation over time.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，通货膨胀会影响你。你知道，随着时间的推移，我们肯定会经历通货膨胀。

Paul Volcker got very upset the other day and spoke out about three weeks ago, I guess, when he read that a majority of the Federal Open Market Committee had sort of targeted 2 percent inflation as the number.

保罗·沃尔克前几天非常生气，大约三周前，他看到联邦公开市场委员会的大多数成员将 2%的通胀率作为目标时，公开表达了自己的看法。

And Volker, who came in when inflation was raging and saw the problems of stopping it when it got a momentum of its own, said, “You know, 2 percent sounds great, but in a generation it cuts away purchasing power by 50 percent.”

沃尔克在通货膨胀肆虐时上任，他看到当通货膨胀形成自身势头时，遏制它的问题，他说：“你知道，2%的通胀听起来不错，但在一代人内，它会削弱 50%的购买力。”

He was — kind of a long generation, there — but he was right in that once you start thinking about a couple percent, you are on something of a slippery slope.

他——有点像是一个漫长的世代——但他是对的，一旦你开始考虑几个百分点，你就进入了一种滑坡的状态。

And we are following policies in this country now to stimulate things, which — stimulate business — which are bound to have some inflationary consequences.

我们现在在这个国家遵循的政策是刺激经济，刺激商业，这必然会带来一些通货膨胀的后果。

And to the extent that we borrow money from the rest of the world, it would be very human on the part of politicians in the future to decide that they would rather pay the rest of the world back in dollars that are worth far less than the dollars they borrowed.

在我们向世界其他地方借钱的情况下，未来的政治家们决定用价值远低于他们所借美元的美元来偿还世界其他地方的债务，这将是非常人性化的选择。

I mean, it’s the classic way of reducing the impact and cost of external debt. And we’re building up a lot of external debt.

我的意思是，这是一种经典的减少外债影响和成本的方法。而我们正在积累大量的外债。

I always find it interesting when politicians now talk about using the taxpayer’s money to do this and the taxpayer’s money to do that and how the taxpayers are paying the bonuses at AIG.

我总是觉得有趣的是，当政治家们现在谈论用纳税人的钱来做这个和那个，以及纳税人如何支付 AIG 的奖金时。

We haven’t raised taxes at all in this country. You know, I mean, taxpayers are paying nothing beyond what they were paying a couple years ago.

我们在这个国家根本没有提高税收。你知道，我的意思是，纳税人支付的税款与几年前相比没有增加。

Matter of fact, the federal revenues this year, which were close to 2.6 trillion a couple years ago, you know, maybe more like 2.3 trillion. So we are taking less money from the taxpayers.

事实上，今年的联邦收入，几年前接近2.6万亿美元，你知道，可能更像2.3万亿美元。所以我们从纳税人那里拿的钱更少了。

The people who are really paying for the things we’re doing now will probably be the people who are buying fixed-dollar investments, much of it from the U.S. government, and who will find the purchasing power when they go to redeem those investments to be far less.

那些真正为我们现在所做的事情买固定美元投资的人，可能就是那些购买美国政府债券的人，他们在兑现这些投资时会发现购买力大大减少。

So you can — you might say that the AIG bonus is — probably the Chinese have — are the people that are ultimately paying the most in terms of the loss of purchasing power they will have with their holdings of government bonds, U.S. government bonds, many years down the road. But it sounds better to say the taxpayer than to say the Chinese are paying for it.

所以你可以——你可能会说AIG的奖金最终是由中国人支付的——他们在持有美国政府债券方面购买力的损失将是最大的。但说纳税人支付更好听一些，而不是说中国人在支付。

It’s an interesting situation. I read that comment everyday about how the taxpayers are doing this and that. And, you know, I haven’t had my taxes raised. You haven’t had your taxes raised. They’re giving me $250 bucks back here pretty soon.

这是一种有趣的情况。我每天都看到关于纳税人做这个做那个的评论。而且，你知道，我的税没有上涨。你的税也没有上涨。他们很快就会给我 250 美元的退款。

The taxpayers haven’t paid anything so far. And my guess is that the ultimate price of much of this will be paid by a shrinkage in the value of — the real value — of fixed-dollar investments down the road.

纳税人到目前为止还没有支付任何费用。我的猜测是，最终大部分的成本将通过未来固定美元投资的实际价值缩水来支付。

And that will be the easiest thing to do. And if it’s the easiest thing to do, it’s the most likely thing to have happen.

这将是最简单的事情。如果这是最简单的事情，那么发生的可能性就最大。

So you will see plenty of inflation. Now, the best protection against inflation is your own earning power.

所以你会看到很多通货膨胀。现在，抵御通货膨胀的最佳保护是你自己的赚钱能力。

If you’re the best teacher, if you’re the best surgeon, if you’re the best lawyer, you know, whatever it may be, you will command a given part of other people’s production of goods and services no matter what the currency is, whether it’s seashells, or reichsmarks, or dollars.

如果你是最好的老师，如果你是最好的外科医生，如果你是最好的律师，无论是什么，你都会掌控其他人生产的商品和服务的一部分，无论货币是什么，无论是贝壳、德国马克还是美元。

So your own earning power is the best, by far. If you’re the best journalist, whatever it may be, you will get your share of the national economic pie, regardless of the value of whatever the currency may be, as measured against some earlier standard.

所以你自己的赚钱能力是最好的，远远超过其他。如果你是最优秀的记者，无论是什么，你都会获得国家经济蛋糕的一份，无论货币的价值如何，与某个早期标准相比。

The second best protection is a wonderful business. You know, if you own the Coca-Cola, trademark, Company, you will get a given portion of people’s labor 20 years from now and 50 years from now for your product.

第二好的保护是一项美好的事业。你知道，如果你拥有可口可乐的商标公司，20 年后和 50 年后你将获得一部分人们的劳动来为你的产品服务。

And it’s doesn’t make any difference what’s happened to the price level, generally. Because people will give up three minutes of labor, whatever it may be, to enjoy, you know, 12 ounces, you know, of a product they like.

这与价格水平发生了什么变化无关。因为人们愿意放弃三分钟的劳动，无论是什么，以享受他们喜欢的 12 盎司产品。

So those are the — and — those are the great assets, your own earning power first, and then the earning power of a wonderful business that does not require heavy capital investment.

所以这些就是——这些是伟大的资产，你自己的赚钱能力首先，其次是一个不需要大量资本投资的优秀企业的赚钱能力。

If it requires heavy capital investment, you get killed in inflation. And with those guidelines, I would tell you the best thing to do is invest in yourself.

如果需要大量资本投资，你会在通货膨胀中受到重创。根据这些指导方针，我会告诉你，最好的做法是投资于自己。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. The young man should become a brain surgeon and invest in Coca-Cola instead of government bonds. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。这位年轻人应该成为一名脑外科医生，并投资于可口可乐，而不是政府债券。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I get paid by the word. He doesn’t. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我按字数收费。他不收费。（笑声）

32. Newspapers are fading but we’re keeping the Buffalo News

报纸正在逐渐消失，但我们仍在保留《布法罗新闻》。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK. This question comes to us from Dennis Wallace (PH) in Waldorf, Maryland. We got a lot of these. And I’m selfishly interested in the answer.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的。这个问题来自马里兰州沃尔多夫的丹尼斯·华莱士（PH）。我们收到了很多这样的提问。我自私地对这个答案很感兴趣。

Given the current economic conditions in the newspaper and publishing business, can you please provide some of your thoughts on its impact on Berkshire? Given that our investee, the Washington Post Company, has had a substantial decline in its stock value, is it still a good use of capital?

考虑到当前报纸和出版行业的经济状况，您能否提供一些关于其对伯克希尔影响的看法？鉴于我们的投资对象华盛顿邮报公司，其股票价值大幅下跌，这仍然是资本的良好使用吗？

And given the, quote, “cheap trading prices of newspapers in the current climate,” would Berkshire considering — consider purchasing additional newspapers to add to the Buffalo News and Washington Post properties?

鉴于当前环境中报纸“便宜的交易价格”，伯克希尔会考虑购买更多报纸，以增加对布法罗新闻和华盛顿邮报的头寸吗？

At what price does it become compelling to invest in the newspaper business? Or is there no price at which it becomes compelling in today’s environment?

在什么价格下投资报纸行业变得具有吸引力？或者在当今环境中是否没有任何价格能使其变得具有吸引力？

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say, it isn’t today’s environment. I mean, it’s an evolutionary development.

沃伦·巴菲特：我会说，在今天的环境下还不行。我的意思是，这是一个渐进的发展。

But — so the current economic environment has accentuated the problems in newspapers. But it is not the basic cause.

但是——当前的经济环境加剧了报纸的问题。但这并不是根本原因。

Newspapers are, to the American public as a whole — Charlie and I — I read five a day. Charlie probably reads five a day. We’ll never give them up.

报纸对整个美国公众来说——查理和我——我每天读五份。查理可能也读五份。我们永远不会放弃它们。

But we’ll also be the last guys reading a newspaper while having a landline phone, you know, by our side. (Laughter)

但我们也会是最后一批一边看报纸一边旁边有座机的人，你知道的。（笑声）

So, you don’t want to judge consumer preferences by what we do. The newspaper — no. The answer is, for most newspapers in the United States, we would not buy them at any price.

所以，你不想通过我们的行为来判断消费者的偏好。报纸——不。答案是，对于美国的大多数报纸，我们不会以任何价格购买它们。

They have the possibility, and in certain places, they’ve already hit it, but they have the possibility of just going to unending losses.

他们有可能性，在某些地方，他们已经达到了，但他们有可能面临无尽的损失。

And they were absolutely essential to a very high percentage of the American public, you know, 20, 30, 40 years ago. They were the ultimate business.

而且它们在很大比例的美国公众中绝对是必不可少的，你知道，20、30、40年前。它们是终极的业务。

It was a business where only one person won, basically, in almost every town in the country. There were 1,700 papers in the United States. And about 50 of those, 20 years ago, existed in a city where there were multiple papers.

这是一种几乎每个城镇只有一个赢家的业务。在美国有1700份报纸。大约50份，20年前，存在于一个有多家报纸的城市。

So they were a product that had pricing power, that was essential to the customer, essential to the advertiser. And they’ve lost that essential nature.

所以他们是一个具有定价权的产品，对客户和广告商来说都是必不可少的。而他们已经失去了这种本质。

They were primary 30 years or 40 years ago if you wanted to learn sports scores or stock prices or even news about international affairs.

他们在 30 年前或 40 年前是主要的，如果你想了解体育比分、股票价格或甚至国际事务的新闻。

And then that nature, what Walter Annenberg used to call “essentiality,” I don’t know whether it’s in the dictionary or not, but it started eroding. And then the erosion has accelerated dramatically.

然后那种本质，沃尔特·安嫩伯格曾称之为“本质性”，我不知道它是否在字典里，但它开始逐渐侵蚀。然后这种侵蚀加速得非常明显。

And they were only essential to the advertiser as long as they were essential to the reader. And you know, nobody liked buying ads in the paper. It was just that they worked.

他们对广告商来说只有在对读者重要时才是必不可少的。你知道，没有人喜欢在报纸上买广告。只是因为它们有效。

And that has — that is changing. It’s changing every day. And I do not see anything on the horizon that causes that erosion to end.

而这正在改变。它每天都在变化。我没有看到任何迹象表明这种侵蚀会结束。

We — you know, at the Buffalo News, Stan Lipsey would greet me 10 years ago. And he would say, “Warren, you should — on an economic basis — you should sell this paper.” And I said, “I agree 100 percent. But we’re not going to do it.”

我们——你知道，在布法罗新闻社，斯坦·利普西十年前会和我打招呼。他会说：“沃伦，从经济角度来看，你应该卖掉这份报纸。”我说：“我百分之百同意。但我们不会这样做。”

And you know, we could’ve sold the Buffalo News for many hundreds of millions of dollars some years back. And we couldn’t sell it, you know, for remotely anything like that now.

你知道，我们几年前本可以以数亿美元的价格出售《布法罗新闻》。而现在，我们根本无法以接近那样的价格出售它。

And that’s one of the policies. We have a union that’s been very cooperative — unions, a bunch of unions — have been quite cooperative with us in recent months in trying to have an economic model that will at least keep us making a little money.

这就是其中一项政策。我们有一个非常合作的工会——多个工会——在最近几个月与我们合作，试图建立一个经济模型，至少能让我们赚一点钱。

And as I put in the annual report, in our economic principles, that as long as we don’t think we face unending losses or have major union problems, we will stick with the businesses, even though it would be a mistake if you were acting as a trustee for, you know, a bunch of crippled children or something of the sort. And that’s just our policy at Berkshire.

正如我在年报中写的，在我们的经济原则中，只要我们不认为面临无尽的亏损或有重大工会问题，我们就会坚持这些业务，尽管如果你充当一群残疾孩子或类似的托管人的角色，那将是一个错误。这就是我们在伯克希尔的政策。

The Post has a very good cable business. It has a very good education business. But it does not have answers on the newspaper business, as Don Graham wrote in the annual report. Nor does anyone else.

邮报的有线业务非常好。教育业务也非常好。但正如唐·格雷厄姆在年报中所写的，它对报纸业务没有答案。其他人也没有。

Now, we all keep looking around for somebody that will find the model. But there — I think there are about 1,400 daily papers now in the United States, and nobody yet has found the model.

现在，我们都在寻找能够找到模式的人。但——我认为现在美国大约有1400份日报，而且还没有人找到这个模式。

We are as well-positioned in Buffalo, believe it or not, I think, to play out the game as anyone else. But whether we find something before the lines get so that we’re inexorably in the red, whether the situation gets so we’re inexorably in the red, I don’t know.

我们在布法罗的定位同样良好，信不信由你，我认为我们在比赛中与其他任何人一样有优势。但我们是否能在局势变得不可避免地陷入赤字之前找到解决方案，我不知道。

But we will play it out as long as we can. It’s not what they teach you in business school. But it’s the way we run Berkshire.

但我们会尽可能地继续下去。这不是商学院教你的东西。但这就是我们经营伯克希尔的方式。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s all 100 percent right. And it’s really a national tragedy. The — these monopoly daily newspapers have been an important sinew of our civilization.

查理·芒格：我认为这完全正确。这确实是一个国家的悲剧。这些垄断的日报一直是我们文明的重要支柱。

And, by and large, they were impregnable from advertiser pressure. And by and large, they were desirable editorial influences. And by and large, they kept government more honest than it would otherwise be.

总体而言，它们在广告商的压力下是坚不可摧的。总体而言，它们是理想的文字影响力。总体而言，他们使政府比其他情况下更加诚实。

So as they disappear, I think what replaces it will not be as desirable as what we’re losing. But this is life.

所以当它们消失时，我认为取而代之的东西不会像我们失去的那样令人向往。但这就是生活。

33. Expect weak consumer spending for “quite a bit longer”

预计消费者支出将“再持续一段时间的疲软”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 12.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 12 位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m Marc Rabinov, from Melbourne Australia.

观众：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自澳大利亚墨尔本的马克·拉比诺。

I’m wondering if I could ask you how retailing, manufacturing, and service businesses have been severely impacted by the recession given the way consumer spending has changed. Is it likely the results will still be 20 percent below 2007 levels in three years’ time?

我想问一下，在消费者支出发生变化的情况下，零售、制造和服务行业如何被经济衰退严重影响？在三年后，结果是否仍可能比2007年低20%？

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know about three years’ time. Certainly those areas you named, to varying degrees, have been hit very hard.

沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道三年后的情况。你提到的那些领域，程度不同地受到了很大的冲击。

Some of the manufacturing would tie in with residential construction. If we hold housing starts at 500,000 a year, you know, my guess is that in a couple of years at most, we would get something close to equilibrium in housing. Maybe quite a bit sooner. Nobody knows the figures with precision.

一些制造业将与住宅建设相结合。如果我们将住房开工维持在每年 50 万套，我猜最多在几年内，我们将接近住房的平衡。也许会更早。没有人能准确知道这些数字。

But if you keep forming households at a million-3, or something like that, a year, and you create 500,000 new units and a few of the old ones burn down, and a few — you will reach equilibrium at a point that’s not ridiculously far in the future.

但是如果你每年以130万的速度不断形成家庭，创造 50 万个新单位，而一些旧单位烧毁，几处——你将在不久的将来达到一个并不荒谬的平衡点。

And that will make a big difference in our carpet business, and brick business, and insulation business, and paint business, and so on.

这将对我们的地毯业务、砖块业务、保温材料业务、油漆业务等产生重大影响。

Retailing has been hit very hard. The higher the end of it, generally speaking, the harder it’s been hit.

零售业受到了很大的冲击。一般来说，越高端的零售业受到的冲击就越大。

There’s been a big change in consumer behavior. And I think it will last quite a bit longer.

消费者行为发生了很大变化。我认为这种变化会持续相当长一段时间。

I think for years, government was telling people to save. And now that they’re saving, they’re unhappy about it.

我认为多年来，政府一直在告诉人们要储蓄。而现在他们在储蓄，却对此感到不满。

But I think that — I think the experience of the last couple years, I don’t think will go away very fast. I think it could last quite a long time.

但我认为——我认为过去几年的经历不会很快消失。我认为它可能会持续相当长的时间。

So I would not think our retailing businesses would do great for a considerable period of time.

所以我认为我们的零售业务在相当长的一段时间内不会表现得很好。

And I would say that in retail real estate, I would think that that would be a tough field to be in for quite a period.

我认为在零售房地产领域，长时间处于这个行业会是一个艰难的选择。

I think the shopping centers will be seeing vacancies that will be hard to fill. I think that the retailers will be struggling in many cases. And of course, the supply of real estate doesn’t go away.

我认为购物中心将会出现难以填补的空缺。我认为零售商在许多情况下会面临困难。当然，房地产的供应不会消失。

So, that could be — the shopping center business, which was selling at, you know, these premiere cap rates of 5 percent or even less sometimes. I think that is going to look very silly before all of this is done. In fact, it already is looking that way. So I wouldn’t count — I wouldn’t —

所以，这可能会——购物中心业务，过去这些顶层资本化率有时只有5%甚至更低。我认为在这一切结束之前，这看起来会非常愚蠢。事实上，它已经开始如此。因此，我不会计算——我不会——

The service businesses are generally the better businesses. They require less capital and they can be more specialized in the markets they serve, in general.

服务行业通常是更好的行业。它们需要的资本较少，并且通常可以在所服务的市场中更具专业性。

But I would not look for any quick rebound in the retail manufacturing service businesses. We’ve got a ways to go on that.

但我不会期望零售制造和服务型企业会迅速反弹。我们还有很长的路要走。

And we’ve got a ways to go on the ones that are construction related. But at least there, you can sort of see the math of when it’ll work out. And you can get a lot of information on what’s going on in real estate markets.

我们在与建筑相关的项目上还有很长的路要走。但至少在那儿，你可以大致看到何时会有结果的数学。而且你可以获得很多关于房地产市场的动态信息。

South Florida, I think, will be — for example, I think that’s going to be a problem for a long, long time.

南佛罗里达，我认为，这将是——例如，我认为这将是一个长期存在的问题。

I hope it isn’t. But I just think the math of it is pretty devastating, in terms of the number of units you have and net household formation down there. You’ve got a lot to wade through.

我希望不是。但我认为从单位数量和那里的净家庭形成来看，这个数学问题相当严重。你有很多事情需要处理。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

34. We’ll never buy back Berkshire shares at a “silly” price

我们绝不会以“愚蠢”的价格回购伯克希尔的股票。

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to Carol.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们去找卡罗。

CAROL LOOMIS: I got lots of question sent in to me about the possibility of Berkshire buying its own shares. And here’s what one said:

卡罗尔·卢米斯：我收到了很多关于伯克希尔是否会回购自己股票的问题。以下是其中一个问题：

“You recently described Berkshire’s policy regarding share repurchase as self-defeating, because before repurchase, you said, you would write a letter to shareholders explaining why we are going to do it.

“你最近将伯克希尔的股票回购政策描述为自毁，因为在回购之前，你说过，你会给股东写一封信，解释我们为什么要这样做。”

“You said the letter would, by necessity, tell investors that the stock price was at a substantial discount to intrinsic value, which would cause the stock price to rise.

“你说这封信必然会告诉投资者，股票价格相对于内在价值有很大折扣，这将导致股票价格上涨。”

“The letter would be, in essence, a buy recommendation, though as a matter of policy, you don’t make those.

“这封信本质上会是一份买入推荐，尽管作为政策，你们不会这样做。

“In the past, you have emphatically endorsed share repurchase by other companies and criticized managers who would not buy when the price was right.

“过去，你曾明确支持其他公司的股票回购，并批评那些在价格合适时不进行购买的管理者。”

“You have said no alternative action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases. Your previous views suggest little patience for a manager with a self-defeating policy.

“你曾说没有其他替代行动能像回购那样肯定地使股东受益。你之前的观点表明对采取自毁政策的管理者几乎没有耐心。”

“You’ve said when you have a manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases when these are clearly in the interest of owners, he reveals more than he knows of his motivations. So — and the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him.

“你曾说过，当一个经理在明显符合所有者利益的情况下，始终对回购置之不理时，他暴露了自己动机中更多的东西。因此——市场正确地对他所持有的资产进行了折价。

“Would it not be rational to conclude that the market will appropriately discount Berkshire’s share price unless and until you abandon your self-defeating policy and engage in repurchases of shares?”

“除非你放弃自毁政策并参与股票回购，否则，市场会对伯克希尔的股票进行适当地折价，这难道不是一个合乎逻辑的结论吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, incidentally, the — and this important, actually — the comments I made about repurchasing, overwhelmingly, those go back a lot of years when stocks generally were — frequently were — cheap in relation to intrinsic value. I did not make that —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，顺便说一下，这些关于回购的评论，实际上非常重要，都是我多年前说的，当时股票相对于内在价值通常都是便宜的。我并没有——

You haven’t seen me writing about that in the last 10 years or so. Because I would say most of the repurchasing done in recent years, I’ve thought has been foolish, because people have been paying too much.

在过去的十年里，你没有看到我写过关于这个的内容。因为我认为近年来大多数的回购都是愚蠢的，因为人们支付的价格太高。

And companies got, in many cases — they would never acknowledge this — but they were buying because they were basically liked — they were trying to give out a buy recommendation when it wasn’t justified.

而公司在许多情况下——他们永远不会承认这一点——但他们之所以购买，是因为他们基本上受到欢迎——他们试图在没有正当理由的情况下发出买入推荐。

In the ’70s and early ’80s, Charlie and I would frequently urge people to repurchase shares because it was so much more attractive than other things they could do with their money.

在 70 年代和 80 年代初，查理和我经常鼓励人们回购股票，因为这比他们可以用钱做的其他事情更具吸引力。

The only time we felt strongly that Berkshire should repurchase its shares was in roughly 2000, whenever it was, that we thought it was demonstrably below intrinsic business value. And we wrote we would do it, and it did become self-defeating.

我们唯一强烈认为伯克希尔应该回购其股票的时刻大约是在 2000 年左右，当时我们认为其股价明显低于内在商业价值。我们写道我们会这样做，但这确实变得适得其反。

There’s clearly a point where if we thought it was demonstrably below — conservatively estimated — intrinsic business value and we notified the stock holders we were going to do it, we would do it. I think again, it would largely be self-defeating.

显然，如果我们认为它明显低于——保守估计——内在商业价值，并且我们通知股东我们将这样做，我们就会这样做。我再次认为，这在很大程度上是自我挫败的。

I don’t think that situation exists now. I think — I won’t give any buy or sell recommendations. But I think it ought to be quite compelling.

我认为现在不存在那种情况。我想——我不会给出任何买入或卖出的建议。但我认为这应该是相当有说服力的。

Like I say, I don’t — I think, probably 90 percent of the repurchase activity I’ve seen in the last five years, I did not think was serving the cause of the shareholder.

就像我说的，我认为，在过去五年中，我看到的回购活动中，大约 90%并没有服务于股东的利益。

I thought it was being done because management thought it was the thing to do, and their investor relations department told them it was the thing to do, and they were actually buying stock at kind of silly prices.

我认为这是因为管理层认为这样做是正确的，他们的投资者关系部门告诉他们这样做是对的，而他们实际上是在以有点愚蠢的价格购买股票。

And that was not the case when Charlie and I looked at Teledyne or the Washington Post or Cap Cities Broadcasting doing it many years ago. But I haven’t seen situations like that in recent years.

而在许多年前，当查理和我查看Teledyne、华盛顿邮报或Cap Cities Broadcasting时并不是这样的。但我在最近几年没有看到过这样的情况。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that, either.

查理·芒格：我对此也没有什么要补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Number — it’s interesting how many companies were buying in their stock at twice present prices that aren’t buying it now. I mean, there are lots of those.

沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是，许多公司在股票价格是现在的两倍时买入，但现在却不再买入。我是说，这样的公司有很多。

We will never buy in our stock at a silly price. We may make a mistake by not buying it at a cheap price. But we’ll never make a mistake, I don’t think, by buying it at a silly price.

我们绝不会以愚蠢的价格购买我们的股票。我们可能会因为不以便宜的价格购买而犯错。但我认为，我们绝不会因为以愚蠢的价格购买而犯错。

And we think a significant percentage of corporate America has done that in recent years, including a few stocks that we’ve owned ourselves.

我们认为，近年来美国企业中有相当一部分已经这样做了，包括我们自己持有的一些股票。

35. Crisis made opportunity cost calculations difficult

危机使得机会成本的计算变得困难。

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 13.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 13 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jack Benben (PH) from Haworth, New Jersey. First, I’d like to thank you. This is — I’ve been to about a dozen meetings. This is probably the best one.

观众成员：来自新泽西州霍沃斯的杰克·本本（PH）。首先，我想感谢你们。我参加过大约十几次会议。这可能是最好的一次。

So thank you very much for the new format. And thank you very much to the journalists who’ve really helped out a lot. (Applause)

非常感谢您提供的新格式。也非常感谢那些真正给予了很多帮助的记者们。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: At past meetings, you and Mr. Munger have talked at great length about opportunity cost. Excuse me. The past year has presented you with many unusual opportunities.

观众成员：在过去的会议上，您和芒格先生详细讨论了机会成本。抱歉，过去一年给您带来了许多不同寻常的机会。

Can you discuss some of the more important opportunity cost decisions of the past year? And were those decisions at all affected by the macroeconomic picture? Thank you.

你能谈谈过去一年一些更重要的机会成本的决策吗？这些决策是否受到宏观经济形势的影响？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, certainly opportunity cost has been much more in the forefront of mind in the last 18 months.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，在过去 18 个月中，机会成本在我们心中更加突出。

When things are moving very fast, when both prices are moving, and in certain cases, intrinsic business value is moving at a pace that’s far greater than we’ve seen for a long time, it means that in terms of calibrating A versus B, versus C, it’s tougher.

当事情发展得非常迅速时，当两个价格都在波动，并且在某些情况下，内在商业价值的变化速度远远超过我们很长时间以来所见的速度，这意味着在校准 A 与 B、C 时，会更加困难。

It’s more interesting. It’s more challenging. But it’s — and it can be way more profitable, too. But it’s a different task then when everything was moving at a more leisurely pace.

这更有趣。这更具挑战性。但它——而且它也可以更有利可图。但当一切都以更悠闲的节奏进行时，这就是一个不同的任务。

And I described earlier, you know, we face that problem. And it’s a good problem to have. We faced that problem in September and October. Because we want to always keep a lot of money around.

我之前提到过，我们面临这个问题。这是一个好问题。我们在九月和十月面临这个问题。因为我们总是希望手头有很多资金。

We have all kinds of levels — extra levels of safety — that we follow at Berkshire. And we will never get so we’re dependent on banks or other people’s money or anything else. We’re just not going to run the company that way.

我们在伯克希尔遵循各种级别——额外的安全级别。我们绝不会依赖银行或其他人的资金或其他任何东西。我们就是不会以那种方式经营公司。

So we were seeing things happen. I mean, we got a call — we got lots of calls. But, most of them, we ignored. But the calls that we got that we ignored helped us calibrate the calls that we paid attention to, too.

所以我们看到事情发生。我是说，我们接到了很多电话。但是，大多数我们都忽略了。但是我们忽略的那些电话帮助我们调整了我们关注的电话。

And if we got a call from a Goldman Sachs, I think it was on a Wednesday, maybe, you know, that was a transaction that couldn’t have been done the previous Wednesday and might not be done the next Wednesday.

如果我们接到高盛的电话，我想那是在一个星期三，也许你知道，那是一笔在前一个星期三无法完成的交易，可能在下一个星期三也无法完成。

And we’re talking real sums, 5 billion in that case. And we had certain commitments outstanding. We had a $3 billion commitment out on Dow Chemical. I think at that point, I could be wrong exactly on the day when we made it.

