2010-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session

早晨会议

1. Opening remarks

1. 开场白

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. I’m Warren, he’s Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好。我是沃伦，他是查理。

He can hear, I can see. We work together for that reason. (Laughter)

他能听，我能看。我们因此一起工作。（笑声）

Like to make one correction in the movie. My fast ball was filmed in slow motion. They tried the regular way and you couldn’t even see it, so — (Laughter)

我想对电影做一个更正。我的快速球是以慢动作拍摄的。他们尝试了正常的方式，你根本看不见，所以——（笑声）

Our approach today will be to announce a couple of things, our earnings, and introduce you to the directors. But as soon as that’s through, we’ll move on to questions. We’ll have those until noon.

我们今天的做法是宣布几件事情，发布我们的收益，并向您介绍董事们。但一旦这些结束，我们将进入提问环节。我们会持续到中午。

We’ll break for an hour and we’ll come back at 1:00. Those of you who are in the overflow rooms may find that you can get into the main arena here at that time.

我们将休息一个小时，1:00 再回来。那些在分会场的人可能会发现到时可以进入主会场。

And we’ll go till 3:30 with the questions and then we’ll have the annual meeting, business meeting, for those of you who are still around at that point. And at that time, we will have the election of directors.

我们将进行到 3:30 的提问环节，然后我们将召开年度会议，商务会议，针对那些在场的朋友。届时，我们将进行董事选举。

2. Board of directors introduced

董事会介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: But because not all of you may be here at that time, I would like to introduce the directors to you, and I’ll ask them to stand.

沃伦·巴菲特：但因为并不是所有人都可能在那个时候在这里，我想向你们介绍董事们，我请他们站起来。

And if you’ll hold your applause until they’re all done standing, or you can even hold it after that — (laughter) — it will make — it will make for a very orderly meeting.

如果您能等他们都站好再鼓掌，或者甚至在那之后再鼓掌——（笑声）——这将使会议变得非常有序。

So let’s start in with Howard Buffett. I’m the next one alphabetically. Our new director, Steve Burke.

所以我们先从霍华德·巴菲特开始。我在字母顺序中是下一个。我们的新董事，史蒂夫·伯克。

They didn’t hear the part about stay standing, but that’s OK. They’re generally fairly obedient, but the — (laughter)

他们没有听到要保持站立的部分，不过没关系。他们通常都很听话，但是——（笑声）

Susan Decker. Bill Gates. David Gottesman, Sandy Gottesman. Charlotte Guyman.

苏珊·德克尔。比尔·盖茨。大卫·戈特斯曼，桑迪·戈特斯曼。夏洛特·古伊曼。

Don Keough is unable to be with us today. He’s had a serious operation but he’s recovering very well and he’s got a lot of friends in this audience and he’ll be with us next year.

唐·基欧今天无法与我们在一起。他进行了一个严重的手术，但恢复得很好，他在这个观众中有很多朋友，明年他会和我们在一起。

Charlie, we’ve already introduced. Tom Murphy. Ron Olson, the manager in our movie. And Walter Scott.

查理，我们已经介绍过了。汤姆·墨菲。罗恩·奥尔森，我们电影中的经理。还有沃尔特·斯科特。

Now you can go wild with applause for the group. (Applause)

现在你可以为这个团队热烈鼓掌了。（掌声）

3. Some recovery for “sputtering” economy

经济的零散复苏

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, before we start with the questions, we do have preliminary earnings figures for the first quarter.

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们开始提问之前，我们有第一季度的初步收益数据。

And I’d like to ask the projectionist to put up slide A. There’s nothing really very surprising in these numbers, but we’d like to give them to you. They up there OK? Yeah. If you have any questions on these later on.

我想请放映员展示幻灯片A。这些数字没有什么特别令人惊讶的，但我们还是想给你们看一下。它们显示得还好吗？如果你们之后有任何问题，可以问。

What we’re seeing in our businesses is that, in what was sort of a sputtering recovery a few months ago, seems to have picked up steam in March and April.

我们在业务中看到的是，几个月前的缓慢复苏似乎在三月和四月加速了。

And our businesses that kind of serve broad industry, such as the railroad or Marmon or ISCAR, we’re seeing a pretty good uptick. It’s a long way from where it was a couple years ago, but what was very spotty in the recovery a couple of months ago, the trends really seem a fair amount stronger in the last few months.

我们的业务涵盖广泛的行业，例如铁路、Marmon 或 ISCAR，我们看到了一定的增长。与几年前相比，情况有了很大改善，但几个月前的复苏情况非常不稳定，而最近几个月的趋势似乎明显强劲得多。

And we always encourage you to focus on operating earnings. We have the figures there for our investments and derivative businesses.

我们始终鼓励您关注经营收益。我们提供了投资和衍生业务的相关数据。

We don’t really think they mean anything on a quarterly basis. Obviously, they’re meaningful over the years. I mean, we’ve piled up a lot of net worth over the years with capital gains. But in any quarter, they mean absolutely nothing.

我们并不认为它们在季度基础上有什么意义。显然，它们在多年中是有意义的。我的意思是，随着资本增值，我们多年来积累了很多净资产。但在任何一个季度，它们绝对没有任何意义。

And you’ll notice another thing about our report. We don’t even put down — we have to when we publish generally — but we don’t even put down the earnings per share. We’re not focused on that number in any quarter or any year.

你会注意到我们报告的另一个特点。我们甚至没有列出——通常在发布时我们必须列出——但我们甚至没有列出每股收益。我们在任何一个季度或任何一年都不关注这个数字。

We’re focused on the buildup of value. And we really think that an undue focus on quarterly earnings, not only is probably a bad idea for investors, but we think it’s a terrible idea for managers.

我们专注于价值的积累。我们真的认为，过度关注季度收益不仅对投资者来说可能是个坏主意，对管理者来说也是个糟糕的主意。

If I had told our managers that we would earn three dollars and 17 1/2 cents for the quarter, you know, they might do a little fudging in order to make sure that we actually came out at that number.

如果我告诉我们的经理们，我们这个季度将赚三美元和 17.5 美分，你知道，他们可能会做一些小手脚，以确保我们实际上达到了这个数字。

And there was a very interesting study that was published a few months ago where thousands of earnings reports were examined.

几个月前发表了一项非常有趣的研究，研究了数千份财报。

And instead of taking it out to the penny, which is customary in the reporting, they took it out one further digit. And of course if you go out one further digit, and it’s four or less, you round downward, and if it’s five or more, you round upward.

而不是按照报告中的惯例精确到分，他们多取了一位数字。当然，如果你多取一位数字，且该数字是四或更少，你就向下舍入；如果是五或更多，你就向上舍入。

And they found out that a statistically impossible number of — small number — of fours showed up because if they got to four-tenths of a cent, somehow somebody in the accounting department managed to find another tenth of a cent so they could round upward. It was not an accident.

他们发现，出现了一个在统计上不可能的——小数量——的四，因为如果他们达到了四分之一美分，不知怎么的，会计部门的某个人设法找到了另一个十分之一美分，以便他们可以向上舍入。这不是偶然。

And, you do not want to have — in our view, we think it’s terrible practice to be thinking about trying to report to some penny that you’ve whispered to Wall Street analysts in previous months.

我们认为，试图报告一些你在之前几个月对华尔街分析师低声说出的数字的做法是非常糟糕的。

And we probably carry that to an extreme at Berkshire. But we always think of the enterprise as a whole. We think about building value over time.

我们在伯克希尔可能把这一点推向了极端。但我们始终将企业视为一个整体。我们考虑的是随着时间的推移创造价值。

And we do not worry about earnings per share, and we don’t worry about investment gains or losses.

我们不担心每股收益，也不担心投资的盈亏。

Charlie may want to weigh in on this one a bit. Charlie?

查理可能想对此发表一下看法。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我同意你的看法。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He is the perfect vice chairman. (Laughter) They don’t come any better. OK.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他是完美的副主席。（笑声）没有比他更好的了。好的。

With that preliminary — we probably ought to quit at that point, actually. (Laughter)

就这个初步数字，我们可能应该到此为止，实际上。（笑声）

4. Panel of journalists introduced

记者小组介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re going to alternate the questions between a panel of three journalists here. We have Carol Loomis of Fortune magazine on the — on the far right. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们将让这里的三位记者轮流提问。我们有《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯在最右边。（掌声）

And we didn’t do it quite alphabetically. We have Andrew Ross Sorkin from The New York Times. (Applause)

我们并没有完全按字母顺序进行。我们有来自《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索金。（掌声）

And Becky Quick of CNBC. (Applause)

贝基·奎克（Becky Quick）来自 CNBC。（掌声）

Andrew’s maneuvered for a seat there, apparently, to get earlier in the questioning order, but I’ll probably stick with the alphabetical list.

安德鲁在那里争取一个座位，显然是为了在提问顺序中更早，但我可能会坚持按字母顺序排列。

And we will alternate between our journalists, and then we will go around the auditorium here where people have been chosen by chance to ask questions.

我们将轮流让我们的记者发言，然后我们将在这里的礼堂中走动，随机选择的人将提问。

And we also will go to just I guess one of the overflow rooms; we have a whole lot of overflow rooms, but we’ll not go to all of them.

我们也会去其中一个分会场；我们有很多分会场，但我们不会去所有的房间。

5. To be deleted

将被删除

WARREN BUFFETT: So let’s just start things off. Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：那么我们就开始吧。卡罗？

CAROL LOOMIS: Well, since I won the alphabetical lottery, I get to make two very short statements also.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：好吧，既然我赢得了字母彩票，我也可以发表两个非常简短的声明。

One is that we received an awful lot of questions. We really don’t know how many because some people sent their question to all three of us. But I would guess we had something between 1,500 and 2,000 questions.

我们收到了很多问题。我们真的不知道有多少，因为有些人把他们的问题发给了我们三个人。但我猜我们大约收到了 1500 到 2000 个问题。

And obviously, we’re not going to be able to ask all of those, and we’re sorry for those we didn’t get to ask. They were very good questions and we appreciate the work that people put into them.

显然，我们无法问所有这些问题，对于那些我们没有机会提问的问题，我们感到抱歉。这些问题都非常好，我们感谢大家为这些问题所付出的努力。

The other thing I want to mention is that Warren and Charlie have had absolutely no hint as to what the questions will be so they will have to field them just as they come up.

我还想提到的另一件事是，沃伦和查理完全没有任何关于问题的提示，因此他们必须在问题出现时直接应对。

6. Buffett strongly defends Goldman Sachs

巴菲特强烈捍卫高盛

CAROL LOOMIS: However, Warren and Charlie may be smart enough to have guessed that the first question will be about topic A, which is Goldman Sachs.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：然而，沃伦和查理可能足够聪明，猜到第一个问题将是关于主题 A，即高盛。

And I received several emails about the SEC’s lawsuit against Goldman, all of them asking a different question about that problem.

我收到了几封关于证券交易委员会对高盛提起诉讼的电子邮件，所有邮件都在询问关于这个问题的不同问题。

I have combined the several thoughts in these questions, and with thanks to Greg Firman (PH), Kai Pan (PH) of Morgan Stanley, Brian Chan (PH), and Vic Timono (PH), here is the question:

我将这些问题中的几个想法结合在一起，感谢摩根士丹利的 Greg Firman（PH）、Kai Pan（PH）、Brian Chan（PH）和 Vic Timono（PH），以下是问题：

Warren, every year in the Berkshire movie, you did it again today, you use the clip from the Salomon crisis in which you tell Congress that you have warned Salomon’s employees that if they lose a shred of the firm’s reputation, you will be ruthless in your reaction.

沃伦，每年在伯克希尔的电影中，你今天又做了一次，你使用了关于所罗门危机的片段，在其中你告诉国会，你已经警告所罗门的员工，如果他们损害了公司的声誉，你将会毫不留情地反应。

Clearly, Goldman Sachs has lost reputation because of the SEC’s action. Could you tell us your reaction to the lawsuit, your reflections in light of it about Berkshire’s large investment in Goldman?

显然，高盛因美国证券交易委员会的行动而失去了声誉。您能告诉我们您对这起诉讼的反应，以及您对伯克希尔在高盛的大额投资的看法吗？

And what advice, in light of your own Salomon experience, you would give Goldman’s board of directors and management?

根据您自己的 Salomon 经验，您会给高盛的董事会和管理层什么建议？

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Anytime you ask me these multiple questions, I may go back to you to get all parts.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。每次你问我这些多个问题时，我可能会回过头去询问你所有的部分。

But, well, let’s start with the transaction, because that’s the important thing.

但是，好吧，让我们从交易开始，因为这才是重要的。

A few weeks ago on a Friday, a transaction described as ABACUS was made the subject of an SEC complaint. I think it ran about 22 pages. And I think there’s been probably sort of misreporting, not intentional obviously, but misreporting of the nature of that transaction in at least — probably a majority of the accounts that I’ve read about it.

几周前的一个星期五，一项被称为 ABACUS 的交易成为了 SEC 投诉的对象。我认为这份投诉大约有 22 页。我认为在我所阅读的关于这项交易的多数报道中，可能存在某种程度的误报，显然不是故意的，但确实存在对这项交易性质的误报。

So, I would like — this will take a little time, but I think it’s an important subject. I would like to go through that transaction first. And then we’ll get further into the questions posed by the people that emailed Carol.

所以，我想——这会花一点时间，但我认为这是一个重要的话题。我想先讨论一下那个交易。然后我们会进一步探讨那些给卡罗尔发邮件的人提出的问题。

The transaction, the ABACUS transaction, there were four losers in, but we’re going to focus on two of them.

这笔交易，即 ABACUS 交易，有四个失败者，但我们将重点关注其中两个。

Goldman itself was a loser. They didn’t intend to be a loser, I’m sure. They couldn’t sell the piece — a piece of the transaction — and they kept it, and I think they lost 90 or $100 million because they kept it.

高盛本身是个失败者。我相信他们并不打算成为失败者。他们无法出售这部分交易，因此选择保留，我认为他们因此损失了 9000 万或 1 亿美元。

But the main loser, in terms of actual cash out, was a very large bank in Europe named ABN AMRO, which subsequently became part of the Royal Bank of Scotland.

但实际现金损失最大的则是一家名为 ABN AMRO 的欧洲大型银行，该银行随后成为苏格兰皇家银行的一部分。

Now, what did ABN AMRO — why did they lose money? They lost money because they, in effect, guaranteed the credit of another company, ACA.

现在，ABN AMRO 为什么会亏损？他们亏损是因为他们实际上担保了另一家公司 ACA 的信用。

ABN AMRO was in the business of judging credits, deciding what credits they would accept themselves, what credits they would guarantee.

ABN AMRO 从事信用评估业务，决定他们自己会接受哪些信用，哪些信用他们会担保。

And in effect, they did something in the insurance world called fronting a transaction, which really means guaranteeing the credit of another party.

在保险界，他们实际上做了一件被称为“前置交易”的事情，这实际上意味着担保另一方的信用。

We have done that many times at Berkshire. We get paid for it. And people do not want the credit of the XYZ insurance company but they say they’ll take a policy from XYZ if we guarantee it. And Berkshire has made a lot of money guaranteeing things over the years.

我们在伯克希尔做过很多次。我们为此获得报酬。人们并不想要 XYZ 保险公司的信誉，但他们表示如果我们担保，他们会选择从 XYZ 购买保单。多年来，伯克希尔通过担保赚了很多钱。

And Charlie can remember back to the early 1970s when we ran into some very dishonest people and we lost money, and we lost a fair amount of money at that time, because we guaranteed the credit of somebody that turned out to be not so good.

查理可以回忆起 1970 年代初，我们遇到了一些非常不诚实的人，导致我们亏了钱，而且那时我们亏了相当一笔钱，因为我们担保了一个人的信用，而这个人结果并不好。

It happened to be some syndicates at Lloyd’s, of all things. But they found ways not to pay when our name was on it.

事实证明，他们在劳埃德的某些联合体中找到了不支付的办法。

So ABN AMRO agreed to guarantee about $900 million of the credit of a company called ACA. They got paid for that, and this is in the SEC complaint. It’s not mentioned very often, but they got paid, what, 17 basis points, that’s 17/100 of 1 percent.

因此，ABN AMRO 同意为一家名为 ACA 的公司的约 9 亿美元信贷提供担保。他们为此获得了报酬，这在 SEC 的投诉中有提到。虽然不常提及，但他们获得了 17 个基点的报酬，即 0.17%。

So they took on a $900 million risk of guaranteeing credit. They got paid about a million-six. And the company whose credit they guaranteed went broke, and so they had to pay the 900 million. It’s a little hard for me to get terribly sympathetic with the fact that a bank made a dumb credit deal.

他们承担了 9 亿美元的信用担保风险。他们获得了大约 160 万美元的报酬。而他们担保信用的公司破产了，因此他们不得不支付这 9 亿美元。对于一家银行做出愚蠢的信用交易，我很难感到特别同情。

But let’s look at ACA, because they were sort of the nub of the transaction.

但让我们看看 ACA，因为他们在交易中是关键。

ACA, and you wouldn’t really know this by reading most press accounts, ACA was a bond insurer. Now, they started out as a municipal bond insurer. They guaranteed various credits and they were like Ambac, they were like MBIA, they were like FGIC, they were like FSA.

ACA，而通过阅读大多数新闻报道你并不会真正知道这一点，ACA 是一家债券保险公司。最初，他们是作为市政债券保险公司起步的。他们担保各种信用，就像 Ambac、MBIA、FGIC 和 FSA 一样。

And all of those companies — and we wrote about this a few years ago in the report — all of those companies started out insuring municipal bonds. Some of them started 30 years ago. And there was a big business in insuring municipal bonds.

所有这些公司——我们几年前在报告中提到过——最初都是为市政债券提供保险的。其中一些公司成立于 30 年前。为市政债券提供保险是一个大生意。

And then the profit margins started getting squeezed in the municipal bond business. So what did they do? Instead of sticking to the business they knew and accepting lower profits, they went out and got into the business of insuring structured credits and all kinds of different other deals.

然后，市政债券业务的利润率开始被压缩。那么，他们该怎么办？他们不愿意接受较低的利润，于是开始了他们对结构性信用和各种其他交易的保险。

I described their activities a couple years in the annual report as being a little bit like Mae West who said, “I was Snow White but I drifted.” (Laughter)

我在几年前的年报中形容他们的活动有点像梅·韦斯特说的，“我曾经是白雪公主，但我迷失了方向。”（笑声）

These bond insurers — and almost all of them did it — these bond insurers drifted into insuring things they didn’t understand quite as well but where they could make a little more money.

这些债券保险公司——几乎所有的债券保险公司都是这样——这些债券保险公司开始承保他们并不完全理解的事物，但在这些领域他们可以赚更多的钱。

ACA did it, MBIA did it, AMBEC did it, FGIC did it, FSA did it, and they all got into trouble, every one of them.

ACA 做到了，MBIA 做到了，AMBEC 做到了，FGIC 做到了，FSA 做到了，他们都陷入了麻烦，每一个人。

Now, is there anything wrong with a bond insurer insuring structured credit or something other than municipals? No. But you better know what you’re doing.

那么，债券保险公司担保结构性信用或市政以外的其他东西有什么问题吗？不，但你最好知道你在做什么。

Now, interestingly enough, Berkshire Hathaway, when these other guys got into trouble, went into the municipal bond insurance business.

有趣的是，当其他公司遇到麻烦时，伯克希尔·哈撒韦进入了市政债券保险业务。

And we insured things that were almost identical to what ACA or others had insured, the difference being that we thought we knew more about what we were doing. We got paid better than they got paid, and we stayed away from things we didn’t understand.

我们承保的东西几乎与 ACA 或其他公司承保的东西相同，区别在于我们认为我们对自己所做的事情了解得更多。我们的报酬比他们的报酬更高，而且我们避免了那些我们不理解的事情。

We never insured a CDO; we never insured any kind of a RMBS deal or anything of the sort.

我们从未为 CDO 投保；我们从未为任何类型的 RMBS 交易或类似的交易投保。

But I want to give you an example of something we did insure, because I think it will help you understand better this ABACUS transaction. So if the — if the projectionist would put up slide number 1, I’m going to describe a deal to you.

但我想给你一个我们确实投保的例子，因为我认为这会帮助你更好地理解这个 ABACUS 交易。所以如果放映员能放上第一张幻灯片，我将给你描述一个交易。

And as you — as you look at this — is it up there yet? Yeah. Somebody came to us a couple of years ago. I’ll tell you the name a little later. But a large investment bank came to us a couple of years ago.

而当你——当你看这个——它上去了吗？是的。几年前，有人找到了我们。我稍后会告诉你名字。但几年前，一家大型投资银行找到了我们。

Now, we were insuring bonds regularly. We insured bonds here of the Omaha Public Power District that’s familiar to many of you. We insured the bonds of the Nebraska — of the Methodist Hospital, which is six or seven miles from here.

现在，我们定期为债券投保。我们在这里为奥马哈公共电力区的债券投保，这对你们中的许多人来说都很熟悉。我们为内布拉斯加州的卫理公会医院的债券投保，该医院距离这里大约六到七英里。

We have told people that if the Nebraska Methodist Hospital does not pay its bonds, Berkshire Hathaway will pay them. And we’ve done that to the tune of about $100 million in their case. So we are in the business of insuring bonds.

我们告诉人们，如果内布拉斯加州卫理公会医院不支付其债券，伯克希尔哈撒韦将支付。我们在他们的案例中做到了大约1亿美元的担保。

Now, a couple of years ago, somebody came to us, large investment bank, and they said, “Take a look at this portfolio.”

几年前，有一家大型投资银行找到了我们，他们说：“看看这个投资组合。”

And as you can see, it’s got the names of a whole bunch of states. Yeah, it’s up there. And very different amounts. It’s got a billion-one for Florida; it’s only got 200 million for the State of California.

而且正如你所看到的，它有很多州的名字。是的，它在那儿。而且数量差异很大。佛罗里达州有十亿一千万；加利福尼亚州只有两亿。

And they said to us, “Will you insure these states, that these bonds of these states, will pay for the next 10 years? If any of the states don’t pay, you have to pay as the insurer.”

他们对我们说：“你们会为这些州提供担保吗，这些州的债券将在接下来的 10 年内支付？如果任何州不支付，你们作为保险人就必须支付。”

And I looked at the list, Ajit Jain looked at the list, and we had to decide, A) whether we knew enough to insure them, and B) what premium we would charge, because that’s what we’re in the business for.

我查看了名单，Ajit Jain 也查看了名单，我们必须决定，A) 我们是否知道足够的信息来为他们投保，以及 B) 我们会收取多少保费，因为这就是我们的业务所在。

And we don’t have to insure them. We can say, “Forget it. We don’t know enough to make the decision.” But we made the decision and we offered to insure those bonds for about $160 million for 10 years.

我们并不一定要担保他们。我们可以说：“算了。我们不知道足够的信息来做出决定。”但我们做出了决定，提出以大约1.6亿美元的价格担保这些债券，期限10年。

So we collected a premium of a little over 160 million, and somebody on the other side, the counterparty they call it, somebody on the other side, for 10 years, gets an assurance that, if these states don’t pay, we will pay as if they did pay.

所以我们收取了超过 1.6 亿的保费，而对方，也就是他们所说的对手方，在 10 年内获得了一个保证，如果这些州不支付，我们将像他们支付了一样进行支付。

And this gets to the crux of the SEC’s case — or complaint — in respect to Goldman. Somebody came to us with this list; we didn’t dream up the list. Another party came to us.

这正是美国证券交易委员会（SEC）针对高盛案件的关键所在——或者说是投诉——有人向我们提供了这份名单；我们并不是凭空想出的这份名单。另一个方来找我们。

Now, there’s about four possibilities. Now I’ll tell you who the party was that came to us two years ago: It was Lehman Brothers. So Lehman Brothers, there’s four possibilities, roughly.

现在，大约有四种可能性。现在我告诉你两年前来找我们的那方是谁：是雷曼兄弟。所以雷曼兄弟，大致上有四种可能性。

Lehman Brothers might own these bonds and want protection against the credit. They might just be negative on the bond market and, in effect, be shorting these bonds and using this method as a way of shorting it.

雷曼兄弟可能拥有这些债券，并希望获得信用保护。他们可能对债券市场持负面看法，实际上是在做空这些债券，并将这种方法作为做空的方式。

They might have a customer that owned these bonds who wanted to buy protection against the credit.

他们可能有一个拥有这些债券的客户，想要购买信用保护。

Or they might have a customer who was negative on these bonds and was simply wanting to short it.

或者他们可能有一个对这些债券持负面看法的客户，只是想做空它。

We don’t care which scenario exists. It’s our job to evaluate the risk of the bonds and to determine the proper premium.

我们不关心哪种情景存在。我们的工作是评估债券的风险并确定适当的溢价。

If they told me Ben Bernanke was on the other side of the trade, it wouldn’t make any difference to me.

如果他们告诉我本·伯南克在交易的另一边，对我来说没有任何区别。

If I have to care about who’s on the other side of the trade, I should not be insuring bonds. They could have told me Charlie was on the other side of the trade. (Laughs)

如果我必须关心交易另一方是谁，我就不应该为债券投保。他们本可以告诉我查理在交易的另一边。（笑）

So, in effect, we did with these bonds exactly what ACA did with the bonds that were presented to them.

因此，实际上，我们对这些债券的处理与 ACA 对他们所呈现的债券的处理完全相同。

Now, ACA said, with the list of 120 that was presented to them, they said, “There’s about 50 of these that we’re willing to insure.”

现在，ACA 表示，针对他们提供的 120 个名单，他们说：“我们愿意承保其中大约 50 个。”

And then they went back and negotiated and took on 30 more of them.

然后他们回去谈判，又增加了 30 个。

We could have said, presumably, “We don’t like Texas that well at a billion-150, and we’d rather have you give us more Floridas,” or something like that.

我们本可以说，假设他们表示：“我们不太喜欢德克萨斯州的11.5亿，更愿意多要一些佛罗里达州的债券。”

We didn’t do it. We just took the list that was submitted. So it was totally the other guy’s list that we insured.

我们没有这样做。我们只是拿了提交的名单。所以这完全是另一个人的名单，我们为其投保。

In the case of the ABACUS transaction, it was sort of a mutual — a negotiation — as to which bonds were included.

在 ABACUS 交易的情况下，这是一种相互的——一种谈判——关于哪些债券被纳入。

Now, in the end, the bonds that were included in the ABACUS transaction all went south very quickly.

现在，最终，参与 ABACUS 交易的所有债券都迅速贬值。

That wasn’t quite so obvious they were going to do that in early 2007, as you could see by studying something called the ABX Index.

在 2007 年初，他们要这样做并不是那么明显，正如你通过研究一个叫做 ABX 指数的东西所看到的。

But the housing bubble — really, mania — started blowing up in 2007.

但房地产泡沫——实际上是狂热——在 2007 年开始膨胀。

Now, there could be troubles in these states that we insured. You can say they have big pension obligations, and maybe the guy who’s shorting them on the other side knows more about that than we do, but, you know, that is our problem.

现在，我们所保险的这些州可能会出现问题。你可以说他们有很大的养老金义务，也许在另一边做空他们的人对这些情况了解得比我们多，但这就是我们的问题。

I mean, if we want to insure bonds, in the case of ACA, in the case of MBIA, they have teams of people do it. We just do it with a couple people at Berkshire.

我的意思是，如果我们想要为债券投保，以 ACA 和 MBIA 为例，他们有团队来做这件事。我们在伯克希尔只用几个人来做。

But I see nothing whatsoever — I mean, if we lose a lot of money on these bonds, I am not going to go to the guy on the other side of the transaction and say, “Gee, you took advantage of me.”

但我什么都看不见——我的意思是，如果我们在这些债券上损失了很多钱，我不会去交易对方那里说：“哎，你利用了我。”

I don’t care if John Paulson is shorting these bonds to me. He has no worries that I’m going to claim that he had superior knowledge about the finances of these states or anything of the sort.

我不在乎约翰·保尔森是否在对我做空这些债券。他完全不担心我会声称他对这些州的财务状况有更优越的知识或类似的事情。

So that was basically the ABACUS transaction. I think the central part of the argument is that Paulson knew more about the bonds than the bond insurer did.

所以这就是ABACUS交易的基本情况。我认为争论的核心是，保尔森对这些债券的了解比债券保险公司更深入。

My guess is the bond insurer employed more people than John Paulson did in his business, and they just made — they made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a dumb insurance decision.

我猜债券保险公司雇佣的人数可能比约翰·保尔森在他的业务中雇佣的人数还要多，而他们却做出了一个显然回顾起来看是愚蠢的保险决定。

And for the life of me, I don’t see whether it makes any difference whether it was John Paulson on the other side of the deal, or whether it was Goldman Sachs on the other side of the deal, or whether it was Berkshire Hathaway on the other side of the deal.

我实在看不出这笔交易的另一方是约翰·保尔森、还是高盛，或者是伯克希尔·哈撒韦，是否有什么区别。

Let’s say we had decided to short the housing market in some way in early 2007. I don’t think anybody should blame us for taking our position if we did it. We didn’t do it. Or if we’d taken the long side.

假设我们在 2007 年初决定以某种方式做空房地产市场。如果我们真的这样做了，我认为没有人应该责怪我们。我们并没有这样做。或者如果我们选择了做多。

I think before we get to the other part of Carol’s questions, I’d ask Charlie to comment as this as Charlie has a law degree, and in other ways is superior to me, so we’ll get his views.

我想在我们讨论卡罗尔问题的其他部分之前，请查理对此发表意见，因为查理拥有法学学位，并且在其他方面优于我，所以我们来听听他的看法。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my attitude is quite simple. This was a three-to-two decision by the SEC commissioners under circumstances where they normally act unanimously.

查理·芒格：嗯，我的态度很简单。这是在证券交易委员会委员通常一致行动的情况下，作出的三比二的决定。

If I had been on the SEC, I would have voted with the minority two and not with the three who authorized the lawsuit.

如果我在证券交易委员会，我会投票支持少数派的两位，而不是支持授权提起诉讼的三位。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol, would you get to the three parts that we probably haven’t answered yet? And then I’ll tackle this one.

沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗，你能把我们可能还没有回答的三个部分提出来吗？然后我来处理这个问题。

But I really feel it’s important to understand the transaction. I have not seen — I have seen ACA referred to as an investor. It’s true that ACA had a management company, but it was 100 percent owned by ACA.

但我真的觉得理解这笔交易很重要。我没有看到——我看到 ACA 被称为投资者。确实，ACA 有一家管理公司，但它是由 ACA 百分之百拥有的。

ACA was a bond insurer, pure and simple. And they had this — very simple, as it turned out — and they had one part of the organization did this and that. But ACA lost money because they were a bond insurer.

ACA 是一家债券保险公司，简单明了。事实证明，他们有一个非常简单的结构，组织的一个部分负责这个和那个。但 ACA 亏损是因为他们是一家债券保险公司。

Yep, Carol? 好的，卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: Well, I’m assuming that you have covered the part that says could you tell us your reaction to the lawsuit. So the next part was your reflections, in light of it, about Berkshire’s large investment in Goldman.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：好吧，我假设你们已经涵盖了那部分内容，即你能告诉我们你对这起诉讼的反应吗。那么下一部分是你对此的反思，考虑到伯克希尔对高盛的大额投资。

And then the third was what advice you would have, given your Salomon experience and the thread of reputation that you have planted, those words you have planted. Those are the last two parts.

然后第三个是你会给出的建议，考虑到你的所罗门经验和你所建立的声誉的线索，你会给高盛什么建议？这就是剩下的两个部分。

WARREN BUFFETT: Ironically, very ironically, it’s probably helped our investment in Goldman in a certain way, because we have a $5 billion preferred stock that pays us $500 million a year.

沃伦·巴菲特：具有讽刺意味的是，这在某种程度上可能帮助了我们对高盛的投资，因为我们有 50 亿美元的优先股，每年为我们带来 5 亿美元的收益。

Goldman has the right, the legal right, to call that at 110 percent of par. So anytime they want to, they can sent Berkshire 5 1/2 billion, and they get rid of this preferred stock which is costing them 500 million a year.

高盛有权利，合法权利，以面值的 110%赎回。因此，他们随时可以向伯克希尔发送 55 亿美元，从而摆脱每年花费 5 亿美元的优先股。

If we got that 5 1/2 billion in, immediately we’d put it in very short-term securities, which probably, under today’s conditions, might produce 20 million a year or something like that.

如果我们获得那 55 亿，我们会立即将其投入非常短期的证券，在今天的条件下，可能每年会产生 2000 万左右的收益。

So every day that goes by that Goldman does not call our preferred is money in the bank. It’s been pointed out that our preferred is paying us $15 a second. So as we sit here, tick — (laughter) — tick, tick, tick, that’s $15 every tick. (Applause)

因此，高盛没有打电话赎回优先股的每一天，这对我们来说都是额外收入。有人指出，我们的优先股每秒钟为我们支付15美元。所以当我们坐在这里，滴——（笑声）——滴，滴滴，滴，每一滴都是15美元。（掌声）

I don’t want those ticks to go away. (Laughs)

我不想让那些勾勾消失。（笑）

I just love them. They go on at night when I sleep — (laughter) — on weekends.

我就是喜欢它们。它们在我睡觉的时候晚上开启——（笑）——在周末。

And frankly, Goldman would love to get rid of that preferred. I mean, they only agreed to sell us that preferred because it was sort of at the height of the crisis.

坦率地说，高盛非常希望摆脱那种优先股。我的意思是，他们之所以同意卖给我们那种优先股，是因为那正是危机的高峰期。

The U.S., I’m not sure what part of the government, probably the Fed, but they have been telling companies that took TARP money whether they could increase their dividends or not, whether they could redeem preferred, and all that.

美国政府，我不确定是哪部分政府，可能是美联储，但他们告诉那些接受TARP资金的公司，是否可以增加股息或赎回优先股。

Up till now, probably the Federal Government has been doing us a big favor by telling — even before this thing happened — they’ve probably been telling Goldman that, “You can’t call that preferred until we tell you you can. And you can’t increase your dividend.”

直到现在，可能联邦政府一直在大力支持我们——即便在这件事情发生之前——他们可能一直在告诉高盛：“在我们告诉你之前，你不能赎回那笔优先股。你不能增加股息。”

They’ve been pretty strong with all of the TARP companies. That has not been publicized too much, but believe me that it’s the case.

他们对所有的 TARP 公司一直很强硬。这一点并没有被广泛宣传，但相信我，确实如此。

So I was just sitting here hoping that the — basically, that the Fed, or whomever, would be — continue to be — quite tough, in terms of letting Goldman call our preferred. But it wasn’t going to go on forever.

所以我在这里只是希望——基本上，联邦储备或其他任何人——继续对高盛的优先股保持相当强硬的态度。但这不会永远持续下去。

I think that — I think recent developments have probably delayed the calling of our preferred by some time so the tick, tick, tick — (laughter) — will go on, and we will be getting $500 million a year instead of $20 million a year.

我认为最近的发展可能会推迟高盛赎回我们优先股的时间，所以滴，滴，滴——（笑声）——会继续下去，我们将获得5亿美元的收益，而不是2000万美元的收益。

We love the investment, and I would expect that — the question about losing reputation.

我们喜欢这项投资，我会期待——关于失去声誉的问题。

There’s no question that the allegation alone causes the company to lose reputation, and obviously the press of the past few weeks, they hurt. They hurt a company. They can hurt morale, a lot of things. Nothing — it’s not remotely mortal or anything like that, but it hurts.

毫无疑问，单单指控就会导致公司声誉受损，显然，过去几周的新闻也会造成损害。它们会对公司造成伤害。它们可能会影响士气，很多事情。没有任何事情是致命的或什么的，但会造成伤害。

Incidentally, Goldman Sachs had a situation in connection with the Penn Central, 30 — 40 years ago now. And that hurt at that time.

顺便提一下，高盛在 30 到 40 年前与宾夕法尼亚中央铁路有过一个情况。这在当时造成了损失。

They had a connection with one fellow in terms of Boesky that hurt at that time. And it was the source of great pain to John Weinberg, who was running Goldman.

他们与一个人有联系，涉及到博斯基，那时也造成了伤害。这给当时管理高盛的约翰·温伯格带来了极大的痛苦。

But I don’t believe that the allegation of something falls within my category of losing reputation. If something is proven, then you have to look at it.

但我不认为指控某些事情属于我失去声誉的范畴。如果事情被证明，那你必须去看看。

My advice, in times of some kind of an emergent — when some transgression is either found or alleged, you know, basically, you saw Ron Olson in our movie, he was the manager of the team.

我的建议是在某种紧急情况下——当某种违规行为被发现或被指控时，你知道，基本上，你在我们的电影中看到了罗恩·奥尔森，他是球队的经理。

And back when we were working at Salomon together in a somewhat similar situation, we had as our motto, “Get it right. Get it fast. Get it out. Get it over.”

当我们在 Salomon 一起工作时，处于类似的情况，我们的座右铭是：“做对。做快。做出。结束。”

But, “Get it right,” was number one. I mean, you have to have your facts right, because if you go out with the wrong facts you get killed, and you can’t redo it afterwards.

但是，“把事情做对”是第一位的。我的意思是，你必须确保你的事实是正确的，因为如果你带着错误的事实出去，你会受到重创，而且事后无法重来。

But that does mean sometimes some delay. You have to gather information from within your own organization, and you are on the defensive.

但这确实意味着有时会有一些延迟。你必须从自己组织内部收集信息，而你处于防守状态。

I would not — I do not hold against Goldman at all the fact that an allegation has been made by the SEC. And if it leads into something more serious, you know, then we’ll look at the situation at that time.

我并不——我完全不对高盛因美国证券交易委员会提出的指控而感到不满。如果这引发了更严重的情况，你知道，那时我们会再看这个情况。

But what I’ve seen in terms of the ABACUS activity, I just don’t — I do not see that that would be any different than me complaining about the list of municipals that were given to me to insure a couple of years ago.

但就我所见的ABACUS活动而言，我完全看不出——我不认为这与我抱怨两年前提交给我的市政债券的清单有什么不同。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with all of that. But I also think that every business ought to decline a lot of business that’s perfectly legal and proper to accept.

查理·芒格：我同意这一切。但我也认为，每个企业都应该拒绝很多完全合法和合规的业务。

In other words, the standards in business should not be what’s legal and convenient. The standards should be different.

换句话说，商业中的标准不应该是合法和方便的标准。标准应该有所不同。

And I don’t think there’s an investment bank in America of any consequence that didn’t take too many scuzzy customers and deal in too many scuzzy securities.

我认为在美国没有任何一家重要的投资银行没有接纳过太多不良客户和交易过太多不良证券。

WARREN BUFFETT: I would agree with that. But, Charlie — (applause) — do you think we should have done our municipal bond deal?

沃伦·巴菲特：我同意这一点。但是，查理——（掌声）——你认为我们应该进行我们的市政债券交易吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it was a closer case than you do.

查理·芒格：我认为这是一个比你认为的更复杂的案例。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) OK.

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）好的。

We insure, probably, 40 billion now, or something like that, of municipal bonds. And we have done very little in the last year, not because of Charlie’s views that he just expressed, but basically because the price isn’t right, the premiums are wrong.

我们现在担保的市政债券可能约为400亿美元或更多。过去一年我们几乎没有做过任何业务，不是因为查理刚才表达的观点，而是基本上因为价格不合适，保费不对。

And the reaction of other people when premiums are wrong is to take more risk. And our reaction when premiums are wrong is just to go play golf or something and tell somebody to call us when premiums get right again.

其他人对保费错误的反应是承担更多风险。而我们对保费错误的反应只是去打高尔夫球或其他事情，并告诉某人当保费再次正确时给我们打电话。

I do want to — Charlie and I will give our views on a lot of the activities that have gone on on Wall Street, and we do think plenty has been wrong.

我想说的是，查理和我将就华尔街上发生的许多活动给出我们的看法，而我们认为很多事情是错误的。

I do want to point out, though, that our experience with Goldman goes back 44 years. And during those years, we’ve bought more businesses through them than through any other Wall Street investment bank. We’ve probably done more financing.

我想指出的是，我们与高盛的合作已经有 44 年了。在这段时间里，我们通过他们购买的企业比通过任何其他华尔街投资银行都要多。我们可能进行了更多的融资。

They have helped build Berkshire Hathaway. And we trade with them as well.

他们帮助建立了伯克希尔哈撒韦。我们也与他们交易。

We don’t hire them as investment advisors. They have a big investment advisory business, and, you know, our reaction to that is, “No, thanks.” You know, we are in the business of making our own decisions.

我们不雇他们作为投资顾问。他们有一个庞大的投资顾问业务，而我们的反应是：“不，谢谢。”你知道，我们的业务是做出自己的决策。

But when we trade with them, they can very well be shorting to us a stock we’re buying. You know, they can be buying for their own account some stock we’re selling.

但是当我们与他们交易时，他们很可能会向我们卖出我们正在购买的股票。你知道，他们可能会为自己的账户购买我们正在出售的一些股票。

They do not owe us a divulgence of their position any more than we need to explain to them our reasoning or what we are doing in our position.

他们并不欠我们披露他们立场的义务，正如我们在交易中不需要向他们解释我们的理由或我们在做什么。

We are acting there in a non-fiduciary capacity, and they are operating in a non-fiduciary capacity, in my view, when they are trading with us.

在我看来，我们在那里以非信托身份行事，他们在与我们交易时也以非信托身份行事。

Now, if they’re working on our behalf on an acquisition or a financing, that’s a different story.

现在，如果他们在为我们进行收购或融资，那就是另一回事。

But I would say that we have had a lot of very satisfactory transactions with Goldman Sachs.

但我想说，我们与高盛有过很多非常满意的交易。

And I don’t want to prolong this. I won’t do this on any more questions. But I’d like to — some people here will remember this — I’d like to take you back to the very first bond issue that Charlie and I ever did.

我不想拖太久，也不会再有更多类似的问题。但我想——有些在座的人会记得这一点——我想带你们回到我和查理第一次发行债券的时候。

This was our maiden voyage back in 1967, I believe. Yeah. And if we could put slide 2 up there, I will direct your attention to the —

这是我们在1967年的首次交易，对，我记得没错。对，如果我们能把第二张幻灯片放出来，我会让大家关注这个——

This is an offering that was made in 1967. We’d just bought a department store and we had a company called Diversified Retailing. Now, Diversified Retailing only owned one retailing operation, but we were sort of imaginative in those days, so we called it Diversified Retailing. (Laughter)

这是1967年做的一个发售。我们刚买了一家百货商店，并拥有一家叫做“多元化零售公司”的企业。现在，“多元化零售”实际上只拥有一个零售业务，但那时我们比较有想象力，所以我们称之为“多元化零售”。（笑声）

And we went out to raise $5 1/2 million. And Charlie Heider of Omaha, whom many of you know, helped me in the financing.

然后我们出去筹集550万美元。奥马哈的查理·海德尔（Charlie Heider），你们很多人都认识，他在融资过程中帮了我。

And you will notice our tombstone ad there has on the top two lines “New York Securities” and “First Nebraska Securities.”

你们会注意到，在我们那份刊登的墓碑广告中，最上面两行写着“纽约证券”和“第一内布拉斯加证券”。

They were the lead underwriters. And as customary with tombstones, there are a group of underwriters listed below, and they’re usually listed in the degree of their participation.

他们是主要承销商。按照墓碑的惯例，下面列出了一组承销商，通常按他们的参与程度进行排序。

In other words, the more that they’re involved, the higher up in the list they are, with the lead underwriters on top. And that’s been true of every tombstone I’ve ever seen, except this one.

换句话说，他们参与得越多，排名就越高，主要承销商位于最上面。这在我见过的每一个墓碑上都是如此，除了这个。

And what happened in this one was that we were having trouble raising $5 1/2 million. And I called Gus Levy of Goldman Sachs, and I called Al Gordon of Kidder Peabody. Those were two of the most prestigious firms in Wall Street at the time.

在这件事中，我们遇到了筹集 550 万美元的困难。我打电话给高盛的古斯·莱维，也打电话给基德·皮博迪的阿尔·戈登。这两家公司在当时是华尔街最有声望的公司之一。

And I said, “Would you guys help me? We’re trying to raise 5 1/2 million and there’s nobody that wants to give Charlie and me 5 1/2 million. And the underwriters we’ve lined up are having trouble getting it done.” And both Gus Levy and Al Gordon said to me, “Warren, we’ll take a big piece.”

我说：“你们能帮我吗？我们正在努力筹集 550 万美元，但没有人愿意给查理和我 550 万美元。我们联系的承销商也在完成这笔交易上遇到了困难。”古斯·莱维和阿尔·戈登都对我说：“沃伦，我们会承担一大笔。”

And if you’ll put — if you put up slide number 3, you will see the list of underwriters, and Goldman Sachs highlighted and Kidder Peabody highlighted were actually the next-largest underwriters. But they were so ashamed of being associated with our dinky little company that they asked us to leave their names off. (Laughter)

如果你把第 3 张幻灯片放上来，你会看到承销商的名单，高盛和基德·皮博迪被突出显示，实际上是下一个最大的承销商。但是他们对此次交易感到非常羞愧，因此他们要求我们把他们的名字删去。（笑声）

They wanted to give us money under an assumed name. (Laughter)

他们想用一个化名给我们钱。（笑声）

But they did — they did come through for us. They did come through for us. And believe me, a lot of people weren’t coming through for us then. I do have a long memory for people that have taken good care of Berkshire over time.

但他们确实做到了——他们确实为我们提供了帮助。他们确实为我们提供了帮助。相信我，那时很多人并没有为我们提供帮助。我对那些长期以来照顾伯克希尔的人有很深的记忆。

And Al Gordon died last year at the age of 107. He worked until he was 104. He was a remarkable man. Gus Levy was a remarkable man. And I thank them for their participation, even though they did want to do it under an assumed name. (Laughter)

阿尔·戈登去年去世，享年 107 岁。他工作到 104 岁。他是一个了不起的人。古斯·莱维也是一个了不起的人。我感谢他们的参与，尽管他们确实想以化名参与。（笑声）

7. Munger: “I would make Paul Volcker look like a sissy”

芒格：“我会让保罗·沃尔克看起来像个娘们”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to — we’ll go to area number 1 and we’ll shorten the answers. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们去——我们去第一区域，我们会简短回答。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Guy Pope and I’m from Portland, Oregon.

观众：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫盖·波普，来自俄勒冈州波特兰。

I’m curious about your thoughts on financial reform that Congress is currently working on. Specifically, what are the good ideas that you think are out there that should be included in the bill, and what are the bad ideas that you think should be left out?

我对国会目前正在进行的金融改革的看法很感兴趣。具体来说，您认为有哪些好的想法应该纳入法案中，哪些坏的想法应该被排除在外？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, it’s 1,550 pages so you take the first 1,500, I’ll take the last 50 pages. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，这有 1550 页，你先看前 1500 页，我来看看最后 50 页。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think anybody in America right now, including the people in Congress, know what’s going to happen. And my guess is that most of them have not read the bill, either.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为现在美国没有人，包括国会中的人，知道将会发生什么。我的猜测是，他们中的大多数人也没有读过这项法案。

So I think we’re all in the doubt — (applause) — as to what’s going to happen.

所以我想我们都在怀疑——（掌声）——接下来会发生什么。

To me, one thing is perfectly clear and that is that our governmental system, which regulates the big investment banks, was so permissive and the investment banking culture had a nature, that together helped arrange that, under stress, every big investment bank except Goldman Sachs was going to go blooey.

对我来说，有一件事是非常清楚的，那就是我们的政府系统，监管大型投资银行，过于宽松，而投资银行文化的性质也助长了这一点，这使得在压力下，除了高盛以外的每一家大型投资银行都将崩溃。

A system that likely to go blooey, that is so important to the country, should be changed so it’s less permissive in what it allows the banks and the investment banks to do. And people are thinking about that right now.

一个可能会崩溃的系统，对国家来说如此重要，应该进行改变，以减少对银行和投资银行所允许的行为的宽容度。人们现在正在考虑这个问题。

The banks and investment banks just hate the idea of losing investment flexibility. For instance, on maintaining the biggest derivative book in the world at, say, JPMorgan Chase.

银行和投资银行非常讨厌失去投资灵活性的想法。例如，保持全球最大的衍生品投资组合，比如在摩根大通。

They hate giving that stuff up. That doesn’t mean that it’s good for the country that they be allowed to continue to do as they have done.

他们讨厌放弃那些东西。这并不意味着让他们继续这样做对国家是有好处的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Based on what you know about the bill, and I know you haven’t read all 1,550 pages, but would you vote for it today or not?