我们谈论的是实际金额，在这种情况下是 50 亿美元。我们有一些未完成的承诺。我们对陶氏化学有 30 亿美元的承诺。我想在那时，我可能对我们做出承诺的具体日期记错了。

We had a $5 billion commitment out on Constellation Energy. We had 6 1/2 billion we were going to have to come up with in early October on the Wrigley-Mars deal. So we were faced with opportunity cost-type considerations.

我们在Constellation Energy上有 50 亿美元的承诺。我们在 10 月初需要筹集 65 亿美元用于Wrigley-Mars交易。因此，我们面临着机会成本的考虑。

And as I said earlier, we actually sold something that under normal circumstances we wouldn’t have thought about selling if it was 10 or 15 points higher, in Johnson & Johnson. But we just didn’t want to get uncomfortable.

正如我之前所说，我们实际上卖掉了一些在正常情况下如果价格高出 10 或 15 点我们不会考虑出售的强生股票。但我们只是想避免感到不适。

So you are faced, in a chaotic market, particularly where people needs large sums — so you’re not talking about buying a hundred million dollars’ worth of something that, you know, one day and a hundred million the next day — but all of a sudden you’re called on for billions, if you’re going to play at all.

所以在一个混乱的市场中，尤其是当人们需要大笔资金时——你并不是在谈论一天买一亿美金的东西，第二天又是一亿——而是突然间你被要求提供数十亿，如果你想参与的话。

We faced that opportunity cost calculation frequently during that period. I mean, when we decided to commit to buy Constellation Energy, we had to be willing to come up with $5 billion seven or eight months down the line. And you didn’t know exactly when because it would be subject to public utility commission approval.

在那段时间，我们经常面临机会成本的计算。我的意思是，当我们决定承诺收购Constellation Energy时，我们必须愿意在七八个月后筹集 50 亿美元。而且你并不知道确切的时间，因为这将受到公共事业委员会批准的影响。

But if something chaotic happened in the market next week, we would get phone calls. Or we would see stocks selling or bonds selling at prices we liked. And if the relative values, against what we held, were interesting, we might sell things.

但如果下周市场发生了混乱，我们会接到电话。或者我们会看到股票或债券以我们喜欢的价格出售。如果相对于我们持有的资产，其相对价值有趣，我们可能会出售一些东西。

Now, it’s harder to sell things in huge quantities than it is to buy things in huge quantities during a period like that. So you have to measure whether you can actually get the offsetting transaction done to move from one to another.

现在，在这样的时期，出售大量商品比购买大量商品要困难得多。因此，您必须衡量是否能够实际完成抵消交易，以便从一种转移到另一种。

We have a much — if we’re going to move billions from one to another, it’s much different than the problem you may have in moving hundreds of thousands or tens of thousands of dollars from one holding to another. We really can have big transactional costs unless we’re careful.

我们有很多——如果我们要将数十亿从一个地方转移到另一个地方，这与您可能在将数十万或数万美金从一个账户转移到另一个账户时所面临的问题截然不同。除非我们小心，否则我们真的可能会产生巨大的交易成本。

But that’s the kind of calculation we go through. And we love the fact we get the opportunity to make those calculations. It’s a sign of opportunity around.

但这就是我们要进行的那种计算。我们喜欢有机会进行这些计算。这是机会存在的标志。

And you know, we’ll — we haven’t had the flurry of activity like we had last year for a long time. So it was the first time we really faced the question, you know, can we raise a couple billion dollars in a hurry, to be sure that we’ve offset the cash needs of what we’re committing to on the purchase side.

而且，你知道，我们还没有像去年那样有那么多的活动。因此，这是我们第一次真正面临这样的问题，你知道，是否能够在匆忙中筹集数十亿美元，以确保我们在购买方面的现金需求得以抵消。

On the Johnson & Johnson we sold, we actually made a deal where we got — I had a floor price on what we sell that for, just because the markets were so chaotic, that we wanted to be absolutely sure that we would not end up a couple billion dollars less than comfortable when we got all through.

在我们出售的强生，我们实际上达成了一项协议，我设定了一个最低价格，因为市场非常混乱，我们想确保在整个过程中不会损失几亿美元。

Our definition of comfortable is really comfortable. We want to have billions and billions and billions around. And then we’ll think about what we do with the surplus.

我们对舒适的定义是真正的舒适。我们希望有数十亿、数十亿、数十亿的人在手里。然后我们再考虑如何处理剩余的部分。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Again, I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。

36. GEICO spends millions on advertising and will “never stop”

GEICO 在广告上花费数百万，并且“永远不会停止”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from someone named Yem (PH) in Columbus, Ohio. It’s —

贝基·奎克：这是来自俄亥俄州哥伦布市一位名叫耶姆（PH）的人提出的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: That narrows it down.

沃伦·巴菲特：这就缩小了范围。

BECKY QUICK: Yeah. Very company specific. It says, “GEICO has been spending around 400 to $600 million on media advertising a year in the last few years. What are the deciding factors into how much to spend? And how could one estimate the net return on such spending?”

贝基·奎克：是的。这非常具体于公司。它说：“在过去几年中，GEICO 每年在媒体广告上的支出约为 4 亿到 6 亿美元。决定支出多少的因素是什么？如何估算这种支出的净回报？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a question people have been asking themselves since the beginning of advertising.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是人们自广告开始以来一直在问的问题。

And, you know, I’m not sure whether it was Marshall Field or John Dorrance at Campbell Soup, or something, one of those fellows said that, you know, when asked whether they didn’t waste a lot of money on advertising, he said, “Yeah, we waste half of it, but we don’t know which half.” (Laughter)

你知道，我不确定是马歇尔·菲尔德还是坎贝尔汤的约翰·多兰斯，或者是其他什么人，其中一个人说，当被问到他们是否在广告上浪费了很多钱时，他说：“是的，我们浪费了一半，但我们不知道是哪一半。”（笑声）

And that is the nature of advertising. Although, we can measure it better with GEICO than most companies.

这就是广告的本质。尽管我们可以比大多数公司更好地用 GEICO 来衡量它。

We will spend about $800 million on advertising. We spend far more — even though we’re the third largest company — we’ve spent far more than State Farm or Allstate. And we will spend more and more and more. I mean, we will never stop.

我们将花费大约 8 亿美元用于广告。我们花费的远远更多——尽管我们是第三大公司——我们花费的远远超过了 State Farm 或 Allstate。我们将会花费越来越多。我是说，我们永远不会停止。

We were spending $20 million a year, a little over that, when we bought control of it in 1995.

我们在 1995 年收购控制权时，每年花费 2000 万美元，稍微超过这个数。

But we want everybody in the world to — well, everybody in the United States. We’re not going to be selling insurance in China or someplace very soon.

但我们希望世界上的每个人——好吧，美国的每个人。我们不会很快在中国或其他地方销售保险。

But we want everybody in the United States to have in their mind the fact that there’s a good chance they can save money by picking up the phone or going to geico.com and checking it out. And important money.

但我们希望美国的每个人都意识到，通过拨打电话或访问 geico.com，他们有很大的机会可以省钱。这是重要的金钱。

And when we get that message in people’s minds, you never know when it’s going to pay off later down the line. Because, as I mentioned earlier, starting in — around September 30th, we saw a big difference in the propensity of people to come to us to save $100 or $200, whereas they might not have cared about saving that before. So, we want —

当我们在公众心中传达这个信息时，你永远不知道它何时会在未来带来回报。正如我之前提到的，从大约 9 月 30 日开始，我们看到人们来找我们节省 100 美元或 200 美元的倾向有了很大变化，而他们之前可能并不在乎节省这些钱。因此，我们想要——

Here’s auto insurance. Everybody has to buy it. Nobody likes to buy it. But they like to drive. And if you like to drive, you need auto insurance.

这里是汽车保险。每个人都必须购买它。没有人喜欢购买它。但他们喜欢开车。如果你喜欢开车，你就需要汽车保险。

And so it’s going to sell. And you’re going to buy it from somebody. And if you care about saving money, you’re going to check with us. And we want to make sure everybody understands that.

所以它会被卖出去。你会从某人那里购买它。如果你关心省钱，你会和我们核对。我们想确保每个人都明白这一点。

And we won’t — you know, we will spend more money on it, I will guarantee you, three years from now.

而且我们不会——你知道，我们今年会在广告上花更多的钱，我向你保证，三年后。

Now, we’re getting more for our money in buying advertising this year. So 800 million this year buys more than 800 million would’ve bought a couple of years ago. So we’re getting more exposure for the money.

现在，我们在购买广告时花的钱得到了更多的回报。今年的 8 亿比几年前的 8 亿能买到更多的东西。因此，我们花的钱得到了更多的曝光。

But we love spending money on advertising at GEICO. And we want to be in everybody’s mind.

但我们喜欢在GEICO上花钱做广告。我们希望在每个人的脑海中占有一席之地。

Coca-Cola’s in everybody’s mind around the world. You know, he started in 1886. And they just kept associating Coca-Cola with moments of pleasure and happiness. And billions and billions of billions of people have that in their mind.

可口可乐在全世界人们的心中。你知道，它始于 1886 年。他们一直将可口可乐与快乐和幸福的时刻联系在一起。数十亿数十亿的人心中都有这种印象。

And they don’t have anything in their mind about RC Cola, you know. You know, or — they just — you say RC Cola to somebody around the globe and they give you a blank stare. You say Coca-Cola and it means something.

他们对 RC 可乐没有任何印象，你知道的。你知道，或者——你对全球某个人说 RC 可乐，他们就会一脸茫然。你说可口可乐，那就有意义了。

And a brand is a promise. We’re getting our — we’re getting that promise in people’s minds that there’s a good chance they can save money if they check with GEICO. And we’ll never stop.

品牌就是一个承诺。我们正在让人们心中形成这样的承诺：如果他们咨询 GEICO，就有很大的机会可以省钱。我们永远不会停止。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s interesting.

查理·芒格：是的，这很有趣。

If GEICO would remain more or less the same size if we didn’t advertise so healthy, and if the new subscribers are worth more than the $800 million we’re spending advertising, then, in an important sense, GEICO is earning $800 million more pre-tax in a way that doesn’t even show.

如果 GEICO 在不进行如此健康的广告宣传的情况下，规模大致保持不变，并且新订阅者的价值超过我们花费的 8 亿美元广告费用，那么在一个重要的意义上，GEICO 以一种甚至不显现的方式，赚取了 8 亿美元的税前收入。

That’s the kind of thing we like to see within Berkshire Hathaway.

这就是我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦内部喜欢看到的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: The value of GEICO goes up by far more than the earnings every year, if we keep adding these people, as Charlie says.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，正如查理所说，如果我们不断增加这些人，GEICO的价值每年都会远远超过收益。

And we could maintain, I’m sure, we can maintain for a very long time our present policy holder count and probably spend $100 million a year, maybe less.

而且我确信，我们可以在很长一段时间内维持我们当前的保单持有量，可能每年花费1亿美元，甚至更少。

But we are getting more than our money’s worth for the — for what we spend. We probably waste some. But overall, we’re getting at terrific return on it.

但我们所花的钱得到了超值的回报。我们可能会浪费一些。但总体来说，我们得到了很好的回报。

And if I thought we could get anything like the same return by spending 2 billion next year, we’d spend 2 billion. I mean, it — it’s a very attractive business. And I don’t see how you create anything like it.

如果我认为明年花 20 亿能得到类似的回报，我们就会花 20 亿。我的意思是，这是一项非常有吸引力的业务。我看不出你能创造出类似的东西。

I mean, we are the low-cost producer. And if you’re the low-cost producer in something people have to buy and is roughly a $1,500 item, I mean, you’ve got a terrific, terrific business. And we have durable competitive advantage there.

我的意思是，我们是低成本的生产者。如果你是一个低成本的生产者，而且人们必须购买你生产的东西，而且大约是1500美元的项目，我的意思是，你拥有一个非常、非常棒的业务。而且我们在那里拥有持久的竞争优势。

相当于一个手机的价格。

37. Wells Fargo is better than many other banks

富国银行比许多其他银行更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll to go to number 1. And I think then we’ll break for lunch. Number 1?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来看看第一个问题。我想然后我们就可以休息吃午饭了。第一个问题是什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. Hello Warren, Charlie. Felton Jenkins from Savannah, Georgia, a long-time shareholder and partner.

观众成员：好的。你好，沃伦，查理。我是来自乔治亚州萨凡纳的费尔顿·詹金斯，一位长期的股东和合作伙伴。

Just want to make a quick comment about something that was a big deal the last couple of years about PacifiCorp. There was some controversy.

我想对过去几年关于太平洋电力公司的一个重要事件做个简短的评论。曾经有一些争议。

But I’m glad that PacifiCorp has agreed to work with the Native Americans and fishing communities on the West Coast to remove the uneconomic and harmful dams on the Klamath River.

但我很高兴 PacifiCorp 同意与西海岸的土著美国人和渔业社区合作，拆除克拉马斯河上那些无经济效益且有害的水坝。

So I want to encourage PacifiCorp management to move quickly, close the deal, and open the river soon. But thanks for their improved efforts over the last year.

所以我想鼓励 PacifiCorp 管理层迅速行动，尽快达成交易，早日开放河流。感谢他们在过去一年中的努力。

My question is, you mentioned Wells Fargo got to $9. And that was a great deal, it looks like, at that price.

我的问题是，你提到富国银行达到了 9 美元。看起来在那个价格下，这是个很好的交易。

But what about Washington Mutual, AIG, Wachovia, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, even some Irish banks that I think you were involved with?

但是华盛顿互助银行、美国国际集团、沃乔维亚、花旗集团、房利美，甚至一些我认为你参与过的爱尔兰银行呢？

Those went through $9. And probably a lot of people thought they were still good deals or mispriced at $9.

那些以 9 美元成交的人。可能很多人认为他们仍然是好交易或者在 9 美元时定价错误。

And now you’ve got very expensive toilet paper, essentially, out of those stock certificates. So I mean, how would you know on the way down?

而现在，你们拿这些股票证书基本上就像拿着昂贵的卫生纸。所以，我的意思是，你们怎么知道在下跌的过程中？

And looking at something like Bank of America, that was on the 13F sometime recently, what’s a likely outcome for a Bank of America and how would you analyze what might happen? Thanks.

最近在 13F 上看到像美国银行这样的公司，您认为美国银行可能会有什么结果，您会如何分析可能发生的事情？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s some you can’t analyze. And on the Irish banks, I couldn’t have been more wrong.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，有些事情是无法分析的。关于爱尔兰银行，我的判断完全错误。

But it isn’t a matter of whether they go through $9 or anything like that. It’s really what their business model is and what kind of competitive advantage they have.

但这并不是他们是否经历过 9 美元或类似的事情。关键在于他们的商业模式是什么，以及他们拥有什么样的竞争优势。

I would say that Wells, among the large banks, has, by far, the best competitive position, you know, of any — of the really large banks in the country.

我会说，在大型银行中，富国银行无疑拥有最好的竞争地位，您知道的，在全国所有真正的大型银行中。

And essentially, if you look at the four largest, they each have somewhat different models. But the model of Wells is more different from the other three than any one of the other three would be from the remaining group.

从本质上讲，如果你看看四个最大的，它们各自有些不同的模式。但富国银行的模式与其他三个相比更为不同，而其他三个之间的差异则相对较小。

But I was wrong on the Irish banks in a very big way. I simply didn’t understand. And I should’ve understood.

但我在爱尔兰银行的问题上犯了一个很大的错误。我根本不理解。我本应该理解的。

It was available for me to understand, the incredible exposure they’d got into in more land development-type loans — not property loans, in terms of completed properties — but all kinds of land development loans.

我能够理解他们在更多土地开发类型贷款方面所获得的令人难以置信的敞口——不是针对已完成物业的物业贷款——而是各种土地开发贷款。

It was extraordinary. For a country with 4 and a fraction million people, you know, they had money lent for developing properties, homes, that would extend just forever in the future.

这真是非凡。对于一个拥有四百多万人的国家来说，他们借款用于开发房地产和住房，这些将会在未来无限延续。

It was the terrible mistake by me. Nobody lied to me, nobody gave me any bad information. I just plain wasn’t paying attention. The —

这是我犯的可怕错误。没有人对我撒谎，没有人给我任何错误的信息。我只是完全没有注意。

If you talk about the WaMus — I don’t want to go through all the names on them, because it’s specific to some companies.

如果你谈论WaMu（华盛顿互惠银行）——我不想列出他们所有的名字，因为这具体到一些公司。

But there were a lot of signs that they were doing things that a highly leveraged institution shouldn’t be doing. And that could cause trouble if this model of ever-rising housing prices turned out to be a false model.

但有很多迹象表明，他们正在做一些高杠杆机构不应该做的事情。如果这种不断上涨的房价模型被证明是错误的，那可能会造成麻烦。

You can get in a lot of trouble with leverage. I mean, it’s — you start creating $20 of assets, or something like that. You know, for every dollar of equity, you better be right.

杠杆使用很危险。我的意思是，你开始创造20倍的资产，或者类似的东西。你知道，每一美元的股本，你最好是对的。

And some of those big institutions did some very — what, in retrospect, for certain here — were foolish things, which, if they hadn’t been so highly leveraged, would not have hit them as badly.

一些大型机构做了一些非常——从某种角度来看，确实是愚蠢的事情，如果它们没有那么高的杠杆，就不会受到如此严重的打击。

And I would say most of them, if you read the 10-Ks and 10-Qs and did some checking, you could spot differences in them. Certainly, you can spot —

我会说，如果你阅读 10-K 和 10-Q 报告并进行一些核查，你可以发现它们之间的差异。显然，你可以发现——

There’s no comparison, if you take Wells Fargo versus a WaMu or something like that. I mean, you don’t have to have an advanced level of sophistication about banking to compare those two.

没有可比性，如果你把富国银行和华盛顿互助银行之类的进行比较。我是说，你不需要对银行有高级的理解就能比较这两者。

They’re two different kinds of businesses. It’s like comparing a copper producer whose costs are $2.50 a pound with a copper producer whose costs are $1 a pound.

它们是两种不同类型的企业。就像比较一个每磅成本为 2.50 美元的铜生产商和一个每磅成本为 1 美元的铜生产商。

Those are two different kinds of businesses. One is going to go broke at a buck-fifty a pound. And the other one’s going to still be doing fine.

这两种生意是不同的。一种在每磅一块五时会破产，而另一种则会继续做得很好。

And banking has real difference in it. But people don’t — they don’t seem to look at them. The figures are available. And — but they don’t seem to look at them very carefully.

银行确实存在真实的差异。但人们似乎并没有关注这些差异。相关数据是可以获取的，但他们似乎并没有仔细查看这些数据。

When Wells reported the other day, they have an item of expense of over $600 million in a quarter for the amortization of core deposits. That it not a real expense.

当富国银行前几天报告时，他们有一个季度超过6亿美元的费用项，是核心存款的摊销。这并不是一个真实的费用。

I mean, the core deposit figure will be up over time. And they are entitled under the tax law to put up, I don’t know, $15 billion or so, and they get to amortize that, which is an advantage.

我的意思是，核心存款数字会随着时间的推移而增加。他们根据税法有权投入，我不知道，大约 150 亿美元，他们可以摊销这笔费用，这是一种优势。

But I didn’t see one newspaper article or any commentator that mentioned that that $600 million charge is in there, which is entirely different than looking at any other bank. But it just — it goes unnoticed.

但我没有看到任何一篇报纸文章或评论员提到那 6 亿美元的费用，这与查看其他任何银行完全不同。但这就是——它被忽视了。

So the figures are there. And the information’s there. And I think with Freddy and Fannie, for example, I think it was pretty clear what was going to happen.

所以这些数字在那里。信息也在那里。我认为以房利美和房地美为例，我认为当时很清楚会发生什么。

Now, the interesting thing is, the government was telling them to go out and raise some more money for investors. And if those investors had put the money in, it would’ve been gone. It was already gone, actually, within a month or two, so —.

现在有趣的是，政府告诉他们出去为投资者筹集更多资金。如果那些投资者投入了资金，那钱就会消失。实际上，在一两个月内，那笔钱已经消失了。

We had calls on that, people trying to — investment bankers — trying to place billions of dollars with us on something, on those two institutions. And you just could take one look at them and you could tell they were in big, big trouble.

我们接到过关于这件事的电话，有人——投资银行家——试图在这两家机构上为我们安排数十亿美元的投资。你只需看一眼他们，就能看出他们正处于大麻烦中。

You do have to know a little bit about — you have to know something about banking and what’s going on in the various kinds of lending and everything.

你确实需要了解一些关于银行业的知识，以及各种贷款情况和相关事务。

And I would say that generally speaking, for people that don’t spend a lot of time on their investments, they’re going to have trouble separating financial institutions.

我想说，通常来说，对于那些不花很多时间在投资上的人，他们将很难区分金融机构。

I think it’s much easier to come to a conclusion on something like Coca-Cola or Procter & Gamble than it is for a person who is spending only a limited amount of time on investing to make a decision on whether to own bank A, or bank B, or bank C.

我认为，对于像可口可乐或宝洁这样的公司，得出结论要容易得多，而对于一个只花有限时间进行投资的人来说，决定是拥有银行 A、银行 B 还是银行 C 要困难得多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there’s another problem. Generally accepted accounting principles allow a conservative, sensible bank to show vastly increased earnings if it changes its practices to make a lot of extremely dumb loans in large volumes.

查理·芒格：是的，还有另一个问题。公认会计准则允许一个保守、理智的银行，如果它改变其做法，大量发放极其愚蠢的贷款，便能显示出大幅增加的收益。

Generally accepted accounting principles should not be constructed to allow this result. It’s — that what seduces so many of these bankers into this ghastly decision-making.

普遍接受的会计原则不应被构建以允许这种结果。这就是——诱使许多银行家做出这种可怕决策的原因。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, when we bought Gen Re, they had a financial products division. It was named similarly to the AIG one. It was called Gen Re Financial Products — AIG Financial Products.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当我们收购 Gen Re 时，他们有一个金融产品部门。它的名称与 AIG 的类似。它被称为 Gen Re 金融产品——AIG 金融产品。

And it produced numbers regularly that were always satisfactory numbers. But, you know, when we looked at that, you know, it looked like all kinds of trouble to us.

它定期产生的数字总是令人满意的数字。但是，你知道，当我们看到这一点时，对我们来说似乎有各种麻烦。

It cost us over 400 million to get out of. And a black box like that can produce — that’s why managements love them to some degree, they can produce numbers.

我们花费了超过 4 亿来摆脱它。而像这样的黑箱可以产生——这就是为什么管理层在某种程度上喜欢它们，因为它们可以产生数字。

They don’t necessarily produce cash. And they sure as hell can produce all kinds of problems if you have to start posting collateral and doing things of that sort.

它们不一定会产生现金。如果你不得不开始提供担保和做类似的事情，它们肯定会带来各种问题。

And I would say it is tough for, you might say, the passive investor, the one who’s not spending very much time on it. I would say it’s difficult for them to discern when that’s going on.

我会说，对于那些被动投资者来说，这很困难，您可以说，他们并没有花太多时间在这上面。我会说，他们很难辨别何时发生这种情况。

So I — it’s not a bad area to just say, “This one’s too tough,” and go onto something else that’s a lot easier.

所以我——这并不是一个坏的地方，可以说：“这个太难了，”然后去做一些更简单的事情。

I think you can analyze a utility operation easier or, you know, some premier consumer company or something of the sort.

我认为你可以更容易地分析一个公用事业运营，或者你知道，一些顶级消费公司或类似的东西。

I don’t think I would look for the tough situations to differentiate tough industries in which to differentiate things.

我认为我不会寻找艰难的情况来区分艰难的行业以区分事物。

But there are huge differentiations. And again, I urge to read the JP Morgan Chase — Jamie Dimon’s letter. Because you’ll learn a lot by reading that.

但存在巨大的差异。而且我再次建议阅读摩根大通——杰米·戴蒙的信。因为通过阅读它你会学到很多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But a lot of the new regulation that is coming wouldn’t have even been needed if accounting had done a better job, particularly in banking.

查理·芒格：但许多新的监管规定，即使会计做得更好，也不需要，特别是在银行业。

And yet, I have yet to meet an accountant from any of the big firms who has said, “I’m ashamed of my own profession.”

然而，我还没有遇到过任何一家大公司的会计师说过：“我为自己的职业感到羞愧。”

That’s a mistake in accounting. If they don’t have shame, they’re not thinking right.

那是会计上的错误。如果他们没有羞耻心，他们就没有正确的思维。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with that happy thought, we will — (laughter) — we will go to lunch now.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，带着这个愉快的想法，我们现在去吃午饭吧。（笑声）

We’ll reconvene about — let’s reconvene about a quarter of one. We’ll start at that time with Andrew and move onto section 2 when we come back.

我们将在一点钟的四分之一左右重新集合。到时我们将与安德鲁开始，然后在回来后进入第二部分。

Afternoon session

下午会议

38. Quarterly earnings release schedule

季度财报发布日程

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s get back to work.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，回到工作中。

I should mention one thing, because it’s appeared in the press recently — a bit.

我应该提到一件事，因为它最近在媒体上出现过——一点点。

We will — our goal is to issue every quarterly report on the last Friday — after the close — prior to the expiration of the 40-day period after the end of a quarter that we have for reporting to the SEC.

我们的目标是在每个季度结束后的 40 天内，在最后一个星期五——收盘后——发布每份季度报告，以便向 SEC 报告。

The SEC says 40 business days — or 40 calendar days — unless it ends on a weekend. Forty calendar days after the end of the quarter — that you have to file.” If it comes on a weekend, then it’s the Monday following that.

美国证券交易委员会表示，40 个工作日或 40 个日历日，除非它结束在周末。季度结束后的 40 个日历日——你必须提交。如果恰逢周末，那么就是随后的那个星期一。

That usually means — because we hold the meeting, usually, on the first Saturday in May — it usually means that the last Friday possible will be the day before the annual meeting.

这通常意味着——因为我们通常在五月的第一个星期六召开会议——这通常意味着最后一个可能的星期五将是年度会议的前一天。

This year, because the meeting is early on a calendar basis, because of Saturday falling on May 2nd, the last Friday will fall on May 8th. And that — our policy —

今年，由于会议在日历上提前举行，因为星期六在 5 月 2 日，所以最后一个星期五将落在 5 月 8 日。而我们的政策——

We like to get it out on a Friday afternoon, if possible, because we want people to have the whole weekend to read it before the market opens. It takes time to — I think it takes time, anyway — to digest the report.

我们希望在周五下午发布，如果可能的话，因为我们希望人们在市场开盘前有整个周末的时间来阅读它。我认为消化报告需要时间。

And we’d like — we don’t want some headline to determine market prices. We want, as much as possible, a thorough reading of the report.

我们希望——我们不希望某个头条新闻来决定市场价格。我们希望尽可能全面地阅读报告。

So we will always, unless something comes up, makes it unfeasible, we will issue our quarterly reports on the last Friday before the expiration of the 40-day period. And that’s what we’ll do this quarter. And so we have not changed anything.

所以我们将始终在 40 天期限到期前的最后一个星期五发布我们的季度报告，除非出现不可行的情况。这就是我们本季度要做的。因此，我们没有改变任何内容。

39. Preliminary Q1 earnings

初步第一季度收益

WARREN BUFFETT: I can tell you some preliminary figures, which then we have to file an 8-K on, because then the information I give you has to be in the public domain before the market opens.

沃伦·巴菲特：我可以告诉你一些初步数据，然后我们必须提交一份 8-K，因为我给你的信息必须在市场开盘之前进入公共领域。

But our — what I call our operating earnings, which would be the earnings before any gains or losses from securities or derivatives or any other transactions of that sort, the operating earnings will be about, after-tax, about 1.7 billion against 1.9 billion last year.

但我们的——我称之为运营收益的部分，即在任何证券、衍生品或其他此类交易的收益或损失之前的收益，运营收益在税后大约为 17 亿美元，而去年为 19 亿美元。

And — as I told you, we’re lucky to be — in this particular period — we’re lucky to be in the insurance and utility business. They’re relatively unaffected by the recession. Whereas most of our other businesses are anywhere from significantly to drastically affected by the recession.

而且——正如我告诉过你的，我们很幸运——在这个特定的时期——我们很幸运能在保险和公用事业行业。它们相对不受经济衰退的影响。而我们其他的大多数业务则受到经济衰退的影响，从显著到严重不等。

We had an underwriting profit, in our insurance business. It was a little larger than last year.

我们在保险业务中获得了承保利润，略高于去年。

Our float increased a couple of billion. That was primarily due to a transaction that was announced with Swiss Re, which occurred in March, in which they bought what’s known as an “adverse loss development cover” — and gave us 2 billion Swiss francs for that.

我们的浮存金增加了几十亿。这主要是由于与瑞士再保险公司宣布的一项交易，该交易发生在三月份，他们购买了所谓的“不利损失发展保障”——为此他们给了我们 20 亿瑞士法郎。

Now, that’s very, very long float. And the probability is that we will not pay out on that, probably, for at least 15 years and maybe quite a bit longer. So that’s long-duration float. And that’s what accounts for the 2 billion— roughly — $2 billion gain in float.