沃伦·巴菲特：根据你对这项法案的了解，我知道你没有读完全部 1550 页，但你今天会投票支持它吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I simply don’t know enough about it. I know what I would do if I were the benevolent despot of America. And I would make Paul Volcker look like a sissy. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：我实在不知道太多。我知道如果我是美国的仁慈专制者，我会怎么做。我会让保罗·沃尔克看起来像个软弱的人。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You want to get more specific than that? That’s quite a word picture. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：你想更具体一点吗？那真是个生动的比喻。（笑）

Want to get more specific, Charlie?

想要更具体一点吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would reduce the activities that are permitted. If you’re de facto using the government’s credit to help your business run, you shouldn’t have a bunch of financial statements in the trillions, which you can’t really understand even if you’re a partner in the business.

查理·芒格：好吧，我会减少允许的活动。如果你实际上是在利用政府的信用来帮助你的业务运作，你就不应该有一堆你即使是业务合伙人也无法真正理解的数万亿的财务报表。

This is crazy. The complexity that has come into the system is quite counterproductive. And of course, the people have proven they can’t really control it.

这太疯狂了。系统中出现的复杂性非常适得其反。当然，人们已经证明他们无法真正控制它。

So I think what we need is a new version of Glass-Steagall that drastically limits what — (applause) — what both commercial banks and investment banks are allowed to do.

所以我认为我们需要一个新的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法》，大幅限制商业银行和投资银行被允许做的事情。

They should have a much simpler and safer mode of business.

他们应该有一种更简单、更安全的商业模式。

When we owned a savings and loan association, it had a very restricted repertoire that it could use. And of course, it had government credit for its deposits.

当我们拥有一家储蓄和贷款协会时，它的业务范围非常有限。当然，它的存款有政府信用支持。

And by and large, as long as the repertoire was quite limited, the savings and loans stayed out of trouble. But you give human beings the flexibility the do any damn thing they please with absolutely unlimited credit under the repo system and other systems, and they will go plum crazy. And of course, they did.

一般来说，只要业务范围相当有限，储蓄和贷款机构就会避开麻烦。但是如果您让人类在回购系统和其他系统下，任意做任何事情，拥有绝对无限的信用，他们就会变得疯狂。当然，他们确实如此。

8. We shouldn’t have to collateralize previous deals

我们不应该为之前的交易提供担保。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. On that cheery note, we’ll move to Becky. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。在这个愉快的音符上，我们来看看贝基。（笑声）

BECKY QUICK: We received a lot of questions about the financial regulatory impending legislation. This question comes in from Jay Gelb, who wants to follow up on the point that Mr. Pope just made.

贝基·奎克：我们收到了很多关于即将出台的金融监管立法的问题。这个问题来自杰伊·盖尔布，他想跟进波普先生刚才提到的观点。

“What’s the anticipated impact of pending financial reform legislation on Berkshire? In particular, how much additional collateral may need to be posted on Berkshire’s existed $63 billion of derivative contracts? And could Berkshire get too close to its minimum requirement of $20 billion of cash on hand as a result?”

“待决的金融改革立法对伯克希尔的预期影响是什么？特别是，伯克希尔现有的 630 亿美元衍生合约可能需要提供多少额外的担保？这是否会导致伯克希尔的现金储备接近 200 亿美元的最低要求？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. As I understand the bill now, the one that got presented a couple of days ago — and I could be wrong but I think I understand it and I’ve read the sections — the requirements would be zero.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。根据我现在对几天前提出的法案的理解——我可能错了，但我认为我理解了它，并且我已经阅读了相关部分——要求将是零。

If we were found — Berkshire were found — to be a — and I don’t know the exact term in the bill — but basically, dangerous to the system, by the secretary of the treasury, or I believe some commission, then we could be required to post collateral on retroactive contracts — on contracts that were written in the past.

如果我们被发现——伯克希尔被发现——是一个——我不知道法案中的确切术语——但基本上，对系统构成危险，那么财政部长或我相信某个委员会可能会要求我们在追溯合同上提供担保——在过去签订的合同上。

I think the chances of us being regarded as a danger to the system when we have 250 contracts and other companies have a million contracts — our position was described in the Journal not long ago as “huge.”

我认为，当我们有 250 个合同而其他公司有一百万个合同时，我们被视为对系统的威胁的可能性很小——我们的地位不久前在《华尔街日报》中被描述为“巨大”。

You know, our position is 1 percent, in terms of notional value or liabilities or a lot of ways of measuring. It’s 1 percent of that of several other very large institutions.

你知道，我们的地位是 1%，无论是从名义价值、负债还是其他许多衡量方式来看。这是几家其他大型机构的 1%。

So I — I’ve really wondered if you use the word “huge” to describe our position, what you would use for 100 times that position?

所以我——我真的在想，如果你用“巨大”这个词来形容我们的地位，那么你会用什么来形容这个地位的 100 倍？

That must be some adjective that lurks out there someplace to be attributed to those other positions.

那一定有某个形容词潜伏在某个地方，可以用来形容那些其他的头寸。

We had 23,000 positions 10 years ago when we bought Gen Re. And we proceeded promptly to get rid of all but less than a hundred that are left.

十年前我们收购了 Gen Re 时有 23,000 个头寸。我们迅速采取行动，除了不到一百个头寸外，其他头寸都被裁撤了。

So we have absolutely, in my view, we have no problems.

所以在我看来，我们绝对没有任何问题。

If for any reason though, the Treasury or this commission should go back and maybe in some more sweeping declaration decide that they wanted all past contracts to be collateralized, we would comply, obviously.

如果出于任何原因，财政部或该委员会决定回溯并可能在某种更广泛的声明中决定他们希望所有过去的合同都要有担保，我们显然会遵从。

We also would feel that we were due substantial money because, in negotiating those contracts, there was one price for collateralized contracts and there was another price for un-collateralized.

我们还会认为，我们应该得到相当可观的赔偿，因为在谈判这些合同时，担保合同和非担保合同的价格是不同的。

So if I sell my house to you for $100,000 and wanted $120,000 if it were furnished, but you said, “I’ll take it unfurnished for $100,000,” and then Congress comes along later on and says, “All houses have to be sold furnished, and by the way, that’s retroactive,” if I give you the furniture now I want something for it. A little unreasonable, maybe.

所以，如果我以10万美元的价格将我的房子卖给你，而我希望以12万美元的价格出售，并且你说，“我愿意以10万美元的价格购买不带家具的房子”，然后国会后来通过了一项法案，说：“所有房屋都必须带家具出售，而且是追溯性的”，如果我现在给你家具，我就想要一些补偿。这样可能有点不合理。

We do think — well, just a week ago we were offered an equity put contract that’s identical, basically, it’s a 10-year contract, by one of the very largest investment banking houses.

我们确实认为——好吧，就在一周前，我们收到了一个与之基本相同的股权回购合同，这是一个为期 10 年的合同，由一家非常大的投资银行提供。

The price that they would pay us was 7 1/2 million un-collateralized and $11 million collateralized. So there’s a very different — there’s a price to be paid for having a collateralized contract.

他们愿意支付给我们的价格是 750 万无担保和 1100 万担保。因此，担保合同的价格是非常不同的。

And we elected to forgo probably a billion dollars of extra premiums we could have received in the past for our contracts if we had agreed to have them collateralized.

我们选择放弃了过去可能获得的额外10亿美元的保费，因为我们拒绝给这些合同担保。

And with a few exceptions, we declined that. And we would feel, if we ever had to collateralize them, we would be entitled to fair compensation for it, and we would like that language to be in the bill.

并且有一些例外，我们拒绝了这一点。如果我们不得不为其提供担保，我们会觉得有权获得公平的补偿，我们希望这段文字能写入法案中。

And incidentally, Secretary Geithner — we’ll put up slide number 7. We have his testimony before the Senate Ag Committee on December 2nd. And as you can see, he testified very strongly, in terms of the sanctity of past contracts.

顺便提一下，盖特纳部长——我们可以展示第七张幻灯片。我们有他在12月2日参议院农业委员会前的证词。正如你所看到的，他在关于过去合同神圣性的观点上表达了非常强烈的立场。

But if the bill passes tomorrow, the way it reads to us and to our attorneys, we would not have to put up a dime.

但如果法案明天通过，根据我们和我们的律师的理解，我们将不需要支付一分钱。

And I would think there might be some other companies that would be determined to be dangerous to the system before Berkshire Hathaway would be.

我认为在伯克希尔哈撒韦之前，可能还有其他一些公司会被认定为对系统构成危险。

So I really — I don’t see any — I don’t see any consequences unless there’s some sweeping declaration that any company of a certain size that has derivatives shall be required to put up collateral.

所以我真的——我不认为这会有什么影响，除非有某种广泛的声明，规定任何具有衍生品的公司都必须提供担保。

And if that’s required, we will, and it would be no problem. It would — it would have a cost to us in terms of the opportunity cost, but then of course we would argue about what collateral was proper and so on.

如果这是必要的，我们会这样做，这没有问题。这会给我们带来机会成本，但当然我们会争论什么样的抵押品是合适的等等。

And if we could put our Coca-Cola stock, you know, we’re going to hold our Coca-Cola stock anyway. So it really changes nothing. We still get the dividends from the Coca-Cola stock if it’s placed as collateral, we get the profit if it goes up.

如果我们可以把可口可乐的股票作为担保，你知道，我们反正会持有我们的可口可乐股票。因此，这真的没有改变任何事情。如果作为担保，我们仍然会获得可口可乐股票的股息，如果股票上涨，我们仍然会获得收益。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. If collateral requirements were inserted by fiat of the government into existing contracts, it would be just like having a contract to buy a house for a million dollars, and the government passing a law saying, “No, you’ve got to pay $2 million.”

查理·芒格：嗯，是的。如果政府通过法令将抵押品要求插入现有合同中，那就像是有一份合同，约定以一百万美元购买一栋房子，而政府却通过一项法律说：“不，你必须支付两百万美元。”

I mean, it would be of dubious constitutionality, and it would be both unfair and stupid. I don’t think the government is that crazy. (Laughter)

我意思是，这在宪法上是有疑问的，而且既不公平也不明智。我不认为政府会那么疯狂。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Plus, I think what they would see — there’s a whole list, in fact I think I’ve got a page even for that. Yeah, let’s put up slide number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：此外，我认为他们会看到——实际上有一整份清单，我想我甚至有专门的一页。是的，让我们展示第 8 张幻灯片。

And this is just a sample page of people who oppose putting up collateral — being required to put up collateral — prospectively. And you’ll see IBM, you’ll see Ford Motor, you’ll see 3M, you’ll see HCA.

这是反对要求提供担保——要求将担保施加于未来合同的一部分公司的样本页面。你会看到IBM，你会看到福特汽车，你会看到3M，还有HCA。

I mean, there’s all kinds of companies that don’t want to do it in the future. We don’t care what we do in the future as long as we get paid for it.

我的意思是，有很多公司不想在未来这样做。我们不在乎我们在未来做什么，只要我们为此获得报酬。

So this is not anything that is peculiar to Berkshire at all. In fact, we happen to be in a different position than the IBMs and the 3Ms and those of the world, in respect to this. As long as we get paid for it, we’re indifferent to what the rules are going forward.

所以这并不是伯克希尔特有的事情。事实上，在这方面，我们的处境与 IBM、3M 及其他公司有所不同。只要我们能得到报酬，我们对未来的规则无所谓。

But considering the fact that we took lesser premiums in the past, we would not like something retroactively to take money out of our pocket.

但考虑到我们过去收取的保费较少，我们不希望有任何追溯性措施从我们口袋里拿钱。

But bear in mind, Burlington Northern, when we buy it, it has some fuel contracts. MidAmerican has energy contracts.

不过，请记住，伯灵顿北方，在我们收购时，它有一些燃料合同。中美能源也有能源合同。

There was a story in Businessweek about Anheuser-Busch a couple of weeks ago. And, you know, they say, “We don’t want to take money out of our business and send it to Wall Street as a deposit on collateral.”

几周前，《商业周刊》上有一个关于Anheuser-Busch的故事。他们说：“我们不想把钱从我们的业务中拿出来，作为抵押品存入华尔街。”

And I think when — if they really saw that the net effect of this would be to send a whole lot of money to be held by Wall Street that was otherwise employed in operating businesses, there might be a little less congressional enthusiasm.

我认为，如果他们真的看到这一措施的净效果是将大量资金转移到华尔街，而这些资金本来是用于运营企业的，国会的热情可能会稍微降低一些。

9. Greek debt crisis: “I don’t know how this movie ends”

希腊债务危机：“我不知道这个故事怎么结束”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们来看看第二个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning to all of you. Switching topics, Charlie and Warren, I’m Norman Rentrop from Bonn, Germany. I want to first give you a big thank you and then a question.

观众成员：大家早上好。换个话题，查理和沃伦，我是来自德国波恩的诺曼·伦特罗普。首先，我想对你们表示衷心的感谢，然后问一个问题。

“Come by train,” you wrote in the shareholder letter, and that is how I came to Omaha for the first time back in 1997.

“坐火车来，”你在股东信中写道，这就是我在 1997 年第一次来到奥马哈的方式。

I deliberately took the train from Denver to experience Omaha as a railroad city, and I immediately liked Omaha a lot. But the train ride, I saw room for improvement. So thank you very much for taking the future of American railroads into your gifted hands. (Applause)

我故意从丹佛乘火车前往奥马哈，以体验奥马哈作为一个铁路城市，我立刻非常喜欢奥马哈。但是在火车旅行中，我看到了改进的空间。所以非常感谢你们将美国铁路的未来掌握在你们的才华之中。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s one of the best questions I’ve ever heard. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是我听过的最好的问题之一。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, here a question.

观众：哦，这里有个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, OK. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好吧。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It’s about Greece, the future of the euro, and the fiscal discipline all over the world, and what we have to prepare for as investors.

观众成员：这关乎希腊、欧元的未来以及全球的财政纪律，以及我们作为投资者需要为之准备的事项。

In the past, you have been warning us about structural weaknesses of the U.S. dollar. Now we see Greece, and potentially other European countries, in crisis.

过去，您一直在警告我们关于美元的结构性弱点。现在我们看到希腊，以及其他潜在的欧洲国家，正处于危机之中。

Berkshire has significant investments in the eurozone, the big ones like Cologne Re, Munich Re, and even small ones like ISCAR’s (inaudible) in Hamburg.

伯克希尔在欧元区有重要投资，包括Cologne再保险、Munich再保险等大型公司，以及汉堡的 ISCAR 等小型公司。

How are you preparing Berkshire Hathaway for potential currency failures? And what are your thoughts on the sustainability of the euro? And what is your advice for us as investors?

你如何为伯克希尔哈撒韦准备应对潜在的货币失败？你对欧元的可持续性有什么看法？作为投资者，你对我们有什么建议？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’m going to — Charlie and I have not talked about Greece, actually, recently, so I’m going to be very interested in hearing his views on that. I will — I’ll answer the last part of your question first.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我和查理最近没有谈论希腊，所以我非常想听听他的看法。我会先回答你问题的最后一部分。

We have a lot of exposure in various countries on both the asset and liability side. In other words, we do own stock in Munich Re, and they’ve got lots of assets, majority, probably, in the euro.

我们在各个国家的资产和负债方面都有很多曝光。换句话说，我们确实拥有慕尼黑再保险公司的股票，他们有很多资产，可能大部分是以欧元计价的。

We have Cologne Re, a subsidiary of General Re, which has a substantial net worth that is basically tied to the euro.

我们有科隆再保险，这是通用再保险的子公司，其净资产基本上与欧元挂钩。

On the other hand, we have very substantial liabilities that are denominated in other currencies, including fairly big time in the euro around the world.

另一方面，我们有相当大的以其他货币计价的负债，包括在全球范围内以欧元计价的相当大一部分。

For example, when we reinsured three or four years ago, three years ago maybe, Equitas, we took on many, many, many billions of liabilities around the world. And we were paid by, in effect, Lloyd’s. And we took that money and invested it in dollars.

例如，当我们在三四年前进行再保险时，可能是三年前，我们与 Equitas 合作，承担了全球数十亿的责任。实际上，我们是由劳合社支付的。我们将这笔钱投资于美元。

So we keep those liabilities for all kinds of old insurance claims arising from Equitas in foreign currencies.

因此，我们保留了来自Equitas的所有旧保险索赔的负债，这些索赔以外币计。

And if the euro depreciates against the dollar, we benefit on that side, but we lose, as you point out, on other sides.

如果欧元对美元贬值，我们在这一方面受益，但正如你所指出的，我们在其他方面会损失。

I can’t tell you, and it’s something I’m not concerned about, whether our net balance in euros or sterling or yen or whatever, I can’t tell you what it is on any given day. Some of it enters into our equity put options and things of that sort.

我无法告诉你，而且我对此并不关心，无论我们的净余额是欧元、英镑、日元还是其他什么，我无法告诉你在任何特定的日子它是什么。其中一部分进入了我们的股权认沽期权和类似的东西。

But we have no dramatic exposures in any other currency. That doesn’t mean that other currencies are unimportant to us, because what happens with the Greek situation and what may fall out from that can be quite important, in terms of the world’s economy.

但我们在其他货币中没有戏剧性的风险敞口。这并不意味着其他货币对我们不重要，因为希腊的情况以及由此可能产生的后果在全球经济中可能非常重要。

And Charlie’s going to explain to you exactly what that might be. (Laughter)

查理将向你详细解释这可能是什么。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Well, generally speaking and with rare exceptions, of course, we’re agnostic about currencies. We simply do our business and we take those fluctuations as they fall, wouldn’t you agree with that?

查理·芒格：是的。一般来说，当然有少数例外，我们对货币持中立态度。我们只是做我们的生意，接受这些波动，难道你不同意吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’re agnostic in terms of the relative values, of —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在相对价值方面是无偏见的，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yes.

查理·芒格：是的。是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — course. Yeah, we’re not agnostic about where we think all currencies are headed, generally.

沃伦·巴菲特：——当然。是的，我们对所有货币的未来走向并不持中立态度。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no. 查理·芒格：不，不。

WARREN BUFFETT: But the relative value —

沃伦·巴菲特：但是相对价值——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But — 查理·芒格：但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: — agnostic.

沃伦·巴菲特：——不可知论者。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — Greece presents an interesting problem, of course. What’s happened is that the past conservatism of a place like the United States gave it wonderful credit, a combination of success and conservatism.

查理·芒格：——希腊当然提出了一个有趣的问题。发生的事情是，像美国这样的地方过去的保守主义赋予了它极好的信用，这是一种成功与保守的结合。

And we used that credit to win World War II, and help revive Germany and Japan in one of the most constructive and intelligent foreign policy decisions ever made in the history of the world.

我们利用这项信用赢得了第二次世界大战，并帮助德国和日本复兴，这是世界历史上最具建设性和智慧的外交政策决策之一。

And we used that credit to help assure prosperity for all these decades in which Berkshire has flourished.

而我们利用这种信用确保了这几十年来伯克希尔蓬勃发展的繁荣。

And now, of course, the government does not have quite as good a credit as it had before it started using it so heavily. And that’s happened pretty much all over the world.

现在，当然，政府的信用没有之前那么好，因为它开始如此大量地使用信用。这种情况几乎在全世界都发生了。

And so Greece is just the start of a very interesting period, and of course, it’s more dangerous to civilization when governments push their credit so hard.

因此，希腊只是一个非常有趣时期的开始，当然，当政府过度使用信用时，对文明来说是更危险的。

Because if you need credit to help civilization function, and you’ve blown it by your own aggression in using it in the past, that’s not a good thing.

因为如果你需要信用来帮助文明运作，而你因在过去的侵略性使用中透支了它，那可不是件好事。

And I think in this country, and in other countries too, responsible voices are now realizing that we’re nearer trouble from lack of government credit than we’ve been, well, in my lifetime.

我认为在这个国家，以及其他国家，负责任的声音现在意识到，由于缺乏政府信用，我们离麻烦的距离比我一生中经历过的任何时候都要近。

WARREN BUFFETT: Everything you read about country credits, currency, you always want to make a — you always want to distinguish between countries that are borrowing in their own currency pretty much exclusively, like Japan has or the United States, and countries that are being forced for one reason or another, because the world doesn’t trust them, to borrow in other countries’ currencies.

沃伦·巴菲特：关于国家信用和货币的所有信息，你总是想要做一个区分——你总是想区分那些几乎完全以自己货币借款的国家，比如日本或美国，以及那些由于某种原因被迫借用其他国家货币的国家，因为世界对他们不信任。

I mean, in the past, you know, if you were some South American country and you were borrowing in your own currency, you never default, you just buy a new printing press or work it a little harder.

我意思是，在过去，你知道，如果你是某个南美国家，并且你以自己的货币借款，你永远不会违约，你只需买一台新的印刷机或稍微加大工作力度。

But the world doesn’t like that sort of thing. So with weaker credits, and countries with poorer reputations, they force those countries to borrow in other currencies, frequently the United States currency.

但世界不喜欢那种事情。因此，信用较弱和声誉较差的国家被迫以其他货币借款，通常是美国货币。

And that can really put you out of business very quickly because, you can’t — if you’re some South American country, you can’t print U.S. dollars, although you can print your own currency. And that’s what’s caused failures among countries.

这可能会让你很快失去生意，因为如果你是某个南美国家，你不能印刷美元，尽管你可以印刷自己的货币。这就是导致一些国家失败的原因。

The European Monetary Union, it’s a really interesting situation, because Greece, they are a sovereign country, in terms of their own budget. But they can’t print their own currency, you know, they’ve got the euro.

欧洲货币联盟的情况非常有趣，因为希腊是一个主权国家，在自己的预算方面。但他们不能印制自己的货币，你知道，他们使用的是欧元。

And this is — you know, the euro was regarded as quite an experiment 20 years or whenever it was ago, or less than that. But you may be seeing sort of a test case play out here of a country that is not using its own currency, in effect, or using a common currency, and yet is sovereign, in terms of making its own promises to its citizens.

这就是——你知道，欧元被视为大约20年前的一个实验，或更短的时间。但你可能会看到，一个未能使用自己货币的国家的试点案例正在展现，而它是一个共同货币，然而在向公民作出承诺方面是主权的。

And I don’t know how this movie ends. That doesn’t mean I’m forecasting disaster or anything, I really just don’t know how this movie ends. And I try not to go to movies like that, if I can. (Laughter)

我不知道这部电影的结局。这并不意味着我在预言灾难什么的，我真的就是不知道这部电影的结局。如果可以的话，我尽量不去看这样的电影。（笑声）

But I’ll be watching. Really, this will be high drama, in my view, what happens here.

但我会关注的。真的，在我看来，这里发生的事情将是高度戏剧化的。

The one thing, Charlie says we’re agnostic on currencies, and we don’t make big currency plays. We did make one a few years ago and we did all right on it. But we very seldom will develop a strong view on one currency versus another.

查理说，我们对货币持中立态度，不会进行大规模的货币投资。几年前我们确实做过一次，并且表现不错。但我们很少会对一种货币与另一种货币形成强烈的看法。

I would say this though, that events in the world of the last few years would make me more bearish on all currencies, in terms of their future — holding their value over time — than previously. But it’s not unique to the United States, it’s not unique to the United Kingdom.

我想说的是，过去几年的世界事件让我对所有货币的未来——保持其价值的能力——更加悲观，但这并不是美国特有的，也不是英国特有的。

If you really could run budget deficits of 10 percent of your GDP and do it for a long period of time, believe me, the world would have been doing it a long before this. I mean, that is — that’s a lot of fun if you can keep it up.

如果你真的可以将预算赤字维持在国内生产总值的 10%，并且持续很长一段时间，相信我，世界早就会这样做了。我的意思是，如果你能做到这一点，那真是太有趣了。

And the reason it hasn’t been done in the past, I think, is probably that most people understand that it can’t be kept up.

我认为过去没有做到这一点的原因可能是大多数人都明白这无法持续下去。

And how the world weans itself off huge deficit financing by country after country after country — it’s going to be easy — I mean, it’s going to be interesting — to watch.

世界各国如何逐渐摆脱巨额赤字融资——这将是轻而易举的——我的意思是，这将是一个有趣的过程——值得关注。

You do not need to worry; as long as the United States government borrows in U.S. dollars, there is no possibility, none, of default. If the world won’t take our obligations denominated in dollars then we — then you have a real problem.

你不需要担心；只要美国政府以美元借款，就没有违约的可能性。如果世界不接受我们以美元计价的债务，那么我们——那么你就会面临一个真正的问题。

But you don’t default when you can print your own currency.

但当你可以印刷自己的货币时，你就不会违约。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. And of course, the published statistics are quite misleading because the debts of the currencies — of the countries — are normally stated in terms of the government bonds outstanding, and the unfunded promises of the various governments are much greater than the government bonds outstanding.

查理·芒格：嗯，是的。当然，公布的统计数据非常具有误导性，因为各国的债务通常是以未偿还的政府债券为标准，而各国政府的未资助承诺远远超过未偿还的政府债券。

So whatever you think this problem is when you read the statistics, it’s miles bigger.

所以无论你在阅读统计数据时认为这个问题是什么，它都要大得多。

And those unfunded promises don’t bind if you keep growing GDP at 2 or 3 percent per annum, per person, or something like that. You can afford the unfunded promises.

如果你每年人均保持 2%或 3%的 GDP 增长，那些未资助的承诺就不会约束你。你可以承担这些未资助的承诺。

But if you get to where the growth stops, then you’re going to have enormous social strains. And God knows what the effect will be on government policy and on currencies.

但如果你到达增长停止的地方，那么你将面临巨大的社会压力。上帝知道这对政府政策和货币会产生什么影响。

10. Did Goldman need to disclose SEC notice?

高盛是否需要披露 SEC 通知？

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew, you’ve been very patient.

沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁，你一直很耐心。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I’ve received over 300 questions just related to Goldman Sachs, and I know we’ve covered it already but there are a couple outstanding questions and one individual sent three specific questions that I thought I’d ask.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我收到了超过 300 个与高盛相关的问题，我知道我们已经讨论过这个话题，但还有几个悬而未决的问题，有一个人发送了三个具体的问题，我想问一下。

The first is, since Berkshire is a Goldman shareholder, who would you like the see run Goldman Sachs if not Lloyd Blankfein?

首先，由于伯克希尔是高盛的股东，如果不是劳埃德·布兰克费恩，你希望谁来领导高盛？

Were you made aware of Goldman’s Wells notice, or anything about the case, prior to it being brought?

在这起案件提起之前，你是否了解到高盛的Wells通知或与此案有关的任何信息？

Do you think the Wells notice constituted material information and should have been disclosed? Would have you disclosed it?

你认为Wells通知构成了重大信息，应该披露吗？你会披露吗？

And finally, have you been contacted as part of the Galleon investigation and the allegation that a Goldman Sachs board member passed inside information about your pending investment in Goldman in 2008 at the height of the crisis to Galleon?

最后，你是否在Galleon调查中被联系过，关于一名高盛董事在2008年危机高峰期向Galleon传递关于你即将投资高盛的内幕消息的指控？

I know there’s a lot of pieces to that, but I thought we’d get Goldman out of the way —

我知道这其中有很多细节，但我想我们先把高盛的事情处理掉——

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, good.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，好的。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: — right now.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：——现在。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good. Yeah. Well, let’s answer the third one first.

沃伦·巴菲特：很好。是的。好吧，让我们先回答第三个问题。

We’ve not been contacted in any way about Galleon. I read about that in the paper and the allegation, apparently, of a contact between a Goldman director and Galleon.

我们并没有以任何方式被联系过关于Galleon的事情。我在报纸上读到过，显然，有关一名高盛董事与Galleon之间的联系。

And I think in one of the stories, I read something about, presumably, Galleon trading on it. But the answer is no contact from anybody. And I can’t pronounce the name of the guy that runs Galleon. (Laughter)

我在某些报道中读到过，显然Galleon是在进行交易。但答案是我们没有接到任何联系。至于管理Galleon的那位先生，我也无法正确发音他的名字。（笑声）

The Wells notice, I’ve talked to a number of lawyers about that. And I think — when we got a — we didn’t get the Wells notice, but when the Gen Re executives got the Wells notice, I’m quite sure we stuck that in the 10-K or 10-Q that came up.

Wells 通知，我和一些律师谈过这个。我认为——当我们收到——我们没有收到 Wells 通知，但当 Gen Re 的高管收到 Wells 通知时，我很确定我们把它放进了随后的 10-K 或 10-Q 中。

And maybe we filed an 8-K announcing it. That was not us receiving it ourselves but certain executives receiving it.

也许我们提交了一份 8-K 公告。这并不是我们自己收到的，而是某些高管收到的。

I have been on the board of at least one well-known company over the past 40 years, and I won’t narrow it down any more than that.

在过去的 40 年里，我至少在一家知名公司的董事会任职过，我不会再具体说明了。

But before, they received a Wells notice and they didn’t publicize it, and, in truth, it was nothing. So lawyers tell me that if you regard it as material, you report it.

但在此之前，他们收到了 Wells 通知，但他们没有公开它，实际上这没什么。因此，律师告诉我，如果你认为这很重要，就应该报告它。

I don’t think if I’d received something relating to the ABACUS transaction, based on what I know about it, I would have considered it material to a company that was making many, many, many billions of dollars a year.

我认为，如果我收到与ABACUS交易有关的通知，根据我对该交易的了解，我不会认为这对一家每年赚取数十亿的公司是重要的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I wouldn’t have regarded it as material, either.

查理·芒格：嗯，我也不会认为这有什么重要性。

If every company reported every little thing that might happen with what they regarded a tiny probability, we’d just have unlimited confusing reports.

如果每家公司都报告他们认为概率极小的每一件小事，我们就会有无尽的混乱报告。

There has to be some materiality standard. And you don’t want to give blackmail potential to people that are mad at you and make claims. I’m not saying that’s what the SEC was doing, but —

必须有某种重要性标准。你不想给那些对你生气并提出索赔的人留下勒索的机会。我不是说SEC是在这么做，但—

WARREN BUFFETT: No, but it could happen with a lot of — (laughter) it could happen with individual —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，但这种情况可能发生在很多——（笑声）可能发生在个人身上——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It could happen with other people, yeah.

查理·芒格：这可能会发生在其他人身上，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I know what percentage of Wells notices result in something that’s material to the company. But my guess is that there are plenty of them that wouldn’t be.

沃伦·巴菲特：我知道Wells通知中有多少比例的案件对公司产生了重大影响。但我的猜测是，有很多通知并不会导致重大影响。

And of course, the bigger the company, the less likelihood that it would be material.

当然，公司的规模越大，发生重大事件的可能性就越小。

And then your other question about who I would want running, if Lloyd wasn’t running it?

然后你问的另一个问题是，如果劳埃德不再负责，谁来领导？

I guess if Lloyd had a twin brother, I’d go for him. But I’ve never given that a thought.

我想如果劳埃德有一个双胞胎兄弟，我会选择他。但我从来没有考虑过这个。

We think about who would run Berkshire — (laughs) — but there’s really no reason to think about that.

我们考虑谁会管理伯克希尔——（笑）——但实际上没有理由去考虑这个。

There wasn’t any reason to think about, in my view, back in 1970, when they had the Penn Central problem whether somebody other than Gus Levy should be running Penn Central — be running Goldman.

在1970年，当他们面临彭中央铁路的问题时，我认为有没有理由考虑高盛的任何其他领导人？当时古斯·莱维正在负责高盛。

And when the event happened in connection with the Boskey thing, John Weinberg was running it then. And I thought that John Weinberg was a terrific manager of Goldman.

当与博斯基事件有关的事情发生时，约翰·温伯格当时在负责。我认为约翰·温伯格是高盛的一位非常出色的经理。

So I just don’t see this as reflecting on Lloyd.

所以我不认为这反映在劳埃德身上。

I think, as Charlie — and we’ve got strong feelings. There’s plenty of stuff goes on Wall Street that we don’t like. But we do not think it’s specific — we know it isn’t specific — to Goldman.

我认为，正如查理所说——我们有强烈的感觉。华尔街上发生很多事情我们不喜欢。但我们并不认为这特指高盛。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there are plenty of CEOs I’d like to see gone in America. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，美国有很多我希望看到离开的首席执行官。（笑声）

But Lloyd Blankfein is not one of them.

但劳埃德·布兰克费恩并不是其中之一。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 3. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第三个问题。（笑声）

I was afraid he might start naming names. (Laughter)

我担心他可能会开始点名。（笑声）

11. Driver feedback technology

驾驶员反馈技术

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is David Clayman (PH) and I come from Chicago, Illinois. This question is for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Gates, principally as Berkshire shareholders, but also as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation trustees.

观众成员：你好。我叫大卫·克莱曼，我来自伊利诺伊州的芝加哥。这个问题主要是问巴菲特先生和盖茨先生，作为伯克希尔的股东，同时也是比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会的受托人。

The leading cause of death for Americans my age are motor vehicle crashes. Over 6 million occur each year and you insure a significant number of these crashes.

美国我这个年龄段的主要死亡原因是机动车事故。每年发生超过 600 万起事故，而你为其中相当数量的事故投保。

The World Health Organization ranks motor vehicle crashes as the 11th leading cause of death in the world.

世界卫生组织将机动车事故列为全球第 11 大死亡原因。

A new category of technologies are reaching the market. These technologies not only reduce driver distraction but also deliver positive feedback to drivers to help make drivers aware of how well they’re driving or how much better they could be doing.

一种新类别的技术正在进入市场。这些技术不仅减少了驾驶员的分心，还向驾驶员提供积极的反馈，帮助他们意识到自己的驾驶表现有多好或可以做得更好。

Will GEICO or the Gates Foundation make an aggressive and visible bet on driver feedback technologies to stimulate road focus and save life, liberty, property, and insurance premiums?

GEICO或盖茨基金会是否会在驾驶反馈技术上进行积极而明显的投资，以刺激道路安全，拯救生命、自由、财产和保险费用？

I have a note here for Mr. Gates and Mr. Buffett. I’d be happy if I could get these to you somehow.

我这里有一张给盖茨先生和巴菲特先生的便条。如果我能以某种方式把这些交给你们，我会很高兴。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I think we know your position. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我想我们知道你的立场了。（笑声）

The Gates Foundation, I think, has a fairly major initiative, along with Mayor Bloomberg, in terms of cigarette smoking. And I think you’ll find a whole lot more people have been affected by that than auto accidents.

比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会，我认为与布隆伯格市长一起，在吸烟方面有一个相当重要的倡议。我认为你会发现，受到这一倡议影响的人远比汽车事故多得多。

Auto accidents per mile driven, auto deaths, have diminished. I thought I heard a figure of six — I thought the figure was more in the 30,000 to 40,000 range actually, but it’s diminished over the years.

每英里驾驶的汽车事故和汽车死亡人数已经减少。我记得听到过一个数字是六——我认为这个数字实际上在 30,000 到 40,000 之间，但这些年来已经减少了。

You know, there have been a lot of things done to make cars safer. I’m not sure that cell phones and BlackBerries are among them. (Laughter)

你知道，为了让汽车更安全，已经做了很多事情。我不确定手机和黑莓是否在其中。（笑声）

And I think they actually are — there will be more people die in auto accidents because the cell phone and various other instruments were invented than would otherwise be the case. I don’t know how significant that item will be.

我认为确实如此——因为手机和其他各种工具的发明，将会有更多人死于汽车事故，这比原本的情况要多。我不知道这个问题的严重性有多大。

But everybody has an interest in bringing down fatalities. And GEICO has a very active safety program, testing cars, doing all kinds of things, working usually in conjunction with other insurance companies.

但是每个人都有兴趣降低死亡率。GEICO 有一个非常活跃的安全项目，测试汽车，进行各种活动，通常与其他保险公司合作。

I do not think that — The Gates Foundation has fairly specific and intelligent, in my view, guidelines as to where they direct their activities, and they believe in focus, so they are not going to try and solve every problem in the world.

我认为比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会在指导其活动的方向上有相当具体和明智的准则，他们相信专注，因此不会试图解决世界上的每一个问题。

But I can assure you that the insurance industry, as well as auto companies generally, are continuously working to make cars safer.

但我可以向您保证，保险行业以及汽车公司普遍都在不断努力使汽车更安全。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

12. Berkshire shares not affected by Buffett’s donations

伯克希尔的股票不受巴菲特捐赠的影响

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question also concerns the Gates Foundation but it’s entirely different.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题也涉及盖茨基金会，但完全不同。

“One of your owner-related business principles says that you will attempt, through your policies and communications, to keep Berkshire’s stock price rational.

“你们与所有者相关的商业原则之一是，通过你们的政策和沟通，努力保持伯克希尔的股价理性。”

“Yet every year, you give large amounts of your Berkshire stock to the Gates Foundation. And my understanding is that more will go to the foundation when you die.”

“然而每年，你都会将大量的伯克希尔股票赠予比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会。我的理解是，当你去世时，更多的股票也会捐给该基金会。”

By the way, I forgot to say this is from Michael McLaughlin (PH) of Omaha, who continues: “Already, we have seen that foundation regularly sell Berkshire stock, and it will sell more because its purpose is to give money to charities not hold the stock forever.

顺便说一下，我忘了说这是来自奥马哈的迈克尔·麦克劳林（PH），他继续说道：“我们已经看到该基金会定期出售伯克希尔的股票，并且它会出售更多，因为它的目的是将资金捐赠给慈善机构，而不是永远持有这些股票。”

“Won’t the foundation selling create a downward pressure on the stock because as much as 25 percent of it will be turned over?”

“基金出售不会对股票造成下行压力吗，因为多达 25%的股票将被转手？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Basically, there’s five foundations I give money to every year, every July.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。基本上，我每年七月都会向五个基金会捐款。

And the amount I would be giving now, it’s a 5 percent declining balance, the amount I would be giving now would amount to about 1 1/2 percent of the shares outstanding annually, something like that.

而我现在捐赠的金额，按5%的递减比例计算，约占每年流通股的1.5%左右，差不多是这样的。

So if they sell, and they will, that stock fairly promptly after receipt in order to make charitable gifts, you basically have 1 1/2 percent of the shares being sold annually.

所以如果他们出售，而且他们会，在收到后相对迅速地出售这些股票以进行慈善捐赠，基本上每年会出售 1.5%的股份。

Now, if you contrast that with trading on the New York Stock Exchange, which averages well over 100 percent of the amount of shares outstanding, it’s not anything unusual at all in the way of sales.

现在，如果你将其与纽约证券交易所的交易进行对比，后者的交易量平均超过已发行股票数量的 100%，那么在销售方式上这并不算什么特别的事情。

And it is a free country. I mean, I could sell 10 percent of the company if I wanted to. I’ve never sold a share in my life, and I never plan to sell a share in my life. And I won’t sell a hell of a lot of shares after I die either, probably. (Laughter)

这是一个自由的国家。我的意思是，如果我想的话，我可以出售公司 10%的股份。我一生中从未卖过一股股票，也不打算在我的一生中卖出一股股票。死后我也可能不会卖很多股票。（笑声）

If 1.5 percent of the outstanding shares at Berkshire move the price down in a year, it probably deserves to move down.

如果伯克希尔 1.5%的流通股在一年内导致股价下跌，那么它可能确实值得下跌。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, I regard that degree of stock distribution to aid charity as almost a nonevent, and it may actually have been a constructive event, in terms of getting Berkshire into the Standard and Poor’s indexes and so on.

查理·芒格：当然，我认为这种程度的股票分配来支持慈善事业几乎算不上什么事件，实际上可能在某种程度上是一个积极事件，因为它使伯克希尔更容易进入标准普尔指数等等。

WARREN BUFFETT: Excuse me.

沃伦·巴菲特：劳驾。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you’ve got more important things to worry about. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：我认为你有更重要的事情需要担心。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: If I’d owned 100 percent of Berkshire, for sure it would not have been in the S&P 500. It was always a problem of concentration.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我拥有伯克希尔的 100%股份，它肯定不会在标准普尔 500 指数中。这一直是一个集中度的问题。

So if by selling down it enhanced — and it did to some degree — enhanced the chances of Berkshire being in the S&P 500, that probably accounted for maybe 7 percent or so of the capitalization, some number like that.

所以如果通过减持来增强——而且确实在某种程度上增强了——伯克希尔进入标准普尔 500 指数的机会，那可能占到了市值的 7%左右，类似的数字。

So that was extraordinary, you might call it, buying that was brought in, to some extent because of the diminution of my own holdings.

因此，这种改变可以说是非凡的，某种程度上是因为我持股比例的减少而引入的。

As Charlie said, I would say if none of the stock had been given away in the last four years, I don’t know whether — I have no idea — whether the stock would be selling a little higher or a little lower. I think that’s sort of an even money bet.

正如查理所说，我认为如果过去四年没有赠出任何股票，我不知道——我完全没有想法——股票是否会稍微高一些或低一些。我认为这大致是一个50/50的赌注。

13. Buffett: “I would not run from the United States”

巴菲特：“我不会逃离美国”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第四个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett. Hello, Mr. Munger. My name’s Vern Cushenbery. I’m from Overland Park, Kansas.

观众：你好，巴菲特先生。你好，芒格先生。我叫维恩·库申伯里。我来自堪萨斯州的奥弗兰帕克。

What do you see as the biggest challenge facing the United States economy relative to other countries? And what are the implications of that with regard to investing globally over the next decade?

您认为美国经济相对于其他国家面临的最大挑战是什么？这对未来十年全球投资有什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you for steering that easy problem to me. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：谢谢你把那个简单的问题交给我。（笑声）

I think the answer to that is that by and large we haven’t made our way in life by having great global allocations systems.

我认为答案是，总体来说，我们在生活中并不是通过拥有出色的全球分配体系而取得成功的。

Berkshire’s attitude, generally, is to find things that seem sensible to us and to concentrate, to some extent, in those matters. And then let the world economy and the world’s currency fluctuations fluctuate as they will.

伯克希尔的态度通常是寻找对我们来说合理的事情，并在某种程度上集中精力处理这些事务。然后让世界经济和世界货币的波动随其自然。

I do think we’d prefer some countries to others, and the more responsible the countries seem, the more comfortable we are. Wouldn’t you agree with that?

我确实认为我们会更喜欢某些国家，而那些看起来更负责任的国家让我们更感到舒适。你不觉得吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But we —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但是我们——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But beyond that, we can’t help you very much because we really don’t have a global allocation system at Berkshire, unless Warren is keeping it secret from me. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：但除此之外，我们无法提供太多帮助，因为我们在伯克希尔并没有一个全球配置系统，除非沃伦对我保密。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Not that one. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，确实没有那个。（笑声）

We did not buy Burlington Northern with the idea of moving it to China or India or Brazil — (laughter) — and we love that. We love the fact that Burlington Northern is in the United States.

我们购买伯灵顿北方铁路并不是为了将其迁移到中国、印度或巴西——（笑声）——我们喜欢的是，伯灵顿北方铁路就在美国。

The biggest threat we have is some kind of a massive nuclear, chemical, or biological attack of one sort or another.

我们面临的最大威胁是某种形式的大规模核、化学或生物攻击。

And if you would say what are the probabilities of that over a 50-year period, it’s pretty high. Over a one-year period, it’s very low.

如果你问在 50 年期间这种情况的概率有多大，那是相当高的。而在一年期间，这个概率非常低。

But if you talk about whether the qualities that have led to the last 220 years of incredible progress, with a lot of hiccups, but incredible progress, you know, in the status of mankind that we’ve experienced in these two centuries compared to any two centuries you want to pick out in history, this country is remarkable and its system is remarkable.

但是如果你谈论的是导致过去 220 年令人难以置信的进步的品质，尽管经历了许多波折，但仍然是令人难以置信的进步，你知道，在这两个世纪中人类所经历的状态与历史上任何两个世纪相比，这个国家是非凡的，它的制度也是非凡的。

And it does unleash human potential like has never been seen before.

它确实释放了前所未有的人类潜力。

This crowd here is not smarter than a similar crowd 200 years ago, and they don’t work harder.

这里的人群并不比 200 年前的类似人群更聪明，他们也没有更努力工作。

But, boy, do they live differently. And they live differently because this system has enabled fairly ordinary people, over a period of time, to do extraordinary things. And that game isn’t over.

但是，伙计，他们的生活方式确实不同。他们的生活方式之所以不同，是因为这个系统使得相当普通的人在一段时间内能够做出非凡的事情。而这场游戏还没有结束。

There is nothing that says we have come close, in my view, to the limits of what humans can achieve.

在我看来，没有什么能说明我们已经接近人类所能达到的极限。

We probably don’t even know our own potential, any more than the people in 1790 knew their own potential. I mean, they thought it would be great if somebody finally came along with some farm tool that let them work 10 hours a day instead of 12 hours a day.

我们可能甚至不知道自己的潜力，就像 1790 年的人们不知道他们自己的潜力一样。我的意思是，他们认为如果有人最终带来一种农具，让他们每天工作 10 小时而不是 12 小时，那将是很棒的。

So I — there’s no reason — you know, I hope the rest of the world does well, and I think they will do well. And it is not a zero-sum game. If China and India do well, that does not mean we do worse; it may mean we do better.

所以我——没有理由——你知道，我希望世界其他地方都能好，我认为他们会做得很好。这不是一个零和游戏。如果中国和印度做得好，并不意味着我们会做得更差；这可能意味着我们会做得更好。

So we are not — it’s not what they get is taking it away from us. But I would be perfectly content if Berkshire Hathaway were forced in some way to limit its investment to the opportunities available in the United States.

所以我们并不是——他们得到的并不是从我们这里夺走的。但如果伯克希尔·哈撒韦被迫以某种方式限制其投资于美国可用的机会，我会感到非常满意。

We would have plenty of opportunities. I’d rather have the whole world, obviously, in terms of opportunities, but there will be ample in this country. I would not run from the United States. OK. (Applause)

我们会有很多机会。显然，我宁愿拥有整个世界的机会，但在这个国家机会也会很多。我不会逃离美国。好的。（掌声）

14. No rush to find new investment chief

不急于寻找新的投资主管

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This is a question that has to do with the Berkshire succession plans. It comes from Craig Merrigan in Sprucegrove who asks, “How did the four potential candidates for Berkshire’s CIO position perform over the course of 2008 and 2009?

贝基·奎克：这是一个与伯克希尔继任计划有关的问题。来自斯普鲁斯格罗夫的克雷格·梅里根问道：“在 2008 年和 2009 年，四位潜在的伯克希尔首席投资官候选人的表现如何？”

“Did any of the four employ leverage? And have any of the four now been excluded from consideration?”

“四个中有谁使用了杠杆吗？现在这四个中有谁被排除在考虑之外吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yes, the answer to that is that, in 2008, I reported to you last year that they didn’t, I think we got a question like that last year, they did not distinguish themselves. 2009, they did pretty darn well.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，答案是，在2008年，我去年向你们报告过他们的表现，我想我们去年收到了类似的问题，他们并没有脱颖而出。2009年，他们的表现相当不错。

It’s not — I would say that the four — it’s not the same four. I would say that none of them, Charlie, I believe you may use leverage at all. Do you think so?

我想说，四位候选人并不是同样的四位。我认为，查理，你认为他们可能没有使用杠杆吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the one with which I’m most familiar made a little over 200 percent using leverage of zero.

查理·芒格：嗯，我最熟悉的那个在没有杠杆的情况下赚了超过 200%。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that narrows it down. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，这样就缩小范围了。（笑声）

The potential investment people, that list will be subject to more movement around than probably the CEO succession.

潜在的投资者名单可能会比首席执行官的接班人更频繁地变动。

And it’s really far less urgent. If I die tonight, there will be a new CEO in place in Berkshire within 24 hours, and all the directors know who it would be, and they’re all comfortable with it.

而这真的不那么紧急。如果我今晚去世，伯克希尔将在 24 小时内任命一位新的首席执行官，所有董事都知道会是谁，他们对此都很满意。

And there should be somebody in place within 24 hours.

在 24 小时内应该会有人到位。

The investments, they don’t need anything done next week. I can go on vacation on investments. And we could go — we wouldn’t do it, or the directors wouldn’t do it, I won’t be there — but they could wait a month, they could wait two months.

投资方面，他们不需要在下周就采取行动。我可以放假去做投资。我们可以——虽然我们不会这么做，董事们也不会这么做，但他们可以等一个月，甚至两个月。

I mean, the Coca-Cola isn’t going to go away, Procter & Gamble’s not going to go away, American Express. There’s no great need to be doing things day by day. We don’t do things day by day.

我的意思是，可口可乐不会消失，宝洁也不会消失，美国运通也不会消失。没有必要每天都做事情。我们不是每天都做事情。

So they can be fairly leisurely in working out, probably in conjunction with a new CEO, who they would like to bring in, how they would like to compensate them, what the number might be.

所以他们可以相对从容地进行工作，可能会与他们希望引入的新首席执行官一起考虑，如何补偿他们，可能的数字是多少。

That is not fixed in stone at all. The one thing I can tell you is that there are some very able people who would like very much, I think, to be managing money for Berkshire, and who would do a good job, and who are familiar to at least some of the directors. And that problem would get solved.

这并不是一成不变的。我可以告诉你的一件事是，有一些非常有能力的人非常希望能够为伯克希尔管理资金，我认为他们会做得很好，并且至少有一些董事对他们很熟悉。这个问题会得到解决。

The CEO problem — which is not a problem — but the CEO question, you want an answer for right now and you want to be prepared to implement it, you know, the next day, although I did just have a physical. (Laughs) Came out fine. (Laughter)

首席执行官的问题——这并不是问题——但是首席执行官的选择，你希望立刻有答案，并准备好在第二天就实施，尽管我刚做了身体检查。（笑声）结果很好。（笑声）

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

My doctor isn’t here today so I will tell you, it drives him nuts because I eat like I do and he can’t find anything wrong — (laughs) — and he wants to, believe me. (Laughter)

我医生今天不在这里，所以我会告诉你，他非常生气，因为我吃得像这样，而他找不到任何问题——（笑声）而且他想要找到，信不信由你。（笑声）

And with that 说到这——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I’m — (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我是——（笑声）

I am not the most optimistic of the two people up here. And — (laughter) — yet, I’m quite optimistic that the culture of Berkshire will last a long, long time and will outlast, greatly, the life of the founder. I think it’s going to work.

我并不是这里两个人中最乐观的一个。不过——（笑声）——我对伯克希尔的文化能够持续很长时间并且远远超过创始人的生命感到相当乐观。我认为这会成功。

WARREN BUFFETT: I really think — I mean, we shouldn’t be getting into superlatives — but I think we have as strong a culture, and as distinctive a culture, in terms of managers, ownership, the whole works, of any really large company in the country.

沃伦·巴菲特：我真的认为——我们不应该使用超级l形容词——但我认为我们在文化方面有着与其他大型公司相比同样强大且独特的文化，无论是管理者、所有权，还是整个运作体系。

And it’s taken a long time to develop, but it becomes self-reinforcing after a point. And we love it, and I think they’ll love it after I’m gone. (Applause)

这花了很长时间来发展，但在某个时刻它会变得自我强化。我们喜欢它，我认为在我离开后他们也会喜欢它。（掌声）

Don’t clap there. (Laughter)

不要在那里鼓掌。（笑声）

15. Good, but not brilliant, returns for businesses needing capital

对于需要资本的企业来说，回报良好，但并不出色。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Steve Fulton (PH) from Louisville, Kentucky. Once again, I gave up a box seat to the Kentucky Derby to come ask you a question. (Laughter)

观众成员：嗨，我是来自肯塔基州路易斯维尔的史蒂夫·富尔顿（PH）。我再次放弃了肯塔基德比的包厢座位来问你一个问题。（笑声）

And I appreciate that opportunity.

我很感激这个机会。

My question’s focused on the shift, if you will, to investing in the capital-intensive businesses and the related impact on intrinsic value.

我的问题集中在转向投资资本密集型企业及其对内在价值的相关影响。

You again stated in the annual report that best businesses for owners are those that have high returns on capital and require little incremental capital.

您在年度报告中再次指出，最适合业主的企业是那些资本回报率高且需要少量增量资本的企业。

I realize this decision is somewhat driven by the substantial amounts of cash that the current operating companies are spinning off, but I would like you to contrast the requirement for this capital against the definition of intrinsic value, which is the discounted value of the cash that’s being taken out.

我意识到这个决定在某种程度上是受到当前运营公司产生的巨额现金的驱动，但我希望你将对这笔资本的需求与内在价值的定义进行对比，内在价值是被提取现金的折现值。

And just for all of us to be aware, you’ve mentioned the fact that you think these businesses will require tens of billions of dollars over the few decades, and just the time value of that, I’d like to understand a little bit more of your insight into that.

为了让我们所有人都意识到，你提到过你认为这些企业在未来几十年内将需要数百亿美元，我想更深入地了解一下你对此的见解。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Although it’s clear you understand the situation quite well, and it’s — as important a question as you could ask, virtually, I would say, at Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。虽然很明显你对情况理解得很好，而且这是你在伯克希尔几乎可以问的最重要的问题。

We are putting money into good — big money — into good businesses from an economic standpoint. But they are not as good as some we could buy when we were dealing with smaller amounts of money.

我们正在将资金投入到优秀的企业中——大量资金——从经济角度来看，这些企业是好的。但它们并不如我们在处理较小金额时能够购买的一些企业那么优秀。

If you take See’s Candy, it has 40 million or so of required capital in the business, and, you know, it earns something well above that.

如果你考虑 See's Candy，它在业务中需要大约 4000 万美元的资本，而你知道，它的收益远远超过这个数。

Now, if we could double the capital, if we could put another 40 million in at anything like the returns we receive on the first 40 million, I mean, we’d be down there this afternoon with the money.

现在，如果我们能将资本翻倍，如果我们能再投入 4000 万，以与前 4000 万相似的回报率，我是说，我们今天下午就会带着钱下去。

Unfortunately, the wonderful businesses don’t soak up capital. That’s one of the reasons they’re wonderful.

不幸的是，优秀的企业并不会吸收资本。这就是它们优秀的原因之一。

At the size we are, we earn operating earnings, $2.2 billion, or whatever it was in the first quarter, and we don’t pay it out, and our job is to put that out as intelligently as we can.

在我们目前的规模下，我们的运营收益是22亿美元，或者在第一季度中是这样的，我们不支付这些收益，我们的工作就是尽可能智能地利用这些收益。

And we can’t find the See’s Candies that will sop up that kind of money. When we find them, we’ll buy them, but they will not sop up the kind of money we’ll generate.

我们找不到能吸收那种资金的 See's Candies。当我们找到它们时，我们会购买，但它们无法吸收我们将产生的那种资金。

And then the question is, can we put it to work intelligently, if not brilliantly? And so far, we think the answer to that is yes.

然后问题是，我们能否聪明地（如果不是出色地）将其投入使用？到目前为止，我们认为答案是肯定的。

We think it makes sense to go into the capital-intensive businesses that we have. And incidentally, so far, it has made sense. I mean, it’s worked quite well. But it can’t work brilliantly.

我们认为进入我们所拥有的资本密集型业务是有意义的。顺便说一下，到目前为止，这确实是有意义的。我的意思是，这运作得相当不错。但它不可能运作得非常出色。

The world is not set up so that you can reinvest tens of billions of dollars, and many, many tens over time, and get huge returns. It just doesn’t happen.

世界并不是为了让你可以重新投资数百亿美元，甚至是数十倍的金额，并获得巨额回报而设立的。这根本不可能发生。

And we try to spell that out as carefully as we can so that the shareholders will understand our limitations.

我们尽量详细说明，以便股东能够理解我们的局限性。

Now, you could say, “Well, then aren’t you better off paying it out?”

现在，您可能会说，“那么，你们不是更应该将这些资金支付出去吗？”

We’re not better off paying it out as long as we can translate, as you mentioned, the discounted value of future cash generation. If we can translate it into a little something more than a dollar of present value, we’ll keep looking for ways to do that.

只要我们能够将其转化为您提到的未来现金流的折现价值，我们就不会更好地将其支付出去。如果我们能够将其转化为稍微超过一美元的现值，我们会继续寻找实现这一目标的方法。

In our judgment, we did that with BNSF, but the scorecard will be written on that in 10 or 20 years.

在我们看来，我们与 BNSF 做到了这一点，但这将在 10 年或 20 年后写入评分卡。

We did it with MidAmerican Energy. We went into a business, very capital intensive, and so far, we’ve done very well, in terms of compounding equity.

我们在MidAmerican Energy上也做到了。我们进入了一个资本密集型业务，到目前为止，在股本复合增长方面，我们做得很好。

But it can’t be a Coca-Cola, in terms of a basic business where you really don’t need very much capital, if any, hardly. And you can keep growing the business if you’re lucky, if you’ve got a growing business.

但这不能是可口可乐，因为在一个基本的商业中，你实际上几乎不需要任何资本。如果你运气好，拥有一个不断增长的业务，你可以继续发展这个业务。

See’s is not a growing business. It’s a wonderful business, but it doesn’t translate itself around the world like something like Coca-Cola would.

See's 不是一家正在增长的企业。它是一家很棒的企业，但它并不像可口可乐那样能够在全球范围内传播。

So I would say you’ve got your finger right on the right point. I think you understand it as well as we do. I hope we don’t disappoint you, in terms of putting money out to work at decent returns, good returns.

所以我想说你抓住了关键点。我认为你理解得和我们一样好。我希望我们在投资方面不会让你失望，能够获得合理的回报和良好的回报。

But if anybody expects brilliant returns from this base in Berkshire, you know, we don’t know how to do it.

但是如果有人期望在伯克希尔这个基础上获得辉煌的回报，你知道，我们不知道怎么做到这一点。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m just as good at not knowing as you are. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我在不知道方面和你一样出色。（笑声）

16. Making loans vs. buying stock in credit crisis

在信贷危机中发放贷款与购买股票

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁？（笑声）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Victor and Amy Liu (PH) who are shareholders from Santa Monica, California.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡的股东维克多和艾米·刘（PH）。

And they ask, “When you made investments during the financial crisis in February of 2009, why did you lean towards debt instruments rather than equity?

他们问：“在 2009 年 2 月金融危机期间，你为什么倾向于债务工具而不是股票进行投资？”

“For example, why did you invest $300 million in Harley-Davidson at 15 percent interest instead of buying equity when the shares were at $12? Today, they’re at $33.

例如，为什么你选择以15%的利率向哈雷-戴维森（Harley-Davidson）投资3亿美元，而不是在股票价格为12美元时买入股票？如今，股票价格已涨至33美元。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that if I were writing that question now, I might write the same question. But I’m not so sure you would have written the same question in February.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我会说，如果我现在在写这个问题，我可能会写出同样的问题。但我不太确定你在二月份是否会写出同样的问题。

Now, there were different risk profiles, obviously, in investing. And the truth is, I don’t know whether Harley-Davidson equity is worth $33 or $20 or $45. I just have no view on that.

现在，投资中显然存在不同的风险特征。事实上，我不知道哈雷-戴维森的股票值 33 美元、20 美元还是 45 美元。我对此没有任何看法。

You know, I kind of like a business where your customers tattoo your name on their chest or something. But — (laughter) — figuring out the economic value of that, you know. I’m not sure even going out and questioning those guys I’d learn much from them. (Laughter)

你知道，我有点喜欢那种客户在他们的胸口纹上你名字的生意。可是——（笑）——弄清楚这背后的经济价值，你知道。我甚至不确定去问那些家伙我能从他们那里学到多少。（笑）

But I do know, or I thought I knew, and I think I was right, that, A) Harley-Davidson was not going out of business. And that, B) 15 percent was going to look pretty damned attractive.

但我确实知道，或者我以为我知道，我认为我是对的，A) 哈雷-戴维森不会倒闭。并且，B) 15% 看起来非常有吸引力。

And the truth is, we could probably sell those bonds, I don’t know, probably at 135 or something like that. So we could have a very substantial capital gain, a lot of income.

实际上，我们可能可以以 135 或类似的价格出售那些债券。因此，我们可能会获得相当可观的资本收益，带来大量收入。

I knew enough to lend them money; I didn’t know enough to buy the equity. And that’s frequently the case. And, you know, we love buying equities, but we love buying the Goldman preferred at 10 percent.

我知道足够多可以借钱给他们；我不知道足够多去购买股权。这种情况经常发生。你知道，我们喜欢购买股权，但我们更喜欢以 10%的利率购买高盛的优先股。

Now, let’s say Goldman, instead of offering me the 10 percent preferred and warrants had said, “You can have a 12 percent preferred, non-callable,” I might have taken that one instead. I mean, the callable — so there’s a tradeoff involved in all these securities.

假设高盛不是给我提供10%的优先股和认股权，而是说：“你可以选择一个12%的优先股，且不可赎回。”那么我可能会选择那个。我的意思是，可赎回的债券——在这些证券之间有权衡。

And obviously, if I think I can make very good money, as we did on Harley-Davidson, with a very simple decision, just a question of, “Are they going to go broke or not?” as opposed to a tougher decision, “Is the motorcycle market going to get diminished significantly? And, you know, are the margins going to get squeezed somewhat?” And all of that. I’ll go with a simple decision.

显然，如果我认为我可以通过一个非常简单的决定赚到很多钱，就像我们在哈雷-戴维森上所做的那样，只需问“他们会破产吗？”而不是一个更复杂的决定“摩托车市场会显著萎缩吗？而且，利润空间会受到一定挤压吗？”等等。我会选择简单的决定。

在足够少的范围内不需要这么做，要么买入股票，要么什么都不做。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course your one good answer, that you simply didn’t know enough to buy the stock but you did know enough to buy the bond, is a very good response.

查理·芒格：当然，你一个很好的回答是，你根本不知道足够的信息去买股票，但你知道足够的信息去买债券，这个回答非常好。

The other side to that is, after all, we are a fiduciary for a lot of people, including people with permanent injuries and et cetera, et cetera. And to some extent, we are constrained by how aggressively we buy stocks versus something else. And you mix those together, why, you get our investment policy.

另一方面，毕竟，我们对很多人，包括那些有永久性伤害的人，都是受托人。在某种程度上，我们受到如何积极购买股票与其他资产的限制。将这些结合在一起，你就得出了我们的投资政策。

I think, generally speaking, you raise a very good question. I think very often, when you’re looking at a distress situation and buy the bonds, you should have bought the stock. So I think you’re looking in a promising area.

我认为，总的来说，你提出了一个非常好的问题。我认为，通常情况下，当你看到一个困境时，买入债券，你应该买入股票。所以我认为你关注的是一个有前景的领域。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Ben Graham wrote about that in 1934, actually, in “Security Analysis,” that in the analysis of senior securities, the junior securities usually do better, but you may sleep better with the senior securities.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。本·格雷厄姆在 1934 年实际上在《证券分析》中写到，在对优先证券的分析中，普通证券通常表现更好，但你可能在持有优先证券时睡得更安稳。

And we, as Charlie points out, we have 60 billion of liabilities to people in our insurance operation that, in some cases, extend out for 50 years or more.

正如查理所指出的，我们在保险业务中对人们有 600 亿美元的负债，在某些情况下，这些负债的期限延续超过 50 年。

And we would never have all of our money in stocks. I mean, we might have very significant amounts, but we are running this place so that it can stand anything.

我们绝对不会把所有的钱都投入股票。我是说，我们可能会有相当可观的金额，但我们经营这个地方是为了让它能够应对任何情况。

And a couple years ago, we felt very good about where that philosophy left us.

几年前，我们对这种哲学给我们带来的结果感到非常满意。

I mean, we actually could do things at a time when most people were paralyzed, and we’ll keep running it that way.

我意思是，我们实际上可以在大多数人瘫痪的时候做事情，我们会继续这样运行。

17. Creating a good corporate culture is easier than changing a bad one

创造良好的企业文化比改变不良的企业文化要容易。

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 6 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, thanks for having us here.

观众成员：芒格先生和巴菲特先生，谢谢你们邀请我们来这里。

I recently joined a new organization and for me to succeed there, the culture of the organization needs to change.

我最近加入了一个新组织，而要在其中获得成功，组织的文化需要改变。

So I’m interested in hearing your thoughts about how do you change culture of an organization? And if you’re building a new organization, then how do you make sure you have a strong and unique culture?

我很想听听你对如何改变一个组织文化的看法。如果你正在建立一个新组织，那么你如何确保拥有强大而独特的文化？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s a lot easier to build a new organization around a culture than it is to change the culture of an existing organization. It is really tough. And I like that fact, in the sense of Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为围绕一种文化建立一个新组织要比改变现有组织的文化容易得多。这真的很困难。我喜欢这一点，从伯克希尔的角度来看。

I mean, it would be very tough to change the culture of Berkshire. It’s so ingrained in all our managers, our owners. Everything about the place is designed, in effect, to reinforce a culture.

我意思是，改变伯克希尔的文化将非常困难。这种文化在我们所有的管理者和所有者中根深蒂固。这个地方的一切实际上都是为了强化这种文化而设计的。

And for anybody to come in and try and change it very much, I think the culture would basically reject it.

如果有任何人试图对其进行重大改变，我认为文化基本上会抵制它。

And the problem you describe, if you want to walk into, you know, whatever kind of organization you want to name — I’ve got to be a little careful here — it is tough to change cultures.

你描述的问题，如果你想走进某个组织——我得小心措辞——改变文化是很困难的。

Charlie and I have bucked up against that a few times. And I would say if you have any choice in the matter, I would much rather start from scratch and build it around it.

查理和我在这方面也遇到过几次挑战。我会说，如果你在这方面有任何选择，我宁愿从头开始，围绕文化建立。

But that was the — I’ve had the luxury of time with Berkshire. I mean, it goes back to 1965, and there really wasn’t much of anything there, you know, except some textile miles, so I didn’t have to fight anything.

但那是——我有幸与伯克希尔共度时光。我的意思是，这可以追溯到 1965 年，当时那里几乎没有什么，除了几条纺织品生产线，所以我不需要与任何东西抗争。

And as we added companies, they became complementary and they bought into something that they felt good about, but it took decades.

随着我们增加公司，它们变得互补，并且它们认同了一些让他们感到良好的事情，但这花费了几十年。

And, you know, at Salomon, I attempted to change the culture, in terms of some respects, and I would not grade myself A+ in terms of the result.

在Salomon，我试图在某些方面改变文化，但我不会给自己的结果打 A+。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m quite flattered that a man would say that he’s in a new place where he can’t succeed unless he changes the culture and he wants us to tell him how to change the culture.

查理·芒格：嗯，我很受宠若惊，有人说他在一个新地方，除非改变文化，否则无法成功，而他想让我们告诉他如何改变文化。

In your position, my failure rate has been 100 percent. (Laughter) And —

在你的情况下，我的失败率是100%。（笑声）——

文化是自我选择，问出问题本身就说明有问题了，无可救药了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie started a law firm. Go back to, what, 1962, Charlie, what was it?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理开了一家律师事务所。回到 1962 年，查理，那是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I can move out but I couldn’t change the culture. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：是的。我可以搬出去，但我无法改变文化。（笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: We can tell some interesting stories from the old law firm, but we’ll go on to Carol now.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们可以讲一些关于旧律师事务所的有趣故事，但我们现在继续请卡罗尔提问。

18. Ajit Jain can’t be replaced

阿吉特·贾因无法被替代

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Jon Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff in New York City.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自纽约市的鲁安·卡尼夫的乔恩·布兰特。

“You have emphasized many times how important Ajit Jain is to Berkshire and National Indemnities reinsurance operations. So I’m wondering whether you expect National Indemnities’ float to continue to grow or instead to unwind after he retires?”

“您多次强调 Ajit Jain 对伯克希尔和国家赔偿再保险业务的重要性。因此，我想知道您是否预计国家赔偿的浮存金会继续增长，还是在他退休后会减少？”

Well, of course we don’t think —

好吧，我们当然不认为——

WARREN BUFFETT: No. 沃伦·巴菲特：不。

CAROL LOOMIS: — Ajit will retire.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：— 阿吉特将退休。

“Another way of asking that is whether National Indemnity has competitive advantages beyond Ajit, or is all of its value, above book value, tied up in Ajit and the runoff profits from the deals he has already put on the books?”

“换句话说，国家赔偿是否有超出Ajit的竞争优势，还是其超出账面价值的所有价值都与Ajit以及他已经记录的交易的收益有关？”

WARREN BUFFETT: His operation has competitive advantages that go beyond Ajit, but they have been developed by Ajit, and he has maximized them, and he knows how to use them in a way that’s far better, in my view, than anyone else in the world could.

沃伦·巴菲特：他的运营具有超越阿吉特的竞争优势，但这些优势是由阿吉特开发的，他最大化了这些优势，并且在我看来，他知道如何以远远优于世界上任何其他人的方式来利用它们。

But they don’t all go away. I mean, he has a cadre of about 30 people who are schooled in it, you know, in a way that would make the Jesuits look quite liberal, in terms of what they let their membership do.

但这些优势并不会完全消失。我的意思是，他有大约30人的团队在这个领域受过训练，以一种让耶稣会士看起来相当宽松的方式，来让他们的成员进行工作。

Ajit — you can’t imagine a more disciplined operation than Ajit has. But Ajit cannot be replaced. On the other hand — well, I’ll state that absolutely, categorically — it would be a huge loss to Berkshire if anything happened to Ajit.

阿吉特——你无法想象比阿吉特更有纪律的运作。但阿吉特是不可替代的。另一方面——我会绝对、明确地说——如果阿吉特发生任何事情，对伯克希尔来说将是巨大的损失。

But it would not mean that the Berkshire Hathaway reinsurance operation would not continue to be an extremely special place that would do large deals that nobody else would do, that could think and act quickly in ways that virtually no other insurance organization can.

但这并不意味着伯克希尔哈撒韦的再保险业务不会继续成为一个极其特殊的地方，它会进行其他公司无法做到的大型交易，能够以几乎没有其他保险机构能够做到的方式快速思考和行动。

We’ve got something very special in that unit, and then we’ve got the most special of leaders in Ajit.

我们在这个部门有一些非常特别的东西，而Ajit则是最特别的领导者。

As to our float, every year I think our float has peaked. I never see how we can add to it. It’s up to 60 billion-plus now. And we have things like the Equitas deal that are runoffs.

关于我们的浮动资金，我每年都认为我们的浮动资金达到了峰值。我从未见过我们如何能够增加它。现在它已超过600亿美元。我们有像Equitas交易这样的逐步减少的情况。

Every day, in insurance, some of the float runs off, it’s just that we add additional amounts. And like I say, I was ready to quit, you know, at 20 billion and think, you know, that we’d reached the apex of it.

在保险行业，每天一些浮存金都会减少，只是我们会增加额外的金额。正如我所说，我曾准备至少保持200亿美元的浮存金，认为我们达到了顶峰。

But it’s over 60 billion. Things keep happening.

但它超过了 600 亿。事情不断发生。

Berkshire has become, in my view, the premiere insurance organization of the world, and we’ve got — a lot of good things come from that.

伯克希尔在我看来已经成为世界上首屈一指的保险组织，而我们也因此获得了许多好处。

I don’t see how, with 60-odd billion of float, I don’t see how we can increase it significantly unless we would make some very significant acquisition. And I don’t rule that out, but there’s nothing imminent on that.

我看不出在有 600 多亿的浮存金的情况下，我们如何能显著增加它，除非我们进行一些非常重大的收购。我并不排除这种可能性，但目前没有任何迫在眉睫的计划。

But we will not organically grow the float of Berkshire at a fast clip from here. It can’t be done. And we may fight to stay even.

但我们无法在此基础上快速有机增长伯克希尔的浮存金。这个是做不到的。我们可能会努力保持现状。

But we may come up with something out of the blue. I mean, who would have known that Equitas was going to come along three years ago? There are various things that could happen of a positive nature.

但我们可能会突然想到一些事情。我的意思是，谁会知道三年前 Equitas 会出现呢？可能会发生各种积极的事情。

But when I tell you about the value that Ajit has added to Berkshire, believe me, if anything, I’ve understated it.

但是当我告诉你 Ajit 为伯克希尔增添的价值时，相信我，如果有什么的话，我是低估了它。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with you, and I’ve got nothing to add.

查理·芒格：我同意你的观点，我没有什么好补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧。（笑声）

19. Opportunities in India, but government paralysis is a deterrent

印度的机会，但政府瘫痪是一个障碍

WARREN BUFFETT: In that case, we’ll go to number 7. Here we are.

沃伦·巴菲特：在这种情况下，我们将转到第 7 个。我们来了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Warren and Uncle Charlie. I have to call you Uncle because my parents are from India and we call anybody older than us Uncle or Auntie.

观众成员：早上好，沃伦和查理叔叔。我必须称呼你们为叔叔，因为我的父母来自印度，我们称呼比我们年长的人为叔叔或阿姨。

WARREN BUFFETT: You may have to call us great uncle. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你可能得叫我们大叔。（笑声）

SABRINA CHOOG: I’m Sabrina Choog (PH) from Los Angeles and I’m 12 years old.

萨布 rina·楚格：我来自洛杉矶，我叫萨布 rina·楚格（PH），我 12 岁。

My mom owns a bunch of Berkies, which obviously I’m gonna get one day. (Laughter)

我妈妈拥有一堆伯基鞋，显然有一天我会得到一双。（笑声）

My question is, 17 percent of the world is Indian. That’s one of six people in the world.

我的问题是，世界上有 17%的人是印度人。这是世界上六个人中的一个。

India’s economy has been growing at 7-8 percent per year. At this rate, it will surpass total U.S. GDP in 2043.

印度的经济每年增长 7-8%。按照这个速度，到 2043 年，它将超过美国的总 GDP。

Can you please tell me why aren’t you investing in India?

你能告诉我为什么你不在印度投资吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s a good question — (applause) — and we have connections there, obviously.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题——（掌声）——显然我们在那儿有联系。

But it hasn’t — in the insurance field, there have been very distinct limitations on what a non-Indian company — a non-Indian-owned company — can do.

但事实并非如此——在保险领域，非印度公司——非印度拥有的公司——在能做的事情上有非常明显的限制。

We’ve looked a lot, mostly through Ajit. We’ve looked a lot at the possibility of being in the insurance business there.

我们看了很多，主要是通过 Ajit。我们也考虑了在那里的保险业务的可能性。

And actually, as of yesterday, I agreed next March to go to India because our ISCAR business — (applause) — is doing very well there.

实际上，从昨天开始，我同意明年三月去印度，因为我们的 ISCAR 业务——（掌声）——在那里发展得非常好。

But, I don’t know what they think I can do additionally, but in any event they said, “Come on to India in March and see if we can’t expand it substantially.”

但是，我不知道他们认为我能做些什么，但无论如何，他们说：“三月来印度，看看我们是否可以大幅扩展业务。”

India is going to grow dramatically, and ISCAR belongs in every industrial country in the world. I mean, we are very basic to industry, and we’ve done wonders for our customers all over the world.

印度将会大幅增长，而ISCAR在每个工业国家都是必不可少的。我是说，我们对工业至关重要，我们为世界各地的客户做了很多工作。

And we have a good-sized operation in India. But ISCAR management hopes that if we take a trip over there in March, we might land a few more accounts.

我们在印度有一个规模不错的业务。但 ISCAR 管理层希望，如果我们在三月份去那里一趟，可能会获得更多的客户。

We do not rule out India, believe me, in looking at either direct investments or marketable securities.

我们并不排除印度，相信我，在考虑直接投资或可交易证券时。

In fact, POSCO, Charlie can describe the POSCO situation better than I, but they have big plans for India.

事实上，POSCO，查理可以更好地描述POSCO的情况，但他们在印度有很大的计划。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the one trouble that India presents is that its governments tend to have a fair amount of paralysis, endless due process, endless objection. Zoning is hard, planning permissions are hard, et cetera.

查理·芒格：是的，印度面临的一个问题是，其政府往往存在相当程度的瘫痪，无休止的程序，无休止的反对。区域划分很难，规划许可很难，等等。

And that has caused the very wise founder of modern Singapore to say that China is going to grow much faster than India, because their government causes less paralysis.

这导致现代新加坡的杰出创始人说，中国的增长速度会远远超过印度，因为他们的政府造成的瘫痪更少。

So these countries are different in the opportunities they present.

所以这些国家在提供的机会上是不同的。

But of course we like India, and we — kind of admire the democracy that causes the paralysis, but we still don’t like the paralysis.

但当然我们喜欢印度，我们——有点欣赏导致瘫痪的民主，但我们仍然不喜欢这种瘫痪。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not ordained, however. You know, if you’d looked at China 40 years ago, you wouldn’t have dreamt of what would happen.

沃伦·巴菲特：然而，这并不是注定的。你知道，如果你在 40 年前看中国，你不会想象会发生什么。

So countries do learn from each other, I mean, and they should. I mean, I think they’ve learned many things from the U.S. that they adapt — I’m not talking about India specifically, I’m talking about other countries generally.

所以各国确实相互学习，我是说，他们应该这样做。我认为他们从美国学到了很多东西，并进行了调整——我并不是特别指印度，我是指其他国家。

They don’t take on everything we have. But if you looked at a country that was as successful as this country has been over a couple hundred years, you might figure that there could be a few good ideas you could steal.

他们并不会接受我们所有的东西。但如果你看看一个在过去几百年里像这个国家一样成功的国家，你可能会想，或许有一些好的想法可以借鉴。

And I think that you’re seeing that around the world, and maybe they can improve on us.

我认为你在世界各地都能看到这一点，也许他们可以在我们之上有所改进。

So I don’t think I would feel that any impediments to growth that existed now are necessarily ones that have to be permanent. Indian — we ought to figure out a lot of ways to do business in those countries.

所以我认为现在存在的任何增长障碍不一定是永久性的。印度——我们应该想出很多在那些国家做生意的方法。

My preference is, obviously, in something like insurance, which I understand, and where we’ve got terrific people. Both China and India do limit us right now quite significantly in what we can own of a company.

我显然更倾向于像保险这样的领域，我对此有所了解，并且我们有出色的团队。目前，中国和印度在我们可以拥有的公司方面确实对我们有很大的限制。

And I really hate to take some of our managerial talent and put them to work for something we only own 25 percent of. I’d rather have them working on something we own 100 percent of.

而我真的不想让我们的一些管理人才去为我们只拥有25%的公司工作。我更愿意让他们为我们拥有100%的业务工作。

So it will depend on the laws. But people in India are going to be living a lot better 20 years from now than they are now, as they are in China, and as they are in the United States.

这将取决于法律。但 20 年后，印度人民的生活将比现在好得多，就像中国和美国一样。

20. “Prospects for significant inflation have increased”

“显著通胀的前景已经增加”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Jonathan Marsh (PH) in Sydney, Australia.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自澳大利亚悉尼的乔纳森·马什（PH）。

He says, “Many shareholder letters in the 1970s and 1980s discussed various aspects of inflation and its potentially destructive effects on investment.

他说：“1970 年代和 1980 年代的许多股东信件讨论了通货膨胀的各个方面及其对投资可能造成的破坏性影响。”

“The 2008 letter mentioned the current Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing could again bring about inflation, yet the 2009 letter made no mention of this threat.

2008 年的信中提到，目前美联储的量化宽松可能再次导致通货膨胀，但 2009 年的信中没有提到这一威胁。

“What are your current thoughts on the risk level of higher inflation in the United States?”

“您目前对美国高通胀风险水平的看法是什么？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I may be a little biased on this because I’ve always worried a lot about inflation, and there’s been a lot of inflation.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我可能对此有点偏见，因为我一直很担心通货膨胀，而通货膨胀确实很严重。

You know, Charlie’s pointed out, you know, since I was born in 1930, the dollar’s depreciated by well over 90 percent. But as he also points out, we’ve done OK. So it isn’t the end of the world, necessarily.

你知道，查理指出，自从我 1930 年出生以来，美元贬值超过 90%。但正如他所指出的，我们过得还不错。所以这并不一定是世界末日。

I think that the prospects for significant inflation have increased, you know, with what — not only here, but around the world, with the situation that governments have either been forced into or elected to embrace.

我认为，显著通胀的前景已经增加了，你知道，不仅在这里，还有世界各地，政府被迫或选择接受的情况。

And they may well have been the correct responses, but we may find that weaning ourselves from the medicine was harder than solving the original illness. And the medicine, you know, has been massive dosages of debt. And, like I say, not only here, but elsewhere.

而这些可能确实是正确的反应，但我们可能会发现，摆脱这种药物比解决最初的疾病要困难得多。而这种药物，你知道，是大量的债务。就像我说的，不仅在这里，在其他地方也是如此。

And I don’t see any way that countries running very high deficits, relative to GDP, don’t have a significant diminution in the value of their currency over time.

我认为，那些相对于GDP运行着很高赤字的国家，随着时间的推移，其货币价值将显著减少。

Now, it could be done for a while. I mean, we’ve done it through wars and everything else, and maybe we will correct the situation.

现在，这可以持续一段时间。我的意思是，我们已经经历了战争和其他一切，也许我们会纠正这种情况。

But if we don’t, I wrote an op-ed piece in The New York Times about a year ago on this.

但如果我们不这样做，我大约一年前在《纽约时报》上写了一篇关于此的评论文章。

And I do think that if you wanted to bet on higher or lower inflation, bet your life on it, I’d bet on higher, and maybe a lot higher.

我确实认为，如果你想要打赌通胀是上升还是下降，赌你的一生，我会选择赌通胀会上升，而且可能会大幅上升。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, again, I agree. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我再次同意。（笑声）

21. Munger: McDonald’s is better educator than universities

芒格：麦当劳比大学更能教育人。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第 8 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Lucas Rineswell (PH) and I’m from Whangerei. And in case you don’t know where Whangarei is, it’s in New Zealand.

观众成员：我的名字是卢卡斯·赖恩斯韦尔（PH），我来自旺格雷。如果你不知道旺格雷在哪里，它在新西兰。

At the moment, it’s quarter past 4 in the morning in New Zealand, so I’d be safe to say that my wife will be sound asleep.

目前，新西兰的时间是早上四点十五分，所以我可以肯定地说，我的妻子会睡得很香。

So I’m an idealist. What can be done to educate the children about the sage of Omaha’s philosophy of successful money management, and to prevent another reoccurrence of the financial mayhem that we’ve all seen and experienced in the 2007 and 2008 years?

我是个理想主义者。我们能做些什么来教育孩子们关于奥马哈智者的成功理财哲学，以防止我们在2007和2008年经历的金融混乱再次重演？

WARREN BUFFETT: We will see financial mayhem, as you put it, from time to time. I hope we reduce it, I hope we reduce the magnitude, et cetera.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会时不时看到你所说的金融混乱。我希望我们能减少这种情况，我希望我们能减少其规模等等。

But people do crazy things, and it’s not a function of IQ, and sometimes it’s not a function of education.

但人们会做疯狂的事情，这与智商无关，有时也与教育无关。

In fact, I would argue that some of the problems, and not a small part of what’s occurred in the last 30 years, has been because of what became the prevailing conventional wisdom in the leading business schools.

事实上，我认为过去30年中发生的一些问题，很多不是因为智商低，而是因为在一些领先商学院中形成的主流观念。

So, I’m not particularly positive about modifying the madness of mankind from time to time.

因此，我对改变人类的疯狂行为持谨慎态度。

The first part though, however, is the kind of thing in our movie. I really do believe that getting good financial habits — other kinds of habits, too, but what I’m thinking about here is primarily financial habits — getting those early in life is enormously important.

不过，第一部分是我们电影中的一种内容。我真的相信，早期养成良好的财务习惯——其他类型的习惯也是如此，但我在这里主要想到的是财务习惯——在生活中尽早养成这些习惯是非常重要的。

I mean, Charlie and I were probably lucky that we grew up in households where we were getting all kinds of unspoken lessons, even, in terms of how to handle our life, but in particular, how to handle finances.

我和查理可能很幸运，我们成长于那样的家庭，潜移默化中学习到如何处理生活，尤其是如何管理财务。

And not everybody gets that. And Andy Heyward, who did a terrific job with “Liberty’s Kids” in teaching about the history of America three or four years ago, has come up with this idea of “The Secret Millionaires Club.”

而并不是每个人都能获得这样的教育。安迪·海沃德（Andy Heyward）曾为“自由的孩子们”（Liberty’s Kids）做了出色的工作，教授美国历史，现在他提出了“秘密百万富翁俱乐部”的理念。

And if we get through to 2 or 3 percent, or 5 percent, or whatever it may be, of the kids, in terms of giving them some ideas they might not otherwise have, and they build some habits around it, you know, it isn’t going to change the world, but it could be a plus in their lives.

如果我们能让 2%或 3%甚至 5%的孩子接触到一些他们可能不会想到的想法，并围绕这些想法养成一些习惯，你知道，这可能不会改变世界，但这可能会对他们的生活有所帮助。

It’s very important to get the financial habits. And really, Charlie’s a big fan, and so am I, of Ben Franklin’s. And he was teaching those habits a couple hundred years ago. So we’re just going to try and take Ben Franklin’s ideas and make them entertaining for children’s stories, in effect.

养成良好的财务习惯非常重要。实际上，查理和我都非常喜欢本·富兰克林。他几百年前就开始教授这些习惯。因此，我们将尝试将本·富兰克林的理念变得有趣，以便用于儿童故事。

And I think that’s about what you should be doing. I don’t think — I think it’s much more important to have good learning at the elementary level than, frankly, to have it in terms of advanced degrees and graduate schools.

我认为这正是你应该做的。我认为，在小学阶段获得良好的学习比拥有高级学位和研究生院的学习更为重要。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there are other great educational institutions in America to help handle this problem. One of the ones I admire most is McDonald’s.

查理·芒格：是的，美国还有其他优秀的教育机构来帮助解决这个问题。我最钦佩的之一是麦当劳。

I had fun once at a major university when I said I thought McDonald’s succeeded better as an educator than the people in the university did.

我曾在一所大大学里玩得很开心，当时我说我认为麦当劳在教育方面比大学里的那些人更成功。

And what I meant was McDonald’s hires a lot of people who are quite marginal at the very start of their working career. And they learn to show up on time for work and observe the discipline.

我所指的是麦当劳雇佣了很多在职业生涯初期相对边缘化的人。他们学会按时上班并遵守纪律。

A lot of them go on in employment to much higher jobs. And they’ve had an enormous constructive effect about educating into responsibility a lot of people who were threatened with not making it.

他们中的许多人在就业中晋升到更高的职位。他们对教育许多面临失败威胁的人产生了巨大的积极影响，使他们承担起责任。

So I think we all owe a lot to the employment culture of McDonald’s. And it’s not enough appreciated.

我认为我们都应该感谢麦当劳的就业文化。这一点并没有得到足够的重视。

WARREN BUFFETT: I learned a lot from a paper manager at The Washington Times-Herald named John Daley (PH).

沃伦·巴菲特：我从《华盛顿时报-先驱报》的一位管理者约翰·戴利（John Daley）那里学到了很多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And probably 13 years old or 14 years old, and I was lucky to run into him.

沃伦·巴菲特：大概在 13 岁或 14 岁的时候，我很幸运遇到了他。

Basically, my life would have been somewhat different if I didn’t get those lessons from a guy that taught them to me in a very enjoyable manner. He wasn’t preaching them to me, he just told me I’d do better if I did this and that, and it worked.

基本上，如果我没有从一个以非常愉快的方式教我这些课程的人那里得到那些教训，我的生活会有所不同。他并没有对我说教，他只是告诉我如果我这样做和那样做会更好，而这确实有效。

So you’re lucky if you’ve got the parents to teach you that. But anything that brings it into a broader teaching environment, I’m for.

所以如果你有父母来教导你这些，那你就很幸运。但任何能够将这些教导扩展到更广泛的教育环境中的事情，我都是支持的。

And like I say, I really think Andy has got a terrific project in this and we’ll see how it goes.

就像我说的，我真的认为安迪在这个项目上做得很好，我们拭目以待。

22. Giving away everything is a “terrific tax dodge”

赠送一切是一种“绝妙的避税手段”

WARREN BUFFETT: And speaking of Andrews or Andys, Andrew? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：说到安德鲁或安迪，安德鲁？（笑）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: So we received about a dozen questions, at least I did, on the subject of your taxes, Mr. Buffett, from shareholders no less. And I chose what I hope is the most polite version of the question.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：所以我们收到了大约十几个问题，至少我收到了，关于您的税务问题，巴菲特先生，还是来自股东的。我选择了我希望是最礼貌的提问方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: I hope so, too. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我也希望如此。（笑声）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This one came from Tom Cornfeld (PH).

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个来自汤姆·科恩费尔德（PH）。

And he says, “Mr. Buffett is often quoted as saying that his assistant pays at a higher tax rate than he does, because of the disparity between the long-term capital gain and ordinary income tax rates.

他说：“巴菲特先生常被引用说，他的助理缴纳的税率比他高，因为长期资本利得税率和普通收入税率之间存在差异。”

“The implication is that taxes should be much higher on people like himself.

这意味着像他这样的人应该缴纳更高的税。

“However, I note that Mr. Buffett has donated virtually 100 percent of his estate to charitable organizations. Because he has owned his Berkshire shares for many, many years with no dividend distributions, it is virtually certain that the bulk of his estate will therefore never be subject to taxation by the U.S. government.

然而，我注意到巴菲特先生几乎将他全部的遗产捐赠给了慈善组织。由于他持有伯克希尔的股票已经很多年，并且没有分红分配，因此可以肯定，他的遗产大部分将永远不会受到美国政府的征税。

“My question is that, if Mr. Buffett feels that he should pay more taxes, how should the tax system be changed?”

“我的问题是，如果巴菲特先生觉得他应该缴更多的税，税制应该如何改变？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you could have a wealth tax, would be one way. I mean, you could tax — I don’t know how many countries do that now, Charlie.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你可以征收财富税，这是一种方式。我是说，你可以征税——我不知道现在有多少国家这样做，查理。

In effect, you have that with a property tax in certain ways, but you could have a wealth tax. I would say this: he is absolutely correct. If you want to give away all of your money, it’s a terrific tax dodge. (Laughs)

实际上，在某种程度上，你在某些方面有财产税，但你可以有财富税。我想说的是：他绝对是正确的。如果你想把所有的钱都捐出去，这是一种绝妙的避税方式。（笑）

Although, I will say this also. In the tax return I just filed, on the “charitable contributions” line, I have an unused carry-forward of something over $7 billion that I haven’t gotten a deduction for. (Laughter)

不过，我也要说，我在刚刚提交的税表上，慈善捐赠一栏中，我有超过70亿美元的未使用抵扣额。（笑）

But I welcome the questioner or anybody else following my tax dodge example and giving away their money. They will save a lot of taxes that way, and the money will probably do a lot of good. (Laughs) (Applause)

但我欢迎提问者或任何其他人跟随我的避税例子，捐出他们的钱。这样他们可以节省很多税款，而这些钱可能会做很多好事。（笑）（掌声）

Taxes — if we continue to spend 25 percent or 26 percent of GDP, as a country, and we made those elections through our representatives, we are not going to be able to keep taxation at 15 percent of GDP.

如果我们继续将GDP的25%或26%花费在国家上，而我们通过我们的代表做出了这些选择，我们就不可能将税收维持在GDP的15%水平。

Now, we’ve got a deficit commission. You couldn’t have two better guys than Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson heading it. You have got two classy individuals there. They’re smart, they’re decent. People like to work with them. I mean, the president made a great choice in picking those two.

现在，我们有了一个赤字委员会。没有比厄尔斯金·鲍尔斯和艾伦·辛普森更合适的人来领导它了。那是两个很有风度的人。他们聪明，正直。人们喜欢和他们一起工作。我的意思是，总统在选择这两个人时做出了一个很好的决定。

But in the end, they’re either going to — they’re going to have to recommend, and it will be some combination of taxes quite a bit higher, and expenditures quite a bit lower, and then they won’t be quite as popular as they are today.

但最终，他们要么会——他们将不得不推荐，这将是税收大幅提高和支出大幅降低的某种组合，然后他们的受欢迎程度将不再像今天一样高。

And I doubt very much if you’re going to be able to increase taxes significantly as a percentage of GDP and do it, essentially, from taxing lower income people a higher amount. So it’s going to be an interesting equation to solve and I wish them the very best. They’re two terrific fellows.

我非常怀疑你能否以GDP的百分比显著增加税收，而又不通过对低收入人群征收更高的税款。因此，这将是一个有趣的方程式，我祝他们好运。这两个人真了不起。

Charlie, what do you have to say about taxes?

查理，你对税收有什么看法？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think those who worry about your unfairly low taxes should be consoled by the fact that eventually you pay 100 percent. When you die and they ask, “How much did old Warren leave?” the answer will be, “I believe he left it all.”

查理·芒格：我认为那些担心你税负过低的人应该感到安慰，因为最终你会支付 100%。当你去世时，他们会问：“老沃伦留下了多少？”答案将是：“我相信他留下了全部。”

WARREN BUFFETT: And I hope they emphasize old. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望他们强调“老”。（笑声）

No, it’s kind of interesting. I mean, just take Berkshire. You know, essentially, I will never sell a share of Berkshire.

这真有意思。就伯克希尔而言，你知道，基本上，我永远不会卖出伯克希尔的任何一股股票。

But I’ve known that for a long, long, long time. So basically, that’s fine.

但我早就知道这一点了。所以基本上，这没问题。

If I was a trustee for some trust and they owned Berkshire, which, in effect, I am, you know, it’s a lot of fun to run and everything. And I’ve got everything in life I could possibly need, and I always will.

如果我是一家信托的受托人，而他们拥有伯克希尔，实际上我就是这样，你知道，管理它非常有趣。我拥有生活中可能需要的一切，并且我将永远拥有。

And, you know, in the end, because Berkshire’s done well, we can give away the rest.

而且，你知道，最终，因为伯克希尔表现良好，我们可以把剩下的捐出去。

Now, if you want, you can argue that if I gave it all to the federal government instead of giving it to the charities, society would be better off, but I don’t think many of you would want to hold that position. (Laughter)

现在，如果你愿意，你可以争论说，如果我把所有的钱给联邦政府，而不是给慈善机构，社会会更好，但我想很多人并不想持有这个观点。（笑）

23. The best defense against inflation

对抗通货膨胀的最佳防御

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：第九。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. 观众：你好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. 沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Jeff Chen (PH) from San Francisco.

观众成员：巴菲特先生，我叫杰夫·陈（音）来自旧金山。

I wanted to ask you a little bit more detail about the inflation question, wanted to know what are the key metrics you look at when you evaluate future inflation and your valuation methodology?

我想问你关于通货膨胀问题的更多细节，想知道在评估未来通货膨胀和你的估值方法时，你关注哪些关键指标？

And what are some of the catalysts that’s going to cause the inflation to rise in the future?

未来导致通货膨胀上升的一些催化剂是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: You give me credit for more brain power than I actually bring to the question.

沃伦·巴菲特：你对我的智力给予了过高的评价。

I don’t think you can look at any given metric in any given month and figure out exactly what that’s going to do to inflation rates because, so much — if it gets going so much, it creates its own dynamic.

我认为你无法仅通过某个月的任何特定指标来准确判断它对通货膨胀率的影响，因为一旦它开始运作，就会产生自己的动态。

You know, we saw that in the late 1970s and early 1980s until Volcker came along with a sledgehammer to the economy.

你知道，我们在 1970 年代末和 1980 年代初看到了这一点，直到沃尔克带着大锤来冲击经济。

But we had people running from money at that time, and, of course, we got the prime rate up to 21-and-a-fraction percent, and we got governments up to very close to 15 percent.

当时人们在疯狂逃离货币，当然，我们的基准利率升至21点多，而政府利率接近15%。

So we had a little demonstration project 30 years ago in this country of what happens when people get fearful about money.

所以，我们在这个国家经历了一个小型的示范项目，展示了当人们对货币感到恐惧时会发生什么。

And if we were to continue the policies we have now, I would think something — a rerun of that, you know, could be fairly likely.

如果我们继续保持现在的政策，我认为再次出现那种情况是相当可能的。

But, you know, trend is not destiny. We have the power to do things, and Congress has the power. And that’s why I wrote that op-ed piece a year ago, to sort of flash a yellow light.

但是，你知道，趋势并不是命运。我们有能力去做事情，国会也有权力。这就是为什么我一年前写了那篇评论文章，以此来发出一个警示信号。

We have the power to control our future, and we do it through elected representatives.

我们有能力掌控我们的未来，而我们通过选举产生的代表来实现这一点。

I will just go back to the conclusion that, based on what I see happening, American people, government around the world, I think currencies are a poorer bet than they have been for some time. But I have no idea what that means in terms of rates of inflation. And I hope I’m wrong on it.

我只想回到结论，基于我所看到的情况，我认为美国人民和世界各国政府，货币的投资价值比一段时间以来都要差。但我不知道这在通货膨胀率方面意味着什么。我希望我错了。

I would say if inflation ever really gets in the saddle, that it gets very unpredictable as to how fast it can accelerate and how faith in institutions can break down. A lot of things — a lot of bad things could happen with it.

我会说，如果通货膨胀真的开始加速，那么它的加速速度和对机构的信任崩溃将变得非常不可预测。很多事情——很多坏事可能会随之发生。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. The best defense, of course, is to contribute as much as you can to the civilization and expect to counter inflation’s effects by your own merits.