现在，这是一笔非常非常长的浮存金。我们很可能在至少 15 年内不会支付这笔款项，甚至可能更久。所以这就是长期浮存金。这就是导致大约 20 亿美元浮存金收入的原因。

The utility business — earnings are reported down somewhat. But there were two items that account for that. One is that, on our Constellation Energy deal, which blew up last year, and we reported a significant gain on it, we got a bunch of Constellation stock.

公用事业业务——收益有所下降。但有两个项目对此有影响。一个是我们的Constellation Energy交易，去年被中止，我们在其上报告了重大收益，我们获得了一堆Constellation Energy的股票。

Constellation Energy处于破产边缘时BRK先达成收购的协议，不到几周时间Constellation Energy又收到法国电力集团的报价，高出30%，BRK退出协议获得了12亿美元的补偿。

And that is a mark-to-market and goes through our income account, every day, in theory, but certainly every quarter. And Constellation was down somewhat during the quarter. So that got charged against the utility earnings.

这是一种按市值计价的方法，理论上每天都会计入我们的收入账户，但实际上每个季度都会计入。而在这个季度，Constellation 的表现有所下滑。因此，这对公用事业的收益造成了影响。

And then a larger item was a payment, and the final payment, in terms of options that were issued 10 years ago, which had the effect of increasing Berkshire’s interest in MidAmerican, which we like.

然后一个更大的项目是支付，以及最终支付，涉及10年前发行的期权，这增加了伯克希尔在MidAmerican的权益，这是我们所喜欢的。

But we wrote a check, a significant check, with MidAmerican to buy out the option. So — and that got recorded as an expense in the first quarter.

但我们开了一张支票，一张相当大的支票，给 MidAmerican 以买断这个期权。因此——这在第一季度被记录为一项费用。

But the utility earnings are more than satisfactory with those two items in it.

但公用事业收益在这两个项目中是相当满意的。

Then when you get into all of our other businesses, with just a couple of exceptions — those businesses are basically down. I mean, they’re all getting hit to varying degrees by the recession. So — that’s basically the operating earnings story.

然后，当你进入我们所有其他业务时，只有少数例外——这些业务基本上都在下滑。我的意思是，它们都在不同程度上受到经济衰退的影响。所以——这基本上就是运营收益的故事。

Our book value per share went down about 6 percent in the first quarter, which is a combination of security markets, and the fact that the credit default swaps, which — I’m the one responsible for writing them — that experience has turned worse, even since I wrote the annual report, in terms of bankruptcy.

我们的每股账面价值在第一季度下降了约6%，这是证券市场的组合，以及信用违约掉期（credit default swaps）的影响——我负责撰写这些——自我撰写年报以来，破产的情况变得更糟。

So that loss — or potential loss — we’re actually still funds ahead by a substantial margin — but that potential loss — and, I would say, expectable loss — is reflected in the first quarter figures. And of course, there’s been some bounce-back since March 31st. But that’s pretty much the story of the first quarter.

因此，那种损失——或潜在损失——实际上我们仍然有相当大的资金优势——但那种潜在损失——我会说是可预期的损失——在第一季度的数字中得到了反映。当然，自 3 月 31 日以来，情况有所回升。但这基本上就是第一季度的情况。

We ended the quarter with cash equivalence of about 22.7 billion, excluding any cash at the utility or at the finance company operation.

我们在本季度结束时的现金等价物约为 227 亿，不包括公用事业或金融公司运营中的任何现金。

But we spent 3 billion of that the next day on a Dow Chemical preferred. So we actually ended, effectively, one day later, the quarter with a little less than 20 billion in cash.

但我们第二天就花掉了其中的 30 亿购买Dow Chemical的优先股。因此，实际上我们在一个季度结束时，现金略少于 200 亿。

We always keep a significant amount of cash at the parent company, not at the regulated subsidiaries, so that — whatever comes along, we’re prepared for.

我们始终在母公司保持大量现金，而不是在受监管的子公司，这样无论发生什么，我们都做好了准备。

And that’s pretty much the story of the first quarter. And I wouldn’t be surprised — I mean, I guess I would almost be surprised if the opposite happened, if the world changed much — over the remainder of the year.

这基本上就是第一季度的故事。我不会感到惊讶——我的意思是，如果发生相反的情况，世界发生很大变化，我几乎会感到惊讶——在接下来的时间里。

I think that we will continue, barring some huge natural catastrophe, we will do quite well on insurance. And we will do in the utility operation. And we won’t do well in most of the other operations.

我认为，除非发生一些巨大的自然灾害，否则我们将继续在保险方面表现良好。在公用事业运营方面也会表现不错。而在其他大多数业务方面，我们的表现将不佳。

But we will have significant operating earnings, which I mentioned is about a billion-seven the first quarter.

但我们将有显著的运营收益，我提到过第一季度大约是十七亿美元。

If you look at our operating earnings, a billion, or a little more, that comes from MidAmerican — from our energy business, basically — we’re going to leave in that business. I mean, there’s all kinds of opportunities to do things even within our present subsidiaries. There’s lots of projects that promise decent returns.

如果你看看我们的运营收益，十亿或稍多一点，基本上来自 MidAmerican——来自我们的能源业务，我们会继续留在这个业务中。我的意思是，即使在我们现有的子公司内，也有各种机会可以做事情。有很多项目承诺提供不错的回报。

So you should not think of that billion or so as being available to us at the parent. It would be, if we wanted it to be. But as a practical matter, we’re going to leave it all in.

所以你不应该把那十亿多视为我们在母公司可以使用的资金。如果我们想的话，它是可以的。但实际上，我们会把所有的钱都留在里面。

The rest of the earnings are available to us in cash, plus or minus any change in the float, to do anything interesting that comes along.

其余的收益以现金形式可供我们使用，加上或减去任何浮动的变化，以便做任何有趣的事情。

So that’s an abbreviated summation of the first quarter. We will put out the 10-Q next Friday after the close. And we’ll continue to follow that policy.

所以这是第一季度的简要总结。我们将在下周五收盘后发布 10-Q 报告。我们将继续遵循这一政策。

40. “Value” investments? What other kind are there?

“价值”投资？还有什么其他类型的投资？

WARREN BUFFETT: With that, we’ll go to Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我们去找安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Excellent. This question actually just came across the BlackBerry before lunch from what I think is an audience member.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：很好。这个问题实际上是在午餐前通过黑莓发来的，我认为是来自一位观众。

Josh Wolfe (PH) of New York writes the following: “BYD appears to be more like a venture capital speculative investment than a value investment. Would you both explain that investment, your logic behind it, and your expectations for it?”

纽约的乔希·沃尔夫（PH）写道：“比亚迪似乎更像是一项风险投资的投机，而不是价值投资。你们能否解释一下这项投资、你们的逻辑以及你们对它的期望？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’m going to turn that over to Charlie in just one second. But Charlie and I think there is no other kind of investment than a value investment.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我马上就会把这个交给查理。但查理和我认为，没有其他类型的投资，只有价值投资。

In other words, we don’t know how anybody would invest in a non-value investment. So we’ve always been puzzled by the term, “value,” and saying that contrasts with growth or anything.

换句话说，我们不知道别人如何投资于非价值投资。所以我们一直对“价值”这个术语感到困惑，并且说它与增长或其他任何东西形成对比。

Value relates to getting a lot for the expectable flow of cash in the future, in terms of what you’re laying out today.

价值与未来可预期现金流的回报有关，具体来说，就是你今天所投入的。

So we — we’ve always — every time somebody characterizes us as value investors, we always ask them, what other kind can there be?

所以我们——我们一直——每当有人把我们描述为价值投资者时，我们总是问他们，还有什么其他类型的投资者呢？

41. Munger: Electric car maker BYD is a “damn miracle”

芒格：电动车制造商比亚迪是一个“该死的奇迹”

WARREN BUFFETT: But Charlie is our team leader here on BYD. And he gets very excited. So I may have to control him. But go to it, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但是查理是我们在比亚迪的团队领导。他非常兴奋。所以我可能得控制一下他。不过，查理，尽管去吧。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, well, of course, BYD, although its founder is only 43 years old, is not some early-stage venture capital company.

查理·芒格：是的，当然，比亚迪，尽管其创始人只有43岁，并不是一家早期的风险投资公司。

BYD is one of the main manufacturers to the world of the rechargeable lithium battery. And it achieved that position from a standing start at zero under the leadership of the founder, Wang Chuanfu.

比亚迪是全球可充电锂电池的主要制造商之一。在创始人王传福的领导下，它从零起步，达到了这一地位。

And — they went on into cell phone components and developed a huge position.

他们进入了手机组件领域，并建立了一个庞大的市场地位。

And then, finally, not satisfied with having worked a couple of miracles, Wang Chuanfu decided he would go into the automobile business.

最后，王传福不满足于已经创造的几个奇迹，决定进入汽车行业。

As nearly as I can tell, it was zero experience in automobiles. And from a standing start at zero and with very little capital, he rapidly was able to create the best-selling single model in China.

据我所知，他在汽车方面几乎没有经验。在几乎没有资金的情况下，他从零起步，迅速创造出了中国最畅销的单一车型。

And that’s against competition that was Chinese joint ventures with all the major auto companies of the world, technological marvels with way more capital and so on.

这与中国的合资企业竞争，这些企业与世界主要汽车公司合作，拥有更多的资本和技术奇迹。

This is not some unproven, highly speculative activity. What it is, is a damn miracle. And — (Laughter)

这不是一些未经验证的高度投机活动。这是一个该死的奇迹。——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I warned you. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我警告过你们。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And of course, Wang Chuanfu has hired 17,000 engineering graduates. And those engineering graduates are selected from a billion, 300 million people in China.

查理·芒格：当然，王传福雇用了 17,000 名工程毕业生。这些工程毕业生是从中国 13 亿人中挑选出来的。

And he’s hiring at the top of the classes. And — so you get a remarkable aggregation of human talent.

他在顶尖班级中招聘。因此，你会得到一个卓越的人才聚集。

And then you’ve got the basic quality of the Chinese people. Which, when unfettered from the wrong kind of government — for instance, the wrong kind of emperor — the Chinese people succeed mightily.

然后你就看到了中国人民的基本素质。当摆脱了错误类型的政府——例如，错误类型的皇帝——时，中国人民会取得巨大的成功。

When they came to this country as “coolies” — slaves — they would leave and soon be the most important people in the town.

当他们以“苦力”——奴隶——的身份来到这个国家时，他们会离开，并很快成为镇上最重要的人。

So this is a very talented group of people. And, in a sense, this particular period may be Chinese — the Chinese day.

所以这是一群非常有才华的人。从某种意义上说，这个特定时期可能是中国人的“黄金时代”。

And of course, these batteries, these lithium batteries, are totally needed in the future of the world. We need them in every utility company in America. We need them in every utility company in the world.

当然，这些电池，这些锂电池，在未来的世界中是绝对必要的。我们在美国的每个公用事业公司都需要它们。我们在世界上每个公用事业公司都需要它们。

And we have to use the direct power of the sun. And we can’t do that without marvelous batteries. And he’s in the — BYD is in the sweet spot on that stuff.

我们必须利用太阳的直接能量。而且没有出色的电池，我们无法做到这一点。他在——比亚迪在这方面处于有利位置。

And I know it looks like a miracle. And it looks like Warren and I have gone crazy. But I don’t think we have.

我知道这看起来像一个奇迹。看起来沃伦和我已经疯了。但我不认为我们疯了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, one of us, at most. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，最多只有我们其中一个人。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And that car you’re going to see in the annex — I think they make everything in that car except the glass and the rubber. There may be a couple of small exceptions.

查理·芒格：而且你将在附录中看到的那辆车——我认为他们制造了那辆车的所有部分，除了玻璃和橡胶。可能有几个小例外。

That’s unheard of. Whoever went into the automobile business and made every part, and made the automobile a best-settle — best-selling — thing? This is not normal. I mean, this is very unusual.

这简直是闻所未闻。谁会进入汽车行业，制造每一个零件，并把汽车变成最畅销的产品？这不正常。我是说，这非常不寻常。

And I regard it as a privilege to have Berkshire associated with a company that is trying to do so much that’s so important for humanity, when you get right down to it. Because it may be a small company, but its ambitions are large.

我认为能够让伯克希尔与一家为人类做如此重要事情而努力的公司合作是一种特权。因为这可能是一家小公司，但它的抱负却很大。

And I don’t want to bet against 17,000 Chinese engineers led by Wang Chuanfu, plus 100,000 more talented Chinese in a brand-new area — constructed the way they want it. I will be amazed, if great things don’t happen here.

我不想和 17000 名由王传福领导的中国工程师以及另外 10 万名在全新领域中以他们想要的方式构建的优秀中国人才对赌。如果这里没有发生伟大的事情，我会感到惊讶。

I don’t think, given the size, it can be all that important to Berkshire, financially. But I have never, in my life, been more — felt more privileged to be associated with something than I feel about BYD.

我认为，考虑到规模，这对伯克希尔在财务上并不是那么重要。但在我的一生中，我从未感到比与比亚迪的关联更有特权。

WARREN BUFFETT: BYD was Charlie’s last year. The Irish banks were mine. So he’s — (laughter) — the winner.

沃伦·巴菲特：比亚迪是查理去年的投资。爱尔兰银行是我的。所以他是——（笑声）——赢家。

BYD, incidentally, does $4 billion a year of business. I mean, so it is not a small business. And it will probably get a lot larger.

比亚迪顺便提一下，每年的营业额达到 40 亿美元。我是说，这并不是一个小企业。而且它可能会变得更大。

42. U.S. dollar will buy less in the future

未来美元的购买力将下降

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to the — area 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们去第 2 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Dan Lewis (PH). I’m from Chicago.

观众：你好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫丹·刘易斯（音）。我来自芝加哥。

My question has to do with the U.S. dollar versus other major currencies. You spoke a little bit already about the — government policy and its effect on inflation in the future.

我的问题与美元与其他主要货币的关系有关。您已经稍微谈到了政府政策及其对未来通货膨胀的影响。

And just by itself, you’d think inflation would hurt the dollar. But obviously, there’s a lot of other factors at play. So I’m kind of interested in knowing your latest outlook on the dollar.

单靠通货膨胀，你可能会认为这会对美元造成伤害。但显然，还有很多其他因素在起作用。因此，我对你最新的美元前景很感兴趣。

I know you’ve been bearish. But given everything that’s been thrown up in the air in the last six months, how you think these various things will come together, trade deficit, budget deficits, and how it will affect the dollar?

我知道你一直持悲观态度。但考虑到过去六个月中发生的各种事情，你认为这些因素，包括贸易赤字、预算赤字，将如何结合在一起，以及这将如何影响美元？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s pretty unpredictable. But the — I will guarantee you that the dollar will buy less, you know, five, 10, 20 years from now. And it may be — it may buy very, very substantially less.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是相当不可预测的。但是——我可以保证，美元在五年、十年、二十年后会买到更少的东西。而且它可能会买到的东西会少得非常多。

But I don’t know that, obviously. But we are doing things that will hurt the purchasing power of the dollar.

但我显然不知道这一点。但我们正在做一些会伤害美元购买力的事情。

On the other hand, the same thing is happening in countries around the world. So it’s very difficult to say whether the dollar versus the pound or the dollar versus the euro, et cetera — how that will behave.

另一方面，世界各国也发生着同样的事情。因此，很难说美元与英镑或美元与欧元等之间的汇率将如何变化。

Because, you know, the British will run a deficit this year of 12 and a fraction percent of GDP. And even the Germans, with their, you know, long-time fear of inflation, will probably run a deficit of 6 and a fraction percent of GDP.

因为，你知道，英国今年将运行一个占GDP 12%多一点的赤字。即使是德国，他们长期以来对通胀的恐惧，也可能运行一个占GDP 6%多一点的赤字。

So you’ve got governments around the world all electing to run — and I think properly so — electing to run very material deficits, in some cases, you know, close to unprecedented except in wartime — electing to do that in order to offset this contraction of demand by their citizenry.

所以，世界各国政府都选择运行——我认为这是正确的——选择运行非常大的赤字，在某些情况下，这种赤字接近于历史上前所未有的水平，除了战争时期——选择这样做是为了抵消公民需求的收缩。

And how that plays out in relative exchange rates, I can’t tell you. How it will play out in terms of the value of their currencies’ purchasing power in the future versus now, I think, is fairly easy to say, and that’s that it’s going to cause units of currency to buy a lot less over time.

我无法告诉你这在相对汇率中如何表现。至于它在未来与现在相比对他们货币购买力的影响，我认为这相对容易说，那就是货币单位随着时间的推移将购买到的东西会大大减少。

That isn’t going to happen in the next year or two. But that doesn’t mean that markets won’t start anticipating it at some point. And it’s going to be a very, very interesting future.

这在未来一两年内是不会发生的。但这并不意味着市场不会在某个时刻开始产生预期。而且未来将会非常非常有趣。

I mean, we are doing things that we haven’t seen in the past. And policymakers do not know the outcome of that. I don’t know the outcome of it. You do know it will have consequences. And — you can bet on inflation.

我的意思是，我们正在做一些过去没有见过的事情。政策制定者不知道结果会怎样。我也不知道结果会怎样。你知道这会有后果。而且——你可以打赌会有通货膨胀。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — I was raised here in Omaha. And I well remember the two-cent first class stamp and the five-cent hamburger. And so, in my life, there’s been a lot of inflation.

查理·芒格：好吧——我在奥马哈长大。我清楚地记得两分钱的邮票和五分钱的汉堡。因此，在我的生活中，经历了很多通货膨胀。

And in my life, I think I’ve had the most privileged era of all history in which to live. So a little inflation is not going to ruin the lives of any of us.

在我的生活中，我认为我生活在历史上最有特权的时代。因此，稍微的通货膨胀不会毁掉我们任何人的生活。

The trick is to avoid the runaway inflation. That is a problem Warren and I are going to quitclaim to the younger people. (Laughter)

诀窍是避免失控的通货膨胀。这是沃伦和我将要转交给年轻人的问题。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Here is a product, though. Six and a half ounces of this product, 100 years ago, cost a nickel plus a two-cent deposit. And it’s hardly gone up in price at all. It’s very interesting. And wheat hasn’t gone up that much or oats or things of that sort.

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，这里有一个产品。100 年前，这种产品六盎司半的价格是五分加两分的押金。而它的价格几乎没有上涨。这非常有趣。小麦、燕麦或类似的东西也没有上涨太多。

可口可乐。

And on the other hand, a newspaper that cost a penny 100 years ago costs a dollar now and they lose money turning it out. So it gets very uneven, in terms of its impact.

另一方面，100 年前一分钱的报纸现在要花一美元，而他们在制作过程中却亏损。因此，在影响力方面变得非常不均衡。

43. Buffett “irritated” by the loss of triple-A rating

巴菲特对失去 AAA 评级感到“恼火”

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: Warren, Charlie — this question, I got a good many of these. This one comes from — who does it come from? Well, it comes from Mr. Kempton (PH) — Kempton Lam or Lam Kempton (PH) — one of the two — from Calgary, Canada.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：沃伦，查理——这个问题，我收到了很多类似的。这一个来自——它来自谁呢？嗯，它来自肯普顿先生（PH）——肯普顿·拉姆或拉姆·肯普顿（PH）——其中之一——来自加拿大卡尔加里。

And the question is, “How would you quantify the financial impact and damage of Berkshire losing its triple-A credit rating — which increased the cost of capital of Berkshire, which was surely a competitive advantage for the company?

问题是，“你将如何量化伯克希尔失去其三 A 级信用评级的财务影响和损失——这增加了伯克希尔的资本成本，而这无疑是公司的竞争优势？”

“And Warren, what are you doing actively to try to restore Berkshire’s triple-A rating? Do you think that Berkshire will be able to regain it?”

“沃伦，你正在积极做些什么来恢复伯克希尔的三 A 级评级？你认为伯克希尔能够重新获得吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it won’t regain it soon, because I don’t think rating agencies will turn around like that, even if they should. We have a triple-A from Standard & Poor’s, but it’s provisional. And they’re going to look at it in about — I think they said about 12 months.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，它不会很快恢复，因为我认为评级机构不会那么快改变，即使他们应该。我们从标准普尔获得了 AAA 评级，但这是临时的。他们大约会在——我想他们说大约 12 个月后再看。

Moody’s affirmed the rating early in January. Then we issued a bond at one point, where it was — well, that was right after the rating changed.

穆迪在一月初确认了评级。然后我们在某个时点发行了一只债券，那时——好吧，那正是在评级变更之后。

And actually, in terms of our credit default swaps, which is a metric you can use for credit acceptance — although, I’ll tell you, in a second, an interesting aspect of that — that spread came down, actually.

实际上，就我们的信用违约掉期而言，这是一个可以用来衡量信用接受度的指标——不过，我会在稍后告诉你一个有趣的方面——那个利差实际上是下降的。

It makes very, very little difference in our borrowing costs. I mean, very little. And it never has, incidentally. I mean, double-As versus triple-As, the spread has always been very small.

这对我们的借款成本几乎没有影响。我是说，几乎没有。而且，顺便提一下，这一直都是这样。我是说，双 A 与三 A 之间的利差一直都很小。

And people would argue, in finance classes and all that, it wasn’t worth paying the price to have a triple-A because you didn’t save that much on debt. And it costs you, in terms of return on equity.

人们会争论，在金融课程等场合，拥有 AAA 评级不值得支付这个价格，因为你在债务上并没有节省太多。而且这在股本回报方面会让你付出代价。

I never subscribed to that. And I very much liked having a triple-A from both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. I was disappointed when Moody’s downgraded us. We didn’t really think that was going to happen, but it did.

我从来没有认同过这一点。我非常喜欢同时拥有穆迪和标准普尔的 AAA 评级。当穆迪将我们的评级下调时，我感到失望。我们真的没有想到会发生这种事，但它确实发生了。

And — it doesn’t have any material effect on borrowing costs. It does cause us to lose some bragging rights around the world in terms of our insurance promise, although nobody ranks ahead of us, that’s for sure.

而且——这对借贷成本没有任何实质性的影响。它确实使我们在全球范围内失去了一些关于我们保险承诺的自豪感，尽管可以肯定的是，没有人能超越我们。

But, it will not change back in a hurry. I mean, people don’t make decisions in committees that they reverse very quickly. It’s just not human nature.

但这不会很快改变。我的意思是，人们在委员会中做出的决定不会很快被推翻。这就是人性。

We’re still a triple-A in my mind. And actually, we’re a triple-A in Standard & Poor’s’ mind, till we hear something differently.

在我看来，我们仍然是三 A 级别。实际上，在标准普尔看来，我们也是三 A 级别，直到我们听到不同的消息。

We certainly think, and we run it in a way, that there can be no stronger credit than Berkshire.

我们当然认为，并且我们以一种方式运作，伯克希尔的信用没有比这更强的了。

It’s difficult for a rating agency, if they have a checkbox system of ratios and such, to measure something like the attitude of management toward creditors.

对于评级机构来说，如果他们有一个打勾系统的比率和其他指标，衡量像伯克希尔管理层对债权人的态度是很困难的。

But I will assure you that Berkshire has a management that regards meeting its obligations as sacred and a lot more important than increasing earnings per share or anything of the sort.

但我可以向您保证，伯克希尔的管理层将履行其义务视为神圣的事情，这比提高每股收益或其他任何类似的事情更为重要。

I mean, we have obligations to people in something like workers’ compensation that go 50 years out in the future. I mean, this is somebody that’s been injured severely and they get a check every month from Berkshire.

我的意思是，我们对像工人赔偿这样的事情有义务，甚至要延续到未来 50 年。这是一个受到严重伤害的人，他们每个月都会从伯克希尔那里收到一张支票。

And you know, that’s a lot more important than whether we earn X, or X plus a tenth, or a couple of tenths, percent on equity. And we conduct ourselves, or we try to — certainly try to conduct ourselves — so that not only will people get those checks, but they’ll never have to even worry about getting those checks.

你知道，这比我们赚取 X，或者 X 加十分之一，或者几分之一的股本要重要得多。我们以这样的方式行事，或者说我们努力这样做——当然，我们努力这样做——以便人们不仅能收到这些支票，而且他们甚至不必担心能否收到这些支票。

And that’s very difficult for a rating agency to quantify that attitude on the part of the management of Berkshire. But believe me, it exists.

这对于评级机构来说，很难量化伯克希尔管理层的这种态度。但相信我，它确实存在。

And — I would say that the triple-A change at Moody’s is not going to be material in the future of Berkshire. But it still irritates me.

而且——我想说穆迪的三 A 级别变化在伯克希尔的未来中不会产生重大影响。但这仍然让我感到恼火。

Charlie? (Laughs) 查理？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at least they showed a considerable independence. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，至少他们表现出了相当的独立性。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Who knows? That may have entered into it, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：谁知道呢？这也可能与此有关。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. My attitude is quite philosophical. I think the next change at Moody’s will be in the opposite direction. And I think that will happen because we deserve a higher rating and they’re smart. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的。我的态度相当哲学。我认为穆迪的下一个变化将朝着相反的方向发展。我认为这将发生，因为我们值得更高的评级，他们也很聪明。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie and I disagree, and we do disagree a lot. We never argue, but we disagree.

沃伦·巴菲特：当查理和我意见不合时，我们确实有很多分歧。我们从不争吵，但我们确实不同意。

And Charlie, when he gets to the point where he really wants me to do something, like buy the BYD interest or something, he always says to me, “Well,” he says, “in the end, you’ll see it my way. Because you’re smart, and I’m right.” (Laughter)

查理，当他真的想让我做某件事，比如购买比亚迪的股份时，他总是对我说：“好吧，”他说，“最终你会理解我的观点。因为你聪明，而我是对的。”（笑声）

44. “Crazy” prices for Berkshire credit default swaps

“疯狂”的伯克希尔信用违约掉期价格

WARREN BUFFETT: I will — I can’t resist pointing out one item that is, maybe, a little technical to most of you. But there are some people here who will find it quite interesting. And it actually even enters into credit ratings to a great extent, the credit default swaps enter into it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我会——我忍不住要指出一个对你们中的大多数人来说可能有点技术性的项目。但这里有些人会觉得它非常有趣。实际上，它在很大程度上还涉及到信用评级，信用违约掉期也与之相关。

When we write a, let’s take an equity put option, and we get paid for writing a billion dollar put, somebody pays us $150 million, we get the $150 million of cash that day.

当我们写一个，比如说一个股权认沽期权，并且我们为写一个十亿美元的认沽期权获得报酬，有人支付我们 1.5 亿美元，我们当天就获得这 1.5 亿美元的现金。

And we set up a liability for 150 million the first day, for the value or the — that we — our appraisal of what it’s going to cost us to meet that obligation. I mean, that’s the market price for it.

我们在第一天设立了一个1.5亿美元的负债，这是我们对履行该义务所需成本的评估。我是说，这是市场价格。

The other guy takes 150 million out of his cash and sets up a $150 million receivable that day.

另一个家伙从他的现金中取出 1.5 亿，并在那天设立了 1.5 亿的应收账款。

Now, these receivables and payables change over time. But the first day, no profit, no loss, just cash changing hands. One guy sets up an asset, the other guy — we set up a liability.

现在，这些应收款和应付款会随着时间变化。但在第一天，没有利润，也没有损失，只是现金在转手。一个人设立了资产，另一个人——我们设立了负债。

Now, as the world has developed in the last couple of years, the value of that asset to the other fellow has increased in a mark-to-market basis.

随着过去几年的发展，那个资产对另一个人的价值按市值计价基础上增加了。

And he reports that through earnings. So his asset goes up. Our liability goes up. And we report that through earnings as a loss.

他通过收益报告这一点。所以他的资产增加了。我们的负债增加了。我们通过收益报告这作为亏损。

But we’ve got the cash and he’s got an asset from us that comes due in 15 years or something like that.

但我们有现金，而他从我们这里获得的资产将在 15 年左右到期。

And in the last couple of years, the — his auditors — his credit department — has said, “Gee, you’ve got a receivable from Berkshire that comes due in 15 years. And, they don’t have to post collateral. So you have to go out and buy a credit default swap to protect yourself against that receivable going bad.”

在过去的几年里，他的审计师——他的信贷部门——说：“哎，你有一笔来自伯克希尔的应收款，15 年后到期。而且，他们不需要提供担保。所以你必须去购买信用违约掉期，以保护自己免受这笔应收款的损失。”

Now, that has two effects. A, he’s laying out money every year to buy something that doesn’t cost us anything but costs him real money. So the — and the more he shows us a profit, the more of the credit insurance he has to buy, so the more money it costs him every year.

现在，这有两个影响。首先，他每年都要花钱购买一些对我们没有成本但对他来说却是真正花费的东西。因此——而且他越是向我们展示利润，他就越需要购买信用保险，这样每年花费就越多。

And that has driven up the demand for credit default swaps at Berkshire, which made for some crazy prices. So at one point, our credit default swaps were costing that guy five percent a year.