查理·芒格：是的。最好的防御当然是尽你所能为文明做出贡献，并期望通过自己的优点来抵消通货膨胀的影响。

That’s the safest antidote. The idea that just by outsmarting other people you can somehow profit from the inflation is a much more dangerous course of action.

这才是最安全的解药。仅仅通过智胜他人就能从通货膨胀中获利的想法是一条更危险的道路。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Your money can be inflated away but your talent can’t be inflated away. If you’re the best brain surgeon in Omaha, or the best painter, or whatever it may be, you will always command your share of the resources around you, you know, whether the currency is seashells or $10 million notes, or whatever it may be.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你的钱可能会被通货膨胀侵蚀，但你的才能不会。如果你是奥马哈最好的脑外科医生，或者最好的画家，或者其他什么，你总会在你周围的资源中占有一席之地，无论货币是贝壳还是 1000 万美元的钞票，或者其他什么。

Talent is a terrific asset to deal with any kind of a monetary situation. But Charlie and I have to fall back on money.

才能是应对任何货币情况的极好资产。但查理和我必须依靠金钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Too late for talent.

查理·芒格：为时已晚，无法靠才能了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

24. Problems at NetJets

NetJets 的问题

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Douglas Ott of Banyan Capital Management in Atlanta.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自亚特兰大的班扬资本管理公司的道格拉斯·奥特。

“In your recent letter to shareholders, you wrote that it was clear you failed us in letting NetJets descend into such a condition that it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss over the 11 years we have owned the company.

在您最近给股东的信中，您写道，很明显您让我们失望了，让 NetJets 陷入了这样的境地，以至于在我们拥有这家公司 11 年期间，累计税前亏损。

“What specifically were the errors committed by you and the previous CEO? What have you learned? And how will you prevent such a thing from happening with any of our other businesses in the future?”

“你和前首席执行官具体犯了哪些错误？你学到了什么？你将如何防止这种情况在未来发生在我们其他业务上？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I probably won’t. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我可能不会。（笑）

We’ll make mistakes from time to time, and some of our managers may make mistakes. And sometimes you run into conditions that are really extraordinary.

我们会不时犯错误，有些管理者也可能会犯错误。有时你会遇到一些非常特殊的情况。

But the mistake, the biggest mistake made with NetJets is essentially we kept — we were buying planes at prices that were fictitious, in terms of the price at which we would later be able to sell them. And there’s a certain time lapse involved in buying fractional shares.

但NetJets的最大错误基本上是，我们在以虚假的价格购买飞机，也就是说，按照我们后来能够出售的价格来考虑。购买分时股份时有一定的时间延迟。

There’s a lot of explanations for it. But in the end, we didn’t properly prepare for what was obviously happening. And we lost a lot of money, a good bit of which was attributable to the write-down of planes, which you could call is our inventory, where we bought them at X and we couldn’t sell them at X or 90 percent of X.

有很多解释。但最终，我们没有为显然正在发生的事情做好准备。我们损失了很多钱，其中一部分是由于飞机的减记，这可以说是我们的库存，我们以 X 的价格购买它们，但我们无法以 X 或 X 的 90%出售它们。

Some of those were new planes that we should not have taken on, and many of them were planes coming back from owners.

其中一些是我们不应该接收的新飞机，许多则是从业主那里归还的飞机。

We also let our operating costs get out of line with recurring revenues.

我们还让我们的运营成本与经常性收入失去平衡。

But, you know, I’ve made plenty of mistakes. I stayed in the textile business for 20 years. I knew it was a lousy business. Charlie was telling me it was a lousy business in the first year, the second year.

但是，你知道，我犯了很多错误。我在纺织行业待了 20 年。我知道这是一门糟糕的生意。查理在第一年、第二年就告诉我这是一门糟糕的生意。

And 20 years later, I woke up. I was like Rip Van Winkle. I mean, it’s kind of depressing when you think about it. (Laughter)

20年后，我才醒悟过来。我就像Rip Van Winkle一样。想起来有点令人沮丧。（笑）

But the one thing we will guarantee, we’ll make some mistakes. It was a big mistake at NetJets, $711 million is the figure.

但我们可以保证的一件事是，我们会犯一些错误。在 NetJets，这是一个大错误，数字是 7.11 亿美元。

We are now operating at NetJets at a very decent profit. The figures you saw there on the screen reflect a pretax profit of well over $50 million in the first quarter, and that’s not with any big boom in plane sales or anything else. It’s just with a business plan that involves not an iota of diminution of safety or service, but just got things in line that needed to be in line.

我们现在在 NetJets 的运营中获得了相当可观的利润。你在屏幕上看到的数字反映了第一季度超过 5000 万美元的税前利润，而这并不是因为飞机销售或其他任何大幅增长。只是通过一个商业计划，没有丝毫降低安全性或服务，而只是将需要调整的事情理顺。

And I give Dave Sokol enormous credit. I mean, he turned that place around like nobody could have, and all the shareholders here owe him a big vote of thanks for that.

我对戴夫·索科尔（Dave Sokol）给予了巨大赞誉。他像无人可比的那样转变了NetJets，所有在场的股东都应该感谢他。

Charlie? (Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, but I believe that the episode ought to be reviewed in context.

查理·芒格：是的，但我认为这个事件应该在上下文中进行审视。

If we buy 30 big businesses and generally let the people who run them successfully and before run them with very little interference from headquarters, and it works out 95 percent of the time very well, and we have one episode when the basic franchise was protected but we lost profit opportunities for a while, it’s not a big failure record.

如果我们购买了30个大型企业，并通常让那些成功管理过的人在总部的很少干预下继续管理它们，而且95%的情况下效果很好，那么我们有一次事件，尽管基本特许经营受到保护，但我们暂时失去了利润机会，这并不是一个大的失败记录。

Nor does it indicate that we should stop being pretty easy with the remarkable people who join us with their companies.

这也并不意味着我们应该对那些带着他们的公司加入我们的杰出人士变得过于苛刻。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it does not change our management approach at all. I think that we have gotten performance, overall, from managers that are beyond the dreams I would have had when I was first putting this company together.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，这完全不改变我们的管理方式。我认为，我们从经理那里获得的整体业绩超出了我在最初组建这家公司时的梦想。

So, it’s been a — we let managers do their stuff. And I think —

所以，这段时间我们让管理者去做他们的事情。我认为——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s worked for us, net.

查理·芒格：这对我们有效，净收益。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, it’s worked — it’s worked very well for us, net. And we’re going to keep doing it.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，这个方法有效——对我们来说效果很好，净收益。而且我们会继续这样做。

25. BYD investment shows the “old men” are still learning

比亚迪的投资表明“老年人”仍在学习。

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. This is Eric Chang from Beijing, China.

观众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自中国北京的埃里克·张。

First, thanks for the occasion for us to engage with you like this, and also for inspiring young people to learn. Mr. Munger has described you as an incredible learning machine in terms of learning new areas, and expanding your circle of competence.

首先，感谢您给我们这样一个机会与您交流，也感谢您激励年轻人学习。芒格先生形容您是一个令人难以置信的学习机器，能够学习新领域并扩展您的能力圈。

So I would like to understand is if you can make it more concrete, recently you make investment in BYD, a company in China that makes batteries and also electric cars which are, arguably, technology companies.

我想了解的是，如果你能更具体一点，最近你对比亚迪进行了投资，这是一家在中国生产电池和电动汽车的公司，可以说是科技公司。

So can you sort of go through that example and see how you sort of like analyzed the case and asked questions that helped you make a decision to invest in such a company? Thank you.

所以你能否详细讲解一下这个例子，看看你是如何分析这个案例并提出问题，帮助你决定投资这样一家公司？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie deserves 100 percent of the credit for BYD, so I’m going to let him answer that.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理应为比亚迪获得 100%的功劳，所以我让他来回答这个问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s an interesting example because Berkshire would not have made an investment in BYD if the opportunity had come along five or 10 years earlier. And it shows that the old men are continuing to learn, and that’s absolutely essential.

查理·芒格：嗯，这是一个有趣的例子，因为如果机会在五年或十年前出现，伯克希尔就不会投资比亚迪。这表明老年人仍在继续学习，这绝对是必要的。

Berkshire would have a lower potential than it does if we had stayed the way we were. And — so you are absolutely right in calling attention to this episode.

如果我们保持原样，伯克希尔的潜力将会低于现在。因此，您提到这一事件是完全正确的。

Again, Dave Sokol helped. I wasn’t at all sure I could get Warren to do this all by myself so I inveigled Dave into going over to China, and the two of us were able to help the learning process. (Laughter)

再次感谢戴夫·索科尔的帮助。我并不完全确定我能单独说服沃伦，所以我说服戴夫一起去中国，我们两个人一起帮助了学习过程。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well put. Well put.

沃伦·巴菲特：说得好。说得好。

26. Why we will never hire a compensation consultant

为什么我们永远不会雇佣薪酬顾问

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Mark Wares (PH) and it has to do with Berkshire’s compensation.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自马克·韦尔斯（PH），与伯克希尔的薪酬有关。

He says, “How does Berkshire structure the performance based-compensation of the CEOs of its subsidiaries? Please because as specific as you can regarding the metrics on which you focus the most, and how the degree to which those are attained translates into compensation.”

他说：“伯克希尔如何构建其子公司首席执行官的基于业绩的薪酬？请尽可能具体说明你们最关注的指标，以及这些指标的达成程度如何转化为薪酬。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, the first thing we do is we never engage a compensation consultant. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，首先我们从不聘请薪酬顾问。（掌声）

And we have, whatever it may be, 70-plus or whatever number businesses we have.

我们有，无论是什么，70 多家或其他数量的企业。

They have very different economic characteristics. To try to set some Berkshire standard to apply to businesses such as insurance, which has capital as a bulwark but which we get to invest in other things we’d invest in anyway, so there’s minus capital involved, to a BNSF or our utility business where there’s tons of capital involved, or in between See’s where there is very little capital involved.

它们具有非常不同的经济特征。试图为像保险这样的业务设定一些伯克希尔的标准，保险有资本作为防护，但我们可以投资于其他我们本来会投资的东西，因此涉及到的资本是负的（净流出），而对于 BNSF 或我们的公用事业业务则涉及大量资本，或者在 See's，涉及的资本非常少。

We have other businesses that are basically just so damn good that a, you know, a chimpanzee could run them, and we have other business that are so tough at times that, you know, if we had Alfred P. Sloan back, you know, we wouldn’t be able to do very well with them.

我们还有其他业务，基本上好得让人觉得，就连一只猩猩都能经营，而我们也有一些业务，有时难度大到，如果阿尔弗雷德·P·斯隆回来了，我们也无法很好地处理它们。

So there’s enormous differences in the economic characteristics of our business.

因此，我们业务的经济特征存在巨大的差异。

I try to figure out what — if I owned the whole business — what is a sensible way to employ somebody and compensate them, considering the economic characteristics of the business. So we have all kinds of different plans.

我试图弄清楚，如果我拥有整个业务，雇佣某人并给予他们合理的报酬的明智方式是什么，考虑到业务的经济特征。因此，我们有各种不同的计划。

It doesn’t take a couple of hours of my time a year to do it. We have managers who stay with us, so they must be reasonably happy with the plans.

这每年只需要我几个小时的时间。我们有留任的经理，所以他们对这些计划应该是相当满意的。

And, you know, it is not rocket science, but it does require — it requires the ability to differentiate.

而且，你知道，这并不是火箭科学，但确实需要——需要区分的能力。

If we had a human relations department, it would be a disaster. They would be attending conferences and people would be telling them all these different things to put in equations and so on. It just requires a certain amount of common sense.

如果我们有一个人力资源部门，那将是一场灾难。他们会参加会议，人们会告诉他们各种不同的事情来放入方程式等等。这只需要一定的常识。

And it requires, incidentally, an interaction with the managers where, you know, I listen to them, they listen to me, and we sort of agree on what really is the measure of what they’re actually adding to the company.

这需要与管理者的互动，您知道，我听他们说，他们也听我说，我们在某种程度上达成一致，真正衡量他们对公司所做贡献的标准是什么。

And — what do you — what do you say to that, Charlie?

那么——你对这个怎么看，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the U.S. Army and General Electric have centralized personnel policies that probably work best for them, and we have just the opposite system, and I think it clearly works best for us.

查理·芒格：我认为美国陆军和通用电气的人员政策是集中化的，这对他们来说可能是最有效的，而我们的系统正好相反，我认为这显然对我们来说是最有效的。

And practically nobody else is entirely like us, which makes us very peculiar. And I like it that way, don’t you?

而几乎没有其他人完全像我们，这使我们非常独特。我喜欢这样，你呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we really like it that way. We get worried when people agree with us. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们真的喜欢这样。当人们和我们意见一致时，我们就会感到担忧。（笑声）

We pay people — we pay some very big money. We have managers that have made and will make in the tens of millions annually, and we have managers that, you know, when we suffer, they suffer.

我们支付给人们——我们支付一些非常高的薪水。我们有一些经理每年赚取数千万，还有一些经理，当我们遭受损失时，他们也会受到影响。

But you’ve got to treat people fairly. Even though they don’t need the money, everybody wants to be treated fairly.

但你必须公平对待人们。即使他们不需要钱，每个人都希望受到公平对待。

And so the rationale for how you’re doing it should be understood, but there is no cross-Berkshire rationale at all. I mean, if you run See’s Candy, to put a cost of capital factor in or something like that, what the consultant would tell you, it’s nonsense.

因此，您如何进行补偿的理由应该是明确的，但没有跨伯克希尔的统一标准。如果你管理的是See's，设置资本成本因素等顾问会告诉你的，那是无稽之谈。

It isn’t going to make any difference whether there’s 40 million or 43 million or 37 million of capital in the business.

在业务中，资本是 4000 万、4300 万还是 3700 万都没有任何区别。

The main thing to do is, in terms of market position and all that sort of thing, the real thing I really want to pay managers for is widening the moat that separates our business from our competitors’ businesses over time. Now, that gets very subjective, so I don’t have any perfect way of doing that. But that is always going through my mind in trying to design compensation systems.

主要的事情是，在市场定位和所有这些方面，我真正想要支付给管理者的，是随着时间的推移，扩大我们业务与竞争对手业务之间的护城河。现在，这变得非常主观，所以我没有任何完美的方法来做到这一点。但在设计薪酬体系时，这始终在我脑海中盘旋。

So far, like I say, I don’t think — I can’t — can you recall any manager that’s ever left us over compensation, Charlie?

到目前为止，正如我所说，我认为——我不能——你能回忆起有哪个经理因为薪酬离开过我们吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it’s amazing how simple it’s been and how little time it has taken and how well it has worked.

查理·芒格：我认为这简单得令人惊讶，所花的时间很少，而且效果很好。

There’s this idea that headquarters can do these wonderful things. Headquarters, in a conglomerate kind of a company, is frequently hated in the field. We don’t want to be hated in the field. We don’t want an imperial headquarters with big costs that’s imposed everywhere.

有一种观点认为总部可以做一些很棒的事情。在一个综合性公司的总部，常常在基层受到厌恶。我们不想在基层被讨厌。我们不想要一个高成本的帝国式总部，强加于各地。

And averaged out, it’s worked wonderfully well for us.

而且平均来看，这对我们来说效果非常好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we make no headquarters charges. We charge for our credit with a couple of companies, but — most companies are allocating a couple percent of sales, maybe, or whatever it might be, to all their different operations. And usually it’s resented out in the field. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们没有总部费用。我们会对一些公司的信贷收取费用，但大多数公司可能会将几个百分点的销售额分配给各个不同的业务。而通常，一线对此感到愤恨。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Is it ever.

查理·芒格：确实如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. So we don’t do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。所以我们不这样做。

27. “We won’t trade reputation for money”

“我们不会为了金钱而牺牲声誉”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. My name is Joe Bob Hitchcock. I’m a winemaker from the Napa Valley in California.

观众成员：谢谢。我的名字是乔·鲍布·希区柯克。我是加利福尼亚纳帕谷的一名酿酒师。

I would like to suggest that the next time you and Charlie have a steak at Gorat’s that you accompany it with a new health food, a Napa Valley red wine. (Laughter)

我想建议你和查理下次在 Gorat's 吃牛排时，搭配一种新的健康食品，纳帕谷红酒。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We just went in the wine distribution business, as you may know. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：正如你们所知，我们刚刚进入了葡萄酒分销业务。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Excellent.

观众成员：很好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren is helpless, but I’m with you.

查理·芒格：沃伦无能为力，但我支持你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. (Laughter)

观众成员：好的。（笑声）

I’ll send you a bottle.

我会给你寄一瓶。

One of the keys to the success of Berkshire is your policy to allow the managers of the various Berkshire Hathaway companies to operate with minimal interference from Omaha.

伯克希尔成功的关键之一是你们的政策，允许各个伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的管理者在奥马哈以外进行最小干预的运作。

But if you became aware of unethical or illegal activities at a Berkshire Hathaway-owned company, would you directly and personally intervene?

但如果你意识到在伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下的公司存在不道德或非法活动，你会直接亲自干预吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. We have to jump in.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。我们必须介入。

We have a hotline, which I think was a very good invention of — it wasn’t an invention, but a good policy embodied in Sarbanes-Oxley. And, you know, that’s been a plus to us. I get letters directly sometimes.

我们有一个热线，我认为这是一个非常好的政策，体现在萨班斯-奥克斯利法案中。你知道，这对我们来说是一个好处。我有时会直接收到信件。

So I want to hear about problems. I hope somebody else has heard about them first and already gotten them solved, but if they don’t get solved someplace else, I want to hear about them.

所以我想听听问题。我希望其他人先听说过这些问题并且已经解决了，但如果在其他地方没有解决，我想听听这些问题。

And we have an internal audit function, which is important at Berkshire. And anything that comes in, you know, when somebody calls in on the complaint line and says, “The guy works next to me has bad breath,” I tend to skip over those.

我们有一个内部审计职能，这在伯克希尔非常重要。任何进入的投诉，比如有人打电话说：“我旁边的那个家伙口臭，”我通常会忽略这些。

But if anything comes in that relates to alleged bad behavior, it’s going to get investigated at Berkshire. And it does.

但如果有任何与所谓的不当行为有关的事情出现，伯克希尔会进行调查。而且确实会。

And every now and then, there have been some important transgressions that have come to us via either letters to me, or calls on the hotline, or maybe letters to the audit committee, whatever. We encourage that.

而时不时地，有一些重要的违规行为通过给我写的信、热线电话，或者可能是给审计委员会的信等方式传达给我们。我们对此表示鼓励。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We care more about that than business mistakes, way more.

查理·芒格：是的。我们更关心这个，而不是商业错误，远远超过。

WARREN BUFFETT: We have a letter that goes out every roughly two years; it’s the only communication. I probably ought to put a copy of it in the annual report sometime so that the shareholders see it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们大约每两年会发出一封信；这是唯一的沟通方式。我可能应该在年度报告中放一份副本，以便股东们看到。

But it’s a page and a half long. It asks the manager to tell me who, if something happened to them that night, who I should consider putting in charge of the place the next day.

但这封信一共只有一页半，要求管理者告诉我，如果他们今晚出事，第二天我该考虑谁来接管这个地方。

Doesn’t mean I’ll follow their advice, but I want to know their reasons and the pluses and minuses.

这并不意味着我会听从他们的建议，但我想知道他们的理由以及利弊。

But it starts off basically and it says, “Look, we’ve got all the money we need.” We’d like to make more money. We love making money.

但它基本上是这样开始的，它说：“看，我们有我们需要的所有钱。”我们想赚更多的钱。我们喜欢赚钱。

But we don’t have a shred more reputation than we need, and we won’t trade reputation for money.

但我们没有一点多余的声誉，我们不会用声誉换取金钱。

And we want that message to get out. It’s the reason we stick that Salomon thing in the movie every year. I mean, you can — probably some of you can recite it by now, but I don’t think it can hurt to keep repeating that story.

我们希望这个信息能够传播出去。这就是我们每年在电影中加入那个 Salomon 元素的原因。我的意思是，你们中的一些人可能现在可以背诵它，但我认为不断重复这个故事并没有坏处。

And the one thing we tell — we tell them that message, and then I’ve added a new line in this. And I say, if the reason you’re doing something, the best reason you can come up with, is that the other guy is doing it, it’s not good enough.

我们告诉他们这个信息，我还在里面加了一条新线。我说，如果你做某事的最佳理由是“别人也在做”，那就不够好。

There’s must be — there’s got to be some other reason besides, “The other fellow’s doing it,” or you’re in trouble. And I tell them, “Call me if anything’s questionable. You think it’s close to the line, give me a call.”

一定还有其他原因，而不仅仅是“别人也在这样做”，否则你就会有麻烦。我告诉他们，“如果有什么问题，给我打电话。你觉得这接近底线，给我打个电话。”

By saying that, nobody gives me a call because they — (laughs) — they know that the very fact that they think it’s that close to the line probably tells them it’s over the line.

这样一来，没有人会给我打电话，因为——（笑声）——他们知道，他们觉得事情接近界限的事实，可能已经说明超出界限了。

But I want to hear about stuff. We can cure any problem if we hear about it soon enough and take action soon enough. But if it’s allowed to fester out someplace and people cover it up — and sometimes they have — then we’ve got a problem.

但我想听听事情。我们可以治愈任何问题，只要我们及时了解并采取行动。但如果让问题在某个地方滋生，人们又掩盖它——有时他们确实这样做——那么我们就会有问题。

And we will have more of that in the future, there’s no getting around it, you know. If you have 260,000 people, there can be some things going on. I just hope we hear about them fast.

未来我们会有更多这样的事情，这是无法避免的，你知道的。如果有 260,000 人，就会发生一些事情。我只希望我们能尽快听到这些消息。

And I hope their managers hear about them even faster and do something before it even gets to us. But we want very much to protect the reputation of Berkshire. It’s the right thing to do.

我希望他们的经理能更快地听到这些，并在事情传到我们这里之前采取行动。但我们非常希望保护伯克希尔的声誉。这是正确的做法。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it is absolutely essential. And Berkshire, averaged out, has a very good reputation, as you can tell by the ratings from major media and surveys.

查理·芒格：嗯，这是绝对必要的。而伯克希尔的声誉总体上非常好，从主要媒体和调查的评级中可以看出。

And that is absolutely precious to us. In a sense, you people are part of the culture, too.

这对我们来说是非常珍贵的。从某种意义上说，你们也是文化的一部分。

The ideal is not to just make all the money that can be legally be made without causing too much legal trouble. The idea is bigger than that. It’s that we celebrate wealth only when it’s been fairly won and wisely used.

理想并不仅仅是合法赚取所有可以赚到的钱而不引起太多法律麻烦。这个理念更为深远。我们只有在财富是公正获得并明智使用时，才庆祝它。

And if that idea pervades the culture of a place, including the shareholders, we think that’s very helpful to us. (Applause)

如果这一理念渗透到整个企业的文化中，包括股东，我们认为这对我们很有帮助。（掌声）

28. BNSF has benefitted from good regulations

BNSF 从良好的监管中受益。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question relates to your investment in Burlington Northern, and it comes from Josh Sanbules (PH), who I believe is in New York City.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题与您对伯灵顿北方的投资有关，来自乔什·桑布尔斯（PH），我相信他在纽约市。

And he asks, “You mention in your annual letter that regulators of the railroad industry need to provide, quote, ‘certainty about allowable returns,’ unquote, in order to make huge investments. If you were going to help the regulators calculate, quote, ‘allowable returns,’ how would you suggest they do it?”

他问：“您在年度信中提到，铁路行业的监管者需要提供‘可允许的回报’的确定性，以便进行巨额投资。如果您要帮助监管者计算‘可允许的回报’，您会建议他们怎么做？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think the Service Transportation Board — and maybe Matt Rose could help give more details — but I think they’ve adopted something like 10 1/2 percent, or thereabouts, on invested capital.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为服务运输委员会——也许马特·罗斯可以提供更多细节——他们大约设定了10.5%或者差不多的投资资本回报率。

And if you had a major enough change in interest rates or something, you could argue that there should be some adjustment, perhaps, in one direction or another.

如果利率发生了重大变化，或者其他因素，你可以认为应该在某个方向上进行一些调整。

Usually, in the case of regulated utilities, they talk about return on equity. And you have different amounts in different states, but some states it may be 11 percent, in some states it may be 12 percent or something like that. It’s usually in that range.

通常，在受监管的公用事业中，他们会谈论股本回报率。在不同的州，回报率的数额不同，但在某些州可能是 11％，在其他州可能是 12％或类似的数字。通常在这个范围内。

With the railroads, they’ve gone toward this return on invested capital, which includes debt as an adjusted figure.

通过铁路，他们朝着这种投资资本回报率的方向发展，其中包括作为调整数字的债务。

And I don’t think that’s a crazy, crazy standard. I mean, the railroad, unlike the electric utility, when you get an allowed return in the electric utility you’re almost certain of earning it, I mean, if you behave yourself. And your demand is never going to fall off that much, probably, that you’ll go way below your return.

我认为这并不是一个疯狂的标准。我的意思是，铁路与电力公用事业不同，当你在电力公用事业中获得允许的回报时，你几乎可以肯定会赚到这笔钱，当然，前提是你要守规矩。而且你的需求不会下降到那么多，可能不会让你远低于你的回报。

The railroad’s got more downside in it if you run into a terrific industrial recession, so you’re not as protected on the downside.

如果遇到严重的工业衰退，铁路行业的下行风险更大，因此在下行方面的保护性较弱。

But there should be some figure, and I would argue that the 10 1/2 percent, or whatever it may be on invested capital, that’s been achieved by the four big railroads in recent years, something close to that or right around that figure.

但应该有一些数字，我认为最近几年四大铁路公司在投资资本上取得的 10.5%或其他类似的数字，应该接近这个数字。

And you want the railroads investing a whole lot more than depreciation, and I would think that would be — it’s certainly an inducement to me to invest money in improving the transportation system.

而且你希望铁路投资远远超过折旧，我认为这无疑是一个诱因，让我愿意投资改善交通系统。

And on the other hand, if that return were far lower than that, it would be crazy to put money, because you can’t change that railroad system and do something else with it.

另一方面，如果这个回报率远低于这个数字，投资就是不理智的，因为您无法改变那个铁路系统去做其他事情。

So I think the country and the railroad systems have a very common interest in not earning exorbitant profits or anything like that, but getting a decent return on what is sure to be much needed investment over the next 10, 20, 30 years.

所以，我认为国家和铁路系统在未来10、20、30年内迫切需要投资的过程中，有着共同的利益，既不赚取过高的利润，也能获得合理的回报。

And I’d go along with — if the Service Transportation Board says 10 1/2 percent, or some number like that, I think that’s not a crazy number.

如果服务运输委员会说是 10.5%或类似的数字，我认为这不是一个疯狂的数字。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, the railroads have been a hugely successful system, in terms of a regulated business. If you stop to think about it, the railroads of America have been essentially totally rebuilt in the last 30 or 40 years.

查理·芒格：嗯，是的，铁路在作为一个受监管的行业方面是一个极其成功的系统。如果你仔细想想，过去 30 或 40 年里，美国的铁路基本上已经完全重建。

They’ve improved the tracks, they’ve changed the size of the tunnels, they’ve improved the bridges. The average train can be more than twice as long and twice as heavy.

他们改善了轨道，改变了隧道的大小，改善了桥梁。平均火车的长度可以是以前的两倍，重量也可以是两倍。

And you can hardly imagine a business that’s done a better job in adapting to the needs of the rest of us than the American railroad industry. And that’s by and large been a system of wise regulation accompanied by wise management. And that was not always the case.

你几乎无法想象有哪个行业能像美国铁路行业那样更好地适应我们其他人的需求。这在很大程度上是一个明智监管与明智管理相结合的系统。而这并不总是如此。

If you go back a long time, neither the management nor the regulation was all that wise. But the existing system has worked very well for all of us.

如果追溯很久以前，管理和监管都不是那么明智。但现有的系统为我们所有人工作得非常好。

29. “Lumpy” earnings as competitive advantage

“波动”收益作为竞争优势

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 12.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第 12 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Ashish Texali (PH). I am from New Delhi, India.

观众成员：你好，我的名字是阿希什·特克萨利（PH）。我来自印度新德里。

First of all, I would like to thank Kelly Bruce (PH) and Carol from American Express to the help they’ve extended to make this event possible.

首先，我要感谢凯莉·布鲁斯（PH）和来自美国运通的卡罗尔，感谢他们提供的帮助，使这次活动成为可能。

The question regarding General Re and reinsurance business.

关于 General Re 和再保险业务的问题。

As the insurance business uses complex models, how is Berkshire more comfortable that insurance business models are not exposing you to significant risks like the models did for Wall Street?

由于保险业务使用复杂的模型，伯克希尔如何确保保险业务模型不会将您暴露于像华尔街那样的重大风险？

Also, if it is not confidential, is there concentration of risk? That is, what are those few events which can cause significant loss for insurance businesses?

另外，如果这不是机密信息，是否存在风险集中？也就是说，哪些少数事件可能会对保险业务造成重大损失？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m not sure I got all of that, but we run significant risks from earthquakes. We had, in the Chilean quake — I don’t know how much would have been in the first quarter. When you read our 10-Q there will be a number in there. But we insure 20 percent of Swiss Re. We will take 20 percent of their loss from that.

沃伦·巴菲特：我不确定我是否完全理解，但我们面临着来自地震的重大风险。在智利地震中——我不知道第一季度会有多少。当你阅读我们的 10-Q 时，里面会有一个数字。但我们为瑞士再保险公司承保 20%。我们将承担他们 20%的损失。

We have various other exposures in something like that. We included our best estimate in those figures I put up earlier.

我们在类似的事情中有各种其他的曝光。我们在我之前提到的数字中包含了我们最好的估计。

Our peak risks now, in terms of earthquakes or hurricanes — which are the two biggest natural catastrophes, in terms of frequency and severity — are probably down quite considerably from a few years ago, not because of any diminished appetite for risk. But we just haven’t felt that the rates were that attractive in those areas.

我们现在的高峰风险，在地震或飓风方面——这两者是频率和严重性上最大的自然灾害——可能比几年前大幅下降，并不是因为我们对风险的胃口减弱了。而是我们只是觉得这些领域的费率并不那么有吸引力。

But if we thought the rates were attractive, we’re perfectly willing to take on a group of risks where, if something very close to worst case happened, you know, we would lose $5 billion or something like that.

但如果我们认为这些费率具有吸引力，我们完全愿意承担一系列风险，如果发生非常接近最坏情况的事情，我们可能会损失 50 亿美元或类似的金额。

We lost 3 billion-plus in Katrina. We lost well over 2 billion, I think quite a bit more than that actually, on 9/11.

我们在卡特里娜飓风中损失了超过 30 亿。我认为在 911 事件中我们损失了超过 20 亿，实际上可能更多。

There will be things come along like that. Nothing that ever remotely comes close to making us uncomfortable, though, in terms of the level. I don’t know whether I got his full question there or not, Charlie, but you —

会有这样的事情发生。不过，在这个层面上，没有任何事情会让我们感到不适。我不知道我是否完全理解了他的提问，查理，但你——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, pretty close. I would say that the main difference between our practice and that of most other people is that we are deliberately seeking a method of operation which will give us occasional big losses in a single year, big overall losses.

查理·芒格：嗯，非常接近。我会说我们的方法与大多数其他人的主要区别在于，我们故意寻求一种操作方法，这种方法会让我们在某一年遭受偶尔的大损失，整体上也会有大的损失。

And everybody else is trying to avoid that. And we just want to be rich enough so a big loss in a single year is a blip.

而其他人则试图避免这种情况。我们只想确保自己足够富有，这样一年的大损失只会是一个小插曲。

And that’s a competitive advantage, that willingness to endure fluctuating annual results. Big advantage, wouldn’t you say?

这就是一种竞争优势，愿意承受波动的年度业绩。你不觉得这是一个很大的优势吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a huge advantage. It’s a huge advantage. And it’s one that no one else is going to pick up on. I mean, they know what we do, they just don’t want to do it, or they’re unable to do it, in terms of financial resources.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一种巨大的优势。这是一种巨大的优势。而且这是其他人无法掌握的。我是说，他们知道我们在做什么，他们只是不想做，或者在财务资源方面无法做到。

So, I would say that comes very close to a permanent and substantial advantage at Berkshire.

所以，我会说这接近于在伯克希尔的一个永久性和实质性的优势。

I don’t — forget about — you shouldn’t forget about it, but forget about the human suffering and all that. Just the financial consequences of a Katrina, you know, when we lose 3 billion in that, I don’t feel any different the next day than I felt the day before, financially. I mean, it just doesn’t make any difference, because we are in that particular game.

我不——忘记——你不应该忘记，但忘记人类的痛苦和所有这些。仅仅是卡特里娜的财务后果，你知道，当我们在那方面损失 30 亿时，我第二天的感觉和前一天没有任何不同，财务上。我是说，这根本没有任何区别，因为我们正处于那个特定的游戏中。

And as long as we make the right decisions over time, in terms of the premiums we get, and as long as we never expose ourselves to a loss that would really shake up our capital structure or anything, you know, that is a game in which we have a huge competitive edge. And it gets wider every year.

只要我们在时间上做出正确的决策，获得合适的保费，并且永远不让自己面临会真正动摇我们资本结构的损失，你知道，这是一场我们拥有巨大竞争优势的游戏。而且这种优势每年都在扩大。

So, you know, risk — we are in the business — in insurance, we are in the business of taking the other guys’ desire to smooth their earnings, and, in exchange, get what we think are larger, lumpy earnings over time. We like the business.

所以，您知道，风险——我们在保险中，就是在于利用其他人希望平滑他们收益的愿望，换取我们认为在时间上能获得更大、不规则收益的机会。我们喜欢这个行业。

保险业务的本质，任何性质的平滑都是有成本的，比如，锁定外汇汇率。

Carol? Oh, go ahead, Charlie.

卡罗尔？哦，继续吧，查理。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I was going to say Warren has a different position than a lot of other people in the insurance business. After a year in which Berkshire has a big loss, he can look into his shaving mirror and say, “Your shareholder still loves you.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我想说沃伦在保险行业中的立场与许多其他人不同。在伯克希尔经历了一年的重大亏损后，他可以照着剃须镜看自己，并说：“你的股东仍然爱你。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s right.

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Other people are not in that position.

查理·芒格：其他人并不处于那种位置。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I knew a guy from Omaha who, 40 or 50 years ago, was one of the richest guys in the United States, named Howard Ahmanson. And Howard had a fetish about owning 100 percent of everything that he came in contact with.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我认识一个来自奥马哈的人，40 或 50 年前，他是美国最富有的人之一，名叫霍华德·阿赫曼森。霍华德对拥有他接触到的所有事物的 100%拥有权有一种执念。

And so he said, when asked why, he said, “I like to look in the mirror and say, ‘All my shareholders love me.’” (Laughter)

于是他回答，当被问及原因时，他说：“我喜欢照镜子并说，‘我所有的股东都爱我。’”（笑声）

And I’m not quite that extreme, but I like to look in the mirror and say, “Enough of my shareholders love me.” (Laughter)

我并没有那么极端，但我喜欢照镜子对自己说：“我的股东们足够爱我。”（笑声）

30. “Gambling” with derivatives

“衍生品”赌博

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol. 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is about derivatives.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题是关于衍生品的。

“What useful function do derivatives serve in our economy? We got along quite well without them for many years. If they serve no useful purpose, and in fact, have demonstrated that they can do considerable damage to the economy, why are they not made illegal, especially the naked ones? There is precedent for that.

“衍生品在我们的经济中有什么有用的功能？多年来我们过得很好，没有它们。如果它们没有任何有用的目的，实际上还证明它们可能对经济造成重大损害，为什么不将它们禁止，尤其是裸露的衍生品？这是有先例的。

“I believe that short selling of stocks that one does not own or has managed to borrow is illegal.”

“我相信，卖空自己不拥有或未能借到的股票是非法的。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie has — he can get worked up more on this than I can, so I’m going to let him answer that. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理对此比我更激动，所以我让他来回答这个问题。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the usefulness of derivatives has always been overrated. If we didn’t have any derivatives at all, including contracts to buy and sell grain that were traded on exchanges, we’d still have plenty of oats and wheat.

查理·芒格：我认为衍生品的实用性一直被高估。如果我们根本没有任何衍生品，包括在交易所交易的买卖谷物的合同，我们仍然会有足够的燕麦和小麦。

I mean, I think it is slightly more convenient for people to be able to hedge their risks of farming by using derivative markets and commodities.

我的意思是，我认为能够通过使用衍生市场和商品来对冲农业风险稍微方便了一些。

And the test is not, “Is there any benefit in derivatives?” The question is, is the net benefit versus disadvantage from derivatives useful? Or would we be better off without it?

测试不是“衍生品是否有任何好处？”而是“衍生品的净收益与损害相比是有用的，还是如果没有它们，我们会更好？”

My own view is that, if we went back to having nothing but derivative trading in commodities, metals, currencies, safely conducted under responsible rules, and all other derivatives contracts vanished from the earth, it would be a better place. (Applause)

我个人的看法是，如果我们回到只有在负责任的规则下安全进行的商品、金属和货币的衍生品交易，而所有其他衍生品合同都消失在地球上，那将是一个更好的地方。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll take a current example. Burlington Northern has hedged diesel fuel, which they use a lot of, over the years. And then they also have fuel adjustment clauses in a lot of their contracts for transportation.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们来举一个当前的例子。伯灵顿北方铁路多年来对他们大量使用的柴油燃料进行了对冲。此外，他们在许多运输合同中也有燃料调整条款。

With Matt Rose, who does a wonderful job of running Burlington, I basically say, “Look at. If I were running the place, I wouldn’t bother to hedge them,” because if you hedge it — if you hedge it for a million years, you know, you’re going to be out the frictional costs, probably, of doing it, unless you’re smarter than the market generally on diesel fuel. And if you’re smarter than the market on diesel fuel generally, we’ll go into the business of speculating on diesel fuel.

与马特·罗斯一起，他在管理伯灵顿方面做得非常出色，我基本上会说：“看看。如果我是这里的负责人，我就不会去对冲它们，”因为如果你对冲——如果你对冲一百万年，你知道，你可能会承担进行对冲的摩擦成本，除非你在柴油燃料方面比市场更聪明。如果你在柴油燃料方面比市场更聪明，我们就会进入柴油燃料的投机业务。

I mean, if we’ve really got an edge, you know, why bother to run the trains? Let’s just speculate diesel fuel.

我的意思是，如果我们真的有优势，你知道，为什么还要费心去运营火车呢？不如就投机柴油燃料。

But I also say, you know, they’ve got — and if you have an organization where you have somebody in charge of that activity, it’s going to take place.

不过我也会说，如果你在一家有一个人负责这项活动的组织中，它会发生。

On the other hand, Matt Rose has done a fabulous job, as well as his management team, in running Burlington Northern. If they are more comfortable, or they find it useful in any way, in terms of pricing contracts, or anything, to hedge it, that’s fine with me, too.

另一方面，马特·罗斯和他的管理团队在运营伯灵顿北方铁路方面做得非常出色。如果他们在定价合同或其他方面感到更舒适，或者发现对冲有任何用处，我也没问题。

本质上没有必要做的事但如果对心理有一些安慰，付一点摩擦成本也是有价值的。

I mean, it’s his company, he can figure out the best way of running it. I’ll hold him responsible for how it does over time. And, you know, I would do it one way and somebody else would do it another way. I don’t think that’s —

我的意思是，这是他的公司，他可以找到最好的管理方式。我会对它随时间的表现让他负责。而且，你知道，我会以一种方式做，而其他人会以另一种方式做。我认为这并不是——

I would not condemn anybody that’s running a railroad for hedging diesel fuel, nor would I condemn anybody that runs an energy company, like we do at MidAmerican, for hedging energy costs in certain ways.

我不会谴责任何为了对冲柴油燃料而经营铁路的人，也不会谴责任何像我们在 MidAmerican 那样以某种方式对冲能源成本的能源公司。

But I do think, if we could put up a presentation, number 4 on the screen, please.

但是我确实认为，如果我们能把第 4 号演示文稿放到屏幕上，请。

I think it was said very well in 1935. In fact, chapter 8 of Keynes’s General — chapter 12, I’m sorry — chapter 12 of Keynes’s “General Theory” is, by far, in my view, probably Charlie’s too, the best description of the way capital markets function, the real way people operate. It’s prescriptive, it’s descriptive.

我认为在 1935 年说得非常好。实际上，凯恩斯的《通论》第 12 章，抱歉，是第 12 章，在我看来，可能也是查理的看法，是对资本市场运作方式的最佳描述，真实地反映了人们的运作方式。它是规范性的，也是描述性的。

Everybody should read chapter 12. It’s a little — it starts a little slow in the first few pages.

每个人都应该读第 12 章。它的开头有点慢，前几页的节奏比较缓慢。

But Keynes — I’m going to read this because I don’t think Charlie has it in front of him.

但是凯恩斯——我将读这个，因为我认为查理没有在他面前。

The first part of it is very familiar to people. I mean, this quote has been used a lot. But every word in this, to me, is right on the money.

它的第一部分对人们来说非常熟悉。我的意思是，这句话被使用得很多。但在我看来，这里的每一个字都是恰到好处的。

“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.”

“投机者在稳定的企业流中可能无害如泡沫。但当企业成为投机漩涡中的泡沫时，情况就严重了。”

锁汇率“无害如泡沫”。

You can change that to “gambling” if you want to.

你可以把它改成“赌博”，如果你想的话。

“When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.” That’s the famous part of the quote.

“当一个国家的资本发展成为赌场活动的副产品时，这项工作很可能会做得不够好。”这是这句话的著名部分。

Keynes went on to say, “The measure of success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism - which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street have been in fact directed towards a different object.”

凯恩斯继续说：“华尔街所取得的成功，作为一个机构，其适当的社会目的就是将新的投资引导到未来收益的最有利渠道，这一成就不能被称为放任资本主义的杰出胜利——如果我认为华尔街的优秀人才实际上被引导到一个不同的目标，这并不令人惊讶。”

That was written in 1935. I don’t think there’s been anything better written about how government, how citizens, should look at Wall Street and what it does and it doesn’t.

这是在1935年写的。我认为没有什么比这更好地描述了政府和公民应如何看待华尔街及其所做的事情。

It’s always had this mixture of a casino operation and a very socially important operation.

它总是包含着赌场经营和非常重要的社会价值的混合。

And when derivatives became popular, and academia was behind them 100 percent. They were teaching more about how to value an option than they were about how to value a business. And I witnessed that and it drove me crazy.

当衍生品变得流行，学术界100%支持它们时。他们教导更多关于如何评估期权，而不是如何评估商业。我目睹了这一切，感到非常恼火。

But in 1982, Congress was considering, really, the expansion of a derivative contract to the general public in a huge, publicized way. It was the S&P 500 contract. That changed the whole derivatives game.

但在 1982 年，国会实际上在考虑以一种巨大的、公开的方式向公众扩展衍生合约。这就是标准普尔 500 合约。这改变了整个衍生品市场。

At that point, basically, Wall Street just said, “Come on in, and everybody can speculate in an index. Not any real company, just an index. And you can buy it at 10 o’clock in the morning and sell it at 10:01, and you’re contributing to this wonderful society by doing it.”

在那时，华尔街基本上说：“进来吧，大家可以在指数上进行投机。不是任何真正的公司，只是一个指数。你可以在早上10点买进，10点01分卖出，你通过这样做为这个美好的社会做出了贡献。”

And I wrote a letter to Congressman Dingle, and we’ll put up exhibit 5. I just excerpted a few of the statements I made there. This was one month before they put in trading in the S&P 500, April. They put it in April, 1982, in Chicago; did a little in Kansas City first.

我写了一封信给国会议员丁格（Dingle），我们将放上第5个幻灯片。我只是摘录了我在那封信中写的一些声明。这是在他们决定在芝加哥推行标准普尔500交易的一个月前，也就是1982年4月。他们在芝加哥推出了它；首先在堪萨斯城进行了一小部分。

And I went through four pages of things and I just pulled out a few things. But I think that, to some extent, what I forecasted then has turned out to be the case.

我翻阅了四页的内容，只挑出了几样东西。但我认为，在某种程度上，我当时预测的情况已经变成了现实。

And then it got squared and all of that, as both the people in Wall Street kept dreaming up new and new ways for people to gamble.

然后它被平方了，所有这些，华尔街的人们不断想出新的方式让人们赌博。

And as I say, academia was applauding all along the way and getting hired as consultants to various exchanges to tell them how wonderful they were, in terms of their social purpose.

正如我所说，学术界一路在欢呼，并受聘为各种交易所的顾问，告诉他们他们的社会目标是多么美好。

I think that — well, it’s up there for you to read. I’d be glad — the whole letter was reprinted, I believe, in Fortune at one time, Carol. Was it—?

我认为——好吧，您可以阅读上面的内容。我很高兴——整封信我相信曾在《财富》杂志上重印过，卡罗尔。是吗——？

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, if I remember right, this was like the only letter in opposition to this uniformly acclaimed new world of better gambling in things related to securities. Warren wrote the letter —

查理·芒格：顺便说一下，如果我没记错的话，这封信是唯一一封反对这个普遍赞誉的新世界的信，涉及与证券相关的更好赌博。沃伦写了这封信——

WARREN BUFFETT: And it’s a —

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一场——

CHARLIE MUNGER: — all those years ago, and it was the only letter —

查理·芒格：—— 多年前，那是唯一的一封信 ——

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally —

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下——

CHARLIE MUNGER: He basically said the idea’s insane. It will do more harm than good. Then, as now, people didn’t pay that much attention to him.

查理·芒格：他基本上说这个想法是疯狂的。它会造成更多的伤害而不是好处。那时和现在，人们对他并没有太多的关注。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I’ll venture that very few people in this room know — you all know that if you buy a stock, you have to hold it for a very long period of time to get a special capital gains treatment on it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我敢说，这个房间里很少有人知道——你们都知道，如果你买了一只股票，你必须持有很长一段时间才能获得特别的资本利得待遇。

If you buy an S&P 500 contract at 11 o’clock and sell it at 11:01 and have a profit, it’s taxed 60 percent as a long-term capital gain, and 40 percent as short-term capital gain.

如果你在 11 点买入一份标准普尔 500 合约，并在 11:01 卖出并获利，那么 60%的利润将作为长期资本收益征税，40%作为短期资本收益征税。

So you really get better tax treatment if you’re gambling on an S&P 500 derivative, which is what it is, in Chicago, than you do if you invest for four or five months in some security and then have to sell it for some reason.

所以如果你在芝加哥对标准普尔500衍生品进行赌博，你实际上获得的税收待遇要比你在某些证券中投资4到5个月后因为某种原因不得不卖出时的待遇要好得多。

It’s a tribute to the lobbying power of a rather small group that has done very well off this particular activity.

这是对一小部分人游说力量的证明，这部分人从这一特定活动中获得了丰厚的利益。

Charlie, can you think of any reason why it’s 60 percent long-term gain if you hold something for 30 seconds? (Laughs)

查理，您能想到任何理由，为什么如果你只持有30秒，它就能享受60%的长期收益吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course it’s crazy. It’s neither fair nor sensible.

查理·芒格：当然，这很疯狂。这既不公平也不明智。

But if a small group with a lot of money and influence cares a great deal about something and the rest of us are indifferent, why, they tend to win before our legislative bodies.

但是如果一个拥有大量资金和影响力的小团体非常关心某件事，而我们其他人对此漠不关心，那么他们往往会在我们的立法机构面前获胜。

That’s just the way it is. I always liked Bismarck’s remark that you shouldn’t watch two things: sausage making and legislation making. (Laughter)

我一直喜欢比斯马克（Bismarck）的一句话，你不应该看两件事：香肠制作和立法的过程。（笑声）

31. Buffett is losing his bet against hedge funds

巴菲特正在输掉他对冲基金的赌注

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, with those hopeful words — (laughter) — we’re going to break for lunch. Before we break for lunch, I made a charitable wager with a group, Protégé Partners, two years ago about the behavior of funds of funds that they would select, hedge funds, and the S&P index fund.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，带着这些充满希望的话——（笑声）——我们要休息一下，吃午餐。在我们休息吃午餐之前，我和一个名为 Protégé Partners 的团体在两年前做了一个慈善赌注，关于他们选择的基金中的基金、对冲基金和标准普尔指数基金的表现。

The duration of our wager is ten years, and whichever one loses, the money goes — well the money from both goes to the winner’s charity, is what it amounts to.

我们的赌注持续十年，输的人将把钱——实际上是双方的钱——捐给赢家的慈善机构。

Interesting firm out on the West Coast that supervises what they call these long bets. So if we’ll put up exhibit 6, you can see at this point I’m behind.

这是一个有趣的公司，位于西海岸，专门监督这些所谓的长期赌注。如果我们能放上第6个幻灯片，你可以看到目前我处于劣势。

And have we gotten exhibits? Yeah. Let’s go to lunch. OK. (Laughter)

我们得到了展示吗？是的。好吧。去午餐吧。好的。（笑声）

Afternoon session

下午会议

32. Speak out, but speak responsibly

说出你的想法，但要负责任地说。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I think therefore we go to 13, which is in a separate room. And is there anybody at the microphone in 13?

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为我们去 13 号房间，那是一个单独的房间。13 号房间有谁在麦克风前吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, there is.

观众成员：是的，有。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. This is a shareholder from New York. One could argue that a major contributor to the great bubble was that there wasn’t a healthy and open debate. That all the opinion and all of the money was on one side of the trade.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自纽约的股东。可以说，造成巨大泡沫的一个主要原因是没有健康和开放的辩论。所有的观点和资金都集中在交易的一方。

And I was thinking about this recently as I read Christine Richard’s new book, “Confidence Game,” about Bill Ackman and his battle with what was once the largest bond insurer, MBIA.

最近我在阅读克里斯汀·理查德的新书《信心游戏》时，想到这一点，这本书讲述了比尔·阿克曼与曾经最大的债券保险公司 MBIA 之间的斗争。

The story also reminded me of David Einhorn and the questions he raised about Allied Capital and Lehman Brothers. We now know that they were 100 percent correct, but at the time that they first spoke up they were attacked by the companies, pilloried by the media, ignored by the accountants of those firms and the rating agencies, and perhaps most alarmingly were investigated by the SEC for daring to go public with their bearish analyses.

这个故事也让我想起了大卫·爱因霍恩以及他对联邦资本和雷曼兄弟提出的问题。我们现在知道他们是百分之百正确的，但在他们首次发声时却遭到了公司的攻击，被媒体抨击，被这些公司的会计师和评级机构忽视，甚至更令人担忧的是，他们因敢于公开发表看跌分析而受到美国证券交易委员会的调查。

And I can tell you that watching what happened to them, it’s a real deterrent to anyone else speaking up and raising similar questions.

我可以告诉你，看到他们发生的事情，确实让其他人不敢发声和提出类似的问题。

So I’d be curious for your thoughts on this, and is having short sellers speak out healthy for our markets?

我对你的看法很感兴趣，做空者发声对我们的市场是否有益？

And in general what should be done to encourage a greater diversity of opinions so that we can avoid future bubbles? Thank you. (Applause)

一般来说，应该采取什么措施来鼓励更多样化的观点，以便我们能够避免未来的泡沫？谢谢。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t see anything wrong with people who are positive or negative speaking out, as long as they’re willing to be held responsible for the kind of statements they make. I mean, there are — obviously —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为人们无论是持积极态度还是消极态度发声都没有问题，只要他们愿意为他们所说的陈述负责。我的意思是，显然——

Well, take the extreme example. If there were two banks in town, and I owned one of them and I was of kind of a devious type of mind, I might go out and hire 50 people to stand in line in front of the other bank, and I would probably not have a competitor before long.

好吧，举个极端的例子。如果镇上有两家银行，而我拥有其中一家，并且我心思有些阴险，我可能会雇佣 50 个人在另一家银行前排队，这样我很快就可能没有竞争对手了。

So you can do things on either side, the long side or the short side, that I would regard as certainly unethical and in many cases should be illegal.

所以你可以在任一方面进行操作，无论是做多还是做空，我认为这肯定是不道德的，在许多情况下应该是非法的。

But anytime you attack the conventional wisdom, you’re going to meet with a lot of opposition because you’re threatening people’s positions.

但每当你挑战传统观念时，你会遇到很多反对，因为你威胁到了人们的地位。

When we would talk about the efficient market theory 30 years ago when it was absolutely de rigueur that — and virtually every finance department in the country, major schools, you either had to swear allegiance to it or you were not going to be promoted.

当我们在 30 年前谈论有效市场理论时，那时几乎是必须的——几乎每个国家的金融系、主要学校，你要么必须宣誓效忠于它，要么就不会得到晋升。

You know, people don’t like that. And any institution, when they get a threat from the outside, they will attack both the threat and the threatener.

你知道，人们不喜欢这样。任何机构在受到外部威胁时，都会同时攻击威胁和威胁者。

But that exists on both sides. I have no problem with short selling, and I have no problem with speaking out responsibly about your reasons for doing so, any more than I have on the long side.

但这在双方都存在。我对卖空没有问题，也对负责任地表达你这样做的理由没有问题，这与我对做多的看法没有区别。

There have been some very bad practices on the short side, and there have been some very bad practices on the long side, in terms of people trying to literally spread things that are untrue.

在短期方面存在一些非常糟糕的做法，在长期方面也存在一些非常糟糕的做法，涉及到人们试图传播一些不真实的事情。

But that has probably been more on the long side over the years than on the short side, by some margin.

但多年来，这可能更多地偏向于长的一面，而不是短的一面，差距相当大。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think to some extent you’re criticizing the wrong people. In many cases, the accountants that allowed the lousy accounting are the ones that ought to be held in the dock. And they get very little criticism in America and that’s a mistake.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为在某种程度上你批评的是错误的人。在许多情况下，允许糟糕会计的会计师才是应该被追责的人。而他们在美国几乎没有受到太多批评，这是一种错误。

33. Why there’s no synergy among subsidiaries

为什么子公司之间没有协同效应

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？（掌声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Ben Soh (PH) who lives in the metro Vancouver area in British Columbia, Canada. This is for either Mr. Buffett or Mr. Munger.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自于住在加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚省温哥华大都会地区的本·索（PH）。这是给巴菲特先生或芒格先生的。

He wants to know about synergies at Berkshire, specifically, “Does it make sense that the Dairy Queen stores here sell PepsiCo products and would not expect — accept — American Express, only Mastercard or Visa? (Laughter)

他想了解伯克希尔的协同效应，具体来说，“在这里的冰雪皇后店卖百事可乐产品而不接受美国运通，只接受万事达或维萨，这是否合理？”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There are — around the world, there are pretty close to 6,000 Dairy Queen outlets of one sort or another. And some are called Grill and Chill now, different things, but roughly 6,000, and company-operated are 70 of those.

沃伦·巴菲特：世界各地差不多有6000家冰雪皇后店，某种程度上，叫“Grill and Chill”等等，大约6000家，其中公司运营的只有70家。

So almost 99 percent are franchised, and at Dairy Queen we do not control what the franchisees do. Most of the franchisees — last time I checked sometime back — but most of the franchisees serve Coke, the enlightened ones — (laughter) — but it is entirely their business.

所以几乎99%都是特许经营的，而在冰雪皇后，我们并不控制特许经营者的经营方式。大多数特许经营者——我上次检查时，大多数特许经营者都是卖可口可乐，睿智的特许经营者——（笑声）——但这完全是他们的生意。

They can — they can — they can serve Coca-Cola products or Pepsi. It seems some of the other franchise operations seem to have more control over that than Dairy Queen.

他们可以——他们可以——他们可以提供可口可乐产品或百事可乐。似乎其他一些特许经营业务在这方面的控制力比冰雪皇后更强。

But if you think about it, Dairy Queen goes back before McDonald’s, before Wendy’s, before Burger King, before Kentucky Fried, all of those. It goes way back into the ’30s, and a lot of the agreements with franchisees were territorial operators were done on the back of a napkin, or something of the sort.

但是如果你仔细想想，冰雪皇后比麦当劳、温迪、汉堡王、肯德基都要早，早在 30 年代。与特许经营者的许多协议都是在餐巾纸的背面或类似的地方达成的。

So to some extent we have less control over what franchisees do, particular in certain — a few parts of the country — than other people.

因此，在某种程度上，我们对特许经营者的行为控制较少，特别是在国家的某些地区，较其他人更是如此。

But we’ll — keep asking for Coke, and maybe you can cause them to see the light. The synergies, any synergies, any synergies at Berkshire come about at the operational level pretty much.

但我们会继续要求可口可乐，或许你能让他们看到光明。伯克希尔的任何协同效应，都是在运营层面上实现的。

We do not tell our companies to do business with each other. We hope they do do business with each other, and, you know, and we hope that each side of a subsidiary A offers good reasons for subsidiary B to do business with them.

我们并不告诉我们的公司彼此做生意。我们希望他们能够彼此做生意，并且，我们希望子公司 A 的每一方都能为子公司 B 提供良好的理由，以便与他们做生意。

But the whole idea at Berkshire is that our managers are responsible for their businesses, and if they’re going to be responsible for their businesses it means we shouldn’t tell them what to do, except in very limited ways.

但伯克希尔的整个理念是我们的经理对他们的业务负责，如果他们要对自己的业务负责，这意味着我们不应该告诉他们该做什么，除非在非常有限的情况下。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you’ve accurately described the way it is. What’s interesting about it is we really like it that way. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，你准确地描述了事情的真相。有趣的是，我们真的喜欢这样。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a lot less work. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这轻松多了。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And I think, actually, that there’s some merit. Sometimes people work better together if it’s their decision to work together than if you tell them to work together.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为，这实际上是有一定道理的。有时候，如果是他们自己决定一起工作，而不是你告诉他们一起工作，人们的合作效果会更好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It goes beyond that. Warren and I would like it that way if we were in the subsidiaries. There’s no doubt about that.

查理·芒格：这不仅仅是这样。如果我们在这些子公司中，我们也会喜欢这种方式。这一点毫无疑问。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’d probably leave if it wasn’t that way. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果不是那样的话，我们可能会离开。（笑）

34. Act as if “you were an owner of the place”

采取“你是这个地方的主人”的态度

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area 1.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。区域 1。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Mr. Buffett, dear Mr. Munger, my name is Steven Roman (PH). I’m a student of engineering maschinenbau at the University of Vienna in Austria.

观众成员：亲爱的巴菲特先生，亲爱的芒格先生，我叫史蒂文·罗曼（PH）。我是在奥地利维也纳大学学习机械工程的学生。

If I one day want to apply as a manager with one of the Berkshire companies, what qualities are you especially looking for? And what do I have to do to become your successor? (Laughter)

如果有一天我想申请成为伯克希尔公司的一名经理，您特别看重哪些品质？我需要做些什么才能成为您的接班人？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably shoot me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：大概是要把我打死。（笑声）

The managers of our subsidiaries hire their own people. The number of decisions I have to make about managers are really, really few.

我们的子公司的经理自己招聘员工。我需要做的关于经理的决策真的非常少。

As I mentioned earlier, they do send me a letter that if something happens to them, gives me their ideas about who should succeed them.

正如我之前提到的，他们确实给我写了一封信，如果他们发生了什么事情，信中表达了他们对谁应该接替他们的看法。

But I make no decisions about who gets hired at GEICO, or Burlington, or Mid-American or anything of the sort. I mean, if they need a CFO they go out and hire a CFO, or if they need somebody to run a plant they go out and hire them themselves.

但我并不决定谁在 GEICO、Burlington、Mid-American 或类似公司被雇用。我的意思是，如果他们需要首席财务官，他们就会去雇一个首席财务官；或者如果他们需要有人来管理工厂，他们就会自己去雇人。

They are responsible for their operations, and occasionally we have a death, we have an occasional — very occasional, I can’t even hardly think of one — resignation.

他们对自己的运营负责，偶尔我们会有死亡事件，偶尔 — 非常偶尔，我几乎想不起来有过一次 — 辞职。

And at that point I have to make a decision about who should be put in charge of the operation. But I don’t think I’ve had more than 10 or 12 of those in 45 years.

在那种情况下，我需要做出决定，谁应该负责这个运营。但在45年里，我不认为我有过超过10或12次这样的情况。

So I’m not a very good employment agency. We have 21 people, I think it is, at headquarters, and I made a terrific hire here a few months ago. But that’ll take care of me for four or five years.

所以我不是一个很好的就业中介。我们总部有 21 个人，我想是这样，几个月前我在这里招聘了一个非常出色的人。但这将让我受益四到五年。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there’s no indication we’d be particularly good at it, either. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我们没有任何迹象表明我们会特别擅长这件事。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I wasn’t going to mention that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我本不打算提到这个。（笑声）

But I would say this: if you want — what is interesting to me is that when you find somebody outstanding, boy, do they jump out. I mean, somebody that is thinking about the place the right way, is working extra hard, whatever it may be.

但我想说的是：如果你想——对我来说，有趣的是，当你找到一个杰出的人时，他们确实会让人眼前一亮。我的意思是，那种以正确方式思考公司、额外努力工作的人，无论是什么。

There aren’t — you don’t have that much competition in this world. So, in terms of generally advancing within organizations, I think you’d be surprised at how little competition you really have if you start thinking like you would if you were an owner of the place, and working like you would if you were an owner of the place, and pretty soon you may be running something.

这个世界上竞争并没有那么激烈。因此，在组织内部的晋升方面，我认为你会惊讶于，当你开始像一位业主一样思考，并像一位业主一样工作时，实际上你面临的竞争有多么少，很快你可能就会负责某个事情。

35. Retained earnings, present value, and dividends

留存收益、现值和股息

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Tomer Malon (PH) from Tel Aviv, Israel. And he has clearly been a long-time shareholder because he references your 1984 Chairman Letter.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自以色列特拉维夫的托默·马隆（PH）。显然，他是一位长期股东，因为他提到了你 1984 年的董事长信。

He writes, “You have previously stated that a company should retain its earnings only if, quote, ‘For every dollar retained, at least one dollar of market value will be created for owners,’ unquote.

他写道：“您曾表示，公司只有在‘每留存一美元，至少为所有者创造一美元的市场价值’的情况下，才应保留其收益。”

“You also noted that if such conditions will no longer apply to Berkshire, as measured on the basis of a five-year rolling average, then quote, ‘We will distribute all unrestricted earnings that we believe cannot be effectively used.’

“您还提到，如果这种情况不再适用于伯克希尔，以五年滚动平均值为基础进行衡量，则‘我们将分配所有我们认为无法有效利用的无限制收益’。”

“However, during the five-year period between July third — I’m sorry, January 3rd, 2005 and December 31st, 2009, the average annual earnings per share for class A, as reported, amounted to $5,930, while at the same period the average annual change in the share’s market price was only $2,420.

“然而，在2005年1月3日至2009年12月31日的五年期间，按报告计算的A类股平均每年收益为5,930美元，而在同一期间，股价的平均年变化仅为2,420美元。”

“Consequently, are you considering a distribution of a dividend or buying back shares? I imagine I know the answer, but I thought we had to ask.” (Laughter)

“因此，您是否考虑分配股息或回购股票？我想我知道答案，但我认为我们必须问。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, he does know the answer, but we’ll elaborate.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，他确实知道答案，但我们会详细说明。

I did write that, not only in 1984 but continuously in the back of the Berkshire annual report where I’ve got our economic principles.

我确实写过这个，不仅在 1984 年，而且在伯克希尔年报的后面持续写着我们的经济原则。

And frankly, the way I wrote that the first time was not well thought out. And in the 2009 annual report, partly because somebody asked that question last year, I actually rewrote that section.

坦率地说，我第一次写那个的时候并没有经过深思熟虑。在 2009 年的年报中，部分原因是因为去年有人问了那个问题，我实际上重写了那一部分。

And I pointed out that even when I wrote it in 1984, we would have flunked the test in many previous years when, generally speaking, the stock market had suffered a significant decline over a period of time.

我指出，即使在1984年我写的时候，在许多以前的年份里，我们也会不及格，因为一般来说，股市在一段时间内经历了显著的下跌。

As you can tell by looking at our report, right now every dollar that we have left in the business, you know, has produced, in present value terms, something over $1.30 of market value.

从我们的报告中可以看出，目前我们在业务中剩下的每一美元，按现值计算，产生了超过 1.30 美元的市场价值。

We have met the test of retained earnings proving their worth. But the way I phrased that originally, anytime the stock market went down a whole lot in a five-year period, because we were carrying our Coca-Cola at a certain price five years earlier or whatever it was that entered into our asset value, we could have done a great job of allocating capital in the five-year period and we still would have looked bad.

我们已经通过保留盈余的考验证明了它们的价值。但我最初表述的方式是，在五年期间，如果股市大幅下跌，因为我们以五年前的某个价格持有可口可乐或其他进入我们资产价值的东西，即使我们在这五年期间资本配置做得很好，我们仍然会看起来很糟糕。

And similarly if the stock market had gone up a whole lot, we could have done a dumb job and looked good.

如果股市大幅上涨，我们也可能做得很糟，但看起来却很好。

So, if you will look in the back of the 2009 annual report, I think it’s number 11, or — I’m not sure about that.

所以，如果你查看 2009 年年报的最后一页，我想是第 11 页，或者——我不太确定。

But read the economic principles. You’ll see that I had to confess my error in how I originally worded that.

但是阅读经济原则。你会看到我不得不承认我最初措辞时的错误。

But I think it is still intellectually honest, in terms of meeting what I intended to say.

但我认为这在智力上仍然是诚实的，符合我想要表达的意思。

You know, I voted against this before I voted for it, or something like John Kerry said in 2004. (Laughs)

你知道，我在投票支持之前投票反对过，就像约翰·凯瑞在 2004 年说的那样。（笑）

I think it does meet the test of a dollar retained earnings producing more than a dollar of market value. And we will continue to measure ourselves based on whether we meet that test.

我认为这确实符合保留收益超过一美元市场价值的标准。我们将继续根据是否符合这一标准来衡量自己。

If we don’t — if keeping a buck doesn’t produce more than a buck in present value, I don’t mean every day or every week, but over time, we should figure out something else to do.

如果我们不这样做——如果保持一美元的现值不超过一美元，我不是说每天或每周，而是随着时间的推移，我们应该想出其他的做法。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I like people that parse through a long series of documents and find an error and rub my nose in it, particularly when it’s your error.

查理·芒格：我喜欢那些仔细研究一系列长文档并找到错误的人，尤其是当这是你的错误时，他们还会让我意识到这一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Rub my nose in it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：提醒我。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah.

查理·芒格：是的，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: How tolerant. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：多么宽容啊。（笑声）

I should have had him word it originally. Actually I think those were his words. It’s just coming back to me. (Laughter)

我应该让他最初来写这段话。实际上，我认为那些是他的话。现在我想起来了。（笑声）

36. Safety net needed for the unemployed, but Berkshire isn’t it

失业者需要安全网，但不是伯克希尔提供。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第二个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Glen Molinar (PH) from Cleveland, Ohio. It’s been on my bucket list to come meet you, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, so it’s a privilege to be here.

观众成员：来自俄亥俄州克利夫兰的格伦·莫利纳（PH）。能来见到您，巴菲特先生和芒格先生，一直是我心愿清单上的一项，所以能在这里真是荣幸。

My question has to do with hope and jobs. You know, in America, I think we need to figure out how we can go about creating jobs. I have been trying to help people get jobs.

我的问题与希望和工作有关。您知道，在美国，我认为我们需要找出如何创造工作的办法。我一直在帮助人们找到工作。

My question is, and a challenge maybe, how can we get Berkshire Hathaway and your board to maybe go out and just basically hire people to give them hope?

我的问题是，或许也是一个挑战，我们如何才能让伯克希尔哈撒韦和您们的董事会去主动雇佣一些人，以给他们带来希望？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we will hire people when we have something for them to do. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，当我们有事情让他们做的时候，我们会雇佣人。（掌声）

But — and we are actually, net, hiring people now.

但是——我们实际上现在正在招聘人员。

I mean, when the Burlington is carrying 173,000 cars a week like last week, as opposed to some time back 155,000, we need more people. And we need more people at some of our other businesses.

我的意思是，当伯灵顿像上周那样每周运送 173,000 辆汽车，而不是之前的 155,000 辆时，我们需要更多的人。而且我们在其他一些业务中也需要更多的人。

But our carpet business, we are down 6,000 people-plus from our peak. But people aren’t going to quit buying carpet forever. And we will be hiring a number of people, but there’s no sense hiring them when they’re not — when there’s nothing for them to do.

但我们的地毯业务比巅峰时期减少了超过 6000 人。但人们不会永远停止购买地毯。我们会招聘一些人，但在没有工作可做的时候招聘他们是没有意义的。

I went through a period, particularly, it was dramatic to me, because we owned — Berkshire Hathaway owned — a couple of textile mills, one of them in New Bedford.

我经历了一段时期，特别是对我来说，这很戏剧性，因为我们拥有——伯克希尔·哈撒韦拥有——几家纺织厂，其中一家在新贝德福德。

And eventually we had to close those mills after we tried for 20 years to make them work.

最终我们不得不关闭那些工厂，因为我们尝试了 20 年让它们运转。

And if you get somebody that’s working in a textile mill and they’re 55 years old, and in many cases still were speaking Portuguese, you know, retraining doesn’t mean much to them.

如果你遇到一个在纺织厂工作的 55 岁的人，而且在很多情况下他们仍然讲葡萄牙语，那么再培训对他们来说意义不大。

I mean, you need — if you believe in creative destruction and you believe in capitalism, essentially figuring out ways to do the same things with less and less people, you better have a social safety net.

我的意思是，如果你相信创造性破坏和资本主义，基本上就是要想办法用越来越少的人做同样的事情，那么你最好有一个社会安全网。

And we’ve got a pretty good one in this country, a whole lot better than we had 30 or 40 years ago.

我们在这个国家有一个相当不错的，远比 30 或 40 年前要好得多。

But right now there is significant unemployment. Not any higher than it was in 1982 or thereabouts, but it’s a lot and it’s not going to go away fast, although it is going to go away.

但现在失业率很高。虽然没有超过 1982 年左右的水平，但仍然很高，并且不会很快消失，尽管它最终会消失。

And we should take — in my view, society owes some minimum living standard to people who are looking for work, trying to get work, and frankly, at a time like this, they’re not going to be able to find it.

在我看来，社会应该为那些寻找工作、努力工作的人提供一些最低生活标准，坦率地说，在这样的时期，他们是无法找到工作的。

But I don’t think that Berkshire Hathaway should be the social safety net.

但我认为伯克希尔哈撒韦不应该成为社会安全网。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I would say that if Berkshire started out to create a bunch of make-work jobs in order to increase human hope, the net effect would, over time, would be the reduce human hope. (Applause)

查理·芒格：是的，我想说，如果伯克希尔开始创造一堆临时工作来增加人们的希望，最终的效果将是降低人们的希望。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s true, but I’d rather have Charlie saying it than me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为这是真的，但我更愿意让查理来说，而不是我。（笑声）

37. Why GEICO isn’t looking at China or India

为什么 GEICO 不考虑中国或印度

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: “Our car insurance business” —

卡罗尔·卢米斯：“我们的汽车保险业务” —

Oh, this comes from a New York man who asked that I use his initials, A.J.

哦，这来自一位纽约人，他要求我使用他的首字母，A.J.

“Our car insurance business has continued to return excellent profits and expand its business within the United States. Why hasn’t Berkshire made any progress in the car insurance business in China, or India, or even Europe?

“我们的汽车保险业务持续获得优异的利润，并在美国扩展业务。为什么伯克希尔在中国、印度甚至欧洲的汽车保险业务没有取得任何进展？”

“As BYD has shown, these markets are exploding in automobile sales, so aren’t they ripe for the picking?”

“正如比亚迪所展示的，这些市场的汽车销售正在迅猛增长，那么它们难道不是成熟的收获时机吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. There’s no — we’ve known for a long time there’s no shortage of drivers around the world. That — there may be a lot of business in the United States, but there’s a whole lot of business elsewhere.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们早就知道，全球范围内的司机并不缺乏。美国可能有很多业务，但其他地方也有大量的业务。

In terms of India and China specifically, we can only own a limited amount, I believe 24.9 percent, of a company in either of those countries. And we’re not eager to work hard on something where we own 24.9 when we could work hard on something where we can own 100 percent.

在印度和中国方面，我们只能拥有有限的股份，我相信是 24.9%。而且我们并不热衷于在我们只能拥有 24.9%的情况下努力工作，而是更愿意在我们可以拥有 100%股份的项目上努力。

Obviously, we talk all the time, we’ve thought for decades about ways we can possibly expand GEICO, because it’s a wonderful, wonderful company.

显然，我们一直在交谈，几十年来我们一直在思考如何可能扩展 GEICO，因为它是一家非常出色的公司。

And we have gone from a market share of 2-and-a-faction percent when we bought control to 8 1/2 or so now.

我们在收购控制权时的市场份额为 2.5%左右，现在已经上升到 8.5%左右。

But there’s plenty to do here. And we do not have the same kind of advantages — or we don’t think we could build those in any reasonable period of time — as we look at other markets.

但这里有很多事情可以做。我们没有同样的优势——或者我们认为在合理的时间内无法建立这些优势——当我们看其他市场时。

I mean, obviously we look at Canada. You know, I mean — Tony and I talk about this kind of thing frequently.

我意思是，显然我们关注加拿大。你知道，我和托尼经常谈论这种事情。

I agree with his decision that now, and probably for a long time to come, there is so much opportunity in the United States. And the other areas, for one reason or another, as we’re looking at them, do not give us the same kind of competitive advantage we have here, that we pass on them.

我同意他的决定，现在，可能在很长一段时间内，美国有很多机会。而其他地区出于某种原因，在我们审视它们时，并没有给我们在这里所拥有的那种竞争优势，因此我们放弃了它们。

But we love the idea of taking a business that’s working in one area and figuring out a way to have it work in other areas. Whether it’s geographical adjacencies or product extensions, or all kinds of things.

但我们喜欢将一个在某个领域运作良好的业务扩展到其他领域的想法。无论是地理邻近性、产品扩展，还是其他各种方式。

We’re well aware of possibilities out there. In the case of GEICO, we have not decided to go to other countries, but it isn’t because we didn’t know there were cars there. (Laughter)

我们非常清楚外面的可能性。以 GEICO 为例，我们尚未决定进入其他国家，但这并不是因为我们不知道那里有汽车。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

38. China’s economic growth is “fun” to watch

中国的经济增长“有趣”可看

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Number 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第三个。

CHINESE STUDENT: Good afternoon. My name is Shin Tse Chen (PH). I am a Chinese student from Kansas State University.

中国学生：下午好。我叫陈新泽（PH）。我是一名来自堪萨斯州立大学的中国学生。

My question is, Mr. Buffett, what is the most important thing that you have learned from China? Thank you.

我的问题是，巴菲特先生，您从中国学到的最重要的事情是什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Most important thing I’ve learned from China?

沃伦·巴菲特：我从中国学到的最重要的事情是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: China, yeah.

查理·芒格：是的，中国。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. What’s the most important thing you’ve learned from China, Charlie? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。查理，你从中国学到的最重要的事情是什么？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It has some very unusual people in BYD. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：比亚迪里有一些非常不寻常的人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve learned —

沃伦·巴菲特：我学到了——

CHARLIE MUNGER: No other lesson is as important as that one. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：没有其他教训比这个更重要了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve learned they like Sprite better than Coke. Sprite outsells Coke in China by two-to-one. But they’re both growing dramatically.

沃伦·巴菲特：我了解到他们更喜欢雪碧而不是可乐。雪碧在中国的销量是可乐的两倍。但它们的增长都非常显著。

I think China is an amazing economy. I mean, there is no question in my mind that, you know, the growth on a per-capita basis is going to be dramatic going forward. They’re just starting to exercise their potential.

我认为中国是一个令人惊叹的经济体。我的意思是，我毫不怀疑，未来人均增长将会非常显著。他们才刚刚开始发挥他们的潜力。

When you think about it, in 1790, there were four million people in the United States, just under four million. There were 290 million in China in 1790. Just as smart, you know, just as hard working, resources of the land, the minerals, everything, its climate, very, very similar.

当你仔细想想，1790 年，美国的人口不到四百万。而在 1790 年，中国的人口为两亿九千万。聪明程度相当，勤奋程度相当，土地资源、矿产、气候等一切都非常相似。

And for 170 years or so, relatively little progress was made in the standard of living for those people, like you say, who had all the native abilities that America had.

大约 170 年来，这些人，正如你所说，拥有美国所有的天赋，但生活水平的进步相对较小。

But, you know, in recent decades, the potential of the Chinese is being unleashed and it’s huge. And I think it’s very, very interesting to watch.

但是，你知道，在最近几十年里，中国人的潜力正在被释放，而且这个潜力是巨大的。我认为观察这一点非常非常有趣。

Charlie and I, and a group of some of the directors, are going over there at the end of September.

查理和我，还有一些董事，将在九月底去那里。

You know — and I was over there a couple of years ago. It’s a sight to behold.

你知道——我几年前去过那里。真是一个值得一看的景象。

But, in terms of specific lessons, they haven’t taught me how to eat Chinese food, I will say that. (Laughs)

但是，至于具体的教训，我要说的是，他们没有教我如何吃中国食物。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think I always knew that the Chinese people had an enormous potential for huge and rapid progress, because I could see that in all the Chinese-Americans that I dealt with.

查理·芒格：我一直认为中国人民具有巨大的快速进步的潜力，因为我在与所有的华裔美国人打交道时都能看到这一点。

And indeed, people came in here as Chinese “coolies” — in effect, slaves — and they rose so rapidly that it was a marvel.

实际上，曾经以“苦力”身份进入美国的中国人——实际上是奴隶——迅速崛起，真是让人惊叹。

So I always knew that China had a potential to be a huge credit to human civilization. But I think I underrated how fast it could happen.

所以我一直知道中国有潜力成为人类文明的巨大贡献。但我认为我低估了这一切发生的速度。

China is setting a new record for advancement of civilization at a very rapid rate. It’s fun to watch.

中国正在以非常快速的速度创下文明进步的新纪录。观看这一切令人兴奋。

39. Why Buffett addresses the annual report to his two sisters

为什么巴菲特在年度报告中提到他的两个姐妹

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from a shareholder in Aiken, South Carolina who asks not to be identified, but he asks that Mr. Buffett or Mr. Munger discuss changes that have been made in the Berkshire annual report in the last several years, and the reasons for making some of these changes.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自南卡罗来纳州艾肯的一位股东，他要求匿名，但他希望巴菲特先生或芒格先生讨论在过去几年中伯克希尔年报中所做的更改，以及做出这些更改的原因。

Two of the changes that he’s noticed are, number one , look-through earnings no longer seem to be discussed, and number two, the unaudited combined financial statements of the business groups no longer seem to be included, although at least some of the business groups material seem to be covered in other places in the report.

他注意到的两个变化是，第一，透视收益似乎不再被讨论；第二，业务组的未经审计的合并财务报表似乎不再包含在内，尽管报告的其他地方似乎覆盖了一些业务组的材料。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the second point I’m confused about, because we have broken them down into four groups and tried to give the relevant financial information for what we thought was a logical grouping, and will continue to do that. So I’m not sure I totally get that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我对第二点感到困惑，因为我们将它们分成了四组，并试图提供我们认为合理分组的相关财务信息，并将继续这样做。所以我不太确定我完全理解这一点。

We really do have four fairly logical breakdowns. Now, you can break it down 70 ways and all that, but there’s a point at which adding 100 pages to an annual report obfuscates information rather than illuminates.

我们确实有四个相当合理的分类。现在，你可以用 70 种方式来细分，但在某个时刻，向年度报告中添加 100 页会使信息变得模糊，而不是清晰。

And that’s what — we’re trying to, in a reasonable number of words — Carol might say too many — but in a reasonable number of words, convey as much as we can about the information we’d want to have if we were in your place and you were writing to us.

我们正在尝试用合理数量的词语——卡罗尔可能会说太多——但用合理数量的词语，尽可能传达我们想要了解的信息，如果我们在你的位置，而你在给我们写信。

And we think these four classifications — regulated industry is terribly capital intensive. You know, insurance: capital, really not a factor, but the amount of capital it gives us being a factor, and so on.

我们认为这四个分类——受监管的行业非常需要资本。你知道，保险：资本实际上不是一个因素，但它提供的资本量是一个因素，等等。

And so I don’t think we really changed on that. Now, when you get into look-through earnings or sometimes when we talk about the earnings per share and the investments per share, some of that I don’t repeat every year because we try to get — run at, maybe, 12,000 words or something like that in the annual report.

所以我认为我们在这方面并没有真正改变。现在，当你谈到透视收益，或者有时我们谈论每股收益和每股投资时，有些内容我并不会每年重复，因为我们试图在年报中控制在大约 12,000 个字左右。

I really think if you extend it too much — I’ll say this, nobody’s told me it was too short, yet — (laughs) — including my editor, who is here today.

我真的认为如果你扩展太多——我要说的是，没有人告诉我报告太短了，包括今天在这里的我的编辑。（笑声）

And every other year I may do that breakdown between operating earnings and the — but that takes 1,000 words or so to explain it to people.

每隔一年我可能会对运营收益和——进行这样的细分，但这需要大约 1000 个字来向人们解释。

The whole report is guided, as it has been ever since I really started taking it seriously in the mid ’70s, is guided by the idea that I’m — actually, I’m writing it to my two sisters who are here. And I have my audience in my mind — is two very intelligent, interested people but who are not around the place, been gone for a year, and they’re very capable of understanding anything but they’re not necessarily familiar with all the lingo.

整个报告的指导思想，正如我从1970年代中期开始认真对待它以来，一直是我实际上是在为我的两个姐妹写作。我心中有我的受众——是两位非常聪明、感兴趣的人，但他们不在这个地方，已经离开一年，他们非常能够理解任何事物，但不一定熟悉所有的术语。

If I get too esoteric on it, so I should explain that. And I really want them to understand how I’m thinking about the business, and by implication, how I think they should think about it, and to answer the questions that I think would be in their mind.

如果我对此过于深奥，我应该解释一下。我真的希望他们理解我对这个业务的思考方式，以及由此推导出的我认为他们应该如何看待它，并回答我认为他们心中会有的问题。

And they’ve got most of their net worth in it, so they’re going to read to the end. And I really haven’t changed that framework in my mind for how I’ve written it.

他们的大部分净资产都在其中，所以他们会读到最后。我实际上并没有改变我心中对我写作框架的看法。

I start mentally off writing, “Dear Doris and Bertie,” and then I just cross them off and put, “To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway.” But that’s the way it’s done.

我开始时在心里写下“亲爱的多丽丝和伯蒂”，然后我就把它们划掉，改为“致伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东”。但这就是做法。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but the details can change as the facts change. The undistributed earnings of corporations in which we hold shares, but do not control, used to be way more important than they are now. It’s perfectly natural that the emphasis would shift.

查理·芒格：是的，但随着事实的变化，细节也会改变。我们持有股份但不控制的公司的未分配收益，过去比现在重要得多。重心的转移是完全自然的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the undistributed earnings now, without me looking at it very carefully, you know, are probably — they’re not more than, probably, 15 percent of our reported earnings or something like that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，未分配的收益现在，在我没有仔细查看的情况下，可能——它们不会超过我们报告收益的 15%左右。

They used to be a much higher percentage. And they’re still important. But I don’t think they’re — I think the people that understand that Coca-Cola and American Express aren’t paying out all their earnings, and it’s not a big enough number that I would want to spend a lot of the report explaining it.

这些曾经是一个更高的比例。它们仍然重要。但我认为，人们理解可口可乐和美国运通并没有支付所有的收益，认为这个数字并不大到我想花很多篇幅来解释它。

40. Munger endorses Roth IRAs

芒格支持罗斯 IRA

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Joe Hudson (PH), a shareholder from Culver, Indiana.

观众成员：我叫乔·哈德森（PH），是来自印第安纳州卡尔弗的股东。

I doubt either of you have any money in Roth IRAs, but what are your thought on the opportunity this year for anyone to convert IRAs to Roth IRAs, thus having all future growth on Berkshire or other investments 100 percent tax free?

我怀疑你们两位是否有任何资金放在罗斯个人退休账户（Roth IRA）中，但你们对今年任何人将个人退休账户转换为罗斯个人退休账户的机会有什么看法，从而使伯克希尔或其他投资的所有未来增长100%免税？

Is the government making a big mistake here, and should people be concerned about the deal changing down the road?

政府在这里是否犯了一个大错误？人们是否应该担心这一交易在未来会发生变化？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ll take this one, because I have an IRA that I am going to convert to a Roth IRA. So there’s your answer. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我来回答这个问题，因为我有一个 IRA，我打算把它转换为罗斯 IRA。所以这就是你的答案。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I still don’t understand it, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我还是不太明白，但—

CHARLIE MUNGER: You don’t have to. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你不需要明白。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. He’s always telling me that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。他总是这样告诉我。（笑声）

I assume - if Charlie said it, it must be true.

我相信——如果查理说了，那一定是对的。

41. Newspapers are losing ground in battle with internet

报纸在与互联网的竞争中失去优势

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s go to Andrew. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们去找安德鲁吧。（笑声）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question I’m actually very self-interested in. It comes from Anton Ossip (at) Alexander Forbes from Johannesburg, and (he writes), “Last year you said you were down on the newspaper industry.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题我其实非常关心。它来自约翰内斯堡的亚历山大·福布斯的安东·奥西普，他写道：“去年你说你对报纸行业不看好。”

“Given your life-long interest in newspaper companies and your stake in the Washington Post Company and others, has your view changed in the past year with the introduction of the iPad and other e-reading technologies?

“鉴于您对报纸公司的终身兴趣以及您在华盛顿邮报等公司的股份，随着 iPad 和其他电子阅读技术的推出，您在过去一年中的看法是否发生了变化？”

“Do you think we will see a contraction in the value of — in the value retained by — media houses versus what will be passed on to distributors of the media?”

"你认为我们会看到媒体公司的价值--媒体公司保留的价值--相对于转给媒体发行商的价值的缩水吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you could probably answer it better than I can.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你可能比我更能回答这个问题。

My relatively uninformed opinion — because I’m not that up on the technology — but I just have a feeling that when the money — has basically — the money to run good newspapers has come from advertising, you know, three-quarters of the money or thereabouts — the papers become less useful to advertisers.

我相对不太了解这个技术，但我有一种感觉，经营好报纸所需的资金基本上来自广告，约三分之二的收入——报纸对广告商的价值降低了。

I mean, they were the only game in town for a long, long time. They are not the only game in town. And what a difference that makes if you’re selling something.

我的意思是，他们在很长一段时间内是唯一的选择。他们现在不是唯一的选择。这对你在销售某样东西时影响很大。

So, when the Philadelphia Inquirer, I — Stan Lipsey is here — I called Stan up and I said, “Stan, this is probably like an old fire horse or something, but let’s think about it anyway a little bit.”

例如，当我打电话给斯坦·利普西时，我跟他说：“斯坦，这可能就像一匹老消防马，但无论如何我们还是想想。”

And it was sold yesterday at a bankruptcy sale, although I think that’s pending confirmation.

而费城问询报纸（Philadelphia Inquirer）在破产拍卖中出售了，虽然我认为那是待确认的。

But, you know, it is very tempting, if you’ve still got fairly substantial circulation - The Philadelphia Inquirer and they’ve got the Daily News there, too.

但是，你知道，如果你仍然有相当可观的发行量，这非常诱人——《费城问询报》和他们那里还有《日报》。

But the math is really tough. I mean, the distribution costs, the printing costs, everything, and maybe all this changes that in some way that you would understand better than I would.

但是数学真的很难。我的意思是，分销成本、印刷成本，所有的一切，也许所有这些以某种方式改变了你比我更能理解的事情。

But since I don’t understand it, I have to stay with — and there are plenty of things I don’t understand — and I cannot make an affirmative decision on newspaper ownership.

但由于我不理解这一点，我必须坚持——而且有很多我不理解的事情——我无法对报纸的拥有权做出肯定的决定。

I just got the — the ABC puts out Fast Facts, this big yellow publication — I just got it a couple days ago and I can’t resist looking through there. And I flip the pages and look at circulation of all kinds of papers.

我刚收到这本——ABC 出版的《快速事实》，这本大黄书——我几天前刚收到，忍不住想翻一翻。我翻阅着，查看各种报纸的发行量。

Actually, in Buffalo, we were down less than a great many papers, even though, you know, our population demographics are very tough. We were down less than Rochester, I might mention, which is owned by Gannett.

实际上，在布法罗，我们的下降幅度比许多报纸都要小，尽管我们的人口结构非常严峻。我可以提到，我们的下降幅度比罗切斯特还要小，而罗切斯特是由甘尼特公司拥有的。

But you look at San Francisco Chronicle, you know, down 20-odd percent. Dallas —

但你看看旧金山纪事报（San Francisco Chronicle），下降了20多个百分点。达拉斯——

These are communities that are thriving, and it blows your mind how fast people are dropping it.

这些社区正在蓬勃发展，让人惊讶的是人们放弃它的速度有多快。

It’s not just older — it’s not just that younger people aren’t picking it up. I mean, the world has really changed, in terms of the essential nature of newspapers.

这不仅仅是年轻人不再捡起报纸。我的意思是，世界确实改变了，报纸的本质发生了变化。

There’s nothing that looked — back when Charlie and I would talk about them in 1970 or ’65, there was probably nothing that looked more bulletproof than a daily newspaper where the competition had melted away.

想想查理和我在1970年或1965年谈论的时候，几乎没有什么比日报在竞争消失后更坚不可摧的了。

But it’s a form of distributing information and entertainment that has lost its immediacy in many cases.

但在许多情况下，这是一种传播信息和娱乐的方式，已经失去了其即时性。

It’s certainly — it is not the essential place to get — think about how stock market quotations were, you know, 30 or 35 years ago. You looked in the paper to see what stocks had done. You looked in the paper to see how sports games had turned out.

这当然不再是获取信息的主要途径——想想 30 或 35 年前股市报价的情况。你需要查看报纸来了解股票的表现。你需要查看报纸来了解体育比赛的结果。

So its primacy has withered away, and the advertisers weren’t there because they love the publisher of the newspaper. They were there because it was a microphone to talk to everybody in town, and they had to talk to everybody in town.

因此，它的首要地位已经衰退，广告商之所以在这里并不是因为他们热爱报纸的出版商。他们在这里是因为这是一个与全城人对话的麦克风，他们必须与全城人对话。

And so you get this chicken and egg thing that the newspaper becomes less valuable as the advertisers float away, and the advertisers float away as the subscribers diminish. And I don’t see a good answer to it, but Charlie, what do you have to say?

所以你会看到这种鸡和蛋的情况，报纸的价值随着广告商的流失而降低，而广告商又随着订阅者的减少而流失。我对此没有好的答案，但查理，你有什么想说的？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the independent newspapers, due to the accidents of history, as they became dominant in their individual towns, for decades had impregnable economic strength.

查理·芒格：好吧，由于历史的偶然，独立报纸在各自的城镇中占据主导地位，几十年来拥有不可动摇的经济实力。

And by and large they behaved better because they were so strong. And they were called the ”Fourth Estate.” They were really a branch of the government, they helped keep government honest.

总体而言，他们的行为更好，因为他们非常强大。他们被称为“第四权”。他们实际上是政府的一个分支，帮助保持政府的诚信。

And if you take this state in which we’re located, The World-Herald has been a very constructive force, net, over a long period of time. As those dominant franchises have weakened and weakened, it’s not good for the country.

如果你考虑我们所处的这个州，《世界先驱报》在很长一段时间内一直是一个非常建设性的力量。随着那些主导特许经营的不断削弱，这对国家来说并不好。

I think we’re losing something that we have no substitute for. And I think it’s very sad and I don’t have the faintest idea what to do about it.

我觉得我们正在失去一些没有替代品的东西。我认为这非常悲伤，我对该怎么做毫无头绪。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I love newspapers.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我都喜欢报纸。

I think The World-Herald hit a 300,000 circulation peak on Sunday at one time. I don’t think they averaged that for the six-month period, but I seem to remember that, I could be wrong.

我认为《世界先驱报》的周日发行量一度达到了30万的高峰。我不认为他们在六个月的周期内平均达到这个数字，但我似乎记得这一点，可能我记错了。

And the figures — 100,000 off that or something of the sort, and the state has gained population, the city’s gained population.

而这些数字——减少了 100,000 或类似的数字，州的人口增加了，城市的人口也增加了。

I think it’s as vital to me as ever, but it clearly — it has changed for the populous as a whole.

我认为这对我来说仍然至关重要，但显然——对整个大众来说，它已经改变了。

And, you know, when I look at the Philadelphia Inquirer and I forget what it was, 350,000 or something like that of circulation, and, you know, I’m not worried about Philadelphia going away.

而且，你知道，当我看到《费城询问报》，我忘了具体是多少，35 万还是类似的发行量，我并不担心费城会消失。

But when I look at the figures being down — I don’t know, I forget what it was now — 30 or 40,000, you know, in a year, it doesn’t work very well as that goes along, because the advertiser just does not need you the same way as they needed you 10 or 15 years ago. So your ability to price evaporates in them.

但是当我看到数字下降时——我不知道，现在忘了是什么——三万或四万，你知道，一年下来，这样下去效果并不好，因为广告商对你的需求已经不像 10 或 15 年前那样强烈了。因此，你的定价能力在他们眼中逐渐消失。

It used to be — Charlie and I met Lord Thompson in 1970 or so, and he owns the paper — he owned the paper — in Council Bluffs, right across the river. And he was a jovial fellow, he was very happy to see us.

以前——查理和我大约在 1970 年遇见了汤普森勋爵，他拥有那份报纸——他曾拥有那份报纸——在河对岸的Council Bluffs。他是个快乐的人，见到我们非常高兴。

And we said to him, “Lord Thomson,” we said, “We noticed you own the paper in Council Bluffs. Have you ever been there?” He said, “I wouldn’t dream of it.” (Laughter)

我们对他说：“汤普森勋爵，我们注意到您拥有Council Bluffs的报纸。您曾去过那里吗？”他说：“我绝对不会去。”（笑声）

And then I said, “Well, Lord Thomson,” I said, “You seem to increase the price of your paper every year and your poor advertisers” — I mean the advertising price. And I said, “What can they do about it?” He says, “Nothing.”

然后我说：“好吧，汤姆森阁下，”我说，“您似乎每年都在提高您的报纸价格，而您可怜的广告商”——我是指广告价格。我说：“他们能对此做些什么？”他说：“什么也做不了。”

And then I said to him, “Well, in that case, how do you decide how much to increase prices, since it’s totally at your discretion?”

然后我对他说：“那么，在这种情况下，你是如何决定提高价格的幅度的，因为这完全取决于你？”

And he said — I think Charlie will remember these words — he says, “I tell my U.S. managers to price to make 40 percent pre-tax. Above that, I feel I may be gouging.” (Laughter)

他说——我想查理会记得这些话——他说：“我告诉我的美国经理们定价要达到 40%的税前利润。超过这个，我觉得我可能是在敲竹杠。”（笑声）

Those days are gone. (Laughs)

那些日子已经过去了。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, and the politicians are not behaving better as the newspapers are weakening. We’re going to miss the newspaper power.

查理·芒格：是的，随着报纸的衰弱，政治家们的行为并没有变得更好。我们将会怀念报纸的力量。

WARREN BUFFETT: I agree with that. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：我同意这一点。（掌声）

42. There will “always be opportunities to overperform”

总会有“超越表现的机会”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：第五。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Robert McArthur (PH) from Boston, Massachusetts.

观众成员：我叫罗伯特·麦克阿瑟（PH），来自马萨诸塞州波士顿。

I’m starting a career in investing, and many, if not most, investors my age think they’re value investors.

我正在开始投资生涯，许多，甚至大多数和我同龄的投资者认为他们是价值投资者。

Also, there’s a record number of people here to see you this year, and the same value investors who were laughed at three years ago are now celebrated by the financial press.

此外，今年来这里看你的人数创下了记录，而三年前被嘲笑的价值投资者现在却受到金融媒体的赞誉。

Will there be fewer metaphorical $100 bills left on the street going forward, and if so, should I look for a career in managing a business instead of managing money?

未来市场上会有更少的隐喻性 100 美元钞票吗？如果是这样，我是否应该考虑从事管理业务而不是管理资金的职业？

WARREN BUFFETT: There will probably be fewer, but I would say there will always be — except in the most bubbly of markets, perhaps — but there will always be opportunities if you’re not working with large amounts of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：未来可能会更少，但我会说，除了在最泡沫的市场中，机会总是存在的——如果你没有管理大量资金的话。

The money manager — there’s a basic conflict. There’s conflicts in most businesses. Everybody’s pointing out the conflicts now in the investment banking business.

资产管理行业有一个基本的冲突。大多数行业都有冲突。大家现在都在指出投资银行业务的冲突。

But the investment management business has a conflict that’s equally as significant in the fact that asset gathering can become a way more important part of your income than asset managing.