这推动了伯克希尔对信用违约掉期的需求，导致了一些疯狂的价格。因此，在某个时刻，我们的信用违约掉期每年让那个人花费了五个百分点。

So if he was showing, say, a $200 million asset, he was laying out $10 a year, and he was going to have to lay it out for 15 years, just because of these — this credit department’s requirements.

所以如果他展示的是一个价值 2 亿美元的资产，他每年要支付 1000万美元，并且必须支付 15 年，仅仅是因为这些——这个信贷部门的要求。

And it made it very unpleasant for the people on the other side of our transactions, even though they keep writing up the profits. It doesn’t cost us anything. But it does result in kind of a crazy market in the credit default swaps.

这让我们交易另一方的人感到非常不愉快，尽管他们不断在写利润。这对我们没有任何成本。但这确实导致了信用违约掉期市场的疯狂。

I realize that that has not been a burning issue with many of you. But it is an unusual — it’s something I didn’t anticipate.

我意识到这对你们中的许多人来说并不是一个迫切的问题。但这是一个不寻常的——这是我没有预料到的事情。

And it explains why, to some extent, people may want to modify their contracts with us. And if they — with us — and if they want to modify them enough, we’ll answer the phone. But in the meantime, we’re sitting with the money. (Laughter)

这也解释了为什么在某种程度上，人们可能想要修改与我们的合同。如果他们——与我们——如果他们想要足够多地修改，我们会接电话。但与此同时，我们手里有钱。（笑声）

45. MidAmerican working with Iowa on wind farms

MidAmerican 与爱荷华州合作建设风力发电场

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to area 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们去第三区域。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jim Hadden (PH), a Cornhusker in Davenport, Iowa.

观众成员：吉姆·哈登（PH），一位来自爱荷华州达文波特的康霍斯特。

On our drive over from Davenport, we noticed two rather large wind farms by MidAmerica Energy.

在我们从达文波特开车过来的途中，我们注意到中美能源旁有两个相当大的风力发电场。

And my question is, when will be the return on investment of these wind farms? And are Berkshire Hathaway looking at any other alternative energies?

我的问题是，这些风力发电场的投资回报期是什么时候？伯克希尔·哈撒韦是否在考虑其他替代能源？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re the largest, in terms of owned capacity in wind, in the country, I believe, of any utility. And Iowa has the greatest percentage of its electricity generated by wind.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们是全国拥有风能发电能力最大的公用事业公司。我相信，爱荷华州的电力中由风能产生的比例最高。

But of course, the wind only blows about 35 percent of the time in Iowa, something like that. And we’ve got people here who can be more accurate than that. But — so you can’t count on it for your base load or anything of the sort.

但当然，风在爱荷华州大约只有 35%的时间在吹，差不多是这样。我们这里有一些人可以更准确地预测。但是——所以你不能把它作为你的基础负荷或任何类似的东西来依赖。

But Iowa has been very, very receptive and, I would argue, progressive, in encouraging us — and we’ve encouraged them, in return — to bring in a lot of wind capacity.

但是爱荷华州非常、非常乐于接受，我认为在鼓励我们方面是进步的——我们也回过头来鼓励他们——引入大量风能发电能力。

We are a net exporter of electricity in Iowa. Iowa’s far more than self-sufficient in our service area in terms of electric generation. And I think that works to the benefit of the people of Iowa.

我们是爱荷华州的电力净出口州。爱荷华州在我们的服务区域内的电力生产方面远远超过自给自足。我认为这对爱荷华州人民是有利的。

And we have an arrangement with Iowa. We — as you may know, we have not increased our rates at all — what — for more than a decade now. And that’s been achieved by efficiencies. It’s been achieved with wind generation.

我们与爱荷华州有一个安排。正如您所知，我们的费率已经超过十年没有任何增加。这是通过提高效率实现的，也是通过风能发电实现的。

We have a return that’s built in on that that’s fair to us, fair to the people of Iowa. And part of that return comes in the form of a tax credit — I think it’s 1.8 cents per kilowatt hour — that is given to anybody in the United States that develops wind power generation.

我们有一个内置的回报，对我们和爱荷华州人民都是公平的。这个回报的一部分以税收抵免的形式出现——我认为是每千瓦时 1.8 美分——这项抵免给予任何在美国开发风能发电的人。

We love the idea of putting in more wind. And we’re doing it. We’re doing it out at PacifiCorp. And I think we’ll continue to be a leader in it.

我们喜欢增加风能的想法。我们正在这样做。我们在太平洋电力公司正在进行这项工作。我认为我们将继续在这方面保持领先。

One advantage we have over, perhaps, some people is that we are a big taxpayer, so that we don’t have to worry about whether the tax credits are useful.

我们相对于某些人有一个优势，那就是我们是一个大纳税人，因此我们不必担心税收抵免是否有用。

I guess the tax credit could be sold, also. But we don’t need to do that in our particular situation. So you’ll see more and more wind generation by the MidAmerican companies.

我想税收抵免也可以被出售。但在我们特定的情况下，我们不需要这样做。所以你会看到中美公司越来越多的风能发电。

When we went into PacifiCorp out on the West Coast, to six states out there, they had virtually nothing — maybe nothing at all — in wind generation. And we’ve developed a lot. And we’ve got more coming on.

当我们进入PacifiCorp，进入西海岸的六个州时，他们几乎没有——可能完全没有——风力发电。而我们已经开发了很多，且还会继续开发更多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think in practically anything that makes sense in utilities, the Berkshire subsidiaries will be leaders. I think we can all be very proud of MidAmerican and its two leaders.

查理·芒格：哦，我认为在任何合理的公用事业领域，伯克希尔的子公司都会是领导者。我认为我们都可以为中美能源及其两位领导者感到非常自豪。

46. Constellation and Dynergy deals

Constellation和 Dynergy 交易

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’re enormously proud of MidAmerican. And we will do a lot more in utilities over time. Constellation didn’t work out. I wish it had. But we were back there — Constellation, we learned of their troubles on a Tuesday at noon. I mean, we saw it in the stock price and so on.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们对中美能源感到非常自豪。随着时间的推移，我们将在公用事业方面做更多的事情。Constellation没有成功。我希望它能成功。但我们当时在那儿— Constellation，我们在一个星期二中午得知了他们的麻烦。我是说，我们在股价等方面看到了这一点。

Dave Sokol and Greg Abel were in Baltimore that evening with a firm, all-cash bid to solve Constellation’s problems. And Constellation was likely to get downgraded within 48 hours, maybe 24 hours.

戴夫·索科尔（Dave Sokol）和格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）那天晚上在巴尔的摩与一家公司进行了全现金竞购，以解决Constellation的问题。Constellation可能会在48小时内，甚至24小时内被降级。

And they would’ve had posting requirements in connection with various derivative transactions that they probably would not have met. I mean, they were facing bankruptcy.

他们可能在各种衍生交易中有披露要求，而他们可能无法满足这些要求。我的意思是，他们面临破产。

And we literally went from a phone call that Dave made to me at noon or 1 o’clock to handing them a firm bid that evening in Baltimore. And that’s one of the advantages of Berkshire. That is — I think that’s a durable competitive advantage.

我们实际上是从戴夫中午或下午 1 点给我打的电话，到当晚在巴尔的摩递交了一个正式的投标。这就是伯克希尔的一个优势。我认为这是一个持久的竞争优势。

I think there are very few organizations that will act in that manner and that — where you have the talent there that you feel is — as a CEO — you can back them up with that kind of money without worrying about it.

我认为很少有组织会以那种方式行事，而当你觉得有才能的人在那里的时候，作为首席执行官，你可以用那种资金支持他们，而不必担心。

So it’s — that is a plus — for Berkshire, even though it didn’t work out in that case. We will do more in the utility business.

所以这对伯克希尔来说是一个好处，尽管在那个案例中并没有成功。我们将在公用事业业务中做更多的事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you bought a pipeline, didn’t you, in about two hours?

查理·芒格：好吧，你大约花了两个小时买了一条管道，是吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we did buy a pipeline, and it’s turned out very well.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们确实买了一条管道，结果非常好。

And, in that particular case, the company, Dynegy, that — this was back in 2002 or so — the company needed the money enormously. They had gotten the pipeline from Enron. It was a very complicated transaction.

而在那个特定的案例中，Dynegy 公司——大约是在 2002 年左右——非常需要这笔钱。他们从安然公司获得了管道。这是一笔非常复杂的交易。

But they needed the money. And we needed the Federal Trade Commission approval, the FTC approval, on the deal, as would anybody that was buying it.

但他们需要钱。我们也需要联邦贸易委员会的批准，FTC 的批准，才能进行这笔交易，任何购买它的人都需要。

And we literally wrote a letter. I wrote a letter to the commission. And I said, you know, “These guys need the money. They need it before the 30-day period is up. And let us go through with this early. And we’ll do any damn thing you tell us, subsequently.”

我们确实写了一封信。我给委员会写了一封信。我说：“这些人需要钱。他们需要在 30 天期限之前得到这笔钱。让我们提前进行这个。之后我们会听从你们的任何指示。”

And Berkshire can make that kind of a transaction. We don’t ask the lawyers before we do it or anything. We just do it.

而伯克希尔可以进行那种交易。我们在做之前不问律师或其他任何人。我们就是这样做的。

And that is an advantage. And it was an advantage to Dynegy. It got them through a period that they would’ve — I’m not sure they would’ve gotten through otherwise. So, we can move fast when the time comes.

这就是一个优势。这对 Dynegy 来说是一个优势。它帮助他们度过了一个他们可能无法度过的时期。因此，当时机来临时，我们可以迅速行动。

But the — one of the reasons we — there’s a couple of reasons we move fast. A, we’ve always got the money. You know, but — and we’ve got a mental attitude toward that.

但——我们快速行动的原因有几个。首先，我们一直有钱。你知道，但——我们对此有一种心态。

But we also know we’ve got the managers that can deliver on the properties, once we own them. And that’s a huge, huge advantage. Back —

但我们也知道，我们有能够在拥有资产后交付的管理者。这是一个巨大的、巨大的优势。回到——

(BREAK IN RECORDING) （录音中断）

47. Foreign ownership rules limit China opportunities

外国所有权规则限制中国的机会

WARREN BUFFETT (IN PROGRESS): — China. We would be restricted by that ownership limitation.

沃伦·巴菲特（进行中）：——中国。我们将受到所有权限制的影响。

But it’s very hard to imagine that we won’t find more things to do in China over time. I mean, it’s a huge market. We do a lot of things. And some of those are exportable.

但很难想象随着时间的推移我们在中国不会找到更多的事情可做。我的意思是，这是一个巨大的市场。我们做了很多事情。其中一些是可以出口的。

And there will also, perhaps, be opportunities to buy more businesses there. We would’ve bought more than 10 percent of BYD, if we could’ve. But, that’s all that they wished to sell us. So we hope that comes about.

也许还会有机会在那里购买更多的企业。如果可以的话，我们本来会购买超过 10%的比亚迪。但这就是他们愿意卖给我们的全部。所以我们希望这能实现。

48. U.S. trade deficit is actually China’s problem

美国的贸易赤字实际上是中国的问题

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of the Chinese dollar holdings, you know, in a way, they can’t get rid of owning more dollar assets. I mean, the nature of it is, if we’re going to run a, as we did a few years ago, or a year or two ago —

沃伦·巴菲特：就中国持有的美元资产而言，他们在某种程度上无法摆脱拥有更多美元资产的局面。我的意思是，如果我们要像几年前，或者一两年前那样运行——

If we’re going to run a $250 billion trade deficit with China, I mean, if they’re going to send us goods — and we want those goods — to the tune of $250 billion more than we sell to them, they end up with $250 billion of little pieces of paper.

如果我们要与中国有 2500 亿美元的贸易逆差，我的意思是，如果他们要向我们发送商品——而我们想要这些商品——比我们卖给他们的多出 2500 亿美元，他们最终得到的是 2500 亿美元的小纸片。

And they can convert those pieces of paper, called U.S. dollars, they can convert them into — U.S. real estate, into U.S. stocks, U.S. government bonds. They can do all kinds of things.

他们可以将这些纸币，称为美元，转换成——美国房地产、美国股票、美国政府债券。他们可以做各种事情。

They can even trade them to the French, you know, and get euros or something in exchange. But then the French have the problem.

他们甚至可以把它们交易给法国人，你知道的，换取欧元或其他东西。但这样一来，法国人就有了问题。

So the — Chinese dollar assets are going to build as long as there’s a significant trade surplus with China. And then they have the choice of what to put those dollars into. And they have elected, so far, to put a significant amount — into U.S. government bonds.

所以，只要与中国存在显著的贸易顺差，中国的美元资产就会增加。然后他们有选择将这些美元投入到什么地方。到目前为止，他们选择将大量资金投入到美国政府债券中。

And — I think — a major official, about a month ago or so in China, said he wasn’t too happy about the prospect of what’s going to happen in terms of the purchasing power of that money that’s been put in U.S. government bonds. And I would say he’s right.

我认为，大约一个月前，中国的一位高级官员表示，他对将资金投入美国国债后购买力的前景并不太满意。我认为他说得对。

I mean, he — it — he — anybody that owns dollar obligations outside of this country is, if they hold them a long time, is going to get less back in the way of purchasing power than existed at the time that they took on those dollar obligations.

我的意思是，他——它——他——任何在这个国家以外拥有美元债务的人，如果他们持有很长时间，最终得到的购买力将会低于他们承担这些美元债务时的水平。

And it’s a major problem, not the world’s worst problem, but it’s a major problem for a finance minister or a government in China to decide what to do with this buildup that comes about, because they are running a trade surplus.

这是一项重大问题，虽然不是世界上最糟糕的问题，但对于中国的财政部长或政府来说，决定如何处理这种因贸易顺差而产生的积累是一个重大问题。

And — they’ve set up the Chinese Investment Corp, which has a couple hundred billion dollars in it — in terms of deciding to make investments around the world, but —

他们设立了中国投资公司，里面有几千亿美元，用于在全球范围内进行投资，但——

49. Munger: China’s economic policies are “exactly right”

芒格：中国的经济政策“完全正确”

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s an interesting question, if you made me the finance minister of China, what I would do with the trade surplus, the funds that came in because of the trade surplus.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个有趣的问题，如果你让我担任中国的财政部长，我会如何处理贸易顺差，因贸易顺差而涌入的资金。

And I think it’ll take it over to Charlie and ask him what he would do, if he were the finance minister of China.

我想我会把这个交给查理，问他如果他是中国的财政部长会怎么做。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I (Inaudible) that is a very easy question. I would do exactly what they’re doing.

查理·芒格：嗯，我（听不清）这是一个非常简单的问题。我会完全按照他们的做法。

I think China has one of the most successful economic policies in the world. And China has advanced more rapidly than the rest of the world. And, I would say their policies are exactly right.

我认为中国拥有世界上最成功的经济政策之一。而且中国的发展速度超过了世界其他地方。我想说，他们的政策是完全正确的。

And their rate of advance is so great and so meaningful that if they lost a little bit of purchasing power on their dollar holdings, it’s a trifle in the big scheme of things from the viewpoint of China.

他们的前进速度是如此之快和重要，以至于如果他们在美元持有上失去了一点购买力，从中国的角度来看，这在大局中只是微不足道的。

So I’ve got nothing but admiration for the way the Chinese have been running their own affairs. And they’re going to be very hard to compete with all over the world. And that is exactly the correct policy for China. That’s the way you get ahead fast is to be very hard to compete with all over the world.

所以我对中国人处理自己事务的方式只有钦佩。他们在全球范围内将非常难以竞争。这正是中国的正确政策。要想快速发展，就必须在全球范围内变得非常难以竞争。

So I think they’re doing it exactly right. And I think that the United States and China should be very friendly nations. Because we’re joined at the hip.

所以我认为他们做得完全正确。我认为美国和中国应该是非常友好的国家。因为我们是紧密相连的。

WARREN BUFFETT: So you’d suggest they keep buying U.S. Treasurys at —

沃伦·巴菲特：所以你会建议他们继续购买美国国债——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You bet. 查理·芒格：你说得对。

WARREN BUFFETT: — practically no yield?

沃伦·巴菲特：——几乎没有收益？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Whatever the yield. They’re not no-yield. Because they can buy longer.

查理·芒格：无论收益是多少。它们不是零收益。因为它们可以购买更长期的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ve got some advice for the Chinese government. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们有一些建议给中国政府。（笑声）

50. Deal post-mortems shouldn’t be public

交易的事后分析不应该公开。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: “In the past, you have stated that management should —”

卡罗尔·卢米斯：“在过去，你曾表示管理层应该——”

This question comes from Ingrid Hendershot.

这个问题来自英格丽德·亨德肖特。

“In the past, you have stated that management should be required, after several years, to do a post-mortem on acquisitions it makes. Would you each provide us with your post-mortem on Berkshire’s largest acquisition, General Re?”

“过去，你曾表示管理层在几年后应该对其进行的收购进行事后分析。你们能否各自提供一下对伯克希尔最大收购——通用再保险的事后分析？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t think — I’ll comment on General Re, but I don’t think we generally should make our post-mortems public. I don’t think — I think that, if we acquired —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为——我会评论一下通用再保险，但我认为我们一般不应该公开我们的事后分析。我认为——如果我们收购了——

We do believe in post-mortems. We strongly believe in them. We think they’re conducted at far too few companies. It’s easy to propose a deal and it’s much harder to account for it later on.

我们确实相信事后分析。我们非常相信这一点。我们认为，进行事后分析的公司太少了。提出一个交易很简单，但事后对其进行核算要困难得多。

And — Charlie is a big fan of rubbing anybody’s nose in their own problems.

查理非常喜欢让别人面对自己的问题。

And it absolutely should be done. I don’t think it necessarily should be made public.

这绝对应该做。我不认为它一定要公开。

I don’t think that you attract businesses by — and managers — by pointing out — even though you are the one that made the mistake, as the acquirer, in your projections — pointing out the shortfalls that may have occurred with the managers that are maybe doing a very good job to try and overcome the fact that you made a mistake in buying it in the first place. So I don’t want to — I wouldn’t want to get into that.

我认为你不能通过指出——即使你作为收购方在预测中犯了错误——来吸引企业和管理者，指出可能发生的缺陷，而这些管理者可能正在努力克服你最初购买时所犯的错误。所以我不想——我不想陷入这种情况。

对人性的通透。

51. Buffett: I was “dead wrong” on Gen Re’s reputation

巴菲特：我对通用再保险的声誉判断“完全错误”

WARREN BUFFETT: Gen Re has worked out well after a terrible, terrible start. And I was dead wrong, in 1998, when I bought it, in thinking that it was the Gen Re of 15 years earlier, which had absolutely the premier reputation in the insurance world.

沃伦·巴菲特：通用再保险在一个糟糕的开局后表现得很好。1998 年我购买它时，我完全错了，我以为它是 15 年前的通用再保险，当时在保险界享有绝对的顶尖声誉。

And some practices, in terms of reserving and underwriting, had changed somewhat. But I’m happy to say that, thanks to the combined work of Tad Montross, who is with us here today, and Joe, that the —

在准备金和承保方面的一些做法有所变化。但我很高兴地说，多亏了塔德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）的共同努力，他今天和我们在一起，还有乔（Joe），——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s Joe Brandon.

查理·芒格：那是乔·布兰登。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Joe Brandon, of course. But Joe and Tad, when they took over in, what, September of 2001, actually — right about the time of the World Trade Center problem — they took after all of the problems. They went right after them, reserving, underwriting, whatever it might be.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，乔·布兰登，当然。但是乔和塔德在 2001 年 9 月接手时，实际上——正好是在世界贸易中心事件发生的时候——他们处理了所有的问题。他们立即着手解决这些问题，他们直接处理了准备金、承保等各方面的问题。

And Gen Re is the company now that I thought it was when I purchased it in 1998.

而 Gen Re 现在是我在 1998 年购买时所期望的那家公司。

So we’re proud of them. It was a very tough job. It wasn’t one that was going to get done by itself. And that, to some extent, when you tighten up on an organization that has fallen into some lax ways, it can — you know, that is not an easy job.

所以我们为他们感到自豪。这是一项非常艰巨的工作。这不是一项能自然而然完成的工作。在某种程度上，当你对一个已经变得松懈的组织进行严格管理时，这并不是一项容易的工作。

Both of them, or each of them, they could’ve left for some other place and made just as much money, maybe more money, not had to face the problems that they faced at Gen Re. But they hung in there. And now we have an organization that we feel terrific about and has a great future.

他们两个，或者说每一个人，都可以去其他地方赚同样多的钱，甚至更多的钱，而不必面对他们在 Gen Re 所面临的问题。但他们坚持下来了。现在我们有一个我们感到非常满意并且前景光明的组织。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s right. And — but it’s very important that you have an ability to turn your lemons into lemonade.

查理·芒格：我认为这是对的。但是，能够把你的柠檬变成柠檬水是非常重要的。

And we were very, very lucky to have Joe and Tad to help us in the process. It wasn’t pleasant. And it wasn’t pretty. And it was very successful.

我们非常幸运有乔和塔德在这个过程中帮助我们。这并不愉快，也不美好，但非常成功。

And it wasn’t something that ordinary managers would’ve been at all likely to do. You had to be very tough minded to fix General Re. And they really did fix it.

而这并不是普通经理人会做的事情。你必须非常坚定才能解决通用再保险的问题。他们确实解决了这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: When we do the post-mortems, we, in a sense, are looking at our own handiwork. I mean, we make the decisions.

沃伦·巴菲特：当我们进行事后分析时，从某种意义上说，我们是在审视自己的作品。我的意思是，我们做出决策。

You know, it’s not some strategy department someplace, or vice president in charge of acquisitions, or some management consultant that comes in and tells us we ought to buy this or that. We’re looking at our decisions.

你知道，这不是某个地方的战略部门，也不是负责收购的副总裁，或者某个管理顾问进来告诉我们应该买这个或那个。我们在审视我们的决策。

And that’s very important. And we talk about that. And we’ve made some dumb decisions. And most of them have been mine. Because I’m the guy that’s sitting in Omaha, making most of the decisions.

这非常重要。我们谈论过这个。我们做了一些愚蠢的决定，而大多数都是我的决定。因为我是那个坐在奥马哈，做大部分决定的人。

But it would really be a mistake to discuss, in public, my dumb decisions, which might reflect, you know, on some of the managers in some of the arenas. So we will not disclose those. But we will tell you that there are dumb decisions made around Berkshire.

但在公开场合讨论我的愚蠢决定真的会是个错误，这可能会影响到某些领域的一些管理者。所以我们不会透露这些。但我们会告诉你，伯克希尔确实有一些愚蠢的决定。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The really brilliant decision in the General Re transaction was made by Joe Brandon. He was the one who decided that Berkshire should buy General Re. And he caused the transaction. And it wouldn’t have happened, I think, if he hadn’t been there. Would you agree with that?

查理·芒格：在通用再保险交易中，真正聪明的决定是由乔·布兰登做出的。他是决定伯克希尔应该收购通用再保险的人。他促成了这笔交易。我认为，如果没有他，这笔交易是不会发生的。你同意吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s true.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And Joe was the steward for the General Re shareholders. We got a decent result, and they got a fabulous result. So if capitalism has any heroes in that transaction, why, Joe’s the hero.

查理·芒格：乔是通用再保险股东的管家。我们得到了不错的结果，他们得到了极好的结果。所以如果在那笔交易中资本主义有任何英雄的话，乔就是那个英雄。

52. “We are not big believers in contracts”

“我们并不太相信合同”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来看看第 6 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir. Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I’m Chuck Hosmer (PH) from California.

观众：是的，先生。巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是来自加利福尼亚的查克·霍斯默。

And you mentioned earlier the union cooperation at the Buffalo newspapers. Without the introduction of unions, how do you view contracts for other employees of BRK subsidiaries?

你之前提到布法罗报纸的工会合作。如果没有工会的引入，你如何看待 BRK 子公司的其他员工合同？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m just trying to think whether we have any real contracts.

沃伦·巴菲特：我只是在想我们是否有任何真正的合同。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I hope not.

查理·芒格：我希望没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we are not big believers in contracts. We hand people hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, in some cases, to sell us their business.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们并不太相信合同。在某些情况下，我们会给人们数亿或数十亿美元，让他们把他们的业务卖给我们。

And the decision we have to make is, are they going to have the same passion for the business after they hand us the stock certificate and we hand them the money? Are they going to have the same passion that they had beforehand?

我们必须做出的决定是，他们在把股票证书交给我们并且我们把钱交给他们之后，是否会对这项业务保持同样的热情？他们是否会保持之前的热情？

And if we’re wrong on that, no contract is going to save us.

如果我们在这方面错了，任何合同都无法拯救我们。

We don’t want relationships that are based on contracts. So — I can’t — you know, I’m — I can’t really think of a formal contract that we have.

我们不想要基于合同的关系。所以——我不能——你知道，我——我真的想不出我们有什么正式的合同。

We have understandings about bonus arrangements and that sort of thing — and that’s not that complicated — with various managers.

我们与各个经理对奖金安排等事项有共识——这并不复杂。

I mean, we have — the comp of the top person at each company is basically my responsibility. And we have all kinds of different arrangements, because we have all kinds of different businesses.

我的意思是，每个公司的最高职位的薪酬基本上是我的责任。我们有各种不同的安排，因为我们有各种不同的业务。

Some of our businesses, capital’s an important factor. So you have to put that in the comp arrangement. Some of it, capital doesn’t mean a thing. Some of our businesses are very easy and very profitable. Some of them are very tough. And it takes a genius to, you know, to get a so-so result.

我们的一些业务中，资本是一个重要因素。因此你必须把它放在公司安排中。有些业务，资本并没有什么意义。我们的一些业务非常简单且利润丰厚。还有一些则非常艰难。要想取得一般的结果，需要天才。

So we have a whole bunch of different arrangements on that. But we don’t try to hold people by contracts. And it wouldn’t work. And we basically don’t like engaging in them. So you’re looking at a company that — can you think of any contracts we have, Charlie?

所以我们在这方面有很多不同的安排。但我们不试图通过合同来束缚人们。而且这也行不通。我们基本上不喜欢参与这些。所以你看看这家公司——查理，你能想到我们有什么合同吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Our model is a seamless web of trust that’s deserved on both sides. That’s what we’re aiming for. The Hollywood model, where everyone has a contract, and no trust is deserved on either side, is not what we want at all.

查理·芒格：不，我们的模型是一个双方都应得的无缝信任网络。这就是我们所追求的。好莱坞的模式是每个人都有合同，双方都不值得信任，这绝不是我们想要的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t — we do not want to negotiate the size of the executive bathroom. I mean, that is not our game.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不——我们不想谈论行政浴室的大小。我是说，这不是我们的游戏。

一堆烂人的地方总是有些奇奇怪怪的东西。

53. How to get yourself thrown out of Buffett’s office

如何让自己被巴菲特的办公室赶出去

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Edward Donahue (PH) from Belmont, Massachusetts.

贝基·奎克：这是来自马萨诸塞州贝尔蒙特的爱德华·多纳休（PH）的问题。

“In the spirit of raising partnership value in these times, has Warren given any thought to spinning off as separate companies?

在提升合作伙伴价值的精神下，沃伦是否考虑过分拆成独立公司？

“My thinking is that some of these companies would sell at higher multiples to book value that Berkshire currently does. Further, where appropriate, consolidate companies with similar industries with the wish to save on management costs, administration, and even potential selling costs.”

“我的想法是，这些公司中的一些会以比伯克希尔目前更高的账面价值倍数出售。此外，在适当的情况下，合并具有相似行业的公司，以期节省管理成本、行政费用，甚至潜在的销售成本。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will not be spinning off any companies. We had to — we were a bank holding company, believe it or not, at one time. We became one in 1969. Then we were given 10 years to dispose of our bank, which was in Rockford, Illinois, and we did have a, in effect, a spinoff of that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不会剥离任何公司。相信与否，我们曾经是一家银行控股公司。我们在 1969 年成为一家银行控股公司。然后我们被给予 10 年的时间来处置我们位于伊利诺伊州罗克福德的银行，实际上我们确实进行了剥离。

But, we — if somebody comes around us and says, “Gee, you can — you’ve got a multiple of X, and you can have a multiple of 1 1/2 times X for this subsidiary, if you spin it off,” you know, we can’t wait to throw them out of the office. I mean, it just doesn’t interest us.

但是，如果有人来到我们面前说：“哇，你可以——你有 X 的倍数，如果你把这个子公司剥离出来，你可以得到 1.5 倍 X 的倍数，”你知道，我们迫不及待想把他们赶出办公室。我的意思是，这根本不吸引我们。

We are not looking for something that gives a, you know, a one-month jump or something like that in market value. If we’ve got a wonderful business, we want to continue it within Berkshire.