但投资管理业务有一个同样重要的冲突，即资金规模可以成为你收入中比资金管理更重要的部分。

But if you manage moderate sums of money, I think there will always be opportunities to overperform. That doesn’t mean lots of people are going to do it, but they will be out there.

但如果你管理适度的资金，我认为总会有超越表现的机会。这并不意味着很多人会做到，但他们会存在。

And, you know, it might have been easier many years ago when there were fewer people looking and not as much information was available on the internet and all that.

而且，你知道，多年前可能会更容易，那时关注的人较少，互联网上可获取的信息也不那么多。

But people still make the same mistakes and they still get — well, I’ll give you an illustration.

但人们仍然犯同样的错误，他们仍然会得到——好吧，我给你举个例子。

Charlie has a company called the Daily Journal Company. And the Daily Journal Company has a bunch of cash. And it sat there with cash, and it sat there with cash, and I own 100 shares — which is all he’ll let me own — and I got their annual report here a while back.

查理有一家叫Daily Journal的公司。Daily Journal有一笔现金。它一直在持有现金，我拥有100股——这是他唯一允许我拥有的——我最近拿到了他们的年报。

And in their fiscal year of 2009, they never bought stocks before that I’d seen, and all of a sudden they’d bought $15 million worth of stocks and they were worth 45 million.

在他们的2009财政年度，他们以前从未买过股票，突然间他们买了价值1500万美元的股票，后来这些股票变成了4500万美元。

So by sitting around for a while, but waiting until things got really ridiculous in certain cases, he put $15 million out that became 45 million within, probably, a six month period or so.

所以通过坐在那里一段时间，但在某些情况下等到事情变得非常荒谬，他投入了 1500 万美元，可能在六个月左右的时间内变成了 4500 万美元。

So opportunities come around. You have to be prepared to grab them when they come. And you can’t do it with the kind of money — I mean, you can’t get the extraordinary things with the kind of money that we’re running.

机会总是会出现。你必须准备好在它们来临时抓住它们。而你无法用我们现在所拥有的那种钱去获得非凡的东西。

With moderate amounts of money, I think there will always be opportunities. Charlie’s going to tell you something more pessimistic now, probably. (Laughter)

有适量的钱，我认为总会有机会。查理现在可能会告诉你一些更悲观的事情。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. One piece of advice that Warren frequently gives — and it’s particularly useful to those going into money management — take the high road. It’s far less crowded. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的，沃伦常常给出的一个建议——尤其对那些进入资金管理领域的人来说——就是走正道，那条路几乎没有人走。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Alan Simpson used to say, he said, “Those who take the high road in Washington are seldom bothered by heavy traffic.” (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：艾伦·辛普森（Alan Simpson）曾说过：“在华盛顿走正道的人很少遭遇繁忙的交通。”（笑声）

But getting to the last part of your question, there’s going to be opportunities for talent, whether it’s in money management, operating management, whatever. It’s going to work.

但针对你问题的最后一部分，无论是在资金管理、运营管理还是其他领域，都将会有机会。这是会有效的。

Money management, you know, is easier to scale up and easier to get into and all of that. So it was certainly my natural inclination, in any event.

资金管理，你知道，更容易扩展，也更容易入门，所有这些。因此，无论如何，这肯定是我自然的倾向。

I would not have wanted to work my way up to plant superintendent and all of that — (laughs) — until I got a job at the top, you know, about the time they were going to give me a gold watch.

我本不想一步步升到工厂主管之类的职位——（笑）——直到我得到一份高管的工作，你知道的，大约在他们要给我一块金表的时候。

But there’s opportunities in both places.

但这两个领域都有机会。

43. Municipal bond insurers must worry about contagion

市政债券保险公司必须担心传染效应

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is about municipal bonds. Municipal bond defaults, on the scale you described in the 2008 letter, have so far not materialized.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题是关于市政债券的。您在 2008 年信中描述的市政债券违约情况，到目前为止尚未出现。

To what extent will we see municipalities default outright in the next five to 10 years? Will the bond insurance companies be able to swallow the losses? Will there be federal bailouts of states?

在接下来的五到十年里，市政当局将会在多大程度上彻底违约？债券保险公司能否承受这些损失？联邦政府会对各州进行救助吗？

And considering all of these risks, should investors be getting paid more than they already are for holding municipal bonds?

考虑到所有这些风险，投资者在持有市政债券时是否应该获得比现在更多的回报？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if the bonds are insured by Berkshire, you don’t need to worry at all. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果债券是由伯克希尔保险的，你根本不需要担心。（笑）

But we’re not insuring a lot of bonds currently, because we don’t think the premiums are appropriate, which gets to the question.

但我们目前并没有为很多债券投保，因为我们认为保费不合适，这就引出了这个问题。

Just the other day, within the last few days — you’ve probably read about it in the papers — Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, defaulted on a relatively small amount of bonds.

就在前几天——你可能在报纸上读到过——宾夕法尼亚州的哈里斯堡违约了一笔相对较小的债券。

And the bond insurer, named Assured Guarantee, starts paying the interest.

债券保险公司 Assured Guarantee 开始支付利息。

And Harrisburg may get things worked out in a week, you know, and they may not. There’s certainly some incentive to do that. And if they do get it worked out, the bond insurer’s not too much on the hook.

哈里斯堡可能在一周内解决问题，你知道的，也可能不会。确实有一些动力去这样做。如果他们真的解决了问题，债券保险公司就不会承担太多风险。

But what you worry about is correlation in this field, that if one entity defaults — and particularly if nothing terrible happens, that the police are on the street the next day, and the fire trucks still go to fires and all that — and people start thinking, “Why should I have a great fiscal reputation when I can have lower taxes and still have all the services I need?”

但你担心的是这个领域的相关性，如果一个实体违约——尤其是如果没有发生什么可怕的事情，警察第二天仍然在街上，消防车仍然去灭火等等——人们开始想，“我为什么要有良好的财政声誉，而我可以有更低的税收，仍然拥有我所需的所有服务？”

It’s very hard to tell how that will play out. I personally think it would be very hard, in the end, for the federal government to turn away a state that was having extreme financial difficulties when they’d, in effect, gone into General Motors and various other entities and saved them.

很难判断这将如何发展。我个人认为，最终联邦政府很难拒绝一个面临极端财务困难的州，因为他们实际上已经介入了通用汽车和其他各种实体并拯救了它们。

I don’t know exactly how you would tell the governor of state X that you were going to stiff-arm him, and when you’d participated in so many other bailouts of corporations.

我不知道你该如何告诉州长你打算拒绝他，尤其是在你参与了这么多其他公司的救助之后。

But who knows what would happen, and who knows how contagious it would be? The big thing you worry about if you’re a bond insurer is contagion.

但谁知道会发生什么，也不知道这种情况会有多大的传播性。作为债券保险公司，你最担心的就是这种传播性。

Obviously the bond insurers — except for Berkshire — the bond insurers, in my view, have got extraordinary liabilities in relation to their capital.

显然，除了伯克希尔之外，债券保险公司在我看来，其负债与资本相比是非常巨大的。

And virtually every one of them either failed or effectively failed — had to spin off a bad bank versus a good bank type of thing, or something like that — with merely the troubles they encountered when they got into structured securities.

几乎每一个都失败了或实际上失败了——不得不分拆出一个坏银行和一个好银行之类的东西，或者类似的事情——仅仅是因为他们在进入结构化证券时遇到的麻烦。

And I think they’ve had a very optimistic attitude toward what could happen in the field. But I don’t know the answer on what default rates are going to be over the next few years.

我认为他们对该领域可能发生的事情持非常乐观的态度。但我不知道未来几年违约率会是多少。

I knew that I felt I was getting paid fairly for taking that risk on a year-and-a-half ago, and I don’t feel that we’re getting offered a premium that’s fair now, so we’re going to let somebody else do it.

一年半前，我认为在承担那种风险时我得到了公平的回报，但我现在觉得我们没有得到公平的溢价，所以我们将让其他人去做。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, with the municipal bonds, I would try and invest in places that were both prosperous and disciplined.

查理·芒格：是的，对于市政债券，我会尝试投资于那些既繁荣又有纪律的地方。

You want to invest in the prosperous, because Ben Franklin was right when he said, “It’s hard for an empty sack to stand upright.”

你想投资于繁荣，因为本·富兰克林说得对：“空袋子很难站立。”

And you want to invest in the disciplined places because integrity still matters. It’s not very difficult, it’s not very complicated.

你想投资于有纪律的地方，因为诚信仍然重要。这并不难，也不复杂。

WARREN BUFFETT: But you could argue that in a country, if the undisciplined are not being punished for being undisciplined, that the taxpayers in disciplined areas would say, “Wait a second. You know, why should we keep up a record of financial prudence and all that and pay our bills when other guys aren’t paying their bills?”

沃伦·巴菲特：但是你可以说，在一个国家，如果不守纪律的人没有受到惩罚，那么守纪律地区的纳税人会说：“等一下。你知道，为什么我们要保持财务谨慎的记录，支付我们的账单，而其他人却不支付他们的账单？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s no question about the fact that bad behavior is contagious. That’s the way human nature works. But I’d still rather be with the disciplined, —

查理·芒格：毫无疑问，坏行为是有传染性的。这就是人性运作的方式。但我仍然更愿意与有纪律的人在一起，—

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — prosperous people.

查理·芒格：——富裕的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：第六。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s why I like the Berkshire meeting. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这就是我喜欢伯克希尔会议的原因。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That, and free fudge. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：这也是因为免费的糖果。（掌声）

44. Short-term stock moves aren’t predictable and don’t matter

短期股票波动是不可预测的，并且没有意义。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m (inaudible) from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. First of all I want to thank you for sharing your wisdom with us so generously.

观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自佛罗里达州劳德代尔堡的（听不清）。首先，我想感谢你们如此慷慨地与我们分享你们的智慧。

Back in October of 2008, you highly recommended buying U.S. stocks and that was a brilliant idea, it worked very well.

在 2008 年 10 月，你强烈推荐购买美国股票，这真是个绝妙的主意，效果非常好。

And I just want to get your opinion how you think about the market going forward.

我只是想听听你对未来市场的看法。

Are you still that optimistic, and what’s a reasonable rate of return to expect from equities in the next decade or so?

你还那么乐观吗？在接下来的十年左右，股票的合理预期回报率是多少？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I write articles very infrequently, or get interviewed very infrequently, on the subject of the general level of the market itself. Probably only four or five times in 40 years have I really declared myself about — what I thought — about the general level of the stock market.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我很少写文章，或者很少接受采访，关于市场整体水平的话题。在过去的 40 年里，我大概只有四五次真正表明过我对股市整体水平的看法。

And it turned out I was pretty premature, actually, in October of 2008, as was pointed out to me by a number of people.

结果我发现我其实在 2008 年 10 月的时候有些过早，这一点被很多人指出了。

But I felt — and what I said in that article really was that it would be way better to own stocks over the long term than to follow a policy of buying either long-term bonds or holding cash. And I knew I could make that statement and I would be eventually — I thought odds were very high — I’d be proven right on that.

但我觉得——我在那篇文章中所说的确实是，从长远来看，拥有股票要比采取购买长期债券或持有现金的政策要好得多。我知道我可以这样说，我最终会被证明是对的——我认为这种可能性非常高。

But I don’t like — I don’t know what the stock market’s going to do next week, or next month, or next year. I don’t have any idea.

但我不喜欢——我不知道股市下周、下个月或明年会怎样。我没有任何想法。

People always think I do. I know I don’t have any idea, I don’t think about it, it doesn’t make any difference because Charlie and I — I can’t recall a discussion we’ve ever had on it, basically.

人们总是认为我在想。我知道我根本没有想法，我不去考虑这件事，这没有任何区别，因为查理和我——我几乎想不起来我们曾经讨论过这个问题。

But I do think over the next 10 years or 20 years, I’d much rather own equities — including U.S. equities — I’d much rather own them than cash, or I’d much rather own them than a 10 or 20-year bond. But that’s partly because I’m very unenthusiastic about the alternatives.

但我确实认为，在接下来的 10 年或 20 年里，我更愿意拥有股票——包括美国股票——我更愿意拥有它们，而不是现金，或者我更愿意拥有它们，而不是 10 年或 20 年的债券。但这部分是因为我对其他选择并不热衷。

I think equities are likely to give you some positive — modest positive — real return over time. But beyond that I really don’t know anything.

我认为股票在一段时间内可能会给你带来一些积极的——适度的积极——实际回报。但除此之外，我真的不知道其他的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s a cheerful thought that equities are the best of a bad lot of available opportunities. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这是一个令人愉快的想法，股票是众多糟糕机会中最好的选择。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You disagree with it?

沃伦·巴菲特：你不同意吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think you’re right. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不，我认为你是对的。（笑声）

I think people should get accustomed, on average, to doing less well in their investment portfolios, in real terms.

我认为人们应该习惯于在投资组合中，平均而言，实际表现不那么好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I don’t —

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我不——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we’re in for a long period of where the ordinary result is not going to be very exciting.

查理·芒格：我认为我们将经历一个漫长的时期，普通的结果不会非常令人兴奋。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we like owning businesses. And we’re in a position where we can own entire businesses, but we also like partial ownership of businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们喜欢拥有企业。我们处于可以拥有整个企业的地位，但我们也喜欢部分拥有企业。

And we want to own businesses where we really think they have some competitive advantage over time, and where we feel good about the management, and where we think the price is reasonably attractive.

我们希望拥有那些我们认为在长期内具有竞争优势的企业，并且我们对管理层感到满意，同时我们认为价格相对有吸引力的企业。

I think you can find things like that now, but they aren’t dramatically attractive at all. They do beat, in my view, they do beat holding cash or five, 10, or 20-year bonds.

我认为你现在可以找到这样的东西，但它们并不是非常吸引人。在我看来，它们确实比持有现金或五年、十年或二十年期的债券要好。

45. Why we don’t use bond rating agencies

我们为什么不使用债券评级机构

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from John Bailer (PH), who’s asking about the rating agencies. He points out that you started selling your stake in Moody’s this year.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自约翰·贝勒（PH），他在询问评级机构。他指出你今年开始出售在穆迪的股份。

“Has the investment case for Moody’s changed due to potential regulation, and if so, why not sell the position to zero?”

“穆迪的投资案例是否因为潜在的监管发生了变化？如果是的话，为什么不将这一头寸卖到零？”

WARREN BUFFETT: We won’t discuss what we will or won’t do with any position, but I would say this. The ratings agencies have had, and still have, under current conditions, an incredibly wonderful business.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不会讨论我们会或不会对任何头寸采取什么行动，但我想说的是。在当前情况下，评级机构拥有并仍然拥有一个非常出色的业务。

I mean, it takes no capital at all, you know, the pricing power is significant. And certain parts of the world feel they need rating agencies.

我意思是，这完全不需要资本，你知道，定价权是显著的。而世界某些地方觉得他们需要评级机构。

搜索引擎有类似的功能。

There are also — a certain part of the world is very mad at rating agencies. And many feel that the rating agencies let them down when the rating agencies, essentially, succumbed to the same mania, in effect, you can say, that prevailed throughout the investment world, and, really, the political world, and the media world, et cetera.

当然，世界上也有一部分人对评级机构非常愤怒。许多人感到评级机构在某种程度上让他们失望，因为评级机构在投资世界、政治世界、媒体世界等整体狂热中屈服了。

They made the same mistake that, again, politicians made, I made, you know, you made, mortgage brokers made, whomever.

他们犯了同样的错误，政治家犯过，我犯过，你知道的，你也犯过，抵押贷款经纪人犯过，任何人都可能犯。

They couldn’t see a world where residential housing, countrywide, would collapse.

他们无法想象全国范围内的住宅市场会崩溃。

And I don’t think that was done because they were — the incentive part of it, there may have been some small aspect that that played. I just think that, you know, it’s very hard to think contrary to the crowd.

我认为这并不是因为他们有激励因素，可能有一些小的方面起了作用。我只是觉得，反对人群的想法是非常困难的。

And on the other hand, there is a, obviously, a backlash against rating agencies. There may be legal remedies. You can get views on that either way.

另一方面，显然对评级机构有一种反弹。可能会有法律救济。你可以对此有不同的看法。

If they are not forced to change their — the whole structure around them does not change in some dramatic way — it’s a pretty darn good business in that you can’t shop pricing in the rating agency business.

如果他们不被迫改变，整个围绕他们的结构没有发生某种戏剧性的变化——那么这仍然是一个相当不错的生意，因为你无法在评级机构的业务中进行价格比较。

We have never paid any attention to ratings for bonds, I mean, you know, at Berkshire. We don’t think we should farm out, outsource, investment judgment.

我们从未关注过债券的评级，我是说，你知道，在伯克希尔。我们认为不应该外包投资判断。

If we can’t do it ourselves, we just don’t do it. And we’re not going to rely on somebody else’s opinion, whether it’s a rating agency or an investment advisory organization, or a management consultant firm, or anybody else.

如果我们自己做不到，我们就不做。我们也不会依赖其他人的意见，无论是评级机构、投资顾问组织、管理咨询公司，还是其他任何人。

So, it’s not a business that we rely on, but we do recognize that if the, sort of, the social model doesn’t change, it still remains a phenomenal business.

所以，这不是我们依赖的业务，但我们确实认识到，如果社会模式不改变，它仍然是一个非凡的业务。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that the rating agencies, in their present forum, and structured with their present incentives, have been a wonderfully constructive influence in our country for a great many decades.

查理·芒格：我认为，评级机构在目前的框架下，以及在现有激励机制下，几十年来对我们国家产生了非常积极的影响。

And what happened, of course, is that the cognition faltered. They drifted with the stupidity of their times in a way that was regrettable.

当然，发生的事情是认知动摇了。他们以一种令人遗憾的方式随波逐流，沉浸在时代的愚蠢中。

Part of it came out of asininity in American business education. They overbelieved in these ridiculous models and so on and so on. And I have yet to hear a single apology from business academia for its huge contribution to our present difficulties. (Applause)

部分原因来自美国商业教育的愚蠢。他们过于相信这些荒谬的模型等等。我至今还没有听到任何来自商业学术界的道歉，关于他们在我们目前困境中所作出的巨大贡献。（掌声）

46. World will find a solution when oil “windfall” gives out

当石油“意外之财”消失时，世界将找到解决方案

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 7. 沃伦·巴菲特：第 7 区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike McCoy (PH) from San Francisco.

观众成员：来自旧金山的迈克·麦考伊（PH）。

Chairman Buffett, you frequently speak favorably about the prosperity of future generations, that our children and our children’s children will live better than us.

巴菲特主席，您经常积极地谈论未来几代人的繁荣，我们的孩子和我们的孩子的孩子将过得比我们更好。

How much of our current prosperity do you attribute to us being able to get oil out of the ground at a fraction of the cost of its value to us in the economy?

您认为我们当前繁荣有多少是归因于我们能够以远低于其经济价值的成本提取石油？

And how will we be able to live better in the future when we can no longer get more and more of this free lunch and we become dependent on more dilute sources like solar and wind?

我们将如何在未来过得更好，当我们无法再获得越来越多的这种免费午餐，并且我们变得依赖于更稀薄的来源，如太阳能和风能？

Couldn’t this turn out like trying to satisfy a drug addict with a Coca-Cola?

这会不会变成像用可乐来满足一个吸毒成瘾者一样的局面？

WARREN BUFFETT: The oil business — obviously, the discovery of oil — what was it, about 1850- something? Colonel Drake at Titusville, Pennsylvania, or something?

沃伦·巴菲特：石油行业——显然，石油的发现——大约是在 1850 年左右？德雷克上校在宾夕法尼亚州的泰特斯维尔，还是别的地方？

That changed the world in a very major way, and it was only 150 years ago.

这在很大程度上改变了世界，而这仅仅是 150 年前的事。

And since then we’ve been sticking straws into the earth at an incredible pace. There’s over 500,000 producing wells in the United States, would you believe that? I mean, 11 barrels, 10 barrels a day average or something of the sort.

自那时以来，我们以惊人的速度将吸管插入地球。美国有超过 500,000 个生产井，你能相信吗？我的意思是，平均每天 11 桶，10 桶左右。

We have really exploited what may have taken, I don’t know, whether it was hundreds of thousands of years or millions of years to create.

我们确实利用了可能需要数十万年甚至几百万年才能形成的资源。

It’s contributed in a huge way to the prosperity of the world, but the world, in my view, will not be dependent upon that particular — call it “windfall” — for the next hundred years.

这对世界的繁荣贡献巨大，但在我看来，世界并不会在下一个百年依赖于这种特定的——可以称之为“意外之财”。

And Charlie knows way more about this subject than I do, but there will be other free lunches available. You know, whether it’s solar or — there’s lots of possibilities.

查理对这个话题的了解远超过我，但会有其他免费的午餐可供选择。你知道，无论是太阳能还是——有很多可能性。

Don’t ever give up on humans’ ability to innovate in ways that create solutions to problems that seem insolvable.

永远不要放弃人类在创新方面的能力，以创造出看似无法解决问题的解决方案。

We’ve faced all kinds of predictions. You know, all of the inventions having been invented — there’s some famous statement, I forget who made, on that.

我们面临过各种预测。你知道，所有的发明都已被发明——有一句著名的话，我忘了是谁说的。

We haven’t really started. I mean, if you could pick a time in history when you would want to be born — leaving out the nuclear, chemical and biological threat, which is something to leave out — but I would pick today. The world has a bright future.

我们真的还没有开始。如果让您选择历史上一个出生的时机——不考虑核、生物和化学威胁的话，我会选择今天。这个世界有光明的未来。

Now, Charlie will give you the other side of that. (Laughter)

现在，查理将给你另一个方面的看法。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I think you’re failing to recognize something really important. In the technology of 150 years ago, they really needed the oil to get ahead.

查理·芒格：不。我认为你没有意识到一些非常重要的事情。在 150 年前的技术中，他们确实需要石油来取得进展。

In our advanced civilization, which has benefited from this last 150 years of technological expertise, we can get ahead without the oil if we have to.

在我们这个先进的文明中，经过过去 150 年的技术积累，如果必须的话，我们可以在没有石油的情况下取得进展。

Now, Freeman Dyson is a physicist who is not an economist but a genius, and he’s been very good at pointing out that it isn’t that horrible to contemplate a world which goes off oil, provided that world is as rich and knowledgeable as ours is now.

现在，弗里曼·戴森是一位物理学家，他不是经济学家，但他是个天才，他非常善于指出，考虑一个不再依赖石油的世界并不是那么可怕，前提是那个世界和我们现在一样富裕和知识渊博。

So the fact that they couldn’t have got to where we are now without the oil starting 150 years ago, does not mean we can’t do without the oil if we have to.

所以，他们无法在 150 年前没有石油的情况下达到我们现在的地步，并不意味着如果必须的话，我们就不能没有石油。

We need the oil and the gas, and the coal, eventually, for chemical feed stocks more than we need it for keeping warm and propelling our vehicles.

我们更需要石油、天然气和煤炭作为化工原料，而不仅仅是用来取暖和驱动车辆。

WARREN BUFFETT: And the adjustment, fortunately, will be fairly gradual. I mean, it isn’t like 85 million barrels in the day goes to 50 million or something in five or 10 years. So it’s a workable period of adjustment, in my view.

沃伦·巴菲特：幸运的是，调整将是相当渐进的。我是说，不会像 8500 万桶在一天内降到 5000 万桶，或者在五年或十年内降到那样。所以在我看来，这是一个可行的调整时期。

CHARLIE MUNGER: If it doesn’t bother Freeman Dyson, who knows more about it, I don’t think it should bother you too much. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：如果弗里曼·戴森对此不在意，我认为您也不必太担心。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s always pulling that on me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他总是这样对我。（笑声）

47. Buffett doesn’t like Kraft’s purchase of Cadbury

巴菲特不喜欢卡夫收购吉百利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: I received a number of questions regarding Kraft, and this one comes from a shareholder who says they prefer to remain anonymous.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我收到了关于卡夫的许多问题，这个问题来自一位希望保持匿名的股东。

The question is, “Given your stake in Kraft and your public criticism earlier this year about the Kraft-Cadbury deal, how would you grade the Kraft board of director’s capital allocation and the management compensation abilities?

问题是：“考虑到您在卡夫的股份以及您今年早些时候对卡夫-吉百利交易的公开批评，您如何评价卡夫董事会的资本配置和管理层的薪酬水平？”

“What did you think of Kraft CEO Irene Rosenfeld’s $26.3 million compensation package for services, including her leadership in completing the Cadbury acquisition and selling Kraft’s North American frozen pizza business?”

您如何看待卡夫首席执行官艾琳·罗森菲尔德（Irene Rosenfeld）2630万美元的薪酬方案，包括她在完成收购卡德巴里和出售卡夫北美冷冻披萨业务中的领导作用？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I didn’t like either the Cadbury decision or the pizza decision. But we’ve made our share of dumb deals at Berkshire, you know.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我对卡德伯里和比萨的决定都不太喜欢。但你知道，我们在伯克希尔也做过不少愚蠢的交易。

So I’ve gotten more tolerant of other people, and incidentally the fact I think it’s a dumb deal doesn’t for certain make it a dumb deal, but I think the odds are it was a dumb deal.

所以我对其他人变得更加宽容，顺便说一下，我认为这是一笔愚蠢的交易并不一定意味着它就是一笔愚蠢的交易，但我认为这笔交易的可能是愚蠢的。

In fact, I think the odds are that both deals were dumb. The pizza deal was particularly dumb, but — in my view.

事实上，我认为这两笔交易都是愚蠢的。比萨饼的交易尤其愚蠢，但——在我看来。

But just think of all the dumb things we’ve done, right? Starting with that department store in Baltimore.

但想想我们做过的所有愚蠢的事情，对吧？从巴尔的摩的那家百货商店开始。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah, right. A few Irish banks, you know.

查理·芒格：哦，对，没错。一些爱尔兰银行，你知道的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right, (inaudible).

沃伦·巴菲特：对，（听不清）。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We never seem to go —

查理·芒格：我们似乎从未去过——

WARREN BUFFETT: I wish you hadn’t brought this up.

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望你没有提起这个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — we never get over it. (Laughs)

查理·芒格：我们似乎从未摆脱这些事。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We expect to do some dumb things, it’s just we get mad when other people do dumb things with our money. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们预计会做一些愚蠢的事情，只是当其他人用我们的钱做愚蠢的事情时，我们会生气。（笑）

You know, the pizza business — somewhere I probably have some figures on that — but when they sold the pizza business for $3.7 billion they announced it as selling it for $3.7 billion.

您知道，披萨业务——我可能在某个地方有一些数据——但当他们以37亿美元出售披萨业务时，他们宣布以37亿美元出售。

They didn’t sell it for $3.7 billion, that’s what the other guy paid. What they got was about $2.5 billion. And that was a terribly tax-inefficient deal when they’d already shown their ability to understand that you could do a tax-efficient deal when they sold the Post cereals business earlier.

但他们并不是以37亿美元出售，而是另一方支付的那个价钱。他们实际得到的约为25亿美元。而且这是一个非常低效的税务交易，当他们已经展现出可以进行高效税务交易的能力时，比如他们之前出售的波士顿谷物业务。

And when they referenced — well, they didn’t reference at all what pizza was earning beforehand, but I think that Nestle said it was earning something like 280 million pre-tax, but that was referring to the previous year.

而且当他们提到——嗯，他们根本没有提到披萨之前的收益，但我认为雀巢（Nestlé）说它的税前收益大约为2.8亿美元，但那是指前一年的。

When they talked about the Cadbury earnings they were buying, they were talking about next year. And when they talked about the pizza earnings they were selling, they talked about last year.

当他们谈论他们所收购的卡德巴里收益时，他们是谈论明年。当他们谈论他们所出售的披萨收益时，他们谈论的是去年的。

Pizza in 2009, believe it or not, earned three hundred and, I think, 40 million pre-tax.

披萨在2009年，您可能不会相信，税前收入为3.4亿美元。

So they got 2 1/2 billion for 340 million of pizza earnings that were growing as fast or faster than the Cadbury earnings and where the sales were going as fast or faster. It really didn’t make sense in my view.

因此，他们以25亿美元的价格出售了3.4亿美元的披萨收益，而这些收益增长速度与卡德巴里收益一样快，甚至更快。在我看来，这真的没有道理。

Now, you know, Irene is a perfectly capable manager and she may know a lot of things about that business I don’t know. Like I say, we’ve made plenty of mistakes ourselves.

现在，你知道，艾琳是一位完全有能力的经理，她可能对我不知道的业务有很多了解。就像我说的，我们自己也犯了很多错误。

But if it’d been me, I would have voted to keep pizza and not buy Cadbury. And I expressed myself, and I don’t do that too often, but we owned a lot of Kraft.

但如果是我，我会投票保留披萨，而不是收购卡德巴里。我已经表达过我的观点，而我并不经常这么做，但我们在卡夫的持股很大。

And Kraft, still, is selling for considerably less than the value of its constituent parts, particularly if you value them the way they valued Cadbury. (Laughter)

而且卡夫的价格现在仍然低于其组成部分的价值，特别是如果您按照他们对卡德巴里的估值来看待它们。（笑声）

But if they don’t sell them all like they sold pizza, you know, the present price is below the value of Kool-Aid and A.1. Sauce and — and Jell-O and Oscar Meyer wieners and a few things.

但如果他们不以出售披萨的方式出售它们，您知道，当前价格低于库拉（Kool-Aid）、A.1.酱、果冻（Jell-O）和奥斯卡·迈耶（Oscar Meyer）热狗的一些东西的价值。

Those are very good businesses. I just hated to see them give up a significant portion of those businesses to buy Cadbury at what I felt was a very fancy price.

那些都是非常好的业务。我只是不喜欢看到他们以我认为非常高的价格收购卡德巴里，从而放弃了相当大一部分这些业务。

Charlie? 查理？

And in terms of her compensation, you know, we’ve got a compensation system at Berkshire that I regard as quite rational. And there’s a lot of companies in the United States that have different compensation systems. (Laughter)

在薪酬方面，你知道，我们在伯克希尔有一个我认为相当合理的薪酬体系。在美国有很多公司有不同的薪酬体系。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think generally, at the top of American businesses, people think they know too much about strategy. And they tend to hate the tough competitive conditions in the business they’re in, and to yearn for some business where it’s less difficult.

查理·芒格：是的，我一般认为，在美国企业的高层，很多人认为他们对战略了解得太多。他们往往厌恶自己所处行业的竞争压力，并渴望进入某个竞争较小的行业。

You remember when Xerox bought Crum & Forster, an American insurance company, one of the dumbest acquisitions in all time?

你还记得当施乐收购了美国保险公司 Crum & Forster 时，那是历史上最愚蠢的收购之一吗？

The reason Xerox did that is they didn’t have any tough Japanese competing in the insurance business. They were really tired of facing the tough competition they had in the business they were in.

施乐之所以这样做，是因为他们在保险业务中没有遇到任何强大的日本竞争对手。他们真的厌倦了在他们所处的行业中面对激烈的竞争。

I think it’s quite typical to dream, if you’re in business, that something that’s a little different, no matter how much you pay for it, will make your troubles less.

我认为在商业中，梦想一些稍微不同的东西是很典型的，无论你为此支付多少，它都会让你的烦恼减少。

WARREN BUFFETT: And you will have an absolute army of lawyers, investment advisors, public relations people, all of whom will have a strong economic interest in having you push ahead on deal, after deal, after deal, regardless of how the shareholders come out. It’s just — it’s the way it works. OK.

沃伦·巴菲特：而且，您会有一大堆律师、投资顾问、公关人员，他们都有强烈的经济利益，促使您不断推进交易，无论对股东的结果如何。这就是事情的运作方式。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s why Berkshire is a better deal. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这就是为什么伯克希尔是一个更好的交易。（笑声）

We are very stupid in many ways, but we have avoided a slight subset of stupidities. (Laughter)

我们在很多方面都很愚蠢，但我们避免了一小部分愚蠢的行为。（笑声）

And they’re important.

它们很重要。

48. Biggest threat to integrity: “everyone else is doing it”

对诚信的最大威胁：“其他人都在这样做”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK Number 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第 8 个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Mr. Buffett, dear Mr. Munger. My name is Richard Rentrop. I’m a shareholder from Germany.

观众成员：亲爱的巴菲特先生，亲爱的芒格先生。我叫理查德·伦特罗普。我是来自德国的股东。

Mr. Munger, you just mentioned again the importance of integrity. My question is about changes in integrity of management.

芒格先生，您刚刚再次提到了诚信的重要性。我的问题是关于管理层诚信的变化。

One of your three key questions is, does management love what they do or does management love the money? So how do you see the crisis having changed integrity of management?

您提到的三个关键问题之一是，管理层是否热爱他们所做的工作，还是仅仅热爱金钱？那么，您认为这场危机在多大程度上改变了管理层的诚信？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think what led to the crisis involved, to some extent, a lack of integrity in many a management. Fortunately, some of them are now gone. So, integrity’s very important.

查理·芒格：我认为导致危机的原因在某种程度上涉及许多管理层的诚信缺失。幸运的是，其中一些人现在已经离开了。因此，诚信是非常重要的。

It’s the safest way to make money, also. There’s an occasional perfect knave who succeeds pretty well with money, but that kind of success reminds me of what Pope Urban said about Cardinal Richelieu.

这也是赚钱最安全的方法。偶尔会有完美的恶棍在赚钱方面表现得相当不错，但那种成功让我想起教皇乌尔班对黎塞留红衣主教所说的话。

He said, “If there is a God, Cardinal Richelieu has much to answer for. But if there is no God, he’s done rather well.” (Laughter)

他说：“如果真有上帝，黎凯尔有很多事情需要向他交代。如果没有上帝，他做得相当不错。”（笑声）

And too many people want to be like Pope Urban’s view of Cardinal Richelieu.

而太多人想要模仿教皇乌尔班对黎凯尔的看法。

And — the integrity is important, it’s terribly important. And of course everybody mouths the integrity, even when it’s lacking.

而——诚信是重要的，这非常重要。当然，每个人都口口声声说诚信，即使它缺失。

So it’s difficult to be sure that professing integrity is the same as having it.

因此，很难确定自称诚信就等于拥有诚信。

WARREN BUFFETT: The “everyone else is doing it” is the toughest thing. I think —

沃伦·巴菲特： “大家都在这么做”是最难应对的。我认为——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: You had this classic example. In about 1993, roughly, you know, the Accounting Standards Board came out and says what was obvious to everybody all along, was that stock options were actually expense, and that expenses, for some reason or another, belonged on the income statement.

沃伦·巴菲特：你有这个经典的例子。大约在 1993 年，财务会计准则委员会出来说出大家一直都知道的事情，那就是股票期权实际上是费用，而这些费用出于某种原因应该出现在损益表上。

And America — corporate America — fought back like you cannot believe. I mean, it was like World War III had broken out, in terms of armies of CEOs marching on Washington.

美国——企业美国——反击得令人难以置信。我是说，这就像第三次世界大战爆发了一样，成群的首席执行官们涌向华盛顿。

So the Accounting Standard Board backed off. Congress — the Senate — voted 88 to 9 to tell them that, you know, what the hell did the Accounting Standards Board know about accounting, and that the Senate would tell them what accounting was all about.

所以会计标准委员会退缩了。国会——参议院——以 88 票对 9 票投票告诉他们，你们知道，会计标准委员会对会计了解多少，参议院会告诉他们会计到底是什么。

When the Accounting Standards Board backed off, they said, “We’ll now say that you can do it one of two ways. Number one is preferred,” which was to expense. Number two was acceptable, but not preferred.

当会计准则委员会退缩时，他们说：“我们现在可以说你可以有两种方式。第一种是首选，”即费用化。第二种是可接受的，但不是首选。

Of the Standard & Poor’s 500 companies, 498 chose number two, the non-preferred way. Two took the preferred method.

在标准普尔 500 家公司中，498 家选择了第二种，即非优先方式。两家采用了优先方法。

And I talked to a number of people in that 498 that I would trust to be a trustee of my will, you know, I’d love to have them as a next door neighbor, they could marry my daughter, but in the end they said, “I can’t do it if the other guy isn’t doing it.”

我与这498家公司中的几位交谈过，我会信任他们作为我的遗嘱托管人，您知道，我很乐意将他们作为邻居，他们可以娶我的女儿，但最终他们说：“如果其他人都不这样做，我就不能这样做。”

It was a variation on the, “I’m doing it because the other guy is doing it.”

这实际上是一种“我这么做是因为其他人也这么做”的变种。

They basically said, “I’ll be penalizing my shareholders if I report less in the way of earnings than I can report. And all the other guys are doing it that way, and I understand your point.”

他们基本上说：“如果我报告的收益比我可以报告的少，我就会让我的股东受到惩罚。而其他所有人都在那样做，我理解您的观点。”

And the situational ethics problem is huge. I gave you earlier that illustration of how rare it is to find, if you carry it out to tenths of a cent, a four in reported earnings, quarterly.

情境伦理问题非常严重。我之前给你举了一个例子，说明如果你将其精确到十分之一美分，季度报告中找到四的盈利是多么罕见。

That’s not accidental and it’s — but if you talk to the people that play games to get that four up to five, they would say, “Everybody else is doing it, your own statistics proved that.”

这不是偶然的——但是如果你和那些玩游戏以获得四舍五入的人交谈，他们会说：“其他人都在这样做，你自己的统计数据证明了这一点。”

And that is, you know, it is a tough problem to deal with.

这确实是一个难以处理的问题。

We try to create as few situations in Berkshire as we can that would induce such behavior. I don’t have the managers submit budgets to me, there is no Berkshire budget, you know. They can use them in their own operations. Some do and some don’t. Many do, a great many do.

我们尽量在伯克希尔创造尽可能少的情况，以避免这种行为。我不让经理们向我提交预算，伯克希尔没有预算，你知道的。他们可以在自己的运营中使用这些预算。有些人使用，有些人不使用。很多人使用，很多人都在使用。

But if they submit them to me, you know, and the temptation becomes, if they’re not quite making it and they think I’m looking at them all the time, the temptation becomes to fudge in some way.

但是，如果他们向我提交预算，您知道，如果他们没有完全达成目标，而且他们认为我一直在看着他们，诱惑就会变得更加明显。

And very few would do it, but the more that thought the other ones were doing it, the more that would do it. It’s just human behavior. And you want to try and create a structure that minimizes the weaknesses in human behavior.

而很少有人会这样做，但越多的人认为其他人正在这样做，越多的人就会这样做。这就是人类行为。你想要尝试创建一个结构，以最小化人类行为中的弱点。

And I think Berkshire’s about as good a place at that as any, although I’m sure we’re not perfect at it.

我认为伯克希尔在这方面是个不错的地方，尽管我相信我们并不完美。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what’s really interesting on this issue is that so much of the bad behavior does not come from malevolence or overweening greed or anything like that.

查理·芒格：是的，这个问题真正有趣的是，很多不良行为并不是出于恶意、过度贪婪或其他类似的原因。

It comes from subconscious poor cognition that justifies a lot of behavior that’s really not justifiable if it’s better understood. And that happens to practically everybody.

这源于潜意识中的糟糕认知，这种认知为许多实际上并不合理的行为提供了辩解，如果更好地理解这些行为，就会发现它们并不合理。这几乎发生在每个人身上。

And the cure is very difficult. The best cure is to have a system where the people who are making the decisions bear the consequences.

而治疗非常困难。最好的治疗方法是建立一个系统，让做出决策的人承担后果。

非常难，逃避现实是生理性的能力。

And that’s why the system that Wall Street created where nobody really owned the mortgages, they just passed them rapidly to somebody else at a profit. And so nobody felt any responsibility that the mortgages be any good.

这就是华尔街创造的系统的原因，没人真正拥有抵押贷款，他们只是迅速将其转手给其他人以获取利润。因此，没有人感到有责任确保抵押贷款的质量。

Systems like that, at a basic level, are irresponsible systems, and it’s deeply immoral to create irresponsible systems like that.

像这样的系统，从基本层面上来说，是不负责任的系统，创造这样的不负责任的系统是非常不道德的。

But the people who create them don’t realize they’re being immoral, they think those systems are wonderful.

但创造这些系统的人并没有意识到他们在不道德，他们认为这些系统是很棒的。

Who do you see apologizing for the behavior you now find so regrettable in our recent mess?

您看到谁为您现在发现的在我们最近的麻烦中非常令人遗憾的行为道歉？

There are very few apologies, you’ll note. People think they did fine.

您会注意到，几乎没有人道歉。人们认为他们做得很好。

49. Can’t make money if you’re scared when everyone else is scared

如果你在别人都害怕的时候也感到害怕，就无法赚钱。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗？（掌声）

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from James A. Star.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自詹姆斯·A·斯塔尔。

“I have read an enormous amount about past market declines and the opportunities they presented to investors.

“我阅读了大量关于过去市场下跌及其为投资者提供的机会的资料。”

“The last two years have seemed to me, a 43-year-old investor, a real opportunity. Yet in the thick of the action, I was too scared, because I felt the market decline, while severe, was not necessarily sufficient to match the risks of global financial meltdown.

过去两年对我这个 43 岁的投资者来说，似乎是一个真正的机会。然而在行动的关键时刻，我却感到非常害怕，因为我觉得市场的下跌虽然严重，但并不一定足以与全球金融崩溃的风险相匹配。

“So my question is, given that we are possibly not totally out of the woods, how did the two of you assess this latest buying opportunity against the previous opportunities of your life?”

“所以我的问题是，考虑到我们可能并没有完全走出困境，您二位如何评估这次购买机会与您一生中其他机会相比？”

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not the greatest one. We’ve seen a few that scream at us, and we’ve seen a few periods of overvaluation that scream at us. And 90 percent of the time we’re somewhere in between and we don’t know exactly where we are in between.

沃伦·巴菲特：这并不是最好的机会。我们见过一些让我们惊呼的情况，也见过一些明显高估的时期。90%的时间我们处于两者之间，但我们并不确切知道我们处于哪个位置。

The business of being scared, you know, I don’t know what you do about that.

关于害怕的问题，我不知道你该如何处理。

If you’re of that — if you have a temperament that when others are fearful you’re going to get scared yourself, you know, you are not going to make a lot of money in securities over time, in all probability.

如果你是那种——如果你有一种性格，当别人感到恐惧时你也会感到害怕，那么，长期来看，你在证券市场上很可能赚不到很多钱。

You know, people really — if they didn’t look at quotations — but, of course, the whole world is urging them to look at quotations, and more than that, do something based on small changes in quotations.

人们真的——如果他们不看报价——但显然，整个世界都在催促他们查看报价，而且更重要的是，基于小幅度的报价变化做出行动。

But think how much more rational — we’ve talked about it before — but think how much more rational investing in a farm is than the way many people buy stocks.

但想想投资农场比许多人购买股票的方式理性得多——我们之前谈过这个。

If you buy a farm, do you get a quote next week, do you get a quote next month? If you buy an apartment house, do you get a quote next week or month?

如果你买一个农场，下周会得到报价吗？下个月会得到报价吗？如果你买一栋公寓楼，下周或下个月会得到报价吗？

No, you look at the apartment house or the farm and you say, “I expect it to produce so many bushels of soy beans and corn, and if it does that, it meets my expectations.”

不，你看公寓楼或农场，你会说：“我期望它能生产这么多蒲式耳的大豆和玉米，如果能做到这一点，它就符合我的期望。”

If they buy a stock and they think if it goes up it’s wonderful, and if it goes down it’s bad.

如果他们买了一只股票，他们认为如果股票上涨那就太好了，如果下跌那就不好。

We think just the opposite. When it goes down we love it, because we’ll buy more. And if it goes up, it kills us to buy more.

我们恰恰相反。当它下跌时，我们喜欢它，因为我们会买更多。如果它上涨，买更多就让我们痛苦。

And I — you know — all kinds — you know, Ben Graham wrote about it. It’s been explained. But if you can’t get yourself in that mental attitude, you’re going to be scared whenever everybody else is scared.

你知道——各种情况——本·格雷厄姆写过这些。这已经被解释过。但如果你无法调整自己的心态，你就会在别人害怕时感到恐惧。

And to expect somebody else to tell you when to buy and therefore get your courage back up or something, you know, I could get this fellow’s courage up substantially by saying this is a wonderful time to buy, and then a week from now he’d run into somebody else that tells him the world is coming to an end and he’d sell.

期待其他人告诉你何时购买，从而让你的勇气恢复，或者类似的东西，我可以大幅提高这个人的勇气，告诉他现在是一个很好的购买时机，然后一周后他又会听到其他人说世界即将崩溃，他就会卖出。

I mean, he’s a broker’s friend, but he’s not going to make a lot of money.

我意思是，他是经纪人的朋友，但他不会赚很多钱。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think I developed more courage after I learned I could handle hardship. So maybe you should get your feet wet with a little more failure. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的，我认为在我学会应对困难后，我变得更加勇敢。所以也许你应该经历一些失败来增强自己的勇气。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve certainly followed that advice. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我当然听从了这个建议。（笑声）

No, some people really do not have the — apparently, they don’t have the temperament, or emotional stability, or whatever it may be, to invest in securities.

不，有些人确实没有——显然，他们没有投资证券所需的气质、情绪稳定性或其他任何东西。

They’d be much better off if there were no quotations at all. And Keynes talked about that some in the past, too.

如果没有报价，他们会过得更好。凯恩斯过去也提到过这一点。

To take something that should be an asset, a quotation every day, you know, terrific liquidity, nobody says, “How liquid is my farm?” or something of the sort. So they’re not expecting the prices to tell them something about how they’re doing.

要把本应该是资产的东西，每天都进行报价，你知道，流动性极佳，没有人会问：“我的农场流动性如何？”之类的话。因此，他们并不指望价格能告诉他们自己做得怎么样。

The market is saying this or that. Whenever anybody says, “The market is saying this or that,” you know, it’s sort of unbelievable.

市场在说这个或那个。每当有人说“市场在说这个或那个”时，这听起来是不可思议的。

But there’s a lot of interest in investing, and people are going to yak about it all the time.

但对投资有很多兴趣，人们会一直谈论这个。

And in the end, what counts is buying a good business at a decent price, and then forgetting about it for a long, long, long time. And some people can do it and some people can’t.

最终，重要的是以合理的价格购买一个好的企业，然后长时间忘记它。有些人能做到，有些人则不能。

50. Munger is “enormously optimistic” about solar power

芒格对太阳能“非常乐观”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：第九。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Joe McCabe (PH). I’m from Littleton, Colorado. I want to thank you for the opportunity to ask a question and for your annual discussions in your report, just wonderful reading.

观众成员：嗨，我叫乔·麦凯布（音）。我来自科罗拉多州的小顿。感谢您给我提问的机会，以及您报告中的年度讨论，真是精彩的阅读。

Charlie Munger, you are on a YouTube video that discusses BYD and solar energy, and I really appreciate that interview and it being available to everyone. I want to talk about that in relationship to your other companies.

查理·芒格，您出现在一段YouTube视频中，讨论了比亚迪和太阳能，我很感激那次采访能够让大家看到。我想谈谈与您其他公司的关系。

So the BYD was mentioned as electric car and battery, but I understand their second goal is solar energy.

所以比亚迪被提到作为电动车和电池，但我了解到他们的第二个目标是太阳能。

And you also own roofing companies and buildings companies, (inaudible) and Clayton, as well as utilities, Mid-America, PacifiCorp, and Pacific Power.

您还拥有屋顶公司和建筑公司（听不清）以及克莱顿，还有公用事业公司，中美洲，太平洋公司和太平洋电力。

This seems to be a perfect golden opportunity for solar to be on these buildings in those kinds of utility companies.

这似乎是一个完美的机会，让太阳能在这些建筑上为这些类型的公用事业公司服务。

You’ve mentioned you don’t interfere with individual companies, but is there a way you can direct, suggest, motivate a synergy between all these companies to bring solar solutions? Thank you.

您提到过您不干预个别公司，但有没有办法可以引导、建议或激励这些公司之间的协同，以提供太阳能的解决方案？谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: As the solar solutions are coming, because they’re so obviously needed.

查理·芒格：太阳能解决方案正在到来，因为它们显然是必要的。

And regarding solar panels on roofs, I never pass an opportunity to decline to put them in, because I think they’re going to get a lot cheaper and I’d rather wait.

关于屋顶上的太阳能电池板，我从不放过拒绝安装的机会，因为我认为它们会变得便宜得多，我宁愿等待。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, at 86 you can afford to, Charlie. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，查理，86 岁的时候你可以这样做。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I have to think about the long term. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我必须考虑长期。（笑声）

And I’m going to miss you terribly. (Laughter)

我会非常想念你。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Touché. 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It reminded me of the wife, and the husband said, “Will you still love me if I lost all of my money?” And she says, “Yes, I would always love you, but I would miss you terribly.” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：这让我想起了一对夫妻，丈夫问：“如果我失去了所有的钱，你还会爱我吗？”她说：“是的，我会永远爱你，但我会非常想念你。”（笑声）

Well, the solar is coming because we have no other practical alternative.

好吧，太阳能正在兴起，因为我们没有其他实际的替代方案。

And it should be regarded as a very good thing, because what in hell would modern civilization do if we had no alternative to fossil fuels? That would be a really serious problem.

这应该被视为一件非常好的事情，因为如果我们没有替代化石燃料的选择，现代文明到底会怎么办？那将是一个非常严重的问题。

And so of course, the cities that are chocking to death on their own poisonous air are going to go to electric cars and we’re going to get a lot more renewable energy from the sun.

因此，当然，那些因自身有毒空气而窒息的城市将会转向电动车，我们将会获得更多来自太阳的可再生能源。

I’m also quite negative about growing corn in America using fossil water and fossil fuels in order to burn up in automobiles. (Applause)

我对在美国用石油和化石燃料种玉米以便在汽车上燃烧也持有相当负面的看法。（掌声）

That is a stunningly stupid idea, and another example of how our politicians have failed us.

这是一个令人震惊的愚蠢想法，也是政治家辜负我们的又一个例子。

But I am enormously optimistic about what is going to happen. Our politicians will eventually create a big electric grid that’s way better than what we have now. We’ll eventually have the energy we need, and we will be way better for it.

但我对即将发生的事情非常乐观。我们的政治家最终会建立一个比现在好得多的大型电网。我们最终会拥有所需的能源，而我们也会因此变得更好。

And it’s wonderful that these technical problems are proving solvable.

而且这些技术问题被证明是可以解决的，这真是太好了。

It is not all that important over the long term, if solar power costs twice as much as what we’re used to. That’s a blip in the economic future of our country, it’s just a blip.

从长远来看，太阳能的成本即使是我们所习惯的两倍，也不是那么重要。这只是我们国家经济未来中的一个小插曲。

And I think it’s probably a good thing that we have all these big capital needs coming that will create a better system in the end and solve our problems in the end.

我认为，面对即将到来的重大资本需求，这可能是件好事，最终会创造出更好的系统并解决我们的麻烦。

So I’m quite optimistic. But in terms of immediate business decisions, I think frequently the right answer is counterintuitive, like mine, to say, if you want to put in solar panels, wait. They’re going to get cheaper.

所以我相当乐观。但在即时商业决策方面，我认为正确的答案往往是反直觉的，比如我所说的，如果你想安装太阳能电池板，等一下。它们会变得更便宜。

Warren, do you want to criticize that?

沃伦，您想对此进行批评吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I have nothing to add. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

51. No “exploding bananas” now in our stock portfolio

现在我们的股票投资组合中没有“爆炸香蕉”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Jennifer Mancuso (PH) who is a shareholder here in Omaha. And she’s hoping that you can settle a debate between her husband and her.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自于珍妮弗·曼库索（PH），她是奥马哈的一位股东。她希望您能解决她和她丈夫之间的争论。

WARREN BUFFETT: That a promising assignment. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个有前途的任务。（笑）

BECKY QUICK: She says that he believes the Berkshire Hathaway stock will rise significantly in the next one to two years because of all the smart buys Warren made last year in Fortune 500s when stock prices were bottomed out.

贝基·奎克：她说他相信伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票在未来一到两年内会大幅上涨，因为沃伦去年在财富 500 强中进行的所有聪明投资都是在股价触底时进行的。

She says she knows this type of purchasing has driven much of your financial success, but she doesn’t know how impactful these buys are, given the size of Berkshire Hathaway and that Warren himself indicates that we shouldn’t expect to see large increases in his stock price in the next few years.

她说她知道这种购买方式推动了你们的财务成功，但她不知道这些购买的影响有多大，考虑到伯克希尔哈撒韦的规模，以及沃伦本人表示我们不应该期待在未来几年内看到他的股价大幅上涨。

So the question is, what percentage of the portfolio is represented by those stock purchases, and what kind of an impact might they have on the fund’s value as the valuation of that stock increases?

所以问题是，这些股票购买在投资组合中占据什么百分比，它们的价值增长会对基金的整体价值产生什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say this, that our portfolio now — I’ve always regarded our portfolio as something that we thought would be worth more money later on.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想说的是，我们的投资组合现在——我一直认为我们的投资组合是我们认为将来会更有价值的东西。

But the degree of undervaluation in our portfolio now compared to what I would expect it to produce over time is not dramatic, and that undervaluation has been exceeded many times in the past.

但我们投资组合中目前的低估程度与我预期的长期收益相比并不显著，而且这种低估在过去多次被超越。

So it isn’t like we’re sitting here on some exploding bananas or anything like that. That couldn’t be further from the truth.

所以我们并不是坐在一些爆炸的香蕉上之类的事情上。这与事实相去甚远。

We think we’ll do reasonably well over time. We’ve got a lot of good businesses, we try to allocate capital rationally, we don’t waste a lot of money at the top.

我们认为随着时间的推移，我们会做得相当不错。我们有很多优秀的业务，我们努力合理分配资本，不会在顶层浪费很多钱。

But we do not have a whole bunch of things that are likely to increase dramatically in value from here, it just isn’t the case. So I hope she and her husband get along fine. (Laughter)

但我们并没有一大堆可能会从这里大幅增值的东西，情况并非如此。所以我希望她和她的丈夫相处得很好。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think I can solve any of those domestic troubles, either. In my own day, I simply accepted the other point of view. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我也解决不了这些家庭纠纷。在我那个年代，我只是接受了另一种观点。（笑声）

52. “If I can be optimistic when I’m nearly dead, surely the rest of you can handle a little inflation”

“如果我在快要死的时候都能保持乐观，那么你们其他人肯定也能应对一点通货膨胀。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第十名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello gentlemen, my name is Randy Bellows (PH) and I’m from Rock Hall, Maryland.

观众成员：你好，先生们，我叫兰迪·贝洛斯（PH），我来自马里兰州的洛克霍尔。

I’ve been coming here for many, many years, yet today I sense from each of you a guarded sense, a sense of reserve.

我来这里很多年了，但今天我感受到你们俩都有一种谨慎的情绪，一种保留的感觉。

Not quite overt pessimism, but real reserve. You have spoken of impending inflation, government debt, both here and abroad, that’s higher than we’re accustomed to, increased regulation and red tape that may slow innovation and growth.

并不是明显的悲观，但是真实的保留。你们谈到即将到来的通货膨胀、政府债务——无论是在国内还是国外——比我们习惯的要高，增加的监管和繁文缛节可能会减缓创新和增长。

And just a few minutes ago, Charlie, you spoke of that we have to reduce our expectation of investment returns.

刚才几分钟前，查理，你提到我们必须降低对投资回报的期望。

And yet in the same day you say children in India will live better than we do, Chinese will live better than we do, and our own children here in this country will live better than we do today.

然而在同一天，你说印度的孩子们将比我们生活得更好，中国人将比我们生活得更好，而我们自己国家的孩子们将比我们今天生活得更好。

Can you give me four or five facts that explain your optimism? And thank you.

你能给我四五个解释你乐观的事实吗？谢谢你。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, having the main technical problems of civilization — which, of course, are all energy related — having a solution that’s on the horizon and nearly here, that is not a small benefit to humanity.

查理·芒格：好吧，解决文明的主要技术问题——当然，这些问题都与能源有关——而且这些解决方案即将到来，这对人类来说是一个不小的好处。

That is the biggest single problem we have, so of course I’m optimistic about that.

这是我们最大的单一问题，所以我当然对此持乐观态度。

And — I’m optimistic about the culture that generally pervades in Berkshire, because I think it will continue to work.

我对伯克希尔普遍存在的文化持乐观态度，因为我认为它将继续发挥作用。

And of course it gives me some pleasure to see people that have had it tough for a long time — through their own extreme efforts and talents — rising rapidly, as in many parts of China and India.

我当然很高兴看到那些经历了很长时间艰辛的人——通过他们极大的努力和才华——迅速崛起，尤其是在中国和印度的许多地方。

All of that gives me pleasure, and why shouldn’t it? Of course there are terrible problems, and of course reduced expectations are the rational way. There’s no better way to be happy than getting your expectations down, it’s much easier than —

这一切让我感到高兴，那又有什么不好呢？当然，存在可怕的问题，当然降低期望是合理的方式。没有比降低期望更好的方式让人快乐，远比—

WARREN BUFFETT: Getting your results up.

沃伦·巴菲特：提高你的业绩。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — than getting your results up, yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：——比提高你的结果更重要，是的。（笑声）

It’s just — we never know anything here except the most elementary common sense. It’s amazing that it’s sufficed for us.

这就是——我们在这里除了最基本的常识外什么都不知道。令人惊讶的是，这对我们来说已经足够了。

So no, I’m optimistic about life. If I can be optimistic when I’m nearly dead, surely the rest of you can handle a little inflation. (Laughter and applause)

所以不，我对生活持乐观态度。如果我在快要死的时候都能保持乐观，那么你们其他人肯定能应对一点通货膨胀。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I really have nothing to add to that. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我真的没有什么好补充的。（笑声）

53. Why Buffett prefers TV interviews

为什么巴菲特更喜欢电视采访

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from Myard Shields (PH), and I want to say in advance that I don’t — I’m not thrilled asking this question and you’ll see why.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自迈亚德·希尔兹（PH），我想提前说，我并不——我并不喜欢问这个问题，你们会明白原因。

The question is, “The American public almost certainly benefits from Mr. Buffett’s increasing media exposure, but is it the best use of your time for Berkshire’s shareholders?”

问题是：“美国公众几乎肯定受益于巴菲特先生越来越多的媒体曝光，但这对伯克希尔的股东来说真的是最好的时间利用吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably not. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：可能不是。（笑声）

I do a lot of things that aren’t the best use of my time for Berkshire shareholders. I play bridge on the internet 12 hours a week, you know. I’m not sitting there thinking improving my bridge skills is going to do wonders for Berkshire. (Laughs)

我做了很多对伯克希尔股东来说并不是最佳时间利用的事情。我每周在网上打桥牌 12 个小时，你知道的。我并不是坐在那里想着提高我的桥牌技巧会对伯克希尔产生奇迹。（笑）

No, I — I do — I have seen over the years that the development of broadcast television, as opposed to print, and I would say that if you want to have a record of exactly what you said as opposed to interpreted through not only reporters but editors who bounce back things and say, “Take six paragraphs down to four paragraphs, and why don’t you ask this question?”

不，我——我确实——我多年来看到广播电视的发展，与印刷媒体相比，我想说，如果你想准确记录你所说的话，而不是通过记者和编辑的解读，他们会把内容从六段缩减到四段，并问：“为什么不问这个问题？”

I would much rather have a record on Charlie Rose which is permanent. Where people can go back and look at exactly what I said, and my body language, and whether I was kidding.

我宁愿在查理·罗斯的节目上有一个永久的记录。人们可以回去查看我说的确切内容、我的肢体语言，以及我是否在开玩笑。

I’m sure Lloyd Blankfein would have preferred to have a television interview. He would like to take back that remark about, you know, doing God’s work, under any circumstances. But I would bet that that was delivered as a throwaway line in terms of something that was said earlier.

我相信劳埃德·布兰克费恩更愿意接受电视采访。他希望在任何情况下都能收回关于“做上帝的工作”的那句话。但我敢打赌，那句话是在谈到之前某些事情时随口说出的。

Clearly he did not mean that in a literal sense, but he’s gotten killed in the media because somebody elected to treat it halfway seriously, and then other people, to fit other stories, play it that way.

显然他并不是字面意思，但他在媒体上受到了攻击，因为有人选择半认真地对待这件事，然后其他人为了适应其他故事，也这样处理。

I like the idea, whether it’s, you know, in terms of CNBC keeping a record of it or Charlie Rose keeping a record of it, of being judged by my own words rather than somebody writing a few paragraphs trying to summarize some views.

我喜欢这个想法，无论是 CNBC 记录它，还是查理·罗斯记录它，我更愿意被自己的话来评判，而不是别人写几段来总结我的观点。

And that requires being on television instead of having people, essentially, take a one-hour interview, often just shopping for a single quote that fits their storyline, and having that somehow become representative of what I think.

这需要在电视上出现，而不是让人们基本上进行一个小时的采访，通常只是为了寻找一个符合他们故事线的单一引用，并让这个引用以某种方式代表我所想的。

So the clearer I can be about what I think, whether writing my own annual report or whether being in broadcast, the better I feel about the accuracy of the reporting.

因此，我对自己想法的表达越清晰，无论是撰写自己的年度报告还是参与广播，我对报道的准确性就越有信心。

And I figured that out a few years ago. So that’s the direction I go now. And whether it’s the best use of the time, it works fine.

我几年前就意识到这一点。所以这就是我现在的方向。不管这是否是时间的最佳利用，它都运作得很好。

I’ll tell you one story on that. You even have to be a little careful about broadcast.

我给你讲一个故事。你甚至需要对电视广播稍微小心一点。

After we made the Burlington deal, Charlie Rose, who may be here, did an interview with me and we taped it on a Friday morning. And we did the tape, and we had a good time doing it.

在我们达成伯灵顿交易后，查理·罗斯（可能在这里）和我进行了采访，我们在一个星期五的早晨录制了它。我们录制了这个节目，过程很愉快。

And during the tape there was a little section on it showing great railroad scenes, and one had Cary Grant and Grace Kelly, and another one had Marilyn Monroe in “Some Like It Hot,” and then they showed a bunch of the kind of things we had about railroads in our movie this morning.

在录制过程中，有一个小部分展示了一些伟大的铁路场景，其中有凯瑞·格兰特和格蕾丝·凯利，还有玛丽莲·梦露在《热情似火》中的镜头，然后他们展示了一些关于我们早晨电影中铁路的内容。

And when we got all through that, he asked me some question. And just to give a flip answer, but it did tie in with what I’d just seen, I said, “Well, I would have paid more for the Burlington if they’d thrown in Grace Kelly and Marilyn Monroe.” (Laughter)

当我们完成这一切时，他问了我一个问题。为了给个轻松的回答，但这确实与我刚刚看到的有关，我说：“好吧，如果他们把格蕾丝·凯莉和玛丽莲·梦露一起送过来，我会为伯灵顿支付更多。”（笑声）

Well, this taped interview ran an hour and six minutes, so when they ran the tape that night they had to take out six minutes and they took out these railroad scenes that showed Grace Kelly and Marilyn Monroe. (Laughter)

好吧，这段录音采访持续了一个小时六分钟，所以当他们那晚播放录音时，他们不得不删去六分钟，他们删去了这些展示格蕾丝·凯莉和玛丽莲·梦露的铁路场景。（笑声）

So to anybody that viewed this thing, it looked like I was spending my time there fantasizing about these — while Charlie was talking to me. (Laughter)

因此，对任何观看这个节目的人来说，这看起来就像我在那儿幻想这些——而查理在和我说话。（笑声）

So even television isn’t safe. (Laughter)

所以连电视也不安全。(笑声)

54. How Berkshire gets loyal shareholders

伯克希尔如何获得忠实股东

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 11 号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Kip Johann-Berkel from Boston, Massachusetts.

观众成员：嗨，我的名字是基普·约翰-贝尔克，来自马萨诸塞州波士顿。

First, thank you both for your writings, annual shareholder meetings, and even the Charlie Rose interviews — (Buffett laughs) — as they have helped me grow both as an investor and as a person.

首先，感谢你们俩的著作、年度股东大会，甚至查理·罗斯的采访——（巴菲特笑）——这些帮助使我在投资和个人成长方面受益匪浅。

Berkshire has, in my opinion, the best and most loyal shareholders of any publicly-traded company or mutual fund.

在我看来，伯克希尔拥有所有上市公司或共同基金中最优秀、最忠诚的股东。

How do you attract and retain a shareholder base, particularly when many of the same behavioral tendencies that produce mispriced securities also produce fleet-footed shareholders? Thank you.

您如何吸引和保留股东基础，尤其是在许多导致证券定价错误的行为倾向也会导致股东的频繁变动的情况下？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the interesting thing about marketable securities is that, basically, anybody can buy them.

沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是，市场上的可交易证券，基本上，任何人都可以购买。

You might elect to join somebody in buying a McDonald’s franchise or a farm, or apartment house, or something, but if you’re running a public company, you know, you can have anybody from, you know, Osama Bin Laden, you know, to the Pope as your shareholder.

你可能选择与某人一起购买麦当劳的特许经营权、农场、公寓楼或其他东西，但如果你在经营一家上市公司，你知道，你可以有任何人作为你的股东，从奥萨马·本·拉登到教皇。

I mean, they elected — you don’t elect them, they elect you.

我的意思是，他们选择了你，而你并没有选择他们。

Now, if you want a shareholder body that is going to be in sync with you, it’s important — in my view — it’s important that you let them know exactly what sort of institution you plan to run.

现在，如果你想要一个与您保持同步的股东群体，那么在我看来，让他们知道你计划经营什么样的机构是很重要的。

And we’ve got the annual reports, we’ve got television interviews, we’ve got various ways of conveying to people what kind of a place Berkshire is. And to some, that says, “Come in,” and to others it says, “Stay out.”

我们有年度报告，我们有电视采访，我们有各种方式向人们传达伯克希尔是什么样的地方。对一些人来说，这意味着“欢迎进来”，而对另一些人来说，这意味着“请留在外面”。

Phil Fisher wrote a great book on investing back in the very early 1960s and he described the situation this way.

菲尔·费舍尔在 1960 年代初期写了一本关于投资的好书，他这样描述了当时的情况。

He said, “Look it, you can have a restaurant and it can say ‘French food’ and if you have French food inside, you know, people are going — you’re going to get a satisfied and returning clientele. And you can have another one that says hamburgers. But what you can’t do is have hamburgers on the outside on the marquee and deliver French food inside.”

他说：“你看，你可以开一家餐厅，上面写着‘法式料理’，如果里面有法式料理，你知道，人们会——你会得到满意并且回头的顾客。而你可以开另一家，上面写着汉堡。但是你不能在外面招牌上写汉堡，而里面却提供法式料理。”

And so many companies sort of try and promise everything to everybody. Their investor relations department tells them that any shareholder they can get interested, you know, they want.

许多公司试图向每个人承诺一切。他们的投资者关系部门告诉他们，任何能够引起兴趣的股东，他们都想要。

We want people who think the way we do. And we think, on balance, we won’t disappoint them too much.

我们希望找到与我们思维方式相同的人。我们认为，总体来说，我们不会让他们失望太多。

But if we get a bunch of people who think that the earnings next quarter are going to be up 10 percent for some reason, and that’s the reason they own the stock, we’re going to have a lot of disappointed people.

但是如果我们有一群人认为下个季度的收益会因为某种原因上涨 10%，而这就是他们持有股票的原因，那么我们会有很多失望的人。

And our goal in life is not to spend our time associating with people who are going to be disappointed with us.

我们生活的目标不是花时间与那些会对我们感到失望的人交往。

It’s our fault if we give out the wrong advertisement. So we try to advertise what we are, and then we try to deliver on that.

如果我们传达了错误的信息，那就是我们的错。所以我们努力宣传我们是什么样的公司，然后我们试图兑现这一承诺。

And I do think we have the best group of shareholders in the world, you know, among large publicly-traded companies.

我确实认为我们拥有世界上最优秀的股东群体，您知道，在大型上市公司中。

And I think it’s because we’ve got people that basically look into buying a business, becoming our partners over the years, and they know we’ll treat them like partners.

我认为这是因为我们有一些人基本上在考虑购买一个企业，成为我们的合作伙伴，他们知道我们会像对待合作伙伴一样对待他们。

And they, in turn, give us a lot of comfort in having a stable shareholder base and a good feeling about just running the whole place.

他们反过来给我们带来了很多安慰，让我们拥有一个稳定的股东基础，并对整个运营有良好的感觉。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, what happened here is, to some extent, an accident.

查理·芒格：嗯，这里发生的事情在某种程度上是一个意外。

Warren and I started out investing money for our families and friends, and the people who trusted us when we were young and unknown, of course, we developed a strong affection for.

沃伦和我最初是为我们的家人和朋友投资，当然，还有那些在我们年轻和不知名时信任我们的人，我们对他们产生了深厚的感情。

And we morphed into controlling public companies from that base, and so we tend to regard our shareholders, including the new ones, as family.

我们从这个基础上转变为控制上市公司，因此我们倾向于将我们的股东，包括新股东，视为家人。

And that’s not put on, that’s the way we regard you. Other people can’t do that because they morphed into their situation in a different way.

这不是做作，这就是我们对你的看法。其他人无法做到这一点，因为他们以不同的方式适应了他们的处境。

And if you were a CEO and dealt with the average institutional investor, who is interested in having his portfolio management look good the next six months, you’d find it hard to love your shareholders.

如果你是一位首席执行官，且与普通机构投资者打交道，而他们关心的是在接下来的六个月内让他们的投资组合看起来不错，你会发现很难爱你的股东。

They’re sort of a hostile force that are putting unreasonable expectations on you. And so I don’t think Warren and I deserve such wonderful credit for the fact that we have better relations with our shareholders. We came up in a totally different way.

他们是一种敌对势力，对你施加不合理的期望。因此，我认为沃伦和我并不值得因为与股东关系更好而获得如此美好的赞誉。我们是以完全不同的方式成长起来的。

Now, we did have enough sense, when we saw that it was such a good thing and so satisfying, that we stayed with it. But weren’t we — we got into this by accident, didn’t we?

现在，当我们看到这是一件如此美好和令人满意的事情时，我们确实有足够的智慧坚持下去。但确实，我们是意外走到这一点的，不是吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we got in by accident, and we also were blessed with the fact that we did not have an investor relations department that wanted us to go out and pump up.

沃伦·巴菲特：对，我们是意外走到这一步的，而且我们还很幸运，因为我们没有一个想要我们去宣传的投资者关系部门。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But that was on purpose.

查理·芒格：但这是故意的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。（笑声）

I have seen them in operation at dozens of companies, I’ve been involved in one way or another. And it is really ridiculous, the idea that you go out and try and cater to the expectations of people that are expecting you to do things you can’t do by operations, but maybe you can do by accounting for a short period of time. It leads to the worst behavior.

我在几十家公司看到过它们的运作，我以某种方式参与其中。这个想法真是荒谬，你出去试图迎合那些期望你通过运营做一些你无法做到的事情的人，但也许你可以通过会计在短时间内做到。这导致了最糟糕的行为。

And in the end, somebody’s going to own all your shares, you know. There’s no way that shares remain empty, you know, in the shareholder list. So why not get a bunch of people who are going to stick with you who are in sync?

最后，总会有人拥有你所有的股份，你知道的。股东名单中不可能有空着的股份。那么，为什么不找一群会与你保持一致的人呢？

And the way they’re going to be in sync is if you told them rather accurately what you expect, how you expect to do it, and tell them when you make mistakes, all of that.

他们能与你步调一致的方式是，如果你相对准确地告诉他们你的期望、你如何打算实现这些期望，并告诉他们你犯的错误，所有这一切。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But we probably shouldn’t be as critical of people who came up a different way dealing with a different shareholder face.

查理·芒格：但我们可能不应该对那些以不同方式应对不同股东的人过于苛刻。

It’s not at all clear that we wouldn’t have ended up somewhat the same way if we’d had the same manner of rising.

如果我们以相同的方式崛起，结果是否会有所不同并不清楚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. Yeah. So we’ll give up being critical for the next five or 10 minutes, and then we’ll go back. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。对，所以我们会放弃批评，持续五到十分钟，然后再回去。（笑声）

55. Low interest rates are hurting people scared out of stocks

低利率正在伤害那些因害怕而退出股票市场的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: Very short question. Please comment on the implications of our existing, and perhaps continuing, zero percent interest rate.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：非常简短的问题。请评论一下我们现有的，或许还会继续的零利率的影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s very tough for anybody that’s got their investment in short-term money.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，对于任何将投资放在短期资金上的人来说，这非常困难。

You know, if you’re getting a tenth of a percent on some money market fund currently that if you’d started doing that when Columbus landed, and didn’t pay any taxes, you’d have almost doubled your money by now. (Laughter)

你知道，如果你现在在某个货币市场基金上获得千分之一的收益，而如果你在哥伦布登陆时就开始这样做，并且没有缴税，你现在的钱几乎翻了一倍。（笑声）

It’s really — I mean, people talk about easy money policies, but it isn’t so easy on the people who’ve got the money.

这真的——我的意思是，人们谈论宽松货币政策，但对那些有钱的人来说并不那么简单。

It won’t go on forever, but it may seem like forever to people that are on fixed income. I’m very sympathetic with them.

这不会永远持续下去，但对于那些固定收入的人来说，可能会感觉像是永远。我对此非常同情。

Basically they got, many of them, became fearful when the world was looking like it was collapsing in late 2008. And the price they pay is really — I know some people like that that are — it’s terrible in terms of returns and their purchasing power will be eaten away. But this will end at some point.

基本上，他们中的许多人在 2008 年末世界看起来要崩溃时变得恐惧。他们所付出的代价真的很大——我知道一些人就是这样——在回报方面非常糟糕，他们的购买力将会被侵蚀。但这一切终将结束。

I don’t know how it will end, but I would not like to be chairman of the Fed or secretary of the treasury. Nobody’s ever asked me, but maybe that’s why I say I wouldn’t want to do it.

我不知道它会如何结束，但我不想当联邦储备主席或财政部长。没人问过我，但也许这就是我说我不想做的原因。

But the — we will — it won’t work forever to run huge budget deficits and try and have very easy monetary policy. And when — if we do run into trouble, the blame should not go to the Fed, the blame should go to Congress. (Applause)

但是——我们将——这不会永远有效，持续大规模预算赤字并试图实施非常宽松的货币政策。当——如果我们真的遇到麻烦，责任不应该归咎于美联储，而应该归咎于国会。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: In some sense, the reality of our situation is almost amusingly depressing.

查理·芒格：在某种意义上，我们所处的现实几乎令人哭笑不得。

Stocks are up because the return from loaning your money out at interest in a safe way is so lousy, and of course, one answer is that can’t last.

股票上涨是因为以安全的方式借出你的钱获得的回报非常糟糕，当然，一个答案是这种情况无法持续。

In which case, stocks won’t be as pronounced a value, relatively speaking. And of course, if it does last, as it has in Japan, we won’t like that either because it will mean we’re mired in some horrible stagnation.

在这种情况下，股票的相对价值将不会如此明显。当然，如果这种情况持续，就像在日本一样，我们也不会喜欢，因为这意味着我们陷入了一种可怕的停滞状态。

This is a very cheery message. (Laughter)

这是一个非常愉快的信息。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: The pressure that is exerted by extremely low interest rates — short-term rates — on the value of everything else, it’s hard to overestimate that.

沃伦·巴菲特：极低的利率——短期利率——对其他一切价值施加的压力，难以低估。

I mean, the reason people have their money out at one-tenth of 1 percent is that they’re afraid of everything else. But as they’re being afraid of everything else abates, as it has over the last couple years, the pressure to push stock prices up, push real estate prices back up, it’s enormous.

我意思是，人们把钱放在千分之一的利率上是因为他们对其他一切感到害怕。但随着他们对其他一切的恐惧减弱，正如过去几年所发生的那样，推动股价上涨、推动房地产价格回升的压力是巨大的。

And of course, that’s understood by people who have something to do with those matters. But I don’t think you should underestimate the degree to which the last year of stock prices has been a result of the agony that people are being put through that keep their money in short-term money instruments.

当然，这一点对于那些与这些事务有关的人来说是显而易见的。但我认为你不应该低估过去一年股价上涨的程度，这是由于那些在短期资金工具中持有资金的人所经历的痛苦。

Unless they’re terrified of the world, they get pushed into other investments, and I think we’ve seen a lot of that, and we’ll see what happens when money rates do go up, if they do.

除非他们对这个世界感到恐惧，否则他们会被推向其他投资，我认为我们已经看到了很多这种情况，我们将看看当利率上升时会发生什么，如果它们真的上升的话。

56. Valuing businesses by asking questions

通过提问来评估企业

WARREN BUFFETT: Twelve. 沃伦·巴菲特：十二。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Jeff Colvette (PH) and I’m from Olathe, Kansas.

观众成员：你好，我叫杰夫·科尔维特，我来自堪萨斯州的奥拉西。

I got started in investing in 1999, right before the big tech bubble, and unfortunately I learned buy and hold and don’t fret about market price fluctuations before I learned the importance of valuing a business and applying a margin of safety.

我在 1999 年开始投资，就在大科技泡沫之前，不幸的是，我在学习如何买入并持有以及不必担心市场价格波动之前，先学会了评估企业价值和应用安全边际的重要性。

So, as Charlie said, I got my feet wet with huge failure right away. And —

所以，正如查理所说，我一开始就经历了巨大的失败。然后——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Join the club. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：加入俱乐部吧。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, I don’t feel so bad now.

观众：谢谢，我现在感觉好多了。

So that leads to my question. It seems like I’ve read all the Berkshire reports and all the reading I can do about you two, and I thank you for these wonderful meetings.

这就引出了我的问题。似乎我已经阅读了所有的伯克希尔报告，以及我能找到的关于你们两位的所有资料，感谢你们举办这些精彩的会议。

But it seems like it boils down to some simple things, valuing a business and applying a margin of safety.

但似乎归结为一些简单的事情，重视业务并应用安全边际。

So my question is, what do you recommend for an approach to getting better and better at valuing companies?

我想问的是，您推荐什么方法来不断提高对公司估值的能力？

WARREN BUFFETT: That was a very, very good question. And in my own case, you know, I started out without knowing anything about valuing companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个非常非常好的问题。在我自己的情况下，你知道，我一开始对公司估值一无所知。

And Ben Graham taught me a way to value a certain type of company that would prove successful, except the universe of those companies dried up.

本·格雷厄姆教我一种评估某类公司价值的方法，这在某种程度上证明是成功的，只是这些公司的数量减少了。

But nevertheless — it was almost a guarantee against failure, but it was not a guarantee that these things would continue to be available.

但尽管如此——这几乎可以保证不会失败，但并不能保证这些公司会继续存在。

Charlie taught me a lot about the value of a durable competitive advantage, and a really first-class business.

查理教会了我很多关于持久竞争优势和真正一流企业的价值。

But over time, I’ve learned more about various types of businesses. But you’d be amazed how many businesses I don’t feel that I understand well.

但随着时间的推移，我对各种类型的企业了解得更多。但你会惊讶于我有多少企业我并不觉得理解得很好。

The biggest thing is not how big your circle of competence is, but knowing where the perimeter is.

最大的事情不是你的能力圈有多大，而是知道边界在哪里。

You don’t have to be an expert on 90 percent of the businesses, or 80 percent, or 70, or 50. But you do have to know something about the ones that you actually put your money into, and if that’s a very small part of the universe, that still is not a killer.

你不需要对90%的企业、80%、70%或50%的企业成为专家。但你确实需要对你实际投入资金的企业有所了解，如果这只是宇宙中的一小部分，那也没什么大不了的。

And I think if you think about what you would pay for a McDonald’s sandwich, you think you would pay for — you know, think about the businesses in your own hometown of Olathe.

我认为如果你考虑一下你愿意为麦当劳的三明治支付多少钱，你会想到——你知道，想想你自己家乡奥拉萨，你愿意投资于奥拉萨的哪些企业。

Which would you like to buy into? Which do you think you could understand their economics? Which do you think will be around 10 or 20 years from now? Which do you think it would be very tough to compete with?

你想投资哪个？你认为哪个的经济情况你能理解？你认为哪个在 10 年或 20 年后还会存在？你认为哪个会很难竞争？

Just keep asking yourself questions about businesses. Talk with other people about them.

不断问自己关于商业的问题。与其他人讨论这些问题。

You will extend your knowledge over time. And always remember that margin of safety. And I think you basically have the right attitude because you recognize your limitations, and that’s enormously important in this business. You will find things to do.

你会随着时间的推移而扩展你的知识。并且永远记住安全边际。我认为你基本上有正确的态度，因为你认识到自己的局限性，这在这个行业中是非常重要的。你会找到可以做的事情。

Six or seven years ago — maybe not that long — six or seven years ago, when I was looking at Korean stocks, for example, I never had any idea that Korean stocks would be something that I would be buying.

六七年前——也许没有那么久——六七年前，当我在关注韩国股票时，我从来没有想到过韩国股票会成为我购买的对象。

But I looked over there, and I could see that there were a number of businesses that met the margin of safety test.

但我看向那边，看到有许多企业符合安全边际的测试。

And there I diversified, because I didn’t know that much about any specific one, but I knew that a package of 20 was going to work out very well, even if a crook might run one of them, and a couple might run into competition I didn’t anticipate, because they were so cheap. And that was sort of the old Graham approach.

我在那里进行了多样化，因为我对任何特定的东西了解不多，但我知道一包 20 个的产品会非常好，即使有个骗子可能会经营其中一个，几个可能会遇到我没有预料到的竞争，因为它们太便宜了。这有点像老格雷厄姆的方法。

You will find opportunities from time to time, and the beauty of it is you don’t have to find very many of them.

你会时不时发现机会，关键是你不需要找到很多机会。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well obviously, if you want to get good at something which is competitive, you have to think about it a lot, and learn a lot, and practice doing it a lot.

查理·芒格：显然，如果你想在某个竞争激烈的领域变得优秀，你必须多思考、多学习，并且多加练习。

And the way the world is constructed in this field, you have to keep learning, because the world keeps changing and your competitors keep learning.

在这个领域，世界的构造要求你不断学习，因为世界在不断变化，而你的竞争对手也在不断学习。

So you just have to get up each morning and try and go to bed that night a little wiser than you were when you got up.

所以你每天早上都要起床，努力在晚上睡觉时比起床时更聪明一点。

And if you keep doing that for a long time — and accumulate some experience, good and bad, as you try and master what you’re trying to do — people who do that almost never fail utterly.

如果你长期这样做——并积累一些经验，无论好坏，试图掌握你正在做的事情——几乎没有人会完全失败。

They may have a bad period when luck goes against them or something. But very few people have ever failed with that.

他们可能会在某个阶段遇到运气不佳的问题。但很少有人完全失败。

If you have the right temperament, you may rise slowly but you’re sure to rise.

如果你有正确的心态，你可能会缓慢上升，但你肯定会上升。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, did you take any business courses in school?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你在学校上过任何商业课程吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: None. I took accounting.

查理·芒格：没有。我学过会计。

WARREN BUFFETT: And when did you start valuing businesses and how did you go about it?

沃伦·巴菲特：你是什么时候开始评估企业的？你是怎么进行的？

CHARLIE MUNGER: When I was a little boy. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：当我还是个小男孩的时候。（笑声）

I can remember, I would come down to the Omaha Club, and there was an old gentleman who hit the Omaha Club about 10:30 every morning. He obviously did almost no work, and yet was quite prosperous.

我记得，我会来到奥马哈俱乐部，每天早上大约 10:30 有位老先生会到奥马哈俱乐部。他显然几乎不工作，但却相当富裕。

WARREN BUFFETT: He became your ideal. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他成为了你的理想。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. But he made me very curious as a little boy. I said to my father, “How in the hell does he do that?” And he said, “Charlie,” he said, “A business where he enjoys practically no competition. He gathers up and renders dead horses.”

查理·芒格：是的。但他让我在小的时候非常好奇。我对我父亲说：“他到底是怎么做到的？”他回答说：“查理，”他说，“这是一个几乎没有竞争的生意。他收集并处理死马。”

That was an example of avoiding competition by one stratagem. And you keep asking questions like that of reality, starting at a young age, you gradually learn. And weren’t you doing the same thing?

这就是通过一种策略避免竞争的例子。不断地问这些现实的问题，从小开始，你逐渐学习。你也是在这样做吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, thankfully he went beyond his original insight there. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，谢天谢地，他超越了他最初的见解。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I noticed, it was rather interesting — you take the rulers of the businesses when I was a little boy, an awful lot of those businesses, in Omaha, a lot of those businesses went broke, a lot of them sold out at modest prices under distress.

查理·芒格：我注意到，这很有趣——当我还是个小男孩时，奥马哈的许多企业的领导者，很多企业破产了，很多在困境中以低价出售。

And some of the people who rose, like Kiewit, from small beginnings, nobody thought of as the great glories of that early time.

一些从小开始崛起的人，如基维特（Kiewit），在当时并不被认为是伟大的荣耀。

And I think that’s kind of the way life is. It’s hard to get anywhere near the top, and it’s hard to hold any position once you’ve attained it.

我认为生活就是这样。要接近顶峰是很困难的，一旦达到某个位置，保持这个位置也很难。

But I think you can predict that Kiewit was likely to win. They cared more about doing it right. They cared more about avoiding trouble. They put more discipline on themselves.

但我认为你可以预测到基维特很可能会赢。他们更关心正确地完成工作。他们更关心避免麻烦。他们对自己要求更严格。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you knew the individual well, you would have bet, right?

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果你很了解这个人，你就会下注，对吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: What? 查理·芒格：什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: If you knew the individual.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你了解这个人。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would not have bet on any of the people I knew who were already wealthy. But I would have bet on Pete Kiewit. His sister taught me math, and no, half-Dutch, half-German, you know, this is a tough culture. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我不会对我认识的任何已经富有的人下赌注。但我会打赌于彼特·基维特（Pete Kiewit）。他的妹妹教过我数学，而他半荷兰半德国，这是一种艰难的文化。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s your — you just heard it folks. Half-Dutch, half-German. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你们听到了吗，朋友们。半荷兰人，半德国人。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well but —

查理·芒格：好吧，但是——

WARREN BUFFETT: Go out looking for them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：出去寻找他们吧。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the man who’s recommending this is named Munger. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，推荐这个的人叫芒格。（笑声）

Anyway, the — no — I don’t think it’s that — I was just automatically doing that. What was working, what was failing, why was it working, why was it failing?

无论如何，—不—我不认为是这样—我只是自动地在做那件事。什么在起作用，什么在失败，为什么它在起作用，为什么它在失败？

If you have that temperament, you are gradually going to learn. And if you don’t have that temperament, I can’t help you. (Laughter)

如果你有那种性格，你会逐渐学会。如果你没有那种性格，我帮不了你。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If you’d followed Pete Kiewit around for 10 years, you never would have seen him do anything dumb, right?

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你跟着皮特·基维特走了 10 年，你就绝对不会看到他做任何愚蠢的事情，对吧？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah. It’s so —

查理·芒格：哦，是的。太——

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s avoiding the dumb thing. You really don’t have to be brilliant, but, you know, you have to avoid just sort of what almost seem the obvious mistakes.

沃伦·巴菲特：避免愚蠢的事情。你真的不需要聪明，但你知道，你必须避免那些看起来几乎是显而易见的错误。

But I would say that you’re on the right track back there, in terms of having the basic fundamentals, knowing your limitations, but still seeking to learn more about various kinds of businesses.

但我想说，你在那方面走在正确的轨道上，掌握了基本的基础知识，了解自己的局限性，但仍然寻求了解更多关于各种类型的业务。

Charlie, I think, when he practiced law, any client that came in Charlie was thinking about that business as if he owned the place.

查理，我认为，当他从事法律工作时，任何来找他的客户，查理都像拥有那家公司一样考虑业务。

And he probably generally thought he knew more about the place than the guy that actually owned it, who was his client. (Laughs)

他可能一般认为自己对这个地方的了解比真正拥有它的客户要多。（笑）

But I remember talking to him, you know, 50 years ago, and he would start talking about Caterpillar dealerships in Bakersfield or something of the sort. He was incapable of looking at a business without thinking about the fundamental economics of it.

但我记得，五十年前和他谈话时，他开始谈论巴克斯菲尔德的凯特彼勒经销商之类的事情。他无法不考虑一个企业的基本的经济特征。

How’d that guy do with the Caterpillar deal? (Laughs)

那个家伙在与卡特彼勒的交易中表现得怎么样？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he sold it for a perfectly ridiculous price to a dumb oil company. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，他以一个完全荒谬的价格把它卖给了一家愚蠢的石油公司。（笑声）

It wasn’t worth half what he got for it.

它的价值还不到他卖的价格的一半。

WARREN BUFFETT: But they had a concept and a strategy.

沃伦·巴菲特：但他们有一个概念和一个策略。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They had a concept and a strategy, and turned out they had consultants. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：他们有一个概念和一个策略，结果他们还有顾问。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑）

57. Companies with the best return on capital

资本回报率最高的公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Carson Mitchell in Aberdeen, South Dakota, who asks both of you, “What business has had the best return on capital for Berkshire, and what business of any on earth has had the best return on capital?”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自南达科他州阿伯丁的卡森·米切尔，他问你们俩：“对于伯克希尔来说，哪个业务的资本回报率最高，世界上哪个业务的资本回报率最高？”

And he adds, “PS, I would have come by rail but there are no seats in the grain rail cars.” (Laughter)

他补充道：“顺便说一下，我本来想坐火车来的，但粮食货车没有座位。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: There’s two ways of looking at it.

沃伦·巴菲特：有两种看待它的方式。

If you talk about the capital necessary to run the business, as opposed to what we might have paid for the business — I mean, if we buy a wonderful business — you could run the Coca-Cola Company —assuming you had the bottling systems — you could run it with no capital.

如果你谈论的是经营业务所需的资本，而不是我们可能为这项业务支付的费用——我的意思是，如果我们购买了一家出色的企业——你可以经营可口可乐公司——假设你拥有灌装系统——你可以在没有资本的情况下运营它。

Now, if you buy it for $100 billion, you can look at that as your capital or you can look at the basic capital. When we look at what’s a good business, we’re defining it in terms of the capital actually needed in the business.

现在，如果你以 1000 亿美元的价格购买它，你可以把它看作你的资本，或者你可以看作基本资本。当我们看什么是一个好的生意时，我们是根据业务中实际需要的资本来定义它的。

Whether it’s a good investment for us depends on how much we pay for that in the end.

这对我们来说是否是一个好的投资取决于我们最终为此支付多少。

There are a number of businesses that operate on negative capital. Carol’s with Fortune magazine. You know, any of the great magazines operate with negative capital.

有许多企业在负资本的情况下运营。卡罗尔的与《财富》杂志合作。你知道，任何伟大的杂志都是在负资本的情况下运营的。

I mean, the subscribers pay in advance, there are no fixed assets to speak of, and the receivables are not that much, the inventory is nothing.

我的意思是，订阅者是预付费的，没有可谈论的固定资产，应收账款也不多，库存几乎没有。

So a magazine business — my guess is that People magazine operates, or Sports Illustrated operates, with negative capital, and particularly People makes a lot of money.

所以一本杂志的生意——我猜《人物》杂志或《体育画报》是以负资本运作的，尤其是《人物》赚了很多钱。

So there are certain businesses. Well, we had a company called Blue Chip Stamps where we got the float ahead of time, and operated with really substantial negative capital.

所以有一些企业。我们曾经有一家叫蓝筹印花的公司，我们提前获得了资金，并以相当大的负资本运作。

But there are a lot of great businesses that need very, very little capital. Apple doesn’t need that much capital, you know.

但有很多优秀的企业只需要很少的资本。你知道，苹果并不需要那么多资本。

The best ones, of course, are the ones that can get very large while needing no capital.

最好的，当然是那些可以在不需要资本的情况下变得非常庞大的。

See’s is a wonderful business, needs very little capital, but we can’t get people eating ten pounds of boxed chocolates every day.

See's 是一家很棒的企业，所需资本很少，但我们无法让人们每天吃十磅的盒装巧克力。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Except here.

查理·芒格：除了这里。

WARREN BUFFETT: We want to. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想要。（笑）

Generally, the great consumer businesses need relatively little capital. The businesses where people pay you in advance, you know, magazine subscriptions being a case, insurance being a case, you know, you’re using your customer’s capital.

一般来说，大型消费企业需要的资本相对较少。那些人们提前付款的业务，比如杂志订阅、保险等，你知道的，你是在使用客户的资本。

And we like those kind of businesses, but of course, so does the rest of the world, so they can become very competitive in buying them.

我们喜欢这种类型的企业，但当然，世界其他地方也喜欢，所以在购买它们时竞争会非常激烈。

We have a business, for example, that’s run wonderfully by Cathy Baron Tamraz, called Business Wire. Business Wire does not require a lot of capital. It has receivables and everything, but it is a service-type business and many of the service-type businesses and consumer-type businesses require little capital.

我们有一个业务，例如，由凯西·巴伦·塔姆拉兹出色运营的 Business Wire。Business Wire 不需要大量资本。它有应收账款和其他一切，但它是一种服务型业务，许多服务型和消费型业务所需的资本很少。

And when they get to be successful, you know, they can really be something.

当它们变得成功时，确实会成为非常出色的企业。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add, but at any rate, the formula never changes.

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的，但无论如何，这个公式永远不会改变。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you could own one business in the world, what would it be, Charlie? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你可以拥有世界上任何一家公司，那会是什么，查理？（笑声）

I hope we already own them, myself.

我希望我们已经拥有它们，我自己。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You and I got in trouble by addressing such a subject many decades ago.

查理·芒格：你我在几十年前讨论这样一个话题时遇到了麻烦。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s right. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：没错。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t think I’ll come back to it.

查理·芒格：我想我不会再回到这个话题了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter) Number 13 —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）第 13 个——

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you name some business that has incredible pricing power, you’re talking about a business that’s a monopoly or a near monopoly.

查理·芒格：如果你提到某个具有惊人定价能力的企业，那你就是在谈论一个垄断或近乎垄断的企业。

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. 沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t think it’s very smart for us to sit up here naming our most admired business or something, that other people regard as a monopoly.

查理·芒格：我认为我们在这里讨论我们最钦佩的企业或其他人视为垄断的事物并不是很明智。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’ll move right along. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们继续前进。（笑声）

58. Phone hasn’t been ringing, but we’re still ready to buy

电话没有响，但我们仍然准备购买

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, have we done number 13? No, I don’t think so, that’s in the other room again. Anybody there?

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们看看，我们做过第 13 个了吗？不，我觉得没有，那在另一个房间里。那里有人吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, greetings from the breakout room.

观众成员：是的，巴菲特先生，芒格先生，来自分组讨论室的问候。

My name is Glenn Tongue from New York. I would like to thank you both for your exemplary stewardship through the economic crisis. We are all wealthier in several ways as a result of your efforts.

我的名字是格伦·汤格，来自纽约。我想感谢你们两位在经济危机期间的杰出管理。由于你们的努力，我们在多个方面都变得更加富有。

I’d like to ask about Berkshire’s growth, specifically your acquisition outlook and appetite. Has the phone been ringing?

我想询问一下伯克希尔的增长，特别是你们的收购前景和意愿。电话响了吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The phone doesn’t ring very often at Berkshire, you know. That’s partly because — well, we set out our criteria in the annual report for what we’re looking for, and we’re not looking for larger and larger things.

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，伯克希尔的电话并不常响。这部分是因为——我们在年度报告中列出了我们所寻找的标准，而我们并不是在寻找越来越大的东西。

So when we start saying that we want to buy businesses that earn 75 or 100 million, at a minimum, before tax, that weeds out a lot of phone calls.

所以当我们开始说我们想要购买年利润至少在 7500 万或 1 亿的企业，税前，这就筛掉了很多电话。

And I would say that, you know, if we get a couple of — three or four serious phone calls a year that sort of meet our criteria that look like they might be a possibility, that’s a good year, I like that.

我会说，如果我们每年能接到几通——三到四通符合我们标准的严肃电话，看起来可能有机会，那就是一个好年头，我喜欢这样。

I don’t think there’s been any major change in the frequency that something comes along that might interest us.

我认为在接到感兴趣的事情的频率上没有发生任何重大变化。

The answer is, in terms of being interested, we’re as interested as ever. I mean, we wrote a big check and issued shares in connection with BNSF.

答案是，就兴趣而言，我们的兴趣依然如故。我的意思是，我们为 BNSF 写了一张大支票并发行了股票。

But I would love it if Monday morning my phone rings with some big deal. We’ll figure out a way to do it.

但我会很高兴，如果周一早上我的电话响起，有什么大交易。我们会想办法做到这一点。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s amazing to me that we have been as successful as we have been in buying desirable places.

查理·芒格：是的，令我惊讶的是，我们在收购理想企业方面取得的成功。

And it’s human revulsion that has helped us, because many of the people who sell to us are so smart that they’re revolted by almost everything else.

而人类的厌恶感帮助了我们，因为许多向我们销售的人非常聪明，他们对几乎所有其他事物都感到厌恶。

They don’t want to sell into some fee-driven buying system that doesn’t care about their employees or their business.