我们并不寻求能够在市场价值上带来一个月跳跃的东西。如果我们有一个出色的业务，我们希望在伯克希尔继续发展它。

We’ve got this ability within Berkshire, which is a real asset, in terms of moving money around into various opportunities without tax consequences. I mean, they’re part of a consolidated return.

我们在伯克希尔内部拥有这种能力，这是一项真正的资产，可以在没有税务后果的情况下将资金调动到各种机会中。我的意思是，它们是合并报表的一部分。

So if a See’s Candy is a wonderful business, which it is, but it generates a lot of capital that can’t be used effectively in that business, we can move it to some other business or buy other businesses with it.

所以，如果 See's Candy 是一项很棒的生意（确实如此），但它产生了很多无法有效用于该业务的资本，我们可以将其转移到其他业务中，或者用它收购其他业务。

And we have a real advantage in allocation of capital that a shareholder, basically, can’t do as tax efficiently as we can do it within the company.

我们在资本配置方面有一个真正的优势，股东基本上无法像我们在公司内部那样高效地进行税务处理。

Plus, when we buy businesses from people, we make them a promise. You know, they can read our economic principles in the back of the annual report. And they know that we’re buying for keeps.

此外，当我们从人们那里购买企业时，我们会向他们承诺。你知道，他们可以在年报的后面阅读我们的经济原则。他们知道我们是为了长久而购买。

You know, it is a marriage that’s going to last. And we’re not going to, because we can get a higher multiple or something for a temporary period of time, spin something off.

你知道，这是一段会持久的婚姻。我们不会这样做，因为我们可以在短期内获得更高的倍数或其他什么，分拆某些东西。

On top of it, that — there would be those other costs. But that’s not the determining factor. It’s the basic principle at Berkshire that we buy to keep. And people can trust us to keep our word on that.

此外，还有其他成本。但这并不是决定性因素。伯克希尔的基本原则是我们的购买是为了持有。人们可以信任我们在这方面遵守诺言。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the — so many of those spinoffs, because your market cap will be a little higher, Wall Street sells that stuff, so they can get fees.

查理·芒格：是的，很多这样的分拆，因为你的市值会稍微高一些，华尔街会出售这些东西，以便获得费用。

It isn’t really doing that much for anybody, in the ordinary case.

在一般情况下，这对任何人来说并没有太大帮助。

I suppose the one exception that could happen, if the regulation was crazy enough, you know, you can imagine something that might cause Berkshire to go to two parts. But short of something like that, you’re looking at what you’re going to get.

我想唯一可能发生的例外是，如果法规足够疯狂，你知道的，你可以想象一些可能导致伯克希尔分成两个部分的情况。但除了这样的事情，你只能期待你将得到的结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if it was actually hurting some operation that — because regulation was focused in that, and that tied the hands of other companies in the Berkshire group, you know, we’d have to look at that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果这实际上对某个运营造成了伤害——因为监管集中在那上面，这限制了伯克希尔集团其他公司的手脚，你知道，我们就得考虑这个问题。

But, as Charlie said, we have listened to presentation after presentation, over a lot of years, about — by investment bankers, you know, basically saying, you know, “If you just do this wonderful thing,” you know, all these — that the market will love you.

但是，正如查理所说，我们多年来听了一个又一个的演讲，都是投资银行家在说，“如果你只做这个美妙的事情”，那么市场就会爱你。

And — it — how much is conscious, and how much is subconscious, we’ll never know. But the one thing we do know is there’s always a fee that accompanies it.

而且——它——无论有多少是有意识的，有多少是无意识的，我们永远不知道。但我们知道的一件事是，总会有费用伴随其后。

54. Don’t know much about student loan business

对学生贷款业务了解不多

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7. 沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. Mike Nolan from Montclair, New Jersey.

观众：下午好。我是来自新泽西州蒙特克莱尔的迈克·诺兰。

Until recently, the student loan business in the United States has been a very attractive and successful one. However, proposed changes coming out of Washington have thrown the industry into disarray.

直到最近，美国的学生贷款业务一直是一个非常有吸引力和成功的行业。然而，华盛顿提出的变革使这个行业陷入了混乱。

Could you comment on the industry, which is highly reliant on both faith, trust, as well as financing, and talk a little bit about the companies in this business?

您能否评论一下这个高度依赖信任、信心以及融资的行业，并谈谈这个行业中的公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t know that much about it. Maybe Charlie does.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我对这个了解不多。也许查理知道。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I don’t know this much about it, either. There’s been a fair amount of scandal, in terms of the sales methods. Some of the companies in the field got awfully cozy with some of the university administrators and so on.

查理·芒格：不，我对此也不太了解。在销售方法方面有相当多的丑闻。该领域的一些公司与一些大学管理人员关系非常密切等等。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been a long time since Charlie and I thought about getting a student loan. So we — (laughter) — haven’t checked the regulations too carefully on that one.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我很久没有考虑过申请学生贷款了。所以我们——（笑声）——在这方面没有仔细查看过相关法规。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But, you know, we don’t know a lot about it.

查理·芒格：但是，你知道，我们对它了解不多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

I actually got approached, I guess it was about a year ago or a year and a half ago, on the deal that fell through, on Sallie Mae.

我实际上是在大约一年前或一年半前被接触的，关于那个未能达成的交易，萨利梅（Sallie Mae）。

And I said, at the time, to the fellow that called me, I didn’t understand it that well. And it turned out to be a good thing I didn’t.

我当时对给我打电话的那个人说，我并没有那么理解它。结果我没有理解这件事是件好事。

大学是个非常敏感的领域，政治上的敏感，甚至可以扩展到整个教育行业。

55. Earnings “management” at Goldman Sachs and General Electric

高盛和通用电气的“收益管理”

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, this question comes from John McDonald (PH).

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：好的，这个问题来自约翰·麦克唐纳（PH）。

And he asks, “Warren, in your General Electric and Goldman Sachs investments, do you think you’ve picked attractive businesses or simply attractive securities?

他问：“沃伦，在你的通用电气和高盛投资中，你认为你选择的是有吸引力的企业，还是仅仅是有吸引力的证券？”

“Ben Graham’s ‘Security Analysis’ suggests that the most frightening things an executive management can do is manage earnings, which it could be argued both of these firms do. What is your reaction to that?”

本·格雷厄姆的《证券分析》指出，管理层最可怕的事情就是操控收益，可以说这两家公司都在这样做。你对此有何看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can say that I could argue that a very substantial percentage of American industry over the last 15 years, at one time or another, has managed earnings. And I’ve witnessed it and argued against it and gotten no place.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我可以说，我可以争辩说，在过去 15 年中，美国工业的一个非常可观的百分比在某个时候都进行了盈余管理。我亲眼目睹过这一点，并对此提出过反对意见，但没有取得任何进展。

So, I don’t regard that as a malady that’s limited in its experience. I don’t know anything. I would not get into the specifics of those companies.

所以，我不认为这是一个仅限于其经验的疾病。我什么都不知道。我不会深入讨论那些公司的具体情况。

I felt good about those companies, in terms of the quality of the businesses they had and the quality of the management. But it was the terms, primarily, that caused us to make those deals.

我对那些公司的感觉很好，主要是因为它们的业务质量和管理质量。但主要是交易的条款导致我们做了那些交易。

一片混乱中某些伟大企业也可能变得暗了一些，而条款的好坏更容易识别。

I mean, those were made in a period when markets were in chaos and you should’ve gotten very good terms for committing money then.

我的意思是，那些交易是在市场混乱的时候做出的，当时你应该在承诺资金时获得非常好的条款。

Very people were either willing, or in some — many — most — cases, able to commit major sums on short notice. And it took good terms in order for us to do it. It —

很少有人愿意，或者在某些情况下——许多情况下——大多数情况下，能够在短时间内投入大笔资金。而且我们需要良好的条件才能做到这一点。它——

And like I say, I’m not sure there was any second possibility in those cases. It was a really extraordinary period.

而且就像我说的，我不确定在那些情况下是否还有第二种可能。这是一个非常非凡的时期。

We were happy to do it. I feel good about the deals, obviously, because we got a very good coupon. But considering the circumstances under which the deals were made, I don’t think there was an alternative.

我们很高兴这样做。显然，我对这些交易感到满意，因为我们得到了一个非常好的优惠券。但考虑到交易达成的情况，我认为没有其他选择。

So if they wanted 5 billion and 3 billion, respectively, on those deals, I think we were the low bid, in effect. But I also think we made very decent deals.

所以如果他们在那些交易中分别想要 50 亿和 30 亿，我认为我们实际上是最低报价。但我也认为我们达成了非常不错的交易。

And you know, could we have done something better with the money at that time? I don’t — as I measured at that time, I could not find anything that I liked better. It was the terms of the deals overwhelmingly, although we obviously liked the businesses.

你知道，我们当时是否可以用这笔钱做得更好？我当时没有找到我更喜欢的选择。尽管我们显然喜欢这些业务，但交易的条款占据了绝大部分。

I know the managers, the CEOs, of both companies very well. And I think they are terrific people. I think they’re smart people.

我非常了解这两家公司的经理和首席执行官。我认为他们是很棒的人。我觉得他们很聪明。

And I think they’re very — they’ve been very straight with us, straight with us long before we made a deal with them. So we’re very happy with those deals.

我认为他们非常——在我们与他们达成交易之前，他们就一直对我们很坦诚。所以我们对这些交易非常满意。

Charlie? 查理？

56. “Very happy relationship” with Goldman Sachs

与高盛“非常愉快的关系”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, you know, there’s been a lot of criticism of investment banking in this arena, starting with that movie. But Berkshire itself has had marvelous services from all of its investment bankers, which is interesting.

查理·芒格：是的，你知道，在这个领域，投资银行受到了很多批评，从那部电影开始。但伯克希尔自己从所有的投资银行家那里得到了很棒的服务，这很有趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: Think of what we’d be saying, if we’d been mistreated. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：想想如果我们受到不公正对待，我们会说些什么。（笑）

We’ve done a lot of business with Goldman Sachs over the years. And my experience goes back to when I was 10 years old and met Sidney Weinberg, who was running the firm and was a legendary Wall Street — well, he was “Mr. Wall Street” for a long, long time.

我们多年来与高盛做了很多生意。我的经历可以追溯到我 10 岁时遇到的西德尼·温伯格，他当时在公司任职，是华尔街的传奇人物——他很长一段时间都是“华尔街先生”。

And I was a friend of Gus Levy’s. And Gus Levy also did some really nice things for us, including when we had a little nothing company, called Diversified Retailing, which Charlie and I and Sandy Gottesman jointly formed.

我和古斯·莱维是朋友。古斯·莱维也为我们做了一些非常好的事情，包括当我们有一个小小的公司，叫做多元化零售时，这是查理、我和桑迪·戈特斯曼共同成立的。

Gus came in on an underwriting of a $6 million issue brought by New York Securities, which he wouldn’t have dreamt of coming in, you know, for — in that kind of a deal, under most circumstances. And he had Goldman Sachs join in at that time.

加斯参与了承销由纽约证券公司发行的600万美元债券，在大多数情况下，他是不敢想象会参与那样的交易的。而他当时邀请高盛加入。

So there have been a lot of things that have made for a very happy relationship with Goldman Sachs. I feel good about them.

所以有很多事情让与高盛的关系非常愉快。我对他们感到满意。

And of course, we do lots of business with General Electric. We’ve bought I don’t know how many of those wind turbines from them.

当然，我们与通用电气有很多业务往来。我们从他们那里购买了不知道多少台风力涡轮机。

But GE — you know, is a very, very important American institution. We’ll do — we’ll sell them a lot of things. We’ll buy a lot of things from them. And we’ll make money on our investment. So that keeps me happy.

但是通用电气——你知道，是一个非常非常重要的美国机构。我们会——我们会卖给他们很多东西。我们会从他们那里买很多东西。我们会在我们的投资中赚钱。所以这让我感到高兴。

57. Buffett optimistic on America’s standard of living

巴菲特对美国的生活水平持乐观态度

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 8. 沃伦·巴菲特：第 8 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. Mark Hoffman (PH) from San Diego, California. Just want to thank you for all your wisdom and advice over the years.

观众成员：你好。我是来自加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥的马克·霍夫曼（PH）。我只想感谢你多年来给予的所有智慧和建议。

Also like to thank the boys at — the Blumkins — the Furniture Mart. They gave us a great tour the other day. I’m from an organization called Eel (PH). And they really showed us the culture at Berkshire and what you guys do.

也想感谢布伦金斯家具市场的男孩们。他们前几天给我们进行了很棒的参观。我来自一个叫 Eel（PH）的组织。他们真的向我们展示了伯克希尔的文化以及你们所做的事情。

My question is, looking at the overall world economy, the Berkshire businesses are great. But my question is, is there underlying issues you see in the world economy, like going off the gold standard 40 years ago and fiat currency in countries making money like crazy?

我的问题是，从整体世界经济来看，伯克希尔的业务非常出色。但我的问题是，您是否看到世界经济中存在潜在的问题，比如 40 年前脱离金本位制以及一些国家疯狂印制的法定货币？

If the Berkshire businesses are great, but the underlying economy is a problem, where do we go from there? What are the questions you’re asking yourself about the world economy? Thanks.

如果伯克希尔的业务很好，但基础经济存在问题，我们该如何前进？你对世界经济有什么疑问？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s always a lot of things wrong with the world. Unfortunately, it’s the only world we’ve got. I mean, so we live with it, and we deal with it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，世界上总有很多问题。不幸的是，这就是我们唯一的世界。我的意思是，我们与之共存，并且应对它。

But the beauty of it is this system works very well. I don’t have the faintest idea what’s going to happen in business or markets in the next year or two years.

但美妙之处在于这个系统运作得非常好。我对未来一两年内商业或市场将会发生什么毫无头绪。

But the one thing I know is that, over time, people will live better and better in this country. We have a system that works. It unleashes human potential.

但我知道的一件事是，随着时间的推移，人们在这个国家的生活会越来越好。我们有一个有效的系统。它释放了人类的潜力。

I was just thinking, we have, today, about 35,000 people here. That was almost 1 percent of the population of the United States in the first census in 1790. Just 100 groups like this, and you were talking the whole country.

我刚刚在想，今天我们这里大约有 35,000 人。这几乎是 1790 年第一次人口普查时美国人口的 1%。只要有 100 个这样的团体，你就可以谈论整个国家。

If you look at the — if we had had this room filled, back in 1790, with 35,000 citizens of the United States then, they would’ve been just as smart as we were, natively, their intelligence.

如果你看看——如果我们在 1790 年把这个房间填满，当时有 35,000 名美国公民，他们和我们一样聪明。

They would’ve lived in a country with resources that, obviously, same fertile soil, the same temperature, the same minerals, all of that. So they were just as able as we are.

他们生活在一个资源丰富的国家，显然有相同肥沃的土壤、相同的气温、相同的矿物质，所有这些。因此，他们的能力和我们一样。

But they weren’t turning out anything like we turn out today. I mean, just look at how we live compared to those people several hundred years ago.

但他们的生活与我们今天的生活完全不同。我的意思是，看看我们与几百年前那些人的生活相比。

So we have had a system that works. It unleashes human potential. And China went, for a long time, without a system that unleashed potential. Now they’ve got a system that’s unleashing human potential.

所以我们有一个有效的系统。它释放了人类的潜力。而中国在很长一段时间内没有一个能够释放潜力的系统。现在他们有了一个正在释放人类潜力的系统。

We haven’t reached the end of that road, by a long shot. I mean, we’re just starting, basically. We will have bad years in capitalism. I mean, it overshoots in markets. It gets overcome by fear and greed and all of that sort of thing.

我们还远未走到那条路的尽头。我的意思是，基本上我们才刚刚开始。在资本主义中，我们会经历糟糕的年份。我的意思是，市场会出现过度波动。它会被恐惧、贪婪以及所有这些东西所压倒。

But if you look at the 19th century, you know, we had a civil war. And we had 15 years or so of bad economic times spread out through that century. We had six panics, as they called them in those days.

但是如果你看看 19 世纪，你会知道我们经历了一场内战。在那个世纪里，我们经历了大约 15 年的经济困难。那时我们经历了六次恐慌。

And the 20th century had a couple of great wars. And we had plenty of recessions. And we had the Great Depression. So we have these interruptions in the progress of our society.

20 世纪经历了几场大战。我们经历了许多经济衰退。我们还经历了大萧条。因此，我们的社会进步中出现了这些中断。

But overall, we move ahead. And we not only move ahead, we move ahead at a pretty damn rapid rate, when you think about it.

但总体而言，我们在前进。而且我们不仅在前进，我们以相当快的速度在前进，仔细想想。

I mean, when, in the 20th century, we had a 7-for-1 improvement in living. And we did that. You know, we had slavery for a long time. We had blacks counted as three-fifths of a person. We didn’t let women vote for 130 years or thereabouts.

我的意思是，在 20 世纪，我们的生活水平提高了七倍。我们做到了这一点。你知道，我们曾经有过奴隶制。我们曾把黑人算作五分之三的人。我们让女性在大约 130 年内无法投票。

I mean, we have — we were wasting human potential. And we still are. But we were doing it more so for centuries. But we do keep moving forward in kind of fits and starts.

我的意思是，我们在浪费人类潜力。我们现在仍然在这样做。但几个世纪以来，我们更是如此。不过我们确实在不断前进，只是时断时续。

And right now, we’re sputtering somewhat, in terms of the economy. But there is no question, in my mind, that there is enormous human potential and that every period, every year we will meet, you can name a bunch of problems.

而现在，我们的经济有些踉跄。但在我看来，毫无疑问，人类拥有巨大的潜力，每个时期，每年我们都会遇到一堆问题。

I mean, it will happen. But the opportunities will win in the end. And you know, your kids will live better than you live. And your grandchildren will live better.

我意思是，这会发生。但机会最终会胜出。你知道，你的孩子会过得比你更好。你的孙子孙女会过得更好。

And we will find more and more ways to find easier and better ways to do things that we haven’t even dreamt of yet.

我们将找到越来越多的方法，以更简单、更好的方式做我们甚至还未曾梦想过的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

58. Munger optimistic about solar energy

芒格对太阳能持乐观态度

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, now that I’m so close to the age of death, I find myself getting more cheerful about the economic future — (laughter) — which I’m not going to be here to enjoy.

查理·芒格：好吧，现在我离死亡的年龄如此接近，我发现自己对经济未来变得更加乐观——（笑声）——而我将无法享受这一切。

And what I find really cheerful is that we are plainly going to harness the direct energy of the sun. And we’re going to have electrical power all over the world.

我发现真正令人振奋的是，我们显然将直接利用太阳的能量。我们将在全世界范围内拥有电力。

And that’s going to enable overpopulated countries to turn seawater into fresh. And it’s going to eliminate a lot of the environmental problems and preserve more of the hydrocarbon resources for future needs in — as chemical feedstocks.

这将使人口过剩的国家能够将海水转化为淡水。这将消除许多环境问题，并为未来的需求保留更多的碳氢化合物的资源，作为化学原料。

What I see is a final breakthrough that solves the main technical problem of man. And you can see it coming right over the horizon. And of course, MidAmerican and BYD will be participating in it.

我看到的是一个最终的突破，解决了人类的主要技术问题。你可以看到它正从地平线上出现。当然，MidAmerican 和比亚迪将参与其中。

So, I think it’s hugely a mistake to think only about your probable misfortunes. You should also think about what’s good about your situation.

所以，我认为只考虑你可能遭遇的不幸是一个巨大的错误。你也应该考虑一下你处境中好的方面。

And what’s good about our situation now is the main technical problem of mankind is about to be fixed. It’s the — if you have enough energy, you can solve a lot of your other problems.

而我们现在处境中好的方面是，人类的主要技术问题即将得到解决。就是——如果你有足够的能源，你可以解决很多其他问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: He is getting more optimistic as he gets older. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：随着年龄的增长，他变得越来越乐观。（笑声）

59. Not concerned about Swiss Re reinsurance deal

不关心瑞士再保险交易

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This is a question about Berkshire’s investment in Swiss Re. “Given that you have no control over Swiss Re’s underwriting, how can you be comfortable with 2.6 billion invested in a relatively junior security in addition to the relatively sizeable common stock position you already have?

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这是一个关于伯克希尔对瑞士再保险投资的问题。“鉴于您对瑞士再保险的承保没有控制权，您如何能对投资 26 亿美元于相对较低级别的证券感到放心，此外您还拥有相对可观的普通股头寸？”

“Did the Gen Re acquisition’s problems over the first several years you owned it not make you wary of the potential landmines in reinsurance?

“在你拥有 Gen Re 的头几年中，收购所遇到的问题是否让你对再保险中的潜在雷区感到警惕？”

“And isn’t Swiss Re even more likely to continue to make mistakes, given that you have no management control?

“而且，考虑到你们没有管理控制权，瑞士再保险公司更有可能继续犯错误，不是吗？”

“Or has your insight into its underwriting culture, since you entered into the quota share agreement, increased your comfort level with the risks it is taking?

“或者自从您签订配额分成协议以来，您对其承保文化的洞察是否提高了您对其所承担风险的舒适度？”

“You have said, in the past, that Berkshire’s float is worth as much or more than equity. Would you say the same about Swiss Re’s float?”

“你曾经说过，伯克希尔的浮存金价值与股权一样多或更多。你会对瑞士再保险的浮动资金说同样的话吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: About Swiss Re’s what, now?

沃伦·巴菲特：关于瑞士再保险的什么，现在？

CAROL LOOMIS: Swiss Re’s float.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：瑞士再保险的浮存金。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. The — we have several arrangements with Swiss Re. One was engaged in a little over a year ago, where we take 20 percent of their property-casualty business, which is reinsurance business, primarily, over a five-year period.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦。我们与瑞士再保险公司有几项安排。一个是在一年多前达成的，我们在五年内接手他们 20%的财产险和意外险业务，主要是再保险业务。

Then we made a — and that started about a year ago. And then, a month or two ago — and at that time, we bought about 3 percent of Swiss Re’s common.

然后我们做了一项投资——大约在一年前开始的。然后，一两个月前——那时，我们购买了瑞士再保险公司大约 3%的普通股。

Then, about a month ago, we invested 3 million — 3 billion — Swiss francs in a security which pays us 12 percent a year and which they can call, after two years, at 120 percent of its principal amount. And then if they haven’t called it by the third year, it becomes convertible to 25 Swiss francs a share.

然后大约一个月前，我们投资了30亿瑞士法郎于一种年利率12%的证券，该证券在两年后可以以其本金的120%被赎回。如果到第三年还未被赎回，则转换为每股25瑞士法郎的股票。

The odds are probably pretty good that it will get called. And if it gets called, we’ll be unhappy, because they only reason they’ll call is if it’s advantageous for them to call it and disadvantageous to us.

被赎回的可能性相当高。如果它被赎回，我们会感到不快，因为它被赎回的唯一原因是对他们有利而对我们不利。

But if it does get called, we will get 120 percent of par plus 12 percent a year for it.

但如果真的被叫回，我们将获得面值的 120%加上每年 12%的收益。

We are senior, actually, to the Swiss re-equity of roughly 20 billion Swiss francs. So I would not regard it as a junior security.

实际上，我们的投资在瑞士再保险的200亿瑞士法郎的股本之上，因此我不认为这是一种次级证券。

Swiss Re’s problems of the last year or so have not come about, in any way, through their insurance underwriting.

瑞士再保险在过去一年左右的问题并不是通过他们的保险承保造成的。

Their insurance underwriting has been fine over the years. And we feel fine about having a 20 percent quota share in that. And we feel fine about our investment. So, I would regard —

他们的保险承保多年来一直很好。我们对拥有 20%的配额份额感到满意。我们对我们的投资也感到满意。所以，我会认为——

They develop a large amount — as many reinsurance companies do — they develop a large amount of float per dollar of premium volume.

他们每美元保费收入产生大量的浮存金，就像许多再保险公司一样。

So we would expect that this 20 percent quota share that we’ve had for a year will develop a very significant amount of float relative to the 3 billion or so of premiums that it represents.

因此，我们预计这项我们已经拥有一年的 20%配额份额将相对于其所代表的约 30 亿保费产生相当可观的浮存金。

And I think it will turn out to be attractive float. It will be attractive for us. And it’ll even be a little more attractive for Swiss Re. Because in effect, they get — the commission we pay them gives them a little overwrite on that.

我认为这将成为一个有吸引力的浮存金。对我们来说，它将是有吸引力的。对瑞士再保险公司来说，它甚至会更具吸引力。因为实际上，我们支付给他们的佣金让他们在这方面获得了一些额外收益。

I think, like I say, that the most likely thing is that our $3 billion position gets called.

我认为，正如我所说，最可能的情况是我们的30亿瑞士法郎的头寸将被赎回。

We also have that $2 billion or 2 billion Swiss franc. If I’ve said, “dollar,” I meant Swiss franc. $2 billion — 2 billion Swiss franc — adverse loss cover.

我们还有 20 亿美元或 20 亿瑞士法郎。如果我说“美元”，我指的是瑞士法郎。20 亿美元——20 亿瑞士法郎——不利损失覆盖。

And what that says, essentially, is that, if their reserves — we’ll say, in the property-casualty business, at the end of 2008 — were roughly 60 billion francs — that once they’ve paid out — these are not precise figures — but once they’ve paid out 58 billion, 2 billion less than their carried reserves, that we pay the next 5 billion.

这基本上意味着，如果他们的储备——我们假设在 2008 年底的财产和意外险业务中——大约是 600 亿法郎——一旦他们支付了——这些不是精确数字——但一旦他们支付了 580 亿，比他们的账面储备少了 20 亿，那么我们支付接下来的 50 亿。

And like I say, it’s very unlikely we would be paying out money before 15 years on that. And if their reserves are accurate, we will pay out only the 2 billion.

而且就像我说的，我们在那之前支付钱的可能性非常小，15 年内不会支付。如果他们的储备是准确的，我们只会支付 20 亿。

So that was a transaction, again, that was made at a time when Swiss Re was under considerable pressure. They were under threat of downgrade, in terms of ratings.

所以这是一笔交易，再次是在瑞士再保险面临巨大压力的时候进行的。他们面临评级下调的威胁。

And, I met with the CEO — the then-CEO — of Swiss Re on a Sunday in Washington, D.C., along with his investment adviser. And we arranged a transaction, which their shareholders and their directors later approved. And I think we met their needs. And I think we’ve got an attractive transaction.

我在华盛顿特区的一个星期天与瑞士再保险的首席执行官（当时的首席执行官）及其投资顾问会面。我们安排了一笔交易，后来得到了他们的股东和董事的批准。我认为我们满足了他们的需求。我认为我们达成了一笔有吸引力的交易。

There’s nothing wrong — you know, we may prefer Gen Re — but there’s nothing wrong with Swiss Re’s underwriting. It did not cause any of the problems that they have now.

没有什么问题——你知道，我们可能更喜欢 Gen Re——但瑞士再保险的承保没有任何问题。它没有导致他们现在所面临的任何问题。

That arose from something akin to the problems of AIG, although not remotely on the scale of AIG, but both in somewhat in financial products and somewhat on the asset side. It did not arise from underwriting.

这源于类似于 AIG 的问题，尽管规模远不及 AIG，但在某种程度上涉及金融产品和资产方面。这并不是由于承保引起的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, and that’s a terrible problem. We wish we had more of it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，这确实是个可怕的问题。我们希望能有更多。（笑声）

60. Irrational CEO compensation and incentive systems

不合理的首席执行官薪酬和激励系统

WARREN BUFFTT: Area 9, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 区，请。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Vishali (PH) from the Philippines. My question is about compensation in a capital-intensive subsidiary.

观众成员：我是来自菲律宾的 Vishali（PH）。我的问题是关于资本密集型子公司的补偿。

Now, I am going to take the liberty to assume that the large number of bank failures were caused, in large part, by incentive bias.

现在，我将冒昧地假设，大量银行倒闭在很大程度上是由于激励偏差造成的。

If a board of directors makes a mistake with compensation, then the board introduces incentive bias towards earnings manipulation.

如果董事会在薪酬方面犯了错误，那么董事会就会引入对收益操纵的激励偏差。

So bearing in mind rule number one, which is, “don’t lose money,” and bearing in mind that it’s OK to have losses in the short term if the moat is widened, then how do you develop a fair and intelligent compensation package for a manager of a subsidiary that requires a lot of capital?

考虑到第一条规则，即“不要亏损”，并且考虑到如果护城河扩大，短期内出现亏损是可以接受的，那么如何为一个需要大量资本的子公司的经理制定一个公平且合理的薪酬方案呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you obviously — it’s a very, very good question. It’s one that Charlie and I have both thought about. And we’ve been around so many crazy compensation systems that we’ve spent a lot of time thinking about it and talking about it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你显然——这是一个非常非常好的问题。这是查理和我都考虑过的问题。我们经历了许多疯狂的薪酬体系，因此我们花了很多时间思考和讨论这个问题。

In a capital-intensive business, you have to have something that — you have to have a factor in the compensation arrangement that includes a capital cost element.