他们不想把企业出售给那种不关心他们员工或业务的费用驱动型购买系统。

And they finally decide they want to join this one, they don’t want to join the alternatives. And of course, that’s marvelous for us.

他们最终决定想加入这个系统，而不想加入其他选项。当然，这对我们来说非常好。

We’ve got a screening device out there that is protecting us, to some extent, from the wrong sort of people. And very few people have this particular —

我们有一种筛选机制，某种程度上保护我们不受到错误人选的影响。而且很少有人有这种特定的——

We get offered things by people who would not sell to anybody else. That is really peculiar. And it’s happened what, how many times?

我们会收到那些不会卖给其他人的人的提议。这真的很奇怪。这已经发生了多少次了？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——

CHARLIE MUNGER: A lot. 查理·芒格：很多。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s happened, and on important ones. There’s one I’ve mentioned before, so I can mention the name.

沃伦·巴菲特：这已经发生了，而且是重要的事情。我之前提到过一个，所以我可以提到这个名字。

When I heard from ISCAR, and I’d never heard of ISCAR before, I’d never heard of Eitan Wertheimer, who wrote me, but he basically told me and made it quite specific, they either wanted to sell to Berkshire Hathaway or they didn’t want to sell it to anybody.

当我听说 ISCAR 时，我之前从未听说过 ISCAR，也从未听说过给我写信的 Eitan Wertheimer，但他基本上告诉我并明确表示，他们要么想卖给伯克希尔·哈撒韦，要么不想卖给任何人。

And we met and we made a deal. And there was another person — I won’t even define exactly the time period — but he came in and he’d been thinking about it for about a year on this business, and he’d built it over many decades.

我们见面并达成了一项协议。还有另一个人——我甚至不想确切定义时间段——但他进来了，他在这个业务上思考了大约一年，并且他在几十年里建立了它。

And he said, “There were three possibilities. One was to sell it to a competitor.” And he said, “They would have ideas immediately about all the people they could take out of this place and move the headquarters,” and everything, and they would dismantle something that he’d spent 30 years or so building.

他说：“有三种可能性。一个是把它卖给竞争对手。”他说：“他们会立即想到所有可以把他们从这个地方带走的人，并搬迁总部，”还有其他一切，他们会拆除他花了大约 30 年时间建立的东西。

And he decided that he didn’t want to do that, even though it was probably worth more to a competitor, because that’s often the case, than to anybody else.

他决定不想这样做，尽管这对竞争对手来说可能更有价值，因为通常情况就是这样，而对其他人来说则不然。

And then he looked at selling to a leverage buyout firm — and now would call itself a private equity firm — and he decided he did not want his place being, basically, a piece of meat that would be resold in not that many years. He really wanted to find a permanent home.

然后他考虑将其出售给一家杠杆收购公司——现在称自己为私募股权公司——他决定不想让自己的地方基本上成为一块在不久的将来被转售的肉。他真的想找到一个永久的家。

So he said, “When I come to you, I don’t come to you because you’re so damned attractive.” He said, “You’re the only guy left.” (Laughter)

所以他说：“当我来找你时，我不是因为你太有魅力。”他说：“你是唯一剩下的家伙。”（笑声）

And we bought the business. So that happens from time to time, and it’s accidental. It’s when something happens in someone’s life that they decide they really want to assure a permanent home.

我们买下了这家公司。这种情况时不时会发生，而且是偶然的。这是当某人的生活中发生了一些事情，他们决定真的想要确保一个永久的家。

It may be because the family isn’t getting along. It may be, you know, a half a dozen reasons. Maybe somebody wants to monetize it because they want to give away a lot of money.

这可能是因为家庭关系不和睦。也可能有六七个原因。也许有人想要将其变现，因为他们想要捐赠很多钱。

But periodically that will come up, and we are a logical place to get the call, and we will get the calls. But there’s not much we can do to accelerate the process or do anything of the sort.

但这种情况会定期出现，我们是接到电话的合适地方，我们会接到电话。但我们能做的事情不多，无法加快这个过程或做其他类似的事情。

We are ready to act when it happens. I mean, if I get a call, and it’s a $10 billion deal, on Monday, and I like it, I will say yes. (Laughs)

我们准备好在事情发生时采取行动。我的意思是，如果我接到一个电话，周一有一个价值 100 亿美元的交易，我喜欢的话，我会说是的。（笑）

And then I’ll figure out how we do it.

然后我会想办法怎么做。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don’t think it’s over. It may be, in fact, it will be, slower than it was in the early days. But that’s not so bad, considering how much richer we all are than we were then.

查理·芒格：是的，我认为这还没有结束。实际上，它可能会比早期的日子慢得多。但考虑到我们现在比那时富裕得多，这并不是那么糟糕。

59. Big question for Berkshire’s future

伯克希尔未来的大问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Since I imagine this may be one of the last questions, Peter Brotchie, a shareholder from Wenham, Massachusetts, writes to say, “Thank you, Warren and Charlie, for improving the Q&A session last year.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：我想这可能是最后一个问题之一，来自马萨诸塞州温汉姆的股东彼得·布罗奇写道：“谢谢你，沃伦和查理，感谢你们改善了去年的问答环节。”

“Along those lines, are there important questions that you were surprised that you don’t get asked about Berkshire’s financials or businesses? And if so, what is the question you would ask yourself if the roles were reversed?”

“在这方面，有没有让你感到惊讶的关于伯克希尔财务或业务的重要问题是你没有被问到的？如果有的话，如果角色互换，你会问自己什么问题？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well Andrew, first of all, I will say we got a lot of compliments on changing the format. It worked, and that’s why we’re continuing it. So it’s worked very well. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，安德鲁，首先，我要说我们收到了很多关于改变格式的赞美。这个改变有效，所以我们会继续这样做。因此，这个改变非常成功。（掌声）

And that applause is for you, not for me, and you deserve it.

那掌声是给你的，不是给我的，你值得拥有。

It really has improved the quality of questions, in terms of having it Berkshire-related and having a system of weeding them out without us being the ones that do the weeding out.

这确实提高了问题的质量，既与伯克希尔相关，又有一个筛选系统，而不是由我们来进行筛选。

Now, I’ve given Charlie time to think about what the answer to that question is going to be, so I’m going to turn it over to him. (Laughter)

现在，我给了查理时间来思考这个问题的答案，所以我将把它交给他。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t have a lot of comment about things that should be done differently at Berkshire.

查理·芒格：嗯，我对伯克希尔应该以不同方式做的事情没有太多评论。

I think it is quite interesting that we got into BYD, because BYD is surfing along on the developing edge of new technology, and that has not — we have always bragged about avoiding that.

我认为我们进入比亚迪是非常有趣的，因为比亚迪正处于新技术发展的前沿，而这一直是我们自夸避免的。

Isn’t that a fair statement?

这不是一个公平的说法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s fair.

沃伦·巴菲特：这很公平。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And yet here we are.

查理·芒格：然而我们就在这里。

I think it’s because we’ve shown some capability for learning. And I think the BYD investment is going to work out very well. And I think it’ll work out very well in a way that gives great pleasure to all of us shareholders, because I think they’re going to help solve some significant problems of the world.

我认为这是因为我们展示了一定的学习能力。我认为比亚迪的投资会非常成功。我认为这将以一种让我们所有股东都感到非常愉快的方式取得成功，因为我认为他们将帮助解决一些重大的世界问题。

And, that place is — you know, I spoke with pride of Kiewit. They tried harder, they were more self-disciplined. That’s the way I feel about BYD.

而那个地方是——你知道，我曾自豪地谈论 Kiewit。他们更加努力，更加自律。我对比亚迪的感觉也是如此。

And it’s a pleasure to associate with such people, and in my life those are the people with whom I’ve achieved the most.

与这样的人合作是一种乐趣，而在我的生活中，那些人是我取得最多成就的人。

So as far as I’m concerned, we found our own kind, except they’re better. And we may do more of that.

就我而言，我们找到了自己的同类，只是他们更优秀。我们可能会更多地这样做。

And we wouldn’t have felt confident enough to go into venture capital, typically with just a bright young man with an idea, no matter how brilliant.

我们不会有足够的信心去进入风险投资，通常只是一个有想法的聪明的年轻人，无论他的想法多么出色。

WARREN BUFFETT: Not me. 沃伦·巴菲特：不是我。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I wouldn’t either.

查理·芒格：不，我也不会。

But BYD had won its spurs in life by the time we found it. They had accomplished things that struck me as almost impossible to do, and yet they’d done them.

但在我们发现比亚迪时，他们已经赢得了自己的声誉。他们完成了一些让我觉得几乎不可能做到的事情，但他们却做到了。

And so I don’t think that’s the last unusual thing that Berkshire will do, and the last one that will work.

所以我认为这不是伯克希尔最后一次做出不寻常的事情，也不是最后一次成功的事情。

And I think the Burlington Northern acquisition — when we did it, we knew it would be better for their shareholders than it was for ours, because, after all, they were getting into Berkshire. (Laughter)

我认为伯灵顿北方收购——当我们进行这笔交易时，我们知道这对他们的股东来说会比对我们的股东更好，毕竟，他们是进入了伯克希尔。（笑声）

But we also thought it was good for our shareholders. And why should we care that it was better for theirs, if it was satisfactory for us? And I think that will happen again, too.

但我们也认为这对我们的股东有好处。如果这对我们来说是令人满意的，为什么我们要在意这对他们更好呢？我认为这种情况也会再次发生。

That’s our kind of a culture. You know, Middle Western, and constantly improving the place. And with MidAmerican and Burlington, we’re getting a fair amount of engineering into Berkshire, which of course, I like.

这就是我们的一种文化。你知道，中西部文化，不断改善这个地方。通过中美和伯灵顿，我们在伯克希尔引入了相当多的工程，这当然是我喜欢的。

And so I hope you people are comfortable with the way things are going, because I think they’ll keep going in the same direction. (Applause)

所以我希望你们对事情的发展感到满意，因为我认为它们会继续朝着同样的方向发展。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause) I think they will keep going in the same direction.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）我认为他们会继续朝着同一个方向前进。

But to answer your question on that, Andrew, I would probably ask the question, you know, “Can you keep using all of the capital you generate, effectively, for a very long time?”

但是为了回答你的问题，安德鲁，我可能会问这个问题，你知道，“你能否有效地长期使用你所产生的所有资本？”

And the answer, I think, to that is that even — we will see more things and we will do some more of this. There comes a point where the numbers get big enough that it gets extraordinarily hard to do things that add value.

我认为对此的答案是，即使——我们会看到更多的事情，我们也会做更多这样的事情。到了某个点，数字变得足够大，以至于做出增加价值的事情变得极其困难。

I mean, if you just play out the numbers, you could see where in 10 or 15 years, not only the capital that’s already accumulated, but the generation of capital in everything, would make it very hard to do things that are, essentially, creating more than a dollar of value per dollar invested.

我的意思是，如果你把数字算清楚，你会看到在 10 年或 15 年后，不仅是已经积累的资本，还有在各方面产生的资本，会使得做一些事情变得非常困难，这些事情本质上是每投资一美元就创造超过一美元的价值。

A portion of the money may be able to be used that way, and likely would be used in the kind of businesses we’re in.

这笔钱的一部分可能可以这样使用，并且很可能会用于我们所从事的那种业务。

There comes a point where the numbers get too big. And actually, our history is a curve that approaches that point all the time.

有一个时刻，数字变得太大了。实际上，我们的历史是一条不断接近那个点的曲线。

It’s turned out to be that now I think we can go a lot further than I would have thought 30 years ago. I mean, it’s just — it’s developed that way. And partly that’s because we see things that I never would have thought we would have seen 30 years ago.

现在我觉得我们可以走得比 30 年前我想象的更远。我是说，这就是——它以这种方式发展。而部分原因是我们看到了我在 30 年前绝对想不到的事情。

But there is a limit. And there will come a time when we cannot intelligent — in my view — there will come a time when we cannot intelligently use 100 percent of the capital that we develop internally.

但这是有一个限度的。在我看来，总会有那么一天，我们无法明智地使用我们内部开发的 100%的资本。

And then we’ll do something that’s — whatever is in the most interest — best interest — of the shareholders will be done at that point.

然后我们将做一些对股东最有利的事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we will get into Berkshire, on the investment side — probably starting sooner than many of you expect — people who have some promise of being, well, if not as good as Warren, a decent approximation. And in some cases with abilities that Warren lacks.

查理·芒格：我认为我们将在投资方面进入伯克希尔——可能比你们许多人预期的要早——那些有潜力的人，虽然不一定能和沃伦一样出色，但也能相当接近。在某些情况下，他们的能力是沃伦所缺乏的。

In other words, it won’t be all negative. (Laughter)

换句话说，这不一定是负面的。（笑声）

And so I’m really quite optimistic. (Laughter)

所以我真的很乐观。（笑声）

I can see — the reason I think we will succeed at that is because Warren never looks twice at anybody who isn’t a little eccentric, which, of course, is what you’re looking at when you look up here.

我可以看到——我认为我们会成功的原因是，沃伦从来不会多看一眼那些不够古怪的人，而这正是你在这里看到的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Living proof, yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：活生生的证明，是的。（笑声）

60. “Find your passion, and then don’t let anything stop you”

“找到你的热情，然后不要让任何事情阻止你”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well I think we’d better move on to section 1. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我想我们最好继续进行第一部分。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Joseph Mazzella from Jim Thorpe, PA.

观众成员：你好，我叫约瑟夫·马泽拉，来自宾夕法尼亚州吉姆·索普。

I wanted to first thank Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, as well as the board of directors for this meeting, as well as the whole shareholder weekend. I’ve had a great time so far.

我首先想感谢芒格先生和巴菲特先生，以及董事会举办这次会议和整个股东的周末。我到目前为止过得很愉快。

WARREN BUFFETT: Terrific. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：太棒了。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you.

查理·芒格：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: With that, I wanted to share. Aristotle, when asked how to define wealth, answered simply this, “It is he who spends less than he earns.”

观众成员：对此，我想分享一下。亚里士多德在被问及如何定义财富时，简单地回答：“财富就是花费少于收入的人。”

What advice could you give a young entrepreneur as myself on how to go about defining and both building wealth within their own business, as I hope to build a business that, one day, you’d be interested in acquiring.

你能给像我这样的年轻企业家什么建议，关于如何定义和在自己的业务中创造财富，因为我希望建立一个有一天你会感兴趣收购的企业。

WARREN BUFFETT: I predict you’re going to build one. You know, it may not quite get to the size that — and we’re a moving target as well — but if you start off with that principle you just enunciated, there are probably some other similar principles that you’ll have that we would also agree with.

沃伦·巴菲特：我预测你会成功建立一家企业。你知道，可能它的规模达不到——而且我们的目标也在不断变化——但是如果你从刚才你所阐述的原则出发，可能还有一些我们也会认同的类似原则。

There’s nothing like following your passion. I mean, I love what I do, obviously, and I’ve loved it the whole time I’ve done it. Charlie is the same way.

没有什么比追随自己的热情更重要。我是说，我显然热爱我所做的事情，并且在整个过程中我一直都热爱它。查理也是这样。

We have managers, you know, they come — some of them went to business school, some of them didn’t, you know.

我们有经理，你知道，他们来了——有些人上过商学院，有些人没有，你知道。

They’re all types. But the common factor in them — they’re successful — the common factor is they love what they do, you know.

他们都是不同类型的人。但他们的共同点——他们都很成功——共同点是他们热爱自己所做的事情，你知道的。

And you’ve got to find that in life. And some people are very lucky in finding it very early. It was dumb luck that my father happened to be in the securities business, so when I would go to his office there were a lot of books to read, and I got entranced with that.

你必须在生活中找到这一点。有些人很幸运，能很早就找到它。我的父亲恰好在证券行业工作，这真是运气，所以当我去他办公室时，有很多书可以阅读，我对此着迷。

But, you know, if he’d been in some other occupation — I think I would have read those books eventually, but it would have been a lot later.

但是，你知道，如果他从事其他职业——我想我最终会读那些书，但那会晚得多。

So if you find something that turns you on, my guess is you’re going to do very well in it.

所以如果你发现了让你兴奋的事情，我猜你会在这方面做得很好。

And the beauty of it is, in a sense, there’s not that much competition. There are not a lot of people out there that are going to be running faster than you in the race that you elect to get into.

更妙的是，从某种意义上说，竞争并不算太激烈。愿意为你所选择的领域全力以赴的人并不多。

And if you haven’t found it yet — you may well have found it — but if you haven’t found it yet, you know, you’ve got to keep looking.

如果你还没有找到它——你可能已经找到了——但如果你还没有找到它，你知道，你必须继续寻找。

And we’ve got 70-plus managers. You know, some of them didn’t — we had one guy that didn’t go to high school, even, didn’t he, Charlie? (Inaudible)

我们有超过 70 位经理。你知道，有些人没有——我们有一个人甚至没有上过高中，是吧，查理？（听不清）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah. 查理·芒格：哦，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: He quit in fourth grade, I think.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想他在四年级时就退学了。

Well, Mrs. B never went to school a day in her life.

好吧，B夫人一生中从未上过一天学。

And when you go out to the Furniture Mart — I hope you go out this evening, we expect to set a record today in sales (laughter) — what you are looking at on those 78 acres, you know, is the largest home furnishing store, about 400 million in sales. The largest store in the United States, and it comes from $500 of capital paid in by a woman that never went to a day of school in her life and couldn’t read or write.

当你去家具市场时——我希望你今晚能去，我们预计今天的销售将创下纪录（笑）——你在那 78 英亩的地方看到的是最大的家居用品商店，销售额约为 4 亿美元。它是美国最大的商店，而这来自一位从未上过一天学、不会读写的女性投入的 500 美元资本。

She loved what she was doing, and, you know, I tell the story, this is a true story.

她热爱自己所做的事情，你知道，我讲这个故事，这是真实的故事。

When she was well into her 90s, she invited me over to her house for dinner. That was very unusual.

当她年过九旬时，她邀请我到她家吃晚餐。这非常不寻常。

And a very nice house, six or seven blocks away from the store. And I went into the house, and the sofa, the chairs, the lamp, the dining room table, they all had little green price tags hanging down. (Laughter)

一栋非常漂亮的房子，离商店六七个街区。我走进房子，沙发、椅子、灯、餐桌上都挂着小绿价签。（笑声）

It made her feel at home. (Laughter)

这让她感到像在家一样。（笑声）

And I said to her, “Mrs. B, you are my kind of woman.” Forget Sophia Loren and all of that, this is my kind of woman. She loved it.

我对她说：“B夫人，您是我心目中的女人。”忘掉索非亚·罗兰这些吧，这才是我心目中的女人。她热爱这份工作。

And she loved it all her life, and just think of what that produced. I mean, it just — it’s incredible.

她一生都热爱这一切，想想这产生了什么。我是说，这真是——太不可思议了。

I mean, you know, one time — my dad used to quote Emerson, that “the power that lies within you is new in nature.”

我意思是，你知道，有一次——我爸爸常常引用爱默生的话，“你内心的力量是全新的。”

And basically, the power that was within Mrs. B was new in nature. And over a lifetime it produced amazing things.

基本上，B夫人体内的力量是全新的。在漫长的一生中，它产生了惊人的成果。

So find your passion, and then don’t let anything stop you.

所以找到你的热情，然后不要让任何事情阻止你。

61. Munger’s fundamental algorithm of life

芒格的生活基本算法

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔？（掌声）

CAROL LOOMIS: This is a deeply philosophical question. “Many things that you” — the man did not want his name announced — “Many things that you and Charlie do and preach are opposite to those of what people practice and expect.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这是一个深刻的哲学问题。“你和查理所做和宣扬的许多事情与人们的实践和期望正好相反。”

“For example, you do not change the management of the acquired company, you applaud long-standing employees while others always look for fresh blood and try to fire people as they grow old. You probably do not encourage retirement, while many companies do.

例如，您不改变被收购公司的管理层，您赞扬长期员工，而其他人则总是寻找新鲜血液并试图解雇年长员工。您可能不鼓励退休，而许多公司则会。

“You do not give large compensation to directors or compensate them using stock options. You do not seem to hire many MBAs. You don’t invest in high tech, but your company has grown very fast.

“你们不向董事支付高额薪酬，也不通过股票期权来补偿他们。你们似乎没有雇佣很多 MBA。你们不投资于高科技，但你们的公司增长非常快。”

“You do not provide earnings guidelines. You do not live near New York. You do not like sushi.” (Laughter)

“你不提供收益指引。你不住在纽约附近。你不喜欢寿司。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s the key. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这就是关键。（笑声）

CAROL LOOMIS: “I wonder, what is the fundamental reason for all of these things? In other words, there appears to be a central philosophy here that I am missing.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：“我想知道，这一切的根本原因是什么？换句话说，这里似乎有一个我所缺失的核心哲学。”

“I can understand these as isolated principles, but where is the beef? Scientists and philosophers look for a unifying theory when possible.

“我可以将这些理解为孤立的原则，但实质在哪里？科学家和哲学家在可能的情况下寻找统一理论。”

“What is yours? Is it Buddhism, or Paganism, or something else? Yes, I am looking for your fundamental or unified theory of management in life or fundamental guiding principles.”

“你有什么？是佛教、异教，还是其他什么？是的，我在寻找你生活中管理的基本或统一理论或基本指导原则。”

WARREN BUFFETT: In ten words or less. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：十个字以内。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me try that one, Warren.

查理·芒格：让我试试这个，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh good. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，好。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s pragmatism. Partly, we do things in our different way because it suits us. And partly, we do it — it suits our temperaments and our natures — and partly, we do it because we’ve found through experience that it works better, at least with us sitting where we sit.

查理·芒格：这是一种务实主义。部分原因是我们以不同的方式做事，因为这适合我们。还有部分原因是，这符合我们的性格和天性；另外部分原因是，我们通过经验发现，这种方式效果更好，至少对我们来说是这样。

It’s just that simple. And we’ve had enough good sense when something is working very well to keep doing it.

就这么简单。我们有足够的智慧，当某些事情运转得很好时，就继续这样做。

So I’d say we’re demonstrating what might be called the fundamental algorithm of life. Repeat what works.

所以我会说，我们展示的是可以称之为生活基本算法的东西。重复有效的做法。

Is that terse enough for you? (Laughter)

这对你来说够简洁了吗？（笑声）

62. Private high-speed passenger trains aren’t economic

私人高速客运列车并不经济

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll go on to number 3, I like it. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们继续到第三个，我喜欢这个。（笑）

Or number 2, I’m sorry. Number 2.

或者是第二个，我很抱歉。第二个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, I am Carolyn Boyle, from Barrington, Illinois.

观众成员：下午好，我是来自伊利诺伊州巴林顿的卡罗琳·博伊尔。

Thanks for the meeting and thanks everybody from behind the scenes who put this together. It’s quite well orchestrated. (Applause)

感谢会议，也感谢所有在幕后为此付出努力的人。这次活动组织得很好。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If I may interrupt you for just one second, that’s very well deserved. And I would to point out that at Berkshire, everybody in our home office — we have 21 of us — they all participate in working at this meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我可以打断你一下，这非常值得。我想指出，在伯克希尔，我们的总部每个人——我们有 21 个人——都参与了这次会议的工作。

I mean, our CFO works on it — you name anybody in the office — because they enjoy it.

我的意思是，我们的首席财务官在处理这件事——你可以提到办公室里的任何人——因为他们喜欢这样做。

We don’t think we should have a department, you know, for this or that, or the other thing. And I think that’s probably fairly unusual with companies with market caps of close to $200 billion. (Laughs)

我们认为不应该设立一个部门，你知道，专门处理这个或那个，或者其他事情。我觉得这在市值接近 2000 亿美元的公司中可能是相当不寻常的。（笑）

But you’ve seen Marc Hamburg walking around here and doing things. It’s a group effort, and they have — I hope they have — fun doing it, because they sure don’t get a bonus for it. (Laughs)

但你已经看到马克·汉堡在这里四处走动并做事情。这是一个团队的努力，我希望他们在做这件事时能玩得开心，因为他们可没有因此获得奖金。（笑）

But I think it exemplifies the organization. Thank you, I’m sorry to interrupt you, go ahead.

但我认为这体现了组织。谢谢，抱歉打断你，请继续。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That’s OK. Let me share a bit.

观众：没关系。让我分享一下。

I had some trouble getting the annual statement information, so I finally got on the internet and sent in the postcard request a week ago Friday, yesterday, and I got my tickets before the meeting. So it was very well orchestrated.

我在获取年度报表信息时遇到了一些麻烦，所以我终于在上周五上网并发送了请求，昨天我收到了我的门票，在会议之前。所以这一切安排得非常好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Now that you own some rail business, I’d like to have your perspective on whether our country needs a high-speed passenger rail service.

观众成员：既然您拥有一些铁路业务，我想听听您对我们国家是否需要高速客运铁路服务的看法。

And if you think it does, should that be a private or a public endeavor?

如果您认为需要，这应该是私营还是公共的事业？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think by its nature, it would be non-economic when it competes with auto and competes with air. We don’t have the point-to-point density and demand that would produce a return on capital.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我认为从本质上讲，当它与汽车和航空竞争时，它将是非经济性的。我们没有能够产生资本回报的点对点的密度和需求。

That just — that is my guess. I made no big study of it. But all of the times I’ve seen projections of the economics of it, it just doesn’t work that well.

这只是我的猜测。我没有进行深入研究。但我看到的所有经济预测都表明，这并不太奏效。

So it will be — if it gets done — unless it’s heavily subsidized in some way, which means it’s public anyway — I don’t think it will happen under private — it won’t meet the test of private economics.

所以如果完成了——除非以某种方式得到大量补贴，这意味着它无论如何都是公共的——我认为在私营部门是不会发生的——它无法满足私营经济的标准。

Charlie, you know, they’ve got a big proposal in California on this. What do you know about the economics of that?

查理，你知道，他们在加利福尼亚有一个大提案。你对这方面的经济情况了解多少？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I know very little, but I’m at least as dubious as you are.

查理·芒格：嗯，我知道得很少，但我至少和你一样怀疑。

The cost of putting in a high-speed rail system in a place that’s already densely populated is awesomely large. And of course, you’re competing with a system that people prefer.

在一个已经人口稠密的地方建设高速铁路系统的成本非常庞大。当然，你还要与人们更喜欢的系统竞争。

WARREN BUFFETT: They’re talking about in Omaha —

沃伦·巴菲特：他们在谈论奥马哈的情况——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m very skeptical about sticking high-speed rails. I think it’s great in Japan and China.

查理·芒格：我对高速铁路持非常怀疑的态度。我认为在日本和中国很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s working.

沃伦·巴菲特：确实有效。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They have a different calculus.

查理·芒格：他们有不同的计算方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in Japan, But it worked — yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，在日本。不过这是可行的——

CHARLIE MUNGER: But putting high-speed rail into Los Angeles just looks to me like a bottomless pit of cost and trouble. And just think of how difficult that would be.

查理·芒格：但在洛杉矶建设高速铁路在我看来就像是一个无底洞，充满了成本和麻烦。想想这将有多困难。

WARREN BUFFETT: If it’s going to be high-speed, it can’t stop very often, you know, by definition. And it can’t go off into spurs and all of these kind of things.

沃伦·巴菲特：如果是高速铁路，按照定义，它不能经常停车。它不能偏离主线。

So it really gets to point-to-point operation, and the cost gets staggering. There’s talk in Omaha about a trolley system, and I think — they’re talking about, you know, a couple hundred million dollars or something like that from the federal government.

所以这实际上变成了点对点的运营，成本变得惊人。在奥马哈有关于电车系统的讨论，我认为——他们在谈论，您知道的，联邦政府大约几亿美元之类的资金。

And the projections of actual revenue are, as I remember, are something like $400,000, and that’s before operating costs.

实际收入的预测，我记得大约是 40 万美元，这还不包括运营成本。

So the math — you put $200 million into something to move people a few miles in Omaha, and most of the people are going to want to ride their cars. And to have it be efficient it has to be point-to-point, pretty much, for them. I mean, if you start living six blocks one way or eight blocks another way, you say, “Nuts, I’ll take the car.”

所以，数学上——你花2亿美元去做某件事，仅仅是为了在奥马哈几英里内运送人群，而大多数人还是会选择开车。为了实现高效，它必须是点对点的，基本上。我的意思是，如果你住在一个方向六条街或者另一个方向八条街，你就会说，“算了，我还是开车吧。”

The math really gets to be staggering on these things.

这些事情的数学确实是令人震惊的。

And now, you know, everybody figures if you can get the money from the federal government, you know, it doesn’t cost anybody anything. But it would be a lot of money.

现在，大家都认为如果你能从联邦政府那里获得资金，那就不会花费任何人的钱。但这将是一笔巨款。

It’s been done in Buffalo, and people like it. But I’ve also — I’ve requested the figures on it, and it blows your mind, in terms — I mean, you could give everybody a cab ride or something and it’d be cheaper for society as a whole.

这在布法罗已经做过了，人们喜欢它。但我也——我已经请求了相关数据，结果让人震惊——我的意思是，你可以给每个人提供一次出租车服务，这对整个社会来说会更便宜。

So I have a feeling that it works marvelously, maybe, between Tokyo and Yokohama or something. And it really does. And it even works well enough so I think it justifies private investment.

所以我觉得，也许在东京和横滨之间的高速铁路确实运作得很好。它确实如此。甚至运作得好到我认为可以适合私人投资。

But it’s tough in a country of, you know, three million-plus square miles, and within the continental lower 48. It’s very tough to make the math work.

但在一个超过三百万平方英里的国家，尤其是在大陆的 48 个州，情况很艰难。这样的数学运算很难成立。

Now, if people get — it becomes a huge project or something of the government so it isn’t anybody’s math, you know, maybe it’ll happen. I don’t think it’ll ever happen with money that wants a return.

当然，如果人们对此项目产生了巨大兴趣，或者它成为某种政府项目，那么就没有人负责这个数学，或许它会实现。我认为在想要回报的资金支持下，它永远不会实现。

63. We can handle claims from a major earthquake

我们可以处理来自重大地震的索赔。

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This is a question on the insurance portfolio from Jerry Haller (PH).

贝基·奎克：这是来自杰瑞·哈勒（PH）关于保险投资组合的问题。

What would be the impact on insurance companies, and the U.S. economy in general, if an earthquake of the same magnitude that struck Chile were to be focused on Los Angeles or San Francisco?

如果一场与智利相同规模的地震发生在洛杉矶或旧金山，对保险公司和美国经济整体会产生什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know the answer to that. The Richter Scale is not a perfect — it’s far from a perfect — index of the damage caused, even if you tell me where the epicenter will be.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不知道答案。里氏震级并不是一个完美的——远非完美——损害指数，即使你告诉我震中在哪里。

And then you get into the — you know, the big damage in the famous San Francisco quake was the fire following.

然后你就会进入——你知道，著名的旧金山地震造成的大损失是随之而来的火灾。

They call that — when they distinguish between the — what coverages are involved — they call that the “shake and bake.”

他们称之为——当他们区分涉及的保险范围时——他们称之为“摇晃和烘烤”。

I mean, how much is shake and how much is bake afterwards? (Laughter)

我想问，摇晃多少，之后烘烤多少？（笑声）

I think it gets hard to get up — I mean, in a really extreme quake — I think it gets hard to get up much more than 100 billion.

我认为在一次非常强烈的地震中，起床会变得很困难——我想这会比 1000 亿更难起床。

You know, a very big quake — the frequency is way less — but if you get up in the Pacific Northwest, you know, there is a possibility of a very high Richter Scale quake there.

你知道，一个非常大的地震——频率要低得多——但是如果你在太平洋西北地区，你知道，那里的里氏震级可能会非常高。

And of course, the big ones that we know about — I mean, our history doesn’t go back that far — but New Madrid, Missouri, had three quakes in a relatively short period of time that were all well over eight.

当然，我们知道的大地震——我的意思是，我们的历史并没有那么久远——但密苏里州的新马德里在相对较短的时间内发生了三次震级都超过八级的地震。

And that will happen again someday, maybe 500 years, you know, maybe 1,000 years, and maybe tomorrow. That’s what the insurance business is all about.

这一天可能会再发生，也许是 500 年后，也许是 1000 年后，甚至可能是明天。这就是保险行业的全部意义。

I tend to think — and when I think about quake exposure, sort of worst case in California — I think 100 billion is getting up there.

我倾向于认为——当我考虑加利福尼亚的地震暴露时，最坏的情况——我认为 1000 亿美元已经算是一个很高的数字。

Northridge caused far more damage than the one that was up near San Francisco a few years earlier.

诺斯里奇造成的损害远远超过几年前在旧金山附近发生的那次。

But we’ll have them. And Berkshire is totally prepared to handle anything that comes along, even if it’s considerably worse than what I’ve —

但我们会遇到这样的情况。而且伯克希尔完全准备好应对任何突发情况，即使情况比我所经历的要糟得多——

The worst insured loss — I don’t know whether Katrina came in finally at 70 billion or something like that — I think in terms of a 250 billion sort of worst case.

我所知道的最大的保险损失——我不知道卡特里娜最后的损失是不是在700亿美元左右——我认为最坏的情况可能是2500亿美元。

And my guess is if that came along, and we had a normal year and everything else, Berkshire would still have positive earnings of some substantial amount. So we are prepared.

我的猜测是，如果那种情况出现，而我们有一个正常的年份和其他一切，伯克希尔仍然会有相当可观的正收益。所以我们已经做好准备。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and, you know, the big San Francisco quake of whatever it was, ’06, caused a terrible fire. But the recent California quakes, the big ones, have not caused much fire. And a lot of earthquake damage is totally uninsured.

查理·芒格：是的，你知道，旧金山的大地震，是什么时候的，06 年，造成了可怕的火灾。但最近的加州大地震，尤其是大的那些，并没有造成太多火灾。而很多地震造成的损失是完全没有保险的。

So you might have a hell of a lot of damage without massive — Warren would know more about that than I.

所以即使损害很大，也可能没有大规模——沃伦对此了解得更多。

WARREN BUFFETT: So far in Chile —

沃伦·巴菲特：到目前为止在智利——

CHARLIE MUNGER: The earthquake insurance is not universal like fire insurance.

查理·芒格：地震保险不像火灾保险那样普遍。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh no, no, not at all, not at all. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，不，不，完全不是，完全不是。还有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: So it — an earthquake — a really terrible fire, or terrible wind conditions, it seems to me, catch people worse than the earthquakes.

查理·芒格：所以——地震——一场真正可怕的火灾，或者可怕的风灾，在我看来，似乎比地震更能让人措手不及。

WARREN BUFFETT: And so far in Chile, as I understand it — and I could be wrong on this and it may not be the way the final numbers come in — but as the numbers have been coming in, something like 40 percent of it has been the tsunami and 60 percent has been the quake, in terms of damage.

沃伦·巴菲特：到目前为止，在智利，按照我的理解——我可能是错的，最终的数字可能不是这样——但根据目前的数据，损失中大约 40%是由于海啸，60%是由于地震。

But that may well not hold to be — in terms of final figures.

但这在最终数字上可能并不成立。

There will be huge catastrophes from time to time. We’re in a different class, in terms of even being able to handle them.

时不时会发生巨大的灾难。就连应对这些灾难的能力，我们也处于不同的层次。

I mean, we’ve got so much earning power outside of the insurance business that if you take a $250 billion quake, or hurricane, or whatever, and we have, probably now, not much more than 3 percent of that — but call it 4 percent — that’d be $10 billion — and, you know, our pre-tax earnings, in any given year, I would expect would be substantially greater than that.

我的意思是，我们在保险业务之外有如此强大的盈利能力，如果发生 2500 亿美元的地震、飓风或其他灾害，而我们可能现在的承保金额不超过 3%——但算上 4%——那就是 100 亿美元——而且，你知道，我们在任何给定年份的税前收益，我预计会大大超过这个数字。

So we would have other — we have net earnings in a year that every other insurance company, you know, would be gasping. So we’re in pretty good shape on that.

所以我们会有其他——我们每年的净收益是其他保险公司都惊讶的。所以我们在这方面的状况相当不错。

64. “Huge amounts of debt are not going to do us in”

“巨额债务不会让我们垮掉”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3. 沃伦·巴菲特：区域 3。

This is probably the last question, and then we’ll go to the business meeting.

这可能是最后一个问题，然后我们就去商务会议。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Frank Teed and I’m from Arkadelphia, Arkansas.

观众成员：我叫弗兰克·蒂德，来自阿肯色州阿卡德尔菲亚。

This is also an insurance-type question, but I did want to thank Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, the board, and in Arkansas we call them the associates — the managers — for your integrity in running Berkshire Hathaway and dealing fairly with the shareholders. So thank you very much.

这也是一个保险类型的问题，但我想感谢巴菲特先生和芒格先生，以及董事会，在阿肯色州我们称他们为合伙人——管理者——感谢你们在经营伯克希尔哈撒韦和公平对待股东方面的诚信。非常感谢你们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We saw in the credit crisis the gross overuse of credit, which led to the big financial meltdown with the government ultimately stepping in.

观众成员：我们在信贷危机中看到了信贷的严重过度使用，这导致了大规模的金融崩溃，最终政府介入。

Now we see a huge increase in debt in our cities, our states, our countries.

现在我们看到我们城市、州和国家的债务大幅增加。

For Berkshire Hathaway, what could be our exposure on a global financial meltdown? Could there be correlated risk that could get us in trouble?

对于伯克希尔·哈撒韦来说，我们在全球金融崩溃中可能面临什么样的风险？是否存在可能让我们陷入困境的相关风险？

You’ve said we have 40 billion in municipal bond insurance. There’s 8 billion to the states, which I’m not sure exactly if that was a municipal bond.

你说我们有 400 亿美元的市政债券保险。给各州的是 80 亿美元，我不确定这是否是市政债券。

Could a large event cause a large number of losses that was coupled with a decrease in our investments to make an AIG-type situation? Thank you.

一个大型事件是否会导致大量损失，并伴随我们投资的减少，从而造成类似 AIG 的情况？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if you postulate something where there was a total meltdown, and we essentially made the bet in 2008 there would not be.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果假设出现完全崩溃的情况，而我们在2008年基本上做出了不会崩溃的赌注。

It would be unnecessary, but we came close in 2008, and I decided that A) the government could solve the panic that existed, and finally that they would.

这将是多余的，但在2008年我们差点就遇上了，我决定A）政府能够解决当时的恐慌，最后他们会这样做。

There wasn’t any question in my mind they could. The question is, would they get so muddled up, would decision making get paralyzed, would rivalries break out, would, you know, Congress grandstand? All of those sort of things.

我心里没有任何疑问他们能做到。问题是，他们是否会陷入混乱，决策是否会瘫痪，是否会出现竞争，国会会不会做表面功夫？所有这些事情。

And I thought there’d be some of that, but I thought in the end we would do the right thing, which was go all in, which we did.

我以为会有一些这样的情况，但我认为最后我们会做正确的事情，那就是全力以赴，而我们确实做到了。

And that would happen again. So I — if you talk about some massive nuclear, chemical, or biological attack that really does in a very significant proportion of the population or something, you know, who knows what would happen.

这将再次发生。所以我——如果你谈论一些大规模的核、化学或生物攻击，确实会对相当大比例的人口造成影响，或者其他什么事情，你知道，谁知道会发生什么。

But I would say this, that I think Berkshire can withstand anything that any corporation can.

但我想说的是，我认为伯克希尔能够承受任何公司所能承受的任何事情。

And it won’t be our insurance business that causes a problem. If something extraordinary happens — and I don’t anticipate that at all — but there could be a situation where the world becomes paralyzed.

而造成问题的不会是我们的保险业务。如果发生一些非凡的事情——我完全不预期会发生——但可能会出现一个世界瘫痪的情况。

But I think that having gone through 2008, I think that our government probably better understands the necessity of taking massive action at a time like that.

但我认为经历了 2008 年，我们的政府可能更好地理解在那样的时刻采取大规模行动的必要性。

Doing whatever is necessary — when the guaranteed money market funds, when the guaranteed commercial paper — I mean, when there are things like that, you know, they were sort of unprecedented, and they did them very quickly.

做任何必要的事情——当有保证的货币市场基金，当有保证的商业票据——我的意思是，当有这样的事情时，你知道，它们是前所未有的，而且他们做得非常迅速。

They’d do it again, in my view. There is no reason — the plants of the country don’t disappear, the land doesn’t become less fertile, you know, people don’t become less innovative — things will work unless somehow the gears get all entirely messed up. And I don’t see that happening.

在我看来，他们会再这样做。没有理由——这个国家的植物不会消失，土地不会变得不肥沃，你知道，人们不会变得不具创新能力——事情会运作，除非某种方式让所有的齿轮完全搞乱。而我看不到这种情况发生。

Berkshire, from any insurance catastrophe — and you’re right that things correlate on the downside — when things are bad in one area, they really do spread to another.

伯克希尔，来自任何保险灾难——你说得对，事情在下行时确实相关——当某个领域出现问题时，它们确实会蔓延到其他领域。

But we were built, I think, to withstand anything that — other than a total sort of wipe out of the world. That isn’t going to happen.

但我认为我们是被造来承受任何事情的——除了世界的彻底毁灭。这是不会发生的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m not worried about it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我对此不担心。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Huge amounts of debt are not going to do us in. That’s one thing I can guarantee you.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。巨额债务不会让我们垮掉。这是我可以保证的一件事。

I can’t tell you about comets hitting us or something of that sort, but I don’t care how silly governments get in terms of finance, or corporations get, or anything of that sort, that will not harm Berkshire.

我不能告诉你彗星撞击我们或类似的事情，但我不在乎政府在财政方面变得多么愚蠢，或者公司变得多么愚蠢，或者类似的事情，这不会对伯克希尔造成伤害。

I want to thank you all for coming. Charlie and I really appreciate it. (Applause) And thank you.

我想感谢大家的到来。查理和我非常感激。（掌声）谢谢你们。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Thank you. (Applause)

查理·芒格：谢谢。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. I appreciate it, we appreciate that, I’m sure the panel does.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。我很感激，我们都很感激，我相信小组也一样。

Now we’ll break for about five minutes. Some of you can go shop and some of you will want to stay around for the business meeting, and we’ll start the business meeting in five minutes and we’ll see how long it takes.

现在我们将休息大约五分钟。你们中的一些人可以去购物，而有些人可能想留下来参加商务会议，我们将在五分钟后开始商务会议，看看需要多长时间。

65. Berkshire business meeting begins

伯克希尔商业会议开始

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. I’ve already introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我已经介绍了伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事们。

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire.

今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，他们是我们的审计师。他们可以回答您可能对他们公司对伯克希尔账户审计的相关问题。

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of proceedings.

福雷斯特·克鲁特先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将对会议进行书面记录。

Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting, and she will certify to the count of votes casts in the election of directors.

贝基·阿米克小姐已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将对董事选举中投票的计数进行认证。

The main proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的主要代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting?

秘书是否有关于伯克希尔流通股份数量、投票权和出席会议的报告？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 3, 2010, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,029,738 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 926,013,086 of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one ten-thousandth of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

福雷斯特·克鲁特：是的，我知道。正如 2010 年 3 月 3 日发送给所有记录在案的股东的会议通知中所附的委托书声明所示，该会议的记录日期为 2010 年 3 月 3 日，届时共有 1,029,738 股 A 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有一票投票权；同时，B 类伯克希尔·哈撒韦普通股在外流通 926,013,086 股，每股在会议上对所考虑的动议有万分之一票的投票权。

Of that number, 705,611 Class A shares and 566,627,821 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 29th.

在这个数字中，705,611 股 A 类股份和 566,627,821 股 B 类股份通过截至 4 月 29 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott who will place the motion before the meeting.

会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请沃尔特·斯科特先生提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last annual meeting of the shareholders and the special meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略对上次股东年会和特别股东会议记录的阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions?

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并获得支持。有没有任何评论或问题？

We will vote on this motion by voice vote. All of those in favor say aye.

我们将通过口头表决对这一提案进行投票。所有赞成者请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion’s carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：反对？提案通过。

66. Election of Berkshire directors

伯克希尔董事的选举

WARREN BUFFETT: Second item of business is to elect directors. The shareholders present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so.

沃伦·巴菲特：第二项议程是选举董事。出席的股东如果希望撤回之前发送的代理投票，并亲自投票选举董事，可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so.

此外，如果在场的任何股东尚未提交委托书并希望亲自投票，您可以这样做。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so that we may distribute them?

如果您希望这样做，请在过道上向会议工作人员表明您的身份，他们将为您提供选票。请那些需要选票的人表明身份，以便我们可以分发选票。

I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to the election of directors.

我现在承认沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并第二次提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? Nominations are ready to be voted upon.

还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？提名已经准备好投票。

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections.

如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举上标记他们的选票，并允许将选票交给选举监察员。

Miss Amick, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以开始您的报告。

BETSY AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 756,041 votes for each nominee.

贝茜·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票，根据上周四晚上收到的代理投票，为每位提名人投出了不少于 756,041 票。

That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

该数字远远超过所有已发行的 A 类和 B 类股份的总投票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as any cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律，投票的确切计数所需的认证，包括在本次会议上由代理持有人根据所交付的代理投票所投的额外票数，以及在本次会议上亲自投的票数，将交给秘书，并与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。

Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Donald Keough, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, and Walter Scott have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、唐纳德·基欧、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特已被选为董事。

67. Business meeting adjourns

商务会议休会

WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们休会之前，还有人要在这个会议上提出其他事务吗？

If not, I recognize Mr. Scott to place a motion before the meeting.

如果没有，我请斯科特先生在会议上提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move this meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Second? 沃伦·巴菲特：第二？

VOICE: I second the motion.

我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say aye.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成者请说“是”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

2010-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2010-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Opening remarks

2. Board of directors introduced

3. Some recovery for “sputtering” economy

4. Panel of journalists introduced

5. To be deleted

6. Buffett strongly defends Goldman Sachs

7. Munger: “I would make Paul Volcker look like a sissy”

8. We shouldn’t have to collateralize previous deals

9. Greek debt crisis: “I don’t know how this movie ends”

10. Did Goldman need to disclose SEC notice?

11. Driver feedback technology

12. Berkshire shares not affected by Buffett’s donations

13. Buffett: “I would not run from the United States”

14. No rush to find new investment chief

15. Good, but not brilliant, returns for businesses needing capital

16. Making loans vs. buying stock in credit crisis

17. Creating a good corporate culture is easier than changing a bad one

18. Ajit Jain can’t be replaced

19. Opportunities in India, but government paralysis is a deterrent

20. “Prospects for significant inflation have increased”

21. Munger: McDonald’s is better educator than universities

22. Giving away everything is a “terrific tax dodge”

23. The best defense against inflation

24. Problems at NetJets

25. BYD investment shows the “old men” are still learning

26. Why we will never hire a compensation consultant

27. “We won’t trade reputation for money”

28. BNSF has benefitted from good regulations

29. “Lumpy” earnings as competitive advantage

30. “Gambling” with derivatives

31. Buffett is losing his bet against hedge funds

32. Speak out, but speak responsibly

33. Why there’s no synergy among subsidiaries

34. Act as if “you were an owner of the place”

35. Retained earnings, present value, and dividends

36. Safety net needed for the unemployed, but Berkshire isn’t it

37. Why GEICO isn’t looking at China or India

38. China’s economic growth is “fun” to watch

39. Why Buffett addresses the annual report to his two sisters

40. Munger endorses Roth IRAs

41. Newspapers are losing ground in battle with internet

42. There will “always be opportunities to overperform”

43. Municipal bond insurers must worry about contagion

44. Short-term stock moves aren’t predictable and don’t matter

45. Why we don’t use bond rating agencies

46. World will find a solution when oil “windfall” gives out

47. Buffett doesn’t like Kraft’s purchase of Cadbury

48. Biggest threat to integrity: “everyone else is doing it”

49. Can’t make money if you’re scared when everyone else is scared

50. Munger is “enormously optimistic” about solar power

51. No “exploding bananas” now in our stock portfolio

52. “If I can be optimistic when I’m nearly dead, surely the rest of you can handle a little inflation”

53. Why Buffett prefers TV interviews

54. How Berkshire gets loyal shareholders

55. Low interest rates are hurting people scared out of stocks

56. Valuing businesses by asking questions

57. Companies with the best return on capital

58. Phone hasn’t been ringing, but we’re still ready to buy

59. Big question for Berkshire’s future

60. “Find your passion, and then don’t let anything stop you”

61. Munger’s fundamental algorithm of life

62. Private high-speed passenger trains aren’t economic

63. We can handle claims from a major earthquake

64. “Huge amounts of debt are not going to do us in”

65. Berkshire business meeting begins

66. Election of Berkshire directors

67. Business meeting adjourns

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