在资本密集型业务中，您必须在补偿安排中包含一个资本成本因素。

We have dozens and dozens of subsidiaries. And we have different arrangements for different businesses.

我们有数十家子公司。我们为不同的业务有不同的安排。

Because — as you point out —an arrangement for a business that needs no capital, like a See’s Candy or a Business Wire or something of that sort, has to be materially different than something that requires a lot of capital.

因为——正如你所指出的——一个不需要资本的商业安排，比如 See's Candy 或 Business Wire 或类似的东西，必须与需要大量资本的东西有实质性的不同。

We think we’ve got rational compensation systems. We agree with you that incentives are very important.

我们认为我们拥有合理的薪酬体系。我们同意您说的激励非常重要。

I would say that I think your question implied, a little bit, that the board sets these things. The truth of the matter is, at least over 40 years of experience and 19 boards that I’ve been on and observing behavior a lot of other places — basically, the board has had relatively little effect on it.

我想说，我认为你的问题暗示了一点，董事会设定了这些事情。事实是，至少在我 40 年的经验和 19 个董事会的观察中——基本上，董事会对此的影响相对较小。

The CEO has managed, in most cases — in a great many cases — to be an important determinant of his own — or her own, usually his — own compensation arrangement. They, you know, they — the human relations — first of all, they pick the comp committee, you know.

首席执行官在大多数情况下——在很多情况下——成功地成为自己（通常是他的）薪酬安排的重要决定因素。他们，你知道，他们——人力资源——首先，他们选择薪酬委员会，你知道。

So I have been on one comp committee out of 19 boards. I mean, people are not looking for Dobermans. They’re looking for Cocker Spaniels. And then — (Laughter) and they’re looking for Cocker Spaniels that are waving — wagging their table — tails, very friendly.

所以我在 19 个委员会中只参加了一个评审委员会。我的意思是，人们并不是在寻找杜宾犬。他们在寻找可卡犬。然后——（笑声）他们在寻找那些摇着尾巴、非常友好的可卡犬。

You know, you — CEOs spend a lot of time thinking about who’s on their comp committee. The audit committee is less important. But the comp committee, they think about plenty.

你知道，首席执行官们花很多时间考虑谁在他们的薪酬委员会上。审计委员会的重要性较低。但薪酬委员会，他们会考虑很多事情。

And the comp committee meets every few months. And a human relations vice president comes in, who is responsible, directly, to the CEO and probably recommends a compensation consultant. And believe me, they don’t go around looking for the ones that are going to upset the apple cart.

薪酬委员会每几个月召开一次会议。人力资源副总裁会参与其中，直接向首席执行官汇报，并可能推荐一位薪酬顾问。相信我，他们不会去寻找那些会打乱局面的人。

So it’s been a system that the CEO has dominated.

所以这是一个由首席执行官主导的系统。

And in my experience, boards have done very little in the way of really thinking through, as an owner or as owners’ representatives, what the hell is the proper way to pay these people and how to incent them, not only to do the right thing, but also to incentivize them not to do the wrong thing.

根据我的经验，董事会在作为所有者或所有者代表时，几乎没有真正思考过，如何正确地支付这些人以及如何激励他们，不仅要做正确的事情，还要激励他们不做错误的事情。

Charlie and I are fairly familiar with a company here in town, the Peter Kiewit Organization. And Pete Kiewit, I don’t know, 50 years ago or more, you know, figured out a very, very logical way to pay people in this business.

查理和我对镇上的一家公司，彼得·基维特组织相当熟悉。彼得·基维特，我不知道，五十年前或更久以前，想出了一个非常非常合理的方式来支付这个行业的员工。

And it wasn’t rocket science. And I’ll guarantee he didn’t consult with any compensation consultant on the subject. He just figured it out.

这并不是火箭科学。我敢保证他没有就这个问题咨询过任何薪酬顾问。他只是自己想明白了。

And you would be able to figure out one. I can figure out one. But you have to understand that not every CEO wants a rational compensation system, you know? Who wants rationality, when irrationality pays off more?

你会能够想出一个。我可以想出一个。但你必须明白，并不是每个首席执行官都想要一个理性的薪酬体系，你知道吗？谁会想要理性，当非理性带来的回报更高时？

So it’s a real problem getting people at the board level — I think the — I don’t think there should be a comp committee. I think the board as a whole actually should thrash this sort of thing out.

所以在董事会层面让人们达成共识确实是个问题——我认为——我认为不应该有薪酬委员会。我认为整个董事会实际上应该对此类问题进行深入讨论。

So that you don’t get some report from the comp committee, and that’s treated as holy writ, because they’ve debated for a couple of hours the day before, supposedly, and then come in and give some recommendation, everybody rubber stamps it.

这样您就不会得到来自薪酬委员会的报告，然后将其视为神圣的教义，因为他们在前一天讨论了几个小时，然后就进来给出某个建议，大家都随便盖章。

I think it ought to be a subject of general discussion. I think it’s very important how you compensate the CEO.

我认为这应该是一个普遍讨论的话题。我认为补偿首席执行官的方式非常重要。

I’ve said, in our annual reports, choosing the right CEO, making sure they don’t overreach, and exercising independent judgement on major acquisitions or divestitures, if the board does that right, you can forget about all this other check the list — checklist stuff. And if they don’t get that right, the other doesn’t make much difference.

我在我们的年报中说过，选择正确的CEO，确保他们不越权，并在重大收购或剥离上行使独立判断，如果董事会能够做到这一点，您可以忘记所有其他的检查清单。如果他们做不好这一点，其他的就没有太大区别。

So I would say that it can be done. It’s very difficult to have a system where somebody — where the board, thinking as owners or representing owners, care as much about it as the guy on the other side who’s getting compensated.

所以我想说这是可以做到的。要建立一个系统，让董事会像业主一样关心它，或者代表业主关心它，确实非常困难，因为对面那个获得报酬的人关心的程度可能更高。

I do think it’s gotten better in recent years. But it started from a very low base.

我确实认为近年来有所改善。但它起步时基础非常低。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there are some counterintuitive conclusions in the field that are quite interesting.

查理·芒格：是的，这个领域有一些反直觉的结论，非常有趣。

I would argue that a liberally paid board of directors in a big American public corporation is — the liberal pay is counterproductive to good management of the company.

我认为，在一家大型美国上市公司中，薪酬丰厚的董事会对公司的良好管理是适得其反的。

There’s a sort of a reciprocation. You know, “You keep raising me, and I keep raising you.” And it gets very club-like. And I think, by and large, the corporations of America would be managed better if the directors weren’t paid at all.

有一种互惠的关系。你知道，“你不断提升我，我也不断提升你。”这变得非常像一个俱乐部。我认为，总的来说，如果美国的公司董事根本不拿薪水，公司的管理会更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re working toward that. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们正在朝着那个方向努力。（掌声）

Well, it is interesting. Because the SEC would define independent directors, you know, as — they would question, you know, my independence, if we would own billions and billions of dollars’ worth of some security, but we would sell them some ice cream at Dairy Queen or something of the sort.

这很有趣。因为SEC会定义独立董事，您知道，他们会质疑我是否独立，如果我们拥有数十亿美元的某些证券，但我们会在Dairy Queen等地方卖给他们一些冰淇淋。

And the — to get real owners’ representatives is very — and knowledgeable, because they’ve got to know business. They have to really have some business savvy.

要获得真正的业主代表是非常重要的，他们必须具备丰富的知识，因为他们需要了解商业。他们必须真正具备一些商业头脑。

And the truth is, if you get somebody that’s getting $200,000 a year, $250,000 a year, for being director of a company, and they don’t have that much income outside or net worth, and they would just love to get one more directorship for another $200,000, they are very unlikely to sit there and argue with the CEO and say that the system is rigged in favor of incentive compensation or something of the sort.

事实是，如果你找一个年薪 20 万美元、25 万美元的公司董事，他们在外面没有太多收入或净资产，他们非常希望再获得一个年薪 20 万美元的董事职位，他们很可能不会坐在那里与首席执行官争论，声称这个系统是偏向激励薪酬的，或者类似的事情。

There is more baloney in the compensation arrangements —

补偿安排中有更多的胡说八道——

And now, you have these 100-page proxy statements. If you take 100 pages to explain how you’re paying the people of the place, something is wrong. I mean, you don’t need 100 — we don’t have 100-page, you know, understandings or anything of the sort.

现在，你们有这些 100 页的代理声明。如果你需要 100 页来解释你是如何支付这个地方的人们的，那就有问题。我是说，你不需要 100 页——我们没有 100 页的理解或类似的东西。

But it’s gotten to be more and more of a game as it’s gone along.

但随着时间的推移，这变得越来越像一场游戏。

And I would say that, as Charlie — that when compensation is a very important part of a director’s wellbeing, you do not have an independent director.

我想说，正如查理所说，当薪酬是董事福祉中非常重要的一部分时，你就没有独立董事。

And the funny thing is, the way it’s — the system has been arranged, those are the very people that tend to be regarded as the independent directors, in most cases.

有趣的是，按照这种安排，通常被视为独立董事的正是这些人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s way worse than practically anybody recognizes. Elihu Root, who was the ultimate good Cabinet officer in the United States, used to have a saying that no man was fit to hold public office who wasn’t perfectly willing to leave it at any time.

查理·芒格：这比几乎任何人意识到的情况要糟糕得多。埃里胡·鲁特（Elihu Root），他是美国历史上最优秀的内阁官员，曾经有一句话：没有人适合担任公职，除非他愿意在任何时候都辞职。

And of course, the minute he left public office, he went right back to being the leading lawyer of the world. So he didn’t have much to lose by —

当然，他一离开公职，就立刻回到了世界顶尖律师的身份。所以他并没有太多可以失去的——

But the man who has a lot to lose from his office is going to be very loath to be an independent director.

但是，那些在职务上有很多损失的人将非常不愿意成为独立董事。

So the way we do it, at Berkshire Hathaway, is one-tenth of 1 percent of America. And the way everybody else does it is silly. (Laughter)

所以我们在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的做法是美国的千分之一。而其他人做法是愚蠢的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) I love being up here with him.

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）我喜欢和他在这里。

61. Worst-case scenario for insurance operation

保险运营的最坏情况

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky. 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Paula Sauer (PH). And, since Charlie seems to be getting more optimistic, maybe we should ask him this question first. And then Warren, you can try and top it.

贝基·奎克：这是来自保拉·索尔（PH）的问题。既然查理似乎变得更加乐观，也许我们应该先问他这个问题。然后沃伦，你可以试着超越他。

But Paula writes in, “What’s the worst-case scenario you could imagine with respect to the insurance business?”

但Paula写道：“你能想象的保险行业的最坏情况是什么？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: You mean ours or generally?

查理·芒格：你是指我们的还是一般的？

BECKY QUICK: I believe she means yours in particular.

贝基·奎克：我相信她特别指的是你的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, the very worst case is some catastrophe where we lose quite a few billions of dollars pretax. Even that, I don’t think, significantly impairs the basic business in place.

查理·芒格：是的。最糟糕的情况是发生某种灾难，我们在税前损失数十亿美元。即便如此，我认为这并不会显著损害现有的基本业务。

So I think we have a marvelous insurance business. I don’t want to trade it for any other that I know. How about you, Warren?

所以我认为我们有一个很棒的保险业务。我不想用我知道的任何其他业务来交换。你呢，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no, it is a fabulous business.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，不，这是一项绝妙的生意。

The worst — I used to say we would probably play 4 percent to 5 percent of the industry loss — from any mega-catastrophe.

最糟糕的是——我曾经说过，我们可能会承担行业损失的 4%到 5%——来自任何重大灾难。

I’m not sure where Katrina finally came in. I don’t know whether it was 60 billion or something in that area. And we probably did pay close to — we were in that 4 percent to 5 percent range.

我不确定卡特里娜最后的损失是多少。我不知道是 600 亿还是在那个范围内。我们可能确实支付了接近——我们在 4%到 5%的范围内。

We’re lower than that, probably, right now, not necessarily way lower. But if we had $100 billion catastrophe, you know, we would probably pay 3 to 4 percent of that, currently, so that you’d be talking 3 to 4 billion.

我们现在可能低于这个水平，不一定低得很多。但如果我们遇到 1000 亿美元的灾难，你知道，我们可能会支付其中的 3%到 4%，所以你说的就是 30 亿到 40 亿。

You know, the worst — I think the worst situation that could occur is if we ran into so much inflation that people got very, very unhappy with anything that they had to buy in their daily life.

你知道，最糟糕的——我认为可能发生的最糟糕情况是，如果我们遇到如此严重的通货膨胀，以至于人们对他们日常生活中必须购买的任何东西感到非常非常不满。

This applies in the utility business, too, but certainly like auto insurance, and in effect, that they express their outrage at inflationary increases and said, “Let’s nationalize the whole thing.” I mean, that would not — that would be a huge asset that would disappear, if that occurred.

这在公用事业行业也适用，但当然像汽车保险一样，实际上，他们对通货膨胀的增加表示愤怒，并说：“让我们把整个事情国有化。”我的意思是，如果发生这种情况，那将是一个巨大的资产消失。

I don’t think that’s a high probability. But if you’re asking me to look at worst cases, that’s probably the one I would come up with. I —

我认为这不是一个高概率的情况。但是如果你让我考虑最坏的情况，那可能就是我会想到的那个。我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that happened. Auto insurance was nationalized somewhere, New Zealand or somewhere.

查理·芒格：嗯，这发生了。汽车保险在某个地方被国有化了，新西兰或其他地方。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：哦，当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s not — if you want the absolute worst cases, you found it.

查理·芒格：但这并不是——如果你想要最糟糕的情况，你找到了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we nationalized, to some extent, the annuity business, you know, when we went into Social Security. I think it was a good thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，在某种程度上，我们国有化了年金业务，你知道，当我们进入社会保障时。我认为这是一件好事。

But when people get outraged enough about something, you’ve heard talk about the banks. I mean, when the public gets outraged, the politicians will respond.

但是当人们对某件事感到愤怒时，你就会听到关于银行的讨论。我的意思是，当公众感到愤怒时，政治家们会作出回应。

And inflation would be — wild inflation — would be the most likely cause, it seems to me, if something like that — I don’t think that’s probable — but something like that happening in auto insurance.

而通货膨胀——疯狂的通货膨胀——似乎是最可能的原因，如果发生类似的事情——我认为这不太可能——但在汽车保险中发生类似的事情。

It’s a bill that most people pay, you know, every six months, or even more frequently than that. And if they see that bill going up and they don’t want to get rid of their car, they’re going to get mad.

这是大多数人每六个月支付的账单，甚至更频繁。如果他们看到账单上涨，而又不想摆脱他们的车，他们会感到生气。

And utility companies are going to get — utility customers — are going to get very mad during inflation. Because they need to turn on the lights. And they hate to see, you know, those monthly bills going up.

公用事业公司将会让公用事业客户在通货膨胀期间非常生气。因为他们需要开灯。他们讨厌看到每月账单上涨。

It’s the — it’s something they can’t give up. And it’s very visible. And the reaction will be to go to their public representatives and say, “Do something about this.”

这是他们无法放弃的东西。而且这非常明显。反应将是去找他们的公众代表，说：“对此做点什么。”

And one of the things they can do about it is take it over. So very low probability of that, but it’s not nonexistent.

他们可以采取的措施之一就是接管它。因此，这种可能性非常低，但并非不存在。

62. No preset goal for international investments

对国际投资没有预设目标

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 10? 沃伦·巴菲特：第 10 区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, Patrick O’Donoghue (PH) from Cork in Ireland. So I suppose I should start by saying I’m sorry you’ve had such a tough time in my otherwise wonderful little country.

观众成员：先生们，我是来自爱尔兰科克的帕特里克·奥多诺霍（PH）。所以我想我应该先说声抱歉，你们在我这个本来美好的小国家里经历了这么艰难的时光。

WARREN BUFFETT: I love the Irish. We’ve got some — we’ve had great luck with the Irish. It was my mistake. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我爱爱尔兰人。我们有一些——我们与爱尔兰人非常幸运。这是我的错误。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. Now, I’d like to grow my investment in Berkshire Hathaway. And I think we’ve established it’s a wonderful company.

观众成员：好的。现在，我想增加我在伯克希尔哈撒韦的投资。我认为我们已经确认这是一个很棒的公司。

So I’m left with a couple of other issues, which, for a foreigner, are maybe a little different for people domestically, the first of which is that any gains in Berkshire Hathaway may be wiped out by a slide in the dollar versus the euro. And we’re talking a long-term investment here, obviously.

所以我还有几个其他问题，对于外国人来说，这些问题可能与国内人稍有不同，第一个是，任何在伯克希尔哈撒韦的收益可能会被美元对欧元的下滑所抵消。显然，我们在这里谈论的是长期投资。

The second is, perhaps you could discuss the — your — global acquisitions, which will reduce your dollar dependence and increase your foreign-source income.

第二点是，也许你可以讨论一下你们的全球收购，这将减少你们对美元的依赖，并增加你们的外源收入。

I’ve lost the third. If you could discuss those, please.

我忘记了第三个。如果您能讨论这些问题，请。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure, yeah, and if it comes to you, that’ll be fine.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，如果想起来，那就很好。

The — predicting the euro versus the dollar, I’m no good at. You —

我不擅长预测欧元对美元的汇率。你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You did pretty well.

查理·芒格：你做得很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Yeah, we did make a couple billion. But the — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）是的，我们确实赚了几十亿。但是——（笑声）

You could, if you wished — I’m not suggesting this at all — but euro/dollar is an easy thing to hedge. I’m not recommending that. I’m just telling you that that is an option, if you’re worried about a major currency. It’s hard to do with smaller-country currencies.

果您愿意——我并不是在建议这个——但欧元/美元是一个很容易对冲的事情。我并不推荐这样做。我只是告诉您，如果您担心主要货币，这是一种选择。对于小国货币来说，这很难做到。

But when you’re talking the euro/dollar thing, you can keep hedging that, if you want to.

但是当你谈论欧元/美元的事情时，如果你想的话，可以继续对冲。

But like I say, we don’t normally do that sort of thing. And that could be a pain in the neck to you.

但正如我所说，我们通常不做那种事情。这对你来说可能会很麻烦。

I would say, in terms of Berkshire’s earnings, we will just keep doing things that make — we think make sense. Now, if we own —

我会说，就伯克希尔的收益而言，我们将继续做我们认为有意义的事情。现在，如果我们拥有——

We own over 8 percent, for example, of Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola, you know, makes 80 percent or more of its money outside the United States.

我们拥有可口可乐超过 8%的股份。你知道，可口可乐 80%以上的收入来自美国以外的地方。

We own a lot of Procter & Gamble. They make a lot of their money out of the United States. Kraft makes a lot of money out of the United States.

我们拥有很多宝洁公司的股票。他们在美国以外赚了很多钱。卡夫在美国以外也赚了很多钱。

So we have a lot of indirect sources of earnings. And then we have a lot of direct sources of earnings outside the United States.

所以我们有很多间接的收入来源。然后我们在美国以外还有很多直接的收入来源。

ISCAR makes most of its money — it makes money in the United States, but it makes a lot of money elsewhere. And we have other businesses like that.

ISCAR 在美国赚取大部分收入，但在其他地方赚得更多。我们还有其他类似的业务。

We do not have a predetermined goal at all of developing X percent of our earnings here or there or that place. We just keep, you know, every day, we go to work.

我们并没有预设的目标，要求在这里或那里或其他地方开发X%的收益。我们每天都在工作。

And we don’t know whether the phone call will come from Israel or from Indiana, in terms of a chance to invest some money.

我们不知道这个电话是来自以色列还是印第安纳州，关于投资一些钱的机会。

We want all of our subsidiaries to be looking at opportunities everyplace. And some of them will find them abroad. And some of them won’t. So it — we are not a — we are not heading anyplace, in terms of sources of earnings.

我们希望所有的子公司都在各地寻找机会。有些子公司会在国外找到机会，有些则不会。因此——我们并没有朝着某个方向前进，至于收益来源。

There are a lot of countries we feel comfortable with. And we would be happy to put money into those countries.

我们对很多国家感到舒适。我们很乐意在这些国家投资。

But we don’t wake up in the morning saying that we would like to have more money in Germany or Spain or whatever, or that we would want to take money out of those countries.

但我们并不会早上醒来时想着想要在德国或西班牙多投资一些，或者想要把资金撤出那些国家。

And Charlie, have any more?

查理，您还有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. People look at a modern, liberal democracy. And it’s very easy to conclude that it’s messy and full of defects. And I think that’s a correct view.

查理·芒格：是的。人们看现代的自由民主制度，很容易得出结论，它是混乱的，充满缺陷。我认为这是一个正确的看法。

But it’s not at all clear to me that the messy defects that we have are worse than the messy defects of Europe.

但我并不清楚我们所拥有的混乱缺陷是否比欧洲的混乱缺陷更糟。

I am an agnostic about these things. I think there’s plenty wrong and plenty right on both sides of the Atlantic.

我对这些事情持不可知论态度。我认为大西洋两岸都有很多问题，也有很多正确的地方。

63. “Nobody gets any joy” from layoffs

“没有人从裁员中获得任何快乐”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: So this question comes from three shareholders who happen to be employees of Berkshire portfolio companies. They’ve asked not to be named in the — they ask the following question.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自三位股东，他们恰好是伯克希尔投资组合公司的员工。他们要求在——不透露姓名——提出以下问题。

They say, “We are concerned with both the financial condition of the company and the stability of our jobs. Could you discuss your attitude towards the use of layoffs as a means of responding to short-term downturns in company profits?”

他们说：“我们关心公司的财务状况和我们工作的稳定性。您能谈谈您对裁员作为应对公司利润短期下滑的一种手段的态度吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, these are investee companies or subsidiaries?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这些是被投资公司还是子公司？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: These are — I imagine they are investee companies. They —

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这些——我想它们是被投资的公司。它们——

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: And they are shareholders and employees.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：他们是股东和员工。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I wouldn’t have a different attitude. I was just clarifying it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我不会有不同的态度。我只是澄清一下。

The — there’s no question that business conditions can change such as to necessitate temporary or permanent layoffs.

毫无疑问，商业环境可能会发生变化，从而需要临时或永久裁员。

I mean, there’s — scales of businesses change. We’re fortunate, in a place like GEICO, where our business is expanding. So we’ll probably add at least, I would guess, a thousand jobs, net, at a GEICO.

我的意思是，商业规模在变化。我们很幸运，在像 GEICO 这样的地方，我们的业务正在扩展。因此，我猜我们可能会至少增加一千个净工作岗位。

But at the same time, we probably have close to half of our brick plants closed in the Southwest, because people just aren’t building houses now. Now, that business will come back. And we’ll rehire people.

但与此同时，我们在西南地区的砖厂可能有接近一半关闭，因为人们现在根本不建房子。这个行业会恢复，我们会重新雇用员工。

On the other hand, our textile business never came back. And we employ fewer people at the Buffalo News than we did a year ago. And we are not going to regain those or get back to previous levels.

另一方面，我们的纺织业务从未恢复。而且我们在布法罗新闻的员工人数比一年前少。我们不会恢复这些员工，也无法回到之前的水平。

So there are some businesses that may permanently contract. And you have to face up to that, in terms of layoffs.

所以有一些企业可能会永久性缩减。你必须面对这一点，尤其是在裁员方面。

There’s other businesses that have severe cyclical-type contractions, and they are going to face significant layoffs.

还有其他一些企业面临严重的周期性收缩，他们将面临大规模裁员。

There are other businesses that are suffering a little bit during a period like this, but very little. And we will resist the idea of having layoffs.

在这样的时期，还有其他一些企业受到了一些影响，但影响很小。我们将抵制裁员的想法。

We — you know, nobody gets any joy out of it. And generally, you do it, probably, a little too late, even, because you keep hoping the business will bounce back up or something of the sort.

我们——你知道，没有人从中获得任何乐趣。而且通常情况下，你可能做得有点晚，因为你一直希望生意会恢复或类似的事情。

But, you know, it — if the business changes in a material way, you’d better change your business model. Or, you know, somebody else will. And then you’ll even have more changes facing you.

但是，你知道，如果业务发生重大变化，你最好改变你的商业模式。否则，别人会这样做。然后你将面临更多的变化。

On balance, we hope we get into businesses that don’t face those kind of problems.

总体而言，我们希望进入那些不面临这些问题的业务。

But certainly, in our construction-related businesses — we’ve had layoffs at Shaw, we’ve had layoffs at Johns Manville, we’ve had layoffs at Benjamin Moore, we’ve had layoffs at Acme Brick, and there’s really no alternative. I mean, it — and our competitors all have had also.

但当然，在我们的建筑相关业务中——我们在肖公司进行了裁员，我们在约翰斯·曼维尔进行了裁员，我们在本杰明·摩尔进行了裁员，我们在阿克米砖厂进行了裁员，实际上没有其他选择。我的意思是——我们的竞争对手也都进行了裁员。

And you know, in the textile business, we got into it in 1965. In the end, we laid off everybody. I mean, it — we — it had contracted enormously before we got there. We tried all kinds of things. And we finally gave up.

你知道，在纺织行业，我们在 1965 年进入这个行业。最后，我们解雇了所有人。我的意思是，在我们到达之前，它已经大幅缩减。我们尝试了各种方法，最后终于放弃了。

You know, there — capitalism — you know, is creative destruction. And sometimes, you’re on the short end of that.

你知道，资本主义就是创造性毁灭。有时候，你会处于不利的一方。

This year, in terms of the businesses we have, you know, our employment will probably be reduced even — I’m almost sure it will — even though GEICO will expand.

今年，就我们拥有的业务而言，你知道，我们的就业可能会减少——我几乎可以肯定会减少——尽管 GEICO 会扩张。

It will not be reduced dramatically, because it just hits in certain areas. But it will be reduced. And our managers have to look at the reality of the current situation.

它不会大幅减少，因为它只在某些领域受到影响。但它会减少。我们的管理者必须关注当前形势的现实。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Some of our businesses have a shared-hardship model, where they don’t layoff, at least not yet. And the businesses with that model tend to be very strongly placed, economically.

查理·芒格：是的。我们的一些业务采用共享困难的模式，他们不会裁员，至少目前还没有。采用这种模式的企业在经济上往往处于非常有利的位置。

So I guess it shows that Benjamin Franklin was right, when he said, “It’s hard for an empty sack to stand upright.”

所以我想这表明本杰明·富兰克林是对的，他说过：“空袋子很难站立。”

And, so we’re all over the map on that, and so is all of industry. And —

而且，我们在这方面的看法各不相同，整个行业也是如此。还有——

But I do think the — an ideal model would be a business so strong that it could operate in the shared-hardship mode instead of the layoffs.

但我确实认为，理想的模式应该是一个如此强大的企业，以至于它可以在共享困难的模式下运营，而不是裁员。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, some are doing that, where they — you know, you give up hours. And — but a lot of operations don’t lend themselves to that very well, either. So —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，有些企业确实是这样，他们——您知道，减少工时。但是许多业务并不太适合这样做，所以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: ISCAR’s operating that way.

查理·芒格：ISCAR 就是这样运作的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, ISCAR’s operating that way. And, in other cases, you basically have to close down whole plants. I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，ISCAR 就是这样运作的。在其他情况下，你基本上不得不关闭整个工厂。我是说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, sure.

查理·芒格：是的，当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s just the nature of it. It’s better — you really can’t operate every plant at 50 percent and have it work as effectively as shutting down the least-productive plants.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这就是事情的本质。您真的无法以50%的产能运营每个工厂，保持其有效性，还不如关闭效率最低的工厂。

CHARLIE MUNGER: In a world where you sometimes have to amputate a limb to stay alive, you can’t expect that every business can stay exactly as it is.

查理·芒格：在一个有时你必须截肢才能生存的世界里，你不能指望每个企业都能保持原样。

64. Fight egregious CEO pay with embarrassment, not legislation

用尴尬而不是立法来对抗过高的首席执行官薪酬

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，11 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Ralph Witkin from Greenwich, Connecticut. I was first here in 1995. And I really appreciate the way you handle this meeting. I’ve been to dozens of others. And I know you’re not obligated to do this. And I thank you for it, both of you.

观众成员：嗨，我是来自康涅狄格州格林威治的拉尔夫·维特金。我第一次来这里是在 1995 年。我非常感谢你们处理这次会议的方式。我参加过其他几十场会议。我知道你们并没有义务这样做。对此，我要感谢你们两位。

My question is very similar to number 9′s, regarding executive compensation.

我的问题与第 9 个问题非常相似，涉及高管薪酬。

Not so much your view on the compensation, but how we, as shareholders, can make some attempt to try to correct this and bring it back into some level of balance. Thank you.

并不是说你对补偿的看法，而是我们作为股东如何尝试纠正这一点，使其恢复到某种平衡水平。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: I had a senator call me just the other day. And, his constituents, obviously, are enraged about executive comp.

沃伦·巴菲特：就在前几天，我接到一位参议员的电话。他的选民显然对高管薪酬感到愤怒。

Probably — you know, AIG really had a huge impact, although, you know, you can take the Merrills and all the rest of them, also. But that story was huge with people.

可能——你知道，AIG 确实产生了巨大的影响，尽管你知道，你也可以提到美林证券和其他所有公司。但这个故事对人们来说是巨大的。

And it was probably — in a certain sense, the outrage was disproportionate to what happened. But in any — it doesn’t make any difference. The people are enraged about it.

而这可能——在某种意义上，愤怒与发生的事情不成比例。但无论如何——这没有任何区别。人们对此感到愤怒。

So this senator called me. And he said, you know — he was essentially saying, “Tell me about a statute we can enact that will make my constituents happy about executive compensation.”

所以这位参议员给我打了电话。他说，你知道——他基本上是在说，“告诉我一个我们可以制定的法律，让我的选民对高管薪酬感到满意。”

And my advice to him was that he probably couldn’t, and that the last time Congress got into this was in the early days of the Clinton administration, when they passed a bill that said, as I remember, for the top five officers, that you couldn’t get deductibility for comp in excess of a million dollars annually, unless it was tied to performance in some way.

我对他的建议是，他可能做不到，而国会上一次涉及这个问题是在克林顿政府早期，当时他们通过了一项法案，据我记得，对于前五名高管，年薪超过一百万美元的部分不能扣除，除非与某种绩效挂钩。

That was probably the most counterproductive piece of legislation that Congress has ever come up with, which is quite a statement to make in itself. (Laughter)

这可能是国会提出的最适得其反的立法，这本身就是一个相当大的声明。（笑声）

The net result of that was that when the tax was imposed, of course, the stockholders paid it and the officer didn’t. So it penalized the shareholder, who was already getting penalized by the comp.

最终结果是，当税收被征收时，当然，股东支付了税，而高管没有。因此，这惩罚了股东，而股东本身已经因为薪酬而受到惩罚。

It led to all kinds of arrangements that were designed to dance around this, which involved lots of lawyering and lots of consultants and lots of pages of proxy statements, the net effect of which was to ratchet up compensation very dramatically. Compensation increased far more, in my view, because that was put on the books than otherwise.

这导致了各种安排，旨在规避这一点，涉及大量的法律事务、顾问和代理声明的页面，其净效果是大幅提高了薪酬。在我看来，薪酬的增加远远超过了其他情况，因为这被记录在案。

So I suggested to him that the first thing they would do — should do — is probably repeal that and say, “We were wrong,” and then figure out whether they should do something right. But that did not go over very well. (Munger laughs)

所以我建议他，他们首先应该做的事情——应该做的事情——可能是废除那个，并说：“我们错了”，然后再想想他们是否应该做正确的事情。但这并没有得到很好的反响。（芒格笑）

So I would say that — I’ve always proposed this. It never has gone anyplace. But that won’t stop me from continuing to propose it.

所以我想说——我一直在提这个建议。它从来没有得到过任何进展。但这并不会阻止我继续提出这个建议。

All you need in this country is the top half dozen or so investment managers who manage, you know, we’re talking hundreds of billions, trillions, in some cases, of assets.

在这个国家，你所需要的就是大约六位顶级投资经理，他们管理着数百亿、甚至数万亿的资产。

If they would just speak out on the most egregious cases. Just — you know, there’s a lot of stuff about “say on pay” and everything. But half a dozen of them, they get lots of publicity — they wouldn’t have to worry about getting their views out.

如果他们能够对最过分的案例公开发表意见。只要——您知道，关于“薪酬表决”之类的东西已经有很多讨论。但如果六位投资经理公开发表意见，他们会得到大量的媒体关注——他们根本不需要担心将自己的观点传达出去。

The way they get big shots to change their behavior is to embarrass them, you know, basically. And the press has great opportunities to do that. And — but they need the cooperation of the big investors.

他们让大人物改变行为的方法基本上是让他们感到尴尬。媒体有很好的机会做到这一点。但是，他们需要大投资者的合作。

So if you’ve got three or four of the biggest investors, when the XYZ Company comes out with some crazy plan, to step up and just say, “This is outrageous,” it would change behavior. And it would —

所以如果你有三到四个最大的投资者，当 XYZ 公司提出一些疯狂的计划时，站出来说“这太离谱了”，这将改变行为。并且它会——

The directors don’t like to look foolish. They don’t like their names in the paper looking foolish. And you would see some real changes.

董事们不喜欢看起来愚蠢。他们不喜欢自己的名字出现在报纸上，看起来愚蠢。您会看到一些真正的变化。

I think that the legislation for it is going to be — I just don’t know how to write the stuff, you know?

我认为相关立法将会是——我只是不知道该怎么写这些东西，你知道吗？

I mean, you read the case recently at Chesapeake Energy, you know, $75 million for kind of a re-signing bonus and some — there were some other things involved, too.

我指的是，你最近看到切萨皮克能源的案例了吧，7500 万美元的续签奖金，还有其他一些事情也涉及其中。

I mean, it just — you wonder what people are thinking. You know what the CEO is thinking. And it just — I don’t think you can write the statute that stops it. And like I said, the one they tried to write just screwed everything up royally.

我意思是，你会想知道人们在想什么。你知道首席执行官在想什么。然后——我认为你无法写出能阻止它的法规。就像我说的，他们试图写的那个法规只把一切搞得一团糟。

But I do think big institutions — if they spoke out — you’d only need three or four of them that spoke out jointly. And they don’t have to do it on every corporation at all, just when it’s egregious enough.

但我确实认为，如果大型机构发声，您只需要三四个共同发声的机构。他们并不需要对每个公司都这样做，只需在情况严重到足够的程度时。

But if they get a reputation for speaking out when it’s egregious, every now and then, it would act as — I think there would be some restraining factor that might set in in corporate America. Because the restraining factor is not there then — not there now.

但如果他们在严重问题上发声并获得声誉，偶尔这样做会起到一种作用——我认为这可能会在美国企业中产生某种约束因素。因为现在并没有这种约束因素。

I mean, right now, every consultant comes in and brings along what the people at so-called pure companies are making. And they —

我指的是，现在每个顾问都会带来那些所谓纯粹公司的高管薪酬数据。

Nobody wants to say their CEO is in the bottom quartile or something. So they just keep comparing themselves to the higher quartiles. And then they ratchet up from there.

没有人想说他们的首席执行官处于底部四分位或其他什么地方。因此，他们只是不断与更高的四分位进行比较。然后他们就从那里逐步提升。

And, you know, it’s a game that works wonders. I call it the honor system. You know, the shareholders have the honor and the executives have the system. (Laughter)

而且，你知道，这是一款奇妙的游戏。我称之为荣誉系统。你知道，股东有荣誉，而高管有系统。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, I don’t — I’m not too optimistic about fixing it from the big investor standpoint.

查理·芒格：是的，我对从大投资者的角度来解决这个问题并不太乐观。

The big investor groups contain many an investment manager making $20 million a year for insignificant contributions. He’s like a man in a glass house that starts throwing stones.

大型投资集团中有许多投资经理每年赚取 2000 万美元，却贡献微不足道。他就像一个在玻璃房子里的人，开始扔石头。

And the public pension funds are dominated, in many cases, by left-wing politicians and by labor unions who tend to have an agenda of their own that doesn’t really relate to good management. So, sometimes, the cure is worse than the disease.

而公共养老基金在很多情况下受到左翼政治家和工会的主导，他们往往有自己的议程，这与良好的管理并没有真正关系。因此，有时，解决方案比问题更糟糕。

65. We don’t hire potentially great managers

我们不雇用潜在的优秀经理。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on that hopeful note, we’ll move on to Carol. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，在这个充满希望的音符上，我们来看看卡罗尔。（笑声）

CAROL LOOMIS: This is a question from Peter Poulson, spelled P-O-U-L-S-O-N.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这是彼得·波尔森的问题，拼写为 P-O-U-L-S-O-N。

He says, “When you acquire companies, they come equipped with managers. And in general, Berkshire has done a great job putting the right leaders in the right roles.

他说：“当你收购公司时，它们会配备管理者。一般来说，伯克希尔在将合适的领导者放在合适的角色上做得很好。”

“But occasionally, you have to hire someone for an executive spot. Please describe an interview that you might have with a prospective Berkshire operating executive. What do you look for? How do you evaluate a person’s potential to become a great manager?”

“但偶尔，你需要为一个高管职位雇佣某人。请描述一下你可能与一位潜在的伯克希尔运营高管进行的面试。你会关注什么？你如何评估一个人成为优秀经理的潜力？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, usually, we hire people that have already proven they’re great managers. I mean, when we buy a business, very — a very high percentage of the time, the management comes with it.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，通常我们会雇佣那些已经证明自己是优秀管理者的人。我的意思是，当我们收购一家公司时，管理层通常会随之而来，比例非常高。

When we buy an ISCAR, you know, we get the group that had been knocking the ball out of the park for years and years and years.

当我们购买 ISCAR 时，你知道，我们得到了那个多年来一直表现出色的团队。

And the real question we have to ask ourselves is, you know, will they be with us in the future? Will they keep — will they be feeling the same way after the deal as they did the day before the deal?

我们真正需要问自己的问题是，你知道，他们未来会和我们在一起吗？在交易之后，他们会像交易前一天那样的感受吗？

And we’ve made occasional mistakes on that. But overall, that does come through. So it’s — we’ve had good luck with managers, not perfect.

我们在这方面偶尔犯过错误。但总体来说，这一点是显而易见的。所以我们与经理的合作运气不错，但并不完美。

And, the toughest part is, since we have no retirement age, is when managers lose the abilities that they had at an earlier age.

而且，最困难的部分是，由于我们没有退休年龄，当管理者失去他们在年轻时所拥有的能力时。

And that — it doesn’t relate to — there’s no yardstick you can use up and down the line for that. So it’s — people age, at least in business ability, they age in very different ways and at different paces.

而且——这与——没有可以用来衡量的标准。因此，人们在商业能力上老去的方式和速度各不相同。

And Charlie and I have the problem of figuring out, sometimes, when somebody has — does not have the same managerial ability that they had at an earlier time.

查理和我有时面临一个问题，那就是判断某人是否仍然具备他们早期所拥有的管理能力。

And then we have the responsibility for doing something about it. And we hate it. But it’s —

然后我们有责任去做些什么。我们讨厌这样。但这就是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, we’ve been slow in those.

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，我们在这些方面进展缓慢。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve been slow every time.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们每次都很慢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’ve been slow. If we really love the guy, we’re really slow. (Laughter) We are far from ideal.

查理·芒格：我们一直很慢。如果我们真的爱这个人，我们就会非常慢。（笑声）我们远非理想。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it’s very — well, we had a manager, you know, a wonderful — I mean, a guy we both loved at Wesco.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯，这非常——我们有一个经理，你知道，一个很棒的——我的意思是，我们都很喜欢的一个家伙在 Wesco。

And he got Alzheimer’s. I mean, it — you know, and we didn’t want to face it. We finally did. But it took us probably an extra year, year and a half, didn’t it, Charlie?

他得了阿尔茨海默病。我是说，这——你知道，我们不想面对这个。我们最终面对了。但这大概花了我们多一年的时间，或者一年半，对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure. 查理·芒格：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

It’s the only part of my job that I don’t like, basically. I mean, I hate it. But — I’d pay a lot of money not to have to do it. But occasionally, it happens. Fortunately, it doesn’t seem to happen that often at —

这基本上是我工作中唯一不喜欢的部分。我是说，我讨厌它。但是——我愿意花很多钱来不做这件事。不过偶尔还是会发生。幸运的是，这种情况似乎并不常见。

We find people who love their businesses, you know? I love Berkshire. I — you know, I go to work every day, and I’m excited about it. And we — you can spot that in people.

我们发现那些热爱自己事业的人，你知道吗？我热爱伯克希尔。我——你知道，我每天都去上班，并且对此感到兴奋。我们——你可以在这些人身上看到这一点。

I mean, I think most of you would probably realize that that’s the way I feel about it. And I realize that’s the way the managers of our subsidiaries feel about it.

我想，我认为你们大多数人可能会意识到我对这件事的看法。而我也意识到我们的子公司的管理者对这件事的看法也是如此。

I mean, Tony — Tony Nicely — went to work at GEICO when, you know, he was a teenager. And he’s as excited every day about GEICO as I am. It hit me the first time —

我指的是，托尼——托尼·尼克利——在他还是青少年的时候就去 GEICO 工作。每天他对 GEICO 的兴奋程度和我一样。第一次让我意识到这一点——

I saw him yesterday at lunch. And the first thing he does is hand me the figure, which he knows I’m waiting for. You know, ”(Inaudible), we’re up 505-thousand,” and he carries it out all the way, “policyholders.”

我昨天在午餐时见到他。他第一件事就是把我一直在等的数字递给我。你知道的，“（听不清），我们增加了 505,000，”他一直说到最后，“保单持有人。”

And, I mean, I get excited about those numbers. He gets excited about them. You know, we talk about state-by-state, whatever it may be. And, you can’t put that into somebody.

而且，我是说，我对那些数字感到兴奋。他也对它们感到兴奋。你知道，我们讨论逐州的情况，无论是什么。而且，你无法把这些灌输给某人。

But we do recognize it when it’s there. And we do our best to make sure that we don’t do anything that dampens that in any way.

但我们确实能意识到它的存在。我们会尽力确保不做任何会抑制它的事情。

66. Don’t try to time the market

不要试图把握市场时机

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, area 12.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，区域 12。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. Jimmy Chong (PH) here from Dayton, Ohio.

观众：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我是来自俄亥俄州代顿的吉米·张。

Mr. Buffett, in October of last year, you wrote, in a New York Times op-ed piece, that you were moving your personal portfolio to a hundred percent U.S. equities.

巴菲特先生，去年十月，您在《纽约时报》的一篇评论文章中写道，您将个人投资组合转向百分之百的美国股票。

My question is, is that move complete? If not, are you still buying? And in addition to that, how would you rank the recent market downturn in terms of investing opportunities in stocks during your investment careers?

我的问题是，这个动作完成了吗？如果没有，你还在继续购买吗？此外，在你们的投资生涯中，你会如何评估最近市场下跌在股票投资机会方面的排名？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s certainly not as dramatic as the 1974 period was. Stocks got much cheaper in 1974 than they are now.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，1974 年时期的情况显然没有那么戏剧化。1974 年的股票比现在便宜得多。

But you were also facing a different interest rate scenario. So you could say they really weren’t that much cheaper.

但你们也面临着不同的利率情况。所以可以说它们并没有便宜多少。

You could buy very good companies at four times earnings or thereabouts with good prospects. But interest rates were far higher then.

你可以以大约四倍的收益购买非常好的公司，前景良好。但那时的利率要高得多。

That was the best period I’ve ever seen for buying common equities. The country may not have been in as much trouble then as we were back in September. I don’t think it was. But stocks were somewhat cheaper then.

那是我见过的最佳购买普通股票的时期。那个时候国家可能没有现在的麻烦那么严重。我认为是这样。但当时股票确实便宜一些。

In the recent period, I — you know, I bought some equities. And then corporate bonds looked extraordinarily cheap. The spreads were very, very wide. So I bought some of those, too.

最近，我——你知道，我买了一些股票。然后公司债券看起来非常便宜。利差非常大。所以我也买了一些。

But the cheaper things get, the better I like buying them. I mean, if I was buying hamburgers at McDonald’s, you know, the other day for X, and they reduced the price to 90 percent of X tomorrow — not likely — but if they did, I’m happy.

但东西越便宜，我越喜欢买。我是说，如果我前几天在麦当劳买汉堡包花了 X，如果他们明天把价格降到 X 的 90%——虽然不太可能——但如果他们真的这么做了，我会很高兴。

I don’t think about what I paid yesterday for the hamburger. I think I’m going to be buying hamburgers the rest of my life, you know? The cheaper they get, the better I like it.

我不考虑昨天为汉堡支付了多少钱。我觉得我会在余生中一直买汉堡，你知道吗？它们越便宜，我就越喜欢。

I’m going to be buying investments the rest of my life. And I would much rather pay half of X than X.

我将会在余生中购买投资。我宁愿支付 X的一半，也不愿支付 X。

And, the fact that I paid X yesterday doesn’t bother me, if I get — as long as I know the values in the business.

而且，我昨天支付了 X 并不让我感到困扰，只要我知道业务中的价值。

So on a personal basis, I like lower prices. I realize that that is not the way all of you feel when you wake up in the morning and look at quotes.

所以就个人而言，我喜欢更低的价格。我意识到，这并不是你们早上醒来查看报价时的感受。

But, it just makes sense that when things are on sale, that you should be more excited about buying them than otherwise.

但当商品打折时，您应该比平时更兴奋地购买它们，这很有道理。

And lately — when I wrote that article in the Times, I did not predict what stocks were going to do. Because I never know what they’re going to do.

最近——当我在《泰晤士报》上写那篇文章时，我并没有预测股票会怎么走。因为我从来不知道它们会怎么走。

But I do know when you’re starting to get a lot for your money. And that’s when I believe in buying.

但我确实知道什么时候你开始获得物有所值。这就是我相信购买的时候。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if stocks go off 40 percent on average, they’re obviously closer to an attractive price than they were before.

查理·芒格：好吧，如果股票平均下跌 40%，显然它们比之前更接近一个有吸引力的价格。

And, of course, interest rates have gone down a lot recently, at least short-term interest rates.

当然，最近利率下降了很多，至少短期利率是这样。

It’s nothing like ’73-4. I knew when that happened that that was my time and my only time. I knew I was never going to get another trip to the buy counter like that one.

这与1973年和1974年完全不同。我知道那时候是我的机会，也是我唯一的机会。我知道我不会再得到那样的购买机会。

Unfortunately, I had practically no money available, which is — (Laughter)

不幸的是，我几乎没有可用的钱，这就是——（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why it happened.

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是为什么会发生。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s why those times occur.

查理·芒格：这就是为什么会发生在那些时刻。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So, if I were you, I wouldn’t wait for 1973-4.

查理·芒格：所以，如果我是你，我就不会等到 1973-1974 年。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we don’t try to pick bottoms or you know —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们不试图抄底或者你知道的——

We don’t have an opinion about where the stock market’s going to go tomorrow or next week or next month.

我们对股市明天、下周或下个月的走势没有意见。

So to sit around and not do something that’s sensible because you think there will be something even more attractive, that’s just not our approach to it.

所以坐在那里不做一些明智的事情，因为你认为会有更吸引人的东西，这不是我们的处理方式。

Anytime we get a chance to do something that makes sense, we do it. And if it makes even more sense the next day, and if we’ve got money, we may do more. And if we don’t, you know, that — what can we do about it?

每当我们有机会做一些有意义的事情时，我们就会去做。如果第二天这件事更有意义，而且我们有钱，我们可能会做得更多。如果没有，你知道，我们能做什么呢？

So picking bottoms is basically not our game. Pricing is our game. And that’s not so difficult. Picking bottoms, I think, is probably impossible, but —

所以抄底基本上不是我们的游戏。定价才是我们的游戏。这并不那么困难。抄底，我认为，可能是不可能的，但——

When you get — when you start getting a lot for your money, you buy it. And as I say, after I wrote that, stocks did get cheaper.

当你获得——当你开始以较低的价格获得很多东西时，你就会购买它。正如我所说，在我写下那句话后，股票确实变得便宜了。

Corporate bonds — the corporate bond market got very, very, very disorganized. And we bought some fairly good-sized pieces of bonds for Berkshire. And I also bought a few little things for myself.

公司债券——公司债券市场变得非常非常混乱。我们为伯克希尔购买了一些相当大规模的债券。我自己也买了一些小东西。

But I spend 99 percent of my time thinking about Berkshire. That’s —

但我 99%的时间都在思考伯克希尔。这是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, by now, don’t we have our small life insurance companies pretty well full of desirable debt instruments at 10 percent?

查理·芒格：沃伦，到目前为止，我们的小型人寿保险公司是不是已经装满了10%的优质债务工具？

WARREN BUFFETT: We certainly have got a lot more of it than we had, yeah. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们确实比以前拥有更多，是的。（笑）

No, we’ve — we got a chance to buy some corporate bonds very, very cheaply — at least in my view — a few months back.

不，我们——几个月前我们有机会以非常非常便宜的价格购买一些公司债券——至少在我看来是这样。

And we had money in life companies that can’t be used in certain other areas and for which this was an ideal time to just barrel in.

我们在人寿保险公司有资金，这些资金不能用于某些其他领域，此时正是大规模进入的理想时机。

And anytime we like to do something, we really like to do it. I mean, our idea is not to tiptoe into anything. So we buy them as fast as we can, when prices are right.

我们想做任何事情的时候，真的很想去做。我是说，我们的想法是不想小心翼翼地进入任何事情。因此，当价格合适时，我们会尽快购买它们。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that bond thing didn’t last very long, but —

查理·芒格：是的，那种债券的事情没持续多久，但——

WARREN BUFFETT: Nope. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — there were perfectly safe bonds that yielded 9 percent or more with very fancy call protection.

查理·芒格：——有一些完全安全的债券，收益率达到 9％或更高，并且有非常好的赎回保护。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And some of those bonds are up 20, 25 percent. So the opportunities are frequently under shell A, when you’re looking at shell B.

查理·芒格：其中一些债券上涨了 20%到 25%。因此，当你在关注 B 壳时，机会通常在 A 壳之下。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We try to look at all the shells.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们尽量查看所有的外壳。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we look at all the shells.

查理·芒格：是的，我们查看所有的外壳。

67. “Decent” rates of return from regulated utilities

从公用事业中获得“体面”的回报率

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Jim Mitchell from Costa Mesa, California, who wants to know from both of you.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自加利福尼亚州科斯塔梅萨的吉姆·米切尔，他想问你们俩。

He says, “Years ago, you taught us to beware of capital-intensive businesses, like electric utilities, that may be overstating profits due to understating depreciation.

他说：“多年前，你教我们要提防资本密集型企业，比如电力公司，这些企业可能因为低估折旧而夸大利润。”

“Now that you are investing in utilities and gas pipelines, have you discovered the secret of long life for power plants? Or do we need to discount your utility earnings?”

“既然您正在投资公用事业和天然气管道，您是否发现了发电厂长期生存的秘诀？还是我们需要对您的公用事业收益进行折扣？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the utility earnings, pretty much, come about through a return on equity capital allowed by the jurisdictions in which you operate.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，公用事业的收益主要来自于您所经营的辖区所允许的股本回报率。

So, for example, if something like pension costs or something of the sort, you get surprises on, you do get to earn that back over time. But you don’t get any bonanzas, either.

所以，例如，如果像养老金成本之类的事情让你感到意外，你确实可以随着时间的推移逐渐弥补这些损失。但你也不会获得任何意外之财。

So I would say the capital-intensive businesses that scare me more are the ones outside of the utility field, where you just pump in more money without knowing that you’re going, in a general way, to get, more or less — within a range, anyway — a guaranteed return.

所以我会说，让我更害怕的资本密集型企业是那些公用事业领域之外的企业，在这些企业中，你投入更多资金却不知道你是否会在某种程度上获得保证的回报。

So I do not have — there’s no way we get rich on our utility investments. But there’s no way we get poor, either. And we get decent rates of return on the equity that we leave in it.

所以我没有——我们在公用事业投资上没有办法致富。但我们也没有办法变得贫穷。而且我们在留在其中的股本上获得了不错的回报率。

And we’ll probably get those returns with or without inflation. Now, inflation may diminish the value of getting an 11 or 12 percent return on equity, if you get into very high rates of inflation.

我们可能会获得这些回报，无论通货膨胀如何。现在，如果进入非常高的通货膨胀率，通货膨胀可能会降低11%或12%股本回报的价值。

So in that sense, I’d agree with Jim, who I know, incidentally. He used to work with my daughter out there at Century 21. He’s a good investor.

所以在这个意义上，我同意吉姆的看法，我恰好认识他。他曾在世纪 21 和我女儿一起工作。他是个优秀的投资者。

But the — on balance, if you can find a good business that’s not capital intensive, you’re going to be better off than in a capital-intensive business over time.

但是，总的来说，如果你能找到一个不需要大量资本的好生意，随着时间的推移，你会比在一个资本密集型的生意中更好。

I mean, the world, they’re hard to find. But the best businesses are the ones that don’t require much capital and, nevertheless, make good money.

我的意思是，这种企业在世界上是难以找到的。但最好的企业是那些不需要太多资本，仍然能赚钱的企业。

They’ve got some moat protecting them, other than the capital required as entry in the business that’s protecting them.

它们有一些护城河保护着它们，而不仅仅是进入行业所需的资本保护它们。

And if you can find those that are durable, you’ve got a great investment and one that will do the best in inflation, which, as we mentioned earlier, seems fairly likely to come along.

如果您能找到那些持久的企业，您就找到了一个伟大的投资，这种投资在通货膨胀中会表现得最好，正如我们之前提到的，这种情况似乎相当可能会出现。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, unfortunately, a lot of moats have been filling up with sand lately, you know, the daily newspaper, the network television station, all these castles with their lovely moats. The moats are filling up.

查理·芒格：是的，不幸的是，最近很多护城河都在被沙子填满，你知道的，日报、网络电视台，还有这些美丽护城河的城堡。护城河正在被填满。

68. Surprise marriage proposal from Buffett’s great-nephew

巴菲特的曾外甥意外求婚

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on that cheery note, we have time for just one more question. And Marc Hamburg, I believe you said there was somebody who wanted to finish this off. Marc, where are you?

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，在这个愉快的气氛中，我们还有时间问一个问题。我相信马克·汉堡，你说过有人想结束这个。马克，你在哪里？

MARC HAMBURG: Right here. Right here, Warren.

马尔克·汉堡：就在这里。就在这里，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I can’t — I still can’t see you. But I can hear you.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我看不见你。但我能听到你。

MARC HAMBURG: He’s right up in front.

马尔克·汉堡：他就在前面。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right up in front. OK, good. Oh, I see you now.

沃伦·巴菲特：就在前面。好的，好的。哦，我现在看到了你。

ALEX ROZEK: Hi, Warren. It’s Alex from Boston.

亚历克斯·罗泽克：嗨，沃伦。我是来自波士顿的亚历克斯。

I just wondered if you could give us some advice on how we could improve the economy, as we leave.

我只是想知道您能给我们一些关于如何改善经济的建议吗？在我们离开时。

WARREN BUFFETT: What was your name?

沃伦·巴菲特：你叫什么名字？

ALEX ROZEK: Alex, from Boston.

亚历克斯·罗泽克：亚历克斯，来自波士顿。

WARREN BUFFETT: Ah. Well, the obvious thing to do is to do what our government tells us to do, which is to go out and spend.

沃伦·巴菲特：啊。那么，显而易见的做法就是按照我们政府的指示去做，也就是出去消费。

And as I mentioned, household formations are important to developing — to getting past this overbuild in residential construction. So does — I don’t know whether that gives you any ideas or not. But… (Laughter)

正如我提到的，家庭形成对发展——克服住宅建设过剩非常重要。所以……我不知道这是否给你带来了什么想法。但……（笑声）

ALEX ROZEK: I think so.

亚历克斯·罗泽克：我认为是这样。

Mimi, you’re my best friend. Would you be my wife? (Applause)

咪咪，你是我最好的朋友。你愿意嫁给我吗？（掌声）

MIMI KRUEGER: Yes? (Applause)

米米·克鲁格：是吗？（掌声）

VOICE: Mimi, you’ve got to say yes.

声音：米米，你必须答应。

MIMI KRUEGER: I said, yes. Yes!

米米·克鲁格：我说，是的。是的！

WARREN BUFFETT: I have just two —

沃伦·巴菲特：我只有两个——

ALEX ROZEK: Thanks, Warren.

亚历克斯·罗泽克：谢谢，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I have two comments to make. Alex is my sister Doris’ grandson, my great-nephew. And Mimi is terrific.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我有两个评论。亚历克斯是我妹妹多丽丝的孙子，我的外甥。米米很棒。

So on that note, we’ll end the meeting. And we’ll be back in 15 minutes for the board meeting. Thank you. (Applause)

那么在这个基础上，我们结束会议。我们将在 15 分钟后回来参加董事会会议。谢谢大家。（掌声）

69. Berkshire Hathaway formal meetings begins

伯克希尔哈撒韦正式会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now we’re going to hold an annual meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，现在我们要召开年度会议。

The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company. I welcome you to this 2009 annual meeting of shareholders.

会议现在开始。我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事会主席。欢迎您参加 2009 年股东年会。

I will first introduce the Berkshire directors that are present in addition to myself. We’ve got Charles Munger. We’ve got Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott.

我将首先介绍在场的伯克希尔董事，除了我自己。我们有查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克、比尔·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特。

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning the firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，他们是我们的审计师。他们可以回答您可能对德勤对伯克希尔账户审计的相关问题。

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Ms. Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors.

福雷斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对会议的过程进行书面记录。贝基·阿米克女士已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员。她将对董事选举中投票的计数进行认证。

The main proxyholders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的主要代理人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

70. Berkshire shares outstanding and quorum

伯克希尔的流通股和法定人数

WARREN BUFFETT: Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and representing at the meeting?

沃伦·巴菲特：秘书是否有关于有权投票的伯克希尔流通股数量的报告，并在会议上代表这些股份？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 4, 2009 — being the record date for this meeting — there were 1,057,573 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting —

福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，我知道。正如随本次会议通知一起发送给所有在 2009 年 3 月 4 日登记的股东的委托书中所指出的——该日期为本次会议的登记日期——当时有 1,057,573 股 A 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权——

And 14,749,861 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

共有 14,749,861 股 B 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对提案的投票权为 1/200。

Of that number, 821,400 Class A shares and 10,298,152 Class B shares are represented at this meeting through proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 30th.

在这个数字中，821,400 股 A 类股票和 10,298,152 股 B 类股票通过截至 4 月 30 日星期四晚上返回的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

That number represents a quorum. And we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

该数字代表法定人数。因此，我们将直接进行会议。

71. Last meeting’s minutes

上次会议记录

WARREN BUFFETT: First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：首要事务是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生发言，他将向会议提出一项动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议记录的阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

VOICE: I second the motion

我支持这个提议

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion’s been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并得到支持。有没有任何评论或问题？

We will vote on this question by voice vote. All those in favor, say, “Aye.”

我们将通过口头表决对这个问题进行投票。所有赞成者请说“赞成”。

VOICE: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? Motion’s carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：反对？动议通过。

72. Election of Berkshire Hathaway directors

伯克希尔哈撒韦董事的选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The first item of business is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.

沃伦·巴菲特：第一项议程是选举董事。如果有股东在场，想要撤回之前提交的代理投票并亲自投票选举董事，他或她可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.

此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交委托书并希望亲自投票，您可以这样做。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles, who will furnish a ballot to you.

如果您希望这样做，请在过道上向会议工作人员表明您的身份，他们会为您提供一张选票。

Will those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them?

请希望领取选票的人士自我介绍，以便我们分发选票

I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我现在提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并第二次提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion?

还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？

The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

提名已准备好进行投票。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并允许选票交给选举监察员。

Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: The ballot of the proxyholders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening cast not less than 859,366 votes for each nominee. That number of — that number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

贝基·阿米克：代理持有人的选票回应了截至上周四晚上收到的代理，投给每位提名人的票数不少于 859,366 票。这个数字远远超过所有流通的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxyholders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律，投票的确切计数所需的认证，包括在本次会议上由代理持有人根据所提交的代理投票所投的额外票数，以及在本次会议上亲自投票的任何票数，将交给秘书，并与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。

73. Shareholder motion on working conditions at Russell Athletic plant

股东关于拉塞尔运动服工厂工作条件的提案

WARREN BUFFETT: The next item of business is a motion put forth by Berkshire shareholder Joseph Petrofsky.

沃伦·巴菲特：下一个议程是由伯克希尔股东约瑟夫·佩特罗夫斯基提出的动议。

Mr. Petrofsky’s motion is set forth in the proxy statement and would request Berkshire Hathaway to prepare a sustainability report for shareholders. The directors are recommended that the shareholders vote against the proposal.

佩特罗夫斯基先生的动议已在代理声明中列出，要求伯克希尔·哈撒韦为股东准备一份可持续发展报告。董事会建议股东投票反对该提案。

We will now recognize, I believe it’s Mr. Billenness — Mr. Petrofsky’s representative — to present the motion.

我们现在将请比伦尼斯先生——彼特罗夫斯基先生的代表——来提出动议。

To allow all interested shareholders to present their views, I will ask Mr. Billenness to limit his remarks to five minutes. The microphone at zone 1 is available. Well, we go first to Mr. Billenness.

为了让所有感兴趣的股东表达他们的观点，我将请比伦尼斯先生将他的发言限制在五分钟内。1 区的麦克风可以使用。好吧，我们首先请比伦尼斯先生发言。

SIMON BILLENNESS: Thank you very much, Mr. Buffett. My name is Simon Billenness. And I represent Mr. Joseph Petrofsky, the shareholder who filed this year’s resolution asking for a publication of a sustainability report.

西蒙·比伦尼斯：非常感谢您，巴菲特先生。我叫西蒙·比伦尼斯。我代表约瑟夫·佩特罗夫斯基先生，他是今年提出要求发布可持续发展报告的股东。

I will move that shareholder resolution. Miss Norma Mejía Castellanos (PH) will then second the resolution. And then I will ask for a preliminary count of the shares voted.

我将提出现有股东的决议。诺玛·梅希亚·卡斯特利亚诺斯（PH）将对此决议进行第二次提议。然后我将请求对所投票的股份进行初步计数。

As shareholders, we are proud that, in so many ways, our company is a leader. A prime example is the emerging success story on the Klamath River. This may result in the largest river restoration project in U.S. history. And this makes economic sense for PacifiCorp and for us, as shareholders.

作为股东，我们为我们的公司在许多方面都是领导者而感到自豪。一个典型的例子是克拉马斯河上正在崛起的成功故事。这可能会导致美国历史上最大的河流恢复项目。这对太平洋电力公司和我们作为股东来说经济上都是合理的。

However, when it comes to managing environmental and human rights risk, and disclosing those risks to shareholders, our management is sadly a laggard.

然而，在管理环境和人权风险以及向股东披露这些风险方面，我们的管理层遗憾地落后。

Two respected proxy advisory firms, PROXY Governance and RiskMetrics, have advised shareholders to vote in favor of this resolution on the grounds that management badly lags other companies in disclosing these risks to shareholders.

两家受人尊敬的代理咨询公司，PROXY Governance 和 RiskMetrics，建议股东投票支持这一决议，理由是管理层在向股东披露这些风险方面严重落后于其他公司。

Last week, CalPERS, the California retirement system, announced that it would vote close to half a billion dollars’ worth of stock in favor of this resolution.

上周，加州退休系统 CalPERS 宣布将投票支持这项提案，涉及近五亿美元的股票。

Consider the situation today with Russell, the subsidiary of Fruit of the Loom and a Berkshire Hathaway company. Collegiate licensed apparel — sweatshirts bearing university logos, for instance — is a $5 billion a year market.

考虑到今天拉塞尔这一子公司，Fruit of the Loom是旗下的公司。大学许可服装——比如印有大学徽标的运动衫——是一个每年价值50亿美元的市场。

Russell has admitted to repeatedly committing serious labor rights violations in Honduras. And now, over 50 universities, including Harvard, Stanford, and the entire University of California system, have decided to terminate Russell’s license to make clothing bearing their college logos.

拉塞尔承认在洪都拉斯反复严重侵犯劳动权利。现在，包括哈佛、斯坦福和整个加利福尼亚大学系统在内的 50 多所大学决定终止拉塞尔制作带有其大学标志的服装的许可证。

This particular sweatshirt, which I’m holding up right here, is University of North Carolina. This was made in a Berkshire Hathaway factory. But the university has since ended their licensing agreement.

这件我手里拿着的卫衣是北卡罗来纳大学的。这是在伯克希尔哈撒韦的工厂生产的。但该大学已经结束了他们的许可协议。

The treatment — the management of Russell, through its actions, has put $5 billion of potential business at risk. The management of Berkshire Hathaway should provide proper disclosure of that risk to us, the shareholders in this company.

该管理层通过其行为使拉塞尔的 50 亿美元潜在业务面临风险。伯克希尔哈撒韦的管理层应向我们这些股东适当披露这一风险。

Now, I will pass over to Ms. Mejía Castellanos. She is a sewing machine operator who worked in the factory in Honduras that is the center of these problems. And after she has spoken, I will ask for a preliminary vote count for this resolution.

现在，我将把时间交给梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯女士。她是一名缝纫机操作员，曾在洪都拉斯的一家工厂工作，该工厂是这些问题的中心。在她发言后，我将要求对此项决议进行初步投票统计。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Yo trabajó como operadora de una maquila de costura en la fábrica Jerzees Honduras.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：我在赫尔泽斯洪都拉斯的缝纫加工厂担任操作员。

INTERPRETER: I used to work as a sewing machine operator at the factory, Jerzees de Honduras.

翻译员：我曾在霍恩德拉斯的 Jerzees 工厂担任缝纫机操作员。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: En 2006, cuando Fruit de Loom compró la empresa, las condiciones empeoraron.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：2006 年，当 Fruit of Loom 收购该公司时，情况变得更糟。

INTERPRETER: In 2006, when Fruit of the Loom bought my factory, conditions got much worse.

翻译员：2006 年，当 Fruit of the Loom 收购我的工厂时，条件变得更糟。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: La empresa empezó hacer acumulación de personal esto para ahorrarse mas y no pagar renta.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：公司开始整合人员，以节省更多费用并不支付租金。

INTERPRETER: Fruit of the Loom began to consolidate personnel in order to save more on rent.

解释员：Fruit of the Loom 开始整合人员，以便在租金上节省更多。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Esto ocasionó mucho molestar de salud en los trabajadores, como ser dolor en la espalda a causa de maquinaria de esta muy cerca, y esto provoca un recalentamiento.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：这导致工人们健康受到很大影响，比如由于机器靠得太近而引起的背部疼痛，这会导致过热。

INTERPRETER: This created many conditions in the factory that caused health problems for workers, such as pain in our backs being caused by the heat from the sewing machines, which were now pressed into our backs, because of the limited space.

翻译员：这在工厂中造成了许多条件，导致工人出现健康问题，例如由于缝纫机的热量造成的背部疼痛，因为空间有限，缝纫机现在紧贴着我们的背部。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Esto significa una inseguridad en un momento de evacuación.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：这意味着在撤离时的不安全感。

INTERPRETER: The close proximity also made it very dangerous in the case of an emergency evacuation.

翻译员：在紧急撤离的情况下，近距离也使得情况非常危险。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: En nuestra fabrica, la ventilación era tan mala que esto nos provocaba enfermedades respiratorias como el cáncer del pulmón.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：在我们的工厂，通风非常差，这导致我们患上了呼吸系统疾病，如肺癌。

INTERPRETER: In part, because of the overcrowding, as well, the ventilation was so poor that it caused many respiratory illnesses, including lung cancer.

翻译员：部分原因是由于过度拥挤，通风非常差，导致许多呼吸系统疾病，包括肺癌。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: El agua de los filtros era contaminada.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：过滤器的水被污染了。

INTERPRETER: Even the filtered water was dirty.

翻译员：即使是过滤过的水也很脏。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Trabajamos de la 6:30 de la mañana hasta las 5:30 de la noche, con tan solo 15 minutos para almorzar.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：我们从早上 6:30 工作到晚上 5:30，只有 15 分钟的午餐时间。

INTERPRETER: We worked from 6:30 in the morning until 5:30 at night with only 15 minutes for lunch.

翻译员：我们从早上 6:30 工作到晚上 5:30，只有 15 分钟的午餐时间。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Nuestros salarios eran demasiado bajos que no nos alcanzaba para pagar una niñera y la empresa no respeta el código de trabajo de nuestro país, porque no brinda guarderías de niños.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：我们的工资太低，无法支付保姆，而公司不遵守我们国家的劳动法，因为不提供儿童托儿所。

INTERPRETER: Our wages were too low to afford childcare. And the management refused to provide onsite childcare, even though it was required by Honduran law.

翻译员：我们的工资太低，无法负担儿童保育。而管理层拒绝提供现场儿童保育，尽管这在洪都拉斯法律中是要求的。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Por eso, decidimos organizarlos para obligar el gerente que nos escuchara y que respetara nuestros derechos.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：因此，我们决定组织起来，迫使经理倾听我们并尊重我们的权利。

INTERPRETER: Because of all of this, we decided to organize to compel management to clean up our factory.

翻译员：由于这一切，我们决定组织起来，迫使管理层清理我们的工厂。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Entonces, fue cuando despidió 145 trabajadores ilegalmente por organizarse a un sindicato.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：于是，145名工人因组织工会而被非法解雇。

INTERPRETER: In retaliation, Russell illegally fired 145 workers for organizing a union.

翻译员：作为报复，拉塞尔非法解雇了 145 名组织工会的工人。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Russell tenía que respetar el sindicato, constituido por la ley. Y entonces, Russell dijo que por causa al sindicato, iba a cerrar la empresa y que nos íbamos a quedar aguantando hambre.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：拉塞尔必须尊重由法律成立的工会。于是，拉塞尔说由于工会的原因，他要关闭公司，我们将不得不忍受饥饿。

INTERPRETER: After we finally legally established our union, Russell said that because of the union, they would close down the factory and leave the workers to starve.

翻译员：在我们最终合法成立工会后，拉塞尔说，由于工会，他们将关闭工厂，让工人们饿死。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Fue cuando empezamos hacer amenazados a muerte los directivos.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：这是我们开始收到死亡威胁的时候。

INTERPRETER: And this is when we started to receive death threats.

翻译员：这就是我们开始收到死亡威胁的时候。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Me dejaban mensajes y dibujos en los baños y en el puesto de trabajo, diciéndome que me iban a cortar la cabeza.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：他们在洗手间和我的工作台上留给我便条和图画，威胁要割掉我的头。

INTERPRETER: They would leave me notes and illustrations in the bathroom and at my workstation threatening to cut off my head.

翻译者：他们会在浴室和我的工作站留给我便条和插图，威胁要砍掉我的头。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Finalmente, Russell siguió y cumplió con su dicho, y cerro la planta el 30 de enero de este año.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：最后，拉塞尔遵循并履行了他的承诺，于今年 1 月 30 日关闭了工厂。

INTERPRETER: Finally, Russell Athletic did follow through with their threat and shut down the factory in January of this year.

翻译员：最后，拉塞尔运动确实兑现了他们的威胁，并在今年一月关闭了工厂。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Russell sostiene que nos ayudara a encontrar nuevos puesto de trabajo, pero en cambio la lista negra que tiene con nosotros y nos han impedido la búsqueda de nuevos empleos.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：拉塞尔声称会帮助我们找到新的工作岗位，但相反，他对我们的黑名单阻碍了我们寻找新工作的机会。

INTERPRETER: Now, Russell has been claiming that they will help us find new jobs. But instead, they have blacklisted us, preventing us from finding work elsewhere.

翻译员：现在，拉塞尔一直声称他们会帮助我们找到新工作。但实际上，他们却将我们列入黑名单，阻止我们在其他地方找到工作。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Es por que tantas universidades han cortados su contratos con Russell y porque esto se ha convertido en un problema para esta empresa.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：这就是为什么这么多大学与拉塞尔终止了合同，以及这对该公司造成了问题。

INTERPRETER: This is why so many universities have stopped doing business with Russell and why this has become such a problem for Berkshire Hathaway.

翻译员：这就是为什么这么多大学停止与拉塞尔合作，以及这为什么对伯克希尔哈撒韦来说成为了一个如此棘手的问题。

NORMA MEJÍA CASTELLANOS: Y por tanto, yo voto a favor de la resolución y exhortó que a los accionistas voten a favor. Gracias.

诺尔玛·梅希亚·卡斯特拉诺斯：因此，我支持该决议，并呼吁股东投票支持。谢谢。

INTERPRETER: And therefore, I second this resolution and urge that shareholders vote in favor. Thank you.

翻译员：因此，我支持这个提案，并敦促股东投票赞成。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I’d like to ask Mr. John Holland, the CEO of Fruit of the Loom, to respond to the comments just made, and after which, we will act on the motion.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我想请 Fruit of the Loom 的首席执行官约翰·霍兰德先生回应刚才的评论，之后我们将对提案进行表决。

JOHN HOLLAND: First, I need to give you a little background. Russell was a public company listed on the New York Stock Exchange prior to the time that we acquired them in August of 2006. The acquisition consisted of 47 facilities with a little over 14,000 workers.

约翰·霍兰德：首先，我需要给你一些背景信息。拉塞尔在我们于 2006 年 8 月收购他们之前，是一家在纽约证券交易所上市的公众公司。此次收购包括 47 个设施，员工人数略超过 14,000 人。

And, as we began to get involved with the Russell operations and how they were conducted, to integrate those into our operations, we found that there were a couple of plants in Honduras that had some problems.

随着我们开始参与拉塞尔的运营及其运作方式，并将其整合到我们的运营中，我们发现洪都拉斯有几家工厂存在一些问题。

And we began — we acknowledged the problems. And we began immediately to remedy these problems.

我们开始了——我们承认了这些问题。我们立即着手解决这些问题。

A little later, we had a letter from the WRC, the Workers Rights Commission (Consortium), indicating that there had been some abuses of the employees and that some had been terminated because they were involved in union activities.

稍后，我们收到了工人权利委员会（联盟）的信，指出员工遭遇了一些虐待，并且有些员工因参与工会活动而被解雇。

We were unaware of the union activities. And we investigated the abuses. But we thought it best to contact an independent third-party organization to do an audit.

我们对工会活动并不知情。我们调查了这些滥用行为。但我们认为最好联系一个独立的第三方组织进行审计。

And we contacted the Free (Fair) Labor Association, which is kind of a worldwide organization that’s grouped with a group of businesses and the leading universities in the U.S. to try to make certain that workers’ rights are adhered to on a worldwide basis.

我们联系了自由（公平）劳动协会，这是一个与一群企业和美国顶尖大学联合的全球性组织，旨在确保全球范围内遵守工人权利。

We asked them to conduct the audit. And they conducted the audit. And all of the abuses that we had been charged with, they said, through the independent audit — they were nonexistent.

我们要求他们进行审计。他们进行了审计。所有我们被指控的滥用行为，他们通过独立审计表示——根本不存在。

But they did tell us that there were two supervisors who had conducted some abusive language with the employees and, also, that it was very likely that some employees might’ve been terminated due to their union activity.

但他们确实告诉我们，有两位主管对员工使用了一些辱骂性语言，并且，很可能有些员工因其工会活动而被解雇。

So as a result, they gave us a list of items that they would like us to follow to remedy the situation. The supervisors, as well as the management of the facilities, were eliminated.

因此，他们给了我们一份希望我们遵循的项目清单，以解决这一情况。监督人员以及设施的管理层被淘汰了。

And we have started immediately, progressively, to implement all of the recommendations of the Free Labor Association’s independent audit.

我们已经立即、逐步开始实施自由劳动协会独立审计的所有建议。

And part of that was that the workers that they felt might have been terminated due to union activities, that we reinstate the workers.

并且其中一部分是，他们认为可能因工会活动而被解雇的工人，我们将重新聘用这些工人。

The plant had not been organized at that point. So we voluntarily engaged the union and acknowledged them and accepted the union.

工厂在那时尚未组织。因此，我们自愿与工会接触，承认他们并接受工会。

And we rehired all of the workers that we could locate into a facility that was across the street from this particular plant.

我们重新雇用了所有能够找到的工人，安排他们在这家工厂对面的一个设施工作。

And since then, we have followed all of the recommendations of the Free Labor Association. And they have a monitoring process.

自那时以来，我们遵循了自由劳动协会的所有建议。他们有一个监测过程。

And after about three months, there was another audit by the Free Labor Association and the Workers’ Rights Commission, which is another related organization. And they said that the activity that we engaged in, they were very well pleased with the progress.

大约三个月后，自由劳动协会和工人权利委员会进行了另一次审计，这是另一个相关组织。他们表示，我们所参与的活动进展非常令人满意。

And as I said previously, we acknowledged the union and began negotiations. There was approximately 48 issues that they wanted to discuss. And we reached agreement on 24 of those.

正如我之前所说，我们承认了工会并开始了谈判。他们想讨论大约 48 个问题。我们在其中 24 个问题上达成了协议。

And we — the union even agreed that we had had very good relationships, that we had approached the negotiations openly and fairly.

我们——工会甚至同意我们之间的关系非常好，我们以开放和公平的态度进行谈判。

There were some other points that they wanted to move to arbitration on that — or mediation — that we could not agree on.

他们还想就一些其他问题进行仲裁或调解，但我们无法达成一致。

And by that time, the time had passed till we reached the midyear of 2008, when the recession in the apparel industry dramatically affected our particular business.

到那时，时间已经过去，直到我们到达 2008 年年中，服装行业的衰退对我们的特定业务产生了显著影响。

And over the course of the next few months, we had to close nine of our facilities. One of those was the Jerzees de Honduras plant that they have referred to.

在接下来的几个月里，我们不得不关闭九个设施。其中一个是他们提到的洪都拉斯的 Jerzees 工厂。

And there was a total of 12,780 employees involved in the plant closures. And out of that group, about 310 people, which has been acknowledged by the union, that were union employees, because in Honduras, under the laws there, only 30 people are required to form a union and be acknowledged as a union.

共涉及关闭了12,780名员工。在这群人中，大约有310人，工会也承认他们是工会员工，因为根据洪都拉斯的法律，成立工会只需30人。

And up until that time, there had been no indications of any issues that had been brought up by the union that were not solved.

直到那时，工会提出的所有问题都没有任何未解决的迹象。

Now, beyond that, I would like to tell you a little about how we conduct business worldwide in our plants.

现在，除此之外，我想告诉你一些关于我们在全球工厂如何开展业务的情况。

We have been in Honduras since 1993. All of our plants are air conditioned, excellent ventilation in all of those facilities. Our wages in those plants are 26 percent, on the average, above the minimums in Honduras.

我们自 1993 年以来一直在洪都拉斯。我们所有的工厂都配备了空调，所有设施的通风都非常良好。我们这些工厂的工资平均比洪都拉斯的最低工资高出 26%。

We offer 11 paid holidays. We have paid vacations. We have free life insurance. We have a doctor and nurse in each one of those facilities.

我们提供 11 个带薪假期。我们有带薪休假。我们提供免费的寿险。我们在每个设施都有医生和护士。

And the reference to the filtered water, when we acquired that plant, that particular plant had its own filtration systems, which was different from all of our other plants, which we used bottled water.

当我们收购那家工厂时，提到的过滤水是因为那家工厂有自己的过滤系统，这与我们其他工厂使用瓶装水的方式不同。

We immediately had that water tested. Although there was some discoloration, it was tested as pure. But we immediately shut down the filtration system and went to bottled water that we have in the other plants.

我们立即对那水进行了检测。尽管有些变色，但检测结果显示是纯净的。不过我们立即关闭了过滤系统，转而使用我们在其他工厂储备的瓶装水。

Now, we have paid maternity leaves, we have a breastfeeding hour, we celebrate the employee birthdays, in fact. And also, the — we have a children’s day.

现在，我们有带薪产假，我们有哺乳时间，我们庆祝员工的生日，实际上。此外，我们还有儿童节。

And that, I think, our benefits, I’m proud to tell you, I think are far and above any that you’ll find in most other apparel facilities throughout the world.

我认为我们的福利，我很自豪地告诉你，远远超过世界上大多数服装工厂提供的福利。

And there have been no death threats. We have tried to conduct our business with honesty, integrity.

并没有收到死亡威胁。我们一直努力以诚实和正直的态度开展业务。

And quite frankly, I’ve been with this company, I’m in my 48th year, and I would tell you that I’m very proud of how we operate our particular plants.

老实说，我在这家公司已经工作了 48 年，我可以告诉你，我对我们各个工厂的运营方式感到非常自豪。

We have met with a number of the leading universities to try to tell the other side of the story. We’ve invited those presidents of the universities and the administration to come to see for themselves what our plant facilities are like.

我们已经与一些顶尖大学会面，试图讲述故事的另一面。我们邀请了这些大学的校长和管理层亲自来看看我们的工厂设施是什么样的。

And we’ve had two acceptances that were down this past week, the representatives from Princeton and also from the University of Arizona.

我们已经有两位代表接受了邀请，上周他们分别来自普林斯顿大学和亚利桑那大学。

And we welcome putting all of this into an open spotlight. We also have a website. That’s www.russellsocialresponsibility.com — that all of this activity that we’re responding to the recommendations of the Fair Labor Association is posted on that website. It’s there for the world to see.

我们欢迎将所有这些置于公开的聚光灯下。我们还有一个网站。那就是 www.russellsocialresponsibility.com — 我们对公平劳动协会建议的所有活动都发布在该网站上。它在那里供全世界查看。

And we continue — Fair Labor Association has a three-step process of continued monitoring. And then they do independent audits periodically to see what our progress is. And all of that is posted on that website. Thank you.

我们继续——公平劳动协会有一个三步的持续监测过程。然后，他们定期进行独立审计，以查看我们的进展情况。所有这些信息都发布在该网站上。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, John. The motion is now ready to be acted upon. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，约翰。动议现在可以进行表决了。（掌声）

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the motion and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election. Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在动议上标记他们的选票，并允许选票交给选举监察员。阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以给出您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxyholders, in response to the proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast 49,251 votes for the motion and 702,963 votes against the motion.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的投票，针对上周四晚上收到的代理，支持该动议的票数为 49,251 票，反对该动议的票数为 702,963 票。

As the number of votes against the motion exceeds a majority of the number of votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding, the motion has failed.

由于反对该提案的票数超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份相关票数的多数，该提案已失败。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. The proposal fails.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。提案失败。

74. Berkshire formal meeting adjourns

伯克希尔正式会议休会

WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting, before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有没有其他事务需要在本次会议上提出？如果没有，我请斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice.

沃伦·巴菲特：有人支持吗？已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。

2009-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2009-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Q&A sessions starts

2. Board of directors introduced

3. Money under your mattress beats Treasurys

4. Panel of journalists introduced

5. Carol Loomis comments

6. Our stock index derivatives aren’t dangerous

7. Financial literacy problem could help Berkshire

8. Buffett “commends” DC’s response to credit crisis

9. Higher mathematics can be dangerous for investing

10. Moody’s wasn’t alone in making mistakes

11. Housing markets are beginning to improve

12. 2008 wasn’t great for investment manager candidates

13. Munger expects public/private hybrid health care system

14. Why we’re not training or naming our next CEO

15. Buffett’s business school: only two courses

16. Ajit Jain’s successor won’t have the same broad authority

17. Berkshire was “cheaper” at the end of 2008

18. How GEICO benefited from the financial crisis

19. 2008 was tough, but still no plans for dividend

20. Wells Fargo’s stock price plunge shouldn’t spark selling

21. Big stimulus spending bound to have some “slop”

22. Hard to compete with government-guaranteed debt

23. Graham would probably agree with us on derivatives

24. Bailouts shouldn’t hurt senior debt holders

25. Ignore original cost when reviewing your portfolio

26. Berkshire’s competitive advantage no longer requires us

27. We don’t keep every stock, but we do keep every business

28. We run Berkshire as if we owned all of it

29. Why the annual meeting isn’t webcast

30. No “quarrel” with copycats

31. Your best inflation protection

32. Newspapers are fading but we’re keeping the Buffalo News

33. Expect weak consumer spending for “quite a bit longer”

34. We’ll never buy back Berkshire shares at a “silly” price

35. Crisis made opportunity cost calculations difficult

36. GEICO spends millions on advertising and will “never stop”

37. Wells Fargo is better than many other banks

38. Quarterly earnings release schedule

39. Preliminary Q1 earnings

40. “Value” investments? What other kind are there?

41. Munger: Electric car maker BYD is a “damn miracle”

42. U.S. dollar will buy less in the future

43. Buffett “irritated” by the loss of triple-A rating

44. “Crazy” prices for Berkshire credit default swaps

45. MidAmerican working with Iowa on wind farms

46. Constellation and Dynergy deals

47. Foreign ownership rules limit China opportunities

48. U.S. trade deficit is actually China’s problem

49. Munger: China’s economic policies are “exactly right”

50. Deal post-mortems shouldn’t be public

51. Buffett: I was “dead wrong” on Gen Re’s reputation

52. “We are not big believers in contracts”

53. How to get yourself thrown out of Buffett’s office

54. Don’t know much about student loan business

55. Earnings “management” at Goldman Sachs and General Electric

56. “Very happy relationship” with Goldman Sachs

57. Buffett optimistic on America’s standard of living

58. Munger optimistic about solar energy

59. Not concerned about Swiss Re reinsurance deal

60. Irrational CEO compensation and incentive systems

61. Worst-case scenario for insurance operation

62. No preset goal for international investments

63. “Nobody gets any joy” from layoffs

64. Fight egregious CEO pay with embarrassment, not legislation

65. We don’t hire potentially great managers

66. Don’t try to time the market

67. “Decent” rates of return from regulated utilities

68. Surprise marriage proposal from Buffett’s great-nephew

69. Berkshire Hathaway formal meetings begins

70. Berkshire shares outstanding and quorum

71. Last meeting’s minutes

72. Election of Berkshire Hathaway directors

73. Shareholder motion on working conditions at Russell Athletic plant

74. Berkshire formal meeting adjourns

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